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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 23 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13764 



United States Government Printing OfTice 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contm Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 23 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. -Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987. -Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnittd States Senate 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 
available. 



Sincerely, 




iLA\\AJu. U Utut^ 



vice Chairman 



III 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON. DC 20515 

(202) 225-7902 



198£ 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Speaker: 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the R eport of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified fop-Yslease to the public. 




United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence/Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Ray nor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 



Senator Mitchell 
Senator Nunn 



Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 



Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 



Senator Cohen 



Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard CuUen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummel! 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, III 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



*The staff member was not with the Select Committee 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



/hen the Report was filed but had, during 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



John W. Nields. Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Special Deputy- 
Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratcliff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority' Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis, 

III 
Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Traylor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
G. R. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courter 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Doman 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 23 



Preface XXI 

Richard, Mark M 1 

Richardson, John. Jr 211 

Robelo, Alfonso 46 1 

Robinette, Glenn A 564 

Rodriguez, Felix I 755 

Roseman, David 811 

Rosenblatt, William 883 

Royer, Larry 995 

Rudd, Glenn A 1 183 

Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney) 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez, Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Volume 3 



Armitage, Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Bamett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF. 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagett. C. Thomas, Jr. 

Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke, George. 

Clarridge, Dewey R. 

Cline, Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier, George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig R 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford, Susan. 
Crowe, Adm. William J. 
Currier, Kevin W 
DCM, Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC". 



Duemling, Robert W 
DIA Major. 
Dietel, J. Edwin. 
Dowling, Father Thomas. 
Dutton, Robert C. 
Earl, Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber, Jacob. 
Feldman. Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor, Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A. Rudd). 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus, Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt, Nelson Bunker. 
IkJe, Fred C. 
Jensen, D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly, John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn, John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., Jr. 
Ledeen, Michael A. 



Lei want, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald, John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



McMahon, John N. 
McMahon, Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese, Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 15 



Volume 16 



Volume 17 



Volume 18 



XVIII 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhome A. 
Mulligan, David R 
Nagy. Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., II. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, Jr. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revell, Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson, John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinette, Glenn A. 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Roseman, David. 



XIX 



Rosenblatt, William. 

Royer, Larry. 

Rudd, Glenn A. 

Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney). 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo, Vincent M. 
Sanchez, Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer, Robert L. 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley, Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H., IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack T. 
Teicher, Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman, Jacqueline. 



Volume 24 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

Tull, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., IIL 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses -or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses -could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits -documentary evidence- were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
I volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



XXIII 



mimim 



SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT 

ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AND 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 

TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

Wednesday, August 19, 1987, 
Washington, D.C. 
Deposition of MARJ^ M. RICHARD, taken on behalf of the 
Select Committees above cited, pursuant to notice, commencing 
at 10:15 a.m. in Room 901 of the Hart Senate Office Building, 
before William D. McAllister, a notary public in and for the 
District of Columbia, when were present: 
For the Senate Select Committee: 
W. THOMAS McGOUGH, JR. 
Associate Counsel 
DAVE FAULKNER 
For the House Select Committee: 
PAMELA NAUGHTON 
Assistant Counsel 




Partially Declassified/Released on /'^^'^IC 
ROBERT W. GENZMAN , under provisions of E.O. 12356 

by N. Menan, National Security Council 



82-732 0-88-2 



UNCLASSIFIED 



CONTENTS 
Examination by counsel for 



Page 



House Select Conunittee (Ms. Naughton) 12, 21, 61, 74, 85, 

89, 94, 113, 117, 119, 122, 144, 153, 156, 162, 170, 179, 191 

Senate Select Conunittee (Mr. McGough) 3, 15, 23, 62, 75, 

86, 90, 102, 115, 118, 120, 133, 147, 155, 159, 166, 173, 189 



Richard Exhibits 



Marked 

48 
53 
67 
81 
102 
104 
132 
140 



UNCLASSIFIFO 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PROCEEDINGS 
Whereupon, 

MARK M. RICHARD was called as a witness and, after 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 

MR. McGOUGH: Let's go on the record. Let the 
reflect that the witness has been sworn. 

Mr. Richard, I'm Tom McGough from the Senate Select 
Committee. Pam Naughton will be here in a moment. Dave 
Faulkner is an investigator with the Senate Select Committee. 
If there are any questions that I ask you that you don't 
understand or would like me to clarity, please just stop me 
and I'll be glad to do that. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q I'd like to start, if I could, by getting a little 
bit of background. But first let me ask you if you'd state 
your full name and current title. 

A Mark M. Richard. I am deputy assistant attorney 
general in the Criminal Division, Department of Justice. 

Q What is your business address and business telephone 
number? 

A Department of Justice, 10th and Constitution 1 
Avenues, N.w., wj^l^j^fjfnft flrt M^fTfVhone number, 633-2333. 



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SIlLASSinED 



507 C Soot. N E 

Vuhmroo. O C 20002 



Q In your current position, what are your respon- 
sibilities? 

A I oversee three components within the Criminal 
Division. Those three are the Internal Security Section, the 
Office of International Affairs, and the Office of Special 
Investigations, which is a component which focuses on 
identifying and initiating legal action against ♦»» Nazis 
living in the United States. 

Q Against — 

A Nazis. 

Q Are you the only deputy, or are there other 
deputies, Mr. Richard? 

A There are a total of four deputies to the assistant 
attorney general. Two of the deputies are career deputies, 
and two are non-career deputies. 

Q Who are the deputies at the present time? 

A John C. Keeney is the senior deputy — he is a career 
daputy; myself; Victoria Toensing — T-0-E-N-S-I-N-G; and Joe 
Whitley. The latter tvro are non-career deputies. 



when did you graduate from law school? 

In 1967. 

And from what law school? 

Brooklyn Law School in Brooklyn, New York. 

I understaf(|Kptl|ywf'0'iD(fv^^) ^^® Department of 



Justice in 1967. 



"mmm 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A That's correct — under the honor graduate program. 
I have been with the department ever since. 

Q In what position did you join the department? 

A As a trial attorney. 

Q In the Criminal Division? 

A That's correct. I was assigned to the Fraud 
Section as a trial attorney and essentially remained with the 
section until 1976, when I was appointed chief of the Fraud 
Section. And then in 1979 I assumed my current position. 

Q Could you describe generally the duties of a trial 
attorney in the Criminal Fraud Division? 

A Well, at the time I had specific cases assigned to 
me in various locations around the country, working alone or 
with assistant U.S. attorneys out of particular U.S. Attorneys 
Offices to develop investigations and prosecutions of various 
white collar offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the 
Fraud Section and to take these cases to completion through 
grand jury and trial. 

Q And then you became chief of that section in 1976, 
is that correct? 

A That's correct. In approximately 1972, following 
several details of varying duration to U.S. Attorneys Offices 
in Washington and in Louisiana, I was made chief of a newly 
created major violators unit within the Fraud Section which 
focused on interna 



"tiWrttmnirifiY^^"- 



# 



'tK 



. O C 20002 



ONCUSSIFIED 



In 1975 I was detailed to the then-deputy attorney 

general-^ o ffige — deputy attorney general, excuse me — Harold 

m 
Tyler, where I served for approximately six months as trra "^ 



staff d i r a gter '-feo a newly created white collar crime committee 
headed by Judge Tyler. 

And then in 1976 I was appointed to the position of 
chief of the Fraud Section. 

Q What was the next professional step? 

A In 1979, the then-assistant attorney general in 
charge of the Criminal Division, Phil Hyman, elevated me to 
ray current position, although I did not at that time neces- 
sarily have the same components under my supervision. 

Q How long have your components remained as they are 
now? How long have they been like that? 

A Assigned to me or as — 

Q No. How long have you been handling those three 
components? 

A I've handled our Office of Special Investigations 
since its creation in 1979. With respect to the Internal 
Security Section, I believe I assumed responsibility for its 
oversight following the departure of Robert Keek, who I 
believe^in 1980 [sicl. I have/^ovorainht responsibilities 



WWtf 



since that time 

As for the Office of International Affairs, I think 
if my memory serves me correct, in 1979 when it was created byi 



UNCUSSIRED 



Mr. Hyman, I assumed responsibility for its oversight and 
remained responsible for their operations until, I believe, 
approximately 1982 when Mr. Jensen, who was then the assistant 
attorney general, assigned responsibility for that office to 
then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roger Olsen. 

At that period, I also was responsible for the 
oversight of our General Litigation Section, primarily 
because at that time we were functioning only, I think, with 
three deputies rather than the current four. During this 
same period I had additional oversight responsibilities for 
our Narcotics Section, our Office of Administration, and I 
think that's about it. 

Q Let's take the three over which — were just dis- 
cussed — Special Investigations, Internal Security, and 
International Affairs. Could you tell me what the jurisdic- 
tion of each of those was? Start with Special Investigations. 

A As I said, they are responsible for identifying and 
initiating legal action against former Nazis who are residing 
in this country illegally. 

Q Is that their only responsibility? 

A Essentially, although they have from time to time 
been tasked by the attorney general or the deputy attorney 
general with related activities, such as focusing on the 
question of U.S. government involvement in hiding Nazis after 
World War II, such^^^ t^lP-Klaug Jar^ie matter, we've, also 



jftfHi'^JfJtilYrirn 



UNCLASSIRED 



been tasked to try to locate and establish whether Joseph 
Mengele is alive. And those types of assignments have come 
from time to time to the OSI operation. 

Q Let's turn to Internal Security. What's its area? 

A Internal Security is responsible for overseeing the 
administration of various internal security statutes, 
including those relating to espionage, export control laws, 
unauthorized disclosures of classified information, and the 
operation of the Classified Information Procedures Act — the 
so-called CIPA. Those are the primary responsibilities of 
our Internal Security Section. 

Q And in International Affairs? 

A International Affairs is a support organization 
that is primarily responsible for securing evidence abroad 
for use by both federal and state prosecutors, arranging for 
the extradition of fugitives to this country and handling the 
extradition requests of treaty partners around the world, 
negotiating treaties for extradition, mutual legal assistance 
as well as prisoner transfers. Essentially, those are the 
primary responsibilities of our Office of International 



Affairs. 

Q As a general matter ,| 
Neutrality Act matters 

A Well, specifically the Internal Security Section. 

Q And how about Antidef iciency Act matters? And the 



::::'tmOTEr 



ONCUSSIFIED 



subset of that may be Boland Amendment sorts of pronunci- 
ations . 

A I'm not sure those particular statutes have been 
assigned, if you will. Certainly the Boland Act would not be 
nominally assigned because of the lack of criminal penalties. 
The Antideficiency Act, if I'm not mistaken, has some 
regulatory penalties, but to my understanding its administra- 
tion has largely involved, if you will, questions about its 
import— largely involved only the Civil Division to deal 
with. But there is a chart, if you will, of specific 
assignments. I would refer you to that chart. 

Q That would be the U.S. Attorneys manual? 

What I'd like to do is run down some names and ask 
you about your first contact with some of these people and 
also the scope of your contact, if any. Some of the people 
you may not have any contact with. The first would be Oliver 
North. In your service with the federal had--what, if any, 
contact, did you have with him? 

A I recall two occasions where I've had contact with 
him directly. One related to an effort to clear some 
proposed anti-terrorist legislation that we at the department 
had been very interested in. And a lot of this was post-Ed 
Wilson inquiry. We had, as a result of our experiences in 
the Wilson matter, come up with a variety of legislative 



proposals which we were 



rr^Tmi*(«ffl^H 



dopted by the 



10 



UNCUSSIFIED 



administration and submitted to Congress for action. 

I would place that contact in early '84, and it 
involved an attempt to resolve a dispute which had emerged 
between us and the CIA with respect to one particular 
proposal. I think it was four or five specific legislative 
proposals that we had prepared, and one of them was causing 
particular concern to the CIA. 

MS. NAUGHTON! Can we get more specific on that? 
Was that the provision to make it a crime to plot to kill 
someone outside the United States? 

MR. RICHARD: That's correct. This arose from our 
experience, like I said, in the Wilson case, we had a series 
of individuals in the United States who were planning to 
assassinate — in that case I think it was Libyan dissidents 
who were located in Europe or other places outside the United 
States. 

And we had particular difficulty asserting jurisdic- 
tion under existing statutes for such activities. In that 
piirticular case, we arguably had some jurisdiction only 
because gratuitously some of the overt acts took place in the 
District of Columbia, and we were able to use D.C. provisions 
for dealing with solicitation? But I assume we regarded that 
as merely gratuitous that it occurred there, and but for that 
fact we would not have had federal jurisdiction over the 
transaction 



m^ hmm 



11 



UNCLASSIHED 



BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q What was Colonel North's role in the process? 
A Well, as I recall, a meeting was called. Stanley 
Sporkin was there and others, but I cannot identify them. 
It's hazy. We were at the Old Executive Office Building. I 
was seated in a fairly small office, and all I recall of this 
was that there was something else going on because people 
were constantly running in and out of the room. And there 
was very little substantive resolution. After about a half 
hour, the meeting seemed to terminate with, "Well, can't you 
try to work it out with the CIA?" 

There was major pressure, if you will, to have some 
resolution because it appearec that there was--I don't know 
whether it was a leak or an authorized statement that came 
out of, I think, the White House announcing the fact that 
there was this, I think, five or six chapter title proposed 
anti-terrorism bill that was about to go up to the Hill. 

Maybe I'm speculating somewhat. Maybe it was in 
connection withT^tate of the union addressee. I don't 
recall. But it was in the January context. 

Q Do you recall any specific input that Colonel might 
have had? 

A No, other than "Can't you work it out?" He really 
to be involved in something else at the moment. 

I cannot, in terms of timing, tell you whether the 




12 



UNCUSSIFIED 



1 proposed resolution that we had agreed on was accomplished 

2 before the meeting or after the meeting. But we had — I 

3 thought — worked out an arrangement whereby we provided the 

4 CIA with a letter regarding the scope and applicability of 

5 this proposed statute. And the thrust of our letter was that 
/K6 we had envisioned that this particular proposal 44»*t would be 

Ijf' 1 placed in Title XVIII in that portion.. > 

8 MR. McGOUGH: Let the record reflect that Robert 

9 Genzman, assistant minority of the House Committee, is in the 

10 room. 

11 MR. RICHARD: If I may continue. 

12 MR. McGOUGH: Sure. 

13 MR. RICHARD: We had indicated that we intended 

14 this particular portion to go in the foreign relations 

15 chapter of Title XVIII, which we at Justice had interpreted 

16 as not applying to authorized government conduct. The CIA 

17 was concerned that, as written, the statute would arguably 

18 apply to authorized CIA activities. 

19 MR. McGOUGH: You said there was a second meeting 

20 with— 

21 MS. NAUGHTON: Can I? 

22 MR. McGOUGH: Sure. 

23 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 

24 COMMITTEE 
"Is BY MS. NAUGHTON: 



UNCIASSIHED 



13 



uNcusno 



Q You said before that Casey had insisted on some 
sort of express-- 

A That's correct. 

Q — disclaimer on this. Was Casey personally, do you 
recall? 

A I certainly didn't deal with him personally on 
this issue. My recollection is that Casey wanted assurances 
that this proposal would not reach authorized conduct of the 
agency. My information would have come from Stan Sporkin. 

After we had devised this letter — and I think even 
sent it over Lowell Jensen's signature--and had occasion to 
discuss it with Mr. Sporkin and received clear indication 
from him that this was acceptable, I subsequently learned 
that DOD had gone to Mr. Casey and had voiced serious 
concerns whether the letter was adequate to protect duly 
authorized government conduct. 

The agency had then taken the position that the 
latter was not acceptable and that they would only go along 
with an express provision in the statute exempting authorized 
intelligence activities. The resolution, as I recall, was 
that Lowell Jensen, who at this time was the associate 
attorney general, felt that that was not acceptable. And 



ultimately that particular provision was dropped from the 



package. ■•. 2 j ^J J ., j 



r provision was 

mm 



That's my recollection of the whole transaction. 



14 



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UNCLASSIREO 



Q You mean the whole provision which would have made 
it illegal to conspire to kill someone — to conspire in the 
United States to kill someone was dropped from the anti- 
terrorist — 

A That particular proposed legislation, yes. It was 
excluded from the package transmitted to Congress. That's my 
recollection. 

Q when Sporkin or anyone from the CIA or DOD, for 
that matter, voiced their opposition to those provisions, did 
they give any specific examples? 

A No. Their concern was that it wouldn't provide 
sufficient assurances to protect their personnel and that 
citing the letter would not provide the comprehensive 
assurances that they were seeking that personnel — duly 
authorized personnel — engaging in activities otherwise 
covered by the statute would not fall within the statute. 

The statute, as I recall, reached not only assassi- 
nations and assaults and other types of physical violence 
directed against individuals abroad. So it wasn't just a 
question of prohibition on murder. It was a prohibition on 
any assault, if I recall correctly! 

Q And was the section concerned Just solely with CIA 
personnel and DOD personnel or their assets as well? 

A I don't recall it coming down to that kind of 
specificity in the discussion. It was just more generalized- 



it was a proniDition oi 

UNCLASSIHED 



15 



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UNcussm 



him concerned about the personnel . 

Q Did your letter, do you recall, refer just to 

personnel--in other words, U.S. government employees — or did 
it cover assets as well? 

A I think it talked about duly authorized conduct. 
I'm not sure that it focused on any particular classes of 
individuals . 

This letter is available — I mean, the materials are 
available. I'm not sure if they were included, but if you 
need it, I'd be glad to send it over to you. 
MS. NAUGHTON: Okay. Thank you. 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q You mentioned in your answer that there was a 
second conversation with Colonel North. 
A Yes. That's correct. 

This related to what I referred to as the^^^^B 
^^H matter. 

Q Let's set that aside for a moment, because I'm 
going to come that. He'll talk about that in a little more 
detail. And I'll just a note to ask you about Colonel 
North's involvement with that. 

Was that a single meeting that you were in? 
A That's correct. 
Q 



Le meeting tnat you were 

UNCLASSIHED 



r 



Any other contact with Colonel North that you-- 

I d©o,i* recallTthose two contacts. I must confess- 



16 



nmssm 



I mean, I have attended so many meetings. I don't recall him 
being in any other meeting, but it is possible. 

Q Let me ask you about John Poindexter. When do you 
first recall meeting Admiral Poindexter? 

A Well, the first meeting--it 's hard to date other 
than saying some time in '81. 

And the context is a group that was established by 
the White House to meet weekly to review outstanding informa- 
tion that had been received by various agencies relating to 
— pcrte«*-i*i possible threats against the security of the 
president. It started apparently in response to information 
indicating that Colonel Khadaffi had sent in or was attempting 
to send in hit squads to assassinate the president. 

And the White House, under Ed Hickey, who was — I 
understood to be some special assistant to the president, 
began to chair weekly meetings attended by a variety of 
agency personnel. Justice had been asked to participate, and 
my understanding was the Director Webster had asked that in 
addition to the FBI sending a representative that the 
Department of Justice also send a representative. In that 
fashion, I was tasked by — I think it was Lowell Jensen, who 
was then the ass_i_stant attorneY_qene£al , to represent the 
department . 

At these meetings, more often than not I went with 
Jeff Harris, who was then a deputy associate attorney general 



17 



UNCLASSIHED 



reporting to the associate attorney general, Rudy Giuliani. 

I apologize for being so long-winded, but it was in 
the context of those meetings that I first met Admiral 
Poindexter. He attended a good number of the meetings. If 
not personally, a representative of the NSC was always 
present at the meetings . 

So I met him in that context. 
Q We're going to bring up in a few minutes a little 
bit about the Wilson matter and whether that was discussed in 
the context of those meetings . 

Outside the context of those meetings did you have 
any contact with Admiral Poindexter? 

A I had, I recall, one meeting with him relating to 
one aspect of the Wilson matter. 

Q This was a one-on-one meeting? 

A No, the senior assistant U.S. attorney responsible 
for this particular aspect, Larry Barcella, was with me. 

Q Can you put any kind of time frame on that? 
^_ A ■?«*. Could we stop the record and discuss? 



UNCIASSIRED 



MR. McGOUGH; Sure. 

[Recess 

MR'. McGOUGH: While we were off the record we were 
discussing the contours of the questions and answers that are 
going to follow in order to avoid any disclosure of classified 
information, and with the witness' permission I will try just 



18 



jlbK 



DNCUSSIflEO 



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^ 



to lead hiro through a short number of questions. 
BY MR- McGOUGH: 

Q We were referring, when we broke, to a meeting with 
Admiral Poindexter at which Mr. Barcella also attended. 
Would it be fair to say that you were at that meeting to 
request Admiral Poindexter 's assistance in an aspect of the 
Wilson investigation that involved the State Department? 

A That's correct. 

Q I think at that point that's all we really needed 
for the record at this point. 

All right, then. Outside the Hie key subgroup and 
the meeting with Admiral Poindexter that we just discussed, 
did you have any other contact with Admiral Poindexter? 

A I don't recall any other meetings with him. 

Q Any phone calls or correspondence with him? 

A I don't recall, except that — I don't recall any, 
except that after Wilson was apprehended there was concern 
because the individual who had used Wilson to--had apparently 
on his ownTWithout authorization from the Department of 
Justice composed a letter purporting to be from the NSC to 
Wilson. And I had been contact, by a representative of the 
NSC making inquiry with respect to this alleged letter. I 
don't recall who initially attempted to reach me, but I think 
I ultimately discussed the issue with an individual by the 
name of Tanter — Ray Tanter. 



iiMniA<;RiFiFn 



19 



ONCLASSIHED 



Q Phonetic— T-A-N-T-E-R7 

A Yes. Something like that. But conceivably--and 
for that matter, either Colonel North or Admiral Poindexter 
may have been trying to initially reach me. 

Q Did you ever discuss — to your recollection — or 
communicate with Admiral Poindexter on any Justice Department 
investigation other than the Wilson matter? 

A No, not that I recall. 

Q Now, I'm going to also go down a number of names 
which will be familiar to you, I'm sure. But my question is 
really whether you had had any personal contact with them, 
whether it be meetings, telephone calls, correspondence of 
any kind, or anyone who represented — strike that — I was going 
to say anyone who represented they spoke on their behalf — some 
of these people who were represented by attorneys — someone 
other than an attorney who was appearing who came to you on 
their behalf or as an agent for them. 

Richard Secord — have you ever had any personal 
contact with him? 

A I have never personally met the man. He obviously 
was a target of what I call the Wilson investigation. 

Q But you never had any personal contact with him? 
Albert Hakim. 

A The same category as General Secord 



Thomas l^lines. 



as General Secord. 

IINClASSinFD 



20 



507 C Sotti. N E 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A Same. 

Q Rafael Quintero. 

A I've never met the man. He of course figured in 
the Wilson inquiry. 

Q Erich Von Marbad. 

A He was a target of the Wilson inquiry. 

Q Again, have you ever met him personally? 

A No. No, I haven't met him. 

Q Michael Ledeen. 

A I have never met Michael Ledeen. 

Q Have you ever communicated with him or exchanged 
correspondence with him, spoken to him on the phone--to the 
best of your recollection? 

A I don't believe so. I forget your admonition with 
respect to his attorney. 

Q Well, maybe — what I wanted to do was — I know you've 
met — you've spoken probably to attorneys who represented some 
of these people. 

A Yes. 

Q Have you spoken to an attorney who represented Mr. 
Ledeen? 

A I don't recall. Let me, if I may, just explain why 
I'm hesitant 

I had occasion within 't"fie~last 18 months to address 
a congressional inquiry regarding Mr. Ledeen which, if I 



21 



WUSSIflED 



4 



recall correctly, was prompted by articles which appeared in 
Italian newspapers concerning his involvement with some--what 
was then viewed as scandals in Italy. 

And some questions were raised in the article 
regarding Mr. Ledeen which prompted *he congressional 
inquiries of the department concerning his security clearance. 
It was something along those lines. I don't recall with great 
precision, but I think I had occasion to prepare a proposed 
response to that congressional inquiry based on some FBI 
reports that were made available to me. 

During the course of that, I have no recollection 
of talking to an attorney, but on the other hand, if you tell 
me who the attorney is that represented Mr. Ledeen, that may 
be helpful. 

Q I don't know the answer. 

A That's okay. I have no specific recollection of 
talking to the attorney, but I did handle an aspect of the 
congressional inquiry at that time. 

Q How about Theodore Shakley? 

MS. NAUGHTON: Excuse me. Could I ask a question? 

MR. McGOUGH: Of course 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q I've seen that correspondence, and what I wanted to 
know was did the attorney general actually participate in any 
of that? Did you discuss this issue with him? 



course. 

UNCIASSIRED 



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a CO.. MC 
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icussm 



A I don't recall discussing it directly with the 
attorney general. I recall the matter being at Ken Cribbs ' 
level. He was then, I think, counsel to the attorney 
general. 

And it was — I was asked to attend a meeting in his 
office, and I believe present in addition to myself w»s Ken 
Cribbs and Judy Hanunerschmidt , who was part of the attorney 
general's staff. I just don't recall her specific title. 

They had apparently — this congressional inquiry — 
and didn't know how to respond to it. And they showed it to 
me, and I -h^ suggested that it be sent to the Criminal 
Division for normal processing, which is what I think 
ultimately happened. 

But I don't recall ever having occasion to discuss 
it directly with the attorney general or anyone else, for 
that matter. 

Q Was Ellen Gersen present for that meeting? 

A It's possible. 

Q Did anyone at that meeting ever refer to any 
meetings they had had with Michael Ledeen on any subject? 

A I don't recall. It was more of a how-do-we-handle 
meeting — how do we respond to the congressional inquiry? It 
was from one of the intelligence committeesj 

Q What I'm curious about is in the normal course how 
this is handled. The Office of Legislative Affairs would 



m 



23 



UNCUSSIFIED 



normally, l imagine, route that to you as a matter of course. 
A That's correct. 

Q How is it that it got to Cribbs ' attention? 
A I have no idea. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Thank you. 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q I believe you were talking about whether you had 
every-day contact with Theodore Shakley. 

A Again, the answer would be no, although he was part 
of the Wilson inquiry. 

Q How about the Max Gomez or Felix Rodriguez names? 
The same person, two possible names. 

A I've heard the name. If I'm not mistaken, I first 
heard it in the context of the Wilson inquiry, but maybe I'm 
wrong . 

Q But you've never had any contact with him? 
A No. 

Q Donald Gregg — have you ever worked with Mr. Gregg 
or had any contact with him? 

A I have no recollection. My only hesitancy is it is 
not unusual to attend meetings, especially at the State 
Oepartment-fa cast of thousands, where you at times send 



around a sign-in sheet. But whether he is at a meeting that 
I'm at--it's conceivable! 

Q Let me turn — let's turn, if we could, in a little 



out wiiei.neL^ ne is ac a i 

'INClASSIRFn 



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■un Nooimta co.. mc. 

«7CSm«. NE 25 

Wuhuiroa. C 2000) 



"}//( 



UNCLASSIFIED 



more detail to the Wilson matter. And let's start, although 
I don't think we'll tarry long at it, at the beginning and 
when you first became aware that the investigation--that 
there was an investigation being conducted and Mr. Wilson was 
involved. 

A Well, I would place it probably in '81, when the 
papers were carrying daily revelations of massive CIA-related 
illegalities, all revolving around Wilson and his associates. 
And it was a tremendous media blitz on the Wilson-^illegal 
activities thay were engaged in by the intelligence community. 

At that time, as I recall, different aspects 
seemingly were of interest to probably six to ten different 
U.S. Attorneys Offices around the country. And we were 
terribly disjointed, no one knowing what was going on. 

And it was apparent to me that the matter was being 
poorly handled, in my judgment. I expressed that observation 
to both Lowell Jensen and Rudy Giuliani, who were then the 
^ssociatetf — someone's got to ride herd on this because the 
ailsgations were — if they were true — obviously very serious 
but also suggesting that there was tremendous overlap in 
investigations, one district targeting the other one's 
witnesses, and the other one targeting the other's subject. 
It was something that cried out for some coordinatior. . There 
were--in addition to the U.S. Attorney problems, you had a 
whole panoply of different investigative agencies all over 



25 



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© 
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o^. 




^^ 




^: 








■usiwomwaco. 


"^c 


>07 C Simr, N E 


25 



UNCLASSIRED 



the place seemingly not coordinating. 

At or about the same time, I think the FBI came to 
the departments ae-'-do something to bring this matter under 
control in terms of setting up a comprehensive investigative 
and prosecutorial effort here. Accusations, of course, were 
flying all over the place with respect to government com- 
plicity, CIA cover-ups, and what have you. 

Ultimately a meeting of all interested agencies and 
U.S. Attorneys Offices was convened. It was held in the 
auditorium of the FBI. I kid you not, just in terms of the 
number of interested parties. 

I mean, it was really — it was just a bizarre 
phenomenon. Because everything that was ever wrong with this 
country was being attributed to Wilson. And everything wws a< 
Wilson connection. And we just didn't know if there was any 
substance or not to it. Obviously, I'm being facetious. 

So there was a need to try to bring it all together 
and coordinate the inquiries. 

What emerged was my assignment to be responsible 
for trying to pull it together and make some sense to the 
investigation and prosecution. And that's how the Wilson 
task force, if you will, came to be created. 

Q Did you select a district or districts that would 
act as the center of gravity or the lead in the investigation? 
Or how did you--how did you bring it all together, I guess is 



26 



mmsim 



_ 1 my question. 

2 A Well, at that time the focus of the allegations, as 

3 you know, were in the District of Columbia. And we had Larry 

4 Barcella, who had, if I'm not mistaken, already brought down 

5 charges against Wilson and others. There were several 

6 ongoing inquiries that were based in D.C., but even those 

7 inquiries--upon analysis, it was clear that the venue for the, 
'^8 kinds of dofonooc that they were looking at was elsewhere. 

9 So we brought in other districts as the information 

10 began emerging. We brought in many districts — Houston, in 

11 particular, Virginia, Colorado. We had resolved one aspect 

12 of this in Philadelphia where we quickly established that 

13 that was not a Wilson matter, if you will. And we began 

14 tapping into other resources from those U.S. Attorneys 

15 Offices. 

16 There came a point in time when the FBI at my request 

17 had, in effect, categorized all the Wilson allegations and 

18 had come up with some 50 or 60 different transactions, if you 

19 will, which in my judgment had to be examined during the 

20 course of this effort. And they ranged from classical 

21 bribery to espionage_^_ illegal exportation of guns, explosives 

22 and the like. 

23 I had — I did, in fact, convene" regular meetings of 

24 both the key prosecutors and the key investigative agencies 

25 where we would — well, let me back up. First I assigned out 



27 



UNCLASSinED 



primary responsibility for all of these transactions to 
different offices and prosecutors, based on what appeared to 
be logical venue at that time as then known. 

And then we would meet regularly — this is primarily 
at the investigative stage--to ensure that each agency and 
each U.S. Attorneys Office involved would know what other 
agencies were doing and planning to do with respect to 
developing their particular r e Bp e naiblc areas. 

We also tapped into some Criminal Division attorneys 
that were utilized to augment the U.S. Attorney complements. 
I trust that's responsive. 

Q There came a time in early 1982, I believe, when the 
EATSCO aspect of the investigation was assigned to the 
Eastern District of Virginia, is that correct? Can you tell 
me what went into that decision and how it came about? 

A Well, I think it was clear that for that particular 
case, the venue was there. I mean, you had a defrauding of-- 
if anything — the Pentagon. And that was a logical place for 



It was seemingly the kind of case that required, in 
my judgment, someone with a white collar crime background. 
It was more a paper case. And we were very fortunate to have, 
in my judgment, someone I consider to be an extremely good, 
accomplished prosecutor in the w^^t^, ficilV^iiinig_aj;£A^ Ted 
Greenberg, who was in Virginia. 



wnmm 



28 



jlb28 



% 



VK 



wm&m 



And looking around for alternative venue, on 
reflection, I'm not sure it had some of the--that were in 
Rhode Island and elsewhere around the country. I'm not sure 
that there was any other T V > ha t I would consider to b« logical 
venue other than in Virginia. 

Q Did Mr. Barcella in the District of Columbia 
express dismay or any problem with that assignment? 

A Well, Larry Barcella wanted to be the head of the 
entire task force. He wanted to be responsible for all 
cases. What Larry didn't appreciate was that he was not 
well-liked in terms of his ability to get along with other 
agencies and other prosecutors. To me, that was a--as being 
able to coordinate this kind of multi-district effort. 

Q Did--in particular regard to the venue on the 
EATSCO investigation, did you discuss that with the people 
who were then your superiors in the Department of Justice? 

A I don't recall specific discussions, but I was in 
close communication with the U.S. Attorneys Office in the 
Diatrict of Columbia. In fact, they were very concerned and 
almost insisted on being present at every meeting that Larry 
had with us because they wanted to be sure that they were 
apprised of what was going on. 

Q This was who? 

A I think at that JtJ|ne.^welJ.,^i^ was-^oe DiGenova l/ 
was the first assistant 



'^ 



29 



UNcussra 



C 



Q This was the U.S. Attorneys Office in Washington? 

A John Hume, I think, was head of the Criminal 
Division. He was very interested in making sure that he knew 
what Larry was doing. 

Q And Larry was in his office. 

A Larry was in his office, yes. 

Q Did you ever — leading up to that decision, did you 
receive any input on that — on the allocation of that case to 
the Eastern District of Virginia from anyone outside the 
Department of Justice? Did anyone— did you solicit anyone's 
opinion or receive anyone's recommendation as to whether that 
case should be assigned to someone else out of the department' 

A I don't recall. Those decisions, quite candidly, 
as to where to assign the cases was, as I recall, largely 
made by me based on my assessment of what we had inTthe 
strength of a particular office, the venue, what else was on 
their plate in terms of assignments, and what have you. 

Q But no one from the NSC or from the White House or 
the Department of Defense or State approached you or communi- 
cated with you regarding that decision. 

A I'm not even sure that they were aware of it. 

Q Or the CIA — I should throw in that. 
A Well, I mean I'm sure they became obviously aware 
of it very quickly as to how we were 
mean, it was no secret what we were doing 



::ill:rii.<!!tin 



30 



jlb30 



r 





9 




10 


^11 






























E^ 




!^ 




S=> - 




ARVomwaco 

C Sc««. N E. 


HC. 

25 



UNCUSSIFIED 



But let me say the--position of Larry. Larry had 
tremendous knowledge, certainly at the outset of this 
particular case — knowledge that was of value. He had the 
historical knowledge that was important. And I tried to 
integrate him to the extent I thought appropriate in other 
cases, including the EATSCO case and including the case in 
Houston and even in the case in New York. 

So tfe-^3 not a suggestion that Larry was cut out of 
the process. He was aware and had, as far as I'm concerned, 
ample opportunities to have input in critical decisions--in 
fact •**»«., if you look at the record, participated in many 
Eastern District grand jury sessions. But in terms of a 
tactical judgment where to put this case, the record is there 

Q Were you aware that at or about that same time — 
that is, when the decision was made that venue lay in the 
Eastern District of Virginia — that Mr. Barcella had been 
approached by Michael Ledeen? Had you ever heard anything in 
that regard? 

A When you say approached, I'm not sure what you mean 

Q That he had had a contact from Michael Ledeen 
regarding the investigation. 

A I don't recall that. Somebody at some point — 
someone told me that Larry Barcella had purchased his house 
from Ledeen, but I don't know when I heard this or from whom. 
I don't recall--Michael Ledeen — I may have known that, but-- 



31 



4'' 



?Ks 



uNcussra 



It doesn't ring a belli 



Let me back up to what Q i tg£nc l«d — it's important. 
The original referral or contact with the individual that 
subsequently assisted in inducing Wilson to leave Libya was 
through the NSC Newspaperman Hersch brought this individual 
to Allen, who was then the National Security advisor. And 
With the representation -of this individual could somehow help 
in obtaining the apprehension of Wilson, that individual was 
subsequently referred over to the department. 

But I don't think Ledeen was involved in that. I 
just don't recall Ledeen being involved in the Wilson matter. 

Q Let's return, if we could, to the Hickey subgroup 
meetings, at which you said Admiral Poindexter was in 
attendance — at some of them, at any rate. 
A That's correct. 

Q The Wilson case came up in the context of those 
meetings on one or more occasions, did they not? 

A That's correct. I would generally raise it only 
wlMn the group was discussing events or upcoming events that 
might trigger a reaction from a foreign power. And it was in 
this context that I would mention a particular event which 
might happen or we anticipated would happen in the near 
future which, as I said, might spark a response from 
foreign power 

Q In the context of those briefings or in the 



I said, mi 



32 



UNCLASSIFIED 



information that you passed on to the rest of the group, did 
Major General Secord's name ever arise? 

A I don't recall his name coming up in the context of 
those meetings. The only thing I could suggest is that there 
was a secretary present in most if not all of the meetings 
that took what I always assumed were minutes. I have never 
seen them. And I would refer you to those minutes. 

Q Whose secretary would that have been? 

A I always assumed it was someone from Mr. Mickey's 
staff. I don't have a name to offer. 

Q Do you know if the minutes were ever transcribed? 

A I don't. 

Q Did you ever see any typed or written minutes of 
the meetings after the meetings that occurred? 

A I don't recall seeing them. It certainly was not 
routine to distribute minutes or anything like that. 

Q Let me return to the question. Actually, we hit it 
right on the head. To your knowledge, was General Secord's 
naae mentioned in the course of the discussion of the Wilson 
case — at any point? 

A I don't recall. The subject of Egypt on occasion 
did come up. But I cannot recall ever specifically mentioning 
General Secord, nor could I focus in on any event that was 



going to occur that would have suggested a 
raised it in the context of this meeting J ■' 1 ^ f J 



FIED 



33 



M7 C SotTT N E 



_ 1 

^ 2 

3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 

DO CO. MC. 

25 



UNcussire 



But let 
not somathinq t>\ 



say, if I may, that it was at this time 
particularly secret about the EATSCO 
investigation and the involvement of General Secord. We 
had — I forget whether we instituted or recommended it — at any 
rate. General Secord had been suspended as a result of this 
investigation. I think there were numerous articles about 
the investigation, its impact on Egypt, and what have you. 

So the fact that we were investigating the general 
was no secret at that time. We had briefed various congres- 
sional committees about the matter. It was just something 
that was Taa r e 'iy public — going on. 

Q Is it fair to say that as the investigation and 
particularly the capture of Mr. Wilson played out that there 
developed some tension between the FBI and some of the other 
agencies or entities involved in the investigation? 

A Well, one of the forces at work, if you will, that 
led to the creation of this effort and coordination was the 
ongoing tension between investigative agencies. And there 
was a certain degree of tension between the FBI and Larry 
Barcella. 

Q What was _the_source ^f_that tension, as best you 
could understand? 

A Well, here you have — depending on how you wish to 
look at a given transaction--you have agencies with a variety 
of overlapping jurisdictions. A given transaction could give 



the source of that tensJ 

UNCLASSIFIED 



34 



UNCLASSinEO 



_ 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

ICO.. HC 



rise to FBI jurisdiction as well ATF, as well as Customs, and 
what have you. 

And I think you did have questions about the--you 
know, what one agency was doing on one aspect and the other 
agency feeling they should be the lead agency and what have 
you. I mean, it's classical jurisdictional squabbles. 

So part of the justification, if you will, i think, 
for needing this coordinated effort was to reduce, if not 
eliminate, this inter- jurisdictional problem. 

Q Let's take about a five-minute recess here. I want 
to clear up some things and stand up. Everybody stretch 
their legs. 

[Recess] 

MR. McGOUGH: Let's go back on the record. 

BY MR. McGOUGH: 

Q Speaking of the Wilson matter for a few more 
minutes — in the course of the investigation, did you ever 
laarn or hear about any interest in the investigation on the 
pajTt of Erich Von Marbad? 

A Well, he was a target of the investigation. 

Q Were you aware of any attempt by Mr. Von Marbad or 
anyone associated with him to i^y^ffjgf th^:^v^^JL^^on 
through governmental channels? 

A I don't know whether it was through Mr. Von 
„- . . .-^ — u-_i. .._ T u.™ . ^»,.„no,.,.{„„ that I think 



35 



_ 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 
xm MMimM CO.. wc 

t C Sorer. N E 2 5 



UNCLASSIFIED 



it was his attorney attempted at the outset to bring to the 
NSC's attention what the attorney characterized as the 
potential dire consequences on our relations with Egypt that 
would flow from this inquiry. 

If I recall correctly, Bob K4iM«, who was I think 
then the general counsel of the NSC, was the one who was 
handling it. The State Department was going to meet or was 
pushing a meeting between the NSC and I think it was counsel 
for Von Marbad. I believe so. And I think, if my memory 
serves me correctly, we went through the ceiling and said no 
meeting — don't meet with them. And if I recall correctly, we 
were successful in cutting it off. 

I must admit that my memory is vague, but I would 
refer you to Jeff Smith, who's on Senator Nunn's staff, who 
at that time was working with us — working with me very 
closely — on the EATSCO matter. He was at the legal advisor's 
office of the State Department. And I think this issue--he 
and I worked together to turn off this effort, if you will. 

Q In the course of your contact with the Wilson 
investigation, did it ever--was there ever brought to your 
attention any attempt to influence the investigation that you 
felt was improper, be it on behalf of Mr. Von Marbad or 
anyone else? 

A Quite'cand'idly, 1 Rave no recollection of anything 
that I would describe as undue influence or attempted 



DNCUSSIFIED 



1 influence. I obviously kept my superiors apprised of 

2 developments. They were interested in different aspects of 

3 the case. But they never, to my recollection, suggested 

4 courses of action or vetoed courses of action that we wanted 

5 to take. 

6 So I guess the answer to your question is no. 

7 Q Let's turn, if we could, to the hostage situation 

8 and various plans — possibilities for rescuing them. Then 

9 again, if we get into an area that you feel is still clas- 

10 sified, let me know and we'll try to finesse it as best we 

11 can. 

12 But prior to the — do you have a recollection that 

13 you wanted to add to the record? 

14 A What would — I'm hesitating — going back to your last 

15 question. One aspect of the Wilson inquiry which we looked 

16 into was the relationship or possible relationship of Wilson 

17 and associates with a senator. And there was concern 

18 expressed because — or at least conveyed to me that I had 

19 opened an investigation and commenced an investigation 

20 without clearing it with my superiors that involved launching 

21 investigation of the senator. 

22 Q Was that investigation ultimately launched? 

23 A Yes. 

24 Q You say concern was expn 

25 expressed concern to you about 



1 



:iNctESinEir 



37 



jlb37 



50 

00 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A It was more of a surprise that I had done it 
without apparently clearing it or advising my superiors of 
that effect. I'd be speculating that it was probably Lowell 
Jensen, but I don't recall. It was what I regarded as a mila 
reprimand for not following procedures, at least as they 
perceived them. 

Q Did he indicate that he had received a reprimand or 
an input from anyone else that sparked his own approach to 
you? 

A There was some surprise being expressed that it was 
done without knowledge of higher officials within the 
department. It was a reprimand for failure to notify rather 
than focusing on substance. At least, I interpreted it that 
way. 

Q We have to ask for the record who the senator was . 
I assume — with the caveat this is a committee document which 
will be classified as committee sensitive and would not be 
released absent a majority vote of the committees. At least 
that aspect — any aspect of it would have to — 

A Well, it involved Senator Thurmond. 

Q An alleged contact with Mr. Wilson. 

A Not — I don't — if I recall correctly, I don't 
believe directly with Kr. Wilson. It was his associate who 
indirectly was trying to purportedly influence the senator ir 
some fashion to accomplish some bidding on Wilson's behalf. 



ONCUSSIRED 



Q All right. Let's turn to hostage rescues, if we 
could. 

Prior to the revelations of the arms deal in 
November of '86, I understand that you were involved in 
several possible efforts to rescue or ransom or secure the 
release of the hostages. Could you itemize the ones in which 
you were involved. And we may ask you about some of the 
others in a minute. 

A Not in any particular order. 




I But at any rate, the 
Southern District was interested in acquiring some assistance 
from Switzerland, and in that fashion I became involved in 
working with the Southern District to accomplish their 
prosecutive objectives. 

So there came a point in time when Andre Serena, 
who was then the assistant legal advisor at the State 
Department, thought that it might be fruitful to explore the 
possibility of — maybe we should go off the record. 

MR. McGOUGH: For the classified stuff? 

MR. RICHARD: Yes. 

MR. McGOUGH: Let's go off. 

[Recess ] 



UNClASSinED 



uNcussm 



MR. McGOUGH: Going back on the record after we 
have had the discussion about classified matters in the 
context of hostage release or rescue plans. 

BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q Mr. Richard, let's refer to one you raised before 
we broke, 



)07 C Siren N E 




I correct so far? 

A That's correct. 

Q And while the Justice Department gave its input on 
the matter, the plan itself never really materialized. 

A To my knowledge, it never did. 

Q Let's turn to another incident of which — which we 
discussed off the record. It involved, did it not, a 
fugitive who was under indictment in the United States who-- 
again, through an intermediary — offered to set up a meeting 
with Iranian official to discuss possible release of the 



hostages. Is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And the fugitive or his intermediary offered to do 



UNCLASSIFIED 



40 



UNCLASSIFIED 



)07 C Sum. N E 



1 that in exchange for some consideration on the outstanding 

2 criminal charges. 

3 A Some unspecified consideration — yes. 

4 Q Did the conversations — or did the discussions of 

5 that proposal include, to the best of your recollection, any 

6 mention or reference to what the Iranian official might want 

7 in exchange for assisting in the release of the hostages? 

8 A No. I don't recall if there was any specifics 

9 discussed, and the notion was to sit down and listen to the 

10 Iranian proposal, as I recall. 

11 Q And again, that never — that meeting never came to 

12 fruition. 

13 A To my knowledge, it never did. 

14 Q Then there was an episode involving a relative of 

15 the fugitive we've just been discussing, of which — a proposal 

16 of which you're general aware, is that correct, but that is 

17 primarily the responsibility of Vicki Toensing in the 

18 dapartment. 

19 A That's correct. 

20 MS. NAUGHTON: Could you— did we get on the record 

21 approximately when this individual was indicted? 

22 MR. McGOUGH: The fugitive we were_di^cu£^s_ing? 

23 MS. NAUGHTON: Yeah. 

24 MR. McGOUGH: Let's put it on the record. 
"25 MR. RICHARD: I believe it was late '70's. 



igitive we were aiscussim 

UNCLASSIFIED 



41 



_ 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

> CO . nc. 



yn c Soth. n e 



umvm 



,1 I 
i 



MS. NAUGHTON: Do you know what the charges where? 

MR. RICHARD: Illegal exportation of munitions and 
other military equipment and violation of, I believe, the 
munition control laws. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Thank you. 

BY MR. McGOUGH; 
Q Now, there was an episode involving a representative 
of the United States Customs Service that you indicated there 
was not anything classified about. Could you describe your 
connection with that? 

A Yes. On one trip to London I had occasion to visit 
with the Customs attache assigned to the embassy. It is n\y 
practice to try to stop by when I am in a foreign capital and 
visit with law enforcement people, time permitting. 

On this occasion, the Customs attache brought to my 
attention the fact that two sources of theirs had indicated 
an ability to effectuate the release of the hostages. The 
representation was that at that time, which I would place 
probably in late '85 or early '86, these individuals had 
information that there was, to begin with, one additional 
American hostage that we were unaware of and that for 
payments of certain monies that they could accomplish the 
release of the hostages. The Customs Service, as represented 



by the attache, was unc 
information. 



mf" 



42 



UNCUSSIRED 



upon my return to the United States I discussed it, 
as I recall, with the State Department and other members of 
the Department of Justice and through exploration quickly 
concluded that we were in all Hrkeiy [ale] dealing with a 
scam. We referred it to the FBI for consideration of 
possible criminal prosecution of these individuals for 
attempting to defraud the United States. 

That's my recollection of that incident. 

Q All right. Let's refer briefly to two other 
episodes or proposals. One — let's call it the New York 
proposal and the other t.he Detroit proposal. 

The New York proposal is an ongoing matter. Is that 
correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q And the Detroit proposal is a recently closed 
matter. Is that correct? The agency that had been brought 
in in regard to the hostages has determined not to pursue it 
further. Is that fair to say? 

A It is my understanding that the matter is closed as 
far as that agency is concerned. That's correct. 

Q All right. Now, to your knowledge, in either the 
New York matter or the Detroit matter was the NSC involved in 



ONCUSSIFIED 



A Not to my knowledge. 

Q Are you aware of any proposal for an operation 



43 



jlb4 3 



' C Scum. N E 



irnmim 



relating to the hostages that involved agents of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration in an operational role? 

A I was not aware of that. My only knowledge is 
limited to what I read in the public media. 

Let me, if I may, just go back and possibly amplify 
or clarify a response I previously made with respect to 
possible involvement in the NSC and these initiatives. 

We have — at least with respect to the matters we 
have been discussing — worked closely with the State Department 
to coordinate these efforts. While I don't recall ever — let 
me go back and stop at this moment and correct an answer I 
already gave. 

And that was with respect to these three issues 
that were the subject of a memorandum that you were aware of. 
There was a meeting at Ambassador Oakley's office concerning 
all three of them. And if I'm not mistaken, at that meeting 
there was a representative of--I have to assume--the NSC. 

Q But you can't recall who that was? 

A No. 

Q Or what if any input that person had? 

A I don't recall that individual mentioning anything. 

Q Do you recall--can you put a time frame on that 
approximately? 

A I would certainly peg it to the date of the 
memorandum, in that--give a take a week either side of the 



iu recaii.--can you put a i 

UNCLASSIFIED 



44 



.«c. I 
25 



UNCLASSIFIED 



date of the memo. 

Q And that's the memorandum that discusses or s^cs 
forth an update on^^^^^^^^^^|ynitiative, the fugiti,^ 
initiative, and the Custvms initiative. Is that correc-7 

A That's correct 

Q Now, I think you were clarifying your answer vhen 
you interrupted yourself --the point of qualifying your 5nswer 
that to your knowledge t.'.e NSC was not involved in any ,£ 
these. 

A Yes. My answer being a negative at that poiri; y,as 
really designed to be liaiited to my contacts with them But 
throughout this process I always assumed, I believe, t.^^ 
Ambassador Oakley or others at the State Department we;^ ^n 
close contact with what I understood to be a White Hout^ 
group that was focusing on hostage-related issues. 

Q In the context of hostage-related issues, die you 
ever have any contact with Oliver North? 

A I don't recall such contact, but during one vf the 
incidents— whether it be the hijacking of the Achille •_,uro 
or the TWA hijacking — I was on duty that evening and I ^ag 
with the general counsel of the CIA a good portion of v^g day 
and night. 

Q Do you knoy ,ii ,it woul^ be Judge Sporkin? 

A Yes 



.""IMlFIEl 



And there were many people in and out over a the 



45 



y)^ C Stren. N E. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



CIA at the time. I don't recall Colonel North being there, 
but it's quite possible. 

Q Were you aware that he was--as they say over at the 
NSC — responsible for the hostage account, that he was 
involved in hostage issues at all? 

A I think I was aware that he was working on this 
account in some capacity. It was my understanding that the 
FBI had some ongoing liaison with him in some intrigue — 
setting. They have a lot of acronyms that I really never 
fully learned. 

I do recall that we in the Criminal Division were 
attempting during this time to participate in that process 
because we thought it was relevant to us to directly be 
present at these various meetings. 

Q While we're on the subject of Colonel North's 
account — or accounts — when, if ever, did you become aware 
that he was also responsible for the Central American issues 
at the NSC? 

A I couldn't pinpoint that I was ever aware that he 
was responsible for any Central American account. I knew 
from media reports that he was heavily involved — or pur- 
portedly heavily involved — in Central American activities. 
But I couldn't pinpoint_ a ny^ specific time_tJT^at I acquired 
this information. 

Q Let's turn, if we could, to Central American 



nt any specific time that 

UNCUSSIHED 



46 



jlb46 



50 




oo 


21 


•«!^ 




s:^ 


22 


^ - 


23 


^2> 


24 


MLLnMM«TMaCO 


. MC. 


107 C Sa«i, N E 


25 



UNCLASSIHED 



issues, in particular investigations of Neutrality Act 
violations or gun-running or efforts — let me put it this 
way--efforts to assist the democratic resistance in Nicaragua 
in particular. 

Did there — was there ever a time when there was an 
effort made to consolidate or coordinate investigations that 
related to supplying the democratic resistance in Nicaragua? 

A Well, when you say to coordinate those kind of 
cases — there came a point in time in late — I think it was 
mid- to late- '86 when there was Increasing congressional 
concerns and pressures, if you will, for information regarding 
pending inquiries. 

I had, for one, been urging the Criminal Division 
to pull it all together, if you will, because the cases of 
interest in this area and the area I would define as one 
relating to Nicaragua and the activities of the contras and 
the activities relating to the Sandinistas — there was a 
fragmentation within the division of responsibility, if you 
will, over these cases. 

Q Would they have generally come under your auspices 
at all? 

A Well, yes and no. I mean, part of the focus of 
many of the inquiries was alleged narcotics violations, for 
example. And those kinds of cases — if that was the principle 
thrust of the case — would not, even though a subsidiary 



47 



jlb47 



9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 

^^C7 21 
CS 22 



Co 



'JNCLASSIHED 



aspect might be a neutrality- type violation. 

Likewise if it's a--you know--we had cases that 
would seemingly span—fecom the area of arms violations 
domestically, which can go to our General Lit Section. You 
had assertions of fraud of some of the humanitarian programs 
that would go to our Fraud Section. And if it was straight 
neutrality, it would come under my bailiwick. So there was a 
seeming to me, anyway, j»i fragmentation of responsibility for 
an area that was of tremendous public interest. 

Q But that--as far as the consolidation, that would 
have been mid- to late-1986 when that began to gain momentum. 

A Well, what happened — Bill Weld began calling 
sessions, if you will, of interested parties, if you will, 
trying to get — as I appreciated it — an overview of what was 
in the hopper, if you will, regarding Central American 
activities . 

Q Was the Hasenfus crash the catalyst for that sort 
of thing? 

A No, I don't believe there was any particular case. 
The catalyst — if you're looking for a catalyst, I think it 
was the increasing congressional pressure for information. We 
had a list of — coming from I think the Foreign Relations 
Committee on the Senate side of 25, 30 individuals and 
information about these individuals that the committee -rs <'t'^<7 



25lraemanding to know their status. There** a lot of cross- 



48 



UNCLASSIHED 



^, 



cutting requests coming in from Congress. 

And again there was the sense that — at least I had 

the sense that nobody really knew what was in the works. 
MR. McGOUGH: Let me show you — let's have an 

exhibit market here as Richard Deposition Exhibit 1. 

[The document referred to was marked for identifica- 
tion as Richard Deposition Exhibit No. 1.) 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q This is a memorandum dated April 13, 1984 from 

Stephen Trott to you and Vicki Toensing with our control 

number J-4782 on it. It refers to the Boland Amendment and 

requests a memorandum on that amendment. 
Do you recall this memorandum? 
A J««h. If I recall correctly, this was triggered by 

one of many congressional requests for appointment of special 

prosecutors. I'm not sure what the specific triggering?©* 

titmX was. 

Q Could it have been the mining of the harbors in — if 

you look at the third paragraph, it says, "Richard Willard 

and Ralph Tarr insist that 1341 means that if zero funds 

were authorized for 'mining activity' etc. ..." 
A I believe you are correct. 
Q There's a — the second paragraph says, "What is the 

effect of its expiration_on_ our groblem7J|_ _Do^you know what 

that refers to? 



49 



1 

2 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A I can only speculate again, but I would assume--and 
it's pure speculation — that it's the question of the applic- 
ability of a ny o f the special prosecutiice bi44 . But I'm just 
speculating. 

Q To your knowledge, was this memorandum — not this 
memorandum but this time frame that surrounded the memoran- 
dum — the first time that you and your group became involved 
with the Boland Amendment and its applicability to efforts in 
support the Nicaraguan resistance? 

A When you say the frame of time, probably so. I 
would venture to say that this is in the ball park of when it 
became an issue. 

Q Did you and your division continue to monitor the 
possible criminal implications of the Boland Amendment as it 
went through its various phases? 

A Quite candidly, when you say did the division 
monitor the Boland Amendment — no, it didn't. As far as I was 
concerned, it was a regulatory provision without criminal 
penalties. So when you say monitor — the compliance aspect, 
if you will — compliance with the thrust of the Boland 
Amendment — quite candidly would not be something that as far 
as I'm concerned would fall routinely inthe^ jurisdiction of 
the Criminal Division. 

Q Although in r984 that theory was being advanced, 
was it not, by Mr. Willard and Mr. Tarr via the Antidef ictency 



d fall routinely in the j 

UNCLASSIFIED 



50 



ONCIASSIFIED 



Act? 

A Oh, yes. By all means. When you have a specific 
issue that arises, obviously we would take a look at it. But 
what I thought you were suggesting was that we in the 
Criminal Division monitor the compliance with a variety of 
congressional requirements. 

Q No, I wasn't referring so much to monitoring the 
compliance as I was to monitoring the evolution of the Boland 
Amendment in its various manifestations to determine--to do 
this sort of exercise periodically. By this exercise, I mean 
that referred to in Exhibit 1. 

A No, that I would probably say if it would be the 
responsibility of anyone, Mary Lawton's office--the Intel- 
ligence Policy Office — to monitor the evolution, if you will, 
of the statute and its potential import. 

This, if I recall correctly, triggered the first — 
or triggered an analysis of the Antidef iciency Act and 
followed on the heels of a meeting which I did attend. But I 
believe it occurred between various assistant AG's in the 
department . 

Q Was there any decision — was there a decision made 
at this time or at a later time as to which of the various 
departments — various sections of the Department of Justice 
would have primary jurisdiQtj.QA. o^et. Qoi4Jld.AQd Antidef iciency 
Act violations? 



imisiflfii 



51 



UNCLASSIHED 



1 A I don't think it was assigned in that fashion--you 

2 know, responsibility. The issue kept coming up in the 

3 context of the applicability or non-applicability of the 

4 special prosecutor's bill or the independent counsel's bill 

5 being triggered by congressional referral, citing, among 

6 other things — I don't think they ever cited the Antidef iciency 

7 Act — but citing from the Boland Amendment. 
Q Let's go, if we could, to an investigation in the 

9 Southern District of Florida that's received a lot of 

10 attention. It's been called a number of things. The 

11 initial — one of the initial informants or sources of inves- 

12 tigation was a fellow by the name of Garcia. It's also 

13 been — I think down there it's referred to as the Costa 

14 matter. You're nodding your head, so I think you know which 

15 investigation I'm referring to. 

16 A Yes. I'm familiar with the one you're referring to. 

17 Q Can you recall what your first contact was or 
awareness of it was of that investigation? 

19 A Well, depending on how you define investigation, 

20 the investigation that focused in Miami is an outgrowth of an 

21 earlier investigation or a different investigation or a 

22 segment of a larger investigation — however you want to 

23 characterize it — involving the^ QlA^fy^^i,y^founder- leader by 
the name of Posey. t||||j| 

There was a Neutrality Act violation investigation 



52 



iMLLOi mrorrma co.. mc. 

)07 C SoiT,. N E 25 

Wuhiiifrao. D C 2000J 



ONCUSSIREO 



52 



begun I think in about '84 or '85. 

Q In what district, do you recall? 

A I don't think--as you will find in many Neutrality 
Act cases, the bureau will open an investigation and not 
necessarily bring it iiranediately to the U.S. attorney's 
attention. So I think the bureau had it focused in Alabama, 
where Posey was headquartered. But I'm not sure that the USA 
had been apprised of it. But the bureau, in Neutrality Act 
violations, works closely with our Internal Security Section. 
So I can't say that the USA at this point was necessarily an 
integral part of the inquiry. 

But in any event, that was ongoing. I think it was 
triggered or it occurred about the same time a helicopter 
involving Posey's operation--it was the downing of some 
plane — excuse me — or craft and the killing of a couple of men 
who were traced back to being members of the CMA, if I recall 
correctly. 

Q Here you aware of that investigation contempor- 
anoous? 

A Was I aware that there was such an investigation? 
Yes. I was aware that it was ongoing. 

Now, how does that tie into the investigation we 
are here talking about — this part of it? In March of '86 I 
received a memo--not a memo--what I call a buck tag. 

MR. McGOUGH: What we're showing — we've got — I'm 



3ucn an investigation i" 

WCLASSinED 



53 



UNcussra 



showing the unclassified version of it, which does not 
include--or I'm having marked as a deposition the unclassified 
version of it, which will not include the attachment to it. 
It consists — the unclassified version consists of four pages 
which had been used as a — were introduced as an exhibit 
during Mr. Meese's testimony. 

[The document referred to was marked for identifi- 
cation as Richard Deposition Exhibit No. 2.] 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q And we have available for you the classified 
portion, which is essentially all of the memorandum from Mr. 

Revel to the deputy attorney general, if you would care to 

i 
review that. But again, because of the constraints what 

we'll do is mark this as a deposition exhibit and refer to it 

unless you feel it's necessary — if you want to review the FBI 

memorandum . 

Looking at Deposition Exhibit 2, is this the — 

particularly page two — is that the buck slip to which you 

wece referring a moment ago? 

A That's correct. 

Q Can you tell me, to the best of your recollection, 
when you received that buck slip? Was that the first 
indication you had that this investigation had surfaced in 
the U.S. Attorneys Office in Miami? 

A I believe so. The first contact that I recall with 



ONCIASSIFIED 



54 



DNCUJJIflEO 



the Southern District of Florida was triggered by this, 
although I cannot say categorically that the FBI had not been 
in touch with them on earlier occasions with respect to the 
CMA aspect. 

Q The memo to you is dated March 24 and reads, I 
believe, "Please get on top of this. DLJ" — which would be a 
reference to Lowell Jensen — is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q --"is giving a heads up to the NSC. He would like 
us to watch over it." Am I right so far? 

A That's right. 

Q "Call Kellner, find out what is up, and advise him 
that decision should be run by you." Is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q All right. Now, let's — first of all, let me back 
up a moment . 

Do you recall seeing a letter from Garcia's wife, 
either to the judge involved in the case or to the Department 
of- Justice essentially raising allegations about the cir- 
cumstances of his prosecution? 

A I don't recall seeing it, but I recall hearing 
about it. I hate to assume for Mr_-_ Kellner ,^bi^t_I_cgf^ay 
categorically I haven't seen it. 

Q Is it possible that you had a discussion of that 
letter with Mr. Kellner prior to March 24 of 1986, when yoi. 



55 



ONCUSSIFIED 



saw the buck slip? 

A Is it possible? Yes, but I assume he won't recall 
it. 

Q Would you have initiated that conversation — for 
that conversation regarding a letter? 

A On what basis would I initiate it? 

Q I have no-- 

A When you say initiated, you're assuming I had the 
letter. I don't recall doing that. 

Q Do you recall initiating any conversation with Mr. 
Kellner prior to receiving the buck slip as part of Exhibit 2 
regarding this investigation? 

A My answer is no, but you have to appreciate I can 
be talking to Leon Kellner with great frequency over a 
variety of issues and a variety of times. So I can't 
categorically respond. I have no recollection of talking to 
him about this matter prior to this buck tag. 

Q It says that Mr. Jensen is giving a heads up to the 
NSC' What did you understand that to mean? 

A That he was alerting them — I mean, it makes sense 
when you read the content of the classified attachment why 
there would be, in my judgment, a need to alert the NSC. In 
fact, I think a failure to alert the NSC, in my judgment, 
would be foolhardy by the department , aivei^ the_ cpn^ent^ oj^ 
the classified document. I mean, I — I 



56 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q Without going into the details of the investigation 
in the classified document, can you be a little more specific 
about what it was about this investigation that you felt 
merited a heads up to the NSC? 

A Well, you're talking about a plot to assassinate a 
U.S. ambassador. You're talking about a plot to attack U.S. 
facilities and other embassy quarters of friendly and 
unfriendly nations. I mean, this is stuff of potential 
significance to not only the security of individuals and the 
United States but in terms of tremendous foreign relations 
impact, and since the FBI had alerted previously the State 
Department, INS, Secret Service, and the whole — the other 
interested agencies, it's natural that somebody in this 
context better tell the NSC. Because I think it is something 
that is particularly appropriate for the NSC to know about, 
assuming you give any credence to the allegations. 

Q In cases like this with the same sorts of implica- 
tions, was it — were other briefings given to the NSC? Can 
you recall any other case where a briefing was given> to the 
NSC? 

A Two weeks ago I briefed the NSC on a case involving 
an ally. We were about to take enforcement actions that would 
have tremendous ramifications on our foreign affairs. And 
there was a full-blown mee 
do you want to go back? 



:::'::r»ll;Miii 



57 



1 Q But I mean, there were other occasions. 

2 A What you're talking about is a law enforcement — 

3 it's activity which by its very nature has potential sig- 

4 nificant impact on the — obvious impact — on the security of 

5 this country and how our foreign relations appears. To say 

6 that somebody should not alert the NSC, I think, is foolish. 

7 Who should be the one alerting them — that is an 

8 issue I can't address. 

9 Q Well, that's really the next question I wanted you 

10 to address, and that is why would the deputy attorney general 

11 be the one who would go over to the NSC to alert them? I 

12 mean, if it's a matter of just briefing them on a matter 

13 that's of interest to them, would that not be normally done 

14 at your level or by the FBI or someone like that? 

15 A No. By my level? No. I don't routinely brief the 

16 NSC. I believe that I would request — I mean, it is atypical 

17 for me to be in touch with the NSC except in the most unusual 

18 circumstances. 

19 The FBI — I can't speak for them in terms of routine 

20 briefings and relationships with the NSC. Moreover, I can't 

21 address what Is routine contact between the attorney general 

22 or the associate. 

23 But if I may, let me just say that sitting where I 

24 sit, you have to appreciate, I think, that we are moving into 

25 an area of international law enforcement. Law enforcement is 



TuhmcuM. C 20002 



58 



jlbSS 



iK 



M^9M»omiNocc 



UNCUSSIHED 



1 more and more impacting — directly and indirectly--on other 

2 vital interests of this country in the international arena. 

3 It's a function of a variety of factors, including the fact 

4 that crime has become international. Whether it's narcotics 

5 activities, terrorism, export controls, we are moving into 

6 the international arena. 

7 Moreover, just acquiring information abroad requires 
more and more contact with foreign countries and what have 

9 you. And our statutes that Congress is passing ■C'iuin dealing 

10 with these issues are giving us more and more extra ter- 

11 ritorial jurisdiction, so that we're constantly running into 

12 this issue of dealing — or impacting on foreign affairs. 

13 So quite candidly, this issue of coordinating law 

14 enforcement with other vital equities of the government is 

15 one that we'd better start facing up to. 

16 I'm sorry if it sounds like I'm pontificating, but 

17 I don't know — to just set it in context, I remember going back 

18 wli«n I was testifying in the Billy Carter matter and one of 

19 th« senators asked me how — why I felt it was important that 

20 the attorney general notify the NSC of information we had 

21 learned, and I asked the senator was he suggesting at that 

22 time that the Department of Justice should not advise the 

23 White House that the Libyan government had designed a plot to 

24 infiltrate the White House? We should not advise the White 

25 House of that fact? And I said in my judgment, that's 



UNCUSSIFIED 



1 irresponsible. 

2 And I continue to adhere to that. You must set up 

3 some realistic system of making sure that there is some 

4 coordination. 

5 Q Well, let me--was there — did you feel it was 

6 unusual for Mr. Jensen to be the one to make that contact? 

7 A I don't know, when you say unusual — I have long 

8 felt that it's important for the attorney general to be — play 

9 a role in NSC activities. I felt it's important to have what 

10 I would regard as the Justice Department oversight into that 

11 process. 

12 Who should accomplish that? At what level within 

13 the department? I don't know. I do not advocate that it 

14 come down to my level. I think at my operational level — or 

15 more operational level — you should try to minimize White 

16 House contacts. 

17 Q Are you aware of any other instances where the 

18 d^^ty attorney general briefed the NSC on a pending inves- 

19 tigation? By the deputy attorney general, it doesn't 

20 necessarily mean Mr. Jensen. I mean anyone serving at that 

21 point as deputy attorney general. 

22 A I am not aware of any, but I would have to assume 

23 that the White House contacts at the NSC level on spy cases, 

24 whether it be the Pollard case, the Walker case--I would have 

25 to assume that there is dialogue because of the nature of the 



60 



'^ ^^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



issues we're talking about. 

Now, I can't attest to them, but I know, for 
example, the NSC will be tasking intelligence agencies to 
find out what is the damage being accomplished by certain 
espionage cases that we are working. And in that regard, 
there is a flow of information, if you will, for what I 
regard as well-founded, legitimate purposes. 

Who's accomplishing it? 1 can't say. 

Q The buck slip refers to — the second sentence says, 
"He would like you to watch over it." What did you understand! 
your assignment was at that point? 

A Again, in reference to the nature of the allega- 
tions, to stay on top of it, to be familiar with the ongoing 
issues as they emerged, and to ensure that the case doesn't 
languish, that there is — 

Q Does not languish. 

A That it doesn't languish. That it moves ahead to 
r«solution. 

Now, I've regarded this, based upon the context, 
notwithstanding the way the bureau may have c a ptur ed it, that 
the first of the threats, if you will, stemmed from the 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hrelationship where we 
information that that was a possibility^ coupled with the 



targets identified. To me, th 



mimm 



61 



_ 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 
>eo.. MC 



liNCUSSIflEO 



61 



Q Interest by? 

A I assumed upstairs. You know, the gravamen of the 
NSC interest, the gravamen of the deputy's interest, the 
gravamen of the FBI interest. This is an ongoing case, and 
all of a sudden the FBI is coming to the deputy. Hey look. 
Look what's going on. And you read the memo. Why is the FBI 
coming there but for these points? 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 

BY MS- NAUGHTON: 

Q Was it your understanding that this case came to 
the attention of Mr. Jensen through the FBI or through the 
NSC? 

A No, no. I assumed it was the FBI to Jensen. 

Q Do you have any basis for that assumption? 

A I'm assuming that this was all being triggered by 
the FBI to Jensen, by this memo that is attached. It's an 
assumption based on the flow of paper, but maybe there's 
another way. 

Q You first received the memo as an attachment to the 
buck slips, correct? 

A That's right. 

Q So you actually received them from Mr. Trott, is 



that right? 

A That's right. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



62 



jlb62 



^S» 2( 






^ 
^ 



DC 2000J 



ICIASSIREO 



Q So when you received it, you did not know whether 
or not Mr. Jensen had even seen it. 

A Oh, I assumed so because the buck tag referred to 
the fact that DLJ--Jensen — had already given the NSC a heads 
up. 

I assumed that because the FBI buck tag--the FBI 
memo was addressed to Jensen, if I'm not mistaken, that this 
was triggered as a result of the FBI memo to Jensen, whether 
there was a meeting or whether it was Just Jensen reading 
this memo and saying, "Here's what has to be done,' I can't 
tell you. 

Q Okay. So you don't know if it was a function of 
Jensen knowing about the case and asking the FBI to do a memo 
or it's a function of the FBI bringing the case to his 
attention. 

A I have no idea. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 

BY MR. McGOUGH: 

Q The last line — the last two lines essentially ask 
you to advise Kellner that decisions should be run by you. 
what decisions did you understand that to mean? 

A Decisions to prosecute or not prosecute. 

Q The ultimate decision was then to indict or not to 
indict. What about interim steps? That is, whether to issue 



63 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

HC. 

25 



ONCUSSIflEO 



grand jury subpoenas, whether to call certain witnesses, 
whether to interview certain people. Did you consider those 
the types of decisions? 

A I really didn't--it's not something that I would 
normally do, nor did I do it here — for me to run the investi- 
gation. That's~I interpreted as keeping apprised of what 
was going on, apprised of what they were doing, the way they 
were going. And beyond that--the manual requires, at least 
in a neutrality area, close coordination, but that's — I'm not 
sure that I would have ever thought of— if you would take 
this literally — I would have to run the investigation myself. 
And certainly that's not what happened. That's not what I 
considered I was being asked to do. 

Q Would you assume that decisions meant the decision 
to indict or not to indict? 

A Well, certainly that. Certainly any major--you 
know, if you're going to immunize the critical subject I 
would want to know about it or something like that. If 
you're going to take an enormous step, I'd want to know about 
it. 

Q Why— what was it about this case that triggered 
that kind of supervision? 

A Well, again, in the context— ^'s nSffhis case- 
it's the context of the information in the memo. 

Q Let me back up for a minute. I understand why- 




64 



UNCLASSIFIED 



you've indicated why you were watching over and being advised 
about what was going on. 

But there's an addition later here, and that is 
you're being asked now to say--to approve or disapprove 
decisions made in Miami, specifically a decision whether or 
not to indict. What was it about this case that made it 
important that main Justice clear the decision to indict or 
not indict? 

A I can't answer. You're going to have to ask -Steve 
Trott. I mean, you know, what was in his mind? I mean, I 
can't tell you what was in his mind. I can tell you how I 
interpreted it, and it's just--I'm not sure whether it was 
triggered by--I'm not sure of the timing. 

And I know we had a problem with Kellner wanting to 
go with an open indictment at a point in time when we didn't 
want him to go. We wanted to keep a particular indictment 
sealed because — 

Q Was this in this case or in another matter? 

A No, but it — well, it related to our dealings with 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Now, whether that influenced Steve's decision-- 
Steve Trott's decision--! don't know. I'm not even sure 
whether this is a Steve Trott decision or a Jensen decision. 

But you're asking me to speculate whether I was 
concerned that Kellner might go off on his own and do 



Vuhuifion. C 



65 



Jlb65 



— 






2 




3 




4 




5 




6 




7 




8 




9 




10 




u 




12 




13 




14 




15 




16 


^ 


17 


1 


18 

igi 

20 
21 
22' 
23 
24 



UNCLASSIFIED 



something that would impact adversely ^^^^^^^^Hand 
elsewhere--! don't know. 

Q Did you consider it unusual that you were being 
instructed to clear decisions like indict or not indict? 

A Yeah. It was unusual. It was unusual. Again, I 
just hark back to the unusual--what I regarded as the 
sensitivity of--the allegations regarding threats to indi- 
viduals at enemy installations. 

Q Did you consider the Neutrality Act gun-running 
allegations to be as sensitive as the — 

A No. 

Q Did you consider those to be at all sensitive? 

A Not particularly. 

Q If you look at the first page of the exhibit as a 
buck slip--what appears to be a buck slip from you to some-- 
excuse me — tell me what it is. That's probably — 

A It's a handwritten v a c baJL of where I am with 
respect to a particular matter. It's Just my own reminder. 
There are so many things that cross ray desk at any given 
time. It just keeps me apprised of what I've done on a 
particular matter. 

Q It indicates that on March 26 you spoke to Kellner 
and that the AUSA not back yet from New Orleans . 

A Not back from New Orleans. Right. 

Q And you understood at that point that Mr. Feldjnan 



82-732 0-88-4 



UNCIASSIHED 



_ 1 had gone to New Orleans to do an interview. Is that correct 

2 A That's correct. 

3 Q Can you recall anything else about your conversation 

4 with Mr. Kellner on March 26? 

5 A Well, when I finally reached him, which I guess was 

6 the 26th, he gave me a whole different perspective of the 

7 case — one that was different and reflected in the FBI memo. 

8 He indicated, as I recall, that the entire story was out and 

9 the wire services had it, and basically what you had was 

10 something being manipulated by a couple of reporters who were 

11 dealing with — in this case — Garcia in an attempt to mitigate 

12 an upcoming sentence that would be imposed on Garcia for his 

13 involvement in some gun charges of his own. 

14 He expressed skepticism and indicated that there 

15 were assertions of all sorts of government misuse — well, CIA 

16 involvement in this transaction, government illegalities, and 

17 what have you. 

18 Q Let me interrupt. Did you take any notes during 

19 that conversation? 

20 A I'm not sure. I have scratch notes of conversa- 

21 tions. I'm not sure that they're necessarily dated with that 

22 date. 

?3 MR. McGOUGH: Why don't we^put those _with — your 

24 

CO.. MC 

25 



notes in as Exhibit 3. 



Am I on the right track? Is that in fact your 



67 



_ 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

>CO.. MC 



UNCUSSIFIED 



handwriting? It's a good start, because the way they come 

over from — 

MR. RICHARD: Can I take the Fifth on that? 

MR. McGOUGH: You're going to have to. 

MR. RICHARD: That's my scribble. 

MR. McGOUGH: Now, it's two pages. Our control 

number is J-5641 and J-5642, which we'll mark collectively as 

Exhibit 3. 

[The document referred to was marked for identifi- 
cation as Richard Deposition Exhibit No. 3.] 
MR. RICHARD: This is not the earliest — there 

should be an earlier page. This is--that'3 got to be the end 

of one of the later conversations. 

MR. McGOUGH: Can you look at the second page? I'm 

not sure — I'm not positive that the two are linked in time. 
MR. RICHARD: There's a third page which is — 
MR. McGOUGH: So a third page is missing. All 

right, let's back up for a second here. 

I think we're going to be on this topic for a 

little while more. This might be a good time to break for a 

half an hour or so for lunch before we turn to the notes. 

Because once we get into these, we're going to be at it a 

while, I think. Before XLlunaiag j.rw rhi.^m^h£ be a good 

I will attempt to find — I will just go to this 



68 



jlb68 



£3 



UNCUSSIHED 



1 portion of the file and attempt to find — it didn't turn up on 

2 our — read off the record. 

3 [Recess] 

4 BY MR. McGOUGH: 

5 Q Why don't we go on the record and indicate that 

6 you've looked at Deposition Exhibit 3, which is two pages of 

7 handwritten notes . 

8 I believe you indicated that you thought there was 

9 another page that's not here. I'd appreciate it if you'd 

10 tell us what you believe what was on that first page and then 

11 also go on to tell us what the two pages we do have are. 

12 A As I recall, the first conversation I had with USA 

13 Kellner, he related to me the fact that the AP had a story 

14 based on Garcia 's statement largely to the effect that Garcia 

15 had been set up to keep him from revealing the proposed 

16 action that had been reflected in the FBI memo. And Kellner 

17 described other portions of the story. He expressed skep- 

18 tlcism about Garcia 's credibility and the validity of the 

19 representations, if you will. 

20 We proceeded to discuss what he was doing. I think 

21 at that point he had the assistant travelling to New Orleans 
-22 to interview Terrell. There was a conversation — I'm not sure 

23 whether it was just devoted to the results of the New Orleans 

24 visit or whether it was combined with the results of the 

25 Costa Rican visit by the assistant and the FBI agent--but 



jlb69 






ONCLASSIFIED 



«f 



6 

7 
8 

11 
12 

m 

14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 



-^^ 



: lam. N E 25 



during that conversation he relayed to me the fact that 
Terrell had essentially — that his information was hearsay, 
that the individuals in Costa Rica were, again, walking away 
from the story. 

And Js- h e ar Leon's emphasis was that that was being 
subject to some manipulation by Garcia to secure some lenient 
treatment by the court and that it was being hyped up by a 
couple of reporters who were out to make a lot of hay from 
these allegations. In fact, I think he suggested that they 
might — they may have even co nopir ed the allegations or put 
the seeds in Garcia 's mind, if you will. 

The information reflected on the material you have 
essentially corresponds with'^Leon Kellner'f' relaying it to me. 
Q But not in a single telephone conversation? 
A No. The notes that I have consist, I believe, of 
about three pages, and I am not sure — well, I am sure that 
they represent at least two conversations. Whether these two 
pages you have is one conversation — I suspect it is, because 
the last conversation I had with him on the telephone, was his 
preliminary conclusion, which was the fact that he had 
thought he had at best a weak gun case. 

And his — the gravamen or the thrust of the conver- 
sation was his lamenting the fact that it would be a case 



^.r 



that he would not normally bring. And he was concerned 



because he would anticipate ±t being vilified by the media 



70 



^ 



jlb70 



iJNCLASSIHED 



£3 



^ - 



1 for not bringing a case. 

2 And we agreed that he would — when the investigation 

3 was concluded — that he would send up a prosecutive recommen- 

4 dation which we would review and either agree with or 

5 disagree with but that he was very much concerned about how 

6 the media would treat him if he failed to find a prosecutable 

7 case. 
Q Can you put a time frame on that latter conversa- 

9 tion? When is it that you're having this conversation with 

10 him about the prosecutable case? 

11 A I can only — I really — logic would suggest that it's 

12 some time between June and October. 

13 Q Was it after you had received — or main Justice had 

14 received a memorandiam over Mr. Feldman's name laying out the 

15 circumstance of the case? 

16 A I can't say with any certainty. It may have been 

17 prior to that, because there came a point that he had an 
interim memo which he was going to send up — which he did. 

19 And there was additional investigation that was required that 

20 he intended to undertake. 

21 And he was lamenting the fact that the case did not 
look promising as a prosecutive vehicle, and the fact that he 
anticipated a lot of criticism from the media — from Congress- 
being directed at him for what appeared to be--what prosecu- 
tive judgment he would be rendering. And he was very 



71 



jlb71 







^-•' 2 3 


24 


>0,CS„^.NE 25 



INCLASSIFIED 



concerned about it. 

Q when, if you can recall, did you first become aware 
that there were allegations being made by some of the 
witnesses who had been interviewed of government involvement, 
be it CIA or NSC involvement? I note on one of your notes 
you have Hull CIA. 

A I think this — I think he--if I'm not mistaken, 
right from the start there were these allegations. I think 
Kellner had indicated that this was part and parcel of what 
the media was asserting. 

Q When you say that this was part and parcel, does 
that include the NSC-Oliver North allegations as well? 

A I'm not sure whether they were specific in that 
regard. There was certainly wrong-doing by government 
officials. Whether it was NSC specifically — it was certainly 
CIA involvement, because CIA, as I recall, right from the 
start was certainly involved in this plot, if you will. 
I can't answer your question precisely. 

Q Do you recall any discussion or effort by main 
Justice to postpone a sentencing for Mr. Garcia? 

A By main Justice-- 

Q Let me just give you a little bit of background. 
There was a pleading filed in March of 1986 by — over Mr. 
Feldman's signature to seek a postponement of an impending 
sentencing proceeding for Mr. Garcia. And one of the 



72 



UNCUSSIFIED 



allegations in that is that the day before, a call had come 
in from main Justice asking for a postponement to explore 
further apparently the possibility that Mr. Garcia might 
cooperate. 

A It may very well have come from me. I don't recall 
it. I do recall that the sentencing was postponed. What I 
thought — I don't recall specifically asking for the postpone- 
ment, but I certainly — we wanted to explore Garcia 's coopera- 
tion. He was the source of this information. So-- 

Q Is it possible — go on, I'm sorry. 

A — I mean, I don't recall specifically asking, 
"Let's postpone the sentencing," but it would certainly--it 
would be a tactical move that I can see myself suggesting. 

Q Would you have suggested it prior to March 26th or 
when you saw that buck slip? 

A I would have to say no, only because I don't recall 
knowing about this until I got the material. And I called 
Ksllner, so I would have to assume no. 

But when was that, if I may ask? You said that 
there was a pleading filed. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Mid-March. 

MR. McGOUGH: Mid-March. March 19th, March 15th-- 
something like that. 

MR. RICHARD: I knew that there" was a postponement 
of this. Then I have to assume that Kellner told me as part 



n: nia-narcn. piarcn i»t 

UNcussra 



. D C 10002 



73 



KNMsra 



1 of the briefing. He was briefing me. He was giving me the 

2 update of what was going on. So he was bringing me into the 

3 picture; I wasn't bringing him into the picture. 

4 The fact that a postponement of sentencing occurred 

5 so as to first explore a proffer of cooperation would be to 

6 me a logical step to take. I don't--just the dates suggest 

7 that I didn't do it. But it would be a logical step. If 

8 someone said, "Should we?", I would say, "By all means." 

9 BY MR. McGOUGH: 

10 Q Was there anyone else in your section or under your 

11 supervision involved in this matter? 

12 A Well, the Internal Security Section was getting 

13 reports all the time from the FBI and what have you. Whether 

14 they were in touch directly with Kellner, I can't say. I'm 

15 sure — I mean, if I recall correctly, the memo reflects 

16 somewhat daily contact with the Internal Security Section by 

17 the FBI on the matter. They were apprised of what was going 

18 on. 

19 Q Did you delegate responsibility for the case to 

20 anyone in specific? 

21 A When you say delegate — Internal Security was 

22 responsible for following the case. It's the Neutrality Act. 

23 They worked historical_lj^\^ry ^l^se^ wLth_the FBI. It's a 

24 close relationship. 
joTCVm.. Nt 25 Did I delegate specifically anything beyond that? 

Wiriwroa. C !O0D2 



74 



UNCLASSIHED 



1 No. 

2 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 

3 COMMITTEE 

4 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

5 Q Would it have been unusual for anyone in the 

6 Internal Security Section to call the U.S. attorney as 

7 opposed to calling the assistant working on the case? 

8 A To call the U.S. attorney? 

9 Q Yes. In other words, to call Mr. Kellner as' 

10 opposed to Mr. Feldman. 

11 A In answer to your question, no, I don't think it 

12 would be unusual for, say, someone in the management staff to 

13 call the U.S. attorney. I'm not aware that anybody did make 

14 such a call. But in answer to your question, it wouldn't be 

15 unusual for someone in a senior position to call directly the 

16 U.S. attorney. 

17 Q Well, as I recall, I think Mr. Marum — is that his 

18 name? 

19 A Tom Manim. 

20 ' Q Tom Marum? 

21 A He's the deputy. 

22 Q He was sort of coordinating this. 

23 A He does most of the neutralitx work at the Internal 

24 Security Section 

25 Q Did he tell you that he had spoken to either Leon 



lost of the neutrality woi 

UNCIASSIHID 



75 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Kellner or Jeff Feldman? 

A NO. I don't recall him ever mentioning any 

contact. 

Backing up to complete the record, there was a 
meeting later in October in which Kellner was in Washington. 
I-. not sure whether Marum was there, but the FBI was there, 
internal Security, maybe Tom Marum was there-among other 
things, to discuss the status of a case. 

Again, I just don't have any recollection of this 
before the buck tag date. But I-like I say, if there's a 
question of a cooperating witness-should we postpone the 
sentencing until we have interviewed the witness, obviously 

I'd say do it. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 
BY MR. MCGOUGH: 
Q Let's look at the notes, if you could. I know 
it'll be a bit time-consuming, but given your handwriting, it 
would be helpful if you could just read the notes to us so 
that we have a clean record of what they say. 

You're referring to the second page, now, of the 
exhibit. DO you think they're reversed in time? 

A I do believe so. Well, not necessarily reversed in 

■"r".;:;;.:;T.BOTE..„.. 



76 



iiNMra 



page of what has been marked as Exhibit 3. 
A "Court probation. 
"Garcia 's wife. 

"Allan Sam — lunatic — but used him to make" — well, 
again, these are incomplete sentences, and I apologize for it 

"12/85 — conviction on gun charge. 

"public defender tells AUSA that in February '85 
Miami Garcia, Carr, Thomas, Hall or Hull, Jones, Carter, 
Carbo — meeting in Miami. 

"Discussed blowing up three embassies, killing 
Tambs, and gun-running. 

Okay — "We corroborate" — I don't know — "with their 
people in Miami. 

"In 3/85 — Thompson, Carr — weapons to Costa Rica for 
above operation. Carr and Thompson and two others arrested 
in Costa Rica. 

"1/7/86 — Garcia polygraphed. 

"1/14 — inconclusive on assassination — deceptive on 
Posay" — this again is Kellner relaying to me. 

"January '86 — FBI asked that Carr and Thompson be 
interviewed. Carr and Thompson deny participation. Admit, 
however, guns. Heard of plot in jail. 

"Garcia, Jose Cotin — 1/16/86 — FBI interviews. 
Implicated in Zeal murder (provided murder weapon) . Refers 
FBI to Terrell 



lINnUSSIFlEO 



77 



Kmsim 



"FBI interviews Terrell. Terrell confirms Garcia 's 
story but" — well--"Terrell says it's all hearsay. 'Heard it 
around.' Terrell say story. 

"Frank Castro representing Ochoa at meeting, who 
says to group would pay $1 million to kill Tambs . Believes 
that Tarns and CIA had killed Corea. Corea killed at CIA 
request. 

"Terrell saying that CIA reps present at the 
meeting" — representatives of the CIA were present at the 
meeting. "Killing of Tambs, three embassies — U.S. /Honduras 
and Costa Rica and Russian embassy and Costa Rica — making it 
all look like Sandinistas. Castro says Ochoa doesn't care 
who gets credit. 

"Garcia — tentatively" — I assume scheduled-- "tenta- 
tively on Monday" — crossed off — "Tuesday. 

"Claiming that he be prosecuted because he wouldn't 
go along. Tony Avignon visits Carr and Thompson. 

"Worked for assistant public defender in Miami. 
Tony visits Carr and Thompson. Tony Avignon says he also 
worked for '60 Minutes'. 

"Public defender believes it's all a CIA plot — CBS 
has the story. 

"Co-pilot--Vasquez--3on of gun runner. 
^ "Summary--has case on gun charges--possibly 

< CUT 

Neutrality X*t violation. 



\mm\ 



78 



jlb78 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Co 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

O.. MC. 

25 



••Hull— CIA." 

Like I said, scratch notes of my telephone conver 

sation. 

Q would this all have been one telephone conversation? 
A I would venture to say yes, which— although it's 
quite possible that it's not. And I say that because the 
second page, where it says, "Has case on gun charges," I 
specifically recall that conversation when he reached that 
tentative assessment. That was later on in the process. 

The earlier notes seem to suggest an earlier period 
in time. So it is possible that this top page is in time 
subsequent to the second page. 

Q There was mention of lie detector tests. Did you 
ever learn-or to your knowledge were the lie detector or the 
polygraph results ever submitted to Washington for re- 
interpretation or review-the Garcia polygraph material? 

A Re-interpretation? There was an initial report that 
I have seen indicating that he had passed the polygraph. 
That was contained in a memo that I saw from Clark, who is the 
head of the Criminal Investigative Division, to- 
MS. NAUGHTON: Excuse me— of the FBI. 
MR. RICHARD: -of the FBI, I'm sorry-to either 
Buck Revel or Judge Webster. I don't recall. 

There's a memo from Clark that pre-dates the memo 
that was attached to the memo which went to Jensen-or was 



79 



jlb79 



UNCLASSIFIED 



79 






addressed to Jensen. That memo characterized the results of 
a polygraph different, if I recall correctly, than how it was 
characterized in the memo to Jensen. I believe that--that 
can be changed just looking at the memos. 

But I don't recall it being resubmitted subsequent 
to that point. Whether it had been done prior, I don't know. 

But when you say — my understanding of the process 
is that the field gafliiyJa p he r — the individual out in the 
field--makes a tentative assessment and then sends the 
results to Washington, where they are — I don't want to say 
re-interpreted, but the final interpretation is made out of 
Washington. That's my understanding. Now, I may be wrong. 

Q Do you understand--or do you have any understanding 
or knowledge as to how the results — the statement of the 
results changed between the Clark memo and the Revel memo? 

A No. 

Q Did you know whether it was a matter of Mr. Clark 
just having his facts wrong or someone else later looking at 
the results and saying, "No. He didn't pass. It's incon- 
clusive"? 

A I can't — I mean, I don't know. But I hope you 
appreciate — I don't credit much, in my experience, the 
results of polygraphs. So to me it's not a critical element 
whether someone says that the individual passed or didn't 
pass. So it wouldn't bug me whether it said he passed or he 



80 



«Ncussife 



didn't. I mean, it just wouldn't be of major consideration — 
the results of polygraphs. That's my own view of the results. 

Q Now, after your initial buck slip from Mr. Trott, 
did you have any further contact with Trott, Jensen, or the 
attorney general on this case that you can recall? 

A I don't recall specifically discussing it with 
either — I certainly didn't discuss it with the attorney 
general. I have no recollection of discussing it with- 
Jensen. I have no specific recollection of discussing it 
with Steve Trott, but I would have to say I had to have 
discussed it. I mean, just knowing my practice and what I 
would normally do. 

But I have, in answer to your question, no specific 
recollection of doing so. 

Q If you look at Exhibit 2, which is the actual buck 
slip — or page two of Exhibit 2, which is the buck slip — I 
think there's an indication on there — "See me" — circled in 
the transmittal slip. Does that refresh your recollection? 

A No, not really. I mean, I can't close my eyes and 
picture a discussion with Steve Trott, but I am sure that I 
would have. This is 3cm^|t|j^CL ^^AVBUl^ifiu^^n^ly ^^^^ 
kept him apprised of. UlllllLAuull I LU 

There are so many things that I would and still — 
keep an assistant attorney general aware of. I am sure I did 
that. 



81 



jlbfll 










vn CSowi. NE 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q To the best of your knowledge, how many times did 
you discuss the case with Mr. Kellner? 

A Probably I believe three times on the telephone. 
Probably. 

And once in person, that one being in October when 
we had — he was participating in a broader session, if you 
will, as part of, I think, our efforts in October to try to 
get a better grasp of all of these cases. And after that 
session, which ended focusing on just one case — not this case 
but a different case — after that meeting broke, I think we 
began a discussion of the status of this case. 

MR. McGOUGH: Let's have this marked as Exhibit 4. 
This appears to be a list of individuals who attended a 
meeting — the type of sheet you would pass around for a sign- 
up. 

MR. RICHARD: Yes. 

[The document referred to was marked for identifi- 
cation as Richard Deposition Exhibit No. 4.) 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q Scanning down the list of people there, you'll note 
about midway or two thirds of the way down is Leon Kellner 's 
name. Is this the meeting to which you were referring? 

A There were several meetings convened by Bill Weld — 
like I say--acro3s the board. This looks like a sign-in 
sheet for one of them. I say that because if you notice the 



82 



jlb82 



f 



UNcujsife 



participants include our Fraud Section, our Narcotics 
Section. There are a variety of cases. 

It was after a session like this where we ended up 
essentially spending most of our time on the humanitarian aid 
case. 

Q When you say "we," you mean you and Mr. Kellner? 

A The group--the entire group. We constantly tended 
to get bogged down. 

And after that meeting broke — and it was at the end 
of the day — I recall grabbing the people — grabbing is the 
wrong term — but suggesting, "Hey, look. Let's wait a few 
minutes and discuss this case" — however you want to caption 
it--the Posey case, the Costa case. 

So of this group, the interested parties remained. 
I don't think you'll find — if my memory serves me correct-- 
you won't find another sheet for that because it was a tag-on 
to a meeting like this. 

Q Who were the interested parties that remained for 
that meeting? 

A Myself, Leon Kellner, people from the Internal 
Security Section were there. Now, if it's a tag-on to this, 
I have to assume Tom Marum and Joe Tafe, the FBI — and I would 
assume that was Gail Burton. In this case, you had — let me 
see--George Van Balen. Al Seddon would be the logical one, I 
think, at that time, because he is the principle unit chief-- 



jibnj 



M 



wussife 



or I think his title is over at the FBI on Neutrality Act 
issues. 

So I suspect this type of complement, if you will. 

Q You recall — I'm skipping a little in time — but do 
you recall receiving the memo under Mr. Feldman's name in 
June of 1986? 

A That's correct. 

Q And that memo at the end, I believe, concluded that 
it was premature to issue grand jury subpoenas. Up until 
that point, had you discussed with Mr. Kellner or anyone in 
the Southern District whether or not the matter was ready to 
be — that subpoenas should be issued in the case? 

A No. I recall no discussion. In fact, I think if 
you look at the attached FBI memo, I think their suggestion 
was that it was at that time already in the grand jury. I 
made the mistake of following that suggestion. 

Q By issuing the memo that was attached to the buck 
slip that came to you. 

A Or the earlier one — the one — I'm not sure when I 
got the earlier one, but it was a day or two earlier in date. 
It was the Clark to either Revel or Webster. 

There was a reference, I think, in just reviewing 
the material at some point, because this — I noticed that it 
represented that there was a grand jury either sitting or was 
about to sit. 



84 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q When you got the Feldman memo, if I can call it 
that--the memo that came out in June--at the end it said it 
was premature to go to a grand jury and listed some reasons. 
Did you find that surprising in light of the March memo from 
the FBI saying that a grand jury was ready to go? 

A I didn't pick the connection up, and that connec- 
tion I only made recently, because the issue of going to the 
grand jury or of not going to the grand jury, as far as I was 
concerned, was never an issue until allegations surfaced that 
somehow there was an attempt either to influence timing or 
what have you. 

So it was never, to me, a critical question whether 
to go into a grand jury or not. It was a tactical judgment 
that I would routinely defer to a USA. If he wants — he 
thinks he needs to go into a grand jury — fine. If he thinks 
it's premature — fine. 

Q But you don't recall discussing it with him up to 
that point. 

. A He may have said — at that point, no. In October 
when we met he was still saying, "Hey, it's just too early." 
Nobody at the October meeting j«fas saying no, no, no. Get it 
to a grand jury 

Again, it was a tactical judgment. 
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 



)ber meeting was saying n 

UNCLASSIHED 



85 



^21 



22 
23 
24 

MLLin MVOKTMa CO.. HC 
W7 C %mn N E 25 



ONWSSIflED 



85 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Could I clarify that? 

In October, when he was saying it's still too early 
to go to grand jury — when someone says go to grand jury, they 
can either mean indictment or subpoenas . 

A No, no. He was saying— at least I interpreted it-- 
he was certainly not saying, "I'm going to return an indict- 
ment," or "It's too early to return an indictment." I didn't 
interpret that at all. 

What I interpreted it as was bringing substantive 
witnesses before a grand jury for an interrogation. I'm not 
even talking about using grand jury process. I'm talking 
about bringing witness — fact witnesses in for questioning. 

Q What about grand jury subpoenas? Would you ever 
discuss with Mr. Kellner the timing or wisdom of issuing 
subpoenas for things like bank records and so forth? 

A No. Again, he may have mentioned that he was going 
to do it this way or that way. 

I mean, again, if — I didn't care one way or the 
other whether he used subpoenas or didn't. It was not an 
event We moment in my thinking. If he thought it was right 
to use a grand jury subpoena, that's fine with me. If he 
thought it was preij^f^j^^QJ^ _tactically unwise, that was fine 
with me as well. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 



86 



jlb86 



vmmB 



nfK u 



f 



1 COMMITTEE 

2 BY MR. McGOUGH: 

3 Q After getting the memorandum in June, do you recall 

4 following up on the matter at all or having any other contact 

5 with the case until the October meeting you described? 

6 A Well, again, I can't put the timing. There was a 

7 point in time when I spoke to Kellner, and he gave me this 
preliminary assessment. I can't put it before or after the 

9 Feldman memo. 

10 I have no specific recollection, but during this 

11 period-- there are highs and lows with Mr. Kellner in my 

12 dealings with him, meaning that he is very much involved in 

13 narcotics enforcement in the Caribbean and South America. 

14 This is a major priority for me, dealing with extradition 

15 treaties, mutual legal assistance, the use of grand jury 
subpoenas to acquire records ot- biuaClen the — doctrine 
developed out of his district. Those are of critical 

18 iaportance to me. 
9 ^yv There was a point in time in this summer hstce where 

20 I recall a trip to Colombia — or from Colombia — where he asked 

21 me to stop by and talk to his staff about the situation 

22 regarding Ochoa in particular. These are prosecutors who are 

23 moving very aggressively against these international traf- 

24 fickers at great personal risk. And they took issue with some 
of the approaches we were tirying to take with the Colombian 



87 



jlb(37 



4. 



£? 



M7 C SoHi. N E 



UNCLASSIFIED 



government . 

Kellner asked me to meet with them and explain the 
rationale that we were employing and which I did en route 
either to Bogota or from Bogota. Could I have discussed it 
with him at that point? Conceivably yes. 

I would just stress this wasn't — at least in my 
mind — a big-deal case. It looked like a case where you had 
questionable witnesses, highly suspect motivations — something 
that obviously had to be investigated that was being inves- 
tigated. I didn't detect any unusual interest in my superiors 
on the case, and to me it was largely being handled in a 
routine, expeditious fashion. 

It just wasn't something that I would remember or 
feel that I was compelled to make detailed calendar notes. 
Q Did Mr. Kellner come to you or forward to you or 
give to you affidavits via Mr. Hull that made allegations 
about either Senator Kerry or members of his staff? 

A Yes. He called me up — I'm glad you reminded me of 
it. He did call me up, and he said that he just received 
this. Apparently this package had been sent to selected 
members of the Congress as well to the U.S. attorney. 

He said that it reflected all sorts of questionable 
activities by the senator — let me retract — not by the senator 
but by the senator's staff. And I think, if I'm not mistaken, 
reporters themselves — attempts to influence testimony and not 



ONClASSinED 



(t!Z 



1 suborn perjury and the like. 

2 I think there probably could be a package available 

3 to you of what the allegations were. 

4 I said, "Send it up, we'll take a look at it." He 

5 did. . 

6 I forwarded it to Steve Trott with a noteTto be 

7 handled — I think I gave him a couple of options along with my 

8 recommendation. To wit, either refer to the Public Integrity 

9 Section of our division, which has responsibility for 

10 questionable activities by government officials, or before 

11 deciding that, go interview Hull or try to get an interview 

12 with him and see whether he's going to be willing to be 

13 interviewed. 

14 Steve Trott, I believe, sent it to Jack Keeney for 

15 Keeney 's comments, and I believe ultimately it was decided 

16 let's ask the FBI to go and see whether Mr. Hull is willing 

17 to submit to interview now edsout this. 

18 And we sent it to the FBI, and I'm not sure whether 

19 the FBI made the attempt and if so, the results of it. I've 

20 never seen a report on it. 

21 Q Did you ever get back to Mr. Kellner on that at all 

22 A I have to assume — I don^t recall specif_icair 

23 telling him what we were doing. 

24 Q Do you recall whether he sent them to you or 
'"25 whether he delivered them in person? 



ONCIASSIFIEO 



A I think he sent them. 

Q Do you recall him coming to your office — or being 
in your office and discussing the affidavits with you? 

A He may have. I mean, it's not unusual for--Mr. 
Kellner was in Washington frequently — I mean, he's in touch 
with a variety of officials — to stop by and say hello, 
whether he did it — again, it's quite possible. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q What was his demeanor when he was talking to you 
about this? In other words, was he very upset about the 
political ramifications or this, or was he — 

A The whole — 

Q The affidavits and the problems with Senator 
Kerry's staff. 

A Hell, he was — I would describe him as feeling that 
it vindicated his assessment that this was part of a situation 
b«ljig manipulated by political forces where everybody had 
their own agenda — in other words, was particulary pure from a 
prosecutorial point of view. Garcia had his agenda — trying 
to get out from under a situation, reporters trying to come 
up with interesting stories, and Kerry's staff attempting to 
discredit the actions oi-rJ-^ioji' ^ know who — the CIA, the 



90 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 So I think this was the further vindication of an 

2 approach that Kellner was articulating beginning from day 

3 one — that he had skepticism about this whole situation. 

4 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 

5 COMMITTEE 

6 BY MR. McGOUGH: 

7 Q Do you recall ever having any contact with anyone 

8 other than Mr. Kellner in his office about this investigation? 

9 Did you ever speak to Mr. Feldman? 

10 A No, I don't believe so. I can't identify to you 

11 the prosecutors I met with during that trip. I don't recall 

12 speaking to them about this case. But it is conceivable that 

13 one of them was Mr. Feldman. I mean, there were prosecutors 

14 focusing — 

15 Q Well, all I'm really asking you is whether you 

16 recall discussing this case with anyone in that office other 

17 than Mr. Kellner, like Mr. Feldman, Mr. Scharf — do you know 

18 Larry Scharf? 

19 A I don't know them. I may have met him, but I — 

20 Q Mr. Gregory? 

21 A I know Dick Gregory, but I don't recall any 

22 discussion with him. _ 

23 Q Miss Barnett? 

24 A I know of her. '^* ChTnlcshe used to work for the 

25 Criminal Division. But I know who she is. The substance--! 




91 



leiASSIflEB 



don't think — I think she's an administrative assistant or 
something like that. I wouldn't discuss substance with her 
in any event. 

Q How about David Liewant, another assistant down 
there? 

A No. 

Q There was a point in time when, in response to 
press inquiries, main Justice issued a statement that there 
was in fact no investigation being conducted in this matter 
or that something — that it hadn't risen to the level of an 
investigation. This would have been, I believe, in about May. 
MS. NAUGHTON: I was thinking April. 
MR. McGOUGH: April or May of '86— out of the 
Public Information Office. Do you recall receiving any 
inquiries like that or — just for your point of reference — the 
people in the Southern District were quite upset when that 
statement was issued, because it seemed to fuel the specula- 
tion that they really weren't doing much. 

