(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

Y l.l/2:Serial 13763 

United States Congressional.., 




BOSTC 

pijp,: 

j um. 




■A. 



-'"-.nc,.,. 



°^'^a€|^*«S 



ut./^ 






? '.>/ _ 



1990 

■^ U^i^ -■■■ ■ ' I 



100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 22 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13763 



United States Government Printing Office 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report .of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 22 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987.— Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987.— Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnittd States Senate 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 

ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 
available. 



Sincerely, 




ij (AuL 



Warren B. Rudman V^^ 
Vice Chairman 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON. DC 20515 

(202) 225-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr . Speaker : 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified fa?->xelease to the public. 




Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Ken- 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence/Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Ray nor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 

Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 

Senator Cohen 

Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard Cullen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, III 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



♦The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratciiff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority' Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis, 

ni 

Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Tray lor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
G. R. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mieike 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courter 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Doman 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 22 



Preface ., XXI 

Raymond, Walter, Jr 1 

Regan, Donald T 521 

Reich, Otto J 716 

Revell, Oliver B 857 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman) 

Reynolds, William B 1051 



XIII 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez, Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Volume 3 



Armitage, Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Bamett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF. 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagett, C. Thomas, Jr. 

Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke, George. 

Clarridge, Dewey R. 

Cline, Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier, George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig P. 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford, Susan. 
Crowe, Adm. William J. 
Currier, Kevin W. 
DCM, Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC". 



Duemling, Robert W. 
DIA Major. 
Dietel, J. Edwin. 
Dowling, Father Thomas. 
Dutton, Robert C. 
Earl, Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber, Jacob. 
Feldman, Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor, Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffhey, Henry (With Glenn A. Rudd). 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D. 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus, Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt, Nelson Bunker. 
Ikle, Fred C. 
Jensen, D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward S. 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly, John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn, John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., Jr. 
Ledeen, Michael A. 



Leiwant, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald, John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



McMahon, John N. 
McMahon, Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese, Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 15 



Volume 16 



Volume 17 



Volume 18 



XVIII 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhome A. 
Mulligan, David R 
Nagy, Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., 11. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, Jr. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revell, Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson, John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinette, Glenn A, 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Roseman, David. 



XIX 



Rosenblatt, William. 

Royer, Larry. 

Rudd, Glenn A. 

Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney). 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo, Vincent M. 
Sanchez, Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer, Robert L. 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley, Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H., IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack T. 
Teicher, Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman, Jacqueline. 



Volume 24 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

TuU, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., IIL 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses— or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses— could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits— documentary evidence— were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



XXIII 



SYBNOGRAPHIC MINUTBS 
UnrcTiaHl and Docdlted 
Mot for Qootatkn or 
DapUcatka 



^i'^ciASSir.Po 



r 



CoHBiittee Heartufi 




iftt* 



JJ3, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



0^ 







w 



oopv Na 



a^^ 



AF. 



XOPIB 



OWIO or THB CLBK 

Oan o< OOcUl Sapart«a 



UNCLASSIFJEO 



KAME: HIRaUSOOO 



UNvLAba-S -^-^^' PAGE 



RPTS MAZUR 
DCMM DONOCK 

DEPOSITIOK OF WALTER RAYMOND, JR. 

Thursday, September 3, 1987 

House of Representatives, 
Select Committee on Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 

The select committee met, pursuant to call, at 2-00 p.m. 
in Room 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Spencer Oliver 
(Associate Counsel to the House Select Committee] presiding. 
^\So Present: on behalf of the House Select Committee: Thomas 
Fryman, Staff Counsel; Kenneth R. Buck, Assistant Minority 
Counsel; Richard J. Leon, Deputy Chief Hlnority Counsel; and 

On bahaii of the Senate Select Committee: Henry J. Flynn. 
i< i i i 1 B ill L HanMUna, Investigator^. 

On behalf of the Witness: C. Dean HcGrath, Jr., Associate 
Counsel to the President. 

Also Present: Robert H. Cooksey. Notary. 









NAHE: 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
MO 
(t1 
U2 
143 
(4(4 
45 
146 

148 
149 



HIR2146000 



UMCLASS.-r:;:D 



PAGE 



Whereupon, 

WALTER RAYMOND, JR. 
was called ior as a witness and, after having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 

HR. OLIVER: Mr. Raymond, w« will take this 
deposition today on an unclassified basis, since the 
reporter does not have a security clearance. In the event 
that any questions are asked to which the answers would 
require the divulgence of classified material, if you would 
just note that those matters are classified, and we will go 
on to the next question and deal with that at another time. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
EXAMINATION OH BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 First, Mr. Raymond, could you tell us what is your 
present position? 

A My present position is Assistant Director of USIA. 
2 And could you tell us briefly on the record your 
background and where you were born, your education and other 
government service or other jobs prior to coming to the--to 
your present position? 
A All right. 

I was born in New York, 1929, grew up in the north 
and the south, went to William--sorry , College of William and 
Mary, bachelor's degree in 1950, history, government. Yale 



NAME: 
50 
51 
52 
S3 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 

614 

65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
7 1 
72 
73 
74 



HIR2U6000 



WfCLASSir" 






PAGE 



University, master's degree in international aifairs, 1951, 
and then military service in the Army, and followed that 
with government service, where I have--where I have been ever 
since . 

So, in effect. I have been on active duty with the 
Army or with one part of the government or another for 35 
years . 

a When did you begin your employment at the White 
House? 

A July--I believe July 12. 1982. 

2 And what was your position at that time? 

A At that tine, I was the Senior Director for 
Intelligence Programs. I might point out just for the 
record, I was also at the White House in 1961 for siK months 
when we established the Situation Room. 

2 Who did you report to and who was--what was the chain 
of command m your position, both before you and below you 
in that position? 

A In 1'982, Bill Clark was the National Security 
Adviser, and he was my principal supervisor. The chain of 
command was from Bill ClarK to Bud ncFarlane. At that 
stage, I think John Poindexter was just coming on line as 
sort of number three, but it worked as a team. 

2 Ura-hum. 

A And when we communicated in almost all cases, the 



mm 



MAIIE 
75 
76 
11 
78 
19 
80 
81 
82 
83 

85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 

914 

95 
96 
97 
98 
99 



ma 



HIR2U6000 ~ "'^^i'%\^\^^f Uk\ r- PAGE M 

coraraunicatio/i would be to Mr. Clark, but it would go through 
sone of these other gentlemen. 

8 In other words, you would send a memorandum directly 
to Mr. Clark, but with copies to these other people and go 
through a clearance procedure . 

A Right. You mentioned who else was in my ofiice at 
that time. I had two other officers. Ken DeGr af f enreid and 
Bill Rye. 

2 And they were your deputies? 

A Well, everybody--yes , in a sense, we all--I was the 
senior officer and they were junior to me. 

2 And what were your responsibilities in that 
position? 

A Well, for the first few months--and I was only in 
that office for a few months--the principal responsibility in 
that office was to look at the intelligence community apart 
from the standpoint of its production or from the standpoint 
of its resources, its programs, its general activities. 
That was basically-- 

2 For a particular purpose, or just to--report to the 
White House about what they were doing? 

A Well, you know, it would break down. There were a 
lot of certain specific committees that existed. If I can 
refresh my memory now. They were part of the same process, 
SIG/I, Senior Interagency Group/Intelligence--and I--one or 



UHCl^ic 



^NCUSS 



ifLjci) 



PAGE 



NAHE: HiRaueooo 

100 the other of us would attend these various meetings ii staff 

1 1 was required . 

102 Now, a lx>t of this was done by principals and didn't 

103 involve staff and with only three people, you can do only so 
lOU much. Colonel Rye was principally looking at the Air Force 

105 and space systems--worked very closely anong other things 

106 with NASA, so DeGraf f enreid and I looked at other problens, 

107 production and programs, which would mean some budget, which 

108 would mean some sufficiency of programming, some-- 

109 Q For all the elements of it in various agencies in 

110 the government. 

111 A Right. 

112 . 2 So, did you make any recommendations--did you do a 

113 report when you say you looked over--were you looking at it 
IIU for the purpose of evaluating it or making a report as to 
lis how it could work better? 

116 . A Well, this takes some--I have been so far removed 

117 from all this for almost five years that it takes some 

118 thinking. There is a body that is slipping my mind, but it 

119 was an interagency body that looked at questions and worked 

120 closely with the intelligence staff, and John McKahon, as I 

121 recall, was--chaired most of those meetings, and this 

122 uas--this got into the range of whether one's intelligence 

123 collection systems and detection and verification and things 
1214 like this, which I can't get into in an unclassified basis. 



UMCLASSr; 



NAME: HIR2U6000 



(iNCLASSIr;s 



125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
1 31 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 

mo 
m 1 

142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 



but can make allusion to, is whether we had the right amount 
of coverage, and ue spent a lot of time on that. 

We spent time on trying to make a judgment of 
whether the analytical elements of the community were 
functioning, and how they interrelated. Ue scrubbed at the 
priorities of collection, the requirements process, were 
they adequate, were they comprehensive, were the priorities 
properly established, and we had responsibilities for 
overviewing other kinds of programs, including covert action 
programs . 

We were--including counterintelligence programs. If 
you look generioally at the elements of intelligence, were 
the disciplines, human intelligence, various types of 
technical systems, some of which are related to HS», you 
have to look at that as a body and that is what we did. 

With three people, you can't go too much 
beyond--beyond serving as a broker, pulling people, pulling 
papers together and trying to see the communities coming 
together with the right focus. 

2 You stated you only stayed in that job for a few 
months. What happened then? 

A In July 1983, there was a reorganization of the 
National Security Council under Bill Clark, and he 
established several new offices. I was assigned a position 
as the Senior Director of — International Director of 






l/NCLJlSSi'f^EO 



NAME- HIRaySOOO - - "-- ^« ■<t^l^f f i LfS PAGE 

150 Communications, and concurrently with the title Special 

151 Assistant to the President, and that was in June or July of 

152 1983. 

153 S So that was a promotion? 

154 A I--yes. 

155 2 I mean, the title of Special Assistant to the 

156 President moves it up a notch. 

157 A Oh, you are right. 

1 58 . 2 Was that at your request? Did you recommend the 

159 creation of that entity within the HSC? 

160 A Hell, I had--I had been emphasizing to Bill Clark for 

16 1 a number of months that it was consistent with the 

162 President's program as articulated in June 1982 at_ 

163 Westminster in London. -that we had quite a challenge, and 
16U simply stated, was to fight the war of ideas and build the 

165 infrastructure of democracy as you and I know it, and I made 

166 the point, and I don't want it to sound as if I were the 

167 single person doing this. Many fine people were talking 

168 along the same lines, including Congressman Fascell. 

169 . I made the point that wa were not configured 

170 .effectively to deal with the war of ideas, and to deal with 

17 1 building infrastructure of democracy. We did not have 

172 enough emphasis on that within the United States Government. 

173 We did not have an effective way to reach out to various 
17^ elements of our society and work with them and help assist 



UNCLA3S;?:iS 



NAME: HIR2U6000 



mc 



^CIASSfRED 



PAGE 



8 



175 
176 
V77 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
18>4 
185 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
19 1 
192 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
198 
199 



them to be involved internationally and, last analysis, ue 
also needed to try to encourage the private sector to be 
more active . 

This is hard to do for the government, but if you 
take a look at the amount of money that uas given for 
international programs by some of the principal foundations 
in 1961, and you see 25-28 percent of their budget went to 
international programs, and you see about M or S percent of 
their budget goes to international programs a couple of 
years later, you have a problem, and that is that ue were 
not engaged. 

It uas a function of a lot of things . It was a 
function of Vietnam, it uas the function of--a challenging 
internal agenda which resulted in a number of racial 
disturbances in the sixties, it uas the result of Watergate, 
it was turning inward. 

We needed to re-engage and ue talked about this, a 
number of us. The President's speech set the tone, but we 
had to translate that into some form of action. I think to 
some degree the creation of that office was Bill Clark's — uas 
a step by Bill Clark to try to help us move towards 
categorizing at least the governmental bureaucracy to meet 
some of those challenges. 

2 Did you write a paper recommending that that ae 
approved? 



UNCLA3SiF:i^D 



10 



N&nE : 
200 
201 
202 
203 
20M 
205 
206 
207 
208 
209 
210 
21 1 
2 12 
2 13 
2 1U 
215 
216 
217 
218 
219 
220 
221 
222 
223 
22(4 



unclassif:£d 



HIR2M6000 I JMi:i UXXIlJ-. r 11 PAGE 9 

A No, ue talked repeatedly about it in the aftermath 
of the June 1982 speech, and some of us who had been 
involved one way or another in the June 1982 speech, uhich 
includes people like Mike Palmer. Larry Eagleburger and 
o thers--talked about it. 

I don't happen to remember where it was one seminal 
paper, but the organizational family that tried to deal with 
these things was the NSDO-77, which was promulgated in 
January '83, which was designed to give us a governmental 
structure . 

Then we tried to develop a democracy program as an 
analog to provide some governmental funding to deal with the 
programs we are trying to develop. 

2 So, you created this new division. How big a staff 
did you have in this--in your new position? 

A When we started, I had one person and when I 
finished, I had two people--fouc years later. That is what 
is known as having to depend in large part on the 
bureaucracy through the job, and again goes back to what the 
NSC should be doing, and that is helping coordinate and in 
some cases stimulate, but to look at where problems are, and 
where possible policy is needed to try to make the system 
work. 

2 And who were your staff people? Hho was your first 
staff person — 



UNCLASSIFIED 



11 



NAME : 
225 
226 
227 
228 
229 
230 
231 
232 
233 
23U 
235 
236 
237 
238 
239 
2U0 
2U1 
2U2 
2*«3 
2U>4 
2U5 
2U6 
247 
248 
249 



^OLASSir^L,^ '. 



HIR2U6000 iJl'3«.J'|SL?^-^n j'<r IT ^1 PAGE 10 

A I inherited Caty Lord, who was actually leaving the 
KSC about that time; Steve Steiner replaced him. Steiner 
remained with me until a couple oi years, when he got pulled 
off to work full-time on public diplomacy issues related to 
arras control, at which point I brought Judy Kandel. M-a-n-d- 
e-1. over from State. She was there and--about six months 
before I left--even less, maybe three or four months. I had 
another chap join me, Mike Castine, C-a-s-t-i-n-e . 

Q And what--how was this organized in terns of its 
relationship with the other agencies of the Federal 
Government? As a new entity, I would assume you had to set 
up some new interagency groups of-- 

A That was spelled out in--in the MSDD-77, which I 
presume is a matter of record somewhere. If not, we can 
obviously make it available. It is unclassified. 
Essentially, what we did is--first of all, we spent some time 
figuring out what would be the right approach. 

We looked at some of the historical precedents. We 
looked at OCB. Operations Coordinating Board. We looked at 
that model in the early sixties, felt that that probably was 
too comprehensive to take on at that point, so we looked at 
other models, and we came up with a plan to bring together a 
steering group under the direction of the MASA Security 
Adviser, Bill Clark, and around the table five other 
principals. Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, 



UNCLASSIF'.ED 



12 



unclass!f:ld 



NAHE' HIRaueOOO %^l«^#lBri«^^liB Lltak' pAGE 11 

250 Director of USIA, Administrator of AID, and the President's 

251 Communications Coordinator; I think Chief of Communications. 

252 Now. that meant specifically when ue had our first 

253 SPG meeting, as it was called. Special Planning Group, in 
25'4 early 1983, that would be the Cabinet principals' place; 

255 Dave Gergen, who at that time was the Communications 

256 Coordinator. This group provided overall guidance. 

257 . There were f our--committees which were established 

258 with different functional responsibilities. 

259 S Excuse me. They didn't meet at this level, though. 

260 You are talking about representatives of the Secretary of 

261 State and Secretary of Defense, aren't you, or did they 

262 actually meet at the-- 

263 A Secretary Weinberger and Director Witt came to all 
26M the meetings. Peter HcPherson came to some, or he sent his 

265 deputy. I think Secretary Shultz only came--I am not sure if 

266 Secretary Shultz came. I know the Deputy Secretary came 

267 once, and I know that Larry Eaglebutger came regularly, so 

268 there was one sort of one step down there. I don't know 

269 whether I an going into too much detail for you. 

270 ' . 2 No , please . 

27 1 . A The committees were very important, and a lot of work 

272 was done in the name of the SPG, and that is a point which 

273 we can deal with later, because it does cause confusion, and 
27>4 that is that the National Security Adviser was concurrently 



uNCLASS.prsia 



13 



NAME : 
275 
276 

• 277 
278 
279 
280 
281 
282 
283 
28'4 
285 
286 
287 
288 
289 
290 
291 
292 
293 
294 
295 
296 
297 
298 
299 



HIR2U6000 ^^^ Wiir^^j'^- 



: 4" '■•■' '■ 



PAGE 12 

' -• <~ ■■■-. \J 

the--the head of the SPG. 

Now, specifically, the committees, the International 
Political Committee was chaired most of the time by the 
Undei Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and in his 
absence usually by his deputy. Ambassador Gerald Helman. 
This group largely focused on democracy-building programs. 
They would be the kind of group in contemporary terms that 
would be looking at the problem in Haiti, the problems in 
Chile, possibly the program in South Korea, or the things 
that are to be done constructively to help facilitate the 
electoral process as the country emerges from an 
authoritarian or totalitarian state to a democracy. 

The International Information Committee was chaired 
by the Deputy Director of USIA, and it dealt, as the name 
describes, with a whole raft of informational issues, 
including public diplomacy, action plans for specific 
themes, maybe Afghan--the commemoration of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. 

He might have a worldwide plan or might be a 
program--something about Soviet disinformation, or arms 
control and so on. 

The International Broadcasting Committee was 
initially chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs. But after tha--but over a 
period of time, I think by about 1984. I was asked to assume 



UNCLASSIFIED 



14 



NAME ■■ 
300 
301 
302 
303 
3014 
305 
306 
307 
308 
309 
310 
31 1 
312 
313 
314 
315 
316 
317 
318 
319 
320 
321 
322 
323 
32U 



UNCUSSSFt'ED 



HiR2i4eooo UlltJl.M.'^.'^Stf' Ulr kl page 13 
that chairmanship by the Director of--by the head of the SPG, 
so I served for the last two or three years as the head of 
the International Broadcasting Coraniittee. 

Q But at first, it uas-- 

A First uas by-- 

2 --Bud and John Poindexter . 

A Yes. and then briefly it was Don Fortier. 

2 Bud McFarlane-- 

A Uas first, John, and then Don. And I did it, and it 
uas consistent with my--basically my responsibilities in the 
KSC, and ue were lacking at such questions as the VOA 
modernization, RFE/RL modernization, possible uses of direct 
broadcast by satellite, television. Radio Harti, just to 
name a feu. 

The fourth committee uas the Committee on Public 
Affairs. It uas initially co-chaired by--Dave Gergen and Bud 
McFarlane, and rather quickly moved down to the number tuos 
in the press office, which in the HSC--press man, so there 
have been a lot of changes there, but it was Bob Sims at one 
point, Ed Djerejian at another point--D- j-e-r-e- j-i-a-n--but a 
number of people, but principally uas the pressman for the 
NSC with the number two person in the Hhlte House press 
office/ and they would co-chait for the purposes of looking 
at key press issues that were coming up, and seeing to it 
that the press spokesman and State and Defense principally. 



UNCLASSiFSiit) 



15 



NAKE: 
325 
326 
327 
328 
329 
330 
331 
332 
333 
33M 
335 
336 
337 
338 
339 
3140 
341 
3U2 
343 
344 
345 
346 
347 
348 
349 



UMCLASS^fi:k:& "< 



HIR246000 W 2'3 i*E_ f^o"^."^ 1 t" •■ '.' .^ PAGE 14 
and White House and NSC were all basically saying the same 
thing on the one hand, and also engaging in some short-terra 
planning for the next week or two. 

That committee stopped meeting formally after a 
couple of years, and it has been replaced by a weekly 
meeting of the press spokesman of the principal agency and 
departments without staff, and then they go back and so, it 
is a five or six-person meeting, and they go back and report 
and follow up. 

Also, ue found out, in the case of press that we 
could do the job just about as well by having a 
teleconference every morning at 11=00, and get the positions 
integrated . 

2 How often did these committees meet? Once a week? 

A The committees met very erratically, in the sense 
that it wasn't a precise time for each meeting. In the case 
of the lie, we started meeting every two weeks, and we 
settled into model meetings. 

In the case of IPC, we tried to be sure that the 
meeting — with a fair amount of regularity, but we were 
basically responding to problems, so sometimes it was 
regularly and sometimes not particularly regularly. We 
could go two or three months without a meeting and then have 
three or four meetings in a month, depending on the issues 
that required that kind of focus. 



1>NCIASSIFl"£D 



16 



NAME ■■ 
350 
351 
352 
353 
354 
355 
356 
357 
358 
359 
360 

36 1 
362 
363 
364 
365 
366 
367 
368 
369 
370 

37 1 
372 
373 
37t» 






HIR2'*6000 ^-' ... Si,; ■• •- J . PAGE IS 

The IPC met when it had a decent agenda, so we met 
every two or three months. What we did to see to it that it 
worked effectively was that we created, in effect, an ad hoc 
executive committee, called an SPG Executive Committee, 
which I chaired, which met in my office, and for the first 
three years--well, for the first two or three years. I should 
say, we met every week. 

After that, we met every two weeks, and that would 
be made up of either the chair or his designee for each of 
the major committees, and that permitted us to do a lot of 
work with the network that had already been created in the 
government . 

For example, Jerry Helman would frequently go back 
and have meetings, interagency meetings following up on some 
of our issues. He would also frequently proceed--precede 
meetings that we would have with his own meetings, and he 
would then share the results of those meetings with us . 

e Those met weekly? 

A Yeah. 

2 On what day? Has it a regular day? 
. . A Yeah--f irstly , it was a regular day. I don't 
remember specifically because from tine to tine we would 
change it around, but it was a regular day. 

2 And that net up until when? Up until the tine-- 

A I would think up until early 1986, we thought that 



UNCL 






17 



NAME ■■ 
375 
376 
377 
378 
379 
380 
381 
382 
383 
38U 
385 
386 
387 
388 
389 
390 
39 1 
392 
393 
39U 
395 
396 
397 
398 
399 



UNCLASS!?: 



r 1 " 



HIR246000 *# 118 ''^ Ho ri \Jf W ki J L ix fe^ PAGE 16 
perhaps it might be more eiiicient if we just net every two 
ueeks , but it did meet virtually every week for the first 
couple of years . 

Part of this is to energize the system, and that is 
uhat ue are trying to Keep going. 

2 So, who would attend those meetings on a regular 
basis ? 

A The main team would be myself; from AID under the 
current terms it would be the Assistant Administrator for 
Policy, Rich Bissel; from State, it would be the Deputy to 
the Under Secretary, Jerry Helman; from USIA, it would be 
Michael Schneider, who was the Deputy Associate Director of 
Policy and Programs; and from Defense, it would be Craig 
Alterman, Deputy to the Under Secretary of Policy and/or his 
Public Diplomacy Coordinator, Irwin Kern. 

2 Who would it have been in 1985 in those positions? 

A Well — 

2 Would it have been Helman? 

A Yes, Helman at State; Schneider would have been 
USIA--I think the only difference would be the question of 
AID and probably, we were in a transition period therfc--for a 
while, Kate Summerad sat in. She actually had public 
relations in AID. We didn't have — the best person we have 
had on that team has been Rich Bissel, who understands the 
concepts of nation-building and constitution-building. 



mtm 



18 



i']-rn. ! 



NAME: 

uoo 

U01 
"402 
"403 
UOU 
405 
(406 
1407 
U08 
1409 
410 

m 1 

14 12 
1413 
14114 

ms 

1416 
14 17 
14 18 
419 
420 
421 
422 
423 
424 



^C???^ 



HIR246000 . PAGE 17 

The AID presentation was better when we brought the 
Associate Director or Assistant Director--start again. 
Assistant Administrator for Policy. When ue had the person 
from the Public Affairs Office, it was not as--it was not a 
good access point to AID as having Mr# . Bissel. 

2 Mho else from the NSC attended? 

A Rarely anybody else. There are, as I alluded a 
little bit back, there were sometimes special programs such 
as the arms control under Steve Steiner. I tried to have 
him Come as often as he could, so ha could share some of the 
results of his work with our group. But ha had a very 
effective interagency group with representation from all the 
concerned departments and agencies. And he would share the 
results of this meeting--his meetings very regularly with me 
and with the NSC front office, so we were monitoring his 
activity very closely, but it was operating on a somewhat 
parallel track. 

There were, over periods of time, as you know, 
special public diplomacy coordinators which were 
established, and sometimes the SPG Ex-Com worked closely 
with them, and sometimes they did not, so--for example, when 
Peter Dailey was sent up to help at the direct request of 
the President, and Bill Clark in 1983 to facilitate popular 
acceptance of the INF missiles in Europe-- 

2 When you say he was sent up, what do you mean? 






ir^ 



19 



NAHE: 
U2S 
U26 
427 
428 
429 
430 
431 
432 
433 
434 
435 
436 
437 
438 
439 
440 
44 1 
442 
443 
444 
445 
446 
447 
448 
449 






HIR246000 U l»lLlf3_;-«e.'^._^fj . .,. PAGE 18 

A He was asked by the President to coordinate a public 
diplomacy eiiort on the INF question, and he worked at State 
and worked closely with the Secretary, but he reported back 
to the SPG. This was--at a SPG meeting, it was recognized 
that ue needed to have a special effort to be able to ensure 
European acceptance of placement of the weapons systems, so 
we--after talks between Bill Clark with whatever hat you want 
to describe, the head of the SPG or as National Security 
Adviser, it was felt that one had to make a special effort 
to try to extend then our case to the Europeans . 

2 Has he a full-time government employee at that 
point? 

A He was . 

2 Did he have the rank of Ambassador? 

A He did. 

2 But it was not a position that required 
confirmation. It was just a title or was he confirmed? 

A No, he was our Ambassador to Ireland, and we brought 
him back for two months . 

2 You brought him back for two months in 1983? 

A Um-hum. 

2 To set up and coordinate this program related to 



INF. 



A Right. 

2 And he sat in on the ad hoc Ex-Corn at that point? 






20 



1 



NAME: 
(450 
USI 
452 
453 
454 
455 
456 
457 
458 
459 
460 
461 
462 
463 
464 
465 
466 
467 
468 
469 
470 
47 1 
472 
473 
474 



HIR246000 



L-NCLASf:' 



PAGE 



19 



A No, he didn't sit in on the Ex-Cora. The Ex-Con was, 
you know, going along doing its business, and when a special 
program like the INF got started, it basically did not 
report through the Ex-Cora. It reported to Bill Clark or to 
the chairman of the SPG through established processes. 

2 When you became a Special Assistant to the 
President, as well as your other titles, did you also report 
in another chain of command to the Chief of Staff of the 
White House? 

A No . 

2 You always reported through the NSC hierarchy. 

A Absolutely. 

Q When the--when these groups were set up within the 
various agencies--f or instance, the Office of Latin American 
Public Diplomacy in the White House, did they report to this 
SPG also? 

A Well — 

2 LPD in the State Department? 

A LPD was set up in 1983 at the request of--on the 
basis of a neno from Bill Clark--signed for the President to 
-the Secretary of State, in fact, to all members of the SPG, 
and the forner Senator, Richard Stone, was naned at that 
time as the head of this special public diplomacy group for 
Central America, and while cited in the Department of State 
and with a very rudimentary team, he would report to the 



UNCLASS 



» 7« f. '"' ""^^ 



21 



NAME : 
475 
476 
477 
478 
479 
480 
481 
482 
483 
484 
485 
486 
487 
488 
489 
490 
49 1 
492 
493 
494 
495 
496 
497 
498 
499 



HIR246000 ? J |^(^ I, fl^. ?■''"'■•''■■ "'■" PAGE 20 
chairman of the SPG, and he served very briefly, as you 
Know, before he moved on and became a negotiator, but he met 
on two or three occasions with the SPG, and gave a brief on 
where he thought things were heading, and he, I think, met 
when he wanted to, and I can't really speak to that, with 
Bill Clark and obviously with the Secretary. 

It became--increasingly institutionalized as you know 
from the records--! am sure you have seen--with his successor. 
Otto Reich, where first of all, the memo which appointed 
Otto indicated that he served as an advisor to the 
Secretary, and LPD, of course, was totally an organization 
within the Department of State, so its activities were under 
direct scrutiny of the Department of State. 

His programs, its accomplishments, ware communicated 
periodically to the SPG. How, I say that because there was 
some question of whether Otto Reich worked for the NSC or 
not. He had his own program and was within State, and he 

y 

reported to the SPG, which it is a distinction with a 
difference . 

2 The Central American Public Diplomacy Program was 
'actually begun earlier in 1983, wasn't it, before July of 
1983, when you took over this new position? 

A Hell, in other words, when we, trying to generate 
support for our program, before we appointed Dick Stone. I 
suppose the answer would be yes, but it didn't become part 



UNCLRSSi 






22 



HIR2>46000 y^ 



Q^'t 



PAGE 21 



NAHE: _ . _ , . r 

500 oi this bureauczatic process until ue naned Dick Stone, and 

50 1 I an not frankly certain, you know, what ue really had 

502 before July '83. 

503 Ue clearly uere trying to nake our case known as to 
SOU what ue uere trying to do in Central Anerica. Ue were doing 

505 it through all the established channels, but the reason for 

506 naming Dick Stone, and the reason for naning Otto Reich uas 

507 clearly that we were having--it was an extremely difficult 

508 issue . 

509 It uas one uith a lot of controversy, and it uas one 

510 on which very few people really had much understanding of 

511 the issues, so there was at least a serious educational 

5 12 problem that uas involved in the Central American public 

513 diplomacy field, and ue were trying to deal with that as a 

51U major part of our responsibility. 

515 Z Uas there a struggle between the White House and the 

516 State Department over the location of this Office of Latin 

517 American Public Diplomacy and who it should report to? 

518 . A Hell, I think that any bureaucracy is much happier 
5 19 when all the elements are under its oun aegis, and I think 
520 there probably uas a certain sense of tension that--you 

52 1 know--but on the other hand, the reason the question even 

522 came up is because the job uasn't being dona very uell, and 

523 if things were going uell, I think you don* t--if--the old 
52'4 adage, if it ain't broke, don't fix it. If things uere 



UNCLASS 






23 



ir\ r- 



MAME : 
525 
526 
527 
528 
529 
530 
531 
532 
533 
53U 
535 
536 
537 
538 
539 
540 
541 
542 
543 
544 
545 
546 
547 
548 
549 



HIR246000 *^ * * ^ -^ PAGE 22 

going well, I don't think there would have been a necessary 
need to engage in this. 

But ue had been, I think, hardened by Peter Dailey's 
very effective work with the INF, and ue had thought that it 
might be useful to provide some extra focus. And I don't 
really want to get into a controversy with professional 
foreign service officers, but some of them are not 
particularly interested in information programs. 

They are' more interested in sort of the traditional 
dimensions of diplomacy, and I think that what ue were 
trying to do is energize kind of a new discipline. Now, I 
might point out that--I am sort of a foreign affairs 
professional. I am talking very much, as you can see, from 
the need to get the story told internationally, and--but 
obviously there was a domestic dimension to it, too, as we 
all know. 

2 I would like to show you a memorandum, Walt> and 
like to have the reporter mark this as Walt Raymond Exhibit 
1 . 

[Walter Raymond Exhibit No. 1 was marked for 
identification. 1 

THE WITNESS' Do you want me to read this now? 

\ 
BY HR. OLIVER: 

2 Yeah. I would like to ask you about--have you ever 

seen that memorandum before? 



UNCLA 






24 



NAME : 
550 
551 
552 
553 

ssu 

555 
556 
557 
558 
559 
560 
561 
562 
563 
5614 
565 
566 
567 
568 
569 
570 
571 
572 
573 
57U 



HIR2146000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 23 



A Mo, not to the best--well, let rae read it through. 
Superiicially , I don't think so, but let me look at it. 

2 It is marked M-29'458, is the committee's 
identification number. It is a memorandum from the 
Secretary of State to the President, dated May 25, 1983. Do 
you recall ever seeing this memorandum? 

A I do not. I do not. 

MR. HcGRATH: Why don't you give him a second? 
THE WITNESS: To the best of my knowledge, I don't 
think I have seen it. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Have you ever heard about this memorandum? 

A No, I don't think so. Let me--but let me see 
uhere--uell, to answer your question, and I have read it all 
now, and the answer is no, to the best of my knowledge, I 
have never seen it before. 

2 Was there resistance by Secretary Shultz to the 
naming of Otto Reich as the Coordinator for Latin American 
Diplomacy and the location of this entity in the Department 
of State? 

A I can't answer that definitively. I don't recall 
whether that question was posed quite like that to the 
Secretary during the testimony. But my--I do know that after 
Otto had been on board for a while, that Secretary Shultz on 
several occasions spoke very positively about Ambassador 



l^^'Ci^ 






25 



NAME : 
575 
576 
577 
578 
579 
580 
581 
582 
583 
58U 
585 
586 
587 
588 
589 
590 
591 
592 
593 
59U 
595 
596 
597 
598 
599 



UNCl/|?S?r^^;p - 



HIR246000 ??J>ffl.« t? ^ "^i !-';'- .' i *' PAGE 2H 
Reich's periocmance. 

I think that the points that are raised in this 
ntemorandun--in5of ar as they speak to public diplomacy on page 
3--I think that the Secretary saw that — somewhat more of a 
recognition oi Otto Reich's role as spelled out in the memo 
irora Bill Clark, which had been--my recollection is that the 
memo appointing Otto Reich had been shown to Secretary 
Shultz before it was signed by Mr. Clark, and the Secretary 
had agreed to it, and it also has, as you recall, as I said 
before, it identified Ambassador Reich as an advisor to the 
Secretary, so what it did is it did permit the Secretary and 
ARA to have a stronger public diplomacy arm as spelled out 
in the Shultz memorandum. 

One of the things about the team we put together was 
we brought people from several departments and agencies, so 
we were able to have an interagency process work more 
effectively. We had Defense and USIA and AID people 
detailed . 

S I would like to ask the reporter to mark this as 
Walt Raymond Exhibit No. 2. 

[Halter Raymond Exhibit No. 2 was marked for 
identification. ] 

BY HR. OLIVER: 
2 This is a memorandum from Halt Raymond. Jr. to 
William P. Clark, dated Kay 18. 1983. The committee's 



UNCLA3S!F3B 



26 



NAME : 
600 
601 
602 
603 
604 
605 
606 
607 
608 
609 
6 10 
61 1 
6 12 
6 13 
614 
615 
6 16 
617 
618 
6 19 
620 
621 
622 
623 
624 






HIR246000 \2V/iv^ ^^ y."^:" *' \- •■ PAGE 25 

identification number is N-30921, and attached to it is a 
meraorandure from William P. Clark to James A. Baker III. 
identification number K-30925, uhich I believe is a draft 
memorandum, and attached to that is a memorandum to 
Secretary Shultz from William P. Clark, related to public 
diplomacy, and its identification number is H-30928. 

I show you this memorandum, Mr. Raymond, and ask you 
to look it over and ask you if you recall that memorandum 
and the attachments, and what the circumstances were 
surrounding that memorandum to Fir. Clark. 

A Okay. There are a whole lot of points here, and 
worth some touching on. One is-- 

2 Well, do you remember drafting that document? 

A Yeah, I remember--well , let's put it this way ^ I 
remember the issue. I quite frankly had not seen this paper 
for over four years, and I remember the issue. I don't know 
if I necessarily remember putting pen to paper on it, but I 
obviously wrote it. It is my signature. I certainly 
remember the issue. 

2 Well, the memorandum--it appears from this memorandum 
that it was on the basis of this memorandum that the 
attached directives--directlvtt iron the Mational Security 
Adviser went forward to the Secretary of State proposing 
Otto Reich as the Director--as the Coordinator for Latin 
American Public Diplomacy. Is that, in fact, what happened? 



UNCLASSIry^^ 



27 



NAME ■ 
625 
626 
627 
628 
629 
630 
631 
632 
633 
634 
635 
636 
637 
638 
639 
640 
641 
642 
643 
644 
645 
646 
647 
648 
649 



(T* n, ; r ■ r ■ : -^ 

HIR246000 'l5 2vJ???L*'^, "^'^V '■ PAGE 26 

A I am not at all certain that is the way it worked, 
no. I can't--you know, I can't specifically say that. I do 
know, as I mentioned previously, that when the question carae 
up of having Dick Stone take on the negotiating role, that 
thete uas this discussion as to who would replace hin . 

It is reflected in these memoranda. Otto Reich was 
a candidate--was recommended from the NSC side, and there was 
this discussion, but I thought it took the form of a draft 
memorandum to Secretary Shultz that was then shown to 
Secretary Shultz. I would have to compare this text with a 
signed text. There uas a signed text at some point where 
we--where ue take on this question of the replacement. 

And I just don't know whether it is the sane as 
this. ny recollection is that it is a little bit different. 
2 Hell-- 

MR. HcGRATH: Do you have a signed copy of the memo? 

KR. OLIVER: Do I have a signed copy? I do not have 
a signed copy at the moment. We may have one. Uhat happens 
around here is--we reproduce so many documents that you 
produce the original and copies and that sort of thing. 

THE WITNESS: Hell, my recollection of the signed 
one is that it did not get into the policy management 
things. My recollection is that the signed one dealt with 
public diplomacy and that and nothing else. 

BY HR. OLIVER: 



UNCLAS 



y ^' ii ^ LJ- 



28 



HAME : 
650 
651 
652 
653 
65(4 
655 
656 
657 
658 
659 
660 
661 
662 
663 
6614 
665 
666 
667 
668 
669 
670 
671 
672 
673 
674 



HIR2'46000 






PAGE 



27 



2 But you did sign the cover memo that is here? 

A Right. 

2 And you did recommend Otto Reich? 

A Correct. 

2 To Mr. Clark? 

A Right. 

2 And in iact, Mr. Reich did become the Coordinator 
for Latin American Diplomacy. 

A Right. 

2 Was it your idea for nr . Reich to become the 
Coordinator, or uas it someone else's? In this memorandum, 
it indicated he had been recommended by Dick Stone and Jeane 
Kirkpatrick . 

A ny recollection is like so many appointments, it 
sort of oozes out of the ground. I think that--I don't 
believe I a^aca Otto Reich enough to have made the 
recommendations at the time. Dick did. They both lived in 
Florida, and my recollection is it uas something were Bill 
Clark, knowing that Ambassador Stone was going to move on, 
asked me and probably asked others to come up with some 
ideas, and I took soundings and Otto's name emerged at the 
top oi the list. 

Q Why did you--why would oeana Kirkpatrick be involved 
in the recommendation of the Coordinator for Latin American 
Public Diplomacy? 



UNCLASSi 






29 



NAME : 
675 
676 
bll 
678 
679 
680 
681 
682 
683 
6814 
685 
686 
687 
688 
689 
690 
691 
692 
693 
69U 
695 
696 
697 
698 
699 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLAS 



f!^""! 
HlW 



PAGE 28 



A Because at the time she was at the U.N., she was 
peisonally inteiested in Central. America. As you know, she 
has written a lot on it, and she also was a regular 
participant, I believe, in NSC processes, so it would be 
very consistent for her to be one of a number of people who 
might be asked or who might recommend. I can't remember now 
whether she was polled or whether she recommended, but I 
know that she strongly supported Otto. 

2 In the last, paragraph on page 2 of your memorandum, 
you indicated that it is your sense that State is, and Z 
quote, is ''increasingly restive over public diplomacy 
representatives being Presidential representatives 
responsible to your SPG,'* and you go on to argue that you 
think this is necessary. 

A Um-hum. 

2 Isn't it true that.in fact, you won that battle and 
Otto Reich did report to the SPG as the Coordinator of-- 

A He reported to the SPG, but as I point out, it was 
on a periodic basis. He was working dally with ARA and in 
the Department of State, and day in-day out guidance and 
policy. Certainly was not coning in the SPG which meets 
very erratically. Day in-day out policy was coming from 
whatever policymaking processiif existed at the time. Like 
these memoranda talk a bit about whether there was a 
sufficiently focused policy process, but the fact is that 



UNCLASSSFED 



30 



NAME ■■ 
700 
701 
702 
703 
704 
70S 
706 
707 
708 
709 
7 10 
71 1 
712 
713 
711* 
715 
716 
717 
718 
719 
720 
721 
722 
723 
724 



HIRZUeOOO 



'J.r 



'u; ■-*•■ 



PAGE 29 



that is where his day in-day out guidance was coming from, 
and as you Know from testimony later on, that became the r_i£ 
under Elliott Abrams, but of course, Abraras wasn't even in 
the equation at the time when you are talking about Tony 
Mo tley--uell , basically, Tony Motley. 

2 You mean--what you are saying is that eventually this 
Office of Latin American Public Diplomacy reported to the 
rig rather than the SPG? 

A No, I want to differentiate that it was important, 
as described in here, that if you have a Presidential 
appointment, you have--as a Presidential representative, you 
have a much better chance of mobilizing and orchestrating 
the community in this area, and it was our judgm«nt at that 
time that we had--we had a much better chance oi getting 
people to move forward and respond, if Otto was a 
Presidential appointment. 

But to get the job done on a day in-day out basis, 
he was working closely with the policy people in ARA, and I 
was not sitting and formulating policy. Public diplomacy is 
not involved in policy, it is involved in supporting policy, 
so where is he going to get it, not from ma, so he got it 
from the interagency group that was chaired most of the 
time, to the best of my knowledge, by the Assistant 
Secretary for ARA. 

2 So, Otto Reich reported to Tony Motley? 






31 



HAKE: 
725 
726 

. 727 
728 

729 
730 
731 
732 
733 
73U 
735 
736 
Til 
738 
739 
740 
7141 
7U2 
7U3 
714U 
714S 
746 
747 
748 
749 



m^Mi 



HIR246000 W » >? ■C.f Jt. . ■' s; y ■. .; _ ^», '^^ PAGE 30 

A He was getting his policy guidance from Tony Motley. 
2 But he didn't teport-- 

A Only was kept briefed thoroughly on what he was 
doing and woiKed--! mean, their offices were three doors 
apart. They would attend staff meetings together, they 
would discuss issues on a constant basis. He would be 
working with the ARA people, because anything he was doing 
with their geography, he obviously has to work closely with 
then, but he did have the extra capability of reporting to 
the White House in the font of the Chairman of the SPG and 
in the first year, when we were establishing Otto's 
credentials and his organization, we had several SPG 
meetings where Otto would come and would brief. 

Now, in terms of guidance, we had also a formula 
known as the Central American Public Diplomacy Action Plan, 
and we would ask his office to produce periodically an 
action plan which dealt with the issues, the policies, the 
thrust, the themes, the goals and a lot of it was focused on 
overseas audiences, because we felt at that time that one of 
the things which was most difficult from the Central 

- American situation was what we felt--it was excessive ariount 
of support received by certain circles--received by the 
Hlcaraguans from certain circles in Europe. 

So, we were trying to get the information known in 
Europe as to what was going on in Central America. 



UNCLASSlr 



32 



NAPir ■ 

750 
751 
752 
753 
75LI 
755 
756 
757 
758 
759 
760 
761 
762 
763 
764 
765 
766 
767 
768 
769 
770 
771 
772 
773 
774 



HIR2U6000 " * PAGE 31 

9 And at the tirae you wrote this memorandum 
recommending Otto Reich and this structure and the draft 
memo for Hr . Clark to Secretary Shultz, you were stili at 
that tirae the Senior Director for Intelligence on the NSC; 
IS that correct? You had indicated earlier that you moved 
over in July 1983 to this new position. 

A I had about one or two months left there > yeah, and 
I was, as you can see from this memo, already rather deeply 
involved in my new responsibility, and it was this kind of 
involvement which obviously prompted Bill Clark to suggest 
that I take the public diplomacy coordinator i i yiiir . 

I was spending an increasing amount of time thsre. 
and it was an anomaly, because it wasn't intelligence, and 
it did--was not consistent, so we felt that reorganization 
would be very helpful. 

2 But basically, you began early on to become involved 
in the public diplomacy effort long before you took over 
this position, before this new position was created? 

A Somewhat before, because it was only 11 or 12 months 
from the time X joined the NSC before I got into the new 
assignment . 

fi So, actually the LPD and the SPG itself actually 
preceded this International Communications and Public 
Diplomacy Section at the NSC? 

A That is correct, but I would say at NSC, "have some 



n.^'C" 



33 






NAHE: HIR2U6000 '^ ^*^*^'^ :^ ^if ^^^Q PAGE 32 

775 30-soree-odd staffers, this is not abnormal in the sense that 

776 you would take people in the staff who had a specialty and 
■777 there were frequently officers in the staff who were doing 

778 three and four and five different things, and since you are 

779 where you are at the HSC, an HSC officer, I nean that is 

780 your responsibility. 

781 . You do not belong to State or Defense or any other 

782 organization. You belong to the HSC. This is not abnormal 

783 to have somebody take on a special responsibility. When it 
78'4 becomes obvious that that extra responsibility is one which 

785 is a growth industry and one which your supervisor feels 

786 that perhaps you would be logical to do, then it makes sense 

787 to make some changes and have it be your full-time job than 

788 a part-time, so I don't feel it is unusual that somebody in 

789 the NSC would be picked up to take on a special task if he 

790 has a skill in that area. 

791 2 At the time that this Office of Latin American 

792 Public Diplomacy was created in the State Department 

793 reporting to the SPG, was there another office in the Uhite 
79t< House called the Office of Public Liaison that was engaged 

795 - in a program called the Central American Outreach Program? 

796 A Yes. I can't fix the dates. I can extrapolate the 

797 dates from this memorandum here, but faith Whittlesey, as 

798 this memo suggests, was involved in an outreach group. One 

799 of the issues that is threaded through Exhibit 2 is a 



UNCLASSlrED 



34 



HAKE : 
800 
801 
802 
803 
8014 
805 
806 
807 
808 
809 
810 
81 1 
812 
813 
8114 
815 
816 
817 
818 
819 
820 
821 
822 
823 
82U 



U^CLASSH 



HIR2146000 Hraa.i u:>3 -'i page as 

concern from the NSC that the outzaach gzoup be consistent 
with policy, and what she was doing was an informational 
program. She would bring people in and get people to talk 
about Central American policy. We just wanted to be sure 
she was talking about the policy of the United States 
Government . 

8 So, did she report to the SPG also? 

A No, she reported to Jim Baker. 

2 So, you had a--you had an Office of Public Liaison 
with the Central American Outreach Program? 

A But that is across the board. In other words, it 
could be dealing with privatization. It could be dealing 
with church groups, Jewish groups, it could be dealing with 
any issue that affects the President's agenda, domestic or 
foreign . 

It just so happens that she had a very special 
interest in Central America and got very involved with it 
and spent a lot of time in it, and it was encouraged. I 
don't suggest that she was not operating consistent with the 
desires of the President. 

S Well, what was the difference between what LPS was 
doing or set up to do. and what the Central American 
Outreach Program was doing and set up to do in the White 
House? 

A Well, first of all. the LPD at various stages could 



(iNCLASSIF^ZJ 



35 



825 
826 
827 
828 
829 
830 
831 
832 
833 

sau 

835 
836 
837 
838 
839 
8U0 
8M1 
8((2 
8>43 
8>4'4 
8145 
8<46 
8U7 
8148 
8(49 



HIR2U6000 IJ P^ ljl.*lsJ''"Jf i'ii; ii '- • PAGE 34 
be as nuch as 10 people and they would produce-- 
S But initially it was just one person? 
A Well> here is where part--there is a reference there 
to concerns about Dick Stone and how he was getting the job 
done. This is unfair to Dick in a way. Dick had a staff of 
one, himself and one assistant, so there was only one way 
that he could deal with it, and that was, as I say in this 
memo, sort of the big picture. 

If we wanted to have a lot of material produced, you 
have to get some horses to produce the material. Otto was 
able to put together a team with the support of the 
Secretary and the support of Bill Clark, so production could 
come on line, and it is a matter of public record. I 
mean--and you can see it. There is a great deal of 
production he produced, and his office produced, and was 
made available publicly and through appropriate channels. 

Faith Whittlesey had a very small office and had--! 
don't know, maybe one or two people who had as a rather 
special interest Central America at most. Her purpose 
wasn't to--was much more restricted than Otto Reich's. I 
mean, she was trying to bring in groups into MSO in the 
Hhite House or into smaller groups, sit down and discuss the 
program in Central America, meat with people, and needless 
to say, get the President's policies known to a broader 
group of people, to generate support for the policy. But it 



UNCLASSl 






36 



NAME: 
850 
851 
852 
853 
8514 
855 
856 
857 
858 
859 
860 
86 1 
862 
863 
86i« 
865 
866 
867 
868 
869 
870 
871 
872 
873 
87M 



xs different. *-^-^^^^^^^ 



PUGK 35 



i On page 2 of Exhibit 2, you zaconnended that Mike 
Ledeen and John Glassman should be added immediately to the 
Office of Central American Public Diplomacy. Why did 
that--did that happen or, if not, why not? 

A Ky recollection is that Glassman may have 
joined--Glassman is a very fine writer, is a professional 
FSO. At least I know him as being a Department of State 
officer. And if he joined it was for a matter of a few 
months, because he was then given another assignment, I 
think a promotion. 

Mike Ledeen never joined the office. He did — if I 
recall correctly--some contract writing for the group, but ha 
became principally preoccupied very shortly after this, very 
shortly after this with the whole question of the Grenada 
documentation, and this was something which was in effect 
encouraged directly or indirectly by Otto Reich's office, 
because to tell the Grenada story was a rather graphic case 
as far as we were concerned of one of the potential dangers 
of Cuban interference or involvement in countries in that 
region, and Hike became extremely preoccupied with that, as 
you know produced a book, pulled the documents together and 
produced a book, and I don't think, to the best of my 
recollection--! could be wrong — he did anything else with Otto 
Reich other than the Grenada thing. 



UNCLASSInil^ 



37 



MAHE : 

875 
876 
877 
878 
879 
880 
881 
882 
883 
88U 
885 
886 
887 
888 
889 
890 
89 1 
892 
893 
8914 
895 
896 
897 
898 
899 



HIR2146000 



UNCLASS! 






PAGE 36 



2 What was his position at the tins you recommended 
him? 

A He was essentially a £ree-lance. He was trying to 
develop some business interests. He had leit the Department 
of State coincident with the departure of Secretary Haig> 
and he was engaged in some consultancy work. I believe the 
Department of Defense. Somewhere along the line, X am aware 
of the fact that I don't know when--I Know he became a 
consultant to the HSC . 

I listened to the hearings about this, but I don't 
know when he did that, and that was--as far as X can 
extrapolate from what I hear in the press and so on. it had 
to do with issues which were quite remote from mine. 

2 What was the genesis of your recommending him for 
this job? 

A He is a good writer. 

2 And how did you--you had worked with him — 

A X hardly knew him. X read his writings. X don't 
even know Glassman. These are people who had been called to 
my attention as people who were good writers. X was looking 
for resource people. We were thinking about who can write, 
who can take a clump of raw material and put together a good 
study. 

X mean, an example--X just brought this, and you have 
probably seen this, but this is--these are laborious efforts. 



UNCLA3 






38 



HAHE : 

900 
901 
902 
903 
904 
905 
906 
907 
908 
909 
910 

91 1 
912 
9 13 
914 
9 IS 
916 
917 
918 
919 
920 

92 1 
922 
923 
924 






HIR246000 Uii?.. i-.Tit^'^- ■ PAGE 37 

These are three of Otto Reich's things. You have probably 
seen them all. They are all public domain, but this takes a 
lot of work and a good writer, and at the time we were 
starting this, ue were simply--we had to start, we wanted to 
put a good team together, and we were looking around for 
people who could write. 

Q Did you interview Hike Ledeen? 

A I did not get involved in the ins and outs oi 
management of Otto Reich's office. 

2 This memorandum recommends that he be added to the 
Office of Latin American or Central American Public 
Diplomacy immediately. 

A Ura-hum. 

Q If you didn't interview him, and you hadn't really 
worked with him. why did you make this recommendation? Has 
this actually somebody else's recommendation? 

A It is a little bit like the Otto Reich who 
recommended Otto Reich. I mean this was, again, a question 
of A being somewhat aware of material that had been written 
and was in the public domain, but also going around town and 
trying to find out who was a good writer, and in a sense who 
might be available. 

How, at that point in time, Ledeen, if I recall 
correctly, was relatively available. He had left State, and 
he did not have a full-time job. So the thought was that 



^ficmsiKi^ 



39 



NAME: HIR2U6000 



PAGE 38 



925 
926 
927 
928 
929 
930 
931 
932 
933 
934 



this is a good writer who might be able to help, and there 
really wasn't anything more than that. 

2 Nobody recommended him to you? 

A Someone may havef, 

2 Do you remember who? 

A But I do not remember who it was. 

2 Kant to take a five-minute break now? 

A Okay. 

riR. OLIVER: We will just take a five-minute break. 
[ Recess . 1 



liNCLASS!F:SD 



40 



NAME: 
93S 
936 

937 
938 
939 
9ilO 

9m 

9U2 
9U3 
9M14 
945 
9146 
947 
948 
949 
950 
951 
952 
953 
954 
955 
956 
957 
958 
959 



HIR246000 *]UOii HOC'' 



PAGE 39 
DCMM DOMOCK 

MR. OLIVER: All right, back on the record. 
I would like the reporter to make this document as 
Walt Raymond Exhibit 3. 

(Walter Raymond Exhibit Ho. 3 was marked for 
identification. ] 

MR. OLIVER: It is a memorandum iron Walt Raymond, 
Jr. to William P. Clark, dated Kay 20, 1983. It is a weekly 
report, and the committee identification number is H-3091S. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 All right, Mr. Raymond, I would like you to look at 
that memorandum and to identify it. Is that a weekly report 
to Mr. Clark signed by you? 
A Yes, it is. 

2 In the first paragraph, in the last sentence, there 
is a reference to a Coalition for Democratic Central 
America, for the establishment of a Coalition for a 
Democratic Central America. Could you tell me what that 
refers to, and rather--whether such a coalition was ever 
formed ? 

A Let me just quickly read through the first 
paragraphs here. To the best of my recollection, I don't 
think that organization ever did--I don't think that 
organization ever was formed. She met with a number of 
people in the private sector that ware concerned about 



IJNCLASS^^:^3 



41 



NAME: 
960 
961 
962 
963 
964 
965 
966 
967 
968 
969 
970 
97 1 
972 
973 
97M 
97S 
976 
977 
978 
979 
980 
981 
982 
983 
98U 






HIR2U6000 .'..vH-llg ff5S.V'' PAGE UO 

Central America, and there was a lot of discussion there and 
other places about the possibility o£ some kind of a 
coalition, thinking--the title is very similar to a Coalition 
for a Democratic Majority or Committee for Present Danger, 
groups formed in the seventies. 

To the best of my knowledge, this one was never 
created . 

2 I would like the reporter to make this as Walt 
Raymond Exhibit Ho. H. 

(Walter Raymond Exhibit No. U was marked for 
identification. 1 

MR. OLIVER: It is a memorandum from Halt Raymond, 
Jr. to William P. Clark dated Hay 27, 1983. The committee 
identification number is K-30910. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q I would like to ask you to look at that memorandum, 
Mr. Raymond. Is that a weekly report signed by you to 
William Clark? 

A Yes, it is. 

2 Dated Hay 27, 1983. 

A Correct. 

Q In that memorandum, in paragraph two, you refer to 
Otto Reich, who has <Jeane Klrkpatriok' s strong endorsement, 
is a very hard, dedicated worker who will make the process 
effective. That memorandum seems to indicate that there 



UHCLASS'F^^ 



42 



KAME: 

985 

986 

987 

988 

989 

990 

99 1 

992 

993 

994 

995 

996 

997 

998 

999 

1000 

1001 

1002 

1003 

100U 

1005 

1006 

1007 

1008 

1009 



^" ^S? 



HIR246000 *»- * ^ '?ir Bca uv^i: t . _ pjGE 41 

is--that you are having some difficulty or there is some 
resistance to the naming of Otto Reich. 

Do you recall whether or not that was the case? 
A I know it took a while to get the agreement. I do 
think It reflects the fact that we had, as X mentioned to 
you previously, that we had--that we, in this case Mr. Clark, 
had indicated that he wanted to havePState Department 



agr 






•<_ 



to the naming of Ambassador Reich, and I cannot 



recall whether this was a problem in the Department or just 
simply bureaucracy taking a long time to move forward, 
because a lot of things were happening at the time. 

It reflects--it could reflect either--and I can't put 
myself into this memo to four years ago. It reflects either 
bureaucratic inertia or a bureaucratic problem, and I don't 
recall which it was. 

S Were you dissatisfied with what Faith Whittlesey was 
doing at that time? 

A I wanted to be sure that it was not inconsistent 
with policy and as reflected in an earlier — the previous 
week's memo, clearly there was a considerable degree of 
energy being expended in the Whittlesey office, and I was, 
hopefully it could be a little closer coordination, but we 
had to have alhead of the Public Diplomacy Office to make it 
work . 

2 Would it be fair to say you were driving the effort 



liNCLASSL^; 



^'"^ 



43 



HiRaueooo 



UNCLASSinSD 



PAGE 142 



NAME ■■ 

10 10 to create this office and have it report to the SPG and to 

1011 have Otto Reich naned as the head of it? 

1012 A No, it would be fair to say that Mr. Clark, on 

1013 behalf of the President, was very, very anxious to see to it 
101U that It was a sharply focused public diplomacy effort, and I 
10 15 was asked to do what I could to carry that out, but this was 

10 16 something which was coming from the highest levels of the 

our 

1017 government, the desire to sea to it that we get ••*-story 

1018 out as effectively as possible. 

10 19 2 Did Mr. Clark recommend Otto Reich to you? 

1020 A I--as I mentioned previously, I am not sure of the 

1021 action genesis of Otto Reich. I believe, among others, 

1022 Jeane Kirkpatrick was a strong endorser. Jeane Kirkpatrick, 

1023 by being a member of the Cabinet, was in close contact with 
10214 Mr. Clark, and I took some soundings also and shared ny 

1 025 soundings . 

1026 Dick Stone, of course, fellow Floridian, strongly 

1027 supported Otto Reich. It is hard to know whose 

1028 recommendation was the principal one. Hay well be that Dick 

1029 Stone, who is highly respected by Bill Clark, was the pivot 

1030 person. I can't recall that, but he certainly played a 

1031 role, and Reich was a vary good man. 

1032 fi I would like to ask the reporter to mark this as the 

1033 next document as Walt Raymond Exhibit 5. 

103<4 [Walter Raymond Exhibit No. 5 was marked for 



^^eus^ 






44 



NAME ■■ 
103S 
1036 
1037 
1038 
1039 
10M0 
10U1 
1042 
10U3 
10UU 
lOUS 
1046 
10147 
1018 
10M9 
1050 
1051 
1052 
1053 
1054 
1055 
1056 
1057 
1058 
1059 



}:>;pi fio^?^ 



HIR2I46000 |"<.*j-f ,1':' ^ «-^ - TAGE US 

identification. ] 

MX. OLIVER: This is a raenotandun iron Halt Raymond. 
Jr. to William P. Clark dated August 9, 1983, has a 
committee identification number, N-33U50. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 I would like to ask you to examine that memorandum, 
Mr. Raymond, and ask you if you recall sending that 
memorandum to Mr. Clark? 

A This is a very interesting document. The answer is 
no . 

2 I might indicate-- 

A I don't think this is--I have seen another memo — as a 
a matter of fact, was made available to me by the press on a 
subject that started like this, a number of the documents 
that happened to be in one ox another of the packages. 

This is sort of like it, but it is not like it. The 
distinction, I think, is that this one is not signed, so I 

would say that it is may be a draft that I was working on, 

t> ^ 

look^ at, thought about and may have talked to some people 

about it, but for various reasons, felt that some of the 

things in here were wrong, or some of the recommendations 

ware poor and weren't the kinds of things we should be 

doing, and therefore, it was not sent forward. 

MR. LECH: Did you normally sign your memos? 

THE HITKESS: Absolutely. 






45 



HAHE: HIR2U6000 1;**?|^»| 1^" P\Gl 44 

1060 HR. LEON: Uhexe would you put the signature? 

1061 THE WITNESS: Right there on the top. 

• 1062 HR. LEON: Right next to the ''from''.' 

1063 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

106U BY HR. OLIVER: 

1065 8 I would like to ask you to--ask the reporter to mark 

1066 this as Walt Raynond Exhibit No. 6. 

1067 It is a memorandum from Walt Raynond. Jr. to John M. 

1068 Poindexter, dated August 29, 1983. It bears the committee 

1069 identification number N-33><<(0 through *t>l2--make sure I have 

1070 got the right--no, I have got the wrong piece of paper here. 
107 1 Would you mark this--document as Exhibit No. 6, 

1072 please? 

1073 [Walter Raymond Exhibit No. 6 was marked for 
107<4 identification.! 

1075 MR. OLIVER: Actually, this — I would like you to 

1076 examine this document. Hr . Raymond. It is a meitozandum from 

1077 you that was signed, which was like the other — like Exhibit 

1078 5. provided to us from your files by the FBI, and it is a 

1079 memorandum fzom you which attaches the memo of August 9. 

1080 which I believe is the same memorandum as Exhibit 5--it 

1081 simply doesn't have the third page on it. 

1082 THE WITNESS: Okay, I have read this thing. 

1083 BY HR. OLIVER: 

108'4 2 Now, does that — that signed memorandum and the 



JiNCLASSJ 



.i^il 



46 



NAME : 
1085 
1086 
1087 
1088 
1089 
1090 

109 1 
1092 
1093 
1094 
1095 
1096 
1097 
1098 
1099 
1 100 

110 1 
1 102 
1 103 
1 104 
1 105 
1 106 
1 107 
1 108 
1 109 



UNCLASSIFEB 



HIR2U6000 lilUl-l II W».-5i5~HL-'^ PAGE US 
attachment, are the first two" pages "that are attached there 
the same memorandum as Exhibit 5? 

A I have to go line to line out, but it looks close. 
Let ' s see . 

MR. ncGRATH: Have you guys done a line-by-line? Do 
you know? 

HR. OLIVER: Yeah. 

MR. McGRATH: And you would represent that they are 
the same? 

KR. OLIVER: Yes. 

HR. HcGRATH: All right. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Does that refresh your memory about whether or not 
that memorandum went forward? 

A Well, I--yeah. I frankly remember very clearly the 
issue that caused this memo to be written, and that was a 
great number of people were doing things all around town, 
and they were all more or less concerned about the need to 
create some kind of a bipartisan coalition of concerned 
citizens, as I said in the first paragraph. 

And we were struggling with this problem. That was 
reflected in a couple of my earlier weekly reports to Bill 
Clark, and I — all I can do to reconstruct this now is to say 
that--it is possible that I sent forward this attachment, 
even though it is not initialed to John PoindeKter just to 



l^NCLflSSIKED 



47 



NAHE : 
1110 
1111 

•1112 
1113 
1 1 lU 
1 1 IS 
1116 
1117 
1118 
1119 
1 120 
1121 
1 122 
1 123 
1 124 
1 125 
1 126 
1 127 
1 128 
1 129 
1 130 
1131 
1 132 
1 133 
1 1314 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLASSlriD 



PAGE U6 



illustrate the problem we were dealing with, and also 
reilected, as you see in my third paragraph in the cover 
memorandum, that--under John Poindexter's recommendations, 
clearly this is not an issue for the NSC or for the White 
House to take on, and ii anybody does it, State--but not for 
the White House, the NSC, so I think that the memo recreates 
a problem, that the recommendation or the discussion of 
possible solutions was already redirected by informal 
conversation and reflected in the cover memorandum. 

2 I would like to focus for a minute on the August 9, 
1983 memorandum that you have sent forward. 

A All right. 

e On the 29th of August. 

A All right. This Is all three pages. 

2 Yes, all three pages. Exhibit 5. 

A Okay. 

2 The second line of the first paragraph indicates 
that various proposals call for the creation of a bipartisan 
coalition of concerned citizens to generate majority support 
for the President's policies. 

A Um-hum. 

2 Isn't this pretty much the same thing as the 
coalition that was referred to in the Hay memorandum, same 
idea? 

MR. McGRATH: Do you recall which Hay memo you are 






48 



NAME : 
1 13S 
1 136 
1 137 
1 138 
1 139 
1 1 UO 
1 1U1 
1 1U2 
1 143 
1 144 
1 145 
1 146 
1 147 
1 148 
1 149 
1 150 
1151 
1 152 
1 153 
1 154 
1 155 
1 156 
1 157 
1 158 
1 159 



(iNCLASS^FED ' 



referring to? 

HR. OLIVER: The memo, Exhibit 3, that I referred to 
earlier . 

THE WITNESS: The answer--it is the same generic 
idea, yes, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, 
Coalition for a Democratic Central America. What I was 
simply highlighting was the issue was being discussed in 
May. 

I continued to get reports of various efforts all 
around town to try to do this, so I summarized these to Bill 
Clark, and say, look at here are some of the proposals known 
to me. There may be others and we got kind of a problem, 
everybody is running around. 

That is basically the point I was trying to make to 
him, and as you can see, it served--I mean, reconstructing 
simply the paper trail in front of me, it appears that it 
served as the basis for a conversation that took place 
between John Poindexter and Bill Clark, or maybe not even 
that much. It may have been just John Poindexter 's 
recommendations that this be deflected or sent over to State 
and discussed with State, and that is the end of it that I 
am aware of. 

BY HR. OLIVER: 
2 On Exhibit 5, on the second paragraph, it indicates 
that a group of public relations specialists met with Bill 



49 



KAHE: 

1160 
1 161 
1162 
1163 
1 16U 
1 165 
1 166 
1 167 
1 168 
1 169 
1 170 
1 171 
1 172 
1 173 
1 17t4 
1 175 
1 176 
1 177 
1 178 
1 179 
1 180 
1 181 
1 182 
1 183 
1 184 



(iNCLASSIF?E[) 



Casey a feu days ago. Uhy u&z^ they meeting with Bill 
Casey? 

A I am factually reporting what happened. Bill Casey, 
as you know--uhile he was the DCI. he was a member of the 
Cabinet and member of the KSC and was personally very 
concerned about Central America, so I can only conclude that 
drawing to some degree from his private life before the 
agency that he brought people together and asked some 
questions as to how the story could be more effectively 
handled . 

He did it, obviously, I would have to conclude not 
so much in his CIA hat, but in his advisor to the President 
hat. 

2 How did you Know about the meeting? 

A I can't specifically state. I-- 

2 Here you-- 

A --trying to see any indication in here--no. I don't 
remember--recall the facts of how I learned about the 
meeting . 

2 You weren't present at the meeting? 

A Ho . I was not . 

2 And you don't remember how you learned about this 
meeting with Casey? 

A I may have learned about it from faith. I don't 
recall precisely, but Faith met with these people. and--that 






50 



NAHC: 
1185 
1186 

1 187 
1 188 
1 189 
1 190 
1191 
1 192 
1 193 
1 194 
1 195 
1 196 
1 197 
1 198 
1 199 
1200 
120 1 
1202 
1203 
12014 
1205 
1206 
1207 
1208 
1209 



UNCLASS!FEED 



HIR2X6000 IIIVI.I UXXH^HI}- ill PAGE 149 
may be ny sourca. I honestly don't teaenber exactly how I 
found out that Bill Casey met with them. 

2 As you go through this memorandum, there are 
references to several different meetings of public relations 
specialists and individuals. 'The second paragraph refers to 
a group that includes yourself. Faith Whittlesey, Charlie 
Hick, Alan Bell and Tom Korologos, and it indicated that you 
focused on the hiring of a public relations firm. 

A Right. 

2 And that that group recommended Ron Nessen. 

A Right. 

2 And that Nessen subsequently submitted a proposal, 
ny question is, who asked Hessen to present a proposal? 

A I don't recall. It was not Hick, it was not 
Raymond. It is whittling it down to the other three. I 
don't know. I know that no contract was ever let to Ron 
Nessen . 

2 How did you know that a proposal had been presented? 

A Again by extrapolation, I think I was aware of it 
from--from Faith. 

2 Did you ever see the proposal? 

A I — I don't think so. I think we discussed the 
outline, but I don't think I saw the proposal. 

2 Who organized the meeting? Who invited you to come? 

A ny recollection is it was probably generated by 



UNCLASSIFIED 



51 



KAnc = 

1210 
121 1 
12 12 
1213 
1214 
1215 
1216 
1217 
1218 
1219 
1220 
1221 
1222 
1223 
12214 
1225 
1226 
1227 
1228 
1229 
1230 
1231 
1232 
1233 
1234 



HIR2146000 



UNCLASS!F'B 



PAGE 50 



Faith, and it was an effort to try to draw back a little bit 
and ask people--you know, what is the problem? He have got a 
knouled9eable--we have got an information gap of very serious 
proportions out there in the country. If you ask people if 
they can identify on a map where is Central America, what is 
Nicaragua, what is El Salvador, the answer is remarkably 
low . 

How are we going to get this story out? And a lot 
of people--what this memo really reflects is an enormous 
frustration that was in the body politic of Washington in 
nid-1983. Everybody was popping up and saying, what are we 
going to do about this problem, and groups were meeting all 
around town trying to come up with an answer. 

Casey calls people in and says, what are we going to 
do? Faith calls people in. That is what you got here, and 
I can--you know, certain actions presumably can be identified 
as having taken place from all this running around, but 
no--no overall body, no Coalition for a Democratic Majority 
in Central America or something like that ever was 
created--unf ortunately . I think-- 

Q You indicated in the first paragraph that the 
overall purpose would be to sell a ''new product' 'I,, Central 
America, by generating interest across the spectrum. Has 
that the purpose of the whole exercise of talking to these 
various groups and public relations specialists? 



UNCLASS!?:ZD 



52 



1235 
1236 

1237 
1238 
1239 
12>40 
1241 
12U2 
12U3 
12U14 
1245 
12U6 
1247 
1248 
1249 
1250 
1251 
1252 
1253 
1254 
1255 
1256 
1257 
1258 
1259 



HIR246000 



unclass!f:ed ... 



51 



A Cettainly a najor puiposa. H« w«ra--on« person told 
US--I don't remenber which specialist, but said you can't 
sell a product ii only six people in the country Know of it, 
and you have got to have people understand what the issues 
are, and its relationship to U.S. national security. 

So, what I think is a key factor that keeps popping 
up, and that is certainly the botton line of that first 
paragraph . 

2 The third paragraph indicates that Faith told 
Charlie Wick that she had the prospect of funding from the 
nellon-Scaif e Organization, and in parentheses, it says, 
Terry Slease. Hou did you learn that? 

A I believe I learned that from Faith. I had never 
met Slease or Cantrell. And I have no knowledge personally 
of whatever came of that particular paragraph. Again, I was 
trying to be a spokesperson, as much as I could, to report 
to Bill Clark all the movement out there, and let him know 
there was an awful lot of people moving around that thing. 

2 Hell, was there an effort in the White House to try 
to encourage the funding of private efforts on behalf of the 
-President related to Central America? 

A Any discussion--! can't answer that definitively. I 
certainly can't speak for the Office of Public Liaison. 
Clearly, there was a feeling that an informational program 
was sorely lacking, and If — this would have to be done by 



UNCLASSir.Q 



53 



MAKE: 

1260 
1261 
1262 
1263 
12614 
1265 
1266 
1267 
1268 
1269 
1270 
1271 
1272 
1273 
1274 
1275 
1276 
1277 
1278 
1279 
1280 
1281 
1282 
1283 
128U 



«...oo UNCLAS?^55^?P^^ . 



>AGE 52 

private groups if it were to be — there would be a — some of 
this would have to be something which does not involve the 
United States. 

In other words, that is why we were talking about 
bipartisan. Not trying to make it a one-way thing. It was 
an informational, educational problem, as we saw it, and-- 

2 Were you tasked by anyone to try to pull these 
proposals together and to see if such a group can be created 
or funded? 

A I wasn't tasked to creating any group nor was X--I 
don't think there is anything here to suggest that I was 
aware that all of this was moving around, and I was really 
essentially presenting it to my superiors and trying to 
interpret what I was hearing out there and where they 
appeared to be heading. 

2 Well, were you the one who was synthesizing and 
coordinating these proposals in these meetings? 

A No. 

2 Was somebody-- 

A That is the problem. There was no central point 
and-- 

Q But your memoranda in May and in — earlier in August 
and so on related to the SPG and LPD and so on, and seemed 
to have been directed toward creating that kind of a central 
focus point, and in July, a month or so before this--this 



unclassif;e3 



54 



UNCLASS1F5B 



NAHE: HIR2U6000 imVI.! »»."^ J S T :' ?>» -. .'■ PAGE S3 

1285 memorandum was written, you took over as the head of this 

1286 International Communications and Public Diplomacy Section 

1287 and chaired these various groups. 

1288 I mean> if it wasn't you, who was it? 

1289 A Well, first of all — I didn't take over the Central 

1290 American issue. I was dealing with issues that covered the 

1291 entire world and various functional cuts as well, 

1292 information and political broadcasting, so my ability to 

1293 spend time and focus on one issue or another like Central 
129<4 America was very limited, and it is why the Otto Reich 

1295 office--and as soon as it really became operative, and it did 

1296 as 1983^ began to roll on, became thef key coordinating 

1297 point. 

1298 As you can see from several of the memoranda to Bill 

1299 Clark, there was a disparate void there for a while, and I 

1300 kept urging the Reich appointment there for a while as 

1301 quickly as possible, because we had a lot of spontaneous 

1302 activity popping up here, there and the other place. 

1303 Faith Whittlesey was quite active, and we did not 
130(4 have a public diplomacy coordinator, and I wasn't the public 

1305 diplomacy coordinator for Central America, but I was getting 

1306 calls and various types of people were coning up, many of 

1307 which I identified in here, and asking this, that and the 

1308 other thing, so I was trying to at least bring this 

1309 development to the attention of Bill Clark. 



UNCLASS 






55 



NAHE: HIR2U6000 Ull(/Ljf SSf F " ^ '**°^ ^'* 

1310 2 On page 2 of--Exhibit 5, you indicate that ''Roy 

1311 Godson and I have discussed this, and we are concerned that 

1312 efforts undertaken by Faith's office tend to be combined 

1313 through the preaching to the converted. Ue recomnended 

1314 funding via Freedom House or some other structure that has 

1315 credibility in the political center.*' 
13 16 Who did you recommend that to? 

1317 A I can't remember. The basic point that is made 

1318 there was a concern that we had with the Faith Whittlesey 

1319 exercise, and one of the reasons why we wanted to get the 

1320 Otto Reich program launched, because we did not feel that 
132 1 the Central American issue was one which could successfully 

1322 be discussed if it were a--if it were characterized as a kind 

1323 of a right-wing, exclusive issue, and we felt that it was. 
132(4 and of course it is replicated on Capitol Hill, where a 

1325 number of Democrats supported this that we felt it was an 

1326 issue that could generate broad support, and if we have an 

1327 informational effort that is broadly based, it is obviously 

1328 much more successful. 

1329 How, lurking around through all of this, and I 

1330 understand your question, and I realize my answers are not 

1331 totally complete, because we are dealing with fragments. 

1332 That is part of the problem. There was a feeling that if 

1333 you could somehow generate, if you could somehow create a 
133U Coalition for a Democratic Majority, and the reason a 



UNCLASSIFIED 



56 



NAME- 
1335 
1336 
1337 
1338 
1339 
1340 
13(41 
1342 
1343 
1344 
134S 
1346 
1347 
1348 
1349 
1350 
1351 
1352 
1353 
1354 
1355 
1356 
1357 
1358 
1359 



HIR246000 



UNCLASS 



iW ■ " ^i PAGE 55 

Freedom House--ua could have put the word A in front of it--is 
suggesting you are talking about something that has 
credibility in the world, and is viewed as a mainstream and 
not right or left-wing, but that is clearly a private sector 
initiative . 

The problem is, how do you interface with public and 
private sector for these programs, and this is an issue 
which was causing me some anxiety, and I tried to see to it 
that we kept public and private separate, but there was a 
need for private people to speak out and be heard on the 
issue . 

Q For the record, could you identify Roy Godson and 
tell me who he is? 

A At that juncture, if I recall correctly, of course, 
he was a professor at Georgetown, is a Professor at 
Georgetown, is--I believe his title is Washington Director of 
the National Strategy Information Center, and at that time, 
was a part-time consultant to the NSC. 

2 In August of 1983. 

A I believe so. 

8 Who did he report to? Did he report to you? Was he 
a consultant to your Division? Or your sector? 

A Over a period of about thzee years, and I am not 
absolutely certain i ri^ e th ar the date is that he became a 
consultant, but it is about this time, possibly before he 



UNCLASSt 



«'"""> 



57 



NAMt : 
1360 
1361 
1362 
1363 
136U 
1365 
1366 
1367 
1368 
1369 
1370 
1371 
1372 
1373 
1374 
1375 
1376 
1377 
1378 
1379 
1380 
1381 
1382 
1383 
138i« 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR2U6000 IriNIII U_X:^gir ;;.' f 3 page 56 
did some consultancy work with several elements in the KSC, 
including limited amounts of work with me, very limited. 
I mean--occasionally-- 

2 Do you know who hired him at the NSC? 

A Hot ior sure. Probably Bill Clark, but I don't know 
that for an absolute certainty. 

2 Why were you meeting with him about this public 
relations private effort? 

A Well, partially because he was in the NSC, had 
clearances, had been interested in the whole concept of 
outreach programs, and he used in a sense the NSIC as sort 
of an outreach group, and he also was in touch with Faith, 
so that we--you know, we were in contact with each other on 
some--because of some issues that were--I mean, not issues, 
but we were in contact with each other, because we were in 
some cases talking about the same subject. 

2 When did you first meet Roy Godson? 

A I guess shortlWl joined the NSC. I don't think I 
had ever known him before, and in the context of his partial 
consultancy . 

2 You don't recall meeting him during the transition? 

A No, no. Knew his father, but I did not know him. 

2 There are several other proposals of individuals 
mentioned in here, but the bottom line in the last 
paragraph, or not the bottom line, but it seems to be the 



UNCLASSIF.SD 



58 



MAffE ■■ 
1385 
1386 
1387 
1388 
1389 
1390 
139 1 
1392 
1393 
139M 
1395 
1396 
1397 
1398 
1399 

moo 

lUO 1 
1(402 
1403 
1<40(4 
1405 
1406 
1407 
1408 
1409 



HIR246000 



UNCLASS!E 



PAGE 57 



last paragraph, indicates that you think there is a 
consensus that we should strive ior the creation--! an 
quoting from the last sentence on page 2--I think there is a 
consensus that we should strive ioz the creation of a 
genuinely bipartisan, centrist structure to generate public 
support around the issue of Central America. 

Then it goes on to say. if we agree^jthat we will set 
up a committee and select an activist to put the thing 
together, most other issues fall in line. Fund-raising, 
marketing, substantive input. 

Uhat-- 
A What I was sharing with him is just the fact that it 
seems most of the people were saying we need a Coalition for 
a Democratic Majority. We need a Coalition for Present 
Danger, and a Coalition for Central America, and that seems 
to be where we are. and there is--I would say if I were to 
write this again. I don't think the syntaK--well . I don't 
think the wording is particularly suitable, if we agree. 

I am really speaking if we go along with the 
analysis served up to us by the 10 people before this is 
where we seem to be heading, and X was speaking in sort of a 
collective ''we'' there, but X was trying to tell him that 
we have got all these people running around town. 

This seems to be where it is. and seems like 
something which would be useful. 



UNCLASS! 



'i i\ 



59 



MAKE ■■ 

mio 

1U1 1 
M4 12 
1U13 

mis 

11416 
11*17 

mis 

11419 
11420 
142 1 
1U22 
1423 
1424 
1425 
1426 
1427 
1428 
1429 
1430 
1431 
1432 
1433 
1U34 



HIR246000 



UNCLASS!i 






PAGE 58 



C Well, you ate saying there that ue will set up a 
committee and then in the last paragraph, you recommend that 
Peter Dailey be asked to put the group together to spend a 
month doing it. and turn it over to an outside coordinator, 
as you mentioned a couple names of people who had been 
recommended m earlier paragraphs. 

Was It your responsibility to create this group? 

A No. 

S What was this exercise all about? 

A Exercise all about is that I was conscious of the 
fact that there was a real problem, and try to find some way 
to get the story more effectively told in the country, and a 
great number of people were coming to ma and to other 
people, and they all seemed to be saying the same thing, the 
bottom line of which was there is a need for this type of a 
coalition, and you know, if we are going to be doing this 
kind of thing, this is the sort of thing needed, and if you 
are going to do that sort of thing, somebody who understands 
this business is going to have to put it together like a 
Peter Dailey. 

That is what it was--I was basically drawing the 
conclusions out of all this massive information, which 
was--which was coming in from different people. The fact is 
nothing happened . 

Q Hell, you indicate that a principal — a central office 



UNCLASS 






60 



NAME ■■ 
1U3S 
1M36 
1437 
11438 
1439 

muo 

144 1 
1442 
1443 
1444 
1445 
1446 
1447 
1448 
1449 
1450 
1451 
1452 
1453 
1454 
1455 
1456 
1457 
1458 
1459 



ONCLASSf«>^: " 



HIR246000 353rs?|.l U X '^•■- '? !.*• li > t ' PAGE 59 
in the U.S. Government should be identified as the principal 
point uith this outside, independent group, and you indicate 
that It would be difficult for Faith to do it. because two 
of the principal audiences would be Congress and the nedia. 
Was it--uas that the purpose of this group, to influence the 
Congress and the media? Has that what the consensus was of 
these discussions? 

A I think these discussions and, of course, not all of 
them, some of them are a great raft of different types of 
people there, but the discussions focused largely over the 
fact that there was an enormous educational problem, and we 
had to get that story--we had to get the story out, and that 
if we were--if you are interested in getting it out, these 
people are all telling you, is essentially you are going to 
have to create something like a Committee for Present Danger 
and going to have to get soma kind of an activist to do it. 

Now, there is an informational problem, and they 
need to have some point in the government where they can 
receive written materials like this, and the logical place-- 

HR. LEON: Would you identify for the record, Mr. 
Raymond, what it was you referred to? 

THE WITNESS: This is a document produced by 
Department of State--better one would be the one over 
there--produced by the Department of State's Office of Public 
Liaison--Of f ice of LPD-- 



UHCLASS 



U i*<^*' 



61 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLAS 






PAGE 60 



HR. OLIVER: Let th« record indicate that Hr . 
Raymond has several documents produced by the Office of 
Latin American Public Diplomacy and the State Department 
with which the committee is familiar. 

THE WITNESS: It could be LPD, it could be 
Secretary, or whatever, but I think--it was the 
recommendation of John Poindexter if anything like that 
happened, it should be the Department of State. 
BY KR. OLIVER: 

2 You say in there that — when you sort of say that 
Faith Whittlesey's mandate would make it difficult for her 
to meet with committees of Congress, that this might argue 
for keeping the contract within the public diplomacy context 
where substantive support could be supplied as requested. 
What do you mean by that? 

A I mean that if you got a group of people who are 
concerned citizens about Central America, that if they 
requested information, they would be able to receive it, and 
this is--this is possible, American citizens can do this, and 
they would be able to get this type of material. 

Q Did you — you recommended that Peter Dailey be asked 
to put the group together? 

A Um-hum. 

S Was he asked to put the group together? 

A To the best of my knowledge, nothing ever happened. 



UNCLASSL^. 



62 



NAME: 
1U85 
1U86 
11487 
1488 
1>489 
1490 
1491 
1492 
1493 
1494 
1495 
1496 
1497 
1498 
1499 
1500 
150 1 
1502 
1503 
1504 
1505 
1506 
1507 
1508 
1509 



UNCLASS 



* 4 



HIR246000 I II ma. I U W;. ■^';. , _ i PAGE 61 
e Did you ever discuss it with Peter Oailey? 



A Not — not in this time frame. Peter, after the IHF 
debate, went back to Ireland, and I think the general 
feeling was he would be out of--out of Ireland long enough, 
and he needed to stay there, because he had been out for a 
couple of months. 

Again, I repeat that--I mean, one can argue this both 
ways, but what this memo actually ref lects--and the ones 
previous--a series of frustrations that existed in Washington 
and need to try to find some way to have a--and I kept 
reiterating throughout everything I write, genuinely 
bipartisan, centralist organization designed to engage in 
information, and that is what is stated here initially, 
informational programs, and this was basically where my 
thrust was . 

Now, that doesn't mean to say you may not find 
various testimony and other discussions, other people who 
had different approaches, but I was basically interested in 
trying to get the story out. 

2 Primarily, the effort was directed to trying to 
Increase the support for the President's policy in Central 
America? 

A Absolutely. 

2 Did you ever discuss this with Peter Dalley? 

A I have discussed Central America with Peter Dailey 



UNCLASS^ 



i il^:J 



63 



NAHE: 
1510 
1511 
1512 
1513 

15114 

1515 
1516 
1517 
1518 
1519 
1520 
1521 
1522 
1523 
152M 
1525 
1526 
1527 
1528 
1529 
1530 
1531 
1532 
1533 
153U 



|!S-(>[jS^«M 



HIR2146000 \. .' r',9;5_^^ 'T(,." PAGE 62 

at vailous stages, yes. 

2 Did you discuss this idea with Petez Dailey — 

A I don't believe I discussed this idea with Peter 
Dailey in 1983. 

e When did you discuss it uith him? 

A Ue discussed it at a subsequent date, and I would 
have to do some homework on that. I think--I think it cones 
back up on the screen and it is in sonething you have got 
here m 1986. 

2 You made this recommendation. What happened to it? 

A Well, I think--again, if memory serves properly, 
nothing. What happened is Faith Whittlesey continued to do 
her outreach. Otto Reich came on, put a staff together and 
started producing a lot of material, but we never did, to 
the best of my recollection, unless something happened I 
wasn't aware of, construct a coalition in the sense that I 
am talking about. 

I mean, there may be other organizations, but I was 
talking about a broad-based, bipartisan structure. 

2 So, all of this--all of these meetings with all of 
these public relations specialists and consultants and 
others, cane to naught and nothing happened. Did you get a 
response to this memo? 

A Well, I think--! won't say. though, all — I mean, some 
of the ideas proposed as to how one gets a message across 



UNCLASSir. 



iy w 



64 



1535 
1536 
1537 
1538 
1539 
15140 
15U 1 
1542 
15<43 
15Ut« 
1545 
15U6 
1547 
1548 
1549 
1550 
1551 
1552 
1553 
1554 
1555 
1556 
1557 
1558 
1559 



ONCLASS' 



HIR246000 |?Srai.|_H«l<^^!'^ •" PAGE 63 

and so on. may have been leilected in some of the thinking. 
We needed to produce a paper like this, or you need to get 
the message out across the land, but I don't think an 
organj.zational structure came out. 

It roay have been helpful for Otto Reich's benefit to 
get the benefit of the views of experienced people like Ton 
Korologos and Bill Greener, but I think that--basically that 
is the answer . 

2 Did you get a response from Bill Clark? 

A Well, the only response that I can see from what you 
are giving here, unless there is something that--one of the 
exhibits--my recollection is that by looking at this 29 
August Raymond to Poindexter is--he and I must have talked 
between the 9th and the 29th, and he must have stopped an4 
talked to the chain of command earlier. 

He must have stopped this memo--this, I agreed some 
of this--and I wrote a new cover note and said, you are right 
about--and proceeded to discuss this, so the response as best 
I can remember was an oral between myself and Poindexter. 

2 Hell, let's move on to that memorandum that has 
already been marked as, I believe. Exhibit 6) is that 
correct? You have it? 

A Poindexter? 

2 Yeah. You said in that memorandum you continued to 
get a number of proposals about how we can generate a 



UNCLASS: 



65 



unclassif;ed 



NAHE : HIR2i*6000 ^0 um ^r ^m w^m -^ m m . ^ _- PAGE 6U 

1560 private sector program to support the President. Are you 

1561 referring to proposals that you got subsequent to August the 
1562, 9th? 

1563 A I cannot answer whether I got anything between 

15614 August 9 and August 29, but I had received quite a few 

1565 during the summer months of 1983, and they were in a sense 

1566 saying much the same thing, and that is why I was sharing it 

1567 with--Clark and PoindeKter. 

1568 Q Well, you 9ot--in the second paragraph, you indicate 

1569 that Bill Casey called you on August the 26th and wanted to 

1570 follow up on his idea to have a meeting with five or six 

157 1 public relations specialists, and said you put him off until 

1572 after Labor Day. 

1573 Uhy did Bill Casey call you to follow up on his 
157U idea? 

1575 A He--I can't answer that specifically. I will try to 

1576 reflect what I think might have been the situation. He was 

1577 aware of the fact that I was interested in public diplomacy; 

1578 he was aware of the fact that Otto Raich was or was about to 

1579 come on board. 

1580 He was aware of the fact that we needed to be more 

1581 effective in how we were going to get our message delivered 

1582 to domestic and foreign audiences, and the next step was 

1583 that he advised me that he was meeting with these public 
158<4 diplomacy people. 



UNCLASSirSED 



66 



NAHE: 
1585 
1586 
1587 
1588 
1589 
1590 
1591 
1592 
1593 
1594 
1595 
1596 
1597 
1598 
1599 
1600 
160 1 
1602 
1603 
1604 
1605 
1606 
1607 
1608 
1609 



UNCLASS! 



> \'.V ; 9 PAC 

5 _ Vsa ^ 



HIR2'46000 r'JMI'l n Wg.:« tit." , ? page 65 

X might answer your quastion if you ar« going to ask 
it. I don't know if the meeting ever took place. I don't 
recall having any feedback from it. Again, it is four years 
ago. But I have no further--to the best of my knowledge, the 
story ends here on this particular--proposal . 

Q In the second paragraph, you refer to Gil Robinson 
moving to the State Department as the Public Diplomacy 
Coordinator . 

A Right. 

2 Did that in fact happen? 

A He moved to State. The timing. I am not sure. It 
suggests from this thing probably in late 1983. but I oan't 
be sure of the time. He was given a title that frankly was 
confusing in the Department of State, as I am sure you know. 

He became a Public Diplomacy Coordinator, sort of. to 
Shultz. and Jerry Helman was also operating and frankly, it 
was an unfortunate development, because it reduced 
Ambassador Helman's staff, and I think--created some 
confusion in the ranks as to command lines and 
responsibilities . 

2 Well, let me ask you--you indicate in there that--you 
thought that he could be the glue to put this sort of public- 
private relationship together. 

A Hell. Secretary Shultz has occasionally commented on 
the need to have outreach, the need to involve the private 



UNCLASSir^EB 



67 



NAHE: 
1610 
1611 
•1612 
1613 
16 m 
161S 
1616 
1617 
1618 
1619 
-1620 
162 1 
1622 
1623 
162U 
1625 
1626 
1627 
1628 
1629 
1630 
1631 
1632 
1633 
163<4 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 66 



sector in foreign policy, and without putting words in the 
Secretary's mouth, which I have no intention of doing, this 
business of citizens, foreign policy is sonething that the 
Secretary has talked about fron time to time, and there was 
the question of whether Gil, with his background, might play 
that kind of a role. 

One of the reasons I find that it attracted--f r ankly , 
Gil Robinson, as having been President of the New York Board 
of Trade and other kinds of things, knew that field, and he 
knew that field infinitely better than I did, and I frankly 
wanted to get my office and myself out of the middle of 
this, and part of what I was trying to do was, I have the 
problem, and this is not exactly grabbing at straws, but it 
would be very helpful if it could have been moved 
comfortably over to the Department of State, and if it could 
have been effectively and legally. 

Now, the fact of the matter is that Gil Robinson's 
responsibilities at State were quite restricted and instead 
of coming on and creating a major presence in terms of 
private-public interface, he undertook a few specific 
projects--! remember one case where he brought in 50 CEOs to 
meet with the Secretary and key spokesmen on Central America 
talked about the problem. 

But that is--it did not create a major new presence 
in either the public diplomacy field nor the Central 



UNCLASSIFSEk) 



68 



NAME: 
1635 
1636 

1637 
1638 
1639 
1640 

16141 

16142 
16>43 
1614(4 
16M5 
1646 
161(7 
16>48 
1649 
1650 
165 1 
1652 
1653 
165M 
1655 
1656 
1657 
1658 
1659 



HIR2<46000 



(JNCLASSIr^ 






PAGE 



67 



American field. 

2 You indicated in the last sentence that you 
philosophized a bit with Bill Casey in an effort to get him 
out of the loop. Why were you trying to get him out of the 
loop ? 

A I felt it would be more appropriate for these issues 
to be dealt with by the Department of State or the NSC or 
people who had a responsibility for being involved in public 
diplomacy, including informational programs to the United 
States . 

2 Why uas--why uas Bill Casey involved in this? What 
uas--what uas his role here? 

A I think this goes back to his role in the 
Administration, and he uas one of the key foreign policy 
advisors, and you can name the rest. I mean, the Secretary 
of State, Secretary of Defense, then National Security 
Adviser, and I think that the President, and I think this is 
probably true of some other Presidents, not all--I think the 
President found his advice important and useful, and he 
participated and history can judge uhether this is the right 
. role--that he participated in the foreign policy process, and 
frequently I think probably took his DCI hat off and looked 
at foreign policy issues as a senior member of the 
Administration. 

Nou, it is in that capacity that I think he uas 



^NOUSS 



i2x,5, 



69 



NAME : 
1660 
1661 
.1662 
1663 
166U 
1665 
1666 
1667 
1668 
1669 
1670 
1671 
1672 
1673 
1674 
1675 
1676 
1677 
1678 
1679 
1680 
1681 
1682 
1683 
168^ 



HIR2U6000 



unclass!f:ed 



PAGE 68 



obviously extremely concerned about the Central American 
issue . 

2 You do on to say he was negative about turning the 
ball over to State, but positive about someone working on 
the problem irom within State. Does that imply that 
somebody is working within State but the ball is somewhere 
else ? 

A That was not the spin I expected. Let me read it 
again. What it implies is a frustration, some might say a 
realization that the traditional lines in the Department of 
State were not going to be particularly energetic, and 
informational programs and someone like Gil Robinson, who 
had spent his life in the private sector and understood 
public relations, understood how one tries to project a 
message, would probably have more success in this th*n a 
traditional Foreign Service officer. 

That is what is reflected from Bill Casey's side. I 
am not making a judgment on this, but I think that was 
behind his perception. 

8 While you were in the White House, how often did you 
talk to Bill Casey? 

A It is a descending scale. If that is the right 
word. Obviously, when I was in the Intelligence 
Directorate, very regularly, and-- 

2 When you say regularly, do you mean on a regular 



UNCLASSSi^:E3 



82 7^ 69 



70 



KAKE : 
1685 
1686 
1687 
1688 
1689 
1690 
1691 
1692 
1693 
169U 
1695 
1696 
1697 
1698 
1699 
1700 
170 1 
1702 
1703 
1704 
170S 
1706 
1707 
1708 
1709 



mam 



HIR2'46000 SHWII'I 1.1^ ^ . ■ ' PAGE 69 
basis, daily basis? 

A Maybe it is a week or something like that. 

2 Did you meet with him regularly when you were-- 

A Let me nodiiy that--someuhere around the 1st oi 
January, give or take. 

2 What year are ue in? 

A I am sorry. 1983. Bill Clark decided to have a 
ueekly meeting with Bill Casey. Every Thursday, 5:00, ii I 
recall. While I was in the Intelligence Directorate, I very 
rarely had contract with him. other than at that meeting, 
but that was a weekly meeting. If I had--back with my 
intelligence hat on now--if I had concerns about the 
community, I would normally go through the easy c>iannels of 
talking to the Exec Officer or the Chief of Staff or 
something like that. 

I think if you were to get all my correspondence 
from 1982 to 1987, you would see--it will support this 
descending trend. This is an August--this is an August memo, 
and I left that Directorate in July, and there was some--you 
know, you always have a slow disengagement on previous 
regular contacts. 

fi Did you stop sitting in on the meeting in July of 
1983? 

A Yes, as soon as I left that Directorate, I stopped 
sitting in and my contacts with him wera--very limited in, 



uNCLAdSkrk3 



71 



NAME: 
1710 

171 1 
,1712 

17 13 
1714 
171S 
17 16 
17 17 
17 18 
1719 
1720 

172 1 
1722 
1723 
172U 
1725 
1726 
1727 
1728 
1729 
1730 
1731 
1732 
1733 
173M 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLASSli' 



?rw""^j 



PAGE 70 



let's say, the last three years. I mean< probably I would 
bump into him in the hall. His office was around the corner 
from the NSC on the third floor, and I probably had occasion 
to see him maybe three or four times a year in the last two 
or three years, so it was limited contact. 

S But between January and July or August of 1983. you 
met with him on a weekly basis with Bill Clark? 

A Yeah. 

S Just the .three of you? 

A No. Often he would bring his deputy and often Bill 
Clark would have his deputies, Bud McFarlane and so on. 
Might have John Poindexter possibly, but you might hava John 
McMahon. Sometimes it was three and sometimes it was six. 

2 In those meetings, did you discuss this subject of 
public diplomacy in 1983? 

A I--very rarely. I can't recall any specific 
occasions where we discussed it in one of those five October 
meetings. I wouldn't rule it out that we might have. Z 
cannot remember anything specific on that. 

As I said, that wa are going through a transition, 
and by the time that I had moved into my new responsibility 
and other people were then meeting with Bill Casey, there 
was a whole new communication set-up. and I quite frankly 
was extremely busy with my new responsibilities, and was 
quite anxious not to stay involved with the other 



UNCLI^S 






72 



NAME ■■ 
173S 
1736 
1737 
1738 
1739 
1740 
1741 
1742 
1743 
1744 
1745 
1746 
1747 
1748 
1749 
1750 
1751 
17 52 
1753 
1754 
1755 
1756 
1757 
1758 
1759 



HIR246000 



UNCLASS 



'^^' 



1 



PAGE 71 



Directorate, because X thought it would be better to keep it 
separate . 

2 Did you discuss the nove from the Senior Director of 
Intelligence to this new job with Bill Casey prior to your 
taking the new job? 

A I don't believe I specifically did, but I wouldn't 
rule it out. I might have. I think that ray recollection. 
as far as it may be hard to believe that we were called in 
by Bill Clark and the reorganization was announced, and we 
all took a look and said--to find out where we were going to 
be sitting toraorrow morning. 

Now, this does not mean to say there had not been 
discussion with various people. There had been discussion 
with me about the desirability of creating a Public 
Diplomacy Office, Information-Communication Office, and I 
had discussed it, but it was very--but none of us were 
totally certain as to how that reorganization was going to 
be, and it was an in-house thing, so I wasn't going to 
people outside of the NSC wmi discussing it. 

I--I don't want to be naive, but it is very possible 
.something like that was discussed one of those Wednesdays, 
because it was going to affect the liaison. I don't 
remember it, but it would not have been surprising if it 
was, and there was nothing remarkable that came out of that 
exchange that I recall. 



uNCUSSir.a 



73 



HIR2146000 



UNCLAS 






■J 



PAGE 



72 



2 Do you think Bill Casey approved, or do you know 
whether or not Bill Casey approved the creation of this and 
the moving of you to Senior Director of Intelligence to 
Public Affairs. International Communications? 

A Yes. I think he would have. 

2 Did he? 

A I think--did he approve it in the formal sense? 
No--did he think it was a good idea? 

2 You don't remember whether you discussed it with 
him? Do you know whether or not Bill Clark discussed it 
with him? 

A No, I don't. 

2 Has there-- 

A I have to conclude that it is probable that it was 
discussed in some context with him, because it affected his 
liaison. It affected his contact point at the NSC at the 
working level, but I don't recall the discussion. 

I do know that all of us had felt. Bill Clark, Bill 
Casey, had felt that there was a need for a number of 
activities, not so much what we are talking here, but in the 
' broader sense of energizing other parts of the government to 
be doing things in the open--in the open, public activities. 
State Department, USIA, AID and Defense, so he favored 
concept and the philosophy behind the creation of the SPG-- 

2 You were the one-- 



UNCLASSi^ a 



74 



MAME : 
1785 
1786 
1787 
1788 
1789 
1790 
1791 
1792 
1793 
1794 
1795 
1796 
1797 
1798 
1799 
1800 
180 1 
1802 
1803 
180U 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 
1809 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLAS 



IffcH^r.r-'^ 



a L^!^ i'»GE 



73 



A --so, it would not be inconsistent. 

2 You were the one zecommending that it be created, 
the SPG? 

A I don't want to take the full responsibility for 
that. I think it is a logical outgrowth of the discussions 
which were taking place in the KSC over a period of a year, 
and Bill Clark was personally very supportive of it. 

2 But you wrote the nemorandun reconnending-- 

A I wrote it in conjunction with Gary Lord, who 
was--still active in that area. 

2 And when you left the Intelligence Directorate, your 
deputy then became the Senior Director of — 

A Right. 

2 --Intelligence. Uhen did you first meet Oliver North? 

A Probably the first day I cane into NSC, but I can't 
be sure of that, but he was on board and the staff officer, 
and that is the first time I met him. I had never known him 
before . 

2 And did you work with him at the NSC in your 
capacity as Senior Director of Intelligence? 

A No, not that I recall. I worked with him--trying to 
r«member--well , I don't recall working with him when I was 
the Senior Director of Intelligence. I could have. I can't 
be specific, but I was--my recollection is in those days, the 
interface Central American policy frhYTfen a n J »n haw from 



UNCLASS 



K^i 



75 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLASSl 



a .. 



PAGE 7H 



the people in Central America was with--I believe Al Sapia- 
Bosch. S-a-p-i-a dash B-o-s-c-h--and Roger--I guess basically 
Al Sapia-Bosch. and the reason why I would be dealing with 
it--with him was because he was the one who was interested in 
the issues that I was interested in. 

I don't know, frankly, what Ollie was doing when X 
came there. It may be military issues. 

8 When did he first begin to attend your NSP6 
meetings, or SPG meetings, whatever it was-- 

A Let me clarify some of the responses that have been 
made in the hearings on that. First of all, he was not a 
member of the SPG. Someone says that in one of the 
hearings. He was an NSC staff officer who was one of 
several with responsibility for Central America. 

Uhen the SPG Ex-Com met, we very rarely covered 
Central America, because it was largely being done by Otto 
Reich's team. On the other hand, when SPG met and there 
were frequently meetings discussing Central America, 
presentations by either Dick Stone or Otto Reich--to the best 
of my recollection. Cilia Korth never attended one of those 
' meetings . 

I believe this nan, Al Sapia-Bosch, was the one who 
attended. Kou, the question then comes back to what was his 
role with — you know, with Otto Reich? You have to ask Ollie 
and you have to ask Otto on that, but he was a person that I 



UNCUSSirSD 



76 



NAME: 
1835 
1836 
1837 
1838 
1839 
18(40 
18141 
18142 
18143 
18(414 
I8I45 
18146 
I8I47 
18148 
18(49 
1850 
1851 
1852 
1853 
185(4 
1855 
1856 
1857 
1858 
1859 



UNCLASS 



HIR2U6000 liMk"! Il^'««>.l PAGE 75 

uould l >Ht to iron tine to tirea. as I would othat Central 
American people.i.when he began to get the Central American 
responsibility . 

Z uould also work very closely with Ray Burkhart. 
who was the principal officer on Central America--on Latin 
America. And I uould uork closely with--who was the other 

person--it is principally Burkhart^uas the head of the Latin 

>h 

America Office, but sometimes Burkhart uas available, and 
when he uasn't, Ollie uould coma in. 

2 Hou many weekly meetings did you chair or 
participate in in 198(4, '85 and '86? 

A Uell, this takes us back to sort of the Dante 
Fascell and George Shultz exchange. The Central American 
coordination on a day in-day out basis for public diplomacy 
uas run by LPD, uas not run by Halt Raymond. There were 
quarterly or semi-annual or annual reports which were sent 
over to the NSC--sent over to the SPG, which were status 
reports of progress. 

How, we would meat with considerable periodicity, 
once or twice a week--sorry--onca a weak or every other week 
-in a meeting in EOB, and this is where the confusion entered 
into EOB. This was a proposal suggested by Otto Reich so 
that we could use the EOB, since he was a Presidential 
appointee and since the way his appointment was made, that 
he had ties back to the Hhita House, ua would use the EOB as 



f^'- 



77 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLAS: 



PAGE 76 



a meeting place for weekly or bi-weekly meetings on Central 
America, so we could keep the process moving forward, and I 
basically provided facilitative services and essentially co- 
chaired these meetings with Otto, but that--that was going on 
for two or three years, and we were seeking to implement the 
Central American action plans which were approved by the 
SPG. 

2 Uho else attended those meetings? 

A Ue would have from--we would have a representative 
from--OPL, which is the Office of Public Liaison. That is 
the successor of Faith Whittlesey, that different people 
were in charge. Most of the time, Linas, L-i-n-a-s, 
Kojelis, K-o-j-e-l-i-s , would attend. I tried to insist of 
having somebody from the Central American Office, because 
public diplomacy does not make policy, but public diplomacy 
has to be in support of policy. 

Therefore, you have done what the policy is, so I 
had tried to get Burkhart to come. Burkhart wasn't 
available, North came, and at one stage, Constantine Henges, 
n-e-n-g-e-s, would cone. 

NSC, State, we would have Otto and one or two 
officers from his office, and when he--uhen possible, we 
would get somebody from ARA for policy. We would have 
somebody from USIA, we would have somebody from DOD, we 
would have somebody from the White House or NSC. press and 



UNCLASS:. u:.i 



78 



NAHE : 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
189 1 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLAS: 



PAGE 77 



on occasion, ue would have somebody iron CIA. 

2 How, did those nestings normally take place on a 
weekly basis? 

A Noimally. 

S Uas that the Thursday afternoon meeting? 

A Ho. I think this was the Thursday morning meeting. 
I don't know what the Thursday afternoon meeting is. I 
can't tell about that. Meeting times changed. It was a 
weekly meeting. 

2 But it was a regular Thursday--once weekly meeting? 

A That is right, but periods of time--various points in 
time would be every two weeks, not that that is very 
important, but sometimes it would change. 

e But isn't it true that for a long time, nobody from 
ARA attended those meetings? 

A It is true, but it was therefore the responsibility 
of Otto to be sure that he had the proper policy backdrop on 
which we could do all the program, and it was also why I 
wanted to have Kay Burkhart there. 

2 What was Ray Burkhart's position at that time? 

A Special Assistant to the President for Latin 
American Affairs. 

fi But in effect, ARA, while Tony Motley was the 
Assistant Secretary, was essentially not Included in those 
meetings; isn't that correct? 



UNCLA 



h 



:J 



79 



NAHE 
1910 
19 11 
1.9 12 
19 13 
1914 
19 15 
1916 
19 17 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
192U 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 



HIR246000 



UNCLASS 



PAGE 



78 



A No. I mean, if the inplication is that we were 
excluding Tony Hotley-- 

2 I didn't say that. I said not included. I would 
say this-- 

HR. LEON: Has he excluded? 

THE UITNESS: No, the ARA was not excluded, but 
there was tension, tension with Anders in the public 
diplomacy effort, tension with Motley in the public 
diplomacy effort. With Elliott Abrans, there is not 
tension, and you know this gets partially to personality, 
gets partially to--you Know, other Kinds of considerations, 
but I thinK at this point--! thinK that it is essential to 
have a policy person at these Kinds of meetings. 

There is somewhere in one of these--! talK about the 
need to have the policy involved. Public diplomacy has to 
be close to policy. The Public Diplomacy Coordinator should 
be in policy discussions, and one of the things hopefully he 
would say. you can't get from here to there. The public out 
there, whether the United States or overseas, isn't going to 
support you. This goes bacK to a more philosophical 
discussion, ! thinK, we have had in another context, but it 
is essential to get them together. 

S So, this weeKly meeting was co-chaired by you and 
Otto Reich? 

A But — 



IJNCLASS 



Si ilhaV^ 



80 



NAHE: 
193S 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
19M0 
1911 
19142 
1943 
194U 
1945 
19146 
19147 
1948 
1949 
19S0 
195 1 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 



HIR246000 



UNCLASSirE3 



PAGE 79 



2 Until 1980--what, early 1986? Otto moved to another 
job, and then you chaired it; is that right? 

A Well, it is co-chaired in a nominal sense, but I 
want to be clear on one point, and that is that Otto Reich 
ran LPD, and they reported up through the State bureaucracy 
for all kinds of things. I was concerned from the NSC/TSPG 
side of assuring that the public diplomacy plans which had 
been approved on an interagency basis were being carried 
out . 

And the character of the meeting is as--we would 
start and turn to Otto, and now Bob Kagen, and say, okay, 
what is going on? And they would report all the activities 
of their office and other people around the table report 
activities of their office, and very frequently that was the 
sum and essence of it, because one of the big problems in 
Washington is the left hand doesn't Know what the right hand 
is doing, and-- 

S Was there a note-taker present? 

A LPD would take any actions that needed to be carried 
out, or anybody else would taka any actions. Ha did not 
write a formal record. 

2 Was there a note-taker present? 

A No. 

S Was there any kind of reports or summaries of any 
kind that were made of these meetings? 



i 



UNCLASSIFIED 



81 



HAKE: 

1960 
1961 
■ 1962 
1963 
19614 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
198U 



HIR2'46000 



UNCLAS 



i^l-sr';^ 



PAGE 80 



A Not in any formal sense. LPD would use it — LPD would 
take actions on the basis of the meeting, but those actions 
would then be part of the final record, rather than the 
meeting itself . 

2 So, let me get this straight. It is you and Otto 
Reich and Ray Burkhart and/or Oliver North and sometimes 
someone from the CIA or always--CIA always included? 

A They were invited. 

Q They were always invited. Could you tell us who was 
there? 

A 

e 

Force ? 
A 
S 
A 
8 
A 

A 

e 

A 

2 



I don't think--probably for the — 

Was it the--Chairraan of the Central American Task 



A representative of his office. 
Did--and did you say DOD was also present? 
Right. 

Was that Nestar Sanchez? 
No, Irwin Kern usually. 
And from USIA, who was usually there? 
Usually John Scaif e . 
From USIA? 
Um-hum. 

Hasn't John Scaif • in the Offioa of LPD or 
Department of State? 

A It is a question of timing. You are absolutely 



UNCLAS 






82 



NAME: 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
199 1 
1992 
1993 
19914 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
200t« 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 



UNCLASS 



HIR2H6000 laiVI.I U_"^JA PAGE 81 

Eight. He has been coming for the last 12-18 months, 
because he is back in the USIA, leptesenting USIA . BejEoie 
that, he was in LPD. Several people--prevlous to John Scaife 
may have been Don Mathis . 

In other words, somebody was coming generally from 
the USIA Policy Office. That is where Hathis was. That is 
where Scaife was located. 

2 Once the rij^ was created for Central America, how 
did this group interact with the ri^? 

A Well, this is why I am really trying to define my 
role as a--generally a modest one. I never attended a rig. 
The people who attended the rig were Burkhart--North--I don't 
know what North's role is with the rij . Burkhart always 
attended. I don't know whether North always attended or 
not. I just can't answer that. 

And I know that Otto Reich felt he should attend the 
^Xg on a regular basis. I don't think he did. So, we were 
dependent on ARA or dependent on somebody from the NSC 
coming to give us policy guidance. 

2 So, you took your policy guidance from the _ri^ once 
' it was created ? 

A Yes. Ue are talking about day in-day out, because 
the broad strategic guidance is something which was 
interagency approved and signed off on by the SPG, and it 
was largely schematic materials and so on. 



UNCLASS: 



83 



NAME: 
2010 

201 1 
•2012 

2013 
201>4 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 

202 1 
2022 
2023 
202i« 
2025 
2026 
2027 
2028 
2029 
2030 
2031 
2032 
2033 
20314 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLASS 



'1 



PAGE 82 



I know that material is available in the public 
record someplace. 

e Who did the ri^report to? I know Elliott Abrams 
chaired the rlS' but who did the rig report to? 

A I--not being involved in the policy side of that 
process, I can only say that I believe to the NSP6. I am 
not certain whether HSPG got in between. 

2 When you say the NSPG. you mean the planning group 
chaired by the — 

A But smaller than a full HSC . 

Q I understand. Did you ever attend any KSP6 
meetings ? 

A On Central America. You are talking about--beoause X 
have attended them on other subjects. On Central America. 
I--um--I may have attended--! believe I did attend an NSPG 
meeting in 1982 with my other hat, but I attended--the--I only 
attended one NSPG meeting in my capacity in the public 
diplomacy responsibility, in my new responsibility, and that 
was on a radio-related subject. 

2 Well, did-- 

A Well, X think you probably know about it. 

Q Well, did--you took your policy guidance from the 
rig. Who told you to take your policy guidance from the 
rig? 

A Well, X think that is the standard procedure for all 



UHCLA 



r^%i> <i'^ 



J 



84 



NAME: 
2035 
2036 
2037 
2038 
2039 
20140 
20<41 
20142 
2043 
20414 
2045 
2046 
2047 
2048 
2049 
2050 
2051 
2052 
2053 
2054 
2055 
2056 
2057 
2058 
2059 



HIR246000 



UNCLA 



("-'""^ 



PAGE 83 



of public diplomacy. You have got to--ue tak« our policy 
guidance from the ongoing principal policy-making structure, 
whether it is the IG--the IG, the Interdepartmental Group 
(IG), is normally chaired by an Assistant Secretary and is 
normally the ongoing, daily workaday guidance process. 

When things get sticky or when policy negotiation in 
the road comes up or when senior authorities want to effect 
reviews, you can go either to the NSPG, the NSC or in some 
cases--and here I can't speak to this. They may go through 
the SIG process. The SIG--I am not frankly aware of very 
many SIGs taking place in the last couple of years in 
Washington . 

My sense is that most of these policies go iron the 
Assistant Secretary-run group right up to the apparent body 
up to the time of Frank Carlucci. As you are aware, there 
have been changes since then. 

2 What I am trying to determine is you set up 
this--this SPG earlier, which includes a lot of very high- 
ranking people, and then their deputies, and here you have 
the rig that is chaired by an Assistant Secretary with two 
-people well below that level, and it would--sometiaes like 
you have got--an imbalance here oz something that is not 
quite at the same level for this Hhita House Central America 
Public Diplomacy Group chaired by Ambassador Reich and co- 
chaired by you, to be taking your direction from a rig--which 



UNCLAS 



r- 



85 



HAME: 

2060 
2061 
. 2062 
2063 
206U 
2065 
2066 
2067 
2068 
2069 
2070 
2071 
2072 
2073 
2074 
2075 
2076 
2077 
2078 
2079 
2080 
2081 
2082 
2083 
208(4 



LI™!?! 



HIR2146000 asni'4„a v- . page 84 

none of you attend and it seems to ba at a lower level; 
doesn't make a lot oi sense to me > and that is why I asked 
the question, who told you to take policy guidance for them, 
because ordinarily in the government, ±i something like that 
happened, people would tell them to go fly a kite. 

A I think you have to differentiate between the policy 
track line and the public diplomacy track. What the SPG is 
is a very senior body, and the SPG is much more of a--is an 
organization which was designed to energize a community, 
energize a process, get people engaged in public diplomacy 
business . 

Now, it did not--at no point was'^ever suggested that 
it would begin to replace any of the policy mechanisms, and 
we want to be very careful. How, if the public diplomacists 
start trying to become policymakers, then you are going to 
have two competing policy bodies. 

So, I think it is not out of line for a public 
diplomacy working group, if you want to call it that, on 
Central America to be taking its policy guidance from the 
Assistant Secretary. Z mean, Reich did not outrank, if you 
want to try-- 

Q I understand that. 

A Yeah. 

8 But in effect, the only person from the White House 
in the rig was Oliver Horth. 



UNCLA 



^ti:i 



'^-0^ 
-..J 



86 



NAME : 
2085 
2086 
2087 
2088 
2089 
2090 
209 1 
2092 
2093 
20914 
2095 
2096 
2097 
2098 
2099 
2 100 
2 10 1 
2 102 
2103 
21014 
2105 
2106 
2107 
2108 
2109 



HiRaMeooo 



UNCLAS 






PAGE 85 



A No, I think Ray Burkhart was there at almost all the 
meetings . 

Q But he was below Oliver North. 

A No. Burkhart was Special Assistant to the President. 

MR. LEON: Burkhart was North's boss, in essence, 
wasn't he? 

MR. McGRATH: Off the record. 

(Discussion oii the record. ] 

( Recess . ] 

KR. OLIVER: All right. Back on the record. 

What was the last question. 

[Whereupon, the reporter read the record as 
directed . 1 

[Discussion off the record. ] 

KR. OLIVER: Let's go back to where Mr. Leon said--is 
it true that Ray Burkhart was Oliver North's boss in the 
formal structure of the NSC? 

THE WITNESS: ko , in the formal structure, Ray 
Burkhart was the Special Assistant for Latin American 
Affairs, and Oliver North was assigned to a different part 
of the NSC. 

KR. OLIVER: All right. 

