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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 26 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13767 



United States Government Printing Office 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 26 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. - Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987. - Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnited^tater3enatr 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON. DC 20510-6480 



HonoreUsle John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 
available. 



Sincerely, 




Warren B. Rudman V^^ 



Vice Chairman 



III 




U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON. DC 205 15 

(202) 225-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr . Speaker : 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified fo^-Nxelease to the public. 




Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 



Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republ 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 



lean 



W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence /Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Raynor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 



Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 



Senator Cohen 



Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard Cullen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, III 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



♦The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had. during 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratcliff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority Research 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis, 

III 
Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Tray lor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
G. R. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courter 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Doman 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 26 



Preface XXI 

Slease, Clyde H., Ill 1 

Smith, Clifton 87 

Sofaer, Abraham D 227 

Steele, Col. James J 339 

Taft, William H., IV 461 

Tashiro, Jack T 583 

Teicher, Howard 633 

Thompson, Paul 833 

Tillman, Jacqueline 1191 



XIII 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez, Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Armitage, Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Bamett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF. 



Volume 3 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagett, C. Thomas, Jr. 

Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke, George. 

Clarridge, Dewey R. 

Cline, Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier, George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig R 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford, Susan. 
Crowe, Adm. William J. 
Currier, Kevin W. 
DCM, Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC". 



Duemling, Robert W. 
DIA Major. 
Dietel, J. Edwin. 
Dowling, Father Thomas. 
Dutton, Robert C. 
Earl, Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber, Jacob. 
Feldman, Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor, Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A. 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Rudd). 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D. 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus, Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt, Nelson Bunker. 
Ikle, Fred C. 
Jensen, D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward S. 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly, John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn, John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., Jr. 
Ledeen, Michael A. 



Leiwant, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald, John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



McMahon, John N. 
McMahon, Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese, Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 15 



Volume 16 



Volume 17 



Volume 18 



XVIII 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhome A. 
Mulligan, David P. 
Nagy, Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., II. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, Jr. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revell, Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson, John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinette, Glenn A. 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Roseman, David. 



XIX 



Rosenblatt, William. 

Royer, Larry. 

Rudd, Glenn A. 

Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney). 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo, Vincent M. 
Sanchez, Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer, Robert L. 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley, Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H., IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack T. 
Teicher, Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman, Jacqueline. 



Volume 24 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

Tull, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., IIL 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses -or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses -could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposifion transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits— documentary evidence— were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigafion or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



XXIII 



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DEPOSITION or CLYDE H. SLEASE, III 

Thursday, Jun« 11, 1987 

Housft oi K«piasantativAS , 
Select Commlttea to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 



The select committee met, pursuant to call, at 10=09 a.m. 
in room H-328, the Capitol, with Thomas Fryman presiding. 

On behali oi the House Select Committee-' Thomas Fryman, 
staff counsel; R. Spencer Oliver, associate staff; Bill 
Davis, investigator; and Kenneth R. Buck, assistant minority 
counsel . 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: Laurence Emhrey. 
investigator . 



Partially Oeclassified/Releasefl nn S'Jj^iC 'fiP 



UNClASSIFiED 



ONClASSIflEI)' 



""■••• uHwjtMiritu™ ' 

22 HK. TXtniK> Okay, would you suaaz th« Hitnafs? 

23 Hharaupon, 

2M CLYDt H. SLEkSK, III 

25 was callad iot as a wltnass and. having baan duly sworn, was 

26 aMaminad and tastiilad as follows - 

27 EXAniNATION OK BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COHHITTEE: 

28 BY HK. FKynAN: 

29 e Hz . Slaasa, would you stata youz iull nana ioz tha 

30 tacozd, plaasa? 

31 A Clyda H. Slaasa, III. 

32 fi Hhara do you raslda, Hz. Slaasa? 

33 A Ligoniaz, Pannsylvania, I-I-G-O-K-I-E-R. 
3>t e And what is youz oocupatlon? 

35 A I'a a lawyaz. 

36 e Hhat day wara you bozn? 

37 A 

38 e And what Is youz Social Sacuzlty nuabaz? 

39 A 

MO s Hhan waza you adaittad to tha baz? 

((1 A 1969. 

U2 fi And that's In Pannsylvania? 

U3 . A In Pannsylvania. 

MM . S Any othaz Statas? 

M5 A !'■ also adaittad In tha Olstzlot oi Coluabla. 

M6 fi Hhaza did you attand law sohool? 




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50 
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52 
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55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
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61 
62 
63 

614 

65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 



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A Tha Univsrsity oi Pittsburgh. School oi Law. 

S Graduatttd in '69? 

A Ytts. 

Q And whara did you obtain youz undargzaduata dagtaa? 

A Ouka Univazsity. 

fi What yaaz? 

A 1966. 

8 Did you sazva in tha mllltazy? 

A Ko. 

e Now, baginning in 1969 aftaz gzaduatlon from law 
school, hava you baan amployad as a lauyaz? Hava you uozkad 
as a lauyaz sinca than? 

A Yas. 

2 Mould you dascziba tha various positions that you 
have hald? 

A Suza . Fzom 1969 until, say from Juna or July of 
'69. until March of 1971. I wozkad at Thozp. Raad and 
Aziistz«ng, which is a law fizm in Pittsbuzgh. 

e And you waza an associata thaza? 

A I was an associata thaza. 

a And what was your paztlculaz azaa oi pzactica? 

X Kstatas and tzusts, doaastio. cozpozata; soma tax. 

e And aftaz Hazch of 1971? 

A It was probably March or Fabruary of that yaar I 
went to tha district attornay's offica of Alleghany County. 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



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72 and I was the adninistrative assistant to th« district 

73 attornay oi Allegheny County. 

71 fi Hon long did you continue in that position? 

75 A Until January of--January of 1972, uhen I became a 

76 senior attorney in the general counsel's oiiice oi the 

77 Federal Conraunications Comiission. 

78 2 That was here in Washington, D.C.? 

79 . A In Washington. 

80 2 What were your responsibilities in that position? 

81 . A I was in charge oi the common carrier section oi 

82 the Communications Commission and also political 

83 broadcasting rules which were just being adopted then, and 

8<4 then general--and other times general agenda work through the 

85 general counsel's ofiice in the Commission. 

86 2 How long did you continue in that position? 

87 A Until Harch oi 1974. 

88 2 What did you do after that? 

89 . A I returned to Pittsburgh and became general counsel 

90 ior Richard n. Scaiie and his family and entities. 

91 2 And hoM long did you continue in that position? 

92 i Until September 19, 1986. 

93 . fi In that position, did you have other people 
914 reporting to you? 

95 A Not in house. 

96 2 You had outside counsel reporting to you? 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



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97 ■ A Ha had outsida lawyacs, yas . 

98 S What was tha natuxa of your dutlas as ganaxal 

99 counsel to Hr . Scaiie? And I ballava that is spallad S-C-A- 

100 I-F-E. 

101 A Yes. 

102 I handled his personal legal matters, any personal 

103 legal matters that cane up ior the family, and X was general 
10M counsel to the newspapers and radio station that ha and we 

105 owned, and I was a trustee oi several of the family trusts. 

106 fi You mentioned radio stations ''that he and we 

107 owned.*' Does that mean you ownad-- 

108 A Ha owned part of a radio — I owned part of a radio 

109 station on which ha is tha majority shareholder in 

110 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

111 Q Which station is that? 

112 A Station Kev. 

113 Q KfiV? 
IIM A Yes. 

115 e Hr. Scaifa is a mambax of tha Hallon family? 

116 A Yas. 

117 S Sid you have any other personal investments in 

118 businesses along with Hr . Scaifa? 

119 A Ko. 

120 8 Would you dascziba Hz. Semlfa's activities as 
12 1 basically those of an investor, or does ha have a more 



DEiAssro 



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NAME: HIR162000 

122 activa tola in particular businassas? 

123 A X don't s«e what ralavanca that has to th« 
1214 procaadings. 

125 C Ara you declining to ansuar? 

126 A I just don't saa what--ha would ba tha bast 

127 descriptor o± that. Ha is a newspaper publisher, a private 

1 28 investor . 

129 S Since September 19, 1986, what have you done? 

130 A I've bean retired. 

131 2 What was the reason you left the employment with 

132 Hr. Scaife? 

133 A To take a year off. 

13(4 2 Is this in the nature of a sabbatical? 

135 A No. Just taking a year off. 

136 2 Do you expect to go back to work for him? 

137 A Ho. 

138 2 Do you know a gentleman named Roy Godson? 

139 A Yes. 

1U0 2 Hhen did you first meet Hr . Godson? 

mi A Probably middle or lata '70's. 

mz fi What was he doing whan you first met him? What was 

m3 his position or professional activity? 

IMM I Tha bast I knew, he was a professor at Georgetown 

1>45 University and was working for tha National Strategy 

1146 Information Canter. 



UNClASSIflEO 



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NAME: HIR162000 V I 1 Ul-niJft] 1 1 II Bl PAGE 



2 HOH did you happan to m««t him? 

A Through friends. 

e And you met him when you were working in Washington 
for the FCC? 

A Ko. After I returned to Pittsburgh. 

fi Did you meet him through friends in Pittsburgh? 

A Through friends in Pittsburgh. 

2 Has he in Pittsburgh and you met him or-- 

A No . I just--they happened to know him, and I met 
him somehow. 

2 What do you understand are the activities of the 
National Strategy Information Center? 

A They do research on various projects involving 
national security; publish monographs on topics that involve 
national security, foreign policy; hold seminars. 

2 Have you attended any of their seminars? 

A I'm sure I have, yes. 

2 After first meeting Hr . Godson in the middle or 
late 1970's, how frequent has your contact been with him? 
And to try to quantify the question, if there is any average 
number of times, how many times would you see him or talk 
with him within a year since you first met him? 

A Well, I really didn't get to know him well or 
really see him probably until the early '80's, and then 
maybe a couple of times a year. 



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fi How did you happan to g«t to kno¥ hin h*11 in th« 
•axly 1980's? 

k Oh, I just think through th« National Strategy 
Infoznation Cantaz and th« iact that I would eon* to 
Washington on businass. Thay had an office hara, and I 
would just dzop in and saa him, in affact, just chat about 
things about which wa had a nutual intarast. 

2 Was thaza any zalationship batwaan Hz. Godson and 
Hz. Scaiia oz any of his foundations oz businass 
antazpzisas? 

A Hall, othar than tha fact that soma of our 
charitabla antitias gava aonay to tha National Stzatagy 
Information Cantaz. 

fi That's soma of Hz. Scaifa's — 

A Charitias that waza sat up in Pittsburgh. 

2 Did you maat Hr . Godson originally thzough Hz. 
Scaifa? 

A Hot thzough Hr . Scaiia, I don't think. 

e Thzough soma mambaz of tha Hallon family? 

A No. 

ft Did you gat to know him battaz in eonnaction with 
thasa contributions fzom Hz. Scaifa's foundations? Has that 
tha basis for — 

A Hall, assantially. and Z was a trustaa, and so ona 
of my dutias as a trustaa was follow-up. which was raquizad 



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NAME: HIR162000 UllUkriwwII IkU PAGE 9 

197 by the IRS, to iind out whethar th« p*opl« ar* doing with 

198 th« monay what thay say thay ata going to do Hith tha iionay, 

199 and that's sort of how I got to know Roy. 

200 Q Has this a particular foundation that nada a 

201 contributions? 

202 A Gosh, I guass tha contributions probably cama from 

203 tha Sara Scaifa Foundation and also from tha Carthaga 
2014 Foundation. 

205 Q Tha Carthaga-- 

206 A Carthaga Foundation. 

207 fi Mara thasa ragular contributions of approximataly a 

208 certain amount each a year, or did tha amounts vary from 

209 year to year? 

210 A I can go through this, but I don't--I thought I was 

211 down here to testify about what it says on tha subpoena, not 
2 12 how we ran our charitable operations. 

2 13 e Hell, I think your relationship with Hr . Godson is 

2 1U a significant subject of this deposition, and I think it's 

2 15 appropriate to inquire into the background. 

2 16 A Hell, I disagree, but in any event, no. Like any 

2 17 other grantee, they would make requests every year because 

2 18 they had certain programs that they wanted funded or 

2 19 paztlally funded, and they would apply, and the trustees 

220 would meet and decide whether or not to grant them x amount 

22 1 of dollars up to the amount that they requested or less. 



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222 2 And you ueia a tiusta* oi th« Sara Scaif* 

223 Foundation? 
22U A Yas. 

225 e And also tha Carthaga Foundation? 

226 A Yas. 

227 2 And part oi youi lasponsibilitias was to hava 

228 contact with tha NSIC. which was a laoipiant oi grants from 

229 thasa foundations? 

230 A Yas. 

231 e Now you first mat Hr . Godson in tha ■id-1970's, but 

232 I gather from your answars your contact with him until tha 

233 aarly 1980's was vary sporadic. 

23>4 A That's right, you Know, and mayba I didn't maat him 

235 till 1979, I don't know, but it was, I knaw of him, and I'm 

236 sura I had mat him. 

237 2 But beginning in tha aarly 1980 's, thara has baan a 

238 mora ragular contact batwaan you and Hr . Godson? 

239 A Sura. 

2(40 e And you would maat him or talk with him at laast 

2M1 sevaral timas a yaar. 

2X2 A Yas. 

2*43 fi KoM cartain of thosa discussions, I gathar from 

2t(i4 your answar, ralatad to tha grants from thasa foundations. 

2>45 Wara othar contacts unralatad to tha grants? Did you hava 

2M6 social contacts with Mr. Godson or othar typas of business 



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contacts with him? 

A It was mainly just in relation to th« grants a 
the fact that ue had become friends. 

fi Who made the decision with respect to grants i 
these foundations to Hr . Godson? Has that Hr . Scaife, 
was that you. or was that the trustees as a group? 

A Well, there were never any grants to Hr . Godso 

2 To the NSIC then. 

A Those decisions were made by the trustees. Il 

2 Was Hr . Godson's contact with you? Was the re 
for a grant to you or to someone else? 

A No. It was to the grant officer of the foundi 

2 Do you know a woman named Faith Whittlesey? 

A Yes. 

2 When did you first meet her? 

A Probably 197»4 or '75. 

2 Where did you meet her for the first time? 

A I don't see what relevance this has to anythir 
that's listed here in this schedule or the subpoena. 

2 Well, I do. 

A I mean you could go through the list of everyl 
Know in the world that has no relevance to this. 

2 Well, we thinK it has significant relevance, 
have a number of questions about your relations with 
Ambassador Whittlesey, and I intend to asK those questj 

ONCUSSIFIED ■ 



13 



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HAHE: HIR162000 

272 If you dacllna to ansusz, th«n, you know, w« will taka 

273 Hhatavaz staps wa naad to taka , but I will put tha 
27M quastions, and you can naka your own dacision. 

275 Now tha quastlon is, whan did you first maat haz. 

276 and what wara tha cizcumstancas ? 

277 K Hail, I nat haz in Pannsylvania probably in 197i4 

278 and '75 whan sha was going to run ior liautanant govarnor. 

279 fi Hhat was har position than? Has sha in businass? 

280 A I think sha was in tha Stata laglslatura. 

281 fi And whan you iirst mat har, you wara ganaral 

282 counsal to Hr . Scaiia? 

283 . A Yas. 

28<( e Kow how fraquant has your contact baan with har 

285 sinca tha 1970's? And I raaliza that quastion may ba 

286 difficult to answaz as phzasad, so lat ma tzy to zaphzasa 

287 it. Duzing tha 1970's> approximataly how many timas a yaar 

288 would you hava any contact with har. aithar naating haz or 

289 spaaking with har on tha phona? 

290 A Hhy don't wa do this? Hhy don't you tall ma what 

291 tha ralavanca of this is to tha subpoana? fiacausa I'm not 

292 going to go through my ralationship with avarybody I know 

293 that you may ask ma, bacausa I don't think it has any 
29M ralavanca to why I'm hara undar tha diraotion of this 

295 subpoana. If you can show ma how you think it's ralavant, 

296 I'll ba happy to. you know, maka my judgmant than. 



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fi W«ll> I will g«t into mor* spacifics with 
Ambassador Whittl*say, but particularly you had naatings 
with her in Switzerland in Dacanbar of 1985. Thara wara 
various dinners in Switzerland which she arranged with 
friends of yours which are reflected in expense reports that 
she turned in, and I want to know answers and the 
circumstances . 

A Hell, what relevance does that have to this 
subpoena? 

a Well, that is for me to decide and not you. 

A It's really for the comnittaa to decide. 

2 Hell, that's right, and I'll pose the questions.' 
and if you decline to answer, you can do so, and tha 
committee can decide. 

Kow I've a pending question, and you can either 
answer it, or you can refuse to answer it. 

A Hall, I mean I don't have anything to hide, but I 
think that it's highly irrelevant. I would see her, I don't 
know, in the '70's infrequently, maybe once a year. 

Q Now did there come a time in tha 1980's when you 
began to saa her mora frequently? 

A Probably. 

fi Hhen? 

A Probably whan she was appointed Ambassador to 
Switzerland . 



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HknZ HIR162000 ' "^ ^^ ■ ■ I U|/p»GE 1 14 

322 fi Hhan was that? 

323 A Son* tima in--ptobably sob* tiita in 1981. 

32U Q So you bagan to saa hai noza izaquantly and hava 

325 noza izaquant contacts with haz aitaz sha aovad to 

326 Suitzezland? 

327 A Pzobably. yas . 

328 2 What causad you to hava moza contact uith haz aftaz 

329 haz nova to Switzazland? 

330 A Sha was a iziand. 

331 e Sha had baan a fziand izoa tha 1970's? 

332 A Yas. 

333 fi That you had saan mayba onca a yaaz? 
33M A Onca oz tuica a yaaz. 

335 fi And than sha goas to Swltzazland. and you bagin to 

336 see hez noza fzaquantly? 

337 A Yas. 

338 fi Old you visit haz in Suitzazland savazal tiaas? 

339 A Onca--ttiica whan sha--onca whan sha was thaza tha 
3M0 iizst tiaa--twica uhan sha was thara tha fizst tiaa ; twica 
Sm when sha uaa thaza tha iizst tiaa. 

342 fi Hhat do you aaan by "tha first tiaa"? 

343 A Hall, sha caaa back to tha Unitad Statas, wozKad in 
3(4<4 tha Hhita Housa. and than Mas zaappointad. 

3145 S And tha pariod oi sarvioa tha iizst tiaa bagan in 

3146 1981? 



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A I don't knou the exact date. I assume aitei the 
President was sworn in, and then he nominated her, and she 
was coniirmed and was sent over. 

2 Okay. So you visited her twice when she was there 
the first time. Then she came back to the United States, 
and then she went back to the embassy in Switzerland. Is 
that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q How many times have you visited her there since she 
went back? 

A I don't think I've visited her there in Switzerland 
at all since she's been back, though I may have; I'm just' 
trying--no, I'm not so sure. I was there, but she wasn't 
there. 

2 Did you stay at her residence? 

A Yes. 

2 When was that? 

A Well, in December o£ — gosh — '85. Yes, I think it was 
December of '85. 

2 Kow were your meetings and communications with her 
in the 1980's. when she was in Switzerland, of a business or 
professional nature, or was this a personal relationship? 

A Purely social. I 

fi And the time you were there in 1985. you stayed at 
her residence, but at youx recollection you did not see her 



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MAHE: HIK162000 

372 during that visit? 

373 k Oh, that visit I saw har. 

374 a In December of 198S. Has there another visit when 

375 you did not see her? 

376 A March of this year. 

377 2 How long were you there in Harch of this year? 

378 A Two nights . 

379 2 Do you know a gentlenan named Herbert Barness? 

380 A Yes. 

38 1 2 Who is Hr . Barness? 

382 A A businessman. 

383 2 Is he in Pittsburgh? ' - 
38U A Outside of Philadelphia. 

385 2 Hhat is the nature of his business? 

386 A I don't know everything that Herb does. 

387 2 Uell, tell me what you do know. 

388 A I think he is involved in real estate, and that's 

389 about all that I know. 

390 2 How do you happen to know him? 

39 1 A We're on the Pennsylvania Judicial Selection 

392 Commission. 

393 fi When did you first meet Hr . Barness? 
39M . I Oh, probably in the early '80's. 

395 2 How did you meet him? 

396 A I don't know. Probably through friends, a 



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NAHI> HZX162000 

397 political function 

398 fi On th* av«x»g«, how aany tia*s a y«ar have you saan 

399 Hz. Batnass or spokan with hin sinca you aat hia7 

MOO A Two oz thtaa tiaas . Soaatiaat aora bafoza judicial 

*«01 naatings. 

t02 fi Has that baan youz only proiastional contact with 

<t03 Hz. Baznass, your sazvica togathaz on tha Judicial Salaction 

MOU Coaaission? 

UOS A Yas. 

1*06 fi Do you hava any othaz businass contacts with hia? 

ct07 A Ko. 

<408 fl Ooas tha Scaiia Foundation oz any oi tha Soalia 

409 intazasts? 

It 10 A Not to ay KnoMladga . 

*4 11 fi nr. Slaasa, hava you avaz baan appzoachad by anyona 

14 12 raquasting any sort oi contribution ralating to Nicaragua? 

m3 A Hhat do you aaan> ''ralating to Nicaragua'*? 

MIM fi A contribution to ba pzovidad to] 

m^^^^^^^^^^oz to ba usad in connaction with activitias in 

i4l6 Nicazagua. 

Ml? A You'za going to hava to ba a littla bit aoza 

M18 spaoiiic. 

M19 fi Hall, lat's put it this way. Did anyona avar ask 

M20 you, aithaz you pazsonally oz to you as a zapzasantativa oi 

M2 1 tha Scaiia iaaily, to aaka any sozt oi oontzlbutlon and in 



wuissw 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



HAHE KIR162000 UllULflUUll ll-U ^'^'^^ ^^ 

1422 tha request to you the word ''Nicaragua'' was mentioned? 

1423 A To me as an individual, yes. As a representative 
(42U of the Scaife family, never. 

"425 S To you as an individual, did that occur on more 

426 than one occasion? 

M27 A Actually, no one ever asked me to make a 

■428 contribution using the word ''Nicaragua.*' 

■429 2 Well, you earlier answered yes to my question, so 

•430 what did you have in mind when you answered yes? 

•431 A Hell — well, when I thought about it: he asked me 

1432 personally to make a contribution, and the answer is, no one 

1433 ever asked me to make a contribution, no. 

<43'4 2 Well, you've got me coniused by your answer. 

1435 A Well, when I said yes, that was an incorrect answer 

1436 to your question when I thought about It. I was never asked 
"437 by anybody for me personally to make a contribution. Define 
■438 ''contribution.'' I assume you mean dollars. 

1439 2 Yes. 

MUO A The answer is no. 

Mm S Were you asked to arrange for a contribution or to 

■4142 find someone else to make a contribution? 

14143 A Yes. 

UUM fi And did that occur on just one occasion or more 

14145 than one occasion? 

14146 A One and a half occasions. ' 



«msffe 



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So it's nor* than on«? 
Sort of. 

Who mada that requast to you? 
nz . Godson . 
Uhan was that? 

Probably tha spring of 1985. 
Hon was that tha ona occasion? I want to 
distinguish batwaan tha ona occasion and tha half occasion. 
A Hall, whan you say tha word •' Nicaragua, ' ' I naan 
that's, you know, that's vagua . No ona avar askad ma to 
naka a contribution to Nicaragua or solicit contributions 
for Nicaragua. 

2 No. I think ay quastion was that thay askad you 
for a contribution and in tha convarsation tha Mozd 
''Nicaragua'' was nantionad. I didn't intand to say that 
thay specifically askad you for a contribution or to arrangs 
a contribution to Nicaragua. I was trying to — 
A Yas, okay. I understand now. 

2 So you racaivad such a zaquast from Hr . Godson on 
ona occasion. 

A On ona occasion, ha askad mm if I would ba willing 
to halp in a projact that involved Nicaragua, yas. 
2 That was tha thrust of My quastion. 
A No. Actually, ''Central Aaerioa' ' were his words. 
2 And you said there was another half occasion, and 



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I'm not sure-- 

A U«ll> I'd say that was tha hali. 

fi What was the ona then? You said there uaie one and 
a half occasions . 

A When I met uith Robert McFarlane and Oliver North. 

2 Now the call from llr . Godson was in the spring of 
198S? 

A I think so. 

2 Some time in 1985? 

A Oh, yes. 

2 Did he call you at your office in Pennsylvania? 

A Yes, but I actually think he was in Pittsburgh for 
some reason, and we talked about it. 

2 Had you seen him during his visit to Pittsburgh? 

A That's--yes. 

2 Do you know what he was there for? 

A No. 

2 Has it related to the Scaiie faaily in any way? 

A I don't have any idea; I really don't recall. 

S Hhat did he say to you, as best you reoall? 

A As best as I recall, it was at lunch time, and 
he — we were outside my office, and he asked me if I would be 
willing to help if anything ever arose on any special 
projects involving Central America. 

2 You say this was outside your office. So was this 



22 



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a fac«-to-fac« m««ting you had with hint? 

A Yas. 

B Do you knou the taason h« was at your offic«? 

A I laally don't tacall uhathttt ha may have just bean 
passing through and had tina batuaan planes or whether he 
was there for, you know, for a visit. I don't know whether 
he was specifically in our office or maybe was seeing other 
people in Pittsburgh. I really don't recall. 

S But in any case, he cama by your office. 

A Yes. 

2 And you spoke with him. 

A Or he was staying in town and maybe didn't avan 
come by my office. I think I just mat him during my lunch 
time. 

fi Did you have lunch with him? 

A No. 

2 You met him at a club, or you mat him-- 

A No. I think we just walked around Mellon Square. 

fi Just to try to clarify this, as I understand it, ha 
called you and said, ''I'd like to talk to you about 
something,'* and than he comas by and-- 

A Yes, that's-- 

S --and you spend 10 minutes walking around the 
square . 

A Or longer, yes. That's essentially it. 



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UNCIilSSIFlEO 



NAUE: HXR162000 w t < U L.rlU' ' * ' ■■ ■' ^'^''^ ^^ 
2 • 'Nica day, ' ' and-- 
523 k Vas . I mean this wasn't probably tha only thing wa 

52M talkad about. 

525 2 Okay. 

526 In 1985, had you baen having mote frequent contact 

527 with Mr. Godson than you had in earlier years? 

528 A Probably '8<4, '85, he was in tha midst of writing a 

529 book and wanted help on--he was writing a book on Soviet 

530 disinformation and wanted some help on how to get his book 

531 publicity, and so I had more frequent contacts with him, 

532 helping him do that and talking about how you go about doing 

533 that--you know, talk shows, and television appearances, and 
5314 speeches, presentations--things like that. 



If 



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HIR162000 IJi^SII M.l.linril PAGE 23 

fi Why would ha turn to you on that nattar? Was that 
talatad to your-- 

k Just bacause ua ware ftiands and bacausa I knau 
somathing about that. 

fi And about tha radio industry and tha nawspapar-- 

A And about presantations . It was a subjact that 
ua--you knou, wa had a mutual intarast, and so I was faniliar 
with tha subjact, and I was a good sourca on how to gat your 
point across . 

fi So in '84 and '85, how many total timas would you 
say you had mat with him or spokan with him? 

A Cosh, I couldn't--! couldn't tall you. I don't 
know. 

fi 

A 
numbar . 

2 You had izaquant contacts with him? 

A Fraquant, yas, sura. Suza . I talkad to him onca a 
month or so, somatimas mora oftan. 

fi And ona subjact oi tha maatlngs or discussions with 
him was pzomotlon for tha book that ha was writing? 

A That was basically 95 pareant of it. 

a Has tha subjact of grants to tha NSIC from tha 
foundations anothaz subjact? 

A Mot zaally. Not raally. I don't racall whathar wa 



Mora than 20? focusing on '84, mora than 20 timas? 
That--that*s hazd to say. I maan that may be a good 



yHEUSSIFIED 



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HIR162000 lllliS.! £1 A MrSr II PAGE 2K 

specifically providad funds for this or whathar thas was 
being dona out of their general operating budget. I don't 
know. I uas just sonaone he could turn to because we knew 
each other . 

S How returning to the day uhen he called you and you 
believe you walked around Hellon Square, what do you recall 
about what he said on that occasion? 

A He asked me if I would be interested in working on 
some special projects if anything came about involving 
Central America. 

2 Did you ask him any questions about what he was 
referring to? 

A Hell, my comments were that I would be happy to 
help, that I wasn't going to do anything for the--for the 
contras, because I had no idea what the law was or wasn't on 
that, and so I made that absolutely clear, and that was 
clear to him, and that was the end of that subject, and then 
he called me one day and asked me if I'd be willing to help 
on a specific project, and I said yes. 

fi Hell, returning to your meeting with him in 
Pittsburgh, he asked you if you're interested In being 
Involved in, any projects relating to Central America. 
That's how the subject initially comes up. 

A Yes, and he may have even asked me about the 
specific subject at that time. It was also relevant. 



IINCIASSIFIED 



26 



NAHE> 
585 

586 

S87 

588 

589 

590 

591 

592 

593 

S9t4 

595 

596 

597 

598 

59 

60 

601 

602 

603 

60M 

60S 

606 

607 

608 

609 




HZX162000 lllll.l U.A MMKII PAGI 25 

fi What was th« sp«ciiic sub'j«or' that Mas ralavant? 
A li I wantad to halp lalsa any funds iozl 



fi You baiiava ha zaisad that during that walk? 

A Pzobably. 

fi Kou what did ha say about tha iunds that wata to ba 
taisac 

A Ha just said that thay uaza assantially having 
a--you Know, a tough go of it 

^^^^^^^^^^^^H and ba Hilling to saa 
halp. 

ha Hhat^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H waza?' 

A Just ganarally suppoi 




fi KoM in rasponsa to this, I ballava you said you 
would ba happy to halp but you did not want to gat Involvad 
in support for tha contras? 






27 



HIR162000 



ONOtASMB.. 



26 



N&HE 

6 10 A Not In any way. 

6 11 fi That was what you tald to hla at that tin* 7 

6 12 (uitnass nods. 1 

6 13 BY HR. fRYHAH- 

6 1<4 Q What alsa did you say to hia? 

615 A Wall, I just told you, that was It, that I'd ba 

6 16 happy to halp, that I wantad to Know that if this was 

6 17 sonething that tha paopla wantad dona, you know, hava 

6 18 theii--hava them tall ita , and I'll go out and saa ii I can do 

6 19 anything. 

620 fi By ''happy to halp you.'* that ralatad to raising 

621 iunds for] 

622 A Suxa. 

623 a Now had Hz. Godson raisad tha subjaot of tha 
62M1 contras? 

625 A Navaz. 

626 e What ptoaptad you to aiiirnativaly stata that you 

627 did not want to gat involvad in assisting tha contras? 

628 A Uhanavaz tha wozd "Nicazagua" eaua up. 

629 fi Had that coma up baioza? 

630 A I was talking about Cantzal Amazlea, so wa waza 

631 talking about avazything that was going on down thara. and I 

632 think I pzobably just voluntaazad and said, "I'm not 

633 zaising any monay ioz tha contzas." and ha hadn't askad ma 
63H to zaisa any monay ioz tha contzas. I just said. ''I just 



umssiFe 



28 



Hknz 

6351 
636] 

637 
638 
639 
640 

6m 

6U2 
6>43 

6<4>4 

6145 
6M6 
6M7 
6M8 
6M9 
650 
651 
652 
653 
65<4 
655 
656 
657 
658 
659 



want you to kn 



now this Is ,^oc ^^^^^^^H 



iot 



not ior anything els*,*' and mad* that claaz. 
and that was tha and oi It. 

fi Had you baan following davalopaants In Cantzal 
Anazica? 

A Sura. 

fi In tha ptass? 

k Suza. 

fi Had you baan doing anything aoza than zaadlng tha 
dally nawspapazs and naws nagazlnas? I aaan waza you 
getting any sozt of spaclal bzlaflngs or spaclal zapozts 
with zagazd to Cantzal Amazlca? 

A Kot that I — not that I zaoall. I aaan I know oi a 
lot oi paopla who know a lot about fozalgn polloy, and othaz 
than convazsatlons that wa would hava, no. I aaan I didn't 
gat anything spaclal whaza thasa paopla waza axpazts In an 
azaa. Ha would hava convazsatlons. and thay would tall aa 
about thalz vlaw oi, you know, what was going on. but 
nothing — nothing spaclal. 

fi Is fozalgn aifalzs a partloulaz Intazast of youzs? 

A Yas. 

fi Aza you a aaabaz oi vazlous iozalgn policy — 

A No. 

fi You'za not a aaabaz oi tha Council on Fozalgn 
Relations? 



m 



29 



(iNci/isxife 



So h* a*ntlon«d Cantial Aaarloa and! 

tak* It fxoB your ansucx h* Idantli 




¥•3. 

HR. FRYHAK: Off th« racord. 
(nr . Buck antazs. ] 
BY HR. FRYHiX' 
fi What spaciilcally hava you zaad oz known about tha 
contzas that lad you to tall Hr . Godson in this initial 
convatsation that you didn't want to ba involvad in any way 
in pioviding monay to tha contras? 

A Oh. I don't know. It was just a 9anaral--ganezal 
opinion. That wasn't ay intazast in halping military kinds 
oi things, bacausa I zaally didn't know anything about it, 
and I didn't know what tha status oi tha — oi tha law was oz 
all tha nuancas, so it just didn't hava any intazast to ma, 
and ha navaz askad ma to halp tham. I just mada that claaz. 

I just voluntaazad that, that that wasn't an intazast oi 
mina.. 

ft In making tha zaquast ioz tha contzibution ^<^^^^H 
who did nz. Godson say ha was acting ioz in 
making this raquast? 

A Ha zaally didn't— ha zaally didn't say. I said ii 



UNCUSSlFiED 



30 



NAME: »,«,.... .,v-i,.- 

685 this was something that, you know, pttopla wanted done, then 

686 take ne to then and let then, you know, tell ne . I assuned 

687 that he had had discussions with Bud HcFailane and Ollie 

688 North about it. 

689 e Old you know them? 

690 A I had met Bud. I didn't know Ollie then. 
69 1 e You knew of Colonel Horth at that point? 

692 A Vaguely. 

693 Q You said you told hin ii this is something, I 

69U believe, people want done, to take you to them. Did you use 

695 the phrase, ' ' Ii this is something the administration wants 

696 done, take me to them''? 

697 A I may have said--I may have said the Government. 

698 2 But if you used the phrase ''people,'' by that 

699 phrase you meant, ''Take me to the people in the Government 

700 who want this done''? 

701 A Hm-ran. 

702 S ''And let then tell me directly*'? 

703 A Or who want to nake--make a request, let them make i 
70U request of me directly. 

705 Q So did you understand that he was acting as an 

706 emissary of someone else in making this request? 

707 .A I essentially assumed he was acting as a friend of 

708 a friend. 

709 S Hho was the friend? 



iC 



31 



NClASSiHED .... 



NAME: HIR162000 U 3 ^ iJ*,rtlJ ^ 3 1 fll-U ''*°^ ^0 

710 A Probably Bud HcFatlan* or Oliver North. 

711 2 Did you know that he knew Hcrarlane? 

712 A Oh. yas. 

713 C Hon did you Know that? 

71U A Gosh, I don't know. I kn«w that ha was--did 

7 IS something with NSC and obviously knaw tha director. 

716 2 Had you aver been together with Godson and 

717 HcFarlane? 

718 A What? Before he asked me? 

719 2 Yes. 

720 A No . To the best of ay knowledge, no. 

721 2 But you had previously met HcFarlane. 

722 A Yes. 

723 2 On what occasion? 

72U A Some party here in Washington. 

725 2 On more than one occasion? 

726 A naybe twice at the most. 

727 2 Both social occasions? 

728 A Yas. 

729 2 Had you aver met Hllliam Casey, by tha way? 

730 A Yas. 

731 2 When did you first meat him? 

732 A Probably soma time in tha middle '80's. I sat next 

733 to him at a dinner that NSIC had here in Washington, and I 
73>4 had net him mayba once or twice before at «--soma social 



mkmm 



32 



lINWSSIflED 



NAHC: HIR162000 

735 function. 

736 2 And you sat next to hln at tha dinnat in th« nid- 

737 1980's, you think? That would ba ' 6U or *8S? 

738 A Y«s. SonewhAEC in thaza . 

739 2 Did you avaz neat with him or spaak with hln aitaz 
7(40 you saw hiit at that dinnai? 

7m A Mo. 

7>42 2 Did you hava any undazstanding about a pzofassional 

7(43 zalationship batwaan Hr . Casay and Hr . Godson? 

7144 . A No. 

7t45 2 Do you know ii thay knaw aaoh othaz? 

7146 A Oh, I'lt suza thay knaw aach othaz. 

7147 2 Why do you say that? 

7M8 A Bacausa thay waza all thata at tha dlnnar. and I 

7149 assuna that Roy had known him for a long tima . Ha spoka of 

750 him. 

751 2 Godson spoka of Casay? 

752 A Hm-mm. 

753 2 Did ha mantion Casay that day in Plttsbuzgh whan 
7514 you spoka with him — 

755 A No. 

756 2 --around Hallon Squara? 

757 .A Ho. 

758 2 Hall, how did this discussion with Hr . Godson in 

759 Pittsburgh and? 



DNMSSra 



uNcussm 



NAME: HIR162000 ^ ■ " ^ fc.* I W* J I I L, U ''*°^ ^^ 

760 A Ha said, ''Wall, I'll try to atzanga for you to see 

76 1 tha paopla that you should saa about this.*' 

762 2 Did he identify tha people? 

763 A McFazlane and North. 

76'4 Q Ha said in response to your-- 

765 A At soma time in that time irama. I can't 

766 specifically tell you whether he was in Pittsburgh when he 

767 said that exactly or not. It was somewhere around there. 

768 2 Did he--did Godson tell you if ha had been 

769 contacting other people? 

770 A I don't think--no . Ho. I don't think ha did tall 

77 1 me. 

772 2 Do you know if ha had been? 

773 A I don't know. Not that time, no. 
7714 2 Did you learn since if he had bean? 

775 A I don't think that ha did on this thing; not to my 

776 knowledge. 

777 2 Did you haax fzon Mr. Godson after this meeting in 

778 Pittsburgh? 

779 A Ya«. 

780 & How long after? 

781 I Gosh, a week, two weeks maybe. 

782 .2 Ha called you? 

783 A I'm suza. 

784 2 What did ha say? 



«ussro 



38 0-88-3 



34 



785 
786 
787 
788 
789 
790 
791 
792 
793 
794 
795 
796 
797 
798 
799 
800 
801 
802 
803 
SOU 
805 
806 
807 
808 
809 



.""«»« UNCt/ISSIflEfl "" » I 

k He said that he had aztanged a meeting and what 
uete some dates uhete I could come down to Washington and 
meet with McFarlane and North. 

S So he identified them in that phone conversation? 

A Yes, I'm sure; yes. 

2 But you're not sure if he had-- 

A No, but I may have been down here on business and 
happened to run into him or go see him. I think it was do: 
by the phone . 

2° In any case, the next time you spoke with him, he 
said he had arranged for you to see HcFarlane and North? 

A In the next one or two times I spoke to him, yes. 

fi Okay. 

A Because we were still talking about, you know, a 
lot of other things . 

2 And some of the other things were the grants from 
the foundation and-- 



on« 



No. 



--the publicity for the-- 
They were--they were mainly the book. 
The book, okay. 

Yes. They were mainly the book. 

So he gave you some dates, and did he arrange an 
appointment with those two? 
A Yes. 




^.'J 



35 



NAME 
810 
81 1 
812 
813 
81U 
815 
816 
817 
818 
819 
820 
821 
822 
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8214 
825 
826 
827 
828 
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830 
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832 
833 
8314 



HIR162000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 34 



2 When did that occur 



A I think that was in th« early spring oi 1985--«arly 
spring or early summer. 

2 Do you have any calendars or records that indicate 
that? 

A I don't. I don't have a date on there. I looked 
at ray calendars, and I don't--I didn't find a date. I was 
doing all this on my--on ray own tirae , so that there wasn't 
any notations that I made on any, you know, business 
calendars and things that I have. 

2 Where did you meet with them? 

A At the White House. 

2 Whose office? 

A The Situation Room. 

2 Who was present? 

[Pause while House Floor bells ring. 1 

A Hone oi those guys. Mr. Hcrarlane, Colonel North, 
Roy Godson, and me. 

2 How long did the meeting last? 

A Haybe 20 minutes. 

2 Kow you had met HcFarlane before a couple of times 
on a social occasion. 

A Yes. I don't know whether he really knew me or 
not, but I had met him. 

2 And this was the first time you had met North? 




yrfiiijv. 



36 



NAHE- 
835 
836 
837 
838 
839 



847 
8U8 
8M9 
8S0 
851 
852 
853 
85M 
855 
856 
857 
858 
859 



Y«t. 



iimssim 



e Did ncFazlan* do mot* talking than Nozth, oz was It 
about tha sana, oz did Nozth do moza talking than NoFazlana? 
A It was pzobably about tha sasa. 
S Uhat do you zacall HcFazlana said? 
A Ha just askad ma li I wantad to halp zalsa funds 




fi Now you say ''thay.'' Is that a distillation of 
what both of than said? 

A Yas. That's assantlally what It was. 

S Hhat did Godson say? 

A Hall, ha zaally didn't say — say vazy much. 

fi Did any of tham at this maatlng Indlcata why you 
had baan salactad foz this zola? 
. - A Mo. 

fi Did Godson giva any indication at tha aazliaz 
meeting why you had baan salaotad? 



ustmsw 



37 



860 



863 
8614 
865 
866 
867 
868 
869 
870 

87 1 
872 
873 
8714 
875 
876 
877 
878 
879 
880 

88 1 
882 
883 
8814 



wi«s!fe 



NAME^ HIR162000 U 3 f I jl W.^ ,\ « T I T ? I PAGE 36 



A He just asked me because--because he knew rae , you 
know, and that's the assumption that I made, and I guess 
they thought that I might know people who would be willing 
to help in a situation like this. 

One other thing they asked me about there was, did 
I know what UNO was, and I had no idea what that was, so 
they told me about that. 

2 What did they tell you? 

A That it was some kind oi symbol that were symbols 
of the resistance to the Sandinista Government. 

C Did they mention any amount that they wanted you to 
raise? 

A That's hard to say. I think somewhere along the 
line the figure «i400,000 came up, but whether — but that may 
have been 3ust a general discussion on what he thought might 
be, you know, possible at the outside on something like 
this, and so I think »i400,000 was, in effect, the goal. 

fi Who mentioned that figure? 

A I don't know who first mentioned that. 

fi That was at this meeting? 

A I think so. I can't say specifically whether it 
waa or whether that's something that Roy and I talked about. 
It could have been. 

2 Did anyone at the meeting speak of efforts by other 
groups to raise funds? 



BCiSSlfO 



38 



UNCIASSIFIEO 



NAHZ< HII1162000 Ul « ULHl Sl^ i il 11 1 "^°' ^"^ 

885 k Ko. not that I tacall. Tha sola dlacusslon was 

886 aboutj 

887 fi How did tha subjact oi UKO coma up? 

888 A I don't zacall. 

889 C Did you aiiirmatlvaly tall thaa that you did not 

890 want to gat involvad in providing nonay tot azas? 

891 A That subjact navat cama up. Tha ilzst and only 

892 tiaa that subjact avat cama up was whan I had ay initial 

893 convarsations with Koy, and it was navat bzought up or 
89<4 mantionad again. It was not tha iocus oi what wa waza 

895 talking about. It wasn't any way ralatad to what wa wara 

896 talking about. 

897 S Did you spaak by talaphona with fir. Davis in April 

898 of this yaar? 

899 A Probably April or Hay. first I talkad with Tom 

900 Ciahanski. 

901 2 And than you had anothar convarsatlon with Bill 

902 Davis? 

903 A Has it you that I talkad--wa talkad on tha phona . 
90M B So you did hava a convarsatlon with Hr . Davis? 

905 A Yas. about this appaaranoa> and mayba It was--and ii 

906 it was you that I talkad to brlaily about whatavar Tom 

907 Ciahanski had askad ma about. 

908 fi In your talaphona convarsatlon with Hr . Davis, did 

909 you tall him that during your aaatlng with Hr . HoFarlana and 



wissro 



NAME: 
910 
91 
912 
913 
9 11 
915 
916 
917 
918 
919 
920 
921 
922 
923 
92M 
925 
926 
927 
928 
929 
930 
931 
932 
933 
931 



HIR162000 



UNcwssm 



PAGE 38 



Colonel North you told them that you would not gat involved 
m providing money for arras? 

A I nay have--yes. I don't think I ever said that to 
Bud or Ollia, because they never asked na about that. 

fi But did you tell Mr. Davis that you had told them 
that? 

A I don't recall. I think I told Hr . Davis 
that--whatever the focus of all this was, that I had made it 
clear that I wasn't going to do anything, you know, in 
regard to contras or that subject, yes. 

S Did you also tell Ht . Davis that in response to 
such a comment by you to them they responded that they had 
other people doing that? 

A I don't recall that. 

2 You don't recall telling Rr . Davis that? 

A I don't. I don't. I may have, not to say that I 
didn't, but I don't recall that. 

e Hell, does that refresh youz recollection that 
there was such a discussion with Hz. HcFazlane and Colonel 
North? 

A Z never had a discussion with them like that. 

fi You never did? 

A I did with Roy. 

B What did you tell Roy? Has that when you met in 
Pittsburgh or on another occasion? 



\SHWSSW 



40 



NAHE: 
935 
936 
937 
938 
939 
940 
914 1 
942 
9M3 
944 
94S 
9X6 
947 
948 
949 
950 
951 
952 
953 
954 
955 
956 
957 
958 
959 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR162000 lllllll U.^.\irini PAGE 39 

A Oh, I thin!', when we mat in Pittsburgh, because then 
the subject never came up after that. 

Q And did Roy say to you, "'Me have other people 
doing that,'* or words to that eiiect? 

A Well, that I really can't recall. I don't--we never 
really talked about it otherwise. I mean I may have had 
some generic knowledge, you know, myself, that people, you 
know, were doing that. I think I probably was aware that 
that was going on, but I never had any specific discussions 
with McFarlane or North anywhere near that subject, and I 
may have talked with Roy about it. 

e What were you aware that was going on? 

A Hell, I knew there were a lot of groups doing, you 
know, different things for people in Central America. 

2 What did you know about raising money for arms? 

A I didn't really know anything. 

Q Well, you said just a minute ago you knew that was 
going on. 

A Hell, I probably had some generic knowledge that 
I'm sure that there probably were private people out there 
raising money for arms. I had probably seen it in the 
newspaper or on television or something like that. 

fi What about specific knowledge? 

A Ho. I didn't know any, no. 

S No one had contacted you? 



smussw 



41 



KANE' 

960 
961 
962 
963 
964 
96S 
966 
967 
968 
969 
970 
971 
972 
973 
974 
975 
976 
977 
978 
979 
980 
981 
982 
983 
98(4 



mmsm' 



K Ko, n«v«t 

fi W«r* you awaza that anyona alta had nada 
contributions for that purposa? 

A Ho; no. 

S Kou you zafazzad to tha amount oi «>400,000 which 
may hava baan mantionad in tha aaating with HcFazlana and 
Nozth. oz it nay hava baan nantionad latar with Godson. Is 
that cozzact? 

A Yas . Oz nayba avan baioza tha maating. Around 
that tima. 

2 And did you undazstand you uaza baing askad to 
zaisa «MOO,000 oz that was tha goal? 

A That was moza lika tha goal. I aaan you navaz knaw 
in a situation Ilka this what you could zaisa. 

fi Uaza thay asking foz, at laast in part, a pazsonal 
contribution fzoit you? 

A Navaz askad ma foz a pazsonal contzlbution . 

2 You undazstood youz rola was just to ba that oi a 
fund raisaz? 

A Yas. 

2 Hhat was to ba dona with tha aonay? Haza you told? 

A It was to go to suppoztj 

2 But physically, how waza you to gat tha monay 



wussm 



42 



iiNciiissife 



NAME: HIR162000 v*Wh.||W|g I L. L# P*GE 



985 
986 
987 
988 
989 
990 
991 
992 
993 
994 
995 
996 
997 
998 
999 
1000 
1001 
1002 
1003 
1004 
1005 
1006 
1007 
1008 
1009 



A Hell, in the only instance-- 

e Hall. wer« you told at this naeting in tha Hhita 
House? 

A I don't think so. 

2 Hhen were you told? 

A When I probably went and asked Herb if he wanted to 
make a contribution. 

2 All right. Let's then get to that in a second. 
How did the meeting at the White House end? They described 
the need; the naeting went on for about 20 minutes. What 
was the conclusion of the neeting? 

A And after they had said what they had said and X~ 
had said that I would, that was--that was that, and thay went 
to their offices, and I walked out. I think Roy and I 
talked for a little bit in the parking lot, and then I left. 

2 Did you come to Washington just for that meeting? 

A I think I probably did. 

2 And you have no notation of that meeting in any 
calendar ? 

A Ho. 

Q Haran't you concerned about knowing tha right 
address or tha right time? 

A Not while I was told. I can ramaabar that. 

fi You ware told how far ahead? 

A I don't know. Probably a couple of weeks — one or 



mmi\m 



iiNwssife 



NAME: HIR162000 |]|V||| AJ . A .M 9" I ^ fl I PAGE 42 

1010 two weeks 

1011 fi A couple of weeks ahead, and you nada no notation 

1012 of the date or the time? 

1013 A Didn't have to. 

101M 2 Hou did you handle the expenses for that trip--youE 

1015 travel expenses down? Did you charge that to your employer? 

1016 A I doubt it. I'm sure I probably paid for that 

1017 trip. 

1018 fi You flew in from Pittsburgh? 

1019 A I'm--I'm pretty sure I flew. I can't swear that I 

1020 didn't drive. 

1021 2 Did you spend the night? 

1022 A I don't recall. 

1023 Q How do you normally arrange for plana tickets? Do 

1024 you go through a travel agent, or do you arrange your 

1025 reservations directly? 

1026 A It would depend really whether or not my secretary 

1027 would make them directly or whether she would make them 

1028 through one of the people that we use in our office when 

1029 people in the office travel. 

1030 fi Youz secretary normally naKas your reservations? 

1031 X Normally. 

1032 . - 2 So then your travel expenses would be Initially 

1033 charged to the office and then — 
1031 A Ko. 



UNCUSSIBEa 



44 



HIR162000 



UNCLASSinED 



PAGE 43 



HAKE 

1035 2 How would you pay for it? 

1036 A All th«--I would pay ior them all mysalf. 

1037 e On a credit card? ' 

1038 A Most--yes. Probably most all the tine. 

1039 2 American Express, or uhat-- 
lOUO A Probably. 

10M1 I'll tell you, we nay have been billed. I mean she 

10M2 may have called the travel agency, they may have made them, 

1043 and then the travel agency just billed us direct without 

10U(4 using the credit card. 

10<*5 B Us being you individ-- 

lOte A The office or anybody that — yes, me as an 

10<47 individual. 

10M8 2 Going back to the meeting at the Hhlte House, you 

10>49 come out of the meeting, you may talk, or you do talk, with 

1050 Mr. Godson for a while in the parking lot. What was said 

1051 there? 

1052 A I think essentially that was okay, and this is 

1053 fine, and I'll see what I can do. 
lOSU 2 What did you do? 

1055 X Thought about it for a while, talked to some people 

1056 about the possibility of, you know, raising money for this 

1057 or -the--Hell, the subject of it really didn't — mainly just 

1058 thought about it and tried to figure out who — who I would 

1059 approach and-- 



\lHtm«0 



45 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR162000 11 1 1 ULHlJlJ 1 1 I L IJ ^'^^^ ^^ 

1060 2 Did you talk to Mr. Scaifa about it? 

106 1 A No, naver. It turned out not to ba vaty 

1062 successful. 

1063 2 Who did you talk to? 
106(4 A I talked to Heib. 

1065 2 Who else? 

1066 A That's essentially it. I talked to another guy in 

1067 Pittsburgh, but he--he wasn't interested in giving any noney 

1068 to anything that's, you know, listed here. I.e., Inc., or 

1069 whatever. 

1070 2 Now why did you happen to call Herb? 

107 1 A Because he had sone money and because he was always 

1072 a willing giver on different things that--you know, that we 

1073 all supported, and I thought this nay be something that may 
107(« have some interest. 

1075 2 How had you known he was a willing giver? You had 

1076 only seen him two or three times a year. 

1077 A Oh, because he and I had traded off on various 

1078 political fund-raising things for candidates, and whatever I 

1079 knew that he was interested in in the political process, and 

1080 he'd call me, and we'd talk about, you Know, various and 

1081 sundry things. 

1082 . 2 What do you mean, ''trading oii on various 

1083 political"-- 

108>4 A Well, somebody calls and says, ''Will you give 



UNCLASSIFIED 



46 



IINCUSSIFIED 



NAHC: HIR162000 VI'VLflULIll if II PAGE U5 



1085 
1086 
1087 
1088 
1089 
1090 



money to x candidate?' ' and they say yes. Heli, sooner or 
later, you're going to get a call iron then saying, ''Hill 
you give somebody '' --give money to somebody that they 
support . 

e Was Herb a Republican or Democrat? 

A Republican. 



WlASSffl 



47 



NAHEt 
1091 
1092 
1093 
1094 
1095 
1096 
1097 
1098 
1099 
1 100 
1 101 
t102 
1 103 
1 104 
1 105 
1 106 
1 107 
1108 
1109 

I 1 10 

1112 

II 13 



HIR16200( 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE U6 



2 So you thought of calling hin bacausa you knau ha 
had nada various contributions? 

A Yas, and I thought that this night ba a subject 
that would intarast hin, yas . 

2 Why would this intarast hin in particular? 

A I don't know. Probably bacausa ha thought our 
policy in Central Anarica was a good policy and-- 

2 Now you nantionad you talkad to ona othar parson in 
Pittsburgh. Did you talk to only two paopla about this 
aitar naating in tha Uhita Housa with Hr . HcFarlana and 
Colonal Korth and Mr. Godson? 

A For iunds, yas. 

fi What did Mr. Barnass say whan you oallad hin, and 
what did you say to hin? 

A Wall, actually, I nat with hin in Philadelphia. Z 
think wa wara thara for a judicial naating. So Z got hin 
alona. Z think Z nat with hin — 

[Pausa whila Housa Floor balls ring.] 

--it was aithar baiora or aitar our naating. 

B And tha two oi you spoka alona? 

A Yas. 

S Hhnt did you tall hin? 

A I just raviawad tha avants oi naating with Hr . 
HcFarlana and Colonal North and Koy and askad hin ii — ii ha'c 
Ilka to halp. 



DNtussra 



48 



UNCLASSIFIED. 



NAHE: HIR162000 -^ —' "^ '^ u M Wtmtf pnQi 47 

1116 2 What did ha say? 

1117 A Ha said he'd think about it. 

1118 fi When did he tell you he would? 

1119 A Well, I think--I think I got a — I think he said he'd 

1120 think about it, and he said he'd probably help but he didn't 
112 1 know hou nuch, and then I think the next thing I knew I 

1122 piobably called Roy, got the nane of I.e., Inc., called 

1123 Herb's office, gave it to the secretary saying if he wanted 
11214 to make a contribution this was the way the check would be 

1125 made out, and then he sent me a check for «5,000. 

1126 2 So Roy Godson himself gave you the — 

1127 A Yes. 

1128 Q — name of I.e., Inc. And he said just make th* 

1129 check out to I.C, Inc.? 

1130 A Yes. 

1131 Q Now had you known about I.e., Inc. previous to--I 

1132 thought you said you spoke to someone else in Pittsburgh and 

1133 they didn't want to give to I.C, Inc. 

113U A Hell, I think all of this happened at the same 

1135 time--you know, probably within the same couple of weeks, and 

1136 so I had either gotten the name from Roy before I talked to 

1137 Herb or right after I talked to Herb or, you know, 

1138 whatever — somewhere in that time frame — you know, in that 

1139 summer after I had been down here, and I still to this day 
IIMO don't know what it is. 



uNtuissro 



49 



Nine 

1 mi 

1 1142 
1 1i»3 
1 1414 
1 IMS 

1 m6 

1 1«47 
1 IMS 
1 1149 
1 ISO 
1 1S1 
1 152 
1 153 
1 15<4 
1 155 
1156 
1 157 
1 158 
1 159 
1 160 
1161 
1 162 
1 163 
1 16<4 
1 165 



HZlt163000 



UNCUSSIHED 



PAOI 148 




a Old you understand this m*s to b« a t«M-d«ductlbl« 
oontxlbutlon? 

& Ko. 

Q Did Bazn*ss ask li this Mas to b« a daduotlbla 
contribution? 

A I don't think so. 

fi You had no undar standing ona way or tha othar? 

A Ho, I didn't. I didn't. I thought this was hard 
dollars, and I didn't think this was tax daduotlbla. 

2 Hhy wouldn't a contribution to th« 
ba tax daduotlbla? 

A Hall, I think li you maka your chaok out tc 

It would ba tax daduotlbla, but I didn't 
hava any Idaa ona way or tha othar whathar I.C.. Inc. was a 
50Uc)(3) or not. 

fi Old It saaa stranga to you that tha ohack was not 
mada tojj^^Hj^^^^^^^^^^Blf 
monay was balng raisad fox? 

A Hot particularly. 

2 Isn't It aaslar to ralsa funds for tax-daductibla 
puxposas than non-tax-daductlbla purposas? 

A It cartalnly saams to ba . But I didn't know. I 
aa»n tha only thing I knaw. that I.C.> Ino . was an 
offshora — I supposa an offshoxa antity. and that's tha way 
tha monay would gat tol 



wmsffl 



50 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAHE' HIR162000 Ul 1 UUrlUU i I I LU riOI t(9 



1 166 
1167 
1 168 
1 169 
1 170 
1 171 
1 172 
1 173 
1 1714 
1175 
1 176 
1 177 
1178 
1 179 
1180 
1 181 
1 182 
I 183 
1 1814 
1 185 
1 186 
1 187 
1 188 
1 189 
1 190 



8 Mhy did you thlnX It mas an oiishora antlty? 

A Bacaut* I think Roy told aa. 

e Old ha mantlon tha naaa Rlohard Hlllaz? 

I Mot that I racall. 

S rzank Goaaz? 

A Who? 

e rtanX Gomaz. 

A Ko. 

Q Cazl Channall? 

A No. 

fi Hava you avaz sat any oi thosa Individuals? 

A Yas. 

fi Which ona? 

A Cazl Channall. 

fi Whan? 

A I ilzst aat hla back In tha lata WO's oz aazly 
•80*s. 

fi Aza you awaza that ha waa Invelvad In iund zalsing 
foz mattazs zalatlng to Nleazagua? 

A I aa noM. 

fi Hhan did you ilzst laazn that? 

A Raadlng It In tha nawspapaz. 

fi you told Baznass that this Mas to ba a oontzlbution 




itiASsm 



51 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Hxnt> HIX162000 VI ivLaflUUII iLli i''^o> so 

roiB^^^^^H^^^^I you hia althax 

1192 In th« initial aaating ox aitaz you talKad to Oodaon to aak* 

1193 th« ch«ck out to I.e., Inc. 
119U A Yaa. 

1195 fi And Godson mailed th* chaek to you? 

1196 A No. Hazb mailad th« chack to aa , and I aailad it 

1 197 to Roy. 

1198 Q That was ay quastlon. 

1199 A Or gava it to Roy. I probably aailad it. 

1200 fi Ha aailad it-- 

1201 A I'a pratty sura I aailad it. 

1202 fi But it caaa through you? 

1203 A Yas. 

120<« fi Barnass gava it to you 

1205 A Yas. 

1206 fi Ona May or tha othar. 

1207 A Yas. 

1208 fi And you baliava you sant it diraotly to Godson? 

1209 A Yas, I think I did. 

12 10 ni. rRYHAN: I ask tha raportax to aaxk this 

1211 doeuaant as Slaasa Daposition KKhibit 1 for Idantiiication. 

12 12 (Tha following doeuaant was aaxkad as Slaasa 

1213 . . Daposition EKhibit 1 fox Idantifioation< 1 

12 14 **M*M»»»* COHHITTK INSXKT ««««x«»«*« 



\lHtmsW 



52 



mssim 



NAME- HIR162000 

1215 BY MR. FRYHAH-- 

1216 S nr . Slease, I show you Deposition Exhibit 1 ioz 

1217 Identification. Is that a copy of the check that Mr. 
12 18 Barness sent to you? 

12 19 A I assune it is. yes. 

1220 e KoH the date on that check. I believe, is November 

1221 4. 1985. Is that correct? 

1222 A Yes. 

1223 2 Now I believe you indicated that your meeting with 
122M Mr. McFarlane and Colonel North was within a few weeks of 

1225 that date. 

1226 A Hell, looking at the date of the heck, I'm pretty 

1227 cer--well. I'm certain that I met with Hr . HcFarlane and 

1228 Colonel North--I know it was nice out. so I'm assuming it was 

1229 the early--you know, the early summer, and then when I net 

1230 with Herb, it was probably around one of our judicial 

123 1 meetings, and I--it runs in my mind that that was probably 

1232 later on in the summer. It may have been--it may have been 

1233 in the fall. I don't remember, though, the time that 
123U elapsed between when I talked to Herb and when I got the 

1235 check. 

1236 2 When you received the check from him, did you 

1237 notice that he had written ''contribution'* on the check? 

1238 A I'm sure I did. 

1239 fi Did you have any understanding with Hr . Barness 



UNCLASSIFIED 



53 



KAME: HIR1620( 



12M0 
1241 
12H2 
1243 
1244 
124S 
1246 
1247 
1248 
1249 
12S0 
1251 
1252 
1253 
1254 
1255 
1256 
1257 
1258 
1259 
1260 
1261 
1262 
1263 
1264 



UNCUSSIFIEO"' " 



that you would reimburse hin for this anountl 

X Ho. 

2 Did you ever reimburse him? 

A Ko. 

2 Do you know if any of the Scaife interests 
reimbursed hira in any way for that? 

A Oh. heavens, no. They didn't know anything about 
it. 

2 Now was that *5.000 contribution the oniy funds you 
were able to raise following your meeting in the White House 
with Mr. McFarlane and Colonel North? 

A Well, there were some other funds raised by other 
people . 

2 Who were they? 

A Mr. John Hirtle. 

2 How do you spell that name? 

A H-I-R-T-L-E. 

2 Who else? 

A Who exactly he contacted. I'm pretty certain that 
they did raise money for — wall, I don't know whether it went 
to I.e., Inc. or not. I can't--I can't be sure of telling 
you that, so I don't know that. But he had called me. and I 
said, ''Well, here's the project,'' and he indicated that he 
had some interest. 

2 Who called you? 



umnssffl 



54 



NAME 
1265 
1266 
1267 
1268 
126< 
1270 
127 
1272 
1273 
12711 
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1276 
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1282 
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128M 
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1286 
1287 
1288 
128< 



HIR162000 



iinmim 



John Hirtle. 



2 And who is he? 

A He is a broker at Goldnan, Sachs in Philadelphia. 

C Do you have some business relationship with him? 

A He's my broker. 

2 He's your broker. So did he call you with respect 
to the business relationship? 

A This particular time, I think he called and just 
said, you know, ''I've been seeing all this stuff about 
Central America and the problems out there, and we've got 
to. you know, try to help them keep the communists out of 
Central America' ' --that kind of stuff, and he said, ''You"'ra 
familiar with these things, and is there any way I can 
help?'' and I essentially said. ''Hell, you've called at the 
right time . ' ' 

2 Had you told him that you were going to meet-- 

A Ko, no. It just, like, dropped out of the sky. 

2 Just a coincidence? 

A Yes . 

2 Did you put him in touch with Hr . Godson? 

A Yes. 

2 Do you know if they met? 

A I know they talked, and whether they physically 
met--he may have come down here; I'm not certain. 

2 Do you know if Mr. Hirtle met with anyone in the 



iiHtussro 



55 



NAME: 
1290 
1291 
1292 
1293 
129U 
1295 
1296 
1297 
1298 
1299 
1300 
1301 
1302 
1303 
1304 
1305 
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1311 
1312 
1313 
1314 



HIR162000 



ihlte Hous 



.. UNCLASSIFIEO 



PAGE 514 



A Wall, I know he met with Colonel North, but they 
didn't meet in the White House, to the best of my knowledge. 

e Well, I meant any employee of the White House. 

A He met with Colonel North. 

2 And it's your understanding that Mr. Hirtle raised 
some money? 

A I think so, yes. 

2 Do you know how much? 

A Less than a hundred. I think. No, I'm not certain, 
because I didn't — I sort of was out of it, and they were 
going . 

2 And was that paid to I.e., Inc. also? 

A That I don't know. I really don't know. 

2 How do you know this? Did Hirtle tell you? 

A That they raised money? 

2 Yes . 

A Yes. 

fi Who do you understand contributed whatever it was 
that he raised? 

A I really don't remember who they — who they talked to 
or who they got it from, but it's — it's my recollection that 
they did raise some money. I know he talked to some people, 
and I--I'm not 100 percent certain that they raised money. 
but I'm pretty sure that they did. 



UNClASSlflEO 



56 



UNcussro 



KAME: HIR162000 ^ ' * VUnUU 1 1 I L IJ*°^ ^^ 

1315 2 Are you aware of any oth«z funds that w*ra raisad? 

1316 A For I.e., Inc. or any of this stuff on hare, no. 

1317 e Hell, "'by any of this stuff on here,*' I'n really 

1318 talking about any funds that were raisad for the purposes 

1319 that were generally described by Ilr . Godson and nr . 

1320 McFarlane and Colonel North. I nean you've described the 

1321 $5,000 you raised from Mr. Barnass, and you've described the 

1322 monies that Mr. Hirtla raisad. Now are you aware of any 

1323 other funds that were raised for those general purposes? 
132U A That ' s--that's hard to say. I'm aware of some funds 

1325 that were raised, but I don't have any idea Hhat--Hhat 

1326 happened to them. 

1327 2 What are you thinking of? 

1328 A Hell, there were soma funds that were donated to 

1329 the Heritage Foundation. 

1330 2 Has this «100,000? 

133 1 A Yes, that were for the purposes of--you know, of a 

1332 grant to tha--through the foundation, and after that I don't 

1333 have any specific knowledge as to what happened to them. 
13314 2 Has this money that was sought by Hz. Godson? 

1335 A No. 

1336 e Or was he involved in any way with that grant? 

1337 . . A Not in the — not really in the solicitation of the 

1338 grant. Not in the solicitation of tha grant. 

1339 2 Hho made the grant? 



UNCLASSIHED 



57 



NtnE< 

13U0 

13U 

13(«2 

13143 

1 3<4<4 

13M5 

13146 

13147 

13148 

1349 

13S0 

13S 

1352 

1353 

13514 

1355 

1356 

1357 

1358 

1359 

1360 

1361 

1362 

1363 

136U 



UNcussie 



HIX162000 WlfULnUllll iril PIGS 56 

A It can* iron an Individual in Pittsburgh. 

fi Who Mas It? 

A Hz. John r. Donahua. 

fi D-0-M-A-H-U-I? 

A Yas, I think so. 

Q How do you know about that grant? 

A Bacausa I want and talkad to Jack. 

e Why? 

A Bacausa ha ' s a long-tiaa and big supportar oi 



fi So was this somathlng you did as a rasult of your 
maating at tha Hhlta Sousa? 

A Yas. 

fi Why didn't ha contrlbuta «100.000 to I.C., Inc.? 

A I don't think ha had any Intarast in doing that. 

Q Was that discussad? 

A I don't think so. I raally don't think so. 

fi How did tha Hazitaga Foundation gat Involvad? 

A Hall> ha wantad to do somathlng to halp, bacausa I 
had askad li ha wantad to do soaathlng to halp, and wa sort 
oi sattlad on tha fact that mayba tha bast way to do it 
would ba glva aonay to tha Harltaga Foundation and hopaiully 
thay could do somathlng to halp tha situation in Cantral 

h a 1 p a d^^^HH^^^^^^^B b y 
research and, you know, policy analysis and stuii Ilka that. 



mussra 



58 



iiNwssm 



HAHEi HII1162000 lllllll M.^.Mrl T 1 1 PIGI 57 



1365 
1366 
1367 
1368 
1369 
1370 
1371 
1372 
1373 
1374 
1375 
1376 
1377 
1378 
1379 
1380 
1381 
1382 
1383 
138(4 
1385 
1386 
1387 
1388 
1389 



that uas--that was a good anough raason. 

fi Did you discuss this with soaaona at tha Harltaga 
foundation? 

A Z may hava talkad to Ed Faulnat vary bxlaily, and Z 
talkad uith John Von Kannon, tha traasuxar> just to lat tham 
know that a grant was coalng down and what it would ba . 

2 What did you and Faulnat say in your eonvaxsatlon? 

A Z raally don't racall. axoapt that Jaok Donahua was 
going to giva •100,000 to Harltaga to halpl 

and that thay would taka It iroa 
thaxa as far as what would ba tha bast way to--you know, bast 
way to do it. 

fi Did you tall hia Godson had baan Involvad in this? 

A Z told hi* that Z had talkad to Roy, Z think. Z 
probably did. 

fi Did you suggast ha spaak to Godson? 

A Z think Roy and Z daoidad that Roy would spaak to 
Ed. 

fi Did Roy suggast that you oall Faulnar? 

A Oh, gosh, Z don't know whathaz it's a aattar ei 
suggasting or not. Z aaan obviously li soaabody is going to 
sand soaabody 4100,000, you just daeida to lat hia know. So 
Z d«n*t know whathar — who daeidad what. Z think wa both 
mutually daeidad that wa'd call hla and tall hia that it was 
coamg . 



wmsw 



Hxnt 

1390 
1391 
1392 
1393 
13914 
139S 
1396 
1397 
1398 
1399 

moo 

1U01 
1l»02 
m03 
1M0U 

mos 

11406 
11407 
11408 
1409 
lUlO 
1141 1 
1412 
lUU 

mm 




HIR162000 liaill.f '1 '^ \ f 1*1 &> If'^I^E 58 

ow had you knoun'^v 

k Oh, I've known him for, I don't know, 10 or 12 
years. I've known him since 1974 or 'S. 

2 Do the Scaife Foundations contribute money to the 

Heritage Foundation? 

A Oh, yes. 

e So you've known hia through that relationship. 

A Yes. 

2 Is that the basic-- 

A That's the basis oi it. 

2 Did you tell Feulner that another contribution was 

going to I.C., Inc.? 

A I don't think so. 

2 Did you mention-- 

A What other contribution? 

2 The Barness contribution. 

A Oh, I doubt it. Ko . I'm sure I didn't. 

2 Now speaking to Feulner, you mentioned Godson, you 
believe . 

A Probably. 

2 Did you mention Xntexnational Business 
Communications ? 

A Hhat's that? 

2 Hell, by your answer I take it you did not. 

A IBH? 




60 



1U15 
1416 
14 17 
lU 18 
mi9 
1420 
1421 
1422 
1423 
1424 
1425 
1426 
1427 
1428 
1429 
1430 
1431 
1432 
1433 
1434 
143S 
1436 
1437 
1438 
1439 



UNCLASSIFIED" 



NAME HIR162000 HSVIll H.^.M T I T I l»GE 59 



2 No, IBC--International Business Communications. 

A No, I've no idea who they axe. 

2 Richard Hiller? 

A No . I mean I've read about Kichard Hiller in the 
paper 

2 Recently? 

A Yes, recently. I didn't have any idea who he was. 

2 So you did not mention him-- 

A No. 

2 --to Feulner when you spoke with him? 

A No. I'm sure no. 

2 Now other than Donahue and Bazness, who did you 

speak to about contributions aiter your meeting with 
HcFarlane and North? 

A Nobody. 

2 Just those two? 

A Yes. 

2 You mentioned-- 

A Other than Hirtle. obviously. 

2 Right. I thought you mentioned a Pittsburgh lawyer 
earlier . 

A No. 

e Hell, you mentioned someone in Pittsburgh you spoke 
to that did not want to give to I.e., Inc. 

A That was Jack Donahue. 



wussw 



61 



NAHZ< 

iimo 

mm 

1>4M2 

mits 

1(4(4 (4 
1(4(45 
1<4<46 
1(447 
1(448 
1(4(49 
1(450 
1(451 
1(452 
1(453 

1(45(4 

m55 

1(456 
1(457 
1(458 
1(459 

meo 

11461 

1(462 
1U63 
1(46(4 




fi That was 

k li tha subjact oi I.e.. Ino . oa«a up. I aaan Z, 
you know--it may hava . 

fi What did Donahua — what Is Donahua's occupation? 

A Ha was tha chaliaan oi a company callad Fadaratad 
Invastots which was bought by Aatna. and Z think ha still 
tuns tha whola Pittsburgh opaxatlon. bacausa It's called--I 
don't know, nayba It's still callad Fadaratad. 

e Aitar yout maatlng with Hx . HoFatlana and Colonal 
North, you than succaadad in causing a 4100,000 grant to tha 
Hatitaga foundation and a «5,000 contribution fioa Hr . 
Barnass to Z.C., Inc., and you in soaa way wara rasponslbla 
for raising this with Hr . Hirtla, and ha than contactad 
othar paopla about contributions, and you ballava that's-- 

A Hall, Z did that — thasa two on my own, but, you 
know, tha contribution froa Jack, Z think Jack Donahua had 
givan to Haritaga Foundation baiora and was vary faniliar 
with — with thalr works. Hhat all tha motivations wara, you 
know, for hlB--you know, Z don't know, but ha was cartainly 
willing to glva than monay. hopaiully that thay could halp 
tha sltuatlor 




a Klght. Othar than thosa thxaa — Rlxtla, Donahua, and 
Kaxnass — what othar contributions wara a rasult oi your 



iiNsmsM 



62 



Hint 

1U65 
1*466 

me? 

11468 

m69 

1M70 

m7i 

1M72 

m73 

1U7M 
1147S 
11476 
1(477 
11178 
1««79 
1(480 

lusy 

1(482 
1(483 
m8(4 
1(485 
11486 
1«487 
1(488 
1il89 



Mmm 



HZK162000 

A Wall, Hhat*v«r--what«var aonlas John Hlrtl* ralsad 
M«t« a tasult oi that. Hothing alsa that Z know of. 
fi All right. Why didn't you conttibuta aonay 
youzsalf ? 

A Couldn't aiiotd it. I was navar askad. 
HR. FRYHAK: Oif tha lacord. 
[ Racass . ] 

MR. FRYMAN: Lat's go back on tha tacozd. 
BY MR. FRYHAN: 
& nz. Slaasa, I hava a iaw iollou-up quastions, and 
than I ballava Hz. Olivar ulll hava a i»M quastions> and Hz. 
Buck may hava a iaw quastions. Ha'll tzy to finish — 
A Ko problaa. 
fi --in a half-hour, ii wa can. 

In your aaatings with Hr . Godson. Hz. HcFarlana, 
and Colonal Kozth, 
^^^^^H Mas thara any nantion of a Fathaz DoMling in any of 
thasa maatings? 
A No. 

2 Hava you avaz haard oi Fathar Dowllng, or Toa 
DoMllng? 

A Yas. 
. ■ S Hava you avaz haard oi him othaz than in prass 



raports? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



63 



IINCUSSIFIEO .. 



NAME: HIR162000 W] V iJ£„nUlJ IS I 11 fj PAGE 62 
m90 2 What weta those occasions? 

1U91 A Actually, I have never seen any press reports. All 

1492 I know is that John Hirtle knows him. 
1U93 e What did he tell you about hin? 

1U9I4 A That he knows him. I think he thought that I knew 

T»95 him. whoever he was or anything. I really-really don't. 

m96 The only thing I got from John was that somehow he was 

1497 active m Central America, very interested in it--put it that 

1M98 way, more interested in it, and that ' s--that ' s all I know. 

1499 e What was the occasion when John told you that ha 

1500 knew Dowling? 

150 1 A I think he wanted ma to meat him. This was within 

1502 the last--last year, last six months, last three 

1503 months--something like that. 

1504 Q Did John indicate, or did Hr . Hirtle indicate, that 

1505 he had been raising any money for Father Dowling? 

1506 A Hot that I know of; no, he did not. 

1507 2 I take it you have not met Father Dowling. 

1508 A No. not to my knowledge. 

1509 S You mentioned earlier a dinner you attended when 

1510 you sat next to William Casey. What was that dinner? 

1511 A NSIC has programs that they run hare in Washington. 

1512 maybe one avary--I don't know-three months or a couple of 

1513 times a year, where they have speakers come in and talk 
15 14 about issues that mainly. I guess, related to foreign 



fcUSS® 



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UNCmSSIflED,.., 



63 



NAME: 

1515 policy, and, you know, the speaker starts at, like, U 

1516 o'clock or 430, and they go on for an hour, and there are 

1517 questions and answers, and then they have a--in this case 

1518 then, they had a small dinner that started at 6=00 or 6-30 
15 19 and was over at 8=00, something like that, and he was there 
1520 among others, and it just happened that I was sitting next 
152 1 to him. I can't recall whether there were place cards or 

1522 not. 

1523 2 So this was not a fund-raising dinner? 

1S2>4 A No, no. It was a lecture, questions and answers. 

1525 and then--since they had everybody there, a small dinner to 

1526 which they invited some people to stay, and I was in town 

1527 that night, and so I came. 

1528 fi Did Hr . Casey speak on that occasion? 

1529 A Ho. 

1530 fi Do you recall-- 

1531 A I don't recall who the speaker was, actually. 

1532 2 How large a group was this? 

1533 A Well, I — I don't know. It was probably a fairly 
153M decent crowd. They maybe had 80/120 there for the lecture, 

1535 and then the dinner was, I think, maybe 20/2tt. 

1536 fi Uhat did you understand was the reason why you were 

1537 invited to the dinner other than the fact that you were 

1538 staying in town that night? 

1539 A Oh, it was--well, they just would invite me as they 



wtus«^ 



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PAGE 6<« 



would anybody aJlsa who is oonnactad with giving than funds, 
bacausa thasa ara what tha funds aza usad for, to put on 
saminazs and talks lika this, of this typa . So I'm sura, 
along with all tha othaz trustaas on tha foundation, thay 
all got an invitation, and I was going to ba in Washington 
and said I'd stay ovar, you know, for--for this and coma to 
tha dinnaz. 

e You'va dascribad various convarsations and maatings 
with rtr . Godson with raspact to raising funds for^^^H 

and you'va 

dascribad funds that you wara diractly or indiractly 
tasponsibla for raising as a rasult of your maatings with" 
Godson and Mr. HcFarlana and Colonal North. Ara you awara 
of any othar funds that Mr. Godson is diractly or indiractly 
zesponsibla for raising othar than tha onas you raisad with 
t o ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ft K i c a r a g u a ? 

A No. 

fi Did ha avar tall you about any othar — 

k No. 

fi — fund-raising afforts? 

A No, not that I racall. 

HK. mynAN: I ask tha raportar to mark as Slaasa 
Saposition Exhibit 2 for Idantif Ication a subpoana of tha 
Housa commlttaa. 

(Tha following doeumant was markad as Slaasa 



mwm 



66 



NAME^ HIR162000 
1S65 
1S66 



ONCLASSIFIED .... •• 

Deposition Exhibit 2 for Idantif ication: ) 
xxxxxxxxx COHHITTEE IKSERT «»«*«»*««* 



wiRSie 



67 



NAME: HIR162C 



UNWSSIFIED •• 



1567 
1568 
1569 
1570 
1571 
1572 
1573 
1574 
1575 
1576 
1577 
1578 
1579 
1580 
1581 
1582 
1583 
158it 
1585 
1586 
1587 
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1589 
1590 
1591 



MR. FRYMAN: The subpoena is dated May 14, 1987, 
and it's directed to Mr. Slease. 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 

2 Is that a copy of the subpoena that was served on 
you , Mr . Slease ? 

A The cover page is the sane. 

B And there's an attachment to the subpoena that 
calls for production of documents? 

A It looks to be an exact copy. 

Q Now have you caused a search to be made of your 
files for the materials called for in the attachments to the 
subpoena? 

A Yes, I have. 

2 Have you located any materials responsive to that 
subpoena? 

A No. No; I have nothing. 

2 Do you Know Tom Cantrell, Mr. Slease? 

A Yes. 

2 Hho is Tom Cantrell? 

A Gosh, he's somebody I've known probably since 197<4. 
I don't know what he's doing now. He was involved in 
political and charitable activities here on the Hill. 

fi Has he in the Congressional Relations Department at 
the Department of Energy at some point? 

A Could have been. I really don't recall. He could 



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1S9S 
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16 10 
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have been. He had a bunch oi different things. 

C What's the otigin of your friendship with hin? 

A He was working either for, X guess, the House Study 
Coramittae--House Republican Study Committee, the Committee 
for Survival of a Free Congress, maybe for Heritage 
Foundation when it started up. That's how I first met him. 
in conjunction with meeting all those people in those 
activities. Then he had his own public relations firm. 
Then he maybe was in the Government, with Energy, and I 
haven't seen or talked with him for a couple of years. 

fi Did you ever discuss Central America policy and 
Hicaragua--and/or Nicaragua with Mr. Cantrell? 

A I've got into discussion with politics, I'm sure. 

2 Did you ever have any discussions with Faith 
Whittlesey about the nellon-Scaif e organization funding a 
program to generate public opinion support for 
administration policies in Central America? 

A Well, let's see. She was running that stuff for 
the President on Central America when she was public liaison 
to the White House. I'm probably sure that it came up, but 
we never gave any money, to the best of my knowledge, for 
anything like that. 

8 Did you tell hex that you wanted Cantrell to be 
involved in such a program? 

A Oh, gosh. That rings some vague bell if we were 



UfJCLASSIFIED 



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Mmim •■ 



MAnE: HIR162000 ^'"Vkll^lJII ft || fkGZ 68 

1617 going to do anything. That does ring a ball. Was ha 

1618 working for h«i? That rings a vagu« ball, but I raally 

1619 can't--! really can't recall whether--! don't think we did 

1620 fund anything like that, to the best of my knowledge, but ! 

1621 can't--! can't be certain. ! don't recall any specific 

1622 grants to something like that. ! do recall having--talklng 

1623 to her about Tom, but that was a long time ago. 
16214 2 Would that be in 1983? 

1625 A Well, if it's when she was in tha White House, it 

1626 probably would have been there, yes, but I don't — there 

1627 wasn't any significance that ! attached to it, certainly 

1628 nothing in relation to any of this. 

1629 2 Did you discuss with Whittlesey on any occasion a 

1630 «1 , 000-a-plate fund-raiser to generate funds for a public 

1631 relations campaign with respect to Central America? 

1632 A God. ! don't recall. ! don't recall. 

1633 MR. FRYMAN: nr . Slease, ! believe Mr. Oliver has 
163(4 some questions at this point. 



yflCLASSiHED 



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leuo 

16U 1 
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MR. OLIVER: Yes. I'll try to keep it brief, just 
to clarify some things. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 

2 Mr. Slease. earlier you mentioned that Mr. Godson 
did something with the HSC and that's why you assuned that 
he would know Mr. HcFarlane and so on. What was it that he 
did with the KSC? 

A Exactly, I don't know. 

2 Did he tell you that he had sone association with 
thera? 

A Yes. I think I came to know that generically over 
my period of time of--of knowing Roy and that he did some 
work for the NSC, but specifically what h« did. he never 
told me. 

2 When you went to the meeting with HcFarlane and 
North, did you and Mr. Godson go to the White House 
together? 

A I think he was already there, so I think I walked 
in by myself. I'm not sure. 

2 Does he, to your knowledge, have a White House pass 
or an ident--Government identification card of some kind that 
allows him access? 

A Specifically, the only thing I've ever seen on him 
IS the little chain that everybody gets when you work there, 
but he may have had a picture on his. I--that's really hard 



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166 

1662 

1663 

166K 

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1667 

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1669 

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1671 

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U 

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ior m« to say. Ha navat showad na anything and said, "Thlj 
is ay pass in and out oi tha Whlta Kouaa,'' ot Mhatavax. 

fi Do you know whathar or not ha has any affiliation 
With any U.S. Covarnmant agancy or antity? 

A Hall, as I just statad, I'm undat tha iapxassion 
that ha has an affiliation with NSC. 

e Doas ha hava, to your knowladga, any affiliation 
with tha CIA? 

A Hot that I Know of. 

fi Hava you avar had any affiliation with tha CIA? 

A No. 

C You'va navar uorkad with tha CIA? 

A No. 

S Did you know that Hz. Godson was on tha CIA 
transition taaii for tha Raagan adainistration? 

A Oh, I may hava Known that. 

2 But you don't know whathaz ha had any affiliation 
or ralationship with thaa othar than that? 

A I ' va navar known that ha's workad for tha CIA, no. 

S Hhan you wara asKad by Hr . Godson if you would ba 
to assi^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m did ha aantion any 
ts in connaction with 




ilMSSIFIED 



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MAKE' 

1685 

1686 

1687 

168 

168 

169 

1691 

1692 

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17014 

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1707 

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PAGE 71 



fi Did h* tall you h* knat 
A No. 

fi Did h« tall you that ha had baan halpinj 
:hiough lalslng funds foi 




A Not--no. Tha first tima tha subjact avar caaa up 
abou^^^^^^^^^^^ was whan ha asked ma. as I lalatad eailieii 
if I'd ba willing to halp laisa sona funds, you know, to 
help then m soma manner. Ha did tall ma that ha was 
already engaged In or not engaged In, you know, anything 
Ilka that. 

S Had Mr . Godson avar asked you to raise funds for 
any projects before? 

A No, not that I recall. 

C Was it unusual for him to ask you to raise funds 
f o I ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H? you an 

request? 

A I don't think so. I mean it was--lt could have comi 
from. I don't know, I guess maybe any number of people. I 
didn't think it was unusual to come from — from Roy. 

fi You mentioned that you went to the offices of NSIC 
when you were in Washington, and you indicated that it was 
in your capacity as a board member of the foundation or 
foundations that ware giving grants to NSIC. 



uNCiASsra 



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A Yes 

2 Which foundations were those? 

A The Sara Scaiie Foundation and the Carthage 
Foundation . 

2 They were both giving grants to NSIC? 

A I think money cane out of both of them at one point 
or another, yes. 

2 Do you know how much money those foundations gave 
to KSIC? 

A They were varying amounts, whataver--you know, they 
followed the same procedures like the United Hay or the 
opera, the museum, or something like that. They'd subait a 
proposal, and they had a number attached to it, and thay 
varied . 

2 Did you know that Herbert Barness contributed money 
to Faith Whittlesey's representation fund in Berne? 

A I read that in the newspaper. 

2 He never told you that? 

A I don't think until after it cane out in the 
newspaper. I don't know. He nay have. I don't know. 

fi Hhen you went to Switzerland in December of 1985, 
what was the purpose of your trip? 

A I was taking a week's vacation and had one, two, 
three, four, five other people that were going with ne on 
various parts of the trip, and when we went to — to Berne, I 



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NAME^ HIR162000 



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1736 

1737 

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1750 

1751 

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1755 

1756 

1757 

1758 

1759 



took them to see Faith, you know, to meet her, because they 
had never met her before, and she had a dinner Mith, I don't 
know, some Americans and mainly Suiss . 

2 It uas a vacation trip, the whole trip to Europe? 
A Yes. 

2 For all of the people that were traveling with you? 
A To the best of my knowledge. 
2 Where did you go besides Berne? 
A Berne, Zurich, Paris, and London. 
2 At the dinner which she held for you, there were a 
number of people, and I'd like to ask you to identify them, 
if you would. 

A If I can, sure. 

2 Dr and Mrs. Stephan Schmidheiny. 

A The first time I ever met them was there. He was 
a--to the best of my knowledge, he uas a very well-to-do, 
influential, young business person in Switzerland. 
2 Dr. and Hrs. George Segal. 
A I don't recall who they are. 

2 Dr. Alfred Wiederkehr . J 

A Freddy Wiederkehr is a lawyer in Zurich. I 

2 A friend of yours? | 

A Mo. It uas the first time I had ever met him. He 
uas a friend of other people who uere there. I think he uas 
the lawyer of some of the younger people who were there. 



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75 



HIR162000 



mtmmB 



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714 



2 Oi people who ueze with you or people in--Swiss? 

A Swiss--Swiss nationals. 

2 Dr. and Mrs. Rudolf Spruengli. 

A I think they own one of the larger chocolate 
companies there in Switzerland. The first time I had ever 
met them. 

2 Hr . and Mrs. Donald Hess. 

A I don't--I can't recall who he is. 

2 Mr. and Mrs. Ernst Harquardt. 

A I can't recall who they are. 

2 Mrs. Beatrice Burchler-Keller . 

A I can't recall who she is. 

2 Mr. and Mrs. Beat Jordi. 

A I can't recall who they are. 

Don't tell them all I said this. 

2 No, no. 

nr . and Mrs. William Jadden. 

A I can't recall. 

2 Mr. and Mrs. Christoph Malms. 

A Yes, I know who they are. 

2 Mho are they? 

k Chris and Sigrid Halms, they are friends of other 
friends of mine, Swiss nationals. Well, I don't know. They 
may be German. She's German. Her family owns the Adidas 
company . 



Bsussra 



76 



UNCUSSiFlEO 



NAHE^ HIR162000 

1785 2 He. and Mrs. Hans Bodraer . 

1786 A They were also younger friends oi other friends of 
1 787 mine . 

1788 2 Do you know what they do--what Mr. Bodner does? 

1789 A They're very well-to-do. I can't tell you exactly 

1790 what Hans' business is. 

1791 2 nr. and Mrs. Michael Pieper, P-I-E-P-E-R. 

1792 A They're younger friends of--of other friends of mine 

1793 who were there. 

179U 2 Are they Americans or-- 

1795 A Mo. These are--the Piepers are--no: they're Swiss. 

1796 2 Mr. Stefan Sten Olsson. 

1797 A He's another friend of a friend of nine who was 

1798 there. 

1799 2 Who was your friend that he was a friend of? 

1800 A Scott Miller. All these guys had sone connection, 
180 1 because they all went to Wharton Business School or 

1802 something like that. They had never been to the embassy. 

1803 2 Mr. and Mrs. Hilliam Vandermack. 
180M A They were friends of mine. 

1805 fi They were from Pennsylvania? 

1806 A Yes. How they live in Maryland, but they were from 

1807 Pittsburgh then. 

1808 2 Mr. and Mrs. Scott Miller. 

1809 A He's from Philadelphia. 



HdOU i-^ 



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HXnl HIR162000 -— 'wtf f^^ pji(jj 74 



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181 1 
1812 
1813 
181(4 
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1818 
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1821 
1822 
1823 
182M 



1826 
1827 
1828 
1829 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 
183M 



S Ha was tiavallng with you? 

A I mat him ovat thata. All thasa youngat Swiss ara 
iilands oi Scott's, bacausa thay waia all In school 
togathai, and Scott's In tha invastmant buslnass, and ha 
knaw them, and, you know, thay had--thalz iamlllas knaw aach 
othai . 

fi Ha's a iiiand oi yours? 

A Yas. 

e What doas Hi. Miliar do? 

A Ha's now in--wall, ha works for Goldman. Sachs now 
m Kew York in, I guass, Invastmant banking. 

e Has ha avar baan Involvad In any way, to your 
knowladga, m fund raising for Cantral Amarlca causas oi any 
Kind? 

A Hall, ha knaw about this thing wltl 



1823;^^^^^H but I don't know that Scott avar want out and did 



any iund raising Ilka John did. I don't know whathar ha 
want with <John whanavar John callad on anybody or not. I 
can't — I don't raally racall whathar ha did or not. 

Q And othars who wara thara that night. Hr . and Hrs . 
Jim Shlnn. 

A Ha was tha DCH. 

fi Hr. and Hrs. Grag Passlc. 

A I don't--can't racall who thay aza . 

2 Hiss Hattla Sharplass. 



mmim 



78 



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KAHE: HII1162000 w ' - '^ -" - " "^ pjKjB 77 



183S 
1836 
1837 
1838 
1839 
18U0 

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ieM2 
18143 
I814M 
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18146 
1847 
1848 
1849 
1850 
1851 
1852 
1853 
1854 
1855 
1856 
1857 
1858 
1859 



A Sh« was a black gltl, to th« b«st of ay 
racollaction. but I don't know who sha was. 

S Hx . and Hrs. Jo* Hayas . 

A Ha was somabody that was attaehad to tha ambassy. 

2 Hi. Robait Railly. 

A Bob Railly I know. 

S How do you know Hi. Railly? 

A I just--I probably know hia through Faith, nat hia 
down hera. 

S You said that Hr . Nillar knaw about | 
^^^^^Biund raising. How did ha know? 

A Ha and John Hirtla wata in partnarship within tha 
Goldnan, Sachs partnarship, and wa wara all iriands, you 
know, ior--wall, for yaars. and quita good fxiands sinca tha 
aarly '80's, and so whan John had callad aa and said, ''Hey, 
you know, I raally--is thara anything I can do?'' and I said 
''Uall, I'va got this projact for you,'' obviously, wa 
talkad to Scott about it, too. 

2 And what did Scott say? 

A It saaaad lika a good idaa. 

fi Did ha raisa soaa aonay fox thai 

A I don't--! don't xacall that ha did. actually. As 
say, ay racollaction was John pxobably aada aoxa of tha 
calls, such as thay waxa. whatavax thay aada. I don't know 
what nuabar thay aada, or how aany, or spaclfic dollars. I 



UNCIASSIFIED 



79 



UNEUSSiFO '■. ■ 



HAME^ HIR162000 

1860 don' t--other than :ust bamg vary int«r«sted as--you Knou, as 

1861 a citizen. 

1862 S Doas h« tiaval to Euiopa of tan--nr . Hillai? 

1863 A I don't know. I mean I knou ha ' s gona a coupla of 
186<4 tines . 

1865 2 To? 

1866 A Probably--w«ll , I shouldn't asauma anything, but I 

1867 knou that he's bean a coupla of tinas to saa, you knou, 

1868 school fziands in Suitzazland and I think to saa Stefan m 

1869 London. 

1870 e Do you know uhathaz ha »vz attamptad--discussad 
187 1 raising funds for Central Aaarica with any of his friends in 

1872 Europe? 

1873 A Oh, gosh. I know wa had--I shouldn't say iie--I knou 
187U that there ware discussions with these people about--you 

1875 knou, about Central America, but I don't recall any--any 

1876 specific thing on raising — raising funds for anything--any 

1877 funds. 

1878 2 These discussions took place at that dinner that 

1879 evening? 

1880 A Oh, at that dinner, no, I don't really recall 

1881 anything specific on that. That dinner was — was a get- 

1882 acquainted dinner for a lot of people that probably had a 

1883 coiiBOn interest in a myriad of things, so they uould all get 
188U to know each other, so they could get to know our Ambassador 



80 



HAHE. HI11162000 Ulf ULAuuIi IlU '*" " 

1885 thai*, and so that I could maat Soott'a friends and 

1886 whatavai, but I don't think — tha puxposa of tha dinnar was 

1887 not to hit up anybody for funds or for anything lika that; 

1888 It was for avarybody to gat to know aach othar and hava a 

1889 good tma . 

1890 fi You stayad at tha rasidanca whan you wara thara 

1891 during that visit, did you not? 

1892 A Yas, I did. 

1893 2 Did you avar discuss fund raising for Cantral 
18914 Amarica with Ambassador Uhittlasay? 

1895 A Wall. I don't know. Gaa . in a ganaric sansa. wa 

1896 talkad a lot about Cantral Asarica. Europa, and uhatavar.' 

1897 As far as gatting up any spaoifio program to raisa funds for 

1898 Cantral Amarica with har, I don't raally racall that. no. 

1899 Q Did you tall Hrs. Hhittlasay that you wara raising 

1900 monay or had raisad monay for) 
190 1 ^^^^^^ 

1902 A I raally can't racall whathar I did or not. I 

1903 would sort of doubt it. but I may hava — but I may hava. 
190(4 e Old you tall har that Hr . Barnass had contributed 

1905 to this causa? 

1906 A I doubt that vary much. 

1907 fi Did you know that Hr . Barnass was a friand of 

1908 Ambassador Hhittlasay? 

1909 A Oh, sura. Oh. sura, yas. I don't racall that 



UNCLASSIFil 



81 



Hknt 

1910 
1911 
19 12 
19 13 
19 14 
191S 
19 16 
19 17 
1918 
1919 
1920 
192 1 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
19314 



IIR162000 



UNCUSSIREO 



PAGE 80 



would hav« told her that. 

e Is Mr. Godson a iriend of Ambassador Whittlasey? 
A Oh. he knows her, yes. 

fi And, to your knowledge, did Scott Hiller accompany 
Roy Godson to Europe on several occasions in 1985 and 1986? 

A Probably one. I think I'm iamiliar with one trip. 

2 What was the purpose? 

A That, to my knowledge, was to meet with Freddie and 
some of the younger people who we had all met there together 
at that dinner and talk to them about the spread of Soviet 
disinformation in Europe. 

2 He went all the way to Europe with Roy Godson to 
talk about the spread of disinformation in Europe by the 
Soviets ? 

A To the best of my knowledge. 

2 Is he involved in the Hational Strategy Information 
Center? 

A Hho, Scott? 

2 Yes. 

A Ko. 

2 How did he come to know about Hr . Godson? 

A Through me . 

a When did you introduce Hr . Godson to Hr . Hiller? 

A Well, that was probably in maybe late ' BH . '85, 
somewhere in there. I don't recall that Roy was at that 



UNCUSSIFIED 



82 



MAME 
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1936 
1937 
1938 
193' 
19(40 
19141 
19(42 
19(43 
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1950 
195 
1952 
1953 
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1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 




I'm 



PAGE 81 
it piobably was itoi* 



HIR162000 
dinnst uith Faith, 
in '85. 

S I uant to ask you about a coupl* of organizations 
and sona namas , and would you just tall ma xi you know tham? 

A Yas . You'va just got to tananbat that in this kind 
of stuff, all thasa guys aia vary intaiastad in foiaign 
policy and foraign affairs, and Scott's lalationship with 
tha Swiss, thay'ra all--th«y all cob* ovar hara to hava thair 
babias so thay'll ba U.S. citizans and things lika that. So 
just for tha longast tina thair association and our 
association, tha whola, you Know, part of tha intarast of 
tha group is to talk about things that ara happening in 
Europa, and thay'ra all scarad that luropa is going to go 
down tha chuta , you know, any minuta, and that was raally 
tha ganasis of thasa--you know, of thasa discussions. 

fi You dascribad all thasa paopla as vary waalthy. Is 
that trua? 

A That's tha way thay wara all dascribad to na , as 
very wall-to-do. 

fi And Hr . Ifillar introduced Hi. Godson to these 
people? 

A To soae of them over there, yes. Scott introduced 
them to us. and than I think Scott and Roy want ovar — 
(Pause while House Floor bells rlng.l 
--went over once, aayba twice, I'm not sure, but for 



UNCUSSIHEO 



83 



NAME: 

1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
196U 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
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82 



the sane purpose, as I said, for this Soviet disinf orraation 
thing , 

2 Do you know Pann Kerable? 

A No. 

2 Oo you know Elliott Abrams? 

A I maybe have net hm once. 

2 Do you know Rob Owen? 

A No, I don't think I do. 

2 Do you know Bruce Caneron? 

A Bruce Canpbell? 

2 Caneron. 

A No. 

2 Do you know Walt Raynond? 

A I think I've net hiii once. 

2 Where did you neet hin? 

A Probably at some function down here in Washington. 
I mean I wouldn't recognize hin if I saw hin. I think I 
shook his hand, and that's all. 

2 What does he do? 

A To the best of ny knowledge, he used to work in, or 
works in — works at the HSC. 

2 Have you ever heard of the Latin Anerican Strategic 
Studies Institute? 

A I don't think so. 

2 It's in San Francisco. 



UNCUSSIFIt 



84 



NAHE 
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HIR162000 



VNCUSSIHED 



PAGE 83 



2 Th« acxonym is LASSI. 

A No. 

2 You have navaz haazd oi it? 

A No. 

2 The Institute for Religion and Democzacy? 

A Yes, that zings a bell. 

2 What kind oi a ball does it ring? 

A Well, ue gave a grant to some group. It nay have 
been that on something to do--it may have been that--to the 
best of my recollection, but you can't hold me to this, it's 
something to do with nuclear arms or something liKe that. I 
mean, you know, you had all these priests running around 
wanting to disarm, and it was a respectable group that said 
there's no reason to disarm and that kind of stuff. 

2 Prodemca? 

A To the best of my knowledge, isn't that the 
organization that was funded by the House and the Senate to 
support U.S. policy abroad? 

2 Prodemca. It's the acronym for something called 
the Friends of the Democratic Center in Central America. 

A Oh, well, then no, I don't really know what that 
is. I was thinking of something else. 

2 Here you familiar with Hr . Godson's activities in 
relation to International Youth Year and a conference in 



UNClASSra 



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NAME: 
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201 1 
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2015 
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20314 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 8U 



Jamaica in 1985; 



A Yes . He told me that they uere having a conference 
down there, yes. 

2 Uere you involved in it in any way? 
A No . 

2 Did you raise any funds, or do you know of any 
funds being contributed to that? 
A No, no. 

MR. OLIVER: I have no further questions. 
MR. BUCK: I don't have any questions right now. 
MR. FRYMAN: Ho questions. 
THE WITNESS: Just on the record. I want to be sure 
that you will send me, or that I will be able to go over, ny 
deposition, as is the usual procedure. 

MR. FRYMAN: Yes. I will make available to 
you--well. let ne first ask, have you received a copy of the 
House resolution and the House rules? 
THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. FRYMAN: Let me make--I'll make a copy of those 
available to you. They provide that you will have an 
opportunity to review the deposition. You will not have an 
opportunity to have your own copy of it, but you can review 
it and correct it. 

THE WITNESS: Okay. 

MR. FRYMAN: So when we get the transcript, I will 



UNCLASSIRED 



86 



,. uNcussra 



NAME: HIK162000 111111*1 fll.*("ll im ^'^'^^ 8^ 

2035 notify y< 

2036 THE WITHESS: You ii«an I'll hav« to nak* a spacial 

2037 trip down h«ra than? 

2038 MR. FRYHAN: Or tha naxt tima you'ra down Kara, urn 

2039 can schadula a tina for you to raviau it. 

2040 Off tha racord. 

20M1 iWharaupon, at 12=42 p.m., tha taking of tha dapositior 

2042 uas concludad.l 



UNClASSinFO 



87 



MAHE^ HIR251 



••• wMsm 



RPTS HCGIHH 
DCHN 2UIKTER0 

DEPOSITION or ClIFTON SMITH 

Tuesday. September 8, 1987 

House oi Representatives, 
Select Comnittee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
Washington. D.C. 



^/S3 



The committee met. pursuant to call, at 9=15 a.m.. in roon 
B-352. Rayburn House Oiiice Building, with Thomas Fryman. 
(Stafi Counsel of Hovisk Select Conaitttc) }>i:esiding. 

Present' Kenneth Buck. Assistant hinority Counsel, on 
behalf of the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert 
Arms Transactions with Irani James Kaplan. Associate 
Counsel, on behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition; 
R. Spencer Oliver. Chief Counsel. House Foreign Affairs 
Committee: and Alexi Morrison. Counsel, on behalf of the 

Witness. 

on I'^'^^ . 



Whereupon. 
FRED CLIFTOM SMITH. JR. 



Partially Declassified/Released 



under provisions of E.O. 12356 
by N. Menan, National Security Council 



wna^ss® 



mi 



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having baen first duly sworn, uas called as a witness 
herein, and was examined and testified as follows: 

HR. FRYHAK: Before beginning the questioning of nr . 
Snith, X would ask that the record reflect that counsel for 
Mr. Smith has been provided with a copy of the immunity 
order of the United States District Court, Fort Drum, dated 
August 18, 1987, as well as a copy of the resolution 
establishing the House Committee and the rules governing 
this investigation. 
EXAHINATIOH 

BY HR. FRYHAK- 

fi nr . Smith, would you state youx full name for the 
record? 

A It is Fredi Clifton Smith, Jr. 

e Do you reside in the Washington, D.C. area? 

A Yes, I do. 

e Hhere were you born? 

A I uas born In Anderson, South Carolina. 

e Hhat uas your date of birth? 

A July 8, 1961 . 

e Hhat college did you attend? 

A George Washington. Actually I attended— I graduated 
fxom George Washington. I attended also Hlnthrop College 
and graduated from George Washington. 

fi When did you obtain a degree from George Washington? 