MR. RICHARD: No, no — in answer to your question, I 
have heard, as a result of your activities, this assertion. 
I certainly didn't pick it up at the time, and I'm not sure 
on what it was based. I can't answer. 

I must confess, though, as you've seen, this whole 
matter has had many names now. I don't knc 
just a breakdown in communication oi 



:":;i)mi»i 



92 



UNCIASSIHED 



BY MR- MCGOUGH: 

Q Are you--what, if anything, do you know about the 
attorney general's contact with the case? 

A Nothing. I have never spoken with him. I have no 
idea other than confused media accounts of purported conversa- 
tions between him and Leon Kellner. But I have no first-hand 
information. 

Q To your knowledge, did anyone in the Department of 
Justice, or for that matter anywhere in the federal govern- 
ment, indicate to Mr. Feldman — Mr. Kellner in substance that 
he should slow his investigation or handle it in any way 
other than the way in which he might normally handle an 
investigation of that kind? 

A I have never told him — I never told him to slow the 
investigation. When any issues like that come up in any 
case, that's a significant move. And it's something I think 
I would remember. 

I am sure, though, I have discussed the statutes 
with him — possible applicable statutes. And in that regard, 
I have no recollection what I said to Kellner regarding the 
statutes. But I know normally when I talk to a USA about the 
neutrality laws and their applicability, I always alert him 
that they are tricky statutes and statj^J:§3^ thsLt j:eauj.£e_ a_ 
certain amount of research into them 

Now, I can only speculate how I may have phrased 



UNCUSSIFIED 



it — what I may have said to Kellner. But I have no recollec- 
tion of even discussing it with him--neutrality laws and what 
have you . 

Q So that answer is no, you did not indicate to him 
that he should slow down the investigation. 

A Slow down the investigation? No. 

Q To your knowledge, did anyone else in the Department 
of Justice or anyone else in the federal government indicate 
to him that he should slow down the investigation? 

A Mot that I'm aware. 

Q Did he ever discuss any such requests with you? 

A Let me say — well, I was going to comment that I 
hadn't appreciated that there was any question about the 
aB onymity -jof thinking in the Southern District of Florida 
until this whole issue arose in late '86 — questions of 
Washington suggesting going slow and what have you in any 
regard. You know — the whole what-are-you-talking-about type 
of rosponse on my part . 

Q Did you ever discuss with Mr. Kellner the implica- 
tions of the case in regard to any pending votes in the 
United States Congress? Did you ever discuss votes about 
contra aid with Mr. Kellner? 

A There was — quite candidly, throughout this period, 
there was always controversy on one aspect or another of the 
contra matter. 



I you ever aiscuss votes i 

UNCLASSIFIED 



94 



UNCLASSIFIED 



And really, I think again, from my perspective, in 
dealing with something with — the administration issuing all 
sorts of statements saying, "Look. The CIA is not doing 
this. The NSC is not doing this. We were fighting by the 
Boland Amendment. We're doing this. We're acting in good 
faith in compliance with all laws." All this public dialogue 
going on. 

As far as I'm concerned, we do our investigations, 
we take the investigation where the facts take us, and we 
make the judgment, and then we take the heat when it's not a 
particularly popular judgment. I mean, that's the approach. 

MR. McGOUGH: That's going to conclude my questions 
on this aspect of it. 

Maybe Pam — I don't know if you have some follow-ups 
on some of the things I didn't cover. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Yes, I do. 

MR. McGOUGH: But go ahead. 

MS. NAUGHTON: I have a couple questions. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 



UNCLASSIFIED 



COMMITTEE 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q The memo that we've referred to as the Feldman memo 
that came to you in June of '86 — was that generated for you? 
In other words, did you request it or expect it, or did that 
sort of come out of the blue? 



95 



ONClASSinEO 



A No. It was in the course of a conversation that I 
had requested Leon to keep my apprised — Leon Kellner to keep 
me apprised of the status and developments. 

And it was during the conversation — one of those 
status discussions — that he said he had just received or he 
has a memo giving a status report, which he would show me. 
Which he did. ^ 

He also showed me a copy of a complaint filed by— a 
civil complaint filed by the reporters, I believe, that were 
central to this case. 

But the memo was not prepared at my request, in 
answer to your question. 

Q Were you ever apprised by the FBI or anybody else 
regarding any connection by Glenn Robinette or Secord in that 
lawsuit or in this investigation? 

A I don't recall having any discussions with the FBI 
regarding this particular case. 

I don't remember any connection with Secord. I 
raaaaber just glancing over the complaint, and I think it was 
kind of bizarre, but I don't recall whether there were 
specific allegations involvina Secord. T ^" yU L J^ fi fd^ Y 
lengthy, I guess you know yNl)[|\o5lr llll) 

Q As long we're on Secord, you described some of 
these meetings in an attempt to sort of gather up all the 
contra-related cases. On October 17, the House Judiciary 



96 



«ws/fe 



Conaittee-'-a majority of the majority members sent an inquiry 
for independent counsel. 

I realize that's not your shop, but were you aware 
of that request, and were you aware of any results that the 
Public Integrity Section came to regarding Secord's involve- 
ment with the contra re-supply operation? 

A The answer to the second part of your question was 
no — I couldn't tell you what they concluded. 

I have to assume I was aware that there was another 
request and therefore appointment of independent counsel. But 
in routine fashion, I wouldn't get involved in resolving those 
independent counsel issues. 

Q Well, I was just wondering if that was, for 
instance, a subject of the October meeting with Mr. Kellner. 

A No. In fact, I don't even think — I think there 
was — wait, wait, wait — one moment. I don't see anybody here 
even from our Public Integrity Section and certainly not Jack 
Kamey. And I have no recollection of any independent 
ctmnael issues coming up at these meetings. 

Q Do you — were you aware that the assistant U.S. 
attorney and the FBI were going to down to Costa Rica the 
first week in April? 

A 
knew that they were there at a particular point in time. 

Q Do you happen to know how many trips they took to 



I don't know whether I was aware in advance. I 



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9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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15 
16 
17 
18 
19 

20 

21 

22 

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nc. 

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Costa Rica? 

A I thought one, but they may have taken more. 
Q Did you ever speak to anybody at the State Depart- 
ment or any other agency regarding this case? 

A I don't recall having any conversations with any 
other agencies regarding this whole— I'm going through the 
agencies. None comes to mind. 

Q Were there ever any inquiries made, to your 
knowledge, of the CIA regarding Mr. Hull? 
A Inquiries by us? 

Or you or--I understand — 

No, no, no. From us to the CIA? 

Yeah. 



My understanding was that the CIA was denying any 
relationship. I think that was from day one, as reflected in 
FBI memos--that they were denying 




^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ there | 
was no ongoing relationship. 

Q When you spoke to Mr. Kellner the times that you 
did speak to him, did he indicate to you that he was speaking 
to anybody else in the Department of Justice? 

A Kellner speaks to a lot of peoole at the department 
I don't mean face 

Q Well, I mean on this particular cas 



: speaks to a lot of peoole at the 

■-'UNCLASSIFIED 



98 



IINCUSSIFIED 



1 A No, he never indicated — 

2 Q He never referred to conversations with Mr. Jensen 

3 to you or Mr. Trott. 

4 A Concerning this case, no. But Mr. Kellner--he has 

5 many problems which he deals with at that level, and he is in 

6 touch with the Associate's Office, the Deputy's Office fairly 

7 regularly. 

8 But I have no knowledge on this. 

9 Q But you never heard from either Kellner or from any 

10 of those other people that they had been in touch on this 

11 case? 

12 A NO. 

13 Q Have you spoken to either the attorney general, 

14 Judge Jensen, Mr. Trott, or Mr. Weld about this case — let's 

15 say — since November of '867 

16 A Spoken in substance? No. 

17 Let me go into the particulars. Certainly not the 

18 attorney general. Jensen I haven't spoken to since he left 

19 the department. Trott — no. I have spoken to both Weld and 

20 Trott procedurally. I urged them to send this case over to 

21 the independent counsel. 

22 Those kinds of discussions — nothing about issues of 

23 "Did you talk to Kellner or did you say anything?" I have 

24 tried to avoid discussing it 
"25 Now, I will add, if T may^-T'had a brief conversa- 



iid you say anything <" i 

icussm 



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;Sa«,.NE 25 

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tion only recently with Kellner about the case only after 
believing that your inquiries were over, because I had — well, 
I had been in touch with him on other matters . I avoided 
raising this case. And it was really in the context of again 
the accusations that he has had to deal with about being 
influenced improperly and so forth. And he was a little 
miffed at all of this. 

But it's a long way around. I hope I have answered 
your question. 

Q Did he tell you anything new that he had not told 
you previously? 

A No. Well, he just — you know, this is crazy. He 
wasn't influence in any way and that he only just said, It's 
just crazy. " 

I mean, I really didn't go into details. I don't 
remember this conversation — well, what did you say, what did 
I say--it'3 not that kind of a conversation. It was just-- 
you know — here we are. 

Q It's my understanding — please correct me if I'm 
wrong — that Mr. Kellner did not want the case sent to the 
independent counsel, but as a point of fact the independent 
counsel reviewed it and decided not to t^ke it. Is that 
correct? 

A I have no knowledge about his position. I know 



we--I certainly urged it. 



!!Nni h^mm 



100 



jlblOO 



^ 



CO 

CO 



iH^gJ^oimmc 



wuissro 



1 Q That the independent counsel take the case? 

2 A Yes. For — well — I was going to say for the same 

3 reasons I urged independent counsel being appointed for the 

4 whole thing. 

5 I don't know Mr. Kellner's position on whether to 

6 send it to the independent counsel or not. 

7 Q I gather that until November 1986 you were not 

8 aware of Oliver North's alleged involvement with this case or 

9 Mr. Hull. 

10 A when you say aware of it — I knew of allegations, i 

11 mean, the allegations of North being involved were public-- 

12 yes on that regard. 

13 Q Do you remember North's name coming up in connection 

14 with this case? 

15 A Yes. It was one of those--there was a long list of 

16 names that were involved, if you will. And it was attributed, 

17 if I 'correctly, to newspaper reports of his involvement in 

18 contra activities. 

19 Q Did Kellner specifically mention North or anyone 

20 else at the NSC regarding this case? 

21 A I have no recollection of it, except I would refer 

22 you to the notes. Because I was scribbling down names, if 

23 you will. And if he did, I assume it's on that first page 

24 unless it's on the exhibit that you now have. 

"S'S Q If you could give us then your arguments for 



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UNCLASSIRED 



wanting this case to be taken or assigned to the independent 
counsel in December of '86. 

A well, I had--by that time there were the allegations 
of Washington interference, abuse, improper dealings. I knew 
Mr. Kellner's view of the prospects of making the case, and I 
wasn't aware that the evidence had improved in any marked way 
since then. 

And in terms of the credibility of the department, 
I thought it was important, given the existence of the 
independent counsel, that the ultimate judgment--prosecutorial 
judgment — be made by a component that is above suspicion in 
the context of this whole matter. 

So anything that I perceived as being controversial 
and arguably falling within the independent counsel's 
jurisdiction, I had been urging go over there. Because--! 
mean, I viewed this at t a nt ion as being designed to ensure 
public confidence in the prosecutorial judgment being 
rendered on a criminal matter. And that's my analysis. 

Q Was my statement correct earlier that the indepen- 
dent counsel then refused to take the case on? 

A That's my_understanding^ That's correct. That's 
my understanding. 

Q Thank you. I don't have any other questions. 
MR. McGOUGH: Let's take a look at a couple of 
other exhibits and just get a fix on what they may be. The 



' understanding. That's < 

UNCLASSIFIED 



102 



DNCWSSIFe 



first is Exhibit 5. Take a look at that, if you would, Mr. 

Richard. Tell me what that is. Is it your handwriting, 

first of all? 

MR. RICHARD: I'd plead guilty to that. 
[The document referred to was marked for identifi- 
cation as Richard Deposition Exhibit No. 5.] 
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q Can you give me some indication of what it refers 

to? 

A Again, this is scratch notes prepared, I believe, 

following a conversation I had with the U.S. attorney in 

Oklahoma. 

Q Is that Bill Price? 

A Bill Price. The date of December 11 suggests that 

that's when I talked to him. I think he indicated that Bill 

Handricks of our Public Integrity Section, who was then, I 

believe, shepherding a lot of the Iran matters for the 

division, had been in touch with him previously. 

And this is the gist of the conversation I had with 

Mr. Price and his briefing of me regarding an individual who 

had been arrested and his possAb^^ MWoLv< 

CIA/contra-related activities. 

Q Now, about a third of the way down — the individual's 



m& 



103 



yiUSSIRED 



name was Weekly? Is that — am I reading that correctly? 
W-E-E-K-L-Y? 

A Yes. 

Q About a third of the way down it says — if I'm 
reading correctly — "Weekly posts on tape that he's tied into 
CIA and Hasenf us . Said he reports to people reporting to 
Buah." What does that mean? 

A I don't know what the post means, but apparently 
there was a tape recording. Let me, if I may, just take a 
second to read through the entire page. 

Q Sure . 

A Okay. This is a matter which had just arisen in 
the U.S. Attorneys Office. I was getting briefed. I think 
ultimately we referred it to the independent counsel, if I'm 
not mistaken. And I don't know what happened to it. 

It's an individual who has been arrested and is 
asserting — or there is a suggestion of a relationship to the 
CIA and Hasenfus and the exportation of explosives to the — 
countries . 

Q And he's alleging or indicating to someone that 
he's connected with the CIA and that he is reporting to 
people who report to Bush? 

A That's what he's asserting. 

Q What is the current status, if you know? 

A I cannot--as far as I recall, it was referred to 



UNCUSSIFIED 



104 



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UNCLASSIHED 






the — 

Q Referred to the IC. 

A — to the IC, and I just don't know the status. 
MR. McGOUGH: Let's take a look at Deposition 
Exhibit 6. If the court reporter--are you collecting the 
exhibits? We'll give them all to you. 

[The document referred to was marked for identifi- 
cation as Richard Deposition Exhibit No. 6.) 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 

Q Now, I surmise that this is not your handwriting on 
Deposition Exhibit 6. Do you recognize whose handwriting it 
is? 

A No. 

Q Were you present at a briefing on or about 11/24/86 
at which the Kellner situation was discussed? 

A Who was present? 

Q Were you present? This would have been Monday of 
the — the day before the president's press conference. 

A I don't recall any such meeting. 

Q Let me ask you what may be kind of a general 
conclusory question on this area, and that is to your 
knowledge or in your opinion, was there anything about Mr. 
Kellner's or Mr. Feldman's handling of the Garcia-Costa 
investigation that you felt or feel was inappropriate? 

A No. I've dealt with Leon Kellner now for five, 



105 



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107 C Smn. N E 25 

Wultuunn. C 20002 



UNCLASSIFIED 



six, seven, eight years. I have the highest regard for him, 
and I think he's a fine prosecutor. I have no reason at all 
to question his handling of this case. 

Q Let's turn to the Southern Air Transport matter or 
investigation. 

Shortly after the Hasenfus C-123 crash, did you 
learn of an investigation by the FBI into the ownership and 
operation of the plane that had gone down? 

A Do you want me to do a narrative or just — 

Q Yeah. I mean, is that a fair starting place, when 
Hasenfus — as the place for your first contact with that 
investigation? 

A Yes. Do you want me to just give you a narrative? 

Q Give me the narrative. 

A Okay. The plane goes down on approximately October 
8th or so — or 7th, maybe — of '86. And then there are press 
reports of the department running an investigation into the 
natter. 

Bill Weld asked me--Bill Weld, the assistant 
attorney general — asked me what I knew about it and at that 
time I didn't know anything about the investigation. 

I called Tom Marum, who was familiar with the press 
reports of the investigation, but he was_ii2t familiar with 
it An*^^*^- 

And again, Tt' is' the practice that a Neutrality Act 




106 



UNCLASSIFIED 



violation is generally run by the Internal Security Section 
before even a preliminary is done, Just for concurrence of 
the Internal Security Section that it's warranted. But no 
such contacts had been made, according to Tom. 

I called Leon Kellner. I asked him what's going 
on. He was very — angry may be too strong, but annoyed-- 
because he was getting hit with all sorts of press inquiries, 
and he knew nothing about the pending investigation. 

Q Can you give me a time frame of your conversation 
with Mr. Kellner? 

A It would probably be the 8th or the 9th of October. 
And as I said, he didn't know who authorized it, 
but apparently there was FBI work at the Miami field office 
level . 

What next occurred at my request — I had to ask Tom 
to find out what's going on, and Tom Harum sent over to me an 
FBI teletype from the Miami office to headquarters — a copy of 
that. And attached to it, he put a buck tag, and the buck 
tag, if I recall correctly, indicated that Buck Revel at the 
FBI — I forget the phraseology — was reluctant to or had 
ordered that no further investigation be done because he — 
Revel — apparently believed that it was a CIA operation. 

Q Now, what — this is a buck tag from? 



Tom to me. 



Handwritten? 



yNWSSlREO' 



. O C 20002 



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mm\m 



A Maybe typed. It's just a — it's a transmittal 
sheet, and it just — 

Q Reflecting a conversation with Buck Revel? 

A No, I don't believe it reflects the source of that 
information other than the bureau. Tom Marum, I doubt very 
much, would -b« talked with Buck Revel. 

So presumably it would be Al Seddon or somebody 
else at the FBI that Tom is getting this information from. 
That memo comes over. I brief Weld on this. 

Q Can you put a time frame on that? 

A Again, all this is, I think, the same day. 

Q October 8th or 9th? 

A lC»*h. Uf^ . 

Now, Tom had asked the bureau — the FBI — to question 
the CIA about — you know — is there a relationship to the 
operation, if you will, of the Hasenfus matter? What is the 
relationship, if anything? That's where the matter stood on 
that day, as I recall. 

The next day, which I guess would be the 10th, I 
get a call from Buck Revel asking me to come over to discuss 
the matter. I mentioned that to Weld, who had asked me to 
find out what's "j^JTyTn A^ ■J"iaiWWB«»'Britt°°'^ of what's 
occurring. 

I went over to Buck Revel. I met in his office 
with him. And I believe he — well, another agent — I believe 



wmm 



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UNCUSSIFIEO 



his last name is Miller — Dennis Miller or something like 
that, but he's, I think, assigned to their general counsel- 
tjtpe office. 

And Revel said — he explained, as I recall, that the 
field office had gone off without headquarters' authori- 
zation, which is contrary to — apparently to their procedure. 
And they had begun a preliminary inquiry. And that's how the 
matter got started. 

And he began asking where I thought this matter 
should go. I was skeptical about our jurisdiction. As I 
appreciated the facts and from media and the letterhead memo, 
we had a plane that had last been in the United States, I 
think, three or four weeks before. It had gone down in a 
foreign jurisdiction apparently loaded with arms, had an 
American national — an American national was on board. But 
that was it. 

And I questioned — well, what is the jurisdictional 
base? I maan, are we to assume that the arms that Hasenfus 
was throwing out of the plane necessarily came from the 
United States? And I saw this as a serious question, because 
I couldn't believe the plane would take off and then sit 
around for four weeks before discharging i^_^_5*£?° over 
wherever it was — Nicaragua 

So I approached the conversation of where do we go 
from here with a certain amount of skepticism whether we had 



:e aiscnarging its cargo c 

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UNCLASSIHED 



sufficient bases for even a preliminary inquiry. 

We began discussing what could be done, and he 
says — and the discussion led me to believe that we could 
resolve certain things. We could take a look at the airline, 
the manifest, the last time it was there, and something 
focusing on the airlinei. 

And we had ultimately — by the end of the conversa- 
tion, which lasted 20 or 30 minutes — we had — you know — let's 
do some preliminary work to see whether we have a jurisdic- 
tional basis for a full-blown inquiry. 

I vaguely recall Buck mentioning that he had been 
contacted by North, who was making an inquiry as to what was 
going on. I don't know whether it was North or the NSC, but 
I have in the back of my mind a comment that he had made 
during the course of the conversation that he was--he had 
received in an inquiry on that. 

Q This was in the Cost conversation on October 10? 

A That's correct. 

And that's where we were at that time. I came 
back, I briefed Bill Weld and Tom Mar\un, if I recall cor- 
rectly. I don't recall mentioning it to Leon Kellner, 
although logic would suggest that I would have also called 
Kellner, but I have no specific recollection of doing that. 
And that's where the matter stood until November. 

Q Let me back up for a moment here before we go to 



no 



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. DC :oaa3 



yNWSSIFlEO 



November . 

Can you be any more specific about what Hr. Revel 
told you Oliver North had told him? 

A I'm not sure it was as specific as Oliver North or 
else something more general like the NSC — just that they were 
asking again the same type of question that Bill Weld was 
asking — what's going on? And that's the extent of my 
recollection. 

Q There was an inquiry from North — or the NSC, 
rather — the provision of information or request to do 
something or not to do something. 

A That's correct. I have this generalized recollec- 
tion that this was a prefatory statement that Buck Revel made 

Q All right. So we go to the next step. 

A The next — and here I may have my dates wrong. I 
don't have any dates to offer. 

But there came a point in time when I ^et a call 
fzQB defense counsel for Hasenfus — Spaulding firm in Atlanta. 
They were asking for some assistance from the Criminal 
Division with respect to legal research and precedent and 
opposition on a variety of legal issues. 

And I called the State Department — Mike Cosack, I 
think, in particular. He was with the Legal Advisor's 
Office. I basically said, "Are you working with them? What 
is our relationship to defense counsel?" 



Ill 



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And he said, "Well, Hasenfus is a private citizen. 
He's not a government employee, and we should treat counsel 
as we would in any situation where an American national 
abroad gets into trouble and hires defense counsel to 
represent him in a foreign country," and basically that there 
is no governmental relationship to Hasenfus . 

And it was on that basis that we dealt with 
Hasenfus' attorneys. We gave them good public record 
information, but nothing beyond that in terms of assistance 
and what have you. 

Now, I'm having difficulty pinpointing when that 
defense counsel issue occurred, but the next/e^^on that I'm 



3f 'Tbccurrii 



aware otfoccnrting on this matter is in November, when John 
Martin, the head of the Internal Security Section, sent a 
memo to Weld which, in the paper process, has to cross my 
desk, attaching to John's memo a copy of a note from Judge 
Webster to Floyd Clark, a memo reflecting a request from, I 
think, the attorney general, requesting a delay of the 
inquiry for ten days because of some pending potential impact 
on hostage negotiations or something like that. 

That was the first I was aware o^ that there was a 
delay or that there was any request for a delay. I was not 
familiar with this request. I showed it to Jack Keeney 
because it concerned me no end that we were in the midst of a 
request for a delay in a criminal investigation for reasons 



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that were not particularly clear to me. There was just a lot 
of — this was a point in time where a lot of what is now the 
Iran matter was becoming public, and it's just very confused. 
And I was distressed to see this kind of memo. 

I brought it into Mr. Weld. He shared, I think, ^^,vt. 
concern and suggested I raise it with Steve Trott. John's 
memo — John Martin's memo — had indicated that we, because the 
initial request was only for a ten-day delay and that ten 
days had long expired, that he — John — unless he heard to the 
contrary would assume that it had elapsed and a request for 
delay was no longer operative. 

Q So by the time you saw it, the ten days had already 
expired. 

A Yes. I can't — let me see if I have a date. Well, 
yes-- Judge Webster's memo apparently was dated October 31, 
and this is something hitting my desk on the 12th of November. 

Q And up until that point you had not been aware that 
th«re was a request for a hold-up in the investigation? 

A That's correct. 

Coincidentally, John Martin and I were scheduled to 
meet with Steve Trott that same day on, 1 think, the Walker 
case — spy case. And Bill, aware of this, suggested that we 
raise it with Steve at that time — Steve Trott — at that time. 

Q Was Mr. Weld aware of the ten-day delay? 

A He did not indicate any foreknowledge of that 



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ONCUSSIRED 



delay. He appeared as surprised as I was. 

At the meeting later that day with Steve Trott, I 
took the occasion to raise it. I showed him John Martin's 
memo and Judge Webster's memo. 

My recollection is he tried to reach the director 
to find out whether--! 'm sorry--to discuss the status and was 
not successful. And he said he would get back to us. 

Q Did Mr. Trott appear to have any prior knowledge of 
the ten-day delay? 
A Yes. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did he explain to you what the purpose of the delay 
was? 

A I don't believe so. Other than that it was related 
to our attempts to secure the release of the hostages . 

Quite candidly, the memo — Webster's memo to Clark-- 
r«f lects hostages . But I must confess that in my own mind I 
had thought they were talking about a trade for Hasenfus, 
because at or about the sane time there were public reports 
of Judge Bell, who was representing Hasenfus in Nicaragua, 
talking about trades with the Nicaraguans. But I had this 
notion of this connection, if you will, to the Hasenfus case. 
At any rate, Steve Trott I do not recall going into 



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any of the bases for the request. 

Q I guess I'm not clear then, because you said 
earlier that you were a bit concerned because all of the 
public hoopla over the Iranian arms deal had of course come 
to light in the past week or so. Did you not then connect 
Webster's memo? 

A The whole question of — I'm not sure how I can 
answer. I recall in my own mind speculating that it was a 
Hasenfus trade. Whether the--how that came up in the context 
of what was going on publicly at that time, I don't recall. 
I remember I was speculating that it was a Hasenfus trade. 

I just — a request for delaying an investigation for 
whatever reason is a serious question. Now, it's done. 
There are legitimate enforcement reasons for doing it. But 
in this context at this time, it just looked like a bad — 

Q When did you first make the connection, then, 
between the Webster memo in reference to hostages and what 
was going on in Iran? 

A I'm not sure. I would have to say after I learned 
of the nature of it, I'm not sure that I connected it with 
the hostages in Iran. 

Q In other words, Trott did not tell you that. 

A I don't believe he did. 

EXAMINATION BY CflUMSeL J'OB XHfi. £E1IA1E_SELECT 
COMMITTEE 



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BY MR. McGOUGH: 

Q In your conversation with Mr. Trott, he indicated 
that he would check with Webster. 

A That's correct. He tried to place a call while we 
were there. Judge Webster was not available. 

Q The memo from — that Mr. Martin forwarded to you-- 
reflected that Attorney General Meese had initially requested 
the delay from Director Webster, did it not? 

A I don't recall — it's reflected in the memo. I'm 
not sure whether it reflects that Steve Trott had asked Judge 
Webster for the delay or the attorney general had asked for 
it. I just don't recall the particular — 

Q I guess my question is why would either Mr. — if it 
were Mr. Trott who requested the delay initially, why would 
he be checking with Judge Webster to see if it was okay to 
lift the delay? 

A No. But the delay had already been lifted. The 
t«n days had expired. 

The ten days had expired already by the time we 
were talking with Steve Trott, and what I assumed was that 
the call to Webster was designed to see how we resumed it-- 
-hew we resumed the inquiry. 



Q Was there 
that conversation? 



rney general in 



Oh, I believe Steve Trott had indicated that he had 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



requested the delay at the behest of the attorney general. 

Q Was there any indication by Mr. Trott that he would 
check with the attorney general to see if it was all right to 
lift the delay? 

A No, that's not ray recollection. My recollection is 
only to check with Judge Webster to see whether the delay had 
been lifted. 

Q What happened next? 

A I think, by and large, everybody knows of the- 
events dealing with the Hasenfus matter that I'ra aware of. 

Q In your discussiort with Mr. Trott, did Oliver 
North's name come up in any way? 

A I don't recall that. 

Q How about the National Security Council as a whole? 

A I don't know whether it was at that meeting or in a 
subsequent conversation with Mr. Trott where I was led to 
believe that all of this came at the behest of the National 
Security Council. I don't believe that that was discussed on 
the occasion of the meeting with John Martin and Mr. Trott. 

Q Was there any discussion about why a delay was 
necessary in the first place? 

A No. No substantive discussion that I recall. 
MR. McGOUGH: That's all I have. 
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOIL mE-UflUfiE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 




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UNCLASSIFIED 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Was that — was the Hasenfus case discussed at that 
October meeting — that big meeting that Weld called regarding 
the contra-- 

A There were two meetings that Weld had called. Both 
of them got bogged down, I think, on both occasions on the 
humanitarian case, if I'm not mistaken. 

Q You don't recall any substantive discussion. 

A No. 

Q Were you aware of a parallel Customs investigation 
of SAT? 

A No, I wasn't until public revelations that appar- 
ently there had been a parallel request made of Customs. 

Q So the FBI — Revel — did not indicate to you that he 
knew of a Customs investigation. 

A I don't recall. He may have indicated that Customs 
was doing their own investigation, or — I cannot say — he may 
have mentioned it. 

Q Did Trott mention it? 

A No. 

Q Do you know — as a matter of course, before a 
Customs agent in the field can initiate an investigation — my 
understanding is they focused on the plane as opposed to the 
cargo. Would they also have checked with main Justice? 

A They don't need our authority to investigate. The 



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predicate, if you will, for the FBI, was a possible neutrality: 
violation. The predicate for a Customs investigation would 
be illegal exportation of equipment. i 

Again, it's one of those parallel overlapping 1 
jurisdiction. | 

Q Did you during the course of this--now, this is, j 
let's say, from October 6 until November 20 or so — speak to j 
anybody at Customs, specifically Rafe Lopez or — 

A Did I speak to him? 

Q --or anybody about their investigation? 

A No. I did not. I know these individuals, obvi- 
ously. 

MS. NAUGHTON: That's all I have. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 

BY MR. McGOUGH: 

Q Let's turn to^^^^H||^^| When did you first 
become aware of the^^^^^^^Hprosecution? 

A Probably when he was in^^^B-probably went back 
to '85. 

Q You were aware — you were tracking the — you weren't 
tracking — but you were aware of the prosecution fron 
inception 

A No. My interest was in connection with the 
operation of the Office of International Affairs. I forget 



J — but you were aware of the prosecution fjJJ'-it^ 

" —"-UNCLASSIFIED 



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the sequence, but he had fled, and he was, I think, infl^l 
And we were making some efforts to extradite or persuade the 

o expel him. And it was in that connection, i 
believe, I first had contact with the case. 

Q Did there come a time when someone initiated or-- 
when there were discussions about giving ^^^^^^^| some 
consideration on his sentence? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you tell me about that? 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q First of all, can we ask what he was indicted for 
and convicted? 

A He was indicted for multiple counts of conspiring 
tofa« engaging efforts to assassinate flHHHHHj^^^^l 

So I think he was charged with murder for hire 
and related types of offenses. He ultimately plead to two 
counts of murder for hire. 

Q What was his maximum exposure? 
A To what he plead to? 



Yeah. 



Ten years . 



UNClASSinEO 



And this was prosecuted again, I gather, out of the 



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A That's correct. 

He was charged with others who were also charged, I 
believe, with various narcotics offenses. I don't believe 

ras specifically charged with the narcotics 

offenses . 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 

BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q In response to my earlier question, you indicated 
that there were in fact discussions of giving! 

^^^Hsome consideration. Can you tell me how those were j 
initiated? 

A Well, I can only speak for myself, and I say that 
because there were significant efforts made by persons with 
the Department of Defense as well as those assigned to the 
State Department who tried to secure preferential treatment | 
for this defendant. Those approaches were, in my understand- I 
ing, were made directly to the U.S. Attorneys Office way j ^ 
before we in Washington really became aware--at least to my ] 
knowledge--of what was going on. 

I think I first learned of this aspect of the 
matter when Jim Michel of the State Department, who is 
Elliott Abrams'--one of Elliott Abrams ' deputies, and I had a 
discussion. I may have my timing wrong. I may have first 
discussed it with Mike Cosack at the Legal Advisor's Offio 



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But at any rate, it was a dialogue that began 
between myself, Mike Cosack, and Jim Michel. And it was a 
very strange situation that we found ourselves in, because 

including 

individuals detailed from DOD to the State Department, were 
seeking to secure M-^9m:reatment for i[^^^^^^Hnot neces- 
sarily on behalf of their agency but as individuals. They 
were seeking to make known their views. 

In addition, we began receiving communications from 
the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas to the 
president. I think he wrote to the court seeking some 
consideration fori 

Mr. Michel, myself, and Mr. Cosack had sojiie 
discussions and along with^^^^^^^^^^B concluded that this 
was crazy, that there was no basis for this, and that we were 
going to oppose this kind of treatment for an individual that 
essentially we have viewed and had publicly stated we viewed 
as an international terrorist. So we were quite emphatic 
about our position and were resisting these efforts, if you 
will, to somehow get the gc^v^ 
treatment tol 



WtMRffi"" 



22 That was our posture. We had a meeting with State 

by ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H which affordec^^^ 

24 I opportunity to convince us that there were good and valid and 

25 I legitimate reasons why we should as a government qo into 



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UNCUSSIflED 



court and seek some consideration for this man. 
Q Let me interject there. 

What were the reasons given for 
^^^^referential treatment? 

A He was a friend of the U.S. He had helped the U.S. 
Q Were they more specific than that? 

A Veiry vague, very general. And we were never, to my 
satisfaction, able to get any specifics. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Did you get a sense of whether this was all 
retrospective or whether he was still working for us? 

A Oh, no. I had assumed it was just for historical 
relationships. 

Q Did anybody from the agency attend? 
A Again, this is where I come back to a cast of 
thousands. There were many people there. 

Q Well, at any rate, was the agency heard from in 
this whole — 

A I don't--I'm not aware that the agency waded in on 
this. This was purelj-^^ a^DOD j.nit^ajt_ive^ as far as I could 
tell. 

So we listened, and State was most emphatic on this 
one--no reason why to give into this — 



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MR. McGOUGH: You say State was very emphatic? 

MR. RICHARD: It didn't want it to go over. 

MR. McGOUGH: Did not want to give preferential 
treatment? 

MR. RICHARD: Did not endorse it. The State and 
Justice were walking hand-in-hand on this issue. 

And it was a very peculiar situation, because in a 
way DOD was not institutionally supporting it. But these 
individuals were coining up and always prefacing their 
positions as speaking as an individual and going from there. 

And, in fact, the court was sympathetic and was 
receiving information from individuals such as-- 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q So these people^^^^^^^|were contacting the court 
directly. 

A Well, they were serving as character witnesses. 
When there came a point in time after the plea, they were 
writing in with pleas for leniency. I think I had a sense of 
hearing they testified in his behalf. 

So you have this series of pleas coming in from--l 
wouldn't say DOD representatives, but individuals affiliated 
with DOD, as well as the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

And we were, as I 
said, opposed to it. And the instructions to^^^^were just 
proceed in a normal fashion, dispose of the case as you would 




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normally, evaluate it in normal terms. 

And ultimately a plea was entered, a sentence 
imposed — I think for five years concurrent, if I'm not 
mistaken — and the man ordered to surrender. 

Then there came a point in time--I would say 
probably around the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd of October--when I got a 
call from Steve Trott, I believe it was, asking me to attend 
a meeting with Buck Revel ^^^^^^^^^^^^Hthing over the 
Executive Office Building. I forget whether it was immedi- 
ately or first thing the next morning. 

But I go over with Buck Revel, and we go into-- I 
have to assume it was Oliver North's office. And present is 
Dewey Clarridge, Oliver North, Abrams --Elliott Abrams--and an 
individual who was introduced to me as a retired general. 
His name was given. I have forgotten it, but I believe j 
people have told me it was General Gorman. i 

And the purpose of the meeting, as announced by I 
Colonel North, was that 




egarding this latest plea, 
which seemed to be centered on the fact that^^^^^^^Hhad 
since surrendered to begin serving his sentence. 

It was unclear — I got the impression that^^^^^^ 
^^^|thought he was going to go in from one entrance and out 



125 



UNCUSSinED 



the other entrance--you know, and out the rear. 

Q Did you get this impression from North? Did you 
have it before you went to the meeting? Let's put it that 
way. 

A Well, I got the impression that that was what was 
t r i g g e r i n g ^^^^^^U^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
really holding him--that was the sense I had. Like any--he 
didn't anticipate it — like he really thought, you know-- 

Q What I'm asking is from whom did you get this 
impression? Was from reading ^^^^^^^^^^^^Hor was 
from North told you? 

A It's a valid question. Let me reflect on it. 

I think that was mentioned at this meeting. Like 
what did he expect? And maybe I said it, but it was like^H 
^^^B^s I understood it from, I think, either Colonel North 
or from the generaJ 

And maybe I ventured to say, "Well, it 
sounds like he expected to walk right out." 

MR. McGOUGH: At any rate, was he sentenced and 
then ordered to surrender at a later date? 
MR. RICHARD: He had surrendered. 
MR. McGOUGH: Bi^ it wasn't a matter of being 
sentenced and bail, bond- 

MR. RICHARD: The court had recommended ^^^^H Th« 
government, as I understood, took no position at that point. 





126 



ONCUSSIFIED 



but the court had recommended to the Bureau of Prlsons^^^H 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Was that at the defendant's request? 

A Oh, yes. But the court endorsed it. 

The designation by the Bureau of Prisons was that 
the initial receipt was^^^^^^^^^| which is, I think, one 
step up in security fromi 

The purpose of the meeting, I guess, as articulated 
by Colonel North, was to discuss! 





Then Colonel North, supported by the general, began 
also indicating that ^^^^^^^Hwas a friend of the govern- 
ment — the U.S. government --had helped immeasurably the 
military. 

Had helped U.S. forces, was always available. Again, very 
ambiguous, no specifics, l^it he was always ready to assist us. 




A I always assumed 
but I always thought it was 



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Q Well, yeah, but did they ever refer to him in 
particular — 

A Particular function, responsibility? I don't 
believe so. 

The general just indicated to us that he was 
helpful in accommodating our military. So this became the 
theme, and it was a theme that North was articulating, and 
the general was supporting tt. Dewey Clarridge concurred. 

And what was probably the most surprising was 
Elliott Abrams now concurred that we should do what we can 
for this man, which, I must confess, I saw as a change in ^^Xl 
State Department position. In all fairness to Mr. Abrams, he 
indicated that he had to leave for another meeting. He got 
up, but his parting remarks were, 'We should do what we can 
to accommodate this man." And then he left the meeting. 

I was asked what can be done for this man, and I 
basically said, "Look. His defense counsel can file motions 
to reduce. He's always free to apply for some immediate 
parole consideration." I'm not sure whether I articulated 
any other options at that time. 

Then the issue came up — "Well, can you transfer him 




Who asked that? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



I'm tempted to say North, because Colonel North was 



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yilftSSIFlEO 



doing most of thQ talking. General Gorman was just support- 
ing. Buck Revel was very quiet, and I felt very much on the 
defensive in this setting. This was — I just found myself in 
this situation. 

I told them — I said, "Look. This appears to me 
to — anything we do for this man seems to undercut our position 
that we have taken repeatedly that this man is an inter- 
national terrorist. This is certainly not consistent with 
the position we have articulated throughout the course^ of 
this prosecution that this man is a serious international 
terrorist and should be treated accordingly." 

Buck Revel supported that proposition, and the 
meeting ended up with — "See what you can do about transferring 
him ^^^ 

I think I offered, as a possibility, because the 
mission was to come up with a possible response^^^^^ 

that conceivably what we could do 

was offer to brief ^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

he realize what he's 
asking for? And maybe he doesn't appreciate fully the 
mplications of the conduct engaged in by this man. 





129 




(INCUSSIFIED 




I told them at the meeting that I would 
take it back and discuss it with the Department of Justice, 
and that's where we left it. 

I think Colonel North remarked that he thought he 
had enough ] 

It lasted all of 25 minutes or so. 

I went back to the department. It's strange — I 
don't know — 1 don't recall briefing Weld on it. I have to 
assume he was in place at the time. He came in about this 
time. 

But I talked to Steve Trott, and he said he didn't 
have any trouble with sending I 

Q Had Trott indicated to you that he had had a 
sinilar meeting with Colonel North? 

A Not at that time. Subsequently, more recently he 
had informed me of the fact that there was an earlier 
meeting. I was not aware of that at the time. 

I'm not sure of the timing here. I did speak to 
^^^^^Band told him about the meeting and asked him his 
views on sending him to^^^^^ and. he had no trouble with 
that. It's the mood — the sentencing on_ the^r^eque^t^o jo^o_ 
^^^H, and he had no trouble wit 



mcing on the request to qo to 

"4!NIllASSlflEll] 



82-732 0-88-6 



130 



uNcussra 



I talked to, I believe, John Martin. He had no 
major problems, as I recall. 

And I got back to Weld, and he told me to call Norm 
Carlson, head of the Bureau of Prisons — 

MR. McGOUGH: He told you to call Norm Carlson? 

MR. RICHARD: Yes. 

And why I say that — if I may drop a footnote — I had 
mentioned — when Steve Trott said that to me, I said, "The 
last time I called Norm Carlson and arranged for a transfer 
of a prisoner who had begun cooperating" — I transferred him 
from a medium-security facility to a minimum-security 
facility — "the guy absconded within a week." So I told 
Steve, "I'm not sure whether my credibility is very high with 
Norm Carlson. " 

So Steve Trott said, "Well, tell him if he has 
problems with it to have Norm Carlson call me." 

So that was the gist of the conversation. 

But I called Norm Carlson, and as I recall, he had 
no problem with it, and as far as I know, the man was 
transferred. 

We never, as far as I know, went down and^^^^^^ 
And that's about where we are, as far as I 



know. 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 



UNCLASSIHED 



Did you ever get back to the NSC or State Depart- 



131 



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UNCIASSIRED 



'*' 



mant? 

A No. I didn't. 

Excuse me. There was one other aspect In this 
narrative I didn't include. 

I think right before the sentencing I received a 
call from Judge Sofaer over at State. He had been contacted 
by, the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hof the 

Department of Defense^^^^^^^^^H I don't recall the 




who wanted also to Interject consideration for^^H 
This, I believe, was prior to sentencing. 

For some reason, the individual couldn't reach 
anybody within the department of moment, and Judge Sofaer 
asked me if I would talk to him. I did. And I basically 
articulated what was our position with respect to providing 
any consideration ^^^^^^^^^H That was it. 
Q You never heard from hin again? 
A No. He was just making a very strong pitch for 
consideration. That was probably the most official DOD 
presentation that I had received during this whole process . 

MR. McGOUGH: Do you remember who it was that 
Sofaer was speaking for? 

MR. RICHARD: Sofaer-^he called me just to ask that 
I call this individual. 

MR. McGOUGH: But I mean who the individual was 



ofaer — he called me just 

ONCLASSIHED 



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ONOLASSIFIED 



that you were supposed to call? 

MR. RICHARD: He was head of the J 
for DOD. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did he Indicate either where he had gotten his 
information or what his connection was with] 

A I never received from any source specifics other 
than a friend of the government — a friend of the United 
States or another government. 

Q Just for the record , ^^^^B-do you know what 
security facility it is? Can you just describe it for the 
record? 

A Well, it's a minimum- security facility. 




there are perimeter security arrangements. 

MR. McGOUGH: Let me show—mark this as Exhibit 7. 
[The document referred to was marked for identifi- 
cation as Richard Deposition Exhibit No. 7.) 
MR. McGOUGH: They appear to be a couple of 



133 



UNCUSSIFIED 



transmittal slips. The top one — both of them appear to be 
dated October 2. And is that your handwriting at the top of 
the first one? 

MR. RICHARD: That's correct. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MR. MCGOUGH: 
Q And for the record, would you read — it's dated 
10/3/86, and %rauld you read that for the record? 

A "Steve Trott, according to Jim Michel, agreed to 
briefing. Verified SST"— that's Steve Trott — "send the 
items," which I assume refers to — that we were authorized to 
send the teletype. Do you want me to read the — 

Q No, no. It's not necessary to read the text. But 
the teletype that it refers to from Abraros was to go to whom? 
A If I'm not mistaken, it was a teletype responding 

There was a communication — 
I — whether it was from^^^^^^^^^^^Bor Elliott Abrams 
I don't recall. 

Q How did this fit in time-wise with your meeting 
with North and Abrams in that event? 
A The communication? 




Q This transmittal slip — October 2 — October 3. 
A I assume that the meeting occurred, the cable was 
prepared, sent it over to John Martin or he got it from — did 



134 



UNCLASSIHED 



1 sand it over? 

They weren't aware of this — at the time when they 
were reviewing a cable of the developments — my proposal, for 
example, we^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^and the 
Steve Trott — agreed that that could be something we could do 

They weren't aware 
that it had been accomplished to send them to Abrams . 

Q So by this time there had already been a decision 
made to intervene with Norm Carlson? 

A Yes. I spoke to — this is on the 3rd — on the 3rd, 
my notes suggest that I called Norm Carlson. Now, I'm not 
sure when physically the man was moved fron 

Q But the letter and teletype from Mr. Abrams 
appeared to indicate that Justice had intervened on 
s behalf and recommended that he be sent to] 

So that the draft that was sent over on October 

2 would have stated that Justice had in fact intervened. 

A I'm not sure whether it was put in terms of 
intervention as opposed to — we have agreed to transfer the 
man or the man is being transferred for convenience of the 

I'd have to — I'm not sure it was couched in 
terms of intervention. 

MR. McGOUGH: What time — do you have a restriction 
in the evening? 





ave to — I'm not sure it » 

UNCUSSIFIED 



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MR. RICHARD: No. 

MR. McGOUGH: I think I've got maybe another hour 
or so. 

MR. RICHARD: I just would like to finish today, 
but I'm prepared to go as long as you want tonight. 
MR. McGOUGH: Do you need a break? 
MS. NAUGHTON: I would like a break. 
MR. McGOUGH: Why don't we do it now? 
(Recess] 

MR. McGOUGH: Okay. Let's get back on the record 
and turn, if we could, to the Evans prosecution — the Souther 
District of New York. 

BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q Prior to the revelations in November of '86 about 
the Iranian initiative, were the defendants in the Evans case 
alleging a government authorization or government policy 
defense to their prosecution? 

A I'm probably the wrong one to ask that question of. 
My understanding was that they had consistently maintained-- 
at least with respect to the Iranian transaction8--government 
authorization. But I would suggest you verify that directly 
with the Southern District of New York. 

Q What, if any, authority, supervision, or review did 
you exercise over the Evans prosecution^ 

A Well, I had worked with the Southern District" of' 




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New York in terms of their apprehension. The individuals had 
been lured, if you will, to Bermuda, and it was a question of 
how to accomplish their arrival in the United States when we 
have to go through an extradition proceeding which not only 
would be cumbersome but could pose some problems in terms of 
the existing treaty and what have you. Our efforts were 
designed to see if we could arrange for iaipCttirion to the 
United States . 

Q Were you involved in the pre-lndictment stage of 
thafcase at all? 

A I don't believe in a substantive way. I think I 
was aware that it was coming down — that there was this ] 
pending operation. But I certainly wasn't dealing in 
substance with the Southern District of New York on how to 
bring it down. 

Q Prior to the disclosures about the Iranian Ini- 
tiative, is it fair to say that the case did not — strike 
that. 

After the disclosures about the Iranian initiative, 
did the case draw more of your attention as it related to 
their defense of governmental authorization? 

A Well, the case had that particular interest to me 
because of what I'll call the tsraeli ronnection. And I have 
been working quite closely on a variety of cases impacting on j 
the government of Israel-^-or potentially impacting or i 



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involving the government of Israel In that regard, this 
case was of interest because, if I recall correctly, several 
of the defendants purportedly had priot israeli military 
affiliation. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Could we step back again? Could you 
tell us what the indictment was and what the defendants were 
charging? I believe there 17 defendants. 

MR. RICHARD: That's correct. Not all of them have 
been apprehended. There are a series of — 

MR. McGOUGH: Has the indictment been unsealed as 
to all of them, or do you know if they remain sealed? 

MR. RICHARD: I believe that it is unsealed as to 
all of them. 

It's been a while since I looked at the indictment, 
but what we're dealing with essentially are five conspiracies 
to illegally export substantial arms without requisite 
licenses . 

The arms were going to a variety of — or intended to 
go to a variety of foreign countries, including Iran, but not 
limited to Iran. There were other countries, I believe, that 
also were intended a«d users fer some of the conspiracy. 

So that what you regard as the Evans conspiracy, I 
think, is only a portion of the total case. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Did any arms actually get shipped? 

MR. RICHARD: I do not believe that anything 



138 



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arrived . 

Is that responsive to your question? 
MS. NAUGHTON! That's fine. It's mostly for the 
record, not my curiosity. 

MR. McGOUGH: We get so used to speaking about 
these things as terms — I think you're right. We need a 
little bit of background. 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q You were talking about the Israeli aspect. 
A You asked about — my initial interest or focus of 
the case was in the context of that issue, because I have 
been, as I indicated, heavily involved in a variety of cases 
impacting on- Israel 

Q Can you put a time frame on that issue in the case? 
A I believe in April of '86, if I'm not mistaken, was 
the time when it was brought dovm, if you will — the arrests 
were made and what have you. It was several months, as I 
recall, trying to arrange for their entry into the United 
States. But the case was--coinplaints were filed, I believe, 
in about April of '86. 

Q Now, after the disclosure of the Iranian arms 
initiative, there were intensified efforts by defense counsel 
to raise the government authorization of defense, if we can 
call it that. And when did it first come to your attention 
that these had been connected somehow--these defenses had 



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been connected with the Iranian arms sale? 

A Well, I think from the start of the public revela- 
tions, which I guess were beginning in Novembervof the 
governmental initiative, the defendants in the Evans case 
began citing this as further justification for what they were 
asserting all along--was essentially government authorization 
or belief that there was going to be government authorization. 
If I'm not mistaken, there was no suggestion that they had 

the government authorization, but they had reason to believe 

a 
they would havefat the time of the exportation. 

There came a point in time, as I understood it, 
where the court — Judge Sand in New York — was making inquiry 
into whether there was a connection between the authorized 
initiative and that which was before the court in New York. 

And there had been previous representations, if I'm 
not mistaken, made by the Southern District of New York to the 
court that inquiries to appropriate federal agencies had 
r«T<ealed that the activities embraced by the indictment were 
in fact not authorized. 

Q Let me stop you there for a second. 

Were you involved in those original inquiries to 



the various agencies? 
A No. 

Q Did you coordinate them? ] 
A No. I believe that the Southern District either 



ONCUSSIRED 



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directly went to those agencies or worked through our 
internal security section to secure the information from the 
relevant agencies. 

Q And there came a time in or about November of '86 
when the judge wanted something more in the way of a repre- 
sentation from DOJ. 

A Well, here it was a representation— thaA wanted 
information as to whether there was a connection between the 
mjidLUoad matter and the authorized government conduct, which 
by that time was becoming publicly known and acknowledged. 

As I recall, during this period I had been in touch 
with Rudy Giuliani", the U.S. attorney, and his senior staff; 
Denison Young; and, I think, S p a ni rdo Romano as well as on 
occasion talking directly to the assistant. They telefaxed, 
I think, to me a proposed representation that they were 
suggesting be made to the court. 

MR. McGOUGH: Let's mark this as an exhibit. This 
ia Deposition Exhibit 8. My copy is mis-paginated. Is yours? 

MR. RICHARD: ¥^i. No, I'm all right. 

[The document referred to was marked for identifi 

cation as Richard Deposition Exhibit No. 8.) 

BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q Referring to Deposition Exhibit 8, is that the 



telefaxed proposal or an affi 



I'CLASSIFIED 



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With some handwritten interlineations on it. 

Yes. 

And that would be your handwriting. 



Part of it is. Part of it I believe is Bill 



Q 

A 

Q 

A No. 
Weld's. 

Q Now, this would have been transmitted on November 
14, 1986. Is that right? 

A That's the date reflected on the exhibit. 

Q What steps did you take when you got this? 

A Well, as I recall, I had earlier alerted Bill Weld 
to the fact that this issue was facing the department and 
■ that I believe Bill Weld had informed me that the attorney 
general was going to certify that there was no connection 
between the two cases . 

Q This was before November 14? 

A I believe, if I'm not mistaken, that it was before 
the receipt of the proposed Southern District language. 

Q Which is dated November 14? 

A Which is dated November 14. What I'm suggesting is 
in point of time it may have occurred on the 14th but prior 
to the receipt of the telefax. 

I told Bill Weld that I thought that that was a 
terrible error. 

Q What was the terrible error?| 

A To have the attorney general certify that there was 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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no connection, because, quite candidly, as I evaluated the 
matter, I couldn't understand how anybody at that point in 
time would be in a position to certify that there was no 
connection. Setting aside the ambiguity of what a connection 
means — and I'm not sure to this day I know when you say there 
is no connection what you are asserting — it appeared to me 
that unless one had the most intimate knowledge of both sides 
of the equation — to wit, the Evans case and all of its 
nuances--as well as the Iran initiative along with all of its 
nuances, how could anyone draw a conclusion that there was no 
connection? 

And I expressed this concern, I think, very 
strongly to Bill Weld, because I thought we were going down a 
path where inevitably we would be — the defendants would 
assert that we were disingenuous with our certification if 
fetors - lightest arguable connection showed up down the road. 
And I was concerned about that. 

I expressed it first to Bill Weld. I believe he 
agreed with me. I think he raised it with Steve Trott. we 
then — if I recall the sequence — we got the telefax, we went 
over it, changed some aspects, and again sent it forward. 
And I was again strongly urging that it not be made. 

Q And when you say "sent it forward", you mean sent a 
draft or a revision of tpis. teJ-etyoeact^S^^fiflrward to the 
attorney general. 



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A Well, I can only say that as far as I know, it went 
up to Steve Trott. I have no knowledge of whether the 
attorney general literally saw this proposed teletype — this 
telex. 

Q But at the time you sent this forward, Mr. Trott, 
as you understood it, was aware of your reservations and 
concerns? 

A I don't believe I expressed them directly to him, 
but I think Bill Weld had let him know my feelings. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If I can interrupt you for a second. 

I missed whose idea or insistence or whatever it 
was to have the AG actually certify this as opposed to some 
other official. 

MR. RICHARD: Well, that was the point. I think 
the Southern District had proposed it as their be s t desire. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Had they proposed this to you? 

MR. RICHARD: My recollection is that they had said 
that's what they wanted — was the attorney general to certify. 
And I believe that's the way I interpreted it — that they 
wanted the attorney general himself to certify it. 

And as it related to me, it was that there was a 
willingness to make such a certification. 

MR. McGOUGH: Was that related to you by Mr. Weld 

MR. RICHARD: Yes 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



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COMMITTEE 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q So Weld got back to the attorney general, and he 
said he was willing to make such a certification? 
A ¥ee*»>^ 

If I'm not mistaken, on this particular day when 
the issue was resolved, there was a question. There were two 
matters arising from active litigation in the field--the 
Evans and a matter on the West Coast, where--I think it was 
either San Diego or L.A. had a case — it was L.A. — before 
Judge Wilson. And Judge Wilson was inquiring as to the 
government's intent in light of the public revelations of the 
Iran initiative. 

The judge in that case had a convicted defendant 
who was moving to set aside a conviction or a sentence. He 
had been convicted for allegedly — not allegedly — but for 
exporting illegally to Iran certain proscribed materials. 

And the judge, in response to that motion, was 
asking the prosecuting U.S. attorney for certain information 
regarding the government's intended way to proceed in light 
of these revelations. So we — and the USA out there had three 
questions that he was seeking the answer to from the depart- 
ment. 

So both the Evans and this other~clse went upstairs 
That is to say, I believe it was handled at an executive 




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meeting which the top management of the department holds 
every morning. And I think it was taken up at that point in 
time. And I believe that this was done prior to the receipt 
of this actual proposal. 

There was--if I'm not mistaken--there was nothing 
written on the table, if you will, at the time that the 
initial decisions were made. After the morning meeting, 
which takes place fairly early in the morning, if my memory 
serves me correctly. Bill Weld came back with responses for 
L.A. and a response — or at least a way of proceeding--in the 
Evans matter. 

And it was in that context, if I'm not mistaken in 
my sequence of events, that it was conveyed to me that the 
attorney general was prepared to make the certification. And 
that's where the matter stood. 

And later that day, which was the 14th--a Friday--I 
had occasion to be with Steve Trott, and I believe it was in 
connection with another case — the Pollard case--there were 
aoae developments on that — where Steve Trott called the 
attorney general and asked me to accompany him to see the 
attorney general on that matter. 

We briefed the attorney general on that matter, 
and — maybe somewhat presumptuously of me — I said, "Mr. 
Attorney General, I want to raise the issue of the Evans case 
with you because I think it '-a a horrendous mistake that's 



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WUSSIflfO 



about to be made." And I quickly articulated the reasons why 
I did not think that the department should make this kind of 
certification at this point in time. 

Apparently — and this I guess you'd have to ask 
him — but my impression of his reaction was that he had by this 
time — he was not going to make that certification, because he 
quickly said — led me to believe that he was going to take it 
up the next day — Saturday — with the National Security 
Council. Now, I'm not sure whether he said National Security 
Council or Admiral Poindexter. 

And that's where the matter stood. 

Q Did he say — obviously — correct me if I'm wrong-- 
your pitch is someone's got to know the full details of that 
and — of the Evans case and the U.S. -sponsored Iran initiative 
in order to make such a certification. 

A If I may interrupt, the argument I presented to him 
was a simple argument, and that is that you just don't know 
all the proprietaries that may have been used or contemplated 
by either side of the equation. And until you at least know 
that, you're walking into a no-man's land in terms of 
connections between the two 

I hope you appreciate--at this point in time, I 
don't think I appreciated that the attorney general had any 
personal involvement in the Iran authorized initiative. So I 
assumed he had no knowledge on both sides of the equation. 



lO-man s iana xn terms oi 

UNCLASSIFIED 



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IMIFIEO 



Q Well, that's my question. Did he impart to you 
any — either any knowledge of it or did he tell you that 
someone was looking into the Iranian — the U.S. -sponsored 
Iranian initiative? 

A No, he just — he just basically said without 
commenting on substance that it was going to be taken up with 
the — either with Admiral Poindexter or the NSC the next day. 
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 

Q How did you understand that would move in the 
direction of solving the problem? 

A Well, for one, I felt somewhat relieved because 
the — it wouldn't be the Department of Justice making the 
certification. It was the National Security Council, who I 
assumed was intimately familiar with at least the Iran 
initiative. They would be in a far better position than the 
Department of Justice to come up with this broad certifi- 
cation. 

Q But only from the Iran initiative side of the 
equation, which still had much less to do with the Evans case. 

A I'm still troubled by that fact. 

Q So Attorney General Meese Wf_aoiig i^o_g£ th? NSC 
and Admiral Poindexter on the--case. 

A I'm not sure whether he said he would go, but that 



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1 matter would be taken up on — 

2 Q What was the next word you were going to say? 

3 A Monday, I believe, which would have been, I guess, 

4 the 17th. 

5 I think I probably either was out of town or late 

6 because by that time there was agreement on a certification 

7 to be offered to the Southern District of New York in 

8 response to Judge Sand's request. I think I learned of that 

9 after the fact. 

10 I have seen some notations that indicate that the 

11 certification finally was devised was in fact communicated to 

12 the Southern District by Bill Weld directly. 

13 MS. NAUGHTON: Did you have any part in drafting 

14 that? 

15 MR. RICHARD: I had commented on the draft that 

16 came in from the Southern District without changing the 

17 critical point. What came in from the Southern District was 

18 not focused on the attorney general, though, but rather the 

19 Department of Justice, which also was of more comfort because 

20 originally I thought the attorney general personally was 

21 going to certify. 

2 2 BY MR. McGOUGH: 

2 3 Q So you run it back on Monday to find that there was 

24 some resolution? 

MC. 

2 5 A Yes. 



Mmm 



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Q Did you attempt to determine — or did you determine 
how that resolution had met your concerns the week before--in 
other words, whether someone had in fact discovered once and 
for all that there was no connection. 

A Well, I was confident somebody satisfied themselves 
that under some interpretation of the word connection that 
there was none. 

Q Did you know who had done that? 

A I thought it was Admiral Poindexter, who was in 
charge of making the final judgment to the Department of 
Justice. Whether he tasked anybody at the NSC, I cannot say. 

Q But the certification went out from Mr. Weld to the 
Southern District. 

A It was transmitted by Mr. Weld, but it was from the 
Department of Justice and made reference to the consultation 
with, I think, the NSC. 

Q Were you confident that whoever was acting on 
b«half of the Department Justice in that capacity had 
sufficient understanding of the Evans case? 

A Was I confident? 

Q To make that representation^ 

A I was concerned, only because I was concerned that 
someone would read connection extremely broadly. And I 
wasn't confident that, given the broadest interpretation of 
what Judge Sand was seeking, whether there was anybody in 



UNCIASSIRED 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



1 Washington certainly familiar enough with the Evans case to 

2 assert that there — with conf idence--that there was no 

3 connection. 

4 Q Well, I guess what I'm driving at is when you saw 

5 on Monday that Weld had made this representation for cer- 

6 tification — 

7 A If I may just interrupt you. 

8 Q Sure. 

9 A Weld didn't make the certification, weld trans- 

10 mitted it to the Southern District. 

11 Q When you saw on Monday that it had been transmitted 

12 to the department, were you still uncomfortable with the 

13 transmittal or by that time — 

14 A Well, I'm concerned because it appears to me that 

15 it's an area of potential problems. This was a certification 

16 that was generated in good faith, but I was concerned without 

17 some clarification, simply because I just don't know what the 

18 word connection means in this context. 

19 You have overlapping equipment, for example. If I 

20 recall correctly, some of the equipment in the Evans case 

21 consisted of TOW missiles. Is that a connection? If they 

22 used the same certification mechanism, is that a sufficient 

23 connection? 

24 MS. NAUGHTON: Were you_ aware of the^ Khashoggi 

25 connection with the Evans case? 



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MR. RICHARD: I was aware that— when you say 
connection—I was aware that Mr. Evans had a prior relation- 
ship with Adnan Khashoggi. we haven't determined whether 
that relationship extends to the operations involved in the 
Evans case. But there was history of a proprietal relation- 
ship. 

All of those were concerns of mine. 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q Were you aware at that point that Mr. Khashoggi was 
somehow involved in the Iranian initiative? 

A I can't place it in time. I just — if nothing else, 
in the abstract, I saw this as a troublesome area that either 
should have been better articulated as to what the court was 
seeking by way of assurances or at least some more systematic 
inquiry should be accomplished before we made those represen- 
tations. 

Q As of Monday the 17th, did you express those 
concerns — those continued concerns to Mr. Weld or anyone else? 

A Well, I don't recall afterwards expressing the same 
degree of concern. I was greatly relieved that the department 
had at least gone out to the. NSC, who I understood had the 
information, at least on the authorized Iranian initiative 
and had sought their representations— affirmative representa- 
tions to the extent that they were in a position to make 
them--that no, they were aware of no connection. This 



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certainly alleviated a portion of my concerns. 

I'm not sure that I continued to articulate ongoing 
concerns on this point. 

Q Did you feel that you had been cut out of the 
situation? 

A No, not at all. 

Q On the 14th you screwed up your courage and raised 
this with the attorney general sua sponte, and then on the 
17th you came back and found out that essentially that while 
the solution was a little bit better, it still didn't solve 
the problem. Did you feel — did you follow up any more with 
it? 

A No. No, I didn't. I had, I think, expressed 
concern over a period of time — I just can't put it in time-- 
in conversations with Denison Young about this problem. 

Q After Monday the 17th, when you learned — 

A Excuse me. If I may interject. My concern 
continues to be there only because now you have independent 
counsel generating information on the Iran initiative that is 
not being shared with the Southern District of New York, to 
my knowledge. So that now we're — at least as an abstract 
proposition — in the difficult position of standing by our 
representation but not privy to possibly new facts developed 
by the independent counsel that wf undercut^ theJL^^ regresenta^ 
tion. This concern I have also articulatec 



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No, but I — 

I just want to get at the facts. 

That's right. 

So basically it's in the nature of a pleading to 



MS. NAUGHTON: Can I ask just about the representa- 
tion? 

MR. RICHARD: Sure. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q First of all, this is not an affidavit that someone 
signed. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
the court. 

A I don't know whether it was just a statement on the 
record or by — in a particular pleading. 

I mean, the department would not, .*« my judgment, 
tolerate erroneous representations to the court. 
Q Oh, no. That's not my point. 

My point is this: were this to be challenged--and 
what I'm asking is did this go through your mind as well — not 
just that that representation might be erroneous but that 
someday someone may actually have to testify at a hearing or 
a trial if either connection was found. And did you--did it 
concern you that this person might have to be the attorney 
general or Admiral Poindexter or someone of that stature? 



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A Well, yes it did certainly concern me. This was 
one of the reasons why I suggested that this — initially a 
certification, as I understood, coming directly from the 
attorney general was crazy because it exposed him as a 
potential witness. This was one of the reasons for initially- 
objecting. 

Q Did you articulate that concern to the attorney 
general? 

A No. 

Q Did you articulate it to Mr. Weld? 

A Yes. The question — you made a statement with 
respect to the concern. I was concerned about raising it 
with the attorney general. It was just in terms of the 
propriety of it — I mean, we were not there discussing the 
Evans case, and it was something that I had raised with my 
immediate superiors. 

It was in the context of deviating from the chain 
of conanand that I saw myself, if you will, subject to some 
criticism, because I had raised it with Bill Weld previously. 
I knew he had taken it up directly with Steve Trott, and in 
that regard, for me to jump over them and take it--you know, 
mention my concerns directly to the attorney general was just 
outside the normal chain of command. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL JOJ iHf:.,fi{aU^XE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 



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BY MR. MCGOUGH: 
Q We're now coming up to the fact-finding weekend, as 
its become known, starting — on the 20th, 21st — in that area. 
Did you have any further contact specifically with 
the Evans issue prior to the weekend of the weekend of the 
21st, 22nd, and 23rd? I mean, did it come up again at any 
meetings that you attended? Did you raise it again with 
anyone that you can recall? 

A No, not the certification issue. 

I spoke regularly with the Southern District of New 
York on the Evans case as well as other cases, and I would 
not be surprised if the Evans case came up. 

But in terms of going higher within the department, 
I don't recall any further meetings that we had. 

Q Were you aware that Mr. Weld raised the issue at 
the staff meeting on the 21at? 
A Which is? 

Q Friday — the issue of the — whether the Criminal 
Division should be involved. It came up, as I believe as Mr. 
Weld's deposition, which has been released, indicated in the 
context of the Criminal Division becoming involved in the 
Iranian initiative side of the inquiry so that one person or 
at least one division would have all the facts in both the 
Evans situation and the Iranian initiative — exactly the point 
you were raising before that someone had to understand both 



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sides of the equation. 

Were you aware that Mr. Weld raised that issue at 
the staff meeting on Friday morning the 21st? 

A No. Are you sure it's the 21st and not the 14th? 

Q The information read that it's the 21st. 

A No. In answer to your question, I'm not aware. If 
this is subsequent to the resolution of the Evans certifica- 
tion, then the answer to your question is no. I'm not sure-- 
I was not aware that this became a new issue a week later. 

Q Were you aware that the attorney general spoke to 
Mr. Weld on the 24th? That was a conversation where the 
attorney general said it's not accidental — or allegedly said 
it's not accidental that the Criminal Division has been kept 
out of this. There's a reason for it. Mr. Weld made the 
statement — made a statement about water spilling on the 
attorney general . 

A No, I was not aware of that conversation. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 



Have you read 



mmmw 



Q It's my recollection — please correct me if I'm 
wrong; actually I think I have it — that he stated that you 
were present in his office when he received the call from the 



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attorney general . 

A I may have — on the 20? 

Q On the 24th. This would be Monday morning at 
approximately 9:55 — right before 10:00 o'clock. 

A I may have been in his office when he received the 
call. My recollection is the first time I passed with 
anything or^given any information regarding this issue is the 
25th. 

MR. McGOUGH: Now, this is — when you talk about 
this issue — we're not talking about purely — we're not purely 
talking about the Iranian initiative. What we're talking 
about is the Evans — the interplay between the Evans case and 
the Iranian initiative. 

MR. RICHARD: I must confess. I have read the Weld 
interview on this point, and I wasn't sure what was being 
referred to, whether it was the Evans case or the Iran 
initiative . 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q If I can for the record — page 22 is where he begins 
a discussion of this. And the question was: 

"Q On the 24th, did the attorney general call you in 
regard to this subject? 

"A Yes . 

"Q Do you recall when that was? 

"A Well, it was during a meeting I was having with my 



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deputies. And those are often at 10:00 or at 10:30 a.m., so 
I would say it was between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m." 

And then he goes on to describe the call which Mr. 
McGough just alluded to. 

Do you recall either listening to Weld's portion of 
that conversation or discussing the contents of that conver- 
sation after he hung up? 

A No, I don't. We have regular deputies' meetings. 
Generally they do follow on the heels of his meetings with 
the senior management. 

I don't recall the Evans issue still being on the 
front burner at that time. 

We had — I am not sure of the arguments articulated 
by Bill Weld to the attorney general with respect to the Evans 
certification. I don't know whether he referred to questions 
of proprietaries or both sides of the equation or what have 
you. I'm just not sure how we phrased it to the attorney 
general . 

MR. McGOUGH: Do you recall ever being present when 
Mr. Weld said over the phone to the attorney general something 
to the effect that "I don't think you should try to carry too 
much water on this thing. Some of it may spill on you"? 

MR. RICHARD: I don't recall the specific comment. 
It is the type of comment that Bill Weld would make. 

MR. McGOUGH: But you don't recall being present 



159 



UNCUSSIFIED 



when it was made. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Do you recall him ever alluding to or expressing a 
concern that the attorney general was acting like a gumshoe? 

A Well, the next day — and when you're talking — 

Q The 25th? 

A — the 25th — that there are a lot of discussions and 
comments that I'm privy to--but not on the 24th. 

Q I noticed you brought some of your calendars here. 
Could you please check the 24th? Would that indicate to you 
whether or not you had a meeting with Weld and at what time? 

A I don't have my calendars here. These are only 
just little calendars. 

Q I believe those were provided to the committee. I 
just don't have them with me. 

A I had — beginning on the — I think it was the 25th — I 
began trying, to the best of my discipline and ability, to 
ka«p a log of some sort. But that began on the 25th. 

I have nothing beginning on the 24th other than 
following public media disclosures regarding the Iran 
initiative. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 



COMMITTEE 



BY MR. MCGOUGH: 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Let me — in that vein — let me take us back again a 



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little bit. And I want to talk about public disclosures of 
the Iranian initiative. 

Like most people in Washington, I suppose that you 
were at least picking up on them now and again and were aware 
that this was a breaking sort of story. 

A Oh, yes. Very much so. 

Q Did there come a time prior to November 25th when 
you began to take a professional interest in the Iranian — 
allegations about the Iranian initiative? Did there come a 
time when you began to consider whether or not there were 
possible criminal violations involved in the activities that 
were being reported in the paper and if so, what if any role 
the Department of Justice would be playing in those. 

A Well, I was very much concerned about them — the 
initiative, in particular the impact on potential— well, on 
cases both concluded and pending. 

Q But setting aside existing cases — in other words, 
a*ttlng aside the impact of the initiative on existing 
caaea — did you begin to consider whether the activities that 
were being alleged to have occurred in the initiative itself 
may have transgressed criminal statutes? 
MR. RICHARD: Can we go off? 
[Recess] 

MR. McGOUGH: Let's go back on the_record. 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 



's go back on the record. 

IINCUSSIFIED 



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Q Mr. Richard, is it fair to say that during the 
period when you were reading about the Iranian initiative 
leading up to November 25th that in your 0'.^n mind you were 
speculating about the procedures under which these sales 
might have been made and the legal requirements that might 
have applied to them? 

A Yes. I was very interested in how these transfers 
were accomplished. 

Q But did you discuss those speculations--to the best 
of your recollection — with anyone else in the department? 

A No, I was just following media revelations as they 
occurred. 

And did you do any independent investigation to 
determine whether, in fact, there were violations of those 
procedures or requirements? 

A No. 

Q When was the first time that you initiated those 
sorts of discussions or involved yourself in those sorts of 
discussions or analyses? 

A As I recall, November 25th, I think, was following 
the attorney general's press conference and the revelations_ 
of diversion of monies to the contras 

I was with Bill Weld in his office discussing the 
revelations when we were asked to proceed--! think first to 
Steve Trott's office but ultimately ended up in Chuck 



jnce ana tne revelations 

UNCLASSIFIED 



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Cooper's office, where we were asked to review the situation 
and give a preliminary assessment of possible criminal 
statutes that might be implicated. 

Chuck Cooper was there along with--I think it was a 
staffer for Mr. Cooper-- John McGuinness, I think his name 
was. And we were given probably no more than a five-minute 
factual run-down by Mr. Cooper, and he handed out what 
purported to be a chronology — a classified chronology. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Do you recall how long it was? 
A It was several pages. 

Q Was it like a narrative chronology or just a date? 
A I believe it was just dates. There was a slug--a 
date, an event, a date, an event. 

I recall that Mr. Cooper gave it to us to look at 
but indicated that there was some question as to its accuracy. 

We really didn't have much time, as I recall, to go 
over the chronology, relying on the presentation of Chuck 
Cooper and our appreciation of the facts as discussed both in 
the media and in the attorney general's press conference. 

We opined what criminal statutes might be involved 
or that could be involved. And at that point the attorney 
general convened a meeting which I did not attend; i was not 



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invited to. 

Q Excuse me. Could you give us a time estimate on 
that first meeting in Cooper's office? 

A It was late afternoon. I would venture to say 
4:30, 5:00 o'clock at night. 

The meeting with the attorney general occurred 
probably around 6:00 o'clock. I remained outside the 
attorney general's office. I had — was talking to a U.S. 
attorney who — there were press reports indicating an arrest 
with an Iranian connection, and I was trying to find out some 
details about that which turned out to be not the case. 
My recollection is that the meeting with the 
attorney general lasted seemingly about a half hour or an 
hour and then broke up. 

MR. McGOUGH: Given the facts as you understood 
them at that point, what criminal violations did you speculate 
might have been committed? 

MR. RICHARD: Well, there was a whole »4rO««h of 



potential statutes, depending on how the transaction was in 
fact structured or what was done to accomplish it. And there 
was a lot of assumptions, if you will. How was the money 
transported? what Customs violations were triggered as a 
result of attempting to move currency without declarations? 
Did that occur? Were bribes paid to foreign officials? I 
mean, it just went on and on, all based on "what if". 



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And of course nobody at that time had the answers 
to that. So you really just didn't know. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q If you can recall, what did Mr. Cooper tell you 
during the meeting in the late afternoon of November 25th 
about the November '86 HAWK shipment — how it came about? 

A I'm not sure. I took some scratch notes. I don't 
know whether they reflect that kind of specificity. 

Q But what you have in your notes is "November '85-- IE 
HAWK missiles transferred but ultimately returned." 

A That would have to have come from Mr. Cooper. 

Q Do you know if — do you recall if he said anything 
else about that other than that they were shipped and they 
were returned? 

A I assume I put it down there only because I thought 
it might be of some significance to the analysis of what 
potential criminal statutes might have been triggered. 

It was a very superficial factual presentation, and 
I think, if I'm not mistaken, it was interrupted by one or 
two telephone calls from other high-ranking officials to Mr. 
Cooper giving him more details — I think State Department 
officials. 

MR. McGOUGH: Was it your general conclusion that 
the chances that criminal statutes were transgressed were 
remote, likely, 50/507 Could you — what was your feeling 



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coming out of the meeting? That it was a remote possibility 
that there were crimes committed or that it was a likely 
possibility or did you have a feeling at that point? 

MR. RICHARD: My feeling was that it was something 
that had to be investigated from a criminal point of view-- 
that there was no way you could easily draw a conclusion that 
there was no criminality involved without a thorough analysis 
of what transpired. 

I was obviously familiar with the identifies of 
certain of the participants, which made me very skeptical 
about the integrity of the operation. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Who are you talking about? 
A General Secord, I think, was identified as playing 

a significant role. I think at that time also Mr. Hakim, Mr. 

C 
<lines. 

Q Did you know Hakim from before? 

A I knew of him, yes. 

Q What did you know of him? 

A That he was a shadowy character that played a 
financial role in some of the transactions that occurred back 
during the Wilson inquiry. I don't think we ever made 
anything, but again he was just a very elusive figure. 

It just made me--hai^taned m^concefn^^nowing 
the individuals involved. 



166 



DNCUSSIfe 



EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 

BY MR. McGOUGH: 

Q Did the meeting with Mr. Cooper conclude with any 
sort of recommendation or resolution? 

A Well, I think that — yes, to the extent that there 
were arguable criminal implications of these transactions. I 
think Bill Weld and I were categorical in our conclusion on 
this point. 

Whether a given statute may be implicated or not 
was academic. But it was clear that there were potential 
criminal statutes that were involved, especially with 
diversion and a lot of questions about whose money was 
involved and property rights and was there a theft of 
government property, a misuse of government property — a whole 
range of issues that came to mind, depending on what the 
facts ultimately proved to be. 

Q Was there any consideration or discussion at that 
point of how the investigation might proceed as a practical 
matter? 

A The meeting with Mr. Cooper and Mr. McGuinness? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't believe so at all. It wasn't clear that 
there was going to be an 

Q Was there any discussion gi 



! so at all. It wasn't clear that 

— "-11HCUSSIF1ED 

liscussion given to the — was the 



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possibility of destruction of documents discussed? 

A At that point? 

Q At that point . 

A I don't believe so. 

Q Was there any discussion of the necessity of 
securing documents or examining documents? 

A Again, not at that stage. I don't believe so. 

Q With the conclusion at the meeting with Mr. Cooper 
on the 25th — did that conclude your role in the matter on the 
25th? Did you do anything else that day with regard to that 
investigation or diversion? 

A I believe I remained at the department and talked 
to Bill Weld after the conclusion of his meeting with the 
attorney general. It's hard for me to identify precisely at 
what time what was said. 

When I learned about the role of Mr. Reynolds and 
Mr. Cooper and the attorney general, I know from the first 
time I learned about it I expressed concern about it. And I 
expressed to it to Mr. Weld. 

Q When did you first learn about that? 

A I'm tempted to say the 25th — the time that I met 
with Mr. Cooper. 

Q By that role, you mean their role in the fact- 



finding inquiry over the weekend? 



that's correct. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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ONCLASSIFIED 



Q And what concerned you about that? 
y^ A Well, I saw this as inevitably going toTcriminal 
inquiry. I just didn't see how it would go in any other 
direction, ultimately. 

And there were a variety of issues that gave me 
concern — one, the fact that these very high-level officials 
would in fact be witnesses — conceivably fact witnesses — of 
critical importance to any inquiry; the fact that from an 
appearance point of view it suggested that in all probability 
their conclusions would be questioned and their motives 
examined, their objectivity examined. 

I just felt that given the political situation--the 
factual context in which we found it that the department 
would be best served to get it into a more regularized 
pattern and, in my experience with these highly charged 
situations, to assign it to career, experienced prosecutors 
to commence an appropriate inquiry. 

And I appreciated many of the counter-arguments of 
theirs. I felt, on balance, that it would be a mistake. 

Q It was a mistake to? 

A To play this role at this level--to have these 
high-level officials play this role. 

Q That being the role over the fact-finding weekend. 

A That's correct. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Who was making the counter-arguments ^ 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



MR. RICHARD: Myself, in my own mind. 

MR. McGOUGH: Like any good lawyer. 

MR. RICHARD: No, I can appreciate the fact that 
the attorney general wears at least two hats and that in the 
context ofTneeds that he has to accumulate the facts. But 
there, in retrospect, certainly it might have been better 
served assigning someone to gather these facts and report 
back to him rather than participate at his own level and the 
levels of Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Cooper. 

BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q You said that one of your concerns was the appear- 
ance of a lack of objectivity by Mr. Reynolds, Mr. Cooper, 
and the attorney general. 

Did you have any reason to doubt their actual 
objectivity — that's Mr. Reynolds — any reason to doubt his 
objectivity? 

A None whatsoever. No. 

Q Any reason to doubt his competence to handle the 
investigation — to handle the fact-finding — the role that was 
cast for him in the fact-finding weekend? 

A The role as articulated by the attorney general? 
No. I had no doubt--question his competence and ability to 
do that. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 



IINCLASSm 



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liNCUSSIflED 



BY MS- NAUGHTON: 

Q As long as we're on Reynolds, can I ask a question? 
His official title is assistant attorney general to 
the Civil Rights Division — or at least was at that time. 

A Except that--I just don't know that for sure, 
because I know he has assumed other duties as well. 

Q Okay. That's what I want to ask you about. 

In terms of the other duties, could you describe to 
us what you know of those? I'm speaking in terms of the 
November '86 reference rather than what he's currently 
working on. 

A Well, I don't know the timing. But he has assumed 
the duties of counsellor to the attorney general — that's my 
understanding — the role Ken Cribbs previously played. 

Now, when--I can't place it in a point of time in 
November . 

Q The attorney general testified that Reynolds was 
coordinating or somehow working on national security 
projects — alluded to them and did not elucidate. 
Do you know what those were? 

A No, I don't know, but it's quite conceivable that 
he had such assignments that I wouldn't know. I wouldn't 
nave a need to know. 

Q Was he perceived to be tl* °— '1°— VUJ<L number two man 
at Justice? 



rNffiM"" 



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A No, I certainly didn't perceive--I saw him as an 
individual who appreciated the confidence of the attorney 
general, who was very interested in a variety of areas and 
was called upon by the attorney general and others for his 
counsel and was well-regarded. 

Again, back to the response — you know, of my 
concerns. I think I had articulated a question--why can't 
Mary Lawton's office play a role at some point? 

MR. McGOUGH: You mean at some point after the 2 5th 
or some point leading up to the 25th? 

MR. RICHARD: Why aren't they being utilized? 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Could you explain for the record what her office is 
and what her background is? 

A Well, she is the head of the Office of Intelligence 
Policy Review and handles all Department of Justice matters 
relating to implementation of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act and is the principle component responsible 
for formulating and commenting on national security issues 
for the Department of Justice. 

Q And that would include covert findings — covert 
action findings? 

A I'm not sure precisely what her role is in that 
regard, but I do believe she has a role to play in that. 

Q And could you just give us an idea for the record 



I include covert iinoings- 

UNCLASSIFIED 



172 



IHmFIB 



how long, as far as you know, that you she has been with the 
Department of Justice? 

A Well, she was formerly with our Office of Legal 
Counsel. She is a well-regarded attorney, has been with the 
government — must be at least 20 years. She had been with us, 
I think, for about 15 years, went into the private sector for 
about three or four, and returned to the department--or 
returned to government, I think, in about 1980 and assumed 
her present duties when Richard Willard became head of the 
Civil Division in approximately 1984, I would venture to 
say — maybe earlier. 

Q When she was in the Office of Legal Counsel, do you 
know, was she — did she involve herself or write any opinions 
regarding national security matters or intelligence matters? 

A I believe so. I think at that time there was no 
Office of Intelligence Policy Review, and I think she was the 
principle — certainly one of the principle — senior attorneys 
working in the area for the Office of Legal Counsel at the 
time. 

She was also very active in FBI intelligence and 
undercover operations, commenting on the parameters of those 
activities. 

MS. NAUGHTON; Thank you. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR J^HE .S^liJ^JS^SELECT 

COMMITTEE 



COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SI 

HASSA 



173 



WUSSIfJfD 



BY MR- McGOUGH: 

Q Let me expand on those questions I asked about Mr. 
Reynolds in regard to Mr. Cooper and Mr. Richardson. 

Did you have any reason to question Mr. Cooper's 
objectivity or his experience — competence to handle the task 
that had been assigned to him over the fact-finding weekend. 

A No, not to question his competence. I mean, it was 
apparent — to me, anyway — that he would be criticized, that it 
would be regarded as being irregular, as being inappropriate 
for him to assume what would be perceived by many as an 
operational role more suited for operational type personnel. 
And I was concerned that the public would see this 
as a substitute for a different type of investigation, which 
would draw the department into controversy. 

Q How about Mr. Richardson? Same questions. 

A Mr. Richardson — again, he is an extremely competent 
attorney. And again, there is no question of competence or 

if 

capability. It's a question of given their positions^being 
misconstrued as to their operational responsibilities to 
gather this kind of information. 

Q Do you think that each of the attorneys we've been 
discussing have the type of experience that you believe might 
have been desirable to do the type of document analysis-- 
interviews and analysis^ tha_t^<*as_r^yj.C5d.UJie£ the fact- 
finding weekend? 



iMim 



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A Given their mission, I would say yes. t 

what concerned me was that their mission would be I 
mis-perceived. 

Q How did you see that mission? I mean, you say 
"given their mission". What do you mean by their mission? 

A To basically find out what was--had transpired. To 
determine what has to be done. The trouble is to conduct 
interviews in this setting and in this context. 

The concern I've always had is that it would be 
viewed as the launching of a criminal inquiry by people who 
normally do not engage in such activities, and thus it would 
be perceived as being irregular. The fact that the attorney 
general--tasked by the president or on his own initiative-- 
seeks to acquire relevant data to find out what has occurred 
in order to make executive decisions is not inappropriate, in 
my judgment. 

But I think this distinction over time would be 
lost on the public in general. 

Q Based on what you know about the fact-finding 
inquiry and the results that evolved over that weekend, was 
there a point prior to November 25th that you feel the 
Criminal Division should have been brought in? 

A Well, it's hard to say. For the purpose as 
articulated by the attorney general and others that was to be 
served at that time based on their appreciation of the facts. 



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there was no problem. I have no quarrel with what was done. 

I don't take exception to the notion that we have a 
confused set of facts. You try to find out what in fact 
occurred. The difficulty was the information that they 
generated suggested that what they were involved in may have 
criminal implications. But it was the very product of their 
efforts that revealed that. 

Now we have the question of the ramifications of 
their activities on a potential criminal inquiry, and all 
that "hlowfi from that plus--you know, what concerned me was 
drawing the department's credibility into question publicly. 

Q On November 26th, do you recall speaking with Mr. 
Weld from Milwaukee? 

A tU»tr. 1 had gone out of town for the Thanksgiving 
holiday, but I had urged before leaving that again the matter 
be sent to the Criminal Division and assigned to career 
people. And I periodically called in to Mr. Weld. 

Q Did you feel that your recommendation was being 
followed? 

A At that point it was being considered. There was 
no resolution, as far as I understood--you know, at that time 
what was to be done. How any inquiry would be structured and 
how the department intended to pre 
stood, was still being consi 



."-ICtfflfi 



Did you ultimately at some point learn that a team 



176 



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of Justice Department attorneys that included Mr. Cooper was 
going to conduct the follow-up investigation after the 25th? 

A Well, on the day after Thanksgiving, which was the 
27th, I think. 

Q The 28th. 

A You're right—the 28th. 

I think I was informed by Mr. Weld that a decision 
had been made to send it to the Criminal Division. I think 
when he told me that on the phone, I suggested that we 
immediately issue grand jury subpoenas to all the appropriate 
people at the White House to preserve the record and ensure 
that everyone was on notice that there was an ongoing 
criminal investigation and that there would clearly potential 
obstruction issues if there were destruction or tampering 
with pertinent records. 

Q What suggested to you at that point that that sort 
of precaution was necessary? 

A Professional experience? I don't know. 

Q There was no fact that came to your attention 
between when you were brought into the case on the 25th and 
your recommendation on the 28th that might have led you to 
believe that possible — that these steps ought to be taken to 
prevent destruction of records. 

A I don't recall any specific fact. It just seemed 
to me that any destruction or alteration of documents was a 



177 



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natural concern that we should have. I can't tell you what 
suggested it to me. 

Q Do you know what steps were taken--or what was Mr. 
Weld's response, do you recall? 

A Well, he told me that the attorney general decided 
that grand jury should--subpoenas should not be issued, that 
we can accomplish the same objective I was seeking to 
accomplish through the sending of letters to relevant, 
agencies . 

Q Did you consider that an acceptable alternative? 

A Acceptable? Well, part of my concern was antici- 
pating a potential defense of individuals that they weren't 
aware that there was an ongoing criminal inquiry. And 
sending to an agency — protect your records--accomplishes a 
portion of what has to be accomplished to protect and 
preserve the records . 

The conveying of knowledge, though, is easily 
conveyed when someone is specifically hit with a grand jury 
subpoena for records . 

Q It was acceptable but didn't totally do everything 
you wanted — would have liked it to do. 

A Well, I mean--yes . ,>i4stjny own approach would have 
been to issue the subpoenas. 

Q Let me return to what I think — a questiorT that I 
left dangling a little while ago, and that was did you learn 




178 



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that a team of Justice Department attorneys that included Mr. 
Cooper was going to be supervising the investigation on 
behalf of the department? 

A When you supervising the investigation--the I don't 
recall that it was that he was to supervise but rather be 
part of the criminal investigative team. 

Q Well, I'll accept that. 

A No, I mean it wasn't that all of a sudden we were 
reporting to Cooper — that was not my understanding--but that 
there was the desire that he participate as part of — a member 
of the team. 

Q Did you have any problems with that? 

A Yes, but they were subsumed by events, because it 
was clear that — quickly that the way we should be going is 
through the appointment of an independent counsel. So the 
notion of constructing a viable in-house investigative team 
quickly went by the boards in my mind anyway. 

Q what were your concerns about Mr. Cooper partici- 
pating with the team? 

A Well, it became clear that the FBI felt very 
uncomfortable with his role, ilil^^* ^A^A'^J^M^fihVi'^^ ^^'^Y 
uncomfortable with our rol 

There was seemingly suspicion across the board. 
Anyone other than — at best — career people — you know, who- 
could-they-trust type of atmosphere. And it was very 



roromra"" 



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difficult to learn what the bureau was finding, doing. 

And it was clear right from the first, in my mind, 
that the bureau was very reluctant to work in a constructive 
fashion with the team that was being proposed. I don't think 
they had any problem with the Criminal Division personnel, 
but the whole role of Mr. Cooper and what it implied to them 
gave them, I suspect, a lot of pause. Now, how high up that 
pause went, I don't know. 

MR. McGOUGH: That was as far as I was goin., to go 
with the background sort of thing. 

Pam, why don't you finish it up? 
MS. NAUGHTON: Yeah, I had just really a few 
questions on this. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q I gather — on the weekend between the 21st and the 
24th, were you in Washington that weekend? 
A The 24th of November? 
Q November of '86 — yes. 
A I believe so. 

Q Had the attorney general asked you to take part in 
the fact-finding inquiry that weekend, would you have done sol 
A Oh, sure. 
Q And had he asked you to instruct the people who 



.ry tnac weexena, wouia yi 

UNCLASSIHED 



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work under you to do so, would you have so instructed them to 
do so? 

A Certainly. 

Q If I can go back one minute to what we were talking 
about in the Evans case- 

Prior to November of '86 when the whole issue of 
this certification to the court came up, did the attorney 
general certify at any other court or was there other 
discussion on any--on the Evans case or any other case -that 
the attorney general should make such a certification? 

A No, I don't believe so. 

There was the West Coast case, where we had to make 
some departmental representations to the court, but nothing of 
that nature. I don't recall right off hand what those were, 
but they didn't pose, at least to my knowledge, any-- 

Q To your knowledge, he was not personally involved. 

A He was aware of it, or so I was led to believe by 
Bill Weld, who took this up in his early-morning staff 
meeting. 

Q My question is specifically in a much earlier time 
frame--let's say the summer of '86. Was there such an issue 
raised? 

A I don't recall any--in the summer of '86? I am not 
aware of any. 

Let nie--if I can go back just To^clarify something 



jcall any--in the summer 

UNCLASSIFIED 



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that I said earlier that may be confusing. It was in 
connection with the Evans case. 

At some point Mr. Weld may have been urging that 
the inquiry required — not required, but that should be 
conducted for the Evans certification — be done by the 
Criminal Division. That I don't know. If that's what he was 
urging on the attorney general, which may be possible, that 
may* explain some of the ambiguity that has arisen with 
respect to my knowledge of what he is telling the attorney 
general. That would make some--that is a possibility. 

But I don't recall that being articulated — that we 
should take over the investigation of both sides of the 
equation. It certainly wasn't something I was advocating. I 
don't know if that clarifies it or further confuses it. 

Q Just for the record, the staff — senior management 
group meeting that occurs at 8:30 every morning with the 
attorney general — you are not part of that, is that correct? 

A No. 

Q So you were not present when Mr. Weld made those 
comments . 

A That's correct. 

Q I want to skip ahead for a minute to December 1st 
of '86, and this is right Jj^^tjrg _the _^e^isipn_to_ seek an 
independent counsellor. 

I took a note of our last interview with you, and 



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now I can't remember what it means. It's referring to 
something that Jameson said, who is of course with the 
counsel for CIA, regarding that the 1985 shipments didn't 
occur. And this conversation apparently took place in Deputy 
Attorney General Burns' conference room. 

A There was one meeting on the — if I could just refer 
to my notes for a moment — on December 1st. After a lot of 
discussion, we are urging — we meaning Jack Keeney, myself--we 
urging Bill Weld to recommend the appointment of special 
counsel . 

Now, I think we were favoring at this point a model 
that had been previously used by the department pre- 
independent counsel. What we were referring to as a e ur rsnt 
model is the appointment under existing authority of an 
independent counsel appointed outside of the independent 
counsel's statute. Because there was serious question in our 
mind at this stage, certainly, whether the Independent 
Counsel Act was being triggered by the facts then known. 

MR. McGOUGH: Because of the covered person? 

MR. RICHARD: The — person aspect, the confused 
facts — I mean, a variety of questions arose as to the 
applicability of the Independent Counsel statute to the 

• ••- UNCLASSIFIED 

And I don't propose to be an expert on the nuances 
of that act or the prior department positions being taken 



183 



UNCUSSIFIED 



with respect to the act, but I certainly felt that it was 
appropriate to go for an independent counsel model and that 
if there was any question as to the availability statutorily 
of the Independent Counsel Act, that we still had authority, 
independent of that act, to appoint a special counsel. And 
we were urging that on Bill Weld. 

There was a meeting on the first with the attorney 
general — Burns, Bill Weld, with Cooper, Cribbs, Richardson, I 
think Bill Hendricks of the Criminal Division, Allen Carver — 
at which we expressed our views to that effect to the 
attorney general. From that meeting — and the attorney general 
listened and asked some questions and took it under advise- 
ment. 

From that meeting, we then proceeded down to the 
deputy's office, where we met with some FBI agents, who were 
there to brief us on the status of the inquiry on the first. 
It was clear certainly there that the FBI had great reluctance 
to reveal -- 

MS. NAUGHTON: Had what? 

MR. RICHARD: --had great reluctance to reveal all 
of the information that they were gathering. At least that 
was the tenor of the meeting, if you will. 

Now, in answer to your question: if it's all from 
my notes of that meeting, I can only say that that's something 
that they probably didn't mention 



ly say that t 

Mm 



184 



_ 1 

2l 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 



« 



WNCUSJIflEO 



I don't have the notes before me, but I don't 
believe Mr. Jameson was at that meeting. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q If it came from the FBI, then, during an interview 
with Jameson-- 

A I don't believe that Jameson-- 

Q Now, for the record again, your notes indicate that 
on that date when the issue of Mr. Reynolds' meeting with Tom 
Green came up, you and others were very much opposed to that. 

A Yes. 

Q Could you tell us why? 

A Well, at this point in time, as I recall, the 
matter was now with the Criminal Division, and we really saw 
no justification for someone of that rank and position to be 
present at what could be an extremely critical meeting with 
an attorney for a major figure involved in the matter. 

Q Were you actually present when Mr. Reynolds gave 
his reasoning for a meeting with — 

A I believe that occurred in a telephone conversation. 

Q Were you present for the other half of that 
conversation? 



resent for the otner nait 

UNCLASSIFIED 



A Yes. I know we discussed it with Bill Weld and 
strongly urged'Ho oppose Reynolds meeting at all. And we may 
have opposed even the meeting. I don't recall that. But we 
certainly, I think, were unanimous in our opposition to Mr. 



185 



50' C Su«t N E 
Wuhmiion. O C 20002 



Mmsim 



Reynolds being present. 

Q Were you present when — did Mr. Weld call Reynolds? 

A I believe so. 

Q And were you present? 

A I think so, yes. 

Q And after Mr. Weld was through with the conversa- 
tion, did he explain to you what Mr. Reynolds' reason was? 

A My understanding is that our arguments that he was 
going to be putting himself into a position of being a 
potential witness--that 's already done, so that is not a 
particularly persuasive argument. 

I think the agreement reached was that our attorney 
would be present, which was a significant factor for us that 
meetings with defense counsel would not be held absent the 
presence of a Criminal Division attorney. 

Q I know what I had a question about . 

The subsequent application to freeze the accounts 
made through Switzerland — were you — did you take part in that' 

A Yes. 

Q Where did you get the account numbers that were 
used? 

A Which applications are you_ referring_to? I mean, 
to initially freeze the accounts? 

Q These would have been filed. They're part of the 
attorney general's exhibits — something like exhibit 60 or so. 



■ou referring to? I mean, 

UNCLASSIFIED 



186 



_ 1 

2 

■3 
4 
5 
6 

8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 

a CO.. INC. 
25 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A In answer to your question-- 

Q This would have been in mid-December or so. 

A Well, we started our efforts to freeze the account 
fairly quickly. I think it was early December. 

Judge Sofaer and I had a conversation, in which I 
think he suggested or questioned what are we doing. It was 
agreed we've got to move to ensure that there i« no transfers 
of monies. And we agreed upon an approach to accomplish that 
as quickly as possible. 

Now, at that time — at the initial stage where we 
approached the Swiss — I believe we were given an account 
number by Mr. Cooper. They had acquired an account number 
during their efforts, I'm tempted to say, that was given to 
the FBI either through Mr. Cooper or through the State 
Department . 

Q Well, no — this kind of point — did you personally 
get it from the FBI? Let me start from scratch. 

Did you author the document — the actual document-- 
the application? 

A Well, I worked on it with people from our Office of 
International Affairs. We stayed, I think, well into the 
night, if I recall correctly, on some of the applications. 
The FBI, myself, and the head of--one of our team leaders 

was most familiar with the Swiss procedures --eft**y y 



requirements . 



UNCLASSIHED 



187 



iimsim 



187 



Now, where did we get the number? Depending on 
which request you're addressing your question to, I would say 
the FBI except for the first request. And the first request — 
I think the State Department provided it. 

I apologize — only because it was of no great moment 
to me other than that we had the account. 

Q Forgive my ignorance, but what's the reason for the 
second request? 

A Well, there were initial steps, if you will, that 
were taken that were designed to accomplish the immediate 
objective, which was to freeze the assets. That was the 
immediate objective — to make sure that nobody was taking 
money out of relevant accounts. 

Judge Sofaer and I had discussed the best way to 
approach this. And we had agreed that we would do it on a 
multiple-track approach, going to the Swiss government on a 
diplomatic route, to the ambassador in Washington, and then 
following it up with a request in anticipation of a formal 
treaty request. 

We went this way thinking it was the quickest way 
to accomplish our objective, and in my judgment it proved to 
be that way, because we aat. it^ imnLecUaieJ.i__fiOien but not 
under the treaty. 

Now, this is an area that is difficult for me to go 
nto because under the treaty, the responses coming back from 



m 



188 



_ 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

a CO.. wc. 

25 



WUSSIf/EO 



the Swiss to us I'm not allowed to divulge to-- 

Q Let me ask some specific questions, and you tell me 
if you can answer them then. 

The request I particularly want to concentrate on 
right now describes the--I guess the basis for freezing the 
accounts as the possibility that it might be U.S. money. 

A That's correct. 

Q So is that your first request that you just 
described--in other words, the basis for freezing the 
accounts? 

A The first request was based on a possible 1343 
violation of Title XVIII, which was--if I'm not mistaken. 
The next request included 1^41 and 641. 

Q So the first one doesn't necessarily contemplate 
U.S. monies, because it could be a fraud on anybody. 

A That's correct. 

Q But the second one did contemplate U.S. monies, 
b«CAuse it was 641. 

A The initial formulation of what to ask for, as I 
recall, was my judgment based on what the FBI was telling me 
they knew of from a factual point of view. We had to 
predicate the request on known facti 

Q Did you--other than the very first account number 
that was presented in the first request, did you either add 
account numbers or change account numbers in the subsequent 



)f view. We had to 

UNCLASSIFIED 



189 



jlbl89 



_ 1 
2 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

I CO.. MC. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



M7 C Sunt. N E 



25 



requests? 

A We added account numbers, but the FBI was at this 
point coming up with the data--they were giving Os a«r9to what 
they found as far as the accounts . We wanted to take the 
action against any and all accounts, so as soon as we learned 
of accounts, we would just constantly be sending in our 
requests . 

I was getting the data from the FBI . That was my 
source of information. 

Q Did you ever get any information from either the 
Swiss or any other source that any of the account numbers 
were incorrect? 

Is that revealing too much? 
A It is, under the treaty. I'm really-- 
Q That's fine. 

MR. McGOUGH: While she's looking, let me just ask 
you what I hope is going to be one quick question. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE SELECT 
COMMITTEE 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q Did you have any contact with a prosecution or an 
investigation out of the Eastern District o^ Pennsylvania 
into the machinations of an alleged Saudi prfnce by the 
name--used a lot of different aliases, but the most common 
one was Al-Masoudi— Al-Masou(i^ ||N| I uWirlrn 



190 



^/ 



liNcussm 



A I don't recall, but periodically we would get 
inquiries from the State Department about prosecutions of 
various reported princes. And they're asking for status. I 
don't recall this one. 

Q Do you recall having any contact with Oliver North 
or anyone at the NSC about such a person? 
A No. 

Q How about any — does the name Richard Miller or 
International Business Communications mean anything to you in 
that context? 

A International Business Communications? 
Q IBC. 
A No. 

MR. GENZMAN: Also the name Zadeh--Z-A-D-E-H, which 
I believe was the name- he was prosecuted under. 

MR. McGOUGH: Ho was prosecuted under Zadeh in the 
United States Eastern District. 

MR. RICHARD: And the charge? 

MR. McGOUGHl Attempt to defraud the William Penn 
Bank. 

MR. RICHARD: William Penn Bank. 

Go njid e iabl - y ', only because it iS not unusual for me 
to get these calls about would-be princes and connections 
with various royal families and what have you. But it just 
doesn't ring a bell. 



lll\lfi!il.winFn 



191 



' C Sam. N E 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

"25 



\!mmm 



What I normally do is just inquire on the status 
and pass that on to the State Department. 

MS. NAUGHTON: I do have one other question, I 
think. 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUSE SELECT 

COMMITTEE 

BY MS- NAUGHTON: 

Q I'm referring you to your notes of December 1, '86. 
And towards the bottom here it says — when it's talking about 
Secretary Weinberger — 

A At the bottom? 

Q Where it says--it refers that Secretary Weinberger 
said that the '85 shipments didn't occur. Do you know who 
was talking or what they're talking about in that note? 

A This is part — as I interpret my own notes — this is 
part of the December 1, '86 FBI briefing which occurred in 
the deputy's conference room. And this is the FBI conveying 
thl8 information. I see earlier, incidentally, that they 
make reference to George Jameson, so that confirms the 
suspicif^ns that it was-- 

Q Do you recall the FBI telling you that Secretary 
Weinberger had said that 1985 shipments did not occur? 

A I can only refer to the notes — the fact that they 
here suggest that the representation was made, but the FBI-- 
that this is what is emerging. Now, where they got it from, 



192 



jlbl92 



BNCUSSm 



I don't know. 

MS. NAUGHTON: I have no more questions. Thank you. 

MR. McGOUGH: I have nothing further to make. Bob? 

MR. GENZMAN: All the points that I had have been 



covered. 



I thank you for your time, sir. 



[Whereupon, at 6:12 p.m., the taking of the 
deposition concluded.] 



UNCUSSIFIED 



193 



ONCIASSIFIEO 



CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC 
I, William D. McAllister, the officer before whom 
the foregoing deposition was taken do hereby certify that the 
witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition 
was duly sworn by me; that I am neither counsel for, 
related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the 
action in which this deposition was taken; and further that 
I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel 
employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise 
interested in the outcome of the action. 



William D. McAllister 
Notary Public in and for the 
District of Columbia 



My commission expires October 15, 1989. 



mmzm 



194 



Memorandum 



UNCLASSIFSEO 



J 3 ^/-'^£l 



J 4782 



Boland Amendment 



April 13, 1984 



Mark Richard 

Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General 
Criminal Division 

•Victoria Toensing 
Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General 
Criminal Division 



Stephen S. Trott 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Division 



Please contact Mary Lawton ASAP and prepare a memo on the 
Boland Amendment. What it is, why it was passed, what it was 
intended to accomplish, and when and why it expired (Sept. 83 ?) 
etc. 