BY KR. OLIVER: 
S When the--when the Central American Public Diplomacy 
meeting took place in your office, you Indicated that two of 



UNCLAS 



^g^r' 



'"i 



87 



UNCLAS 



"-4-. ■■■■ 



-J 



NAME: KIR2146000 IJ IVU Ln W%^ :> ^ L^dr^'^ PAGE 86 

2110 Otto Reich's deputies attended on a regular basis. Was that 

2111 Jonathan Miller and John Blaken? 

2 112 A Usually. They were the two deputies, that is 

2113 correct, and they usually attended, but sometimes schedules 

2 1114 interfered and only one person was there. 

2115 2 When did you first meet Jonathan Miller? 

2116 A When he was assigned to Otto Reich's office, LPD. 

2 117 Q Did you know him prior to that? Did you know of him 

2 1 18 prior to that? 

2119 A Ho, on both counts. 

2 120 2 Did the NSC or the White House play any role in his 

2121 appointment to that job, to your knowledge? 

2 122 A To my knowledge, no, although I have subsequently 

2123 heard that--that the deputy job was one that the White House 

2124 felt they might have an interest in filling. I don't 

2125 believe that they played any role in the Miller assignment. 
2 126 Q Now, these meetings began, I take it, in the summer 
2127 of 1983 in your office when you took over as the Director 

2 128 for International Communications and Public Diplomacy? 

2 129 A No , I think the regular meetings began probably 

2130 towards the beginning of 198U. Otto Raich took on his 

2131 responsibility sometime in the early fall or late summer of 

2132 1983, and he held several meetings in the Department of 

2133 State, and he found that he was not able to draw the right 
213^ people together under that sponsorship, and therefore he 



UNCLASS:. .^d 



88 



KAHE : 
2135 
2136 
2137 
2 138 
2 139 
2 1U0 
21U1 
2 1>42 
21(43 
21"4U 
21U5 
21U6 
2147 
21U8 
2 1U9 
2150 
2151 
2152 
2153 
2154 
2155 
2156 
2157 
2158 
2159 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLASS 






PAGE 87 



lecommended that he begin to hold bi-ueeKly meetings in EOB. 
And I basically accommodated hin and that is when ue 
led to this joint sharing oi the responsibility. 

2 And you attended those meetings? 

A Yeah. 

2 Were you aware of Oliver North's trip to Central 
America in the middle of 198U? 

A I would have to be more specific. X know that 
Oliver North traveled overseas in a great deal--in different 
directions, and I couldn't be certain of any specific time 
that he may have taken a trip to the region. 

2 Here you aware of him being given some 
responsibility for Central America within the NSC in 198U? 

A I was aware he had an active interest in an 
involvement in Central America. I can't set the time. 1984 
sounds about right. I was aware of the fact that he took 
frequent trips, some of which were to the region. Ue would 
occasionally hear reports from hin at the senior staff 
meetings which touched on his trips. 

I did not get very much information, you know, from 
Oliver North as to what he was doing. I do know he was in 
contact with the contras. but beyond that, I was not really 
involved in the details of his activities. 

S At these meetings, did you discuss the activities of 
Otto Reich's office? 



^^im 



89 



NAME: 
2160 
2161 

•2162 
2 163 
21614 
2165 
2166 
2167 
2168 
2169 
2170 
2171 
2172 
2173 
217H 
2175 
2176 
2177 
2178 
2179 
2180 
2 181 
2182 
2183 
218M 



UNCLA 



^^iCJiJ ^^^ puGE 88 



HIR246000 

k At which meetings? 

2 LPD, the Central Ametican public diplonacy meetings 
uhich took place in your office. 

A Ue discussed what needed to be done> and most of the 
time, that meant by LPD. It might mean that we needed to 
get West European correspondence down to El Salvador or 
Nicaragua, or it might mean we want to try to find some way 
to bring some Central Americans up to the United States. 

Ue would discuss various task aids for the office, 
and everybody would chip in. It was very free-flow. 

2 When did you first meet Frank Gomez? 

A I think he was still a DAS in soma place. Probably 
public affairs and State, and he sat in on one or two 
meetings that I had on soma subject, and h« lait or retired. 
I have only seen him two or three times since then. 

2 Were you aware that he became a consultant to LPD? 

A I was--yes, yes. I was not aware of all the details, 
nor was I particularly aware of his work responsibilities 
because I was more interested in tasking than being involved 
in the tasking process and discussion process. I was less 
.involved in how you are actually going to get it done. 

But I am aware of the fact that he was working with 
LPD at a point in time. I can't tell you now without 
recourse to records, which I might not even have, when he 
started and when he ended. 



UHCl^ 



-AT'- . 



90 



NAHE : 
218S 
2186 
2187 
2 188 
2189 
2 190 
2 19 1 
2192 
2193 
219U 
2195 
2196 
2197 
2198 
2 199 
2200 
2201 
2202 
2203 
22014 
2205 
2206 
2207 
2208 
2209 



HIR2M6000 



UNCLASSl 



PAGE 89 



2 When did you first meet Rich Miller? 

A I think I met him about two or three times in my 
life. Would have been in 'SU or '85. 

2 Do you remember what the occasion was? 

A Well, once in Ollie North's office. I was down 
there for some reason or another, and he was there, and I 
met him. And other places. Nothing very--nothing that I can 
recall with any specificity. Mindful of all the discussions 
taking place in the hearings, and I was very — hearing most of 
that for the first time. 

2 Were you aware that Frank Gomez and Rich Killer 
obtained a State Department contract from LPD in the fall of 
1984? 

A I was aware after the fact that the contract had 
been signed, yes. I remember also talking to Otto and him 
making the comment that it had been looked at very carefully 
by the State Department lawyers. 

2 Were you aware that just prior to the period for 
this first contract, that Rich Killer and Frank Gomez and 
Otto Reich and Jonathan Killer and Oliver North had a 
meeting at IBC's office? 

A No. 

2 That subject wasn't discussed in your weekly 
meeting ? 

A Not that I can remember. 



UHCLftSl 



91 



NAME : 
2210 
221 1 
2212 
2213 
22 m 
2215 
2216 
2217 
2218 
22 19 
2220 
2221 
2222 
2223 
222M 
2225 
2226 
2227 
2228 
2229 
2230 
2231 
2232 
2233 
223(4 



UNCLASSv"^^ 



HIR2146000 l^nil'l Il^'N':.- '- . ^ PAGE 90 

2 You never--didn' t discuss during that period of time 
the fact that LPD was hiring this public relations firn? 

A No. I kneu the contract had been let, and I knew 
they were doing some work. But you know, as to specific 
meetings with specific groups of people at times I did not 
necessarily--! wasn't following that activity that closely. 
X was aware of the fact that it was a contract. 

2 Well, didn't this sort of follow along the lines of 
your earlier memoranda and discussions about hiring an 
outside public relations firm to do some of these things? 

A What X understood--what X am talking about in terms 
of that kind of a firm--not a firm, that kind of a coalition 
of bipartisan coalitions--that was--X--I envisioned this as 
something vastly different than what you are talking about. 
Ue had hired a firm to write articles or to perhaps take 
care of Central American figures that are coming up. That 
is not what X--had been talking about in some of these 
previous exhibits. 

2 So, you indicated that you had only met Rich Miller 
and Frank Gomez a few times? 

A Correct. 

2 And you remember meeting Rich Killer once in Oliver 
North's office. Do you remember attending any meetings with 
Rich Miller, any substantive meetings that related to 
Central America and public diplomacy? 



(jNi/Ln^w>^ 



:i 



92 



NAHE : 
2235 
2236 
2237 
2238 
2239 
22U0 
2241 
2242 
2243 
2244 
2245 
2246 
2247 
2248 
2249 
2250 
2251 
2252 
2253 
2254 
2255 
2256 
2257 
2258 
2259 



HIR246000 



(\ f. Z''"'T '^ 



PAGE 91 



A I think there uas a meeting that took place once 
with Lew Lehrman> L-e-h-r-m-a-n , Citizens for America. 

2 What was that meeting? 

A That was again the basic question of how to get, you 
know, the informational question, and Citizens for America, 
of course, has an inf ormation--national system for 
information distribution, and they were talking about what 
the issue was . 

ny recollection of this meeting was largely 
informational. Ue were discussing what was going on in 
Central America, and I think Rich Miller was there. 

2 Would that have been on January 25, 1985? 

A It could have been. I would think probably it would 
have been early '85, but I am extrapolating back without a 
calendar or book of notes . 

2 Uho chaired that meeting? 

A Well, clearly Ollie North had been very active in 
setting it up, because I went there completely cold and 
there were a number of people around the table . ny 
recollection is that 011i«--011i« and Lew Lehrman, and again, 
it seemed to me largely a question of what is the problem 
and what is going on in Central America at that stage. 

2 Uas a project discussed at that meeting for Central 
American public diplomacy or generating public support for 
the President's policies? Uas that the purpose of the 



UNCLS^S 



93 



HAKE' 
2260 
2261 
2'262 
2263 
2264 
2265 
2266 
2267 
2268 
2269 
2270 
2271 
2272 
2273 
2274 
2275 
2276 
2277 
2278 
2279 
2280 
2281 
2282 
2283 
228U 



UNCIA 



PAGE 92 



'^C c. 



HIR2t46000 
meeting? 

A No question that the purpose of the neetin? would be 
to generate support for the President's policies. I believe 
that there was discussion/ but what came o£ it, I an not 
sure. There was discussion of trying to--Citizens for 
America was very interested in being active, and there was 
some discussion of the fact that they would try to develop 
an informational program, which would have a broad 
geographic ramification. 

That is my recollection of it. I don't know whether 
there is more to it or not, but again, I am operating two 
and a half years later, and I haven't revisited that since 
then. 

e Has funding for this project discussed at that 
meeting? 

A I don't--! can't be sure. I think that Lehrman felt 
that ha had money, but I don't want to overstate that. 

S Has he seeking funding for his project? Do you 
remember? 

A I don't think so. I mean, my remembrance of this, 
-as you say, January meeting — see, you have got a White House 
door list there--my remembrance of this was that it was 
really stating the problem and him being very concerned 
about Central America. Written a lot on it, and a lot of 
material that has been distributed throughout the country by 



O .'-' 



UNCLAD 



94 



NAME: 
2285 
2286 
2287 
2288 
2289 
2290 
2291 
2292 
2293 
229U 
2295 
2296 
2297 
2298 
2299 
2300 
2301 
2302 
2303 
2301 
2305 
2306 
2307 
2308 
2309 



HIR246000 



liNCLASSJ. 



"^ 



PAGE 93 



the CFA, and I think he wanted to get an update on what was 
going on. and wanted to Know what we were up to and what he 
could do to be helpful. 

2 Why would Rich Miller and Frank Gonez> representing 
IBC, be at that meeting? 

A I am not sure, other than the fact they listened to 
a discussion where there is going to be an 

outteach--inf orraational outreach, and that is some of what 
they were doing. 

2 And you were aware that they were under contract to 
the Department of State? 

A I was aware that a contract had been concluded with 
them. I don't recall when the contract started and stopped, 
so I think we talked before that the contract was during 
1984. I don't know how long that contract lasted. I really 
don't. Somewhere along the line the contract stopped, but I 
don't know when it was. 

S Do you remember one of the > onl ac In being 
classified? 

A I certainly know that after the fact by listening to 
the hearings. I don't recall whether I knew that at the 
tine, but I did talk to Otto about that, and Otto says it 
was for protection of some of the refugees and others who 
were involved in the program. 

2 And this became public, or at the time? 



\9S'' 



95 



NAtlE: 
2310 
231 1 
2312 
2313 

23m 

2315 
2316 
2317 
2318 
2319 
2320 
2321 
2322 
2323 
232<4 
232S 
2326 
2327 
2328 
2329 
2330 
2331 
2332 
2333 
233U 



HIR2U6000 liNCLASS^F-^7) "" '" 

A Something I asked Otto just" a feu days ago, because 
I don't lemembei why it was a classified contract, and X 
have no reason to disagree with that, but that is what I 
understood now aitet the fact. 

e Did you discuss with Otto the deposition that he 
gave this committee? 

A Ko . I discussed with hin--I said I see that this 
thing is classified. He said, well--sources , and we just 
didn't talk any further about that. 

2 Was he in town, or were you in Venezuela? 

A Ko . This was--this was--he was here on summer 
vacation. He was in Washington. 

2 And did you discuss with him the LPD and the whole 
genesis and what they did? 

A Not at that time, because we both--we both new what 
he did. I mean, there was no need to review any of that 
with him. 

Q Did you know a man named Jake Jacobawitz? 

A Yes . 

S How did you know him? 

A A nanber of the LPD team. 

e Did he participate in the meeting? 

A That is when I made my previous comment that we 
always bring the two deputies. Ho, he didn't always bring 
them. Sometimes one deputy was not available, sometimes two 



UNCLASS^FD 



96 



NAME : 
2335 
2336 
2337 
2338 
2339 
2340 
2341 
2342 
2343 
2344 
2345 
2346 
2347 
2348 
2349 
2350 
2351 
2352 
2353 
2354 
2355 
2356 
2357 
2358 
2359 



HIR246000 



UNCLAS3. 



PAGE 



95 



uece not available. One oi the stand-ins was Jake 
Jacobauitz. so he attended a nurabet oi the meetings. 

2 Did you know Mark Richards? 

A By name only. I don't recall meeting him. 

2 Did you know that he uas a consultant to the--to LPD 
during 1985? 

A I only know that because--bacause Otto mentioned his 
name. I don't know the man personally. 

2 Did you know what he was doing? 

A No. 

2 Did you know Barbara Garland? 

A No . 

2 You mentioned John Scaife earlier. 

A These people will be upset that I don't know them, 
because I think they assume X knew them all, and I don't. 

2 John Scaife was assigned to LPD from USIA; is that 
correct? 

A Correct. 

2 Did the White House have anything to do with getting 
these people detailed from other agencies to LPD? 

A Yes. 

2 What did you have to do with it? What was your 
involvement? 

A That is the kind of thing that the SPG process was, 
I think, able to do and do well, and that is that it is 



UNCLASSi 



97 



KAHE : 
2360 
2361 
2362 
2363 
23614 
2365 
2366 
2367 
2368 
2369 
2370 
237 1 
2372 
2373 
237U 
2375 
2376 
2377 
2378 
2379 
2380 
2381 
2382 
2383 
238U 



UNCLASSi> 



HIR2U6000 linil'l llWk'x, PAGE 96 

extremely difficult to get people detailed to another 
agency. People don't like to surrender bodies, and ue 
wanted to have a strong interagency tean, so in effect, ue 
put a levy out and asked Peter McPherson, asked Cap 
Weinberger and asked Charlie Hick to help staff up the LPD 
office . 

2 And did they do that? 

A And they did that. 

2 And John SCaife came from USIA? 

A Right. 

2 Did anyone else come from USIA? 

A There is a fellow named--Johnson--no , I may not be 
right there. There is Steve--is there a Steve Johnson on the 
list? I think a fellow named Steve Johnson who is a USIA 
body, and there may have been somebody earlier. Ky sense is 
that ue have had two from USIA at all tines . One may have 
been the secretary. 

2 Mho came from AID? Do you recall? 

A I don't recall immediately. I might if I saw the 
names . 

2 Was there--uas there any discussion in any of ycur 
meetings about problems they were having with these 
contracts for IBC? 

A Ko, not in our meetings. 

2 Here you ever aware of any--any need for White House 



UNCLASSi 



i uiik V 



98 



NAME: 
238S 
2386 
2387 
2388 
2389 
2390 
2391 
2392 
2393 
2394 
2395 
2396 
2397 
2398 
2399 
2400 
240 1 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2409 



HIR246000 



UNCLflSSr 



d ^-. 



PAGE 97 



support for these contracts being concluded, or the bills 
being paid? 

A No. 

2 And you didn't know at the time why the last State 
Department contract was classified as secret? 

A I did not know at the time. I probably--! certainly 
could have found out if I had asked, but I did not involve 
myself in the management process. For example, I know again 
retrospectively that there was an IG inspection. I have not 
seen the IG report. I have not asked to see the IG report. 
I consider that is the management (question that basically 
would be resolved by the Department of State. 

2 Do you know David Fischer? 

A Well, I know who he is, certainly. I think I have 
met him only in the sense that meetings that I have had--in 
the Oval Office, that he was there, I mean in the outer 
office, but nothing more than that. 

2 Did you ever meet him in the context of his being a 
consultant to IBC? 

A Ho. 

2 Do you know Marty Artiano? 

A Ho. 

2 In December of 1984, you had a meeting with a woman 
named Edie Fraser of W*liiui. C Fraser Public Relations. 

A Right. 



(iNCLA 



W vj , 



.,;j 



99 



NAME ■■ 
24 10 

241 1 
214 12 
2413 
2M m 
24 15 
24 16 
24 17 
2418 
2419 
2420 

242 1 
2422 
2423 
2424 
2425 
2426 
2427 
2428 
2429 
2430 
2431 
2432 
2433 
2434 



HIR246000 



(^.W£R 



UNCLASS^; 



£ Fraser. 



MR. OLIVER: Ofi the record. 
(Discussion off the record. ] 
MR. OLIVER; All right, back on the record 
I would like to ha^/e this marked as Exhibi; 7, and 
It consists of a memorandum from Halt Raymond and Oliver 
North to Robert McFarlane, dated January the 8th, ^985. Its 
identification number is H-32245, and I would like you to 
mark that and show ihat to the witness. 

[Walter Raymond Exhibit No. 7 was marked for 
identification. 1 

KR. OLIVER; Two attachments to that memorandum, 
documents identification numbers H-39629 and N-39830. They 
should actually be attached. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 Do you recognize that document, Mr. Raymond? 
A Hell, you have got to kind of--a situation here where 
I guess I signed it--what is this-- 

fi Is that your initial next to your name? 
A Yeah. It is written by 0111* and the ' * we ' ' is 
myself leading. I will come back to that in a minute. Let 
me see what the rest says here. 

S Hell, the first sentence says Ollie Korth and I-- 

A I am not suggesting that we didn't meet with Edie 

Fraser. I am talking about the second paragraph. Let me 



UNCLASS 



I a uia.-^-' 



100 



NAME 
2435 
2436 
2437 
2438 
2439 
2440 
244 1 
2442 
2443 
2444 
2445 
2446 
2447 
2448 
2449 
2450 
2451 
2452 
2453 
2454 
2455 
2456 
2457 
2458 
2459 



HIR246000 



UNCLASSi 



see uhat ue ate talking about here, because X have to 



refresh ray memory. 

Hell. I have scanned this. Basically--okay . your 
questions ? 

2 The first question says. ''Ollie North and I met 
with Idle fraser.'' which would seem to indicate that you 
wrote the memorandum. Is it your testimony that you did not 
write the memorandum, that it was Oliver North? 

A Well. no. I clearly wrote the first paragraph. The 
second paragraph, I want to come back to, but I will deal 
with--take them one paragraph at a time. 

2 Well, could you tell me about how you happened to 
meet with Edie Fraser? 

A She was brought to my office by Ollie North. 

2 And what did Ollie North tell you about Edie Fraser? 

A That there was an idea afoot to--my recollection is 
she was brought to my office by Ollie North. I don't know 
who else would have been involved, but the issue here that I 
focused on, as I recall--now at that point--aside--Mhat 
happened--let ' s work backwards, uhat happened was that there 
was a ref ugee-'Nicaraguan refugee fund dinner, and was widely 
attended . 

There were presentations by people--! don't remember 
their naraes--uho were actively involved in an effort to 
provide assistance to people who were refugees, and ther€ 



VJHCIA 






101 



HIR2U6000 yPlCLASilf".:--' P»" '00 

uere films and so on that were shown, and the President did 
participate, and that was it. 

I mean, it was a humanitarian effort. Some money 
was raised and given to the organization, and it went to the 
refugees. ny recollection of reading the newspaper a few 
days later was I think $17,000 was raised. 

A lot of these numbers thrown around here are 
awfully big. but that is what I understood was raised from 
the paper. Now. a lot of this other stuff, like referring 
to honorary committees and councils and all of that kind of 
stuff was a very elaborate effort to try to dress up--this is 
Edie Fraser and Tom nilner . a lot of either to try and dress 
up kind of a prestigious group to be concerned with 
humanitarian efforts in Nicaragua and provide the stimulant 
to perhaps increase public knowledge and perhaps public 
funding, private funding of the people who were refugees 
that had medical needs . 

That is what a lot of this was in the first 
paragraph. To the best of my knowledge, a lot of talk and a 
very, very small product at the other end, and I am aware of 
utterly no follow-up. It may be that some of this gets 
taken and developed and molded by some fashion by other 
people, but that is all I am aware of. 

S It says in here that ue have timed this campaign. 
Who is the we, you and Ollie North? 



UNCLASSIF 



llS.L> 



102 



NAME: 
2M85 
2U86 
2487 
21488 
21489 
2t«90 
2491 
2492 
2493 
21494 
2495 
21496 
2497 
2498 
2499 
2500 
2501 
2502 
2503 
2504 
250S 
2506 
2507 
2508 
2509 



UNCLASSl 



HIR246000 linil.l U.-^.-^Sr, :^ page 101 

A Well, Gil Robinson was involved in this, somebody 
from the private sector for initiatives of f ice--Faith 

Whittlesey, someone from her office was involved in this. 

^^ '^ 

Mitner was floating around--Tom Milner was floating around in 

v^ --' 

this. And they are public relations activists, and they 
came at us and said, ue want to do this, and they want to 
start the public relations campaign and the big black tie 
event was marked. 

This is a lot of sort of P.R. language being played 
back into a memo here, which is not terribly appropriate, 
but that is the way it was going, and reading--! mean, there 
is a reference in here to having a meeting with corporate 
CEOs in Washington. I know I wasn't in any of those 
meetings, but X vaguely recall a small meeting taking place, 
but I cannot absolutely certify that, but that is not 
inconsistent, because he did, in effect, meet as you know 
from the testimony with major figures in the private sector 
from time to time. 

2 Did you ask Edle Fraser to undertake this effort? 

A I did not. 

S Did Ollie North ask her to? 

A It came to me full grown. 

2 What do you mean? 

A In other words, when I was approached with this, we 
have a great idea for humanitarian effort with Nicaragua. 



UNCLASS: 



ki u^: 



103 



HIR2^6000 



UNCLASSi 



tT^r^ 



PAGE 102 



We think we should have a big dinner. Ue think this is the 
way to launch the campaign. This will heighten public 

knowledge of the situation in Nicaragua, and I, Edie Fraser 

r\ 
and Tom Kilner will carry this forward. 
^^ 

Now, who presented it to Edie Fraser--I don't know. 
I don't want to say Ollie North, but he is the only 
person--he is the only person I can think oi who may have 
gone to her. I am not sure about that. It wasn't myself. 
I am not sure who went to Edie Fraser. Might have been one 
of the other people mentioned here, including Faith. I 
don ' t know . 

2 On the attachment, it seems to indicate that these 
decisions to go forward with this need to be made by 
somebody in the White House. 



This was not--this attachment was not written in the 



NSC. 



2 No, it was obviously written by her. 

A Yeah. 

2 And it--it refers to. I believe, the meeting which 
you and Ollie North had with her that morning. 

A Right, she went back and wrote this in a very 
aggressive way. 

2 And you got in there that we agreed that both Bob 
ncFarlane and Faith Whittlesey are essential in making this 
decision. Did you agree to that? 



UNCLASSI?:^ 



104 



HiRausooo 



UNCLAS 



fe fi :. s.-. 



PAGE 103 



NAME 

2535 A Well, I don't recall agreeing to that per se, but 

2536 obviously, ii ue were going to have any effort involving the 

2537 President or any of these other types of people that she is 

2538 talking about, clearly they are the two people who would be 

2539 essential to that, so I mean, that is factually correct. I 
25^0 don't recall that, but it is correct. 

2541 I mean, you can't involve the President, you can't 

2542 involve this level of group without having Bud and Faith in 

2543 full agreement. I don't recall it, but it is correct--! 

2544 mean, it is not an incorrect thought that they have to be on 

2545 board. 

2546 e If you go back and read soma of the other parts of 

2547 this memo on--on page 2 of this nemo, on 3(c), it says basic 

2548 costs such as invitations must be dftterroined, it says on the 

2549 education campaign, we can present options within the next 

2550 10 days, and it has been decided that the State Department 

2551 will coordinate through Otto Reich all information to insure 

2552 that the materials are accurate and realistic, and it 

2553 appears if you read this memo in its totality that Edie 

2554 Fraser is relying on you and Oliver North to make all these 

2555 decisions and to make all these things happen. 

2556 A She was trying to nail us to the floor on these 

2557 points. No question about it. She is a very, very 

2558 aggressive lady. 

2559 8 And did she nail you to the floor on then? 



UNCLR 



^■' 



105 



HIR2t<6000 VIlVLnOl^.i'j PAGE 10>4 

A No . I think--all I know is that there uas a dinner, 
and the President did come, so in that sense, the Key thing 
that she wanted was the President to participate. That was 
done . 

2 Did you reconinend the President cone? 

A I think--ray recollection is there is another piece of 
paper that goes forward. No, maybe it is here. There 
always has to be a schedule for something like this--this is 
to Bud--probably . I can't be sure of that. The fact that he 
did come--probably was recommended by us. 

S So, you all worked with Edie Fraser to make this 
thing happen? 

A On a one-time basis. 

2 Did you run into problems with the Hhlte House 
Counsel about this briefing to be held at the White House, 
with the appearance of the President? 

A I do not recall, because as I said, I realize this 
isn't a joint memo, but I was not Involved in any of the 
staffing about the corporate CEO thing. But God knows--we 
may find it in the proposed schedule — but I was not involved 
personally in the corporate CEO briefing. There is an 
elaborate--there was elaborate briefings that took place. 

fi I would like to ask the reporter to enter this 
document into the record as Exhibit No. 8, I believe. This 
is a memorandum from Fred Fielding and Counsel to the 



UNCLAS 



Sq ., 



106 



NAME : 
2585 
2586 
2587 
2588 
2589 
2590 
2591 
2592 
2593 
25914 
2595 
2596 
2597 
2598 
2599 
2600 
260 1 
2602 
2603 
260(4 
2605 
2606 
2607 
2608 
2609 



HIR2'46000 -Mm w»«f B^^^-a .. pjgj. ,55 
President to Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Assistant to thf 
President for National Security Affairs; subject: Nj •••-; -guan 
refugees, dated January the 11th. The identificati.. 1 ■..niber 
is N-39625. 

[Walter Raymond Exhibit No. 8 was marked fo- 
identification. ) 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

2 I ask you if you ever have seen that document 
before, Mr. Raymond? 

A I don't recall seeing it. You know, again, two and 
a half years. I may have, but I think I would have reacted 
pretty strongly to it. 

2 How would you have reacted to it? 

A I wouldn't have wanted to--well, I mean> I would want 
to be certain whatever we were doing was consistent with the 
advice of counsel. 

2 So, do you know why the briefing went forward after 
that memo was written? 

A No . I would think it probably should not have, on 
the basis of this memo. 

2 Do you recall drafting a memo for Robert Kimnitt to 
send to Fred Fielding after that memo, asking him to give 
another opinion? 

A Well, I don't recall it. If I wrote one, I don't 
recall it. It--you know, I just honestly don't recall it. 



UNCLAS3 



ilia ii^ 



J 



107 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLA 



PAGE 106 



2 Well, let me-- 
A Did I iiB > t-Ci one? 



2 Well, let me mark some other documenls iiere . I 
uould like the reporter to mark as Exhibits f and 10 a 
memor andum--uell^. make it Exhibit 9 with atlacliment, 
documents N-39622, a memorandum from Walt Raymond, Jr. to 
Robert Kimmitt, regarding a briefing of CEOs; and a 
memorandum from Robert Kimmitt to Fred Fielding regarding a 
briefing of corporate executives on Nicaragua. The first 
page is dated January 6, 1986; the second, January 17. 

[Walter Raymond Exhibit Nos . 9 and 10 ueie marked 
for identification. ] 

MR. McGRATH: Is there a Fielding response? 

MR. OLIVER: In N-39622 and N-39169 — 



^m.m 



i^ii 



tnW 



108 



HAHE : 
2624 
2625 
2626 
2627 
2628 
2629 
2630 
2631 
2632 
2633 
26314 
2635 
2636 
2637 
2638 
2639 
26U0 
26<4l 
26(42 
26143 
2614 4 
26145 
2646 
2647 
2648 



HIR246000 lllll.l Ui.^y^ . ^ ■ j PAGE 107 
RPTS HAZUR 
DCHN PARKER 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 Kr . Raynond , do you :ecognize those memorandums? 
A Well, I recognize thxs issue. I do not, and I 
believe now that you have refreshed ray memory that I do 
remember these memoranda. 

MR. MCGRATH: Before ue go on, would you be able to 
locate whether there was any response from Fielding pursuant 
to Kimmitt's January 7 memo? 

MR. OLIVER: Yes, I do have that, and I will ask 
him about that in a minute. I am just trying to make sure I 
have it--yes, I do. 

MR. MCGRATH: Could we say that with respect to 
these ? 

MR. OLIVER: Let's discuss these first and then we 
will discuss the response. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 Do you--it appears from those memorandums that you 
were trying to get Fielding to reconsides lols memorandum 
stating that it would be improper to have such a briefing in 
his opinion. Is that in fact what happened? 

MR. nCGRATH: Hell, first, if I might interject, I 
don't think the Fielding memo says it would be improper to 
do It. 



UNCLAS 






109 



HIR2U6000 



MR. OLIVER: Hell- 



PAGE 108 



MR. MCGRATH: Just says it would be contrary to 
established White House policy. 

MR. OLIVER: All right. I will accept the exact 
language since the document has been entered as an exhibit 
anyway, but he did counsel against holding the brieiing or 
any other function coordinating with fund-raising for the 
fund initially, and then you wrote a nemorandum to Kiranitt 
asking him to send another memo forward to Fred Fielding 
subsequent to this in effect asking him to reconsider. Is 
that correct. 

THE HITNESS: But also clarifying what the intent 
was of the meeting with the chief executives. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Well, wasn't the intent originally to raise money 
for the refugees--! mean if ue look at the memos that we have 
:ust^ discussed from you and Oliver North to Bud McFarlane 
and Edie Fraser's attachment after the meeting with you and 
Ollie North, it appears to me that the purpose of this 
endeavor was to raise funds. 

Isn't that correct? 
A The-- at. the black tie dinner we are talking about 
now or with the CEOs? 

2 At the Nicaraguan refugee fund dinner. I believe 
the briefing for t^he CEOs was designed to get them involved 






no 



NAME : 
26714 
2675 
2676 
2677 
2678 
2679 
2680 
2681 
2682 
2683 
268U 
2685 
2686 
2687 
2688 
2689 
2690 
2691 
2692 
2693 
269(4 
2695 
2696 
2697 
2698 






HIR2146000 ■BIHia_**»''5L>r, ■ PAGE 109 

in this project. Isn't that correct? 

I mean the initial memorandun from Fielding to 
Kimmitt indicates that they have asked for his views on a 
proposal to involve the President and the White House in 
iund-raising efforts for a private organization, the 
Hicaraguan Refugee Fund. Wasn't that uhat it uas al.l about? 

A Well, as far as I can reconstruct--! am 
reconstructing sort of here is that ue are talking about a 
substantive briefing, about the problem. I think-- 

2 But the initial meno in January^ the llth^iron Fred 
Fielding to Robert Kimmitt-- 

MR. HCGRATH' Hay I — 
2 Surely. 

MR. ncSRATH: Do you have a copy of whatever 
Kimmitt sent to Fielding posing the question initially? 

THE WITNESS: That is this one. 

MR. OLIVER: It is there. 

HR. nCGRATH: Ko , initially before the January 
1 1th-- 

HR. OLIVER: I didn't enter it In the record, but 
that is what it Is. 

KR. nCGRATH: But the attached proposal, is that — 

HR. OLIVER: --I will enter this as an exhibit, as 
Exhibit Number 1 1 . 

HR. HCGRATH: Could we go off the record a seoond? 



UNCLASS:. 



Ill 



HiRineooo 



UNCLAS 



V'ei 



PAGE 110 



MR. OLIVER: Yes. 

iDiscussion held ofi the record. ] 

MR. OLIVER: Let's enter this as Exhibit Number 



1 1 



[The document referred to was narked as Halter 
Raymond Exhibit Number 11 for identification. ] 

MR. OLIVER: It is Document Number 32244. It is a 
handwritten note from Bob Kimmitt to Fred Fielding asking 
Fielding if he perceives any legal problem with the attached 
proposal and the attachment was Exhibit 7. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 I believe the question was whether or not in effect 
you were appealing the decision of Fred Fielding in asking 
Bob Kimmitt to have him reconsider on the basis of a memo 
that you drafted. 

A I don't recall a great deal of this, but what I can 
piece together from this is that after the memo that you saw 
here from Raymond and North went forward, that it was 
probably bucked over by KcFarlane to Bob Kimmitt, who was 
the General Counsel of the NSC, and he clarified what was 
possible and what was not possible in his memorandum. 

First of all, he clarified what was possible and 
not possible in his discussions with us and indicated--us 
being the NSC staffers, and indicated what we were going to 
do if it were legally acceptable, and that is restated in 



bNCLA 



Xi\ifh\: 



,y 



112 



NAME: 

272U 
2725 
2726 
2727 
2728 
2729 
2730 
2731 
2732 
2733 
2734 
2735 
2736 
2737 
2738 
2739 
27140 
274 1 
27^2 
27M3 
2744 
2745 
2746 
2747 
2748 



HIR246000 



mm 






PAGE 1 1 1 



his memo, the Kimmitt/Fielding memo wheift he said that ue 
have made clear to the NRF that the White House would not be 
involved in fund-raising and that basically it will be a 
briefing, and I have no reason to believe that after we 
received this guidance from our General Counsel. Mr. 
Kimmitt, that we would do anything other than follow that 
guidance . 

Now what ue were doing under clarification, whether 
It was or was not the way that North and Raymond wrote the 
first memo, this was obviously NSC's position in the 17 
January memo from Kimmitt to Fielding, and we would be 
obliged to follow that position. So therefore, no reason to 
believe that any actions that took place would do anything 
other than follow the Kimmitt instruction if Kimmitt was in 
fact authorized thereafter to proceed by Fielding. 

e Did you have any discussions with anyone about Fred 
Fielding's original memorandum after you, for the second 
memorandum to Bob Kimmitt--in other words, did you ask 
anybody to talk to Fielding to get him to change his mind or 
to give you the green light? 

A I think that to ny knowledge it is the 
only--Fielding ' s memo comes down on the basis of the paper 
that was written by North and Raymond. 

MR. HCGRATH: I think it would be useful if-- 

HR. OLIVER: I am going to put that in the record 



Wli ji 



113 



HAHE: 
2749 
2750 
'275 > 
2752 
2753 
275U 
2755 
2756 
2757 
2758 
2759 
2760 
2761 
2762 
2763 
276U 
2765 
2766 
2767 
2768 
2769 
2770 
277 1 
2772 
2773 



HIR2(«6000 



mms 



ai 



PAGE 112 



1> 



iri just a minute. 

KR. MCGRATH: He looked at Fred's nemo to complete 
the loop on this matter. 

MR. OLIVER: All right, I will do that. I have 
another exhibit which I would like to enter prior to that 
memorandum which has some bearing on the question I have 
just asked. 

MR. nCGRATH: Another point I am making is we seem 
to have a number oi other pieces to the puzzle here, and I 
mean I don't see any point in not putting everything on the 
table at once. 

riR. OLIVER: Well, I will be glad to do that, 
counsel. I was trying to--trying to ask a couplaoi other 
questions, and I would just like him to answer that question 
iirst before, and then I will put the other two exhibits on 
the table. I just wanted to ask whether or not you recall 
or remember talking to anyone else about trying to get Fred 
Fielding to ease up or change his mind on this. 

A To the best of my knowledge, the answer is no. He 
wrote a paper. It may or may not have need for 
.clarification. I think to some degree Klmmitt's memo of 17 
January reflects conversation with us where the actions 
which were permissible as far as the NSC were concerned was 
clarified and we would obviously do exactly what was said 
here to Kimmitt and Fielding if Fielding, in responding to 



UNCLASS 



114 



NAME: 

2774 
2775 
2776 
2777 
2778 
2779 
2780 
2781 
2782 
2783 
2784 
2785 
2786 
2787 
2788 
2789 
2790 
279 1 
2792 
2793 
2794 
2795 
2796 
2797 
2798 



HIR2>46000 



yNCLAS 



r\rt?'-~ 



v/^ d 



PAGE 113 



17 January, said okay. Zi ha said, no, obviously that is 
something else again. 

2 Do you rereeraber discussing it with Ollle Notth 
after the first Fielding responr.-*? 

A I don't remeraber goinc; one on one with 011i>? 
Obviously there was some discussion with Bob Kimnitt. 
Whether Ollie was present or not because he has clearly 
made--made his own judgment here on the 17 January memo, and 
I think we had to talk to him about that. 

2 Do you remember discussing it with John Roberts? 

A No. I don't know, but-- 

riR. OLIVER: I would like to enter as exhibit 
whatever number we are on-- 12 and 13, two memorandums, the 
first of which is dated January 18, 1985 from John Roberts 
to Fred Fielding and the committee identification number is 
N39618, and the second is N39667, dated January 8, and is a 
memo from Fred Fielding to Robert Kimmitt. 

I would like to mark those as Exhibits 12 and 13. 
[Whereupon, the documents referred to were marked 
as Walter Raymond Exhibit Numbers 12 and 13, respectively. ] 
BY HR. OLIVER- 

Q Do you recognize, Kr . Raymond, either one of those 
memorandums? Have you seen them before? 

A Well, frankly, I don't remember seeing either of 
them . 



UNCLRSS: 



"^ 



115 



KAME: 
2799 
2800 
"2801 
2802 
2803 
280U 
2805 
2806 
2807 
2808 
2809 
2810 
2811 
2812 
2813 
281U 
2815 
2816 
2817 
2818 
2819 
2820 
2821 
2822 
2823 



HIRZUeOOO 



^Hcm 



Cf 



PAGE 11(4 



e You wera auare that all this was going on> that 
theie was some eiforts-- 

A I am not--no. I mean you must perceive in ray 
responses here which have been very uncertain. I am not 
auare of a lot of this, and Z do not feel that I--you know, I 
don't recall being aware of this process of legal 



I don't recall this. 

2 Weren't you sort of the action officer on this. 

A No, not necessarily. I know there is a joint 
signature, and I know that I wrote that memo, and I said 
Ollie, but that does not necessarily total up that I was the 
one working the Nicaraguan refugee event. 

I was a part player of it. I was in one or two 
meetings, and then I phased out of it. 

S Did you also ask Bud ncTarlane to attend that 
briefing? 

A I had, to the best that I can recall, absolutely 
nothing to do with the CEO briefing. 

Q Did you do-- 

A I didn't attend it. I didn't write the talking 
points for it. I don't even know where it took place, 
unless I have gone completely blank. 

2 Are you sure you didn't write the talking points 
for it? 

A I am comparatively sure. 



UNCLASS. 



116 



HAME: 
282U 
2825 
2826 
2827 
2828 
2829 
2830 
2831 
2832 
2833 
283U 
2835 
2836 
2837 
2838 
2839 
28M0 
28U 1 
28U2 
28U3 
28(4'« 
28145 
28146 
28U7 
28148 



UNCLASS^ 



HIR2146000 VflV^^kn Wdlii ; fc, . PAGE 11? 

2 Well, let rae refresh your memory. I wfuld like to 
have marked as Exhibit 1 <4 a document dated January 22r 1985, 
a memorandum for Bud KcFarlane from Oliver Norlli Si'id Waiter 
Raymond, Jr., ''Talking Points for Briefing, Re Nicaraguan 
Refugee Effort.'' Its committee identification numbers are 
NlU8i42,M3'4'4 . 

[Whereupon, the document referred to was marked as 
Walter Raymond Exhibit Number 14 for identification. 1 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Mr. Raymond, you have seen that document that is a 
memorandum from you and Ollie Korth regarding the talking 
points for the Nicaraguan Refugee Fund. Does that refresh 
your memory about whether or not you had something to do 
with writing the talking points? 

A I did not write the talking points. 

2 That is your signature on the memorandum. 

A It is. 

2 Who wrote the talking points . 

A I presume Ollie North — in fact, yes, Ollie North. 

2 Why is youz nan* on that memorandum? 

A Basically because Ollie North put it there. 

2 But you signed it. 

A I signed it because u* had been talking about this 
issue before, and it came through as a package, so I signed 
it. 






117 



NAME : 
28U9 
2850 
'2851 
2852 
2853 
285U 
2855 
2856 
2857 
2858 
2859 
2860 
2861 
2862 
2863 
286U 
2865 
2866 
2867 
2868 
2869 
2870 
2871 
2872 
2873 



HIR2U6000 '^ 3 1 1^^ JL ^ „s^ /- ■ page 116 

iy. But the talking points ate substantive. 
M This one-- 

MR. OLIVER: I ucvld like to submit as exhibits — 

HR. nCGRATH: I think ue are at 15. 

MR. OLIVER: --documents which ate, I ^-^'lieve, 
cover pages for documents within the National Se..u\.ity 
Council and the White House which have committee nwitbet^ 
N14869 and Nl'4870 which are related to the talking points 
document, and of the same package. Number 0186 on them as 
appears on the talking points memorandum. And I would like 
to — 

MR. MCGRATH: Ue don't — on that, okay. 

MR. OLIVER: All right. 

I would like to ask the reporter to mark these. 

[Whereupon, the documents referred to were marked 
as Walter Raymond Exhibit Numbers 15 and 16, respectively. ] 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
& Now, Mr. Raymond, these documents which I am going 
to show you were attached to those talking points, and the 
first document has written on the bottom of it, ''Return to 
Raymond for further action, cc: to North and J |^P , (the 
entire page . ) ' ' 

The second one says, ''Return to Raymond, North, 
Walt, Ollie, reconsider in light of Fielding memo.'' 

A So these are for different memos then. Right? 



mem, 



''"'^ L% ^ 



118 



NAME: 
2874 
2875 
2876 
2877 
2878 
2879 
2880 
2881 
2882 
2883 
288'4 
2885 
2886 
2887 
2888 
2889 
2890 
289 1 
2892 
2893 
289U 
2895 
2896 
2897 
2898 



bNCLASSi 



PAGE 117 



HIR2U6000 

2 There was-- 

A Let's see, this is the talking points--what does 
this thing go with? 

2 With the Fied Fielding memorandun, which is-- 

MR . nCGRATH : Could ue go off the record a second? 

MR. OLIVER: Yes, go off the record a second. 

[Discussion held off the record. 1 

MR. OLIVER: Could we go back on the record, 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 The two documents that have just been put into 
evidence were cover pages for documents which bear the 
numbers 0186 and 1 97--add--add on--which corresponds to the 
White House numbers on exhibits 7. 8, 9 and 10, but 
apparently all of these came out of the same White House 
file. 

Is it your understanding, Mr. Raymond, knowing the 
White House document system, that all of these documents 
came out of the same system, one file with the number 186-- 

MR. KCGRATH: Before Mr. Raymond responds, the 
record should reflect, however, that Exhibits 15 and 16 are 
not, however, date stamp nunberitt iR^^nsebiek^ve order as if 
they cane from t^he top of Exhibits 1, 8, 9 and 10. 

HR. OLIVERi Wei;^ we don't know. That is why I 
am asking if he understands the-- 

THE WITHESS: What I would state is if you have a 



UHCLASli 



119 



NAME: 
2899 
2900 
290 1 
2902 
2903 
290U 
290S 
2906 
2907 
2908 
2909 
29 10 
29 1 1 
2912 
2913 
29 1M 
29 15 
29 16 
2917 
29 18 
2919 
2920 
2921 
2922 
2923 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLASSi 



PAGE 118 



number like this, that is an action nunber ior the NSC and 
or sorae reason or another you have follow-up or add-on 
actions on the same action you may have it marked as either 
follou-up or add-on, but having said that, I can't put thes^ 
things together in a margin which indicates to me what the 
difference is between these two cover notes, and they are — I 
realize one says add on, and one doesn't, but it is not 
clear . 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

2 Well, IS it fair to say, Mr. Raymond, these 
documents that we have been discussing for the past few 
moments indicate that you were involved in the effort to 
have the briefing for the CEO's on Hicaraguan refugees 
approved ? 

A Ko, it is not fair to say that^ because I realize 
ray signature is on these. I have not seen--to my knowledge I 
do not recall--! am having trouble reconstructing this cover 
note--I do know the action on j^^^^STi Si -^ts^K Kandled by 
Ollie . I realize my signature was on this. 

The action on reclama was handled by Ollie. 

2 But it is your testimony even though your signature 
is on there, Ollie Horth was the person who was pushinc; this 
reclama? 

A In terns of the CEO briefing, that is right. 

2 You just assented to it and was not involved 



UHCLA 



C' 



120 



NAHE : 
292U 
292S 
2926 
2927 
2928 
2929 
2930 
2931 
2932 
2933 
2931 
2935 
2936 
2937 
2938 
2939 
29140 
294 1 
2942 
2943 
2944 
2945 
2946 
2947 
2948 



HIR246000 laiUI-l ilX^l, •/ PAGE 119 

parallel and was not involved in talking points either. 

A Even though I had my signature on it. It was a 
lesson I should learn for the future. 

MR. FRYMAN: Can we go off the record? 
HR. OLIVER: Go off the record. 
[Discussion held off the record. 1 
MR. OLIVER: Back on the record. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Did you have any further involvenent with the 
briefing for the CEOs which took place in the White House. 
A Ko , I did not. I acknowledge--! mean this is my 
signature. I don't question that in terms of the talking 
points . 

2 Did you attend any briefings or meetings prior to 
this CEO briefing that were related to it? 

A To the best that I can reconstruct, the only aspect 
of this program that I was involved in at all was 
discussions concerning the dinner. We have one evidence 
where there was discussion concerning the dinner, and I 
think there may have been a second meeting concerning the 
dinner, and that is it. 

2 Did you attend any of the events, the briefing or 
the dinner? 

A No briefing. I attended the dinner. 

2 Did anybody elstt In the White House attend the 



UNCLASS 



bfe 



121 



NAME: 
2949 
2950 
29S1 
2952 
2953 
29514 
2955 
2956 
2957 
2958 
2959 
2960 
2961 
2962 
2963 
296U 
2965 
2966 
2967 
2968 
2969 
2970 
297 1 
2972 
2973 






HIR2U6000 
dinner ? 

A Suite a few people. I can't identify thea all, but 
It was well attended. 

2 It was well supported by the Uhite House. 

A you know--yes, I think it was quite well-supported. 
I don't know how it can't be precise. Suite a number of 
people . 

2 You were not involved any further with Edie Fraser 
during the preparations for the Hicaraguan Refugee Fund 
dinner ? 

A I had one meeting which I think we stated--the 8th 
of January, I believe, and I think there was one more 
meeting . 

2 Uas the dinner a success? 

A Not particularly. 

2 What do you mean by not particularly? 

A Well, according to press reports--! have no 
knowledge of this first hand--according to press reports 
$17,000 was raised which was given to the organization that 
was providing direct hunanitarian assistance to the children 
and to the f anilies . 

2 Hho else was involved in the Uhite House and in 
coordinating or working with the people who were putting on 
the dinner besides you? 

A Well, my involvenent, as I have said several times. 



ONCLASS 



122 



NAME 
2974 
2975 
2976 
2977 
2978 
2979 
2980 
2981 
2982 
2983 
29814 
2985 
2986 
2987 
2988 
2989 
2990 
299 1 
2992 
2993 
299U 
2995 
2996 
2997 
2998 



HIR2'46000 



yNCLAS 



PAGE 121 



uas very limited, so I can't be absolutely certain wf<n pise 
was. I was in one other neetmg and that was it, and :-r:^re 
was a lot of discussion that obviously had to take pl.-.ce. 
and I don't know. 

Hay have been--I notice that Bob Riley's narat was in 
there and Faith Whittlesey's name, so I think the Office of 
Liaison had something to do with it. 

MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter to 
mark this document as Exhibit Number 17. It is an KSC 
intelligence document with the committee identification 
number, U030 through i403 1 5--140300 through U031S. 

[Uhereupon, the document referred to was marked as 
Walter Raymond Exhibit Mumber 17 for identification. ) 

BY HR. OLIVER: 
S I ask you to look at this memorandum and the 
attachments, Mr. Raymond, just for identification, and ask 
you if you have ever seen this document before. 

A I have not seen this document before it was given 
to me by the press within the last month, again, as another 
piece of evidence that had been presented on the committee. 
The chronological events check list I had seen some--or most 
of this before. 

I had never seen this little thing at the end, this 
little advertisement, but I had not seen the cover memo. 
That is--the point, I might say, that the way it works, if I 






123 



NAME: 
2999 
3000 
3001 
3002 
3003 
3004 
3005 
3006 
3007 
3008 
3009 
3010 
301 1 
3012 
3013 
3014 
3015 
3016 
3017 
3018 
3019 
3020 
3021 
3022 
3023 




HIR2U6000 mill I 'l\\llB|k|l PAGE 122 
were to have "seen ~I^ 'oTTe 'aT:^l§ the process, I would have 
been down in the coordination part-- 

2 But you did see the chronoiogical check list which 
was attached? 

A I have to say I don't know whether this is exactly 
what I had seen before, but I had seen sonething like this, 
yes . 

2 Did you ever see documents of this nature oi the 
chronological events check list while you were at the NSC. 

A Well, yes. I mean this particular document, as 
stated here, is something that has emerged from an action 
group that Pat Buchanan was chairing. 

2 Were you part of that ad hoc working groap? 

A I noticed there were four meetings. I think X 
attended one or two of the four. 

2 Were you given responsibilities in those meetings 
for events on this chronological check list? 

A I have to check each of the ones. I would say, 
yes. but I am not sura that each one here is accurate. I 
will have to read each one. 

2 Hell, let me go through the ones where you were 
mentioned. On {"age it0303, the third paragraph indicates, 
''Assigned U.S. Intelligence Agent to research, report and 
clear for public release Sandinista military actions 
violating the Geneva Convention/civilized standards of 



IINCUSWO 



124 



NAME : 
30214 
3025 
3026 
3027 
3028 
3029 
3030 
3031 
3032 
3033 
3034 
3035 
3036 
3037 
3038 
3039 
3040 
SOU 1 
3042 
3043 
3044 
3045 
3046 
3047 
3048 



"MHiiSSIHED 



PAGE 123 
The responsibility indicates NSC, North and 



HIR246000 
warfare . ' 
Raymond . 

A All right. In this particular case this was done 
by North, not by Raymond. There could have been a dimension 
of this if the LPD office had been collating material on 
these types of human rights violations . Might have been 
type of an item like one of those booklets I passed around. 
night have been one of the items that LPD helped produce, 
but in this case I did not have any action. 

If I see my name listed here, that does not mean I 
had an action. 

2 All right. On page 40305, it indicates in the 
third paragraph, ''Brief the Presidential meeting with Leu 
Lehrman and other leaders of the influence groups working on 
MX and resistance funding,'' and it has there, ''KSC 
Raymond, North. ' ' 

Were you responsible for that? 

A I was not responsible for the Presidential meeting 
to the best of ny knowledge. I did participate, as I 
mentioned earlier in that White House meeting with Lew 
Lehrman, but at a much lower level, and I do not recall 
being involved in any scheduled proposal for the President's 
meeting with Lehrman. I could be wrong because there are a 
lot of schedule proposals, but I don't recall that. 

2 It indicates that--in that paragraph that these 



UNCUISSIFIED 



125 



NAME: 
30149 
3050 
3051 

. 3052 
3053 
305U 
3055 
3056 
3057 
3058 
3059 
3060 

306 1 
3062 
3063 
3064 
3065 
3066 
3067 
3068 
3069 
3070 

307 1 
3072 
3073 




HIR2146000 UlllJL.nUUII ILU PAGE 12U 
influence groups at the Presidential meeting with Leu 
Lehrman were working on MX and resistance funding. 

A That is right, but I didn't participate. 

2 How were they working on resistance funding? 

A I don't know. I wasn't part of it. 

2 Even though you are listed as being responsible for 
it along with Ollie Horth, you don't know. 

A I didn't write this memo, and didn't sign on the 
paper that went forward . 

2 But you 'did attend. 

A I attended a Lehrman meeting with that group that 
you have in the listing. 

2 Well, that event took place sometime prior to this. 

A That's the only time I ever met Leu Lehrman. 

2 But ray question was do you know of influence groups 
that were working on resistance funding? 

A Ho. 

2 On page M0306, there is in the third paragraph, it 
indicates review and restates themes based on results of 
public opinion poll. State--and the responsibility indicates 
State/LPD, Otto Reich, NSR, North and Raymond. 
Do you know what that refers to? 

A Not specifically, but I do know that X would work 
closely with Reich on opinion polls and then try to adjust 
themes as required. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



126 



HAHE: 
3074 
307S 
3076 
3077 
3078 
3079 
3080 
3081 
3082 
3083 
308M 
3085 
3086 
3087 
3088 
3089 
3090 
309 1 
3092 
3093 
3094 
3095 
3096 
3097 
3098 



HIR2146000 



UNCLASSIRED 



PAGE 125 



2 Were you taking public opinion polls? 

A Ko . This IS opinion polls that wete--that were in 
the public domain. 

2 Mot a particular public opinion poll that was done 
by you or LPD . 

A No . 

2 On page <40310> it indicates, first paragraph/ 
' ' Nicaraguan Refugee Fund dinner. Washington, O.C; 
President as Guest oi Honor. Responsibility, State/LPD, 
Miller, NSC. Raymond.'' Does this refresh your memory about 
whether or not you were involved in the preparation for the 
dinner ? 

A No. I was involved in some aspects of the dinner. 
I was involved--hones tly more at the margin than the center. 
What we had was I had that meeting on the 8th of January and 
one other meeting that I recall, but the process moved over 
to State, and I was not a major actor In the details and 
there were a lot of details. 

2 Has this meeting--was this Kicaraguan Refugee Fund 
dinner a topic of your Central American public diplomat 
meeting? 

A Not particularly. 

2 Who is the Miller referred to? 

A Jonathan. 

2 It is Jonathan, okay. 



UNCUS$IHED 



127 



uNcussra 



HIR2LI6000 IIIVIbI U.l.linni PAGE 126 

How do you know that is Jonathan Miller and not 
Rich Miller? 

A All right. I would say I can't be 100 percent 
sure. There is only one Jonathan Miller in LPD, and that is 
the extrapolation. I would have to say on the basis of this 
it appears to be . I Know that on the case of the Hicaraguan 
Refugee Fund Dinner, there was work done in LPD on it. 

2 And it was done by Jonathan Miller. 

A I--I am not sure. I think so, but I an not 100 
percent certain. 

2 On page U0313, the fourth paragraph indicates 
''Visit by various members of European parliaments who 
support the President's various policies on Central America; 
Responsibility, NSC, Raymond, White House Office of Public 
Liaison. Riley . ' ' 

Were you responsible for coordinating that visit? 

A Basically Riley did this with about six 
parliamentarians. They did see the President. I met them 
in context when they were here. I think we had a luncheon 
with them in the Proposal Room. When it is a foreign policy 
issue, most of the time you get a co-sponsor. If OPL goes 
forward with the schedule proposal, most of the time it is 
an KSC officer. I co-signttd. 



UNCLASSiRED 



128 



NAME 
3122 
3123 
312U 
3125 
3126 
3127 
3128 
3129 
3130 
3131 
3132 
3133 
31314 
3135 
3136 
3137 
3138 
3139 
3140 
3141 
31142 
3143 
31414 
3145 
3146 



HIR2146000 



RPTS HAZUR 



ONCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 127 



I think they "p*? ior it thenselves . 



DCMK PARKER 

Q Do you know who funded the visit oi the European 
members oi parliament to the United States? 
A 

fi None of their activities were funded to your 
knowledge . 

A To my knowledge. 

2 Further down the page there is a listing : says , 
''Conference on Religious Freedom, Presidential drop-by in 
Room 450, OEOB; Responsibility, NSC Raymond.'' 

MR. BUCK: Is that relevant, Hr . Oliver? 
MR. OLIVER: Ha will find out in a minute. 
If you look at the top of the page, counsel, it 
says, ''Public diplomacy Presidential events regarding 
Nicaragua resistance.'' 

THE WITNESS: Hy recollection is that we had 
several religious figures from Nicaragua that ware in town, 
and we had a conference with a number of people interested 
in that subject, and we had a Presidential drop by in 450. 
I don't know if that is accurate. 
BY HR. OLIVER: 
S Who sponsored the visit of these religious leaders' 
Do you know? 

A I do not recall. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



129 



NAME: 
3147 
3148 
3149 
31S0 
31S1 
3152 
3153 
3154 
3155 
3156 
3157 
3 158 
3159 
3160 
316 1 
3162 
3163 
3164 
3165 
3166 
3167 
3168 
3169 
3170 
3171 



HIR246000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 128 



2 Do you know whether their visit was funded by U.S. 
Goveinnent funds either directly or indirectly? 

A l--unf or tunately , I do not. I have to check the 
records. I don't remember. 

2 Uas it your understanding that this tine line was 
of events and activities--was designed to influence the 
congressional vote on aid for the Nicaraguan resistance? 

A Ho . I think--every time there was a--you know--an 
effort to--was a vote that there were efforts that took place 
someplace in Washington to try to focus the issues, and this 
particular case I think Pat Buchanan had the lead on this. 

The diplomacy effort that I uas involved in was 
basically on the margin, and I suspect there was that very 
much in mind . 

2 Why do--do you know why the names of Frank Gomez and 
Dan h^ii'liaall appear in this time line with responsibilities? 

A 

MR. nCGRATH : Do you have a specific one? 

MR. OLIVER: Wall, they appear on page 40304 under 



the heading of State/LPD with the name, Gomez and 
appear twice. 

THE HITKESS! I don't know specifically. 
BY MR. OLIVER! 
2 Did they attend any any of these meetings . 
A Ho. 
2 Who attended the ad hoc meeting with Pat Buchanan. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



sn n_fic ft 



130 



MAME: 
3172 
3173 
3174 
317S 
3176 
3177 
3178 
3179 
3180 
3181 
3182 
3183 
3184 
3185 
3186 
3187 
3 188 
3189 
3190 
3191 
3192 
3193 
3194 
3195 
3196 



HIR246000 



UNCIASSIRED 



PAGE 129 
The meeting I attended and I didn't attend then 



all--uas a heavy collection of people iron the congressional 
side. State and the White House, and then thete were a ieu 
other people such as--uell, Buchanan chairing. North, I think 
Reich was in the meeting. Miller, Jonathan, from LPD. 

I think probably Constantine Henges was there in 
this time frame, so you had State and NSC, White House--! 
think principally. And as I say, you were principally 
dealing with congressional strategy. 

2 Let me turn for a minute to another subject. You 
were involved, were you not, with-- 

HR. nCGRATH: Just one second. 
[Discussion off the record.] 
MR. MCGRATH: Sorry. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q You were involved, were you not, Mr. Raymond, with 
the International Youth Year activities? 
A Yes. 

C What was your involvement? 

A I basically was a coordinator in the White House in 
trying to provide focus to an International Youth Conference 
that took place in Jamaica. 

2 When did you assume that responsibility? 
A I guess it would be sometime in mid 198i4. 
2 Who asked you to do that? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



131 



NAME: 
3197 
3198 
3199 
3200 
3201 
3202 
3203 
3204 
3205 
3206 
3207 
3208 
3209 
3210 
321 1 
3212 
3213 
3214 
3215 
3216 
3217 
3218 
3219 
3220 
3221 




HIR2U6000 IIIVI.I UA MriMI PAGE 130 

A Well, it started--the TiTternational Youth Year, you 
Know, was observed in 1985 and there was an effort to try to 
determine what one could do in the international arena which 
made it of interest to the National Security Council, and 
these kinds of functional things basically fell into ny 
office . 

He worked--it worked very closely with State and 
with USIA to develop the governmental side to that issue. 
2 Were you given that assignment by someone or did 
you just sort of step into it? 

A Well, I think--! think in some cases you step into 
these things when they are in your functional area. X mean 
youth, waiver, business. These are sort of the generics 
that are part of the democracy-building umbrella that was 
sort of lodged in my office, so these kinds of functional 
issues would come here. 

I would say one thing. I don't know whether this 
would simplify our discussion, but I would like to make one 
statement. I have never in the entire time I was in the NSC 
discussed the International Youth Commission which is on the 
Ollie North funding chart with Ollie North. Secondly, Ollie 
North never participated in any meeting that ever took place 
with me or anyone else that I am aware of on the 
International Youth Commission, the International Youth 
Committee or anything to do with Jamaica. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



132 



MAKE: 
3222 
3223 
3221* 
3225 
3226 
3227 
3228 
3229 
3230 
3231 
3232 
3233 
323U 
3235 
3236 
3237 
3238 
3239 
32U0 
3241 
32U2 
32U3 
32>4i« 
321*5 
321*6 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLASSIHED 



PAGE 131 



I know that is in that chart, and I would just like 
it on the lecord saying there was no Ollie North 
involvement. I have on idea why--to ray knowledge--why lYC is 
on that chart. I do know that we have run audits both 
through AID where a great deal of money carae from, and I 
believe there was a parallel audit in Jamaica in which the 
authorities were very satisfied that the money had been 
spent properly with no diversions. 

Q International Youth Year was a United Nations 
effort, was it not? 

A Yes. 

2 Uas the Bureau of International Organizations at 
the Department of State involved? 

A Yes. 

Q Did they have a primary responsibility? 

A They had a major responsibility, a fellow named Dan 
Phillips. and--at all times we worked very closely. I am not 
the big guy who ran International Youth Year. This was very 
much a joint effort, and it was--many of the meetings took 
place in the State Department, sometimes they took place in 
the HSC. 

Jerry Helman was involved with his Office of Under 
Secretary and others. Phillips' departure for an overseas 
post left somewhat of a void in--on the state side. 

S How did Roy Godson become involved in International 



UNCLASSIHED 



133 



NAME: 
3247 
32118 
3249 
3250 
3251 
3252 
3253 
325U 
3255 
3256 
3257 
3258 
3259 
3260 
3261 
3262 
3263 
3261 
3265 
3266 
3267 
3268 
3269 
3270 
3271 



HIR2146000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 132 



Youth Year activities? 



A Uell> this may not have much relevance to the Iran 
contra thing, but ue are getting into sort of history here. 
When I was looking at it from the point of the international 
dimensions in Jamaica, Roy Godson and groups that were 
trying to create a--something analogous to an lYYC, a U.S. 
XYYC Commission, within the process of being formed and 
created, and-- 

2 Has Roy Godson a consultant to the NSC at that 
time? 

A Yes, he was. I don't recall. I could be wrong on 
this. I don't recall that--I would have to check the records 
on what Roy Godson was doing. I don't believe soi but I 
would have to check that. 

Q Were you involved in trying to raise funds for the 
International Youth Year meeting in Jamaica? 

A Yes, in various ways. Particularly, trying to get 
AID funding, see what USIA could do for facilitative 
purposes and try to get foreign national funding, German 
foundations, and there were a couple of occasions when 
private people who were close to S«aga--Prime Minister Seaga 
of Jamaica, cane to Washington to see whether they can help 
support the Jamaican youth conference. 

There was also an effort by the American 
Ambassador, I believe, to reach out to some of the American 



UNCLASSIFIED 



134 



yNClASSIHED 



KANE: HIR2146000 \J | 1 Vkl 1 WWfl ■•■■' PAGE 133 

3272 cozpoiations with Jamaican subsidies to see whether they 

3273 could facilitate the effort. Again, it was an #^ 

3274 interagency process from our side. 

3275 I was involved and State was involved, and AID was 

3276 involved, and USIA was involved. When that kind of thing 

3277 happens, even though most of the work may be done in State 

3278 or AID, someone has got to coordinate it, and after Phillips 

3279 left, I ended up picking up a bit more of a coordination 

3280 responsibility than, frankly, I would have liked. 

3281 2 How much U.S. Government money were you able to 

3282 obtain for the International Youth Year? 

3283 nK. BUCK: I want to state an objection for the 
32814 record on behalf of the minority before this continues. If 

3285 Mr. Oliver can't show relevance to the Iran contra affair, 

3286 the diversion of funds or anything else that is associated 

3287 and outlined in the resolution, I would request that he 

3288 cease this line of inquiry. 

3289 MR. OLIVER: I will get to that, counsel. 

3290 HR. KCGRATH: Actually, could wtt go off the record 

3291 and could you state, you know, what the relevance is going 

3292 to be? 

3293 MR. OLIVER: Sura. 

329U [Discussion held off the record. ] 

3295 MR. OLIVER: What was the last question? 

3296 [The pending question was read by the reporter. 1 



UNCLASSIRED 



135 



UNCLASSIFIED 



KAKE: HIR2U6000 IJ I 1 1JI_nUtJI I I1_1J PAGE 1314 

3297 THE WITNESS: I don't have this in front of rae , but 

3298 my recollection--this is obtainable. I mean this is a fact. 

3299 My recollection is in excess of a million dollars. 

3300 BY MR. OLIVER: 

330 1 2 And those funds came from a combination of USIA 

3302 aid. 

3303 A The U.S. Government money was largely AID. USIA 

3304 money was in the sense support costs--a little limited amount 

3305 of travel and that sort of thing. AID was the principal 

3306 funding. 

3307 2 Mere there any other government agencies besides 

3308 USIA and AID involved in funding the conference? 

3309 A No. 

3310 2 Did you attend the conference? 
33 11 A No. 

3312 2 Did you go to Jamaica in preparation for the 

3313 conference at any preparatory meetings? 
33114 A No. Gerald Helman did. 

33 15 2 Here you aware that at the conference a committee 

3316 or a steering committee was set up known as the 

3317 International Youth Year or International Youth Committee? 

3318 A I was aware that a structure was proposed as part 

3319 of the conference deliberations. It included a number of 

3320 international youth figures. Because of no follow-on 

332 1 funding/ that structure never really cana into being. There 



UNCLASSIFIED 



136 



HAHE: 
3322 
3323 
332U 
3325 
3326 
3327 
3328 
3329 
3330 
3331 
3332 
3333 
333U 
3335 
3336 
3337 
3338 
3339 
3340 
3341 
3342 
33U3 
334M 
3345 
3346 



HIR246000I 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PkGE 135 



was a parallel Jamaican structure which was to house this 
called something--possible Jamaican Youth Connittee, possible 
International Youth Committee. I don't know. 

There may have been a door plate, limited funds 
uere still available, and the principal officer in the 
Jamaican government, Errol Anderson, on behalf of Prime 
Minister Seaga, very much wanted to see a follow-on 
international youth structure which could be democratic; it 
could be some kind of a balance in Soviet sponsored youth 
festival and their organizations such as HfDW. 

The money that was left over, I cannot ba precise 
on. But this is a matter of public record, both in Jamaica 
and in AID. One or two staffers wera Kept on for a period of 
time and funded while others hoped that funds would come on 
line. Funds didn't-- 

Q Were any of those staffers Americans? 

A I don't think so. I don't think so. And where we 
are now, is there no organizations left? I mean, that is 
all finished. 

2 Did you attempt to obtain funding for the follow-on 
activities ? 

A Well, I wanted to, but as we both know, there was a 
congressional edict against it, so therefore you couldn't 
use USG funds. I had talked to the (•(Tiii.rfa i*din»rr- Foundation 
before the conference, and had hoped that they would be 



UNCLASSIHED 



137 



UNCUSSIFIED 



HIR2146000 limiil U.l.lll ■■ II PAGE 136 
interested in a fairly substantial support for a follow-on 
organization, but they were only interested in supporting a 
follou-on organization if the United States Government were 
also prepared to support a follow-on organization which was 
not possible with the legislation. 

Q Was Roy Godson involved in the follou-on 
organization? 

A Well, since--I mean it really wasn't any follow-on 
organizations, so he was basically out of it. 

S To your knowledge, he had no involvement in the 
follow-on organization? 

A No. He was--to be frank, he was obviously a friend 
of and in contact with Errol Anderson, but there was no 
follow-on activity, so I mean--you know, a door plate and one 
or two people on a retainer basis for a few months while 
Seaga and Anderson hope there will be funding for a new 
Democratic International in the youth field. 

None comes. It atrophies, end of that. Now, how 
much money we are talking about, I don't know, but my 
understanding is very little. 

S Where did you get that understanding? 

A Talking to Errol Anderson. 

e Did — 

A I don't have a document. X do know where AID money 
was spent because we have an audit. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



138 



NAME : 
3372 
3373 
3374 
337S 
3376 
3377 
3378 
3379 
3380 
3381 
3382 
3383 
33814 
338S 
3386 
3387 
3388 
3389 
3390 
3391 
3392 
3393 
339U 
339S 
3396 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR2<46000 IICUI I IIXXIt>IHII PAGE 137 

I am talking ^bo^u't" the" To 1 low-on now. 

A I can't. 

2 To your knowledge, did Roy Godson attenpt to raise 
money for the follow-on activities . 

A To your knowledge, he had not. He wanted to see, 
and candidly he wanted to see a follow-on activity, but he 
knew that we were unable to do it from the government's 
side, and he knew it wasn't possible for the private side. 

2 Did you know that Oliver North asked Roy Godson to 
raise funds for projects in Nicaragua. 

A No, I did not, and I can make no comment. I did 
not . 

2 Did you ever meet a man named Terry Slease. 

A No. 

2 Did you ever meet a man named John 

A No. 

2 ScottHiller? 

A No. 

2 When the allegations were made in the press after 
the Tower Commission report that the International Youth 
Year Commission might have been related to the International 
Youth Year activity that you were involved in, did you 
attempt to find out whether or not Oliver North was Involved 
with the follow-on to the International Youth Year 
Committee . 



A 



UNCLASSIFIED 



139 



NAME: 

3397 
3398 
3399 
3400 
' 3U0 1 
3U02 
3U03 
31*04 
3405 
3U06 
3407 
3408 
3409 
3410 
341 1 
3412 
3413 
3414 
3415 
3416 
3417 
3418 
3419 
3420 
3421 



HIR246000 



UNClASSra 



PAGE 138 



A Well, first recall this came out in--it uas after 
people had left so that I couldn't go in and ask Ollie North 
directly, uhich I would have lilted to have done, but I would 
say there is no way to check what I had available to him. 

In other words, the best of my knowledge there was 
no diversion of funds to the contras, to the best of my 
knowledge there was very, very little, if any, money left 
over after the conference, and if it was, it was in the 
possession of Minister Errol Anderson, who was holding it in 
escrow and using it on a slow basis for guys on retainer, 
hoping the funding would come in, and I have not seen Errol 
Anderson in the last few years--once or twice, and I have 
asked him about this, and as best I can figure outline — we^ 
are talking about, you know, something on the order of about 
«25,000 . 

2 My question was whether or not you attempted to 
find out whether or not Oliver Korth had been involved in 
the follow-up to the International Youth Commission. 

A I made no specific effort to pursue that at that 
time. This was now, what? February? Something like this 
whan it comes out — March? At that point, all files had been 
sequestered from the NSC. There was none to ask — unless we 
were going to do an audit. The audit had been done before, 
so we knew what the audit said. 

2 Did you attempt to find out whether Oliver North-- 



UNCUSHD 



140 



NAHE : 
3422 
3423 
3424 
3425 
3426 
3427 
3428 
3429 
3430 
3431 
3432 
3433 
3434 
3435 
3436 
3437 
3438 
3439 
3440 
344 1 
3442 
3443 
3444 
3445 
3446 



HIR246000 



uNcussra 



PAGE 139 



A I said no three times. 

e Did you discuss this with Roy Godson? 

A I did discuss the allegations of the lYC, lYYC with 
Roy, and I said, ''What the Heck is this?'' 

2 And what did he say? 

A He was absolutely amazed to see it on the chart. 
He thought it uas dead wrong. 

2 Did he indicate to you at that time that he had 
some involvement in fund-raising for these projects in 
Central America with Oliver North? 

A He did not. 

2 Did he report to you at the White House as a 
consultant? 

A Mo, if he reported to anybody probably reported to 
John Poindexter, but he did not report to him. He 
occasionally did things for rae , but they were not obviously 
in the area that involved Central America. 

2 Do you know Rob Owen? 

A No. 

2 I am going to ask you a series of names now. and we 
can get this over with, hopefully, very quickly. 

2 Richard -S^^^fcT C^eOorcl, 

A No. 

2 Albert Hakim? 

A No . 



UNCLASSIFIED 



141 



HAHE: HIR2146000 



ONCL 



PAGE 1U0 



3U147 

314149 
31450 

345 1 
3U52 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3457 
3458 
3459 
3460 
3461 
3462 
3463 
3464 
3465 
3466 
3467 
3468 
3469 
3470 
3471 



2 George Cave? 

A Yes. 

£ Did you know George Cave in any context related tc 
Hicaragua or Iran? 

A No. 

2 Amiram, A-H-I-R-A-H, Nit, N-I-R? 

A No. 

2 Jacob Hlmrodi? 

A No. 

2 Al^ Schuimmer? 

A No . 

2 David Kimche . 

A No. 

2 Adnan Khashoga? 

A No. 

2 John Shaheen? 

A No. 

2 Did you have any knowledge of the effort to raise 
noney iron third countries for the Kicaraguan resistance? 

A Ho. 

2 Do you know.j 

A Yes 

2 Did^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Ptave any Involvenent in 

funding or seeking assistance for the Nicaraguan resistance, 

to your knowledge? 




Sd"'L. 



142 



NAME : 
3472 
3473 
3474 
3475 
3476 
3477 
3478 
3479 
3480 
3481 
3482 
3483 
3484 
3485 
3486 
3487 
3488 
3489 
3490 
3491 
3492 
3493 
3494 
3495 
3496 



HIR246000 

A 

2 

A 

Q 



To my knowledge, no. 



UNCLAS 



PAGE 141 



Do you know--did you know Glen Souham? 
No. 

Do you know Neal Livingston? 
A No . 

fi Terry Arnold? 

A I know--who is Terry Arnold? Where does he sort of 
fit in--no, I don't think so. I know a Tony Arnold. I don't 
think I know a Terry. 

2 Bruce Cameron? 

A Yes. 

S How do you know Bruce Cameron? 

A Ue were both on the--Guatemala--Presidential electioi 



observer team to Guatemala. 

_^^ 

S Dar 



in KirKdall* 



A Yes. 

2 How do you know Dan- 

A Well see--how do I know him. I met him once with 
Ollie North. 

2 You had a meeting with Ollie North. 

A No it was a group of people. I am trying to 
remember who was there. 

2 There is an indication on Oliver North's calendar 
in here somewhere there was a meeting with you and Dan 
Kirkdall. Do you recall such a meeting? 



UNCLASSi 



£ k ui ■»' 



143 



NAME : 
3497 
3498 
3499 
3500 

, 350 1 
3502 
3503 
3504 
3505 
3506 
3507 
3508 
3509 
3510 
351 1 
35 12 
3513 
3514 
3515 
3516 
3517 
3518 
3519 
3520 
3521 



r^(rr- 

v. " . . 
*i# ~^ .. ^ 

HIR246000 " " PAGE 142 

A I recall a meeting--but I don't recall the dates. I 
don't recall context. 

2 Hou about February the 16, 1985? 

A Could be. 

Q Do you remember what the meeting was about--11:30 in 
Oliver North's office? 

A What I recall on this, and it is hazy, is that--! 
basically remember something to the effect that ue had a 
mutual-- 

2 Sorry, may have been 1986. 

A ny recol-lection is that ue had a mutual friend in 
France that had been a very distinguished French 
governmental official that I knew. 

2 Was this a French intelligence--f ormer French 
intelligence official? 

A Yes, and we were discussing him. 

2 That is what the discussion was about? Were you 
aware of any funds that were raised by Spitz Channel or any 
of his associates going to fund the Hicaraguan resistance? 

A Ho . I have never met Spitz Channel. 

2 Old you ever attend a meeting at Dan Kirkdall's 
town house with Oliver North to discuss legislative strategy 
on AID to the Hicaraguan resistance? 

A I did once . 

2 Hhy were you at that meeting? 






144 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLASS; 



PAGE 1143 



NAUE ■■ 

3522 A Well. I uas there because I was invited. I don't 

3523 think I stayed for the whole meeting. In fact, I know I 

3524 didn't. I don't recall, particularly, who uas there. There 

3525 are a number of outsiders. I Irinm r i rlfili 1 1 uas there. I 

3526 knou Ollie uas there. 

3527 2 Sam Dickens. 

3528 A Yeah. 

3529 e Jacob Ramof? 

3530 A I am not sure I knou--see the guy for Citizens 

3531 for--yeah, I think he uas there. 

3532 2 Lynn Bouchez. 

3533 A Probably. 

3534 2 Otto Reich. 

3535 A Yeah, Otto and I both left early because, frankly, 

3536 it uas not appropriate for both of us to be there, and ue 

3537 weren't necessarily particularly briefed as to uhat the 

3538 meeting uas about, and ue did not stay there for the uhole 

3539 thing. 

35140 2 Uho askn^l"" ^° 9° ^o ^^^ nesting? 

35U1 A I believe Ollie. 

35^2 . 2 Did he tell you he uanted you to cone? 

35143 A I think it uas sonething like the lines that it 

351414 uould be a useful meeting, sort of like that to discuss 

35145 Central America. 

35146 2 Uhat happened? 



bNCLA 



■■•h ■•'i 



145 



NAUE : 
35U7 
35148 
3549 
3550 
3551 
3552 
3553 
35514 
3555 
3556 
3557 
3558 
3559 
3560 
3561 
3562 
3563 
356U 
3565 
3566 
3567 
3568 
3569 
3570 
3571 



HIR2U6000 



(iNCLAS 



PAGE mu 



A Pardon rae ? What happened at the meeting? 

I don't remember at all, but it was a question 
of--gatting involved in a congressional strategy which. A, 
was not my responsibility when--raost of the times when these 
meetings took place, whether it was under the aegis of the 
legislative council, the legislative councils. I would not 
get involved in them, because that was generally held 
separately from public diplomacy. 

From time to time when something like this 
happened, they sort of put a net out to include people. I 
would get asked, and as I said, I did not stay for the whole 
thing . 

2 Were you aware that Arturo Cruz was on--was a 
consultant to the NASA strategy information center. 

A Ho. I was not. 

2 Were you aware that Arturo Cruz, Jr.-- 

A Junior or senior? 

2 I think it was senior in this . 

A No . I was not. 

2 Were you aware that Arturo Cruz. Jr. was a 
consultant to the Department of State or given a contract by 
LPD? 

A No. 

2 Do you recall a lunch on Friday. April 19. 1976. in 
the White House Kess with Otto Reich, Oliver North, David 



I j-B ^ ; - r^ 






146 



NAME : 
3572 
3573 
3S7U 
3575 
3576 
3577 
3578 
3579 
3580 
3581 
3582 
3583 
358U 
3585 
3586 
3587 
3588 
3589 
3590 
359 1 
3592 
3593 
3594 
3595 
3596 



HIR2U6000 



UNO 



PAGE ms 



Woplet and Larry Spivey? Wopler, H-0-P-L-E-R. 

A It is Uolper, the media producer--raovie producer. 
David W-0-L-P-E-R. 

2 Uhat was the purpose? 

A And the lunch make-up uas--did not include North 
despite the fact he is listed there. There were four of 
us--Spivey, Raymond, Reich and Wolpar. It was a 
conceptualization discussion of whether--ldeas about Central 
America and how one nay tell the story better and ue 
were--David Vlolper was thinking about the possibility of 
perhaps producing a film on Central America. Nothing ever 
came of it. It was Spivey's idea. Spivey is another 
hustler, and he arranged to have Uolper--Uolper is a very, 
very fine person. 

He IS the one that did all the television for the 
Olympics, and the Statue of Liberty and had he been 
interested in doing something in Central America, it would 
have been a beautiful piece. 

S And he wasn't. 

A And he wasn't, no. But it was a great idea, but he 
had a full agenda with the Statue of Liberty coming up. 

S Are you aware of any funding from any European 
sources for the Nicaraguan resistance. 

A No. Ky hesitation--when you used the word 
resistance--because I have spoken to the Gernan foundation. 



147 



NAME : 
3597 
3598 
3599 
3600 
360 1 
3602 
3603 
36014 
3605 
3606 
3607 
3608 
3609 
36 10 
36 1 1 
3612 
36 13 
3614 
36 15 
36 16 
36 17 
36 18 
36 19 
3620 
362 1 



HIR2U6000 



UNCLAS 



PAGE 1U6 



but that is for the Democratic opposition in the country. 

2 Are you familiar with the Institute for North/South 



Issues ? 
A 

2 

A 
uith it 



Not in any detail. 

How are you familiar with them. 

Well, I am aware that Frank Gomez is associated 
I am not at all certain what responsibilities, if 
any, that organization/ had uith LPD. I believe that there 
is some work that has been done by Frank Gomez on Haiti, 
which has been good and totally separate from this activity, 
and my principal knowledge of that organization is his 
interests in Haiti. 

Do you know a man name Brian Crocier, C-R-0-C-I-E- 



Yeah. 

How do you now him? 

He is a personal friend or I know him as a 



^^ 



:ournalist "« therefore a cont;pract for 20 years. . rc^ 

2 Here you aware of any involvement by Brian-'^^^^^ 
m support for the resistance in Nicaragua? 
A No, I was not. 

MR. OLIVER: I have no further questions. 
THE WITNESS: My God I 

MR. OLIVER: Sorry to take so long, but I 
appreciate your cooperation. Maybe Mr. Fryman or Mr. Buck-- 



ULM^v;!.. 



148 



NAME : 
3622 
3623 
362(t 
362S 
3626 
3627 
3628 
3629 
3630 
3631 
3632 
3633 
3634 
3635 
3636 
3637 
3638 
3639 
36>40 
36m 
36U2 
36U3 
364U 
3645 
36<46 






HIR2146000 k'<««l.l U^'i. ..,■ PAGE 147 

MR. FRYMAN: I have no questions. 

MR. BUCK: I have no questions. 

MR. FLYNN: Nor do I. 

MR. MCGRATH: Just tuo points for the record. One, 
it IS my understanding that a copy of this transcript will 
be made available to Mr. Raymond as it has been with other 
witnesses, and that pursuant to our discussions this 
transcript, although believed to be unclassified, will be 
handled as a sensitive document. 

MR. FRYMAN: off the record a second. 

[Discussion held off the record. 1 

MR. MCGRATH: After ray first point, strike 
everything where I said to. 

MR. FRYMAN: Why don't you read--off the record. 

[Discussion of the record. ] 

MR. OLIVER: Let me just ask a couple of 
questions, and I cannot show you these notes, but the 
questions I ask are based on notes. 

MR. MCGRATH: Can I ask why? 

MR. OLIVER: Because we aren't allowed to show 
then to anybody on the basis of your rules. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 Did you ever discuss. Mr. Raymond, with Oliver 
North a grant of 475,000 for a conference to be held in San 
Jose, Costa Rica in 1985? 






149 



NAHE: 

36147 
36^8 
3649 
36S0 
36S1 
36S2 
3653 
365U 
3655 
3656 
3657 
3658 
3659 
3660 
3661 
3662 
3663 
36614 
3665 
3666 
3667 
3668 
3669 
3670 
3671 



HIR2146O0O 



IMP 



Q 



PAGE 1148 



A Can you be more explicit as to what kind of a 
conference ? 

2 I don't know. I an just asking whether or not-- 

A I do not remember any discussion. I do not 
remember any discussion with Korth for a conference. I am 
auare that under the Public Diplomacy Plan, we have 
sponsored conferences in several places in Latin America, 
including Costa Rica. 

2 But you don't remember discussing-- 

A Ko > I don't remember that. 

2 --discussing it with Ollie North. 

A No, we had one--just want to state for the record 
that it was a conference bringing together concerned Latins 
to discuss Central America. 

2 But you don't recall discussing it with Oliver 
North? 

A I don't recall. 

2 Do you ever recall discussing with Oliver North 
for^^^^^^l? 

A I don't think so. 

2 Do you ever recall discussing it with Penn Kenble K- 
E-H-B-L-E? 

A No . 

MR. OLIVER: Ho further questions. 

MR. nCGRATH: If I may, I would like to note that 



150 



PAGE 149 



Mr. Raymond appeared here voluntarily today, and he 



NAME: HiRaueooo 

3672 

3673 exhibited the utmost cooperation with the committee for five 

3674 and a half hours of testimony. Thank you. 

3675 MR. OLIVER' Ue are also very appreciative, Mr. 

3676 Raymond, for your appearing on such notice and for your 

3677 cooperation. 

3678 [Whereupon, at 7:>45 p.m., the deposition was 

3679 concluded . 1 



151 



8TKN0GRAPHIC MINUTBS 
UnrvTlwd and DiM«tod 
Not for Qaotetka «r 
DupHfittoo 




TOP 
SECRET 



^ 



Hsrrs 



-/53 



/87 



Committee Hearinfi 

if tte 

UJ3. BOUSE OF BEFBESENTATIVES 




t 



W 



•^ ■^'"'%-^-., 



■'"'^..^ 



/-^^^ 



OFnCB OF THB CLKSK 
OOa of OOdal Bvorta 



Top 



mmmmi j^Sl^^ 



152 



Dotson/drg 
Take #1 



[ni!!ASSffiT 



1 

2 
3 
4 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



DEPOSITION OF WALTER RAYMOND 

Wednesday, September 23, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 



The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in 
Room H-405, The Capitol, Spencer Oliver presiding. 

Present: Spencer Oliver, on behalf of the House 
Select Committee. 

Ken buck, on behalf of the House Select Committee. 

Tom Fryman, on behalf of the House Select Committee. 

Nick Wise, on behalf of the House Select Committee. 

Victor Zangla, on behalf of the General Accounting 
Office. 

Dean Mc Grath, Jr., on behalf of the White House. 



65*- 




tnswHblrT 



153 



URSKSSIflClT 



Whereupon , 

WALTER RAYMOND, 
was recalled for examination by counsel for the House Select 
Committee, and having been previously duly sworn, was 
examined and testified further as follows: 

MR. OLIVER: May we go on the record. 

I would like to remind the witness he is still 
under oath. This is a continuation of the deposition which 
was begun -- 

,MR. MC GRATH: For the record, since this involves 
sensitive information, if the persons who are present today 
would identify themselves for the record. 

MR. OLIVER: — which was begun on September 3rd. 

Fine. I am Spencer Oliver, Chief Counsel, House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Associate Staff Counsel, House 
Select Committee. 

MR. FRYMAN: I am Thomas Fryman, Staff Counsel to 
the House Select Committee. 

MR. WISE: I am Nick Wise, Associate Staff of the 
House Select Committee. 

MR. BUCK: Ken Buck, Assistant Minority Counsel for 
the House Select Committee. 

MR. MC GRATH: Dean McGrath, Associate Counsel to 
the President. 

THE WITNESS: Walter Raymond, witness. 



m^mk 



154 



mmm 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



MR. ZANGLA: Victor Zangla with the General Account- 
ing Office and assigned to the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee . 

MR. BUCK: For the record, I would like to ask the 
witness to answer all questions within the framework of this 
investigation so the answers to the questions are going to 
relevant subject matter. 

MR. OLIVER: You can ask him to answer the questions 
you ask and you want him to answer. I ask that he answers 
the questions I ask. 

MR. BUCK: Are you asking him to answer questions 
on irrelevant matters, Mr. Oliver? 

MR. OLIVER: No, I am not. 

MR. BUCK: If you have any problems with that, I 
would like the chairman to rule. 

MR. OLIVER: I have no problems with relevancy, 
but it is not for you to determine. 

MR. BUCK: It is for the chairman to determine. I 
am asking the witness, because of the sensitive nature of 
this deposition, to keep his answers within that framework. 

MR. OLIVER: I am sure the witness will keep his 
answers within the scope. His counsel can advise him. 

MR. BUCK: I think it is important we also advise 
him. 



OIWHEft 



ET 



155 



umen^FiEFT 



EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Mr. Raymond, we discussed during the previous 
deposition your duties and responsibilities as Chief of the 
Intelligence Directorate at the National Security Council 
and as Special Assistant to the President and Director of the 
Office of International Communications and Public Diplomacy 
at the NSC. 

I would like to ask you what your employment was 
immediately prior to your joining the National Security 
Council staff in 1982? 

A I was in the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Q What was your job in the Central Intelligence Agency 
What was your title at that time? 

A I was a senior staff officer and the Director of 
Operations . 

Q Did your — how long had you held that ]ob prior to 
coming to the White House? 

A I had been in that position, I guess, approximately 
four years. Four years. 

Q Did your responsibilities in that position involve 
Central America in any way? 

A I had worldwide responsibilities, and they did 
include some discussion of Central America. 



"TTTP'^#5*Mt:T 



156 



WMftil^ffW 



Q During 1981 and 1982, prior to your leaving the 
Central Intelligence Agency, did you sit on any interagency 
committees which dealt with public diplomacy and public 
affairs? 

A Yes. 

Q Which committees were those? 




157 



uVGUSonfik 



1 

2 
3 

" 4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




MR. MC GRATH: At this point, I am going to have to 
object to the open-ended nature of the questions and the fact 
the previous two organizations discussed have nothing to do 
with the subject matter which is the mandate of this com- 
mittee . 

MR. OLIVER: Counsel, the subject matter of these 
areas deals with public affairs of public diplomacy. The 
agencies that have been mentioned here thus far all deal with 
foreign affairs and foreign policy. AID is one of the major 
proponents of foreign policy, and my question is whether or 



jm^Hw 



158 



m 



r.''4ii/r; 



•UUII 5tU 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



not they were involved in any of these areas of the com- 
mittees. I think that is perfectly relevant. Given the 
fact that the Director of the Office of Public Diplomacy 
came from AID prior to that position, and so did the President 
of the IBC, I think it is perfectly relevant to ask what AID's 
involvement was. 

MR. MC GRATH: If counsel would like to make a con- 
nection between various individuals and their organizations 
with the committee's work about certain organizations, we 
have no otjjection to that. But the fact we are having open- 
ended questions about the entire organization and inter- 
agency workings of the Central Intelligence Agency strikes 
me as beyond the purview. 

MR. OLIVER: We are not asking questions like that. 
If you don't let me lay the foundation, I can't ask the 
questions. We will be here two or three days. I think AID 
is perfectly relevant, and I think your objection in that 
regard is frivolous. 

MR. BUCK: Let me state another frivolous objection 
for the record. The scope of House Resolution 12 deals with 
diversion of funds from sales of arms to Iran and other 
narrowly-drafted areas. It does not deal with issues 
that are better left to the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

MR. OLIVER: It also deals with issues on a rather 



broad scale. 



.uNsusmr 



159 



tdSUOflSIr 



BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Let me try to rephrase the question so we can try 
to make some progress. Did anyone from AID sit on any of the 
interagency committees that you participated 




Q Did Frank Gomez sit on any of those interagency 
committees when he was Assistant Secretary of State for 
Public Affairs? 

A Without recourse to my files, I can't give the 
timeframe. Frank Gomez sat in on meetings I participated in 
while he was still Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political 
Affairs. I don't remember his actual timeframe when he was 
Deputy Assistant, so I can't pinpoint that. I don't believe, 
I do not believe that many of the meetings that I participated 
in while still at CIA included Mr. Gomez. I believe meetings 
took place with him after. 

And there were only one or two meetings, and they 
deal with how one communicates more effectively U.S. foreign 



iHiissm 



^T 



160 



HfffitefflfflT 



1 

2 

3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



policy, principally to European audiences, INF and related 
matters . 

Q Did you meet Mr. Gomez while you were still at the 
Central Intelligence Agency? 

A I do not believe so. 




ilrobroitVpFffciprp 



161 



ONttASSHVi'^ 




Q Do you recall meeting Rich Miller at any time while 
you were still the Director of Operation at the CIA? 

A Absolutely not. 

Q Is It possible he could have sat in on some of the 
interagency meetings? 

A No. If you would be able to trigger my memory 
with names, then I can answer. 

Q During your service at the Central Intelligence 
Agency, did you ever serve i 

A No, sir. 

Q What was your relationship to William Casey in your 
position at the Central Intelligence Agency in 1981 and 1982? 

A Well, first of all, I had never met Mr. Casey before 
he was appointed to his position at DCI. My relationship 
simply was as a staff officer with several layers of command 
between myself and the Director. 

Q How many layers? 

A At least two layers and several additional people 
if you consider chiefs and deputies. 

Q Were you at what would be a senior career level in , 
terms of your length of service and your grade in the CIA m 
1981 and 1982? 

A Yes. 

Q Would it be the equivalent of SES in the Department 



iJTlGin.KHniR^^ 



162 



mums 



1 

2 

3 

4 

S 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



of State? 



A Yes. 

Q Were you the Chief of a Division or staff of some 
kind? 

A Yes. 

Q What was that position? 

MR. MC GRATH: Could we go off the record. 
MR. OLIVER: Sure. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
•MR. OLIVER: Back on the record. Could you read 
back the last question? 

(Whereupon, the reporter read the pending question.) 
THE WITNESS: I was a staff officer in 




BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Who did you report to in that position: 

A My first command would be the Chief of 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and then to the 

Assistant Director for Operations, and then -- I am sorry -- 
Assistant Deputy Director for Operations, and then the Deputy 
Director for Operations, and since on to the DDCI and DCI. 

Q When did you first meet Bill Casey? 

A Early after he joined CIA, which I believe was some- 
time about April or May, and I am not -- 1981 -- I am not 



UNbuftddlrtslF' 



163 



SHKH^ffitr 



12 



certain. 

Q Did you participate in any meetings with Bill Casey 
that related to Central America or Nicaragua? 

A I believe so. Let me say that the way the 
responsibilities were divided, specific responsibility for 
activities involving Central America would be that of the 
Chief of the Latin America Division. My role would have been 
supportive. But m answer to your question, I would say 
yes, but I can't be specific as to dates. 

Q ,In 1981 and 1982, could you give a general estimate 
of how many meetings you had with Bill Casey or that you 
participated in where Bill Casey was present? 

A We are talking approximately 15 months, and I have 
no recourse to files. I would say probably five or ten. 

Q What prompted your decision to leave the CIA? 

A First of all, I had been considered for an assign- 
ment in the National Security Council in 1979, during the 
Carter Administration, at that time, I and another gentleman. 
I did not accept that position, it wasn't political. Don 
Gregg, who was the head of the Intelligence Directorate in 
the spring of 1982, was asked by Vice President Bush to ]oin, 
the staff, and in turn Don Gregg was asked by Bill Clark to 
suggest a possible candidate to replace him. He suggested 
that I might be a good person to talk to. 

Bill Clark, if I recall, talked to Director Casey, 



unaEffldEET 



164 



UimSMEF' 



13 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Casey said I would be a good man, encouraged interviews to 
take place. I was interviewed sequentially by John 
Poindexter, Bill Clark, Bud McFarlane -- not sequentially, 
interviewed by the three, and then took the ]ob. 

Q Did you discuss the position with Bill Casey? 

A Yes. 

Q What can you recall about that discussion? 

A I said that I had always been interested in assign 
ment to the National Security Council. I recall thinking abou 
that kind .of assignment over the last ten or 15 years as 
something that anyone who is in the foreign affairs field 
views as almost, you might say, the ultimate assignment one 
could have. In other words, it's where you bring together 
all the pieces of foreign policy in one place. 

And I also viewed it as an opportunity to be in a 
much broader-based area. 




So it was a matter where I thought personally I 
could, I would find it very satisfying from a personal point 
of view, but, more importantly, I thought that after having 
been m the government for, as I testified last time, for 25 
or more years, I felt that I had a contribution that I could 



U irvipydttfHlrPT 



165 



msssm 



make, and I genuinely felt there were things that we needed 
to do and could do. 

Now, this is a preface by saying when the question 
came up, I said that I was extremely interested in seeing what 
we could do to strengthen the American Government's capability 
to participate internationally, openly, and through the open 
overt agencies of government, and I would like to see what I 
could do to help facilitate that. 

I was aware that there had been a buildup with 
covert act;ion capability, and I was concerned we might become 
too dependent on the covert action capabilities as a way to 
solve problems and we needed to have a way to provide support 
to pluralistic tendencies around the world, to provide means 
to more effectively articulate our policies, stronger radios, 
stronger public diplomacy efforts, and we needed to energize 
the entire community to these goals and objectives. 

And I made this short speech that I am making to 
you to Bud McFarlane and to John Poindexter and to Bill Clark 
and to Bill Casey. I said that I am going down there, but I 
will be very candid, I would like to take on something which 
I think needs to be done. And Bill Clark said, "Fine, I think 
what you are proposing is very important, the job that is 
open right now is an intelligence job, start there, but you 
can work on this other activity as well." 

His purpose -- this is not surprising as far as 



mmk 



166 



im^ffi^T 



15 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



NSC officers are concerned because the NSC officers, again, as 
I noted before, frequently were involved in a variety of 
different activities. The surprising aspect of it is perhaps 
to have some of these activities handled out of the intelli- 
gence group, but it wasn't viewed as that, I wasn't viewed 
as an intelligence group person when I was taking on those 
aspects; I was viewed as NSC staff also. 

But since it could be perceived from the public as 
a conflict of interest between these two, as it over time 
began to develop and a lot of energetic work was being done 
there. Bill Casey reorganized, as we discussed last time, and 
set up a separate record which I headed, and I resigned from 
CIA at that time so there would be no question whatsoever of 
any contamination of this. Because even though the CIA 
officer could do these things as a NSC officer and not have 
it linked back to CIA, I was concerned there not be contamina- 
tion to these excellent projects which were starting. So I 
resigned. 

Q When was that? 

A That was -- I should know this — spring, '83. 
I think it's April 1, something to that effect. And then was 
hired as a NSC staff officer. 

Q Did you retire from CIA? 

A I actually retired, because I had 32 -- we're 
talking '82 -- I had 30 years of government service, and X 
was old enough 



''^HikiiBBEfiBr 



167 



OltttlSSffB' 



16 



Q You went through the formal retirement? / 

A Yes. I officially retired from CIA, and I was a re- 
hired annuitant is the actual legal terminology with the NSC. 
Q The CIA has a retirement policy that allows people 
to retire at an earlier age than normal government service, 
isn't that correct? 

A Well, it does, that is correct. 

Q I think, for the record, we ought to show that, 
because you were, I think, age 52 at that time. So, ]ust for 
the record, I think it ought to be clarified the CIA allows 
people to retire at an early age after a certain period of 
time of service. Isn't that correct? 

A Yes. They also take into consideration service 
that you had with other departments and agencies to build 
to that point. 

Q So you were able to retire with your full annuity 
at that point, is that correct? 

A Correct. But that's not — I might ]ust point out, 
for the record, that is not different than any other Foreign 
Service officer. If you had worked in the United States 
Government, whether it is with one agency or another or severa 
agencies, they require a varied track record for overseas 
service and so on. 

Q But prior to the spring of 1983, your position at 
the NSC was that of head of the Intelligence Directorate, 




:t 



168 



ummMiET 



17 



' and m that capacity, you would have served as the liaison 

2 of the CIA, IS that correct? 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q With all the other elements of the intelligence 

5 community, is that also correct? 

6 A Correct. 

7 Q You testified earlier that you had a, in 1983, a 

8 once-a-week meeting with Bill Clark and Bill Casey, is that 

9 correct? 

10 A Correct. 

11 Q Was public diplomacy discussed at those meetings 

12 with Bill Casey and Bill Clark? 

13 A To the best of my recollection, no. But I would 

14 say, without recourse to the records, that in nine months of 

15 discussion at these weekly meetings, I am sure there was 

16 discussion about the concern that Director Casey and National 

17 Security Advisor Clark had dealing with our ability to sus- 

18 tain our foreign policy in key areas of the world, and a 

19 specific point which was an issue of great tension was the 

20 question of the deployment of the INF, and I cannot -- without 

21 recourse to my files, I can only speculate that we probably 

22 <iid discuss issues concerning public opinion, public 

23 attitudes, how to generate more support for our policies 

24 concerning issues like INF and probably Central America, 

25 because it certainly was a major, issue at that time. 




169 



UNausssfit 



li 



We may, in that context, have mentioned to Bill Casey 
that progress we were making in putting together an overt 
public diplomacy effort which he would be interested in as a 
Cabinet member and as a senior National Security Advisor to 
the President. But I don't recall that with any specificity, 
but I wanted to make the point it probably was discussed in 
some fashion. 

I recall some of the agenda items, I mean, as being -- 
frequently we would be discussing some of the most difficult 
issues which were coming up as a result of the recent 
intelligence, in other words, incident A, event B, terrorist 
attack C and what could be done about these various things. 
There were a lot of other questions that dealt with the 
nitty-gritty of the communication management question, 
not communication, community, intelligence community managemenlt 
questions. 

Q In your earlier testimony, in answer to one of the 
questions, you indicated it was in July of 1983 that there 
was a reorganization of the National Security Council. Does 
that refresh your memory as to when you resigned from CIA? 

A I said July, and I looked at my Presidential Com- 
mission this morning, and it says 1 June, so to correct it, 
as far as -- without going back to my files, I think the 
Presidential Commissions were given coincidentally with the 
reorganization, so we should advance the date of the 



TCTp'V^^rftfFT 



170 



IIKeQ\$SIFtElT 



19 



1 reorganization a bit. 

2 My recollection of the resignation/retirement is 

3 April -- 

4 MR. MC GRATH: Counsel, we obviously can go back 

5 and check the record and verify that. 

6 THE WITNESS: I think it's about April 1, April 5. 

7 I remember taking a three-day break so I could be hired as 

8 an annuitant, and went off to the beach. 

9 BY MR. OLIVER: 

10 Q , April to 1 June is more than three days. 

11 A Yes. I can term -- 

12 Q I am trying to determine when this transition took 

13 place. 

14 In your earlier testimony, you said July, 1983. I 

15 realize you didn't have your records. You looked at your 

16 Presidential Commission — 

17 A The Commission was 1 June. The recollection I have, 

18 and this can be made available for the record, my recollection 

19 now is April for the resignation/retirement. And I could look 

20 it up in my personnel records. 

21 MR. MC GRATH: If I might interject, it is over 

22 four years ago, we clearly have the information available, we 

23 can go back and check it. I don't think it is worth belabor- 

24 ing the point whether he remembers exactly when he retired or 

25 resigned. 



]!WS*n»wjw:' 



171 



ui<£kA&^Eib 



20 



MR. OLIVER: I think it is important, Counsel, 
because it was during the period between April and June that 
Mr. Raymond was deeply involved in the establishment of LPD 
in the Department of State and the employment of Otto Reich. 
I believe m earlier testimony he said July of 1983 -- m 
response to a question as to whether or not he was still 
Senior Director of Intelligence at the White House when he 
did this, I believe his answer was in the affirmative. I am 
trying to cl'JJarif y • that for the record; and if you could sup- 
ply us with that information, that would clarify the record 
if his memory is not exact. 

THE WITNESS: Let me say this. The best I can 
recall, we will clarify it for the record, but I am quite 
certain this is accurate, the retirement date is April, and 
April 20, somewhere beween April 10 or 20, sits in my mind. 
That means I retired actually before I was given the new 
commission. I knew the reorganization was going to take 
place. This was not a — the commission date and reorganiza- 
tion date can be confirmed, I mean the commission date I can 
confirm with you; the reorganization date can be confirmed. 
It's probably in some records you have already got. 

My retirement date you can confirm, my recollection 
now, on the basis of :ust looking at a few notes that I have, 
based on personal desk calendars at home, was April for 
retirement . 



lEUSSIFIilh' 



172 



mm& 



21 



1 BY MR. OLIVER 

2 Q Did you leave your ]ob as Senior Director of 

3 Intelligence at NSC m April of 1983? 

4 Could we go off the record. 

5 (Discussion off the record.) 

6 MR. OLIVER: Let's go back on the record; m order to 

7 clarify the testimony, we asked Mr. Raymond and his counsel 

8 to check on the exact dates of retirement -^ the assignments 

9 we have been discussing. They have now done that. Perhaps 

10 we could ask you to clarify the record. 

11 MR. MC GRATH: We informally contacted some of the 

12 current administrative officers at the National Security 

13 Council staff, and Mr. Raymond has been provided with some 

14 dates which would appear to be an accurate reflection of when 

15 he started officially at the NSC. 

16 THE WITNESS: My official date of employment as a 

•)7 National Security salaried officer was 1 May, 1983. I retired 

■18 tehj-j« working days before that, which I calculate to be either 

■(9 April 25 or April 26. 

20 And the other question -- because of some ad]ust- 

21 ments in annual leave balances, which are rather complex, I 

22 w=is hired initially as a consultant on 1 May '83 and then came 

23 full-time staff on June 3, 1983, a position I remained in 

24 until 1987. 

25 Then, the other question that you asked me. 



mm^ 



173 



UIW^BEftF 



22 



1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Mr. Oliver, concerned the date of the reorganization of the 
National Security Council and the creation of the Senior 
Directorate for Information and Communications, and that date 
is June 3, 1983. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q When you assumed the 30b as Senior Director for 
Communications, did you move from one office to another and 
create a new staff for this position? 

A Yes. 

Q And who were your subordinates in your new posi- 
tion? 

MR. MC GRATH: I believe this information has 
already been asked and answered in the previous deposition. 

MR. OLIVER: The previous deposition has some con- 
fusion of dates, and we can go back and look at it. 

THE WITNESS: The previous deposition referred to 
a different date, but the facts remain the same. Hi«n?ry Lord 
initially was in my office, he left shortly after that. 
Steve Steiner replaced him, and we worked as a team. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q What was your involvement with the Intelligence 
Directorate after you assumed your new position as Senior 
Director for Communications? 

A Very limited. My responsibilities now were exactly 
as they were described, and I was involved in trying to 



Uffe^SffjfJw 



174 



iWiitASSiEIEfi;' 



23 



1 manage the public diplomacy community. 

2 MR. MC GRATH: I might inter]ect at this moment, it 

3 IS my understanding and agreement prior to this we were not 

4 going to question Mr. Raymond on material that was previously 

5 covered in his earlier deposition. His responsibilities in 

6 the Intelligence Directorate were gone into at length at that 

7 time. 

8 MR. OLIVER: I don't believe this question was asked 
g during the earlier deposition, and there is no agreement 

10 some of tt^e areas that we discussed earlier would not be ra- 
il visited m light of this testimony today. I would like to 

12 determine whether or not Mr. Raymond continued to work in the 

13 intelligence area after he assumed his new position. That 

14 was the reason for the question. 

15 THE WITNESS: Well, clearly all of us worked to- 
1g gether on a number of different issues, and there were areas 

where I would remain m touch, and there's always a transi- 
tion period. So it would be a period of time when you would 
be moving yourselves out of any responsibilities you had and 
turning them over to other people, in some cases because the 
NSC is so limited, you might continue some contacts for a 
time. 

I would have to be, I would be prepared to respond 
to anything specific. It would be hard to answer it in the 
abstract . 



"WWfflU 



175 



ItNCtASStP^T 



24 



BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Well, did you continue to carry out any of your 
previous functions as Director of the Intelligence Group 
at the NSC after you assumed your job as Director, Senior 
Director for Communications? 

A I would answer that negatively in the sense of 
any functions. There were areas that I had been interested 
in while I was in the Intelligence Group that I remained 
interested in in the new group, but the functions of the 
Intelligence Group, in terms of the management of the 
intelligence community so far as NSC has any responsibility 
there, were done by the officers of the Intelligence Group 
and not by me. 

I might point out they were very anxious to see to 
it they exercised their responsibilities. 

Q After you left your position as Senior Director of 
Intelligence, did you draft findings for covert action for the 
President? 

A I don't believe that I did. I am aware that there 
were, there was discussion during the winter of '82 and 
spring of '83 concerning Central America, which I presume is , 
of interest. When I left that area, though, I was no longer 
the principal officer in any of that. I may have been asked 
to — my counsel may have been sought. I don't believe that 
I drafted a finding. But -- 



imtlASStHfe' 



176 



18 



21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



im^Rff' 



25 

1 MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter to 

2 mark this as Raymond Exhibit; Number 18 and ask the witness to 

3 examine that document. 

4 (Exhibit No. 18 was marked for identification.) 

5 MR. MC GRATH: Was this provided to Mr. Raymond 

6 during the previous deposition? 

7 MR. OLIVER: I think so. I don't think I have it 

8 in unclassified form. Let the record show this is a memorand 

9 from William P. Clark to Walter Raymond, dated September 12, 
10 1983, and , the committee identification number is N6828, 
•)■] and it was not discussed in the previous deposition 

12 For the record, this is a memorandum of a SIG 

13 meeting on Central America on September 9 and discusses 

14 legislative strategy and a new Presidential finding. Attached 

15 at Tab 1 is a draft of Presidential Finding, and at Tab 2, 
1g an amendment to the Zablocki-Boland Amendment; and Tab 3 is 
17 Legislative Strategy 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
ig Q Mr. Raymond, is that your signature on that docu 

20 



ment? 

A I think so. 

Q Do you recall drafting this document? 

A Yes. I recall participating in a variety of 
meetings off and on during 1983. I — yes, I recall the 
general discussion. I mean, I can't, I don't recall 



missM 



ET 



177 



DNttASStPIIST 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



specifying a 9 September meeting. I might say that the issue, 
as I said previously, had been one which has been with us 
for a number of months. The principal officer working this 
was the senior Latin America, namely, NSC staff officer 
Al Sapia-Bosch. 

I had been asked by Judge Clark to help out a bit on 
some of this process because of my previous assignment. This 
is simply summarizing a meeting two of us attended chaired 
by Eagleburger. 

Q .When you say two of us attended, who was the 
other? 

A I made the assumption Al Sapia-Bosch was there. I 
believe that's the case. I don't know of any meeting I at- 
tended he was not present. 

Q It is indicated copies of this memorandum went to 
Mr. Sapia-Bosch and Ollie North, Chris Lehman and Ken 
deGraf fenreid. 

A Right. 

Q Did you draft this proposed Presidential finding? 

A I participated in it. I think the original draft 
bindings almost always came from CIA, sent down, amendments 
were made in them by NSC staff, by State, by Defense. This 
probably reflects inputs that we had received from people in 
the community in ^n effort to try to put it into shape. 



the group. 



i-X. ^ 



wsm^ 



178 



vmimffir 



27 



As you notice in the first paragraph, small group 
included, so, in other words, I was part of a process, but 
I was certainly not the principal drafter. 

Q Who was the principal drafter? 

A I don't know. I think, as I said before, the 
normal process is for -- CIA and central community. I remembe 
a discussion, not this one, took place in the Department of 
State at the Assistant Secretary or Deputy Assistant Secretary 
level. Possibly Greg Johnstone, who was the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary y^ith Central America responsibilities. 



iwm 



179 



OlfliBISSfflffl' 



LYDA 



CAS 



10:40 a A 
4 

5 

6 

7 
8 
9 

■•o 

11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Q Why is this memoranduitl to Bill Clark coming from 
you as Director of Communications with copies to the 
Intelligence Director? 

A If I had known this discussion had been taking 
place, it would have been designed by somebody other 
than myself. It was simply a convenience. We were all NSC 
staff officers at the time. I was one at the meeting. Other 
people had responsibilities for Judge Clark. Obviously, 
as you know, Ken de Graffenreid had taken over intelligence 
and this was a transition time. The principal staff officer 
was the Latin America staff officer. 

Q Why didn't this memo come from Al Sapia-Bosch as 
an intelligence record? 

A If you had the files, you would probably find 
many memos were written on adjacent dates by Al Sapia-Bosch. 
He was very busy in writing other things for the Judge. 

Q You indicated earlier that you thought it was 
important that you be separated from the CIA in your new 
position so there would not be any position of conflict, 
yet here it is nearly three-and-a-half months after you 
assumed your new position and four-and-a-half months after 
you retired from the CIA and you are still sending 
memorandums of draft presidential findings. 

Were you still participating in activities of the 
intelligence committee after you assumed your position as 



180 



BNOtlBStfiiT 



29 



Director of Communications? 

A To the best of my recollection, you may have 
some other documents, but it was only the Central American 
issue. It was one going on for months and months. If one 
goes back to the legislative record all through the months 
of 1983, this issue had been debated and wrangled about. I, 
frankly, was anxious to disengage on all sides from the 
intelligence part of it. This is one that I was trying to 
facilitate the transition, but as you can see, I had not 
totally excracted myself from that responsibility. 

Judge Clark was trying to take advantage in the 
positive sense of the personnel he had available to 
try to get the job done. He wanted me to hang in on this 
until we got the legislative issue resolved and then I could 
get away from it. 




181 




Q Was this presidential Tinding ever signed? 
A I believe so, but I am not certain of where we 
stand on that. 

Q The memorandum also discusses legislative 
strategy in the House and the Senate. Was that one of your 
responsibilities as Director of Communication to plan or 
recommend legislative strategy? 

A Not explicitly stated. I think you are dealing 
here in this particular situation because it has the 
covert action aspect to it. 

You are dealing with my disengagement from the 
intelligence group. In the case of Outreach, as we 
discussed in the unclassified briefing earlier in the month, 
that there were meetings from time to time that did take 
place discussing Congress, discussing Central America and 
part of our concern was of an informational quality, to 
get the information out. 

This was an issue that we did have responsibility 
to exercise. So I think that to some degree informing 
foreign and domestic audiences of foreign affairs 
developments is important and this would include Congress. 
Q Did you draft the amendment that is attached to 
this exhibit 2, H.R. 2966, dated 9-1-83? 
A I don't believe so. 



lllAfUJimiEIU. 



182 



ims9H!r 



Q There is some handwriting on that page next to the 
title line which says, "Zablocki-Boland" . Is that your 
handwriting? 

A That is very hard to see on mine. It may be, 
but if it is, it is an explanatory statement to explain 
what 296 was. It is the so-called Zablocki-Boland 
Amendment. That doesn't mean that I had any drafting 
responsibility for that language. 

It simply means I was clarifying in the package 
what that 'particular amendment referred to. 

Q Do you know who drafted the amendment? 

A I do not. It said this whole business is drafted 
by committee. It could have been the original language 
prepared by CIA or it could have been adjustments recommended 
by State or NSC. 

Q In examining a number of NSC documents before the 
committee, there are in many instances more than one 
author's name on a memorandum and there are various 
clearances, but on this one there is only your neime and 
there are no clearances. 

There seems to be copies to all of the people 
who might have otherwise have been co-authors or clearances. 
That is why I am asking if anybody else had anything to do 
with drafting this. 

Q This is not an action memorandum. It is an 



mmsu 



183 



'BWU^ffilSIr 



information memorandum written by one of the participants 
working on the issue bringing Bill Clark up-to-date on what 
was going on. 

I was the guy who sent the information memo for 
it. There is probably in NSC records a series of related 
data which sets forth the action memorandum recommendations. 
This is a compilation of documents to bring him up-to-date 
on what the state of play was. It does not say that I am 
the author of orie or any of these documents. 

It just reflects that I son the author of the 
transmittal memo and the summary memo of the SIG meeting. 
Q Is it your testimony that you did not draft the 
attachments to the memorandum? 
A Which one? 

Q There is two we have not discussed yet. 
A My testimony is that as stated in the memo that I 
was one of several people that discussed the draft rinding and 
made small or large inputs to the draft finding, which to 
the best of my recollection was in the first instance 
drafted at CIA and subsequently rather significantly modified 
by various officers in NSC, State and Defense. 

This may be the final. It may be the semi-final. 
It may even be an earlier version of what finally emerged 
from the interagency process. If I was responsible for 
drafting this, it would be by the insertion of a word here or 



JHJ^iSU 



184 



ONCfASSniB' 



33 



there. It is not as the drafter of key paragraphs because I 
was not the person drafting the text. I was making a 
contribution to the drafting of the text provided to us. 

Q On the page following the amendment, there is a 
page called "legislative strategy". Did you draft that 
legislative strategy paper? 

A No. 

Q Do you know who did? 

A No, I don't. Really. I suspect it came from 
one of thfe three legislative liaison officers in State, 
NSC or the White House, but I do not know. It is somebody 
who obviously is rather actively involved in assessing mood, 
attitude and positions on the Hill as reflected in the vote 
analysis . 

Q Were you involved in assessing moods and shifts 
and swings on Capitol Hill? 

A No. 

Q What was your involvement in legislative strategy i: 
Central America? 

A Well, as I stated, I was involved in some of 
these discussions leading up to it, up to the submission of 
the finding which, as I say, I cannot state categorically 
was submitted but I assume it was. I was not involved m 
any direct dealings, although I may have some time in 1983 -- 
I may have briefed a few Congressmen. 



l/flfflliMMwnBlfcn r' 



185 



mmm 



I can't recall whether it was before or after my 
departure from the intelligence group. I think my role 
would have been supplemental in terms of the Hill. I was 
listening to everybody talk, and coming up with suggestions 
and ideas like others were. 

Q Why would a memorandum concerning legislative 
strategy and a presidential finding from the CIA come through 
you to the Director and not from the Director of Intelligence 
or the Legislative Director of the NSC? 

A .Are you referring specifically to the summary of 
the SIG meeting? 

Q Yes. 

A As I stated before, I think what you had was a 
group of people who were discussing the substance and the 
process that had been meeting for almost a year. It would 
have been more appropriate in retrospect when the organiza- 
tion took place that people who were working the problem 
but had now been re-assigned stop working the problem. But 
in fact because of the smaliiess of staff and the turnover 
of people, for a brief period of time I remained involved in 
this process which to the best of my recollection terminated 
when this process ran its course. 