UNCLASSifitB 



Hxnz 

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su 

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HIR251000 IIIVI.l ^..,. .^i^' P*G2 

1 Jun* oi '8<4. 
S What field? 
A Political sclanca. 

2 Hava you attandad any graduata school? 
A Ko , I hava not. 

S Hava you sarvad In tha allltary? 

A No, I hava not. 

S What la your social sacutlty nuabar? 



S You hava baan amployad iromlna to tlaa by Carl 
Channal or by organizations with which Hr . Channal. is 
associatad; hava you not? 

A That is trua. 

S Whan did you bagln such aaployaant? 

A Z first want to work for Hr . Channa^ on Saptanbar 
12, 1983, and stayad with him — lat aa saa — until about April 
of '8<4. At such tima I took soma tiaa off to finish up 
school, and took a sumaar off, and I want baok in his amploy 
in Saptaabar of '8K, and was undar his aaploy until Hay of 
this yaar. 

fi Did you apply for a job with Hr . Channal| in 19837 

A Yas. Yas. That's whan Z originally want to work 
for hla. 

fi Row did you laarn that thara was an opanlng with his 
organization. 



mm& 



90 



^.00. \lHWSSfB 



NAHE HIR2S1000 IIIMIl! ?^VilJ'»' 'SB-*- PAGE ^ 

76 . A It u»s in a social cont«xt. I was talking to 

77 soaabody and thay said, wall. I hava a fxiand who is laavln? 

78 his anploy and pathaps you should go by and talk to than 

79 about taking his placa. And that's what I did, and it took 
about a nonth. About a month latas I was hizad. 

e So you want by in lata ^usaar of 1983? 

A Yas, that is corract. 

2 And that was tha first tima you had aat Hz. Channal? 

A That is corraot. 

Q Uhosa placa did you taka? 

A I think it was Lou Bonsignouz. 

2 How do you spall tha last naaa? 

A I knaw you would ask. B-O-M-S-I-G-K-O-U-I. 

Q Hhat waza tha zasponsibilltlas of tha position you 



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appliad for and aocaptad? 

A Hall, whan I originally want to work for his I was 
working for tha Channal^ Corporation, which was Hz. ChannaV* 
fund-raising consulting fiZB. and at tha tiaa what ha did 
was taka on various oliants to xaiaa funds for thaa, and I 
caaa on sort of as an account axaoutlva to work with 
whichavar oliants I was assignad to, to do talaphona and 
soma in-parson solicitation. 

a Hhan you say cliants. you maan contributors? 

A Ko. Organizations. p0^ iox axampla, tha Amarican 
Spaca Frontlaz Committaa. Young Amaricans for Fraadom. Lat 



miM 



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PAGE 



ne see. Who else was there? 

There was a group that ue started to do soae work with 
that didn't go through with, called. Alert American, and 
that's what I mean by clients. 

2 So by clients, you mean companies that were retaining 
the Channel Corporation and obtaining services for the 
Channel Corporation? 

A Right. 

2 Now, was Mr. Channel, in 1983. conducting any fund 
raising on behalf of his own organization at the time you 
commenced your employment? 

A Ho, sir. It was totally doing work for other 
groups. He was not his own PACs or foundations or anything. 

2 How were you paid? How was your compensation fixed? 
Were you on a standard salary? 

Was your compensation related to the fees paid by the 
clients or was there some other basis? 

A At that point X was on a straight salary. 

2 Do you recall what the salary was? 

A Yes. It was «1U.00O. 

fi «1(t.000 a year? 

A Uh-huh. 

fi As an example of a client, you Indicated the Young 
Americans for freedom was one of the clients. I believe. Is 
that one of the clients you worked for? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



d2 



imnss;:e 



HAHE: HIR251000 ij |^\| ^llW W ■ ■ '^-"^ p»G£ 

126 A Yas, it is. 

127 . 2 Just taking that as an axaiipl*, would you dasctib* 

128 th« nature of your activities on behali of that client, just 
using that as an eManple? 

130 A Okay. 

31 It's my understanding that Young Americans for Freedom, as 

32 you probably know, they have been around a good while. They 

133 have also had financial problems. 

I 
1314 So they contracted with nr . Channel to provide capital 

135 fund raising services to try and get them some funds raised. 

36 At the &t time the project that we had related to the 

37 movie that came to television called the ''Day After,'* 
138 which was about a simulated nuclear holocaust. 

39 It was the opinion of the Young Americans for Freedom that 
1U0 this did not reflect an accurate view towards arms or arms 
mi control, and they wanted — Young Americans for Freedom wanted 
|i42 to do something to present the other side of what they felt 
1(«3 was not being presented in that movie. So they were going 

to organize some demonstrations, do some newspaper ads. this 
l>45 type of stuff, and I was raising funds from their 
m6 contributors to fund these types of aotlvities that related 

to this film. 

ms ft Is it fair to say that youx moxX primarily for the 

/-/ 
I (49 Channel Corporation, in this period beginning in September 

4 
150 of 1983. was bajieally fund-raising work? 



BNtiAssra 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Hkni HIR251000 lllllll Hllllll ILU P'^GE 

151 » Uh-huh. 

152 fi Had you had any prior aKpArittnc* in that typa oi 

h 

153 work bAiora joining Hr . Channal' in S«pt*abar of 19837 

1SU . A » little bit. In collaga I workad a littla bit in 

155 the davalopment offica and I halpad with tha annual iund 

156 campaign at GU. 

157 But it was not--it was miniaal . It wasn't a great deal. 

158 It was mainly just sort of student government work. 

159 2 Did you travel much in this job? 



160 . A Kot at that point, but down the road, beginning a 

L 
year later, up until I left Hr . Channel's employ this year. 

162 I traveled a reasonable amount, yes. 

163 2 But in the initial slx;|to eight Hionth period from — 
16U A Ko. sir. I don't think Z traveled any. 

165 2 Now. from September of 1983 until April of 198U, you 

166 were enrolled at George Washington; is that correct? 

167 A Ho. It's not correct. 

168 I took the semester, the fall semester of 1983 off from 

169 school to work full-time for Hz. Channels. I returned for my 

170 final semester in the Spring of '8*1. I went on part-time 

u 
working for Hr . Channel/ and went back to school f ull|/time . 

172 fi Hhen did the spring semester begin? 

173 A January of '8^. 

17<4 2 So you were full(|time from September of 1983, until 
175 some point in January of 198U, and then you went on part- 



UNCUSSIFiEO 



94 



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tina basis; 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A E»ploym«nt_jiise, ys. sir. 

2 EnploynanCuls* with Mr. Channal? Did you salary 
remain th« sama? 

A It did not r*nain th* sama. I think I want on 
connission at that point, but I don't ramambar bacausa I was 
only working two days a waak. i 

So it would not hava ramainad tha saaa. I think I went on 
commission, and it was basad on, I think I was paid 15 
percant of what I ralsad. It's so long ago. I can't 
ramembar axactly whieh ona it was. 

2 And you eaasad work antiraly in April oi 198>47 

A That is corract. 

2 And than you coaplatad your studias at Gaorga 
Washington latar in tha spring or suaaar of 198U? 

A Yas. sir. 

2 And you want back to work for Channal in Saptaabar 
of 198>*? 

A Uh-huh. 

2 Hhat wara your dutlas whan you want back in 
Saptaabar of 198i4? 

A Hall, I had talkad to hia toward tha and of tha 
suaaar and ha'd wantad aa to ooaa back and work for hia 
again. This tlaa ha was just foralng and gattlng going with 
tha Aaarican Consarvatlva Trust, which was his political 



UNClASSiFO 



95 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR2S1000 w-— PAGE 9 

201 action coimitt««, or the first of his political action 

202 coamittess. And h* asked m« if X would coii« and b« 

203 political diiectoi for it and work to gat going for tha 

20U upcoming 'SK fall elections which we were active in. And he 

205 wanted me to do that. And I gave it some thought and 

206 decided to go back, and I went back primarily in that 

207 capacity in September of '8U. 

208 2 How, what did your work then involve in the fall of 

209 198<4? 

2 10 A Well, the American Conservative Trust raised funds 

211 from private citizens to support candidates for Congress, 

212 the Senate and we did several special projects. For 

213 example, following the election we worked on a project 

2 114 with--it was an Inauguration Day series of newspaper ads 

215 congratulating the President on his victory, and we got a 

2 16 group of citizens who wanted to help fund the ads and they 

2 17 wrote a message, their own message or they could sign their 

2 18 name to a standard message and that was one of the things we 

219 did, in addition to just supporting candidates. 

220 fi In the fall of 198U, was the American Conservative 
22 1 Trust the only fund -raising organization that Mr. Channel 

222 had established? 

223 A At that time. 

22U fi I'm not sure what tha status of the National 

225 Endowment was at that point legally. Z don't know whether 



UNCLASSiFIE 



96 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR2S1000 w -■-■—-• ww - .. . — _ p^gj ,g 

226 it had baan incoipotatad yat oz not, but it was to my 

227 knowladga not activa yat. ii it was. 

228 2 Tha Amazican Consazvativa Tzust is also known by its 

229 initiai/ACT. is it not? 

230 A Right. 

23 1 . 2 So ACT was tha only ozganizatlon that was activa in 

232 tha fall of 198)4; is that cozzact? 

233 A I baliava that — caztalnly I don't think anything was 

V 

234 going on with tha Channa L^Cozpozatlon. 

235 2 How many pazsoiy^waza amployad in connaction with tha 

I' 

236 opazations of ACT othaz than Hz. Channa^ and youzsali? 

237 A Oh, thaza pzobably waza about thzaa othazs. 

238 S Who waza thay? 

239 A Rogaz Wilklns , who was an adatlnlstzatlva assistant; 
2M0 thaza would hava baan Jaan Channlng . who was Hz. Channal's 
2i«1 saczatazy. C-H-A-K-K-I-M-G . 

2i«2 S That's G-E-K-E? 

2K3 A I think it's J-I-A-M. Sha's no longaz his 

2(414 saczatazy. Sha laft qulta soma tima ago. 

245 I thlnK that's about it. Ya«. that is it. 

2146 fi To tha bast of youz zaeollaotlon. how much monay did 

247 ACT zalsa in 198«4? 

2>48 . A Z hava no Idaa. 

249 e Can you say if it Mas aoza than «500.000? 

250 A Yas. It was not. 



%V0^ 



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NAME: HIR2S1000 

251 2 It was not? 

252 Can you say if it was mora than «100,000? 

253 a I think wa gave away, in tarns oi contributions, 
2SU about^ 20,000 that fall, which would hava baan 198U, bacausa 

255 that's tha only part of tha yaar ua waza in operation. I 

256 imagine we probably-- just a wild guess — would be about 'uo/oz 

257 450,000. 

i 

258 Let ne see. I would say probably it was about 75,000. 

259 2 In total that was raised? 

260 A In total. 

26 1 . 2 I an just asking for an estiaate. I'm not holding 

262 you to an exact amount. 

263 A Okay. 

26>4 2 Now, the money that was raised was used, you 

265 mentioned, for contributions. Has this contributions to 

266 particular political campaigns? 

267 A Yes, sir. 

268 2 And were these congressional races or Senate races? 

269 A Let's see. 

270 2 Oz what else? 

27 1 . A He gave a contribution to Senator Helms. I believe 
272 to Senator Jepsen. who. as you know, lost in '8U. I believe 
27 3 Jack Kemp. That's all I remember. There were others, but I 
27U don't remember them. 

275 2 And you also mentioned an independent expenditure. 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



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A Yas. 

2 What do you maan by that? 

A Ua did an indapandant axpandituza in tha Stata of 

u 
Uast Virginia, which is whaza Hr . Channal/is from. 

2 What is an indapandant axpandituza? 

A Uall. an indapandant axpandituza is whan a political 
action committaa undaztakas a pzojact by which it will spand 
a caztain amount of aonay on halping to pzoaota a candidata 
oz alect a candidata. Mowavaz, thaza aza caztain rulas that 
apply. 

Foz axanpla. a candidata and tha political action 
connittaa cannot hava any contact and you do an indapandant 
axpandituza as opposad to just giving tha candidata a 
contzibution bacausa tha spanding, tha amount you can spand 
on tha campaign oz halping tha candidata is unllmitad whan 
you do an indapandant axpandituza. 

It was nz. Channal's ballaf that you can ba of moza halp 
to a candidata if you aza abla to spand moza monay on tham, 
bacausa It takas big bucks thasa days to gat alactad. So 
that was tha flzst indapandant axpandituza tha Amarlcan 
Consazvatlva Tzust did. 

fi And was that tha only ona In 198U? 

A Yas. It was. 

S And what was tha campaign again? 

A Azch nooza foz govarnoz of Hast Virginia. 



IINOUSSIFIED 



99 



ONCUSSIFIED 



NAME' HIR251000 ll|^||L-nVWII • ■- ^ PAGE 13 

30 1 . S This was in support of Arch Hoora? 

302 A Y«s, it was. 

303 2 Do you rttcali approKinataly how much was axpended on 

304 this activity? 

305 A Y«s. It took tha form, tha indapandant aKpanditura 

306 took tha form of nawspaper ads, and wa placad about 10 or 12 

307 newspapar ads all ovar tha stata in tha month yt a c aad iyg the 

308 election in support of tha candidate, and I believe we spent 

309 about «20 , 000 , 1 5 [ to «20,000, something like that. I have 

310 tha figures somewhere on that I think, but X don't have them 
3 11 in my head . 

312 Q Here you involved in preparing tha copy for tha ads? 

313 . A Wa would have meetings--! was In on the — yes. Wa 

l- 

31U would meet with an advertising parson, and Spitz Channel and 

315 I, we would sit down and bat around, you know, sort of West 

316 Virginia you really have to — it's an interesting stata 

317 politically and it took a great deal of effort actually to 
3 18 get them together. 

319 . 2 So you did participate in meetings about the content 

320 of the ad and tha strategy for tha effort? 

321 A Yes. but mora so just as sitting in. X just started 

322 out in doing this type of work, and it was sort of more of 

323 an educational process for me just to sit there and listen. 
32t But X, you know, X can't have my mouth cemented shut the 
325 whole fall. X'm sura X said something. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



100 



«HtU,SQtB 



HAHE: HIR2S1000 V • ■ '^ P»GE 1 •» 



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2 Did nr. Channay take th« lead In tha stzataglc 
daoisions mada? 

A Yas. 

2 And did ha also taka tha laad in salacting tha 
newspapars? 

A Yas, bacausa baing fzon that stata ha knaw exactly 
where to place things. Ha as vary familiar politically with 
tha stata. 

2 Other than tha independent expandituze in the Hooze 
campaign and the contributions that you described to the 
Senate races and to tha Kanp congressional race, what other 
expenditures did ACT make in the late iall of 1984 or 1984? 

A The only other one that ooaes to mind is a 
contribution to George Hansen who had. aocozding to who you 
talk to, either ^g or lost that election by one-tenth of 
one percent, I think was what it was said in the Post for 
nany weeks on end . 

2 First of all. for the record, who is George Hansen? 

A George Hansen was a Congzessaan and he had been up 
for re-election in 1984. 

Q Where was he from? 

A Idaho. It was either Idaho or Iowa. 
As »uoh as has been in the newspapez recently I should 
know, but it's eithez Idaho oz Iowa. 
It's Idaho. I think, isn't it? 



uNcussife 



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UHtUSSiniB 



PAGE 



But as I said, he had eithat won or lost this alaction by 
a minuscul* amount of votes and he was conducting a recount 
and needed money to do a recount I guess for whatever he 
wanted to use it for. 

So we raised funds to help him with his recount and gave 
him the maximum amount allowed by law, which is a check for 
«5000. 

2 Were there any other activities that you recall in 
198U? 

A No . X think that covers it. 

fi Now, in 1985. you mentioned there were some 
advertisements purchased in connection with the 
inauguration . 

A In 'at. No, in '85. right, in January of '85. 

2 Uould you describe those advertisements and how the 
money was raised for those? 

A It was fullnewspaper ads. two full pages in the 
Washington Post, one full page in the Washington Times, that 
appeared on Inauguration Day, January 20, 1985. 

As I said, it was the opportunity for private citizens who 
we contacted to contribute and on this full page write a 
message and/or then sign their name and have that reproduced 
in the newspaper wishing the President well or telling him 
to stand firm on this issue or that issue. Therefore, also 
a general philosophical statement. 



UNCLASSra 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR2S 

376 In tha Post one paga was tha individuals saying 

377 congratulations, and tha othar paga was a ganaral 

h 

378 philosophical statement wcittan by Hz. ChannaL. talking 

379 about freedon and issues that ha felt wesa important to 

380 focus on on that day. 

381 In tha Washington Times it was just tha philosophical 

382 statement. It was a repeat of the same thing that was in 

383 the Washington Post. 

38(4 2 Was that sponsored by kCT? 

385 A Yes, it was . 

386 fi Were you involved in raising funds ior this series 

387 of ads? 

388 A Yes. I was. 

389 fi How did you go about that? 

390 A Well, we had — for example, in tha Washington Post, we 
39 1 had to pay to reserve the two pages which at that time I 

392 believe they were «25,000 a page in the Washington Post. So 

393 we had a «50.000 advertising bill. 

39U And we solioitad contributions to partiolpata in tha 

395 project, and to sign youz name to it. Soma people gave mora 

396 than othari . I think tha average contribution was about 

397 •500. 

398 fi How did you go about soliciting oontcibutloni? 

399 A From tha house list? 

UOO Is that what you mean? Who to call? 



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1*01 2 Just d«scrib« to a* hon you d«t«rmin«d th« 

U02 individuals that you would contact and dasctib* how th« 

•403 contact occuiiad and what was tha natura of tha statanants 

UOU that you nada to tha potential contributors. 

UOS A Wall, by this point I had talkad to many oi tha in- 

UOe house contributors that had contact with Mr. Channel »any 

407 times, having bean thara for awhila. 

408 2 What do you mean by ' ' In-housa contributors*'? 

409 A Thasa ware contributor naaas that Hr . Channel, had on 
4 10 various lists that ha had obtained during his fund-raising 

411 career is my impression. And we would talk to these people. 

412 You, of course, call tha people you know first, because 

413 you can raise funds froa folks you know better than you can 

414 from those who you don't know. And tall them about what we 
4 15 were doing, and ask them if they would like to write their 
416 own message, or be included in a standard message for this 

4 17 project, and then we would send them an envelope thing and 

418 they could send back their signature. 

4 19 It had to be in really heavy black ink so it would 

420 reproduce in the newspaper. So we had to work with that. 

421 It was just a lot of logistics, a lot of little things that 

422 had to be done for that. 

423 fi And did Hz. Channel assign to you certain 

424 individuals to call? 

425 A At that point, not really. It was just more or 



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t426 lass, you know, go and laisa monay ior it becausa h* had i«H 

M27 paopla ha had worked with himsalf and othar than thosa 

>428 people, I would do everything else. 

1)29 I mean liKa ua would make sure we weren't calling the same 

(«30 people. We were coordinated to that point. 

(«31 2 So he notified you that there ware certain 

■432 individuals that he was dealing with and you could call 

U33 anybody else you wanted to? 

i43(( A Yes. 

U35 2 Was there a large nunbar that ha reserved for 

436 himself? 

437 A No. 

U38 2 Do you recall the ones ha reserved for hlaseli? 

439 A Yes. 

UitO 2 Which contributors were those? 

14(41 . A Usually Ellen Garwood, Barbara Newington. John 

442 Ramsey, Barbara Christian. That is all I remember off tha 

443 top of my head. 

444 There ware several others, but thosa ware major 

445 contributors of his, and ha would talk to thosa people, and 

446 ha knew tham wall, and ha talked to them for some time. 

447 fi Mow, these advertisements ran on Inauguration Day in 

448 January of 1985) is that correct? 

449 A Uh-huh. 

450 2 Did ACT have any othar products underway at tha time 



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of th« inauguration in 1985? 

A Ko, not to roy racollaction . Just that ona pzojact. 

2 What did you do whan you eaaa to tha oiflca tha waak 
of inauguration? 

A Wall, ue bagan work with tha National Endownant 
shortly aftar that, but thara was an intarlm pariod thara 
that I honestly don't remanbar what I did. It was always 
something to do whan your ara Hozklng. 

S But there was an intazln pazlod whara thara was no 
najor project underway? 

A Right. I don't think thara was i no. 

2 Did you bacona involved in tha Nlearaguan Kaiugae 
fund dinner? 

A Yes. That's what started. 

2 Did that occur at approKiiiataly this tine, or 
shortly after inauguration time in 1985? 

A That occurred, that xhila prooass started about, I 
think, aid to late February of '85 and it bagan by Hz. 
Channel/ being invited to a aaatlng at tha Mhita House of 
individuals who ware helping to otganlza that dinner and 
that's hoH I first heard about it, with the Nlearaguan 
Kafugaa dinner. And he wanted to beooaa Involved in that, 
and wanted to raise money foz It. and decided to zaise funds 
foz the dlnnez through the National Endowment foz the 
Preservation of Liberty and Baking a grant to tha Nlcazaguan 



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■476 Refugee fund. And that is soit oi how that AvolvAd. 

477 2 Kow, was that your first significant ptojact for Hr. 

L 

478 Channel' aftar tha inauguration advertisanants? 

479 A Yas, yas, it was. 

480 2 Ovar what period of time did you work on that 

481 project? You say it started in February of 1985? 

482 A Yes, I would say mid February until the event of the 

483 dinner which would have been on April IS. I remenber it was 

484 April IS. 

485 2 Kow, during this period of time were you working on 

486 other projects as well, or was this your only project during 

487 this period of tine? 

488 A This was It. 

I- 

489 2 At this time who were the employees of Hr . Channel's 

490 organization? 

49 1 . A Myself, of course, Hi. ChanneJ^*^, of course, his 

492 secretary, who at that point I think was Angela Davis. Dan 

493 Conrad joined the staff at that point about February of 

494 1985. He came on board to help with that effort, as you 

495 know. 

496 I think that was it. And Roger. Roger Hllkins. 

497 fi Did you understand that Hr . Conxad had come on as an 

498 eaployea ox as a consultant? Ox do you know, one way ox the 

499 other? 

500 A I didn't know ona way ox the othex. I mean I know 



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that he is a consultant for various philanthropic 
organizations by what he's done for the past 15 years. So I 
guess I assumed that he was a consultant, but I just didn't 
pay much attention to it. 

He was there working a^long beside me day-by-day and I 
didn't think in my own mind whether he was an employee or 
consultant . 

2 What did you do yourself in this February-April 
period in connection with this dinner? 

A I contacted many different supporters, asked them 
for their help with the dinner, asked them for their 
contributions; traveled some, took several trips with Hz. 
Channel to visit with contributors and talk to them about 
the event, why it was being held, asked them for their help; 
and that pretty much was what I did for those two months. 

2 So It was basically fund raising? 

A Uh-huh. 

2 Here you involved in the logistical planning for the 
dinner ? 

A Ko. That was done by the Nioaraguan Refugee tuni 
people, and it was also done somewhat by Spitz as time grew, 
as we got closer to the dinner. They were very unorganized, 
and they were having great problems, I remember, in getting 
the date set. 

I think we had two or three dates that we went through and 



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cancallad and postponad, and iinally thara was a data sat, 
and as you know, the Presldant attandad tha dinnar and it 
was vary important to gat tha data sat so ha could connit or 
not commit to ba thaza. 

And it was vary — had graat logistical ptoblams. As wa go< 
closer to the dinnar Spitz and Dan helped plan that more and 
more but I did not. 

fi Did you attend the dinnar? 

A Yes. 

2 Were you aware oi a luncheon meeting that Hr . 
Channel^ had with John Roberts in early 1985? 

A I vaguely heard him say he had met with John 
Roberts. I believe he and Dan did. or maybe it was just 
Spitz--I don't remember. And I knew that John Roberts was an 
attorney in the White House, and that was tha extent, at 
that time, of what I knew about that meeting. 

2 Did you learn that fzoa Hz. Channel/? 

A Uh-huh. 

V 

fi Did nr. Channel indicate that Hr . Roberts had 
reiezzad him to Richazd nillez. 

A Yes. Yes. he did. 

fi Hhan was the fizst time you mat Rlohard nillez? 

A That's tha first time Z have bean asked that in this 
lovely little process we have gone thzough. I honestly do 
not remember. But I would assume that it was probably at 



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his oificft, and I had probably just gon* ov«r th*ia with 
Spitz ona day after wa had hirad--aitar tha National 
Endounant had hirad Richard Millar's PR firit as PR counsal, 
and it was sonauhara lika that, just a casual maating. 

2 So would you estimate that it was in tha spring or 
summer oi 1985? 

A Oh, yas . It would have been the spring oi 1985. 

2 Spring of '85? 

A Let me see. we hirad them in March or April, so it 
would have bean late spring or early summer of '85. 

S What was the name of his firm? 

A International Business Communications, known as IBC . 

2 What did you understand they had bean hired to do? 

A At that time, it was my undarstandlng that they were 
hired to provide general public relations support for Hr . 

Y 

Channel's various organizations. 

2 What does that mean? 

A About the only thing ox the only thing I knew at 
that point was help with the press and possibly — you asked me 
what I knew at that time, and I am trying to put it In that 
context. Just really, it wasn't very specific. 

It was just a public relations firm, and maybe helped with 
press matters, and that was all that Z was awaze of until as 
we approached the suamer. as you know, wa started having our 
briefings. I know that Hz. Hlllez was Involved In helping 



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to gat those scheduled. 

It later became apparent to ne down the road that they 
were more of a resource entity for contacts ulthln the Mhite 
House than just an PR firm. 

Does that answer your question? 
S Well, I'll come back to the subject. 

When did you understand for the first time that Hr . 

Channel Intended for his organization to be involved In 

/I 
Issues Involving Nicaragua and Central America beyond the 

work for the Refugee ^und dinner? 

A Okay. 

Well, we participated in the dinner, and following that 

there was a vote coming up in Congress on I'reedom fighter 

aid. and so we, by way of. I believe it was the American 

Conservative Trust, raised funds and produced some 

television messages in April and Hay of '85 to support the 

/reedom fighter aid vote in Congress. 

I 
This was an issue that Hr . Channel' was very concerned 

4 

about and wanted his organization to fooua on. It was just 
a continuance really of the ^efugee/fund in a way as far as 
issues wise. 

a Do you know the reason that he began to focus on 
this Issue? 

A Ko. other than that he was very ooncerned about it. 

fi He expressed that concern to you? 



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60 1 . A Oh, y«s. I nean you know uh«n you nork in that kind 

602 oi anvironment you liva and aat and braath tha issuas, part 

603 of tha natural agenda each day, and talk about what youx 

60U organization can do to, parhaps, hava an influence or inpact 

605 on those issues. This uas one that he uas vary concerned 

606 about. 

607 S Did he indicate that he had concluded that this was 

608 an issue that he believed his in-house contributors were 

609 likely to make contributions for? 

6 10 . A It is my belief on that that ha didn't really know 

611 what in-house contributors would be giving to, but that this 

6 12 is something that cane along, that it was, as evldancad by 

613 the Refugee fund support — that it was apparent through 

6 1U example that this was somathlng that was vary popular among 

615 the contributors. 

616 But there was no grand design from whan ha started tha 
6 17 American Conservative Trust or Htrij//^ to go focus on freedom 
618 /ighter ald|^or Kioaragua, to my belief. It just, it came 

6 19 about as a result of — it was popular as tlma want on and wa 

620 just stuck with It. 

621 . ft So in connection with tha work on tha Refugee l^und 

622 dlnnaz, you observed that Nleazagua was an issue that 

623 aippaazad to appeal to oonsazvatlva oontzibutorst is that 
62>4 correct? 



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2 And it is your understanding that growing out of 
that aKp.rienc. Mr. Chann.f conclud.d that h* would continu. 
to work with this issua in 1985? 



e _^W th« first Avan that was tha f< 



:us of afforts by 



has organizatio 



n was a vota in tha Congrass latar in tha 
spring of 1985) is that corract? 
A Ifas, yas. 

2 And you wara askad to work on fund raising in 
connection with that vota? 

A Yas. H.n, to work on fund raising in connection 
with the television ads we produced regarding that vote. 
2 All right. 
How, was this being done at this point by the Kational 
Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, which I 
understand is also known by it. initial. KEPI, or was thi. 
being done by ACT? 

A Thi. was being don.—the.e particular M^of ads or 
this particular ..t of ad. war. being done by the A.arioan 
Conservativa Tru.t. or I'll tall you. thi. wa, either the 
American Conservative Tru.t or the American Conservative 
Trust stata alectlon fund. One of tha two entities did the 
ads. 

2 What 1. your recollection of tha time of tha vote? 
A The -as vota. I ballava that hu«anltarian aid wa. 



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651 voted finally and no nllitary aid. 

652 Q What is your ittcollaction oi tha datas oi tha vota? 

653 A Hay. 

6514 2 Was tha first vota in lata April of 1985? 

655 A Yas. X think thara was nora than ona vota as thara 

656 is usually evary yaar on this issua. 

657 e And tha first vota was in April? 

658 A Yas, I think. 

659 2 April or May? 

660 A Uh-huh. 

66 1 . 2 And you wara raising funds fox talavlsion ads that 

662 ran in connection with that first vote or series of votes? 

663 A Yas. 

66U 2 Is that correct? 

665 A Yas. To tha best of ny recollection, ue started to 

666 try to have an impact on the whole voting prooesa. 

667 2 What was the television advertisement or 

668 advertisements? 

669 A I believe there were a total of three of them, and 

670 they encouraged Congress to vote for the aid. 

67 1 . fi Here their titles for the ads? 

672 A Yes. there were. There were always titles for all 

673 of the ads that we produced, and there were probably 30 or 
67U 10, and I cannot remember them. 

675 2 You don't recall tha titles of these three? 



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676 & No. I am sorry, I don't. I would know than ii I 

677 saw them. I don't ramembar. 

678 2 Who preparad tha advartlsamants ? 

679 & This first sat, I baliav*, was dona by tha Robart 

680 Goodman Agency of Maryland. 

681 2 Ware you involvad in tha praparation in any way? 

682 A Ho, sir. 

683 fi Ware you involv<c[ in any maatlngs discussing tha 
68U content of tha ads? 

685 A Not at that point) no. 

686 2 Do your raoall how many madia markats tha flzst 

687 series of ads appeared in? 

688 A Possibly just Hashington, O.C. It may hava baan 

689 Washington D.C. and ona or two others, but I think it was 

690 just Washington. D.C. greater Washington. 

691 . e Did you participate in any discussions about 

692 selection of tha madia markats? 

693 A No. sir. 

69>4 Q Was your activity in oonnaotlon with this first 

695 series of advartlsamants only to attempt to raise funds? 

696 A Yes. sir. 

697 fi And did you do this by talaphona? 

698 A Yas. sir 

699 2 Was it all dona by talaphona? 

700 A That was a vary short window of fund raising. We 



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70 1 did it from the end of the dinner until the vote, which 

702 would only have been what, six weeks? And I believe that it 

703 was all on the telephone. 

704 I am trying to remember if I traveled any to meet with any 

705 people on that one. I don't think I did. I think it was 

706 all by telephone, and, of course, mail. 

'O'' 2 To the best of your recollection, approximately how 

708 much money did you raised for this series of ads? 

709 A I honestly don't have an idea on that. 

710 e Has it over *100.000? 

711 A Ho. It wouldn't have been. It wouldn't have taken 
7 12 that just to do Washington and one or two others. 

713 It probably was 25 to 50. but it's not a fact. 

V 

7 14 a Ware you given any instructions by Hr . Channel/as to 

7 15 the type of appeal you should make to the contributors in 

7 16 these telephone calls? 

717 A Hell, the purpose was to raise the funds to help in 

7 18 the vote effort and the appeal was. of course. America 

7 19 needed to support the freedom fighter movement, and that was 

720 the general appeal and we were trying to do these ads to 

72 1 have an influence with the upcoming vote. 

722 fi So to summarize your work so far in 1985. from the 

723 baglnnlng of the year, up until the Inauguration, you were 
7214 working on raising funds for the series of Inauguration Day 
725 advertisements! is that correct? 



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& Yes. 

fi From the inauguration until mid April oi 1985. you 
uere working raising funds for the Xeiuge* /und dinnar? 

A Ves. 

2 And from mid April. 1985. until lat« m^y > 
approximately, of 1985, you uere raising funds for the first 
series of televisions ads relating to the congressional vote 
on Nicaragua aid: is that correct? 

A Yes. that is correct. 

2 Kou. if you would then describe for me your 
activities for Mr. Channel's organization beginning in late 
nay or early June of 1985 throughout the end of M^ 1985? 



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RPTS CAKTOR 
DCHK HILTOH 
110=151 

A Okay. It was Kr . Chann«ll's d«slr* to giv* 
contributors an opportunity to com* to Washington and learn 
mora about the Nicaraguan issue, and to that end we started 
a series of briefings with Colonel Korth, in which he would 
give a briefing on the Reagan adainistration policy towards 
Central America and towards the freedom fighters, and we 
would invite groups of contributors to Washington to attend 
the briefing as held in the Old Executive Office Building, 
followed i^^ai^ dinner at the Hay^-Adams Hotel, and it's my 
belief that the contact and the briefings were arranged as a 
result of Hr. Miller and his firm and their contact with 
Colonel North. That is how that developed. He would invite 
contributors to dinner. They would come up and attend the 
briefing. 

For the very first briefing we had, which was June 
27, 1985, each contributor was asked to contribute a grant 
of «5J|000. and I believe we raised about «80,000 from that 
first briefing, ♦70- to «80-, around that neighborhood, and 
it was a vary successful first meeting, and we had about 20 
very active, very interested contributors here for it, and 
Colonel Korth gave a very fine briefing, as he always did. 



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in a roon m the Old Executive Office Building that had 
audio-visual set-ups, and had slide shows and things, so ue 
did that. 

In June--let ma see. I don't believe we had another 
major briefing until October, and then again another one in 
November, and the process was always the same. It would be 
to call the contributors and ask thea to cone and attend the 
briefing. And what else? 

2 Hell, froii late Hay or early June, 1985, until the 
end of 1985, was basically all of your tlae devoted to work 
in connection with these briefings that you have described? 

A Yes, it was. It was fully devoted to that. 

2 And that involved calling people and inviting then 
to briefings and attenpting to obtain contributions from 
them? 

A Yes. 

2 In connection with the invitation to the briefing, 
is that correct? 

A Let me think here. I have a procedural question I 
need to ask her. 

(Counsel and witness confer. 1 
I Recess . ] 

HR. FRYHAN: I believe there Is a pending question, 
if you would read back the pending question. 

[The repoztei zead the zeoozd as requested.] 



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788 MR. KAPLAN! Just to intatjact for th« t«cord, 

789 during this morning's questioning, I undertook to deliver to 

790 counsel ior the deponent a copy of the Senate Inaunlty 

791 order, and this deposition is taken pursuant to that order 

792 which IS in form and substance virtually identical to the 

793 House immunity order. 

79M MR. FRYMAN: Just to clarify it, the deposition is 

795 taken pursuant to both of the immunity orders. 

796 Now, if you would read back the preceding question. 

797 (The reporter read the record as requested. 1 

798 BY MR. FRYMAN: 

799 fi Back on the record. Do you have something further 

800 to say, Mr. Smith? 

801 A During 1985. I was involved in my work for Mr. 

802 Channell in all Nlcaraguan related issues, working on the 

803 freedom fighter issue, and we in the beginning, when we had 
SOU our briefings, it was my Impression giving aid to--the money 

805 we were raising was going to Mr. Calero, to his efforts. 

806 Would you like to ask me something else? 

807 2 In 1985, all of youx wozK for Mr. Channell was 

808 related to the Nicaragua issue, is that correct? 

809 A That's correct. 

810 fi And did all of your work Involve raising funds? 

811 A Yes, sir. 

812 fi And you were raising funds in part to pay fox 



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television advertisements, is that correct? 

A Yes, sir, that would have been in the April-May 
slot. 

2 Part of your work in 1985? 

A That's right. 

2 And another part oi your work in 1985 was raising 
funds for what you understood to be contributions to Mr. 
Calaro or Adolfo Calero? 

A Right. 

2 Is that correct? 

A Right, the money that was as a result of the 
contributions given by the individuals who cane to the 
briefings is what ny impression was. 

2 You understood that was being given to Mr. Calero? 

A Yes. 

2 Or to his organization? 

A Yes. 

e Apart from the television advertisements In 1985, 
were you aware of any other activities that Hr . Channell was 
involved In In 1985 which were designed to affect the 
outcome of the vote In the Congress on aid to the Hlcaraguan 
resistance? 

A No. 

2 You are not aware of any lobbying activities In 
1985? 



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838 A No. 

839 . fi You nantlonad savaral brlaiings In 1985, and you 
8U0 hava mantlonad that Coa.onal Horth spoka at thasa briaflngs. 
8<4 1 Are you aware of private meetings that Colonel North had in 
8i«2 1985 uith contributors? 

8t43 A Yes. 

8MM 2 Which meetings are you specifically auare of? 

8(45 A Well, this type of briefings and private meetings 

8>t6 as it has been called started in June of '85 and extended 

8(«7 until about last summer, and I can't remember exactly Mho 

8U8 went in when. 

8149 e By last summer, are you talking about the summer of 

850 1986? 

851 A '86, yes. Actually. It went on past that, I would 

852 say to November of '86, but in '85. in the period you are 

853 talking about. I believe that Ellen Garwood had a meeting, 
85<4 and then there would be various private, not totally just 

855 one-on-one. but there would be several people going in. For 

856 example. Mrs. Lynch. Mrs. Beck, and I believe that they were 

857 involved In meetings in which it was collective. It was 

858 several people, not just ene-on-one. Barbara Newington also 

859 met with Colonel North but Z don't remember exactly when. 

860 S By the second half of 1985. did you have particular 
86 1 contributors assigned to you as your contributors? 

862 A Yes. you could phrase it that way. The 



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contributors «ho gava to th« organizations run by Hr . 
Chanr.all that I priitarily workad with would call and talk 
to. would visit, would kft*p in contact with what th« 
activities and projacts oi th« organizations wara, and it 
becaae that way. assignad, but as I said, thera was no grand 
design to it. It ;ust sort of caaa out that way. 

2 Sy tha and oi 1985. how large a group oi 
contributors did you have primary responsibility ior? 

1 I would say probably about 12 to 15. 

S Did any of these have private meetings with Colonel 
Korth or aeetings in a very small group with Colonel Xorth 
in 198S? 

1 Yes. 

fi Which ones? 

X Hrs . Lynch, nrs . Seek. Let me see. I believe Hr . 
and Rrs. Pentecost, and that is all that comes to mind at 
the moment. 

S Did you attend these meetings? 

i Xo, sir. I would help gat thMm over to the tfhlta 
Bouse. &nd get them to the right room. Sometimes Z would go 
up with them to Colonel North's office. Sometimes his 
seexetery. Pawn would meet me down in the lobby and would 
just make sure that the person get where they were supposed 
to be going. 

2 But you did not attend yourself? 



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HIR251000 PAGE 37 

A Kot any of thesa in this tiaa period, no, sir. 

2 Hhat was tha taason you did not? 

A I was not invited. 

2 U«re you told not to attand? 

A I uas not specifically told not to attend, but the 
procedure uas that the contributors would neat with Colonel 
North and from tine to time Spitz would be there too, and I 
just wasn't in on the agenda that I would be there. 

2 Are you aware of any occasions in 1985 where 
Colonel North discussed military needs of the Nicaraguan 
resistance with contributors? 

A Since I did not sit in on those meetings, Z Know 
that he was concerned about military aid. but I guess I know 
that from talking to Mr. Channell. I did not have any 
direct conversations with him about military aid. 

2 That is not my question. It is broader than that. 
Hr. Smith. 

Do you have any Information that in meetings with 
contributors during 1985 Colonel North discussed the need 
for such military aid with the contributors? 

A Z know that he discussed military aid with some 
contributors, and Z know that from being told that, and Z 
don't know when that took plaoa. 

2 Hho told you? 

A Z guess Spitz did. Hx . Channell did. 



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2 And who wera the contributors? 

A I believe Barbara Christian, because she was in on 
a meeting with several people in which they were discussing, 
I believe, missiles, and the reason I remember is, there was 
some joke about one of the contributors wanting to have 
their name put on the missile ii they paid for it or 
something, I don't know. 

2 Did Mr. Channell tell you this? 

A I have heard it somewhere during this year of these 
investigations, and I can't remember whether it was--I think 
probably it was him. This has been, as you know, a very 
long year, and I can't remember exactly who told me, but I 
don't have a reason to think it's not true. I mean, I think 
that is what it was. 

2 Uho participated in this meeting other than Barbara 
Christian? 

A I believe Mary Adamkiewicz. 

S Anyone else? 

A Perhaps Hr. John Ramsey. However, I'm not sure on 
that. 

2 And Hr. Channell reported to you about this 
meeting, is that correct? 

ns. nORRISOK> He axe running Into a problem of 
possible privileg*j^here/ is the problem. Tom. He has 
identified for you that he heard about It this year. If we 



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938 try to go any further, we ara going to run into son* 

939 problams . 

910 BY MR. FRYHAK: 

941 e Hr. Smith. I'm not inquiring about any 

9U2 conversations that you had Mith your attorneys , but you hava 

9143 statad that Hr . Channel! informed you about a raaating uhara 

944 Colonel Horth, as I understand your testimony, discussed 



9HS 



91*7 
948 



lissiles with Mrs. Christian, Dr. Adamkiewicz, and possibly 



916 Mr. Ramsey; is that correct? 



MS. MORRISOK- I think what he is saying to you, 
Tom, is he said at the time of that testimony, he was not 

9U9 sure. He assumed it was Mr. Channell, and now he has 

950 thought further and has decided that it may involve 

951 privilege. 

952 THE WITNESS: It may not have been him, where I 

953 heard that. 

9St« BY MR. rRYMANi 

955 fi It may have involved conversations with your 

956 counsel? 

957 A Yes. 

58 e Other than this possible meeting, are you aware of 

959 any other meetings held during 1985 where Colonel Korth 

960 Usoussed the need for milltsry aid? 

96 1 A There was an incident when Colonel North was flown 

962 to Texas at the expense of the organization, and while he 



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it Wi\h 



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was in Texas, he met uiih Elian Gazwood, Sunkaz Hunt, and 
Ralph HiMon. I was not in attendance at any oi those 
meetings, in the zoom with him, but it's my belief that they 
discussed the entize Nicazaguan situation, including theiz 
railitazy plight, so to speak, and theiz need foz militazy 
aid in a vaziety oi ways. 

2 Uho told you about that? 

A Well, I was on the tzip, and this comes fzom my 
memozy, just fzom being on the tzip and heazing vazious 
scattezed comments aitez the tzip was ovez and duzlng the 
tzip, and since then again this yeaz. 

2 Aze these comments by Channell? 

A Heze and theze, yes. 

2 Did Channell tell you at the time oi that tzip that 
Nozth zeviewed with Bunkez Hunt a list oi militazy equipment 
needed by the Kicazaguan zesistance? 

A Hell, let me answaz it this way. I know that 
myseli. I do have independent Knowledge oi that. When 
Colonel Hozth azzived in Dallas he got oii the plane and he 
had a long legal pad, yellow sheet, and he had wzitten 
things that they needed. He didn't say they weze militazy 
things, militazy items, but he had gotten oii the plane and 
o«mmented to I guess Spitz, we weze mil getting in the cazs 
and such, oz going into the building, that he had cone up 
with akist oi needs the izeedom iightezs have, and I doubt 



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NAME: HIR251000 \||lWfc-»'*'^' PAGE m 

seriously, I maan it was very likely it uas Killer. 

B Did you review the list? 

A Mo, sir. 

Q Did he discuss any itens on the list in your 
presence ? 

A No, sir. 

2 Did he see the list? 

A Ho, sir. 

e Sut he said he had a list that ha was going to 
review with Mr. Hunt? 

A It was the list that ha had brought to Dallas with 
him. I think it uas prinaxily for Hz. Hunt's use, but ha 
could have showed it to othaz people while ha was there. 

e Do you know the total dollar amount o£ the items on 
the list? 

A At one point I haazd that, and it was millions of 
dollars, and that is all I remember — it was millions. 

e was it «S million? 

A I honestly don't ramambaz. If you asked me 410 
million, I couldn't be any moza spaoiflo. 

e It was millions of dollars? 

A Yes. I'm not tzying to ba vagua. I just don't 



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2 Hhat did Hz. Channall tall you about Colonel 
North's meeting with Hz. Hunt in tha oouzsa of this tzlp? 



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A w, all went downtown, to downtown Dallas, and 
Colonal north and «r . Chann.ll and „r . Conrad got out oi th. 
car and w.nt into tha building wh.r. Hr . Hunt's offica is. 
I stayed in the car and went bacK to go «.et-l thinJc I went 
to go and picX up Ellen Garwood, who wa, staying at a hotel 
attending a convention in Dallas at that ti... and br.ng her 
bacK to the airport where we were to get her so she could 
meet w.th Colonel North when he was through meeting with „r . 
Hunt, because he only had the evening and we had to get 
.verybody in in the evening, and. l.f. ..., your question 
was. what do I know about the .eating? 

2 Y.s. or What did «r . Channel! tell you about the 
meeting during this trip? 

A That Colonel North talked to ... Hunt about the 
need, of the fre.do. fighters. i beli.v. th.y went to his 
ofi.ce first. They then went to a club wh.r. they had 
d.nner xn a private room, i b.li.v.. .„a th.y h.d a very 
thorough discussion on what wa. going on In Nicaragua and 
the freedo. iighters. and th. n..d.-and it w.. a. put that 
-ay. and I a.,u«. that to b. .cro..-th.-bo.rd n..d.. but 
c.rtainly including .llitary-th.t th.y h.d In ord.r to 
maintain th.lr d.f.nsiv. .fiort. 

fl Hhy did you a.su.. it includ.d .lllt.ry .qulpm.nt? 
* B.caus. th.r. had b..n dl.ou.slons about .illtary 
•quipment within our organization, .lllt.ry n..d.. To tell 



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1038 you th« truth, raayba not so nuch at that point, but aftar 

1039 that, and also Colonal North was tha kind of nan who was a 
10U0 military man who had a vary aKtansiva background in. you 
lom know, artillary. and knew what it took in ordar to daiand a 
10U2 group of man fighting in a war. 

10U3 fi What ara tha discussions that you racall within 

10UM your organization about military naads? 

lOMS A With contributors or with my fallow staff mambar or 

1046 what? 

lOU? 2 Hy quastion follows up on your ranark a aoitant ago 

1048 that you racallad discussions within youz organization about 

10>49 military naads. and I'b trying to datamlna what you wara 

1050 referring to. 

1051 A Well, during the course of our funding raising, wa 

1052 would have discussions from time to tine with contributors 

1053 about the fact that the freedom fighters are not going to be 
10514 able to maintain their effort just on humanitarian aid. and 

1055 perhaps we should try and help them with allltazy needs as 

1056 well. 

1057 e Hho participated In these discussions? 

1058 A Hyself, Hr . Channell. everybody. Hz. Conrad. 

1059 fi Mr. Conrad? 

1060 A And this Is very ambiguous for me to talk about. 
106 1 because I was not really sure at the time where these funds 
1062 were going and If they were Indeed purchasing military aid. 



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KAHE: HIR251000 V I 1 Wfcii »** ^^ " " • — — pjQj y^ 

1063 As I told you, I thought first wa w«ra giving tha halp to 

loeu Adolfo Calaio, and tha down tha coad it bacana apparant 

1065 through an evolutionary procass that it saanad that tha 

1066 funds ua wara raising uara going to Colonal North, to hin. 

1067 but I didn't know how that was baing dona othar than tha 

1068 fact that tha funds wa wara raising whanavar wa would hava 

1069 an avant or something would ba distributed through IBC, and 

1070 wa would cut a check to the International Business 

107 1 Conmunications . Of course, I later found out that it seamed 

1072 that IBC was the conduit, at least from what X have read or 

1073 have bean allowed to read. 

107U e Going back to the discussions, you recall 

1075 discussions with Hr . Channell and Mr. Conrad about raising 

1076 funds for military equipment for the resistance, is that 

1077 correct? 

1078 A Yes. sir. 

1079 2 And can you place those discussions at any point in 

1080 time? 

1081 A One incident that comes to mind, just a little 

1082 clearer because it also meshes together, is when we had the 

1083 briefing in the fall of 1985, Hr . Channell asked me to 
108(« solicit one of our contributors for missiles, and Z did so. 

1085 and the contributor gave a contribution, and this was at one 

1086 of the meetings at which we had a briefing with Colonel 

1087 Korth and then the meeting back at the hotel and the 



UNCIASSIFIED 



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iiNcussm 



NAME: HIR251000 V • » ^ "' PAGE ^S 

1088 solicitation took plac« back at tha hot«l. 

1089 e Which contributor was this? 

1090 A Hrs. Beck of Dallas. 

1091 2 This is Ms. Patricia B«ck? And was thare a 

1092 specific prica for tha missiles? 

1093 A Yes. it was *22,000 per nlssila, and she gave a 
10914 check for «'»4,000. 

1095 2 So she gave a check for two itissiles? 

1096 A Yes, sir. 

1097 2 And that was in the fall of 1985? 

1098 A Yes, sir. 

1099 2 Do you recall any discussions prior to that 

1100 incident with anyone within tha organization about seeking 
110 1 contributions for nilitary equipment? 

1102 A Well, the Bunker Hunt incident Z believe was before 

1103 that, and in all likelihood. Spitz mentioned something in 
110U passing to me about it after it took place, but I don't 

1105 remember the specifics of It. 

1106 2 Other than the Bunker Hunt Inoldent that you 

1107 believe preceded the Beck solicitation, do you recall any 

1108 other discussions? 

1109 A There was one other inoldent. The reason I asked 

1110 hex is because we have not been able to pin down when it 

1111 was. He had a terrible time figuring out when this was, but 

1112 it was when Spitz and I met with nary Adamkiewlcz, and asked 



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HknZ- HIR2S1000 miUUravlWlB t^*-' PACK 46 

1113 her to support or to mak« a contribution ior I b«li«v« it 

nit was tuo missilas. It was a diifarant kind oi missila or 

1115 soitathing, that they ware *8,000 apiece, if I remenber 

1116 correctly, and this either took place in the spring of '85 

1117 or the spring of '86, and so if indeed it was spring of '85 

1118 or early summer of '85, it would have been before the Bunker 

1119 Hunt incident, which is what I was trying to clarify. 

1120 fi Any other incident before the Beck solicitation? 

112 1 A Hot other than what I have said. 

1122 2 Following the Beck solicitation in the fall of 

1123 1985, what other occasions do you recall where funds were 
112U sought from contributors to acquire military equipment for 

1125 the Kicaraguan resistance? 

1126 A I would talk from time to time with the Pentacosts 

1127 about military aid. The Pentacosts live in south Texas, 

1128 about 150 miles from the Hexioan border, and are very 

1129 sensitive to what goes on politically in that part of the 

1130 world, and they are, as all people who supported this effort 

113 1 were, very concerned in making sure the freedom fighters in 

1132 their efforts stayed alive, so for that reason, 

1133 geographically they were always sort of focusing on it, so 
113U wa would sort of discuss military aid and I would solicit 

1135 them from time to time, and Z imagine Z did that in the fall 

1136 of '85 as well, but Z can't remember exactly when it would 

1137 have been. 



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P»Gr 47 



fi Looking ah«ad iron tha fall of 1985 and into 1986, 
what other occasions do you recall uhera there was a 
solicitation for nilitary aid? 

A There was one in January of '86 in which Spitz and 
I met with Innan Brandon, one of our supporters, and he was 
solicited for missiles, and gave a contribution of «100,000 
for that purpose. 

2 And is this the sane type of missile that costs 
»22,000 each? 

A To tell you the truth, I don't know. I uas at a 
luncheon meeting in which Spitz did the talking in this 
particular incident. It seems to me it may have been heat- 
seeking missiles. 

2 Do you recall the cost for these missiles? 

A I believe the original amount we asked for was 
•200,000. I think that was based on a number of missiles, 
but he gave SIOO.^'so the figure he gave doesn't go with what 
might have been asked for, but, no, I don't recall 
particular cost per missile in this solicitation. 

2 And this was in January of 1986? 

A Yes, slz. 

9 Was there a discussion with Hr . Brandon about his 
contribution being tax deductible? 

A I don't believe there was a speclflo discussion. 
Xhman had b»»n a supporter of the organizations for a long 



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PAGE 48 



time, and knew which organizations were and were not tax 
deductible . 

2 Let's pass that for the moment, Mr. Smith. I want 
to come back later to a letter from Mr. Brandon about that 
contribution, so we will discuss that further in connection 
with that letter. 

What other solicitations for military equipment do 
you recall? 

A Give me a moment to think. I'm moving forward in 
time in doing this. As far as specific solicitations for 
specific pieces of equipment, as we have discussed, and I'm 
saying that as opposed to just general talking about 
military aid, for example, at the Pentacosts, that is all 
that I remember. 

e Do you know Hilliam O'Boyle? 

A I know of him, yes, sir. He was a contributor who 
worked with Hs . McLaughlin in our office. 

2 Did you speak with Mr. O'Boyle about making a 
contribution for any type of military equipment? 

A The only time I ever spoke with Mr. O'Boyle was at 
a dinner at the Hay^Adams Hotel in which he and just a few 
other contributors were there. It was a smaller meeting and 
had not been quite as successful. He just weren't able to 
get many people here to Washington for it, and during the 
course of dinner conversation, I could have talked to him 



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NAME: HIR2S1000 ^IIW^I***^'" • " — pjQE U9 

1188 about military aid, but I did not solicit him, and I knou, 

1189 as a matter of iact, Ms. McLaughlin and Spitz Channell uete 

1190 sitting at opposite tables, and in the course of that 

1191 dinner, Spitz asked — I think I was sitting with him, and 

1192 asked that I move over to another table and let he and Jane 

1193 sit at the table with Mr. O'Boyle and talk to him, and this 
11914 is because it was Jane McLaughlin's contributor, you know, 

1195 as ue were talking about how we did that, and that is what I 

1196 remember about that. 

1197 Q Do you have any recollection of telling Hr . 

1198 Channell that you had been talking with Mr. O'Boyle at the 

1199 reception, and he was interested in making a contribution 

1200 for military equipment? 

1201 A I'm just trying to be as specific as I can. X 

1202 don't recall that, but it would not surprise me if, as I 

1203 said during the course of the evening we had talked about, 
120t4 well, something in the context, ''these guys have to have 

1205 bullets to keep alive,'* or something like that. 

1206 2 Were you aware that Colonel North net with Mrs. 

1207 Garwood in the spring of 1986 together with Mr. Channell, 

1208 and they discussed specific military needs of the Nicaraguan 

1209 resistance? 

1210 A I'm aware of a meeting, which I attended part of, 

1211 that took place between Colonel North, Hr . Channell, myself, 

1212 at the Hay. Adams Hotel in. I believe it was in the spring of 



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'85. 



UNCLASS!ri[D 



2 The spring of '86? 

A '86, y«s . I was there for the beginning of it, and 
then I left, and that was a prearranged thing that ue did, 
that I would be there for the beginning of the meeting and 
then leave. 

2 This was a meeting with Hrs. Garwood? 

A Yes, and it was ny impression that Colonel North 
was going to be talking to her about, again, the military 
situation in Nicaragua, and what was going on down there, 
because Mrs. Garwood was very concerned about that. 

e Were you aware that he had another list at th« time 
of that meeting? 

A At that time when we had the meeting, I did not 
know about any list that Colonel North had with him or was 
bringing with him to use as a solicitation device or 
anything . 

e Have you subsequently learned about such a list 
from a source other than your attorney? 

A Yes. During the course, since then I have had some 
brief conversations with Hr . Channell in which he was 
referring to this card that Colonel North had with him at 
that meeting. He referred to it as like an index card or 
something like that. 

Q Uhen wexe those discussions with Mr. Channell? 



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A It would have been since January of this year. 

Q Did you ever hear any discussion between Mr. 
Channell and Colonel North about solicitation of 
contributions for military equipment? 

A To the best of my recollection, I did not or was 
not a part of or sit in on a conversation with Colonel Horth 
and Mr. Channell, Spitz Channell, in which they engaged in 
back-and-f orth exchange about soliciting for military 
equipment . 

2 Did you ever hear Colonel Korth make a direct 
presentation to a potential contributor about the need for 
specific items of military equipment? 

A In his briefings he would discuss such things as 
the Soviet influx of military aid that was coming in to 
Central America, and he would always say, to ray 
recollection, if somebody asked a question about making a 
contribution or solicitation or whatever, he would say, 
'■You can't talk to me about money. You talk to this man 
over here about money,'' and point to Spitz, and so htt would 
not make the solicitation himself. 

S You recall him making that remark? 

A About not talking about money? 

e Yes. 

A Yes, sir. I do. 

2 On more than one occasion? 



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A Yes, Sir, I do. I would say probably at least 
twice and raaybe three times . 

B And was this during briefings that he held at the 
White House complex? 

A It was either at the White House or at the hotel, 
and I have a mental picture of him saying this, and I'm 
trying to remember where we were when he said it, and as I 
said. It was more than once, but it would always come as a 
result of a contributor asking a question about how do ue 
help these people with military aid, or something, or can we 
make a contribution to help with military aid, and ha would 
respond by saying what I said, and I'm just not sura where 
he said it. 

2 Do you recall hearing Colonel North speak to any 
potential contributor about the need for specific items of 
military equipment, such as missiles or grenades or 
ammunition? 

A In one instance when Colonel North was giving a 
private briefing to Mr. and Mrs. Driscoll, and I was sitting 
in on this meeting, and I believe Spitz Channell was there 
as well--or was it somebody else? It was with a contributor, 
and we ware talking about a former contribution that a 
contributor had made, and it was a contribution the 
contributor had made for surveillance-typa airplanes, and it 
was, I believe, my statement about Mr. Channell to Colonel 



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NAHE: HIR251000 MI^VmIIw^'I" " "" PAGE 53 

1288 North, the contributor helped with surveillance planes at an 

1289 earlier date and Colonel North said ''thank you very much,'* 

1290 and it was an acknowledgement I guess of him saying, you 
129 1 know, yes, I thank you, and so that is the only thing I can 

1292 remember that I can come down on with your question. 

1293 2 Do you recall the contributor? 

1294 A I'm trying to--I first thought this was the 

1295 Driscolls and then probably was Hrs. King. 

1296 2 When you say surveillance-type planes, can you be 

1297 more specific as to the type of plane? 

1298 A Military aircraft, small Maul aircraft that were 

1299 useful because they can take off and land on a short strip. 

1300 They were quiet. That is the plane that I'm talking about. 



UNCUSSiFlED 



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NAME: HIR251000 II 1 1 |J|_niJIJ I I I L. U PAGE S^ 

130 1 RPTS nCGIHK 

1302 DCHN eUINTERO 

1303 2 These planes were also used to transport supplies; 
130U were they not? 

1305 A Yes, sir. 

1306 2 Both military and humanitarian supplies? 

1307 A I do not know what they transported. 

1308 e You understood they were transport planes? 

1309 A Yes. Hell, yes, sir. 

1310 2 That was one of the functions of the planes? 

1311 A Yes, sir. 

1312 2 What contributions are you aware of that were made 

1313 for the purpose of acquiring military supplies? 
13114 A Including what I have already told you? 

1315 For example, Mrs. Beck? 

1316 2 Let's include the ones we have already discussed. 

13 17 If you could identify the contributor and the approximateiy 

1318 amount, to the best of your recollection. 

13 19 A Okay. 

1320 nrs. Beck, Ut^OOO; Inman, 100,000, Inman Brandon; the 

1321 Pentacosts, but I can't identify the specific amounts. 

1322 Uould you be kind enough to define what you mean by 

1323 military equipment? 

1324 2 Is there some particular ambiguity that you would 

1325 like me to clear up? 



UNCUSSife 



141 



HIR25 



.... UNCLASSIFIED 



'AGE 55 



Is there some particular item that you question whether is 
included in military equipment or not? 

MS. MORRISON: I think he wants to be totally 
responsive to your question, Tom, and he is trying to figure 
out how wide a circle to draw, what to include and what not 
to include . 

MR. FRYMAH: All right. 
BY MR. fRYMAN: 
e I am including in the phrase any type of equipment 
that is used for military activity, and I would include in 
that transport planes, and I would include in that 
communications equipment; if that clarification helps you. 
A Okay. 
In addition to what I said, the transport planes, Mrs. 
King gave a contribution, I believe, of 150,000 for the 
small spotter, type planes-- 

2 This th^ the maul aircraft? 
A Maul , yes . 
I remember discussing with somebody a long the way, now 
that you brought it up, the communications, and they were 
radios that> you know, you would use one out in the field 
and one in the base camp, and thare was a name for it and I 
can't remember what it was. 

I don't remember who I discussed that with, though. That 
was a very short-lived little project, and I don't remember 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



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1354 
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HIR251000 



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PAGE 56 



Who I discussed that with. 

I believe I discussed the planes also with the Pentacosts, 
and I think that was it. 

Q So you have specific knowledge of contcibutions from i 
Mrs. Beck, Mr. Brandon, fir. And Mrs. Pentacost. and Hrs. 1 
King? 

A Yes. 

2 And X take it from your answers you have general 
knowledge of such contributions indirectly, or indirect 
knowledge from information that had bean given to you by Mr. 
Channel^and others, by such individuals as Mr. Hunt and Mrs. 
Garwood ? 

A That is right. 
Very well said. 

2 Did you refer to Colonel North as ''green''? 

A Yes. 

Who told you to do that? 

V/ 
Mr. Channel'. 

,1 
What reason did he give you? 

He was telling ma one day in passing that that's 

what Richard niller and Frank Gomez called him was 

••graen.'* I can remember trying to figure out why ha was 

called ''green,'' and thinking or having somebody tall me 

perhaps it was because he was a Marina and Marines wear 

green uniforms. 



UNCUSSIRED 



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HA... HXKaS,000 y^y[j.^^./,FO -0. S7 



1376 

1377 

137 

137 

1380 

1381 

1382 

1383 

138U 

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1386 

1387 

1388 

1389 

1390 

1391 

1392 

1393 

1394 

1395 

1396 

1397 

1398 

1399 

ItOO 



2 Did he give any reason why you should call hira by 
the name • 'green'' instead of by his real nane? 

A It IS ray recollection that it is because ue were 
dealing with a person in a sensitive position, in a 
sensitive White House position, dealing with National 
Security and, perhaps, it would be better to be careful. 
For eKainple, on the telephone in discussing anything about 
hira to refer to him by this nane. 

2 Did you understand this was a coda vord or-- 

A I have given a great deal of thought to that since 
this whole ''green'' business cane up. and I, to tell you 
the truth, didn't think of it as a code nane. I thought of 
it more as a nickname, and when you enter into the word 
code, you sort of make it look more clandestine or 
something . 

But I thought, I really thought since Richard Miller and 
Frank Gomez knew him so well, they had nicknamed him that 
and told Spitz to call him ' 'green. '* I never gave it much 
thought, and since then it has been the iescinetlon of the 
world and never meant anything to me. 

fi Hhat did you call Colonel Korth when you spoke to 
him directly? 

A Colonel North. 

2 You didn't call him by his first name? 

A Ko, sir. I have never called him by his first name. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



144 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR251000 VIIVI-IIWII t^V pAGE S8 

1401 I might say ''Ollie'' sitting here with you because 

1>402 everybody calls him Ollie these days, but I never called him 

m03 Ollie. 

1404 S And you never called him ''green''? 

1405 A No. There were contributors from time to time that 

1406 uould say hello Mr. Green, or Colonel Green, and would sort 

1407 of joke with him like that, but I never did that. 

k 

1408 2 Did you know about an account in the Channel/ 

1409 structure called the ''toys account''? 

t 

14 10 A Yes, I did become aware of such an account as time 

14 11 wore on. 

1412 2 When did you become aware of that? 

14 13 A I think probably--this is another one of those areas 

14 14 that I am very ambiguous on myself. While I was under Mr. 

1415 Channel's employ I did not go around referring to a '"toys 

14 16 account,'" as you might think from things that have come out 

1417 in the media, that we went in every day at the office at 9 

1418 o'clock and sat down and talked about the "'toys account'* 

14 19 !^»^ eight hours. That is not how it was with me, and that 

'' U 

1420 IS not how it was with Mr. Channel^ 

\ 

142 1 Somehow or another that name came into being referring to 

1422 one of thclbank accounts. I never understood anything about 

1423 it until all this came up this year in which It was talked 

1424 about how it came into being when the Christmas solicitation 

1425 for nr . Calero came about for toys, and also there ware 



UNCUSSIFO 



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11428 
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1447 
1448 
1449 
1450 



times, isolated instances, when I would talk to Mr. Mcriahon, 
who was the accountant, and he would talk about the ''toys 
account,'* and say it in jest or in fun. And I never paid 
any attention to it. 

I understand that it is supposed to have been a military 
account and that ''toys'* was its nicknane, but that was 
something that, and still to this day, remains a mystery to 
me why it was called that, or how that came about. I still 
don't understand it. 

e You did not have an understanding the account was 
used for that purpose, during 1986, or you did not have the 
understanding during 1986, that the ''toys account'' was the 
account where military contributions were placed? 

A That is right. Because we were--we had, as you know, 
a good number of bank accounts and we would cut checks out 
of those accounts to go over to IBC from all of those 
accounts . 

Q Were you aware that there was--there were changes 
ordered in the NEPL accounting records in late 1986 to 
remove the nane ''toys*' from the internal records? 
HS. MORRISON! i would note, Tom, that your 
questions assumes the fact that certainly isn't before us 
through this witness . 

MR. FRYHAN: I will rephrase the question, if you 
want to object to the form of it. 



UNtmSM 



146 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAriE: HIR251000 ll|lUknWwll IkV PAGE 60 

1U51 HS . nORRISOH: Let us conier for a second. 

11452 (Discussion off the record.) 

11453 ns . KORRISOH: I assume you are talking about 
1U5U conversations that did not involve counsel? 

11455 MR. FRYHAH: I am, yes. 

11456 BY HR. FRYHAK: 

ms? Q Would you like me to rephrase the question. Mr. 

1458 Smith? 

11459 A If you wouldn't mind, I would appreciate it. 

11460 2 Are you aware of any changes that were made in the 
1146 1 internal financial records of the Channel/ organization 

11462 during 1986, with respect to the name of the ' ' toys 

11463 account' ' ? 

I14614 ns. nORRISOK: Other than conversations involving 

1465 counsel? 

11466 BY HR. FRYMAM: 

1467 fi Other than conversations with your attorney? 

11468 A Ho. 

11469 S Hr . Smith, we have been talking about your 

1U70 activities in part in 1986, with respect to fund raising, 

1(47 1 and particularly fund raising with respect to military 

11472 equipment for the Nicaraguan ;(esistance during 1986, as well 

11473 as 1985. Hhat other activities were you engaged in in 1986? 
1U714 ns. nORRISOK: Are you talking about through the 
11475 organization we have already identified? 



wussw 



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KAMI: HIR251000 



UNCUSSIFIED 



PAGE 61 



1476 MR. FRYHAN: Yes, yes, yes. 

1(477 THE WITNESS: Well, let's see. In 1986 we did an 

1478 independent expenditure in the State of Maryland, and by 

1479 that I mean the Antifterrorism American Committee, which was 
mSO one of Mr. Channel's political action committees. 

1481 Of course, we had the elections last fall, and the 

11482 American Conservative Trust participated in those elections. 

1483 BY MR. FRYMAN: 

1484 2 And were you raising funds for campaigns in 

1485 connection with votes in Congress on aid for Micaraguan 

1486 Resistance during 1986? 

11487 A For ACT, for the American Conservative Trust, we 

1488 sponsored a variety of independent expenditures, and they 

1489 were. I believe, all for Senators and they were just for 

1490 Senators who Spitz felt that needed the help. 

1491 I don't think he based that particularly on anything to do 

1492 with Nicaragua. I think probably they all voted for 

1493 Nicaraguan aid, but they were just folks that needed help. 

1494 2 Are you familiar with a product called the ''Central 

1495 American Freedom Program''? 

1496 A Yes. 

1497 e What was that? 

1498 A Well, the Central American Freedom Program — I have to 

1499 digress here for a moment — was the collective name of our 

1500 television advertising campaign sponsored by the National 



wmsro 



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1502 
1503 
ISOU 
ISOS 
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1519 
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1522 
1523 
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1S2S 



PAGE 62 



HIR251000 '.r U "^i V 
Endoument in the spring o£ '86. 

2 And were you involved in raising iunds for that? 

A Yes. 

2 And was there also a lobbying component of that 
program that according to the meraorandun describing the 
program was to be conducted by another organization called 
' ' Sentinel ' ' ? 

A Yes, I believe that's how--as you are talking about 
his memorandum. I don't remember what you're talking about. 

2 Other than raising funds for the program what was 
your involvement in the Central American Freedom Program in 
1986? 

A Well, the kick-off event for the Central American 
Freedom Program was a meeting we held at the White House on 
January 30, I believe it was. in which we met with President 
Reagan, and about 30 of our top contributors came to town, 
and met u^^rfi the Roosevelt Room of the White House. We had 
some words about Linda Chavez. 

The President spoke, and Spitz also spoke at the end of 
the meeting, and it was to raise funds for the advertising 
campaign sponsored by NEPL to educate the American public on 
the issue of Kicaragua and on why it was important that the 
Freedom fighters be supported. 

2 Right. 
And you were involved in-- 



ONCLASSIRED 



149 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME' HIR251000 ^|lV*-IW%/*> *^*' PAGE 63 

1526 A In raising funds for that, in inviting people to the 

1527 meeting. 

1528 2 Right. 

1529 But apart from the fund-raising side of it, were you 

1530 involved in the planning of the program, the strategic 

1531 decisions, the selection of media markets in 1986? 

1532 A No, sir. 

1533 2 Here you involved in any of the lobbying activities 

1534 in 1986? 

1535 A I raised several contributions for Sentinel in the 

1536 summer, right as the last vote came down to the wire, in 

1537 which — the vote in which the military aid was, I believe, 

1538 approved. And that was--since Sentinel could lobby for 

1539 issues or legislation, X think that was the only time, as 

1540 you define it like that, that I did anything with Sentinel 

1541 in that context. 

1542 Q Again, apart from the fund raising aspect, though, 

1543 were you involved in any of the implementation side of the 

1544 lobbying activities? 

1545 For example, were you involved in targeting of 

1546 Congressmen? Were you involved in any strategy meetings 

1547 where it was discussed how lobbying efforts would be 

1548 directed toward particular Congressmen? 

1549 A Ko, not to my recollection. I was not involved in 

1550 that area of planning. I was involved in raising the funds, 



DNCUSSifilB 



150 



NAME- HIR251000 



ONClASSiREO 



1551 and that uas just about it throughout the time of ray 

1552 employment with Mr. Channel. 

1553 2 Now, you mentioned you were involved in an 

15SU independent expenditure in Maryland. What race uas that? 

1555 A That uas the Senatorial race in uhich Linda Chavez 

1556 uas running for the Republican nomination, and Michael 

1557 Barnes and Barbara Mikulski uere opposing each other to be 

1558 elected on the Democratic ticket side. 

1559 e Are you familiar uith transfers of funds between the 

1560 different campaign organizations? 

156 1 Let me ask you then a specific question. 

1562 A Thank you. 

1563 C Uere you auare of a series of transfers of funds 

1564 from NEPL to Sentinel in March of 1986? 

1565 A Ho. 

1566 S You weren't auare that those had occurred? 

1567 A No, sir. NEPL to Sentinel? 

1568 2 From NEPL to Sentinel? 

1569 . A Ho. _, 

1570 MR. rRYMAN:\7/isk the reporter to mark as Smith 

1571 deposition Exhibit 1 for identification, a group of 

1572 docunents uhich have been selected from the materials 

1573 produced by counsel for the Channel organization. 

157U The first page of the exhibit contains the date of the 

1575 document, uhere the date can be determined from the 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



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1577 

1578 

1579 

1580 

1581 

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1583 

1584 

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1587 

1588 

1589 

1590 

159 

1592 

1593 

1594 

1595 

1596 

1597 

1598 

1599 

16 



document, as well as an indication of the document 
identification number that was placed on each page by 
counsel from the Channel organization. 

(The Exhibit No. FCS-1 was marked for identification.] 
[ Brief recess . 1 
BY MR. FRYHAK: 
2 Mr. Smith, the repor^ has marked Smith deposition 
Exhibit 1 for identification, and I have a number of 
questions for you about the pages in this exhibit. Before 
ue are starting through this exhibit, however, I believe you 
indicated at the beginning that your employment by Mr. 
Channels' ceased in May of 1987; is that correct. 
A The end of May. 

fi And have you continued to be employed in the 
Washington, D.C. area since then? 

A Yes. Well, I am employed, and I'm also — 
2 I believe I have a pending question. 

A Yes, sir. I am employed by a nontprofit foundation. 
2 How, turning to Exhibit 1 , Mr . Smith, and directing 
your attention to the second and third pages in that 
exhibit, which are to mailgrams, and the identification 
numbers are 30573, and 30574, one is from you to Major 
Patton, and the second is from you to Mr. Caldwell. 

There's a reference in those mailgrams toward the end to 
special project which comes on line in eight days. What 



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1602 
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1605 
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1625 



HIR25 1000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 66 



ioes that refer to' 



A I uould imagine--! tell you. This probably is a fund^ 
raising device, and I am not aware, nor do I remember, what 
the specific special project was. 

For that reason, you would think that I would because it 
IS so clearly defined here. I uould think, perhaps, this is 
a fund-raising device, or it could mean--uhat's the date of 
this mailgram? 

2 It appears at the top to be October 21, 1985. 

A In all honesty, I just don't know. 

2 Does that relate in any way to contributions for 
military equipment? 

A It could and could not. 

2 Did you draft his mailgram? 

A Mo, sir. 

2 Who did? 

U' 
A It appears to me to be Mr. Channel's writing, 
^ \ 

Sp;fitz' writing. 

A Turning to the next document, which is a letter from 
Mr. Brandon, dated February 12, 1986, to your attention and 
Mr. Channel's attention; is that the transmittal letter that 
accompanied the ♦100,000 contribution for missiles that you 
described earlier? 

A Yes, sir, it is. 

2 Mow, you will note the first paragraph where he says 



ONCLASSIHED 



153 



UNCLASSIFIED 



HIR251000 VllUknUUII iLIJ PAGE 67 
that ''It is particularly gratifying to respond to the 
request for tan-free contributions, as I an herewith.'" Do 
you know the basis for his understanding that this was a tax- 
free contribution? 

A That would, to me, be the fact that he knew that the 
National Endowment was a nonfjprofit foundation and, as such, 
contributions to it were tax deductible. I had worked with 
Inman for some time and ever since the inception of the 
National Endowment, he would have known from telling him m 
the past that it was a tax deductible. 

He sort of misphrases, actually tax free is not right. 
But I, of course, know what you mean, what he is saying. 

It would just be--you probably know a contribution to the 
American Red Cross is tax deductible, and he would know it 
is to NEPL. 

2 The discussions that you and Mr. Channel had with 
nr . Brandon indicated to him that a contribution to NEPL 
would be a tax; deductible contribution; is that correct? 
MS. MORRISON: That's not what he's saying. 
Tom, he's saying that conversation may well not have but 
that prior affiliation with the organization. 

MR. FRYMAN: Hell, let me rephrase the question. 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 
Q Do you recall a discussion that you had with Mr. 
Brandon where you indicated that his contribution for the 



UNCLASSIFIED 



154 



UNCUSSIflED 



HAME: HIR251000 11 1 1 III M. 1,1 1 f | T I I ^l^^^ ^8 

1651 «100,000 reflected in this letter, would be a tax deductible 

1652 contribution? 

1653 A Ho, sir. I do not. 

165U If that had happened, it would have taken place at the 

1655 meeting we had in January when this grant was solicited, and 

1656 I remember what I have told you about that conversation, and 

1657 the missiles being solicited, but I, in all honesty, don't 

1658 remember going into detail to whether it's tax deductible or 

1659 not at that meeting, because that was not the purpose of the 

1660 meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to talk about the 

1661 grant. 

1662 2 But at the time of that neeting there had been a 

1663 history of discussions with Hr . Brandon where you understand 

1664 that he understood that contributions to HEPL were tax 

1665 deductible; is that correct? 

1666 A Yes, from prior conversations. 

1667 2 From prior conversations? 

1668 A Yes, sir. 

1669 e Do you recall specifically this letter dated 

1670 February 12, from Hr . Brandon? 

1671 A Yes. sir. 

1672 2 And when you received It, and you read the first 

1673 paragraph where he talked about a tax-free contribution, did 
167>4 you understand that to mean a tax^ deductible contribution? 
1675 A Yes, sir. 



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HIR251000 Ul 1 ULnULIII ILLI PAGE 69 

2 And did you, or to your knowledge, «t . Channel, take 
any steps to indicate to him that this contribution would 
not be tax deductible? 

A No, sir. 

2 Turning to the n^ letter from you to Mrs. HcFaddin, 
dated March 13, which is a document with the identification 
number 33S01, by your counsel-- 

A To Mrs. McFaddin; okay. 
I have got that. 

2 Do you recall sending this letter? 

A No, I don't recall specifically sending it but 
that's my signature so I am sure I sent it. 

2 Do you know if this was a solicitation for a 
contribution to KEPL? 

A Well, it's obviously a solicitation because I asked 
her for money. 

2 Yes, but was it for NEPL as opposed to ACT or 
Sentinel? 

A Yes, sir, it was for NEPL. I refer to it being tax 
deductible . 

2 And this is for funds for the purchase of air time 
in connection with the vote in Congress next Wednesday, 
Harch 19; is that correct. 

A Yes . This would have been our--this would have been 
part of the Sentinel American Freedom program, is what I was 



wiAssm 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



y/ 



NAME: HIR251000 U I 1 U|.r|lj tl I I I L U V'k'^T. 70 

1701 asking her for 

1702 2 Did you draft this letter or did Mr. Channel'. 

1703 A Probably I did. 

1704 2 Was it your understanding of the television 

1705 advertisements being sponsored by NEPL was to attempt to 

1706 effect a constitutional vote scheduled for March 19? 

1707 A No . It was my understanding that KEPL was doing 

1708 things--was doing the ads for the Central American Freedom 

1709 program to discuss the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighter issue and 
17 10 why It was important for the American people to support 

17 11 tha-^. . 

17 12 Uhat seems to be the case here is we had gotten up so 

17 13 close to the vote--the date of the letter is the 13--that 

17 14 inevitably every one was very, very--as far as our office 

17 15 goes was very focused in on this upcoming vote, and I put 

1716 this in here in this context, is what I gather. 

17 17 2 Well, there was no intention of running the ads 

17 18 after the vote, was there? 

1719 A I wouldn't think so, no. 

1720 2 Why not? 

172 1 A Because then the issue would be over for the moment. 

1722 Even if it had been voted down it would be another year 

1723 before it came up again if it was the final vote. 



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157 



UNCUSSIFIED 



HIR251000 IJllUknWII t*-*^ PAGE 71 

RPTS CANTOR 
DCHN PARKER 

2 So is it correct that your understanding oi the 
purpose oi the ads was to attempt to affect the vote? 

MS. MORRISON: He answered that question already. 
MR. FRYMAN: In light of his last answer, Mrs. 
Morrison, I thought it appropriate to pose the question to 
him again. 

MS. MORRISON: You are asking him when he wants to 
change his testimony in response to that question? 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 
2 In light of your last answer, do you wish to change 
your earlier answer, Mr. Smith? 
A No. 

2 Turning to the next document, which is a mailgram 
dated April 17, 1986, from you to Jerry Finger, in that 
mailgram, Mr. Smith, there is a reference toward the middle 
to a working dinner. • 'After the dinner, a special project 
to specifically support the President's goals in regard to 
Nicaragua will be discussed and undertaken by the group.'' 

What does that phrase refer to, and what is the 
special project? 

A This would have been April 17, t4-17; is that what 
that is? 

S That is what I understand it is, yes. 



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17S0 
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1753 
17SU 
1755 
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A And ue know the year? 

2 It says 1986. 

A Here ue go, okay. Thank you. This would have been 
the Central American Freedom Program, and this would have 
been the television, I suppose. The various components of 
that program, and the special project would have been that, 
and it would have been telling the group about that, those 
who didn't yet know about it. 

8 Does the phrase, ''special project,'' in that 
mailgram refer to military aid or solicitation for military 
aid? 

A No, sir, Mr. Fryman. I understand why you would 
think that, but that is just Mr. Channel's writing. That is 
how he wrote things. It didn't necessarily mean anything 
sometimes, and sometimes it did. To me, when you ask me, ny 
honest answer to you is it would mean the Central American 
Freedom Program, but it might have meant just a nice way to 
write--to send out a nice direct mail tactic in the form of a 
mailgram. 

2 Turning to the next document, which is document 
33520, and is a handwritten letter signed, "Cliff" to Hary 
Jo, dated apzil 22, 1986; is that your handwriting, Mr. 
SMith? 

A Yes, it is. 

2 And to whom is that letter addressed? 



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159 



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NAHE: HIR251000 11 1 1 III f\U ^ fc S i SU W PAGE 73 
17714 A It IS Mary Joi Pentacost. 

1775 2 Would you read that for the record? 

1776 MS. MORRISON: The document is here. It is part of 

1777 the record. 

1778 MR. FRYMAN: The handwriting is not completely 

1779 clear, and I just think it would be useful to read the 

1780 handwriting into the record. 

1781 THE HITNESS: ''Mary Jo: I want you here to stand 

1782 hand in hand and heart in heart with me to have your private 

1783 moment alone suspended forever in time with the President. 

1784 You will never forget it, Mary Jo. Cliff' 

1785 BY MR. FRYMAN: 

1786 2 What were you attempting to convey by this letter. 

1787 Mr. Smith? 

1788 A I am a little bit confused myself, because of the 

1789 date of the letter. In all likelihood, what this was, Mr. 

1790 Fryman, was during the course of my employ with Mr. Channel. 
179 1 we engaged the service of Mr. David Fi'^er, who from time to 

1792 time helped to arrange meetings at the White House, and I 

1793 imagine that this was an effort to try and have Mr. and Mrs. 

1794 Pentacost. Mary Jo and possibly their sister. Mrs. McKinley. 

1795 to come up and have a meeting with the President. 

1796 They are some of the most literally, out of 

1797 everyone I have ever met in my life, some of the most 

1798 committed people to what they believe in, and they were not 



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able to corae, and the reason I an confused about this is 
because it seems to me the date should have been in January, 
because that is when the meeting, the group neeting with the 
President was. 

Since it is in April, I would imagine this was an 
effort to have them come up alone and meet with the 
President, and have Mr. Pi^er arrange this. Does that help 
any? 

e Is this your phrasing in this letter? 

A Yes, it is. 

2 Mrs. Pentacost, by this point, had made a 
contribution for military supplies; is that correct? 

A Yes, sir, in all likelihood. 

fi What had the total amount of her contributions been 
by this point? 

A I would imagine about «35,000, somewhere around 
there, 35 to MO, I would say. 

2 At this point, did you expect that you might be 
able to obtain additional contributions from Mrs. Pentacost? 

A We, as long as I was undar tha employ of Hr . 
Channel^, and we were working on various projects, we would 
need the financial support of our contributors. So I don't 
think I would ever reach a point where I would say, ''Well, 
no, we don't need any support.'' 

2 Has it your understanding that Mrs. Pentacost had 



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what you considered to be substantial wealth? 

MS. MORRISON: Can we go off the record? 
[Discussion held off the record. 1 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 
2 I uill withdraw the' last question, Mr. Smith. 
What was the reason that you were proposing a 
meeting between the President and Mrs. Pentacost and her 
sister? 

A And her husband. 
2 And her husband. 

A The Pentacosts were very special people who had 
contributed to the best of their ability, very generously, 
and we thought it would be very nice ii they could sett the 
President. 

e Do you know if the Pentacosts ever net with 
President Reagan? 

A Yes, they did. 

Q Turning to the next docunent. which is a letter 
dated April 23. 1986. from you to Mrs. Patricia Beck, do you 
recognize that letter? 

A Yes, I do, if I can read it through one more tine. 
lOff the record. 1 
MR. FRYMAN: Back on tha rttcotd. 
THE WITNESS: You would like an explanation of this 



letter? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



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NAME: HIR2S1000 ^ - - -^ • w -w ■ ■ ■ sb. a^ ?kGt 76 

1849 MR. FRYMAM: You asked the question very well, Mr. 

1850 Smith. On this one you can provide both the question and 

1 85 1 the answer . 

1852 THE UITNESS' To be as brief and maXe as much sense 

1853 as possible, the National Endowment was hoping to enter into 
18514 a project called, ''The Future oi Freedom Forums.'' This 

1855 idea came about in late 1985. It would be a series of 

1856 speaking engagements by which the major Presidential 

1857 candidates for 1988 would be invited to speak at MEPL 

1858 sponsored events called the Future Freedom Forums, and give 

1859 the candidate an opportunity to talk about lU i Hnyti we talk** 

1860 about. 

186 1 He had tried to go with the first one with Vice 

1862 President Bush. Mrs. Beck in Dallas is a great supporter of 

1863 Vice President Bush, and is a great fan and friend of his, I 

1864 understand, and we were going to use this opportunity at her 

1865 home. She has quite a substantial home, to have a nice 

1866 group of folks there invited from across the political 

1867 spectrum in Dallas, to give everybody a chance to come and 

1868 hear Bush, and it was going to be filmed and taped and the 

1869 video tapes were then going to be distributed to 

1870 various--whoever wanted them down the road, if they wanted to 

187 1 learn more about Vice President Bush and his views and 

1872 opinions on the issues. 

1873 So I went down, saw Mrs. Beck, met with her and 



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1874 solicited this grant, and she was very kind to give it, and 

1875 this uas in December of 1985 when I did this, and from 

1876 December oi 1985 until April of 1986, it just dragged. Ue 
577 had received tentative--uell , approval for the project, it is 

1878 my under s tand^-^fr ore Vice President Bush's office, and then it 

1879 seems that there were conflicts that arose, and he uas 
unable to go through with participation in this effort. 

1881 2 So you returned the grant? 

1882 A Yes, because ue ueren't going to have it at her 

1883 house, and she wanted the money back, so of course ue hadn't 
188U spent it because the project hadn't gone like we had hoped 
1885 according to schedule. 

16 2 Vou referred earlier to contributions or a 

contribution from Mr. Beck for certain items of military 
equipment . 

1889 A Yes. 

1890 e This letter has nothing to do with that 

1891 contribution; is that correct? 
•2 A Absolutely nothing. 

1893 2 If you would turn to the next pages, which are 

189U 36710 through 36714, which refer to a fund-raiser meeting on 

1895 Hay 23, 1986, do you recall attending such a fund-raiser 

1896 meeting on or about that date? 

1897 A No, sir, I do not recall being at this particular 

1898 meeting. I am aware of what this is, and I know of it and 



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HIR2S1000 III^JlS! i*,^.\iiii" *5^" SS P*GE 78 

It is in here. 

HS. MORRISON: You answered the question. 

BY HR. FRYMAN: 

2 Have you seen these pages before? 

A No. 

C What do you mean you know everything that is in 

here ? 

A If this is what I think it is, this is what Jane 

McLeughlin talked about on national T i V I, when she came out 

earlier this year and was discussing her employment under 

L 
Mr. Channel'^ and things that she did. 

2 Is your only knowledge of this from hearing tha 
discussion on television by Jane KcLl^ughlin? 

A Other than with counsel, yes, sir. 

2 On page 36712, Mr. Smith, toward the middle of the 
page, there is a statement, ''So when these people give us 
$30,000 and our ads cost *35,000 a day around the country, 
there are in many districts literally giving a political 

contribution to support President Reagan's congressional 

U 
candidates.'' Do you recall any discussion with Mr. Channe]^ 

or other employees of the Channe^ organizations similar to 

that statement in connection with fund-raising activities 

for the Central American Freedom Program? 

A Never. 

2 Turning to page STSUS, which is a latter to you 



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1924 from Richard Miller, dated September 2, 1986-- 

1925 A Letter ior Richard Miller from me. 

1926 2 Ves. Refers to a record of action of the Antif- 

1927 Terrorism American Committee. What was your position on 

1928 that committee? 

1929 A I raised funds for it. I was not an officer, an 

1930 official officer of the Anti-l-^errorisra Committee. 

1931 2 Were you a director of it? 

1932 A No, sir. 

1933 2 If you will look at the next page, which is SeoOU. 
193U which IS a mailgram dated September 9, 1986, to Colonel 

1935 North, it appears to be signed at the bottom by Cliff Smith, 

1936 Director. Can you explain the reason for that title there? 

1937 A Mr. Fryman, I remember vaguely Mr. Channel^ 

1938 dictating this mailgram, and Chris Littledale and I, who 

1939 worked for Mr. Channel, had worked very hard during our time 

1940 of employment for him, and had been very committed to what 

1941 we had been doing, and he wanted to sign our names to this 
19142 just as a nice gesture to us. 

19U3 . I think he felt it would be nice for Colonel North 

19'4'4 to get this letter from all three of us, and since he was 

19US signing as president. I think frankly he thought it would be 

19U6 nice to have a title after our name, and did it just in that 

1947 context. 

1948 2 That telegram concerns Congressman Michael Barnes, 



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HIR251000 ijiiUi najiiijll ELsJ ''**'^ ®° 

and he is identified as a foe of the freedom fighter 
/Movement. Had you understood Mr. Barnes to be one of the 
leading foes of the freedom y'ighter M^ovement? 

A I would find it difficult to be at all involved in 
working in politics in Washington and not know that Mr. 
Barnes is a foe of the freedom fighter (Movement. 

2 And he had been one of the leaders of the campaign 
against United States aid for the Kicaraguan resistance that 
your organization had been supporting in 1985 and 1986. had 
he not? 

A That is correct. 

2 And you had been working with Colonel North in that 
campaign in support of such legislation; is that correct? 

A I never discussed legislation with Colonel North, 
but I understand your question, I believe, is that we had 
been-- 

ns . MORRISON: You have answered the question. 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 

2 Colonel North had been specifying at briefings that 
had been a part of your fund-raising efforts for the Central 
American Freedom Program, had he not? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 This telegram or this mailgram which we are 
discussing-- 

MS. MORRISON: YOU have been discussing mailgram. 



minssm 



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UNWSSfflf!) 



NAME: HIR2510OO vf | ^ v ■>-■ »'«^ — ' " " PAGE 81 

197U I think Mr. Smith has been responding to generic questions 

1975 that don't have anything necessarily to do with this. 

1976 BY MR. FRYMAN: 

1977 2 The raailgrara which is a part of Exhibit 1, which is 

1978 document 36004, and which you signed together with Mr. 

U 
Channel^ and Mr. Littledale, states that, ' ' Ue at the Anti-f 

Terrorism American Committee feel proud to have participated 

1981 in a campaign to insure Congressman Barnes' defeat.'' Uas 

982 the reason that you selected the Barnes campaign for an 

1983 effort by the Anti^^errorism American Committee the fact 

198'4 that Mr. Barnes had been one of th« leading foes of the 

)85 Freedom Fighter ttovement? 

MS. MORRISON: Object to the question on relevance. 

1987 Why Mr. Smith, whose name appears on the document you have 

1988 referred to, but not his signature, or anybody else involved 

1989 in those organizations may or may not have supported a 

1990 particular political candidate in connection with activity 
199 1 by an organization that never did anything on the Nicaraguan 

1992 issue directly, it seems to me, is Irrelevant to these 

1993 proceedings. 
I99U If you want to ask the witness whether he, himself, 

1995 participated in or whether he has any knowledge of 

1996 discussions about the Barnes campaign with Colonel North, 

1997 that might make it relevant to these proceedings. But it 

1998 seems to ne that the reasons why somebody supports a 



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HiR25,ooo uilULHOOSIiLU "" '' 

political candidate or doesn't support a political candidate 
should be viewed with a certain amount of privilege, if you 
will, and particularly here where they are not relevant to 
matters before the committee. 

MR. FRYMAN- Do you understand the question, Mr. 
Smith? 

MS. MORRISOH: Do you understand the question? 

THE HITHESS: I have totally forgotten the sense of 
all that. 

MR. FRYMAH: Would the reporter read back the 
question, please? 

(The question was read by the reporter.] 

BY MR. FRYMAN: 
fi Mr. Smith, the reporter has read back my question 
with respect to the mailgram, which is document SSOOH, and 
my immediate question following Mrs. Morrison's remark is do 
you understand the question that I posed to you about that 
mailgram? 

A Yes. 

2 Mould you answer the question? 

MS. MORRISON; I will direct the witness on the 
basis of the objection that I have already placed on the 
record not to answer the question. 

MR. FRYMAN: Mrs. Mozxlson, I have a number of 
additional questions for Mr. Smith with respect to the 



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HIR251000 UllUL-nVIVII MimV PAGE 83 

activities by this committee in f 8 ■ i L i erit to Congressman 
Barnes. Rather than taking unnecessary time today, is it 
your position that you will direct the witness not to answer 
any questions relating to that campaign? 

MS. MORRISON: Within the confines of the last 
objection that I made. yes. 

HR. FRYHAH: When you say. ''within the confines,'* 
you mean for the reasons stated in your last objection you 
would make a similar objection? 

MS. MORRISON! i would except to the extent that 
the question that I suggested to you, whether or not Mr. 
Smith is aware of activities by Colonel North that involve 
that particular campaign, I think if you wanted to explore 
that particular area there might be some acceptable 
questions there, but otherwise, yes, I would continue my 
objection to anything else. 

BY MR. FRYMAN: 
2 Let me ask one question related to the one you 
suggested. Why did you send this telegram to Colonel North? 

ns . MORRISON: That doesn't necessarily get us to 
the sane question, Mr. Fryman. 

MR. FRYMAN: So you are directing the witness? 

MS. MORRISON: As you know fron earlier dealings-- 

HR. FRYMAN: So you are directing the witness not 
to answer that question? 



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NAME- HIR251000 U ! 1 U&-riV' ^ ! i 3 L &<» P'^^E 8U 

2049 HS. nORRISON: Yes, insofar as the record doesn't 

2050 already reflect that it is not something he drafted, but 

2051 rather something Mr. Channel drafted . 

1 

2052 BY MR. FRYMAN: 

2053 2 I believe your prior testimony, Hr . Smith, is that 
205U you participated and discussed with Hr . Channel the sending 

2055 of this raailgram, is that not correct? 

2056 A No, sir. I did not help write it in that way of 

2057 participation. I believe I didn't know about it until after 

2058 it was already written, and when he was dictating it, I 

2059 believe over the phone, he had already written it. 

2060 S But you knew about it before it was sent. 

2061 A Perhaps. 

2062 2 And you knew your name was going to be signed to 

2063 it, or your name was going to be included at the end of the 
2061 paragraph as one of the senders of the mailgram? 

2065 A I would like to slightly alter what X said a moment 

2066 ago. My confusion comes over the fact that I cannot 

2067 remember whether I saw the Western Union copy that comes to 

2068 you after you send a mailgram. They send it to you in the 

2069 mail as just a confirmation, or whether I heard Mr. Channel 

2070 dictating this. 

207 1 I was around him many times when he would dictate 

2072 things over the phone, and it was one of the two, so I could 

2073 have known. 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



NAriE: HIR2S1000 V I « W Uf 1 W V/ I • I L> V PAGE 85 

20714 2 Did you concur in the sending of this telegram or 

2075 raailgrara? 

2076 MS. MORRISON: Ue are getting into a conclusion, 

2077 Mr. Fryraan. He has just told you he is not even sure 

2078 uhether he knew that it uas being sent before it uas sent. 

2079 He may have learned about it for the first time when a copy 

2080 was received back at the office. That doesn't sound like 

2081 concurrence to rae . It sounds like learning that an action 

2082 has been performed. 

2083 BY MR. FRYMAN: 

208M 2 Do you understand my question. Mr. Smith? 

2085 A If I was not aware that it was being sent, not 

2086 until after the copy came in the mail, then I don't sea how 

2087 I could concur with it if I don't know until afterwards. 

2088 2 As I understand it, your recollection now is that 

2089 you may have been aware of this before it was sent, or you 

2090 may have been aware of it after it was sent, and you are not 
209 1 sure which . 

2092 A That is my testimony. 

2093 2 That is correct. 
209U A Yes, sir. 

2095 2 On the assumption that you were aware of it before 

2096 it was sent, did you take any steps to stop the sending of 

2097 the mailgram? 

2098 MS. MORRISON: Now we are getting into if's and 



DNMSSiFlED 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



NAME: HIR251000 UllVknUUll I L. LI ^'^^^ ^^ 

2099 hypotheticals . He doesn't remembei whether he Knew about it 

2100 beiore or after, whether he had any recollection of it 

2101 occurring before the fact, then he would have a clear 

2 102 recollection about whether or not he knew it was sent before 

2103 or after the fact, so it seens to me that the inference to 

210<4 be drawn from the testimony is he didn't have a whole hell- 

2105 of-a-lot to do with it before it got sent and if he did, it 

2 106 didn't involve himself so that he can now even recall 

2107 whether he knew about it before the fact or after the fact. 

2108 BY MR. FRYMAMt 

2109 S I don't want to prolong this. Let me ask one final 

2110 question. At the time you became aware of this mailgram, 

2111 whenever it was, did you take any steps to have the mailgram 
2 112 withdrawn or have your name removed from it? 

2 113 A I would not have had the power to do that. 

2 1 1M 2 So is the answer to my question, no? 

2115 A Not necessarily. 

2 116 2 Let me ask the question again. At the time you 

2 117 learned of this mailgram, did you take any steps to have the 

2 118 telegram or mailgram withdrawn. 

2 119 ns. HORRISOM: Hr . Fryman, if he didn't believe at 

2 120 the time that he hadiThe power to take such steps, he might 

2 12 1 well not have ever even considered taking any. 

2122 MR. FRYMAN: He can say yes or no, and explain the 

2123 reasons, but I think I am entitled to a yes or no. 



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THE WITNESS: A yes or no and to whether I would 
have stopped it if I could or withdrawn it. 

MR. FRYMAN: No, did you take any steps? 

MS. MORRISON: Did you actually do anything to get 
your name taken off that? 

THE WITNESS: No. I did not. 

MR. FRYMAN: Off the record. 

(Discussion held off the record.) 

MR. KAPLAN: Back on the record. 

Mr. Smith, do you know why this mailgram was sent? 

MS. MORRISON: Actually I have the same objection 
to that question that I had to the one Ton asked earlier. 
It could revolve around a whole lot of reasons that have 
nothing whatsoever to do with the matters before this 
committee . 

MR. KAPLAN: I think if we get an answer to that 
question, which is just a yes or no as to whether he knows 
why, I think we may be able to break down the ones that 
might have something to do with relevance to this committee 
and the ones that don't. 

HS. MORRISON: The witness has asked for a moment 
to consult, so we will take a couple of minutes. 
(Recess. 1 



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NAME: HIR251000 

2147 RPTS nCGINM 

2148 DCHH euiNTERO 

2149 HR. KAPLAN: i will just repeat the question for the 

2150 benefit of coming back on the record. 

2151 BY HR. KAPLAN: 

2152 B Mr. Smith, we are talking about a mailgram that's 

2153 number A-36004, that's been provided to the committee by 
215U your counsel in connection with the investigation, and I 

2155 just ask you if you knew why this mailgram was sent to 

2156 Colonel North? 

2157 A No. 

2 158 S Do you know whether Colonel North requested that 

2159 this mailgram be sent to him? 

2 160 A I do not know he requested that. 

2 16 1 2 Do you know whether Colonel North had any 

2162 communications with Hr . Channel, yourself, or anyone else at 

2 163 the NEPL, with respect to the United States Senate Campaigns 

2164 that was conducted by then Congressman Hichael Barnes? 

2 165 . A To the best of my knowledge, he never did. 

2166 2 Just as a practical matter, do you know why a 

2167 decision was made to communicate to Colonel North by 

2 168 mailgram rather than by telephone call with respect to an 

2 169 event that certainly was In the press in this area? 

2170 MS. HORRISOH: Objection. 

2171 I don't see that that's relevant to what we are about 



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UMMSSIFiED 



NAME: HIR251000 Vl'*'^**^'^ PAGE 89 

2172 here. What may have motivated Mr. Channel is not relevant, 

2173 particularly given the record we have here, where he is not 

I 

2 1714 aware of Colonel North and Mr. Channel^ having any 

2 175 coraraunications about the campaign. 

2176 It's not really relevant to have him hypothesize. He said 

2177 he didn't know why it was sent. 

2178 HR. KAPLAN: If he has--given the record that has 
2 179 been established throughout the course of these 

2 180 investigations with respect to communications between NEPL 

2181 officials and Colonel North, I think it's relevant to the 

2 182 committees' investigation as to if he knows why a mailgrait 

2 183 f»*m of communication was chosen in this instance, as 

2 18U opposed to telephonic communication, ox a face-to-face 

2 185 meeting to convey some information as has been used with 

2 186 respect to many other communications between NEPL employees 

2187 and Colonel North. That was really all I was asking, as to 

2 188 whether he knows why the mailgram fc«ii of communication was 

2189 chosen hare. 

2190 If he does, I would like to pursue it> and if he doesn't, 

2191 there's nothing to pursue. 

2192 THE MITNESS: In answer to your question as to why a 
2 193 aailgram format was chosen, I do not know. 

219H nil. KAPLAN' Can we just go off the record for a 

2195 second? 

2196 (Discussion off the record. 1 



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MR. FRYMAN: why don't I wind my questions up. 
MR. KAPLAN: I thank Mr. Fryman iot his indulgence, 
and I turn the questioning back over to him. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 
2 Moving on in Exhibit 1, Mr. Smith, would you turn to 
the handwritten notes dated November 1U, 1986, which have 
your counsel's control number 33332 at the bottom? 
Are those notes in your handwriting? 
A No, sir. 

e Do you know whose handwriting that is? 
A It is possibly Dan Conrad's handwriting. 
S Have you seen this document before? 

MS. MORRISON-- Other than through counsel? 
THE WITNESS: No, Sir. To the best of ay 
recollection, I have not seen it before. 
BY MR. FRYMAN: 
2 Do you recall Mr. Conrad's requesting this type of 
information from you? 
A No, sir. 
e All right. 
Turning to the next document, which is document 33121. 
it's a memo from Steve to Cliffy and Spitz, dated December 
2, 1986. do you recognize that document? 
A No, sir. 



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2 You do not recall receiving that document? 

A No. sir. 

2 Do you recall discussions about whether the Goodman 



Agency had billed the correct Channel/organization for work 
that the agency had performed or for advertising time that 
t had purchased? 



Yes, sir. 

When did those discussions occur? 

I believe in December of '86, and January of '87. 

Who did you have such discussions with? 



Mr . Channelj-- 

Hr. McMahon? 

Mr. HcHahon, and Adam and Bob Goodman, primarily 



Adam. 



2 What was the issue in those discussions? 

A Okay. I'm going to read this first. 

2 My question is really broader than this memo. My 
question relates to your recollection of the memo issue in 
late 1986, or early 1987. You are free to look at that memo 
If you feel that will assist your recollection. 

A It's my recollection that the Goodman Agency made 
some errors in how they invoiced charges to various Channey 
organizations, and that could be what you are talking about 
here. 

2 Do you recall the magnitude of funds that were 



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discussed with respect to these ezrors? 

Aze we talking about an amount in excess of 4100,000? 

A I zemembez having discussions about the anount, but 
I can't zemembez the amount. 

C What do you zecall was the resolution oi these 
discussions ? 

A I don't know ii It evez was resolved. 

Q Has this a mattez that you had primary 
responsibility for. that is working out a correction oi the 
billing or determining what the error was, or is this a 

mattez that someone else had primary responsibility ioz? 

L 
A Foz a shozt time Hz. Channel/asked me to help in 

looking into this. It was one oi the most coniuslng things 

I have evez looked into. 

I had a meeting with Adam Goodman on this issue, and as I 

said, I still don't know if it was ever resolved, because I 

believe that it was certainly Mr. Channel's view that there 

was some errors in billing. 

I haven't thought of this in months and months, so that's 

why I am vague on it. 

Q Uas this something that Mz . HoHahon was involved in? 

A Yes, siz. 

e ftnd Hz. Channel/also? 

A Yes, siz. 

& And Mz. Goodman, Adam Goodman on the side of the 



UNWSIFIED 



179 



UNCUSSifltfl 



NAME: HIR2S1000 IIUBfll JIAAI.?*3^»« PAGE 93 

2272 agency? 

2273 A Yes. 

2274 2 All right. 

2275 Turning to the next document, which is document 33269 and 

2276 33270, do you recall having seen these pages before? 