What is the effect of its expiration on our problem? 

Richard Willard and Ralph Tarr insist that § 1341 means 
that if zero funds were authorized for "mining activity" etc., 
the expenditure of $1 violates the Antidef iciency Act. It is 
a technical argument at best, with respect to a statute that 
has never been enforced — or even thought of in this light. 
Any thoughts? 

Stay in touch with Lowell on this during my absence. 



I^Declassilied/Released onJ^it«So 
under provisions oi E 0- t23i5 
K Jonnson. National Setunry Council 



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STEPHEN S. -mOTT 
ASSISTA^f^ ATTORNEY GENSWL 



Room ^4o.— 8ldg. 



Phon« No* 



0RM4UII*».7-76) 



197 



l!NCUSS!FIEO 



The Deputy Attorney General 



March 20, 1966 



Oliver B. Revell 
Executive Assistant Director 
Investigations 




INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 

The entire contents of this memorandum are classified 




Classified By G^ 
Declassify On: OADR 



vN^iLftyi'.. j StU 






198 



KICUSSIRED 

Rest o-^ 



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under provisions ot E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 






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J 5642 






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Johnson. Nanonal Swuiity Council 



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204 



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ROUTING AND TRANSMHTAL SUP 



October 2, i?86 



1. Mark M Richard 






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We have reviewed the attached draft ""- 
teletype and proposed letter from "v" -^-^ 
Assistant Secretary Abrams, and discussed 
this matter with Roger Yochelson of OIA. ■ -. 
We note two inaccuracies in A/S Abrams' ■-■ 
letter. First, contrary to the assertion 
[ustice has not intervened 
oehalf to recommend that -rs) 

— ^^ 

the Government wasrf>0(>-. 

Since then, we V" '^ 

ted nor opposed sending ^ 

"~ Second, although %lo 




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John L. Hart/nT" 


Phon* No. 






205 



J 461 5 



- 2 - 

A/S Abrams represents that Justi 

prepared to brief the | 

on the evidence and legal process 

case, we are not aware of any such plans 

We understand that the attached 
communications have not yet been sent. 
We strongly urge that, before transmitta 
A/S Abrams' letter and the draft teletyp 
be modified to clear up these two points 



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VERIFICATION NUMBER 



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AUNiY. mWsmw i uni t . 

Unlttd SUU( Attorney 'J Office 
Southern Olitrlct of New York 



SENDER'S FTS PHONE NUMBEF 



Auumss (with room nunber} 

One Stint An4r«»'i Pliw. tai. ^2-7 
New York. Nev York 10007 ~ 



^AUIHIU HACHIM US NUh6» 
(Auto«t1e) 

662-917* 
(212) 7S1.9178 



MtMHlLJ HAJHINI 

VERIFICATION NUMBER 



662-1139 



SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: 



3 i% 






THIS SHEET MUST BE USED OH AIL TRANS-,SS,ONS THAT ORIGINATE FROM 5.O.N.Y. U.S. AHORNEY'S 0. 



rOpciass.rie;)/ne'ejsK) onJl££«.6S' W ^^^ 

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UNCLflSSIfJED 



J 4006 

-^NQS ^ilB -s-n 

This statement is aubmltted'ln response to the Court's 
inquiry concerning the e«e=t on this case of recent .laclosures 
concernln, th. authorized shipment by the United states of ar.s 
to Iran. At the Courf. re.ue.t we address three issues: :, the 
-rits Of the case. 2, bail, and 3, the scheduled trial date 
MERITS OF THE rxtv 

All Of the charges in this case arise out of the 
defendants- schemes to .a., false statement, to the United • 
States. The events discussed by the President late last weeK 
have no bearing whatsoever on the illegality of plots to defraud 
.the United States, as charged in Indictment ssss 8« Cr 38. 
(LBS) . 

The indictment charges three type, of crimes all 
arising fro. the defendants- efforts to misrepresent to the 
united states the intended destination of ar.s, which the 
defendants in fact were attempting to sell to Iran. The first 
five count, charge conspiracy to defraud the United States and 
n.a.e false statements. The next .6 counts charge a scheme to 
defraud the United States using wire and mail conununications 
The last five count, charge that .ome of the defendants actually 
-de false statement, to the Office of Munitions Control in the 
Department of State. 

The Department of Justice'i^^^l^;;^^,^ this case in 
connection with the recent event. ^ di.cussed by Present .eagan 
"U«".t^iS:!^^ ^''^^"^"^ >^^"3S last Thursday. The Department 
havdvi^TJ^Cnited states Attorney, office that the.e events 

taMb Oeciassiliedmeteasea oniZ_i_5^23 
u„toBto.«onso.tO .2356 
by K Jolinson. Nalional Zewu-.f Coiiiicil 

UMCLRSSIF5E0 



209 



mussmEo 



4007 



»*i^V-ff 



charged in the Indlcwent. The United States Attornc^^Of f Ice 
i, Jurther advised that no exculpatory. 1^ Brad^ Jnaterials 
exist by virtue of those «^^""- ^^=5^^^^^°^ 
previous statement/that A:here is nct^t^i^ p^^H^ 
def/ndits/were a/part /f any /of ficiiuJsa/ctioLd e4foAs by 
the* United State/ to ship ary(aments/to fr»n-J 

we would respectfully remind the Court that five 
eeparate conspiracies or proposed arms deals are charged in the 
Indictment. In connection with only one, the "vlanar 
conspiracy,- did any of the defendants discuss or even suggest 
during the undercover negotiations that the specific arms deal in 
question had teen submitted to the United States r.overmrent for 
approval and that the Government was considering it. As for that 
propocal, that aeeertion that the propcial was ,.r>^Hnn»,l i» 
demonstrably inaccurate and, in any event, unrelated to the 
recent disclosures. I As for the remaining four conspiracies, the 
defendants' assertions that the transactions were authorized are 
also without foundation. They are speculative defense raised by 
counsel only after the arrests. 1 

Accordingly, the Government submits that the merits of 
the case are not affected by recent disclosures and news reports. 



All of the defendants are free on ball except the 
defendant Albert riearmoy. We have agreed to a bail package for 
Mr. riearmoy in view of his representation last week for the 
..... .._„ •h.t he actually ha- 'n^-^. to deposit as security for 



UHCLftSS\?:£0 



210 



ijHcimim , ,„„3 



hi» release. Until last weak, Plearmov's counsel had not 
pi«b«iiL«a rot Llie courl,'6 consiileiaLlon any bail conditions that 
rlearmoy could meet. 

We oppose any modification to the bail conditions 
previously set by the Court for the remaining defendants. In our 
view, the trial should proceed expeditiously as scheduled, and 
the strength of the Government's evidence is unaffected by recent 
disclosures. 

TRIAL DATE 

All pretrial proceedings should be concluded in a 
timely fashion such that trial can begin as scheduled on February 
2, 1987. In view of what Is described above, there if no basis 
for additional discovery related to the recent disclosures. 
Moreover, defendants cannot raise an apparent authority defense 
Accordingly, as discussed in the Government's memorandum of law 
in opposition to the defendants' discovery requests, defendants 
are not entitled to information related to the recent 
disclosures. 



fr» 



*V 



lMCLASSiF:t3 



211 



iummi 



DEPOSITION OF JOHN N. RICHARDSON, JR 



Wednesday, July 22, 1987 



U.S. House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions in Iran 




V3^^ 



Washington, D.C. 



The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m., in 
room B-352, Raybum House Office Building, with Pamela 
Naughton (Staff Counsel, House Select Committee) presiding. 

Present: Piunela Naughton, Staff Counsel, Staff Counsel, 
House Select Committee; W. Thomas McGough, Jr., Associate 
Counsel, Senate Select Committee; emd Kenneth Buck, Assistant 
Minority Counsel, Rouse Select Committee. 

Also Present: Jack E. Perkins, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. 
Department of Justice. ^ _ , r.^/ooiBased on LZ^ — 



212 



UN(IH$»PT 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

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MS. NAUGHTON: Could you state your full name? 

THE WITNESS: John North Richardson, Jr. 

MS. NAUGHTON: My name is Pam Naughton. I am 
Staff Counsel to the House Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. 

MR. McGOUGH: Tom McGough, Associate Counsel to 
the Senate Select Committee. 

MR. BUCK: Kenneth Buck, Assisant Minority Counsel, 
with the House Select Committee. 

MR. PERKINS: Jack Perkins, Office of Legislative 
Affairs, Department of Justice. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Mr. Richardson, could you tell us what your title 



Q 
is? 

A 
Of staff. 

Q 

A 



It is Assistant to the Attorney General and Chief 



What do your duties include? 

I am basically responsible for the office 
operations. Office of the Attorney General, and that includes 
supervising a number of lawyers, the paper flow in and out 
of the office, the schedule operations, travel operations, 
and basically daily management of issues that are coming 
through the office. 

Just so I have the structure correct, at around 
October-November of '86, Mr. Cribb was in your office. 



213 



Kenneth Cribb? 

A Right. 



3 Did you work for him or was that sort of separate? 
^ A Yes, I did. He was Counselor to the Attorney 

5 General and my reporting relationship was through Cribb to 

6 Meese, although as a practical matter, I did a substantial 

7 amount of my work without checking with him. 

8 Q Now, could you tell us where you graduated from law 

9 school? 

10 A University of Virginia. 

11 Q What year was that? 

12 A -82. 

13 Q What did you do after law school? 

14 A I was Law Clerk to a U.S. District Judge in 

15 Richmond, Virginia for one year. 

16 Q Which judge was that? 

17 A Dorsch Wariner. 

18 Q Okay, and after that one year Clerkship with the 

19 judge, what did you do? 

20 A I joined the staff of the Counselor to the 

21 President, Mr. Meese, when he was at the White House. 

22 Q This was in '83? 

23 A Yes, June of '83. 

24 Q What did you do as Mr. Meese' s assistant at the 

25 White House? 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



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A I was a volunteer in that office for the first 
couple of months, and I basically worked as assistant to Ken 
Cribb, who was Meese's assistant. In August, I was put on 
the payroll and for the first probably six months, I worked 
primarily on judi^5c.al selection matters, and preparing briefs 
for meetings and reviewing incoming papers, helping to 
organize them, and whatever projects Cribb gave me, 

Q After that period of time? 

A Then Meese's Special Assistant left the staff. I 
was made Special Assistant and I guess my duties, the 
responsibilities, increased. I became involved in more 
substantivie matters, more meetings. I would attend 
meetings and occasionally with Mr. Meese, take notes. 
Essentially the same, but I guess doing more of that. 

I became, when he was nominated to be Attorney General, 
I was working on the confirmation document production, 
working on those issues. I guess I also was, I was the 
lawyer — Cribb and I were two lawyers on the staff, and 
when, for example, when debate came along, I was tasked with 
going through all of his documents to see if anything was 
responsive. So I would take on projects like that, too. 

Q During your years at the White House did you do 
any staff work regarding Mr. Meese's role in the National 
Security Counsel or NSPG? 

A No. I saw paperwork occasionally but no staffing. 



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as I recall. 

Q Did you attend any meetings either on your own or 
with Mr. Meese during that period of time at the White House 
regarding funding for the contras, Nicaraguan resistance? 

A 1 don't think so. 

Q Did you participate in any discussions or any 
meetings involving soliciting money from third countries to 
support the contra movement? 

A No. 

Q Did you have anything to do while you were at the 
White House with processing any form of findings for covert 
actions? 

A No. Again, I may have seen certain documents in 
the safe if I were looking for something like that, but I 
was not otherwise involved. 

Q Do you know what your clearance was while at the 
White House? 

A I think top secret, but — 

Code word? 

A No. I think I would know and I don't, never knew 
about code word until I got to the department. 

Q When did you get code word clearance? 

A Well, it was definitely after March of eighty -- 
let me think here — I came to the department in March of 
IOC Tfc ....e er^m« *■ i mo mfi-fr that. I don ' t know precisely. 



216 



IWKI^RP^T 



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Q Shortly after? 

A After I had been at the department several months 
over doing^^^^^HH^H^Band for a 
when I took that task on, ?ti»fei Gailback in the office 
continued to do the code word stuff that would come in^^H 
^^^H I took those over — I am not just sure when it was. 
It was a substantial period of time. 



24 




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Now, along this same period of time, in '85, early 
'86, were you aware of efforts on the part of DEA agents to 
be tasked with locating and/or extricating hostages held in 
Lebanon? 

A No. 

Q When did that come to your attention? 

A I am not sure. I know it was some substantial 
period of time after the Iranian initiative had been made 
public and — 

Something after November of ' 86? 

A Definitely after that, and it may ~ it could have 
been later than that. 1 think I became aware of it when it 
became a matter of general public discussion. that there had 
been some sort of DEA assistance. 

Did you have any discussions with the Attorney 



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A After I learned about it? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't think so. 

I know he was briefed by Jack La^n, but I did 
sit in on that briefing, other than to say something, I may 
have said we need to find out what DEA did, or something 
along those lines. He didn't have any detailed discussion 
of it at that point. 

Q Do you know of any discussions with the Attorney 
General in which you either participated or were present at 
which the subject was mentioned that private funds were being 
used for this operation? 

A Well, more recently, the last couple of months, 
there have been discussions like that, saying where we have 
learned some information about what DEA did and who was 
involved, but back at that point, no. 

I guess that is your question, back when we first, 
when I first learned about it? 

Q What I an getting at is, was it ever discussed at 
any time between the Attorney General and anyone else in 
your presence, including yourself, that private monies had 
been used for this operation? 

In other words, had been authorized to be used or 
there was a discussion to the propriety or legality of it? 

A There have been, there have been discussions about 



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that in the last two weeks, for example, but not before that 
I recall. 

What were the discussions in the last two weeks, 
do you recall? 

A Well, it was basically going over matters that 
have been of public interest, preparing for his testimony, 
and I asked from DEA General Counsel last week, the Chief 
Coxinsel, documents that had been provided to the Hill so I 
could inform Meese and inform the Attorney General about what 
might be reviewed. So it was in that context. 

Q Did the Attorney General tell you whether or not 
he authorized the use of private monies for the DEA operations 

A He did not tell ine that he authorized it. 

Q Did he say he did not? 

A I don't think he was aware of it. That is 
obviously something that you should ask him, because — 

Sure. 

A There is no discussion of — that I recall -- of 
his having authorized it. 

Q I want to take you to a tine around March of 1986. 
There is a case out of the Southern District of Florida, in 
Miami, that is known by him at this time also. One is Garcia, 
one is Corvo, and it has to do with basically two things, 
an alleged assassination plot against Ambassador Tambs , and 

o^-.«. «1 1«»r,.HfM^e nf nun rnnnino to the COntraS . The 



221 



uiieu»EfeT 



investigation began sometime on or about December of '85, 
and continued through '86. 

Do you recall when this case first ciune to your 
attention? 

A No, I don't. 

Q In March of '86, or thereabouts, do you know 
whether or not you were aware of the case? 

A I don't recall being aware of it. It is only 
recently that I have been -- it is something that is 
recognizable. 

Q So, you don't think you learned of it until, shall 
we say, after November of '86? 

A Well, the question dealt with March of '86, right? 

Q I am trying to get a handle on when you first 
learned about the case. 

A Okay. I think it is clearly after — I believe 
it would be after November of '86. It may have been much 
more recently, since the beginning of the congressional 
hearings on this initiative. 

Q Are you aware, or were you aware, or are you now 
aware, of any requests by anyone on the staff of the National 
Security Counsel for a briefing on this criminal 
investigation? 

A I was not aware of any requests at the time that 
thev were made. 



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00 19 



Q Have you since come to learn NSC requested such 
a briefing? 

A I an not sure. I believe — I am not sure if they 
did or not. There have been a number of subjects that 
have been covered in prep sessions in the last week or two 
with the Attorney General, so I am not familiar with the 
details of it. I may have heard something along that dealt 
with this subject, but I don't recall it, so I am really not 
in a position to answer. 

Q Moving along to the month of November '86. Were 
you aware on. or about November 7 that Chuck Cooper was being 
tsked to look into the legal raunifi cations of the Iranian 
arms transaction? 

A K believe I found out the tasking to Cooper fairly 
son after it was done, and I think I found out from Cooper, 
but I eun not positive. But I did know fairly soon after that 
Cooper had been tasked to look into some of these issues. 
I think it came up in the context of asking the AG about 
making sure that we, OLC, is looking at some of these question 
and the AG having said Chuck is working on that. Something 
like that. 

Q Was there any discussion at that point -- let's 
say from November 7th until the 20th — regarding whether or 
not the Criminal Division should taOce a look at it, being as 
though the Arms Export Control Act and other Acts may be 



wmmk 



applicable? 

A I don't recall any discussions suggesting that, 
but 1 wasn't — I was not intimately involved in that during 
that time period before the 20th. 

Q Did the attorney — 

A OLC would normally advise on matters like that, as 
opposed to the Criminal Division. 

Q I am not asking about advise, I am asking about 
investigation. 

A No, I don't think there was any discussion. I 
certainly was not aware of any, present in emy discussions 
where it was suggested Criminal Division investigate anything 

6 Did the Attorney General tell you whether or not 
he had asked Mr. Cooper to do this of his own volition, or 
whether or not he had been asked to help with a legal analysis 
by anyone at the White House or NSC? 

A I don't know the answer to that. He didn't 
explain the reason for doing that. 

You don't know how it was initiated? 

A Other than the Attorney General asking Cooper to 
do it, no. 

Q Mr. Cooper has testified that he prepared a book 
of statutes for the Attorney General to review. Did you see 
that book or — 



224 



Did it come through you or -- 

A I don't think so. 1 think he handed it to the 
Attorney General. 

And how is it that you came to look at it? 

A I specifically recall seeing it over the course 
of the couple of days before and during the weekend. Well, 
I say I know during the weekend fact finding inquiry, I am 
not sure about the days before. But I know I saw it over 
the course of that weekend and afterwards. 

Was there any analysis in the notebook or was it 
something of compilation of statutes? 

A I am just not sure. I think it was a combination 
of statutes, but he had done, as I recall. Cooper had 
provided a legal memorandum by the time of the weekend inquiry 
and so whether that was in there, I don't remember. 

I tend to think it was just the statutes, though. 
Meese is very committed to looking at the law. He doesn't 
like for you to tell him what it says, he likes to look at 
the statute and all that sort of thing. 

Were you aware whether or not the Attorney General 
participated in drafting or reviewing any of the President's 
statements that were made between the time period of say, 
November 4th and November 2 0th? 

A Can you give me a hint about what they would be? 

n Won f-h* President aave a statement, I believe. 



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Yes. I just don't recall whether he did or not. 
Do you recall getting any drafts from the White 



on November 13th. 

A That was that speech to the nation? 

Q Yes. He had another press conference on November 
19th. 

A 


House? 

A I just don't remember. I know, I don't think we 
got anything circulated formally. That is, through the 
Office of Cabinet Affairs at the White House into our 
Executive Secretariat. 

Q If it got circulated informally, would it have 
come through you? 

A Most likely it would have come through me, because 
there are standing instructions on our staff, which Meese's 
personal secretary abides by as well, if a package comes in 
it is normally kicked to me. So I probably would have seen 
it, but I just don't recall whether one was sent or not. 

He have done, as I said, we have done a couple of 
speeches on a close hold basis where a text would be sent 
over and come to n^ and he would take a look at it, but 
actually statements were more on the point, but I just recall 
it if these were one of them, I tend to think not, but I am 
just not sure. 

I know after the 25th of November, for example, 



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the President's statement on the 25th of November, Meese was 
involved with, and I don't know, I know there was a statement 
concerning -- I believe it concerned immunity in December of 
'86, that I think he was involved with, but I recall those, 
but I don't recall the others. 

Q Moving then to November 20th, the Attorney General 
was scheduled to spend most of the day at West Point. Do you 
recall what it was that cancelled or changed those plans? 

A It was basically I think twofold, but his reaction 
to the President's news conference and the next — that was 
a Wednesday night. The next day, Thursday, I believe there 
was a meeting scheduled in Poindexter's office to review 
Casey's testimony, and either Poindexter's testimony or 
material he was going to use to brief members of Congress. 

I think, I don't know if the AG called me 
Wednesday night or if I found out first thing Thursday 
morning, but he called and said that he was going to be 
attending this meeting and that he would delay his departure 
by I think it was four or five hours. 

I believe he was scheduled to be in classes at 
West Point teaching, and that sort of thing, Thursday 
afternoon. He delayed it until a dinner function. 

Q You made those arrangements? 

A Well, I probably called our travel guy and said 

fi-^ t-K-ie Ko^xiea >%o -i o r.n«- oninn tn 1 pava iin<-il " X" time. 



227 



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but I think the Army, I believe flew him up there, so it 
was pretty simple. They were providing the plane. So I 
think we delayed his departure time. 

Q Does the Attorney General have a driver? 

A Yes. 

Q For all his transportation? That is from home to 
office and meetings and so forth? 

A Yes. If he goes out, he will frequently not use 
a driver on the weekends, or unless he is going to a particula 
function or something like that, but if he leaves the house 
he normally has an FBI person with him and sometimes they 
will go in his car, sometimes the FBI car, but for business 
functions, he would be brought to work by the department 
driver and taken to and fro. 

Q When would it be he would have an FBI driver with 
him? 

A It may be on weekends. If say it is Christmas 
time, if they are going to go out to get the tree on the 
weekend or when he goes to chrjuoion Sunday, I think they 
drive a family car and the FBI follows him to church. So it 
sometimes, like in those circumstances, they would not, he 
would not have an official driver. Most of the time, he does. 

Q During the weekend of November 21 through the 2 3rd, 
do you recall whether or not for that period of time, you 



228 



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' vehicle? 

2 A I think he had, well I used the personal vehicle. 

3 For example, when I went over to the White House to go through 
^ Ollie North's documents, but I believe the AG had his driver 

5 on duty that weekend. I recall after lunch on Saturday, his 

6 getting into his department car and I could be wrong on that, 

7 but that is my recollection. 

8 Q Now, we were on the 20th and the delayed departure. 

9 Do you recall, did you see a draft of Mr. Casey's testimony 

10 prior to the meeting to review the testimony on the afternoon 

11 of the 20th? 

12 A I don't think so. I don't recall it if I did, but 

13 I don't believe I did. . 

14 Q Did you see it after that? 

15 A I don't think so. I mean, I may have seen a 

16 document, I may have seen a draft in Chuck Cooper's hand, for 

17 example, but I don't recall having looked at a draft. 

18 Q Were you at the session to review Mr. Casey's 

19 testimony? 

20 A No. 

21 Q Did you speak to the Attorney General about it 

22 after he returned from the drafting session? 

23 A No. As I recall, he went straight from the White 

24 House to I think Andrews Air Force Base and on up to West 
9R Point. 



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Q Do you recall when that was? 

A Well, I made an inquiry to try to find out, and 
this is more recently, and I think it was, I believe he had 
wheels up at around 4:30 and/or 4:40, and so it is probably 
— I think we estimated he left the White House around 3:30, 
because at that time of day, it is probably 45 or 50 minute 
drive out there. I think their takeoff had been delayed by 
rain or something. It is in the 3:30 range. 

Q Now, do you recall the Attorney General receiving 
any calls from anybody at the Department of State on the 
afternoon of the 20th? 

A No. I just don't recall. 

Q Do you know whether or not he spoke to Judge Sofaer 
Legal Advisor from the State Department? 

A I don ■ t know . 

Q Do you know whether or not he spoke to Secretary 
of State Shultz that day -- the 20th? 

A I don't know. 

Q Would those calls normally have come to you in 
his absence? 

A I think if the system worked, I would have been 
notified that they had called, but I just don't know whether 
I was or not. If he was not in the office a call like that 
would be put on his telephone log and frequently if a Cabinet 
official calls, I would return it and see if there were 



230 



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anything that we could lend a hand on, although I don't 
recall whether there was a call or whether I did that. 

Do you know whether or not Deputy Attorney 
General Burns received emy telephone calls from the 
Department of State that day? 

A I have been told since that day that he did. I 
didn't know that he had then. 

Q When did you learn that he had? 

A I recall learning about it in the last several 
weeks. 

Q So it was not brought to your attention at the 
time it occurred on November 20th? 

A That is right. I don't recall it having been. 

Q Did you speak to Mr, Burns eibout it after learning 
about. it? 

A No. 

Q How is it that you learned then that that 
telephone call took place? 

A It may have been during congressional testimony, 
which I was watching on TV, or it may have been from Chuck 
Cooper. 

Were you present when Deputy Attorney Burns spoke 
to the Attorney General about this phone call? 

A 
up, I think we figured out that Meese probably took the call 



No. I mean, I think a fewll^eks ago when this came 



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Q When you say we figured out, who is we? 
A I asked a couple of my secretaries in the office 
to figure out when Meese took off from Andrews, talked to 
Cooper to see how long the meetings was in the White House, 
and I guess Chuck Cooper indicated the approximate time of 
the call or that information came from someone, and the 
estimate was Meese was probably in the car when it happened. 

Q So the Attorney General did not tell you about the 
call I guess at any point and certainly not November of "86, 
is that correct? 

A I don't recall him mentioning it in November of 
•86. He has mentioned it in the last several weeks. 

Q Now, on the evening of the 20th, were you called 
by anybody from the Department of Justice regarding the 
discrepancies that had come up between the recollection of 
Secretary Shultz and the statements made in the Casey 
testimony? 

A I don't think I was. I don't believe I was. I 
believe I got a call. It might have been from the Attorney 
General, or from the staff member who was in West Point with 
him, indicating that -- probably from the staff member — but 
indicating th*t he had had a conversation with Chuck Cooper 
and that he was returning to Washington first thing the next 
morning and cancelling the Friday leg of his trip, and I 
believe I called that night, Bruce ZanXa, who is our travel. 



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he handled traveling arrangements for the Attorney General 
to make sure everything was wired. I think I put him in 
touch with West Point. 

Q Do you recall when it was that the Attorney General 
arrived back in Washington, D.C. on the 21st? 

A I don't recall. I know in looking back at staff 
meeting notes that — I don't think he was at the 8:30 
meeting that day. So he may have arrived right afterwards, 
but I think it was fairly early, at the start of most people's 
day, a couple of hours after he normally begins. 

Q Were you at the staff meeting on the 21st? 

A I think so, because I believe I saw some of my 
notes from that day. 

Did anything occur at the Friday morning staff 
meeting that is of relevance to the Iranian arms sales or the 
Nicaraguan resistance? 

A Well, there is an entry from my notes where the 
subject is mentioned but there is nothing significant. I 
don't think there was anything significant at the time and 
now I don't think anything significant occurred. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If you could _Bark this, please. 

(Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q I am showing you what has been marked as Exhibit 
No. 1 to this deposition. Are those your notes? 



233 



'DTIliCRMintO 

A Yes. 

Q Of the staff meeting? 

A Yes. 

And your notes indicate, do they not -- firstly, 
do you know where the originals of these notes are? 

A I believe they are in ray office's possession with 
material that -- I think what we have done is kepi an 
original of everything that is produced and they are I believe 
with that. Although they have been searched in response to 
other document requests in other matters from the Independent 
Counsel Walsh and another matter. They have been reviewed 
for relevant material for another matter, so I can't — I 
provided to the Independent Counsel Walsh originals of most 
of my notes, if not all, in this matter, and I don't think 
I provided the originals of these notebooks to him, I think 
I still have got them. They are one of two places. 

Q We were told last Friday at the Department of 
Justice that the originals were at the White House. 

A Mo , no . 

Q To be kept for Wedtech. 

A Those are Meese's notebooks -only. 

Q Your originals are then, where precisely would 
they be? 

A I can't tell you. I don't know. We have got — 
we have got — there is a location in our office where we 



234 



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have got all of these, all of the original materials. I 
think they are put in one location to be made available for 
inspection. What is it? I am not sure if they are physically 
in the White -- what is in the custody of the White House are 
Meese's spiral notebooks, handwritten notebooks in spiral 
notebooks. 

If we can then go to this exhibit, which is 
obviously a redacted copy. Thre is an entry that says 
"Weld" — which 1 assume refers to Assistant Attorney Weld 

Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, 
is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And the reference teads "How long AG to carry legal 
load alone — various agents involved. JJIB';" whom I assume 
is Mr. Bolton, he is A^^"^£ant: Attorney General for the Office 
of Legislative Affairs? 

A Yes sir. 

Q 'Response focus Cooper, et cetera — as develops," 
and then Weld again, "CRM Division,". *ihich I assume stcmds 
for Criminal Division? 

A Yes. 

Q "Needs to be informed for intact on other cases." 

A Yes. 

Q Could you tell us exactly what those notes indicate 
the discussion was? 



235 



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A Okay, I don't have a specific recollection but 
this is what 1 think they mean. 

That Weld was mentioning that the AG should have 
others involved in trying to figure out what statutes were 
implicated by the transactions that we knew had occurred. 

Q You are speaking about the U.S. sponsored Iranian 
initiative arms transactions? 

A Well, I am speaking of the Iranian initiatives 
and I guess at that point, we didn't really know. I am not 
sure when precisely I became aware enough to know there were 
questions about what happened in '85 and who had sponsored 
or approved, but it is that whole series of arms shipments 
and initiatives in that regard. 

Bolton pointed out that Cooper is already involved 
in that, that his office has been the focus of this legal 
review and Meese was not, that the department was formally 
involved in doing that, Meese wasn't doing that alone. And 
that then Bill's point. Weld's "point for second .entry is that 
Criminal Division needs to be informed of for^ impact on 
other cases. There were, as I recall, there are pending 
arms shipment cases in a number of districts around the 
country and he was just concerned that whatever legal 
conclusions or factual development, I guess I think the 
legal conclusions OLC was reaching were they were aware of. 

Q When you say Mr. Weld mentioned the AG should have 



236 



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C^ 






others involved, did he mention the Criminal Division? 

A No, I don't believe this was — this referred to 
getting the Criminal Division involved. I think it just 
referred to generic comment that there are others that need 
to be involved, the department needs to look at these legal 
questions. 

I guess he was not aware that OLC had been tasked 
to do that, which is what the Bolton note indicates. 

Q Did he indicate in any way concern with the 
Attorney General acting as fact finder? 

A I don't recall anything along those lines, no. 
I think I would have — I don't have any specific, clear 
recollection of this meeting, but I think something like that 
I would have noted in my notes because this was what makes 
me think the AG was not present because I wrote a note here 
on the margin, AG, with an arrow and star. 

That star cir<gled for me is an action notice 
which hopefully I follow up on. That mefuis to me that I need 
to tell Heeae about this conversation or this suggestion and 
I think if there had been a concern raised by the AG that is 
the kind of thing I specifically would have written down. 

Q Was there any other discussion other than Mr. 
Bolton's reply to Mr. Weld's comment? 

A I don't recall any. 

Q Since you indicated with a star it should be 



237 



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followed up, did you follow up on that? 

A I don't recall doing that or not. 

Q Did you tell the Attorney General about this 
comment when he did return on the 21st? 

A I don't recall whether — I don't have any 
recollection of doing that or not doing that. 

Q Did you tell him at any time? 

A I don't recall. I just have no recollection of 
such a conversation. I mean, I was not, I may have or I 
may not have, I just don't recall, but this notation means 
that this is something I think I should tell Meese about. 
This is not a tasking to me out of the meeting that I have 
action on Weld's behavior to inform Meese. That is what I 
try to do. This kind of notation would not indicate that 
I have been tasked to take this and be assured that it is 
done. 

Q Did anyone inform the Attorney General of Mr. 

Weld's comments in your presence? 

A I don't recall. whether they did or not. This 
reference to things like this New York case, where there is 
an arms shipment prosecution underway amd -- 

Q Well, let's get specific when you say this. Are 
you referring to his last -- HMO! AOOirir'^' 



imE 



This last entry. 

r»-iminai Division needs to be informed? 



238 



mmm! 



?5 " 

CO 20 

^^ 22 

~-^ 23 

24 



A For impact on other cases. 
That refers to the New York case? 
A Yes, that is what I believe. 

Q The first reference, however, to the Iranian arms 
shipments? 

A Yes. 

Q I wanted to be clear. 

Now, when that meeting broke up, do you recall 
whether or not this subject was discussed with anyone . 
informally or as the meeting was breaking up? 
A I don't recall. . 

Q Do you know whether or-^ot the Criminal Division 
prepared any research papers or irfeerials or memoranda on 
the Iranian arms sales, the U.S. initiatives? 

A Well, I have been told that they did and I saw 
such a memo this week for the first time. I don't think I 
knew until the last few weeks that they did. But apparently 
such a memo was prepared, either over the course of this 
weekend or this weekend in November of '86. 

Q Who brought it to your attention that the Criminal 
Division had prepared a memo? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Did Mr. Weld? 
A I don't think so. It might have been Cooper or 

e^l 4-nn K.i«- T Hnn • ♦• i-«»f»1 1 . 



(infliji^asiiT 



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2 
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S" 

rT* 18 

CO 19 

i«^ 20 

So 21 

• ^^ 22 
23 
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Q Do you know where they received the information 

that a memo had been prepared? 

A No. 

Q Moving along then to when the Attorney General 
returned the morning of the 21st, when he first returned, did 
you meet with him? 

A I don't recall whether I did or not. 1 probably 
did, but I don't recall whether I did. 

Q And what can you recall that happened Friday 
morning; the 21st? 

A I~J3elieve that he went over to see the President 
late morning, and I recall that we got together for lunch — 
Cooper, Reynolds, Meese. I am not sure if Bolton was there, 
but he may have been, and myself. And he told us how we 
were, what the President had asked him to do and how we were 
going to be spending the next couple of days. 

Q Well, prior to the Attorney General's going to see 
th« President, were you aware he was going to see the 
President? 

A I probably was, yes. 

Q What did you know prior to that meeting taking 
place, what did you understand was the purpose of that 
meeting? 

A I don't think I knew the purpose. 

Q Well, you knew the Attorney General had cut short 



240 



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2 
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CO 19 

^ ■* 21 

^^ ^ 

23 
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his trip. 

A I surmised things, but I don't think he told me 
what he was doing. I knew he was going over to the White 
House. 

You didn't know why? 

A No. I assumed it was to discuss the topic of 
special interest, which was the Iranian initiative. But I 
don't recall whether I knew what problems there were or 
not. There may have been a Friday morning meeting that I 
attended. I just don't have any recollection of it now. 
There may have been a note or something that would refresh 
but I don't recall. 

Q When the Attorney General returned from his meeting 
with the President, what did he tell you about that meeting? 

A Well, as best I recall, over the course of lunch, 
he said that the President had asked him to conduct a 
fact finding inquiry to try to determine what had transpired 
in this Iranian initiative, that there seemed to be different 
recollections of what had happened and that it didn't seem 
that anyone was in a position or did know the full set of 
facts, and there was going to be a NSPG meeting on Monday 
and that the President had asked Meese to try to look into 
the matter and see if he could put together a factual picture 
on v^at had occurred. 



241 



yPifBF 



1 

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Wednesday night he was concerned because I think the statement 
about not, no third countries being involved, I think he was 
concerned about the performance of the President and inaccuratu 
statements being made, and he was concerned that he had not 
been properly briefed or informed, and I gathered from the 
lunch there had been a discussion, the meeting the day before 
had resulted in the viewpoint that their people didn't seem 
to know what was going on, and that the President didn't 
have a complete picture of the facts. 

Q When did he tell you that he was concerned about 
the President's remarks at the President's press conference? 

A I don't recall specifically. I don't know that 
it was -- it was a poor performance in the press conference, 
there seemed to be — this is my own impression — the 
President seemed to be unsure about some of the facts, seemed 
not to understand that question. A correction was issued and 
Meese, I don't think we got into detail, but I think that as 
I recall, he shared that impression. 

Q But do you recall when he shared that inqsression? 

A No. 

Q Did the Attorney General indicate to you when he 
met with the President, in what capacity he was setting 
forth on this fact finding inquiry? 

A I just don't recall. I don't recall that. I 
don't think so. 



242 



yuiv^^ . itwgissifir 



i 



1 Q I guess my question is did he explain why it was 

2 that he, Ed Meese, Attorney General, was going to be tasked 

3 with finding the facts as opposed to a Don Regan or Mr. 

4 Wallison or Secretary of State Shultz or someone else in the 

5 Administration? 

6 A I don't think he explained to us where the 

7 President wanted this done. I think he told us we were going 

8 to do this. It didn't seem odd to me, so I didn't ask about 

9 it. 

10 Q Did he explain whether or not it was the President 

11 that tasked him with this or whether he asked to be able to 

12 do it? 

13 A He did not state which of those was the case. He 

14 just said the President wanted him to do this or had asked 

15 him to do this. 

16 During that, I guess you met for lunch that day? 

17 A Yes sir. 

18 Q Do you recall who else was present? 

19 A I recall Meese 2uid Reynolds, Cooper, Richardson, 

20 I think Bolton may have been present, but I am not sure. I 

21 know Bolton was present at a simular lunch the day before. 

22 Q On the 20th? 

23 A Yes. 

24 Q Was part of this discussion at lunch surrounding 

25 Mr. Casey's testimony? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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Take 2 

T. .AS:mhl 
fls myself 



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A Part of the discussion, certainly. It certainly 
involved that, but we didn't have the testimony. It wasn't 
a session to go over the testimony as I recall. I think the 
two — again, I had not made myself intimately familiar with 
the facts in that sort of thing at this point, but I, as you 
recall. Cooper was reviewing some of the applicable legal 
requirements, and Bolton was updating him on events that were 
underway with the Hill, and I don't think that the testimony 
was passed around and gone over, but I think it was, certainly 
it was in the context of Casey going up the next day. 

I think Bolton might have been at this lunch 
Friday because at some point he debriefed us on, he sat in 
on some testimony and took some notes, I think at some point 
he debriefed tH&ese on what had happened. 

Q Do you recall when he did that, what his statement 
was regarding what Casey had told Congress regarding the 
November 1985 Hawks? 

A No, I don't recall that. 

Q Now, as far as the lunch on Friday, can you tell 
us what was discussed? 

A Well, as best I recall, he explained that we were 
going to be engaged in this fact finding inquiry, he discussed 
who should be, who he should meet with and interview. I think 
he put together a list. He asked if we could make, if our 
schedules %*ere clear and that sort of thing, and that is all 



244 



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I specifically recall. 

When we got together over the course of the weekend 
the small team we would review the state of play, what do we 
know so far, what seems to have now -- these are the state 
of facts as we know them thus far. That may have happened, 
but I doh't specifically recall that happened or not. 

Q Was there a discussion at that meeting of who was 
to comprise the team? 

A I don't recial any specific discussion about it, 
no. 

Q Was there any discussion of excluding anyone from 
the inquiry? 

A I don't recall 2my discussion about that either. 

Q In other words , did the Attorney General mjike any 
statement as to I pick you folks to do this because, or give 
you any reasons for why these particular people were brought 
together for an inquiry? 

A No, I don't think so. I don't recall zmy. 

Q Was there another nteeting bout 2:00-2:30 that 
day? 

A I don't have any separate recollection of it. 
There may — I also — while you mentioned that, I think it 
was at lunch he told me I should keep a log of the meetings, 
of his schedule of the course of the weekend, what meetings 
...^T-o Voir) an<i hr>w lona thev went and who was there. So there 



245 



mmm 



may be a note that indicates there was such a meeting, but 
I don't recall it. 

Q Why were you to keep this log of scheduled 
meetings? 

A He didn't explain why. 1 assume so we would know 
who we talked to and what order and for how long. I am not 
sure, I think it was probably at lunch, but at this point, 
lunch or 2:00 or 2:30 meeting, he basically -- the tasks were 
assigned , that Meese would be the primary interviewer. Cooper 
would be with him and would take notes. 

This may have been right before the McFarland 
interview, I am not sure of the time. He wanted me to keep 
a log of events, what was done, when. I think Saturday 
morning I learned that. 

Friday night when I went home for — I asked for 
the copy of chronology we had, so I could write and try to 
become familiar with the facts, and I think Saturday morning, 
he determined to send Brad and me over to look at documents. 
So he ws sort of deciding who would do what and making a 
list of people that should be interviewed, that sort of thing. 
I think that was the nature generally of what was going on 
at that point, 

Q I gather Mr. Cribb was out of town at this point? 

A Yes. 

Q On this weekend? 



246 



wKumfflT 






CO 



Q On this weekend? 

A Yes sir. 

Was there any discussion of bringing him back to 
help out? 

A I don't think so. He would hate to interrupt 
anybody's vacation anyway. I don't think that was discussed. 

Q Was there any discussion at this point Friday 
either at noon or if there was a subsequent meeting at 2:00, 
sometime in early afternoon o Friday, of whether Tow missiles 
that were the subject of the '85 and '86 transactions, any 
of them had been redirected to the contras? 

A I don't recall anything of that nature. I don't 
recall anything having to do with the contras coming up in 
this regard until Brad Reynolds passed me the now famous memo, 
when wWyfere in Ollie North's office. 

Q Is that a comment that you think you would have 
remembered? 

A Yes, I think I would have remembered that. The 
reason I do is because when I was going through documents 
there was mention in some of Ollie' s files of sending some 
Tows to ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 That 
mind like crazy. In fact, I asked him the follow-up question 
about it in the interview and so I think, I am confident 
I would have remember^ such a comment. 

Q Do you recall at what point on Friday it was 



247 



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c:::si8 

g*rf 22 

^? 23 
24 



decided that someone ought to go over and look at the 
documents at NSC? 

A No. My first recollection of that was Saturday 
morning. 

Q As of Friday, you did not know you would be tasked 
with the next day going to the NSC to look at dociiments? 

A Well, that is right. I don't recall the 
specifically. It may have been, but I first — ray first 
recollection of knowing that was Saturday morning. 

Q We have heard testimony, of course, from Admiral 
Poindexter he received a call from the Attorney General 
around 3 o'clock that afternoon on the 21st, asking him to 
make documents available. Were you aware of that phone call 
when it took place? 

A I don't — well, now that you say that,- I tend to 
recall that somewhere in my notes I wrote down a call between 
Meese and Poindexter that day — 3; 05 or something — but I 
recall the entry, I doh't recall the subject. It is not — 
Brad Reynolds — I believe I an stating this accurately, 
recalls, knowing that we would be looking at documents on 
Friday, but my recollection is I don't recall that. Mine is 
that it was on Saturday tnoming. 

MS. NAUGaxeK»< If we can have this marked as 
Exhibrt No; 2. 

(Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.) 



248 



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^^ 23 

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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Exhibit 2 for the record appears to be a handwritte 
chronology type log. It begins with 20 November, '86. Is 
this in your hand, Mr. Richardson? 
A Yes. 

And is this the log that you kept that you were 
describing earlier in your testimony? 

A Yes. Although this, I don't think this was 
contemporaneously kept. It was not. I think I put it 
together from scrap, fro^scraps that I think you have as well. 

Q All right. So, why don't we mark one of these 
scraps now. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Why don't we mark this number 3? 
(Exhibit 3 was marked for identification.) 
MS. NAUGHTON: We can mark this as Exhibit 4. 
(Exhibit 4 was marked for identification) 
MS. NAUGHTON: And this one is 5 and that 
one is 6. 

(Exhibits 5 and 6 were marked for identification.) 
MS. NAUGHTON: This one is 7. 
(Exhibit 7 was marked for identification. ) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q What I have tried to do here, Mr. Richardson, is 
to put the items which appear to be logs or chronologies 
together to both refresh your recollection and explain to us 



249 



miSMtBfflr 



CO 19 

J 20 

;SSi» 21 

«— ^ 22 

23 

24 

25 



~5 



what some of your notes might indicate, so feel free to refer 
to them as we go through them. 

YOU mentioned you collected exhibit number 2 from 
different scraps of paper? 
A Yes. 

Q Would one of those scraps of paper be exhibit no. 
3. that one that is a two page document that starts off with 
November 21, 11:30 to 12:15? 
A Ves, I believe so. 

Q Now, I assume that that note, November 21, 11:30 
to 12:30, indicates the meeting that Mr. Meese had with the 
President, right? 

A Well, yes, but I think this — it doesn't 
delineate when he saw the President, when he saw Don Regan, 
or I think he saw Regan before he went in to see the President" 
I am not sure how long the Regan meeting was. But that is 
how long he was in meetings at the White House. 

Q Did you ask him how long the Regan meeting was? 
A I don't think so. 

Q Did you ask him how long the meeting with the 
President was? 

A No, I don't recall, no. 

Q If you would turn that page over then, the next 
page of exhibit 3, this starts off 6:25 p.m.. AGC, JC, WBR, 
JR, 21 November, update. Cooper. 



250 



2 



25 



mmm 



1 A Right. 



Was this made on the 21st of November? 

3 A I think it was. 

4 Q Can you tell us what this is, what your notes on 

5 the piece of paper indicate? 

6 A That entry I think at 6:25 p.m., Meese, Cooper, 

7 Reynolds, Richardson, met on the 21st and that Cooper provided 

8 an update or -- it might mean we gave Cooper and update. I 

9 think it would have been the other way around. Probably that 

10 is intended to show update from Cooper. 

11 Then there is an arrow drawn to another circle 

12 which says "6:30 add JRB," who is John Bolton --"legislative 

13 update. Bolton out at 6:35." 

14 He popped in and told us what was going on up 

15 on the Hill. Then there was another arrow to a circle, 

16 "Cooper out at 6:45." Which means Cooper left the meeting 

17 at 6:45. 

13 There is also another arrow saying Bolton, then a 

19 star, called NSC. Tell us what that is. 

20 A Okay. Well, what it indicates I think it says 

21 call NSC Bolton in hearing. I believe there was a question 

22 about our ability to get Bolton into the hearing that day. 

23 That entry was probably made — I think the hearings were 

24 Friday, so it would have been made early next day, but I am 
not certain. 



yfiCLftSSIFl[3 



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I recall that there was the need to get the NSC 
to get Bolton the list of people who could attend the hearing. 

Q The name Sporkin appears. I assume that is 
referring to CIA General Counsel Sporkin? 
A Yes sir. 

Q Was that one of the names to be interviewed? 
A I think that is right. 
Q And then further down there is VP. 
A Office of OFC. 
Q And — 

A Says John Scfimidt, with an arrow to McGinnis. 
Q **hat does that indicate? 

A Well, Schmidt is in the Vice President's — he 
is the counsel office over there. I am not sure what that 
means. Probably that 5midt was to be in touch with McGinnis 
but I don't recall on what. 

Q Was there any discussion of the Vice President's 
office then on the 21st? 

A I don't recall any. What I tend to think this 
means is that he was appointed contact who might have done 
some work on some of the legal questions — Schmidt — but I 
don't recall specifically what that is about. 

Q What would :the connection be of Mr. McGinnis, who 
I assume is John McGinnis, OLC? 

A Yes sir. I don't recall. I can only speculate 



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that Schmidt may have worked on some legal question that 
McGinnis was going to get up to speed on, or maybe Schmidt -- 
at some point, Chuck was trying to get John McGinnis to go 
over to review some materials at either^^^^^^^^^^^ I don't 
know if Schmidt was involved in getting him access to that. 
I don't have any recollection of that. 

Q And the other names that appeared -- Shultz, Casey 
and Weinberger. 

A Right. 

Q I assume those would be names of people to 
interview during the weekend? 

A Probably. 

Q Can you tell us why it was that Bill Casey was not 
interviewed that weekend? 

A I know the Attorney General did talk to him on 
Saturday. 

Q Was that an interview? 

A I don't know how you would — how you would phrase 
it. I was not present. 

Q Well, to your knowledge, then, was Mr. Casey 
interviewed that weekend? 

A I know the Attorney General met with Casey Saturday 
evening. I don't know how to characterize it, because I am 
not familiar with the details of the discussion. I would 
say, yes, he was Lntfixviewed emd information was, that he was 



DWlllStHS' 



asked some questions about this to add to the information, 
but I don't know that — that was my assumption. 

Q When the Attorney General reported back, did he 

tell you that he had asked Mr. Casey if he knew there had 
been a diversion of funds to the contras? 
A No. 

Q Did he report back that he had asked Mr. Casey 
about November '85 Hawk shipments? 

A I don't recall. I thinX he would have said some- 
thing like. Bill doesn't remember this or doesn't think this 
happened. That is the context in which it might have come 
up. But I don't remember anything specifically that Casey 
added or that Meese reported on the Casey meeting. I don't 
recall knowing that he was going to see Bill Casey on his way 
home. 

Q But as far as those two subjects which I mentioned' 
A No, the diversion I know he didn't say he asked 
him about that. I would have remember that. The other, I 
don't recall. 

Q What I want to know though, is when you are 
planning out these interviews, we have a very short amount of 
time in which to do this — was there a discussion as to Mr. 
Casey, as to whether or not the Attorney General would just 
meet with him himself or did you plan on interviewing him at 
a certain place and time? 



1!»ASSIFIE0 



254 



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en '' 

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C-O 22 



cj:> 



A Well, as I recall it, something like Meese saying 
I will see Bill Casey on the way home, so that took care of 
touching base, interviewing Casey. 

C Do you recall when he said that? 

A No, I don't. I only saw him, I saw him at lunch 
and probably talked to him on the telephone, but I think, 
I don't think he was -- well, I can't remember if he was at 
the department after we finished in Ollie North's office, 
if I went back to the department and Meese was there. I just 
don't remember. There is probably a note here somewhere that 
would refresh my recollection. I don't remember when I 
learned that. 

Q When you put Casey's name down on that piece of 
paper on the 21st of November, was it assumed then that he 
would be someone who would be interviewed? 

A Well, I don't recall if Casey is on Meese's list 
from lunch. 

Q On Friday? 

A Yes, that would be the authoritative document, 
because I don't have any recollection of these notes and they 
are random notes at the bottom of a piece of paper. It 
could have just been my thoughts about we need to be sure to 
touch base with these folks. I just don't have any 
recollection of that. 

Q Now, exhibit 4 is simply a list of meetings and 



255 



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chronology. I don't have questions on that. 

Except one. Towards the end of those documents, 
referring to a meeting with Michael Ledeen on November 14 
with the Attorney General. Were you present for that meeting 
with Mr. Ledeen? 

A No. I was supposed to be. 

Q Was Mr. Gerson present at that meeting? 

A No. Meese had asked me to sit in and the three of 
us sat down and Lepeen said I would really — made apologies 
and said I prefer to talk to you one on one. So I stepped 
out. They were in there a few minutes, then I came in. 
Meese told me what the meeting, he said all he wanted to do 
was say this and he had made and he read to me from entries 
in a notebook and told me what he had said, which was nothing 
traumatic, I guess. He said something like he had been 
involved in the initiative early on, that it was still a 
viable initiative. That is my recollection of it. Talking 
about the Iranian initiative. 

Did he explain what being involved meant? 

A No, I took it in a diplomatic sense. He had been 
involved in establishing the contacts, but I don't recall 
any explanation of it. 

Is there any reason Mr. Lepeen wasn't on the list 
of people to be interviewed? UNCLAuulriLl 

A No. I don't recall any discussion about it. 



256 



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^ Q Exhibit no. 5, which is one dated the 25th of 

2 November '86, you said -- I just have one question -- when 

^ the Attorney General tells you, apparently at the bottom, 

^ regarding a phone call he got from Prime Minister Peres of 
Israel, saying that they did ship 500 Tows but Attorney 

6 General got it wrong in his press conference regarding the 

7 accounts to the contras. Did the Attorney General read this 
to you from a note or were you present at the phone call, or 

9 do you recall how you came to put this information on this 

10 piece of paper? 

11 A I do not recall. I don't see any references in 

12 the note that Meese got it wrong in the press conference, 

13 although this nay be different from what he understood in 

14 the press conference. I guess that is your point. 

15 Q I don't have questions on the remaining exhibits. 

16 If we can get back to the 21st. 

17 (Discussion off the record) 

18 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

19 Q Now, after the early afternoon meeting of the 

20 21st, what did you do? 

21 A The McFarlai^ interview was under way? 



22 Q Yes . 



,„yNClllSSIFIE 



23 A I don't remember what 

24 Q Did you meet later to discuss what Mr. McFarland 

25 had said? 



257 



mteme^ 



A This entry in exhibit 2 indicates that we got 

2 together about 6:25, Meese, Cooper, Reynolds, Richardson. 

3 That is when Bolton popped in for five minutes. McFarland's 
interview results were probably discussed at that time 
although I don't have a specific recollection of it now. 

Q What else was discussed at that 6:25 meeting? 
A I don't remember anything else particularly about 
it. I do recall coming out of it with the feeling like I 
9 ought to get my own copy of the chronology and try to become 

10 familiar with the facts. 

11 Q Did you do that: 

12 A Yes. I think I took it home Friday night and 

13 read it or stayed at the department late and read it. I 

14 don't recall which. 

15 Q Do you know what it is Mr. Reynolds did on Friday 

16 afternoon? 

17 A No. 

18 Q So, it was not discussed — please correct me if 

19 I am wrong — on Friday afternoon, about reviewing documents 

20 at the National Security Council? 

21 A I don't recall it, but as I mentioned, I think 

22 Brad Reynolds does recall it, but I just don't. 

23 Now, on Saturday morning, did you go straight to 

24 the Department of Justice? 



25 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



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Do you recall when you arrived? 

A Yes, it was in the 9:15 range. I rememeber I got 
there either just before or just after Brad had walked in to 
Meese' sof fice and Cooper and Meese had just come back from 
talking with Shultz and Charlie Hill. 

Q Did they brief you on that interview? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you remember what they said about it? 

A I don't remember in any detail. 

Q Do you remember if you took notes of that? 

A No, I don't remember. I doubt I did because Cooper 
had been in the interview and had taken notes of the actual 
conversations. So I don't think I did take notes. 

Q At that point in time, though, after he briefed 
you on the Shultz interview, did it come clear in your mind' 
there was a discrepancy between what Mr. Shultz was saying 
about the November '85 shipment and what Mr. Casey had 
testified to, or the draft of Casey's testimony? 

In other words, what I am getting at, Mr. Cooper 
testified publicly regarding that discrepancy and how his 
investigation began and so forth. Was that clear in your 
mind prior to the time of reviewing documents at the NSC? 

A I don't have a recollection of there being that 
discrepancy between Casey and Shultz. I do recall that it 
was unclear what had happened and who had known about it, and 



259 



imsseit 



' who had known about it and authorized the '85 shipments, what- 

^ ever shipments there were in '85. 

"* My recollection was that there was a difference 

^ between McFarlan/ and Shultz. I am not myself even now 

5 intimately familiar with Casey's testimony then and I don't 

6 know if Casey's testimony had been based on this Scime set of 
' facts that McFarlan^ had put forward. So that the answer to 

8 your question might be yes, but I didn't know of it in those 

9 terms. I thought the difference was between McFarlan/'s 

10 point of view, and Shultz point of view. 

11 It was clear to me that what had happened in '85 

12 was unclear and who had known about it or endorsed it was 

13 unclear. That was the principal area at that point that we 

14 were interested in, because of the legal significance of 

15 what had happened. 

16 Q So you understood that if those shipments were not 

17 authorized there may be a violation of the Arms Export Control 

18 Act, or perhaps some other law? 

19 A Yes. I knew legal, knew legal significance would 

20 attach to whether they were authorized or not and that we 

21 would have to figure out if there had been a violation or if 

22 another set of legal justifications would attach — 

23 Presidential, for exeunple. Presidential authority, independent 

24 of the statutes. 

25 But that -was obviously a worse case scenario 



UNCIASSIFIEO 



260 



mmsw 



^ because that would posit a violation of one of the statutes. 

2 Q What would? 

3 A Well, I mean, if one relied exclusively on the 

4 President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign 

5 policy, for example, that as a justification that was a legal 

6 justification that would only, would be a last resort, a 

7 last resort, that, in other words, would you rely on the 

8 statute first, if the statute had been violated that would 

9 put us into a difficult situation. We didn't know if one had 

10 been violated or not. 

11 Q When you arrived at the — 

12 A A caveat. Cooper had the main arrow on that. I 

13 was a much more of a listener, note taking and trying to 

14 find out what happened, so I am not even now intimately 

15 familiar with those statutes. 

■J6 Q When you arrived at the Department of Justice that 

17 morning, I gathered at some point the Attorney General told 

18 you would be going over to review documents? 

19 A Yes sir. 

20 Q When he told you that, did he tell you what it 

21 was you were to look for? 

22 A I believe, yes, I believe yes, I don't recall 

23 him, I don't have a specific recollection of him uttering 

24 the instructions but I knew when I went over there that our 

25 interest was '85, and trying to determine if the U.S. 



ne -cej-j. you wnat it 

UNCiiSSIFIE: 



261 



llfffiLSSSIRffi' 



Government role in the shipments, whether they were authorized 



^ acquiesced in, or other~wise known about, and so I had that 



3 clear understanding. I don't remember him actually saying 

^ this is what you look for, X,Y,Z, but he might have done it 

5 I don't recall. 

6 Brad and I rode over together and we probably 

7 talked about it in the car as well. 
Q Did the Attorney General ever discuss with your 

9 during this weekend his participation in the '76 finding: 

10 A He probably did, but I don't remember specific 

11 conversations about it. I do recall looking through his 

12 schedules at some point and trying to determine where he was 

13 in '86 and what meetings he might have attended of either the 

14 National Security Council or the President or Poindexter. 

15 Q Well, was this subsequent to January '87 that you 

16 did this? 

17 A No, I did that over the course of this weekend 

18 review. 

19 Q You looked? 

20 A I looked at January ' 86 schedules over the course 

21 of this November '86 weekend. 



yNCLASSIRE 



22 Q Why was that? vii v*-i iw*** * i s*:=.^-x* 

23 A We wanted to see what, to try to determine the 

24 answer to the question you posed — trying to learn if Meese 

25 had been at any of these meetings when they occurred, that 



262 



imussiaiB 



sort of thing. His recollection needed to be refreshed in 
terms of precise dates and times. I am pretty sure I did 
that over the course of this weekend. It is possible I did 
it on Monday, but I am pretty sure I did it over the weekend. 

5 Q Did he discuss with you his knowledge or lack of 

6 knowledge of the either August or November '85 shipments? 

7 A He did discuss with me his lack of knowledge of 

8 the '85 shipments. That is, his lack of knowledge of them 

9 at that time and I believe in January. I think he indicated 

10 that he learned about them in November of '86. 

11 But he clearly, he did, clearly didn't know about 

12 them in '85, That was — I don't remember him uttering the 

13 words again, but I have clear recollection that he was 

14 unaware. What makes me think I might have done this schedule 

15 on Monday as opposed to earlier is because, when North 

16 indicated in our interview with him that there was early 

17 December meeting and I went back to see if Meese had 

18 attended, euid he had — he was out of the country at the time 

19 so it well could have been Monday. 

20 Q But I guess my question is did the Attorney General 

21 say he never learned of the ' 85 shipments until November 

22 ' 86 or until January ' 86 when he learned of the Iranian 

23 issue? 

24 A I have trouble separating out when he told me, 

25 because I know he did not, he has told me recently, and I 



ONCUSSiHI] 



263 



TJBKySSMfi 



'' can't remember how far back dating back to November of '86 

2 this had been, he had told me this, but he has told me that 

3 he did not, does not recall learning about the '85 shipments 
^ until November of "86 and that the January '86 was the first 

5 time he learned about the initiative, the Iran initiative, 

6 which involved these arms shipments and that his knowledge 

7 of that in '86 was prospective. 

8 Q Did he tell you after Mr. Cooper's testimony? 

9 A He did tell me afterward, but he may have also 

10 told me that before. I believe he did. I am pretty sure 

11 that over the course of this -- I have trouble giving a sort 

12 of photo snapshot in time back to November of '86 and 

13 remembering certain things like this when I learned them, 

14 at what time, but I feel pretty sure over the course of that 

15 four or five day period, Meese was operating in the dark, as 

16 if we had no personal knowledge of the '85 shipments that 

17 was clear to us. 

13 I don't know when he told me that but — 

^9 Q Let's go from that angle. An important question 

20 is whether or not the '85 shipments were authorized? 

21 A Yes. 

22 Q Correct? 

23 A Yes. 

24 Q As a matter of usual course, the Attorney General 

25 would review findings, for instance? 



imHSSIFIED 



264 



iffiASSiffiF 



A That is not — he reviews some findings, he does 
not review all findings. 

Q Which ones has he not reviewed? 

A Well, I don't know. The ones we don't see we are 
not sure about. 

Q Exactly how would you know he doesn't see very 
finding? 

A We made an inquiry recently of our office. When 
he reviews a finding normally it would come from NSC to our 
Office of Intelligence Policy anc^eview, who would review 
it for its legality and kick it down to the Attorney General 



12 with a memo. 

""^ Now, that was done with considerable frequency 

14 under Attorney General Smith, and I had a discussion with 
Mary Bmj^irton, head of that office. The numbers of 
findings dropped off under Meese and there are, she recalled 
one specifically, and there may have been more findings 
that we found out about after they had been signed by the 

19 President and we did not have advance clearance 

20 

21 

22 office would not be involved, but there is not a process 

23 place for the Attorney General to review every Presidential 

24 finding. 

25 That is my understanding of it. We try to, but 



That is conceivable that there are, that a finding 
IS discussed at an NSC meeting and therefore,-DaTi^hfeon.' s 



265 



1 

2 
3 

end 4 
mhl 
ms fls 5 



PJtlgSffRBT 



we don't find out about them all the time. 

Q And the basis for your statement that you just 
made is based on conversations with Ms*- Mary 



Yes. 



ICIASSIFIEO 



266 



ONffiftSSIFIffiT 



:^ S-^ 



Is it based on any research with either the NSC or 
the CIA? 

A Yes, with the NSC. 

Q With whom did you speak at the NSC? 

A I have staffed that to one of my staff members, 
Ann Ra-iiilyaB, who when we have got -- I got two memos, one 
indicating the numbers of -- the findings have been signed 
by the President from the NSC, and another memo from 
Mary Lawton, a list that indicates departmental review 
or advice on findings and I compared the two and not all of thje 
things signed by the President were reviewed by the 
Department and there is at least one that has specifically 
been in our area, an area of departmental responsibilities 
we found out about some months after the fact. 

Q Did you discuss this one with the Attorney General 

A That one finding? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't recall, he probably — he was probably 
briefed on it, probably Ann Rondeau or Mary Lawton may 
have seen it done after we learned about it. I don't have 
a specific recollection of that. 

Q I guess what I am getting at is, what you are 
telling us is there is one finding that you know about from 
the list given you at NSC. 



Yes, 



UNCLASSIFIED 



CAS-2 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

6 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

Ua,J 20 

' 21 

**'— * 25 



ItKfiS^RIpT 



>r" 



iT/ 



Q That did not go through the Department of Justice 
procedure for reviewing findings, correct? 

A Actually, well, no. There is more than one that die 
not, but what I am referring to is there is one that we know 
we missed because we know we missed it, that is, they told 
us after it was signed, they sent us a copy. There are 
others of these that we have not received a copy of, but 
were signed by the President. 

Lawton's list would show me things she got a copy of, 
but didn't know about in advance. The NSC list shows 
everything signed. There is some on NSC list that aren't on 
hers. 

Q Do you recall how many more on NSC than on her 
list? 

A No, let me think here. Well, I did gross numbers, 
and I assume that I can reveal these numbers -- but, there 
were, as I recall, from the NSC list, there are a total of 
^■findings since 1981 and I don't remember how these numbers 
divide, but I believe^^Bwere not reviewed by the 
Department and^^Bwere. This is 1981 through 1987. 
There were a substantial number, in the half a dozen range, 
in early 1981 which were not reviewed that may have 
pre-dated Smith's getting in place. One of these findings 
which I count amongst those that department review was the 
January 17, 1986 finding on Iran. That did not show up 



268 



mH 20 



oo 



21 
OO 22 

■Sk*^ 24 
"—^ 25 






X 



s^ 



in Mary's record. I don't know if a finding at NSPG or NSC 
meeting was passed around which the Attorney General would 
have seen then. 

Q That is what I am getting at. 

A I don't know those numbers. 

Q Sixteen went through Lawton's office, you don't 
know how many actually were reviewed by the Attorney General. 

A That is right. But, I guess the point I am 
trying to make is there is no — there was a tug of war, so 
to speak, when Smith was Attorney General, with the NSC 
feeling like Justice need not review every finding and the 
Attorney General feeling like he did and towards — Mary 
tells me toward the end of Smith's tenure NSC was beginning 
to feel like they didn't need to and that Smith — she 
told Smith about it and she thinks Smith didn't get into that 
fight again since he was on the way out and Icbn't think 
that right now there is, when I asked Mary this question, 
do we see every finding, she said, well, we are supposed to, 
but there is not a process in place by which, for example, 
there is a concurrence block cover sheet on the findings and 
Justice has to sign off. 

But you are right in indicating that there may — 
it is conceivable that there are other findings in the 
January 17 category that Meese may have seen. She said 
that, for example, on occasion Casey or someone would come ov^r 



IMISSfflEBT 



.^d^ 



5-7 



and brief Smith orally on a finding and discuss it rather 
than send it over and she would normally know about that. 
So that number I haven't been able to determine. 

I am aware of North's testimony that the Attorney 
General reviews every finding so, in fact, that has caused me 
to determine if that is true. 

Q Are you saying Colonel North isn't totally 
accurate? 

A Well, I think his perception was probably that 
that was done. 

Q I guess we were on November 22 in the morning, 
Saturday morning. 

A Yes. 

Q That was a major diversion there. The wrong word, 
but we needed to cover that anyway. 

A That is right. 

I don't know if it is of interest;when a finding 
comes over, Lawton reviews it for legality, she sends a 
memo down, it would come to me. I would review it, ask 
one of our lawyers to review it, walk it into Meese and 
I recall in the last year-and-a-half since I have been in 
this position of pushing paper, two or three, two probable 
findings that were handled in that way. So, the volume 
of business that we do in that formal process is small. 
So I think the numbers of findings that have been signed 



270 



(iim^mT 



%^ 



60 



.S-5 1 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
iT''^ 18 

— i-- 20 

^^ 

e/O 21 

^^23 

■I "^24 

25 



in the last couple of years has declined, as well. 

Q To your recollection, were any rejected by the 
Department of Justice or opposed? 

A I think they were. Well, Mary Lawton's notes 
indicate there are notations such as "advised that a new 
finding would be necessary", or "revision to a previous 
finding would be necessary", or that a finding is "premature" 
I gather because the activity is too far away or that this 
is insufficient, something like that. So, but, it is 
difficult to tell if the same thing was — if more 
information was gathered and it was later put in place, I 
don't have this kind of detailed analysis of them. 

Q Once that goes forward from the Department, then 
do you receive a corrected or amended copy of the finding? 

A I don't — well, I am sure we don't always because 
Mary had indicated to me and she is my source of information 
on this, I don't think that NSC, I don't think we have 
copies of the findings because my recollection of my 
conversation with Mary is that they don't, NSC does not feel 
comfortable about having copies of findings outside of 
their files. 

We have got Meese, her cover memo to Meese, I 
recall one specifically more in the last year where he 
wrote "concur" and initialed on her cover memo which she 
retained but I don't think she retained the finding. 



271 



BJWASSIRffiT 



^ 



^i 



Q You don't necessarily know if your advice is 
heeded? 

A That is correct. Although, Mary may have back 
and forth with either the CIA general counsel, for example, 
on or NSC. Just not aware of it. 

Q Back to Saturday morning. Do you have, aside 
from trying to focus on the 1985 shipments, did you have 
any other discussions as to what document you would be 
looking for. 

A I don't think so. My basic tasking from Meese 
was to look through everything that they have got on the 
Iranian initiative and see what you can piece together and 
see what you find. 

Q When did you know that Oliver North was the 
action officer on the Iran initiative? In other words, 
prior to this were you aware that his were the files to 
search and that he would have the most information? 

A I am sure I was before I went to the White House. 

Q Did you know you would be conducting a 
docximent review in his office? 

A I probably — I don't know — I assumed that the 
documents were — I assumed -- I guess I knew that he had most 
of the documents or at least a substantial volume of documents 
that we would review. 

I also, before I got there, I figured that we would not 



272 



IIMM$»SI&T 



^ 



^Z 



7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 

15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



be sitting in Poindexter's office doing this. It is just -- 
Meese used to have that suite of offices, I know they are 
two very small offices, the secretary's and Poindexter, with 
a conference table and I assumed we would not be in there, so 
I guess I figured we would be probably somewhere in North's 
office. 

Q Could you tell us then who made the arrangement 
for you to actually go to the White House. 

A As I recall. Cooper. Well, there was a discussion 
that Brad and I would go to the White House to review 
documents. Cooper called Paul Thompson, told him 
Brad Reynolds and I would be coming over, then handed me 
the phone to talk to Thompson to make arrangements and I 
gave Thompson our names and I probably got our dates of/ 
birth and I don't remember if I parked in the White House, 
I may have given him my license plate number, then told him 
where we would meet and we went to the West Wing and met 
Thompson and then he — well, with that phone call 
completed, we got in the car, went on over, went up to the 
West Wing, met Thompson, he walked us over to North's office 
in the EOB . 

Q Thompson met you in the West Wing? 

A Yes. There is a West Wing basement office, which 
is where I went and asked for Thompson and he came down. 
I don't recall whether he walked us up to his office first 



l)&iCIJC£inu__ 



273 



iffiea^fi^' 



0^ 



.^ 



or not, but I don't think so, I think we headed straight on 
over. 

Q Had you met Mr. Thompson before? 

A I don't think I had. Although it is possible I had 
seen him before when I worked in the White House, but I 
don't think I had met him. 

Q Had you met Oliver North before? 

A Icbn't think I had, no. 

Q Perhaps we put in the note already. Do either 
you or Mr. Reynolds drive a Mercedes? 

A That is Reynolds. 

Q License number then and birthday? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And that is what was given to Mr. Thompson to 
gain admittance to the White House? 

A I think that was given in for admittance on Sunday 
morning because my recollection is I drove my car over 
to the White House Saturday and Brad "rai^i^with me and 
Sunday morning we met at the White House, but anyway, that is 
correct, that is information I got to get him cleared in. 

Q Now, when you got to Colonel North's office, were 
the documents laid out or did you have to retrieve them from 
shelves and so forth? 

A My recollection is that when we got there Earl was 
there, a number of file drawers were open, ajar, several 



274 



laffiRMffiT 



8^ ^H 



9 

10 

11 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



inches, I don't recall the documents being out on the table, 
although I am aware of statements that they were, but I 
don't recall them being out on the table. We explained what 
we were interested in. 

Earl said, well, these are the terrorism files, these an 
all this and that, and he was pointing at the various file 
drawers. 

We said we want the files on the Iran initiative. 
Thompson was still there and, as I recall. Earl went 
behind North's desk and North's desk was in the rather 
corner of his office facing out and there was sort of 
an L-shaped along the left, there appeared to be book 
shelves and seemed to be a book shelf on the left and he 
went under there and got out a number of what I called 
"read well" folders, but sort of fiber-board, dark red 
folders and laid them out on the conference table. We had a 
brief conversation. 

Q Excuse me, Mr. Earl went like around 
Colonel North's desk? 

A Yes. 

Q This would have been in the area of where 
Colonel North would be seated if he were at his desk? 



Yes. 



Please continue. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



And Earl did that. Brad and I primarily talked 



275 



UNfll)IS$»»ET 



&^ 



^ 



with Thompson but Brad had a conversation with Thompson, 
I chimed in here and there, indicating what, reiterating 
what documents we wanted to see -- we had already said 
everything on the initiative in Ollie's possession that was 
what Earl was tasked to provide. We also asked him for 
anything that Poindexter had in Poindexter's or Thompson's 
files. 

Thompson responded that they really didn't have 
anything, that when they had documents, reviewed documents 
like this, they would send them back to the originating 
office. 

We asked that McFarlane's materials be produced. 
Thompson said that there really wasn't much 
McFarlane material left, there may be one box, but he 
didn't think there was anything in there responsive; we 
asked him to check and make sure. 

We asked him also to make sure he didn't have 
anything on this subject — and then I can't — I don't recai: 
if we asked him to run a search through their formal 
executive secretary system, I don't recall that. He might 
have indicated that would not be a real source of information 
because of the compartmentalized nature of the thing, I 
don't remember. 

Q Could you describe to us the System 4? 
A I don't think so. 



UNWSlilUti] 



276 



imtssififrr 



>r" i^u 



XS-ll 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 



Q Document collection system? 

A I don't think so. 

Q If I can skip ahead one minute, I know you 
went to the White House Tuesday morning, did you learn 
about the System 4 at that time? 

A No, I knew from my previous tour there, I had 
seen documents that said System 1, 2, 3 and 4. To this day, 
I don't know what a System 4 document is. 

Q So, Mr. Thompson might have said something like 
it wouldn't be helpful to go through. 

A Yes, he may have. For some reason, I was left 
under the impression that the main -- the formal 
computerized filing system would not be a source of -- real 
source of information and I don't know, if the extent to 
which that was discussed or he said everything in this would 
be in Ollie's files, it could have been that kind of 
discussion. 

But that does not — my reaction is that doesn't 
stand out as a source of documents that we were 
expecting to receive. It may have been just that he may 
have indicated that everything in Ollie's files would be the 
system, whatever is in the system would be a subset of that. 

Q Did you ask Mr. Thompson to see a finding? 

A I don't think so. I don't think so. I don't 
recall that. 



jlLASSIFlEO 



277 



WKU^IW^ 



m 



^ 



9 
10 

11 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 

»"v 

' - 19 

^^ 22 

•^ 23 

24 

25 



Q Did you see a finding? 

A Well, I know I saw a finding on Tuesday. I 
don't think I saw a finding in Ollie North's files 
although Brad may have, but I don't think I did. I don't 
recall one. Let me put it that way. 

Q I have in my notes of your interview with us on 
April 15 of 1987, that you recalled Mr. Thompson producing 
the January 6 finding which has some notes in blue ink on it 

A Yes, that happened Tuesday morning. I don't 
want to jump out of sequence. On Tuesday morning when we were 
at the White House, Meese asked me to make sure that a 
system-wide search was conducted to make certain that no 
document containing the diversion had gone forward to the 
President in any form. And when I went in to Thompson's 
office to ask for that, there were several folders of 
material on his desk. I said, are these files on this, and 
he said yes. 

I said I would like to go through those, I said. 
He said, fine. It was in there, I saw that finding. 
Q Now I am confused. 

A It surprised me, too, because he had said they 
didn't keep them. That str^k^ me as odd, although not 
being — I just have a nodding — la^^t an intelligence 
professional, although I have dor|^^p)ork for that for two 
years now, it seemed unlikely, but possible, that North, 



278 



WtttHSStfSli' 



9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



if he were reporting directly to Poindexter on this 
initiative, that North was holding the file that 
normally would be held by someone in Thompson's position 
because I have been a staff officer for a while and normally 
Meese, for example, normally has a working file of 
active items that he has a couple of things that are at his 
fingertips that would normally be kept by his personal 
secretary or by me and that is why we had asked for that 
material, but he indicated that they didn't have anything 
of that nature, so I thought it was possible that North 
had served that function and that Thompson just did not 
retain paper. 

Thompson's office was very small. 

Q If we can stay on the same subject, we will have to 
skip a little bit, but, Mr. Sporkin was interviewed sometime 
on Saturday. 

A I think that is right. 

Q Do you remember if it was morning or afternoon? 

A I don't recall. I don't recall. Might have been 
late morning. I was not present and Meese and Cooper did 
that. 

Q At any rate, Mr. Sporkin did mention there was a 
November 1985 finding, correct, that is vour understanding 

IINCIASSIFIED 

A I think that -- I guess that is right. I don't 



279 



*si/raw 



^ ^? 



2 
3 
4 
5 



recall that specifically. 

Q I guess my question is, when you returned to the 
White House on Sunday morning to complete your document 
review, did you ask anybody there to see that finding? 

A I don't think so, no. The only person there 
Sunday was a young fellow who had been in Ollie's office for 
been in his employ for six weeks or so. I don't recall. 

Q Jock somebody? 

A Yes, a red-headed guy. 

Q Do you recall asking Commander Thompson at any 
point to produce, or if there was a November or December 
1985 finding? 

A No, I don't think I did. 

Q Did he volunteer that there was one? 

A No. The first, my first reaction of their 
being such a finding was from the North interview. I may 
have heard it mentioned or referred to Saturday or Sunday 
before that, but I reacll it from the North interview. 

Q Do you recall whether Colonel North told you 
that that finding had been destroyed by Admiral Poindexter? 

A He did not say that. I recall that he did not 
say that. 

Q And did Commander Thompson tell you that that 
finding had been destroyed by Admiral Poindexter? 



He did not say. 



ICUSSIFIED 



280 



IWISSHF 



T 



^ 70 



Q Did Admiral Poindexter ever tell you or, to your 
knowledge, the Attorney General that he had destroyed that 
December 1985 finding? 

A No. 

Q Did Commander Thompson then leave you alone with 
Mr. Reynolds to review the documents, this is Saturday 
morning the 22nd. 

A Thompson left, Earl remained, and I am trying to 
recall, because I tend to think that Earl was at North's 
desk for a part of the time and if not the whole time. He 
might have gone upstairs to his desk. I don't recall. I 
wrote Brad a note or two while we were sitting at a table 
because he was in the room and North was in the room when 
we were there, of course. 

Q Why did you write the note? 

A Well, I just didn't want to mention anything that 
would be overheard. 

Q Why not? 

A One of the notes, I would have to see them, one 
of the notes concerned Brad's suggestion that we might want 
to just take all of these documents back to the Department 
and go through them and I wrote him a note back saying that 
is probably not a good idea. 

I just didn't follow there was any need for them to 
know the contents of our discussions. Also, didn't want 



281 



wmssiw^ 



^ 



CO 20 



xKaroJ' 



to begin a conversation with North or Earl. As far as I was 
concerned, I was there to do documents and the interviewing 
was to be done by Meese. 

Q Well, Mr. McGinnis went to the CIA to conduct 
interviews, correct? 

A I know that to be the case now. I don't know when 
I knew that. I knew I was not there to interview anybody 
at the NSC. 

Q I am going to ask that this be marked as the next 
exhibit in order. 

(Exhibit No. 8 was marked for identification.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q I am showing you what has been marked as Exhibit 
number 8. I gather that these are notes that you took while 
reviewing the documents on Saturday at the NSC; is that 
correct? 

A Yes. Let me flip through here. 

Q Directing your attention to the last two pages 
that you are looking at, are those the notes that you wrote? 

A Yes. 

Q To and from Mr. Reynolds? 

A Yes, sir. They are the second and third pages 
from the end. This one, the last page, I am not really — 
I guess this looks like the last page, looks like notes I 
took over there on Sunday, but I am not certain about it. 



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Q Could you please read those two brief notes into 
the record and tell us which is "to" and which is "from"? 

A Okay. The first note, it is the third page from 
the end, '^re we going possibly to be open to attack if we 
take custody out of NSC of these documents? E.g., if 
anything, should turn out to be missing?" 

Q And "should" is underlined. 

A Yes. 

Q Is that your note, Tom? 

A That is my note to Reynolds. 

Q What was his response? 

A I think he shrugged, I think he just shrugged and 
agreed that we wouldn't take — he had suggested it would be 
easier to if he just took all this over to Justice and I -- 
this was a large volume of material and I was not comfortable 
taking them out of the office where they were produced 
because if we had misplaced a document or something like that 
and it turned out to be an important one, we would, just 
having gone through the move, I was worried about our 
being subject to criticism for there being a missing 
document. 

Q And the next? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A This did not contemplate in my mind that documents 
were being destroyed. It was in the other direction. I 
didn't know if everything had been produced to us, that is 



ywumi^ 



75 



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what that was about. The next one? This is the second 
page from the end, "we could use night to catch up with Chuck 
and I can come here early in a.m. to finish this. Then meet 
you guys later in the day." 



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Q Now, the first note that you passed to him, 
was that in the morning? 

A This was probably pre-lunch, yes. And the 
second note was probably after lunch when Ollie was in the 
office. 

Q So, when Mr. Reynolds found the famous diversion 
memo, for lack of any other name for it, that was prior 
to Colonel North coming to the office, is that correct? 

A Yes. I think it was after this note but I 
believe this note about taking custody of the documents was 
pretty early in the search. 

Q Could you tell us what you recall about that 
event, that is. 

A The diversion memo? 

Q Yes. 

A He either kicked me under the table or something 
and we were sitting across from each other about the same 
distance you and I are now, just a foot or two, and he 
passed it over, directed me to at the top paragraph and 
had an expression of this was a surprising entry. So I 
read it and 1 gave a similar look back and I think I 
probably said something like that didn't happen or something 
along those lines, that's hard to believe that had 
happened and passed it back to him and then that was it, 
we did not discuss it at the time and 1 don't think Earl 



KUSSIEIOL 



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noticed anything particular about it. Every once in a 
while I was going through some documents I would point 
out something to him, that sort of thing. 

But that was clearly the most interesting document 
we had seen. I should add my statement was based partly 
on the fact on page 1 of the document there was a handwritter 
correction and that sort of thing. My first impression 
was this is too spectacular to think it happened and there 
is no reason to believe this is a final document so that sort 
of incredulity was my reaction. 

Q Do you recall if you had seen any other versions 
of that? 

A I did not. That referred to the contra 
diversion? 

Q No, any other version of that, version of that 
memo. 

A There were other memos that discussed the initia- 
tive but I don't recall anything that looked like a version 
of that. 

Q Do you recall any other memos that mentioned 
diversion? 

A No. 

Q Do you happen to know where that memo was in 
terms of the other documents around it, in what file? 

A No; Brad found it and I just don't know. I think 



286 



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it was in '85 material because before lunch Earl had 
not produced '85 files and in fact when we were leaving 
we passed North in the hall and we told him that there 
weren't any '85 files, he expressed surprise and said I 
will get them out for you. So it was in '86 material 
but I don't remember which files. 

Q Do you recall when you were first shown the 
material by Commander Thompson? Do you recall any files 
in North's office regarding the Nicaragua resistance or 
Central America? 

A I did not see any. I don't recall — it's 
conceivable that Earl said these are all the files having 
to do with the freedom fighters but I don't recall that. 
He did say these are terrorist files, this is a hostage 
file. We said we want everything on the Iranian initiative 
and because they pulled open one drawer and said these 
are all the reports from the hostage ^^^^^^^^1, and that 
had to deal with where they were and we said we weren't 
interested in that. I don't thinX we discussed or saw 
any files concerning that. 

(Short recess.) 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Okay, back on the record. 

Do you recall how soon it was after the 
diversion memo was found that you folks broke and went to 



yNCLASSIRED 



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mmm 



lunch? 



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A No. I don't remember precisely. I think there 
was a substantial period of time after it was found before 
we went to lunch. 

Q Do you recall about what time you went to 
lunch? 

A Just from the note that I saw a minute ago, it 
was Exhibit 2, which indicated 1:45 to 3:15. I do recall 
it a late lunch, this wasn't noontime. 

Q Could you tell, describe for us of the documents 
that you wanted set aside or copies or somehow preserved, 
for you, could you tell us how you did that procedure, 
how you work that out? 

A Well, as I recall, Brad was, I may have done this, 
too, but I know he was using paperclips to mark them. I 
tended to think I took over with me, but I may not, I may 
have been using paperclips, I tend to use those yellow 
stickums, they were marked one way or the other. 

Q Were they put in a separate pile? 

A I am not sure. 

Q At any rate? 

A This may have been turned sideways in the same 
pile they were somehow delineated. 

Q The ones that you wanted to copy? 
A Yes, sir. |ift|| 



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Q Was this done, do you know, with the diversion 
memo? 

A I din't know. I am not sure what Brad did with 
it. 

Q Were any documents copied for you before you left 
for lunch? 

A No. 

Q But I gather you had set aside some documents 
for copying by them. 

A Well, yes, we had marked some documents as being 
ones we wanted to keep with us, take with us copies. 

Q And when you left was Colonel Earl still there? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Do you recall that morning what discussion you 
had with Colonel Earl, if any? I know you said you didn't 
want to interview him. Did he make any comment? 

A I don't think he made any comments. He may 
have said something like let me know if I can get you 
anything or be of assistance, but that was, other than I 
think he indicated pointed out which documents were in 
which files and produced the things behind North's desk, 
that is it. 

Q Did he participate in any conversations on the 
telephone or otherwise in your presence that you overheard? 

A I don't think so. I don't recall any. 

!1 



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He did have a conversation with Thompson. 
Thompson asked him if he knew where Ollie was and Earl 
said I have been trying to reach him, but I think he is 
due in soon, or something like that. 

Other than that, I don't recall any conversation 
and I don't recall him taking any phone calls. 
Mr. Thompson came in later in the morning asking for 
Colonel Earl, that was when we arrived. I missed that earliei 

Q Do you know whether or not Commander Thompson 
left after escorting you to Colonel North's office. 

A He left North's office, I don't know what he did. 
Q Did you see him later that day? 
A I don't remember. I don't recall seeing him 
again that day, or Sunday, for that matter, but I may have. 
This is Thompson? 
Yes, Thompson. 

What about Craig Coy, was he around that weekend? 
No. 
What about Admiral Poindexter? I gather you didn't 



Q 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 
see him. 

A No, I didn't see him. I got the impression — 
well, no, in fact, I guess it is more impression. North 
talked to Poindexter. That is the impression I got when 
North was there. 

Q That was in the afternoon? 



ONClASSintB 



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owsasaBiST 



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A Yes. 

Q Do you recall what he said to Poindexter? 

A I don't think so. Let me see. I made a couple of 
notes at the bottom of one of these. No. I am not sure, 
my recollection is after that North had a conversation with - 
he had a conversation with an Israeli. I think he then 
had a conversation with Poindexter. I don't recall. 

I think he called over and said, is he still there 
or something like that. Then he talked to someone. I 
gathered it was Poindexter, but I don't know if he said 
that was Poindexter. 

Q When you and Mr. Reynolds left for lunch, did you 
tell Colonel Earl you were going to lunch? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you tell him you were going outside the 
White House complex? 

A Probably. Meese had called and said he wanted us 
to meet him at Old Ebbitt. I probably told Brad that in 
Earl's presence. We may have said we will be back in about 
an hour or something like that. I don't recall. You can't 
eat in the White House, there are some machines in the 
basement of EOB , but you can't eat in the White House mess 
unless you are a member. I think he would have known that 
we were not going to eat in the White House. 

Q Was Alton Keel at the NSC on Saturday? 



!!MClJiNMi-itis__ 



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^ 



18 

CSS 

th^ 20 

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c^ 



A I don't know. 

Q And did Colonel Earl mention what his lunch plans 
were? 

A No. I don't think so. 

Q As I gather, as you were leaving to go to lunc^ 
you met Colonel North; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And how did you know it was Colonel North? 

A I don't know. I guess Brad and I came out of his 
office and we had walked probably five steps and I believe 
he said something like where are you guys going or 
something like that as a greeting and I don't know if 
Brad had met him before, but I had not, and introduced 
myself. 

I think Brad introduced himself, too, now that I 
think about it. 

Q Then my question, how did you know that was 
Colonel North? 

A I guess he assumed that the two guys leaving his 
office were the Justice guys and he introduced himself, as 
I recall. 

Q Did you tell him you were going to lunch? 

A Probably did. He said where are you guys going, 
have I missed it, or something like that, and we said, we 
probably said we were going out and have a bite of lunch. 



292 



BNRlgSfflff' 



to be interviewed? 



then we would be back shortly. 

I don't remember precisely. 

Q Did he volunteer at that tir 

A No, that was later. 

Q Was there anything else said in that brief meeting? 

A Brad told him, yes. Brad told him we had not seen 
the 1985 material and that we wanted to see that when we got 
back from lunch. What we were looking at was 1986 material. 

Q What did North say? 

A He said something like, oh, that should have been 
in what you were given. I will be sure that you have got it 
or I will find it, something to that effect. 

Q Was that produced by the time you came back? 

A Yes. I don't remember if it was on tbe table or 
if he — I think it was — he had pulled it out and he said 
this is the 1985 stuff. 

Q Along those lines, in your document review of 
1986 materials, you saw what we know now as PROF notes; 
is that correct? 

A I don't know. I may have. Now, I don't think 
since the name PROF note had been attached, I don't think 
I have gone back and looked at one. 

Q Do you know whether or not either you or Mr. 
Reynolds discussed with Colonel North whether _he had PROF 
notes from 1985. 



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itmimirr 



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A I don't think so. I don't recall any such 
discussion. 

Q Can you tell us what happened when you got to 
Old Ebbitt? 

A Well, Meese and Cooper were already there, as I 
recall. They seated us shortly, and I think Meese began 
by saying, all right, let's see where we stand and he and 
Cooper reported on what they had been doing and I don't 
remember independently what it was. Let me see if this -- 
I don't have an entry on my notes on Exhibit 2. But it may 
have been the Sporkin interview that may have been after 
lunch, I don't know, but they reviewed the state of 
knowledge based on what they had learned and he said, well, 
have you guys learned anything new, and I think we -- I 
told him I had been looking through ^^^^^^^^^^^^| told him 
one of two things that seemed to be of interest from those 
and Brad did the same thing, and Brad said, oh, we found 
another document which seems to indicate that funds might have 
gone from this transaction to the contras, and I mean 
Meese expressed great surprise. He visibly said something 
like, oh, a curse word, and sort of squinted his eyes and that 
sort of thing, and we said something like we haven't found -- 
Brad indicated we haven't found anything else to indicate 
that happened, and Meese said, be sure you bring a copy of 
that out when you come, and we said, we are marking things 



294 



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to copy, and I think that was it on that front. 

Cooper may have said, there may have been 
comment like if this happened, we have got a major problem, 
but that was sort of obvious. But it was very, very much - 
the context of the information was very much incredible 
prospect and clearly uncertain whether this had occurred 
or not. 

Q Was it discussed, the fact that Oliver North 
himself had the Central America account? Did you put 
those two things together? 

A No, I don't think so. I don't recall that, but I 
don't think it was. 

Although I am sure -- I may have known that and 
the AG, I guess, he would have known that. I think I may have 
known that because of when these matters have come up before, 
Ray Duon, our staff who handles that sort of thing might 
have said Ollie North handled this business. 

So it may have been just a piece of knowledge that 
we had, it wasn't openly discussed. 

Q Now, just for the record, so we get a couple 
things straight, I gather at that luncheon you did not have 
copies of the memo with you. 

A That is correct. 

Q What else did you discuss after mentioning the 
diversion memo and what you just related, what other subjects 



emssiFiED 



295 



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^ M 



were discussed. 

A Well, I thank that the ma^or things of interest 
still focused on what was going on in 1985 and who did what, 
whether this was authorized, et cetera. I don't remember 
with any specificity what the contents of that discussion 
was, but I recall that we, the diversion discussion, was 
^ about what I have recounted, the basic information and there 

8 may have been some statement that this will be a -- 

9 this obviously is a major problem, if this has happened, 

''0 we need to find out if it has happened. There may have been 

11 a mention that we -- North would be interviewed -- at the 

12 bottom of this in the North interviews, something like that. 

13 That was it on the diversion business and the rest was 

14 spent talking about the arms initiatives and Chuck, for 

15 example, he might have -- there were other things going on 

16 like McGinnis having gone through^^HH^^^^^H and I 

17 don't know if he was at CIA that day, but Chuck having some 
point -- Chuck and Meese, I think, split up and did 

19 some different things. So I am not sure what was 

20 precisely we talked about, but it was other things. 

21 Q How did you know that North had authored the 

22 diversion memo? 



mm. 

23 A We didn't. 



mmm 



24 Q Why did you feel you should interview him? 

25 A He was going to be interviewed anyway. This was 



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found in his files and so the most likely person to have 
knowledge about it was him out of the pool we had identified 
thus far. 

Q Was there a discussion at this point that 
Poindexter should be interviewed? 

A I don't recall that. 

Q How about whether Casey should be interviewed? 

A I don't recall there being a discussion about 
adding anyone to the list or subtracting anyone from the 
list or targetting the interviewing any differently other 
than our having a clear understanding that this would be 
something to question North about. 

Q Was it decided whether to question anyone else 
about it? 

A It wasn't discussed in that context. We didn't 
say, okay, now about the diversion, who do we question. It 
was something found in a document that might or might not 
have happened, next step to finding it out, get a copy of 
it and ask North about it in his interview the next day. That 
is as far as it went in terms of that point. 

Q Was it discussed whether it shouldn't be mentioned 
to people who were going to be interviewed? 

A No, I don't think so. I mean, it was clear that 
we weren't going to say anything about any of this to anybody 
outside of our group of four. I don't recall that being 



297 



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reiterated, but that was a very -- that was very clearly 
understood. Meese might have reiterated it. I know at the 
beginning of the weekend, it was made clear that — we, 
three of us, were going to work in support of Meese 's 
fact-finding inquiry, we were to talk to each other and 
obviously -- I mean the potential significance of this 
bit of information was not lost as a major development in 
this fact-finding question. 

Primarily for — at this point it was a factual 
bomb shell and whether it could possibly have occurred or not 
these are obviously to the President's two major and 
independently controversial initiatives and so that was not 
lost on anyone, there was no substantive discussion of it 
at this point because we didn't know if this was just a plan 
or a possible way to go or if it actually happened. 

As just in percentage of conversation at lunch, this 
was a small percentage, five minutes or less. Probably 
five minutes. It grew in time over the course of the 
next several days. 



298 



Bob Thomas 
' -t-l 



.«sr^ 



CO 21 






mwH^fi^T 



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Q When you went back then to the NSC, was North in 
his office? 

A I think he was, yes, I think he was. 

Q That would be at what, 3:00 probably, in the 3:30 
range, 3:15 you said. 

A That is probably right, when we probably left lunch 
at 3:15. It was in that neighborhood there. 

Q Did Colonel North mention to you where or with whom 
he had had lunch? 

A No. 

Q When you did get back to the NSC, did you know 
whether or not any of the documents that you had set aside for 
copying had been disturbed in any way? 

A No, everything, everything looked as we had left it. 

Q One more question about the lunch, was it discussed 
at lunch or even generally on the way over to the NSC that 
something should be done to secure the documents? 

A Well, we discussed getting copies of the documents. 

Q But was there any discussion of securing them? 

A Any what — 

Q Being sure they weren't destroyed. 

A No. There was no reason to believe that they would 
be or that they had been for that matter. 

Q Was Colonel North at his desk when ycu returned? 

A Well you have to be, — to get into that office you 



299 



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U) 



have to be let in because there is a vault on the door. He, 
as I recall, I think he let us in. We rang the visitor's but- 
ton and he went to his desk and we went to the conference 
table. 

Q I trust that you began to up your interview of docu- 
ments? 

A Yes. Earl was still there by the way. We asked 
him, we told him we wanted to make copies of some of the 
documents. He said fine. He said, do you know which ones? 
Do you have some you know you want right now? We'll help 
copy them. Yes, these we know we want. He and Earl helped 
copy what we had up to that point. When that was done — 

Q Colonel North and Colonel Earl helped you? 

A Yes, that is my recollection. Then after we had 
copied that group, I took over all the xeroxing from that 
point on. Earl left at some point fairly soon thereafter and 
North took a portion back behind his desk. 

A So do you recall was it you or who copied the diver- 
sion memo or would it have been Earl and North? 

A I don't recall who copied it. 

Q Well, did they copy everything that you had set 
aside that morning? 

A I think so. What I don't know if Brad held out the 
diversion memo and then gave that to me to copy. I don't 
recall when, who actually copied that memo. 



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Q Now, I had one question of your notes here of the 
documents that you had reviewed. You reference As underlined. 
Is that a person? 

A I think it looks like it is, yes. In entry nu.Tiber 
1, there is the word beginning with capital A and then the 
rest of it is blacked out, and K, and the rest of that is 
blacked out. So, I probably was using the initials not want- 
ing to write down the names because there seems to be, there 
IS an aside and a quote, it is probably some individual. 
These are, I think, notes' 

Q Do you recall who that could have been? 

A looked ^^ ^^^^^^^^^^| ^ could you 

but — does the name ^^^^^ring a bell? That sticks in my 
mind for some reason. I don't know who it was. It was some- 
one in 

Q Okay. 

A I gather there was a^Bperson too, but I don't know. 
After awhile I stopped taking notes on each document because 
it became too time-consuming. 

Q Now, if we could sort of take the rest of your docu- 
ments and review a couple. I gather you didn't come across 
any other documents mentioning diversion of the monies to the 



contras; 



That is right. 



ilNCLSSSIFIED 



Did you find any document which indicated that the 



DttJH^I^IlT 



M- 



November 1985 Hawk shipment was authorized? 

A Yes, well the document that contained the reference 
to the diversion, I believe, the second paragraph it said 
something like the U.S. Government endorsed the September 1985 
shipment and that I specifically recall that one. Meese, in 
fact, that was the principal angle of questioning that Meese 
used on North when he showed him the diversion memo at first. 
I specifically recall that. I don't, I tend to recall that 
there was reference in, maybe, in^^^^^^^^^^^^f the Septem- 
ber 1985 shipment being connected to actions on the part of 
the United States but that is a fuzzy recollection. Nothing 
else specifically stands out in my mind at this time, but 
there may have been back then. 

Q And of the comment regarding the Hawk shipment being 
endorsed by the U.S., did you discuss that particular provi- 
sion at the luncheon you had? 

A Well, that was actually the September shipment. I 
think those were TOWs. 

But I don't think we did discuss that at lunch. I 
don't recall but this is surmising because I had read only 
the diversion section of that memo I think. I might have 
looked at this section. We got the copy of this memo at the 
end of the day and I know we went over it in great detail 
with Meese before the North interview. We probably didn't go 
--didn't go over it in that much detail, although Brad might 

m\:\ 



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have mentioned it was in there, I don't recall. I know there 
was a discussion about it on Sunday afternoon before North's 
interview. 

Q During your document review on Saturday afternoon, 
can you try to recall, please, everything that North had to 
say to you? 

A Okay. 

Well, I recall that he had a conversation, that is 
in the note that made in Exhibit 8 at the bottom — Iguess 
I will count the pages--bottom of page 7 I have written a G 
in a circle, drawn a line across the bottom, received call 
from Israeli code talk nephew and then a swiggle line said 
lots came out, lots not, mos sens, not so still talking. 
Then that was referred to a North call that he had with some- 
one that I could tell was an Israeli because he said, did you 
see, he referred to an article in the New York Times that day 
or the day before that mentioned Kimche, he mentioned this 
article in the New York Times to this gentleman on the tele- 
phone. He said things like your government, everyone in your 
government and my government is overreacting or panicking or 
something like that. The code talk and nephew, he mentioned 
a nephew, the code talks you don't remember if that I ran 
across the code which had a key for names and that sort of 
thing, I don't remember if he was using something like that, 
but he mentioned Beethoven and composers, I think he might 



!^l<;SlFlfJL. 



UMA^WSlET 



^ 



have told us that Poindexter was Beethoven or I saw that, I 
remember that. 

But he told him that a lot had come out about this 
initiative already but a lot hasn't, that the most sensitive 
things have not come out. I think that is what my note means 
here so they are still talking. 

There was another, second note I have got, Bremer 
mentioned phone call. I am not sure what that is about. 

He didn't — I just don't remember what that is about. 
He mentioned the Ambassador on phone call but I can't remem- 
ber more about it. I think, the only other recollection I 
have got is that he placed a call which I thought was back 
to the West Wing and asked for Poindexter after he talked to 
the Israeli. He left the room one time to make a pot of 
coffee. He offered us coffee, and I followed him out of the 
room, went back while he made coffee. We talked about Marine 
coffee and how bad it was and that his wasn't much better, 
that sort of thing — and he came over and, this is over the 
course of the three hours, I don't remember the sequence, but 
came over at one point, sat down, and said, all right shoot, 
let me know I'm ready to take your questions or I guess you 
are ready to ask them, something like that. We explained that 
we were just the workers who were going to go through some of 
the documents and that the AG would ask him some questions 



tomorrow. 



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yM«S 



ET 



1^ 



And, at some point there was a telephone call from 
Meese and my recollection is that Meese talked to me about 
setting up the time with North, he said, could you see if I 
could do it in the afternoon instead of the morning because 
that is church time with the family, we go to Roy Rogers 
afterward, that sort of thing. That could have been a direct 
conversation, but I think I was the person who talked to Meese 
then talked to North. 

Q Hold on for a second, was it a case of the Attorney 
General placing the call, putting him on hold while he talked 
to North and then speaking to him, or did you place another 
call to the Attorney General? 

A I don't remember. 



n 



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1 

2 

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5 

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8 

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A I tend to think. I put the AG on hold and asked him, 
but I just don't recall specifically. I mean, it is possible 
also that the AG called and aid, "Let me talk to--put Ollie 
on," and that I overheard Ollie saying, "Well, could I come 
in the afternoon." I mean I could be wrong on that; but 
that's just my recollection. 

At another point, he said something like--you mean 
he was passing the time of day and he said something to the 
effect that there aren't that many poeple around the govern- 
ment who are at work at this hour like us that are working 
these extra hours and that sort of thing. He may have said 
something— I know at some point he talked about the initiative 
and the purpose of it. He said people don't understand what 
it is all about, but this was a broad-based initiative or 
something, more of the diplomatic reasons. And he also — I 
just remembered one thing and it slipped through my mind. 
Q How about his remark of being a fall guy? 
A Yes. He didn't use that phrase, as I recall, but 
he did say something to the effect that— I mean, he was very 
friendly and outgoing and— I mean he gave the appearance of 
being relaxed. But he said something like well, I'm not 
worried, in six weeks I'll be commanding a Marine battalion 
of infantry troops, or something to that effect, that I won't 
be--he knew he would not be long for this job, something to 
that effect. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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Q Anything that you can recall? 

A The last thing I recall — I'm trying to think if 
there's anything in the office. I know when we were leaving, 
we walked out with him from the building into the parking lot, 
and walked Ollie — Ollie got into his car, just like, as I 
recall, just like a red and white wagon, a Bronco; and Brad 
and he were talking about their daughters mutual interest in 
horseriding and the strain that put on parents. I think 
that's about it. I don't think there's anything--nothing else 
I recall. 

Q Did he mention to you that he had consulted with an 
attorney, or that he had an attorney? 

A I do not recall him saying anything to that effect. 

Q Did he say that anyone had advised him to obtain an 
attorney? 

A No. I don't recall anything about that. 

Q Did he ask either you or Mr. Reynolds whether or 
not you thought he should have an attorney? 

A I don't think so. I don't recall that, and I don't 
think he did. 

Q Did — 

A These are the kinds of things I think I would remem- 
ber, but I don't. I mean I can't be certain that they didn't 
occur, but I think I would remember them if they did. 

Q Did either you or Mr. Reynolds advise Colonel North 



yMciij;sififiL_ 



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to get an attorney? 

A No. I certainly didn't, and I did not hear Brad 
recommend that. I mean to give — the nature of the thing was 
that there was a major political problem in terms of — it was 
clear there was a major political problem with this initiative 
having been made public and the policy seemed to run counter 
to previously stated Administration policy, and it didn't 
seem unusual at all to me to hear him joking about losing his 
job. As being a — and I didn't know whether it is because he 
was a proponent of or complementor of the policy. That didn't 
seem unusual. There was not any flavor or feeling of he hdd 
personal legal liability. Although, I mean, we were clearly 
aware of legal problems for the Administration. 

Q Do you recall what time you did leave in the company 
of Colonel North? 

A I saw a note here a minute ago that seemed to indi- 
cate it was — yes. On Exhibit 2, it indicates 7:15, JR and 
WBR depart NSC offices. That's probably about right. I don't 
think it's contemporaneous, but that's probably about right. 

Q Did Colonel North mention he was going home or did 
he have another engagement that evening? 

A I don't recall. I don't think he mentioned another 
engagement. I mean, I think we — I recall him saying he lived 
in Great Falls and I may have said, because they were talking 
about the horses. I may have said I live in McLean, you have 



308 



UHttlfiSHlfeT 



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a long drive, or something like that; but I don't recall 
knowing where he was going. 

Q Did he mention any meetings that he had had or 
planned to have with Robert McFarlane? 

A No. 

Q Did he make mention of Tom Green? 

A No. 

Q Did he make mention of Richard Secord? 

A No. 

Q Did he make mention of Albert Hakim? 

A I don't think so. No. They were all mentioned the 
next day during the interview. 

Q Sure. 