Q When was that? 

A I am not sure. It seems to me it is right about 
this time now, fall of 1983. But, again, the principal 



"Tpy^muBiFT 



186 



ufiiawiEr 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



actors and the ones discussing the real substance, both 
from the standpoint of the Hill, such as legislative liaison 
people from the three various components, and the people 
who were principally making the decisions were the 
Latin American people. 

I was another voice in this mix during this 
transition period. 

Q What other activities that were not involved with 
international communications besides legislative strategy 
and Presidential findings for CIA activities were you 
involved in during this transitional period? 

A I am not sure I understand the question. Do you 
mean carry-over from my previous job? 

Q I am trying to determine what other activities you 
were involved in. Was legislative strategy part of your 
previous job? 

A No, and legislative strategy was not even my 
]ob there. What you have here is not as tight and orderly 
a structure as one would like with everything 
divided in neat lines. What happened, an officer got 
transferred from group A to group B and there was an 
ongoing, complicated issue which was still front and center 
on the plate and I was asked to continue to be an actor m 
that group. I was not the principle in the group. Despite t!- 
document, which suggests that the principal person was 



JMM^ftiMk 



187 



DNttASSIBffiT 



36 



writing to Clark, the fact is I was one of several who were 
writing memorandum and I was asked to put this together. I 
don't want to overplay what my role was here in any aspect 
of this. 

I am not aware of any intelligence functions that 
I remained involved in after I shifted. I could respond 
to something specific, but essentially once we could get 
this legacy off the plate, I could get on with my 
other business. 

Q When did you get that legacy off the plate? 

A I don't know. Obviously it was not over by 
9 September. I don't recall, frankly, when this thing was 
resolved, but I sense by thinking through other things I 
may have been doing at that time, I think fall. I don't 
recall much after September. 

Q The reason I asked the question is that I think 
that probably the legislative aspects of Zablocki-Boland and 
Central America are still on the plate. 

A That is true, but after this round we are talking 
about, do we have a finding or don't we have a finding. 
I think once that issue was resolved, I was able to put it 
past me. 

De Graffenreid staffed his office and was able 
to take the full responsibility and I was out of it. 

Q I would like to ask the reporter to mark this 



auivySBiEttH? 



188 



Umffl^Rfrr 



1 as Raymond Exhibit 19. 

2 (Raymond Exhibit 19 was marked for identification.) 

3 BY MR. OLIVER: 

4 Q I would like to note that this is a 

5 January 25, 1983 memorandum from Scott Thompson to the 

6 Director. I assume that was the Director of USIA since 

7 that is where Scott Thompson was employed at the time. 

8 The sub^ject is Walt Raymond's memo to Judge Clark. 

9 I will ask you if you have ever seen that memorandu 

10 before. 

11 A No , not the cover letter. 

12 Q Were you aware of Scott Thompson's memorandum to 

13 the Director regarding your memorandum to Judge Clark? 

14 A No. I was not. It would be consistent with his 

15 responsibilities as the Associate Director of Programs 

16 to so communicate to his director. 

17 Q Is this the same Scott Thompson who chaired the 

18 interagency working group that you participated in while 
you were^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^I^^^^^Hat 

20 A Yes. 

21 Q Did you provide him with a copy of your 

22 memorandum to Judge Clark? 

23 A I will have to take a minute to read the memcran- 

24 dum to Judge Clark. 

25 I» frankly, do not recall four-and-a-half years ag: 



ilEUlMia. 



189 



uiwiaiifeE' 



38 



whether I gave a copy co Scott Thompson or not. If I did, 
it was to facilitate his preparation of his principle at 
the meeting. 

Q Did you draft the memorandum that is attached to 
Scott Thompson's memo? 

A I believe so. < 

Q Was this drafted for the first SPG meeting as it 
states in the first line? 

A I believe so. 

Q .When did that first SPG meeting occur? 

A I would have to check the records. It implies 
from Scott's memo that it would take place on the 21st of 
January. I don't know for an absolute fact. Sometimes 
these meetings get scheduled and then get shifted two or 
three days. I would suspect that it was very close to the 
date. 

Q In number one of that memorandum you say, "State 
provides central focus for greater commitment of resources 
and greater concentration of effort in our foreign policies. 
Call it political action, if you will." 

What did you mean by "political action"? 

A Political action represents a variety of effort to 
be involved in strengthening, projecting one's own foreign 
policy. It could be programs that involve support to 
various institutions. It could be the development of network 



Wj:'<ti 



IINfil^&iE&ET 



190 



UMEBISaflfffET 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



and personal relationships with key people. 

I think the more appropriate rubric for the SPG 
and one which we have used is public diplomacy and 
democracy-building. I think the word "political action" is 
subject to misinterpretation and, therefore, we chose not to 
use it lest everybody start to view it as something like a 
packet group which it really was not. 

Q On the last paragraph of that page, you indicate 
a need to supplement Federal programs and have some quasi- 
public/prdvate effort with private funds. When you refer to 
nascent quasi-public/private? 

A That is a tongue-twister. Basically I am referring 
to programs that are supported by the Federal Government in 
the sense of funding, but generally go to private boards. 
Therefore, they maintain their integrity in the private 
dimensions to their work. 

Specific examples, as you know, include the 
National Endowment for Democracy, the Free Trade Institute, 
the Center for Private Enterprise and other such 
organizations. The point that is being made here is not 
related to any discussions with contra funding. The point 
being made here is that our society to project, our 
society to support pluralistic elements internationally, 
to help project the dialogue, cannot be exclusively funded 
by the Federal Government in the out-years. It is consistent 



iiS ^SBHI^ 



191 



imtBiSSIfRS' 



40 



with the Reagan Administration philosophy and with reality. 
There are not Federal funds available to provide this kind 
of support for all thebrograms that could constructively be 
done in the world. 

I was making the point that sooner or later we 
have to find some way to bring this issue home to the private 
sector that they have, in fact, a responsibility to help. 
That is what was intended by that particular paragraph. 

Q You indicated in the next sentence, "Our letter 
to the President will put together private donors for a 
quiet chat with the President." 

Was that to have the President raise money? 

A No. That is the meeting that raised some publicity. 
That meeting did take place and was focused on the basic 
issue that I just identified, namely, that we can only do 
so much on the Federal side and it is important for the 
private sector to recognize the need to be more involved. 

Q Did the President ask these people to raise funds 
for some of these projects? 

A No. 

Q Did he indicate to them that there was a need for ' 
private funds to be raised? 

A I believe he identified the fact, as best that I 
can recall, that there were some very complicated issues 
in the world and he particularly focused on the question of 



1 ne particularly rocused on 

iCUSSlElilL 



192 



Tifimm 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Europe and the constancy of our relations with the NATO 
alliance. 

George Gallup was present and stated that there 
were, m fact, serious difficulties in our dialogue between 
the United States and Europe and we discussed this and we 
made the point that, frankly, we cannot, as the U.S. 
Government, just go out there and do it all. Hopefully, 
there will be some kind of a private expression. 

But he did not directly approach them for funds. 
He posed 'the issue. 

Q Did you attend the meeting? 

A I did. 

Q Who else was there? 

A I can recall some. I can't recall all. My 
recollection is, from the Administration, and this material 
is available someplace, my recollection is that from the 
Administration it was myself. Claries Wick, Bill Clark, 
Peter Daly and I believe Gerald Hellman. I don't remember 
whether Scott Thompson was or was not there. Possibly there 
was an aid to Wick present, a junior officer. 
From the outside, 
ind their inclusion was as much as anything else 
to discuss the issue of European public opinion. As I 
mentioned before, we had Gallup. Other people who attend 
were: Joaquin Maitre — Joaquin Maitre was there 




ms^wir 



193 



mmm 



representing Springer. So we had media. 

In addition, we had John Kluge, who was with 
Metromedia, Carl Lindner, 1-i-n-d-n-e-r , and I think 
Robert Evans. I believe that is it. 

Q These people were described m your memorandum as 
potential donors. Is that what they were? 

A That may be a poor choice of words. Obviously, 
what we hoped was to find a way to mobilize the private 
sector. That is not the way the meeting was developed 
with the Rresident. 

The President was trying to encourage the private 
sector to be more involved. One of the involvements would 
be financial, but he was talking about our problems m 
Europe . 

Q You indicated in the last sentence that you would 
ask the International Political Committee to coordinate 
a list of items which needed private funding for use at 
this meeting. 

Did they provide a list of items for that meeting? 

A I have read this with some interest after not havinc 
seen it for four years. I do not recall a list that was 
provided. I do recall a discussion of the needs. In 
almost every case the focus was on Europe and it was on the 
fact that in the fifties and sixties, whether it had been 
major foundation support for such things as the Atlantic 



UrKtv* w If 1 Mtt 



2-730 0-88-8 



194 



umei^Fii^T 



43 



' Institute in Paris and for that matter, Encounter Magazine, 

^ and other structures in Europe that today organizations 

^ like Encounter Magazine, which is a significant opinion 
molder, had to proceed around hat-in-hand, cup-in-hand, 

^ to cry to meet its annual budget. 

" We were posing the issues and we said there is a 

' lot of networking structures that could help support mutual 

8 goals on both sides of the Atlantic. There was, as best I 

9 can recall, a list. I don't know if it was ever written, 

10 but it was orally discussed in the context of European public 

11 opinion. 

12 Q If you look at the next page in the fourth 

13 paragraph on that page, it indicates prograuns such as 

14 Central America, which is mentioned first, then the European 

15 Strategic debate. Yellow Rain, and even Afghanistan. Further 

16 down the page you refer to Secretary Shultz putting together 

17 the international committee. 

18 There is two issues, European security and Central 

19 America. Was funding for paL'j^ate or the need for funding 

20 for projects roalfce d to Central America discussed at that 

21 meeting with the President? 

22 A I recall no discussion in the meeting with the 

23 President other than the general concern that we have about 

24 our general alliance and community and our need to generate 

25 support for our policies in Western Europe. 



wHjy^AwnRlPT 



195 



BNffiSSffH' 



44 



Q Are you aware of any funds that were raised for 
any of the projects that are contemplated in this memorandum 
at a subsequent time by any of the participants in that 
meeting? 

A I am aware of the fact that as a result of 
expressions of concerns by various Administration spokesmen 
that a few projects were supported. Again, my recollection 
is that they were all on Europe. We discussed this 
marginally at the last meeting. I think there is a 
citation in one of the memorandum which identifies a program 
for Freedom House, one for the Dutch Atlantic Community. 
There may be one more. The only programs that were 
supported that I know of were in the context of the U.S.- 
debate . 

Q Was part of the purpose of this to influence 
European public opinion? 

A Part of the purpose of this was to -- well, I would 
say I guess I would call that bottom line. That is the 
bottom line of a lot of U.S. policies to try to influence 
targetted areas, other countries. I would say that we were 
concerned that Greens, the Peaceniks and others were 
being heard and another side was not being heard and that 
we could state our positions over and over again, but 
we would like to see the Europeans speak out for themselves. 
To some degree, that involved helping provide support. That 



^WJ&mA 



T?»r 



196 




45 



was one of the ideas that was behind the Freedom House 
program. 

I might say I think that subsequently is being 
funded by the National Endowment but the idea was to try to 
find a way to network good ideas throughout the United 
States, Western Europe and now Central America. There were 
lead items, good materials, to re-produce them and make t.hem 
available. So people who were speaking out for perhaps a 
view which might not have been as popular in certain parts of 
Western Europe would know they were doing it. We were 
hoping to try to open these things up, openly, overtly. 

Q Were many of these materials and articles related to 
U.S. policy in Central America? 

A Well, we are in two stages now. The general 
discussion that I recall, the meeting with the President, 
was general, but in subsequent meetings I think it was to try 
to articulate views. 

Central America was not singled out. IMF and 
Central America seemed to be the two issues generating the 
greatest degree of controversy so they were the ones we were 
most concerned about at that time. 

Q My question was related to the subject matter of 
these efforts to influence public opinion. Mentioned 
here is Central America, the European strategic debate, 



Yellow Rain, and Afghanistan. 



massm. 



197 



ONffiASSIRKT 



Was the effort to influence public opinion 
worldwide on all of these issues in terms of trying to 
generate greater support for Ainerican foreign policy? 

A I think the answer is yes. 

Q So these efforts to encourage private funding for 
various initiatives involved other issues such as Afghanistan 
Central America and Yellow Rain. Would that be a fair 
statement? 

A I think -that is drawing a conclusion that was not 
there. In other words, I think what we were interested in 
in the first instances, we were operating on several levels. 
In the first instance, there was a broad theatrical problem. 
That problem, I might point out, is here today in September 
1987. We are facing a vastly under-funded foreign affairs 
budget to the point where the Secretary of State is talking 
about closing missions all around the world. 

We still need to change the foundation dollar 
from 25 cents on a dollar international or four cents on the 
dollar, we need to reverse it. So the issue is there. 
Some of these discussions are generally at a 
broad strategic level. I know you want me to get down to 
tactical. 

Q I don't know about that. I am trying to 
establish the relevancy of this to our deposition so that 
Mr. Buck doesn't get upset. 



UNCUSSKIilU 



198 



12 
13 



25 



IRffiR^EI'^ 



A I cim not sure there was a direct relevance, 
because what we were doing in the fundraising was expressing 
our concerns about the lack of private involvement, it was 
really largely cast in terms of our alliance. This discussior 
^ in the sub-tiq^under paragraph 3 identified several of the 
® very critical polical programs that we were concerned about 
' Clearly they were issues that were going to be covered by 

one or more of the committees. Central America and 
' European Strategic Debate, as we both know, were 
^^ such a major issue that we considered asking the 
'' special coordinator to take charge, Peter Daly, Dick Stone 
in one case, and later. Otto Reich in the other case 

The others, Yellow Rain, Afghanistan, were handled 

14 by existing committees because they were issues which did not 

15 seem to have the seune kinds of labor intensive work involved 

16 in the public diplomacy field 

17 Q Did any of the individuals that were involved in 

18 this meeting with the President which we have been 

19 talking about ever raise or donate funds for any projects 

20 designed to influence European public opinion on U.S. policy 

21 in Central America? 

22 A To the best of my knowledge, it was never that 

23 specific. 

24 Q Did it include influencing public opinion on 



utifusmiw 



199 



msmm 



U.S. policy in Central America? 

A I don't know. We had talked in general terms 
and what they did subsequently I was not directly involved 
in. For all I know, one or more of those people conceivably 
could be doing something now. 

Q Are you aware if they did raise funds for a pro]ect 
related to inf laoirtg public opinion related to Central 
America? 

A I am not aware of anything specific. The most 
specific information I have is the one included in that 
report. 

Q Were you aware of any funds that were donated to 
an organization in Europe which was associated with an 
individual named Brian Crozier designed to influence 
European public opinion of U.S. policy in Nicaragua? 

A What time frame? 

Q 1985 or 1986. 

A No. I am not. I am aware of the fact that 
several of these gentlemen are friends of Brian Crozier 
but that does not mean they provided funding. I am not aware 
of any direct or indirect funding to Crozier at that time. 

Q Were you aware of Brian Crozter's activities 
designed to influence public opinion in Europe on U.S. 
Central American policy? 

A The short answer and narrow answer is no. The 



y 



q:^?V»»^«Wlft**^^ 



200 



BNOU^tS&r 



49 



longer answer is chat Brian Crozier is a publicist who has a 
very energetic, shall we say, newsletter which he 
produces and which is extremely outspoken on many subjects, 
including Central America. He does that on his own, to the 
best of my knowledge. 

So, certainly, yes, he was an aggressive spokesman 
on these issues but I don't think it necessarily leads to 
the next stage that this was a result of any admonition 
on my part. 

' I would point out that Brian Crozjer did know the 
President of the United States. You will probably find 
records of his having visited the White House. 

But other than a friendly exchange of views, and I 
did not participate in those meetings, I don't believe 
anything more was discussed. 

Q How did you know that he knew the President of the 
United States? 

A Because he -- well, that is a matter of public 
record. He contacted Bill Clark once shortly after the 
President came in_^o office. He said he met the 
President before he became President, once in California, 
and he would appreciate an opportunity to pay his respects. 

23 Clark invited him in. 

24 Q How many occasions did he visit the White House? 

25 A I don't know, maybe tw^pice. The president 
has, as we all know, _met a number of Western press. This is 



;now, met a numbe^^f We^er 



201 



uSffiiflffi' 



50 



not exceotional 




Q Do you know whether or not Brian Crozier knew 
Arturo Cruz? 

A I do not. 

Q Do you know whether or not Brian Crozier received 
funds from the Heritage Foundation? 
A I do not. 

MR. McGRATH: Can we go off the record? 
(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. OLIVER: 



202 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 



15 
16 
17 
18 
19 



22 



VfHa/t$Siff%3' 



51 



Q Are you familiar with an organization known as the 
International Freedom Fund Establishment? 

A No, I don't believe so. 

Q It is an organization based in London with which 
Brian Crozier has been associated. That does not refresh 
your memory about it? 

A No. 

Q Do you know of any involvement of Brian Crozier 
in recent years, in the past three or four years, related 
to support for the democratic resistance in Central 
America? 

A No. I am aware of no action program that Brian 
Cro2jer has been involved in directly or indirectly. 
^ Q What do you mean by action? 

A Support for the contras. I am aware that he has 
been an articulate and accurate publicist through his 
newsletter. That is word support, nothing beyond that. 
Beyond that, I have no personal knowledge. 

Q Let the record reflect that Bert Hcimmond of the 

20 House Select Committee and staff member of the House 

21 Foreign Affairs Committee has joined this illustrious 
group. 

23 Going back to the meeting with President Reagan 

24 that you attended, you mentioned a man named Robert Evans. 

25 Who was Robert Evans? 




SECRET 



203 



52 

A An industrialist who lives in Michigan. 

Q Did he ever raise funds or contribute funds for 
any activities related to American pro-grams or policies in 
Central America? 

A Not to my knowledge. 

Q You indicated that Joakim Maitre was at the 
meeting with Axle Springer? Was he an employee of Axle 
Springer? 

A I believe so. He came over from Hamburg. This was 
before he' moved to the United States. I believe he was 
sort of the Director of Publications or something like that. 



Q Were you aware of a trip that Joakim Maitre 
took to Central America on behalf of the Gulf and 
0«rb>nc Foundation? 

MR. McGRATH: Do you have a time frame? 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Between 1984 and 1987. 

A I am aware by hearsay that he took the trip. 
Q When you say by hearsay, what do you mean? 



uNCiassi^&g 



204 



(Mi^fiRgr 



5 2A 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A In some meeting some place I remember having someone 
mention to me that Joakim Maitre went to Central America. 
I think he may have been involved in writing the Gulf or 
Caribbean monograph that was produced some time around 1984. 

Q Was that also the monograph that Michael Ledeen 
participated in publishing. 

A I think so. The closest I can get to being 
specific is to say it has a blue cover. 






205 



UKCdSSff^ERET 



53 



BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q On page three of the memorandum we were discussing, 
there is a number four that indicates congressional strategy. 
Is that the congressional strategy that you were recommending 
that Bill Clark approve? 

A Yes. The congressional strategy here was the 
caution of how to deal with development of public diplomacy 
and the democracy program with Congress. And specifically, 
as noted on page one, there is the fact that we would be in- 
cluding in ^ our budgetary submission money for public diplomacy 
and democracy. 

But we felt at the first meeting that we would have, 
with the SPG principals, we ought to determine how it would be 
submitted to Congress, which budget, which spokesman, and that 
sort of thing. And, that's what th;is was dealing with. 

Q Did you draft the languatge that was included in the 
State of the Union address on this subject? 

A I helped participate in the preparation. Anyone 
having dealt with — you know what I mean — White House 
speeches, you don't draft them, you tcy to suggest ideas for 
inclusion. 

Q It is worse than interagency committees. 

The last tick in number four that you recommend 
briefing of key Senators and Cbngressroen and selected phone 
calls, and looked to USIA and State to orchestrate, did that 



UNfikASSIFlBr 



206 



UNC»(SIR<^T 



54 



1 happen, were there briefings of key Congressmen and Senators 

2 and selected phone calls related to Project Democracy at that 

3 point? 

4 A I believe so. As you know from your previous 

5 experience, we were working very closely with Chairman Fascell 

6 and his staff concerning the process moving forward to create 

7 what later became the National Endowment for Democracy, and 

8 that was, of course, a major financial part of the whole 

9 democracy program, and we had to work closely with the Hill 

10 to be sure our plans were understood by them and supported by 

11 our friends and colleagues on the Hill. 

12 We also had the question of trying to put some 

13 public diplomacy funds into other parts of the government, 
^4 such as State and AID, and that required discussion. As I 
fg recall, one point that was of particular concern was to 

^g guarantee a funding floor for the Asia Foundation, and that 

17 was an issue that came up as part of this. It is not cited in 

13 this memo. 

ig Q Since you have mentioned Congressman Fascell and 

2Q staff, I do recall those meetings and having participated in 

21 them, but I think the record needs to reflect we did not know 

22 at the time you were the director of the intelligence compon- 

23 ent of NSC and former employee of the CIA. 

24 A This is at what timefreune? 
2g Q January of 1983. 

MR. MC GRATH: If Mr. Oliver would like to be sworn 

I ujttbftssnaHET 



207 



UNlQRSIflfiET 



55 



to accommodate that statement, we will accommodate him. 

MR. OLIVER: I am making the statement for the record 
If there is some need for me to be sworn at some appropriate 
time, I will certainly aver I did not know Mr. Raymond was the 
Director of the intelligence component of the NSC and employee 
of the CIA at the time. 

THE WITNESS: I feel compelled to make one comment, 
though. The way the NSC functions, not only under this admin- 
istration, but previous administrations, the staff officers are 
there as NSP staff officers, not as detailees of different 
agencies . 

For example, my predecessor in the intelligence 
group was the senior NSC staff officer for East Asia, and his 
predecessor was the senior staff officer for most of Africa, 
and his predecessor. So the point is that you work for NSC, 
and whether you were a detailee from CIA or from the Defense 
Department or State, you were not responsible and you did not 
accept command from those other agencies. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q In point number five, on that page, it is inaicated 
that you pulled together the weekly summary statement of the 
activities and plans of the four committees, which I will 
share with the SPG principals. 

Does that assume that you are going to put together 
a weekly report on these activities for Bill Clark? 



UNlBU&SlFIEfiT 



208 



UNCLYSSHSETRET 



56 



1 A Well, that was the — yes, that is the correct 

2 statement there. That was the assumption 

3 Q And did you do that? 

4 A Not as precisely as stated there. I noted high- 

5 lights in the weekly summaries which we sent forward to the 

6 judge, each of the senior directorates.- 

7 Q You mean Judge Clark? 

8 A Yes. And I periodically briefed him on activities 

9 and plans of the four committees. The level of activity was 

10 not such it required a weekly summary of the activities, in 

11 other words. 

12 Q On the last page of this memorandum, the last tick 

13 in the summary, it says "We will move out immediately m our 
■|4 parallel effort to generate private support." 

15 Could you tell me what you meant by that and what 

■jg you did in terms of moving out immediately to generate private 

^j support? 

13 A That is in reference to the earlier paragraph on 

ig page one, the last paragraph. 

20 Q So this was a NSC effort to generate private sup- 

21 port? Is that correct? 

22 A In a broad overall sense, trying to encourage 

23 broader cross-section of the .American people to be involved in 

24 these foreign issues. I think that the way the legislation 

25 worked out, not so much legislation, but the way that the 



l)NGUSS|»i9? 



FT 



209 



UNcE188i?ffiS^T 



57 



board resolved the division of responsibilities in the National 
Endowment for Democracy, it accomplished one of the goals in 
the sense the National Endowment gives grants to American 
organizations participating, in helping them participate inter- 
nationally. That was one of our goals. 

Q What role did the CIA have in the activities which 
are mentioned in this memorandum, other than the fact that you 
were on loan from the CIA to the NSC? 

A The CIA had no direct role in any of these activi- 
ties. As you all note, the SPG meeting took place on or about 
the end of January. You will also note that I left, I retired 
from CIA the first week in April. I was concerned to be 
sure that there were no connections, links to this process. 

Q Did you discuss the general thrust of this memoran- 
dum and the projects which it talks about with Bill Casey? 

A As I mentioned earlier, I am sure the question of 
public diplomacy did come up in one or more of those meetings 
with Bill Clark. And after some considerable consideration 
of the appropriate role for CIA, it was agreed CIA should not 
be involved in this, because it would contaminate public 
diplomacy. 

Q But this is January of 1983. My question really 
was: Did you discuss this project, this memorandum and what 
it contained with Bill Casey in this timeframe? 

A I don't believe specifically. 



UMTAASStHCQ:. 



nri 



210 



UNCtlKSSIffiffRET 



58 



Q Did you discuss it with him generally? 

A Well, as I said before, I think the question of 
trying to develop a public diplomacy capability, overt public 
diplomacy capability, is something that had been discussed 
periodically before. I knew I wanted to do that when I came 
down here. He is a man of broad interests, many times in his 
own past when he had no intelligence connection; he had been 
involved in public diplomacy efforts. He knew they were 
necessary. 

So, he, personally, taking his CIA hat off for a 
minute, was supportive of this in his contacts as adviser to 
the President, the Cabinet. It's the kind of thing which he 
had a broad Catholic interest in and understanding of and would 
encourage. 

Q This January — January of 1983 was the period of 
time which I believe you testified earlier you began to have 
once-a-week meetings with Bill Clark and Bill Casey and your- 
self, sometimes including two or three others, related to your 
activities as Director of the Intelligence Group of the CIA. 
Is that correct? 

MR. MC GRATH: NSC. 

THE WITNESS: I would like to correct my earlier 
testimony on that by looking back through some sort of 
marginalia I wrote to myself. I think that may start as early 
as August of '82. It is true, from what you have said, that 



U NlnwSQWHsUbrr 



211 



UNCCK^tfffiORET 



59 



1 other people attended, it was not three people. It could be 

2 anywhere between three to six. 

3 BY MR. OLIVER: 

4 Q But sometimes it was the three of you, and other tim^s 

5 other people might have been involved, your deputy or Bill 

6 Casey's deputy or someone else? 

7 A Correct. 

8 Q But the primary purpose of that meeting was to 

9 discuss matters related to the Intelligence Committee, is that 

10 correct? • 

11 A Correct. 

12 Q During the time period that you were at the NSC, 

13 did you have any interaction or dealings with — and I am going 
i4 to ask you a series of names, and the question is, did you 
15 have any dealings with them related to Central America during 

18 this time period. 
17 A What timeframe? 
1g Q We are talking about 1982 to 1987. 

19 MR. MC GRATH: These names are different than the 

20 ones you went through before? 

21 MR. OLIVER: Yes. 

22 THE WITNESS: You are covering my assignment in 

23 the NSC? 

24 MR. OLIVER: That is correct. 
,- THE WITNESS: All right. Related to Central Americej. 



^ WHi9 fSSlHpvT 



212 



uNCinfsn^EtRET 



60 



MR. OLIVER: Related to Central America. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Dewey Clarridge. 

A Yes. 

Q What was your -- could you describe your dealings 
with Dewey Clarridge related to Central America during your 
service at the NSC as best you can recollect? I know it is a 
broad timeframe. 

A I do not recall the date that Dewey Clarridge be- 
came Chief of the Latin America Division, but it was before I 
had completed my responsibilities in the intelligence group. 
So I had contacts with Clarridge in that connection during 
the time that I was in the Intelligence group. I did not have 
any ongoing professional relationship with him after that time 
Although there were representatives of his organization 
participating in some of what we call the "scrub" sessions on 
that finding-, which we characterize as the legacy I hadn't 
quite gotten rid of in the first few months of the new assign- 
ment. 

Q Did you ever discuss with Dewey Clarridge the 
creation of the international communications component of the 
NSC? 

A I do not think so. 

Q Did you ever discuss the need for private fund- 
raising or funds from third countries or private sources for 



IJ'IIot^SIkSh-:' 



213 



UmCASSIFdBET 



61 



the Democratic Resistance with Dewey Clarridge? 

A No. 

Q Did you ever discuss any matters related to Iran 
with Dewey Clarridge during that time period? 

A No. 

Q Were you aware of the frequent contacts between -- 
frequent contacts between Oliver North and Dewey Clarridge 
during that time period? 

A I was aware that there was contacts. I wasn't aware 
of the frequency of them. 

Q What did you know about the nature of those con- 
tacts? 

A Not a great deal. I know, as we all know, that 
Ollie North was very actively involved in supporting the contra 
traveling back and forth, and that he had contacts with Dewey 
Clarridge. Beyond that, I can't get specific. I wasn't in 
any of the meetings; I don't know what the substance was; I 
am just aware of the fact they were in touch. 

Q Did you ever discuss Ollie North's activities 
related to Central America with him during that timeframe? 

A I don't believe so. 

Q Did he ever tell you of any CIA involvement with the 
contra re-supply operation while you were at the NSC? 

A He being Clarridge? 

Q Oliver North. 



U iftVflLrl ddF^tfu'C'' 



rp 



214 



ui^ffssme^T 



62 



1 
2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A CIA re-supply -- 

Q I said CIA involvement m the re-supply operation. 

A No, not that I recall. 




^/LATF 




related to Central America. 

A Let's see, I had a couple meetings with, 
relating to Central America. What else can I give you 

Q I would like to know if you could tell me about thos 
meetings with^^^^^^^^Hrelated to Central America, when 
they took place, and what the nature of the discussion was. 

A Well, they were two different types of meetings. 
One dealt with -- back to the word "legislative", but there 
were some legislative strategy meetings that took place around 
or about '85- '86. I am not sure when^^^^^Bactually came on 
board. The principal actors in this were the legislative 
counsels. State and the White House, and I guess NSC. 

Q When you say legislative counsel, you mean the 
heads — 

A I mean — 

Q Will Ball — 

A Will Ball, Ed Fox, Allison Fortier, or their 
predecessors, and they would discuss the general strategy. I 
was there once in a while. I was not a regular participant m 
those discussions. Otto Reich was there .^^^^^^^^^^^r:artici- 
pated because there was a potential dimension of the CIA, and 



T 



215 



nm.m^ 



63 



he was the coordinator for the staff force. 

The other context was in the Central Ajnerica 
Public Diplomacy Working Groups, where there was a participa- 



tion by a representative of^^^^^^^^^B^ost of the time 
rather than^HjUH^Hhimself at the Central America Working 
Groups, Public Diplomacy Working Groups. 

Q The CIA was always represented at the Public 
Diplomacy Working Group meetings? 



ill 



A They were represented at the gjml'l ones simply 
because by ,the last legislation they were involved, so we had 
to be certain that we weren't crossing wires. And in some 
cases. It was a question of getting information, perhaps even 
getting some information declassified we used there for 
public use. The role was a minor one, but an important one, 
since they did have a piece of the real estate. 

Q Did you ever discuss funding for any projects, 
individuals or organizations involved in support of the 



Did you ever discuss funding foi 

or at the Central America Public 



Democratic Resistance wit! 

A No. Not that I remember 
Q 
^^^"/it 
Diplomacy Working Group meetings? 

A I don't recall any discussion on that. 

I would want to differentiate one point there. 
The Public Diplomacy Working Group would not be the kind of 



UNfikA^^^tirf&d::T 



216 



unSORSfSPt 



64 



place for that discussion. That discussion, were it to take 
place, and I don't know if it did, would have been in the 
restricted IG, the RIG. Because we were not sitting there 
discussing funding of anything, we were basically discussing 
themes and ideas and needed to receive some public attention, 
and matters of that character, not political issues and funding 
issues, which would be done m the RIG, if it were done. 

Since I don't participate and didn't participate in 
the RIGs, I cannot speak to how comprehensively they were 
discussed there, but they were not discussed in the Public 
Diplomacy Working Group. 

Q In the Public Diplomacy Working Group, didn't you 
discuss the work that was being done by the private groups in 
support of the President's policies in Central America? 

A Insofar as it was part of the informational effort, 
in other words, if there were going to be a big meeting by a 
private group in Chicafifc or we were going to possibly have a 
White House event focusing on human rights, something like 
this, but we were not discussing again anything that touched 
on funding of contras, funding of the Nicaraguan Resistance. 
That was not in our charter. 

Q I wasn't talking about funding for the contras, I 
was talking about funding for private groups who were support- 
ing the President's policies in Central America. 

A I think the answer is no, but if there is a specific 



UNfifcflSSfflflrT 



217 



UNfQB^fEfiET 



65 

issue you would want me to answer, I would be happy to respond 
to something specific. 

Q At the Central America Public Diplomacy Working 
Groups, was there ever any discussion of the State Department's 
contracts with IBC? 

A I think I testified on this last time, and if I 
recall what I said, we — LPD , the Public Diplomacy Group, 
essentially functioned in its day-in and day-out affairs 
independently. When the question came of a contract in the 
early stages of LPD for IBC for specific purposes as stated in 
the testimony, we were advised after the fact such a contract 
had been consummated, but it wasn't necessary for them to clear 
with us. That wasn't part of the process. And that was -- 
period. 

Q Well, were you aware of what IBC was supposed to 
be doing under this series of contracts with the State 
Department? 

A Probably less than I should be. But my recollection 
of it was that they were supplementing some of the research 
analysis and writing that was needed to help get LPD launched 
and that they were involved in, as I recall, the entertaining 
or the assisting of some of the foreign advisors. That is 
my recollection. I was not directly involved in this, and I 
am to some degree maybe -- I may be reading back to you 
press stories about their involvement. 



UllfibASSificdT 



218 



25 



UVGIASSf^T 



66 



1 Q To your knowledge, was IBC asked to program or to 

2 guide or to assist advisors from Central America to the United 

3 States who were brought to the United States by the CIA? 

4 A I can't answer that. To the best of my knowledge, 

5 no, but I cannot answer that with any specificity. I am not 

6 personally aware of any cases like that. But that doesn't 

7 mean -- I may not have been aware of it, but I -- I personally 

8 have no knowledge of it. - j. . 

9 Q You indicated some of your discussions witt^^^^^B 

10 ^^^^^frelaCed to declassifying information for use in the 

11 public diplomacy project, I assume public diplomacy project. 

12 To your knowledge, was the information that you sought to 

13 have declassified by the CIA provided to IBC either before or 

14 after it was declassified? 

15 A To my knowledge, any material that was declassified 

16 would have been declassified in the normal process and become 

17 part of the production of LPD. I don't have any reason to 

18 believe personally that this was given to IBC for exclusive 

19 use or any exclusive treatment. If it had been produced by 

20 LPD, then obviously it would be available to IBC. 

2\ Now, that is my knowledge of the situation. The 

22 facts may be different, but that is my knowledge of the situa- 

23 tion. I know that — I mean, the kinds of information that we 

24 were particularly concerned about insofar as we could get this 



material was evidence of Soviet or Cuban support to the 



UMCUSSIflii^'P 



219 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UfimSSffffiBT 



67 



Nicaraguans or evidence of Cuban-Soviet or Nicaraguan support 
to the Salvador revolutionaries, and there was a lot of hard 
evidence, but the question was what if the security classifi- 
cations would preclude sharing that information with the 
foreign and the American people? 

Q This is information that was gathered by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, is that true? 

A Well, everybody, the overall community — I mean, 
in some cases, it might have been through some specificated -- 

Q You are talking about intelligence collection meth- 
ods primarily? . 

A Yes, we are primarily talking about problems ««* 
methods of intelligence, yes. 

Q Were you aware that some of the material that was 
published by IBC or provided by IBC to LPD emanated from 
declassified information gathered by the intelligence com- 
munity? 

A I was not aware of the fact IBC got anything before 
it had been produced by LPD. In other words, LPD had many, 
many publications they put out, and I would have thought IBC 
'^ii have used those publications. I was not aware of the 
fact LPD got something I described as exclusive. 

Q In your earlier deposition, I believe you produced 
some materials that were produced by IBC. 
A No, by LPD 



^mm^. 



PPT 



220 



VNOLRSSlfO' 



68 



Q By LPD. 

Did those, do you recall any of those publications 
containing information that had been declassified by the CIA 
as the result of your discussions with 

A I don't recall specifically. You are dealing with 
sort of a line-in/line-out , and, as I said, there were very 
limited contacts really with CIA on the declassification that 
my group had. I thinJc we raised it one or two times. 

There may have been discussions with others who were 
much more actively involved in the liaison with CIA. I was 
not. I can't speak to that. 

I would assume since one of the speeches I gave did 
deal with Soviet involvement in Central America, I would 
assume some of that had been declassified as a result of our 
general interest in trying to make the material available to 
the public. 

Q But it was part of your effort to try to develop 
this kind of information and get it into the public domain 
in any way that you could? 

A Well, it was a very minor part of my effort. It 
was, of course, the responsibility of LPD to try to get as 
much information together as they could from whatever source 
was appropriate and credible. I was involved in an enormous 
number of different things, and this question of Central 
America was something that I spent some time on, but I 



U lf>WH» StflCDC?' 



rp 



221 



UNCLAS^FfiSPRET 



69 



wasn't -- It wasn't the only thing I was doing. 

Q At the time of the Hasenfus incident in Nicaragua, 
was there a discussion m the Central America Public Diplomacy 
Working Group about that incident and its ramifications? 

A I don't recall any specific discussion. 

Q Did you become aware at that time, or shortly 
thereafter, m October of 1986, that the aircraft that was 
shot down was related to the CIA? 

A Everything I learned about that was after the fact 
and largely from the newspapers. /r Arr' 

Q Did you learn anything f rom^^^^^^^^H? 

A No. 

Q Did you learn anything from any other participants 
in the Central America Working Group about that? 

A No. 

Q Did you discuss in the Central America Working Group 
on Public Diplomacy how to deal with the aftermath of that 
airplane crash? 

A I don't recall any specific discussion. 

Q Let's move on to the next figure. Clair^^ George. 
Related to Central America. J 

A I would say no discussion. 

Q Did you have any — no discussion related to Central 
America, either public diplomacy related or legislative related 
in any fashion? 



UHOVA^^yimT 



222 



UNlFQg^fEPT 



70 



1 A To the best I can recall, yes, no discussion. 

2 Q 

3 A Never met hint. 

4 Q Ray Vickers? 

5 A Ray Vickers is the NIO for Latin America. I know 

6 him slightly. I have never had a one-on-one conversation 

7 with him, to the best of my knowledge. He may have been in 

8 and out of various types of meetings I have attended. I can 

9 come up with nothing more in detail than he was a staff officer 

10 that served, the analysts 

11 Q Bill Casey, related to Central America. 

12 A Well, I presume I have had conversations with Bill 

13 Casey related to Central America. How, what, when and why is 

14 a little bit hard to clarify. It came up periodically at the 

15 5:00 o'clock meetings with Judge Clark, Bill Clark, Bill Casey 
1g and others. I don't recall having any personal one-on-one 

17 conversations with Bill Casey about Central America. 

13 Whatever dealings I had were in this other context larger, and 

19 these meetings, of course, I was no longer in these meetings 

2Q after the reorganization. 

21 Q That would have been — 

A June , '83. 

Q — June, '83. 

A And I don't recall any discussion with Bill Casey 
in any forum that I had — I hope the record doesn't disprove 



^Whi'wb'iQu/' tUv''M 



223 



UN?BRS¥fiPT 



71 



me on this — but my memory tells me no meeting with Bill Casev 
after June 1, '83 on Central America. In other words, one-on- 
one or group meeting. 

Q Did you have any meetings with Bill Casey relating 

5 or discussions with Bill Casey relating to Iran after June of 

6 1983? 

7 A No. 

8 Q Did you have any involvement in the effort to secure 

9 the release of the hostages held by the Hizballah in Beirut? 

10 A What timeframe? 

11 Q We are talking about post-1983. 

12 A No . 

13 Q Do you recall being involved in a broadcast over 

14 VOA related to the hostage situation in Iran or related to 

15 Iran? 

16 MR. MC GRATH: Timeframe? 

17 MR. OLIVER: Any time. 

18 THE WITNESS: ■ THere has been discussion of this. 
•jg My recollection on this — if you have something specific to 

20 jog my memory, my recollection of this is that there was a 

21 case, I think my involvement was on the margin, I would have t 

22 have the facts more specific — there was a question of one 

23 broadcast to Iran that you are aware of, I think it has been 

24 in the public domain, I don't have the specifics. Have you 

25 got something there -- 



HllOfe!\8SH5lHh^ 



224 



Uia)C«S8R<(fflET 



1 BY MR. OLIVER: 

2 Q Do you remember being involved in any way in a 

3 broadcast over VOA to Iran? 

4 A My recollection is that there was a desire, I may 

5 have this twisted, I believe there was a desire to have an 

6 editorial run. I can't remember whether it was an editorial 

7 or article. I believe there was a desire to have something run 

8 whether it was an editorial or article, and the specific lang- 

9 uage was given to me, and I either told USX I would be coming 

10 over or I took it over. I don't recall the language that was 

11 put into It. 

12 Q Do you know what that editorial was related to? 

13 A I know after the fact what it was related to, namely 

14 that it had something to do with some sort of signal. I did 

15 not know it at the time. 

1g MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter to 

17 mark this as Raymond Exhibit Number 20 and ask the reporter 

18 to — 

ig (Exhibit No. 20 was marked for identification.) 

20 MR. MC GRATH: Can we go off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. OLIVER: Let's take a five or ten-minute break 



here. 



(Recess . ) 



umASSiHJ^^ 



225 



liN¥96^ff«ET 



73 



BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Let's go back on the record. When we went off the 
record we were discussing Raymond Exhibit Number 20, which 
bears the number N31004, and it is a memorandum from Oliver 
North to Ambassador Paul Bremer re international cooperation 
against terrorism, and attached is a draft of a VGA editorial 
and two PROF notes to Oliver North from Walt Raymond on Sep- 
tember 23, 1986. 

Mr. Raymond, do you remember the circumstances 
surrounding this exhibit? 

A I remember being asked specifically by Colonel 
North sometime approximately, about 22 September, for informa- 
tion concerning, some technical information concerning VOA 
broadcasts which I explained to them in the attached PROF 
note. 

Q Did he tell you why he needed that information? 

A He did not specifically discuss his reasons. 

Q In the PROF note on the next to the last page, 
the last tick in your PROF note to Oliver North says, "If we 
are trying to send a message as we did before, it may be tough 
to get it on more than a couple times." What were you referring 
to when you said "as we did before"? 

A There was one other case where we were involved in a 
terrorist incident where we tried to send a message that would 
help, that would trigger something that would release people. 



U NfiUbSSttlfiCkT 



2-730 0-88-9 



226 



UNKJK^fiP' 



74 



' It did not involve Iran. 

2 Q Did it involve Central America? 

3 A No, it involved a different continent entirely. 

* As you can see from ray note here,- I am not even sure, I wasn't 

5 aware exactly what he was up to. I just knew that it sounded 

6 to me like we were trying to get a message, I am not sure what 

7 it was. I don't recall, frankly, seeing the editorial. I 

8 think, there's no evidence on this document that would suggest 

9 I reviewed the editorial. I simply provided the raw material 

10 on broadcasting. 

11 Q It didn't indicate you might have? 

12 A That is correct. 

13 Q Did you ever discuss this matter with Colonel North 

14 subsequent to these PROF notes? 

15 A I don't believe so, 

16 Q Did you ever discuss it with anyone at the CIA? 

17 A No. 

18 Q Did you ever discuss it with anyone else at the 

19 NSC? 

20 A No, I don't think so. 

21 Q Did you ever learn what the purpose of this 

22 editorial was before now? 

23 A Not before the hearings, no. 

24 Q Did you discuss it with Jerry Bremer? 

25 A No . 

UNCiASSlHift«r 



227 



uM^W 



75 



MR. OLIVER: I think we will take a break now 
until either 8:30 tomorrow morning or 2:30 tomorrow afternoon, 
and Mr. Raymond or Mr. McGrath will get in touch with Mr. 
Fryman and I regarding which of those times is convenient, 
and we will indicate to you what room will be available. 

MR. MC GRATH: Pursuant to our earlier discussion, 
it is my understanding, because of the sensitivity of Mr. 
Raymond's deposition that it will be closely held, that copies 
are not going to be made available other than to members on 
an access-only basis. 

MR. OLIVER: That is correct. Except to the extent 
that the chairman or the chief counsels of the committee may 
determine that other appropriately cleared people should have 
access as they determine, that is a correct assumption. 

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the select committee 
was adjourned to reconvene Thursday, September 24, 1987.) 



228 



229 






Not for Qqototiaa or 
DapUotkB 




Committee Heaiinffs 

oftka 

UJ3. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



6ia 






OFFId OF THE CLERK 
OOao^Offldal 



Jfl^J9^^ 



3^5SfS#^ 



230 



McGINN/CAS 



UNCLASSIFIED 



DEPOSITION OF WALTER RAYMOND 



Thursday, September 24, 1987 



House of Representatives , 
Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D. C. 



The select committee met, pursuant to call, at 8:30 a.m., 
in Room H-405, The Capitol, Spencer Oliver (Associate Staff 
Counsel of the House Select Committee) presiding. 

Present: On behalf of the House Select Committee: 
Spencer Oliver, Associate Staff Counsel; Thomas Fryman, Staff 
Counsel; Kenneth Buck, Assistant Minority Counsel; and Victor 
Zangla, Associate Staff Member. 

Also Present: Dean McGrath, Associate Counsel to the 
President; and Michael Olmsted, White House Counsel's Office. 



^5/? 



■^'rir^:l 'r.i\eas-:.; r,?Jfj^^f7 



UNCLASSIFIED 



231 



uNeiss^spT 



Whereupon, 

WALTER RAYMOND 
having been previously duly sworn, was recalled as a witness 
herein, and was examined and testified as follows: 

MR. OLIVER: Good morning, Mr. Raymond. 

THE WITNESS: Good morning, Mr. Oliver. 

MR. OLIVER: This is a continuation of the two 
previous sessions we have had and you are still under oath. 

MR. McGRATH: At the outset could we have everybody 
identify themselves again since there are some different 
people here today. 

MR. OLIVER: I am Spencer Oliver, Associate Staff 
Counsel, House Select Committee, and Chief Counsel of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee. 

MR. FRYMAN: Tom Fryman, Staff Counsel of the 
House Select Committee. 

MR. BUCK: Kenneth Buck, Assistant Minority 
Counsel, House Select Committee. 

MR. OLMSTED: Michael Olmsted. I work in the 
White House Counsel's Office. 

MR. McGRATH: Dean McGrath , Associate Counsel to the 
President. 

MR. RAYMOND: Walter Raymond. 

MR. ZANGLA: Victor Zangla, Associate Staff 
Member, House Select Committee. 



iHiakfl&su^jEdn- 



232 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




THE WITNESS: Mr. Oliver, I wonder if I could 
clarify two points yesterday. Reflecting after the hearing, 
after the deposition that was filed yesterday, one is you 
asked me a question about Iran. I don't recall precisely 
the time__f rajne that you asked me, but I did participate in 
one Iran session with the CIA and Near East Division Chief 
and with the Assistant Secretary of State, Nick Veliotes in 
early March, 1983, when still in my capacity as the 
Director of the Intelligence Office of the White House -- 

in the NSC, I participated in a brief ingj 

Iwhich 

had been thoroughly approved and debated with the Congress 
with appropriate oversight committees. 

That is the only contact with Iran but I want to 
make it clear I did, in fact, have that one conversation. 
I did not remember yesterday. 

The second point for clarification is we were 
discussing my contacts with Dewey Clarridge on it 
reflection, I recall -- reviewing a few documents last night, 
I did note and recall that I had sent a memo to 
Clarridge in August, 1983, discussing the presidential 
finding which we discussed yesterday. This, on the basis 
of my reading the documents, I had had some comment, some 
exchange in writing or orally -- I am not sure -- with 
Judge Clark, Security Advis'^r Bill Clark, and he asked me 



iliilfil^f^SWA.. 



233 



iimA^jq^i^T 



to share some of my views with Mr. Clarridge. 

MR. OLIVER: Thank you very much for those 
clarifications, Mr. Raymond. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Did ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Ht hat you discussed the 
Near East Task Force Chief and Mr. Veliotes have anything 
to do at that time or ultimately with arms sales to Iran 
or the events which led to the arms sales to Iran? 
A No, sir. 

Q Was the^ course that you mentioned with 
Dewey Clarridge in August of 1983 provided to this committee? 

MR. McGRATH: Yes, it was. 

MR. OLIVER: If you have a record of that, 
counsel, I haven't seen it. If you could provide me with 
it or indicate the document numbers on it, I would appreciate 
it very much so we would have a chance to examine it. If 
we have it, it is not reflected in the files which I have 
examined. 

MR. McGRATH: That is something we can discuss 
after the deposition. 

MR. OLIVER: Does that mean there is a problem 
with your providing it? 

MR. McGRATH: It has already been provided to the 
best of my knowledge. 



UmA^Mfim 



234 



Vlitl^fllKr 



1 MR. OLIVER: If it has not, you will provide it 

2 to us. 

3 MR. McGRATH: Yes. 

4 MR. OLIVER: Thank you. 

5 BY MR. OLIVER: 

6 Q Mr. Raymond, we were discussing yesterday the 

7 activities, your activities in relation to the establishment 

8 of the public diplomacy initiative, the project democracy 

9 initiative, 1983, 1984. How much of your time after May 1, 

10 1983, would you say you discussed -- you devoted to 

11 public diplomacy as opposed to your intelligence 

12 responsibilities? 

13 A The new directorate was established "■io/»f»^June. 

14 We are thinking in terms of my subsequent four years in the 

15 NSC, almost totally devoted to public diplomacy, democracy- 

16 building issues. 

17 Q Did you participate in the draftings of any other 

18 presidential findings for covert action on Nicaragua after 

19 you left your intelligence position other than the one we 

20 discussed on September the 12th, 1983, yesterday? 

21 A To the best of my recollection, the only involvement 

22 that I had was the Central American question, which as the 

23 files pointed out in our discussion yesterday, I simply 

24 was on a continuation basis until that issue could be 

25 settled and other people had exclusive responsibility for 



iiM£ii££iEl£a 



235 



WOtMW 



that. 

So the answer is to the best of my knowledge, no 
other programs. 

Q In the Central American public diplomacy group, 
which met in your of f ic■e^;<ihich you either chaired or co- 
chaired from time to time, did you task any of the members of 
that working group to do anything or was it simply a discussicjn 
of what is going on? 

A I think' over a period of a couple years this group, 
which was basically chaired by Otto Reich, did from time to 
time task -- could be selected research, could be reports or 
other matters. 

Q Was Oliver North tasked by that group from time to 
time? 

A Very infrequently. He was not a regular member of 
that group, although as one of the officers of the National 
Security Council, working on Central America, it was useful 
.to have him present if, in fact, another member of the 
Latin American Office of the NSC was not present. So in 
that case he would participate. 

There were occasions where he would volunteer to 
undertake one aspect or another of work. In most cases, it 
would be his willingness to undertake an effort rather than 
the group tasking him. This principally was in the area, 
as we discussed yesterday, of finding intelligence 



iiNamMA. 



236 



wm& 



' information that perhaps was available for declassification. 

2 He was much closer to the intelligence corranunity than any 

"^ other member of that working group and he sought to facilitate 

some of the declassification. 
' Q But there were representatives of the intelligence 

" community in that worJcing group, were there not? 
7 A Not in 1983 and 1984 time^f rcune. 

Q Q But in 1985 and 1986, there were? 
9 A I think we did include a member of the Central 

10 American Task Force, I think it is called. 

11 Q Of course, when you indicate Oliver North was 

12 closer than anybody else to the intelligence community, 

13 you are excluding yours? 

14 A I am excluding — no, I am not excluding myself 

15 because I was not engaged in an ongoing, running negotiation 

16 for any of these documents with CIA at the time. I am 

17 including myself. 

18 To re4?-tate, I am specifically referring to the 

19 other NSC staff officers, to Otto Reich and his 

20 representatives. USI' representative, DOD representative. 

21 When the Central American Task Force began to have an officer 

22 included in this group, clearly, they were in a better 

23 position than anybody else to help facilitate declassif ica- 

24 tion. 

25 Q I think your statement -- I may have been confused ■ 



IJliAlliMifflDf Tui_<rp 



237 





was that Oliver North was closer to the intelligence 
community than anyone else. You meant, I assume, he 
worked more closely with them on the subject of Central 
America than anybody else because obviously with his back- 
ground and your background, I think it would be very 
difficult to describe him as being closer to the intelligence 
community than you were. 

A Well, basically, the issue here is who was working 
with CIA to perhaps facilitate declassification and the 
answer is that Oliver North would be the only officer that 
I am aware of at the NSC that was seeking to facilitate 
declassification. 

Now, there was also some efforts by the task force 
when they came on line. I was not. 

Q The purpose of his seeking declassification of 
this information was what? To pass it on to Otto Reich 
and LPD? 

A Basically when possible to declassify by protecting 
sources and methods, we felt the American people and the 
world needed to know that the Soviets were providing 
lethal support to Nicaragua, and the size of it and that 
there were support systems running through from Cuba, 
Nicaragua and other places that were supporting the 
insurgency in El Salvador. We thought as best we could to 
facilitate the documentation of that. 



UWSSItlilU 



238 



25 






1 Q What were the mechanisms that you used to tell the 

2 world this story? 

3 A Well, it could be a range of mechanisms. In some 

4 cases it might be included in a statement, a press 

5 statement or a speech by Secretary Shultz or an appropriate 

6 assistant secretary. In some case^ it might appear in 

7 testimony. 

8 Other cases it might be in a collated analysis 

9 which would be produced and disseminated by Otto Reich's 

10 office as an open, public document. These are the things 

11 we were working on. 

12 As I described in our earlier open testimony, 

13 there was an elaborate production from Reich's office and 

14 I gave you three samples. 

15 Q Is this the kind of information that Oliver North 
15 also included into his famous slide show? 

17 A I presume if it is declassified, it would be open 

13 to be used in that. I presume so. I was not personally 

19 intimately involved in the development of the slides, but my 

20 recollection was that they did include evidence of Soviet, 

21 Cuban, Nicaraguan support of insurgency. 

22 Q Did you ever see the slide show? 

23 A Not in the form that it was given to the 

24 oversight committee. I had seen some — 
Q I don't think anvbody saw it in the form it was 



n't think anybody saw it in t 



239 



wmm 



10 



given to the oversight committee. 

A No . I had not sat and seen the whole thing. 

Q But having the responsibility for Central 
American public diplomacy in the White House, you were 
aware that he was conducting these briefings and whc>^he was 
conducting them for and that sort of thing, weren't you? 

A In very general terms. The person who had the 

responsibility for the overall public diplomacy was 

Otto Reich and his group of "»«♦»- to 14 people. 

A, 



Q Otto Reich had overall responsibility for 
Oliver North's activities? 

A Otto Reich had overall responsibility for public 
diplomacy. 

Q Did he task Ollie North? 

A In some cases. In some cases he did not. 

Q What I am trying to determine is in these weekly 
meetings where -- I don't know whether these were 
Thursday afternoon or the Tuesday evening or what -- the 
weekly meetings that took place in your office on Central 
American public diplomacy, didn't Ollie North report back 
that, I briefed X number of groups or I am going to or 
something? Weren't you aware of all this? 

A A, Ollie North was a self-starter. Ollie North 
was also quiteVindependent orator. Ollie North attended 
probably one in every 4^ meetings, which means that group 



240 



# 





1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



11 



had a generalized idea of some of the things that he was 
doing, but they certainly had no ovenall knowledge of the 
range of his activities. 

Q Mr. Raymond, did you participate in any other 
working groups where Oliver North was an active participant 
besides the one on Central American public diplomacy? 

A On any subject? 

Q A subject related to Iran or Nicaragua? 

A To the best of my knowledge, no. 

Q Well, let me indicate to you that our staff has 
examined Oliver North's calendars, which are not complete, 
for 1984, 1985 and 1986, and they show him meeting with 
you -- most of these are meetings in your office -- over 
70 times in 1984 and 1985 and 1986, and I stress that 
calendar is incomplete and there are many gaps in it, because 
of course, he was out of the country a lot. 

So that seems to me like a pretty hefty number of 
meetings. In fact, you are on his calendar more than anybody 
else in the White House or in the Government. 

A I find that to be absolutely amazing and inaccurate 

Q Well, we can certainly get the calendars — 

A I don't care whether the calendar says it. That 
doesn't mean to say I met him that many times. First of all, 
we are talking three years, so spread that over 150 weeks, 
that means a possibility of meeting Oliver North every two 





rp 



241 



l)K((A^tPi6T 



12 



' weeks, rough estimate. That probably coincides with a 

2 notation -- I am speculating totally — it probably coincides 

3 with roughly biweekly meetings we had on public diplomacy 
^ where presumably -- the meetings were frequently in my 

5 office and it would be posted that that is the meeting 

° with Walt Raymond. That would be the meeting with Walt 

7 Raymond and Otto Reich. 

8 The fact is that all those posted on his calendar 

9 by his secretary, presumably, this is the ten o'clock 

10 meeting or whatever it was and the time changed and the 

11 day changed because of schedules — that it was there and he 

12 knew it was taking place. 

13 Now, that does not mean that he attended. It 

14 simply means that he knew that that meeting was scheduled. 

15 Now, occasionally he would come to the meeting. 

16 I can't specify how many times, but he didn't 

17 come very regularly. 

18 Q I don't know whether it means whether he attended 

19 or not, but on most instances where he didn't attend the 

20 meeting or it was cancelled, there was a line drawn through 

21 it- That wasn't the case in this instance. When you 

22 indicated you thought he may have come to one meeting, what 

23 I am telling you is our evidence that we have indicates quite 

24 a different story. 

25 A You could ask Otto Reich whether Ollie North 



liUffin^nwwIfttvT 



242 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




attended 70 meetings in my office and I think he would 
tell you Ollie North probably came a few times. He was not 
a regular attendee. 

Q When he attended, did he report on his activities 
related to public diplomacy in Central America or related to 
Central America? 

A Sometimes. 

Q Did he ever report on the presentations that he 
made to the contributors to Spitz Channell's organization? 

A Never that I can recall. 

Q Why would he not tell you about those? 

A I can't answer that. I don't know. Other than 
he felt that was information that he didn't want to share. 

Q Well, these were briefings that were taking place 
in the White House with people who were important enough to 
have the President of the United States attend one of the 
briefings and some of whom were important enough to have 
private one-to-one meetings with the President with 
photo sessions. It seems that is important enough for 
him to report that to the group that is working on 
Central American public diplomacy. 

A Well, let me clarify my point there. That on 
meetings that involved the President, involved bringing 

groups into the White House, there was an elaborate process 

e 

where we would send forward schedul^^^mrpposals and other 



IV *0' ^ 




T 



243 



wmms 



people would be aware. Now, when we had events of that 
character, most of the time — and I want to underline 
most of the time -- we would be aware of a White House 
event, not always, but most of the time we would be aware 
of it. 

We would not necessarily be aware of the full 
make-up of the group. I was not aware of the name 
Spitz Channell until the hearings a few months ago. Now, 
Spitz Channell for all I know may have been included in that 
group. It certainly was not a name that rose up to me and 
had any special significance until the hearings. 

Q I find that very difficult. Did you see any of the 
ads that were run on television regarding the President's 
program in Central America that were run very heavily in the 
Washington media market in 1985, in the springer in 
1986, between early February and late June? 
A Did I see them on television? 
Q Yes. 

A I think I might have seen one on television. I am 
not certain about that. 

Q Did you know about them? 

A We have to differentiate because part of the 
confusion is whether I was running Central American public 
diplomacy. I was not running Central American public 
diplomacy. This is one of the confusions here. And we 



244 



IIWH^REF 



15 



met biweekly towardi che end, sometimes I think earlier 
It may have been weekly. I am not sure. And we were -- each 
of us we are sharing our insights of what was going on. 
Ollie North was periodically there and he shared some of 
his information, obviously not all of it. 

Q He didn't tell you about the briefings in the 
White House for these contributors? Is that your testimony? 

A I am not certain about that. He did not tell me 
that he was bringing in funders to meet in the White House. 
I may be aware -- I would have to look at the record on 
this -- I may be aware of the fact there was a White House 
meeting where presidential supporters were coming in. I was 
not aware that the purpose of this meeting was to raise money 
There were meetings that have taken place in the White House 
on Central America with the outreach group and others since 
1983, as we are aware, perhaps earlier. Frequently there 
were people coming in who were supporters of the President 
and others and there may or may not have been a fund 
raising dimension. I was not aware of a fund raising 
dimension to a specific group. 

Q Do you recall what activities Oliver North 
reported to you about other than declassification of 
information in this working group? Do you recall anything 
he reported to you that he was doing on behalf of Central 



American public 



mmuL 



245 



UNSHSaflffiT 



16 



A We were aware of the fact he periodically would be 
traveling to the region or to Mieuni where he would be working 
with the contra leaderships? he would in one case seek to 
develop a political document with the leadership, but not 
with much precision, which would be broader in supportj^ 
democracies in the region. We were aware of an ongoing 
contact he had with the contras. 

I was personally aware of that type of contact. 
We were aware that from time to time he would make a speech 
here or there, that he would seek to generate as much , 
support as he could by providing, by giving speeches \xi\^ 
450 to outreach audiences; that he certainly from time to 
time would come up with proposals for presidential events, 
presidential drop-bys. 

Q Do you remember whether any of those were related 
to Central America? 

A Not precisely. I would be happy to review a 
■document and comment on it, but I don't remember specifically 
events. I remember a lot of events over four years of 
various and sundry groups being brought in. 

Q You don't remember Oliver North recommending a 
presidential drop-by for any specific group or meeting? 

A I do remember drop-bys to groups of American people 
American citizens. I don't remember a specific meetings. 
We did discuss -- 



UMCUSMIU. 



246 



WHJ^Mr 



17 



' Q Do you remember a specific group or an individual? 

2 A I would rather respond to something specific. 

3 Q I am asking if you remember ]ust one 

* individual or one group that Ollie North recommended the 

^ President meet. 

" A Well, I remember events when the contra leaders 

' were in t^won, one meeting there. I know it may sound 

° implausible, but I do not remember specific groups. I 

9 remember people. I don't identify faces and names with those 

'0 I remember we had human rights events where we were focusing 

"I"! on Central America. We had a religious event and I can't 

12 identify the people in the audience, but these were 

13 human rights activists. They were religious, people 

14 concerned about religion. 

15 I remember several events where we had people who 

16 had been persecuted, suffered religious persecution in 

17 Nicaragua. They were brought up. I remember a couple of 

18 .times we would have members of Congress in the audience on 

19 that. I remember one event with some foreign dignataries 

20 that were in town on Central America and one name sticks 

21 in my — name is Sir Winston Churchill, Sir Winston Churchill 

22 son. 

23 There were other events with the group -- this is 

24 back largely in 1983, 1984, with the outreach network, if 

25 you want to call it that, of conservatives that 



uNHAsma 



L"*!' 



247 



mmm 



18 



Faith Whittlesey had put together that met with the President 
once in the Roosevelt Room. I don't recall specifically who 
was in there, but I think it included people like 
Lynn Bouchet and perhaps somebody from American Security 
Council and a couple of others. 

I am trying very hard to remember if I can remember 
a specific funding group and I don't. That was never brought 
into the issue as bringing these guys in for funding. That 
was never a question. 

Q I was trying to determine what the people who sat 
in on this group reported to you. We discussed yesterday, 
I believe, briefly the IBC contract with the Department of 
State and you indicated you knew about it but that you had 
very little knowledge of it or very little knowledge about 
what they were doing. 

I am just trying to determine what these people 
reported to you about. It appears from what we have seen 
thus far that Ollie North, in addition to running the 
air resupply operation and working, you know, that in the 
public diplomacy area his main activities related to 
Spitz Channell's fundlraisers and these briefings and Rich 
Miller and IBC's things and if there is someplace in the 
White House where they are going to report those things, it 
would seem to be in the meeting that took place in your 
office . 



mmsu 



248 



m^mm 



19 



A But they weren't. 

Q That is your testimony. 

A We did talk in early September about the Nicaraguan 
refugee fund dinner and there was this question of 
funders that came in. 

Q Early January, you are talking about 1985? 

A 1985. I did not participate in that meeting and, 
as I testified before, I do not have the details of that, 
although my memory was refreshed, there was this analogue 
to the dinner. 

Q Did Jonathan Miller participate in these meetings 
in your office on a regular basis while he was Otto Reich's 
deputy? 

A Quite frequently. 

Q What, to your best recollection, was Jonathan 
Miller doing at LPD? What were his duties? What did he 
report that he was working on? 

1 think Otto had two deputies, John Black/and 
Jonathan Miller. 

A Well, it was principally helping Otto on across-the- 
board activities. 

I don't know that he had any specific division of 
labor. He did travel several times to Latin America, but that 
was I think as much as anything else for familiarization. 

Q Did he work for a time out of Oliver North's office? 



(iNaAmunn. 



249 



MlSSfFfR'^ 



20 



A I am not sure. He was in rather frequent contact 
with Oliver North. 

Q How do you know that? 

A Because he would -- I would just be aware he was 
there. You are sort of aware of who is in the NSC. 

Q Is your office close to Oliver North's 

A No, not that close; around the corner. 

Q Is it on the same floor? 

A Same floor, around the corner. But Oliver 
North, Ray Burkhart, earlier, Constantine Mengas , were 
the early staff officers working on Central America, so it 
would be consistent to be in touch with all of them and 
Miller and Reich were in touch with all of them. 

Q Do you know what Jonathan Miller's frequent 
contact with Oliver North related to? 

A Not specifically. 

Q Were you ever aware that Jonathan Miller cashed 



.traveljtei/s,'/ checks for Oliver North to provide money to the 
resistance? 

A No. No, I was not. 

Q Were you ever aware that Oliver North kept funds or 
traveHersV'' checks in his safe that had to do with funding 
the democratic resistance in Nicaragua? 

A No, I did not. 

Q What did you know about the UNO office that was 



uimsmifA 



I nil 



250 



UlffittfflflWT 



21 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



located in Washington? 

A Well, I don't know specifically how to answer that. 
In general terms, I knew there was a UNO office. The UNO 
office presumably was designed to try to increase the image 
and perception of the United Nicaraguan Opposition in 
Washington, in the United States. I don't think it did a 
particularly good job, but that was its mission. 

I know from time to time the head of it would 
make various statements to try to facilitate access of some of 
the UNO personnel, access to people in Washington. 

Let me start the sentence again. The UNO office 
would try to facilitate meetings for UNO personnel when 
they came to Washington. 

Q Were you aware that Ollie North was involved in 
seeking funds to support that office? 

A Not specifically, although I was aware of the fact 
the UNO office was suffering from a lack of finance. 

Q How do you know that? 

A Just simply it wasn't able to do very much, 
had a restricted budget as best I could tell^and there may 
have been some discussion about a need to see if there is 
some way if some private funding were available for this 
in an mf ormaticnal mode to help support the circulation of 
information about UNO. | 

I have no specifics on it. It was a general 



UHHimPFT 



251 



vm^iFiEffT 



22 



statement. I have no knowledge of whether anybody actually 
went out to try to find funds and whether any funds were 
found. 

Q Was there a discussion -- did that discussion take 
place in your office? 

A No. I am not sure if it was my office or someplace. 
I do know there was a concern that the UNO office was very 
inadequate and very poorly funded. 

Q Who was involved in that discussion? 

A I don't recall. Might have been Jonathan Miller. 
Might have been Ollie North. Might have been Otto Reich 



because all of us were concerned about the ability^efe- the- 

A 

Nicaraguans to be able to speak for themselves, and if the 
office had no funds, it would not be possible to be able to 
make their case. 

Q Did Bob Kagen ever indicate to you that he had 
anything to do with providing funding for the UNO office? 

A He did not indicate that to me. 

Q Were you aware that he was involved in any way 
in seeking funding for the UNO office? 

A No, I was not. 

MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter to 
mark this as Raymond Exhibit number 21. It is a memorandum 
dated -- has everybody got one? 

(Raymond Exhibit 21 was marked for identification.) 



(mA!»»m.- 



252 



UNftl^MT 



BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 Q This is going back to the 1983 period, 

^ Mr. Raymond, when you were still the head of the intelligence 

unit m the White House prior to your resignation from the 
CIA. 

° This is a memorandum from you to William Clark 

' through Charles P. Tyson dated March 18, 1983. Its committee 
° identification number N-30865. Is that your signature, 

Mr. Raymond? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q Do you remember drafting this document? 

12 A Yes, I do. 

13 MR. McGRATH: At this point I would like to ask 

14 counsel if there is anything in this document that relates to 

15 the matters that were within the jurisdiction of the committee? 

16 MR. OLIVER: This relates to private fund_raising 

17 and the purposes of building democracies worldwide and it is 

18 one of the documents that refers to the follow-up of the 

19 presidential speech that took place in June of 1982. It 

20 pertains to Peter Daly, who was involved in the programs 

21 related to Central America. It has in it a number of people 

22 who/Mr. Raymond has referred to earlier in his deposition, 

23 particularly in addition to Mr. Daly, Mr. Robert Evans, 

24 John Kluge, Carl Lindner, and Hakim Maitre. 

25 One of the discussions here is about the 



UNCUSSIEKA 



iTTTl 



253 



UNM9e»ET 



24 



democracy's initiative, and the need to build stronger private 
institutions so I think it is relevant. 

MR. OLMSTED: Can we go off the record for a moment? 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. OLIVER: We are having a discussion about 
relevancy with Mr. McGrath. 

Mr. McGrath has indicated he is going to object on 
the grounds of relevancy. I have indicated -- 

MR. McGRATH: I would like to make a point. 

MR. OLIVER: Please. 

MR. McGRATH: I said I would object if there was 
not some tie-in between matters discussed in here and the 
witness' testimony that those subject matters relate to 
matters under the committee's jurisdiction. 

MR. OLIVER: Mr. McGrath, let me indicate that if 
you have an objection on those grounds, and make your point, 
if I believe you to be correct, I will either re-(-phrase the 
question or withdraw the document or go on to the next 
subject. 

But if I believe it to be relevant on the basis of 
my examination of the document, I will ask the question and 
you may instruct the witness not to answer. But I think 
it is important for the record at this point for us to be 
clear in what capacity you are here, whether you are here 
representing the witness to protect his constitutional rights. 



llilLLU.UltUJi„ 



254 



UNCUS^gb 



or whether you are here in some other capacity representing 
some other entity. I would like for the record for you to 
indicate to us what capacity you and your colleague are here 
and what your representation is 

MR. McGRATH: We represent the individual in his 
official capacity 

MR. OLIVER: You do not represent the Government 
of the United States in this deposition; is that correct? 

MR. BUCK: Wait a second 

Let me interrupt just for a second. 

I don't think counsel is under oath at this point 
'2 and I am not sure we can have an examination of the counsel or 
''3 just what capacity. If you want to ask the witness what 

14 capacity his counsel is in, that is one question, but 

15 I have a problem with questioning the counsel. He made a 

16 statement under what capacity he is here and I think the 

17 statement should stand by itself 

18 MR. OLIVER: Mr. McGrath, I would like to repeat 

19 you are not representing the United States Government. You 

20 are here representing this witness in his individual 

21 capacity; is that correct 

22 MR. McGRATH: I have previously stated we 

23 represent the individual in his official capacity 

24 MR. OLIVER: May I ask you whether or not your 

25 responsibilities in this deposition and after this deposition 



UNaASMH.. 



255 



UNeiiASM«ET 



26 



"• extend to discussing this deposition with anyone in the 

2 White House or any other government officials who are not in 

a position of attorney-client with this witness? 

'* MR. BUCK: My same objection. I don't know -- 

5 MR. OLMSTED: I don't think we have to answer 

6 that question. Whether or not we have an attorney-client 

7 privilege with Mr. Raymond and he chooses to allow us to 

8 speak with other people is also within our attorney-client 

9 privilege with Mr. Raymond. You can ask the question, but 

10 we can politely refuse not to respond. 

11 MR. OLIVER: I am trying to determine in what 

12 capacity you are here. This is highly unusual. You may 

13 be familiar with the rules of the Congress and the rules of 

14 the House of Representatives that witnesses may have counsel 

15 present for the purpose of protecting their constitutional 

16 rights, but it is highly unusual to have attorneys present 

17 who are not there solely in the capacity of representing 

18 .the witness' personal constitutional rights. 

19 MR. BUCK: This is not the first time that witnesses 

20 have been represented by government attorneys and will not, 

21 undoubtedly, be the last time. I don't think it is highly 

22 unusual that Mr. Raymond is represented by attorneys from an 

23 agency from which he worked prior and which is relevant to 

24 I this investigation. 
OLIVER: I am just tryinfe^to d^rmine whether 



25 MR. 



OLIVER: I am just tryir 

iiiim<;$lm 



256 



11 

12 
13 
14 



UNtt«^nii^ 



27 



or not you are here in more than one capacity, counsel. 

MR. McGRATH: I believe the manner in which I have 
answered that covers your question. We represent the 
individual in his official capacity. 
^ MR. OLIVER: Let me read to you from the rules for 

Mr. Buck's edification. Rule 6 of the Select Committee to 
' Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran states, 
° "Personal counsel, retained by any witness and accompanying 

9 such witness, shall be permitted to be present during the 
10 testimony of such witness at any public or executive 

hearing and to advise such witness while he is testifying on 
his legal rights. 

"The presiding member may require that the witness 
not be accompanied by anyone except such personal counsel." 
15 What I am trying to determine is whether or not you 

"16 are here in any other capacity other than personal counsel 

17 for this witness. 

18 MR. McGRATH: I have answered the capacity in which 

19 we represent Mr. Raymond. We represent Mr. Raymond as an 

20 individual in his official capacity. 

21 MR. OLMSTED: All of this, by the way, has been 

22 previously discussed and worked out as among, I gather, 

23 the committees and each government agency from which 

24 witnesses have testified. Rather than going over old 

25 territory, I think what fomented this discussion originally 



UNCliSWL 



257 



UNDNSSWret 



28 



was our concern that this deposition, which is now m its, 
I guess, third day, was going to go back into issues from 
1983, which we can see no connection and if you can, 
then perhaps focusing on that connection we will have no 
objection. I guess what we were trying to suggest is that 
this deposition could be -- rather than going into 
everything having to do with 1983 -- 

MR. OLIVER: Counsel, I presume you have been 
provided with a copy of the rules, and the White House has 
had this for some time and you are familiar with the rules. 

I would like to read into the record Rule 7, 
pertaining to affidavits and depositions, which I assume 
you are familiar with. 

I would like to have it on the record. 

"Witnesses may be accompanied at a deposition 
by personal counsel to advise them of their rights subject 
to the provisions of Rule 64, 65, 66 and 67 hereof. Absent 
special permission or instructions from the Chairman, no 
one may be present in depositions except Members, staff 
designated by the Chairman, and the official reporter, the 
witness and any personal counsel. Observers or counsel for 
other persons or for the agencies undefc^investigation may 
not attend." 

MR. McGRATH: I would like to note for the record 
that I accompay^^d, ^Jf , ^ WM.'l Afl ^V J n r p r v i g w by members 



omm;; 



258 



10 

11 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 



UIKLAmifiikT 



29 



of this committee last April; that with the full knowledge 
and awareness of the counsel present here today, I was 
with Mr. Raymond at his deposition approximately two weeks 
ago and that with the same members present yesterday I 
accompanied Mr. Raymond to the second part of this 
interview or this deposition, excuse me, and that under the 
same conditions we accompanied Mr. Raymond to this deposition 

Q 

" beginning today. 

' MR. BUCK: If there is an objection to White House 

counsel being present, perhaps we should adjourn this 
deposition for three or four weeks so that Mr. Raymond has 
time to get his own attorney and has time to include that 
attorney in the affairs and let that attorney gain the 
knowledge with which that attorney needs to represent 
Mr. Raymond's interests. 

MR. OLIVER: Thank you, Mr. Buck. That is 
consistent with your usual contributions to these depositions. 
MR. BUCK: I just want to be fair to Mr. Raymond. 

19 MR. OLIVER: I do not object to your presence, 

20 counsel. I am just trying to determine when you raise an 

21 objection, whether you are raising that objection on the basis 

22 as his personal counsel or in another capacity. I realize 

23 that this has occurred on other occasions. I find it highly 

24 unusual and I would not have raised it had it not been for 
15 the discussion we had about your objection to the relevancy 



wmm. 



259 



onefflSMF' 



30 



of a particular document that Mr. Raymond signed. 

MR. McGRATH: The objection is Mr. Raymond should 
not be asked to comment upon matters that are not within the 
committee's jurisdiction. The only reason for raising the 
possibility of an objection on my part was that Mr. Raymond 
should not be forced to answer questions which are beyond the 
committee's jurisdiction. 

MR. OLIVER: I understand that and I am perfectly 
willing to entertain those objections and I certainly hope 
you will object if that is the case. But in the case of this 
document, I think that trying to draw a line that this documer 
is outside the relevancy is such a narrow construction that I 
am concerned about on whose behalf you are asserting that 
relevancy and that is why I asked what your capacity here 
was . 

I think I have generally established that. I would 
like to discuss this document, counsel, and to ask questions 
about it. Do you have any objection? 

MR. McGRATH: Proceed. I was ]ust raising the 
point that that is an issue that I have a concern about and 
I just wanted you to be aware of it before we got into a 
discussion of this document. 

MR. OLIVER: Thank you. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Mr. Raymond, in the first sentence of the 



' f y TOMgE'/ HglcfTi 



260 



UNHHSSflWE' 



31 




1 second paragraph of this document it starts of with, "This 

2 will be our first session with donors and Charley has 

3 focused this meeting specifically on our need 

4 What did you mean by this sentence? 

5 Was this — what were these people donors to? 

6 MR. BUCK: I am going to object to the question 

7 unless they were donors to Central America. I am going to 

8 ask the witness not to answer the question, not because I 

9 represent the witness' interest, but because I represent 

10 the minority's interest and their interest in the integrity 

11 of this investigation. 

12 Unless Mr. Oliver can show direct relevance to this 

13 investigation, I am going to ask the witness not to answer 

14 until we have a ruling by the Chairman. 

15 MR. OLIVER: Would you please answer the question, 

16 Mr. Raymond? 

17 THE WITNESS: There was nothing involved with 

18 .Central America in this meeting. 

19 BY MR. OLIVER: 

20 Q I understand that. But it indicates that this would 

21 be the first session with donors and that this meeting 

22 specifically focuses on our needs^^^^^^^^^K t leads me to 

23 believe there might be needs elsewhere that these donors 

24 might be involved with. Did you contemplate that you would 

25 have some need elsewhere other than^^^^^^^^Hand that this 



261 



l)HSU$SIEiftT 



32 



would be the first session with these people and that 
subsequent sessions might focus on your needs elsewhere? 

A Whatever may have been in my mind when I wrote the 
piece, the fact is that it was the only meeting that took 
place that I was involved in of this character that I can 
recall . 

It was the only meeting involving Mr. Wick that I 
can recall. 

Q Was the purpose of this meeting to get these 
people to donate money to something? 

MR. BUCK: Objection. Same grounds. 

MR. OLIVER: I would appreciate , counsel , if you ■ 
would allow the witness' counsel to represent him and when it 
comes your turn to ask questions you may certainly do so, 
but this is going to be a long deposition which may take a 
long, long time if you continue to make such frivolous 
objections that have nothing to do with this deposition. We 
■are already discussing this document. 

The relevancy has already been conceded by the 
witness' counsel. We will proceed along much more 
expeditiously if you will allow the witness' counsel to give 
him advice. 

MR. OLMSTED: If I could comment on one 
representation. The relevance of this document has not been 
conceded by arw counsel^ ^*£ Jj^g^^rmitted questioning on 




prp 



262 



UffiBSSSSIIftE' 



33 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



this document because it is within the realm of imagination 
and zeal that a relevant question could be asked from this 
document. We have not objected to the questions because the 
answers have been specifically how this document may or may 
not relate to (nge issues that are involved in this 
investigation. 

We have mentioned before we did not find this a 
relevant document, but it is conceivable a relevant question 
could be asked from it so we have not objected to it. 

MR. BUCK: I want to make it clear to the 
rsocrd I am not objecting on the witness' behalf. I am 
objecting on behalf of the minority and if Mr. Oliver 
is suggesting that the minority has no interest in this 
investigation, I take exception with that objection. 

MR. OLIVER: That was not the case, Mr. Buck. 
That was not what I stated. I want to allay your fears. 

MR. McGRATH: If you might repeat the question. 

MR. OLIVER: The question was whether or not these 
people were -- it was contemplated these people were going to 
donate money to projects and whether or not that is the case. 

THE WITNESS: The discussion focused exclusively, 
as you know from the document ,^^^^^^^^^HThere was no 
discussion of Central America, no contemplation of funding 
for Central America in any of this discussion. 




rprSP or^r^ T^rn 



263 



ONltMSSffllBET 



34 



BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q On the talking points that are attached, I assume 
these are talking points in the big speech type. 
A Right. 

Q It says in the last paragraph on that page, 
"Charley Wick has led in Project Democracy and in near-term 
consensus building projects." 

Is that the same Project Democracy that included 
activities related to Central America? 

MR. McGRATH: I apologize, counsel. Which — 

THE WITNESS: The Project Democracy referred to 
here is the roughly $65?million program that was developed 
by the Administration in early 1983 and submitted as part of 
the budget in January, 1983, to submit to Congres§^ which would 
include funding for a wide range of activities, all of which 
were totally in the public domain and would be discussed 
with Congress. 

It did include funding for something similar to 
the National Endowment for Democracy;, which I don't believe 
had come into existence at that time and was a concept. It 
had been determined that USIA would be the lead agency in 
submitting that package to the Hill. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Did you draft these talking points? 
A I believe so. 



HASSMB. 



264 



UNeUSSKtiSET 



35 



1 Q On the last line of both the suggested talking 

2 points and what I guess is the final cut on the talking points 

3 It says, "I note Charley can do this. He has done pretty 

4 well for me raising funds in the past." 

5 And then in the final cut it says, "I asked 

6 Charley to pull the group together to form nucleus support 

7 in private sector for programs critical to our efforts over 

8 seas. Charley can do this. He has done well raising funds 

9 in the past." 

10 What were you referring to raising funds in the 

11 past when you drafted these talking points? 

12 MR. BUCK: I am going to object again to the 

13 question being overhbroad and would ask the witness only to 

14 answer in regards to Central America. 

15 THE WITNESS: To the best of my knowledge, that 

16 reference there had nothing to do with Central Ameria. 

17 I believe he had been active in a presidentialJand 

'V 

18 congressional; supported international youth program. That 
■ V 

19 was one reference. 

20 BY MR. OLIVER: 

21 Q It had nothing to do with raising funds for the 

22 contras or for any of the private groups or private sector 

23 initiatives that had to do with building support for the 

24 Central American policy? 

25 A Abso^^jt^eJ.^ jiothing_ to_do with Central America. 



'iUUeJ-i;. nothing to do with Cen 



265 



UW»SS$M«ET 



36 



Q Thank you. 

Mr. Raymond, I had asked you earlier how much 
time you devoted to public diplomacy as opposed to your other 
activities, previous responsibilities after you resigned or 
retired from the CIA the end of April, 1983. I wanted to 
ask you prior to your resigning from the CIA in 1982 and 1983, 
how much of your time did you devote to public diplomacy, 
publicsdiplomacy activities while you were still head of the 
intelligence section of the National Security Council? 

A You are speaking specifically of July 1982 to 
appropriately June 1983? 

Q Yes. I just want an approximation. I know you 
don't keep a time clock. 

A I would say that starting initially in early 

July 1982, early in my tenure, it would be principally 

intelligence and it was a reversing trend. So by the time 

that I was ready to leave the intelligence group I was 

probably spending over 50 percent of my time on public- 

-1 

diplomacy matters, a not unsurprising thing in the NSC, 
because, again, the labels mean very little. 

The NSC utilizes its personnel as best they can 
and they do a lot of different things. But I would say over 
50 percent on public diplomacy by the time I was asked to 
head the public diplomacy directorate. 

Q But you had 'indicated earlier that when you discussc 




266 



y«i!Pfi;!ifi!r 



37 



1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



going to the NSC with Bill Casey while you were still at the 
CIA that you made a speech to him about how you wanted to 
foster this public^diplomacy initiative so that you and he 

A, 

agreed that that would be something that you could engage in. 
Is that correct? 

A No, sir. I made that speech to Bill Clark. 

Q You didn't make that speech to Mr. Casey? 

A I discussed the matter with Bill Casey, that is 
correct, as I testified yesterday. But the basic point 
that I made was to Bill Clark because Bill Casey was not 
in a position to make a judgment as to how my time would be 
decided and divided in the National Security Council. That 
was a judgment for Mr. Clark. 

Q But you did indicate to him that this was one of 
the reasons you wanted to go to the NSC and to participate in 
this job. Isn't that correct? 

MR. OLMSTED: Which him? 
MR. OLIVER: Bill Casey. 

THE WITNESS: Yes. I indicated that to Mr. Casey, 
but he couldn't make any judgment as to how my time would be 
decided. I worked for Bill Clark. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q But you indicated earlier Bill Casey was also 
interested in this whole public ^diplomacy area and, therefore 
was agreeable to, I believe -- I may be drawing conclusions — 



uiKusm.. 



267 



«sW 



ET 



would it be your testimony Bill Clark, on the basis of your 
conversations with him, interested in the public^ diplomacy 
area, knowledgeable about your interest, knowledgeable about 
your desire to work at the White House to promote this 
idea and that he was informed about your activities from time 
to time in the public ^diplomacy area? 

MR. BUCK: Which question are we going to ask of 
that? 

MR. OLIVER: Let the witness decide. 

THE WITNESS: You used the worXd "Bill Clark 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q I meant Bill Casey. Thank you. 

A As you say, counsellor, there are several questions 
Mr. Casey has been or was interested in public diplomacy, 
I think, all his professional life. So this is not something 
that was directly related to his role as the Director of 
Central Intelligence. It related to his very essence. It 
is true that I discussed this with him. 

It is true that he thought it was a good idea. 
Q And did you keep him informed from time to time 
of what you were doing in the public-^diplomacy area? 

A As I testified yesterday, there were weekly 
meetings involving Mr. Casey and Mr. Clark. Occasionally 
an item would come up in those meetings. I did not have any 
formal process of advising or informing Mr. Casey. 



s or advising or intorming Mr. 



268 



immm 



39 



1 I met with him perhaps every four or five months. 

2 It was not a regular process of meeting with Mr. Casey. 

3 Q Did you keep Mr. Casey informed about the progress 

4 of your efforts to have LPD established in the Department of 

5 State? 

6 A Not -- a response to your question would be 

7 negative. He was aware of our interest in establishing a 

8 LPD in the first instance. He was aware of the proposal 

9 to have former Senator Stone take that responsibility. He 

10 was aware of the possibility that Otto Reich might take that 

11 responsibility as a replacement for Senator Stone. But I 

12 was not in any way briefing him on a regular basis. 

13 Q Did he approve of the appointment of Otto Reich? 

14 A I don't recall specifically that. I know that 

15 JASl^^r- Kirkpatrick and Senator Stone were strong supporters 

16 of Otfe-I^S^r. I don't recall whether Mr. Casey even knew 

17 Otto Reich. 

18 MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter to 

19 mark this as Raymond Exhibit 22. 

20 (Raymond Exhibit 22 was marked for identification.) 

21 THE WITNESS: Is there some specific — ~" 

22 BY MR. OLIVER: 

23 Q Is that your signature on that document? 

24 A Yes, sir. 

25 Q Let the record indicate this is a weekly report 



WKUsmit. 



269 




40 



from Walt Raymond, Jr., to William P. Clark, dated April 29, 
1983, and the committee identification number is N-3091. 

Mr. Raymond, this document was written while you 
were still the head of the Intelligence Directorate; is that 
correct? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q In the last paragraph on the first page titled 
"Private Fund Raising jj there is a reference to a 
presidential meeting with donors and the final sentence 
says "I believe the activist orientation of the key donors 
suggest that grants that they give will have a sharp cutting 
edge that will be directed to both^^^^^^^^^^Hand American 
audiences. I will provide you details as they become 
available. " 

Could you tell me what you mef^t by the activist 
orientation of the key donors in that last sentence? 

MR. BUCK: I am going to re+state my previous 
objection and ask the witness only to answer in regard to 
Central America. If this is a^^^^^^^wnatter , I am going 
to ask the witness not to answer that question. 

MR. OLIVER: Let the record indicate that it does 
not -- this is a weekly report. It does not indicate in that 
paragraph any particular region other than bot 
and American audiences. It also includes the name of 
Roy Godson who has been well established in this investigation 




270 



WtS^SSKKfiT 



41 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



raiseo private funds at the request of Oliver North for 

the resistance in Nicaragua. I think that once againVS^ 

1 
frivolous objection which simply delays and frustrates the 

purpose of this deposition. 

MR. BUCK: Roy Godson has not been shown to be 
relevant to this investigation during this time]"f rame and 
to the best of my knowledge, anything Roy Godson said has 
not been released by this committee for public consumption. 
I am just warning the witness that we need not go into 
areas with private contributors that are outside of 
Central America. 

If it is relevant to Central America, I 
certainly encourage the witness to answer. 

MR. OLIVER: We have already discussed Roy Godson 
earlier in this deposition, Mr. Raymond, but that was not my 
question on this paragraph. I would like to ask you what 
you meant by this last sentence that we have already discussed 
and has been read into the record. 

THE WITNESS: Well, first of all, there is no 
indication in here or in the facts that I am aware of that 
any of this dealt with any grants that involve Central 
America. The activist orientation of key donors is 
simply a characterization of people who have a history of 
being active political and public servants, political 
figures in public service. 



^WTfeL^PT ffepT 



271 



weasst^T 



42 



BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q You refer in there to the third sentence in that 
paragraph that Roy Godson and Leo Churn have had several 
meetings with the private donors executive committee. What 
is that? 

A Well, that is worth clarification. After the 
President had the general meeting with the group in the 
White House, there was a discussion of the concern that the 
President had about the need for private sector to be more 
active in international affairs. 

This was a discussion that we covered yesterday 
in about 15 or 20 minutes of talk. The private group met • 
separately and decided that they did think that there was a 
problem and they would like to see what they could do 
constructively. They did not want to be working with the 
United States Government. 

They did not want to be responsive to the 
United States Government. They understood the need as 
articulated by the President and they said let us see what we 
can do and they went off and they created an executive 
committee of several people that would sit there and see 
what they could do on their own to deal with the 
problem and that was the end of it. 

Now, they asked -- and this is not from the 
executive side, it is not f5£)ii;^riy^A^^^ it is not from the 



wmm. 



272 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



ufffia^ftB^T 



43 



NSC Side -- they asked whether Mr. Godson and Mr. Churn 
would perhaps meet with them periodically. That is their 
decision, their call and their follow-up action. 

Q Was Roy Godson a consultant to the National 
Security Council at that time? 

A I do not know his dates. I know later he was. I dc 
not know if he was a consultant at that time. 

Q Do you know whether or not he was a consultant to 
the National Security Council at any time when he had meetings 
with the private donors executive committee? 

A I do noty^because I do not know when he became a 
consultant to the NSCI ^h is exeCJaClve' conunittee might say to 
the b(^^t of ray knowledge — and I never met with them -- to 
the best of my knowledge this executive coBonittee met a couple 
of times irT 1-983. I do nof believe it:^gx.er met after that 

and Roy Godson*-;; 

Q For the record, could you identify Leo Churn? 

A Leo_Churn is the — I want to get the title right. 
I think it is — Leo Churif is a leRiyer, a distinguished 
American -- active in ^A numljer of different programs. He 
has ^en very active in refugee relief, international 
refugee relief. He has, I think it is called, the Research 
Institute-<S Pimt^fi^, w*>ich he is involved: with. 




tMverCSlkfiS to Ijoth Leo Churn 




pqi 



273 



unci AACiClUlr. 



44 



He is also a recipient of the Presidenc's Medal cf 
Freedom. 

Q Was he a member of — 

A And he was also associated with Freedom House. He 
was a member of PFIAB, Vice Chair. 

Q So at the time Roy Godson and Leo Churn had a 
governmental connection, Roy Godson was also, was he not, a 
consultant to PFIAB? 

A I "am not certain of that. I think so but I would 
have to — that would have to be checked in the White House 
records. 

Q PFIAB, for the record, is the President's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 

Who was on this private donors executive committee? 

A My understanding was that it wai 

land one more and I am not sure who the 
third one was, an American, but I never met with the group. 
As I said, it met twice and possibly more but it didn't meet 
any more than two or three times in the first part or during 
1983. 

I don't know how long this went on. And that was 
it. 

Q On the last paragraph of page 2 of this exhibit 
there is a reference to a PAO conference in Miami on May 2nd 
or 3rd. The last sentence says, "We will be discussing our 



JMUS^iM-' 



274 



tWftlOTIfflr 



overall needs in the region with particular attention to 
providing support to the President's program." 

What were your overall needs in the region that you 
discussed at that meeting? 

A As you can see, incidentally, it is April 29. I was 
already basically wearing my public-diplomacy -l^ea^ This 
was a very typical USIA-PAO conference where each PAO would -- 

Q For the record, I believe in April of 1983 you were 
still the head of the Intelligence Bureau? 

A I said that. Let me correct myself here. 

I did not attend this meeting. I looked at it. 
I did attend a PAO conference which is what I was describing 
as a very typical conference Latin America-fwide in Miami in 
May, 1984, but not in 1983. I did not attend this meeting. 
My recollection of the agenda was that it was an overall 
discussion participated in by State Department and USIA 
people, of policy issues in the region and what USIA, PAOs , 
■in their various host countries could do to facilitate the 
President's program. 

That is really what you see is what you get 
the.e. 

Q Mr. Raymond, you were involved in tasking public^ 
affairs officers*; is it your testimony you were involved 
in tasking public; affairs officers in Central American 
affairs while you were head of the Intelligence Directorate 



UNCUSSIREIL 



275 



UNfttm^ 



at the National Security Council? 
A No. I didn't say that. 

Q What was your relationship to PAOs in Central 
America while you were head of the Intelligence Directorate 
and still an employee of the CIA? 

A There was no direct relationship. I mean, we were 
on an interagency basis, we were discussing Central 
American policy questions but there was no direct relation- 
ship. 

MR. McGRATH: One point of clarification. I don't 
believe from the informal information we had yesterday that 
Mr. Raymond was still an employee of the Central 
Intelligence Agency on May 2 to 3 . 

MR. OLIVER: The memorandum we are referring to was 
written on April 29, counsel. 

MR. McGRATH: I believe, if my recollection is 
correct, that the date of termination was April 25 or 26. 
.Minor point. 

MR. OLIVER: That was what he thought, but I 
think you are going to provide us with the initial documenta- 
tion of all that, isn't that correct? We had asked you to 
do that yesterday. Yesterday you gave us an informal 
recollection. and we would like very much if you would provide 
the documentation to the committee. 

MR. McGRATH: We are trying to obtain the actual 



mmmi 



•cm 



276 



uim^SifiPT 



personnel records on that. 

MR. OLIVER: You will provide us with the 
documentation on the representation that was made yesterday 
regarding the retirement date, official retirement date from 
the CIA of Mr. Raymond, the official date of his assumptions 
of his duties in the White House after his retirement when 
he became a full-time employee. 

MR. OLMSTED: We will provide you with those 
dates if that is your question. 

MR. OLIVER: Yes, yes. There was an informal 
telephone conversation yesterday and there is some confusion 
about this as to how many days there are in April, 
I think, at this point. 

MR. OLMSTED: I understand. 

MR. OLIVER: Could we take just a five-minute 
break? 



" ftUtP t^gyHgg^ 



277 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UWbASSEtElET 



48 



MR. OLIVER: Back on the record. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Mr. Raymond, we have been discussing private 
donors, persons who are referred to in these exhibits as 
private donors. Was part of your public* diplomacy effort 
to secure and encourage private donors for projects related 
to public diplomacy? 

A As stated earlier, I felt there was need for 
greater involvement by the private sector. To the best of 
my knowledge, no efforts that I was involved in involved 
Central' America . 




278 



UNCtt^BE&T 




Q I would like to ask the reporter to mark as 
Raymond Exhibit No. 23 three comments from Walter Raymond 
to William P. Clark dated May 18, 20 and 21, 1983. 

The first one is the subject of Central America 
public diplomacy, bears committee identification 30921. 
The second one is a weekly report and bears the committee 
identification No. N-30915. And the third one is subject, 
Central American public diplomacy, and bears the committee 
identification No. 30913. 

(Raymond Deposition Exhibit No. 2 3 
was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q I would like to ask you to examine these documents 



JTObWivoWTOtT 



279 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



DHttKSWBET 



50 



Mr . Raymond . 

Mr. Raymond, is that your signature on those 
documents? 

A Yes. 

Q These documents were written during the period, 
I believe, you testified earlier, during which you were a 
consultant to the National Security Council, which was the 
period between your retirement at the end of April and your 
commission as special assistant to the President in charge 
of international communications, which I believe you indicated 
you had 'looked at yesterday morning, and was dated June 2nd, 
1983; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q In the fifth paragraph of -- 

MR. OLMSTED: Just a moment. 

THE WITNESS: Let me finish this last part. 

MR. OLMSTED: Could we hold up? 

MR. OLIVER: Would you like to take a moment to 
examine these documents? 

MR. OLMSTED: Yes. 

MR. OLIVER: We will take a two-minute break. 

(Recess. ) 

THE WITNESS: Okay. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q In the fifth paragraph of the first page -- 



IMPIACQlPICn 






280 





A The 18 May document? 

Q Yes. We are going to talk about them in chrono- 
logical order. 

You state that "our vulnerability is that neither 
Dick Stone nor State has done a particularly distinguished 
job in implementing a day-to-day public^diplomacy strategy. 
Stone has worked on the big picture and not gotten into some 
of the details necessary to make the wheels turn. State, 
ARA, has been disinterested, incompetent, overworked, all 
of the above . " 



You/talk about the! 



1 



the daily efforts 



is striking. I'm referring to paragraph five. 

Why did you feel that State, AFLA, was disin- 
terested, incompetent, overworked, all of the above? 

A No, it's interesting, a personal note, I read this 
quotation^ which I S**?ian-^ recalled, in the Jacksonville 
newspaper on Saturday and the APA release on Saturday. I 
hadn't realized it ha^ been declassified. 

Q It may have been declassified. I don't know what 
has been declassified and what hasn't. 

This document that we have in front of us has not 
been declassified. There may be a declassified version that 
has been made public, I'm not sure. 

A Specifically I think that the issue about Dick 
Stone I would like to put in perspective. He was a 



IIWSSIWL 



281 



UNft^M^T 



52 



singleton and what he was really talking about was the need 
to have a more energetic, more robust program, and it wasn't 
that he lacked any of the competence; he was a very fine 
person in that responsibility. I think that the question 
of State Department, ARA participation at that time was a 
deep concern in the White House about the degree of support 
that ARA was providing for the President's program. 

Q The import of this memorandum, as I read it, is 
that you wanted to change the structure that was developing 
with Central American public diplomacy. Is that a fair 
assumption? 

A Yes, but it reflects discussion that I had with 
the leadership of NSC^which were dissatisfied with the 
implementation of our Central American policy. So I was 
trying to identify that we had a problem also in the public; 
diplomacy area. 

Q In the next to last sentence on the first page, 
you state and I quote, "If you wanted to keep a discreet 
group looking at the covert action, it could be identified 
as the NSPG working group." 

Was there an NSPG working group created subsequent 
to this memorandum? 

A I do not recall. I was expressing a concern 

about the issue because I wanted to keep any covert dimension 

t 
out of public diplomacy, but I realise there needed to be 



mismk 



T 



282 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



INBU^tBir 



53 



some command and control. 

Subsequently, as you know, we know from history, 
a group known as RIG restricted was created. I do not know 
whether an NSPG working grouqwas created or not, so I did not 
participate . 

Q You do not know whether or not an NSPG working 
group was ever created? 

A I do not know whether a formal group by that name 
came into being. 

Q You refer in the next section, which overlaps into 
the next page, "A working group meets under Craig Johnstone. 
Needs to be an effective working group" a^what group are 
you referring to? 

A Well, I was referring simply to the existing 
policy structure at the 'working level, which was a group 
which I'm calling the working group under the deputy assistant 
secretary for Latin America, Craig Johnstone. 
Again, my concern — 

Q Who was Craig Johnstone? 

A Deputy assistant secretary of State for Latin 
America, with principal responsibility for Central America. 

Q Was Craig Johnstone employed at CIA? 

A No, he was a State Department Foreign Service 
Officer, now an ambassador overseas. 

Q In the next paragraph, on page 2, you refer to a 



owussw u 



283 



UiKUSSBE&T 



Central American working group. Was that the Central American 

working group which met in your office? 

A No. This is not a very elegantly phrased sentence 

but I believe it refers tolthe same subject as the previous 

paragraph where I felt that we needed to have an effective, 

more effective coordinated approach to policy, and I state 

in here that a publiC;;diplomacy coordinator should be in 
^ 

such a group because public diplomacy takes its lead from 
the policy. 

Q In the last sentence of that paragraph, you say, 
"Failing' to act on this will mean our international program 
will be inadequate and our domestic program will go by 
default to the outreach committee." 

What was the outreach committee? 

A Faith Whittlesey's group. 

Q It was your recommendation that domestic programs 
should not go by default to that committee? 

A As I believe we discussed in the open/fiearings 
a few weeks ago, I felt that, and Judge Clark, Bill Clark 
felt very strongly that there should be some kind of coopera- 
tion between the foreign#policy process which we were urging 
under state or the White House, but strengthened, and the 
domestic program Faith Whittlesey -- it shouldn't be totally 
separate tracks . 

Q So in effect what you are saying here is that you 



mmmL 



284 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



mumm 



55 



want this effort to be coordinated m the White House but 
not by Faith Whittlesey's outreach committee; is that 
correct? 

A The outreach group as a support element doesn't 
make foreign policy. I wanted to have the foreign;: policy 
community in charge of foreign policy for Central America. 

Q And the person who you wanted to be in charge of 
this was Otto Reich; is that correct? 

A Otto Reich would only be in charge of public^ 
diplomacy dimension, information programs. 

Q •• But your recommendation in there that he be given 
a White House cache in order to enhance his clout over these 
elements; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q You recommended in there that to Bill Clark, that he 
meet Reichiseek George Shultz's concurrence and issue a state- 
ment similar to that involving Stone. Did he meet Reich? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he seek George Shultz's concurrence in Reich's 
appointment? 

A Yes. 

Q And did George Shultz resist Reich's appointment? 

A There was discussion. There was review of the 
proposed announcement. My recollection is that the 
Secretary made some personal changes in the announcement and 



wmm. 



285 



URoasafiWT 



then he concurred. 

Q Did he send a memoranduin to the President indicating 
that he wanted to run this activity through the assistant 
secretary of State and with career Foreign Service Officers? 

A I believe that, I haven't reread my testimony, but 
I believe you showed me a memorandum to that effect. 

Q Yes, that is correct. 

A In early September. Yes. 

Q Actually it was late May. 

A I mean — 

Q 'I'm trying not to go back to some of the things 
we already discussed. 

A My answer to the question is I don't know whether 
I had -- I had not seen that memo before you showed it to me 
in our first deposition. But the President did to the best 
of my recollection decide in favor of the final text which 
announced the appointment of Ambassador Reich, but he also 
made certain that there were clear responsibilities into that 
process for the Department of State. It was a question of 
working very closely with the Department of State to implement 
the program. 

Q On the third page you have four elements there that 
you have asked Mr. Clark to make a decision on. Do you recall 
whether or not he returned this to you with markings in those 
boxes on those lines? 





31 



286 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 





57 

MR. McGRATH: Do you have a copy of the document 
which indicates whether he did or didn't? 

MR. OLIVER: I'm asking him whether he remembers. 
THE WITNESS: My answer is I do not remember that, 
but it's my recollection that the first three decision 
blocks were carried out. Obviously the third had some 
interim stages. I don't know what happened to the fourth. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q You indicate that Al Sapia-Bosch and Bob Sims 
concur. Was Al Sapia-Bosch in the public diplomacy? 

A ' He was the senior Latin American official at that 
time in NSC. 

Q Bob Sims? 

A Public^af fairs press official for the NSC. 
Q Is the last page on this exhibit a memorandum for 
Shultz that you drafted for Mr. Clark? 

A If you will let me, I have to read this. I did 
not catch this in my previous reading. 

Yes, I believe I drafted it in coordination with Mr. 
Bosch and Mr. Sims. I do not know whether this is a draft 
or whether this is the document that was taken over by 
Mr. Clark and discussed with Mr. Shultz. I have no evidence 
here to indicate whether this is the final version. 

Q Did all the things that are recommended in here 



happen? 



WipftflHcMT 



287 



MifiStPISIr 



58 



A No, I repeat, I can't speak to the question of the 
first paragraph although it was finally resolved in terms of 
how to centralize policy. In shifting to my new responsibi- 
lities, I was not involved in day-to-day policy. I believe 
some adjustments were made, one, in terms of public diplomacy. 
This is in the ball park of what happened, I believe, 
although there were some modifications made after discussions 
with the Secretary. 

So I mean the document can be provided, but I 
think a line in-line out analysis will show some adjustments 
were made after Mr. Clark and Mr. Shultz talked and a revised 
version went forward. I can't be certain about that. 

Q Once again in the last sentence of the first 
paragraph of that memorandum you prepared for Clark to send 
to Shultz, it says, "Special meetings devoted to covert 
action items would be discussed in NSWF%rorking group 
under NSC work chairmanship." Did that happen? 

A As I indicated before, I don't know whether NSPG 
working group was established. I cannot answer definitively. 

Q In the next memorandum dated May 20, '83, there is 
a sentence in the end of the first paragraph, "Private 
representatives at the second meeting raised the question 
of establishing a coalition for democratic Central America. 
This would be helpful if it happens." 

What was_ ^pu^^inv^jj^^ipjifc^^ jjglping to establish 



12 

1 





39 



=^ 









3^ knovlf 



2 
3 

4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 

n 

16 

17 - ss:. : "-.< 

20 -s-a--==^5::_i=3 vrL". 1-a p. 

21 

22 

23 

25 



mmm. 



289 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



TOP 

UNCLA 




r 



6S 



V- -"~T^-. 









Has rhar l:Lsr oeer. : 
your knowledge? 

MP.. McSSA: 



net. /tTjOw. 



(Witness r:-ferr^-r v.zs. =:— -sel.) 



wr -- v:; 



comiTi t.~e£ 



counse. 



cujiuiii -~5s , "c ".".eir cr. 






i^my^saErs'pT 



290 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



mmw 



61 



list is. 



THE WITNESS: We are trying to identify what the 

I don't know whether it's been provided. 

MR. OLMSTED: We don't know whether it's been 
provided. 

THE WITNESS: We can search it. 

My recollection of some of the ideas are 95 
percent^^^^^^^Khere was one item something to do with 
Salvador students. I don't have this specifically in my 
head. If I could find the list and reread it, I could tell 
you, but I think we were trying to bring a group of young 
Salvador students up in the early '83, who were very much 
typical kind of youth exchange where we could try to encourage 
more young Salvadorans to be exposed to the democratic 
process. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Who is Jeff Davis? 

A Jeff Davis is a businessman in Seattle, Washington, 
who had contacts with the Reagan administration when the 

President was governor in California, and he in a sense 

-> 

approach/Bill Clark, who was a friend, and asked Bill Clark, 
chatted with him and that was, I met him subsequently. 

Q Did he ask you to provide Jeff Davis with this 
list, Bill Clark? 

A I don't — 




IF 




291 



PvS^^fliElk:' 



62 



Q Did Bill Clark ask you? 

A I don't recall that. I imagine so. I wasn't just 
doing this on my own. 

Q Did Jeff Davis, to your, knowledge , help raise 
funds for this private-sector support? 

A No funds were raised by Jeff Davis. No funds were 
raised by Jeff Davis for Central America. 

Q Did he assist anyone else in raising funds for 
this private-sector support, or did he ask anyone else to 
raise funds for this private ^sector support? 

A ■* No conversations that Jeff Davis had resulted in 
the raising of any funds for any cause that I'm aware of. 

Q But you are aware that he had a conversation in 
which he was attempting to secure funding, private funding 
for these? 

A He may have had conversations, but no funds were 
raised. And with the single exception of Salvador, none of 
the discussions of programs dealt with Central America. 

Q Why do you say he may have had conversations? 

A He indicated that he had talked to a couple of 
people -- I don't know their names -- who seemed to be 
interested in the democracy program, but, as I stated earlier, 
a lot of this I'm afraid was -- scratch that -- a lot of 
this was rhetoric. 



mmmr 



292 






1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



63 

Q The next or the third sentence -- next sentence-- 

. c 

indicated he was enthusiastic about the package and 

proceeding forward. Your recollection is that he may have 
been enthusastic in proceeding forward, but he wasn't 
very successful in his efforts. 

A Unfortunately, that is correct. 

Q Next sentence, Roy Godson reported he met early 
this week with donor. Did Roy Godson report to you? 

A He did not report to me in any command or 
control. He did as this cable, as this 
memo states, advise me of that meeting, which is the 
follow-up to the meeting we discussed a while back. 

Q To your knowledge, did any of the private donors 
that Roy Godson met with ever donate any funds that were 
related in any way to central, including supporting, 
including trying to inf luence^^^^^^^Hpublic opinion to 
support the President's policiesir^central America? 

A There are several questions there. 

Q The main thing is, did any of the donors that 
Roy Godson met with, to your knowledge, ever raise any 
money that was related to Central America? I was trying 
to define — 

A I think the answer is that they did not raise any 
money that directly relates to Central America. 

Q Did they raise any money that related to 






293 



UHCBSSBiftET 



inf luencing^^^^^^^^or American public opinion on Central 
America. ^^^ 

A I think they were very concerned about! 
and American public opinion on a wide range of issues. 
I think their hope was they could get more balanced 
press coverage on committee issues, one of which would be 
Central America. 

Q Did they raise any funds for that purpose, to 
your knowledge? 

A To my knowledge they did 




Q Did Roy Godson provide you with the details of 
any of these programs? 

A No, that is about all I have. And, it is about 
all I received at that time, too. 

Q Let's move on to the documents. May 21, which 
is already part of the exhibit here. This is your third 
memo over a period of four days to Mr. Clark and this 
follows the subject matter that was discussed in your 
May 18 memo which you indicate that we have got to bring 
this whole effort into organizational harmony, changes 
are needed in how we do business and you made recommendations 
You indicated in the first sentence we need to put 



WHMmL 



294 



OHfiHlSSIHilT 



65 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



this program together immediately. What was the urgency 
of this new structure to be put in place? 

A Well, it was a period of considerable activities 
in the whole Central American area. We had to be more 
effective not only in the way we were formulating and 
implementing policy as we discussed earlier, but also in 
the way we were formulating and implementing the public- 
diplomacy strategy. This includes, as you know -- does 
anybody recall the dates of the Kissinger Commission? 

Q Were they involved in this? 

A* No, they were not, but I mean it was a whole 
question of identifying a broad strategy for Central 
America. We were as concerned in our public ^diplomacy 
efforts. We were as concerned with the Salvadore question, 
as we were with Nicaragua. We were also concerned to 
have our policy understood more effectively in Europe^ 
in Latin America and in the United States, so there was 
need to get our collective act together. 
That is what it called for. 

Q In the first sentence of the third paragraph you 
indicate coordinators must be -- at this time must be 
separate from ARA. Why? 

A To be more effective. 

Q You recommended that it should be wired to the 
SPG structure, but in this case you recommended he 



UniiOKiKHriiib^ 



295 



intK.l^i6^ 



66 



initially be identified as a special^^ assistant secretary 
to Secretary Shultz, working primarily for Egfgleburger. 
This should ensure State support. 

Were you indicating you wanted him to report 
to NSC although on organization charts he would likely be 
reporting to somebody in State? 

A All of this in this area — what was in Walt 
Raymond's mind at any given date. The ultimate resolution 
of this was to have discussions between Secretary Shultz 
and Bill Clark, and it resulted in a formal memo that 
went in the NSC,lto State, I think, in which Clark signed 
for the President. 

I think it established the basic policy I wanted 
to try to mobilize the whole community. However, I 
didn't want to put any kind of organizational structure 
together which would not include the Department of State. 
At the same time, more resources were involved. We wanted 
to have it as a national strategy national policy. 

Q You indicated in the last sentence of the 
second paragraph on the first page, public^sdiplomacy 
coordinators will orchestrate the ovemll USG effort 
coordinating closely with Faith and simultaneously driving 
forward. 

Ultimately, did the public^ diplomacy coordinator 
orchestrate the overall USG effort as you recommended? 



ftskiF'io 



He tried. I think he did a good job. 

imDBISSIEBSin 



296 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



67 

Q So basically, these memos of May 18 and May 21, 
where you recommended this structure of Otto Reich and LPD 
and so on, came to pass. 

A Yes. 

Q Is that correct. 

A Yes. 

Q I would like to ask the reporter to mark this 
document as Halt Raymond Exhibit Number 24. 

(The document was marked as Walt Raymond Exhibit 
Number 24 for identification.) 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q This is a document which is a memo to Honorable 
William Casey, dated July 13, 1983. The subject is 
"Increase Funding Level for Nicaraguan Covert Action 
Program," signed by William P. Clark for the President 
and the identification number is N43661, continuing 
through N43685. 

Mr. Raymond, this is a memo of notification 
about increased funding level for Nicaraguan covert action 
program, and if you will turn to the seventh, I believe, 
or eighth page with a memo for you dated July 6, 198 3, 
there is a memo for you. The subject is, "Request for 
Increased Funding Level for Nicaragua Covert Action 
Program," signed by Dennis Kox, and it seems to be 
notification to you that the acting Secretary of State 



mPLACCJCL 



•IVi»' "ilV 'I'li 



297 



mmm 



68 



has approved this. 

This is more than two months after your retirement 
from the CIA, after you had assumed your new job of 
International Communications Director. Why were you being 
notified of the request for this increased funding level 
for covert action? 

A The memo was misaddressed. The coordinator for 
jTitelligence was Ken de GrafTenreid. I don't even recall 
seeing this memo. If I did, I obviously immediately gave 
it to Mr. de Graffenreid. As you can see from all the 
docviments which surround this, the interstaf f ing of this 
was done by Mr. de Graffenreid, not by myself. My 
name does not appear to my knowledge. I aim shown it 
does appear in one place. 

Q Yes, it does. 

A I stand corrected in terms of that. 

Q I believe that memo to you is dated July 6. Your 
name appears later in with a copy, copied July 13, 1983, 
the memo from de Graffenreid and North to McFarlane and not 
only does your name appear at the copy, it says, "in 
connection with the|^^^^^^B Nicaragua Walt Raymond has 
suggested you might want to call Ken Robinson," and so 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Right. I accept your point. I obviously 



was aware of th 
discussing the; 




I don't recall, frankly, 
but I accept the document. 



298 





69 

1 the accuracy of theiti, but I think my original point is 

2 correct; that it was a mistake from the Department of 

3 State to have sent the document to me, because 

4 I was not involved in the active staffing of the package. 

5 As we discussed last session, I had been involved in some 

6 aspects of this congressional strategy and as you can see 

7 my remarks here quoted by de Graffenreid in memo not 

8 coordinated with me, was my suggestion to him on the basis 

9 of my tracking of the congressional question, as you saw 

10 in the separate traffic, something he might consider. 

11 Q Well, if you look at page 4 of the last memo 

12 in this exhibit, which is a memo from Ken de Graffenreid, 

13 Al Sapia-Bosch and Oliver North to Bill Clark, and it 

14 relates to this memo of notification on Nicaraguan covert 

15 action funding, and it makes some recommendations that 

•)g Clark brief the President; that he sign the attached memo 

ly informing -- then at the bottom it says, "Walt Raymond 

•]3 coimrs." 

•jg A I don't remember seeing the document, and my 

2Q signature is not on it. 

21 Q On the first page is that Mr. de Graf fenreid' s 

22 signature and Mr. Al Sapia-Bosch' s signature? 

23 A Yes, sir it looks like it. 

24 Q To your knowledge. 

25 A Yes, all three. 



iimiMSSMfipT 



299 



(BWiWifW 



70 



Q Why would they put Walt Raymond concurs in a memo 
they sent forward if it wasn't the case? 

A Documents are typed on the presumption of how they 
are going to be handled. But that doesn't necessarily 
mean that has happened. I think it is important there is 
no signature on here. 

Q Well, Mr. de Graffenreid had been previous 
Deputy at the Intelligence Directorate, was your successor 
as head of that component in the NSC, was he not? 

A Yes. 

Q And Al Sapia-Bosch was working in the Central 
American Division, I believe, of NSC; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Oliver North was in the political^^railitary 
directorate, I believe that is correct-- well, they all 
knew you no longer were involved with the CIA and you had 
a different job. 

A Yes. 

MR. MCGRATH: I would just like to make the point 
that Mr. Oliver keeps indicating that previous employment 
or detailed employment at NSC by Mr. Raymond has some 
relevance to his responsibilities at NSC, and I am not 
sure that that has been testified to at this deposition. 