2277 A No. I have not seen this document. 

2278 2 Do you recall any discussions uith Hr . Channel or 
2279 

2280 International Youth Conference or the International Youth 

2281 Year? 

L 

2282 A I have one vague recollection of Mr. Channel 

2283 mentioning this to me, I believe in 1985. 

2284 2 What did he say? 

2285 A That we might be participating in some type of youth 

2286 conference, and then I never heard anything else about it. 

2287 So I assumed it went by the wayside. 

2288 2 That one conversation is the only matter that you 

2289 recall relating to that subject? 

2290 A Yes, sir. 

2291 2 Turning to page 36003, which is a page of 

2292 handwritten notes headed ''Ollie solicitation" at the top. 

2293 is that your handwriting? 
22914 A Yes, sir. 

2295 2 Would you read for the record what appears on that 

2296 page? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



180 



HIR251000 



UNCLASSiHED 



PAGE 9U 



NAHE: 

2297 A It says, ''Ollie solicitation; Barnes campaign; 

2298 indict Ollie; execute President,'' or abbreviation for 

2299 ''President's policy; can be beaten; one reason here' '--I 

2300 don't know what this is--something-- 

230 1 2 Is that Maryland, MD or Maryland? 

2302 A Yes, but that makes no sensa. Something 'wants me 

2303 to enlist those are engaging in secret activities'' or looks 
230U like activities. 

2305 ''Washington and Baltimore media, your 5000 would help < 

2306 great deal to; $200,000 program to get Barnes, newspaper, 

2307 TV.'' There's a phone number ' ' ( 203 ) .^^^HHt own 

2308 foundation.'' 

2309 2 Do you recall making those notes? 

2310 A No. 

2311 2 Do you recognize the phone number on the page? 

2312 A No, sir. 

2313 . 2 Do you know what the occasion was when you made 
231U these notes? 

2315 (Reporter read question back at the request oi Mr. 

23 16 Fryman . ) 

23 17 A I believe I renenbez these were notes that Mr. 
I 

2318 Channel, gave ne probably over the phone during the 

2319 independent expenditure caitpaign that a J^AC did in Maryland. 

2320 fi So these are notes of a conversation with Mr. 
232 1 Channel,? 



UNcussra 



181 



NAME: HIR251000 



UNCLASSiriED 



95 



2322 

2323 

2324 

2325 

2326 

2327 

2328 

2329 

2330 

2331 

2332 

2333 

233M 

2335 

2336 

2337 

2338 

2339 

23U0 

2341 

23U2 

2343 

231*1* 

23MS 

2346 



A I believe so. 

2 Now, what does the phrase at the top ''Ollie 
solicitation"' mean? 

A It could have been how Spitz told ma to cast 
solicitation, just called it the •■Ollie solicitation," but 
I don't remember specifically. 

2 In other words, you would make an appeal to a 
contributor and you would characterize it as a solicitation 
on behalf of Colonel North? Is that what you are saying? 

A No. 

2 Would you explain then what you mean by that? 

A Because the contributor might have met or know about 
Colonel North, using his name with the contributor might 
have some impact so that could explain that. 

2 And does the second line, ''Barnes campaign,'' 
indicate that these were contributions you were seeking for 
the Barnes campaign? 

A Contributions for the independent expenditure. 

2 In connection with the campaign against Congressman 
Barnes; is that correct? 

A Hell, the independent expenditure was not against 
Congressman Barnes. It was for Linda Chavez. 
2 All right. 
But the phrases in these notes "Barnes campaign" refers 
to the independent expenditure made in that Senate race; is 



UNCLASSIFIED 



182 



HIR2S1000 



UNCLASSIFIED 



naue 

23147 that correct? 

2348 A Yes, sir. 

2349 S Now, moving doun toward the center of those notes 

2350 you use the phrase ''Enlist those who are engaging in secret 

2351 activities.'' What does that refer to? 

2352 A As I sit here now, I don't recall what it meant at 

2353 the time. 

2354 2 Mr. Smith, looking at your handwriting and those 

2355 lines again, you indicated you believe the word was 

2356 ''enlist'' I believe, to enlist those who are engaging. 

2357 A That's what it looks like. 

2358 9 But focusing on that word there appears to be a 

2359 fl a pait i x i A i rp^PfSSns^iXS a^^ over the first letter. Is it 

2360 possible that that word is ''indict,'' and the initials that 

236 1 you could not determine at the beginning could that be 

2362 ''MB,'' instead of ' ' HD , ' ' so that that would read, ''MB 

2363 wants me to indict those who are engaging in a secret 

2364 activities''? 

2365 A It's possible it could be that. 

2366 2 Hell, again, it is your handwriting, and I'm just 

2367 trying to deterninejff what that phrase is in your own 

2368 handwriting. 

2369 A So your question to m« is^ is it possible it could be 

2370 that, instead of how I read it, and my answer to you is, 

237 1 yes, that is possible. Again, this would have been written 



UNCLASSIFIED 



188 



HAME 
2372 
2373 
2374 
2375 
2376 
2377 
237! 
2379 
238( 
238 
2382 
2383 
238U 
2385 
2386 
2387 
2388 
238< 
2390 
2391 
2392 
2393 
2394 
2395 
23< 



HIR251000 



UNCLASSIFiEO 



PAGE 97 



a year ago and I'm--I just- 



2 Well, at this point do you have any recollection of 
what the phrase ''secret activities'' means in that 
sentence ? 

A That would probably mean, although this is a guess, 
Colonel North's activities, such as going down to Central 
America . 

2 Do you know there's the phrase ''program to get 
Barnes ' ' ? 

Do you see that phrase? 

A Uh-huh. 

2 Has it your understanding that you were soliciting 
funds to support a program to get Barnes? 

A I was raising funds to fund an indep«ndent 
expenditure, and it as an independent expenditure to help 
elect a Republican Senator from Maryland. 

2 What is the significance of that phrase in your 
handwritten notes, the phrase being program to get Barnes? 

A I don't remember. I mean, if there was some 
program, I don't remember what that would mean. 

2 Is it your recollection that these are notes that 
you made from a conversation with Mr. ChanneV giving you 
directions about how to approach various contributors? 

A To the best of my recollection, that's what these 
notes would be. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



184 



UNtUSSW 



NAME: HIR251000 |Ql«lf| |>|l]|Ji1 1 b> V PAGE 98 



2397 
2398 
2399 



2 Do you recall which contributors you contacted? 

A No, sir. 

S Did you contact Mrs. Neuington? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



185 



NAME: 
2400 
2M01 
21402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2409 
2410 
241 1 
2412 
2413 
2414 
241S 
2416 
2417 
2418 
2419 
2420 
242 
2422 
2423 
2424 



UNCLASSIFIED 



RPTS CANTOR 
DCMK MILTOH 
tIMSl 

THE WITNESS: I contacted the contributors, Hr . 
Fryman, to these various organizations all the time for the 
main projects. I'm not trying to be uncooperative. It is 
that I can't break it doun. 
BY HR. FRYMAN: 

2 The phrase in these notes, "'Your *5f000 would 
help,'' is that the amount you were seeking from th« 
contributors? 

A That would have been a relevant amount since that 
is as much as an individual can give to a political action 
committee . 

2 Were you seeking these funds on behalf of the 
Antiterrorism American Committee? 

A Yes. 

a Looking again at this telephone number, Hr . Smith, 
do you know what area is covered by area code 203? 

A I know who that is. I just remembered. That is 
Barbara Newington. 

e Does that indicate you called Mrs. Hewington? 

A No, it does not. It means I was writing this note 
on a piece of paper, that I already had her number down 



DNEUSSm 



186 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAHE: HIR251000 V I 1 Wfc» •^i' " ■ " ■•-'-' PAGE 10 



2>425 
21426 
21427 
2428 
2429 
2430 
2431 
2432 
2433 
2434 
2435 
2436 
2437 
2438 
2439 
2440 
2441 
2442 
2443 
2444 
2445 
2446 
2447 
2448 
2449 



theie or I wrote her number down just to get some place that 
was in front of me 

B So you don't recall one way or the other whether 
you contacted her? 

A For this effort? 

2 Yes. 

A I probably did. 

2 Do you recall if she made a contribution? 

A Not without looking at financial records. 

2 Do you recall now what the phrase ''own 
foundation'' refer to down there? 

A I have been asked about that before, and I have- no 
idea what in the world I neant when I wrote that. 

2 Turning to the last page in this exhibit. Hr . 
Smith, which has number 37851 on it. is that your 
handwriting on that page? 

A No. sir. 

2 Do you know whose it Is? 

A No, sit. 

2 Have you seen this page beioze? 

A No. sir. 

Q Hr. Snith, you were involved in fund raising for 
all of Hr . Channell's organizations in 1985 and 1986. were 
you not? 

A No, sir. 



BNCUSSIFIED 



187 



yNCiASsm 



HAHE: HIR251000 
21*50 S Which ones ueia you not involved in? 
21(51 A Grow Washington. 

2U52 2 That organization was basically inactive, was it 

21*53 not? 

2t45>4 & Yes. sic. 

21*55 S Other than that, were you involved in all of the 

21*56 other organizations? 

21*57 A Yes, with the exception of Channell Corporation, 

2U58 which was also inactive. 

21*59 2 The financial records that have been provided by 

2460 counsel for fir. Channell indicate that the total 

21*61 contributions in 1985 were approximately »3.9 million. Is 

2U62 that consistent with your recollection of the total 

2U63 contributions in 1985? 

21*61* A It is not consistent with my recollections because 

2U65 I have no idea what the total figure is. 
21*66 2 You did not know the total? 
2467 A Ko, sir. 

2M68 2 Is that true of 1986 as well? You did not know the 

2U69 total amounts? 

2470 A Yes, sir, that is correct. 

21*7 1 HR. FRYHAN: Mr. Smith, I have no further 

21*72 questions. 

21*73 MR. KAPLAH: I have no further questions. 

2471* BY MR. OLIVER' 



UNCUSSIFIED 



188 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR2S1000 U I 1 V kri^^^ V « > I *- fc^ PAGE 102 



2475 
2476 
2477 
2478 
2479 
2>480 
2M81 
2482 
2483 
2484 
2485 
2486 
2487 
2488 
2489 
2490 
2491 
2492 
2493 
2494 
2495 
2496 
2497 
2498 
2499 



2 fir. Smith, you indicated earlier that no one could 
have lived in Washington and not known that Mr. Barnes was 
an opponent of the freedom fighters, or something to that 
effect, is that correct? 

A That was my testimony, yes. 

S What did you knou Mr. Barnes had done to become an 
opponent of the freedom fighters? 

MS. nORRISOM: I Will object to the question. Hou 
he is to know that is really ||relevant, Mr. Oliver, to the 
reasons we are here. 

BY HR. OLIVER! 

2 Did you know that Hr . Barnes was the Chairman of 
the subcommittee of the Congress that dealt with aid to the 
freedom fighters? 

A Yes, sir. 

2 The Foreign Affairs Committee. How did you know 
that? 

A From the media and from follow-up, just from being 
involved in this area. I mean I was concerned with the 
issue of freedom fighter aid, and I should know just as a 
matter of record who is in that position. 

2 So you were involved in the effort to try to get 
congressional support for freedom fighter aid, is that 
correct? 

A That is partially correct. I was involved more so 



mmm 



189 



WSMB 



HAME: HIR2S1000 ll|^V^***'^ PAGE 103 

2500 than that to tzy and educate the American public on the 

250 1 issue o£ freedom fighter aid. 

2502 2 Was the Central American freedom program designed 

2503 to obtain congressional support for freedom fighter aid? 
25014 A To the best of my recollection, there uas one 

2505 component of it that used Sentinel, that the Central 

2506 American freedom program had one component which uas 

2507 Sentinel, that uas to lobby for freedom fighter aid. The 

2508 majority of the Central American freedom program uas to 

2509 muster public support or to educate the public. 

2510 e What uas your relationship to Sentinel? 

2511 A I raised funds for the organization. 

2512 fi You testified earlier you raised funds for all of 

2513 the Channell organizations except Grow Washington and the 
25m Channell Corporation, is that correct? 

2515 A Yes, sir, during this time period ue are talking 

2516 about. 

2517 e So that was two political action committees. ATAC 

2518 and American Conservative Trust? 

25 19 A ATAC and ACTS, Federal PACs. 

2520 e Two state PACs? 

252 1 A Yes, they each had state election fund components. 

2522 Q NEPL? 

2523 A KEPL. 
252U Q Central? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



190 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR2S1000 Wiiw»-»i^w«« ■ ■> BKr pjQf ^qU 

2525 A Central. 

2526 2 Any others? 

2527 A Mot during this time period. When are you talking 

2528 about? 

2529 e 1985-86. 

2530 A That's it. 

253 1 2 Who were you paid by? 

2532 A I was paid by the organization that I performed the 

2533 work for. 

25314 2 So you were paid by all of these different 

2535 organizations at different times? 

2536 A At different times, yes. 

2537 2 But you remained in the same office throughout this 

2538 period? 

2539 A What do you mean, the same building or the same 
25U0 room? 

25M1 2 The same physical offices. In other words, they 

25U2 were all located, all these organizations were located in 

25U3 the same place? 

25MU A Yes, sir. 

25U5 2 And your bosses in all these organizations were 

25U6 Spitz Channell and Dan Conrad, is that correct? 

2SU7 . A Yes. sir. 

25U8 2 All these organizations were really one entity, one 

2549 conglomerate, is that correct? 



iinwssife 



191 



IIR251000 



uNtmsiffl 



'AGE 105 



HAKE : 

2550 A No, Sir, it's not correct. Each organization was a 

2551 separate legal entity with its own articles of 

2552 incorporation, and each had a board of directors, and there 

2553 was sone overlapping of officers, but they were definitely 
255^ to my understanding separate organizations. They weren't 

2555 3ust something, a different nane on a different sheet of 

2556 paper for each one. 

2557 [Discussion off the record. 1 

2558 HR. OLIVER: Back on the record. 

2559 BY J1R. OLIVER: 

2560 2 Here you an officer of any of these corporations? 

256 1 A I became treasurer of the American Conservative- 

2562 Trust about a year and a half ago. 

2563 2 Here you ever the treasurer of National Endowment 
2S6'4 for the Preservation of Liberty? 

2565 A No, sir. 

2566 2 In Exhibit 1, which we examined earlier, there is a 

2567 piece of paper which I believe Hr . Fryman asked you about 

2568 earlier. It appears to be on the letterhead of the National 

2569 Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty and it's a letter 

2570 signed by you. Cliff Smith, treasurer. Here you the 

257 1 treasurer of the National Endowment for the Preservation of 

2572 Liberty? 

2573 A No, sir. At one point there had been some 

25714 discussion between myself and Hr . Channell about making me 



yNtussiFe 



192 



iiNWSsro 



NAME: HIR2S1000 lJ|lVi-'»^^ PAGE 106 



2S7S 
2576 
2577 
2578 
-579 
2580 
2581 
2582 
2583 
258U 
2585 
2586 
2587 
2588 
2589 
2590 
2591 
2592 
2593 
259U 
2595 
2596 
2597 
2598 
2599 



the tteasuiei. and it was never done, and at the time we 
wanted to have me an officer of NEPL, and it never went 
through. He never did it. 

e Is that your signature on that letter? 

A Yes. 

2 Why did you sign that letter if you were not the 
treasurer? 

ns. nORRISON: He just told you they were having 
discussions about him being an officer including treasurer. 
HR. OLIVER: Counsel, the letter indicates that he 
IS the treasurer, under his signature. He has just 
testified that he was not the treasurer, so I'm asking him 
why he signed the letter that indicated he was the 
treasurer . 

THE WITNESS: I thought at the time that we would 
be going through with this, and that I would be the 
treasurer at some point in the not too distant future. 
Therefore, I thought It was all right to go ahead and sign 
that name . 

BY MR. OLIVER: 

fi You indicated earlier that you were involved in 
independent expenditure in Maryland on behalf of Linda 
Chavez, is that correct? 

A Yes. 

2 Who made that decision? 



UNMSSm 



193 



iiNCUSsm 



NAME: HIR2S1000 y|lV^»'*'^ PAGE 107 

2600 MS. nORRISON: Again ue are not going to get into 

2601 independent eKpenditures , Mr. Oliver, because it's beyond 

2602 the mission oi this commission. The fact that some people 

2603 may be interested in that issue does not render relevant the 
260U mission oi these committees. There has been enough 

2605 background information provided uith respect to the 

2606 organization's participation in that independent expenditure 

2607 campaign and the source of that campaign to demonstrate that 

2608 it had nothing to do so far as this witness is concerned 

2609 uith any relations uith the White House or the other issues 

2610 that are before us here. 

261 1 BY MR. OLIVER: 

2612 (2 Mr. Smith, you testified earlier that on January 30 
26 13 a meeting took place in the Hhite House where 30 or so of 
261<4 your major contributors were invited, is that correct? 

2615 A Yes, sir. 

26 16 2 Did you also indicate that Linda Chavez spoke at 

2617 that meeting? 

2618 A Yes, sir. She was still the director of office of 
26 19 public liaison at the time. 

2620 e And was she helpful to your organizations while she 

2621 was in that position? 

2622 .. A I honestly don't know, because I didn't coordinate 

2623 any of that that went on. 

262U 2 Were you at the White House briefing? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



194 



UNCUSSIFIED 



NAME: HIR251000 M|f^triwwll 9 ■■ V PAGE 108 

2625 A Yes, sir. 

2626 2 Did she speak at the briefing? 

2627 A Yes, for a few moments. 

2628 e Do you remember what she said? 

2629 A No, sir. 

2630 e Do you remember whether or not it was in support of 

2631 your organization's activities? 

2632 A As I said, I don't remember what she said. I would 

2633 not think she would have spoken against the organization. 
263(4 2 Did your activities on behalf of Linda Chavez have 

2635 anything to do with her previous connection with the 

2636 organization while she was in the White House? 
2537 MS. MORRISON: 

2638 Objection to the form of the question. There has been no 

2639 established record that there was a connection between her 
26<40 and the organization. 

26(4 1 MR. OLIVER: He just Indicated, Counsel, that she 

26M2 spoke at the briefing for the 30 large contributors at the 

26<43 White House on January 30. 

26>4U MS. MORRISON: He also said h* didn't know whether 

26'45 she had anything else to do with the organizations. 

2646 BY MR. OLIVER: 

26147 2 She spoke at a briefing for youz organization, is 

2648 that correct? 

26U9 MS. MORRISON: nr . Oliver, people who are employed 



UNCUSSIFIED 



195 



NAME 
2650 
2651 
2652 
2653 
2654 
2655 
2656 
2657 
2658 
2659 
2660 
2661 
2662 
2663 
2664 
2665 
2666 
2667 
2668 
2669 
2670 
267 
2672 
2673 
267U 



HIR25100( 



wmsro 



PAGE 10< 



and represent other citizens in these two institutions, the 
House and the Senate, regularly speak before organizations 
they don't have anything to do with, and I'm certain some of 
thera may not want to be connected with the organizations 
before whom she appear. The fact she appeared, nomentarily 
said a couple of words conducted at the White House, and 
this witness said he doesn't know whether she supported or 
had anything to do with the organizations, doesn't make her 
connected with the organization. 

There is no foundation for the question. Please 
rephrase it or move on. 
BY HR. OLIVER: 

S Mr. Smith, in 1985 your organization had several, 
at least two briefings, I believe, at the White House, one 
in June and at least on^in October, is that correct? 

A Yes, sir. 

e Did Linda Chavez appear at those briefings? 

A Hot to my recollection. 

2 Do you remember who appeared at those briefings? 

A At the White House portion? 

Z Yes. 

A Colonel North. 

fi Anyone -else? 

A I think someone introduced Colonel North at the 
first briefing in June of '85, but I can't remember who it 



mussiFO 



196 



NAME ■■ 
2675 
2676 
2677 
2678 
2679 
2680 
2681 
2682 
2683 
268U 
2685 
2686 
2687 
2688 
2689 
2690 
2691 
2692 
2693 
269K 
2695 
2696 
2697 
2698 
2699 




hu^^* -^ 



HIR251000 ljl^^yt.1 ^^■^ **■" "-- PAGE 110 

was. No, I cane in late to that briefing, so I have to 
withdraw that. 

Other than Colonel North, I don't believe there 
were any other Uhite House officials who spoke. 

2 Let's go back for a moment to document A0036003 
that Hr . Fryman asked you about earlier. I believe it's the 
next to the last document. You indicated earlier that the 
independent expenditures in Maryland that you were 
attempting to raise money for were on behalf of Mrs. Chavez, 
is that correct? 

A Hr . Oliver, upon further reflection, it might not 
have been on her behalf. It might just have been an 
independent expenditure taking place during that particular 
campaign discussing both of those candidates as in the ad 
discussed Barbara llikulski and Linda Chavez. 

2 Why does only Mr. Barnes' nana appear on this in 
your notes, if it might have been related to Mrs. rtikulski 
or Mrs . Chavez? 

MS. MORRISON! Mr. Oliver, ha testified earlier 
that these were notes he took because he was having a 
conversation with Mr. Channell and reflecting what Mr. 
Channell was saying. That is why Mr. Barnes' name is there. 
BY HR. OLIVER: 

2 You indicated earlier that this might have been a 
phone conversation with Hr . Channell, is that correct? 



UNCLASSIflED 



197 



MNCUSSIfe 



MAtlE: HIR251000 *<n ^ w — PAGE 111 

2700 A Possibly, yes, sir. 

270 1 2 Could It have been a meeting of your fund raisers? 

2702 A No, sir. 

2703 2 Where you took these notes? 

2704 A The reason I said that it uas possibly a phone 

2705 conversation is to rae it appears to have the format of 

2706 taking quick notes when you are talking on the phone. If it 

2707 had been a face-to-face meeting uith other people, I think 

2708 my notes would have been more extensive because I had a 

2709 habit of making more extensive notes when I was at a 

27 1 meeting . 

27 11 2 Was the usual method of operation as fund raiser 

27 12 with Mr. Channell to have a meeting among the fund raisers 

2713 to decide on a program or a project for which you were going 

27m to raise money, and then for the fund raisers to solicit the 

27 15 contributors who they had developed or worked with over a 

2716 period of time on behalf of that project? 

27 17 A What you have said is partially true, and if you 

2718 don't mind, I will refine it a bit. 

2719 2 If you would elaborate on it, I would appreciate 

2720 it. 

2721 A Usually the project was already decided by Mr. 

2722 Channell at the point that a meeting would take place with 

2723 the staff, and a meeting would take place in order to 

272U discuss the project, whatever it might be, and then the fund- 



^m^^ 



198 



UNCUSSIFIED 



KAKE: HIR251000 ^|^^L.riWII 9*^** PAGE 112 

2725 raising staff would conduct solicitations regarding that 

2726 project later. 

2727 2 When you made a solicitation over the telephone, 

2728 did you generally take notes as to what was said? 

2729 A When I'm talking to a contributor, is that your 

2730 question? 

2731 2 Yes. 

2732 A Sometimes. 

2733 2 Mas there some kind of a report that was given to 

2734 Mr. Channell and/or Mr. Conrad based on solicitations that 

2735 you made? 

2736 A I did not engage in that kind of reporting. 

2737 2 Did the others, other fund raisers? 

2738 A They could have. I have never seen any notes to 

2739 that effect. 

2714O 2 Do you recall which of the individual contributors 

2741 you had primary responsibility for? 

2742 A Yes, sir. 

2743 2 Could you tell ne who they were? 

27(44 MS. nORRISOHi Hr . Oliver, we have already gone 

2745 over this. 

2746 HR. OLIVER: I would like to go over it again, 

2747 Counsel. I don't believe that this question has been asked 

2748 of hin, and I would like to know who the contributors were 

2749 that he had primary responsibility for. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



199 



wmssiFiti) 



NAME: HIR251000 PAGE 113 

2750 MS. MORRISON: For the purpose of speed, I will 

275 1 allow him to ansuer what he recalls now, but the question 

2752 was asked and the answer solicited earlier in the testimony 

2753 today. 

27514 THE WITNESS: Mr. Brandon, Mr. and Mrs. Pentacost, 

2755 Ms. McKinley, Mr. Driscoll, Dr. Adamkiewicz, Ms. Christian 

2756 at times. That should do it. 

2757 BY MR. OLIVER: 

2758 C Did you solicit these people for each project as 

2759 directW- by Mr. Channell? Did you solicit them for 

2760 different projects at the direction of Mr. Channell? 

2761 A Yes, sir. 

2762 2 Did you solicit some of these people to buy 

2763 military equipment, to contribute to military equipment for 

2764 the contras? 

2765 MS. MORRISON: Mr. Oliver, that question clearly 

2766 has been asked and answered in a lengthy exchange between 

2767 Mr. Fryman and Mr. Smith in which Hz. Smith answered all of 

2768 the questions. 

2769 BY MR. OLIVER: 

2770 fi Did you solicit each one of those people or any of 
277 1 those people that you have just mentioned? 

2772 ^ ns. MORRISON: The exact same objection. Mr. 

2773 Oliver. He were all here and the questions were asked and 

2774 the record was made. He has gone in detail over his 



UNCLASSIFIED 



200 



UNCUSSiFIED 



NAME: HIR251000 w ■» ^ ■-■■'»■'-■- ' pAGE IIU 

2775 dealings with each of those contributors on those subjects. 

2776 BY HR. OLIVER; 

2777 2 Did you solicit those contributors for each of the 

2778 projects that Mr. Channell's organizations were engaged in 

2779 in 1985 and 1986? 

2780 A I solicited some contributors for some projects and 

2781 some for others. 

2782 2 Could you distinguish for me which ones you 

2783 solicited for which projects and which ones for other 
278U projects? 

2785 MS. MORRISON: I'm going to object to that 

2786 question. It's overly broad. Some of the projects have no 

2787 relevance to this committee's work. He has answered the 

2788 question as to who was solicited for military equipment, Hr . 

2789 Oliver. 

2790 BY MR. OLIVER: 

279 1 S Could you tell me which of those people were 

2792 solicited for ads that related to Congressman Barnes? 

2793 MS. MORRISON: Objection; relevance. 

2794 BY HR. OLIVER: 

2795 2 During the Central American freedom j^ogram in 

2796 1986, in which television ads prepared by the Goodman Agency 

2797 w«.xe run in March and April of 1986, were those ads designed 

2798 to influence the vote in the Congress on freedom fighter 

2799 aid? 



uNciissro 



201 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR251000 V • « V *-» '^ ■« * " '— — pAQg 115 

2800 A The Central American freedom program? Ho, sir, 

2801 those ads were designed, to my knowledge, to discuss this 

2802 issue uith the American public using the medium of 

2803 television. 

28014 2 Were they run in specific congressional districts? 

2805 A Well, I mean if you put them on in Texas somewhere, 

2806 that is going to be a specific congressional district. You 

2807 can't help that. 

2808 2 Were you aware that they were designed to be run in 

2809 specific congressional districts? 

2810 A I was told they were being run in specific media 

281 1 markets . 

2812 2 Did those media markets have any relationship to 

2813 congressional districts? 

281U A I was told that they were media markets and was not 

2815 told of any specific congressional district parallels. 

2816 2 You were not aware that those media markets 

2817 corresponded to congressional districts of congressmen who 

2818 were targeted by Hr . Miller or Mr. Channell? 

2819 A Ho, sir, not of congressmen, as you phrased this, 

2820 who were targeted. 

282 1 2 Were the ads that were run in the Washington area 

2822 by. your organizations prior to the vote which was to take 

2823 place in the spring of 1986, did those ads to your 
28214 recollection include Hike Barnes' name? 



wmm 



202 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR2S1000 wiiw— "^ww^- ■ •■ a^ pjQj ,,g 

2825 A Could you be more specific about which organization 

2826 you are talking about? 

2827 2 Were the ads that were tun as part of the Central 

2828 American freedom program in the Washington, D.C., media 

2829 market--did those ads include Hike Barnes' name? 

2830 A I remember an ad mentioning Congressman Barnes' 

2831 name, but I don't remember when it ran, because, as I have 

2832 stated earlier, ue ran so many during this tuo-year period. 

2833 2 Could the ads that were tun using Hike Barnes' name 
283U have been a result of this Ollie solicitation note that we 

2835 were discussing a moment ago, docunent 36003? 

2836 A Well, I thought we had established the fact that we 

2837 thought this dealt with the Haryland independent 

2838 expenditute, and I still think that, and that is my genuine 

2839 belief about what these notes peitain to. 

28'40 S Was the Haryland independent expenditure designed 

28<41 to get Barnes? 

2842 MS. HORRISOK! Objection to the question on the 

28U3 same basis . 

28>4>4 HR. OLIVER: The document In lit. Smith's 

28M5 handwriting says ''Programmed to get Barnes.*' He just 

28146 indicated he thought this document related to the 

28147 independent expenditures in Haryland. I think the question 

2848 is obviously relevant. 

2849 MS. MORRISOM- Not to the mission of this 



UNCLASSIFIED 



203 



„ iClBScD 



HAHEt HIR2S1000 U | B ',* kW ' <--"^ ■ ' PAGE 

2850 committee. He has answered questions that, to his 

2851 Knowledge, has nothing to do with it with some of the 

2852 inferences that might be drawn from the face of the document 

2853 dealing with the White House. To the extent that the 

285H independent expenditure had to do with an organization that 

2855 did not do anything on Nicaraguan issues, and on the basis 

2856 of the objections earlier raised to detailed exploration 

2857 abou*^ Mr. Barnes or anybody else who may have been 

2858 independently discussed in connection with that or other 

2859 unrelated organizations' political activities, I object to 

2860 the question. 

2861 MR. OLIVER: Counsel, th* witness has testified 

2862 that this is his handwriting. 

2863 ns. MORRISON: Ha has lots of handwriting, lots of 

2864 places that don't have anything to do with the mission of 

2865 this committee. 

2866 HR. OLIVER: Wa have already established his 

2867 handwriting. The top line says ''Ollia solicitation.'' 

2868 BY MR. OLIVER: 

2869 2 Mr. Smith, does Ollia in that line refer to Oliver 

2870 Horth? 

2871 . A It's likely that it does. 

2872 . S On the third line, there are the words, ''Indict 

2873 Ollie.'' Is it your recollection that that also referred to 
28714 Oliver North? 



DNWSSm 



204 



2875 RPTS HCGINH 

2876 DCHN 2UIHTER0 

2877 A Yes. 

2878 2 Why did Mr. Channel^ tell you someone wanted to 

2879 mdict Oliver Horth? 

2880 ns . nORRISOH: He's not going to speculate about 

2881 what was in Mr. Channel's nind at the time ha had this 

2882 conversation. 

2883 BY MR. OLIVER: 

U, 
288U 2 Did Mr. Channel/tell you someone wanted to indict 

/I 

2885 Oliver North? 

2886 A Mr. Oliver, since these are short notes taken during 

2887 a phone conversation, it's hard ior me to remember 

L 

2888 specifically about what Mr. Channel was talking about, even 

/I 

2889 with the entire thing. 

2890 For eKample, I told you earlier I have no idea what ''own 
289 1 foundation'" means. It was. obviously, part of this. 

2892 2 Do you remember whether or not Mr. Channel told you 

2893 that someone wanted to indict Oliver North? 

289U A X recall a conversation which Mr. Channer^had with 
me at one point, and I have no idea when ltl\AAS. about there 



2895 

2896 were Members of Congress who were concerned with trying to 

2897 oust Oliver North out of the National Security Council. I'm 

2898 not sure if ''indict*' was the word. 

2899 2 Did he tell you why they were trying to oust Colonel 



yNCUSSIFiED 



205 



NAME 
2900 
2901 
2902 
2903 
2904 
2905 
2906 
2907 
2908 
2909 
2? 
291 1 
2912 
2913 
2914 
2915 
2916 
2917 
2918 
2919 
2920 
2921 
2922 
2923 
2924 



HIR2S 1000 



North? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



PAGE 119 



A It is ray recollection that they were upset, the 
Merabers of Congress, or whoever this was, was upset with 
Colonel North's activities on behalf of the supporting 
President Reagan's j'reedora Fighter efforts. 

2 Which activities are you referring to? 

MS. nORRISON: Did you have an understanding of 
specific activities? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

BY MR. OLIVER: Which activitias were you referring 
to? 

MS. MORRISON: He just said ha didn't — 

HR. OLIVER: He used the phrasa "Colonel North's 
activities .' • I'n asking what Colonel North activities he 
was referring to. 

HS. nORRISON: Ha just said he didn't know which 
specific activities these Congressmen had apparently 
targeted Hr . North for having engaged in. 

BY HR. OLIVER: 
Q Why did you just usa tha phrasa ''Colonel North's 
activities ' ' ? 

A nr . Oliver, what I was referring to is that I had a 
tacollactlon sone of these Congressman ware upsat that 
Colonel North had been traveling to Central America, and 
they were upset with this. Thay didn't think ha should be 



UNCUSSiFlED 



206 



uNWSsra 



NAME: HIR251000 W • » ^ — ' PAGE 120 

2925 going down there, and I'm not suze why they thought that. 

2926 I don't know anything about the law that governs him going 

2927 down there, but that's, I believe, what they were upset 

2928 about. 

2929 2 Were you aware he had been to Central America? 

2930 A Mr. Channel had referred from time to time that he 

2931 was--had gone down there. I don't think he knew beforehand 

2932 when ever he was going. 

2933 2 Do you recall whether or not there was ever 

29314 discussion about a letter being written to the White House 

2935 inquiring about Colonel North's activities in Central 

2936 America? 

2937 A Yes. I think I do remember that. 

2938 2 What do you remember about it? 

2939 A I believe it was a letter that Michael Barnes wrote 

2940 to somebody at the White House. I don't know who it was. 

2941 2 How did you learn about that letter? 

2942 A I think I read it in the newspaper. 

2943 2 Did that letter have any relation to the notes that 

2944 are made on this page that we have been discussing? 

2945 A Hot to my recollection. 

2946 2 Do you remember whether or not Congressman Barnes 

2947 was a candidate at the time that that letter was written? 

2948 A Since I don't remember when the letter was written, 

2949 I don't remember if he had announced whether he was running 



207 



imwssw .... 



NAME: HIR2S1000 lllvllS I^U^* * "" PAGE 121 

2950 for reelection, or not or running for Senate, which I guess 

295 1 IS what it would have been if he had been a candidate. 

2952 2 You have written on this page on the fifth line. 

2953 ''can be beaten.'" Did Hr . Channel tell you Ht . Barnes 
295^ could be beaten? 

2955 A I don't reraeraber specifically what the context of 

2956 that was. since it's :ust, as I said, short notes. 

2957 2 When you refer to that, in that docunent to ''your 

2958 5000 would help,'' you have testified earlier that that was 

2959 probably the pitch that you were going to make to potential 

2960 contributors for this solicitation: is that correct? 

296 1 A That could have been some of the things that I would 

2962 have said, however. It would not have been the same 

2963 necessarily. 

296U 2 Do you recall talking to any contributors about this 

2965 particular campaign? 

2966 A You mean just about doing the independent 

2967 expenditure? 

2968 2 I'm talking about the Barnes campaign, ibhen it 

2969 says, ''indict Ollie.'' 

2970 Further down it says ''your 5000 would help a great 

2971 deal.'' Two lines later it says, ''program to get Barnes.*' 

2972 . - ns. nORRISOH: He has said in earlier testimony, Hr . 

2973 Oliver, that this is a document he believes Is related to 
297U 



UNtUSSffl 



UNCIASSIFIEO 



NAME: HIR251000 VIVVK-IIWH « *- b^ pAGE 122 

2975 Reading the document to him is probably not going to 

2976 change that. Mow, if you want to rephrase the question. 

2977 MR. OLIVER: I'm asking him whether or not he 

2978 remembers soliciting contributions from any contributors 

2979 where you used the phrase that is on this page, '"your 5000 

2980 would help a great deal,'* related to this campaign that is 

2981 referred to on this page? 

2982 MS. MORRISON: There, again, I would object on the 

2983 basis of relevance, Mr. Oliver. It's an independent 

29814 expenditure campaign, as best he recalls, having to do with 

2985 an organization that was not involved in Nicaraguan issues. 

2986 MR. OLIVER: Counsel, this particular piece of paper 

2987 has ''Ollie solicitation, indict Ollie, Barnes campaign, 

2988 want to indict those who are engaging in secret activities'" 

2989 all over it, and if that doesn't relate to Nicaragua, I 

2990 don't know what does. 

2991 MS. MORRISON: Maybe you don't know what does, Mr. 

2992 Oliver-- 

2993 MR. OLIVER: I think I probably do. 

2994 MS. MORRISON: Those of us who were here earlier and 

2995 listened carefully to the questions and answers given, 

2996 recognize the record clearly reflects whether or not this 

2997 document has anything to do with the mission of this 

2998 committee . 

2999 Mr. Smith was asked questions and allowed to answer an 



UNCUS8IFIED 



209 



msMM 



NAME: hIR; 

3000 adequate number of questions to determine whether or not 

3001 this document, to his knowledge, had anything to do with 

3002 dealings with the Uhite House, dealings with Ollie North, or 

3003 anything directly related to those organizations supporting 
300U Nicaraguan and freedom fighter issues. 

3005 Now, to the extent that this is an independent expenditure 

3006 campaign in which he took notes dictated by Mr. Channel^ from 

3007 an organization that didn't have any activities in the 

3008 freedom ^isl^ter aid movement, it does not have any relevance 

3009 to the matters before the committee. I'll have to direct 

3010 him not to answer, if I have to. 

301 1 BY MR. OLIVER: 

3012 S Are you sure that this document resulted from notes 

30 13 that were taken from a telephone conversation with Mr. 

I 

3014 Channel? 

3015 A No, sir, I am not absolutely sure, but in trying to 

3016 give ray best testimony, it would seem that that's what it 
30 17 was and that's why I have testified as such. 

30 18 . 2 What was the relationship of this independent 

30 19 expenditure to the Barnes campaign? 

3020 HS. MORRISON! Objection. 

3021 Same basis. 

3022 HR. OLIVER: He's indicated that this note refers to 

3023 an independent expenditure, and it says on the face of it in 
302U his handwriting ''Barnes campaign.'' I'm asking him what 



IINCUSSIFIED 



210 



ONMSSIflfD 



PAGE 



2U 



MAHE: HIR2S 

3025 the relationship of the independent expenditure was to the 

3026 Barnes carepaign. 

3027 US. MORRISON: Let ne try again Mr. Oliver. There 

3028 were activities engaged in, by sone of Mr. Channel's 

^ J. 

3029 or ganizatioiy, including ^JIAC . that had to do specifically 

3030 with political campaigns, and did not deal specifically with 

3031 the Nicaraguan issue. 

3032 The fact you reake a nexus between sone of those and the 

3033 particular candidate, and that particular candidate's 

3034 involvement in the Micaraguan issues is something that you 

3035 are willing to draw and you apparently are bound and 

3036 determined to pursue. 

3037 In our view, it is not relevant to the Mission of the 

3038 committees. He has answered sufficient questions about this 

3039 particular document to determine that itw^s not related to 
30U0 the other Kicaraguan and freedom /ighter aid support that 
30m the organizations tried to provide, and subsequently, we 
3042 find no relevance, and I will continue to prevent the 
30143 witness from answering, if I must. 

3014U MK. OLIVER: Counsel, is it your contention Hike 

30145 Barnes has no relevance to the mandate of this committee? 

30146 MS. HORRISOM: It is my contention, Mr. Oliver, that 
30U7 campaign^elated issues that are directed at a single 

3048 candidate are not the mission of this committee. This 

3049 committee is here on a broad purpose, not to take on 



UNCLASSIREi 



icO 



211 



NAME: 
3050 
3051 
3052 
3053 
305K 
3055 
3056 
3057 
3058 
305 
3060 
3061 
3062 
3063 
3064 
3065 
3066 
3067 
3068 
3069 
3070 
3071 
3072 
3073 
307U 



SSIFIED „.,, 



HIR251000 w«»w— -w-o.— pjgj. 125 

particular candidate's specific political-- 

KR. OLIVER: Kike Barnes was the chairnan of the 

subcommittee . 

MS. nORRISON: We understand who HiXe Barnes was. 
MR. OLIVER: Is it your contention he is not 
relevant to the investigation of this committee? 

Is that why you are directing your witness not to answer: 
MS. MORRISON: In the context of this particular 
document, and the context of the particular organization of 
the Channel group that was involved, and the activity that 
has been described by this witness, yes. 
BY MR. OLIVER: 
2 A few moments ago, Mr. Smith, you indicated that 
several Congressmen were upset about Colonel North's 
activities in Central America; is that correct? 
A Yes. 

e You also indicated you believed one of those 
Congressmen was Congressman Barnes; is that correct? 
A Yes. 

2 You also indicated it was a letter these Congressmen 
had written inquiring about, or you had heard of a letter, 
or read in the newspaper about a letter from these 
Congressmen inquiring about Colonel North's activities in 
Central America; is that correct? 

A I didn't know exactly who it was from, which one or 



UNCLASSiRED 



212 



NAME: 
307S 
3076 
3077 
3078 
3079 
3080 
3081 
3082 
3083 
3084 
3085 
3086 
3087 
3088 
3089 
3090 
309 1 
3092 
3093 
3094 
3095 
3096 
3097 
3098 
3099 



UNCLASS!F![f) 



HIR2S1000 w • • w— •■» ■^ ■?■ a.n.t.v PAGE 126 
several Congressmen. 

2 It was your understanding that Mike Barnes was one 
of the principal opponents of aid to the Freedom /ighters in 
Central America; is that correct? 

MS. MORRISON: Objection. 
Calls for the witness to conclude for his opinj' 
matter that's not relevant. 

HR. OLIVER: Counsel, earlier the v. ^led 

that everyone who lived in Washington or eve. ^ who was in 
Washington Knew that Mr. Barnes was an opponent of the 
Freedom tighters . 

MS. MORRISON: Another one oi the many reasons why 
It would not be a subject relevant to this committers 
mandate . 

MR. OLIVER: I believe this committee's mandate is 
to try to determine how assistance was given to the 
resistance in Nicaragua, to determine whether or not that 
assistance was legal, illegal, within the law to determine 
what happened. 

MS. MORRISON'. If we get to some of those questions 
instead of the only ones we seem to be focusing on right 
now, which are Mike Barnes, intensive , perhaps we can answer 
some of them. 

MR. OLIVER: Counsel, that seems to be because you 
don't seem to be willing to allow questions about the 



ttntmsw 



213 



wussw 



3102 
3 103 
3104 



NAME: HIR251000 U|lW*-»'^^ PjqE ,27 

3100 chairman oi the subcommittee that dealt primarily with aid 

3101 to Nicaragua in 1986. 
MS. MORRISOH: No, Mr. Olivet. I'm not prepared to 

have political axes ground here off the backs of my clients 
in connection with matters not relevant to the mandate of 

3105 this committee. 

3106 MR. OLIVER: I'm sorry, but that has absolutely no 

3107 relevance to this committee, and there are no political axes 

3108 being ground here. Counsel. 

3109 I would hope I would withdraw that statement. It's 

3110 improper and irrelevant. 

3111 MS. MORRISON: I am relieved to hear your statement. 

3112 Mr . Oliver . 

3113 Can we move to a subject that is relevant? 

31 l"* MR. OLIVER: I'm on a subject that is relevant. 

3115 BY MR. OLIVER: 

3116 . 2 Mr. Smith, I would like to ask you once again, were 

3117 the organizations that you worked for in 1986 engaged in 

3 118 attempting to influence congressional support for aid to the 

3119 Freedom /ighters in Nicaragua? 

3120 A That would have been the hopeful results of the work 

3121 through Sentinel. And if the educational efforts by the 

3 122 National Endowment caused private citizens to think about 

3123 this issue and then form their own opinion, then it stands 

312i« to reason they might call their Congressman or Senator and 



uNcussm 



214 



NAME : 
3125 
3126 
3127 
3128 
3129 
3130 
3131 
3132 
3133 
3134 
3135 
3136 
3137 
3138 
3139 
31U0 
3141 
3142 
3143 
3114 
3145 
3146 
3147 
3148 
3149 



mm& .=. . 



HIR25 1000 lES^Pti'^.S"^.".. ■;.tiB H'm.i^ PAGE 128 

say, hey, I want you to vote this way or that way on this 

issue, and that conceivably could influence congressional 

opinion . 

S Which employees at the organization of which Mr. 
k 
Channel was the head, or the president, or the chairman, 

which other employees were engaged in soliciting funds for 

the Central American Freedom program? 

A Mr. Littledale--no . Wait a minute--yes, Mr. 
Littledale, and Ms. Itg Lo^ttiUio and, I believe, that's it. 
Perhaps, Mr. Fred Freed. 

I'm trying to remember when various staff people came on 
board with relation to what was going on at the time they 
came on board. I think that is about it. 

2 Did the Central American Freedom program include in 
addition to television ads and lobbying, as I believe you 
have testified earlier. include||| any other methods of public 
relations activities that were designed to influence the 
vote in the Congress? 

A Hot to my knowledge. 
If you could be more specific. 



8 Do you know Edie Fralilar' 



A I know who she is. She is with Minor, Frailer and 
Gabriel. It's a 1^ firm. 

2 What was their relationship to Central American 
Freedom program? 



UNCLASSiFIE'D 



215 



llNfiUSSlfitD 



NAME: HIR251000 I 1 1 V IJ L.nW W ■ ■ ■ ■■ -^ PAGE 129 

3 1S0 . A I was not aware that she had one in the Central 

3151 American freedom program. 

3152 2 Do you know whether or not she was a subcontractor 

L 

3 153 to one of the ChanneJ^ organizations during that period oi 

31514 time in early 1986, when the vote was pending in the 

3155 Congress? 

3156 A You mean her firm, or herself, or her personally? 

3157 2 Either one. 

3 158 A No. This is totally 4J(new to me. 

3 159 I mean if it was, and it was, you know, in some way that 

3160 it wasn't apparent, maybe. But the onlyy Edi* rrais|^er did 

316 1 was she was involved in the Nicaraguan Refugee Fund in the 

3162 very beginning in 1985, was my understanding. 

3163 2 Were you aware that Bob and Adam Goodman were 

3164 Involved in the Central American Freedom program? 

3 165 A They were involved in producing the television ads. 

3166 2 For the Central American Freedom program? 

3167 A Yes, sir. 

3 168 2 Did you work with Bob and Adam Goodman on the 

3169 Central American Freedom program? 

3170 A No, sir, I did not. 

3 17 1 2 You indicated earlier that you had met with Adam 

3172 Goodman in relation to some billing discrepancies that were 

3173 pointed out in late 1986, I believe; is that correct? 
317U A Yes. 



*VK^^«\^^ 



216 



HIR2S1000 



wMfe 



PAGE 130 



NAME 

3175 2 Why ueie you meeting with Adam Goodman? 
3 176 A It was probably the whim oi the moment with Spitz. 

3177 He wanted someone who was trying and straighten this out. 

3178 It was a very confusing problem. 

3179 No one seemed to know how to get to the center of it and 

3180 figure out what the billing problem was. and he suggested 

3181 that I maybe try and figure it out. 

3182 2 Had you worked with him previously on billing? 

3183 A No, sir. 

3184 He might have asked me since I had been one of his staff 

3185 members who had been with him the longest and perhaps he 

3186 trusted me to try and go work it out. 

3187 2 Do you know Dan Kuykendall? 

3188 A Yes, sir. 

3 189 2 How do you know Dan Kuykendall? 

3190 A Well, Dan Kuykendall is one of the finest persons I 

319 1 have met since moving to Washington, and he is a former 

3192 Congressman who now is a lobbyist with his own lobbying 

3193 firm. 

319U 2 Does he do anything other than lobby professionally, 

3195 that you know of? 

3196 A Well, he hires clients, and at one time he was 
3 197 working with Hr . Channel's organization. 

3198 2 You say he hires clients? 

3199 A He hires himself out. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



217 



NAME 
320 
320 
3202 
3203 
32014 
3205 
3206 
3207 
3208 
3209 
3210 
321 1 
3212 
3213 
3211* 
3215 
3216 
3217 
3218 
3219 
3220 
3221 
3222 
3223 
32214 



..... UNCLASSIFIED 



'AGE 131 



e To lobby? 

A It is ray understanding, to get things done in 
Washington. 

Excuse me one moment please. 

Q Ue were talking about Dan Kuykendall. 
What did Mr. Dan Kuykendall do for Mr. Channel, in relation 
to the Central American freedom program, if anything, if you 
know? 

A At that time I believe Mr. Kuykendall was--whether it 
was employed or not, I don't know, but connected directly 
uith Mr. Miller and IBC, and was sort oi a subcontractor of 
IBC, and as a result, I'm not auare of what specifically he 
was doing. I think that he was probably'one thing he did 
was afj'inf ormation gather^about opinion on the Hill regarding 
certain issues . 

But other than that, I'm not familiar in any substantive 
way with his specific duties. 

2 What kind of work did you do with Hr . Kuykendall? 

A I engaged in no substantive work with him. I just 
talked to him on the phone from time to time, when Spitz 
wasn't around and he as trying to find him. 

But when it came to the--any strategy that went on between 
hlA and the organization run by Sptdz Channel, Spitz handled 
that. 

2 Was your relationship with him one of--a social one 



UNCUSSIFIE 



218 



yNCLASSIFlEO 



NAME: HIR2S1000 11 1 1 III ni J li B 1 K L_ U PAGE 132 

3225 or a professional one? 

3226 A Professional. 

3227 2 In what sense? 

3228 A In that I know him as a result of ray work and not 

3229 outside oi work in a social context. 

3230 2 Mas he involved in fund raising for any of Mr. 

3231 Channel's organizations? 

3232 A To ray knowledge, he never solicited funds for any of 

3233 nr . Channel's organizations. 

323U 2 Your primary responsibility was fund raising? 

3235 A Yes. 

3236 2 What was your professional relationship with Hz . ~ 

3237 Kuykendall if it was not fund raising? 

3238 MS. MORRISON: Mr. Oliver, I think you are trying to 

3239 play a senantic game with the witness. He has said he 
32t40 considered the relationship professional and not social, 
32'4l because he knew Mr. Kuykendall only froii his work and not in 
32<42 social context. 

32M3 He has described to you he did no substantive work with 

32t4U Mr. Kuykendall but talked to hin from time to time when Mr. 

L 

SZUS Kuykendall would call looking for Hr . Channel. 

32U6 HR. OLIVER: Counsel, he's testified earlier that 

32147 He. Kuykendall was one of the finest persons that he had met 

32'48 since coming to Washington. Ha also testified his 

32149 relationship with him was professional. 



UNCUSSiFIED 



219 



UNCUSSiFIEB 



NAME: HIR251000 y ||yf|_nUUil IfciW PAGE 133 

3250 I'm just trying to determine what the professional 

3251 relationship with Mr. Kuykendall was. 

3252 THE WITNESS ^ In reference to what I said about my 

3253 high feelings of regard for Hr . Kuykendall, that comes from 
32SU having been around him in a professional setting when he 

3255 would be over at the office meeting with Spitz, or he 

3256 perhaps might be at a meeting that I was at -^ a luncheon, 

3257 or something in which I was there attending also, and during 
^58 this time I just have come to know him, his background, what 

3259 he stands for, which is very much what I stand for, and I 

3260 regard him as a political fighter, and I admire that very 

3261 much. That's why I said that I admired him. 

3262 In ray daily work on a day-to-day basis at the National 

3263 Endowment, or the American Conservative Trust, or any 

3264 organization, I did not have an ongoing set of 

3265 responsibilities that required me to work with Hr . 

3266 Kuykendall to any specific project. 

3267 BY HR. OLIVER: 

3268 2 When did you begin to work with Hr . Kuykendall in 

3269 such a way that you could determine that he was a political 

3270 fighter. 

327 1 A I guess I met him originally through--came to know 

3272 about him throughfiis relationship with Rich Hiller, and that 

3273 would have been — I don't think that I — wall, probably late '85 
32714 or early '86. 



llNWSSWf- 



220 



UNCLASSIFIED 



NAME: HIR251000 lJ|l|JL.nUWII IkV PAGE 13<4 

3275 2 You testified earlier that you ended your employment 

3276 with Hr . Channel in Hay of 1987; is that correct? 

3277 A Yes, sir. 

3278 2 In 1987 were you raising funds for any projects that 

3279 uere related to Nicaragua? 

3280 A In 1987, Nicaragua? 

3281 I believe there was a little bit of fund raising that went 

3282 on in February with some efforts to try and do some things 

3283 through Sentinel. 

32814 2 What things uere you going to try to do through 

3285 Sentinel? 

3286 A I helieve it was going to be soma newspaper ads on 

3287 the Freedom f'ighter vot«. I balieva that was Sentinel. I'm 

3288 not sure. 

3289 2 In 1987? 

3290 A Yes, sir. 

329 1 2 Did you raise any funds for any activities that 

3292 related in any way to this investigation? 

3293 A That related to this investigation? 

329M Could you say what you mean a little better? 

3295 S Did you raise any funds for the Oliver North Defense 

3296 Fund? 

3297 . . A Oh. yes, I did. 

3298 2 And what did you do with those funds? 

3299 A Hell, they were ultimately returned to the 



UNCUSSIFiED 



221 



NAME: 
3300 
3301 
3302 
3303 
330U 
3305 
3306 
3307 
3308 
3309 
3310 
331 1 
3312 
3313 
33114 
3315 
3316 
3317 
3318 
3319 
3320 
3321 
3322 
3323 
3324 



........ yNCLASSI^ED ... 



HIR251000 i55iyLn??iJ^ ■ ILO ''*°*^ '^^ 

contributors . 

S Did you raise any iunds ioz any lobbying activities 
related to this investigation? 
A Not to ray recollection. 
2 I have no further questions. 

MR. FRYMAN: Mo further questions. 
BY MR. BUCK: 
e Mr. Smith, I just have a few questions. 
I wanted to clarify some of the previous testimony without 
trying to beat any horses to death. 

Earlier in your testimony I believe a maul airplane was 
described as a transport plane. I don't know whether Mr. 
Fryman or yourself characterized it that way. 

What is your exposure to a maul airplane? Have you 
lly s( 
A No. 

2 Have you seen pictures of a maul airplane? 
A Yes. 

2 How many people can sit in a maul airplane, if you 
know, from the pictures you have seen? 

A It's my recollection that it can seat as many as you 
put the seats in there, like maybe 8 or 10. If you take the 
seats out then that's what you use that area as a cargo bay. 

2 Okay. I believe you testified earlier also that 
Inman Brandon gave a contribution to you for Mr. Channel's 



\lNtmSlfit8 



222 



UNCIA"'"'''^' 



NAME: HIR2S1000 IJIluLnyU^a tLi/' PAGE 136 



3325 
3326 
3327 



organization? 

A You are referring to the January '86 solicitation 
when he gave *100,000? 



iwssife 



223 



mmm - - 



NAME: HIR2S1000 

3328 RPTS CANTOR 

3329 DCHN MILTON 

3330 [2:151 
3331 

3332 2 Correct. 

3333 A Hell, yes, it was a solicitation in which Mr. 
333M Channell solicited the grant. 

3335 2 It was ♦100,000 and it was for a specific purpose? 

3336 A To my recollection, it was for missiles. 

3337 2 What does Mr. Brandon do for a living? 

3338 A He IS a retired attorney. 

3339 2 But he was an attorney at one time? 
33U0 A Yes. sir. 

33>41 2 Do you know how long he practiced? 

33M2 A A very long time. He is 81, I believe, now, and 

33>43 actually he is not retired. He probably has been a lawyer 

Z3HH 50 years. 

3345 2 Do you know anything about the law firm he is with? 

33U6 Is it a large law firm? 

33<47 A Yes, sir. 

33>48 2 Prestigious law firm? 

33it9 A I think so. 

3350 ^ 2 In Atlanta. Georgia, is that correct? 

3351 A Yes, sir. 

3352 2 Did he ever raise any questions about the tax 



UNCUSSiFe 



224 



iwssifiio 



NAME: HIR251000 ^ PAGE 138 

3353 deductibility of the donation that he was giving? Did it 

33SU concern hint that he was giving money ior weapons and did he 

3355 raise any questions about the taK deductibility for 

3356 contribution for weapons? 

3357 A It did not seem to be a matter of great concern to 

3358 him. 

3359 2 When did you become aware that contributors could 

3360 meet with the President? 

3361 A That would have been after Ht . Fischer was retained 

3362 to assist in matters in that area, and that would have 

3363 been--I'ra sorry, I can't remember when. Sometime in the past 
336M two years. What is your name again? 

3365 2 Hy name is Ken. 

3366 Mho would make a decision whether a contributor 

3367 would meet with the President or not? 

3368 A Mr. Channell. 

3369 2 Do you know what the basis for that decision was, 

3370 or if there was more than one? 

337 1 A It would be a contributor who was very committed to 

3372 whatever project we might be working on, in most cases, 

3373 Nicaragua, and usually someone who had been financially 

3374 active in supporting that cause. 

3375 S Mas it strictly a dollar amount that determined 

3376 whether someone could meet with the President or not? 

3377 A I have heard, and I honestly don't know where, that 



UNCLASSIFIED 



225 



ituissite 



NAME: HIR251000 \^|1V»-*"^ PAGE 139 

3378 theie was sons speculation that In ordar fox one of ouz 

3379 contributors to meet with the President, they had to give a 

3380 certain dollar amount, and X never knew that to be a rule, 

3381 and I never Knew what the dollar amount was. 

3382 2 But to your belief, there were other factors than 

3383 Dust money that went into determining whether somebody met 

3384 with the President? 

3385 A Yes. It would have tojbe someone who was--I mean, 

3386 you know, someone who was politically active and who would 

3387 appreciate that opportunity, given the contacts that they 

3388 were working on a project that the President very much 

3389 believed In himself. 

3390 2 Was the Antiterrorism American Committee Involved 

3391 in fund raising for the freedom fighters? 

3392 A No, sir, not to my recollection. 

3393 2 Did Colonel Horth have any direct involvement in 

3394 the Antiterrorism American Committee? 

3395 A No, sir, never, not to ray recollection. 

3396 2 Are you aware of any money that was used by the 

3397 Antiterrorism American Committee that was received from a 

3398 diversion of profits from the Iran arms sales? 

3399 A Absolutely not. 

3M00 . (Whereupon, at 2=20 p.m., the deposition was 

340 1 adjourned . 1 



lussipa 



— OiiASsra 

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 






SELECT co^nirrK.^ or sicr.sr military .s3I3T.m.ce 

■rO IRAll .':.'0 .HE .IO^aUG.7J< 0PP0S17ICU 

aUTT^D ^.ATES SETIATS 0O\^t>t> CTC^^^ 

' • ^ (g) oU^ 



jpo3icion of J^VMMl D, SOr -R 



« « 






-^ f<arS£SJ:Jl^ ' 



Partially DiclsSified/ Released on ^Y/U ^Ip 
under provisions oi E.0. 12356 .■ • »* 
hy 3. Reger, tiatoa^ Sefi^fritt CottKU ' 




Washington, D, 
juiie 13, 1387 



Pages 1 tlvru 93 




MILLER REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 

507 C Str«. N t. 
y»M^•n^ton, O.C. 20002 



_J 



(227) 



228 



UNCLASSIFIED 



SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT 

ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

* and 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 

TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

Washington, D.C. 
Thursday, June 18, 1987 

The deposition of ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, called for 

examination in the above-entitled matter, pursuant to notice, 

in the offices of the Senate Select Committee, Room 901, Hart 

Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C, convened at 3:06 

p.m., before Pamela Briggle, a notary public in and for the ; 

District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the { 

parties : i 



UNCUSSIFIED 



229 



APPEARANCES: 



UNCLASSIFItO 



On Behalf of the Select Conunittee on Secret Military 
Assistance to Iran and Nicaraguan Opposition of th« 
United States Senate: 

MARK BELNICK 

Executive Assistant to the Chief Counsel 

-and- 

TERRY SMILJANICH 

Associate Counsel 

Room 901 

Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C 

On Behalf of the Select Committee to Investigate Arms 
Transactions with Iran of the U.S. House of 
Representatives: 

TIMOTHY E. TRAYLOR 

Special Agent 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

1900 Half Street, S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



230 



UNULA55IMtU 



WITNESS 

ABRAHAM D. SOFAER 
By Mr. Belnick 

NUMBER 

Sofaer 1 
Sofaer 2 
Sofaer 3 
Sofaer 4 
Sofaer 5 
Sofaer 6 



CONTENTS 



EXAMINATION 



EXHIBITS 



FOR IDENTIFICATION | 



UNClASSra 



231 



UNt;U55iHED 



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2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

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23 

24 
m iw>oiiTiio CO.. nc 

;Sa-..NE 25 



PROCEEDINGS 

Whereupon, , 

ABRAHAM D. SOFAER j 

was called for examination by counsel, and having been first 

duly sworn by the notary public, was examined and testified | 

as follows: I 

EXAMINATION 

BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q Good afternoon. Judge. By way of background, 

you've had a distinguished career and I just want to go over 

some of the highlights. 

Prior to becoming legal adviser you've been a 
prosecutor? 

A Yes, I was a federal prosecutor from 1967 to 1969. 
Q And subsequent to that? 

A I was a law professor at the Columbia Law School 
for 10 years, '69 to '79. 

Q And then after that you became a federal judge in 
the Southern District of New York? 
A That's correct. 
Q And served on the bench until? 
A The district court until 1985. | 

Q And you've been the legal advis1[r at the U.S. State j 
Department from that time until now? j 



UNCUSSIFIED 



. D c :o<»j 



ONCLAJiJilNhU 



Q Judge, when was the first tiine--I want to question 
you about the Iran initiative, but let me take a small 
subject up first. You're familiar during 1985 and 1986 with 
the existence of a restricted interagency group at the State 
Department that dealt with Latin American affairs including 
Central America, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And that was chaired by Assistant Secretary Abra/ms^ 

A I had heard about it. I don't know anything about 
its operations. 

Q Did' you know who the members of that RIG were? 

A No. 



RIGi 



Was the legal adviser's office represented on chat 



No. 



A 

Q Was there a desire on the part of the legal 
advisfft's office to be represented on that RIG? 

A Yea. 

Q Did you take actions to achieve such a result? 

A I didn't take any actions. I asked my principal 
deputy, Michael Kozak, who is a long time associate of Jim 
Michtel, who had become the principal deputy in AKA, to take 
up with ARA the question of getting legal representation on 
the RIG, and generally getting more legal input into the 
Central American policy. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



233 



UNGUSSIFltD 



1 

2 
3 
4 

5 

' ! 

7 I 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 

:0-. •«. 

25 



Q And approximately when did you ask Mr. Kozak to 

pursue that? _j 

A I believe I started asking him and complaining ^fr 
^||r talking to him about the subject within months of my 
arrival in the State Department, late '85. 

n This would have been sometime in the fall? 

A in the fall of '35. 

Q By that point Elliot^-Abrafans was ensconced as 1^ 
Assistant Secretary for ARA? 

A Yes. 

Q Did Mr. Kozak report back to you on the results of 

his inquiries? 

A Yes, he said that it was unacceptable. 

Q What was unacceptable? 

A TO have a member of the legal advis/|r's office to 

be a part of the RIG. 

Q Did he tell you— did Mr. Kozak tell you who had 
advised him that it was unacceptable? 

A I don't recall. 

Q Did you pursue it thereafter? 

A No, I didn't. I, first of all, assumed that if 
there were any legal issues they would be brought to me. Ar 
Kozak, of course, told me that that would be the case, that 
we were given that assurance. 

And furthermore, ^^^^2. J^m^^m^ "^"^ whether Jim 



234 



1 

2 
3 
4 

5 

6 
7 
8 
9 

10 
11 
12 

13 

14 I 

is! 

16 ' 

17 

13 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 I 

25 



UNCLA^^INtU 



:ich/«l was invol\ 



Mich/«1 was involved in Central American issues or not 
involved in Central American issues, I assumed that his 
presence in ARA was a responsible factor in not having to •^ 
h&ve other lawyers participate, he being far more experienced 
that either Kozak or me. 

I did not regard him as a substitute for the legal 
advis^r's office. 

Q You still would have preferred to have your office 
represented? 

A Absolutely. I frequently told Kozak that I thought 



1^1 's 



that Jim Mich/el's presence in ARA was a liability for us, 
the legal adviser's office, because it could mean potentially 
that people would use Mich/el for legal advice instead of us. 

Q Did you ever discuss the RIG and your desire for 
representation on it directly with Secretary Abralms? 

A No. 

Q Do you know who the members of the RIG were? 

A Not at that time. After October 1st, 1986 I did. 

Q And how did you learn--after October 1st, 1986 
there was a change in the nature of the RIG? 

A There was a change in the legislation that led me 
to renew my interest in having a representative of the legal 
advis^'s office be present at policymaking sessions about 
Central America. 

Q This was once Congress restored the aid and came in 



rice Congress restorec 



235 



iKi-'SIFIED 



fact that the legis- 
' the Secretary of 



Central American policy 



alms 



9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 

0..-C i 

25 I 



with SlOO million, that package 

A It wasn't that. It was the fact that Jhejegis^- 
lation for the first tim 
State 

Q And after that you had a discussion with Abra 
about legal being represented on the RIG? 

A Yes. 

Q And he agreed to it? 

A Yes. 

And you are represented on that RIG now' 

Yes, as far as I know, yes. I think Olson sits in j 



Q 

A 
or Kozak. 

Q Let me turn now to the sub]ect of Iran. Prior to 
the disclosures of an American involvement with arms to Iran, i 
the disclosures of November 1986, had you been made aware of , 
what we now call the Iran initiative? I 

A Prior to November 1st, 1986, I was unaware. | 

Q You had never received a briefing from the Secretary] 

or any of his advisors on that program? | 

i 
A On no occasion. ; 

Q What was your first official involvement in matters | 
pertaining to the Iran initiative subsequent to November 1, ^ 
1986? And If you want to use your notes to refresh your 
recollection, that's fine. 

A It was on Novemcer I8t_h, J?8J when a conference was 



lifMlFiPn 



yNCLA^SIFIED 



called by the white House counsel related to the Iran arms 
issue. 

Q Who was at that conference, do you recall? 

A Wallison was there, who was white House counsel; 
Cooper; Thompson, Paul Thompson of the NSC; Dave Doherty, CIA 
general counsel; and a couple of other people may have been 
there. But those people were definitely all there. 

Q And this meeting was at the white House? 

A Yes. 

Q And by whom had the meeting been called? 

A I seenr to recall that it was Wallison. 

Q Tell us what you recall having transpired at the 
meeting. And you're free to refer to your notes if that 
helps . 

A Thank you. Wallison said that we needed the facts 
relating to the arms sales to Iran. By that time it was 
clear that such sales had occurred. Initially, ^^BBH^ 
denials^published in the press and even I was doubtful that 
it was true. But by then it was quite clear that it had ^ 
occurred, ^^i fhere was going to be a press conference *^ the 
President. And Wallisory as his lawyer, no doubt wanted to 
know more about it. ^t One of the major lessons I learned 
at that meeting was that he knew as little as I did. 
At that meeting I found that Cooper — 

Q Now that '_s _CJiuck_ Coo2er_from the Justice Department* 



lat's Chuck Cooper from tl 

HNCUS^!F!ED 



237 



9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 

t..mc 

25 



mama 



A Yes, ChucJc Cooper who is Assistant Attorney General 
in the Department of Justice. And Paul Thompson of the NSC, ■. 
and to an extent, Doherty, although he didn't say as much, ! 
they knew a lot more than wallison did. 

cooper's knowledge, however, seemed to be related 
to the legal issues. He explained that there was a finding 
adopted tfn January 17 or so of-- 
Q This is Cooper now? 

A cooper. And that from January '86 on all activities 
were pursuant to that finding and all arms shipped were 
pursuant to fhe Economy Act. At least this is my understan- 
ding. It may have been Thompson who said this, but I think i 
Cooper already was aware of a finding. I'm not sure. j 
Q Did Mr. Cooper say for how long he had been aware? 
A No, he didn't. 

Q Did you understand— did he give you the impression 
that he had known about it all along? 
A No. 
Q Or that this was something he had just found out in 

the course of — 

A He gave me the impression that he had been assigned 
the job of figuring out the legal issues involved. And he 
had looked at a 1981 opinion -nat was written by^the legal 
advisjr. Actually it was written by Jim Mich^, signed off 
■^ __j * ,,,,er to Attorney General Smith 



by 



•" ■■■•■ "mmfm 






who had approved it, relating to the transfer of certain arms 



Q Judge, you've said and your notes indicate that 
Peter Wallison, then the President's counsel, said at the 
meeting that he needed facts and that he couldn't give advice 
without the facts, correct? 

A Yes. 

w 

Q Who was^asking for the facts? 

A He was asking Thompson essentially, and to an 
extent. Cooper. 

Q And what was Thompson's response? 

A Thompson said that on that day theaJwas going to 
^0^ brief ^|^M» Intelligence Committee staff on the Hill. 
4^1 We pressed hijn for at least as much information as he was 
going to give to the congressional staffers and he refused. 

Q Did he tell you why? 

A He said that Poindexter had instructed him not to 
give out any information to anyone who didn't need to know 
it. ^mi miT position was tha^ in order to advise our clients 
on the legal issues involved, we did need to know it. And at 
a minimum, we should be told what was going to be told to 
staffers. 

Q And h# continued to refuse? 

A Flatly refused, with considerable embarrassment. 

Q But on instructions, as he put it, from Admiral 



wPMvm 



239 



Jn.A^^"r'-0 



Poindexter who was then the President's national security 
advisor? 

A Yes. He also said that — 

Q Just so I get this straight, being a civilian. 
Paul Thompson was then counsel to the National Security 
Council? 

A He was counsel to the national security advisor. I 
don't think he had the same rank or title that Paul Stevens 
has now. 

Q Let me ask you. Do counsel to different depart- 
m«nts, such as the National Security Council or the legal 
advis«r himself, your position, do they have each as their 
ultimate client the President of the United States? 

A Absolutely. 

Q And Peter Wallison — 

A Particularly someone like myself who's nominated by 
the President. 

Q So that in addition to being the legal adviser to 
th« Secretary of State, you're also one of the President's 
lawyers? 

Yes. 

And the same would be true of Thompson for that 



A 
Q 

matter? 
A 

Q 



I would say so. 

And certainly Peter Wallison directly was counsel 



240 



llN!;Ua::,r£D 



to the President, correct? 

A Correct . 

Q And you're telling us that at this meeting counsel 
to the President was asking another counsel to the President 
^^^■^■■■■■■■■■t. for facts so that he could give the 



President advice and Thompson said, no, on orders from 
Admiral Poindexter? 

A Yes . 

Q Didn't you find that unusual? 

A Absolutely. 

Q And disturbing? 

A Very disturbing. He gave as his reason that the 
lawyers who needed to work on the issue — and I gathered by 
that he meant Doherty in the CIA and Cooper from the Depart- 
ment of Justice — had been briefed adequately to work on the 

And that C^HHH^^HBiH^H^Bi^^^°^^ ^^® 
people in charge of legality as he put it. 

Q According to Thompson? 

A Right. And he said that from the political point 
of view that things seemed calm and the committees seemed to 
be accepting the position of the White House and there was 
really no need to get the issue more broadly briefed. 

Q Did you make any comment in response to that 
position? 

A Well, _I_tho\i.ght_tfia^Wailia^ was right and that we 



241 



UNCL,U,..1D 



should get more information. But I did say that they could 
handle it that way. They could choose to restrict access to 
the facts to the Attorney General and his designee, and the 
CIA director and his designee. 

But that as a result of that, they could not look 
to us for legal opinions at all. That ^gB^MH^^HHlHHM 



Bii^kB the Attorney General would then 



bear the full role with respect to the legal issues. He 
could not look to. Department of State and legal adviser's 
office, or to white House counsel for that matten for legal 
support. 

Q Did Thompson or Cooper make any response to that as 
you recall? 

A His response was that people are learning — 

Q This is who, Thompson? 

A ThompsQn. That people are learning that this is an 
intelligence operation not an arms sales as such, and they're 
calming down. 

Q Now your notes indicate that you asked whether the 
usual vetting process would be followed, what did you mean 
by that? 

A There is a process for all findings and intelligence 

^b6 



activities that 



ft^^before they go to 



the Hill they come through the agency process. 
^^■■■■■■■■■^■■■•-^Mbw that they were going to brief 



iiNni^ iFn 



242 



bl^yULiilED 



th« Intelligence Committee on this, would we be briefed on 
it, would we find out about it in the usual manner, would we 
be involved in the process of analyzing the issues as we went I 
along? And he said he assumed that we would. 

Q That was Thompson again? 

A Yes. 

Q Now you had said that Coopet when he was giving 
some statement of facts that he had learned, mentioned the 
finding that the President had signed sometime in January 
1986, correct? 

A I believe it was Cooper. 

Q Did Cooper mention any other finding that the 
President signed in connection with Iran? 

A No. 

Q Did Thompson mention anything about findings? 

A No. 

Q Was ther« anjf — 

A But Thompson knew about the finding also and he 
mentioned eikaiK the same finding. He confirmed that there 
was such a finding. 

Q Did he mention f^^i* any other finding? 

A No. 

Q Was this the first time you had heard that there 
was any finding relating to an Iran initiative? 

A Absolutely 



l^^li^ioirEO 



243 



11^.:. r!EO 



Q Was there any discussion at this meeting on 
November 18 of specific shipments? I notice on the next to 
the last page of your notes there seems to have been some 
discussion, if I'm right, about the September arms transfer. 
And I assume that was September '85 unless you tell me 
otherwise. 

A Yes. 

Q What was that discussion? 

A There was a statement that the finding was in 
January, and there were two issues that arose. One was a 
post-August '86 shipment--at least one that was concluded 
after August '86 when a new law took effect--and its legality 
despite the finding. And pre-January '86 shipments of which 
I was told there was one which had gone via Israel in 
September '85. 

Q Who said there had been that shipment? 

A I don't recall who said it exactly, but it's quite 
clear it was said at that meeting. Let me see if my notes 
reflect that. 
Yes 

through the government of Israel and they transferred — the 
government of Israel transferred arms to Iran. He described 
it as ^■■■Vi^^P ^ transfer of arms by the government of 
Israel to Iran- 

Q Did Thompson give you the impression or did he 



lompson give you the impr 



244 



yNCL...;iED 



state that this was the only shipment that had taken place, 
or only transfer of U.S. arms to Iran that had taken place 
prior to the finding of January 1986? 

A Yes. He didn't say so, but he didn't go into any 
others. And it was a focus of discussion because that would 
raise, obviously raise a very serious legal question. The 
finding was in January, what happened before the finding? 

Q And his answer to the question, what happened 
before the finding was the September transfer? 

A Well, it wasn't as much an answer to the question. 
He was the one who mentioned the September transfer. And 
then when the issue of our role arose, I pointed out that 
there were real legal questions involved irrespective of what 
he might think. And one of them was the September transfer. 
Cooper said, for example, you see on page 3 of my 
notes, Wallison says, without the facts what is the legal 
analysis? How can we do this? Cooper says, we're still 
studying it. Then I raised the question, what about the 
September transfer? 

And what I was saying was, you may have a good 
explanation for the shipments after January because they 
occur under the Intelligence Act rather than the Arms Export 
Control Act, but what about prior to January? What's your 
explanation for that September shipment that Thompson had 
me.ntioned? 



m'::m 



245 



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2 
3 
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8 
9 
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(INCUKHEO 



Q And that was the shipment that he apparently 
mentioned early in the meeting judging by your reference on 
the first page of your nptes . That there had been a September 
shiu^^The government of Israel transferred arms to Iran. 
And then he says, finding January 17, 1986? 
A Precisely. 

Q So as far as you understood from what Thompson 
said, that was the only transfer that had occurred prior to 
the January '86 finding? 
A Right. 

Q. And Thompson did not tell you that he knew other- 
wise? 

A Basically what I said — in fact on my last page you 
can see, the last page of the notes--I said to him, you would 
have to look to the AECA — 

Q The Arms Export Control Act? 

A Yes, with respect to the September '85 finding. 
And then I asked him, did the President approve it, because 
then it would depend upon Presidential approval under that 
statute. And of course, then later I found out that there 
might be an argument for an oral finding by the President. 

In either event, whether the President had approved 
that finding would become a major legal question. 
Q That transfer? 
A That transfer, right 



w»«^^'i-iiv.-. .i a.U 



246 



ONCUSSIFIED 



Q Did Thompson answer whether he had approved it? 

A No. 

Q He didn't answer one way or the other? 

A No, he didn't at that time. 

Q On the last page of your notes. Judge, there's an 
indication that Thompson said, total value about S14 million. 

A That's correct. 

Q What was he saying? 

A He was saying — it was really addressed to the Arms 
Export Control Act issue, because I knew that the reporting 
requirement under the Arms Export Control Act depended in 
part upon the total value of the arms that were either 
shipped directly or transferred by a third country. 

Q And Thompson was telling you that the total value 
of the arms shipped to Iran in this whole program was about 
$14 million? 

A Correct. 

Q Did he tell you anything about how the arms had 
been priced? 

A No. 

Q Give you any information on that? 

A Not at that time. 

Q So if I understand correctly, the overall impression 
that Commander Thompson at least tried to convey was that he 
couldn't give much information, that he was under instructions 



UNCUSSm 



247 



UNCLASSlHEy 



from Admiral Poindexter not to give information, but that 
this was really no big deal, it was under control? 

A That's right. 

Q Generally speaking. 

A Yes. 

Q When the meeting ended, did you have a conversation 
with Mr. wallison about what the two of you had just heard or 
not heard? 

A Yes. r told Wallison that I thought this was 
extremely serious. 

Q That what was serious? 

A That we had not been briefed. And that they were 
going to say things to Hill staffers that they weren't 
telling us — shocking. And that it was particularly serious 
from his point of view because he was the President's counsel 
and that he should act accordingly. 

He i^^Hi^pMe agreed with me, and he asked 
Thompson to remain at the end of the meeting to talk to him. 

Q Were you there when Wallison spoke with Thompson? 

A No, I left the meeting. 

Q Were you then notified that Poindexter would see 
you later that day? 

A That's correct. 

Q You received a message that you and Undersecretary 
for Political Affairs Armacost could see Poindexter, as I 



"M(!! aj^SIFIFR 



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< naKMrriMO CO.. wc 



understand it, at 6:00 p.m. for a briefing on the Iran 
program? 

A That's right. 

Q And did you and Secretary Armacost go to the west 
wing at 6:00 p.m. on Jniwi- 18th? 

A Yes, we did. 

Q You met with Admiral Poindexter? 

A Yes. 

Q Was anyone else there? 

A Thompson. 

Q The four of you? 

A Yes. 

Q And could you recount for us what transpired at 
that meeting? And again, please feel free to refer to your 
notes. And I know we also have a memcon prepared by you of 
that meeting which we can mark. But I'd like you first to go 
through your recollection and notes of what happened. 

A Poindexter presented a review of some of the facts 
relating to these transfers. And he did--undoubtedly he was 
referring to what appeared to be a chronology. ^BH^t one 
point, in fact, it came out that he was referring to a 
chronology, so I was confident that he was referring to a 
chronology. 

Q Did he show you that chronology? 

A No, he did not. ^i^iimHIHHBHirlV^ some point 



did not. ^MHIVBMiBBBM 



249 



UNCLASSIFIED 



either I or Armacost asked whether we could see the chronology 
and we were told we could not. 
Q Did he say why not? 

A He didn't say we couldn't ever see it. He conveyed 
the impression that right now it wasn't complete, and we got 
the sense that perhaps in due course we would be seeing it. 
Keep in mind that this was the first briefing that I was 
receiving, ao anything that I was getting~i^8 more th4| I had 
gotten before, so we were not complaining. 

He then gave us a relatively sketchjr outline of 
what had happened. And it was not given in.the chronological 
order that is reflected in my memcon. 

Q While we're referring «^|B|^, let me mark as 

Sofaer Exhibit 1 this document. 

[Sofaer Exhibit No. 1 was 
marked for identification.) 
BY MR. BELNICK: 
Q And ask you. Judge, if this document so marked is 
your memorandum of conversation of the November 18 meeting 
with Armacost, Poindexter and Thompson? 
A Yes, it is. 

Q And this summarizes in more or less chronological 
order what you were told by Admiral Poindexter, albeit not in 
chronological order at that meeting? 

A It wasjili entirelY^ in chronological order. He 



lIR^iHFn 



250 



UNCLASSIFIED 



junp«cl around, but I tried to keep it in chronological order. 

Q Looking at this memorandum of conversation, the 
only pre-January 1986. transfer of U.S. arms to Iran that is 
referred to is a transfer in September 1985, numbered 
paragraph 3 of your memcon; is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q And is that your recollection? Namely, that that 
was the only pre-1986 transfer that Admiral Poindexter told 
you about? 

A Yes. 

Q That was the same one that Commander Thompson had 
told you about earlier in the day? 

A Yes. 

Q Was there any mention at this November 18 meeting 
of the fact that there had been a transfer in November 1985? 

A No. 

Q Was there any mention at this meeting that there 
had been a transfer of Hawks prior to January 1986? 

A No. 

Q What do you recall — 

A Another significant thing that occurred was he 
showed us the finding. I read the finding and Armacost read 
the finding. 

Q Now r want to go over that. That's what I was just 
about to go into. Admiral Poindexter had the finding with 



IINWSiFIED 



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him? 



Yes. 
This 
Yes. 



UNCUSSiFiED 



•ting was in his office? 



Did he have the original finding? 
The original. 

Where did he take it out from? 
Out of his safe it looked like. 
And it was with the blue ink? 

He might have had it on his desk already, but I 
seem to recall that he asked Thompson for it and Thompson got 
it and gave it to him. ! 

Q And again if you'd bear with me, do you recall 
where Thompson got it from? 

A I don't. j 

Q But your recollection is that Poindexter said to | 

Thompson, I want the finding and Thompson produced it for him? 1 



A That's my vague recollection, yes. 

Q And then it was displayed to you and Secretary 
Armacost? 

A Right. And it was the original. That I recall 
clearly. 

Q Do you remember the date? 

A January 17th. 

Q Were you _shown any-;- January^ 17th, 1986? 



you snown any — January i 

(iNi:iA.i^iFiFn 



252 



UNCLAliSll-ItU 



A Yea. 

Q Were you shown any other finding? 

A No. 

Q Were you told whether there had been any other 
finding? 

A No. 

Q Was there any discussion with you of any proposed 

or actual finding that had been submitted to the President in 
1985? 

A No. There was some discussion about whether the 

President had approved the September 1985 shipment. 

Q And what was said about that? 
[Off the record. ) 

THE WITNESS: fg^g/gg^mmmmam^sBKmkWe had a 

discussion about what W McFarlane apf and what 40t the 
President knaw about this policy. And McFarlane said ue 
expressed to the Israelis — this is what Poindexter was 
telling us^ Ve made clear that the U.S. would not trade arms 
for hostages, refused expressly to sanction the shipment, the 
first shipment. ^^ ihenlsaid, he had a strong interest in 
establishing a channel to Iran. 

And in response to a question from Kimche, he 
opined that the U.S. government would not stop selling arms 
to Israel if a transfer occurred. «wThen Poindexter said 
that he, McFarlane, apparently informed the President of this 



IINCLASSIHED 



253 



m.mm 



action. 

BY MK. BELNICK: 

Q And as best you recall, that's what was said at 
that meeting concerning pre-January Presidential approval of 
the transfer? 

A Right. And from that I would infer that the 
President had approved of the policy that McFarlane had 
articulated. That is, we're not approving of any of your 
specific arms sale^ but if you do it/we're not going to cut 
you off; Congress is not going to cut you off. 

Now there was also mention of Hawks. You'll see 
that in my notes . But 

^^^^^g^^^iaaSMiipiiBl^^^^iHBB* no missiiesA 
line items, spares, et cetera, for Hawk air defense batteries^ 



I, if anything, it indicated that 
» no missiles* It was parts, 240 






Poindexter said, i*i>i g ^U.S. experts believe will 
prove useless . 

Q But no mention that actual Hawk missiles themselves 
had been shipped? 

A Correct. 

Q And just so the record is absolutely clear, no 
mention by Poindexter or Thompson of any transfer pre-January 
1986 other than the September transfer of TOW missiles via 
Israel to Iran? 

A Correct. 

Q Did you mention to Admiral Poindexter at this 



iiNini iis.^ii-iFn 



254 



mmmm 




m««ting or question him as to why ha had been taking the 
approach that you shouldn't be getting all the facts, and 
that those facts should be confined to those on the Hill who 
get the briefing? 

A Not in those terms . But we did press him for 
information. we asked him whether there were any memcons of 
their conversations with the Iranians and others. ^^^ 

And he 

mentioned, in fact, that there were tap« recordings of 
meetings with Iranians in the White House. 

ftMdW5 asked for transcriptions of all these 
things. >^<^ ^mmlfew for^information . 

Q Did Poindexter or Thompson tell you at the November 
18 meeting anything about the involvement of private parties 
like Richard Secord or Albert Hakim in this transaction? 

A No. 

Q I believe there is a reference, if you look on the 
last page of Sofaer Exhibit 1, your memcon page 3, that 
apparently Admiral Poindexter said — I'm looking at the third 
paragraph-- "Iran paid in advance for these shipments to Israel 

which paid the U.S. government through a proprietary. 

'A 

Poindexter assured that the arms merchant took his profit, 

but does not know how much was paid by Iran, only how much 
was paid to the CIA and DOD." 



Did Po 



wmmm 



u anything more about who the 



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arms merchant was? 
A No. 
Q And again he didn't mention Secord, didn't mention 

Hakim? 

A No. 

Q Did he tell you anything more about the pricing of 
the arms, other than what's reflected in this paragraph? 
A No. 

Q And he did not tell you on November 18, I gather, 
that any portion of the proceeds of the Iran arms sales had 
been diverted to or for the benefit of the contras? 
A NO. 

Q Nothing like that came up? 
A Nothing like that. 

Q And the only finding he told you about and led you 
to believe existed was the finding of January 17, 1986? 
A Correct. 

Q When that meeting was over did you feel that you 
then had the whole story? 
A No. 
Q Why not? 

A Because I've heard lots of whole stories in my life 
Q All right, we'll go on. I just want to clear up, 
there is another version of the memorandum, of conversation of 
your November 18 meeting with Ar».acost, Thompson and Poihdex- 



iiNniii^fiiFiFn 



251^ 



UNCU^SiFlED 



ter I'll mark as Sofaer Exhibit 2. It's substantially 
similar to the one we've marked as Sofaer Exhibit 1. 

[Sofaer Exhibit No. 2 was 
marked for identification.) 
BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q Judge, would you -just describe what the--is Sofaer 
Exhibit 2 the version of the memcon of that meeting after ' 
Secretary Armacost edite4 it or added some of his comments? 

A I don't know what Chris Ross did. 

Q Ch^^is Ross is Armacost's assistant? 

A Chris- Ross is Armacost's assistant, ^took what I had 
done plus other information that he had available to him ^^^ 
^^gj^gf--Lt may have been recollections by Armacost of the 
meeting that I didn't have in my version/ BBV he wrote this^ 
^iMl I thought for a complete record you ought to have it. 

Q And you've looked at it. Is it substantially 
similar to your version? 

A It is. There might be some differences. I haven't 
looked at it with great care. I think that there are no 
material differences. There might be e»|la]|ation points afb 



Q Look on the second page, if you would please, of 

Sofaer Exhibit 2. You see the handwriting in the margin, 
December 1985. whose handwriting is that? 



I don 



niNP'^'^'FIED 



257 



UNCUSSiritD 



Q How did the meeting with Poindexter and Thompson 
end on November 18? 

A Cordially. 

Q You and Secretary Armacost urged, as I gathered 
from the memcon, that they make sure the witnesses who will 
soon be appearing, tell the complete story and be utterly 
truthful? 

A That was my particular concern because I was 
already very concerned about the way in which things were 
being done. HtartVie were there, in par^ because we knew that 
Casey was going to testify that Friday. 1HB V^ asked 
Poindexter to please be sure to see to it that we got to look 
at Casey's testimony before it was given on Friday. 

I think I told him--I have here what I told him. 
That the witnesses had to be very carefully prepared. 

Q This is the last paragraph of Sofaer Exhibit 1? 

A Right. And in fact it says here, especially those 
related to activities prior to January 17, and that those 
things should bs answered--all questions should be answered 
truthfully. 

Q All right. Do you recall the President had a press 
conference the next evening, November 19th? 

A Yes. 

Q And do you recall that there was then a meeting 



that you partic 



IClSSSfffl 



he State Department on the 



82-738 0-88- 10 



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morning of the following day, that is Thursday, November 20? 

A Yes. 

Q This was a regular morning meeting with the 
Secretary of State? 

A Yes . 

Q And the Secretaxry of State called you over after 
that meeting? 

A Yes. 

Q And what did he say to you concerning the Iran 
matter? 

A He told Charlie Hill in my presence — 

Q And who is Charlie Hill for the record? 

A His executive assistant. He told Charlie «ta^HtlM 
■^■■k brief Armacost and myself about the arms sales to Iran 
and all the information that he, the Secretary, might have 
about those sales. 

Q Did the Secretary indicate that by then he had read 
your memo of the November 18 session with Poindexter and 
Thompson? 

A No, but he might have. 

Q Did Charlie Hill then give you the briefing? 

A One additional fact. And that is that he knew that 
Armacost — 

Q He is? 

A The Secretarv knew that Armacost and I were going 



3s<it.etVY knew that Armac 

Massified 



259 



iiNCUSsm 



to review the draft of Casey's testimony prior to Casey's 
testifying. And I'm sure that he had it in his mind that we 
should know what h^ knew--what the Secretary knew--in 
evaluating that draft. 

Q Did you then proceed to a briefing with Hill? 
A Yes. 

Q This was in Hill's office? 

A We started the briefing in Hill's office, and it 
went on for a considerable length of time with Hill reading 
from a summary based on his notes. I have a set of notes of 
that. 

Q Please refer to th«m. In the course of that 
briefing, did you learn from Hill that there had indeed been 
a pre-January '86 transfer of weapons in addition to the 
September '85 transfer that you had heard about from Poindex- 
ter and Thompson? 

A Yes, I did. 
Q What did you learn? 

A I learned that on November 18th, 1985 several 
things happened. One was a story about Ollie North stumbling 
on a warehouse in a certain country. And then a call from 
Bud McFarlane to the Secretary, or a conversation in which he 
said that the hostages, American hostages in Lebanon were 
going to be released on November 20th. 

^H \^ said that Israel would fly 100 Hawks to 



\m\ hmm 



pb33 



• 

were rele 



m '^'sm 



nd transfer them to another plane. If the hostages 
eased, the plane would fly to Iran. If the hostages 
were not released the plane would fly to Israel. 

Q This was McFarlane talking to Shultz in November of 
1985? 

A Yes. ^Mpvwas a recorded conversation. I got the 
clear impression that there was a record of a conversation 
about that arms shipment in Charlie's notes. 

Q And Hill told you also, judging from your notes, 
that Shultz had approved of what McFarlane told him--or 
opposed, excuse me. 

A Had opposed. 

Q Had opposed what McFarlane told him, and McFarlane 
said nothing further? 

A Well, nothing further was said about the whole 
matter. It later developed that that whole plan fell 
through. The hostages were not released. But the Secretary 
was not told that the Hawk missiles were actually delivered 
to Iran until he was told that they had been returned. 

Q Now during your briefing with Hill did someone from 
the CIA arrive with a draft of Director Casey's proposed 
testimony for November 21? 

A Yes, right in the middle of that briefing. We took 
a break and Armacost and I went down to his office where we 



met with David Cries 



iiiiiijife 



261 



ji^ifl iic^nrp 



And particularly, was he sure that the CIA and the NSC did 
not know that these were weapons rather than oil drilling 

bits. 

Q What did Gries respond? 

A He didn't know anything really. I don't think he 
had any personal knowledge of this matter. 

Q Did you find anything else in the draft testimony 
that caused you concern or that you took particular note of? 

A Yes. First of all, I saw the prices, the money for 
the missiles, and it seemed low to me. «- Jt was either by 
then o^^r^^yl started collecting information on the 
prices of TOW missiles. That was one. 

Another thing that I saw that made me skeptical was 



but only 



the assertion that the CIA said they would 
this one time. The CIA said they wou l^ssist I s rae 1 in 
Shipping these oil drilling bits fro:f||^^by finding an 
airline for them or giving them the nan>e of an airline, but 
this is the only time they would do that without a finding. 

^this made me ■ ■ skeptical because I 
1 didn't see any reason why they would be reluctant to help 
Israel get the na.e of an airline if all they were doing was 
Shipping oil drilling bits. So that story did not hang 

together. 

And tn.n I s»- th. n.,.e ol Southern Mr Tr.n.port 

in the te=tlmony.. That ••1«,"'« J^^^^f"'"' 



® 



L^^fllfif'^in) 






Li wJiiED 



Q Why? 

A I associated that name with Hasenfus or the whole 
Central American thing. I don't know whether Hasenfus had 
gone down yet. 

Q He had. 

A I associated the name with that. And to me it was 
a red flag indicating a possible- connection to Central 
America. 

Q When you finished reviewing the draft which had the 
reference to Southern Air Transport and oil drilling equip- 
ment, did you seek permission to go to the Attorney General? 

A Yes, I went Co--it was the sa.ne day. I think 
probably there was about an hour's difference between when I 
learned all these facts and had them mull in my mind. 

I went to Charlie Hill and I told him that I 
thought there was a serious question relating to November and 
possibly even September. That the pre-January activities 
were not necessarily known by the Attorney General. That he 
had given an opinion in January, that he may not have known 
of any of these pre-January activities. And that it appeared 
that there was a misstatement in Director Casey's testimony 
and a story that was concocted. 

Whether it was concocted with his knowledge or not, 
I had no idea. In fact, I knew he was out of the country. 

Q Who? 



263 



. C 20001 



A Casey, while this testimony was being prepared. So 
I assumed that it was being prepared by his staff. But 
whoever came up with that story, I questioned its veracity. 
And I asked for permission from Charlie Hill, and 
Nick Piatt, I believe was also there at the meeting. 

Q Who was Nick Piatt? 

A Nick Piatt was Executive Secretary. 

Q At the Department of State? 

A At the Department of State. And I asked him 
permission, in the sense that I had made up my mind to do 
this, but I always get clearance for a major thing like this. 
This was a — 

Q What were you getting clearance for? 

A To call the Attorney General and advise him that 
the testimony of Casey contained information about a shipment 
allegedly of oil drilling bits. That I did not believe that 
statement, and that in Secretary Shultz's notes, which 
Charlie Hill kept, there was an indication of a shipment in 
Nove«b«r of Hawk missiles and that McFarlane knew about that. 

Q Did you know as of the time. Judge, that you 
reviewed the draft testimony- -that is November 20--whether 
McFarlane had previously reviewed it? 

A No. 

Q You didn't know one way or the other? 

A No. 



lll'^'nED 



264 



mi M 



Q Going bacJc to your conversation, I assume Charlie 
Hill gave you peraission to contact the Attorney General? 



Yes, he did. with great apprehension, but he did. 

What did you do? 

I called the Attorney General and he was not in. 

This vas on November 20 still? 

Nc-e.T-.ber 20th. t^ I then called the Deputy 
Attorney General .^nie Burns. He was not in, but there was a 
proBise that he would get back to me- He returned my call at 
around 3:2" that afternoon. I had called him around 2:30^ 

Mmt^^mmmmmm^me^^^mmmimiwmmimmmt^^m^ told 
biB Vi^i^HHHlHHBBHaHBBBBBai 



this information. 



»n h 



3 The i.-.formation about the Hawks and the draft 
testimony? 

.Si Right. He returned — let me get that clear now. I 
called him. 

Q You called Arnie Burns? 

A I comnunicated the information. Then he called me 

back and I returned his call again, and he told me the 

following. He said, that he had told the Attorney General 

I 
the information I had conveyed. This is at 3:50 p.m. that j 

day. 



November 20? 



Noveaier 2Cth. He told 



)|flOO!Cjf[) 



that he had conveyed the 



UNCI 



i„fcr,.t.on t... : .aa ccnveye. ..1=30 .o ^h. Attorney 

2 General about ..e Noven^r 1985 sh.p«en. fro. Israel, about 

3 the CIA'S test.-.ony ccncerning a White House urgent request 

4 for ass.sta.ce .. that shipment, and the wh.te House SSC 

5 1 denial of such assistance. 



By that t.:ne I had learned frc3 =r.es that the SSC 
and the CIA had a conflict. That the SSC cla.:ned that they 
.ad no .nfonnat.cn at ail about a request for ass^tance fro» 
the CIA concerning an oil drilling bit shipment. And the CIA 
Claimed that their assistance in finding this aircraft was m 




Sc sums said to me t.hat t..e Attorney General had 
M I spent the afternoon worKmg with Pomdexter and Casey on 
.5 Casev s testimony and that he, the Attorney General, wa, 

16 fully aware of the fact, I had mentioned. Burns said that 

17 the A.G. wa, profuse m hi, than.s for ^ warning and 

18 appreciated »^ native, but that he, the Attorney General, 
1, Lew Of certain facts that explained all these matters and 
20 Lat laid to rest all the problem. I ...ht perceive. 

Burns said the Attorney General did not give hi- 
22 any facts and that he, Burns, -as simply passing on t.he 
23Lysteriou,, as he put it, assurance that all was well. 
,, I And so Burns did not .now what facts the Attorney 

torney General knew 



s^'-^T~"'-""WCM' 



266 



UNCLASSIFIED 



that supposedly explained everything and laid to rest all the i 

problems? | 

A Correct. Burns was just acting as a messenger. ! 

Q And he himself found the assurance from the A.G., ! 

in his 'words, mysterious? j 

A He used that word. | 

Q Did you speak to anyone else on November 20 about i 
your concerns regarding the draft testimony of Director Casey? 

A I reported on this conversation to Charlie Hill and 
perhaps Nick Piatt also, and told them that I was going to 
call the White House counsel. 

Q They said fine? i 

A Not quite in that spirit. 

i 
Q In any event, they said okay? | 

A Let me make it clear that I was not asking them for 
permission in the ordinary sense of the word. 

Q I understand that. 

A I knew what my obligations were to the President | 
and to the law, and it was a question of simply telling them 
what I was going to do. That I was not satisfied with the j 
answer I had gotten from Burns and that I was determined to 
tell Wallison. 

Q Let me make one thing clear for the record, we're 
not going to mark your notes, but the notes that you've been 
referring to of .tl^f fkCOHv«s^tjjy^^jLncluding your notes of 



mmms 



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the Burns conversation on November 20 are contemporaneous 
notes that you made at or about the time the events and the | 
conversations took .place? I 

A Most of them are. The ■ ^^ * ' conversation with \ 
Burns was particularly carefully written down because I felt 
it was an important conversation and I wanted to be very 
careful as to its accuracy. 

Q And that's the conversation to which you've just j 
testified making reference to the notes, correct? 

A Yes. I think I read them. 

Q NOW did you call Peter wallison on November 20? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q Tell us about that conversation. 

A I called wallison after speaking to Burns and then 
going and telling the people upstairs that I was going to 

call Wallison. 

Q I take it you weren't satisfied in hearing that the 
Attorney General knew of some unknown facts that explained 
everything and laid the problems to rest? 

A NO, I was not satisfied. I was not speculating in 
my mind as to what had happened, but obviously one of the 
possibilities I had in mind was that people in the NSC or 
others, Casey included, had convinced the Attorney General of 
a story that I might find unconvincing. 

Q so you feared that there may be a cover-up in 



^^m h^^wm 



268 



wmi\m 



1 progr««»? 

2 A : was very afraid. 

3 ^ .'•'cw te.i js, please, aoout your November 20 

4 conversation wit.n Peter Wailison.7 

5 A : called wallison, it aust have b««n around 4:00. 

6 And I told him everything that I had learned up to that 

7 point. I told ^.ia that .ie was the President's lawyer, that I 
felt an obli'jaticn to tell him these facts. That I had 

9 reviewed the CIA testimony. That I felt that it included a 

10 ' false story aoout oil drilling equipnent, and that h« should 

11 ' look into it. 

12 Q What did he say to you? 



m^Li» t mo r -a eo . 



A Ke was shocked. 

Q This IS Wallison? 

A Yes. He didn't know anything about any of this. 
It was clear to »e that he had been totally shut out of the 
process. .He was extremely interested in as much information 
a« I had, and he promised to talk to Cooper and Thompson 
about it. They may even have been in his office. 

Do yo'j recall that he told you that Cooper and 
Thompson were standing in his office at the tiine? 

A .My recollection is he said to me, they're right 
here. Cooper and Thompson are right here in front of me. 

Q Did he put Cooper on the phone, do you recall? 
: do recall that he did put Cooper on the 



"^'fliil^SlFIFD 



269 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 phone, as far as : recall- 



9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 



.^U'.d what did j-ou tell Cooper? 

A T^^a sajne thing. 

A.d sr^cfically that the statement, regarding lac. 
Of knowledge cr staten^nts regarding oil drilUng e^ip-ent 
that you .ad seen were untenable .n Ught of what you .new to 
have been the -cfarlane-Shulti conversation? 

., ,-es : added the-not only that. I told hi. what I 

., .^H -»-e'v ' added mv own obser%-a- 
knew about the conversation and ...en . a^.e . 

tions. 

Sefore we get to your observations, dc you recall 
that When you spc.e to Cooper on Nove^r :0 while Cooler .a. 
in wallisons office, -hen you told Cooper what you were 
concerned with that Cooper told v-ou that the draft of 
Oirector Casey s testimony had only shortly before been 
^ified to strengthen the clai. regarding the November 

united State, government .new that the Severer shipn^nt -as 
Haw., as opposed to oil drilling e^uip.ent. :.. ."cu recall 
Cooper telling i-ou that? 

A Ves 

, .... >,u r..po„.e<,. : -He .- ^ -.^« .... cl.i. ... 
^pc„.Me in U,nc of -h« >-cu .n,. -o ^«v. ^~n .« 



-cnversa 



...en between the Secretary of State and McFarlane 



2 5 I November 95? 



UNCUSSIFIED 



270 



mm::m 



A Yes. And I also thought it was untenable as a 
matter of logic That the CIA would not have reacted in the 
way that Casey's testimony indicated. That is, with a 
warning that they would not do this again. That the request 
for an airline would not have been urgent over oil drilling 
bita.'X 

\And that generally the whole thing smelled to me 
like the kind of thing you see in a trial — and yUim I've 



presided over hundreds — in a narcoifics cas^ 



e^josam 



^Upr where they refer to the drugs as shirts or something 
like that. You always have some kind of phrase that you use 
to describe what you're selling when you don't want to talk 
about it directly. 

Q And here it was oil drilling equipment? 

A Right, oil drilling bits. 

Q But what you heard from Cooper on his end was that, 
if anything, from the time you had seen the draft of Director | 
Casey's statement until the time of this conversation, in 
between which you had conveyed a message to the Justice 
Department, the draft had gotten worse? 

A That's true. 

Q And now the draft had gone out to say that nobody 
in the United States government knew anything other than the 
oil drilling story? 

A That's what Cooper told me. I had not seen the 



271 



«»'' 



'01 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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8 
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12 
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16 
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18 
19 
20 
21 
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24 

25 



Ti^«HiM D C 20001 



redraft. I 

Q Did you |ave occasion, on that call, to aslc Cooper | 

if he had spoken to the Attorney General by then about any of i 

I 
this? I 

A I don-t know that I specifically asked him that. I | 

probably mentioned to him that I had called Arnie and Arnie | 

had communicated this information to the Attorney General. j 

Oh, yes, I definitely did, because I told him that 1 

I was disturbed by the answer that I had gotten. 

Q The answer that you had gotten from Arnie? 
A From Arnie, and that I thought that he should 
follow up and make sure that the Attorney General was not 
being sold a bill of goods. 

Q And Cooper indicated he would do so? 
A Yes, he did. 

Q That conversation ended. Do you recall any more 
conversations on November 20, concerning this same matter? 

A Yea, I had another conversation with Cooper around 

six o'clock. 

Q Before you spoke to Cooper again, do you recall 
speaking to Wallison, who told you that there had been a 
conversation with North about that November shipment? 

A I recall that having occurred at 6:25- 

Q After you spoke to -- 



272 



)07 C ..tn, .-i E 



ONCLASSIFIEO 



I do recall a conversation at 6:25. 

Q Since I think that's the shorter one, tell us what 
the conversation was with Wallison at 6:25 p.m. on November 
20. 

A He said that, according to North, all North did was 
to give the IsraelL the name of a proprietary airline. They, 
than, made the arrangements to use the airline. That he, 
North, denies that he knew it was Hawk missiles or arms. He 
says he understood it was drill bits. 