Now Sunday morning, do you recall when it is you 
went to the Department of Justice? 

A Well, I came straight to the NSC. 

Q Oh, okay. 

A From home. And I overslept because I got in there 
later--! think we had Jock in there at 9:00 or 9:30, something 
— we wanted him to meet us around there at that time. It's 
just my recollection. And my note here on Exhibit 2 indicates 
I got in there about 10:45. I stayed up very late the night 
before. 

Q By the way, when the copies were made of the docu- 
ments you wanted, did you take possession of them? 



OMCliSSlfJEL.- 



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99 



A Yes. 

Q Where did you put them? 

A Well, I kept them in a pile next to me while we 
were in the office. Then I think I got one of those legal 
size fiberboard folders and put them in there when we left. 

Q Okay. And where did you take them? 

A Took them back to — well, I don't remember if I went 
to the Department. I probably went to the Department after 
leaving the NSC. And then I took them with me--I mean, they 
were on me at all times. I took them home. I don't take 
classified material home normally, but — I mean I locked them 
in my trunk when I drove home. I took them inside and put 
them under my bed. I lived in a one-room place at that time 
so they were within arms reach. I am sort of paranoid about 
classified material anyway. 

Q I take it then you took them back with you when you 
went back to the NSC? 

A Yes. I probably had a litigation case going or 
coming. I tend to recall that I did, with notepads and-- 
that's why I think I used stick- 'ems to mark my documents. 
I think I had one of those with me. 

Q Do you recall when it was you went from the NSC to 
the Department of Justice? 

A I think it was around mid-day. Let me see if this 
refreshes ray — Exhibit 2, the note for 2 3 November indicates 



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100 

12:40 to 2:00 p.m. that we met with Meese and Cooper, Reynolds 
and myself. So we probably left there about 12:00, 12:30. 

Q And during that meeting, you mentioned that you 
went through the diversion memo? 

A Yes. 

Q Carefully? 

A I think that we showed it to Meese for the first 
time then. 

Q Had you seen typewritten questions prepared by John 
McGuiness? 

A I think I saw them at this meeting, at this pre-Nort 
meeting. I think Cooper went through them with Meese. 

Q When did you first discuss the weekend inquiry with 
John McGuiness? 

A Golly, let me think. May have been Friday night. 
I went down to see Cooper and knew that John was involved. 
I didn't sit down and talk to John about what we were find- 
ing or the state of play. I did not brainstorm with him or 
share any information that I had gotten with htm. I know 
there's a set a notes that I took after a conversation with 
McGuiness, and I don't remember what day. Maybe Monday, where 
he told me what he had learned at the CIA; and I am sure there 
came a time when I knew John knew about the diversion pros- 
pect and a fuller conversation was had, but that could have 
been Tuesday as opposed to sooner. I don't think that I knew 



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2 

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McGuiness before this weekend. I knew Cooper trusted him and 
that he was — is a very good lawyer and a very confidential 
person to deal with this kind of sensitivity as well as 
classified material. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q I show you what has been marked as exhibit nximber 
9. Is this your note taken of your conversation with John 
McGuiness on the 24th of November, 1986? 

A Yes. 

Q And it indicates 1:30. Is that when the conversa- 
tion took place? 

A Probably — yes. That's probably what that means. 

Q Can you tell me what the first reference is to? 

A The entry says, "Rumors at CIA extra money" — a 
dollar sign — "paid to" — its Southern Air Transport. It says, 
"SO Transport." and "funneled to Nicaragua." 

Q Now when he hold you this, were you — in other words, 
were you in his office or your office or was this part of a 
bigger, meeting? 

A I'm pretty sure this was one-on-one. I don't know. 
We might have been in Cooper's office or we might have been 
in my office. I don't know which. 

Q Was Cooper present? 

A I don't think so. I mean it's possible, but I 
would tend to thinX not. 



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2 
3 
4 
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i<:g...^ 



Q Do you know whether or not Mr. -Mefiujaitss told you 
that he had told Cooper this piece of information? 

A I don't recall. If he had not, he certainly would 
have the next moment I saw him because I mean he was reporting 
to Cooper; so I think he was bringing me up to speed on what 
he had found. 

Q Did you bring this fact to the Attorney General's 
attention? 

A I don't recall. I may have. What is more likely 
is that Cooper briefed me on what McGuiness learned at CIA, 
or from talking to the CIA people. But I might have; I just 
don't recall. 

See, at this point, — well, this is a slightly 
different twist on contra funding because it seems to indi- 
cate the ruitiors at CIA were the money was funneled through 
Sourthern Air Transport. But my basic point of view is that 
well, we already know that money has been diverted from the 
contras and this would go to the how — but I would think 
Cooper was the one who would have briefed Meese on this. 
Although I may have done it. 

Q When McGuiness told you that this was a rumor at the 
CIA, did you tell him at that point, well, we found a memo to 
that effect at the NSC? 

A I don't think so. 

Q And did you tell him about the North interview: 



yNCUSSIFIED 



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IMIWH' 



103 



A I don't think so. 
Q Why not? 

A I just was not telling anybody outside of the other 
two, three people including the Attorney General that I was 
authorized to tell people — tell things to. I knew that Chuck 
was tasking John to gather certain kinds of information and to 
look into certain legal questions, and I wasn't going to take 
it upon myslef to share that information with anyone. Not 
that I didn't trust — he may have known. I just don't remem- 
ber. Cooper may have told him by this time, but I don't recall 
But I'm pretty sure that I did not volunteer it. 

Q Prior to the Attorney General's press conference of 
November 25th, did you tell anyone at the Department of Jus- 
tice or outside of the Department of Justice — 
A No. 

Q --about the diversion? 

A No. The only possible person would have been 
fKGUlKBss-, and I'm pretty sure I didn't tell him. 

Oh, I take that back. I told Ken Cribb. Cribb 
came back into town probably Sunday night. I don't know for 
sure. Monday morning— actually , I think I called Cribb at 
home Sunday night and said we are meeting with Meese at 8 
o'clock or— I think it was 7:30, maybe, 7:30, a quarter to 
8, we arranged to meet with Meese. I asked Ken— I said, you 
should be at that meeting. I went and caught him in his 



314 



imi^RE^ 



office five minutes before the meeting and brought him up to 
speed. I mean up to speed in terms of the bombshell prospect 
not in every detail. And then I think Ken went — I believe h« 
was in that pre-8:10 meeting, but I'm not certain. I think t 
was. But Ken was added to the list of people who knew. i 
better think for a minute so I make sure I don't miss anythir 
else. 

I think that is it. I did not tell anyone else be- 
sides Cribb. 

Q Are you sure? Or do you just think? 

A I am pretty sure I did not. As I say H e Guineo s is 
a possibility, but — unless M e Ouinog s has raised it with me, 
I would not have raised it with him. Now he may have raised 
it with me, but then I wouldn't have told him, so I would saj 
that Cribb is the only one I told. 

I don't think, for example, I told Meese's secretary anc 
she was there all weekend. So I think that's right. I'm 
pretty sure Cribb is the only one. 

Q What about anything else outside of the Department 
of Justice? 

A No. I'm not married and I don't think I would hav« 
told my wife anyway; but that would be the only possibility. 

Q If we can go further now through Exhibit 9, rumors 
about CIA. Then we have another CIA did not — please read 
that. 



315 



IMH^ISr 



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A Second entry, "CIA did not use" — it says, "SO 
Trans," T-R-A-N-S, which is Southern Air Transport — "in this" 
—underlined this— "transaction (Nicaraguan or Iranian ship- 
ments. ) " 

Q What does that mean? 

A I gather it means that the CIA did not use Southern 
Air Transport. I^m not sure what "this* underlined refers to. 
It may refer — I mean, it may refer to — in fact, it must--when 
I look at the next entry which says, "All arrangements NSC 
Bud November ' SS^^^^^^^Hand November '86 replenishment, 

'.' I gather it refers to the — probably to the 
November 1985 shipment. I hesitate because at some point, I 
have the recollection that a Southern Air Transport crew 
was used for something, but I don't know where that fits in. 
That may have been 1986 shipments. But I think our attention 
here was on November 1985, which was ^^^^^^^H the proprie- 
tary. 

Q Were you aware during this weekend that Southern 
Air Transport was being investigated after the Hasenfus 
crash? 

A I don't think I was. 

Q Were you aware of the call by the Rouse Judiciary 
Committee members for an independent counsel to investigate 
that? 

A Well, I was aware of — let me think for a second. I 



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•LK-12 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 



was aware of Congressional requests for investigations of 
drugs, alleged drug smuggling by the contras. Now I don't 
know if that's the same — 

Q No. There is a request on October 17th, 1986, 
following the shoot down of the Hasenfus plane at which a 
majority of the House Judiciary Committee members asked for 
a preliminary investigation into whether or not an independent 
counsel should be appointed to investigate that particular 
activity; 

A Did they name an NSC member as the target? 

Q Yes, it named North, it named Poindexter, it named 
Casey, it named Vice President Bush and others. 

A I was probably aware of that but not — I did not 
think of it this weekend. I did not — I mean, I was probably 
aware of such an allegation or a request. I would have seen 
the letter when it came in to Meese; and I probably would have 
known that something had been referred, but I don't think I 
knew that the entity involved was Southern Air Transport or 
that I put the two together. 

Q I guess we skipped ahead to Monday morning. I 
think those are the relevant things from the M c Guiiiesb . 

A Yes. Okay. There's a reference to fair market 
value. We were trying to find out the price of the weapons. 

Q What's that last line? 

A "NSC paid (or intermediary for Israelis et cetera) 
111 



317 



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for Southern Airways." 

Q Okay. If we can get to then I guess the North 
interview. 

A Yes. 

I gather Colonel North came alone? 

A Yes. 

Q And this took place in the Attorney Generals 's 
office? 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 



Yes. 

Were you the designated notetaker, as it were? 

Yes. 

You had decided that prior to the interview? 

Yes. I mean, it had been decided for me, but yes. 
I knew I was taking notes. Let me put it this way. I think 
Cooper was tired of taking notes and Meese — he thinks I'm a 
decent notetaker. 

Well, you have one of the best penmanships of any- 
one at the Department of Justice. I can tell you that from 
personal experience. 



A 

Q 

of you. 

A 

Q 



Thank you. Except Meese 's, his is very neat, too. 
In fact, sometimes it's hard to distinguish the two 



Yes. 

Did Colonel North mention at this interview mention 



having consulted with an attorney or having an attorney? 



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2 

3 

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IS 

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A I don't think he did. 

Was he asked if he had an attorney? 

A No. I don't think he was. 

Q Was he told he had a right to have one there? 

A No. I don't believe he was. I should just, as an 
aside, on any specific thing, if my memory can be refreshed or 
corrected by looking at the notes, I sort of reserve that. 
I go by recollection on this line. It may be incorrect in 
some detail, but I think on those none of that happened. 

Q Okay. I really did not have specific questions on 
the interview. 

A Okay. 

Q But I think Tom does. If you want to jump in? 
MR. McGOUGH: Want me to do them now? 
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes. 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 

Q I only brought one copy of these because I didn't 
intend to introduce them as an exhibit. 

I wanted to go to that portion of the interview 
where the Attorney General raised the subject of the diversion 

A Right . 

Q As I understand, the way the interview went at — it 
proceeded on a general level and for some time, or at least 
it didn't deal with the diversion for some time, and then the 
Attorney General brought out the diversion memo and began to 



llNClA.^SJHFft' 



319 



109 

to go over portions of the diversion memo other than portions 
referring to the diversion itself? 

A Right. 

Q Is that right? Fair to say? 

A Yes. I mean — and I think — I mean, that was a tacti- 
cal determination. He established that North had written 
the memo and he drew his attention to what was genuinely 
new information or — on the question of enforcement by the 
U.S. Government of that September 1985 shipment which was 
on page 1 . 

Q One of my questions is was that a tactic discussed 
in advance of the North meeting? When you had this rather 
lengthy meeting before North C2une? Were there tactics dis- 
cussed? How you were going to broach it? 

A I don't recall that specifically. I do know Meese 
was talking about what areas to cover; and using the typed 
questions that Cooper had provided. He said, all right, we 
want to go through the 1985 shipment; well, how the initiative 
began; the 1985 shipments. Then talked to him about this memo 
concerning the use of funds. But I don't recall him specific- 
ally saying now — if he~he did say, now I will do the question 
ing. And if you've got anything to add, you let me know. 
But it was clear — I mean, it was very obvious to me once he 
began the questioning what he was doing. You may know this, 
but he had been a prosecutor for eight years in his early 



KUSSlEe,„ 



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no 



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career. So he's--he's a good questioner. 

Did you know going into the meeting that the Attorney 
General might have to leave early? 

A I think I did. His wife was coming back from out 
of town and he had to go pick her up at, I guess, the train 
station or--either there or the airport. I think I knew, 
but I'm not--I don't recall clearly. 

Q Now there's been some indication, I believe Mr. 
Cooper's testimony and elsewhere, that when Colonel North's 
attention was drawn to the diversion paragraph that he was 
surprised or appeared surprised. Do you concur in that assess 
ment? 

A Yes. Yes. 

Q Can you elaborate on it in any way? Can you tell 
me from what you drew that conclusion? 

A Well, he--I mean, as I recall, his first--he first 
said was this in my files? We said yes. 

Q Let's back up for a second. When he said was this 
in my files, was he referring to — was this at the point where 
he was first shown the memo or only when his attention was 
drawn to it? 

A When it was drawn to the diversion. He had already 
said he had written the document and that sort of thing. He 
said you found this in my files? We said, yes. And he — I 
mean, he was visibly surprised. Meese asked him if this took 



!lmil«laL^„ 



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2 
3 
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5 
6 
7 



era 



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25 



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place. He said yes. And you could see him sort of then 
recline back in the chair and I think that's about--that ' s 
about it in terms of surprise. He was visibly surprised that 
we had--that this had been fround. 

Q Can you parse it out at all? Could you determine 
here/hei_was_[ surprised that the memo he was looking at had a 
reference to the diversion in it? Or was he surprised that 
you knew about the diversion in general? Maybe I'm getting 
a little too specific. 

A Well— 

Q What I am trying to find out was he surprised that 
here is a memo he says he's written, and all of a sudden he 
rears up and realizes there is a paragraph in there relating 
to the diversion? Was that what surprised him that there was 
a paragraph in there relating to the diversion? 

A I would say both. He was clearly surprised we 
had information about the diversion; and 1 think he was — 
his reference to — this was in my files — indicated that he was 
surprised that it was in the memo. I think it's both. I took 
it as both anyway. I mean, he never said anything like, I 
can't believe you found this. I thought I'd gotten rid of all 
of these. He never intimated anything like that. 

But something about that memo surprised him? That 
was clear? 

A Oh, no question. I mean I'm convinced, he had no 



82-732 0-88-12 



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112 



idea we were going to find anything that concerned the di- 
version. 

Q And it wasn't the fact that you had the whole memo? 

A No. It was the diversion. 

Q He was--it was the diversion paragraph that was 
in there? 

A That's correct. 

Q This then was — looking at the notes-general conver- 
sation, after the diversion was broached, about how much was 
moved to Nicaragua, that sort of thing; and then the question 
of who knew, I guess, and who approved, who approved the 
diversion was broached? 

A Yes. 

Q Can you relate to me what you recall about how that 
was raised and what he said about who knew? 

A If I can look at those notes, it might help me 
refresh my recollection. 

Q Sure . 

£ The one thing I remember without looking at the 
notes is he said specifically the only three people who could 
know are the following, which was Poindexter, himself, and 
McFarlane. 

Q Yes. 



UNCUSSIFifP 



A But, let me get to the point of — well, they talked 
about where the idea came from. Then Meese asked him — 



323 



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Q Let's back up a little bit here. There is a refer- 
ence here to, "if President okays something into working 
files of," who is speaking here? Can you tell? And what is 
that a reference to? 

A The reference is to if the President okays a memor- 
andum or plan, where does it go. That was what we were try- 
ing to determine. 

Q I think if you go back up, there is a reference here, 
"AG, discuss with RK not with N." 

A Neese said was this discussed with the President? 
North's answer, not with North in the room, not when North 
was present. 

Q This was then the discussion of the residuals? 

A Yes. North continues here, Poindexter-this is what 
the notes mean on 15, Poindexter is the point of contact with 
the President. Fortier was involved, too. When he became 
principal deputy. Question: Do you know the amount? North 
didn't know. Question: Was there any CIA handling of that 
money? North: No. Don't think they know underlined. Some 
may suspect. Was this an Israeli suggestion to sweeten the 
pot? It was discussed with the Israelis to how they could 
help generally, and that's North and Rabin. Don't recall 
asking them. Thought the Israelis offered. 

Q Now we have the line, "if the President okays some- 
thing into working files of." 



w tmm 



324 



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11^ 



Do you recall what that was a reference to? 

A I don't have a specific recollection. From the 
looks of the note, it looks like Meese asking if the President 
okays something, what happens to it; and--normally I used a 
dash to indicate the answer. And the dash, into working 
files. 

Q And this is as best you can understand the notes, 
the Attorney General attempting to determine if there was 
a written document indicating the President's approval? 

A That's right. 

Q And then the next line is again, "AG, if RR approved 
it, you'd have it"? Is that more or less the question he was 
asking North? 

A Yes. 

Q North said yes. Then there is a line, "don't think 
it was." 

A North did not think it was approved by the President. 

Q Look at the next two lines. Would you read those 
into the record? 

A It says, "other files there. It could be in." 

I think what it means is other files it could be in. 
Question mark. 

Q Was that the Attorney General asking North if there 
were *any other files where such an approval might be located? 

A Yes. I mean. North had said he didn't discuss it 



325 



ra«ffl»!pT 



115 



with the President. He didn't think the President had approv- 
ed it. Meese was saying are there other files it could be in 
besides yours that — to verify it didn't go forward. 

Q In other words, the point of asking about other files 
was to verify that it didn't go forward to Reagan; is that 
right? 

A Yes. 

Q And then there is a trunk indicated — what does that 
line say? 

A The last line, there is a star that says, OLN will 
check. 

Q What did that mean? 

A He said, — we didn't ask him. North volunteered, 
I'll check, I don't think so, that it could be in any other 
fiels, but I'll be glad to check. I just wrote that down. 
We weren't expecting the report back. 

Q Okay. But at least at that point — then it goes on, 
there's some other things to be checked on this page; right? 
Check if Israeli dollars got to Nicaraguans. 

A Right. 

Q What does that mean 

A I don't know what that means. 

Q Do you recall who was to check if the Israeli 
dollars got to Nicaraguans? 

A Well, I don't think it was— from looking at the note 



„ ISLIiSSIflFi! 



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itrnftsstHiS' 



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I don't think it was intended in that way. Because if there 
were--I use a star and circle if there is some follow-up or 
action item. I think this was a statement of information. 
But I don't know who made the statement. It could have been 
how would you check to see if Israeli money got to the Nicarag- 
uans, but I don't know what that means. I don't recall. 

Q The previous entry does have a star next to it ' 
indicating what you have called an action item? 

A Yes. 

Q Is that your understanding somebody was to do some-- 
thing as a result of that? 

A Well, he said — he volunteered that he was going to 
check. 

Q Yes. 

A I noted that. I don't think — I mean, I don't think 
any of us every followed up with him to determine whether 
there was additional paperwork in the system. 

Q Did anybody say at that point or at any point to 
Colonel North, no, don't go and check? 

A No. 

Q In other words, you didn't say don't go back to 
the files? 

A No. 

Q And see if there is approval? 

A No. 



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Q Okay. And to the best of your knowledge, no one 
ever followed up to ask him whether he did, in fact, find an 
approval? 

A That's correct. 

Q Would it be fair to say that at least at that point 
in the interview, and by the end of the interview, that was 
just left as an open item? 

A Yes. 

Q Okay. Did Colonel North mention any other files 
that such an approval might be located in? 

A I don't recall any other files, no, that he thought 
it might be located in. 



Did he indicate what other files he was going to 



check; 



A No. 

Q I think that's all I have on the notes, Pam. 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Did Colonel North indicate that he had spoken to Mr, 
McFirlane that day? 

A I don't think he did. No. Although he did not — 
let me think for a minute. He did not have his car with him 
at the Department and when we were done, he asked me for a 
ride to get his keys at the White House and then to pick up 
his car. And I was going to do it, and then Meese showed 
back up from getting his wife. The interview was done. So 



um^fpr 



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Meese's secretary drove him first to the White House, where 
she waited for him to run in and get keys, which I think he 
said his wife had brought an extra set of keys in. I didn't 
really pick up where he had lost or misplaced his keys; but — 
I don't know if she brought them — if she went — if he picked 
them up at the guard's gate or if he went to the office. But 
Kathy, Meese's secretary waited for him and then drove him 
over to pick up his car which he said was parked on the street 
around K Street; and then she left from there. At some point 
he may have had a conversation — North may have had a conversa- 
tion with her and said, you know, I was over at McFarlane's 
and my car is over there, would you mind dropping me off, 
because at some point, it sticks in my mind, that his car 
was near McFarlane's office. 



Q This is Cathie Appleyard?_ 

A Yes. 

Q Is that a common spelling? 



UNCIASSIREO 



A Yes. With a c and i-e, though for the Cathie. 

Q After Colonel North left, what did you all discuss? 
I assume-- 

A Well, the number one item was the confirmation of 
the — of a diversion as it's come to be known, of a use of the 
proceeds of the Iranian arms shipments to fund the contras. 
There was a recognition of the need to find out 
who else knew about this and whether this was an authorized 



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activity. There was discussion--! believe that night, but it 
may well have been the next morning, of trying to determine 
what--if this happened, and if it was an authorized activity, 
what the legal ramifications could be. 

MR. McGOUGH: You said if it was an authorized or 
an unauthorized? 

THE WITNESS: I said an authorized, but--I mean, 
we were looking at, I guess, the first question was--if the 
President authorized this, what is the — what are the legal 
implications. We were obviously--there was a clear prospect 
that it had been unauthorized as well, I mean unauthorized by 
the President. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Excuse me. Did Colonel North say whether or not 
Admiral Poindexter had authorized it? 

A I don't think he did. 

Q Was he asked? 



ONCLASSIFIEO 



A The implication was both of his supervisors knew 
about it. He said the only specifically — the only people who 
could know were Poindexter and McFarlane. McFarlane, as I 
recall — he said McFarlane found out about it in May of 1986; 
and so that— I don't think it was specifically said did Poin- 
dexter authorize this plan; but his — it was clear that his 
immediate superior knew about it. Oh, and Secord--we asked 
later if Secord knew, and he said yes. 



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Q And also Mr. Hakim knew? Right? 

A I don't know if he knew or not. I haven't followed 
the hearings that closely. 

Q No. I am asking you what Colonel North said? 

A I don't think he metioned Hakim as knowing. 

Q Did he mention that it was Nir's idea? 

A My recollection is that he did. But I couldn't 
point out to you exactly the section of the notes that deal 
with that. But I think he did. 

Q So he indicates that there were at least two other 

( 
peole outside of the U.S. Government? 

A That's right. And he said that Nir may be — I think 
it's Nir, the Israeli he named may be the only one in the 
Israeli government who knew, if he had handled the transaction 
himself. That is Nir. And he described the transaction. 
As I recall, again without looking at the notes, that he said 
he called Calero, told him to open up three accounts, got 
three account numbers, and he gave the account numbers to Nir 
who put money in the accounts. And my recollection of the 
Tom Green call /meeting on Monday, that the import of that 
was that North had told us about how the money changed hands 
was not correct, that it had changed hands in a different way. 
I don't recall specifically how, but I know you have someone's 
notes on that. 

Q When Colonel North left, was there a discussion as 



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to what to do with the information that you had learned? 

A On the--well, there was--I recall one on the diver- 
sion yes. And the Attorney General said he wanted to talk 
to the President about this and I don't know if it was Sunday 
night or Monday morning, we met him again Monday morning at 
7:30. And it--out of those two meetings, it was clear he 
wanted to talk to the Vice President, the President, Don Regan, 
and Poindexter. I think he talked to McFarlane about this, 
too, because he met with him briefly Monday morning. 

Q Did he indicate — 

A Just to give this some context, at this point we 
knew that this was a big deal and the question--! mean North 
had said this layer of my supervisors know. Meese's immedi- 
ate concern was does the President know about this? Was this 
authorized by the President? And if he didn't, you know, this 
was clearly the kind of policy call that he thought that the 
President, if it happened, that the President should have 
known about. So that was the immediate shift, and trying to 
determine if the President knew about it and if it had gone 
forward to him. So that's what he set out the next day to do, 
talk to Poindexter, Regan, et cetera. 

Q On Sunday, did Mr. Meese indicate what he discussed 
with Mr. Casey the evening before, Saturday evening at 
Casey's home? 

A I just don't recall any — I don't have a recollection 



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of any report about what he talked to Casey about. North had 
specifically excluded the prospect that anyone at the CIA 
knew about the use of money from the Iran shipment to fund 
the contras, and he had specifically said, and used the word 
"could." The only ones in the U.S. Government who could know 
about the use of those monies for the contras were Poindexter, 
McFarlane, and himself. 

Q But the Attorney General speaks to Mr. Casey prior 
to the North interview? 

A That's right. 

Q But after the diversion memo was found? 

A That's right. 

Q My question to you is did Mr. Meese indicate what he 
spoke to Mr. Casey about? 

A I don't recall him mentioning that at the time. 
He may have, but I just don't remember it. 

Q Did he mention the visit of Mr. Furmark to Mr. Casey 
indicating that investors in the Iran arms sale were about to 
file suit? 

A Did Meese mention that? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't know. I know North — Meese asked North if 
there were any other problems, bombshells, that wasn't the 
word he used but that was the import of the question, clearly 
understood.. One of them mentioned by North was that there were 



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investors that were getting antsy about not having their money 
and feeling that there could be problems there. But that's 
the only thing I recall about that. I don't think I heard 
about the Furmark materials until maybe Wednesday. Because 
Casey sent them over to Meese--some Furmark memos with a 
letter from Casey which — and I think they are dated the 25th, 
which was Tuesday. I think I may have seen that Wednesday 
morning. But I don't have any recollection of those before 
then. 

Q On Monday, did the Attorney General ask anyone to 
do any further interviews? In other words, he was going to 
go to the White House to see the Vice President and other 
people about this. Did he task anybody else with doing any 
other interviews? 

A I don't remember him doing that. He certainly did 
not task me to do that, but Cooper— I don't know if Cooper was 
doing anything or not on the other front. He may have still 
been in contact with the CIA on — I know that he was doing 
things with the CIA general counsel for sometime. I just 
don't know. 

Q And was it discussed with the Attorney General 
whether or not someone should go along with him when he spoke 
to Mr. Poindexter and the others? 

A I don't think so. I don't recall any such discussion 
I don't think — I don't think there was one. 



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By the way, were you present when the Attorney 
General spoke to Secretary Weinberger? 

A I don't recall being present, but it's possible that 
I was. This is on the telephone? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't remember. Being there or not being there. 

Q Did the Attorney General discuss with you what 
Secretary Weinberger told him. 

A I don't think so. I mean, all I — and I can't place 
this in time, but Meese's comments were that Cap doesn't know 
--Cap doesn't really have many of the details on this, some- 
thing to that effect. 

Q Now once the Attorney General returned from ;±he 
White House, did he tell you what happened? I gather he 
returned sometime around noon or so? On the 24th? 

A Let me see if I can remember from looking at--yes. 
Well, it indicates in my notes. Exhibit 2 here, on the 24th, 
that we had lunch from 12:45 to 1:30. Meese, Reynolds, Cooper 
Cribb, and Richardson. But I have, in parentheses, check, 
with an exclamation point. That may mean I either got the 
time, the person — or the number of people wrong. But he had 
a — I know he had — well, there is a notation here, 1:40, V.P. 
I know he had a NSPG meeting at 2:00. This would indicate 
he talked to the Vice President at 1:40. I tend to — I don't 
have a note to this effect, but I tend to recall that he saw 



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--I know he saw McFarlane around 10:00 in his office and I 
thought that was over at the White House to see Regan and the 
President late morning. But he may not — that may have just 
been Regan and Poindexter. 

I don't recall anything out of that lunch meeting at 12:45 
that day. He may have--I mean, at that point he might have 
said well, I'll see the Vice President then and I will see 
the President again at 4:30, something like that. It may 
still have been fluid. 

Q Did he tell you at the meeting with the President in 
the morning that he had told him about the diversion? 

A To this — I'm still not sure when — which--when he 
talked to the President that day. I know he did at the end 
of the day. But I don't recall him — I just don't recall any 
lunch conversation on that day. Sorry to say. He may have, 
but he may not have. 

Q But, I mean, this was the big issue. Did the Presi- 
dent approve it or not? 

A Yes. I just don't remember it now. He may have 
come in and said well, the President doesn't remember this. 
But I just don't remember now. I mean it was clear by the 
end of the day, it may have been at lunchtime that the Presi- 
didn't think he had approved it or that he had never heard of 
it and Regan had never heard of it and that was confirmed 
later in the day. But I don't know. I can't say when that 



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conversation occurred. It was obviously the big topic and 
it was obviously covered at lunch, but I just don't know the 
content of the conversation. 

Q Now-- 

A If I can just — I do know that when he came back at 
the end of the day Monday, we knew that this had not been 
authorized by the President for a certainty. 

Q If I can go back, in the morning, to the meeting 
with McFarlane? 

A Yes. 

Q Were you present at that? 

A No. 

To your knowledge was anyone present other than the 
Attorney General and Mr. McFarlane? 

A I don't know. Cooper might have been, but I don't 
— it might have been just Meese and McFarlane. I'm not certain 

Q Do you know why you were not present? 

A I mean I was--I had not been in the first McFarlane 
interview, so I didn't expect to be. I was the most junior 
and least — to be blunt, least important member of the team. 
So it didn't surprise me not to be there. 

Q I am not asking you if you were surprised. I am 
asking you if you know if there is a reason why you or anyone 
else wasn't there? 

A Oh, no. No, I don't. I mean, I know of no reason 



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why I was excluded if that's the question. 

Q Was there an expression on the Attorney General's 
part prior to that meeting that he wished to speak to Mr. 
McFarlane, the Vice President, Poindexter, and Regan alone? 

A I don't think so, no. 

Q Was there any discussion of whether or not he was 
going to take notes of these discussions? 

A No. I don't recall any. 

Q Now I take it that you know — 

A Vou know, we might at lunch, we might have talked 
about — at some point either that morning or the night before 
Meese told Cooper to find out when the Boland Amendment was 
passed, and that sort of thing. It may be that there was a 
preliminary discussion along those lines at lunch that day. 
But that would be a reasonable guess on what — I know that was 
covered Monday at some point. 

Q Other than the early morning meeting with the 
Attorney General and the lunch meeting, what were you doing 
Monday? 

A Well, we — 1 suspect that we probably had our formal 
8:10 staff meeting, our 8:30 staff meeting. I could look at 
his schedule and tell you for sure, but if you have that--but 
we normally then spend the 9:00 to 9:30 or so timeframe with 
our schedulers and that sort of thing. That may have been 
done. I just don't remember. I might have been seeing that 



leu^EiET 



128 



copy of the documents from the NSC was made, something along 
those lines. I just don't recall. 

Q Did you feel confident as of Monday that you had 
seen all the documents you needed to see? 

A Well, we had been through almost all of what North 
had provided to us. We had not been through some files marked 

11986. We had been through all 1985 material and 
all the 1986 material marked White House memoranda or miscel- 
laneous. So — I mean, I felt confident — I knew that we had 
been through everything that had been provided to us. I 
couldn't say that I thought every document that existed in the 
government on the subject I had looked at, but — at this point, 
— I mean the weekend tasking was get the facts, there's a 
2:00 o'clock meeting on Monday. At this point, by Monday, we 
had learned the facts and we hadn't pursued every detail, but 
at this point, there is a major — I mean obviously what happen- 
ed in 1985 was much less significant than the diversion; and 
the attention was focused very — immediately on the diversion. 
Cooper was looking into some of the legal questions. I'm not 
sure what I was doing. I might have just been in my office 
working or looking through some of these memoranda, but the 
focus of things shifted immediately to Meese working at a 
level with the President and the Vice President, Regan, Poin- 
dexter, to figure out what happened and what this factual 
revelation meant. So, I mean--my intimate activity in terms 



SLK-35 



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uKt^ssraiET 



of looking at documents and all that stuff had become a secon- 
dary thing. I mean this was clear— I mean, there was a very 
clear consensus Sunday night, reiterated explicitly Monday 
morning. We've got to find out what happened, was this 
authorized, and make this public; and so that is the track 
that was moving very quickly and those other activities which 
seemed much more important 24 hours earlier were much less 
important at this point. 

Q Why was it so important for it to become public so 
quickly before you had all of the facts? 

A Well, Monday was spent getting all the facts. That 
is— I mean the important facts. Did the President know about 
this? Who else knew about it? Those were the crucial things 
at this point. It's pretty obvious that this was a major 
development, that the Reagan initiative had already been the 
subject of three weeks of very serious public debate and the 
Administration was dealing with a serious foreign policy 
problem. I mean, this is from my personal perspective. There 
was also— I mean it was obvious that this development compound 
ed that dramatically and— I mean Meese was conscious through- 
out, that is throughout Sunday night when he and I had a brief 
conversation and Monday morning when this conversation occur- 
red that with this kind of development, all information had 
to be gathered quickly and made public quickly, because this 
—I mean, this is obviously— was going to create a problem 



340 



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for the Administration and could only be compounded if it 
were not made public. By public, I mean Congress to be 
notified, because there had been--the three weeks preceding, 
the debate had centered upon the nation — the failure to notify 
Congress on the arms initiative; and I think that was the bas- 
ic reasoning. 

Q But my question is why go public so quickly? In- 
other words, a decision was made to go public prior to, 
for instance, informing the FBI what had occurred. The infor- 
mation to go--the decision to go public and the going public 
of the information was prior to interviewing many of the key 
players in the Iran arms transaction. So my question was 
what is it that triggered Tuesday noon as zero hour for when 
it was going to go public? 

A Well, I mean — I would see no basis for informing the 
FBI, for example, as an entity. And all the key players had 
been interviewed. I mean North had been interviewed. We 
didn't track down Secord and Hakim or any of that sort of 
thing. The President was interested, Meese was interested in 
what do Administration officials know about this. 

Q Was Mr. Casey asked if he knew about the diversion? 

A I don't think — well, I don't know. The Attorney 
General has said that he did not raise that with Casey before 
the interview with North. But that it was discussed with 
Casey, as I understand it, Tuesday morning at Casey's home. 



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131 



because apparently Regan had said something to Casey about it. 
So — but it's obvious that with this kind of a devel- 
opment, that this was going to cause a major political problem 
for the Administration; and--I mean Meese, in the interview 
with North, said we don't want anything that can even look 
like a coverup. We want to get to the facts and get them to 
the President and this was before knowing about the — getting 
Meese--getting North to confirm the contra diversion. 

So I think the interest was in — as this bombshell 
was learned, it was to be made public as soon as possible, 
because it would have been--if this had been made public by 
someone other than the President, that would have added to the 
problem. 

So there was a concern of leaks as well? 

A I mean I didn't — I know Cooper has tagged it as 
a concern of leaks. I didn't view it that way. I guess — 
I mean — I was concerned personally. I mean Meese was commit- 
ted to getting this public as soon as possible. He didn't 
say I want to get this public because x, y, and z. In con- 
versations with Cooper, he said, you know, this thing could 
leak out, et cetera. I said the key is to get the President 
to make this public. And the President has — I mean, through- 
out this, certainly since this time, has wanted to make — 
get the accurate inforroation and msJte it known. This was 
a major operation, a major policy initiative that blended 



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two very important and controversial policies together and 
the President didn't know about it. So it's obviously-- I 
mean in hindsight and it was clear to us at the time that 
unless this was made public immediately, that it would create 
even more problems for the Administration. 

Q As you said, if someone else would have--were to 
have mentioned it, if it were to come out by some other means 
other than the Administration? 

A Right. 

Q Okay. 

A I mean, with rumors — rumors at CIA about this and 
that. 

Q Monday afternoon, the meeting vith Green, I tate it 
you were not involved in the 

A That's right. 

Q Did you receive a report about it? 

A As I recall, yes. 

Q And in that report, — when you received the report 
about it, were you in the presence of the other tecim members 
or was this-- 

A I think I was. I think Meese, Reynolds, and Cooper 
and there may have been others present, too. I think I have 
a note on that, but I'm just not sure. 

Q Was it discussed then that Albert Hakim was — let me 
back up. Mr. Cooper's notes indicate that they were told 



•" UNCLASSIFIED 



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that Albert Hakim was the guy who originated the idea of the 
diversion, according to Mr. Green. Do you recall that being 
state to the group? 

A No. I mean, it may have been. I don't recall it. 
Q Do you remember Mr. Hakim's name coming up? 
A No. I don't recall it. 

Q Now on Tuesday morning, you were tasked to go to 
the White House to look at documents? 

A Well, I rode into work with Meese Tuesday morning. 
I live very near his house. So once in awhile, I just hop 
a ride with him. That coincidentally happened to be one such 
day. So I rode with him from his house. He stopped by Casey's 
house. We went to the Department. He met briefly with Poin- 
dexter. He met--we then grabbed Cooper. In fact, Meese 
called Cooper from the car, and Cooper was still at home, and 
said be in my office by X time. 

Q When you stopped at Mr. Casey's house, did you take 
part in that meeting or did you stay in the car? 
A No. I sat in the car. 

Q And do you recall how long the meeting was? 
A My notes reflect, I think— well, in Exhibit 2, my 
notes seem to indicate five minutes. 6:40 to 6:45 a.m. Might 
have been a little longer. Actually it seemed a little longer 
in hindsight, but five to ten minues, 1 would say. 

While he was in there, there was a call placed to 



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to the car froni Don Regan--from the White House operator. I 
told him he was in Casey's house. I think he called him in 
there or we ran in with the message to Keese who called Regan. 
I can't recall which. 

Q Was Regan calling for Meese or for Casey? 

A For Meese. 

Q Why is is that you didn't go into Casey's house 
with Mr. Meese? 

A No particular reason. I wasn't asked to and I 
normally wouldn't sit in on a meeting between Meese and Casey. 

Q Did the person who placed the call for Mr. Regan 
indicate what he wanted? 

A No. I think it was a White House — the White House 
operator and I tend to recall that Meese 's driver ran in-- 
ran up to Casey's door and said that Regan was trying to 
reach him. As opposed to our directing the operator to 
Casey's residence. 

Q Did Regan place the call then to Casey's residence? 

A I don't — I mean I think based on my recollection 
that the driver went and told Meese that Meese placed a call 
to Regan from Casey's residence. 

Q But— 

A They did talk, when they were in there. 

Q They did not talk in the car? 

A Right. Because when he came back, I said did you 



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get Regan, as I recall; and he said yes. 

Q Did he say what Mr. Regan wanted? 
A No. I don't think he did. I don't recall that. 
But he — Meese then placed a call to Poindexter who was not 
in his office. He was in his car. So he reached him in his 
car and he asked him if he could meet— Poindexter if he could 
meet Meese at the Department. 

Q When is it that you discovered that Regan had told 
Casey about the diversion? 

A Oh, at sometime substantially later. It could have 
been in the last month. It was a statement to that effect. 
I'm not sure that he did, I should say. I just— my recollec- 
tion is that someone said that Regan had told Casey about it. 
Meese may have said that. I'm not sure. 

Q When the Attorney General got back into the car 
after visiting with Casey, did he tell you what he talked 
about? 

A No. I don't think he did. And we were— Meese 's 
driver and a FBI agent were in the front seat, so he — I mean 
he didn't get into any details. I mean I would not have ex- 
pected him to give me an update on the diversion of funds in 
front of those— in front of his driver and the agent. 

Q Were you present when Admiral Poindexter met with 
Meese at DOJ? 

A No. They met one on one and I was outside the door. 



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Q Do you know how long that lasted? 

A Well, my note here-again in Exhibit 2, indicates 
it was about 15 minutes. Ten, fifteen probably. 

Did you have any indication that Poindexter would 
be asked to resign? 

A I'm pretty sure that I knew after the meeting. I 
don't know that I knew before. I just don't recall. But I 
grabbed Cooper probably while the meeting was underway and I 
think Meese pulled Cooper in and we talked briefly. I think 
he said Poindexter is going to be resigning this morning, we're 
going over to the White House. That's just my recollection. 
It's not crystal clear. 

Q Was there any discussion of Colonel North's being 
resigned or fired? 

A I don't think there was there at the Department. 

Q Did you discuss that with the Attorney General or 
did he discuss that with anyone in your presence? 

A Well, we went — the next meeting was at the White 
House with Regan and Wallison and Thompson and then Meese, 
Cooper, and myself. I mean at some point before the press 
conference--and I don't know at what point, this might have 
been with Meese and Regan out of the room, I understood that 
Poindexter would be requesting reassignment to the Navy. 

Q Okay. 

A 1 may have learned about Colonel North when I saw 



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a draft of the President's statement. 

Q Do you know who wrote that? 

A Yes. Let me think here a second. Well, after the 
Regan-Meese meeting broke up, which was about 9:00 o'clock 
when Regan and Meese went down to the Oval Office, Cooper and 
Thompson and Wallison were tasked to write a statement. I 
was tasked to go down to Thompson's office and look at docu- 
ments. I cim not sure who penned it, but between the three of 
them, they wrote one. Because I joined up with them later in 
the morning up in Wallison 's office. They were going over a 
draft. 

Q There seems to be much discussion primarily amongst 
Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter as to why Poindexter was 
allowed to ask for reassignment and why North was summarily 
discharged from the NSC, can you shed any light on that 
decision making process? 

A I was not present when that was discussed with Meese 
and I don't know that Meese was a part of that. It's my 
impression, purely an impression,, that — I mean, that was a — 
just something that Don Regan and or his deputies had done. 
I mean, I don't even--I got the impression, and I believe that 
it may have been that day, I'm not sure when, that North was 
not informed about this. And it may have just been an over- 
sight on the part of Regan and his deputies. I don't recall 
any specific discussions saying, all right, we are going to 



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do this to North and this to Poindexter. Although there may 
have been out of my presence. 

Q You were tasked with finding out whether or not any 
of these documents got to the President. 

A Right. 

Q By some other system or some other manner? 

A Yes. 

Q What did you do to try to find that out? 

A I went down to Thompson's office, told him that that 
is what I wanted to do. He--and I described the nature of the 
search and the need to search all the systems that would pro- 
duce documents to the President. He said okay, we'll do that. 
He came back at some point with a lady, his executive secre- 
tary, and she brought me some documents that were responsive. 



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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Do you remember what her name is? 
A No, she looked to be about 50, with brown curly 
or wavey hair, sort of short, but I don't remember her name. 
She had some documents which I looked through, and I said, 
"How have you searched' and she told me the six or seven 
terms she used. 

There were things like Iran arms shipment, 
Nicaragua, contras, that sort of thing, and I questioned 
her about it, saying, "Well, would this kind of document 
show up on this search, and does your computer scan all 
that kind of thing, and satisfied myself that this would 
have been found, and she said, "We will make sure it is," 
which she did. And I don't think she brought me a second 
load of documents, I think Thompson came in and said, 
"That is all we found." 

In that group of documents, I recall one document 
that was relevant, which was minutes of an NSPG, I think, 
a meeting where third country assistance to the Nicaraguan 
resistance was discussed, and the Secretary of State 
specifically was talking about it. 

There was no mention in that meeting, in those 
minutes, at least of the use of the arms shipment proceeds 
to fund the contras. 

Q Do you recall when that meeting was? 



! anus snxpiueiit pi.v./1-ccus 

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A No, I did then, but I don't. We turned those notes 
over, though. I tend to think it was sometime in 1986, 
May or sometime in the spring, early summer of 1986, but 
that is just the vaguest recollection. 

In the meantime, I looked through Thompson/ 
Poindexter file, saw the findings of 6 January, saw a 
document of -- at the time I looked quickly. There was 
nothing that the President had signed other than the 
findings. 

I think a copy of the second findings was in 
there, but I am not crystal clear. But there were a 
number of documents which said, "Shred after reading," 
that sort of thing, which were scenarios of events 
involving arms shipment, hostages. I took one page of 
notes on these and one of the interests. Things that I 
recall was that they expected Khomeini to be dead on a 
certain date, and that — which was, I thought, was very 
interesting. There were one or two other things. 

I took a note in addition to the 17 January 
findings in the 6 January finding, which was the words, 
"third party," and one or two things like that. When I 
finished that, I went up to Wallison's office and reported 
to them that there was nothing else there that I saw, looked 
over the statement. I made those comments to Cooper. He 
said, "That is already being fixed." I don't remember what 



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it was, but it wasn't much, and then I think we were told 
that we knew that NSC was going to meet with the 
President, I think, in the Oval Office, and then the 
Congressional Leadership was going to be briefed, and we 
were told that we would be -- Tore Dawson, Regan's aide, 
you and Cooper will be in the Congressional briefing. 
And the next event that 1 recall was being in the 
Congressional briefing waiting around outside the cabinet 
room while they all showed up. 

Q If we can go back to the documents, given by 
Paul Thompson's executive secretary/ were any of those 
System 4 documents? 

A Don't recall. I did not focus on that. I might 
have seen a System 4 up there, and it did not register 
at all. 

Q When you did see the finding of January 6, was 
it in with other documents, or did he retrieve it separately? 

A It was in the pile. Let me think here. He showed 
it to me, but I tend to think that he showed it to me and 
said here is this, and then put it down, and I went ahead 
and went through other things. I think it was in a folder 
by itself. I think it was the original. 

Q Do you remember seeing ink? 

A Blue ink. I think it was signed in blue ink by 
the President, and it was — I don't know if the — what I 



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142 
can't remember is if the editing was done on the original 
or on a copy. I don't remember that. 

Now, as of Tuesday morning, was it clear that 
this was going to be the Presidential statement and the 
Attorney General having press conference? 

A Yes. 

Q So the format was already established by then. 

A Well, over the course of the meetings there it 
may have come out of the 8 o'clock meeting or we might 
have met Meese and Regan back in the office at 10:00 
but I am not sure, but at some point over the course of the 
meeting I knew before the Congressional Briefing, I knew 
that we were going from that to a press conference; that 
Meese would take the main lead in addressing the press. 

Q The Attorney General mentioned in his presence 
that the matter would be referred to the Crijninal Division. 

A That is probably correct, I don't. I haven't 
looked at the transcript recently. I did look at my notes 
of the Congressional Briefing where he indicated that this 
would be reviewed for any criminal liability. 

Q When was that decision made? 

A I don't know. I think that is my first recollection 
of it, of hearing that. There had been discussions Monday. 
There had been discussions after the North interview 
Sunday night or Monday morning, that this presented new legal 



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problems, which I guess is an obvious enough conclusion, 
and Cooper had undertaken to detennine and the example I 
specifically remember is when the Boland Amendment was in 
place, and if so, what are the implications of that for 
this transaction. And I recall that there were, I believe 
there was a conversation about that on Monday -- yes, 
Boland was passed on X date. 

I don't recall any discussion of — although 
there may have been, Meese may have said something like 
see what other laws are implicated by this, but I am not 
crystal clear on when that was. I know Cooper would 
probably be clearer because he was tasked to do it. 

But, I know that on Tuesday, when we got back, it was 
formally kicked into a criminal investigation. 

Q Bringing Mr. Weld and Mr. Trott into this? 

A Yes, sir, and he met with Webster and I think they 
talked about getting -- I guess the first meeting was 
with Weld, Trott and et al. He net with Webster about 
having a team of agents put together that could work very 
quickly on this. 

Q Do you know whether this meeting was at the 
Attorney General's impetus or Mr. Webster? 

A Yes, I think he asked. I believe he asked Webster 
to come over and meet him. I could be wrong on that. This 
was a matter that they had discussed before. 



354 



MftSMBET 



144 



Q Were you present when they discussed it on Friday' 

A No. 

Q Was anyone to your knowledge? 

A I don't think so. 

Q Were you present when they discussed it on 
Tuesday? 

A No, not on Tuesday, not that I recall. Well, 
let me take that back. I don't think I was, no. It is 
possible. I don't know if I got an entry that indicates 
that. This 25 November entry in Exhibit 2 indicates that 
I was present in the meeting with Webster — 2:05 Meese, 
Webster, Arnold Burns, Cooper, Richardson, Qribb, Reynolds, 
and Trott joined the meeting at 2:20. 

So I was present, 1 guess, when that — when they 
decided it is time to go criminal. I don't recall that. 

Q The meeting the next day, the large meeting when 
representatives of the FBI were present and so forth, 
was Mr. Webster present, do you recall? 

A I don't think he was. 

Q But are — 

A I think Floyd Clark was present. 

Q But you recall him there on the 25 meeting at 



around 2:00? 



'lUSSIFlEO 



Has there a discussion then of securing the 



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145 



documents at the White House on the 25th? 

A Yes, on Tuesday the 25th, Meese instructed 
Arnold Burns to call Wallison and the reason is any time 
there is communication between the Justice Department 
and the White House on pending cases or such as it is 
between the Deputy's office and the Counsel's office, to 
call Wallison and make sure that they secured North's 
documents, Poindexter's documents. 

Q Do you know when that was actually done? 

A I know it had been done at the end of the day. 
My recollection is that there was a meeting again at the 
end of the day, and where we were reviewing, I had been 
tasked to draft a piece, written document, request a 
document description of all these documents should be located 
and held for the Hireau, and we were going over that at the 
late afternoon meeting and — 

MR. MCGOUGH: Would this be the 6:40 meeting? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. I think Meese asked — Meese 
said something — Meese said, "Have the documents been 
secured," and Arnie said, "I haven't got through to Wallison, 
or something like that, and he left the room and did so. 
I recall he came back and said Wallison has already done 
that, something along those lines, which makes me think it 
was taken care of on Tuesday afternoon. 






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BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q The letter that you drafted, do you know when 
that was sent? 

A Well, it wasn't a letter. It was plain white 
paper, a paragraph, describing the field of documents, and 
I don't know when it was sent. I don't. 

Q Who was in charge of sending it? 

A I think it was to be an Arnold Burns to Peter 
Wallison meroo, but I do not know if it was in fact 
sent. I know that a group of letters were sent. I guess 
this was — Wednesday was the day before Thanksgiving. 
I think the letters went Friday to Cabinet officials asking 
for documents on the subject, and I don't know if Wallison 
instead got one of those letters to make the formal 
request or if there was a nemo. 
I just don't recall. 

Q Who was in charge of drafting the cabinet letters? 

A I don't know. 

Q When was the possibility of appointing independent 
counsel first discussed? 

A I don't know that. 

Q Well, at some point it was discussed in your 
presence, I take it. 

A It sure was. 

f\ w.e it- Hiern<;<5*>(l with Trott and Weld when they were 



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brought in at 2 o'clock? 

A It may have been. I just don't recall the first 
time it was discussed. I mean, it was fairly soon after 
this issue, after it became a criminal investigation, 
because one of the first — we have had a number, a lot 
of experience with these matters, and having independent 
counsel investigations, and one of the early things on 
the table was whether this first triggering mechanism had 
been met. And I mean I recall discussions of whether 
North was a covered person or Poindexter, and that sort 
of thing. 

I am not sure when they began. Not before 
Tuesday afternoon, I am sure of that. 

Q There was some discussion along those lines, 
was there not? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q About appointing instead a "special prosecutor," 
that would be a part of the Department of Justice, but 
sort of on a separate track. Do you recall that discussion? 

A Well, I did not until you mentioned it. I 
vaguely recall that. There was considerable discussion 
about whether there was enough information or criminal 
conduct and/or criminal liability to proceed with an 
independent counsel, and there — I remember specifically 
thinking that we weren't quite there even when the decision 



358 



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1 was made — Weld, I recall, had problems although he was — 

2 he had produced a draft that cited every statute in the 

3 code practically. There was a lot of concern that if we 

4 followed the law, the independent counsel statute, we were 

5 not in independent counsel territory based on facts, 

6 and the laws that we knew, and someone, I think, surfaced 

7 this as a concept that we will because of the political 

8 climate, what you might want to do is look at appointing 

9 someone to operate independently, but not within the 

10 independent counsel's statute. 

11 I don't think that was — my recollection it was 

12 very much a passing suggestion and not an option one or 

13 option two. 

14 Q Do you know what the Attorney General's position 

15 was Wednesday, the 26th? 
•J6 A I couldn't — 

17 Q Regarding the counsel? 

18 A Well, I think his — I don't know as of Wednesday, 

19 the 2eth. His view had been, as I recall, he had expressed 

20 this view, this was — this probably was going to end up with 

21 an independent counsel, but we based on discussions he got 

22 out of it in terms of doing interviews and that sort of 

23 thing, after we turned it over to the criminal side, and 

24 it was in the mode of Trott and Weld coming up and saying, 

lira rtn*- «->t»es 1 »uc . 4-hAe» farts." 



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independent counsel, and that being the sort of terms of 
discussion, and I don't think this other business was a 
serious option. 

But the conversation kept coining back to well, we 
don't really have enough to proceed under the independent 
counsel statute yet. Then Weld came in the first or 
second day with a rash of legal theories that how one could 
have criminally built ranging from conspiracy to violation 
of civil law like the Boland Amendment was a crime to 
all kinds of fraud prospect based upon not knowing who 
did what with these amounts of money and where they went 
or the intermediate theory of this was government money, 
and it is fraud against the government. 

So they had that kind of range of things. No 
facts to back them up yet. 

Q Once Mr. Cribb got into it, and when he returned 
fr cat his trip and came back on Monday, and took part in 
sevaral of these meetings, did you know whether or not 
he took notes? 

A I don't know whether — I did not know whether 
he did or not. 

Q Is it typical for him to take notes in such a 
meeting? 

A His typical approach was to take action notes so 
he would have a list, and if he were to do something, he 



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1 would take a note down, but he did not take, as a rule, 

2 meeting notes or that sort of thing. 

3 Q Was there anyone assigned or anyone who 

4 generally took such notes that you have described as meeting 

5 notes in the Monday morning staff meetings, the preliminary 

6 meetings or 8:30 meeting? 

7 A Yes, I always took notes in the 8:30 meeting. 

8 I have a spiral notebook that eventually — I regularly 

9 listed it in spiral notebooks. 

10 As an aside, these notebooks I bought with my own 

11 money so that my attempt was to create a personal record 

12 that I could take home and that would be of historical 

13 and personal use so it would not be a document subject 

14 to FOIA. So it was more of a — I took action items 

15 on occasion in there, or occasionally on a yellow sheet, but 
1g I was the principal note-taker. 

iy Now, Meese occasionally took action notes out 

13 of the 8:30 meeting. I have since learned, though, I 

lig dlto't really pay attention. Occasionally people write 

I 

2Q down things they are supposed to do. Terry Eastland, 

21 who is Director for Public Affairs and Randy Levine, who 

22 is in the Deputy's office, he took more systematic notes. 

23 I really wasn't aware of that. I don't think anyone at 

24 the 8:10 meetings — there are only five of us in there -- 

25 takes notes. For a time I used to take 8:10 notes in my 



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binder with the 8:30 meeting notes, but I stopped doing 
that. 

Q And regarding Mr. Bolton, these staff meetings 
and these meetings that he attended on the 20th and 
possibly the 21st, do you recall whether or not he took 
notes? 

A He does take notes. There are not comprehensive 
notes like I try to take. He takes action notes, that he 
has a small pad that will fit into the inside of the 
coat pocket, and if Meese asks him to do something or 
check up on something, he will jot it down. 

Q Now, we are going to go through just a 
few more documents. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If you could mark this one next 
in order, please. 

(The document referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-10.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Now, Exhibit 10 is a document taken from the 
spiral notebook, dated 29 October 1986. Are those your 
notes or the Attorney General' 

A They are my notes. 

Q This is the discussion of the requests by 
the House Judiciary Committee members regarding independent 
counsel to be appointed. If you could review that and tell 



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::sr23 



rae what the discussion was. 

A Okay. 

Q Can you describe to us what that discussion was 
about? 

A Okay. It is not clear who is speaking for the 
first entry because you can — I would have written 
someone's name up here with a colon and made a point 
here, then went on to these, so someone — 

Q If I recall, for the record we have a redacted 
copy. 

A This is a redacted copy. Whoever has — the 
redaction has also included the name of the speaker for 
the first entry on the note. But it refers to a Conyers 
letter, and independent counsel request. Our response — 
this is me interpreting my notes — our response was to ask 
for more specific information, if any. Then we would review 
that information. 

Then speaking to Terry Eastland — I would guess. 
Well, I don't know this — speaking to Terry Eastland, 
the statement put out a press advisory that there is not 
"a preliminary investigation" to set the record straight, 
public record. 

That is, the letter that had been received had 
not triggered a preliminary investigation, but instead we 
had asked for more specific information. It may just 



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be based on a press report, which occasionally would happen. 

Then Weld says, "Let's just get the word out, 
to make clear what our position is." And Eastland says, 
"We will be sure to make sure certain large media know." 
Then Cooper says, "There is lots in OLC on triggering 
the Independent Counsel Act and the Neutrality Act." 

That entry means that OLC has a lot of 
institutional learning, legal analysis and opinions on 
both questions, triggering the Independent Counsel Statute 
and the neutrality and/or Neutrality Act. 

Q Then there is a portion that is redacted. 
A Yes. 

Can you tell us what that was? 

No, I have no idea. 

Then, the subject is apparently — 

Then — 

We do have this on the sane subject, the 



Q 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 
portion . 

A Right, it says, "Provide some briefs to Griffin 
Bell on Neutrality Act." I guess that is to Griffen Bell 
when he was Attorney General, but I don't know. Then it 
says "others which are non-public are available." 

Then there it says, "AG," with an arrow to 
Cooper, "Do a FOIA analysis. OLC will work with Criminial 
Division 



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Q What did that mean, do FOIA analysis? 

A I think that referred to — well, I am not sure, 
but my guess from looking at this is to determine if 
OLC opinions are subject to FOIA. I don't know why one 
would have that. But this here mentions non-'public opinions 
available. He probably said would these be discoverable 
to the public under FOIA. 

I guess they could have been implicating a number 
of things. Either a FOIA request had been received or 
this line, they were saying how would we draw the line 
under FOIA for whether to make this public or not. That 
may have driven the decision about what documents to 
release. 

Q All right. Going through the rest of these 
in no particular order, we could mark this Exhibit 11. 

(The document referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-11.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Exhibit 11 appears to be actually a little 
drawing of a balance of scales. One says arms to Iran; the 
other scale says intelligence to Iraq. It is on white 
stationery. Do you know who drew that? 

A The handwriting looks like the Attorney General's. 
I don't know if he drew this or not, but it looks like 
his handwritino. 



365 








155 



Q At any rate you did not. 

A No, I did not. 

Q This could be marked Exhibit 12, please. 
(The document referred to, was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-12.) 

THE WITNESS: This was found in his office, by 
the way. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Exhibit 11 was found — 

A In the Attorney General's office, or files, I 
should say. I am not sure whether it was in his office 
or in his files. 

Q Showing you exhibit 12, then, which again is on 
White House stationery, it says at the top, "any other 
facts." Is that your handwriting or the Attorney General's? 

A The Attorney General's. 

Q Were you present when there was a conversation 
to this effect? 

A I don't think so. This entry says, "any other 
facts." That is Number one. Number two, problems, 
"broke no laws, defensive weapons." It is possible that 
that conversation occurred the morning of the 25th and/or 
at some point when I was either present or not. It is 
not dated, and I know that this was, again, found in the 
immediate offices of the Attorney General, either in 



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there was nothing else to indicate what it was. 

Q Were you involved in the document production 
to the Select Committees? 

A Yes. 

Q And I take it then if this document was produced 
to the Select Committees, it was thought to be relevant 
to the investigation. In other words, this is not about 
some drug case or something, is it? 

A Well, we didn't know. When we found this, 
when we looked at this, it said defensive weapons, 
broke no law. We weren't sure what it meant, and it 
wasn't in any particular file. 

As I recall, it was in a pile of miscellaneous 
material, so I am not sure. 

I wanted to be sure to turn it over, emything 
that was a question mark over. 

Q The next exhibit to be marked is 13, please. 
(The document referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-13.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Directing your attention to Exhibit 13, then 



says "Nicaraguan Angle. 



"Contras funding. 



WNCIASSIFIED 



367 



VNftAMfi&T 



157 



Q Is this your handwriting? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall when that document was generated? 

A It was generated, as I recall, over the course 
of the weekend, probably Sunday night, because it was 
clearly after the North interview. Because the 
information contained in entry 1 is all post North 
interview. 

Q Okay. 

A It might have been Monday, but this may have 
been one of the things I was doing Monday. I would 
bet it was Sunday night, though. 

Q Were these notes done in a meeting, do you know? 

A I don't think so. I think they — I might have 
been in a meeting, and I was writing this down on my own, 
but this did not represent the discussions in a meeting. 
This was representing my thinking and my organizing. 

Q Did you show these notes to anybody? 

A I don't think I showed them to anyone. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If we could mark the next one 
as Exhibit 14. 

(The document referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-14.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q And Exhibit 14, then, is a document with a heading, 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



368 



bap-20 






i/massw 



158 



1 "Wby? There is." Could you tell us when this document 

2 was generated? 

3 A This is my handwriting. I wrote it, I believe, 

4 very late Saturday night or in the wee hours of Sunday 

5 morning. 

6 Q Did you write this at home? 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q And could you tell us what the discussion is, 
g I guess, you are having with yourself? 

10 A Yes, that is right. I was writing down 

•J1 possible reasons for some of the things that were going on. 

12 One, more extensive relationship with Iran, which I guess 

13 I am restructuring, but I think that simply means to the 

14 greater strategic opening rationale, Iran strategically 

15 located, all that sort of thing. 

1Q Number two, more extensive relationship with 

17 Israel. I think that refers to the principal reason for 

13 tlM initiative is trying to be cooperative and build our 

ig bridges with Israel. As you can see, no weight assigned 

20 to any of these theories, and they are marked, "theories." 

21 Three, relationship with Nicaragua. Four, 

22 cover own tracks, and this — do you want me to read the -- 

23 Q yes. 

24 A The "cover own tracks" — drew strict limits 

25 vis-a-vis arms, but McFarland present. North, others. 



^mw 



159 



7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



question mark, went beyond that, unauthorized agents in 
September/November transactions. 

Q These, I assume, are the 1985 transactions? 
A Right. And this again, I showed these to no one. 
These were me sitting down trying to think up what could 
have led to all of this and the prospect was that the 
President had, might have said no arms, but we will 
explore the initiative and McFarlane and others went 
beyond that and beyond arms in the things, and therefore 
the September/ November transactions might have been 
authorized by someone, but not the President, and that 
they were trying now to cover their own tracks on the 
September/November shipment in terms of authorization. 

Number five, again, says, "Cover own tracks." Arms 
deal with G, probably meaning Ghorbanifar, a loser, not 
really with effective present prowess faction. That would 
have — I guess 1 was thinking there that it was 
d*|»cribed as stratigic initiative and that it was 
described as strategic initiative and that sort of thing, 
but it really turned out to be loser of the deal, not what 
they expect, and now there was concern on that end. 

Q You have a reference at page 4, September 1986 
minutes. What is that a reference to? 

A I wonder if that is a reference to the chronology. 

Q It refers to minutes. 



370 



wmim 



IfiO 



A September -- what would have been in September 1986? 
I don't know what that refers to. 

Q I gather you did have your documents at home 
with you. Were you looking through them as you were 
writing. 

A Gentlemen, I was flipping through the documents. 
Entry four has a present footnote — McFarlane and Shultz. 

Q Number six says? 

A Six, "Reasons for secrecy, Soviet anxiety." 
Again, it refers to minutes, September 1986 minutes. 

Q Okay. And finally, seven. 

A Seven says,- "Involvement of Vice President, 
Regan, Casey, Poindexter, Tompson, CIA personnel^^^^H 



Q What does that refer to? 

A I don't know other than what it says. This may 
have just been we should check the involvement of these 
foUcs. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Mark this Exhibit Number 15, please. 
(The document referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-15.) 

THE WITNESS: I should just say if I had known 
these were going to be preserved for posterity's sake, 
I would have written more extensive explanations and not 
have put down — I don't know if I would have put do*m all 



371 



bap- 2 3 



IflKK^SE^ 



161 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



these sort of theories, but anyway — 

Q I am mostly concerned with identifying and — 

A I would like to know myself. Okay, Exhibit 15, 
this is my handwriting. I think that the bottom half of 
this where I have got numbers 1 through 4 are questions 
that I wanted to ask North, and which were jotted down 
during the North interview when other people were question- 
ing him. 

I have checked, I have got a check mark of 
things which I believe represent that I asked that question. 

Q So this document was generated, then, sometime 
Saturday? 

A Sunday afternoon. 

Q Afternoon. 

A These are contemporaneous notes taken during the 
interview. You need to ask North this. And, it looks 
to me like the top half was some existing document, s(^ne 
existing notes. The bottom half I had flipped open as 
writing down during the interview. 

Q The reference ^°^^^^^^^^^^H ^o y°^ 
what that is a reference to? 

A What comes to mind is I believe that there was 

Q Provided to the Iranians? 



372 



TcPwwiHBt 



162 



A Well, either they or the Iraqis. Probably the 
Iranians. Very fuzzy recollection of something like that. 
But I think it was! 
The entry above is intelligence exchange, so I think that 
is probably what it refers to. 

Q Then there is a reference to Ghorbanifar money. 

A Then present other lost money. 

Q Then there is a parenthetical, Casey. Apparently 
Weinberger, Shultz, Vice President. 

A There is another entry here that says Nicaragua 
angle withan arrow, and it lists North, Poindexter, 
McFarlane, Regan, Thompson, RR. And to the right of that 
is Secord. I have checked off in front of the names North, 
Poindexter, McFarlane and Secord. 

I believe that indicates those are people that 
we Knew about the Nicaraguan angle. Besides Regan, Thompson, 
anA R.R., I have got a bracket with a question mark. 
That means we don't know what these three know. 

Then there is a third — second or third list 
depending on how you are counting, says, "Casey, Weinberger, 
Shultz, VP,"with a bracket on the side. We don't know what 
they know either. 

Q Was Paul Thompson ever asked if he knew of the 
diversion? 

h T ''on * ^ ♦•ViinV ^o ».,fl^. 



373 



iiNeumi^ 



163 



1 Q Was there any discussion as to whether to ask him 

2 or not to ask him? 

3 A It was by time — I think that it had well 

4 moved away from finding out everyone at that level who would 

5 know. I don't think there was that discussion. 

6 Q Then there was a reference to see McMahon, 

7 Secord, Cave. Are those people that should be interviewed? 

8 A That's how I would interpret it now, but I don't 

9 know . 

10 Q Were these notes taken again on your own or 

11 at a meeting. 

12 A These were my random notes of — I expect what 

13 I did, probably have written down — this is my guess in 

14 trying to reconstruct these — the top part of these were — 

15 and I got a line drawn, top third, I think are things 

16 I thought we might want to cover with North. I am 

17 guMsing. 

13 When we covered certain individuals, we checked 

19 them off. I checked them off. The bottom third I know 

20 was covered — I did during the North interview. The 

21 middle third I am not sure about. 

22 Q Okay. We could mark these two next in order, 16 

23 and 17. 

24 (The documents referred to were marked for 
tc I identification as Exhibits 16 and 17. ^ 



374 



bap- 2 6 



IIIKlA%N<tE|ET 



164 



BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Exhibit 16 appears to be a document, not dated. 
Three areas vulnerable, apparently. 
A Yes. 

Q Abbreviation. Could you tell us when that document 
was generated? 

A No, I can't. 
Q Are these your notes? 

A These are my notes, both 16 and 17. Sixteen, 
three areas of vulnerability, and I have only listed 
one, which are the TOWs, 508 TOWs and the Hawks. And 
the problem listed no reporting, AEC a violation, or if 
acquiesced, Hughes, Ryan, no finding. This is probably 
Sunday evening. Could be earlier, but I think it is 
probably then, sometime over the course of the weekend. 
Q Okay. 

MR. MCGOUGH: To which transaction, if any, does 
that relate? 

THE WITNESS: The number one? The TOWs and — 
MR. MCGOUGH: TOW 508. 

THE WITNESS: September/November 1985, those two 
transactions. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Okay, and the next exhibit, 17, which simply 
says, "Tell R.R. , re Nicaraguan angle," right? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



375 



ap-27 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



1W8t*K!fffiF 



165 



A Yes. That is — would have this after the North 
interview. This would have been — it is an obvious thing 
to tell the President about it. 

Q Well, do you recall first why you wrote that? 
Firstly, did you write that? 

A Yes, this is ray writing. As I recall, I had 
a legal pad and I flipped over and wrote down Exhibit 16, 
three areas of vulnerability and started on one. I don't 
know why I didn't finish with the other two, and flipped 
the page again, and tell R.R. re Nicaraguan angle. 

When this was found, I think when I produced 
this stuff, they were the first ten pages of a legal 
tablet, and so Z assume pages were, as can be obvious 
in reviewing them now, were scrap paper rambling thoughts, 
that sort of thing. This is not a redacted document. 
There is nothing else on the Exhibit 17. 

The original of all of these, by the way, are in 
tt0 hands of the independent counsel. 

Q Do you have any of your original documents in 
the hands of the Wedtech either independent counsel or 
held at the White House for the Wedtech independent counsel? 



A Are any of them being held? 
Q Yes. 

A Not of my documents. Only Meese's spiral 
notebooks. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



376 



WkfSSffB^ 



166 



Q So all of yours are with the Iran Contra 
independent counsel? 

A Yes, except with the one category of the staff 
meetings notebooks, I don't -- I am not sure where they are. 
I think we have got them in our control room, but I am 
not sure. 

Q Now, were these exhibits, 16 and 17, taken at 
meetings or again are they just your own thoughts? 

A I don't recall. These may well have — if 
I were guessing, I would say they were probably taken 
during team meetings where we sat down and sort of were 
reviewing the bidding where we stood thus far. 

Q And ~ 

A They are probably my thoughts. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If I could have these marked -- 
these exhibits marked Exhibits 18, 19 and 20. 

(The documents referred to were marked for 
identification as Exhibits JR-18, 19 and 20, respectively.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Okay, I direct your attention to Exhibit 18, 
which is at the top marked "508 TOWs." Is that your 
handwriting? 

A Yes. 



UNMSSIFIEO 



Q Do you recall when you generated that document: 
A No. 



377 



jap-29 



WEUSSBift;' 



Co 20 

■S"*^ 21 

Si^ 22 

^^ 23 

24 



167 



Q Was it sometime during the weekend? 

A It might have been. I would tend to think, well 
it was certainly after the North interview because of the 
Nicaraguan angle mentioned, and it may have been — this 
may be why Exhibit 16 only has one area because here it 
breaks out number 2 is 508 TOWs and, legal problems 
with those number two is Hawk shipment, and, three, legal 
problems with those. 

Three is Nicaraguan angle. So that makes me 
thing it might have been Monday. Could even have been 
Tuesday. I would guess it was probably Monday. 

Q Then four is criminal prosecutions. 

A Yes. 

Q And five says, "Secord." 

A Yes. 

Q Do you remember why you are listing those, what 
do you have in mind when you put these things together? 

A Well, I don't know. I didn't know Secord until 
the North interview. That helps date it as well. It is 
clearly sometime after that. 

Criminal prosecutions was not on the table until 
late Monday or Tuesday, as if that refers to the criminal 
li2Q5ility of the individuals involved in this. May be that, 
I don't know. I think it would not refer to armed shipment 

Ko^aiiee T ♦■ViinV T ur^>^^H K;«^ro wrS*-*-on ^ho«a t-Viat- w;*V. T 



378 



bap- 30 



yifciBSBffiET 



168 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




think it tends to refer to criminal liability of the 
individuals involved in this. 

Q And Exhibit 19, which is entitled, 

A That is my handwriting. 

Q Now is this pursuant to a meeting or is it 
pursuant to just — 

A I think this looks like just a scrap note of mine 
because one of the entries shows the lunch time on Saturday. 

Q What the reference ^°^^^^^^^|^H ^°' 
you recall? 

A No. 

Q And Exhibit Number 20? 

A Twenty is also my handwriting. Miscellaneous 
notes. 

Q If I could look through them. 

A Sure. 

Q There is a reference to a date on the bottom, 
21 November. Do you recall when all of these notes were 
taken on the 21st of November. 

A No, I don't recall that. 

Q Okay. Let's start at the beginning, then. 

A What makes me wonder, on the bottom left corner 
it shows the Friday interview of McFarlane. That was the 



21st, though. Right? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



379 



•VQv-wBi^ 



169 



A Maybe it was, I don't recall, though. I'm sorry. 

Q The top says Sporkin. 

A Right. 

Q Upper right-hand corner an A.G. notes telephone 
logs. Is that him instructing you to keep notes and 
logs of weekend activities? 

A I don't know. It might be, but I don't know. 

Q Is there anything else that it could be a 
reference to? 

A Unless it is an instruction for me to check 
notes or telephone logs, but I think that I would have listed 
that differently. 1 think that is probably what it refers 
to. 

Q And then it says, "Monday." 

A JRB. 

Q That is Mr. Bolton? 

A Yes . 



It says A.G. — 

Re law. 

What does that mean? 



on hill. 



IINOLASSIRED 



A I don't know what that means. 

Q Then A.G. call Poindexter, Casey, Regan, Sporkin. 
What is that a discussion of? 

A Well, it is in the margin from that it says, 
Sunday talk shows." I think this was to make sure that no 



380 



wmm 



170 



one from the Administration went on the Sunday talk shows 
to talk about the Iranian initiative. 

Q Do you know if those calls were made to — 

A I think Meese called — well, I think he called 
Regan. 

Q For him to call these people not to appear on 
the talk shows? 

A Yes. I don't think he called all of them. I 
think it was just Regan. In fact, the Regan entry may 
refer to the Sunday talk shows, and the other two just 
to making — that he wanted to make those calls, but I 
don't know. This would, the next entry says, "Office 
coverage for the OAG," which is our office on Saturday. 
One with the AOG, one if the front office that refers to 
our secretaries. 

Q Moving down here, if you could dicipher these 



tbsse notes for me. 



Okay, right here. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A This is a circle in the bottom. It says, 
"Bolton debriefing on Senate Intelligence hearings present. 
Bolton was present, and he gave a debriefing on the 
hearings during the meeting at 2:25 on that day. 

It also says with Casey, present, CIA something. 
Don't know what that says. It says, "Armacost, Armitage." 



wmstKer 



171 



1 Then, it says, "dash. House present, will get 

2 Hyde debriefed." 

3 As I recall, he was not permitted to attend 

4 the House Intelligence Committee meeting, and said he was 

5 going to try to get debriefed by Congressman Hyde. 

6 Q Do you know if that occurred? Did he later 

7 report? 

8 A I don't recall whether that happened or not. 

9 Q If we could mark that exhibit 21, please. 

10 (The document referred to was marked for 

11 identification as Exhibit JR-21.) 

12 (Recess.) 

13 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

14 Q Turning to Exhibit 21, are these your notes? 

15 A Yes. 

16 Q Were they made on the 25th of November? 

17 A Yes. 

18 Q If I could look at it for a moment. 

19 A Sure . 

20 These were taken by me when I was going through 

21 documents and in Thompson's office. 

22 Q Okay, my question is the third entry says, "Ollie 

23 memo in mid file. Ollie brought over last night." 

24 Do you recall what that is? 

25 A No. 



over i.asi;^ nignt. 

UNCLASSIFIED 



382 



p-34 



KWHSSflflF 



172 






Q Are you telling — 

A I think the phrase, "Ollie brought over last 
nigh," means that was a notation on the memo. Like Ollie 
brought this over last night. 

Q Do you know which memo that refers to? 

A No. 

Q Then the next reference is to JP memo to RR, 
the 17th finding. Then, on the second. 

A One of the things I found interesting that go 
get Weir out revolutionary guard had to storm the building 
and demand release of one hostage. It showed that they 
aren't clearly in the pocket, but it is things like that 
I thought were — 

Q Now on the second page, there is -- 

A I corrected myself. It wasn't Khomeini dies, 
it is Khomeini steps down on the 11 February. That was in 
the plan. 

Q On the second page it says Casey told 14 December 
note. Do you recall what that is? 

A Vaguely I do because there is a note in 
there. It said something like Casey was told on 14th of 
September — didn't say what he was told, didn't say. It 
said — I can't remember precisely, but it said something 
about Casey being informed about something on the 14th 
of September. 



383 



UlffiBIWifflE 



:t 



173 



Q Was this a handwritten note? 

A I think, yes, it was. 

Q Do you recognize whether it was Colonel North's 
handwriting? 

A No. 

Q Did you ask anybody about that reference? 

A No. 

Q Did you get a copy of that note? 

A No. 

Q Did you get a copy of any of the documents that 
you were shown by Mr. Thompson? 

A No. 

Q Have this marked Exhibit Number 22. 

(The document referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-22.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q And Exhibit 22 is, again, 25 November, 6:40 p.m., 
press update guidance. I want to ask you on the second 
page ~ 

A This is my handwriting, by the way. 

Q Thank you. 

On the second page it says Weld, Secord, recently 
criminal target. 

A Yes. 

Q Do you know was that the first time this was 



ICUSSIREO 



384 



bap-36 



HNSUSSii&T 



174 






brought to your attention. 

A Yes. 

Q Secord had been a criminal target before. 

A Yes. I think he referred to, as I remember, 
an investigation in late 1979. 

Q Okay, did he say what about? 

A Well, it remains in my mind something to do with 
Wilson, but I don't remember if he mentioned it at this 
point or if I heard that later. 

Q Okay. If we could mark this Exhibit 23. 
(The document referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-23.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q The front page of Exhibit 23 says please note 
that the attached document was typed prior to March 15, 
1986. 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And the second page is a memo to the Attorney 
General from MAM. Who is that? 

A That is Marlee, M-A-R-L-E-E, Melvin. She was 
confidential assistant personal secretary to the Attorney 
General and this ceime out of her files. She is now a 
special assistant. This came out of her files that she 
maintained when she was confidential assistant, and so 
page 1 indicating that it was typed prior to March 15, that 



385 



oveu^fls^T 



175 



is the date she changed jobs. So we deduce it was typed 
while she was back in the -- 

Q Excuse me. When did she change jobs? 

A It was in March of 1986. Probably early March, 
but we — 

Q And if you could please just read that short memo 
she typed. 

A Says EM, it is on Office of Attorney General 
stationery. "EM, Oliver North's office said you agree 
with Admiral Poindexter to see North today? Do you want 
to meet with him after judicial selection at White House 
and delay your departure for home? Or what? Meeting 
should last 15 to 20 minutes. Contact Fawn at 395-3345, MAM, 
12:30 p.m." Then there is a handwritten notation which 
is Meese's handwriting says, "4:55, A with a circle, 
Roosevelt Room, 4:50." 

I would interpret that to mean Meese met him 
aihead of judicial selection 5 o'clock in the Roosevelt room. 

Q Do you recall when this judicial selection was? 

A No, they are normally on Thursdays. 

Q Did you ask Ms. Melvin about this note? 

A I did. She didn't have any — it was not with 
anything that would assist in determining what it meant 
or what it was or when it happened. 

Q All right, if we could mark this as Exhibit 



386 



bap-38 

1 
2 
3 



|)N8ttSaBBkT 



176 



Number 24. 

(The document referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-24.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Exhibit 24 is a document on the front of which 
says, "This document cannot be dated nor can subject 
matter to which it was related be recalled." Did you 
draft this cover? 

A I don't think so. I think that was done by , 
lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel. But it might have 
been done by one of the lawyers on our staff. 

Q Do you know whether it refers to the statement 
"nor can the subject matter to which it was related be 
recalled," does that — who doesn't recall it? In other 
words, who was queried? Do you know who was queried as 
to whether they could recall it? 

A I don't know. I might have asked the A.G. if 
this meant anything to him, but — 

Q The second page, for the record, is on American 
University stationery. 

A Right, apparently Office of the President. 

Q Right. And the notes regard Adnan Khashoggi, 
Robert Shaheen, S-H-A-H-E-E-N, and McFarlane has not seen 
the memo of 20 March. 

When you asked the Attorney General about this 



387 



bap 



«N£M$KlflilT 



177 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



did he recall this document? 

A I don't know that I did. I probably did, but 
because I tried to go through the unidentified notes 
with him. I don't think he recalled it. 

Q Do you know whose handwriting that is? 

A No. 

Q Was this found in this file? 

A I know it was found in our office, I think. I 
don't think it was in any particular file. 

Q Do you know on what occasion that was at the 
American University. 

A No. 

Q Other than what is an apparent from the page, 
do you know anything about that? 

A No, no idea. 

Q Okay. If we could mark that, please. Exhibit 25. 
(The dociment referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-25.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q The cover of Exhibit 25 says, "This document, cannot 
be dated nor can subject matter to which it is related be 
recalled." 

The second page of the document is on White House 
stationery. 

A Right. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



\p-40 



mmm 



1 

2 

3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
J, 18 
1 19 



CO 



17E 



Q Could you read the note? 

A Yes, it looks like the Attorney General's 
writing, and it says maybe we should contract the job out 
to the Israelis. 

Q And do you know when that document was generated? 

A No, I don't. We had one other — the drawing of 
the scales -- it is in the Roosevelt Room. The pads on 
the tables are plain, so this would not be in the 
Roosevelt Room meeting. I don't know what they do in the 
Sit Room where they have the NSC meetings. It may be they 
use these pads down there, and this was written and showed 
to someone during a meeting. 

Q Did you ask the Attorney General about that? 

A I believe I did, and I don't think he recalled 
anything about it. 

Q And the next — finally, believe it or not. 
Exhibit Number 26. 

(The docioment referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-26.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Okay, 26. Is that all in your handwriting? 

A Yes. 

Q Now, the top reference is Casey, Poindexter and 
brackets, and says, "misstatements to Congress/." 

A It means Senators. S-E-N-S. 



389 



vmmm 



179 






9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Q Do you know when that document was generated? 
A No. Although it is at the bottom, it is dated 
24th of November with a lunch time. Then 1:30 to the 
White House VP at 1:40. 

My best estimate would be it had been done that 
Monday the 24th. I don't know. I don't recall that. 

Q The reference to Poindexter and Casey misstatements 
to Congress, do you recall was this note taken during 
a meeting? 

A I don't recall. 

Q Do you know when you wrote it down, what you 
were thinking? 

A No. I gather, trying to think back on Monday, 
information learned over the weekend have been different 
from information provided Friday, and that probably is 
what it refers to, but I don't recall. 

Q Was there a discussion at any time during the 
weekend? Let's start with Thursday and work through 
Tuesday; that there was a possible violation of law in 
that Casey or Poindexter may have made misstatements to 
Congress. 

A No. There was no discussion about possible 
violations of the law from that being done. 

Q Was it discussed regardless of whether there was 
violation of law that they had made misstatements. 



390 



yNftftssfl<tpT 



18(8 



oo 



CJ^^ 



1 A I don't recall any discussion about there 

2 having been misstatements to Congress, no. 

3 Q You can't recall what made you write that note? 

4 A No. 

5 Q Did you read the transcript of the Attorney 

6 General's deposition? 

7 A No. I read the first paragraph of the deposition 

8 with you, I guess. That is the only one I know of. 

9 Q Yes. Do you know anybody who read it other 

10 than the Attorney General? 

11 A No. Steve Matthews may have read it, but I 

12 don't know for a fact. I provided it to him. He is 

13 keeping custody of some of those things. 

14 Q Okay, those are all my questions. Thank you 

15 for your patience. 

16 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

17 BY MR. MCGOUGH: 

13 Q Do you ever recall seeing Colonel North in the 

19 Attorney General's office or visiting the Attorney General 

20 at his office. 

21 A No, but the one meeting that apparently occurred 

22 which was January 6, 1986, was before I was Chief of Staff, 

23 so I would not — I would not know — be in a position to 

24 know that and to keep track of that. After March -- really 

25 effective February of 1986, but in officially first part 



391 



ap-4 3 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

6 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

S 18 

LJt— 19 

O^ 20 

«CC 21 

CLO 22 

»-^««5 23 

24 

25 



^mmF 



of March of 1986 I was Chief of Staff, and I would have 
known. 

Q There were references very early on in the 
depostion t 



and one that you believe 
you saw. Was it only one that you can recall seeing 
or might there be more than one? 

A There might have been more than one, but I only 
recall one. 

Q Can you put any kind of time frame on it? I 
believe they were talking about the fall of 1985 as being 
possible — do you recollect it being in the fall of 1985? 
A No. 

Q Could it have been in 1986? 
A It could have been 1986. 

I took on new duties in March of 1986, as I 
said, but I kept the^^fon portfolio for several months 
until it just became — I just decided to put another 
lawyer on it, and get them trained up. I think it was 
certainly months before that occurred, and even still it 
was possible, as I recall. I tend to recall this as a 
rush sort of rush job, and on various sensitive or very 
urgent things. 

They would come, might come to my office, I 
would handle it personally. 

Q Do you ever recall being contacted by anyone 



392 



oap-44 



HNIikSSIflilT 



182 



CO 



1 outside the Department of Justice with a request that 

a^^^^^^^^^^^^^B be 
3 A Yes, well I was not, but I recall one incident 

^ where such a call was made and Bill Casey called the 

5 Attorney General about having expedited 

6 and I spent Friday night until 1:00 in the morning with 

7 Webster's guy, and then met Meese at the White House 

8 Saturday morning early. He was at a breakfast or something 

9 and got that down. 

10 Q Do you recall did that relate at all to either 

11 Iran or Nicaragua? 

12 A I just don't recall. I don't remember what 

13 the subject was. I could try to go and pick it out, but 

14 I don't recall the subject. 

15 Q Do you recall any time frame on it.. 

16 A Well, I know I still lived in McLean, but that 

17 doesn't help us much. That means it was before January of 

18 this year. So, no, I don't really. 

19 Q Do you remember where the Attorney General was 

20 the next morning. 

21 A He was at the White House Hostage — a coffee and 

22 doughnuts for a group that — 

23 Q Was this an irregular enough occurrence to help 

24 you fix it? 

9K A Yes. sir. If it aooeared on a schedule, it mav 



393 



JlNfil &S£l£lt[U 
IxDPLBfiiOREH' 



183 



well appear on a schedule, but it was probably some group 
like Junior Statesmen or he does a lot with them. There 
are several youth groups, kids coming in, interns and 
that sort of thing. It may have been one of those. 

I tend to think it was the Westpoint cadets maybe 
in 1986, be my guess. I might be able to track that down. 

Q If you could track that down. 

A I will make a note. 

Q Other than that incident where Mr. Casey called 
to expedite ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^P can you any 
other learning or any other cases where someone attempted 
to expedite^^^^^l 

A Well, by calling Meese or me, no. There were 
a number of instances where client agencies were upset or 
the FBI was concerned with the time lag and^^^^is a good 
example, RPA. 

Q Let's narrow it down. Do you recall learning 
of any calls from NSC regarding I 

A I don't think — I don't recall any. I don't 
recall it out entirely, but I don't recall any. I did 
not receive it, I are sure. 

At one point in talking about the fact findings 
weekend, you referred to the Iranian initiative or the 
subject of your investigation as I have it written down in 
ouo«-ps. the tooic of soecial interests f^lmost a<? if that 



394 



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IISeOBSFSFi' 



184 



were a code or designation that was used as a term of art. 
Does that term have any significance? 

A No. 

Q It was just the way you said it. 

A Iran initiative was the term of art. 

Q You mentioned that the only person you believe 
you mentioned or you spoke to at the Iranian initiative-- 
I'm sorry, of the diversion, during the course of the 
fact finding weekend or up in the press conference was 
Ken Cribb. Was the Attorney General aware that you had 
told Ken Cribb about it? 

A Yes, Cribb joined us as ny recollection. He 
joined us at this 7:30 meeting on that Monday the 24th. 

Q Was aware of you told Ken Cribb, that you were 
going to tell Cribb. 

A I don't think so. 

Q Did that create any problems from the Attorney 
General's standpoint? 

A No, I may have told — I may have told Meese I 
will brief Ken tomorrow morning. But I don't know. Ken 
and Meese were very close. Ken was my superior, and there 
was — that was not a surprise to Meese. He may have known 
it in advance, but it would not have. It was anticipated 
that Cribb would join the deliberations and the activities 
the next day. 



iJNClASSIfe 



395 



JJIJPl/iOcurirn 



185 



Q Did the Attorney General ever chastize either you 
or anybody in the group of four for what he perceived to 
be dissemination of the information about the diversion? 

A No. Not that I ever heard. 

Q Did it ever come to your attention that there 
was-- did it ever come to your attention there was a 
possibility that a member of the press had the story of the 
diversion on the night of Monday, November 24th? 

A No. 

Q To your knowledge, did any member of the press 
have information about the diversion? 

A No. 

Q That evening? 

A No. 

Q To your knowledge, when William French Smith 
was Attorney General, was there a formal listed procedure 
for findings being submitted to the Department of Justice? 

A Well, I can answer based on the conversation 
I had about a week ago with Mary Lawton, as I understand it 
the rule with Smith was that they would come to the 
Justice for clearance, but there was a continual back and 
forth to be sure that they did. 

Q To your knowledge, did Attorney General Meese 
attempt to reassert that rule when he became Attorney 
General? 



!iNn!A.^.<vinFn 



396 



lap -jS 



19 



^ ^ 22 

-^"'^^ 23 
24 



uNsusaenT 



186 



A To my knowledge, he did not. In fact, when I 
handled findings, which I think I mentioned, I handled 
two of them as Chief of Staff, it was not something he 
expected, and just recently a couple of weeks ago whenever 
I talked to Mary, he said, "You find what the findings 
process and what the department's role is because--" So I am 
pretty sure he did not assert any formal role in that, 
although he sits on the National Security Council, and 
there has been a continual desire on his part to increase 
the formal participation of the department in national 
security matters, so that their legal ramifications are 
considered more routinely. 

That is normally resisted by NSC. I don't know 
that that — generically the answer is, yes, but I don't 
think it ever rooted itself out in terms of saying I want 
the finding to come here first. 

Q At one point you referred to the Presidential, 
President's alleged prerogative in the field of foreign 
affairs as being, I think you put it, arrangement of last 
resort in the context of the Iranian initiative and 
finding, or lack thereof. Was it discussed in those terms 
by the Attorney General and your group? 

A No, it was put in, I should clarify, because it 
was put in terms of what authority, what legal authority 
<~;(n ho rolipd uDon for the President to undertake this 



397 



MkSSiiEflE' 



187 



activity, and there is explicit authority given certain 
processes in certain other statutes. 

Q The Arms Export Control Act and National 
Security Act being two of them? 

A Yes, sir, covert action, for example, Hughes- 
Ryan you have to have a finding, but there is a school of 
thought depending on which activities you are talking 
about, that certain statutes, notwithstanding the President 
has inherent constitutional authority to undertake 
certain activities on behalf of the United States in the 
conduct of foreign policy or other areas, and that if a 
statute had been violated, just one thing that is discussed - 
well, there is the President's inherent authority obviously, 
if you have that up against a statute, it is difficult, more 
difficult arrangements to make. 

For example, there is a school of thought which 
I happen to adhere to that the War Powers Act is an infringe- 
ment of Presidential authority and the notations and that 
sort of thing, so that is what I am referring to. There 
are things that the executive branch out of comity had 
tried to activate its practices to because they think 
they are good ideas or that sort of thing and because it 
is the law, but if push came to shove, there may be certain 
circumstances where in spite of a statute, the President's 
constitutional authority might be a basis for action. 



398 



^ap-50 



tWttASgfPlffiT 



188 



Q Was that theory discussed in connection with 
specifically Iranian initiative? 

A It might have been mentioned, but the principal 
area of focus was where these laws complied with and, if 
not, we have got a violation of the law. 

Q To the best of your recollection, did anyone 
say it wouldn't be a violation because the President has 
inherent authority to sell arms outside? 

A No, I was thinking this more in terms of if 
this had been an authorized diversion of — funds had been 
authorized by the President, what would the legal posture 
be, and this being one possibility, but it didn't 
receive great attention because it wasn't-- we found out 
immediately it wasn't authorized, and I think it might 
have been in the conversation with Cooper as opposed to 
Meese. 

Q I have to ask this question. Was Oliver North 
shredding documents while you were present in the NSC? 

A No, he was not. 



Q Can you state — 

A I am glad you asked. 



yilASSlFlf 



Q Somebody had to ask. 

A He was not. He was in the room with us almost 
the whole time, excuse me. 

Q Can you state with some certainty that North was 



399 



ap-51 





9 




10 




11 




12 




13 




14 




15 




16 


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17 


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19 
20 
21 
22 
23 




24 



imsiMi' 



or did not shred any docuraents anywhere in your vicinity 
during the time that you were there? 

A Yes, I aun certain. I am certain he did not. 

Q Do you know where the shredder was located? 

A Yes. 

Q How far away from you? 

A May I even draw you a map? 

Q Yes. 

A It won't be to scale. 

Q Why don't we put an exhibit sticker on it and 
mark this as the next exhibit. 

(The document referred to was marked for 
identification as Exhibit JR-27.) 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
BY MR. MCGOUGH: 

Q Just describe what we have got with Exhibit 27. 

A There was a small suite of offices. Brad and I 
were sitting at the conference table in Ollie North's 
office. Ollie North was behind his desk. Outside his 
office was another small office, two secretarial desks, a 
few cabinets. Then there was a small room off to the 
corner, with more file cabinets and the shredder, coffee 
machine up on top of the table cabinets. Then in the main 
office where the second door to the hall and Xerox machine, 
and then over in this corner where I have aot wash marks 



400 



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18 


* 


19 


^ ^ 


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21 




22 




23 




24 




25 



POUSStfiffir 



190 



is a stairway up to the second floor. 

We are probably not more than a dozen feet or 
20 feet from the shredder. Ollie did not leave the office 
more than a couple of times that I recall, a couple of 
three times. I went with hira to the coffee machine. 
He wanted to — 

Q Did you go with him purposely to keep an eye 
on him or just was it a coincidence that you went with him. 

A The principal reason for my end of things was 
I didn't want him to serve me coffee. I just soon as do 
it myself. So I walk over there with him. 

Q You didn't feel a need to keep an eye on him 
when he walked out of the office. 

A No, no, not particularly. But, anyway, we went 
back in there. I saw the shredder. I saw the shredder 
again when we were looking at some of the files. The 
bag was half or three-quarters full, but Brad, Ollie was 
in the office with us most of the time. 

Brad, from where he was sitting, could see the 
entrance to a little room with the shredder. It is a very 
small room. He would have known if Ollie had taken anything 
in there. Both of us would have heard the shredder if it 
had been turned on because we have a shredder, and I shred 
my documents — I shred some of my things myself. But 
I am very familiar with what the shredder sounds like. 



401 



<p-53 



m^er 



191 



He has the same kind of shredder we have in our 
office. 

Q Could you tell whether this shredder was 
operatable at that time? 

A I couldn't tell. There was shredded paper in 
the bag. It is a see-through bag underneath. I don't 
know whether it was working or not. That shredder did 
not go on while we were in the office. I am practically 
certain of that. The only conceivable thing is if he 
had slipped out with one sheet of paper and it had a two- 
second blast, I think we would have heard that as well. 

I don't think he had any intention of shredding 
documents while we were there, to tell you the truth. 

Q Have you discussed your recollection with 



Mr. Reynolds: 



And? 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



A He is even more firm in his view than I am. He 
says he was sitting in a position where he could see Ollie 
enter the room. There is no way he took a document in there 
to shred it. I think he was confused. He was doing it on 
another occasion. 

Q Exhibit 8 — I can show you my copy -- this is 
going to be a quick question. One of the notes that you 
passed to Brad Reynolds* you underlined the word "should," 



402 



bap- 5 4 



HNSUSSmr 



192 



in the sentence, "If anything should turn up to be missing...' 
Was there any reason for emphasizing the "should?" 

A I think the way I would look at that now, I didn't 
think anything was, so I emphasized if anything should be 
missing, this would be better. I had no basis to think 
anything was missing. I guess that is why I underlined 
it to let him know just on the outside chance that we had 
had a problem or misplaced something. 

Q Am I correct in my time sequence that Colonel 
North arrived for the first time as you were leaving 
for lunch? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you keep a log or a list of the documents 
that you wanted to have copied? I noticed partially 
Exhibit 8 appears to be a partial log. 

A It was not for that purpose. I did not keep a 
log for the purpose of copying. I had intended after we 
got back to the department to put together a log of 
documents actually copied, but I didn't get to that in 
the series of other events. 

Q In the course of the fact-finding weekend, up to 
the time of the Attorney General's press conference, do you 
recall any discussion of the possibility that documents 



would be destroyed or altered: 



mumB 



403 



mmm 



193 



Q When you were briefed by Mr. Reynolds on Mr. 
Green's conversation with him, did Mr. Reynolds tell you 
that Mr. Green did not want or suggested that no disclosures 
be made of the initiative because of potential danger to 
people involved? 

A Well, I recall Brad mentioning that he did not 
think that the initiative should be disclosed. 

Q Now, he, being. Green? 

A He, being Green, because there were things we 
didn't know or something like that, but I don't recall 
it being linked to individual safety, but you know. 
Brad took notes of that discussion and was present, so 
ray recollection is not very much firmer on that. 

Q Did Mr. Reynolds indicate to you that he had 
indicated to Mr. Green in any way that the initiative or 
the diversion would not be disclosed until they got back 
to Mr. Green? 

A I don't recall that it may not. I don't recall 
at all. 

Q You said you were briefed, I believe, in the 
conversation at the same time as the Attorney General? 

A I think that's right, yes. 

Q At the point when — can you put a time frame on 
that when you were briefed on that conversation? 

A It was either at lunch or at that meeting at the 



404 



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194 



end of the day, the 8 o'clock meeting on Monday, because 
Meese was out of the office late morning until lunch time, 
and then he was gone again from 1:40 until 4:30 or 5:00. 
I recall that. Whenever that meeting occurred, the 
next session we were together I think he debriefed. 

Q At the time Mr. Reynolds made or briefed the 
Attorney General on the meeting with Green, did the 
Attorney General indicate any inclination either to 
release it-publicly, the information publicly, or not to 
release it publicly? 

In other words, you had Mr. Green saying, "Please 
don't release this information." What was the Attorney 
General's reaction to that? 

A I don't recall any specific reaction. 

Q To your understanding, had a designation been 
/ 
reached at that point to release the next day? 

A I don't think — I mean one had not been 
communicated to roe. I expected that there would be an 
announcement imminently. 

Q When did you first realize that the matter was 
going to be announced at the time it was? 

A Tuesday morning. 

Q Did anyone consult or were you present at any 
discussions or involved in any discussions of whether to 
release it on Tuesday morning or Tuesday afternoon or to 



405 



iHNtassiHff 



195 






hold it for a few days? 

A At the 8 o'clock meeting with Regan and Meese, 
etcetera, they were talking in terms of making it public 
that morning. 

Q Were you present during that meeting? 

A Yes. 

Q And can you recall what the course of the 
conversation was about the pros and cons of releasing 
it that day as opposed to — 

A It wasn't that type of discussion. The 
discussion that Regan said, as we have talked, "We will 
go down and see the President. We will have Poindexter 
resign. We will present the President with the following 
plan for sequence for events." 

"The Congress, at this time, we will have a news 
conference where the President will make a statement. 
You will then brief the press. We will have a special panel 
appointed to look into this," and they through out a 
couple of names. It was that kind of thing, and this is 
what they were going to go in and talk to the President 
about as a plan of action. 

I gather that the decision was actually made with 
the President at 9 o'clock. 

Q Moving to a little later that morning, when you 
were assigned or asked to make a determination as to 



406 



bap-58 



WKbTOIIW 



196 






when a meitio had gone to the President, when there had been 
a Presidential approval, how much time did you consume 
doing that? 

A I wasn't asked to make that determination, but 
it was to check the files and make sure that people's 
memory that nothing had gone forward to the President 
was not contradicted by a document. 

For example, you might have seen -- I mean there 
are documents in there where Poindexter writes, "brief to 
the President orally," and dates it and signs it, and 
Meese wanted to make sure that there was neither a formal 
signature document or a document like that in the main 
files. So it was more of a double-check to be sure we 
don't have one of these in there. 

Q And how long did you have to do that? 

A Probably an hour would be my guess. I got the 
clear impression, though, that they were not going public 
until he heard back that there was no such document. 

Q But you also got the impression, did you not, 
that there was some urgency? 

A Oh, no question, no question. In fact, I think 
I knew the general time sequence by then. 

Q The answer to this question is obvious, but did 
you make any attempt to contact Colonel North and ask him 
if he had followed up on his offer on Sunday to check the 



407 



enMW 



197 



1 files. 

2 A None. 

3 Q Why not? 

4 A This was clearly beyond Colonel North at this 

5 point. I was asked to check. North knew of no such 

6 document when he was asked. We saw none in his files, and 

7 I was asked to search the principal filing system. 

8 Out of common sense, I wasn't going to call 

9 North at this point and ask him if that had been done. 

10 Q But he had stated — 

11 A Yes, he did say he would check. I don't know 

12 if he checked or not. 

13 Q The point is no one ever got back to him. 

14 A No one ever got back to him and I did the 

15 checking Tuesday morning. 

1g Q Did you ever tell anyone at the White House, 

17 including Colonel Thompson, that Colonel North had said 

13 he was going to go back in the files and look for exactly 

19 that type of document. 

20 A No, I don't think I did. 

21 Q We can agree that the type of document that 

22 Colonel North said he was going to look for on Sunday 

23 afternoon was exactly the type of document you were ^oojc^in^ 

24 for on Tuesday morning. 

25 A Yes. His actually probably was a more narrow 



imeni: you were looKing 

UNCLASSIFIEB 



408 



iKKifti^Wir 



1 category of Presidential approval. I was looking for not 

2 only that, but if it could have even been in a briefing 

3 paper that had been given to or orally presented to the 

4 President as a information matter. 

5 Q I am a little unclear on Exhibit 5. This is 

6 the one where somebody is covering their tracks. I was 

7 a little unclear as to who they were, who was covering 

8 their tracks. This is Exhibit 14. 

g Who was covering who's tracks in item Numbers 

10 4 and 5? 

11 A. Well, I am not clear myself. In four I would 

12 guess either McFarlane, North or Shultz. I would probably 

13 think the same, McFarlane, North in Number 5. 

14 In other words, whoever had been responsible for 

15 the initiative, a failed initiative, or for an initiative 

16 as in Item 4 that had exceeded their authority, so that is 

17 probably the universe of people that I would be contemplating 

18 McFarlane, Poindexter, Shultz, North. 

19 Q Just one quick look, and I think I am done. 

20 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

21 Q Can I ask one question? 

22 While Regan and Meese were discussing on Tuesday 

23 morning what has turned out to be the Tower panel — 

24 A Right. 

25 Q — who were the first neunes that were suggested? 



UNWSSIflED 



409 



bap-61 



WKMIEifiT 



199 



A Oy, boy, let me think. 

Q Was Ron Brzezinski? 

A I think so. I want to say Ann Armstrong, as well, 
but I don't know. I know she is on PFIAB Pifabs. 

Q At the time, were either Mr. Tower, Senator 
Muskie or Mr. Scowcroft suggested? 

A I just don't recall. The conversation was 
something like, "and will announce the formation of a 
special board with people like Brzezinski or Tower or 
Armstrong." I don't really recall. The names were not 
particularly central at that point. I don't really 
know who picked them. I guess the President. 
MR. MCGOUGH: That is all I have. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. BUCK: 

Q I need to rehash the events of November 22 real 
quick. When did you arrive at the NSC, particularly at 
North's office? 

A I think that was late morning. Let me see if I 
have i t . 

Q Refer to Exhibit 2. 



UNCLASSIFIEC 



A You know what is going to be helpful is the list 
of — well, yes, when I arrived is different than when I 
actually started the document review, because Exhibit 8, 
it says 12:05 document starts, so that is when I actually 



410 



bap-62 



HKtftSSitllT 



200 



sat down and started taking these notes. Also at the top 
of Exhibit 8, it says, "arrived approximately 11:30, 
Paul WBR to JR to North's office met Bob Earl." 

Let me see if this exhibit sheds more light on 
it. No, there is no mention of it in Exhibit 2. That 
is my best guess there. It was late morning. 

Q Let me get this straight. You arrived in 
North's office around 11 o'clock? 