I would request that he refrain from using that 
as a determinant whether Mr. Raymond was involved in 



IW£JiMi£n.. 



300 



mmm 



71 



1 certain activities or not. 

2 MR. OLIVER: I think, counsel, that the documents 

3 which have been put into evidence in this deposition or 

4 have been used as exhibits indicate that Mr. Raymond was 

5 involved throughout this period of time, in both 

6 intelligence activities, and activities related to the 

7 CIA, as well as activities related to Central America 

8 public diplomacy, and this particular covert action finding 

9 that we are talking about relate directly to Nicaragua, and 
10 I am not putting his name on these pieces of paper. 

■|1 I am just asking him why his name appears there. 

12 MR. MCGRATH: Counsel misconstrues my point. 

13 My only point is that in your question about his involvement 

14 in these activities, the fact that he was formerly a 

15 member of the Central Intelligence Agency, which you keep 
15 predicating the questions on, does not have 

17 relevance to the issue which we are discussing. 

13 MR. OLIVER: I am sorry, counsel, I am referring 

19 to his relationship with the agency while he was at the 

20 NSC from 1982 until the spring of 1983. He was still 

21 an employee of CIA. 

22 MR. MCGRATH: That\is exactly my point. There is 

23 nothing here to indicate the fact that the relationship 

24 that existed had anything to do with his responsibilities 

25 as an intelligence director at NSC. 



301 



mmw^ 



ET 



72 



MR. OLIVER: That is why I am asking the 
question as to why his name appears on covert action 
memorandum related to Nicaragua when he is no longer 
associated with the CIA and people who write the memo 
saying he concurs certainly know that. 

MR. MCGRATH: My point is that his involvement in 
covert action findings at NSC, was, as the record will 
indicate a product of his position as intelligence 
Director, not the fact he was or was not associated some 
time with the CIA. 

MR. OLIVER: I may state that, but I am not 
certain/\that anything that has been said here, any 
documents indicate that to be the case. 

MR. MCGRATH: My point is nothing said here or any 
documents produced indicate that the point you are making 
is in fact the case. 

MR. OLIVER: I am trying to determine why the 
State Department sends a memo to Mr. Raymond recommending 
^ covert findings ancMfcovert action memo/and why people 
within the NSC, in the Intelligence Directorate, 
indicate on their memos to the NSC adviser that Walt 
Raymond concurs on covert action memoranda if he is now 
Special Assistant to the President. 

MR. MCGRATH: I am not objecting at all to that 



question . 



imssm 



f rp 



302 



bap-ll 

1 
2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



lfllBH^?|T 



73 



MR. OLIVER: The question was this: I understand 
how Mr. Raymond has testified that Dennis Kux at the 
State Department made a mistake; that it was misaddressed 
on July 6th, but on July 11, there is a memo indicating 
that he concurs on the same matter from people within 
the NSC, with whom he worked very closely and who 
certainly knew what his role was. 

THE WITNESS: I will respond to your question, 
Mr. Oliver. It seemed to me that the record is clear 
that while turning over my responsibilities in the main 
there were a few residual responsibilities continued 
through that summer. 

We have seen documents citing my involvement or 
my concern, certain aspects of this problem as late as 
September. As you can see, the principal architect of 
this mem,o were three NSC staff officialsA alx te e. 
lAUwitifiud as the record shows some limited involvement in 
this issue/ in the transition period which is what we 
are talking about right now on a very complicated issue, 
which started early in the year. 

I was put down as a coordinatJ**-. That is 

A 

why my name is there. I do not recall coordinating, 
concurring, but I don't know that is particularly relevant. 
The fact was the record shows I had some involvement in 
this issue, during the summer while transition was taking 



IttimSSIflEfi. 



303 



u 




74 



place. 

MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter to 
mark this document as Raymond Exhibit Number 25. 

(The document was marked as Walt Raymond Exhibit 
Number 25 for identification. ) 

MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask for the 
record, that this is a memo classified secret to Robert 
McFarlane from Walt Raymond, Jr.; subject, "Central 
America Covert Action," dated July 21, 1983, the 
committee identification number N46168 through 46179. 
And this package contains a memo dated July 8, 1983 from 
Walt Raymond, Jr., to William P. Clark on Central 
American Covert Action. 

It also includes a memo draft memo for Mr. Clark 
to send to the President on Central American Covert 
Action and an amendment to H.R. 2760, which relates to 
legislation on the prohibition of covert assistance for 
any military operations in Nicaragua. My question, 
Mr. Raymond, did you sign the two memos there to Mr. 
McFarlane and to Mr. Clark? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q My question is, why were you initiating memos 
to the National Security Adviser on Central American Covert 
Action in your position as Director of International 



IMASMitr 



304 



bap-13 



URKSSSffe 



ET 



75 



1 Communications at NSC? 

2 A This issue we discussed yesterday in rather 

3 exhaustive detail. Basically, this is one area where 

4 the transition was taking place during the summer. On 

5 an issue which had been going on during the time that I 

6 had been in my other position, and as I think most of the 

7 documents pointed out, the general focus seemed to be 

8 dealing with congressional strategy. 

9 In a somewhat division of labor, I had been 

10 asked by my superiors to stay plugged in on that issue 

11 for a little while and that is what I was trying to do. 

12 Q Why would you not advise Mr. de Graffenreid to 

13 put forward such a memorandum rather than putting forward 

14 in these measures? 

15 A I think I have covered that point. This was 

16 something that I had been working on while I was in the 

17 /ntelligence group. We kept thinking this was going to 

18 be resolved. We expected it to be resolved in early 

•)9 spring. It dragged on into summer, and the question was 

20 simply was at what point in time do you turn over this 

21 one aspect of it, and I was asked to stay with it. Let's 

22 get this problem solved, and then get it off your desk. 

23 Q By this aspect of it, do you mean Central 

24 American covert action? 

25 A No, I mean this general, discussion which was going 



305 



im^nw 



76 



back and forth with various parts of the government, 
particularly with the Department of State and others, 
over the congressional issue. 



mm^ 



306 



#3 
McGinn 

11 :00am 
mas 1 



«sw 



77 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Q What was your responsibility for legislative 
strategy in either position? 

A I was not a principal for legislative strategy 
in either position. There was -- I think there was a 
reference in hereVChris Lehman had come on board as the 
Special Assistant for the President for Legislative Liaison. 
I am not clear on this, but my vague recollection is he 
came on board about coincident with the reorganization of 
the NSC. I am reasonably confident he came on board about 
June '83. So we had a transition problem and we also had 
a fast-moving train. So they asked me to stay on the train 
until this could be sorted out. 

It did not mean that I had a sudden new job 
description. 

Q So you are indicating, I take it, that your 
responsibilities in both positions overlapped in the areas 
of covert action, legislative strategy and public diplomacy? 

A I don't think the word "overlapped" is correct. 
This is one issue we have identified in which I stayed 
involved until approximately September. Yes, that was three 
months of overlap but it doesn't mean that the whole 
process of both offices was all entangled. This is an issue 
I was asked to stay with. 

Q Who asked you to stay with it? 

A The Readership, Judge Clark and — basically 



lIMUL^i^ 



307 



BNtimeBi' 



78 



Judge Clark. 

Q Judge Clark asked you to stay with this area of 
responsibility. Why is the only other name that is mentioned 
on these two memorandums Al Sapia-Bosch? When you indicate 
it was coordinated with him, what did you mean by that? 

A It means I coordinated with him. 

Q Why doesn't it indicate on here you coordinated 
with anybody in the intelligence section of the NSC? 

A I don't know. I discussed this with the people 
in the intelligence group. 

C But It is not indicated on here that they concur 
or were involved in anything. 

A That is correct. 

Q The only person whose name is mentioned was 
someone involved in the Central American Division of the 
NSC, is that correct? 

A Central American Policy. 

MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter to 
mark this as Raymond Exhibit No. 26. 

(Raymond Exhibit No. 26 was marked for 
identification.) 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q This is a memorandum dated August 29, 1983 from 
Walt Raymond, Jr., to John Poindexter on the subject of 
Central American Outreach, and the committee identification 



niWtikD UPMUHate «m 



308 



DliJSSifllP 



m3 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



number is N-3340 through N-33449. 

Mr. Raymond, I know that the signature on that first 
document is barely legible but can you determine whether 
or not it is yours? 

A No, I can't. But I am prepared to accept it 
as a document that I wrote. 

Q In the second paragraph it indicates that Bill 
Casey called on August the 26th and would like to follow 
up on his idea to have a meeting with five or six key 
public- relations specialists. What was his idea? 

A 

A I think it's stated about as eloquently as I could, 
is in that first ticked paragraph on the next memo, if you 
want me to read it, essentially I think the key in there 
was effort to have a more effective means of communicating 
our policy and generating support nationwide. 

Q You discussed his idea with hiriu\ did you not? 

A The memo indicates that there was a brief telephone 
call and that I would talk to him later. I do not recall a 
follow-up conversation personally. This may be faulty 
memory but I recall no follow up. 

Q What did he say when he called you on 
August 26th? What did he tell you? 

A Basically that he chatted with public^ relations 

A 

specialists and that these guys felt that what was needed 
was to generate a nationwide campaign. 



ujiiM)^ 



309 



wasaB®' 



80 



MR. McGRATH: Do you have an independent 
recollection of that phone call at this time? 
THE WITNESS: I do not. 

MR. OLIVER: I believe, counsel, he just 
testified to his recollection of that phone call. 

THE WITNESS: I don't have an independent 
recollection of the phone call. I have recounted it here 
in a memorandum. I presume it took place. I can't recall 
specific telephone calls like this. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Did you have a lot of phone calls from Bill Casey 

in those days? 

A No, no, I did not. 

Q Before your counsel asked you about your 
recollection, you were talking about your recollection of 
this phone call. Do you remember where you were when you 
received this phone call? 

A Probably sitting at my desk in EOB . 

Q How many times did Bill Casey call you? 

A As I testified yesterday, very infrequently, 
possibly after my new position, possibly every three or 
four months or less. 

Q Did you consider it a fairly important event when 
Bill Casey called you? 

A I think any time a cabinet^level person calls that 



umAffl^ 



310 



iwea^RHp 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



you should -- I would consider it something that one 
should listen to certainly. 

Q In the last sentence on the first page it says, 
"When I philosophized a bit with Bill Casey, (in an effort 
to get him out of the loop) he was negative about turning the 
ball over to State" and so on. I would like to ask you 
several questions bout this. 

What did you mean when you said you philosophized 
a bit with Bill Casey? 

A We are still talking about the basic generic 
question that somewhere between 10, 15, 20 percent the 
American people at that time could identify Central 
America on a map and less could identify anything about the 
political structure in the key countries. 

So what was necessary, as I stated, was an effectiv|e 
communication system, a need to sell a new product. 
Central America, by generating interest across the spectrum. 
It was a philosophical question. How are we going to get 
the Central American story told and get the facts out to the 
American people. And that is what he was discussing. 
That is the philosophical part of it. 

The next part, in an effort to get him out of 
the loop, obviously it was clear to me you don't want the 
Director of Central Intelligence being the lead man in 
any of this kind of discussion. 




311 



owaaflWT 



82 



m6 



1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Q You didn't talk about him being the lead man, 
you wanted to get him out of the lead. Was he the lead 
man prior to that? 

A No. Get my syntax straightened out. No, of 
course not, but to get CIA out of the loop, period. 

Q When you say that he was negative about turning the 
ball over to State, what did you mean by that? What 
was he negative about in turning over the ball? What ball 
are you talking about? 

A He shared a concern that a number of other people , 
had at- that time that the traditional elements of the 
Department of State were neither configured nor particularly 
effective in the pro]ection of American foreign policy. 
That was his perception and his feeling was that if it 
were given to some of the institutional elements of state 
nothing would happen. Gil Robinson, who was about ready to 
assume a position of a special assistant to the Secretary 
of State for Public Deplomacy, a man who had previously had. 
"considerable experience in public relations, in various jobs 
in New York, was someone who possibly could have been effec- 
tive in trying to help generate a major publicity effort. 
I think that is what was meant by the last three lines. 

Q On the next page, a memorandum from you to Bill 
Clark which preceded this top memorandum, you indicate that 
a group of public-.relation specialists met with Bill Casey 



DtWWU 



312 



mwm 



83 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



a few days ago. How did you know that? 

A I don't recall whether I received that information 
directly from Bill Casey or indirectly. 

Q You saw in there they stated, and you have that 
in quotation marks what needed to be done to generate a 
nationwide campaign. Why did you put that in quotation 
marks? 

A I don't recall why. I think it could have been 
done without the quotation marks. 

Q And you indicate that several elements were 
identified and the first, a fund_raising effort under the 
direction of someone like Walter Winston. Was that a 
fund raising effort for public diplomacy relating to Central 
America? 

A I think it is related to this whole question of 
getting more information out to the American people on 
Central America. 

Q To your knowledge was Bill Greener ever involved 
in a fund raising effort for public diplomacy efforts 
related to Central America? 

A To my knowledge the answer is no. 

Q In the last paragraph you indicate that Faith 
advised Charlie Wick that she had the prospect of funding 
(OTnr the Mellon-Sciaf e foundation and she has in 



parentheses "Terry Slease/"!. Do you know Terry Slease? 



Ji;u£si»£D.. 



313 



mtmm' 



84 



No, I do not. 



Q Do you know whether there was ever any funding 
provided for this purpose by Mellon-Scaif e organization? 

A I don't recall. I don't know if I ever knew. 

Q When you say Slease also speaks of a 1000 dollar 
per plate fund raiser, is that what Faith told you? 

A Yes, I believe so. 

Q In the next apragraph near the top of page 2, 
you indicate that, IJ"Roy Godson and I have discussed this 
and that we are concerned that efforts undertaken by Faith's 
office' tend to be confined to briefing and converting." 
You put, "We reconunended funding via Freedom House." Who 
did you and Roy Godson recommend that funding to? 

A I don't recall. Probably from the context of 
this i'k would be Faith, but I am not sure whether any money 
was ever raised. 

Q Well, the paragraph indicates that you thought 
that her efforts tend to be confined to preaching and 
converting and it appears you are recommending that the 
funding be some other place. Did you recommend this to these 
public^ relations experts? 

A No. No, I did not. 

Q You don't remember who/Vou recommended it to; 

is that correct? 

A Well, I don't remember this exact paragraph but 



IfirobH gMirtfcMr ''P 



314 



ONtEhSStFHie' 



85 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



trying to reconstruct, the only recommendations that 
we could have made we, presumably, meaning Gus and myself, 
would have been to Faith that were she successful in 
whatever she was doing, to encourage her to pick a 
structure which would be broader based, more representative 
of a broad section of the American people. 

If an effort is to be successful, you can't just 
be preaching to the converte/i^^ 

Q You indicate in a subsequent sentence that 
Wick via Murdock may be able to draw down added funds for 
this eJfort. 

What did you mean by that? 

A I meant that there was a possibility that Charlie 
Wick might be able to raise funds. To the best of my 
knowledge, nothing ever — that sentence never wpj^t anywhere. 
A, I don't believe he talked to Murdock about it. B, I don't 
think any funds were raised. 

Q Why did you think he might be able to get funds 
from Murdock? 

A Because I think Murdock was a gentleman who had 
indicated a great concern about some of the major foreignj: 
policy issues and the belief they were not being thoroughly 
discussed. 

Q Did he ever provide funds for any of these 
efforts to your knowledge? 



315 



mmm 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



86 



A Not to my knowledge, but I cannot be sure. I do 

not know. There is previous testimony in here which talks 

about\400, 000 of it being raised in one earlier document. 
/^ 

It was never broken down to me as to where it came from. 
Possib|ly it came from Mr. Murdock, possibly somebody else. 

I don't know that. 

(Jd/ 
Q You indicate that the Wagner-Bafjjfdi firm, 

recominended by Cliff V/hite^ could be hired by Freedom House. 

Who/did Cliff White recommend the Wagner-Bar]2fdi firm to? 

A I don't know whether he recommended it to me 
or whether he recommended it to Faith. 

Q Do you know whether or not the Wagner-Barif^di 
firm was ever hired by Freedom House for this purpose? 

A I do not. I believe the answer is negative, but 
I cannot be certain. 

Q In the next paragraph where you are 
talking about Dan James, you indicate that he believes he 
can get funding from Ross Perot, Clem Stone and others. 
Did he tell you that? 

A He told me that and this, to the best of my 
knowledge, was a dry hole. 

Q Who was Dan James? 

A Dan James was -- 

Q Is Dan James? 

A --is a journalist. He has written a book on 



y 




T 



316 



wmm' 



87 



1 Mexico that I am aware of. He has written several articles 

2 on Central America, Latin America. I think he is free lance. 

3 I had never met him before. He called up for an appointment, 

4 came in and saw me. 

5 tt4l/VN^ 

Q Did he tell you that law' Armstrong would make 

6 calls for him to seek funds for these projects? 

7 A Mr. James had a lot of very big ideas and I 

8 don't believe any of them were carried out, but I do not 

9 know because I did not follow-up with Mr. James. 

10 Q You indicate in the last paragraph on this page 

11 that Les Lyncusky believes we need to create a coalition 

12 for the present danger to generate support. 

13 Did he tell you that? 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q To your knowledge did the Smith Richardson 

16 Foundation provide any funds to any individuals or entities 

17 for this purpose. 

18 ■ A I can't be sure on that. My sense is that the 

19 Smith Richardson Foundation, not in response to anything 

20 that I may have talked to Les Lyncuski about, but my sense 

21 is the Smith Richardson Foundation has given grants in 

22 the region, in thejcentral American region. Their grant 

23 reports are matters of public record. I am sure you could 

24 get them. I don't know specifically which programs he may 

25 have supported. 






317 



msmm 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Q Do you know any programs that they may have 
supported specifically? 

A Not specifically, no. 

Q Do you know of any organization which may have 
received funding from the Smith Richardson Foundation for 
this purpose? 

A Not that I can state with any certainty. 

Q In the last paragraph you indicate, "We need an 
organizer. I would like to lead with our silver bullet. 
I recommend Peter Daily be asked to put the group 
together. " 

I believe we discussed this earlier, and you 
indicated that you discussed this with someone and 
learned that Peter Daily was not available. Is that 
correct? 

A I believe I stated that since Peter Daily had 
been called back to help the public^diplomacy effort in the 
INF debate, that while still serving as U.S. Ambassador to 
Ireland, that we felt asking him to come back again from 
his post in Ireland would be too much of an inconvenience 
to the responsibilities he had as Ambassador. 

So we did not pursue that with Mr. Daily. 

Q The next memorandum that is there is a memorandum 
to you from Roger Chapin. Who is Roger Chapin? 

A Roger Chapin is another in a long line of people 



lumsMiLs 



318 



mmwB 



ET 



89 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



that knock on the doors of NSC staff officers and chew up 
their time. This happens all the time and he was what we 
might call in the trade a walk-in. He had a very hignpalutin 
idea with a lot of rhetoric, but you and I don't need to 
spend any time on something that went absolutely no place. 
It is dead on arrival as we say in the military. 

Q Did you pay enough attention to him to forward 
his memorandum to Bill Clark. 

A I may have in the context of this whole package, 
because as you can see, I was getting -- I was listening 
to dialogue in various groups. I was participating in 
some meetings and many people were calling and there 
seemed to be one basic issue that most of these people 
were saying, and that is we have a need for a major 
information program, and we need to mobilize the American 
people in a broad bipartisan basis to understand the 
issues more effectively. , 

That is what I was basically telling Bill Clafk"^ 
was coming at me from all kinds of directions, some 
well-informed and not so well-informed. That seemed to 
me to be what bottom line was, and essentially it was his 
call. 

Q In the last paragraph of the memo from Mr. Chapin 
there is a reference to you getting a coup for him to have 
Ted Turner's office call you for a good word about what he 



UMEUSSii^ 



319 



mmm 



90 



1 is doing and asked you to please try and do so. Did you do 

2 that? 

3 A I did not do that. But if I had done that, it 

4 probably would have been a hundred members of the Senate that 

5 he would then have me make calls for. I am not trying 

6 to be glib on it. The point was roy files are lined with 

7 these kinds of proposals. If I were to follow-up with -- 

8 just open this door for me, I can turn the world around, 

9 once in a while — 

10 Q Your testimony is you didn't try to open the 

11 doors. 

12 A I didn't try to open the door, no. It just 

13 wasn't going an^Shere. 

14 Q There is an additional attached memo from 

15 Mr. Chapin. Did it get the same general treatment as his 

16 first raemo^ ._ -^ 3" -~ 

- - jj^™' ^^- ' ^_ ' -^^ 

17 A -|p|Kir you k'how, lik» jnything^^^tri^ to help 

18 him, direct" him in a "limited way, and I said that maybe 

19 he should talk to Dan McMichael, Les Lyncusky. He did, as 

20 you can see, and nothing happened. 

21 Q Who was Dan McMichael? 

22 A He was associated with the Mellon-Scaife Foundation 

23 in Pittsburgh. 

24 Q Mr. Chapin referred to brainstorming and planning a 

25 meeting for Chapin with several of his counterparts. Do 



llflKyidKHXtni^ 



320 



DNffJSStFUST 



91 



1 you know whether or not that meeting ever occurred? 

2 A I don't recall, no. I don't think it did, but I 

3 don't recall. If so, it might have been something that 

4 Mr. McMichael was doing by himself. 

5 MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter to 

6 mark as Raymond Exhibit No. 27 a memorandum from 

7 Walt Raymond, Jr., and Oliver North to Bud McFarlane. 

8 (The document was marked as Walt Raymond Exhibit 

9 Number 27 for identification. ) 

10 MR. MCGRATH: I dc^ t want to state with certainty. 

11 I know we discussed if not this one, similar memoranda. 

12 MR. OLIVER: Counsel, I remember a similar 

13 discussion. I think this must have been another memo 

14 because I have gone through the first deposition and 

15 marked and extracted all the documents that are mentioned 

16 in there, and I don't find this particular document number 

17 mentioned in the first deposition. 

18 . MR. MCGRATH: I accept your word on that. If 

19 you might, however, it does clearly involve material that 

20 we did discuss at length in the first deposition. If 

21 you could at least direct us to the general parts of that 

22 deposition where it is discussed, it would be appreciated. 

23 MR. OLIVER: Let's go off the record a minute. 

24 (Discussion held off the record.) 
25 



lfflbKfiS!GKt^ 



321 



THOMAS :mhl 
take 4 



uiffisaR^ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



MR. OLIVER: Back on the record. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Mr. Raymond, this is a memorandum from you and 
Oliver North to Bud McFarlan^ that I believe we may have 
discussed in the earlier deposition. But in this memorandum 
you indicated that you and Oliver North met with Frazier. 
Do you recall how that meeting was initiated? 
A No, I don't, as I testified. 

MR. McGRATH: I would point out this question has 
previously been asKed and answered. 

MR. OLIVER: What was the answer? 

MR. McGRATH: The question is page 99 of the 
deposition of September 3, 1987, line 2446. Could you tell 
how you happened to meet with Edie Frazier? 

Answer: She was brought to my office by Oliver 
North. 

MR. OLIVER: All right, then we have to answer 
another question. 

AH right, on the record. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Well then, since we have discussed this, I will 
just move on to the next exhibit and ask the reporter to mark 
this as Raymond Exhibit Number 28. 

(The Raymond Exhibit Number 28 was marked for 



identification. ) 



IMUMIEL 



322 



Mf^fflB)^ 



93 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q This is a memorandum from Walt Raymond to Bud 
McFarlandr, subject. Central American strategy dated January 
18, 1985, Committee Identification number N 32476. 

Do you recall writing this memorandum, Mr. Raymond? 

A In a general way, yes. 

Q In this memorandum you indicated that you had three 
I guess you wanted to share with Mr. McFarlan^ and in the 
first paragraph^ on surrogate supporters, you indicated that 
you wanted to expose the Congressional leadership directly 
to the views of leaders in Central American countries, 
excluMing Nicaragua. 

They want to explore the possibility of bringing 
Congressional Jieadership together with the leaders. Did you 
ever bring the Congressional leadership together with these 
leaders? 

A I think this idea was followed up on. I don't have 
specifics on it. I don't have specifics on this. I know 
that it is important, it seems to me, for not only the 
Administration but for the Congress, and for the American 
people to know what the leaders of those countries are 
thinking about this issue, and they may speak publicly or 
may only privately. This could be done by either having 
representatives of Congress or the Administration or the 
American people, the press, go to Central America or to have 




a. 



323 



wmswtT 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Central American leaders come here. 

As you know, there has been a fairly steady pattern 
of invitations to key leaders from these countries to come to 
the United States. Some have and some have not. I don't know 
that -- it would be too simple to say that that is the only 
reason why they come. There are many issues of state that 
cause us to have detailed conversations with these leaders, 
but it certainly is worthwhile hearing their views on Nicaragua^ 
situation while they are in town. 

Q Were you aware of a secret meeting that took place 
in Texas between Central American leaders and ^en^ers of 
Congress to discuss Central American policy? 

A I have no first-hand information on that. I believe 
I heard some informal discussion of it. I was not in that 
loop. I was not involved in planning and preparation. I 
think I heard reference to it after the fact. I can't be more 
precise than that. I don't have any more detail. 

Q Where did you hear referenceto this meeting? 

A In the National Security Council. I can't identify 
the spokesman. 

Q Might it have been Oliver North? 

A It could have been. 

Q It is your recollection that you heard such a 
meeting had taken place? 

A I heard it either tpo_k_E.]^<;e., or was to take place. 




324 



UNElA^iK^T 



95 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



I am so vague on this Mr. Oliver, I ceui't confirm that it 
actually took place. I have heard discussions of the issue at 
some point in time. 

Q Next paragraph on overf;^covert missions, you 

talk about supporting covert programs with overt programs. 
Was it your idea that a shift to seeking legislative support 
for humanitarian assistance would supplement the covert 
actions that were taking place in Central America? 

A This Memo described three ideas that I was 

suggesting to him for his own consideration. It has no more 
standin-g than that. 

The idea that I had was stimulated by observing a 




land my point was, that by 
having everybody run away from any direct support of the 
contras, there was no way of anybody reaching out perhaps 
and embracing them. 

I thought one way that we could show more direct 
support to the contras and might be constructive way, was in 
the area of humanitarian assistance. So my point was , not 
really as a way of increasing the overiall funding level or 
anything like that, I wasn't dealing with that, I was trying 



325 



ummt^T 



96 



to generate a sense of greater association with, better 
understanding of, appreciation for the contras, and it might 
be possible to do with some overt support if we could do it. 

Q In that paragraph you stateV'I do not see any 
credible or legal way which paramilitary support can be given 
to the contras." 

Would that include not having any paramilitary 
support given to the contras through the National Security 
Council? 

A I was only addressing myself to the legislative 
situation at the time, of the Boland Amendment and so on. 
I was not aware of any other means of providing paramilitary 
support. That was my understanding of the legal situation 
that pertained at that time. 

Q I would like to ask the reporter to mark# this 
as Raymond Exhibit 2 9 

(The Raymond Exhibit Number 2 9 was marked for 
identification. ) 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q This is a memorandum dated March 15, 1985, from 
Robert McFarlan;^ to Mr. Oliver North, Walter Raymond, Jr. , 
and Donald Fortier. It is committee identification number 
N 40603, 

Do you recall participating in drafting of this 
memorandum, Mr. Raymond? 



IMUSRIEIEU 



326 



umussiaiiT 



97 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A Excuse me a second, I will have to read it. 

I don't recall participating in the drafting. I 
actually don't even recall seeing it until now, but memory 
can play tricks. I did not participate in the drafting to 
my knowledge. As you see, my signature is not on it. I have 
not initialed it. 

Q Well, this is a copy that was acquired from Oliver 
North's files at the NSC not from yours, but since it has 
your name on it — 

A It is possible I have seen it, but I did not 
participate in the drafting. 

Q All right. Do you recall being involved in the 
legislative campaign and orchestration of an ovei^ll effort? 
W^pe you put in charge ol meshing legislative strategy 
mentioned in the first paragraph? 

A I played a significantly smaller role in the 
legislative exercise in 1985 as compared to the documents we 
have seen in '83. This was principally, as you can see from 
the points here, we are calling for some kind of organized 
approach. My recollection is that Pat Buchanan was very 
active, Don Fortier was active, and I believe the Legislative 
Liaison Offices of concerned elements were very active. 

I attended some of these meetings and I didn't 
attend others. 

Q On the last page of thi^ ejthibit . talking points 



;he last page of this_ejdiil 



327 



mm& 



regarding public diplomacy in Central America, these are 
talking points for McFarlan^ prepared for a conversation with 
Buchanan. In the third >to >Last paragraph it indicates that 
it suggests that the Buchanan coordinates, Reich Coordinating 
Group, including the following, and then it has Buchanan, 
Riley, Simms, Walt Raymond, Ollie North and Chris Lehman and 
Ed Rollins, Otto Reich, Jonathan Miller, and Jim Michael. 
Was there in fact such a coordinating group? 

A I think, yes, there was and I think we have a 
document in the official record in the early September hearings 
that speaks about that group a bit. 

Q Did you participate in that group? 

A My attendance was uneven. I was there probably 
for one third to one half of the meetings. 

Q Did the people who are mentioned in the memorandum 
participate in that? 

A Some did. The principal concern that, the ' - 
principal public^ dfSfplomacy control point at this time was 
Otto Reich, which was appropriate. He had a large enough staff 
to support any efforts that were needed. 

We did have, as you can see from here, representa- 
tion from the legislative offices. I believe we also had 
somebody from State legislati«iM^S^ 

Q Who was that? 

A I don't recall. Jim Michael of course had a lot 



IU^LA^^EI£D 



328 



<( 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



imeassfiEF 



of experience in that field. He or one of his assistants 
attended. 

Q The only person from the legislative area I believe 
mentioned in here is Chris Lehman, who was the legislative 
person for the NSC. 

A Yes sir. I think there was somebody from State. 

Q Was it Ed Fox? 

A It could have been. That would have been logical. 

Q It also indicates in here, mentioned something about 
scrub sessions with you and Ollie and Otto and Buchanan. Did 
you have such a scrub session? 

A That is very colorful language Ollie has written 
there. I presume Ollie is the author of this. I don't think 
it is Fortier. We did have a couple of sessions, or at least 
a session with Pat Buchanan to explain to him what the Otto 
Reich effort consisted of, and what type of support LPD 
could provide. Which I think was appropriate. 

Ollie was present in this context principally as 
the Central American substantive poirtTKrom the NSC. 

Q On the first page of this memorandum there is a 
sentence in the last paragraph which says, "You call to make 
sure Max on board for^^^^^^^^^^^^^Buse of former 
Congressman Dan Kuykendall for those who wish to contact and 
schedule resistance leaders. 

Do you know Dan Kuykendall? 



IINCL/i<;<ycirn 



329 



HmsnattT 



A We discussed this last time. I have met Dan 
Kuykendall, yes. 

Q Do you know whether or not Dan Kuykendall was the 
focal point for this purpose? 

A I do not know. I know Dan Kuykendall' s name. I 
know he was trying to support the Nicaraguan effort but I 
don't know what his responsibilities were. 

Q Did you attend a meeting at Dan Kuykendall 's town 

hou«a with Otto Reich for the purpose of discuslng legislative 

strategy? 

MR. McGRATH: I think this question was asked and 

answered at the September 3rd deposition. 

c 
MR. OLIVER: I am sking it again in the ^ontext of 

his most recent answer. 

THE WITNESS: I hope my answer is the same. My 

recollection is that we attended a meeting. I don't believe 

I knew the exact purposes of the meeting. Otto Reich and I 

left before the end of it. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Who/did you go to the meeting with? 

A I don't recall the transportation. 

Q Do you recall whether or not it was in the White 

House car and you were accompanied by Ollie North? 

A Could I take time out for just one second? 

(Pause) 






330 



10 



DNttASSiPIEST 



lOMO I 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



THE WITNESS: As far as tra@(i]lportation is concerned, 
no, I do not recall how I got there. I don't recall what kind 
of car I went in. 

Q Did you go there with Otto Reich? 
A I just frankly don't recall whether I went alone 
or whether anybody else was in the car. 

Q Why did you leave the meeting? 

MR. McGRATH: This whole line of questions has been 
previously examined in the September 3rd deposition and if 
counsel desire to go back through and reexamine that, we would 
like for him to identify the previous questions and previous 
answers as an expeinsion of those answers he desires. 

MR. OLIVER: I don't object to doing that if you 
don't object to this deposition continuing beyond 1 o'clock. 

MR. McGRATH: What is the question on the table? 

MR. OLIVER: The question on the table is why did 
you leave the meeting? 

MR. McGRATH: I believe the answer to that question 
is set forth on page 143, line 3535, of the September 3, '87 
deposition of Walt Raymond in which he responded, "Yes, Otto 
and I both left early because — 

MR. OLIVER: Because? 

MR. McGrath. "Frankly, it was not appropriate for 
us to be there. We weren't necessarily briefed as to what 
the meeting was about. We did not stay for the whole thing." 





T" 



331 



mmm 



103 



THE WITNESS: And in response to your question, Mr. 
Oliver, I confirm that that is my recollection of the 
circumstance. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Did you discuss leaving the meeting with Otto Reich 
before you left? 

A I don't know whether -- I don't recall whether Otto 
and I discussed it before the meeting. I think we both felt 
that the meeting was getting into an area which was not part 
of our responsibilities and we felt it fc^^ld be appropriate 
for us to leave. 

Q Have you discussed this subject with Ambassador 
Reich during the past few months? 

A No, I have not. I don't recall discussing it. 

Q That meeting, according to Oliver North's calendar, 
took place on March 1, 1985, and he indicates on his calendar 
your name, Kuykendall, Abermot, Reich, Blair, Dickens, Denton, 
and Bouche. 

Did you discuss prior that meeting, your participa- 
tion ,\with Oliver North? 

A I don't recall having discussed it with prior to it 
other than his inviting me to a meeting and saying we will 
discuss Central America. I would like you to meet and listen 
to them. It was a very quick sort of contact in the hall as 



best I recall it. 



llNfl/155lElFL. 



imssiffir 



104 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Q And after leaving that meeting 12 days later on 
March 15, you and Oliver North and Don Fortier suggested to 
Bud McFarlane that Kuykendall be insured, or Kuykendall be 
the focal point for the contact for the resistance leaders, 
knowing Mr. Kuykendall was involved in the legislative 
effort; is that correct? 

A As I say, I may have seen this memo. I don't 
remember the exact specification. I did not draft it. I'm 
not in a position to associate or not associate with the 
recommendation of his character. Mr. McFarlane, despite 
my name -- I did not have that kind of conversation with 
Kuykendall and I don't know Max Friedersdorf . So I can't 
expand on this point. 

Q Other than that meeting at Dan Kuykendall 's town 
house did you have any other subsequent meetings with Dan 
Kuykendall? 

A I think there were two other sessions. 




Q I remember that. We don't need to go into 
that. 

A The second session was a sort of bull session, 
I would characterize it, at the White House mess with 
six or seven people where we talked about Central America. 
No actions were taken. We were generally discussing the 



iiNHi mm 



333 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



BNlIiMfflT 



105 



situation and it was organized not by Ollie North but by 
the White House liaison, Linas Kojelis, and one or two 
others. We are now at a stage where Faith Whittlesey 
has moved on. Other people are there. I don't recall any 
actions were tabled or any actions were taken as a result 
of that discussion. I'm not aware of any follow-up. 

Q Who else was in that bull session besides 
Kuykendall and you and Linas Kojelis? 

A I think there was a representative from 'jfPD. 
Whether it was on the Otto Reich or whether it was Jonathan 
Miller,-! do not recall. There were about three representa- 
tives of the Office of Public Liaison and that's about it, 
about six of us, possibly two members from Otto Reich's 
office . 

Q Was there anybody from the legislative office 
there? 

A There may have been but I don't recall. 

MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter 
to mark this as Walt Raymond Exhibit No. 30. 

(Raymond Deposition Exhibit No. 30 
was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Is that your signature, Mr. Raymond? 
A I think so. 
Q It indicates that Central American public^ 



«4Vrvbno0H^ti.ijrp 



334 





1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



106 

diplomacy working group, which you chaired, had discussions, 
considerable discussion about the need to underscore 
continued Presidential commitment on the Central American 
issue and reinforce our supporters in the aftermath of the 
House action on April 16. And the working group recommended 
two actions. One was a meeting with private^sector 

supporters in room 450. Did such a meeting ever take 

t 

place? 

A I believe so, but the difficulty here, Mr. Oliver, 
is that there are scheduled proposals like this that come 
up quite regularly and it's very difficult to know — a 
lot of them are rejected. It's very difficult to know 
whether this one was approved or not. I think it was. 
I can't be absolutely certain. I have a feeling that there 
was also this meeting with congressional leaders but that, 
of course, happens quite regularly also. There is no 
indication on the document that I have here that Admiral 
Poindexter approved. It's entirely possible that such a 
meeting took place. 

Q I would like to ask the repflter to mark this as 
Raymond Exhibit No. 31. 

(Raymond Deposition Exhibit No. 31 
was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Moving on to this one because part of it was 



imcLJii^SMa. 



335 



BNBtiffiflW 



107 



inadvertently attached to the previous exhibit, thi;: is a 
memorandum to Walt Raymond to John Poindexter regard i.ng i^K 
Peter Daily/dated August 29, 1986, and the exhibit identi- 
fication number is N-31965. It indicated that Bill Casey 
had sent a brief note to him which put some caveats around 
the activities and then you're attaching a letter dated 
August 7.1, 1986, to John Poindexter from Bill Casey. 

Did Bill Casey give this letter to you to give to 
John Poindexter? 

A I honestly don't recall whether he gave it to 
me or whether it was sent to the NSC and John Poindexter 
sent it to me for -- it wasn't John Poindexter by my cover 
note here, but it went into the system and it went over to 



Everyone knew I had been in touch with Peter 
Daily. I don't know how it got to me, in other words. 

Q It appears from this note you are forwarding this 
note to Poindexter. 

A yes, btit that doesn't mean that somehow the 

y 

letter was hand carried to me or something. It may have 
come through the NSC system and the NSC secretary may have 
sent it down to me to prepare something for John Poindexter. 
So I don't physically know whether the letter was handed to 
me or whether the letter came through the mail or whatever. 
But I can deal with the substance of the issue. 



KASSIEE 



336 



wmsiPiST 



108 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Q Please do. 

A Do you have the -- 

MR. McGRATH: Be happy to let you deal with the 
substance. Is there some particular area? 

MR. OLIVER: I was going to ask some questions, 
but he indicated he could deal with the subject matter and 
I was going to allow him to go ahead and do it and save 
some time. 

THE WITNESS: That means in response to everything 
you know. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q I would like to know everything you know 
surrounding this letter and this memorandum. 
A I believe that you -- 

MR. McGRATH: That question may be a little 
general. Why don't you go ahead and ask whatever question 
you were going to ask. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q What was the help that you were referring to 
along the lines of your previous explanation via the PROFS 
system? 

MR. McGRATH: Do you have those PROFS system 
notes for him to look at on that issue? 

MR. OLIVER: I don't know whether we have got them 



or not. 



IMASSlEm 



337 



ItNELIIlSStREft' 



109 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



MR. McGRATH: Obviously in order to help refresh 
his recollection of what the previous explanations were, it 
would be helpful to have the PROFS. 

MR. OLIVER: This is a memorandum from him to 
Poindexter and I'm just asking him what he's referring to 
in this memorandum. He's already said he could address the 
subject matter. I don't know whether we have the PROFS 
notes or not. I don't recall. 

THE WITNESS: I'm willing to deal with this 
because, frankly, there's not much mysticism here. We 
are back again with the same question that has occurred for 
three or four years, and that is whether there would be 
any possibility of crafting something like a meaningful, 
bipartisan commission for Central America like the Coalition 
fof^'^Democratic Majority, like the Committee €Se>-yt^ Present 
Danger and Peter Daily, whose name, as you know, came up 
in some context, some previous discussion, in 1983. He 
was now back and finished his tenure as ambassador and was 
basically willing to see if there was anything he could do 
to help in the public idiplomacy efforts. Nothing had gone 
forward. There had been discussion with some people in the 
private sector about the need -- private people had been 
talking back and forth of, gee, there should be something 
like this. Right in the middle of this Peter ended up coming 
in to take certain special projects on with Bill Casey. 



lim&SSI£lE^. 



338 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UMftSSflWT 



no 



I do not know what they are. Mr. Casey felt that this is 
information that should be brought to the attention of John 
Poindexter so that any activities that Peter Daily might be 
doing in behalf of the United States in the public /diplomacy 
field be done with the full recognition of his new assign- 
ment in CIA. That's what's behind it. 

Q In the letter from Bill Casey to John Poindexter, 
it indicates that as a CIA employee, naturally Pete is 
subject to legal prohibitions on us relating to activities 
intending to influence U.S. public opinion or policy. 

Did those same legal prohibitions pertain to you 
when you were a CIA employee and head of the intelligence 
component at the National Security Council? 

MR. McGRATH: I don't mean to quibble with that, 
but that seems to be calling for a legal conclusion on the 
part of the witness. If you would like to rephrase it, 
what restrictions applied to you at the time -- 

MR. OLIVER: All right. I'll accept that 
rephrasing. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q What legal prohibitions pertained to you when 
you were at the NSC and still a CIA employee? 

A It's my understanding that detailed employees of 
the White House or specifically to the National Security 
Council, are regarded as employees of the National Security 



WHvi>'fSiSnr''EHs»Ti 



339 



imEftssiiiitT 



111 



1 Council and are subject to any restrictions or any caveats 

2 pertaining to National Security Council personnel, not 

3 pertaining to the organization from which they are detailed. 

4 Q Was it not your earlier- testimony that a representa- 

5 tive of the CIA sat in on your working group on Central 

6 America/adlii public diplomacy? 

7 MR. McGRATH: Are you referring to a specific 

8 answer to a specific question? Was it not your previous 

9 testimony? 

10 MR. OLIVER: Let me rephrase, counsel. 

11 BY MR. OLIVER: 

12 Q Did a representative of the CIA attend your 

13 working group meetings on Central American public diplomacy? 

14 MR. McGRATH: I believe that question has already 

15 been asked and answered. 

16 MR. OLIVER: I'm asking it in the context of 

17 this discussion, counsel. 

■\Q THE WITNESS: The answer is yes. 

19 BY MR. OLIVER: 

20 Q In the last sentence in Bill Casey's letter, it 

21 says that "similarly, now that Pete has joined us, he 

22 obviously can have no role in the private fund^aising 

23 effort on behalf of the Nicaraguan resistance." 

O 

24 He had a role in the private fundjjaising effort 

9c on behalf of the Nicaraguan resistance prior to joining the 



UNimSMJ). 



340 



uvcu^m:'^ 



112 



1 
2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



CIA? 

A I do not know. I cannot answer that. I don't 
have the basis of any personal knowledge. 

Q Do you know why Bill Casey would be informing 

John Poindexter about the fact that he could have no role 

in the private fundfraising effort? 
y 

A I have no information about that. 

Q Do you know whether or not John Poindexter had 

r 
any role in the private f und-fraising effort on behalf of 

the Nicaraguan resistance? 

A I do not. 

MR. OLIVER: I would like to have this entered 

as Raymond Exhibit No. 32. This is a PROF note from Walter 

Raymond to Oliver North dated June 7, 1986. 

(Raymond Deposition Exhibit No. 32 

was marked for identification.) 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q Do you remember writing this PROF note, Mr. 

Raymond? 

A Yes. 

Q When you indicate that Ann ^^a^Ha^s or will have 

a part of the FDN account, what are you referring to? 

A She simply said that she was doing some things 

to support the Nicaraguan resistance, no further identified. 

I assumed, since it's a public^relations firm, she meant 




UNimsififA. 



341 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



imctt^fiipT 



113 



in terms of information in the United States, but this was a 
very noisy, large dinner of 250 people. It wasn't an intimate 
private dinner in a house and with the din of background 
nc^e, I simply said, "You know, I 'm^ involved in this but 
I'll get someone to call you," and that's what this says. 

Q Did she indicate to you she wanted to get some 
guidance from Oliver North? 

A She indicated she would like to talk to Oliver 
North. Well, yes. What I said here, that's what she said, 
but we didn't get into detail what the guidance was and I 
worked on the assumption that we were dealing with informa- 
tion but I didn't see that it was appropriate for me to 
discuss it. I didn't choose to get involved in that. 

Q Did you think it was appropriate for her to get 
guidance from Oliver North on public diplomacy rather than 
you? 

A I didn't want to become involved in a series of 
uncontrolled, uncoordinated, independent efforts. She 
wanted to talk to Oliver North. I passed the message. 

Q You indicate that Chris Lehman would have brokered 
but he's constrained until his one-year limitation has 
passed. What does that mean? 

A Chris Lehman was an NSC staff officer and^by 
various types of laws, not in a position to contact his 
former employer until after or^vfiac-. —.Chris Lehman worked 



until atter one.vegr. __Chr 

UHUSliElL 



342 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UMCffl^flpT 



114 



for Black, Manifort & Stone. So whether it would be logical 
rather than go through this sort of chance encounter with an 
NSC staff officer who happens to be sitting next to her at 
a dinner, what her point was that she would have asked one 
of her colleagues in her own organization to make the contact. 
But he couldn't do it. 

Q Did Chris Lehman tell you he would have brokered 
it but he was constrained? 

A She said that. 

Q Was Chris Lehman in business with Ann Stone? 

A Part of Black, Manifort & Stone. I'm not sure. 
That's a good point. I may have misspoke. I think that 
Chris Lehman is in Black, Manifort & Stone. Maybe somebody 
here knows. 

Q Was Black, Manifort & Stone involved in any way 
in securing support for the democratic resistance? 

A I can't go beyond this and it was not my intent 
at a dinner with Ann Stone, who has obviously her own agenda, 
to start getting into a discussion of these kinds of issues. 
She wanted to be put in touch with North. I sent a PROF 
note to North. I have no idea whether the contact ever 
took place. 

Q My question was whether or not you knew whether 
Black, Manifort & Stone was involved in securing assistance 



for the resistance? 



IIMi;Ufi»j:u;fi., 



343 



mm§' 



1 A I do not . 

2 MR. OLIVER: I would like to have this entered 

3 as Raymond Exhibit No. 33. 

4 (Raymond Deposition Exhibit No. 33 

5 was marked for identification.) 

6 BY MR. OLIVER: 

7 Q This is a PROF note from Walter Raymond, subject 

8 "Otto Reich," replying to a note of July 3rd, 19B6. It 

9 bears the committee identification No. N-16813. It does not 

10 indicate to whom this PROF note was addressed. 

11 Do you recall to whom you addressed this PROF 

12 note, Mr. Raymond? 

13 A Give me one more minute. 

14 I don't know, Mr. Oliver. It's a rather curious 

15 format. It almost looks as if I wrote a PROF note to my 

16 secretary for her to put in some final form of a status 

17 report of activities or something like that. 

18 Q Well, I ^ink my expBcAence has been a lot of 

19 these PROF notes were so minuscule that we may have blown 

20 them up in order for them to be more readable but -- 

21 A I don't know. The point is that it's a summary 

22 of some of the more recent activities and where we are going 

23 on some of these issues. What can I deal with specifically 

24 for you? 

25 Q Do you recall writing this PROF note in November, 



lum^Ha. 



344 



umigi^ffi^ 



116 



1986? 

A More or less. It's consistent with general 
discussions we were having. 

Q You indicate in there Kacrtn ' s office, which was 
LPD, was folded under our command and control but continues 
to have a reporting responsibility to the IPC and SPG as 
part of my effort to give an interagency mandate. 

You further indicate that you continue to chair 
weekly meetings to sustain public diplomacy effort and that 
DoD, CIA, USIA, and so on attend those meetings. 

You go on to say, "We seek to lay out, implement 
broader international strategies, particularly Latin America, 
and EUR." 

What do you mean by Latin American and EUR? I 
assume that's Latin America and Europe. 

A Right. 

Q What are the broader national strategies you 
are implementing in this regard? 

A I believe we have in the documentation, again 
in September, an example of the type of public; action plan 
that was produced by Otto Reich's office and what it is is 
an identification of the themes and the audiences we want 
to reach with those themes. 

The themes would identify certain key points, 
including the democracy process that has taken place in 



cfraTltiftOiJM 4u|pr 



345 



UKftftSSttlBET 



117 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Honduras, including 
various aspects of the political and security situation in 
Nicaragua and an effort to try to generate greater under- 
standing and support by some political sectors in Latin 
America or Europe, or conversely, to try to minimize at 
least some of the opposition to the President's programs on 
those two continents. 

Q What form did your efforts in Europe take? 

MR. McGRATH: Objection on the grounds of 
relevancy to the committee's investigation. 

MR. OLIVER: The relevancy is support in Europe 
for the President's Central American policies. 

THE WITNESS: Briefly stated — 

MR. OLIVER: The subject of this memorandum is 
Otto Reich, who is the head of the Office of Latin American 
Diplomacy . 

MR. McGRATH: As long as it's Europe aspects of 
this only. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q My question is, what form did your activities or 
your international strategies in Europe take to support the 
President's Central American policies? 

A A number of different forms. We provided detailed 
talking points and backgrounders to our U.S. embassies 
abroad so they could speak on these issues, so they could 



imAS^IFIQ^' 



346 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



mmsk 



118 



reach out to the body politic. 

We encouraged the travel of PAOs to Central America 
so they would have a better understanding of the situation and 
they could meet European press. We tried to join the center- 
left and left in dialogue so they would have a better under- 
standing of the views. 

We made available, of course, all the publications 
that were produced by Otto Reich's office. There's nothing 
particularly unique about the various techniques that we 
were using to try to let information reach the right offices 
and, where necessary, try to have political officers in the 
embassies reach out to key labor and political leaders in 
Europe to make our case. 

Q Were private organizations and individuals involved 
in this strategy? j 

A Not particularly. We did have several seminars 
in Latin America and in Europe sponsored in some cases by 
USIA funding to private organizations to cosponsor a 
conference in the region and then to bring a cross section 
of people together so the case could be heard. 

One of the things we had hoped to do was have 
more Latins travel to Europe and more Europeans travel to 
Latin America so they could understand the situation better 
but there's always a problem of funding for that. 

Q How did you seek to resolve that funding problem? 



ii^iwsiEia- 



347 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



litUiMik' 



119 



A Weren't able to do it very successfully. There 
aren't very many Latins to go to Europe and vice versa. We 
did encourage the germane foundations where possible to 
bring Latin leaders to Europe. 

Q Did you encourage any private-funding sources 
to help you with these efforts? 

A I don't recall, but I think it's one of the issues 
that did come up from time to time as something which would 
be worthy of private-sector funding because there were 
difficulties in USIA being able to transport Europeans to 
Latin America and Latin Americans to Europle . Legal problem, 
they had to go through the United States. It was clearly 
an area where private-sector support would be helpful, but 
I don't have very many examples, if any, where this has been 
done . 



wmmi 



348 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



IHKIlA^SItT 



120 



Q Do you have any examples of where private funding 
was provided for this purpose? 
A No, I don't recall. 

thy 

Q Do you know whether or notfylleritage Foundation ever 
provided funds for this purpose? 

A Europe to Latin America, Latin America to Europe. 

Q Were your international strategies to influence 
European public opinion on Central American policy? 

A My first responsibility was that link^i between 
Europe and Latin America(i) I do not know specifically of 
Heritage Foundation support for activities pertinent to 
Central America. 

Q Do you know generally? You said specifically. 
Do you have any knowledge? 

A No, I am aware of this issue came up in the 
hearings but I have never heard of that before. I'm not 
aware of any specific case. 




Q I would like to ask the reporter to mark this as 
Raymond Exhibit No. 34. 

(Raymond Deposition Exhibit No. 34 
was marked for identification.) 



utw» 



FT 



349 



mms' 



121 



BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q This is a group of documents that bear the cominittee 
identification numbers N-16798, 16799, 16000 and 16001, 
through 16000. 

MR. McGRATH: Off the record. 
MR. OLIVER: Yes. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. OLIVER: Back on the record. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q Mr. Raymond, in the first memorandum in this 
packet dated August 7, '86, from you to John Poindexter, 
is that your signature? 
A Yes, it is. 

Q In the first paragraph you put in response to 
your PROF note "I prepared a memorandum for you to send to 
Bill Casey." 

Do you recall what his PROF note asked you to do? 
A My recollection of it is that he had Bill Casey 
had contacted John Poindexter, and expressed his concern 
again with the Cabinet that the information program of the 
United States was inadequate and that we needed to have a 
more energetic effort. 

He also recommended that Peter Daily might be a 
good person to contact to help on this. 

Q And did you prepare the attached memorandum for 



iHm&qiHUt- 



350 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



mi^iifflF 



122 



Bill Casey? 

A Weil, Mr. Poindexter -- I don't have the PROF note, 
but I think his feeling was that Casey doesn't know, Casey 
doesn't know what is going on, and it might be useful to give 
him a status report, prepare something for him. 

As you can see from the fourth line of this cover 
note of my note to Mr. Poindexter, there is some -- some 
question of revising the structure and so on . I essentially 
was saying that we have a structure in place. We are out 
there working, and that is what this memorandum to Casey 
summarizes . 

Q How deeply involved in public diplomacy was 
Mr. Casey during this period of time? 

A He was not. 

Q Why are you sending a detailed memorandum talking 
about what you're doing, public diplomacy and having the 
entire public-diplomacy plan? 

A Well, one, as a Cabinet level official, he was 
very concerned about the implementation of our Central 
American policy. I think that when the question came up in 
the discussion between Mr. Poindexter and Mr. Casey, at 
which I was not present, Mr. Poindexter felt it might be 
useful for Mr. Casey as a Cabinet official to know what was 
going on. 

To the best of my recollection, I did not discuss 



ilN(W!y{P..- 



351 



UHfil^^EIEJk' 



123 



any of this directly with Mr. Casey. 

Q You indicate in the third sentence of the first 
paragraph on the memoranduin to Casey that -- 

A To Casey? 

Q To Casey. You refer to the painstaking effort 
undertaken by many people in the government and outside. 
Who were the outside people you were referring to? 

A I can't identify them. There were a lot of people 
in the private sector who were concerned with this issue. 



irv Kirkpatri 



Jearv Kirkpatrick was a person in the private sector at that 
time. There were many others who spoke out and expressed 
their concerns about the developments in Central America. 

Q In the second paragraph you indicate that LPD 
reports directly to the NSC. Is that correct? They did 
report directly to the NSC? 

A This is not good construction. 

Q It's your construction. 

A It's my construction. The LPD, as is clear from 
the appointment memorandum, works within the ARA structure 
and within the Department of State but still maintains that 
link back for reporting purposes to the SPG, and the 
sentence, this is a sentence which I know caused Congress- 
man Fascell some concern in the testimony. It's confusing. 
I think we did talk about this as my memory serves. We 
talked about this in early September. The group reported 



UMi nBijgirmlgT^ 



352 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



iWS^SSiPIElT 



124 



to the SPG. 

Q In the bottom paragraph on that page, of this 
memorandum to Bill Casey, you indicate that a representative 
of the CIA Central American task force participates in these 
weekly Central American public!?diplomacy meetiirs which you 
chair . 

Did Mr. Casey ever express any concern to you 
about the CIA representatives participating in this public^ 
diplomacy effort? I asked that question in light of the 
letter to John Poindexter from Bill Casey where he poif^s out 
his concerns about the legal prohibition. 

A No, he did/'^ but it's important to recognize what 
the CIA's Central American task force representative was 
doing. Since there was a covert program, it was important 
not to get the public-diplomacy process involved in any way 
which would compromise it, so in effect they were there to 
ensure that we did not mingle. 

The second point is that they were in a position 
to provide us from time to time useful information, 
intelligence. They were monitoring what was being done 
publicly and openly. They in effect also served as 
insurance to prevent mingling covert and overt. We were 
very, very concerned to see to it that we did not get those 
lines tangled. We felt there was a major program out there 
we had to at least have them be aware of what we were 



UlvUiiliauiJrfExtnri 



353 




125 

doing as protection. 

Q Well, you indicate on the second page that you 
want Peter Daily to meet with that group periodically. And 
Mr. Casey indicated that he couldn't do that because he was 
a CIA employee. Yet this memorandum indicates that he was 
informed that a CIA employee was also participating in the 
group. I'm trying to determine why legal prohibitions would 
apply to Peter Daily but not to someone from the CIA Central 
American task force. 

A My question here is really, Mr. Casey says that 
Pete is subject to the legal prohibitions on us relating to 
activities tended to influence U.S. public opinion or policy. 
Any advisory role he plays in the public^diplomacy front 
must, of course, be in accordance with legal restrictions. 
At no time did anyone from the Central American task force 
participate, ever, speaking to the question of influencing 
U.S. publicsopinion policy. Their role was totally passive 
in that area. 

Q Isn't it true, Mr. Raymond, that Oliver North 
interacted in this group with the CIA representative in 
order to get documents declassified for use in the public^ 
diplomacy program? 

A He interacted occasionally as I testifed, not 
regularly. 

Q Did you also testify that the CIA representative 



HAmiEiU 



354 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UNStASMikET 



126 



facilitated declassification of information gathered by 
intelligence sources and methods to be used by the public^ 
diplomacy group? 

A If we asked them to, if they could declassify a 
specific document, they would take that request back and see 
if they could. They were not coming down to us and volun- 
teering a lot of documents to be declassified for the 
American people; they were, we might on occasion, it was very 
rare, we might on occasion raise a question, and material 
would then be produced by the Department of State and the 
LPD series. 

Q But the fact is, they did declassify intelligence 
documents for the use of the public^diplomacy group, is that 
not true? 

A CIA has declassified documents forever, since 
their creation, on occasion for information documents to be 
distributed, to be circulated, to be made available to the 
American people if requested by the Department of State or 
some other body. 

Q Did the representative of the CIA who participated 
in your Central American public^diplomacy group ever facili- 
tate the declassification of documents containing information 
gathered through intelligence sources and methods for use 
of any of the participants in the Central American working 
groupVpublic diplomacy which you chaired? 



WirbJbnitfwrffblL^ 



355 



UNeU^BE^ 



127 



A I imagine they may have once or twice facilitated 
in response to a request from another official in the working 
group. They would never initiate the action nor could they. 
That was not their responsibility/ If we saw them, intelli- 
gence, we might have seen it any time, brought it to 
attention of group and said, "This is an important document. 
Is it possible to declassify?" Then it would be appropriate 
for a CIA official, whether he is in that group or whether he 
is back in Langjajy, it doesn't make too much difference, to 
respond . 

Q The subsequent document in this exhibit indicates 
that public ^diplomacy plan submitted bi^vDepartment of State 
was approved by the NSC staff. Why was the public? diplomacy 
plan of the Department of State submitted to the NSC staff 
for approval? 

A Well, again, this should have been written 
differently. I wrote it. It should read the SPG, but it is 
in that context that it was approved. However, it is not a 
unique occasion for one part of the government or another 
to submit a paper which has responsibilities for several 
departments to NSC for approval. 

Q But in this case, the State Department submitted 
a publicidiplomacy plan? 

A 

A To the NSC. 

Q To the NSC, for explaining U.S. Central American 



UNCUSMIU 



356 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



imeassflffT 



128 



policy in Europe and Latin America to the NSC? 

A Correct. 

Q It indicates that part of the plan focuses on 
explaining same policies to international political organi- 
zations such as, et cetera, et cetera. Christian Democrats. 
Were those part of the plan carried out? 

A What page are you on? 

Q I'm on 16806, the memorandum to John Poindexter 
from Mr. Blatt. 

A Okay. I see, yes. Efforts were made, the success 
of which is in the eye of the beholder. 

Q Were any of those efforts made through private 
groups? 

A I aim not certain. I know that — not directly. 
No, I know there is a relationship between the Republican 

ii 

International Institue and IDU, but no one in the White 
House, no one in the administration was leaning on Republicans 
to press the Centarl American policy with the IDU. I think 
the Republican International Institute believes strongly 
about Central America, and has spoken out about the concern 
for civil and human rights in Nicaragua, and the Sandinistas 
interrelationship, I think they have raised this in the IDU 
context. But a number of broader sense number of officials 
have been in direct touch with several of these inter- 



national 



rnm^ 



357 



HttttA^iffir 



129 



Q Were you the liaison between the National Security 
Council and Republican National Committee for this purpose? 

A There was no purpose. In other words, nobody was 
dealing with the Republican International Institute on this 
issue . 

Q Was there a time when you requested clearance from 
your liaison Republican National Committee because of an 
internal memorandum directing the staff of NSC not to be 
involved in the political — 

A My recollection was that there was a memo dealing 
with the RNC. There was a response which indicated that in 
my responsibilities in the White House, that I had an ongoing 
contact with the Republican International Institute and was 
in touch with the chairman of the Republican National 
Committee. 

Q In effect it was approval for that liaison, isn't 
that correct? 

A I would think so, yes. 

Q I would like to ask the reporter to mark this as 
Raymond Exhibit No. 35. 

(Raymond Deposition Exhibit No. 35 
was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q This is a PROF note from Walter Raymond to John 
Poindexter dated 7-31 -- 



liiilAUC^JnCA. 



358 



1 

2 
3 
4 

5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



im^esrr 



130 



MR. OLMSTED: I believe that it's dated up in the 
right hand. 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q '86, I think that is 8-26, which would be August 
26, 1986. The subject is Central American public diplomacy. 

I would like to ask you to examine that PROF 
note, if you can, and tell me whether or not you recall 
sending this PROF note to Admiral Poindexter. 

Do you remember writing this PROF note, Mr. Raymond? 
A Yes, I do. 

Q You put in there, "We believe we are operating 
within a really narrow window which turn around American 
perceptions, Reich Central America. Particularly the 
Nicaraguans will be chewed up by the Congress." 

What was that narrow window you refer to in that 
PROF note? 

A I can't match up the legislative track record 
v^ith the actions here, but I think what I must have been 
referring to was the fact that we have to demonstrate what 
we are supporting is worth demonstrating, is worth supporting 
and this means to present, as described in here, the image 
of the contras , image of Nicaraguan resistance, to broaden 
their political base, to make them the kind of people the 
American people are prepared to support. 

Q You indicate that you discussed the need to glue 



iMumciEa, 



359 



mmm 



131 



white hats on our team, et cetera. What are you referring to: 

A Just what I said. In other words, the Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance has got to be honestly converted into 
a structure which supports the goals and objectives that 
American people can support, and I think a lot of the 
reorganization taking place in the last few months broadening 
the directorate and refocusing can have the goals and objec- 
tives have done that. 

Q Who are you going to glue black hats on? 

A Do I have black hats in here? 

Q I think you had in the previous memo. 

A The white hats are clearly the people that we were 
supporting, namely Nicaraguan resistance. Black hats I don't 
see in here, presumably unless something is changing in 
Managua, their hats are still really black. 

Q You go on to say that the themes are those we have 

e 
pressed, although we hJlieve we could change dialogue away 

from contras to Democrats. 

A Emphasizing the need for free and open, et cetera, 
nothing really new here -- which Democrats are you referring 
to? 

Q Were you referring to resistance? 

A Yes, sir, sure, Nicaraguans . 

Q And the key difference that he thinks -- 

MR. McGRATH: I wanted that to be on the record 



IIMOk&f^SlEKA.. 



360 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



VNKASSIHEBt 



132 



for your own benefit; since this was being entered as an 
exhibit, I didn't want someone to misconstrue your purpose 
here. 

THE WITNESS: Lower cased. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

Q The key difference that he thinks we should run 
more like political Presidential campaign. Did you agree 
with that? 

A Well, I passed it on. I thought it was worth 
further discussion and that is one of the reasons why we , 
I was proposing, or that after Labor Day in the last paragraph 
we ought to talk further about it. I don't know how realistic 
something like that would be. The issue obviously anybody 
looking at four days' worth of testimony would know that I 
have constantly stated for years that there was need to get 
a broad bipartisan support out there among the American 
people on this issue, and frankly this is just a repeat of a 
theme all over again. 

Q You indicate that names like Rolins, Nofypiger, 
and something else, were thrown around, and Kopp I guess. 



And 



■^opp. 



Q Were thrown around. Were Rolins and Nofaiger 
ever tapped to support this effort? 
A Not to my knowledge. 



U nwo Oajp/MiSt'Ti 



361 



UNC&AMfF'^ 



133 



Q Were they ever involved in any way? 

A Not to my knowledge. 

Q In the next sentence you said, "Later in talking 
to Ollie and Bob Kagen, we focused on what is missing and that 
is a well-funded, independent outside group — remember 
the committee for the present danger — that could mobilize 
people." y.o\i go on to talk about a 501-C-3 tax exempt 
structure was needed; you seemed to agree with that. 

Did you or what efforts did you make to try to 
bring about the creation of a well-funded independent outside 
group? 

A I didn't. The issue was there and basically 
I stated we need a horse, and the horse by definition means 

someone outside who is committed, as Paul Nitze was on 

^/ 
Committee for;'Present Danger, who is committed to the cause. 

It is not a question of whether you should be running the 

government* it is a question of private sector should be 

nothing, I might say, has proceeded on past this discussidn 



partially because Peter Dail^y clearly could not remain 
involved, and did not. 

Q You indicate in there that for discreet 
political reasons, this discussion of this 501-C-3 well> 
funded ^& outside group was not included in a memorandum 
to Bill Casey. 

What were the discreet political reasons why this 



im&ssn. 



362 



jm 3 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



"W^lffiB 



134 



wasn't included? 

A I didn't think it was a subject that should be 
discussed with him. 

Q But you thought all the other matters? 

A Those were community taskings and interagency 
processes that were underway, involving State Department, 
Defense, NSC, USIA, and we felt that he had the right 
to status report on this subject. 

Q What was wrong with giving him status report 
on what the outside groups were doing? 

A This was value judgment on my part, that was 
my attitude in that note ,ll could have been overruled by 
someone, but that i:^ what my view was. 

Q Those were the discreet political reasons? 

A I just didn't think it was appropriate. 

Q Several other of your memorandum refer to Bill 
Casey, in your conversation with Bill Casey about outside 
public 'relations specialists private funding, what had 
changed that caused you not to mention it in this memorandum? 

A I can only state that what-was in my mind^ I 
didn't think it was appropirate. 

Q You recommended in there that after Labor 
Day whenever, back in the city, andthata meetinfl take place, 
with Peter Dail*y, et cetera, ElU6^i/tt Abrams, Bob Kagen, 
and you, what was — did that meeting ever take place? 



IMU!»UHEJlcp 



363 



1 

2 

3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 

#7 fls "I® 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



URKRSSfflfflET 



135 



A I — no, it did not. . 

Q You were recommending that this meeting be set 
up with private people and these government officials that are 
mentioned here, Abrams and North and you; is that correct? 

A Right. 

Q You thought it would be appropriate to have this 
discussion with these private people about this subject? 

A That is correct. 

Q Was the purpose going to be to encourage the 
establishment of this well-funded independent outside 501-C-3 
group? 

A To consider whether there was sufficient outside 
private interest, and whether there were people concerned 
about this issue that were prepared to take a leadership 
role, as a matter of fact, nothing has happened on this. 
At least as far as I am personally concerned, I can only 
speak to my time in the NSC. 



UilCLilMir^, 



a64 



HNMItPIIST 



136 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Q I would like to go back for a moment to the 
previous exhibit, which is the memo from you to John 
Poindexter on August 7, 1986. On the last sentence 
in the memo on that page, you proposed to have Peter Daily 
coordinate private^ sector activities such as funding 
that currently cannot be done by either CIA or State. 
Who were you proposing have Daily do that? 

A First of all, we are discussing actually 
aspects of this PROF note. We are talking if there were 
to be or were not to be -- if I am reconstructing this 
correctly -- I think we are talking about something 
equivalent to an independent outside group of some fashion. 
My counsel points out the sequence of events, the timing 
is wrong. That is true. But we had discussed this 
previously with Peter and the whole thing begins to 
change when he is not in a position to personally play 
an active, outside role. 



But if he wasn't, who was going to have him do 



this? 



A I don't know. 

Q You said I would propose to have him meet. 

A This is all ^iys' sort of shades of Chapin. This 
is all in conjectural stage. There was a desire to have 
an outside group. There were some very preliminary 
conversations. Essentially, the discussion began to fall 



l/lSKUSStfM. 



365 



UNCGI^FIpT 



137 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



apart when we found out that Peter Daily was no longer 
available for that kind of consideration. 

Q Were you proposing that John Poindexter have him 
meet with this group? 

A I think the point I am trying to make is the 
issue was not thought through in a detail. You are 
getting the first fragments of an idea that was under 
discussion. Peter Daily was a very fine public diplomist. 
We could use his expertise and guidance and counsel that 
would be very good. He felt, as I think is shown in one 
of these documents, it would be useful to have some sort 
of a bipartisan group. 

But before the bipartisan group could ever be 
created, a number of events intervened, not the least of 
which was Peter Daily's new job. 

Q When you refer to coordinating private-sector 
activities such as funding that currently cannot be done 
by either CIA or State, what private^sector activities are 

A 

you talking about? 

A I am not referring to anything concerning 

funding of the contras. I was referring to some kinds of-- 

Q I am sorry. Would you — 

A Not referring to funding of the contras. I was 

talking about information activities in a general sense. 

Q Why couldn't they be funded by CIA or State? 



uiXvbnflnDrrttvT' 



366 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



IBKft^BifeT 



In the 



United Kt 



ates? 



Q Well, you had — State was already contracting 
IBC to put out these documents. 

A Well, I think that is different than a public* 
support group. 

Q When you said in the United States, did you 
think there was a problem there? 

A I think there was an information gap in the United 
States. 

Q You didn't think there was something wrong with 
them coordinating private^sector activities, funding public 
diplomacy in the United S/tates? 

A Who is them? 

Q The private^ sector activities that are being 
carried out by people. 

A I am having a very difficult time proving a 
negative. There isn't any activity here. I don't think 
what I am referring to here there is anything wrong with 
it. 

Q I am just trying to determine what funding were 
you referring to that could not be done by CIA or State. 

A I believe what I am referring to here is the-- 
if we were going to have something like a bipartisan group 
interested or concerned with Central America, this could 
not be done by the CIA or State. 



lum^i^iiEifii, 



367 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



IMMSSISilT 



139 



t£*o- 



Q So you wanted him to coordinate funding for 
private^j^sector activities which couldn't be done by 
State. What would those be? 

A Well, if you got — first of all, we are in a 
very theoretical mode of a group that doesn't exist, and 
if it did exist, what are some of the things it might do. 
I can't speak to what it might do, because it doesn't 
exist. But nevertheless I will proceed on. 

Q The proposal existed. 

A The proposal that we see throughout the t^^^itr 
^^course was some way to get a higher degree of activity, 
informational activity in the United States. As we have 
seen other proposals, it would be useful to have some 
people who are information specialists find ways to get 
the story more to the American people. 

One type of thing might be to provide recourse 
for travel expenses for Central American citizens to come 
to the United States so that they could articulate their 
views. Another might be the publication of certain types 
of materials. 

Q The CIA couldn't bring figures from Central 
America to the United States? 

MR. OLMSTED: To the extent that requires his 
legal conclusion, he can state what he understands. 
MR. OLIVER: Let me rephrase, counsel. 



iiiwsm.. 



368 



tweuistft^ 



140 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Q Are you aware of CIA ever bringing Central 
American figures to the United States who were utilized for 
public diplomatic activities? 

A I am not aware, but I am not making a statement 
that it never happened because I don't know the details on 
that. 

Q Do you know whether it ever happened? 

A I don't know. 

Q You have on this memo to Poindexter the concurrence 
of 01 lie North, Ray Burkhart and VincW~- <vaJ » oo4 




A Which -- I am sorry. Okay. You are asking 
about these three gentlemen here? 
Q Yes. 

Q He was in the t'ntelligence directorate? 

A Correct. 

Q Why did you seek his concurrence to send a memo 
to Bill Casey and to concur in the recommendations or the 
proposal about having Peter Daily do the things that you 
outlined in here? 

A He was concurring in the fact that there was a 
memo going to Bill Casey and it was appropriate, although 



IINOASKIL 



369 



UNCi^B^ 



* 



1 sometimes these niceties were not always observed, it 

2 was appropriate to coordinate with the /ntelligence group. 

3 If not, it was going to Bill Casey. 

4 Q Do you recall your depity , Steve Steiner, 

5 accompanying Ollie North to a meeting in the Washington 

6 Hotel with Joe Godson? 

7 A I did not recall that. I recall Steve Steiner 

8 meeting Joe Godson at one point. I do not recall Ollie 

9 North. I don't know that. Might be. 

10 Q Do you know whether Ollie North met with Joe 

11 Godson? 

12 A No, I do not know. 

13 Q What was the purpose of Steve Steiner meeting 

14 with Joe Godson? 

15 A Joe Godson was interested and concerned about 

16 American image in Europe, particularly the infrastructure 

17 of our allies. In other words, the communications, the 
■|8 dialogue among our allies on the one hand and the United 

19 States, which he felt had been strained by the INF debate. 

20 Q Did it relate in any way to Central America? 

21 A To the best of my knowledge, no. 

22 Q Was Joe Godson involved in any way in the 

23 efforts to influence public opinion in Europe on behalf 

24 of the President's policies in Central America? 

25 A I do not believe that he was involved in that 



iim^ffib. 



370 



iaasaw 



ifA 



1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



aspect of it. I think he was involved only in terms of 
the U.S.- European debate. 

Q But the U.S .-European debate also included 
support for the President's policies in Central America, 
didn't it? 

A His principal focus was on security issues. 

Q But it also included Central America? 

A It could have. I don't know that for a fact. 

Q There are a number of meetings on Oliver 
North's calendar with you and a number of them refer to 
meetings with you and other people. I would like to ask 
you about what the purpose of some of those meetings was. . 
We have already discussed the meeting at Dan Kuykendall's 
town house. We discussed the meeting with Citizens 
for America that took place in the Situation Room. 

There are several meetings with Buchanan, Elliott, 
Riley, Miller and Leyman. I assume that is the group we 
referred to earlier. Is that correct? 

A What time frame? 

Q Well, March 19, 1985, March 22, 1985 and March 26, 
1985. 

A Yes. I think that is all related to the — I 
can't, in this type of abstract exchange, I cannot assure 
that any of those meetings took place, even that are on the 
calendar. Ollie is better at calendar scribbling. Nor can 



liNCUSStfJ^ 



371 



bap- 8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



IBJBHMflHFT 



I assure if it 'did take place he was present. But you 
are right. Those are some of the people that would have 
been involved in that discussion at that time. 

Q On March 26, 1985 on 'his calendar it has a 
meeting with you, Buchanan, Riley, Elliott. I assume 
that is Ben Elliott, Miller -- I assume that is Jonathan 
Miller --Lehman, Bouchet, Coldwell and Sims. 

Did Lynn Bouchet attend any of those meetings 
for that group? 

A I don't think so. I can't swear to it. I 
don't think so. If we were meeting in the context of the 
documentation that we have read before, we were talking 
about in-house and I don't believe he was present. I 
wouldn't swear to it, but I don't believe he was. 

Q Was the reference in there to Ben Elliott or 
Elliott Abrams in the context of that group? 

MR. MCGRATH: Is there any reason to believe 
Mr. Raymond would have knowledge about what Mr. North's 
intentions were on the notations in his calendar? 

MR. OLIVER: My question was whether or not the 
Elliott that was in the group was Elliott Abrams or Ben 
Elliott. This is a group that we discussed earlier. 

MR. MCGRATH: The question was whether the 
reference was to Ben Elliott or Elliott Abrams. 



wmm. 



372 



1 BY MR. OLIVER: 

2 Q Did Ben Elliott or Elliott Abrams participate 

3 in the group we have discussed earlier that included 

4 Pat Buchanan, Bob Riley, Jonathan Miller, Cris Lehman and 

5 yourself and sometimes Ollie North? 

6 A Well, my recollection is that it is probably 

7 Ben Elliott. My recollection also is that these meetings 

8 did not take place as frequently as Ollie 's calendar 

9 shows and that the make-up of the meetings ultimately were 

10 significantly different than so characterized on the card. 

11 Q Did Elliott Abrams ever participate in any of 

12 those meetings? 

13 A I don't believe he personally came. I believe 

14 we saw Jim Michael or somebody from his office came. 

15 Q Did Ben Elliott attend some of those meetings? 

16 A He attended at least once. 

17 Q Do you know someone named Ambassador Borg? 

18 A Parker Borg. As a matter of fact I never 

19 met him. I have talked to him on the phone a few timeis. 

20 Q Was there a meeting set up with you and Ollie 

21 North and Ambassador Borg on June 2nd, 1986? 

22 A Well, I may have met him once on that basis. 

23 Somewhere along the line I think -- I frankly don't recall. 

24 I think once. All right. I will accept the correction 

25 by saying there was a meeting 



mmsML 



373 



bap-lO 



1 
2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UmSSRIf' 



^ 



Q What would have been the purpose of the 
meeting, had it occurred? 

A The purpose of the meeting, had it occuned, 
was to explore the possibility of following on from the 
Vice President's counterterrorism study which recommended 
that heightened public diplomacy effort be undertaken to see 
how we could put together a public diplomacy action plan 
to support the Government's counterterrorism effort and 
Parker Borg was the deputy head of the counterterrorism 
office, and Ollie North at that time was the head of the 
NSC Office. 

Q Thank you. 

You indicated that Michael R^ftasrrTJbrked for you 



in the public^diplomacy effort; is that correct? 

A Briefly. 

Q Were you ever aware of any relationship between 
Mr. KAOtt n and a French citizen named Suhahn? 

A After he died. 

Q What did you learn about that? 

A I simply knew they were good friends. 

MR. MCGRATH: Could the record indicate the 
presence of Nick Wise. 

MR. WISE: W-I-S-E, Associate Staff of the House 
Select Committee. 



mmm 



*n»m 



374 



UNS^ASSIPIISt 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q What did you learn about Mr. Suhahn and Mr. 
Ji Cjjeli ' i ''i ) relationship with him? 

A 

A I learned nothing other than the fact they were 
good friends and that they had met when they had both been 
in Grenada at the time a private^sector investment group 
went down there in probably very early 1984. 

Q Is this the same Mr. Suhahn who was assassinated 
in Paris? 

A The son was assassinated. The son is the friend. 

There is a father also who is quite famous and obviously he 

is still alive. I think Mike Kaotin ' a friendship was with 

^ 

the son. I have not gotten involved in any detailed 
discussion with him. Because of the timely — untimely 
death there has been significant investigation. He 
is testified in various fora, and I have felt that it was 
not appropriate for me to seek to debrief him in detail. 

(Recess. ) 

MR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter 
to mark this as Walt Raymond Exhibit 36. 

(The document was marked as Walt Raymond Exhibit 
36 for identification.) 

BY MR. OLIVER: 
Q This is a document dated November 25, 1983 bearing 
Committee I.D. Number N-37932 for Sharon Cooksi/from 



IIN£I:AS!»)> 



pqi 



375 



liKJ^WT 



147 



1 Paul Thompson, subject, "Contact with the Republican 

2 National Committee." Mr. Raymond, does this memo relate 

3 to our earlier discussion about whether or not it would 

4 be appropriate for you to have this contact with the 

5 Republic/National Committee? 

6 A Yes, it does. 

7 ■ Q Was it ultimately decided that it was all right 

8 for you to continue to have this liaison? 

9 A Yes, it was. 

10 MR. OLIVER: Mr. Raymond, I have no further 

11 questions. I apologize for the length of this deposition, 

12 and I appreciate your cooperation and your patience. Thank 

13 you very much. 

14 MR. BUCK: Mr. Raymond, I have just a few questions 

15 for you. Actually I have a few hours of questions. I 

16 would like to ask you about human rights abuses by the 

17 Sandinistas and Soviet active measures in the United 

18 States, which I am sure you could talk about for a long 

19 time. But maybe we will do that another time. 

20 I think the questions I have for you concern the 

21 period of time from which you started at the NSC to the 

22 time at which you resigned from the CIA, in that time frame. 

23 I don't have the dates in my mind, but that is the time 

24 frame. 

25 The question is during that time frame did you ever- 



^H^pinuulrmltn^ 



376 



imssifiErr 



148 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



were you ever tasked by Bill Casey for anything? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. BUCK: 

Were you ever tasked by Clair George for anything? 
No, I was not. (L/^ATT^ 



for anything? 



Were you ever tasked by' 
No, I was not. 

Dewey Clarridge, same question. 
No. 

Did you ever ask anybody at the CIA for a special 
favor in any way during that time period? 
A Not that I can recall. 

Q Is it fair to say that your relationship with the 

r 
CIA during that time was nonf-existent? If you want, I 

will rephrase that question. 

A Please rephrase that, question. 

Q Is it fair to say that you did not have any day-to- 
day activities, nor were you tasked by the CIA during the 
time you were working at the NSC before you resigned from 
the CIA? 

A I was not tasked by the CIA. I had ongoing 
contact with all of the Intelligence community agencies, 
and that was a give and take. I mean there were things 
that from time to time they would ask NSC as an 



iimAS^^Fiyi. 



377 



mmm 



149 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



institution, but there was nothing that was specifically 
Walt Raymond. It was an institutional relationship. 

MR. BUCK: I have no further questions. 

MR. MCGRATH: I would like to note for the 
record the same conditions we set forth yesterday concerning 
the sensitivity and limited access of this deposition. 

MR. OLIVER: It is our intention to have this 
deposition kept in the most secure conditions in the 
Select Committee with limited access and to have it 
declassified only by the normal procedures, which I 
believe are clearances with the White House and a vote of 
the committee. 

MR. BUCK: I understand there was a representation 
made also about only a single copy. 

MR. OLIVER: A single copy would be all right 
with me, but I don't know what the committee's procedures 
are related to the Senate; whether or not we are obligated 
to provide them with a copy. 

Tom, if it is all right, I would like to stipulate 
that we will just have a single copy of this made by the 
reporters and kept in the secure storage area with limited 
access to be determined by the chairman.. 

MR. BUCK: The chairman can decide. 

(Discussion held off the record.) 

MR. OLIVER: Back on the record. We will seek to 



fnH.VhimriHi-'T 



378 



bap- 15 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

end bap 8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



mmm: 



150 



have one copy only made of this deposition, and to have 
it held under the most limited access conditions at the 
committee and subject to declassification by the normal 
procedures, which h?ve been agreed upon by the White House 
and the committee. 

MR. MCGRATH: Thank you very much. 

(Whereupon, at 1:30, the deposition was 
concluded. ) 



I Inllfiin VJvJvifLlt 



rr 



379 



M\ 







/o /^L 



SS^I 



HHJWSSW 



380 



^»i^€ -0-se. 



SECRET 



' August 13, 1986 h'Tfh^ 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABL£_Jii«rrronT. CASEY 

The DirectCLC jJf Central Int& -I_Lj-gence_ 

SUBJECT: Central American Public Diplomacy (U) 



I have looked into the question of our overall public diplomacy 
effort concerning Central America. A great deal of hard anS ^ 
effective work 13 being done. It is clear we would not have won 
the House vote without the painstaking deliberative effort 
undertaken by many people in the government and outside. (S) 

IJlort''"Hiroubi?^'^^T'"^ ^" "°' resulted in any reduction of 
effort. «^s public diplomacy coordination office (LPD) has 
P???^?!? f; *^^'^°"'?h the independent office was folded into 
1)^111 ^""" bureau, the White House has sent a clear tasker 
rfM-^fn^T^H"^ ^^" ^^^^ limited reorganization in no way 
reflected a dimujiition of activities. On the contrary, the same 

r2nor^n?L"fP°"''''^''^"» «« ^«i"9 exercised, and the gro^ 
reports directly to the NSC. It continues to be one of the ^=w 
offices in the government that is staffed by a truly interagency 
team, including representatives from State, USIA, AID, and ^ 

^ni*2ff: . °"'" ^^^*^ ^' ^°^ '^^'5^"' *'f'° i» * y°«"g. bright 
m«„!^^K!^vT,°P*"^°'^• ^" reality, the reorganization also^ 
TnT X- ^^^^°" ^""« Pl*y« * strong public diplomacy role, 
and in this way we have harnessed one of the best public dip'-l 
macy assets that we have in the government. (S) 

There is a weekly Central American public diplomacy meeting which 
takes place in the Old EOB, chaired by Walt Raymond, and which 
includes not only the four organizations noted above but also the 

^ve'fro-'cTn"? °"'?'/"'' ^^'^'^'^ ^"^«°" °"i«' * representa! 
tive from CIA s Central American Task Force, and key NSC Staffers 

I?G jr«P ^*''" '" P^'^^'^y guidance from the Centrll American 
RIG and pursues an energetic political and informational agenda. 
The group seeks to focus both on domestic public issues as well 
as the informational battle in Europe and Latin America It 
generates requirements for major publication efforts. I will 
onK?- f'^^*^ ^^*f^ ""■* y°*' * package of some of the more recent 
publications. The group also works closely with the concerned 
legislative offices to be supportive in terms of the Congres- 



SECRET 
DECLASSIFY ON; 



UNCUISSIFIEO 



PaMi3l!y Declassitied/Reieascd "" ^ »^^ go 
undei provisions ol E '2356 



by K Jotinson, National Security Council 




381 



jj.^;-,.. -.s ^.-.d 1- a practic-. wjy ii <m.z •-•. ~.~". .-_«;■ 

on-qoing daily issuts. As an Axampl*, issuaa th« group d««it 
with l«at w««lc included: 



kj 1 /: r A 
-"- Steps to undsrtaks EC support to Nicaragua;' ' ooju 




— Dflv«lopm«nt of prograffls to publicist 
in Nicaragua; 

Support to th« intarnal, Nicaraquan opposition, including 



— Staps to strangth«n th« El Salvador public diplomacy 
•ffort. (S) 

Thar* is a comprahansiv* public diploaacy action plan for Latin 
AiMrica in Europe, and I aa attaching a copy for yoa. This plan 
is monitorad vary actively by the LPD office, and periodic 
reports of activity are provided to the NSC. (S) 

While this group ensures that the issue remains a high priority 
public diplomacy goal, X share your view that this prograa can 
certainly benefit by the professional skill and insight of Peter 
Oailey, and I am delighted that he is in Washington and available 
to provide tiae to help this effort. Peter met with the Thursday 
morning interagency group on August 7. It provided him an 
opportunity to hear first hand from the action officers and be 
briefed on their current programs. The exchange was useful, and 
Peter has committed himself to meet periodically with this group 
to help strengthen their effort. Bob Kagan, the interagency 
coordinator, will seek Dailey's counsel on a regular basis and 
will bring Elliott Abrams into this process. (S) 

Peter underscored that the Nicaraguan issue remains a matter of 
great urgency and that the next year is critical. w« must show 
progress both in Central America, but also in the eyes of the 
world community, if we are to sustain and support the democratic 
forces in Nicaragua. It will be necessary to 'frontload* our 
public diplomacy on this subject so that we can strengthen our 
international support and change attitudes concerning this 
prograa. Certain themes that he recommended at the first meeting 
will tm given serious consideration by the working group. One 
special area of importance concerns generating private sector 
support and funding. His assistance in this area would be of 
greatest importance. (S) 




382 



\0 9iijtmii\Jijii itmi) 



?.~..c C:p. 



think properly focu«s«d. P«t«r D«il«y's xnput can b« v«rv J.7' 
abla in •n«rgi2ing this •ffort, «nd w« c«rt*iniy intend to Ity 
;f "u'JrSjrii* '("•"" " •'""''**•" "*> divr.xfy th. tJrJlt 

Joh^M. Poindaxtar 



Attachmanta 

Tab A Public Diplomacy Planning 



<?C: 






ffri 




383 



MEMORANDUM 



SECRET 



IINCIASSW 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

July 21, 1983 



'''"' 14333 
CHRGN FILE 

^6Ud 



N 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 
FROM: WALTER PAiMOND, JR. 



.,^^ 



SUBJECT: 



Central America Covert Action 



1 *i$ 
CO 



I have t 

session. 

balanced 

supporte 

points 

Montgome 

corrments 

Z/B was 

present 

or two a 

hours of 

expect a 

might st 

will be 

count. 



aken several soundings following the closed House 
As you have probably heard, it was a relatively 
meeting, a number of good points were made by our 
rs and the opposition did not score any telling 
Reportedly, Robinson, Young, Whitehurst, Hyde, 
ry, Stratton, MicHa and Fascell all made helpful 

Zablocki made a vague statement, indicating that 
not perfect and we might amend it. Wright was not 

Attendance dropped off rapidly after the first hour 
nd the House was relatively empty for the last two 

debate. According to one report, Broomfield does not 
ny movement. He thinks Zablocki is locked in but we 
ill try Wright. Zablocki reportedly thinks his bill 
defeated. I have no independent way of making a 



I would like to offer the following ideas for your consid- 
eration: 

That you (or Jim Baker, Ken Duberstein) hold a LSG meeting 
to identify any steps that should be taken before floor debate 
next week. 

That you or others meet privately with Jim Wright to see 
whether there is a basis for compromise in the aftermath of 
the closed session. 

That we consider the addition of one thought in our 
proposed compromise. (See attached discussion draft June 30, 
1983.) Following on the Ortega statement and playing to what 
will be a Democratic desire for negotiations we might be able 
to accept language along the following lines: 

"That it is the sense of Congress that the President 
take advantage of all opportunities for negotiation." 

In terms of our discussion draft I doubt that we need to 
include any of the language on the commission since this is 
already in motion. Other textual adjustments that we dis- 
cussed before are attached to this note. 



SECRET 

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR 



mmm 




384 



JiiULVJOIl 



llJ 



N 46159 



SECRET - '2 

It is my understanding that any amendments will have to be 
tabled by tomorrow the latest according to House rules for 
floor action on this subject. Therefore if we are going to 
try to work something out with Jim Wright it will have to be 
done today or tomorrow unless the proposed date for floor 
debate is delayed. 

NB: Following is possible language which can be used to deal 
with one of our concerns to be added as subsection (c) : 

(c) The prohibition contained in Subsection (a) shall be 
suspended in the event the President determines that the 
Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua has 
materially breached either of the agreements set forth in 
Subsection (b) . Such suspension shall continue until the 
President determines that the breach has been corrected 
and that the Government of National Reconstruction of 
Nicaragua is again m full compliance with the agree- 
ments. 



Coordinated with Al Sapia-Bosch 



SECRET 



UNCLASSIFIED 



385 



MEMOR.O>'DUM 



SECRET 



imei^ssifito 

NATIONAL SECURITYCOUN'CIL 

July 8, 1983 



ACTION 



N 46170 



M.yC?ANDL'M FOR WILLIAM P. CLARX 
FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. 



SUBJECT: 



Central AiXerican Covert Action 



Attached herewith is a decision r.emorandum for the President. 
There is a disagreement within the cominunity concerning the 
appropriate next step in our Congressional strategy dealing 
with Central Ainerican covert action. I have sought to high- 
light the options with some background discussion of the key 
points. What it boils down to is do we accept a comprotr.ise 
which Bud, Chris Lehir.an and I believe may be the best language 
we can get or do we try to stonewall the whole thing. We 
might have the votes to defeat Zablocki-Boland but I doubt it. 
I doubt that we have the votes to defeat a renewal of Boland's 
Decenber 1982 amendment. I think we should work for a compro- 
mise and try to get bipartisan support for this action. The 
key points if we were to arrive at a compromise would be House 
support for our program as long as it is not for the overthrow 
of the Sandinistas and until the Sandinistas stop intervening 
in neighboring countries. That is not a bad position to be in 
at this juncture. Furthennore a number of key members of 
Congress have negotiated in good faith with us and if we were 
now to back off and go for a full defeat of Zablocki-Boland 
there would be, in ray view, negative political reactions. 
While I ajn sympathetic to the CIA and Defense concern about a 
renewal of the December 1982 Boland Amendment, it is my 
understanding from Bud that Jim Wright will not back off this 
point. We have live^w^J^it to date and have built our 
Centra force upH^^||^^|^|^^ becomes a problem only if our 
basic policy towar^I^Taragua changes. 

Fecorrjnendation : 

That you forward the attached to the President. 

Agree Disagree 

Attachment 



Tab I 



Memorandum to the President 



SECRET 

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR 



immm 



386 



TOU^'oSSB 



N 46171 



UNCUSSIFIED 



387 



MEMORANDl M 



SECRET 



ACTION 



SE 



:»'» 



THE UHITE HOLSE 
w ^sHl^CTO^ 



^\m 



m 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK 

SUBJECT: Central Anerica Covert Action 



N 46172 



Issue 

Should we approve a Congressional compromise on Zablocki- 
Boland which will permit us to continue our paramilitary 
covert action program in Central America while simultaneously 
continuing certain limitations on our activity. 

Facts 

The House passed (411-0) and the Senate concurred in a "Boland 
Amendnent" in Deceir±>er 1982 which barred funding in FY 83 
designed to over throw the Government of Nicaragua or provoke 
a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras. In April 
1963 the House Perm.anent Select Corjr.ittee on Intelligence 
developed a bill--HR 2760 (Zablocki-Boland) --which prohibits 
covert assistance for military operations in Nicaragua and 
authorizes overt interdiction assistance. This bill is due 
for discussion in a closed session of the House on/about 
July 19. 

Discussion 

HR 2760 is a fundamentally flawed piece of legislation. This 
is recognized by members from both sides of the aisle. We 
have held protracted discussions within the Administration and 
with selected Republicans and Democratic House members with 
the objective of seeking an acceptable middle ground. We have 
also benefitted by the passage of time which has permitted 
House members to become more aware of the key issues involved. 
At this juncture several alternative routes are developing: 

— We can try to defeat HR 2760 outright. Our best vote 
count is that HR 2760 will pass but it will be a hard and 
divisive fight. If HR 2760 passes it automatically includes 
restrictions which were in the December 1982 Boland amendment. 



SECRET 

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR 



mtSSIFIED 



388 



SECRET 



— We c 

includes 
Zablocki 
and othe 
sugceste 
for a ce 
force of 
providin 
1 n s u r = e n 
language 
acceptan 
Wright h 
original 
Sandinis 



Utt^SMO 



N 4617^ 



an try to orchestrate a corrpron-ise to 

a compromise developed with Jim Wrigh 

, Dante Fascell, Bob Michel, Ken Robin 

rs. It is based on a syr-,etry prcposa 

G by Jim Wright and Bill Young which e 

sation of our operations in Nicaragua 

an agreement between Nicaragua and it 

g for a verified cessation of Nicaragu 

ts m Central Ajr.erican countries. It 

committing Nicaragua to negotiations 
ce of democratic principles, including 
as insisted on the inclusion of the la 

Boland amendment barring a US effort 
tas. 



HR 2760. Tab A 
t, Clem 

son. Bill Young 
1 originally 
ssentially calls 

upon entry into 
s neighbors 
an support to 

also includes 
and the 

free elections, 
nguage of the 
to overthrow the 



We could try to delay action further in the House and seek 
to develop a new Presidential Finding as requested by the 
Senate. Then, with the Senate on board, we could try to bring 
the House along. Even if the House passed HR 2760 it will die 
in the Senate. It remains quite possible that a House-Senate 
conference might accept Sec 801 "of HR 2760 which is the 
original Eoland Amendment as both Houses of Congress had 
previously supported it. 

There is a division in the U.S. Governm.ent on the strategy. 
Defense and CIA believe we should not accede to a reenactment 
of the Boland amend-ment as a key to Wright's acceptance of 
sy-uT.etry. while State agrees an effort should be m.ade to drop 
the Boland am.endment, they believe the amer.dm.ent is suffi- 
ciently permissive to allow pursuit of our current policy 
objectives. There is no essential reluctance to a true 
symj-ietry option, although all of us would prefer to add two 
points to Sec 802 of HR 2760 which would (1) authorize a 
resujT.ption of operations if the Nicaraguars violate the 
agreeiT.ent to stop helping the insurgents in other countries 
and (2) an amnesty for all members of opposition or resistance 
groups. This would protect our Nicaraguan freedom fighters. 

To sum.mari2e, we believe the language is about as good as we 
will get in our negotiations with the House. If we are to 
seek a middle route we would be better off directing the 
compromise rather than allowing a series of uncontrolled 
am.endments to steer the action. We ray be able to add the 
specific points noted above re "airjiesty" and "resumption of 
operations in the case of treaty violations": 



Option l! 



(Defeat HR 2760) 



o If we lose, we are no closer to solution. 

o If we win, we send a loud clear signal that we are 

proceeding forward actively with our program. 



SECP.ET 



wmm 



389 



S 



SECFLET 



iSHOJSsifa 



N 46174 



Option 2: (Develop coir.promise language in the House) 

o We can carry on with our program. 

o We will have bipartisan support largely built around a 

"syrjnetry" concept. 

o The negative aspects* are that we will have accepted 

a limitation to our operations. (The inclusion of the 

original Boland language concerning overthrow.) We also 

stand the danger that we might be challenged that if the 

FSLN fell, we had violated the law. 

Option 3: (Delay, wor)t with the Senate) 

o The advantage is that we do not associate with a 

coir.promise or a limitation. 

o The disadvantage is that we lose some control 

over the situation and are li)cely to end up with at least 

the Boland Amendment if not more. 

Recom.Tiendation 



Yes 



That you authorize us to agree with the basic 
Wright-Young compromise (Tab A) . 

That you support our effort to try to add 
language in the compromise paper to include 
provisions for "amnesty" and for "a resumption 
of operations." 



AttachjT.ent 

Tab A Air.endment to HR 2760 



SECRET 



mmms 



390 



N 46175 



UNCLASSIFIED 



UNCLASSIFe 



391 



ytiCUSSinEO 



(DISCUSSION DRAFT— JUNE 30, 1982) 

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2760, AS REPORTED 

OFFERED BY MR. . '^ ^6176 

Page 2, strike out line 10 and all that follows through 
line 8 on page 3 and insert in lieu thereof the following: 

1 "PROHIBITION ON EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF 

2 NICARAGUA 

3- "SEC. 801. None of the funds appropriated for fiscal 

4 year 1984 fcr the Central Intelligence Agency or any other 

5 cepartr.ent, agency, or entity of the United States involved 

6 in intelligence activities r.ay be ■used to furnish military 

7 equip-ent, mili::ary training or advice, or any other support 

8 for military activities, to any group or individual, not 

9 part of a country's armed forces, if the purpose of the 

10 United States in providing such support is to 

11 overthrow the Government of Nacaragua or provoke a 

12 military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras. 

13 "PORHIBITION ON COVERT ASSISTANCE FOR ANY MILITARY 

14 OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA 

15 "SEC. 802. (a) None of the funds appropriated for 

16 fiscal year 1983 or 1984 for the Central Intelligence Agency 

17 or any other department, agency, or entity of the United 

18 States involved in intelligence activities nay be obligated 

19 or expanded for the purpose or which would have the effect 

20 of supporting, directly or indirectly, military of 



«U«m 



392 



UHCLMOoliiLU 



1 para:rilit£ry operations ir. Nicarague by ar.y r.aticn, group , 

2 organization, movement, or individual. N 46177 

3 ''(b) The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall 
^ take effect upon the entry into force of an agreement by the 

5 Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua with the 

6 governjients of other countries in the region-- 

7 ''(1) that the GoverrLaent of National Reconstruction 

8 of Nicaragua will not ship military equipcent to, or 

9 otherwise support, antigoverr-iaent forces in any country 

10 in Central .-jLerica; 

11 ''(2) that provides for effective nultilateral 

12 verification of compliance with paragraph (1); and 

13 ''(3) to resolve the conflicts in Central .-jLerica 

lA based on the principles affirmed in the Final .Act of the 

15 San Jose Conference of October 1SS2 and the coniii tiLents 

16 aade by the Govemnient of National Reconstruction of 

17 Nicaragua to the Organization of .^Derican States in July 

18 1979. •'. 

Page 3, line 10, strike out ''£02'' and insert in lieu 
thereof ' '803' ' . 

Page 5, after line 10, insert the following: 



19 SEC. 2. (a) The Congress finds that-- 



UNCUSSIHEO 



393 






NCLASSiREfi 



1 (1) Ce-tral .-jssrlca is of vital icportance to the 

2 interests and long-tern security of the United States; 

3 (2) the social and economic crisis facing Central. ° 
A rJLerica arise m large part from long histories of 

5 poverty, social injustice, and lack of econonic 

6 opportunity; 

7 (3) military solutions alone are inadequate to deal 

8 with the challenge the United States faces in Central 

9 America, and efforts to resist Conaunist insurgency will 

10 be unsuccessful unless the serious social and economic 

11 injustices and hur.an rights abuses of the region are 

12 addressed; 

13 (^) respected leadership froa all sectors of 

14 ijierican society and froa all regions should be crs--n on 

15 to studj- and advise on the caking of United States 

16 policy toward Central Ax.erica; and 

17 (5) an effective United States policy for Central 

18 .-jaerica requires the understanding and support of the 

19 iijserican people. 

20 (b) Therefore, it is the sense of the Congress that the 

21 President should convene a national bipartisan coaiaission to 

22 address the serious long-tern: problems of security, poverty, 

23 and democratic deve-lopment in Central .-Jierica, and to help 
2i- build the necessary national consensus on a comprehensive 
25 United States policy for the region. Such cocTission 



wiASsra 



394 



vmum 



1 should-r 



N 46179 



2 (1) be composed of distinguished leaders of 

3 goverrjjent, business, labor, education, and the Hispanic 

4 and religious comiEuni t les ; 

5 (2) consult with goverrjiental and other leaders of 

6 Central ijerica, ir.vite their views, and receive their 

7 reco=:3endations on the policies which would best assist 

8 them in their long-range security needs and economic 

9 development ; and 

10 (3) report its findings and reconmendations to the 

11 President and the Congress one hundred and eighty days 

12 after the date of enactment of this Act. 



""CMW/flffl 



395 




^^A^^St 




NK«fl 









?«>T'a.'v OeciassitiBd/Releasetf on jSLt^^p" 

unoer orovisions ot E 12356 

by K Johnson. Naiional Security Council 




u -■-■^^' 



.5i^ 



UNCIASSIHED 



396 



Ur.^ ^' 



lINClASSIFiED 




I 





/^" 




397 



Ui^.Ui-n'JUSl SLU^HtWH.TCHOUS.'^ 33367 

WASHINGTON 



^^t 11, 198 
''•It Raymond 

to no,, thii*?/:,^,'o'« 1 i„, ,^^ 

«n«th«r or not ^^,- /-t. ?^*^" *« to 
-ith th. tvo°Jo,S?tJ.^J had consulted 

Nicaragua proorajn "^WP^li 'c th« 

«"t ««^b,tantr;r'^p^fJi|°™ittee. vith 

On that baala „i«. 

holding th« rJlia5.^a«J^°"i ^^o 1, 
90 ahead to di',p:t%^ i"^ "'^ '^^ ^- 

*<*ny thanJcj 
^cr£t/sensitivi 



Partially Declassified/Released tin J^f-(:6 88 
under oravisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson. Natrona! Security Council 



@) 



I 






398 



MEMORANDUM 

CONFIDENTIAL 
ACTION 



wmm 



2 rr\i^(^Q2 

5-<;tEM I: 14 36 



fX, 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

March 3, 1983 



103 



MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK 

WALTER RAYMOND, JR. 



FROM: 

SUBJECT 



Presidential Meeting with Funders 



As you will remembes you and I briefly mentioned to the President 
when we briefed him on the ^NSDD on public diploma cy that we would 
like him to get with some potential funders at a later date. 
Charlie Wick was given the lead to put this together. Charlie 
believed, and I think rightly, that we should develop precise plans 
that could be presented to the potential donors for their considera- 
tion. He also felt that the initial focus should be principally on 
Europe where we must generate greater European private support for 
our policies. 

To accomplish these objectives Charlie has had two lengthy meetings 
with a group of people representing the private sector. This group 
has included principally program directors rather than funders. The 
group was largely pulled together by Frank Barnett, Dan McMichael 1 
(Dick Scaife's man), Mike Joyce (Olin Foundation), Les Lenkowsky 
(Smith Richardson Foundation) plus Leonard Sussman and Leo Cherne 
of Freedom House. A number of others including Roy Godson have also 
participated. The private group has put together a $5 million package 
for funding. 

Charlie is comfortable with the package and ready to sell it to the 
private sector. He wants to set up two meetings for March 21. He 
would like to bring his potential donors together with representatives 
of the private sector (Barnett, McMichael, Cherne) with himself and 
Peter Dai ley. The problem of Europe and the program would be 
discussed. He would like this meeting to take place in the Roosevelt 
Room at 3:00 p.m. I have reserved the Roosevelt Room for two hours. 
He would like you to drop in for a brief time with this group. 

The grou^that is clearly on board includes: David Rockefeller, 
Dwayne AflH«a»-> Henry Salvatori and Rupert Murdoch. He expects that 
Carl LifnmC and Clint Murchison, Jr. will also attend. He will add 
one or tvfo others but he does not want the group to be larger than 
six or seven. He anticipates that each of these people will make a 
large pledge. He also expects that each, after his visit in Washington 
will seek to gain three or four additional supporters. While the 
progr am will initially foeua on Europe it is obvi ous that this type 
of a core eould b^ built upon to provide f unding to broader aspects 
of project democracy. 

, Decdssitied/Reieasea nn J^^^P P 
under D'ovisions of E 12356 
JoDnson. National Sttjnty Council ^ 
j^^ < 



CONFIDENTIAL 
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR 




^^^, 



399 



UNCIASSIFIED , ^«' 



CONFIDENTIAL .- — --—-«- — - ^ - . ^,>)^J 



The key to this is a meeting with the President. Charlie would like 
the President to dine with this group on the evening of March 21. 
Can you confirra this? Charlie has had some discussion on this 
subject and believes he has a tentative green light. 

Charlie is very anxious to get a commitment on the proposed points 
noted as recommendations below by close of business March 4. He will 
be leaving the country this weekend on official business for the 
better part of two weeks and would like to issue formal inviations. 

Recommendations : 

That you concur in the meeting in the Roosevelt Room on March 21. 
(I have reserved the room from 3-5:00 p.m. on a contingency visit.) 

Agree Disagree 



That you agree to meet briefly with the group in the Roosevelt Room. 

Agree Disagree 

That the donors plus Charlie, you and Peter Dailey dine with the 
President on March 21. 

Agree Disagree 



mmmm 



CONFIDENTIAL 



400 



UNCLHS^IFIEO 



MEMORANDUM 



/ 3 i-^y- h '^' 

Ns:/:cs-4::;99 
(Add-on) 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

/SENSITIVE July 13, 1983 



N 43 6G0 



ACTION 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE 
FROM: 



SUBJECT: 



KENNETH deGRAFFENREIQ^ 
OLIVER L. NORTH vj 

Memorandum of Notification on Nicaragua 



j/Tt want 



In connection with the|^^|MON on Nicaragua, Walt Raymond has 
suggested that you might want to call Ken Robinson and 
Bill Young and advise them that we will be sending up a 
reserve release imminently so that they do not get caught 
by surprise. Both committees are already aware a^th^ staff , 
level at least that the program will increase to^f^ The i 
only issue^^^wher^they receive the advisory not^oithe 
additional,^H|||||mmpcommitment and the 'relationship of 
that advisory note to the Zablocki-Boland floor debate. 
Such a telecon would give Robinson/Young an opportunity to 
express any concern, and for you to make further suggestions 
on how this issue affects our legislative strategy. 

R econnendation 

That you telephone Ken Robinson and Bill Young. 

Approve Disapprove 

cc: Al Sapia-Bosch 
Walt Raymond 



P3r!,3,i» Declass^lied/Releasen mSEesQS, , 

. unne. Dfovisions of E m^i I 

"" ' ■'°''"^" Nai,onal Secu„!y Counci 



F/SENSITIVE 
Declassify on: OAOR 



!!/' 




401 



'MU4$^ 



John Poindexter 
Bud McFarlane 
Jacque Hill 
Judge Clark 
John Poindexter 
Executive Secretary 
SituatioTi/Aoom 



(j-r 



o 






SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN ACTIO.' 



7^ 



V^ 



:z 



l-lnformationC^ A-Action B-Retain D-Oispatch N-No further/ 
DISTRIBUTION 
VP Meese Deaver Other 

COMMENTS 




4 




402 





5 


Na-e d'-a -c;- 


?•,% 




Date 


;- ta'Si 


1 1 Robert C. McFarlane 


' 2 








3 


- 






4 








5 








6 








X 


<ACTlON 




FILE 




APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 




DIRECT REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


REMARKS 




NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 1 °°j^^^ j 



COPY NO ^ np '^ 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



^ 



Warning Notice 
Intelligence Sources and Methods involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanaions 



OT.-rs^ -^^STf^^-^ 




•^SBSSTK. Xr'aS.X '^F'^rr^ ""^"^ 



403 



Information 
Agency 

y^iifongion DC lOi-i^ 




1557 






MEMORANDON FOR; 



FROM: 
SOBJECT: 



Th« Hqnorabl* 

Jud9* Hilllaa p. Clark, Jr. 
A«si«tant to tb« Pr««ld*nt 
for National^acurity Affairs 



Char lea I. tfiek 



i7VV 



Raquast foe th« President to 
Host a Dinner on March 21 to 
Encourage Private Sector 
Efforts for Public Diplomacy as 
per NSDO 177 



Background 

As you know, in NSDO 77 the President established a new 
mechanism in order to 'strengthen the organizaton, planning 
and coordination of the various aspects of public 
diplomacy. . .relative to national security.* The President 
noted in his establishment of the International Political 
Committee and in his delineation of its responsibilities: 

'This will require close collaboration with other 
foreign policy efforts — diplomatic, economic, 
military — as well as a close relationship with those 
sectors of the American society — labor, business, 
universities, pbilanthrophy, political parties, 
press — that arc or could be more engaged in parallel 
efforts overseas.* 



UNCLASSIFIED 



CLASSIFIED BY: CHARLES t. WICK 
OFFICE SYMBOL: D 
DECLASSIFY (OR DOHMGRADB) ON: 
' Originating Agency's 
Determination Required* 



ta** Deciassified.'Reteased on jS^SSQ 
unfler Dfcvisions of E.O 12356 
By K Johnson. National Security Couflcll 



S'lffCH 



404 



OlnblSSIFIED 



W 



30a97 



R«cognisin9 that maximizing the parallel efforts of auch 
privat* ocganltatona is critical to overall public diplomacy 
prograaa> you indicated to the President in your memorandum 
of January 13, 1983 that: 

'Our intention is to supplement our commitment of 
public funds with private funds as well. Some of the 
public funds would be allocated to private O.S. 
organizations which could conduct certain programs 
overseas more easily than the OSG. We will develop a 
scenario for obtaining private funding. Charlie wick 
has offered to take the lead.* 

At the SPO meeting on January 2^, 1983, you again mentioned 
that I should develop the program for private funding and 
stated that the President has agreed to host a dinner for 
potential donors. 

1. What Do We Want - The Plan 

We have all agreed that parallel private efforts are 
desperately needed now to complement the government program 
for European security and arms control being directed by 
Ambassador Peter Dailey. We need to counter the avalanche 
of public criticism of deployment which General Rogers and 
others believe will take place when site preparations begin 
at the basing countries. According to General Rogers, 
without our efforts, activists may frustrate site 
construction in May and jeopardize the timetable for 
deployment. 

t have asked a small group of prominent individuals to meet 
on March 21 to discuss the funding of activities which could 
be undertaken in the neit nine months in hopes of enhancing 
our position. A list of the activities to be undertaken is 
being developed by Peter Dailey, Dr. George Gallup, Walt 
Raymond and members of my staff. 

Our preliminary opinion is that activities requiring funding 
of tS Hlllion would have a good chance of helping secure 
deplo^Bpt should that be necessary in the absence of an 
araa ^HroI agreement. The individuals invited to the 
meetinp^ave the ability to donate the required funds or to 
raise the funds from others. 

Z hope that you will be available to say at least a few 
words to impress the need for action upon the potential 
donors at our meeting from 3:00 to 5:00 p.m. in the 
Roosevelt Room on the 21st. 



limslFIED 



405 



llNK)v>.i icD 



1,0S9' 



2. " Rol« of th« Prasident 



Dcaonstration of th« Inpoctanc* of these private sector 
efforts parallel to our public diplomacy program would be 
dramatically achieved if the President could host a dinner 
for those in attendance at the March 21 meeting. The 
President could lend his encouragement to efforts undertaken 
in the private sector at this critical juncture. He would 
underscore the seriousness of the situation in Europe. 

3. Who Will Be Invited? 

Potential donors attending the meeting and dinner would be 
David Rockefeller, Dwayne Andreas, Henry Salvatori, Rupert 
Murdoch, Sir James Goldsmith and a deputy of Axel Springer. 
I am working to add a few more and will keep you informed of 
additions as they are made, but the group will be kept small. 

Conclusion 

I am committed to the strengthening of our public diplomacy 
efforts as directed by the President in NSDD #77, 
particularly in light of the challenges we face in Western 
Europe during the coming months. I believe the private 
efforts can help the President. I hope he will be able to 
host a dinner for the participants after our March 21 
meeting. — — ___ 



wmm 



406 



/ ^^-^ 



S-3 



£<^ 



THl WMlTf House 
.'^AtHlNOTON 

*'*y 12, 1983 

^' McParlan., 

Bob Drews called — 



^^358 



ONCUSSIflEB 



Wiima 
»• "»"" »» .«.« to „x.... ,. 
.«Pr...«, „„ oppo«tlo„. - 








Partially Declassided/Released on^l^SSH 

under provisions ot E 12^6 

by K. Johnson, Na„onalSecu,i(y Council 



mufisw 



S(fiOs 



407 



mm\m 






O- - V 



COPY. 

NATIONAL SECURITY 

COUNCIL 

INFORMATION 

Notice 



The attacnsd document contains ciassitied National Security Council 
Information. It is to be read and discusseO only tiy persons authorized By 
law. 

Your signature acknowledges you are sucn a person and you promise you 
will show or discuss information contained m the document only witti 
persons who are authorized by law to have access to this document. 

Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and 
understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with 
any lawful investigation by the United States Qovernment into any 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein. 



Access List ^ 



DATE NAME DATE NAME 



Partially Dedassilied.'fitfleasea an 3 ^^^ 8 8 
iinoei previsions ol E 13356 
Dy K Johnson, Nalional Secui.ty Council 



wmmB 



408 



nnmiim 



UIIULnuOII ILU 

MIMORANTJUM 

SECRET/SENSITIVE^ ^^^Q-^^^ SECURITY COU^;qi^^^^^ ^,^ ,^33 
INFORMATION 

■ N 6S2S 

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK 

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. 

SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on Central America, September 9 

The SIG met to review the general strategy concerning 
Zablocki/Boland and the related question of the new Presiden- 
tial Finding. Eagleburger chaired. 

The basic conclusions on strategy included: 

— We would push for a Presidential Finding soonest. 
This would permit us to implement a strategy designed to gain 
the support of the Senate and put us into a good position with 
the House, Incidentally, the Finding itself is in good shape 
havir.g been thoroughly scrubbed by a small group ir.cluding Ai 
Sapia-Bosch and myself on Septenvber 8. (See Tab I.) 

— The DCI would test SSCI reactions with preliminary 
discussions over a draft Finding with Goldwater, Moynihan and 
possibly Lugar, Bentsen and Chafee. Peon Turner urged contact 
with Howard Baker too. 

As soon as the DCI has tested the waters on the Hill, 
he would make adjustments in the PF and seek a quick NSPG. 
There was no commitment concerning an NSPG date although CIA 
asked for an NSPG on Monday September 12. The SIG recognized 
that the faster we can get a Finding to the Hill the more 
chance we have to use our 'Senate first" strategy. (I would 
personally judge that if Casey meets with the key Senators on 
Monday that he could request a brief delay in his currently 
scheduled SSCI hearing of 0900 hours on September 13. He 
should tell the Senators he will take their views into consid- 
eration in adjusting the Finding. Then, submit a revised PF 
to NSPG principals by COB Monday September 12. He could 
meet— schedules pennitting — on 13 or 14 September at the NSPG 
and h* could brief the Hill 15 or 16 September.) 

— Following a SSCI hearing of the new PF, we would 
press for fast Senate floor action on the Intelligence Au- 
thorization Bill thus locking in the Senate. (All holds off 
if we get clobbered in the SSCI.) We anticipate a 
Kennedy-Pell anendaent similar to Zablocki/Boland. A strong 
win in the SSCI- will help here. 

Panially Declassihed/Relessea on J^^66 
SECRET/SENSITIVE IIKIAI lAAl 1^1 f" fv"""^' P'o«'sions oi E ;2356 

Declassify on: ^OADR ' l||i|'|A\VlLlUff '""'"'°"' '""°"" ^"""^ '^'"'™" 




UNCLASSinE!) 



409 



SECR£T/SENS:TIVt 



sNOUiSsra 



Following Senate action we would hope to water down 
Zablock-i/Boland. There will probably be a role permitting one 
amendnient--by Ken Robinson. We will sort out with our House 
supporters whether he uses it to have a straight up/down vote 
on Zablocki/Boland or whether he tries to add on Mica type 
symmetry language. (See Tab II.) 