Then Wallison said to me the President keeps 
getting deeper into this because people are operating in his 
name. 

Q Who did you understand Wallison to be referring to 
when he said people are operating in his name? 

A People were operating in his name. I understood it 
to be Poindexter, North and others were taking actions, had 
taken actions without the President's approval. 

Q Taken actions during the period of the — 

A Yes, September and November, right. 

Q Tell us, then, about the evening conversation or 
conversations that you had with Cooper on November 20? 

A Cooper said that Ollie North said that there had 
been no call and that he had no knowledge of any of this. 

Q Any of the -- 

A The arms. And he denied the call to the CIA, as 



HNCI.fl^^'FIED 



273 



BNClAeSiflED 



v^ll, at that point. 

Q What call to th« CIA7 

, The »t„nt can <ot a„ a.rilh,, to hav, ah aitUn, 
a„.h,ea. .U he .id -a. pto.i.e the ha»e o. a ptop.i.tatv 
,.,„ the CIA. That is, he apparehtiy .i. ,-■ <- "« "» 

the Israelis. 

, 3ai. that that -as nohsehse, that^^t^-f^-"- '« 
correct, that -e ha. a coht,»poraheous hote o. ^ call. ■ 

^^^^^^t^m Ollie North said there 
guess my note said that ^^^^B^W 
.as no call, I gather would be the November "85 call- ^-i 



, .ou sa.d that there were contemporaneous notes at 

the State Department? 

, Ves, I told cooper that we had a contemporaneous 

16 1 note of the call in November '85. 

.om.mber Cooper's succinct response? 
Q Do you remember ^-oofc"= 

^ i. „ a w«v that would not be 
18 1 A He expressed shock in a way 

19 



polite to mention in a public record. 

Q Shock at hearing about the note? 

A Yes. 

, Did you tell cooper you had a concern about the 

course that events were on? 

^ Yes I told him that both Armacost and I were 

^^^ ^ telling the full 



Ts 1 extremely concerr|H^ 



274 



yNCl'^'IflED 



truth and we were scared -- I was scared that the President 
would be in trouble if the testimony was not changed and if 
people were not forced to tell the truth about all this. 

Q Did you indicate to Cooper that you might have to 
resign or would have to resign if the testimony were not 
changed to reflect what you believed to be the truth? 

A Yes, I did. The reason for that was I believed in 
the Secretary of State and if he had a note indicating that 
he believed that something had happened, I ^■■V assum^ that 
that would be the truth and that would force me to have to 
indicate that in some forceful way. 

Q To put it bluntly. Judge, you told Cooper that if 
Director Casey gave testimony that said no one in the United 
States government knew that the November transfer was Hawks, 
you were going to resign from the government? 

A Yes. 

Q Did Cooper respond? 



Q Did Cooper tell you whether he had spoken to 
Thompson or to McFarlane, after having heard from you in 
Wallison's office about McFarlane's recollection of November? 

A It may well be that he told me that McFarlane said 
there was no call in November. 

Q And that McFarlane even hearing, via Thompson or 
Cooper, that tf 



ate Department was taking the position 

YflV — 



275 



wm"m 



9 
LO 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



there had been such a conversation and that the conversation 
involved Hawks, McFarlane was still saying he didn't know , 
anything about Hawks in November and was denying or at least | 
failing to recall any such conversation? 
A Yes. 

Q Did you hear again from Cooper late in the evening 
on November 20, that he had reached the Attorney General? 

A Yes. Let me say that I was more concerned about 
cover-up than I was about anything else. I believed that 
cooper and I and a number of other people had a duty to 
insure that no cover-up occurred. On the other hand, we also 
could have, if we had the true facts, we could deal with it. 
we could then see whether there was any proper legal basis 
for what had occurred. 

I was not assuming that anything that had been done 
was illegal, what I knew was that a cover-up was illegal and 

™i„hf he able to say about the legality of 
that whatever you might be able to say 

something you did, there is no way you could claim that a 

cover-up was legal. 

Q It was your position you could deal with the facts, 
but not with the alteration of facts? 

A Absolutely. YOU might be able to deal with the 
facts, and you have to face the facts, whatever they were, 

yes . 

cooper told me, at 11:28 p.m. that night, November 



"^jr.1 h'^mm 



276 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

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15 

16 

17 

18 

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25 

I 

I 



lINCIiSSiFIED 



20, according to my notes, that he had told the Attorney 
General about this. Apparently he had called him out of town 
and he, the Attorney General, fully shared the concerns we 
shared and he cancelled a trip. 

There were many questions about Charlie Hill's 
notes that Cooper and the Attorney General had. When were 
they taken? what was written down in them? The Attorney 
General was very interested in those notes. 

That he had called Paul Thompson and he was told 
earlier that Ollie North had adhered to his prior story, that 
Paul Thompson-then called Poindexter, who tried to reach 
McFarlane and he couldn't reach him. 

Then he told me that references in Casey's testimony 
had been changed. 

Q The references to the oil drill story? 
A Right, that it had been adjusted correctly to avoid 
the issue. I wrote U N u W j notes that way because — 
Q Wrote your notes that way? 

A Yes, because what he told me was not an indication 
that the matter had been dealt with fully, in a satisfactory 
way, but at least the misleading of Congress was avoided. 

I congratulated him and we agreed that the President 
should not be placed at risk until the truth is known. That 
is, we were satisfied with that fix because at least there 
wasn't a lie out there and the President wasn't at risk. We 



llliS.^!nED 



277 



5iNi;i''-''''''![D 




could then go further, investigate further, et cetera. 

At this point, no formal investigation had been 
authorized by the -President and I gather it was the next day 
or so that Cooper called me and said the President had 
authorized the Attorney General to investigate. 

Q Does that do it for your recollection of events on 
November 20? 

A Yes. 

Q Let's/<urn to the next day, which is — 

A **•* about two minutes to jtf, November 21. 

Q Turn to the next day, Friday, November 21, which is 
the day that Director Casey will go to the Hill to give his 
testimony. Did you see a draft of the revised Casey testimony 
that morning? 

A Yes, I did, or I saw it at the hearing or heard it 
at the hearing. 

Q Did you attend the hearing? 

A Yes, I attended the first half of the morning 
session. 

Q So you heard the Director testify? 

A I did. 



Q And you either observed, by looking at the testimony 
or heard by hearing it, that the reference «» no one in the 
U.S. government knew that November involved Hawks was gone 
from the testimony? H&ItT' ; '-•"^il'irn 



278 



IW^'^^IED 



'VuhkTfTon DC lot 



A Yes. 

Q Do you remember that what was there was a reference > 
by Director Casey to the effect that the pilots were told i 
that the planes contained oil drilling equipment? \ 

A It might have been there. j 

Q But you were satisfied, at least, that there was no i 
misleading reference to what anyone in the United States 
government knew or did not know about that Hawk shipment? 

A That wasn't cleared with me, anything about the 
pilots. If I had seen that in an earlier draft, I might have 
raised some questions a^out that as well. 

Q What you heard, though, did you find satisfactorily 
in terms of the issue that you had been focused on, of U.S. 
government knowledge or lack of knowledge? 

A Yes, that there was no assertion that no one in the 
U.S. government knew these were arms. I knew that some 
people knew that these were arms. 

Q Was Secretary Axmacost with you at the hearing? 

A Yes , he was . 

Q Was the reference to Southern Air Transport, that 
you had taken note of in the draft testimony, still in the 
testimony as Director Casey gave it to the Senate Committee 
on November 21? 

A No. 

Q Did that bother you7IF)%|A| ^ |f* '^,''T 



'w-^m 



279 



m!^M 



Yes 



Did It concern Secretary Armacost, as well: 



-X 



6 
7 
8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 



did concern him- 

Q Why did it concern you? 

A AS I said, I thought that the fact that the arms 
were carried by Southern Air Transport created a potential 
connection to central America. I 

Q potential connection between the Iran program and 

central America? 

A Yes. 

Q What did you do, given this concern that now the 
reference to Southern Air had disappeared from Director 
Casey's testimony? 

A I told Armacost of my concern and I drafted a 
memorandum, handwritten, to the Director of the CIA, Casey, 

from Armacost and myself. 

[Sofaer Exhibit Number 3 
was marked for identification. 

BY MR. BELNICK: 
Q 13 that the handwritten memo that we've just marked 

Sofaer Exhibit 3? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you take this handwritten draft to Secretary 



25 Armacost' 



m '-m 



280 



1 

2 
3 
4 

5 
6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 

is! 

16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 



!?^CLIi^'*"^'FO 



A Yes. 

Q Did he make certain additions to it? 

A I believe that the addition, "which were in earlier 



drafts" on the second line of the memo was made by Armacost. 
It could have been made by Chris Ross, or someone on his 
staff, but that is not my handwriting. 

Q Was this memo officially sent to the DCI? 

A No. 

Q What happened? 

A I gave this to Armacost by hand and I told him that 
I thought that we should send this memorandum. He said he I 
would look at it and get back to me. He got back to me later ' 
and said that he had talked to Cries about this matter j 
directly, rather than send a memorandum. Cries acknowledged ' 
a mistake had been made, that he didn't know why this ' 
reference had been dropped out, and that he would take care I 
of it. I 

Armacost added that it was in their hands to take i 



cara of 

Q 
A 

Q 



In CIA'S hands? 

CIA's hands. 

That discussion is noted at the bottom of your 
draft memorandum, Exhibit 3, correct? 

A Yes, when Armacost gave me back this memorandum and 
told me what he told me, I wrote that down on the bottom. 



W ^'^"'^lED 



281 



pb55 



'MP' 



lED 



I. OC. 20001 



Q Talked to cries, et cetera? 

A Right. 

Q What is the last line on Sofaer Exhibit 3? 
Meeting CIA to discount - ■ could you read that to as? 

A 'Meeting CIA to discount Iranian terror.' 

I recall, at that time, there was considerable 
criticism Within the Department of State that the CIA was 
discounting the danger of Iranian terrorism and that there 
had been a meeting to discuss Iranian terrorism and that we 
had taken the opposite point of view, that no change had 

occurred. 

Q Going back then to Exhibit 3 itself, though, the 
araft memorandum, your concern as I understand in preparing 
this memorandum for you and Armacost, was that the Intel- 
ligence committees, one way or the other, get the information 
about southern Air that had been deleted from the Director's 

testimony? 

A Absolutely. This was a form of potential deception 

and lack of full information. 

Q Vou understood from Armacost that Cries had given 
him some kind of an assurance that this would be taken care 

of? 

A Yes. 

Q Then you subsequently saw reference to Southern Air 



282 



mm 



'X 



ffl 



that that had been done? 

A Yes, I assumed that the matter had been taken care 
of. After we discussed this recently, you and I, I called 
Mr. Armacost and he confirmed that he had passed this 
information on to Gries and Gries confirmed having received 
it and having passed it on. 

He doesn't know exactly what happened, but from the 
newspaper accounts of all these events, and everything else, 

StfMX 

I assumed that the staff had learned inCappropriate manner 
that Southern Air Transport was involved. 

Q On November 21, did you also receive a telephone 
call from Cooper? 

A Yes. 

Q What did Mr. Cooper tell you on that day? 

A He told me that he was investigating the matter, 
that the President had authorized the Attorney General to 
conduct an investigation. This was Friday, I believe. And 
that he had learned that the pilot of the plane knew that 
they were carrying Hawk missiles or arms. 

Q The pilot of the plane involved in the November '85 
transfer? 

A That's right. 

Q Did Cooper tell you it was all a big mess now? 

A Yes, because he gave me the impression that they 
had assured him -- sgilAI *'P*'"'nrn I 



i!:'!';''io 



283 



507 C %<mt. N 
(101) m H it 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q That who had assured him? I 

A That the people in the NSC, with whom they had I 

spoken, had assured the Attorney General that the pilot did ! 

I 
not know that he was carrying arms and the CIA didn't know, | 

and now they found out that the pilot did know. 

Q Indeed, Director Casey, as the record will show, 
had testified earlier that day that the pilot was told it was i 
oil drilling equipment? 

A Right. So it's clear that Cooper regarded that as 
very significant in light of that specific testimony. 

Q Did Cooper tell you what he was going to do? 

A He said he was getting off the phone right away 
because he was very busy. 

Q Did he tell you, by that point, that the President 
had ordered a formal investigation by the Attorney General? 

A Yes, either then or roughly then. 

Q Did you, on this same day, Friday November 21, 
write a memorandum concerning this whole matter? A memorandum i 

which was for the purpose of helping prepare the Secretary of | 

I 
State to see the President about the Iran deal? | 

A Yes. I 

MR. BELNICK: I will ask the reporter to mark what j 

I believe to be that memorandum as Sofaer Exhibit 4. | 

(Sofaer Exhibit Number 4 | 

, ! 

was marked for identification.]! 



284 



limr '^Cfl 



BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q I will hdnd you the memo so marked. Judge. It's 
dated November 21, 1986, addressed to Messrs. Piatt, Hill, 
Bremer and nii^e^ from you, subject memorandum of points 
concerning arms transfer to Iran. That is your memorandum? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q As stated, this is one you wrote in furtherance of 
helping prepare the Secretary to see the President? 

A Yes, this was a reaction to the events of the last 
few days and to several drafts oLtmemorandi_ that w*& prepared 
by other officials in the Department of State concerning the 
President's press conference and the tremendous skepticism 
that existed within the Department about the positions taken 
by the President at that press conference. 

I felt that the other memorandum was much too 
critical of the President and, in fact, missed what was 
really going onJ the President li^PBf prepared for a press 
conference by individuals who had actually supported a policy 
that was a disaster politically and possibly raised serious 
legal questions, and who were possibly withholding the truth 
from the President about events that occurred before January 
1986. 

Q So that you thought the focus ought to be on 
advising the President that there were people around him that 
were not telling him the truth: 



UNCLASSIHED 



285 



W^^^'HEO 



A Yes, in fact Vimm ought to be more supportive of 
the President and more helpful in trying to get the President 
to support a full investigation and to avoid letting the 
President be drawn into a cover-up scheme of any kind through 
his sense of loyalty, which he has in abundance. 

Q I gather also, from our conversation before the 
deposition. Judge, that you're not certain whether this 
memorandum of yours, Sofaer Exhibit 4, reached the Secretary 
before or after he had already seen the President? 

A I am certain it went into the system because I know 
it was read by the Deputy Secretary, who approved of its 
approach. He felt that this memorandum was more in line with 
how the Secretary ought to approach the President, but I'm 
not sure that it got to the Secretary before his meeting with 
the President. 

I've never really asked the Secretary. 

Q Did you have a chance, during that period, Judge, 
to say to the Secretary face to face or to express to the 
Secretary face to face your concern that there was a cover-up 
or that people around the President were not telling the 
truth? 

A I don't recall a specific meeting with him until 
Saturday, the next day, the 22nd. But everything I told 
Hill, I assumed was getting right to the Secretary. He was 
an immediate pipeline to the Secretary. 



ONPJir^^lED 



Q And you were telling Hill, throughout this period, 
that concern of yours? 

A Every single event, P uu jji the phone calls, the 
substance of the calls^ *mk was communicated either to Hill 
or to Piatt and I have found, in my experience at the State 
Department, that that is a direct channel. Either is a I 
direct channel to the Secretary. I 

MR. BELNICK: Can we go off the record for a moment? 
[Discussion off the record.] 

[Sofaer Exhibit No. 5 was 
marked for identification.] 
BY MR. BELNICK: 
Q For the record, Sofaer Exhibit 5 bears our identi- 
fying stamp numbers S-3915 through S-3921. And, Judge, my 
question is whether this exhibit is at least a draft or one 
of the drafts of the memo to which you were reacting in the 
memo you wrote, namely Sofaer Exhibit 4? 

A Yes, it is a draft of the memo referred to in the 
first sentence of my memorandum. The memo we have prepared 
is indispensable in that it contains useful material for the 
Secretary. " 

Q But you thought M^V was a memo which didn't give 
the right focus, which again in your judgment ought to have 
been not on criticizing the policy or the President, but on 
let's get the jCj:ytfU<lut_ and_then deal with the facts? 



^Qut ana tnen aeax 

MS^IflEO 



287 



UNCUorfiED 



A well, the criticism could be there. The only part 
of this memo that I had been involved in-^^^«i^^—* 




m^mt^mm^KHIt^^^^^^ That's why I 
found out about this memo. 

But the tone of this memorandum was not the kind of 
tone you would use if you were trying to get the President- 
if you were try.ng to help the President and trying to get 
the president to protect himself, rather than to protect 
others who might really not be deserving of protection. 

Q NOW when you say to protect himself, to protect 
himself by mak.ng sure that he got the facts and that the 

facts got out? 

A The true facts, yes, because he was being told this 
was all defensive equipment. I mean, that's not an .dea that 
hatched out of his head. Obviously, the President, he was 
told that all this equipment would fit on a certain size 
plane. I mean, the President of the United States doesn't 
„«Ke calculations like that. Those were calculations that 
were made by his staff, and they were obviously misleading 

him. 

so the way this memorandum was written quotes from 



What the president said, and the?;j:rghly critical answers to 
What the president had said. That is not constructive. That 
was not constructive in n^judgment_ 



iiNni 



288 



UNCLASSiRED 



Q You didn't think that the issue was a debate 
between the President and the facts, it was a debate over 
whether the President was getting the facts? 

A Yes, I thought the facts--it was great to give the 
President the facts, and the facts here were very useful to 
the Secretary to convey to the President. But that that 
should be done m a way that's supportive of the President to 
show him how people were misleading him. 

Q On November 21, did you also receive a telephone 
call from Bud McFarlane? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q Please tell us about that call. 

A Mr. McFarlane asked me if-- 

Q He called you? 

A Yes. He asked me if there were — he said that he 
had heard that there were notes, contemporaneous notes kept 
by the Secretary of conversations between him and the 
Secretary and others relating to the Iran arms matter. 

Q Did he specifically mention the November '85 
shipment, or just generally the Iran matter? 

A I don't recall, but he said he had heard that there 
were notes. And I assumed that he had heard that from the 
Attorney General and that it related to the note that I had 
told the Attorney General about. 

Q What else did Mr. McFarlane say? 

mm 



289 



Ui'lCUS'lD 



A He asked if I had the notes and if he could have 

access to them. 

Q What did you say? 

A I said I didn't have the notes and that I would 

pass on his request. 

Q Did he ask you whether the notes would be given to 

the Justice Department? 
A Yes, he did. 

Q And you told him they would be? 
A Yes, I said I was sure they would be. 
Q Did you hear from the Secretary of State's office 
subsequent to McFarlane's call? 
A Yes. 

Q What did you hear and from whom? 

A I heard from Charlie Hill and/or Nick Platt-might 
have been both, might have been one-that McFarlane had 
called the Secretary and had asked to see hi. about the 
possibility of some notes that he, the Secretary, had kept. 
Q were you asked for your advice about that meeting? 

Yes. 

What advice did you give? 

I advised the Secretary not to see Mr. McFarlane. 

Why or why not? 



to the Sec re 



The reason, are spelled out in a memorandum I wrote 
'• It's entitled rfot for 



wi^mM 



82-738 0-88-11 



290 



UNCUis:>;nED 



the System because it was not to be distributed to other 
people. 

[Sofaer Exhibit No. 6 was 
marked for identification. ] 
BY MR. BELNICK: 

s 

Q And i^ that memorandum the one that we've just 

marked as Sofaer Exhibit 6? 

A Yes. I 

Q And this is a memo you did send to the Secretary? 

A Yes, definitely, on that day. | 

I 
Q Do you know tf the Secretary followed your advice? j 

A Yes . ' 

Q And he did not see Mr. McFarlane, as far as you 

know? ; 

A Yes, as far as I know. He may have spoken to him 1 
on the phone to tell him that he couldn't see him, but 
that he didn't see him. 

Q There's a notation in the upper left, 12/5 OBE, NP j 
is that? j 

A Yes. I 

Q Is that Nick Piatt's writing? I 

A Right. 

Q Do you know what that — I know OBE usually means 
overtaken by events . I 

A Right 



to nim 



}!i^f ^"^S '^fO 



291 



UNCUooHiED 



Q And is that your understanding of what it means | 

! 
here? 

A Yes, It means that by the time Nick Piatt got it it 
was December 5th. I must have delivered it to the Secretary 
via Charlie Hill, which is the back door essentially. 

Q NOW do you know whether the Secretary had a meeting 
with the Attorney General on the next day, Movember 22? 

A Yes, one of the calls that I received on the 21st 
was from Cooper who asked me to set up a meeting between the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of State on the morning of 
November 22nd. 

Q That Saturday morning? 
A Yes . 

Q And you set up that meeting? 
A I did. 

Q You came to the office that day? 
A Yes, I did. I was in the office by 7:20 or so. 
Q YOU did not sit in on the meeting between Cooper 
and the Secretary? 
A I didn't. 



was the A.G. at that meeting so far as you know? 

Yes. 

And so was Charlie Hill? 

AS far as I know, Charlie was there, yes. 

were you debriefed on the meeting after it ended? 



re you debriefed on the meet 



292 



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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 

n 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 I 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

■IC 

25 



UNCUSSIFIED 



A Yes, I was. 

Q What were you told? 

A I was told that the Secretary and Charlie had gone 
through some of the story with the Attorney General. That 
the Attorney General had asked about the type of notes that 
had been preserved, and that had been explained to him. 

The Attorney General asked the Secretary, was he 
sure that he dirf not know about the finding. That came up. 
And the Secretary said he did not recall the finding. And the 
thought was floated that the finding may have been discussed 



after the Secretary had left or some such thing, or^another 
meeting. But that came up. 

And there was a general agreement that the«^ would 



'^ 



[state Departmeny for this 



■M«HU cooperat 
investigation. 

Q You spoke to Cooper the next day, November 23 on 
Sunday to find out how he felt about his meeting with the 
Secretary of State? 

A Yes, I wanted to know--incidentaHy, another thing 
that came up in the meeting was the Secretary asked me if I 
could be his lawyer. He asked me for my judgment as to 
whether there was any reason why he should get another 
lawyer. He had mentioned the fact that I had very actively 
called the White House and the Attorney General about 



293 



UNCLASSIFIED 



^vrytning t.at r was f.nd.ng out, and t.at .e r-cogn.z.d th« I 
propriety of th... That I was really a lawyer for t.e ' 
,o.ernn,ent and for t.e President and t.at I .ad a duty to j 

report all that. | 

f^^a h^ I ^ wanted to know--I think the ! 

„sue had been ra.sed w.th h.. by Nick Piatt and CharUe i 

Hill-— -^-^^«- ' ^°^^^ '^"^^ " ''" '*^"' "'' 'i 
hi. that I had heard the story fro. Charlie. That I had | 
p,etty good .nfor.at.on up to that date of the events, and 
...t I saw no confUct of interest .n .y role as department 
lawyer, and Pres.denfs lawyer, and the Secretary of State. s 
,.^er. That 1 felt that s.nce he w.s essentially clean, as 
t.r as I could tell, that he d.d not have any problem and 
...t 1 had no problem representing h.m and preparing him as 
the ranking official of the Department of State. 
Q Okay. 

,„,t said .hot U. would ..». to Uv, with thi,. That i 

p„c,iv.d . lo., pec.od o< ,..nt, ..!«.„, to i.,.1 ' 

,„d h.<itlr„» «"d eveTythin? .1... 

..t ™ ,o b.c. . d.y o. so. DO you ..=.11 th.t 
„und tK. M=t,_.._o,..bo.t l.?-l.iy«u "'^ "-^ °"' °' 



on or about then that y 

iijiini AfifiiFiFn 



294 



UNULA^^H'tU 



your deputies to get you some numbers regarding the cost of 
the various weapons that you knew to be involved in these 
transfers? 

A I believe it was Friday afternoon. 

Q The 21st? 

A I came back down and I called Mike Matheson. And I ! 

asked him to get me the figures on the cost of TOW missiles. 

i 
Q He gave you those figures, and what did you | 

conclude when you looked at the figures? , 

A I concluded that the fair market value of TOWs was I 

substantially in excess of w4kaik>«JkfciAMMiuJ LLLvrmm^^-Amam^^^ I 

what the DOD received from the CIA as payment. ; 

Q And did that lead you to conclude that there was ' 

probably a surplus of funds that had been generated in this ; 

transaction? 

A I didn't conclude anything, but it led me to «i^ 

mention to the Secretary on Saturday the 22nd at the end of I 

the meeting with him, after he had spoken to the Attorney | 

i 

General, i^men^'^mi^itm that I was very concerned about the | 

I 

possibility that there was a surplus of funds. And that I hadi 

no idea how it was used, but that I also was concerned about 

the presence of Southern Air Transport in the picture. j 

And Mike Armacost mentioned the fact that there had j 

been this contact in May of '86 from people involved with the ; 

And he was concerned about money being j^ 




nmm 



295 



muivm 



69 



;■■•■•"■"":::'.:':--■••• - 

^ The secretary d.dn ^.^^ ^^^ 

3 tt ^ , ,£ter the Secretary had 

Q This «as ^'^^^ 

5 Uttorney General^ 

6 11 - '''■ ,,ear, the meetin. between the 

8 secretary and the 

1 H fore lunch r 

jj^er that >.'5"' 

--"»" "' ^ ^„ ,„,„e,.ed in Xno-i« --« 

„la«W" '"°'*' ., I don't kno- 

,5, t« invent.,. „„. ,„ th, P-- "'«^"- ^Ifc 

j.«no».. --Jj"' l,..,o-.— — "• ,, 
T ISSh, how diO i-v- ■» could 

And I -T' -f .-kie was exhausted, 

hi.3 voice- 1^ '^ . found out a 

22 tell fromh.s and that they had £o 

.^ ,,.3 iust a real mess, 
23|3axd, ^t J 

iAlllot c£ things. 

And he aslc. 



11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 



Q 

A 
Q 
A 



flnrrMfirn' 



had mentioned 



296 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
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13 
14 
15 
16 ! 
17 
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22 
23 
24 

MC 

25 



IINCI.JSSIRED 



earlier that I was concerned about a surplus of funds . 

Q How did he know that? 

A I had mentioned it to him. 

Q To Cooper? 

A Sure. And he said, how did you know about that? 
What had led you to that? And I explained to him that I just 
thought there was a spread. •jCcost price and sale price 
might be very different. I^k |b didn't say anything/The ^m% 
led me to believe that that might be significant in the 
story. He did not explain to me what had happened. 

Q Cooper didn't tell you on the 2 3rd that the day 
before representatives of the A.G. had found the so-called 
diversion evidence? 

A No, he didn't at that time. I told him that, •■i 



Southern Air Transport had been given a lot of money 
for its arms shipments to the Middle East to subsidize it, in 
effect, for doing the work it was doing in Central America | 
for the FDN. 

Q But these were concerns that you were generating 
based on inferences? You at that time knew nothing about the 
fact of any diversion from the Iran program to contras or 
elsewhere? 

A Not until the Attorney General's press conference. 

Q On the 25th of November? 



liMniagSiFlED 



297 



mmsm 



A Yes . ] 

Q Okay. i 

A Anyway, I also asked him about the Secretary's ' 
testimony and was the Attorney General satisfied with it, is 
there any other information that he needed, et cetera. And 
he assured me that the Secretary had given the Attorney ' 
General a full and credible story as far as he could tell, 
and that thg problems that they had lay exclusively elsewhere.} 

Q Subsequently, did Cooper come in to sea the Hill 
notes? I 

A Yes, he came in at 9:20 a.m. on the next morning. i 

Q November 2 4th? 

A Yes . 

Q Reviewed the notes? Were you there? 

A No, he wanted to see the notes then, and Charlie 
still didn't have the notes pulled. He was very reluctant to | 
actually give up physically the notes. It had never happened-' 

Q I know that. 

A His reluctance came as a result of the fact that he ' 
has never had to do w lMli in his whole career as a foreign 
service officer. But I told him in no uncertain terms that 
he would have to reveal all the notes that were relevant to | 
any criminal investigation, and he accepted it. j 

So anxftftt*^ Jift as^sed _to^j3u_ll. the notes, and Cooper 



mii^ir^iWh 



298 



mk.^m 



said he'd wait. m# ^ read a memorandum Charlie prepared, 
which was an outline of what had happened. And Charlie gave 
him some more of a briefing. «M»\Je had further discussion, 
and Cooper left. 

^m^r^k»mmm'i*^v w^i Vt ff^ that meeting again that 
issue of the finding came up, that the Attorney General 
recalled that the finding was mentioned at the January 7 
meeting. 

Q Cooper was telling you this on November 24? 

A Yes, telling us that. But it was not dwelled upon, 
were his words . 

Q Did Cooper say anything to you on November 24th 
about the fact that there had been a finding signed on 
January 6, an earlier version? 

A No, he didn' t. 

Q Did he mention to you on that occasion Aa to 
whether there had been a finding submitted in the fall or 
around November, early December of 1985? 

A No. I found out that there were other possible 
findings at the hearing on the 21st when some senators — and 
the record will reflect this, Eagleton, I believe--raised the 
question about other findings. Apparently, Senate staff had 
already started to get information about other findings, even 
as early as that. 

Q The only finding though of which you formally Icnow 



ily finding tnougn or wnic 

IINHIil^lRED 



299 



UNCLASSIFIED 



73 



about even today is the finding of January 17, 1986? 

A No, I did find out when I was asked to clear boxes 
of notes and other materials for delivery to this committee 
about the other findings. I saw them when I went through 
those boxes . 

Q I want to be careful on that. You saw a finding 
that was signed earlier in January 1986, right? 

A Yes . 



Q And ycu saw another finding which had been prepared | 

i 
in or about iats November 1985? ' 

i 

A Could be, I don't know. I wasn't paying that close I 

attention. I was doing a screening for purposes of ^■^■t- 

mmmmmmfmmm 



■■■^ transmittal ^^^■p*^ 

Q Recognizing that, to your knowledge as you sit here 
today. Judge, do you know whether there was any finding 
signed earlier than January 1986? 

A Do I know that? 

Q Yes, sir. Do you know whether there was or there 
wasn't? 

A I don't. I mean, I couldn't — not of my own 
knowledge, definitely not, could say that. Even if I saw a 
document dated before that day I wouldn't know that it was 
signed before that day. 

C Has anyone in the government ever told you whether 
there was a finding signed prior to January 1986? 



"MP! ilWIFIFn 



300 



ONCLiJiFIEB 



A I saw a January--January, anytime in January? 

Q No, has anyone in the government told you whether 
there was a finding signed earlier than January 1986? 

A Earlier than January 1, 1986? i 

Q Earlier than January 1. 

A No. Anyway, right after that call Cooper wanted 
to--he called me again. Ha really wanted to see the notes, I 
and got Charlie to give me the note. And I got the note in my 
hand, and I read it to him, and he came over and he took a | 
copy. 

[Discussion off the record.] 
BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q Judge, then November 25 came, that was the Attorney i 

i 
General's press conference. And I take it your involvement I 

since then has been in terms of — your involvement in this I 

matter since November 25 has essentially been in terms of j 

responding to requests from the congressional committees and | 

the other investigator in town, the independent counsel, for I 

information, documents and so forth? 

A Pretty much. | 

Q And counseling the Secretary? 

A Yes. Well, I helped prepare the Secretary's 
testimony and I'll be working with the Secretary on his 
appearance here with the committee. And I occasionally wrote 
things related to the Iran arms sale. 



mmMB 



301 



p^ '^vr\ 



m 



Q You did have involvement though subsequent to . 

November 25 with the pledge and attempted contribution to the i 
contras from the Sultan o£ Brunei, correct? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q And could you tell us what your involvement was . 

there, what you learned and what you did? i 

A Incidentally, as to the note, I have a note on my 

I 
copy of the note. I 

Q The Hill note? j 

I 
A The Hill note, that it was sent to the Department I 

of Justice on 11/24 at 11:45 a.m. ; 

I 
Q Thank you. Back to the Sultan. 

A After the morning meeting on December 1st, the 

Secretary asked me to come into his office, and he asked 

Charlie to brief me on an operation involving Brunei, g^. 

And Charlie, in the presence of Elliott Abraims in j 

part, and perhaps when he was out of the room in part, but 

certainly Ellioti was there during much of this. He told me j 

his best recollection and reading from his notes of what had 

happened with Brunei. And Elliott was there and he also added , 

to the story as we went along. ] 

Q You made more or less contemporaneous notes of that j 

briefing you received on December 1, right? | 

A Yes, I made sketchy notes. 1 

Q NOW this was the first timeyou had heard about the | 



ilNHI L%m^{\ 



302 



Wulu.«nai OC iOOOl 



UNClilSS!F!ED 



Brunei contribution? 

A Absolutely. 

Q Prior to then, by the way, had you heard whether 
any foreign countries had contributed monies to the contras? 

A NO. 

Q Now in the course of the briefing, I understand 
that Hill advised you that AbraKms had gotten an account 
number at one point from Oliver North for the deposit of the 
Brunei contribution, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q And did you learn also during that briefing that 
North had told Abrawns when he gave Abraims the number, that 
Abra 

from Brunei, and that Abrajkms should not use an account 
number that the CIA had given him? 

A Yes. Abrafns had c^^e^the CIA first and had 
gotten an account number from^^^^^^HAnd he then got an 
account number from Ollie North. >md S^ notes indicate that 
that statement was made. 

Q That North had said to Abrajpns, don't tell the CIA 
you're getting the money? 

A If you wait a moment, I'll tell you exactly. 
[Pause. ) 

A Yes, he said, Ollie-- 

Q Who IS telling you this on December 17 



hould not tell the CIA that he was getting the money 
rafUs 



■\o IS teliinq you tnis on 

"Mnin^SiRED 



303 



UNCLAS'lD 



107 CS 



A I think this is Charlie Hill telling me this, 
presumably in Abra^s ' presence. That his notes indicated 
that Ollie said to Abrakms, 0on ' t tell the CIA that you got 
the money and don't use their number. 

Q And Elliot then went to Hill and asked, what should 



I do? 



Right. 



u 



And what.Hill tell you that he had told Elliot? 
He said, nothing's changed. That is, we're still 



on track on the Brunei thing. Use Ollie North's number, 
which Hill felt was the better number to use because it was a 
direct pip^o the FDN, rather than something the government 
of the United States would actually be holding. 

Q That's what Hill believed? 

A Yes, he believed that it would be better, legally 
better, although he didn't ask me. :^HHH^M*BiMa"^^*^ 



fc— I think it was a pretty good 



judgment on his part in that sense. It would be more direct 
anyway, as a contribution from Brunei to the FDN, for it to 
go into an FDN account rather than into a CIA account which 
would be a U.S. government account. That was his rationale. 
And then he said,'*>on't trust Ollie North. 
Q This IS what Hill told Abrajns at the time, right? 
A Right, don't trust Ollie North. Tell the CIA. 
Don't follow Ollie North's instructions. And If we go 



mp\ mmn 



304 



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2 

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8 

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10 
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12 ' 
13 
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15 
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22 
23 
24 
25 



UNClHoSiFIED 



ifcms, don't us€ 



through the CIA account, the money i3 more likely to be 
handled by the U.S. What we want is a straight transfer 

Q But tell-- 

A But tell the CIA, yes. 

Q So in other words. Hill said to Abral 
the CIA account, but tell the CIA what's going on. Don't ' 
listen to North and don't trust North? 

A Right. As I recall now, Abraluns may not have been 
in the room when Hill told me this, because I have a note i 
here that Hill did not know what Abratns did. j 

Q Did Hill tell you the basis for his instruction to j 
AbraCns or his advice to AbraljSns not to trust Ollie North? 

A He didn't at that time tell me anything beyond 

that. But at other times he had indicated to me that he ' 

didn't trust Ollie North. ! 

i 
Q He, Hill, did not trust North? ! 

A Yes. i 

Q And did he tell you why he didn't trust Ollie North?! 

A That Ollie was very aggressive and would do things j 
without telling people. At least he got the impression that i 
Ollie — I got the impression that he thought Ollie was 
aggressive and might not be telling people everything that he 
was doing. 

Q And when did you hear statements like this from 



Charlie Hill? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



UNCUi^SIFIED 



79 



A Starting, let's say the winter of '85. As I got 
„ore integrated into the department and into the govermnent I 
learned more about the personalities. And there were times 
when I would review suggestions by Ollie North for undercover 
activities in Central Ainerica, or for anti-terrorist opera- 
tions in parts of the world and things of that sort. Wk 
Some of the^suggestions that he made were irresponsible. 

some of them were creative, too. But he certainly 
was somebody that had to be watched. 

Q DO you know whether Hill's view during '85- '86 of 
North was shared by the Secretary of State? 
A Yes. 
Q And it was? 
A I think it was, yes. 

Q Had you ever heard the Secretary of State comment 
about North directly? 
A NO. 

Q But you knew Hill was close to him and believed he 
w«. reflecting the Secretary's view as well as his own? 

A Yes, I think that he was reflecting the Secretary's 
ew. certainly, Armacost had that view also. He told me so 
Q Had Abrafcns ever expressed— 
A And AUramowitz had that view. 

Q HOW about Elliot Abraims? ! 

A I never had a discussion about B MiUL uHuul Ollie j 



iiKioi Aocicicn 



306 



UNClAS^iflED 



as 



such|*%. flrr*** 



1 . 



)rai]ns 



express a view on North:" 



that Abralms was cl 



Q And never heard Abi 

A Not that- I recall . 

Q Did you hav« the perception tnat mjcaams was close 
to North? 

A That he had dealings with him, yes. I didn't know 
how close he was to him. 

Q Back to Brunei. 

A He told me during this period-- 

Q Who's that? 

A AJbr'aJuns told me during this period, it was around 
Dacember or so. 

Q Of? 

A '86. This was after all this was starting to be 
revealed. And the question became- -these issues of what he 
knew about North and what-not came up. He told me that he 
had called 011i« to get money to pay for the return of 
certain bodies in the Hasenfus shootdown, and that there was 
no money to move these bodies back in the State Department 
account . 

AN^i^iJkMk ||e mStm^a. that Ollie had access to people, 
Americans who believei 



I that they had a duty or a patriotic 
obligation to help in these situations. J«# that Ollie had 
said this would be no problem--several thousand dollars. And 
he did ask me at the time, I recall, do I see any legal 



\mmm 



307 



C 10001 



UNClAS;„:iED 



difficulty wich that. Ja0t I saw no legal difficulty with 

Americans making a contribution to return the bodies of 

Americans to the United States. 

But he was aware that this was a significant piece 

of information, and I advised him to pass it on to the FBI, 

and I passed It on to the FBI. 

Q Returning to Brunei, Hill gives yqu the briefing on 

December 1. And does he tell you that the money subsequently [ 

has not arrived so far as the department can tell? 1 

A Yes. He did, and Elliot told me that as well. I 

I 
Q What happened next? j 

A He said the whole thing was still in limbo and that 
they had received a message from the Sultan that the money 
might take some time, and then they gave me all the cables. 
I asked for all the cables because this was similar to an 
incident that had occurred with the Singlaub contract. 

Q The Pastora-Singlaub? 

A Yes, Paatora-Singlaub "contract." 

Q Between ■•(■t Pastora and the United Stat^P^s? 

A Yes- I had been called in on that on the day of 
that cable that went down to Ambassador Tambs . And I called 
for all the cables, studied that, and I drafted a cable to 
Tambs telling him to stop that immediately. 

Q Which I believe is in evidence as part of our 



hearing record. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



308 



UKlilA^oisjcD 



A Right. And this was another such instance. i 
called for all the cables, I looked at all of them and I put 
the story together. And basically went to my White House 
counsel group, which consists of the White House counsel, the 
OLC, Assistant Attorney General Cooper, the DOD counsel, CIA 
counsel when it's an intelligence matter. 

tm^lf I told them about this and I said, we'd better 
do 3omething--thi3 was the next day--we'd better do something 
about this money, and find out about it. iMl^ I also told the 
FBI. I called them in — actually they were fhere in the 
building interviewing people and all, and I called them into 
my office and I told them this whole story. I cut out the 
name Brunei, but I told them the whole story and gave them 
the cables . 

Q And that the money was missing or unaccounted for? 
A The money missing, right. And Llimi J lia^ iiljiL Lj — 
Tuesday I got the account number from Nick Piatt, 
and I immediately communicated that to the Department of 
Justice and to the FBI . 

J(n^"***»n yn Wednesday I started pressing for action 
and was not getting it. Ww i "'kll' getting the message that 
it would take a long time to put together a request for the 
Swiss through the normal channels of the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty, or whatever we had with Switzerland. 



llfflMfi""" 



very, very 



309 



UNCUSSiRED 



1 I 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



concerned that we would be criticized for not doing something 
about this money. So on Thursday— | 

Q December 4 7 I 

A December 4th, I told Charlie HiU that I was going i 
to seek authority to \ directlj approa"I\the Swiss ambassador 
in Washington, and simultaneous lyj^send a cable to our 
ambassador in Switzerland, and^ask for the freezing of these 
accounts on an informal basis pending the Department of 
Justice's action. 

I got approval for that. I talked to Burns and 
Mark Richard, at the Department of Justice. I got their 
approval. I talked to White House counsel, I got his 
approval, and I acted. That evening I went to the Swiss 
ambassador's residence with my demarche, my official request. 
I took along the Swiss desk officer. 

1M*7he ambassador was most responsive and communi- 
cated that message to Switzerland. ^Hen I came into work 
the next morning I was informed that that account and several 
related accounts had been frozen. 

Q Judge, prior to the freezing, during the time 
period When you were getting briefed on this, do you recall 
that Elliot Abra^s wrote or gave you a draft memo that he 
had written to the Sultan telling him that there's a big 
problem. He thought the problem was severe. A memo which 

, ,_ :. ...,„»H ,^,i^-h«c«u«e the disclosures came 
wasn't sent, a 

I mil"! 11 vv 12^ 



iimsif 



310 



^SiritD 



about in November and overtook the draft? 

A It was a draft cable, I think, and it wasn't sent. 
He did give me that. 

Q And he also gave up the copy of the account number 
that he had been given by North which went into the safe as 
well? Did he give you that? 

A No, hs didn't give me that. He had given that to 
Nick Piatt, and Nick Piatt gave it to me, or he gave me a 
copy of it. 

Q Fine. 

[Discussion off the record.] 
BY MR. BELNICK: 

Q Were there any questions relating to Brunei that 
you pursued with Abra^ms on your own? 

A Yes, I asked him whether there were other countries 
involved. 

Q And he answered? 

A No, except that I did find out about the Country 
No. 8 radios. 

Q Radios from a certain country. Judge? 

A Yes. 

Q And I've identified for you that on our list that 
country is Country No. 8 and you agree we're talking about 
the same country? 

A Yes. 



mmm 



311 



Df^a .mIFIED 



Q All right. He told you about the radios involving 
Country No. 8. Did he tell you whether that solicitation had 
been made? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he say who made it? 

A He may have told me. I think he did tell me about 
this . 

Yes, the Secretary made it. 

Q And did he tell you that it was unsuccessful? 

A He may not have told me at that time. 

Q But he did tell you? 

A Yes, at some point I found out about it. 

Q Did he tell you the solicitation was unsuccessful? 

A Unsuccessful. 

Q Did you ask — 

A But he also said then that they briefed the 
committee about it, the Intelligence Committee, and the 
committee had approved the purchase of the radios. 

Q Did you also ask Abra|pns--and by the way, were you 
asking these questions when, early December? 



December Ist. 

The same time you were briefed? 

Absolutely. 

Did you also ask Abrajma if-- 

We 1 1 ft. j.i Jni<I^t have been later in the day. 



. ft. J-i -milAt have been latt 



312 



UNCIASS!F!ED 



day more or less' 



Q Yes, but the s< 

A Yes. 

Q Did you also ask Abraims whether there had been any 
quid pro quo for the contribution of Brunei? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q What did he say? 

A He said there was no quid pro quo other than the 
gratitude of the U.S. government, that we would appreciate 
it. And this is one of the reasons we ended up with a 
country like Brunei that doesn't get any assistance from us. 
^(^^■■■P ^her countries were knocked off the list of 
proposed countries to approach <c4g< ' '-^ J ^KM^ ^^cTX , 

He did tell me that there had been a survey with 
Murphy, Ridgeway and d^K ^^^ ^^^ regional secretaries all 



sat down. ^1^^ I gather, the African regional secretary 

>^ 

wasn't consulted because/xhe relative poverty of the countries 

there. But these four assistant secretaries were consulted 
■^^■■^■■■■MHv/ which countries should be 



as tc 



approached and 

it. tfkSi^fpvor 



tMurphy and Ridgeway said forget 



someone came up with Brunei. i 

Q Did Abralms tell you or did you discuss with him i 



how it was going to be insured in some way that the money 
from Brunei would be used for humanitarian purposes? 

A Yes, I said that the one basis upon which the State 
Department might be criticized about this — I said, clearly we 



jht be criticized about t 

mmm 



313 



m^m 



had the authority to solicit the money. And as far ai I 
could tell, it was for humanitarian purposes. 

The reason for that is, first of all, because the 
Secretary said that it was for humanitarian purposes and I 
believe him. And the second thing is that Brunei itself in a 
cable referred to, for welfare or something, ^nd 1 felt that 
that was for humanitarian purposes. But tflK we might still 
be criticized for not having taken steps to ensure that it 
would be used for humanitarian purposes. 

This was a line of criticism that I had considerable 
skepticism about because money is fungible. And I didn't see 
any requirement in the legislation that we ^HH^ follow up 4^ 
■■■^and make sure that anything that was solicited was in i 

fact used for humanitarian purposes* ^HaaHiaHMMV a very hard | 

i 
thing to make sure of when you don't have any control over 

what the contras are doing with other people's money. 

JIMlThere seemed to be two different approaches. I 

Elliot said that he was aware of this issue, and he was 

I 
detamined th^t once the money was in our hands or came into 

the account in Switzerland and Ollie told him about it, that 

he would do something to make sure the money was spent on 

humanitarian purposes, or we would get some assurances or 

something would happen. 

^■1 Charlie Hill's position was exactly the 

opposite. That we had noresponsibility over that and that 



lite. That we had no responsiDiii 



314 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 I 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

HC 

25 



huuiii 



tD 



the less we got involved in that, the better. That it was 
not appropriate for us to start trying to monitor it, because 
if we did try to monitor it, we would have the duty to go 
into something that we would not really have the capacity to 
follow through on. 

Q Let me understand. You have the impression that 
Hill and Abrajuns had had that discussion contemporaneous with 
the contribution, or that they were having it now? 

A I got the distinct feeling that Hill's position on 
this was formed contemporaneously with the events, and that 
that was behind his statement to Abrafjns to use Ollie's 
number rather than the CIA's, because it was a direct 
pipeline to the FDN. ^|0 that way we did not get involved 
and wouldn't be responsible for FDN's use of the money. 



(ms 



Q But did you learn whether Hill and Abra^ms had i 
exchanged those views contemporaneously with the contribution?! 

A I don't know. Abrafms just told me. It may not | 
even have been in the presence of Hill. But he did tell me 
that he was concerned about that issue and intending to do 
something about it. y 

Q On December 1, did Abralms tell you about his 

testimony on November 25 to the Senate Intelligence Committee 
concerning foreign country contributions to the contra cause? 

A Yes, he told me that the issue had not been briefed 



ye 



t to the Senate Select Committee, and that there had been a 






315 



yNCUSJIFIED 



r Abra^s { 




hearing the last Tueaday-- 

Q Which was November 25? 

A Right. And chat Bradley had asked whethe 
had any discussions regarding money from Iran 

Abratms had said no. And Abratms went on 
after that, if my recollection is correct--! 'ra sure of this- 
to give me the feeling that it had gone beyond that and that 
he had conveyed an erroneous impression of what had occurred 
f^ I told him that he had to tell the full story, 
and that he should get back in touch with the committee and 
tell them ijiunediately what had happened. 

Q And your recollection is that you told this to 
Abrafms on December 1? 

A Definitely. 

Q And did Abratms tell you in the course of indicating, 

to you that he believed he had given the Senate committee 

erroneous information, did he say to you that he had done ; 

I 
that because he felt he wasn't authorized to talk about 

Brunei? 

A He definitely said that. I'm confident that it was ', 
understood by Charlie and Abrajjns Ithat the Secretary had said | 

to AbralfflS that Abralms should not reveal the solicitation of | 

i 
Brunei as such. That Brunei, the use of the Brunei was a no- \ 

no. ; 

Q But it was the use of i^e word Brunei that they i 



316 



UNCLASSIFIED 



were asking him not to reveal, correct? 

A It was that specific solicitation. The fact of a 
solicitation, the fact that a solicitation had occurred, I'm 
sure the Secretary would not have intended that iMi^iHMi^^i^ 



the committee would not be informed of that. 



fkf sense of it was that Abraims was 
quite upset that he had--that he felt that he had misled 
Bradley, and that that was a mistake. *■* ihere was no 
suggestion that he had been authorized to mislead the 
committee. To the contrary, Ll i> « « ii uj u feeli 



a genuine ^B^^B^ of remorse in my judgment. 
Q You told him to go back to the committee. what did 
he say? 

A He nodded. He didn't contest that. 
Q Did you discuss it with him again thereafter, this 
issue of his testimony and going back to the committee? 

A Not really. I didn't go into any detail. I was 
available ^MMHV to help him in any way that he might need 
help. 

Q But he didn't come back for advice? 
A No, he didn' C, no. 
Q All right. 

MR. BELNICK: Tim, do you have any questions? 
MR . TRAYLOR : No . 



•iiifKireinED 



317 



IJNWSSIRED 



MR. 5MILJANICH: No. 

MR. BELNICK: Judge, on behalf of both committees, 
the House and the Senate, I want to thank you for your 
cooperation, and use the occasion also to thank you for the i 
cooperation we've received throughout from your office in 
this investigation. Thank you for your testimony. ! 

THE WITNESS: I appreciate your app^^eciation since 

it has taken a tremendous amount of time of my staff. miWe i 

1 
have tried to respond on behalf of the Secretary, pursuant to I 

his instructions, to all your needs. i 

MR. BELNICK: I know it has, and as I said, we're | 

all very appreciative of that cooperation. Thank you. 
[Whereupon, at 5:12 p.m., the taking of the 



UNCUSSIFIED 



318 



ONCIiSSIFIED 



I have read the foregoing 91 pages, wnlch 

contain a correct transcript of the answers made by me to 
the questions therein recorded. 



ABRAILW-I D. SOFAER 



Subscribed amd sworn to before ma this 
day of . 



NOTARY PUBLIC 



My Commission Expires 



UNCLASSIFIED 



319 



pb59 



1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
S 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 



IINCUSSIFIED 

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC 



I, PAMELA BRIGGLE, the officer before whom the 
foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the 
witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition 
was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was 
taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or 
under my direction; that sa.d deposition is a true record of 
the testimony g.ven by the witness; that I am neither counsel 
for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the 
action in which this deposition was taken; and further, that 
I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel \ 
employed by the parties hereto, nor f.nanc.ally or otherwise 
interested in the outcome of the action. 



PAMELA BRIGGLE 
Notary Public in and for the 
District of Columbia 



Commission expires May 14, 1990. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



320 



I im.-.l >tal«-4 l)«-|.artni<tu of >,„, ' f,* 



l "It.-. I >tal«-4 l)«-|.artni<tu of >,„, J,^ 

\^$C/ ITa^h.n^ion. UC. J05J0 f 

Wiimm 



Hovemoec 21, i986 



MEMORANDUM 

TO: The Secrecary 

FROM: L - Abraham 0. Sotaer /•S 

SUBJECT: lean Arms Sales 



How to respond to Bud McFaclane's request to speak or ra«et 
with you concerning Iran arms transfers. 

The Attorney General has informed me that the President 
has authorized a review of the facts relating to the transfers 
of arms to Iran, either 3y the U.S. or by Israel. McFarlane 
has apparently claimed that he knew nothing about a shipment of 
HAWK missiles in November 1985, and that he kept you fully 
informed as to ail the details of the operation. Me has been 
interviewed by the A.G., who now wants to interview you on 
these matters. I recognize that you may want to agree to meet 
with McParlane in light of your longstanding professional 
relationship. He may also be offended if you decline his 
request. On the other hand, to see McParlane now, or to 
discuss any disputed issue of fact witn him, could (1) create 
an appearance that he is coordinating his position with you; 
(2) lead to misunderstandings between you and McParlane as to 
what IS said in tne meeting; and (3) cause the A.G. to feel 
that he is not getting your views without any effects that 
might result froa a discussion with McParlane. Finally, you 
are in no position to discuss these matters with McParlane 
until you have gone over the record. 

I therefore recommend that you decline in the manner of 
your choosing to speak or meet with Bud McParlane at this time. 



r 

Decla»fifid/R.l3,sei nn g^S Y^ , , \9y 
under pr'^visiors of to. I^?55 
by 8. Refer, f-;ion:| Security Cou.icn 



nmma 




321 



biiuLHd^^MtU 



10. *TIi«r* ur b* MM ■IsufldtettandLiif of on* oe ay «n«w«cc 

toalfiit. thf w«« 4 thled eeuiTcry Uvolvod U ouc ««cxoe 
proJ««t Witt rr««....» 



II. T w«« aot betaking «ay lav.... i b«v« eb« eifbt oador 
tb* lav eo dofor rtpoctin? eo con^ctj*.. .* 

— Saxioiu 1*^41 qii«aclon« «ci«« Coc evo c«a«oa«: 

a) v« ka«v o£ aad avldantly -<eq!ai««ettd la Zara«ll ablpMau to 
tratt aoatlt* b«£or«^ thm J^xmmcr UtC eiadiaY v«a alga^d. k 
eaatrmX. La«u« 1« bow «• aqpa^ ouc kaawl«d)g« aad av9«raae 
aeecptaae* at. znet shipa^aes vlfek th* tact thae^ ov«r * ?««r 
Uear*. w% bav* aetll aoe iafotaad Qsafcaas o£ «. eHird paetr 
transf ac ac v* cc« nq^lr•d e» 4» oadar eh* kxam Ixpoee coaeraX 

b) Aft laaae oa« abipaaaft oe (T.S. acaa aay bava l«£t tf 0.5» 
fos Zraa aftar xuguat 1399, vboa coa^raaa paaaad a lav 
prohlbltla? all traaafara eo Icaa. Wtaila a scroa?^ ac?ua«ne eaa 
ba aada that. th% riadla^ eaa. aucbocLza eraaafara probibitad by 
tba AKX'a faaaeal. peorlalaBar tbae aeT>aiaac bacaaa aoea 

-' f^^mlt la e&« Caes at thm apanflc pgnhihtrioa la Aufuas.. 

rij3.xll» . whll* saeelos SffI oe eb* naeional sacurley Ae« 
oaa da^ra* oe la^aX aurhoelty la tba 
«' i inr i-m th« dalny aad taar at aectea of 
tssakIll9aBe» aesiaaa*. tft* dalar* ts eiila t aaeaac* — afioac LL 
^^issfea — > t« aavcaeadaaead and vUL b« condaanad by la^tlaeora 
ero« bodr partlaa. 

Q'-vraU^ ctrts accios eauld laad eo fustbar caaeeietlona oa eba 
Jldane'a la^al aueftoctey. 



IINCLiir'"^' 



lUoxiHii 



322 




— XJL40^ •^•n. it th* dmmL hmA ««oetc«d am pUnocd, Le would li*v« 
b««s y«e eurtlivr •vld«iie« ehae w* eoadea* eradlit^ lra«ta4«s for 
«»«. v« uad«cst«nd eb^e 4aoii« tta* «eeineiM Aetaapcad. Imc 
«•«« w«« th« er«a«f ae of addleional aca« aa a a waat aaar toe th» 
ralaaaa of aera hoaea^aa. le thU bad workad, Lt would bava 
eoaelualTaly abewn ebae tf prlea for ^aeelA? ^* addltioaal 
two boata^aa ealaaaad wa« ^nu. 



9. "Wa said ebae w* did noe wane to do bualnaaa wicb aay- 
aaeloa tbat opaniy back ad eaetoelsa. Tbaca baa baaa avidanc* 
of a laaaaniav of taecoelaK' bs eb« pac^ of cboMlal and bla 
fovcn«ane»* 




^Klthaaqh ooa aay b* thlM to ar^a cbAC ^•fjf 
incanaaiy tac^«ad by thw Irantaaa durlmj 1383 
foclarly: tbaca t« no doubt cbat Iran baa not l*^<=^Jrl^^^ , 

llyila sMpgotz tor Uitacnatton.l carror.sa and our - ' 

alliaa, «a wall *a cha tbcaa ..•- ..— — ■,— - 

continua to suSfac. 



eriaada and 



323 






-. -- - , , - »*a^a» 

«ca« for hotetfM'* 






-* Xfe L« v«cr <t«ttc eo eJift traoian« cuac ««• w«ea- •lehAnqin^ 
•mm Cor ti««ttf»«. ncraeUo* Infocswd th^ f«cr«t«ry ebat- 
Klaeh« e«port«4 ehae hettaq** would b« ctl««c«d on cfevtabte 20, 
' ibae Zacaal plaanad ee fly 100 Hawk ■iasilaa etoa 

:«r««l> «ad aubaa^uantly .CO lean if th* hocta^aa wara 
(ta eba avane^ tha ablpaanea vaea aaae via a ciA 
preprlatary aad vara daiivaead ee lean daaplea eha Caec ehae no 
boaea^ar vara ealaaaad.) 

— Ob aarvral oceaalon#» aefarlana aad ffeUdascar daacrlsad tiia 
oparaelov bo as«. aad 0111a ■o«ti> daaerlbad le to oebacs, «ar 
b^ia^ Aca« foe boaeagaar aad la aoa« eaaaa aa aeaay foe 
boata«as. ivaey tiaa a boata^a waa ealaaaad «■ le vaa pracadad 
by a ablpaaat of ana to Iran. Ra^aedlaaa of our atataaanta to 
tlaa- eoatracT' *'• *ta convteead tbae tba Zraalaa laadaeabip 
baliavaa tbae It waa lavolvad La asaa-for-boata^aa azebaagaa. 

7. "lay Cablaae aaabaea wacd eonaoltad tbrou^boufcr aad cue 
poUey oblaedvas «ac« oairas Ia dtapnra.* 

— tbia* tm aee tru*. tf SaoaearF ^t seat» was told os ae 

laa«« eoor oeeaaloaat tbae tb* agmeuetan va« eoaplataly tueaad 
o£S* 'ghm laae aaefc tlj» «a« ta «am o£ tbi« xa«c* tt* 
saccotarr ««» nmnc ttnm. tf rtadta«r b* vac aoe Ufbraad off 
■er«rlaB«*r trty ea Tabsase aatf b» t(a« oaavara ot tb* CZI cola 
ia. traaa£acriaf elma* iiaapuaa. latt tb« Saeraeariar ot Staea 
aad Oafaaao wara ftraly oopoaad ta tba attpply ot a raa and 
eoatlauad to aab* tbair oppoaieiott icaova to tba Praaldaat. 

t pttbllelcyi- w* woold bav* bad 

«• war* daallar aoMC fally daHrarad 




t&l« var peovas 
up tbra* Boea 



HMSIFIED 



324 



poMlol* eer ii# u 






uatctt«twortlir- TUn «e« atfvocaetc «ad pr«etuieii«ec of tilt 
earrorlM. Oii^iM£tl||cy contact* for eb« op«ratlea v«c« 




•» qocbaaifat bad b««a rajactad by tha CIA a« a contact 
alnca, axtai aavaral poly^eapba, tboy eoncludad ba waa a 
"babitual fabricator* vbo could not ba tr«atad. ~ 




Z. **• M nee e o ad e a » aad da aoe coadoaa tbo abipaaae ot ara* 
froar otbar couaerla*,.., W ba^* bad oetlilaf to do wttb otbar 
couatzla* oc tbair ahipaaae o£ asaa oe dola^ wbae tboy'ca 
dolaq.* 

— KM your iiitiaaniianr dasiiieatioa oetaa, wa kaav tbat Israal 
\mM ttcLvvXaf * aapoa a. la a Joly, 15IS diaeuaaloa witb Bud 
actmzlMim^ Xsr»*Ll mx Otractor Oaaaral Oavld tiacba dirocUy 
O^. appcoTttl. of Xaxaall scar eraasf art to mA» I aa 
aaeft aaipaaaea bat a«id tbae tbo a.^ 



Partially DeclaSifiedZKeleaSd da^ 
ondff P8l»fiHoni of EA. : 
by B. REiir. Rational S«ui1ty CoQDfiU 




325 



UI^ULHOOiDQU 



In light of tht dtclsion not to ship any more arms to Ic«n, 
would it b* iA£*4ul to consldtr other channels 
■Oia^fffort to develop better ties?! 




The Administration has engaged in policy which had great 
risks to the credibility you established. Many legal questions 
raised In the process. Possibly harmful changes may result In 
relevant laws, even if actions not demonstrably unlawful. 

But these are not the most serious concerns. We can get 
through claims of illegality, but not through any dlsembllng. 
We need to be sure no one mista|%s the facts. Further, this 
Administration has done well at restoring confidence of 
American people, especially in our foreign policy. This 
confidence should be preserved to the extent possible. 

To accomplish these ends, we must consider the extent to 
vhich th« President may be vulnerable, not merely on account of 
the arms sales which were approved, but also because of other 
actions which were not approved 



326 

Ul^bLHOOincu 

November 21, 1986 

To: Nick PUrt 

Charll^inll 
Jetty Bremer 
Arnle Rafael 

From: Abe Sofaer 

Subject: Memorandum of Poincs Concerning Arms Transfers co Iran 

The memo we have prepared is indispensable in chat it 
contains useful material for the Secretary. We need also co 
prepare, however/ a set of points more appropriate for him to 
use with the President. The Secretary is not interested in 
criticizing the President, and the memo is presently written in 
a form that could be so construed. The memo also seems too 
concerned with defending both the Secretary and the Department; 
that is not an approach that is likely to succeed. We need to 
change the memorandum's format, or to provide a separate set of 
points by which the memorandum's substance can be conveyed so 
as to advance the Secretary's aims. In the process, we may 
find that, while all the points collected are valid some should 
be deferred as untimely or potentially counterproductive. 

The President is presently under great pressure, and is 
still learning about some aspects of the question. He needs to 
feel we are his loyal troops, working to protect him from the 
dangers this operation has created. Timing is therefore a 
matter of crucial importance. The Secretary will be far more 
effective if he defers the broader, institutional reforms he 
may be seeking until after the present crisis has abated. Time 
is on his side on those issues. The type of help the President 
needs in the short run is in attempting to prevent further 
damage to his credibility. This is a formidable challenge, 
since some of his closest former and present advisors may have 
an interest in avoiding a full and truthful exposure of their 
activities. Yet, such exposure should be the Secretary's 
highest priority. The facts will demonstrate the Secretary's 
points, over time, but in a way that the President is most 
likely to accept. In general, I suggest an approach that asks 
rather than instructs, that exposes facts rather than asserts 
conclusions, and that allows the President time to see what is 
in his best interests rather than makes demands based on our 
own, already well-formed conclusions. We will need to work 
carefully, and with the Secretary's guidance, to convert these 
thoughts into calking points. But here are some preliminary 
ideas: 

We have a variety of problems, some Tiore urgent than 

others. My main, present concern is co ensure chac no one 

who acts or speaks for the Adminisc rac ion msleads js or ^ — ~\ 

the public as co Uie true faces. 



U^e true faces. m^V 

"^"Rlfi^Nstonal Security Council VI ti^i./tuUiriLU X^c.t^ ^ if ^ 



under provision ot LO. 12355 



327 



UNCMSSIFIED 



Would It D« useful CO have i systematic collection of all 
the evtdencir.5t«il*bl*? Congress wiU soon be out of 
sesalon. Tlfl« win provide in opportunity to develop a 
relatively full account of what occurred. 

Some disputes aa to the facts have already arisen, even 
within the Administration, what can we do to ensure that 
we do not embarass the Administration by taking positions 
that may later be proved wrong? Perhaps an interagency 
group under the AG's control should be formed to ensure 
that we know what each of the players d id. 

We cannot avoid a 




We also have 

recordings of meetings with the Irknian^ They should be 
analysed now, rather than later under the pressure of 
legislative scrutiny. The records kept at the NSC are 
particularly important. All diaries, memcons, and other 
materials should be collected and a thorough chronology 
prepared. Of course, this includes any materials in Bud's 
possession. 

Congress and the press are focussing a lot of attention on 
legal issues. Of course, the AG's position is a great 
help, and we will do everything possible to support it. 
Buc does it cover all the problems? Ny understanding is 
that the AG's opinion relates to the legality of activities 
pursuant to the Finding. What about prior activities? 
Also what about activities after the prohibition on 
transfers to Iran in August 1986? 

The issue of notification is less a legal than a practical, 
political pcobleH. We have delayed notice of arms 
transfers both before and after the Finding, for 
unprecedented periods. We must work to make the strongest 
case possible to justify the delay, and to avoid alienating 
potential supporters in Congress. 

How should we d««l with claims that our foreign policy 
apparatus is in disarray? we should not appoint any panel 
of wise aen to decide how to allocate foreign policy 
functions. But shouldn't we do some thinking of our own? 

In particular, should we not evaluate the premises on which 
this arms transfer plan was adopted? Many of them seem 
questionable. (Add discussion of specifics.) 



UNCLASSIFIED 



328 



tU 



UNCLASSIFIED 

U^ -K^i- 4^ ^kT ^ y^i-A. yVv*^*T^^ ..^ ^- 









-THHi^-mssife 



5<,f«, &. ^3 



329 



\immm 



Oth«c f*cts ch*^J>oindextec communicaced include: 

— Th« use shipped « total of 2008 TOW missiles and 2*0 line 
items (spare*, etc.) for HawK air defense batteries (which US 
experts believe have proved useless) 

— The USG got agreement f rom Iran i 
|HHHIHHHiH^H|H (Pomdext-er believes this diversion 

has in fact occurre^^^^ 

— The payment chain went from Iran to Gorbanifar to Israel an 
arms merchant to a "proprietary" to the CIA to DOD. 
(Poindexter knows only what was paid to the CIA and DOD; he is 
sur» the arms merchant took a profit and therefore does not 
know how much Iran paid.) 

— The NSC states it kept no memcons of any of the relevant 
meetings. Some tape recordings of meetings with Iranians do 
exist. Sofaer asked that they be transcribed promptly. 

— At least one contact has been made after public exposure of 
this channel. The Iranians have indicated that they are still 
trying to get the release of the two remaining U.S. hostages 
and to find out the location of the three U.S. hostages roost 
recently seized. 

— Poindexter believes the USG should continue to pursue the 
objectives of the finding, but did not say anything about 
future arms transfers. He said the effort was now less tightly 
held, so the Department could be involved to a greater extent. 

— Aritacost and Sofaei emphasized the need to prepare all 
witnesses carefully and to answer all questions, especially 
those related to activities prior to January 17, truthfully. 



UNSmflED 



330 



uiiby^iMtu 



^9A7 



— TD* 41e««c llalrcf* b«ev««n I*ra*Il «ad a.S. «upply u tuown 
by eh« eace eii«t, la •&ely 19II» »• tupplitd SOI ;ow«- to :sri«l 
eo r«pUe« tiraa* le iia4 smc eo tras Ut s«pcao&«r 19IS. 

— > Sill caaay't taaelaeny for eeaorrow ravtala ehae in Mov«mb«r 
I9IS eha CIA halpad Zaraal eranafar Hawk aKsilaa by israal co 
rcan ae th« NSC aeaf£'« raqu«ae. Sboekia^iy, eh« >tsc staff 
daniaa having aad» eaia caquaac. 

•» Tft* NSC staff has. apparanely accaa^ad chAC Souttiaca Alz 
traaapocr esccy aBaT* af eiic- «a» to Cna. tb* CX& s«yr eirla l« 
no Lon^ar a propclaeacy. re L< aoeawere&y, tiouavar, ebae Le is 
eb* aaa« airiia« oa waiea laaaafoa- tnd ocbars eaccl«d axas eo 
th* Coaeraa. Tbir will uadoubeadly ceaplleaea our affoct« eo 
support tb* Coatca«* 

3. "Tba alsaloa was aaevod ebat aada 'IM walva eaapoearlly foe 
ebat caaily aiaiacula aaoune of apaea pacta aad dafaaaiva 
waapoaa. . . . Tba ao><:aIl«d violaeloa did not la aay way alear 
eba allitary balaaea batwaan eba evo eouaeri'as."' 




4.>' •traa doar ooe owa. or bwr» a utb o d ty ff»«r tb> 
HarftoILah..-. Tb» lca^«» fo n ai iiMi ir bad so hamsaqm*^ Iraa 
hald no hoaeagaa.* 

— »tthoue aay ;iaalif Icacxoa, ■ftmni Ian is i craaxiira of cia 
-ovacnaanc. of Iran, aad Iran is Lta oaj-a aaaitar, pacroa. ^rss 
suppLiac, and advUae. 



UNCLASSIHED 



331 



UNCLASSIFIED 



19\^ 



-HIiSAoUAit 




— •£!»• MvoLutioniry Ju«eic» Organlxitlon (WO) &•# elaim4 
«e«die Coe th* nidnappUY o£ two ofi th* Imc eac«« Aa«eleatt 
iTo«e«9«r. the kldaappta^ ot th% ciiicd w«« cl«ta%d by u* 
r«lA«le Jthad: Oc7«iiix«feiow, «v trmnlAn-<:oBfetoU«* •ntiey. 




— V* «r* eoBTlAesd tii&e mat«ft-coatreU«d froup* la 
hKV. eoaelodad tHae L6 L« i& tiwtr taettc«se ea kldac^ 
•ddltloaal. Aflcrleaas b«caa«*«, wtwei«r*r w* saY^ s«y^^ luiaslea iamm 
p«Y eaacoa. 



.ea belnv » nt^eiAe«4 ud eo eh* 



S. "One purpovas v«c». 
rrmi^rraq w«c.» 

— Opaniar a cbannal of eeauaicaelona eo Iraa could baataa ebae 
•ad. THa supply- oC «n«» m^mn la eaa context you d«flccib«d, 

vtlL only aaka Iraa aera iattaaal^aae aad aora « ac oa 

pcaavcscxa^ t&9 asc* Ott ScaalxB laadacsbip La coarlacad ic 
baa aaaa^ad » a»jor braaktisrau^trr aad otbac acaa suppliacs vill 
aaw diara^ard Opacaaioa Staoaeh. ^ffacz*. cvaryoaa wlta 
•xparlaac* la Imr and daallar vtttt irantana eitvly ballcraa 
»^«^y wft baw laoftlMBaA tftiv wcs bacaaaa o£ ta* psTtSbfllo^lcal. 
as^ poltttead. boose a* bav« ftvas eo* tiiaav atm auuLwafu lIy 9or 
asBK o«e 9t ov. Dr * wafaabac ZO: apaadr, Ayacallaa mreaalal 
ba» told Ula- oacloa cbaC the nKacte ffouaa* rtpraaaneaelvoa 
*peaaaacad thasaalvaa aaakly- tnd^ buobly ae etia door ot this 
naeioa, wUhiisq- to attabllah calaelona. Thay •Jiah eo apolo^lza 
Cor ebalr nnacaica, buc our narlon cajacts e.'iaa." 



y 



<'^'^: 



332 



UiUMIED 

WJEMORAKDUW OF COyVTRSATTOM 

Parcicipantf : ^C- Admiral Poindexcer 

NSC Accocney Paul Thompson 
Under Secretary Armacosc 
Judge Sofaer 

Place and Time: Admiral Poindexter s Office 

November 18. 1986, 6:00 - 7:30 p.m. 

Subject: Iran 

Ac 6 p.m. November 18, Messrs. Armacost and Sofaer met with 
Admiral Poindexter and Mr. Thompson. Poindexter presented a 
review of some of the facts concerning USG arms transfers to 
Iran. Although from time to time Poindexter referred to a 
document that appeared to be a chronology, the presentation was 
not strictly chronological. Armacost and Sofaer interrupted 
periodically with questions. The following outline emerged: 

1. June 1985 . The idea of opening a channel to Iran was 
expressly considered in connection with (a) an NIE 
describing increasing internal turmoil in Iran and Soviet 
efforts to exploit it and (b) a proposed NSDD that 
suggested the use of arms sales as part of a strategy of 
dialogue. 

Both Defense and State formally expressed their opposition 
to this portion of the strategy. 

2. July 1985 . Israeli MFA Director General David Kimche 

visited the U.S., met with McFarlane, and proposed to him 

that -.h<» U.S. allow Israel to transfer a quantity of arnr.s 

to Iran to facilitate the establ is hment of a channel to an 

authoritative Iranian .! 

^ and Menachehc 
Gorbanifar, who miqh^b^^seful in helping get the release 
of U.S. hostages. HHJpiH^Pwas to be the channel for 
policy; Gorbanifa^tn^cnJnnel for hostage issues. 
McFarlane expressly refused to sanction such a shipment and 
made it clear that the U.S. would not trade arms for 
hostages. He did, however, express a strong interest in 
establishing a channel to Iran, and in response to a 
question he opined that the USG would not stop selling arms 
to Israel if a transfer occurred. 

McFarlane apparently informed the President of this action. 



1 

PartoJIy Declaajfied /Released onaiV..ii9H 

ondfr tinivlsionj of E.0. 1235f 

^ 3. Regtr, Matfonal Security Council 



mmE nn 



333 



ulcuLtwotricu 




-- lsr«tl agreed co snip oniy wnae the USG allowed, out 

Poindexter oelieve.s Israel nas snipped what it wanted to 

ship, thouqn such shipments may now be suspended or 
slowed; 

— Iran paid in advance for tnese shipments to Israel, 
which paid the USG tnrougn a 'proprietary'. Poindexter 
is sure that the arms merchant took his profit, out does 
not know how much was paid oy Iran, only how much was 
paid to the CIA and DOD; 

-- NSC kept no memcons of any of the meetings involved, 
Poindexter said. Some recordings do exist, nowever, of 
meetings with Iranians. (Sofaer asked that they D« 
transcrioed promptly.) 

-- At least one contact has been made after public 
exposure of this channel. The Iranians indicated they 
were still trying to ootain the release of two remaining 
American hostages, and to find out the location of tne 
three hostages most recently seized; 

-- Poindexter believes the USG should continue to pursue 
the objectives of tne Pinding, but did not say anything 
aoout future arms transfers. He said that the effort was 
now less tightly neld so State couio be more involved. 

-- Armacost and Sofaer empnasized the need to prepare all 
witnesses carefully, and to answer correctly all 
questions, especially tnose related to activities prior 
to January 17. 



UlSiOSPIED 



334 



OimSSIflED 



«• J«nu«rv^i'». 1986 The President signed a finding on 
I can. (Poildexcer showed it to Armacost and Sofaer.) ic 
i» carefully drafted; ic stresses the strategic issues and 
mentions the return of the hostages as the third objective 
being sought . 

1 ■ February-April 1986 . Meetings took place between 

Ltati ves of the U.S. (NSC and CIA), Israel, and Iran 

The Iranians with whom the US. was in touch 

were youngr they claimed that the U.S. needed to 

demonstrate th]e tangible benefits they would derive from 

dealing with the U.S. through arms transfers, including 
TOWS . ^ 

The U. 



Additional shipments of arms were also provided durlnq this 
period, specifically lOOO TOWs to Iran and 508 TOWs to 
Israel to replace the September 1985 shipment. 

8. May 1986 . McFarlane visited Tehran and attempted to 
establish higher contacts. He eventually met advisers of 
the leadership, but none of the three top leaders was 
willing to meet him. The Iranians wanted the meetings, but 
failed to prepare for the visit. (Poindexter attributed 
the disappointing results of the trip to Iranian disarray. 
He gave Armacost a copy of the talking points prepared for 
McFarlane' s use in Tehran.) 

9. May-November 1986 . Discussions and other activities 
continued. (Thompson had told Sofaer earlier in the day 
that at least one shipment of arms may have reached Iran 
after August 1986, when Congress passed a law prohibiting 
all transfers to Iran.) The operation became 
an Iranian faction souc 




^wmm 



335 



vmmm 



3 S«pttwbM*.t9as . Israel transferred 50« TOW anti-tank 
missile* to lean. it is not clear what understandings 
th«r« m*y hav« been with respect to USG replacement of 
equipment shipped by Israel to Iran. 

A meeting was held in the President s quarters to discuss 
the issue, with Secretaries Shultz and Weinqberger 
present. Both objected to such arms transfers, citinq. 
inter alia, leqal obstacles. 

The NSC subsequently astced Attorney General Meese to review 
the leqal issues. 

4. October-December 1985 . Meetinqs occurred in London and 
elsewhere between McFarlane. CIA and NSC officials, 
Iranians, 4nd Israelis^at least initially to clfeck out the 
bone fides ofHHH||H^nd Gorbanifar, « second Iranian 
channel. Priire Minister Peres chose his counter-terrorist 
coordinator, Aviram Nir, to represent Israel. These 
discussions made clear that the September tr|nsle^ha^^ 
potentially opened a channel for the U.S. toflH^^BBwho 
actually attended a December meetinq with McFarlane in 
London. (Poindexter told Armacost he was unsure whether 
the Israeli initiative reflected their desire to b« helpful 
or their search for sanction for their own arras shipments. 
Israel agreed to ship only what the U.S. asked it to, but 
it is likely it shipped whatever it wanted. The NSC 
assumed it couldn't verify Israeli activities and sought 
therefore to harness then. to its own "project."} 

At the Decembe^neetinq, McFarlane laid out U.S. 
objectives. |^H|BBHtold him that Iran could stop 
hostage-takin^an^thal Khomeini had issued a Fatwa 
(religious pronouncement) to the effect that terrorism is 
inconsistent with the Koran. (No one has b«en able to 
corroborate whether such a document was actually issued.) 

5. Peceeibec I9tt . A meetinq was held in the President's 
quarters with Weinberqer, McFarlane, and Meese in 
attendance. (Poindext«r was unclear as to whether Shultz 
was present). The President heard a report on the project, 
as v«ll as all views, and was told by Meese that he culd 
lawfully proceed with the plan as a covert intelligence 
operation. The President decided to proceed and ordered 
the preparation of a finding. 



MWRSIFIED 



336 



UOBfiAHniCU 



MEMORAHDOW Of ^oSwRSATION 

On II Novtmt)«r 1986, tt 6:00 p.m., Acmacost and Sota«r 
atctndtd a m««ting with Adm, Poindtxter, at Poindexttr's 
rtqu««t, in his offxc*. nsc attorn«y Paui Thompson also 
attended. Pomdexttc presented a review of some ot the facts 
of USG acms ccansfecs to lean. Although Poindexter rcfecced 
froa tin« to time to a document tnat appeared to oe a 
chronology, the presentation was not strictly chronological, 
and was interrupted periodically oy questions from Aroacost and 
Sofaer. The following outline energed: 

1. June 1985 . The idea of opening a channel to Iran was 
expressly considered m connection with a proposed nsdd 
which included arms sales as a. strategy. (000 and State 
opposed arms sales.) 

2. July 1985 . Kifflche visited the U.S. and proposed co 
NcParlane that the U.S. aiiow Israel to transfer some 

I in order to establish a channel to 

_^ McParlane refused expressly to sanction such 

shipment, ^nd made clear that the U.S. would not trade 
arms for hostages. He did express a strong interest, 
however, in establishing a channel to Iran, and in 
response to a question he opined that the USG would not 
stop selling arms to Israel if a transfer occurred. He 
apparently informed the President of this action. 

3. September 1985 . A transfer of 508 TOW anti-tank 
missiles occurred from Israel to Iran. A meeting was 
neld in tne President's residence, at whicn Secretary 
Shultz was present to discuss this issue. GPS and 
Weinberger ob]ected, and raised legal obstacles to arms 
transfer. 

4. October-Decemoer 1985 . Meetings occurred in London 
and elsewhere between Casey, other CIA officials, NSC 
personnel, Iranians, and Israelis. Peres cnose Nir to 
represent Israel. These discussions made ciear chat the 
September transfe^had potentially opened a channnel for 
the U.S. toUHUBPH^ho actually attended a December 
meeting witl^cF^^ane in London. At this meeting, 
HcFarlane laid out USG oo]ectives, and was told by 
Goroanifar that Iran could stop hostage taKing, and tint 
Khomeini had issued a Fatwa (pronouncement) that 
terrorism is inconsistent witn the Koran. 



-aio..j( i.-laaified/ReJiagd oii^^\<f%n 

^■iiT tnvtsioig of £.0. j^s? 

by B. Rgjfr, Bational Security Council 



vmm «^ 



337 



UI^Q(^»H:U 



5. Jtctmotc 1989 . A m«tcinq w«« ntio ae tn« Pftiiatnt's 
£«*ia«ncS?itTif>3«a oy utinotrstc, Mcr«cl«n«, and H««at. 
( PoindtxtSiTw** unclear «■ to S«cctc«ry snuicx' 
pc«««nc«.) Tnt Pr««id«nc n««td « rtporc on th« pro]tcc, 
•• w«ll «a all viaws, ana waa cold by cnt Accornty 
Gtnaral that h« could lawfully proctad with tha plan aa 
an intalii9«nc« oparation. Tna Pcaaidant dacidad to 90 
ahtad and ocdarad a findinq ptapacad. 

8. January 17, 1986 . A finding on Iran waa aiqnad. 
(Poindaitar ahowad it to Armacoat and Sofaar. It is wall 
draftad, and atrassaa tna stcacaqic issuaa, mantioninq 
tha raturn of noatagas aa tna third oODactiva baing 
sought.*) 

7. Fabrua rv-April 1986 . Maatinga took placa batwaan 
foralantati vaa oi tha U.S. (NSC. CIA), Israal, and Iran 

■■■■■■if. Tha Iranian* with whoa tha U.S waa in touch 
wJT^ounq and claimad a naad to damonstrata through araa 
transfara (apacif ically including TOWa) that thay wara 
dealing with tha USC. Tha O.S. p atiodically gava^'" 
' ;aniana inta Iliqancc — 

shipmants of arms wara also prowrdad during this period, 
specifically 1000 TOWs, plus 508 TOWs to replenish 
Israeli shipment in Septemoar 1985. 

8. May 1986 . Mcrarlane visited Tehran and attempted to 
establish higher contacts. He met advisers of the 
leadership, but none of the three top leaders waa willing 
to meet him. Tne Iranians wanted tne meetings, but 
failed to prepare for rhe visit. (Poindexter gave 
Armacoat a copy of the talking points prepared for 
McParlane's use in Tehran.) 

9 Mav-Novemp er 1986 . Discussiona and otner activities 
continued. (Tbompsoii haa told Sofaer earlier ^n the day 
that at least one shipment of arms "'y/*^* '"^J^f^J"" 
after August 1986, when Congress passed a law prohibiting 
all l:ransf«C8 to Iran.) The operation »•«•»•,""" " 
•n Iranian faction 




Other fact* communicated oy Poindexter including the 
following: 

— use Shipped a total of 2008 Tow misailes, and 240 Una 
item. dpi"., .tc.) «or Hawk air defense batteries 
(Which o!s. experts believe will prove useless); 



iBBr NO.. 



yNClftSSiFli 



DEPOSITION 

COLONEL JAMES J. STEELE, USA 

Tuesday, April 21, 1987 



Select Committee on Secret Military 
Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 
Opposition, <;; 

United States Senate, 
Washington, D.C. 




The deposition convened at 9:00 a.m. in the Select 
Committee's secure conference room. Hart Senate Office Building. 

Present: Mark A. Belnick, Executive Assistant to the Chief 
Counsel, Senate Select Committee; Clarence H. Albright, Jr., 
Associate Counsel, Senate Select Committee; Roger L. Kreuzer, 
Investigator, House Select Committee; Dan Finn, Associate 
Counsel, Senate Select Committee; John D. Saucon, Associate 
Counsel, Senate Select Committee; Richard J. Leon, Staff Counsel, 
House Select Committee; Arthur L. Liman, Chief Counsel, Senate 
Select Committee; and Thomas Polgar, Associate Counsel, Senate 
Select Committee. Also present: Robert J. Winchester, Special 
Assistant to the Secretary of the Army and Colonel John K. 
Wallace, U. S. Army 



iiHcussro 



COPY NO.. 



A 



(339) 



340 



wms&m 



,,jSi- 






EXAMINATION f-" ' 

2 BY MR. BELNICK: 

3 Q Colonel, would you state your full name for the record, 

4 please. 

5 A James John Steele 

6 And you are an officer in the United States military? 

7 A That's right. 

8 Q Your rank? 

9 A Colonel. 

10 Q What's your current assignment, sir? 

11 A I'm presently assigned to the Nuremberg Military Command in 

12 Germany. 

13 Q And what was your assignment immediately before undertaking 

14 your present one? 

15 A Well, I was the Nuremberg Commander in El Salvador from May, 

16 actually June of 1984 until the first November of 1986. 

17 Q Where were you headquartered in that capacity? 
San Salvador 

At the American Embassy? 
That*'* correct. 

To w^em did you report at the Embassy? 
Ambassador Corr, and prior to that his predecessor, 

23 Ambassador Pickering. 

24 Q Did you have reporting responsibility to anyone in 

25 Washington, DC? 

26 A Reporting responsibility? Let me answer the question this 



18 


A 


19 


Q 


20 


A 


21 


Q 


22 


A 



IINCIASSIHED 



S41 



IJNCUSSiflED 



1 way. I was, I had responsibilities to the Ambassador to 

2 CINCSOUTH, to the Director of DSAA, and I suppose also to the 

3 Joint Chiefs in the Army Staff. MILGROUP Command is not a clear- 

4 cut type chain of command. I certainly had responsibilities to 

5 answer to Department of State and, on occasion, the NSC. 

6 Q Who was your immediate superior military officer in the 

7 chain of command? 

8 A That would have been General Warner, initially, then General 

9 Taylor; the CINC head put them in charge of Central America. 

10 However, in both cases with General Gorman and with General 

11 Galvin. They took a particular interest in El Salvador, so I 

12 found myself dealing directly with them I would say a good bit of 

13 the time. 

14 Q What was General Gorman's position in the military during 

15 your assignment at El Salvador. 

16 A He was the Commander-in-Chief, SOUTHCOM 

17 Q Where was he stationed? 

18 A Panama. 

19 Q Did you know a gentleman who used the name Max Gomez while 

20 you were oonnander of the MILGROUP in El Salvador? 

21 A Yes. 

22 Q What was the other, what was his real name? 

23 A Felix Rodriguez. 

24 Q When did your first meet Mr. Rodriguez? 

25 A I don't recall the exact date, but it would have been 

26 probably in the Spring of 1985. 



UNCUSSIHED 



342 



yNCLASSlFlEO 



3 

1 Q Do you recall how you met him? How he came to your 

2 attention? 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q Would you tell us? 

5 A I first heard about him from I believe from General 

6 Bustillo, the Commander of the Air Force in El Salvador. Then 

7 later from General Blandone, the Chief of Staff of the Salvadoran 

8 Armed Forces. Felix Rodriguez had met with them while they were 

9 on subsequent trips to Washington and had offered to come down 

10 and assist the Salvadoran Military fight against the guerrillas. 

11 And I met him when he did come down, again the date X don't 

12 recall, but it would have been the Spring at '85, and sat in on a 

13 meeting with then Ambassador Pickering. That's my first 

14 recollection of meeting him. 

15 Q The meeting with you, Ambassador Pickering and Rodriguez was 

16 held at the American Embassy? 

17 A Yes. 

18 Q Was anyone else at that meeting? 

19 A Not that I recall. 

20 Q Had you heard prior to that meeting that Mr. Rodriguez had 

21 been a eaf^loyee of the Central Intelligence Agency? 

22 A Yes. 

23 Q From whom did you hear that? 

24 A From Ambassador Pickering. 

25 Q And what else did Ambassador Pickering tell you prior to the 

26 meeting about Rodriguez? 



siiussm 



343 



UNCLASSIFIED 



4 

1 A He had told me that Rodriguez was, wanted to come down, and 

2 that he had made it fairly clear to me that he wasn't real 

3 enthused about it, nor was I, quite frankly, because we're 

4 talking about a kind of a, sort of a, loose cannon- -someone who 

5 really didn't seem to work for anyone. And that one of the 

6 things that Ambassador Pickering said, was that he wanted Felix 

7 Rodriguez to talk to then, to General Gorman before he came, 

8 and I guess get Gorman's opinion as to whether he ought to come 

9 up or they ought to try to discourage him. 

10 Q Did Ambassador Pickering ask you to do anything in that 

11 regard? 

12 A I don't think so. I think he made a call himself to General 

13 Gorman, although I'm not sure about that. In any case, Felix 

14 Rodriguez did go to SOUTHCOM prior to coming up and had talked to 

15 Gorman. 

16 g Did you understand that Felix had a sponsor in 

17 Washington, DC? 

18 A Well, maybe a sponsor is not the rtfht word. But he had a, 

19 there was a fellow named Don Gregg who was a friend of his, who 

20 spoke vejcy highly of him, I guess is the best way to put it, and 

21 Ambassad^f Pickering did mention that, ^^atl - 

22 Q And you knew that this fellow named Don Gregg was then 

23 Assistant to the Vice President of ^« United States for National 

24 Security AffTirst^ ? 

25 A At the time I didn't, I knew he was somewhere up there ""in 

26 the stratosphere, but I didn't.... 



liNCUSSinEO 



344 



KUSSIFIED 



1 Q You came to know that Gregg had that position? 

2 A Yes. 

3 Q Alright. 

4 Q Now again, can you tell us to the best of your recollection 

5 when the meeting was among you, Rodriguez, and Ambassador 

6 Pickering at the Embassy? 

7 A March '85. 

8 Q Prior to that, do you remember sending any messages to 

9 General Gorman about Felix Rodriguez? 

10 A I didn't send any messages. I had a conversation with 

11 General Gorman at some point. I don't recall whether it was on 

12 the telephone or it was in person. He also, quite frankly, had 

13 reservations about Felix Rodriguez. 

14 Q Did Ambassador Pickering, to your knowledge met with 

15 Rodriguez about Rodriguez's potential assignment in Salvador 

16 before the meeting among the three of you? 

17 A My impression was no. 

18 Q Colonel, what was the backchannel for communicating to 

19 General Gorman? 

20 A Well there were several ways: one, you could pick up a 

21 telephone, a classified phone and call him and there was, for the 

22 Ambassador, he certainly could send in effect a backchannel 

23 message to him. 

24 Q Did you ever send backchanneled messages to General Gorman? 

25 A It's possible, it's possible--rarely though, if I did. 

26 Q Do you have a secretary named Bette Silva. 



345 



UNCLilSSIFIED 



1 A Yes. 

2 Q Was she your secretary the entire time of your assignment in 

3 El Salvador? 

4 A No. 

5 Q When was she your secretary? 

6 A Gosh. I would guess — I'd have to go back and check, but she 

7 was there the last 8 months maybe; 2 years. 

8 Q Would you mark this document as Steele Exhibit 1 for 

9 identification, please? 

10 g Alright, Colonel, for the record the document now marked as 

11 Steele Exhibit 1 is a 2-page document; the first page of which is 

12 typed on the letterhead of U.S. Military Group El Salvador dated 

13 1 February '85. Is that your signature on the document where it 

14 says Steele. 

15 A Yeap. 

16 Q On the second page of the Exhibit appears to be a ^^ed 

17 message. Do you recognize this document. Colonel? 

18 (Pause.) 

19 A There's no rttson to believe that it isn't accurate. I 

20 don't raqpnber, you know, the details of the message, except I 

21 think it .|* consistent with what I just told you. 

22 Q Well, the top page is a memo from you to Ambassador 

23 Pickering reading, "Per your guidance, attached is a draft 

24 backchannel to Gen Gorman on our "no pay" mercenary." What did 

25 you mean by "draft backchannel"? 

26 A Well, as I recall, I knew that Ambassador Pickering had 



346 



yNClASSIFIED 



1 conferred with the CINC about this. I didn't remember this 

2 specific backchannel message, but it's consistent with the 

3 guidance I recall getting from Ambassador Pickering, which was to 

4 put together, in this case, probably to put together a message 

5 for him that said he had some concerns about it and he wanted 

6 Rodriguez to talk to him before he came. 

7 Q Who was the CINC at that time? 

8 A General Gorman 

9 Q Now, what is a backchannel? Let tne refine the question. 

10 What did you mean in this memoranduin when you sald^at this was - 

11 a "backchannel to General Gorman?" = _ __. 7 

12 A Only that it was a messes that wi^^jco go %o him only, and 

13 not to everyone on the staff. -^^ 

14 Q And how was it to g^to hiiitt:£_ 

15 A To be sent out over the wire. 

16 Q And why did you intend that it be senlhgii a backchannel? 

17 A Well, r-think becaua*, probabl^^. becaus* that was the 

18 guidance I got from the Ambassador, but I don't remaster it. I 

19 don't remember exactly what he said, but it's very comnon for 

20 Ambassadors and Generals to talk to each other through what is 

21 referred to as backchannel messages, and thlj wasn't anything 

22 particular. 

23 Q Do your recall receiving a rsil^nse to tills Message from 

24 General Gorman? ' -- ^- 

25 A No. 

26 Q There was, do you recall General Gorman telling you that 



l!^i^!fflRFn 



347 



mmmii 



1 Rodriguez's primary interest would be in assisting the Nicaraguan 

2 Resistance when he got to El Salvador? 

3 A No. 
4 
51 
6 



Q Let's mark this next document as Steele Exhibit 2. 

(Pause) 

Now, Colonel, I applogize for the quality of-^he printing on 
Steele Exhibit 2, but it's the best copi^hat jgre have. Steele 
Exhibit 2 for the record is a 1-page copy of what appears to be a 
telex or cable message from General Gorman to Ambassador 
Pickering and Colonel Steele in February of 1985. In the upper 
right-ha^d^ corner of the copy it says, "File for me" and there is 
the initJte. S. Did you write that, is that your handwriting? 
A Yes. 

Q That's your S. 
A It sure is. 

Q Okay. Now why don't you take a moment to look at this 
message, apologizing for the quality of the copy, and see if it 



348 



lCUSS!f!tO 



1 refreshes your recollection as to what you heard back from 






pic7 mercenary. 



but it certainly appears to 



- 2 General Gorman about your 

3 (Pause) 

4 A Well, I don't remember the 

5 be accurate. 

6 Q Alright, and do you see in this message from General Gorman 

7 to you and Ambassador Pickering, it states, "Rodriguez's primary 

8 commitment to the Region is in^^^^^^Hand he wants to assist 

9 the FDN." Do you see that? 

10 A Yes, I see that. 

11 Q Seeing that, does it refresh your recollection that that is 

12 what General Gorman told you about Rodriguez's commitment to the 

13 Region? 

14 A Well, that's what the message says. I mean it was very 

15 clear to me though that after Rodriguez got there, that that was 

16 not his primary commitment. 

17 Q We'll get to that in a minute. 




349 



UNCLASSIFIED 




1 

2 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V My job was El Salvador — it was the largest 

3 program in the hemisphere. You know, I probably read 50 messages 

4 a day and so the answer is no, I don't remember this specific 

5 message, you know, but that's not to say that it isn't accurate. 

6 And that certainly is not to contradict what General Gorman said, 

7 but I'm just telling you that I don't remember the message 

8 specifically. 

9 g At that time in February 1985, you knew that Congress had 

10 prohibited American military aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance, 

11 right? 

12 A Let's see. Well, I don't remember the exact dates where we 

13 went from a not giving them any military assistance to giving 

14 them non-lethal kinds of assistance. But at some point there was 



15 a change there. 



>res. 



^t'-t-'' ^"^ 



H-iv^ot' 



cuc:^ 



-±-6 Q Do you recall if I .."...of October 1984, what's known as 

17 Boland Amendment II came into effect and all American aid was 

13 banned and then sometime in 1985, late '85, there was 

19 humanitarian aid. But during this period, February 1985, 

20 American military aid was prohibited. Does that refresh your 

21 recollection? 

22 A Military aid, in you mean lethal aid? 

23 Q Um-hum, lethal aid, yes. 

2 4 A Yea. '^- 

25 Yes. Alright. And Gener^ Gorman, was telling you in this 

26 Ticssage that Felix Rodriguez, who you had told him in a draft 



pnSSSIFIfO 



350 



rn 



yiussifiti! 



11 



1 cable had high-level contacts at the White House, Department of 

2 State, and Department of Defense, was coming down committed to 

3 assisting the Nicaraguan Resistance. Isn't that something that 

4 would have stood out in your mind at that time, in light of the 

5 Congressional prohibition? 

6 (Pause) 

7 A Well, I'm not quite sure how to answer the question except 

8 to say that the whole Felix Rodriguez thing was sort of a unique 

9 arrangement, and I didn't feel as though I was trying to train 

-10 him on this thing. The idea was for him to talk to the CINC and'fy>efc 

11 talk to the Ambassador before we did anything that related in any 

12 sort of official contact with Felix Rodriguez. 

13 Q Weren't you assigned to monitor Rodriguez's activities once 

14 he got to El Salvador? 

15 A Yes, in a sense I was. 




that time wasn't the American Embassy and the 

21 Military'fcoup providing Rodriguez with logistical and 

22 administrative support? 

23 A Of a limited nature. Mostly designed around his personal 

24 security. 

25 Q And- on whose orders were you doing that? 

26 A Whose orders. Certainly the Ambassador was aware of it. I 



fllUSSIFIFD 



SSI 



yi^CLASSiflES 



mean I'm not trying to shirk the responsibility for what I did, 

no. 

Q But Ambassador Pickering was aware of it? 

A I don't know what exactly Ambassador Pickering was aware of 

as far as Felix Rodriguez. I know Ambassador Corr knew that he 

had, for example, he had an Embassy radio in case he had a 

problem. 




352 



WlKSIfP 



13 




1 Q 

2 A 

3 Q Alright. Did you understand from this message that, to the 

4 extent we can read it if you look at the same part of the telex 

5 that talks about Rodriguez's primary commitment, that you were 

6 being asked to put Rodriguez in touch with that unit, or to make 

7 him aware of its capabilities in connection with Rodriguez's own 

8 commitment and interests? 

9 A Yea, but, again, you know that organization didn't have any 

10 responsibilities that I was aware of that went outside of El 

11 Salvador that had anything to do with the Contras. 

12 Q Well, le t me ask you this. . . 

13 A That was^^^^^^^^^^^^Hthat probably aligned very closely 

14 to the kind of thi ng that Rodrigu ez h ad done in Vietna 
15j 

16 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas 

17 the ideal kind of unit to follow-up on an operation like that, 

18 and I think that's the reason why he suggested he get linked up 

19 with'tjf^; and I did that. 

20 Q Let ■• just ask that this next document be marked as Steele 

21 Exhibit 3. This document, for the record, is a 2-page 

22 backchannel message and appears to have come from Ambassador 

23 Pickering. And again. Colonel, is that your handwriting 

24 indicating that you wanted this document filed for you? 

25 A Yes. 

26 Q Alright. Take a moment please to look at the message and 




353 



mmm 



14 

1 see if you recall it at all. Were you at this meeting between 

2 Ambassador Pickering and Rodriguez — is this the meeting you 

3 referred to before? 

4 A This is the nneeting I referred to. 

5 Q Now looking at that, plus whatever you independently recall, 

6 can you tell us what happened at the meeting among the three of 

7 you at the Embassy? 

8 A Okay. The background to this was again reservations on 

9 everybody's part — myself. Ambassador Pickering and Gorman, at the 

10 idea of Felix Rodriguez coming to El Salvador.. Things started to 

11 turn around, though, when he went down and talked to General 

12 Gorman. 

13 g When Rodriguez had talked to Gorman? 

14 A Yea. "AlQikknau, if you know Gorman, this message he sent, 
is which is consistent with the general feeling that Z got from him 

16 is that he was impressed by Rodriguez as opposed to saying this 

17 is a dumb Idea, which is the kind of the initial impression that 

18 I got from General Qornisn. And, AmbasMdor Pickering was still 

19 very, you know, kind of, what's the word — he was very suspicious 

20 of having. Bodrigues come. Ii\ the note here about the "no pay 
-n roercenass" Is sort of a sme si ( s >9 » reference to Rodriguez 

22 because I think v both, I and the Ambassador, talked about him 

23 and this probaBly .went- ^ . Jie came up and in «^ 

24 meeting he sat dowfi with AittMssador Pickering' and my sense was 

25 that he kind of turned him around. ^ 

26 g Rodriguez turned Gorman around? 



ONcussife 



354 



mmu 



15 



1 A Well, he turned Pickering around. And I have to admit he 

2 turned me around. Because he laid out a tactical scheme that I 

3 thought would work in El Salvador. 

4 Q This wast 

5 A Yea. And the net result of that meeting, and I didn't know 

6 quite frankly; I didn't remember tha* this all had been recorded 

7 in message traffic. But that's a fairly accurate record of it, 

8 and as you can see, you know, Pickering basically came on line 

9 and said it ' s probably a good idea the guy sticks around and 

10 works with the Salvadorans. -.. .^^,— ^~ 

11 Q Did Felix teli you how he, did he say — what kind of support 

12 rather — I know nothing abcait military matters, so if I ask a 

13 questian in a way that's scre*^, I a^^ogize, but you correct me., 

14 Did you tell you what kind of support he wouli^ ne«(| from the 

15 MILGROUP or the Embassy? 

16 A Not really. He came in and said that he would like to have 

17 a chance to go out and work with! 

18 well. And th^, you know, he basically ha^a little pitch that 

"~ * 

19 he gave— he had a little book and he had pictures in it and s^on 

20 and it w«a kind of persuasive. And so what I^^-^^iJ^ii, the answer 

21 was, tb^^Xony-winded answer was, no, he really didn't outline his 

22 requirements although he outlined what the concept was and 

23 implicit in that were obviously that he 
24| 
2; 
2« 




355 



ymssiRM 



16 



1 Q Do yout remember, Colonel, if he said anything at that time 

2 about his interests in assisting the FDN? 

3 A He never said anything to me. As a matter of fact, as this 

4 message here would suggest, there's no mention in it. — 

5 Q Steele Exhibit 3. 

6 A ...because nobody was really thinking in those terms, 

7 except, I guess General Gorman, when he wrote the message back. 




9 ^^^ 

10 Q Do you remember. Colonel, Felix Rodriguez's first successful 

11 mission in El Salvador? 

12 A Very clearly. 

13 Q Could you tell us about that? 

14 A Well, successful. You want to hear about the unsuccessful 

15 and then the successful one? 

16 Q Sure. Do both. First, the bad news and then the good news. 

17 Do it the way my wife tells ■• about the latest bills. 

18 A The bad news for Felix Rodriguez when he first s tarted out 

19 was--I took him over and introduced him toH^^^^land they 

20 basicall^l «»ve him the cold shoulder. They said we're not 

21 interest^at and they had thair own agenda, and they pretty much 

22 saw him as an intruder and didn't really want, they felt as 

23 though they knew^how to do this kind of thing and they didn't 

24 need somebody to coa%Jik and telling them. Which was probably 

25 kind of a way of describe the whole attitude 

26 had] 



356 



ONCUSSIFEO 




And they 
did an intell assessment and they came up with a plan, and they 
went out and tried to execute it and it was a disaster, 

basica] 




it was a fiasco. And they Ceune back in and I got kind of an 
assessment of what happened, and I sat down with the Coramande| 

ind Felix Rodriguez was there and I said, "You 
know, as individuals you guys are great pilots, but I said, you 
know, this is really a lousy operation." And they basically, I 
mean my Mnae was that they didn't want it to succeed because 

they saw this as .an- view of how to do things. And, 

while we were sitting there talking about it, they got a report 




got another report here, so we'll go out and try it again 



imssiFifn 



357 



ONCLASSlFiEO 




1 and you can grade us when we get back." You know, kind of a 

2 snide way of saying that this was all a bunch of bullshit. In 

3 any case they did take off 

4 I 
5 
6 

7 ^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^Vso it was sort of an immediate 

8 success, and that was the beginning of Felix Rodriguez's 

9 ascendance to great favor with 

10 Q This document's to be marked Steele Exhibit 4, from Don 

11 Gregg congratulating Felix and I guess you on that first mission. 

12 A I'm glad you're showing me the letters now before you ask me 

13 about them. 

14 Q Well, you know we vary it... 

15 A Yeah, I remember the letter. 

16 Q What is the note that Gregg has penned in on the front page, 

17 "Tell Felix not to take too many chancesl", was Rodriguez a great 

7 

18 risk taker 



'&^ 



19 A Yeah, he is a great risk taker. I'm sure sure... oh, this is 

20 the letter. 

21 Q What It appears to be, Steele Exhibit 4 is a letter to you 

22 from Don Gregg dated April 29, 1985, and attached to it, and I 

23 don't know whether he sent you that or not, I was going to ask 

24 you. This is how we got the letter... 