A No, I think we arrived at the White House around 
11:30, met Poindexter, headed over, talked about the 
documents that we wanted. Earl brought them out and we 
actually settled down to me taking notes at 12:05. 

MS. NAUGHTON: You just said you met Poindexter. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I meant Thompson, thank 
you. 

BY MR. BUCK: 

Q When did you meet North? 

A It was as we were leaving for lunch. We had 
left the office and it was probably — and he was probably 
10 feet away from the door on the way out. 

Q I have got you at a lunch at 1:45, so you left 
for lunch maybe about 1:30? 

A Yes, I would say, a little later. 

Q About an hour and a half of document review 
before you went. 



UNCLASSinEO 



411 



Um^llFT 



201 



A Yes. 

Q Were you aware that the shredder, which you have 
described in North's office there was not functional? 

A No. I don't know whether it was or not. 

Q At what point in time did you notice the shredding 
machine? Did you notice it in the morning or the 
afternoon? 

A I don't know. I am sure I saw it after lunch 
when North and I went into the — in to make coffee, but 
I probably noticed it upon arrival, when Earl was pointing 
out the different files and the drawers were ajar. 
The shredder was right next to him, so I 
probably noticed it then. 

Q Were you aware of a second shredding machine 
just outside of North's office? 

A No. 

Q And North was there when you returned from lunch? 

A Yes. Earl might have opened it. North might 
have been at his desk, but he was definitely in the office. 

Q I take it North could have shredded documents while 
you were out on lunch. 

A Yes. 



ONCLASSIFIED 



Q Do you know how long a period that was? 
A It would have been about an hour and a half, 
roughly. 



412 



bap-64 



[I^^BHkT 



202 



Q Do you recall seeing North at any time leave 
the office that you were in with him, with documents? 

A No. 

Q And you said he left maybe a few times? 

A A couple of times I would think. I know once 
to do the coffee. I don't think he ever left with 
documents in hand. He was working at his desk, but 
there was very little papfer on the desk. He was reading 
a newspaper, on the phone. I mean he didn't seem to be 
going — he was not going through files or great volumes 
of paper. 

Q Did Thompson stop by and accompany North anywhere; 

A Not that I saw. 

Q Did you see anything that would suggest that 
North was shredding at any time that you were in his 
office? 

A No, nothing. 

MR. BUCK: I have no more questions. 
(Whereupon, at 7:50 p.m., the deposition was 
concluded. ) 



UNCLASSIFIED 



413 



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Oliver North's office said you 
agreed with Admiral Poindexter 
to see North today? 

Do you want to meet with him 
after Judicial Selection at the 
White House, and delay your 
departure for home? Or what? 
Meeting should last 15-20 minutes. 

CONTACT: Fawn at 395-3345. 



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THE AMERICAN UNIVERSTTY 

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mm. Qp PROCEEDINGS 

CONFIDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 

IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WCWSS(F(ED 



i 



DEPOSITION OP ALFONSO ROBELO C 



CONFIDBN'^IAL 




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Washington, D. C. 
Thursday, April 23, 1987 



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UimSSIflED 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 

IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



DEPOSITION OF ALFONSO ROBELO C. 

Washington, D. C. 
Thursday, April 23, 1987 

Deposition of ALFONSO ROBELO C, called for examination 
pursuant to notice of deposition, at the offices of the Senate 
Select Conunittee, Hart Senate Office Building, Suite 530, at 
10:00 a.m. before JOEL BREITNER, a Notary Public within and 
for the District of Columbia, when were present: 



RICHARD PARRY, ESQ. 

Associate Counsel 

United States Senate 

Select Committee on 

Secret Military Assistance 
to Iran and the Nicaraguan 
Opposition 

901 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, D. C. 20510 

KENNETH R. BUCK, ESQ. 
Assistant Minority Counsel 
House of Representatives 
Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with 

Iran 
H-419, The Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

ROBERT A. BERMINGHAM, Investigator 
House of Representatives Select 
Committee 



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CONTENTS 



WITNESS 

Alfonso Robelo 

by Mr. Parry 

by Mr. Bermingham 

by Mr. Parry 

by Mr. Buck 

by Mr. Parry 



EXAMINATION 



9 
10 
1] 

12 ,, 

13 I 

"! 

15 I 

16 1 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 



EXHIBITS 
ROBELO DEPOSITION NUMBER 
Exhibit 1 
Exhibit 2 



IDENTIFIED 
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Whereupon, 

ALFONSO ROBELO 
was called as a witness and, having first been duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 

BY MR. PARRY: 
Q First, Mr. Robelo, I would like to thank you for 
coming in today. It has been completely voluntary, there has 
been no subpoena, and we appreciate the full cooperation that 
you have given the House and Senate Select Committees in this 
investigation. 

Before we start, I would like to explain that you 
are giving your testimony under oath; the reporter will take 
down your testimony and transcribe it. You will have the 
opportunity, if you want, to review your testimony once it 
has been transcribed, and make any corrections or if there 
have been typographical errors or if you were misunderstood, 
you can point that out to us if you choose to review your 
testimony. 

Please, just try to answer the questions as 
accurately as you can. If you don't understand a question. 



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1 let us know and we'll do our best to clear it up. 

2 Can wc start with your general background. You 

3 are presently a director of the United Nicaraguan Opposition; 

4 is that correct? 

5 A Yes. May I say just a few words? My native 

6 tongue -- my native language is not English. I do think that 

7 I speak it fluent enough to answer anything, but if I make 
any mistakes, if there is something you don't understand, 

9 please say so, so everything will be clear. Okay? I don't 

10 need an interpreter, obviously, but I wanted to make that 

11 clear, because there may be a lot of mistakes there. 

12 My present pooition, I as a member of the 

13 directorate of UNO; UNO is the acronym for the United 

14 Nicaraguan Opposition. 

15 Right now, there are two directors, is Pedro 

16 Joaquin Chamorro, and myself. There is one vacant seat. 

17 The director of UNO is the top executive authority 

18 that has control on both the military and the political 

19 struggle for the liberation of Nicaragua. 

20 Q Does UNO incorporate the entire Nicaraguan 

21 resistance movement at this time? 

22 K No, sir. There are two other groups that arc 



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1 outside UNO -that are of a certain importance. There are more 

21 than two, but two that arc oC importance. 

3 One is the southern opposition block, in Spanish 

41 is called BOS, B like in boy, OS. 

5 And then the Indian group called Misurasata. 

6 Q BOS and Misurasata, neither group has 

7 representatives in UNO; is that correct? 

8 A For the time being, no. There are conversations 

9 at this time to include it in what will be the Nicaraguan 
10 resistance, we hope. 

H Q I would like to briefly touch on these two 

12 groups. BOS, the southern opposition block, who are the 

13 leaders oC that group; do you know? 

14 A They have a Cive-BC«ber directorate, but at 

15 present the — I will say the key leader is Alfredo Cesar, 

16 and, in Misurasata, the key leader is Brooklyn Rivera. 

17 Q Are cither of those groups presently engaged in 

18 Bilitary activities? 

19 A Yea, According to what I know, both have minor 

20 military activities inside Nicaragua. 

21 BOS has about a^^^^^^^Bncn, aaybcl 
22^^^^Hand Misurasata nav have up to^^^^^Hinside. And both 



rand Misurasata nay have up to^H 
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1 

2 
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4 

51 
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7 
8 
9 
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12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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IE 
19 
20 
21 



oC these organizations did receive aid in the last 9100 
million aid package. Each one of thcB got|^^^^^H each. 
So is^^^^^^H each. 

Q Do they coordinate in any way uith the larger 
military forces of the FDN? 

A No, sir. 

Q Or the southern group? 

A Well — Misurasata does not. BOS operates in the 
same region of Nicaragua, in the southern part of the 
Atlantic Coast. And, due to that, yes, they do coordinate 
with the southern front of UNO. 

Q In addition to your position as director of UNO, 
you also have your own political party; isn't that correct? 

A Yes, air. In March of 1978 I founded a political 
party in Nicaragua with other young professionals in 
Nicaragua, and I have been president of that party since the 
foundation. 

The na»e of it is MDN, which stands for Movinicnto 
DcBocratico Nicaraguense. That party is part of UNO, that is 
an alliance, and has been part of UNO since we organized UNO 
in June of 1985. 

Q Does the MDN have any ailitary functions? 



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mrnmn 



A No, 3ir. The MDN is a political party with no 
military structures. There arc members of the MDN who have 
-- who are fighting inaidc Nicaragua, but, as part of other 
forces like FDN forces, or in the southern front of UNO. But 
the MDN, as such, has no military activities and no military 
structure. 

Q So the MDN is purely a political body? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Do you have any involvement or are you a leader of 
any of the military factions? 

A According to UNO bylaws, the top authority in any 
area of the struggle, any branch of the struggle, is the 
directorate. So, according to the bylaws, I do have 
authority and responsibilities. The fact is that, because of 
my experience, which has always been in the civic-political 
struggle, I have been kept fairly well informed of what is 
going on. I, a few times, have looked at reports and budgets 
about the military part. But I don't get involved in any of 
the actual direction or the -- direction of the military 
part. I am devoted mostly to political activities. 

Q Do you have -- other than your general authority 
over military operaljajptiia «s a,d4rcctor of UNO, do you have 



1 



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any particular affiliation or communication with the forces 
in the south? The forces that are not part of the FDN? 

A Not on any regular basis, whenever I occasionally 
see the people inside there, I do talk to thca but not on a 
regular basis. 

In the past, when the so uthern front was command ed 
by Fernando "El Negro" Chamorrc 
had more regular contacts. But not formal contacts. But we 
did talk to each other more frequently. 

Q Yes. 

A He left several months ago, about, what, maybe 
seven, eight months ago. Since then the contacts with any 
people in the south have been more irregular. 

Q What was the name oC Fernando Chamorro's group, or 

military unit? 

A It has two acronyms. It is ODN-FARN. UDN-FARN. 
The "UDN- stands for Union Democratica Nicaragua, 
I think it is, which is the political branch of his 
organization. FARN stands for Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias Nicaraguenses, the Revolutionary Nicaraguan 
Armed Forces. That is the military branch that was part of 
the southern front under his command. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

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1| Q Were you ever affiliated with UDN-FARN? 

2 A No, 3ir. 

3 Q Maybe we should go back and trace your political 

4l affiliations. 

I 
5j Starting with the formation of the MDN in 1978 and 

6| going through the revolution and your present position, could 

7 you just briefly describe your various political leadership 

8 positions? 

9 A Yes, sir. As I said before, MDN was founded in 

10 1978, in March of 1978. Me becaac instrumental, and we were 

11 the binding force to a larger coalition of political, labor 

12 and private sector organizations that was called the "Broad 

13 Opposition Front." 

14 This broad opposition front was very important in 

15 the overthrowing of Somoza. 

16 I was instrumental to strike against Somoza, and 

17 became involved in the insurrections against Somoza. 

18 Due to my involvement in the broad opposition 

19 front I was also a member of the political commission that 

20 took — that was involved in the mediation of the OAS in 

21 September of 1978. When the final insurrection against 

22 Somoza took place in June-July 1979, then I was invited to 




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1 discuss the formation of the governing junta as a 

2 representative of my party, the MDN. And I did join and 

3 became one of the five members of the governing junta of my 

4 country, Nicaragua, from July 19, 1979 to April 22, 1980, 

5 when I stepped down and resigned and became active in civic 

6 activities inside Nicaragua, as the president of my party, 

7 the MDN. 

8 Q Stop there for a minute. Why did you resign from 

9 the governing junta? 

XO A I was fully committed to the original principles 

11 of the Nicaraguan revolution, being effective pluralism; 

12 nonalignmcnt in foreign policy and a well defined mixed 

13 economy. 
i 

X4 It was clear, as time went by, that these 

15 principles were betrayed by the key force in the revolution 

16 that controlled all the weapons, that was the FSLN. 

17 So, due to this betrayal of the key principles, 
due to the clear detour of the revolution out of these 

19 principles and becaae Bore totalitarian linked with the 

20 Communist regimes, became more Communist, controlled by the 

21 Marxist-Leninist, I decided to step down. I saw there was no 
role for me inside the government. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

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11 



1 Q You referred to the FSLN, that's the Sandinista 

2 party? 

3 K Ye3 . Called the Prcnte Sandinista dc Liberacion 

4 Nationalc; FSLN, what is known as Sandinistas, now. 

5 Q So, in 1980 it became apparent that they were 

6 controlling the country and that they had their -- they were 

7 opposing a totalitarian. Communist form of government and 

8 that's the reason you stepped down from the junta? 

9 A That is correct. 

10 Q Where did your activities take you from there? 

11 A I stayed inside Nicaragua, in civic opposition to 

12 the totalitarian Sandinista regime, for almost two years, 

13 until in March of 1982. The emergency law was imposed on the 

14 Nicaraguan people by the Sandinista regime. This emergency 

15 law put censorship on the press and on the — on radio, the 

16 television was a monopoly oC the Sandinistas, and political 

17 activities of parties were not allowed. I thought this had 

18 closed, 30 much, the space inside Nicaragua, political space 

19 inside Nicaragua, and on top of that my house was attacked by 

20 mobs and I wasn't allowed to leave the country. Several 

21 times they stopped me at the airport and there were several 

22 attempts to kill me. So I decided to go to exile in Costa 



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1 Rica, with the key leaders of my party and to set the key 

2 structure of my party, the MDN, in exile in Costa Rica. 

3 I left Nicaragua the 23rd of March of 1982 and I 

4 have not returned since then, to Managua. In exile in Costa 

5 Rica, we set up our own organization, tried to contact 

6 members and do the usual political activities that a party 

7 does and we became, also, members of an alliance called ARDE, 

8 where the key military leader was Commander Pastora, 

9 p-a-3-t-o-r-a, and I was the key political leader in ARDE. 
Iq\ For a period of one year, until May of 1983, all 

11 our struggle was civic — or political, I should say. There 

12 was no military activities under XRDE. 

13 1 Q Can I interrupt there? 

i 
14 1 A Yea. 

15 Q were there military activities taking place 

16 elsewhere? For instance, in the north, at that time? 

17 A Yes, sir. The FDN although I don't know if it was 

18 called FDN at that time, but there were forces in the north 

19 operating since March of 1982. In fact, the state of 

20 emergency was "decreed"? 

21 Q Decreed? 

22 A ~ decreed by the Sandinista government because of 



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some military actions that took place inside Nicaragua, which 
showed the presence oC these forces, military forces, 
operating in the north. 

Q Did you have any knowledge of who organized the 
military forces of the north? 

A Well, I do have now because it is public to an 
extent. 

It was a group of Nicaraguans, some of them former 
members of the national guard and some former Sandinista 
combatants that were already also disillusioned in — 
disillusioned with the regime in Nicaragua. And they 
received some help fro« the United States government and some 
froB some^^^^^^Hailitary 

Q Did ARDB, or the MDN, receive any help from the 
United States ^^^^^^^^^|or other foreign countries, during 
this period March of '82 through May of '83? 

Froa^^^^^^H nothing. 
FroB the United States sometime in May or June of 
1982, through Commander Pastora, 

I think it was in 
itartcd receiving some financing! 





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■money was pcraanently given to us 

9 until May-June oC 1984 when two things occurred; one, the 

10 U.S. Congress cut off the aid after the aining of the ports 

11 ^^^^^^^Hand the the CIA and, two, due 

12 the reluctant attitude of Coamandcr Pastora to join forces 

13 with the north, we split. He kept the ailitary forces that 

14 were inside Nicaragua, and I kept the political activities 

15 that were under ay responsibility. I got in contact with 

16 Adolfo Calero, and the Indians^^^^^^^^Hto create 

17 uBbrella organization that was called, at that tiae, UNIR, 

18 U-N-I-R. And that is the origin of what is now known UNO; 

19 that evolved and was founded in June of 1985^^^^^^^^^^^ 

20 Q So there was a period froa June of '84, 

21 approxiaatcly? Is that when you broke up with Pastora? 

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1 Q Until the formation of UNO, that you functioned as 

2 an umbrella group under a different na«e, the UNIR? 

3 A Yes. It was not as effective as UNO is now. It 

4 was very loose. We didn't have offices or anything. It was 
i 

5 more a type of coordination, but the umbrella existed on 

6 paper but did not exist in reality. 

7 Q Throughout the period of your direction of ARDE, 

8 what was the role of the MDN? 

9 A Well, the MDN was the key political force in 

10 ARDE. We did have a few members that got involved in 

11 military activities in ARDE. By the way, the military 

12 activities in ARDE started in May of 1983. Okay? But the 

13 key role of the MDN was responsible for political activities 

14 and the standing by political activities, publications, 

15 seminars, missions to touch base with foreign politicians and 

16 political parties; trying to group and organize the 

17 Nlcaraguan exile communities, et cetera. 

18 MR. PARRY: Can we go off the record for a 

19 second. 

20 (Discussion off the record.) 

21 BY MR. PARRY: 
22 




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Q Did you have any knowledge ot how Hr. Pastora was 
procuring his aras, his weapons, during this tiae period? 

A It was being aainly provided by the CIA. 

Q And the aoney that he received was for food and 
clothing? Is that what it was? 

A It was aainly Cor food, transportation, the whole 
apparatus of vehicles, and they did buy a £cw things here and 
there that they thought that they could do better than the 
agency like soae radio equipaent and soae sophisticated 
cquipaent or things like that. 




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1 Q How large was the military force oC ARDE during 

2 thia period? 

3 A At the peak, that must have been May-June of 1984, 

4 Conmandcr Pastora claincd to have about^^^^^^^^Bf ightcrs 

5 inside Nicaragua. And he had control about of half the Scin 

6 Juan River, that is the river that serves as a border between 

7 Costa Rica and Nicaragua. 
Q ^^^^^^^^^H^^Hdid you or you 

9 have contact with other representatives of the United States 

IC government? 

11 A Usually I will have contact with the Aaerican 

12 ambassador as well as the political attache in the embassy. 

13 In the beginning the ambassador was — is it Frank 

14 or Fred MacNeil? Ambassador MacNeil, whichever. And then it 

15 was Ambassador Curtin Windsor. I had contacts and discussed 

16 political matters and sometimes, also, the operation of the 

17 hell 

18 Q Any contacts with the NSC or with the White House 

19 during this time period? 

20 A With the NSC, I did meet — what was his name? — 

21 A gentleman that now works with the Washington Times who was 

22 in charge of Latin American policy there. A French name thai 

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I don't recall. 

(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. PARRY: 

Q Just before our break you were mentioning an 
individual from the NSC that you had contact with during the 
period prior to June of 1984. 

A Yes, sir. Now I recall, his name is Roger Fontain 
and that is the first person fro» the NSC that I met. 

Later on, when the Kissinger Commission visited 
Costa Rica in early 1984, I also met Colonel Oliver North and 
he asked me to call him next time I was in Washington. 

Q Is that the incident where he passed you a note in 
a reception line? 

A Yes. YC3. I was shaking hands with the people 
that was inside the room: Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador 
Kirkpatrick and others, and I shook hands with this gentleman 
I didn't know and there was a piece of paper between his 
hands and my hand where he has written "next time you are in 
Washington please contact me, my name is Oliver North," and a 
phone number and it was very embarrassing because I had to 
shake hands with the next one and I didn't know what to do 
with the piece of paper that was in my hand so I had to move 



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1 it and put it in my pocket. 

2 Q So that was your first contact with Oliver North? 

3 A That was my first contact. I don't think I 

4 contacted him in the next trip to Washington but in some of 
5| my trips to Washington I did contact him. This must have 
61 been in the middle of 1984 and I did pay several visits to 

7 him during the second half of '84 and '85 and '86. 

8 From July-August of '84 until sometime in the 
I 

9j middle of '85, if I don't recall it wrong, when there was no 

10 U.S. aid, I asked Adolfo Calero to keep on providing funds to 

11 cover the expenses of the political activities of ARDE, in H 

12 Costa Rica. Being part of this UNIR, that is the first 

13 umbrella organization. And this was very awkward and very — 

14 it bothers me because, being a political leader, getting 

15 money froa another political leader in Nicaragua, had the 

16 effect of subordination to another Nicaraguan political 

17 leader, Adolfo Calero. 

18 So, because of this I complained to several people 

19 that I wanted to get some direct assistance and in several of 

20 the meetings with Colonel North we discussed this and he 

21 expressed that he will look and see if he could help me — 

22 help us out; "us" being, mainly, the political movements, an 



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organization that has stayed with mc in the split with 
Commander Pastora, that took place in May of 1984. 

Q Can we go back to that split? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Your political organization split off from 
Pastora 's military organization. Then there was — you 
subsequently were united with other nilitary organizations; 
is that correct? Fernando Chamorro's group — how did that 
come about? Was he under Pastora and did he join your 
faction that split tzou Pastora? 

A In ARDB, at the beginning, there were six 
organizations. Some of thea stayed with Pastora. Some of 
them split into factions, and sobc of them stayed with mc. 
The ARDE political, that stayed with me, was ray 
own party, MDN, "Negro" Chamorro's organization as a whole, 
UDN-FARN; a labor group that split, half of a labor group 
that split called STDN, and a Christian Democratic 
organization that also split, and part of it — most of it 
stayed with me in the political activity. 

So, at that time from May of 1984 until UNO was 
formed in June of 1985, these four organizations became part 
of ARDE and one of them, UDN-FARN, did have a military branch 




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but had very, very little military activities. 

Q So you retained the name "ARDE" after the split 
with Pastora; ia that correct? 

A The split was such that there were two ARDEs . He 
had the name "ARDE" and we had the name "ARDE," both had the 
same names. This was very confusing. 

Q And I talce it the funding you received first from 
Adolfo Calcro had, subsequently, through Colonel North — was 
intended for your entire organization, both the political and 
the small military unit of Fernando Chamorro's? 

A Not exactly. The one we received from Adolfo 
Calero, yes. It was intended to maintain the four 
organizations that stayed with me that had mainly political 
activities and a little bit of military activities under 
Fernando Chamorro. 

The second part, the ones that I received after my 
conversation with Colonel North, were mainly to be divided 
into two organizations only, not four. Two organizations: 
MDN and UDN; both being political. Okay? 

Q And the UDN, again, was under Chamorro? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q But it was his political activity? 

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A Yes. 

Q Olcay. 

A Because there was humanitarian aid coming already 
whatever activities wc had^^^^^^^^^^^land the 
humanitarian aid was enough to take care of the military 
branch under him called "FARM." 

Q In terms of their food and — 

A Food, clothes, medicines. 

Q Do you know during this time if they received 
additional weapons or ammunition and how that was paid Cor? 

A They could have received some small lots of 
ammunition, coming from private people. But let me make — 
let mc state that part of the commanders of Pastora, in May 
of 1986, came back to UNO. UNO had been formed already, and 
they came back to us and they had — the forces have 

froi^^^^^^^Bto maybc^^^Vactive they were 
very badly equipped. 

Sometime after that, 1 think the first one being 
in September of 1986, there were several flights. 

Q September of '86? Or '85? . 



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Q Ju3t this past year? 

A Yes, not too Car away. 

Q AH right. 

A Several flights took place in the second half of 
■86. Let's put it that way. And they were mainly military 
logistics, going inside Nicaragua for the southern front. 

Q Did you have any comaunication with the private 
benefactors, the persons making these air drops inside 
Nicaragua? 

A No, sir. I was inforaed only, a posteriori, about 
everything that they received. And in general terms, 
general, 




Q Okay. You didn't have any role in communicating 
what was needed in terms of military supplies for these 
drops? You were just told after the fact that drops had been 



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made? 

A No, 3ir. I had nothing to do with the 
implementation or anything. 

Q Do you know who would have? Would Fernando 
Chamorro have communicated the needs oC the military? 

A Logically it will be either hi» or someone under 

hia. 

Q Do you know who he communicated with? 

A I could imagine it would be someone from the CIA 
Ibut — 
You are just guessing. Did he ever indicate to 
you who it might be? 

A No. I wouldn't know for a certainty. 

Q IS there anything to make you believe that the CIA 
would have been the intermediary in communicating that 
information? 

X Yes. I thi 





cally makes me believe that they 
■^I^^niJT^ril^Ihl^h^ called the -patriotic Americans" in 
these efforts to resupply the troops from the southern front 
Q Do you have any idea of the total amount of 



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1 materials supplied, the value of the military supplies that 

2 1 were delivered? 

3 k Delivered where? To the south? Or to the total 

4 operation? 

5 Q To the south. 

6 A I think the south received between five and six 

7 flights. These flights usually will be 8000, 10,000 pound 

8 flight. 

9| The material that was delivered there sometime was 

10 ammunition. There were a lot of boots and uniforms, and 

11 there were some weapons. And my guess will be that the cost 

12 of that will be in the neighborhood of $20 per pound. 

13 If that is the case, every drop will be about 

14 $200,000, being five or six, will be in the neighborhood of 

151 $1 million to $1.2 million. 

I 

16 Q Okay. 

17 A Plus the cost of transportation that I understand 

18 was in the neighborhood of $20,000 to $30,000 each, because 

19 of the risk it involved. So you will have to add to the 

20 previous total about 100-, $120,000 more, about. 

21 Q All right. Now, do you know whether the materials 

22 supplied that you have estimated to have a value of about 



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$1.2 million, were those paid for by these patriotic 
Americans? Or had they previously been purchased by UNO or 
the FDN? 

A It was a mixture of the two. It was not — it 
wasn't UNO, because at that time UNO did not have any money 
for military purposes. 

Q Okay. 

A It didn't have any military aid. So it could come 
from only two sources . 

What they, "patriotic Americans," or FDN who 
bought it previously and it was in FDN warehouses. It could 
well be that in one flight it could be so«e things from one 
side, some things from another. 

Q Do you thinlc there were some of each? 

A Yes. I don't know where it came from but this is 
what I have learned. 

Q It could have been cither or both? Is that what 
you are saying? 

A That is correct. Either or both. 

Q Do you have siallar knowledge with respect to the 
total supply by the patriotic Aaericans? Not just in the 



south. 



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1 A I was told by Adolfo Calcro that the total amount 

2 of flights were between 20 and 25. That being the case, and 
31 applying the same arithmetic, that will be between $5 to $6 

million in total, including goods and transportation costs. 
5| Q What was the period of time of these 25 flights? 

6 Do you know that' 

7 A I only have knowledge of the ones in the south. 
The ones in the south took place, I think, between June to 

9 when the Hassenfus accident took place, that I don't recall, 

10 Q Okay. Late October? 

11 A Is that when that occurred? 

12 MR. BUCK: October 5th. 

13 MR. BERMINGHAMs October 5. 

14 THE WITNESS: Until October ~ then. 

15 BY MR. PARRY) 

16 Q All right. Do you know the names of any of the 

17 individuals involved in the supply effort by the "patriotic 

18 Americans"? 

19 A No, sir, 

20 Q You didn't have any direct contact? 

21 A No. AdolCo Calcro told me once, in late November 

22 of 1986, that the person that handled all of these was 




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Captain Cooper — 

Q Okay? 

A — who was the pilot in the plane that was dropped 
down in — the Hasscnfus flight. 

Q Did you ever discuss the supply operation with 
Colonel North or any of Colonel North's representatives? 

A No, sir. 

Q, He never indicated any connection or control over 
the "patriotic Americans"? 

A In talks that we had, he indicated knowing about 
it. 

Q Okay. 

A But, since I was not involved in it there was no 
detail or anything. 

Q Let's go back to the funding now. 

A Yes. 

Q Prior to money received from Colonel North, you 
received money from Adolfo Calero; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall approximately the total amount of 
money received through that source? 

A Roughly 9600,000. 



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1 MR. PARRY; Can we raarlc this as the first 

2 exhibit. 

3 (Robelo Exhibit 1 identified.) 

4 BY MR. PARRY; 

5 Q Mr. Robelo, I'm going to show you a act of 

6 documents relating to what wc believe are the funds you 

7 received fro« Adolf o Calero. The first two pages are 

8 compute^ printouts, based on bank records that Adolf o Calcrc 

9 has provided to the com«ittee3. And the subsequent document 

10 are the individual documents evidencing the various 

11 transfers. 

12 Would you look at these and first tell me if the 

13 numbers on the computer printouts would show the dates and 

14 amounts of the various transfers from Adolf o Calero 's 

I 

15 accounts appear to be accurate? j 

16 A They appear to be accurate according -- to the 

17 best of my knowledge, yes. 

18 Q Now, the accounts that you had set up for 

19 receiving these funds was in which bank? 

20 A 

21 Q And the name on the account was? 

22 A I don't recall if this one is the same 




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1 I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H account, or could be a personal account 

2 under my name. I know about the others but not this one. 

3 (Discussion off the record.) 

4 THE WITNESS: Hhat we were talking about? 

5 BY MR. PARRY: 

6 Q You said you didn't know whether this was your 

7 account or the private account — 

8 A After seeing the records, it was clear that this 

9 was transferred to an account, special account, under my name 

10 ^^^^ 

11 Q So that was not the same account later used by 

12 Colonel North? 

13 A No. It is not. 
14 1 NR. PARRY: Can you aark this as the second 

15 exhibit? 

16 (Robelo Exhibit 2 identified.) 

17 BY MR. PARRY) 

18 Q The other documents aarked as Exhibit 2, the othei 

19 documents, are documents which you yourself provided to the 

20 committees at an earlier date. Those are the documents 

21 representing the the monies received through Colonel North; 
22 



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Yc3. These arc the credit notes ofl 
|of cable transfers to the account of 

Ithat were the result of my conversation 
with Colonel North requesting direct financing of military 
operations -- I'm sorry -- political operations of MDN and 
UDN. The total amount being $225,000 minus cable cost 
expenses that account for a few dollars each time. 

Q How were those funds divided between MDN and UDN? 
A At the beginning there arc some transfers that ar 
larger than the normal $10,000 per month because we had run 
into some debts and we wanted to clear that out. 

Later on it will be 910,000 and it was usually 
divided 50:50. 

I say "usually" because in the beginning I don't 
think it involved any of UDN-FARN; and also because at the 
end, the fact that humanitarian aid was coming to UDN-FARN, 
also meant that it stopped, earlier, that November of 1986. 

In other words, in the last month it was not 
divided. At the beginning it was not divided. But in the 
middle it was divided half and half. 

Q There appears to be substantial drop off in the 
amount of funding you received throufllL^Colonel North as 




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opposed to the funding received through Adolf o Calcro. Were 
they both intended to finance the same operations? 

A No, sir. 

Q What was the difference? 

A This -- the amounts received from Adolfo Calcro 
were to sustain ARDE as a whole. That, as I mentioned 
before, it is four organizations and a larger structure as 
such. 

These funds, from coaing — because of ay talks 
with Colonel North -- was only to finance the political 
activities of two organizations, not four. And had nothing 
to do with ARDE as a coalition. 

Q Did ARDE dissolve when UNO was formed? 

A Yes, sir. ARDE Stopped operating when UNO was 
founded in June of 1985. 

Q Okay. Approximately at the same time. I sec the 
last contribution through Calcro came July 3 of '85? 

A Ves. 

Q So that approximately coincides with the 
dissolution of ARDE and the formation of UNO? 

A Of UNO. 

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A That is correct. The money coming because of my 
conversations with Colonel North that are in Exhibit 2, 
started more or less at the same time UNO was formed and they 
were intended only for political activities of the two I 
organizations that I have mentioned. 

Q Do you know how the other two organizations that 
were in ARDE — did they continue in existence, continue to 
receive funding? 

A Yes. Only through UNO, whenever they were 
involved in the structures or projects of UNO. 

Q Okay. 

A In the case of my party, the MDN, we kept a 
separate office in San Jose, Costa Rica, that we still have. 
And for party activities we use that office and most of this 
money, received through Colonel North, the part that was for 
MON, was used as party funds to cover political expenses like 
rent, telephone bills, salaries for the receptionist, the 
office administrator, the night watch; publications — we 
have a bimonthly publication called Rescatc; some seminars of 
members of ay party; some missions to foreign countries, 
things of this nature. 

Q Did you yourself rcceiva.^^^lary out of these 




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2 A No, sir. I have never received any salary because 

3 of my work as a politician. I have never received any salary 

4 out of either my party or UNO or ARDE. I had ray own savings 

5 out of my work in Nicaragua, and that's what I live from, 
g Q^^^^^^^^^ think, has indicated that he received 
7 money from Colonel North for his personal expenses and I 

think Adolfo Calero has indicated the same thing, in terms of 

9 a salary. But you never received that type of funding? 

10 A No, sir. Never ever .^^^^^^Hmade it public to 

11 us, the directors of UNO, in a meeting in May of 1986 in 

12 Miami, that in order for him to cover his living expenses as 

13 well as some political expenses, he was receiving some 

14 money. 

15 That is not the case in this money that 

16 ^^^^^^^^^^^^Breceived. This is money for 

17 organizations, specifically and mainly the MDN and in some 

18 part, in a minor part, UDN-FARN. 

19 Q All right. Do you — at this time, do you have 

20 any outside interests, activities, to generate income for 

21 supporting your family' 

22 A Yes, sir, I do. I have a coffee farm in Costa 



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1 Rica that I bought many years ago. I have intcrcat in a 

2 sugar mill. I have interest in — 

3 Q In Costa Rica? 

4 A In Costa Rica, yes. I have interest in a larger 

5 coffee farm in Costa Rica. I have savings accounts in Costa 

6 Rica, time deposits in Costa Rica where I live from. 

7 Q And your family lives in Costa Rica at this time? 

8 A Yes. My family in Costa Rica and I am divorced 

9 and my ex-wife has a house and has her own living. 

10 Q Prior to your exile from Nicaragua, what was your 

11 business in Nicaragua? 

12 A I am a chemical engineer and I have worked from 

13 1961 until 1979 as an executive in an agribusiness complex 

14 that produced cooking oil out of cottonseed and that had 

15 investments in cotton plantations, banking as well as what I 

16 have mentioned that I still have in Costa Rica that is a 

17 product of that agribusiness complex. 

18 Q Let's go back to the money supplied by Adolfo 

19 Calero. Did he tell you what the source of that money was? 

20 A Private donors that wanted to remain anonymous . 

21 Q Did he indicate whether they were American 

22 citizens or from foreign countries? 

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1 X No, sir. 

2 Q Did he indicate that he knew anything beyond what 

3 he told you? 

4 A He didn't indicate anything. Just mentioned 

5 that. So I could not say if he knew or did not know. 

6 Q He didn't give you anything — 

7 A No. 

8 Q You just assumed that they were private donor . 

9 Did he Bcntion who raised the Boncy Cor him? 

10 A No, sir. There were so«c names that were public, 

11 like General Singlaub and other people but he mentioned the 

12 fact that most of these contributors will want to remain 
13 1 anonymous. Wanted to remain anonymous. 

14 Q Again, with the money received through Colonel 

15 North, did you understand anything with regard to the source 

16 of those funds? 

17 A Colonel North in one conversation explained that 

18 these were foreign, private donors. 

19 g So with the money in th^^^^Bac count, you 

20 understood they were foreign private donors. The money from 

21 Calero they were just private donors, could have been foreign 

22 or — 



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1 A That is precise. 

2 Q And when they say "foreign" they mean non-United 

3 States, I assume? 

4 A That is correct. 

5 Q Beyond that did he identify the countries or the 

6 individuals that were contributingl 

7 A No, sir. 
Q The first check in this Exhibit 2, or the first 

9 wire transfer, comes from a John Ramsey; is that correct? 

10 A That is correct. 

11 Q Do you know anything about Mr. Ramsey, or how it 

12 came about that he wired, was it 910,000? 

13 A No. At the time I received this money I knew 

14 nothing about who he is — who he was. A posteriori, now, I 

15 received the visit of Rich Miller, the 9th of April of this 

16 year. Hhen I asked him who John Ramsey was, he told me he 

17 was an American contributor and he knew who he was. But at 

18 the time that I received this, I honestly didn't — did not 

19 read about this — just took knowledge and filed these credit 

20 notes. 

2l| Q This was arranged by Richard Miller? This 
22 1 



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X No. No. I don't know. 
Q You don't know? 
A I don't know. 

Q What was your connection with Richard Miller? 
K Richard Miller was introduced to ne by Colonel 

North, cither in his office at the White House or else in a 
telephone conversation and then later on I went to Miller's 
office., 

Miller acted aorc like an adviser on visits to the 
different -edia in Washington, like television and radio and 
newspapers. 

He did accompany me several tiaes to visit a 
journalist or televisions or radio stations, and they did 
■ake soae appointments for me. 

When 1 say "they" it means the organization he has 
with another person that I know fairly well, Frank Gomez. 

Q Was it your understanding at the time that 
Mr. Miller or Mr. Gomez had anything to do with the money 
that was sent to youi^^^HH^^ account? 

h NO, sir. My talks about this deal was only with 
Colonel North. 

Now, a posteriori also, I have seen here in the 



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1 second and third transfer, the name "International Business 

2 CoBinunications" appears. 

3 Q Right. 

4 K These were the two largest money transfers because 

5 we had, as I had mentioned, previous debt that we had to 

6 pay. Mr. Miller visited — visited me last April 9th here in 

7 Washington, and asked nc to write an aclcnowlcdgment of this 

8 money toeing received. I promised that I will acknowledge 

9 that and give copies of these transfers — photocopies of 

10 these transfers. 

11 Again, I found that this money was coming from 

12 IBC, only when I looked at my files in order to get these 

13 records out in order to cooperate in this investigation. 

14 I didn't pay attention to that when I received it. 

15 Q Okay. So I take it that prior to April 9th of 

16 this year, you had no idea that John Ramsey had any 

17 connection with Richard Miller whatsoever? 

18 A That is correct. 

19 Q You didn't know that Richard Miller or Frank Gomez 

20 were in any way connected with the funds being provided to 
you^^^^^Bccount? 

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1 because I didn't look in detail on the credit notes. 

2 When I looked for the credit notes, in order to 

3 cooperate with the investigation, I found those names and, 

4 since I have seen those names in the newspapers, then it 

5 became — 

6 Q After the deposits from International Business 

7 Communications, there are deposits from Lake Resources. 

8 Again, you didn't know who Lake Resources was or who had 

9 control of that account? 

10 A No, sir. I had no knowledge and there are three 

11 deposits from Lake Resources, each one of 915,000 and I 

12 didn't know who Lake Resources was. I know now because of 

13 the publications in the newspapers. 

14 Q All right. Subsequent to the transfers that 

15 specifically identify Lake Resources there are some documents 

16 that don't specifically identify the source. They cither say 

17 "one of our clients" or "El Misao," do you know who the bank 

18 was referring to or this document was referring to when it 

19 says "one of our clients" or "El Mismo"? 

20 A No. I have no idea. After the transfer from Lake 

21 Resources, all of the rest don't have any identification of 

22 who ordered these cable transfers. It only gives the name of 



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and I 




1 the bank. 

21 In some cases it isl 

i I 

3| think, after seeing here it is really^ 

4i^^^^^^^^H Because the bottOR 

5 a mistake here, it' 

6 Some say"^ 
that 's^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l some these come £roa 

8 Suisse, Geneva. But all of them say by order of "El Mismo" 

9 which, in Spanish, means "the same." So there is no more 

10 information. 

11 When I received this money and it was for monthly 

12 resources, at that time I marked them down with the names of 

13 the months that it corresponds with at the bottom. Like, in 

14 here, in the third receipt I have "August-September." And 

15 then it says, "October." "November." Et cetera. 

16 There were some cases when there were delays, and 

17 then two monthly installments will come in one, like the one 

18 of the 25th of August of 1986 that covered July-August. 

19 Instead of being for $10,000 it is for 920,000. 

20 Q Has the last payment received that of November of 

21 '86? 

22 1 A Yes. The l^jt Ji^yflWV^MPtrrt^ncd November 4, 



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1986. According to my records, that is the November monthly 
resource for the political organizations. However, in the 
credit note it's the only one that has a reference saying 
"October *86." 

Q Since this last payment, either October or 
November "86, how has MDN and UDN been funded? 

A Well, UDN, I don't know. UDN, I don't know. 

MDN has, in addition to this, received for quite 
soBC time private donations from Nicaraguans. And, in fact, 
everyone — every MDN member that is involved in any 
political activities and receives, because of his work a 
stipend, according to the magnitude of the stipend, has to 
give a certain percentage to the party. 

Q I see. 




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Q Has there any period oC time between "84 and '85 
or '86, that the CIA said they could not provide you with 
funds? 

A Oh, yes. The CIA has not given funds to the MDN; 
no funds during late '84, I aa sure. Nothing, I think, 
during 1985. Maybe in early 1986 it has started, or the 
■iddlc of '86. 

Q I take it coinciding with the expiration of the 
restrictions on the CIA under the Boland aaendaent; is that 
your understanding? 

A Yes, that's ay understanding. 

Q Now, the Nicaraguans that are funding the MDN, I 
take it these are all Nicaraguans in exile? 

A Yes, sir. 




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Q Prior to October 24th of '86, during the period of 
the Boland a«end«ent, do you know if the CIA provided any 
funds to the military operation in the south? 

A No. Nothing. I know nothing — I know of 
nothing. 

First, fro« May of 1984 until May of 1986, there 
was al«ost no military operations in the south because in the 
split with Pastora, ComBandcr Pastora has retained most of 
the forces so there was no military forces in the south. 

Now, from May of 1984 on — from May of 1986, I 
correct myself, on, there was some humanitarian aid. And 
that took care of the nonlcthal part of the military 



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1 operations. 

2 The military ones, as I have stated before, came 

3 from what I call the Hasscnfus flights that took place and 

4 they were the ones responsible for lethal logistics. 

5 MR. PARRY: I'm just about finished with the 

6 questions I have. I would just like to go back and ask you 

7 about individuals and then I think these two gentlemen might 

8 also have some questions. But let's go back to Colonel 
9i North. 

10 BY MR. PARRY: 

11 Q You met him in early 1984 in connection with the 

12 Kissinger Commission and he passed you a note. 

13 Did you follow up with him solely because of that 

14 contact or did other people recommend that you contact 

15 Colonel North? 

16 A Out of that contact I developed a friendship and, 

17 usually when I came to Washington, I would pay a visit to his 

18 office because of the reality that Colonel North was very 

19 knowledgeable about Nicaragua; very knowledgeable about the 

20 policy of the U.S. government, and his knowledge was not only 

21 military but also political. And knowledgeable about the 

22 resistance structure and problems. So it was a very useful 



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1 person to talk to because of his knowledge. 

2 Q So from that first contact the relationship 

3 developed on your own initiative? You took it upon yourself 

4 to contact him when you were in Washington? 

5 A Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

6 Q Who else, working for Colonel North, did you have 

7 contact with? 

8 A Working for Colonel North? 

9 Q Or who did you understand was working with Colonel 

10 North? 

11 A I understood first, Robert Owen. 

12 Q When did you meet Robert Owen? 

13 A I think I met him at Colonel North's office. 
I 

14 Lfcfs get these dates straight. Could I go off the record? 

15 MR. PARRY: Sure. 

16 (Discussion off the record.) 

17 THE WITNESS: In March of 1985. He was presented 

18 to me as a private citizen, helping Colonel North to get aid 

19 for the Nicaraguan resistance from the U.S. Congress. 

20 BY MR. PARRY: 

21 Q After that how many times did you see Robert Owen, 

22 and what was his role? 




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1 A I saw Robert Owen several tiacs here during — 

2 from March '85 to October "85. Usually at Colonel North's 

3 office. Maybe a couple oC times outside his office. 

4 Later on, when the humanitarian aid was approved 

5 in September-October 1985, because of his knowledge about 

6 Nicaragua and Central America, we requested from the 

7 Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office, NHAO, that was 

8 headed by Ambassador Ducmling, D-u-e-m-1-i-n-g, I think — 

9 that Robert Owen be included in the personnel as an expert, 

10 with expertise, or a man that will help us in getting the 

11 humanitarian aid moving and getting it to Central America in 

12 the best way. 

13 Q So you recommended Robert Owen for the position? 

14 A We, the three directors, did. 

15 Q Prior to this time, though, you understood that he 

16 was working for Colonel North? 

17 A I understood that he was a private citizen 

18 cooperating with Colonel North on Colonel North's efforts to 

19 get aid for the Nicaraguan resistance. 

20 Q Did he with V^u^^^^^^^^^^Hi 9^^°^ ^^<^ 

21 time he became involved with the humanitarian aid? 

22 A No, sir. I don't recall. But he did meet with me 



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two or three times ^^^^^^^^^^vaftcr he became involved in 
the logistics of the humanitarian assistance; yes. 

Q What were the purpose oC his visltsi 

A To give mc a report on how the humanitarian 
assistance was flowing, both to the north and to the south. 

Q Other than Colonel North, were any other 
individuals involved? Did you have contact with, that were 
involved with Colonel North? 

A I mentioned that I met Rich Miller and Frank 
Gomez. 

Q All right. 

A Both from IBC, through Colonel North. And that 
they helped mc out in getting some interviews with 
newspapers, television, et cetera. 

Q Along that line, did you ever meet Mr. Channell? 

A I met Mr. Spitz Channell in March of 1985, I think 
it was. But not through Colonel North but through FDN. I 
■et Mr. Channell at FDN headquarters here in Washington at 
Jefferson Street in Georgetown, they used to have 
headquarters . 

I saw Mr. Channell a couple of times when we paid 
visits to President Reagan and there were large gatherings of 




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1 people that supported the cause of the Nicaraguan resiGtance, 

2 and Mr. Channcll was there; General Singlaub was there. But 

3 these were more of a protocolary formal gathering where no 

4 substance was discussed. 

5 Q Did you ever understand that Mr. Channell had a 
61 role in providing funding for the F0N or for the UNO? 

7 K No, sir. My understanding was that he did 

8 fundraising to have a political campaign to help the aid to 

9 Nicaraguan resistance. But I knew of no direct funding of 

10 UNO ~ to UNO, I mean. 

11 Q This would have been for American political 

12 campaigns? Is that what you understood his role was? 

13 A Yes, sir. I did watch television advertising, 

14 that was paid for by some organizations funded by the 

15 organization of Mr. Channcll. 

16 Q Were you ever told or did you ever understand that 

17 either Mr. Miller or Mr. Gomez or Mr. Channcll were involved 

18 in procuring weapons or arms for any Contra groups? 

19 A No, sir. 

20 Q No reason to believe that that happened? 

21 A No. I had no reason to believe and I would have 

22 not known because that's not the area that I had. 



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1 Q How about Jane McLaughlin, did you ever meet her? 

2 A Yes. I met her at a reception put out by Polcmka 

3 in one Washington hotel. I don't recall the name, for 

4 Colonel Enrique Bermudez, from the FDN . We had met several 

5 times to, in general, discuss the Nicaraguan resistance 
i 

el situation and to discuss how the aid to the Contras was. 
I 

7 Q What did you understand her role to be? 

8 A She was an executive in Spitz Channell's 

9 organization in charge of fundraising specifically for aiding 

10 the resistance — aiding — for aid to the resistance, I 

11 should say. Do I make myself clear? 

12 She was an executive in Mr. Spitz Channell's 

13 organization to do fundraising that will pay for political 
I 

14 i advertising or propaganda in this country to help create 

15 favorable public opinion for the aid to the Nicaraguan 

16 resistance. 

X7 Q But again it was your understanding that they were 

18 not raising funds for either «ilitary or nonmilitary aid 

19 directly to the Nicaraguan resistance? 

20 A My understanding was that she and the organization 

21 she worked for were not fundraising for any military 

22 activities and were not fundraising to help UNO directly. 



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1 However, Spitz Channell's organization did have some 

2 financing to IBC, where Rich Miller and Frank Gomez worked, 

3 and they were helping ua doing some lobbying and with the 

4 press here. So, indirectly through that service they were 

5 helping us. 

6 Q All right. 

7 A On top of that, when Mr. Carlos Ulvert was the 
person in charge of our UNO Washington office, he, 

9 Mr. Ulvert, informed me that through a conversation with Rich 

10 Miller, he, Mr. Ulvert, has received some funds to cover the 

11 expenses of the UNO Washington office. 

12 Q From Richard Miller' 

13 A Yes, sir. From Richard Miller. 

14 Q Do you know what the amount was? 

15 A Close to 9100,000. 

16 Q This was at what time? 

17 A The first half of 1985. 

18 Q Is that the only instance you know of? Or knew of 

19 that money was coming directly from Miller — from Mr. Miller 

20 to any of the Nicaraguan groups? 

21 A Plus two small incidents, two small events when 
22 



they gave me some money. 



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1 Q Maybe we should talk about that. In addition to 

2 the money that was put into th^^^^^Haccount which you 

3 understood was arranged by Mr. North, were there any other 

4 contributions of cash made to you or your group? 

5 A Two incidents happened. One took place in, I 

6 think it was April 4, 1984. Could it be '84? No, no, no, 

7 no. I'm wrong. It has to be April 4, 1985. Yes, '85. It 

8 has to be '85. 

9 That was the first time when I act with President 

10 Reagan and — yes, that's correct. A Lear jet was sent down 

11 to Costa Rica to pick bc up. My understanding was that both 

12 Colonel North and Rich Miller and his organization, had to do 

13 with the contracting of that Lear jet that went down to Costa 

14 Rica to pick me up. And my understanding is that they paid 

15 for whatever coat that was. 

16 Due to an accident that the airplane suffered, 

17 when bringing me back in the Caribbean, we have to land in 

18 Cancun in an emergency landing and I came very late for the 

19 meeting with the President and without any sleep the whole 

20 night before. They have made reservations for me at the 

21 Hay-Adams, that is a very expensive hotel. And I complained 

22 that I didn't have money to pay for that expensive hotel and. 



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1 through Colonel North, one of hia assistants that I don't 

2 recall gave rae an envelope with 9300, i£ ray memory doesn't 

3 fail. I think it was three 9100 bills; three 3100s. 

4 The second incident is sometime, it could be 

5 earlier or later, I don't know. But I came to Washington to 

6 lobby Congress and my plans were to stay here for only a few 

7 days and I had to stay for three weeks at a hotel called 

8 Ramada Renaissance on M Street and because of my credit card 

9 hit the limit I was very annoyed and I requested from Rich 

10 Miller to help mc. And he did send me eight traveler's 

11 checks of 9100 each, totaling 9800 that I deposited in the 

12 hotel account so I could stay for the rest. 

13 Q Going the other way, were you ever asked to give 

14 money to Colonel North or to Richard Miller or any of these 

15 people? 

16 A No. Never. 

17 Q Do you know if any of the Nicaraguan resistance 

18 groups were ever asked to give money to any of these people? 

19 A No. Never. 

20 Q How about General Secord, have you ever met him? 

21 A No, sir. Never. 

22 Q You mentioned you had met General Singlaub. What 




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sort o£ contact have you had with hi«? 

A I had met General Singlaub two or three times in 
my life. 

The first tiaie was in Miami when ho invited me for 
dinner with several other Nicaraguans at the Viscount Hotel 
to discuss an event where the several Nicaraguan leaders of 
the resistance will get together and where my name was 
includc;d without my previous consent. 

After that, I think I had met General Singlaub 
twice in the White House on these protocol gatherings with 
President Reagan and in those cases we only said hello. 

Q You haven't had any communications with him 
regarding military supplies or — 

A Never ever. 




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Q How about the State Department? Hhat contact have 
you had with the State Department in Coata Rica, other than 
the ambassador? 

A Hell, I usually talk to the political attaches 
there. I talked to Mr. Charles Harrington who works there, 
and who is continuously asking me to meet with visitors from 
Congress and others. And I have met with the political 
attache. I don't recall his name. 

Q How about Elliot Abraas . Uhat has your contact 
been with Elliot Abrams? 

A Whenever I come to Hashington it is almost certain 
that I will pay a visit to Mr. Abrams and discuss with him 
the U.S. policy towards Nicaragua. We usually will meet with 
several of his staffers and assistants. i 

Q Mould you discuss the same things with Abrams that 
you would with Colonel North? 

A I will say my discussions with Mr. Abrams are 




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usually more on the political side. With Colonel North, 
because of his background we did get involved in more of the 
military strategy. In broad terms, but military. With 
Elliot Abrams we seldom discussed any military matters 
because it's not what they handled. 

Q Did Elliot Abrams ever know about the funding that 
you were receiving through Colonel North? 

A I don't know. 

Q You never discussed that with him? 

A Never ever. 

Q Did you ever discuss the patriotic Americans 
supply network with Elliot Abrams? 

A I don't recall ever discussing it. 

Q Did you discuss those things with anybody at the 
State Department? 

A No. 

MR. PARRY: Okay. I don't have any more 
questions. 

MR. BERMINGHAMt I would take a few minutes, if I 



might 



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EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BERMINGHAMt 

Q There has been a lot of publicity about the 
airport — air atrip John Hull at Santa Elena; John Hull's 
former aircraft, the Santa Elena air strip, a group of Cuban: 
allegedly active in Costa Rica. What is your view or 
knowledge of those? 

A I have met Mr. John Hull, H-u-1-1 — right? 

Q Yes. 

A Several times. He's an American who has a farm ir 
Costa Rica. I have been on his farms 




Later on I have not seen any of — I have not seer 
Mr. Hull — I don't think I have seen him in maybe the last 
three years. 

Q' Do you think he's been inactive in the support of 
the Democratic forces? 

A He has always been a man that is willing to help 
the struggle — the Nicaraguan resistance. I know nothing 
about activities in his farm that has to do with Cubans. 
Only very broad rumors, in Costa Rica, about some Cubans 



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1 there. And that's not — that is not in recent months but 

2 several months ago. 

3 Q Let me ask you about the air strip at Santa 

4 Elena. Did you have any involvc«ent in that? 

5 A Which one is the one in Santa ElenaJ 
6 
7 Q Yes. 

A I only know what appears in the Costa Rican 

9 newspapers. 

10 Q One last question Cor the record. There has been 

11 a lot of talk about drugs playing a very important part in 

12 the raising of funds. Would you like to make a statement 

13 about that Cor the record? 

14 A Yes. I know oC no people involved in ONO that had 

15 any connections with any person involving drugs. 

16 Now I know oC people in -- one person who is in 

17 BOS, in the southern opposition block, who, because of a 
television program in CBS called 57 Best, says that I have 

19 some involvement in late 1984 with a drug dealer that is in 

20 jail in Miami. But no one Crom UNO organization have I ever 

21 known oC being involved in anything that has to do with drug 

22 traCCicking. 




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7 

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18 
19 
20 
21 
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Q You State no one in UNO. Would you say, other 
than this man in BOS, would you know about any other from any 
organizations? 

A I do remember one incident, a long time ago, when 
I was in ARDE, that a Nicaraguan in link with the struggle in 
the south, by the name Sebastian Gonzales, had to flee Costa 
Rica to Panama because he was accused by the Costa Rican 
authori.ties of being involved in drug trafficking. 

He lives in Panama and has lived in Panama for the 
last two years at least. And he was not directly involved in 
the struggle but he was a Nicaraguan exile with some contacts 
with Commander Pastora. 

Q But when you were active in the Costa Rica with 
ARDE and the other organizations you saw no funds coming in 
of drugs or knew of no drug operation? I 

A Never ever. No, sir. Never. I 

MR. BUCK: I had some questions. * 

MR. PARRY: I had just one question that occurred 
to ne. 



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people by code names. 

Do the naaea "Spark" or "Clutch" have any 
significance for you? 
A What? 

Spark, S-p-a-r-k? 

No. 

Or Clutch, C-1-u-t-c-h? 

No. What is that, my code name? 

Might be. I don't know. 

No. 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BUCK: 
Q Have you ever heard of the code naac "Green"? 
A I met with Jane McLaughlin two or throe weeks ago 
and she said that "Green" was the code name for Oliver 
North. But I have known about that code name only recently. 

Q Did you — do you remember a conversation with 
Jane McLaughlin in which she asked you about your 
organization receiving Singlaub-typc aid? 

A At one time she was very surprised because she 
asked me the assistance that Spitz Channell's organization 
was giving to us and according to my knowledge there was no 



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1 such aid. And she was very surprised. 

2 I do recall it, not in detail, but yes. Because 

3 she was surprised. What do you mean we arc not helping you? 

4 I said no, you are not helping us. Maybe you arc helping us 

5 the same way General Singlaub's organization is helping us 

6 but nothing oC significance. Because I knew nothing about 

7 private funding. 

8| I would like to add one thing that may be ot 

9 interest to you. In August ot 1985, at a meeting ot UNO 

directoratc^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^lwhere AdolCo 

Arturo Cruz, and myself were present ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 

12 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H we came to an 

13 funds, irrespective of the origin, should be channeled and 

14 controlled by the directorate in a collective way. In other 

15 words, would not be individually controlled but collectively 

16 controlled among the three of us. 

17 In subsequent meetings that usually were every 

18 month, I will say September, October, November, December 1985 

19 and maybe January of 1986, I asked Adolfo Calero, who was the 

20 one mostly involved in the handling of private funds, 

21 especially with my previous experience of receiving money 

22 from him, what was the situation of funds coming to — 



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1 private funds coming to help the cause? And the answer, in 

2 each and every one of those meetings of the directorate, 

3 was: I have received no funds and there is no money 

4 available to be disbursed by the directorate. 

5 I interpreted this as Adolfo not wanting to share 

6 that responsibility with us and I gave up asking him more 

7 about that. 

8 Q Would you have known about weapons that would have 

9 been delivered to your — to a military group associated with 

10 the southern front or military groups associated with the 

11 northern front? 

12 A I did know, as I have expressed, of some air drops 

13 that were made to the southern front and they usually will 

14 inform mc of how many bundles and how many pounds. I did not 

15 receive any report on the details of what those bundles 

16 contained. 

17 Q What I'm wondering is, you mentioned that you 

18 believe they were paid for by private donors. 

19 A Yes, sir. 

20 Q And we have Mr. Channell raising money from 

21 private donors. But at this point in time you have not made 

22 a connection between Mr. Channell "s activities and the 




PORTERS, Inc. 



526 



30686.0 
BRT 



UNCLASSIFIED 



65 



private donors and military air drops? 

K No. I did not make such connection. Besides 

that, my understanding was that Mr. Channcll's fundraising 
was devoted mainly for political campaigning in the United 
States to move the public opinion in this country in favor of 
Contra aid. 

Q Uho told you that or how did you develop that 
opinion? 

A Because I saw the advertising that appeared in the 
television continuously and I saw how he was doing publicly 
these moves to change the public opinion. And I honestly 
didn't think of any links that he may have with providing 
funds for weapons or military logistics. 

Q So, when you saw him with Colonel North, again 
your assumption was that he was helping out in a political 
sense and not — 

A I don't recall ever seeing Spitz Channcll with 
Colonel North. But in the large meetings with the President 
I don't recall ever seeing Spitz Channell in Colonel North's 
office. 

MR. BUCK: Okay. I have no more questions. 
MR. PARRY: Just one. 



AcE-Fi 




TERS. Inc. 



527 



30686.0 
BRT 



UNCLASSIFIED 



66 



1 THE WITNESS: There's always a last one. 

2 EXAMINATION f 

3 BY MR. PARRY: 

4 Q What is your opinion of the efficiency of the 

5 private supply network? How did it operate? The airlifts? 

6 A It became evident after the drop of the Hassenfus 

7 flight, because of the documents the crew carried and because 

8 of the pattern that they flew, that this was not a very well 

9 prepared and secure and effective operation. To the 

10 contrary, it became evident that it was very unprofessional. 

11 But I didn't know nothing at the time of the flights. 

12 Q Prior to the Hassenfus, you hadn't heard 

13 complaints? 
I 

14 A No, Sir. 

15 Q Anything about the ammunition not matching the 

16 weapons that were dropped? Things like that? 

17 A Maybe once or twice Commander Chamorro told me 

18 that they had dropped materials that were not of use to the 

19 troops. Not necessarily not matching but maybe sometimes in 

20 excess of what they really need, so it only meant more weight 

21 to the insurgents. 

22 Q Were they always dropped in the right spots? 



UNCIASSIRED 



Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 

•)n7-U7.17nO 



528 



30686.0 
BRT 



UNCLASSIRED 



67 



A oh, no. There were tremendous problems because 
there will be drops that will not coincide with the dropping 
zone. In many cases there were bundles that were lost 
because o£ not dropping in the proper zone. 

Q Fernando Chamorro would communicate this to you? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Did you ever meet anybody named Max Gomez or Felix 
Rodriguez? 

A No, sir. Never. 

Q Rafael Quintcro? 

A No. 

MR. PARRY: Olcay . No more questions. 
(Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the deposition was 
concluded. ) 



UNCLASSro 



Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 



529 



CERTIFICATE OP NOTARY PUBLIC & 



JOEL BREITNER 



, the officer before whom 



the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify 
that the witness whose testimony appears in the 
foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that 
the testimony of said witness was taken in shorthand 
and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under 
my direction; that said deposition is a true record 
of the testimony given by said witness; that I am 
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by 
any of the parties to the action in which this 
deposition was taken; and, further, that I am not 
a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel 
employed by the parties hereto, nor financially 
or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action. 




My Commission Expires 8/14/90 



UNWSSW 



530 



B'TOSSffl 






Partially 0aclas5ilied/Rel«3sed nn 3 fe^gS 

under provisions o( E,0 12355 

by K Johnson. National Security Council 



UNCIASSIFIEO 





REPE=5ENCE 
SANK TRANSACTIONS 




Report Da 


ts: 1-13-3- 


Ccurce 


Tra-sact ion 


deference 






nate 


Bank 
jT.e: - 
100 7 


"/pe 


NuniDer 


"Oil! 

Numcer : 


A-noun- 


Acczu^t n; 


^-OCCIBLE .-Wf-EJBI 


^^1 




■:-4-2c: -.35 
ealan.re; 


wire Deoosi'-. 
?_ .000.04 5.00 


DoT'j-ent 


r ooc.o^^.'?- 

0288-" 


- - - 




■701-{ 


^^^^^^^^1 


C3-01.-84 
Pa lanes: 


1007 


wi.-s r^eDosi*- 
50 .04 5.00 


C oc'jiTient 


NumSer : 


50 . 04^ . " ■ 


08-13-34 

Balance: 


1007 


Wi'-e [leoosit 
100 .090.00 


Doo'-ment 


Nunibe" : 


50.045.00 

0312-9 


03-29-34 

Balance: 


1007 


Wire Deoosit 
150, 1 35.00 


Document 


Number: 


50.04 5.00 

0312-15 


10-0<5-84 
Balarice : 


1007 


Wire Deooei!- 
175 . 130.00 


Document 


Number: 


25,045.00 

0307-? 


10-18-94 
Balance: 


1007 


Wire Deposit 
200.225.00 


Doc'jment 


Number : 


25, 045. on 


11-05-84 
Balance: 


1007 


Wire Deposit 
265.270.00 


Document 


Number ; 


65. 045. I :m 

0305-8 


11-19-84 
Balance: 


1007 


Wire Deposit 
300,315.00 


Document 


Number: 


35.045.00 

0305- .8 


12-06-84 

Balance: 


1007 


wire Deposit 
375,360.00 


Document 


Number: 


7 5,04 5.00 

03U0-10 


01-04-85 
Balance: 


1007 


Wire Deposit 
410.405.00 


Document 


Nunioer : 


35,045.00 


02-08-85 

Balance: 


1007 


Wire Deposit 
445.450.00 


Docunien t 


Numoer : 


35.045.00 


02-28-85 

Balance: 


1007 


Wire Deposit 
430.485.00 


Document 


Number : 


35.035.00 

0294-20 


03-26-85 
Balance: 


100 7 


Wire Deposit 
515.520.00 


Documen t 


Number : 


35,035.00 

029 1 -2 J 



:2A.i^ - 



531 



MUSSIFe 



X 0/.49 



BANK 


REFERENCE 
TRANCAOriONC 


i^eport Date 


: .-i:-37 


Source 


Transaction 
-vpe 


Reference 
Numoer Am' 


ount 


04-26-85 100- 


^1.-= Deposit 
550. 555.. .0 


Oocun.enr NuniCer : 


35.035.'iO 
32^y-3i 


05-21-85 100- 
6a 1 area : 


Wire CeooEi' 


Document Numoer : 


25. 035. CO 


0"" -03-85 i:.24 
Balance : 


^■. re Depos: : 
&00,635.00 


Document NumDer : 


25.045.00 

:ii9-7 


Account Name: ^^| 




1 (8004) 




03-05-36 1024 
Balance : 


Ohecu 
37.418.CCCR 


Document Number: 


37.418.00CR 
Q120-1 


04 -01-80 1024 
Balance: 


OhecU 
120,736.C0CR 


document Number: 


33.366 ...OCR 

0117-1 


Account Name: H| 




(3005) 




08-09-34 130? 
8alance: 


Oeposi t 
2.300.00 


111 
Document Number: 

(8007) 

106 
Document Number: 


2. 300.00 
03 12-? 


Account Name: ^^| 






07-11-34 1007 
Balance : 


Deposi t 
4.000.00 


4,000.u0 
0318-3 


-cccunt Name: ^H 




HH^H 




08-27-85 1024 
Balance : 


Deposi t 
4.093.00 


113 

Document Number: 


4 . 093 . 00 
0152-23 


Account Name: ^^H 




HHP 




08-26-85 1024 
Balance: 


Deposit 
7,500.00 


120 

Document Number: 


• .500.00 
0152-33 


Account Name: DHL 




(8014) 




07-10-85 1024 
Balance: 


Deposi t 
29.95 


101 

Document Number: 


29.^5 
01b9-4i 



mmm 



532 



BNCIASW 



/C fto^^. f<.y 



Agosto 10, 1994 



n\^ 



Muy senores nuestros: 

Por medio de la presente les autorizamos a debitar nuestra 

cuenta <=°'^^^^"^€^^^H^H||^|^H 1<3 <^s 

USS50,000.00 para que se sirvan efectuar la siguiente trans- 
ferencia: 

a) ^^^HBQ|H|HHHM| 




Partially Declassified/Released on 3 f-^^ 6 8 

under Ofovlsions ot E 12356 

by K Johnson. National Security Council 



iffiUSSIflEO 



533 



lINOUSSIflED 



;jf /^i^^^y 



']\^ 






Agosto 28, 1984 



Present 

Muy senores nuestros: 

Por medio de La presente les autorizanos a debitar nuestra cuen- 
ta corriente^^^^^^^^HH la cantidad de US$50,000.00 para 
que se siryan efectuar la siguiente transferencia: 




ily Declassified/Released on 3i^B& 'R 
under provisions 0fE0l2356 vaaH^I 

< Johnson, Nal/onal Secunt/ Council i F % E M ' 



\' 



mm 



534 



UNCUSSIFIED 



^c Jc^lfV 



Julio 30, 1984 



Presents. 

Muy senores nuestros: 

Por medio de la presents les autorizamos a debitar nuestra cuen- 
±3. corriente ^^^^^^^^^^H la cantidad de USS50,000.00 para 
que se sirvan efecfjar la siguiente trans ferencia: 



120 



b) Para crSdito de Cta. Especial U.S. Dolares No. I 



Partially Deciasatied/neleased on. '" " .- •">• 
undei ptovisions ol E.O 12355 



^ ^-^ 





Partially Declassified/Released on 3A£^g8 

under provisions of E,0 12356 

by K Johnson, National Security Council 



535 



/i^ OJr^H 



Preser.te. 



;s r.uestros; 



69^ 



For T^edio de la presente ^^^^^o^^^no^^i dec i ra; 

tidad de 'JSS25 , 000 . 00 para que se sirvan efectuar 
la siguiente transferencia : 



a) 



b) Para credito de 

Cta. Esoecial U.S. D61ares r<o 



Partially Declassified/Released on 3 fcak 

under provisions of E.O 12356 

by K Johnson. National Secuniy Council 




536 



Mssm 



/<f- CJ~t 



690 



Octubre 18, 1994 



cJ 



'resente. 

Muy senores nuestros: 

Por medio de la presente les autorizamos a debitar 
nuestra cuenta '^^'^'^isn^^'mHmHH^^H ^^ can- 
tidad de USS25,000.00 pa^^qu^s^^^^?a^eTectaar 
la siguiente transf erencia : 



b) Para credito de 

Cuenta Especial U.S. D61ares # 




Partially Declassified/Released on 3 /-c^R 

under provisions ol E 12356 

by K Johnson, National Security Council 



mm\m 




537 



UNcussm 



S^oxi <Fv 



,83 



Noviembre 5, 1934 



Muy sefiores noestros: 

Por .Tiedio de la presente les autorizamos a d ebitar 
nuestra cuenta corriente^^^H^^^^m|||^|^H la can- 
tidad de rjs$65, 000 . 00 para que se sirvan efectuar 
la siguiente transf erencia : 



a) 



b) Para credito de : 

Cuenta Esoecial U.S. D61ares No 



Partially Oeclassided/Released m3±66^ 

under provisions o( E 12356 

by K Johnson, National Security Council 




538 



ONCUSSIHED 



/f /V^n/'f 7 



67S 



Noviembre 19, 19S^ 



Presente. 

Estimados senores: 

Por medio de la preser^^ai^o^^amo^a ustedes debitar nues- 

tra cuenta corr iente|^^|^^^m||^^|^p la cantidad 

USS35,000.00 para transferirse a: 

1) Banco : 



.2) Para pagarse a; 
3) Cuenta nGmero ; 



c/- 



Partially Declassified/Released on^££^8i 

under pcovisions ol E 12356 

by K Johnson, Nalional Security Council 



Cuenta Esoecial t'.S. D61ares 



\>^tentamente^ / 



UNWSSinED 




539 



l'5fl|| 



66S 



Diciembre ^, 1' 



'resent 

Estimados senores: 



Por medio de la present^autor^amo^a ustedes debitar nues- 

corrienteHmi^^^^^miH la cantidad de 

USS 75,000.00 para transferirse a: 



1) Banco 



2) Para pagarse a: Cuenta 'Especial 

3) Cuenta nQmero 





Partially Declassitied/ReleaseO on >/-t?^ft fl 
lEO 12356 
I Security Council 



under provisions c 



OilASSIRED 



540 



DNCUSSIHED 



V s7'^'v pr~ 



564 



:nero 4, 1095 



Presente. 

Estimados senores: 

Por medio de la preser^^^^o^^amo^^i us tedes debitar nues- 

cuenta corr iented|^|^|^^|^|^| la cantidad dc 

US$35,000.00 para transferirse a: 



1) Banco- 



2) Para pagarse a: 

3) Cuenta nQmero : Cuenta Esoecial Mo. 




Panially Declassified/Released on 3 ^g « 8 6 

under provisions o( E 12356 

by K Jonnson. National Security Council 



mmm 




541 



♦^SJ-v 



HNCUSSIFO 



^ ft.i^^ 



Febrero 8, 1935 



537 



Presente. 

Estimados senores; 

Por medio de la pres ente autorizar 
tra cuenta corriente| 
USS35, 000.00 



a u stedes debitar nues- 
la cantidad de 

56 a r 



1) Banco- 



2) Para pagarse a: Cuenta Especial 



3) Cuenta nQmero : No. 





.^6 



Partially Declassified/Released on_J_£e558 

undtr pfovistons of E 12356 

by K Johnson. National Security Council 




■M 



542 



ONCL/ISffD 



Z^Fz.L'?^ 



^, 



Febrero 28, 1985 



519 



Presente. 

Estimados senores: 

Por medio de la preser^^^^^o^^amo^^i ustedes debitar nues- 

corriente ^^^H^^HH|^^|H la cantidad de 

USS 35,000.00 p^^^tr^T^e^^^^a : 

Banco : ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 



2) Para pagarse a: 

3) Cuenta nCmero : Cuenta Especia] 




Partially Declassified/Released on J/^d/SS g 

under provisions ol E 0. 12356 

by K Johnson. National Security Council 



mmm 



543 



mssm 



1 



.".arzo 26, 1995 



^9^ 



Estimados senores: 

Por medio de la preser^^ai^or^amo^^i ustedes debitar nues- 

tra cuenta corriente ||m||HHmH|^ la cantidad de 

US $ 35, 000. p^^^tr^is^^^^s^^^ 




2) Para pagarse a: Cuenta Especial Mo. 

3) Cuenta nGmero : 





Partially Oeclassitied/Released on 3>t-iJi8S 

under provisions of E.O 12356 

by K Johnson. National Security Council 



UNCLASSIFIED 



544 



UNCLASSIRED 



^c^pRf:,-- ^ 



451 



.^bril 26, 19S5 



'resente. 

Estimados senores: 

Por medio de la preser^^^^o^^amo^^i us tedcs debitar nues- 

tra cuenta corriente m^Hmmpi^m la cantidad dc 

US$ 35,000.00 par^^^^T^^^^^^^^ 

1 ) Banco 




Para pagarse a: ^^^^^^^^H 
3) Cuenta nQmero : Cta. Esoecial ?)oJ 



Pariialiy Declassided/Released on 3(<.3 6 '& 

under provisions ol E 12356 

by K Johnson. National Security Council 




UNCLASSIFIED 



545 



UNCLASSIHED 






'.ayo :i, 1935 



428 



'resente. 

Estimadcs senores: 

Por rTiedio de la prescr^^^^o^^amo^^i us tcdcs debitor nuc 

cuenta corr icn tc H|HHI^HH^H ^^ cantidad dc 
USS25,OCO.OO para transferirse n: 



2) Para pagarsc a 

3) Cuenta nGmero : Cta. Dolares 






Partially Deciassiried/Released on J/'£'S8 f>, 

unaer provisions ot E 12356 

by K Johnson, National Security Council 



fNCUSJIflEO 



82-7S2 0-88-19 



546 



immim 



jclI b" 



578 



J 'J 1 1 o 3 , 19 3 5 



'resente. 

Estimados senores: 

Por medio de la present^a^or^amo^^i ustedes debitar nues- 

tra cuenta corriente |^HH||^Hm||||m|| la cantidad de 

USS 25,0 0.00 para tr^^r^^^^^^^ 



1) Banco 



for further credit to 



Para pagacse ^ = ^^^^^^^^| 

3) Cuenta nGmero : Cuenta Especiall 



Pariiaily Declassitied/Released on J£M38 

under provisions o( E 12356 

Sy K Johnson, National Security Council 




liNSlASSIHED 



547 



UNCLASSIHED 



I^O^M S^ 



0250 



I 




Partially Declassified/Released on. 
under provisions c 



ht£>8 & 

EO 12356 
Secunty Council 



ONClASSIFIED^^'v • ' 



:l 



548 



INSTRUCCIONES RECIBIDAS OE 



ORDEN DE PAGp No_ 
ot^rden de 
por cuenij dt 
por U tumt d* 




PSSIFIED 



^^o. 312330 
X 2 5 \'^^' 



1753 



Idas. 



I PSt9.985^ ( 



U.'D<.Ufii...« IIU 



jVX mii/novi.cii.ii*os ocHijr.,. y ..u.-o cc;; 

00/100,- ^ 



' qu« liquidjmot y p^ganioi 

( ntreditindo Ij cuenu cornemc del Benehciano ^o. 
( ) baio eJtricta ideiiliticacion / 



EJECUTADA EL 



TC: 



'♦9.75' 



'c '♦96.753 



7^-85V / 



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yiliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiinlrfilTn^iiii!! 
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiuutii^ii 





Ftrma dc(loj) ben 



||||lllHllllll'!ll!llllllll!'Hpl'IM'i:"';i:' ' ■' / 
Allli;<JaiJlflll«JBtll8iWWflW>W}fi|lCWIi;Mii^la.:T:/'£i 



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anitiaP'iii'ti I'i'M ii'inii' ,■'■'■ 




NOTA OB CREOITO 



xxKXx 310.;>00 



N2 72985 



4CllCO(TAOO M 



///COMPOISADO///. 




1_ 



Lnp Dujt. CX lll«l . UOllOOd 11-U 



Partially Declassified/Released on 3^^£S£ 8 
under provisions o( E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 



mmm 



549 




NCIASSIFIED 



^Jo 313439 

tolAX. 

X 2 5 2 

, u:,ix)LAa;:si veu.tikuevs/Jiil/ novz.ci.jirt;, -■:,t.::7,\ ccs 

UE|29.970,ooi<^ 00/100 \ 



INSTRUCCIONES RECIBlQAS DE 



TT-20'»9.- 

poc cuentj d< 
por l< luma de 



qut liquidjmos y pagontos 

XXIcreditando la cuenia coinente del Bern 
( I baio esincta ideniilicocion 



EJECUTAOA EL 




•c 50,35 ''£l. 

' ■ ^■-■llilllll!lllllillll!ll)IIIIIIIIHIllllllllillll!liilillllllllllllll!lllllllli;i:h::'i! 
iin'n>:i>iiiiiiiiiiii:iiiiiiiiiiiaiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii|!n;{BiijiitiMi;^>iiui:iniiiiiiiiiiiiiini!ii,iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiH ;> 

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.|,,ii,II,|IIIII|,|I,,|,,||.,|m;, ■i:i!iiiiii:'i:;::50/'lO0_^- 
i:!r:ii|i||iii!'^llliiii:! 



COPIA CLIENTS 



'^ 



SOTA DE aiEDITO 



310.300 



N9 736Q4 



CREDITADO 



3 UECUCIOH DE NUi:STRA-OHDar DE PACO NO. 313^39./ 

|| L4 IVUA DC 

cou*o Y>:iWTmnL7EHIL NQYMII^ 

aruIM 




It 1: 



\± 



limp. Hum. C>i. >ii« . Xtoiood 1>41 




Pariially Declassilied/Reieaseo' on 3/g^ 

under provisions ol E/0 12356 

by K jQlmson, Naliooal Secunly ^unc.l 



550 




UNCLASSIFIED 



31 



INSTRUCCIONES RECIBIOAS D 



OROEN OE PAGO No^ ''^ 

d. ordende INTL BU3INEG3 COKMUNICATIONi/ 

IDi.H 



:izx 



por cuenia do 
por la tuma de 



/,, 



1*29.970.00/ i PCLARZS: VEIMItjULVE MIL'^ .\OV„;:l;.:..C.^ 



53 



f que liquidamoi y pafj 
^'S^crediiaiido li 




liiiiiiiimiii 



COPIACLIENTE 



NOTA DE CREDITO 



XXXX 310.300 



N2 73297 



.CREOITaOOku »»racl4lili 



EJECUCION DE OP Na3142Qa. SEGUN —TALLE ADJUNTO (JUUU'li 

,°^IMTINUEVE MIL NOV/cllHJ^feKf^NTA CON 00/100-x-x- i J29.97C.oo 




lap. Uun. cu iiiu . xBuma ■ n-n 

Partially Declassified/Released m l>f3S€ 

under provisions ol E 12356 

Dy-K Johnson. Nalional Security CauncH 



551 



UNCLASSIFIED 



INSTflUCCIONES REClBlDAS OE 



22.10-45 

at£CZT saxssi - aavrs.' 



OROEN DE PAGO No. 
rden de 



pof li lumi d« 

y qu« hqutdamoi y pogamoi 

( 'Facreditjndo li cuenta 
( I baio eilrico identifier 



ZA i021.92^8-O%3/6.. 

UXZ BSS0DRCZ2 Z1IC«^ 

IDW— / 



No. 3 1 4 



353 



315.000,00// DOU8B81 qOWC£ Mllj^OM CO/10^''- 



0,/54 



EJECUTAOA EL 
4l TC 



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52,20/ °. ,c 783.000.00./ 



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""'ili|'"iii|M|iniii!iMi|!in' 



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iiiiiiiniiiiijiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii/fi 
■ |M|H'iC0>fWai6>tDO4/ii': 



COPIACLIENTE 



y/f-S 



Y 



"lllli:!!!!!!!: 

liliilliil'iHII'i'!!'" :'Pii"iiii"iiii; 



NOTA OE CREDITO 



xnxx 310300 



N9 76156 



WKDCIOH IS NOISTaA O.P. Jl'tSjS,/ SD 7AV0B. 



QPIHCl MIL OOW 00/100. » 

CUENTA N' 



I ,15.M0.UO«- 




" 2 2 OUT 1985 j,o^; 



t^. D<«. CL uitt ■ aoiioaa . iMi 



Partially Oedassilied/Released on 3/^£-g6 H 
undet pnjKisions o( E 12356 



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Lka U^OBCXS ZNc/ 

|15.000.«^/DOULHSSi vBCTCS MIL 



No. 315198 



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por cutnta d« 



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( '^aertdinndo Ij cuenia corri'-nii dtl Btnafiei. 
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/ 15-11 

JECUTADA EL / , „ 

T.c. 52.W ^c 786.750. 



15-11-45 
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553 



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17-1-86 



53^.300,00 




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21-3-86 



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UN^ASSIF'^D 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 

IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

DEPOSITION OF GLENN A. ROBINETTE 

Washington, D.C. 
Friday, March 27, 1987 

Deposition of GLENN A. ROBINETTE, called for 

examination by the Senate Select Coinmittee on Secret Military 

Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, at the 

Senate Hart Office Building, Room 901, at 10:30 a.m., 

before DAVID L. HOFFMAN, a Notary Public within and for the 

District of Columbia, when were present: 

JOHN D. SAXON, ESQUIRE 

Associate Counsel 

Senate Select Committee 

Hart Senate Office Building 

Room SH-901 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

On behalf of the Committee. 



MARK H. TUOHEY, III, ESQUIRE 

Attorney at Law ,e^x-, »•> 

Pierson, Ball & Dowd ^'' . - D?-la3!if;H/ Release' on J.8££iiL 
1200 18th Street, N.w. jnder p rovisvjr^ of Lj '2?^^ 

Washington, D.C. 20036 by •■B^, Natiof.:.. oecurit, Council 



E-rcDCWU. tEPOriTEns mc 



UfRUKSIlPlED 



566 



UNOl^Sy^UD 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



'i Glenn A. Robinette 
!| By Mr, Saxon 



tCC-rCMIItL l«CPO«Tt«S INC 



EXAMINATION 



IDENTIFIED 

11 
12 
12 
13 
19 



UN(MSSM'fED 



567 



UMCUSSIfftO 



•CE^CDCML «tPO«TE«S IKC 



Whereupon, 

GLENN A. ROBINETTE 
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Mr. Robinette, would you state for the record, 
please, your full name. 

A Glenn A. Robinette. 

Q Your address, sir. 

A 3265 Arcadia Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 

Q Could you tell us by whom you are employed, sir. 

A I am self-employed. 

Q What would be the name of the entity under which 
you do business? 

A Glenn Robinette & Associates. 

Q What is your business address? 

A The same as the home address . 

Q What is the nature of the business that Glenn 
Robinette & Associates engages in? 

A I do security consulting, consulting on security 



UitS^I(S^j?^E3 



568 



UNCkftSSAHiD 



ltCl-flOt»U. DEPOHTEIIS INC 



type projects. 

Q Could you elaborate a bit on that? 
A Yes. Individuals, businesses or companies 
require advice and guidance on physical security, personal 
security, technical security. 

Q Okay. Do you or did you ever have any relatives 
who worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation? 
A No, I did not. 

MR. TUOHEY: Off the recrod, 
(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Mr. Robinette, I'd like to inquire into matter 
which has received some public notice within the last few 
weeks involving a security system installed at the home of 
LTCOL Oliver North. 

First question, do you, sir, know LTCOL Oliver 
North? 

MR. TUOHEY: I object to the question on the 
grounds of privilege, and I instruct my client not to answer. 
Now, you can leave this on — you can leave it on the record. 
How is it best handled for you? 

MR. SAXON: I do not care whether you assert 



ijNetfts^i^^i^ 



UNeiASStPtED 



!l 

Ijprivilege on behalf of your client. I see no reason to go 

1 
through the process of having him do it. I would, however, 

^like to ask the questions which I would have otherwise asked. — 

MR. TUOHEY: Fine. 

MR. SAXON: — for purposes of ascertaining where 

privilege does and does not apply. 

MR. TUOHEY: Why don't we do this then, to make it 

I simple. I will just say we assert the privilege in response 

to the question, or do you want me to object? Whichever is 

easiest. It is going to be a transcript for the Committee. I 

Will object and assert the privilege. 

MR. SAXON: Okay, 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Have you ever met Colonel North? 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question; assert the 

privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Have you ever done any work for Colonel North? 

MR, TUOHEY: Object to the question; assert the 

privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Have you ever done any work on behalf of or as a 



yN0ift^|J?3 



570 



UM€tftSStBt9 



favor to Colonel North? 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question; assert the 
privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever had a conversation with Richard 
Secord? Did you have a conversation with Richard Secord 
sometime in the time frame of late spring or early summer 
1986 regarding Colonel Oliver North? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever spoken with a Mr. Ben Chatham of 
Automatic Door Specialists? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

MR. SAXON: That objection would be as to any 
conversation of any nature? 

MR. TUOHEY: Yes. Yes, it would, although, it 
would make it easier for my client and I to respond, John, 
if you are going to go beyond the time frame at issue , which 
I guess, based on what's public, a matter of public record, 
the period of 1986 through the present — if your question is, 
have you ever had a conversation of any kind with an 
individual other than during this period, we might have a 



>CI'fEDCIML I1EI><J«T€«S, INC 



Uifl6|EASStFtcD 



571 



UNeiftS^FlED 



different response. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever had a conversation with Mr. Ben 
Chatham of Automatic Door Specialists about doing any work 
for Colonel North? 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question and assert the 
privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever had any conversation with Mr. Chatham! 
regarding doing any work for an associate who press reports 
suggest — an associate of yours whom press reports suggest 
would have been Colonel North? 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question; assert the 
privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever had a conversation with Mr. Chatham 
regarding doing any work to install a security system at 
703 Kentland Drive, Great Falls, Virginia? 

MR. TUOHEY; Object to the question; assert the 
privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever been to 703 Kentland Drive, Great 



UNGL^Stf^ED 



572 



uNe^)ts^r;i3 



Falls, Virginia? 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question; assert the 
privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Do you know, sir, who lives at 703 Kentland Drive, 
Great Falls, Virginia? 

A MR. TUOHEY: Same question. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever met Mr. Chatham at a private home, 
a private residence for a job that Automatic Door Specialists 
was to do? 

MR. TUOHEY: Other than what has been previously 
described? 

MR. SAXON: That's correct. 

MR. TUOHEY: Other than the address you've just 
given or including? 

MR. SAXON: Including. 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question and assert the 
privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever told Mr. Chatham that a party living 
at 703 Kentland Drive was an associate of yours? 



uNei^sffitd 



Kl-nOiHtL DEPOIITEIIS 



573 



UHCll^SSiiltO 



MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question; assert the 
privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever receive an invoice from Automatic 
Door Specialists for a job done at 703 Kentland Drive, 
Great Falls, Virginia? 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question; assert the 
privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever call Mr. Ben Chatham of Automatic 
Door Specialists upon receipt of an invoice and ask him to 
meet you for dinner? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you, in fact, ever meet Mr. Chatham for dinner 
at a Japanese restaurant in Silver Spring, Maryland, or, for 
that matter, in any other restaurant? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you, over dinner with Mr. Ben Chatham at a 
restaurant in Silver Spring, Maryland, present him an 
envelope with cash in the amount of $2173? 



UH€Lft$^RED 



574 



UN6tll[SSIFA^3 



MR. TUOHEY: Sarae objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever called Mr. Chatham of Automatic 
Door Specialists with regard to servicing a home security 
system, gate intercom at 703 Kentland Drive at Great Falls, 
Virginia, after such time as the system was installed? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever discussed with Mr. Chatham, apart from 
the job referenced in Great Falls, Virginia, doing business 
with him overseas? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever discussed with him doing business 
in the Far East or other parts of the world, which you are 
not at liberty to disclose? 

MR. TUOHEY: Sarae objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever discussed with him doing business 
overseas involving electronic devices on buildings? 

MR. TUOHEY: Sarae objection. 



ICErEDCXL DtPOITCaS 



ViH£U^^?*t^ 



575 



UNOASS^P 



BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever discussed with him doing business 
overseas, in which his employees would require government 
security clearances? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

MR. SAXON: I would like to present to you some 
documents, which I would ask be marked in order as Deposition 
Exhibit 1, 2 and 3, and ask you to refer to, if you would, 
Mr. Robinette, Deposition Exhibit 1, which is a proposal 
submitted to Glenn Robinette & Associates by Automatic Door 
Specialists, presented by, if you look at the authorized 
signature block, Mr. Benjamin P. Chatham. This is the date 
of June 17, 1986, and I would ask you if you have ever seen 
that before. 

(Exhibit 1 identified.) 

MR. TUOHEY: On the basis of what has been 
previously asserted as the objection by Mr. Robinette, more 
specifically under the Fisher Doctrine, we respectfully 
decline to answer the question on the grounds of privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I would ask you, Mr. Robinette, if you could 
verify for the committee whether that is, indeed, your 



CI-fEOe*U. UPOtTE*! INC 



liN6lASS»F;ED 



576 



UtRHASSIFlED 



tCE-FEDCUl l)EK»Tt«S 



signature at the bottom of Exhibit 1. 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection as just made. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I would ask that you look at what has been marked 
as Deposition Exhibit 2, which is a letter on the letterhead 
of Automatic Door Specialists to Glenn Robinette & Associates, 
signed by Benjamin P. Chatham, dated July 7, 1986, and ask 
you if you have ever seen that letter before. i 

(Exhibit 2 identified.) ' 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I would ask you if you have any confirmation of 
the facts asserted in that letter. 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I would ask you then to look at Deposition Exhibit 
3, which is an invoice from Automatic Door Specialists, 
Job Invoice No. 2747, billed to Glenn Robinette & Associates, 
and ask you if you've ever seen this invoice. 

(Exhibit 3 identified.) 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 



uHeti^^t^ 



577 



UNeElfSStHED 



BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I would ask you if you have paid the amount circled 
on that invoice of $2173 to Automatic Door Specialists. 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. John, are we 
entitled to have a copy of this or not? 

MR. SAXON: Yes. There's a copy unmarked as to 
deposition exhibit number, and those are for your purposes, 
and those are for you. 

MR. TUOHEY: Thank you. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Mr. Robinette, I referenced at the outset that 
some of the matters I have inquired about have appeared in 
public, for which reason I would like to ask you some 
questions about some newspaper articles. I will give you 
these as your copies to have and take with you. 

The first newspaper article, which I have asked 
be marked Deposition Exhibit 4, is a story from the 
Washington Post of March 17, 1987, by George Lardner, Jr., 
with the headline, "North Given Gift of Home Security: A 
$2,Q00 Gate." 

CExhibit 4 identified.) 



UNSEeSPlED 



82-732 O-88-20 



578 



UNetltS^HED 



BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I would ask you first if you are familiar with, 
or have any knowledge of that Washington Post article. 

MR. TUOHEY: While I would, reflexively, based on 



DtPOtTCIIS INC 



jj the context of this deposition, assert the privilege, I want 
to be sure that I am doing it accurately. 

MR. SAXON: Do you need a moment to read the 
article? 

MR. TUOHEY: If your question is, has Mr. Robinette 
read the article, he can answer it. 

If your question is, is he familiar with the 
contents reflected therein, that is a different question. 

MR. SAXON: All right. Let me take them in order 
then. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Mr. Robinette, you see the article in front of you. 

Have you read that article, sir? 
A Yes, I have. 

Q Can I ask you if there is anything in that article 
which you find to be inaccurate? 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question and assert the 
privilege. 



UK§ERSSI??ED 



579 



UNa^SflFlED 



ll BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Can I ask you, then, whether you can confirm any 
.1 
'I of the facts stated in that article and attributed to you, 

!i 

Sir. 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you, within the last month, spoken to George 
Lardner, Jr., of the Washington Post ? 

MR. TUOHEY: You may answer that question. 

Have you spoken to Mr. Lardner? 

THE WITNESS: Subsequent to this? 

MR. TUOHEY: No, in the last month at all, have 
you spoken to Mr. Lardner? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell him you heard about Colonel North's 
security problems with "terrorists and people like that" in 
a Northern Virginia bar one evjning? 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question and assert the 
privilege, and I will object emd assert the privilege to 
each and every question regarding the contents of the 
interview, although you can ask them, John. 



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UNClASSlf^D 



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BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner that Richard Secord told 

;' you of Oliver North's difficulties, after Colonel North was 

ii 

ij publicly linked to aid for the contras? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner that you were a "security 

consultant"? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner, 'General Secord told me 

to talk to him," meaming Colonel North? Continuing the 

quotation, "I think there had been some things put in the 

mailbox, potential explosives. And there was also some 

concern about cars driving onto the property." 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner that the bill for this 

job was "around $2,000"? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Did you tell Mr. Leurdner that you paid for that 



UNeEltSS'i^'iD 



581 



UHCl^Stf^^^ 



bill upon receipt of the invoice, in cash? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner, "I considered it worth 
it as perhaps a business venture"? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner, that you hoped Colonel 
North would steer some business your way? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner — excuse me. Did you 
suggest to a reporter that you had in mind putting in more 
gates for North's friends and neighbors? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner, you did not regard 
paying for the gate in cash as "a very unusual deal. I 
pay in cash for a lot of things"? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection? 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner that you still expected 



UNCtftssyr.Eo 



582 



UHefPSSfFED 



expected Colonel North to pay you back one day? 
MR- TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner of Colonel North, "He'll 
pay. I look at it as simple business. He's a hell of a nice 



guy. 



Very nice family. Super kids. He just wasn't able 



aCCfEOMU KCroHTEIIS 



to come up with the money"? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner that you met General 
Secord through Thomas G. Clines? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner that you have known 
Thomas G. Clines for than 30 years? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Lardner, of our committee, "They 
must think I've been moving money"? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

MR. SAXON: I'd like to invite your attention and 
that of your counsel to Deposition Exhibit No. 5, which is 



b?KtflS$irED 



583 



UNeiRSS«FtEO 



a newspaper article in the Chicago Tribune on the date of 
March 18, 1987, by Mr. Michael Tackett and William Gaines, 
with the headline, "North Financial Aid Arranged by Secord. 
(Exhibit 5 identified.) 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I would ask you, sir, whether you have read that 
article before. 

MR. TUOHEY: Have you read it? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, recently. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Thamk you. 

Did you ever talk with either Mr. Tackett or 
Mr. Gaines? 

A Yes. 

Q Could you tell us which? Mr. Tackett? 

A Yes. Mr. Tackett. 

Q Mr. Gaines? 

A No. 

Q So you talked only with Mr. Tackett. 

Did you ever tell Mr. Tackett that you paid 
$2000 cash to a contractor to install a security system 
for Colonel North? 



UN€t«SSr,ED 



584 



UNC^I^tHED 



MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that you have billed 
North for work but have not been paid? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Could you tell us when you billed Colonel North? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that General Secord 
approached you last spring to the effect that Colonel 
North was concerned about security and a possible terrorist 
attack on his home or his person? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that you called North 
and said you would arrange to have a security system 
installed? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that you paid a contractor 
$2000 in cash and billed Colonel North for the work? 



»CI-f€0€«n HtPOHIEKS 



unayissifcED 



585 



UNeiltSSfRED 



MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that Colonel North had not 
yet repaid you? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that you were a business 
associate of Mr. Clines"? 

MR. TUOHEY; Same objection. ' 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that Mr. Clines 
introduced you to General Secord several years ago? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that you denied any 
impropriety in paying for the gate? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that you exchanged letters 
with Colonel North about the debt? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 



UN{a.ftS8fflED 



UNOI^S^ED 



BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that you expected to be 
paid by Colonel North? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that Colonel North 
indicated in his letter to you that he was strapped for cash? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever received a letter from Colonel 
Oliver North? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett of the security system 
and its installation, "It's an innocuous thing"? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever tell Mr. Tackett — excuse me — 
"It's just a remote control gate"? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever tell Mr. Tackett, speaking of 



Uim<fi8SlfJED 



587 



UNOL^SfftED 



Colonel North, "He told rae he was really concerned about 
terrorists. He was concerned about his kids and all"? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever tell Mr. Tackett that you told North 
that the security gate and the intercom system would help 
protect his family and home? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

aY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever tell Mr. Tackett that you believed 
the installation of the gate at Colonel North's home might 
benefit your own business. 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

aY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever tell him, "I was hoping to get more 
business. He volunteered if I wanted that if I wanted to 
use the gate as a reference for other business, he wouldn't 
mind"? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever tell Mr. Tackett that Secord approached 
you about helping Colonel North? 



ICtftOtHAL ItWtTEIS mC 



UN€ift^fik:D 



588 



UNtUS^HED 



BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever tell Mr. Tackett, "Secord said here's 
the phone number. Call him up," meaning Colonel North? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever tell Mr. Tackett that after the gate 
was installed. Colonel North wrote you a letter thanking you 
for your concern for his family? i 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever tell Mr. Tackett that you had no 
other business dealings with Richard Secord? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tackett that you and Thomas Clines 
had been business partners in several business ventures in 
conjunction with one of v^iich you're codefendants in a breach 
of contract suit on appeal before a federal appeals court in 
in Richmond, Virginia? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Can you tell us anything that you did tell 



*CC«0««l *CK)IIT»S INC 



UmSkASS^HEO 



589 



UlAaASSirSED 



Mr. Tackett in the conversation which you have previously 
acknowledged? 

MR. TUOMEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Can you tell us anything that you told to 
Mr. Lardner in the earlier conversation you've acknowledged? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Mr. Robinette, were you ever employed by the 
Central Intelligence Agency? 

MR, TUOHEY: You may answer that. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I was. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Could you tell us the approximate dates of your 
employment? 

A 1951-1971. 

Q Cein you tell us the nature of your work for the 
agency? 

MR. TUOHEY: John, I'm going to object, not on the 
grounds of self-incrimination privilege, but on the grounds 
that Mr. Robinette, when he retired from the Central 
Intelligence Agency, signed an agreement that he would never 



UH^ASSii 



590 



UmilASSIFIED 



disclose the details of his employment. I can formalize 
that in a national security type assertion, but for the 
moment, I am going to instruct the client not to answer the 
question. 

MR. SAXON: Let me say for the record, that this a 
cleared deposition. Our court reporter is cleared at the 
secret level. I am cleared at top secret and compartmented 
information. Whether that assists you in revising your 
previous answer, I don't know. 

MR. TUOHEY: It does not assist me today. It may 
assist me at a further discussion down the road, and I would 
have to review the terms of that agreement before I advised 
my client. 

MR, SAXON: Okay. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q If you can't describe the exact nature of your 
work for the agency, could you state for the record your 
position or title at the CIA for any or all of your positions? 

MR. TUOHEY: I believe the same objection would 
apply at this point. I will review the agreement, the 
security agreement that was signed by my client, and at a 
future date, maybe we will be able to discuss this, but for 



tci-fcociuu. •CPOireiis 



U^ASS^flED 



591 



UN^ItSSIFltD 



the moment, I am going to have to instruct him to respectfully 
decline to 2mswer the question. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Are you now employed by the Central Intelligence 
Agency? 

A No, I'm not. 

Q Have you been employed by the agency since leaving 
in 1971? I 

MR. TUOHEY: I instruct the witness not to answer ! 
the question on the grounds of privilege. 

MR. SAXON: Privilege as to security? 

MR. TUOHEY: Yes. 

MR. SAXON: That objection would likewise apply 
to the question: have you ever done any work on a contract 
basis for the agency, since leaving in 1971? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever done 2my work as a security 
consultant for the United States Capitol? 

MR. TUOHEY: You may answer. 

THE WITNESS; No. 



itroiiTiiis IMC 



UNfikftS^JflED 



592 



UNCiA&SlEIED 



BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever done any work as a security 
consultant at the White House? 
A No, I have not. 

Q Have you ever done any work as a security consultant, 
after leaving the agency in or for clients in South Africa 
or doing work in South Africa? 
A No, I have not. 
Q The same question as to the Middle East. 

MR, TUOHEY: I an going to instruct my client not 
to answer the question, on the grounds of his Fifth Amendment, 
privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q The same question as to the State of California. 

MR, TUOHEY: As to all client questions, since his 
retirement from the CIA --well, I will listen to each one, 
but as to California, while that's very general, and I admit 
that to you, it's very general, I am going to err on the 
side of caution and advise him not to answer the question, 
on the grounds of privilege. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever done any work, since retiring from 



«C£^EO£«»L ItPOITEHS 



UKtl^SSlfltB 



593 



UN(n.ASSIFt£D 



tcE-rcoMAL nnmtn mc 



the CIA, security work, on the premises of or involving 
aircraft hangars? 

MR. TUOHEY: I am going to object to the question 
and instruct ray client not to answer. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you done any work as a security consultant 
involving security fences? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you done any work as a security consultant 
involving radar devices, in general? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q A specific question, as to Central America. 
KR, TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q The same question regarding nuclear power plant 
security in South Korea. 

MR. TUOHEY: You may answer that question. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever had any involvement with a business 



UNSL^SH^iED 



594 



UNetftSSIHED 



entity entitled EATSCO? 

MR. TUOHEY: I object to the question and instruct 
my client not to answer. 

MR. SAXON: On what basis? 

MR. TUOHEY: Fifth Amendment. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever been interviewed by law enforcement 
authorities or authorities within the criminal justice 
system at either the state or federal level, to include 
prosecutors, with regard to EATSCO? 

MR.- TUOHEY: May I consult my client? 

MR. SAXON: Yes. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. TUOHEY: The question is whether he was ever 
interviewed by a law enforcement official of any type with 
respect to EATSCO? 

MR. SAXON: That's correct. 

M1^, TUOHEY: I'm going to instruct ray client not 
to ftnswex the question on the grounds of privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Let me narrow it then and ask whether you've ever 
been interviewed by authorities regarding EATSCO, who are at 



UMSfeASSaJHED 



«CI-fEO€«»l «EPO«TE«S INC 



595 



UNeE/(SS(PlED 



the state level? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Same question as to federal law enforcement 
authorities. 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

RY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever testified before a grand jury ! 
investigating matters involving EATSCO? 

MR. TUOHEY: You can answer that question. 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Can you tell us whether that was a federal or state 
grand jury? 

MR. TUOHEY: Do you know? 

THE WITNESS: I don't know. I know where it was. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Cam you tell us that? 
A Virginia. Alexandria, Virginia. 
Q Northern Virginia? 
A Yes. 
Can you tell us anything a±iout the nature of that 



iccrcocui acKiaTC*: mc 



UiS^Ul^S^iED 



596 



UNd'ftSSffltO 



testimony. 



ICI-rCMUl «tPO«TEIIS IKC 



MR. TUOHEY; I'm going to object to the question 
on the grounds of privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Could you tell us the approximate date of that 
testimony before the grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia? 

MR. TUOHEY: You may answer the question. 

THE WITNESS: The reason I'm acting vague, is 
damn -- that ^- I'm going to guess, subject to ray trying to 
scratch my' head — with records — '82 or '83. I cim sure 
it's a matter of record. It seemed to me it was hot. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Thank you. Do you know an individual named Thomas 
G. Clines? 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question on the grounds 
of privilege and instruct the witness not to answer. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever done work for Mr. Clines. 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Are you familiar with Systems Services 
International. Inc? 



UNCuasyiJED 



597 



UMCtRSSfftO 



MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Do you have knowledge of Systems Services 
International, Inc. paying a fine in 1984 in the amount of 
5100,000? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever been involved with a business 
arreuigement , whether totally private or on behalf of an 
entity or agency of the United States Government to sell 
arms to Mr. Somoza in Nicaragua? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Do you know Erik von Marbaden? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
HY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever worked for or with Mr. von Marbaden? 
MR, TUOHEY f Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON; 
Q Do you know John Sinlaub? 

MR. TUOHEY: You may answer that. 
THE WITNESS: No. 



li^J^S^^s'^^ 



Cf-rCMtU XPOITEIS INC 



UNCiAS^lF^D 



BY MR. SAXON: 

Do you know Robert Dutton? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Have you ever worked for or with Mr. Dutton? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Do you know Richard Gad? 

MR. TUOHEY: You may answer that. 

THE WITNESS: No. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Do you know Albert Hakim? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Have you ever worked for or with Mr. Hakim? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Do you know Robert Owen? 

MR, TUOHEY; Same objection. 

m. SAXON; 

Have you ever worked for or with Mr. Owen? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 



U^flSSlf!ED 



599 



UNCEH^^llD 



BY MR. SAXON: 

Do you know Richard Secord? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Have you ever worked for or with Mr. Secord? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Do you know Robert Lilac? 

MR. TUOHEY; Same objection. 

at MR. SAXON: 

Have you worked for or with or met Mr. Lilac? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Do you know Theodore Shackley? 