State IS developing appropriate briefing materials 
for our concerted legislative action plan. The legislative 
strategy paper circulated was a modest one and Eagleburger 
requested that it be expanded. (See Tab III.) When the 
question of "leadership" emerged--who is in charge?--Dam' s SIG 
was first identified. This was further expanded by the 
comment that the Duberstein networ)Q--including the legislative 
council elements in State, NSC and CIA would serve as the 
action team for legislative action. 

Attachment- 
Tab I Draft Presidential Finding 
Tab II Amendment to Zabloclci/Boland 

Tab III Legislative Strategy 



Al Sapia-Bosch 
Ollie North 
Chris Lehman 
Ken deGraf fenreid 



imHSSIFIED 



SECRET/SENSITIVE 



410 



uNcusra " ' 

Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of 

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 

As Amended, Concerning Operations 

Undertaken by the Central Intelligence 

Agency in Foreign Countries, Other than 

Those Intended Solely for the Purpose 

of Intelligence Collection 



I hereby find that th* following activities are important to th 
national security of the United States, and direct the Director of 
Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this Finding to th 
Intelligence Conunitteet of the Congress pursuant to Section 501 of 
the National Security Act of 1947, as aaended, and to provide such 
briefings as necessary. 



SCOPE 



NICAHAGUA 



PURPOSE 




[provide 

support, equipment and training 
assistance to Nicaraguan 
ctsistanc* groups as a means to 



iiNWssro 



SECRBT 



411 



UNimSIFIED 



683 



2 - 



pressure the Sandinistas and 
Cubans and their allies to cease 
their support for regional 
insurgencies; to hamper 
Cuban/Nicaraguan arms trafficking; 
and to being the Sandinistas into 
meaningful negotiations and 
constructive agreements with thei: 
neighbors. 




imSSIFIED 



412 



yNClASSIFlEO 



^aJ/SD /J 



IINCUSSIHEO 



413 



Mmm 



- 4 - 



N 65: 




The Director of Central 
Intelligenct is directed to ensur 
that this progrsB is continousl/ 
reviewed to assure that its 
objectives ace being met and its 
restrictions adhered to. 



mmm 



414 



UNCLASSIFIED 



To 7^1^ 



Mm»0 



415 




THE NICARAGUA FINDING 



N <: 




This Pinding autborlxas th« provisioa oC ■«t«ci«l auppoct and 
guidance to Nlcaraguan rcsistanc* groupu its goal is to induce the 
Sandinista governaent in Nicaragua to enter into aeaningful 
negotiations with its neighboring national and to induce the 
Sandinistas and the Cubans and their allies to cease their ptovision 
of arms, training, coamand and control facilities and sanctuary to 



wmsmi 



416 




mm\m 



417 







wiAssro 



.^0 n-88.1 f; 



418 



AMENDMENTS to H.R. 296« T aT-c. ^. r.^-, - 
Offered by ^ 683c 

On page 5, .line 22, immediately after "Sec. 108.", 
insert " (a) " . 

On page 6, between lines 3 and 4, insert the following: 

(b) The prohibition contained in subsection (a) shall take 
effect when — 

% (1) the Government of National Reconstruction of 

Nicaragua has ceased its activities (including the 
furnishing of anas, personnel, training, conmand and control 
facilities and logistical support) in support of 
military or paramilitary operations by antigovernment 
forces in any country in Central America or the Caribbean; 

(2) the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua 
is implementing the commitaents it made to the Organiza- 
tion of American States in July 1979; and 

(3) the cessation of such activities and the implementation 
of such connitaents has been verified by the General 
Assembly of the Organization of American States, or by 
th« President of the United States in a report to Congress. 



9/1/83 



inmsim 



419 



liNliUiSSIFIED 



N 684G 

LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY ^ 



I. Introduction 



In order to avoid a legislative prohibition denying 
authority of funds to support covert operations in Nicaragua, 
we should seek to avoid action on any free-standing bill such 
as Boland-Zablocici (H.R. 2760) or its Senate equivalent 
(Kennedy-Pell) . However, in the absence of Congressional 
action on the FY 1984 Intelligence Authorization Bill and 
FY 1984 DOD Appropriation Bill, or on a Continuining 
Resolution, funding for the current pcograa will expire on 
September 30. Therefore, we Bust press foe legislation in 
September to continue funding for the pcograa and must be 
prepared to deal with harmful amendments in that content. 

II. Oblectives 

At the interagency meeting September 7, there was general 
agreement on the following key elements of our strategy: 

--Among the items of legislation that are likely to be 
acted on by the Congress, our preference would be to have a 
Senate vote first on the Intelligence Authorization Bill 
and try for a clean bill without restrictions. (If the 
House were to vote first and adopt an amendment, then our 
opponents in the Senate might press a similar amendment in 
order to weaken our position in Conference.) 

— In the House, we should seek to amend the flat ban on 
funding for covert activity in Miearagua now contained in 
the Intelligence Authorisation Bill. An alternative along 
the lines of the Mica Amendment, supported earlier by 
friendly Democrats, is likely to draw more votes than an 
effort to strike the ban entirely. 

III. Initial Conaultations 
Sena til 



Secretary Sbults will meert with Senator Baker early next 
week. At that time, be should seek to ascertain the likely 
sequence of relevant Senate actions, indicating Administration 
preference for early passage of'the.PT 19S4 Intelligence 
Authorization Bill, without aaendaent. 



UHMSm 



420 



HfiSASSW 



DCI Casey witl meet with Senate Select Comnittee on 
Intelligence leaders early next week. He should make the same 
point, and should elicit their views on how the Administration 
can help gain support for passage of the bill as reported by 
the Committee. 

House 

Deputy Secretary Dam should meet with Congressmen Michel 
and Robinson next week. Be should: 

--Elicit their views on the likely sequence of relevant 
House actions, indicating our preference that the issue be 
joined on the Intelligence Authorization Bill, and that the 
Senate act first. 

' --Explore the prospects for obtaining a Rule on the bill 
that would permit a floor aaendaent delaying any funds 
cutoff until our policy objectives are met. (This should 
also be explored with Trent Lott.) 

--Seek their sponsorship of an aaendment along the lines of 
the Administration draft. 

--Share with thea our list of ■•■bees (attached) whose 
votes might be changed and ask their advice on approaching 
these or other meabera. 

IV. roUow-on Action 

Based on the results of these talks, we should: 

--Organize a caapaign of personal telephone calls and 
visits to be conducted by senior officers in State, DOO, 
and the NSC, directed at those aeabers identified as 
appropriate targets. In State, Assistant Secretary Motley, 
AabasMtor Stone, Aabassador Reich, Aabassador Middendorf, 
and sSOttrwinski should all be engaged in this effort, in 
additlM to the Secretary, Onder Secretary, and H. 



--Set up inforaal breakfast meetings with key aeabers to be 
hosted by senior officials at CIA, State and Defense. 

— Consider a Vhite House breakfast aeeting with the 
President for key Senators suggested by Senator Baker. 

—Prepare aaterials to be distributed under covering Dear 
Colleague letters froa supportive Meabers of Congress. 



Attachaent: 
Aa stated. 



WRClASSIflEO 



421 



vrnmrn 



VOTE ANALYSIS ./ THE B0LAND-2ABL0CKI BI 

On July 28, six separate House floor votes took place on 
Boland-Zablociti or various alternatives. These were the first 
floor vote* on any eleaent on our Central America policy in 
four years, and turnout was heavy. fj 

Most Bouse Members were solidly consistent in their voting. 
187 Members supported the Administration on all important 
votes, 145 Republicans and 42 Democrats. 200 Members were just 
as solidly opposed, 195 Democrats and 5 Republicans. 

The Administration won narrowly on the first of the six 
votes, an amendment defeated by 214-213. After that our 
support eroded until the final adverse vote of 221-195. 

Our vote analysis has identified 26 key "swing votes,' 12 
Republicans and 14 Democrats. These Members voted for 
Boland-Zablocki on final passage, but supported Administration 
positions on one or more earlier aaendaents. In contrast to 
these 26 'soft' opponents, our vote analysis identifies 13 
'soft' supporters, 5 Republicans and 8 Democrats. The otfly 
four House Members not present all appear potential 
Adainistration supporters. A listing of the key 'swing votes' 
fellows. 

While these key targets should receive the highest level 

of our attention, our Congressional effort must also include 

meetings with our key supporters to give them reassurance and 
support. 

HODSE 'SWIMG VOTtS* OH BCLAND/ZABLOCKI 

'SOFT' OPPOSITION ; Members voting for Boland/Zablocki on final 
passage, but supporting Administration positions on earlier 
amendments: 



68^: 



REPUBLICANS - 12 




Cooghlin 


(PA) 


Evans, Cooper 


(PA) 


Fish 


(NT) 


Hoc ton 


(W) 


Pcitelwzd 


(HA) 


Ridf* 


(PA) 


williaM, Kyle 


(PA) 


Zsehaa 


(CA) 


McKernan 


(MB) 


Snowe 


(MB) 


Boehlert 


(NT) 


Jeffords 


(VT) 



DEMOCRATS - 14 




Brobk* 


(TX) 


Mazzoli 


(KY) 


Andrews 


(TX) 


D« la Garza 


(TX) 


Biaggi 


(NY) 


Cacp«c 


(DE) 


English 


(OK) 


Hefner 


(NO 


Hughes 


(NJ) 


Jonas 


(NO 


MacKay 


(FL) 


Octlz 


(TX) 


Valantlne 


(NO 


Whitley 


(NO 



TOTAL: 26 



UNCUSSIflEO 



422 



. ._SSinED, 

'SOFT' SUPPORTERS ; Members voting against Boland/Zablocki on final 
passage> but abstaining or opposing Administration positions on one 
or acre earlier votes: 




REPUBLICANS 



Molinari (NY) 

Strangeland (MN) 

McOade (PA) 

Solomon (NY) 

Martin (ID 



Administration positions on 


DEMOCRATS - 8 




Applegate 


(OH) 


Bevill 


(AL) 


Plippo 


(AL) 


Gaydos 


(PA) 


Levitas 


(GA) 


Murtha 


(PA) 


Boner 


(TN) 


Tallon 


(SO 



TOTAL t 13 



OTHEK POTENTIAL SUPPORT ; Members not present or voting on 
Boland/Zablocki, but possible supporters: 



RZ77BLICANS - 1 
Chappie 



DEMOCRATS 



(CA) 



Dowdy (MS) 
Beftel 
Jones (TN) 



(HI) 



TOTAL i 



«HWSSW 



423 



} 



IIHCiaSSlFIED 



11028 



25 January 1963 
TOi The Director 
FRCM: W. Scott Thonpson 
SUBJECT « Walt Raymond's Memorandum to Judge Clark 



Attached you will find a copy of a draft memorardum froa Walt Rayncnd to 
Judge Clark. I secured this throu^ the back -channel, so we should not 
discuss it in any way except among ourselves. We should not mention it 
at the January 26th SPG meeting , but you should read it for your own 
information. The main points are: 

1. The NSDD is on track with the endorsement of the President. 

2. The budget effort on beliaif of Project I>emocracy is moving 
ahead: 

a. USIA is the lead agency, with the cooperation of State and 
AID, on the legislative strategy. 

b. Private funds are also needed, and the President is willing 
to have you take the lead in putting together a meeting for him with a 
grorjp of potential private donors. 

3. The lie, with your guidance, should pursue several key issuesi 

a. Soviet propaganda 

b. the "Post-Soviet Vtorld" project (designed to dispel the myth 
of Soviet invincibility and inevitability) 

c. development of the ^SSD en International Infomaticn 

4. <p infrastructure for managing the new systeim will be provided 
ty a week 1|K Meeting of Bob Sims (Public Affairs Oormttee), Carey Lord 
(Broadcasting), Soott Thcnyson (Information Comnittee), Jerry Helman 
(Ralitical Carwittee), and W&lt I^ymond. 

5« Eadi oontnittee will generate its ot\ staff support, and this 
will require significant resource enhanceiQent in the various agencies and 
departments. * ■■ 



'^'v Declassified/Released on^2-S.SJ^ 
under previsions ol E 12356 
lohnson. National Security Council 



wmsim ^ 



424 




rUDLlC DIPLOMACY 

NSDD Implementation ; First Special Planning Group Meeting 

'■ ^ 39077 

1. Pestatement of purpose; 

- Provide central focus for insuring greater conunitment of 
resources, greater concentration of effort in support of our 
foreign policies; call it political action, if you will. 

- Includes initiatives under both the "public diplomacy" and 
"democracy project" rubric. 

- We have a chance to try to maximize our total effort in 
this field. 

2. Progress to date; 

- The President has signed the NSDO on Public Diplomacy, 
solidly endorsing our course of action. 

- Our initiatives must take into consideration our public 
and private capabilities in the U.S. and abroad. 

- We have dealt with the budget questions concerning 
programmatic buildup of our governmental programs. At the 
BRB on December 18, we agreed to submit to the President for 
inclusion in FY 84 's budget $65 million for "Public Diplomacy and ( 
Democracy" (aka "overt political action"). We also called for a i 
supplemental of $20 million in FY 83. I would strongly encourage ' 
each participating Agency and Department to think very seriously 
about their ongoing budget outlay* and consider ways in which 
their resources may be redirected and targeted to these needs now. 

- We have submitted to Congress a $44 million supplement for 
RFE/RL and a proposal for Radio Marti. Both of these are 
priority legislative items for the new Congress. This body, 
aided by the International Broadcasting Committee, must keep this 
as a priority item. The supplement is but a first stage in the 
rebuilding process. 

- The Aaerican Political Foundation study has been launched. 
The Excora is a true bi-partisan body (cite inter alia , Manatt, 
Richards, Allen, Brock, Fascell, Kirkland and others). This will 
fill a key gap and provide a vehicle for quasi-public/private funds. 

- We will need to supplement the federal programs and the 
aascent quasi-public-private effort with private f unds . Our letter 
to the President indicated Charlie Wick will put together a meeting 
of potential donors (circa 12) for a quiet chat with the President. 
Let's move on this now: the President is ready. I would ask the 
International Political Committee to coordinate a list of items 
which need private funding for use at this meeting. 



^mmm 



425 



^ 



B8W«'.t« 



- In this regard, I also note Larry Eaglcburgcr ' s agreement 
to host a working lunch of foundation executives eg that we can 
develop a breader network of private supporters who can help us 
get this job done. We can not, forever, rely on one or two good 
soul6, such as Smith-Richardcon or ^fcllon-Sc>Iaife. I would like 
a report on this at our next meeting. 

N 39018 

3. Let us turn to Organizational form. 

- The four Interagency Committees should be organized 
immediately. 

~ It is essential that a serious and deep commitment of 
talent and time be dedicated to this. Progranis such as Central 
America, European strategic debate. Yellow Rain and even 
Afghanistan have foundered by a failure to ae eard hiyh priori ty 
to these efforts. £rv..A*x_^ S-V/.-.--T *.-,^-.. ^ /,^ 

— As we are creating a "new art form" I think we can best 
prove the relevance and effectiveness of the approach by taking 
up key issues, selectively and discreetly. Then as we develop a 
base of success, we can expand. I . am not concerned with only a 
measured and limited focus at the outset. 

— I would expect each of the committees to submit a terra of 
referenqp for its activity to the next SPG. Each committee will 
need to'^ddress the questions of permanent and ad hoc composition, 
specific issues to be covered etc. We will also need to pay 
attention to coordination and interrelationships among the various 
committees. 

- I would look to Secretary Shultz to put together the IPC. 
Issues that immediately come to my mind for consideration of the 
IPC include: 

1) European Security-INF 

2) Central America 

— In a broader context, I would urge this group to look 
at the role of functional groups to see how they can be involved 

in the democracy process: International labor, private enterprise, 
etc. 

— Also, as you will recall, the IPC will develop a proposed 
list of projects for private funding to be used at the projected 
Presidential meeting. 

- I would look to Charlie Wick to put together the IIC. Again, 
I would 'ask Charlie to guarantee high level commitment of talent 
and time. Your committees terms of reference will be most useful. 
Issues that come immediately to my mind and should be pursued 
include: 

— A continued examination of Soviet strategy in the propaganda 
field. 



UNOA^IFIEO 



426 







N 



^90^9 



— The commendable project on a "post-Soviet World" should 
be diligently pursued. (Why allow the Soviets to foster a myth 
of either invincibility or inevitability?) 

— In a broader context, I would charge, on behalf of the 
President that the IIC take on the responsibility for development 
of the NSSD on International Information. 

- The NSC will organize the structure of the International 
Broadcasting Committee. Issues which I anticipate arising concerning 
this committee include: 



recmT^al modernization 
Radio Marti 
Direct broadcast by satellite. 

- Public Affairs Committee. Bud and Dave Gergen will jointly 
chair this committee. It will continue its activity on nuclear 
issues and I expect it will be very active concerning MX. 



4. Congressional Strategy 

( 

- Inclusion in State of the Union IJ 

4 .. '' 

- Budget submission to the Hill (January 31) 

- USIA is the point agency. Charlie needs the close support 
of State and AID. NSC will help, as required. Loo)i to Secretary 
Shultz to make an opening statement. 

- Hill interest has been raised by press commentary. Recommend 
briefings of key Senators and Congressmen and selected phone calls. 
Look to USIA and State to orchestrate. 

5. Staff Support 

Each committee will largely generate its own staff support. As 
noted before I anticipate this will require significait resource 
enhancement in the various agencies and departments. Walt Raymond 
will directly support me and you can work with him on SPG matters. 
He will provide an infrastructure by meeting weekly with Bob Sims 
(PubAf f) , Gary Lord (Broadcasting) , Scott Thompson (Info) and 
Jerry Helman (Political) to ensure continuity, coordination and to 
prepare for SPG meetings. Walt will pull together for me a weekly 
summary .statement of the activities and plans of the four committees 
which I will share-with the SPG principals. 

6. Peter Dailey . 

Brief on his efforts to orchestrate INF European security program. 



^wssm 



427 




Ifr, 



iFI[n 



39C20 



7. Sujiunary 

- We ar« moving 

- Resources must be committed 

- Expect Committees to be organized immediately 

- SPG meet in 2 weeks to discuss entities of Committee 
structure and specific tasks. We have the challenge now to see 
that we get the job done, whether it is in Latin America, Europe 
or elsewhere. Your support is critical. 

- We will move out immediately in our parallel effort to 
generate private support. 



UNCIASSIFP 



^ « . ._- I 



428 



UNtMa 



;^/>:/^/l?J ^^*'' 



ex-^'B,- 2./ 



MEMORANDUM 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

CONFIDENTIAL March 18, 1983 



ACTION 



100 



MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK 

THROUGH: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Donors 



CHARLES P. TYSON 

MIL 
WALTER RAYMOND, JR. 



ih 



-^' 



Attached is a briefing paper and talking points for the 
President concerning Charlie Wick's meeting with approxi- 
mately ten donors. The plan will be to gather in the 
Situation Room at 1:45 p.m. on Monday, March 21, 1983. 
Charlie Wick and Peter Dailey will make the major presenta- 
tions. The President, accompanied by you, would join the 
group for 15 minutes to set the tone and purpose of the 
gathering. 

This will be the first session with donors and Charlie has 
focused this meeting specifically on our needs in Europe. 
Three of the donors are Europeans and they are involved in 
the hopes that we can stimulate the commitment of both US 
and European private resources to support these efforts. 
Candidly, I do not know whether the group assembled on 
March 21 will serve as the core for a large funding effort 
which could support the "National Endowment for Democracy" 
or whether this group, by background and interest, will 
remain focused on Europe. The problems of European public 
opinion, however, are sufficiently great that this is enough 
of a task to take on at this time. 

Recommendation 

That you forward the briefing paper and talking points to 
the President. 



Approve 



Disapprove 



Attachments 



Tab I 



Briefing Paper to the President for Signature 




A 
B 

C 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Declassify on: OADR 



Talking Points 
Meeting Agenda 
Participants 



aVNMSiriED 



Declassified/Released on 33^€S 89, 
unfler pfovisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson National Secunty Council 






429 



DHtUlSSW 






"HCUSSIFIED 



CONFIDENTIAL 



430 



UNMSKIED 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

WA S M I N GTON 

MEETING WITH CHARLES WICK 

AND PRIVATE SECTOR DONORS 

DATE: Monday, March 21, 1983 

LOCATION: Situation Room 

TIME: 2:00 p.m. '\ 



PURPOSE 



FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK ^^ 



Charlie wick has arranged a small meeting to encourage the 
private sector to provide support for our public diplomacy 
and democracy initiative. This is consistent with our 
tasking to Charlie. As we indicated to you several weeks ago, 
it is very important that we enlist the private sector to 
help generate broad support for our public diplomacy efforts 
m this area. Your personal participation will be a 
significant stimulant to this effort. 

II. BACKGROUND 

The focus of this meeting will be on the need to stimulate 
support for our policies in Europe. We will be discussing 
with the group the problems as we see them, both in terms of 
the immediate issue of the INF, but also in terms of more 
effective working relationships between the United States 
and Europe. Peter Dailey will deliver the key arguments. 
Building a solid base of collaboration on a broad range of 
issues within the Atlantic Alliance has profound long term 
consequences for our overall democracy project as well. 
Included in the group of invitees are three Europeans as we 
are anxious to stimulate private support from both sides of 
the Atlantic. 

Over time Charlie hopes to build upon this core of funders and 
attract others for the broader purposes of building democracies 
worldwide. 

III. PARTICIPANTS 

See attached list. (Tab C) 

IV. PRESS PLAN 
None. 

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 

See attached agenda. (Tab B) 

Attachments 

Tab A Talking Points (with cards) 

Tab B Meeting Agenda 

Tab C Participants 

CONFIDENTIAL 
Declassify on: OADR 




431 




^ 






iiNCHSSira 



432 



CONFIDENTIAL 



ctWiASSIFlEO 



TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH 



^b'' 



CHARLES WICK AND PRIVATE SECTOR DONORS o :> 

1. vJ 

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. We 
are united by our coininon concern over the future of the 
Atlantic Alliance. I would like to ask for your help 
in something which is important to us all. 
The Soviets are directly challenging our Alliance. We 
face an even more vigorous and sophisticated challenge 
from the Soviets with the accession of Andropov. The 
Soviets - through their campaign of disinformation and 
propaganda - seek to convince the peoples of Western 
Europe that friendship with the United States increases 
rather than reduces the threat to their security. 
As we seek to negotiate arms reductions with the Soviets 
in Geneva, they seek to legitimize a military dominance 
in Western Europe. They are fighting on the ideological 
battlefields of Europe. We must counter our adversaries, 
both in the near and longer term. 

Last June I spoke to the British Parliament, proposing 
that we - the democracies of the world - work together 
to build the infrastructure of democracy. This will 
take time, money, and efforts by both government and 
the private sector. We need particularly to cement 
relations among the various sectors of our societies in 
the United States and Europe. A special concern will be 
the successor generations, as these younger people are 
the ones who will" have to work together in the future 
on defense and security issues. 



CONFIDENTIAL 
Declassify on: OADR 




433 



CONFIDENTIAL 



uKcmm 






Charlie Wick has taken the lead in Project DemocraiJ;^ 
and in some of our near-term consensus building projects, 
particularly in Europe, Our immediate problem is the 
Soviet challenge in Europe. It is in this area that we 
must energize private voices as well as those of the 
government to meet the challenge. An effective public 
diplomacy effort in Europe requires genuine inputs from 
all parts of our society. 

As I have said in the past on so many matters, government 
cannot do the job alone. That is why I asked Charlie to 
pull this group together - to form a nucleus of support 
in the private sector for programs critical to our efforts 
overseas. I know Charlie can do this. He has done pretty 
well for me raising funds in the past. 



CONFIDENTIAL 



" icira 




434 



MEETING WITH CHAJU,ES WICK 

APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET. UNITED BY 
COMMON CONCERN OVER FUTURE OF ATLANTIC 
ALLIANCE, ASK FOR YOUR HELP. 

SOVIETS DIRECTLY CHALLENGING ALLIANCE. WE 
FACE VIGOROUS CHALLENGE FROM SOVIETS. 
SOVIETS USING DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA 
TO CONVINCE EUROPEANS. SOVIETS SEEK TO 
PICTURE U.S. AS THREAT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY 




WE NEGOTIATE ARMS REDUCTIONS; SOVIETS SEEK 
TO LEGITIMIZE MILITARY DOMINANCE IN EUROPE. 
THEY ARE FIGHTING ON THE IDEOLOGICAL 
BATTLEFIELDS OF EUROPE. WE MUST COUNTER 
IN NEAR/LONGER TERM. 

LAST JUNE I PROPOSED WE WORK TOGETHER TO 
BUILD THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DEMOCRACY. 
TAKES TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS BY GOVERNMENT 
AND PRIVATE SECTORS. WE NEED CLOSER LINKS 
JF^OIJL SOCIETIES. A 



I 



AMONG AL: 




SPECIAL CONCERN SUCCESSOR GENERATIONS WHO 
WILL HAVE TO WORK TOGETHER ON DEFENSE 
SECURITY ISSUES. 

CHARLIE WICK HAS LEAD IN PROJECT DEMOCRACY 
AND IN NEAR-TERM CONSENSUS BUILDING 
PROJECTS. IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS SOVIET 
CHALLENGE IN EUROPE. WE MUST ENERGIZE 
PRIVATE VOICES AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT TO 
MEET CHALLENGE. EFFECTIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 



435 



ONCLASSIFIED 



IN EUROPE REQUIRES INPUTS FROM ALL PARTS 
OF SOCIETY. 

- GOVERNMENT CANNOT DO THE JOB ALONE. I ASKED 
CHARLIE TO PULL GROUP TOGETHER - TO FORM 
NUCLEUS OF SUPPORT IN PRIVATE SECTOR FOR 
PROGRAMS CRITICAL TO OUR EFFORTS OVERSEAS. 
CHARLIE CAN DO THIS. HE HAS DONE WELL 
RAISING FUNDS IN PAST. 



WMW 



W 



.^^ 



436 



WW^sW 



\V 



^^ 



v««0^^ 



( 



I 



437 



HtHSSiFiED 



MEETING AGENDA 

I. Introduction and Overview (Charlie Wick) . 

II. Arrival of President - General Remarks. 

III. The Immediate Challenge - Western Europe and INF 
(Peter Dailey) . 

The US Government Public Affairs Program. 

The Need for Private Sector Support 

IV. The Democracy Initiative and the Need to Build Stronger 
Private Institutions. 







438 



wssra 



'!i' 



*<4S?/f/fl, 



439 



i < I • • . . (1 

...... ..^^^ ' *^^iX^^l)lu . iM 

1:45 - 4:00 p.m. '^^'O'^U 

The Honorable Charles Z. Wick - Director, United States 
Information Agency 

Ambassador Peter H. Dailey - O.S. Ambassador to Ireland; 
Chairman, European Public Diplomacy Committee 

Robert B. Evans - Chairman, Evans Industries, Inc.; Detroit, 
Michigan; Former Chairman, American Motors 

Dr. George H. Gallup - Chairman, Gallup Organization, Inc.; 

Princeton, New Jersey; Marketing and attitude research 

Sir James Goldsmith - Chairman, Generale Occidentale Paris; 
Diversified interests, including publishing; dual 
residence in London 

John w. Kluge - Chairman, Metromedia, Inc.; New York, New York; 
Broadcasting 

Alfred Lerner - Vice Chairman, Equitable Bancorp; Baltimore, 
Maryland; Real estate and finance; hone and office 
Cleveland, Ohio 

Carl H. Lindner - Chairman, American Financial Corporation; 
Cincinnati, Ohio; Diversified financial holdings 

Dr. Joachim Maitre - Senior Editor and Executive Manager, Axel 
Springer Publishing. Coming as personal 
representative of Axel Springer, German publishing 
executive. 

Rupert Murdoch - Australian publisher. Owner, London Times, New 
York Magazine, New York Post 

Kenneth Q. Volk > Chairnan, Public Storage Corporation; 
Pasadena, California 

Walter Rayaond - Staff, National Security Council 

Mark Everson - Office of Director Wick 



'f 




440 



wNCUssro 



21 '-'-'-1,53 

UWViLKOOii ««-" 

MIMORANDUM 



4 

i ^1 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

CONFIDENTIAL 

ACTION May 21, 1983 

W -• 

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK 

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND 

SUBJECT: Central Ajnerican Public Diplomacy 



We need to put this program together immediately. Given other 
personnel considerations, I would like to recommend an interim 
solution designed to get the job done, but at the same time, 
cause the least amount of bureaucratic confusion. 

Faith Whittlesey is definitely on-board in terms of the division 
of responsibility. She sees her role exclusively as 
implementing policy. She looks to us for policy formulation and 
for substantive support. She will also expect us to help with 
speakers. To do this we need an effective public diplomacy 
coordinator and this person must be prepared to devote full 
time. I am speaking specifically about a replacement for Dick 
Stone, since he will not be able to take on this responsibility 
concurrent with his duties as negotiator. The public diplomacy 
coordinator will orchestrate the overall USG effort, 
coordinating closely with Faith and simultaneously driving 
forward an effective international program. 

At this time, the coordinator must be separate from ARA. We 

should wire him into the SPG structure, but in this case I would 

recommend that he initially be identified as a Special Assistant 

to Secretary Shultz working principally with Larry Eagleburger. 

That should ensure State support. I would recommend that we 

borrow Otto Reich from AID where he now serves as Assistant 

Administrator for Latin America. Reich should be immediately 

joined by Mike Ledeen and Jon Glassman. Others would be added, 

if needed. I would recommend that Reich be detailed for two . ^_ 

months. By that time, we should have gotten our Central {S/5i/'^\ 

American public diplomacy moving forward, personnel situations V ^O^^ 

would have clarified, and we could decide what, if any, role 

Reich should play in the future. 



BNcmsintlT 



Declassiried/Released on S^^^S S 
unaer provisions of E 12356 
CONFIDENTIAL 11^1*1 11 VV I n F I !»"<■""'"«'" National SecuriiyCo^ngf 

Declassify on: OADR itnuLnOOn Iw" ^jl r<^ 



441 



--•^^^'USSIFIEe 



v\ 



Recommendation 

That you call Shultz and propose that the Reich team be put in 
place immediately vice Stone. That this be under the SPG, 
but that his assignment be under the aegis of Shultz and 
Eagleburger. /> A /l 

- That Shultz/Eagleburger raise this with Reich and get his 
concurrence. Reich should assume his duties immediatelv 
(week 23 May) . ' 

- That we put out an SPG notice of Reich's assignment. 



Approve 



Disapprove 



iWSSW 



442 



MASsra 

''^OnAKDUM OP NOTIPICATIOK. 



N 4 3 703 



^•'> 'ii.i- I'JH', 



'^'t. Members of u,,' W-. , , 
'^^'^^ : nequcst for l,„, ^ f^annlnK Cro,. 

. , ''''^"-' ' '^"K :.cvcl 



SUBJF.CI 
REP£f(ENCli 



f ) 



Presidential im . ' «^ ' -" 



lis 

i ^ f 



f- BACKGROUND- o„ , n ^^^^^^ 

'^*"triT~prnHT;r„ "" ^ December 1981 p-...^ 



Preal 

8U 




443 




M 43704 



suKjKcr 



Memo ru lid urii oI_ 
(ur NiCJFJ'jiK 



OOO/I.A/CATI 




(icaVion: lurrc.^scJ Funding t4v«l 
Covfi l Action Trojcct 

(20 H.iy I9H1) 



Oiscr ibot lont 

Orii) - i)C'(/w/<ttt ((or transi«ittal to NSPO) 

I - i)|>CI w/att 

1 - t«cc Ro<j w/«tt 

1 - Cotaptrollar w/att 

1 • ADOO/000 w/«tt 

1 - ppo Reg wo /att 
1 
I 

2 - C/LA w/al 
2 - C/fJk/CATf w/att 




UNCLASSIFIED 



444 

--6S86 



THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASMINCTON 



OHCUs^a ..n..„«--s 



MEMORANDUM FOR DON REGAN 
FROM: BOD McFARLAN 



"'V^ 



Attached is the decision meno on Contra 
funding. I have discussed it with George, 
Cap and Bill Casey who all support it. Cap 
would like for the President to also be 
advised that even this approach could place 
the Contras at some risk for as long as the 
ceasefire endures. Subject to your 
agreeoent, I would like to raise this for 
decision at the 11:00 am meeting today. 



Attachnent 



^■nJeclsssified/Released on, 3fi^^ 88 
under orovisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson, National Security Council 



mj0B 




\ 






445 



WA5WINCT0N Jalv 29 19aT 

3opibiJHZT/si>>s:T:vi ATTAc:-LHzyT ^ 43699 

M£.MORANDOM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT 

THE SECRETAi^Y OF STATE 
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT 
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS 
, THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 

THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE VICE PRESIDENT 
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

SUBJECT: National S«curity Decision Directive on 

■ Enhanced U.S. Military Activity and Assistance 
in the Central American Region (NSDD-100) 



The President has forrnally approved the attached National 
Security Decision Directive (NSDD-IOO) on enhanced U.S. 
military activity and assistance in the Central American 
region. Copies of this directive' may net be reproduced. 
Please ensure proper handling of this document and the 
attached directive to prevent unauthorized disclosure. 

FOR THE PRESIDENT: 



r 



William P. Clark 



Attachment: MSDD 100 



f> /t 




wBmTgasLysttjstf/srNSiTi^v'E attachment 

Declassify on CADR 

irMv Pgi^::;;(f7Rei>^-.-sg ^fi fjfi: /?n iiijni IftQi rrn 

■tmi^mf.r: . ^D. i235E tttllOTtDUrtr 




446 



L^«CkyK'^'>i>Li liaii 



Utttbb.v-i.rlLU 



July 23, 1983 



N 43700 



EJNHAyCED U.S. MIIITXRY ACTIVITY A.ND ASSISTANCS FOR 
TH£ CENTRAL A.'-'-iRICAN RZG:CN 



Th« incrtaaing threat to U.S. national i'nttrtsts in Central ^irerica 
requires that w« str«ngth«n our diplomatic and s«curity <sJt-;v-3 i- 
tha region. The consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist re<ji.-a m 
Nicaragua, cotnmxtted to the export oi violence and totalitarianism'., 
posei a significant risk to the stability of Central America, Our 
ability 'to support democratic states in the region, and these on 
the path to democracy, must be visibly demonstrated by our -ilita.-. 
forces. We must likewise enhance current efforts to pro":,:^ a 
democratic alternative to the peoples of the region who dre 
subjected to repression and totalitarianism. Adaquata U.S. support 
must also be provided to the democratic resistance forces' wit,'" -^ 
Nicaragua in an effort to ensure that Nicaragiaa ceases to 1 ^ ,i . 
Soviet/Cuban base and that the government adheres to the pnnc' tJ.ie? 
that it agreed to in July 1979. • 

The democratic- states of Central America must ba assisted to nhij 
maxi-tuim degree possible in defending themselves against e:-;f.-; t.^'iy 
supported subversion or hostile neighbors. U.S. military 
activities in the region must be significantly increased tu 
demonstrate our willingness to defend our /-vLlies and to deter 
further Cuian and Soviet Bloc intervention. 

To this end, the following measures are difectad-: 

• A program of expanded U.S. military activit.iaa and 

exercises both in the Caribbean Basin and qn -t.^e. TTr.- 'ii. 
coast of Central America will commence as scon; a.<j --o3' ::,fc''.e . 
Program details will ba coordinated i.n'thii ZCy'SIG 
s- fraoawork. 

1 ■ • ■ 

liS • Exercise AHAOS TAWV II should begin on or about August. 1, 

1983. WhiJ.a the specific duration and scope of th« exercise 

will ba determined by the situation, plans should b-3 m^^ie 
for tha exercise to continue for four to six mcrth' . 
Program details developed by DOD .will ba coordirtattd iu the 
IG/SIG framework. 




Tdr^EE^-'nrn 



447 



I^Liie 



lJliC.....^^./iLli 



^'?r4-3 7 01 




ese plans shoul: 

existing rtsources 

Logistic packages and enhancements 



ave.cred •-/•.-.: 




The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense will prepare a 
coordinated legislative, diplomatic, and public affairs strategy 
that supports these initiatives. A time-phased schedule should be 
an integral part of this package. I.tplementation of these 
initiatives will be tined to taxe into account public affairsA 
legislative factors. This implementation plan should be provide 
to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
Presidential review and approval by July 30, 1983. 




tr.9 Assista.nt to t.-.e ?ros: 

July 30, 1983 for approval, as necessary, by the President. 

The Secretary of Defense will review the military training 
requirements of El Salvador with a view to determining if the 
n'.ir±er of military trainers is adequate. If more are deemed 
necessary, the Departments of Defe.nse and State will develop a 
credible and defensible rationale and a legislative strategy 
designed to increase the number to the appropriate level. This 
program will b« reviewed by the Assistant to the President Jor 
National Security Affairs and approved by the President prior to 
Congressional submission. This proposal should be provided by 
July 30, 1933. 

The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of 
State and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget wi! 
ensure that sufficient resources are available to carry out the 
provisions of this Directive. 




..wflA 



\ Csur*-^* — 



i 






mmM 



sens: 



448 



MEMOR.VNDUM 



CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION 



••w 



TlOFrAX SECURITY COUNCIL 



Weekly Report 



April 29, 1983 



104 



MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK 
FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. 



SUBJECT: 



Weekly Report 



John Carbaugh . At Carbaugh's invitation I had breakfast 
with him on April 26. Jeff Davis has been in touch with 
Carbaugh and told me that he thought Carbaugh would raise 
the idea of a study of European alternatives to the Soviet 
pipeline. Surprisingly this did not come up. Rather, 
Carbaugh described the ability of his group--Center for Free 
Society--to undertake in-depth reviews of the election 
process, particularly in Central and South America. Bill 
Kimmerlin (Federal Elections Commission) , Alberto Piedra and 
Carbaugh have served as a three man group in observing 
elections. Clearly he would like to become involved in 
upcoming elections ir. Venezuela, Panama and El Salvador. He 
then expressed himself on the value of seeking to roll back 
communist advances in the Seychelles and Guinea Bissau. 
These views were treated separately by Fred Wettering. (U) 

Jeff Davis and I have spoken several times. He will be in 
Washington during the week of May 9 and we will discuss 
further his fund raising efforts for project democracy. (U) 

Mark Palmer . We discussed a number of subjects over lunch 
including Soviet exchanges with the US. I know this has 
been the subject of separate correspondence from the Secretary 
to you. Under the proper circunstances and with reciprocity 
observed, exchanges can be a very powerful weapon in the war 
of ideas. The Soviets may seek to use exchanges as a means 
of acquiring technology and specialized scientific training; 
we can use exchanges to stimulate the circulation of ideas 
in thought in the USSR. I would encourage your favorable 
consideration of a carefully crafted exchange progreun. (C) 

PrivaW^^WFRalsing . There has been limited progress since 
the Presidential meeting with the donors on March 21. This 
has been partially slowed by Charlie Wick being in Asia the 
last month. Roy Godson and Leo Cherne have had several 
meetings with the private donors executive committee. The 
next session is scheduled for May 16 at which time I think 
the first major financial commitment will be extended. I 
believe the activist orientation of the key donors suggests 
that the grants that they will give will have a sharp 




CONFIDENTIAL 
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR 



UNftMSffiED 



^ 'f*^ 

"r-' 



449 



frnt 




CONFIDENTIAL 



cutting edge that will be directed to both^l^^^^^^^Hand 
American audiences. I will provide you deta^^^^^^ney 
become available. (U) 

SPG Related Matters . ^. 3090^ 

The first full International Broadcasting Committee 
(IBC) met and covered a very full agenda of items. This 
committee appears to be functioning very effectively. 

The International Information Committee . 

One of the principal items is the completion of the 
NSSD on international information. Cary Lord and I have 
been working with the group to use this study as a piece for 
building up an internal US Government approach of the role 
and importance of "information" as a lever of foreign policy. 
(U) 

- The lie (Scott Thompson) has asked Dr. Fredrick 
Seitz, University President Emeritus of Rockefeller University 
and former Executive President of the National Academy of 
Sciences, to help provide support to our yellow rain public 
diplomacy campaign. Seitz 's participation may permit us to 
attract broader international support particularly from the 
international scientific committee, for our considered 
conclusions concerning the Soviet use of CBW. (U) 

International Political Committee . 

The IPC is monitoring follow-up tasking as directed 
by the SPG meeting on April 14. More than half of the 
requested papers are at hand but I have concurred in a weeks 
delay before submission to the SPG so that we can review all 
the papers simultaneously. This would mean we would target 
a SPG for the week of May 9 unless you wish it earlier. (U) 

I am preparing a detailed memorandum for NSC staffers 
on the mission and function of the SPG and its related 
committees. We certainly want to involve the staffers more 
thoroughly. I recognize that in the views of some, particularly 
Sven Kraemer, there has been a perceived lack of coordination. 
He was thoroughly briefed as soon as this was called to my 
attention April 21. Any further criticisms are unwarranted. 
The SPG taaker, which was the apparent offending document 
was developed by the SPG Excom including Cary Lord and Bob 
Sims, and discussed at the SPG at which all were present. I 
believe my broader memorandum discussing the system will 
work out the kinks within the staff. (U) 

PAO Conference . I will be at USIA's Central American Public 
Affairs Officers Conference in Miami on May 2-1. We will be 
discussing our overall needs in the region with particular 
attention to providing support to the President's program. 
(U) 



CONFIDENTIAL 



IINSmWD 



> 7Qn n_«fi-ifi 



XxlEMORANDLM 




■^ 2/^>^^cC^^' 



<^/^/8i 



^N 40096 £^'' 



ACTIOW 

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFXRIANE 

FROM I 



Nay 21, 19aS 




SUBJECT! 



HALTER RAYMOND, JR.v*A<. 
OLIVER L. NORTH e J 

Fr«*doa Flghtars International 



^ 3 



Froa Jun« S-10, a coalition of anti-coanunist rasiatanca 
groupa will convana in Janba, Angola. Tha puzpoaa of tha 
Beating, which will involv* repraiantativaa of all tha world's 
major anti-Soviat guerrilla leaders (except Rename) , is to 
announce the formation of our Alliance for Liberation and 
Democracy. Tha Alliance plans to serve as a fund-raising 
conduit for anti-communist resistance movements. The 
convocation will be hosted by Jonas Savimbi. Citixens for 
America is the principal U.S. sponsor, and both Lew Lehrman 
and Jack Wheeler plan to attend. Wheeler has been actively 
helping with the organizational work. As indicated in the 
vote from Pat Buchanan at Tab I, Dana Rohrabacher would like 
to attend and would like to carry a taped Presidential message 
for the group. 

I have some problems with the meeting. The meeting location 
virtually assures soma form of Sou th African involvement. 
riaitors will transit South Africa,! 



Ray Burghardt has no problama froa his Central 

American perspective. John Poindexter is concerned about 
tainting tha "contras* with the South Africans. Phil 
Rlngdahl /Helen 8oo» are both concejmad that^ it will be coun- 
terproductive la tazma of our current negotiations to get the 
Cubans out of Angola and regarding Namibia. Oliver North 
argues that we do nothing to interfere with the program and 
auggesta that m Prasidantial massage be carried by Lahrman 
vice Rohrabacher. From a policy point of view, it may go 
againat any Congreasional efforts to repeal tha Clark Amend- 
ment, which will be debated soon on tha floor. 



We reconunend proceeding as follows t The meeting ia good 
advancing the cauae of friends and allies, but does not 
require a high Adminiatration profile. Walt Raymond is 
oppoaed to a Preaidential message. Further, even though 
Rohrabacher would be traveling with 'private funds," we 
definitely do not think that he ahould be at the session 
Jaoha. 

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR 



for 





451 



iiiB^^MtiJ 



Qptiont Yes No 

Do w« send « Presidential aeciage - ., . _ ^ 

with LehxTwn? N 40C97 

Should Rohrabacher attend? 

RgCOMMEWPATION 

That you orally advise Pat Buchanan of your dcciaion. 

Approve Disapprove 

v» ♦V U.S ^c» 

Ray Burghardt, Phil Ringdahl, Helen Soos, and Jock Covey have 
concurred. 

Attachment 

Tab I Buchanan to RCM Meoo, May 12, 85, w/atch 



,r 

D«cJas£ifiM/Rt|.,s5j 0.1 9J;A 
under provisiofs of E.O. 12356 
Iiy B. Rcger, hiticrl Sscurity Cou.Tcfl 







r) 



J 



452 



ftHtUSa® 



THC WHITC HOUSE 

WASMINOTON 

Ma^ 12, 1985 



3854 

N 4009; 



MEMORANDOM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLAME 

FROM: PAT BDCHANANi 

StJBJECT: FREEDOM FIGHTERS INTERNATIONAL 



(¥ 



Toward the end of this nonth, in Janba, capital of the Unita- 
controlled area of Angola, a Freedon Fighters international will 
be held, hosted by Jonas Savimbi. As the President is the single 
world figure to whom all these movements (Nicaraguan Resistance, 
Afghans, etc.) look for inspiration, it might be well to have the 
President send a message of support. (RENAMO of Mozambique is 
the only pro-Western group currently excluded from the gathering.) 
Lew Lehman, I understand, is going and would be delighted to 
carry a taped message from the President. What thinX? It might 
get a measure (per attached) of international coverage. 



Attachment 



• 1' I. ." 



o ^ , 




453 



THC WHITC HOUSC 

WASMINOTOM 

May 3, 1985 



N 40099 



""utmrn 



MEMORANDUM FOR PATRICK J. BUCHAMAK 
FROM: DANA ROHBABACHER 4j^^ 

SXnJECTt Tv^om FiqhtT» 



Between May 20-25 Jon*» Savimbi will be hotting > Bumait; 

Meeting of the world'* waior «n»i-SQviet yuirrill^ It^^Ai-r*. 

ipinua RENAMO of Mozambiqu e. The neeting will be held in 
Jaaba^ the capital of Dr. Jonas Savinbi's UNITA novement in 
free Angola. 

They would like us to provide a taped message from the 
President expressing the American people's solidarity with 

those struggling ftfl frggdom thrnn^houf «-h> world. Tht« is 

consistent with everything the President has been saying. 

They are holding a press c onference on Mav 23rd and it ^ s 
expected to receive worldwide coverage . 

First, we need approval for the itessage, taped or otherwise. 
Second, I would like to hand carry the President's messa ge. 

This gathering of freedoa fighters is the baby of 

JlCK WlHtl^rt I've been close to Jack during these last 

2 year s while he's been working with anti-Soviet guerrillas. 
Citizens for America or Freedom Research Foundation (Wheeler) 
will pay mg way down to deliver the message if I am permitted 
to 90. 



UHCUSSIHEB 



454 



i ' 



r£>rOR/.VDCM 



- '■■'.'■ ■i\'- ^\ \\ 

NATIONAL SECURITY COLWcTl' 



90060 



INFORMATrOM 



January i9, 1995 



, M^ORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARMNb 

WALTER RAYMOND '<,\« 
SUBJECT: r.,* , 

Central America Strategies 

y^„. thxs and have three idea, I SdMj; ^r'n^^'^^^' 

j.i.Km to share with 

"■ ^H£ro2ateSupporters 

particularly ef^eeff,^. It would seem to me th««- . 

pout";.,!"'" =""• - i" " P=.u"„ fj '»PP°"i"9 th. 
2ii£ver, , ,"|g|mhi. m,y . . . . P . ^« TherHr,. 



If s 

■S a on- 






classify oni 



OAOR 



Kussm 




455 



■*.i 



iLHOO 



26:8 



Th« Bob L«i)c«n Approach . I had a long talk with Bob L«iken 
whor «• you know, is a roc)c-ribb«d liberal who works for the 
CarlM^le Endovment. Two months ago Leiken wrote a major 
piece supporting our policies, and it was a significant 
breakthrough. He approached me on IS January at a 
face-to-face dinner and suggested that he would like to 
help. He plans to .take some soundings and will confirm his 
willingness to help about 1 February. If Leiken is prepared 
to help he will be particularly useful in lobbying the 
political liberals in this city. He believes we have a 
fairly good chance of winning the Contras fight on the Hill 
if we play our cards right. I think at some point it will 
be useful for you to talk directly to him. His proposed 
package includes several elements which I will tick off 
for you below: 

o Build a positive image of the FDN. To do this we 

should send down one or more key journalists to start 
developing major positive stories for the US. He 
thought Richard Millett might be willing. 




We must clean up the image of the FDN by making 
some changes, particularly removing known violators of 
human rights. We cannot sit on a status quo situation 
with the FDN. It would not be a sign of weakness 
on the Hill but rather a sign of a constructive 
willingness to meet Congressional critics half-way 
by offering to them a more "attractive package." He 
specifically mentioned a man named Lagas (?). He said 
that a more active effort should be made to unify the 
Contras, including the involvement of Brooklyn Rivera. 
In sununary, we need a cleaned up package. 

We should be prepared to accept certain elements of 
conditionality. In other words, we should be able to 
accept some limitations and conditions for Contra 
approval. 



UNCLISSIHED 



456 



MEMORANDUM 

CONFIDENTIAL 
ACTION 



Um^fFKO 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 



March 15, 1985 






ICrof,(^g 



2088 



^ 4060S 



14x3 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLaJiE 

OLIVER L. NORTHr 
WALTER RAYMOND, JR. 
DONALD R. FORTIER 



FROM: 



SUBJECT! 



Coordinating our Nicaraguan Resistance Strategy 




This afternoon we met with ADM Poindexter to discuss ongoing 
problems in coordinating the public affairs and legislative 
strategies regarding the Nicaraguan resistance. Don has, of 
course, taken the lead in trying to engage key Congressional 
leaders, sensitize them to our problem, and lay the groundwork 
for compromise. As we move from this phase to a new overt 
legislative campaign, we will need to decide how to orchestrate 
our overall effort and who to put in charge of meshing 
legislative strategy with an energetic public affairs effort. 
This is something you may want to discuss with Secretary Shultz 
on the way back from Canada, or after the meeting on Tuesday. 
Final decisions on this point should be made at next week's LSG. 
In the interim, there are two isolated actions you could take to 
ensure advance coordination: 

First, a call from you to Pat Buchanan which will help him 
focus his own White House communications effort with that of 
Ambassador Otto Reich at State. Your call will help to ensure 
that those who are operating independently will be responsive to 
clear cut guidance (talking points are attached at Tab A) . 

Second, a call from you to Max Friedersdorf which will 
fulfill the sane requirement for our legislation 
coordination (talking points are attached at Tab B) . At 
this point, the resistance leadership (Cruz, Calero, and 
RoiMlo) are being contacted by everyone from our own Latin 
Aauriea Directorate to Max Singer at PRODEMCA — all of whom 
ar* telling them to be in different places at different 
tinea. Your call will ensure that Max is aboard on the use 
of former Congressman Dan Xuykendall as the focal point for 
those who wish to contact and schedule the resistance 
leaders. Cruz, Calero, and Robelo have all agreed to this 
procedure and Kuykendall is setting up an Ops Center/ 
Secretariat to handle their schedules, calls, and staff work 



under the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation. 



CONFIDENTIAL 
Declassify: OADR 



umoED # 



<? 



^ 



x\ 



'-^ 



ck 



457 



CONFIDENTIAL 2 



^ 406D4 



RECOMMENDATION 

That you use the talking points at Tabs A and B for calls to 
Buchanan and Friedersdorf. 

Approve Disapprove 



Attachments 

Tab A - Talking Points for Buchanan Phone Call 
Tab B - Talking Points for Friedersdorf Phone Call 



CONFIDENTIAL 



imii^iED 



458 



mmm .. 



TALKING POINTS REGARDING LEGISLATIVg SCHED ULE 
FOR THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE LEADERS* 

(Friedersdorf) 



There needs to be an integrated approach to our overall 
Central American public strategy. The NSC staff will try to 
serve as the glue to pull these strings together. We will 
be looking to you to serve as the legislative coordinator 
and will provide whatever assistance you need. Chris Lehman 
will serve as our regular lin)t to you on this. 

Meanwhile, we have a very active series of public 
initiatives that we will be working in tandem with your 
efforts. (Background: The President asked Otto Reich to be 
the public diplomacy coordinator a year ago and ha has built 
an effective staff to support this overall effort. His work 
has a domestic and foreign focus. And there is the "Faith 
Whittlesey* outreach effort which has brought the White 
House dimension into play.) 

Pat (Buchanan) and Otto will be working closely to integrate 
all this effort. Pat's special focus will be the 
President's role but his experience is such that he can help 
in many ways. He has had two fruitful meetings with his ad 
hoc public communications working group which is dealing 
the upcoming vote on aid to the Nicaraguan resistance. 

The Pat/Otto group will be meeting every two days, will be 
developing a dynaaic action plan, and constantly updating 
it. They will link to you through Chris Lehman, to Larry 
Speakes through Bob Siata, and will have Ed Rollina, the 
speechwriters, and State present ao w* can provide real 
focus to the public diplomacy strategy neceaaary to win this 
one. 

From my people who are participating in this effort, it 
app«ara that one of the problema haa been an eatablished 
focal point for scheduling appearances and appointments for 
th« Mlcaraguan reaiatance leadera who come to Washington. 

As a consequence, the resistance leaders have accepted an 
offer by former Congressman Dan Kuykendall'a Gulf and 
Caribbean Foundation to have the foundation provide 
organizational and aecretarial-typ« aupport. 

To the extent we are able, it would be uaaful if you could 
encourage membera and their ataffa who wiah to talk to 
contac^th^resistanceleaders to do so through Kuykendall's 
office ^^^"^^^^ 




mm 



459 



iMSIHED' 



im 



^ 40606 

TALKING POINTS REGARDING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
IN CENTRAL AMERICA 

(Buchanan) 



Welcome your active role in the public diplomacy aspects of 
the Central American question, particularly concerning the 
buildup to the contra vote. 

Would like to suggest that we divide the labor up somewhat 
as follows: 

You take the lead on all White House involvement on 
this issue (be sure to tuck the effort underway with 
Bob Reilly under this) . 

Otto Reich take the lead on overall public diplomacy. 
He has a staff of 14 professionals and has been doing a 
strong job supporting the President. In effect, his 
staff can double as your staff. 

Your proposal to have regular meetings (every couple of 
days) to keep this effort energized and coordinated is 
excellent. I would envisage that you and Otto would develop 
a co-chair. Ollie North and Walt Raymond would support both 
of you. 

I would suggest that the Buchanan/Reich coordinating group 
include the following: You, Bob Reilly, Bob Sims, Walt 
Raymond, Ollie North, and Chris Lehman (aa a link to the 
legislative effort), Bd Rollins, Otto Reich, Jonathan Miller 
(Reich's deputy), and Jim Michel (State Department Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Latin America) . This keeps the 
group lean, serious, and sharply focused. Other 
participants could be added if and when needed. 

You may wish to have a scrub session with Walt, Ollie, and 
Otto to b« sura all the wiring is in place. 

Thanks for your help. 



mm^m 



460 






WM^ ^^*^.»1 



NATIONAL SCCURITY COUNCIL 
wAtHiNaTON. o.c. aeiM 



October 3, 1985 



N 34288 




UNCLASSIFIED 

CONFIDENTIAL w/attachment ( ■ . . 

ACTION 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFA 
FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH 



RL;pi 



SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman Hamilton re NSC Connection 
with Nicaraguan Resistance 

Attached at Tab I is a letter from you to Congressman Hamilton 
responding to his questions forwarded in his letter at (Tab II) . 

Per our discussion, the responses are based on your earlier 
briefing before the committee on September 10, 1985. 

This package should be reviewed in concert with SYSTEM I #7890 
(Barnes) and t7913 (Durenberger and Leahy) . 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you sign and forward your letter to Congressman Hamilton at 
Tab I. 

Approve _^^^ Disapprove 



Attachments 

Tab I - McFarlane Itr to Hamilton 

Tab II - Hamilton Itr to McFarlane of September 12, 1985 
w/attachment 



WWr Declassilied/ReleaseO nn 3*'^^>8 >o 

under provisions 0( E 12356 
by K Johnscn. National Security Council 



UNCLASSIFIED 
CONFIDENTIAL w/attachment 



(^jb) 



MB 







461 



uimEo 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

WAIHINOTON 



34289 



UNCLASSIFIED 
CONFIDENTIAL w/attachment 



Dear Mr. Chairman; 



Please find attached responses to the 
questions posed by members of your 
committee and forwarded under your letter 
of September 12, 1985. , Where requisite 
information was provided in my briefing 
of September 10, the response so indicates. 
I have classified the responses to 
preclude the unintentional disclosure of 
classified information or potential 
embarrassment to friendly governments in 
the region. 

Sincerely, 



Attachment 



The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee 

on Intelligence 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 



UNCLASSIFIED 
CONFIDENTIAL w/attachment 




462 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWESS -'4^90 » 

Direction r Tactical Influence, and Advice to th« Contraa 



Q-1 Both Adolf o Calero and Edgar Chamorro ( Waahington Post , 

14 August 1985 and Miami Herald , 24 June 1985) have publicly 
state that Colonel North traveled to Honduras in the spring 
of 1984 to assure them that, despite Congressional 
opposition, the White House would "find a way to keep their 
movement alive." Also, they note that Colonel North met 
with them in June 1984. What was the purpose of Colonel 
North's visit to the FDN in April and June 1984? 

A-1 As I noted in my briefing on September 10, Lieutenant 

Colonel North has traveled frequently to Central America to 
meet with those who our policy is designed to support, as 
well as those who are opposed to it. Lieutenant Colonel 
North did not travel to Honduras in April or June 1984. 
During a visit to Honduras in May 1984, Lieutentant Colonel 
North met with members of the Honduran Government and the 
Nicaraguan democratic resistance. He assured them that the 
Administration was committed to the cause of the democratic 
resistance and would, as the President had promised, go back 
to the Congress for resources to support a democratic 
outcome in Nicaragua. 

Q-2 It has been alleged in the. New York Times (8 Aug 85) that 
Colonel North was advised in advance of proposed rebel 
attacks and had offered the rebels advice and direction. Do 
you have any knowledge of whether this is true? A specific 
exaunple was cited: an attack in July on a ferry boat that 
travels between Rama and Bluefields in southeastern 
Nicaragua. Do you have any knowledge of whether the NSC had 
advance information that attack was to take place? 

A-2 The allegation that Lieutenant Colonel North offered the 

resistance tactical advice and direction is, as I indicated 
in my briefing, patently untrue. 

Q-3 When the CIA had to withdraw from their day-to-day contact 
with the rebels, it has been alleged in the New York Times 
(8 Aug 85) that Colonel North tried to fill the void, partly 
through helping facilitate the supplying of logistics help. 
Did Colonel North, in his capacity as a staff member of the 
National Security Council, use his influence to facilitate 
the movement of supplies, either raised privately in this 
country or otherwise, to the contras? 

A-3 Lieutenant Colonel North did not use his influence to 
facilitate the movement of supplies to the resistance. 



UKOmMO 



463 



wmmm 



N 34291 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Cont'd...) 

Direction, Tactical Influence, and Advice to the Contraa 



Q-4 A Nicaraguan exile leader is quoted in the New Yor)c Tiroes 

(8 Aug 85) as stating that Colonel North was very important 
in coordinating efforts to reorganize and better coordinate 
the operations of the two main rebel groups, the- FDN and the 
Democratic Alliance or the ARDE, and that he had met with - 
rebel leaders in both countries. Is that an accurate 
statement? 

A-4 As I indicated in my briefing and my earlier letter, the NSC 
has been actively engaged in urging the resistance to forge 
a representative political front involving credible 
non-military figures and that this front assume responsi- 
bility for framing a political program aimed at a democratic 
outcome in Nicaragua. 

Q-5 There are allegations of some concern expressed by 

intelligence officials in the CIA that Colonel North may 
have been wallcing a dangerous line in his activities with 
the contras (New York Times , 10 Aug 85) . Were such 
sentiments brought to your attention? 

A-5 I am aware that unnamed intelligence officials have been 
quoted in the New Yor)c Times as being "concerned" about 
Lieutenant Colonel North's activities. No official of our 
intelligence community in any of our frequent meetings has 
ever taken the opportunity to address such a "concern." 

Q-6 Adolf o Calero, President of the FDN and a leading figure in 
the new Unified Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) , the group which 
will receive the $27 million of humanitarian assistance, has 
stated publicly (Washington Post , 14 Aug 85) that he met a 
half a dozen times with Colonel North this spring. For what 
purpose did Colonel North meet so frequently with Mr. 
Calero? 

A-6 As indicated above and in my briefing. Lieutenant Colonel 
North and others in the Administration, including the 
President and I, have met with Messrs. Calero, Cruz, and 
Robelo; leaders of the Indian opposition; and opposition 
figures from the Nicaraguan southern resistance front in 
order to better determine the course of our policy and to 
convey our concerns regarding human rights. 



mtmm 



464 



^mmm 



N 34292 



QUESTIONS AMD ANSWERS (Cont'd...) 

Direction, Tactical Influence, and Advice to the Contras 



Q-7 It has also been alleged that Colonel North had to travel to 
Honduras and meet with Honduran military leaders because 
apparently they were siphoning off supplies which were 
intended for the contras. As a result, the supply effort 
was switched from the civilian airport at Tegucigalpa to the 
military airfield at Palmerola. Did Colonel North undertaJte 
such a mission? 

A-7 No. 




465 



otomiBED 






QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS W 34293 

f]Btt»f MiMr tH< Railing of Funds from Private Sources 



Q-1 Has Colonel North been the focal point within the NSC staff 
for handling contacts with private fund raising groups, 
such as the World Anti-Coininunist League and the Council for 
World Freedom headed by retired Major General John K. 
Singlaub? 

A-1 No. 

Q-2 General Singlaub has stated (Washington Post , 9 Aug 85) that 
he would often talk to Colonel North and inform him what he 
was doing and, then state that if it was a dumb idea, for 
North to send him a signal. Is that your impression of the 
relationship between General SiTiglaub and Colonel North? 

A-2 There is no official or unofficial relationship between any 
member of the NSC staff regarding fund raising for the 
Nicaraguan democratic opposition. This includes the 
alleged relationship with General Singlaub. 

Q-3 It is alleged (Miami Herald , 24 Jun 85) , after a visit by 
Colonel North and a CIA official to the FDN in June 1984, 
that the CIA provided funds to publish ads in American 
newspapers to solicit private aid. Is that, in fact, what 
occurred? 

A-3 To my Itnowledge, the CIA has never provided any funds for 
publishing any material in U.S. newspapers. 

Q-4 Did Colonel North at any time during the frequent speeches 
and lectures that he has given around the country on the 
subject of Nicaragua, advise individuals on how they might 
donate money to the rebels as was alleged in the 
New Yor)c Times (8 Aug 85)? 

A-4 No. 

Q-5 It has been alleged in the Washington Post (11 Aug 85) that 
Colonel North has been particularly close to the leadership 
of the Citizens for America, an organization headed by Lewis 
Lehrman, and that Colonel North was in almost daily contact 
with the former executive director of that group and help'ed 
select contras for speaJcing engagements and tours within the 
United States organized by the Citizens for America during 
the April Congressional debates. Is that true? , 

A-5 No. 




466 




N 34294 



QUESTIONS. AND ANSWERS (Cont'd...) 

Facilitating th« Raising of Funds from Private Sources 



Q-6 General Slnglaub has indicated ( New York Times , 10 Aug 85) 
that, at one time, he had fairly frequent contact with 
individuals within the Department of Defense and other 
agencies concerning the Nicaraguan freedom fighters but, 
because of Congressional restriction, he didn't go near the 
Pentagon anymore. Why did he continue to deal with Colonel 
North? 

A-6 You would have to inquire with General Slnglaub as to why hie 
chose not to be in contact with other departments or 
agencies. NSC contacts with General Slnglaub were not 
unliJce those with other concerned Americans who have an 
Interest in our foreign policy.- It should also be noted 
that Lieutenant Colonel North and other members of the NSC 
have also been in frequent contact with those who oppose our 
policy or who have differing views. Lieutenant Colonel 
North and others, in the course of their duties, have also 
met with the World Council of Churches, the National Council 
of Churches, the American Friends Service Committee, and 
other organizations which have expressed disfavor for our 
Central American policy. 

Q-7 It has been alleged that Colonel North has been in close 

contact with Alvaro Rlzzo, a former Somoza diplomat, who was 
a member of the Nicaraguan Development Council and also the 
Nicaraguan Refugee Fund, and that both Colonel North and 
another member of the NSC staff, Mr. Walter Raymond, met 
with Rlzzo earlier this year to help set up the Nicaraguan 
Refugee Dinner which was held in April at which the 
President spo)ce. Were Colonel North and Mr. Raymond 
involved in helping set up this dinner? 

A-7 Lieutenant Colonel North and Mr. Raymond coordinated the 
request for Presidential involvement in the Nicaraguan 
Refugee Fund dinner in the same manner that the NSC staff 
routinely coordinates other functions involving the 
President, such as the recent appearance before the INTERPOL 
conference. 

Q-8 While Colonel North may not have had direct contact with 

paramilitary groups such as the CMA, Soldier of Fortune, and 
others, it is alleged that Colonel North used other members 
of the White House staff, to include his secretary, to 
communicate with these groups. Do you know anything about 
that? 

A-8 Thi*- allegation is untrue.^ 

,1 




467 



mmsm 



N 34295 



QUESTIONS AMD ANSWERS (Cont'd...) 

Facilitating the Raising of Funds from Private Sources 



Q-9 Has Colonel North been active with a group headed by Mr. 
Woody Jenkins of Louisiana known as the Friends of the 
Americas and has he assisted this group in obtaining 
transport for goods which they have provided to Nicaraguan 
refugees? 

A-9 Friends of the Americas is a reputable, private, voluntary 

organization providing humanitarian assistance to Nicaraguan 
refugees. Our contacts with Friends of the Americas have 
been the same as those maintained with Knights of Malta, the 
Knights of Columbus, Project Rope, and other humanitarian 
organizations committed to easing human suffering. No 
assistance has been provided to this or other groups in 
obtaining transportation. 



uimsn 



468 




N 34296 

ANSWERS TO RELATED QUESTIONS 



Q-1 The Associated Press reported that three foreign countries 
came to the White House in July 1984 and offered to provide 
assistance to the contras but without any quid pro quo. Is 
that true? 

A-1 No. 



Q-2 The Nicaraguan freedom fighters, in the last two months, are 
reported by the U.S. Embassy, Tegucigalpa, to have received 
a large influx of funds and equipment with some estimates of 
their value reaching as high as $10 million or more. Do you 
know where they have obtained this assistance? 

A-2 No. 



Q-3 Why was it necessary to have someone from the National 
Security Council staff in touch with the various contra 
groups? Couldn't this have been better handled in Central 
America by State Department representatives by CIA personnel 
who could have certainly maintained contact for the purposes 
of collecting information, which is what Deputy Press 
Secretary Speakes implied was the reason for Colonel North's 
contact? 

A- 3 The statutory function of the National Security Council is 
to advise the President with respect to the integration of 
domestic, foreign, and defense policies related to the 
national security of the United States. The Council has the 
responsibility to assess and appraise the objectives of the 
United States on matters of common interest to the 
departments and agencies of the government, and to make such 
recommendations and such reports to the President as it 
deems appropriate or as the President may require. It is 
the responsibility of the NSC staff to facilitate this 
process. Thus, it follows that NSC staff members must be in 
contact with a wide range of groups, movements, and 
individuals who are affected by our policies. 



iimmiED 



469 




297 



ANSWERS TO RELATED QUESTIONS (Cont'd...) 



Q-4 The Waahlnqton Post reported (28 Aug 85) that according to 
leaders of Mlsura, the main coalition of the Indians 
fighting the Sandiniata government. Central Intelligence 
Agency personnel brokered two agreements this year on how 
the insurgent groups should divide supplies which had been 
privately raised. To your knowledge, was the CIA involved 
in brokering this agreement? Was any NSC official? Any 
other U.S. official? 

A-4 As indicated above, we have actively encouraged a broad 
based political unity movement within the Nicaraguan 
democratic opposition. The opposition includes the various 
Indian and Creole factions — now unified as KISAN — headed 
by their newly elected coordinator, Wycliffe Diego. 
However, the Wa3hin(^ton Post (28 Aug 85) article to which 
you made reference is without basis in fact. 

Q-5 You have been quoted as saying that the role of the NSC 

staff was to collect information and to offer encouragement 
to the contras. How do you distinguish between that and the 
provision of advice and assistance in raising funds? 

A-5 I believe that my briefing to your committee on 

September 10, adequately explained how I distinguish between 
collecting information and offering encouragement and the 
issues of advice, assistance, and fund raising. 

Q-6 Why didn't you come to the Congress when this relationship 
began and inform us that there would be high-level contacts 
but they were for the purpose of "collecting information and 
keeping the faith"? 

A-6 As indicated in my response to Question 3 above, it is my 

responsibility to keep the President adequately informed on 
a broad range of national security issues. In carrying out 
this responsibility, my staff is appropriately in contact 
with various entities, both governmental and otherwise 
around the world. You, your colleagues, and Congressional 
staff members likewise have private contacts and channels of 
communication which assist you in carrying out your 
responsibilities. I do not believe that the constitutional 
separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative 
branches of our government would be well served by requiring 
that the Congress be informed of all such contacts 
maintained by the NSC, any more than the Executive should 
demand that it be apprised of similar Congressional 
activities. 




470 








U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

nmuMfNT saicT cotoMrrm 
ON nfnuneici 

WASHmQT0N.DC]0t1l 



Septmutmr 12, 1985 



34298 



Honorable Robert C. McF&rlane 
Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs 
The Vlhite House 
Washington, 0. C. 20500- 

Oear Mr. McFarlane: 

At our meeting Tuesday, you agreed to answer written questions sulanitted 
by Meslbers of the Coomittee oonceming allegations about the activities of 
Lieutenant Qslonel Oliver ^forth of your staff. Qidosed are questions that 
have been submitted by Menbers of the GooBiittee. 

The Conmittee appreciates your willingness to discuss this matter and to 
respond to these questions. 

With best wishes, I am 

Sinc^rfibly yours, 

Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairaan 

E^Kzloeure 



IINCUSSm 



471 



nNiwssra 



dUBSnOHS _ _ _ 

ii 34299 

Direction. Tactical Influence, and Advice to the Cbntraa 

1. Both Adolfo Calero and Edgar Oianorzo ( Washington ttoat , 14 August 1965 anl 
Miami Herald , 24 June 1985) have publicly stated that Colonel North 
traveled to Honduras in the spring of 1984 to assure theo that, despite 
Congressional oppoeiticn, the White House would "find a way to keep their 
movement alive." Also, they note that Colonel North Tnet with them in June - 
1984. What was the purpose of Colonel North's visit to the FTM in April 
and Jizw 1984? 

2. It has been alleged in the New York Times (8 Aug 85) that Colonel North 
was advised in advance of proposed rebel attacks and had offered the 
rebels advice and direction. Do you have any knowledge of whether this is 
true? A specific exaaple was cited: an attack in July on a ferry boat 
that travels between Rama and Bluefields in southeastern Nicaragua. Do 
you have any knowlec^e of whether the NSC had advance information that 
attack was to take place? 

3. When the CIA ha3 to withdraw from their day-to-day contact with the 
rebels, it has been alleged in the New York Times (8 Aug 85) that Colonel 
North tried to fill the void, partly through helping facilitate the 
supplying of logistics help. Did Colonel North, in his capacity as a 
staff member at the National Security Council, use his influence to 
facilivate the movement of 3v:pplies, either raised privately in this 
country or otherwise, to the contras? 



"NWSSIflES 



472 



mf'MB 



'^' ■ ^' ' ^4:00 



4. A Hicaraguan azil* leader ii qustad In the New York Tinea (8 Aug 85) as 
stating that Colonel North was very inportant in coordinating efforts to 
reorganize and better coordinate the operations of the two main rebel 
groi4>«. the FDN and the Omorratic Revolutionary Alliance or ARDE, and 
that he had met with rebel leaders in both countries. Is that an accurate 
statesient? 

5. There are allegations of some concern expressed by intelligence officials 
in the CIA that Colonel North oay have been waUclng a dangerous line in 
his activities with the ccntras ( New York Times , 10 Aug 85). Were such 
sentiments brought to your attention? 

6. Adolf o Calero, President of the FQH and a leading figure in the new 
Unified Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), the gz<xjp t^iich will receive the $27 
million of humanitarian assistance, has stated publicly ( t<a3hington Post , 
14 Aug 85) that he met a half a dozen times with Colonel North this 
spring. For what purpose did Colonel North meet so frequently with Mr. 
Calero? 

7. It has also been alleged that Colonel North had to travel to Honduras and 
meet with Honduran military leaders because apparently they were siphoning 
off supplies which were intended for the ccntras. As a result, the supply 
effort was switched frcai the civilian airport at Tegucigalpa to the 
military airfield at Palmerola. Did Colonel North undertake such a 
mission? 



ICUSSIHED 



473 



■-^m^"^^, 



CJUBTTI 

lllVll.l MkllJl* -^ 

fJ 34301 

Facilitating tim Baiainq of Fund* from Private Scxirces 

1. Has Colonel North bean tha focal point within the tGC staff for handling 
oontacts with private fundraising groups, sudi as the World Anti-OcBounist 
League and the Council for World Freedco headed by retired Major General 
John K. Singlaub? 

2. General Singlaub has stated ( Washington Poet , 9 Aug 85) that he would 
often talk to Colonel North and Inform his viAiat he was doing and then 
state that if it was a dunb idea, for North to send him a signal. Is that 
your ijipressian of tha relaticnship between General Singlaub and Colonel 
Itorth? 

3. It is alleged ( Miami Iferald , 24 Jun 85), after a visit by Colonel North 
and a CIA official to the FEN in Jvme 1984, that the CIA provided funds to 
publish ads in American newspapers to solicit private aid. Is that, in 
fact, v^ut occurred? 

4. Did Colonel North at any time during the frequent speeches and lectures 
that he has given auround the country on the subject of Nicaragua, advise 
individuals on how they might donate money to the rebels as was alleged in 
the New York Times (8 Aug 85)? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



474 






n 34302 



5. It hu bMn &ll*9«d in th« Vhahington ftast (11 Aug 85) that Colonel tferth 
has been partioilarly close to the leadership of the Citizens for Anarica, 
an organization headed ty Lewis Lehman, and that Cblonel North was in 
aliaoat daily cxntact with the former executive director of that grotp a«i 
helped select oontras for speaking engagenents and tours within the United 
States organized by the Citizens for AuKrica during t}» April 
Congressional debates. Is that true? 

6. General Singlaub has indicated ( New York Times . 10 Aug 85) that, at one 
time, he had fairly frequent contacts with individuals within the 
Department of Defense and other agencies concerning the Nicaraguan freedan 
fighters but, because of the Congressional restriction, he didn't go near 
the Pmtagon anymore. Why did he continue to deal with Colonel North? 

7. It has been alleged that Colonel North has been in close contact with 
Alvaro Rizzo, a former .Srmoza diplcnat, who was a member of the Micaraguan 
Develofanent Couicil and also the Nicaraguan Refugee Fund and that both 
Colonel North and another member of the NSC staff, Mr. Walter Raymond, net 
with Rizzo earlier this year to help set vtp the Nicaraguan Refugee Dinner 
which was held in April at which the President spoke. Were Colonel ^i^rth 
and Mr. Raymcnd involved in helping set up this dinner? 

8. While Colonel North may not have had direct contact with paramilitary 
grona such as OIA, Soldier of Fortune and others, it is alleged that 
Colonel North used other members of the White House staff, to include his 
secretary, to cocmunicate with these groups, to you tav>N' anything aic-t 
that? 



IINCUSSIflEO 



475 



*#\>S5)S^^'.., 



9. Has Colonsl Morth been active with a groi4> haadsd tay Mr. Woody Jenkins of 
Louisiana known as the Friends of the Americas and has he assisted this 
groqs in obtaining transport for goods which they have provided to 

Nicaraguan refugees? 



ONCLASSIFIED 



476 



RELM1ED OUESTICfeB 



m 



&0^^ 



4334 



1. Tha Aaaociatad Press reported that three foreign countries casM to the 
White House in July 1984 and offered to provide assistance to the oontras 
but without any quid pro quo. Is that true? 

2. The Nicaraguan freedoD filters, in ths last two oonths, are reported by 
the U.S. Qnbassy, Tegucigalpa to have received a large influx of fisxls and 
equipment with sane estinates of their value reaching, as high as ilO 
million or more. 03 you )ax>/ vAtere they have obtained this assistance? 

3. Why was it necessary to have soaeone frcn the National Security Cbuncil 
staff in touc^ with the various contra groi^w? Cbuldn't this have been 
better handled in Central America by State Department representatives ty 
dA personnel ^ixi could have certainly maintained contact for the purposes 
of collecting information, which is what Deputy Press Secretary Spea3ts 
inplied was the reason for Colonel North's contact? 

4. The Washington Post reported (28 Aug 85) that according to leaders of 
Misura, the main ooalition of the Indians fighting the Sandinsta 
government, Central Intelligence agency perscxmel brokered two agreenents 
this year on how the insurgent groins slvould divide supplies which had 
been privately raised. To your knowledge, was the CIA involved in 
brokering this agreeinent? Was any NSC official? Any other U.S. official? 



yNCLASSiFlEO 



477 



* 00^\^^'^ 



5. You hav* baan quoted as saying that tha rols of the NSC staff was to 

ooUect Infonnation and to offer encouragement to the contras. How do you 
distinguish betwe en that and the provision of advice and assistance in 
raising funds? 

6* Why didn't you ocrae to the Congress vAien this relationship began and 
inform us that there would be high-level contacts but. they were for the 
purpose of "collecting information and keying the faith"? 



WUSSIf/fB 



478 




i( 





use 

WASMINOTOM 






stcurt 



July 13, 1983 



MEMORANDOM POK THX HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASBT 

The Diraetor of Central Intalllganc* 



SUBJECTS 



Increased Funding Level for Niearaguan^ 
Covert Action Prograa (S) 



Your Menorandua of notification, dated June 25, 1913, 
requesting an increased funding level for the Nicaraguaa 
Covert Action Prograa is approved. (S) 



FOR THE PRESIOEMTi 



WinTaa P. CTark 



cot The Secretary of State 
The Secretary of Defense 



SECRET 

D«classify on: OADR 



(^6) 



Pariijiiy Declassified/Released mJ^^^S § 
under provisions o» E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 



mm^ 



479 



mwsm 

THC WMITC HOUtC 
WASHINOrOM 



MSC/ICS-400499 

N 43661 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MILLI^tP-iTT CASEY 

The Director of f«lftral Int«lll9«nc« 



SUBJECT: 



Increased Fundin? Level for Nicaraguan^ 
Covert Action Xro^raa (S) 



Your Meowrandun of Notification, dated ^^ne 2S, 1983, 
requesting an Increased funding level for v* Nlcaraguaa 
Covert Action Program Is approved. (S) 

The President has deferred approval of youn/request to 
Increase further the Nlcaraguen resistan^tf forces until we 
have available a detailed projection oKthe long tera goals/ 
objectives and costs for these tor^mt. This report should 
also Include an assessBtent of h^v'^ls Increase relates to ^ 
the key judgments and Implications of NIE 83.3-83. (S) 



FOR THE PRESIDENT: 



ids. 

Wllllaa P. Clark 



The Secretary of State 
The Secretary of Defense 



Declassify on: OADR 



480 



UNCLASSIFIED 

^ 43662 




481 



1 




ROUTING 


\ 


To 


^•mt 4od Aaar»%% 'i Oat* llnitijit 




The President. 1 1 


1 






1 ! 


\ 






I 


1 
















i 












^ 


ACTION 1 


FILE 


1 


APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 


i 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 






CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 






OlREa REPLY 




RETURN 






DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


1 


REMARKS 



ONGLiSiFIED -,,,.. 

SEOREf- 



NSC/ICS CONTROL NO ^°°^^^ 



.OF. 



COPY NO 



(CIA ER 83-2861 - Origi.-ia; 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notice 
Intelligence Sourtei «nd Mett^odj Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthorized OiKloiure Subiect to Criminal Sanction* 



} (^!"'J^ 



m 




89.75^n n-«8-17 



482 



UNCLASSIFIED 

e e s n D T 

MEMORANDUM OP NOTIFICATION 



N 43664 

CIA ER 83-2861 
Cy » 1 

25 June 1983 



lEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the National Security Planning Group 

SUBJECT Request for Increased Funding Level 

REFERENCE Presidential Finding on Nicaragua dated 
1 December 1981 

1. PROPOSAL : The Central Intelligence Agency requests an 
Increase In tne authorized funding level for the program 
authorized by the 1 December 1981 Presidential Flndins 



BACKGROUND : On 1 December 1981 President Reagan signed a 
Presidential Find In^o^Nlc^ajua authorizing the Agency to 
support arid conduct BMBBBBBB paramili tary Qperatlana_aga ln3t 
1 Nicaragua 




«. DEADLINE : Please forward written concurrence or non- 
concurrence and any desired comments concerning the proposed 
action to the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs within five working days after date of receipt by your 
office. The Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs Is requested to advise the Director of Central Intelli- 
gence by memorandum of NSPG concurrence or non-concurrence. 



wm ^mi^m 



483 



UNCLASSIFIED 



N 43665 



. v^^A 



-SB 



yN«'"!Fe 



m 



484 






i 



cited Sute* ^P*1f>e|t%g;k^e 
tratkinpon, D.C 20520 



SENSITIV 




July 6, 1983 



MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt Raymond 

Special Aislatant to th« President 
National Security Council 



SUBJECT: 



Request for Increased Funding Level for 
Nicaragua Covert Action Prograa 



The Acting Secretary of State has approved the 
Mefflorandun of Notification Request for Increased Funding 
Level for Nicaragua Covert Action progran date^ 
State, however, believes drawing the requested] 
should be deferred until deliberations on pcndJ 
are completed. 



ised Funding « 
ifflgr^ffiftldr 



Dennis Kux ' 



Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Coordination 
Bureau of Intelligence & Research 



SENSITIV 



DECLi OAD 



INC 83-911 



UNCLASSIFIED 



485 



wussro 



N 43667 



5*" 



■* 



CLI,15!flED 



486 



/^Ij^ 




TMrsiCffCTAAV Of OCrCNSC 

WASHI»«OTON. TMC Ol»T(»»CT OT COLtAWA 



N 43668 



ft'VOl'1983 



(4 



>.1 



MEMORANDUM TO THI ASSISTANT/. V THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL 
SECURlif AFFAIRS 

SUBJECT! Maacfndu a of N otification, 25 Juno 19S3t 
Nicirau9«/(m (S) 



(S) I concur In tho MoBor«ndua of Notification (MOM) 
to inerots* by^^Htho FYSS funding of tho «ctivlti«a autherisod 
undor tho 1 Doconbor 1981 Proaldontlal Finding. 



ClaaaifUd byi SocDof 
Doelaaalfy ont OADR 




!l 




487 



UNCUSSiFIED 



N 43669 



UNClp?SiflED 



488 



To 



N«mt tod Addrtit 



Ottt 



Nfr. DeGrtffenreld 
Ra SOU. N&L bClIf 



ACTION 



APPROVAL 



COMMENT 



CONCURRENCE 



FILE 



INFORMATION 



DIRECT REPLY 



DISPATCH 



PREPARE REPLV 



RECOMMENDATION 



RETURN 



SIGNATURE 



REMARKS 

1 Cy sent direct to Defense, >^aj Gen Smith 
1 Zy Sent direct to State, 



\mmm 



SlGRCF^'^0 



CIA ER 83-2861 



NSC/ICS CONTROL NO 



COPY NO 



.OF. 



Copy 1, 2 and S thru 10. 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 

Smith 
Mr. Montgomery 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notice 
int«lligtn<t SourcM *nd Method* involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthofiztd Oit<l0*urt Subi»<t to Criminal S*nctiom 




489 



UNCUSSIFIED 



N 43671 




• put Kum iMitturur re 




•Winn ojjMimoB 






,^ 













IB Mmui ■aorr 




- - — VI 



5Li?IFIED 



490 






UNCUSSIHED 



H 43672 






n June 1983 



NOTE FOR: Mr. Kenneth OeGraf fenreid 

Director, InteM igence Proqr«n$ 
Nation*) Security Council 



The attached Memorandt n of N otification: "Increased 
-Fundino Level for NicaraQua,«| Covert Action Progran" 
IS forwarded for necessary action. 

Thomas 8. Cormack 
Executive Secretary 

Attachment: 

Memorandin of Notific.it ion 



CL arfll 

OECL 0AM 




llNn!«"SlflEO 



491 



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

July 12, 1983 



;-l 43673 



MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL MURPHY ^^ 

KENNETH deGRAFFENRElfi^ 
(X3334) 



FROM: 



Attached are two MONs for the Vice 
President. Since I am the new head 
of the Intelligence Directorate at 
the NSC, Bud McFarlane has asked that 
I meet with you today, if possible, 
to review procedures for obtaining the 
Vice President's comments and 
concurrence on all NSPG covert action 
and MONs. I am available this afternoon, 
at your convenience. 



Attachments 
a/s 




Declassify on: OADR 



SECRET ^ 



Is ^ ^ e> 



f-r^! 



492 



ROUTING 



To 


'Nam« «nd Addrtn i Oltt |ln>t<<lt 


1 


The Vice Presideit 






1 












1 j 




1 




1 






ACTION 




fiLE 




APPROVAL 




INfORMATiON 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 




OlREa REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


REMARKS 



UNCDSSSIFI^ 






400499 



NSC/ICS CONTROL NO 
COPY NO 



.OF. 



(CIA ER 83-2861, Copy 2) 
HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notice 

intelligence Soured <nd Mtthodt Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 

Unauthorized OiKloture Subject to Criminal Sanctions 




493 



ROUTING 



To 


'N«mt «nd Addrttt { 04t« |lniti4lt 




Edwin Me«s« III 




















« 1 1 


! 




1 




ACTION FILE 


APPROVAL INFORMATION 




COMMENT 


I PREPARE REPLV | 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 




OlREa REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH 


|$lGNATUR£ 1 


REMARKS 



3 liNimsst^ 






NSGICS CONTROL NO 
COPY NO 



400499 



OF. 



(CIA ER 83-2861, Copy 5) 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notice 

lnt«tlig«o<t SourCM *nd M«thod» involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Un*uthonztd OiKlotur* Sub|»<t to Criminal S*n<tion» 



mmm 



494 



I 

I 

4 

I 

I 



1 






•Ou'iNC 



To 


°N<m« «nd Addrra 0«tf 


initiali 




JaiT\«t A. Ba)c«r, BII 






. 






J 








* 








5 










1 






ACTION 




FILE 




APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 


|CONCU««ENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 


OIREO REPLY 




RETURN 


DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


REMARKS 



UNCLASSn 



met 



^2fi 



i^ 



i 



NSC/ICS CONTROL NO 
COPY NO 



400499 



OF. 



(CIA ER 83-2861, Copy 6) 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notice 
Inttlligtncc Sourcvi and Methods involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthorized OiKlo»urt Sub|»ct to Cnmmal Sanction* 




n'^ULi 



495 



•OuTlNG 



To 


'Namt <nd Addmt i 0<tt 


initilli 


1 


Michael K. D«aveb 






I 


. 


1 


3 








4 










? 




1 




6 




1 






ACTION 




FILE 




APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENOATICN 




DIRECT REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


REMARKS 





\BV 



NSClCS CONTROL NO 



COPY NO 



400499 



.OF. 



(CIA ER 83-2861, Copy 7) 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



{ 

I 



A 



Warning Notice 

lnt«llig«nct Sovircvt and M«thodt involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthonztd 0^IOturtSub|«<t to Criminal Sanctioni 



I'MljZ^IStT^.llil 



!lVlft.Hf>>!'ILI 



496 



90.- 



[ '0 j N*!^* *'0 AOdffM 0*lf i«,I.*U 


1 1 ' Robert C. McFarUne 


2 


' i 


« 


L i 




■ r 

! 1 




1 1 


X 


<ACTiON ! JFILE 1 




APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLV 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 




DIRECT REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH 




Signature 


REMARKS 



yNCLn: 



m Bponcr 



NSOICS CONTROL NO 



COPY NO 



N AZ67S 



400499 
(Add on) 



.OF. 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notice 

Intelligence Sou'CM and Mcthodt Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthorized 0>Klmure Subiect to Criminal Sanctions 



497 



UNCLASSIFIED 



The White House 



iohn ^oindtxttr 


SEQUENCE TO 


■ud M<F«rlana 


/ 


Jacqut Hill 




Judgt Clark 




John Poindaxtar 




Eiacutiva Sacratary 


/ 


SituatioMloom 


/ 


2^ 



Cir,' t 



'^ 4S679' 

HAS SEEN ACTION 



V^ 



Jl 



7Z 



J. 



4o|ru 



■•Information^ A-Action ^-Aatain O-Oiipatch N-No(furth«r Ar 
0ISTRIIUT1ON 
VP Maata Dta^tt Othar 

COMMENTS 



mmmm 



7/'f 
7 



r 



498 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NSC/:C£-4C0499 
(Add-on) 



MEMORANDUM 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

Oe e M f / SINSITIVE July 13, 1983 



N 43630 



ACTION 



MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE 
FROM: 



SUBJECT: 



KENNETH deGRAFFENREIQ^ 
OLIVER L. NORTH \J 

Memorandum of Notification on Nicaragua 



jfft want 



In connection with the^^lMON on Nicaragua, Walt Rayaond has 
suggested that you migntwant to call Ken Robinson and 
Bill Young and advise them that we will be sending up a 
reserve release imminently so that they do not get caught 
by surprise. Both committees are already aware a^th^ staff 
level at least that the program will increase toj/f^^ The 
only issue^^ijjhej^hev receive the advisory not^o^the 
additional^l^mmij^commitment and the 'relationship of 
that advisory note to the Zablocki-Boland floor debate. 
Such a telecon would give Robinson/Young an opportunity to 
express any concern, and for you to make further suggestions 
on how this issue affects our legislative strategy. 

Reconner.dation 



That you telephone Ken Robinson and 

Approve 

cc: Al Sapia-Bosch 
Walt Raymond 



Bill Young. 
Disapprove 



^/SENSITIVE 
Declassify on: OADR 



UNC!,^ 




499 



tfwussm 



N 43681 



National Security Council 
The White House 



. ftc*a9«# ^ga<^?? 



John Poindaitir 
•ud McF«rlan« 
Jacqut Hill 
Judgt aark 
John Poindutar 
Exacutiva Sacratary 
Situation Room 

7 



SEQUENCi TO 



HAS SEEN 



ACTION 




r^. 



•Ratain O'OUpatch N-No furthar Action 
OtSTRitUTION 
yP Maas* Oaavar Othar 



f\J^^^^^^ COMMENTS 



wmmM 



500 







«Ou 


'i\G 






To 


N«ma and Addrttt 


Oatt 


Irvualt 


1 


William P.. Clark 








I 








3 










4 










! 










< 










X 


CAaiON 




FILE 


X 


^APPROVAL 




INFORMATION 




COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLY 




CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 




DIRECT REPLY 




RETURN 




DISPATCH " 




SIGNATURE 


REMARKS: 



llNtlSSW 



NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 



COPY NO. 



N 43682 



400499 



.OF. 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



mmm 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notice 
Inttlligcrxt Sourcn *n4 Method! Invotvvd 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthorized Oitclowr* Subject to Cnmirval Sanction* 




V^n'v- * ■ 



m 



501 



uim^ifD 



NSC/lCS-4004f 

lOMORANDUM 

NATIONAt ItCUmTY COUNCIL 

'"""•T 43 63 3 

ACTION 

MEMORANDUM FOK NILLXAM P. CLAM 

FROM: KENNETH dcGRATrCNREIOftf 

AL SAPIA-BOSCB (iL^- 
OLIVER L. NORTHvJP^ 

SUBJECT: Incrtatcd Funding L«v«l for Nlcaraguan/^^B 

Cov*rt Action 

Attached at Tab IX is a Maaorandua of Notification on tha 
Nicaraguan covar^actipn finding. Tha HON raquasta aa 
additional |HHH[||||B<rom tha Agancy's rasarva for contingancias 
for FY 1983 uTordarto da fray costa o^incraa8a^aetlvitia& and 
bacauaa of heavy axpandituras during JHjJIIHIHjHHppiof Tt 
1983. If approved, thl^jiQul^br ing Tn^Total funding 1 

level for FY 1983 to ■^^■■■i This fa the second MOM \ 



thlj^Ml^bri 
ilnonTes for F 



requesting additional nonies for FY 1983. This HON reflects 
support for continuation of activities approved in the 
Presidential Finding of Deceaber 1, 1982, and mandated in 
NSDO 82. ' ^ 



State (Tab III) and DoO (Tab IV) have concurred in the HON. 

We have also coordinated with 0MB. The State concurrence (Tab III 

Includea th^stateMnt that 'State believes drawing the 

requested HH^Hpahould be deferred until deliberations 

on pending legislation are completed.* Hugh Montgomery at 

State informs ua that this is a 'suggestion.' However, for 

the following reasons, we believe that you ahould approve 

the MON request without delay: 



1. The legislative strategy for Central America is set 
and continuing apace. 

2. The money is for FY 1983 and is to be drawn from 
the reserve for contingency. 

3. Although the full Bouse li)cely will act on Boland/ 
Zablocki, etc., before the end of July, delaying thia HON 
is unlilcely to win us further supporti those against will 
continue agaijiat. 

4. It ia important as a signal of strength and purpose 
that we let the opposition on the Bill know that we believe in 
and intend to continue to pursue this program until such time 
•• the full Congress successfully votes to stop it. 



Declasiify on: OADR 



ilMgiiiS^ncn 



502 



UiluBBSWMllfr' 



Your nwnoranduffl to Diractor Casey at Tab I approves tha 
monias raquastad in tha HON. It also notas that d^^isjigr^^ 
th^DCX'a varbal raquast to anlarga tha rasistanca foreas to 
^^Hj^Bhas baan daferrad pandlng: 

an analysis of tha longar tarn goals/objactivas/costs 
for thcsa forces, and 

- an assessment of how the proposed force level relates 
to the key judgments and implications of NIS 63.3-83, 
Nicaragua: The Outlook for the Insurgency. 

w« believe that this evaluation is essential if w* are to 
properly employ these forces. This process has already started 
and can be completed in the next 10-14 daya. 

Recommendations 

That you brief this MON to the President at the 0930, Tuesday, 
July 12, 1983. 

Approve Disapprove I 

That you sign the attached memorandum (Tab I) inforaing tha 
DCI of the President's decision. 

Approve Oisapprov* 

Walt Raymond concurs. 



Attachments 

Tab I Memorandum to tha OCI for Signature 

Tab II Memorandua of Notification, June 25, 1983 

Tab III Departnant of State Concurrence 

Tab IV Departaant of Defense Concurrence 

Tab V Copies of MON for White House NSPG Members 



9«ew« 



503 



#^£«^ 



On 



^^ ^^ 








VM 



I 



e t. 

•• • 



H 



:82 

•• ■ «> 

o m 








r 



ri. 



.. ^ 2 









I 



- - 2 



/ -)? / ! 




504 



^4- 



'd V 



«. •. -.ointn 



gi'-sOi^^i^^ytl 






National Sacurity Council 
Tha Whita Housa 



Fee 2 6 ^987 



iebHarMfi 
Qrant GrMn 
Colin bewail 
Hul ThempMn 
Frank Cariu«i 
Situation Roem 
NSCS«<r«Uri«t 






ooaoc- 



»A/0 



SiqUENarO HASSIEM (MSK}SiT10N 



i ffy . 



\9mtwtmiUttK. I 



Aa 



■ ■ 



f c VP Itogan luchanan Othar __ 
COMMiNTS Should bataan by: 



(OM^Tim*) 



-1 

Partially 0c::2:si{;-..-:/^e;3:3eJ on^^Ji^? 

under prc'.'i'.ions cl E-0. 12356 

by 3. Reg«r. li^ticnal Security Council 




.t-? 






n: 



^ 



505 



Ll 


•,j'-« i'-c ^z-'is'. Dd'e - ■ j.s| 


Bpj:Nr\ R£G£R 1 y^^ |^^ 






/ 




































ACTION 


FILE 


APPROVAL 


INFORMATION 


COMMENT 




PREPARE REPLr 


CONCURRENCE 




RECOMMENDATION 


DIRECT REPiy 




RETURN 


DISPATCH 




SIGNATURE 


REMARKS: 




.^i 16759 

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. ^°^°'* 

(40064 Add-On Atch'd) 
COPY NO. OF 



HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY 



NSC INTELLIGENCE 
DOCUMENT 



A 



Warning Notict 
intalliQtnct Sourcti and Mttbods Involved 

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 
Unauthoriztd Ois<toturtSub|tct to Criminal Sanctioni 







n 









^ ^5IW!V 



506 



mMMH 

NATIQNAU SECUPiTV CCUNQL 



I 



ACTION 



August 7, 1986 
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER 

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. \Jti/ ~— CIT" 

SUBJECT: Cantral Anarican Public Diplomacy 






\ 



In raspons* to your PROF not*, I h«v« prepared a fflamorandua for 
you to send to Bill Casey (Tab I) . Peter Dailey had a very good 
meeting with my Thursday morning group on August 7, and I think 
he can be very helpful as a adviser to this group. I do not 
think it is necessary to revise the current structure. As I told 
you in my earlier PROF note, I think the structure is in place, 
but it constantly needs to be energized. I do this on a regular 
basis. But having Peter Dailey available in Washington will be 
an enormously useful asset during this next year while we imple- 
ment the 1100 million in Contra aid. I would propose to have him 
meet with the group periodically to critique and review programs 
and processes, to work closely with Bob Kagan, the Interagency 
Central Amerian Public Diplomacy coordinator, and to help coord- 
inate private sector activities such as funding that currently 
cannot be done by either CIA or State. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Bill Casey. 



. Approve Disapprove 

Jllie North, Ray'lurghardtT 



Ollie North, Ray BurgnardtT aQdyVince Cannistrar^ concur . 

Attachments 

Tab I Memo to Casey 

Tab A Public Diplomacy Planning 



DECLASSIFY ON: OAOR 






507 



U 



mm 



'8 40 
THC WHITE MOUSC 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY ^\ 1 ,'' Q . 
Th« Oiractor of Central Intailigcnca 

SUBJECT: Central American Public Diplomacy (U) 

I hav* loolcad into th« question o£ our overall public diplomacy 
effort concerning Central America. A great deal of hard and 
effective woric is being done. It is clear we would not have won 
the House vote without the painstaking deliberative effort 
undertaken by many people in the government and outside. (S) 

The departure of Otto Reich has not resulted in any reduction of 
effort. His public diplomacy coordination office (LPO) has 
continued. Although the independent office was folded into 
Elliott Abrams' bureau, the White House has sent a clear tasker 
to the community that this limited reorganization in no way 
reflected a dimunition of activities. On the contrary, the same 
interagency responsibilities are being exercised, and the group 
reports directly to the NSC. It continues to b« one of the few 
offices in the government that is staffed by a truly interagency 
team, including representatives from State, USIA, AID, and 
Defense. The office chief is Bob Xagan, who is a young, bright 
and effective operator. In reality, the reorganization also 
means that Elliott Abrams plays a strong public diplomacy role, 
and in this way we have harnessed one of the best public diplo- 
macy assets that we have in the government. (S) 

There is a weekly Central American public diplomacy meeting which 
takes place in the Old EOB, chaired by Walt Raymond, and which 
includes not only the four organizations noted above but also the 
White House Press Office and Public Liaison Office, a representa- 
tive froa CZA's Central American Task Force, and key NSC Staffers. 
This group takes its policy guidance from the Central American 
RIG and pursues an energetic political and informational agenda. 
The group seeks to focus both on domestic public issues as well 
as the informational battle in Europe and Latin America. It 
generates requirements for major publication efforts. I will 
have the NSC Staff send you a package of some of the more recent 
publications. The group also works closely with the concerned 
legislative offices to be supportive in terms of the Congres- 

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR 






• 1> » I 



508 



tr 



-> 



RED 



siora; ce=dt« and m a practical way it deals with a -jro^r oi 
on-qoing daily issu«s. As an axafflpl*, issues th« group d«alt" 
with Last w««)c included: 

— Stapa to undertake EC support to Nicaragua; 

-- Tr i o s of U.S. a nd/or foreign persons to Nicafeiagtl^ t dr -t 

greater forngn awareness o£ developments m Nicaragua; 

-- Development of programs to publicize religious repression 
in Nicaragua; 



— Steps to strengthen the EI Salvador public diplomacy 
effort. (S) 

There is a comprehensive public diplomacy action plan for Latin 
America in Europe, and I am attaching a copy for you. This plan 
is monitored very actively by the LPD office, and periodic 
reports of activity are provided to the NSC. (S) 

While this group ensures that the issue remains a high priority 
public diplomacy goal, I share your view that this program can 
certainly benefit by the professional skill and insight of Peter 
Oailey, and Z am delighted that ha is in Washington and available 
to provide time to help this effort. Peter met with the Thursday 
morning interagency group on August 7. It provided him an 
opportunity to hear first hand from the action officers and be 
briefed on their current programs. The exchange was useful, and 
Peter has committed himself to meet periodically with this group 
to help strengthen their effort. Bob Kagan, the interagency 
coordinator, will seek Dailey's counsel on a regular basis and 
will bring Elliott Abrams into this process. (S) 

Peter underscored that the Nicaraguan issue remains a matter of 
great urgency and that the next year is critical. We must show 
progress both in Central America, but also in the eyes of the 
world community, if we are to sustain and support the democratic 
forces in Nicaragua. It will be necessary to "frontload' our 
public diplomacy on this subject so that we can strengthen our 
international support and change attitudes concerning this 
program. Certain themes that he recommended at the first meeting 
will be given serious consideration by the working group. One 
special area of importance concerns generating private sector 
support and funding. His assistance in this area would be of 
greatest importance. (S) 



MiLllfT 




LiSSiflEO 



509 



..a s^-ary, the public diplomacy conwiunitv t. «.-^ 
thmK properly focuss.d. P*ter DaiUy", L«\ '^ f' ^^"^^ ^■■<^' ■ 
able in •n.rgizmg this .ffort. and wi c.«!? i^*" ^* "'•'"^ ^'^iu-' 
advant.9. of his pr.a.nc. to strengthen Ind^^^ '"^•"** •=" ^o*** 
of this progr»n. (S) "gcnen and diversify the thrust 



M 16:03 

Attachments 



Tab A Public Diplomacy Planning 



S6CWSB 






510 



UittJtRd^iirtfeD 



VA'CNAC SECU*"^ -C'.NCiU 



F'<^' 



AL 



Jun* L6. 1986 



MEMORANOLM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT 

Executive S«cctt«ry 
0«p«ctm«nt oC St«t« 

JAMES F. LEMON 
Exacutiv* S«cr«tary 

0«partm«nt of 0«f*ns« 



n l6iC4 



SUBJECT: 



RICHARD MEYEH 

Executive Secretary 

Agency for Internetionei OeveLopment 

RONALD J. POST 

Acting Chief of the Executive Secretariat 

U.S. Information Agency 

Public Diplomacy Plan for Central Aaerica (U) 



The NSC Staff approves the Public Diplomacy Plan submitted by t^e 
Department of State on this subject. We note that there has been 
considerable progress in the realization of our public diplomacy 
goals concerning Central America among European audiences, we 
must, however, continue to emphasize our comprehensive policy 
towards Central Ainerica at the same time that we focus on the 
specific question of Nicaragua. (C) 

There is a need to maintain this as a high priority of our 
missions Europe and Latin America. The opposition is engaged in 
an intensive propaganda effort to sustain their point of view in 
these areas, and our activity must be at a high level to gain 
support for our policies. In addition to the continued provisicn 
of import«nt materials to the field missions, we must keep up a 
flow of speakers to the target areas. We must also seek to 
utillxa, as much as possible. Central American spokesmen to spe^ 
on their ovn behalf in Latin America and Europe. Posts m Europe 
and Latin America should find ways to encourage locals to travel 
to Central America to gain on-the-ground knowledge of what is 
happening. (C) 



DECLASSIFY ON: 



OAOR 



511 



UNIit^Jti^iHtU 



■*■:! fiizii^-i^_ 



Th« liraittd reorganization of th« SLPO fnn^.,^!, .k^ ,. 

sugg.st any dimunition of .fforc. (C) ^''"=''°" "'^"^d ^n no wa^ 

Th« NSC requests a status report of activit-,-- ,.r,^-. . 
impUment^ch. action .plan by August 3l! IgJJ ?S? *" '° 



N 1 6 C 5 

Rodney S. McOaniJl 
Executive Secretary 



DECLASSIFY ON: OAOR 



UlY&^f^lHLl] 



512 

L oiled Suiej Depanmeni of fuie 



i 



^V^i^ trath,r,fU)n. DC. :os:o 



Kay 23, 1986 



0NCL1SSIFIED 



MEMORANDUM TO VAOM JOHN M. POINOEXTER 
THE WHITE HOUSE 



SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Plan for Explaining U.S. Central 
Aiaarican Policy in Eucop* and Latin Amacica 

T^a Dapartmtnt submits hartvith a public diplomacy plan 
foe explaining U.S. Ctntral Amacican policy to Latin Amaricans 
and Europeans. Parts of tha plan focus on explaining tnosa 
sama policies to international political organizations such as 
tna socialist international, tna International Democrat Union, 
and tha Christian Democrats. 



Nicnolas Piatt 
Executive Secretary 



^ttacnaent: 

P'jolic Diplomacy Plan 



wmmB 



513 



UNCM»IED 



PU3LIC OIPCOMACY PLAN 

FOR EXPLAINING U.S. CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY 

IS E'-'ROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 



BACKCROUMD ^l ' tj »- / 

Tfi« Sandinistas cam* to p3w«c in July 1)73 in a coalition vitn 
gtnjin* democrats. However, within we*<s the Sandinista 
National Liberation front (PSLN) seqan a pattern of actions 
reflecting a betrayal of the revolution: internal repression 
of genuine democrats and of non-commanist institutions sucn as 
religious organizations; aggression against fellow Latin 
American countries tnrougn armed subversion; ties witn 
terrorist organizations in Latin America, the Middle east, and 
Europe; and a military buildup supported by t.ie Soviet bloc inj 
Cuba. That pattern continues today. 

under President Reagan, a balanced U.S. policy has "it^n 
followed in Central America. It contains four mutually 
reinforcing elements: 

1. Encouragement of democracy; 

2. Economic aid to improve living conditions; 

3. Active diplomacy for realistic political solutions; 

4. Security assistance to give the people of Central 
America the means to defend themselves against 
axpanded Soviet-Jloc/Cuban/Nicar agjjn suoversion or 
armed aggression. 

Much progress has ^atn made in four of the five Central 
American countries since 1)81: Costa Rica, Honduras, 
d Salvador, and Guatemala are democratic and ire steadily 
strengtheaing their democratic institutions. The U.S. Congress 
has y««c by year provided support foe the President's policy 
throu^a increasing appropriations for economic and security 
assistance (total amounts by fiscal yeir 1933--SS13 milli^-i; 
:)a4--$}3) million; 1)35--$931 million; 1933--$1.014 million). 



514 



UNCUSHD 



GOALS 



-- TO convine* audicncts in Central «nd Soot.i A'ntrica 

(particularly tn« Coneadora and Contadora Support Group 
cou-iyies) and in Europ« tnat U.S. policy toward Ctntral 
A.^crica IS salanctd, wocKaOlt, and tnt Stst altccnativt 
possial*. 

-- To convince audlencts In Latin Amtclca and Eucop* t^at the 
Nicaraijuan dtmocratic resistance nas a cohesive and 
crediDle political proqram and that it is a viable. 
democratic force worthy of the support of the U.S. and 
otner democratic nations. 

— TO demonstrate to audiences in Latin America and Europe 
that the Sandinistas support international teeroclsn and 
that Sandinista external subversion threatens the nascent 
democracies in nei<3hborinq countries. 

-- TO demonstrate tnat the Sandinistas consciously and 
systematically violate human rights. 

-- TO convince audiences in Latin America and Curop* that the 
united States seeKs only that the Sandinistas deliver on 
t.neir promises ot 1979 to the organization of American 
States: that we believe that the best way to do this is 
for the Sandinistas to engage in dialogue with the 
opposition; that the Contadora process, if It can meet our 
three requirements tnat it be comprehensive, simultaneous, 
and verifiable, is an alternative we can support. 

-- TO demonstrate to audiences in Latin America and Europe 
now Sandinista ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union adversely 
affect U.S. and their own national security interests. 

-- TO persuade the internationals (Socialist international, 
Christian Democrats, International Democrat Union, etc.) 
to speaK out on their concern for civil and human rights 
in Nicaragua, Sandinista intervention in neighboring 
countries, and Sandinista ties with international 
terrorists; and to encourage the internationals to oppose 
aid to the Sandinistas for the same reasons. 

-- TO counter Sandinista disinformation activities with ficts 



515 



l!t*»« 



3 - 



AOOITIOSAL GOALS IN LATIN AMERICA 



M i6Cq: 



TO eonvinct ent coantrits of Ctntral Antriea that en* 
Unlttd States snacts thtir political and tconomic goals 
atd can d« counted upon to sticK witn tntn for tna long 
hauL*(tn* U.S. is a rcliaOl* ally). 

To pcrsuad* Ctntral American govcrnmant, political, 
churen. and labor leaders to be more active in telling tne 
Central American story in Europe, South America, Mexico, 
and the Caribbean. 



ADDITIONAL COAL IS EUROPE 

— TO convince European publics that the U.S. is responding 
in a constructive manner to the desires of Central 
American nations for political and economic reform. 



THEMES 



Stress positive aspects (economic development, promotion 
of democracy, security) of U.S. policy in Central America. 

Set record straight on U.S. policy toward negotiations 
with Nicaragua and on Contadora, including Micaraguan 
refusal to negotiate a comprehensive agreement and U.S. 
aid to the Nicaraguan resistance. 

E-iiphasize democratic background and objectives of the 
Nicaraguan resistance, wnile reiterating totalitarian 
nature of the Sandinista regime. Point out militaristic 
and undemocratic Sandinista educational system; exploit 
existence of neighborhood committees and internal 
repression. Remind audiences of Sandinista efforts to 
crusn internal opponents, especially the Catholic cnurcn, 
political parties, and labor unions not controlled by tne 
government. Focus on new Nicaraguan constitution wnen it 
is unveiled by the Sandinistas and on totally controlled 
process in which constitution will be subjected to 'puolic 
discussion. * 

(teemphas ize progress and successes in El Salvador, wnile 
publicizing tne destructive and totalitarian nature of ^-e 
Salvadoran guerrillas. 




516 



N 16oQ9 



explain tn«e cnt unietd St«tts supports enos* p«oplt tnd 
<33v«cnm«.nts who irt fuctntrin9 tn« danocratic pc3cess-<in 
Costa Rica, Honduras, Cuattnala, and d SaIvador--]nd 
sackinq tofostar reconciliation and tnt dtmoccatic 
proctss in Nicaragua. 

.Remind audiancas o{ Sandlnlsta and Salvadoran <)uarril,la 
tias witn terrorists in Latin Arntrica (aiampla, H-L9 in 
CoIofflOia) and alsawnara (includinq Middla East), arms and 
dru9 runnars, and ot trtair Soviat-Cu^an tias. Hantion 
Sandinista practice ot 9ivin9 Nicara9uan passports to 
terror ists. 

Continue to present U.S. position on, and rationale for, 
withdrawal from Nicara9uan case before the International 
Court of Justice. Notet TR* XCJ decision on the merits 
of tne Nlcaraguan case, expected in May, will speck 
Nicaraguan attempts to garner support foe calls for tne 
U.S. to comply with the Court's rulings, likely including 
a Nicaraguan approach to the UN Security Council foe 
enforcement of the ICJ's ruling undee Article 94(2) of t^e 
US Charter. 



ADDITIONAL THEME IN CENTRAL AMERICA 

-- Europeans do not have a clear understanding of progress 
toward democracy in Central America, nor do tney 
understand tne threat to democracy posed ay tne 
Sandinistas. The United States government cannot ilone 
convey that story to Europeans. The Central A.'nericans 
Should take on a snare of that task. 



AUDIENCES 

Political and government leaders in Latin America and 

Europe 
Media in Latin America and Europe 
Tn* Internationals 
Religious leaders 
Academics 



UNS^^IED 



517 




5 - 



M 1651Q 



Mott: Tn« following tnctt «udltncts navt rtaJy access cj tit 

A.it«c ic«n ntw» utiia jnd to U.S. pjslic opinion data. Tn u win. 
ifftcc tntif wiUin9nt«$ to icctpt uttrijls mi infocnjtion 
ii.ntd dlctcely at entm. 

European and Latin American delegations to tne United 

Nations 
Latin American and European diplomatic missions in 

Washington. O.C. 
Latin American and European journalists in tne United 

States 



ACTIONS 



Make increased use of WORLONET as »n interactive medium 
for explaining U.S. policy in Central Anecica (among 
officials to oe sought as spokesmen on ^antral America ice 
Vice President Busn, Ambassador Walters, Assistant 
Secretary Asrams, and Amoassadoc HabiO). 

Speech by President Reagan describing his positive vision 
for Central Americans. This should note ouc greatly 
increased economic assistance, including scholarship 
programs, and our identification with the hopes of the 
people of the region for a better life. The speech snojld 
also note tnat tne door is open for Nicaraguans to srisre 
in this prospect — if their Sandinista leaders will allow 
them the freedom to pursue it. This speech should ae a 
major event delivered on some appropriate occasion, 
preferaoly during the June 10-11 visit of the four Central 
American democratic presidents. Other possibilities nignt 
de to nive the President speak to the CVS or during eitiec 
the Preiident Sanguinetti or President Azcona visits. 

A senior Administration official, perhaps Secretary 
Shultt, should publicly unveil tne second annual cepoct oi 
tne i.i\plenentation of tne Kissinger Commission (or J)c<son 
Plan) findings. This can be an opportunity to demonstcscs 
tnat we recognize the North-South dimensions of the 
pcooleii, and to stress tne affirmative part of our 
strategy. 

For Socialist International in Lima, Jjie 20-23. Stats 
will instruct embassies in the countries represented to 
nake da.^arches to party leaders. USIS Lima will try to 
place material on Central America in tne Peruvian medii it 
that time, and will also distrioute ARA/LPO pamphlets 
presenting U.S. views on Central America. 



> HPlB e » T i iNt r 



UnoLHO 



Sffl 



518 




n 16S11 



USIA will .naintaift • sttady flow of AMPASTS to Earopt and 
Latin Aa«rica to sptak «5oat Central Ancrica. Tn«s« wtu 
&• arranged according to tnt nttds identified ^y posts i-i 
tneic coantcy plans. 

in addition to continuous reporting by its own mtdia, usiA 
will distribute abroad increased numbers of copies of 
studies produced by ARA/LPO. USZA will encourage its 
posts in Europe to translate more ARA/LPO documents into 
local languages. 

DOO will continue its series of researcn/study seminars in 
Latin America on the Strategic Challenges to Regional 
Secur ity. 

DOO and USIA will distribute the ao-plece slide 
presentation "The Challenge and Response' to posts in 

Europe and Latin America. USIA will consider translating 
the show into local languages. 

Put ARA/LPO sponsored 'Arms Display" exhibit at itey points 
in U.S. and overseas. 

ARA/LPO will work closely with lO/UNP to prepare U.S. 
statements and rights of reply in multilateral fora to 
counter Sandinista disinformation. 

ARA/LPO and USIA will be prepared to exploit any 
Nicaraguan intransigence at the Esquipulas, Guatemala, 
summit (May 24-26), and at the June 6 Contidora meeting 
(possible Contadora conclusion), and at Contadora 
negotiating sessions leading up to June 6. ARA/LPO and 
USIA will also prepare to support positions taken by ce 
Central American democracies. 



ACTIONS (Latin America) 

-- Ouelnq President Ouarte's travel to Costa Rica, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Brazil. May 9-22, USIS posts at each stop 
promoted media coverage; USIA media covered in depth. 

-- At the Cost J Rican Inaugural, May a, the U.S. delegation 
took the opportunity to meet with Contadora an-J Contidoci 
support country leaders to demonstrate U.S. support foe 
their goals. 



UMMFIED 



519 



ONCi'^WO 



0«irin9 visit of Uruguayan President > AnPcjbPictei eo 
Washin9Con in Junt, Adniin iier it ion itadtrs will jnjerscor* 
U.S. support for dtmocracy and tcononic proqrtss, 
tnphasiiin^ » positive vision, raentr tnan rtxtaratin^ 
w«ll-<nown Afflcc ican opposition to opprtssion. USIA media 
tfill'covar in full and also assist Uruguayan m«dia 
trav«lin9 witn tn* president. 

USIA will provide full media covera9e and assistance to 
tne workin9 visit of Honduran President Ascona to 
wasriin9ton Hay 26-29. Appropriate q^tes by Aicona will 
be played into Europe and Latin Anerlea. 

ARA/LPO will prepare a caole to Embassies in Central 
America instructin9 them to discuss with 90vernment 
officials, political, church, and labor leaders the need 
to tell tne central American story in Europe, a special 
effort will be made to persuade President Ouarte to be9in 
a public affairs effort in Europe. 