25 A I didn't get this... "^ 

26 Q from Don Gregg to Felix Rodriguez describing, I believe, the 



lINCIiSSIFlEB 



358 



mumm 



19 



successful mission that you just told us about. 

A Yeah. I didn't, this was the only thing that I saw that I 

recall. ^ A, V^iS- 

Q That is the letter to you from Don Gregg? I^kay. Now, if I 

could jump ahead for a moment. Colonel, sticking with Felix 

Rodriguez, to 1986. Let me first ask you — do you know a 

gentleman named Robert Dutton? Right? 

A Yes. 

Q And who did you understand him to be, and what did you 

understand his role to be| 

A He came down, the date I don't recall, it was in '86, early 

'86. And Felix Rodriguez got in touch with me and 




it would be a good idea if I met with him. And so I did. It 
wasn't clear to me at that point exactly what his role was 

^^^^^^ :hat he had just 
retired from the Air Force, I believe. 




OElASSiBEO 




don't 

know if 3^B»'ve talked to Felix Rodriguez, but the guy is — I mean 
his hatred is Castro and he's strong ant i- Communist and anything 
he could do to assist, I think against the Nicaraguans or the 
Cubans, he would do it, I 




Did you know Colonel Gadd to be involved with that private 



ONClASSiFiEO 



360 



organization? 



mtamim 



land others, but 



1 

2 A I ' ve heard Gadd ' s name| 

3 I don't know Gadd. 

4 Q You never met him to your knowledge? 

5 A To my knowledge I have not met him. 

6 Q Did you know a fellow named Bobby Owens, 0-W-E-N-S, did you 

7 meet him? 

8 A I met a guy named Bob Ower 

9 Q That's right. 

10 A The one Owen that I met, I met Owen one time, who was a 

11 fellow who had introduced himself to m a s a guy who w as with the 
.^r2 humanitarian assistance thing. I saw him^^^^Hj^^Mone time, a 

5 -minute meeting, that was the extent of my dealings with him. 




361 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



' 




# 


■^^ 


- i--.^ 


^ 




^m^ - 



wsEism 



362 




OJtay. Let me dec me my relationship with North. 
Q Please. 

A As I said before, ^ had a lot o£ people that, as a MZLGROUP 
Commander, that I was dealing with. The guyyjtihen I'dUgo to 
Washington and I ' d try to go abott^l^jMyke every 6 months , perhaps 
every quarter, depending on wlWEV w^were in the budget cycle. 
There were a number of pfttpl* that I felt that was absolutely 
critical that I talk to and_this was related to landing for 
El Salvador. One of those was within OOD, specifically General 
Gast in DSAA; within the State Department, Abrams, Walker- -they 
were big players — Snyder, in terms of us getting resources that 
we needed. And at the NSC, North. And whenever I v.'ent to 
Washing^flkX'd try to talk to one or all of those people. 
Particu^lP^ if we were in a period where we were fighting for 
resources which was almost all the time. So Z had occasions to 
talk to North, and it was not related to the Contras. In fact, 
my first contact with him had no thing to d o with Contra s, they 
were related to this.i 




Kussife 



363 



icusm 






WUSSffl 



364 



ONCUSSIfiEO 




Did you find that curious? 
A Listen, I mean the conversations with Oliver North, you 
know, I mean I don't taow if you've ever had any, but I mean.. 
Q As soon as they tepeal the Bill of Rights . . 

(Laughter) -^ -^ 

Q We'll have one.. 

A Raz^JI^ did you did get a chance to have a conversation that 
lasted niAs than about 3 minutes. The guy was like a.. 
Q Like talking to Arthur Liman. . 

A like a one-armed paper hanger, you know he's talking on this 
phone— he's talking on that phone.s He's in, he's &kt. So you 
know I . . 
Q But in between hanging the wallpaper, did he tell you at any 



DNCUSSIFIED 



mms&\m 




Q Okay. Did you, on your visits to Washington, keep Elliott 
Abrams or Bill Walker advised at all about what Rodriguez was 
doing? 

A < 1 — I — "*'^TrT" ^^' T — •* *•* " conversation with him about 

Rodriguez, but it's possible. 

Q Well, did you keep Abrants and Walker advised, generally. 



A I may have discussed it with Walker on an occasion, but most 
of that I pretty much left to the Ambassador, because he was 

dealing with them pretty much on a, probably a weekly basis, at 



!ims.^ifirfi 



UNCLASSiJIES 




Q Your reports were then solely about El Salvador as you 

recall it to wal)ier and Abrams? 

A That's my reco llection . 

Q How about 

to Washington? 

A I never went to see him directly, but he was at a number of 

meetings that I've attended. 



Did you meet with him when you came 




367 




22 A I knew you were going to ask me that. (Pause) You got it 

23 there... 

24 g I don't know if I h«ve it^there. . .X-Jtave some messages. 

25 (Laughter) I mean if you think I can decipher these, to me 



,26 they're still in code, but<<^-»- 



3^ qo) c< 



kaac/ 



iiNCLASSIflEO 



Those, that was kind of it. 

Q I have in my hand what appear to be copies of some messages 
that went over that device. And I'd like to just go over some of 
them with you and see if you can help me understand them. Okay. 
Let me give you this one first and ask the reporter to mark it as 
Steele Exhibit 6 for identification. Do you see the number RD, 

10 you can ignore it- -those are numbers we put on. Thi» document 

11 happens to bear number RD triple zero three eight seven. It a 
message that I believe reprinted^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^sent by 

13 Bob, who I have reason to -believe in this instance, means Bob 
-*4 Dutton. And it starts at the top, "you~need to pass all info re/ 

15 tasking problems to Steele. He is now the^^^^^HuSG 

16 representative with interest in our operationsj 

17 Why don't you just take a look at that. 

18 (Pause) 




(TAgE PDIA'i) 



20 Q . . .«tlch is numbered RD triple zero three eighty four begins 

21 the saroa WKf as Steele Exhibit 6, only it continues with a 

22 message for Steele from McAllister, which you'll see mid-way down 

23 the page. - - 

24 A Okay, I have not seen this message. 

25 Q Alright. That was referring to Steele Exhibit 6. Now take 

26 a look at Steele Exhibit 7. 



mmMiB 



(Pauae) 



UNCLASSinEO 



54 



2 Q Steele Exhibit 7, as I said Colonel, begins the same way as 

3 6, which you just read, then as you see it goes on and says for 

4 Steele from McAllister. Did you know a McAllister? 

5 A McAllister was, I found this out later, was Dutton. Same 
6 
7 




370 



ElA»0 




Q Okay, let me show you another one. But before we do, let's 
stick with Exhibit 7 and 6 for a moment. At the beginning of 
these messages, whomever is being addressed, and we can't tell 
from the sheet. It starts, "you need to pass all info ref 
tasking ^mimuM to Steele. He is now the^^^^^HUSG 
repreM^KiXSJ'^^^ interest in our operat ions . "j 




Well I'm not sure what that means. 






371 



UNCIiSSiREB 



56 



^and yes, it's true that I did have interest in their 

operation. 

Q Then if you look, continuing in Exhibit 7, there are 

numbered paragraphs before the message to you. There is a number 

3, and it says, "Steele may be able to help with^^^Hreguests 

and clarifications of mission param eters. .u se him.. he is a 

friend. 




UNCLASSIRE 



372 



fiPf hWmn 



No. 



No communications with him? 

No. 

Okay. Let me show you this document, and asJc. . 

I don't remember ever talking to him at all. In fact I 
didn't even, I didn't even know his name until the Tower people 
told me his name as part of the questioning process. 
Q So to the best of your knowledge you never met| 
A That's right. 
Q Colonel, let me please show y ou Exhibit 8. RD trip le zero 
three eight three. 




373 



mam^s 




We 11 take a break 



OriOiilSSiFlEO 



374 



UNCUSSiFiEO 



59 
(R«aHn after break) 

2 Q I hava. Colonel, ^^better copies of the document that was 

3 previously marked as Steele Exhibit 2, and I'm just going to ask 

4 the reporter to mark this better copy as Steele Exhibit 2A, and 

5 ask you to look at it briefly, I'm not going to ask you to 4maA- 
Sre-testify, but just to confirm for me for the record that it 

7 appears to be the same message as the one previously marked as 

8 Steele Exhibit 2. I believe it to be the same and, only easier 

9 to read. 

10 A Yeah, it looks the same to me to me too. 

11 Q Okay, that's Steele Exhibit 2A. 

12 (Pause) ^^^■^_^-.^— ^»_ 

Q Now, getting to these messages^^^Hj^^^^^^^^^Hj I 

14 want to show you a few more, if I may. Okay. This next one I'll 

15 ask the reporter to mark as Exhibit 9. I'm going to show it to 

16 you. Colonel, it's from Bob — the document does not indicate to 

17 whom Bob is speaking on this message, but when you look at it, 

18 you'll see references to your name, and my question is really 

19 going to be not whether you recall seeing this specific message, 

20 but wh«lfl^ you have any recollection of the subject matter that 

21 the roefl^^B discusses . And while the Colonel is reading it, this 

22 is Bates number RO triple zero three eight eight. Exhibit 

23 appears to be August 22, 1986. 

J5 A Kaye delay J T. . haven ' t seen the message before as to the 

26 content. (Pause) Well you know these are the same kind of 



mmsim 



375 



ONCLASSIFiEO 



60 




Q 

G-O-O-D? 

A Bill, I don't. But I remember that Goode was a name that 

North used. 

Q How did you learn of that cryptonym for North? 

A He told me he was using that 



mmwB 



376 



UNCLASSIFIED 



61 

1 Q Did ;pl tell you when he was using it? Or why. Did he tell 

2 you, did Ndrth tell you on what occasions he would use the 

3 cryptonytn Goode? 

4 A No, he just said that if, that he would be using the name 

5 Mr. Goode, and that, I got the impression that he was using it 

6 for not; I mean I would call his office and his secretary would 

7 say, "Mr. Goode is not in." You )uiow, I meem.... 

8 (Laughter) It wasn't a great secret. 

9 Q (Laughter) Excuse me. Did Mr., did North tell you at any 

10 time that if you got a message that referred to Mr. Goode, or was 

11 said to be coming to you from Mr. Good that you should understand 

12 that it was coming to you from Ollie North? 

13 A Did who tell me that? 

14 Q North. Or anyone tell you that if you received the message 

15 from a Mr. Goode it was coming to you from Oliver North? 

16 A Well, I guess, yeah that %#ould follow. He said he was using 

17 the name. 

18 Q Did you ever hear the name, Copp? C-O-P-P? 

19 A Ho. ,.g» only time I heard it was %^en I was at the Tokwr 

20 Coranls^l^^K Tlkey asked me the question about the name Copp. But 

21 I nev«s(HH It before. 

22 g And you never received messages from someone identifying 

23 himself as Copp? 
A H if Mj ) No. 

25 g Okay. Let me ask you if you recall, then we'll go back and 

26 look at some more of these messages. A conversation with Dutton 



UNCLASSIREO 



377 



UNClASSIFiti 



62 

1 in early Aagust of 1986, informing you that the bosses or the 

2 chiefs of the private organization had decided to keep three 

3 aircraft in place, and as)cing you to inf onri^^^^^^^^^H the 

4 three aircraft of the private organization were going to remain 

5 in place. Or anything to that effect? 

6 A Well I only remember two meetings with Dutton. 

7 Q Alright. You told us about the first. Tell us about the 

8 second.. 

9 A The second meeting was a meeting in Washington. (Pause) 

10 I'm trying to remember exactly what the content of that was. I " 

11 know it had to do with — I'm sure it had^to do with the continuing 

PrvbJft'is ut""^ j= --21. ;" 

12 ^ .et Felix Rodrigu<a!, and also I know- that it had to do with. 

13 I got the impression that Dutton was, that they were considering 

14 cancelling their operation, but that.. - 

15 Q Let me see if I can refresh your recollection with this 

16 document, which I'll ask the reporter to mark as Ste«le 

17 Exhibit 10. It's Ba^ea_iiumbered RD tripl« tero th ree nin e four. 

18 Appears to be dated August 20, 1986. 

19 ^^^^^^^^^^K^^m ^^^ there's a little handwritten 

20 abovet^^^toedtext which reads "to Goode". But why don't you 

21 take a l^yat Exhibit 10, Colonel, and see if it refreshes your 

22 recollection of your second meeting with Dutton? 

3 CJ ape uff! delay in Pegiftnlftg) -4, (jUkos Is btci< ^ 

24 g I believe your question was who was Dick. I believe it's; I 

25 mean I; the fun part of this is that I get to ask the questions. 

26 (Laughter) But I think that, I think that Dick is Secord, 



UNCIASSIRE 



378 



lINCUSSiFlB 



63 



1 although I'm sure that's who it means here. 

2 (Pause) 

-* Q Does this refresh; does it ^ refresh you on what you and 

4 Dutton discussed. 




379 






^^ 



380 



ONCLASSIFiEO 




23 Q lir Exhibit 10 you notice at the end 

24 there's a suggestion that the person to whom the message is 

25 addressed, and I believe simply from the fnencil note at the top, 

26 that this note was addressed to North- it says, suggest you talk 



yiiiSSIFlEO 



381 



wussife 



1 to Steele and confirm that we are going after the CIA plan and 

2 will advise him, close quote. 




5 
6 

7 ~Q Okay. 

8 A I think, I don't remember.... 

9 Q Does Exhibit 10 refresh your recollection that you're 

10 meeting with Dutton was around the middle of August 1986? 

11 A That would have been about the right timefreune. I was in 

12 Washington I know with General Vidas, Administrator of Defense — 

13 came up here on a sort of semi-official visit and.... 

14 Q And where did your meeting with Dutton take place? 

15 A In a hotel that I was staying at. 

16 Q Do you remember which hotel that was, by any chance? 

17 A The Watergate, I think. 

18 Q That's okay. (Laughter) This is nothing like Watergate. 

19 The; waa any, was anyone at the meeting other than you and 

20 Dutton? 

21 A No. J\iat the two of us. 

22 Q Do you remember a meeting on any occasion, or in that time 

23 period, with Dutton and Bob Earl? 

24 A I never met with Bob Earl and Dutton together. 

25 Q Did you have meetings with Bob Earl? Alone? 

26 A Yes. In fact I found myself talking to Earl probably when I 



mmim 



382 



UNCUSSIREO 



67 



1 went to Washington more than I did North because he was always 

2 you know gone or something. Earl was there. 

3 Q So on the occasions you saw Earl that was in the North suite 

4 at the Old Executive Office Building? Or the North's, the 

5 offices? You never met with Earl outside those offices? 

6 A No. 

7 Q And did you only see him alone on those occasions when North 

8 was not there? 
A Yes. 




mimm 



^ 



1 next exhibit as Steele 10. (Reporter: 11) Eleven, rather. 



^^ 




384 



UNCLASSIFicO 






wsmm 



385 



yMMSSIPiEO 




19 meeting he had attended in Washington at which concerns which had 

20 been traapaltted by Felix Rodriguez were raised and set out by 

21 Don Gregg?. 

22 A Yeah, in fact I was at the same meeting. 

23 g You were at that meeting; that was in Gregg's office? 

24 A Yes. 

25 Q August 12, '86. 

26 A I assume that's; I was at a meeting where that was .... 



386 



mumrE 



71 



1 Q And Ambassador Corr was there as well? 

-2 A jjAintiy^ Yes, sir. 

3 Q ^^^^^^^Hwas there? Do you recall? 

4 A Yeah, I think he was. 

5 Q And do you remember that Bob Earl was there? 

6 A < faintl y ) Bob, yes. . 

^7 Q How about Bob Burkhardt--did you )tnow him?' He was ther^"fb«- 

3 Was William Walker there from the State Department, as you 

9 recall? 

10 A Yes, I think so. 

11 Q Okay. Anyone else that you recall? 

12 A Don Gregg. 

13 Q Don Gregg. Anyone else? 

14 A That's it. 

15 Q Give us your best recollection of what transpired at that 

16 meeting. Let me stop that. Before you do that- -how did, how 

17 were you asked to come to this meeting. How was the meeting set 

18 up? 

19 A Well I was in Washington with the Ambassador and I'd have to 

20 go back aid check the calendar but I think it was the same time 

21 that th« mnister of France was in Washington. I think we were 

22 all there together. And said it was a meeting of 

23 opportunity. . .and it was an opportunity to raise some of the 

24 issues because Felix Rodriguez had had; well these kinds of 

25 things were surfacing. And it looke^a s though t here was a 

26 potential confrontation brewim^^^^^^^^^^^B This was a way 




387 



72 

1 of just Jcind of bringing the thing out, talking about it and 

2 seeing what the implications were. 

3 Q So you were asked by Gregg to attend? 

4 A Well I was with Ambassador Corr; he just took me with him 

5 when he to the meeting. 

6 Q Now tell me what happened at the meeting, as best you 

7 recall. 

8 (Pause) 

9 A It was not a long meeting. It was; one of the issues that 
'10 was discussed was this issue of the airplanes. That tht s ■ 

. 11 /tl 1 nf er-rutJLiulU confrontation was brewing and that we ought to be 

12 sensitive to that. Also concern that Felix Rodriguez was kind of 

13 at odds with the private organization, I guess is the best way to 

14 put it. Those were kind of the two central things that I recall 

15 in the meeting. Things that I remember from it? 

16 Q Sure. ^^^^ 

17 A I remember^^^^Hhe was critical of the private 

18 organization. He said that as far as he was concerned that there 

19 wasn't, they weren't going to be a player in the new regime after 

20 it came on board. . 

21 g Meaning when the CIA took over? 

22 A Yeah. 
'23 (J 



V Yeah. 

-24 A »,^North wasn't there because he was, I don't know where he 

25 was, he was going 

-26 Q k MR. KREUZER: Who wasn't there? 



388 



UNClASSIfSl) 



73 

1 A Oliver North. 

2 Q MR. BELNICK: Did anyone say; what was the reason expressed 

3 for disappointment that he wasn't there? 

4 A Well obviously this was an area he had been deeply 

5 interested in. 

6 Q Did Gregg say he was disappointed that North wasn't there 

7 or.. 

8 A I don ' t know . . 

9 Q But, just the sense.. 

10 A he may well have said that. 

11 Q Alright. What else do you remember. Let me try and focus 

12 on the question. What did; did Gregg; what was Gregg's position 

13 at the meeting. Was he simply articulating the issues? 

14 A I think what; Gregg was concerned about Felix Rodriguez. I 

15 mean that was the sense that I got, and he felt as though, you 

16 know, Felix was sort of under attack by the private organization, 

17 and that he was, he had; I think that Don Gregg said that Felix 

18 had talked to him and I think he recalled that you know that 

19 Felix had brought out some things about me.mbers of the 

20 organiz«Men and the fact that this was a potential 

21 embarraaMint, and that sort of thing, and that, and I think what 

22 Gregg was trying to do is, you know what are the implications to 

23 this, what should we do, and that sort of thing. 

24 Q Let me follow that up. When, in connection with Gregg's 

25 comment that Felix had expressed concern about some of the 

26 players in the organization--did Gregg give you any names? Let 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



389 



74 

1 me be specif ic--do you recall him mentioning Secord, Clines, Chi- 

2 Chi Quintero, any of those? 

3 A I don't think Gregg got into those details. I mean I have 

4 heard all those names before, but it wasn't clear; I don't 

5 remember those names coming out in that meeting at all. 

6 Q How about Ed Wilson group — something like that? 

7 (Pause) 

8 A Part of my problem is that, the names that I've heard 

9 change . . 

10 Q Sura, it's hard.. 

11 A Mixing with the names that were there. I don't know if it 

12 was Wilson or who it was, but there was some reference back to 

13 the Libyan problem and that sort of thing; but I, you know I'd 

14 really be, I'd be doing somebody a disservice if I were to put 

15 their name in here, because I'm not sure. 

16 Q I don't want you to do that, and I'm just seeing if any of 

17 what I say refreshes or prompts a recollection. If it doesn't, 

18 you know by all means, tell me. Did, let me go through some of 

19 the people who were there. Did you speak at the meeting? 

20 A Yes. 

21 Q What you recall that you said? 

22 A I told them that, I think as I recall, I was the one who 

23 laid out the problem with the airplanes; 

24 ^^^^^^^^^^^H And that we were in for a confrontation and that 

25 you know somebody ought to be thinking about what we ought to do 

26 when you know this thing kind of blows up and who the airplanes 



390 



■ ■ 75 

1 belong to. That, I think that was really the only thing that I 

2 said. 

3 Q Did you address the issue of the.. 

4 A And I didn't have a solution, either, quite frankly. I mean 

5 I didn't know where we were going with this airplane thing, too. 

6 You know what I would have, what I wanted to have happen was I 

7 wanted them to turn the airplanes over to the Contras, too. 

8 Q Did you address the issue of friction between Felix and the 

9 private organization? 

10 A Well, ^ think that was raised; I joined in the conversation- 

11 cr. zY 
12 
13 

14 And that there was friction. So I guess the answer... 

15 2 How about the g-uestion of the nature of the guys involved in 

16 the private organization. Did you make any comments on that 

17 issue? 

18 A No, I didn't. Because I didn't know. 

19 Q Ambassador Corr. Do you recall if he spoke at the meeting? 

20 (Pause) 

21 A Ke didn't say a whole lot, except you know he said he wanted 

22 to; in a way it was really kind of the Ambassador's idea, I 

23 think, to get together and talk about it. That's ray 

24 recollection, and I think he talked to Gregg and said he'd like 

25 to come over and talk to him because he kept getting these vibes 

26 from me essentially that there was a problem; and so he talked 




391 



WiSSKB 



1 about that, but you know he didn't lay out any kind of plan or 

2 anything like that.. 

3 Q Or express a viewpoint? 

4 A No, I don't remember if he ever... 

5 Q Was anyone taking notes at the meeting? 

6 A Nobody was designated that way. 

7 Q Did you see anyone taking notes? 

8 A No. 

9 Q You didn't take notes? 

10 A No. 

11 Q Did Earl speak? 

12 (Pause) 

13 A If he said anything, he sure didn't say very much. I 

14 remember he was sitting over on the right-hand side and he was 

15 very quiet. 

16 Q Was there any discussion in the course of this meeting of 

17 North's role in, with the private organization? 

18 A Not that I remember. 

19 Q Did Bxirkhardt speak? 

20 A I ^fc't thi nk he said a word. 

21 g ^^^^^^H do you recall anything else he said about his 

22 criticism of the private organization and his statement that 

23 private regime would not be adopted, if you will, by the CIA? 

24 A That was the only thing I remember him saying. He may have; 

25 there was some casual conversation that went on afterward, but I 

26 don't remember anything--that was the part that registered with 



iiliiiSSIFIFn 



392 



77 

1 me. 

2 Q Do you recall any discussion at the meeting of the concern 

3 that Felix had expressed from time to time, that the Contras were 

4 being ripped off by the private organization? 

5 A Yeah. 

6 Q What was that discussion? 

7 A Well just basically what you said.. 

8 Q Who raised it? Gregg? 

9 (Pause) 

-10 A . lather Gregg or the Ambassador. 

11 Q Tell me what you recall being said on that subject. 

12 A Well it was; it was part of the same discussion about, you 

13 know, the scrupulous characters and that sort of thing. I can't 

14 remember you know this business of the hand grenades costing X 

15 number of dollars when purchased, and so much being charged for 

16 them later. So I don't know if that was part of it; it's running 

17 together in my mind, but that was sort of the implication to me 

18 that Felix had had attacked the private organization in terms of 

19 the maintenance of their aircraft; what was going on with the 

20 money and that scrupulous characters were involved too. 

21 Q Did Qfgg indicate whether he was reporting, or had reported 

22 any this information to the Vice President? 

23 A He certainly didn't say anything that I know of. 

24 Q Did he indicate what the Vice President's view's were at all 

25 or position on any of this? 

26 A No, in fact I don't even remember the Vice President's name 



78 

1 coming up in the discussion. 

2 Q How long did the meeting last? (Pause) Approximately? 

3 A 30-minutes, maybe. 

4 Q Were there any decisions reached? Any consensus formulated 

5 at the meeting? 

6 A The only thiiig that really came out of there, and I'm not 

7 sure if it was any, if it was formal, but I certainly kind of 

8 took it away that I talked to Felix and see if I could, if we 

9 could get him you know to stay away from the private organization 

10 and just kind of get him away from them and that we were going to 

11 work on this problem with the aircraft and try to formulate a way 

12 to deal with it when it happened. 

13 Q When the meeting adjourned- -did you stay around for any time 

14 and talk to anyone.. 

15 A No we had to go somewhere else. I can't remember exactly 

16 what was going on, but the meeting ended and we had to leave 

17 then. I left with Ambassador Corr. 

18 Q Do you recall whether Dutton was in town at the seune time as 

19 this meeting? 

20 A Well I think that the meeting that I had with Dutton was 

21 part of thia same trip, but I'm not sure. 

22 Q Okay. 

23 A It was in; it was close. It was within several weeks 

24 anyway. 

25 Q Do you know the name Olmstead? (Pause) Do you remember at 

26 any time meeting with somebody who was introduced to you as 



394 



muw"' 



79 

1 Mr. Olmstead? Do you recall meeting someone in connection with 

2 the private organization at any time while you were in 

3 El Salvador who had one eye? ^lay have been referred to as one- 

4 eye Jack? 



# 



5 A No. J .^\^- 



6 g Could we mark this next document as Exhibit 12? Exhibit 12, 

7 Bates stamped RD triple zero four oh two are several additional 
The first one at the top of the page appears to be 

9 dated August 13, and somebody had written in in pen from Bob 

10 Earl. Why don't you takf, a look at these message and. Colonel, - 

11 you'll see that you're referred to in the one at the top of the 

12 page. And possibly the one at the bottom if Jim is a reference 

13 to you. 

14 (Pause) 

15 Q Let's talk about the first one. Do you remember the subject 

16 matter at least of that message? 

17 A Okay. Alright, now, yeah. Originally.. 

18 Let me stop for a minute. Off the record before you do 

19 that. 

20 A Originally I, originally I wasn't going to meet with Dutton. 

21 And then L talked to the Ambassador and he said well, you know go 

22 ahead and meet with him. But you know and so that, and so I did 

23 reconsider the meeting. . 

24 Q You mean you weren't going to meet with him for the second 

25 time? 

26 A This was in Washington. The second meeting. 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



395 



mmmn 



1 Q Right. Okay. What about the other part of the message 

2 referring to: conduct emergency recall immediately, bring the 

3 maintenance and aircrews out of there quietly, etc. 

4 A Well I never seen that or heard of that before. 

5 Q Off the record. . e ka y , I 'ro so rrv ■ ,; , -f- ^ 

6 JV- 1 rnp'" '"la1 irt <-tA 1 lurchincT thing like this is not worth the 

7 effort and we're going to pull out; but I wasn't, I didn't know 

8 about that. 

9 Q Did you know somebody named or referred to as Bacon? 

10 A No. I don't know who that is. 

11 Q Alright. Take a look at the message at the bottom of the 

12 page which again has a pencil note from Rob Ea., which I think 

13 means from Rob Earl. And there 're references in that message to 

14 Jim. I don't know if that refers to you or not; I would just 

15 like you to tell me whether you can tell from the substance of 

16 the memo or the message whether you believe that that reference 

17 to Jim is a reference to Jim Steele. 

18 A I think it probably is. 

19 Q And reading the message, can you tell what the subject 

20 matter refars to? 

21 A Well I had indicated that that I wasn't going to meet with 

22 Dutton when I was in Washington. 

23 Q I' m looking at the part that says that a threat of a lawsuit 

24 against^^^^^^Hfor air piracy close quote. Do you recall such 

25 a lawsuit being threatened by someone? 

26 A I don't remember it, but you know there; these guys ...some 



ONCLASSIFIED 



UNCLASSIFIED 



81 

1 fairly outlandish things from time to time, and that doesn't 

2 surprise me. 

3 Q Do you remember them, them being the private organization 

4 people, at any point accusing Felix of having hijacked one of 

5 their airplanes? 

6 A Oh, yeah, they did that. That's true. 

7 Q Tell me about that. 

8 A I got this as I recall from Felix, but apparently Felix had 

9 gone over^^^^^H^Hon one of their aircraft and then they had 

10 claimed; no, wait a minute, maybe it was from Miiuni; I can't 

11 remember, but they had accused him of diverting one of th eir 

from site^^^^^^^^^^^^^P^P^Hand that 

13 he had, you know, he had hijacked it. 

14 Q And I take it that he denied that he had.. 

15 A Well, yeah, he did. I mean I felt like it was kind of, kind 

16 of silly. . 

17 Q Kind of what? 

18 A It was kind of silly. The accusation. But they were really 

19 down on Felix at that point. 

20 Q I'm looking at this bottom message again on Exhibit 12: the 

21 threat of a lawsuit against^^^^^^Hfor air piracy has 

22 apparently really poisened the atmosphere for Jim and for the 

23 Ambassador about the good intentions of the company; so this is 

24 as I understand it was som e kind of t hreat the private 
23 organization was making to^^^^^^^Und about suing him? 

26 (Pause) Which was causing you and Ambassador Corr problems? 



llNCLASSIflEfi 



397 



UNCLftSSihu 

82 

1 A Well this went back to the issue of who owned the airplanes. 

2 Q Okay. That's what I thought. Fine. Let me move along. 

3 Can we go off the record for a moment? 

4 A sure. c^,Je^l3 

5 Q I want to show you this. Please, Mr. Reporter, Steele 13, 

6 Bates numbered RD triple zero four oh. It's hard to see the 

7 date, but it's sometime in August though of 1986, and it's 

8 continuing about the air priracy lawsuit. Refers to a comment 

9 made to vp by Ollie, and there's the statement that this entire 

10 issue now borders on ridiculous. And then again near the bottom" 

11 of the message, says Udall and the other companies are perfectly 

12 legal in their activities and I will make this a m ajor issu e if 

13 Ambassador and Steele do not rectify matter with^^^^^^^B I will 

14 not permit Max to tear us up, so forth, signed Dick. I have no 

15 reason to believe you saw this message. Colonel Steele; I'm 

16 showing it to you as with the others to see if it triggers a 

17 recollection relating to this issue. 

18 (Pause) 

19 Q Had you ever heard the name Udall? Was that a company name 

20 you wer« familiar with? 

21 A No. Mil, no, I don't think so. I just always referred to 

22 him as private organization. I've heard it a number of times 

23 since... 

24 Q Right. Is this more of the same bickering between Max, the 

25 private organization^^^^^^^^l As best you can judge from 

26 reading it now? 



UNCIASSIHED 



398 



wmsifiE 



the plantation, those 




A Yeah, that's how I would read it, 
( Pause) 

Q Had you ever heard the term, J 
terms? (Pause) The ranch? 

A ^^^^^^^^B they referred to as; I'm not sure which one was 
ind which one was the plantation, but they had a name 
for that one; they also had a name for the airstrip they had in 
Ccjasta Rica. 

Q In Co/sta Rica, huh? Did you know who had built that 
airstrip in Co/stifi.Rica? 
A No. 

Q Did you )cnow anything about where this private organization 
was getting its money from? 
A Absolutely none. 

Q Had you ever heard that it was coming from any foreign 
governments in any way? I'm not referring to the diversion, 
alleged diversion issue with Iran, but did any; let me, let me 
bac)c up and clarify it. Had you ever heard that it was coming 
from private donors in the United States? Any of the funding 
with th* private organization? 

A Private donations is the way it was always, you know that, 
but as far was where it was coming from, I never did know, no. 





18 hear^hat^^^^^^^^^^^^M^^^™ had 

19 contribution for the benefit of th e Contras— not through 
2o^^^^^^^^Hbut that^^^^^^^Hwere 

21 assistance? 

22 A Max Gomez mentioned, but it was strictly in the rumor 

23 category. . 

24 Q Yeah.. 

25 A I mean it was nothing 

26 Q Excepting that it was in the rumor category, what was the 



mmmm 



400 



yiWSSIFlM 



rumor that Max told you he had heard? 

A That it was coming out of^^^^^^^^^^^^B I don't if it 

wasi 

Q Did he say how much he heard was coming? 

A Not to me. 

Q Did Max, or anyone else, tell you that they had heard that 

any other Governments were contributing, 

A No. 




Q With the different Contra factions? 

A Yeah. Not, he did not ask me to help him or try to engage 

in any U.S. assistance .... 

Q He didn't tell you about any fundraising activities that he 

was involved in for the Con, excuse me for the Contras? 

A No. Although it was sort of implicit; it sounded like he 

was, he was not only trying to raise money but trying to provide 

it . . .himself. 

Q Now, did he, when Singlaub came to El Salvador 

from prior testimony of yours--! understand tha^was m 
mid-1986. Does that still sound about right? 



ONeUSSIflfO 



401 



wmssffl 



86 

1 A Yeah, I don't remember the exact dates that he came through, 

2 but he came through, as I recall it was in '86, and he was 

3 trying; actually it turned out to be more of a sales pitch. He 

4 had a, had a woman with him.. 

5 Q Large, blond woman? 

6 A Yes. And then he had another guy who was an ex-helicopter 

7 pilot; he had gotten out of the Army and they were, they were 

8 looking; sh e was specifical ly interested in some business 

9 arrangement^^l^H^^^^^iover some aircraft parts and aircraft, 
10 and that sort of thing. 

Was the woman intoduced to you by name? 

She was. I don't remember her.. 

Barbara Studley? 

That's her, yeah. 

Do you remember the name of the gentleman who was with them? 

Besides Singlaub? 

Yeah. 

Uhm. (Pause) He was trying to sell a helicopter package to 

19 the Salvadorans. If I heard the name I might remember it. 

20 Q That one I can't help you with, I don't know if anyone here 

21 knows. This pilot.. 

22 A He was kind of a young guy, you know curly, dark curly hair. 

23 Q Did Singlaub tell you that he had been dealing with ac^ 

24 B<A€aa~ Pastora? 

25 A Yeah. 

26 Q What did he tell you about that? lIMni 

ulflL 





Q 




A 




Q 




A 




Q 




A 




Q 




A 



ra 



402 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 A He said that he had gone down to meet with Pastora and that, 

2 had secured an agreement with Pastora to rejoin, reunite with the 

3 other organizations. 

4 Q Did he happen to show you, tell you whether that agreement 

5 was in writing? 

6 A I think he told me it was. Although I don't remember; he 

7 might. I don't know. ... I don't remember if he showed me a 

8 paper. 

9 Q Did he show you the agreement that he entered into? 

10 Off the recor<^- the r eac a n . . . . 

11 (Pause) 

12 Q Did you meet Singlaub? 
Yeah. 

I understand that you also meet Dick Secord rt least once. 
Only once. 

That was in Salvador? 
That was in El Salvador. 
In what connection? 
He cam* through there on a quick trip. He was only on the 

20 ground, I. would guess for a very short time. And he met with the 

21 Anibassa4M(» kind of a courtesy call thing. I can't remember if 

22 North was with him or not. I think h»^was though. That's my 

23 recollection that North was with him and that he met with the 

24 Ambassador very short and he was gone. 

25 Q Did you learn on that occasion, and if I've asked you this 

26 before, I apologize--did you learn on that occasion or any other 



13 


A 


14 


Q 


15 


A 


16 


Q 


17 


A 


18 


Q 


19 


A 



UNCLASSIFIED 



403 



UNMSiflEO 



that Secord was involved with the private organization, as you 

refer to it? 

( Pause) 

A No. I had the sense that he was, but I never; I never 

pinned, he certainly didn't say he was, as I recall. And you 

know that the only time that he came to El Salvador. 

Q Did Felix ever tell you that Secord was involved. 

A Well he thought Secord was involved. 



Q Reaching the end--did anyone in the United States Government 

ever ask you to provide assistance the Contras while you were on 

mission in El Savador? 

A No. 

Q And I understand your testimony in general here today, and 

you correct me if I characterize it wrong that in what you did 

you attempted at all times to stay on the correct side of what 

the law was, as you understood it? 

A ( ^aiuLty ) That's what I tried to do. 

Q But 1-t was not an easy line always to walk. 

A It was not an easy line and it was, and I know you know, 

that sometimes I may appear that I'm not, I don't remember 

everything you've asked, but ke ep in mind that this 

I mean my principal job was fighting a war, at least 



wmm 



404 



--^ 



UNCMFiE 




Let's go off the record a moment. Ken, let me asJc you about 



24 this, and then I'll be able to wrap up.... 

25 Q Now mark as Exhibit 14 a document which bears the Bates 

26 stamps numbers RD triple zero three nine three and it's another 



mmm 



405 



IJHCLftSSIflEO 



couple of messages 



and I want to refer only 



to the first message on the page. Colonel. v«fhY don't you take a 
moment to read it. (Pause) ( T^^e d u lJii ' ) .!. have any idea what 




Q Let iM mark as this next exhibit. Exhibit 15. A document 
which has not Bates stamp number on it, but it is another message 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Colonel, I'll ask you to look at it; read 

it. 




UNCLASSIflE 



406 



UHWSSIBQ 



91 



1 Q Exhibit 15, somebody has penned in from Steele; let me just 

2 read it--from Steele retransmitted to Earl, 18 August, oh nine 

3 hundred. 

4 (Pause) 

5 

6, 
7 




Q Colonel, I have no further questions right now. Let me turn 
first to my House colleagues and see if they have any questions. 



BNCUSSiFIED 



407 




VU 



92 



BY MR. BALLEN: (€uiiV6rsacion rdlnr on cape trom this pomt 




408 



uHtussro 






\mtmsw 



409 



ONCLASSiREil 




SalvMoran military. '°"' °" """ ^' 



llUSSIFIFll 



410 



liNWSSiPit'J 




19 Q Do you know if North was ever at a meeting with anybody? 

.^ A well Itj 1 North cameflmH^Hseveral times; dates 

21 don't remember. He usually came down to; not usu ally, I guess he 

22 came down on one occasion I remember specif ically^^^^^|^Jpnd 

23 with either Walker or Elliott Ab rams—I don't remember which one. 

24 And they had a meeting; the y ^^^^^||^H ^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^°'^' ^ 

25 thin)^^^^^m^|B they had a 

26 Ambassador because it more convenient to, they could and just 



MiMSm 



411 



mmmm 



meet for a few minutes. And I remember that meeting. 



Jtmg? 



Were you, were you m part of that 
Yeah, part of it I was. 
And what discussions were had? 

The Ambassador gave them an update on what was going on in 
El Salvador. How the war was going. They gave an assessment of 

8 how they thought the funding for El Salvador was going to be and 

9 what they thought the chances of Congress passing the package for 
10 the Contras. That's what 
11 
121 



I remember. 



Would this be in the Spring of 1986' 
Probably early Summer wou] 




CUSSlfifO 



412 



mmm 



1 Q Were you present at the entire meeting or you said you 

2 participated in some of it. 

3 A I wasn't there for the entire meeting. I was in and out. 



9 Q No further questions. 



10 BY MR. BELNICK .i 

11 Q ...few questions then we'll wrap up. 

12 BY MR. LEON 

13 Q I have a few questions. 

14 BY MR. BELNICK 

15 Q You want to go n«f*t', or let John ask a few and then you ask 

16 a few? 

17 BY MR. LEON 

18 Q Doesn't matter to me. 

19 BY MR. BELNICK 

20 Q John, why don't you fire? Then we'll let Mr. Leon go in the 

21 ... cleanup position? 

22 BY MR. LEON 



23 Good enough. 



ONCUiSSlREO 



413 



1 BY MR. BELNICK 

2 Q Alright, John. 






BY MR. SAXON 




22 Q You had a deputy by the name of David Rankin at one point. 

23 Is that correct? 

24 A Not my deputy. He was the Air Force; my Air Force rep. 



leiissife 



414 



wussw 






^^^ 



I I 



p 



1, 

2| 

31 

4 

51 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

.20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 



Q Did you ever have any discussions regarding the private 

supply operations with Nester Sanchez? 

A (Pause) He was one of the people that I talked to when I 

went to Washington. He was, and I would deal with him as it 

related to specifically El Salv ador; but I certainly well may 

have aboutj^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^V I 

don't remember specifically, but it would have made sense for me 

to do that. 

Q Do you remember anything he might have said in those 

discussions himself? 

A He didn't give me any guidance at all. 

Q What about Noel Koch- -same question. 

A I don't think I know him. 

Q What about Mr. Armitage— Richard Armitage. H Jjm a t ) Did you 

have any conversations along these lines about private supply 

operations, either directly or as an indirect part of a 

discussion with any people in the Army hierarchy-Secretary 

Marsh, for example. 

A No. 

Q General Wickham? 



416 



( - .104 

1 A No. 

2 Admiral Crowe? 

3 A No. 

4 Secretary Weinberger? 

5 A ^o. 

6 Q Secretary Taft? 

7 A No. 

8 Q Mr. Weinberger's military assistant. General Powell? 

9 A No. 

10 Q Could you tell us in any way what kind of guidance or 

11 instructions you got from General Gorman regarding any activities 

Or ^ f\d\C(iC^ 

12 you had direct ^-cougH' dfeietes heaiJAj qmtMLir>f>ar )i^ regarding the 

13 private supply operations? 

-14 A fB auA u l I don't remember getting any guidance from him at 

15 all. 

16 Q Were there any negative admonitions — don't do this; don't do 

17 that, vis a vis the private supply operation? Same questions 

18 regarding General Galvin. 

■19 A '"— (P fl uaP ) The only thing; General Galvin was; the thing 

20 that I recall from him was that he said you know to be make sure 

21 t hat you d^gj^tj that you're careful ab out what you del 

22 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B I remember 

23 Q And what would you interpret that to mean? 

24 A Don't break the law. 

25 Would you be able in any way to date your conversations you 

26 might have had with Nestor Sanchez? 



417 



UKWSSlf! 



B 



105 



A (Pause) The most recent conversation I had with him was 
when I left, I guess this would have been in probably, I want to 
say late October; it seems to me, I made a trip to Washington I 
think in October. And then I was also in Washington in August, 
so it's possible; I'd have to go bade and you know check his 
calendar, but I you really you know you're barking up the wrong 
tree because he really he didn't do, he had nothing to do with it 
as far as I know. At least as it related to me. 
Q At one point I believe there was some threats on your life, 
and you moved your family out of El Salvador--what can you tell 

us about that? 

early ' 8 6 ^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^H I gotten some 
telephone death threats which I basically kind just kind of b lown 
off, but then I got a r( 




some discussion witr. the 
Ambassador at that point as to whether he wanted me to move; 
feeling was that that was probably a loser, it was better to, for 
me to stay in the house, that we'd go ahead and prove the 
defenses and that I'd send my family back to the States for a 
month or two until things cool down. And that's what we did. 
Q Okay. Does the name^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vring a bell with 



you? 



ONCUSSiFIED 



89.7.'^8 n-«8-l f, 



418 



mumm 




a 



is it; it's not a pronunciation problem is it. 



:^ 



BY MR. SAXON 



ad you ever had any dealings a John Hull in Central 
A 
srica? 

Not that I know of. 

Did you ever go to a farm home of someone who may have been 



A 

Q 

a John Hull, a farmer from Indiana? 



J-ir- A I don't remember anybody. 

12 Q Did you ever make any notes or MFRs from any of your 

13 discussions with Colonel North? 

14 A No. 

15 Q We know from what you've told Mr. Belnick that on some 

16 documents you wanted to keep you would put File for Me. S. Were 

17 there ever any notes, memoranda, correspondence, diaries or 

18 anything else about these operations that you would put into 

19 those files or any others? 

20 A No. I didn't keep any records of those; and again, this was 

21 really on the periphery for me. 



23 Q 



BY MR. BELNICK: 



Okay, Rich. 



WM^B 



419 



OilLASSIFIED 



BY MR. LEON: 



2 Q Yeah, I just have a few things. Colonel. Remember you were 

3 talking about a meeting with Mr. Gregg, Ambassador Corr, in 

4 Mr. Gregg's office--do you recall Mr. Gregg, or anybody, 

5 mentioned at the meeting Oliver North on a prior occasion 

6 confronting Felix about his conduct down there and admonishing 

7 him to become more conscientious about security and careful about 

8 what he said, with Dutton present? 

9 A With Dutton present? No. 

10 Q How about without Dutton present? 

11 A Yeah, in fact I don't remember that at all. Oliver North 

12 admonishing Felix? 

13 Q Uh-hum. To you know at the request of Dutton, to clean up 

14 his act and start becoming more security conscious. 

15 A I don't remember that. 

16 Q Was Sam Watson at that meeting? Gregg's deputy? If you can 

17 recall. 

18 A That's right Watson had taken as his; I just don't now. I 

19 don't remember. He might have been. I'm sure if you're asking 

20 me to renwmber if he was there. 

21 Q Has Felix at any time ever told you that that happened. 

22 That North sat him down in Dutton' s presence and admonished him 

23 for being a security risk? 
_i4 A Never. ( Tauaa) In fact, well.. 

25 Q Okay.. 



wmm 



420 



108 

1 A I would have thought that that would have been something 

2 Felix would have told me if that I had happened. I mean even the 

3 fact that he and Dutton and North together would have been a 

4 surprise to me. So I don't remember that at all. 

5 Q Why's that? 

6 A I just didn't; I never seen them together. 

7 Q But didn't you associate them as being people who would be 

8 in touch with one another; because of the resupply and North's 

9 involve, interest and involvement in resupplying? 

10 A Well you now it sort of seems that way now, but it didn't at 

11 the time.. 

12 Q Really? 

13 A The relationship didn't seem to be like that to me. 

14 Q What was your impression at that, at the time as to North's 

15 influence or involvement with Dutton and his operation? 

16 A My sense was that there was definitely contact there but 

17 they made a point of not you know, North^^ never told me about 

18 talking to Dutton. 

19 Q How about Dutton? Did he ever make it a point to you and 

20 tell you that you had been dealing with North or that North was 

21 helping him in any way? 

22 A NOj 
23 
2^ 
25| 
26 



421 



«VAS»8 






yHClASSlFIED 



422 



9 

10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 

19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 




Q Okay. With regard to the Boland question, so to speak--at 

some point somebody at the Defense Department must have informed 

you in some way, shape or form that because of the Boland 

Amendinent the Department of Defense, which you are a part of, 

could not be involved any way in the ovot a m ' the is that 

a safe statement? tBawrtl) Either in writing or oral? 

A Well, I'm not to try to hide behind anything like that.. 

Q No , no. . 

A Nobody, no the simple fact is nobody did. But you know. . 

Q If that's a fact, say it. That's alright. But, it's all 

hard for me to appreciate that because. . 



Well keep in mind. . 
You're not a lawyer. 

Well I'm not a lawyer, no. 



wussm 



423 



ONCUSSiFitO 



111 



Q And here's a law that that you're supposed to adhere to and 

a new law, and you're supposed to abide by it, right? 

A Well, it was very clear when I got there that we weren't 

providing anything for the Contras, this is '84. 

Q When you arrived? 

A When I arrived. . 

Q What month was that, if you can recall. 

A Well I got there in May; I'm not sure; there wasn't even an 

issue with the Contras as far as I was concerned. In fact I 

didn't, I didn't pay much attention to them. This whole thing 

didn't even surface for me until, until after the non-lethal bill 

was passed^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^H That's 

it became. 

Q The no-hope program, N-H-A-0? 

Yeah. 

Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance? 

Right. "^ 

Would you put that at the end of '8 5? 

I would put it, well for me it was earl y '86. 

Early '86. 




424 



ymss!Fi[B 



2 No. Okay. So in the NHAO program comes into, the 

3 humanitaria n program comes into effect 
4^^^^^^^H Was there anyone at that time from in your chain of 

5 command, let's say, who advised you that with regard to that 

6 program there are limits as to what you can or cannot do? 

7 A Well I was talking to the Ambassador.. 

i n f o rmed^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^^HH a nd 

10 what my intentions, and what I was doing and so on. And so I, 

11 certainly he gave me some guidance. 

12 g Now help me here a little bit.. 

13 A What was the guy's name.. 

14 2 Well yeah besides that. Where does he fit into your chain 

15 of command? 

16 A He's my boss. You know I mean I had about six different 

17 bosses and I.. "g gj. 

18 Q State Department representatives.. 

19 A Well he is the President's representative in El Salvador. 

20 He is my boss. You know and if it came push to shove he was guy 

21 you responded to. You know I also answered to General Gorman and 
-2-2 Galvin after him, t e tho ( s o meone -c owj liilia mdX. e 3 tduie inaudible 

23 gf o i. dlJuuL 3 wuiJii )-'. . . in utiaiyt! in G e iiLial Aiii e LJca ; I certainly 

24 answered to General Gast in the Pentagon. So it was not such a 

25 clear-cut chain of command. 



yi^CUSSlHED 



425 



mm 



JfflUSSlfia- ... 



1 BY MR. BELNICK: 

2 Q I don't know if you were here, Rich, we did this at the 

3 beginning. 

4 A Oh, okay that's.... 



BY MR. LEON: 

Q Did he give you any legal points •£*- *^° follow? 

A Well yeah, from time to time he told me what to do and what 

not to do 



.^ .^l^r^^ 



16 BY MR. BELNICK: 

17 Q And we're also covering stuff that we did this morning, 

18 Rich, so if we could just, I don't think you would want to put 

19 the witness through this again. 
2o) 
21 
22 
23] 
2' 




426 




^ 



BY MR. LEON: 
Q Did you ever talk to 
ever heard his name? 



fellow namec 



Have you 



A No. 

Q How about Clair George? 

A Clair George? That's a familiar name, but I don't know him. 

Q Have you ever heard the name Brett Sciaroni? 

A No. (woiiiaLhiii i j bdia-inauaibie) 




Thank you 



UllASSlflED 



427 



wimm 



1 BY MR. BELNICK: 

2 Q 0)cay. Colonel, who advised you of the shootdown of October 

3 of 1986? 

4 A I got a tele phone cal! 
51 
6 
7 




428 



UNCUSSiFitO 




Q What did the Ambassador say that you remember in response to 
your advice to him that the plane had been shot down with an 
American crew? . , , , , ^ -L / ~ 

A (- Taua e) (tap e inL e j.j.uplitM ' > ) . . . on what I knew and that. As 

I recall you know that he hoped to hell it didn't get shot down 
in Nicaragua. 




No, no. None of us does 
we'll let you right out of here. 



couple of quick ones and then 



22 BY MR. SAXON: 

23 Q Do you know Tom Posey? Does that name ring a bell to you: 

24 A Only because I read about him in the paper you know; that 

25 goes back a couple of years ago though. 



ONCiiSSiRED 



429 



isussro 



117 



C As best you )cnow did you ever have any dealings with him? 

A No. 

What about other individuals associated with CMA which began 

initially a civilian military assistance and became civilian 

materiel assistance? 

A ^'ft iauaibl e) /JO. f\e\y€<~. 




430 



iWSlPiEO 






asEmsw 



8 BY MR. BELNICK: 

9 Alright. 

10 BY MR. BALLEN: 

11 

121 

I3I 

14 

15 



16 BY MR, BELNICK: 

17 Q Befor« we say goodbye, let me just point you to the word 

18 Goode in Kshibit 15 and ask if you recall ever using North's 

19 cryptonym in any messages that you sent. 

20 A Did I use the word Goode in things that I sent.. 

21 Yes, cause that name.. 

22 A I referred to him as Good^occasionally but I don't remember 

23 ever putting it in a message. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



432 



\!m: 



120 

1 Q Colonel, on behalf of both Committees I want to thank you 

2 for spending all this time with us today and I know that you came 

3 in and are scheduled to go back overseas. We appreciate your 

4 forthrightness, your candor and your cooperation. And thank you 

5 very much on all of our behalf. 

6 A Thanks very much. 

7 ADJOURNED AT 1:05 P.M. 

8 /dss, 5/6/87 



wussw 



433 



UNOiAssra m 



/ ^eCf5^ 




US MILITARY CROUP EL SALVADOR 

APO MIAMI 31023 1 fS3 8 5 



5LBIECT Felix Rodriguez 

THRU : DCM 

TO: A.HB PICKERING 



Per your guidance, attached is a draft 
backchannel to Gen Gorman on our 



'no pay" mercenary. 



Partially Declassit.e!l/Re'C3sed on^i_/feeS6 

under provisions of E 12356 

by K Johnson National Security Council 



mikssira 




434 



Jll 



CONFIDENT I AL 
TO SSO PANAMA 



ONCUSSlBrO 



CONFIDENTIAL 

SSO PANAMA PASS TO GENERAL GORMAN FROM AM8 PICKERING 

PERSONAL FOR GEN GORMAN FROM AMB PICKERING 

1. (C) DURING BLANDON'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE U.S. DURING Th£ 

PERIOD 22-27 JANUARY 1985, HE EFFECTED LIAISON WITH A MR FELIX 

RODRIGUEZ, WHO I AM TOLD MAS EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMER: 




2. (C) AS A RESULT OF THE MEETING, BLANDON EXTENDED AN INVITATI; 
FOR MR RODRIGUEZ TO WORK FOR THE GOES (ON A NO SALARY BASIS) 
WHEREBY MR RODRIGUEZ WOULD CONCEIVABLY BE EMPLOYED INDEPENDENTLY 
TO TRAIN, ADVISE, AND EVEN ACCOMPANY SPECIAL SALVADORAN UNITS INT; 
COMBAT, 




3. MR RODRIGUEZ HAS HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS AT THE WHITE HOUSE, DOS 

AND DOO, SOME OF WHOM ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTING HIS USE IN EL 

SALVADOR. 

^. IT II MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT IT WOULD BE IN OUR BEST 

INTERESTS THAT MR RODRIGUEZ CONFER WITH YOU PERSONALLY PRIOR 

TO HIS COMING TO EL SALVADOR. I HAVE SOME OBVIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT 

THIS ARRANGEMENT AND WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS. I BELIEVE A MEETING 

YOU WOULD SERVE TO CLARIFY OUR APPROACH IN EL SALVADOR AND WOULD 

ALSO PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME INSIGHT INTO HIS PROPOSED METHODS OF 

OPERATION. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY USEFUL INFORMATION BE PASSED 

TO ME SO THAT I COULD BE READY TO SUPPORT OR DISCOURAGE HIS 

EMPLOYMENT BY THE GOES. 

PICKERING. 



mmmji 



435 



^ 



UNttASSIfltBJt,^. 



IVfiiSi 







%t miNA Vrf224 1»4«257 

v.NT WINS! 
.4Zk 00 SO A 1)1 

LiMHr^i 00 ZTK 

r« o§S6JJkco|^ 

CONflDIMTlAl 

nQQQ 

^ BT£S ONLT//ITIS ONLT/ZlTIS ONLT// 

■^ MACI IMMEDIATID ^ — — ^ ^ 

>0H AMBASSADOR PIClIRINC iWD COL STEELlJfROM CEN GORMAN 
-., SUi>JiCT: FELIX RODRIOOEZ >^ 

^. 1. (C) I HATE JUST MET HERE «ITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ 
iOIU fRCM MIAMI. JORN I N CJBA. A TE TERAW O F GUERRILLA 0, 
^ -■"■■•■■ 



/yy^i 




PNA-BiOi-U-XEB-eS 
JS ONLY// 



liM 



H! 



_ 3E IS 

CPiRATINO AS A PfclTATE CITUEN, BOT HIS ACQUAINTANCESHIP WITE IHI TP 
IS R£AL iiNOUCtf, GOING BAC;i TO LATTFR'S DATS AS DCI . ^^^^^^ 

2. (C) RODRIGUEZ' PRIMARIJOMMTMZNT TO TiK REGION IS iNKHpBBB 
*Htf.i, 31 WANTS TO ASSISTTTLE IW. I lOLD HIM THAT THE EDjf CESi^HVEt 
cIS ^RIORITT. I ALSO TOLD SIM THAT TOOR WORa WITH THE PRAL WAS . 
AJ.7A;.CING well, and THAT *1 HAD MADE PROGRESS. WITH TRAINING OTSI?. 
PATRO'- POaCiS. I WARNED HIM THAT WHATETER HIS C0NS0LTIN5 ROLE K' Ty 

15 AL AfO'J NT ED TO, HE COULD NOT BECOME TISIBLE TO THE PRISS IN AMI 
.•ifiS: ilTiOUT EAIASING OUR CAOSf THESl. I ALSO CAOTICNID THAT FL 
-'1 >. :i A liRT M3C3 f-ORE DELICATE ENVlRONriNT *ITd RESPECT TO CIVIL- 
•ILITA.-<T RELATIONS AND RESPSCT FOR aO>'AM RIGHTS THAN ANT HE HAD 
O.-JiAIZt IW jJEFORE. 

V, (C) HE WILL *ANT TO )LI WITH TiE ISAP TO -STASLISH HIS 
CSiriblLITl, BUT TEAT BIT OF MACHI-SMO SEPSIS TO Mi; BOTH ONNECESSART 
A.-'iJ ur«iss. 

4. ■ (f) HT JOiGMLNT IS THAT HIS AD?ICE tlLl REIKFORCE OORS, AND 
-SAT »i SEOOLE P'JT NO OBSTACLES IN HIS WAI TO CONSULTING tlTE 
-IANlON or .-USTILLO unless and until «E GETCOONTERINO I CATIONS. I 
A.L-Q^riN D TEAT JIM S TEELE -lITWirOn*-BBBBBiiP*'*'' A"3ASSAL'0a 

r-ki .UbU VA.i<l 10 If^TlKnil alH, illJ! bU nUU If^TERESl IS, AS I S^Z 
:T, YO IhSORi Wk .\NOW WHAT HE IS TELLING 3LANDCN AND 3USTILL0 TIV 
•.-.'iUlY AND OJT-BRIEF. 

.. (C) ASSUMING TOUR *PPROTAL, I WILL SEND RODSICUFZ TO 
:C>i;F.KC«, 15 FSB, ON ONE 01 KT C-12S. iS WILL A.-lRl»E AROUND 
LCwAL. HI IS A LONG-TIME fP.ILNC OF LOU RODRIGUEZ AND, IF AfAlLA3Li, 
•»OUi: APPRiClATl IT I? LOO COUID BE HIS CONTACT POINT. I ANTlCIPArE 
:-.Z WILL WANT TO DEPART FOR MIAMI ON SATURDAY. 

SSo'N?T?f \lLIVER IMMEDIATELT. Partiailj De«3SM7.8.1i3*^ ^^M^J^ST" 

^if22s 



lin(l«rprDv($ioalofL0.123S6 
!»y 3. RigJr. National Security Council 



r 

\ 






436 



mmm 




frfti'Si 



Vd? mm 'Vrf22* l»4«2!)7 
' ».»IT HMNSS 

•^ ir. tf fygm coH 

TO 
-^ Zl'i 
-^ C0N7IDIMTIAt 

QQQQ 
^ ET£S ONLT//ITIS ONLT//mS ONLT/, 
-^ MACT IMMEDIATM > ^. 

>0R AMBASSADOR PICklllNS f<D COL STEELEjTROM CEK CORKAM 
-^, SUi»JiCT: yiLIX RODRIO01ZTS4 

^. I. (C) I RATI JUST MIT HEfil •IIH lELIX RODRIGUEZ 

IQIlJfRCM MIAMI. fORW IN CUBA, A TETIRAW Of CUIRF.ILIA OPEintfl 



^ JFn. 

D 23179 ^ 




PNA-e43S(-i4-rEB-e5 

ONLT// 



»J» 



21! 






38 IS 

CPiRAlINC AS A PRIFATE CITUEN, BUT aiS ACQUAINTANCESHIP WITE THE TP 
IS EtAL aNO'JOH, GOING BAC^ TO LATTFR'S DATS AS DCI. ^^^^^^ 

2. (C) RODRIGUEZ' PRIMART .COMMITMENT TO TdE REGION IS InH|^^HI 
•*Hif.i 3E WANTS TO ASSISOEI ILH. I TOLD HIM THAT "TBI TIH Bl^SSVTT 
c:S :-'F.IORITT. I ALSO TOLD SIM TBAT TOUR WOR* WITH TBI PRAL WAS 
AtVANCINC WELL. AND TBAT »E BAD MADE PROGRESS WITH TRAINING OTSI: 
fATRO'. POHCiS. I EARNED BIM THAT WBATETER HIS C0NS01TIN5 ROLE I r' fT^ 
l.-Al AroUNTED TO, EE COULD NOT BECOf'I VISIBLE TO THE PRESS IN ANT 
.-ins- --ITHOUT DA1A1ING OUR CAOSf THlRt. I ALSO CAUTIONED THAT EL 
-'l v. ^ A URT M3Ca rORE DELICATE ENVlRONriNT *ITa RESPECT TO CIVIL- 
■ ILITAaT RILATIOKS AND RESP2CT 70R ili>'KH RIGHTS THAN ANT SS BAD 
C:- /.HATED lU HEfORE. 

c. (C) 3£ WILL WANT TO )LT WITB Til LSAf TO -STABLISH BIS 
C^i.:■IbILITT, BUT THAT BIT OF MACHI-SMO SEP^S TO .IE BOTH UNNECESSARY 
A^J Ut.ilSE. 

4. (C) MT JOiGMiNT IS THAT HIS ADVICE tlLL REINFORCE OORS, AND 
"ir-.AT »i SHOOLr PUT NO OBSTACLES IN BIS WAI TO CONSULTIAIC •ITH 
rlANLON OR rUSTILLO UNLESS AND UNTIL lE GETCOUmHlNO I CATIONS. I 
, ^.C-O^MEN D THAT JIM S Trni 'ill > I f il N I ^ MMMBHl^NII AM3ASSAI-0S 
.'A( .UbU WA'('l 10 UTiHrai alH, BUT dJ?. Mni. InTERESI IS, AS I Sil 
.?, YO IhSURi Wt .%NOW WHAT HE IS TELLING 3LANDCN AND 3USTILL0 VIX 
:-.---;.IZF AND OJT-BRIEP. 

:. (C) ASSUMING TOUR APPROTAL, I WILL SEND RODRIGUEZ TO 
:C>l.f.KC», \i FEB, ON ONE 01 MT C-12S. HE WILL A.-lRI?! AROUN 
ICJAL. HE IS A LONG-TIME FP.IIND OF LOU RODRIGUEZ AND, IF AIAILAJLZ, 
•iOU'-C APPRiCIATl IT I? LOO COUID BE 3IS CONTACT POINT. I 4?«TICIPArr 
:-.Z WILL WANT TO DEPART FOR MIAMI ON SATURDAY. 

Ss"n?t?:'\iLIYZR IMMEDIATELY. Partially DedaSif.e<r/8.1i«ed 0fl^LiM567- 

-y2Zz omUf pFovlsioaS of LO. 123S6 

!)y 3. Reger, national SeCurtty Council 



.NNN 



UNDIASSIFIED' 



i i 



3Q5^ 



437 



*H)NCUSWD 



e«CK CHA-.NE' Partially I)«lafflfr«d7fi«J»led«.2QAiM?87 

undirprwUiocoftCmS 
H J? 3. %«f. Jbflonal Security Council 

iCTIC'.: ST*TrRCI, IMMEDIATE 
USSOUTHCOM, IMMEDIATE 



D 23180 



EVES CN'.Y -■;= a:a rOTLEY AND JOHNSTONE; SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAl. 

g;f:-a'; fscx pic<£RIng 



■E£^:fJG WITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ 



1. I hAD A VALUABLE MEETING WITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ FE3RUARY 15. 

2. h£ -(AS C.TLlr.'E: A TACTIC WHICH I BELIEVE HAS f^cRIT A:,0 SHOULD 
e £ TRIED OUT , VIZ ; 




OBVIOUSLY ^BR VARIATIONS ARE POSSIBLE, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO 
INTEGRATE^^^^^^^^^^^^ISSUE AND HANDLE IT BETTER THAN EVER 
BEFORE IF IT IS TO WORK, SOI^ETHINS I AGREE WITH ON ITS OWN. 

3. RODRIGUEZ WILL RETURN IN 3-4 WEEKS TO WORK WITH BUSTILLO 
<PAS) AND STEELE. STEELE WILL HONITOR CLOSELY. RODRIGUEZ UNDER 
STANDS MY GENERAL RULES -- NO CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND HE IS NOT 



TO ACCOMPANY FAS ON COMB 



lIMnilSMI^h 



WE WILL START 




438 



UNCLASSIFIED 



D 23181 



SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY TO S££ WHAT APPROACH Ci\ P=:OUC£. H£ WILL 
TAKE ON h:3HER PRIORITY^^B''! SS ion FIRST. 

i. . rCR ARA: PLEASE B.= :£F DON GREGG IN VP'S OFFICE FOR r'E. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



439 




April 29, 191$ ^''^''•'V-Sk^.k-ic^ 



Colonel Jaaes St««l« 

U.S. Military Group CoM«nd«r ■ 

El Salvador 

APO Mlaai. Florida 34023 

Dear Colonel Steele: 

I received late last week aa extraordinary letter 
froM Felix Rodrituez telling ae of the succesf of hia first 
operation in El Salvador. This brought ireat joy and satis- 
faction to ay heart as Felix and I worked very closely In 
yietnaa and I fe lt ce rtaTTfh'at what we had done there could 
also be done in El Jilvador. 

I want to thank you for giving Felix your eonfidence 
and support, without .which he feels he could not have gotten 
things under way. Felix is an extraordinary aaa and I hope 
your association with hia is a long and happy one. 



With wara regards, 



Sincerely, 



Donald .. w^^•• ^ 

Assistant to the Vice President 

for National Security Affairs 






0? 



i 






uNtussm 






440 







11^ 
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ca <» CO 



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^f^iAtt^ l>,'r/»j^r^. y^jff s^A*r ^»^^, ^^_ 4 s 



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ymsiED 




441 







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yt4.^ ««v 7*r 7-^*' 

v^(/i.( /*^>' c-^iA^^ *f-» #^c^ ^^r/ /Lifter's 



y^ '' J *v4 A. 



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r*f .wc. 



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Aft^oMO r***^ «*/• 




ONSIiSSIFIED 



442 




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«"4. v..,w> 



«NCIAS«D 



443 




i-1 



A-V:/- 



•^- 



fft 




f^^m X 






2, ^.11 Af^nuj0lX 



W..VA0 A-*^* 'J'^/^ *^^fc /Jr^.^l -•»•• •'* 



iw, JOH.*^ Oj 



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444 



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- z /^^T ^s'. 



PATTON, BOGGS & BLOW R T\ f] f] (] f) ^ 

aSSO M STREET. N. w. " UUUUI 



/ASHl^4GTON. O. C. 20037 



H^d^i 






— — August 22, 1985 

'^^2)457-6333 RECEIVED MAY Q 3 «6 



Mr. Richard V. S«cord 
Saita 205 

440 Maple Avenu« East 
Vienna, v\ 22130 

Dear Diclc: 

Enclosed is a aiemorandum which s umma rizes our research 
into questions raised under the Neutrality Act. 



With best regards. 



& 



f Dedassided/Beieased on J rtSS 8 R 
under Dfcviiiors o( E 12356 
< JOtinson National Security Council 



W/lSSIfitO 




3 4 5 J 



DHSJ&SW 



445 



ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMCNICATICNS 
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 

August 21, 138 5 
MEMO RANDOM 



R D 00C019 

R«: Applicability of th< N«utr«lity Act 

Tbis BCBOcandua addrtssca th« applicability of the 
prohibitions of th« N«utrality Act, particularly 18 a.S.C. s 960, 
to actions undertaken in the United States in connection with the 
airlift of certain goods to insurgent forces in Nicaragua. The 
facts relating to this question are as follows: 

Private individuals are considering arranging the 
initiation of negotiations between a non-0. S. company engaged in 
the business of providing contract airlift services (the 
'Company") and representatives of insurgent forces seeking the 
overthrow of the present government of Nicaragua. These arms- 
length negotiations would be intended to establish a commercial 
relationship whereby the Company would airdrop various supplies, 
including ammunition and other implements of war, into Nicaragua 
for use by the insurgents. All services would be provided 
outside the a.S. and be paid for with non-0. S. funds. 

The Company would not transport insurgent personnel for ^^£^ 
military or any other purpose, nor would the Company otherwise ?■*='-* 
participate beyond provision of airlift services in insurgent ^T^^ 
activities. Similarly, although, the O.S. -based individuals *^^' 
arranging Cor the initiation of these negotiations are fully __- ' 7 
aware that the airlift services would be in support of the 
insurgents, such individuals would not participate in the 
arcvision o£ such services nor otherwise combine with the 



&S 



insurgents to further the insurgents' military objectives. O'JT'hi) 



446 



... iiHCussro 



R D 000020 



Tha seatuta most: directly ralavant to th« scenario see 

forth above is 18 a.S.C. S 960, which provides: 

Whoever, within the United States, toowingly 
begins or sets on Coot or provides or 
prepares a means Cor or Curnishes the money 
Cor, or taJces part in, any military or naval 
expedition or enterprise to be carried on 
Croa thence against the territory or 
dominion oC any Coreign prince or state, or 
oC any colony, district, or people with whom 
the Onited States is at peace, shall be 
Cined not more than $3,000 oc imprisoned not 
more than 3 years, or both«±/ 

This provision grows out oC a statute originally passed in 1794 

as part oC the early O.S. government's attempts to avoid Coreign 
entanglements stemming Crom the use oC the Onited States as a 
staging ground Cor private military actions against otherwise 
friendly governments. The basic elements oC a violation oC this 
statute are: 

1. The actions (or planning Cor the 
actions) must taice place, at least in 
part, in the anited States; 

2. The actions must constitute "knowing" 
provision oC assistance; 

3. The actions must be in support oC or 
constitute participation in a military 
expedition; and 



y Also arguably relevant to these Cacts is 13 O.S.C. S 956, 

which prohibits any conspiracy "to injure or destroy 
specific property situated within a Coreign country and 
belonging to a Coreign government or within the political 
subdivision thereoC with which the Onited States is at 
peace." Exposure under this provision is considerably irtore 
attenuated under the proposed airlift contract, however, 
because of the requirement Cor injury or destruction of 
specific property. 



ONCUSSIFIffl 



'^''^0-\^i 



447 



UNaASSiffiO ' 

4. Th« military expedition must be against 
the govecnaent oC a nation with which 
the United States is ae peace. 

As these eleaenes relate to the proposed Nicaraguan airliSt, 

three of the four eleaents ot a violation would be net. 

Preliainary arrangements Cor the airli£t would occur in the 

United States, with Icnowledge of the use which would be made of 

the airdropped supplies, and the airlift would constitute 

assistance to insurgents acting against the government of 

Nicaragua, a government with which the United States is presently 

at peace. 

The propriety of the proposed arrangement therefore will 

turn on whether or not the airlift itself constitutes a "military 

expedition or enterprise," as that tern has been defined in the 

case law relating to the statute. Most of the cases dealing wi:h 

13 U.S.C. S 960 (or its predecessors) reflect prosecutions 

undertaken in the 19th century. The leading case is wiborq v. 

United States , 1S3 U.S. 632 (1396), in which the U.S. Supreme 

Court reviewed a conviction under the Neutrality Act for the 

assistance provided by a ship captain in transporting a group of 

arnted men who mounted a military expedition against the Spanish 

government in Cuba. In finding that the transport of :nen and 

ams for landing in Cuba was participation in a military 

expedition, the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that the 

mere transport of arras to another country is not , in itself, an 

actionable offense under the Neutrality Act. Rather, it is a 

commercial transaction subject to the ris)< of capture as 



mmsim 



uOS4i 



448 



UNCWSSIFIED ■■ ■'»««.- 

contraband of war by the foreign power against which such arms 

were to be used. Because the nen and arms aboard the defendant's 

vessel were clearly undertaking a military expedition against the 

Spanish government in Cuba of which the defendant had knowledge, 

and the arrangements for the transport were made within the 

Onited States, the ship captain was found to have been guilty of 

a Neutrality Act violation by providing the transportation. 

A similar analysis can be seen in the case of anited States 

V. Munez , 32 P.S99 (S.O.N.Y. 189«) , in which the court considered 

the propriety of the transportation of men and arms in connection 

with an expedition against Cuba. In analyzing what constitutes a 

military enterprise, the court cited the Supreme Court's 

definition in wiborg that a military expedition is "a Journey or 

voyage by a company or body of persons, having the position or 

characteristics of soldiers, for a specific warlike purpose." 

The court in Nunez identified the "essential features" of a 

military enterprise as: "concert of action, unity of action by a 

body organized and acting together, acting by means of weapons of 

some kind, and action under command leadership." The court 

reiterated that: 

There is nothing in this statute which 
prohibits a commercial enterprise. The 
transportation of goods in a commercial way, 
wtiether it be contraband of war or not, is 
not prohibited. by the- fact that other 
nations are at war, or that a colony is in a 
state of insurrection against the parent 
country. . . . 

Because, in the Nunez case, the men and arms were clearly acti.-.g 

for inilitary purpose, t.'ie arnis removed from boxes aboard ship and 



IWIASSIFIEU 



U'jq4S'J 



449 



liNfiUSSIffl) 



f D 000023 



tht tn«n drillt'd on deck during the transport, those providing the 
transportation were guilty ot violation oC the Neutrality Act. 

Conclusion 

While these cases are very old, the Supreme Court's 
interpretation in Wjborg ot what constitutes a "military 
enterprise' Cor purposes oC a violation of the Neutrality kcz has 
not been modified or overturned by court action since that 
tia*. Wiborq and the cases which follow it establish that a 
'military enterprise' contemplated by the statute must be 
comprised of men and arms with a military purpose and that mere 
transportation of arms to insurgent forces, without more, does 
not constitute a 'military enterprise' or preparing the means for 
a 'military enterprise.' Applying the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Neutrality Act to the proposed Nicaraguan 
operation, the provision of contract airlift services as 
described above would not be conduct proscribed by the Neutrality 
Act. AS long as the airlift operations transport only supplies 
(whether or not including implements of war), but not men, and as 
long as the persons engaged in arranging or providing the airlift 
services do not also engage in broader planning or action in 
concert with others to ccrabine these supplies with insurgents on 
the ground for military purposes, those providing the 
transportation of supplies have not begun, or provided the means 
for any military expedition within the meaning of the statute. A 
federal prosecutor acting in the mid-1980s could always take a 
■nore exoansive viaw of the tvce of conduct proscribed by the 



UNClASSIHEil 



C'OqJS.J 



82-738 0-88-16 



450 



mm\m 



^ ^ 00002. 



statute, bufh« would hav« to overcom* the weight of judicial 
authority or find other facts which tended to support the 
existence of a 'ailitary enterprise." 

One final note: the Neutrality Act has been neglected by 
prosecutors since the Pirst World War. However, in the last few 
years, efforts by those opposing o.S. actions in support of the 
insurgency in Nicaragua have attempted to compel enforcement by 
the Justice Department of the Neutrality Act by resort to the 
Ethics in Government Act under which the Attorney General is 
required to conduct an investigation upon receipt of information 
that a government official has violated the law. This was the 
issue in the 1984 case of Delluma v. Smith . 577 ?. Supp. 1449 
(N.O. Cal. 1984). In that case, the court held that a 
preliminary investigation was required upon presentation to c.le 
Attorney General of evidence of federal criminal actions by 
federal officials. The court expressly rejected the Department 
of Justice's attempts to raise prosecutorial discretion as a bar 
to such suits. "Public interest" actions to compel Justice 
Department investigation of such activity therefore remain a 
possibility. 



IINCUSSIflEO 



451 



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■■> prrpirrc '■---..£ /.:"' 

r- -c ^£CT :jP TO -.-PEEI' "'-J -'-'- :'.' 

•■ ' -.emem't a-v to Vi-i.'R p POP -•;?:• 
■ = i::i:''. = fj '>ir"-iMi.;' f.:r-E hea :=■ where 
:•:' -.r.^ z-£ sc- :■.:.. ^jh.'.t ape --e 
• :r = r.i~,^T€:-" ■••-HAT rx <.;.i'p ppoP'''?e:' 

■ji.-IMC.- ■'■-lEPE APE jTHEP OUE'f'ION-f I 

:,_,T :m Tue pc.E^rou^ wji.t. ^"^1 -c-m have 

..-■' ^.'■■A«JE '=e: . : . r'cELE MA/ &£ ABLE T'j 
'£^r '/JlTo^^MlPEOi.EJT^ ANC' 

■.apifilattTtJ?; jF ^ijfiON 

■APAME'EP-^. .'Jf' i-'I'-..^E r; A c-pIENt'. 
;:.;A:-^TNr, YOUP AN-fWER'J. BOB BT. 



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UNaAS^IRED 






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= :- --f. :■■.-■, PRC5L £.-is t: fE^-i. ^e if 

zl^BPBB'jfLi -£F = E.--:\--.-:ve wi-- 

-__.._. ^., rc,;9_£;-.if _ ^_ J CANT Mftf. E AnV 

-= :^"E:'.FEf >jr--'::jT ■iowE rrEfl of '^aere 

•:. w::.^ SE wCFt I-iC WHAT ARE -AE 

"::■=::'"■-."£:-■ what :; voc'R FPi.'Fir'^.Er' 

".■■.-:.r.- TME=E APE OTHEP "MEiTIONS I 
z-j-r ;m -j^ = = EVIC'iJf >1'='i:i. THAT YOU HAVE 
•r:- Ar..'v>iE =Er'. } . ^^EELt xCy B£ ^BLE 'O 
-EL- >. r --'■■■- EC ■■.£ J T'f ANO 

:_-'-f:~i ."."•. •^nT OF r^iiiiON 

^•-FAfE'Ei-r. .UfE -^IM..HE It. A FPIENt'. / 

AWAITI'iC, rjljfi ANrWER'5. &0B &T. FOR ^ 




R D 000384 




Parli3ily Oeclassified/neleased on I I fffig fi £ 

under provisions ot E ',23% 
by K Johnson National Secunr/ Council 



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453 









16 






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454 



•:' :.">Ai:iAiN- uiH*;^ ,;,pc ■:.jcp: V\^-Zt :p iz' 

= =.':':E£'URE'5"' what -"ATSRIiL r--P£ VOI.I 

frppiM^i^ WHO HAS iioof.: Vi^Tc.:- '■■-<£ :?.'•?■- 
••'--^T :-; Er-EMY SITUATION :m :z apea-- has 

■'T£ELE BEEN INFORMED OF rZynoN- HAS :-iE 

r-t.-.vire:. anv suprriR-- :. ^^m-- y,-,ij 7-. 

■■■■•.■TACT fTEZ_£ „ra: £. Ft_AZ\ i^HAT HAFP E.'^lEt' 
-•■; THE ^>1i;i -.FORMATION O'NC ERN ING THE 
'=P.EVIOUSL<' OA,\OELEt' IPOP . IMP.jRTANT 
"WAT ; r;:. OF BAD cRESS NOT ,^eT PASSED 
-^ROUNr-. At'VISE .IE WHEN STEELE !■=. 
rNrORMED AND HIS !5EA0TI0N. ALSO HE 
OmOmLI' 5E aware of VO'JR CURRENT MISSION 
-nz .^H-OULI- PROVIDE w::. imtel. Err, PR,-,ir^ 
TO rE= art: .;PE. 5. ' SLAP TO SE E yr;i iR 
FE-ATIONSHIP- W I TH^BI^^ I IMPROVING. 
-OMTINUE -^0 ■^10P^ OLOSELy WITH HIM. WE 
•NEEI' HIS SUPPORT. BOB BT. 



22 hk'.< f^^ 



JLO 000388 



QJHrWi - iiteuJb ^"^ 




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UNCLASSIHED 

3TEELe Exhibit -^^ 



455 



UNCI 



^"ITh 'jTEELE LAST WEEK, t REOijeiTEt' 

•-E MAKE THE -SITUATION CLEAR Ti! 

•if TO THE OWNERSHIP OP THE ^1=:^?= 

ANt ASSOCIATED EQL'I?. HE WAS TO INFORM 

^:m that WHtLE THE ASSETS WERE MAC'E R 000394 

availa&le to the 'lAvse. they belonged to «w«i;-^t 

A PANAMA eASET' COMRANV AND THAT '.IRON 
lOMPLETXON of THEIR SUPPORT WORK HERE 

t;-iey were to be returned to that company 

POP FUTURE C'ISPOSITION. STEELE FELT 
HE JH CULr HAVE TROUBLE '.iETTINiS 

rO ACCEPT THIS UNTIL HE COULD 

'YPE OF SUPPORT WAS COMINLi IN 
TO REPLACE US. THIS MATCHES WHAT DICK 
SAID TO VOU ABOUT GETTING A FIRM PLAN 
FROM THE CIA AS TO THEIR FROC»RAM FOR AIR 
SUPPORT. THIS WE MUST CiET ASAP AND PASS 
TO STEELE TO PAVE THE WAY FOR OUR 
DEPARTURE. IF WE DONT i3ET IT. OUR 
WITHDRAWL COULD BE A MESSY AFFAIR. 
SUCiCiEST YOU TALK TO STEELE AND CONFIRM 
THAT WE ARE liOINCS AFTER THE CIA PLAN AND 
WILL ADVISE HIM ASAP. BOB BT. 




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003 10 



456 




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(JNCLASSSrSEiy 



•»SCALL iMPEI'IATKLy, B^INCi THf 
lAINrS'iANCf AND AIRCREWS •X'" Or THC<^f 
OOlETLy. BUT OiJiCKLf. LEAVE ALL THE 

co'jiPwSMT. incl'jmnq airplane*, bpinq 
BAc*. or;uy personal eouip. :. cestroy 

RE'SIJTRATION PLATES ON A/C IF POSSIBLE, 

BUT r.-iKi.T CAMA.-iS TwE A/C. 3. A OHH 

■HBbob. bacon, anc OLnsTEAr st)oul& 

yiET TOGETHER. 'HE AIRFIELt. REVERTS TO 
BACON. S CONTROL. *■ CIt eIlE * H 

reconsi:eri>nCi meeting m/ y<x> ano may 

CALL VO'J. 7. IF HE HELPS PERHAPS THIS 
TwiNa CAN BE PATCHED BACK TOGETHER FOR 
THE TRANSITION. euT FOR THE WOWENT THE 
PEOPLE MUST BE GOTTEN OUT OF THERE. BT 






fi D 



671 



13134?ZAUG36 1. THERE 19 MORB THAN 
>0LLAR9 WOPTMOF EQIJIPMENT. 

.OCATED AT^HH I PRESOMC YOUR MSQ 

rSUUTS FROM TELECON WITH OLLIC. IF SO 
I MUST REMIND YCMJ THAT THESE ASSETS ARE 
OWNED 8V UIALL RESEARCH CORP AND THERE 
IS NO INTENTION OF ABANDONING THEM. 2. I 
INSIST ON IMMEMATE tnEETINS BETWEEN BOB 
AND *-t££LB OR I WILL SEEK OUT TV« 
AMBASSADOR AND RESOLVE THE ISSUE. DICK 



5Tt&Le 
Exhibit 



1. -y READING IS IT RE SULTS FR OW YOUR 
REPORT LAST NIGHT THAT ^^ ANDflflH "^^ 
BEEN t'lPEOTED HANDS OFF BY DC I. COMBINED 
WITH My REPORT THAT ;IM DIDN, T WANT TO 
MEET WITH YOU. SUPPOSEDLY AT DIRECTION 
OF THE AMBASSADOR^^^HE THREAT OF A 
LAW SUIT Air^AINST^HHjfpOR AIR PIRACY 
HAS APPARENTLY PEAL^^CtSONED THE 
ATMOSrHEPE FCR ,:If;AND FOR TwE 
A.-ffir-iAt'OR Ap.ji.'T -HE -.OOD INTENTIONS OF 
Twe COMPANY. BT, 







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003 



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"_':- '•■AS i: :.r-"eNT >'fl;.e '•■ , 

'^'--"' '^'-'"' V-j^^jr'-E WCPr- VIL_ "AF-IZLV 
"TVL^'S AMC'NG Mv ENEriZ? '.1^0 v lEW («E 
^ 'E"f -C-I : ^A I I.;, MI_Li:>MS ■^SCM TWE 
-•■•■T-AS. PC.-; -ASTIN. CARL JENUM*. r<A.:. 

f-fecMAN.ANc. -osr OF ot-es* will 

IMMEtlATEl..- .-.■<•'=• IN ANr lORE BAE' FRE'r? 
-:=-,-0\.-ri. i.ir^LL ANt' THE OTHER COMPANIES 
-RE F-i-P^CT!./ LEiSAL IN THEIR ACTIVITIES 
ANt. : WILL MAt^E TMI J A MAJOR ISSUE I? 
AX&A-AJAtOR AN^^EELE t^O NOT RECTIFY 
rATTI-:; MIT'-II^^^IB. I WILL NOT FREMIT 

.rA:_ t:, tear '.^T-iTP-r-^-. tmis is no small 

'^^c E^. WE MUST OPERATE AS THOUSH WE 
HAVE SOME SENSE. MCK BT. 



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0031' 



459 



ONClASSiFiEO 




■ 


Hon Rele^jant 


I 


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Paniailv Declassiled;Reio5sr^ <■- tOrcS gP 
under piovi3ii)'.3 ii E '^TVj 
by K Johnson Ndl;onal Secuiu'v Council 






^ \s»wss\«^^ (^ 



5TEELE hXttlBlT ^/^ 



460 



UNClASStriED 






^A/4, 









UNCLASSIFIED 



461 

1 DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM H. TAFT, IV 

2 Thursday, June 25, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Committee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C. 

8 Deposition of WILLIAM H. TAFT, IV, called as a 

9 witness by counsel for the Select Committee, at the 

10 office of Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft, The Pentagon, 

11 Washington, D. C. , commerffiing ai%^jrtiT^^pmk. , the witness 

12 having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, a Notary 

13 Public in and for the District of ColTSfcia, *nd the 

14 testimony being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN 

15 SCHAFER and transcribed under her direction. 
16 



Pirfally Declassified/Released on 



under provisions of E.O. 12356 
by N. Wenan, National Security Council 




■y^P- 



COPY NO \-L-—i 



462 



\lH?WHffi 



1 APPEARANCES : 

2 on behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 JOHN SAXON, ESQ. 

6 Associate Counsel 

7 on behalf of the House Select Committee to 

8 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

9 JOSEPH SABA, ESQ. 
10 ROGER KREUZER 

j_j_ ROBERT GENZMAN 

12 On behalf of the witness: 

13 LARRY GARRETT, ESQ. 

14 General Counsel 

15 ED SHAPIRO, ESQ. 

Ig Department of Defense 




"^jJoU 



463 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 




CONTENTS 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 

SENATE HOUSE 

WITNESS 

William H. Taft, IV 

By Mr. Saxon * 

87 
By Mr. Saba 

93 
By Mr. Kreuzer 

EXHIBITS 

„^.r,r.« FOR IDENTIFICATION 

TAFT EXHIBIT NUMBER "^'^ ^" 

19 

1 

21 
2 

22 
3 

25 
4 

25 
5 

37 
6 

58 
7 

62 
8 

65 
9 

72 
10 

77 
11 

81 
12 

85 
13 



\lWJiSI®® 



464 



\mss3 



1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon, 

3 WILLIAM H. TAFT, IV, 

4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Committee and having been duly sworn by the Notary 

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION 

8 BY MR. SAXON: 

9 Q Mr. Secretary, would you please state your 

10 name, sir? ■ 

11 A My name is William Taft. 

12 Q And what is your current position? 

13 A I'm the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

14 Q How long have you been in that position? 

15 A Since February of 1984. 

16 Q And what were you doing immediately prior to 

17 assuming that position? 

18 A I was the General Counsel of the Department. 

19 Q And how long were you General Counsel? 

20 A From April of 1981 until February '84. 

21 Q Mr. Taft, if you would, let's focus first on 

22 the Iran arms initiative portion of the matters we're 

23 inquiring into and tell us when you first knew of what we 

24 are now calling the Iran initiative ~ and that is before 
2 5 we were talking expressly about any arms going to Iran, 



iiHTOsra 



465 



UtCrSmiliiQ 



1 when were you made aware that the White House was 

2 considering opening or attempting to open some channel of 

3 communication with the Iranians to improve relations? 

4 A Well, this would always have been a 

5 possibility, I suppose, but as a formal matter I don't 

6 think that there was any discussion about it on paper 

7 recpiesting an initiative to go forward that I was aware 

8 of until probably the middle of 1985. 

9 Q And would that be the draft NSDD that Mr. 

10 McFarlane sent the Secretary and Secretary Shultz for 

11 coniaent? 

12 A Yes. 

13 Q And you at that time did see a copy of that? 

14 A Yes, I think I did. I must say I can't 

15 remember it very clearly, but I have seen in my own 

16 files, you know, that I was provided with a copy. 

17 Q Do you recall having been part of any 

18 discussions at that time about the draft NSDD? 

19 A Mo, not really. Conceivably I was out of town 

20 at the tins, but I don't remember any meetings. 

21 Q All right. From the point at which Mr. 

22 McFarlane sends the draft NSDD and a response is prepared 

23 here and sent back, I guess I should say prior to its 

24 going over, did you see a draft of the Secretary's 

25 response? 



mmm 



466 



l^Slsfel^itU 



1 A I don't )tnow whether I did or not. I 

2 sometimes do see those and sometimes not. I don't know 

3 whether I saw that one or not. 

4 Q From that point forward what is the next event 

5 of which you had knowledge or involvement regarding the 

6 Iran initiative or the shipment of U.S. arms to Iran 

7 either directly or through Israel? 

8 A The subject came up after that, to my 

9 knowledge around the end of the year or early in '86, and 
10 it cam* to my att ention throuc 
11 
12 
13 

14 I have not been able to exactly identify when 

15 that was, although I've tried to. But I haven't been 

16 able to locate the thing that I seem to remember. And it 

17 would have been, I think, though, towards the end of '85 

18 or beginning of '86. 

19 Q I believe when we met with you previously for 

20 an informal interview, which for the record would have 

21 been April 27, 1987, you told us that you processed two 

22 of those requests that came to mind — one in October of 

23 '85 and one, I believe, in March or April of '86, but 

24 that your recollection was that you actually found out 

25 about this initiative in February, which didn't neatly 




umsseo 



467 



i^si;^i£D 



fit either of those twol 

Have you been able to better date? 

A No, I haven't. And I guess that would remain 
the record on it as far as we can develop it. But it 
doesn't corroborate my active memory of it. I'm very 
sure that I knew about it before March, but I don't 
recall knowing about it as early as October. 

Q We now know from what record has been put 
forward publicly thus far in our hearings that there were 
discussions in the fall of 1985 about the shipment of 
HAWK missiles to Iran and in fact that 18 U.S. -provided 
missiles went from Israel to Iran. 

Did you have any knowledge at the time of 
those transactions that they were taking place? 

A No, I didn't. In fact, I think my first 
knowledge of those Israeli transactions was perhaps a 
year later. 

Q How did you become aware in early '86? You 
say it was in the process of handling th^^^^^B 



A Yes. Hell, that's ay recollection. And when 
I was doing this I decided that it was something that 
certainly the Secretary of Defe nse should be aware of. 
As a rule I don't discuss thesel 
with him. Most of them are .rAl«£4K«ly routine 



lost of them are y|l4&4K* 




468 






1 of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B but this one seemed out of the 

2 ordinary and a subject that he would be interested in, 

3 that such negotiations would be going on. 

4 And I went and discussed it with him and he 

5 informed me of the nature of the program, the status of 

6 it. 

7 Q What did he tell you? 

8 A Well, I can't remember precisely any single 

9 conversation, but certainly that he was aware of the 
10 initiative and that I should go along and proceed with 

the ^^H^^^^H that was before 

12 Q And approximately when would this have been? 

13 A This would have been around the turn of the 

14 year, is my best recollection, but I can't locate it any 

15 more precisely than that for sure. 

1* Q Do you know if there had already been the 

17 December 7 meeting at the White House at which the 

18 Secretary apparently expressed hie opposition to the 

19 initiative fairly strongly? 

20 A I think that there would have been — there 

21 certainly had been a meeting. Nov whether it was a 

22 December meeting or a January meeting — I believe there 

23 was another meeting in January at which the item was 

24 discussed. It might have been after that. I don't know. 

25 Q Did he tell you at whichever meeting had 



yWCtRSSlfSD 



HNeUSSIfiED 



1 preceded your discussions with him that he had opposed 

2 the initiative vigorously? 

3 A Yes. He told me that he had recommended 

4 against pursuing the initiative but that the President 

5 had decided to pursue it. 

6 Q And did he tell you what his reasons for 

7 opposition were? 

8 A I don't want to in replying suggest that all 

9 of this is the product of a single conversation, but over 

10 a period of conversations, perhaps, or maybe in one I 

11 certainly came to know what his reasons were. And in 

12 fact they were the same reasons as he had had for 

13 opposing the initiative in the middle of 1985 — that he 

14 did not believe that the Iranians were people with whom 

15 we could deal and that our ability to obtain any benefit 

16 from dealing with them was a mirage, and that we 

17 shouldn't try to deal with them. 

18 H« would add to that, in the context of the 

19 particular program, that the connection of dealing for 

20 hostages was not a wise one. So there were two bases by 

21 then. But certainly the basis on which he had opposed 

22 the July suggestion would carry right through. 

23 Q Did he either in the first discussion or 

24 subsequent discussions raise any legal arguments against 

25 the initiative? 



WDsmt 



470 



UNCtRiySffifl 



10 



1 A I don't recall that. I think that there were 

2 legal difficulties in handling the program if we had done 

3 it from the Department of Defense, but inasmuch as — 

4 because of the Arms Export Control Act provisions and 

5 reporting requirements. But inasmuch as the Central 

6 Intelligence Agency was handling it I believe he had been 

7 satisfied that there was legal authority to do it the way 

8 it was being done. 

9 Q Did he tell you how he had been satisfied or 

10 by whom that there was legal authority to proceed? 

11 A I believe that — and I wouldn't know, again, 

12 at what point I would have become aware of this, but I 

13 certainly became aware probably from the Secretary that 

14 the Attorney General had passed on the question. 

15 Q And did you know whether Attorney General 

16 Meese had given a written opinion or an oral opinion, or 

17 did you know? 

18 A I didn't know for sure, no. 

19 Q Mr. Secretary, in sworn testimony to our 

20 coBinittee in the form of depositions and also on Tuesday 

21 afternoon in his publicly^sworn testimony, Mr. Noel Koch 

22 relayed to us a meeting which he places you at in which 

23 he had returned from his negotiating session where he had 

24 met with a representative of the Israeli purchasing 

25 office in New York to attempt to get the price of a basic 



471 



yt''^lsr^9ojy<^R*L l) 



11 



1 TOW missile up from an unreasonably low floor that 

2 apparently Michael Ledeen had fixed it at in negotiations 

3 with the Israelis. 

4 Mr. Koch says he notified then-Major General 

5 Colin Powell, the Secretary's senior military assistant, 

6 that he had had this negotiating session. General Powell 

7 said, go tell the old man, meaning we need to go down to 

8 the Secretary, and that the two of them went into 

9 Secretary Weinberger's office, that you were already 

10 there and a previous meeting was breaking up, and certain 

11 participants were leaving, and there ensued a discussion 

12 about the arms initiative, at which point in passing and 

13 half in jest Mr. Koch made the statement, words to the 

14 effect, you know, this is politically stupid, this is 

15 diplomatically stupid. 

16 I wonder if this is legally stupid. Do we 

17 have any problems? Is this legal? Can anybody go to 

18 jail? At which point, according to Mr. Koch, Secretary 

19 Weinberger responded in the affirmative and said yeah, it 

20 might be illegal and yes, people could go to jail. 

21 I'm not asking you to comment if there were 

22 such a statement on whether it would be correct or not, 

23 but to your recollection do you recall being present at 

24 such a meeting, and, second, do you recall any 

25 conversation along the lines I have just related? 
TOR SECREJ/I 



472 



Ufl^i^i^rf^LU 



12 



1 A I recall being present in at least one 

2 conversation on this subject with Noel Koch. 

3 Q With Secretary Weinberger? 

4 A with Secretary Weinberger, but with Noel 

5 participating in it. There may have been more than one, 

6 but I'm not sure about that. If it was only one, I would 

7 have been inclined to place it later in the year, but it 

8 could be that I was, as you say, in the room and at a 

9 meeting. What was the date of this meeting? Did he 

10 place that? 

11 Q Well, his negotiating session at the airport, 

12 National Airport, he dates on Sunday, January 12, and 

13 believes that the following day, the 13th, he called 

14 General Powell and thinks that probably that same day 

15 that toward the end of the day, when General Powell 

16 thought they could squeeze it in and catch the Secretary 

17 for a few minutes that that's what happened. 

18 In any event, he thinks it was the week 

19 following January 12, 1986. 

20 A I would have to check my calendar to see if I 

21 was there, and it might not reveal it if it came up in 
2 2 the way that he suggests. But it might. I mean, it 

2 3 might say I was in New York or something; I don't know. 
24 But I don't recall specifically that meeting 

2 5 nor that conversation. 



mmms 



473 



UNCLASwlEO 



13 



1 Q So if I understand what you are telling us, 

2 you do recall being present in a meeting at some point 

3 but you think perhaps later in the year with Mr. Koch and 

4 the Secretary in which this general subject was 

5 discussed? 

6 A Right. 

7 Q But as to that precise date and the particular 

8 discussion about any possible legal questions, you do not 

9 recall? 

10 A I do not recall that, no. 

11 Q Did Secretary Weinberger ever tell you, either 

12 at the time this was happening or subsecpjently, what he 

13 thought had happened to permit the arms initiative to 

14 survive the month period from December 7, 1985, when both 

15 he and General Powell and Secretary Armitage all agreed 

16 that the Secretary came back and relayed to them words to 

17 the effect, I think this baby should be strangled in the 

18 cradle, and a clear consensus from others at the meeting 

19 that it was not going forward, to the period of January 

20 7, when there was an additional meeting held with all of 

21 the sane players, except that at the January 7 meeting 
2 2 Mr. Casey was present rather than his Deputy, Mr. 

23 McMahon, who had been at the December meeting, at which 

24 point it went forward^ did he ever explain to you or 

25 offer a theory as to what transpired during that month? 



OtttMtED 



474 



WASS^^O 



14 



1 A No, not specifically. In a general way the 

2 Secretary is fond of saying that nothing is ever dead in 

3 Washington, and he never assumes that anything is dead or 

4 strangled in its cradle. So I'm sure it didn't surprise 

5 him that it came back up again. Many things do, and this 

6 thing had before. But he never described to me exactly 

7 how it was killed or not killed, or revived. 

8 Q In the period after the January 7 meeting and 

9 the week or two between January 7 and January 18, when 

10 General Powell calls General Maxwell Thurman, who at the 

11 time was the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army, and goes 

12 forward with the requirement for the Army to supply TOW 

13 missiles to the CIA, were you aware of any discussions 

14 that the Secretary participated in or, for that matter, 

15 anyone else at DOD with regard to the issue of a 

16 Presidential Finding subsequent to which or pursuant to 

17 which the transfer went forward? 

18 A I believe there was an understanding that 

19 there either was or would be a Presidential Finding that 

20 was part of the regularizing and authorizing of this 

21 whole activity. 

22 Q Did you come to that understanding at the 

23 time, or did you learn that much later? 

24 A No. I think that was at the time. 

25 Q To your knowledge did Secretary Weinberger 



UNCtSSSftED 



475 



sNsy^^^^i^ 



15 



1 ever have the legal aspects of a Finding staffed? Did he 

2 ever have anyone here in the building look at the Finding 

3 to do a legal analysis of it or provide legal input into 

4 it, or for any other reason? Are you aware of the 

5 Finding being looked at over here and being staffed over 

6 here? 

7 A I don't believe that that was done. I believe 

8 that we were assured or — I mean, the reason why it 

9 wouldn't be done here is that the Agency and the Justice 

10 Department were engaged and that was their assignment, 

11 and the Secretary would be aware of that. 

12 Q That would be the normal course of business. 

13 I guess what I mean is in this particular case were you 

14 aware that it may have made its way over here for any 

15 legal review? 

16 A No, I don't believe it did. 

17 Q When the requirement was imposed on the Amy 

18 to provide initially 1,000 basic TOW missiles, with 3,000 

19 more likely to follow on, did you have specific knowledge 

20 of that event as opposed to the general understanding 

21 that something was being discussed and talks were taking 

22 place and so forth? 

23 A I was aware that we were providing TOWs and 

24 the number kept changing from time to time, but I would 

25 hear about that. 



BRCttSSIflEB 



476 



\J|^^fft^iC°ltU 



16 



1 Q Who made you aware of that? 

2 A I was aware of that from conversations with 

3 General Powell and the Secretary and Mr. Armitage. 

4 Q In mid to late January? 

5 A It would have been that, and on through 

6 February, because I don't think the matter was settled 

7 all at once. 

8 Q Did you have any involvement yourself in any 

9 substantive decisions with regard to pricing of TOWs, 

10 down-grading of I-TOWs into basic TOWs — any of those 

11 issues which were thoroughly investigated by the 

12 Department of the Army IG? 

13 A No. We were concerned that we be compensated 

14 for the weapons that we were making available to the 

15 Agency, and we instructed the Army to do that, to bill 

16 them. But what price they were charging or that there 

17 were different prices that might be considered, I was not 

18 aware of that. ^-g_ 

19 Q Were you ever party to any discussions about 

20 the means or modalities for transfer to the Agency, by 

21 which I mean whether, I guess, this would be an Economy 

22 Act transfer, whether the Army would be able to charge 

23 replacement price, et cetera? 

24 A I understood this to be an Economy Act 

25 transfer to the Agency and that whatever prices we'd 



IfflCIKMD 



477 



\si>i l^^^^Mjnev cl4. li 



17 



1 charge in that circumstance would be charged, but I was 

2 not aware of what the mechanism for determining those 

3 prices would be. 

4 Q At the point at which you indicated, from mid- 

5 Januaryton, you would have had discussions and been 

6 updated periodically by the Secretary or General Powell 

7 or Mr. Armitage, would you say that those were the only 

8 individuals in addition to yourself at the Pentagon who 

9 had knowledge of these transactions in terms of the arms 

10 going to Iran? 

11 A Well, no. Later on I was aware that people in 

12 the Army, such as that I myself introduced to it — in 

13 fact General Wickham was one — 

14 Q But you would not have told him these arms 

15 were destined for Iran, did you? 

16 A I don't recall. I think I probably did, but I 

17 may not have. I don't recall specifically doing that, 

18 but I think I probably would have. 

19 MR. GARRETT: Excuse me. Are you talking 
2 about the February time frame or later? 

21 MR. SAXON: Well, I put it in the mid-January 

22 to mid-February time frame. 

23 THE WITNESS: Oh, no. I was thinkiB4^|toe» I 

24 talked to General Wickham about the HAWKs later. 
2 5 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 



m\mm' 



478 



25 



DNGMffiD 



18 



Q That was in April? 



1 

2 A Yes. I think I told him they were for Iran, 

3 but I'm not sure. But at that point he would have known 



about the initiative. But the only other person besides 

5 the ones you mentioned would be Noel Koch, who at some 

6 point I came to be aware he was aware of it. 

7 Q Do you recall any discussions about the 

8 issue — 

9 A And then Admiral Jones. 

j_0 Q At the point at which General Powell left? 

11 A Right. 

3_2 Q we should say for the record that Vice Admiral 

Donald Jones then became the senior military assistant to 
secretary Weinberger in place of General Powell. 



13 

14 

15 A Right. 

j_g Q Were you aware of any discussions in this 



earlier time frame of, say, mid-Januan' through mid- 
February about the issue of Congressional notification, 
Whether the Congress should be notified, who would do the 
notifying - any concern on the part of the Army that 
congress b. notified as they read the newlyfenacted 
intelligence Authorization Act of FY 86? Were you a part 

23 of any of those discussions? 

24 A NO. My understanding was — and I imagine 
this was because I was specifically told -- that the 



479 



UNfilASSSli 



1 Congress was not going to be notified or had not been 

2 notified and should not be notified, by me anyway. 

3 Q Who told you that Congress should not be 

4 notified, that a decision had been made? 

5 A A decision had been made. Either the 

6 Secretary or General Powell. It was something that we 

7 all knew. 

8 Q I want to show you and have marked as Taft 

9 Deposition Exhibit 1 a series of essentially two 

10 memoranda and one note, and it might help to start at the 

11 back and look first at a memorandum dated 7 March 1986 

12 from General Arthur Brown, the Director of the Army 

13 Staff, in which he addresses the memo to General Powell 

14 and it concerns Congressional notification. 

15 (The document referred to was 

16 marked Taft Exhibit Number 1 

17 for identification.) 

18 I'll give you a moment to look at it and then 

19 by way of explanation General Powell puts his memo on top 

20 of it addressed to Vice Admiral Poindexter, the National 

21 Security Advisor, and then there is a memo on top from 

22 Admiral Poindexter. 

23 (Pause.) 