MR. TUOHEY; Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Have you ever worked for or with Mr. Shackley? 

MH. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Do you know Rafael Quintero? 

MR. TUOHEY; Same objection. 



aCE-fCOUM. nCPQITEIIS mc 



UK€tftSi^lf}E3 



600 



UHClftSSIFftO 



BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever worked for or with Mr. Quintero? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Do you know Carl Channel? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever worked for or with Mr. Channel? 

MR, TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Do you know Mr. Felix Rodriguez, also known as 
MeLx Gomez? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever worked with Mr. Rodriguez, either 
with or for hin> under that name or that of Mr. Gomez? 

HR, TUOHEY; Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON; 
Q Do you know Mr. Richard Miller? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON t 
Q Haye you ever worked for or with Mr. Miller? 



UHSIJ§§\?'^' 



tCI-rCDCMU. HEKITEHS 



601 



UNa^SHlED 



MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Do you have any knowledge you have gained, other 
than from general news accounts, regarding activities on 
hehalf of the United States within the period from 1981 to 
present, to sell, transport or ship arms, directly or 
indirectly to Iran? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. ; 

BY MR. SAXON: | 

Q Do you have any independent knowledge gained 
separate and apart from press accounts, dating to roughly 
late November 1986, regarding efforts to supply arms, 
ammunition or other military equipment to the opposition 
forces in Nicaragua, otherwise known as the contras? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Do you have any independent knowledge, other than 
that gained from general news accounts since the post-Novembei 
'86 period regarding efforts to divert money from the profits 
gained from the sale of arms to Iran to the opposition forces 
in Nicaragua, otherwise commonly known as the contras? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 



ACI^EDCtU •troiTt«S INC 



UKil^ll^^^JED 



602 



UNDI^SH'IED 



BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Do yoa have any independent knowledge, gained 
apart from general news- accounts; regarding American hostages 
held in Lebanon? 

MR. TUOHEY: You may answer that question. 
THE WITNESS: Would you say that again, please? 
I'm listening closely, but I miss. 

BY MR, SAXON: , 

Q If I need to restate it fiirther, just tell me. I 
Do you have any knowledge, independent of general 
news accounts regarding American hostages held in Lebanon? 
A No , I don ' t . 

Q Do you have any knowledge — excuse me. Let me 
rephrase that. 

Have you ever worked for or with Global American 
Resources? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever worked for or with Transworld Arms, 
Inc.? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 



UNetftSS^F5E0 



UK^li'^SR^''- 



BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Have you ever worked for or with Edwin Wilson? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. Well, let me just 
say this for the record. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Robinette were 
in the Central Intelligence Agency during some of the same 
years. My client, in response to your question, would 
testify that he has met Mr. Wilson, has never had any 
professional dealings with him, has never worked on any 
project in or out of the Central Intelligence Agency with 
him, but if he saw him in a room, would he know who he was, 
yes. But he's had no relationship. And since that name has 
special character in this city, given his activities and 
criminal involvement, I want my client to answer those 
questions directly without an assertion of privilege. 

So you may ask anything you like about Mr. Wilson. 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Do you know Mr. Edwin Wilson? 

A Yes, I do, 

Q Apart from the period of your employment at the 
Central Intelligence Agency, have you ever worked for 
Mr. Wilson? 



No, I have not. 



U 



Hf^JlS«'« 



604 



UNClASSimD 



Q You never swept an office for Mr. Wilson in 
Washington, D.C.? 

A To ray recollection, no. I had been requested. 
That was one of the things he asked me. I was trying to 
reraember. I did an adjoining suite. 



Would that have been on K Street in Washington, 



D.C.? 



A Uh-huh. 

Q Would that have been at the request of Mr. Wilson? 

A 1 doubt it. I dealt directly with the principal 
who occupied, it, an entirely different compamy. 

Q So if I understand your testimony, you never swept 
an office owned, used or rented by Mr. Wilson, immediately 
after federal authorities had entered into his suite and 
engaged in activities which led Mr. Wilson to believe that 
they might have bugged his office? 

A No, sir. But I can recall him asking me to do 
that. And it might have been at that breakfast up at the 
Dniyersity Club. I may be wrong on that, but it's a long 
time ago, but no, sir. 

Q Have you ever rented a space from Mr. Wilson? 

A No. 



tCC-rCOCML «CfO«Tt«S INC 



UN£tftS^lriED 



605 



UKCLISt^r^tD 



tCI-flMliU. •fro«TC>S iHZ 



Q Have you ever done contract work for Mr. Wilson? 

^j A No . 
il 

Q With regard to all previous questions asking whether 

|| you have done work for Mr. Wilson, have you also ever done 

ij work for amy businesses which he owned or was associated with? 

ij A No . 

Q Have you ever swept offices which were for 

corporations owned or associated with Mr. Wilson? 

A Not to my knowledge. 

Q Have you ever worked for or with Udall Corporation?' 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question. I instruct 

the witness not to answer on ground of privilege. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Have you ever worked for or with Udall Research 

Corporation? 

MR. TUOHEY: Seuoe objection. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Have you ever worked for or with Udall Resources, 

Inc., S.A.? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

BY MR, SAXON; 

Q Have you ever worked for or with Systems Services 



li»;HASSV5£^ 



606 



UNdftS^ft^tD 



II International? . ^ 

' MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 



BY MR. SAXON: 



•CKWTCIIS INC 



I Q Do you have any knowledge, independent of general 
I news accounts, of Project Democracy? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever worked for or with Corporate Air 
Services? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON; 
Q Have you ever worked for or with Intercontinental 
Technology? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever worked for or with IBC? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection, 
ay MR, SAXON: 
Q Har/e you ever worked for or with Stanford 
Technology Corporation? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 



^set<\^'^^^^' 



607 



SA^CON: 



BY MR. SA^CON 

Q Have you ever worked for or with Lake Resources? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you ever worked for or with Southern Air 
Transport? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did Thomas Clines ever employ you in any way, in 
order to help incriminate Edwin Wilson? 
MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 
Can we just finish one thing 
(Discussion off the record.) 

THE WITNESS: Would you say it again? I am 
certain of my answer, but I want to be sure I understood your 
question. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q I apologize for an unintentionally vague question. 
A It sounds clear, but it sounds odd. 
Q Have you ever been employed by or worked for 
or with Thomas G. Clines in an capacity in which he instructed 
you, suggested to you or importuned you to, in any way. 



UN£l6S^^r«£0 



KE-rCOCIiU. aCKITEHS INC 



UHa%SS1?^^ 



ME-FEMIUU. «CPa>TCIIS 



incriminate Edwin Wilson?' 
A No. 

Q Do you know a woman by the name of Charlene Brill? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you tell us how you came to know her? 

MR. TUOHEY: Object to the question on the grounds 
of privilege; instruct the witness not to answer. 

BY MR. SAXON: j 

Q Can you tell us for what period of time you've | 
known Ms. Brill? 

MR. TUOHEY: Same objection. 

MR. SAXON: That would be the objection under the 
Fifth Amendment privilege 2uid not going to security? 
MR. TUOHEY: Yes. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you work with Ms. Brill while at the Central 
Intelligence Agency? 

MR. TUOHEY: Seune objection. 
MR. SAXON: I'm sorry. Which? 
MR. TUOHEY: Fifth Amendment. 
EY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did you ever sweep an office for Bob Gray in 



u»iiyvsr^*t^ 



609 



yjHa^SStf'^t^ 



Washington, D.C.? 

MR. TUOHEY: You may answer that. 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Have you given any testimony in the matters which 
have become known as the Iran-Contra Affair before the U.S. 
House of Representatives? 

MR. lOOHEY: You may answer that. 

THE WITNESS: NO. 

BY MR. SAXON; 
Q Have you been contacted by anyone employed by the 
U.S. House of Representatives in this matter? 

MR. TUOHEY; I will state for the record that a 
bureau agent contacted my client last evening from the 
Special Prosecutor's Office and encouraged him to come down 
and discuss matters. I have not talked to him, but my 
client advised the agent that he l:vet^ counsel, and that I 
should be contacted. There's been no contact from the House 
side. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Do you have any documents which were requested 
under the Committee's subpoena of March 16, which you have 



US?'^tfSS 



ErCMDU •E'OITOS INC 



610 



unafissfftto 



brought with you today?* 

MR. TUOHEY: 'John, I have documents in my 
possession which ray client has given to me. 

MR. SAXON: Pertaining to matters subject to the 
subpoena? 

MR. TUOHEY: Pertaining to matters subject to the 
subpoena, which I have examined carefully. 

I have concluded that in each and every one of 
those documents, the Fisher Doctrine of implied self- 
authentication would permit me to, and I do so assert the 
privilege on my client's behalf with respect to those 
documents. 

BY MR. SAXON: 
Q So you have no documents to present to the 
Committee today? 

MR. TUOHEY: Correct. 

MR. SAXON: I believe that completes the questions 
that I would have at this time. 

Is there further statement that you or your client 
would wish to make? 

MR. TUOHEY: No. Other than to say, we're prepared 
to be present, and it is not necessary for you to issue a 



U|lt;^|.^S^??T:3 



UC-fCMMI. lltPO«TE«S. 



611 



UNtWS^f^tO 



formal subpoena. If you will call rae, I will have my client 
prepared to meet any mutually convenient dates. 

MR. SAXON: For purposes of public testimony? Is 
that what we're talking about? 

MR. TUOHEY: Whatever. You don't need to subpoena 
my client from this point forward. You can call me or 
notify me in writing, although it is not necessary to do it 
in writing. I will waive any formal requirements of a 
subpoena. 

J4R, SAXON: Very good. Thank you. 

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the taking of the 
deposition was concluded.) 



Glenn A. Robinette 



U»^(^dSI'^'tO 



612 



CARDKCY S«curity-Sy«Jt«ms 
CX)RO-MATIC Automatic Doors 
STANLEY Parking Gat* & Fence Controls 



UN 




am 



132 Washington Boulevard 

Laurel, Maryland 20707 

Bait. 301-792-4090 Wash. 301-953-7900 



Automatic Ooor Specialists 



SOPOSAl. SUBMiTTto rO 

Glenn Robfnette and Associates 



966 - 5873 



June 17. 1986 



3365 Arcadia Place. NW 



Private Residence 



STATt »N0 :i» coot 

Jashinton. O.C. 20015 



jOe LOCATION 

Kentland Drive, Great Falls, Vi 



•ginia 



Automatic Door Specialists (ADS) will automate the existing gate using an Edko 
Medium Duty Swing Gate Operator. To accommodate automation of gate, ADS will remove 
existing wooden gate post, replace it with a metal post painted white. 

In conjunction with automation of the gate, ADS will provide one Multi-Elmac 
Receiver and two Multi-Elmac Single Button Transmitters to operate gates from an 
automobile. 

ADS also will install an Aiphone Intercom consisting of an IBG-IGD Master Station 
inside the front door, and IBG-IHD Additional Master on the upstairs bedroom, and an 
IB-DA Door Station on a post outside the gate. 

ADS will install intercom wiring through existing conduit and will obtain power 
from existing box in the yard near the gate location. 

Quoted price doesnot include price of permits, if needed. 



GUARANTEE - Material & Equip. - 1 yr. Labor - 3 mo. 









flr l^rapOBr hereby to furnish material and latxjr — complete in accordance with above specidci ions, for the sum of 



Two thousand one hundred fifty-four 



2,154.00 



ent to ee mad« as follows 

1% discount / 20 day. Net 30. A U service charge will be charged 30 days 
after the date of the invoice. 




Arrr ptanrp of ^rapoaal - rt,, aw., one. .o«.i.cat.on, 

ana conditions art latiiiactory ana are nereoy acceplea You are auinoruea Signalu' 
to do the worh as soeciied Payment 

j2A Q^^-^ 'Te- 5,,n.,ui 



^ /^ 



m«nt wtil IM made «s outhnto aOc 

^-"^ - 






613 



^^ ^O^- A 0268 






SPECIALISTS 

July 7, 1986 



Glen Robinette and Associates 
3265 Arcadia Place, NW 
Washington, DC 20015 



Dear Mr. Robinette: 



Attached is an invoice for $ 2,173.00. This amount represents the 
original $ 2.154.00 contracted for, plus $ 19.00 for an additional radio 
transmitter. 

Mr. Robinette', Automatic Door Specialists appreciates the business 
represented by this invoice. If we may provide additional assistance to 
you in the future, please do not hesitate to contact me. ^. . 

_ Very truly yours, 

AUTOMATIC DOOR SPECIALISTS 




UKCIRSSIFP 



614 



mm^^^' 



ilv 27647 



AUTOMATI 

in WiSHIMTOH IO«(V«n 

,a*>TUND 20707. 43S7 



DOOR CONTtOU 
SICUIITY CARDS 
rARKINO OATIS 




¥^^ 



'/-Vf7 



si? 



UMCLRSS5 



5- r.i; 



615 



UMCLASSlF'.tJ 

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC & REPORTER 



I, David L. Hoffman the officer before whom 
the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify 
that the witness whose testimony appears in the 
foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that 
the testimony of said witness was taken in shorthand 
and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under 
my direction; that said deposition is a true record 
of the testimony given by said witness; that I am 
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by 
any of the parties to the action in which this 
deposition was taken; and, further, that I am not 
a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel 
employed by the parties hereto, nor financially 
or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action. 



ly^/ 



Notary Public inoij^d for the 
District of C^Mimbia 



My Commission Expires 6/30/90 



UKClftSS)F!P?) 



617 







^^^r i : TR:^S(^iPi^F^RbrCEEI^ 



SELECT CGtSIITTEB TO INVESTIGATE COVERT 
ARtlS TRAUSACTIOMS HITU IRAN 
0. S. ROUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES 
—and— 
SELECT COIflllTTBB ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN Al«) THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 
UNITED STATES SENATE 



l^NCUSS/FI£D 



Oaposltlon of GLENN A. ROBINETTB 



WashingtoDf D, p. 
June 17, 1987 



Pages 1 thru 85 



MILLER REPORTING COMPANY. INC 

■ . B07 C iPt. W.1. 
: WiAlnttan.D^ 20003 




by a »ko, NdkMd SeJwfty^aiiAbarr- 



618 



UNCLASSIFIED 



SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT 

ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

and 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 

TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

Washington, D.C. 
Wednesday, June 17, 1987 

The deposition of GLENN A. ROBINETTE, called for 

examination in the above-entitled matter, pursuant to notice, 

in the offices of the Senate Ethics Committee, Room 220, Hart 

Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C, convened at 10:41 

a.m., before Pamela Briggle, a notary public in and for the 

District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the 

parties : 



UNCLASSIFIED 



I 



619 



pb2 



UNCLASSIFIED 



APPEARANCES: 



On Behalf of the Select Committee on Secret Military 
Assistance to Iran and Nicaraguan Opposition of the 
United States Senate: 

PAUL BARBADORO 

Deputy Chief Counsel 

jtEWygT H BALLEM, S t a f f -eomrS^lT 

JOHN R. MONSKY, Staff Counsel 

Room 901 

Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 

On Behalf of the Select Committee to Investigate Arms 
Transactions with Iran of the U.S. House of 
Representatives: , .i^ r P 

GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE, ?n^->^-^''-*^ 
Room Vl-^, U.S. Capitol 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 

On Behalf of the Witness: 

MARK H. TUOHEY, III, ESQUIRE 
Pierson, Ball & Dowd 
1200 18th Street, N.w. 
Washington, D.C. 

Also Present: Thomas Polgar 



UNCLASSIFIED 



620 



pb3 



UNCUSSIFIED 



CONTENTS 



WITNESS 

GLENN A. ROBINETTE 

By Mr. Barbadoro 
By Mr. Van Cleve 



NUMBER 

GR-1 

GR-2A-B 

GR-3 

GR-4A-B 

GR-5A 

GR-6A-B 

GR-7A-F 

GR-8A-E 

GR-9A-B 

GR-IOA-B 

GR-llA-B 



EXAMINATION 



EXHIBITS 



FOR IDENTIFICATION 



UNCUSSIFIED 



621 



UNCUSSIHED 



UNdlASSIHED 



PROCEEDINGS 
Whereupon, 

GLENN A. ROBINETTE 
was called for examination by counsel for the Plaintiff and 
having been first duly sworn by the notary public, was 
examined and testified as follows: 

MR. BARBADORO: Mr. Robinette, it's my understand- 
ing that you intend to rely on your Fifth Amendment rights 
and not to testify to the committee in this or any other 
proceeding unless you are ordered to by a court and granted 
limited use immunity. Is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 

MR. BARBADORO: I want to give you now copies of 
orders obtained from the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia for both the House and the Senate. 
These orders compel you to testify and grant you limited use 
immunity . 

I give you a copy of these orders and also have 
them marked for the record. 

[Robinette Deposition Exhibit Nos . 

GR-1, 2A-C, 3, 4A-B, 5A-B, 6A-B, 

7A-F, 8A-E, 9A-B, lOA-B and llA-B 

were marked for identification. ) 

For the record, we are satisfied with 



^ MiwpfMMeM of LO. 12356 
i4li b. I Mm, Nalwiil Security CouncM 



MR. TUOHEY: 



both orders and we intend to proceed accordingly. 



622 



UNCLASSIRED 



MR. BARBADORO: Thank you, Mr. Tuohey. 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Q Mr. Robinette, I want to get right to the point 
here and start in asking you questions about what you did 
with Richard Sscord in 1986. And let me first ask you, did 
there come a time in March of 1986 when you were hired by 
Richard Secord to do some work for him? 

A That's correct. 

Q And do you know the date that you were hired by Mr. 
Secord? 

A No, it would probably be the last week of March; in 
that time period. 

Q I want to show you Exhibit GR-1, which is your 
calendar for the year 1986 and ask you to look at it and turn 
your attention to the month of March of 1986. In reviewing 
that calendar, I see only one meeting with Richard Secord in 
March, and that was on March 19. 

Could you look at that exhibit and tell me, was 
that the date where Mr. Secord hired you? 

A I see it. I can't accurately testify as to the 
19th, but it certainly is in that time span of the last — the 
latter part of the last week of March, to my recollection. 

Q That <=^^^^tfM#|f ^1 /ff^Vffi^l^ reflects the fact 
that there was a meyliyfL fWmll 11^14^ *'ith you, Secord, 



623 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Tom, which would be Tom Clines, correct? 

A Tom Clines, yes. 

Q And Chi-Chi, which would be Chi-Chi Quintero; is 
that right? 

A Are you reading the same thing I'm reading? Yes, 
excuse me, I'm sorry. I apologize. I was looking below. it 
says Hoyt. I'm sorry. 

Yes, that's Chi-Chi Quintero. 

Q Do you recall meeting with those people at Mr. 
Secord's office on March 19, 1986? 

A No, I don't, but I'm sure I did. 

Q Would Tom Clines and Chi-Chi Quintero have been 
present on the date that Mr. Secord hired you to do work for 
him? 

A To my recollection, I doubt if Mr. Clines or Mr. 
Quintero knew anything of General Secord's hiring me at that 
time. 

Q So you don't think that you would have been hired 
at that meeting on the 19th? 

A If I was, I don't think they would know it. It's 
the kind of conversation, knowing General Secord, that he 
wouldn't necessarily discuss it in front of them. 

Q Do you know what the purpose of that meeting was on 



March 19th? 



itiynrK^inpn 



and then something 



UNCIASSIHED 



about an attorney in South Carolina — his name is Hoyt — 
regarding a bill, something pink slip. And I can't recall 
what pink slip means. It probably has something to do with 
payment, or I don't know. 

Q So you can't remember what the purpose of that 
meeting was, correct? 

A No, but it looks like social to me. Dinner and 
drinks . 

Q I'n any event, you recall that you were hired by Mr. 
Secord some time in March of 1986, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q What were you hired to do? 

A I was hired to conduct research and investigation 
on allegations being made against General Secord. 

Q Can you describe in general terms what those 
allegations were? 

A Yes . General Secord commented that there were 
people unknown to him who were saying that he was involved in 
drug trafficking and arms shipments and generally illegal 
type activities. 

Q And what kind of investigation did he want you to 
do of these allegations? 

A He said he didn't know who these people were, and 
he wanted to know if I could find out who they were and their 
background and why-tlipy^giu^d J)V'Ba2iiia-i*^®'® derogatory. 



iilMli'tfM]til*n "' '" 



625 



UNCLASSIFIED 



statements about him. 

Q And how much did he propose to pay you for this 
work? 

A Originally we discussed it and I think we said 
$3,000 a month, but I asked for $4,000 a month plus expenses. 

Q And he agreed to pay you that amount? 

A Yes, he agreed. 

Q And when did you start actually working for him? 

A Probably the first week of April. 

Q Do you recall when you first got paid? 

A No, I don't recall but probably toward the end of — 
middle or end of April. 

Q And that would have been for work you did for him 
during the month of April and March? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall whether you were paid by check or in 
cash? 

A I think cash. 
- Q After the first cash payment you received from Mr. 
Secord for this work were you later paid by check for some of 
the work you did for him? 

A Much later in the year. 

Q Take a look at Exhibits 2-A, B and C 

A Yes, I see them. 



Q Those are checks 

• -•■Ml k 



oWflWft 



tanford Technology 



626 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Trading Group International account, correct? 

A Yes, they are. 

Q They are made out to you? 

A Yes, they are. 

Q And they are signed by Richard Secord? 

A Yes. 

Q The first check is dated June 9, 1986, correct? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q And the second check is dated June 26? 

A Twenty-four. 

Q Twenty- four. And the third check is dated? 

A August 11. 

Q August 11. Are these checks that you were paid by 
Mr. Secord for the investigative work you were doing for him? 

A Yes, they are. 

Q And that is for work that you did in the months of 
May, June and July of 1986? 

A Yes. 
- Q Did you continue to work for Mr. Secord after July 
of 1986 on this investigative assignment? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q How were you paid for the work you did after July 
of 1986? 

A By cash. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q When you were paid in cash, did you sign any 



627 



_ 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

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receipt for the money that you received? 

A No, I did not. 

Q And did you keep any record of the cash payments 
you received from Mr. Secord? 

A No, I did not. 

Q For how long did you continue to receive these 
payments? 

A I was paid up through, I think, November maybe 
December '86, and they stopped. And then in March of '87 i 
received one payment of $2,000. 

Q And that $2,000 payment, was it in cash or was it 
paid by check? 

A That was a check, I believe. 

Q Did you do investigative work for Mr. Secord for 
which you were not paid? 

A I continued through January, February — March was a 
partial payment, it was $2,000 instead of four. And I think 
I probably stopped just about early April. 

Q And you have not yet been paid for that work, 
correct? 

A No. I had told him in, I think, early January that 
I realized he had a lot of problems, newspaper articles and 
so forth, and would undoubtedly have other expenses, and that 
I was willing to continue on a time available basis — my time 
available--to recej.yg .iiL^^44W'JVlf*i|f'*^Ainvestigations that 



miwiwtncn"""' 



628 



IINCUSSIFIEO 



I had initiated. 

And then in March I spoke to him along the same 
lines, but told him that if he had any available funds they 
would be appreciated. And I don't recall his exact words at 
that time, but he said this was the best he could do at that 
time and gave--I think he had his girl give me a $2,000 , 
check. I don't remember receiving it, but I got a $2,000 
check. 

Q rfow much money does General Secord owe you for the 
investigative work that you performed for him? 

A Well, if we put it around $4,000 a month up until 
mid-April it would be maybe $15,000, $14,000, something like 
that. But if he were to come into some funds and there 
wasn't so much problem, controversy, I probably would ask him 
for it. But I don't think I would pose that question to him 
at this time. 

Q Do you still expect to be paid for the work? 

A I don't know. 

Q Are you saying that you don't intend to ask General 
Secord for the money at this time because you don't think he 
has the money to pay you? 

A That's right. 

Q And if he does at some point have the money to pay 

you, you intend to ask him for it? |||Lin| i|00lPlf*l\ 

A Yes, because I have billsUl lULnOuiri Lli 



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Q Let me turn to a different subject. Did there come 
a time in the spring of 1986 when General Secord talked to 
you about installing a security system at the residence of 
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North? 

A That's correct. 

Q Could you look at your calendar, Exhibit 1, and 
from that calendar can you identify the date when General 
Secord first talked to you about installing the security 
system? 

A Yes, I can. 

Q And what's that date? 

A It's the latter part of April, April 29, 1986. 

Q Now where were you when he brought up the subject 
of the security system? 

A I believe in his office in Virginia. 

Q Was anyone else present at that meeting? 

A No, I was in his room, in his suite in Virginia. I 

Q As of that date had you ever met Lieutenant Colonel | 
Oliver North? ! 

A No, I had not. * | 

Q Had you ever spoken with him? I 

A No, I had not. i 

Q Had you ever heard his name mentioned before? 

A I think I had heard it mgntipned, _yes 

Q Who had mentioned it? 



nentioned, yes. 

UNCLASSIHED 



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A Probably General Secord or Mr. Clines. 

Q What did they say about Lieutenant Colonel North? 

A That he was working in the White House, and 
probably identified him at that time as being with the 
National Security Council. And being a very hard worker, 
that type of thing. 

Q Let's go back to the 29th, and can you tell me as 
best you can remember what General Secord said to you in that 
meeting about the need for a security system at Colonel 
North's residence? 

A General Secord described, mentioned that Colonel 
North had been experiencing threats to his home. And specifi- 
cally mentioned one in which lights were being shined on the 
house at night, which frightened his wife and family espe- 
cially when he. Colonel North, was not there, because as I 
understood Colonel North was frequently not at home. 

In addition, they had received phone calls and 
threatening phone calls, I believe sugar in the gas tank, 
flattened tires and unknown packages in the mailbox, which is 
external to the house. 

Q What do you mean by unknown packages? 

A Packages not sent by the post office department, 
but packages that have been--boxes of some type that were put 
in there by persons unknown, which it was interpreted could 
be threatening such as a bomb. 



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Q He didn't say that Colonel North had received a 
bomb though, did he? 

A No, he did not. 

Q But collectively, the matters that I've just 
identified resulted in a feeling of severe uncomfortableness 
by Mrs. North and Colonel North for their family. 

Q Did General Secord also say something about the 
fact that Colonel North was frequently away from home? 

A t don't know if he did at that meeting, but at the 
next meeting it certainly came up that he was--and certainly 
Mrs. North told me that subsequent to this meeting. 

Q Was there any discussion at this April 29 meeting 
about the concern about terrorists? 

A The word terrorist might have been used at the 
April 29 meeting, but subsequent it was used. 

Q Did General Secord say anything to you at this 
April 29 meeting about the kind of security system that he 
wanted you to have installed? 

- A No, he knew that I was familiar with security, all 
phases of security and he deferred to me to go out and look 
at the property and make some recommendations . 

Q Did he say anything at this meeting about who was 
going to pay for this system? 
A No, he did not. 
Q What else did he say at the meeting about the 



UNCUSSIFIED 



632 



security syst 



UNCUSSIRED 



A That's about all that I can recall. 

Q After he told you about the need for a security 

system, what did he do? 

A He asked me if I thought I could handle it, and I i 

agreed. And would I agree to handle it; yes, I would. And I 

i 
he then said he would call Mrs. North to make — to identify me | 

and make arrangements for a meeting with Mrs. North. 

Q And did he call Mrs. North while you were at his 
office? 

A Yes. 

Q what did you do after General Secord called Mrs. j 

North? I 

t 
A I then called Mrs. North, it seems to me within 45 | 

minutes later to identify myself and get an agreed time for a 

meeting with her. 

Q And what was said in your telephone conversation 
with Mrs. North? 

A I identified myself by name telling her that I 
think she had recently heard from General Secord and that I 
was coming out there to look at her property, the possibility 
of implementing some security procedures to protect the 
family. 

Q And what was her reaction 

A Very brief, but yes, and she would meet me the next 



ICUSSIFIED 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



day. And we agreed on a time. 

MR. BARBADORO: Off the record. 
[Off the record. } 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Q Mr. Robinette, when did you go out to the North 
residence? 

A I went out the next day, April 30th. 

Q What did you do when you got out to the residence? 

A Met with Mrs. North, introduced myself and briefly 
asked her a few questions about what had happened out there, 
specifically about the lights that were shining from the 
house--shining from the road. And asked her permission to 
walk around the house and the property. 

Q In general terms can you describe the North 
residence, the property and the area in which the residence 
is situated? 

A It's located in Great Falls, Virginia. It's a two- 
story house situated in the middle of a plot of ground with 
houses on each side and a woods to the rear. There's a fence 
enclosing all the property. Not a secure fence, just simply 
a fence to keep the animals from getting out. They had two 
horses at that time. 

Had a built-in garage. Fairly rural area, wasn't 



well traveled out there. 



How big is the lot? 



VNCUSSIFIED 



634 



507 C Umi. N £ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A I'm going to say an acre. I'm guessing on that. 
Q How far back is the house from the street? 
A The roadway--let 's see, the house sits back off the 

public highway about 250 feet. 

Q And how far away are the houses on either side of 

I 

the North house? ! 

A Probably an equal distance of 200 to 250 feet. 

Tell me what happened once you got inside the house? 

During this visit? 

Yes. 

I commented that I spoke to Mrs. North. She 
described to me that — in response to my questions she 
described that, yes, she had experienced on several occasions 

lights — someone a topping :Cn^.tito. ro^ .j«|jid»- ynd- L Ioshi^iQ ,:„ 

lights fe^ ^SHSBMI^ use at night. Colonel North was not home 
and it certainly frightened her. 

I can't recall at the moment whether it also 
occurred when Colonel North was home. But she did describe 
in response to my questions that Colonel North didn't usually 
arrive until around midnight every night at which time she 
fixed him dinner. But there had been occasions — in addition, 
there had been occasions with threatening phone calls. She 
made no reference to the^^^^t^^e^ ^ij^uf^Jif sugar in the 
gas tank. 

Q After speaking with Mrs. North, did you walk around I 



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DNCUSSm 



the house? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q And after looking at the house and speaking to Mrs. 

North did you draw any conclusions about the kind of security 

system you would need to install at the house? i 

A Yes, I did. It didn't take too long because it's a 

I 
fairly standard residence, and it became quite obvious that j 

security at the house would be difficult because of the j 

family lifestyle; four children and two horses and dogs and 

cats. 

Q What effect did the fact that he had children, dogs 
and cats have on the kind of security system that you planned 
to install? 

A Well, if you were concerned about someone entering 
into the property within the house at night and you had the 
security system on, you would normally have some sort of IR 
beams, intrusion alarms that would go off, would be alerted. 
But the best you can do under the circumstances with children 
running around at night and dogs and cats is to simply wire 
the doors and the windows with the hope that the system would 
be turned on and that if someone forced their way through the 
window or the door, at that time an alarm would go off. 

Q Is it safe to say that because of the animals and 
the children you felt that a passive system rather than an 
active system ^"^o^v^£'9>'VJM"^>''^^AIf IPA infrared beams 



636 



UNCLASSIFIED 



would be required for the house? 

A Yes. I felt also that Mrs. North, who appeared to 
be extremely concerned about her children, would be able to 
carry a portable transmitter, something very small that as 
she walked through the home or out in the back of the 
property that if she was accosted or alarmed at some point 
that she could press this wireless transmitter which in turn 
would automatically set off an alarm. 

Q D'id you describe for Mrs. North the kind of 
security system you were thinking about? 

A I probably touched on it, but I perceived that she 
wasn't personally interested in the details. I think she 
would be more responsive to simply knowing that a system 
existed. 

Q What else happened at your visit to the North 
residence? 

A That's about the extent of it. I think I left 
after about 45 minutes. 

. Q Did you on a later date meet with Colonel North to 
discuss the security system? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q And from your calendars can you determine when that 



(ting occurred? 
A Yes, I can. 
Q When was thati 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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UNCLASSIRED 



A That was on May 5th, 1986. 

Q How did that meeting come about? 

A I believe between May 5th and the time that I'd 
been to General Secord's I reported back to him that I'd made 
the visit and I had a general idea what I thought would be 
useful, but it was necessary in my experience, that the user 
know what was contemplated. And I suggested that General 
Secord either tell Colonel North that which I would tell him, 
or General Secord and I meet Colonel North. 

And on the 5th of May, General Secord and I did- go 
to Colonel North's office at 7:00 or 7:30 that night. 

Q Was it General Secord who arranged the meeting with 
Colonel North? 

A Yes, he did. 

Q The meeting occurred at 7:30 on May 5th? 

A Yes, it did. 

Q And it was at Colonel North's office, correct? 

A Yes, in the Old Executive Office Building. 

Q And you went to the meeting with General Secord? 

A Yes. 

Q Who else was present in Colonel North's office when 
you got there? 

A When we walked in, I believe 'FlWmftn^WS there in 
the outer office. And then General Secord and I walked into 
the inner office, which I recall was to the right of the 



638 



vamsm 



outer office. And we sat down, and that's the only person I 
recall seeing at that time. 

Q What happened at the meeting? 

A The meeting was brief. I think it took about 30 
minutes and told — General Secord introduced me to Colonel 
North, told him that I was the man that had surveyed the 
property and--had surveyed Colonel North's property and that 
I had some proposals for equipment that I wanted to discuss 
with him, with Colonel North. 

Q What happened then? 

A I summarized very quickly what I thought would be 
useful considering the family lifestyle that they had. And 
in addition, I suggested that if he concurred that I would 
also attempt to put in a visual surveillance system of the 
mailbox in an attempt to — the mailbox and the mailbox area in 
an attempt to identify who was leaving the packages at night 
and perhaps who was pausing on the highway to shine lights. 

Q What kind of visual surveillance system did you 
have in mind? 

A At that time it was either going to be a still 
camera that would be operated electronically each time the 
mailbox was opened, or it would be a wireless video camera. 
In either case, both would maintaif A f Sf 2J^4 °i ^ho stopped 
or who opened the mailbox door. 

I had some tentative plans for maybe having it^also 



mssifii 



639 



UNCUSSIRED 



be operated from the house, but that was tentative because I 
didn't think that either Mrs. North or Colonel North would be 
able to turn on the camera in times of emergency. 

Q What happened after you described the kind of 
system you had in mind to Colonel North? 

A He said, okay, that sounds good. Let's get 
together when you have more firm— when you've formulated your 
plan. 

Q As of May 5th, had you contacted any contractors 
about installing this system? 

A I think 1 contacted more than one. But there was 
really one firm here in the Washington area that I had 
previous experience with and knew the personnel as b eing 
extremely reliable. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I^^^H^^^I 
^^^^^^^^^^^^H And I felt that to 
because of their ability and reliability. 

Q What is the name of that company? 

A The name of the company is VATEC. 

Q A» of May 5, had you obtained an estimate of how 
much this security system was going to cost? 

A No, I don't believe so because I hadn't — I don't 
believe so because I don't think J.^ad^firmed up in my mind 
just what I was going to have. 

Q Was there any discussion at this meeting on May 5 
about who was going to pay for the security system? 



Ili'OTsSlFIED 



640 



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WUJSIFIEB 



A No, there was not. 

Q Did General Secord say anything else at the meeting 
other than to introduce you to Colonel North and describe to 
Colonel North the fact that you were the one who was working 
on the security system for him? 

A No, he did not. 

Q Was anything else said at the meeting other than 

what you've described? 

A Nothing that I can recollect. 

Q When did you meet with Colonel North again? 

A Let's see, that was on the 5th. I met with Colonel 
North on the 10th of May at approximately 10:30, Saturday. 
MR. BARBADORO: Let's go off the record for a 



second. 



Q 
A 

Virginia . 

Q 

A 
Q 
A 
Q 



[Discussion off the record.] 

BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Wh«re did this meeting take place? 

It took place in General Secord 's office in 

Who arranged this meeting? 

General Secord. 

Was General Secord present at the meeting? 

Yes. 

Was anyone else present, other than you and Colonel 



North and General Secord; 



ssent, otner tnan you ana 

UNCUSSIFIED 



641 



BNCWSSIFIfD 



A No. 

Q What happened at this meeting? 

A This was an opportunity for me to tell Colonel 
North, in more detail, just what I thought they should have 
at the house. And I, in turn, related what I thought they 
should have. 

Q Could you describe for us, in general terms, what 
the system was that you had in mind? 

A Yes, it's pretty much as I mentioned earlier. 
There would be — the doors and the windows would be alarmed 
n case anyone attempted to force their way in there. There 
would be smoke and heat detectors. There would be the 
portable transmitter, one or two, which Mrs. North could 
carry around, and perhaps one of the older children, or even 
Colonel North. 

There would be external lights shining on the 
property that would come on at night in the event of an 
alarm. I believe there was an audible alarm, I believe. I 
can't remember whether that was installed or not. 

In addition, there would be an audible signal 
installed in one of the vehicles in the event that Mrs. North 
or one of the children was using the car and there was an 
attempt to kidnap them or force them off the road, I felt 
that a loud sounding ,^ijen_ or whistle would scare the people 
away. 



ig siren or whistle would 

UNCUSSIHED 



642 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



Also, there would be a radio control system at the 
front gate so that when Mrs. North came in or went out, the 
gate would always be closed and she or anyone else, with 
these two transmitters, could open the gate without having to 
get out of the car. They would always be in the car. 

And lastly, there was a discussion at that time, 
that I was still looking into a video type, or pictorial type 
of coverage of the gate and the mailbox. I hadn't really 
defined that at that time. 

I also described, lastly, that this whole system 
would be connected to a central station alarm company that 
would receive signals 24 hours a day, every day of the year, 
and that when an alarm was received they would contact the 
authorities to send them out. 

Q So the way the system would work is that if the 
alarm went off in the house, it would also ring at this 
company who could notify the police, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q At this point, you were planning to have VATEC 
install the entire system, correct? 

A Yes , I was . 

Q Had you obtained an estimate from them as of May 
10, as to how much this system was going to cost? 

A I don't believe so. I think it was shortly 
thereafter, very shortly thereafter. 



I/NCI ilWiFiFn 



643 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q From your own experience, in working in this area, 
did you have a rough idea as to how much you thought the 
system would cost? 

A I thought the system would be about $10. to $12,000. 
Q Let me ask you, was there any discussion of how 
much the system would cost, at this meeting on May 10? 
A Yes, there was. 

Q Could you describe that discussion? 
A Yes, I don't recall who instigated the question or 
the subject of the money, whether it was Colonel North or. 
myself, but the result was that Colonel North commented that 
he'd like to keep the price between $8,000, $8,500, that he 
was a poor colonel and he wanted to try to keep it around 
that figure. 

Q Mr. Robinette, was it you who first raised the 
figure of $8,lto $10,000, or was it Colonel North? 
A I think it was Colonel North. 

MR. BARBADORO: Let's go off the record for a 
second . 

(Discussion off the record.] 
[The reporter read the record as requested.] 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 
Q Mr. Robinette, during the break, you've had a 
chance to speak to your counsel. Do you now wish to correct 
an answer that you had earlier given? 



UNCUSSIRFD 



644 



UNCUSffD 



A Yes, I do. 

Q Please go ahead. 

A We were discussing the approximate costs of the 
system. It's my recollection that I stated the cost would be 
around $8,000 to $8,500 and, in response to that. Colonel 
North said fine, keep it around there, I'm on a poor colonel's 
pay. 

Q Let me just make sure I understand your testimony 
then. Earlier, I asked you if you had a rough estimate of 
the cost of this system, and you answered between $8,/and — 



Do you want to correct 



between $10, and 512,000, excuse 
that answer as well, or do you want to stand by that answer? 
[Counsel and witness conferring.] 
THE WITNESS: At the time, we're talking now of 
Saturday the 10th of May, the figure that I quoted was $8,000 
to $8,500. 

BY MR. BARBADORO: 
Q The figure that you quoted to Colonel North? 
. A Yes, to Colonel North, yes. 

Q My question then ia if you thought it was going to 
cost between^lO^fand 12,\ why did you quote to Colonel North a 
figure between 58,000 and $8,500? 

A There was some debate in my mind about this 
monitoring system, which may or may not be used at that gat 
I didn't think I'd ultimately use it. 



ICUSSIFIED 



645 



UNCIASSIHED 



Q So you decided to give Colonel North an estimate in 
the low range of what you thought the system would cost? 

A I felt if we implemented the security system as I 
had described, I didn't think we'd really need the video 
system. 

Q The second point of clarification, at this meeting 
on May 10, who was it that raised the question of how much 
the system would cost? Was it you, or did Colonel North ask 
you about How much it would cost? 

A I think it was me. 

Q And when you said that you thought the system would 
cost between S8,000 and $8,500, what was Colonel North's 
reaction? 

A He stated, as I had said a few moments ago, okay 
keep it around that figure, I'm on a poor colonel's pay. 

Q What else happened at that meeting? 

A That's about the extent of it. It was a very short 
meeting. I got the impression that Colonel North and General 
Secord were meeting for other reasons and my participation 
was really very small. 

Q Did there come a time when you made a down payment 
to VATEC for the security system? 

A Yes, that's correct. 

Q Take a look at Exhibit 3, which is a check from you 
to VATEC in the amount of $6,000. 



I/NCI IW/FIFD 



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A Thank you. 

Q Do you recognize that check? 

A Yes, I do. 

Q Is that the down payment that you made to VATEC? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q That check is dated May 19, 1986. Is that the date 
that you made out that check? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q 'What did you do with the check after you made it 
out? 

A I believe I personally gave it to a representative 
of VATEC, who came to my home. 

Q Had work started on the system as of that date, or 
was that down payment required before work was to begin? 

A As I recall, I don't think work had actually 
started. I had made a trip or two back out to Mrs. North's 
but no, I don't think work had started. 

As I recall, they wouldn't start the work until 
they had — they couldn't order the equipment until they had 
money . 

Q When you made out this check to VATEC, you were 
using your own funds, correct? 

A I was using my checking — yes. 

Q Did you subsequently look to someone for reimburse- 
ment for this down payment? 



ONCLASSIFIFn 



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A Yes, I did. 

Q Who did you look to for reimbursement? 

A General Secord. 

Q When was that? 

A Either on that day, the 19th, or on the 20th. 

Q Did you go to General Secord's office to get the 

reimbursement? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q How much did you ask General Secord for? 

A To my recollection, it was $7,000. 

Q Why did you ask him for $7,000, in view of the fact 
that the down payment you made was for $6,000? 

A The additional $1,000 was for expenses that I had 
incurred in looking into this system. 

Q Is it fair to characterize that $1,000 as part of 
your fee for the work you had done in connection with the 
security system? 

A I think so. 

Q When you asked General Secord for the money, did he 
give it to you? 

A Yes . 

Q Did he pay you by checJ^pX-in cash? 

A He gave me cash. 

Q Where was he when he gave you the cash? 

A I believe he was in his office, in his suite. 




648 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q Where did he get the cash from? 

A I don't know where he got the cash from. To my 
recollection, I was sitting at a desk, sitting at his desk, 
sitting in front of his desk, and he leaned down and either 
took it from a drawer or took it from a case. 

Q Did he count the money before he gave it to you? 

A I don't recall. 

Q what was the denominations of the bills that he 
paid you in? 

A I can't actually recall today. 

Q Did General Secord express any surprise when you 
went to him for reimbursement for this security system? 

A No, he did not. 

Q — H x^^^l^ ad any previous discussions with General 
Secord about Tn^Tact that General Secord was going to pay 
for this M i ra i uutr? 

A No, I did not. 

Q Why did you look to General Secord, rather than to 
Colonel North, for this payment? 

A I was working for General Secord. He was the one, 
in my opinion, that had assigned me the task and that was the 
natural — in my opinion, that was the natural place to go. 

Q So even though you installed the system at Colonel 
North's house, you looked to General Secord for payment 
because he was the_Qr\e^tiiat Ud^tlife^UCu to install the 



filiM'k^6ii'lt«" 



649 



UNCUSSIFIED 



system, correct? 

A I did. I did, yes. 

Q What did you do with this cash that General Secord 
gave you on either the 19th or the 20th of May? 
A I took it home. 

Q I want to show you Exhibit 4-A and 4-B. Exhibit 4- 
A is your bank statement for the month of May and Exhibit 4-B 
is a deposit slip. 

gxhibit 4-A, the bank statement, reflects that 
there was a deposit to your account of $7,000 on May 20. -Is 
that the deposit you made with the cash that General Secord 
paid you? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q Exhibit 4-B is a deposit slip in the amount of 
$7,000. Is that also the deposit slip for the $7,000 deposit 
that you made with the money General Secord gave you? 
A I'm sure it is. 

Q When you went to General Secord, to seek reimburse- 
ment for this down payment, did General Secord say anything 
to you, that you should go to Colonel North and ask him for 
the money? 

A No, he did not. 
(q) And General Secord never said anything to you about 
him getting the money from Colonel North to pay you, did he? 
A No, Genera 



iiriorisi^^tcitrit 



anything to me 



650 



UNCUSSIHED 



about doing that and, in fact. General Secord never told me 
that he. General Secord, would pay for the system. 

(^ And he never told you where the money was coming 
from, to pay for this system? 

A No, he did not. 

Q Is it fair to say that as of May 19, when you made 
this down payment to VATEC, that you were expecting that 
VATEC would be the sole contractor for this system? 

A Yes, it was, at that date, yes. 

Q At some point, did you make a decision to use 
another contractor for a portion of the system? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q What part of the system did you decide to give to 
another contractor? 

A The remote control, the electronic gate. 

Q What caused you to decide to give the electric gate 
contract to someone else? 

A I thought that VATEC 's proposed charges for the 
electronic gate were high and I also had some impression that 
maybe it was a type of installation that they weren't able to 
do easily and cheaply. 

Q When did you first receive an in a Ui uawnt from VATEC? 

A I think I got a verbal estimate from them sometime 
in June, mid- June, early June. 

Q Wouldn't vou have received an estimate fr^nTthem 



il estimate from them som 

UNCUSSIRED 



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prior to making the down payment on May 19? 
A Probably, yes. 

Q Do you recall what that estimate was? 
A I believe it was around 11-something, 12-something. 
Q Did that first estimate you got from them include 
the electric gate? 

A I don't recall right now. 
MR. TUOHEY: Excuse me. 
[Witness and counsel conferring.] 
[Discussion off the record.] 
[The reporter read the record as requested.] 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 
Q Mr. Robinette, 1 had asked you if that first 
estimate you got included the electric gate. Your answer was 
that you couldn't recall. Have you had a chance to think 
about that answer? 

A Yes, I have. That was a verbal estimate that was 
given to me by a member of VATEC. 

Q Did it include the electric gate? 
A Yes, it did. 

Q It's fair to say that the estimate would have been 
substantially higher than VJ'rf l^i -^ ^_ ^i included the gate? 
A Yes, it would. 

Q When did the installation of this system begin and 
when was it completed, approximately? 




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A It Started sometime in May and ended in early July. 

Q The dates you gave me, does that include the 
installation of the electric gate by the other contractor? 

A Yes, it does. 

Q What is the name of the contractor that installed 
the electric gate? 

A I think it's Automatic Gate. 

Q Did Automatic Gate require a down payment before 
they installed the system? 

A No, I don't believe they did. 

Q Did there come a time when you made final payment 



& 



to VATEC and also final payment ~»r the automatic door 
company, for the work that that was done for you? 

A Yes, there did. 

Q In looking at your calendars, can you determine 
when it was that you made that final payment? 

A Yes, I can. 

Q When was that? 
' A July 10, 1986. 

Q Can you describe the circumstances in which you 
made these payments? 

A Yes, I spoke to both contractors, who agreed to 
meet me at noon at a restaurant in Silver Spring and I timed 
it so that I would meet one contractor at one point and the 
other contractor at a second point, so. that there wouldn't be 



IniKi iKhifiFH 



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any 



IINWSSW 



:ing of the two contractors. 



Q How did you plan to pay them, by check or with cash? 

A No, I was going to pay them with cash. 

Q Where did you get the cash from, to pay them? 

A Cash that I had accumulated and kept in my home. 

Q Please take a look at Exhibit 5-A, which is an 

invoice from the VATEC Corporation. Have you seen that 
exhibit before? 

A I've seen it recently. It was shown to me. 

Q That is an invoice for the security system that' was 
installed at the North residence, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q In the upper right-hand corner, it bears an address 
of ^^^^^^^^^M property and that's the North residence, 
correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q It also says payment received 7-10-86. Is that the 
date that you made final payment to VATEC for the work done 
on the system? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q By looking at the invoice, can you tell the amount 
of the payment that you made on July 10? 

A Yes, I can. 

Q What is the amount that you paid VATEC on that day? 

A 55 70. IIMPIflCOirirn 



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UNCIASSIHED 



Q You had earlier made a down payment of S6,000, 
correct? 

A Yes. 

Q So what was the total amount that you paid VATEC 
for the work that they did at the North property? 

A 511,703. 

Q Please take a look at Exhibit 6-C, which is an 
invoice from Automatic Door Specialists. Have you seen that 
before? 

A Yes . 

Q That invoice is for work that Automatic Door did 
for you installing the electric gate at the North property, 
correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q And that invoice reflects that that work was done 
at the North residence, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q It also states that payment was made on July 10, 
1986, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Is that when you paid Automatic Door? 

A That's correct. 



)u Day them for the work 

iClASSIFIED 



Q How much did you^ajr^hem fc'^^h_^_work they did? 

A 52,173. 

Q You paid them in cash at the restaurant on July 10, 



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correct? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q So if you paid VATEC 511,703 and you paid Automatic 
Door Specialist S2,154, the total cost of the installation of 
the system was 313,857. Does that sound right to you? 

A I accept your addition. 

Q In any event, it's approximately $14,000? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q Mr. Robinette, you testified that you used your own 
funds to make these cash payments on July 10, 1986? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q Did you subsequently seek reimbursements from 
somebody for these funds? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q who did you go to for reimbursement? 

A General Secord. 

Q On July 10, you paid approximately $7,800 to these 
t%«) contractors. How much money did you seek from General 
Secord? 

A Subsequent to this date, I asked him for ap- 
proximately S9,000. 

Q Why did you ask him for ^S.9_,0QiJ_whprvXflvu^Jlflifli1&nts 
to the contractors were $7,800? 

A My expenses, gas, time, telephone. 

Q Your fee and your expenses? 



jSMir 



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A Yes. 

[Counsel and witness conferring.] 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Q How long after July 10, 1986 did you go to General 
Secord and ask him for reimbursement? 

A I don't recall the exact date. 

Q Do you remember when it was that you got paid? 

A I received a check. 

Q In August, 1986? Does that sound right? 

A Yes, if I saw the check, I'd probably recognize it. 
MR. TUOHEY: Off the record. 
[Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Q Let me show you Exhibit 7-F, which is a cashier's 
check in the amount of $9,000? 

A Yes. 

Q Have you seen that before? 

A Yes . 

Q That check is made payable to you, correct? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q And it bears the notation that it is from CSF 
Investments, Limited? 

A Yes, it does. 

Q And the date of the check is August 20, 19861 

A August 20, 1986. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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UNClASSra 



Yes, it is. 

What did you do with that check? 

I put that in an account at Merrill Lynch. 

Mr. Robinette, is Exhibit 7-F a copy of the check 



Q Is that about the time that you received the check, 
sometime shortly after August 20, 1986? 
A Yes, it is. 

Q Is that the payment you received from General 
Secord? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 

you received? 
A Yes. 

Q Does the back of the check bear your endorsement? 
A Yes, it does. 

Q And that's the check you received from General 
Secord for the reimbursement for the payments you made plus 
your fee for the security system, correct? 
A Yes, it is. 

Q Between the beginning of May and the time when the 
system was paid for, did you ever go to Colonel North and 
seek reimbursement from him? 
A No, I did not. 

Q Did you ever send Colonel North a bill for any of 
the work you had done on the security system during this time 
period? 

A NO, I did not. 



ONCUSSIFIED 



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UNCIASSIRED 



Q Did General Secord say anything to you, during this 
time period, that suggested that he was obtaining the money 
he was paying you from Colonel North? 
A No, he did not. 

MR. BARBADORO: Let's go off the record for a 
second. 

[Discussion off the record.] 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 
Q Mr. Robinette, do you recall making any other 
payments in connection with the security system? 
A Yes, I do. 

Q What payments did you make? 

A I had to pay the Central Station Alarm Company and 
I had to pay VATEC for electrical work that was done. 



Q 
A 
Q 
A 

Q 

VATEC? 

A 

Q 
A 
Q 



How much did you pay the alarm company? 

I believe it was $90. 

What was that payment for? 

Services for, I believe, a six month period. 

What were the payments and how much did you pay 



I paid VATEC the $90. 

And they forwarded it to the security system? 

Yes. 

You also mentioned making other payments to vatec, 



It CO tne security sysLt 

UNCIASSIHED 



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■MLLW n v omwta eo.. mc 
»- c Sut.t St. 2 5 



A Yes, I paid VATEC S140 to go fix, repair that 
electric gate. It was faulty and the company would not 
acknowledge that it was their problem. 

Q Did you seek reimbursement from anybody for these 
payments? 

A No, I did not. 

Q Why not? 

A I don't recall why. It was a small amount and I 
just felt that I had been paid for it. 

Q I want to move ahead to November of 1986 and ask 
you about a date that's now familiar to everybody, November 
25, 1986. That was the date that Attorney General Meese held 
his press conference and announced that the funds from the 
Iran arms sales were diverted to the Contras and also 
announced that Colonel North had been removed from the 
National Security Council staff. 

Let me ask you, where were you on November 25, 1986: 

A I was in Costa Rica. 

Q What were you doing there? 

A Doing some — continuing with my work with General 
Secord on research investigation. 

Q When did you return to the United States? 

A November 29, 1986. 

Q At some point in December, after you returned from 



UNCLASSIRED 



Costa Rica, did you receive a telephone call from Colonel 



660 



UNCLASSIFIED 



North? 



A Yes, I did. 

Q When did you receive that phone call? 

A My recollection is not — it seems to me it was 
shortly thereafter. 

Q Are you reasonably certain that it was sometime in 
December, before Christmas? 

A Yes, very much so. 

Q What did Colonel North say to you, in this phone 
call? 

A We passed the time of day for a moment or two and 
said that -- he mentioned to me that I had not sent him a 
bill for the — 

Q Give me his exact words, if you can? 

MR. TUOHEY: On that particular issue? 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Q On that issue. 

A To my recollection, it was something along the 
lines of a very friendly comment, like hey, you know you 
haven't sent me a bill for that work, security work that you 
did at my house. How about sending me the bill. 

Q What was you] 

A I said yes, 

Q What was the tone of his voice? 

A He was very friendly, I thought in a good frame of 



:::riNCUSSlFl[D 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



mind, considering that at that period of time he was having 
what I considered major personal difficulties. 

Q At the time you received this call, you knew that 
Colonel North had been removed from the National Security 
Council staff, correct? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q And you knew that he had hired a lawyer? 

A Yes, I did. ! 

Q You also knew that he was being investigated by the 
FBI, correct? 

A I assumed he was being investigated by not only the 
FBI but a number of federal agencies. 

Q When he called you in December and asked you to 
send him a bill for the work you had aone, did you expect him 
to pay you for the work? 

A I didn't really know, but I doubt it. 

Q You knew that you had already been paid for the 
work by General Secord, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Were you surprised that he called you in December, 
several months after the work had been completed, and for the 
first time asked you for a bill? 

A Yes, I think I was surprised 

Q It's fair to say, Mr. Robinette, that you knew why 
he was asking you for this bill, correct? 



VNCUSSm 



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A I think so. 

Q And he was asking for this bill to cover himself 
because he was under investigation by the FBI and other 
federal agencies, wasn't he? 

A Yes, he was. 

MR. BARBADORO: Let me just go off the record. 
[Discussion off the record.] 
[The reporter read the record as requested. ) 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Q Mr. Robinette, did you think that Colonel North was 
asking you for a bill because he wanted to pay you the money 
that he owed you for the security system? 

A No, I didn't. 

Q Isn't it true that you thought, at the time, that 
Mr. North was asking for a bill because he wanted to cover 
himself because of the federal investigation that was then 
ongoing, correct? 

A I can't respond exactly to Colonel North's thinking, 
but I think he felt that possession of a bill would be 
helpful to him. 

Q I'm really interested here, not in Colonel North's 
state of mind, but in your state of mind. Your state of mind 
was you assumed that you were being asked to provide a bill 
that could be used to cover the installation of the security 
system, correct' 



iiNdi hmm 



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A Yes. 

MR. BALLEN: Why did you assume that? 
THE WITNESS: Because he had not been billed. 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 
Q Isn't it true there are several reasons why you 
assumed it? You assumed it because the system had been 
installed months ago and Colonel North hadn't come to you at 
the time and requested a bill, correct? 
A Correct. 

Q You also assumed it because you had sought and ' 
obtained payment from General Secord for the system, correct? 
A Correct. 

Q And you also thought it was true because of the 
circumstances at the time, where Colonel North was under 
investigation when he asked you for the bill, correct? 
A Correct . 

MR. TUOHEY: Off the record. 
[Discussion off the record.] 
BY HR. BARBADORO: 
Q After you received this phone call from Colonel 
North, what did you do? 

A I typed up an invoice, probably within several 
days, within one to two days of his phone call and mailed it. 
Q Mr. Robinette,- let me show you Exhibits 9-A and 9-B. 
A Yes, I have them. 



IINfllASSIFIED 



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CSimiNE 25 



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Q Are those invoices that you prepared after this 

December phone call with Colonel North and then sent to 
Colonel North? 

A Yes, they are. 

MR. TUOHEY: Paul, I'm not nit-picking, but he 
prepared an invoice, xeroxed it, and then typed a note. 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Q Exhibit 9-A is an invoice dated July 2, 1986, 
addressed to Colonel North for the security system in the 
amount of $8,000, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q And Exhibit 9-B is a copy of that invoice with an 
additional note written on the bottom, dated September 22, 
1986, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Is it fair to characterize Exhibit 9-A as a first 
notice and Exhibit 9-B as what is intended to be as a second 
notice? 

A That's correct. 

Q Mr. Robinette, did Colonel North ask you to send 
him a bill or did he ask you to send him copies of bill? 

A In my recollection, he said send me a bill. 

Q What you sent to Colonel North, however, was a bill 
dated July 2, 1986 and a second notice which was the original 
bill with an additional "°^s, '^fl'^^^f itfifeft 22 typed on it. 



665 



UNCLASSIRED 



correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Why did you send him a first and second notice, 
instead of just sending him a bill? 

A I selected the dates because the first date of 2 
July was approximately when the equipment was -- the install- 
ation was completely finished. And the second date of 22 
September was when the installation was working satisfactori- 
ly- 

Q Mr. Robinette, my question is what was your purpose 
in sending him these two pieces of paper? 

A To help him, to assist him. 

Q In wh?t way? 

A Because he hadn't been billed. 

Q Again, you weren't expecting Mr. North to pay you 
for this system, correct? 

A No, I was not. 

Q And there was a reason why you sent him a first 
notice dated July 2 and a second notice dated September 22, 
wasn't there? 

A Yes. 

Q Tell me what that reason was? 

A I responded in response to his request and those 
were the dates that I felt represented the true status of the 
equipment for the installation. 



IIMPI ACCIClcn 



666 



IINCUSSIFIEO 



Q Wasn't it your purpose to provide him with a 
plausible explanation as to why he hadn't paid you as of 
December, 1986? 

A I don't think so, but it was to provide him with 
documentation. 

Q Exhibit 9-B, the note that you wrote and dated 
September 22, 1986, says "Oilie, due to my schedule, I have 
not found time to follow up on my paperwork. As you can see 
from the dates, I'm sure that you have had the same problem. 
Please remit when you have time." 

When you said I have not found time to follow up on 
my paperwork, that wasn't correct, was it? 
A No. 

Q That was a deliberate misstatement? 
A Yes. 

Q What was the purpose in making that deliberate 
misstatement? 

MR. TUOHEY: Do you understand the question? 

THE WITNESS: I think so. 

MR. TUOHEY: Excuse me. 

[Witness and counsel conferring.] 

MR. TUOHEY: Can we take a break? 



■Recess . 



BY MR. BARBADORO: 



UNCUSSIRED 



Mr. Robinette, I'm going to ask you some questions 



667 



UNCLASSIRED 



about these two exhibits, some of which I've asked you 
before, but I'm going to try to put it all together here. 

Let's start with Exhibit 9-A. Exhibit 9-A is an 
invoice dated July 2, 1986, correct? 
A That's correct. 

Q Mr. Robinette, you did not prepare this invoice on 
July 2, 1986, did you? 
A No, I didn't. 

Q You prepared it in December of 1986, correct? 
A That's correct. 

Q The invoice states that it is for the installation 
f the security system that you installed at Colonel North's 
house, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q The amount that you are billing Colonel North is 
$8,000. That amount is not what the system cost, correct? 
A That's correct. 

Q That amount is an incorrect statement of what the 
system costs, right? 

A That's correct. 

Q I want to turn to Exhibit 9-B, which is a copy of 
9-A except for a note on the bottom, dated September 22. 
That date is incorrect, isn't it? You didn't prepare that 
note on September 22, did you? 
A That's correct. 



UNCLASSIHED 



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Q You prepared that note in December, didn't you? 

A That's correct. 

Q Indeed, you prepared the note at the same time you 
prepared the first exhibit, dated July 2, 1986, didn't you? 

A That's correct. 

Q So that date is false, right? 

A That's correct. 

Q In the note, you say "due to my schedule, I have 
not found time to follow up on my paperwork. " When you said 
that, that was not true, was it? 

A That's correct. 

Q When you mailed these bills to Colonel North, you 
mailed them at the same time, didn't you? 

A That's correct. 

Q When you mailed them to him, did you mail originals 
or copies? You mailed copies, didn't you? 

A Yes, I believe so. 

Q Can you explain why you made all these misstatements 
in these two exhibits and why you mailed copies to Colonel 
North, rather than original bills? 

A At that period of time. Colonel North was in what I 
considered a great deal of — having experienced a great deal 
of problems and troubles and I thought that documents -- 

[Telephone ringing ] [J NClASSIF IlD 

[The reporter read the record as requested.] | 



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THE WITNESS: And I thought that possession of 
these documents would be helpful to him. 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Q How did you think the possession of these documents 
would be helpful to him? 

A Colonel North had not been billed for the system 
and had not paid for the system. Possession of these 
documents would indicate that payments were expected. 

Q It would give Colonel North a plausible explanation 

to anybody who might ask as to why he hadn't paid for that 
system himself? 

A That's correct. 

Q Did you hear from Colonel North after sending him 
these bills? 

A I didn't hear from him by telephone but shortly 
thereafter I was surprised to receive two documents from 
Colonel North, in response to these bills. 

Q Take a look at Exhibit 10-A and 10-B. 

A Yes, I have them. 

Q Are those the letters you received from Colonel 
North in response to the bills you sent him? 

A Yes, they are. 

Q HOW long after yQ)i ^SPS- l}i!!L the_bins^ did you get 
these responses? 

A I'm only able to guess, but I'd say within a week. 



670 



tlNEUSSIflEO 



Q 

A 

Q 

copies? 

A 



Did they come together or did they come separately? 

They came together. 

Do you recall whether you received originals or 



I think I got copies. 

Q Before I get into these, I want to just go back to 
the two bills you sent. Can you describe how you sent these 
to Colonel North, the two bills. Exhibits 9-A and 9-B? 

A How I mailed them? 

Q Yes. 

A Yes. 

Q Please do that. 

A I mailed them to Colonel North's attorney. I 
selected the attorney's address rather than his home address 
because I didn't think he's get them. I knew his attorney, 
knew of his attorney, his name had been in the paper and I 
knew the office and the location. 

Q Did ycu double seal the bills? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q So that the outside envelope was addressed to the 
attorney and the inside envelope was addressed to Colonel 
North, correct? 

A That' 

Q Back to the responses that you got from Colonel 
North, the first one. Exhibit 10-A is a letter to you from 



'■— UNCUSSIflEO 



671 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Colonel North dated May 18, 1986. Did you ever receive this 
letter from Colonel North on or about May 18, 1986? 

A NO, I did not. 

Q So the first time you ever saw this letter was in 
December, 1986, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q The second letter is again from Colonel North to 
you and is dated October 1, 1986. Did you ever receive this 
letter on or about October 1, 1986? 

A No, I did not. 

Q The first time you saw this letter was in December, 
when Colonel North sent it to you? 

A That's correct. 

Q I want to read from the second paragraph of Exhibit 
10-A and that paragraph begins "It is my understanding that 
the full system will cost approximately $8,000 to $8,500." 
Mr. Robinette, did you give Mr. North that understanding in 
May of 1986, that the security system would cost between 
$8,000 and $8,5007 

A Tes, I did. 

Q I will continue, "That it can be installed quickly" 
did you give Mr. North, and I'm asking you did you give Mr. 
North the impression that the system could be installed 



quickly in May of 1986? 
A I believe so. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



672 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q I will continue reading, "And that we have two 
options for reinbursing you for the expenses: one, loan of 
the equipment for a period not to exceed the expiration of my 
active service in the United States Marine Corps (June 1988). 
At that time, we will make our home available for commercial i 
endorsement of your firm and the equipment, without fee." 

Did you ever present Colonel North with this option 



No. 



A 

I 
Q You never offered to loan him the security equipment ] 

until he ended his active service with the Marine Corps, did 

you? 

A No, sir, I did not. 

Q And he, in turn, never offered to make his home 
available for commercial endorsement of your firm and the 
equipment without a fee? 

A No. 

Q The second option he describes in the letter states 
that he will "make payment in full for the equipment and tht 
cost of installation in 24 equal monthly increments, commenc- 
ing on the date that the installation is completed and fully 
operational . " 

Did Colonel North ever offer to make payment for 
the system in 24 monthly payments 

A No, he did not. 

Q In fact, he never offered to pay you for the 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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wtmm 



installation of the system, isn't that right? 

A That's correct. 

Q I will turn to the second letter, GR-IO-B and read 
from the third paragraph of that letter. Colonel North says 
to you, "Back to the point, your note of September 22, it was 
our understanding that we were going to go ahead with the 
first option for first reimbursement, that is commercial 
endorsement of your company and the equipment when I retire 
from the Marine Corps in 1988. " 

You've already testified that you never offered 
Colonel North that option. Is that right? 

A That's correct. 

Q So you never had agreed with Colonel North that he 
could have the system in exchange for him making some kind of 
commercial endorsement of the company and the equipment when 
he retired from the Marine Corps? 

A That's correct. 

Q At the bottom of the note, what is apparently in 
Colonel North's handwriting is the P.S. "Please forgive the 
type, I literally dropped the ball." Do you know why he 
added that note to the letter? 

A I have no idea. 

Q The typeface is a little bit different on this 
letter than it is on the letter dated May 18, 1986. Do yovj 
know why the typeface appears to be different? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



674 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A No, I do not. 

MR. TUOHEY: Off the record. 
[Discussion off the record.] 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Q What did you do with these letters after you 
received, Mr. Robinette? 

A I just — these two letters from Colonel North? 

Q Yes. 

A Came as quite a surprise and I just threw them in 
my drawer, file drawer. 

Q Did you ever tell General Secord that you had sent 
bills to Colonel North and that you had received some letters 
back from Colonel North? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q When was that? 

A Sometime in this same time period of December. 

Q What was General Secord 's reaction? 

A Very noncommittal. Just simply yes, okay. 

Q Did General Secord express any surprise that you 
were sending Colonel North a bill in view o£ the fact that 
General Secord had already paid for the security system? 

A No. 

Q Did he tell you it was wrong to send Colonel North 
bill? 

A No, he did not. 



uNcussra 



675 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q When was the next time you spoke with Colonel North? 

A I believe March 16th, 1987. 

Q And that's when he telephoned you, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q And what did he say in that phone conversation? 

A Said he hadn't seen me in some time and let's get 
together for lunch. I had suggested a commercial restaurant 
downtown and he said, no, that wasn't a good idea because of 
the publicity about him, and he suggested his attorney's 
office the next day. 

Q And did you agree to meet him? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q Did ycu also hear from--strike that. 

Before going to lunch on the 17th of March with 
Colonel North, did you hear from General Secord? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q And he called you as well, correct? 

A Yes, he did. 

Q What did General Secord say to you? 

A He called in regard to a newspaper article that had 
been published that day. 

Q Tell us what the newspaper article was about. 

A It was in regard to the security installation at 
Colonel North's residence that I had participated in and made 
reference to an interviey. ^Bl«r*«4ftilPI'Pw(.ew that I had 



iisi(*iirc?l0fft' 



676 



UNCUSSIFIED 



had. General Second commiserated with me. He said sorry 
that I was involved and getting notoriety, and wanted to get 
together to talk. I told him that I was coming downtown that 
day the 17th, March 17th to meet Colonel North and he 
suggested meeting a time right after that. 

Q What happened when you got to Colonel North's 
lawyer's office that afternoon? 

A The day before Colonel North had asked me to lunch 
and also to bring the documents which I then had in my 
possession. 

Q So in his telephone conversation with you on the 
16th, Colonel North asked you to come to lunch at his 
attorney's office and he asked you to bring with you the 
bills and the letters concerning the security system, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Now please continue and describe what happened when 
you got to lunch. 

A I met in a conference of — his lawyer's conference 
room. It was a very brief luncheon, very brief meeting of 
about 40 minutes. We discussed the family, his children. He 
made two telephone calls. And then asked if I had the--if I 
had brought the documents with me. I said, yes. He said, 
let's go upstairs to see my attorney. 

Q And which attorney did you go up_tp^seeT 

A \ nentleman named Barry Simon. 



IIELASSIEIED 



677 



yn C imn. N I 



mmm 



Q And what happened when you got to Mr. Simon's 
office? 

A He introduced me to Mr. Simon and left; Colonel 
North left. 

Q And tell us what happened when you met with Mr. 
Simon. 

A Mr. Simon and I had a brief informal discussion 
about the building and security. And then Mr. Simon raised 
the question, did you bring some documents down. I said, 
yes. Can I see them? Yes, I showed them to him. He asked 
if he could make copies, and I said, certainly. He attempted 
to give them to his secretary who was not at the desk, and he 
went and made copies . 

He returned shortly thereafter — I'd say within 
three to four minutes — returned my copies to me and had his 
copies in hand. He sat down and glanced at them and said 
something along the lines, you did prepare these, or you 
prepared these, correct? And I said, that's right. 

And that was about — and just about at that time 
Colonel North came back into the office. I perceived the 
meeting was over and Colonel North took me back out of the 
office to leave. 

Q Where did you go after leaving the attorney's 
office? 

A I then went over to meet General Secord at the 



go alter leaving tiie ai-uu 

UNCUSSinED 



678 



UNCUSHD 



Capitol Hilton Hotel at 16th and K. 

Q Did Colonel North come with you? 

A No, he did not. 

Q What happened when you got to the Capitol Hilton? 

A I went in the bar. General Secord was not there. 
He did arrive within 10 minutes. We both had ordered drinks, 
or I had ordered a drink earlier. He ordered a drink. He 
commiserated again with me about the newspaper article 
expressing some sympathy that now my name was in the newspa- 
per. 

Q Did he say anything to you about the bills? 

A Yes, he did. 

Q What did he say? 

A The subject of the bills came up and he said, well, 
you sent him bills, didn't you? And I said, yes. He said, 
well, fine, you don't have anything to worry about. You did 
right — you did the right thing. 

Q What else was said at that meeting? 

A That was about it. He appeared to be in a hurry 
and he left shortly thereafter. 

Q Have you spoken to Colonel North since this meeting 
on the 17th? 



Q Did you 
Sullivan? 



"miKsra 



ttorney Brendan 



679 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A Yes. 

Q When was that? 

A That was on that same day. Later, almost within 15 
minutes of Secord's leaving. 

Q And what did Mr. Sullivan say to you? 

MR. TUOHEY: Let me just interrupt, if I may, Paul. 
Just one thing. Just so it's clear, I think Glenn ought to 
describe the circumstances. My understanding is Sullivan 
didn't know where he was, and I don't want to be unfair to 
somebody. 

MR. BARBADORO: Let's go through that. 
THE WITNESS: But I do like the idea, did you get a 
call or I would have forgot. 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Q What were the circumstances under which you 
received this call from Mr. Sullivan? 

A Shortly after General Secord left I received a call 
on my beeper. And my beeper is a display type which shows 
the number. And I called it and it was Brendan Sullivan's 
number who is Colonel North's attorney. 

Q And what did Mr. Sullivan say to you? 

A He might have commented about the newspaper 

article, just commiserating. But he said that he wanted me 

to--he wanted to tell me a couple of things, which he did. 

He said, don't cover ^OE-QPlSffl -Noptb^ Jjs'jj^ big boy, or 



680 



iiNcussm 



something to that effect, or he's a big man. And tell the 
truth. And the third was, he suggested I get an attorney. 
MR. BARBADORO: Let's go off the record. 
[Discussion off the record.] 

MR. VAN CLEVE: Let the record reflect that we've 
reconvened and Mr. Ballen has stated that he does not have 
any questions for the witness at this time. 

Mr. Robinette, I do have some questions. 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 
Q Let me start out by asking you, sir, today we did 
not go through the normal biographic details, but I want to 
have this fixed in my mind for other purposes. 
How old are you? 
A Sixty-five. 

Q Okay. And you have been employed — you left the 
Central Intelligence Agency about how long ago? 
A I left in 1971. 

Q And have you had regular employment since then? 
A No, I've worked part-time or self-employed. 
Q And I believe you testified earlier today that you 
went to work for Richard Secord sometime in March of 1986? 
A That's right. 

Q Had you ever previously worked for Richard Secord' 
A No. 



UNCIASSIRED 



681 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q 


Or for Thomas Clines? 


A 


No. 


Q 


Or for Edwin Wilson? 


A 


No. 



Q Now I believe you also testified that you were paid 
a substantial part of your total compensation from Mr. Secord 
during 1986 was money you received in cash; is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Would it be fair — this is just an estimate and I 
don't want to hold you to this — but to say that it might have 
been as much as $25,000 in cash? 

A Yes. 

Q Possibly $35,000? 

A Yes- 

Q Had you, during your prior self -employment from 
1971 through 1986, had you ever before been paid by a client 
in cash? 

A No. 
- Q Whose idea was it that Mr. Secord would pay you a 
substantial part of your total compensation in cash? 

A The subject was never discussed. I don't know. It 
must have been his idea, I guess. 

Q Is it your testimony that it seemed natural to you 
to receive $35,000 in cash^a^fter having^ never ^een paid that 
way before? iiiviii r^ili] 



682 



VNCUSSIFIED 




A No, but I didn't question it. 

Q You didn't ever ask to be paid in check? 

A No, I didn't. 

Q And you were never asked for a receipt of any kind 
by Mr. Secord? 

A No, I was not. 

Q And you have no written records of the amounts that 
you were paid; is that correct? 

A No, I do not. 

Q Now I believe you did testify that you received 
$16,000, a total of $16,000 in the form of checks during 
1986; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And was the sole purpose of those payments compen- 
sation for your fees and expenses in connection with your 
work for Mr. Secord? 

MR. TUOHEY: Let me just correct something, George. 
There are two checks for five and one for six, which is 16. 
But there's also the check for nine. Did you clarify that 
they viel^mo^ for Secord? 

MR. VAN CLEVE: I'm sorry, perhaps I misspoke. 
THE WITNESS: It's apples and oranges. 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 

Let me back up here. Exhibit 2 for the deposition 
contains three checks; one in the amount of $6,000 and two in 



Pb66 



M> C Satn N C 



_ 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

I CO.. HC. 

25 



vNcussn 



the amount of S5,000 each. And my question was, is it your 
testimony that the sole purpose of those checks was to pay 
you for your fees and expenses on behalf of work you did for 
Mr. Secord? 

A That's correct. 

Q And that work was totally unrelated to the instal- 
lation of a security system; is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q And I believe you testified previously that at some 
point in late April 1986 you were approached by Mr. Secord 
and asked whether or not you could help to provide a security 
system for Oliver North's home? 

A That's correct. 

Q And that you're not sure, if I understood your 
testimony correctly, whether or not the subject of terrorist 
threats against Colonel North came up at that time or later; 
is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q But it did come up at some point? 

A Yes, it did. 

Q Can you tell us what was said to you on the subject 
of terrorist threats against Colonel North? 



A Yes. It was described to 

Q Or his family. 

Q It was described to me that Colonel North had^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



684 



)07 C SntR. N I. 



UNCLASSIHED 



experienced a number of unusual circumstances at his house 
and that he was concerned for himself and his family. 
Specifically the name of Abu Nidal was mentioned as a 
principal terrorist represented a threat to Colonel North. 
And that since the North residence was frequently — since 
Colonel North was not at the North residence frequently, he 
wanted some kind of protection for his family. 

Q Were you ever given any specific information about 
the nature of these threats or the reasons why--you're a 
former Central Intelligence Agency officer. Were you ever 
told what type of information might have supported the idea 
that there were threats being made? 

A NO. 

Q Were you ever told anything else about that subject? 

A No. 

Q Were you told that at one point there had been 
guards posted at the North home? 

A Yes, I was. 
■ Q And will you tell us what you were told on that 
subject, please? 

A Yes, I believe Colonel North told me at one of 
those meetings; early meetings that there had been two guards 
stationed or assigned to his residence and that they stayed 
in the built-in garage area. And that his experience with 
them was not satisfactory. 



685 



UNCLASSinED 



Q From what you were told, were you able to determine 
whether these guards were private guards hired by the Norths 
or guards provided by the federal government? 

A No, I was never told that. 

Q And were you told about what time the guards had 
been stationed there? Would it have been about this same 
period of time? 

A I'm gathering it was prior to my entrance on the 
scene. 

Q But in the recent past previous to that? 

A In the recent prior time. 

Q You were told that the experience that they'd had 
with the guards had been unsatisfactory? 

A Yes. 

Q Was that suggested to you as a reason why they 
needed a security system? 

A NO. 

Q To replace the guards? 
"A No, I don't think so. No, it was not suggested to 
me. 

Q Were you told at that time — this would be in the 
spring of 1986 — that at one point Colonel North's family had 
actually physically been removed from their home in response 
to earlier threats that had been madj 

A Not that I recoiled 



"""ICLASSinED 



686 



UNCiA$sra 



Q Now when you set out to design the security system 
for the North home, this would have been probably in the 
beginning of May 1986? 

A Correct. 

Q Was the design a design that was left pretty much 
up to your expert judgment? 

A Yes, it was. 

Q And if I understood correctly, the basis of the 
design was an inspection of the North's home, together with 
your conversations with Mrs. North, together with conversa- 
tions you had with Colonel North about what kind of security 
they were looking for; is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q And I believe you told us earlier today that when 

you met with Mrs . North she described a variety of problems 
the family had had at home, that they had gotten packages of 
unknown origin, that there had been sugar put in gas tanks of 
cars that were 200 feet off the road and so on. Does any of 
this sort of thing, based on your professional experience, 
sound the like the kinds of things that terrorists do? 



No. 



Does it sound like.v. 



WSSIFIED 



Q Now the security system that you designed, was it 
•signed to protect against vandals or was it designed to 



687 



9 

10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 i 



UNCLASSIFIED 



protect against terrorists? 

A It's primary value would be against vandalism, but 
I would hope it would be a deterrent in some way to terrorists 
who might attempt to force their way into the house, at least 
she would get an alarm. 

Q But would a — 

A And she could, of course, then easily alert help 
with the built-in system. 

Q I know this is a difficult question, but in terms 
of a private home, protecting a private home against a 
potential terrorist attack with limited resources available, 
would the kind of system that you put in have provided 
reasonable protection? 

A Against terrorists? 

Q Against that kind of an attack? 

A It would give them some prior notice, prior alert 
that someone was forcing their way into the house, whether it 
was a terrorist or a good guy or a bad guy. It's just simply 
a — perhaps it was something to help Mrs. North's peace of 
mind. But as you know, protecting against terrorists is a 
very difficult job. Certainly the U.S. government has a 
iad experiences. 

Sure. Let me sharpen this question a little bit. 
24 iobviously, the Norths did not have unlimited resources. They 
^^j!!!rTr''"' 2 5 I couldn't spend the kind of money that you would spend to 



NCLASSilK": 



688 



UNClASSinED 



protect the United States Capitol. 

A Yes. 

Q But taking that into account, were they receiving 
protection really against neighborhood vandals? Or weren't 
they receiving something considerably more sophisticated that 
would, in fact, allow some warning against a potential attack? 

A The latter, yes, what you had described. Protect- 
-some early warning against a potential attack. Ideally, if 
the home style had permitted it, there should have been 
something put in the grounds so that as people, as individuals 
came through the open fence and they walked through this 
several hundred feet, the house would be alerted that someone 
was walking there. 

But when you have children, dogs, cats and horses-- 
you have to try to marry a reasonable protection system into 
a lifestyle. And their lifestyle was typically family. You 
couldn't restrict them in any way and have the system operate 
reasonably well . 

Q Okay. I believe you told us the other day — and I 
don't mean to hold you to this, but my notes reflect that 
when you described the situation the other day you told us 
about your meeting with General Secord in late April in which 
he described to you the possibility that you would undertake 
this job. And you told us, if my notes are accurate, that 
initially ar least you thouaht Sl'lf .Ull ■W'lt'^ would be paid 



689 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 



«NM«D 



for by Colonel North; is that correct? That you had an 
impression that that would be the case? 

A It was a completely — it was an assignment completely 
detached from what I was doing for Colonel North— I'm sorry, 
for General Secord, pardon me. And I would assume that this 
was Colonel North's need for some professional assistance and 
I didn't know who was going to pay for it at that time. 

Q You did know that Colonel North was a government 
official? 

A Yes. 

Q And you're a former federal government official 

yourself, right? 
A Yes. 

Q Turning to the meeting of May 5th, which I believe 
was the sort of first meeting you had with Colonel North 
himself about this. You gave him a general set of recommen- 
dations. He indicates, as I understand your testimony, that 
he wants to meet again. 

I believe you testified that at that meeting there 
was no discussion of price; is that correct? 
A At that meeting, yes. 

Q He didn't say, for example, that he couldn't afford 
to spend more than a certain amount or anything like that? 
A Not to my recollection at that meeting. 



I believe yo 



."AVlKMrfli*ll 



I want to confirm 



690 



UNCLASSIHED 



73 



this for the record, that in your view North clearly was the 
one who was making the installation decisions; what would go 
into the system, what would not go into the system? 

A I felt it was his — well, it didn't seem unusual to 
me. Yes; yes, in response. 

Q He was the client, in effect, for this job, wasn't 
he? 

A Yes, it was his house. 

Q Right, I understand. Secord had come to you, but 
he appeared to be the client for the job; is that right? 

A [Nodding affirmatively.] 

Q Now at the May 10th meeting — and we've gone over 
this a little bit earlier this morning, but I want the record 
to be as clear as it can be on this subject. This is the 
meeting where there is discussion of the price for the system 
and you give him sort of a final configuration. 

A Yes. 

Q And my question to you is, who brought up the 
question of the cost of the system? What is your recollection 
on that point? 

A I think I brought that up. 

Q Now within about 10 days or so between May 10th and 
May 19th you got at least some estimates for a significant 
part of the total job frj 

A Yes. 



mmmw 



691 



uHCUSsra 



Q And these estimates came in a lot higher than the 
$8,000, $8,500 that had been discussed at that May 10th 
meeting. Is it a fact that you never consulted with Colonel 
North after the May 10th meeting about how much the system 
was going to cost? 

A Yes, that's correct. 

Q Instead, you did check back with General Secord to 
see if the higher estimate was acceptable to him; is that 
correct? 

A Yes, I believe I mentioned it to him, yes. 

Q And I believe you told us that at all times you 
looked to Mr. Secord for the payment? 

A That's correct. 

Q So both in terms of approving the estimates and in 
terms of payment, you looked to Secord for the payment? 

A Yes. 

Q And you don't know whether or not there might have 
been some arrangement between Secord and North; is that 
correct? 

A No, I do not know. General Secord never mentioned 
anything like that to me. 

Q Now as a former federal employee, did it occur to 
you that there might be a problem if General Secord was 
paying for the installation of this 3\ 

A No, it did not occur to 



inraiiED 



692 



UNCLASSlFIEir 



UNCLASSIRED 



Q So you thought it was okay for federal officials to 
accept large gifts from other people for this sort of thing? 

MR. TUOHEY: If we were in a deposition I would 
object to that question as argumentative. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: I can rephrase it, but I'm asking 
based on his prior experience as a federal employee. 

THE WITNESS: I have to say, yes, I don't think 
federal employees should get, whatever your word, large gifts 
or whatever it was . 

BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 
Q I mean, based on your current understanding, that 
is what happened here, isn't it? You've told us that Colonel 
North has never paid a penny for' this system. That it cost 
$14,000. 

A I thought you were talking of at that time in March 
or April or whatever. 

Q I can say it as of the middle of May, if you like. 
I can say it as of the present, if you like. 
Q Whichever way you prefer. 

Q I was initially interested in your state of mind at 
the time because clearly you were dealing with Mr. Secord in 
getting his approval, looking to him for payment, and yet you 
ow whether there was any arrangement. 

So I was asking, at the time, what was your state 
25 I of mind about this? I mean, did you think this was a 



693 



UNCUSSIFIED 



76 



I perfectly proper arrangement? 

A Yes. 

Q And why was that? 

A Because I didn't think there was anything wrong 
with it at that time. I didn't know what arrangements had 
been made or were being made. 

MR. TUOHEY: Off the record for a second. 
[Discussion off the record.] 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 

Q I want to turn now to the period after November' 
25th, Mr. Robinette. I'd like to ask you to try--and maybe 
looking at your calendar will help you a little bit to place 
in time some of the events a little more precisely. I don't 
know that it will be--do you have a copy of the calendar? 

A Yes, I do. 

Q I don't know that it will be material today, but it 
may be material at a later point. 

A Okay. 

Q I believe you told us that on December 9th that you 
were interviewed by the FBI? 

A December 10th. 

Q My apologies . On December 10th you were interviewed 
by the FBI. And as I recall your testimony o;f the interview, 
you said that you were asked generally about the Iran arms 



sales, some questions ^^i^\^Mi?^99tf§^r%^^'^ about your 



mai 



694 



UNCLASSIFIED 



relationship with Secord; is that right? 

A I think so. You know, the best thing is to look at 
their records or show them to me or something. 

Q I can just tell you that whether we have them or 
not, I have not done that and haven't had a chance, and I'm 
not going to pursue it in detail. 

Were you asked about Colonel North at that inter- 
view? 

A I could have been. But again, I don't have a clear 
recollection of what they asked. They spent about an hour at 
my home . 

Q I'm not trying to put you on the spot, I'm just 
trying to see what you remember. 

A I can only answer-- 

Q You don't remember? 

A No. 

Q Okay. Now my notes reflect that you told us that 
on December 11th you then got a phone call. Was it December 
nth? 

A Yes, it was. It looks like 12:00 from the agent. 

Q So this would be the next day? 

A Next day. 

Q And it was a follow-up call by one of the agents 
that had interviewed you the day before; is that — 

A Yes. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



695 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Q And my question is — and I apologize for that sort 
of lengthy introduction — did the phone call from Colonel 
North come before or after the FBI had interviewed you in 
December? 

A That was asked yesterday. I can't recall. 

Q You don't have any way of placing the phone call in 
time? 

A No, I notice my appointment calendar for December 
is rather blank. I don't know whether it was me or what, 
because I usually have a lot of notes on there. But I don't 
know. There's no way for me to reconstruct that in my memory. 

Q Now we went over some of this ground and I am not 
at all interested in having the record be different on this 
point than it already is. But I believe you told us that the 
reason that you changed--you made out two bills that you put 
false dates on them and so on — that one of the reasons was 
that you wanted to protect Colonel North? 

A That's right. 
' Q Mr. Robinette, you didn't know Colonel North at all 
before May 1986; is that right? 

A That's correct. 

Q And you've never had any social dealings with him? 

A That's correct. 

Q And you really don't have any way of knowing much 
about his performance in the qovernment, do you? 

1^ iiiiAi if*0%inrw %, 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A Personally, no. 

Q So other than by general reputation, you really 
don't know Colonel North? 

A That's correct. 

Q Why would you want to protect him? 

A The few times that I did see him, I was impressed 
with him. In addition. General Secord had talked — had 
commented to me about Colonel North. And I think Colonel 
Dutton had commented to me. And I know Tom Clines had 
commented to me, all in the same lines, along the same lines 
that Colonel North was a super hard-charger, a workaholic, 
and a never-give-up type. 

Another point that would affect my actions was I 
was extremely impressed with Mrs. North and the family and 
the lifestyle, and the problems that she as a mother and a 
wife had to put up with. She had a pretty tough time out 
there with Colonel North always working and she having to do 
a lot of things on her own. 

Q Now you knew it was important to General Secord to 
continue his relationship with Colonel North, didn't you? 

A No. 

Q No? 

A Are you speaking in regard to those notes, those 



bills- 



UNCLASSinED 



697 



UHtmSW 



I 



A No, I would have--no, my concern with — my actions 
with the bill was primarily for Colonel North. Now as far as 
important that General Secord continue with Colonel--! don't 
know. I don't know what they were doing. I don't know if it 
would be important or not. 

MR. TUOKEY: Let me ask a clarifying^ Are" you 
asking whether or not a secondary motive or an alternative 
motive in preparing these bills was to protect General Secord? 
MR. VAN CLEVE: That's part of the question. 
THE WITNESS: I think that's true to a degree, but 
I don't know--that's true to some degree. But my primary 
objective was Colonel North. 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 

Q Have you ever asked General Secord whether he's 
received any kind of payment from North for the system? 

A No, I've never asked him. 

Q Even after the stories were in the paper and you 
met with him on March 17th, that subject never came up? 

A Never asked him. It just never came up. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: I have a couple of additional 
questions. I don't mean to be unnecessarily personal. But 
bearing in mind that this is an executive session and that I 
have not personally had the time to do the background review 
that we would normally _(4p_ here. _ _I hope^ counsel will bear 
with me. 



698 



UNCLASSIFIED 



MR. TUOHEY: Off the record. 
[Discussion off the record.] 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 

Q Mr. Robinette, have you ever been arrested? 

A No. 

Q Have you ever been indicted by either a state or a 
federal agency? 

A No. 

Q And I take it that you have never ple^d guilty to 
any charge that would amount to a felony? 

A No. 

Q Would you please tell us the nature of the lawsuit 
that you're currently involved with down in South Carolina? 

A He's suing us for failure to -- 

Q Who is he? 

A A fellow who is a principal in a firm. The firm is 
named Sisco and his name is Mario Salvador and he's suing for 
failure to meet terms of a contract. 

- Q Are there any allegations that claim fraud in the 
business relationship? 

A I don't know. He had a lengthy number of -- you 
mean about us or about me? 

Q Yes. You or your business partners? 

A No, not that I know of but you have to look at 
their records. I'm not being evasive, I lust don't recall 



m not being evasive, Ilw 

i iupi ftooid cn 



699 



UNCUSSinED 



82 



Q How much money is involved in the lawsuit? 

I'll take an approximate number. How much is the 
claim being made against you? 

A I think he wanted $750,000 or we promised to pay 
him over ten years, or something like that. I might now be 
right on that. Somebody's been down there, I know. The 
attorney said. 

Q That may be, sir, but I can tell you for what it's 
worth that they haven't been talking to me. 

I am struck by the fact that you appear to have 
voluntarily decided, in December 1986, that you were going to 
go out of your way to try and protect Colonel North while he 
was under investigation, as you knew, at the time by various 
federal agencies and officials. As I understand your 
testimony, you did that purely out of a disinterested 
personal concern for Colonel North and his family, is that 
correct? 

- A That's correct. 

Q Obviously, the testimony you are giving here today 
is going to have just the opposite effect when it's given in 
public, isn't that so? 

A Opposite effect? 

Q I think it's fair to say that this testimony is 
going to be very «^3'"*gi"3 ,*^iL,*^°l°Ji?ik ffflff |»|t®" ^^'^ given in 



700 



iimsim 



public, isn't that so? 

A Probably, yes. 

Q Did it occur to you, in December of 1986, that you 
might end up across the table, where you are today? 

A No. 

Q Why not? Didn't you think that federal inves- 
tigators were going to be pursuing this matter? 

A If it didn't occur to me, in December 1986, that's 
why not. it didn't occur to me. 

Q Mr. Robinette, you've spent a considerable part- of 
your career as an intelligence' officer, isn't that so? 

A Yes. 

Q Surely you're aware of the investigative resources 
available to the federal government, aren't you? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you mean to tell us that when you backdated 
these bills, it never occurred to you that anyone was going 
to figure this out? 

- A No, I probably wouldn't have done it. As everybody 
says, in hindsight, they wish they hadn't done something. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: I have nothing further right now. 
Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the takiQfl. flf _the 
deposition was concluded. 

[Whereupon, the witness having been 




701 



pb84 



UNCLASSIFIED 



advised of his right to read his 
deposition, waived signature.] 



UNCUSSIFIED 



507 C Suttt. N E 



702 



pb59 



wusjife 



CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC 



I, PAMELA BRIGGLE, the officer before whom the 
foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the 
witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition 
was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was 
taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or 
under my direction; that said deposition is a true record of 
the testimony given by the witness; that I am neither counsel 
for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the 
action in which this deposition was taken; and further, that 
I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel 
employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise 
interested in the outcome of the action. 



fdpi^ Ikt^^L 



PAMELA BRIGGLE 
Notary Public in and for the 
District of Columbia 



My Commission expires May 14, 1990. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



703 



(Rol^/vei^ 



lOOTH COHOKEsi'' RESOLUTION f-j,/ 

1ST SESSIOM ^ 

of the Senate Select Coramlttee on 

Secret Military Assistance to Iran 

and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



To iianunize from use in prosecution the testimony of, 

and other information provided by. 

Glen A. Robinette 

June 4, 1987 

MR. IMOUYZ, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Kicaraguan Opposition, 
submitted the following resolution to the CoimUttee, which 
approved it by unanimous vote of its eleven members on 
the 4th day of June, 1987. 

Whereas, the Senate select Conniittee on Secret Military 

Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition is con- 
ducting an investigation under authority of Senate Resolu- 
tion 23, 100th Congress, and will conduct proceedings to 
receive testimony and other information; 
Whereas, the Select Caenittee may require Glen A. Robinette 

to testify and provide other infotmatlon at its proceedings; 
Whereas, Glen A. Robinette has refused i a testify or provide 
other information at proceedings of the Select 
Coaalttee on ground of self-incrimination; and 
Whereas, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. $S 6002 and 6005, a committee may 
seek, by two-thirds vote, a court order immunizing testimony 
and other Information provided by a witness from use in 
prosecutions other than for perjury, giving a false state- 
ment, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order: 
Now, therefore, be it 

Resolved, That the Select Committee on Secret Military 
Assistance to Iran and the Nlcaraguan Opposition, pursuant to 2 
u.s.c. it ^BSDia; ana ^oar, aireccs cne Senate Legal Counsel to 
apply for a court order inwunlslng froa use in prosecutions the 
testimony of, and other inforaatlon provided by. Glen A. 
Robinette at proceedings of the Senate Select CooBlttee on Secret 
Military Aasiatance to Iran and the Nlcaxaguan Opposition. 



704 



^//.' 



~ //2-5;cnro to SAT {c^jyr. r'r^-orAt /I 
. .. _ <^^^^^ ) 

Cmo.I C^uz/C -^rs^ U^ it^^ li' ^uijj/,) 






705 



S^ TO 



iLEX MANftGER . 72£3 

ig t»leK: 08399 



GENEVA AUGUST 20TH, 1986 ; 



ATTN nRS nORABlA 

PLEASE ISSUE A CHECK IN THE AMOUNT OF 

USD 9 000,-- 

TO THE ORDER OF G.R. ROBINETTE 

AND HAIL IT DIRECTLY TO : 

G.R. ROBINETTE 
3265 ARCADIA FL NW 
■WASHINGTON DC 20013 



TEST KEY NO 151 


THAN* YOU IN ADVANCE 

tEST REGARDS 

CSF INVESTMENTS LTD. 


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715 



Glenn Robinette & Assocuites 

lliS ARCADIA PLACE. NW R B 262 

WASHINCrON. DC JCOU 



2 July 1986 



Lt. Col. Oliver North 

703 Kentland Drive 

Great Falls, Virginia 22066 

For Installation of Security Equipment, Systems 
Services at 703 Kentland Drive, Great Falls, VA. 



(This equipment should prevent any further problems for 
you and the family. Please call me if there are any questions 
about the operation of the systems and/or any other matters 
regarding protective security) 



Many thanks 



>^ 






716 



Glenn Robinette & Associates 

R B 263 



LC. Col. Oliver North 

703 Kentland Drive 

Great Falls, Virginia 22066 



For Installation of Security Equipment, Systems and 
Services at 703 Kentland Drive, Great Falls, VA. 



(This equipment should prevent any further problems for 
you and the family. Please call me if there are any questions 
about the operation of the systems and/or any other matters 
regarding protective security) 



Many thanks 



>^ 



22 September 1986 

Ollle, 

Due to my schedule I have not found time to follow up 
on my paper work - as you can - -e from the dates. I'm sure 
that you have had the same problem. Pl€3se remit when you 
have tim*. 

Many thanks I 






717 



R B 261 



L^Col Oliver L. North t 
703 Kentland Dr. 
Great Falls, Va . 22066 



18 May 1986 

Dear Mr. Robinette 

-sr^flar"f„' ?-«.f!"f^^"ed your 



y system ..^ ."^ '° "Polite 
z syacern at our hn.i«— .■ - f . _ 



--. .*«w .JL r^e re-ent t^t-k ►'■I "" '^^'^ house in Grea 

fron home, „, would very"uch Lnrec"'?"^- "'' f"^"^"^ absent. 
- -cord wu. ..e .er™r -e^Sl-u-^ri: o:r 'LsTm^:?!^,-- 



If 13 my understanding that th« f,,ii 

thft^^'^K^*^^ 58000-8500; thit it can'h""° "'^^ "" 
"" "• ""' ^-° --°" ^" "--"i" ^o!'?^^''?he^-=--,:- 
1. Loan of the equipment for > n.-j j 

expiration of my active service ^f„?? "?'^° '""'^ ^he 
Corps (June 1988) at wh?^h ► *^**" United States Marine 
available for commercial -nHli"" "® "'^^ '»*'<• 0"r home 
equipment withouriee; or """ °^ ^'""^ ^^^ "d the 
2. Payment in full ?«- ..w 

installation in zi eaual Ln?^,'^"""' '"" '"" "" °f 
the date that the inlt^lUtion LV""T"'' "^^"cing on 
operational. -i-iation is completed and fully 

Given our current financial 

alternative if this is st ill%menlh?r' ►"* """^"^ prefer the first 
particularly concerned :;oi t^^a ^roPthe^K^f^- ' '" 
unfortunate media visibility my oositiL h =hildren given the 
aforementioned terms are stiu acr.nt k? " g«"era(ed. If the 
to have you commence work as son^ ! " ^°" ' "« """ll ii^e 
course, prepared to ^ign an endorse P""'"!'" "• are, of 
require more than t'^i-'let ?er'"L°l:StcIt L°n"or;ur°rnt^'nr 



•^•vb^ 



Oliver L. North 






718 



264 



"iivjr L. North 
703 KjntUnd Dr. 
Falls Chjrch, Va. 



2206S 



O-jar Gljnn, 

c»ll«- -'" '° '"-'P ""»i"3 -.ach oth.r on pho;^: 

Tha 
Sjpc 



yodr company and thv -.qjip„.^nt „h 1 =°°«"-^ =■<: " 1 ^ndorsara-.-nt of 

- school, and XaU ,oln, .tTryl.t^'lZ'.-Vl'.ll't lUl^l'^'^ 
Plaasj advisj soonasc. i dop't wanr «« . . ,. 

I don'c -anc to hava to rasort trh^n? " "'■' ="''5''"= '"o" " bu 
-ay homa from work at night "th!r^' "^ '" stations on ™y 









719 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
=-FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND 
THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

The United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510, 

Applicant. 



Misc. No. 87 



-OLi- 



ORDER 
Upon consideration of the application by the Senate 
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, and upon determining that the procedural 
requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. S 6005 have been satisfied, 
it is, this 15th day of June, 1987, 

ORDERED That Glen A. Robinette may not refuse to 
testify, and provide other information, at proceedings of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition, on the basis of his privilege 
against self-incrimination, and it is 

FURTHER ORDERED That no testimony or other information 
compelled under this Order (or any information directly or 
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against Glen A. Robinette in any criminal case, 
except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or 
otherwise failing to comply with this Order. 



United States District Judge 



720 



V-^ UNItED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
'* FOR TITE district OF COLUMBIA 



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND 
THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

The United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510, 

Applicant. 



Misc. No. 87- 



APPLICATION FOR ORDER IMMUNIZING TESTIMONY AND 
OTHER INFORMATION PROVIDED BY GLEN A. ROBINETTE 

1. The Senate Select Committee on Secret Military 

Assista-nce to Iran and the Nicaraauan Opposition applies to 

C-r- 

this Court for an order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS ^OOi l?uJ _ 

- ■';; -^ ' 

6005, immunizing from use in prosecutions testimony, and other ^ 
information provided by one of its witnesses. Glen A. ^ "2 
Robinette, at proceedings of the Select Committee. "^ 

2. Senate Resolution 23, 100th Cong. 1st Sess., 133 
Cong. Rec. S575-78 (daily ed.. Part II, Jan. 6, 1987), 
established the Select Committee and authorized it to conduct 
an investigation into transactions to provide arms to Iran 
and into the use of the proceeds from those transactions. 

3. Senate Resolution 23 authorizes the Select 
Committee to hold hearings, conduct depositions and require 
answers to interrogatories; issue subpoenas for obtaining 
testimony and documents; and apply for immunity orders under 
18 U.S.C. SS 6002 and 6005. 



721 



»-«*■ ..i^^^it^ 



4. q^-.tfune 4, 1987, by a unanimous vote of its eleven 
members, the Select Committee adopted a resolution directing 
the Senate Legal Counsel to apply for an order immunizing 
testimony and other information provided by the witness at 
proceedings of the Select Committee. The Select Committee's 
resolution is attached as Exhibit A. 

5. It is anticipated that the witness will invoke his 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 

6. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. $ 6005 and 28 U.S.C. 
S 594(a)(7), we notified Independent Counsel Lawrence E.. 
Walsh on June 4, 1987, of the Select Committee's intention to 
request this order. A copy of the notice to the Independent 
Counsel is attached as Exhibit B. On June 4, 1987, we also 
notified the Attorney General of the Select Committee's 
intention to request this order. A copy of the notice to the 
Attorney General is attached as Exhibit C. A certificate of 
service of Exhibits B and C is attached as Exhibit D. 

7. We have been authorized to represent to this Court 
that neither the Independent Counsel nor the Attorney General 
will request this Court, under 18 U.S.C. S 6005(c), to defer 
the issuance of an immunity order for this witness. 



722 







723 



'^J i--Tj|&&^-'^ 



a 'ts ••( «i)niM?.iiM S 

■: ••='»r;-JT!iE.SAFECEn ^ 



^ 



■» 5^ 



724 



•^t^ 



Oliv-r L. North 
703 K.-ntland Dr. 
Falls Church, Va . 22066 
1 Occ 86 

D-.-ar Gl-jnn, 

security arrang-.mvnts at th-' hoas-! r T ^^^ Pl'-'^'-'d with th-. 
looking in on B-tsy and th-- cirlc'' .k" H^° Srat-.^fal for your 
school and .y h.ctlc ..cT^ol^'^l^^^tl t^^^'l^^.^'l ,\\ 

^^rlt.^^i^- wn:.r^V°J ^l^^^ f .. It was our 
option for r-.i,„bursvm-..nt - ?hat is !L ^-'^^ T"^ "^'^ ^^""^ 
your company and th-.- --quipm'nt wh!; ""™;'^=ial -'ndors-.^m-.nt of 
Corps in 1988. if chat il n^l r-tir- from th-.- Marin- 

no3.th-..r and talk Shil " w- a%r;;.%^"^:"""<^i"3, --' ----'^ to g.t 

- school, and Xait going n^^^'^^Vl' ^ lUiJ^r^ 

:'^:n.t^2rirtn;;r;o ;-^o;:\rh:ir ^° '■- =°^^^^ -°" - -^ 

way hom-.^ from work at night lit J°r^^ ^^ ^^^ stations on my 



Warm regards. 