000 Policy Support Staff prepared special briefing and 
display materials on Central America for use at the 
meeting with air force chiefs of staff froa 20 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries May S-9. Similar 

materials and briefings will be given to air force 
intelligence chiefs from 20 Latin American and Caribbeaa 
countries wnen they meet at Homestead AFB, Florida, in 
August 1936. 



gOllMBgt lT »> fe4 y !) 



520 



UNCLASSIFIED 



N 43685 



if'-'jra 



521 



ercgrapric i ran scrip: cr 




Select Committee on 

Secret "lilitary Assistance to 

Iran and the '.licaraguan "^poosition 



UNITED STATES SENATE 



DEP0SITIO«J '-F D0:TALD REGAN 

Tuesday, March 3, 1937 
. (3:15 p.m.) 



endtf pravgiooi of LO. 1235S 
5y 3. Reger, Natfcnal Security Council 



Washington, D.C. 




(202) 623-9300 
20 ? STRiZT, 5J.W. 
WASaiNGTCN, D. C. 200 OL 




I 



523 



BNCLASSIFIEir 



^<f^r\^ 



'', ^ • /'^ ""^ *!«% 



DEPOSITION OF DONALD REGAN 



TUESDAY. MARCH 3. 1987 



5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



United States Senate , 
Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opoosition, 
Washington, D. C. 
Deposition of DONALD REGAN, a Witness herein, 
called for examination by Counsel for the Senate Select 
Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opoosition, pursuant to notice, the Witness 
being duly sworn by ANNE P. HOROWITZ, a Notary Public in 
and for the State of Maryland, at Conference Room No. 475. 
Old Executive Office Building, 17th & Pennsylvania, N.W., 
Washington, D. C.7 at 3:15 o'clock, o.m., Tuesday, March 3. 
19S7, and the oroceedings being taken down by Stenomask 
by ANNE P. HOROt^TZ , and transcribed by her. 



ALDIRSON REPORTINS COMPANY. INC. 
20 f ST.. N.W , WAJHINCTON. DC. 20001 (202) 621-9300 



mMSim 



o^ 



i;u:j± 



b w s^ M ^ 



524 



UNCLASsine 



APPEARANCES 



On behalf of che Senate Select Committee on Secret 

Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 
ARTHURL. LIMAN, Senior Chief Counsel 
PAUL 3ARBAD0R0, Senior Deputy Chief Counsel 
MARK BELNICK. Executive Assistant to the Chief Counsfe 

On behalf of the House Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

MEIL EGGLESTON, Deputy Chief Counsel 
GEORGE VAN CLEVE , Chief Minority Counsel 

On behalf of The '^Tiite House: 

JAY B. STEPHENS, Deputy Counsel to the President 
C. DEAN McGRATH, JR., Associate Counsel to the 
President . 



AIDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. 
20 f ST . N W . WASHINGTON. OC 20001 (2021 »2i-«]00 



IINCLASS0 



J-'^^-f^tp^ 



rr? 



525 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



f- <ODCWORD 



N- T 



Deoosition o' 



Donald Regan 



Exaninacion by Counsel for che 
Senate Select Conmittee -- aaae 



EXHIBITS 

Regan Number 1. 
Regan Nunber 2 
Regan Number 3 
Regan Number 4 

Pages after vhich material is to be inserted: 



Page 
40 
64 
67 
67 

22 
33 



Thia document ii th« propcny of tb« S«n*te and remainj onder its control through the Select 
Committee on InteiU^nce. It u provided for limited purposo relited to con^resaion*! oversight 
of intelligence »ctiv.tie». on condition thit it will not be released or otherwise disseminated irithout 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Execut.ve Branch personnel 
whose oif.ciai duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



mmsMk 



AftPWAfn 



527 



UNCLASSIFIED 



'^,'- 



2 

3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

10 

n 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



PROCEEDINGS 




IfflEREUPON, 

DONALD REGAN, 
a Witness herein, called for examination by counsel for 
the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opoosition, having been first 
duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified 
as follows: 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE 
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND 

THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 
BY MR. LIMAN: 
Q. Mr. Regan , I read your orior testimony before 
the Senate, and I am going to try to avoid repetition and 
pick up where they left off. 

I would like to begin with a recent event, the 
day of November 24, 1986. That was a Monday. 

Is that the day that the Attorney General told you 
and the President that he had discovered that some of the 
proceeds from the Iranian arms sale had gone to the Contras? 
A. Yes. 

Q. Did he tell you that at a special meeting that was 
called by him? 
A. Yes. 



ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. 
20 f ST.. N.W.. WASHINGTON. O.C. 20001 (2021 62I-9300 



HriJNfJtt 




528 



mumm 



i/-: 



S' 



V^ 



Elaborating a lictle bit on thac , he asked me 
earlier in the day -- I believe at the National Securitv 
Council or MSPG meeting or some such meeting earlier that 
day -- for some time with the President in the afternoon. 

We set the time at 4; 15. It actually took place 



at 4:30 

q. 

A. 



And did he tell you what was on the agenda? 
No. 

He said that he had what he thought was a smoking 
gun, or words to that effect, and he had to nail down 
something else; and as soon as he got that nailed down, he'd 
be able to talk to the President. 

Q. Had you heard any rumors before you met with the 
President and the Attorney General about any diversion of 
proceeds of the Iranian arms sales? 

A Absolutely not. 

Q. Had there been any discussion before this meeting 
with the Attorney General of what had happened to the proceeds 
of the arms sales? 

A. Absolutely not. 

0. How long was the meeting with the Attorney General? 

A. At least 30 minutes; perhaps 40 minutes. 

Q. As I understand your prior testimony, the President 
was shocked at the news that was conveyed. 

A. Very definitely. 



ALOERSON REPOKTING COMPANY. INC. 
20 f ST . N.W . WASHINCTON. O.C. 20001 12021 621-9100 



wmvm 



529 



IIWCt/r^^Qinrn 



18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



0. And so were you? 
A. Yes. 

Q. Did Che ACtorney General say chat he had alreadv 
spoken to Admiral PoindexCer? 
A. Yes. 

Q. And can you recall now whaC he cold you and Che 
Presidenc Chat Admiral PoindexCer had said? 

A. I believe Chat he said Chac he had talked to 
Admiral Poindexter, who had admitted that he knew something 
of this, but he did not go into a lot of detail about 
what Admiral Poindexter "s role in any Contra dealings might 
have been. 

Q. Did Che ACCorney General make any recommendations 
as to what the President should do? 

A. I'm not sure who spoke first; but. among the 
Chree of us, we quickly agreed Chat we had Co go public 
with this, we had Co puc ic all out in the open. 

The Attorney General, I believe at that meeting, 
agreed with that and said there would probably be a role 
here for an independent counsel. 

I believe I was the one that said I think that 
there should be a oress conference and that the President 
should outline it but leave details to the Attorney General. 

Q. Now, in the period that led up to this bombshell 
of a disclosure to you. there had been a presidential speech 



AIDERSON RIPOBTING COMPANY. INC. 
10 F ST.. N.W., WASHINGTON, O.C. 10001 (202| 618-9300 




C^v, 



-^ 



^ 



530 



m\m/m 



T CODEWOR D 



2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

3 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



and a presidential oress conference dealing with Iran. 
Am I correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. In connection with those events, had vou spoken 
to .Admiral Poindexter? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Had you spoken to Colonel North? 

A. Never. 

0. Had you asked Admiral Poindexter if there were 
anything embarrassing that had not been disclosed? 

A. I don't believe I used that word, "embarrassing." 
I did ask Admiral Poindexter about whether or not 
we had all of the facts and whether the President was aware 
of all of the facts in this case, both before the radio, the 
TV address, and before the oress conference. 

Q. And what did Admiral Poindexter sav to you? 

A. He said ves. 

I don't want to quote him exactly because I'm not 
certain; but he led me to believe that all of the facts were 
known to the President. 

0. Would it be fair to sav, therefore, that your 
reaction, when you were told this by the Attorney General, 
was one of at least disappointment in Admiral Poindexter? 

A. It was a shock to me to hear that anyone had 
done this, and the fact that Admiral Poindexter was involved 



Thia document ii th* property of the Senate ind renudna onder ita control through the Select 

Cormnittee on Intelligence. It ia provided for limited purposes related to congTeuional oversight | 

of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without • 

permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel j 

whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. i 



mmmk 



aPEWOBCf 



531 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
\2 I 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



ilNCLftS SlHt^CRCT CODEWORD 

was incomDrehensibLe to me . 

Q. Why was chat? 

A. Because I thought of Admiral Poindexter -- and I 
stilt do; I still can't understand this -- as a man of 
probitv, of honesty, as a man of high intellect, a leader. 
a Vice Admiral in the ^avy , Number One in his class, a Ph.D. 
in Dhysics, nuclear physics. It was inconceivable to me that 
a man with that background would not have told the President 
of the United States everything about a situation of this 
nature . 

Q. Now, did you try to reach Admiral Poindexter that 
day. which was Monday -- we are still on the 24th? 

A. No. 

I did the next morning. 

0. T^7hy didn't you try to reach him on the 24th? 

A. Mv state of mind, plus -- 

7- Describe that state of mind, please. 

A. Sick, offended, generally down in the dumps -- 
that type of feeling -- plus wondering, my God, what do we 
do about this President and getting the facts out, how do we 
handle press inquiries, things of that nature. 

Q. Was there any discussion by the Attorney General 
with the President and you of whether a diversion would have 
violated law? 

A. The Attorney General, I believe, told the President 



This document is the property of tlw Senate and remains under iti control through the Select 
Committee on Intelli^nce. It is provided for limited purposes related to congressional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to thes« restrictions and controls. 



WMsm 



CODEWOn i X - 



532 



UNClIWi 



T CODCWORD 



i 



^ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



chaE he had FBI personnel looking further into this matter, 
and would continue with his investigation and then turn over 
to an individual , an independent counsel whatever evidence 
he was able to find of any criminality. 

O. Was there any discussion of the Boland Amendment? 

A. I believe the Attorney General did mention there 
might have been the oossibility of a violation, and he would 
have to look further into that. 

n. ;\niat I am getting at is you have described the 
President's shock, your own feeling of shock and disappointmen 

VThat was it about the fact that funds were given 
to the Contras that caused this reaction? 

A. The oossibility, maybe indeed the probability, of 
some type of violation of the law that might necessitate 
a further prosecution. Secondly, the fact that we realized, 
from a political as well as a public relations point of view, 
that this was devastating, devastating to this President, 
devastating to the cause of the Contras. 

Q. Did you have any discussion about what should be 
done with Oliver North? 

A. I think that the Attorney General reconimended that 
North be suspended during this further investigation and the 
President agreed. 

Q. And when you say "suspended," my understanding 
is that he was reassigned. 



This document i« the property of the Senate and remaini under it« control through the Select 
Committea on Intelligence. It i« provided for limited purposes related to conirrestional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will notiie released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to theaa restrictions and controla. 



UliOXIROOITvEV 



ewwew- 



533 



M 



S| f | [ft<:RET CODEW ORir 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



. A. Well, that's all I'll say for now, because I don't 
recall any further -- I used that word, "susoended," that 
somehow or other he be relieved of his current assignment. 

1. And what about Admiral Poindexter? 

A. Nothing was said about Poindexter at that time. 
The following morning, the morning of the 25th, 
at breakfast-time, I visited John Poindexter. 

Q. Before you get to that, let me still stay with that 
day. 

You said before that you had not spoken to Colonel 
North. Do I understand that you have never spoken to Colonel 
North? 

A. Onlv pleasantries, or generalities. I never talked 
to North about any specific aspects of his job, nor mine. 

Q. And what occasions did you have to explain 
pleasantries? 

A. I would see North in groups of people, particu- 
larly groups of people who might be coming in to visit the 
President or before whom the President was to appear to 
speak to that group. 

I never talked to North alone . 
The one time that I had any kind of serious 
discussion with North was after the TV speech by the 
President, which was -- when -- November 19 or thereabouts. 

0. And what happened then? 



This dociunent ia the property of the Senate *nd remains ondcr iti control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purposes related to eonffressional oversight 
of intelligence activitiei, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern ita subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



B ET C ODEWORD - 



534 



CLA SStf t E?"" ^ootw m) 



^ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A. There was discussion as Co whether or not: the 
President had misspoke regarding a third country in his 
TV speech. 

MR. STEPHENS: This would be the press conference. 

THE WITNESS: Excuse me. This was the nress 
conference, the press conference, and a group of us, after 
saying good night to the President in the quarters, walked 
over to th^ Roosevelt Room, where another group of oresidentia 
advisors Me*€ assembled, wa c a hing the talk. And there, we 
found them in a discussion. North was in that group. 

I recall hiji looking at some papers he had and 
talking about Israel, and arms shipments and the like. 

I talked in general terms to those oeople, saw 
Chat among Chem chey were going Co cry Co gee Co che boCCom 
of ic , because Chere were press represenCatives there, 
legal people, and so on. I felt they didn't need ray 
presence. I left. 

As I was going out the door, one of my assistants, 
David Chew, said to me -- one of the President's assistants, 
I should say, not my assistants, one of the President's 
assistants, David Chew, said to me did you notice that 
North had a chronology from which he was reading? I said 
no, I didn'c know that was a chronology. He said, "It is. 
Why don't you get a copy of that so you know what has gone on? 

That is the first that I heard of a chronology. 



This document ii the property of the Senate and remaini onder iti control through the Select 
Committee on Intelli^nce. It ii provided for limited purpose* related to conirresuonal oversight 
of intelligence activitiei, on condition that it will not be releaied or otherviee disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission i« granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern ita subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



ssci Foaa » 



mmm 



RCT copcwono 



535 



UiiU 



LA SStflHi" ^ T CO DE WO Wr- 



1 3Y MR. LIMAN (Resuming) : 

2 0. I was going to ask you chat. 

3 You had not known that a chronology was being 

4 preoared, is Chat correct? 

5 .ii. That is correct. 

6 0. And you had not asked for a chronology to be 

7 orepared? 

8 A. I had asked that -- John Poindexter, as I testified 

9 earlier, are you sure Che President has all the facts, and 

10 you'd better make sure the President has all the facts, John. 

11 I did not ask for a chronology, nor did I take 

12 part in creating any chronology. 

13 Q. And am I correct, therefore, that you had not 

14 received from Admiral Poindexter in connection with the 

15 President's speech or press conference any written oresentatio 

16 of Che faces? 

17 A. Thac is correct. 

18 Q. And this occasion, right after the President's 

19 press conference, was the first time you were aware that a 

20 chronology had been prepared? 

21 A. Yes. 

22 Q. Did you then get a copy of the chronology? 

23 A, Not until the 21st. 

24 I asked for one from Poindexter on the 20th, buC 

25 did noc receive ic until the 21st. It was given to me and 

I This document ii th« property of the Senate and remain! under ita control through the Select 
I Cnmmittee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposes related to congressional oversight | 
I o! inteUigence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise diisseminated withoat | 
I permission of the Committee. Permission IS granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
» hose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UCI FMM n 




53 



' u 



hUhU\ 



:i o i * 



ff-€eMWOM^ 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Chen, a few hours later, it was sent for and asked that it 
be returned. 



^Jho sent for it? 
Poindexter . 

Were you told why he wanted it back? 
There were errors or omissions in it. 
Had you had an opportunity to read it? 
I eyeballed it and had turned it over to Peter 
WaLlison, the General Counsel, because I said this doesn't 
pass my feel test. "It doesn't seem right to me for some 
reason; read it over, Peter, and see what you think of it." 
Q. And, at that point, Poindexter asked for it back? 
A. Yes. 

But Wallison had it, and I said I'd get it back 
to them in due course. 

V/allison gave it back to me as I was leaving that 
afternoon. I took it with me. I took it home that weekend 
and returned it on the 24th. 

Q. Did you read it over the weekend? 
A. I did. 

Q. And did you find something in it that was contrary 
to your own recollection of events? 
A. Yes. 

0. l<7hat was that -- if you recall? 
A. Well, it was the impression I had. It was too pat. 






This document is the property of the Senate and remains under its control through the Select [ 

Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposes related to congressional ovcrsinht | 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel I 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



MT-eeenvem- 



537 



Ili'iJI 



^4S8ff(^€«f-6eww6fte— 



B 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



- The chin^ flowed much more smoothly than I 
remembered events. 

Q In what respect? 

A. Well, you know, that so-and-so said something to 
so-and-so, and then that led to this and that led to that. 
The whole flow of it was not as I remembered it. 

Q. It was much more disjointed? 

A. Yes -- as I remembered it. 

0. All right. Let's go back, then, to the 24th. 

You met that evening with Mr. Casey, is that correct' 

A. He dropped by for a few minutes. 

0. Now, Mr. Casey was an old friend of yours? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Is he the man who was responsible for getting vou 
into government? 

A. There have been a lot of oeople who claimed credit 
for that. 

Q. You still say "credit?" 

A. I think there will be less claiming that in the 
future, or maybe currently. 
(General laughter) 

Q. But he is a friend? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did you discuss this with him? 

A. Only to the effect that there were --no, I didn't. 
. I 

I This document it the property of the Senmte and remuna imder ita control through the Select ! } 

I Committee on Int«llif;encc. It is provided for limited purposes related to conKressional oversignt | 

of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without ; i 

I permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 

whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. | 



mmm 



RUT COOIWORD 



538 



m 



JO 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



[jgfptffwf^eMwewr 



Let me back up. 

I did noc discuss the orecise nature of what Ed 
Meese, the Attorney General, had told the President, 
n. '.■Jhy was that? 

A. Well, at this point, I didn't know who knew what, 
or who was guilty of what, and I thought the less I talk 
about it, the better off the Attorney General and his 
investigators would be. 

Q. But didn't you want to know what your friend, 
William Casey, knew of this? 

A. I knew that Ed Meese had been talking to him. 
Q. How did you know that? 

A. On Friday, Ed Meese again had asked me for time 
with the President, and in that ti-/ period, a meeting 
which I attended, he told the President that going over 
Ed Meese 's testimony before -- 

MR. STEPHENS: You mean Bill Casey's. 
THE WITNESS: -- Bill Casey's testimony in 
preparation for an appearance before an Intelligence 
Committee, that there were discrepancies in what was known 
and some of^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^And I take it, in using that 
:hat we are all sensitive to -- 
BY MR. LIMAN (Resuming) : 
Q. We are in a Top Secret environment. 
A. -- that there^^^^^^^^^^^Hthat led us to 



This document ii the property of the SenAte and renuini osder itj control through th* Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited puiposei related to conipesiional oversight 
of intelligence tctivitiei, on condition that it will not b« released or ocherviae disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern it* subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



mmswk 



tft rf COOEWORft 



539 






Uni^L 



2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A 5i y^l i9c<ET CO eCWO R fr- 



believe that some of the figures we had didn't: jibe. 

Q. So, you knew that Attorney General Meese had 
spoken to Mr. Casey. 

Is that correct? 

A. Right. 

Q. But here you are, now, on Monday night, with one 
of the worst pieces of news that you have received in 
government -- is that fair to say? 

A. That's correct. 

Q. And Mr. Casey was Director of the CIA. Did you 
talk to him at all about the whole problem of Iran? 

A Only in general terms. 

Again, I did not know the extent of his knowledge 

or and I'm sorry to say this -- the extent of his 

involvement, if any, in the matter. 

So I thought I would be on safer grounds not to 
discuss it with hira, to leave it in the hands of the legal 
people . 

Q. And yet, the next morning you felt comfortable in 
speaking to Admiral Poindexter? 

A. Not about the facts in this, but about his 
resignation. 

Q. Tell me about what happened with Admiral Poindexter 
the following morning. 

A. I went in to see hira while he was having breakfast 



This document U th« property of the S«nmt« tod rein*in» under iU control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purposes relsted to congretsionsl oversight 
of intelligence activitiei, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminsted without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



SKI Fom n 



UNCLASSKm 



RtT COPtWOM) 



540 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 







RET CO D EWORD - 



by hiiTiself, in his office, and I said, "What did you know 
of this, John?" 

His reply was, "I knew something of it, but I 
didn't know much.- I didn't want to know any more." 

And I recall telling him, "You're coming in to the 
9:30 meeting. I think you'd better be prepared to resign 
at that time . " 

Q. And he said he would? 

A. He said that he had been thinking along the same 
line . 

Q. Did you ever ask him why North did this? 

A. Why North did it? 

Q. Yes. 

A. No. 

Q. Did you ask the Attorney General why, to his 
understanding, North did it? 

A. I did not ask that question. 

My memory is vague here. But I recall in that 
meeting with the President on the 24th North alluding to 
the fact that probably -- 

Q. Do you mean Meese alluding to it? 

A. Meese. Excuse me. I'll get it straight -- Meese 
alluding to the fact that North probably did it for good 
reasons, or for patriotic reasons, whatever was done. 

Q. Did you ever have a discussion with Director Casey 



This document if th« property of the Senate and reniaini under ita control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purpose! related to comrressiona! oversight 
of intelligence activitie*. on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



mMsim 



CRET CODCWOI W-^ 



541 



uLASIriWfc ilCRCT CODWOR D 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 






in -.xrhichhe cold you chat he chought Chac che BoLand Anendrr.en- 
was unconsticucional? 

A. Mo-- not unconscitucional . 

"Q. Did Mr. Casey ever cell you Chat after chis 
disclosure of che diversion that he had written a note Co 
North to the effect that the Boland Amendment was unconsticuci 
and that North should challenge it? 

A. No. 

Q. That was never discussed with you? 

A. Never. 

Q. And never, to your knowledge, discussed with the 
President? 

A. No. 

Wait a minute -- do you mean the fact that -- 

0. The fact that Casey was sending North a note. 

A. No. 

Q. Were you aware of the statement that the President 
made on December 1 in an interview -- and I'll quote it -- 
"I do not feel betrayed. Lieutenant Colonel North was 
involved in all cur operations, the Achille Lauro , Libya. 
He has a fine record. He is a national hero. My only 
criticism is that I wasn't told everything." 

A. I am aware chat the President made such a 
statement . 

Q. Was that discussed with you in advance, whether 



This document it th* property of tkt S«tute and remuns under ita control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposes related to conKTessional oversiitnt 
of intelli^nce activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
»hose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNCLASSMft 



CREI CODEWORD - 



542 



RET CODEWOftP-^ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



he should call Colonel North a "national hero." 
A. No. 

Q. Or what oosition he should take with respect to 
Colonel North? 

A. I remember my cautioning the President to be 
sensitive to what he said about North until we knew everything 

Q. The President's statement that Colonel North was 
involved in all of our operations is ambiguous. 

tVhat did you understand Colonel North's role was 
at the NSC? 

A. I'll preface my remarks by the same statement that 
I said to both the Senate and the House Intelligence 
Committees. The NSC does not report to me, contrary to the 
belief of most people in this country. It is not oart of the 
l^^hite House staff in that respect. 

I have charge -- or had charge -- of what was 
known as the "West Wing Staff," a separate and distinct 
entity from the National Security Council. It reported to 
its head, the National Security Advisor, who reported 
directly to the President, not through me, not under me. 

My knowledge of the dealings of anyone except the 
National Security Advisor to the President is very limited 
because I never come in contact with those people at general 
meetings and have no supervisory role over them. 

Coming specifically to the question of Colonel North 

This document ii the property of the Senate and remains ander its control through the Select 
Committee on Inteili^ence. It ii provided for limited purpoaei related to conirressional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminaud without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNCI 




543 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



a * ■■' ow 



Mwe^e^ 



I had orvly a vague understanding of what he did. But it alwavs 
seemed to me that, when you needed a guy to fix something -- 
and I say "fix" in the nice sense of the word, not in any -- 

0. Pejorative? 

X_ --yes -- that North was the guy you called on to 
do it; that that was his sort of charter, or his role, in 

the NSC. 

Q. You attended the 9:30 briefings by the National 

Security Advisor with the President? 

A. Most of them during my tenure as Chief of Staff. 
Q. And had Colonel' North's name come up in connection 
with those briefings? 

A. Occasionally, yes. 

Q. Did he ever attend any of those briefings, to 
your recollection? 

A. Only if other people were being brought in. He 
never came in either by himself or lust as a single person 
accompanying the National Security Advisor. 

0. Now, at these briefings, did the National Security 
Advisor bring his deputy? 
A. Usually, yes. 

Q. Was there somebody who made notes at meetings 
or briefings with the President? 

A. Unfortunately'; I have now found out no. It is 
Q. Well, whe n you say "you now found out." when you 

I Thi. document i. th. property of »»- ^„? "l.d^Si^L^I^^^'"^'*^-"?^'^ 




SECm COPCWOR B - 



544 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 i 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



were there, did vou ever see anyone making noces? 

A. I saw the deputy, usually with a pad, pen or 
pencil, doing some writing. 

I assumed he was taking notes. I now understand 
that he wasn't, but he was jotting down things the President 
was asking the Security Advisor to do. 

Q. How do you have that understanding now? 

A. From my readings. 

Q. But, at the time, you assumed that you had a 
note-taker there? 

A. That's what I thought. 

No one else in the room used a pencil, pen, or 
took, seemed to be taking notes. 

Q. ^jid when you say you now have a different 
understanding from your readings, what readings are you 
referring to? 

A. Press accounts of the fact that there were no 
notes taken at any of these meetings. 

Q. Did you, during that November period, when the 
President was getting ready for his address and his 
press conference, when you wanted to be sure that you 
had a correct understanding of the facts, ever ask Admiral 
Poindexter if there were notes of the briefings with the 
President? 

A. No. 



This document ii tha property of th« Senate and reznaini onder iu control throngh the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ij provided for limited purpon* related to conirreuional oversight 
of intelligence activitiei, on condition that it will not be relaaied or otherwiae diueminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permisaion is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch peraonnel 
vhose official duties concern ita subject matter, lubject to thcM reatrietions and controls. 




RiT CODWO RP l 



545 



mmm 



CRCT CODEWO i tP ^ 



Q ■ And I cake it Admiral Poindexcer never mencioned 
anv notes Chat might help refresh the recoUection of the 
participants? 

A. "^o. He-never did. 

Q. In connection with the President's speech in 
^Iovember and his press conference, what was your role in 
connection with the speech? Did you review a draft of the 

speech? 

A. Yes That is a normal procedure that I followed 

on all TV soeeches . 

The first drafts would go out. They'd be circulated 
among several people. Then the second draft. I'd see each 
draft as it was finished. 

Q. Who put together the facts that would be 
available to the speech writers? 

a: In connection with anything having to do with 
foreign policy -- and this did -- it would have been the 

NSC staff. 

Q. And that would have come up through Poindexter 

to the speech writers? 

A. Yes -- or the speech writer may have worked directly 

with a member of the NSC staff. 

0. Who was in charge of the President's address on 
November 13, the speech writer? 

A. O h. I'll have to get that for you. I don't 

I Thi. document i. th. property of »h. feaat. .nd «B*inj^d« iu co^^ i 

Committee on IntelU^enee. It •«.P""ded '" '^''T* P""^^ „ ^thii^^IJ^Sin.ted »ithlut 



mmm 



uan c ootwon p 



546 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
IS 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



recall which among chem was the one. 

[The informacion referred co follows:] 
COMMITTEE INSERT 
BY r-TR. LIMAN (Resuming) 

Q. Were chere any problems that you encountered with 
the facts in that speech? 

A. I recall it going through several versions, and I 
recall my becoming exasperated and saying, you know, come 
on, time's short, we have to get this thing finished. 

Q. Do you remember any problems with the versions? 

A. I can't put my finger on a particular problem. No. 

Q. Do vou remember any conversation with the Secretary 
of State about the speech? 

A. Not before the speech. 

Q. Do you remember one right after the speech? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Tell us about that. 

A. The following day, which would have been the 
20th -- 

Q. The speech was the 13th. The press conference 
was the 19th. Which one are you referring to? 

A. Excuse me. I am referring there to the -- 

Q. The press conference? 

A. -- press conference. I do not recall hearing 
from the Secretary of State regarding the speech. 

{ Thir document ii tha property of the Senate (nd remain! onder it< control through the Select | 
J Committee on Intelligence. It U provided for limited purpose* related to conrrressional oversight 
I of intelligence activttiei, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without | 
I pennission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel ' 
vhose o-iicial duties concern its subject matter, subject to Jiese restrictions and controls. 



SKI rem n 




CT CODCWORDu 



547 






1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



I SECnCT CODEW O RD ^ 



23 



Q. . You did hear from him righc after che oress 
conference? 

A. Exactly. 
'^. And that would have been November 20? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And what happened? 

A. He told me that there were quite a few inconsistenci«' 
in the President's speech, and he thought he should bring 
these to the President's attention. 
He was quite upset. 

Q. Was he talking about the speech or the press 
conference? 

A. The press conference. 

'■^at I meant by "the speech" was the President's 
opening remarks and answers. 

Q. Did he tell you what the orobleras were that he 
had with it? 

A. Only in general terms. 

Q. What did he say? 

A. He said that these were incorrect facts that the 
President had been furnished, and that he thought he 
should set the record straight as to what happened. 

0. Did he tell you that one of the things that 
bothered him was that in the oress conference, the President 
had said that all -- and the speech -- that all appropriate 

I This document ii tha property of the Senate and remain* under iti control through the Select 
i Committee on Intelli^uice. It is provided for limited purposes related to conitTeasional oversight | 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without | 
permission of the Committee. Permiasiun is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel | 
I whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 




tCRET CODEWORD 



548 



y 



i^-U'Lt- 



€M^-40&£W0ftB- 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Cabinec officers had been consulted in connection with the 
Iranian initiative? 

A. That was one of the five or six that he mentioned. 

Q. Now you testified before the Senate Committee 
that the Secretary of State was not part of the discussion 
process before the McFarlane mission. 
Do you recall that? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Was there a decision to exclude the Secretary of 
State from that process relating to the McFarlane mission? 

A. Nothing that was discussed in front of me, in that 
regard regard. 

0. vou knew by May of 1986 that the Secretary of State 
had been opposed to the Iran mission -- is that fair to say? 

A. That's right. 

0. Did you have any understanding as to why the 
Secretary of State was being excluded from knowledge of the 
McFarlane mission? 

A. Most of the discussion of the McFarlane mission 
took place during the 9:30 briefing of the President, not 
at an NSPG or an NSC meeting called for that particular 
purpose. And, accordingly, just by the timing alone, the 
Secretary of StateT Secretary of Defense, and others would 
not be present. 

0. But they get up early, don't they? 



Thia document i( tha property of the Senate tnd renuinj osder its control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It i> provided for limited purposes related to conirresaional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will norbe released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Com.-mttee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



sxi mm » 




- TOT SECR i l COD E WORD ^ 



549 






; r e t co d eword 



- A. ■ Well, they're just never at Che 9:30 meeting. 

0. If the President wanted them to be involved, thev 
could have been involved. That's fair to say? 

A. That is fair to say. 

Q, And that there was at least a conclusion reached 
that they shouldn't be involved? 

A. I don't recall anyone discussing that in front 
of me where I could agree with that. 

That may have happened because of the timing, but 
I don't recall anyone actually specifically saying to the 
President or saying to me should the Secretary of State 
be here or not . 

Q. You also, in addition to being the Chief of Staff, 
regarded yourself as an advisor and friend of the President. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did you ever say to him in connection with the 
McFarlane mission don't you think we ought to get the 
Secretary of State in? 

A. No. I don't recall my saying that. 

Q. The McFarlane mission was a significant event, 
wasn't it? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Was there any thought that was given to the 
possibility that McFarlane might even not be able to get 
out of Iran? 



This document U tha property of the Senate and lemaini nnder itj control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It i* provided for limited purpose! related to conirressional oversiKht 
of intelligence activiti.«a, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
pennission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



HSSilJl 



SECRET COBIWORD 



550 



2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 I 
14 
15 ! 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



. A. Yes. 

Q. And did you understand Chat McFarlane was going to b-; 
going in under a false oassporc? 

A. ^lo. 

0. Buc chere was a recognition that the Iranian 
Government or elements there might seize him? 

A. Yes. 

0. And, therefore, you were taking a significant 
risk in sending McFarlane there? 

A. Yes. 

0. And here was a man who, as a former National 
Security Advisor, was the repository of many of the nation's 
secrets . 

A. Yes. 

Q. And you had heard stories before that Mr. Buckley 
had been tortured in order to get secrets. 

A. Yes. 

0. What kind of discussion was there with the 
President about • whether it was wise to take this risk of 
sending McFarlane over there? 

A. There was some discussion in early May about who 
should go. It had to be a man, a person of competence, 
who would understand the issues, but a person who could 
get in and out of the country without causing much 
disturbance or observation. 



This doeumtnc is the property of the Senate and remains onder ita control through the Select 
C'~inmittee on Intelligence. It i> provided for limited purposes related to conirresaional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
pel mission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose otticial duties concern ito subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNCLI^SSii 



KRET CODEWORD 



551 



I 

1 I 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 

10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



m-jm 



Obviously, this ruled out elected officials. It 
ruled out leading people in the administration. 

The question then revolved around whether or not 
it should be the National Security Advisor himself or a 
special emissary. 

After the discussion, it was decided that it should 
be a special emissary. 

Q. But was there any discussion about the risks that 
vou were taking in sending someone who possessed the kind 
of sensitive information McFarlane had? 

A. Yes. VJe knew that there was that risk. 

But, on the other hand, "IcFarlane was one who 
certainly understood the issues a lot better than someone 
who would have had to have been briefed on the issues, 
who hadn't been in the game, as it vere , before his going 
to Iran. 

Q. Was there any discussion about trying to have that 
meeting on neutral territory? 

A. Yes. 

Q. What was said on that subject? 

A. It was said that the people in Iran, with whom 
we were trying to make contact, could not come out, or would 
not come out; that we had to send somebody in there for 
purooses of establishing a contact. 

O. When you were talking about this mission to Tehran, 



This document is the property of the Senate and ranaini under iti control through the Select 
Cnmmittee on Intelligence. It ie provided for limited purposei related to conirressional oversight 
of intelligence activitiea, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



uci Fom n 



wmwk 



CR E T C OP EWQgP 



552 



:•- n ti 



ir'i •^^vil.,HU 



ET CODCWOR D 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



with all- of ics risks, explain to me again as to why ic 
wasn't a natural thing to say we ought to talk to the Secretar 
of State about this so that he is alerted to the oossibility 
that we might have a problem. 

A. I cannot explain in too much detail because it 
never came up as a subject or part of a discussion. 

My own feeling was that there had been, and still 
was, at that time, a series of meetings of the National 
Security Advisor, Secretaries of State and Defense and the 
head of the CIA. They had weekly luncheons. 

The purpose of those luncheons was to thrash out 
differences among them, to relay information from one to the 
other on an informal basis. 

I think I just assumed that something of this 
moment would have been discussed anong them at a luncheon. 

Q. Who was the President relying on for advice on 
whether to send this emissary forward? 

A. Admiral poindexter. 

Q. Was the President looking for advice on this 
subject to Mr. Casey? 

A. I don't recall his talking directly to Mr. Casey 
about this . 

Q. Would it be fair to say -- I'm trying to understand 
this -- that at some point in this whole Iranian process, 
that Poindexter became the President's principal advisor? 



This document is the property of the Senate and remaini under its control through the Select 
Cnminittee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposes related to conirreaaional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



oNcussra 



5CCRCT CODEWORD 



553 



y^HLiSSIfttft6^«£i-£««woiu^ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



- A. Oh, ves-- noc only on this but on many other things 
This is supposition on my part. I have not 
discussed it with Admiral Poindexter nor the President, but 
it just seemed an impression I had that when Admiral 
Poindexter talked to the President about this situation, or 
any situation, he was reflecting the concerns, the opinion, 
of the security community, not just his own personal opinion. 
That is the purpose of the 9:30 briefings each morning. He 
comes in to give the President a briefing on national 
security affairs . 

None of us expected that he would do this all by 
himself, with only his opinions reflected at that 9:30 briefin 

Q. Did you understand at the time of the Tehran 
mission that Mr. Shultz was unaware that it was going 
forward? 

A, I had no reason to believe that he knew it or did 
not know it. I never discussed his role in it. 

Q. Had you been at the Tokyo Summit with the President? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And Mr. Shultz was there? 

A. Yes. 

q. Do you recall Secretary Shultz saying to you that 
he had heard from an ambassador or someone else that the 
United States was still engaged in discussions with Iran? 

A. Yes. 

This document ia the property of the Senate «nd remmiiu onder its control through the Select 
Committee on Ini.ei:igence. It ii provided for limited purposes reUted to con(rre«sion»l oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without | 
permission o( the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to thes* restrictions and controls. 



UNCLASSIMc 



CKCT CODCWOffi — 



554 



^^;i;Li\B«4b««- 



C O D E WORD - 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Q. Tell us what you recall was said? 

A. Secretary ShuLcz came to me to say that he wanted 
to talk to the President eventually, but, in particular, wanteji 
to talk to Admiral Poindexter about something Chat he had 
found out through a cable regarding some goings on in the 
Middle East. 

He said that he was most unhappy to hear that 
there were recresentatives from the U.S. Government 
apparently doing something in Israel that Sam Lewis, 
our Ambassador, did not know about. 

No, excuse me. Let me back up. Let me retract. 
That was an earlier thing. 

The one in Tokyo, I believe, referred to the fact 
that there was a question being raised about the type of 
people that the NSC was dealing with, and there were other 
people involved in it. 

I'm confused here, now. 
0. Did he tell you that he had heard from an 
ambassador that the United States was planning to ship some 
arms to Iran? 
A. Yes. 

There is another time when Shultz came to me and 
talked to me about -- 
Q. GhorbaniSar? 
A. -- Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi, and several other 



Thia document is the property of the Senate knd remains ander its control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposes related to conMressional ovenight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise dissemmated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
wnose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



MCI FOOl n 



luNcuissra 



CCftET CO D EWOl t»- 



555 






3L 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



peop-Le, Chat chev were involved in thaC . 

Q. And he was very uneasy abouc chem? 

A. Yes -- because of the names involved, and the like 

q. But in the Tokyo Summit -- 

A. At the Tokyo Summit, it was Sam Lewis and the 
fact that they were thinking of shipments. 

Q. And he was opposed to that? 

A. Yes. 

Q. What did you say to him, if you recall? 

A. T told him that he should get together with 
Poindexter, that I knew nothing of it, that he should 
get together with Poindexter to find out what it was , and 
that if they wanted to talk with the President, I'd cry 
to find time to do it. 

Q. And did you not know that the Iranian iniciacive 
and the contemplation of sale to amis was still going on 
when you talked to Shultz? 

A. I had not followed it ud that closely. I knew 
that the mission was going to start, but I had not followed 
it up . 

Q. To put it point blank, was there a policy of 
just keeping Shultz in the dark because he was opposed to 
this initiative? 

A. Not on my part, and I don't think on the President's 
Dart. I cannot answer for Admiral Poindexter. 



This document i« the property of the Senate and remaina onder iu control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It it provided for limited purposes related to consrressional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
"iermission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose orficial duties concern its subject matter, subject to theae restrictions and controls. 



MLAS 




xmwms^ 



556 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Q. Vas Chac ever recommended in your presence, that 
ShulCz not be told about what was hapoening with Iran? 

A. Not in my presence. 

O. Did Mr. Casey ever express chat view to you, that 
Shultz really was just a negative influence? 

\. No. No. Mot by Casey. 

Q. Anyone? 

A. It was generally known among those of us who 
attended meetings of the NSC that Shultz was opposed to it. 

Q. Let me go back to the Contra matter again. 
Is it fair to say that the President was 
concerned after Congress cut off funds for the Contras 
with how they would remain a viable force? 

A. Yes. 

q. Do you recall that in the first half of 1986, 
there was concern expressed by Admiral Poindexter about the 
effect that lack of funding was having on the Contras? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Do you recall any briefings by Admiral Poindexter 
when he was National Security Advisor, in which he discussed 
where the Contras were getting funds from? 

A. No. 

Q. Did you ever ask him where they were getting 
funds from during this cutoff period? 

A. No. 



This document ia tha property of the Senate and rcmaina ander ita control through the Select 
Committee on Intelli^nce. It ia provided for limited purposes related to conirresaional oversight 
of intelligence activitiea, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



uei Foaa » 



mmsm 



CRET COPCWORD ^ 



557 



I'sii-Lr.u 



€ RET COD E WORD 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



■Q. ■ Were you present ac any briefings where he discussed 
where they were getting arms from? 

A. No. 

0. Did you ever ask him about that? 

A . '.-lo . 

Q. Did you have any understanding that Colonel Morth 
was involved in raising funds for the Contras? 

A. Not concern. I knew that there were funds being 
raised for the Contras in the private sector? 

Q. How did you know that? 

A. There were people brought into the t'/hite House. 

I recall one time the President addressing a group 
of people who had contributed private funds to the Contras, 
and the President saying that he apnroved of what they were 
doing, that it was a good thing. 

n. Who brought them into the briefing, the raeetin" 
with the President? 

A. I don't know, specifically. I could find out 
on that . 

It was a combination, I think, of our public 
affairs people plus the NSC. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
COMMITTEE INSERT 

0. And did you understand that Colonel North had any 

role in this fund raising effort? 

This document !■ th« property of the Senate tnd remaina under its control through the Select 
I Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purposes related to congressional oversiRht 
I of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without I 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel , 
whose off.cial duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 




CRCT CODCWORJ 



558 



^U'ii 



E T CODEWOR D 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A. - I knew chat Colonel North was present at this, 
but a role -- no. 

Q. Did you ever hear him make a speech to potential 
contributors? 

A. No, I did not. 

Q. Do you recall hearing in the summer of 1985 that 
Colonel North was being criticized for playing too active 
a role in raising money for the Contras? 

A. No. 

In the summer of 1985? 

Q. Yes. 

A. No. 

0. Do you have any recollection of any Congressional 
inquiries or questions from Congress about what Colonel 
North was doing for the Contras? 

Does that ring any bells? 

A. No, it doesn't, not in my memory. I know that I 
have read such things, but not in my memory. 

Q. You don't have a memory of learning it at the time? 

A. No. 

Q. Did you ever ask any questions in 1985 or before 
this whole subject of the diversion came up of what is 
Ollie North doing to help the Contras? 

A. No. 

0. Did you have any understanding in the period prior 

Thi« document is the property of the Senate mnd rem«in» onder it» control through the Select | 

I Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposes related to consrressional oversight i 

of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without I 

I permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel I 
j whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



uNcussa 



CRCT CODEWORD - 



559 






SWHewwoMwom 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 

13 I 

14 ' 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



V 1/ inoi ,^ rn whfiCher the NSC or anv of ics 
CO November 2U , 1986, as to wnei-n 

1 • 1 .„A •jn arranging for military supplies 
personnel were involved Ln arr<iu&j- & rt- 

for the Contras? 

A. " I recall the talk about supplies 
and things of that nature. 

Q. What do you recall about that? 
A. Because there were discussions at the time the 
money was furnished by the Congress as to how the funding 
would be handled, through the State Department, the Congress 
having put that on them, and then how the -- 
Q. That's the humanitarian aid? 

A. The humanitarian aid -- and how that would be 
accounted for. There were discussions of that nature. 
Q. What were the discussions on that subject? 
A. Well, they were, in general, with each one assuring 
the other that there should be full accountability here. 
I believe that it was going to be done through Peter 
McPherson's group in the State Department, and, accordingly, 
that there would be a full accounting available to the Congres 

when they wanted it. 

rj. And this was to be a mechanism to insure that the 
funds were being used for the purpose for which they had 
been appropriated? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And not to be used for lethal aid? 



of inMlligenc .ctivitie.. on ""'1'"°° f^» ;'J^„,^\o pro^ndiit to tht Ex«n.t.ve Br»nch P«"onn.l 

permission of the Comimttee. Pemi"ion i^i ^nUM w pre „,trictJons »nd control*. 

whose official duties concern lU subject mttur, suDjecj w ^ 



UNCL^SSUe 



MT COPCWORD; 



560 



mu 



CRCT CODCWOM ) 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



. A. That's right. 

Q- During this period prior Co November 24. did 
Admiral Poindexter in any of the morning briefings cell the 
President how the' Concras were doing? 

A. There were times -- this is a very sensitive 
matter -- but since this is Top Secret, we'll discuss it. 
In the President's briefing book, quite often 
there is a page which describes the action that is taking 

Nicaragua^^^^^^^^^^^|and from chat the 
President would be kepc abreasc of any actions that were 
going on eicher wich che Concras or wich Che Sandiniscas. 
Occasionally, Admiral Poindexter would briefly 
describe ChaC Co che Presidenc, saying in your book you will 
see this morning such and such. 

Q. Do I understand chat Admiral Poindexter would 
submic a briefing book Co che Presidenc each morning? 

A. Ic's called Che PDB, Che Presidenc's daily 
briefing. 

Q. And how many pages does ChaC normally run? 

A. Well, ic comes in seccions . There is a seccion 
submitted by che Scace Department, a section submitted 
by che CIA, and a section submicced by NSC. The Cocal may 
be 20 Co 25 pages. 

Q. Would you like Co cake a break? 

A.. Could I cake a couple of minutes , to get a Coke 



Thia doeuracnt it th« property of Om Senate and r«maii» under ite control throurh tha Select 
Committea on Intelligenca. It ia provided for limited purpoiea related to eonitrefuonal oversight 
of intelligence activitica, on condition that it will not b* releaaed or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controla 



mussm 



CCRIT C0DCW0Rt)b :^;3u 560 



561 



UNCLA 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

15 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



or something? 

Q. Sure. 



[A brief recess was taken.] 

BY ^TO. LIMAN (Resuming): 

How much in advance would the President get the 



PDB? 



SKI ron » 



A. Advance of what? 

Q. Advance of the meeting with the security oeople. 

A Oh. He got it at the meeting. He read it 
afterwards . 

0. So, then, the book would be given to him by the 
security, the National Security Advlgof? ' ■' 

A. Hand-delivered. 

Q. Hand-what? 

A Hand-delivered by the National Security Advisor. 
"Here's your PDB for this morning." Then we would sit down 
and the briefing would go on. 

Q. And would the National Security Advisor then 
highlight what was in the book? 

A. Most of the time, yes. 

Q. And would you get a copy of the book, too? 

A. Yes. 

Q. What happened to the book? Was the book 
preserved? 

A. It was taken back, delivered back to the national 

I This document is ths property of th« S«n«U and remains onder its control through the Select 
I Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposes rtlsted to congreajionsl oversight | 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without | 
peimissionof the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel ; 
I whose official duties concern its subject matur, subject to thess restricUons and controls. 

S tBEOiXBCT coctr ii r bi m , 



562 



UNCUSSIfl^ 



€RCT CODCWO iffl 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



security people the same day, usually within a matter of 
hours . 

Q. And your copy, too? 

A. Oh, yes. 

Q. And would the President -- 

A. The Vice President also gets a copy. 

Q. Was it the practice of the President to read the 
book? 

A. Oh, yes. 

Q. So that after the National Security Advisor left, 

he would read the book? 

A. We always gave him time-- they still do, I guess -- 

give him time, immediately after the national security 

meeting, so he could read that. 

Q. And if he had any questions, would that occur 
from time to time after he read the book? 

A. Occasionally. 

Q. And what would he do? 

A. Pick up the phone and call Poindexter. 

Q. rxid the book always contain a page dealing with the 
Contras? 

A. No. Quite often, but not always. 

Q. Did the book, to your recollection, ever contain 
any reference to the status of their funds, the Contras' 
funds ? 



This document ii the property of the Senate and remains ondcr its control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purposei related to eongretiional oversight 
of intelligence activitiea, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to theie reatiictions and controls. 



UCI FODII 21 



UNCLASSra 



ccirrr coiycwoii:!? 



563 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 

25 



Stf t [ftcRET CODEWORD 



■. A. Mever. 

Q. Their supplies? 

A. ^lever . 

I'll back UP. If Chere were a top secret drop of 
arms to them, that might be recorded, occasionally, that 
arms were drooped in such and such an area. 

0. Do you recall any reference in the book to 
supplies being dropped to them by General Secord? 

A. No. 

Q. Did you hear General Secord' s name at all? 

A. No. 

Q. You did not hear his name until after this whole -• 

A. After November 25. 

Q. Was there any description or reference in the 
book to the role of the NSC in connection with providing 
supplies for the Contras? 

A. No. 

It was usually a description of what was happening 
on the ground -- the fighting, the condition of troops, 
the disposition of troops. 

Q. Did Admiral Poindexter ever complain that, unless 
Congress turned back on the money faucet, that the Contras 
were going to be in trouble? 

A. Orally. Not in any of this book or anything. 

Q. Do you remember any proposals that Admiral Poindexter 



This document ii th« proptrty of the Scnmte »nd ranaini nnder iU control through the Select I 

Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purpose* related t« eongreswon*! ovepi(?ht 
of intelligence ectivitiet, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without ] 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel j 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNCLAS SWEBdttT zmzm 



564 



UNCLA$$llilB««- 



^oMwem) 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



made for geccing money? 

A. Only Che Legislative ones chat we were all working 
on. 

Q. Do you recall a meeting in May of che MSCPG , where 
Che raaccer of funding for che Contras was discussed? 
A. '^/hac was chac dace? 

Q. I'll give ic Co you right now. It was May 16. 
A. In 1986? 
Q. That's right. 
A. No , I don't remember that one. 

MR. LIMAN: Would you mark as Regan 1 a set of che 
minutes of the NSCPG meeting, and the meeting is dated 
May 16, 1986. 

[The document referred to, 
documenc number N 10288, was 
marked Regan Exhibic No. 1, 
for idenCif icacion, and is 
appended Co chis cranscript.) 
BY MR. LIMAN (Resuming) : 
Q. If you look at page 2, you will see that 
Director Casey states chat 




Thii document is th« property of th« Seiuta mi renuina nndar its control thrauch th* Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ij provided for limited purpoaea related to eonfremonal ovenight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will nor be rcleaaed or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



mmssm 



CCBET C ODCWORCb; 



565 



UHULM^^i^ rtttBECRCT CODCWO W)— 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 

24 

25 




Do you recall chac meeting now at all? 
A. Just vaguely. 

0. Do you recall any discussion of the fact chat there 
were, several options, including seeking reprogramming from 
Congress, raising money orivately and raising money from 
foreign states? 
A. No. 

I don't recall that specifically, although I do 
know that there were those alternatives. 
Q. How do you know that? 

A. Well, because I was engaged in the legislative 
effort with the Congress and I knew that there were these 
private groups because I had seen some come into the 'Jhite 
House. 

Q. Do you remember any discussion of seeking aid for 
the Contras from foreign states? 

A. No. . 

Q. Were you ever told that^^^^^^^^^Mhad made a 

contribution? 



Thii document ii th« prowrty of tb* S«a»U »nd rem«in» onder iu control throufh the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purpose* related to con(rre»»ion»l oversight 
of intelligence mctivitie», on condition that it will not be relewed or otherwise dmeminated without 
permusion of the Committee. PermiMion is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern iU subject matter, subject to thcM reatnctjons and controls. 



S« FOOl » 



UNCLASSra 



CRIT CQPCWOItP 



566 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UNM Stf f C&CRCT CODCWORD - 



A. 
0. 



No. 



Were you ever told thaC funds were being sought 



from! 



"A . No . 

Q. ^Jhat about I 

A. No. 

Q. Did you have a discussion with Admiral Poindexter 
and the President before Prime Minister Peres came to the 
United States in the fall of 1986? 

A. Yes. 

Q. '-'ere you told by Admiral Poindexter that Israel 
had offered to suddIv some armsl 



to the Contras? 
A. This, again, is vague in ~v mind. But I recall 
that just prior to Mr. Peres coming Ln , there was a briefing 
in the Oval Office by Admiral Poindexter with the usual 
list of people there, and there being something about 
if Mr. Peres says something to you about arms for the 
hostages -- hostages -- arms for the Contras, merely 
acknowledge it and say thank you or something like that. 

But that's all I recall. 
Q. Mr. Regan, let me see if I can refresh your 
recollection. 

When you testified before the Senate, you testified, 
and let me read it to you at page 56: 



Thii documtnt ii th< propcTty of the Soute snd remaini onder iti control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purpoiea related to conirrefuonml oversight 
of intelligence ectivitiei, on condition th«t it will not be released or otherwiae disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern iU subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



IINCLA$SIH£frna>^«»£jitfiu^ 



567 



UNCUS 




ORir 



1 I "The Chairaan: Old you ever learn of any foreign 

2 country providing humanicarian or milicary assistance co the 

3 anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua? 
^ . "Answer : Yes . 

5 "!<nien was that? 

6 "I cannot tell you whether it was in '35 or '36. 

7 It wasi 

8 Does that refresh your recollection at all, that 

9 you learned at some point that^^^^^^^^^^^was providing 

10 aid?- 

11 A. All I know is that I had an impression that they 

12 were getting funds from someolace, but I wasn't in that loop. 

13 I don't know how to express this, but it was not 

14 something that was discussed with me, or my ooinion asked, 

15 or I was told, a "don't tell anyboc ■ but," or something 

16 of that nature. But I gained a general impression that there 

17 was somebody involved in supplying. And, adding one and 

18 one, I assumed it orobably was^^^^^H^^^^^^ But did I 

19 learn of it? No. 

20 Q- When you say you "weren't involved in that loop," 

21 what loop was that? 

22 A. Well, I suspect that what was going on -- they 

23 kept this very close hold. 

24 Q. ''?ho is "they?" 

25 A. The National Security Council, the National Security 

; . This document ii th* property of th* Senate and remaina under ita control thioush the Select 

:' Committee on Incelliycncc. It ii provided for limited purposes related to contrressional ovenight | 

{. of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 

; ' I permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel i 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. i 



mmssm 



CRH CODEWORD 



568 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



l)NCL ASMFIg&"" go p ^woRD 

Advisor and his scaff, and only a few people were involved 
in whacever it was. I wasn't one. 

MR. STEPHEN.S : Mr. Regan, you may want to exolain 
for the record, if you can-- Mr. Liman has pointed out if 
you have an explanation for the difference of your view now 
and the difference of vour view when you were testifying 
before the Senate -- if you can. 

THE WITNESS: Well, at this Doint in time, I have 
read so much and I have impressions so much from the press 
reports, the Tower Renort , and so on, that I am never sure 
now what I did know and what I didn't know at that point. 

All I can say is at this ooint in time, I recognize 
that I was under that impression. But when you say to me 
did I learn of something, I didn't learn of it in that sense 
of the word, that I was told. 

BY MR. LIMAN (Resuming) : 

0. Were you present at any briefings of the 
President by Elliott Abrams? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Were there any discussions with Elliott Abrams 
about going to foreign countries for money for the Contras? 

A. Not in my presence. 

Q. Did you ever hear the President express a view on 
whether aid should be sought from foreign countries? 

A. Not in my presence. 



Thia document ii th« property of tht Senate and remains ooder its control throuffh the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purposes related to conKTcssional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Execut.ie Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



SKI FOMt }t 



IINCLASSIH Efcc BET C0D 8WG RD - 



569 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



0. Was there ever any discussion in 1985 and 1936 about 
whecher the adminiscracion was free to seek military aid 
from foreign govemtnencs for the Contras? 

'A. Mot in my oresence -- other than this meeting 
that you just referred to, and I don't know what's in that 
(indicating) . 

n. And the meeting that I referred to was the 
meeting that I have given you the minutes for, of May 16. 

A Yes. 

I don't know -- I haven't read through this 
document -- as to whether that came up during that meeting. 

0. I'll tell you that the meeting ended with 
Secretary of State Shultz being asked to consider the 
solicitation of other countries. 

Do you recall any subsequent response on that 
subject after this meeting about whether other countries 
were willing to orovide aid or not? 

A. After this meeting? 

0. Yes. 

A. No. I don't recall any. 

Q. You see, it says, if you look at the last 
paragraph, Admiral Poind exter summarizes the meeting, and he 
says , 




Do you recall any list being prepared? 



Thii document ii th« property of tli* Sciuta ind rtmaini ondtr iti control through th* Select 
Cnmmittec on Intelliyenee. It ii provided for limited purposca reUtad to coni^Tcuioaal oveniitht 
of intelli^nce *ctivitie«. OD condition that it will not be releaecd or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Pennisaion is (rranted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern ita subject matter, subject to theaa restrictions and controla. 



wmmsk 



CRET CO I XEWO R P' 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



570 

A. I don'c recall such a list. 

Q. To the best of your recollection, vou never saw 
such a list? 

"A. That is correct. 

Q. Going back just a moment to that meeting at which 
Attorney General Meese told the President about the 
diversion, did he tell you that that was referred to in a 
memo that his staff had found? 

A. No. 

0. I know you have to separate what you now know 
from what you were told at the time 

A. No. I did not know of that memo. 

Q. Have you ever seen that memo? 

A. I have , now. 

0. But you did not see it on the day that the 
Attorney General told you about this? 

A. No. 

0. And you had not seen it before? 

A. No. 

1^. And when you saw it, you saw it in connection 
with the investigations? 

A. Peter Wallison first showed it to me as something 
that had been uncovered and was being furnished to the 
Senate and House Intelligence Committees. 

O. And when he showed it to vou, that was the first 



This document ia the property of the Senate (nd reroaini nnder its control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It if provided for limited purposes relsted to congressionsl oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition thit it will not b« released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permiaaion is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 




I 



571 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UNCLASS HEOcRET codeword - 

Cime you saw chat document? 

A. Yes. 

0. Incidentally, did you have any role in assisting 
in the preoaration of Mr. Casey for his testimony before 
the Senate or House? 

A. No. 

0. Do you recall any discussions with Secretary of 
State Shultz about Mr. Casey's testimony? 

A. In the meeting that the Secretary had with the 
President in the late afternoon of November 20, he alluded 
to the fact that Casey was going to testify on the following 
day and that if he, Casey? had the same inconsistencies, it 
would not be good. 

0. And what steps were taken to make sure that 
Mr. Casey's testimony would be accurate? 

A. The Attorney General had been brought in to make 
certain of where we stood on these things. 

Q. And who brought the Attorney General in? Did you? 

A. I don't know specifically who it was. I was 
aware of it. 

0. Was the Attorney General asked to assist Mr. 
Casey in preparing his testimony? 

A. '/ell, to try to reconcile the differences, yes. 

Q. How was somebody going to reconcile differences, 

to your understanding? 

This document U tht property of th* Senate mnd rcmaini under ita control through the Select 
Committee on Intellisenec. It if provided for limited purposai related to conRTessional oversight | 
of intelligence activitiei, on condition that it will not be releaaed or otherwise disseminated without i 
permission of the Committee. Permiasion is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to theae reatrictions and controls. 



INCLAS$IHiO> 



iC I lE T C O DEWORD 



572 



1 .. A. 'veil, ic was my understanding chat if A were 

2 alleging one thing and B stating something else, that somebodv 

3 should try to find out whether or not A's recollection or 
^ S's recollection was the correct one. 

5 Q. Well, you were present at some of the meetings 

6 at which the Iran initiative was discussed, right? 

7 A. That' s right. 

8 Q. Did anyone ask you for your recollection? 

9 A . No . 

10 9. So that in prenaring the President's speech and 

11 in preparing the Casey testimony, you were not asked what 

12 you recalled? 
I 

13 A. That's correct. 

14 0. But when you looked over the President's speech, 

15 did vou find anything in it that was inconsistent with 

16 your recollection? 

17 A. I'd have to go back to check. 

18 Q. Well, if you did, you would have spoken up, 

19 wouldn't you? 

20 A. Yes, yes. 

21 Q. Do you remember speaking up and criticizing? 

22 A. No. I don't remember criticizing as such. 

23 No. I don't recall that. 

24 Q. You've testified about your recollection of this 

25 series of events relating to Iran. 



This document if th« property of the Senata and remaini under it* control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purposes related to conKmuonal oversight 
of intelligence activitiei, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNCLAS 




573 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A. . Yes 

Q. You testified before the Senate committee, correct' 

A. Right. 

'Q . And you were also questioned by Tower. 

A. And the House. 

0. And by the House. 

As I understand it, your recollection was that 
Mr. McFarlane asked vou Co see the President when the 
President was in the hospital in July of 1985. 

A. That's correct. 

0. ''Jere vou in charge of the President's schedule 
while he was in the hospital? 

A. No. 

T. In order for somebody to <zet to see the President, 
w'no would they have to clear it with? 

A. Me, and I would clear it with Mrs. Reagan and the 
doctors . 

Q. And you were trying to reduce Che President's 
activity while he was recuperating, is that fair to say? 

A. I have been cold that by both Mrs. Reagan and the 
doctors . 

Q. And you've learned Co liscen Co both doctors and 
Mrs. Reagan? 

A. Do I have to comment on ChaC? 

Q. No , you don' C . 



This document is tha property of the Senate and remain! under ita control throuch the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It it provided for limited purpose* related to conKTcsaional oversight 
of intelligence activitiei. on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNCLASSHO 



CCRFT CODCWQRD ^ 



574 



iSJfl^j j CRET CODCWOR P- 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



An;-"vay , were you restricting the President's visits 
to ones of imoortance? 

A. Yes. 
■ Q. '.'/hat did Mr. McFarlane say to you that seemed 
imoortant enough to let him go in to see the President? 

A. He had been asking from day one to get to see the 
President, saying he had something important regarding an 
intelligence finding. But on the second day he told me it 
was regarding the hostages. 

I believe it was on the third day that we finally 
got him in to see the President. 

Q. And when he got in to see the President, were you 
there with him? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And did you tell him that he had 15 minutes or 
something like that? 

A. I said that he had to keep it short, under 
doctor's orders. 

O. The President had had his operation, what, just 
a week before? 

A. Three days before. 

Q. Three days before. 

Was he in pain? Or discomfort? 

A. Uncomfortable. 

0. Did Mr. McFarlane keep it short? 



This document is the property of the Senate *nd remains nnder its control through the Select 
Ccimmittee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposes related to congressional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



SKI roiM n 



llNClASSIM 



ECnCT COOEW O R I K 



575 



UNCLAS^imta£i^£o&ewe<m 



51 



1 ! A. Yes. 

2 Q. That's when he first talked about Iran, am I 

3 correct? 

4 -A. Well, about this new initiative that he wanted 

5 CO undertake in connection with Iran. 

6 Q. Now, do vou actually have a recollection of it 

7 now, as opposed to reconstruction from what you have read? 

8 A. Yes. I know it differs from other people, but it 

9 is mv recollection. 

10 Q. It is actually a recollection? 

11 A. Yes. 

12 Q. What is vour recollection? 

13 A. That at that first meeting, Bud brought up the 

14 subject of the fact that they had been approached by the 

15 Israelis, who had had a contact that they would put us 

16 in touch with that could lead to a breakthrough in reaching 

17 elements in the Government of Iran. 

18 1- And what did this have to do with the hostages? 

19 A. That this could lead to some help in the hostage 

20 situation because we susoected that the Iranians were 

21 in some way connected in to the group who had abducted 

22 Che Americans . 

23 Q. As you sit here today, do you have any 

24 recollection of McFarlane saying that the Iranians may 

25 want weapons as a show of good faith? 



This document U tha proptity of the Senate and reinaini under its control through the Select 
Committee on Intellisence. It ii provided (or limited purposes related to consmtional oversight 
of intelligence activitiei, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNCLASSra 



CCRW COOtWO ML- 



576 



iJNCLA^miJEwiw^wwei^ 



./^ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A. I'm not sure it was at that meeting, but it vas 
shortly thereafter because in the latter part of Julv, I 
recall knowing that there might be weaoons involved here. 

-0. And then is the next thing that you recall a 
C£a**Tig| on this subject after the President returned to the 
White House? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Was this a meeting at which Secretary of State 
Shultz was present? 

A. Yes. 

Now, again, I have a different recollection of thic 
than some others. 

Q. And what is your recollection, sir? 

A. I recall the President being in pajamas and robe, 
so this would have taken place in the quarters. But I can 
find no one who can give me a record of that, that is, that 
there was a record kept of that meeting by the usher or 
anyone else. 

But that is my recollection of it. 

Q. Do you recall McFarlane describing the Israeli 
proposal at that meeting? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And do you recall that the proposal was that 
the Iranians would get some weapons and in return there 
would be some hostages released? 



Thl( document ii th« property of th* S«iuta and remain! under ita control thnuch the Select 
ComniitKe on Intelligence. It ia provided (or limited purpoaea related to conirreitional ovenight 
of intelligence activitiea, on condition that it will not be releaacd or othenriae disKminated without 
permiuion of the Committee. Permisaion ia granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern ita subject matter, subject to theae restrictions and controla. 



UNCIASW& 



€ft CT COPCWORP 



577 



/ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 i 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



A. . No. Not as bluntly as that. 

This was the first time that I had heard the 
word "bona fides." I recall that because of my amusement -- 
if you will pardon the diversion for a moment -- at the 
tJr annnliiJL l o n . It was called bona fide s by these people. 
As an old Latin scholar, "bona fides" made a lot more sense 
to me . 

But that's the first time I had heard it. and that 
was what they referred to, a small amount of arms since that 
was currency in the Middle East among these warring groups , 
that they would want to know about bona fides by having 
this supply of arms. 

Q. Do you recall whether the Secretary of Defense 
was there? 

A. I believe I do place him there. 

0. And do you remember the positions that various 
people took at this meeting? 

A. Everyone was cautious about jumping into this sort 
of affair. That is my general impression. 

0. Was there any discussion about whether under law, 
Israel would be free to sell U.S. weapons to Iran? 

A. I know that issue came up. But whether or not it 
came up at that meeting, I do not know. 

Q. Have you, incidentally, had occasion to see the 

notes, the paraphrases of the notes, that the President made 

Thii docttinent if th* property of tli* S«utc and rcmaina nadtr ita control through the Select 
I Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purpoiM related to concresiional oversight 
I of intellifrence activitiei, on condition that it will not be releaaed or otherwise disseminated without | 
permisaion of the Committee. PermiHion is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel i 
whose official duties concern ita subject matter, subject to thea* reatrictions and controls. 



UNCussra 



CWT cowwonD 



aoA r\ oo on 



578 



ONLl/lSSlie 



CCRCT CODCWORir 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



available to Che Tower Commission? 

A. No. 

Q. You haven't? 

A. Not the notes . 

Q. Or the typed version of them? 

A. Mo. 

That went directly from the President, in his 
handwriting, to Peter WallisonT who had them typed up aoart 
from my seeing it. 

Q. Did you take a position at this meeting in 
August on whether the President should authorize McFarlane 
to pursue the matter? 

A. Yes. 

Q. 'Vhat was your position? 

A. I thought that it was worth pursuing. 

It was an opening. I thought we should explore it. 

Q. Do you remember what the President said? 

A. I recall that he did authorize McFarlane to exolore 
it further. 

Q. Now, as I understand it, the President, then, on 
August 6 or so went out to California. 

A. It was some time in that period, but I don-t know 
the exact date 

0. Did you go to California with him? 

A. A part of the time, yes. 

' This document ia th* property ot the Senate and remaini under it* control through the Select 
I Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purpose* related to conin^ssional oversight 
I o( intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without I 
I permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel ; 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



mmmm 



CCTtT COO e WOTO - 



579 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

15 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



(INCtilSStSf9*««^eewwe.» 3 

■ '^. Were you ever told by the President chat he had 
■ told McFarlane that if Israel wanted to sell weapons, the 
United States would replenish them? 
-A. I cannot recall that. 

Q. Do vou recall at this meeting in the quarters with 
Secretary of State Shultz , McFarlane, and the President 
whether there was any discussion of "deniability?" 

A. I don't recall it being said there; there were 
other times when that word was used. 

0. Tell me what you recall about that. 

A. That later -- this would have been, at least the 
way I olace it, back in September or in through there, when 
we discussed this, that if there were to be any other 
shipments and the like, we couldn't be seen as being the 
ones that were engaging in shipments. If Israel did it, chat 
one thing; but if we were to do it, that would be bad and 
we'd have to be able to deny it. 

0. The Tower Commission's Report refers to Secretary 
of State Shultz 's testimony and notes about an August 5 
meeting and one in January, in which there was a discussion 
about the fact that if Israel sold the missiles, the United 
States could always deny that it was involved. 

Does that refresh your recollection at all? 

A. It doesn't refresh my memory, but I know that that 
type of statement was made, but by whom, I don't know. 

I Thii document ii th* property of the Senate and rcmaini ondn ita control through the Select 

i Cnmmittee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purposei related to congressional oversight 

I of intelligence activitiei. on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without \ 

I permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 

i whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



ONCLASSra 



CRET CODEWOBD 



580 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Q. Do you recall Secretary of Scate Shultz saying 
Chat that would not work? 

A. I do know that the President was cautioned on this. 
But,- again, by whom, I could not swear. 

Q. I want to skip ahead to a meeting with the 
President in December of 1985, and the date I have is 
December 5 and then December 7 . 

Do you recall that in November, while you were 
at Geneva, you learned that there were some Hawks being 
shipped by Israel? 

A. Yes. 

9. And you testified previously that you were told 
in advance that this shipment would be taking place. I 
think you told that to the Senate. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Do vou remember who -- 

A. The reason I am pausing is I wanted to make 
sure that I knew they were Hawks. I knew they were 
munitions . 

Q. Do you remember who told you that? 

A. Yes. Bud McFarlane . 

Q. Do you recall any briefing when you returned from 
Geneva in which Mr. McFarlane described a plan in which 
Israel would sell weapons to Iran in installments , that the 
hostages would be released in installments? 



Thif document if the property of the Senat* and remmini ooder iU control through the Select 
Committee on IntelUjtnce. It i» provided for limited purpose! related to comtressional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNCUS$lilEBc«» 



COMWOtD 



581 



Mmmm 



R ^T CODCWOR D- 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



. A. I have a vague recolleccion of that. But I seem 
to think of that in terms of those Hawk missiles; that there 
was a plan whereby they would originate in one place and a 
shipment would go into Iran, and it would only be a partial 
shioment, and then the hostages were to be released, and 
then -- 

Q. When do you remember that being discussed? 

A. In Geneva. 

MR. STEPHENS: I'm sorry. I didn't hear what he 
said. 

MR. LIMAN: "In Geneva ," he said. 
BY MR. LIMAN (Resuming) : 

Q. I should tell you that the notes that the 
President's counsel turned over to the Tower Commission 
refer to a discussion about the sale of weapons to Iran 
by Israel in installments. The discussion took place on 
December 7 . 

A. Oh, yes. That's a separate meeting. I recall that 
meeting distinctly. 

Q. What do you recall about that meeting? 

A. Well, that was one in the quarters, and, again, 
this is one where John McMahon was there instead of Bill 
Casey. 

Q. That's right. 

A. I remember that meeting. 



This document ia the property of the Senate and leaaina under ita control through the Select 
Committee on IntelliRcnee. It ii provided for limited purpoMa related to conitTesuonal oversight 
of iDtelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNCLA$$»b 






582 



UNW^^J^ 



CRCT CODEWORD ' 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



n. That's the rneeting where he was wearing -- 

A. A plaid jacket . 

Q. -- a flashy jacket? 

At Yes , sir. 

'^. Do you remember a description by Mr. McFarlane 
of an Israeli proposal there? 

A. Yes. 

0. Was it a proposal to sell weapons? 

A. That's right. 

Q. Were they Tows or Hawks? 

A. Those were Tows, at that point. 

Q. And they would be sold in installments -- do you 
recall that? 

A. I am not sure of the installments, but I know 
they were to be sold and hostages brought out. 

Q. I should tell you that, again, the President's 
paraphrase of his notes and, according to the Tower 
Cornmission, Secretary of State Shultz's notes indicate that 
Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger and 
you expressed opposition. 

Do you recall that? 

A. Yes. I have had my memory refreshed on that one. 

Q. How have you had your memory refreshed? 

A. By the President telling me that 




Thii document U tht pnptrty of tlw Senate and reinalni ondtr its control throofh tha Select 
Committee on Intellifenee. It ij provided for limited purpowi related to conirreenonal oversight 
of intelligence aetivitiea. on condition that it will not be releaaed or otherwiae disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictiona and controla. 



sact mm m 



UNCiAsmneb 



RCT CODCWORO 



583 



OMiLA ^^t i MikcnET C ODEWORD 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




Q. And when he cold you Chat, what was chac , in connecc 
wich Che Tower cescimony? 

A^. Yes, as.h^ prepared for the Tower tescimony. 

Did it ring a bell? 

A. Yes, ic did. 

Q. Now I want you Co cell me abouc why you opposed ic. 

A. Well, Che ching had been a fiasco up Co chac poinc , 
in my judgment . Ic had not worked. 

We were dealing with some very unusual people. We 
were fooling around for the better part of six months with 
very liccle resulcs co show for it, and I couldn't see the 
value of pursuing that avenue anymore. I thought we were 
dealing either with the wrong people or in the wrong way. 

And, without passing merits on the information or ch 
plan or anyching else, I jusc said thac I think it's a 
waste of time and we ought to get out of it. 

0. Do you remember what Secretary of State Shultz's 
view was? 

A. He was opposed to it on the grounds of selling 
weapons to Iran would be misunderstood by our allies if the 
news became public. 

0. Did you change your mind between December 7 and 
the January meetings? 

A. I did. 



Thi( document ii the property of tlM Senate and rtmaioi oader its control through the Select 

Committee on Intelli^nce. It ia provided for limited purpoeee releted to conifTeijional oversight 
of intelligence ectivitiei. on condition thit it will not be rele»»ed or otherwise disseminited without 
permijiion of the Committee. Pemtiuion ii jT«nted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern it* subject matter, subject to these restrictiona and controls. 



UNCLASSra 



ccntT coDcwoR eN 



584 



1 '! 

2 



UNCLAIiMlJE 



CR[T CODEWORD 



3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



0. _ V.'hac led you to change your mind? 

A. John Poindexcer's assurances to the President, I 
think first enunciated on the way home on Air Force One 
Let me rephrase that -- back to Washington on Air Force One 
*^rora California. I think we may have had a Mexican meeting, 
a meeting in Mexico, at that time. 

Q. K'hen was that? Do you recall? 

A. That would have been in the first part of 
January, 1986, and the President being briefed by John that 
there was a whole new lead and a whole new plan and that it 
might turn things around, and he wanted to brief the 
President more on it after we got back to the 'Thite House. 

Q. Now, do you recall -- 

A. Oh, dIus the fact that, in the meantime, McFarlane 
had gone to London, returned, and his resignation had become 
effective, and it was now Poindexter that was the main 
proponent here. 

Q. Do you recall that when McFarlane came back from 
London, he indicated that if you terminated discussions with 
the Iranians, the hostages could be killed? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Who did he tell that to? 

A. This he said to the President at one of these 
9:30 briefings, and, again, I believe it was the President, 
the Vice President, Poindexter, McFarlane, and myself . 



Thia doeiunent U the property of the Senate and rcmalnj under iti control thioush tha Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purpose* related to conrrressional overjight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Commjttee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



uei Foaii M 



VNClASSIEe 



[CHET COPEWOUD 



585 






ij 



CRCT CODCWORP 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



, Q. ■ Vas there any thought given at that point that you 
were now in a situation where, having started discussions, 
you were almost being "blackjacked" into continuing? 

A. I wouldn't say "blackjacked," but this was becoming 
increasingly evident, that unless we got on a new tack, we 
would, (a) probably never see our hostages; or (b) the whole 
project would end in dismal failure. 

Q. And in January, when the President signed the 
finding, did you think you were on a new tack? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Explain that. 

A. Well, Poindexter apparently had had new overtures 
and a new plan from these people, which seemed to indicate 
that there was more realism by the people with whom we 
were in contact, and that definitely they would work harder 
to get the hostages out. 

0. But, as I understand it, Mr. Regan, Poindexter was 
still dealing with Ghorbanifar, and you understood that, 
didn't you? 

A. Yes. 

Q. In January? 

A. Yes. 

0. You were still talking in January about the 
Israelis selling weapons and the United States replenishing 
them. Correct? 



Thii document ii th« property of the Senate uid remains under iti control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposes related to comfresnonal oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose orticiaJ duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



iciASsm 



CCRCT CODCWORD - 



586 




RET CODCWORD ^ 



I 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A. AC some point -- 

Q. It changed. 

A. I Chink we were still on that tack, yes. Ic 
was lacer in the year that it changed. 

0. At some point it changed, but in the beginning ic 
was Israel? 

A. Yes. 

Q. So you were dealing with Che same intermediary. 
You were dealing with Israel, and why was this a change in 
tack thac led vou to change your view? 

A. Because of Poindexter's assurances that this was 
a new approach with a lot more realism and a lot more chance 
of being successful. 

Q. So, what it really came down to was that Poindexter 
convinced you that there was more of a ootential for 
success? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Now, do you recall that the proposal that he brought 
in early January involved the sale by the Israelis of 
weapons and the resupply by the United States? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And that that then got changed to having the 
weapons sold by the Pentagon to the CIA and by the CIA to an 
intermediary, to a orivate party? 

A. I don't believe those details were discussed 

This document if the property of the Senate uid remalna nnder iti control through the Select 
Comntietee on Intelligence. It it provided for limited purpoaei leUted to conffresuonal oveniKht | 
of intelligence activitiei, on condition that it will not be releaied or otherwiae cLisseminated without < 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
I whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNClASSra 



ECR[T CODEWORD 



587 



at the January 7 meeting. 

Q. Well, do you recall that at the January 7 meeting -- 
and I will show you the finding -- that you were still talking 
about Israel? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And do you remember that you were talking about 
even a possibility that Israel would release some 
Hezbollahs that it had in prison? 

A Yes. 

Q And these were people who didn't have "blood on 
their hands." 

A. Exactlv. 

0. And that Iran would pledge that it would engage 
in no acts of terrorism. 

A. As a matter of fact, I think it was indicated at 
that meeting, at that point in time that there had been a 
lessening of terrorism by Iran and that they were furthering 
their pledge. 

Q. Now, is it a fact that at the time that the January 
7 meeting of the group -- the Secretary of Scate, the 
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and so on -- 
took place, that the President had already signed a finding? 

A. That has been a peculiarity to me of this 
whole affair, because it is definitely out of normal 
procedure for the President to have signed a finding on 



This docoment is the property of the Senate and remaina under ita control throuth tha Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposes related to conirrcssional oversight > 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel | 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. j 



UNClASSiBEa 



CRCT CODEWORD 



588 



ONCL/ISW^ 



CODCWOR P^ 



1 

2 
3 
4 
S 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



January 6 on a subject chat would be discussed at a meeting 
on January 7 . 

0. Well, you are quoting the Tower Report as saying 
that 'it was signed by mistake. 

A. I have to think that because it would not be 
correct for the President to have signed something. I think 
what happened is that he was given that as a briefing paoer, 
to read on the evening of January 6, in preparation for his 
meeting on January 7, and, inadvertently, he signed it. 
because at the end it did have a place for approval or 
disapproval. 

0. Do you remember him doing it? 

A. I don't remember his doing it, no. 

Q. Do you remember the briefing on January 6 -- 

A. Yes. 

Q. -- before the January 7 meeting? 

A. Yes. 

MR. LIMAN. I want to have marked as Regan 2 a 
briefing paper and the January 6 finding. 

[The document referred to, 
document number N 1323, was 
marked Regan Exhibit No. 2, 
for identification, and is 
appended to this transcript.] 
BY MR. LIMAN (Resuming) : 



This document U th« property of the Senate and remuni under ita control through the Select 
I Committee on Intelligence. It ti provided for limited purposes related to conirressional oveniKhc 
I of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
i permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
' whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



DNCUSS tfect, CO.IWO I .. 



589 



l)NCL*»»»tt 



XQIXiWGfte^ 



s/ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Q. Have you ever seen the briefing memo that is 
attached to the finding? 

A. I probably did. It would be normal for me to 
see this, particularly as it was discussed on January 6. 

The normal course of action was for the National 
Security Advisor to pass out copies of what he was giving 
to the President at that meeting, and then to collect copies 
back when the meeting was over, except for that one he would 
leave with the President. 

Q. You see. it describes the plan as saying ,_ "As 
described by the Prime Minister" of Israel's "e^i!^^^ the 
only requirement the Israelis have is an assurance that they 
will be allowed to mrchase U.S. replenishments for the stocks 
that they sell to Iran. A Presidential Covert Action Finding 
is required in order for us to allow the Israeli transfers 
CO proceed, for our subsequent replenishment sales to Israel, 
for other assistance which may be deemed aopropriate 
(e.g.. intelligence)." 

.,Y<»» haV« actual recollection that the plan was 

for Israel to sell? 
A. Yes. 

MR. STEPHENS: May I interrupt. 

There is no date on this doci»ent. 

MR. LIMAN: There is no date on the copy that I 
have, which I have given to him. But if you look at the 



Thi. d<K»».»t U th. property of tl-' ^„?,f^?,,jrX^1^^^'2r~n«^»"o?.^ 

of int.lUg.n« .cuvitie., on "".^-S?" ,*■' ^l^ntSd to prolridiitto the Ex^ut.ve Branch personnel 

^wrU"om^i°.f ^'uti^,°'r,^.U?:ireit"m.t^r°«bi«5 to the..re,trict,on.andcontroU. 




S IfltBcCRCT CODEWORD 



590 



iUS ^Ifl)"" COD E WORD - 

1 'I covert rinding, you will see there is a date of Januarv 5. 

2 BY MR. LIMAN (Resuming) : 

3 Q. Am I correct that it was this plan that was -- 
4' "A. That, again, by the way, is another reason to 

5 suspect that this was sort of out of order, the signature 

6 on here, because, normally, these things would have been 

7 dated when they are actionable. But if they are just 

8 for memoranda, sometimes they are not dated. 

9 But go ahead. 

10 Q. Do you recall, incidentally, receiving a finding 

11 from the CIA in December? 

12 A. No. 

13 Q. Do you recall any discussion with the CIA that 

14 it wanted a finding to protect it on the assistance that it 

15 gave in the November shipment? 

16 A. McMahon brought that up at the December 7 meeting. 

17 Q. 'That did he say? 

18 A. He said that they needed a finding if they were 

19 to continue on this type of thing, and we should probably 

20 have one ex post facto. 

21 Q. And was any decision made on it? 

22 A. I think all of us agreed that it probably should 

23 be done, yes. 

24 May I interrupt here for a five minute break? 

25 0. Sure. 

Thia document ii th* property of tli* Senate and remains ander iti control through the Select I 
Committee on Intelli^sncc. It ii provided (or limited purposes related to conaressional oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminsced without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch cersonnel | 
I whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. i 



mmssm 



CRET CODCWORP 



591 



f €R E T COD E WOR p-^ 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



[A brief recess was taken] 

MR. LIMAN: Back on the record. 

Would you mark as the next exhibit a memorandum 
dated" January 17, 1936, from Admiral Poindexter to the 
Pres ident . 

[The document referred to, 
document number N 10046 , was 
marked Regan Exhibit No. 3, 
for identification, and is 
appended to this transcript.] 
MR. LIMAN: Number 4 is the finding of January 
17, 1986, signed by the President, with an attachment to it 
of the January 6 finding, marked up to show the change 
between the January 6 and January 17 finding. 

[The document referred to, 
document number N 8035 , was 
marked Regan Exhibit Mo. 4, 
for identification, and is 
appended to this transcript.] 
BY MR. LIMAN (Resuming) : 
Q. Mr. Regan, do you have an actual recollection of 
yourself, of why the plan for Israel to sell the arms to Iran 
was changed between the January 7 meeting and January 17? 
A. No , I do not. 
0, If you look at this memorandum -- I'll put it in 



This document u th* property of the Seamte and ranmim onder iti control thioath the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It i* provided for limited purpoie* related to confrcssianal ovenight 
of intelligence activitiee, on condition that it will not be releaaad or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



uNCussra 



6 0CT CO P tWORD 



592 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



€ftf T CODEWO R D 



fronc of. you, which is Exhibit 3 -- ac the bottom of the first 
page; it says, "As described by the Prime Minister's 
emissary, the only requirement the Israelis have is an assuranc 
that' they will be -allowed to purchase U.S. replenishments for 
the stocks that they sell to Iran. We have researched the 
legal problems of Israel's selling U.S. manufactured arms to 
Iran. Because of the requirement in U.S. law for recipients 
of U.S. arras to notify the U.S. Government of transfers to 
third countries, I do not recommend that you agree with the 
specific details of the Israeli plan. However, there is another 
possibility. Some time ago. Attorney General William French 
Smith determined that under an appropriate finding you could 
authorize the CIA to sell arms to countries outside of the 
provisions of the laws and reporting requirements for foreign 
military sales. The objectives of the Israeli plan could be 
met if the CIA" using an authorized agent, as necessary, 
purchased arms from the Department of Defense under the Econom;' 
Act and then transferred them to Iran directly after receiving 
appropriate payment from Iran." 
Do you see that? 

A. Uh-huh. 

Q. Does that refresh your recollection that there was 
concern expressed about the fact that Israel could not sell 
arms directly to Iran without notification to Congress? 

A. No, It doesn't. 



This document ii th« property of the Senate and rcm&iaa under iti control throufh the Select 
Cnmmittee on Intelligence. It U provided for limited purpose* related to conxTceiional oversight 
of inuUigence ectivitiei, on condition that it will not be rcleaaed or otherwiae disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permisiion is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



IINCLASSira«».«e<»«e» 



593 



RCT CODCWORB 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



• I underscand what I'm reading, cercainly. But I 
stilL don'c recall any more abouc thaC meeting. 

Q. Do you recall any briefing of the President in 
which that was told to him? 

A. I don't recall specifically that it -- I would 
have to answer that, generally, I do not recall it being 
brought to the President's attention. 

Q. Do you recall any discussion by Admiral Poindexter 
with the President in which Admiral Poindexter pointed out 
that, instead of Israel selling to Iran, that an agent 
of the CIA would sell to Iran? 

A. I don't recall that. No. 

0. Well, you're aware now, from reading the newspapers 
and the Tower Board report and what else you learned, that 
the arms to Iran was sold by corporations , that the route 
was from the Pentagon to the CIA to a corporation to 
another entity and then to Iran. You are aware that it was 
that kind of arrangement? 

A. Yes, I generally was. 

Q. Did you know at the time that the President 
signed the January 17 finding that a private corporation was 
going to be used as an intermediary? 

A. No. I had no knowledge of chat. 

q. Was the President told that? 

A. Not in my presence. 



Thia docuniMit U th* property of the Senate *nd remaini under its control through the Select 
Cnmmittee on Intelligence. It i* provided for limited purpose* related to conipessionsl oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



MCI raoi a 



wumm 



CRET COMWOffy 



594 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

3 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



^^ i itib B cR" C OP CWORD 



Q. 'vhat did you underscand was going co be the route 
for Che sale of the arms? 

A. I didn't bother nyself with Chose decails. 
"Q. Well, when you say vou "didn't bother yourself 
with those details," were those decails comraunicaced 
CO the Presidenc in your presence? 

A. No, they were not. 

0. And. as you sic here coday -- I know it's some 
cime ago -- did you have any understanding of who accually 
was going to sell the arms co Iran? 

A . No . 

0. Did you chink it was the United ScaCes that was 
going CO sell chem? 

A. I knew chey would be our -eapons Chat would 
evencually find cheir way Co Iran. But how, I had no 
specific knowledge. 

Q. Do you recall any discussion at any poinc during 
chis process, leading up co che January 17 finding, chac 
maybe ^^^^^^^^^^^^could supply the arms? 

A. No. 

Q. That anyone didn'c have rescriccions on sales of 

arms like we had? 

When you say^^^^^^^^^^^^^a 
in my mind. But the specifics, I can'c remember, no. 

0. Let me state what my concern is. 



This doouncnt ii tha property of th* SenmU and ranains ander iu control throufh th* S«Ieet 
Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purposes related to concressional oversight 
of lotelligenca activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch penonnei 
whose official daties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



taa FMM a 



yNCLASSi£IU«. 



CODCWORP 



595 



1 ; '.>rhen you read these documents, you see that the 

2 original plan was that the United States would sell to 

3 Israel and Israel would sell to Iran. That's the way 

4 it was described to you. 

5 Am I correct? 

6 A. That's correct. 

7 Q. And then it gets changed to have a third party 

8 interposed, and the reason given is that you don't have 

9 to notify Congress. And that doesn't ring a bell with you? 

10 A. No, it doesn't. 

11 Q. But what does ring a bell, I assume, is that there 

12 was discussion of delaying notification to Congress of the 

13 finding. 

14 That you recall? 

15 A. Yes. 

16 My impression is the reason for the delay was 

17 always the safety of the hostages. 

18 Q . Mow, let's talk about that. 

19 Whose idea was it that Congress shouldn't be 

20 told? 

21 A. I cannot put that to any one specific person. 

22 It would be my impression that this came generally from 

23 NSC sources . 

24 0. You understood that Ghorbanifar knew of the plan, 

25 right? 



This document is the property of the Senate snd remains onder its control through the Select 
Committee on IntelliKence. It is provided for limited purpojes related to conirressionsl oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



Missmm^ 






596 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A. . Yes. 

Q. And you were willing to cake che risk -- when I 
say "you," I mean, obviously, the President and his advisors 
were 'willing to take the risk that Ghorbanifar would keep 
a secret -- correct? 

A. Yes. 

0. And Israel knew about this? 

A. Yes. 

0. And you were willing to take the risk that Israel 
would keep that secret? 

A. Yes. 

0. And, of course, Iran and elements in Iran would 
have to know about this? 
Right? 

A. Yes. 

n. And you would be taking risk, that they would 
keep the secret? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did anyone say that it makes no sense at all to 
trust these outsiders but not to trust the Intelligence 
Committees of the United States Congress? 

A. I don't recall it being put as starkly as that. 

Q. You see, this wasn't a closely guarded secret. 
You had a country that w^s describing the United States as 
"Satan" which knew of this. 



Thii document ii tha property of th* Senate »nd remains ooder iti control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It i« provided for limited purposes related to conirreitionsl oversight | 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated withouc 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose otflcial duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictians and controls. 



UNCIAS«8 



CCMT CODCWO It P 



597 



UNCLASMibii. 



tORFWORO 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A. Well, I know now a loc more than I knew then. 3uc 
I had no idea of the numbers of people involved. 

Ve thought it was a small, select group. Each one had 
a peculiar interest in this. 

Q. But, Mr. Regan, missiles were going to arrive in 
Iran and so there would be military leaders there and a 
government that would know, you know, that they just 
didn't come in the mail. Right? 
.A. We were aware of that. 

As a matter of fact, that was one of the reasons 
that we were shipping them. 

n. Was it so that they would be available for their 
army? 

A. No. So that they would understand that they 
were dealing with the President and that we were trying 
to establish contacts with them. 

Q. But you have no recollection whatsoever of anyone 
saying that whatever may be the provisions for delaying 
notification, how can you justify delaying notification 
when you have foreign countries who know about it, when you 
have a middleman like Ghorbanifar knowing about it? 

A. No way. 

Q. That point was just not raised? 

A. No. I do not recall that coming up. 

0. Do you recall any discussion about when Congress 



Thii doevment is th« property of th* Sciut< and remkini under iU control thioush the Select 
Committee on IntelUnnee. It ii provided for limited purpose* related to conirresnonal oversight 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
pennission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
I whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and control*. 



SKI FOSM n 



UNCLASSra 



[CRCT COPCWO IW 



598 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



R ET CODEW O kU 



could be notified? 

A. All I keot remembering was in due course or in 
proper course. 

■Q. From the time the finding was approved until all 
this news broke in the end of October, 1986. did the 
Attorney General ever inquire of you as to whether the time 
had come to notify Congress? 

A. No. Not that I recall. 

0. Did he ever inquire of the President in your 
presence? 

A. I recall the Attorney General at one or more 
meetings stating that there would come a time when we would 
have to notify the Congress. Yes. 

Q. But was there any discussion of whether that time 
had arrived? 

A. I don't recall it in that time. 

Q. Did you consider the McFarlane mission a failure? 

A. 'Thich one? 

Q. The one in May. 

A. The one in May? A failure -- no, because we 
didn't know what would lead from it. A disappointment, yes. 

Q. Was there any consideration at that point in 
your presence of notifying the Congress? 

A. No. I don't recall that coming up. 

Q. Did anyone give any particular reasons for not 

This document is the proptrty of th* Senate asd rcmainf tmder ita control throuch the Select I 

Committee on IntelU^wacc. It is provided for limited purpoeet related to conirressional oversiKhc ! 

of intelligence activities, on cSBditioa that it will not be nIeMed or otherwise disseminated without i 

permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel j 
I whose offlcial doties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



mmmi 



:CR[T CODEW O RD 



599 




1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



notifying the Congress? 

A. The safety of the hostages was what I keep rememberiri 
as the paramount concern, and that anything that you say, 
if it leaks and gets into the press, there will be danger 
to the lives of the hostages. 

Q. So that if Congress let it out that there were 
these discussions going on, that could endanger the 
hostages? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did anyone give any explanation as to why that 
would be? 

A. I don't know that anyone gave that explanation. 
I do know that I was under the impression that 
the Iranians were in touch with people but did not control 
the people who had the hostages, and if that cover were 
blown, the reaction of the captors might be to destroy 
the hostages. 

Q. By "the cover," you mean that if the captors knew 
that Iran was bargaining for their release? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And what assurance did you have at these meetings 
that Ghorbanifar would keep his mouth shut? 

A. None, except he was one of the parties in there 
that was a representative of the Iranian forces who wanted 
these things; that it was in their self-interest not to have 



Thia doaunent ii the property of the Senate and remaini under iti control through the Select 
Cnmmittee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purpose* related to congretsional oversight 
of intelligence activitiei, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise dissenunated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UCI FbSM !• 




tCRET CODEWORD 



600 




1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



it disclosed. 

Q. Weren't you told before this January 17 finding 
was signed, that the CIA considered Ghorbanifar to be a man 
of deceit? 

A. We were told that at some point, but exactly when, 
I don't remember. 

Q. Were you told that he had flunked a lie detector 
test? 

A. I'm not sure we were told prior to January 17. 

Q. Whenever you were told, was there any thought given 
at that point to telling the Congress? 

A. Not in my presence, no. 

Q. ^'fho had the responsibility for monitoring the 
compliance with the reporting statutes? 

A. The !^ational Security Council, the National Security 
Advisor. 

Q. Was there ever any discussion in your presence 
of the view that restrictions that applied to the CIA 
did not apply to the National Security Council? 

A. I believe -- again, this is an impression, without 
knowing specifically who told me this -- that there was a 
distinction and some difference between their standings. 

Q. And you do not recall who told you that? 

A. No. 

Q. Do you remember whether that came up in connection 



Thii document !■ th« property of the Senate and renuiiu under ita control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purposea related to conijrreaiional oversight 
of intellig:ence activitiei, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permisaion of the Committee. Permitaion ii panted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to theM restrictions and controls. 



UNCUSSn 



€ RET CODCWOKD 



601 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



with Che. Contra aid? 

A. Ic did not come up in connection with the Contra 
aid. 

"Q. What did it come up in connection with? 

A. I think it was in this time that we were in this 
general frame,' of January - February discussions, followed b^ 
actual sale in February. It was at that period of time. 

Q. Was there ever -- did you ever hear anyone say 
we have to let the NSC do it because the CIA can't? 

A. No. I don't recall that being the case. 

Q. The last thing I wanted to ask you is this. You 
obviously have read the Tower Commission report. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Insofar as your role is concerned, are there any 
factual assertions there that you would dissent from? I'm 
not talking about the conclusions. I can assume about that. 

A. Factual conclusions -- I haven't checked it with that 
in mind. I looked at the conclusions, with some of which 
I differ, and some references to my own testimony, to make 
certain that what they quoted was correct, as far as I 
remembered it. But as to whether or not everything in there 
was f acual , no. 

I have been told there are errors , but I have not 
looked for them myself. ^ 

MR. LIMAN: Do you have any questions? 



This docunient U th* property of the Senata uid renmiiw under ita control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It ii provided for limited purpose* related to conKressional oversight 
of i.ntelligence activitiei, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose official duties concern its subject matter, subject to these restrictions and controls. 



UNClASSn 



CR[T CODCWORD 



602 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



mmm» 



CCRCT C0DCW0ft 9 



MR. EGGLESTON: Actually, we are curious obser/ers 
at this and I dnn'c have any questions. 

MR. LIMAN : Does anyone have any questions? 

[Mo response] 

MR LIMAN: I thank you very, very much. 

THE WITNESS : Thank you very much for your 
courtesies . 

[Whereupon, at 5:15 o'clock, p.m., the taking of 
the instant deposition ceased.] 



This document ii the property of the Senate and rcnaini tmder iti control through the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. It is provided for limited purpose* related to conirr««iional oversiuht 
of intelligence activities, on condition that it will not be released or otherwise disseminated without 
permission of the Committee. Permission is granted to provide it to the Executive Branch personnel 
whose oflicial duties concern its subject matter, subject to theM restrictions and controls. 



MCI FDOI » 



Miusm 



KRFT CODEWOftfr 



603 



XAME: HIR196002 



iimmim 



X^<:^\<^\ 



PAGE 1 



\Ci>S^^ 



2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

1 1 

12 

13 

1U 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 



R?TS HAZUR 
DCMN DONOCK 

DEPOSITION or DO.HALD F. REGAM 

Wednesday, July 15, 1987 

House of Representatives. 
Select Committee on Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D . C . 




Poi-ela 0. Haughton (Stafi Counsel to the select corrnni t tee 1 
pees iding . 

Present: On behalf of the House Select Corr.nii ttee : Pa.Tiel- 
J. Kaughton, Staff Counsel; and Robert W. Genzrean, Associate 
Minority Counsel. 

On behalf of the Witness: John A. ftintz. Attorney at Lau, 
Gibson, Dunn £ Crutcher. 

Also Present: Corrine Travis, Hotaty Public. 



UNCiASsra 




604 



UNCIASSIRED 



NAilE 
23 
2U 
25 
26 
27 
ZS 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
3(4 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
MO 
141 
<42 
■43 
1414 
45 
46 
47 



HIR196002 



# 



JIS. HAUGHTON: Ue ara on the record. 



I an Staff Counsel to the House Select Comnnttea to 
Investigate Covert Arras Transactions with Iran. People 
around the table, if you would, please introduce yourselves. 

nR. GE.SZMAN: My name is Robert W. Genzraan. I am 
Associate Minority Counsel for the House Conniittee. 

MR. MINTZ: I am John Mintz. I am counsel for Mr. 
Regan . 

THE WITNESS: I an th« inieivieue«. 

MS. MA'JGHIOH: Did we have a notary? Great. Thank 
you . M 

THE WITNESS: Would you come in now? Mould you S 
identify yourself for these people? 

MS. TRAVIS: Corrin« Travis, Notary Public. 

MS. NAUGHTOX: And you ara a notary for the State of 
Virginia? 

MS. TRAVIS: At large; that is right. 

MS. NAUGHTOH: Thank you. If you could, would you 
pittas* swaaz the witness? 

HS. TRAVIS: Oh. Will you please raise your hand? 
ipon, ^^ /. 




jonald/V .1 



DONALD^r.; REGAN 

vtas called for as a witness and, after being duly sworn, was 
e.Hanined and testified further as follows: 
,"1S. NAUGHTON: OKay. Thank you. 



UNCUSSinED 



605 



U8 



HNCIASSIFIED 



PAGE 



49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
5U 
55 
56 
S7 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 

eu 

65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
7 
71 
7 2 



,„ HR. niXTZ: Thank you very much. 
MS. TRAVIS: You are most welco;je. 
-US. N A UGH i' OH: I appreciate your cooperation. 
riR. HINTZ : Fine. 
{Discussion off the record. ] 
EXAMIMATIOH OH SEHAIF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COnniTTEE 
BY MS. HAUGHIOM: 
2 ■ OXay. Hr . Regan, I, of course, read your previous 
deposition before the coranittees and X don't want to plow 
through old ground at all. Uhat I want to do is take you 
through a couple of events that ua need a little note 
explanation about. 2 

And I would like to start with basically th« douhing 
the Hasenfus plane in October of--fiist week in October of 
r386. 

A Ua-hure. 

2 Could you tell me, sit, when that yent down? And 
the news reports started coming in, what were you told about 
t-he connection of that plane, that C-123, with any 
nnant:, operations? 

.■ V«ry little, if anything. It was not identified, at 
lii my presence, as ^eing a governj-ient plane or either 
a governnent agent. 
2 Okay. 

And did anyone give you that assurance that th-ire 




UNCUSSinEO 



606 



X .5 .1 E : H I R 1 9 6 2 



UNClASSinED 



T> 



PAGE 



♦ 




was no 30v»rr..nent involveirent uith the aircraft? 

I don't recall the question being raised either way. 
.-S fi Thera yere statements Iron the Ad:iinis tr ation that 
th« plane uas not in any 'Jay connected to the United Slates, 
very early on. Do you recall? 

A that did not coma iron the Oval Office nor ray si^ie 
of the West Wing. Whether it came froi» anyone else there, I 
wouldn't know. 

Q Uera you awara of the request for Independent 
Counsel nada by the House Judiciary Conmittee then in tha 
second *.2ek of October 1986, regarding Oliver Horth and an 
alleged supply-- 

A I rcneraber reading about it at tha time, but l9^on't 
recall it being tha subject of any suggestion of rae . 
2 Okay. 

Do you recall reading about who was tha targist or 
tha alleged suspects of that IC probe, the request for the 
IC? 

A Ko , that is vary hazy in ny nind. You have got to 
renambar right about that time, I believe wa were preparing 
MY)(javik to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev, 
€.}(mB tha thing that was uppermost in our minds, and 
«■• tima, as I recall it> wa wera having a major 
budget battla. 

Ve did not have a budget, and September 30 had co.-ie 



^do 



UNCLASSIRED 



607 



MJflE ■ 
98 
99 
100 
10 1 
102 
103 
lOM 
105 
106 
107 
103 
109 
1 10 
1 1 1 
1 12 
1 13 
1 lU 
1 IS 
1 16 



MIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



-^/-^ 



PfcGE 






120 



12 1 
122 



and gone, and ye were worried about that. Those mze the 
^Ings that uare occupying my attention, and accordingly, 
this incident in Central America did not capture ny 
attention at all. 

2 I would liXe to go back then, ii I could, to the 
Xovember Hauk ship.nent in-- 

A I apologize for that noise in the background, but 
they are building ojEiioe space next door. 

2 Hauk is .H-a-M-k, a type oi niissile that the Israelis 
sold to Iran on or about Hoveraber 25 or so, 1985. You, I 
take it, -jere in Geneva with the President before thi« 
occurred ? w 

A That is correct. 

2 Do you recall Sud McFarlane briefing yourself or the 
President regarding this imminent shipment of missiles by 
Israe 1 ? 

A I racall 3ud telling ma that ha had some information 
about the hostages that he had to tell the President, and I 
saying to hin that as soon as ue get a moment's respite from 
t^« business at hand, ue will try to get a few minutes uith 
E«ildant, but in all honesty, I didn't uant to 
xvipfe the President's train oi thought, because ue uere 
ooncentrktlng on disarmament and some of the Soviet 
proposals, but there did come a time uhen HcFarlane was able 
to brief the President on this, and it was that, a very 




UNtlASSIHED 



608 



;< A ,1 £ : 

1 23 
1214 
125 

1 2(> 



HIR196002 



IINCtASSIHED 



PAGE 



1 



t^^Ur 



127 
123 
129 
130 
13 1 
132 
1 31 
1 314 
135 
136 
137 
1 i3 
139 
lUO 
141 
1U2 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 



hz\»i naetina to tell Mra ahout tha HawXs and the hos^iges. 

fi Mas that dona in your pre-sence? 

A I belie V a so. 
"2 Mas anyone else there basides the thcee of you? 

A I don't rocaU there being anyone else at thnt tli?.e. 
I do recall that ncTarlane told na that he uould or hid, I 
r,,i\ not sure which, discussed this with Shultz. 

2 Did he say whether or not ha had discussed it with 
Secretary Weinberger or intended to? 

A Well, Heinbarger was not in Geneva, and so therefore 
I don't recall his telling me anything about Weinberger.- 

2 Ohay. B 

Do you recall then what ha told you regarding this 
HawK shipment? 

A It is very vagua, becausa you hava got to rs.iiember, 
Ihis is just, again, a few minutes in a very busy 72-hour 
i?<»riod, but it was to tha 6ffact--it sticks in my mind is 
that thera would ba 80 Hawks, not 18, 80 Hawks that uere 
going to ba shipped from Israel to Iran, and it is also 
vagu* in ay alnd. 

X tm not sura if this is tha tine or at a later date 

^h«za lias discussion of tha simultaneous release of 
so** prisoners by Israel, people that they had incarcerated 
■Jho viera non- terror ists , and our own hostajes would be 
released by tha Hizballah simultaneously. 




UNCIASSIRED 



609 



148 
149 
ISO 
IS 1 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
165 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



-vT 






167 



170 
171 
172 



I do recall his saying it was a corapl ic a*:i?d de^l, 
•usft these <^laiAO -had lo get airborne, host^aes releaaad, 
■lanes continue thair mission and land--I believe it uas into 
Br^^^^^^ut I don't uant to suoar to that, .^nd if the 
hostrigi?? weren't released and the planes had not reached the 
point of no return, they uould come back. 

2 Did nr . ricFarlane mention any invol ve:!ient by the CIA 
on any of this, in the transportation or in the air 
clearance ? 

A Ko, no details. 

2 Did he iT.ention any involvement that he had 
participated in in getting air clearances through ceiiain 
countries ? 
A Ho. 
2 Okay. 

Mas this t-»ken to you, t) .= n, as sort of sinply 
informational or for s«eking concurrence or approval of the 
Pres ident ? 

A I don't recall its being stated as--you know, ''Mr. 
ft«9i.d»nt> will you give us your approval?'*, or things of 
IMiiux*. It was .-note in the nature, I want to V.eep you 
A on what is going on, you know, sort of ''aeanwhile. 
baoK at th« ranch'' type of information. 

But I don't recall permission being sought or giv^^n. 
2 Mas this--was it your understanding at that point 




UNCLASSIHED 



610 



H A n £ : 
1 73 
17t4 
175 
\76 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
132 
183 
134 
185 
136 
187 
183 
189 
190 
191 
192 
J) 19 
19 
195 
196 
197 



HIR196002 



UNGlASSmED 



/ 



PAGE 



twfk this aas solely an Isiaali opetation or-- 
.1 Yes . 

Q Okay. 

And M.1S-- 

A Although ua v:?re a:jare oi it, out people wete aviira 
of it, Ajid although which of out people oz uho was not 
stated. 

2 Was there a discussion nithet at that time ot 
shortly subsequent to that regarding the replenishment of 
those Hawk missiles back to Israel? 

A I am not sure it was at that time, but I did h|ive an 
understanding that ue uould be asked to replenish the stocks 
for the Israelis . 

2 And was there a decision -lade as to repleni sh.-nent as 
to hc'J that uould I'.appen, or a discussion as to how it uould 
occur ? 

A Ko. 

2 Was it decided then that ue uould replenish, ot vis 
it simply mentioned that-- 

'Tft was mentioned that w« uould probably be asked, as 
FadAll It. I, again--I can't recall the precise words, but 
^•n«ral> the understanding was that ue would be rsKed to, 
and theza was no dissent ftoit th« President not frora me that 
we wouldn't t<iplanish. 

2 All right. And was this in 1985? 




mmm 



611 



MAHE : 
198 
199 
200 

20 1 
202 
203 
204 
205 
206 
207 
203 
209 
2 10 

21 1 
212 
21? 

2114 

215 

216 

2 17 

21 

2T 

220 

221 

222 



H I R r.i 6 2 



UNtlASSIHED 



Hovi.nber of 1985, uhile in Geneva. Which date, I 
i*t knou. 
a Do you know oi anyone else in the Federal Govetnraant 
tha-t was ayate of this shipment other than yourself, the 
Ptesidant, Mr. lIcFaclane and possible Sacretaiy Sh\iltz? 
A Ho. 
e Okay. 
A Oh, wait. Xo, I wouldn't swear to that. 

MR. MIKTZ: Counsel, is your question at that 
tine--his knowledge at that time? 

MS. HAUGHTOK: Yas , obviously peopla hav« learnad 
subsequently, but I am speaking in terms of the Noveiiir 18 
through 25 time frame. ' 

THE WITHESS: I was trying to think as to whether 
McFarlana told the President the source of his information 
as to wlio had told him this, but I can't recall with any 
def init iveness the name of the person. 
BY MS. NAUGHTOM: 
2 Okay. Has Mr. HcFarlane speaking from notes or 
simply oi^i th« top of his head? 

I think it yas mora from memory. 
Okay. 

And did anybody-- 
A Because, again, you hav« got to remember that 
oftentimes, during that period of time wa were in Geneva. 




UNCLASSra 



612 



HAME: HIA19o002 



UNtUiSSinED 



v/ 



PAGE 10 



^SUASuXny 



223 
22<4 
225 

2 as 

227 

223 
229 
230 
231 
232 
233 
23U 
235 
236 
237 
^^^ 
23 3 
2(40 

2'n 

2(41 
2MS 
2(46 
2 47 



S<' 



tJ^ssa tyjas of convi>tsa tions and--uiiera infotrwtion w*s l-pirij 

sad to tha President, and as I recall was also right at 
ihat tlraa--I think at that ti:iie were engaged in something 
elsS about trlie budget. 

I would take the President aside, and you just go 
over to the side and talk about sonething and then get fcAck 
into the -.ains treai* . It was that typa of conversation. 
ft Okay. 

So th.-^re Ksre no notes taken that you can recall? 
A No. I certainly didn't make any notes nyself. 
2 Ko'A , shortly after this episode, of course, t'.ieia 
was a finding prepared by Judge Sporkln. and then senC <)n to 
tha President. * 

Do you recall ever seeing this Movenber 26 finding? 
A You say it vas sent to the President. I don't know 
that to ba a fact, jnd I have nev.ir seen it. I learned of 
that subsequently, but I don't recall ever seeing nor 
hearing about tha Sporkln finding in Hovember of 1985. 

2 Okay. 
.^ Could you tell aa . would you normally get involved 

n^iogs. or would that ba sonething done totally throu'jh 
r Casey to tha President? 
& I would have to qualify it. I would say usually. 
Thera--thera is way that that could by-pass n& , .-^nd sonetiinas 
information or memoranda of this natura did by-pass r.e . so I 




UNCLASSIHEO 



613 



Z'iS 
249 
250 
, ?.5 1 
2S2 
253 
ZSM 
255 
256 
25; 
253 
259 
260 
26 1 
262 

. 2 i U 
265 
266 



,^IR 196002 



UNOASSIHED 



/ 



PAGE 1 1 



<'*CUlltyM<J^^ 



267 
/268 
2 6 9. 
270 
27 1 
27 2 



coiildn'.t say th^t L always uss involved, but usually. 

^^ fi Could you tell us hou it would be that it Mould by- 
4' 
P~«ss you? 

"A Kaoh- -no;j, ^his is very 'sensitive u)iat I an going to 

s ly h.^re. Can I Tssuraa that anything I say will be held in 

coni idence ? 

MR. fUXrZ: ;-;ot in coniidence, but let's st-op for a 
rnom&nt and in<iuire about classiiication level. That is one 
oi the coiiCKtns you have, I an sura. What are the levels of 
':^cur:ity cla.ir'xnce that we have represented here? 

lis. MAUiiHION: Wall, -la have coda word. I doa'i 
VnoM what yours is, and I don't Vnou !jhat the reporters is. 

Ifr-if we could get--'jjiat wa will do, all of out depositions 
•■>ra taken in Gxecutiva cession and they ara confidential. 

'Je do not release then, and without getting then 
unci ■\_-s if ied by tha Vhita House :\\i then redact certain 
portions, but I an re.-^lly loo/<lng <or sort of a general 

THE HIIMESS: Well, I can't respond without 
i|v4orninf ^you as to hew tha President receives his 

tlS*a0#- Mow, this Aay hava been testified to by 
t« ftls*. X don't 'xnou. X haven't followed tha 
yrocaedlngs. 

fIR. MINTZ: Why don't va tika an adjourn.T^nt and go 
■^nd discuss this, and than ua will coma back in a couple of 




UNCLASSIHED 



614 



N A .1 E : 
273 
274 
27S 
I n 
Zll 
278 
279 
280 
281 
282 
?i33 
?8'J 
285 
^86 
287 
iSS 

-■:89 
290 
29 1 



H rR196002 



UNCUSSIflED 






PAGE 12 



f 




utes.. 

MS. HA'JGHTOK! All right. 
7~ (Discussion oil ihe record.! 
,1S. ;-<AUGHi'OH: Okay. 
BY MS. HAUGHTOH: 

2 I juess I was asking you about how it would be that 
a iiUiling would by-pass you? 

A Each ii-.orning, the Ptasident receives a foldar 
containing intelligenca material ftoii tha National Security 
Adviser or at the tine that the Hational Security Adviser 
cc.-es in for tha President's d^ily briefing at 9--30. ^Xhere 
could be documents placed in that folder that only t) 
President would zz^ and raturnad to tha National Security 
Advi";ar without going through tha normal White House paper 
process. That has happened seldom, but it has happened. 

It did hc-tvpe.n .luring the .;f?riod when I was Chiaf of 
Staff . 

2 At tha security briefings evary morning, ujra you 
iluays present or soiietimes present or-- 

A Host of tha tinie, I was present; if I wc-re in town, 
lr«t w«s usually. If the President was thista, I was 

Okay. 

Uas there every a tiraa-- 
A T,at ma just say that to give you a fra.-.e of 



UNCUSSIHED 



615 



MA;1£: HI.R196002 



UNClASSra 



7» 



PAGE 13 



298 

299 
300 

> ■5 1 
302 
303 

?on 

305 

';:6 

3 7 

.iO*5 

309 

3 10 

31 1 

312 

313 

3 14 

31 

316 

317 

>.<pfe 318 

319 
320 
3'. 1 



.-.ayba once or tyica a nonth, t uould not ka 



r*J« ranee . 

#iksent. 
.' 2 OKay. Would you in that case s^nd a daputy or 

-,c-J':Ta in your sLaai? 

A MO. 

Q Okay. so there in-iy have baen occasions vihera 
A.lmicsl romdr-xtar laould h^ve itet with the President alone. 

A Admiral Poindaster^and Ht. .IcFarlane^ prior to 
^c:.1,iral PoindeHter, had authority at any time to see the 
Prssid-ont alo,-.e, and occasionally they exercised that 
Huthoci-ty -nd pcivilege. 2" 

A so it -..^sn't just i*-***s briefing, although I will 
also 1. 11 you that uhan he was in tc-.n, the Vice President 
also attended these briefings, so there could have been a 
S,..*, v-u^n I M^s not pr = cent but f.e Vice President -.as 
Prosr^.nt. X don't want to coniusa the issue, but I just M>Mt 
lo clarify it. 

Q Okay. 

p, you know whether or not the Vice President took 

sTSihin in attendance? 

Tkl, in retrospect galls na . I thought there v.re 
always a not. taker at thosa meatings. bacausa usually the 



it 



;<ational r.ecutity Adviser brought a dep 



uty -Jith him. J^*-" — ' 



322 r.crar lane's case, it Mas PoindeHter; than later it vas 



UNCIASSIHED 



616 



HXUZ- MIR 196002 



UNCUkSSIFIED 



?4GE 114 



Hyi^-t^U^ 



323 

324 
325 

^26 

327 

3;. 8 

229 

330 

331 

332 

333 

33M 

335 

i36 

337 

Hi 

339 

3 1)0 

3U1 

3U2 

3<* 

i*t 

3<45 

2'\e 
347 



'^ 



i6r» than latter on ?.oc!n>i'/ IlcDaniel. They :)lMay5 h-id jv^^j 

pancll< ind I au^nr.ad thay v;are taking notes. 

I hAve sine--! !:oen l-3ld that they -jcca not note 
i-iMers oi tha ptocvjS'linjs . Thay ware r.ntely there to 3ot 
'ioyn it.-Mns that the Pi.;>siJeAt reiuested or to lake a nota of 
a Presidential opinion oIk soir.ething otf a subject. 

2 'Jho told you that? 

A I don't k/iou, but so'neona on my staff, because I 
r.skad during Iha period in pr.«paration for ny own testimojiy 

to the Touac Coiin iss ion , are there notes of the meetings 

*. 1 u. 

vdth the Prftsilent, -^nd the yotd cama back to ma, no, 

// 
notes uere t^ken by those people. 



a^i< 



How, in answer to your specific question, tha vica 
Prasident did iiot take notes, nor did the President, nor did 
I. 

2 Okay. As to tha Iran in^^tative, and I an spa-jkir.g 
on the ti:ie frame from .\ujust of 1985 "p to, lat's say, 
January 17, when tha final finding was signed, uera these 
discussions with tha President normally in tha course of 
^sft moxJKlng briefings, or ueta Ihey special neetings th.^t 
Oallad, oc uas it in a mora haphar.ard-- 

■'* .Tihft--T>ost of tha discussions with the Prasidant ■.bout 
K« hostages took placa at tha morning iteetings. Tha 
subject of the opening to Iran and relations uith Iran ur>s a 
subject of a group resting of sor.a nakura toward tha and of 




UNClASSm 



617 



>i t A 1 ; 6 u 2 



UNCLASSIFIED 



/ 



' A '3 E 15 



2'i3 J'li/, 'jct i..ict of Aujust of 193S, .=.n.l :^iC>\n, 'J■l0^^..^r 

3U9 nseting in Poc- ':3t of 1 OSS--! J ■. s t 'Jr-ik in D^c^-.'j^i: of I..J5, 

350 and the- I a r'^hjiij on Januscy 7 of !;36. 