24 For the record, Mr. Secretary, have you had a 

25 chance to look at this? 



siwe 



480 



DNdtftScffl 



20 



1 A Yes. 

2 Q I don't know that there's any reason you would 

3 have necessarily seen this document, but let me ask you 

4 prior to today have you seen any of these documents, to 

5 the best of your recollection? 

6 A I certainly haven't seen the top one, this 

7 handwritten note. I don't know whether I saw the other 

8 ones or not. I don't recall seeing them. 

9 Q The top one, for the record, is a handwritten 

10 note from Admiral Poindexter with the initials JP to 

11 Commander Thompson, the legal adviser to the NSC, whose 

12 first name is Paul that says: Paul, put this with the 

13 Finding. And it's our understanding this was put in the 

14 safe in Admiral Poindexter 's office with the Presidential 

15 Finding. 

16 Let m« simply ask you if in the second 

17 paragraph of General Powell's oenorandum to Admiral 

18 Poindexter, dated 12 March 1986, he says: The Secretary 

19 asked that I make you aware of the Army's concerns in the 
2 event you wish to advise the DCI or the Attorney General. 

21 Were you aware of any discussions that the Secretary may 

22 have had about the issue of Congressional notification 

23 pursuant to General Brown's memorandum to General Powell? 

24 A I can't give you, again, any specific 

25 conversation or direction that I'm aware of, except that 



lINTOSnEO 



481 



HMsetfito 



21 



1 it was well known that this was not being notified -- not 

2 well icnown. It was as well known as the program was. 

3 Q It was well known among the few who knew about 

4 the program. 

5 A Right. 

6 Q Mr. Secretary, let me back up for one moment 

7 and show you what I'd like marked as Exhibit 2, portions 

8 of a CIA document which is dated 3 December 86, and it's 

9 a chronology of CIA involvement in the Iran arms 

10 initiative, and I'm showing you simply the first page and 

11 then what is the third page, and ask really that you look 

12 at the second page, with the entry 6 October 85. 

13 (The document referred to was 

14 marked Taft Exhibit Number 2 

15 for identification.) 

16 (Pause.) 

17 I would ask you if you think it's possible 
that be the October ' ^ 3^^^^^^H|H^^^| 

19 ^^^HH^^^^ ^°^ Bight have had knowledge of. 

20 A Yes, it could be, because I believe my records 

21 show that I did sign one in October. 

22 Q Let ne return to the issue of HAVncs to Iran in 

23 November of '85 and ask that this next document be marked 

24 as Exhibit 3. I will give you a moment to read that, 

25 sir. 



UNeiA^fit 



482 



^^ ''^ 'mHii 



1 (The dociment referred to was 

2 marked Taft Exhibit Number 3 

3 for identification.) 

4 (Pause.) 

5 By the way, this is a memorandum, a PROF note 

6 from Colonel North to Admiral Poindexter and it bears the 

7 date of 11/20/85. It's a bit confusing. Up at the top 

8 it says "reply to note of 8/31/85", but there's a whole 

9 series of these. It's like a rolling set of electronic 
LO messages. The actual date is November 20, 1985. 

.1 A And you want me to read this? 

L2 Q Yes, sir, if you would. 

(Pause.) 

First, for the record, sir, I assiuie you have 
not seen this particular document until today; is that 
correct? 

A That's right. 

Q I want to direct your attention just to a 
couple of statements in it. It is, as I said, a PROF 
memo fro» Colonel North to Admiral Poindexter in which he 
is discussing the planned shipment of 120 U.S. -provided 
HAVnCs from Israel to Iran. The first sentence says: 
"The Israelis will deliver 80 mod-KAWKs^^^^^lat noon 
on Friday, 22 November." 

Now in testimony which the Committees have 



fl 



483 






23 



1 received to date we know in fact from General Secord's 

2 testimony that on November 25 18 U.S. -provided HAWKs 

3 arrived from Israel in Tehran. If you go then to the 

4 next full paragraph of the PROF note. Colonel North says: 

5 "There is a requirement" — he said above there 80, he 

6 says here "there is a requirement for 40 additional 

7 weapons of the same' nomenclature, for a total requirement 

8 of 120." 

9 The first sentence of the third paragraph: 

10 "Replenishment arrangements are being made through the 

11 MOD purchasing office in NVC" — New York City. If you 

12 skip the next paragraph, in the first sentence of the 

13 following paragraph he says: "As soon as we have the 

14 release confirmed we n««d to move quickly with Defense to 

15 provide the 120 missiles the Israelis want to buy." 

16 In the context of this and other documents 

17 it's clear that there was to be a replenishment of the 

18 120 Israeli HAWKs. The first question, sir, did you have 

19 any knowledg* that we were sending 120 or had a plan to 

20 send 120 HAWK missiles to Iran in November of '85? 

21 A No. 

22 Q Were you aWare in or around the time of the 

23 shipment that any HAWKs had actually gone forward? 

24 A No. 

25 Q And did you have any knowledge that there was 



ilNCtraUD 



484 



UNWSO 



24 



1 a plan to replenish out of U.S. stocks the 120 HAWKs to 

2 the Israelis? 

3 A No. 

4 Q And, finally, are you aware of any request 

5 which came from the White House or the NSC in particular 

6 to the Pentagon around the time of this memorandum or 

7 shortly thereafter to begin replenishment operations for 

8 the 12 HAWKS? 

9 A No. I have learned in recent days, I think, 

10 of some request concerning this. Mr. Gaffney I think was 

11 testifying about it, although it wasn't clear to me that 

12 that was identified for this purpose. But I was not 

13 aware at that time or before this whole thing began to go 

14 public that this shipment had occurred by the Israelis or 

15 that we were a party to it or had any plans for 

16 replenishing. 

17 Q Okay. I thinX I understand your testimony. 

18 In what the docuaent says on its face there is no 

19 indication from this particular exhibit that th«re had 

20 been a request put forward to the Pentagon, although 

21 Colonel North makes it clear from the context that that 

22 would follow shortly after the missiles were rel«»sed. 

23 ^ Let me offer as the next exhibit and give you 

24 a chance to read a memorandum for the record that is done 

25 by Mr. McMahon, the Deputy Director of the CIA, after a 



vmsmi 



485 



16 

17 

18 

19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



IjlHlfcSBrSD 



25 



1 
2 
3 
4 

5 
6 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 issue? 



meeting on 4 October 85 a.cng Director Casey, hi.self, 
secretary Weinberger, and you, sir. I'll give you a 

chance to read that. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Taft Exhibit Number 4 
for identification.) 



(Pause.) 

I simply aslc you, Mr. Taft, if you recall at 
the meeting with Director Casey and Mr. McMahon on 4 
October 85 this issue coming up which is referenced here 
regarding arms from Israel to I«n. and particularly that 
„r. Casey had read an article in a London newspaper that 
the Israelis had Just sold the Iranians $800 million 
worth Of arms. Do you recall any discussion about that 



A "^S^t 'recall it sFi^ifr?«Wr^tbou*i»it 

certainly could have occurred. 

Q Let me give you what will be Exhibit 5 and 
giv. you a moment to read that, sir. This is an 
additional PROF memo from Colonel North to Admiral 
Poindexter on the 15th of January '86. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Taft Exhibit Number 5 
for identification.) 
If it will malce it any clearer as you read. 



inrassniD 



486 



mmsB 



26 



1 Copp is the code name for General Secord. 

2 (Pause.) 

3 A Do you )cnow what PWR is? 

4 Q I do not. 

5 A Okay. 

6 Q Mr. Secretary, first of all, assuming that 

7 this PROF note from Colonel North to Admiral Poindexter 

8 to be accurate — and we have no way of )cnowing that — 

9 it indicates that Director Casey views Secretary 

1 

10 Weinberger, in Colonel North's words, as a "roadbloclc", 

11 and say that "we have now gone through three different 

12 methodologies in an effort to satisfy Cap's concerns and 

13 no matter what we do there is always a new objection." 

14 Let me ask you first were you aware during 

15 this time period and prior to the date of this note of 

16 1/15/86 that there had been different methodologies 

17 presented to Secretary Weinberger for transferring arms 

18 to Iran in exchange for hostages or as a means of getting 

19 our hostages back and that the Secretary had in essence 

20 vetoed thea? Does that in any way ring true? 

21 A Vou are saying — it sounds true, but as to 

22 whether I was aware of it on the 15th of January of 1986, 

23 I couldn't say. 

24 Q Do you recall there being discussions between 

25 yourself and the Secretary or other individuals in which 



ONCHSSMO 



487 



UNEtASSl^D 



27 



1 you participated where the Secretary would say, and here 

2 is the latest proposal and I don't think it's any good 

3 either and I'm going to tell them so or I have told them 

4 so? Were there discrete discussions that would allow you 

5 to form the judgment that the Secretary was objecting in 

6 sequence to specific proposals that would be put forth by 

7 the White House? 

8 A I don't recall that specifically. I know that 

9 the Secretary wanted to be sure that this was being done 

10 in a proper way, if it was going to be done at all. He 

11 wasn't in favor of its being done, but he was even less 

12 in favor of its being done in an improper way. 

13 Q I understand that. But you don't recall there 

14 being specific discussions of this proposal and the 

15 Secretary objected to it, and then the White House came 

16 back with a second one? 

17 A No, Z don't. This one, two, three, I don't 

18 remember that sequence, although, as I say, it could well 

19 have happened. 

20 Q Going to the next sentence beyond what I just 

21 read, it states: '*As far as Casey is concerned, our 

22 earlier method of having Copp" — and, as I said, that's 

23 General Secord — "deal directly with the DOD as a 

24 purchasing agent was fine." 

■25 Were you ever made aware that there' was a 



ilNTOlTED 



488 



UNCttSSIffl 



28 



1 proposal or a methodology for these transfers that would 

2 have General Secord be a purchasing agent and deal 

3 directly with DOD in order to get TOW missiles or, for 

4 that matter, HAWK missiles for shipment to Iran? 

5 A No, I don't recall that. 

6 Q Let me move forward to when we actually know 

7 that a requirement came from the White House to the 

8 Pentagon for the shipment of TOWs to Israel destined 

9 ultimately for Iran. Were you aware at the time that 

10 these transfers were to bypass the Army's] 

11 ^^^^F^ ^^* ^""y worked the requirement? 

12 A Whenever I became aware of the transfer I was 

13 also aware that it was not going to be treated^^^^^| 
14 

15 MR. GARRETT: Excuse me. John, may we go off 

16 the record? 

17 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

18 MR. SAXON: Back on the record. 

19 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

20 Q Mr. Secretary, let me rephrase the question in 

21 a way which nay be clearer and more accurate. When you 

22 became aware that the requireaent had been imposed on the 

23 Pentagon by the white House to provide TOW missiles—and 
2 4 this would be in January of '86 — to the CIA with the 

2 5 ultimate destination of Iran, did you know at the time 



lEKScftti^ 



489 




yt^^bfVli^'i^ 39 



that the Army 's^^^^^^^^^^^Hvas to not b« 

2 utilized and in fact was to be bypassed? 

3 A Yes, I was aware of that. 

4 Q And was that a conscious decision that we« 

5 discussed or debated and decided upon, or was it jutt 

6 assumed from the beginning, given the sensitive an4 

7 close-hold nature of these transfers, that the syit«» 

8 would not be used? 

9 A Well, I believe it was a conscious declii*" 

10 not to use any system that would involve aere th«ft ^^* 

11 minimum number of people. Whether somebody specifically 

12 focused on that system, I don't know. 

13 Q Do you know who made that conscious decl»i°"- 

14 Was it made here at the Pentagon? Was it made at th« 

15 White House? 

16 A I believe the White House/NSC and ouri«lv«* 

17 here agreed that only the minimum number of people should 

18 be aware of thie program. I don't thlnX that the Wh i^^ 
House was specifically aware °^^^^^^^^^^^^|B°'^ 

20 not, but they certainly did not want and did not •XP'Ct 

21 ae many people to be involved in this t ransac tion ov to 
be familiar with this transaction as the^^^^^^H 

23 ^^^^Hwould necessarily have required. 

24 Q When we interviewed you in April and w«r« 

25 discussing this topic you stated, if I understand •"<* 



ltNCti?MO 



490 



mJ^s^^-' 



:teiJ 



30 



recall your statement accurately, that the rationale of 
the^^^^^^^^^^H^^awas to the 

leadership of the Department knew that assistance was 
being provided to the CIA, and in this case you stated 
that the leadership did know that, for which reason it 
was not necessary to go through the for 



Does that sound accurate? 

A Yes, that sounds right. 

Q In addition, though, to the leadership being 
aware that the t ransfers are taking pl ace, part of the 
rationale for ^^^^^^^|^^H^^^H ^' been 
explained to m* by people within the Amy and here in the 
Pentagon, is that the re be a legal review at three 

III " I " ^^^^^B^^^^B^^^^^^^^B^^B 

1^ — three 
different levels of legal review and also a readiness 
review. 

To your knowledge did either the legal review 
or the readiness review take place? 

A I'm not aware that they did. 
Q As a natter of policy do you have an opinion 
as to whether a legal review and/or readiness review 
should have taken place with regard to these particular 
transactions? 
II 



491 



\mMM 



31 



1 A No. I don't believe there was a requirement 

2 for a legal review, that having been assumed by the 

3 Attorney General and the CIA. The requirements review, I 

4 think we were aware, would have been a formality. We 

5 have plenty of TOWs. 

6 Q I want to get later to your involvement with 

7 the HAWK repair part tasking, but while we are on the 
3 issue of readiness let me go then from basic TOWs, 

9 because it's my understanding we do have approximately 

10 ^^^^^^Hbasic TOWs in our inventory and everyone with 

11 whom we've spoken has indicated that's not a problem in 

12 terms of readiness, and go to the issue of the HAWK 

13 repair parts. 

14 The Department of Army IG indicated that for 

15 the 234 line item repair parts that were requested by the 

16 CIA for Iran, that when the time came for the Army to 

17 make the decision to go forward and meet the rec[uirement 
13 or not that there were 46 parts which had what they 

19 deemed a significant depletion factor in terms of 

20 readiness, that for 15 of the parts there would be total 

21 100 percent depletion of our inventories if we met the 

22 requirement, for 11 of the parts it would be in excess of 

23 50 percent depletion, and for 20 of the parts it would be 

24 less than 50 percent but still what the Army classified 

25 as significant depletion. 



mtmm 



492 



EtR»^d|;;^Kt^ II 32 






1 A Excuse me. This is the IG did this review 

2 subsequently? 

3 Q That's correct, sir. The first question: was 

4 any of that readiness data brought to your attention at 

5 the time the Army was working the requirement? 

6 A No. 

7 Q Second, we have been told in sworn testimony 

8 by those officers within the Amy who were working the 

9 requirement that they did make the decision that they 

10 would not meet the requirement with regard to a small 

11 number of these items for which the depletion would be 

12 100 percent, and it was communicated to the Agency, and 

13 the CIA overruled them and required that they provide the 

14 parts. 

15 Was that ever brought to your attention? 

16 A I don't recall it, no. 

17 Q With benefit of hindsight, looking at those 

18 data and assuming that they are correct as the DA/IG 

19 reported them, would you still maintain that there would 

20 be no need for a readiness review as to either the TOW or 

21 the HAWK repair part issue? 

22 A Well, you can always have a readiness review, 

23 and if you have one you will learn what the situation is, 

24 That has to be then balanced against the benefits of 

25 applying the weapons to the intended purpose. And the 



'MM^ 



493 



ilStUSSitii 



1 fact that, as you say, in hindsight there might be an 

2 adverse impact on readiness is not at all conclusive. 

3 The balance that one could have made against 

4 that conclusion, if you had it, and the value of being 

5 able to do that would have to be weighed against the 

6 larger number of people who would be made aware of the 

7 program in carrying that out. 

8 Q To do the readiness review? 

9 A Yes, and you have to make that judgment before 

10 you do the readiness review. And I think in hindsight my 

11 sense of it is that the need to keep the number of people 

12 who were knowledgeable about the program and the 

13 situation as small as possible makes the decision not to 

14 do the requirement review a good one. You can't decide 

15 whether to do a requirement review on the basis of the 

16 outcome. 

17 Q On a different issue in terms of readiness, if 

18 I correctly understood Dr. Gaffney's public testimony on 

19 Tuesday afternoon of this week, he indicated that in 

20 November of 1985 General Powell asked him to take a look 

21 at the poeeibility of the Pentagon providing 3^300 I-TOWs 

22 to the Iranians. This was a follow-on to the 120 HAVfKs. 

23 The first question: Were you ever made aware 

24 that the Department was looking at the issue of providing 

25 3<30O I-TOWs to Han? 



mmsm 



494 



Kussia 



34 



1 A I don't recall that, no. 

2 Q . Second, just from general knowledge today 

3 would you have any idea whether there would be an adverse 

4 readiness impact on the Army to provide 3^300 I-TOWs as 

5 opposed to roughly 4J000 basic TOWs? 

6 A I don't )tnow. 

7 Q In addition to discussing the readiness issue 

8 with you in April we talked about this issue of the 

9 Pentagon leadership at the top knowing about this, and 

being rationale the^^^^^^^^^^^^Band 

11 therefore you didn't need to go through it. And in the 

12 process I asked you if you would Include in the 

13 definition of those people in the leadership who needed 

14 to know the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and you 

15 indicated, if my notes are correct, that perhaps you had 

16 a narrower view of the Department's leadership than I did 

17 and that In your opinion perhaps Admiral Crowe did not 

18 need to be made aware of the Iran arms initiative. 

19 Would that still be your judgment, sir? 

20 A Yea, I think so. 

21 Q Adairal Crowe has provided the Committee sworn 

22 testimony last week that when ha found out about the Iran 

23 arms initiative, which he found out about in late June or 

24 early July of 1986 quite by accident, that he immediately 

25 asked three questions that he thought should be examined. 



wtxMm 



495 



BNIUSSIBH) 



35 



1 and he came to learn had not been examined. 

2 The first was the full readiness impact on 

3 Army stocks from both providing basic TOWs and HAWK 

4 repair parts. The second was the strategic effect on the 

5 Iran-Iraq war. And third was the effect on U.S. 

6 security, given that it was not impossible we could find 

7 ourselves in open hostilities with Iran and they would be 

8 having additional copies of our inventory. 

9 To your knowledge were any of those three 

10 issues worked as the Pentagon met this requirement? 

11 A You mean before Admiral Crowe asked those 

12 questions? 

13 Q Yes, sir. 

14 A Well, certainly the general question of the 

15 impact of these sales on our relationship with Iran was 

16 considered. 

17 Q But that was not one of the three questions he 

18 raised. Not the general relationship with Iran. He 

19 looked at more tactical considerations — number one, the 

20 inpact on U.S. readiness in terms of drawing down our 

21 etock* for basic TOWs and HAWK repair parts; second, the 

22 strategic impact on the Iran-Iraq war. 

23 A That's what I mean. I think it was 

24 considered. 

25 Q You think it was? 



496 



ONCLASS 



36 



1 A Yes, not by him but by others. 

2 Q And who in the Department took a look at that 

3 issue? 

4 A I don't mean that it was staffed out. I mean 

5 that it was considered by the people in connection with 

6 the original decision. President's decision. It was part 

7 of the Secretary's thinking and one of the reasons, in 

8 fact, why he tended to oppose the initiative, was that he 

9 thought it would have an adverse impact. 

10 Q And to your knowledge, Mr. Secretary, were the 

11 other two looked at? 

12 A The first one, I think no. 

13 Q That was readiness. 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q And the third was the effect on our security, 

16 given that the Iranians, with whom we might find 

17 ourselves in some form of hostilities, would have TOWs 
IS and HAWK repair parts beyond what they already had. 

19 A Yeah, I think that, it would be fair to say, 

20 was considered, also not again staffed out with the 

21 precision that one can do but as a general issue. I 

22 think the feeling was that these shipments of the size 

23 that were being contemplated would not cause a problem 

24 for us. 

25 Q When we met in April one of the things that we 



IINCIISSi:iED 



497 



iimiis 



lAJCJDEWbRO^ 37 



1 tal)ced about as we discussed the Presidential Finding and 

2 the Attorney General's opinion on which the Secretary 

3 relied to have obviated the need, I guess, for any 

4 further legal review, you pointed out that during the 

5 period prior to your current position when you were 

6 General Counsel of OOD you recall a similar issue, and if 

7 my notes are correct you indicated that with a different 

8 Attorney General, William French Smith, and with Stanley 

9 Sporkin, the General Counsel for CIA, you reached a 

10 different conclusion. 

11 At the time you didn't recall the particulars 

12 of that case. With the passage of time do you remember 

13 anything more about what that case may have involved? 

14 A No, I don't recall that. 

15 Q I'm not sure that I know either. 

16 A Mayb* you could help me. 

17 Q But with the benefit of some of the documents 

18 which the Department has been kind enough to provide us 

19 we may have the example, and I'd ask you to look at this, 

20 which I will ask be marked as the next Taft Exhibit. 

21 (The document referred to was 

22 marked Taft Exhibit Number 6 

23 for identification.) 

24 (Pause.) 

25 A Okay. I have read that memo. I guess here is 



UBUKiHEO 



49S 






38 



ri* -1st. 

S I tak* It, !tr. S«cr«taTy, .ir^iX* scam zt cur 

ex^iiiis yc-« recall havi.-.c st. this it— .3«-t* 

A "fes tiis zcc-.3i«.-t -as ;ee- ««•- r.- le 

; A_-.d ti« trt itrs .$ • :t::ri--i_a ;:r t^« 

Serretar-/ cf r«;e---s« dated ==;-.«zz«r : 1?::. Z r«lieve 
tjiit s Jrca .••;.; a.-.c is tis': .cir sirr.it-r« :r. rags tvc? 

A TM. It IS. 

; EaTi::ig hac a ciarcs tc rsad tiis . ic •z^ 

r»call a.-.%tiijbc arc-t ti« rirr-^astarc^s ^iv^-c riss ts 
tJiis s«Bcrari±:a ird tJtis Isttar* 

A Jet a jr«at d*al . I'« aJraii, :.ut vtat it 
sav«. I do r«eall Cccgrassma.-. Xidarrc s t4i.->3 v»ry 
i-ttr«st»d ir this »=i:«ct, =^t r.rt i- a Jriaridly vay. 

; Tar am r«ccrd, ti« ri^:«:t matter zi ycur 

x«3cra.-^±=a Bays "CIA 5«q--«st izT 2C2 S.ppcrt c* Ccvart 
ActivitiM is licara^ia*. I-t tis rirst ?Ara5Ta?t, if : 
ra:: r«ad it, it •*/«: •ll«c«=tly Jii^e Clark* — arid ti.a' 
•c^ild b« th« latir-il 5«r.r .• id .s:r .'.ir* ■-lliaa 



ti« 3«partai^, i- 
•r.«;^r« tiAt riific.f. 
teac-rratir r««ista.-rt ! 
;_:s«r.*.-.tlv tis CIA za 



.-i: .:- with CKB aod Stat*, 
ti:.r:«s ar« availaile ts s-ppcrt 
rcti .it:ii--. Jfisarar^. 
• 1.- viti a rec'-Mt tc is tzr 
i tr. .raa-t s.-c ier-.-icti tc z* 



/i^^ji iLU 



499 



'-'' 'mB 



1 _sed -- s.zz-zzz zt s_c- fcrces. A---r "sr. •=. say • sse 

2 a-ia:-ei ill-sm-i-e lis-.' 

3 :f :-:- vc.ld :cc< at r»=e v.c tJiat first 

4 rarizrar- ai lie tep yr- state: ' Kr. atte^rpt t: avcii 

5 Crr.gressi:-al irvdverert ir. tj:e tri---sfsr trecess cruld 

6 ;e=pirdize tie e-t:.r£ty ;; tie ZZX le=islat:.ve a.tJicrity 

7 t-o r«c«i-.-e f_-.is frrz itJier =;• errjie-tal arerr.es ' 

8 Coaginuing it states; "I^stite :_r lesire t: sippcrt 

9 CIA initiatives vitii- Certral Xreric^i- ve are 

10 r.c-etieless rcrit_rai.-ei i- t^e retJicc :f t^is s_t = -rt ry 

11 star-^tcr-y restrirticr-s . ' 

12 Z Icr't Je-.rv sir. if tiis is -.-r-it y:_ ial i^ 

13 Bind, bet it seexs tz .:s tc clearly re ar. i-sti=ce -.-ere 

14 tie Departaer.t. frcx tie rcr.text zi tie exiiiit, •o.ild 

15 liXe ts i3v« t««:i r^irpcrtive ir. ielrir.c tie CIA ir. tie 
IS eJfcrts ts iel? tie Si=Arag-.iai r*sistar^« fcrtes, r-rt :si 

17 sca« reascr: ir \-o;ir zipacity a* 3«i.eral Ccurisel Icdtir^g 

18 at tie lav» tiat vare artliciile ycru ir>diritec tiat tie 
IS r-eparta&r.t ec-^i - = t leet tiat request. 

21 iad li- au-.d tiriri. Z tii=3c ti« iss-^a tiat ve iii lats: 

22 -- t-'.at : :ii= rat earlier vas ti,« questic- rf i-w tie 

23 -:.:-es-.- 1- Art fclda i=to ti« Aras ixtcrt :=-trrl Art. 

24 Tiat vas tJie issie. Tiat dres- t arrear tr i* tte iss.s 

25 i:: tiis reie 



mm':^m 



500 



III 



SMfi JCTsncn 



40 



1 Q Can you recall anything more specific about 

2 the question of how the Hughes-Ryan Act and the Arms 

3 Export Control Act overlapped and anything about the 

4 facts of that? 

5 A That is the question whether if you have a 

6 covert activity that relieves you of the obligation under 

7 the Anns Export Control Act to make the reports that are 

8 prescribed in it, and that was the issue that I think we 

9 were examining. 

10 Q And to the best of your recollection how did 

11 you resolve it? 

12 A I think we resolved it that the transfer was 

13 not made, but that may not have been because of the legal 

14 position. It may have been for totally other reasons — 

15 I mean that the thing went away or whatever, that it 

16 wasn't necessary to do. But, as I recall, that was the 

17 issue vm took to th« Attorney General, was whether the 

18 Arms Export Control Act reporting requirements applied or 

19 were vitiated by the Hughes-Ryan Act, where you could 

20 make a covert Finding and then go totally covert and 

21 never make a report about it. 

22 Q All right. Mr. Secretary. I want to ask you 

23 for your best legal opinion in that regard, recognizing 

24 that you are not currently in the position of DOD General 

25 Counsel but you are a lawyer and you have filled that 



wmmi 



501 



1 position -- and if you wish to consult with your counsel, 

2 that's fine. But to your best understanding can a 

3 Presidential Finding in an intelligence activity override 

4 the need for Congressional notification that might 

5 otherwise exist in the Arms Export Control Act? 

6 A What I'd like to do — and I really shouldn't 

7 give you an answer now on that, because I just don't have 

8 the materials at hand, but what I would like to do would 

9 be to see if I can find whatever work we did and if I 

10 signed something back then which reached one conclusion 

11 or another on it, and we'll certainly make it available 

12 to you. That would be my best view at any particular 

13 time, and I wouldn't have any reason now, because I'm 

14 less familiar now than I would have been when I signed 

15 such a document. 

16 As I recall and another reason why I would be 

17 reluctant to opine on it is certainly if we took it to 

18 the Attorney General it's a relatively close question. 

19 Q That would make sense. 

20 Mr. Taft, when we talked with you in April you 

21 indicated — April of '87 — you indicated that you 

22 thought about in April of '86 you had had occasion to 

23 talk to Admiral Poindexter, who at the time was the 

24 National Security Adviser, and be shown a document in his 

25 office that might have been the Presidential Finding 



502 



^jiadkikdi 4 2 

1 pursuant to which these transfers went forward. 

2 What do you recall about that meeting with 

3 Admiral Poindexter and the circumstances and any 

4 documents you may have reviewed? 

5 A Well, what I recall is that I went into his 

6 office and we started discussing the program to transfer 

7 arms to Iran and he showed me a document which described 

8 the reasons for the program and I read it. Our 

9 discussion went on. And I told him that, of course, as he 

10 knew,, who w'as out of the country at the time, was opposed 

11 to the program, did not think that it was a good program, 

12 a good idea, and that my further understanding was the 

13 Secretary of State was of the same opinion. 

14 And he said he knew that. And I guess we were 

15 aware that the President had decided to go forward with 

16 it. _^ . 

17 Q Do you recall when that would have been? 

18 A That would have been sometime in the first two 

19 weeks of April, I think. It might have been the last 

20 part of March, but it was before April — certainly 

21 before April 14, which is a date I remember. 

22 Q And to the best of your recollection did you 
2 3 see the Finding? 

2 4 A I saw a document and it may well have been the 

25 Finding. I'm not positive that it was the Finding. 

V 



503 



UNCIASSIID 



43 



1 Q And why, sir, does April 14 stand out in your 

2 mind? 

3 A Because we had the raid on Tripoli on that day 

4 and this was before that, because the Secretary was out 

5 of town before that and back by then. 

6 Q Do you recafFther* coming a time in the fall 

7 when you had a discussion with Secretary Weinberger and 

8 perhaps General Powell in which the Secretary was 

9 attempting to fix in his mind when he first knew of a 

10 Finding or saw a Finding, et cetera, and you volunteered 

11 that you had seen some document that may have been the 

12 Finding in Admiral Poindexter's office in April? Does 

13 that in any way ring a bell? 

14 A Do I recall — 

15 Q Having a discussion in the fall of '86? 

16 A I think I may have certainly done that and 

17 told him that I may have seen the Finding, yes. 

18 Q Do you recall anything about that meeting or 

19 those conversations? 

2 A Now this would be a meeting I had just with 

21 the Secretary alone on this subject? 

22 Q I believe it would have been a meeting with 

23 General Powell and the Secretary or Mr. Armitage and the 

24 Secretary. 

25 A I can't recall it specifically, but we had 



UNtWW 



504 



UNM^e 



44 



1 quite a few meetings at which this subject was discussed. 

2 Q In fact, it was Mr. Armitage. General Powell 

3 would have been in Germany at the time. 

4 A Yeah, he would not have been there. That's 

5 right. Perhaps Admiral Jones was there. 

6 Q If you would walk us through quickly what 

7 happened with the HAWK repair part tasking which you 

8 passedT on to the Army. How did you come to know about 

9 it? Who notified you and asked you? 

10 A This is the April tasking? 

11 Q Yes, sir. 

12 A I would have gotten that from Admiral 

13 Poindexter. What I did was I was not specifically aware 

14 of what the items were other than that they were related 

15 to HAWK missiles, that they were spare parts, but there 

16 would be a lon^^^lii~d«ferlpt&ih «£ tk^ »nd wte$_ I 

17 did vM^as 'Xdniral' P^ki^«r^Saa|ed or requested, 

18 whatever, was to advise General wickham that we would be 

19 getting a tasking from the CIA that would specify certain 

20 HAWK items, HAWK-related items, and that we were to 

21 fulfill It and that we were to be paid for it by the 

22 Agency. 

23 Q Did Admiral Poindexter come to you because the 

24 Secretary was not in town or out of the country, or was 
2 5 there some other reason? 



UEtSSSffl 



505 



IKWSaS 



45 



1 A I believe that was the reason. He knew that I 

2 was familiar with the program already, so it wouldn't 

3 expand the number of people involved. Also, Mr. Armitage 

4 was out of the country, too, and Admiral Jones. So the 

5 whole team — I was the only person in OSD. Maybe Noel 

6 Koch was here, but, in any case, he went to me. 

7 MR. SABA: Why wouldn't the tasking come from 

8 the Agency? 

9 THE WITNESS: Why wouldn't the tasking come 
10 from the Agency? 

^^ MR- SABA: The Agency had provided a. tasking 

^2 in January of '86 that had coma through, and that was 

13 unusual, but given the circumstances at the time — 

1^ THE WITNESS: You mean the tasking to me come 

15 from the Agency? 

^^ MR. SABA: My question is why do you think the 

17 taskin^j^d ^ go from the Agency straight to General 

18 Wickham? Why is the routing Admiral Poindexter to you? 

19 Normal CIA taakings are Agency to the Army or through the 

20 JCS. The Aray had already done on* tasking under this 

21 program for TOWs. Wickham and General Thurman both knew 

22 about the program. So did General Russo. So they had 

2 3 contact points in the Agency that were familiar with it. 
2* My question is it always seemed strange to me 

25 that the tasking on this radar parts would come from 



mmwfi 



506 



46 

1 Admiral Poindexter at NSC to you. 

2 THE WITNESS: I guess the person to ask is 

3 Admiral Poindexter as to why he did it this way. 

4 MR. SABA: When you received it, it didn't 

5 seem unusual to you? 

6 THE WITNESS: No, it didn't in that this was a 

7 program that the NSC was the one who was familiar with it 

8 and it was also a program as to which our lack of 

9 enthusiasm was well known, and I think they wanted to 

10 perhaps', you know, be sure that we knew that this was 

11 still part of the President's desires and the NSC is much 

12 more able to demonstrate that to us than the CIA. 

13 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

14 Q Did Admiral Poindexter indicate — 

15 A I think they also wanted us to be aware of it. 

16 Q Did h« indicate that this was a follow-on to 

17 the TOWs, part of the same package, the saa* series of 

18 transaction*? 

19 A Z think v« understood that, yes. Whether he 

20 stated it so specif ically or not, it was clear that this 

21 was a second transaction in pursuit of the same program 

22 and under the same authority. 

23 Q Did you convey that to General Wickham or did 

24 he have the same implicit understanding about the 

25 requirement? 



UNCnSSIFIED 



507 



UNeymMi] 



47 



1 A I don't recall exactly what I conveyed to 

2 General Wickham about the authority, nor an I sure what 

3 he knew about the previous shipment because when I asked 

4 General Powell how he had handled the first shipment he 

5 told me that he had handled it through Max, through Max 

6 Thurman, and I was not aware whether Max Thurman had told 

7 General WicScham or not about it. But because General 

8 Wickham was — I believe Colin handled it through Max 

9 Thurman because General WicJcham was out of town. 
LO Q That's correct. 

.1 A But General Wickham being in town, I felt I 

L2 could handle it through him. 

L3 MR. SABAs Is it possible that Admiral 

L4 Poindexter called you so that you would initiate the 

L5 action and thereby, by having the tasking assume that^^B 

I^Hj^^^^^^^^^^^^ftirould again be as was 

.7 passed in the January transaction? 

L8 THE WITNESS: It's possible, but I doubt that, 

L9 because I said earlier I don't thi nk that the NSC peop le 

were aware the existence of the^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vin 

!1 the first place. They may have been, but I don't know 

22 that they were. 

23 MR. SABA: To go back and look at that, when 

14 we discussed that a little earlier I think you said that 

15 one reason the system was bypassed was to keep it a very 



mmwm 



508 



lEHSSia 



48 



1 close hold matter, that there was a conscious decision to 
the^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hin January in order to keep 

3 the matter a very close hold one. 

4 THE WITNESS: Well, a conscious decision to 

5 bypass any system that would result in broad Icnowledge of 
the the^^^^^^^^^^^^^H is a 

7 yes. 

8 MR. SABA: I do want to stay with this a bit. 

9 If it was a conscious decision to bypass the system, by 

10 whom was that decision made? 

11 THE WITNESS: Where I'm having a little 

12 difficulty following you is the conscious decision was to 

13 conduct this operation in a way in which the smallest 

14 numlser of people would be aware of it. You characterize 

15 that as a conscious decision to bypass systems A through 

16 G. That is not the way the conscience was making the 

17 decision. 

18 The conscience was saying I want to limit the 

19 number of people who know about this. Now it may be 

20 there are eight different systems out there that were 

21 bypassed as a result, but to suggest that we considered 
2 2 each one of them and decided to bypass each one of them 

23 is not the way the decision was consciously made. 

24 MR. SABA: All right. In any event, who made 

25 that decision? 



509 



UNWie 



49 



1 THE WITNESS: That was implicit in the nature 

2 of the activity and the Secretary and General Powell in 

3 doing the first transaction had established that pattern. 

4 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

5 Q Mr. Secretary, the thing we're having 

6 difficulty understanding — and maybe you can help us 

7 understand it — we have been told that the^^^m^^ 

8 ^^^^H^^ "°^ only that system that was designed to 

9 handle sensitive transfers to the CIA but that it was to 

10 be the exclusive means for handling sensitive transfers 

11 of defense articles from DOD to the CIA. 

12 We have been told that it has expedited 

13 procedures written into that governing set of procedures 

14 and regulations so it can be done very quickly. We are 

15 told that it has bee^ used for some very sensitive 

16 transfers -1 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■J^^^^H things are 

18 otherwise not the sort of thing you want lots of people 

19 to know about. 

20 And yet for some reason the system was not 

21 utilized in this case, and given the history of its 

particularly the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

23 f^^^^Hwithln the Army, in September of 1984 because 

2 4 of ISA problems and YELLOW FRUIT and other things, 

25 everybody is very sensitive to that and the system was 




510 



IINJMllEi 



50 



1 tightened up and this is the way we are going to go. 

2 A Yeah. 

3 Q And we didn't go that way. 

4 A Right. 

5 Q And, as everybody has told us, this is the 

6 only instance that they can think of — the two instances 

7 of HAvnc repair parts and TOWs — in which we have not 

8 used that system. 

9 A Right. I think the fact of the matter is that 

10 that system means that more people know about the program 

11 than in fact Jcnew about it under the approach that we 

12 adopted, and while nowadays a great many people know 

13 about it, I think that probably- ^tween January of '86 

14 and October of '86 many fewer people knew about this 

15 activity than would know about any activity, however 

16 sensitive, but any activity that goes through the^^^H 
^^^^^^^^^H Many fewer people knew about it, in fact, 

18 and that was our intention and that was the reason. 

19 MR. SABA: I just do want to be very specific 

20 on this because it's not altogether clear. I'm trying to 

21 decide or trying to understand whose decision it was to 

22 be that closs hold. We have a Finding. 

23 THE WITNESS: The NSC was very adamant that 

24 this be extremely closely held, but it was a view that we 

25 shared. 



uNeuisw 



511 



w^mm 



51 



1 MR. SABA: I'm sorry again, but when you say 

2 "we" — 

3 THE WITNESS: I'm talking about the three, 

4 four people in OSD who were familiar -- the Secretary, 

5 General Powell and myself, Mr. Armitage. 

6 MR. SABA: So the decision to keep it close, 

7 held both in January and repeating again in the case of 

8 the HAWK repair parts, was a decision which I take it 

9 yourself and the Secretary consciously made. 

10 THE WITNESS: To keep it to a very small, the 

11 smallest possible number of people. That's right. 

12 MR. SABA: And therefore I take it in the case 

13 of the January TOW transfer there was an order given to 

14 General Powell to tell General Thurman in the absence of 

15 General Wickham to meet the requirement? 

16 THE WITNESS: An order? Well, I guess there 

17 was. You can ask him. But whether it came from the 

18 Secretary or came from the NSC, I don't know. But he 

19 certainly received some instruction. 

20 MR. SABA: He did, but in this entire exercise 

21 that we're doing it's importantTor i^to understand, and 

22 I think the public is trying very hard to understand, 

23 whether a Colonel or whether an Admiral on the staff of 

24 what is an organization which is merely a staffing 

25 exercise, the NSC, can tell people, and people who 



512 



iluCuldl^fi^li 



52 



1 outrank them in agencies, whether it be CIA or DOD, to do 

2 things. 

3 So it is important for us to understand who 

4 told who to do what. If Colonel North can call a three- 

5 star general and say get me TOWs, people in Congress want 

6 to understand how that happens, and similarly the 

7 authority line by which Vice Admiral Poindexter, in his 

8 capacity as head of the NSC — I presume not in his 

9 capacity as Admiral — can call Colin Powell, who is the 

10 special ass'istant to the Secretary, and say transfer TOWs 

11 to the CIA and don't do it the way we have always done 

12 it. 

13 And I don't find paper on that, so I'm trying 

14 to understand who made those decisions and what the 

15 routing was. 

16 THE WITNESS: I guess I'm not the person to 

17 say how the instruction came to General Powell. I don't 

18 )cnow whether it was from Admiral Poindexter or Mr. 

19 Fortier or whoever. 

20 MR. SABA: But in the case of the HAWKs, it 

21 ceuB* to you. 

22 THE WITNESS: But I can help you on how this 

23 kind of thing, this phenomenon, would occur. And I think 
2 4 you see an example of it when you see General Powell, for 
2 5 example, go to General Thurman, who is a four-star 



BNIMSMi) 



10 



UNeiA 



513 






53 



1 general, General Powell then only being a two-star 

2 general, and he didn't have the slightest trouble 

3 persuading General Thurman to do what he asked him. 

4 And the reason is that General Thurman knew 

5 that when General Powell asks him to do something it's 

6 because the Secretary of Defense wants it done. That's 

7 not accurate here, not fully accurate, but he in the 

8 formal sense wanted this done. In the informal sense he 

9 didn't want it done, but that's an aside. 
And they have confidence in the authority of 

11 these people who work for people who are superior to them 

12 but who themselves are not, that they are reflecting the 

13 desires of that superior authority. When the Secretary, 

14 for instance, or I get a request from Admiral Poindexter, 

15 we might, if, for instance, it had been a request to make 

16 this transfer in September of 1985, the Secretary would 
1'^ not have told General Powell to tell General Thurman to 
18 do it, 

^^ He would have said, hey, wait a minute, what 

2 does the President think of this. 

21 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

22 Q That distinction being because at the time — 
2 3 A Because at the time, as far as he was aware, 

2 4 the President hadn't decided he wanted to do this and he 

25 opposed it himself. 



tnmnffl 



514 



\B«U^SP 



54 



1 MR. GARRETT: In September of '85. 

2 THE WITNESS: Of '85, and the Secretary 

3 opposed it and wouldn't do that kind of a thing that he 

4 was strongly opposed to without hearing it from the 

5 President. But by January, once he knows that the 

6 President has decided that he is definitely going to do 

7 this and he has had his day in court and he's aware that 

8 this is indeed the President's program, then, when 

9 Admiral Poindexter calls up and says you remember that 

10 the President decided yesterday that we were going to do 

11 this and here are the details, we do it. 

12 MR. SABA: So then was the conscious decision 

13 to keep it~^'very close hold, the President's decision? 

14 THE WITNESS: I don't think the President 

15 would have disagreed with that policy for the Department 

16 as a whole, but I'm not sure that he focused on it 

17 particularly. He would have agreed with it. 

18 MR. SABA: Wouldn't that have been the chain 

19 of command, then, by which Colin Powell and later 

20 yourself would have taken the tasking from Admiral 

2 1 Poindexter? 

22 THE WITNESS: I guess I don't know whether the 

23 NSC directed us specifically to limit the number of 

24 people who were aware of this to the absolute minimum or 

25 whether we simply understood that that was the right way 



BfffiHesse 



515 



UNCL'Iffi'P 



55 



1 to go about this and ourselves told them that that was 

2 what we ware doing. 

3 It is clear to me and it was clear to them 

4 that we were keeping the number of people in the 

5 Department familiar with this program very small, and 

6 they were pleased with that. That was the way they liked 

7 it, and that was the way we liked it. I hope I'm being 

8 helpful. 

9 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

10 Q . Just for the record, so you'll understand 

11 where our questions are coming from, we're not looking 

12 for some one person to hang for having made the decision 
to bypass the^^^^H^^^^^^H What trying to 

14 find out — 

15 A We all bypassed it. 

16 Q — is given that there is this system, that 

17 there is an office that exists within the Army to 

18 administer it and that everybody more or less understands 

19 it's the exclusive system to follow^ it wasn't used and 

20 w«*r« siaply trying to figure out the point at which that 

21 decision originates so we can put the story together. 

22 M^HsABA: And it's even harder to understand 

23 that in the context of a Secretary of Defense, who is 

24 fundamentally, at least on a personal level, opposed to 

25 the activity and makes, through General Powell, at least. 



mmmrs 



516 



iummo 



56 



1 and yourself continued insistence that in every other 

2 respect the regulations and procedures be followed. 

3 We have an insistence on using the Economy Act 

4 and getting a full price, which means there is a lot of 

5 people who are generating the activity on the price. So 

6 in many ways we have an insistence on maintaining the 

7 procedures that normally attach to a transfer from DOD to 

8 CI\, yet the tasking in each case initially comes from or 

9 out of the NSC and it is just trying to understand that 

10 process is what I am getting at rather than trying to 

11 look to one person. 

12 THE WITNESS: The main point that was in mind, 

13 and I don't think while the Secretary might have 

14 disagreed with the program he was not going to undermine 

15 it once the President had agreed with it. A critical 

16 element in its being a success, if it was going to be 

17 ever, was that it be kept secret, and a way to do that, 

18 generally understood, is to minimize the number of people 

19 familiar with it. 

20 And I guess, you know, the result actually is 
fairly good. The^^^^^^^J^^^^^H you've 

22 several classified programs that have run through the 

j^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwith everyone in the country is 

24 familiar. This one we managed to keep quiet. I mean, 

25 just because we were opposed, the Secretaryri-yas opposed 



DNCDKimO 



617 



BNtKi^ 



57 



1 to the program and recommended against it and all of the 

2 points that you make about his being sure that it was 

3 done right and according to the regulations and not 

4 improperly are consistent, it seems to ne, with the 

5 approach that says we are going to make sure that it 

6 doesn't get ruined either by being improperly done or by 

7 being disclosed. 

8 This was the effort. 

9 MR. SABA: So there was every attempt made to 

10 avoid any possibility for leaks? 

11 THE WITNESS: That's right. That's 

12 essentially what this was about. This program — I 

13 cannot recall more than one or two programs that have as 

14 few people in this department aware of them and in fact 

15 that would justify that type of approach more than this. 

16 I mean this program, the disclosure of it or the rumoring 

17 about it, would be terminal, as in fact it was. 

18 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

19 Q In the interest of time let me move quickly on 

20 to some other subjects. I do want to ask one final 

21 c[uestion about the Iran portion of these matters. In 

22 your opinion, if the United States had provided HAWK 

23 missiles to Israel which they had in their stocks in 

24 November of '85 and Isra«l had wanted to transfer those 

25 to Iran, would that have been legal for them to do and, 



518 



DNCLASSS^II) 



58 



1 if so, what kinds of clearance or approval would have 

2 been necessary on the part of the United States 

3 Government? — 

4 A Well, my understanding is that any weapons 

5 that we have — and HAWKs would be in this category — 

6 that the United States would have exported to Israel and 

7 that it has, that if they are transferred to a third 

8 country — and not just Iran but any third country — 

9 that we must be notified of that and approve it. 

10 Q Do wa have to approve in advance of th« 

11 transfer? 

12 A I baliava so, y^». 1 baliava so. 

13 Q And do you know whether the contract or the 

14 letter of offer and acceptance under which the recipient 

15 country would receive the defense articles, are they 

16 bound by that contract to gat that prior approval in 

17 writing? Do you know whether that's tha casa? 

18 A I don't know. Basically you are going into 

19 tha Arms Export Control Act is whara you are. 

20 Q Lat na shift to a totally different subject 

21 and ask that this next item ba marked as a deposition 

22 exhibit and give you a chance to read it. 

23 (Tha docvunant referred to was 

24 aarkadj&ft Exhibit Number 7 

25 for identification.) 



HNCKSMB 



519 



WHMm 



«Lti 



1 (Paus*.) 

2 Mr. S«cr«tary, this •xhibit is a memorandum 

3 for the record dated 15 March 1985 prepared by Mr. 

4 McMahon, Deputy Director of the CIA, and it follows a 

5 meeting that he has had with you and Secretary Weinberger 

6 of that same day. At the close of his MFR he states: 

7 "In closing, the Secretary stated th at he had heard that 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H had 

9 million for the contras in $5 million increments." 

10 While I understand you have probably had many 

11 meetings with Mr. McMahon and I won't ask you to recall 

12 that particular meeting, do you recall any discussion in 

13 that time period in which Secretary Weinberger would have 

14 made known to Mr. McMahon that he had learned that the 
^^^^^^^^^giving $25 million to the 

16 A No. I don't recall this discussion 

17 specifically at all. 

Q Do you recall knowing that ^^*^^^^^^^H 

19 going to give $25 million to the contras? 

20 A No. I mean, I have heard recently, but you 

21 aean back when other people didn't know? 

22 Q m 1985, when other people didn't know. 

23 A No. I don't have any specific recollection of 

24 it. There were certainly people who were eu^orting the 

25 contras, and one could imagine, perhaps, who they were. 



UNESIStO 



520 



uii 



^?QU 



1 aomstlincs correctly, somatlnas Incorrectly. But we never 

2 had any firm knowledge that this was being done. 

3 Q In March of '85 am I correct in saying that 

4 was a period when the Boland Amendment, Boland IZ, from 

5 the fall of '84 had cut off all U.S. Government funding 

6 of the contras; is that correct? 

7 A I don't recall, but it could well have been. 

8 Q I believe the record would show that that is 

9 correct, and $25 million is a sizf^ble amount of money to 

10 provide as an infusion to the contras even in $5 million 

11 increments. It seems that that is the kind of thing that 

12 would stand out if you learned it. And, likewise, to an 

13 impartial observer two years after the fact it seems hard 

14 to imagine why Mr. McMahon would have reduced something 

15 like that to writing, if that hadn't been discussed. 

16 A I agree with that. 

17 Q So if I understand your testimony you have no 

18 recollection that that was discussed and you hive no 

19 recouection that you ever knew in that time period or_ 
2 any time pr ior to these matters becoming public that 

^^^^^^^H giving $25 million to the contras; is that 

22 what you are saying? 

23 A The question of definite knowledge that this 

24 was being done, and I guess this does not itself suggest 
2 5 that we were sure about this. As it is presented it 



llNttSs^Hffl 



521 



m^m^ 



€1 



1 looks more like the Secretary was reporting a rumor. 

2 And, as I say, there were rumors. I don't )cnow whether 

3 this is even true. But the figure seems a little 

4 different, in fact, from other figures that I have heard 

5 recently. 

6 But there certainly was speculation as to what 

7 the support for the contras — where it was coming from. 

8 A lot of it was from private sources here. I can recall 

9 at the time speculation about! 

10 I don't recall hearing anything about Brunei until 

11 subsequently. 

12 Q So your testimony is — 

13 A I have no reason to think that John was not 

14 writing down what he heard here, but I just don't recall 

15 it, that's all. 

16 Q You don't recall that discussion or you don't 

17 recall the Icnovledge? 

18 A I don't recall the discussion, and I don't 

19 recall any certain knowledge, which as I say right here 

20 it doesn't appear that this is a certain knowledge 

21 either. 

22 Q Did the Secretary ever discuss with you that 

2 3 he had heard that, whether it's in the rxmor category or 

24 in some confirmed category? Did he ever tell you that he 
or that^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 



wmm 



522 



«LilP 



62 



1 to provide $25 million for the contras? 

2 A Well, I was at this breakfast and he's 

3 recorded here as having said it, so I suppose I heard it 

4 if he said it. But in any definite sense, no. And, as I 

5 say, I don't recall this. 

6 Q You don't recall that the Secretary would have 

7 told you that apart from any meeting with Mr. McMahon? 

8 A No. No. 

9 Q Let me go to another matter and ask that this 

10 be marked as the next exhibit. 

11 (The document referred to was 

12 marked Taft Exhibit Number 8 

13 for identification.) 

14 (Pause.) 

15 A Okay. 

16 Q ^^B« Secretary, this is a memorandum from 

17 Colonel North to Admiral Poindexter dated January 15, 

18 1986, and it discusses an upcoming meeting that Admiral 

19 Poindexter is to have with General Galvin, the SOUTHCOM 

20 commander, and it talks about the situation regarding the 

21 contras and a numijer of things in general. 

22 But in particular if you look at the final 

23 paragraph Colonel North is saying to Admiral Poindexter: 

24 "Finally, General Galvin has asked that you agree to 

25 periodic meetings with you to discuss sensitive issues. 



UNCtSSS^O 



523 



UNSLME"' 



63 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



You should be aware that General Galvln is cognizant of 
the activities under way in^^^Hcosta Rica^^^^^^f 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|in the 

Galvin is enthusiastic about both endeavors." 

Now in sworn testimony to the Committees 
General Galvin has indicated that this is essentially 
correct in that he did have knowledge of the private 
supply operations to aid the contras, in Costa Rica the 
private air strip that had been constructed, we have also 
been told In separate sworn 




My question to you Is whether the SOUTHCOM 
commander or anyone else ever made you aware of these 
activities. 

A Of his activities? 

Q Of the private supply operations that were 
going on in which American citizens were involved, and we 
now know General Secord and that network were involved in 
air drops of lethal equipment to the contras during the 
period in which all U.S. Government funds were cut off by 
the Boland Amendment, particularly to the two locations 
of a private air strip in Costa Rical 




The first question is. General Galvin — 



^^^T\ 



524 



tpDtv6%Q]i 64 

1 A General Galvin. I don't recall his ever 

2 having made me aware of these things. 

3 Q Did anyone else prior to these matters all 

4 becoming public? 

5 A There were reports, intelligence reports, that 

6 indicated that private people were certainly supporting 

7 the contras and that the contras were fighting. From 

8 time to time we'd get an intelligence bulletin and 

9 whatnot, and then there was that fellow from the Army 

10 Reserve in Alabama — 

11 Q Tom Posey? 

12 A Yeah, who was picked up. I forget what 

13 happened to him exactly. 

14 Q As a former member of the Army Reserve in 

15 Alabama, for the record it should be uttered that was the 

16 Alabama National Guard. 

17 (Laughter.) ^ ^ 

18 A Excuse me. But he had been involved in 

19 supporting them, and that came out and we got questions 

20 about it, and it developed from that that there were 

21 private citizens working with the contras in support of 

22 them. 

23 But the specific air fields that were used, I 

ever aware of ^^^^^^^^^Khe 

25 one in Costa Rica. I don't think I ever had any 



UNCD!S:^D 



525 



r- .•"' <= r^'« 



5rn 



65 



)cnowledga of thos*. 

Q H«r« you ever mad* awar* that thara vara any 
U.S. military parsonnal facilitating thosa privata 
citizan efforts to which you just mada rafaranca? 
A No. 

Q Lat ma offer tha naxt exhibit and give you a 
Donant to look at that. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Taft Exhibit Number 9 
for identification.) 
(Pause.) 
A What's PRAL? 

Q I couldn't give you a precis* answer, but it's 
one particular group of forces in the military. 
A In th* Salvadoran military? 
Q Yaa, I b*li*v* that's corract. 
A Who is this from? 

MR. GARRETT: SOUTHCOM tc 



THE WITNESS: It's to 6*n*ral Gorman. 
BY KR. SAXON: (Rasuaing) 
Q Th*r* are a couple of different items. On* is 
from Gorman and one is to Gorman. 

A I see. The thing I'm reading second is not 
what was attached to the thing that came first? 



w^mw 



526 



ONClASsififi 



66 



1 Q That's correct, sir. 

2 A I see. All right. So I haven't got that 

3 attachment. Whatever he was attaching, I don't have it. 

4 Okay, this is just another memo. 

5 (Pause.) 

6 Do we know from whom this one is? 

7 Q Which one are you looking at? 

8 A The second one. 

9 Q This is from Ambassador Pickering. 

10 A This may have been the thing that was attached 

11 to the front one? 

12 Q No, sir. 

13 (Pause.) 

14 A Okay. I have read these. 

15 Q Felix Rodriguez, who is the subject of these 

16 three pieces of correspondence, has provided sworn and, 

17 for that matter, public testimony to the Committees that 

18 his purpose in going to El Salvador was to assist the 

19 Nicaraguan resistance forces, and what you are looking at 

20 are three itens of communication which are in 

21 chronological sequence, and one of the attachments is not 

22 there, and that's what I think maybe threw you off. 

23 But the first one, on the letterhead of the 

24 U.S. Mil Group in El Salvador and signed by Colonel Jim 

25 Steele, and in fact in his sworn deposition he confirms 



527 



uticyisiti^^>°o 



67 



1 that this Is his signature and that la a document from 

2 him. Is to Ambassador Pickering, and says: '*For your 
guidance, attached Is a draft back channel to General 
Gorman on our no-pay mercenary." And It says above the 
subject Is Felix Rodriguez. And Colonel Steele has 
confirmed that that Is what this Is with regard to, and 
that Mr. Rodriguez, who was working for no pay, was 
referred to as the no-pay mercenary. 

The next Item of cable traffic, dated 14 
February 85, Is from General Gorman, then the SOUTHCOH 
commander, to Ambassador Pickering -In El Salvador and 
Colonel Steele as the Mil Group iroiaftiaT, and in lina- 
one he says: "I have just met hear* with FClix 
Rodriguez." He goes on to say, in numbered paragraph 
two, "Rodriguez* primary commitment to the region i"]^H 
^^^^^^^^Hhe wants to assist the FDN. him 
that the FOM deserved his priority." 

General Gorman says, in item four, "My 
judgment is that his advice will reinforce ours and that 
we should put no obstacles in his way to consulting with 
Blandon or Bustlllo unless and until we get 
counterindications. I recommend that Jim Steele meet 
with him." And then finally he says; "Ass uming your 
approval I will sent Rodriguez to^^^^^Ktomorrow, 15 
February, on one of my C-12s." 



Ofitn^''^^i 



528 



mu 



1 And the final item that you are looking at is 

2 a back channel message from Ambassador Pickering to 

3 General Gorman, and he says in it, "I had a valuable 

4 meeting with Felix Rodriguez February 15." So in essence 

5 what has just been referenced by General Gorman in the 

6 previous cable took place. He goes on to discuss the 

7 tactical assistance that Rodriguez will provide and then, 

8 in numbered paragraph three at the bottom, he says: 

9 "Rodriguez will return in three to four weeks to work 

10 with Bustillo, FAS and Steele. Steele will monitor 

11 closely." 

12 My c[uestions are to ask you, number one, if 

13 General Gorman in any way, as SOUTHCOM commander, ever 

14 communicated to the Pentagon, to your knowledge these 

15 matters that are referenced in these communications. 

16 A Not to me. I wouldn't be able to say as to 

17 whether he conmunicated them to others. 

18 Q To your knowledge, if the representations here 

19 are correct, was he acting with the blessing of or at the 

20 instruction of the Pentagon? 

21 A I'm not aware. 

22 Q Did anyone else ever make you aware of the 

23 activities of Mr. Rodriguez and the fact that he might^ 

24 have received some U.S. military assistance in going 

25 about those activities to assist the FDN? Particularly 



mmwm 



529 



69 



1 h. ha. t..l:lfied that this is with regard to th. private 

2 supply operations, th. air drops of l^a^oipment to 

3 the southern front which went throughm||||^ 

^ A NO. I was not aware of that. I didn't check 

on his testimony the other day. This is not that, 
though, is it? I mean this is El Salvador. These are 
things h.'. doing in El Salvador. 

Q That's corr.ct. 

A I m.an, I don't .v.n ... what you ar. .aying. 
I don't .v.n ... it h.re in th. document, you ar. showing 



5 

6 

7 
8 

9 
I 10 

11 »•• 



^2 Q That'. corr.ct. H. ha. t..tifi.d to that 

13 publicly in th. first phas. of th. hearing.. 

14 A That? 

15 Q That hi. purpos. in going to El Salvador was 

16 to assist th. FDH, particu larly to as.i.t th . privat. 
supply oparation op.rating^^^^^g^^| 

18 .quip«.nt to th. .outh.rn front, and that that was his 

19 purpos. in b.ing sent th.r*. 

20 A Who wa. s.nding him th.r.? 

21 Q H. w.nt with th. toowLdg. of and blessing of 

22 Colon.l North and — 

23 A Thi. wa. hi. purpos. , but it wasn't 
n.c..UriIy - I don't )cnow. Wa. it G.n.ral Gorman's 
purpose? I» thatj/hat he said? 



530 



70 

1 Q Yes, sir. I think th« .xhibit in that regard 

2 sp«aks for its«lf. 

3 A That's what I'm getting confused about. 
Q The cable from General Gorman of 14 February 

85 to Ambassador Pickering said "Rodriguez' primary 



14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 



ihe wants 



commitment to the region is 

to assist the FDN. l told him that the FDM deserved his 

8 priority." 

9 A Right. 

^° Q • And the Ambassador Pickering the next day says 

11 that Colonel Steele will monitor closely. 
^^ ^ ^•*h. But what he's saying, if i read it 

13 right, what he's saying is, Gorman is saying where you 
just read in paragraph two, his primary commitment is 
there, and he says that he agrees that that deserves your 
primary commitment. 

But then he goes on about whatever Pickering 
is doing, the people in El Salvador, which is not that. 
The bulk of this memo — and I jugt reed it enee; I may 
be reading it too quickly ~ it seemed to me that what 
Gormwt is saying hert^l«slie said he was mainly interested 
in FDH, and I said they are great folks and that's fine 
for you, but that ^I went on and I also told him about 
your work, and then the rest of the memo appears to be 
25 about that, and that he's coming up, Blandon and Bustillo 



531 



m 



((^DEWOM 71 



1 and all these people in El Salvador, and that he's 

2 sending him up to talk to him about that. 

3 And the memo from Pickering then goes back and 

4 says he did come up here. And. it appears from this that 

5 all of these points that he is discussing are all El 

6 Salvador type points. So it doesn't appear from this — 

7 maybe he did; maybe he testified to the contrary or in 

8 addition, but it appears from this that what's ^is -name, 

9 Rodriguez, was taking a detour from his primary interest 

10 and Gorman, was sending him up to El Salvador to discuss 

11 that. 

12 And from this memo, he did discuss it. 

13 Q I guess the question, Mr. Secretary, is to ask 

14 whether you were ever made aware by either civilian or 

15 military personnel of the Department of Defense that Mr. 

16 Rodriguez was providing assistance to the private supply 

17 operation for the contras in tne southern front, whether 

18 prior to any of these matters bacoaing public you were 

19 aware of that. 

20 A No, Z was not aware of it, nor as I aware of 

21 that from this, nor does this say anything about that. 

22 Q I'm telling you what he testified to publicly 

23 as to what his purposes were-, -rsc^^ ^ "* 

24 A No, I'd never heard of Mr. Rodriguez until the 

25 other day. 



532 



Q 
•xhibit. 



0!f!I ti 



72 



NK. SAXON: Off th« racord a second. 

(A dlscusaion was held off tha record.) 

(A brief recess was taken.) 

BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

Let ae ask that this be aarked as the next 

(The docunent referred to was 
Barked Taft Exhibit Number 10 
for identification.) 




yes, to the Embass 

A Okay. 

(Pause.) 
Date? 

Q It's April of '86, the third of April. 

A All right. I've read it. I'm not sure I 
understand it. 

Q All right. Mr. Secretary, I'm not going to 
inquire into tha matters in paragraph two and paragraph 
three. We think we understand what vent on there with 
regard to Colonel Com«ee and the fact that Colonel Clark 
became his replacement. We think we know the reasons why 



mmm^ 



533 



BUtl^Ei.^ 



J 

73 

and there's no great mystery there. 

I want y ou to look , though, at the first 
paragraph, in which^^^^^^His saying that the SOUTHCOM 
commander, General Galvin, at this time wanted to have a 
military team on the ground ready to be involved in 
aiding the democratic resistance. Now there's no 
suggestion in here that this was during a period when 
that would have been illegal. 

A There's no suggestion in this memo or no 
suggestion by you? 

Q Either. There's no suggestion that we're 
talking about a period where such assistance would have 
been prohibited. But we'd like to know, though, from the 
standpoint of the Pentagon and its top leadership, was 
military involvement in the follow-on, once U.S. 
Government funds could be used again to aid the contras, 
what were the discussions had at the Department in terms 
of whether that was wise, who made the decision that it 
would be the CIA that would take that lead, and that the 
military support would be minimal, et cetera. 

How did all that play out — the tension 

22 between military versus CIA, control or leadership or_ 

23 management of that process that's reflected in| 

24 cable? 

25 MR. GARRETT: You're asking him to speak. 



mmm^ 



534 






1 John, of course, from his own knowledg^,,^ 

2 MR. SAXON: Sure. ^ 

3 THE WITNESS: My impression was that th«re 

4 wasn't an issue as to the primacy of the Agency in this 

5 area when it became legal for them to be engaged in it, 

6 that this was ti»^r^ - a n activity that they were the right 

7 people to carry out. Now there was a time — and I 

8 forget exactly when it was — that the State Department 

9 had the lead responsibility by statute, I think, for the 

10 humanitarian assistance program or something, but after 

11 that it came to be possibl^jC^ th« Agency to be 

12 involved, I think. 

13 And at that point they were the people with 

14 the primary responsibility. There was concern here in 

15 the policy office — I know Frsd Ikle had it — and in 

16 the military, JCS, and presumably they were getting that 

17 from SOUTHCOM. 

18 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

19 Q I should say that General Galvin, who we have 

20 also deposed, confirms all of thl»» He says that he very 

21 forcefully made the recommendation to the JCS that there 

22 be a military role, and the reason that he cited was he 

23 didn't think that the CIA was equipped and trained to 

24 carry out that role. You're talking about tactical 

25 military types of things. 



535 






75 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A Yes. That became more of a concern as more 
money became available and the operations larger in scale 
and more contras existing and being trained in tactics, 
et cetera. And on a number of occasions we were urged, 
the Secretary and I, to make very strong representations 
to the CIA that we wanted a larger role for ourselves and 
that we didn't have a lot of confidence or whatever. 

Speaking for myself, I was not too — I did 
not make those representations too strongly. I felt that 
it was important to retain the Agency in the first place 
and to support them, and that our people should figure 
out how best to do that without our making a lot of 
squawking about it. 

Q When we met with you in April wi- -asked you 
about — 

A You know, they had a lot of reasons which 
maybe they are right and I'm wrong, but I have looked at 
some other Agency opera tion s and I didn't see that they 
were that 




By the way, they made ■iallar representations 



Q The military? 

A The military. They wanted more involvement. 



^h«.. 



f^^'t^'^pf'?^ 



53^ 



m\M^ 



76 

Q Mr. Secretary, on a different subject, when we 
met with you in April we asked you about the possibility 
of linkage between the provision of U.S. security 
assistance and contra support, and if I understood your 
statements to us at the time — and correct me if this is 

6 an inaccurate restatement — these matters are complex 

7 and that there are things that are related but that you 

8 were not aware of any instances in which we had provided 

9 security assistance as an inducement to or an after-the- 

10 fact reward for a country giving aid to the contras 

11 during a period when we could not do so; is that correct? 

12 A Yes. That certainly is my experience of it, 

13 yes. 

14 Q And I believe you said that in no instance you 

15 could think of did v« provide anybody something that we 

16 otherwise would not have wanted thea to have anyway; is 

17 that correct? _^> -fe "" -^fe 

18 A Itot «Sly that. I don't •vn know m^»M. 

19 instance where ve suggested to somebody that we would do 

20 that as a future reward for doing something. 

21 Q All right. With that discussion and those 

22 understandings as badcgroun d, iduri: can y u tell ua about 
the decision to pr0V£de|m^^^^^^^H^o tha 

24 I^HHHgovernaent in connection vith-anr^support that 

25 they have given in the past or might give in the future 



537 



UN0U5«'"' 



.nUfiMbbc 



77 



1 to th« contras? 

2 A I don't b€li«v« w« addres««d it in that 

3 context. 

4 Q W« meaning the Department of Defense? 

5 A Anybody that I'm aware of. I mean, that was 

6 the premise that we just went through. 

7 Q Yes, sir. Let me have tfis marked as the next 

8 exhibit. 

9 (The document referred to was 

10 marked Taft Exhibit Number 11 

11 for identification.) 

12 (Pause.) 

13 It's an itinerary and some briefing papers. 

14 (Pause.) 

15 MR. GARRETT: Are the tabs attached, John? 

16 MR. SAXON: No, and ve did not receive them 

17 with the t^ atH&ed. This is the entire document as 

18 we received it from the NSC. 

19 MR. GARRETT: You never got the tabs? 

20 MR. SAXON: No. ^^^^^^^ 

21 THE WITNESS: So these went down ^°^^^^^^| 

22 ^^^^^^lAre these the same trip or different trips? 
2 3 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

24 Q It should be the same trip. 

25 A Funny. Originally he just seems to b«-going— 
>GC»&r/90CiEV0RQ I 



UNei- 



1 oh, wait a nlnut*. Thera ha is. 

2 Q At sona point tha datas for tha trip changed. 

3 A Okay. Hall, I'va got it in a ganaral way. 

4 Why don't wa go to wharevar you ara most interested? 

5 Q For tha record, let me say what this is that 

6 we are looking at as Exhibit 11. Tha top is a memorandum 

7 from Colonel Norths to Admiral Poindaxtar dated December 

8 10, 198 5, in which Colonel North is proposing an 

9 itinerary for a trip to Central America by Admiral 

10 Poindexter, who is about to become or has just become the 

11 National Security Adviser. And thera ara additional 

12 memoranda pertaining to that same trip. 

13 I would ask, Mr. Secretary, that you look at 

14 tha page that bears tha number N-31907 at tha top and has 

15 tha heading Currant Situation and Objectives for 
16 

17 A Yas. 

18 Q In tha first two paragraphs I'd lika to read 

19 portions of it to give a flavor for what Colonel North 

20 indicates tha objectives of these meetings ara, and, by 

21 tha way, tha previous page indicates that for this 

22 itinerary ha ha* had discussions with Ambassador Walker 
2 3 at State and Ganaral Galvin, tha SOUTHCOM conaandar. 

24 Ha^ states: "The purpose of tha meeting in 

25 I^^^^^W-3 ^° reopen our logistics link through 



539 



UNIUS^lj 





for a variety of reasons. 

•has seenTfit to terminate both arms and 
humanitarian assistance deliveries through! 

The effect on the Nicaraguan resistance has 
been devastating." 

In the next paragraph he says: "From previous 
meetings with^^^^Hit is obvious that the 
perceive that the USG" — United States Government — 
using ^^^^^^Kor its own political ends. They have 
learned that we withhold our assistance,! 

in order to 

force concessions from them. They are now using the same 
tactic with us as a means of ensuring that the USG will 
come through for them." 

I realize that you probably have not seen any 
of these documents and you've only had a moment to 
quickly look at them, but from what Colonel North is 
telling Admiral Poindexter it seems clear that he is 
proposing that Admiral Poindexter make a trip to Central 
America to talk toj^^^^^^^^^o them to reopen 
the logistic* link to aid the FDN, which from other 
testimony w« know to be to aid the southern front 
efforts. And he's saying that they have learned that we 
are withholding our aid in order to get concessions from 
them in this context. 

i 



540 



UNtlASSi 



80 



Let m« simply ask you, Mr. Secretary, if this 
is sonething that you would agree with in terms of how we 
are using our security assistance programs vis-a-vis 



A No, Z*B not aware of any instance in which we 
have done that around this period in relation to this 
area. 

Q So to the extent that Colonel North says that 
they have learned that we withhold our assistance, e.g., 



A Congress does, but we don't. We're always in 
favor of sending things. 

Q So you would disagree with any inference that 
one can draw here we wanted^^^^^^^^^Hto the 
centres and that we're going to provide them any security 
assistance? 

A What this says is that they think that we 
don't give them money or threaten not to give them money 
in order to get them to do things we want. I don't think 
that that'* the case in the specific context that we are 
then talking here. Z mean, it is certainly true that we 
don't give assistance to people whose objectives are not 
coincident with our own, but that's a fact. It's not an 
attempt to influence those policies. 

Q Let me provide an additional exhibit that may 



vmmm 



541 



jLKuUiHslU 



OP SECRZT/CODEWORO 



81 



address this more directly and give you a moment to look 
at Taft Deposition Exhibit 12. 

(The document referred to was 
marked TaCt Exhibit Number 12 
for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 
A Okay. I've pretty much got it. 
Q Mr. Secretary, let me ask you to look first 
toward the back of this collection of materials and the 
memorandum of ^^^^^^^H and C-3748 is the page number. 
A Um-hum. 
Q It's dated 23 October 86, and 




542 



9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 




Now from the context of this memorandua it's 
clear that this trip with Secretary Abramsl 
was to help sell the Administration's Central America 
program, and I believe I'm correct in saying that the 
context of aiding contras is what is being discussed when 
he talks about ^f^^^^^^H^llowing supplies to begin 
moving as scheduled. It seems to be th at in exchange for 

support^^^^^^^^^^are wanting^^^fand says 
that DOD is working this problem. ^^^^ 

Based just on that, and assuming that I'm 
correct in the representations I make, what's your 
understanding of what DOD was doing at the time and what 
DOD understood to be the situation regarding these 
planes? 

A What we were doing was what we had been doing 
for some time, which was to try to provide! 



uftre 



4!^5<PS*JiRDf' 




543 



UNtUSSSfO 



1 with an upgrad* for th«ir airplanes. 
Th«ir i^^^^^^^^^B 

3 A Yes, they're slightly less than super, if 

4 you've seen them. And what we wanted to do and ever 

5 since I'd seen then personally in '84, I guess, it was 

6 obvious that they needed to be replaced. 

7 Q Did we accelerate our efforts in trying to 

8 provide them with that upgrade after this trip? 

9 A We nay have been nore successful in getting 

10 things done, but as far as I can recall — and I was down 
there in I also ^"^|^^^^^ 

12 Central America in probably March — 

13 Q March 6 of '86? 

14 A Yes. And they were then and had been for some 

15 time wanting replacements, and we wanted then to have 

16 replacements. And the question was what the replacement 

17 would be, and they wanted as many replacements as soon as 

18 possible as they could get. And they always had. And we 

19 wanted them to have then. 

20 So while I see that they nay have been 

21 demanding this, the implication here in^^^^^^H memo 

22 is that they wouldn't do what he wanted them t o do on th e 

23 Nicaraguan program unless they got airplanes, ^^^^^^^ 
^^H^HBwhich they were then looking at. That didn't 

25 cause us the slightest problem at all. I mean, it's like 



yyi^dii^/^^^ipn 



:H:v._\^"£y 



544 



:OP^KREf /CODEWORD 



1 demanding, throwing a tantrum and saying you won't stop 

2 unless I do something that I fully have every intention 

3 of doing and want to do. 

4 Q Look down at the first item in this exhibit, 

5 which is the memorandum for record of Mr. Douglas George, 

6 who I take it was at a breakfast meeting of Director 

7 Casey and Secretary Weinberger and yourself on 24 October 
a 86. And in the numbered item 21, as you can see, there 

9 are a few of the items that the Agency has deleted. It 

10 states: "Regarding Central America the DCI said that 

11 Secretary Abrams had reported that^^^^^^^^^^^rere 

12 'holding us up*. Secretary Taft said that it was the 

13 same old story, more, i.e., gear,^^^^^^^nd faster, and 

14 the U.S. was doing exactly that." 

15 I take it then your testimony is that we were 

16 simply providing them what we wanted to provide them 

17 anyway and that w« were not allowing this security 

18 assistance — we were not allowing ourselves to be 

19 dictated to in this regard just because we wanted^^^l 
2 ^^^^^^^H^° support our contra plan; is that correct? 
21 A I think it's exactly what this fellow has 

2 2 written down here. The idea that they want more and 

2 3 faster is not new. It's what they've wanted for some 

24 time. It's an old story, as it says here, and we're 

25 doing that aO<4-Wf^fnt to do that. And that's the same 



tnt to do that. 
cia:'i'/coi5si«(i?im < j 



545 






1 
2 
3 guess 



85 

old story, too, that we wanted to do it. 

So that's essentially what I just said, i 



4 Q All right. Mr. Secretary, the final area of 

5 inquiry from me — and I would ask that this document be 

6 offered as Exhibit 13 - is to a sk you about that trip 

referencedjj^^^^Hin March I'll 

8 give you a moment to look at this. 

* (Th« document referred to was 

^° marked Taft Exhibit Number 13 

^^ for identification.) 

^2 (Pause.) 

13 A Okay. 

^* Q All right. This exhibit is a cable from the 

15 American embassy ^^^I^^Hto the Secretary of State 

16 on March H, and, Mr. Secretary, it references the trip 

17 you had mad* on March 6 which you alluded to a moment 

18 ago,, and I liBply want to aak you if when you vera there 

19 and met with these Nicaraguan resistance leaders who are 
named in nuabered paragraph two, whether they raised with 
you the issue of the private supply operations and the 
support for the southern front, particularly in light of 
paragraph five, where it says that when they begin 

24 implementation of their infiltration into Nicaragua they 

25 would need a reliable aerial reaupply system in order to 



mwm 



546 



mf^m 



86 



keep those troops in-country and not have to continue to 
return tc 

Was that a topic that came up? 

A It says it was. 

Q The private supply operation which we talked 
about previously either through the air strip^^^^^^B 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 in order to 
supplies to the southern front, is that something that 
9 was discussed in these sessions? 

LO A Not how they were doing it. Z think at the 

time — what does it say here? I'm just trying to 
refresh my recollection of this thing. 

Q It just., says that the FOM leaders — 

A When they are ready to go, when they get more 
people inside. _, 

Q They are going to need a good, reliable aerial 
resupply system. 

A And not continue the constant return trips to 
For resupply, which I assume is walking. This 
is, I dare say, exactly what we discussed. 

Q But the question is b«yond the generic need 
for resupply assistance was there any express discussion 
about — 

24 A How they were being supplied at the time? 

25 Q There's testimony that the frequency of usage 



14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



87 



547 



in t.e private suppi, .etwor. increase, about t.is ti.e 
and t.e ^estion is whether they raise, with you or 

-scusse. anything a.out the. private supply networ. an. 

-ether the U.S. Covern.ent in any way coul. .e o. 

assistance to the use of that effort. 

A X aon.t thin, so, no. . ..„., „,,,, ^^^^_ 

-s was at a ti.e, 1 thin. re, x thin., in .he 

-^anitarian business but not any other business. 

in the'h '" "" "^^""^"^ "' "^^^ °— -^ -« 
m the humanitarian business. 

. . "" '° " "" '^°' ^^^ P-P^« ^° come to about the 



»• SAXOK, „.. secretary, t.o,. „. ,u th. 

Let .. ... „s.t .y ooU.agu.. h.v.. 

™. S»BA, I J„,t h,v. . t.„, .1,. 

EXAMIKATION 
BI KR. SABA: 

« °° >"""•""-"-. wh.„ you „r.t ai,cu„.. 
". xr.„ ,Mtl.tiv. .,t. A..i.t.„t s.cr.t.ry Ar.it,,., 
» " probacy would h.v. b..„ .,..ti.. .„„„, 

"• "~ ""• ' ^'-"" " «i» th. s.cr.t.ry. ,« 

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 



548 



DUStAISSEO 



88 



1 since I am not very good on that I don't suppose I would 

2 be very good on the others — around the turn of the 

3 year. 

4 Q Presumably — 

5 A It would not have been very long after having 

6 discussed it with the Secretary, simply because I see 

7 Mr. Armitage quite a bit and we tend to discuss things. 

8 Q Now I will focus on the period of November 

9 '85, middle of the month, toward the end of the month, 

10 Thanksgiving as a point of memory, perhaps. Do you 

11 recall if he provided you with copies of any memos, legal 

12 papers or other papers he was having prepared for him in 

13 connection with a briefing for the Secretary in 

14 connection with the Secretary's attendance at a White 

15 House meeting on December 7? 

16 A No. 

17 Q Do you recall any discussion in preparation 

18 for that meeting? 

19 A Mo. My recollection is that I got involved 

20 later than that. I may be wrong about that, and it could 

21 have been earlier, but if I was aware of the program 

2 2 earlier than that it wasn't in any — it wasn't in a way 

2 3 where I was playing a major — where I was discussing it 

24 a lot. I mean Z deduce that because if I had been 

25 discussing it a lot Z think I would remember it more. 



UNtiSlFlEB 



549 



mM-i^ 



89 



1 Q Do you recall if in December he mentioned to 

2 you that he had one or more meetings with Oliver North 

3 about the ini-tiative? The context in which we understand 

4 these meetings to have taken place is that the Secretary 

5 received some information reports that some American 

6 officials were engaged in discussions with Iranian 

7 officials in Europe concerning weapons and transfers and 

8 sales, and it was unclear, and the Secretary apparently 

9 had asked Secretary Armitage to see what he could find 

10 out. 

11 Secretary Armitage in turn, among other 

12 things, had at least one or perhaps more meetings and 

13 conversations with Oliver North which took place very 

14 early in December, and he apparently reported the gist of 

15 those conversations back. Do you have any recollection 

16 of that, of his reporting on those conversations? 

17 A Mo. 

18 Q Do you remember if in the early January period 

19 ~ we have that period where Noel Koch comes in and makes 

20 a report and so forth before the Finding, which was about 

21 the 17th — before then do you recall any discussions 

22 with Secretary Armitage or any briefings or information 

23 that he may have provided about the project? 

24 A Mot specifically, no. There could have been, 

25 of course, but 1 don't recall any specific one. 



550 



''^' ' 'Vi^DtisU 9 



1 Q Do you recall if he had been engaged, in 

2 particular if he had discussed with you or if you had 

3 heard that he was engaged in an activity seeking to 

4 determine how best to prevent leaks about the project — 

5 that is, to keep it very tight or close-held? 

6 MR. GARRETT: Who are you speaking about? 

7 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

8 Q Secretary Armitage. 

9 A NO. 

10 Q All of these questions at the moment have to 

11 do with Secretary Armitage. In late '86, when the 

12 matters were reviewed I believe you mentioned earlier 

13 this afternoon that Secretary Armitage was present in 

14 those discussions. 

15 A Late '86? 

16 Q Late '86. 

17 A After? 

18 Q After the disclosures. Do you recall what his 

19 participation was in those meetings? 

20 A In what meetings? 

21 Q In late '86, the meetings in which the events 

22 of earlier that year and perhaps of '85 were reviewed and 

23 discussed as to what had happened and chronologies were 

24 formed? 

2 5 A I'm not even sure I was in a lot of those 



"ftn 



551 



UNClASIiSa 



1 meetings. 

2 Q That's all right. But do you rscall if you 

3 were in meetings in which Secretary Armitage took part? 

4 A Not too many. I guess, Larry, you were 

5 engaged in putting together some materials with Rich 

6 Armitage, and I think I instructed maybe a couple of 

7 times in the Secretary's absence that, and there were a 

8 lot of people investigating and we were providing, 

9 gathering up documents and providing them to different 

10 people. And I certainly on more than one occasion 

11 instructed everybody in the Department to coordinate with 

12 Larry Garrett and Rich Armitag* 
13 
14 

15 Q 

16 A For assuring that we were aware of all of the 

17 requests that were being made of us and being responsive 

18 to thea in the proper fashion. I may have met with them, 

19 maybe, and probably did meet with them a couple of times, 
2 but not in any extensive way. 

21 I think that mostly they prepared a paper, a 

22 chronology of it, which I saw, but I don't know that we 

23 really met about it a lot. 

24 Q Do you recall any conversations with him? 

25 A Not many. I don't remember any specific 




metftsssi 



552 



l)N6lA§y"""^ 



92 



1 conversation. I certainly had conversations with him 

2 about this. 

3 Q Do you recall any conversations in which it 

4 was indicated that one of the reasons it was so closely 

5 held in January of '86 was that to have treated it 

6 otherwise than in the normal course of procedures would 

7 have been to have revealed that the '85 transfers had 

8 taken place — that is, one of the issues was the 

9 replenishment of the 508 TOWs that had been transferred 

10 in Aucrust and September of '86 and in fact those TOWs 

11 were replenished — I'm sorry, TOWs that had been 

12 transferred in August and September of '85 were in fact 

13 replenished in May of '86? 

14 Do you recall any such conversations? 

15 A No. That would be a reason why the people on 

16 the NSC might have wanted it to be close hold, but it 

17 wouldn't have applied to us because we weren't aware of 

18 them, or I wasn't aware of them. I wasn't trying to 

19 conceal them from anybody; I didn't know they had 

20 happened. 

21 MR. SABA: I have nothing further, sir. Thank 

22 you. 

23 MR. GENZMAN: I have no questions. Thank you 

24 for your time. 

25 MR. KREU2ER: I have maybe just a couple, Mr. 



UNCCP^'^^^^ 



553 



l)Nei^fe:ni 



93 



1 Secretary. 

2 EXAMINATION 

3 BY MR. KREUZER: 

4 Q Does the National Security Advisor have the 

5 authority to give a Cabinet Secretary an order? 

6 A What he will do from time to time — the short 

7 answer is no, unless the Cabinet officer wants to comply 

8 with it, in which case it's yes. But what typically 

9 happens or what does happen quite frequently is the 

10 National Security Advisdr will sign a document and it 

11 will have the words on it, "for the President", and it 

12 will be the National Security Advisor's signature there 

13 instead of the President. So in that sense the President 

14 is the one who is directing. 

15 Q So that would be at the time that he could 

16 say — 

17 A Th« usual form, I really think — and I don't 

18 know whether they do it invariably, but almost all of the 

19 directions that we receive that are signed by the 

20 National Security Advissr are "for the President", and 

21 those words ar« included. 

22 Q Now could he give it verbally and say that 

23 this is for the President? Would it carry the same 

24 weight? If he said I'm giving you an order and this is 

25 for the President, then it would carry the same weight? 



lINCtSSMD 



554 



DNOM^a^'^ 



tfend 94 



1 A Yeah. As I said, I think you hav« to 

2 understand that these are people who work with each other 

3 every day for years on end and if the Secretary disagrees 

4 with an instruction or direction or suggestion that he 

5 gets from the National Security Advisor, he knows exactly 

6 what he can do, and he has done it many, many times, and 

7 that is to say I want to take that issue to the 

8 President. 

9 Now if he already knows that the President has 
LO addressed It and decided it, he wouldn't say that. He 

LI would just say, fine, I understand, or he might say could 

L2 you take that back up to the President. I'd like to be 

L3 sure. And the National Security Advisdr would do that. 

L4 Nov you operate in this environment completely on 

L5 confidence in each other that that's happening — I mean 

L6 that in fact people are telling you, if they say that the 

L7 President is saying this, that indeed he is. 

L8 If he isn't or if you begin to feel that he 

L9 isn't, you've got a lot of problems working in this 

20 environment. 

n Q Whet if a National Security Advis4r asked a 

22 Cabinet Secretary to perform a certain task that both 

23 well know is covered by policy and that both well know is 

24 an appropriate request? 

25 A An appropriate request? 



lINKfe^n^i) 



555 



UHEiMffl 



/CODEWORD 9 5 

1 Q An appropriate request, and he didn't say I'm 

2 speaking- for the President. He just said I am requesting 

3 that you do this, and the Cabinet Secretary hears the 

4 request and says this is policy. So would he be likely 

5 to say well, that's fine, I'll do that? 

6 MR. GARRETT: Roger, you mean Presidential 
1 policy? 

8 THE WITNESS: I could give you an example. I 

9 can give you an example of a case that may be just in 

10 terms of the authority and what a Cabinet officer can do 

11 and what he does do. 

^^ In the Achille Lauro incident, for instance, 

13 the Secretary — I was here and I was getting from the 

14 National Security Adviser or, actually the Deputy 

15 National Security Adviscjr, John Poindexter, because Bud 

16 McFarlane was off in New York or something, directions to 

17 intercept the airplane that afternoon. I got these 

18 directions and the first thing I did when I said thank 

19 you — and this is very time sensitive; we had three 

2 hours or sonething to deal with this — I tried to reach 

21 the secretary to tell hin I was getting these directions. 
^2 And I did things like ~ I did things that 

2 3 would enable me to carry out the mission or that had to 

24 be done so that I would still be able to carry it out, 

25 but I did not give the instructions to carry out the 



UNttSSSnfO 



556 



BNttjI^v^^ 



1 mission, even though John Poindexter was telling me to. 

2 I never talked to the President about it, but I was 

3 confident that when John was telling me that the 

4 President wanted this done that we should be sure that we 

5 were in a position to do it if we possibly could be. 

6 When it came time to actually launch — I mean 

7 to actually execute the mission, I finally reached the 

8 Secretary and I told him that the President wanted this 

9 done and he said well, who is saying that. I said I've 

10 talked with John Poindexter. And he said are you sure 

11 that the President wants this done, and I said yes, I am 

12 sure. 

13 And he said, well, I want to be even more sure 

14 and he called the President himself, and then he called 

15 me back and told me fine, go. So that's just an instance 

16 where he did not take this route, and that is open to 

17 hin. That option is open to him and, as you can see from 

18 what I just told you, he uses it when he feels he wants 

19 to. 

20 BY MR. KREUZER: (Resuming) 

21 Q But we could say, then, that the National 

22 Security Advisor, if he says I would like you to do 

23 something and it's Presidential policy because he works 

24 for the President and that's part of his Administration, 

25 then that would be a proper thing that a Cabinet 



mmmi 



557 



DNtlASPfn 



EWOflft -J 97 

1 Secretary would follow? 

2 A If he wants to. If he disagrees with it ~ I 

3 mean, the issue only arises when the Cabinet member does 

4 not want to do what somebody is telling him to do, other 

5 than the President. And if he doesn't, he is entirely 

6 capable of calling the President and asking him whether 

7 he wants him to do it, and that's his route. That's what 

8 he does. 

9 Q This is my last part of the question. Would 

10 the National Security Advisor have the authority to issue 

11 a request to a Cabinet Secretary if he were plowing new 

12 ground on policy which had not been established with the 

13 President but which he estimated would be what the 

14 President would want to be done? Would it be likely? I 

15 mean, could he give an order based on an estimate of the 

16 situation that the President isn't there, can't answer 

17 the question or for some reason could he request that a 

18 Cabinet officer perform a duty that isn't covered by 

19 Presidential policy? 

20 A I think the answer is a practical one. He can 

21 give such a direction. A Cabinet officer can follow it 

22 or he can give such a direction and then it happens, and 

23 that's the end of it. Or he can give such a direction 

24 and the Cabinet officer can say I don't want to do that. 

25 Then he can't give such an order. Or he can give it, but 



yMSS3fi!fl 



558 



16 



IINCtI 



E«kUT/CODE»Ci|*ll * 98 

IU8 '' 

1 it won't happen. 

2 You )cnow, no one — and this is not just here; 

3 I mean, this is true in HHS, the Chief of Staff of the 

4 White House, just the way you run things. If I give an 

5 order to somebody here, and I accept this, they can 

6 always ask the Secretary if that's what he wants them to 

7 do. They don't often do it, but they could, and if they 

8 did I wouldn't object. I mean, that's open to them. 

9 MR. SAXON: Mr. Secretary, we know your time 

10 is at a premium and both Committees appreciate very much 

11 your giving us this much of your time and appreciate your 

12 testimony. It has been very helpful. 

13 THE WITNESS: Okay. I hope so. 

14 (Whereupon, at 6:50 p.m., the taking of the 

15 instant deposition ceased.) 



17 Signature of the witness 

18 Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of 

19 , 1987. 



20 

21 Notary Public 

22 My Commission Expires: 



m 



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: '/ ■_^ ; chac :he casciaony 0: said -Jiznass -a- 

ca<en by aa co the besc of ny ability and thereaitar redacei to typav 
under ay direction; that said deposition is a true record :: t.-.a tas: 
given by said witness; that I aa neither counsel fpr, ralatec zo. -.:: 
aaployed by any of the parties to the action in vhich this dapositior 
vas taken, and further that I aa not a relative or eaployee of any 
attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially 
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. 



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Th« attached mtaerandua ffroa th« Olrtcter eC eh« Aray staff 
la a«lf-«iplanatorv. It raCUeta eh* unaaaa of th« Aray Ganaral 
Ceunaal'a of flea ovar tha tranafar of itaaa with which you ara 
faalliar. As you know, wa hava b«an handling thia pro^raa on a 
vary clot* hold baala, and tha Aray ha« baan told nothing with 
raap«et to daatinatlon. Par ^uldanea raealtrad froa NIC, tha Aray 
has baan told that thay hava no raaponalbility for Con9raaatonal 
notification. Tha Aray haa alae baan told that whatavar notlfl- 
catlona ara to ba aada will b« takan cara of at tha approprlata 
tlaa by tha approprlata aqaney and that tha Attornay Canaral haa 
provldad an oolnion that aupperts thia poaition. 

Tha Saeratary aakad that I aaka you awara of tha Aray 'a 
eenearna In tha avant you wlah to adviaa tha OCX or tha Attornav 
Canaral . 




Colin t. Powak^ 
Major Canaral, 08A 
Sanior Military Aaaiatant 
to tha Saeratary of Oafanaa 



■-3S cf E 0. -2351 "^^ 
■ ■ ^1 'i-^.^iity Coii'.til 




mmsm 



562 




mmm_ 






KBMORAIIDOM fO» TBI NXLXTAKT^^>«<rSTAiry TO Til StCRBTAKy Of OirCNSE 

StJtJlcri Coa^rtcaleoAl Netlfleatiea of Stfiilf leant Intalliganc* 
AetiTltlaa (O) 



1. rrs/noroi*) Oa ll Jaaaary lUt, th« hrmf raapeadad to a rarbal 
t«akln9 ttom your oCflea to provide 1,000 TOW alaallaa to tbo 
Caatral Zatalllgaaeo J^oaey with a eeatla^oaer for 3,S09 aera at a 
latar data. Tho flrat 1,000 mlaailaa wora dollvorad ea 
14 rabruary 1910 to tbo CIA. 

\n) Thla ra^aat for aapport elreuavaatad tha noraal 

Hysta* for raaaoaa of aocvrlty, yot tho aupport 

leaodoo tbo II alllloa tbraabold aatabllabod la tbo m« 
Xatolllgoaco Autberliatlea Bill for roportla^ to Coa^raaa as a 
*sl9alfleaat latalll^aaea activity.* Puado la aaeoas eC 9). 9 
alllloa vara provldad by tbo CZA to rolaburso tho Aray for tha 
eirat 1,000 alssllas. Illlla« aad poyaoat will oeoir within (0 
days, or whoa all aioalloo aro dollvorod, wtoieboTor la ahertar. 
Tho A9«aey axpocta to eeaploto tho projoet witbia 00 days. 

3. X^/wr»rtawi *"<n>«f « a»iraadiia o f 13 Joao 1919, aubjaeti OeO 
Support ■■■■■■■■^■■i^B (S), astabllshas raspoaslblUty 
Cor aetlfleatioa of Ceofrooo o^oo support to tbo A^oaey with tho 
Oopoty Oador Soerotary of Dofoaso (or poller . It also eoneiraa 
that prlaary raspeasibillty rosldos with tbo Olractor, Cantral 
Intalll9oaeo. Za tbo com of tho T0« aissllao, tho Aray 
undorotoadlao oa roopoaolbllltioa (or aotldeatloa eoaeeras with 
yoor Jiaa 1913 aaaeraadoa. 



4 . 1 KftBIOai ) Thia aaao la to aasoro ondorstaadla^ e( itatatory 

roquiroaaata sboald this issao bo raisod by oao of tho 
Coa^rosaieaal iatollifoaeo eeaaittoos la tbo (ataro. 



...3.^ ^.„ _ ^^i 



" ' r ft T'oa* AWiOl !• illOWl* Jl. 

,n<',..o '- .. ■■ ,'j:\s ^^ -^' r count;* Liootoaaat Ooaoral, M 

*' : "■-•^ ^' :;jj^:A^-^^ Olrootor of tho Amy Staff 



CtASSiriBO STt 
OBCtASSZrT oil 



l)NClAi«fl-„ --"• 

III 



563 



= i 



ill 







uNemnfe 



L^^(fy(^' 






NikrioNAu stcunmr council 
wASMiMaTON. o.e. utM 



19tC 



■^^'■Js 



307 



ACTIOB January 15 

MEMORAMDOM POR JOBM M. POZHDEXTIX 

FROMi OLZVUt L. NO]tTR|/ \\ 

SUBJECT I M««tin9 with GABAral Jack Galvia, 0S800TCB0M 

You ar« seh«dul«d to mmmt with G«o«ral Jack Galvia on Thursday, 
January 16 from 10s 30-11: 00 a. a. <;«n«ral Calvin has soma spaeific 
racoanandations on futura plans for aora affactiva support to tha 
Daaocratie Rasistanea Forcas (DRT) in Nicaragua. In this ^agard, 
Elliott Abrahas advisad today that Sanator Dola is drafting a 
bill which will provida ovart ailitary support for tha ORT. Ha 
raportadly has Sanators Lugar. Buapars, and Boran as co-sponsors 
and Sanator Saa Munn is considaring whathar or not to "sign-on.* 

Ganaral Gozaan was and is an activo proponant of a graatar rola 
for tha Spaeial rorcas in training/advising both tha Salvadoraa 
ailitary tha DRT. (;anaral Galvin sharas this baliaf. Beth 
raaain convincad that tha CIA lacks tha ailitary ai^artisa 
naeassary to adaquataly train and adTisa tha ORT la an appreptiata 
stratagy or avan tha propar tactics. Thair concarn is net 
unfoondad. To this data, tha CZA has baan onabla to produca a 
coharant ailitary stratagy, tha tactics to support saeh a 
stratagy, or to adaquataly train tha forca to acccaplish aithar. 
Adaittadly, soaa of tha problaa is bacausa of our 'on again- 
off again" Congraaaional rastrietlons . But, no saall part of tha 
problaa ia a lack of axpartisa in tha paraailitary sida of tha 
CZA oparationa diracorata. 



Finally, tioaral Galvla has askad that yea agraa to periodic 
(about oatas a aenthl aaetinga with yea to discuss sensitive 
issuea. Toe sheald be aware that General Galvin i^oani|^t of 
the activftiea underway ia both Coata tiea and •tVHBHj 

in support of the DRT. General GalviS is antnusiastic 
leavers. Z will be flying with General Galvin to 
Costa Rica after the iMeting with a return Tuesday aoming. 



^niyO RECOMMEWDATIOH 

"^ ^ ^ That you ravisw tha points above prior to your meeting. 



% 



Approve 



liaW^^BPTTi 



A' 



;l^__ 



564 



us MILITARY CROLP EL SALVADOR 

APO MIAMI 31023 1 FSB 8 5 



stWECT Felix Rodrigu«z 



THRU : DCM 

TO: ANB PICKERING 



Per your guidance, attached is a draft 
backchannel to Gen Gorman on our 
"no pay" mercenary. 



«^^ STEELK 



STEELE 



Partially Oeciassified'PthrJseJ on <0 P& V8 

^3/ 



bit 




565 



wmm 




/((■fii'ji' 



'D 



1637118294 
/OO T£»Ril . 
■VdI niANA''(»rf22* e4;22S7 
' '.NT r.MNSS 

.kZk_0OSOA IE 

^ LiflHirii 00 ZTU 

^ FK U JISOOTHC OW 
TO 

>, ZL'l 

-^ CONFIDE. VTIAI 

-- EI£S ONLT//ETBS ONLT//ITES 0NLT//1 
-^ MACT IMMEDIATED 

>0R AMBASSADOR PIClERINC IND COL' STEELE^FROM GEN GORMA 
-V, SUtfJiCT: FELIX RODRIOOEZ 

--, 1. (C) I HAVE JUST MIT HIRE «ITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ, 

jQIUfROM MIAMI. fORW IN CUBA. A VETERAN OF CUEREILlA OlTHnfTfCNS 



PNA-e43&-l4-FEB-e5 
[IS ONLY// 




3E IS 
IHI VP 



r W^^^ 



- CPiRA:iNG AS A PRIVATE CITUEN, BOT HIS ACQUAINTANCESa IP WITH 
IS R.'U tNOJCd, GOING BAC;x TO LATTFR'S DATS A3 DCI . 

-2. (C) RODRIGUEZ' PRIMART COMMITMENT TO TdE REGION IS INl 

- »Htf.i 3t WANTS TO ASSlSl.TEl FDN. I lOLD HIM THAT TBI FDlf 
ilS ^F.IORITT. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT TOUR WORa WITH THE PRAl WAS 

-N At7A:;ClNC WELL, AND THAT *l HAD MADE PROGRESS WITH TRAINING OTHI?. 
r,./>.iR3'- FOilCiS. I WARNED HIM THAI WHATEVER HIS CONSOLTING ROLE I'' ri 
''?|5A1 Arc'JNiED TO, HI COULD NOT iiECOr'I 7ISI3LE TO THE PRESS IN A>Jr 
-•ins- ilTiOUT DA1ASINU OUR CAOSi. THESt. I ALSO CAUTIONED THAT FL 
-'L •.. i A ViRT MOCa -ORE DELICATE ENVIRONflNT *ITd RESPECT TO CIVIL- 
• ILITAaT RILATIOKS AND SESP2CT FOR 3U>'AN RIJHTS THAN ANT HE HAD 

-•. c:-.;j»a:ed lu ttioRi.' 

" c, (C) he WILL WANT TO >LY WiTa TiE LSAf TO -STASLISH HIS 

CKiriblLIIl, 3UT TEAT J»IT CF MACHI-SMO SEP1S TO Mi: BOTH UNNECESSARY 

- A.VJ Ur.ilSI. 
"' 1. ' (C) MT JUiGMlNT IS THAT HIS ADVICE tILL REIKFORCE OURS, AND 

.-.i.1 »l SHO-DLC P'JT NO OBSTACLES IN HIS WAY TO CONSULTING tlTH 

- -iaklon or .-ustillo unless and until »e g et COU.NTFRIND ICATIOHS. I 

" ^.^;0^MEN D TEAT JIM S TEELE "iET WITH HI1. — ^^IaND AM3ASSAL0R 
I L - A< Al!»0 WA^^I !6 IhUHVIiJ alH, J>iJT 6j/< Mf Tt. 'r,TEREi\ IS. *S I S^Z 

- .T. VO iNSCRi Wt .\NOW WHAT EE IS TiLLiNG 3LANDCN AND 3USTILL0 VI\ 
• :-.-.-r.IIF AND OJT-BRIXF. 

.. (C) iSS'JhlNG TOOll APPROVAL, I WILL SEND RODRIGUFZ TO 
:C>lvRKC«, 15 FEB, ON ONE 01 MY C-12S. 'il WILL A.-tRlVZ AROUfTT 
' LC-'AL. HE IS A LONG-TIME FP.IIND OF LOU RODRIGOIZ AND, IF AVAILABLE, 
iOUlC APPRiClATl IT I? LOO COlJlD bE 3IS CONTACT POINT. I iMTlCIPATr 
:-.! WILL WANT TO DEPART FOP MIAMI ON SATURDAY. 

s's"JoT?:''%ZLIVER IMMEDIATELY. Papally DeclaSined/Sel^ofl^M^ST- 

rk'22o lind^r provlsiwfl of to. 12356 

, !>y 3. Re««r, National Security Councn r 

*.KNN . • 



IINClASSiriED 




566 



(^_30%^\A/-*^ 



BACK CHANNE'. 



-tWClASSIflEO •^"••« 

PartialJiI)eclafflried7«li«M«.2Qj,^iiL4?87 ' ^ ^*^^ 

»ndirpiOT6l(«ofLft.l^56 ^ 'T" >^^ 

Jj! 3. %«;. Katfooal 5«uf1ty Countll ^^ 



;CTION: STATE RCI, IMMEDIATE 
USSOUTHCOM, IMMEDIATE 



EYES ONLY rC A = A f ■• T L E Y AND JOHNSTONE; SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL 

gof:'an FKcr. Pickering 



r--£ET:rJG WITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ 



1. I HAD A VALUABLE f-lEETING WITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ FEBRUARY 15, 




OBVIOUSLY OTHER VARIATIONS ARE POSSIBLE, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO . 
INTEGRATEflHHUmHjJUlSSUE AND THAN 

BEFORE IF IT IS TO WORK, S0.NETHIN6 1 AGREE WITH ON ITS OWN. 



3. RODRIGUEZ WILL RETURN IN 3-« WEEKS TO WORK WITH BUSTILLO 
(FAS) AND STEELE. STEELE WILL HONITOR CLOSELY. RODRIGUEZ UNDER 
STANDS MY GENERAL RULES -- NO CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND HE IS NOT 
TO ACCOMPANY FAS ON COMB*** «<MiOMSW^MP. ifiiLfS.. WE WILL START 



'jjraimi 




567 



UNCLASSIFIED 



D 23181 



SLOWL'Y AND CAREFULLY TO SEE WHAT APPROACH CAN' PPODUCE. HE WILL 
TAKE ON HIGHER PRIORITY^HmISSION FIRST. 

t. . FOR ARA: PLEASE BRIEF OON GREGG IN VP'S OFFICE FOR KE. 



UNtUSSIHB 



568 






^NftlWltu 



/^ Ac, 



NATIONAL SECURfTY COUNCL 

December 10, 1985 ^i| 



SYSTEK II 

91229 

Add-on 



ACTION 

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M, POINDEXTfcp U 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTHj/ 

SUBJECT: Trip to the Central America Region 



iU99 



Attached at Tab I is a NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet for a 
proposed trip to the Central American region headed by VADM 
Poindexter on December 11-12, 1985. 