6x. G'R- /c;^ 
t/.7/?7 r?* 



725 






LtCol Oliver 1. North, USNC 
'03 Kentland Dr. 
Great Falls, Va. 22066 

18 May 1986 

Dear Mr. Robinette 

KstlfraMon^fTsl°u"L'frsysr:rae^".^°J^^^ ^° %^P«^^- ^^« 
I. Loan of th« 




?;j!n!t! '"-^"ii ^°^ '^^ equipment and the cost of 

the dite thrt\"H •^''"^^'"°"'^^^ increments commencing on 

oSeratiJnIj! ''' ^"«^-ll"^on is completed and full/ 

Given our current financial situation, we would prefer the first 
ni't"''^'^? '^ '^^' ^" ^''^^ amenable to your companj! I am 
particularly concerned about the saf^tv of i-h« ^hiT^ ■ 
unfortunate media visibility ;y%::f;;o^1argen%' e"? ^^^th:'^ 
tn h.^! ^"^'^ '*™^ "^ ='^^^ acceptable to ?ou , we would 1 ke 
rnu.tl ^^^ commence work as soon as possible! We are, of 
course, prepared to sign an endorsement contract now if vou 
require more than this letter as indication ofour intent 



Oliver L. North 



7M 



t.jn(?i 



726 



I Glenn Robinette & Associates 

326S ARCADIA PIACE. NW 

WASHiNcrroN oc 2001s 



2 July 1986 

Lc. Col. Oliver North 

703 Kentland Drive 

Great Falls, Virginia 22066 

For Installation of Security Equipment, Systems and 

Services at 703 Kentland Drive. Great Falls, VA. 58,000.00 



(This equipment should prevent any further problems for 

you and the family. Please call me if there are any questions 

about the operation of the systems and/or any other matters 

regarding protective security) 

Many thanks I 






727 



Clinn Kohinette & Associates 

i2iS ARCADIA PLACE NW 
WASHINCTON DC ^15 



2 July 1986 

Lc. Col. Oliver North 

703 Kencland Drive 

Great Falls, Virginia 22066 

For Installation of Security Equipment, Systems and 

Services at 703 Kentland Drive, Great Falls, VA. $8,000.00 



(This equipment should prevent any further problems for 
you and the family. Please call me if there are any questions 
about the operation of the systems and/or any other matters 
regarding protective security) 



Many thanks 1 



>^ 



22 September 1986 

Ollie, 

Due to my schedule I have not found time to follow up 
on my paper work - as you can see from the dates. I'm sure 
that you have had the same problem. Please remit when you 
have time. 

Many thanks 1 






728 



\,'-V 



CARDKEY SecurO^iCyatems 
OORO-MATIC Automatic Doori 
STANLEY Parking Gate & Fence Controls 



6Bfe — 

'-'^^^ — ^^^^ Bait. 301.7< 



132 Washington Boulevard 

Laurel. Maryland 20707 

Bait. 301-792-4090 Wash. 301-953-7900 



Automatic Door Specialists 



HOK3SAL SUBUITTtO TO 

Glenn Robinette and Associates 
3365 Arcadia Place, NW 



966 - 5873 



L5S5_.. 



Private Residenrp 



nr. STATE «No ZIP coot 

Washinton. D.C. 20015 



Kentland Drive, Great Fall' 



OATl Of Pt«i 



Automatic Door Specialists (ADS) will automate the existing gate using an Edko 
Medium Duty Swing Gate Operator. To accommodate automation of gate, ADS will remove 
existing wooden gate post, replace it with a metal post painted white. 

In conjunction with automation of the gate, ADS will provide one Multi-Elmac 
Receiver and two Multi-Elmac Single Button Transmitters to operate gates from an 
automobile. 

ADS also will install an Aiphone Intercom consisting of an IBG-IGD Master Station 
inside the front door, and IBG-IHD Additional Master on the upstairs bedroom, and an 
IB-DA Door Station on a post outside the gate. 

I ADS will install intercom wiring through existing conduit and will obtain power 

from existing box in the yard near the gate location. 

Quoted price doesnot include price of permits, if needed. 



^^^^C^ 



GUARANTEE - Material & Equip. - 1 yr. Labor - 3 mo. 




Br ^ropOBr hereby to furnish material and labor — complete in accordance with above specificaions . tor the sum ot 



Two thousand one hundred fifty-four 



2,154.00 



Plymant to b« made as follows: 

U discount / 20 day. Net 30. A 1% service charge will be charged 30 days 




after the date of the invoice. 



•n \ Cofnp^fiMdc 



l^rpptanrp of PrapoBol -tm. ao 

and conditions are satisfactory and are hereby accep 
Oalt ol Accaoiance ff?'* jAtf^t.^^. '' T^ 



-A 



729 






SPECIALISTS 



imOTOM sou 



• ••0 JO'O' 



July 7, 1986 



Glen Robinette and Associates 
3265 Arcadia Place, NW 
Washington, DC 20015 



Dear Mr. Robinette: 

Attached is an invoice for $ 2,173.00. This amount represents the 
original $ 2,154.00 contracted for. plus $ 19.00 for an additional radio 
transmitter. 

Mr. Robinette, Automatic Door Specialists appreciates the business 
represented by this invoice. If we may provide additional assistance to 
you in the future, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Very truly yours, 
AUTOMATIC DOOR SPECIALISTS 







730 



^«f '^^ 



AUTOMATIC DOOR SPECIAIISTS 

IjrWtSNINfiTONIOntVAlO 
UUIB, MAITUM 20707-4397 



2764^- -r 



JOS INVOtd 
DOOR CONTROU 

SfcuRnr CAios 

rARKINO GATfS 






Glman Robln«ct« aod AaBociates 



3365 Arcadia .--ta^g m 



^Tll^ 



is.uii ',^a, D. 



Prlvf KMid«Qc«. K>n tland Drlv.. fir>^,; f ,;| „ y^ 




731 



LAUREL. MARVLMC 20707 --^*- 

PYMT RcvD 



u ir^ \v^ ls 






3166 




3 2o5 Ar cade^n^'laceT M.w. 

Vasninaton. D.C. 20015 



X. — ftlarm System Anr^ . ^^ r ^ ] ,t, 



J-: Electrical Work. 



06/20/86 



J369 



Kent land_Drive_ Proper c Y_ 



Materials 



Net -- 30 



gj.oa; 



1.25( 



2,88( 00 



SUB-rOTAL 



^ess Down PYll^ 



TOTAL DUE; 



? 7.567 



4.136 



$11.703 



? -^.'^l 



'^Mufyow 



ufo(f7 77^ 



732 



vATET.. INjC^Q^^ Zn\-ED 

\ZZ LA'FAYeTTE AVENUH! 

LAUREL. MD 20707 

9 5 3 O057 



KR. GLENN ROBINETTE 
3265 ARCADIA PLACE, N.W. 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20015 



JULY 10, 198 6 
DEAR MR. ROBINETTI 



COFt 



PER YOUR REQUEST, THE, FOLLOWING IS A SIMPLIFIED TECHNICAL 
EXPLAINATION OF THE SYSTEM DESIGNED AND INSTALLED BY "VATECINC 
AT THE NORTH RESIDENCE IN THE GREAT FALLS AREA OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
VA. 



IN ORDER TO MEET SOME SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS WE BOTH FELT WERE 
NEEDED TO ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF THE AFORKENTIONED PROPERTY, I 
DESIGNED AND ENGINEERED A SYSTEM TO DO CERTAIN OPERATIONS BOTH 
MANUALLY AND AUTOMATICALLY. 

THE BASIC SYSTEM CONSISTS OF A WIRELESS !-JLr.?r. SYSTEM WHICH 
PROTECTS THE HOUSE EY DETECTING UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY AND MOVEMENT 
WITHIN THE HOUSE WHILE ARMED. THE HOUSE IS ALSO PROTECTED FROM 
FIRE BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE "SMOKE DETECTORS". OUTSIDE 
LIGHTS, USING THE LATEST ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY, WE.RE INST.ALLED 
TO INCREASE THE PROTECTION. IT IS A WELL KNOWK FACT THAT THE 
GREATEST DETERANT TO BURGULARS AND VANDALS ETC., IS THE PRESENCE 
OF LIGHT. THESE LIGHTS ARE ARRANGED SO THAT THEY CAN BE USED FOR 
CONX^NIENCE AND ARE CONNECTED SO THAT AN ALARW BY THE SYSTEM 
TURNS ALL LIGHTS ON UNTIL THE AI,ARM IS TURNED OFF BY THE OWNER. 
THE SYSTEM IS ALSO CONNECTED BY THE PHONE TO A CENTRAL STATION 
WHICH CALLS THE PROPER AUTHORITIES WHEN THERE IS AN UNAUTHORIZED 
ENTRY, FIRE OR OTHER KIND OF EMERGENCY SITUTION, 3Y SPECIAL 
ELECTONIC CODE. 

I ALSO HAD A SPECIAL ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT INSTALLED AT THE FRONT OF 
THE PROPERTY NEAR THE GATE TO PROVIDE A MEANS BY V.-HICH VARIOUS 
CEVICES COULD BE OPERATED BY STANDARD "AC" LINE VOLTAGE. I MADE 
SURE 3Y MY SPECIFICATIONS THAT CERTAIN SAFETY PRECAUTIONS WERE 
INCORPORATED SO AS TO MAKE THAT CIRCUIT MORE RELIABLE. 

THE WORK ALSO INCLUDED THE INSTALLATION OF A SIREN IN ONE VEHICLE 
TO BE USED AS A DISTRESS SIGNAL. 




t/.7/f9 JUi 



733 



IN THE ONITED STATES DISTRICT COORT 
-- FOR. THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA 



HOOSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 
COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 



O.S. House of Representatives 
Washington, O.C. 20515 



Applicant. 



ORDER 



Misc. NO. S7- ^'^ 



FILED 

JUN 1 5 1937 

CLE'JK. U. S. DISTRICT COURT 
DiSTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



On consideration of the application by the House Select 
Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and 
the memorandum of points and authorities, and exhibits, in 
support thereof, the Court finds that the procedural requisites 
set forth in 18 U.S.C. S 6005 for an order of the Court have been 
satisfied. Accordingly, it is 

ORDERED that Glen Robinette may not refuse to provide any 
evidence in proceedings before the House Select Committee to 
Investigate Covert Arma Transactions with Iran on the basis of 
his privilege against self-incrimination, and it is 

FORTHER ORDERED that no evidence obtained under this Order 
(or any information directly or indirectly derived from such 
evidence) may be used against Glen Robinette in any criminal 
case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, 
or otherwise falling to comply with this Order. 



■1- 



6^. G-^-ilA 



734 



FURTHER OabBRED That this Order shall become effective 
June IS, 1987. 



Onrlted States District '5ud 



Onrited States District '<fudge 
Dated: June 15, 1987 



-2- 



Unlted States District Court 
tor th» District or Coluxbu 
A THUS COPY 

JAMES r. DAVSy. rLIRK. 

Deputy Cler^ 



735 



Wher^Te, the Select Committee respectfully requests 
that this Court issue an order immunizing from use in 
prosecutions testimony and other information provided by Glen 
A. Robinette at proceedings of the Select Committee. 
Respectfully submitted. 



Of Counsel: 

Arthur L. Liman 
Paul J. Barbadoro 
Mark A. Belnick 



UDu.. 



Michael Davidson 
Senate Legal Counsel 

Ken U. Benjamin, Jr. 
Deputy Senate Legal Counsel 

Morgan J. Frankel 

Assistant Senate Legal Counsel 

Susan B. Fine 

Assistant Senate Legal Counsel 

642 Hart Senate Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
(202) 224-4435 

Counsel for Senate Select Committee 
on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Dated: June 15, 1987 



736 



UNITED "-STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND 
THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



The United States Senate ) Misc No Ri-J}*f 

Washington, D.C. 20510. ^°- ^^-fSU 



Washington, D.C. 20510, 
Applicant 



MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 

SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR ORDER IMMUNIZING TESTIMONY 

AND OTHER INFORMATION PROVIDED BY GLEN A. ROBINETTE 

The Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 

to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition is applying to this Court 

for an order immunizing testimony and other information which 

will be provided to it by one of its witnesses. Glen A. 

Robinette. The application is presented pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 6005 which provides, in relevant part: 

S 6005. Congressional proceedings. 

(a) In the case of any individual who has 
been or may be called to testify or provide 
other information at any proceeding before 
either House of Congress, or any committee ... a 
United States district court shall issue, in 
accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
upon the request of a duly authorized representa- 
tive of the House of Congress or the committee 
concerned, an order requiring such individual to 
give testimony or provide other information which 
he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his 
privilege against self-incrimination, such order 
to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 

(b) Before issuing an order under subsec- 
tion (a) of this section, a United States district 
court shall find that — 

(1) * * * * 



737 



(2) in the >case of a proceeding before a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House of 
Congr^^»- . . . the request for such an order has 
been approved by an affirmative vote of two-thirds 
of the members of the full committee; and 

(3) ten days or more prior to the day on 
which the request for such an order was made, the 
Attorney General was served with notice of an 
intention to request the order. 

(c) Upon application of the Attorney General, 
the United States district court shall defer the 
issuance of any order under subsection (a) of this 
section for such period, not longer than twenty 
days from the date of the request for such order, 
as the Attorney General may specify. 

This law provides the mechanism by which a witness before 
a congressional committee receives "use immunity" for testi- 
mony. The immunized witness remains subject to prosecution for 
the transactions ajsout which he or she testifies if the govern- 
ment sustains the burden of proving at trial that it did not 
use the immunized testimony or its fruits in the prosecution. 
See Kastigar v. United States , 406 U.S. 441, 459-62 (1972). 
Because the court's inquiry on an application for an immunity 
order is narrow and its tests are mechanical, the application 
may be decided ex parte without a hearing. Ryan v. Commis- 
sioner of Internal Revenue , 568 F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1977), 
cert, denied , 439 U.S. 820 (1978). 

Section 6005 sets out the two requirements for an immunity 
order, both of which have been met.i' First, "in the case of a 



1/ The Select Committee may apply for this order prior to 
summoning the witness to testify or provide information at one 
of its proceedings. In re Application of United States Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (Cammisano) , 655 F.2d 
1232, 1236-38 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981). 



738 



proceeding before a conunittee ... the request for such an order 
has been ap^oved by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
members of the full co'mmittee. " 18 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(2). The 
Select Committee's resolution (Exhibit A to the application), 
shows that the Committee approved this request for an order by 
a unanimous vote of its eleven members on June 4, 1987. 

Second, "ten days or more prior to the day on which the 
request for such an order was made, the Attorney General was 
served with notice of an intention to request the order." is 
U.S.C. $ 6005(b)(3). Under 28 U.S.C. $ 594(a) and (a)(7), an 
independent counsel has, for all matters within his prose- 
cutorial jurisdiction, "full power and independent authority to 
exercise all investigative and prosecution functions and powers 
of the ... Attorney General ... includ(ing] ... for purposes of 
sectionO ... 6005 of title 18, exercising the authority vested 
in ... the Attorney General." The testimony and other 
information sought to be compelled from the witness is within 
the investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction that the 
special division of the District of Columbia Circuit has vested 
in Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh. In re Oliver L. 
North, et al.. Div. No. 86-6 (D.C. Cir. Division for the 
Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels, Dec. 19, 1986). 
The accompanying certificate (Exhibit D) shows that Independent 
Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh was served with notice of our 
intention to request this order (Exhibit B); notice to the 



739 



Independent Counsel was ^iven on June 4, 1987, which is "ten 
days or morej>tior to" today.!/ 

Accordingly, the Select Conunittee requests that the Court 
issue an order inununizing the testimony and other information 
which Glen A. Robinette will provide at proceedings of the 
Select Committee. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Michael Davidson 
Senate Legal Counsel 

Ken U. Benjamin, Jr. 
Deputy Senate Legal Counsel 

Morgan J. Frankel 

Assistant Senate Legal Counsel 

Susan B. Fine 

Assistant Senate Legal Counsel 

642 Hart Senate Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
Of Counsel: (202) 224-4435 

Arthur L. Liman Counsel for Senate Select Committee 

Paul J. Barbadoro on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 

Mark A. Belnick and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Dated: June 15, 1987 



2/ On June 4, 1987, we also notified the Attorney General 
(Exhibit C) in the event that he believes that notice should 
also be provided to him notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. S 594(a)(7) 



740 



t? 



f 



SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT 

ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

and 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 

TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

Washington, D.C. 
Wednesday, June 17, 1987 

The deposition of GLENN A. ROBINETTE, called for 

examination in the above-entitled matter, pursuant to notice, 

in the offices of the Senate Ethics Committee, Room 220, Hart 

Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C, convened at 10:41 

a.m., before Pamela Briggle, a notary public in and for the 

District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the 

parties: 



^- /( V'^ 



741 



pb2 



APPEARANCES : 



On Behalf of the Select Committee on Secret Military 
Assistance to Iran and Nicaraguan Opposition of the 
United States Senate: 

PAUL BARBADORO 

Deputy Chief Counsel 

KENNETH BALLEN, Staff Counsel 

JOHN R. MONSKY, Staff Counsel 

Room 901 

Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 



On Behalf of the Select Committee t 
Transactions with Iran of the U.S. 
Representatives : 



) Investigate Arms 
House of 



GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE 
Room H-149, U.S. Capitol 
House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 

On Behalf of the Witness: 

MARK H. TUOHEY, III, ESQUIRE 
Pierson, Ball & Dowd 
1200 18th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 



Also Present: Thomas Polgar 



742 



pb3 



ym C Soot. NX 



CONTENTS 



WITNESS 

GLENN A. ROBINETTE 



By Mr. Barbadoro 
By Mr. van CI eve 



NUMBER 

GR-1 

GR-2A-B 

GR-3 

GR-4A-B 

GR-5A 

GR-6A-B 

GR-7A-F 

GR-8A-E 

GR-9A-B 

GR-IOA-B 

GR-llA-B 



EXAMINATION 



EXHIBITS 



FOR IDENTIFICATION 



743 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
— FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 



SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND 
THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

The United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510, 

Applicant. 



Misc. No. 91- p2J^ 

FILED 

JUi\ 1 5 1937 

ORDER CLE^'<. u s 0'-"^"^^ COURT 

DISTRICT Oh- COLUMB^ " 

Upon consideration of the application by the Senate 
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, and upon determining that the procedural 
requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. S 6005 have been satisfied, 
it is, this 15th day of June, 1987, 

ORDERED That Glen A. Robinette may not refuse to 
testify, and provide other information, at proceedings of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition, on the basis of his privilege 
against self-incrimination, and it is 

FURTHER ORDERED That no testimony or other information 
compelled under this Order (or any information directly or 
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against Glen A. Robinette in any criminal case, 
except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or 
otherwise failing to comply with this Order. 



United States District Cc-jrt 
for the ris'.T-loc of CjI 



t:.:^ A^,.:.^ 



TP.'JS zz.'i '^ " United States Distf.ict Judge 

JAiES F. :a;jy, 



Dv^auty Clerlt 



744 



MICHAEL OAVIOSOM 



SUSAN S riNC 



HBtal States Senate 



lOexMio-riM 



NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST 
ORDER CONFERRING IMMUNITY 



The Honorable Lawrence E. Walsh 
Independent Counsel 
555 13th Street, N.W., Suite 701 
Washington, D.C. 20004 



Please take notice that the undersigned, as 
representative of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 
will request the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. $ 6005 and 
2 U.S.C. SS 288b(d) and 288f, to issue an order immunizing 
from use in prosecutions the testimony of, and other 
information provided by. Glen A. Robinette at proceedings of 
the Select Committee. 



#.1J 

Michael Davidson 
Senate Legal Counsel 
642 Senate Hart Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
(202) 224-4435 



Dated: June 4, 1987 



MICHAEL DAVIDSON 

<ENU I 



745 



BnitDl States ^mtt 

ofnci Of SiMATt iioAi couNsa 



NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REQUEST 
ORDER CONFERRING IMMUNITY 



TO: The Honorable Edwin Meese III 

The Attorney General of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20530 

Please take notice that the undersigned, as 
representative of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 
will request the United States District Court for the 
?\^,'^o^S*^ °^ Columbia, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6005 and 
?ro; •' 288b(d) and 288f, to issue an order immunizing 
from use in prosecutions the testimony of, and other 

ih- c"f''^?V°''''^^'^ ''y' '^^®" '^- Robinette at proceedings of 
the Select Committee. 



4ichael Davidsc 



Michael Davidson 
Senate Legal Counsel 
642 Senate Hart Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
(202) 224-4435 



Dated: June 4, 1987 



746 



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 



I certify that on June 4, 1987, in accordance with 18 
U.S.C. S 6005(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. S 594(a)(7), I caused to be 
hand delivered to The Honorable Lawrence E. Walsh, Independent 
Counsel, and the Honorable Edwin Meese III, the Attorney 
General of the United States, notices of the intention of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition to seek an order conferring 
immunity upon Glen A. Robinette. 



Mu ^. 



u.. 



Michael Davidson 
Senate Legal Counsel 



EXHIBIT D 



747 







748 



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GLENN A OCSINETTE 
WASniMSTCH. C .^OOlt 



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ttaaMBMCAM 

*:o5i,ooooi.i.: 5 ^o^ ait- -i /oooo70oooo/_ 



755 




tWfrBBK"*"7Pf7 



OF PROCEEDINGS 

CONFIDENTIAL 

UKITED STATES SENATE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 

IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



DEPOSITION OF FELIX I. RODRIGUEZ 



■ Declassified/ReleasMl nn QoAiq lAp 
under provisions of E.0. 12356 

2, Reger, National Security Council 




57/ s 



Washington, D. C. 



Friday, May 1, 1987 



UNCLASSlRONRDSmiAt 



fUifnjX 



Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 

Stetwtype Reporten 
444 North Capitol Street 
Washington, DC. 20001 

(202) 347-3700 

Nationwide Coverage 

800-336-6646 

COPY NO. 



756 



UNCLASSIFiED 



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ii 22 



UNITED STATES SENATE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 

IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

DEPOSITION OF FELIX I. RODRIGUEZ 

Washington, D.C. 
Thursday, Aoril 30, 1987 
Deposition of FELIX I. RODRIGUEZ, called for 
examination pursuant to subpoena, at the Hart Senate Office 
Building, Suite 901, at 10:35 a.m., before Michael G. 
Paulus, a notary public in and for the District of 
Columbia, when were present on behalf of the respective 
parties: 

PAUL BARBADORO, ESQ. 
Deputy Chief Counsel 
United States Senate Select 
Committee on Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition 

- continued - 



G^GlilSSSFPEO 



Ace-Federal Reporters. Inc. 

202-J47-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 



757 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



TOM P.foLGAR, ESQ. 
RICHARD CULLEN, ESQ. 
RICHARD ARENBERG, ESQ. 



uwcussiF'in 

Ace-Federal Reporters 



Ace-Federal Reporters. Inc. 

202-347-3700 Nitionwide Coverage 80O-336-«646 



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GNCLASSIF'.EI 



WITNESS 

Felix I. Rodriguez 
By Mr. Barbadoro 



CONTENT 
EXAMINATION 



EXHIBITS 



gmcUssif;eo 

Ace-Federal Kepori 



Reporters, Inc. 



Nationwide Coverage 



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i;NCLASS]F:g9 



PROCEEDINGS 
Whereupon, 

FELIX I. RODRIGUEZ 
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BARBADORO: 

Mr. Rodriguez, you received a letter from 
Colonel North in September of 1985, did you not? 

A Yes, sir, I did. 

When did you receive that letter, exactly? 

A It was dated the 20th and I received it on the 
29th. 

you have provided the committee with a copy of 
that letter, correct? 

A Yes, sir, I have. 

Can you tell rae in general terms what that 
letter asked you to do? 

A It was basically to set up a logistical asoect 
of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters resupply network. The 
letter actually said only to be able to produce maintenance 
at the area where I was able to help in Central America. 



^ fl UIcHpSotoA iStorters. Inc. 

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INCLASSIFIlD 



Q Did this letter ask you to provide storage 
facilities for ammunition and humanitarian' aid? 

A No, sir. Not at that time. 

Q It only asked you to provide maintenance 
facilities? 

A Right. Space in the area where airplanes could 
be serviced on a week basis and two or three different 
types of aircraft. 

Q What did you do after you received the letter? 

A I talked to the proper people that I was asked 
to contact and that I knew and had good relations with and 
acquired the okay to go ahead and use that area for 
maintenance of the aircraft. On the following day I 
notified Colonel North over the telephone that it was a go. 

Did Colonel North give you any instructions at 
that time? 

A In the letter he said that the individual who 
was going to help me to set this up will call me or contact 
mo and identify himself as coming from Mr. Green. 

Did you ever receive a call from someone who 
identified himself as working for Mr. Green? 

A Yes, I did, sir. I received a call, I would 



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yi^CUSSlFSED 



say, approximately (witness reviewing notebook) — i would 
say it was the 14th of December 1985. I received a call in 
my room at the air base where I was and the individual that 
I knew from before identified himself as coming from 
Mr. Green. 

Who did you know this individual to be? 

A Raphael Quintero. 

What did the person say to you in the phone 
call? 

A He identified himself and then he said if I 
could arrange the arrival of a Boeing 707 from Europe — 
the way he described it was it was bringing heavy stuff", 
and if I could keep it in the area of my responsibility. I 
said I would check with the local people and to contact me 
later. wWhich he did, and I was able to get the okay from 
our friendlies in the area to go ahead and receive this 
aircraft with the heavy stuff we had assumed was military 
equipment. 

Q Did he ask you to provide a facility to store 
the material brought in on it? 

A Yes. He asked me if it was possible for me to 
store it in the area. It was possible in local facilities 



»<^TERS. Inc. 

Nationwide Coverage 80O-33*-«46 



762 



^ji^'i;iMSSiiF^£0 



7680 01 01 

W-kepaulu3 1 to store it, which we did. 

2 When did the aircraft arrive? 

3 A The aircraft arrived on the following day, which 

4 I believe was on the weekend, a Saturday, and it was a 

5 Boeing 707 from Southern Air Transport. 

6 Q What did the plane contain? 

7 A The plane contained mainly, if I recall 

8 correctly, hand grenades, 81 millimeter mortar rounds, 60 

9 millimeter mortar rounds, ammunition of different calibers, 
10 and perhaps some 40 millimeter rounds. There were several 

^ 11 shipments later on. So I am taking all that arrived could 

12 have been on that plane. The other three eventually did 

13 all arrive with this type of equipment. Some C-4 

14 explosives, detonators and primers, etc. It was 

15 approximately 88,000 pounds. 

16 What did you do with the material that was 

17 brought in on the plane? 

18 A The material that was brought in was stored in a 

19 local facility belonging to a local officer of the area. 

20 Did you meet with Colonel North in December of 

21 1985 in Central America? 

22 A Yes, sir. Colonel North visited the area where 



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I was working on a helicopter program, on December 30, 
1985, if I recall correctly. 

How did he get to Central America? 

A He arrived, I believe, in a Jetstar aircraft. 

Who was with him? 

A My understanding Is It was to coordinate the 
legal humanitarian aid approved by Congress, and aboard 
that aircraft was^HH^^^L I had known him before when 
he was number three man for Ambassador] 

^^^^^^H There was^^^^^^^^V, who was from 

the agency. During that meeting were also present the 
Ambassador^^^^^^^^^^l^^^^^^^^^^^^H h Is 
officer, if I recall correctly, andj 




and myself. Probably 
but I'm not sure. 
In general terms, what was discussed at that 
meeting? 

A If I understand correctly, they were having 
problems with being able to bring In humanitarian aid into 

secause of some kind of political situation and 
they thought of the possibility of temporarily usinq^H 



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^'kepaulus 1 ^^^^^^1 ^° have there the humanitarian aid that was being 

2 approved by Congress. They wanted to make sure that 

3 nothing was stolen or lost and they had to create a balance 

4 and check type of situation on everything that arrived and 

5 departed from there. 

6 Q Up to that point had any humanitarian aid 

7 arrived at your location in Central America? 

8 A No, sir. 

9 At some point after that did humanitarian aid 

10 arrive at that location? 

11 A Yes, sir. Later on, in the beginning of 1986, 
^ 12 there was an LlOO from Southern Air that did carry some 

13 Butler buildings to be built for this purpose. And also 

14 some humanitarian aid, I believe, came along on the same 

15 aircraft. 

16 Was that in January of 1986? 

17 A To the best of ray recollection, it was January 

18 17 when the first flight arrived, and I told you that later 

19 on I would provide you with more details. 

20 During the entire time that you were down there, 

21 that being 1985 and 1986, how many flights of humanitarian 
^ 22 aid arrived? 



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A I cannot really be sure at that time. There 
were not many. Maybe two, maybe less, maybe three. I will 
be able to answer that question after I go back to Miami 
and look at some notes that I may have, to be accurate. 

Where would the humanitarian aid be stored? 

A It was supposed to be stored in that warehouse 
that was being built, the Butler buildings. 

During 1985 and 1986 did more lethal aid arrive 
at your location? 

A Yes, sir. In 1986 there were several 707s 
coming from Europe, also for Southern Air, that arrived in 
the area. At one point two aircraft came in one day after 
the other, which I believe to be the 25th and 26th of May. 
It was also military equipment, and approximated between 
88,000 and 90,000 pounds apiece. Same type of material 
that I already described before. 

In total, how many flights of lethal aid were 
brought Into your location? 

A To the best of ray recollection, there were 
somewhere between five, probably six, but not much more 
than that. I will try to provide more accurate records 
later on. 



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^Hkepaulus 1 Do you have an estimate of the total number of 

2 pounds? 

3 A Yes, sir. The estimate that we believe we had 

4 in the warehouse for military aid did not go over 500,000 

5 pounds. 

6 Do you recall a meeting again with Colonel North 

7 in Central American in April 1986? 

8 A Yes, sir. I recall a meeting with the colonel 

9 on April 20, 1986. 

10 How did Colonel North get to Central America on 

11 that occasion? 

^ 12 A He was using the same aircraft he had used 

13 before, the Jetstar, and he arrived the 20th of April into 

14 this friendly country, and he was accompanied by retired 

15 General Secord, Dick Gadd, all the members of the crew that 

16 had been recruited for the resupply operation. There was a 

17 meeting held at that location. ^^^^^Bjfrom the FDN came 

18 to discuss the aid to Nicaraguan freedom fighters. 

19 What did you understand General Secord' s role to 

20 be in this resupply operation? 

21 A General Secord seemed to be the individual in 

22 charge of all the operation itself as far as personnel was 



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concerned and the logistics in the program. He was the one 
who controlled the individuals who came on that plane. 

Prior to this meeting had you had any 
discussions with General Secord over the phone. 

A Well, I realized later on that I did have a 
discussion with the general over the telephone over an 
incident of a mechanic that was brought into the area where 
I was, a conflicting type of situation. 

Can you describe that incident? 

A Yes, sir. One day we were called by Mr. Gadd, 
if I recall correctly. They gave us a name, which I have 
now forgotten, but I am sure that you have it. It Was an 
individual who was going to be working for us as a mechanic 
in this project. He arrived. We sent a couple of people 
to pick him up at the airport. They really could not 
recognize the individual, so they returned. 

Later on this individual called from the hotel. 
When they picked him up they said it was hard to recognize 
him because he looked pretty old, that he could be going 
into a nursing home. 

This individual came to the house that we had 
provided for him. The first night he drank 24 beers; the 



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7680 01 01 

^'kepaulus 1 sacond night he drank 36 beers. He told one of our kickers 

2 working^ in the project that he was told that this was a 

3 money-making operation, that he had fixed one plane in 

4 l^mP at one time was doing contraband in Mexico for 

5 $5,000 in one night; and he also fixed drug planes in 

6 Puerto Rico, from Colombia. 

point ^°^<^ HBI^BHHv ^h° 

8 brought me the information, I didn't even want to meet him 

9 or have him know what the operation was about, and tried to 
10 prepare his return to the United States on the following 

^ 11 day. 

12 After that I did call Colonel North, to his 

13 telephone in the White House. I started explaining to him 

14 the circumstances of this individual and my decision to 

15 send him back immediately without further explanation what 

16 the program was. He said to me here is the man you have to 

17 talk to .about it, who was in charge of that, if I 

18 understand correctly. Or similar words. He put on the 

19 phone a man he identified as Dick. At the beginning I 

20 thought it was Mr. Gadd, but later on I realized he was 

21 General Secord. 

^22 I explained the situation to the general in a 



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very strong voice like he has, and he told me he would take 
care of it. At that point I told hira I was sending this 
individual back to the states, and he agreed to it. 

Did the mechanic end up being sent back to the 
United States? 

A Yes, sir, and I don't think he ever knew what 
the operation was all about. 

Let's go back to the April 20 meeting. What was 
the purpose of that meeting? 

A The purpose of that meeting was trying to 
coordinate with the FDN the support to the north front also 
and explain to|HHthe use of these aircraft. The TON 
was apparently very unhappy with the type of aircraft, 
because of the poor condition of it and low speed of the 
aircraft, and also the small capability of carrying 
equipment in it. They thought it was taking a lot of risk 
in one of these aircraft to resupply their units. It would 
carry cargo of probably less than 5,000 pounds, and the 12 3 
less than 10,000 pounds in reality when you have to fill 
them up. He explained his concerned and that the FDN 
fighters were not willing to fly this type of aircraft. 
He was told by Colonel North that they had 

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professional people who had done it very successfully In 
other parts of the world and they would prove to the PDN 
that these aircraft were adequate for the job and at the 
present time there would be a U.S. crew flying there, that 
there were European crews being prepared to come in and 
eventually train the Nicaraguan pilots to do the job 
afterwards. 

When ^mH complained to Colonel North about 
the condition of the aircraft did Colonel North give an 
explanation to^^^^H as to where the aircraft had come 
from? 

A Yes, sir. WhenJUH^I told the colonel why 
not give him the money to buy more decent aircraft than 
these Colonel North explained to him there was no money 
involved in this transaction, that these aircraft were a 
donation to the freedom fighters, and that If he had the 
money he would have bought for them a C-130> since he 
didn't. It Is better to have this type of aircraft than 
nothing, and we will provide whatever he was getting as 
donations from people. 

Mr. Rodriguez, could you describe what your rol< 
in this resupply operation was In general terms? 



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7680 01 01 
^'kepaulus 1 A My main thing, which I self-imposed on myself, 

2 in the area was to help the local people with the 

3 helicopter concept to eliminate the communist guerillas in 

4 the area. 

5 That was working with the host government; is 

6 that right? 

7 A Yes, sir. 

8 I do strongly support the Nicaraguan freedom 

9 fighters after losing my native country to communism, and I 

10 was all for supporting Colonel North in the effort to help 

11 these people. 

^ 12 What support did you give to this effort? 

13 A Basically, I was the main liaison with the host 

14 government in the area and was responsible for getting ID 

15 cards on the base to come in and out, and to coordinate the 

16 clearance to leave the air base on the missions and back, 

17 and the arrival and departure of material in that area. 

18 At some point did you decide to end your 

19 involvement with the resupply effort? 

20 A Yes, sir, I did. 

21 When was that? 

^ 22 A That was shortly after this meeting that Colonel 



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North came to the area. I hate to say* but I had known a 
lot o£. these people who came to be known to me as time went 
by in this process, and I was not very happy with the 
caliber o£ personnel involved in this operation. I felt 
that the background of these individuals would eventually 
create a problem not only for the Nicaraguan freedom 
fighters but for the administration. 

And that was the reason that you decided to 
leave the operation? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q What did you do when you made this decision to 
leave? 

A I went to the host officer that I had originally 
talked to to help me. I told him that I was tired, that I 
had been away from my family for over a year, and the 
program that I was involved in with the helicopters was 
working properly and I was going to leave. 

At that point he told me he felt that my 
presence in the area was important and that I should stay. 
I agreed with him that 1 would return later on and explain 
to him all of the details if I finally decided to leave the 



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7680 01 01 

>cepaulus 1 I "-lent to see the ambassador in the afternoon. 

2 He had .no idea that I was involved in the military aspect 

3 of it. He knew -that I had participated in the humanitarian 

4 aid program. None of this did I express to the 

5 ambassador. I just told him the same thing I told my 

6 friend, that I was tired and that I had been away from the 

7 family too long and I was going to leave the area, and that 

8 I was also tired from begging for airline tickets from a 

9 friend of mine to be able to commute back and forth from 

10 that area. 

11 At that point the ambassador saw that I was 

12 doing a good job with the helicopter concept in the area, 

13 that I should stay. He asked me to stay. He asked me for 

14 my address and telephone number so that we could maintain a 

15 personal relationship? that he appreciated it the same as I 

16 did. 

17 I also told hira that I was planning to come to 

18 Washington soon to visit the vice president. I had 

19 requested the meeting in order to brief him on what I done 

20 in a little bit over a year in the area, my results with 

21 the helicopter concept, and also explain to the vice 

22 president the reason I was going to leave the area. 



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Did that meeting with the vice president take 



Yes, sir. That meeting took place on May 1, 



Before that meeting you met with Colonel North, 




place?. 

A 
1986. 


correct? 

A Yes, sir, I did. 

Could you describe what happened in your meeting 
with Colonel North? 

A Yes,, sir. I asked to be cleared into the White 
House a little bit earlier. I basically told him the same 
thing I had said before. I explained to the colonel that I 
was tired, that I wanted to leave, and that I was planning 
to leave at that point in time to express it to the vice 
president. He told me that my help was very needed and 
useful in this program and that he knew that all soldiers 
get tired and I should consider staying; to go ahead and 
take two weeks vacation but stay in the program. Which I 
did not agree with, and I said I was still leaving. 

At that point I left, because my time was 
getting close to my meeting with the vice president. I 
came down to the second floor. At the time, if I recall 



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7680 01 01 

m 'tepaulus 1 correctly, the vice president was acting president since 

2 president Reagan was in Japan or somewhere. 

3 So we went to the other side of the White House, 

4 Mr. Gregg, Sara Watson, his assistant, and myself, and we 

5 met the vice president, who was with Nick Brady, former 

6 senator. He told me he wanted the senator to stay since he 

7 was very much interested in Central America and had been on 

8 the Kissinger Commission. 

9 So we had the meeting from approximately 11:30 

10 in the morning until 12:00 noon. 

11 In that meeting did you describe what you had 
^ 12 done in implementing your helicopter concept? 

13 A I explained to the vice president from the 

14 beginning of my arrival in the area the problem I 

15 confronted in establishing my concept until I had the good 

16 luck of capturing ^^I^H^^^H, and from then on had a 

17 lot of support from the local individuals. I explained to 

18 hire the statistics that I had been given on the reduction 

19 of the guerillas since I had been in the area and how good 

20 the concept was going. 

21 I also brought an album with pictures on the 
1^ 22 concept that I was doing with helicopters, etc. 



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In the middle o£ that meeting one o£ his aides 
came and requested thatH^^^^^^^^^Hwanted to step 
in for a moment to say hello. The vice president said that 
he was already late for another appointment, but this 
individual insisted. So he said only for a short time. 

The Ambassador came in accompanied by Colonel North. 
Colonel North stayed in the background. The ambassador 
said hello to all of us and then asked the vice president 
to use his influence in getting me to stay! 
He explained to the vice president he was very happy with 
what I had done there, and as long he was arobassador^^^H 
^l^^^^ffor me to stay in there and continue to help. 

Had you told the vice president that you were 
planning to leave at that point? 

A No, sir, I didn't. So I really believe that the 
vice president didn't know what the hell he was talking 
about. I guess we all have feelings, and I, of course, 
felt good that the ambassador would do that, and I made the 
mistake of not following through with my decision. 

I didn't mention emything to the vice 
president. I want to make sure to stress that at no point 
in time did I mention to the vice president anything else 



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that I was involved in. 

0^ You didn't tell him anything about your efforts 
with the resupply? 

A Not to him. Only a member of his staff. 

So you decided at that point that you would 
continue to work in Central America? 

A Yes, sir. I figured out that eventually the 
agency would take over this project and the best thing that 
could happen is that it would be gone and the agency would 
take care of the operation and that would be the end of 
this program. 

So you returned to Central America and continued 
to work with both the host government in implementing your 
helicopter concept and with the resupply operation as a 
liaison to the host government; is that right? 

A Yes, sir, I did. 

Did you attend a meeting in the Old Executive 
Office Building with Colonel North in June 1986? 

A Yes, sir, I did. June 25, 1986. 

Q How did that meeting come about? 

A I was called in the area where I was in Central 
American on June 23rd by Mr. Quintero, and he told me they 



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7680 01 01 

" -kepaulus 1 were reorganizing the whole program and they wanted me to 

2 go up to Washington on the 25th for a consultation with 

3 Colonel North and Mr. Dutton. 

4 Did he tell you why they were reorganizing the 

5 program? 

6 A He just mentioned they were reorganizing the 

7 whole thing. He didn't quite go into detail. 

8 What happened when you got to Washington? 

9 A I talked to Mr. Dutton on the 24th, in the 

10 evening, and we agreed to meet at the Marriott Hotel on the 

^ 11 25th, about 11:30, if I recall correctly. We had the . 

12 meeting with Colonel North from 12:00 noon in the White 

13 House. So we went to the White House. 

14 On ray way there I was curious to find out from 

15 him who actually brought him aboard this program, so I 

16 asked him before we got into the White House door. He told 

17 me that, it was General Secord. 

18 He was cleared immediately and mine was 

19 delayed. I don't know if it was done purposely or not. 

20 That is, your clearance to get into the Old 

21 Executive Office Building? 

22 A Yes, sir. 



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I also had requested a clearance, since I was in 
Washington, to go into the White House at 1:30 in the 
afternoon in order to be able to pick up some pictures that 
were taken on May 20th between a general friend of mine and 
his wife with the vice president. They asked me to come 
around at that time. So I called my friends up there to 
get me cleared since ray clearance was being delayed already 
for about 10 or 15 minutes. 

So I went with Mr. Dutton to the third floor, to 
a new office that I didn't know, that Colonel North had 
moved into. And that's where we had the meeting. 
What happened at the meeting? 
A When we first came in Mr. Dutton gave me the 
pamphlet or paper that he had done with the organization of 
the program. 

Can you describe what was on that piece of 
paper? 

A It was sort of a nice organization of the whole 
resupply network with names and coordinators and 
supervisors. It looked very organized. And my role in 
that was a liaison between his group and the host 
government in the area. 



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This was a diagram of the structure of the 
operation; is that right? 

A A diagram of responsibility for every post. 

And you were listed as the liaison to the host 
government on that diagram? 

A Yes, sir. 

What did you do when you were presented with the 
diagram? 

A I smiled and I gave it back to him. 

What was your reaction when you saw what they 
had envisioned for you on this diagram? 

A Not much. My speculation was that they thought 
the Congress was going to approve the aid to the Nicaraguan 
freedom fighters and they were preparing a schematic for an 
operation running and going and trying to get a contract 
from the Central Intelligence Agency to provide part of the 
resupply to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. 

Had you heard any discussion among the employees 
of the private benefactors about the possibility that the 
CIA would contract out this service to this organization? 

A Yes, sir. Most of the pilots were very 
confident that they would get the contract to continue with 



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the program if the Congress approved — like it did — the 
aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. 

Q What happened next in that meeting? 

A We went into a meeting between Mr. Dutton, 
Colonel North and myself. Colonel North started by telling 
me ~ he referred to Mr. Dutton as Bob — "Bob here has 
told me that you have been very helpful to the crews down 
there and the pilots have suggested that you become part of 
this organization. So we have suggested that in your role 
as liaison you be paid $3,000 a month." To which I 
explained to the colonel that I was retired and I was not 
able to receive a salary per se. Only operations 
expenses. 

He also told me right after that that he wasn't 
too sure that could be done, even me being the liaison, 
because he had information that I was a security risk, that 
I used to talk too much over the telephone, on open lines, 
and also on an amateur radio that I had in my area in 
Central America. 

Q What did you tell him when he told you you were 
a security risk? 

A If you will excuse my wording, sir, I told him 



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that if he thought I was a security risk he can stick this 
goddam operation — fuck it. I didn't want a goddam thing 
to do with. And I asked him to show me where I had been a 
security risk in all of this. He explained to me that the 
Freedom of Information Act prohibits people from releasing 
names, etc. So I asked him how he learned about it. He 
said, well, there is only one American in the area who 
talks over the telephone that we know of and who has an 
amateur radio. 

To that I told the colonel that I would sign to 
him a release from the CIA, from the FBI, from the National 
Security Agency, and the National Security Council where 
they will have access, and even if they wamt to publish in 
the past, in the present and in the future any 
conversations I might have had over the telephone or any 
other means that would prove I have been a security risk or 
put in jeopardy any operations I have participated in. 

To that he lowered his face and he made some 
notes, and he didn't mention about that anymore. 

What happened then? 

A During the conversation Mr. Dutton mentioned 
that he had $1.5 million with which he had to buy one 

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aircraft. We had to be careful not to spend too much 
money, ^because the money would also have to take care of 
all the maintenance for one year of the program, and 
salaries and all expenditures to run the program for one 
year. 

At one point in time I told the colonel that I 
wanted to talk to him alone. He was looking at the 
hearings that were taking place that day. Actually, my 
understanding is during that day eventually the aid to the 
Nicaraguan freedom fighters was approved by Congress, the 
$100 million. He looked at the TV and he said "Those 
people want to get me, but they cannot, because the Old Man 
loves my ass." 

When he pointed to the TV set Congress was on 
the TV? 

A Yes, sir. They were discussing the Nicaraguan 
freedom fighters aid. 

I told him I wanted to talk him privately. I 
had learned through other sources — I don't know whether 
it was true or not, but I had reason to believe it could 
have been true — that a boat had arrived in| 
before that and that the manifest was retrieved by the 



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^<kepaui*J* jH^I^^H^^^^^^Hand they were 

2 grenades In there for the Nlcaraguan freedom fighters that 

3 were bought at $3.00 apiece and being sold to them at $9.00 

4 apiece. The gentleman who was supposed to receive the 

5 money for that was Tom Kline. 

6 At that point I sort of recognized the part of 

7 the old group of Mr. Wilson, with whom I used to friends 

8 many years before. I had separated for ideological reasons 

9 in 1979. I explained that to Colonel North. I actually 

10 told him when we were alone, "Look, colonel, you will never 

11 find any guy more dedicated or honest than I am in this, 
^ 12 but there are people stealing here. My understanding is 

13 there are hand grenades being bought at $3.00 apiece and 

14 sold for $9.00, and it amounts to 100,000 hand grenades. 

15 This is going to be worse than Watergate and is going to 

16 des troy the President of the United States." 
[7 To that, he told me it was not true, that Mr. 

18 Kline was a patriot, that he was not buying any type of 

19 equipment; they were all donations, and he didn't touch any 
IP money in that. 
2yTi I also explained the age of some of the 81 

/22 millimeter rounds that were built in 1952 or 1954. They 



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were very old. He told me that when they were a donatioa 
he could not control the age of it. 

He also explained to me if I said this to 
anybody they would deny it, that he did carry a letter from 
the President of the United States to the Government of 

I where he requested the rate, and all of these 
materials f rom^^^^^| are a donation and we didn't pay a 
cent for it. Since I have been told by a lot other people 



that we were buying the equipment, at that point I decided 
I better terminate the conversation, which I did. 

At some point during that meeting did you 
discuss a letter that you had brought with you concerning 
the condition of the aircraft? 

A Yes, sir. There was an incident with one 
C-123. Almost everybody got )tilled because of poor 
navigational equipment.' They were off ten miles south in 
territory going toward a mission and they hit 
the top of a mountain. They actually had wood inside one 
of the engines, which was completely destroyed, and there 
was damage to the bottom of the 123 aircraft. 

Right after that Copilot HJ^P^rote a very 
emotional letter explaining all the problems with the 



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aircraft and the special situation of why he got involved 
in that operation, by pride, but it would never happen 
again. It was a very emotional letter that I got a hold 
of, and I gave it to the colonel. 

Was Mr. Dutton in the room when you gave the 
letter to Colonel North? 

A Yes, sir, he was. When the colonel was reading 
the letter he looked at me and said, 'This is a joke." I 
said, "No, sir. I don't think it is a joke when almost all 
of those people got killed the day before they wrote that 
letter." 

He showed the letter to Mr. Dutton and asked him 
if he knew anything about it. Mr. Dutton told him that, 
yes, he knew but he didn't feel it was important to bring 
it to his attention. 

Colonel North told him that this type of 
situation if given to the press would create a helluva 
problem for the program, to which Mr. Dutton answered that 

who was the one who wrote the letter, had been 
promoted to chief of maintenance for the program and his 
salary had been increased tremendously starting the next 
month and he would not pose a problem. 



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Mr. Rodriguez, at some point in August you used 
a plane to fly from Miami to Central America and as a 
result oC that flight you were accused of air piracy. Can 
you explain that incident for us? 

A I'll try, sir. Just before the last part of 
July or the very beginning of August I had I 
^^^^^1 friend of mine who stayed at my house who wanted me 
to stop by to say hello. So I took the opportunity that a 
friend of mine was flying on a private aircraft from where 
I was to Miami. I had the understanding from the pilot 
that was in this operation that a C-123 was being prepared 
to return to the area where I was. 

This was one of the private benefactor 123s? 

A Yes, a 123 that was stationed at Southern Air 
Transport. 

So I flew to the Miami area and spent some time 
with my family and]m^H||. I discussed on that 
weekend with Mr. Quintero that I was planning to fly this 
aircraft back to where I was. I believe it was on the 4th 
of August. 

Mr. Quintero explained to me that there were 
some medicines for mountain leprosy that had to be waited 



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upon to be flovm into our area. It was meant for the 
Nicaraguan freedom fighters. 

My understanding from previous conversations was 
this was just a big box and that it could have been sent 
locally, and to me it was big waste to hold a C-123 loaded 
with spare parts that were badly needed down there, and the 
expenditure of the crews and the hotel just for that box. 
I explained that to Mr. Quintero. Mr. Quintero told me it 
was not just a case of a box, but that it was a half plane 
full of medicines. 

At that point I called Mr. Gene Stevenson from 
Southern Air and explained to him the situation. He told 
me that they had enough spare parts, or close to enough 
spare parts, to fill a C-130 to our area. He said he would 
consult with Mr. Langton from Southern Air. He thought it 
was more convenient to go ahead and make the flight that we 
already had programmed with equipment on it, and when this 
medicine arrived it would be cheaper for the program to 
lease a C-130 from Southern Air and fly the rest of the 
maintenance equipment that we had waiting there plus the 
medicines into our area. 

So I asked him to make sure to clear it, and he 



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So we did depart on the 4th of August for my 
area, when we laoded there seven hours later, which it 
would take that piece of junk to get there, I was told sort 
of in a joking way that Mr. Quintero had called and said, 
"Do you know what Max did? That man has stolen a goddam 
aircraft." We were laughing, because the pilot said, "We 
didn't steal anything. It was all authorized and 
everything." 

So the instruction that he gave to the people 
down there was not to unload the aircraft but to refuel it 
and just take personal things out and fly it right back to 
Miami the following day. 

Since all the equipment that was on board was 
strictly spare parts for the aircraft that we had in that 
area, I gave instruction to go ahead and unload the 
aircraft. 

That evening I had dinner with my friend at his 
home. Mr. Quintero called. He said the airplane was ready 
to return and he was told that it was unloaded on my 
instruction, and he asked to talk to me. 

When he talked to me he told me in Spanish, "Are 



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you with me or are you against me?" So I explained the 
best I. could. I said, "Look, this is not a situation of 
being for or against anybody. The spare parts are needed 
badly here, and we unloaded. Unless you are telling me the 
whole program is finished." 

So he told me that is exactly what happened. 
"The whole program has been terminated. I will be down 
there in three days to close all the houses. You tell all 
the pilots and the personnel there that they don't have the 
blessing from anybody from up here, that if they do touch 
or fly any of those aircraft it will be without our 
authority, that there will be no payment for them, no 
insurance for them, no gas or any more money at all, and 
they will be on their own." 

This is a call from Raphael Quintero, correct? 

A Yes, sir. 

I felt very strongly in support of these people 
which are inside Nicaragua. I contacted^^m^^^^ who 
I trust, one of the kickers in the program. I asked him if 
he could find me a crew that will fly for free. I 
explained to him the circumstances. He said he personally 
would do it; he would check with others and let me know. 



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He called roe later. He said, "I have found Mr. 
Bob Sawyer" — who was later killed in the 123 — "who will 
do it for free, and also] 

So I could count on this crew to be able to 
continue to resupply these people. My purpose was to be 
able to maintain the supply to them until the agency was in 
a position to continue the aid to the Nicaragua freedom 
fighters. 

I contacted my local friend who was in charge of 
the base. I explained to him the circumstances that we 
were going through and asked him if he would provide the 
fuel from his end to be able to maintain this operation. 
This gentleman, who feels very strongly for the Nicaraguan 
freedom fighters because he sees very clearly it is in the 
best interest of his country, agreed to continue the supply 
of fuel on his own. 

At that point^^^^^^Btold me he 
believed that if I did talk to the people most of them 
would cooperate and fly on this mission. They were not 
mercenaries. They needed money, but they respected and 
supported the program. 

So I called a meeting. I don't know whether it 




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was the same night or the following night or later, but I 
did hold a meeting and expressed what I had been told to 
them so they were very clear that they no longer had the 
blessing from their group, from their people, that the 
operation, as far as I was told, was terminated, the house 
was going to be closed, and that they would have no 
salaries or no insurance policy for their families, and it 
would be their responsibility if they flew any of those 
planes. 

I explained to them as best I could that I had 
lost my native country to communism, and I knew what it 
meant for these people to be down there without any 
supplies for an extensive period of time until the agency 
could take over the program. 

I realized that they needed money for their 
families to live on, but if any of them could afford a 
month or two in this program it would be greatly 
appreciated by a helluva lot of people. 

Cooper was present, Hasenfus was present, and a 
lot of the other pilots, and they all agreed that they 
would continue to fly the operation for free. 

So I asked my friend to contact Mr. Quintero and 



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7680 01 01 

kepaulus 1 explain to him that if he wanted to call that was fine, but 

2 he would not be closing any base at this point in time, 

3 that their group was willing to fly this mission for free 

4 and I had been able to find the fuel to continue the 

5 operation until the agency could take over. 

6 At some point did you receive a telephone call 

7 from Don Gregg? 

8 A Yes, sir. I also had the understanding that 

9 somebody else received a call down there and was told that 

10 I had stolen the aircraft. And there was also a pending 

11 suit by the owners of the aircraft. It was not quite clear 

12 whether it was against me or the local people there. 

13 So I received a phone call from Mr. Gregg in my 

14 room. Mr. Gregg had been away during all of this time with 

15 the vice president outside of the United States. I think 

16 he was just approached upon his return. He told me on the 

17 telephone, he said, "Felix, do you know anything about a 

18 stolen aircraft and a suit?" I said, "Don, I have a 

19 general idea." 

20 He said, "Ollie has approached me. He said 

21 there is a stolen aircraft down there. That could be very 

22 embarrassing to the government." He didn't explain any 



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details. He said, "You could be instrumental and help in 
getting the aircraft released and it would be a great help 
for the U.S. Government." 

My understanding at the time was, and I still 
believe, he had no idea what he was talking about. He was 
just being used to use his influence auid friendship with me 
to release this aircraft. 

I discussed this with another friend locally 
that had also been called about getting the aircraft 
released. My idea at that point in time was that these 
people probably learned that they were not going to get the 
contract with the agency and they were just trying to move 
out everything they had. It infuriated me quite a bit. I 
explained to my friend, I said, "Look, there is no way I am 
going to go to my friend here to release his aircraft for 
these son of a bitches to steal another aircraft that might 
be worth a half a million dollars. 

So I did approach ray friend. I said, "Look, we 
have been doing this without charging anything to these 
people because we believe in this cause. They might have a 
legal way to retrieve this aircraft." Because they had it 
registered, I was told, in Panama. "But if that is the 

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case, you have been providing space and support totally for 
free because you believe in it, and if they want to take it 
out legally, and they do have the means to do it, go ahead 
and charge them for landing fees, guarding the aircraft, 
painting the aircraft, loading and unloading the aircraft. 
There's a substantial amount of money that we can use to 
buy a decent aircraft for the Nicaraguan freedom 
fighters." To which he agreed, and he gave me permission 
to go ahead and use his name in this proposal. 

This is a discussion with your friend in the 
host government? 

A Yes, sir. 

What did you do after you got the call from Don 
Gregg? 

A I also considered in my mind that the aid to the 
Nicaraguan freedom fighters was already approved by 
Congress and it would not be appropriate at this time for 
me to approach Mr. Gregg and explain to him the situation 
of these things. I was concerned that part of the program 
could be taken to this group of people which I didn't 
consider that well intentioned. So I decided to go to 
Washington and explain to Don my concern about the 



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7680 01 01 

kepaulus 1 possibility of these people getting part of the contract 

2 with the agency, and also a situation that could be very 

3 embarrassing for everybody, and I was pretty sure that he 

4 didn't know anything about it. 

5 So I called him over the telephone. 

6 Q Let me stop you. You were concerned that these 

7 people might get the agency contract and you didn't think 

8 that they were the right people to have the contract; is 

9 that what you just said? 

10 A yes, sir. 

11 You were also concerned that these people might 

12 pull the aircraft out before the CIA could get back into 

13 funding the operation and therefore the contras would be 

14 without a logistics system to resupply them until the CIA 

15 got back in; is that right? 

16 A That's absolutely correct. 

17 Q Tell me what you did. 

18 A So I asked Don if I could meet with him at the 

19 White House. This was, I believe, a Wednesday, So I could 

20 fly on a Thursday all the way to Washington and meet him on 

21 Friday. He agreed and said he would clear ma into the 

22 White House at 9:30. So I flew into Washington. 



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What day is this? 

A I was to arrive and talk to him August 8, 1986. 

What happened when you got there? 

A I went to his office in the White House. He was 
there. I don't know if Mr. Watson was there at the very 
beginning. He later was. I started with telling Don that 
I wished I never had to come to him under these 
circumstances to explain this, but that I had learned of 
this operation down there where Colonel North was involved 
and he was using people that if known by the press, because 
of their past background, with Wilson, etc., it could be 
very embarrassing to the administration and everybody. 

I also explained the condition of the aircraft 
to him and explained my concern about possible corruption 
in the program since I had been told, even though I didn't 
have any concrete proof it, that hand grenades were being 
bought at $3.00 apiece and sold to the contras for $9.00 
apiece. 

To that he was extremely upset. He picked up 
the phone, even though I asked him not to, to bear with me 
and not tell anybody. But he picked up the phone and 
called upstairs to North's office. He was not there, but I 




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7680 01 01 

kepaulus 1 understand that he did talk to Bob Earl. He started 

2 telling him, "My friend Felix is here and what he is 

3 telling me is outrageous. You should come down here and 

4 hear what he has to say. He has mentioned the name of Tom 

5 Kline, and goddamit, he's a dam snake. He doesn't have to 

6 tell me anything about who he is." 

7 He didn't want to come, but eventually Mr. Earl 

8 came down. He tried to appease everybody, that it was best 

9 to not really create a problem at this point in time. 

10 Did you explain to Mr. Gregg about how you had 

11 been brought into this operation? 

12 A No, sir, not at this time. I explained to him 

13 the problem that was going on down there and that I had 

14 become aware of it. 

15 Q Do you recall telling him about the conversation 

16 you had with Raphael Quintero where he said he was working 

17 with. Mr, Green? 

18 A I don't recall if I did or not. I might have. 

19 It was a long conversation and it was a long time ago. 

20 Did you tell him that Ollie North was associated 

21 with this Wilson group and that that is what concerned you? 

22 A Yes, sir. I am sure that he was also aware of 



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th« individuals. Not that they were with hire, but he knew 
the Individuals by name and their reputations. 

Did you mention Secord's name In the meeting? 

A Yes, sir. 

Did Mr. Gregg appear to recognize who Secord 
was? 

A I just went on with all the names. The one that 
he made the most out of was Kline when he was mentioned. 

So you mentioned Kline and Secord. Did you . 
mention Qulntero also? 

A Yes, I did, sir. 

He at least appeared to recognize Tore Kline 
immediately as somebody that the government shouldn't be 
dealing with) Is that right? 

A Absolutely. 

Do you remember whether you mentioned Mr. Gadd's 
name In that meeting? 

A Yes, I did. I thlnJt I mentioned Mr. Gadd In an 
Incident that I heard from Mr. Qulntero, saying that two 
guys were working, who I never met but only heard by name, 
on the runway in^BllH °"* *'*' actually making a 
$100 a day and the other was making $150 a day and Mr. Gadd 



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was charging them $400 a day £or one and $450 a day for the 
other. It was a substantial profit to him or whoever for a 
considerable period of months. 

So you told Mr. Gregg that Gadd was overcharging 
for these employees that were working at the airstrip in 



A Yes, sir. 

Did you mention Mr. Dutton's name in that 
meeting? 

A I probably did, but I really can't be specific. 
I cannot recall whether I did or not. 

How long did you meet with Mr. Gregg before' 
Mr. Earl was called on the phone? 

A As soon as I started reporting the names to him 
he almost immediately picked up the phone to call Mr. Earl, 
but he didn't come down until a considerable time later. 

Before he called Earl did you tell him what this 
was with the private benefactor resupply operation? 

A I really don't know exactly how I put it. My 
main concern was that they would not get a contract. 

you were concerned that they not get the CIA 
contract to supply the contrasj is that right? 



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7680 01 01 
V^kepaulus 1 A Basically, yes. If the press got a hold of it, 

2 with the reputation that these people had, it would be a 

3 disaster for the national security adviser to the president 

4 to have people who had connection in the past and being 

5 publicly exposed in problems with Qaddafi and Wilson, etc. 

6 Did you tell Mr. Gregg that in that meeting on 

7 August 8? 

8 A I think I mentioned it. Yes, sir. 

9 What did Don Gregg say to Earl on the telephone? 

10 A Basically what I told you at the very 

11 beginning. He said that he had heard this thing from "my 

12 friend Felix, and he mentioned Mr. Kline's name," and he" 

13 could not figure out how they could use people like that 

14 and he wanted him to come down to listen to my story. 

15 Did Mr. Earl come down to Mr. Gregg's office? 

16 A He eventually came. 

17 What happened then? 

18 A I gave him part of my concern, and he just tried 

19 to appease me. He didn't make much recommendation one way 

20 or the other. Just to be calm, take it easy. He didn't 

21 say much more th2m that, if I recall. All those things I 

22 don't recall at this time. 



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Was the problem resolved at that meeting? 
A I later learned that Mr. Gregg called a meeting 
to pass my concerns to other people. If I recall 

correctly, after what I read, he called a representative 

C 
from the state Department, from the agency and the NS/ to 

express ray concerns about the whole program so that they 

would take appropriate action. I don't think he believed 

that the Office of the Vice President would get involved in 

something like this, but that he should pass it on to 

people who could do something about it that would be 

involved in this program. But he was not. 

Q After this meeting did you return to Central • 
America? 

A Yes, sir, I did. 

What happened with the private benefactor 
resupply effort after that meeting? 

A After they reconsidered the situation they did 
send a message down there that the owners of the aircraft, 
the way they put it, were willing to continue the effort of 
resupply until the agency would take over the program but 
to be very clear that the aircraft did not belong to the 
Nicaraguan freedom fighters, that they belonged to a 



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private company, and as soon as the agency took it over 
they were going to pull every single aircraft out with 
them. 

Did resupply flights continue after that point? 

A Yes, sir, but it did continue with a Nicaraguan 
guard on board to make sure the aircraft were not stolen. 
That was the young guy that got killed on the October 123 
crash. 

He was on those flights to make sure that the 
pilots didn't take the aircraft away; is that right? 

A Absolutely. 

A. 
Where were you when the f^senfus plane went 

down? 

A I was in Miami. 

How did you learn about the crash? 

A My friend, ^H^^^H|^ft from the area 
these flights were being staged called me over the 
telephone and told me that the flight was overdue in 
returning. We had pretty well timed how much fuel they had 
and how long they could have stayed in the air. I asked 
him to make sure. It was a different area and a 
possibility that they could land on an emergency basis, and 



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7680 01 01 

'kepaulus 1 if he found out it wasn't that way, try to start a search 

2 over the ocean area. 

3 I f61t that this was the beginning of a big 

4 problem. Since I was not on talking terms anymore with the 

5 colonel, I felt that somebody in Washington should know of 

6 this incident. So I called Sam Watson. I had not 

7 discussed this with him before. I just told him that it 

8 was my understanding that a Nicaraguan resupply plane was 

9 lost and had either gone do%ni in the ocean or probably shot 

10 down in Nicaragua. 

11 I later learned through the press that he did 

12 pass this information to the National Security Agency and 

13 the White House situation room. 

14 On the following morning we heard over the 

15 Havana radio that the plane was shot dovm inside Nicaragua 

16 and there was one prisoner. So I called him again to pass 

17 this information to him. 

18 When did you return to the Central American 

19 country after the H^senfus incident? 

20 A After that I didn't return until February 11, 

21 1987. 

22 The resupply operation completely ceased at that 



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^ikepaulus 1 point; is that right? 

2 A Yes, sir. After the H/^senfus crash the 

3 operation completely ceased. I don't know what happened to 

4 the owners of the aircraft who so badly wanted the 

5 aircraft. The aircraft that was in Southern Air was asked 

6 to be flown immediately into Central America, and if I 

7 understand correctly, it was flown intomUmwith no 
authority ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B. Apparently the 

9 wanted to get rid of it as soon as possible, and it was 

10 confiscated 

11 Mr. Rodriguez, the last thing I want to ask you 

12 about is payments that you received from this resupply 

13 group. Can you tell me what money you received from them? 

A I was infl^Hm^with no pay from anybody. 

15 Soon after the arrival of Mr. Quintero he came to us and 

16 said that there was an operational fund fori 

17 myself and himself of $1,000 per month to be used 

18 operationally for us, for food and expenses or bringing 

19 people to dinner, etc. So we took that during that time as 

20 an operational expense. 

21 So after I returned the offer was made to me to 

22 be part of the resupply effort. I forgot to mention that 



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51 



during that meeting with Colonel North and Mr. Dutton in 
the White House after a while Colonel North told me he 
wanted me to sign a contract with Mr. Dutton to that 
effect. He asked me why I didn't want to be part of the 
organization. I told him I had done it so far and I didn't 
need to be paid for it. He- told me that I have to think of 
my family. Which didn't make me feel any better, because 
nobody had worried about my family before. He told me to 
9 get together with Bob and write my own contract, but please 

10 sign a contract with him. Which I did not. 

11 When I went back to Central America my friend 

12 ^^^^^fcame to me and said, "Look, Mr. Cooper has received 

13 a specific instruction from Mr. Dutton not to pay you 

14 anything because you are not part of the organization, but 

15 Cooper insists that you were very, very helpful, and he 

16 wants to pay you the $3,000 a month." 

17 I told him, "Look, I cannot receive it. I don't 

18 want the money. I don't need it here." 

19 I^^^^^^^B told me, "Look, if you don't take it, 

20 it will be another $3,000 these guys are going to be 

21 making." 

22 So at that point he convinced me on that basis. 



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7680 01 01 

^ikepaulus 1 So instead of getting my friends from Miami to support my 

2 trips in here and back and forth to Miami, and my food 

3 expenses, which I never received any amount of money or 

4 other support fron the local ^^^^^^H I did receive the 

5 $3,000. I want to state that I did not sign the receipt. 

6 H^H^^Hsigned the receipt for me. So legally if I 

7 wanted to claim that I did not receive any money they could 

8 not prove it, because the receipt is not signed by me. But 

9 I did receive the money. I acknowledge it here 

10 officially. There is no way I'm going to lie here or any 

11 other statement. 

12 So you received SI, 000 a month from 

13 approximately January until June and then in June, July 

14 A It wasn't effective until the following month, 

15 after the meeting in the White House. 

16 So it would be in July, August, September that 

17 you received $3,000? 

18 A Yes, and probably October. 

19 Then after the H^senfus plane went down — 

20 A After the H^senfus plane, I received, which I 

21 did not sign a receipt for, $2,000 from Mr. Quintero for my 

22 expenses to leave the house. Since the press was sort of 



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11 

12 

13 

14 

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19 

20 

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UNCIASSIFI[D 



hanging around my house all the time, I took the family to 
the Keys for the weekend and stayed out of my house for 
over three weeks. He suggested that I leave the country, 
but I did not. I just stayed in the Florida area. 

That is all the money that you received from 
this operation, correct? 

A Yes, sir. I handled the money on the fuel 
account. I felt it was important to keep a record of it, 
but it was in my hands never more than a few hours. I 
guess one time 24 hours. When I received it I turned it 
over to the local friends and received a receipt from them 
and kept very clear records of dates, aircraft, gallons, 
price per gallon. You have a copy of all of that. 

You have given us a copy of all those receipts 
and your records for the fuel expenditures; correct? 

A Yes, sir, I have. 

MR. BARBADORO: That's all I have. Thank you 
very much, Mr. Rodriguez. 

THE WITNESS: You're welcome, sir. 
(Whereupon at 11:35 a.m. the deposition was 
concluded.) 



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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC & REPORTER 
I, ."I'ichael G. Paulus, the officer before whom the 
foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the 
witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition 
was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was 
taken in shorthand and thereafter reduced to typewriting by 
rae or under my direction; that said deposition is a true 
record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am 
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the 
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; 
and further, that I an not a relative or employee of any 
attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor 
financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the 
action. 



Ily Commission Expires 
February 29, 1992 



:Jotary Public in and for the 
District of Columbia 



811 






DEPOSITION OF DAVID ROSEMAN 

Wednesday, June 10, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert 

Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D. C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:00 p.m., 
in Room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, with Patrick 
Carome, Staff Counsel, presiding. 

On behalf of the House Select Committee: Patrick 
Carome and Bruce Fein. 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: Timothy 
Woodcock. 

On behalf of the Witness: Kathleen A. McGinn, 
Assistant General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, 
Central Intelligence Agency. 

^iliCi Oeclassifie'i/Release-' nn JIJ>^87 
under 3-oyis;jn' of E.U. 12r56 



by IHA Nationa; Security Coufld ^ -^"^ T -r 







812 



T 



1 MR. CAROME: If we could have the Notary please swear 

2 in the witness, and if you could state your name for the 

3 record on the record. 

4 MR. MALLON: I am a Notary for the District of Columbia, 

5 My name is Charles Mallon. 

6 Whereupon, 

7 DAVID ROSEMAN, ""^ 

8 having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as 

9 follows: 

10 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

11 BY MR. CAROME: 

12 Q Would you please state your name for the record? 

13 A Yes. My name is David Roseman. 

14 Q And what is your current oceu^tion? 

15 A I am an attorney with the Central Intelligence 
1g Agency and I serve as Chief of the Intelligence Law Division 
17 at the Agency 

^Q Q And how long have you been Chief of the 

ig Intelligence Law Division? 

20 A For a little more than one year. 

2^1 Q You started in that position when? 

22 A Approximately April of '86. 

23 Q Why don't you just briefly tell me your 

54 educational background, starting with college^ and the 



25 positions which you've held since graduating? 



niSSIElEIl 



813 



UHSa^Blft^T 



A Certainly. I graduated from George Washington 
University in 1970, and graduated from Georgetown University 
Law School in 1973. I took the bar in 1973 in the State of 
Maine and became a member of the bar, in Maine, in 1973, 
and I began my legal career as an Assistant Attorney General 
for the State of Maine. 

I was in that position until 1980 when I got my 
position with the Office of General Counsel at CIA. I 
started at CIA as a position as a generalist, meaning that 
I received assignments from a number of different divisions, 
and within a year I was assigned to the Intelligence Law 
Division and was subsequently named Deputy Chief of the 
Intelligence Law Division. 

Q And what time did you first become a lawyer in 
the Intelligence Law Division? 

A That would probably have been in 19 -- well, it 
was within a year of my entering on duty with the Agency, 
which was, I entered on duty in July of 1980, so it would 
have been some time I think in 1981 that I began to work with 
the Intelligence Law Division. 

Q And your first position in that division was 
what? '*' ^^ -1% '^ 

A I, at that time there was a Chief of the division 
and I was — I simply served as his assistant, and to the 
extent that there was additional work, which there always 



IINClASSIFIEfi 



814 



25 



isaissiffiBr 



1 was, above and beyond what we could handle, it was assigned 

2 out to other attorneys who were considered to be generalists. 

3 Q Okay. And in or around the time of November 
1985 what position were you holding? 

A November 1985, I would have been the Deputy 
Chief for the Law Division. 

Q And is that the same for the period in or around 
January 1986? 

A Yes, that's correct. 

10 Q And what were your general duties in that 

11 position'; 

12 A My duties as Deputy Chief — well, let me 

13 describe first what the — the overall responsibilities of 

14 the division. 

15 The division has primary responsibility for 
15 handling questions relating to Executive Order 12333, which 
■(7 deals in large part with collection ut j^ian^^ion and 

retention and dissemination of information on U.S. persons, 

19 and it also contains guidelines on the limited Agency 

20 activities within the United States. These are guidelines 

21 under Attorney General approved procedures. That's the 

22 primary role of the division. 

23 The division also handles questions involving 

24 the Intelligence Oversight Board, 
As Deputy Chief of the division, of course, I 



UMCLASSIHEIU 



815 



mmm 



received my assignments principally from the Division Chief, 
whose name is Bernie Makowka; and in Bernie's absence, I 
would serve as Acting Chief. 
Q Okay. 

MR. CAROME: It occurs to me that there is a 
brief introduction I should have probably given at the start 
of the deposition which I might as well do now. 

Just for the record, my name is Patrick Carome . 
I'm Staff Counsel for the House Select Committee to 
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. It is 
possible that a staff counsel to the parallel Senate 
committee is going to be joining us in this deposition 
midway through. 

Both of the committees were established pursuant 
to resolutions and have various enacting roles. The Central 
Intelligence Agency has previously been provided with copies 
of our resolution and rules; and, just for the record, I 
have earlier, before we started today, have provided you 
with copies of both of those things. 

The mandate of the House committee is to 
investigate the circumstances surrounding the Iran affair 
and also the U.S. involvement with the contras , and this 
deposition is being conducted purmaaa* tc^fciujse rules. 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Turning now more to the substantive matters that 



•l^^^QilL. 



816 

1 I want to cover, when was the first time — strike that. 

2 The Intelligence Law Division is not normally 

3 involved in the preparation of covert action findings; is 

4 that right? 

5 A That's correct. 
MR. CAROME: The record should reflect that we 

7 have just been joined by Bruce Fein, who is an attorney with 

8 the House Select Committee. 
g BY MR. CAROME: 

•JO Q Is it correct, Mr. Rosemem, that the Intelligence 
•J1 Law Division is not normally involved in the preparation of 

12 covert action findings? 

13 A That is correct. 
Q In 1985, did there come a time where you working 

on a covert action finding? 

A Personally I was not involved in 1985 in working 

on — let me step back, because the times — we got involved 

on the Iran finding on 2 and 3 January 1986 and were involved 

with another , ^^^^^H^^^^^^BH^finding, which may have 

been in late 1985, so let me correct that. 

Q You were involved in preparation of a covert 

22 -action |ipHnt;^ 1985; is that right? 

yj A It probably would have begun in late 1985, in 

„. late December of 1985. 
24 ^ 

When you say you, you mean my role personally? 

Muma 



817 



m^^ 



1 Q That's right. I'm speaking of your role 

2 personally. 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q And what did that finding that you were involved 

5 in, in 1985, deal with: 

6 A To the best of my recollection, we were involved 

7 in a finding dealing with^^^^^^^^^^^B And have not 

8 reviewed that finding, so that's the best recollection I have 

9 at this time. 
10 Q Did that finding deal with any partedcul ay-^ 

countries? 
12 A I do not believe so. 

Q And when you say "we were involved," who besides 

14 yourself was involved in t ha tE^^^^^^^^^^^^H finding? 

15 A It would have been, I am certain, Bernie Makowka, 
1g the Chief of the division. It was myself and Gary Cole, who 
^j was one of the attorneys working for us, assigned -- one of 
1g the attorneys assigned to Intelligence Law Division, 

Q Is Mr. Cole an attorney who reported directly to 
you at that time? 

A Yes, that's correct. To me and, or actually 
22 directly to Bernie as Division Chief, but to me if you want 
to say through the chain of command. 

Q And is it correct that thii 
finding was the first finding that you were ever involved in? 



IIEUSSIEIEIL 



818 



lINEft^RIt^ 



1 A Well, to say the first finding that I was ever 

2 involved in, I have been involved over the years in questions 

3 related to findings, covert — 

4 Q Let me see if I can be more specific with the 

5 question. 

6 Was that the first instance in which you were 

7 ever involved in the drafting of the actual finding itself? 

8 A I believe so; yes. 

9 Q Was that also the first instance that you're 

10 aware of in which the Intelligence Law Division was involved 
•jl in the actual drafting of a covert action finding? 

12 A Well based on my knowledge, what I know at this 

13 point in time, the answer is no. Because I understand that 

14 Mr. Makowka was involved in drafting what has been referred 

15 to as the mini-finding of, I believe, November 1985. As to 
1g whether or not Mr. Makowka has been involved in other findings 
17 prior to that time, I do not know 

^g When I say involved in, I should say the saime 

^g thing, actually drafting. Because he, as well as I, have 
2Q been involved over the years in a number of questions related 

to covert action programs or special activities. 

Other than one^^^^^^^^^^^Vfinding 
findings that did pertain to Iran that are really the subject 
of our investigation — 
A Um hum 



MAMP 



819 



mwm 



ET 



1 Q — are you aware of any other covert action 

2 findings prepared by the Intelligence Law Division? 
A No, I am not. 

4 Q I take it that there did come a time where you 

5 became involved in the preparation of a covert action finding 

6 relating to Iran? 

7 A That is correct. 

8 Q And when did your involvement begin on that? 

9 A My involvement began on that I would say on 

10 2 January 1986. 

11 Q And how did it begin? 

12 A Well, I recall that our Division Chief was on 

13 leave, or going on leave in the end of 1985 and — 

14 Q Who was the Division Chief? 

15 A Mr. Makowka. 

1g Q And he asked Gary Cole and myself to finish the 

17 drafting and the work on th^^^^^^^Hjj^^H finding by, 

•J8 believe he probably said by the end of — by 31 December or 

19 30 December, whatever the last working day of the year was; 

20 and he indicated that that was something that needed to or 

21 should be sent up to the General Counsel as quickly as 

22 possible. 

23 Mr. Cole and I did the work on that finding, and 

24 in preparing the finding itself, in part because we had not 



25 previously drafted "lindings ourselves and in part because 



lUUSSiElL: 



820 



ll^MF 



10 



1 our practice is to do the most thorough legal job we can, we 

2 contacted — I believe we would have contacted George 

3 Jameson or — it was either George Jameson or Ernie 

4 Mayerfeld, who may have been counsel — whoever was counsel 

5 for the DO at that time who ordinarily dealt with these 

6 kinds of matters, or it might have been George Clarke, who 

7 George Jameson or Ernie Mayerfeld, I believe, reported to. 

8 We contacted them to get background paperwork 

9 on preparation of findings and the proper format and who it 

10 goes through within the Agency and who it goes through 

11 outside of the Agency, so that we could do the best possible 

12 job on that. 

13 Q Is your work on this matter all happening toward 

14 the end of December? Is that correct? 

15 A Yes. I'm referring now to the 

16 'finding, which is a lead-in to your question as to how we got 

17 involved or how I got involved in the Iran "finding. 

18 Q And the activity you've just described took place 

19 the last 10 days or so of December? 

20 A I will say within the last 5 or 10 days in 

21 December. 

22 Q Do you know whether or not the activities you 

23 were just describing on the^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hfinding were 

24 related to a meeting that Mr. Makowka attended at Colonel 
«c North's office on 



>n Christmas Eve, 1985? 



820 



821 



1 A I'm sorry . Could you repeat that? 

2 Q Are the activities on the counterterrorism 

3 finding that you have just described related to a meeting of 

4 Mr. Makowka and Mr. North on December 24, 1985? 

5 A To my knowledge, they were not related. 
g Q Were you aware of that meeting? 

7 A I might have been aware generally of the meeting, 

but not of the substance or the specifics of tne meeting. 
Q In other words, Mr. Makowka may have come back from that 
meeting and said to me, I just met with Ollie North, or, I 
just had a meeting at the White House; or he may have said, 
Dave, I'm going down this afternoon to the White House to a 
meeting with Lieutenant Colonel North, something of that 
nature. 

However, on certain matters as the then Division 
Chief, the General Counsel would deal with Bernie Makowka 
directly and not with me. Because we operated on a need-to- 
know principle in certain sensitive matters, the General 
Counsel would deal with the then Division Chief and it would 
be — that information wouldn't be shared with me. 
Getting back to our preparation on the 

finding leading into our involvement in the 
Iran finding, we finished that work, the work on the 

■finding, on a timely basis. We presented 
that Finding to the General Counsel, and I recall that the 




iimjissiBfi 



822 



jiwtissffiiT 



12 



1 General Counsel was very, very pleased with the work we had 

2 done, both substantively and the timeliness of our response. 

3 And that probably would have been, we turned that in I will 

4 say either the last day in December or the first working day 

5 in January of 1986. 
Q That would have been January 2nd, I believe. 

7 A Probably January 2nd. But I recall that we 

8 would have — I will — my best recollection would be that 
we turned that in the last part of December 1985. 

10 Q Could I just ask, did the 

11 fcnding bear any relationship to discussions that were going 

12 on in the Office of General Counsel about an enterprise 

13 theory for prosecution of terrorists? 

14 A I am aware of the enterprise theory that was 

15 discussed at that time in the office. I can't recall that 
1g specifically but I don't believe so. I don't believe it 
^j dealt with that. But I really cannot recall, though, with 
^g any specificity. 



Q We have just now gotten up to the January 2nd 
time frame — 

A That's correct. 

Q — and I think you're going to — 

A That's right. 

Q — begin to tell us what it was that brought you 



25 into the drafting of the Iran finding. 

llimSSIEI£lL 



rn 



823 



'^(iSSii)i&' 



1 A That's correct. 

2 On the 2nd of January, and this would have been 
after we completed our work, at least our draft work on the 

4 ^^^^^^^^^^^^H finding, the General Counsel called me into 

5 this office and said, in effect, that he was very pleased 

6 with the work that we had done and that he had another matter 

7 that was of extreme sensitivity and that he wanted me to 
work on it. 

g And he then described this next matter and it 

10 was this, it was the finding related to — it was the 

11 so-called Iran finding. 

12 Q So this was described to you in a meeting in 

13 Mr. Sporkin's office; is that right; 

14 A That's correct, 

,J5 Q And you are fairly certain this was on 

1g January 2nd; is that right? 

A I'm fairly certain only because I have reviewed 
the two Iran findings, amd one is dated 2 January and one 
is dated 3 January. And my recollection is that Mr. Sporkin 
said that this was another finding that needed to be 
prepared, and needed to be prepared expeditiously. 

And I recall that we, Mr. Cole and I, prepared 



17 

18 
19 
20 
21 

22 

23 that finding by close of business that day 

Q All right. If we could turn to what it was that 
Mr. Sporkin said to you in this first meeting on the subject 



824 





1 of the Iran finding. 

2 A Yes. 

3 Q What did he tell you needed to be done? 
A The best that I can recall on that is that, as 

I said, he called me into his office and said that there was 
a matter of extreme sensitivity and he wanted me to work on 
that. And he described the matter as — 

MR. CAROME: Could we go off the record for just 
a second? 

10 (DiscussionF of f the record.) 

11 MR. CAROME: Back on the record. 

12 The record should probably reflect that Tim 

13 Woodcock, from the Senate staff, has just joined us. 

14 MR. WOODCOCK: 25 minutes late. 

15 BY MR, CAROME: 

16 Q Mr. Roseman, you were just describing what it 

17 was that Mr. Sporkin said needed to be done, and X believe 

18 you were just about at the point to describe what type of 

19 project the finding was to relate to. 

20 A Yes. My recollection on this, I should add, is 

21 in large part based on my reviewing the finding itself 

22 because, obviously, whatever was contained in there or most 
of what was contained in there was based on what Mr. Sporkin 
had told me. 

MR. CAROME: Why don't I have a copy of the 



imCliSSlQEL 



825 



lilSWfi 



ET 



15 

finding, the draft finding, marked as an exhibit, and I will 
put it in front of you so you can look at it. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 

(A document was marked Deposition 
Exhibit DR No. 1 for identification 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Mr. Roseman, I show you what has been marked as 
Exhibit 1. It has a CIIN number 1119, and it's a document 
dated January 2, 1986, and it appears to be a draft finding 
on Iran. 

A Mr. Sporkin basically said that we were, or words 
to the effect that we were, the U.S. Government was trying 
to establish an initiative or open a line of communication 
with the moderate elements in Iran and that we, in order 
to, you know, in furtherance of that -- in furtherance of 
that goal a Finding needed to be prepared to support the 
sensitive special activity or covert action. 

Q What was said about the types of activities that 
would be taken? What did Mr. Sporkin say at that meeting 
on those subjects? 

A Other than to tell you generally what I've just 
described, I really can't — I can't recall specifically 
any specifics of what he said at that point in time. 

Q Let me see if I can ask you a few specific 
questions on things that might have come up to find out 



HMCliS£IEtEa 



826 



yfWSfflSBET 



1 if you have a recollection whether they came up. 

2 A Yes. There is one thing that I did just 

3 remember, but why don't you go ahead. 

4 Q What is the one thing that you remember? 

5 A I remembered in part because — it's Mr. 
Woodcock. 

Q That's Mr. Woodcock. 

A Yes. I have previously been interviewed by 
g Mr. Woodcock and at the close of -- towards the close of that 

10 interview, Mr. Woodcock asked me whether there was any 

11 discussion during my meeting with Mr. Sporkin about the 

12 Israelis being involved in this, whether Mr. Sporkin 

13 mentioned that to me. And I had not previously mentioned 

14 that in my interview with Mr. Woodcock, and I said at the 

15 time that that sort of jogged my memory a bit and that I 



recall that that was mentioned. I am not certain about that, 
but I recall that that — that Mr. Sporkin may have said 
something along the lines of, you know, this is -- in part, 
the sensitivity of this is due to our working with our 
allies on this including, or our ally Israel or our allies 
including Israel. 

Q Do you recall what he said on what specifically 
Israel had to do with the activity? 

A No, I do not. And it may have just been in 
terms of sensitive project. That may have just been the 



iMi&^lElEL 



827 



^^WSk' 



_^_ 17 

nature of it. 

Q Did Mr. Sporkin say that arms or any other types 
of material would be delivered to Iran? 

A I presumed that he did because that is all 
contained -- the finding states that — the finding, or part 
two of the finding, if you will, the second paragraph of 
the finding, states that we would, the U.S. Government would 
provide arms, equipment and related materiel to the 
Government of Iran. And I recall that when we, that when 
Mr. Cole and I submitted this draft finding to Mr. Sporkin, 
which I believe would have been on 2 January, that Mr.. 
Sporkin made, at least initially there were only minor 
changes made. 

So I would -- I could only assume that in our 
initial discussion he mentioned that this finding included 
arms and equipment and related equipment. 

Q Did Mr. Sporkin say anything in this initial 
discussion about hostages and that one objective of the 
activity contemplated was release of hostages? 

A I really do not recall that. 

Q You have no recollection of the subject of 
hostages being mentioned? 

A No, I do not. But we, you know, again the 
finding talks in terms of our activities done in part to help 
protect against terrorist activities directed against U.S. 



\\m h^^mn 



imctiiissiEiiifeT 



18 

1 persons. It's possible that he may have mentioned that. I 

2 do not recall it. 

3 But clearly, one of the purposes of the finding 

4 was to help protect against terrorist acts directed against 

5 U.S. persons, U.S. property, U.S. interests. 
Q Did Mr. Sporkin say anything about an earlier 

finding relating to Iran? 

A I don't believe that he did. If you're referring 
9 to the finding that Mr. Makowka — I later learned that 

10 Mr- Makowka worked on in, I believe, November of '85, I 

11 do not believe that Mr. Sporkin mentioned that earlier 

12 finding to me at that time or any previous time or subsequent 

13 time, 

14 Q When did you first hear anything about the 

15 November 1985 finding; 

^g A I can't give you a specific date but I assume it 
iy probably would have been in November or December of 1986 
,|Q when the news became public about the whole Iran initiative. 

19 But I do not believe that M(^. Makowka ever discussed that 

20 finding with me. 

2< And again, let me clarify. Mr. Makowka may have 

22 said to me something along the lines of I'm working on a 



very sensitive project for Stan or I had to stay late last 
night working with the General Counsel, but that would have 
been it. 



IMASnL 



lllTOSfflFirET 



19 



If he had been instructed by Mr. Sporkin not to 
discuss the specifics with me, he would not have, nor would 
I have asked. And that is our practice, certainly in our 
division. 

Q And I take it that in late 1985 and early '86 
you heard nothing about a 1985 finding being signed relating 
to Iran; is that right? 

A I believe that's correct. 

Q Did Mr. Sporkin mention Oliver North's name in 
the initial discussion with you? 

A He might have mentioned it to me . I will say 
that Mr. Cole and our secretary and myself certainly knew 
that he was bringing the 2 January or the 3 January finding, 
the 3 January redraft of the White House, and certainly 
my understanding was, my belief was that that was going to 
Oliver North. 

Q Did you know who North was at that time? 

A Generally I knew who he was. I never had any 
dealings with him myself. I knew that he was a senior 
official in the National Security Council and seemed to be a 
person who wielded a fair amount of power in the National 
Security Council, but that was the extent of my knowledge of 
Mr. North. 

Q In what sense was it evident to you that Mr. 
North wielded a fair amount of power? 



iiNr.us<;ifiEJi 



830 



wmm 



20 



1 A In the sense that his name had been mentioned on 

2 a number of occasions at office, division chief meetings. 

3 Q Who would mention his name? 

4 A Oh, possibly George Clarke, who, as I said 

5 earlier, had responsibility in covert action areas. Possibly 

6 the General Counsel. 

7 Q What do you know about the relationship between 

8 Mr. North and Mr. Sporkin at or around that time? 

9 A I know nothing of the relationship between those 

10 two gentlemen. 

11 Q You knew that they would have meetings and phone 

12 calls, didn't you? 

13 A Well, certainly I knew that they had — again, as 

14 I said — as I said earlier, not to repeat all of that, my 

15 understanding was that Mr. Sporkin was going down to see 

16 Mr. North to bring this finding. Either Mr. Sporkin had 

17 said that to me directly, that he had to get down to the 

18 National Security Council or to the White House, or I 

19 surmised that. 

20 Q Were you aware of any interaction between North 

21 and Sporkin prior to January 2nd? 

22 A Nothing specific, other than what I just said to 

23 you. His, Mr. North's name I recall had been mentioned at 

24 division chief meetings. 

25 Q Did you ever see North at the CIA? 



UNHAmitL 



831 




A No, I did not. 

Q Have you ever met North? 

A No, I have not. 

Q Have you ever spoken to him on the phone? 

A No, I have not. 

Q Did Richard Secord's name come up in this 
initial conversation with Mr. Sporkin? 

A No, it did not. 

Q Did Secord's name come up in any discussions you 
had on this subject in January of '86? 

A No, it did not. 

Q Have you ever met Secord? 

A No. 

Q Have you ever spoken to him on the phone? 

A No. 

Q Was anyone else present during this initial 
meeting with Mr. Sporkin and yourself? 

A I'm not certain about that. The Deputy General 
Counsel may have been present at that meeting. 

Q And who would that have been? Who was that? 

A That would have been Mr. Dietel. 

Q What is your best recollection on whether or not 
Mr. Dietel was present? 

A As I said, I'm not certain. If he were present, 



he was almost entirely or entj.rely__in__ijjst a — just present. 



m\ 



yiw.ww^ 



22 
•J The instructions I was receiving and the discussion was really 

2 with Mr. Soorkin 

3 Q Anyone else present for this meeting? 

4 A No. Mr. Cole was not present at that meeting, 

5 and Mr. Cole assisted me in drafting this finding, the 
3 January finding. 

Q I want to get to that, but I want to see if there 
is anything else we can learn about the first, January 2nd 
Q meeting. 

About what time of day was that meeting held, 
do you recall? 

A I think it was held either late in the morning 
or around the lunch hour, or perhaps early afternoon, in 
that time frame. I knew -- 1 think we had several hours, 
you know. Mr. Sporkin, again, told us that he needed 
something back expeditiously, and he either said this or the 
implication was he needed it by close of business that day. 
And I know we had several hours to do it. 

Q Did the subject of whether or not there would be 
advance congressional notification of the finding come up 
during this initial discussion with Mr. Sporkin? 

A In reviewing the 2 January and the 3 January 
finding, I see the 2 January finding talks about notification 
to the committees. The 3 January finding has alternative 
language. That subject came up. Whether it came up 



ML&SSIflEIL 



833 



UIKi^ffi^T 



23 



on the first, or in my initial meeting with Mr. Sporkin or 
the meeting the next day, I don't remember. 

I think it might have, it might have come up in 
the initial meeting and it might have come up along the lines 
of this is just a sensitive matter, but I'm not certain on 
that point. 

Q I take it that it was clear during this 
discussion, this initial discussion that the objective of 
what Mr. Sporkin was asking you to do was to get a finding 
prepared; is that right? 

A ' That's correct. 

Q Did you discuss whether or not there should be 
a finding or was it clear right from the start that there 
needed to be a finding? 

A No, we did not discuss whether from — we did 
not discuss whether there should be a finding. We did not 
discuss any policy implications on the finding. It wa s a 
matter of the General Counsel saying to — it was a matter 
of the General Counsel giving me instructions to prepare 
this, and then my reviewing section 501 of the National 
Security Act and preparing the finding in accordance with 
the statute and in accordance with the previous documents 
that I have mentioned to you that we had located. 

Q Did Mr. Sporkin in the initial discussion say 
anything about the National Security Council and its role in 



\e National security ijouncu 

Mime. 



834 



im^HP' 



24 



1 its role in the contemplated activities? 

2 A I do not believe so. I'm fairly confident he did 

3 not. 

4 Q Did you understand that the activities under 

5 consideration were to be carried out by Central Intelligence 

6 Agency people? 

7 A That wasn't discussed but that would have been 

8 my understanding. The executive order. Executive Order 

9 12333 states that the agency within the United States that 

10 will ordinary carry out what Executive Order 12333 defines 

11 as special activities, or what's more commonly known as 

12 covert action, is to be carried out by the Central 

13 Intelligence Agency unless the President specifically finds 

14 that another agency is more fully — is better suited to 

15 conduct that kind of an activity. 

Ig So my understanding would have been that this 

nee Agency carrying this 



17 

18 out. 



Q Did Mr. Sporkin give any indication to you at 
that first meeting or any other time — 

A Um hum. 

Q — that there had been an earlier shipments of 
arms to Iran that the CIA had been involved with? 

A No, he did not. 

MR. FEIN: Did he indicate whether private 



mamL 



835 



OlTOKSStBIST 



25 



parties would be involved in the covert action contemplated? 
Since that was a part of the drafting evolution — 

THE WITNESS: When you say private parties 
involved in — did you say private parties — 

MR. FEIN: Yes, I did. 

THE WITNESS: — involved in providing arms? 

MR. FEIN: Well, in the overall covert action 
that was the subject of the finding. 

THE WITNESS: Well, with regard to providing arms, 
I don't recall that there was any discussion of that. There 
presumably was discussion of private parties in the sense 
that the 2 and 3 January findings refer to working with 
individuals; for example, working with individuals and 
organizations both within and outside of Iran and liaison 
services and other foreign government entities. So in that 
general sense, that was probcibly mentioned that there would 
be, you know, the finding should be written to include not 
only working with another government but with a liaison 
service or individuals or organizations. 

But, as I said, there was no discussion on 
using private persons, to the best of my recollection, to 
provide arms to the Iranians. 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Did Sporkin, in this initial discussion, say 
anything about who within Iran was to be the recipient of 



UMPi i^^Ol 



836 



IRfti^ftSr 



^ _^ 26 

1 arms? 

2 A I don't recall. I can only say that in reviewing 

3 the 2 January finding and comparing it with the 3 January 

4 finding, the 2 January finding refers to providing arms to 

5 the government of Iran, whereas the 3 January finding refers 
to providing arms to moderate elements within the government 

7 of Iran, or moderate elements within Iran. I don't have the 
3 3 January finding in front of me. 

Could you repeat that one, please? Repeat the 
IQ question? 

^1 Q- The question was, was there any discussion at 

this initial meeting with Sporkin on the subject of who 
within Iran was to be the recipient of arms? 

A Okay. I can't recall whether at the initial 
meeting that discussion came up, but certainly during one 
of the meetings that subject was discussed, or that subject 
was, Mr. Sporkin said you — yes, that subject was discussed. 
Q And what did he say on that subject? 
A He — I can't remember specifically, but it was 
along the lines of the finding should be drafted or needs to 
be drafted so that we, so that we provide arms to the 
moderate elements in Iran, or in the Iranian government. 
And I do not recall that there was much discussion on that. 



It was a we tt er of Mr. Sporkin as the General Counsel giving 
me instructions as to how to draft, how to prepare this 



IMASSIQEL 



837 



mmm 



finding. 

Q Mr. Sporkin said that this was a highly 
sensitive matter, is that right? 

A That's correct. 

Q Did he explain to you why it was sensitive? 

A I don't recall. But I do recall at the time 
that he, the whole subject was — I do recall that at the 
time that I was called in by Mr. Sporkin and he mentioned 
the subject matter it seemed to me to be a very, an 
extremely sensitive kind of subject in the sense that we 
were establishing an initiative with the Iranian government. 

Q And why would that be sensitive? 

A Because at the time we did not^relations with 
Iran. That was my perspective. 

Q Was one of the factors that made it sensitive 
at that time the fact that any public disclosure that the 
United States was initiating relations with Iran would be 
a political fire storm if disclosed to the public? 

A Could you repeat that again, please? 

Q Was one factor contributing to the sense of 
sensitivity of this matter the fact that public disclosure 
of the subject would cause a political fire storm? 

A I do not know what Mr. Sporkin was thinking but 
that was not a consideration of mine. It just seemed to be 
to me that this was a — that, you know, Iran was a terrorist 



ICUOTEi. 



W85IFW 



28 



1 or is a terrorist — was and is a terrorist nation or nation 

2 that supports international terrorism, and that we did not 

3 have relations with Iran, and that this was an initiative 

4 to establish relations, and in that sense, in a foreign 

5 policy sense, if you will, it seemed to me to be very 

6 significant and something that was very sensitive. 

7 MR. FEIN: Well, isn't it true that those who 

8 are related to the Shah in the United States in the 

9 aftermath of the Khomeini takeover were summarily executed 

10 in that, if they were moderates who it was publicized, in 

11 Iran, were making contacts with the United States and that 

12 fact was leaked, they could be summarily executed? So the 

13 whole effort to establish a link with the moderates would 

14 collapse because any publicity would be the demise of the 

15 moderates in Iran, since there is no indication that the 

16 Ayatollah himself has changed colors like a chameleon. 

17 THE WITNESS: I don't know the answer to that 

18 question. 

19 BY MR, CAROME: 

20 Q Did Mr. Sporkin say anything about the fact that 

21 the weapons to be provided to Iran were to be used in the 

22 Iran-Iraq conflict? 

23 A Again my recollection is based on what's contained 

24 in the finding, and I would presume that he did state that. 



25 Q You have no independent recollection of the 



16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



m^^ 



29 



1 discussion of use of the weapons in the Iran-Iraq war? 

2 A Well, I do — I have, I have a, some recollection 

3 that in these, that in this discussion or in these 

4 discussions with Mr. Spor)tin that we — there was concern 

5 that the weapons not be used against U.S. interests, and 

6 that's reflected in the finding. 

7 Q Was it also evident that the weapons would be 
used against Iraq? 

g A As I said, from reading the finding, I would 
have to assume that that was something that was discussed. 
Q How long did the first meeting with Mr. Sporkin 



10 
11 

12 last? 



A It may have lasted, more or less, 10 to 15 
minutes. 



^g Q And what happened after the meeting? 



A Well, before the meeting closed, having worked 
on a previous|^^^^^^||inding with Mr. Cole, 
have initiated this or Mr. Sporkin may have initiated this, 
but I certainly didn't, I certainly on something like this 
would not have had Mr. Cole assist me on this without getting 
specific authorization from the General Counsel. 

So I may have said Mr. — I may have said, 
Stan, do you want me to work on this alone or do you have 
any objection if Gary Cole works on this with me; or Stan 
may have said, you can do this alone or with Gary Cole. It's 



840 



IWSBISSieiilT 



30 

1 not to be discussed with anyone. It's not to be discussed 

2 with anyone else. 

3 But it was clear, my orders were clear that I 

4 could work with Gary Cole but that this was not to be 

5 discussed with anyone else within or outside of the office. 
And your question was, what was the process after 

that? I immediately called Gary Cole and described this, 
described as Mr. Sporkin had described it to me, and the two 
9 of us sat down and drafted this. We may have actually sat 

10 down together and drafted it or we may have worked 

11 independently or divided it up, you know, one person working 

12 on one paragraph, one person working on the other. 

13 Q Did Mr. Sporkin indicate to you that you should 

14 complete a draft of the finding before the end of the day? 
^5 A I think that he did. That certainly was my 

16 understanding, and I recall that this finding was submitted 

17 to Mr. Sporkin by the close of business. If it were not by 
■jg close of business, it would have been -- well, it's dated 
19 2 January. I'm assuming that it was done by the end of that 

20 ^^y • 

Q Did Mr. Sporkin say anything in the first meeting 

about how soon the contemplated activity was to occur? 
A No, he did not. 

Q So that afternoon, I take it you and Mr. Cole 



25 sat down and began working on the drafting of what became 



841 



mms 



31 



Exhibit No. 1; is that right? 

A That's correct. 

Q And what sources did you draw on to prepare this 
first draft finding? 

A I would say we drew on three sources. We drew 
on the information, the directions that Mr. Sporkin had given 
to me, number one. Number two, we drew on the previous 
materials I mentioned at the outset of this deposition -- 
other findings and related papers, and the proper formatting 
of those types of findings. And, number three, we drew on 
the language of section 501 of the National Security Act of 
1947 to ensure that the finding was consistent with that — 
consistent with that language and fell within the parameters 
of that statute. 

Q And by the end of the you — 

A And I should add we also certainly referred to 
the Hughes-Ryan amendment, the so-called Hughes-Ryan 
amendment . 

Q And you completed the draft by the end of the 
day, is that right? 

A I believe that we did. 

Q In looking at the draft I see that there is a 
sentence at about the middle of the page that refers to 
provide intelligence, counterintelligence, et cetera, to the 
identified potential alternative leaders. 



iiAinn^siflfo,. 



842 



m^!^ 



32 



1 A Um hum. 

2 Q What do you recall Mr. Sporkin saying on the 

3 question of providing intelligence to alternative leaders? 
A Well, he might have said, and he probably would 

have if there is that language in this first draft -- he 
probably said that the U.S. Government was attempting to 
establish relations with more moderate elements within Iran 
or within the Iranian government. But I don't believe that 
9 he said anything substantially beyond that. 

10 Q He must have said something along the lines of 

11 we're going to provide these elements with intelligence, 

12 is that right? 

13 A He might have or this — no, this draft is dated 
2 January 86. It's possible that Mr. Cole and I presented 
him with the draft and Mr. Sporkin revised it, and then this 
was printed out on our typewriters as the 2 January 86 
finding at the end of the day. 

So it's possible that the language that Mr. Cole 
and I gave to Mr. Sporkin is not exactly what you see here. 

Q I see. 

A In other words, we may have gone back towards 
the end of the afternoon and said, Stan, here is a draft, 
and he looked at it and made some changes in it and then gave 
it back to us for retyping. 

Q Do you recall that's the way it happened? That 



UJUCUmLl 



843 



W^^>1^ 



33 



you presented Mr. Sporkin with a draft on the 2nd? 

A You've asked me that before and I ~ to the best 
of my recollection, I think we did. 

Q So you recall having taken a draft back to Mr. 
Sporkin later that day, is that right? 

A Yes, I do. 

Q Do you recall doing that personally, actually 
walking it up to his office? 

A Yes, I would have done that. 

Q And did you have any conversation with Mr. 
Sporkin at that time? 

A I, I'm not certain but I don't believe so. I 
believe that I probably showed him the draft and waited in 
the office, either in his office and/or in my office, 
waiting for him to give me any further instructions; and I 
would not have left that evening I'm certain until the 
General Counsel said that's fine for tonight. 