>51 r'-,-v.>a -ix:^ 'cha only ^r^GatiAgs I csn tjcill 

355; s;>ao 1 F ic al 1/ :>n ihat topic. 

3S3 . Q -Ja-hi.;!!. 

,354 :!o-J, j^ilUnj to the 'ac<;.Tber 7, 1535 routing, <.'.i.s 

?'jb M^s '.li+.h t ■ cr *:,' cy y -- 1 nbe r j-^ r , Ssoret^ry Shulta? 

.355 . A Chis ** a host of ;oo;-)le In the rasi^.^nce. The 

^,5/ re<i5on it -.las held in tha r«s.\-5ence '-'as it t;as a subj-^ot 

35 i ihat '.'.^ -lis'ied to ']i>C';iiss '-filh f:>.s pj.asi-.'ant upon his cat'ii.n 

359 CtcTi !.he ninch af';st i'h-»r.i<': ji vi ng in 1985, but did not '-vnt 

360 !.o cippi^at on his ■jch«dule hsoa'..se of the sensitivity of tha 
3 6 1 1. o p 1 c . 

36 2 . 2 U:ii-hura. 

''(,1 . X It ■-•-s i-h.^rafora hald on ^ '\'-i ^^IxiclAy -.'.ol lin-j in i '.a 

3 1 '4 i a s 1 ', .- n e . 

3$ 5 . Q .\nd at th-xt i.-..:e t ir.g , Jo you r->call tha Kc>'4k shi;.-.i- )\ t 

36S h.>ir,g discussad? 

307 A Thare uis piobably tafaranca to it, />^s. 

363 . 8 Do you racall in uhat coixt •■ xt ? 

369 . A In ravie'Jing -'hit hid h ai>i>'"'-'i'l •■"•nd ^'haths.r or r,ot 

370 our policy was a succasslul ona or a failed or.i? tl.-Ht "--.s 
3/1 -i-sd .-"s an lixinpla of a riix-vp that vnJicacftd th^t the 
37;. -ooyi^nics of o^trying out this policy '.,'^s too c\"ibai ?■: -a 



UNCUSSIFIED 



618 



R 1 : b J 2 



UNCLASSIFIED 



J 



l\''Z 16 



&;e^ 



'i/'U of '-hy 'Ja should ^itop f;'-.a policy, cut it oil, /oi^^t it, .»id 
37 5 v th =■ c s V. ay li.'j that tv^ti com Id be a b^tt.^r -'^y o i: shovild la ! 

I '- \ c 1. .- r : \ x'l , % a_d , li \\'>t , it sh'.uld be cut ■-■[£. | 

o :j.\s i;pra d \ scii'= s ion of a tinding l'.-ivi.".j >;.i.->n 
3,3 -.ri!. i. 5.1? I 

3;? A ,C /-.-iC^ll, -'i.l IMs IS v^iy x^precise in -ly ;:,t,-,1. i 

: '5 'c . .•^■.■r' 'h on , '.i\o 'its t'-.sra in pls.ce of Diriclor •7->':p.y uho I 
■3 1 "- 3 1. i\-. ■, a v-.s L): -\v:» 1 iiig •.Lrosd, broujht up tha s'lbjict that -.'a 
1? ■■ould c^Lt.-^inly n:->3d i finding to support any s-slas of 
• 3 r ,.-. -5 ■ o E our '..IS by r 3 r - a 1 . 

'2 .\.ll ri.jht. 'Jis :'.e t^^lking p cospec t ivoly or 
i o 5 ■: <^ I. L c •; f .5 c t i v s. 1 y ? 

3:3 A I ■jat:;i»i:ad 'rh^^t ha Lhoujht that if u'e i.aj:e goin^ to \ 

337 90 <or')-^rd yith this, if va uatan't going to sLop then and 
■ •■.r. . .5 . .,id I bpli.ev:^ he • 3S inc.li^d to f-.Gl i.h^t ■,'.\ sh-.ild 
-. '.op , Tl'choujh ha u^sn't co:i-.anti)"ig thit :-.uch on policy, 
3;C '''.--X ;.(» •-.•ould hjva to i>.ave a findijig .if ■-a vita joing to go 
3 9 1 ; o J. •> r d . 

tl 0. Didn't anyOiie say at tint point, but -ra iltoady hiva 

393 a finding or one '.j^s alT.a;>dy dr.ift.^d? 
3:u A Mo. I do.i't cacall that l».inj said. 

39'') 2 U.Tihu,^. ■W^.r\ is it that you first siw irha h'ovii-" ^r 

396 ''T5 fi-Hing? 
39 7 . A I r^var s r>-J it nntil--I don't 'Kno'J; a couple of 



UNCLASSIHED 



619 



UNCLASSIFIED 



H n;:oo2 UllULnUUII ILU ^"'''^ '^ 

lyri ,- :.,-ii.''.s -ijo or •.■>^-->v=!t it '.ucfic.-^d . 

399 . 2 Okay. 

,400 . A I ■v-ri.^inl/ nia't caa it V.^£ora I t-iitWi^.i -,fc t.ha 

,■02 . Q Co^il'J you t.?ll A& in tstiiS oi r^e riyul-ic o l O'.- .^ ■!■!': r^s 

L!03 on the findiags, -.v.ld (.hay all :vs s..-nt to th«» D.t ; ■:. r '.T.^nt of 

■lOU ■.'■istica Xoi r&.'i.cJ j'or la<jal suf •£ ic ie;-.oy ? 

1)05 . A T'-:at --.-v-.il.d ba .vor-ial. 

t,,^r^ . 2 ;^-s t'-..5r:a .->v.--c a tii.a -.ihGn ihst drd not ocut? 

U07 . A Xot that I V.nCM of. 

'-:03 . e OXiy. 

.,,j9 . ;ro'j, '.'.^re i>.-rca svjfcT^iu.^n t .'.e*tir.gs to the Eece^iber 

'no 7 r;.-^atiii3 in :;o.;i.T^f>r of 1935 to discuss this topic? 

;, 11 . A Ar.. i1cf^rl5/^Q, hiving l-^'^A s^^nt is an ifl^^rnath of 

U12 i.hat maeting to London, ifiturned "..id bciaiad the Frssid.-at 

413 on his lisc-ion, go i.'-ra -.'^s a )-. --li-ig it that ti-.a -.-.out 

U 1 1| rha s'lbj-ict. 

mi 2 oy.ny. snd '..i-.-it -50 you r-icill nt. .Icf.^ r l.-.r.a t.-llma 

'4 16 Lhe President? 



4 17 
418 
4 1 9 
4;i0 
4 2 1 
'\?.Z 



A Th^t it '.'as a sh-.d/ bUii.;h oi o:..=.r so te r s ! •■■.-: y •■■>re 
dealing with, ad ha --lidA't th^nX thit Ih^ra •-■is . Mch ao:..5 
of futtheri.n.g contacts wi'-h lean (.hrc.jh that chinnpl, ^r.i I 
?.;, not cattain that ha said this in -.bsolute tai.is, I'Ut t 
.jafch.--.red that ha i'.^s -Usoou t a.j<=d =>r.d thought Ihat \t should 
1 4 a b o L t a d . 



UNCLASSIHED 



620 



UNCIASSIHED 



y 



wvi.: ;• I '. 1 r^ j'l 2 UllULflUUII ILU ''''''"^ ''^ 

'i;>l . ■ 'h^it, of couL'-a, I'oi.nc ilad ■••ith tha advice Ihit 

424 Shultz, Kftiiil- 1 1 j-s t anJ I 'i.J jiv?n to c'.e Pc^silsnt on 

1425 Dec*:ibet 7, '; o the e/f^rict :3 1>.oug!it it sho-ji.J '-a ?'joc'->4. 
, ')-■'.' Q ,-,vi '.Tiat '.'^s Dir.?-;l.oc '.'TS-y's jJOSiHicii? 

i)-i7 \ I 'o.i't ';?ci]l Di'.i'.'.or Cvs';y Naing at '-A\& i;.; r =< r 1 - .■..■> 

423 'jriftTinj, .^nd ha wasn't thste, of cours<», on EecsTi'jer 7. 
'i^'5 '2 Do you '-(nc..! what I'ls .position \i-\s Jur i/ig Tec. "-.^c of 

^•1 ; 1 ■) 3 5 ? 

'i31 . A ;'o, I 'jo'-il ui\ ' t v^rit Lo ch.-ir ao-; a t i.^a -i.h.-it. 

1^2 ?> Xo'J, it 50uiJs as tjioujh in Deoanbet of 1985 

'13'^ l^-S'CA.lly li.i^s vay-a ix.tl.t/ ;-ich s-i-^i.iat Liiat ihis uas .lot a 

'!3't jood i'.^a 0£ 'oul'oi't ba oncriad out v^ty moII. Uhat 

'•i3S h.ii-i-.-r,.>d to cUxnga that? 

U'J.'j a t 'oii't :<jio'j. T j;i\ lajto'ig -ora as a r.jsult of 

U37 this hc>^riig, but at that t-i.ie, I coftainly didn't kj^ou. I 

■j i lo /►-.•jH <.i-,:.t shottly -. f :. .? r tha r /- -s r 3- ,i t ;;^ t'l r .-..-- d to 

435 '■■-■ihi A3 ^•.>A .\<ii^.i ;fr>w T-it's "ind a ••-i'- 'Ihiti 'riii^ '~ 

J'tO /■ . .« I. >. .; - - 1 '.« o n ' t say si. ali» vTTtt, a w i j i t to "."xico -<,\d a 

'i41 aatinj the Pr«>sidant De la Ma^lrid chat John Po indoxte t , •-';io 

'i')2 -'-vs Li-.-an the National SO'-ur: ity Advi c.^ r , -rxir.ad tha is^ua 

443 that that was a possibility of a j-''->'j -.ly of approach ijig tha 

4'44 Iranian contact, a;\d UnuL ln. --ha \.-dio-.';d tait ha hAd this 

445 y.rio-i'i.r'd'ja £ro.i» Tsiaal or Israsli ccnr^^o c ions , ^nd that ha 

':'!G i.h:)';jht it vorth c.-iplor inj . 

;47 . 2 ';-.d v^s this in <2-irly Jar.uscy? 



UNCLASSIHED 



621 



UNCLASSIFIEU 



i,'. E : .1 ■ * I JS :02 rXGt r> 

'; • 3 H . F >c 1/ J.- -.'Mry, 1 ^ ?S . 

449 8 O'/ay. 

'ISO . No'4, pi IOC to J'lMiy 6, Jo you nr,.:-j ■•'.;t-.\^r or .-.ot 

'4 ') 1 f- e' .1 1 to? ,-.-;y ;'!n-:r.a.l ■ -. 5 r n _' >i.;- .^d oE i" ;it Jid '.-.•? ii joinj o.\ 
'S/. rii 1?85 0£ ^■■"-■k j->xtt -in ^ny oi the H j scis s ioA ? 

A He '.iS not at Iha i^ce.nber 7 -ajt.ing. I X.ioj !-.a -^s 

lot it i-.'-.a .--i^ti'ig -hiifi ,'cFar.lana rojoi-ted 'jack on hjs 
^c.-i'iya ..> lesion, 50 I don't kaou vihat tha ^ti;ov:^.o/ '".-•/.v. ^1 
Vn 5M - -c.^ I. c -■ i.i 1 y ;ia'.iir in ;riy pr-.^sonce v.^s he i;old sbout t'-.-j 
';b; M->-.jk shi. '.sat . 

'-i',.? . fi .'■■'rt!; '-.s Ms { i t 5 1 i.AvolvA-.ent i-^^t /ou are ?-usre 

;S9 oi? 

'-150 . A "311 -i.jiVolvi.-..int m 'ihat? 

! b 1 . 2 r n 1 "i a t i ,, ii '. > n i a i t j 1 1 i v a ? 

'.■ii A I );a';all his '.,^.\ng at tha J^jiuaiy 7 .aoating '.•■i.^ia 
'1^3 :■' a s'L-Jxti'-n "=s d i3cijs-:..id -'nd !"a r -. -j i n i i-i \ t \'.-a adv ^ n: -. ! , 
1 ,d I "'.^ii.ova he v.as iavolvad in tha i> co;;.-)r >i ■• i.on of Lh\t 
-finding Lhat laler be-:o,r.e kno'jn iS *-he J-.vjsry 17 finding. 
'iS'; 2 vr^ra you auare at tha January 7 .^.-ating t/.^t theue 
'67 h^d baan a finding of J-nuacy 6? 
':i8 . A Yes. 

'-i.j9 . 2 OV.H'/. And hoM 'Ud you bccc-a -■..'ra of ih^t? 
'i70 A Th»t •!>s brought u? with tha 7 cA.sx.'.~.nt either •.■n 
'4/1 J^'Wiaty 6 or. January 7--I sti not cv^rtain '.Jh i.:h - - it the 9^30 
'1/2 hii.^fing, "-;id gona ovar 'Jith the Pies i J.Mit by A-l.itral 



UNCLASSIFIED 



622 



i ,". ►; : :n :^ 1 / b 2 



UNCLASSIFIED 



\/ 



'474 2 W^s .-1.1/or.e .^Ise i-ros^at? 

'4 7 5 A V 1 ■• a ? r i> s ' '' .? n t - - t i^ 1 1 c ^ \\-^ >• ; . != r a , .\ r; d I h s 1. ? ■. v ,-j \ t 

i;f:- ust ';.i.a '^. en Do.\ 7o'. ti'^r it that point, <r ,n. ' t ' Hb ■ - ! .- ^^ u ':■/ . 

't r/ 2 Rnd 'i.\s this ^finJing si-?ly discussed -iith tV.a 

i78 Presidtnt o i: •• vs >,e nsked to sign it? 

It/9 A '.•.='11, tihat is cnvio'is. I hive li-.zvi. told f:hit v h -. t 

■J'?.0 Jcinn-ity & ^-•''» ^-:^n •."ijr.sd. I have r.ovGr Gsan the sijr-d 

'13 1 doc'.,...int . t '-.ava fi-isn !Jh.it has jurpoitsd to ::ie to ha 

'i.'i2 January 6. Othsi •■» !. tor. ncy s luestioninj ne have shown r-.e a 

':'.3 !oc ■.. .iut , "^d yit, I ? -^va .--ot s;- an i.he President's si'jastiire 

'\?j^ on Iha Jaa'!,-.j;y 6. 

'■iCS . Is thara a si'jno.tnia on the J.inuary 6 docu.r.ant? 

!|16 2 X -rould hive to 20 i-ack a^d look. 

t<37 A I honestly don't Xnow. It has never been shown. 

'lo-T Vou 'Jill i:o';ill, counsel, i.'i^t y.-- s t.iid?.y -..-e :..-»re shown a 

'■■00 dociir«nt by Atto>:n>iys on tliis, and I looked closely .:it Ih 1 1 

'tCO .f/id didn't -ree the President's signature. I sau the 

'(91 Fr.? si dent's signature on J.-rin'j:Kry 17, "jut not on January 5, 

'i}2 .although it has boan told to :r.e ti.r.a -,nd again thit Javi-iry 

493 6 one was signed. 

494 . 2 Okay. As you VtiO'j, the .najor di£ii%rance ie'.'.ien 1 .'■.a 
'40Ii findings ''snd third parties'' is Addc-d, in oth»r uords, Lo 
'i9t) 1 i^e a what is callad a coi.to re ial cutout into the v.^ntvite. 
'i97 Co you recall \\0'* ihat WiS o;<plaii\ad to the ?resid.^,.t, th^t 



UNCLASSIFIED 



623 



■:}3 
'■^9 9 

J 2 
G03 



M r .;. 1 .) i 2 



ICLASSIFIED 



PAi}E 21 



A Ho , I Joa't. The .TrxAUixy 6 ona y^s 'Joa^ ovar in 
det. ^.1. 1 :\s .- c ■> ? 1 r -\l ion or Tt-»l'-!e to Iha Jiivijc/ 7 --i=tinj. 
• I. f : h^ rii>sl!t>iit ■jis ci^i t -I i .ily fiMli^r '-lil-.h i'^.a .-".O';-; eat 
'Mitmj iha J 1. S'Jui s ions on .Jaiiiitty 7, and yJiit t.: ay t>ro;;os--.l 
t o d o . 

Cn JrtA'.i^ry 17, 10 days Ir.ti^.r, a lot of './^lar ;i.iliir 
I ' a • I; ' i 'J J e , A f', .n i t .1 1 r i n ', i X t e r b r o : y h t up, I h ^ 1 -i :■; v ij =i t t h a 
o 1 ■• c e or 3'ist at Hhe itart, ona or Iha other of <:\e 
.■■.■.'.• t inys , ^.-icaiisa I r^c^ll us st^nJing rathar than sitting 
••^••■!i ha !<f]i?fe'i tha ? r^is id^nt on wh»t '.Jas in the docux.ant. 
509 . I '^on't thiiiX ha circulated it; that is, gave copies 

lie to ^^ithar tha Vioe President or '^ysalf, and verbally told 
511 '•'■.a ri-.-si.!^At i.his is tha findi.ij that ue discussad at the 
S 1 2 J:j.>'i9ry 7 .aiating. I hava clean'-d it up. Ihare aze a favi 
13 •.'-■Tjc-s, yackity v'^'-'K- I •lon't ..icall him paying uhit f-.a 
IM .'i-.nj^is 'J a J. a. 
lb Q OX ay. 

S 1 6 lias, than, the subjact of using a cciir.a rcial cutout 

1/ diiO'isGad ••■lith the President? 
518 . A Coinnarcial c-itout -jas nev<?r discuisad. I don't 

19 recall the Mords ''c'j.^T.orcial cutout'' :ivar helng discssad. 
5?0 I '.'ould have pioXfld up ray aars at co!»r;arcial cutout, but at 
b2 1 ih-.t <i.-ia, I do.i't tacall thare avar b.^ing a cc ; -..^r c ial 
<iZ ., uL:ut 'jaing u-;ed. 



UNCLASSIHED 



624 



X.-./£: 


S2 3 


5 21-1 


5 25 


> "-'-^ 


5 2V 


5 2 3 


529 


S 30 


53 1 


'.i2 


'.3 3 


5 3( 


535 


536 


537 


5?a 


5 3 3 


S'lO 


5U 1 


■:')2 


5 '4 3 


£')14 


5 'f 5 


5';& 


5u; 



i I ?. ] ■; '^002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



P A :} E 2 2 



2 • Was I > e r a -• , i y discussion of . I r . :% a c o x d r. 1 his 
involvanient ? 

A "{evir lA irr/ p cus.^r.ca . I navac haard f.ha f\jne 'in+-\l 

..ni.-^c Lhi3--iftr-r :;ovv .ii ar 25. 

2 Okay. Kow, on o£ ^bout JaniaL/ 6, pt lot ^o t'.a 
mi/eting, was thare ^ny direction to Admiral PoinlcXtat to 
h-.va tha ittornii/ CJ^ni-tal chsck out ihn January 6 -flAdinj? 

A :;o . 
2 oy.^'/. 

MR. I^INiZ: That is as to your own knouladge. 
THE :41i:if.SB- As to .ay knowl ;dge , yes, and I hasten 
!-.o -id tha Attorney '^aiiaril, I beliave, -las at the January 7 
.■-.eating jhere it uis discussad. 
BY nS. MAU'JhiOX: 
2 Hell, 'Ja h ivo h.->scd t5Si:i;^0i\y in the hearings that 
Olivar ;iorth broujht out t>.e i.inli.ng to the ALtocnay Can-^.r^l 
oil tha 6th of January. 

A I have no kno'jielga of that. 

2 Okay. I gnass t have to ask this (luastton: 

Uas Oliver Xocth ptesant at ^ny of the '.satiajs you 
have described? 
A Ko . 

2 CUay. X£ you can, give us ^ baokgr ouAd-- tha re h.ive 
'.,.en n-yny .i I lag-i tions iragarding his *':cass to tha Pros i''-ent . 
Do you know vihethar or not nou, affar tha fact, ha f;v*r 



UNCLASSIFIED 



625 



:-( Z?.\' 



12 



UNCLASSIFIED 



y 



f : '3 E 



23 



;<.-i.iE ; 

iS .a^t •>'.oj-.a 'ith 'ch4 F r-; ■; i i--;it ? 
S'49 . A To ./ KA-uloag->, Oliver Voi.;.h n.-.v^c net 3'.vic> •jit-.'i 

■0 tha ? ces iv'. vit of ' > -i 'Jnit.-sd 3kl';^s 'I'T.-i.ig ::ha !:\-,a l:!'-.): I 
■■■TS rhi V £ of SI: Jif . 
3'j2 Q Do /ou t'c^ll -» kT.-.9 -Jh-sn ha '.'-is ever .noatir.'j •ji.f.h 

.33 hhe Pi.->si!.5at 'Jihhout ftithi^r rtr . ricF'^r I ane or Jil^iiral 
'j 5 4 P o i ,1 ■; li X t e r ;-■ co s .? n t in <; h a •/ a s r s 1 D 8 5 -: n d 1 3 S ? 

:S A ihst ' ould h-iv<5 hif-ar.e'l . I :itf'-Md X o r aSo'r e .v i^ 1 v o d ^ 

^6 list of th.5 tn.-!S tViat Oliver Xorth yas uith the Presi.lent 
.3 5 7 of I h e U T 1 < a d S :? a h .-. -s j c .; o i d j a g to t h .? r .? ■; o r d s kept of 
■j-3 ?ies id^-in 1; I al . ^ii i:i ij s . That list -Jis fuc^iishad to rae on 

Hovriibcr 28. "nid copirs h^va been £urntshsd to you o e r« <* » 
60 plur-^l. P l » t ■yhare could have baen a tiine, for example, m 
bl -ihich Oliver 'Corth '.^'-is jri-si'At 'jilh people Mho viare 
S52 •sup- ■- 1. tf>rs of Ih^^ '-oa + t^s and the ?r;?<;id9nt of the 'j'ni^od 
"'cao':? 'JO ijiLo that r >i I, i nj .'or •" it ■-:» cillad a I'rop-'j/, 
nking a inv s t.» t.i.i-.c-nts ••'.nd talk to 'ha ^eople. 

Morth could hn.va '.aaT pie';oi\t thc!ra, but i:cFai- 1 -»p.g 
)6 or Poindexter. dapandiag upon vjhat yoar, jould not 
37 •.•■.20SS Jt tly '.a thsre or hava to ba lh:-'ca, so in ai'S'-ar to 
563 your ii'iastion, that Is possible, b.it it uould nsvar '-a .it a 
S69 point in ti.-a -j'^ara Hotth uould ta ilcna with the rr..-!s iJa At . 
b70 . 2 Dutiiig thssa r.'.atings viith the people you hsve 
b 7 1 J : s >, r i 1; c d , \ ^ t a you p x. 4 ; ■; n t ? 
S72 . A I not -jlly '...-ooiii;) -ijiy 'ha 7 •: .-> -2 il Tit -'e uould go i a'.o 



UNCUSSIFIED 



626 



.U R 1 ? 'j 2 



UNCUSSIFIED 



/ 



?x;z 2 4 



.S74 . 2 fti-id ■j'nt ';*s tha ?ro'jiJ?>;it told s.bout 'Jh/ t'-.p'-e 

S75 F^'^Ple uer* ui-^itir. g ^he Ov;»l Office? 

■j/t . A C '.on't cioaH tha i. .:.?c \. f ics ot it, '.ut Aa j:^--->-i1, 

S77 It ';-,s to t;-. jnk thim <or either :."iat they fi^i dene oc • ^re 

b?.S ,7bo>it Lo do. I r.= ';al.l one spec li ic ally which Mas that l';.-y 

I;,'? --aca i^a/ing ior ^'Is th*t -.-ould be put on TV or in r.-i .i p -^ ■ r s 

■oO ncdir.j citiz'^ns to ■"• ite to Ih^a CoAjress to c-jjport <'-.e 

';<3 1 contia -f in ■xAc ing . 

liZ . 2 Do you Xnow who told hi™ this? 

'J.?? . A rh^t •-■.-<; in : ua I'r.U'finj ^-r^y^LS that '.lore pret>4rsd 

b^JN for tha ivftnt. That "ould hive cc-.a from- -probably through 

535 Lha public liaison group, ■-i)'ich--of the White House 

Z ■''■(} s taii- -'jo'i Id hava ^'i.^pai.ed thore Va<Lfers. 

5a7 . 2 So, this would have i\f:r\ : he outreach group? 

zca . \ Y.^.s. 

b39 . 2 "Ch^t A-ih.T5SSdor '•'h i 1 1- 1 s 'i riy yould h^ive-- 

S'50 il . -I i-v ,.. jv C|v~ „^5 f^^t t;-.-:;,© at the ti-e, it w^s Lj.-'a 

:j91 Chavez under Pat Buchanan. 

S?2 . 2 './as the PtesiJent aver ;.old, (.o your >; loy lad^a , :hit 

593 these people uare donating .r.oney for, u;r.ong other things, 

59'< lethal ua^^-ons to be sent to tha cojitias? 

■jOS . \ I jidcall Dave Fischer t.'lling the Frcsid^At ab;ut a 

590 '.■v.-.an who, on u.-»r cMn, had purohsTad a halicopter for t!;e 

■397 co.Ucas, but I heliava it yis a '.lad-Evic halicopt^r, ^.ot a 



UNCLASSIHED 



627 



.■''.ilE^ ,1 •.< V.I .10 2 



UNCLASSIHED 



/ 



PAGE 2S 



S99 
6 
C-0 1 
$02 
603 

C0(4 

£.0 5 
605 
607 
•jOo 
^. 
6 10 

5 1 1 

6 12 
6 1 3 
6 1 U 

5 1 5 

6 15 
6 17 
6 18 
6 19 
ft20 
62 1 



jur.sai p.. 



2 Do you tacall nny oth5i:--or aay inb i.-nccs u/Ssita L\a 
.Tesiclent vms lold hh^t ihisa r-'^Ple >e u'as -..= .^ri,ij 'Jith 
ira i>rovi-ling Jc'.Ual aid Lo the oon!.r.s? 

A No, I 'lon't Seliive the Fees i^!.:-nt vss e ,• ^ r toM 
thit. I boliiiv.? it 'o^s issditO'l that th^se i-iiople ucre 
contributing in 5or..-?ial to the contrss, uith ao s^^ecifics '. .t 
:ihdt th;2y •.■":JLe Joiag accajit foe tha .MaS p 3 jct •••is. 

2 Ok^y. 

'•.■■jre you .:'ra;ent '.Jhan the Pnosivleat nat uith Kllen 
'-"> .1 1 -.1 d ? 

A I don't laoAll that. I think that uis uhat 'jas 
t»r;-.ad a p h o t o > j l| i.t ' . Th=tt is, tliase people c^^.e in, had 
ihi^ir picture tak-t'n with tha Pi.isi'.ant snd had a f^u words 
of conversation with the President. 

Lhe-jQ noi'-illy T'^pp/'n at !-h4 f.->d of ^he ''.\y, sid I 
•,is i'.ot jrasrant. I a8v?r ,\t^--sndad those. 

2 riho would hive in tha r.or.Tal course? . . 

A '«ell, the President's personal aide, Jim C ' .n- m , vj^s 
"ilso present dur.ing Iho-sa ri\oto ops, n.id 'ihoavar < he action 
officer u^s frcra piihlic liaison or 'jhat.'iver ;5.3rticul^r 
sector of tha slaff had proposed tli^t i:ha ;='r:son^iie biouji.t 
i n , jst persona . 



2 Okay. Did the President avnr discuss ;irs . Gicvood 
in your pcssance? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



628 



UNCIASSIHED 



5 2 > . A - r ■! o n ' t I .-) c i 1 1 b h =i t . 

6 2 '-I 2 Ok.T/. 

r,;>5 . rf .'a ■; "- a j ; t ^'^ck jio'j to : >ra Trsn in.i )■ i. - : i-.a . Tii 

6'') .'ic'li 0-f '36 oc ^o, y>u .^de an miuj.ty, I bsli.-^ve, :>iir;h 

6 27 ..- V.1 ilua I ly jot to iha Cus I'^.tis '■^icvira rej^it'ing a •:; r ^ m -v n. -x 1. 

(■Z3 i;=isa t!.ay hud about a ;f-.n wl-.o supposedly supplied 10 

629 hf>lico;.!--OJ:s to Tt.jn, .ivod Goli t-scl.sk , a/.d I mj 1 I --r-?!! tJiis 

G30 G -0-1 -i - 1 -s -c-h- a-X . 'U-s a c--.ca out of Iha '.f^.stprn Oistri.jt 

'531 of Vi'A 'io^X, ^:\d Van P.-.^b enJud up writing a t.a.bo to you 

biZ 'i j^r. d ing tha s talus :is ctiminal. 

033 . A I \cxva c'.- -.plofely f 01: 50 1 t-^n i-hit. fhat is 'intitely 

0.i4 ^ •■.<■! . Do you hrxva iha docu;;siit? C -tn you fur.iish it to ne? 

635 2 Va C3n furnish it to you at a latat date. I don't 

C 3 6 Vc-.o-j that '-a li'iva it. "a have a '.-;forance to it in ouc-- 

637 . A I •■»-! socry, I liave no .?s-iocy of that. 

(!?.3 . 2 Q"-(^y, you 'lon't r.^call .o-'-Mng a la'iuiry of Ihe 

63'3 Cus t.rns Setvica on that issue? 

6 '10 . A Xo. 

6I4I 2 Okay. 

S'-l2 . A I nada it you '-ay? 

6'45 . 2 ^es. 

6 4U A Okay. 

645 . MR. UiHTZ' Couasel, was that r?.»,aoi;andu:i from Van 

6't^i X^hh to !'t . ".^jan? 

Ci't7 M*;. I'MJOHiCM: rh^it is ny information, i. t '..'53 Mirch 



UNCLASSIFIED 



629 



,1 t 5.1 6 002 



UNCUSIilHtU 



y 



PAGE n 



Old 
649 
r>5 
fjO 1 
^■i2 
&S3 
6Si^ 
C55 
056 
65 7 
•■'3.3 
ftS'J 
660 
06 1 
562 
06 3 
£6U 
065 
666 
6 67 
668 
669 
6 70 
6 7 1 
6 72 



J)., I?.';5, \nj Lh.ls Is a ds :en'^ nnt uho •'■''s conv i., t ,a.l -ind ig | 

serving a t Jitiss -^nl-a-h^lf - V-^r .;.->■. cb nee . It rust sho-jid up I 

in our coij.ih-;:C print -o'ut, nad I '53 j-i-st cuciovis. i 

I 
. " i.:iE yti-HtSS: I, too, .-'w. I 

1 
BY i1S. MAUGHXOH: 

2 OXiy. If '..a can .^ova ^long, tbsn. to tha S'lrner of 
1336 idjsrJing the Ii. .^n initiative. Did there coiia a po.iat 
in '.j)iich you j^ra -,v,.ite tViit Ditrctor I'^bster of tha /BI 
b:>.o=t--.a -T.'^re of the iL-injnn initiative? 

A Mo . 

a l?an; iE '-a c.^n go Lo ..icly Kove.nber when the thing 
sta/.tGd to i.ico.Ta public. 

A Um-^ium. 

2 Do you recall wh^t your -f-i/rst knowlS'lge was? 

A M^^uspapar account of the--l believe it uas the 
..■iCniiW of-'-i^i.ther Xov. .'li^r 3rd oc '-( i h . It MoS cijht a£let 
i-'-.a .-^lection or s inul '.araous mth the e 1 jc t ion--I 9,11 not sui;,? 
'^nt I h.e election c>a Lrf * v; as - - •; f o 1 1 i nj a s.-.all pieca m the 
^;^pec about the fact that there wiS a report from ?in obscuiia 
:ta«sp;^per in lebanon th.-\t iIcFTlnne had 3one to Xiian. 

C Okay. 

Mas thflte a raf;etii\3 hald itter that--that disc loiura ? 

A Ho, not "ntil it oainad vjidar circulation Iha nsxt 
I'^y. Ct vi.>s pic'^ed up liy cur own pra<j"5 in p.ora 'latail. 

2 OK ay. 



ICLASSIFIED 



630 



..;e 
6;3 

674 
bVS 
ij 7 r, 
6/7 
6 /3 
S79 

cso 

631 
532 
•:3 3 

63b 

C fj 6 
687 
C :.' 3 
6 3 9 
690 
69 1 
69^ 
693 
6 9U 
6 9.' 
r>Oi 
GO 7 



1 ■ •■ 1 ? .: ^ 2 



UHClASSra 



' d I 'i.-i:-..'e i'ou y\ll {i<ii ! ^ "i k in ny r.vLes of ll-.a 



staff i-.e^t-.ii^j of "0-. .-pi'iet 4 th- -i>i rh ips ?(vVi,;.^--t Cth-'-in '.h' 
■-■■ At L-J ;. 'i 1 -J ■-■loi;'/^ ^ Ml 1' ! In J \-£;^i-.i by Jo'iA Po i n ' - i "■■> x h 



to t\a (^rf^ot, ji 'is!\ th-^t story off; l>.^re is r. -^tMng 
to t;>at. 

2 0'-l::y. n'ov lo.isl y , ilr . ';fi2',<es :jis not j-jnre of i.he 
T r ?. n i ■» n i a i 1 1 -. I i. v a . 

A i''.at is 'JO C L5C t . 

2 Aft^^r '\:i \«i{t Lfiat -eating. Hid you have a 
■1 i:;c-iss ion 'i\L h .'.'.t. ral r oi ;-. 'ir'H t*r s'aout Lhat? 

A I don't ;-<iic.:j •••'villv^r it >=ip;-.^r.id at the 9 '39 meeting 
•jith the Fr^silent or whiin. but I do i.6;all talking to 
?oin-^ :>:< ti- c ->.jut \t/ '.'ho c iutiO'i<; T / sMd, ' "Aiy , -3 hive jot 
to pl^'y do'^'n vh.At Scot:'/, t .■; o -t h -• a the ]\v.=!S of the other 
hosi. \J5S oaa h" in .■;»,:■; ir .' ' '..'e -'ra ^t a voint h»re 'jh.?ca 
you -Jill rr-call on :(o-/c I'.er 2r,d )^avid ..i^./obsen had 1.3c-n 
c.'?lo:'S.'>d. 

David Jacobiin -dri'^ad in G.^ra^ny on Movenibar 4th, 
T^avid Jacobean ci.-a to >ha '»;hite 'vov'-.a on Kovr-.-ibo r 7, -ind 
you will cecsll his iJding his voice to tha plea, for 'Sod's 

sake, don't i -> i )< ^bout tins .'.sry drraiic. Th-tt is -.hat 

roinde:< 1.3 c h^d 'ripn t^^llLiig all of us 'ho .a** oi JlcF j r 1 ane ' s 
:j.lp. ''Don't 1\}X about it, b.^.cau^a this 'Jill ep.'"' in j>^r th^i 
of-h.'-t ho-itaj^s, :>ud -/a still h.ave a ci\-i.ice of gsttiivg ^hJm 



UNCUSSinFD 



631 



:■(;..■>: ■■ 
c ■: T 

700 
. V 1 
7 0?. 
703 
/ OM 
7 0'j 
706 
7 ij 7 

705 
7 10 
7 1 1 

7 i;; 

7 1 -i 
7 1 M 
! 1 5 
7 1G 
; 1 7 
7 18 
7 19 

7?:o 

7^ 1 
12. 



H I iJ. I ? : 2 



ONCIASSIFIED 



»/ 



P A Q E ; 5 



lU-t . 



2 Was l'^-. t '.M-aca i ;;Tini:-'iit ? 

A Ha .fiL-i i. = d to ') a 1 -i. a V .-5 l.'iAt, ■/,-'.s, bio-i'ia .;-.■ obc.-i\ 
•:id ■,'-'0 ■uL -.3 a itt.'r of f=iCt, wh.-^n J a c o 'j c .; a .; -■ a ■■. u 1; , i; 
bfti.iiiva '.■a tnonjht there '.'fta joing to ba oth.^r.3 with bn, 
.-ind 'Je 'jite d i s ?.? pointed that Jia ca?>a by himself, and -.'e 
vera still 1-, .i JO t i -> t i.ig ior the othars. 

<i n Z t-.ii bjok u? for rx "linuta 3/1 th-'.t I'-cstioA of 
1 ..slii.ap':e . Oth.^rs h-^va testified that Mhan discussing this 
i '-i J^.T.i=>£;y ''i 1 'i '^^ f you !;>■? 1 itved that it jould just ba a 30 
JE ^O^'.^y c 1 1 '. ">t io,i .-,,-..d ch^t V'-^s cr.e ■> I the r.^asons Conji^ss 
■j^in't i,icoi-.'^d of it. 

Do you raoall that? Is there a sense that this uas 
'joip.j to ba 1 •shocttsj.m thing? 

A I didn't have r>ny tar_;Tii.nal date in T\ind, no. The 
'-•■.Tly Lhi.Tj T. '>:!0.'»11 c>'30ut CoAjra'iS haing Lold •_'\s---»nd I -n 
not s-.ira I'hather, at which .-.eating it o ?.',-. a \>p, Ijut I '-"is 
- -ida -Mare of the Willi->n Siiith d.5cision l^ing told to )'rrm 



var(5d a situation like this t ' h t -t 



^nd to the Fr es ident that co 

__ji*<» liuas in l^Agar, i.a didn't h iva to notii/ tV.e Cor.j ';^ ss 

until such tirue as t he-- op er at i on yas co.-^plata. 

fi Do you r^icill 'vho .-xprasjad this opinion, -'ho told 
you thst? 

A .All I t?"call is it ^c>i^g g.-^nar^Ily -jaid. T pictuia 

in ;r/ i\iid Ditactor Cassy -raying that. I am not certain 



UNCLASSIFIED 



632 



UNClASSira 



y 



•Awvi- ;n-(i?6002 UllW*"'*^""' "~'~ page 

/?1 Awcut ■.'■;3 AcLoir.a/ C.;n^i=«l. a-i'/'-.a '.:'-..it, -.ad I .)i..l'Jta *.>a 

724 ;<ation;»l Sr-curity AJvisar sv/iaj i.t at that 7i\;:t, 

7 ?. 5 P o i n J s X t e r . 

7^j 'q H.-.va you ji** (he "T^i.-Lth Oi>iii\on siiica? 

7 2 7 A :;o . 

728 . 2 Hr-ve you ever ssen the "".nith opinion? 

729 . A ;(o, £ i.n not a l-->'-yer, -^nd vary fr^nVly, Mith ^1X 

730 'lui^. r^spaot t.o you aS la-yaxs -./id ray own coun-al, T l.u. ;» vut 

731 '.■\.-!n •.-■« :jet into the Isg^litiris and the nicetias of the l\y. 
7 32 2 Okay. 

733 . %o , you -..it:? ''.-.s ic^^l ly cc-l/ing on tha Attorney 

1 Z'A C-i\.-t^l 'nd Kt . CTisay's input on that score? 

735 A On the le^^l opinion, th?»t somebody in NSC has done 

/33 th.-i l^aal ■..■otk or '..'ouldn't ia so ivising the President? 

737 2 Okay, certainly Coiijrass Ins been notified on ot)iar 

7'?:3 co'.'.-rt actions ihat certainly involi/ad livas. lo you t-ccill 

7^9 uhit it "as that nade this different? 

740 . A The fact that out ch - iine 1- - this is the 'lay it \'as 

74 1 told to r-e and my impressions t;-.en. X have a diff.-?c.5nt 

7(2 npression now, but I will try to yo h?ck and ^liva you -ly 

7U3 impression then, not now. 

741-t . At that point, '.Je were told that cur C'.nticts in 

745 Tran •.■•->re such that \i this beci.ie public kno'Jledja that 

7'lS t'.air lives would be in dar.jer, and that they '^ata ''.omg 

747 so lathmg that ."light provoke the w^^ith oi Iheir goverr.-\ant 



UNCIASSIHED 



633 



A I .< 1 :■ i : 2 



UNGlASSra 



/ 



7 4 9 

7 so 

■; 'j 1 
; S2 

7'. s 



PAGE 31 

If :o-.ad It i^^t i:..v/ -^.Te .IJ-ilinj 'JiVh us -p.^ uUh r,ta*l. | 

\ad ;.ccordl.jly, 'J.i Ivid L.> Ha cu?at - ..•^•it ic us on i.his >o | 

i^cavant < ha Tcs. of .^ .?fi..-ui livss, i. 



h^. 



^s, nnl ':>a 

'it 



•3 You ->aid tl.:>t /ou hive a diffGunt i.ip.rassion now. 
'.iSit -IS /Our i :;p ■£.-:■-> -3 io a nov4? 
A 



'\\, .lew I k/iou t^.a cAst of ..haractars, raving r?<d 
/•^sl ..id iiif..--r..-.d ;o h^stiioxy, ^mrt ptatly s.laas/ jtoup. 

p^r<,on?l ly. I ■."■-■uldii' t cjra v/hat the hell h-iprenad to then, 
•.-it v!' it i -i ly .^.-^isonAl opini.ori At this point. 

Q If •.■a '.-an jo •-•^ck th.-n to -.(ovarabt^r . Once irhis thing 

\agan to untavel-- 

.\ Put, on the oth^r h^nd, .T h.istan to add, I don't 
think ]n covert op.^c^tions ^nd in -^-alings with this nitura, 
..■ou ■V-»3l o-ily with ooy -"oout l-!i".-cs. 

9. CartAinly. .^s Olivar HorHh said, if i'oth^r Thet^^sa 
'-•.^u.iJ have lisn sant to n^gotiata-- 

A E.-(actly. I am not sure sha uould have baan sant by 
hhe .'/a to 11 ah. 

2 Getting l-ack to Xov^^abar, then. Do you recall -..ho 

par t ici pated-- 

A Moveiiber of "hat? 
2 '63. 

A o:<iy. 



7b; 

7 '- 3 
7S9 
7 60 
7 6 1 
76^ 

;e : 

7 5 '-I 

7 s .■; 

7 67 
7o3 
769 
7 7 
7 7 1 
/ 11 



UNCLASSIHED 



634 



UNCLASSIFIED 



;r. ME: a?. 1}5002 "^ " PAGE 32 

773 . ■ 2 C,v:-a cha fiblic s t "i *•..= :-; i Ks c v-.e out. 
7714 A All T.\.jht. I'-.^Ga VMA3S h-j);^n in 'Aoj :.■•'): it . 

lis . 2 yo3, I. hat i;o.>"'S to ^^ K V a :-?p. / Torah. "Jo /on c --■-;» 1 1 

^ i!h \r) p 3 c t i. 1 .^ ttsd in ;^ ; •=■ .: <ii c I Ti J i-ha ? r.- s I'li^r. t ' 3 ■; l :•. '. r- ,-. a t 

777 J-icing this 1 1 ^.g ^r./riod ncv ftcn Hov?pnhar 7, lat's •■.•/, 

773 uAtil the-- f-htoujh the 9th? 

779 . A i'hfi President .nie a state :.-ent on IV addr:»ssaa to 

T'JO *-ho Mation on :{ov-n',.?t 13. Starting S'ovi^nber 10, 

781 s?6«5churi ters uorked with L.t^mbars of the KSC staii to 

'i-'^ pt^r^ra tha jasic 'Ir'-It ot thit IV "ild ):.-5ss . Tt than psssai 

/33 Inioujh .-.■. lA/ hr-nds. • -.yVe as nany as 15 in the White House 

.'C^ ■-■o.Tipl.sx.ior C'j,-«ut ■•r\\ j.^ssible editing, until the final 

7(?5 product vras rr-sdy on the l?th for the President. 

7'^& . 2 I don't Vnow wha'ihi^r or /.^t you watched ilr . Cooper's 

.'87 -istinony, bat ;ir . <?io,->^r Crcs f :> !;.-;p>r lir int of Justice ■- 

7 38 . A Jist occas i :n.il. ly . 

/•J9 2 Me tist.iiied that >n :'.8t with CoMr.andar Thoiijson r,Ad 

790 'dTiiral Poindaxter in an alLsrapt to try to gat sc-e of tha 

?91 facts .md put it in a legal context. Here you Auare that 

/92 this :<ctivity u'as yolng on l)y the ~a pa 1. 1 r^.t^nt of Juitica? 

793 . A Ko, not by tha Di3 ps r t ip nt of Justice, but I '.^n 'pII 

794 you, starting on or -"round Nove.-iber Sth or 6th, I was as>!i.ng 

795 the Presi'.iint of tha United States and AJ-niral PoinJost^r to 

796 .^->>:a all of the -facts public, get it out, .:st it on the 

79 7 r-scord now, tell avar/thi'ag that '-le Xnou, that the cov^r is 



UNCUSSIFIED 



-635 



;r-ii>: ■ 
l-j ■ 
7 99 
3 

, 3 1 
30 2 
30 J 

« ■-! 

•i 5 

SO 7 
oOS 
■3 9 
810 
'3 1 1 
3 12 
<il -' 
3 1 U 
81 5 
316 

ai 7 

813 
819 

o:>o 

3-2 1 
322 



uNcmssra 



/ 



H 'A 1 ? oOOlll^lll Hllllll IwV PAGE 113 

>< >. ■'■'n , ■ Va/ iiot c-'l.k, .-.A'i It ' 'i:ig arj"iid succe'-s f nl ly \/ 
Poinla.xber tSit, no, th<=>rQ rs sLill a i;;-iaaca v^at •..■« r-.i j.it 
the Iiost-ij'js out, ■i-'.i t>.a ?i ?. i J l.'at t; Is'j l:.lnj to jo ui.th IHit 
< .1 J to I ■ ' ■* 1 A -i i 1 .- A t". . 

This v'lir.j ■; -iS ';'i j. 1,1 i,ig i;p a j.-: id of st-.''^.;i Tco.-i • '-. >» 
6th. J'he 10- -* VA^lly, on tha 9th---Joll, I h ivs a :vv ,o -.h-.h 
you hwa a copy of in your fii^is, fTrt Pat S'lch-:) ri->;-i ^-^i l^dLt* 
sayi.7\3 this is a d i-. --s t^^r r.nd nnlass ua rno»de oc-.?loLa 
H isc loiM ls , "a ■.dra gou^g to La jeopardizing this 
P c5 •; I'^-^ncy , And ..cy scr^Aiillng across the bottom of it, t'-.a 
'- ■ ni o , r .1 .1 !. ; 'J 11 ^ t : 

''T hnve '..-..?n trying to do tliis for a :.'eek without 
•iuccscis. If wa can only ■jat the facts out' '--well, let rae 
■5aa wJi.-it nlsa I said. I •-.■.?nt on to say that, ''I think I ^ji 
finally p.-ating vith succ.->';s, a.-^d I told hiii that I uo'jld 
'•-.?11 n i ,1 :-.c>a to.-.ortcw -Oining,'' ihat '^eing tha 10th, 
Isc^'jsa rit that point in ti^e, t i'.Aally had gotten tha 
.■rr!-3i>;iSi;t to agr,^e to Lhe 1 7 ipeach and gat Po ind.'.x ta c ' s 
r-.cq" i asc.-snca to it, so I kneu--I yaiitad so.^iione to 'jat tha 
f^cts out, but '.iho :<as j iLhfl/: iJig facts or if tl-.nre •■.-.s ^n 
indepandent group trying to gathar f^cts, I di.vln't k.noa 
about it. 

2 Okay. You said you had boan trying for a •-: ^k to 
Jit 1 ha facts? 
\ Pi^ht. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



636 



1 A , : IC : H t .'. 1 ? 'J 2 



UNOASSIFe 



/ 



■i 'J h a t 'J -i s •: c c .) i> 1 .1 3 y 3 u / c v m <j a t *: 1 ,-i j t ;■. a £ a •; I s ? 
824 A Xo , not jattiiig '. hi» Eicts, jattxng it out (. o ':'•& 

32'5 public, wSe'i ji* X r. .=■ m And '■■>i--.,\ -..-a V. T.' w it; .•r.l ri^j lie K . r 1. \.--a 

JO? V.-^s, :i;?.'.r l.-^na ■]\d go. f-'S, -'.lit it, 'jciiig jt -1.1 

■■»27 ^'.t -but b^iig 1 1 i '■.uSh' /"■>'' ■'> ' a ^■■'.'1 ^n Jii r ' iig liv;s. V;'i . t a 

3 23 JO lag to blo'4 !;ha ','}iOle thiag jf /Oi Jo Ihat. 
^>.'0 It IS ;>ro- lA L 'ice . '.'i can't do '.hat /i=t. 

i30 2 \n'/oi-.a othivi Ih.in \''.ii.ral rolndis^.ar advoc a 1. 1 hg 

3J1 '. Ii^t, iiot -ec:;'\i:ig j>i;blic. 

332 A I uAnt Lo sa/ Director C'^-jey, but--I am not 

• 53? >';jolui.3ly cart.-^.rn of ll-'it, 'j'lt I l.'liiva so. 
33'i 2 And h«i for tha 3S;;;e r.^^sons? 

8 3S A /as. 

■336 2 Did t»itXir ca of v'i,?iii a'.-r disou-;s with you that 

337 'h.-ira 'j9s a pTobl.-jm, either legally or in any other usy, 

■Jith i:ha Kuvi-ikt^r '35 shii,-..^ at ? 
339 A no --at ^ny ti.ne? Cr tlian? 

i'-iO 2 Mall, I AiB not conca.viiad with anything a£t'?r J-invnty 

.3 '4 1 13 37 . 

;'4 2 A Wall, you put ^ qualiiier in 1 . ■ "i t i.::g^lly. '.<o , 

•• V 

343 they did not discuss with .ia snythinj -Jrong lijully. I -^o 

844 recall discussions that the whole sliipi^nt y.as jrcig; t^^t 

C45 is, it -.las the wrong t/ /a of n-issile, tliy iJJ.uii*(--hi^d the 

Z'\6 '-conj n^rkinjs on the box for the Tranian*;, thiags of t^'^t 

47 :i-»t'jr(». 3ut I don't recall the lagrilit'as of thit l.^i'ig 



UNCLASSIHED 



637 



H [R 1 96002 



uNtiAssra 



/ 



PAGE 35 



3.3 ') f .J u J h t up. 

.349 . 2 O'k^y . lo you r.^cill -.I'.sn it is you /;rst sau a 

■3 50 chronology? 

, ^(Sl A On >.;■,« :ii.ght oi Hov.--.b:>t 19, 1.136, v;-,(» Fr.-:-;i'^ut 

3 5 i '-aid A i>t.-:ss ■-■ .>•■ C- ' •^ :"; c a . I'h.ire 'j.is a :'ixup d'lrj.ig t.'-.s ,■ l ■ •-. s 

353 c 511 f .■ir .■•nca oil ij:.aLh<^£ or not a l^hicd country luvolvf-.i .\i 

A 

3SU 'jhij I. .S.jr or not I !isJ ilentjfiad i-hat country, as X a.>..-.i11. 

R55 . .H olaiJ fyng s t ^1 .r r.4->.i t •_as iss'u^d, writt^ii '_-y 

356 ?oin'l.-.:Hter , -i ^f i . ii hl < L; Pu lil i' .,j A IIJ l. , approved by the 

357 PresidoAt. Afti^r t'nt, I r^itucnad -fco'a the Whits House to 
HSa !.\a ;.'.jst Vin^, .ind xn tl.a ,'.00 j^velt ^ooiii found a group of 
3S9 •j,i\!.i'tiis , jca SSC, ;o'.a other '.'-^st Wing typ.-^s, including 

860 ptess people--our own press people, not outside press--ho Idi.ag 

•3 61 a discus'^ion of the ^venls. 

362 . Colon.'»l N'orth uas s -,ong <' osa present, ^nd ha ■is 

^63 falling r-;jiila of '-.■^■j !;;.>>■;« J.hings h.no.:i-. n.^d -.-.".d '.-V.-^a t'^y 

3 6 'I h '.p^^f.'i.'id . I listinsd to the J iscu-; s ion Cor a uhrls, -nd 

365 Then docidad Lo go to riy ■.-"■m oFfica aj^ 'Jrap up ?r,d get o\it. 

3 66 As I was going out David Chau, Sfacial Assist. int lo 

3G7 hha P.'. ?sident, :;Ocorftpa,-iiad rr.a ^nd said to r.a , ' 'Oii '/ou 

863 recognize what Ollie -\'orth had there?'' I caid no. I'e 

369 said, ''Ha h^s jot a chronology of ''.-.xt has Yr_^r\ .jouij on.'' 

370 X said I didn't r&ali.-^a that. Kg said yas . I said, ' ' ^fjUt^ 
3/1 if you can get a co^y of that for r.n.'' Xe ;?id, ''Ma uon't 
372 give you :» copy, you b.= tt:>r get your own.'' 



UNGUSSIHED 



638 



'. ,1 r. ■■ 

gv3 

874 
87 5 
: !b 
37 7 
i^7a 
3 7 9 
•f 'i 
.•?.31 
C:3;. 

e.?3 

33 '4 
C:iS 

887 

C39 
890 
391 
ii9 2 
893 
394 
39 5 
39 6 
S97 



UNCUSSIFIED 



y 



M. ,•>. 1 ? C 2 

^^1 ifol Icui 13 .-or. ling, H.jve.iber 20, I ssl'C'd A.-i.-nital 
Poin.iflxter for a cop/ of vh.^tGvet chronology thjy l:.->d 
r^gard.vng -.'hpn ^nd Uow th.jsa /ents hid h-ji-j)^nid. 
Q '.han did he ac'cuAlly provi.ie you o,ie? 
A He -issut.^d ...a he i/ov/ld get z& one, -3.1 id it ■.:->5 



(if.. 



-\ ■-■opy. I iyeh:>lled it, Too:-!ad at it quickly ^nd t'.Jtnod it 
uver to 'ha Prasidsnt's counsel, Peter Uallison. 

T.ater that day, A.ir.iiral Poindexter asked for it 
l;3cX, spying it ujs Incorrect in soraa spots and they uould 
f'iC'iiLsh :-a with 'not-;-,er copy. I told him that Wallison had 
It jnd I uould get it and return it to hira. I never did. I 
took it horria with n;e that ueeksnd. 

8 If I can step back for a iiinuta, because I want to 
ij.it to the chronology. On Nover'ber 9, when the President 

•> "e th.at s t^t.- .^.►■nt ^lout r <i th i Ld-country i nvo Ivc-nant . \'is 
(;hat draft.id originally by the HSC? 

A The clarifying st^tsi^ent? 

2 Mo, the original statement that no third country vas 
i.uvo I ved . 

A Thera vi^s no st.ate,-3ent by the President. That was 
an answer to a question. It wasn't written. It was his 
oral answer to an oral question. 

2 All right. And had someone told him that no third 
country-- 



UNCUSSIFIED 



639 



ij1E- 
3 9:: 
399 
900 
90 1 
902 
903 
SOM 
905 
906 
9 7 
9 03 
909 
9 10 
9 1 1 
9 1 2 
9 13 
9 1 '-I 
9 15 
9 16 
9 1 ; 
9 18 
9 19 
920 
9 2 1 
922 



i ,^ 1 9 & 2 



UNCLASSIFIED 



*/ 



PAGE 37 



A '.'all, LhAt £ac[uitt>s a ]ttt;la ax p laaat ion . r>,,-fTa h-(.l 
baan two briafings of the President, Xov^:ni:h:r l(y ^nd \'ov4^.bec 
19, in piep^ratioii for this. In the course of th 1 1 
P L e^'xcation for Vb« pr^ss conferciice, ua nor.Tially divt^ied it 
into t-jo sac t ions, ^ int.irn*tio;-i%l or foreign, -i.-d ttt'" 
uomsstic issues. 

^jly^ Xha ioreiijn or a ntei national si'ie, t)'.s brieliiigs 
'.-•^re conducted by tha MSC Adviser and rr.inbers of this stiff, 
13 -sll as thosa in the press at u li ' o Ti uho are most connected 
i-ith tha international side. 

On Koveraber 18, it u;is apparent that the President 
did not have the facts straight in his own mind, the 
'-i?iuenca of events, who had said what, what had happened, 
that type of thi.xg, and I told Po i ndexter that «e were going 
1-0 have to get the facts straight in tha President's mind, 
^h'-vt he -'as confused, .^od the pota thay tried to coach hi.n 
• nd to prep him, the more confusing it got, bec<iuse they 
•are confusing themselves with the^/^ answers. 

I couldn't lay ray finder on what was going on, but 
th^xre was soijething aiiiss, and I rocognized it. I did not 
patticipata in tha Xovanber 19 foreign portion of tha 
btleilng. I had been in Kaw York, returned to get in on tha 
domestic briefing, not tha foreign, asked Poindexter, ''Is 
tha President no:j set in his o'ln mind as to the sevi'isnce?'' 
Jnd ha said, ''Yes, I think so.'* 



UNCLASSra 



640 



;< A ii £ 
923 
92M 
92S 

, 926 
927 
928 
929 
9 30 
931 
932 
933 
934 
935 
9 36 
937 
930 
939 
9il0 
941 
942 
943 
944 
945 
9 46 
9 47 



II I. A ; ? i 2 



UNCLASSIFIED 



■/ 



?JGE 28 



Hh^t hid ;> ■■ jit.'.iad .las he -i-^s jibing cautioned i.jt to 
mention Isrr.ol. And :jhat u'e should iry to f\r.<;j>ia ^,iy 
.•nention of TsiitgI, -*nd, poor guy, ha aot, as cvuld be 
jf y.'ec t.?d - -hivinj hid all this to-ing and -fro-ing is f^r 5S 
'.-■h-^t h.-j should -i.i'/ ?. \ii hoy ha should and should p.'jt ':ay it, 
ha jOt mlxid up rn his .-ns'-'er. S7T3 /fhera wi?re a group of us 



in the Slue ?.ooin iljht down tha hall fro-n 



t^ 



'. E -> s t ?. o '^ m , 



V'l tohing the F r.-s i d.^ at ' s oeriorraance on XV . 

4jjj IJ/^ all c-\ujht «*«rt eiror at tha time. 
Poin-sxtar, 'Jho v-tj sitting there next to ree , i^raediately 
';ro-C out his ii-i and s^-irtad to -jrita an ans'..'6r. By the 
ti-ia the Pres id.>rit i ?1 n.-?ws confarpnce had finished and ye 
h^d done a f^'J minutijs of post mortara, Poindexter had frW 
clsr.i{ying stAt=^;>nt raiJy, !Jhich '.e showed to SjaaX^s and 
'c'..->n 1. 1 J 1. J ■^H— ^^: to the Ptasi'ant. 

Ka 'iignp.d off on it pnd it was f^loased. 

S Do you Kno'j '■jha i-hfti: oc not the Attotnay Gaaeral 
expr^ssad the same s.-n ti.r.cnts sbout '.hat statsT>*nt in his 
cns-'ar ? 

A Hall, I '/now thii-;a irera nany r^^'opla upcet .\t it. 
The Attorney General, tha Secretary of State. rhece Ui^ie 
nany upset, And the First l-idy--as to the Fresicient's 
p,?rf or^ianca at his r.aus conference that night. 

£ rharo jas also something in a ut.itten draft of this 
s;..-.ach tejatd.ing i.ha fact that any connection bet':a.?n th.e 



UNCLASSm 



641 



NAME •■ 
9U8 
949 
950 
95 1 
952 
953 
9514 
955 
956 
957 
9SS 
959 
960 
961 
962 
963 
96(4 
965 
966 
967 
968 
969 
970 
971 
972 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 39 



Danish fieightei and the U.S. Governraent was not correct. 
Thera had been reports that there was soma connection. 

A Keuspaper reports, and we have been assured by the 
National Security Adviser that those were completely 
erroneous, and I know one of the drafts had it in that the 
President was going to mock that, saying all these wild 
stories in the press about this, that and the other thing 
including Danish shipping, and so forth. 

2 So that assurance that that uas erroneous came fron 
Admiral Poindextei. 

A Yes. 

2 Now, if ue can get to the November 20th, in the 
evening, it is reported that Secretary Shultz visited tha 
residence because he was upset with apparently the way 
things were going? 

A Yes. 

2 Were you present at ^ hat meeting? 

A I would have to check my files. Could I go outside 
and check my records? 

2 Certainly. 

A Excuse me. 
I S-..;ess . 1 
BY nS. :.AUGHTON: 

2 The meeting with the President and Secretary Shulta 
in the evening of November 20th. Mere you present? 



UNCLASSIHED 



642 



NAME : 
973 
97U 
975 

, 976 
^11 
978 
979 
980 
981 
982 
983 
98U 
985 
986 
987 
988 
989 
990 
991 
992 
993 
99M 
995 
996 
997 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE (40 



- A I don't place Adrairal Poindexter thera. He could 
wall have been there, but I am just vague on it. 

C Okay. You uere there, though? 

A Yes. 

2 All right, could you tell us what Secretary Shultz 
told the President? 

A Not in detail, and I have been searching for notes, 
and I don't have them, but ha had £iva points--five 
discrepancies in the President's answers to the press 
conference that he felt had been put into the President's 
raind erroneously by his briefers, and he thought it was high 
time that the President got it straight as to what had 
happened and that he make that available to the public. 

2 Do you recall what those five points uere? 

A No, unfortunately I don't. And I have--! have looked 
for some notes to this effect, but I don't know that 
anyone--! certainly didn't take notes at that meeting, and I 
would have to refer you to Secretary Shultz as to what these 
were . 

2 Okay. 

Tha point I am interested in, and whether or not he 
brought out, was the November Hawk shipment. Did he mention 
that thera was a problem-- 

A He could well hava brought that up, but I do recall 
his saying that Aba Sofaat was worried as to what Casey was 



UNCLASSro 



643 



naui 

998 
999 

1000 
,100 1 
1002 
1003 
100U 
1005 
1006 
1007 
1008 
1009 
1010 

101 1 
1012 
1013 
1014 
1015 
1016 
10 17 
1018 
1019 
1020 

102 1 
1022 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIRED 



PAGE 1)1 



going to say the iollowing day in testimony to the House 
Intelligence Committee, and that there ueie discrepancies 
baf BAi^ what he, Shultz, understood to be the facts and uhat 
Casey might testify to. 

2 Did Secretary Shultz mention that Assistant 
Secretary Armacost--or Under Secretary Armacost uould be 
testifying with Casey? 

A Yes. 

2 And did he say that Armacost would have to-- 

A That is right, he did say that there would be a 
public disagreement. 

2 Okay. 

A I believe at that point in tine, I knew that the 
Attorney General was trying to act as a coordinator of this 
testimony in order to get it straight. I certainly know 
that on Thursday, he was working with that area. 

2 Do you know how that came about? 

A Mo, I don't. 

2 Okay. 
Did-- 

A I do know that Shultz told me and also told the 
President that he had made his views known to Ed fleese? 

2 Did Secretary Shultz indicate what it was about, the 
discrepancy that Abe Sofaer was concerned about. In other 
words, specifically the discrepancies over the Hawk shipment 



UNCUSSm 



644 



NAHE : 
1023 
102U 
1025 

^ 1026 
1027 
1028 
1029 
1030 
1031 
1032 
1033 
10314 
1035 
1036 
1037 
1038 
1039 
10>40 

lom 

10(42 
10(43 
10*4(4 

10145 
10(46 
lOM? 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 142 



and uha In tha go'vammant knew about it In Kovembaz of 1985. 

k That was just ona of tha things that he. was 
concatnad about. Theza ware othet things as to the rola 
that Israel play.ed and the whole -episode was anothec ona 
that was woziying him. 

fi Okay. Did Secrataty Shultz say when ha raade this 
known to Attorney General Heesa? 

A My indications weza that that would have been on tha 
20th also, but he had--told tha Attorney General oi possible 
discrepancies between Armacost and Casay in testinony. 

S Ua have heard testimony that in tha session to 
review Casey's testimony that afternoon on tha 20th with 
Admiral Poindexter. Hz. Casey, the Attorney General and so 
fozth, that Oliver Morth had inserted language saying no one 
in tha U.S. Government found out that there were Hawks on 
the November '85 shipment until January of '86. 

Ware you aware that this change was taking place? 

A No. 

2 Did you hava anything to do with Casey's testimony? 

A No. 

e All right. 

When you first say tha chronology. I believe on the 
21st. did you look at tha section which mentioned tha 
November '85 shipment? 

A I eyeballed tha entire document. It was several 



UNCLASSIRED 



645 



NAME: 
10U8 
10149 
1050 

^1051 
1052 
1053 
10SU 
1055 
1056 
1057 
1058 
1059 
1060 
1061 
1062 
1063 
IO6I4 
1065 
1066 
1067 
1068 
1069 
1070 
107 1 
1072 



UNCUiSSIFe 



v/ 



KIR196002 imUL^UUII 1^^ ''*''' '*^ 
pages long. And I found that--as I recall ny uoids to Peter 
Wallison. ''Take a close look at this. This thing flows too 
saoothly. It wouldn't have happened this way. Check it and 
find out, you know, what is going on.'' 

2 When you finally took it home that weekend to read 
it, did you notice that the section that discussed the 
November '85 shipment as oil drilling equipment? 

A I believe so, and I recognized that as being wrong, 
that that was the cover story that was going to be used in 
case it was discovered prior to its being effected: that is, 
the whole plan being carried out, that it was oil drilling 
equipment, but certainly I knew that the President and 
Shultz and I i«^-and McFarlane, for four of us, knew that it 
was Hawks and therefore, others had to know it was Hawks. 

2 Well, were these chronologies then prepared simply 
for internal use at the White House and NSC, or were these 
to be the case of public-- 

A I had been urging right from the start, get all the 
facts together, get them straight and get it out. Well, 
certainly, one of the things that--on November 8, I again 
told Poindexter, ''You have got to get these facts straight, 
so that the President can memorize them and get them in his 
mind, and unless you put it down, you know, we are not going 
to be able to get all the facts together.'' 

I didn't use the word ''chronology'' as such, but 



UNCUSSIFIED 



646 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HAME: HIR196002 lllllll Hllllll II If PAGE HU 

1073 get th« facts on a pieca o£ pap«i where we can review then, 

10714 and I was still urging that on the 20th and 21st, get these 

1075 iacts together. 

1076 '2 So, when you finally sat down to read this that 

1077 weekend, it was obvious that at least the Moveraber '85 part 

1078 was incorrect and that it was the cover story and not what 

1079 actually occurred. 

1080 . A Right. 

1081 2 Did you take any steps then to modify that section? 

1082 A Ho, because by that tine, another meeting had 

1083 transpired on the morning of Kovember 21st. The Attorney 
108>4 General came to see me to say that he was having a lot of 

1085 trouble getting the facts in one place, and he thought that 

1086 a full investigation should be made. 

1087 . I urged him to tell this to the President, and we 

1088 went to see the President. 

1089 & Okay. Did the Attorney General say that he was the 

1090 one who should do it, or did he suggest someone else? 

1091 . A Well, he said that he would like to do it, that he 

1092 thought there was a need to look into the whole thing and 

1093 try to get all of these facts reconciled, because people 

1094 ware differing, and there was certainly some things that 

1095 didn't hang together. 

1096 . 2 Did he mention which things? 

1097 . A No. This was a rather short meeting. 



UNCUSSIRED 



647 



NAME : 
1098 
1099 
1 100 

^110 1 
1 102 
1103 
1 lOM 
1 10S 
1 106 
1 107 
1 108 
1 109 
1110 
1111 
1112 
1113 
1 1 IM 
1115 
1116 
1117 
1 1 18 
1119 
1 120 
112 1 
1 122 



HIR196002 



UNCUSSIHED 



PAGE US 



Okay. 



A The President agreed that we should get all of the 
facts together, that the Attorney General should 
investigate. I urged that it be done quickly, because ue 
previously scheduled a meeting for Monday at 2=00 to review 
the entire Iranian policy, in view of the fact that the 
cover had now blown and that we would have to review our 
initiatives to see whether we wanted to continue, cut then 
off, go another route, what to do, and I said that we all 
ought to have all of the facts in hand, shouldn't have these 
differences between State, CIA, KSC as to what had happened. 

Get everything straight by 2^00, the Attorney 
General to provide that, and then we will use that as the 
base for, okay, that is what has happened, and then we go on 
from there, and the President agreed and said that, yes, by 
that niseting ha would like to have all of the facts in hand. 

fi I guess what we are curious about, Mr. Regan, is why 
wasn't that done through the White House? In other words, 
why at that point didn't you or Mr. Hallison or someone sit 
everybody down and get the facts? 

A Well, first of all, I an not a lawyer, I am not a 
trained investigator. I was a participant in this. For me 
to drop everything else--there were other things going on, 
believe it or not. in the middle of all of this--I think it 
was Friday afternoon--I had a budget meeting. 



UNCLASSIHED 



648 



NAME: 
1 123 
1 124 
1 125 

J 126 
1 127 
1 128 
1 129 
1 130 
1 131 
1 132 
1 133 
1 134 
1 135 
1 136 
1 137 
1 138 
1 139 
1 1140 

1 mi 

1 1142 
1 143 
1 1(414 
1 145 
1 146 
1 147 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 46 



Reraareber that wa had--had to have our budget to the 
Congress on January Sth. That was then November 21st. Tirae 
was getting auay fron us, and ue still had some decision to 
raake and the President was going to go to the ranch right 
about that tine, and ue should have decisions from hire. So. 
a lot oi other things were going on. 

Second place, the Attorney General is the 
President's chiei lawman. This was a legal investigation 
requiring investigators. Ue didn't have any oi those in the 
White House. Ue would have had to get then from someplace 
else, so it seemed appropriate with the Attorney General 
requesting of the President that he be allowed to do this or 
told to do this, that since he had the resources that he do 
it. 

fi Okay. 

Uas there any discussion about using the FBI or 
particular investigators to-- 

A No, that ha would get investigators to do it. Just 
who the investigator would be uas a detail that didn't come 
up with tha President. 

fi Okay. Uas there a discussion then of reviewing 
documentst 

A Ho, it is an Investigation. 

2 Okay. After that meeting--f ir s t of all, when the 
Attorney General cane, do you know whether or not you were 



UNCLASSIHED 



649 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR196002 EIIVIll U.l.lll II II PAGE M7 
the first person he went to, or did he discuss this 
previously? 

A I can't tell you that. I don't know. 

S All right. 

Hou was it then that Admiral Poindexter became part 
of this meeting? 

A Admiral Poindexter was in on the meeting with the 
Attorney General, the press and myseli. 

2 Hou was it that he was? In other words, did you-- 

A I believe--uell , I am not sure whether it was the 
Attorney General or I suggested that when we said let's go 
talk to the President about this, that we--it would be normal 
for one or the other of us to say, let John, or John should 
join us for this since it was to be something involving the 
NSC. 

S So, in the meeting with the President then, it was 
not discussed that documents would be requested or reviewed? 

A No. As I recall, this was a very short meeting, 
because--if I--I don't recall from memory, but I think the 
President--h« was going to go to Camp David and had a lot on 
his schedule. So this was just a quicky meeting, not more 
than 10 or 15 minutes, so there was no detailing into in it. 

ft After you left the President, where did you go? 

A Back to my own office. Hease, as I recall, exited 
the building to go conduct his investigation, wherever, and 



UNCLASSIFIED 



650 



NAME ■■ 
1173 
1 17U 
1 175 

J 176 
1 177 
1178 
1 179 
1 180 
1181 
1 182 
1 183 
1 184 
1 185 
1 186 
1 187 
1 138 
1 189 
1 190 
1191 
1 192 
1 193 

1 1914 

1195 
1 196 
1 197 



HIR196002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE (48 



Poindexter went back to his office. 

2 Do you know uhather the Attorney General and Admiral 
Poindexter met after meeting with the President? 

A I cannot state that. 

2 Okay. 

At any tine during that day, did you speak to Oliver 
North? 

A In ray entire two years as Chief of Staff, and this 
is no putdown of Ollie North, I only had one conversation 
with Ollie North one on one, and that was a telephone call 
on a oaturday .corning, i hen I had inquired in the situation 
room uhat was going on with the Egyptian hijacking, and the 
duty officer c e back on an hour and a half later; it was 
North, to tell na of the situation. 

That is the only time I ever spoka to North when 
there 'wasn't a gr'^p of people present. So, in answer to 
your specific ;■ mi, no, I never talked to North then, 
nor did I < i i k ^o him on any occasion. 

2 Uere you present in any meetings with him on Friday, 
the 21st of November? 

A Not to my knowledge, no. 

2 Okay. Do you know whether or not the Attorney 
General met with Oliver North on-- 

A No. 

2 --the 21st? Now, when did you become aware that 



UNCUSSIFIED 



651 



MAnE : 
1 198 
1 199 
1200 

,120 1 
1202 
1203 
1204 
1205 
1206 
1207 
1208 
1209 
12 10 
12 11 
1212 
1213 
121U 
1215 
1216 
12 17 
1218 
12 19 
1220 
122 1 
1 222 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE H9 



people fro.-n the Department of Justice were going to come to 
look at documents? 

k Never went through ray mind. Investigation--if you 
think about it, long enough, I would figure they would look 
at documents, so I just assumed that, you know, the Attorney 
General would do what an investigator does, look at 
documents, talk to people, interview and so on. 

Q Did the Attorney General ask to, you know, interview 
you at any particular point as to what you knew of the 
initiative? 

A Ho. 

2 Did Admiral Poindextex mention at any time up to or 
including the 21st that documents had either been altered oz 
shredded at the NSC? 

A No. 

2 Mas there any discussion of--as Colonel North had 
testif ied--that they were shredding these sort of documents 
as a normal course? 

A Not only no, but had I known that, I would have put 
a stop to it. That is one thing that I--has certainly 
surprised me to find out later, is that this shredding was 
going on at the time . 

S When did you find that out? 

A In public testimony later. 

2 There was a story that appeared in the L.A. Times 



UNCUSSIHED 



652 



NAHE ■■ 
1223 
1224 
1225 

^ 1226 
1227 
1228 
1229 
1230 
1231 
1232 
1233 
1234 
1235 
1236 
1237 
1238 
1239 
12140 
1241 
1242 
1243 
1244 
1245 
1246 
1247 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE SO 



the weekend after this, and that would have been around the 
28th of Moveraber, that documents had been shredded. Do you 
know who was the source of that articie? 

"A No, I don't. There were lots of stories at that 
time, stories that I had--soraehow or other ordered the 
chronology doctored, that I had ordered a chronology, that I 
was in charge of the chronology. I never had one darn thing 
to do with the chronology, or its preparation, or the 
Attorney General's investigation during that entire time. 

2 Okay. 

Specifically, this was a story by Jack Nelson that 
documents had been shredded at the White House, which has 
obviously proved to be true, or at the NSC, and I was 
wondering if you were aware of who the source of that 
information was? 

A No . 

I never find out any of these stories, where they 
had originated, not just on this episode, but others also. 

S Now. going back to the 21st, did you have any 
meeting with anyone else regarding this topic? 

A Oh, yes. I told Wallison that the Attorney General 
was going to look into it. And I alerted others on ray staff 
to keep their ears open, because I--there is some things 
that, well, it started literally earlier in November, but by 
that time, the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st--my nostrils were 



UNCUSSIFIED 



653 



UNCLASSIFIED 



MAME: HIR196002 ^ir« • ^— " "-' ^ " " PAGE 51 

12U8 really . twitching . There was something wrong, and I couldn't 

121*9 put ray finger on what it was. 

1250 But also, you have to teraember in this entire period 

1251 of time, I was under attack, people wanting my job, 

1252 suggesting that I resign and so forth because of what was 

1253 going on, and I just couldn't put «y finger on what the heck 

1254 it was, but I knew there was something wrong and was trying 

1255 through other members of my staff to find out, you know, is 

1256 anybody talking, you know, what is happening, but with no 

1257 avail. 

1258 2 Did He. Uallison mention to you that he had had a 

1259 meeting on November 20th with Judge Sofaer and the counsel 

1260 to the Department of Defense and so on? 

1261 A Yes. 

1262 8 What did he tell you about that meeting? 

1263 A Again, discrepancies, the same line Shultz was 
126'4 telling to the President. There were discrepancies between 

1265 what the President was saying, what Armacost would testify 

1266 to and what Casey might testify to as to what the actual 

1267 facts were in this matter. 

1268 Of course, Uallison was not privy to what had been 

1269 going on in the previous year or year and a half in this 

1270 regard, so therefore, he was at a loss to understand who was 

1271 correct and who wasn't. 

1272 2 Mow, did you participate at all in making the 



DNCUSSIFIED 



654 



UNCUSSIFIED 



MAME: HIR196002 |J | f Vkl V^'^' " " "^"^ pAGE 52 

1273 ai_rangements to hava th« documents raada available to people 

127M ftom thft Depaxtnent of Justice? 
1275 A No. 

,1276 . ' 2 On the ?3td, which uas a weekend, Saturday and 

1277 Sunday, wece you at all at the White House? 

1278 A No. 

1279 e Were you aviara of the Attorney General's inquiry 

1280 while it was going on--in other words, did anyone in the U.S. 

1281 Government-- 

1282 A No. 

1283 2 --discuss this with you? 

128(( A No. It was reported to ne on Monday morning when I 

1285 got in by soma of my staff who were in tha White Housa on 

1286 Saturday morning, that there uas a lot of scurrying around 

1287 and a lot of to-ing and fro-ing going on in the NSC area. 

1288 And there were various people from the Department of 

1289 Justice in and out of tha Uhita House--! don't mean White 

1290 House, I mean tha West Wing, over the weekend, and so there 

1291 uas a lot going on. They, of course, did not know what I 

1292 knew, that is, that the Attorney General had been told by 

1293 tha President to conduct an investigation. 

129U . Q Is there a reason you didn't tell them that? 

1295 . A Yeah. When there is an investigation on, you don't 

1296 tell people who might be asked in the investigation to give 

1297 evidence that, you know--that the thing is going on. I felt 



UNCLASSIHED 



655 



NAME: HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



/ 



PAGE S3 



1298 tJvat was coniidential and should remain so, accept I did 

1299 tell Walllson as Counsel to the President. 

1300 fi Did he mention to you that he had made arrangements 

1301 for the documents to be nade available, and so forth? 

1302 A No. 

1303 S What is then the first substantive meeting or 
ISOM discussion that you had-- 

1305 A Not that I recall. He night have, but I don't 

1306 recall that. 

1307 2 What is the first substantive meeting then or 

1308 discussion you had on the 2'4th regarding this issue? 

1309 A Early in the morning--! believ* the Attorney General 

1310 called me sometime right after 9=00 to say that he 

1311 had--something very important that he wanted to discuss with 

1312 me and with the President, and I told him to come on over, 

1313 set a time at around 11:00--uas the first opening on the 
13114 schedule, and that I felt that I would have time to talk to 

1315 him and then we could go see the President. 

1316 So, that was the first that I got some type of a 
13 17^ l^ '^^ e r "that something was up. 

1318 2 Did you discuss whether or not to include Admiral 

1319 Poindextet in this meeting? 

1320 A I asked hia if he wanted anybody else. He said no, 
132 1 ha thought he should just talk to me and the President. 
1322 2 Okay. 



UNCLASSIHED 



656 



NAME : 
1323 
132>4 
1325 

^ 1 326 
1327 
1328 
1329 
1330 
1331 
1332 
1333 
13314 
1335 
1336 
1337 
1338 
1339 
1340 
13141 
1 3142 
13143 
13U4 
13145 
13146 
1 347 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



/ 



PAGE 54 



And when the Attorney General arrived, did you maet 
prior to the meeting with the President? 

A Yes. 

2 What did you discuss? 

A Well, at that point, he told rae that--I don't want to 
characterize his uhola--aIl of his words, but to the efiect 
that he had found soma really troublesome evidence that 
there was possibly a diversion of funds from the sales of 
the Iranian ueapons--sales of weapons to Iran and nonies 
diverted to the contras . 

2 What was your reaction when ha told you that? 

A Horror, horror, sheer horror. First, I had never 
heard of it, and at that point in time, he had not gone into 
any details with me, so I assumed that this was U.S. 
Government money. 

How, I don't want to get into the wn a^y as to whose 
raoney Hi at is at this point. Later can do that, if you 
wish, but I didn't know there would be a mark-up, and I 
thought this was the actual cash proceeds that should have 
gone to the Treasury laaj uliutt he was referring to. 

2 Did you ask him who had done this? 

A He said that this was generally under Ollie North. 
I said, wall, wa had batter go tell tha President about this 
right away. Ha said, well, I don't want to say too much to 
the President until I can nail down some other things. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



657 



NAME: 
1348 
13U9 
1350 
135 1 
1352 
1353 
135M 
1355 
1356 
1357 
1358 
1359 
1360 
1361 
1362 
1363 
136M 
1365 
1366 
1 367 
1368 
1369 
1370 
137 1 
1372 



HIR196002 



wmm 



PAGE 55 



So, I said, well, let's go talk to the man now. So, 
ua went to talk to the President. And he repeated some of 
what ha had told me, enough to alert the President that he 



had "^o^later that afternoo^see him to go over the uhole 
episode, that he was terribly sorry that he was going to 
hava to unburden this on the President, but it was very 
serious, and he would have to have some time later that day. 
We set as a time right after the NSPG meeting, which 
was scheduled for 2 to 4 in the afternoon that we would meet 
•4, 4=15, in through there. 

fi Okay. 

During this meeting with the President, did anyone, 
any of the three of you, take notes? 

A No--although the Attorney General had some papers 
with him. 

2 Um-hun. What were they; do you recall? 

A I don't know. 

2 Did ha seen to ba reading from them or-- 

A Hot reading from them, but I just assumed they were 
papers to which ha could refer if he had to. 

2 Did tha Attorney General tell you--first, in your 
meeting beiora you went to sea the President that there was 
a memorandum to this effect spelling out tha diversion? 

A No. 

2 All right. So you weren't aware then that anything 



UNCUSSIFIED 



658 



MAHE 
1373 
137U 
1375 

, 1376 
1 377 
1378 
1379 
1380 
1381 
1382 
1383 
138U 
1385 
1386 
1387 
1388 
1389 
1390 
1391 
1392 
1393 
1394 
1395 
1396 
1397 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 56 



was inwriting? 

k No. 

fi Okay. 

Did he tell that to the President? 

A No. 

B Okay. Uas there any discussion in that 11^00 
meeting, or whenever it uas. the morning meeting, about uhat 
to do about this revelation? 

A No--because it wasn't revealed to the President what 
It was. He didn't know what we were talking about. 

2 So, in other words, you didn't inform the President 
oi tha diversion. 

A Oi the diver sion-- the word diversion, or what the 
subject was was not told to the President at the 11: 15 
meeting . 

e Okay. 

Was he aware, though, that the general subject 
matter was Iranian arms sales? 

A That th«re was something very wrong with the Iranian 
aims sales . 

fi Okay. After the meeting with the President then. 
did you and the Attorney General meet? 

A Ko, I merely urged him. you know, to get on with it 
and button up whatever he had to button up. He kept using 
the phrase, ''I have got a few last-minute things to button 



WUSSIFIED 



659 



MAME : 
1398 
1399 

11400 

,1401 
1<402 
1<403 
140(4 
1405 
1406 
1407 
1408 
1409 
1410 
1411 
1412 
1413 
1414 
141S 
1416 
14 17 
1418 
1419 
1420 
142 1 
1422 



HIR'196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PACE 57 



up beioiA I can giv* you all th* datalls.*' 

S Did you evai hear hin use the phrase, ''We have got 
to get our arras around this thing*'? 

A Possibly, but I don't reraenber specifically. 

a Okay. 

A I do Know that he indicated that the buttoning up 
had to do uith he had to see John Poindexter. 

Q Okay. Anybody else? 

A Mo. 

2 !4hat did you do then after this meeting with the 
President and the Attorney General? 

A Back to my office--! an not sure. I know I h*d--not 
sure it was that day. Wait a minute. I would have to look 
up my schedule. Do you want me to look up my schedule? 

fi Yes. If you would, I would appreciate it. 
[Recess . 1 

THE HITHESS: On Hovember 24, the reason we had to 
cut the meeting with the Attorney General short was, at 
11=30, the President had a meeting with Chief Bhutalezi from 
South Africa, and he always liked to keep his appointments 
with foreign visitors right on schedule. 

So I had attended that meeting. I then returned to 
my desk and net with Peter Hallison and told Peter Hallison 
something was up, and he better get ready ^« — to go into 
action . 



UNCIASSIRED 



660 



/ 



NAME : 
1U23 

m2(4 

1>425 
^ 1426 
1427 
1428 
1429 
1430 
1431 
1432 
1433 
1434 
1435 
1436 
1437 
1438 
1439 
1440 
1441 
1442 
1443 
1444 
1445 
1446 
1447 



fi Did you tell him uhat was up? 

A Mo, I just said that tha Attorney Genaial had said 
that he had to button up a few things with John Poindexter 
and had some serious revelations to give to the President. 
U* then had an issues brieiing lunch in the Cabinet roon for 
the President. i ^ i 

No mention oi Iran or the Iran aiiaii came up during^ 
thiH* issues briefing fm^TSSks on domestic pollcies--politics > 
things of that nature. 

And the rest of the afternoon, I had meetings that 
don't concern this. but--strangely enough--!! I do have to 
testify in public, I may tell about this meetin9--concern<.# ' 
the salaries of all Federal employees, particularly the 



salaries of the Congress and whether we should award them 
♦ 145,000, b^ij u 1.1 J II the neetmg was with Jim Ferguson and Van 

" r 4 

Norman, w)f Wiws his Chief oi Stafi^ o^tha Presidential Pay 

Board^ mmI '^is is where the idea was broached of Cabinet 

members getting 4145.000. and so on and so forth, which 

later I cut back to 99.S'and got away with it--in the dead of I 

night. 

But anyway-- 

S I don't thinX you will b« asked about that in 
public . 

A Then at 2=00 in the afternoon, I attended the senior 



UNCLASSIHED 



661 



MAHE 
l'4i48 
mi49 
1U50 
1451 
1452 
1453 
1454 
1455 
1456 
1457 
1458 
1459 
1460 

146 1 
1462 
1463 
1464 
1465 
1466 
1467 
1468 
1469 
1470 

147 1 
1472 



UNGUSSIFIED 



y 



HIR196002 ^T" w^r^- -■»■'»' -- ; PAGE 
advisor's briefing--as billed n a r i- a . Actually, it was an NS?g 
mfittting in the Situation RooAf in which ue tevieued the 
Iranian policy and uas given an updater^as ted close to an 
hour/ t^ I recall, by George Cave of the CIA on uh*4 the 
internal situation in Iran «f«fS to the best of their 
knowledge at that tine. 

2 Can I ask a general question? NSPG meetings, why 
uas it that the Iran initiativa iron the fall oi '85 through 
the fall of '86 was not discussed in NSPG meetings 
themselves ? 

A It was discussed in January of '86, and the policy 
laid down. 

2 Uas that a regular NSPG meeting? 

A Yeah, I believe so. 

And once that policy had been laid down, and the way 
it would be carried out, was known generally to those who 
had to know within the intelligence community. CIA knew, 
NSC knew. State Department knew in general what uas going 
on, although they claimed they didn't know the specifics. 

DOD knew part of it/ the portion that would have to 
do with the actual supplying of TOW missiles -from their 
stocks. So, as in most of these things, as I have come to 
find out, they compartmentalize information, and at no time 
do they then get together unless there is something going 
pals have to go back a«fl decide 



•iraiss , th^A the princi 



UNCLASSIFIED 



662 



name: HIR196002 llPlyLnUUir ILU ''*°^ ^° 

1473 whether or not rnr JKqtr ld continue the policy. 

114714 2 So. for instance, when the second channel began to 

11475 open in the summer, let's say, of '86, no one went back to 

^11476 NSPG to brief there? 

1477 A No. That was brought up by Admiral Poindexter to 

m78 the President with myself and the Vice President there. Ue 

1479 were told more than asked that there was this new initiative 

1480 and it was going to be explored and Hicrt. agreement, okay, go 

1481 ahead Mf4 explore it and see how it comes out. 

I 

1482 2 But that was not the discussion at the NSPG meeting 

1483 you are saying? 

1484 A No. 

1485 2 After this NSPG meeting then on the 24th, did you 

1486 and the Attorney General meet with the President? 

1487 A Yes. 

1488 2 Okay. 

1489 A That afternoon, as we were leaving the NSPG meeting, 

1490 Z asked Ed Meese if he wanted to come up right away to see 

1491 the President. Ha said no, he had to speak to John 

1492 Poindexter first and then would be there. 

1493 I went back, talked to Larry Speakes and some other 

1494 nenbers of ray staff about what had happened at the NSPG 

1495 meeting, so Speakes could characterize it for the press, who 

1496 would naturally inquire as to what went on there, aj^tf^he 

1497 Attorney General poked his head in and said he was ready, so 



UNCLASSIHED 



663 



HAHE : 
l'-(9 3 
1499 
1S00 
1 50 1 
1502 
1503 
1504 
1505 
1506 
1507 
1508 
1509 
1510 
1511 
1512 
1513 
1514 
1515 
1516 
1517 
1518 
1519 
1520 
1521 
1522 



HIX196002 



UNCLASSIHED 



y 



PAGE 61 



ue 'J?nt to tha Oval Office to talk to the President. 

Xou, that neeting at the Oval Office did not list 
too long. It was only about 20 minutes, although it was a 
verv fateful meeting. 

2 Okay. Did you or--and the Attorney General discuss 
anything before meeting with the President then that 
afternoon? 
.A No . 

e Okay. 

A Except for a feu asides that ha said, uell, he had 
gotten all of the pieces. 

2 Okay. 

Now, at the meeting w^th the President that 
afternoon, did anybody take notes? 

A No. 

2 Could you tell us the best of your recollection uhat 
the Attorney General said to the President? 

A Yes. He told the President that he had discovered 
evidence over the weekend of the possible conversion of 
funds froii Iran to Israel to a Swiss bank account opened by 
the contra leaders and then drawn on by the contra laad.»rs 
for the use of the contra forces, that there had been mark- 
ups over and above the cost of our government frt these 
i;eapons» a**''Xhese were the funds that were used for 
diversion to the contra bank accounts. 



UNCLASSIHED 



664 



NAHE 
1523 
15214 
1S2S 

^ 1 526 
1527 
1528 
1529 
1530 
1531 
1532 
1533 
1534 
1535 
1536 
1537 
1538 
1539 
15M0 
1541 
1542 
1543 
1544 
1545 
15 4 6 
1547 



HIR196 02 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 62 



. _ fi And do you recall what tha President's reaction uas' 

A Horror again, and- -thinking back on it, it is hard 
to--it is like a person uas punched in the stomach. I mean, 
the air goes out of hint, crestfallen. You know, a slumping 
in the chair sort of thing. A real blou had been delivered 
here that not only was there this possibility, but that 
they--people responsible were primarily Ollie Xorth, for whom 
the President had high regard as a staff person, and the 
Attorney General told the President that Adniral Poindexter 
had some type of inkling of this and should have 
investigated but didn't. 

2 Okay. Did he mention anyone else who knew? 

A Well, the President wanted to know, well, did any 
Americans get their hands on that money. Was there anything 
of that nature? And the answer uas no, the money had gone 
dit&ctly from Iran bank account to Israeli to Swiss bank 
account to contras, and no U.S. person had been involved--in 
the handling of the money. 

2 Did Attorney General Keese disclose who else might 
have known about the diversion? 

A Mo > those are the only two that he nara>sd. 

Q Okay. Did the President ask if anybody else uas 
involved? 

A Yeah, and neese said that, well, to their knowledge 
at that point, those are the only two fron the 



ONCLASSinED 



665 



NAME ■ 
1 5M8 
1549 
1SS0 

> 155 1 
1552 
1553 
155U 
1555 
1556 
1557 
1558 
1559 
1560 
1561 
1562 
1563 
156U 
1565 
1566 
1567 
1568 
1569 
1570 
157 1 
1572 



HIR196002 



ONCLASSIHED 



PAGE 63 



AdTji ms trat ion that had known about it--oh, I think he did 
tell the President that McFarlane kneu about this having 
been told by North on the way back froi» Tehran. 
2 Okay. 

Did the President make any com.ment to that? 
A No. Most of the conversation immediately turned to, 
ue have got to get this--make this news public. We cannot 
sit on this news. Mow, maybe in hindsight some people will 
say ue rush too fast to break the neus . I know that there 
has been some criticism by people of that. I think ue would 
be very reii\iss in not .T\aking it public iraraediately . 

Over that weekend--uell , prior to the weekend, and 
then over the weekend, I had been doing the uhat-ifs along 
with some other members of ray staff, including Wallac e and 
Thomas, Cheu, Dauson and others, and I had come to the 
conclusion that if there uera anything remiss, and ue had to 
do something that we should ge t--immediately make a public 
investigation and whatever the facts were, make it known. 

This is based upon my suggestion to the President at 
the time of the Challenger disaster that NASA not be allo'.jed 
to investigate itself, but that we appoint a 
conraission--later became the Rogers Commission. 

A 

Based upon that, I immediately suggested another 
coraraission to the President, and wa discussed that for a feu 
ninutas, as to was that the way to go, and he agreed that 



UNCUSSinED 



666 



UNCUSSIRED 



HAn£: :^IR196302 Ul lULniJlJI I ll-,|J PAGE 6 U 

1573 that IS probably the uay to go. 
157U I also suggested i.nraadiate ly that we had--ii ue 

1575 were--if via uete going to make the neus available as quickly 

1576 as possible, that right then and there was not the time to 

1577 do It. 

1578 It was late in the aiternoon. The Attorney General 

1579 still had some things to get straight. He had all the 

1580 preliminaries in place, but he, as ue now knou--there uas a 

1581 lot more that could and should have been done, and 

1532 accordingly, ue felt that--I had said that I think what ue 

1533 got to do is tomorrow :norning, as soon as ue had gotten 

1584 everything straight, ue would have to have the President 

1585 make the announcement, and I said, ''Probably, Ed, that 

1586 should be followed by your taking the questions, rather than 

1587 the President, because you will know the details and the 
1538 President certainly won't be able to ans'^'er press 

1 589 inquir ies . ' ' 

1590 So, it was in general agreed upon that, and I said I 

1591 would set things in motion, and we would certainly keep the 

1592 thing quiet overnight, but then break the neus in the 

1593 norning. 

1594 fi Did the Attorney General raention whether or not the 

1595 FBI had become involved? 

1536 A I think he just said, ''My people."' He kept 

1597 teferrdng it as ''ny people.'' I don't think he specified 



UNCLASSinED 



667 



NAME : 
1598 
1599 
1600 

> 160 1 
1602 
1603 
16014 
1605 
1606 
1607 
1608 
1609 
16 10 
16 11 
16 12 
16 13 
16 14 
1615 
16 16 
16 17 
16 18 
1619 
1620 
162 1 
1622 



HIR196002 



UNCUSSIRED 



PAGE 65 



■jh-o tha people uere at ihat point. 

S Did tha Attorney Ganeral mention that this may 
b6--may be referred to an Indepen'lent Counsel? 

A That uas one of the possibilities that ue went over, 
but ray suggestion of the independent body to investigate 
first to see if there indeed was evidence of criminality yas 
the one the President favored, and so did the Attorney 
General at that time. 

Q Okay. Uhy uas that? Uhy uas that chosen over the 
Independent Counsel? 

A He didn't debate it too long. I tell you, my own 
reason for suggesting the commission rather than the 
Independent Counsel, uith all due respect to you lauyers, is 
that Independent Counsel ta)<es--at least up to that point, 
the ones I had noticed--takes a long time before the facts 
are brought out to the public, and Independent Counsel shuts 
up. It operates behind the seen* quietly. It doesn't go 
public uith pieces of information and so on. 

The American public uould expect that this President 
yould come out right auay with everything that had gone on, 
and neither the public nor tha press would ba satisfied to 
say, well. Independent Counsel is going to do it, and a year 
from now after lengthy trials, you will find out all of the 
cwidfence . 

That, from a public relations point of view siraply 



UNCLASSIHED 



668 



HAHE : 
1623 
16214 
1625 

, 1626 
1627 
1628 
1629 
1630 
1631 
1632 
1633 
1634 
1635 
1636 
1637 
1638 
1639 
16140 
1641 
16U2 
16<43 
16<4(4 
16(45 
16146 
16147 



HIRl 96002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 66 



couldn't be condoned. You know, it wasn't credible, wasn't 
believable. Ue had to get something dona and done quickly, 
and so, when I made the--on the following day more of a 
follow-up on this, after thinking about it overnight, I 
decided it should be just a few people that again, with all 
due respect, and I have nothing but praise for the work of 
the Rogers Commission-- 1 7 people looking into this affair 
again would have taken three or four months. 

I wanted a small select group, get into it, get as 
much facts as you can, get it on the table, in the public 
mind, and then ue can find out who shot John, who is to 
blame and so on and so forth. 

So that is the reason I recommended only three 
people, and if you recall, and I say this with some degree 
of ptide--that within 2M hours of the President's hearing 
about this, I was already on the phone to John Tower, Ed 
Huskie and Stent Scowcroft, that we had raade--I had made this 
recommendation to the President of those three names, he had 
agreed with them, and I was on the phone to then asking them 
if they would serve. 

They agreed, and on--we announced this Tuasday 
morning. Wednesday morning, we were able to announce the 
members of the commission, and they swung right into action 
very quickly, so that is how the Tower Commission came 
about . 



UNCIASSIFIED 



669 



1648 
1649 
1650 
> 1651 
1652 
1653 
1654 
16SS 
1656 
1657 
1658 
1659 
1660 
1661 
1662 
1663 
1664 
1665 
1666 
1667 
1668 
1669 
1670 
167 1 
1672 



HIR196002 



llNClASSffl 



PAGE 67 



2 You discussed other names othec than those three; is 
that correct? 

A Onl/ among my staff. I did not take othar names to 
the President. But I had back-up names in the event that he 
uould not go along with this, but actually the President and 
I did this over the phone. I didn't even see hira in 
suggesting the names, because I had already told hira that I 
uould be coming up uith suggestions for hin. 

2 Mow, when the Attorney General briefed the President 
on this the afternoon of the 24th, did he mention that there 
were people outside the government who were well awara of 
the diversion? 

A I ara not sure. I don't know. Again, you have got 
to remember this was a very short meeting, and a lot of our 
discussion was how to nake it public. 

2 Ura-hura. Well, for instaAce-- 

A You know, how--and how quickly to make it public. 

2 For instance, we have heard testimony that Oliver 
Horth told hira that it was Albert Hakira's idea in the first 
place-- 

A Hakira's name never carae up in conversation with the 
President on the 24th, ever. 

e There have appeared articles which credit, again, an 
unnamed White House official as saying that on that day, on 
Monday the 24th, there was discussion that the Attorney 



UNCLASSIFIED 



670 



MAME : 
1&73 
167t4 
1675 

^ 1676 
1 677 
1678 
1679 
1680 
1681 
1682 
1683 
168(4 
1685 
1636 
1687 
1683 
1689 
1690 
1691 
1692 
1693 
169U 
1695 
1696 
1 597 



HIR196002 



UNCldSSIFIED 



i/ 



PAGE 68 



ijanatal 'jentionad that thate was just one black nark in his 
investigation, mantioning the diversion, but saying that he 
things that can ba kept quiet. 

"A I never heard that. He certainly never said it to 
me, because he told ;ne early in the morning--sorae thing most 
distressing to tell rae , and then at the 11^00 meeting, he 
said, when he referred to it I recognized immediately that 
vie would have to go public, and at no time did the Attorney 
General ever suggest to ma that ue could keep this quiet or 
should keep it quiet. 

2 Do you know who the source of that article might be? 

A No. 

fi When was it discussed what the fate of Oliver Horth 
and John Poindexter should be? 

A J^-Aitez the Attorney Genaral lefty the President--! 
lingered behind just to try to co.isole the President. I 
knew he was distraught and s p y i n g '.le would have to take 
steps to clean up the ness. I said, in my judgment, if all 
of this hangs together and is true . PoindeKter has got to go 
<a»d ue will have to clean house, >f*^'fhe President didn't 
comment . 

He never comments on something of that nature. And 
by his silence, I took that I had consent to proceed i**^rn 



«• I 'jent back to my desk, informed Uallison and Thoracis 
of what had happened and asked them to please prepare a 



UNCLASSIFIED 



671 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



NAME: HIS195002 V I » W*'! • VT ^>r » ■ p *- .^ PAGE 69 

1693 st^tsnent for the President. 

1699 . I had ayteed with the Attorney General- ■ a n i i 'jtltt ve 

1700 HIWL -that I would speak to Poindexter about this. The 
,1701 following morning, I did talk to Admiral Poindaxter, asking 

1702 him hou did this thing ever happen, and he told ne that he 

1703 suspected something was going on with Ollie Horth. 

1704 . He probably should have looked into it. .He didn't. 

1705 And I asked him uhy not. I said, ''My God, you are a Vice 

1706 Admiral. Why the hell didn't you look into what was going 

1707 on here?'' And ha said, ''I didn't want to.'' He said, ''I 

1708 knew it would hurt the contras, and the way those guys on 

1709 the Hill are jerking around, •' he said, ''I was afraid it 

1710 would hurt there too much, so I didn't look into it.'' 

1711 So I said, ''Well, John, I can tell you when you 

1712 come in at 9=30, you better have your resignation with 

1713 you,'' and he said, ''I have been thinking of that.'' 

1714 2 Okay. 

1715 A Now, you asked about Ollie Horth. 

1716 2 Yeah. (-^c yuUuO*^^^^ 

1717 A Specifically, I don't recall that I told Po In'.'^xtf r ^ 
17 18 or how it happened. I am inclined to think that after the 

1719 9:30 meeting when Poindextet came in to see the President 

1720 and resigned, that a suggestion was .•iiad«--whether by rae or 
172 1 not I am still not sura--that Horth would have to be 

1722 raassignad back to the ilatine Corps. That was no attempt. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



672 



NAHE ■ 
17? 3 
1724 
1725 

, 1726 
1727 
1728 
1729 
1730 
1731 
1732 
1733 
17314 
17 35 
1736 
1737 
1733 
1739 
1740 
17U1 
17 4 2 
17»«3 
17MM 
1745 
17 '1 6 
1747 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



z^ 



w/ 



PAGE 70 



ajjiin, to d iff e tsntia te between the tyo . North had corae 
into the White House not at the request oi the President, 
but had cone in as a staff man. 

It was logical that he would be staffed out, you 
knou, at the end of his assignment or at the pleasure of the 
national Security Adviser. 

There vias some discussion a year or tuo--c>« actually 

tZu* 

about a year before tlu-t about his being reassigned, and he 

\£ 

was )<ept on. Bud ncF;irlane had raised »hal , and he uas kept 

on . 

2 Mara you part of that decision-raaking process? 

A Mo, Horth never reported to rae--he uas not on ray 
staff. He uas on the staff of the Kational Security 
Council. The National Security Adviser was the one who did 
the hiring and firing there. 

2 So, do you knou who actually told Oliver North that 
he Mould be reassigned? 

A I don't know. I have heard it said that he found 
out about it in the President's statement, and I do knou 
that I uas responsible for the insertion of that in the 
President's statement. Certainly Wallison and Tho.nas 
wouldn't have dreamed it up on their own, but as to uho then 
actually told him. I don't know. 

2 Uell, as you know. Colonel North has testified that 
he Mas under the assumption that he uould be allowed to 



UNCLASSIHED 



673 



NAriE : 
17'l8 
1749 
1750 

,175 1 
17S2 
1753 
1754 
1755 
1756 
1757 
1758 
1759 
1760 

176 1 
1762 
1763 
1764 
1 765 
1766 
1767 
1768 
1769 
1770 

177 1 
1772 



HIS196002 



Mus^m 



/ 



PAGE 71 



r&sign. from the MSC staff, or at least as>:ed to be 
leassigned, and instead heard about this ouer the 
television . 

Do you know who would have given hira that 
i.Tipression? 

A All I can say is I don't know the answer to that, 
and I a™ the last guy in the world to answer that question 
consi-dering what happened to him. I can sympathise with 
Ollie Horth, because I found out about my reassignment 
exactly the same way, first from rumors from the East Wing 
of the White House and then later by hearing it on CMN that 
ray successor had been chosen. 

So, I am the last guy in the world to comment on 
that. 

2 Did you hava the impression you would be allowed to 
1 f n 1 li i I n " ^,«c.'< ' < !■ '* v **"^ , 

A I had asked to T teujj fyn. I told the President that 



I h?.d a letter ^hatlprepared^^rf resignatio^ in October of 



1986. -soSetirae after the election, tJ»«rt I wanted out and 
A 

back to civilian life. And I was carrying that letter with 
HA intending to give it to the Presi.lent after ve hiJ doae 
th« post-mortems in the election, but this Iran affair 
intervened and I didn't think it appropriata that I resign 
i i> till II in spite of the urgin^that many people within and 
without the White House were making T* me, 1>^t«* I didn't viant 



KNMSIflEO 



674 



WSWfl 



v/ 



NArlE: HrR196002 ^ ' * VLflU|l|| | f f | P*GE 72 

1/73 to. be ^ scapegoat and look as I was resigning to take the 

17714 blame for all this. 

1775 So I did not resign until I uas pushed out after the 

^1776rcu'etreport._ 

1777 2 Do you know uhen it uas that ar r angeinents were raade 

1778 to secure documents at the NSC? 

1779 A Ho. 

1780 2 Okay. Do you know uhen it uas that the FBI uas 

1781 brought into the case? 

1782 A No. 

1783 2 Okay. Do you know if those arrangements were nade 

1784 through Mr. Wallison's office, in other uords, that h« 

1785 indicated to you that he had taken any steps to secura 
17 86 documsnts? 

1787 A All I told hin uas to cooperate with Ed Meese and 

1733 offer hi;B any help /('could on yhat happened. The details, I 

1789 don't know. 

1790 2 All right. 

1791 Here you aware of any instructions to Oliver North 
1/92 regarding uhen ha had to leave or uhen he should clean out 

1793 his offica or anything to that effact? 

1794 A No. 

1795 2 There has been much discussion at the hearings about 

1796 this off-the-shelf account of the residual funds, about •SS 

1797 ravllion viorth, that Direc!-or Casey had instructed Oliver 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



675 






V 



N A n E : 
1798 
1799 
1800 

> 180 1 
1802 
1803 
1804 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1308 
1809 
1810 

181 1 
1812 
1813 
1814 
1815 
1816 
1317 
1818 
1819 
1820 

182 1 
1322 



HIR1?6002 PAGE 73 

N<3j:'ch to set aside and use foi coveit operations. Did you 
knou anything about the establishment of this--this off-the- 
shelf account, so to speak? 

A Xo, I never heard of it until the public disclosure 
of it. 

2 Okay. At soma point, did you iniorn Director Casey 
about what the Attorney General had told you? 

* Yes. 

2 Uhen uas that? 

A \iz missed contact during the day of the 2'4th. He 
had put in a call to me. I hwd answered' and -iMlA finally, 
he said he yanted to see me. He haa titnd to see m^ right 
after the NSPG meeting, but I had to push him off because I 
had Mils meeting with the Attornay General and the 
President . 

I didn't till hi -8 at that point 'Jhy I uas pushing it 
off, but said ray schedule prevented it. Ha said that, 
•'Well, then, could you drop by ray office on the uay hone?'' 

So that evening on ray uay to my residence, I want over to 
T.aagley and had a irceting with Casey for 20 or 25 minutes. 

2 Could you tell us what happened at that meeting? 

A Yeah. 

2 First of all--sxcuse rae--was anyone else present? 

A Ho, just the two of us. 

2 Any r.ot:»s tsk^n at that meeting? 




UiliL^ 



676 



H t R 1 9 6 2 



yNcuss 



•" 



irit^i 



PAGE 7 14 



1323 A No. 

1824 2 Okay. Could you tell us uhat happened? 

1825 A These are general impressions, because I don't have 
^1S26 any transcript. I told him that the Attorney Ganeral had 

1827 told the Presideiit that there uas a diversion of funds to 

1828 aid the contcas and that I had said, ue are going to have to 
1329 go public with this right away and therefore an annoinc.-;ni.int 
1830 would be made in the morning about t4ri« . 

1331 I cautioned him to remain quiet about it until the 

1832 public announcement. 

1333 2 Okay. If ue can take it step by step. When you 

183U told him that the President had been told about the 

1835 diversion of funds to the contras. uhat was his reaction? 

1336 A You have to know Director Casey to be auare of what 

1837 I ara saying here. The man's face never reflects anything. 

1333 I uon't say he had a poker face, but he certainly didn't 

1839 show surprise at that point, didn't utter any expletives, 

1840 didn't leap out of his chair or any of those things. 
13U1 2 Did he mumble anything? 

l-3'42 A He always rau.ibled. At that point, wa :ust sort of 

1843 picked up in conversation without his expressing surprise, 

1844 chagrin or what have you, the consequences of uhat was going 

1845 on. 

13'i6 . I think he wanted to viarn ri6--uarn is not the correct 

1347 uord, alart :;& to uhat the naxt steps would provoke. That 



Ul 







677 



18U8 
18U9 
1350 
> 185 1 
1352 
1853 

lasu 

1855 
1856 
1357 
18S3 
1359 
1860 

186 1 
1862 
18G J 
136'< 
13 6 5 
1366 
13 6 7 
1868 
1869 
1870 

187 1 
1372 



oiT^m 



HIRI96002 PAGE 75 

IS", that this ligiit nean a cutofi in contra funds loxevar, 
and th« disaster that that woTild bring if the ?> -.nd in is tas 
had no opposition. 

Thay uere allowed to poison the rest of Centcal 
Amarica and the Caribtaan. Ke uarnod '-.e about the fict i->-it 
ue would now be cut off for quite sone time if not forever 
from contacts with the Iranian Covernraent as soon as this 
became public, because thay uould be irate at the fact they 
had been overcharged and funds diverted. 

He warned ma that this would be very upsetting to 
Middle Eastern fritnds and othsrs when the Israeli portion 
of <his became known. He didn't think that it wou.ld be very 
har^iful to relationships with allies, because they, in fact 
for the iiost part, had baan salliiig arras themselves. Xt '..■^s 
oonv.?r sa tion along that line. 

It u.is no specifics as to, did I know that so-and-so 
jas involved, or did I know the details of how tha--n\oniPS 
pascad or anything of that nature. It was more the 
consequences of what was happening. 

2 Mere any of those consequences that other covart 
activities night be discovered? 

A I don't recall his saying that. 

2 Okay. What about specifically Oliver North's aid to 
the contr^s? 

A Veil, yoah. As I i'lst said that -ihen this ."..^ws c.iiT.e 



UNCLASSIFIED 



678 



N A n E : 
13V 3 
18714 
1375 

> 1 o 7 6 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1330 
1881 
1882 
1333 
13 3 4 
1335 
1886 
1887 
1S33 
1.739 
1390 
1891 
139 2 
1893 
13914 
1895 
1896 
1397 



HtRl 96002 






y 



P .\ G E 7 6 



out that--Mell, he d i d ii ' t get into s:acifics about '...'hat 
Oliver Korth u^s doing -*-»• the coattss, but in jaaer^l, U.S. 
aid to the contras uould be cut off by actio.is of the 
Conji.'iss . 

2 Okay. But I juess I am not concerned ^bout the 
money Congress might or might not vote. What I am asking is 
North has testified that he bssicilly directed contra 
r.?suppl'/ effort. Did Casey allude to that? 

A That didn't coita up, no. 

2 Okay. Did Casey aantion-- 

A Thsse uer6--you know, you understand, generalities, 
broad generalities of future conse<iuences of a change in 
policy. 

2 Oid Casey p.ention anything about the Fucraark visit, 
F-u-r-m-a-r-k, visit that he had been told that there was a 
possibility the money had i.-ien diverted as G,\rly as October 
of '36? 

A Earlier, soaeti'na between Xovt.'sber 3rd and Kova.-nbar 
2'lth, Casey had told rae without using the name Furmark that 
a Canadian friend of his had told hira that t!ie neus of 
McFailane's visit and at;iis shipraants by us aad Israel to 
Iran was pretty viell known in certain circles, and that this 
thing was coming unglued. 

2 Okay. But he didn't .mention the contra diversion in 
that? 



!ty 



679 



IINClASSirlElJ 



.'A IE: -I f.?.l-5SCl02 1^5 I W*»« •'»'^^"" • — ^ TK'IZ 77 

10 9 J A . Mo. 
1899 2 oy..\-/. 

19 . Oo you racall '.ihat conteMt that vjas in? Wera you %t 

^ijOl a -cGting? '■J.is.it on the telephone? 

1902 A I <-:ii inclinisd to think he dropped by ray of-f\ca one 

1903 time on the--aithet baio):e or after another }-eeciJig 'ihan he 
1901^ :w'.>s in tha White House just to let .-na ?{no'4, because ^t th%t 
1305 tv.Tie; you Vnou, it 'jas speculation all over tha press ibout 

1906 rhe Ttsn shipments and so on, and he ca.-ne in to tell me 

1907 about that. 

1903 2 U>3t :,'as the poi,it of his tilling you that? Tn 

19 09 other uords-- 

1910 X Well, just to giva me a heads-up that he tried to do 

1911 this repeatedly on many things, ^.ot just Iran, and--s ituation 

1912 whenever something was about to Mow. Ha would try to give 
191i MS a hc^-ds-up so I could give it to tha President. 

19 14 2 Did he say whether or not the CIA was taking any 

1915 st;2ps to write the chronologies or get their arras around the 

1916 facts? 

19 17 A Ko . 

1918 . 2 Did you ever see a CIA-prsparsd chronology? 

19 19 A Xo. 

1920 . 2 We are back, I guass, to tha evening of the 2Uth, 

1921 -^rd you ?-a niaating with Dir'jctor Cisay. Othar than the 

1 •> 2 2 things that you have listed "Jhare ha rnentionad that the^a 



IINCUSSIFIED 



680 



NAME 
1923 
19214 
1925 

, 1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 

1 9 'I :- 

1947 



HIR196002 



drfii:!; 



^ 



PAGE 78 



nray ba a natural outgrowth of thesa activities. Did ha say 
anything elsa-- 

A Ho. I cut tha meeting short because I was anxious 
to get hin to start doing someLhat if-ing. lOU KnSw, I knew 
what Wallison and Thomas were working on, the President's 
message. I would have to talk with thea on the phona. 
I had been told while in the car on the way to 
Langley that F^'^'t^gj^aa^j^agafc a 3 trying to get me. I had 




many telephone calls stacked up, so I wanted to get home and 
start in on those phone calls and try to make a decision as 
to. jinw li ii| 1 1 ■ , who could ue put on that investigating 
commission and how could ue handle the announcement in the 
morning . 

fi When you spoka to Director Casey, did he ever argue, 
imply or otherwise assert that perhaps you should try to 
keep it quiet because of these possibilities? 

A I don't believa he did, and I wouldn't have listened 
to it anyway. 



Okay. 

Did you speak top^ 



:hat evening? 




UNCLASSI 



It 



681 



NAHE 
1943 
19M9 
1950 

J951 
1952 
1953 
195U 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
196M 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
197 1 
1972 



KIR196002 

2 . Do 
A 



UNCUSSIffiy 

you recall how '^^k-.S^- ' ^•'l^^^'T.'-'^^^^^^^i^ 



PAGE 79 



I can't recall tha spaclflcs, but that was tha 



thing, it would hava to b« a housa cleaning of peopla that 
had 1^ t f^ V '^^^ ^doun . I seen to have tha Impression that 
mine was ona of tha heads that would hava to roll. 

2 What gave you that inptession? 

A Well, when people talk about a thorough 
housecl'eaning starting at tha top, ona gets the impression 
that one nay be considered. 

2 Did t ■ -^MrBention Oliver Morth or Johr. Poindexter in 
that housecleaning ? 

|.;^^^idn't mention North. ^^S^^^sly have mentioned 
Poindexter . 

2 Did you tell jf-J^Bthat steps wera already taKen or 
going to be taken? 

A Yes. That was one of the things I was doing, uas 
working fast and furiously to try to get this information 
out and to hava an investigation and let the facts come out. 





sk any particular questions about what had-- 



lidn't go into details. 

2 Okay. Was there any discussion of if it should be 
nada public oz when it should ba made public? 

A I told i.^^^^what wa had agreed to, that it would ba 
made public in tha morning. 

2 And what was ■ 'i^^responsa to that? 



miASSK 



iJ 



682 



XArtE 
1973 
197t4 
1975 

,197 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
199 1 
1992 
1993 
199U 

13); 

1996 
1997 







PAGE 80 



k I don't recall. Generally agreement, I believe. 
ft Okay. Did you discuss the Tower Comraission with 



A I didn't know it as the Tower Commission at that 
t irae . 

2 Right. 



A 'Jut > pS^V^^'^B that was my recom-iiendation and the 
".-■^Vj.i.-^LM. 
President seened to go with it. 

S Okay. Did^'^Jniention anything else during that 
conversation? 

A Ko. Not that I recall. 

2 Do you recall how long it lasted? 

A 1 or 1 5 minutes . 

2 Did'e§' "^mention having spoken to the Attorney 
General ? 

A Ho. 

2 Director Casey? 

A No. 

2 Anybody elsa in the government other than the 
President? 

X I don't recall^ .^Braentioning anybody ^'^a t i-^'ij^. 