Participants: 

VADM John M. Poindexter 

Asst Sec of State Elliott Abrams 

Dep AsstSec of State William Walker 

Mr. J 



LTCOL Oliver North 
G. Philip Hughes 



General Itinerary ; 



Depart 
Arrive 

Depart 

Arrive 
Depart 
Arrive 
Depart 
Arrive 
Depart 
Arrive 

Depart 
Arrive 



6:30 p.m.. Wed, Dec 11 Andrews AFB 

11:00 p.m. Howard AFB, Panama 

(Remain Overnight) 

9:00 a.m., Thurs, Dec 12 Howard AFB, Panama 

(save one hour enroute - change of time zone) 

9:00 a.m. San Jose, Costa Rica 

10:30 a.m. San Jose, Costa Rica 

11:40 a.m. Ilopongo AB, El Salvador 

1:00 p.m. Ilopongo AB, El Salvador 

1:30 p.m. Palmerola AB, Honduras 

3:30 p.m. Palmerola AB, Honduras 

5:15 p.m. La Aurora AB, Guatemala Cit 

change of time zone) 



(gain one hour enroute 
6:30 p.m. 
12:00 midnight 



La Aurora AB, 
Andrews AFB 



Guatemala Cit 



NSC will defray expenses for North and Hughes' travel. Travel will 
by military aircraft. Trip has been verbally approv ed bv ^oindexte 

RECOMMENDATION 



That you authorize RicJc Benner to cut the appropriate travel orders 
for both North and Hughes. " ». iT 



Approve 



Disapprove 



Attachment 

Tab I - NSC Staff Travel Authorization She 



declassify < OAOR 



wsmm 




irTylylMallj^^ 



1. TRAVELES'S NAME; ^^£-fcCtf Mft.»Vt-M>af tfl'^ffg G. Philip Hughas 

2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATECSI: '^° accompany VADM Poindcxfr on 

brief, low-prof il< trio to Central American region to confer wit.-, 
too ranJci nq U.S. oflficials and to reinforce the continuity of i; . S . 
policy m the region. (see cover memo for itinerary) 

M ;t^u u — ~ 

3. ITINERAPy (Pl«as« Attach Copy of Propo««d Itinerary) ; see cover me.- 

DEPARTURE DATE Wed. Dec 11 RETURN DATE Thurs, Dec 12 
TIME 6 = 30 p.m. TIME J' 2: 00 midnight 

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION: - 
GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR POV RAIL OTHER 

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES: 



TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM xx OTHER TOTAL TRIP COST • ' 

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC XX . OTEZR 

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEKZNTS ; N/A * 



8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO xx 

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Trav«l Not Paid by Traveler, 
Describe Source and Arrangements) : N/A , 



10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: $ 0.00 

11. RE.MARXS (Use This' Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Woulc 
LiJce to Appear on Your Travel Orders) : . 



12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATVSE: 4 AAA>^ {JqJjL^ ^ 



570 



wmm 

NATIONAL SECUWTV COUNCIL . 



D«c«mbcr 2. 198S 



ACTION 



MEMORANDUM FOR JOHK M. POINDEXTES 

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH |/ 

SUBJECT; Trip to Panama and Honduras 







H 1^3^! 



tnce. arranqem«nti hav« be«n made for vou te 

<D«c 5) . The itinerary and substance of your meetings 

lave been discussed with State (DASS Bill Walker) and SOUTHCOM 
(General Calvin) . 

Attached at Tab I is a NSC Staff Travel Authorisation Sheet for a 
proposed trip to Panajna and Honduras on December 4-5, 19*' • 

Participants ; 

ADM John M. Poindexter 

Mr. Richard Armitage 

Mr. William WaPcer 

Mr.J 



LTCOL Oliver North 
Mr. Raymond Burghardt 



General Itinerary (details at Tabs III and XV) 



Depart 


2;iO p.m., 


, wed, Dec 4 


Andrews AFB 


Arrive 


7:35 p.m. 




Howard AFB, Panama 
(Remain Overnight) 


Depart 


9:00 a.m., 


, Thurs, Dec 5 


Howard AFB, Panama 


Arrive 


9:50 a.m. 




Palmerola AB, Honduras 


Depart 


2:00 p.m., 


, Thurs, Dec 5 


Palmerola AB, Honduras 


Arrive 


7:10 p.m. 




Andrews AFB 



■I 



NSC will defray expenses for North and Burghardt's travel. 

Attached at Tab II is a memo from you to Don Regan requesting 
a Special Air Mission (SAM) support for this trip. 

Tabs III and IV provide an overview of the situation and the 
objectives we hope to achieve in Panama and Honduras, 
respectively. Detailed tal)cing points for your use during the; 
trip will be provided separately. 

State (Wal)cer) , Defense (Armitage) , CIA^^^^I and Raf 
Burghardt concur. ^^^^^^ 



571 



SRfBFt. 



iilfp!) 



RECOMMgNDATIONS 



irder;'^JorNcr"\°n^rLr^h='r;;?"" ^° "^ ^*^* appropriate travel 
Approve ^ Ditapprove 

2. That you initial and forward th* memo at Tab II to Don ».„. 
reque.ting SAM support for the trip. •*''*" 

Approve Diaapprova 

3. That you review Tab. Ill and IV prior to the trip. 

Approve Disapprove 

cc: Ric)c Benner (w/o Tabs II, ill, and IV) 



Attachments 

Tab I - NSC Staff Travel Authorization Sheet 

Tab II - Poindexter Memo to Regan 

T*K ^T,^, ■ S""«"* Situation and our Objectives for Panama 

TaD IV - Current Situation and our Objectives for Honduras 



^ laiSIIBHI 



572 



1. TRAVSLES'S NAME: 



2. PURPOSE (S), EVENT (#f,»tjftrfsi T For official m««tingi m Panama 
and Hondurai D«g«mh>r 4-5. 1985. 



i^^sis: 



3. ITINERARY (Pl««sc Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary) ; s«e mewo ' 

^ .^ SYSTEM i: 9122 



OCPARTUR£ DATE **•<»> P»= * RITURN DATE Thuri. D«c 5 

yXME ^ = 30 p.m. TIME ^'^° P-"- 

4. MODE or TRANSPORTATION: 

GOV AI R XX COMMERCIAL AIR POV RAIL OTHIR 

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES: . 



({126.00 par^iam for or 

TRANSPORTATION PER DIEM XX OTHE R ■ TOTAL TRIP COST S252.'00 

• ^^^^ 
-. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC "X . OTHER 



7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOORCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: 



8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO XX 

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Tr*v«l Not P»id by Travaltr, 
Describ* Sourc« and Arrang«m«nti) : n/a . 



10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: f 0.00 

11. REMARKS (Us« This' Spac* to Indicat* Any Additional Itaois You Would 
Lika to Appear on Your Traval Ordars) : 



. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: ^ tlUTA, HCjjtL • -Pph^ 

wmvm 



13. APPROVALS; 



573 




THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 



SYSTEM 
91229 



-eewrDEvrrxr- 



B\90^ 



MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. R£GAN 

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER 

SUBJECT: Special Air Million (SAM) Support 



It ii requested that a SAM C-20 aircraft be provided for a 
propoied trip to Panama and Hondurai on December 4-5, 1985. The 
purpoie of the trip is to review the current situation in Central 
America with key government officials in these two countries. 
The itinerary for the trip is indicated below: 

Proposed Itinerary ; 



Depart 2:30 p.m.. Wed, Dec 4 
Arrive 7: 35 p.m. 



Thurs, Dec 5 



Depart 


9 


:00 a. 


Arrive 


9 


:50 a 


Depart 


2 


:00 p, 


Arrive 


7 


:10 p, 



Thurs, Dec 5 



Andrews AFB - 
Howard AFB, Panama 
(Remain Overnight) 
Howard AFB, Panama 
Palmerola AB, Honduras 
Palmerola AB, Honduras 
Andrews AFB 



cc: The Honorable Richard P. Riley 
Assistant to the President and 

Director of Special Support Services 



•,de ;.;.■:. asc'E.O. 1?356 
^Jy 2. Re:;', i::' ' :' Sjturit; Council 



COWriDENTIAL 
Deel«««< *■" 




574 



\!HWS«B 



3A90S 






MIASSW 



575 




i^906 



Based on diacuasions with Walkar at Stata and Ganaral Galvxn, the 
following detailed itineary has been proposed for Panama: 

•Wednesday, December 4, 1985 ; 

1935: Arrive Howard XFB, Panama; proceed to US\F Hdqtrs 

1940 - 2010: 30 minute briefing w/General Calvin at USAF Hdqtrs 

2010 - 2030: Proceed via USSO UTHCOM auto to SOUTHCOM RdqtrsHI 



2030 - 21001 
2115 - 2200: 
2200 - morn: 




attendees: Poindexter, 



Recap briefing at CG, OSSOOTHCOM residence w/O.S. 
team and General Galvln 

Poindexter RON at Qtrs 1 w/G«ner«l Galvin; 
remainder of U.S. teas RON at Casa Carribe 



Thursday, December 5, 1985 

0700 - 0730: Breakfast (Qtrs 1 and Casa Carribe) 

0730 - 0745: Proceed to USSOUTHCOM Op Ctr 

0745 - 0845: USSOUTHCOM regional security briefing 

0845 -0900: Proceed to Howard AJB, Panama 

0905 - 0950: Enroute to Honduras via C-20 



f.O. 1235* 
,; : it; Council 



SECHttT 



\msssni 



576 



U 



H SI 907 

CURR£NT SITUXTION/OBJECTIVtS FOR HONDURAS 




Thursday, 
0950: 



DecembT 5, 1985 

Arriv* Palncrola Air Base, Honduras (save one 
hour cnrout* — 1 hour and 50 minute flight) 






1000 - 1215: 
1215 - 1315: 
1315 - UOO: 



1400 - 1910! 
5BCRCT 



bltcussioni with| 
Poindexter, U.S. 

Working lunch at CTF Bravo (U.S. military exercise 
hdqtri) 




Hlt}5(^mjrh"" 



rTiflng by AmEmb Tegucigalpa 
to Andrews AFB 



577 






SYSTEM 
91229 
UNCI, 



December 10, 198S '^^ffcL.UJ'L^**^ 



MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXT*P 

FROM: OLIVER •„ . NORTI^ 

SUBJECT: Cable to Post* Advising of Your Trip to the 
Central America Region 

The cable attached at Tab I has been coordinated directly with 
Elliott Abrans, Anb John Ferch, and General Galvin. Please note 
once we arrive in Panama aboard C-20 we will be using General 
Calvin's C-9 in-theater. This will allow sufficient rest for 
your aircrew and provide more space for traveling team 
m-theater. Paul Thompson has coordinated aircraft support and 
exchange of aircraft. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you author^* dispatch of the cable at Tab I 
(Op Immed viaflHH channel) . 

Approve Disapprove 



Attachment 

Tab I - Poindexter Cable to Central American Posts 



cc: Paul Thompson 
Philip Hughes 






Jeclassifv: n>np 



Mli^^Wft 



578 



ilNniFID 



H ^^?o' 



FM: WHITE HODSE 

TO: AM EMB PANAMA CITY, PANAMA 
AM EMB SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA 
AM EMB SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR 
AM EMB TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS 
AM EMB GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA 
USCINCSO, QUARRY HTS , PANAMA 

INFO: SEC STATE, WASH, D.C. 
SEC DEF, WASH, D.C. 
DIR. CIA, WASH, D.C. 
CHMN. JCS, WASH, D.C. 

SECRET //EYES ONLY 



SUBJ: VISIT TO CENTRAL AMERICA BY ASST. TO PRESIDENT FOR 

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DESIG. JOHN M. POINDEXTER (C) 

1. SECRET— ENTIRE TEXT. 

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, 
VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER, TO MAKE A HASTY, LOW-PROFILE TRIP TO 
CENTRAL AMERICA TO CONFER WITH TOP RANKING U.S. OFFICIALS AND TO 
REINFORCE THE CONTINUITY OF U.S. POLICY IN THE REGION. IN EACH 



^im&m 



579 



immii 



LOCATION THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH 
THE U.S. AMBASSADOR.^^^^^^^^^^HaND MILITARY 

REPRESENTATIVES. INVITATION OF CINC U;S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, 
GENERAL CALVIN, FOR USE OF HIS AIRCRAFT IN-THEATER IS qJl^PEQjLLY 
ACCEPTED. WASHINGTON BASED C-20 WILL PROCEED TO gJ^TEMALA TO 
RENDEZVOUS WITH WASHINGTON PARTY. 



3. PURPOSE OF THE TRIP IS TO MEET WITH U.S. OFFICIALS NOT REPEAT 
NOT WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS. PLEASE EMPHASIZE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS 
THAT NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR INTENDS THAT THIS BRIEF, INFORMAL 
FAMILIARIZATION TRIP WILL BE FOLLOWED AT A FUTURE DATE BY A 
LONGER VISIT WHICH WILL ALLOW MEETINGS WITH REGIONAL HEADS OF 
STATE AND ADDITIONAL BOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. AMBASSADORS 
SHOULD STRESS THAT THIS SECOND VISIT WILL PROBABLY OCCUR AfTER 
INSTALLATION/ INAUGURATION OF NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENTS IN COSTA 
RICA, HONDURAS, AND GUATEMALA. 

4. WASHINGTON PARTY WILL ARRIVE VIA SAM C-20 AND CONSIST OF: 
VADM JOHN POINDEXTER, DESIG. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO PRES 
ASST SEC OF STATE ELLIOTT ABRAMS 

DEP ASST SEC OF STATE WILLIAM WALKER 

MR. 

LTCOL OLIVER M6RTH, NSC STAFF 

G. PHILIP HUGHES, NSC STAFF 

CDR PAUL THOMPSON, MIL ASST TO NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 

2 WHCA COMMUNICATORS 



Mmvm 



580 



s»6w:: 



iiiBSsrra 



5^9^^^ 



5. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY VISIT HOST 
NATION AND U.S. MILITARY UNITS IN THE REGION AND INFORMALLY MEET 
WITH CERTAIN KEY OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN AIDING THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF U.S. POLICY IN THE REGION AS INDICATED BELOW. WASHINGTON 
PARTY WILL BE INFORMALLY ATTIRED SINCE MOST STOPS WILL OCCUR AT 
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. ITINERARY IS PLANNED AS FOLLOWS: 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER II, 1985 
18 30 DEPART ANDREWS AFB 
2300 ARRIVE HOWARD AFB PANAMA 

(RON QTRS 1 U.S. CINCSO, GEN GALVIN) 



THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1985 
07 30 BREAKFAST AT QTRS 1 
800 DEPART FOR VIP LOUNGE, HOWARD AFB 

0830-0900 WD LIKE TO MEET PRIVATELY IN VIP LOUNGE AT HOWARD AFB 
m^HHHHAMB BRZGGS, GEN GALVIN, ASST SEC ABRAMS 
IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. 
0900 WHEELS UP FOR SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA 

(SAVE ONE HOUR ENROUTE - CHANGE OF TIME ZONE) 
0900-10 30 WD PREFER MTG AT CARIARI HOTEL OR AIRPORT W/AMB TAMBS , 
;EN GALVIN, AND REMAINDER OF U.S. TEAM FOLLOWED BY 




■iftifct B.^Aiflicn 



581 



tt 



,iliP^«> 



^ASiA2 



THURSDAY, DECEMBER i:, 198 5 (CONT'D...) 

10 30 WHEELS UP FOR ILOPONGO AB EL SALVAADOR 

1140-1300 MTG AT ILOPONGO W/AMB ED CORR, GEN GALVIN, COL STEELE, 
AND MILGP CHIEF, AND^HwD LIKE TO MEET BRIEFLY W/DEF 
MIN VIDES AND GEN BLANDON AND BRIEFLY INSPECT AIR 
FORCE /COUNTER- INSURGENCY ASSETS. BRIEF R£ CURRENT 
OPERATIONS AND DISCUSSION OP COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM 
WD BE HELPFUL. 

1300 WHEELS UP FOR PALMEROLA AB HONDURAS 

1330-1530 MTG AT PALMEROLA W/AMB JOHN FERCH,^^HgEN GALVIN AT 
CTF BRAVO. WD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY FOR 
PRIVATE REPEAT PRIVATE Ml 

15 30 WHEELS UP FOR LA AURORA AB GUATEMALA CITY 

(GAIN ONE HOUR - CHANGE OF TIME ZONE) 
1715-1820 MTG AT LA AURORA AB GUATEMALA CITY W/AMB PIEDRA, 

GEM GALVIN ^^H POLCONS , AND REMAINDER OF U.S. TEAM; 

WD LIKE TO MEET BRIEFLY 



1830 
2400 





DISCUSSION OF 
COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM WO ALSO BE HELPFUL. ~ 
WHEELS UP FOR ANDREWS AFB 



ARiaVE ANDREWS AFB 



w\K 



.y^Slta 



582 



ygg^g*?- 



^W^ 



^A9^^ 



6. WASHINGTON PARTY REQUESTS ASSISTANCE RE VISAS AND CUSTOMS 
CLEARANCE IN THAT TIME HAS NOT PERMITTED NORMAL VISA PROCESSING. 
REGARDS, POINDEXTER. 



i' 



m0^^ 



583 




584 



UNCLASSIHED 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN 

AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 1987 

United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 
Deposition of: 

JACK TADASHI TASHIRO 
was taken, pursuant to notice, commencing at 2:00 o'clock, p.m., 
before Albert J. Gasdor, Notary Public in and for the District of 
Columbia, in Room 901 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 



APPEARANCE: 



On behalf of the Select Committee : 

JOHN A. SAXON, ESQ. 
Associate Counsel 



Partially Declassified/Released on I'T 
under provisions of E.O. 12356 
by N. Menan, National Security Council 



UNCLASSIFIED 



585 



UNCLASSIHED 



Wednesday, June 


10, 1987 




Washington. D 


.C. 






DEPONENT 






DIRECT 


JACK TADASHI 


TASHIRO 


3-48 






E X H _I B 


111 


TASHIRO 






FOR IDENTIFICATION 


No. 1 






9 


No. 2 






10 


No. 3 






10 


No. L 






11 


No. 5 4 5-A 






18 


Nos. 6 & 7 






23 


No. 8 






23 


No. 9 






31 


No. 10 






32 


No. 11 






32 


No. 12 






33 


No. 13 






34 


No. U 






35 


No. 15 






40 


No. 16 






41 


Mo. 17 






42 


Ho. 18 






42 


No. 19 






43 


No. 20 






43 


No. 21 






45 


No. 22 




llUiU AOOl 


45 

cicn 



586 



ONCUSSIflEO 



P-R_0-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
Whereupon , 

JACK TADASHI TASHIRO 
was called 33 a witness and, having been first duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q. Please state your name for the record. 
A. Jack Tadashi Tashiro. 

Q. Mr. Tashiro, what is the nature of your 
employment? 

A. I am one of the two owners and partners of 
VATEC. 

Q. With whom are you in partnership at VATEC? 

A. With Francis Schroeder. 

Q. Spell Schroeder, please. 

A. S-c-h-r-o-e-d-e-r . 

Q. VATEC is V-A-T-E-C? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. What is the address of VATEC? 

A. 122 Lafayette Avenue in Laurel, Maryland. 

Q. Your phone number, sir? 

A. 953-0057. 

Q. How long have you been an owner and partner of 



VATEC? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



587 



UNCUSSIRED 



A. Since 1983, January or February of 1983. 

Q. Is that when the firm was created? 

A. No, the firm was created in January, 1982, but 
nothing happened until February of 1983. 

Q. What is the nature of the business in which 
VATEC is involved? 

A. VATEC is a security organization. We install 

burglar alarms, smoke detectors in residences. We also 

r 
do card a^ccess systems, and perimeter protection for 

10 the government and for commercial buildings. 

11 Q. Who are some of your government clients, which 

12 agencies? 

13 A. Voice of America, Naval Research Lab, a couple 
of small jobs for the State Department. That is about 

15 it. 

15 Q. Mr. Tashiro, did there come a time in early 
1986 when VATEC had occasion to do some work at an 
address in Great Falls, Virginia of 703 Kent Kentland 



19 



Drive? 



20 A. Yes. 

Q. I believe that is the home of Lieutenant 

22 Colonel Oliver North; is that correct, sir? 

23 A. That is correct. 
Q. Did you know at the time that that_w^as the 

home of an Oliver North? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



588 





q 




10 




11 




12 




13 




U 




15 




16 




17 




18 




19 




20 




21 




22 




23 




24 


u 


25 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A. When we first started no, we did not until one 
of the Installers went to the address to survey that 
place. Until then, we did not know it was for Lt. Col. 
North. 

Q. But you did know it was for Colonel North at 
some point? 

A. Yes, we did. 

Q. And at no time wa^s there any attempt to 
conceal that from you? 

A. No, there was not. 

Q. What was the date of the first discussion with 
anyone at VATEC about doing some work at that address? 

A. That I don't have any specific dates because 
Glenn Robinette is the one who called us, and we had 
known him for so long and he had called us about so many 
jobs before that, we really didn't make a note of it. 

Q. If you would, sir, tell us your relationship 
with Hr. Robinette, which might predate this particular 
Job. 

A. Glenn Robinette and li 




were acquainted. 

Q. You said he had occasion to use VATEC in the 



past? 



■ •• UNClASSIflED 



589 



UNCUSSIFIED 



.or to this job; 



Q. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Within a rough timeframe, when did anything 
start happening in terms of the actual work? 

A. For Mr. North? 

Q. For Mr. North, yes. 

A. March or April of 1986. 

Q. Is that the date installation was begun or was 
this preceded by some estimates and measurements, et 
cetera? ' " 

A. It was preceded by an installer going out to 
the residence, looking it over and VATEC preparing an 
estimate in a proposal for Glenn Robinette. 

Q. Tell us if you would what your understanding 
was about what you were supposed to do at the residence. 
How was it put to you that you should go there and do 
something? 

A. We were told that there was an individual who 
worked for the government who was on the hit list of the 
terrorists and that they were getting threatening phone 
calls, and they were getting threats in the mailbox; 
that the individual's wife was distraught and the 
children were upset so, therefore, could we come up and 
very quickly come up with an estimate so that they could 
either find out who H.^. fiiit ting the notes in the mailbox 



590 



UNCLASSIHED 



and also putting a burgular alarm and lighting system in 
the house so that the wife would feel much more secure. 

Q. Who told you this, Mr. Robinette? 

A. Mr. Robinette, yes j 

Q. Did he tell that to you personally or to your 
partner or to someone else? 

A. To me and to one of our engineers, Mr. Jim 
Moore . 

Q. Jim M-o-o-r-e? 

A. That is right. 

Q. So what happened then? Someone went out to 
the residence to look at it? 

A. One of our installers, William Keller went out 
there, surveyed the place, came back and Jim Moore wrote 
a proposal. 

Q. What did Mr. Moore propose be done? What kind 
of system or systems were recommended? 

A. A burgular alarm system in the house, a 
lighting system around the residence. Then a TV camera 
aimed at the mailbox with some flood lights, if they 
were trying to find out who was putting these notes in 
the mailboxt and later a request to put an alarm in his 
vehicle. 

Q. This proposal was worked up you say by Mr. 
Moore? 



oNcussra 



591 



UNWIFIEO 



j)(^OC- 



10 

11 

12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
'\ 22 
23 
24 
25 



A. Ye3. 

Q. And it was presented to Mr. Robinette? 

A. Yes , orally . 

Q. Was there a price-tag on what I will call the 
total system? 

A. Yes. 

Q. What was that price-tag if you recall? 

A. The reason I am hesitating, the price that was 
accepted — they changed their mind about putting a 
camera out there and a gate system, so our price-tag ~ 
ended up at $11,000-some such. 

Q. Are you able at all to recall the earlier 
price, 115,000, $20,000, somewhere in between? 

A. It is in our work-up sheets that have the 
prices broken down by the various systems. I can look 
it up for you. 

Q. Mr. Tashiro, I have In front of me some of the 
worksheets and documents which you have provided us. 

Let me ask that you mark as Tashiro Deposition 
Exhibit 1 something that is handwritten and bears the 
title of invoi ce, made out to Mr. Glenn Robinette, his 
address,f^^^^^^^^^^^^H|re: Drive 

property. So this would be the invoice you actually 
provided to Mr. Robinette for the North residence; is 



that correct, sir? 



UNCLASSIRED 



592 



UNCIASSIRED 



[Tashiro Exhibit No. 1 marked 
for identif iction. ] 

A. No, this is our draft copy and then there 
should be an official invoice. 

Q. But it reflects the same data? 

A. Identical. 

Q. This working invoice or draft invoice shows 
that you provided an alarm system and car alarm which 
with materials and labor came to $7,567; is that correct 
sir? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. You also provided electrical work which with 
materials and labor came to $4,136; is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. So the total for the entire project of what 
you actually provided at the North residence was 
$11,703? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. You were paid this full amount ultimately? 

A. Ultimately, yea. 

Q. We will get into that in a moment. 

You indicated that you also worked up 
estimates on some additional work. I have in front of 
me then the pricing sheets they are called that VATEC 
worked up on the Kentland Drive residence. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



593 



UNCUSSIflED 



The first one I asked be marked deposition 
Exhibit 2 is the pricing sheet for it says type of work 

3 residential protection, and this reflects the figure of 

4 $7,567. This was one of the worksheets for the work 
actually provided; is that correct? 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 2 marked 
for identification.] 
A. That is correct. 
Q. I would ask that deposition Exhibit 3 be 

10 marked and that is a worksheet that reflects under typ* 

11 of work CCTV for the residence, and this is 

12 closed-circuit television? 

13 [Tashiro Exhibit No. 3 marked 
U for identification. 

15 A. Correct. 

16 Q- This was to be provided to focus on the North 
i; mailbox because I believe you told us they had been 

18 receiving so0e threatening mail; is that correct, sir? 

19 A. That is correct. 

20 Q- This is something Mr. Robinette asked you to 

21 price for them? 

22 *• That is correct. 

23 Q' And the worksheet price shows the total job 
2; for the closed-circuit TV would be $3,682; is that 
25 



UNCUSSIFIED 



594 



UNCLASSIFIED 



1 1 



A. That is correct. 

Q. This you did not provide ultimately; is that 
right? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. I would ask you to look then at your final 
pricing sheet which I would ask be marked deposition 
Exhibit 4 which under type of work has two items priced 
out. One is the automatic gate opener which for the 
total job would be $9,753 is that correct? 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 4 marked 
for identification.] 

A. That is correct. 

Q. And the second item is an intercom which the 
total job would be $1,l80. Is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. I believe it is correct, is it not, that 
neither of these was actually provided to the North 
residence by VATEC? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. If we add all of these up in order to arrive 
at the estimate figure for all of the work that you 
worked up and priced out, if you add the $11,703 for 
what was actually done to the $14,615 of the work not 
done by VATEC, we get a figure of $26,318? 

A. That is correct. 



UNCLASSIRED 



595 



UNCUSSIHED 



Q. 



Let me go back to how it came that you did 



lome of this work and not some of the other. 

3 When the pricing was done and the estimate was 

4 worked up, was that communicated to Mr. Robinette? 
A. That is right. 

Q. Was it communicated orally or in writing? 
A. Orally. 

Q. Was he ever shown these worksheets? 
A. He was not. 

10 Q' What happened when you told him here is the 

11 total package and here is the price-tag? 

12 A. He said please start on the alarm and the 

13 lights because that would seem to be the highest 

14 priority requirement. Then, as we were doing that, and 

15 we got the electricians to pull the electrical cable and 
15 the conduit from the house to the front gate, they 
y-j decided against the cafflera, and our discussions revolved 

around the possibility that if the items were being put 

19 in the mailbox in the evening or at night, then we would 

20 need to have a light go on so the camera could get a 

21 picture of the vehicle or license plate; and if a person 

22 was putting an item in the mailbox and all of a sudden 

23 the lights came on, obviously, he would look for the 
camera and either throw rocks or do something to destroy 
the camera. Therefore, I believe that was the reason 



ONCUSSiFIFD 



596 



mmm 






13 



they decided not to go with the camera. 

Q. How was it communicated to you that you shoulc 
hold off on certain of these items or that they did not 
want them installed? 

A. By telephone. He said to hold off on the 
others . 

Q. He is Mr. Robinette? 

A. Mr. Robinette. I have never talked to Mr. 
North. None of us from VATEC has ever talked to Mr. 
North. 

Q. Exactly when was the ins'tallation started, do 
you recall? 

A. I believe in April of 1986. 

Q. Do you know exactly when it was finally 
completed? 

A. In May of 1986, I believe. 

Q. If you would then summarize briefly exactly 
what systems and features were installed. 

A. Since the home was already completed and so 
that we would not drill holes in the walls or the wall 
paper, we decided to go with a burgular alarm system 
which was by RF rather than by hardware. 

Q. RF is what? 

A. Radio frequency transmitters. Therefore, we 
put in an Alert 2 which is our basic wireless burgi^lar 




597 



alarm system. 



BNCUSSm 



Then we also put up lights around the house to 
come on and then we put in smoke detectors and all of 
this is to be tied to a central station so that should a 
forced entry be made or should a fire occur while they 
are away from there, then the central station with get 
the alarm and call the police or fire station depending | 
on what the problem was. 

Q. The Norths or whoever was in residence? 

A. If they were gone and if a burglar attempted 
to come in, then the alarm signal would be sent to our 
central monitoring station which is manned 24 hours a 
day . 

Q. So a central station external to the 
residence? 

A. Right. 

Q. Did Mr. Robinette suggest any of these 
particular items to be installed, or was that something 
he left to you people? 

A. That was left entirely up to us. 

Q. Let^go back and ask you precisely about your 
dealings with Mr. Robinette. 

You indicated that you had dealt with him on a 
number of previous jobs so it is difficult to date 
precisely when you got the first call about this job; is 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



598 



UNCLASSIFIED 



that correct? 

A. Yes, but it was not too much before the start 
of the work because they said it was so urgent. 

Q. So it would have been late March, early April? 

A. Yes. 

Q- And did you ever talk to Mr. Robinette 
yourself about this job? 

A. Yes, I have. 

Q. Do you have any idea how many times you spoke 
with him about the North residence job? ' - 

A. Personally, maybe ten times. 

Q. When did you first find out that it was the 
residence of Oliver North? Was that when the installer 
went out there and said this is the home of a Mr. Oliver 
North? 

A. Yea. 

Q. When Mr. Robinette asked you to do this, did 
he give you the name of Oliver North? 

A. No, he did not. 

Q. But he did say it was an employee of the 
government? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did he say where in the government--the White 
House, the National Security Council? 

A. That, I rrf!Alli-.doa'L. UeB 



UNCLASSIHED 



16 



Q. And he linked the need for this equipment to 
security concerns for the resident, Mr. North? 

A. Yes, that he was also on the hit list of the 
terrorists and, at that time, terrorism was such a key 
issue with the U.S. It seemed very logical that he may 
have been on the hit list. 

Q. Did he mention the name of Abu Nidal? 

A. No. 

Q. Did he mention that this person was on the 
National Security Council staff? 

A. I don't recall hearing that. 

Q. At that point or at any other time, did he 
ever mention the name of General Richard Secord? 

A. No, he did not. 

Q. Did he tell you why he, Robinette, was 
handling this for the person whom you later found out 
was Colonel North? 

A. Glenn's business has always been as a 
middleman and he has handled situations like this 
before, so I was really not that surprised. He is a 
one-man businessman and he makes his living being a 
middleman, in between man, so this is pretty much his 
pattern. 

MR. SAXON: Let's go off the record a second. 
[Discussipn off_the record." 




600 



UNCUSSIFIED 



1 BY MR. SAXON: 

2 Q. Mr. Tashlro, we concluded from the Invoice you 

3 provided that the total amount of this bill was $11,703 

4 for the work done. Were you fully paid for that work? 

5 A. Yes, we were. 

6 Q. Did Mr. Roblnette pay you? 

7 A. Yes, he did. 

8 Q. Did he tell you why he would be handling the 
payment for this work? 

IQ A. No, he did not. 

11 Q. I believe you said he did not specify certain 

12 items to go into this Job? 

13 A. I know he did not. 

14 Q. You knew his background] 

15 from having dealt with him in your capacity at VATEC? 

16 A- ^es- 

17 Q. Was there any haggling over the price or did 

18 he simply say this portion of the estimate I want, this 

19 part I don't, and then he willingly paid the price for 

20 the work he took? 

21 A. No, we had no haggling on the alarm system. 

22 That is the part we did. There was no problem with 

23 that. 

24 Then when we got to the camera, I believe I 

25 explained that they thought that that would not be an 



601 



uNcussra 



effective way to do it 

Third, on the gate opener, unbeknownst to us, 

3 we had all pulled a wire and everything to the gate and 

4 then he had contracted with somebody else, and I really 
didn't know he had done that. He did not tell us they 
got somebody else until they had a problem. They they 
asked us to correct the problem. We suddenly found that 
he had used our cabling to hook up the gate opener and 

q that company had really done a sloppy job, and rain had 

10 seeped into the control box underground and that is w"hy 

11 they had all those problems. 
Q. What was the date for that? 

13 A. I have an invoice in there billing them for 

14 the labor. We guarantee everything for a year but since 

15 it was not something we had done, we billed them for 
15 repairing that problem with the gate opener. 
17 [Tashiro Exhibit No. 5 & 5-A marked 

for identification.] 
Q. I want to show you what I have asked to be 

20 marked as deposition Exhibit 5 which is your invoice 

21 number 425 dated September 2, 1986. It indicates under 
description that this was a service call on 8-27-86 to 
repair a GFI circuit for gate operator not part of VATEC 
warranty and it is shipped to the Oliver North 
residence, ifont-ippjj ^f^"'^- ^fifi^f^^f- Virginia. Is 



[ 



602 



KNCUSSIFIED 



19 



this the repair to which you just made reference? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And the amount for this repair was $140; is 
that correct? 

A . That is correct • 

Q. You billed that amount because it was not 
covered by the warranty? 

A . That is correct . 

Q. It says sold to Glenn Robinette. Does that 
mean you billed Mr. Robinette? 

A. That means we billed Mr. Robinette and we were 
paid by Mr. Robinette. 

Q. We will come back to the payment issue further 
a little later. 

When Mr. Robinette asked you to do this work 
for this particular residence of a government official 
whom you later learned was Colonel North, did he 
indicate at any time that he expected to be reimbursed 
by anyone when he paid you for this work? 

A. He didn't indicate that but I assumed he was 
handling this for his party, obviously for some kind of 
commission. 

Q. That would have been the pattern he used as a 



liddleman in previous dealings? 



A. That is correct. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



603 



BHimim 



Q. But you did not know who 



that party might have 



been , did y ou^ 



A. Not at that time. 

Q. Do you know now know who that party was? I 
A. Yes, Colonel North. i 

Q. Do you know for a fact who reimbursed Mr. 
Robinette? 

A. No, I have no idea who paid him or how much he 
was paid for the amount that we got paid. 

Q. Did he explain his relationship to Colonel " 
North at any time? 

A. Not in detail. The impression we got was that 
this individual who he was helping was on the road an 
awful lot and his wife was very distraught so he was the 
middleman arranging for the security for their home, and 
that since he was a middleman, he would do the billing 
to him and he would handle the entire financial 
transaction as far as VATEC is concerned. 

Q. Did Mr. Robinette ever indicate that he had 
done any other jobs for or anything else for Colonel 
North? 

A. Not that I know of. 

Q. Did he ever indicate that he had done any work 
for Richard Secord"; 



UNCLASSIFIED 



604 



Q. Did he ever "IfMw'lWVII fi%tr'done any work 
for Mr. Thomas C. Clines? 

A. Not necessarily work for but they had worked 
together on many, many business ventures. So I ara not 
really sure what I can answer. I do know that they did 
a lot of work together. 

Q. You know Mr. Clines yourself? 

A. Yes. 

Q. From your days at the agency? 

A. Yes, I do. 

Q. Have you ever done any work for Mr. Clines 
since you have been at VATEC? 

A. No, I have not. 

Q. Have you ever done any work for Mr. Robinette 
for Albert Hakim? 

A. No, I have not, or not to the best of my 
knowledge. 

Q. Have you ever done any work directly with 
VATEC for Mr. Hakim? 

A. No, I have not. 

Q. Let me ask you some questions about how you 
were paid. 

Deposition Exhibit 1 which is the draft 
invoice reflects the total price of $11,703 and shows 
down payment received of $6,000. Is that correct, sir? 



UNCIASSIFIFn 



605 



UNCUSSIFIED 



A. That is correct 

Q. Do I take that to mean that Mr. Robinette paid 
you at some point before completion of the work $6,000? 

A. He paid us the down payment before we started. 

Q. How did he make that payment to you? Was that 
in cash or check? 

A. I got two payments, one for $5,700 and one for 
$6,000 and one was a check and one was cash. 

Q. The $6,000 was the check? 

A, I believe so, but I am not positive, but it" is 
in our records. 

Q. Mr. Tashiro, we were just talking about the 
down payment of $6,000. You indicated that one of the 
amounts, the down payment, the other amount being the 
final payment, one was in cash and one was by check. Do 
you recall which you think was which? 

A. To the best of my memory, I think the $6,000 
was a check and the remainder of $5,703 was by cash. 

Q. Let me show you and have marked as the next 
deposition Exhibit 6 a deposit slip for VATEC — I 
believe that is what we are looking at — dated May 20, 
1986 which shows a deposit of $6,000 with the 
handwritten name of Robinette beside it. Would that 
reflect the payment by Mr. Robinette for the down 



payment? 



UNcussra 



606 



Yes, it would. 



iiNcussm 



23 



[Tashiro Exhibit No. 6 4 7 marked 
for identification.] 

Q. Likewise in Exhibit 7» it shows from Citizens 
National Bank of Laurel, Maryland that on May 20, 1986 a 
deposit was actually made and this is the receipt for 
that deposit of $6,000. That would appear to correspond I 
with the deposit slip made out by VATEC; is that 
correct, sir? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. Your best recollection is that Mr. Robinette 
paid you the down payment by check. You wouldn't recall 
on whom the check was drawn, would you, what bank or 
what individual? 

A. No, I do not. 

Q. When wj j i'fta - the work was completed, did you then 
send Mr. Robinette a final bill? 

A. Yes, I did. Yes, I sent him an Invoice. 
[Tashiro Exhibit No. 8 marked 
for identification.] 

Q. Mr. Tashiro, look if you would at deposition 
Exhibit 8 which is an invoice from VATEC to Mr. Glenn 
Robinette. The date, I believe, is 6-20-86; is that 



:orrect? 



-"«NCUS«D 



607 



UNCLASSIFIED 



Q. Under 'shipped to it says Kentland Drive 
properties so this is the residence of Colonel North? 

A. Yes, that is right. 

Q. It reflects the alarm system and the 
electrical work, the total price of $11,703; is that 
correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. Less down payment. Our copy is a bit faint 
but that says $6,000; is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. Total due $5,703? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. So this is the final bill that you submitted 
to Mr. Robinette? 

A. For the work that we did, yes. 

Q. Up above it on the same copy it is stamped 
payment received 7-10-86 and some initials. So that 
means that this was finally paid? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Tell us about that final payment. 

A. The final payment was received by me at the 
Sakura restaurant. We were having lunch together and he 
said, "I have the money for you to pay the rest of the 
invoice . " 

Q. This is in Silver Spring, Maryland? 



IINCLASSIRED 



608 



UNCLASSIFIED 



25 



Q. You sent the bill to Mr. Robinette. What I 
happened? Did he give you a phone call? 

A. Yes, saying that he's got the money. He's 

ready. He said or I said, "Let's have lunch," so we 

decided to have some lunch. 

Q. He gave you the payment at that time. In what 
form did he give you the payment? 

A. That was in cash. 

Q. Did he give you an envelope? 

A. Yes, he did. 

Q. Was it sealed? 

A. Yes, to the best of my knowledge. 

Q. Did you count the money? 

A. No, I did not. 

Q. You trusted him? 

A. Yes, I did. 

A. Did you count it when you got back to the 
office? 

A. Yes. I gave it to the secretary so she could 
make a deposit. 

Q. And, in fact, it was $5,703? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. Would you recall the date when that took 



place? 



mmmin 



609 



UNCUSSIFIED 



26 



A. That was July 10, I believe. j 

Q. Why would you say that, because that is the : 
date you wrote payment received on the invoice? 

A. That is right. ! 

Q. Was there anything at all unusual about being 
paid in that manner? 

A. No, not too surprising, knowing Glenn I 

Robinette. 

Q. Did most of your other clients pay in cash? I 

A. No, they do not. ; 

Q. Had you ever had occasion in dealing with Mr. } 



Robinette to have him pay in cash? 

A. No, I have not. 

Q. Did he make any comments at that time about 
why he was paying in cash? 

A. No, he did not. 

Q. Is there anything else you recall from that 
luncheon discussion which we should know? 

A. Nothing particular about Mr. North's residence 
that I can recall. 

Q. I believe I have asked you this before with 
regard to the whole Job but in terms of the cash payment 
at the restaurant for the balance due, did Mr. Robinette 
ever make any statement indicating he would seek 
repayment or be. j-JiiiLt>yrie4 by anyone? 



(609) 



610 



UNCUSSIFIED 



27 



A. No, he did not, but I just assumed that he 
would be paid by the owner. 

Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether he was 
ever paid by anyone? 

5 A. For this particular job, I do not. 

6 Q. I take it then you would have no knowledge as 
to whether he would have been paid by Colonel North 
himself? 

9 A. No, I do not know. 

10 Q' Let me ask you a few questions about the house 

11 itself. I believe you told us earlier that no one from 

12 VATEC ever had any dealings with Colonel North himself; 

13 is that correct? 

14 A. To the best of my knowledge, no. 

15 Q. Did anyone have any dealings with Mrs. North? 

16 A- *«»• 

Y-7 Q. How many times would you say that took place? 

A. Each time they went to work on the place, we 

19 had to make sure somebody was there to let us in and 

20 usually it was Mrs. North, and I believe one or two 

21 times it was a sister or a daughter. I am not really 
sure, since I have never been there. 

23 Q. Would you have a guess or an estimate of how 
H many times someone from VATEC went to the North 



residence? 



UNomssinED 



611 



mXSIRED 



A. Close to ten times, I would believe. 

Q. Are you able to recall anything that any of 
your employees may have told you about what Mrs. North 
said to them? 

A. Yes. I believe the feeling was that she was 
totally disorganized. That was not a very well kept 
house. In fact, the men hated to work in the basement 
because there were dog droppings and everything in the 
basement and it was terrible. She was distraught, upset 
and very glad that we were putting in the alarm system 
to give her some peace of mind. 

Q. Was there anything unusual about the residence 
in terms of electronic communications devices, safes, 
classified documents, anything that would say this was 
the home of someone who worked at the National Security 
Council? 

A. Since I have never been there, I have no 
first-hand knowledge but the installers did not report 
anything about safes, special communications equipment 
or classified material. 

Q. For the record, sir, is it your sense that the 
work done by VATEC was quality work? 

A. Yes, I do. 

Q. And that the price that you charged for that 
work was a fair price? 



UNClASSra 



612 



Yes, it is, 



icussra 



(JiS 



Q. Was there ever any discussion with Mr. 
Robinette that this house might be used as a showcase to 
be shown by him to prospective clients of his? 

A. No, it was not . 

Q. Was there ever any discussion that Mrs. North 
or anyone else at the residence had with employees of 
VATEC that this house would be used as a showcase? 

A. Not to the best of my knowledge. 

Q. Did VATEC or any of its employees ever sugg^est 
to anyone that this house could be used as a showcase to 
indicate how work could be done? 

A. No, not to the best of my knowledge. I 
certainly wouldn't after listening to how the house was 
kept and the kind of work we did there. We did not 
finish the job, to start with, and if we had done the 
whole job on the out3ide--no, we wouldn't because there 
was no fence there. It was a wooden fence. To protect 
that property the way it was was kind of ludicrous. To 
conceal a camera in the trees or some such to catch 
somebody putting something in there is not the way to go 
about it. If I were going to do it, I would do it a 
totally different way so we would not use that as a 
showcase. 

Q. If I uBderjstand your testimony, by no means 



613 



ONCLASSIFIED 



30 



would you consider this as a model security system to 
show someone? 

A. No, I would not . 

Q. Sir, I believe from the records you have 
provided us it indicates on a periodic basis some 
service was provided to the equipment that was 
installed; is that correct, sir? 

A. I believe it was just that once, and then the 
rest of the invoices are for the semi-annual charges for 
the central station monitoring services. 

Q. Let me ask you about the servicing of this 
system, Mr. Tashiro. You have already testified that on 
one occasion there was a service call that was needed to 
be made to repair the circuit for the gate operation; is 
that correct, sir? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. That was for $140, and I believe when we 
looked at Exhibit 5, we found that while you put shipped 
to Oliver North residence, Kentland Drive, that it said 
sold to Mr. Glenn Robinette; is that correct, sir? 

A. Yes, that is correct. The shipped to 
indicates where the work took place, not that the 
invoice was shipped there. 

Q. Is it your recollection that this amount of 



$140 was paid for by Mr. Robinette 



UNCLASSIFIED 



614 



DNCUSSm 



A. I believe so 

Q. If you look at Exhibit 6, you see a deposit 
slip by VATEC dated September 24, 1986. The total 
amount is $493, and to the margin you have written what 
each of these amounts were for three separate entries 
and therithere is one for Robinette $140? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. To the best of your recollection, would that 
refresh Mr. Robinette's payment for the service call on 
August 27th? ' - 

A. That is correct. 

Q. Thank you. 

I believe you just stated that twice a year 
there was a billing that went to Mr. Robinette, at least 
initially for the 24-hour hook up into the central 
monitoring station; is that correct. 

A. That is correct. 

Q. What was the monthly charge for that? 

A. The central charge for the central station 
monitoring service is $15 per month. 

Q. And is billed semi-annually for a total of 
$90; is that correct? 

A. Yes, that is correct. 



[Tashiro Exhibit No. 9 marked 



IILASSIFIEO 



identification. ] 



615 



UNOLASSIHED 



32 






Q. Let me show you some exhibits which you have 
provided us. Exhibit No. 9 is an invoice under the date 
of May 27, 1986 and the sold to is Glenn Robinette; is 
that correct, sir? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. It states the 24 hour central station 
monitoring and it gives the period and it lists $15 
under price and then per month and the total amount of 
$90; is that correct, sir? 
A. That is correct. 

[Taahiro Exhibit No. 10 marked 

for identification.] 

Q. I believe if you will look at deposition 

Exhibit 10, it is an identical copy of that invoice to 

Mr. Robinette and someone has written th« date 6-3-86. 

Can you tell us what that means? 

A. That should be the date that we received a 
check from Mr. Robinette. 

Q. That would indicate then payment by Mr. 
Robinette for that six-month service charge on this 
system? 

A. That is correct. 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 11 marked 
for identification.] 
Q. If you wouJCUBaakaak ^bJ.i)i^- _1 1 , which is 



mmmii 



616 



UNCUSSIFIEO 



33 



substantially similar if not identical to the previous 
exhibits and it bears the date of December 17, 1986 for 
the North residence at Great Falls, and it is billed to 
Mr. Robinette; is that correct, sir? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. This is for the semi-annual charge for roughly 
the last half of 1986 in the amount of $90 per six-month 
period; is that correct? 

A. That is correct . 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 12 marked 
for identification.] 

Q. Exhibit No. 12 is an identical copy of Exhibit 
11, that same invoice, but someone has drawn an X over 
the name of Robinette and written in someone's 
handwriting, "Send to Oliver North." What can you tell 
us about that notation? 

A. The invoice was sent to Glenn Robinette and 
normally he pays short of the net 30 and when we didn't 
get paid, the secretary routinely calls the people who 
don't pay to see what happened. In January, we were 
told that we should bill Mr. North directly rather than 
to bill Mr. Robinette. 

Q. You were told that by whom? 



By Glenn Robinette 
Did he say why? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



617 



UNCLASSIFIED 



A. No, he did not. He said he was not handling 
the case anymore. 

Q. That was in December of 1986 or January of 
1987? 

A. I believe that would be January, 1987. 

Q. He did not give any reason why that change in 
payment was necessitated? 

A. By then the Oliver North case was in the press 
and we assumed that he tried to distance himself from 
his relationship with Mr. North as far as security or 
funding was concerned. 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 13 marked 
for identification.] 

Q. Let me show you Exhibit 13 which likewise is a 
bill for the second half of 1986, the semi-annual charge 
for the hookup to the central monitoring station and it 
says, "Ship to same" and the sold to bears the name of 
Mr. Oliver North with the Kentland Drive address; is 
that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. This is dated January 7, 1987 and that would 
evidence if I understand your testimony correctly, in 
essence you sent the same invoice to Colonel North this 



time rather than Robinette? 



That is correct. 



uNcussra 



618 



UNCLASSIFIED 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 14 marked 



35 



for identification.] 

Q. Exhibit 14 is an identical copy of Exhibit 13, 
that being the invoice to Colonel North dated January 7, 
1987 except it has a handwritten notation that says "Pd" 
which I would assume means paid 2-25-87; is that 
correct, sir? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. That would evidence that payment had been 
received from Colonel North; is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. To the best of your knowledge, sir, have there 
been other occasions other than the one time when there 
was a foul-up in the electrical system because of the 
improper installation, I guess, from Automatic Door 
Specialist and then the semi-annual billing, were there 
any other instances in which the system at the North 
residence was serviced? 

A. Not to the best of my knowledge. 

Q. You told us that the first time you spoke with 
Mr. Robinette about this job he did not give or use the 
name of Colonel Oliver North and that when your 
installer, Mr. William Keller, went out to the residence 
for the first time, he discovered it was the residence 
of someone named North? 



mmm 



619 



That is corr 



mmii 



Q. You also told us that you talked to Mr. 
Robinette about ten times; is that correct? 

A. About the North case, yes. 

Q. During those conversation, did you ever 
mention the name of Colonel North or did he ever mention 
the name of Colonel North? 

A. He may have, but I certainly don't recall any 
spec if ic3 . 

Q. How was this property or Job referenced? 

A. As the North residence, Great Falls. 

Q. But when Mr. Robinette would call you up and 
say, "How are we doing on that? How is the schedule 
coming?" et cetera, what manner did he use to describe 
the job? 

A. That was the only job we were doing for Mr. 
Robinette at the time so It would be the North residence 
and I believe he would use the term Great Falls. 

Q. But he would not say North residence but the 
Great Falls Job? 

A. The Great Falls Job. 

Q. When Mr. Robinette would call VATEC, I believe 
you told us from time to time he would talk to Mr. 
Moore. What would that be about? 

A. Mr. Moore would be_the .tfitlini cal man. He 




620 



UNCLASSIRED 



37 



would be talking about the specific proposal, what are 
you going to put in, what will it encompass particularly 
since we didn't give him a written proposal, he would 
have to get the information from Jim Moore on what we 
were going to install. 

Q. Were there occasions when Mr. Robinette would 
talk to Mr. Keller? 

A. Yes, there would be. 

Q. What would be the nature of those discussions? 

A. With Mr. Keller, particularly about the 
trouble they had with the gate opener when Keller had to 
go out to repair to the problem, he would check with 
Keller to see what was done and whether it was working 
properly . 

Q. When he talked with you, I believe you told me 
those discussions would be about price and about 
scheduling is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. What was Mr. Robinette's concern in terms of 
scheduling? 

A. He thought because of the urgency of the 
situation where the principal was on travel status much 
of the time and his wife was so upset and concerned 
because of the threats that he felt that we should give 
it the highest priority to get the job done. 




621 



UNCLASSIHED 



Q. On the items which you costed out but which 
Mr. Robinette did not take from you, did he ever 
indicate that anyone had vetoed those items, Colonel 
North or anyone else? 

A. No, he didn't. I assumed that he had vetoed 
them . 

Q. Sir, did you ever have occasion to ask Mr. 
Robinette who was going to reimburse him for this job? 

A. No, I did not ask him. 

Q. You never asked him is Colonel North goingto 
pay you back? 

A. No, I just assumed that but I did not ask him. 

Q. You never asked whether any other individual 
would be paying him back? 

A. I did not ask him, no. 

Q. I think those are basically all of the 
questions I have other than to ask you for the record 
with whom you have spoken about this case. 

I believ^-^ere contacted by Judge Walsh's 
office, Judge Walsh being the independent counsel; is 
that correct , sir? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. Have you spoken with anyone in his office 



about this matter? 



A. Yes, I h 



■• WMiB 



622 



UNCIASHD 



39 



Q. You were interviewed by an attorney on his 
staff? 

A. Yes, I was. 

Q. And you have provided the originals of all 
your documents to that attorney? 

A. That is right. 

Q. Have you testified before a grand jury in this 
matter? 

A. No, I have not. 

Q. Other than with the attorney in Judge Walsfr's 
office and with the Senate Committee this afternoon, 
have you spoken with anyone else about this matter, with 
a government investiating authority? 

A. No, I have not. 

Q. Have you spoken to any one in the press? 

A. No, I have not. 

Q. After the matters involving Colonel North 
became public and the so-called IranM:ontra affair 
became public, did you ever have occasion to hear from 
Colonel North? 

A. No, I have not. 

Q. Have you ever had occasion to hear from 

■■■•:"•:::; ..uNttliSSlFlED 

Q. Did you have any occasion to hear from Mr. 



623 



UNCLASSIFIED 



40 



Robinette other than to tell you to send the bills in 
the future to Colonel North himself? 

A. Yes, I have. 

Q. You have heard from Mr. Robinette? 

A. Yes, I have. 

Q. What was the nature of any discussion with 
him? 

A. When I saw Hr. Robinette and told him that I 
was going to be appearing before the Walsh Committee, he 
said, "Jack, all you have to do is tell the truth arid- 
there will be no problems." I said, "Fine. That is 
what I was going to do anyway," so that is really what 
happened . 

Q. That is the only other time you have spoken to 
Mr. Robinette about these matters? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Finally, Hr. Tashiro, I would like to walk you 
through for idantif Ication purposes some of the exhibits 
which we will make a part of this deposition which were 
the documents you brought with you. 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 15 marked 
for identification.] 

Q. Deposition Exhibit 15 is a photocopy of, I 
believe, nine different deposits slips from VATEC into 
your bank. If you will note the deposit slip dated 



UNCUSSIHED 



624 



ONCLASSIFIED 



2-27-87, it shows a deposit for roughly $3300 and it is 
broken down into four different sub items, one of which 
says "North $90." 

We have already identified in Exhibit 14 that 
you sent an invoice to Colonel North for the $90 charge 
for the semi-annual hookup to the central monitoring 
station, and that invoice shows that on 2-25-87 he made 
payment in the amount of $90. It would look like then 
two days later that was deposited; is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. I would like to go back to Exhibit 5 which 
which was the invoice to Mr. Robinette for the $140 for 
the service call to repair the circuit for the gate 
opener, and we identified that as Exhibit 5. I would 
like to show you Exhibit 5-A which is simply a photocopy 
of that invoice and it has handwritten on it 9-23-86. 
Can you tell us what that means? 

A. That should be the date we received his check 
for that amount. 

Q. From Mr. Robinette in the amount of $140? 

A. That is correct. 

CTashiro Exhibit No. 16 marked 
for identification.] 

Q. I would like to show you now Exhibit No. 16 
which bears the heading "Proposal, Hager Electric 



UNCUSSIHED 



625 



UNCLASSIHED 



U2 



Service, Inc.," and it shows electrical work in great 
detail with itemized amounts and has the final total sum 
of $3,187. What does this represent, sir? 

A. That represents the electrical company digging 
a trench from the house to the front gate, putting in 
conduit and the electrical wiring to the front gate. 

Q. Where was this work done? 

A. At the North residence. 

CTashiro Exhibit No. 17 marked 
for identification. ] 

Q. Then Exhibit 17 appears to be a 
computer-generated statement from Hager Electric which 
shows amount due of $3,187. Is that correct, sir? 

A. That is correct. 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 18 marked 
for identif iction. ] 

Q. Exhibit 18 is an additional statement from 
Hager Electric bearing that amount and stamped "Past 
Due"; is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. You told us, I believe, there was a little bit 
of a disagreement with them over this? 

A. That is right. 

Q. What can you tell us about that? 

A. We weren't particularly pleased with the work. 



UNCLASSIRED 



626 



UNCLASSinED 



They were supposed to dig the trench a certain depth 
because of frost problems and water problems and some of 
the places they didn't. They explained they ran into 
lots of rocks and stones out in that area and that is 
probably true in Great Falls. Therefore, we had a 
little disagreement but we agreed to pay the whole 
thing. 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 19 marked 
for identification.] 

Q. I will show you Exhibit 19 which records a- 
particular check number and I believe this would show 
that VATEC does pay its bills and, In fact, you paid 
Hager Electric ^3,178; is that correct, sir? 

A. That is correct. 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 20 marked 
for identification.] 

Q. I show you Exhibit No. 20 which is VATEC 
Incorporated with the subscriber of Oliver North, 703 
Kentland Drive. This is with Computerized Central 
Station Services, Inc.; is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. That is a firm in Annandale, Virginia that 
does what? 

A. They maintain a central monitoring station 



service 



UNCLASSIFIED 



627 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Q. For a number of alarm systems that would be 
tied into it; is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. This is the central system into which the 
North residence security system was tied? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. Under item 5, it says, "After reporting to the 
authorities, call the following parties until reaching 
one of them," and it lists four names; is that right, 
sir? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. The first name is Mr. Oliver North and it has 
his home number; is that right, sir? 

A. I am not sure whose number that is but that is 
correct. "^^ 

Q. It has a number for Colonel North? 

A. *«s. 

Q. 'The individual listed number 3 is Mr. Glenn 
Robinette; is that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. As you understand this document, that means if 
there were something triggered by the alarm system, an 
attempted break-in, smoke detected, whatever that that 
would be fed to the central station and they would 
attempt to contact one of these individuals? 



628 



UNCIASSIRED 



U5 



^n^^ 



A. 



That la correct. 



CTaahiro Exhibit No. 21 marked 
for Identification.] 

Q. I would like to show you Exhibit 21 which Is a 
letter to Mr. Glenn Roblnette at hi: 

address dated July 10, 1986 and it is on the letterhead 
of VATEC Inc. signed by Jim Moore, Vice President of 
VATEC. Are you familiar with this letter, sir? 

A. Yes, I am. 

Q. In summary, what does It say? 

A. It explains to Mr. Roblnette the services that 
we provided to the North residence in terms of the 
security system, why we did it, how it works, and the 
other items that we provided such as lights, auto alarm, 
and so on. 

[Tashiro Exhibit No. 22 marked 
for identification.] 

Q. Finally, sir, the final Exhibit is number 22. 
It has a handwritten date — in fact, it is all 
handwritten — of 6-19-86 and has the name Jack at the 
top. Tell ua if you would who Jack is? 

A. That Jack is myself. 

Q. What does this represent? 

A. This is Jim Moore who is the operations man 
sending me a note say faiHk a^Hi w« ,a^ J^i^Hc. Roblnette 



629 



UNCUSSIHED 



46 



for the remainder of the service and it lists our price, 
our part of it, the electrical work and what the invoice 
should be. 

Q. And it shows the total invoice of $11,703; is 
that correct? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. It reflects down payment of $6,000? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. And it shows the final amount due of $5,703? 

A. That is correct. 

Q. At the top it says sends bill to whom? 

A. Glenn Robinette. 

Q. Thank you, sir. You have been very helpful to 
the Committee, Mr. Tashiro. Is there anything else you 
can think of with regard to the work that your company 
did for the North residence at the request of Glenn 
Robinette that the committee should know about? 

A. The only comment, I believe, is that when we 
did hear the name North, it really didn't mean anything 
because, at that time, there was no publicity. We had 
no idea who^ he was and, normally, when we do Jobs, we 
like to put the name of the owner and we often do jobs 
with the middleman in between so the whole process was 
not too remote from some of the things that occur on 
other Jobs. 



liHtlMSim 



630 



UNCLASSIHED 



t? 



Q. With the possible exception of being paid in a 
restaurant with an envelope of cash? 

A. The restaurant is because we occasionally have 
lunch together. That was not strange either. Instead 
of him sending the money over or my going over to his 
house to pick it up, if we met at the restaurant and had 
lunch, that would be a convenient place for him to give 
me the money, and that was the first time he tried that 
restaurant and he really liked that food, so it was a 
good lunch. 

Q. Is there anything else you should we should 
know, sir, that I is not thought to ask you? 

A. I suppose if I were to do this over again, 
after all this publicity, we just wouldn't touch the 
job. Even after we knew of Colonel North, that did not 
mean anything to us because there are lots of military 
people that we do work for-, 

Q. Let me state for the record, so far as we 
know, there is no reason to believe that you or VATEC 
did anything that is in any way improper or out of the 
ordinary tV*i£rr»t^ You were simply performing a job at 
a particular residence and happened to be using a 

"'"':" .3. . ..... UNCLASSIFIED 

Q. If there is nothing further that you can think 



631 



UNCLASSra 



of, I have nothing further and I want to thank you for 
your time and for your cooperation in providing so much 
documentation. Thank you, sir. 
A. You're welcome. 

[The deposition was concluded at 4:05 p.m.] 



UNCLASSIFIED 



632 



ONCUSSIFIED 



CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC/COURT REPORTER 

I, Albert J. Gasdor, the officer before whom the fore- 
going proceedings were taken, do hereby certify that the deponent 
was duly sworn by me; that the testimony was stenographical I y 
recorded by me and, thereafter, reduced to typewritten form by 
computer-assisted transcription under my direction and supervision; 
and that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of 
the testimony given. 

I further certify that I am neither counsel for, related 
to, nor employed by any of the parties to this proceeding, nor 
financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this litigation. 




OjU.<^;yA. 



■-jU^- 



Albert J. Gasdor 



Notary Public in and for 
the District of Columbia 



My Cofnmisslon expires: 
July 31, 1990 



wmm 



DINKEL 
dd 1 



iiNeei^fW' 



Deposition of Howard Teicher 



H=yi 1-^-4 



Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with 

Iran, 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Washington, D.C. 

Thursday, March 12, 1987 



The deposition was convened, pursuant to notice, at 
9:35 a.m., in Room 1605 Longworth House Office Building. 



tialiy DKtefrifM/KelefliK: «. 



zibe<^^~> 




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3 EXHIBIT ; MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATIOt 

^ HT-1 

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HT-3 92 

7 HT-4 93 



"jasA'^SS 



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MR. EGGLESTON: We will qo on the record. Please 
swear the witness. 
Whereupon , 

HOWARD TEICHER 
was called as a witness for the Select Committee, and, having 
been duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and 
testified as follows: 

MR. EGGLESTON: Off the record, please. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. EGGLESTON: My name is Neil Eggleston. I am 
Deputy Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee to 
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. Also partici- 
pating in this deposition is George Van Cleve, Chief Minority 
Counsel to the House Select Committee. 

Let me say at the introduction that this is a classified 
deposition, that Mr. Teicher will be testifying about various 
events that are classified. I would caution anyone who reads 
this deposition to be particularly careful about names and 
other things that might be revealed in the deposition. 

Mr. Bennett, is there something you would like to sa^ 
for the record? 

MR. BENNETT: Yes. Just a couple of points I want 
to bring to the attention of the committee through its 
representatives today. 

Mr. Teiqhcs^as Jiestif ied before both the Senate 



lic^l^as ^%8<^f isd before b 



636 



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1 Intelligence Committee as well as the Tower Commission 

2 and has made an effort to be as complete and as candid in 

3 his testimony as possible. There are one or two obstacles 

4 I want to bring to your attention today. 

5 When events were most fresh in his mind, prior to being -• 

6 retaining counsel — which was the result of essentially being 

7 advised that he could not be represented by government counsel 

8 Mr. Teicher was interviewed for two-and-a-half hours by the 

9 Federal Bureau of Investigation and stated fully to them what 

10 he understood the situation to be. 

11 As soon as we were retained, we made an effort to 

12 get his FBI 302 because it was the freshest recollection of 

13 what occurred. We have been refused that document by both the 

14 White House and by the Justice Department and the FBI. It has 

15 been pursued right up to the Assistant Attorney General level, 

16 so I would just want you to know we have not had access to 

17 that document, would like access to it, because events are 

18 very -- were more fresh at that time and also we don't know 

19 whether they reported what he said accurately or not. 

20 The second point, which is even of greater concern 

21 to me -- and this really has nothing to do with your committee 

22 I just feel I have to make this for the record. 

23 MR. EGGLESTON: Sure. 

24 MR. BENNETT: I intend to be very quiet throughout 



25 this. But is is important to us. 

I'M 



qvHipn^ffpprp 



637 




When Mr. Teicher retained us, it was very evident 
to me that the matters about which he would be asked about 
were exceptionally sensitive; and I suggested that it was 
essential that my partner, Carl Rauh, and myself have the 
appropriate clearances before we could even discuss with Mr. 
Teicher what the facts were and, therefore, advise him about 
what he should do re requests of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, and the House committees, to interview him. 

To my absolute chagrin, that met with some 
initial resistance, but the Justice Department was in full 
agreement with us. I don't want to make more of this than 
it is. So we went before the committee and insisted on 
those clearances. We pointed out to the committee it was 
very easy to get us those clearances because both Mr. 
Rauh and myself at that moment had active top secret clear- 
ances of a compartmentalized nature in other matters that 
were very sensitive. 

Finally, we got a continuance for that and in a 
matter of days, we got our clearances. Further, out of 
respect for the security and sensitivity aspects of all of 
this, we kept our original lawyers' notes as well as copies 
of documents which Mr. Teicher was given by both the White 
House, pursuant to the President's directive to cooperate, 
and a Ms. Rieger. They were kept in files at the National 
Security Council outside of Howcuri'^^aAf ice, marked "Attorney 



outside of Hovajp^j-m n^ ice, 

\mmL 



638 



jm fls dd 



WlBfRiff 



Client Work Product Materials." 

Mr. Teicher advised them, and with the commission 
and Mr. Carlucci, was going to remain until March, I believe, 
the end of March and then was leaving. 

Very abruptly, on February 27, I believe was 
the date, without any notice, but the day or day after the 
Tower Commission report, Mr. Teicher was advised it had 
and was told he would have to leave his office immediately 
that day. 

Mr. Teicher called me and expressed, obviously, 
concern about that unfair treatment; but more importantly 
for our purposes, he wanted to know what would happen 
with our attorney-client work product notes or materials. 
It was important to us because with all the newspaper 
publicity, and everybody talking about everything, and us 
all reading it, it was important that we knew what we knew 
of our own knowledge and not what has been merged. 

We were assured those materials would be available 
to us and that given their nature they should be left in the 
National Security Council, which was agreeable to me. We 
were told that it had to be in a safe facility and that was 
the best way to have it done. 

I personally spoke with Mr. Paul Stevens as did 
Mr. Teicher, and was assured that these materials would 
be readily available to us 



639 



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Mr. Eggleston, as soon as I spoke with you about 
coming here today and I notified my client, Mr. Teicher, 
Mr. Teicher and I requested those materials, and to date we 
have not got them. 

Yesterday, I — Mr. Stevens has not returned 
my calls -- one call. A Mr. a-*, in his office called me 
yesterday and told me I would have to submit a written 
request. I said that that was ridiculous, that we were 
testifying here today, we needed those materials to refresh 
his recollection, to be prepared for today, that these were 
not their original materials, they were copies, attorney- 
client material; and I submitted a letter to him which I 
want to give to you and which I would ask be placed a part 
of this record. 

Mr. Eggleston. Certainly. 
(Letter Proffered.) 

Mr. Bennett. With that, I just want to make the 
point that Howard is going to do his absolute best to 
answer your questions with great care and caution and 
completeness, but we clearly have been prejudiced by our 
inability to get our own materials. I have nothing else 

to add. 

Mr. Eggleston. The first thing, let me do, 

is have this marked HT-1. 

Mr. Bennett. Tnnidanti^-..«.have not received 



'mm 



640 



IISKIWIP' 



a response to that, and I said to Mr. SmAT yesterday that 
I would give him this letter, but I said I have got to see 
those materials because we are testifying today and we 
would have been prepared to review them last night. 

■ ■■ (Whereupon, the document referred 

to was marked for identification 

as HT-1) 



UNCUSSIFIED 

TOD QPr-PPT 



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Mr. Eggleston. Just a few questions and 
only questions in response to that. 

DO you recall how long or approximately when the 
date of your interview was with the FBI? 

The Witness. It would be on my calendar which 
I no longer have access to regrettably. I would like to 
point out when I submitted my letter of resignation to Mr. 
Carlucci in mid-December, which we may have a copy of here, 
I specifically asked to be allowed to stay on the staff 
until the end of March so that I could cooperate fully and 
maintain access to files and documents and calendars. 

He had agreed — we had an agreement. I was never 
given an explanation as to why they decided to break their 
agreement, but as you can well imagine, any document that 
one used or prepared while a member of the staff is con- 
sidered a Presidential paper, so I couldn't even take 
my calendars with me. 

Mr. Bennett, Excuse me. I have the date. 
I asked you for the date. 

The Witness. I was trying to say why I don't 

have it. 

Mr. Bennett. By letter dated December 15, we 
wrote Peter Wallison, counsel to the President, and we 
asked that in order to help him prepare for full presentation 
to the senate - ^= .v...»ei^X*«««« that Mr. Teicher 




642 



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and us be provided a copy of the FBI report memorializing 

Mr. Teicher's December 1st, 1986 statement to the 

FBI. 

Mr. Eggleston. Of course. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q That recently comports with your recollection? 

A Yes, it does. I wouldn't have been isle to say 
more than early December, late November. 

Q Do you know how long that interview was? 

A Approximately two and a half hours. 

Q In just a moment, I am going to get into your 
sort of background in a very brief fashion. What is your 
current employment status? 

A I am a full-time consultant at the NSC, without 
an office at the NSC. I am seeking further employment 
outside of the government. 

Q So although you were terminated in late Feburary, 
you are still on toe payroll, if you will, as a full-time 
consultant? 

A I am not sure how I would characterize what 
was done to me, except to say that I was abruptly and 
without warning advised that the NSC was no longer going 
to honor its agreement to allow me to maintain an office, 
a secretary, and access to my materials as of the close of 
business February 27 . _ Jhis^^wnWrt^dLy told to me in 



"■■""■iiOTiL' 



643 



uiMslS 



ET 



10 



non-negotiable terms. 

Q Who was it who told you that? 

A Grant Green, the executive secretary in the 
presence of Paul Stevens. They made clear that I would 
continue to be paid through the end of March, per our earlier 
agreement, "and they believed that," that is all that should 
have mattered to me anyway. Which is not the case, but 
nonetheless, what seems to have mattered to them. 

They had, while I signed out, and my badge was 
taken, ray clearances are still active and they chose not to 
outbrief me on my security clearances. So I don't really 
know what the proper nomenclature is for my status at this 
point. 

Q But at least you are being paid until the end 
of March? 

A That is correct. 

Q Thank you. 

Let me just sort of get rolling on — as I said, 
I would like to start with a little background so I can place 
you in a context. 

How old are you? 

A Thirty-two. 

Q Could you give us your date of birth? 

A May 9, 1954. 

Q Where were you born 



nimssii^ 



644 




11 

A Boston, Massachusetts. 

Q Could you tell me a little bit about your educationa 
background? 

A When I was about three years old, my father was 
transferred to St. Louis. I maneuvered through the St. Louis 
County public schools, graduated from high school in 1972. 
I was an undergraduate at Boston University where I 
received my B.A. in Political Science, with a minor in 
Economics. I was Suma Cum Laude, Phi Beta Kappa and 
received the political science award. 

Q What year did you graduate from college? 

A 1976. I was on the sailing team for four years, 
sort of a fairly normal undergraduate experience in Boston. 

Q Any post graduate work? 

A I then moved to Washington, D.C., where I attended 
graduate school at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies, participated in a two-year masters 
program. I received my M.A. in International Relations 
in 1978. 

Q In 1978, did you then become employed? 

A Actually, my employment with the government began 
in July of 1977. I was brought on to the State Department 
as a non-paid summer intern, received a course credit during 
that first summer. I worked in the Bureau of Political 
Military Affairs on the Middle East and Tactical Nuclear 






645 



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Weapons Issues. 

At the end of the summer, they asked me if I could 
continue to work for them, because they didn't have a 
Middle East person in the office I worked in. 
Q Who was your supervisor? 

A David Gompert was my first immediate supervisor 
at PM. Leslie i9±»ifc was the director of the 
bureau at the time. I told them there was nothing I 
would like more than to continue working at the State 
Department, but I needed to get paid. 

Mr. Bennett. Slow down a little bit. He has 
got to take it. 

The Witness. I am sorry. Please tell me if I go 

too fast. 

They suggested if I knew how to type and could 
pass the clerk typist examine, that they were sure 
that they could continue to employ me on the same types 
of substantive work, but pay me at the clerk typist rate. 
Because there was otherwise no part-time substantive employ- 
ment at the State — I proceeded to take this examine 
and passed it and was employed for the full second year 
of my graduate studies on a part-time basis in the State 
Department. 

That continued through November, 1978, when I 
became a member of the staf f^ of the Office of the Secretary 



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of Defense in the International Security Affairs Division, 
working on Middle East affairs as a policy analyst, GS-9. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q What was your supervisor then? 

A The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense I 
worked for was Robert Murray. My immediate supervisor 
was Nancy Burg. 

Q How long were you there? 

A I worked in ISA through, I believe it was 
July of 1981, at which time I moved back to the State 
Department, became the staff assistant to the counselor 
of the State Department who was then Robert McFarlane. 

Q And how long did you remain with — in that 
position? 

A In, I believe, early January 1982, McFarlane was 
appointed the Deputy NSC Advisor, and at that time he asked 
me to join him on staff at the National Security Council. 

On March 29, of 1982, I officially became 
a member of the National Security Council staff. 

Q What kinds of work were you doing when you were 
working with Mr, McFarlane at the State Department? 

A I did a variety of things for McFarlane. As 
the staff assistant, I would arrive at work at least a half 
hour before him and assure that all materials that came in 
over night were available fpr him to look at in a priority 



647 



mmm 



fashion; that he was properly staffed for the day in terms 
of briefing materials and talking points; that the newspapers 
were there. In the course of the day, I would participate 
in some meetings with him as a note taker; other meetings, 
as a substantive person. When he traveled, he took me with 
him as a note taker and staff assistant. I don't know 
what you would call it. A horse holder, carry his brief- 
case, although he liked to carry his own briefcase. 
We took several secret trips together and several public 
trips together. 

Q During the period of time you were with the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, did you know Paul Thompson? 

A No, I did not. 

Q When you were with McFarlane in the State 
Department, did you know Michael Ledeen? 

A I met Mr, Ledeen when I came onto the State 
Department the second time. 

Q What was his job at the State Department 
when you were there? 

A As I understood it, he was a Special Assistant 
to the Secretary of State Haig. 

Q Let me now direct your attention to the period 
of time that you were at the NSC. I think you indicated 
that started around March. You have me a precise date. 
My best recollection is something like March 29, 1982? 

Ukini ftC»?»Cr 



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A That is correct. 

Q What job did you have when you first arrived at 



NSC: 



A I was a junior member of the Middel East Directoratd 

Q Who was the director? 

A The senior member was Dr. Jeffrey Kemp, and 
Dr. Raymond Tanter. 

Q Who else was in the directorate? 

A A man named Doug Feith, who was basically leaving 
as I came on. We didn't really work together at all. 
He was asked to leave when Judge Clark came on board. 

Q How long did you remain in that position? 

A I remained in the Middle East office through, 
I believe it was May 25th or 26th, 1986. 

Q Did your position there change during that 
period of time, between March of 1982 and May of 1986? 

A In January or February of 1986, the then senior 
director for the Middle East, Mr. James Covey departed 
the NSC staff to become our Deputy Chief of Mission Inquiry. 
I was to become the Acting Senior Director of the Middle 
East group until his successor, Mr. Dennis Ross, came on 
board in late May of 1986. 

At that time I was to become the Senior 
Director for Political and Military Affairs on the NSC staff. 

Q So it was in May of — May 25 of 1986 that you 

I MP 



649 



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became the Director of 

A Only to the extent that that was the day that 
Dennis Ross became the official Senior Director for Middle 
East Division. 

Q As the Director of the Political-Military Affairs, 
to whom did you report? 

A I would have reported to Don Fortier. 

Q Except that he was 

A Except he was sick. I would then report to Admiral 
Poindexter . 

Q I take it — who did you report to during the 
period of time January-February 1986, up until May of 1986? 
Similarly? 

A The same arrangement . 

Q To Poindexter? 

A Poindexter or Fortier. Fortier was in office 
through mid to late April, I don't believe he was hospitalize^ 
or took medical leave until about the third or last week 
of April because he was centrally involved in the U.S. 
reaction to the Libyan-sponsored terrorism. He was the 
principal coordinator at the senior level. It was only 
after that, that he departed. That was April 15. 

Q When is it that Mr. Fortier died? 

A I believe it was August — I don't recall 
the exact date. The last week of Auoust 1986. 



week of AU9'J' 



650 



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17 



Q I take it, though, he was out of the office from 
April through August? 



He never returned. 

Obviously you know Colonel North? 

Yes. 

When did you first meet Colonel North? 

I first met Colonel North in late May, early 



A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 
June 1982. 

Q What was the context of meeting him at that time? 

A He worked in the Political-Military Affairs office 
on Middle East Affairs and we were engaged in various staff 
activities relating to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 

Q Let me — I have never gotten a clear picture 
of what the office of Political-Military Affairs does. 
What is its principal area of focus? 

A I can only speak to that in terms of when I 
was in charge. 

Q That is all I need to ask you. 

A I don't think anybody knows what part of its 
function was before. Mr. Fortier was in charge of it for 
some time. It was different, I believe, than when I was 
in charge. 

My office dealt with what I would describe as 
overt political military activities. This means anything 

acetime or 



involving the use of military power in pes 



651 



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war time exclusive of what are described as special 
operations, for example, a hostage rescue attempt, or a 
covert use of military assets, for example, a CIA subcontract 
to the military. I had nothing to do with what are 
described as black programs. Some, for instance -- and 
military exercises in the Mediterranean involving crossing 
Qadahfi's so-called line of death was something that we 
would have had principal responsibility on the staff for 
coordinating. 

Another activity 

Q Coordinating among whom? 

A The interagency group of office's representatives 
of the Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, 
State Department, and anyone else who might appropriatey 
have been involved. So it would have been our job, for exampl i 
at the working level to convene working group meetings, to 
draft papers, try and reach agreement on options, on 
the pros and cons of different options, and then 
move it up, move the paper up to a higher level for the 
consideration by the principals. Perhaps to make recommenda 
tions, but not necessarily. That is not exactly how it 
worked in the Libyan case. That is more of an illustrative 
example. I also had one guy who was responsible 
for international narcotics activities. That was a POL-MIL 
function. 






652 



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For instance, the U.S. support for the 
Bolivians in Operation Blast Furnace. This man in my 
group would coordinate to the extent the NSC was involved. 
We also had principal responsibility for what is called 
security assistance, the sale of arms, the provision of foreig 
military sales credits, and that was basically a coordination 
function and a liaison with legislative affairs people 
would then work out a strategy for working with the Congress. 

Q Okay. 

A We had no involvement in — I shouldn't say no 
involvement. We had no responsibility for terrorism 
matters. In fact, when Admiral Poindexter called me to offer 
me the job of Senior Director for Political-Military Affairs, 
on, I believe, February 13, he explicitly 

Q This is February 13 of 1986? 

A 1986. He explicitly stated that Colonel North 
would be responsible and in charge of a separate directorate 
that would have responsibility for terrorism matters and 
what was euphemistically called hostilities in Central 
America. My office had nothing to do, no responsibility 
for terrorism or Central America Contra-backed activities. 

Q Obviously I want to ask you lots more questions 
about Colonel North and how he got in that position. Before 
I do that, let me ask during the period of time you were with 
~ I think you called it the Middle East Directorate — what 



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20 



kind of matters was the Middle East Directorate responsible 
for? I guess this would be the period March of 1982 through 
February or so of 1986? 

A We were responsible for U.S. foreign policy 
in the countries Morocco in the West through Bangladesh 
in the East. The major issues we were involved in included 
the Arab-Israel peace process, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
the Iran-Iraq War, security assistance to Pakistan and India, 
Libyan matters that were not terrorism specific, economic 
developments in various countries, the traditional U.S. 
foreign policy activities in the Middle East. 

Q Could you, to the best that you recollect, 
trace Colonel North's -- the various areas where he was 
assigned from the time that you knew him — I guess the time 
you arrived. I take it he was already there when you got 
there? 

A He was there before I arrived. 

Q When you first arrived, what directorate was he 
in? 

A I believe he was in the Political-Military Affairs 
Directorate. 

Q Do you know whether at that time he had a 
separate assignment? 

A I don't know. 

Q And did he as a technical matter, remain in the 



umiffiiES. 



654 



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BWILICTiEir 



21 



in the Political-Military Affairs Directorate up through 
November 25 of 1986? 

A No. There has been considerable confusion 

Mr. Bennett. Just answer the questions. 
The Witness. No, he was not. There was a 
separate office he ran that was also called Political- 
Military Affairs, but it was not partofniy office. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Who was in his office? 

A He had to substantive subordinates. Colonel 
Earl and Commander Coy, and he had two secretaries. 

Q Did he — and at what time to the best you 
recall, did he have this separate operation, the separate 
directorate, that was also called Political-Military 
Affairs, when did that begin? 

A I am not really sure when it began. 

Q I take it as of this telephone call that you got 
in February, clearly as of that, he has already had this 
separate operation; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you know how much prior to that time, any sense 
at all? 

A I am really not sure. I would say that 

Mr. Bennett. Excuse me. They are entitled to 
get full and complete answers. l2iit.t««^ri' t want you guessing 



IWIHUIIIIU 



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22 



either. 

Mr. Eggleston. I don't want you to guess either. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q I thought you might have attended meetings, know 
who he reported to? 

A I think the best benchmark would be the late — 
late 1985 or early 1986 conclusion of the Vice President's 
Task Force on Counter Luiiiuiiw , which resulted in a National 



Security Council decision directive, I believe. Number 205, 
which called for the NSC to create a separate office dealing 
with terror^^ matters; and North, who was the action officer 
for terrorism matters on the NSC assumed that portfolio. 
I don't know the exact date that Poindexter might have 
decided or created the office. It was around the time of that 
NSDD. 

Q Was he ever in the Middle East Directorate? 

A No. 

Q That you know of? During the period of time 
that you know of? 

A He was never in that. 

Q Again I don't want you to speculate in response to 
this question, but if you know, do you know the reason 
that these two separate activities, counter*^ 



and 



hostilities in Central America were combined in one 



directorate? 



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A I don't know why. 

Q When you say an action officer, was he -- what 
is an action officer? 

A An action officer is bureaucratic euphemism for the 
person responsible for preparing staffing materials, papers, 
memos, what ever is required on a given issue; and that 
person — let's say, person "X" is the action officer -- 
might draft a memo and then be required to have "Y" 
and "Z" look at that memo; but it would be that person, "X" 
that was responsible. It is the responsible staff person. 
That is a common title that is assigned people throughout 
the National Security Bureaucracy. 

Q Were there regular staff meetings at the NSC? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you attend those staff meetings? 

A There were two types of staff meetings, a senior 
staff meeting, four days a week, Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, 
Friday, for senior directors. I attended those when I became 
the senior director. I might have occasionally attended them 
prior to that, if there was a special reason to. Otherwise, 
there was a regulat staff meeting with the entire staff every 
Wednesday at 5 o'clock. 

Q How many people attended the senior directorate 
meeting? 

A I would say it was anywhere from 12 to 17 or 18. 



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2 
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Q And how large is the whole staff? How many people 
attended the whole staff? 

A Most of -- whatever the number was. I don't 
know, 45, 50 positions. 

Q Who presided over the senior staff meetings during 
that period of time you have knowledge of? 

A Generally Admiral Poindexter or McFarlane before 
him. 

Q Did Admiral Poindexter, after — was Mr. Fortier 
Admiral Poindexter 's deputy? 

A Yes. 

Q After Mr. Fortier in April of 1986 no longer was 
functioning at the NSC, who became, if anyone, Admiral 
Poindexter 's deputy? 

A He had no deputy through the summer, but I believe 
in early September, Dr. Alton Keel ~ who the Senate yesterday 
confirmed as our next Ambassador to NATO — was serving as 
the acting deputy to Poindexter. 

Q Since I interrupted you, I lost the time 
period. 

A Early September. 

Q He became the acting deputy? 

A Acting — early September, mid August. 

Q Was Alton Keel in the NSC prior to that time? 



A No. 



im&sisife. 



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IS 

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Q Where had he come from? 

A I am not sure. He had been at the Office of 
Management and Budget, but had left that position and 
I don't know what he had done immediately prior to joining 
the NSC staff. 

Q So it is my understanding that Colonel North 
never reported to you? You were never Colonel North's 
supervisor? 

A That is correct. 

Mr. Bennett. I just want to be sure we are 
using the words the same way. You mean in any kind of 
formal sense? There may have been instances where he spoke 
to North? Gave him a status report on something. 

The Witness. Wf reporting to me, you mean was the 
supervisor responsible for him? 

Mr. Eggleston. I meant reported to in the 
heirarchy technical sense of were you ever his supervisor? 

Mr. Bennett. Yes. 

Could I make just one point to clarify something? 

If you feel you need further clarificaton on it, 
fine. 

This is not quite like a regular civil deposition. 
It is important for me to have the record clear. There is, 
we understand, some kind of directory floating around or a 



list of telephone numbers which has identified Mr. Teicher 

,50', X^r'ifli'.l 



m 



659 



ORR^ffeT 



as the Director and Colonel North as the Deputy Director. 
What Mr. Teicher indicates is that that is not an accurate 
reflection of what occurred. I didn't want you to be 
mislead in any way. I don't Jcnow if you know that exists 
or not. I assumed you did. 

Mr. Eggleston. I did know it existed. I assumed 
from what Mr. Teicher ^^(^fd that that was not an accurate 
reflection of the roles of the two. 

The Witness. For the record, I would like to note 
that on many occasions I said that I believed North's office 
should be called something separate. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q I was about to ask you that? 

A I was told that it was not important. 

Q So there were two directorates called Political- 
Military Affairs? 

A Political-Military Affairs; yes. But people 
within the bureaucracy all recognized that North had a 
separate office and dealt with terrorism and the Contras and 
that it had nothing to do with my office. So that was 
understood. As I was told by Mr. McDaniel, the security 
secretary, when I asked him to explain this to me, he said 
that the decision was made by Poindexter, not to create an 
office with the name of terrorism on it as a concession to 
Secretary Shultz. Because the NSDD 205, while saying that the 



lii^pL&Rij^i^^ 



660 



wmmw 



27 



the NSC should have "The Terrorism C^r," also said the 
primary responsibility for counterterrorism matters should 
rest with the Department of State. So there was a contradic- 
tion in the compromise that was reached by the group pre- 
paring the NSDD and Poindexter chose to at least give Shultz 
and state the impression that they were in charge even though, 
as I understand it, and most people knew, that Colonel North's 
operations subgroup, which was directed to be established 
as part of the NSDD, was the most important interagency group. 

So you have to understand the bureaucratics that 
were involved here to realize why the titles were what they 
were. 

Q Let me direct your attention to around August 
of 1984. I understand that around August of 1984, there 
was an NSSD directive or something; can you tell me what an 
NSSD is? 

A Yes; that is an Natioral Security study directive, 
that is a basically an assignment from the National 
Security Advisor to the interagency group, departments to 
prepare a study on a given question. 

Q And let me refer to this specific, there was 
an NSSD in August of 1984? 

A This is exactly one of those documents that my 
attorney spoke of that is in my file that I would have liked 
to have seen. I expected you might have been interested in 



oinRli^yGfiiJsh^ 



661 



mmm 



"* it. To the best of my recollection, on August 31, 1984, 

2 Mr. McFarlane signed out on an NSSD tasking the groups, 

3 state, JCS, OSD, CIA, and the NSC staff to undertake a study 
^ of what the U.S. might do to have some influence in a post- 

5 Khomeini Iran. I am not sure that is an accurate recitation 

6 of his exact words. Again had I been able to refresh my 

7 memory, I think I would have had it correct. 

8 Q Let me ask you who drafts the NSSD? Or let me 

9 phrase it this way: Do you know who drafted that NSSD? 

10 A I believe that NSSD was drafted by Dr. Jeffery 

11 Kemp, who at that time was the senior directorate of the Middlje 

12 East group. I don't recall whether I commented and 

13 participated in the drafting or not. I probably did, but 

14 it was not my principal responsibility. 

15 Q After the NSSD was issued, and you listed a 

16 number of agencies then who were responsible for coordinating 

17 is the purpose of the coordination to determine whether to 

18 issue an NSDD? 

19 A No. The purpose of the study is to analyze the 

20 problem, analyze U.S. interests, U.S. objectives in the 

21 context of the problem, and assess the options for the U.S. 

22 given interests and objectives, weigh the processes and 

23 consequences, t/ry to reach an agreement, if possible; 

24 if not, convene higher level groups to reach an agreement 

25 on the conclusions of the study, and then to prepare a 



llill'lvrf f duM 4iju'i I • 



662 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Saiifi 



29 



draft National Security decision directive for review and 
decision by the principals. 

Q If you could go through -- let me ask this question, 
first. Were you involved then in that — the activity 
that took place subsequent to and as a result of the M(^H? 

A I had a limited amount of participation. I 
became more involved in early 1985 when Dr. Kemp left the 
NSC and he was succeeded by Mr. Covey. Mr. Covey was 
primarily interested in peace process matters. So I assumed 
a greater responsibility for the Persian Gulf or Southwest 
Asia matters. 

Q By peace process, I assume you mean Israeli 
problems? 

A Arab- Israeli problems. 

Q Were you then in 1985 the principal person at the 
NSC who was responsible for acting on the NSSD? 

A Yes. 

Q Could you 

A Principally lower level. 

A I understand. 

Could you go through and tell me who 

Mr. Bennett. Could he explain that? 
The Witness. I think — because Don For tier 
was then a senior advisor to McFarlane and he was the one 

most interested in long-range developments relating to 

^1 



f)liHfet)Ac[dit*it^ 



lyp 



663 



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Iran. He, I think, would have to be described as responsible 
on the staff. 

BY MR. EGGELSTON: 

Q Right. 

A I would describe myself as a staff officer who 
essentially worked for Don on these matters as did Kemp 
before me. 

Q What I am interested in is if you could, as best 
you can recollect, tell us who the people were at the other 
agencies who were acting b^oth at your level, at the staff 
level, and also at the — at the Fortier-Kemp level? 

A At the CIA, it would have been Graham Fuller, who 
was the National Intelligence Officer. YOu would have to 
ask him who within the CIA was working on it for him. I 
am sure there were many analysts involved. 

Q So Grant Fuller was at the Fortier level? 

A Fortier level and also, perhaps, below that. I 
would be in touch with him. It wasn't that heirarchical 
in terms of who would talk to whom. 

At the State Department, the people involved 
would have been Arnie Raphael, who is the principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs; and James Placke, 
who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
East Affairs relating specifically to the Libyan Peninsula 



and Persian Gulf. 



^^Hli^ 



WPT 



664 



jm 27 



mmw 



And then his staff officers, whomever worked on 
the Persian Gulf matters, would all have been involved. I 
don't recall at that time whether Assistant Secretary Murphy 
whether Murphy was then the Assistant Secretary or whether 
it was still Veliotes. He would certainly have known about 
it. Armacost may not have yet come on. I am just not sure 
what the dates were. 

If it wasn't Amracost at Fortier's level, it 
would have been Larry Eagleburger. 

The people in Defense that were involved were the 
ISA representatives. 

Q What is ISA? 

A International Security Affairs in the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense. At that time 

Mr. Bennett. What time are we talking about? 

The Witness. You are talking about late 1984, 
early 1985? 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Right. 

A I don't really recall — Armitage was the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense. I can't — there was an 
Air Force General who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense. I can't remember his name. They would have 
been involved. 



Q Was there one agency that was sort of the 



'Mil''"''- 



665 



mssfiiB^ 



principal agency responsible for coordinating among the 
various agencies? 

A State Department. 

Q I take it there comes a time when a draft NSDD 
is prepared? 

A Yes. Again that document is in this file that I 
was not given access to. 

Q What does NSDD stand for? 

A National Security Decision Directive. 

Some other names that — some of the lower level 
people that might have been involved at defense and state 
could have included a Mr. John Semple, Mr. Peter Burley, 
Mr. Peter Liden, and other staff officers. They would 
have all answered to the people whom I mentioned before. 

Q Did you particpate in the drafting of the NSDD? 

A I don't believe I did. 

Q Did you read it prior to the time that it was 
distributed? 

A No. To the best of my recollection, the State 
Department distribted a draft NSDD sometime in late 1984 
or early 1985. I don't recall the exact date and I read it 
at that time. 

Q What happened to that draft? 

A I showed it to Don Fortier and Admiral Poindexter 
and I recall their being dissatisfied with it. 



H^f?ib/ iQKll^w t?*Ti 



666 



oifiWffiaF 



33 



Q So that draft remained at the 

A Draft, no standing. 

Q There comes a time when a draft is eventually 
distributed that we have all read about that was commented on 
by Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz. Did you see 
that draft? 

A Y)es. I helped produce that draft. 

Q Was that a more formal draft than the one distribut 
by state? 

A No. It had the same kind of standing as a draft 
NSDD prepared by lower level officials for eventual con- 
sideration by the principals. 

Q Do you know whether Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Shultz 
saw the earlier draft? 

A I don' t know. 

Q Do you recall approximately when it was that 
the draft that has now become famous was distributed to 
Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger? 

A I believe as the Tower report states, on June 
17 Mr. McFarlane signed out a memorandum to Shultz and 
Weinberger covering the draft NSDD prepared by Fortier and 
me. He also signed apparently a separate copy out to Bill 
Casey. 

Q Prior to the time that he had signed a copy 
out to Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger, had you 



Iwiite^ii^RPfr 



667 




read it? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 



Yes. 

Had you discussed it with Mr. McFarlane? 

Yes. 

Had you participated in the drafting of that draft: 

You are referring to the one McFarlane signed 



Q Yes. 

A Yes, I had. 

Q Was it your recommendation it be sent out? 

A Yes. 

Q Was this draft — was the drafting of that 
draft, which I will call the June 17 draft, so we are 
clear, did representatives of the State Department and the 
Department of Defense participate in the drafting as well 
of the June 17 draft? 

A As I recall, I drew on the document that had 
earlier been prepared by the State Department to the maximum 
extent possible so that they would not be able to object and 
would recognize their own inputs in preparing with Fortier 
the subsequent draft. But the way this was prepared was 
that this was essentially an NSC staff product draft, but 
using inputs from all the other agencies. This was not 
something where I just sat down one day and out of my head 
composed a National Security [)ecision Directive. I had 



nMfiA^gj o rn. 

ilWlltHFcKattnitr 



668 



mm^ 



35 



input from the Central Intelligence Agency, I had inputs 
from the State Department, I had inputs from the Defense 
Department . 

Q Are you then the principal author of this draft? 

A I would say that it was a joint document by 
Fortier and me. 

Q And obviously in retrospect the draft produced 
some controversy because of its suggestion that military 
equipment, on a case-by-case basis, might be provided to 
Iran. Were there discussions within the NSC about that 
prior to the time that the draft was sent out? 

A There were discussions at the working level, 
informal or formal interagency group meetings about what 
might make a difference with Iran. The NSC itself is actually 
the President, the Secretary of State, the Vice President, 
statutory members. 

Q I am sorry. 

A The NSC staff, those who were involved in this, 
to discuss the 'pros and cons of a possible' loosening 
of the operation called "Operation Staunch." 

. Mr. Van Cleve. Excuse me just a moment. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q In preparing the draft, did you discuss the 



\mi 



>-.r*.f 



(hhvrv 



m&^ 



concepts here, particularly the concept about providing 
military assistance, military weapons to Iran with groups 
outside of the government? 

A There were individuals in the scholarly community 
who were speaking and writing and said that the only thing 
that would matter, make a difference to the Iranians, were 

arms. 

Q Do you remember who those people were? 
A I believe Dr. Rahollah Ramasani at the University 
of Virginia, made the point. I believe Dr. Marvin Zohnas 
at the University of Chicago may have made the point. 

Others may have as well. I can't recall the 
specifics. I did not engage in any Hl M -irtTm consultation. 
I think it is important to note that we clearly 
recognized, as we stated in the cover note to McFarlane and 
his cover note that we prepared, the provocativeness of this, 
but we felt it was an issue worthy of consideration by the 



principals. That was our 



function. We didn't make decisions. 



We tried to present them with options that might make a 
difference and give them the pros and cons, which we did, 
and which they considered. 

Q Just so I am clear, did you actually consult with 
those scholars or did you just read the things that they had 
been writing? 

A It was more informal. I did not have a 






670 




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10 
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12 
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22 
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37 

consultative relationship with any of them. 

Q Did you have duscussions with them? 

A Intermittently at conferences. 

Q Did you discuss it with any — did you discuss 
it with any other outside people? 

A No. 

Mr. Bennett. Excuse me. I just want the record 

to be clear. When you say "it" 

Mr. Eggleston. The June 17. 

Mr. Bennett. Not the specific directive, but the 
general concept? 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q The general concept of providing arms to Iran? 

A No. It was a very sensitive subject and not one 
we would discuss with anyone on the street. 

Q In the preparation of this draft, the June 17 
draft, was there discussions related to the hostages? 

A No. 

Q Did the draft that you have indicated that was 
sent around by the State Department in, I think you indicated, 
late 1984 or early 1985, did it include the provision, the 
suggestion that arms be given to Iran? 

A No. 

Q On a case-by-case basis? 

And I think I asked this before, but I sort of 



uUHnnSDiriuFr 



671 



jm 34 



WRl^i^ 



lost it in my head, prior to the suggestion that you have 
in this document, had you discussed this particular project 
with representatives of the State Department and the Department 
of Defense? 



I am sure that we discussed it in general terms. 

And 

We certainly knew where our bosses stood on the 



Q I take it by that — let me ask you what you mean 
by that? Where did you think McFarlane stood on the issue? 

A I think McFarlane was openminded. 

Q What was your understanding about where Secretary 
Shultz stood on the issue? 

A He was strongly opposed. 

Q And what is your understanding about where 
Secretary Weinberger stood? 

A Strongly opposed, 

Q So as of the time this document was sent out, 
there was thought that it would — it might be against 
the then views of Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz? 

A Yes. As I said before, we thought that the 
analysis was compelling enough to warrant their consideration 
of the proposal given the importance of Iran and the dangers 
that could ensue should Iran fall under the hegemony of 



the Soviet Union 



JIGLASSML 



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SfES^*^ 



39 



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It is important to note that the purpose of 
this NSDD was to look for ways to compete with the Soviet 
Union and other powers for influence in a post-Khomeini 
Iran. 

Q Was there — and I hope you don't think that by 
asking these questions I am being critical. I am not here 
to make judgments about whether this should have been done 
or should not have been done. 

These were not the reasons for my questions. I 
am just curious as of this date what kind of discussion, 
thought had been given to various aspects of it so that I 
can measure that against what was thought about in various 
other ways. 

But as of 

Q I take everything in the spirit of inquiry and 
discovery. 

(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Obviously the provision of weapons to Iran would 
— is something that was contrary to Operation Staunch? 

A Yes. 

Q And was there — and Operation Staunch was, as I 
understand it, a policy decision that p^d been reached by a 
number of different agencies and was fairly strongly believed 
in at the time? Was there anv A^S^S^SP °^ ^^is proposal 






673 



jm 36 



ISL^^ 



with the Department of Justice, with Customs, with other 
organizations that were backing 

Mr. Bennett. At what point in time? 

Mr. Eggleston. Around the time immediately 
prior to the time the June 17 draft was sent out. 

The Witnes-s. No. 

Mr. Bennett. Excuse me. 

To your knowledge? You don't know about other 
people. 

The Witness. To the best of my knowledge, 
thank you, the directive was provided only to state, defense 
and CIA. The working group that was exeunining this did 
not include representatives of the departments you mentioned 
But my attorney is correct, I can not say that someone may 
not have discussed with them this possibility. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q As the working group was preparing this document 
and as you were working on this document, was there any 
discussion about the implementation of this suggestion 
to provide weapons to Iran? 

A No, there was not. 
Q There was prior — shortly prior to the distributiofi 
of this draft a SNIE — I forget what it stands for. Special 
National Intelligence Estimate — that was produced with 




mt 




82-738 0-88-23 



674 



jm 37 



jdOUSSifiEi&r 



41 



regard to Iran; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q How much prior to this was that SNIE distributed? 

A I don't recall the exact date. You would have 
to check the registry at CIA. 

Q Did you have access to it? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you see it? 

A Yes. 

Q I take it that the SNIE at least in part reported 
that our information about Iran or our intelligence informatior 
about Iran was extremely weak; is that a fair 

A I don't recall whether the NIE spoke of the 
intelligence information, but it was certainly my view that 
— and the view of others that I spoke with — that our 
knowledge and understanding of the details of the internal 
dynamics was weak. 

Q My question is was there any discussion as of the 
time among the working group at this time this draft was 
perpared about whether or not the sending of military 
equipment to Iran would actually affect any of Iranian 
attitudes towards the United States? 

A Yes. There was discussion of whether an arms 
relationship with the Iranian Government would affect their 
attitudes towards th^-UaiJ^ Statg^s^ 



675 



rfiT*: 



42 
There was discussion of that. That, I think, is 
the key. I think it is important -- and I am sure you 
have it -- to look at the memo prepared by Gram Fuller, I 
believe, dated May 17, 1985 toward a policy on Iran, which 
was an input to the working group process and the preparation 
of the NSDD which spoke of the contradictions that we were 
coping with regard to our other interests in the Middle 
East as well as the possible dangers and opportunities that 
might exist. And because we were conducting a formal 
interagency process, the NSC staff requested that the CIA 
update the national intelligence estimate that it had 
prepared in the Fall of 1984 on Iran so that our NSDD would 
be formed by the most up-to-date agreed interagency 
intelligence analyses. 

Q Have you read the Tower Commission report? 

A Yes, I have. 

Q You probably read in the report that Mr. Ledeen 
had begun a dialogue as of this time, I think principally 
with Israelis about the state of the knowledge of both the 
United States and Israel in Iran? Were you aware that 
Mr. Ledeen — were you aware as of this time, June 17, 1985, 
that Mr. Ledeen had begun such a dialogue? 

A Yes. 

Q How were you aware of it? 

A He appri&e£l.^r« biiw»ii «■« a»iir^ or two occasions 



iimssisa: 



676 



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43 



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that he planned to do it, and as the Tower Commission 
relates, I was asked for my opinion by Mr. Fortier of whether 
McFarlane should designate Ledeen as a representative of 
speaking for him with the Israelis. Ledeen did not have 
a consultative relationship with my group. 

Apparently he was a consultant to the terrorism 
group or to Don Fortier or someone, but not to the Middle 
East group. He did come in occasionally. He would drop 
by while doing other business and just sort of bemoan 
our relationship with Iran and our poor intelligence and 
the need to do something about it, but I never got the 
impression that he had any great ideas other than to try 
to insinuate himself into the process in one way or the 
other. 

Q What was your reaction when you were asked about 
whether or not Mr. Ledeen should act on behalf of 

A Again, I refer you to the Tower Commission report, 
"which I think relates a note from Fortier to McFarlane 
on April 9, that says that I did not think it was a good 
idea. 
' Q Why did you think it was a bad idea? 

A I questioned the ability of Michael to serve 
in this sensitive a function given his persona in public 
and his tendency to talk and not necessarily be as discreet 
as one needed to be. I ^as ^J^c^qflaaftft**^ about the 



iiyff©3DL* 



677 



jm 40 



msssife 



bureaucratic implications and the attitude of the State 
Department. But again I don't have access to those notes 
and I am not exactly sure; and, in fact, until I saw the Tower 
Commission, I hadn't recalled that Fortier had asked me to 
check with Nimrod Novick, who worked for the prime minister, 
to determine whether he would be received. 

Q Did you -- were you then aware that Mr. Ledeen 
did make trips to Israel? 

A Yes, I was. 

Q Let me stay on Mr. Ledeen for a few minutes. 
There comes a time, as you know, at least from the Tower 
Commission report, that Mr. Ledeen began meeting with various 
Israeli individuals and also with the individual by the name 
of Ghorbanifar. Were you a aware Mr. Ledeen had met 
wtih Mr. Ghorbanifar? 

A No, I was not. 