But I don't recall whether we had any further 
discussion at that period of time or whether it was a matter 
of handing the General Counsel the draft and having him 
review it and make whatever changes he might want to make 
in that. 

Q This draft that's marked Exhibit 1, do you recall 
or can you tell whether that is what you and Mr. Cole 
originally drafted; 



WUISSIQLL 



844 



uimsswi^' 



34 



1 A It certainly is — I can't, as I said before, I 

2 can't say with certainty that this is exactly the draft that 

3 we gave to Mr. Sporkin and that there are no changes. But 

4 this certainly had most of the elements of what we did; 

5 in other words, we didn't give him a piece of paper and 

6 Mr. Sporkin totally revised it — Mr. Sporkin totally 

7 rejected our work and revised it and came up with this. 

8 Q And you can't recall anything that Mr. Sporkin 

9 would have told you at the time you presented him with this 

10 first draft on the 2nd; is that right? 

11 A No, I really can't. I would be speculating if 

12 I tried to do that. 

13 Q You don't recall him saying, you need to make 

14 these changes in it, at that time, do you? 

15 A Well, I'm not sure. You know, there are obvious 

16 changes between the 2 January and the 3 January draft and 

17 I am not certain whether he said that evening on 2 January, 

18 I want some additional changes, or whether he called me back 

19 into his office again on 3 January and asked us to work on 

20 that again. 

21 In fact, my best recollection of this was that 

22 I provided the draft to Mr. Sporkin and that he made some 

23 changes and — when I say my best recollection, my initial 

24 recollection of the scenario was that I provided this to 

25 Mr. Sporkin and he made some changes, and then he went down 



IMiHSSlEe^ 



845 



m&iMi^ 



to the National Security Council that first evening; however, 
the records don't reflect that, so I assume that I'm 
incorrect on that. 

Q What you assume is incorrect is that Sporkin 
didn't go down to the White House until January 3rd; is that 
right? 

A That's right. The records reflect that he did 
not go down on the 2nd and that he brought the 3 January 
finding down on the 3rd, and I have no reason to doubt the 
record on that. 

Q Is it possible that you didn't present the first 
draft to Mr. Sporkin until the following morning; namely, 
January 3rd? 

A That's possible but I believe it's highly 
unlikely. When the General Counsel indicated that he wanted 
something of this nature done, done quickly, I can't imagine 
that Mr. Cole and I would have left the office until that 
would have been done. And I'm sure our secretary -- I know 
our secretary would have stayed regardless of how late that 
was. 

Q And Mr. Sporkin would have stayed that late, too? 

A Well, that would depend. If we finished at 
nine o'clock at night, he might not have stayed. But again, 
I don't — I believe that we, as I said before, I believe we 
provided this to him the first evening. 

'mASSlElElL 



846 



BNBII^IW' 



1 (A document was marked 

2 Deposition Exhibit DR No. 2 for 

3 identification.) 

4 MS. McGINN: Can we go off the record for a 

5 minute? 

6 MR, CAROME: Sure. 

7 (Recess.) 

5 BY MR. CAROME: 

g Q What happened, Mr. Roseman, with respect to the 

10 drafting of this finding on January 3rd? 

11 A • As I just said — (pause) — it was, we either 

12 completed the drafting on the 2nd or on the 3rd of January 

13 Mr. Sporkin called me in and asked me to redraft the finding, 

14 in part. 
Q I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 2 . 
A Yes. 
Q Did you play a role in the drafting of this 

Exhibit 2? Do you recognize this document? 

A I -- yes, I do recognize the document. 

Q What is it? 

A What is thi-s document? 

Q Yes, 

A It's a finding, dated 3 January 86, dealing with 



Iran. 



And you played a role in the drafting of this. 



wmm. 



847 



ONJa^WFT 



WW-. . ^^ 

is that right? 

A Well, what I recognize, really — specifically 
what I recognize is the alternative language at the outset 
in terms of "essential to limit prior notice" to the 
committees or directing the DCI to provide notice to the 
committees. That language I specifically recall. 

The other language, I have no recollection 
between the — let me rephrase that. With regard to the 
body of the finding, I don't recall specifically what was 
done in the first draft versus the second draft. 

MR. CAROME: Could we go off the record for just 
a second. 

(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Just so it is clear, you do recall being asked 
by Mr. Sporkin to include something on alternative language? 

A Yes, I definitely recall that. 

Q And when did Mr. Sporkin speak to you about that 
subject? 

A I am not, I cim not certain on that, but I do know 
that — I am not certain when he asked me to draft 
alternative language in the finding. The alternative 
language dealing with notification to the Congress. However, 
I am certain that that subject was discussed. 

Q And what did he say on that subject? 



wuma, 



848 



imu^er 



1 A Well, he asked me to draft alternative language. 

2 Q Did he say why that was to be done? 

3 A Well, I don't recall specifically but I presume 

4 that the discussion was along the lines of this matter is 

5 extremely sensitive and under section 501 of the National 

6 Security Act under certain limited circumstances prior notice 

7 to the committees is not — may not be required and so we 
should draft alternative language. 

9 Q You recognize that that was at least highly 

10 unusual that not notifying Congress would be contemplated; 

11 is that' right? 

12 A Well I am not the expert on that subject because, 

13 as you said at the outset, we, the Intelligence Law Division, 

14 doesn't otdinarily get involved in drafting findings. But 

15 my sense was certainly that that was the exception rather 
15 than the rule. 

17 Q Did Mr. Sporkin indicate who would be the person 

18 to choose between the alternatives on the question of 

19 notification? 

2Q A No, he did not. 

Q And with respect to the body of the January 3rd 
draft — 

A Um hum. 

Q — am I correct that what you say is that you 
don't have a recollection of what caused these changes to be 






849 



16 



21 



m^m 



1 made? 

2 A No, I do not. 

3 Q You have no such recollection? 

4 A That's correct. 

5 Q I see that one change is the addition of a 
paragraph number 2 referring to obtaining from them 
intelligence. 

Do you recall where that idea came from? 
A No, I do not. In fact, as I said, I don't recall 

10 whether, specifically in the body of this, how the final 

11 drafting came about. 

12 Q You are not sure whether or not you even played 

13 a role in the changes between the — to the body of the 

14 finding between the January 2nd and January 3rd draft; is 

15 that what you're saying? 
A I'm not certain. I would assume that I played 

17 some role in that. 

Q And any changes that are made here are either 

19 the result of suggestions or directions from Mr. Sporkin or 

20 his own direct edits; is that right? 
A That would be correct, yes. I think the way you 

22 have just phrased it is the most accurate way of 

23 characterizing this. 
Q The second line of this, of the descriptive 

portion of the January 3rd finding, refers to selected 



utmffiL. 



850 



Uim^HEF 



foreign liaison services. Do you know what that is a 
reference to? 

A No, I do not, except to reference my earlier 
statement that I recall that there was a reference made to 
Israel. 

Q Do you recall any reference to any other 
countries besides Israel? 

A No, I do not. 

Q That same second line of this description of the 
January 3rd finding refers to third countries, in the 
plural. • 

Do you know whether additional countries besides 
Israel were contemplated, even if you don't know the 
identity of those countries? 

A No, I do not. And with regard to the answer I 
just gave to you, when you said "selected foreign liaison 
services," I'm not certain whether the reference to Israel 
was with regard to foreign liaison services or third 
countries. It was just possibly a reference to Israel. 

Q Other than Israel, you don't know what either the 
phrase "liaison services" or "third countries" could refer to, 
is that right? 

A That's correct. 

Q What else happened on January 3rd relating to this 
finding that you know of? 



ui^lAMlEL 



851 



mms 



41 



1 A Again, as I've stated before the best of my 

2 recollection, if I worked on the finding on the 3rd, then I 

3 continued drafting or redrafting, making suggested — making 

4 changes that the General Counsel had suggested; and the only 

5 other thing that I know that went on, based on my review of 

6 the record, is that the record indicates Mr. Sporkin on 

7 3 January brought the finding down to the National Security 

8 Council. 

9 And when I say the record indicates that, that's 

10 a cover sheet that I believe our secretary would have 

11 prepared to deal with handling of a Top Secret document. 

12 (A document was marked 

13 Deposition Exhibit DR No. 3 for 

14 identification.) 

15 BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Mr. Roseman, I show you what's been marked as 

Exhibit 3 and ask you is the front page of Exhibit 3 the 

18 cover sheet that you just described? 

19 A Yes, it is. 
Q And that is the source of your understanding that 

Mr. Sporkin took this to Mr. North on January 3rd; is that 



22 rights 



A Yes, that's correct. 

Q Do you have any information independent of this 
cover sheet that that's what took place? Did Mr. Sporkin 



iiMQiiimi. 



852 



m^^ 



42 



1 tell you that that was going to happen on January 3rd? 

2 A I presume that he — he may not have mentioned 

3 Mr. North, but I presume that he told me, or me and Mr. Cole, 
that he was going down to the White House. I'm fairly 

5 certain of that. 

6 This reference here in Exhibit No. 3 really 

7 confirms what my understanding was, at least insofar as 

8 Mr. Sporkin's going to the National Security Council 
Q What was Mr. Cole's role in the preparation of 

10 the January 2nd and January 3rd drafts? 

11 A • Well, as I think I've explained before, Mr. 

12 Cole's role was essentially to assist me in drafting those 

13 findings, getting his direction from me based on what Mr. 

14 Sporkin had told me. 

15 Q Did the three of you, that means you, Mr. 

16 Sporkin and Mr. Cole, meet together on this matter? 

17 A I don't recall that. 
^Q Q If we could just briefly review the other pages 

19 to what is Exhibit 3. The second page is something that is 

20 marked "dummy copy." Do you know what that is? 
A A dummy copy is the way we deal with certain 

very sensitive documents in our, at least in our OGC 
recordkeeping system. In other words, the full text copy 
will go to the actual recipient, and may go to some other 
recipients, but a dummy copy is put into what's called our 



25 recip 



llNfiUSSlHEIL. 



853 



ifflSSIfiS' 



43 



1 signer files, which is a record of everything an attorney 

2 has drafted. 

3 A dummy copy would be put into our OGC chrono -- 
chronology file — would be put into, perhaps, the OGC 

5 registry; but it is done so that very sensitive matters are 
not spread out, if you will, throughout the office. 

Q Does this dummy copy page reflect that any of 
your own files were going to receive a copy of these 
materials? 

A Well, to me the dummy copy says -- distribution: 
original. Colonel Ollie North; ICA subject file, copy 2; 
OGC chrono, dummy copy; ILD opinion — if your question was 
would I receive that, personally I don't have control over 
the ILD opinion files but that would be within my area. 
And "GDC Signer" would be Gary Cole, signer. 

Q And why was he the signer of this document? 
A It could have been one of two reasons. The 
secretary could have assumed that he did more of the actual 
drafting or the secretary could have simply made a choice 
between him and me. 

Ordinarily, the secretaries will put the, will 
put in the signer --will put a memo in the signer of the 
attorney who has done most of the actual drafting. However, 
that is not a hard and fast rule. 

Q Did Mr. Cole do most of the drafting of the 



IIUCltSSKlEL. 



854 




1 finding? The draft finding on January 2nd, January 3rd? 

2 A I think he may have done the actual drafting. 

3 I think he may have done a bit more, but I recall it was 
fairly equal. We both played active roles in that. 

Q And the next pages appear to be, first, the 
January 3rd draft, marked "draft"; and the January 2nd 
draft, marked "draft"; and the last page is an undated 
document which is actually a copy of what appears to be the 
g November mini-finding. 

10 Is it correct that you did not see this last 

■J1 page at any time prior to November 1986? 

12 A That is correct, 

13 Q Once the finding had been taken down by Mr. 

14 Sporkin to the White House, did you hear anything more about 

15 the finding? 

,|g A To the best of my recollection, I did not. 
17 Q Do you recall speaking to Mr. Sporkin about the 
13 finding at any time after it had been taken down to the 



White House on the 3rd? 

A No, I do not recall having done that. 

Q Did you ever hear anything in January or February 
of 1986 about whether or not the finding you had worked on 
had been signed? 

A Certainly not from Mr. Sporkin and, no, nothing -- 
when you say did jab^^tf^^VViVIPtrfV'^^^^ nothing. The 



mmm' 



855 



m^ms!^ 



only subsequent discussion or discussions that I would have 
had on that would have been with Mr. Cole and with Mr. 
Makowka when Mr. Makowka returned from — he was either on 
leave at that time and/or had been ill. And when Mr. Makowka 
came back I'm certain that I briefed him on this, and I'm 
certain that Mr. Cole and Mr. Makowka and I on one or more 
occasions among the three of us said has anybody heard 
anything about the finding? And the answer, as I recall, 
nobody knew anything more. Certainly Mr. Cole and I didn't. 

Q Did you ever ask Mr. Sporkin , "What happened with 
respect to the finding we had worked on"? 

A I don't — I do not believe that I did. 

Q Were yofl^tware of «5^eting« tSat vxe g^g on 
on the subject of providing arms to- Iran during "January 
•86? " - ■ = ' - J:. 




out 0^he offi«e-f<^^ period of 

A Yesf there was 

Q And what were the dat«»- that you were out of the 

office? , :-^ '^^^ "1_.5"- -^ -^ ~. 

A z- WelV I'm at_l,iftAt: certeni^that t--**«« o^t of the 

office the week of 6 Jairaary. ^-^^ 

a_ iFoxL.All of that week? _.r 

A YesT --- "^ 



856 



m^im 



1 Q Were you aware that Mr. Cole participated in 

2 meetings on the subject of the finding and related matters 

3 during that week? 
A Yes. I was subsequently made aware of that. 

Exactly when I don't recall, but subsequently I was made 
aware of that. 

Q And what did you learn about those meetings or 
meeting? 
9 A Well I had a copy -- well let me backtrack. 

10 When the — after November of '86, when the Iran 

11 initiative became public and we received requests from 

12 various, you know, the Independent Counsel and the 

13 committees to review our files for documents, at least at 

14 that point in time I reviewed my files, of course, and one 

15 of the documents that I located in my files was a draft of a 
•jg memo-, which I believe was dated 6 January 86, from Betty Ann 
■J7 Smith to George Clarke, on arms transfer. 

■^Q Q And you understand that that was the subject or 

ig a subject at the meeting or meetings that Mr. Cole 
participated in the week of January 6th? 

A I am not certain but I believe that it was. 
Q Did you have any discussions on that subject 
during January of '86? 

A No. In fact, you know, what may have happened 
was that when I returned the following week Mr. Cole may have 



liliiciji.OTm„. 



857 



ONtmEifiT 



1 given me a co^^^' that memo and indicated tliat he was 

2 involved in a follow-up meeting. I probably retained that 

3 memo because it was of interest to me, the legal analysis on 

4 foreign military sales, not in terms of any Iran initiative. 

5 I retained that document I am certain just because it had 

6 reference to statutes and some legal analysis on a number of 

7 different statutes. 
Q In any of your discussions that you participated 

9 in in January of '86, were you ever told that freeing hostages 

10 was one of the objectives of the activities to be undertaken? 

11 AT don't believe so. 

12 Your question was, was I — could you go over 

13 your question again? 

14 Q The question was, did you ever learn in 

15 January of '86 that freeing hostages was one of the 

16 objectives of the finding? 
A No. I don't believe that I ever learned that. 
Q In January '86 did you ever come to learn what 

the NSC's relationship to the finding was? 

A Other than what I have previously stated here 



21 the answer is no. 



Q I'm not sure of what you're referring to. 

A Well, in other words, knowing that Mr. Sporkin 
brought the finding down to the National Security Council, 
other than that fact, no, I have no — I was not told about 



iiiiicysfiigj^&». 



858 



imssRi^ 



1 what role the NSC may have played in all of this. 

2 Q The activity that kept you out of the office 

3 during the week of January 6 was a management course; is 

4 that right? 

5 A That's correct. 
Q And not only did you hear nothing more about the 

findings that you had worked on in early January, you also 
heard nothing about a January 17th, 1986 finding; is that 
9 right? 

10 A That's correct; I heard nothing about that. 

11 Q ■ Do you recall writing a note to Mr. Makowka on 

12 the subject of the drafting of the finding in early January? 

13 A I can't recall specifically having done that; 
1^ however, when Mr. Makowka would be out of the office for a 
15 period of time, say, several days or a week, if I for some 

reason was not going to be in the office on the day he 
returned, my ordinary practice would be to dictate a note to 
the secretary, just going over a whole list of all of the 
activities that came to our division in the last few days 
or in the last week or in the last month, however long Mr. 
Makowka might have been out. 
-_ In fact, prior to my interview with Mr. Woodcock 

I had thought of that. That there might be something in that 
note, and asked my secretary to — or asked our division 
secretary to review division files, review her own, you know. 



IINiHMlfJL. 



859 



nR»$smT 



1 her own files. She even reviewed her own steno notebook and 

2 she couldn't find any such note. So I may have written one 

3 and I may not have. 

4 Q But you're satisfied that an adequate search 

5 has been done for that and one wasn't located; is that right? 

6 A Yes, I am satisfied. 

7 MR. FEIN: Could I interrupt for just one second 
and go off the record; 

g (Discussion off the record.) 

10 BY MR. CAROME: 

•J1 Q ■ Other than the drafts of the findings we have 

12 already looked at today 

13 A Um hum. 

14 Q — are you aware of the existence of any 

15 documents that relate to the drafting work in early January; 
^g A Drafting work on these findings? 
17 Q That's right. 

A No, with the qualification that I indicated 
earlier, that Mr. Cole and I had used some other background- 
type of papers to assist us in drafting these types of 
findings. But that's the only other. 

Q Did you take any notes of your discussions with 
Mr. Sporkin? 

A Yes, I did. 



Q And did you keep those notes? 

llIiltliOTElL 



860 



mi^tiir 



50 



A No. I would have discarded those notes pretty - 
at the time we drafted this or pretty shortly thereafter. 

Q Was that because Mr. Sporkin said something 
about not keeping papers on the subject? 

A No, he said nothing of that sort. He said 
absolutely nothing of that sort. That was just a matter of 
practice, if you will. Just taking notes down on what 
-somebody is giving instructions on and doing the assignment, 
and the notes have no independent value. 

There was nothing unusual in discarding those 
notes in connection with this particular matter than in 
connection with any other matter I would have hemdled. 




861 



T5 



] c\ci,es S I —- S 3i 



'^ 






862 



IJiKIASaElii&T 




1 
2 

3 Q Let me turn back to the point at which you became 

4 involved in drafting the January 1 — excuse me — January 2 

5 and 3 finding. I was not present at the beginning of this 

6 deposition but I recall from our interview that as a member 

7 of the Intelligence Division of the Office of General Counsel 

8 it was not a usual thing for you to be involved in the 

9 drafting of a finding; is that correct? 

10 A That's correct. 

11 Q' And when you had this task brought to your domain 

12 you sought guidance from earlier findings; is that correct? 

13 A 'That's correct. 

14 Q Had you known about a November finding on the 

15 same subject, then, presumably, you would have used that as 
1g well; is that correct? 

17 A Presumably we would have. 

1g Q But you did not use that, is that correct? 

A We were not aware of the November finding and 
we did not use the November finding. 

Q Let me turn to the two findings that have been 

22 marked Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2. If you would direct 

23 your attention to both of those. 

24 The finding that is dated January 3, Deposition 

25 Exhibit No. 2, contains a reference to providing training 



l^MHiSSlElEll 



863 



BH8R^»T 



55 



and guidance to the moderate elements. Do you have any 
understanding as to what that meant? 

A No, I do not. 

Q That does appear to be a change from the previous 
day's effort, but I gather you have no understanding as to 
whether that meant U.S. personnel might go to Iran or what 
they might be training the moderates to do? 

A No. I have no understanding of what that term 
meant. 

Q Do you have any idea where it came from? 

A ' It could have come from another finding that 
Mr. Cole and I had used as a -- used in assisting us in 
drafting this. It could have been Mr. Sporkin's addition. 
Those are two possibilities. 

Q You have no independent recollection, however, 
I gather? 

A No, I do not. It could have been Mr. Sporkin 
saying to us add in the word "training" or making some 
suggestions, but I have no recollection on that at this time. 

Q The January 3 finding. Deposition Exhibit No. 2, 
also uses the term, in the second paragraph, "establish 
contact with the moderate elements." 

A Um hum. 

Q At the time this finding was drafted did you have 
any understanding as to whether contact had already been made 

1 



ng as to whether contact naa 

llUtUSSlBQL 



864 



^KSStPKlT 



56 



1 with the moderate elements or whether this was something 

2 prospective? 

3 A My best recollection would be that this was 

4 prospective. 

5 Q And what would you base that recollection on? 

6 A I base that recollection on the language of the 

7 finding here. I would really be purely speculating if I said 

8 that, you know, in my discussions with Mr. Sporkin that he 

9 had indicated that there had already been any contact. I 

10 have no recollection of that. 

11 Q ' You, I believe, probably were already asked this 

12 in the deposition but let me — 

13 A Let me just clarify that last point. Obviously, 

14 the discussions went along the lines, something along the 

15 lines of we are trying to establish, establish initiative, 
•jg something along — you know, or we had tried to make efforts 

to do this. 

Q When you say obviously, you're gleaning that from 
19 the language of the finding, I gather? 
2Q A Yes, I'm gleaning that from the leuiguage of the 

21 finding. 

22 Q Did you have an understanding as to whether the 
arms and equipment that are referred to in Deposition Exhibit 
No. 2 refer to any particular kinds of arms; whether, say, 
anything from handguns to missiles were contemplated? 



llNOii^ElElL 



865 



isj^ffir 



57 



A No; I don't believe that any of that was discussed 
with me. 

Q The initial finding that was drafted — 

A Urn hum. 

Q — Deposition Exhibit No. 1, refers to providing 
arms to the government of Iran. That contrasts with 
language in Deposition Exhibit No. 2 that refers to providing 
arms to the moderate elements. 

A That's correct. 

Q Did you have any understanding as to how you 
could provide arms to the moderate elements that would not 
ipso facto be provided to the government of Iran? 

A No, I had no understanding of that. And in fact, 
that particular point puzzled me and I recall discussing 
that with Mr. Cole, and I recall that it puzzled him 
somewhat, too. 

Q Let rae try and sharpen the point a bit. 
Presumably, if something as low power as handguns are being 
provided, then you might be able to provide those to a 
moderate faction within Iran and not have it go to the 
government of Iran; is that correct? 

A I would be just — I would merely be 
speculating on that. 

Q Okay . 

A I'm not an expert on the Iranian hierarchy. 



tiiiiciiiimiL. 



866 



m«5Si«iir 



58 

1 Q I understand. I'm trying to make a point of 

2 contrast here. 

3 If, however, you provide a missile or a series 

4 of missiles, that's the kind of item that it is going to be 

5 hard for a moderate group to hold unto themselves, just in 
terms of common sense. Would you agree with that? 

7 A I would have to agree that it would be more 

8 difficult to deal with a missile than with a handgun. 
Q Okay. Now the reason I asked for that, or tried 

10 to make that contrast is to see if that would assist your 

11 recollection in this conversation that you had with Mr. Cole 

12 as to why it was that you thought there would be a problem 

13 providing weapons to a small faction that would not ipso 

14 facto go to the government. 

.^5 In other words , did you have an understanding as 

1g to what kind of weapons would be involved, given that you 
■J7 focused on that problem? 

.fg A It's possible that we did but I think unlikely, 
^g and certainly now I have no recollection of that. 

I might add that you talked about common sense 
before and that, you know, it may have been that at the time 
common sense led us to think that if this was being used in 
an Iran-Iraq conflict it would be more than handguns. 

Q That certainly would be an exercise of common 
sense. 



^^.^nwlifc^Wfe 



867 



iaisw 



A Yes. 

Q The January 3 finding has the alternative 
language in it, which you have recognized, on notice to 
Congress. 

A Um hum. 

Q It contains in the first alternative a delay of 
notice by the President until he shall otherwise direct. 
Is that right? 

A That's correct. 

Q Now, if the law requires that a finding, notice 
of a finding can be delayed, however, Congress is to be 
notified in a timely fashion; is that your recollection of 
the law? 

A Section 501 states that Congress will be kept 
fully — currently informed of intelligence activities which 
specifically include significant and anticipated 
intelligent activities, which under the Hughes-Ryan amendment 
includes covert action or special activities. 

The law then says that — and it uses this 
language. If says, if — well it says, I believe, in 
extraordinary circumstances where it's — in extraordinary 
circumstances to protect the vital interests of the United 
States where it is essential to limit prior notice, prior 
notice may be limited to, or notice may be limited to, and 
there are eight senior officials in Congress: the chairman. 



ii^ii;^^^ 



UlffiEASSIFISlT 



60 



1 you know, ranking minority member of the Intelligence 

2 Committees and four others. 

3 But there is another section of another ~ I 

4 believe it's Part B of that section of the National Security 

5 Act that says, if there has not been — if the President has 

6 not provided the notice as required under subsection (a) , 

7 which was the section I was just referring to, the President 
will provide a timely — a full report on a timely basis to 

9 Congress of that. 

10 Q The reason I asked that question is that the 

11 formula used in this first alternative, which is "until I 

12 otherwise direct," is really quite indefinite in the time 

13 period. 

14 Do you recall where it was that particular 

15 formula came from? 

1g A No, not specifically. I do know that Mr. Cole 

17 and I reviewed the National Security Act very carefully to 

18 make certain that this alternative language was consistent 

19 with the requirements of the law. 
Again, I am — this is speculation, but it may 

have been that Mr. Sporkin asked that that language be put 
in or it may have been language that Mr. Cole and I drafted 
ourselves. 

Q Do you think leaving it that indistinct is 
consistent with the law? 



lICLiSSlEiti 




61 

A I beTieve'tliat this was consistent with the law 
when we drafted it, as I said earlier; and as I have just 
said, we made every effort to review the statute and ensure 
that this type of language met the requirements of the law. 

And there was nothing in here, or there is nothing 
on the face of this nor nothing that was brought to our 
attention at that time that would have indicated that 
notification would have been — notification" would not. have 
been provided for a period of time. 

Q Is it your understanding that notice can be 
delayed indefinitely? 

A As yott two gentlemen have pointed out earlier, 
we are not the experts on special activities and covert 
action in Intelligence Law Division, so I would have to 
defer to other — others in my office who have that 
responsibility and that expertise on that precise question. 

Q So the answer would be you're not really sure, 
is that correct? 

A I would rather let my answer stand as I have just 
stated it. 

Q There is another point of comparison in these 
two exhibits. Deposition Exhibit 1 and Deposition Exhibit 2, 
that I'd like to draw your attention to. 

The final paragraph of Deposition Exhibit No. 1 
provides that the^ asaistanre^ smd the^ is a wide variety of 



'mi 



r ^jn i g^ ^ iwn 



870 



URBEIiSStPtllT 



62 



1 existence, to Iran will be terminated if the U.S. Government 

2 learns that this materiel is being used for purposes other 

3 than the furtherance of Iran's war effort against Iraq. 

4 That language contrasts with language in the 

5 second version of the finding, January 3, which states that 

6 these materiels are limited in their use essentially to the 

7 Iran-Iraq conflict. This assistance will beycontinued if 

8 the U.S. Government learns that these elements are misusing 

9 or intend to misuse this assistance for the purpose of 

10 reinstituting terrorist actions against U.S. persons, 

11 property or interests, or otherwise. 

12 Do you recall how that transformation occurred? 

13 A No, I do not recall that. 

14 Q Did you have any understanding at that time as to 

15 whether, if the moderate elements used this materiel to, say, 
15 repel a Soviet invasion, that that would have been considered 
17 inconsistent with the purposes of this Jinding? 

ig A I'm sorry. Repeat that question, please. 

19 Q Had the Iranian moderate factions used the 

20 materiel that they were going to receive under this initiative 

21 to repeil, say, a Soviet invasion, would that have been 

22 inconsistent, in your view, with the purposes expressed in 

23 either of these two documents? 

«. A We really did not discuss any hypotheticals or 



25 ^"y 



scenarios at that time as to when the assistance would be 



IIMCliRRlEP. 



871 



« 




cut off. I do recall that, you know, a clear thrust of this 
was to help prevent terrorist acts against the United States, 
against U.S. citizens, U.S. property, any U.S. interests. 

Q What I'm driving at with this question, and 
hoping perhaps to refresh your recollection on the point, 
if there was conversation on this point, is whether the 
Soviet Union was considered to be a military threat that 
needed to be addressed in either of these documents when 
you were called upon to draft them? 

A I do not recall that the Soviet Union was 
discussed with regard to either of these documents. 

Q In any way, shape or form, is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

MR. CAROME: Tim, can I follow-up with something 
on that sentence? 

MR. WOODCOCK: Yes. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q That last sentence in the January 3rd version 
of the finding, which is Exhibit 2, refers to reinstituting 
terrorist actions. 

Was there any discussion to the effect that the 
elements receiving these weapons had previously engaged in 
terrorist actions? 

A Well, if you're referring to Deposition Exhibit 



** TTOlAwi l Jpt P lP« T k 




872 



1 No. 2, and you just said the elements receiving these weapons. 

2 I, to my knowledge — I mean, I have no knowledge that prior 

3 to this finding anyone was — any moderates or anyone in the 

4 Iranian government were receiving any weapons. 

5 Q No. My focus is on the word "reinstituting , " 
which seems to suggest that there had been terrorist actions 
and the goal here was to avoid reinstitution of such 
terrorist actions by these people. And it seems to be that 

9 the reinstituting under discussion here is by the elements 

10 receiving the weapons. 

11 And I am wondering if you can recall, having 

12 focused on this point, any discussion on the question of 

13 whether or not the elements receiving these weapons had 

14 previously engaged in terrorist acts. 

15 A It's possible that there was discussion about 
15 dealing with moderates who were acting somewhat more 

17 moderate now, somewhat more civilized. But again, to say 

that that kind of discussion went on with any kind of 
19 certainty is pure speculation on my part. 

Q You said that you came to understand at this 
time that one goal of the activities contemplated was to 
control or stop terrorism; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now that goal doesn't seem to appear — I withdraw 



JUSSL 



873 



mmm 



65 



A Yes, that is — I believe that is stated in both 
findings. 

Q And do you recall what Mr. Sporkin said about 
how the reduction of terrorism fit in with the activities 
contemplated here? 

A Not specifically. I think I've, you know, 
answered that in terms of that there was an interest there 
in curtailing terrorist activities against the United States. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q ■ Do you recall any discussion of having any 
commercial entity or private citizen play a role in the 
transferral of weapons or the acceptance of monies from Iran 
and putting this policy into effect? 

A No. I recall no such discussion. 

Q Did you have any understanding as to whether the 
United States was going to deal directly with Iran or was 
going to use any kind of a screen in its dealings with Iran? 

A No, I do not, other than to reference my earlier 
statements about recalling that there might have been a 
reference to Israel. But other than that, no discussions of 
third parties. I'm fairly — I'm very confident that there 
was no discussion of private U.S. persons or U.S. groups or 
corporations being used to channel this. 

Q Or private citizens from any area of the world? 



I IvURITb X^Drfwi t*t 



874 



URcuSSSflHW^ 



66 



A Or private citizens; that's correct. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I don't have any more questions. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Just one small point — 
A Sure. 
Q — to clean something up. 

You talked earlier about a1 
finding that had been worked on in late 1985, isi that right? 
A Yes. 

Did you ever learn whether or not that 
finding was signed? 
A No, I never learned the result of that finding 
either. 

MR. CAROME: I don't have anything more. We can 
go off the record. 

(Whereupon, at 3:02 p.m., the taking of the 
deposition was concluded.) 




WU&ClflCJi,^ 



875 



.^/ 



f 









mf 



2^^^<^ 



ion 652 



-gn Assisr ancg Act of ig^i' 
-ea, _Concer n J nq Opera c Ion r 

jTnci 

Ot.'er tJ 



•pepoi 




e^L.u -1- 



SCOPE 
Iran 



DESCRIPTION 

foreign liaison f^vfJ^' f"*^ r^'^ selected 
government en?Ue to iclenJif;^ '°f'^^" 

r::s:;nri?fr"T^"v"----'---"ve 
??:ti".r:n:;; :;:::.;";;.,"• -"».'.-:'o, 



The White House 
'•'ash ington, O.C. 
■'ate: 2 January 1986 



Uki 



CXxaJ ^//f 



- S t C RE 





876 



: DEPOSITION 
? EXHISIT 
I -hit --^2. 



Finding PurBU«nt to Stction %%\ 



r rnn TT»TM^Tm-mT7 iTTn »nLi3j 

jEm iji3iirhm-prTiT?rTT«'i ^T T» in f^ 
;TrrwnT7T-rT-gT:>r>rMfT 






DRAFT 



I b«c«by find that tht following operation in a fortign 
countcv (inclading all support nacaaaary to such operation) ia 
importLnt to th« national aacurity of tha Onltad Stataa, (and 
due to^ts aitraaa^aansitivity and aacurity rlaka, I dataraina 
it ia aMontial'tb Halt prior notica, and dlract tha l^iractor 
of Cantralvlntallifanca to rafrain from reporting thla Finding 
to tha Congress «s provided in Section SOI of the National 
Security Act of 1947, aa amended, until I otherwise direct.] 

-or- 
(and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his 
deaignec, to report thia Finding to the intelligence conittees 
of the Congreas purauant to Section 501 of the National 
Security Act of 1947, aa aaended, and to provide auch briefings 
as necessary.] 



SCOPE 



Iran 



)E^ 




DEiOtlPTIOH 

Work with Iranian elemeAts, groups and individuals, 
selected foreign liaiaok servicea and third countries, 
all of which are ayapathetic to O.S. Governaent 
interests and which do kot conduct or support 
terrorist actions directed againat O.S. persons, 
property or interests, cor the purpose of: 
(1) establishing a aorC aoderate governaent in Iran, 
and (2) obtaining f roa kbea aignificant Intelligence 
not otherwise obtainabW,-^o deteraine the current 
Iranian Governaent 'a intentiona with respect to its 
neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts. Provide 
funds, intelligence, counterintelligence, training, 
guidance and coaaunieations aasistance to theae 
eleaents, groups, individuala, liaiaon aervices and 
third countries in support of these activities. 

EsUblish contact with the aore aoderata eleaenta 
within and outside the Governaent of Iran tb eatablish 
their credibility with that Governaent by pM 
provision of eras, equipaent and related Matarlel to 
these eleaents on condition that these aateciV* ^« 
Halted in their use essentially to the Iran- Itaqi 
conflict. This asaiatance will be diac«)tinued if the 
O.S. Governaent learna that theae eleaabts araj 
Blsuslng or intend to aisuse this aaai/Unce, for the 
purpose of reinstituting terrorist actions against 
O.S. persons^, property or Interests, yhr otherwise. 



The White House 
Washington, D.C. 
Date: 3 January 1986 




■'^y ^^tetrJjEIlaJ^^ 



877 







878 



UL" AS:";f!Ei 



d::-S6-5oo3i 

3 .'a.-uary 198 6 



D 
U 
M 
M 

C 


p 

Y 



The White House 
Washington, D.C. 
Date: 3 January 1986 

Distribution: 

Original - Col. Oil North (copy 1) 

1 - ICA Subject file (copy 2) 
1 - OGC Chrono (dummy copy) 
1 - ILD Opinion file -(dummy copy) 
1 - GDC Signer (dummy copy) 

OGCR TS 0801-86 
copy 1 



r ^ -» 

Partially Declassified /Released on.^^^i^-:i]li'] 

under provitjns of E.3. 1235?^ 

by S. Reger, f;:tiGr!a! Security Council 



djxv^//; 



lji?si/iioifl£ 




879 



UUiimodii 



c^ <W>'^'^ xf^ Pr^.Jinq Pursuant to Section 662 of 
^.■^>_"^^ T.-.e Poreign Aaslatance Act of 1961 



-cN-^- 



, .v,v"' . :;^'' ^ wPdertancn py tr.t Central Intelligence 

i'^ aC'''^.,Av'*^ " Agency in Poreign Countries, Ot.-er 



BRAFt 



3 



^\ - J^"'''" ,j,\v"''' Those Intended Solely for t^.e Pjrpcse 

■^"'' "■■ <:^ of Intelligence Collection 

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign 
country (incl-ding all support necessary to such operation) is 
irportant to t.-e national security of the United States, land 
due to Its extrene sensitivity and security risKs, I determine 
• t IS essential to li.-nit prior notice, and direct the Director 
of Central Intelligence to refrain from r eporting this Finding 
to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of" t"he~ Nat ional 
Security Act of 1947, as amended, until I otherwise direct,] 

-or- 
[and direct the Directoc of Central Intelligence, or his 
designee, to report this Finding to the intelligence conunittees 
of the Congress pursuant to Section 501 of the National 
Security Act of 1947, as amended, And to provide such briefings 
as necessary. ) 

SCOPE DESCRIPTION 

Iran Work with Iranian elements, groups and individuals, 

selected foreign liaison services and third countries, 
all of which are sympathetic to U.S. Government 
interests and which do not conduct or support 
terrorist actions directed against U.S. persons, 
property or interests, for the purpose of: 
(1) establishing a more moderate government in Iran, 
and (2) obtaining from them significant intelligence 
not otherwise obtainable, to determine the current 
Iranian Government's intentions with respect to its 
neighbors and with respect to terrorist acts. Provide 
funds, lntelliqenc«, counter in:elligence, training, 
guidance and communications assistance to these 
elements, groups, individuals, liaison services and 
third countries in support of these activities. 

Establish contact with the more moderate elements 
within and outside the Government of Iran to establish 
their credibility with that Government by the 
provision of arms, equipment and related materiel to 
these element* on condition that these materials be 
limited In their use tsaentlally to the Iran-Iraqi 
conflict. Thla aatlitance will be discontinued if the 
O.S. Government learns that these elements are 
misusing or Intend to aliuse thia assistance, for the 
purpose of rtinstltutlng terrorist actions against 
O.S. person*, property or Interests, or otherwise. 

The White Bouse 
Washington, D.C. 
Oats: 3 January 



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SCOPE 
Iran 



DESCRIPTION 



work with individuals and organizations both 

foreign liaison services, and other foreign 
government entities, to identify, develop and 
promote the advancement of moderate alternative 
leaders in Iran. Provide intelligence, 
counterintelligence, communications assistance 
and funding to the identified potential 
alternative leaders to promote the 
?r.'n^\'f rr' °^* """^ moderate government in 
Hif2,-r^ "^ "''"" ^^' threat of terrorism 
directed against U.S. persons, property and 
interests. Protect and support these 
operations by conducting a program of 
deception, unilaterally and through third 
countries, which may include the use of all 
torms of propaganda. 

Provide arms, equipment and related materiel to 
the Government of Iran to assist in its 
military operations against Iraq in order to 
encourage to curtailment of terrorist activity 
directed against U.S. targets and interests. 
This assistance will be terminated if the U S 
Government learns that this materiel is being 
ased for purposes other than the furtherance of 
Iran's war effort against Iraq. 



The White House 
Washington, D.C. 
"■ate: 2 January 1986 



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I .'■.ave Seen 5r:efed on t.-.e efforts being rrade by private 
parties to obtain t.-.e release of Americans held hostage in the 
Middle East, and hereby find that the following operations m 
foreign countries (including all support necessary to such 
operations) are important to the national security of the 
United States. Because of the extreme sensitivity of these 
operations, m the exercise of the President's constitutional 
authorities, I direct t.T Director of Central Intelligence .lot 
to brief the Congress of the United States, as provided for in 
Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 
until such time as I may direct otherwise. 



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Part 


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by :. R=;er, ' 



;oie3Sc(i craaVM^'^'ti 



DESCRIPTION 



The provision of assistance by the 
Central Intelligence Agency to 
private parties in their attempt to 
obtain the release of Americans 
held hostage in the Middle East. 
Such assistance is to include the 
provision of transportation, 
communications, and other necessary 
support. As part of these efforts 
certain foreign material and 
munitions may be provided to the 
Government of Iran which is taking 
steps to facilitate the release of 
the American hostages. 

All prior actions taken by U.S. 
Government officials in furtherance 
of this effort are hereby 
ratified . 



The White House 
Washington, D.C, 



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DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM PAUL ROSENBLATT 

Friday, September 25, 1987 

U.S. House of Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 



The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:10 a.m., 
in Room B-336, Rayburn House Office Building, Pamela 
Naughton presiding. 

Present: Pamela Naughton, on behalf of the House 
Select Committee. 

Robert Genzman, on behalf of the House Select Committee. 

Thomas McGough, on behalf of the House Select 
Committee. 

Also present: Elizabeth B. Anderson, on behalf of the 

Partially Declassified/Released on /4J<^fV ■ 88 
under pfovisions of E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Secutity Council 



Witness 



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DNfiEASSIffir' 



Whereupon, 

2 WILLIAM PAUL ROSENBLATT, 

3 was called as a witness on behalf of the House Select Com- 

* mittee and having been duly sworn, was examined and testified 

5 as follows: 

6 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE HOUoE SELECT 

7 COMMITTEE 

8 BY MS. llAUGHTON: 

9 Q Could you state your full name for the record. 

10 A William Paul Rosenblatt. R-o-s-e-n-b-l-a-t-t. 

11 Q Could you state your title please? 

12 A Assistant Commissioner Enforcement, United States 

13 Customs Service. 

14 Q My neime is Pamela Naughton, Staff Counsel for the 

15 House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Trans- 

16 actions with Iran. I would ask those present in the room 

17 to state their names and title. 
MR. MC GOUGH: Thomas McGough, Assistant Counsel 

to the House Select Committee. 

MR. GENZMAN: Robert W. Genzman, Associate Minority 
Counsel to the House Committee. 

MS. ANDERSON: Elizabeth Anderson. I represent 
Mr. Rosenblatt. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Now, Mr. Rosenblatt, we interviewed you a while 



Hvlib Afflfiit w&F 



886 



UNSaSHREfl^' 



1 ago on basically three different areas, and I want to go 

2 through those in perhaps a little more detail today. Hope- 

3 fully, we can take these areas chronologically, but complete 
the subject matter before we turn to another. 

The first issue I would like to turn to, and I 
hope this is the correct chronological order, is the Maule 
Aircraft investigation, and it is M-a-u-1-e. If we can 
start with a couple preliminaries first, could you tell us 
in your capacity what your functions are at Customs? 

10 A As the Assistant Commissioner for Enforcement, I 

11 am responsible for all enforcement investigative matters as 

12 it relates to the jurisdiction authorized by the Customs 

13 Service in various United States codes. There are approximate- 

14 ly 4 00 laws that we enforce. 

15 Q This enforcement would include criminal prosecutions: 

16 A Criminal and civil, yes. 

17 Q Now, prior to the investigation concerning Maule 
fg Aircraft, did you have any contact with Colonel North? 

A No. 

2Q Q Could you tell me how this particular investigation 
21 came to your attention? 

A Approximately middle to latter part of August, 
maybe even beginning of September, I had occasion to be in 
the Commissioner of Customs, William VonRabb's, office, at 
which time he mentioned to me that he had a conversation with 



ImlwwWKfh^ 



887 



WiSSKIilT 



^ Colonel North relative to an inquiry made by Colonel North 

2 on Maule Aviation, and the way the Commissioner put it to 

3 me, that according to Mr. North, or Colonel North rather, we 
^ were being very heavy-handed in our investigative pursuit 

5 of the case in the Atlanta, Georgia area, and, therefore, 

6 the Comiiiissioner wanted me to look into it to determine 

7 whether or not Colonel North's contentions were accurate or 

8 not. 

9 Q Did the Commissioner tell you what Colonel North 

10 had told him? 

11 A In substance. I don't believe in verbatim — the 

12 Commissioner and I do not operate that way that we would 

13 state verbatim the conversation. 

14 Q Did the Commissioner tell you Colonel North's 

15 concern was over the substance of the investigation or of the 

16 manner in which the agents were going about the investigation? 

17 A The manner in which the investigation was being 

18 conducted. 

19 Q Exactly what do you mean when you say manner? 

20 A In other words, being too aggressive in conducting 

21 their investigation. 

22 Q Where was the investigation taking place? 

23 A I believe in what I consider the Atlanta, Georgia 

24 area. 

25 Q Which region is that for Customs? 



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1 A The Southeast Region. 

2 Q Who is the Customs person in charge of the South- 

3 eastern Region? 

4 A The Regional Commissioner is George Heavey. 

5 Q Would you spell that? 

6 A H-e-a-v-e-y. 

7 MS. ANDERSON: At the time. 

8 THE WITNESS: Oh, at the time? Edward Kwas at 

9 the time. 

10 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

11 Q Could you spell that, please? 

12 A Edward and then K-w-a-s. 

13 Q Do you know what Commissioner VonRabb's relation- 

14 ship had been with Colonel North up to this time? 

15 A No, I don't. 

1g Q- Did the Commissioner ever speak to you about 
Colonel North's involvement or connection with General 
Singlaub? 

19 A Not that I can recall. 

2Q Q Do you recall any discussion of a helicopter 
21 purchased named Lady Ellen? 
A That I recall. 

Q What can you tell me about that? 

A Apparently, there had been some conversation between 
25 the Commissioner and either General Singlaub or possibly 



17 



itNiliSSMEft' 



Colonel North, I am not sure which, relative to the Lady 
Ellen. Customs had detained the helicopter in the South 
Florida area, I believe Fort Lauderdale. We were determin- 
ing, based on that detention, whether or not State Department 
had issued a license for the exportation of that helicopter. 
We subsequently determined that it had not been, a license 
had not been issued, and, therefore, the Commissioner was 
advised of that, and I believe General Singlaub was subse- 
quently advised, I did not personally advise him, I don't know 
who did, that a license was required. 

I subsequently found out that a license was issued 
for the exportation of that helicopter by, I presume. General 
Singlaub. 

Q The exportation office, not the issuance of the 
license? 

A The license was issued for the exportation of the 
helicopter. 

Q Do you know what Colonel North's connection was 
to this helicopter? 

A No, I do not. 

Q Do you know if he communicated to the Commissioner 
the desire for a license to be issued? 

A No, I do not. 

Q Do you know if he had any input? 

A I do not. 



iiMpL nooinrn 



890 



UNSHSSWHT 



Q Now, could you tell us how it is the Maule 
investigation began, what precipitated the investigation? 

A To the best of my recollection, I believe it was 
CBS News had a segment of a news broadcast wherein it inter- 
viewed a pilot who claimed to have ferried aircraft from 
Maule toJ 

The Department of Justice was watching this iV 
broadcast, and on the basis of this broadcast, requested 
Customs to conduct an appropriate investigation. 

Q Were they ferried into^^^^^^|or into Nicaragua 




Q At any rate, one of the things you wanted to 
determine from the investigation was whether or not it had 
been ferried into eithei^^^^^^^or Nicaragua? 

A That is correct. 

Q Was Joe Tafe the person at the Department of Justice 
that asked Customs to look into the case? 

A I am not absolutely positive. I know in our 
initial discussion, I probably used the name of Joe Tafe, 
since that is the individual I am most familiar with over 
at the Department of Justice, to get involved in these matters 
It could well have been some other individual. I wouldn't 






891 






necessarily know that detail because it would come over in 
writing and go directly to our Strategic Investigations 
Division. 

Q Now, what kind of aircraft was it that was the 
subject of this investigation? 

A It was my understanding the«-e were — nomenclature 
was Super Piper cubs or Seneca Piper aircraft. 

Q Can you tell me what type of aircraft that is? 

A I am not absolutely positive, but I gather they are 
single-engine high-wing aircraft. 

Q Now, could you tell us precisely what violations of 
law would Customs be looking at in this type of investigation? 

A Basically, there would be two segments or sections 
of law we would be concerned with: one. Arms Export Control 
Act, whereby these aircraft would have what we call military 
hard points that require a State Department License; secondly, 
whether or not there was some special equipment on it, such 
as a STOL kit, S-T-O-L, which stands for short takeoff and 
lemding equipment, which would require a Commerce Department 
license. 

Looking back on this, of course, there is also the 
aspect of a foreign asset control license to an embargoed 
country such as Nicaragua. We were fairly confident right 
from the inception that the aircraft was practically in- 
capable of having what we call military hard points put on it, 



HbIvi) AAKfEiEuT 



892 



25 



llflliU^Mr 



not beyond the realm of possibility, but not probable, 

2 because of a variety of technical aspects. So, basically, 

3 we were dealing with two areas, whether or not it required a 

4 Commerce license or — and/or required a license from the 

5 foreign assets control because of an embargoed country. 
Q Also, if on the form the actual point of destina- 
tion was erroneous, in other words, if the plane actually 
was intended to go or did indeed go to Nicaragua but a 

9 different end-user or different point of destination had 

10 been put on the government form, would that also have been 

11 a falsifying? 

12 A Yes, we could have gone after that too. 

13 Q When you say hard points, would such a hard point, 

14 for instance, be a gun mount? 

15 A Yes, that would be correct. 

18 Q After Commissioner VonRabb asked you to or told you 

17 about his conversation with North, what did he ask you to do 

18 about it? 

19 A Just to look into it and ascertain whether our 

20 people were being over-aggressive about the investigation, 

21 and the general nature of our investigation and our pursuit. 

22 Q And did you call Colonel North? 

23 A I did later that day, the same day. 

24 Q Had you spoken to him ever before? 
A No. 



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10 



Q What did you tell North when you called him? 

A That I was calling him in connection with his 
conversation with the Commissioner relative to the Maule 
investigation. 

At that time, he thanked me, and he indicated that 
our people were being very aggressive and were asking for 
all kinds of records from Maule relative to the shipment of 
these aircraft. He indicated at that time that the Maule 
people were good guys and that we were basically, these are 
my words, not his words, that we were barking up the wrong 
tree. 

At that time, I indicated, I said, well, are our 
people being overly-aggressive, or exactly what was wrong 
with our people's conduct? And he said, no, you know, our 
people had been courteous, but that we were demanding all 
kinds of records from Maule, and I indicated to him, I 
said to him, look, the easiest way for us to determine any 
violations of law, and I went into the potential violations of 
law as I have already done with you on the exposure and what 
we needed to do was get documentation as quickly as possible 
and photographs of these aircraft so we could determine 
whether or not there was a STOL kit on these aircraft, which 
would require a license, and also shipping documents and 
invoices, purchase orders relative to these four aircraft. 
It was at this time, he indicated to me that one 



Hmn^iFiPfiT 



BNRIffifffBT 



11 




of the aircraft had crashed, it was located 

and that the other three were over^^^^^^^^| being used 

for shipments of medical supplies and other humanitarian 

purposes. 

And I said, well, if that's truly the case, then we 
would be able to clear this matter up rather rapidly if he 
could provide me, since he had offered to provide me, the 
documentation that I had enumerated earlier in my conversation 
with him. 

Q Well, did his volunteering of the information that 
one had crashed and two were ^^^^^^^^H and so forth — 

A Three . 

Three were ^^^^^^^^B 

A Yes. 

Q - Were any i 

A One crashed 

Q Did he say it crashed 

A The best Z can remember, it crashed and was in 
Whether crashed in^^^H^Hor 
can't tell you. 

Q Did he impart this information to you during that 
very first phone call you had with him? 

A As best as I can recollect, yes. 

Q My notes of our interview indicated that he 
volunteered that information to you at a subsequent 




a total of four. 



rtiJHlitl HwilTffnhrl^n 



895 



"TOd^^BISiT 



12 



conversation, but, again, this is your deposition, and this 
is what is going to be on the record. So, to the best of 
your recollection, was this all a part of that same initial 
conversation? 

A I think you are correct, I think it was in the 
second telephone conversation we had about it, because it 

was also during that period of time he offered that one of my 

f 
agents could go down and see the aircraft, and that's where 

we got into him detailing to me where the aircraft were 

located. 

Q If we can step back to the first conversation, did 
he tell you that the planes were b-?ing used to carry medical 
and humanitarian supplies? 

A That is what he indicated to me. 

Q Did he mention who actually purchased the aircraft? 

A No, I don't recall him mentioning that, no. 

Q If we can explain the term, "Maule", is that the 
name of a company or the neune of an aircraft? 

A That's the name of a company. 

Q What does the company do, to your knowledge? 

A Manufactures and builds aircraft, assembles air- 
craft. 

Q Maule was not the purchaser of the aircraft, it 
sold it to someone else? 

A That is correct. 



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896 



14 



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13 



1 Q Colonel North did not give you the name of the 

2 individuals or corporations that purchased the aircraft? 

3 A No. I didn't think he would know that information, 
that is why I was asking for the purchase orders, the invoices, 

5 the documentation associated with a sale, particularly this 

6 sale of four aircraft. 

7 Q In any of your conversations with Colonel North, did 

8 he ever mention Richard Secord was involved with this air- 
g craft? 

10 A Not that I recall. 

•J1 Q Do you want to go off the record? 

12 A Yes. 

13 (Discussion off the record.) 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

15 Q If we can go on the record. 

^g Would you answer that question and tell me what you 

said off the record? 

A To the best of my recollection. Colonel North did 
not mention Mr. Secord 's name at that time. However, later 
on, when I acquired some records from Colonel North, I 
happened to have observed the name, Secord, on one of the 
documents provided to me. 

Q And did he provide you the documents sometime in 
November of 1986? 

A Yes. My best recollection of that would have been 



IJIJIU ikCCiClCftn 

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897 



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November 17, the morning of November 17, they were picked up 
by my Enforcement Assistant at my direction after I had a 
telephone conversation with Colonel North. 

Q Could you explain to me when -- at the time that 
you first made the phone call to Colonel North, what did you 
understand his job to be at tl.<i NSC? Who did you understand 
that he was? 

A That he was a — my impression was he was a high- 
ranking official within the National Security Council. 

Q Did you know what it is he did there? 
No. 



Do youlwhat accounts he had? 



No. 

Do you know what his — did he explain to you what 
his involvement was at all in this whole issue of this air- 
craft? 

A No. But that's not unusual for me to get calls or 
even a Commissioner to get calls in our capacity, nor was 
it unusual for me when 1 was working in the field as a 
special agent in charge to get a call from different indi- 
viduals. Sometimes they were businessmen, sometimes they 
were congressional staffers, making inquiry about a case or 
making representations about individuals or corporations. 

It's not the first time I have heard the term 
"good guys" by people that would call up and make an inquiry 



Tnilii MtMUtir 



82-732 O-88-30 



wsmm 



15 



' about an investigation being conducted by special agents of 

2 U.S. Customs. 

3 Q Did Colonel North tell you how he learned this 
^ information? 

5 A No. However, let me qualify my answer. During the 

6 course of tuat initial conversation and the subsequent con- 

7 versation, it beccune obvious to me that somebody in Maule 

8 had communicated either directly with Colonel North or through 

9 an intermediary. Otherwise how would he know our people were 

10 conducting an investigation? 

11 Q Did you discuss any other case with Colonel North 

12 on that initial conversation? 

13 A No, 

14 Q We will discuss later on what I will refer to as 

15 the Kelso case. 

16 Did you discuss that with Colonel North during that 

17 initial conversation? 

18 A Not at that time, no. 

19 Q At that point, that first conversation, had a grand 

20 jury subpoena actually been served to Maule? 

21 A No. 

22 Q Did you and Colonel North discuss the service of 

23 such a subpoena? 

24 A No. 

25 Q After speaking with North, what did you do? 



MMin HjiawVAIill 1 1 



899 



INRIOTSBr 



16 



A Subsequent to speaking with Colonel North, I called 
Mr. Leon Guinn, who is the Assistant Commissioner for En- 
forcement, Southeast Region, inquired about the case, the 
Maule investigation specifically, asked him what the status 
was. He informed me that Maule Aviation officials had been 
uncooperative in the course of our investigation and that the 
special agent and the special agent in charge were discussing 
with the Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned to the case, or 
at least the Assistant U.S. Attorney, and our people were 

10 discussing the matter about going for a grand jury subpoena. 

11 I indicated to Leon that I had a i»rce whereby I 

12 thought I could expedite the investigation and make a 

13 preliminary determination whether we had a violation or did 

14 not have a violation and how much more we should pursue this 

15 matter. I would like to pause here in my deposition to 

16 point out to you, we have gotten — we, the U.S. Customs 

17 Service -- has gotten a lot of allegations about various 

18 materials being sent to the contras. Principally, we got 

19 these leads from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 

20 invariably when we pursued them, the allegations were either 

21 unfounded or it was difficult, if not impossible, to pursue 

22 them, because you would have to go into Nicaragua. Our agents 

23 were just not allowed into Nicaragua. 

24 So I indicated to Mr. Guinn, if he had no objections 

25 I would like to utilize this source and see if we can get 



imryjiocicicn 

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900 



25 



ONttKSSIPIlii' 



17 



1 these documents to make a determination of whether to pursue 

2 it and how intense we should pursue it. 

3 Q Did you tell Mr. Guinn who your source was? 

4 A No, I did not. 

5 Q Any reason why not? 

6 A I didn't think he needed to know. 

7 Q Did Guinn, in effect, tell you that Maule Aircraft 

8 was stonewalling the investigation and not being cooperative? 

9 A Yes. I have already indicated that. That's the 

10 term I used during our interval. I think I basically said the 

11 seime thing, they were being very uncooperative. 

12 Q When is the next time that you communicated with 

13 Colonel North regarding this investigation? 

^4 A I would say a couple weeks after my initial tele- 

15 phone conversation with him, because I had not received any 

^Q documents or any call from him, so I pursued the matter by 

17 calling him — 

1g Q If I can stop you there for one second, did you 

19 ever send any written materials to Colonel North, any notes, 

2Q any letters, anything of that type? 

21 A NO. 

22 Q Other than the documents provided to you on this 

23 investigation, did he send to you any memoranda, letters. 



24 notes, any documents? 



A No. We are jumping ahead now. Other than what 



iiM^ni MnTwfi ■vrwTi 



901 



Mmm^ 



we have discussed at our initial interview. 

Q That he delivered on November 14? 

A Well, he or — what is his name — Owens 
delivered. I don't want to jump ahead. You have to guide 
this thing. 

Q Did you make any contemporaneous notes during any 
of your conversations with Colonel North? 

A No. 

Q Did you make any notes afterwards or any memoranda 
of your conversations with Colonel North? 

A No. 

Q Did you keep any logs which would indicate when you 
spoke to Colonel North? 

A The only thing that I kept was the telephone number 
for Colonel North's office and also the telephone number for 
Mr. Owens and the name of the firm, if you will, or the name 
that Mr. Owens gave to me for his particular position there 
too. 

Q You said approximately two weeks later you called 
North to ask him where the documents and photographs were. 
What did he tell you about them? 

A That he was still trying to obtain them from Maule. 
This is when he offered to have me send an agent down^^^^^H 

because that was one of the require- 
ments I wanted with respect to our initial conversation on it, 



902 



''VpL/IWnTHr 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 



because this would 



a gil^ejus a good idea whether or not it 
had a STOL kit, also whether or not it had hard points. He 
was a little apologetic he had not gotten the documents to 
me during the intervening two weeks. I reiterated that the 
sooner we got the documents, the sooner we would be able to 
make a determination. And if he could get the documents, then 
we would be proceeding with our investigation. 

Q Had Colonel North told you that all of the planes 
had been exported to 

A I am not positive, but I recollect that there was a 
reference to] 

Q And he told you one had crashed, but he was not 
sure where, is that correct? 

A Yes, I am not sure where it crashed other than he 
stated it had crashed, it was ^^^^^^^^^H Based on what 
one would assume, without asking a follow-up question, that 
it had crashed ^^^^^^H^^H Technically, from the way 
you are asking me the question, it could have crashed any 
place, and someone could have ferried it over and put it in 



Q As far as you understood, the remnants of the 
airplane — 

A Yes, the remnants of the airplane were) 



IIVIIUI 0IIMHJLIII 



VNSU^IRiSr 



A He used the term "crashed" with me, okay? 

Q And the remaining three were 

A 

Q Did he mention to you how it crashed? 

A No. 

Q Did he offer to arrange for your agents to view 
the aircraft in Central America? 

A Yes. And I asked him whether this had to be done 
openly or otherwise, and he said, no, it could not be 
openly, and I said, well, we can't get involved in that, 
and I just courteously asked him to get the documents and 
photographs I had requested in my initial conversation with 
him to me as quickly as possible. 

Q Did he explain to you why your agents would not be 
able to go down there overtly and check into the embassy and 
do things according to regular procedure? 

A No. And I didn't ask him. 

Q Did you find this to be suspicious? 

A It is an interesting phenomena. There is times 
when various agencies that are stationed in foreign countries 
will say, "Gee, we have no problem", and sometimes the 
embassy will say, "No, we don't want you down" or vice-versa, 
the embassy has no problem but the agency may have a problem 
with us coming down, and we have to work all these things 
out. 



ilAlCIAJUMOn 



904 



24 



oNuLmJainni 



21 



1 I didn't find it unusual that he wouldn't explain 

2 it. You have got to remember that I am — I ,was somewhat 

3 conversant with current events about^^^^^^^^^Bthe 

4 Nicaraguan matter, and if he said that he had — my agent 

5 would have to go down ^^^^^H^^H not in the official 

6 capcwity as an agent, I assumed there had to be a reason 

7 that he was knowledgeable about, and since he was with the 

8 NSC, I had to respect that. 

9 Q Did Colonel North, after this conversation, which 

10 is approximately two weeks after the first, and mid-Sep- 

11 tember, did he ever call you again about this investigation, 

12 or was it always a matter of you checking back? 

13 A As it relates to this investigation, it was always 

14 me calling him. 

■J5 Q And then after that second conversation, do you 

15 recall if you called him again? This would be after mid- 
•J7 September. 

13 A Relating to this investigation? 

19 Q Yes. 

20 A Yes. 

21 Q Do you recall approximately how many times? 

22 A I would estimate, it had to be either three or 

23 four times, I can't tell you exactly was it three or four. 



but it was one of the two. 



25 Q During this period xl time, were you also in contact 

nnjiiBi_miiniuili 1 1 



905 



DNtOtSSIPilT 



with the Southeast Region telling them what was going on, or 
were they inquiring what they could do next, that sort of 
thing? 

A I would say approximately three to four weeks after 
my initial telephone conversation with Mr. Guinn, we were 
having a telephone conversation about other Customs matters, 
and this issue came up. And as a result, I am confident 
that it stimulated my making the third phone call, if you 
will, and, once again, when I called Colonel North, he was 
very apologetic this time that he had not gotten the material 
to me, he told me once again he was going to get right on it. 
And I would say that this had to be near the end of September 
by this time. 

There was subsequent conversation with Mr. Guinn in 
a conference call, and this would have been in November, I 
would say mid-November, whereby we had a conference call, 
he and I, along with Clark Settles, who was a special agent 
in charge in Charleston, and both of them were inquiring 
about the investigation, and I said, gee, I am surprised that 
you don't already know, I already told Strategic to notify 
you to continue the investigation, and I related to him at 
that time that based upon the documents submitted by my 
source and upon review of those documents, that they were 
very shallow, they were not responsive to answer the questions 
that needed to be answered to determine whether or not a 



wiiuUiiiffi rililf 1 1 



906 



DNSmKftT 



23 

1 violation had occurred, that I had sent those documents up 

2 to our Strategic Division and that their case agent from 

3 Atlanta had reviewed them, along with the Division Director 
* in Strategic, and we all agree that they, they did not 

5 address the issue, and they were going to continue to conduct 

6 the investigation. 

7 Q That was sometime in mid or late November? 

8 A It was mid-November. 

9 Q Now, between that time, then, from late September 

10 until mid-November, did you continue to try to get the docu- 

11 ments from Colonel North? 

12 A Yes. Like I said, there had to be some time in 

13 October, and I am not sure, probably middle of October, that 

14 I called again specifically about this Maule investigation. 

15 Q If I can freeze you in time for a moment of that, 

16 let's say October of 1986. In October of 1986, if you had 

17 been told the name Richard Secord, would that have run any 

18 bells with you at all concerning other investigations? 

19 A Yes, the name, Richard Secord, not only in con- 

20 junction with the investigation, but it was a name appearing 

21 in the paper, so I was feuniliar with the name, Richard 

22 Secord. 

23 Q When it was appearing in the paper, was that in 

24 connection with possible contra supply programs? 

25 A Yes. 



innii.ffuiMiiijifP 



907 



VttOU^fflEfiT 



24 



Q Do you ever recall discussing the Maule investiga- 
tion with Colonel North at the same time or in the same 
conversation which you were discussing the Southern Air 
Transport investigation? I know we are jumping ahead a 
little bit. 

A I am not absolutely positive of this, but I think 
that at one time when I was discussing the Southern Air 
Transport, I had mentioned to, or not only mentioned, but I 
reiterated to Colonel North that I was still waiting for the 
documentation on the Maule, and I wasn't as courteous as I 
was in the previous conversations because I was getting very 
exacerbated because we are talking six to eight weeks, and I 
still don't have documentation. I was put out. 

Q Now, in early November, I believe, you were 
visited by an attorney from the Public Integrity Section of 
the Department of Justice named Ralph Martin, who had been 
assigned to review contra-related cases and review of the 
House Judiciary Committee's inquiry to appoint Independent 
Counsel to study the whole problem after the Hasenfus crash 
in October of 1986. Do you recall that meeting? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall what Mr. Martin asked you about? 

A He asked — he had a letter that contained a, quite 
a few names in a letter, and he asked me whether or not I was 
familiar with some of those names, or any of those names. 



■nrD ikVrtiiJiiii' 



908 



WitHiSaaElT 



25 



1 Q Okay. Now, who was the letter from? 

2 A I think it was from Congressman or Senator Kerry 

3 going over to the Attorney General. 

4 Q Did that list of names include Richard Secord? 

5 A It may have. I don't recall. I mean, for me to 

6 look at that letter, with all the names on it, I don't keep 

7 all these names in my head. That meeting, by the way, so we 

8 get it on the record, it was not only Mr. Martin, but there 

9 was another attorney there as well. There were people from 

10 my office there specifically — 

11 Q Excuse me, when you say another attorney, you mean 

12 from the Department of Justice? 

13 A Yes. 

14 Q Was that Marshall Jarrett? 

15 A It could have been. I just don't remember the 
^5 n£une . 

^7 From Customs, Rafael Lopez, who was our Branch 

18 Chief for Munitions, as well as Gary W-a-u-g-h, who was our 

19 Strategic Division Director — Branch Chief, rather. At the 

20 time I asked Ray to make sure they go against all the names 

21 against our files, and as I was out of town, I was going down 

22 to the Southwest, as well as overseas as best I can recollect 

23 now, 1 wanted to make sure that we were responsive to Mr. 

24 Martin's inquiry and whether or not we had any active 

25 investigations or any kind of inquiries or anything like that, 



■tlllBLJIlUilTIHiJIP 



909 



inm^M^ 



26 



I wanted that to be responsive. 

In my absence, a memorandum was prepared by Mr. 
Lopez, signed by Mr. Lopez, going over to Mr. Martin with 
the result of our inquiry against our indices, whether or not 
these names meant anything to us. 

Q Aside from the names, did Mr. Martin inquire about 
any ongoing investigations you had relating to the contras? 

A Yes. And I believe again Mr. Lopez discussed with 
him whatever investigations we may have had. I believe he 
was talking about active investigations. And as I have 
already stated in this deposition, there was a number of 
allegations over the course of the last several years about 
arms going down to the contras and arms going to the 
Sandinistas that they were compelled to check out. In most 
of the cases, I would say invariably they proved to be un- 
founded. 

Q Did you tell Mr. Martin anything about the Maule 
Aircraft investigation? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Why not? 

A Because Ray Lopez could just have easily have 
talked to him about that. 

Q Did Mr. Lopez know about your communications with 

Colonel North? 

A No, he did not know about my communications with 



Hm&SSiflFBT 



910 



eNRKSSffPT 



27 



1 Colonel North, but they were aware that I was dealing with 

2 a source in hopes to get information; that had no bearing 

3 on whether or not we told Martin whether or not we had an 

4 investigation. It was no secret that we had an investiga- 

5 tion, that was open and above board. 
Q You didn't tell Mr. Martin about the Maule investi- 

7 gation, is that correct? You left that to Mr. Lopez? 

8 A I am not saying I did or didn't. I don't recall 
g if I did or did not mention the Maule. I could well have. 

•JO If I didn't, it wasn't because I was holding something back, 

11 it was an open investigation on our inventory that would be 

12 easily discernible if the Maule name came up or insofar as 

13 asking whether or not we had an active investigation. That 
would be something that would be known not only to me but 
also to my Branch Chiefs and Division Directors. 

Q In answer to my question, do you remember 



17 specifically discussing the Maule investigation with Mr. 



Martin? 

A At this time, no, I do not remember, but I want to 
maJce sure it is clear on the record that if the Maule 
investigation had come up in the context of our conversation, 
Mr. Martin would have been advised. 

Q Would you have told Mr. Martin — well, that is 
speculative. Did you tell Mr. Martin about your conversation 



2- with Colonel North regarding this investigation? 



911 



DNIiEASSIHffiT 



28 



A No. 

Q Regarding the Southern Air Transport investigation, 
was that discussed with Mr. Martin at this meeting? 

A It may have been, because -- if you could refresh 
my memory with respect to the date you are talking about, 
Mr. Martin came over to my office, it would be helpful. 

Q I believe it is around November 2. 

A If it is November 2, then I believe the SAT 
happened around October 5, if I am not mistaken. So if they 
were pursuing that, that — I cannot believe it would not 
come up in our conversation, okay? And if it did, even if 
it didn't, I would have indicated we were conducting an 
investigation, which we were. 

Q Do you recall whether or not you told Mr. Martin 
about your conversations with Colonel North regarding the 
SAT investigation? 

A I don't recall, but in all likelihood, I probably 
did not say anything about my conversation with Colonel North. 

Q When you say you probably did not, on what would 
you base that statement? 

A I don't recall Colonel North's name ever coming up 
in a conversation, in my conversation with Mr. Martin. 

Q Mr. Martin did not bring it up? 

A No. 

Q You did not bring it up? 



llfilN.NBu1llCtr 



912 



ONKimiirr 



29 



1 A No. 

2 Q Was there any discussion with Mr. Martin regarding 

3 the Kelso case? 

4 A I don't recall. I don't believe so. I can't 

5 believe that would come up, because I did not perceive that 
Kelso case as a contra matter. Okay? If you want to get 
into it, we can get into it, but it will be out of sequence. 
To me, that's more of an informant situation, okay, vis-a-vis 

9 allegations of counterfeit money and narcotics allegations 
■JO relative to the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the 
•)•) status of Kelso, subsequent to all that and him going to 
12 this farm or ranch and going back to the United States, you 
•J3 know, I happened to be in Costa Rica, but I don't see that 
14 fitting into the Kerry inquiry. 

Q When you received the documents from Colonel North 
on November 14, is that the first — 

A Go over that again. When I received the documents 
from? 

Q Colonel North. 
A What date? 
Q Fourteenth. 
A The 17th I believe I said. 

Q Did they indicate that Udall Corporation was in- 
volved in the purchase of the aircraft? 

A Within the documents I recall seeing the name. 



onutiKMiirUwr 



913 



mmsm 



1 Udall, on a piece of documentation. What that documentation 

2 was, I do not recall at this late date. 

3 Q Is that the first time that you were aware that 

4 Udall was involved in the Maule Aircraft investigation? 

5 A In the Maule Aircraft investigation, yes. 

6 Q In other words, Colonel North did -ot tell you 

7 about Udall? 

8 A No, ma'am. 

9 Q Now, the story regarding the Iranian arms sales 

10 broke on or about November 3 or 4, 1986. I believe you told 

11 us in your interview on or cibout November 10, you discussed 

12 your concerns regarding Colonel North's activities with the 

13 Commissioner, is that correct? 

14 A That is correct. 

15 Q Can you tell us why you discussed it and what you 
1g discussed? 

•J7 A That would bring us back to the telephone conversa- 

18 tion that I had on or about October 29 or 30. 

19 Q With whom? 

20 A We are talking about SAT, are we not? 

21 Q No. Let me rephrase my question. When you went 

22 to speak to the Commissioner on November 10, were your 

23 concerns centered around the SAT investigation or the Maule 

24 Aircraft investigation? 

25 A Primarily the SAT. And my conversation that I had 



UiiifiUS&iHE&ai 



914 



KNftASSIPKST 



31 



1 with Colonel North on or about the evening of October 29 or 

2 30. 

3 Q Okay. Then let me — let's stay with Maule, and 

4 let's skip ahead. 

5 A I don't want to mislead you, that doesn't mean I 
didn't mention to the Comr.issioner abou# Maule. 

Q Sure. 

A That wasn't what drove me to meet with him and 
discuss my conversations and dialogue with Colonel North. 

10 Q I understand. You agreed with the Commissioner, 

11 correct me if I am wrong, to meet with Mr. Kimmet and dis- 

12 cuss the issues with him, is that correct? 

13 A It is not a question of agreeing, this is what the 
■J4 Commissioner advised me, told me to do. It is not a question 
15 of agreeing. 

■\Q Q Can you tell us who Mr. Kimmet is? 

•J7 A He is the General Counsel, United States Treasury 

1g Department. 

ig Q Now, when was your scheduled meeting to be with 

20 Mr, Kimmet? 

21 A The 17th, around 3:00, 3:00, 3:30 in the afternoon. 

22 Q Did you talk to Colonel North the morning of 
November 17? 

A Yes. I already indicated I did. 

Q Regarding the Maule case, what, if anything, did 



u&tALiicciaciu 

uiniPflfSEVcttfrr 



915 



WKIASDIfiei^ 



32 



1 he tell you? 

2 A I initiated the phone call in an effort to obtain 

3 the documents that I had requested back the end of August, 

4 beginning of September on Maule, and I was, quite frankly, 

5 surprised during that conversation that Colonel North said 

6 he had ^he documents and that he was waiting to give me the 

7 documents. I indicated to him that I had a pretty busy 

8 schedule that day, and I would like to send over my Enforce- 

9 ment Assistant to get a copy. He said, well, you could have 

10 the original. I told him, no, I did not want the originals 

11 of the documents, that I wanted the originals of the aocuments 

12 to be given to the investigative agent by Maule and that I 
would like to have a copy. 

Arrangements were made between Colonel North and 
myself to have my Enforcement Assistant go over and pick 
up a sealed envelope which later turned out to be a copy of 
documents — I presume a copy of documents, and as I said, I 
reviewed them, and subsequent, not that same day, maybe that 
evening or later, and then sent them up to my Strategic 
Investigations Division with word I wanted the investigation 
to resume. 

Q What, in your opinion, was deficient about the 
documentation that Colonel North had provided? 

A It did not clearly show what I would consider 



iiMpi A pci nrn.. 

vniiLfKKDtiiiiir 



916 



UlHISSHiierr 



33 



1 purchase orders, and particularly destination of the air- 

2 craft. There were no photographs included in the package, 

3 which I believe were vital to determine whether or not a 

4 Commerce license was required. 

5 Q Did the documents indicate who all of the purchasers 

6 were? That is, there were four aircraft — 

7 A I don't recall. 

8 Q Now, when you discussed this with Colonel North on 

9 the morning of November 17, did you tell him that you had 

10 talked to the Commissioner? 

11 A No. 

12 Q Did you tell him that you were going to meet with 

13 Kimmet? 

14 A No. 

15 Q Any reason why you didn't? 

15 A I didn't think it was very prudent since — you 

17 recall, in our earlier discussion, I indicated to you when 

18 I talked to Colonel North on the evening of October 29 or 30, 

19 when he was out of the country, that I asked him when he 

20 came back that he and I and the Commissioner had to get 

21 together. When I called on the 17th, it was obvious to me 

22 he had been in town for some time and for some reason had 

23 not contacted me or the Commissioner about getting together. 

24 My main concern was that I wanted to see if I could 

25 get the docviments that he had indicated that he would get to 



i)nln.ftiRirn^^ 



917 



17 



22 



lltJmEF 



34 



1 me for the Maule investigation. Therefore, when I called 

2 him on the morning of the 17th and I, in my conversation 

3 with the Commissioner on the 10th of November, where he 

4 directed me to meet with Mr. Kimraet to discuss this whole 

5 matter and get some advice from him, it beccune clear to me 

6 that some of my concerns may have been somewhat valid if the 

7 Commissioner was asking me to go over and discuss the matter 

8 with Mr. Kimmet. I may not have any subsequent conversation 

9 with Colonel North from that point on, and I didn't feel I 

10 had any obligation letting him know Customs business about 

11 this matter and how I was going to resolve my uneasiness and 

12 concerns and my lack of getting this documentation I had been 

13 promised six or eight weeks ago. 

14 Q Do you know whether or not Colonel North intended 

15 to call the Commissioner? Did he express any intent, or did 
1g you suggest he do so at the end of that conversation? 

A You mean the conversation of the 17th — 
^g Q Of the 17th of November. 
19 A No. 

2Q Q I guess I asked two questions. Your answer is no 

21 to which question? Did he express any intent to call the 



Commissioner? 



23 A No, he did not. 

24 Q Did you suggest that? 

25 A No, ito did not. 



imA^lflPfiT 



918 



omwMWffT 



35 



1 Q Did you suggest he call the Commissioner? 

2 A No. I did suggest — as I said, just to reiterate, 

3 when I talked to him the evening of October 29 or 30, I 

4 indicated to him let's get together. 

5 Q You don't recall such a thing on November 17? 

6 A No. 

7 Q Was that the last conversation you had with Colonel 

8 North? 

9 A I believe it was. I was just trying to think psat 

10 that date. I just don't recall ever having a conversation — 

11 a face-to-face or telephone conversation with him since. 

12 Q By the way, did you tell Colonel North about your 

13 visit with Mr. Martin from the Department of Justice? 

14 A Not that I recall. 

15 Q Let's tie that up. After your conversation with 
15 Colonel North on the 17th, and you reviewed the documents 

17 that had been provided to you from him, what did you do 

18 with regard to the Maule investigation from that point on? 

19 A As I said, I forwarded those documents up to the 

20 Director of the Strategic Investigations Division, indicating 

21 that I did not believe that the documents were responsive or 

22 worthwhile and that if he concurred, and that is when he 

23 mentioned the case agent from Atlanta happened to be in, I 

24 said, if you guys agree they are worthless, go conduct the 

25 investigation and resume the investigation, whatever course 



4)ranLfMRriiiuOT 



919 



mmm' 



36 

1 that they normally would. 

2 Q And that would include the issuance of grand jury 

3 subpoenas? 

4 A If they elected to go grand jury, fine. 

5 Q To your knowledge, did the Independent Counsel 

6 assume jurisdiction over this case ir. January of 1987? 

7 A Yes, he did. I don't know if it was January, but 

8 they did since we are on the record. 

9 Q That concludes the examination I had on that 

10 investigation. I will turn it over to my colleagues. 

11 BY MR. MC GOUGH: 

12 Q Mr. Rosenblatt, I think it would be helpful to 

13 take a minute or two to put your background on the record 

14 if we could. How long have you been with the Customs Service? 

15 A Since 1964, August of 1964. 

16 Q And what position did you start with Customs? 

17 A I Ceune into the U.S. Customs Service as a Customs 

18 investigator, GS-5, in New York, New York. 

19 Q What I want to do is get a quick overview of the 

20 various places and positions you have held with Customs 

21 since them. 

22 A In 1966, I was promoted to special agent; in 1967, 

23 I was reassigned to the Los Angeles Special Agent in Charge 

24 Office where I became a group supervisor in Los Angeles, in 

25 1970. In 1972, I went to San Francisco as the Assistant 



IMpjAOOirinv 
iinue.n!Ktffll!itfr 



920 



25 



UNfiH^FtlffT 



1 Special Agent in Charge of Enforcement. We underwent a 

2 reorganization in 1973, so I was converted from the Assistant 

3 Special Agent in Charge to an Assistant Regional Director 

4 for Enforcement. 

5 In 1974, I was reassigned to our Headquarters. In 
1976, I was promoted to a Branch Chief in Headquarters. In 
the latter part of '78- '79, I was selected or appointed as 
the Division Director for our Currency Investigation Division. 

In 1980, I was selected as the Regional Director 

10 of Investigations for the Southeast Region, Miami Region it 

11 was called at that time. We underwent another reorganization 

12 in 1983, and at that time I was — the Regional Director 

13 concept was abandoned, and I beccune the Special Agent in 

14 Charge of our Miami Office. 

15 In November of 1985, I was selected as the Assistant 

16 Commissioner for Enforcement, which is my present position. 

17 Q Thank you. You mentioned, in response to a question 

18 from Ms. Naughton, that you had seen General Secord's name 

19 in the press and at various times during the events we have 

20 been talking about in relationship to contra resupply efforts. 

21 Is that a fair characterization? 

22 A Well, allegations of that or contentions of that, 

23 yes. 

24 Q Did you have any familiarity with the name, Richard 
Secord, outside what you saw in the press in that context? 



imiOitED. 



921 



8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



OWttSSfflffi' 



38 



1 A No. 

2 Q Were you familiar with any alleged involvement by 

3 General Secord in the Edwin Wilson affair or the EATSCO 

4 affair? 

5 A Peripherally. I had heard his name mentioned in 
chat, but in what context, I don't know. 

7 Q I guess what I am trying to establish is if the 

name, Richard Secord, had been mentioned to you in September, 
1986, what, if any, connections you would have made with that 
name? Would you have recalled his connection with Wilson 
or EATSCO? 

A No. 

Q Just with the contra supply articles? 

A Yes. 

Q Had you also seen articles at or about that time 
relating to Colonel North's involvement in the contra re- 
supply efforts? 

A I don't recall seeing Colonel North's name in the 
media until November, possibly October, October-November 
timeframe. I don't remember seeing Colonel North's name in 
the paper in September, August. 

Q Moving to the meeting with Mr. Martin, you said 
he ran down a list of names. 

A Contained in the letter were a quantity of names. 
I don't recall if it was a listing or contained in paragraph 



IMASJUfti^ 



922 



11 



(INSBISaRW^ 



39 

1 form in series, various names. But there were quite a number 

2 of names, I recall, 

3 Q Was Colonel North's name one of those? 

4 A Gee, I don't recall that. Let me put it this way, 

5 I would have found that strange. That would have been 

6 something I would have remembered. 

7 Q I would like to get a clear picture of the meeting 

8 itself, if I could. There was you, Mr. Martin, another 

9 attorney from the Justice Department — and Mr. Lopez, whose 
•)0 exact position is what; 

A He is our Branch Chief for Munitions. 

^2 Q Now, was there a general question directed to you 

and Mr. Lopez about contra investigations? In other words, 

<4 did Mr. Martin or his associate ask for an itemization of 

« active contra investigations? 

.•g A To my best recollection, no. I mean, we discussed 

*j the letter from Congressman Kerry — SenatorJ 

^Q Q Senator. 

.iQ A — Senator Kerry, it was quite a lengthy letter, 
to the Attorney General relative to the allegations of the 
government involvement and various people involved in the 
contra effort. 

I got the impression from Martin and his colleague 
that the meeting that I was having with him was of a general 
nature to explain to me what their line of inquiry was. 



mmB 



wmsm 



The details, insofar as responding to their line of inquiry, 
would have to be handled by those that worked for me. I mean, 
I do not have — I don't go to these meetings and have all 
this information at my fingertip. 

Once I understand what the meeting is about and 
the line a given person has taken, I will make sure they are 
hooked up with the right manager in Headquarters to provide 
the information. 

Q Let me get this straight. Was it your understand- 
ing that the meeting was supposed to determine what active 
investigations the Customs Service had going on the subject 
of resupply of the contras? 

A No, it wasn't. We do not — as a matter of policy, 
we will not give Congress active investigations, and I think 
the attorneys from the Department of Justice were well aware 
of that. 

Q Was it your understanding the meeting was to answer 
the inquiries made by Senator Kerry? 
A That is correct. 

Q Specifically with regard to the Maule investigation 
and the SAT investigation, 1 am not sure I understood whether 
you felt those investigations weren't responsive to Senator 
Kerry's inquiry or whether you felt it was Mr. Lopez's obliga- 
tion to bring those up, which ~ why didn't they come up at 
the meeting? 



riirUsi RKunfiiEV 



924 



BNBPASaflffiT 



41 



1 A Because they may not have been contained in 

2 Senator Kerry's letter. If they were — first of all, the 

3 way the question was posed to me earlier was as if I did not 

4 discuss it with them, and I am not sure that is a correct 

5 representation necessarily, if it was in the letter and it 
pertained to the line of questioning, it would have been 

7 discussed there. I mean, I did not keep notes. 

8 I believe Mr. Lopez did and followed it up with, 

9 as I said, a memorandum to comply with the inquiries that 

10 were being made by Mr. Martin. 

11 Q At any rate, to the best of your recollection, 

12 Colonel North's name was not mentioned at that meeting. 

13 A I don't — no, I don't recall it. 

14 Q Now, you mentioned how you handled congressional 

15 inquiries, but this wasn't really a congressional inquiry, 
1g was it? This was a Department of Justice attorney — 

iy A That is correct, but it was obvious we were talking 
13 about being responsive to a congressional inquiry. 

19 Q Was it explained to you that this was an attempt 

20 to determine whether there should be an Independent Counsel 

21 appointed or sought by the Department of Justice? 
A Yes, that was. That doesn't mean we would not 

discuss open investigations with these attorneys. The Maule 
investigation and the SAT investigation were quite active. 



2g particularly the SAT. 

HvHvliSniciiifr 



925 



MfliaSSIREF 



42 

Q I think you said that by the time you spoke with 
Colonel North on November 17, and later in the day, and 
Mr. Kimmet, you had determined that it would not be prudent 
to continue to talk to Colonel North about those matters, 
about the SAT and the Maule matters. Is that a fair character 
ization? 

A Yes. 

Q And to the best of your recollection, November 17, 
the morning of November 17, or before the meeting with Kimmet 
on November 17 was the first time, or the last time that you 
spoke with Colonel North? 

A To my best recollection, yes. 

Q Can you state categorically that you never dis- 
cussed your meeting with Kimmet with Colonel North? 

A Absolutely. 

Q You categorically state that you never discussed 
your meeting with Kimmet with Colonel North? 

A That is correct. 

Q How about your meeting with Mr. Martin, did you 
ever discuss your meeting with Mr. Martin with Colonel 
North? 

A That was already asked, and to the best of my 
recollection, no. 

MR. MC GOUGH: That is all I have. 
MR. GENZMAN: I have none. 
(Recess 



tmU^HdDlrUb'PT 



926 



LYDA fls 
DOTSON 
10:40 a.m. 
md 



BNttfiSIFIfflT 



1 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

2 Q Before we get to the next subject, I had a couple 

3 of quick, perhaps unrelated questions. 

^ Do you know anything about A-l-m-a-r Industries in 

5 Chatsworth, California? 

6 A It is hard for me to answer. It just doesn't come 

7 to mind. That doesn't mean some of my people might nol- have 

8 said something about Almar — shifting through all the 

9 information I get in a dav in my position. It may not 

10 have been of consequence. I want to be honest. Since I am 

11 sworn, I don't know how to answer that question. I just don't 

12 recall. 

13 Q Specifically in conversations with Colonel North, 

14 do you recall discussing Almar? 

15 A Not to my recollection. 

16 Q You never ';^ave him any information, or he never 

17 inquired? 

18 A No. 

19 Q Did Colonel North ever discuss with you any 

20 cases regarding drug smuggling into Central America or from 

21 Central America into the United States? 

22 A No. 

23 Q Did he ever discuss with you the seizure of a C-123? 

24 A The only conversation I had with Colonel North 

25 relative to a C-123 was the SAT, October 25 crash. 



mnaASsiFiEs^ 



927 



UNCBk^Flt^T 



Q Did he discuss with you the seizure of any 
aircraft by Customs, I mean specific aircraft? 

A No. 

Q If we could move, then, to what I will refer to 
as the Kelso matter. When did the Kelso matter come to your 
attention and how did it come to your attention? 

A I would say approximately September, sometime in 
September is the closest I can narrow it down. 

Q Of 1986? 

A "86, yes. 

Q How did it come to your attention? 

A I was advised by my Special Investigations Division 
Correction, I am sorry. There was a cable that came in from 
the Ambassador, Ambassador Tambs of Costa Rica. It was a cable 
that was very critical of Customs conducting investigations 
and having informants in Costa Rica without the Embassy 
knowing about it.,, 

Q Was this cable sent to the Commissioner? 

A It was sent to the State Department. I believe 
the Commissioner was an addressee on it. It was a multiple 
addressee-type cable. 

Q How did this come to your attention? 

A In two ways. Reading the cable, and also the 
Commissioner indicated that he was quite concerned about this, 
and simultaneously we were getting telephonic reports from our 



HMi:US£[f¥fiT 



928 



mmsm 



Assistant Regional Conunissioner for Enforcement, Larry La Dodg( 
in New Orleans, relative to the allegations set forth in the 
cable. 

Q When you say Larry La Dodge in New Orleans -- 

A That is our South Central Region. 

Q Had he evei. been assigned to Portland? 

A Yes. He was the Resident Agent in Charge in 
Portland, Oregon. 

Q Do you know when it was he moved from Portland to 
New Orleans? 

A Not exactly, but I would say in early '86. 

Q Now, what did Larry La Dodge tell you concerning 
the statements by Ambassador Tambs and the concerns expressed 
by Ambassador Tambs? 

A I spoke to Larry La Dodge about this, but my 
information and what I am about to tell you comes from several 
different sources. There is no possible way at this late date 
to discern which came from who, because I had discussions with 
the Commissioner, discussions with my personnel in the 
International Enforcement Branch, as well as Larry La Dodge. 

Q With whom would the special investigations 
discussion have been? 

A At the time, I think it would have been Peter 
Ballanon and Ronald Smith, that is to the best of my 



recollection. 



■IHInI iI'lAiTlff^Oi Of 



929 



UNHASSKICrr 



Q Did you take any notes of any of these conversations 
on the Kelso matter? 

A No. 

Q Did you write any memoranda or correspondence on 
them/ 

A I didn't, but my staff did. 

Q Did you review that? 

A Yes. 

Q What was the purpose of that documentation? 

A Well, basically we had to respond to the Ambassador's 
inquiry via the cable. 

Q And was that done? Did you send something back 
to the Ambassador? 

A I think we did. But I also talked to the Ambassador 
personally about it. 

Q 

A 

Q 



How soon was that after you read the cable: 
You mean the incoming cable from him? 
Yes. 



A I want to say probably within three weeks. 

Q Why don't we take it step by step, chronologically? 

A That is going to be very tough. 

Q Okay. After you received the cable and you were 
also receiving information from Larry La Dodge by telephone, 
could you tell me within a space of a couple of days what you 
came to learn about Mr. Kelso? 



■iilw I L wiVm^Kfxtrn 



IHiStA^flK^T 



A Kelso, also known as Williams to us, at that time 
his name was Williams. 

Q Richard Williams? 

A Richard Williams, and another individual whose name 
I cannot recall at the time. 

Q Is it Brian Caldwell? 

A Yes, it would be. , They were working as informants 
for Larry La Dodge. Apparently, Mr. La Dodge had received 
communications from one of these two gentlemen by telephone 
that they had uncovered a counterfeit operation in Costa 
Rica, and there was other information that the informants 
wanted to provide. 

Q Did they also provide |rug information? 

A You asked me to do this this way -- other 
information they wanted to provide, but they did not 
feel comfortable doing it over the phone. It related to the 
narcotics and drugs in Costa Rica. 

My information was that Larry La Dodge felt 
responsible for paying some expenses that had been incurred 
by Jthese informants previous to this time. In conjunction 
with the information about counterfeiting operations, Larry 
coordinated with the Secret Service as well as our Customs 
attache in Panama, who is responsible also for the country of 
Costa Rica. 

Arrangements were made for one of the New Orleans 



41Ni:i&!L<UFm. 



931 



ONt^SSISEKT 



agents to travel through Mieiini down to Costa Rica to meet up 



with the informant and the Secret Service, so that we could 
provide first-hand information to the Secret Service about 
this alleged counterfeit money operation. 

When our agent got to Miami, he called and learned 
that the Secret Service personnel were leaving Costa Rica. 
Because of their activities in Costa Rica, they felt that it 
would be better for the Secret Service agents at that time 
to leave the country and come back at another time. 

Our agent proceeded nevertheless down to Costa Rica 
to meet with the informants ,. ostensibly to debrief them and 
also to pay them the money that Mr. La Dodge felt was owed 
to them. 

Our agent being relatively inexperienced in dealing 
in foreign countries, did not wait until our attache or one 
of our Customs representatives met with him in Panama — not 
in Panama, one of our reps or the attache from Panama met up 
with him in Costa Rica. He did not check in with the Embassy. 



H&- immediately met with the informant, paid the informant 



1 and to some extent debriefed the informant. 

This took place over the weekend when our Customs 
representative from Panama met with our agent from New Orleans 
in Costa Rica, our Customs representatives immediately realized 
the error, made contact with the Embassy and met with DEA and 
briefed DEA personnel on the meeting that our New Orleans agent 



mmssm 



932 



gUjll^ffiBT 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



had with these two informants. Ostensibly, these two 



informants made allegations of corruption by members of the DE/: 



Our personnel went back to their respective location 
and, as I understand it, within a matter of days, the Costa 
Rica authorities got information, allegedly got information 
that these two individuals were passing themselves off as 
Customs agents, and that one of them had a gun. 

Costa Rican authorities advised DEA of this, and asked 
DEA if they would want to go along. It is my understanding 
that the Costa Rican authorities, along with one or more 
DEA agents, knockud on the door of Willieuns, Kelso, and 
proceeded to question him and advised them that there were 
comments about them purporting to be Customs agents and having 
a gun. 

From there, the story gets a little hazy, but 
apparently these two individuals were told to get out of the 
country and/or taken in for questioning and subsequently 
released. 

Nevertheless, as it relates to Kelso-Williams, 
made his way to a farm that apparently was owned by John 
Hull. After leaving the farm, he then finds his way back to 
the Denver, Colorado area. 

Q Is this information you learned shortly after 
getting the cable and learning about the case, or are we 



lUiicuyi^iep. 



ONMSa^tilT 



talking about a longer period of time? 

A We are talking about the cable, but the business of 
the farm came from the informant to Larry La Dodg^ to my 
people to me, if you can follow all that. Paralleling this 
at the same time is that I am hearing, while this is going on, 
I would say about a week or 10 days after the cable, I begin 
to hear about a letter that is going from the Costa Rican 
President, allegedly, to the White House praising this 
informant -- 

Q Caldwell, as opposed to Kelso? 

A Right, but they are intertwined. And also, 
laudatory remarks or comments about Larry La Dodge, who obviousjly 
is supposed to be managing this) his informant^ 

Q Can you tell me who you heard about the letter from? 

A I am hearing this from Larry. There is supposed 
to be some kind of letter. He doesn't know about it first-hand 
but he is hearing about some kind of a letter. 

I presume Larry heard it from one of the two informan:s 
Now, I am then getting phone calls from Gary Hilberry, who was 
the Special Agent in charge of the Denver office, and Larry is 
also talking to some of my people Who are also filling me in, 
about Kelso resuming allegations that he is working for an 
intelligence agency. 

Let's pause here and let me give you some background, 
if I may? Mr. Kelso was arrested and convicted in Denver for 



ll^lLi«[L 



934 



UWffl^RI^T 



Customs violations relating to arms to Iran. I believe he was 
put on probation. 

Q Was it Iran or Iraq? 

A I was told Iran. It would have been Iraq. Let me 
rephrase it. I was told to the Middle East. He was on 
probation and he wanted to work for the Denver office while 
he was on probation. 

Our Special Agent in charge went to the U.S. Attorney 
who went to the Judge, and the Judge said no. So, Kelso, which 
is his real name, apparently fades from the scene and strikes 
up a relationship with Larry La Dodge when Larry was still the 
resident agent in charge in Portland. 

He presents himself as Williams. Of course, when 
Larry La Dodge makes inquiries about a Williams, we do not find 
anything derogatory in our informant files, nor of course do we 
hook him up with Mr. Kelso from the Denver office. 

Q Did Larry LaDodge enter him as an informant, a 
source? 

A I am pretty sure he documented Williams, but not the 
other gentleman. One of them was unregistered. 

Q That is what I eim getting at. Was one a subordinate 
of the other? 

A Yes, exactly. 

Q Do you know which was which? 

A I am not positive, but I think Kelso/Williams was the 



ini^Mn Uni A^rililii I 



935 



mm& 



52 



documented source and the other one was the undocumented sourci 

Q Do you know whether or not La Dodge put Williams' 
name through the indexes' 

A I don't know that personally. I presume he did, 
but that is an assumption. 

Q What you just told me about how his name would not 
check out with Kelso is an assumption on your part? 

A Yes, but I think it is a valid assumption. If we 
document Kelso under his true name and if he comes in with 
an alias as Williams, it is not going to bang up against 
a card in there on Kelso. 

Q Did you ever see any documentation regarding Kelso 
as a source? 

A It is not something I would personally see. 
Q So, you never saw any payments to Kelso reflected 
in Customs documents? 

MS. ANDERSON: Can we clarify that as Kelso as a 
source under the name Kelso? 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Either name. 

A No. There are different levels of approval and 
the kinds of money approved for Williams would not come close 
to my level of approval. 

Q They were small amounts? 

A They have to come to my office over $10,000. So we 



rnrliiLDnO Hit LUn 



UttSIA^flg^T 



1 are talking about sums under $10,000. 

2 Q Do you know what sums the New Orleans agent took 

3 with him to Central America? 

4 A I think between $1,000 and $1,500. 

5 Q Do you know how it was broken down between Kelso 

6 and Caldwell? 

7 A No. 

8 Q I guess I stopped you at that point where Williams 

9 becomes an informant for La Dodge. 

10 A Right. 

11 Q This is in 1984 time period? 

12 A I am not sure. It could have been '84 or '85. I am 

13 not sure. 

14 Q All right. 

15 A It is evidence now that — well, let me backtrack. 

16 During Kelso's trial in Denver, he claimed that he was working 

17 for an intelligence agency. That could not be substantiated 

18 by our office in checking with the intelligence community. 

19 Now, I am jumping back to where Kelso is back in Denver after 

20 the Costa Rican incident. 

21 Q If we could put sometimes on this, the Costa Rican 

22 incident is maybe July or August of 1986. 

23 A We 1 1 , no . 

24 Q Do you know how long he was in Central America? 

25 A I don't know. But in talking to Larry, I got the 



MlASfUnilfir 



937 



mmm 



impression that Kelso/williams had been in that area for 

some time. It wasn't just that he was down there visiting for 

a week. 

Q That is what I am trying to pin down. 

A But this incident did not come to my attention 
until sometime in September. 

Q I understand. Now, he is back in Denver in the 
fall of 1986. 

A Right. 

Q Can you tell me what you know about that? 

A This is coming to my people through Gary Hilberry, 
Special Agent in Charge in Denver, that Kelso/Williams is 
being represented by a former U.S. Attorney by the name of 
Snow, and that Snow is beginning to believe Williams' contenticjn 
of working for an intelligence agency. 

Apparently, Snow gave Williams advice to begin 
making tape recordings of all his conversations with government 
officials, including a tape, I understand, between him and 
Leirry La Dodge, along with other tapes allegedly made between 
Kelso/Williams and his so-called intelligence contact. 

Gary Bilberry's concern was that in again doing 
checks through the intelligence community, either using the 
name of Kelso or Williams, nobody is corroborating the 
contentions made by Kelso/Williams. However, Gary is very 
concerned after listening to these tapes that he acquired 



istening to these tapes tha 

MUSSIM. 



938 



imsgiflEitT 



• access through an Assistant U.S. Attorney by the name of Black 

2 Apparently, Snow gave four or five tapes to Black to review. 

3 Mr. Hilberry reviewed those tapes and wanted to 

4 prevent any embarrassment to the United States Goverment 

5 if, in fact, Kelso/Willieims was working for the intelligence 

6 community. It was at that time I decided to explore the 

7 potential, since we were getting negatives, to just ensure 

8 we had covered all bases, I felt I would get a^old of 

9 Colonel North to see if he could find out anything, because 

10 maybe I was getting -- maybe people were getting stonewalled 

11 by somebody in the intelligence community. 

12 Q The tapes that Mr. Hilberry told you about, did 

13 he tell you their contents? 

14 A No. He just said that based on the contents that 

15 he was very concerned, that one could almost make a case from 

16 these conversations , that there was some connection between 

17 Kelso and some member of the intelligence community. 

18 I have known Gary Hilberry a very long time. He is 

19 now our Special Agent in Charge of New York. He is not an 

20 alarmist. Therefore, I paid attention to what Gary said and 

21 figured we would explore the only other area that we had, 

22 which was through the National Security Council. 

23 Therefore, I called Colonel North. This is when 

24 I came into contact with Rob Owen. 

25 Q Do you recall approximately when you called Colonel 



iim^s^inf;!}.. 



imsiiKiT 



North? 

A To the best of my recollection, it is probably 
sometime in September. It was a matter, or no more than 
two weeks after this thing began to bubble up, the report 
of the incident and finding out from Gary Hilberry. 
Let's say two to three weeks is the best estimate I can give 
you, again to my recollection, sometime in September. 

Q Why Colonel North as opposed to someone else? 

A Because I didn't know anybody else at the NSC. 

Q Was it your understanding that Mr. Hilberry 
had already gone through the normal channels and liaison 
people that you had established with the CIA and other 
intelligence agencies for this purpose? 

A Gary went through our headquarters channel. The 
way we pulse, if you will, the intelligence community would 
be through our headquarters. If the field would do it, they 
would only get local feedback. 

My objective was to save any potential embarrassment 
to the government. By that, I mean, if in fact he was 
and there were agencies denying it, then I wanted to make sure 
I and the Commissioner and the Treasury Department were aware 
if I got a kickback from the NSC that, yes, in fact, he was 
associated with a given agency. 

Up to this time, we were being told no, and I wanted 
to be sure I knew about it, and the Commissioner and Treasury 



■■WIIIB KTWnj P U HI 1 1 



940 



UNfiH^flffi^T 



' knew. To make a long story short. Colonel North, Rob Owen 

2 both assured me that they did not know Williams and nobody 

3 else knew Williams. 

^ Q Let's not make a long story short. Let's go through 

5 it, if we can. You called Colonel North, and I presume told 

" him something about the Kelso matter. 

7 A That is right. 

8 Q Did you use Kelso or Williams? 

9 A I think I used the name Williams. 

10 Q When you told Colonel North about it, did he express 

11 familiarity with the subject? 

12 A Yes. I gave the name Williams, and he said Kelso. 

13 We were having a fine time on the telephone keeping the names 

14 straight. He knew it from other source, which he did not 

15 identify on the telephone. He was aware of this. I went 

16 through the whole story with him from beginning to end. The 

17 Costa Rica business. It beceune obvious to me from our 

18 conversation that he was aware of it. 

19 Because he was aware of it, I then went into the 

20 business about the letter, the so-called letter. You see, 

21 I was trying to kill two birds with one stone; one, to find oui 

22 about the letter and the authenticity of the letter; and, two 

23 find out if NSC knew anything about this connection between 

24 Kelso/Williams and the intelligence agency, as Kelso claimed. 

25 Colonel North indicated he was extremely busy, but 



imnmiEL 



941 



HNSbASSIclkl:' 



he was going to have Rob Owen call me. 

Q When you mentioned the letter, was Colonel North 
familiar with the letter or was that news to him? 

A It was not news to him. As I recollect, it was 
not news to him. He said, "I don't think that letter is 
authentic." It was clear to me that he wanted me to deal 
with Rob Owen on this matter. 

Q How did he bring the name of Rob Owen up to you? 
A He just told me he would like me to disucss the 
whole matter with Rob Owen. 

Q Who did he say Rob Owen was? 

A Institute of Terrornsm, on Subnational Conflict. 
Q Is that what Colonel North told you, or did someone 
else tell you that? 

A That is what Mr. Owen told me. 
Q I am interested right now about Colonel North. 
A He told me to talk to Rob Owen, and I assume Owen 
was associated with his office. Until such time as I met with 
Rob Owen and he told me he was with the Institute on 
Subnational Conflict working with Colonel North. 

MR. McGOUGH: Does your book reflect whether he 
gave you a telephone number or an address? 

THE WITNESS: No, I don't have that here. It falls 
right under Ollie North's office number, and then underneath, 
Rob Owen, Instiute of Terrorism, on Subnational Conflict. The 



uiiHlbnwItttirT 



942 



wstmsk 



1 Owen called me. 

2 BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

3 Q Owen called you,