Mm 




'but who the people were I never inquired. 



m^ 



2 Do you recall what it i s FS-^Jr •'''^H P ^ ° P ^ * were 



UNCLASSI 



ms 



683 



NAnc 

1998 
1999 

2000 
<2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
201 1 
2012 
20 13 
20 1<4 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
2021 
2022 




OCffT. 



HIR196002 '-— --^vii ■■■■# pxQj qI 

tailing ^ 

A Uall, about tha seilousnass of tha situation and tha 
facts wata going to hava to ba nada public--and that thera 
should ba a thoiough housecleaning . 

2 On tha 2<4th, then, I gathez you helped ptepaze a 
statement for tha President. 

A Yes. 

2 To naka at tha press confazanca. 

A Actually, it was finalized on tha 2Sth. 

2 And did you meet with tha Attorney General on what 
his responses would ba to questions? 

A Not in a sense of rehearsal or asking of questions, 
but just in general was ha coaf ortabla , did ha know all the 
facts, would ha ba abla to handle tha questions, was thera 
anything further that ha needed to know before he went 
before tha press, and he assuring ma that ha thought he had 
enough that he could handle it. 

2 When was your sense of when this first became a 
criminal investigation? 

A Sonatima during tha preparation of the initial 
investigation of tha Tower Comnission, niddla of December. 
I recall Peter Hallison showing aa a document that purported 
to ba soma typa of aemoranda about tha diversion of funds 
and this for Presidential approval, and I recognized that 
once I began to get tha gist oi tha fact that this was U.S. 



UNCUSSIii[ 



684 



NAME 
2023 
202(4 
2025 

,2026 
2027 
2028 
2029 
2030 
2031 
2032 
2033 
203U 
2035 
2036 
2037 
2038 
2039 
20140 
20U1 
20M2 
20(43 
20U(4 
20(45 
20<46 
20(47 



»x«,».o. uNClASSIfib ..=. . 

Government piopeity sold and added raaik-up charged, that 
thara war* going to be questions as to who got the money, 
whose money was it, all that type of stuff, and there was 
the' possibility, of a crime here. 

8 Okay. 

But--I guess what I am getting at--the Attorney 
General in the press conference on the 25th stated that he 
was going to assign the Criminal Division of Justice to 
begin the investigation. Was there any indication from him 
that this was being done at an earlier time? 

In other words, on Monday, when he told you of the 
diversion, did he say-- 

A That would be the Criminal--no , no, no. 

fi Okay, so this was actually the first you heard of 
it, then, at the press conference. 

A Yes. 

2 And when were you first interviewed by the FBI? 

A I would have to look at my records. I don't know. 
It was shortly thereafter. 

fi Now, as to the roemo--if I can refer to it as the 
diversion nemo for a moment, you have seen the document, no 
doubt. 

A Yeah. 

fi It is a rather lengthy piece? 

A Yeah. 



UNCUSSIfi 



m 



685 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HAME: 
20148 
20U9 
20S0 

>20S 1 
2052 
20S3 
20514 
2055 
2056 
2057 
2058 
2059 
2060 
2061 
2062 
2063 
206*4 
2065 
2066 
2067 
2068 
2069 
2070 
2071 
2072 



HIR196002 



PAGE 83 



. - a Is this the type of docureent that would go to th« 
Ptasident to review, oi would it be normal to distill it 
into it? 

A That, to ny eye was a working docunent, a staff- 
prepared document. It did not hava the normal salutation on 
it that it was a raeraorandum from somebody to the President. 
Normally, there would have been an overlay or a covering 
memo go with that, explaining the contents of what it was. 
The covering memo might or might not hava had boxes for the 
President to check agreement or disagreement, or it might 
have been on the document itself, but tha way that that was 
phrased and so forth, there was mora work needed on that 
before such a document would hava or should have been sent 
forward to tha President. 

Q Mould that normally have gone through you or would 
that hava gone straight from tha NSC to tha President? 

A That type of thing normally would have gone straight 
from tha NSC to tha President. I am not sure--that is the 
best, and I resisted a lot of that while in--as Chief of 
Staff, this by-passing of the normal paper channels, but 
that is the way that they wanted it done. 

fi Um-hum. I take it than that you didn't see that 
memo or any of tha other memos that North described in his 
testimony? 

A No, never. 



IWCIASSIFIEO 



686 



NAME 
2073 
20714 
207S 

.2076 
2077 
2078 
2079 
2080 
2081 
2082 
2083 
20814 
2085 
2086 
2087 
2088 
2089 
2090 
2091 
2092 
2093 
20914 
2095 
2096 
2097 



HIR196002 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



PAGE 8(4 



2 Okay. 

Did you »v»t discuss with Adraital Poindexter uhat 
happened with those nemos? 

A Ho. 

2 At any time since-- 

A Aiter Adniial Poindexter resigned, except for a 
briei meeting of consolation and farewell. I did not talk in 
any detail to John Poindexter about the events that have 
transpired. 

2 Okay. 

Have kind of a snail question. It is ny 
understanding that if a staff nenber at the KSC needs 
transportation, whether it be by car or by airplane, that it 
had to be approved through you? 

A It was not sent. This is a reference to a 
Washington Post story of several days ago in which there was 
a nenorandun shown in The Washington Post from Oliver Horth 
to John Poindexter, saying that the memo should be forwarded 
to him requesting transportation for North when and if he 
had to travel, particularly travel to Andrews Air Force Base 
and back, or to hurried meetings around town, that the Uhite 
House transportation pool be ordered to furnish him 
transportation. 

fi How do you know for sure that wasn't sent to you? 

A Because I would have told hin what to do with it. 



UNClASSlFiEO 



687 



DNCLAJibln 



LU 



NAME: 
2098 
2099 
2100 

»2 101 
2102 
2103 
210U 
2105 
2106 
2107 
2108 
2 109 
2110 
2111 
2112 
2113 
211>4 
21 15 
2116 
2117 
2118 
21 19 
2120 
2121 
2122 



HIR196002 PAGE 8S 

and I don't ienemb«t seeing It. But the newspaper account 
did say that Poindextai want back to Kotth and said, ''Don't 
ba childish,'" or words to that effect. ''Stop bitching,'' 
or words to that effect, ''and get on with your job.'' 

So, ha never did forward it according to the 
articla. 

& Actually, in ny question, I was--I an particularly 
concerned about tha air travel. Hy infornation is from 
speaking to Ed Mickey that if ona--soneone at tha NSC wanted 
to get a flight to a certain location, that that would have 
to be approved by you; is that correct? 

A If they wanted a special itilitary plane from the 
Uhite House pool of planes that wara assigned for 
transportation by the President or his staff, I had to okay 
each of those. I normally okayed flights only for the 
National Security Adviser himself or occasionally one or two 
other very senior White House staffers. 

Wa--I did not see requests--if they requested normal 
government transportation; that is, if they wanted a seat on 
a plana that night ba going somewhere, let's say to Germany. 

That type of thing didn't come to hin. It was for the use 
of a specific plana in whole or in part by someone in the 
Uast King that had to cone to hin. 

Q Okay. 

Did you ever see an application either by or on 



UNCLASSffi? 



r^i 



688 



NAME: 
2123 
212M 
2t2S 

,2 126 
2127 
2128 
2129 
2130 
2131 
2132 
2133 
213<4 
213S 
2136 
2137 
2138 
2139 
21(40 

2im 

21(42 
21(43 
21(4U 
21(45 
21(46 
2 147 



HIR196002 



yNCUSSiFity 



PAGE 86 



behalf o£ 011v«r North? 

A I belleva thaie was, but Z an not tha guy to ansuec 
that conplately, because that Is an adninis tiative detail, 
and I nevei nada notes oi details of that nature. 

e But did you delegate this authority or did you 
yourself exercise it? 

A This authority was delegated for the nost part so I 
wouldn't ba bothered about thasa requests unless tha Special 
Assistant to the President for Administration couldn't 
handle it hinself, then ha caaa to aa . 

2 All right. But if, let's say, Korth wishes to hop a 
military flight, for instance, that would not cone through 
your office at all? 

A No. 

e Okay. 

There has also bean testimony ragarding--oh, I have 
one mora question on tha documents, tha diversion memos that 
would have gone up. Is there a--would there have been a 
central file where these would have been Kept if the 
President had seen them. 

In other words, would either his secretary or the 
central files of tha Uhita House have kept copies of what he 
had seen? 

A That is what we wanted. That Is why we like to have 
White House paper procedure followed, because these 



UNCLASSIFIED 



689 



21>48 
21(49 
2150 
>2 15 1 
2152 
2153 
215(4 
2155 
2156 
2157 
2158 
2159 
2160 
2161 
2162 
2163 
216^ 
2165 
2 166 
2167 
2 168 
2169 
2170 
2171 
2172 



HIR196002 



«Nfi!iSSIFe 



PAGE 87 



dacuraents did go to tha central ills wher* th« archivist or 
tha diarist would know oi then and thay would ba kept. 

Uhen they by-passed tha normal channels that way, 
they then becana docunants that weza off somewhere else in 
somebody else's iile, and that would normally be in the HSC 
iiles themselves and not part of tha Presidential iiles. 

S Okay. So, for instance, tha findings, there would 
just ba one, tha original that would ba kept with Admiral 
Poindexter ? 

A Yes, and how I know that, in October or thereabouts 
Director Casey called ma to ask, did I have a copy of tha 
January 17 f iling--f indings . 

After a search of my records, I said no. Ha said 
neither did ha. And ha would like to have a copy. I told 
him I would ask Poindexter. I asked Poindexter about it, 
and ha said there was only one copy, and he kept it. There 
had been none circulated. 

2 Is that unusual that tha CIA, even though they 
drafted tha finding, would not have a copy of it? 

A Casey found that very unusual that he didn't have a 
oopy. 

e Okay. 

Do you know whether ox not one was provided to 
Casey? 

A I don't know. 




690 



2173 
217M 
2175 
»2 176 
2177 
2178 
2179 
2180 
2181 
2182 
2183 
2 ISU 
2185 
2186 
2187 
2188 
2189 
2 190 
2191 
2192 
2193 
219<4 
2195 
2196 
2197 



HIR196002 HS^^jiHu'.'-^^ -U PAGE 88 

fi All right. 

A Could I taka a short break hera? 

HR. MINTZ: Why don't ue taka a break? 

I Recess . ] 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

fi Actually--now, this is a Hark Belnick question, so 
you have to forgive me, but actually speaking of 
publication, ue understand that you are writing a book, and 
ue would like to know if you would like to share your notes 
with the committee? 

A All the notes that I an using I have already shared 
with tha committee. As a matter of fact, they have tha 
originals, and, if you sent it back. I would appreciate it, 
because I find it hard to read the copies at times. 

2 That is fine. 

Ac tually--only had one other area of inquiry, and 
that is tha use of DEA agents by Oliver North to locate and 
excavate tha hostages. What was your first awareness that 
this had bean dona? 

A Vary hazy recollection that in one of the briefing 
sessions that Admiral Poindexter may have brought this up to 
tha President in no detail, in saying there uere DEA agents 
who thought they had a lead on where the hostages were 
located, and they wata hopeful thay could exploit that 
information and-- 



R^ 



691 



NAHE 
2198 
2199 
2200 

,220 1 
2202 
2203 
220>4 
2205 
2206 
2207 
2208 
2209 
2210 

221 1 
2212 
2213 
22 m 
2215 
2216 
22 17 
2218 
2219 
2220 

222 1 
2222 



HIR196002 



ONCIiSSIFIE!! 



/ 



PAGE 89 



■ HR. HINIZ: In terms of details that may be as far 
as you want to go. 

ns . NAUGHTON: Yeah. I am not interested in their 
sources or anything along those lines. 
BY MS. NAUGHTOM: 

fi Was this at the time when Admiral Poindexter was 
National Security Adviser? 

A Yes. 

S So. sometime in '86 probably? 

A Yes. 

2 Had--is this the first reference to DEA agents 
regarding the hostages that you can recall? 

A Yes, and only reference. 

2 Okay. Mr. HcFarlane testified, and we know that in 
1985, actually in February of '85, that McFarlane sent on to 
the Attorney General, to Director Casey and other s--basically 
requested OEA be used in this capacity. Did that go through 
at all? 

A I had just taken over as Chief of Staff in February 
of '85. I cama on board February 3rd and I don't recall 
that happening . 

2 Do you recall what the President's response was, if 
any, to Poindexter's briefing that DEA was going to be used? 

A Just that Jk^pf Qeneral hoped that something could be 
done to get the hostages out. 




11 



692 



NAME: 
2223 
222lt 
2225 

,2226 
2227 
2228 
2229 
2230 
2231 
2232 
2233 
223(4 
2235 
2236 
2237 
2238 
2239 
22M0 
22141 
22>42 
22U3 
22(4>4 
22145 
22<46 
2247 



HIR195002 



UNCLASSIFIE8 



PAGE 90 



". 8 ■ Was thei* 'any discussion of whathei or not it was 
apptopriat* to hav« diug enfoccareant agents-- 

X No . 

S Was thttia any discussion oi the noney ioi this 
operation? 

A No. 

2 Okay. 

A Not that I zacall. 

fi Now, did you becoraa auaza at sona point that pzivata 
monies weze planning on being used oz had been used? 

A Only aftez the news becane public. 

fi When was that? 

A I am not sura whether it was with the Touaz 
Conmission report or aitar--or during these heazings. I an 
not suze when. 

S So after Januazy of '87. 

A And I left the White House. 

e Okay. Weze you auaze of any donations by Ross Perot 
in anything connected with hostages? 

A You are talking hare of hostages who probably are 
held by the Hizballah, not hostages held by other enenies of 
the United States. 

e Right. I an speaking specifically of those held in 
Lebanon . 

A No. 



UNCUSSIFiED 



693 



HAHE-- 
22M8 
22U9 
2250 

,2251 
2252 
2253 
22S<4 
2255 
2256 
2257 
22 58 
2259 
2260 
2261 
2262 
2263 
22614 
2265 
2266 
2267 
2268 
2269 
2270 
227 1 
2272 



HIR196002 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



PAGE 91 



. . fi • Okay. 

Here you auaie of any conversations oc 
connunications in writing between the President and Koss 
Perot regarding his efforts to locate oi extricate these 
hostages ? 

A These hostagas-- 

2 Yes. 

A --reeaning which hostages? 

Q The ones held in Lebanon. 

A Ho, I ait not aware of any exchange between the 
President and Ross Perot on that subject. 

fi Okay. Were there other hostages they connunicated 
about? 

A Yes. 

fi In another area of the world? 

A Yes. 

fi Do you Know whether Ross Perot donated any reoney in 
connection with that? 

A What is that? 

2 On these other hostages soraewhere else in the world? 

A Yes. 

S Okay. Do you know when that was? 

A Could have been '83> '8i(> *85 and '86. Ross Perot 
has an ongoing interest on hostages in Vietnan. and it is 
well-known--possible hostages in Vietnan. 




SI 



694 



mmm 



u 



Hknf HIR196002 '^ ' " -^ pjGE 92 

2273 2 Okay. So your other activity that u« are alluding 

227t« to is th« one--peopl« possibly being held in East Asia? 

2275 A That is right. 

^2276 2 After the initial briefing by Admiral Poindexter 

2277 about the DEA, do you recall any further information to your 

2278 agency regarding DEA activities? 

2279 A All I know is that it proved fruitless, that ue uere 

2280 told it didn't work. 

2281 2 And who were you told that by? 

2282 A Again, it had to ba Poindexter. 

2283 2 Did it £ver coraa to your attention that DEA agents 
228>4 uere actually assigned to the KSC staff? 

2285 A Mo. 

2286 2 Mould that have been unurual? 

2287 A I never knew for sure how many people uere on the 

2288 staff of the NSC or who they were. 

2289 2 Um-hu«. Did it ever coraa to your attention that the 

2290 expenses of the DEA agents uere being paid from private 

2291 funds? 

2292 . A Ko. 

2293 2 Did you ever discuss the activities of the DEA 
229i( agents with the Attorney General? 

2295 A No. 

2296 2 Did you ever hear him brief the President on their 

2297 activities? 



UNCLASSIFILD 



695 



naue ■■ 

2298 
2299 
2300 
^230 1 
2302 
2303 
230t4 
230S 
2306 
2307 
2308 
2309 
2310 
231 1 
2312 
2313 
231U 
2315 
23 16 
2317 
2318 
2319 
2320 
2321 
2322 






HIR196002 Wl 1 ^ '«a3 ■1^ W-- - — — pj^j ,3 
. . A . No, I don't recall that. 

e Okay. 

What about either Adrainisttatot Long or Director 
Web"ster? Do you recall either of them briefing the 
President on these efforts to locate and extricate the 
hostages ? 

A Ho, I do not. 
' fi Okay. 

Was there a discussion with the Attorney General and 
the President sometime in either December of '86 or January 
of '87 regarding giving immunity to Oliver North or Admiral 
Poindextar ? 

A I don't recall that being brought up to the 
President. I recall staff discussions of that and 
speculation about it in the press, but I don't recall that 
specifically even being discussed in front of the President, 
let alone asking for a Presidential decision in the matter. 

2 Would it be possible for the Attorney General to 
speak to the President without you present during this 
period of time, December and January? 

A Possibly, but I don't recall it. 

fi Did you aver discuss this issue with the President? 

A Immunity for North or Poindextar. no. 

e Was it ever discussed with the President in your 
presence ? 




Ui 



m 



696 



liiLASSificD 



NAME: HIR196002 VIIWW"^'^"' pAGE 94 

2323 . \ ■ Wait a minuta . I do zacall sons conversation among 

232<i tha Prasldent, nysalf and tha Vica President at a morning 

2325 meeting as to was there any way that ue could get Pomdexter 

2326 and North to coma forward and tell their story, and our 

2327 wondering why they were reluctant to corae forward and tell 

2328 their story, and the fact that this natter wouldn't be 

2329 cleaned up until they cana forward and--but after the 

2330 discussion, we agreed among ourselves that it wouldn't be 

2331 appropriate for any ona of tha three of us to initiate any 

2332 types of phona calls or action to try to force these 

2333 people--or to testify because there had been soma suggestions 
233M in tha press and from other people that tha President as 

2335 Commander-in-Chief ordered than to do it. 

2336 Ue decided that just wouldn't ba appropriate to do 

2337 it. and certainly that there should be no overt actions on 

2338 the part of the President for such things as Presidential 

2339 pardons or immunity or things of that nature being promised 
23>40 if they would coma forward and talk with it. 

2311 It just wouldn't do. 

23U2 fi Do you recall tha Attorney General being consulted 

23U3 on this matter? 

2344 k No. I don't. 

23U5 2 Okay. 

23U6 Do you recall any efforts on the part of Brendan 

2347 Sullivan, the attorney for Colonel North, to meet with the 




I' 



697 



NAME : 
2348 
2349 
23S0 

.2351 
2352 
2353 
2354 
23S5 
2356 
2357 
2358 
2359 
2360 
2361 
2362 
2363 
2364 
2365 
2366 
2367 
2368 
2369 
2370 
2371 
2372 



HIR196002 



UNfliSSIFIFi 



PAGE 95 



President? 



A I don't recall that, no. 

a Uera you ever told oi any such-- 

A No . 

2 OXay. 

A I nevez heazd the nana Brendan Sullivan until North 
had hired hira and it became a natter of public knowledge and 
in the press . 

2 Did Mr. Wallison ever discuss with you that North's 
attorney wishes to meet with the President? 

A No . 

2 Finally, are there any questions I didn't ask that 
we should? 

A There are a lot of questions you didn't ask. 

2 Let rae finish ray question. 

A I am not going to suggest them to you. 

2 Well, that is what I an asking you to do. 

A I am just kidding. 

2 The answers which would be relevant or pertinent to 
our inquiry. 

A I understand seriously what you mean. 

2 I mean, Elliott Abrams testified we didn't ask the 
questions in the right way to get the right answers. I 
wanted to be sure-- 

A I want to make certain you understand the reporting 



ONCLASSIFIEO 



698 



NAHE : 
2373 
237U 
237S 

,2376 
2377 
2378 
2379 
2380 
2381 
2382 
2383 
238(4 
2385 
2386 
2387 
2388 
2389 
2390 
2391 
2392 
2393 
2394 
2395 
2396 
2397 



HIR196002 



ISASSIFltB 



/ 



PAGE 96 



ratationship of the head o£ the NSC to the President. I 
understand they just asked John Poindextet about it on the 
tube. But that I uas not in charge, never purported to be 
in charge. I know there has been a lot of speculation that 
I was the all-pouerful Chief of Staff, that I ran things 
with a tight grasp a«- UIM^ or hand/ however you want to 
phrase it, in the White House however, I did handle things 
in the White House. 

Certainly the NSC, particularly NSC staff, never 
reported to ne , I never saw then privately, X never hired 
them, fired then, gave then a pay raise or had anything to 
do other than through the administrative people in the West 
Wing, gave them lodging and whatever things they needed in 
order to perforn their job. 

When I arrived at the White House, Mr. McFarlane had 
access to the President whenever he felt he needed it. We 
continue that procedure. Mr. McFarlane and I had a run-in 
shortly after I was there. I believe it was the death of 
Andropov, and the next norning, the 9 TOctober) meeting , the 
President said to me, ''Gosh, I didn't get much sleep 
thinking about Andropov after I was told last night.'' 

I said, ''When were you told?'' He said maybe 2^30, 
3=30, whatever. I said, "'Oh.'" Then I had words with Mr. 
McFarlane about my not being notified, pointing out to him 
that if something untoward happened that would involve 



UNCLASSirlO 



699 



2398 
2399 
2(400 

240 1 
2<402 
2U03 
240U 
2405 
2M06 
2U07 
2408 
2M09 
2410 

241 1 
2412 
2413 
2414 
2415 
2416 
24 17 
2418 
2419 
2420 

242 1 
2422 



KIR196002 



UNCUSSIFIED 



t^ 



PAGE 97 



raoiient of the President, for the Chief of Staff to still 

rei»ain in his bed sound asleep was most inappropriate yjiJ 

t^rat I wanted to be notified. 

Uell, once we got that straightened out. McFarlane 



was accustomed 



o, if he thought he needed to be with 



the President aird to tell the President something, would 
tell ne ^ mi>b 'j i^ iii lu JLa t l f I ' LtaeJewl #t night, after 
they ;\otified the President of something they would then 

is ^'^^ 

call me snrt tell me^they had told Lll'iJ b« the President. 



When Poindexter took over from McFarlane-- the 
President announced afc Lliul Liiu<i that Poindexter would be 
reporting to him. <IHf9r '(here was a question from the press 
to Poindexter saying. ''Will you report directly to the 
President or will you report to the Chief of Staff?'* And 
he said, * ' No , I am going to report to the Chief of Staff, 
Don Regan has--I am going to report to the President, Don 
Regan has already told roe that.'' So that got a big 
chuckle . 

But at no time did I try to interfere with the 
security aJtfiise o r meeting with the President or talking to 
the President. 

fi Do you know why Hr . McFarlane left, why he resigned? 

A At the time I know that it was a general question of 
fatigue and that he had gone through a lot at Geneva, 
meetings with Gorbachev had been very tiring and wearing on 



ICUSSI 




700 




lU 



iFitU 



NAME: 
2U23 
2M2(4 
2>425 

>2i426 
2U27 
2>428 
2U29 
2M30 
2431 
2M32 
21433 
2i«3(4 
2435 
2U36 
2i«37 
2(438 
2«439 
2>440 
214(41 
2(4(42 
2(4(43 
2(t(4(« 
2(4(45 
2(4(46 
2(447 



HIR196002 PAGE 98 

him. Ha had been sort o£ worn down, and ha thought it was 
tiraa aftar--let's sea, ha had been on tha job then for tuo 
yeais oT so--or ™ore--for hira to move on. 

2 Ura-hum. Vou have no doubt Kept a bit abieast of 
what is going on at tha hearings and specifically of Colonel 
Motth's testimony. Is there anything that has been 
testified to in tha hearings that does not conport with youi 
recollection of tha events? 

A I have not followed it in that great of detail to be 
able to answer that specifically, but fron tha little I 
heard or read, no, I haven't seen anything that I would 
challenge. 

fi When Oliver North said he had authority for 
everything that he did, and if we can take it step by 
step--in terms of the diversion of the funds of tha Iranian 
arras sales to tha contras, did you give him such authority 
to do that? 

A Mo . 

2 All right. In terms of his contra resupply effort 
of lethal aid to tha contras, did you giva him any authority 
to do that? 

A No. 

fi Do you know, to your knowledge, whether or not 
Admiral Poindexter or Hr . HcFarlana gave him authority to do 
those acts? 



WLASSIFI[a 



701 



'mm\m 



NAJIE 

2>4t49 
21450 
2Li5 1 
21452 
2453 
2454 
2455 
2456 
2457 
2458 
2459 
2460 
2461 
2462 
2463 
2464 
2465 
2466 
2467 
2468 
2469 
2470 
247 1 
2472 



HIR196002 



PAGE 99 



k Xo. 

fi Thank you. That is all th* questions I have. 

MR. GENZMAN: Give me a second to finish ny notes. 

BY MR. GENZMAN: 
2 I guess this is your opportunity if there is 
anything else you wan to put on the record-- 

MR. HIHTZ: I think the record should show in 
response to one question counsel asked near the end there 
about responding to questions that weren't put properly to 
him, the record should show nz . Regan's answers have been 
very forthconing and went way beyond what you asked to 
explain and put clear what happened. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Thank you. I would agree with you. 

THE UITNESS: I an not known as one who is laconic. 

BY HR. GENZMAN: 
2 Sir. I have a few follow-up questions so that I am 
sure in ray own mind what the responses are. You had 
mentioned previously that President Reagan would attend drop- 
bys of neetings between Oliver North and contra supporters, 
and that he would thank then for what they had done or were 
about to do. 

Is that a correct sunnary? 
A Let n« just clarify a little bit. When the 
President went in, it was the drop-by. The affair itself 
would be labeled as a meeting at the White House, although 



IJNCLASSinED 



702 



NAME-- 
2M73 
21*714 
2475 

,2*476 
21477 
2478 
21479 
2(480 
2481 
2U82 
21483 
248(4 
2(485 
2(486 
2(487 
2(488 
2(489 
21490 
2(491 
2(492 
2493 
2494 
2495 
2496 
2497 



HIR196002 



yilSlliSKd 



PAGE 100 



it was usually held in tha Wast Ming of the White House and 
then the President would drop by. It was never billed as a 
droj-by by the President. 

2 The President would merely drop by for a short 
period of time ? 

A Five minutes or so. 

2 I wanted you to explain what you meant when you said 
the President would thank the contra supporters for what 
they had done or what they were about to do. Were these 
people who had not yet decided to contribute or were being 
solicited to contribute? Can you explain what you meant? 

A Ue never knew who, or at least I never knew, and I 
don't believe the President did, who among the group in the 
audience had contributed or who hadn't, and if they had 
contributed, how much they had contributed. That detail was 
never furnished. 

The briefing papers would indicate to the President 
that this group, for example, was contributing money for the 
purpose of an advertisement. The advertisement had not 
appeared at the time he would be thanking them, so he would 
be thanking them for a future event; that is, they were 
contributing for something that was about to happen. 
That is what I meant. 

2 That clarifies that matter; thank you. 

You testified earlier about a meeting with the 




^i til 



incij 



703 



^ 1^ i 



NAME 
2M98 
21499 
2500 

,2501 
2502 
2503 
250U 
2505 
2506 
2507 
2508 
2509 
2510 
251 1 
2512 
2513 
251M 
2515 
2516 
2517 
2518 
2519 
2520 
2521 
2522 



HIR196002 



m\miid 



PAGE 101 



Presidftnt and the Attorney General in which the Attorney 
General first reentioned the contra diversion--diversion of 
funds fron the Iranian arms sales to the contras, and you 
mentioned the President's reaction. 

At any point in that conversation or any others, did 
the President ever specifically mention his lack of 
knowledge of this diversion? 

A I an not sure how he phrased it. I an not sure that 
he said it specifically. But I was under the impression 
that he, like me, was hearing that for the first time, at 
least on Monday, Kovenber 2(4. 

fi And this particular neeting took place later in the 
rooming; is that correct? 

A No, that was the afternoon meeting, ((MS, 14:20, in 
through there, on the 2i4th. 

fi I stand corrected. There was an earlier meeting, a 
very brief one. 

A The diversion was not nentioned as a subject, but 
merely Meese alerting the President that something untoward 
had developed that he had found out that it would require 
Presidential attention. 

It was a very serious matter, but he didn't want to 
talk about it at that tine. He knew the President's 
schedule was tight, that he didn't have the time to go into 
it, and he had a feu things, and I believe the expression I 



icussife 



704 



ONiiussiricii 



NAME: 
2S23 
2S2M 
2S2S 

<2526 
2S27 
2528 
2529 
2530 
2531 
2532 
2533 
253<« 
2535 
2536 
2537 
2538 
2539 
25(40 
2SU1 
25(42 
25((3 
2SU*4 
25(45 
25(46 
25(47 



HIR196002 



PAGE 102 



haAfa used ovoi and ovai again on this is a few other things 
to button up befora ha could giva tha full story to the 
President . 

2 Has it your inprassion these were legitimate reasons 
not to go into details at this earlier meeting? 

A I was under the impression that the Attorney General 
had one or two missing links, if you will: that is my 
phrase/ and wanted to get all of the connections together 
before he gave the story to the President; in other words, 
wanted to be able to giva a full and complete story to the 
President . 

fi Later that day, when the Attorney General mentioned 
the diversion to the President, I believe the information 
included tha fact that Admiral Pomdexter and Colonel North 
knew--and were aware of the diversion. 

A Let me have that again. 

S When the diversion was disclosed to the President by 
the Attorney General, is it correct that the Attorney 
General said Colonel North was involved and that Admiral 
Poindexter had soma type of inkling, I believe was you 
aKprasslon? 

A Yes. 

e And did tha Attorney General also say that nr . 
KcParlane also knew? 

A No, he did not say that. 



I 



t 





705 



mm^vi 



1^ 



NAME; HIR196002V^ -■'"•'•'-' ■^' ^ ■■ P*GE 103 

25U8 Wait a minuta . Excusa raa ; ha did. I believe ha 

25<49 told the President that McFatlane knew about it--not during 

25S0 tA*s tenure as National Security Adviser, but had found it 

,2551 out from Horth on the uay back fron Tehran. 

2552 2 Has there any discussion as to what, if anything, 

2553 Mr. Casay kneu about the diversion? 
2S5<4 A No. 

2555 2 I heard you mention earlier there was no attempt to 

2556 differentiate between the way that Admiral Poindexter left 

2557 the NSC and the way Colonel North left. Can you explain for 

2558 me--maybe I missed something. Can you explain for me in a 

2559 little mora detail how it was at least reported in the press 

2560 that Admiral Poindexter had bean allowed to resign and 

2561 Colonel North was firad, is tha way the press had it? 

2562 A I know tha press has, in my judgment, exacerbated 

2563 the President's intention there. The President is a kindly 
256M man, and ha seldom, if ever, to ny knowledge, directly fires 

2565 anybody. People are allowed to resign. It is a face-saving 

2566 gesture, if you will. People ara reassigned. People 

2567 voluntarily agree to do something else. 

2568 Thaza ara many euphemisms for people changing 3obs. 

2569 In this particular case tha President, hearing Admiral 

2570 Poindexter say, • ' and I an resigning, Hr . President, and 

2571 herewith is a letter,'' accepted it. 

2572 In tha case of North, as I told you earlier, I am 



UNCIASSIRED 



706 






It: 



y 



/a^ 






NAME ■■ 
2573 
25714 
2575 

.2576 
2577 
2578 
2579 
2580 
2581 
2582 
2583 
2S8>4 
2S85 
2586 
2587 
2588 
2589 
2590 
2591 
2592 
2593 
25914 
2595 
2596 
2597 



HIR196002 



PAGE 10M 



ncrt quita suia of how th« word actually got to North or uho 
spAciiically signed his tiansf«r, whether it was Dc . Keel 
who remained as National Security Adviser, or how that 
actually happened. I don't know. 

All I know is is that--and it is i»y belief that if 
the subject cane up just briefly at the 9^30 meeting that 
North should be reassigned. I may have suggested it. 
Again, there was no attempt to say out, and he is out on his 
ear as a military person. 

But it is just that he was being reassigned from the 
National Security staff back for R£R with the U.S. Marine 
Corps, if one can get RCR with the U.S. Marine Corps. 

fi Okay, thank you. 

I have a few other issues to touch upon. You 
mentioned a conversation you had with Hr . Casey at Langley, 
I believe that was on November 24 in the evening? 

A On my way home on the night of Monday, November 24. 

2 And I believe you testified that you told Mr. Casey 
that you had learned about the diversion from the Attorney 
General and had told the President? 

A That the President and I had learned from the 
Attorney General just that afternoon. 

S Both of you had learned that day, you earlier in the 
day and the President-- 

A Ho, no, no. I just referred to the 4:30 meeting 




& 



707 



yiJfussiFia 



NAnE: HIR196002 PAGE 105 

2598 uhi'ch wa just discussad. I told hin that th« Attorney 

2599 G«n«tal had com* in and told the President. 

2600 fi Just to be clear, though, you had learned about the 
,2601 diversion, though, earlier than the President. 

2602 A Only in a sentence or two. 

2603 S Sure. 

260*4 A And it was put to ne as possible diversion. 

2605 fi Do you recall whether or not you told the Tower 

2606 Comnission about this conversation with Mr. Casey and the 

2607 fact that you had talked to hin about the diversion on this 

2608 occasion? 

2609 A I don't know whether they questioned me or not. I 

2610 can check that and get--or can I? Do I have access, counsel, 
26 1 1 to Towar-- 

2612 MR. niNIZ: We do. 

2613 THE WITNESS: we can check that and get back to you, 

2614 if you like. 

26 15 HR. MINTZ: I think the coramittee has the same 

2616 access, so if you artt looking for the transcript, you can 

2617 review that yourself. 

2618 THE WITNESS: i don't recall then asking ne , but 
26 19 they nay well have. 

2620 BY MR. 6ENZKAN: 

262 1 S I an asking you whether this specific piece of 

2622 information about talking to Hr. Casey about the diversion 



\wm\iB 



708 



Y'm K'(} 




MAKE 
2623 
262M 
262S 

,2626 
2627 
2628 
2629 
2630 
2631 
2632 
2633 
263M 
2635 
2636 
2637 
2638 
2639 
26U0 
26M1 
26(42 
26M3 
26UK 
26>45 
26146 
2647 



HIR196002 PAGE 106 

is somathing you hav« just t«c«ntly zscalled or soraething 
that you-- 

.A U«ll, I knau it from Novamber 2U on. Whether or not 
anyone asked me about it, I don't recall. 

Q We can check the other testinony. 

A Yeah. 

fi Let me proceed with a feu sore questions. You 
mentioned a conversation with Hr . Casey regarding his 
Canadian friend and the information that Canadian friend had 
provided . 

Did you date that conversation? 

A No, X didn't. Z said sometime between November 3rd 
and the 2>4th, but it is my impression that it came sooner 
rather than later. That is shortly after the 3rd or (4th. 

2 Thank you. And earlier, we were talking about the 
diversion memo, and at some point, we were talking about 
memos, plural; Colonel North has testified in public 
hearings that there were five, I believe. 

When did you first find out that there was more than 
one memo which we tend to call the diversion memo? 

A I first learned that there was a diversion memo in 
the middle of December, when Peter Wallison showed me a 
document just prior to my going to the Senate Intelligence 
Committee. The document had just been discovered according 
to what Wallison informed me. 



liKClASSIFlE!) 



709 



imfflHti) 



»^ 



NAHE: 
26>48 
26149 
2650 

,265 t 
2652 
2653 
26514 
2655 
2656 
2657 
2658 
2659 
26 60 
266 t 
2662 
2663 
266U 
2665 
2666 
2667 
2668 
2669 
2670 
2671 
2672 



HIR196002 PAGE 107 

I did not know that th«ra u*ta oth«t documents o{ a 
similar oi same natuia until tha publio testimony before the 
select committees. 

2 Earlier, you testified a})out the issue of immunity, 
and I believe you said that we all agreed it would not be 
appropriate to initiate any phone calls for take any action 
regarding the idea of getting Admiral Poindexter and Colonel 
North to tell their story. 

Uho were you referring to when you mentioned ''we''? 
A The President, Vice President and myself. 

MR. GENZMAH: I think that covers my questions. I 
thank you for your time, sir. 

MS. NAUGHTON^ I had one other question. 
BY MS. KAUGHTON: 
2 Oliver Horth testified that he got a call from the 
President on the 25th, the day that he was reassigned to the 
Marine Corps. Here you present when the President made that 
phone call? 
A Mo. 

2 Do you know if anyone was? 

A I don't believe anyone was actually in the room, 

although Jim &»«n, the President's personal assistant, might 

have been. I recall X asked the President about it, h w i i i d . 

. ir 1, *- i f it had happened and how did it happen, and he said--no, 

(^uma/ 

O^^n told me about it first. That the President just picked 



iic! hmR 



710 



Hktll- 

2673 
267U 
267S 
.2676 
2677 
2678 
2679 
2680 
2681 
2682 
2683 
268U 
268S 
2686 
2687 
2638 
2689 
2690 
2691 
2692 
2693 
26914 
2695 
2696 
2697 



KIR196002 



yUCLASSinED 



\^ 



PAGE 108 



up"th» phone, said, "'Get na Colonel North,'' and the White 
House operators found Hoith and put hiit on with the 
President. That is how it happened. 

e Did Ht. (f^^m listen to the call? 

A He heard only the President's sida--ii he were there, 
he heard only the President's side. 

2 Did you ever discuss that phone call with the 
President? 

A Yes. 

2 And what did the President tell you about it? 

A I asked hin how it had happened. 

2 Why did you ask that? 

A I was curious. 

2 Why? 

A Huh? I 

2 Why? 

A Curious about anything the President did that got in 
the paper. I wanted to know the background because, sooner 
or later, son* reporter would ask me about it, or someone 
else, and I said--asked hin, you know, how did it happen, and 
he said, ''I felt like it, so I called hin up.'' And I said 
okay. ''Well, I hope you did the right thing.'' 

fi What did the President tell you that he told North? 

A Thanked hin for his job and told him he was a great 
American . 



mm 



!^*L-ii>V' 



hi 



711 




biriilii 



NAME 
2698 
2699 
2700 

, 2701 
2702 
2703 
270(4 
2705 
2706 
2707 
2708 
2709 
2710 
271 1 
2712 
2713 
27 m 
2715 
27 16 
2717 
2718 
2719 
2720 
2721 
2722 



HIR196002 PAGE 109 

S Anything els«? 

A No. Again, you hava got to teraeniber this President 
Is .a uarn-heaz ted , emotional type oi person, and uhen he 
sees somebody in the obvious distress that Ollie North uas. 
Mri having been reassigned back to tha Marina Corps, 
released from his position at NSC. he felt sorry for hin and 
so called him. 

C Did the President indicate to you that they had 
discussed the diversion or the President's knowledge oi the 
diversion? 

A No, and the conversation uas brief, very brief on 
the phone, and I an not sure North even had tine to reply to 
the President. 

BY MR. GENZMAK: 
Q Do you have knowledge of any similar call the 
President night have made to Adniral Poindexter? 

A No, because in the meeting at the tine that 
Poindexter resigned, the President told--thanked him for the 
job he had done, told him that ha appreciated all the work, 
was sorry for the way this was ending and wished him well. 
HK. GENZMAN- I have nothing further. 
Again, thank you for your time, sir. 
ns. NAUGHTON: Thank you very much. 
(Discussion off the record. 1 
MR. MINTZ: I would repeat ny request that the 



cu 



712 



icussra 



NAME: 
272^ 
272U 
272S 
2726 
27 27 
2728 
2729 
2730 
2731 
2732 
2733 
273U 
2735 
2736 
2737 
2738 
2739 
2740 
27m 
27U2 
27(43 
27UI4 
2745 
2746 
2747 



HIR196002 



PAGE no 



tiatnscript be levlawed foi classiiication purposes. 

nS . MAUGHTON: And I represent that our security 
offj.cer can revieu the transcript and ue will classify it. 

MR. niNTZ: Thank you. 

THE WITNESS: I would like to note, can I have a 
copy of that — 

ns. MAUGHTON: — under the House-- 

THC WITNESS: Or should I say, nay I have a copy of 
it? 

MS. MAUGHTON: Under the House Rules, we are asking 
witnesses to come and review the transcript and not 
releasing then however, I mean, if you wish to request it, I 
will make your request known to the chairman, and then he 
has got to rule separately on that. 

THE UITNESS: I would appreciate it, because in the 
event I an called as a witness, it is much easier for me to 
be able to review all of ray material without having to go 
all over the place, and if I nay point this out, I an a bit 
of a public figure and for ne to appear onCapitol Hill nay 
or may not excite the curiosity of the press or others, and 
Z just as soon avoid that, if at all possible. 

nS. MAUGHTON: I understand that, and we have made 
exception for Cabinet-level officers, so-- 

THE WITNESS: And I had Cabinet-level rank. 

MS. NAUGHTOM: We will ask, however, if you provided 



u 




a i> 



713 










27148 
27149 
2750 
27S1 
2752 
2753 
2754 
2755 
2756 
2757 
2758 
2759 
2760 
2761 
2762 



HIR196002 PAGE 111 

a copy that no copies be mad* oc kapt by you, and it will 
have to b* returned to the conroittee after completion oi 
your public testimony. 

THE WITNESS: I Will argue that one later. 

m. niMTZ: We will discuss that. 

MS. NAUGHTON: I just wanted to naKe clear that the 
rules are . 

THE UITHESS: I an just saying X don't wish to fence 
with you, but I an merely agreeing at this time that I will 
return the copy. 

ns. NAUGHTOH: OKay, that is iine . Thank you. 

MR. HIMTZ ! Thank you very nuch. 

THE WITNESS: i hate to be legalistic uith a lawyer. 

(Whereupon, at 12=00 noon, the taking oi the 
deposition was concluded.] 




714 



HAHE: HIR196002 



iiNSUSlitu 



PAGE I 



« « » SPEAKEX LISTING « « « 
RPTSMkZUX 1 

DCHNDOHOCK 1 



iCUSSIFIED 



715 



\V 



>J 



NAME: HIR196002 



* CONTENTS « 

xxxxxxxxxxxx 



STMEMENTS OF: 



m!^ 



716 



HSIS ^^T- /87 



ONettlSlED 

Stenographic Transcript or ^ .^ -^, . \ | 



HEARINGS 
Before the 



SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



UNITED STATES SENATE 

DEPOSITION OF OTTO J. REICH 
Wednesday, July 15, 1987 



Washington. D.C. 

"■|ED (M^ 



uHafly OMlMrifiMl/Releaied on ^L_^£i.£££Z. 





imder iwoWsioM of E.0. 123^ ,^C2CP(\j PF^CPTNG ' '^ «« '~^. - TOPICS 

rOPT NVJ.-- 



717 



^fffUssiFm 



1 DEPOSITION OF OTTO J. REICH 

2 Hadnasday, July 15, 1987 

3 Unitad Statas Sanata 

4 Salact Cooaittaa on Sacrat 

5 Military Aaalatanca to Iran 

6 and tha Nlcaraguan Oppoaitlon 

7 Waahlngton, D. C. 

8 Oapoaltlon of OTTO J. REICH, callad aa a 

9 wltnaaa by'counaal for tha Salact Coasittaa, at tha 

10 of fleas of tha Salact Coaalttaa, Roob SH-901, Hart Sanata 

11 Offlca Building, Washington, D. C, coaaancing at 10:08 

12 a.B., tha vitnass having baan duly sworn by KICHAL ANN 

13 SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for tha District of 

14 ColUBbia, and tha tastimony baing takan down by Stanomask 

15 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribad undar har 

16 diraction. 
17 



UNCCftSSIFIED 



718 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On btthalf of th« S«nata Salact Cooaltt** on Secrat 

3 Military Asslstanca to Iran and th« Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 TERRY SMZLJANICH, ESQ. 

6 Associat* Counsal 

7 On behalf of th« Hous* Select Coasitta* to 

8 Znvastigata Covart Ams Transactions with Iran: 

9 THOMAS FRYMAN, ESQ. 

10 Staff Counsal 

11 On bshalf of the Housa Forslgn Affairs CoBBittss: 

12 SPENCER OLIVER, ESQ. 

13 Associate Chief Counsel 

14 On behalf of the witness: 

15 MARX H. TUOHEY, III 

16 Pierson, Ball & Dowd 

17 1200 18th Street, N.W. 

18 Washington, D. C. 20036 



UNCLASSIF!ED 



719 



UNCi^^SIFiED 





CONTENTS 




EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 




WITNESS SENATE HOUSE 




Otto J. Reich 




By Mr. Smiljanlch 4 




By Mr. Oliver 81 




EXHIBITS 




REICH EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION 




1 81 


10 


2 117 



UNCLASSIFIED 



720 



UN(».4SSIFIED 



1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon, 

3 OTTO J. REICH, 

4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Coonittee and having been duly sworn by the Notary 

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION 

8 BY KR. SMIL7ANICH: 

9 Q State your nane for the record, please. 

10 A Otto J. Reich. 

11 Q Ambassador Reich, ny name is Terry Smiljanich. 

12 I 2UB Associate Counsel with the Senate Select Committee 

13 on the Iran-Contra matter. I want to ask you a series of 

14 (questions concerning your tenure as Director of the 

15 Office of Public Diplomacy, also your ambassadorship in 

16 Venezuela, matters as they bear upon things that may be 

17 relevant to our Comaittea. 

18 This is a joint deposition. Present also is 

19 Spencer Oliver and Tom Fryman on behalf of the House 

20 Coaaittee investing the same matters. We are doing this 

21 all together so we can avoid duplication and calling you 

22 bade for one, two, three depositions. 

23 If there's anything that I ask you that you 

24 are not clear about, what my question means or what it's 

25 about, please let me know and I'll be happy to rephrase 



r p i w W u i M of CO. 123S6 
by D. SMo, Natloful Security Council 



UNCtfiSSIFSEi^ 



721 



UNCtftSSIFIED 



1 it for you. And if you want to tak* a break at any time, 

2 l«t ma know. I don't anticipate this is going to go on 

3 very long, but if you do want to take a break, just let 

4 me know. 

5 A I appreciate it. 

6 Q Would you give us the benefit of a brief 

7 synopsis of your background, starting with your highest 

8 level of education and then your various enployaents and 

9 levels of employment? 

10 A I have a master's degree from Georgetown 

11 University. That's the highest level of education. 

12 My employment started before that. After 

13 graduation from the University of North Carolina I joined 

14 the U.S. Army. I vent through officer candidate school. 

15 After becoming a lieutenant Z was assigned to the Panama 

16 Canal — it was then called the Panama Canal Zone — for 

17 two years, came back and went to graduate school. 

18 While going to graduate school I worked on the 

19 Hill for a Congressman from Missouri part time to 

20 supplement ay income and my 6Z Bill — W. R. Hull. 

21 Finished graduate school, moved to Florida, went into 

22 business with an old Army colleague, an import-export 

23 business in Miami importing seafood from various parts of 

24 the Caribbean and Central America for about a year. That 

25 didn't work out financially, so I joined the State of 



UNmSSIFlED 



722 



UNOLftSSIFIED 



X Florida D«parto«nt of Conunarc* as an intarnational 

2 raprasantatlv*. 

3 I'm giving you th« najor job*. You don't want 

4 to know that I worlcad in a sho* stor* and thing* lika 

5 that. 

6 Q No. This is fin*. 

7 A I did a lot of that, too. Joined th« Stata of 

8 Florida Dapartmant of Conmarca in 1973. I vorkad with my 

9 friand from '72 to '73. '73 to '75 was intamational 

10 raprasentativa of tha Stata of Florida Dapartmant of 

11 Conasrca basad in Coral Cablas, Florida. 

12 In '75 I was hirad by tha City of Miami as th* 

13 community davalopmant coordinator, which is in affact 

14 aconomic davalopmant coordinator, until '76, whan I was 

15 of farad a job and accaptad tha job of Daputy Diractor of 

16 tha Washington offica of tha Council of th* Amaricas. 

17 It's a non-profit association daaling with U. S. 

18 corporations, mamb*rship of U.S. corporations, daaling 

19 with Latin Aaarica, and I bacam* Diractor of th* 

20 Washington of fie* in '77, a yaar later, whan tha Director 

21 left. 

22 I had that job until '81, when I was appointed 

23 as Assistant Administrator of the Agency for 

24 International Development. I was confirmed by the Senate 

25 in early '82. I held that job until approximately 

UNebASSIF!ED 



723 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 July 1. I say approximataly bacausa thara la about 

2 thraa dlffarant dataa whan tha Offlca of Public Dlplonacy 

3 was creatad by tha National Sacurity Council. I think it 

4 officially bacama an offica on July 1 of '83. 

5 I had that job until tha Prasidant namad ma 

6 Afflbaaaador to Vanazuala. Tha official dasi9nation was 

7 January of '86, but ha had actually signad my papars 

8 August of '85. I had a hard tima gatting confiraad. I 

9 was attackad by all aidaa, which Z thinX halpad aa a 

10 graat daal. I was awom in in May and novad on to 

11 Vanazuala in May right aftar confirmation. I hava baan 

12 Ambassador to Vanazuala ainca than. 

13 Q Okay. Your appointmanta, starting with 1981, 

14 Assistant Adminiatrator, on to LPD, and than Ambassador 

15 to Vanazuala, thaaa ara all political appointmanta? 

16 A Thay ara political appointmants, corract. 

17 Q Nov what was your apacific rola as Assistant 

18 Administrator of AID? Hara you tha administrator? 

19 A Z was tha administrator for Latin Amarica and 

20 tha Caribbaan. It 'a tha aquivalant of an Assistant 

21 Sacratary. Zt's Assistant Adminiatrator. Z was tha 

22 coxintarpart of what would today ba Elliott Abrams and at 

23 that tima was Tom Endars. 

24 Q And than whan you bacama Diractor of tha 

25 Offlca of Public Diplomacy you startad off as tha 



UNCOSSIFSED 



724 



liNet«SSIF:ED 



1 Director; is that right? 

2 A I started out as the staff. 

3 Q You were the entire staff? 

4 AX was the entire staff, right. 

5 Q At that time — the acronym is LPD, right? 

6 A At that time it was S/LPO because it was in 

7 the office of the Secretary. We can call it LPD if you 

8 want . 

9 Q Let's refer to it as LPD. 

10 A It's a lot shorter. 

11 Q Because at some point later in time the office 

12 was transferred from the Secretary? 

13 A That's correct, after Z left. 

14 Q Transferred from the Secretary's office over 

15 to Elliott Abrams? 

16 A That's correct. 

17 Q So, thereafter the acronym, instead of S/LPD 

18 is what? 

19 A Thereafter ARA/LPD. 

20 Q And when you were directly under the 

21 Secretary, who was your immediate supervisor? 

22 A On paper, George Shultz. When I say on paper, 

23 there is actually a piece of paper that says, that 

24 designates George Shultz as your supervisor. 

25 Q So you would report, if you needed to report 



UNentSSiF'ED 



725 



UNCLftSSiFSED 



1 to anybody above you, directly to the Secretary? 

2 A If I can clarify that, knowing the Secretary's 

3 time constraints I usually would report to the Deputy 

4 Secretary, who most of the time when I was there was Ken 

5 Dam. 

6 Q How did your appointment to S/LPD come about? 

7 How did it happen? 

8 A During the time that I was Assistant 

9 Administralpor of AID we had a very large increase in our 

10 aid programs for Latin America. I didn't think — I 

11 mean, that was my job, to carry that out, implement that 

12 progrsui. I always complained that I thought the 

13 Administration was doing a very poor job of letting the 

14 rest of the world, including the American people, know 

15 what we were doing. Frankly, nobody really cares very 

16 much about foreign aid. There's a few Members of 

17 Congress — Dante Fascell being one, for example — who 

18 always cared. 

19 And I wasn't under any illusions that we were 

20 going to b« able to get a lot of people interested in the 

21 subject, but what concerned me more was that I knew we 

22 were carrying out doing certain things in Latin America, 

23 particularly Central America, which I thought were very 

24 good for the United States and for democracy in the 

25 region — the land reform program in El Salvador, for 



UNCtftSSIF'EO 



726 



UNCmSIRED 



10 



1 exanpl*, amallar land reform programs in Guatemala, 

2 Honduras, Costa Rica, st cstsra — and thsrs wsrs a lot 

3 of aspects of ths policy also not related to AID where I 

4 thought the Administration was doing a very poor job in 

5 informing the Congress and the American people. 

6 So perhaps as a result of all this complaining 

7 they said, fine. You go and fix it. How would you like 

8 to do this? Actually I have to go back a few months from 

9 the time that Z got that job. Senator Richard Stone — I 

10 wasn't ths only one complaining. Everybody in the 

11 Administration, a lot of people, knew what a lousy job we 

12 were doing in communicating — or let me put it this way 

13 — not what a lousy job, because I think we were probably 

14 trying, but that we could be more effective. 

15 Sometime in early '83, former Senator Richard 

16 Stone of Florida was given the title of Special Assistant 

17 to the President for Public Diplomacy or something to 

18 that effect. I'm not certainly exactly what ha was 

19 called. He had that job only a few months because in, I 

20 believe, April, late April of '83 President Reagan 

21 addressed a joint session of the Congress where he said 

22 we've got a big problem here, folks, I need your help ~ 

23 "folks" being both the Congress and the American people. 

24 Shortly thereafter, a few days thereafter, 

25 Stone was named the special envoy for Central America, 



UN@t!ftSSIF!ED 



727 



unci^sif:ed 



11 



1 which was on* of several things that Prasidsnt Rsagan 

2 announced at the time he was going to do. That left a 

3 vacancy in this position and I was selected then sometime 

4 between April and June to succeed Stone, but with a 

5 little different role in that the position instead of 

6 being at the White House was placed in the Office of the 

7 Secretary of State. 

8 Q Okay. And when you started up your function, 

9 this would have been in July of '83? 

10 A Correct. 

11 Q Did you then have a budget with which to 

12 create a staff or anything? 

13 A No. 

14 Q How did you go aUsout creating a staff at LPD? 

15 A The memorandum from the National Security 

16 Council which created the office authorized the office to 

17 obtain personnel froa State, Defense, AID and USZA, with 

18 the State Department providing the bulk of the budget, 

19 office space, logistical support. So Z started 

20 recruiting people. A lot of people volunteered. 

21 Q You mean like pulling them from a Defense slot 

22 or AID? 

23 A That's right. There were many volunteers. 

24 There were people who wanted to get into this because 

25 they thought it was something exciting, different, for 



UNCLASSIFIED 



728 



UNCLASSIFIED 



12 



1 whatavar raaaon, and thar* vara sona that I spaclflcally 

2 knew vara aithar vary knowladgaabla about Cantral 

3 Aaarlca, )cnaw tha Issuas, or vara particularly good 

4 wrltars or artlculata spokasman. 

5 I triad to chooaa paopla with tha sJcllls that 

6 a public outraach, public diplomacy oparation would naad. 

7 That took quita a faw months. Frankly, I don't think we 

8 vara up to spaad for about a year. 

9 Q Whan you finally got up to full spaad how big 

10 was your staff? 

11 A I baliava that wa got up to about 19, 20 

12 paopla — 18, 19, 20 paopla. 

13 Q And who was your principal deputy? 

14 A I had two deputies — John Blacken, a career 

15 Foreign Service Officer. 

16 Q Hov do you spall Blacken? 

17 A Like black-e-n. 

18 Q He was career Foreign Service? 

19 A He was career Foreign Service, a member of the 

20 Senior Foreign Service. And the other deputy was 

21 Jonathan Killer. You've heard his name. 

22 Q Between the two of thea how were their 

23 responsibilities divided? 

24 A Basically sort of Mr. Inside and Mr. Outside. 

25 John Blacken was responsible for keeping the enormous 



UNCtfSSIFSED 



729 



UNCfcMSIFSED 



13 



1 amount of Infomatlon that was flowing into th« offlc* 

2 flowing. H« was rasponsibl* for keeping it coming in, 

3 making sense out of it, and producing, culling out all 

4 the stuff we didn't need and producing the documents that 

5 became, I would say, the principal activity of the 

6 office, producing documents, speeches, publications, 

7 background papers — you've probably seen a lot of the 

8 stuff — and also making sure that we would get 

9 additional ' — if we needed something, he would try to 

10 find it, not only in the State Department but also in the 

11 other parts of the Executive Branch, whereas Miller was 

12 more the outside person. 

13 He dealt with outside groups. We had a lot of 

14 outside groups who came to us for information, who were 

15 referred to us by other parts of the government, 

16 particularly the White House. There were a lot of people 

17 who wanted help or wanted to criticize or wanted to 

18 contribute ideas, Information, and, as you know, there 

19 are a lot of groups in Washington that were set up both 

20 for and against the policy — a lot more against than 

21 for. 

22 Q Let me Interrupt here for just a second. When 

23 you say "the policy", are you referring to overall Latin 

24 American policy or was there a particular focus within 

25 the Latin American policy? 



UNCtffSSIF^ED 



730 



UNCkASSIFIEd 



14 



1 A Both. Th« raason why th« offlc* was 

2 designated as the Offlc* of Public Diploaacy for Latin 

3 America and the Caribbean was because we didn't want to 

4 just Unit it to Central America, and in fact, for 

5 exanple, the office was in operation at the time of the 

6 Grenada rescue mission or invasion, whatever you want to 

7 call it, and we did a lot on Grenada. He put out most of 

8 the documents that eventually told the story, as we saw 

9 it, of what' happened in Grenada. 

10 Q It would be fair to say, though, that one of 

11 the primary major focuses of your ptiblic diplomacy effort 

12 was geared toward the Administration's Central American 

13 program, particularly vis-a-vis the Sandinistas' presence 

14 in Nicaragua? 

15 A It would be fair to say the first part of your 

16 statement, and eventually the second part, but if we go 

17 bac)c in time to '83, in 1983 and 1984 the principal issue 

18 of debate in the public and in the Congress was El 

19 Salvador, not Nicaragua. Nicaragua becue the principal 

20 issue really sometime after the Congress approved the 

21 President's reqpiest for El Salvador and after the 

22 Salvadoran elections in the spring and summer. There 

23 were two elections because there had to be a runoff — 

24 the spring and summer of '84. 

25 Then the focus of attention nationwide shifted 



UNCLASSIFIED 



731 



UNCLA^IFSED 



15 



1 — it was almost overnight — to Nicaragua. And, 

2 therafora, tha rac[ua8ts that cama into tha offica and tha 

3 demand for information shiftad mora to Nicaragua. But 

4 that doasn't maan that wa waran't alraady working on it. 

5 Ha knaw it axistad. 

6 Q Who was tha parcaivad audienca of your afforts 

7 at public diplomacy? 

8 A Ha had a lot of audiancas, foraign and 

9 domastic — ' foraign govammants, friandly govammants who 

10 wa fait did not hava anough information about tha policy, 

11 ganaral publics, intarastad groups, and domastic, of 

12 coursa. I would say tha Congrass and tha prass. I'm not 

13 putting tham in ordar of priority bacausa ona day it 

14 would ba ona and anothar day anothar. Tha Congrass, tha 

15 madia, lat's say, intarastad groups, paopla who had 

16 axprassad an intarast in tha stibjact and, I'd say, tha 

17 ganaral public. 

18 Q Okay. Gatting information togathar and 

19 prasantad to tha Congrass was part of what you parcaivad 

20 as your function? 

21 A Yas. 

22 Q Lat's go to tha and of your tanura thara, whan 

23 you laft for Vanazuala in January of '86. 

24 A Hall, whan X laft tha offica. 

25 Q Hhan did you actually laava — whan did you 



UNCbASSIFSED 



732 



UNCtftSSIFlED 



16 



1 actually c«a«« functioning as Diractor? 

2 A January of '86. Thar* was a psriod when I had 

3 to prepare for my confirmation hearings and X had to 

4 leave the office. 

5 Q During that time one of your deputies took 

6 over? 

7 A Yes. John Blacken. 

8 Q John Blacken took over your day-to-day 

9 functions?' 

10 A That's correct. 

11 Q Has Jonathan Miller still a deputy at that 

12 time? 

13 A No. 

14 Q When did he leave? 

15 A He left around Labor Day of 1985. 

16 Q And he vent to the White House? 

17 A That's correct. 

18 Q And what was his title there? 

19 A Well, he vent to the NSC. 

20 Q Specifically the NSC? 

21 A He vent to the NSC and I believe his title was 

22 Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC, but we'd have to 

23 check on that exactly. 

24 Q 1 think that's right, and that vas Labor Day, 

25 approximately September? 



uNcmsiFito 



733 



UNCEflSSIFiED 



17 



1 A Vfhen I say Labor Day, I ranuibcr it was around 

2 that tlm«. I think it was aithsr right bsfors or right 

3 after — early September, Z believe it was. 

4 Q Who took his place as Mr. Outside, so to 

5 speak? 

6 A Nobody. I was going to explain what happened. 

7 Q Hell, go ahead and tell me. Go eihead and 

8 explain what you did. 

9 A I started to hire a successor and it took so 

10 long that the successor did not arrive until after I was 

11 gone. 

12 Q Kow when did you first aak* the acq[uaintance 

13 of Lieutenant Colonel North? 

14 A Sooetime in 1983. 

15 Q And how did that coae about? He was one of 

16 the Latin Anerica people at the NSC? 

17 A I think it was probably in a aeeting when I 

18 first caae across hia — soae kind of a aeeting or 

19 soaething like that. 

20 Q Has he involved at all in the discussions 

21 leading up to the creation of LPO? 

22 A No, not to ay knowledge. Not that Z know of. 

23 Q Okay. Now let's talk about a few of the 

24 contracts that LPD entered into. First of all, were you 

25 the contracting officer, so to speak, for LPD? 



UNCmSIFSED 



734 



UNCLASSIFIED 



18 



1 A No. 

2 Q vrho was? 

3 A w« had different contracting officers. I made 

4 th« decisions eventually — ve need this, we need that, 

5 let's find somebody who can do It — but by State 

6 Department regulations there has to be a contracting 

7 office technical representative I believe It's called, or 

8 some kind of liaison officer, and It was never me. 

9 ' I just didn't have the time to supervise 

10 contractors. I was trying to manage all of our Inside 

11 staff, our In-house staff, and doing a lot of traveling 

12 because I was out on the road a lot. 

13 Q I realize that this Is a broad question so I 

14 would expect a broad answer. What types of contracting 

15 services did you find yourself contracting out In generic 

16 terms? 

17 A Usually ve would contract out for services 

18 that we couldn't produce In house because we didn't have 

19 the manpower. As you said, at the beginning of the 

20 office It was just me. For the first year we were very 

21 much understaffed. We were promised people from other 

22 agencies and they eventually arrived, but in some cases 

23 it took six months. I can give you names of people It 

24 took six months to arrive. 

25 During that time — sometime during that time 



UNCtftSSIFtED 



735 



UNC^ftSSIFBED 



19 



1 — I was told you can hir* contractors, you Icnov, to do 

2 soma of this worlc. 

3 Q Who told you that? 

4 A Dlffarant people. I can't rwnambar thair 

5 names — Stats Dspartasnt psopls. I bsllava soma 

6 datallaas, soma paopla who had already arrived in the 

7 office and who knew the conditions we were working under 

8 and, frankly, who were suffering under those conditions 

9 and said we' need help. He were swamped with requests for 
LO information. Once the office was created, people thought 

oh, there's a great resource. Let's use it. And they 
didn't realize we couldn't produce. 

So when I found out we could go out for people 
who could help us trrite papers, check information for us, 
you know, do the things that we eventually learned to do 
ourselves, then I went out and hired them. 

Q How you say you didn't have a budget as 
Director of LPO. 

A In the first year. 

20 Q And the first year would be July of '83 to 

21 July of '84? 

22 A That's right. 

23 Q When did you first start contracting services? 

24 Z realize you don't have documents in front of you. I'm 

25 just asking for your best recollection. 



UNCtltSSIFJED 



736 



UNCLASSIFIED 



20 



1 A I can't remember when our first contract — 

2 Q Was it within the first year? 

3 A I would say it was within the first calendar 

4 year — I should say fiscal year, July to July — 

5 definitely in the first year. I don't remember when our 

6 first contract was. The thing on the budget — 

7 MR. OLIVER: Can we go off the record for just 

8 a minute? 

9 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

10 THE WITNESS: What I wanted to clarify was I 

11 didn't want to leave you with the impression my office 

12 had no budget at first. It didn't have an Independent 

13 budget. But we could use the budget of the Office of the 

14 Secretary, and did, up until the time when we had our own 

15 budget. And I frankly don't remember when that was 

16 either. I believe it was fiscal year '84. I believe 

17 that fiscal y«ar '84, which would have been October of 

18 '84, was when we first had some money of our own. 

19 But up until then, for example, if I had to 

20 travel I would travel on S Bureau funds. 

21 BY MR. SMIUANICH: (Resuming) 

22 Q And if you wanted to contract for services 

23 during that initial time period you had to ma)ce sure that 

24 the money was available in the S budget? 

25 A Yeah, sure. We went through the proper 



UNCLHSSIF'ED 



737 



UNCtflSSIFSED 



21 



1 proc«dur«s, just lik* a travel voucher. 

2 Q Just very generally let me look here. I have 

3 a few of these IBC contracts here, and the earliest one I 

4 have here — Spencer is bringing us a more complete file 

5 that he may want to refer to — but the earliest one I 

6 have here was signed in February of 1984. You might take 

7 a look at that cover there. That's just the first 

8 doctioent there. 

9 MR. TUOHEY: Terry, are you going to mark this 

10 as an exhibit? 

11 MR. SMIUANZCH: No. 

12 MR. OLIVER: Isn't that a Frank Gomez 

13 contract, not an IBC? 

14 BY MR. SMILJANICH: (Resuming) 

15 Q Yea. 

16 . A In fact, that may be the first outside 

17 contract v« had. I don't recall. 

18 Q That's what I was going to ask you. 

19 (Pause.) 

20 MR. TUOHEY: Terry, are you going to ask 

21 questions about this contract? 

22 MR. SMILJANICH: I'm not going to get into the 

23 details, no, but if anybody does he can certainly refer 

24 to it. 

25 MR. TUOHEY: What I'm saying is we won't take 



unci«ssif:ed 



738 



UNCI^SIFJED 



22 



1 the time to read it now. 

2 MR. SMILJANICH: I don't really need him to. 

3 BV MR. SMIL7ANICH: (Resuming) 

4 Q My first question about this is, do you recall 

5 whether or not this was the first or one of the first 

6 outside contracts that LPD would have — 

7 A It certainly was one of the first. 

8 Q Now the contract is specifically between LPD 

9 and Frank Gomez. 

10 A That's correct. 

11 g Now did you know Mr. Gomez at that time? 

12 A At this time, yes. 

13 Q How did you first make his acquaintance? 

14 A My recollection is that I first met him after 

15 I became the coordinator of public diplomacy on the 

16 occasion of a briefing that I gave the USZA Foreign Press 

17 Center. If I'm not mistaken, he was the director at that 

18 time of the USXA Foreign Press Center. I was introduced 

19 to him. He took me out to meet the press. I gave my 

20 briefing and we said goodbye. 

21 I may have met him another time. I have this 

22 recollection that around the time of the Grenada 

23 operation, which would have been October — the first 

24 encounter would have been July or August — - 

25 MR. TUOHEY: Of what year? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



739 



l^'NOWSSIFJED 



23 



1 THE WITNESS: Of '83. And th«n I think in 

2 October again vh«n I want to briaf tha prasa — I vent to 

3 brief the preaa several times. I'm not sure he was there 

4 every time. So I met him, I think, a couple of times but 

5 I'm not even sure that it was a couple of times. It was 

6 at least once, so that's when I met him. 

7 ' BY MR. SMIL7AKICH: (Resuming) 

8 Q At that time was he associated with Richard 

9 Miller? 

10 A Ko. Not to my knowledge. 

11 Q Kow how did this particular contract coma 

12 about? By this particular contract, I mean tha February 

13 '84 Frank Gomez contract. 

14 A One of the first people who was assigned to my 

15 office, to LPD, was a USIA officer called John Scafe — 

16 S-c-a-f-e. John, who was a very experienced officer, 

17 came to my office shortly after it was created. He was 

18 one of the first few people, and he knew what kind of 

19 demands we were under. And he said, several months later 

20 — not right away, several months la^ar — he said, 

21 remember Frank Gomez who you met? 

22 I said yeah. Hell, he's retiring from USIA, 

23 and there was something to the effect of why don't we 

24 hire him. And I said, you know, at that time I would 

25 have hired anybody who walked in the door who had tha 



UNCI:ftSSlF'.ED 



740 



UNCraSSIFJED 



24 



1 right r«quir«m«nta . 

2 And, frankly, Gon«z' qualifications w«ra vary 

3 good. In addition to th« USZA axparlanc* h« had b««n a 

4 Oaputy Assistant Sscratary of Stata for Public Affairs 

5 and Knav tha raglon, Cantral Aaarlca, had sarvad In tha 

6 raglon, spoka tha languaga — on and on and on — just 

7 mada to ordar for our of flea. 

8 I don't racall whathar — I think ha wantad to 

9 ratlra and -not work for us. At first I probably said, 

10 you know, USZA owas us a datallaa bacausa va vara 

11 supposad to hava two. Can wa hava hla datallad? And I 

12 hava this vagua racollactlon that no, ha wants to ratlra, 

13 but wa can hlra hia as a contractor, and Z said flna, 

14 lat's do It. And this Is tha rasult. 

15 Q Did anybody outslda your offlca lobby for or 

16 maka a racoomandatlon to you to contract with Mr. Comaz? 

17 A No, not to ny racollactlon. Tha only parson Z 

18 raaaabar Is John Scafa. 

19 Q You than mat with Mr. Goaaz and nagotlatad 

20 this contract? In othar words, how did you go about It? 

21 A Hall, Z cartainly aat with hia. Z aaan, ha 

22 cana Into tha offica — Z don't raaaabar whan ~ and 

23 said, althar ha said this is what Z can do for you or Z 

24 said what can you do for us, and it was pratty obvious 

25 right away that ha could halp us a graat daal. Ha night 



UNCtftSSIFSED 



741 



UNCt/tSSIF.'ED 



25 



1 hav« •van brought with him son* sample* of %nrltlng, soma 

2 things, for •xampls. Ilka fact shssts, at catara. 

3 Wa'ra now going bac]c almost four yaars in 

4 tima. I think ona of tha biggast complaints I had was 

5 that thara wara carta in allegations about tha policy 

6 which wara wrong but thay kapt baing rapaatad. And ona 

7 of tha things ha said ha could halp us with was thasa 

8 misconcaptions. So I think ona of tha first things ha 

9 did for us was a papar on misconcaptions, ona-pagars. 

10 ° I want ad to raduca tha anormous amount of 

11 information wa had to something that could ba easily 

12 digested by busy people — Members of Congress, editors, 

13 whatever. 

14 Q How did you arrive at a contract price with 

15 him? Do you recall that process? 

16 A I don't recall that. What I usually did was 

17 I would turn it over to tha appropriate people in the 

18 Department. I did not set the prices — at least I have 

19 no recollection of ever discussing the price of any 

20 contract with anyone, because I don't know what tha 

21 services are worth. I don't have any experience in that. 

22 Q So you left that up to your staff? 

23 A I left it up to the staff and to the technical 

24 people whose job it is to do that. 

25 Q What do you mean the technical people? 



UNCCJTSSIFSED 



742 



UNCbftSSIFSED 



26 



1 A Wall, tha Stat* Oapartmant contracting office. 

2 Q In other words, outsld* your particular staff 

3 at LPD? 

4 A Oh, yss, outsld*. Sur*. Our Insld* staff had 

5 no on* knowl*dg*abl* about contracting. As I said, tha 

6 most V* *v*r had, including s*cr*tarl*s, was about 19, 20 

7 p*opl*, including th* p*opl* who did all th* Bountains of 

8 papsrwork. I had substantiv* p*opl*. I just could not 

9 afford to hav* — 

10 MR. TUOHEY: L*t a* for th* r*cord mak* not an 

11 obj*ction but a clarification. I think this is an 

12 Important on* to put on th* r*cord. Th* contracting 

13 offic*r, th* procur*B*nt contracting staff, is a ssparate 

14 antity within tha Stata Dapartmant, and that's loportant 

15 bacausa — and I will gat into mora of this latar — I 

16 hava dlscussad at soma langth with tha Inspactor 

17 Ganaral's staff, Z ]cnow sobs of you fallows hava, tha 

18 inquiry into tha contracting procass, and I think it's 

19 iBportimt that tha racord raflact, and tha Aabassador 

20 cartainly will raspond to tha guastions at tha 

21 appropriate tiaa, that thara was a separata contracting 

22 officer staff that handled a lot of these negotiations 

23 that was not under his control. 

24 MR. SMZL7ANICH: I appreciate that 

25 clarification. I think that's clear In his answer, that 



(JNCEISrslFiED 



743 



UNCt^SIFIED 



27 



1 the actual contracting out of the service was performed 

2 by an entity within State Department outside your staff. 

3 THE WITKESS: That's correct. 

4 BY MR. SMIL7ANICH: (Resuming) 

5 Q Now I don't ]cnow if there is a reference 

6 within that contract or not to this. If there were, I'd 

7 point it right out to you. Do you recall whether or not 

8 there was any discussion of the necessity for security 

9 clearances to Mr. Gomez in connection with that contract? 

10 A No, not at that time. Z don't recall any at 

11 all. 

12 Q Now let me see, then — 

13 A Wait a second. Now that you mention it, I 

14 think I was told that Gomez had a clearance. 

15 MR. TUOHEY: Z think the question was whether 

16 you recalled the language of the contract referring to 

17 it, and you haven't had a chance to review it in detail, 

18 so you just don't know. 

19 THE WITNESS: That's right. 

20 BY MR. SMIUANICH: (Resuming) 

21 Q I didn't say anything about it. I just 

22 wondered if he recalled anything about the discussion of 

23 whether or not he needed a security clearance in 

24 connection with this. 

25 A Um-umm. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



744 



UNCI«SSIF!ED 



28 



1 Q Th« n«xt contract that 1 hav« with oa h«r« — 

2 and let m« for th« racord stat* that I'm not at all 

3 asking you to assuaa that avsrythlng I show you is every 

4 single contract in connection with these matters. These 

5 are just simply ones that I have been able to pull from 

6 the file. I don't Icnov whether they are complete or not. 

7 But I just wanted to refer you to some specific ones. 

8 This next document is a contract with Mr. 

9 Gomez and your office. The date of signature is July 18, 

10 1984. The contract amount is $95,000. For the record — 

11 A $95,000? $9,500. 

12 Q I'm sorry, $9,500. The first one's $9,500. 

13 For the record, the first one I showed you, the date of 

14 signature was February 27, 1984, between Mr. Gomez and 

15 your office, for $9,500, and the second one is for the 

16 same amount. 

17 Take a moment and look at that. I'm not going 

18 to ask you detailed questions about it. Just look at it 

19 to familiarize yourself generally with the subject. 

20 (Pause.) 

21 A Yes. This looks familiar. 

22 Q I just have a general question. Do you recall 

23 how this subsequent contract came about, any discussions 

24 about it or what led up to it? 

25 A Well, I'm sure — I assume that the way that 



UNCLASSIFIED 



745 



UNCI^tSSIFSEO 



29 



1 It happened was after our, say, first trial period with 

2 Gomez, whom, by the way, we ]cnew from referral but we 

3 didn't know how he could perform for us, we felt that he 

4 was performing very well and decided to continue the 

5 services. 

6 So the time of the first contract was about to 

7 run out or had run out or whatever, aiid another contract 

8 was drawn up. 

9 Q ' Okay. When did you first aake the 

10 acquaintance of Richard Miller? 

11 A I knew Richard Miller when he was in AID, and 

12 I don't remember whether he was already the Director for 

13 Public Affairs or was the Deputy Director. I believe he 

14 was Deputy Director of Public Affairs at AID before he 

15 was Director of Public Affairs. 

16 I would say I don't recall meeting hia before 

17 '82. I was already the Assistant Administrator of AID. 

18 But it could have been '81. It could easily have been 

19 '81. 

20 Q Did you know whether or not Mr. Gomez and Mr. 

21 Miller had any connection at the time you were engaging 

22 in these contracts? 

23 A Ko, I did not. 

24 MR. TUOHEY: Would you state the question 

25 again? 



UNGtftSSIRED 



746 



UNC44SSiF;E0 



30 



1 BY MR. SMIUANICH: (R«suming) 

2 Q y«s. At th« tim* you war* vorlclng with these 

3 Initial contracts that I've shown you were you aware of 

4 any connection between Mr. Gomez and Mr. Miller? 

5 A No. 

6 Q Richard Miller? 

7 A No, I was not. 

8 Q He might as well go ahead and just run some 

9 names past you. Do you know Carl Spitz Channell? 

10 A No, I don't. 

11 Q You've never met hln? 

12 A I've never met him, to my knowledge. 

13 Q Old Colonel North, to your recollection, have 

14 anything to do with discussions concerning entering into 

15 these specific contracts that I've shown you? 

16 A No, not to my Icnovledge. 

17 Q Let B« show you a contract, date of signature 

18 of January 28, 1985, between your office and 

19 International Business Communications of Washington, 0. 

20 C. in the amount of, I believe, $24,400, and it shows 

21 contractor representative Frank Gomez. Take a moment, 

22 and again I'm not going to aak you detailed questions 

23 about it. 

24 (Pause.) 

25 A Yes. 



UNCttSSlF^EB 



747 



(JNCLirSSiFL^ED 



31 



1 Q How did International Business Conmunlcatlons 

2 come to your attention, If It did? 

3 A Yes, It did. To the best of my recollection, 

4 what happened was toward the end of '84, after ve had had 

5 nearly a year of what we considered to be a successful 

6 professional relationship with Frank Gomez, I believe he 

7 came to us and said I am — we probably wanted to 

8 continue working with him. 

9 . I know we wanted to continue working with him, 

10 and he said I'm forming a corporation with Rich Miller — 

11 he probably said with Rich Miller; I don't recall, but 

12 there's no reason for him to not disclose that — and 

13 It's called International Business Communications. 

14 And so from now on It won't be Frank Gomez 

15 that makes the proposals or has the contract, but If we 

16 want to continue the relationship It will be with IBC, 

17 which Is not unusual. I thought It was for tax purposes 

18 or something, or to expand their capabilities. 

19 Q Nov were these what is referred to as sole 

20 source contracts? 

21 A Yes, they were. 

22 Q In other words, you didn't put out a request 

23 for proposals or anything like that out and accept bids? 

24 A That is correct. 

25 Q You were, up to this point, very satisfied 



UNCttSSIFSED 



748 



UNCLtSSlFSEO 



32 



1 with th« work Mr. Gomaz was producing for you? 

2 A Y«s. 

3 Q And his product again, just in gsnaral tarms, 

4 tha product ha was producing was papars, things auch as 

5 that? 

6 A Papars, but not just papars. Ha was in vary 

7 fraquant contact with paopla in ny offica, particularly 

8 John Scafa, Jonathan Millar — who was tha COTR 

9 contracting offica tachnical raprasantativa — with ma 

10 lass fraquantly. But I would saa his. If ha would pick 

11 up sona information that ha thought would b« valuabla and 

12 w* should includa, ha would pick up tha phona and call. 

13 So it wasn't just papars but it was a lot of 

14 papars. It was advica. It was translations. It was the 

15 kind of sarvicas dascribad in hara. 

16 Q Did IBC or Mr. Gomaz or Mr. Millar or tha 

17 paopla within IBC, did thay do any of tha actual contact 

18 with tha outslda world? 

19 A Oh, yas. Thay had contact with tha outaida 

20 world. 

21 Q In tarms of gatting tha aassaga out. That's 

22 what I 'a talking about — in tarns of your ovarall 

23 objactiva. 

24 A No. Thay caaa to us and suggastad that wa do 

25 this or that. In soma casas thay had contacts, I am 



unOssifsed 



749 



UNCtASS/Ft'ED 



33 



1 sura, with th« outsid* world, but th«y weren't doing It 

2 for us. I wanted to make sure that whatever they did for 

3 us was only things that were included ^n the contract. - 

4 Q In other words, they were producing' material 

5 and informatTon and whatever for your use. They were not 

6 going out and acting on behalf of the Office of Public 

7 Diplomacy and speaking to groups and saying we're here 

8 for the office and things such as that? 

9 A . Kot to my knowledge. 

10 Q Or making specific contact with tMrgets, if Z 

11 can use that word, targets. -^ 

12 A Target audiencfis. Hell, yea. Vhey would 

13 identify audiences an^Z know that there were timaa, for 

14 example, when they would organize — I think there was a 

15 time when th«y set up a preanL^ftB^Onc* SMr, say^' a 

16 defector. So ttf~Clia tStttnt^^m I agl 

17 one of our tftrg^^^an^n, nn^at aiafrWSBLiS^»j^\ 

18 the press, ,^^^^ yaa, thmf did aaka dastact^ - - je? ^ 

19 I'm reaaabering soma now that thay^ did sake 

■at 

20 contact with aoma of the outaida grpupa or a rifidrter who 

21 would have aaked a queatlon, for axaapl«, who ware to 

22 call the pro^^i^-of a progras who wanted Ib^^mm on his 

23 or her show ife^aal Itya SAlvaderan:^i#ril]^defecter, 

24 let's say. And so Frank Somas or a^&one^fear — not 

25 only Frank Goaex but including Frank Gomez — wottld take 



UNCtl^SlFlEO 



750 



liNttfSSIFJEO 



34 



1 thi« d«f«ctor over there. 

2 Q Was there one person within your staff who was 

3 primarily responsible for administering the Gomez and 

4 then later the IBC contracts? 

5 A Yes. Well, if you mean a contracting office 

6 technical representative, yes. They are listed. There's 

7 a requirement in these contracts that a COTR be 

8 designated, and Z believe every one of the contracts has 

9 a name. 

10 Q And the COTR would be the person within your 

11 staff primarily responsible for overseeing the 

12 implementation of the contract? 

13 A Primarily responsible, yes. 

14 Q Did any other individuals or companies come to 

15 you and request the opporttuiity to provide services other 

16 than IBC? 

17 A Oh, yes, lots of people. 

18 Q How did you go about determining — that's not 

19 a very clear question. 

20 A I'll give you an unclear answer. 

21 Q That won't do either of us any good. 

22 You obviously reached the decision to continue 

23 on with the services of IBC during this time period as 

24 opposed to switching to other groups or allowing other 

25 groups to bid on the work. My question is, how did you 



(iNCtl^SIFSED 



751 



UNC^ftSSIFi^ED 



35 



1 arrive at what I assume was your decision in that regard. 

2 A Well, there were other groups or other 

3 individuals that came to us offering their services. 

4 Some were hired. 

5 Q Name some other groups that were hired to do 

6 services? 

7 A Hell, individuals. 0ns that I Icnow that has 

8 been mentioned is Mark Richards, who we thought had 

9 unique capabilities in press relations. Another one 

10 that's been in the press is Arturo Cruz, Jr., who in my 

11 opinion had a very uniq[ue perspective into the thinking 

12 of the Nicaraguan government at a particular point in 

13 time when he was a member of it — people like that. 

14 There were other individuals — Z forget their 

15 names — people who trrote papers for us, for example, on 

16 a particular subject — terrorism. There's a whole list 

17 of contractors. We had, by the way, a lot of people who 

18 came and frankly we did not like their proposals. Either 

19 they were things that we could already do in-house or we 

20 didn't think they were qualified or they were very 

21 expensive. 

22 You know, people would come and say I can win 

23 ths war for you in Central America if you give me a $2 

24 million contract. You know, obviously they weren't 

25 serious. I'm using that as a humorous statement. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



752 



UNCtftSSIFiED 



36 



1 Q X understand. 

2 A That's it. 

3 MR. SMZL7ANZCH: Off th« record for a second. 

4 (A discussion was hsld off th« record.) 

5 HR. SMIUAMICH: On the record. 

6 BY MR. SMIUANICH: (Resuming) 

7 Q Mr. Ambassador, ve just had a discussion off 

8 the record about how much the total amounts of the 

9 contracts Were for both ZBC and Mr. Gomez. Would you 

10 agree that as a very approximate ballpark figure $400,000 

11 as a total contract amount sounds about right? 

12 A It sounds about right. 

13 Q We're putting Mr. Gomez and ZBC together as 

14 one group, although Z realize that technically we're 

15 dealing with a corporation as opposed to an individual, 

16 but putting thea together. Was there any other company 

17 that had a similar amount, a similar contractual amount 

18 as IBC and Mr. Gomez? 

19 A No. 

20 Q Understanding you don't have any records in 

21 front of you to specifically refresh your recollection, 

22 can you think of who would have been the second in terms 

23 of the total amount of contracts? 

24 A No, Z don't. 

25 Q Can you think of an approximate ballpark 



UNetftSSlFSED 



753 



UNCtmiFfED 



37 



1 amount of what th« second-largast collection of contracts 

2 would b«? 

3 A I would say it probably would hava b««n Mar)c 

4 Richards. 

5 Q And approximatsly how much was th* valu* of 

6 his contract? 

7 A I don't remember. 

8 Q Less than $100,000? 

9 A Hell, he worked for us as^a contractor for 

10 over two years. He might have gotten — ~- 

11 MR. TUOHZY: You don't want to ayAculate. Do 

12 you know? 

13 THE WITNESS: No. 

14 BY KR. SMILTANZCH: (Resuming) 

15 Q If you know. So it would be fair to say that 

16 IBC, even excluding Mr. Gomez, that ZBC was the largest 

17 contractor for LPD during your tentire? 

18 A Yes. It appears that way. 

19 Q Do you recall how and when the subject of 

20 security clearances ever came up in connection with IBC? 

21 A Yes. 

22 Q Tell me about it. 

23 A I've tried to rlbon st n ag i th^*^ Inev you^ " 

24 would b« interested in it^: First of all, rra«* CoMi^ad 

25 been handliftg, let's say dealing, with "^factors fo«.us, 

UNCIVSSIFSED 



754 



UNCfeftSSIFSED 



38 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



talcing th«B around, for a long tla*. But soBatla* In tha 
sumnar of 1985 v* atartad gattingi 




■acond . 



Q Olcay. Stop. Lat'a go off th« racord a 

(X dlacuaalon vaa hald off th« racord. 

THE 




755 



Q^ac^^'^^aa^O 






M- « 



82 730 755 



756 



UNCL^SIFIED 



41 



1 Jonathan Millar had left, who had b««n th« COTR for most 

2 of th« IBC contracts. 

3 In Jonathan Millar's abssncs — 

4 MR. TUOHEY: Can v« stsp outs Ids for just a 

5 second? 

6 (Witness conf srrlng with counsel . ) 

7 MR. TUOHEY: I just want to explain something, 

8 and this can be on the record. One of the confusing 

9 aspects of this period of time, which the Ambassador will 

10 explain In some detail and you can aslc him anything you 

11 want about It, Z just want to make sure the record Is 

12 clear because none of us know where this transcript Is 

13 going when It leaves this room. 

14 MR. SMZLJANICH: Z can answer that. 

15 MR. TDOHEY: Eventually. The Ambassador Is 

16 going to explain that at the time these conversations and 

17 the ultimate decision to tell Gomez to handle this matter 

18 was taken care of, there was a contract proposal on the 

19 table not yet approved. It's the contract which Is later 

20 classified as Secret, which Z'm sure you are going to ask 

21 questions about. But that's on the table and, as the 

22 Ambassador will explain and 1 just want clear on the 

23 record. In the time sequence, at the time the decision 

24 was made to allow Mr. Gomez or his entity to handle this 

25 matter, thereby committing funds of the Department of 



UNClirSSIFSED 



757 



UNCt1KSIF3ED 



42 



1 Stat*, th« contract proposal on th« taU3l« to handl* just 

2 such a situation, dsfsctors, ths dsclslon was mads to go 

3 ahsad and hav* Mr. Gonsz handle it, avsn though ths 

4 contract was not approvsd. 

5 Ths Aabassador will tall you hs did it on the 

6 advice of others. But that's the sequence we're in. 

7 It's a very confusing time and I just want that clear. 

8 I'm not trying to testify in his behalf. He will explain 

9 it in detail, but I just want you to understand the 

10 period. 

11 BY MR. SMIUAMICH: (Resuming) 

12 Q I appreciate that and I think, you )cnow, the 

13 Aabassador, as he goes through the narrative, you know, 

14 he's approaching this, which is frankly what Z would 

15 like, a general narrative approach to this. If you want 

16 to explain the context or I would assuae you would want 

17 to talk about soa* of the aatters your counsel just 

18 referred to, please go ahead. 

19 I just want to get your overall story about 

20 this. 

21 A What Z started to tell you was that when 

22 Jonathan Miller had been the COTR, had left the office, 

23 let's say Septeaber 85 — Labor Day, is what I mentioned 

24 earlier, around that tiae — the position was vacant. 

25 The second Deputy position was vacant. I asked a 



UNetftSStFSED 



758 



UNCtlSSIFEED 



43 



9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



detail**, on* of ay d*tall**a froa th* D*f*na* 
D*partm*nt, an Air Fore* Li*ut*nant Colonal, to h*lp a* 
daal with th* bur*aucraey In th* aanag*B*nt of contracts 
in g*n*ral. 

Q Plaaa* giv* a* hia naa*. 

A Jak* Jacobowitz — actually David, but v* 
n*v*r callad hia David. Colonal Jacobowitz, th*r*for*, 
startad daallng with th* contracting of fie* on what 
bacaa* th|* final IBC contract. What *ls*? 

Q Go ahead. 




A Okay. Soaatia* in th* fall of *85, soaatia* 
aftar Saptaabar — I b*li*v* October or Nov*ab*r — and 
this has all b**n r*aind*d to a*, you know, b*causa of 
all th* various quastions Z'v* b**n askad by diffarant 
paopl* — Jacobowitz caa* to a* and said soaabody 
suggests — and who th« "soaabody" is is not clear in ay 
head, if he ever told ae — it has been suggested that 
this contract be classified because of the handling of 
defectors. 

Q And again this conversation with Mr. 
Jacobowitz is in approxiaately what tiae fraae? 




759 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

13 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




Q I think, as I r«call, that's kind of vhsr* you 
Isft off th* story, and, as I say, you can tall it in any 
fashion you want to, but Z want to aaks sur* v« gst back 
to that bscaus* v« haven't gottsn y«t to Mr. Goasx 
gstting Involvsd in this. 

A w* vsrs kind of in a bind, frankly. 




Th* ssvsnth floor tails bs it's your problem, 
you handls it. Sonsons suggastad — Z'b not svan sura, 
frankly, that it was my idaa; it was probably soaabody on 
my staff — let Frank handle it. Frank has proven 
himself very capable of handling defectors, and he did. 
He spoke the language as a native. He knew the region. 

uNeassiF'io 



760 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UNCMSSIFiED 



I 



45 



H« va« vary good at daallng with p«opl«, with those kind 
of paopla under straas. 




Q This la what your counsal vaa rafarrlng to, 
tha fact that thara was at this aeuta tiaa tha procaas of 
nagotlatlng and antaring into a nav contract? 

A That's right. That's corract, which was not 
at that tiaa classifiad, bacausa va had navar classifiad 
it bafora. But bacausa of tha concam which wa had 
always 




761 



.Ac.M(p 



^^ 



^aJ/sV /J 



aT/^Z- 



762 



liNCL'ASSIFlED 



47 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




g Was thar* a primary aourca of this Information 
froa th« Agancy? Was it I 

A Z don't think it wa^^^^^^Hhimsalf . it 
was paopla undar hia. 

Q Go ahaad. 

A So thay said soaathing to ths affact of gat 
raady and, franXly, I thought wall, this is good bacausa 
thasa paopla ara rasourcas and thay will prova that what 
tha Adainistration is saying is trua about Soviat-Cuban 
prasanca in Nicaragua or huaan rights violations, 

'or tha othar alaaants of tha linas of 
arguaants wa wars following. 

So Z said, graat, lat tha daf actors coaa. But 
it coneamad aa, of coursa, a graat daal that tha 
Sandinistas wars also awara of this and tha daaaga that 
was baing dona to thair govamaant by tha stataaants of 
thasa dafactors and wara parfactly capabla of killing 
thaa, as in affact thay had killad a lot of paopla. 




Wa had no aonay. Z aaan, Z couldn't 



UNCtftSSIFJED 



763 




UNCLASSIFIED 

1 90 up to SSEX and say, hay, Z naad monay for a coat. 

2 Thay would «ay, that's not in tha bud gat^ 
3 
4 

5 ^^^^^^HAnd I think that's a disgraca, franJcly — tha 

6 fact that tha aoat povarful coxintry in tha world is not 

7 praparad to daal with tha paopla who trust thair livas to 

8 us, and it doasn't surprisa aa at all what happanad with 

9 YurchankO', tha Soviat dafactor, who want back. Ha 

10 figurad, you know, thasa guys ara so disorganizad Z don't 

11 want to b« associatad with thaa. 

12 MR. TOOHEY: You wars talking about tha 

13 procass by trhich tha dscision was aada to classify it. 

14 THE WITNESS: Hhan, Z baliava, Jaka caaa to aa 

15 — Z say "baliava" bacausa to tha baat of ay racollaction 

16 ha was tha ona who caaa to a«, and, by tha way, ha has 

17 told a* that that's what h« also baliavas — and said 

18 this should b« classifiad, Z said fina, 90 gat it 

19 classifiad. 

20 BY MR. SMZUANZCHi (Raauaing) 

21 Q Okay. Now tha fact that you wara going to 

22 contract with ZBC for sarvicas that indudad handling of 

23 da factors was soaathing that was alraady on tha tabla at 

24 tha tiaa this particular sub j act caaa up about this 

25 particular daf actor; is that right? 

UNCtirSSIFSED 



764 



UNCtffSSIFSED 



49 




1 A Y«s. And th«y had already don* it bafora. 

2 Q And thay had alraady dona It bafora in tha 

3 pravious contract? 

4 A Yaa. 

5 Q Nov in tha middla of your atory you aaid you 

6 wantad to add aoaathing. 

7 A 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Ava hava no kitty. Mayba that 

9 ahouldn't avan ba in hara, bacauaa Z think it 'a ao 

10 ambarraaaing to tha Unitad Stataa that it would 

11 diacouraga futura dafactora. If X vaa a potential 

12 daf actor, Z would think twica. 

13 Q Wa'll worry about that. 

14 Tha pravioua dafactora that Gomai and IBC had 

15 halpad you out with, tha problaa with ragard to aacurity 

16 claarancas hadn't coBa up in connaction with thoaa 

17 aarvicaa? 

18 A No. 

19 Q During thaaa dlacuaaiona you hava just ralatad 

20 laading up to a daciaion to claaaify thia contract waa 

21 thara any diacuaaion, to your racollaction, with anyona 

22 about tha ralationahip batwaan tha claaaification of tha 

23 contract and tha raqulraaant to go outaida of a aola 

24 sourca approach to thia mattar? 

25 A Not to ay racollaction. 



I 



UNCt^SiFSED 



765 



(iNCEftSSIFIED 



50 



1 Q Spaciflcally, for •xaopl*, war* th«r« any 

2 discussions that in order to Issu* another sols source 

3 contract the matter had to be classified? 

4 A No. 

5 Q Nobody brought that up with you? 

6 A Not that Z can remember. 

7 Q Now this last contract — and I'm not even 

8 sure I have It; I don't think Z have It with me — this 

9 last contract with IBC — and it was the last contract 

10 with ZBC, wasn't it, that we're talking about? 

11 A That's right, the $27C,000. 

12 Q That would have run from approximately when to 

13 approximately when? 

14 A Fiscal year '86, so October 1, '85-September 

15 30, '86, Z believe. 

16 Q Now there's evidence — first of all, was the 

17 contract signed in '85 for fiscal year '86? Has there a 

18 signed contract? 

19 A Hy understanding, after the fact, is that the 

20 contract was signed in August of '86. 

21 Q Nov why was there a gap between the 

22 preparation of the contract and the actual signing of it? 

23 A Well, here Z have a lot of problems answering 

24 because Z left the office in January of '86, when the 

25 contract was still being negotiated, and it was not 



UNCtftSSIF^ED 



766 



UNCmsiREO 



51 



1 signed for savcral months later. 

2 Q waa IBC perfoming sarvicaa from October '85 

3 to the tine you left in January '86 pursuant to that 

4 contract? 

5 A It appears that they were. It appears that 

6 they were performing services in anticipation of the 

7 signing of that contract. 

8 Q And do you know what it was that was taking 

9 place during the time frame of September-October of '85 

10 to January of '86 that prevented there being a final 

11 signed contract? What was going on? 

12 A What I was told was — and I asked — was that 

13 there were a lot of bureaucracy problems. I didn't deal 

14 personally directly, as I said, with the contracting 

15 office or any other office. This was a very busy time 

16 and we're dealing with a lot of different issues, and 

17 this was only on*. I'd say it was maybe one percent, two 

18 percent of what took up my time. 

19 But Jake Jacobowitz would keep coming back to 

20 me saying well, now we need another piece of paper, and 

21 now thay need thia and now they need a aite security 

22 clearance, now they need this. 

23 Q Who is "they"? 

24 A Well, "they" would be different. See, "they" 

25 waa anybody outside our office practically because we 



liNCtftSSIFSED 



767 



UNCI^^SIFSED 



52 



1 dealt with a lot of different people, different offices 

2 and different Individuals. Z mean, there was so much 

3 turnover. One day we'd be dealing with the contracting 

4 officer, with one person, and the next day It could be 

5 somebody else. So I didn't even bother to learn the 

6 names, except, you )cnow, the supervisors. 

7 Q But the entity dealing with the negotiations 

8 or working up this contract was the contracting officer 

9 entity outside your LPD staff; Is that right? 

10 A Among others. 

11 Q Among who else? 

12 A Well, this Is what I'm not clear, because 

13 "they", as I say, "they" Included the contracting 

14 officer. At times It Included the legal people. 

15 Sometimes It Included security people. At one point the 

16 Office of Security had to be involved because we were 

17 told or th«y told us — "they" being I don't know which 

18 one of those entitles — told us that IBC was going to 

19 need a site security clearance If they were going to have 

20 — If the contract was going to be classified. 

21 So "they" referred to a lot of different 

22 people. And Jake Jacobowltz or his predecessors and 

23 successors were the ones who dealt with "thea". 

24 Q And his predecessor was Jonathan Miller? 

25 A No. Yes and no. His predecessor — 



(iNCOSSIFSED 



768 



UNCmSIFiED 



53 



1 Q On this sub j act. 

2 A H«ll, his predecessor — that is to say, the 

3 liaison officer with IBC — was Jonathan Miller. But not 

4 hi* predecessor as liaison with the contracting office. 

5 What happened was our administrative officer, Frank 

6 Gardner, who was one of a whole series of adainistrative 

7 officers we had in a short period of tine, left the 

8 office about the same time Jonathan Miller did. He 

9 retired after many years, after 40 years. 

10 It was a coincidence. So I had a double-bind. 

11 Not only did Z lose my contracting office technical 

12 representative, I lost my administrative officer just 

13 about within weeks or days of each other. And Jake 

14 Jacobowitz frankly ended up with both of those 

15 responsibilities dumped on him, willingly. Z mean, he 

16 volunteered. I'm not saying that Z chained him and said 

17 you have to do this. He was willing to do it because he 

18 knew the job had to get done, and Z don't think anybody 

19 anticipated having this many problems. 

20 Ws thought it was a matter of getting all of 

21 th« proper forms signed, all the proper procedures, and 

22 eventiially, like all the other contracts, this one would 

23 also be signed. 

24 Q To your knowledge was there any other fact — 

25 A Can Z add something on the administrative 



UNCtftSSlF'W 



769 



UNCfc^SIFSED 



54 



1 officar businass? 

2 Q Pl«a«« do. 

3 A I think it's important — and I'm not trying 

4 to dump on the Stat* D«partm«nt, but sine* I'm har* and 

5 this is not tha normal position of an Ambassador of 

6 having to coma and axplain all thasa things — whan tha 

7 of fica was craatad I did not know what it was going to 

8 turn out to ba lika. As I said, I was tha only parson in 

9 tha offica for a vhila, and than paopla startad coming. 

10 It startad growing. It startad bacoming mora and mora a 

11 sourca of information that paopla tumad to. 

12 And without blowing our o%m horn, it got to 

13 tha point whara tha Prasidant of tha Unitad Statas, tha 

14 Sacratary of Stata, tha National Sacurity Advisor, 

15 Cabinat officials and lots of othar paopla raliad on our 

16 information and usad it varbatim. Z maan, it was that 

17 good. My principal concam, frankly, was tha cradibllity 

18 of our product. That's what I spant most of my tima on. 

19 I*B not a contracting officar. I'm not a 

20 lavyar. I couldn't possibly substituta for tha paopla I 

21 thought wars supporting us, you know, our principal job, 

22 which was to gat information out that was cradlbla and 

23 that was accurata, at catara. 

24 So at a point whan tha offica startad growing 

25 ~ I think lata '83 — I said I can't handla all of this 



UNCimSIFSED 



770 



UNCtftSSIFIED 



55 



1 adalnlstrativ* stuff. I naad an adalnlatrativ* officar 

2 In tha of flea aa part of tha staff. Ha had not 

3 anticlpatad this bacausa this was a brand nav of flea, tha 

4 only Offlca of Public Diplomacy that has avar axistad, 

5 had avar axistad until a coupla of yaars aftar that. And 

6 thara vara so admlnlstrativa raqulramants In our offlca - 

7 - Z maan, avan things Ilka thay'd ask aa, for axampla, 

8 for job dascriptlons for aach ona of tha paopla. I aaid 

9 I don't hava tlma to wrlta up job dascriptlons. 

10 Thay askad na to draw an adainistrativa, a 

11 diagram of vhara avarybody fit. 

12 Q An organization chart? 

13 A An organizational chart and all thasa things. 

14 Z said who's going to do tha public diplomacy job whila I 

15 do this kind of thing? So I said, listan, plaasa giva ma 

16 as ona of tha datailaas from aomawhara, giva ma somabody 

17 who's knovladgaabla In administration. Stata couldn't 

18 coma up with ona. AID cama up with Matthaw Friadman. In 

19 othar words, what Z did was I would call tha four 

20 agancias that I had baan told would aupport ma, and tha 

21 first ona that cama up with soma administrativa aupport 

22 was AID, ao Matthaw Friadman cama. 

23 Unfortunataly for Matthaw Friadman and for us, 

24 ha also didn't know Stata Dapartmant administrativa 

25 procadura bacausa ha was a political appolntaa who had 



UNCL'ffSSIF^ED 



771 



UNCLH^IFiED 



56 



1 dona SOB* adninistratlva work at AID and who voluntaarad 

2 to do it for ua, and who was vary bright and pickad up 

3 very quickly, but than ha laft somatiaa in, around Labor 

4 Day of '84 as opposad to — I don't know why paopla 

5 dacida to laava around Labor Day, but it's a logical time 

6 at tha and of the suamar. 

7 W« wars without adainlstratlva support — I 

8 would say I would have to go back and look at tha records 

9 — but I would say for at least half tha tlaa that tha 

10 office was in operation and I was the director of it. 

11 That is not conducive to good manageaent. I asked 

12 repeatedly for and Z begged, I pleaded, for an 

13 adninistrative officer to be assigned to the office 

14 precisely so we would avoid contract probleas. 

15 We were contracting out for services. We were 

16 swamped with requests for this, that, and va didn't have 

17 anybody in house who could do it. The support we were 

18 getting froa SSEX, whieh was tha office that I was told 

19 would support us, was not adequate and, in fairness to 

20 thea, they never expected that they would have to support 

21 us. Thay also had the Office of the special Envoy, the 

22 Kissinger Coaaission, all these other offices were 

23 created just for Latin Aaarica, in addition to all tha 

24 other offices that they had to support for the rest of 

25 the world that were just created. They were swaaped. 



UNC^^SIFJED 



772 



UNCCmiFBED 



57 



1 Eventually I got a State Departnent 

2 administrative officer. I don't even remember who he was 

3 at the time. We had a series of very short-term people. 

4 He had a young lady who all of a sudden got assigned to 

5 Rome, so she left, so we were vacant. We had a young 

6 man, very bright, who got a job in INK. Brent Blaslcy was 

7 his name. If we could have kept him we probably wouldn't 

8 have had any problems at all, because he knew the system. 

9 There were long periods of vacancies. This 
10 was one of the periods of vacancies — as a matter of 
11. fact, three months. 

12 Q It sounds like you had an easy go of it. Was 

13 there, to your knowledge, any other factor other than 

14 what you have described involved in the decision to 

15 classify the final IBC contract? 

16 A Not to my knowledge or not to my recollection. 

17 Q Did anyone — I apologize; I think I asked you 

18 this in connection with Mr. Gomez, but let me ask you 

19 about IBC, and particularly, specifically, the final 

20 contract with IBC — did anyone other than IBC which 

21 would have wanted to have a contract, did anyone other 

22 than IBC com* to you or bring any information to you 

23 asking that IBC be allowed to have another contract for 

24 fiscal year 1986? 

25 A No, not that I can remember. 



UN(fL1SSIF3ED 



773 



liNCCftSSIFSED 



58 



1 Q L«t m« just ask the genaral qusstion. Did 

2 Ollvsr North, Lisutsnant Colonsl North, havs any 

3 Involvsasnt at all In any of th« discussions about 

4 security clsarancss or the contracting for services with 

5 IBC, to your recollection and knowledge? 

6 A I have been trying to think. I anticipated 

7 that question, and it is possible that he nay have asked 

8 me about it once very late, but I 'a not even sure of 

9 that, and that would not have surprised ae because people 

10 knew that Goaez particularly was doing work for us and 

11 had done a good job. 

12 But the reason Z say I can't reaeaber is 

13 because a nuaber of people were aware of the IBC-Goaez 

14 relationship at the NSC, people who had a need to know 

15 and who knew aibout it and who were satisfied. And they 

16 aay have asked eUsout it as well, like what's happening or 

17 what's Frank Goaez up to and that kind of thing, but it 

18 would have been that kind of an inquiry, not any pressure 

19 or anything like that. 

20 Q Did you have any belief or even a suspicion 

21 that Colonel North had a connection with or reason to 

22 wish that ZBC or its people would get a contract with the 

23 State Departaent? 

24 A I had only one occasion where I very late, 

25 right before leaving for Venezuela, during ay 



UNdHSSIFSED 



774 



UNCbftSSlFlED 



59 



1 consultations long aftsr laaving th« S/LPD, wh«n I was at 

2 ths National Sacurity Council in th« Old Exscutiv* Offlcs 

3 Building, and I happsnad to wal)c into North's of fie* — 

4 Q Excuse m« for interrupting. Arc you tallcing 

5 about when you were Ambassador? 

6 A I was Ambassador-designate. I can't remember 

7 the date, but I would think it would have been April or 

8 May already, right before Z left. Z was sworn in May 12 

9 and left May 16, so it would have been before that. I 

10 walked into North's office unannounced and saw Miller and 

11 Gomez walking out. But, once again, you know, at that 

12 time Z didn't give it much thought because they were 

13 sources of information for us on Central America. 

14 Everybody knew that Ollie North was working on 

15 Central America. Zt seemed like a logical connection. 

16 Q Now I've gotten confused here. You said this 

17 would have been approximately April or May of '867 

18 A Right, right before Z left. 

19 Q Z thought that you were originally told you 

20 were going to become Ambassador or designated Ambassador 

21 in late '85 and it was January of '86 that you were 

22 confirmed? 

23 A That's correct — no, no, that Z was 

24 announced. See, what happened — can Z give you the 

25 chronology? 



UNetftSSIF^ED 



775 



UNCfclSSIFIED 



60 



1 Q Plaasa, go ahead. 

2 A I )cn«w in approximately May '85 — 

3 Q '85? 

4 A '85, yes. This took a long time. It took a 

5 year. May '85 was my first conversation with Secretary 

6 Shultz and the White House about Venezuela. It took a 

7 long time for them to make up their minds, et cetera, et 

8 cetera. In August '85 President Reagan signed the 

9 internal memorandum that said my choice is Otto Reich, 

10 but check him out or whatever it is they do. I never saw 

11 the memorandum. The FBI clearance then starts and all 

12 that. 

13 December '85 — it took four months, and part 

14 of the problem was we had the Geneva summit with 

15 Gorbachev and that paralyzed — that slowed down the 

16 Executive branch, and in December *85 the President then 

17 called me and said, you know, Z want you to be Ambassador 

18 to Venezuela. It took another month, however, for the 

19 public announcement and transmittal of the papers to the 

20 Senate. 

21 I didn't think that I should leave my office 

22 until the public announcement. But, for your 

23 information, I was preparing myself to be Ambassador to 

24 Venezuela from even before the time the President signed 
2 5 the memorandum in Aucfust. I was reading Venezuelan 



UNCLftSSIFiED 



776 



UNCtflSSIFSED 



61 



1 history boolcs and •conomics and stuff and trying to run 

2 the offics. So January of '86, whsn ths announcement was 

3 made, I then by memorandum informed everyone in the 

4 Department that I was no longer the coordinator. 

5 I wrote a memo to my staff saying the 

6 President has appointed me, as you know. I mean, I had 

7 told them before. And said some nice things about them, 

8 et cetera, et cetera, and said John Blacken will be 

9 Acting Cooi'dlnator until a new coordinator is appointed 

10 by the Secretary, the President, whoever. 

11 So from January of '86 to May of '86 I 

12 concentrated on my confirmation hearings and getting out 

13 of here. It takes a while. During that time I visited 

14 people in the Executive Branch — Commerce Department, 

15 Treasury, everybody that would have something to do with 

16 . my Venezuela assignaent. During one of those visits to 

17 the NSC is when I happened to see these guys come out of 

18 Ollie's office. 

19 Q Here you there to see North? 

20 A No, I didn't have an appointment with him that 

21 I recall because, frankly, he wasn't going to have 

22 anything to do with Venezuela that I knew of. But I 

23 always used to drop by and say hello to Fawn, you know. 

24 She was a friend. Poor Fawn. She's gotten a bad rap and 

25 doesn't deserve it. 



UN(H.*SS!F5E0 



777 



UNCmsiFEEO 



62 



1 Q I don't feel so sorry for her. She's gotten 

2 some nice publicity. 

3 MR. OLIVER: She's also got immunity. 

4 THE WITNESS: So the best of my recollection - 

5 - and, as I said, it was not the ]clnd of thing that would 

6 have stuck in my mind. So it's vague, but it's around 

7 that time, I would say. 

8 BY MR. SMII<JANICH: (Resuming) 

9 Q Now during that time period of getting 

10 prepared td be confirmed as Ambassador to Venezuela, one 

11 of the things you were doing was starting to get familiar 

12 with the cable traffic to and from Venezuela? 

13 A Yes. I started reading cable traffic. 

14 Q When did you start that procees? 

15 A I believe Z started reading cable traffic — I 

16 believe I started reading caUble traffic in the fall of 

17 '85. Wait a second. I must have because in January of 

18 '85 I said I don't want to see another cable about 

19 Central America that doesn't have to do with Venezuela. 
2 MR. TUOHEY: '85 or '86? 

21 THE WITNESS: '86, when I was officially 

22 nominated, because I wanted everybody — I knew what was 

23 going to happen. People were going to still come to me 

24 and say could you do this, could you do that, and I was 

25 going to say no, I'm sorry. 



UNCtHSSIFJED 



778 



UNCtASSIFlEO 



63 



1 BY MR. SMIUANICH: (Resuming) 

2 Q But you thinJc it was prior to January of '86 

3 that you started reading the traffic? 

4 A Yes. I'm almost definite. Yes. As I said, I 

5 started to get ready for Venezuela in about August of 

6 '86, and I started reading cable traffic. 

7 MR. TUOHEY: August of '85, you mean. 

8 THE WITNESS: August of '85. 

9 'by MR. SMILJANICH: (Resuming) 

10 Q Who was the prior Ambassador to Venezuela? 

11 A George Landau — L-a-n-d-a-u. 

12 Q Was there a hiatus between his leaving and 

13 your coning? 

14 A Eleven sTOTiths. 

15 Q Who was the DCM during that period? 

16 A The Charge, Kim Flower, as in a rose. 

17 Q Okay. And that was an eleven-month period? 

18 A That's correct — June of '85 to May of '86 — 

19 incredibly long. 

20 Q Kia is a neutral name. 

21 A A man. 

22 Q Were you involved at all in the process or 

23 discussions leading up to the switch of LPO from the 

24 Secretariat to ARA? 

25 A Yes, I was. 



UNCmSIFiED 



779 



UNCtl^SIFSED 



64 



1 Q How did that coma about? 

2 A Wall, I don't remember exactly, but it was 

3 something to the effect of somebody in the Secretariat — 

4 I believe it was Nick Piatt, Nicholas Piatt — said we 

5 can't have, and he used a term which I objected to, 

6 growths and polyps attached to the office — but it was 

7 descriptive — attached to the Office of the Secretary 

8 because, he says, we just can't support them all. He was 

9 right. 

10 He was right from the administrative 

11 standpoint. I said if you remove the office from the 

12 Office of the Secretary, these public diplomacy 

13 operations , you ' re going to downgrade them in everybody ' s 

14 minds and they won't have the kind of political support 

15 from the other agencies that they need, detailees, et 

16 cetera. 

17 So there ensued a discussion of several months 

18 where the Deputy Secretary, John Whitehead, was involved 

19 as to what do we do with these offices. By that time the 

20 South Africa Bureau had started one based on what was 

21 then called the extremely successful example of the 

22 Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the 

23 Caribbean. I'm going to keep that clipping. And there 

24 were several options considered — for exeuaple, attaching 

25 them to the Bureau of Public Affairs, creating or 



UNeCffSSIF^ED 



780 



UNCtftSSIFSED 



65 



1 attaching than to tha raglonal buraaus, a lot of 

2 diffarent things which I don't ramamber. 

3 But what was finally dacidad — and I think it 

4 was decided during tha period between January and May of 

5 '86 — was to attach S/LPD to PJtA and we became AKA/LPO. 

6 Q Now at that time Elliott Abrams was Assistant 

7 Secretary of ARA. 

8 A That is correct. 

9 Q Did you have any discussions with him about 

10 the fact that ARA didn't want LPD transferred over there? 

11 A Oh, sure, yes. 

12 Q What were the reasons he gave you? 

13 A Oh, he agreed with me, for example. Budget 

14 was one reason. By that time our office had a budget of 

15 something like $750,000 — X don't remember — and the 

16 staff. Z was concerned that tha budgetary constraints 

17 being what they are if tha budget was transferred from 

18 the Secretary, which is a very high priority, to a 

19 regional bureau that the office would eventually shrink. 

20 I thought, frankly, we had broken ground. I 

21 thought we had done something that the U. S. Government 

22 should do more of, and that is to talk directly to the 

23 American people, to communicate with the American people, 

24 to produce information. 1 was very upset with, and I 

25 communicated this to my superiors back in '81, '82, '83, 



UNCmSSIFIED 



781 



liNCkASSIFiED 



66 



1 which is why I got the job, that so nany of our officials 

2 would go to th« Congress and ba asked something about 

3 Central America and say sorry, I can't share that with 

4 you because it's classified information. 

5 Nov it's true, and everybody who has a 

6 clearance )cnows, that there are sources and methods to be 

7 protected, but I also knew that with a concerted effort, 

8 with a lot of work, and with some high priority that you 

9 could get the intelligence community to declassify and 

10 you could also go out to the unclassified world and 

11 gather information that would support what we already had 

12 but that was classified. 

13 MR. TUOHEY: The question, though — we're 

14 getting off the question — is did you agree with Abrams 

15 and, if so, why? 

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, I agreed because I thought 

17 the office would be downgraded by virtue of the budget 

18 and the positions that eventually the Bureau would have 

19 to absorb. The ASA Bureau would have to absorb the 

20 budget and the positions and it would atrophy. 

21 BY MR. SMIUANZCH: (Resuming) 

22 Q Getting back to one of the initial topics we 
2 3 discussed — that is, the overall objectives of the 

24 Office of Public Diplomacy — and I hope that this isn't 

25 too much of a loaded question and tell me if it is — was 



UNGtASSIRED 



782 



UNDLASSIFIED 



67 



1 part of your objective during this time frame — as you 

2 know, we're talking about right in the middle of the 

3 severest form of the Boland Amendment, complete cutoff of 

4 funds, was part of your overall objective or job to try 

5 to get Congress to change its mind about that matter and 

6 to start funding? 

7 A It was to support the Administration's 

8 request. 

9 Q To get Congress to fund further in that area? 

10 A Yes. 

11 MR. SMIUANICH: Okay. Off the record. 

12 (A brief recess was taken.) 

13 MR. SMILJANICH: On the record. 

14 BY MR. SMILJANICH: (Resuming) 

15 Q I was going to move on to Venezuela, but let 

16 B« back up for a second. You have described one occasion 

17 in which you happened to be over where North's office was 

18 at the Old Executive Office Building and saw Gomez and, I 

19 believe, Richard Miller, I think you said, there. What 

20 happened in