Q Were you aware that he in the summer of 1985, 
began meeting with Mr. Schwimmer, Mr. Nimrod? 

A No, I was not. 

Q As of — just to pick a date, June 17, 1985, 
had you ever heard of Mr. Ghorbanifar? 

A No, I had not. 

Q When is the first that you heard — when is the 
first that you heard of Mr. Ghorbanifar? 



Mr. Benne 



immm 



678 



fl{il.SKi5ft 



45 



Mr. Eggleston. Ghorbanifar. 
Mr. Bennett. Ghorbanifar? 

The Witness. In March of 1986. I never heard 
of him prior to my involvement in the actual initiative 
in March of 1986. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q So you had not heard of him in connection with 
your studies in the Middle East? 

A I never heard of Ghorbanifar. 
Q Mr. Ghorbanifar had a, apparently, a channel 
in Teheran? Do you know the name of his channel? 
A I am really not sure who he spoke with. 

Mr. Eggleston. Was the channel at the meeting 
can we go off the record for a second? 
(Discussion off the record.) 



BNPiSSm 



679 



mms 



1 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

2 Q There comes a time, I take it, when you learn that 

3 Mr. Ghorbanifaor has a particular channel into Iran; is 

4 that correct? 

5 A Eventually I learned that, yes. 

6 Q Without mentioning who that individual's name was, 

7 as of June 17 of 1985, had you ever heard of that 

8 individual? 

9 A No. 

10 Q Now, let me return to this draft NSDD which was 

11 distributed. Do you recall approximately when it was that 

12 you received the responses from — or starting with the 

13 response from Mr. Weinberger to the NSDD? 

14 A Again, those are documents that I would have hoped 

15 to have reviewed. I would hope you have them in your 

16 possession. 

17 Q I think I do. I am just asking for your best 

18 recollection. 

19 A I think Shultz came in first on June 29 with his 

20 comments. I think Weinberger and Shultz were in mid- July. I 

21 may have that confused, though. That was the time frame. 

22 Q You gave us two dates for Shultz. 

23 A Shultz, I believe, was ~ I am sorry. Shultz 

24 would have been the end of June, I believe the 29th. I 

25 believe Casey and Weinberger in mid-Julv. 



i Weinberger in mid-Juiv. 

llMf.1 &RSSFL 



680 



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CAS- 2 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 



Q I take it it is your recollection that Mr. Shultz 
and Mr. Weinberger were generally opposed to that 
provision of the NSDD, and by that I mean the provision 
dealing with — suggesting sending arms to Iran, and that 
Mr. Casey was not opposed to that provision? 

A That is essentially accurate. The comments were 
much more broad, covered many different subjects relating 
not only to the proposal, but to the — 

MR. BENNETT: Excuse me. We just want to be as 
helpful to you as we can be. I gather you want me to do this, 
if you ask him a date and he doesn't remember? 

MR. EGGLESTON: Sure. Although on a lot of this 
the precise dates aren't that important. 

THE WITNESS: Shultz was June 29. Weinberger 
was July 16. Casey was July 18. According to my 
attorney's notes. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q The dates do turn out to be a little more 
interesting than I thought. Following the receipt, then, 
by the middle of June of those comments from those three 
individuals, what, if anything, happened to the NSDD? 

A I talked with Fortier and with Poindexter. I 
don't recall discussing the issue with McFarlane. I may 
have gone on vacation or gone with the President to California 



I really do not recal 



' UNCLASSIHED 



mi 



W^^ 



They asked me to try and work with some people in the 
bureacracy who we had learned had been involved in drafting 
Secretary Shultz ' response, for instance, and who I thought 
might have been working on it at Defense to see if there was 
^tny flexibility or creativity on this particular issue or 
any other issues. 

Q Before you continue, do you recall who it was at 
State and Defense? 

A I recall at State meeting with Secretary -- 
Assistant Secretary Murphy and Peter Burley. At Defense, 
I believe I spoke with a man named Fred Smith. Fred, I am 
not sure was ever actually aware of the NSDD or not. We had tc 
talk around it, but we talked about the issues and I tried to 
explore where there might be some opportunity for a revision 
to the NSDD. 

I concluded from my discussion that there 
wasn't much room and they were reflecting the views of 
their superiors and reflected in their superiors' comments. 
I reported that to my principal, Fortier, Poindexter, 
perhaps McFarlane. 

I just don't recall in August. I was base — 
I basically suggested that we had two options. We could 
prepare a draft decision memorandum for the President -- 

Q Let me ask you as best you recall to place the time 



in August. 



wmm 



682 



A I could only speculate it was sometime between 
early and mid-August. In reviewing my notes, I don't have 
any record that further specifies when that informal 
discussion might have taken place. 

Do a draft decision memorandum for McFarlane to send 
to the President that outlined for him the possible change 
in our policy and the rationale and that would have 
included the comments of Secretary Weinberger, Secretary 
Shultz, and Director Casey, for him to decide whether to 
move against their decision or to do nothing or to say 
no, give it some more thought, or to do nothing else. And 
in the event I was advised not to prepare a decision 
memorandum for McFarlane to consider and to basically stand 
down from the effort for the time being and to just be very 
sensitive to what was going on in Iran and the region and be 
ready to update, adjust, re-intiate the interagency process 
as that might be appropriate. 

Q Between this time period that you are now talking 
about, mid-August of 1985, mid to early August of 1985, througl 
November 25 of 1986, were you ever asked to reactivate the 
NSDD? 

A No. 

Q Did you throughout -- let me do it this way. You 
subsequently learned because you read the Tower Commission 
Report that in the last days jDr^jc^^^J^ust and early 



le last days or sc^ja^Ai^ust and earl 



683 



Wi^sm 



50 



September of 1985, there was a transfer of TOW missiles 

from Israel to Iran and you have also at least read that there 

was some discussion with the President. 

A Who can remember? 

Q Various discussions. Were you aware that was going 
on at the time? 

A No. 

Q As of August of 1985, had you heard of 
Adnan Khashoggi? 

A Yes. 

Q Who did you understand Adnan Khashoggi to be? 

A I knew him from his reputation in the international 
media as an international businessman involved in many 
different types of business deals. 

Q There comes a time about September -- I always 
forget the date — September 15 when Benjamin Weir was 
released from Lebanon. It was attended by a lot of media 
attention. Were you aware as of the date that he was released 
that there had been a transfer of missiles to Iran? 

A No. 

Q Did you participate in any discussions with — I 
will start with Mr. Fortier, I guess, about the reasons 
that Mr. Weir may have been released? 

A No. 

MR. BENNETT: May I have Just a moment with my 



:nnetT: May I have just a n 

UUCUSSlIt 



684 



M^^^ 



clientl 



MR. EGGLESTON: Sure. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. BENNETT: I understand. All right. Well, 
maybe he won't. 

THE WITNESS: If he doesn't, I will make the point. 
I am waiting. 

MR. BENNETT: There is a portion, something which is 
arguably responsive to your question. It was just the 
manner in which you asked it that he didn't respond. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Why don't I ask you to go ahead. Or else I am 
going to sit here wondering. 

MR. BENNETT: The area dealt with his knowledge or 
awareness. He answered that he was not aware. 

MR. EGGLESTON: Right. 

MR. BENNETT: There was incident. 

THE WITNESS: As I related to the Tower Commission 
in mid-September, I believe a day or so after Weir was 
released, I did notice in the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service some interesting press reports alleging that a 
transport aircraft had, I believe, mysteriously dropped off 
the scope in Turkey and appeared in Israel. It was 
subsequently alleged it was involved in arms transfers to 

Iran and had soiam relationship to^Bjaijainin Weir. There was 

•Of 



685 



mifissf® 



CAS- 7 1 
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then some domestic press coverage here on that. As the 
Tower Report states, I believe, and as I told the Tower 
Commission, I went to North to ask him about it. He 
said there was nothing he could tell me about it. 

I subsequently went to McFarlane, because I was 
very concerned about the possibility that the Israelis 
were providing arms to Iran in contradiction of our 
policy, and McFarlane told me, well, there is nothing he could 
tell me except the U.S. isn't selling arms for hostages. 

I was pretty well advised that there was nothing 
else that I needed to know about this through these 
euphemisms . 

I took it to mean I wasn't part of whatever 
was going on, if something was going on. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Can you describe in any greater detail the 
conversation you had with Colonel North? 

A It was a brief -- I stuck my head into his office 
and said, look at this. I have seen this. Can you tell me 
anything about it? A very brief exchange. 

Q And the best of your recollection is his response 
was — 

A His response was there is nothing I can tell you 
about it. 

Q Did you SQ^'lF*^!' W^Wrt ff^*?^ rt*^" McFarlane and 

liNni EmM 



686 





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2 

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North about those press reports? 

A No. I may have spoken with my wife about it. 

Q I am sorry. Anyone at the NSC staff? 

A No. 

Q Did the press reports indicate the origin -- when 
I say the origin, who had leased the plane? Did it reveal 
any information about the plane itself? 

A I don't recall. We would have to look at the clippir 

Q Did you ever see — did you see any information 
within the NSC about this plane? 

A No. 

Q Throughout the fall, between September, the 
release of Benjamin Weir in mid-September 1985, and, say, 
November 23, 24, 25, something around there of 198 5, 
you subsequently learned there were a series of meetings 
with various individuals and eventually a transfer of Hawk 
missiles. Were you aware of that at the time? 

A No. 

Q Was there anyone at the NSC -- you were in the 
Middle East Directorate; is that correct? 

A Right. 

Q Was there anyone at the NSC who was -- let me ask it 
this way. Was one of the areas you were responsible for in 
your role at the NSC Iran? 



mmsM. 



687 



TflJCreiPP 



1 Q Were you the principal staff level officer 

2 responsible for Iran? 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q Was there anyone at the NSC, at the staff level 

5 officer, as opposed to Fortier, or Poindexter, or 

6 McFarlane level who had more responsible for Iran to your 

7 knowledge than you did? 

8 A No. 

9 Q And in 19 -- well, let me ask it this way. From, 

10 say, the first of August 19 -- I am sorry. From the time that 

11 you were told to stand down, I think was your words, on the 

12 NSDD up through the conversation that you had in March of 

13 1986, where you began some involvement in this process, did 

14 anyone consult you about -- again, about the issue of 

15 arms to Iran? 

16 A No. 

17 Q Were you consulted at any time along those times 

18 about the various factions, political factions, in Iran? 

19 A Well — 

20 Q If you recall? 

21 A No one came to me to consult. I am sure in the 

22 course of discussions with the others in the government, 

23 we talked about what was going on in Iran. But it was -- I 

24 was not, for instance, consulted by Colonel North, to the 

25 best of my recollection, about Iraniem jnatters or anyone 

^m^t 



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else on the staff about factions such as you suggest. 

I would just point out that it is important to rote that 
vAiile I would be then described as the principal action officer 
at the staff level for Iran, functional directorates also had 
someone with responsible for Iran. 

For instance, the Intelligence Directorate, 
Vince Canestrero, had responsibility for any covert action 
programs relating to Iran. 

In the Economic Affairs Directorate, there would 
have been one or more individuals, since we had so many 
outstanding financial questions that were being addressed 
by the Haig Tribunal, and emergency regulations, that 
would have had some take a look at some regulations that I 
would not have looked at. Or in the commercial area. 
The people then in POL-MIL, if we were going to conduct 
military activity in the vicinity of Iran, they would 
have been involved, as well, and might have been asked 
some of these questions. 

Q I understand you were not the only person. 

A It is important to understand there were a 
variety of people that would have considered themselves 
responsible. But the Regional Directorate would usually 
assign the primary responsibility. 

Q But the Middle East Directorate would have had 



primary responsibility. 



ilNP.! mML 



itetiM^ 



56 



A Yes. 

Q Well, to your knowledge, and I am asking only to 
your knowledge, were any of those other individuals in the 
other directorates consulted by any of these issues? 

A Not to my knowledge. 

Q Did you consult -- did you have a regular 
relationship with Vince Canestrero? 

A As appropriate, I would talk with him about the 
issues . 

Q Did you throughout this time period -- again, I am 
talking about from the time you were told to stand down in 
mid-August of 1985 through whatever day it was in March of 
1986, did you ever discuss the issue of arms to Iran or 
political factions in Iran with Vince Canestrero? 

A Probably. He had contributed to that NSDD. He was 
one of the people on the staff that contributed to it and 
who would have been the formal liaison with CIA with respect 
to any questions that we might have wanted them to address 
in the SNIE or in the other matter. 

Q I was really directing your attention to the time 
after the NSDD is essentially closed down? 

A I don ' t recall , 



i4niiK%i»»t 



690 



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In Jafluary of 1986, January 17, there was a 
covert action finding signed. This is again something I know 
that having read the Tower Commission Report you now know. 
Did you know that as of, at, or around January 17, 1986? 

A No. 

Q When is the first^that you learned that a covert 
action finding had been signed with regard to Iran in January 
of 1986? 

A In March of 1986, early March I was asked to 
come to a meeting in Fortier's office. North and Peter 
Rodman were also present and at that time, I was given a 
general briefing on the finding, on the activity, and was 
advised of the role that was foreseen for me in the effort. 

Q Before I get into that, because I just want to 
cover about two more minutes, I would like to take a brief 
break and get into a period where your activity gets a little 
more intense in this area. 

You subsequently learned now or you know now there 
was a transfer of arms in February of 1986 directly from the 
United States to Iran. At or about the time that that was 
taking place, prio^-afcc^ J^V-SeQKiM(B9|et«o«>^with — in March of 



llffiESM 



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1986, were you aware that that transfer of arms had taken 
place? 

A No. 

MR. EGGLESTON: I would like to take a brief 
break if that is okay with everybody. 
(Recess. ) 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Right before we took our brief recess, you began 
to tell us about conversations in March of 1986. You had 
just indicated that you had a conversation with Mr. Rodman, 
Peter Rodman, and Oliver North. 

A And Don Fortier, in Don Fortier's office. 
Q Just the four of you? 
A Yes. 

Q What is it, as best you recall, that they said 
to you about the operation and what they wanted you to do? 

A Basically they said that a finding had been signed 
to conduct a joint operation with the Israelis that was to 
try to undertake a strategic opening to Iran, that the 
principal gesture of goodwill that we were going to undertake 
was the provision of limited arms through the Israelis 
and that what we wanted from them was their efforts to gain the 
release of hostages. 

That is the best of my recollection. I didn't 
take notes on this^_.You don Lt J:ake_ notes on this sort of 



is. YOU aont caxe nui-ea 



692 



mmm 



\S-14 1 

2 
3 
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thing. 

And then as a further gesture of our goodwill, 
and we hoped to genuinely initiate the relationship, 
McFarlane would be asked to travel secretly to Iran as the 
President's special envoy. 

I was to be accompanying McFarlane to provide 
substantive staff support as a regional policy expert and 
note taker and that in the preceding period, working with 
Rodman and North, I was to draft the terms of references that 
would bound the discussions McFarlane would have with the 
senior Iranians. 

Q How long did the conversation last? 

A I don't recall. 

Q Was it -- I don't mean — 

A Brief. I am sure it was no more than 20 to 30 
minutes at the most. Fortier's schedule was always wild and 
we all had a lot of other things going on. At that time I 
was principally involved in making preparations for a national 
security planning group meeting to be convened on March 14 
to consider whether to proceed with the naval challenge of 
Qadhafi's claim to the Gulf of Sidra. 

Q At that meeting, what if anything did you learn 
about the prior relationship between the United States and 
Iran with regard to the arms initiative? 

A All I was told in very general terms was that 



\m 



in very gene 



693 



lEWnHF 



some number of TOWs had been provided. There was no mention 
that I can recall of the Hawk missiles. I don't believe 
I learned about the Hawk missile business until the full 
disclosure in November. 

And even then, I was told it was oil drilling 
equipment, as other people were. Only later was it that 
I learned it was Hawk missiles. I was mis-led about that. 

Q When is it that you learned -- I take it that 
when there is a disclosure in November, you learned there had 
been a transaction in November of 1985. 

A That is correct. 

Q And you were told it was oil drilling equipment? 

A I believe that that is what I was told. 

Q Do you remember who told you that? 

A No. I really don't remember. It was fairly 
frenzied. 

Q Yes. We will get to that. It does seem like a 
frenzied time. Do you remember approximately when it was 
in the November time period that you were told about the 
November transaction and that it was — 

A During the preparation of the chronology. 

Q Okay. 

A So that would have been the middle of November. 

Q When did you learn that the November transaction 
had actually been Hawk missile 



mmm. 



694 



WIPW 



CAS- 16 "• 
2 
3 
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A In that same time period. 

Q Who did you learn it from? 

A I don't recall. 

Q Were you consulted in March of 1986 about whether 
a trip to Iran was a good idea? 

A No. My opinion was not solicited about this 
program. 

Q 

A 

Q 



Did you have an opinion? 
I am sure I had opinions. 
Do you remember what it was? 



A I believe that the strategic logic of an opening 
to Iran was sensible and was in our interests. I thought 
that a meeting with Rafsanjani, Khamenei, the President, 
and Musavi would have been a significant and dramatic step 
and would serve our interests. 

I was troubled by the fact that there was a 
relationship between arms and hostages, but I was not asked 
for my opinion about it. 

Q You had indicated in describing your conversation 
that you had with Mr. Fortier, Colonel North, and 
Mr. Rodman that the relationship was with the Israelis. 
Do you recall them saying with the Israelis? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you indicate earlier that you had some familiart^ 
as a result of your consultina^iylft ^iJJi the Foreign 



MiSSEffl 



695 



wmiRHr 



CAS-lTl Military Act sales, arms export laws, all that stuff? 

2 A Arms export laws, yes. 

3 Q Do you have a fairly -- did you have a fairly -- 

4 I don't know how to ask this exactly. In-depth knowledge of 

5 those laws, the requirements, congressional notification that 

6 may have gone with some of them? 

7 A I wouldn't say I had in-depth knowledge of the 

8 laws. I knew about the key components. I would always 

9 go and check the actual legislation before I would put -- 

10 give anyone my opinion about anything. It is very complicated 

11 There are lawyers who specialize in nothing more than that 

12 act. 

13 Q Is there -- did you have any knowledge of the 

14 congressional notification requirements? 

15 A Yes, I did. 

16 Q Let me ask what was your understanding if the 

17 United States had sold weapons to Israel and Israel was going 

18 to transfer them to the — to Iran? Would that have triggered 

19 a requirement of congressional notification? 

20 MR. BENNETT: Excuse me. I am going to object. 

21 I am a little troubled about him opining on the law and 

22 legal requirements. He is not a lawyer. 

23 MR. EGGLESTON: I will re-phrase it in a way 

24 that I think he will have to answer. 

25 MR. BENNETT: Well, you know, re-phrase it. I don't 



lu^m^sa, 



WLRsanS" 



want him giving you his opinions of what the law does or does 
not require. I am not sure I know what it requires at this 
point. 

MR. EGGLESTON: Okay. Although I think that his 
knowledge of how this transaction might have been structured 
and whether or not it was his view that congressional 
notification may or may not have been necessary is a 
question to be covered, that is permissible. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q What was your understanding about how this 
transaction that was going to take place was going to be 
structured? 

A I wasn't — 

MR. BENNETT: Excuse me. What transaction? You 
took us to the point of he is going over to Iran. We are 
not talking about any transactions at this point. We are 
talking about him going to Iran in March is what I thought we 
were talking about. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Did there come a time when you learned that the 
plane that you were going over on was also going to carry 
weapons? 

A Only when I arrived in Istael. 

Q And did there come a time when you learned that 
there were additLpud^ Xl^PC"*. ceotfiUiQlOted in connection 



697 



mmwE 



1 with the trip? 

2 A In the course of the trip. 

3 Q And were you informed during the course of the trip 

4 about the value of the weapons that were being transported? 

5 A No . 
Q Did you have any knowledge as of the time of the 

trip about the quantity of weapons or arms or at this point 
spare parts that would be transferred? 
9 A I was advised that something on the order of 24 

10 Hawk missile spare parts were being sold in the context or 

11 delivered or whatever in the context of the trip. 

12 Q As of the time that you learned that there was 

13 going to be a transfer of Hawk spare parts to the 

14 Iranians in the context of the trip — I think is what you 

15 used — did you have — did you give any thought to whether 

16 V^^e was a congressional notification requirement that would 

17 be triggered as a result of the trip? 

18 . A I was under the clear impression that everything 

19 that was going on was being conducted under the umbrella 

20 of the finding and that whatever was or wasn't being 

21 notified was pursuant to the interpretation of the 

22 Intelligence Act. 

23 Q Did you know whether or not Congress had been 

24 notified? 

25 A I was advised when I asked_^iihen I was briefed, 



698 



uai^^ 



CAS-20 1 that Congress had not been advised. Or I believe 

2 "notified" is the proper word. 

3 MR. BENNETT: At what point in time? 

4 MR. EGGLESTON: I am about to ask that. 

5 THE WITNESS: In March. 

6 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

7 Q That was during your conversation in March? 

8 A When I was brought in, I asked if congressional 

9 notification of the finding had taken place. I was told 

10 it had not. 

11 Q Who did you ask that of? 

12 A Fortier. This was in the Fortier meeting. 

13 Q All right. Okay. And was there any additional 

14 discussion at that time about the requirements of 

15 congressional notification? 

16 A There was not much discussion about it. 

17 Q What was it about what you had been advised 

18 that caused you to ask a question about congressional 

19 notification? 

20 A My understanding of the Intelligence Act was that 

21 findings had to be notified. And I was advised that the 

22 Attorney General had interpreted that timely notification allov|« 

23 the President to determine what was timely. 

24 Q And who is it at that meeting who told you that, if 
25 



you recall? 



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A I believe it was Fortier or North. 
Q I am sorry? 
A Fortier or North. 
Q Fortier or North? 
A Fortier or North. 

Q And do you recall anything else about what either 
Fortier or North may have said about the Attorney General's 
opinion about congressional notification? 
A No. 

Q Was the conversation that you had with Mr. Fortier 
and Mr. North and Mr. Rodman about congressional 
notification, was that a conversation about 
congressional notification under a covert action finding? 
A Yes. 

Q Was there any discussion that you recall about 
notification under any of the Arms Export Act statute? 
A I don't recall. 

Q Do you recall throughout the time period, March of 
1986 through November of 1986, whether there was any 
discussion about notification under the Arms Export Act? 
MR. BENNETT: That he was involved in? 
MR. EGGLESTON: Sure. Sure. 
THE WITNESS: I don't remember any discussion of 



that. 



IttlEUlSSllL 



700 



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BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q You indicated that out of that meeting you were 
asked to draft terms of reference? 

A Yes. 

Q What is "terms of reference"? What are those? 

A Terms of reference are what would be called -- 
could also be called talking points for guidance to bound the 
discussions that one could have with a foreign official. 

Q Were you told at that time what to put in the 
terms of reference? 

A I was given guidance to prepare terms of reference 
that covered the — what I would call macro issues in 
U.S. /Iranian relations. 

Q How long after this meeting did you prepare the 
terms of reference? 

A I probably completed a draft within a day or so. 

Q And what steps, if any, did you take to learn 
about what had occurred prior to your involvement in terms of 
relationships between Iran and the United States? 

A I did not pursue it in great detail. I was advised 
that I was to have no operational role in this affair. I 
had a policy role. I would refer to whatever papers I had or 
what I thought should be in a first discussion that was held 
by a presidential emissary and a senior official from another 
government regardllA lAlk&'A^\|^j:^ 'slie relationship. 



701 



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Q Prior to the preparation, did you have any 
additional discussions with Colonel North about the 
initiative? 

A I may have discussed one or two things with him. 
I really can't recall. I didn't keep that kind of note. 

Q I understand. Have you -- the Tower Report 
refers to a document which is referred to as the undated 
document and there is some speculation that it was around 
April 4 or so. 

Are you aware of the document I am talking about? 
A Yes, I am. 

Q When is the first time that you saw that document? 
A The first time I saw the document that they refer 
to was at the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, when 
they stuck it in my face. 

MR. BENNETT: Excuse me, if I may. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE WITNESS: My attorney reminds me that 
Mr. McMann, the Staff Chief of the Senate Select Committee, 
did not let me see the document, did not let me read it. He 
strictly asked me whether I could describe what type of 
document it was as regards to being a decision memorandum 
or something else. 

The April 4 memo that you referred to, I believe, 
I subsequently formally requested from Peter Wallison that a 



702 



laswar 



copy of that document be made available to me. It is in my 
attorney/client work folder that I don't have access to. 

MR. BENNETT: Just say you clearly understand we 
have no reason to believe it is not the document, but he was 
asked questions about a document which they refused to let 
us see and through subsequent assistance, we got a document 
which was purported to be the document which was in three 
seconds shown to him at that meeting before the Intelligence 
Committee. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q But the first time that you had seen the 
document that is quoted, I think at some length in the Tower 
Commission Report, referred to as the undated document, was 
at the Senate Select Committee hearing? 

A The entire document, as my attorney said, that 
we think was that document would have been at that time, yes. 
I did not have in my possession or read what the Tower 
Commission referred to until that full document was 
provided to me by Peter Wallison's office in December. 

Q So you saw the document prior to the time it was 
released in the Tower Commission Report? 

MR. BENNETT: Yes. We raised hell they 
would show him a document and ask him questions about a 
document and then not let us see it. 

THE WITNESS: After my _tfat4Jpony before the SSCI, 



ITNESS: After my teSjfijnony b 

mSBL 



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I submitted a request for what I believed was the document 
that they had asked me to comment on that I did not have a 
copy of. So that would have been in the third week of 
December, perhaps the 17th or the 18th of December. It was 
probably in my memo requesting that. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q That is okay. I don't care about that. 

How many drafts of the terms of reference did you 
do? 

A I myself did one draft by myself and Rodman and 
North then proceeded to prepare several differing versions of 
the draft and I occasionally commented on it, but not in a 
systematic manner. 

Q I take it there comes a time when a final draft of 
the terms of reference was prepared? 

A I don't know. 

Q Was there a terms of reference document taken by 
McFarlane with him on the trip? 

A Yes , there was . 

Q Did you see that document that Mr. McFarlane 
actually took with him? 

A I only saw that when I got on the plane with 
McFarlane. 

Q Did you have occasion to read it? 



Yes. 



llEUM L 



704 



WBSSiffil 



Q Do you recall any differences between the document 
that you read — let me finish the question — that you read 
on the plane and the document -- let me start this way. 

Were there any differences that you recall that were 
other than grammatical between the draft you prepared and the 
draft that you read on the plane that McFarlane took with him? 

A I really don't remember. 

Q Is it your recollection, if you are able to recollect 
is it your recollection that there were substantial 
differences, that there were minimal differences? Do you 
have any recollection along those lines? 

A I don't recall substantial differences. 

Q Between your conversation with North, Fortier, 
and Rodman in March of 1986 and the time you left on the 
plane, did you have any conversations with Colonel North 
about the structure of the transaction that would take 
place? 

I am sorry. Let me ask you another question. 
I think I may have asked too much. When did you 
first learn that your trip to Tehran would also include 
a delivery of Hawk spare parts? 

A To the best of my recollection, it was in Israel 
that we were told that it would actually be on the same 



plane. 



iWOTC 



broadly". Having 



705 



imm 



u 



asked it in the context of Hawk spare parts, it may not 

■/■'►be- 
have been very clear. When is the first you learned your 

trip would also be in conjunction with the delivery of 

weapons or weapon systems? 

A I believe McFarlane and I had one meeting with North 
sometime in April -- and I don't recall the date, but it 
could probably be determined -- where North discussed in some 
with some specifics for McFarlane how he saw the sequence 
evolving and that is what is in the document that I received 
that was dated August 4 that we think is the one you are 
referring to, some of these things were laid out there. 

Q Do you recall in that conversation any discussion 
of the financing of the deal? 

A No. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: Before you go on, I believe you 
said August. I think you may have meant April 4. You did 
mean April 4? 

THE WITNESS: The April 4 document. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Between March of 1986 and, say, November 2 5 of 
1986, did you ever have any conversation with Oliver North 
eOxJut the financing of the May transfer of weapons to 
Iran? 

A The only thing I heard him say was that the -- 
Ghorbanifa^r and the Iranians XVfr^'#'W?9 trouble coming up 



is: 



82-738 0-88-24 



706 



mfissif^ 



CAS- 28 1 with the money that they needed to in order to complete 

2 their part of what was necessary for other stages to proceed 

3 Q Do you recall when that conversation was or when 

4 you heard Colonel North say that? 

5 A I believe it was in this discussion with McFarlane 

6 Q In April of 1986? 

7 A Sometime in April. 

8 Q You don't recall any other conversation with him abo; 

9 the diversion, about the financing? 

10 A No. I was never involved in the financing, 

11 any of the technical aspects of this. 

12 Q And similarly, did you have any conversations 

13 with Mr. McFarlane about the financing? 

14 A I never discussed that with them. 

15 Q Just so the record is complete, did you have any 

16 conversations with Admiral Poindexter about the 

17 arrangement? 

18 . A I never discussed it with Admiral Poindexter either 

19 Q Do you recall anything else about the conversation 

20 that you participated — that you attended between North 

21 and McFarlane in April of 1986 about the way the deal would 

22 go down? 

23 A The way the deal would go down? 

24 Q I am sorry. The way the transaction would be 
25 



structured? 



mm§. 



707 



mi^^ 



74 



A By that, you are referring to the visit and the 

delivery? 

Q Yes. 

A The one other interesting thing that stuck out in 
my mind was whether the Israeli Nir would accompany us 
or not which I viewed as a policy issue. I strongly 
recommended against his participation. I don't recall 
exactly, but McFarlane seemed to say he didn't have a 
strong view one way or the other, but he was willing to 
think about it. 

Q Did you know Mr. Nir? 

A I had met Nir in the sununer of 1985 during the 
TWA highjacking affair. 

Q As of the time of the conversation with 
Mr. McFarlane, did you have any knowledge about Nir's 
role in the initiative, the Iranian initiative? 

A North had told me that he had become the 
Israeli point of contact. 

Q There comes a time when you actually leave for 
Tehran. Do you remember when that was? 

A It is all in there. I think it was Friday, 
May 23, 7:30 in the morning, something like that. 

Q I am not going to take you through that trip. You 
have done memoranda on it. It is in the Tower Commission I 
think it would be 







708 



^^m^' 



75 



1 A Thank you. 

2 Q Because there are a lot of other sources for that 

3 information. I would like to ask some questions about whether 

4 various things were discussed. 

5 I think you can probably guess what they are. 

6 Unless you find this difficult to answer this way, I am 

7 really talking about during the course — I am going to ask a 

8 series of questions about things that may have been 

9 discussed during the course of all the discussions that were 

10 held with the Iranians over the several day time period. 

11 And then I would like to ask you about whether 

12 various things were discussed separately just among the 

13 Americans, not in conversations with Iranians. Do you 

14 understand where I am going here? 

15 A Yes. 

16 Q When I first say was such and such discussed, I mean 

17 with the Iranians unless I neglect to make that clear. 

18 First, with the Iranians, do you recall any dis- 

19 cussion whatsoever about the financing of the transfer of arms 

20 in May of 1986? 

21 A No. 

22 MR. BENNETT: Let me make an observation. I will 

23 let him answer over my objection, but he has given these 

24 detailed memoranda. I think they would be the best evidence 
25 



of what was discussed 



"Mmm 



709 



TflRLlS?!! 



CAS- 31 1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



He was actually the note taker of what was 
discussed at all those meetings. That is really the best 
evidence of what occurred at those meetings. 

MR. EGGLESTON: I understand. 

THE WITNESS: To the extent that I heard any 
discussions between Americans or Iranians, I heard nothing 
relating to financing. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Do you recall at any time the subject of 
Nicaragua coming up in the conversation? 



No. 



Do you recall any discussion of 

Yes. 

What was the discussion you recall about] 

It is dealt with in detail in my notes. 

Generally, what was it, as best you recall today? 

Again, I mean I don't see what is served by getting 
into a general recollection. 

MR. BENNETT: If you remember, over my objection, 
you can answer it. If you don't remember -- 

THE WITNESS: Okay. 

MR. BENNETT: -- refer him to the notes and stand 
on your notes. Don't guess. 



mim 



710 




MR. BENNETT: Mr. Eggleston, I am sure you know the 
pages by heart, but page B-112 through B-119 contain the notes 
of Mr. Teicher. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q I did not know the page numbers by heart. 

MR. BENNETT: B-112 through B-119. 

MR. EGGLESTON: I thank you for that. 

MR. BENNETT: He is happy to review them if you 
want this stuff on the record. I am a little troubled about 
on such an important issue that he be generalizing on somethinc 
where specifics are so important. 

MR. EGGLESTON: Right. I think the record is 
fairly clear I am asking what he today recalls about 
those conversations. His recollection may be better in 
certain areas than it was then, maybe things were not in the 
notes that were discussed. 

I think I am entitled to know if things were 
discussed that are not in the notes. 

MR. BENNETT: I will allow him to answer over my 



objection. 



HU^SLFl. 



711 



mme 



CAS- 3 3 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 



BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q I sort of lost my train of thought. 
A You asked me -- 

MR. BENNETT: it. No. I want to be helpful here 
Answer his questions. Don't tell him what his questions 
were. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Was there any — let me get my train back. 

You returned from the trip to Tehran and the Preside: 
is briefed. Did you participate in the briefing of the 
President? 

A Yes. 

(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q The Tower Commission has reported that according 
to Mr. McFarlane, Oliver North told Mr. McFarlane "on the 
tarmac at the Tel Aviv Airport after the trip to Tehran in 
May of 1986 that 'This Government is availing itself of part o 
the money (from the Iranian initiative) for application to 
Central America. ' " 

Were you present during that conversation? 
A No. 

Q Did Colonel North ever say anything about the 
Government availing itself of part of the money from the 
Iranian initiative for applic^iqa.to Ji^ntral America during 



MilMC 



712 



CAS- 34 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



the course of that trip? 

A No. 

Q Any time from May of 1986 to November 25 of 1986, 
did he ever say anything to you about part of the money from 
that transaction going to Central America? 

A No. 

Q After returning from the trip, I think you 
indicated that the President was briefed, and I know you have 
testified about this. I am not going to go into it in any 
detail. 

Again, was the President briefed on the 
financing of the transaction? 

A No. 

Q Did you remain active in what has now been called 
the Iranian initiative after returning from Iran? 

A No. 

Q In July of 1986, another hostage was released. 
Did you have any role — how can I phrase this? Did you have 
any role in the release of that hostage? Did you have 
negotiations or discussions about how to get him released 
during the summer of 1986? 

A No. 

Q Did you know whether conversations with -- and 
negotiations with the Iranians were continuing through the 



ir of 1986: 



MCLESSEL 



713 




A I was not aware of what was going on. 

Q There is another transaction which takes place 
at the very end of October of 1986 where an additional 500 
TOWS was shipped from Israel to Iran at or about the time 
that that transaction took place — and when I say "about", 
I mean prior to the early November story in the Beirut 
newspaper -- were you aware that that transaction had taken 
place? 

A No. 

Q There comes a time when the story is released, and 
there is a story about the Tehran trip released in the 
newspaper -- or excuse me, that Beirut magazine. I think 
it was a magazine, not a newspaper. That takes place, as I 
recall, in early november of 1986; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Sometime in the middle of November, the 
President makes a speech to the Nation. Did you have any 
role in the preparation of materials for that speech? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q And what materials was it that were prepared 
for that speech that yovJhad a role in preparing? 

A His remarks. 

Q And who was the principal drafter, if you know, of 
his remarks? 

A Colonel North. ^ «—.-,! - 




714 



mmm 



CAS- 361 Q And what role, if any, did you have? 
2 Did you review it? 

Did you participate in it? In what fashion? 
A Along with several other people, I was asked to 
comment on it, perhaps make inputs, deletions, what I would 
call normal staffing responsibility for presidential 
remarks. Speechwriters were also involved, official speech- 
writers, I believe Pat Buchannan was involved. I am sure 
9 Don Regan was involved. John Poindexter, Alton Keel, 

10 Bud McFarlane, Greg Coy, Bob Earl. I do not know whether 

11 people from other agencies were involved or not. 

12 Q Did you see the initial draft? Did Colonol 

13 North release the initial draft? Did he prepare the 

14 initial draft of the remarks, if you know? 

15 A I believe he did. 

16 Q Did you see the initial draft that Colonel 

17 North prepared; 

18 A I am not sure I saw the initial draft or not, 

19 Q Were you — you have given a list of a number of 

20 people who have -- who had some role or who had read the 

21 speech or whatever. Were you one of the principal people 

22 responsible for preparing the President's remarks; 

23 MR. BENNETT: What do you mean by "principal"? 

24 That means — that may mean one thing to you, one thing to 

25 me, and ten other things to ten other people. I would prefer 



iWMJilb 



715 



m^^ 



82 



1 if you as.ci:d him what his role was. 

2 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

3 Q What was your role? 

4 A As I described it. 

5 Q Did different people have different degrees of 

6 participation in the preparation of the remarks? 

7 A I am sure they did, but I don't believe that I can 

8 assess who wrote how many words or paragraphs or pages. 

9 Q You would know whether you were one of the two or 

10 three people in the room with Colonel North going over the 

11 successive drafts or whether you were a person who saw it 

12 once and didn't see it again? 

13 A I saw it more than once. 

14 Q Did you actually make changes to the draft? 

15 A I am sure I did. 

1g Q Did you participate in the conversations with 

17 Colonel North about the draft? 

13 A I am sure that we talked about it. 

ig Q Do you recall what it was that you discussed with 

20 hira about the draft? 

21 A No. 

22 Q You don't recall? 

23 A (Indicating.) 

24 Q The speech, as I recall, then led quite quickly to a 

25 press conference, is that your recollection? I will delete 



IIMPI ACC'«nr 



^yju^:u^i 



716 



mm^ 



' quite quickly. 

2 A I don't recall the exact dates. I am sure you can. 

3 Q Within several days after the speech, there was a 
^ press conference? 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q Did you also participate in the preparation of the 

7 President for the press conference? 

8 A I helped prepare a couple of questions and answers. 

9 Q Do you recall which questions and answers you 

10 prepared? 

11 A No, I do not. 

12 Q Do you recall the areas that you were asked to -- 

13 A What I would have written about or contributed 

14 to would have dealt with the general Middle East subjects, 

15 general issues relating to U.S. interests in Iran. That sort 

16 of material as well as things relating to the trip that I 

17 participated in. 

18 Q You indicated that you also participated in the 

19 preparation of the chronology? 

20 A (Witness nodding head.) 

21 Q Were you assigned by someone to participate in the 

22 preparation of the chronology? 

23 A Admiral Poindexter. 

24 Q Who else was assigned to participate in the 

25 preparation of the chronology? 



TfTP-^MrhW^ 



717 



11 



M^fflF 



1 A Colonel North was given the primary responsibility 

2 and I believe the CIA was asked to contribute. But it was 

3 Colonel North's action. 

^ Q And how was the chronology prepared 

5 A How was it prepared? Different people over a period 

of time worked on different parts of it. 

Q Did you work on any part of it other than the 
parts about which you had direct knowledge 
9 A No. 
10 Q Which parts of it, if you recall, did you participate 



in; 



12 A The first part, which at least with the version that 

13 I worked on dealt with the importance of Iran in global 

14 terms, relationships that other countries have with Iran and 

15 their recommendations to us that we work with them. The Soviet 

16 dimension, some research on the consequences of 

17 Brzezinski's meeting with Buzargon in Algiers and the 

18 sensitivity of arms to U.S. /Iranian relationship. 

19 General Iranian/U.S. issues. 

20 Q Did you also participate in the preparation of the 

21 part of the chronology with your trip? 

22 A I looked at that. I don't believe that I had much 

23 of an input to it. But I did look at that. 

24 Q The Tower Commission Report indicates that there 

25 was a dispute about a particular^ .spf^^itftn of the report 



wTOFSEifiRE' 



718 



mms 



1 or of the chronology and that is the section dealing with 

2 August -- July/August of 1985 and a dispute relating to 

3 what the President knew, when he knew it. Did you have 

4 any role in the preparation of that part of the chronology? 

5 A No. I did not. 

6 Q Did you participate in discussions about how that 

7 part of the chronology should be drafted? 

8 A I did not participate, although I heard people 

9 talking about it. 

10 Q Who did you hear talking about it? 

11 A Mr. McFarlane, North. 

12 Q Did you hear that on one occasion or more thanfone 

13 occasion? 

14 A I reall don't recall. 

15 Q As best you recall, what do you recall them 

16 discussing about that issue? 

17 A Just that they had to write it up and that — they 

18 were searching for the words to characterize how it had been 

19 decided and when I saw it, afterwards, I was struck by the 

20 careful drafting that I saw that didn't say the President 

21 had approved it, but said that Israel would be 

22 re-supplied and one can interpret things various ways. I had 

23 no direct knowledge of that. 

24 Q Did you ever discuss with Colonel North the careful 

25 way in which it had been drafted? 






719 



«iiW 



A NO. 

Q Or with Mr. McFarlane? 

A No. 



'* Q Or with Mr. Poindexter? 

5 A No. 

6 Q On November 21 of 1986, Mr. Casey testified before 

7 various Senate and House Intelligence Committees. Were you 

8 aware that he was going to testify before the Intelligence 

9 Committee? 

10 A Probably, but I don't recall exactly. 

11 Q You participated in the briefings of the 

12 congressional leaders; is that correct? 

13 A No, I did not. 

14 Q You did not? 

15 A No. If I recall it was only Admiral Poindexter. 

16 But I did not participate, so I don't know who actually 

17 physically was in the room, but it was not me. 

18 Q Between November 21 — between November 20, 1986, 

19 and November 25, 1986, did you have occasion to see 

20 Colonel North? 

21 A I eim sorry. Could you repeat? 

22 Q November 20 of 1986 and November 25 of 1986, 

23 did you have any conversation with Oliver North? 

24 A I am sure I talked to him at one point or the 

25 other. 



wm. 




720 



1SIK5W 



1 Q Let me just for your information, in case these 

2 dates are not in your head, November 25 was the day of the 

3 Meese press conference. 
A The 2 5th? 
Q The 25th. It was the day that North was fired and 

the day Poindexter resigned. It was a Tuesday. Did you 
work over the weekend, if you recall, the weekend of the 
22nd and 23rd? 
9 A I don't believe I went in on that weekend. 

10 Q Do you recall whether or not you spoke to Colonel 

11 North on the 24th, Monday the 24th? 

12 A I don't believe I did. 

13 Q Do you know whether you spoke to him on the 2 5th? 

14 A I think I saw him briefly at the staff meeting that 

15 morning or after the staff meeting. 

16 Q And do you recall what occurred at the staff 

17 meeting? 

18 A No. 

19 Q Was there an announcement — this is Tuesday the 

20 24th now? 

21 A I believe so. Yes. 

22 Q Was there an announcement at the staff meeting that 

23 Colonel North had been fired? 

24 A No . 

25 Q Did Admiral Poindexter attend the staff meeting? 



TOlp-^iilK*^ 



721 



DUttStftS^ 



A I don't recall. 

Q Since November 25 of 1986 to the present, have you 
had any conversations with Oliver North? 

A I bumped into him on the street and said hello. 

Q Did you have any additional discussion other than 
saying hello, how are you doing? 

A No. 

Q Have you had any conversation since November 25, 
1986 to the present with Admiral Poindexter? 

A Rather a brief photo opportunity he held with all 
members of the staff to say goodbye. 

Q And again I take it the conversation -- 

A Strictly -- 

Q — was at the chit-chat level? 

A Yes. 

MR. EGGLESTON: Let me mark these — let me not 
mark these. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Before I mark these, are these your notes? 
MR. BENNETT: You are handing him a 25-page 
document. I am not complaining about that. He is ready to 
answer — 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Let me ask you to look at page one of the 
document. Do you J^ecoqjilze-vd^Mii^ll^f^t that is your 



722 



liUm^RBF' 



"* handwriting? 

2 A That is not my handwriting. 

3 Q Okay. Then that is enough. Then I will ask you 

^ not to look at the rest of it and I will take it right back. 

5 Do you know whose handwriting it is? 

6 A No. 

7 MR. EGGLESTON: Cut out some questions. 

8 (Discussion off the record.) 

9 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

10 Q I take it you have a PROF system in your office? 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q Did you have a method of coiranunicating directly 

13 with Admiral Poindexter through the PROF system? 

14 A No. 

15 MR. BENNETT: I can see why you are asking that 

16 question. 

17 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

18 Q Is there a secret cache of PROFs you would like to 

19 reveal to us? You don't have to answer that. 

20 A I should just say — 

21 MR. BENNETT: There is no question pending. 

22 THE WITNESS: No question pending. As a follow- 

23 up, just for the record, if Poindexter sent anyone a note, 

24 a question, you could reply directly to him. But I had 

25 no system. I didn't want to give you the question no one 



UNfitiSSimr 



723 



UIWWF 



^ could ever conununicate directly. 

2 If he sent Neil Eggleston a note, Ne«l Eggleston 

3 could reply without it going through someone. 

4 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

5 Q If he sent me any note, if he sent me a note that 
said "let's go to lunch tomorrow", could I then always use that 
note and respond to him directly? Do you know what I mean? 

A You could store it -- 
9 Q The computer doesn't know why — 

10 A Theoretically you could. 

11 Q I take it, though, to do that without authorization 

12 would be a pretty gross abuse of the system? 

13 A I think at a certain point you would -- 

14 Q Lose your PROF rights? 

15 A He would tell you to stop it. 

16 MR. EGGLESTON: I don't think I can release these 

17 to you. I will show it to you. You can read it fully. But 

18 just because we are in a deposition status, I am not going to 

19 give you this note when this thing is over. For whatever 
it is worth, may I have this marked HT-2. 

(Whereupon, the document referred 
to was marked for identification as 
HT-2) . 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 



Q Let n«_ show^ypu^what has-been marked HT-2 with 



724 



10 



ymUffiF 



91 



today's date. 

A I am trying to remember who SGB was. Yes. 



^ Q Do you recall sending that notei 

^ A Well 

^ Q I don't care about that. Do you recall the 

general subject? 

A Yes. The Swiss number two from their foreign 

ministry, I believe Alway Bruenner was in Washington for an 
9 official visit for some reason or other. I believe he was 

going to meet, to the best of my recollection, with 

11 Dr. Keel and Tyrus Cobb, NSTC here, was the action officer 

12 for the meeting. He asked me for input to his briefing 

13 memorandum that he was preparing for Dr. Keel regarding 

14 Switzerland and Iran 

15 Q What problem had arisen with Switzerland as a result 

16 of Iran? 

17 A There was no problem. This was actually a 

18 flattery talking point, stroking, we would say 

19 Q Okay 

20 A Telling them what a great job they are doing as 

21 our protective power, we really need you guys, we know 

22 times are hard, but we want you to hang in there and keep 

23 working with us. 

24 Q As of the date of this memorandum, did you know 

25 that Swiss bank accounts had been used in the financing of the 



iii»eiA!i^mkT 



725 



\mmw 



1 arms transactions? 

2 A No. 

3 Q So nothing in the document — excuse me -- with 

4 relation to Switzerland, has anything to do with the use of 

5 Swiss bank accounts? 

6 A No. Not at all. 

7 (Whereupon, the document referred to 

8 was marked for identification as 

9 HT-3.) 

10 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

11 Q Let me show you — 

12 MR. BENNETT: These will, however, be attached to 

13 the deposition. 

14 MR. EGGLESTON: Yes. 

15 MR. BENNETT: So when he reviews it — he has 

16 five days to review it? 

17 MR. EGGLfeSTON: Yes. 

18 BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

19 Q What is that — let me ask you. Just so there is 

20 a question on the record. Let me show you what has been markec 

21 HT-3. Do you recall sending that PROF? 

22 A Yes. 

23 Q What does it refer to? 

24 A A memorandum being prepared, I believe — it was a 

25 response to a proposed input from Colonel Earl relating to 



iwfiilTOlT wgr 



726 



5 



UNsaOTipT 



93 



this memo, system 290784 that I was drafting which was to 



^ prepare the President for a meeting with his national 

3 

4 



security planning group regarding what we might do, 

I mean -- it was a very straightforward memo. One suggestion 

that North made was that Bush should go to the Middle East as 

6 a special envoy to, you know, soothe people, et cetera, et 

7 cetera. 
To the best of my recollection, this is what I was 

9 responding to and I was a little bit takai aback, ergo 

10 "wants this hummer" to be the one to have to tell the Arabs 

11 how we love them 

12 I am sure you could get that system two memo and see 

13 that was the meeting with the President 

14 MR. BENNETT: Do you have objections to him 

15 seeing these other memos 

16 MR. EGGLESTON: Actually, I do 

17 (Whereupon, the document referred 

18 to was marked for identification 

19 as HT-4.) 

20 BY MR. EGGLESTON 

21 Q Let me show you what has been marked HT-4. I 

22 ask you and your counsel to read it 

23 A Yes. Your question i 

24 Q My question is that memorandum, that PROF note 

25 makes a reference to notes which were in your possession which 



JIUM^lEfiET. 



727 



mm 



i [L U 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



you were not immediately going to provide to whomever 
It was who was asking for them? 
A Right. 

Q Did you ever provide those notes? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q That is the extent of my question. 

Do you know a man by the name of| 
A Yes. I do. 
Q I take it you were involved in a project with 



A That is correct. 

Q I am not going to ask details about that project 
with^^^^^^^^^^^^l except to ask you did your project 

have anything to do with the Iran 

initiative? 

A To the extent that I am aware or that I was 
involved, it had nothing to do with the Iran initiative 
we have been discussing today. 





Did it have anything to do with the contrast 
It had nothing to do with the contras. 



728 



yfiraw 



MR. EGGLESTON: I will leave it at that. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Let me ask you questions about the contras. I 
anticipate from what you have said earlier your response 
to these questions will be no, but just so the record is 
clear, I am going to go ahead and ask them. 

I am asking about your knowledge of various 
people and various organizations and companies prior to 
November 25 of 1986. I am not interested in anything you 
might have learned from reading in the newspaper which is 
why I am using that as a date. So up to the time period, 
say, November 25 of 1986, had you ever heard of Lake 
Resources? 

A No. 

Q Had you ever heard of a company called Udall? 
U-d-a-1-1? 

A That is the first I heard of it right now. 

Q There is a company called Hyde Park Square 
'^ Corporation? 

A No. 

Q A company called Toyco? 

A No. 

Q Ever heard of a company called Dolmy Business? 

A No. 



25 Q Let me ask you about some individuals. Do you 



uNiskRbratoft^feT 



729 



ffiffltfSSftKfiT 



1 know a man by the name of Carl Channell, whose nickname is 

2 Spitz? 

3 A No. I am assuming you are continuing this 

4 prior to the revelations? 

5 Q Yes. 

6 A In November? No. I had never heard of 

7 Mr. Channell. 

8 Q I am not interested in whether or not you have 

9 read about Channell in the Washington Post since then. 

10 A Since. 

11 Q Did you know a man during this time period by the 

12 name of Richard Miller? 

13 A No. 

14 Q A company called International Business 

15 Communications? 

16 A No. 

17 Q A company — a man named Robert Owen? 

18 A No. 

19 Q Did you during this time period know a man by the 

20 name of Richard Secord? 

21 A Yes. 

22 Q How did you know Richard Secord? 

23 A I met Richard Secord in 1981 when he became my 

24 supervisor at the Department of Defense as the Deputy 

25 Assistant Secretary of Defense. 



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Q Was he your immediate supervisor? 

A No. There was an office director inbetween us. 

Q When is the last time that you spoke with 
Mr. Secord? 

A I saw him briefly in November when he was in North's 
office working on something relating to this affair. 

Q Do you recall approximately when it was in November? 
Since you are not going to remember the day, I suspect, 
maybe with reference to the speech, the press conference. 
If you don't recall the day, it might be helpful to place it 
with regard to an event, if you can. 

A I believe it was in relation to the 
preparation of the chronology. 

Q Did the preparation of the chronology take place 
after the President's speech? 

A No. I believe it took place over a period of 
weeks, leading up to the speech. 

Q 

A 
• Q 



It continued, though, after the speech? 
I don ' t know . 
If you know? 



A I don ' t know . 

Q So it is your recollection that Mr. Secord was in 
Mr. North's office prior to the President's speech? 
A Yes. 



mM 




•T 



731 



gNBQ»* 



My answer is, yes, he was in his office. I 
couldn't say that it was specifically before, during, 
after the speech, but I believe it was in relation to the 
preparation of the chronology. 

Q And did you speak with him on that occasion? 

A I think I said hello. 

Q No more substantive conversation? 

A No substantive conversation with him. 

Q Did you see him in Colonel North's office during 
November of 1986 on more than one occasion? 

A I might have seen him there one other time. 

Q During November of 1986? 

A Yes. 

Q . How euny times in 1985 and 1986 did you see — 
first see Richard Secord? 

A I don't recall seeing him at all in 1985. In 1986, 
I first saw him in Tel Aviv. 

Q This was in May? 

A May. Both coming and going. That was aside 
from this very limited encounter in November that I mentioned 
before. I don't recall any other meetings with Secord. 

Q Did you ever — starting with 1986 — did you ever 
speak to him in 1985? 

A You mean like by the phone? 

Q By the phone or something. 



lHTHy^5fHf^Rli''r 



732 



bp-2 



fflffi!i\§9fftiT 



99 



A No. 

Q In 1986 by the phone? 

A No. 

Q Did you otherwise see him? 

A No. 

Q And just so that I am clear, how about 1984, 
either see or speak to Secord? 

A I don't recall seeing him. 

Q Do you know a man by the name of Robert 
Dutton, D-U-T-T-0-N? 

A No, I don't. 

Q Richard Gadd? 

A No. 

Q John Cupp, C-U-P-P? 

A No. 

Q Edward De Garay, E. Garay? 

A No. 

Q Do you know a man by the name of Felix Rodriguez? 

A No. 

Q Rafael Quinteros? 

A No. 

Q Ramond Madena? 

A No. 

Q In 1985 or 1986, were you ever in Central America; 



A No. 



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Q During the period of time that you were assigned to 
the SC or working at the NSC, did your responsibilities ever 
include Central America? 

A No. 

Q In 198 — other than — excuse me. 

Did your work for the National Security Council 
require you to travel to Europe? 

A Only in relationship to MiddleEast activities. 

Q Have you ever been to Lisbon? 

A Only on personal vacation. 

Q Were you in Lisbon in 1985 or 1986? 

A I guess it was returning from a personal holiday in 
Morocco. We transited Lison in December of — well, it must 
have been 1984. It must have been December of 1984. 

Q Do you know a man — 

A It was strictly a personal holiday with my family. 

Q Do you know a man by the name of Tom Clines? 

A No. 

Q Have you ever heard of a company called Defex, 
D-E-F-E-X? 

A No. 

Q other than the occasion when you went to Tehran 
in an airplane carrying weapons, to your knowledge, have 
you had any other involvement in the transportation of 



weapons to Iran. 



Masfih 



734 



ttiSfcS'^' 



101 



A I would suggest for the record that what was on 
the plane was electronics spare parts, which you may choose 
to describe as weapons, but I would not. 

Q Okay. 

A To the rest of your answer, no. 

Q Do you know of a company called Stanford Technology? 

A Again returning to the assumptions you laid out, 
no. No, I was not aware of Stanford Technology. 

Q Are you--and again this is during the time 
period, and I am almost done--during the time period prior 
to November of 1986, did you have any knowledge of a 
company called Southern Air Transport? 

A No. 

Q Did you have any involvement either in 19 — 

A Well, I think that the Hasenfus affair occurred 
in October. That is when the first word of Southern Air 
Transport was made public. So I would say at that point in 
time, in October, I heard of Southern Air Transport for 
the first time. 

Q Have you ever been in the United States Air 
Force Base in Lisbon? 

A No. 

Q Have you ever been involved in transporting 
radar tubes to Iran? 



IMPI K^iirlFli 



,)!^,-^skjimu 



735 



iiuei^iiF 



102 



A Radar tubes? 

Q Yes. Sounds a little specific, doesn't it? No, 
I take it? 

A No, to the best of my knowledge. I don't know 
whether they — there were radar tubes in the crate on the plane 
To the best of my knowledge, no. 

Q Let me take a second to look over my notes. I 
think I am done asking questions. 

(Discussion held off the record.) 
MR. EGGLESTON: I have nothing further. 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 
Q Off the record. 

(Discussion held off the record.) 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 
Q Ready to proceed, Mr. Teicher? 
A Yes, sir. 

Q I have a series of questions that are all 
connected in a general sort of way, and I hope they will 
help me with this because I am not very familiar with some 
things that I think you are quite familiar with. 

I guess I would like to start off by talking 
eibout the general process that is used to prepare special 
national intelligence estimates. 

Again, if I ask a question that you think is 
missing something obvious, or has a faulty premise, I hope 



736 



mww-* 



103 



you will just tell me. I really don't know very much about 
this process, but it is my general understanding that 
periodically the Central Intelligence Agency issues 
National Intelligence estimates. 

A Yes. 

Q How often are those done? 

A I don't know. 

Q Roughly how often would they be done? 

A It depends on the issue and the request that 
might come from the Director of the CIA, the State 
Department, the Secretary of Defense, the President, 
the NSC advisor. 

Q How many might there be in an average year? 
You read a number of these things, I am sure. 

A I have read those that deal with the Middle 
East. I honestly don't know what the global — 

Q Take the Middle East, for example. 

A There could be anywhere from three or four to 
10. Some long, some short. 

MR. BENNETT: Off the record. 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
MR. VAN CLEVE: Back on the record. 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 

Q So in the case of the Middle East, my recollection 
of your answer to my last question was there are sometimes 



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three to four to 10 national intelligence agency estimates 
issued in any given year? 

A I hope the record shows I honestly don't know 
what the exact numbers are. 

Q I am looking for an approximation. 
A Several a year. 

Q In the case of a special national intelligence 
estimate, during the time you spent at the NSC in the Middle 
East directorate, which I gather was a period of about 
roughly four years, how many of those were prepared on the 
Middle East? 

A I really don't remember. 

Q Can you say whether it was more than two? 
A I am confident there were more than two, but I 
would be guessing. 

Q More than 20? 
A I don't know. 

Q Can you tell me with respect to the process for 
the preparation of special national intelligence estimates- 
which I will call SNIEs from now on for the reporter's 
sake— is the process by which those are prepared? Is 
there one general process? 

A I would respectfully request that you ask the 
intelligence people what the correct procedures are, 
because I am not familiar with the exact procedures. 



Jitil^^lr 



738 



uSSISSfSF 



1 Q Again, please help me out here. I thought that 

2 you said earlier that they were sometimes issued as a 

3 result of a request from the NSC; is that correct? 

4 A That is correct. 

5 Q Is that the only way in which they are prepared? 

6 A I believe that other departments can also ask 

7 that SNIEs be prepared. 

8 Q If you know, is it generally the case that someone 

9 makes a request for their preparation, an agency makes 
to a request? 

11 A I am not sure whether the intelligence community 

12 itself cannot because of its perception of the problem, 

13 generate a SNIE as well as wait for requests from other 

14 agencies. Again, I would refer you to the experts in the 

15 intelligence community. Whether it is State, NSC, CIA, 

16 there is a national intelligence officer for estimates. 

17 It might be useful for you to call him down 

18 to give — 

19 MR. BENNETT: Excuse me. Just answer his questions, 

20 if you know or don't know. 

21 THE WITNESS: The national intelligence officer for 

22 estimates would know better than anyone. 

23 BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 

24 Q Thank you for that. I appreciate that. 

25 My understanding is that in late August of 1984, 



739 



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I believe you testified that the National Security Council 
requested such a SNIE with respect to Iran; is that 
correct? 

A I don't believe that is what I said. I believe 
it was a national intelligence estimate in the summer or 
fall of 1984 that was prepared and in the spring of 1985, 
we requested an update which led to the SNIE. 

Q Were you at all involved then in the fall of 1984 
with the national intelligence estimate that was prepared 
at that time? 

A No. 

Q Excuse me? 

A No. 

Q No. 

As a general matter, if a national intelligence 
estimate that fell within your general purview — the subject 
matter of which would fall within your general purview 
at the NSC was being prepared, would you be consulted during 
the course of its preparation? 

A Not necessarily. 

Q But on occasion were you consulted? 

A On occasion, yes. 

Q During the preparation of the 1984 national 
intelligence estimate on Iran, were you consulted? 
A No. 



740 



uiPSJfffflF 



Q Were you involved with a request in the spring 
of 1985 for an update on the 1984 national intelligence 
estimate? 

A Yes. 

Q Could you please describe your involvement in 
making the request for the update? 

A The request was staffed, I believe, by 
Mr. Canestrero, and I don't recall the specifics of discussion 
we had relating to it, but as the intelligence officer, it 
was his responsibility. 

Q If I could translate that into what I understand 
you said into English, you would not have been directly 
involved in making the request to the CIA? 

A That is correct. 

Q You would have gone to Mr. Canestrero and 
said, "We would like such an update. Could you please 
arrange to have it done?" Is that basically the way it 
would have happened? 

A Yes. 

Q Is that the way it in fact occurred with respect 
to this update? 

A To the best of my recollection. 

Q I see. Did you, yourself, then have any feelings 
with the CIA during the preparation of the update? 

A I spoke only with Graham Fuller. 



liNfikAMik 



741 



ONKASStFffBT 



10! 



Q Who is Grahum Fuller? 

A The national intelligence officer for the Middle 
East. 

Q Could you describe--and I apologize. I just 
don't know — the function of a national intelligence officer 
for a particular area, such as Graham Fuller? In general 
terms. 

A I have never fully grasped the structure of the 
national intelligence officers and their relationships with 
the regular intelligence and analyses or operational 
directorates, so again I think you are better off asking 
someone else. 

Q But you do know Graham Fuller. 

A Oh, yes. 

Q And you did deal with him at the time that the 
update for the national intelligence estimate was being 
prepared in the spring of 1985? 

A We had intermittent discussions about Iran and 
his memorandum, his ideas. 

Q Was this — excuse me. You weren't finished. 

A That were prepared in the course of interagency 
work on the question. 

Q Let me back up just very briefly. Was 0.ii,iiiL 
Fuller involved in the interagency review of Iran that 
took place during 1984? 



lCl\ <Ctvi 



ImmilfSMn 



742 



mmm 



109 



A I believe he was. 

Q Did you deal with him at that time? 

A I dealt with him at that time more on Syria, Syrian 
matters relating to the situation in Lebanon. But I am 
sure I also spoke with him about Iran. 

Q And so would you have had occasion to discuss the 
NSDD that was prepared at the end of 1984, with Mr. Fuller? 

A The NSDD-- you mean the State Department produced 
version? 

Q Yes. 

A We may have discussed it. I don't recall. 

Q At that time or later? 

A Later 1984, early 1985. 

Q As I believe you are aware, we have received a 
copy of a memorandum written by Graham Fuller and dated May 17, 
1985 to the Director of Central Intelligence. To your 
knowledge did you discuss that memorandum with Mr. Fuller 
prior to its preparation? 

A Yes, 

Q And can you tell us the nature of those discussions 
in as much detail as you can recall? 

A We discussed the problems and vulnerabilities of 
policy and the limited leverage that we had in the event 
that a succession struggle developed in Iran, and he 
proposed that based upon his analysis of the situation, one 



Mfiysilnuir 



743 



ui&sew 



step, which might give us some leverage in the future 
would be permitting other countries on a limited basis, 
case by case basis, to make arms available to the Iranians 
as a way to give them the sense that other countires besides 
the Soviet Union existed as alternative sources of supply. 
And, Graham suggested all this to me. 

I said that is all very interesting, but I believe 
for the integrity of the process, the CIA should write this 
down if you think it is appropriate and distribute it, which 
he did. 

Q Was there any further discussion at the time? 

A No. 

Q If you know, did Mr. Fuller come to you to discuss 
this matter? 



We discussed it in my office. 

In your office? 

I think he came tcpe. 



Did he make an appointment to see you? 

Yes. 

I see, and about when would this have been? 

I don't recall exactly when. March, April— 
perhaps in May. 

Q of 1985? 

A Yes. 

Q Was there any other discussion at that meeting 



JlEHfelSEf^Hflfr 



744 



mmm 



111 



other than what you have just described for us? 

A No. We might have had another discussion about 
other things that we saw happening vis-a-vis Soviet- 
Iranian relations, Soviet activism, but a general analytical 
discussion is what I would describe it as. 

Q Prior to that meeting, do you believe Mr. Fuller 
would have been aware of your general views on this 
subject? 

A Yes, I may have been. 

Q So when he approached you to discuss the 
subject further in the spring of 1985, what was his purpose? 
What did he ask you to do? 

A I believe his purpose was to work with me to 
try to find ways that we could improve our leverage in 
Iran in the event of a succession struggle and, therefore, 
be better positioned to compete with the Soviet Union 
for influence. 

Q So the record is clear, this all took place-- 
this meeting and discussion you have described — prior to 
Mr. Fuller's memo? 

A That is correct. 

Q And also prior therefore to the draft NSDD which 
was produced under cover of a memorandum June 17? 

A That is correct. 

Q I believe you said that as a general proposition 



mmmt 



745 



wSimm 



112 



you were not consulted during the preparation of national 
intelligence estimates; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q And yet Mr. Fuller would have been involved 
in the process of preparing national intelligence 
estimate at the time of this meeting; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q Okay. Did it strike you as unusual that he 
sought you out to have this discussion? 

A No. 

Q Could you explain that? 

A We often discussed policy questions relating to 
the Middle East. 

Q You say we? 

A Mr. Fuller and myself, over a period of years. 

Q So you knew each other reasoncibly well, did you? 

A We had a strictly professional relationship 
that I think dated to when I joined the NSC staff. 

Q I see. 

A We would discuss policy matters as two interested 
Middle East analysts. 

Q So you saw this meeting as part of a continuing 
sort of ongoing professional discussion? 

A Yes. 

Q At the time? I see. At that time or at any 
other time did ii<i^ smtm «n4^il<H^^*^ Mr. Fuller with 



746 



WffiEftSSW 



respect to what he might put in a memorandum of May 17, 
1985? 

A No. 

Q Or with respect to what he might include in a 
national intelligence estimate? 

not 

A I doy^recall making any requests of that type. 

Q I see. And did he make any suggestions to you 
as to what you might have included in the draft national 
security directive? 

A As we have discussed, he proposed, and I agreed 
that it was worth the consideration of the principles for 
them to review the notion of some limited arms sales as 
a means to convince the Iranians that there was an 
alternative to the Soviet Union. 

That was a policy initiative. 

Q At the time that the meeting you have 
referred to took place, would it be fair to say that you 
were both aware based on the interagency work that had 
been done during late 1984 that the State Department and 
the Defense Department were both strongly opposed to that 
policy initiative you just described. 

A I would not generalize and say Secretary Shultz 
and Secretary Weinberger. I think there were probably 
analyists in both departments that didn't totally agree 
with the views of their principles. But as the guidance was 



liMniAiramtieT 



747 



Sltaw 



114 



laid down by Shultz and Weinberger, we understood where 
they were coming from, yes. 

Q Would it further be fair to say that you and 
Mr. Fuller both saw that issue differently than either 
the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State? 

A I don't believe it is proper to compare me 
with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. 
Fuller and I believed this was a principle potential 
lever that we should be--that we should apprise our superiors 
of. Whether they agreed with this or not, we also-- and 
I certainly have always felt that as an analyst, I had to 
be honest about what I thought made sense. 

Just because the principals disagreed did not 
mean that you shouldn't put before them the pros and cons of 
potentially disagreement alternatives. 

Q So to have this clear in my mind, would it be 
fair to say that you took the view that this was an issue 
that was important, that even though it appeared you would 
run into opposition from a couple of cabinet level officials, 
that it should be pursued to a decision and, in effect, 
a higher policy-making level? 

A That is correct. 

Q This process was a way of getting that done. 

A This was a formal correct process involving 
different agenices on a close hold basis. 



mm^ 



748 



wmm 



Q Mr. Fuller agreed with that basic approach of 
pursuing it through this process? 

A As far as I am aware. 

Q I believe you said you have read the Tower 
Commission Report? 

A Yes, I have. 

Q Let me just quote briefly from the report. You 
are welcome to look at the language that I am about to 
read for the record if you need to refer to it. It is on 
page B-8. It is in the first column. About in the middle 
of that long paragraph in the middle of the page, this 
is a--apparently a PROF note from Don Fortier to Mr. 
McFarlane, dated May 28. In the middle of the page it 
says, "we also just got a bootleg copy of the draft SNIE." 

Were you aware that the NSC had received what 
Mr. Fortier refers to as a bootleg copy of the draft SNIE? 

A Yes. 

Q Is it common for the NSC to receive bootlegged 
copies of draft SNIEs? 

A I don't know whether it is common or not. 

Q Have you ever before seen a draft SNIE? 

A Yes. 

Q On how many occasions? 

A I really don't recall. 

Q Would you say that you have seen bootlegged copies 



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24 
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of draft SNIE's often enough so that it is not unusual? 
A Yes. it is not unusual. 
Q Not unusual? Okay. 

You were aware at the time that you received a 
bootlegged copy of this draft SNIE on Iran; is that 
correct? 

MR. BENNETT: Could I ask — I just want to be sure 
that you are using the word, "bootlegged," the sane way 
he is, the sane way that Mr. Fortier is. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: I will be happy to try to define it 
MR. BtNNETT: No big deal. I just want to be 
sure. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: In general when I use the word, 
"bootlegged," what I mean is that you received a copy 
prior to its formal distribution to the people to whom 
it would normally be distributed? 

THE WITNESS: That is a fair description. 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 
Q Was that the case with respect to this draft SNIE? 
A In this case, I believe it was — the pentultimate 
version of this SNIE in double-spaced form. 

Q So I think the answer is, yes. This was a boot- 
legged copy, using the definition I just described? 
A Yes. 
Q Thank you. Mr. Fortier goes on to say, "We worked 



750 




117 

closely with Graham Fuller on the approach. I think it 
is one of the best yet." 

When he says, "we," worked closely, who is he 
referring to there? 

A I believe it is to himself, me and Graham Fuller. 

Q Can you tell us anything else for the record about 
the reference that we worked closely with Graham Fuller 
on the approach, other than the meeting you have already 
described for us? 

A No. I think that sums it up. 

Q I see. So if I understand you correctly, then you 



didn't have any other conversations or meetings with Mr. 
Fuller about the draft SNIE except thafone about which you 



have already testified? 

A I may have talked to him about it on the phone, 
but I only recall meeting with him at length to talk about 
the subject of Iran and the SNIE once or twice as I 
described. 

Q Well, my recollection is we only talked about 
one. 

A One basic meeting with him. He came, called on 
me, we talked. I said, as I said before, but I certainly— 
we had a secure phone. It is possible we talked on the 
phone about it. 

Q On one occasion? 



1^ 



f\ri. 



751 



WSi&W^ 



iLsJ 



I don ' t remember . 



Q But would you recall whether it was on more 
than one occasion? 

A I honestly don't remember. Graham and I 
talked about many subjects often. 

Q Mr. Fortier says somewhat further on in that 
same PROF note, "I also think the Israeli option is one we 
have to pursue, even though we may have to pay a certain 
price for the help." 

At the time would you have had any knowledge about 
what Mr. Fortier was referring to? This is as of late 
May 1985? 

A I don't know what exactly he is referring to here, 
no. 

Q But at the time, would you have had any knowledge 
about something called an Israeli option in connection 
with this? 

A No. I was not aware of an Israeli option in 
connection with Iran. 

Q He goes on to say, "I am not sure, though, we 
have the right interlocutor." I take it you would not 
at that time have been aware of what that reference was to? 

A That is correct. 

Q Could I ask you to refer to page B-6 of the 
Tower Commission Report? 



752 



D«8EASStPt6BT 



119 



1 I would like to ask you to refer to a footnote 

2 down at the bottom of page B-6 and just please read that 

3 footnote if you would, to yourself and tell me when you 

4 have finished reading it. 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q You will notice there is a bracketed interpolation 

7 that was inserted by the authors of the Tower Commission 

8 Report. I wonder if you could tell us whether or not in 

9 your view that is accurate. 

JO MR. BENNETT: I am sorry. I am not clear. 

11 MR. VAN CLEVE: Second line, on May 13, 1985, 

12 Fortier formed Poindexter that we have a brackets of the 
t3 NSDD, question mark. 

t4 BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 

15 Q Would that be a correct interpolation? Would 

16 that have been a reference to something else, if you know? 

17 A I am not sure. 

IQ Q It goes on to say, "I asked Howard and Steve to 

19 rework it. I will give you a copy of what we have and the 

20 suggestions I gave them. We have also done a lot of 

21 additional work on outlining requirements for the SNIE." 

22 This is only a few days before Mr. Fuller wrote 

23 his memo to the DCI on December 17. At this point in 

24 the process, why would the NSC be providing additional 

25 requirements for inclusion in the SNIE, if that process is 



la^l'^lilA*!, 



753 



MISSMr 



120 



near to being concluded? 
A I don' t know. 

Q So you weren't involved in the process of 
outlining additional requirements for the SNIE? 
A No. 

Q Are you familiar with the term that is sometimes 
used to describe an intelligence estimate that may have 
been influenced by someone's view of a prefered policy 
outcome that the estimate has been cooked? 
A Cooked? 

Q Cooked. Have you heard that term used before? 
A Yes. 

Q Has it been used with generally tne definition I 
just gave to it? 
A Yes. 

Q Can you tell me whether in your view this SNIE 
Iran prepared in the spring of 1985 was in any way 
cooked? 

A No, I don't believe it was. I would refer you to 
this letter that was published in the New York Times the 
other day from Gates to Boren, which explicitly takes issue 
with the assertion in the Tower Report that it was 
cooked or that the NSC was involved in the drafting or 
coordination of the SNIE, that they welcome independent 
corroboration of the integrity of the estimate process that 



T 



754 



iMifffflr 



121 



Dunne 

41 

iff/ou will reca] 



was involved in the preparation of this SNIE. So I do 
not believe it was cooked. 

Thank you for that. I had not seen the letter to 
the New York Times. 

A It was published in the New York Times, I 
believe, on Monday in their Washington page. It was a 
letter to Boren from Gates. 

Q Thank you very much. We appreciate having that 
in the record. 

During the period of mid June to mid July 1985, 
ill the draft NSDD was prepared, circulated 
for comment, and then comments were received and I am 
not going to ask you to go back over a lot of your prior 
testimony on this point, but what I did want to ask you 
about was this. 

After you received back the divided comments from 
the cabinet officers and had been told in your words to 
"stand down" from further work on the NSDD, the draft NSDD, 
was anything further said to you at the time about the 
course of policy on the issues that were the subject of the 
draft NSDD? 

I don 'want to put words in your mouth. Let 
me just leave the question that way. 

A Could you elaborate on your question? 

Q I gather you had a meeting with Mr. McFarlane at 



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some point where you sort of reviewed the response, if I 
remember your testimony. 

A I think what I said was I talked with Fortier 
and Poindexter. I don't recall talking with McFarlane 
directly on it. 

Q You talked to Fortier and Poindexter? 

A Yes. 

Q If I understood correctly, they said they had 
gotten comments, that opinion was divided, and they 
wanted you to stand down from further efforts on the 
draft NSDD? Is that basically your testimony? 

A Again, what I said and what I think is in the 
Tower Report was that I saw two alternatives. We could 
force the President to make a decision or we could do 
nothing. 

Q What was their response? 

A Not to prepare a draft decision memorandum for 
the President and to stand down for now. 

Q Based on your previous experience with the NSDD 
process, when that sort of event occurs and no final NSDD 
is prepared or approved by the President, what is the effect 
on existing United States policy? 

A Excuse me. There is no effect. 

Q That is policy is supposed to remain the same 
as it was prior to the creation of the draft NSDD? 



IIMfib^^ilBFT 



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A As far as I am aware, there is no change. 

Q Sowould it have been fair for a participant in the 
draft NSDD process such as yourself to assume at that 
point in the process that there was not going to be a 
change in the United States policy? 

A Correct. That was my assumption. 

Q Were you ever, after mid July of 1985, asked to 
prepare another draft NSDD on Iran? 

A I don't believe so, no. 

Q So from then up until November of 1986, so far as 
you knew, there had been no change in the United States policy 
toward Iran? 

A Through November 1986? 

Q Right. 

A Well, I would say that in March ofA9 86, whe 
I learned of the finding, that clearly superseded — was 
clearly a new policy. 

Q Okay. What was your reaction on finding that out 
in March of 1986? 

A I really don't recall what my exact reaction was. 

Q But might it have been along the lines of, "Gee, 
this seems inconsistent with what happened in July of 198 5? 
MR. BENNETT: You know — 
MR. VAN CLEVE: I am trying to prompt his recollec 



4 



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MR. BENNETT: I object to him answering the 
question dealing with his reactions — might. It is awfully 
speculative. 

BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 
Q There was a meeting in March 1986 
during which you were briefed on the covert action finding 
of January 17, 1986. If you recall, at the time of the 
briefing or shortly thereafter, did you have any thought 
concerning the connection between that covert action 
planning and the work you had done on the draft NSDD in 
1985? If so, what were your thoughts? 

A I don't recall what my thoughts were in that 
regard. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: I think that concludes my 
questions. I want to thank you for your time and 
your helpfulness. 

MR. EGGLESTON: I have nothing further. 
BY MR.. BENNETT: 
Q Did you have anything to do with the decision to 
bring weapons to Iran when you made the trip in May? 
A No. 

Q Did you know weapons would be taken on the trip? 
A No. 

Q When did you first find out that there were 
weapons on the planej 



J! 



ccinffi 




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WSiOW 



1 A In Tel Aviv. 

2 Q You have testified about a meeting in March in 

3 which you were brought back into the process, a meeting 

4 with Mr. Fortier and Mr. North; is that correct? 

5 A And Mr. Rodman. 

6 Q And Mr. Rodman. As best — to the best of your 

7 recollection, exactly what was discussed that you specifically 

8 remember? 

9 A What I specifically remember and what was most 

10 significant for me personally was that I was told that if 

11 and when McFarlane went to Iran pursuant to the finding, 

12 that I would be going with him and that there had been 

13 other actions in the past relating to the provision of 

14 some TOWs and that the Iranians had used their influence 

15 to bring about the freedom of at least Benjamin Weir by 

16 that point. 

17 Q To the best of your recollection, was there any 
ie discussion at that March meeting about the bringing of arms 

19 to Iran on the subsequent trip you would take to Iran? 

20 A There was no discussion of that level of detail 

21 in the March meeting. 

22 Q You made some reference earlier in your testimony 

23 to there being some general discussion about financing. 

24 Could you clarify for me what that was? 

25 A As I have stated, I had no operational or 



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mechanical or logistical role in this initiative. My 
role was strictly a policy person, a substantive resource. 
I do have some recollection of the relationship between 
paying for things and the next trip, but I had no specific 
detailed or anything more general than that, knowledge of 
the relationship between financing and other activities. 

Q Do you remember who it was who mentioned 
financing or anything to do with financing? Was it you? 

A It was not me. 

Q Do you remember who it was? 

A I believe it was Colonel North. 

Q Do you recall whether the references were to 
future things or past things, if you recall? 

A I believe it had to do with future things, but 
it is very vague. It was not anything that I had a 
responsibility for or anything that I worked on. 

Q Did you at any time have — play any role in 
the financing of arms to Iran? 

A No. 

Q Did you ever have any role in connection With 
the logistics of transfering arms to Iran? 

A I had no role in the logistics of the transfer 
of arms to Iran. 

Q Did you have any, in real time, any knowledge or 
involvement in any manner, shape, or form of the diversion 



m'^wmr 



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wsimm 



of funds to the contras? 

A No. 

Q Reference has been made to this April--what is it, 
the April 4 memo? 

MR. EGGLESTON: Undated. Probably around 
Apr i 1 4 . 

MR. BENNETT: The undated memo, probably April 4. 
We all know what we are talking about. 
BY MR. BENNETT: 

Q You may have answered this earlier. When to the 
best of your knowledge did you see that undated memo that 
you can say, yes, I see that memo? 

A In the hearing, the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence. 

Q Did they let you read the memo at that time? 

A No. So I am not sure that was exactly the memo that 
we are referring to. 

Q What did you do after your testimony before the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, i.e., after their refusal 
of showing — giving you that memo or letting you even read 
it in the hearing? 

A I made a formal request to White House Council to 
be provided with a copy of the memo which I believe I have 
been shown — had been shown at that hearing. 

Q And did you subs^nently get what you requested — 



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12! 



you may know the question. But he has to — He doesn't 
know it. 

Did you subsequently get what purported to be 
this undated memo of early April? 

A Yes. 

Q And have you had the opportunity of reviewing that 
memo in preparation for your testimony today? 

A No. Regretably the NSC Council referred to make 
the arrangements that had previously been agreed upon to 
allow me to review that and other documents in preparation 
for this hearing. 

Q When you — in fact, you reviewed that memo together 
with me in your office at the National Security Council; 
is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q Do you recall that that memo had attached to it 
something that we have referred to as terms of reference? 

A The memo that we reviewed in my office? Yes. 
Q Prior to that time, i.e., in your office, had 
you ever seen the terms of reference attached to any kind 
of memo such as the one of early April? 

A No. Prior to that time I had not seen the terms 
of reference attached to any memo of that type. 

Q So is it a fair statement to say that to the best 
of your recollection, while you may have seen some form of 



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a term of reference prior to that time, you have no 
recollection of seeing the memo prior to that time other 
than at the Senate Intelligence Committee hearing where 
you couldn't read it; is that a fair statement? 

A That is a fair statement. 

Q I want to just clarify your involvement in 
preparing or participating in the preparing of a 
chronology. When did the first request come and 
from whom did it come that everybody was supposed to 
help prepare a chronology? 

A The first that I knew of the request was at a 
meeting in Poindexter's office in early November, without 
access to my notes, I can't be specific about the date 
when he made several assignments to people relating to 
this affair, and he assigned North responsibility for 
preparing a chronology and told him to involve anyone else 
who might be able to contribute. 

Q Do you recall approximately how many people were 
in the office? 

A For that meeting? When Poindexter — there were 
probably ten or eight people at that meeting. 

Q How would you describe the process of putting 
together the chronology? How many people were involved? 
When did they meet? How did they meet? Can you clarify 



that? 



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A I can only provide what I was aware of, which I 
would say was fragmented and incomplete at best. I 
witnessed at one point — what I believed to be Secord 
and Cave in North's office working on it. This is what 
I referred to before when I said hello to General Secord. 
Coy worked on it. Earl worked on it. I believe 
Dr. Keil at one point worked on it. Mr. McFarlane, I 
believe spent a considerable amount of time working on it. 

Q Can you estimate approximately how many people 
would have contributed to the chronology? 

A I would estimate at least ten. 

Q Mr. Teicher, when you made your — when you 
contributed your input to the chronology, did you at 
any time ever submit any informatin which to your knowledge 
was incorrect or misleading? 

A No, 

Q You said that at some point in time, at some 
point in time youAndicated that you saw something in a 
chronology, which you considered to be carefully drafted, 
I think, is the term you used. 

\Vhat were you referring to? 

A I was referring to the reference in the text 
to the President not having approved the August actions 
taken by the Israelis. 

Q Did that deal with your input to the chronology? 



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A No. That had nothing to do with any of my inputs. 

Q To the best of your knowledge, whose input did 
that deal with? 

A To the best of my knowledge, that would have 
had to have involved Colonel North, perhaps Mr. McFarlane, 
perhaps Admiral Poindexter. 

Q Just so the record is clear, do you have any 
personal knowledge that Mr. McFarlane, Admiral Poindexter, 
Colonel North or anyone else ever knowingly submitted 
any false information to the chronology? 

A No. 

Q What is your answer? 

A No. 

Q There have been a number of questions about 
your discussion with Craig Fuller in, I think, the 1984 
time frame, 1984 — 

A Craig Fuller? 

MR. EGGLESTON: Graham Fuller. 

MR. BENNETT: I am sorry. Graham Fuller. 

BY MR. BENNETT: 

Q In connection with what he was doing, do you know 
whether or not the general issue of "what will we do with 
Iran when Khomeini dies" was that issue discussed prior to 
1984? 

A I am confident it was. Many people in the U.S. 



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Government often wrung their hands over what the U.S. would 
do in the event Khomeini died. 

Q How far back, to the best of your recollection, 
would you say that was a significant issue that the 
professionals and experts were talking about? 

A From my first days on the NSC staff in March 1982. 
Q Would you describe for me again what exactly 
your role was regarding the preparation of material for 
a speech that was to be given? 

A I would consider myself one of the lesser 
contributors to a draft, a drafting process that 
involved several different offices and individuals. 
Q And who was to give that speech? 
A The President. 

Q Did you see all the drafts of the speech? 
A I don't know whether I saw all the drafts or 
not. 

MR. BENNETT: I don't have anything else. 
MR. EGGLESTON: I have two questions. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q The terms of reference, you indicated that you 
saw the final version because you saw it in McFarlane's 
hands actually on the trip to Teheran; is that correct? 

A I saw what may have been the final version. It 
was certainly a version that he took with him on the trip. 



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133 

Q It was at least the last one. Was there anything 

attached, to it to your knowledge, at the time you saw it 
in McFarlane's possession? 

A No. 

Q The meeting in early November in Poindexter's 
office that you said was attended by ten or eight people, 
can you recall who those ten or eight people were? 

A I believed Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, 
Dr. Keil, Paul Thompson, perhaps Peter Rodman, and perhaps 
Colonel Earl. 

The last two — I recall there was some discussion 
whether Rodman was coming or not. I don't recall. Those 
were the — probably the ones. 

Q . And yourself? 

A And myself. 

MR. EGGLESTON: That is all I have. 
MR. BENNETT: We don't have anything else, gentlemen 
MR. EGGLESTON: Let me just say two or three 
things for the record. As you know, the committee rules 
do not provide for you actually to obtain a copy of your 
deposition. You do have the option — which I take it you 
intend to elect — of reviewing the deposition within a 
certain number of days after the deposition is in fact 
ready. 

I will notify you when it is ready. We can make 



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arrangements for you to pick it up. 

MR. BENNETT: I would just request the exhibits 
be included since some of the questions dealt with 
them. 

MR. EGGLESTON: We thank you for coming. 

(Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the deposition was 
adjourned. ) 



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rJZZ_/87 



TESTIMONY OF HOWARD R. TEICHER 
Thursday, April 23, 1987 

United States Senate 
Select Committee on Secret Military 
Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition 
Washington, D. C. 
Deposition of HOWARD R. TEICHER, called as a 
witness by counsel for the Senate Select Committee, at the 
offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate 
Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 10:25 a.m., 
the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, a 
Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, and the 
testimony being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER 
and transcribed under her direction. 



'jndir own: w of LO. 12?3i 

^.'■^, Nckxn; ytoMii CfiMdi 



K. Johnson 




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insif 



APPEARANCES : 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition: 

ARTHUR LIMAN, ESQ. 

MARK BELNICK, ESQ. 

VICTORIA NOURSE, ESQ. 
On behalf of Senator Mitchell: 

RICHARD ARENBERG, Administrative Assistant 
On behalf of the Witness: 

ROBERT S. BENNETT, ESQ. 

Dunnells, Duvall, Bennett & Porter 

1220 Nineteenth Street, N.W. 

Washington, D. C. 20037 



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CONTENTS 

WITNESS EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 

SENATE 
Howard R. Teicher 

By Mr. Belnick 4 

EXHIBITS 
TEICHER EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION 

1 8 

2 13 

3 23 
3A 34 

4 34 

5 34 

6 34 

7 39 

8 39 

9 39 

10 39 

11 41 



UlLOFJED 



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UNCussiri 

TOP SECRET/ CODEWDRD 
PROCEDINGS 



Whereupon, 

HOWARD R. TEICHER, 
called as a witness by counsel for the Senate Select 
Conunittee, having been duly sworn by the Notary Public, was 
examined and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. BELNICK: 
Q Howard, would you please state what your positions 
were with the National Security Council staff 

MR. BENNETT: Excuse me. Could I just put one 
thing on the record before we start? 

MR. BELNICK: Sure. 

MR. BENNETT: I appear here today as counsel to 
Howard Teicher. Yesterday Mr. McGrath of the White House 
called and asked if Mr. Colby, if I had any objection to his 
being present. I said I did not have any objection, on the 
condition that it was clearly understood that Mr. Colby was 
not representing Mr. Teicher and in fact is not in a position 
to represent him because of the differing interests between 
my client and the institution which he represents. 

Is that a fair statement, Mr. Colby? 

MR. COLBY: Yes. I certainly don't represent him 
in his individual capacity and the only role I have here in 
the odd instance where Executive privilege might have to be 



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(INCliMe 



invoked on some completely irrelevant issue. That's the only 
interest I have. 

MR. LIMAN: Off the record. 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q Howard, would you please give us your positions at 
the NSC?. 

A From March 29, 1982 through the last week of May, 
1986, I was the junior member of the Near East and South Asia 
Directorate of the National Security Council staff. At the 
end of May, when Dennis Ross came on board the NSC as. the 
Senior Director for the Middle East, I transferred to the 
Political-Military Affairs Division and became the Senior 
Director for Political- Military Affairs. I separated from 
the government on March 31st of 1987 and I'm now a self- 
employed consultant on international affairs. 

Q May of which year did you go into the political 
military office? 

A 1986. 

Q And what was the responsibility of the Political 
Military Affairs Division, the overall responsibilities of 
that division of the NSC structure? 

A The basic responsibilities included, for the 
most part, coordinating security assistance matters that 
involved notification to Congress of various types of 



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military sales programs, foreign aid programs. We had 
responsibility for coordination of international narcotics 
efforts within the U.S. Government. We had responsibility 
for crisis management in the event of unforeseen crises and 
some analytical work relating to trying to prophesy, if you 
will, crises and what we might do about it. 

We were responsible for any use of military power, 
exclusive of so-called special operations, and by that I mean 
a hostage rescue or a special insertion for a covert program. 
We had no knowledge or involvement, let alone responsibility, 
for such matters. I would say those are the basic types of 
issues and there were other issues as well that we were 
involved in but not responsible for. 

Q Was Ollie North in the same division? 

A No, Colonel North was in charge of a separate 
directorate that was wholly apart from my operation. 

Q By the same name? 

A The name of his office was the Political 
Military Affairs. His office dealt primarily with terrorism 
and, to the best of my knowledge, hostilities in Central 
America. That's the euphemism that is most meaningful. 

Q To whom did you report once you went into the 
Political Military Affairs division? 

A At the time I assumed that position, we were in, 
I guess, somewhat of a state of flux. Don Fortier had been 



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UNCLASSIfm 



hospitalized for cancer. He would have been my immediate 
supervisor. In his absence I reported either to Admiral 
Poindexter or, procedurally, to Rodney McDaniel, the 
executive secretary. But he was not actually my supervisor; 
it would have been Poindexter or Fortier. 

Q Howard, did you attend any national security 
briefings of the President? 

A What do you mean by National Security Council 
briefings? 

Q It's not a term of art. Did you attend any 
briefings of the President on national security matters? 

A The course of my career? 

Q Yes. 

A Yes. 

Q And would that be on a regular basis? On an 
issue-by- issue basis? 

A I would say issue by issue, intermittent. 

Q Did you attend any briefings of the President on 
matters that had to do with the Iran initiative once you were 
briefed into that compartment? 

A As I have testified, the only meeting that I 
participated in with the President relating to the Iran 
initiative was the, I believe, May 29th. The morning of our 
return from the mission we briefed the President. I should 
say McFarlane briefed the President, with Colonel North and 



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myself in attendance. I don't believe I uttered a word, but 
I did take notes and I recorded a memorandum of conversation 
which is in the file. That morning was the only meeting I 
participated in with the President on this subject. 

Q Did you ever attend any briefings of the 
President on matters dealing with Central America? 
A No. I did not. 

Q Okay. Were you eve r asked to undertake any 
to^Hj^HH^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bon the matter 
obtainii^ aid^^^^^^^^^Hfor the Nicaraguan resistance? 
'A I'm sorry. Was I ever asked? 

Q Were you ever asked by Bud McFa rlane or someboc 
else at the NSC to make an approach^^^^^^^Hto support the 
Contras? 

A When? 

Q Let me see if I can help you. This is a copy c 
a memo which I will ask the reporter to mark as Teicher 
Exhibit 1. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Teicher Exhibit Number 1 
for identification.) 
And, for the record, this memo is dated April 20, 
1984, and it's a memorandum for Howard Teicher from Robert 
McFarlane. I want you to take a look at it. 
A I forgot about this. 



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UNEUSSIEIED 



(Pause. ) 

MR. BELNICK: Do you want to go out and speak with 
Bob? If you want to take the document with you, you can. 
(Counsel and witness left the room to confer.) 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q Howard, you've had a chance to review Exhibit 1. 
Do you recall receiving that memo? 

A I don't recall receiving the memo. And I will 
note for the record that this is exactly among the types of 
documents, that I repeatedly sent memos to the White House 
counsel to ask for in preparation for all this and I never 
received it. So this is the first I've seen this. 

Q Listen, don't worry about it. All I want to do 
is see if you remember these things. This is not an 
accusatory session or anything like that. 

MR. BENNETT: Well, it might help, if you're going 
to ask him questions about documents for which you have 
documents, I would appreciate it if perhaps we could see 
them. 

MR. BELNICK: That's what I was doing. I was 
asking about the general issue and I showed you the document 
before I asked about it. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q But do you remember whether or not — as I 
understand it, your testimony is you don't recall receiving 



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this memo? 

A That's correct. 

Q Leaving the memo aside, do you recall having a 
discussion with Bud McFarlane in 1984 about the possibility 
that^^^^H could be approached through) 
through anyone in the government about providing some 
assistance to the contras? 

A Yes. 

Q Okay, tell us what you recall about that and 
when it occurred, as best you remember. 

A Well, to the best of my recollection — it's 
something I must say I haven't thought — about! 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I believe in March, I wa 
there ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

Q 1984? 

A »84 ~ a March 





'It may have 

been in late March or early April — I'd have to check my 
travel 




I recall a phone call from McFarlane where he 
asked me — I shouldn't say asked me — he instructed me to 
pass a message^^^^^^^^Hfrom him saying that the U.S. 



UNStRSSlff 



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UNcussiiia 



11 



government would appreciate help for the contras and that 
this was to be kept as discreet as possible. And I don't 
recall being involved in any follow-up, and that's why I 
don't recall this memo. If I received it, I don't believe I 
contacted him because we had no means of secure 
communication. 

Q "Him" being? 

^^^^^^^^ That whc^^^^^ I refers 

Q Was Bud any more specific about the kind of 
assistance that the United States Government wanted^^^^H 
^^^^|for the contras? Did he tell you what kind of 
assistance to ask for? 

A I believe he asked — again this was communicated 
over the phone — for material assistance and financial 
assistance. 

Q Did he say how much in terms of financial 
assistance? 

A I don't recall any figures. 

Q Do you recall what he said about material 
assistance? 

A I don't recall any specifics on material 
assistance. 

Q By material assistance did you understand him to 
mean weapons? 

A I believe the word he used was material assistance 



\immm 



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^a^mm 





and I didn't ask him what he meant by it. At least I don't 
recall asking him. 

Q Before we go on with this, the memo refers to 
^^^^H who you to be^^^^^^^^^^^l In parentheses 
says: As h^^^^^^| ^^^ already heard from^^^^^ Would you 
understand that to be^^^^^^^Hprobably, 



A I would speculate that it was 

Q Did you speak to^^^^^^^^^flas Bud McFarlane 
instructed you? 

A I don't recall speaking him about this, no. I 
mean the difficulty would be to call him on an open phone ar 
pass along a message like this would be a breach of security 

Q So your recollection is you did not. 

A I don't recall following up with him on this, no. 

Q Looking further at the memo, in the last paragrap 
of Teicher Exhibit 1, McFarlane says "I am a little 
disappointed. Please let it be known that, in your view, I" 
— meaning Bud McFarlane — "am a little disappointed in the 
outcome but we will not raise it further." 

Do you recall Bud saying anything like that to yo 
and, if so — you do not? 

A This is the extent of what I know about him bein 
disappointed. 

Q Do you know what he's referring to? 



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ONClASSife 



Had he asked you on any prior occasion to talk to 
about providing some help for the 



contras.- 
A 
Q 




No. 

Had anyone froiii^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ever 
approached you on the issue of whether they could, whether 
Icould help with the contras? 

any con t act ^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
Ion that subject. 
Q At all, of any kind? 

A I don't remember it. It was not anything that I 
worked on. I believe that McFarlane may have asked me or 
instructed me to do this because I was there and he chose me 
to pass the message. 

Q Now what I'm going to show you is that we have — 
and I only have one copy here — we have a PROF memo to you 
from Bud McFarlane dated the same day, at 9:20 in the 
morning, and I'm going to have that marked and then show it 
to you as Teicher Exhibit 2 and see if you recall ever 
getting a PROF memo which is the same text as the hard copy 
memo that I've placed before you. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Teicher Exhibit Number 2 
for identification.) 



umssiFe 



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uNCimm 



The redactions or the blacked out portions of 
Teicher Exhibit 2 were blacked out when this document was 
produced to us by the White House and it is, therefore, my 
assumption that it pertained to matters that are irrelevant 
to the inquiry. I'll represent to you that as best I can 
make out the light text, it is light but that's how we got 
it, Teicher Exhibit 2 is the same as Teicher Exhibit 1, only 
Teicher Exhibit 2 is in the form of a PROF note to Mr. 
Teicher from Mr. McFarlane. 

MR. BENNETT: And we don't know what the blackout: 
are?' 

MR. BELNICK: Forget about the blacked out. I'm 
not asking about that. This is the PROF note. 

MR. BENNETT: We don't know what they are or we di 
know what they are? 

MR. BELNICK: I do not know what they are. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q My question is whether looking at the PROF note i1 
refreshes your recollection in any way as to whether you 
received a written message from Mr. McFarlane or whether 
indeed you received that PROF note. 

A I don't recall, and I think we could check with 
the White House communications agency, but I don't believe 
the PROF system had been installed in my office at that time 
and it's possible — I note here that the message is actually 



uimssinfD 



783 



uNCki^n 



15 



addressed to NSWGH which stands for wilma Hall. 

Q His secretary? 

A His secretary, and it's conceivable that he sent 
her the note for her to type it, and the fact that this is 
not initialed suggests to me that — 

Q I think you're right. I think that's probably 
what happened. 

A I don't recall seeing the PROF, no. 

Q Just so that I make sure, Howard, that the 
record is clear, my understanding from what you've said is 
that 'you <^° "o^ recall ever having a discus sion with^^^^l 

concerning 
assistance^^^^^BI^Hto the contras. If I'm wrong, tell 
that I'm wrong. 

A I do recall that I was instructed and had a 
withB^BH| While^^^^^^passing 
message, I was instructed to pass and leaving it at that, anc 
I don't recall conferring subsequently with him, 
notwithstanding these instructions. I can't say that I may 
not have discussed it along with other issues. I don't 
remember it. But I never had, that I can recall, a 
discussion on aiding the contras beyond that one contact. 

Q Now I understand. Tell me what recall saying tc 
fhen you wer^^^^^^^^l And it would have been 
in the same time period. 




uNttRssra 



784 



""G^Wfft 



A To the best of my recollection that I was 
instructed by Mr. McFarlane to pass a message from Mr. 
McFarlane to^^^^^^^H saying that the U.S. government — 
and I really don't have any recoll ection of the exact words • 
- was interested in determining^^^^^^^^^^f could provide 
financial and material assistance. 

MR. BENNETT: Can I just confer a minute? 
(Counsel conferring with the witness.) 
THE WITNESS: That's really as much as I remember. 
There may have been some other points, but I haven't thought 
about this and that would have been the thrust of any 
message. 

MR. BENNETT: I was just trying to determine if we j 
had a refreshing recollection or past recollection recorded. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q What was ^B^^^^^^^^l reaction to your message? 
A To the best that I can recall, he took notes and 
said he would find a way to communicate with McFarlane. 

Q Did you ever hear bac)c from^^^^Hwhether he did 
speak to McFarlane about this matter? 
A I don't recall. 

Q Did you ever hear back from anybody whether^^^H 
got back to McFarlane on this matter? 

A I really don't recall any subsequent discussion ol 



this. 



Mmm 



786 




Q I'm not suggesting otherwise. You understand my 
questions. I'm just trying to see if anything I say triggers 
a recollection. 

So in that vein have you ever heard from anybody 
whether^^l^mi^^^^^^^^^^^Hin any 

help with the Contras -- whether it was material help, 
financial help or some other form of assistance? 

A Well, I would only say that I read about itj 




mMm 



786 




Q Leave that aside. Did you ever hear or learn froml 
any other source ^^^^^^^^Hwas providing any form of 
assistance of any kind to the Contras apart from what you 



UNCLASSra 



787 



mum^ 




on that. 



readl 

A I really don't recall any othei 
Q On any occasions. Were you friendly withj 
^^^^^side from your professional relationship! 
A I would say that we were friendly, yes. 

he ever discuss^^^^^^^^^^^^^ feelings 
towards the contras in terms of whethe^^^^^^^^^^^^was 
disposed to try to help the United States with the Nicaraguar 
resistance? 

A I don't recall any discussions with 
' Q Or any other 
No. 
Had you ever heard that 

[had offered to make 
weapons available to the contras and this would 
have been in the 1985 time period? 

A I was not apprised of that. 
Q And didn't hear that while you were in the 
government? 

A No. 

Q Okay. Sticking with this subject, Howard, for the 
moment, during your period at the NSC did you learn of 
assistance to the contras from any other foreign government? 
A No. 
Q Probing that a little bit, did you hear, for 




wmmm 



788 





whe the r ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H had 
assistance towards the Nicaraguan freedom fighters? 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 

A No. 

Q Anybody? 
■ A No. 

MR. BEKNETT: You're talking real time now right, 
not things he may have read in the paper? We are all real 
time now. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q Right — stuff you learned while you were 
functioning as a member of the NSC staff? You don't know 
anything about it. 

Howard, one of the things you mentioned was in the 
area or the responsibility of the political military affairs 
division was international narcotics effort, as I understand 
it. Am I correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q Did you hear at any time while you were on the 
staff of a project which involved using agents of the Drug 



orassifiD 



789 



UNMM 



Enforcement Administration, DEA, in an attempt to free some 
or all of our citizens who were being held hostage in 
Lebanon? 

A No. 

Q That's something which would come as total news ti 
you if I told you there was such a project? 
A Yes. 

Q Just to go back to a few more questions on the 
subject of^^^^^Hand this period, the McFarlane memo, which 
I understand you did not receive, but for purposes of 
providing a time frame, is dated April 20, 1984. Do you 
remember whether you were in Israel at that time? 

A I don't recall the exact dates of my travel^^^f 

It would have been in late March or early April. 
I'd have to look at travel records to get a specific. 

MR. BENNETT: I just want to correct something. I 
don't think he said he did not receive this. He said he did 
not remember receiving it. 

MR. BELNICK: Sure. You are right. Could I ask 
you to check your travel records, have Howard check his 
travel records and just get back to me, just call me with it' 
Bob can call me. 

MR. BENNETT: Would you have those available? 

THE WITNESS: Well, I have to check with the NSC. 

MR. BENNETT: We'll do what we can. 



UNOtASStflH) 



790 



Q 
your own. 
NSC. 



BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

I thought these were records you may have had on 

If they are with the NSC, we'll get them from the 



MR. BENNETT: I think they are at the NSC. 
MR. BELNICK: All right. We'll check on that. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q When you saw^^^^^Has you told me you did at 
some point in this time period, and had a brief discussion 
with him, can you tell me where that was? Was it in his 
office? 

A It was in his home. 

Q Did you make any notes of that conversation? 

A No. 

Q And^^^^^H-- let me ask you another question, 
you recall whether in this time period^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas 
seeking any contract from the State Department to provide 
assistance in Central America? 

A I don't know specifically. 

Q Do you know something about that subject? 

A I do know that over a period of years formal 
discussions were under way between the U.S. Government and 

[regarding expanding! 
development assistance efforts in Central America and some 
security assistance efforts. And they may indeed have been 



yMctisstne 



791 



DNCUXSW 



23 



working some kind of contract with AID. But I'm not familiar 
with any specifics. 

Q And you don't know whether such a contract was 
ever entered into? 

A I don't know. 

Q Let me ask you about this document. Would you 
mark this document as Teicher Exhibit 3? 

(The document referred to was 
marked Teicher Exhibit Number 3 
for identification.) 
Teicher Exhibit 3, for the record, is a page of 
handwritten notes. It bears our number stamp, Howard -- this 
is not something that was there when we got it — of N-8720. 
I'm going to tell you it was produced to us by the White 
House and, according to the list of files that we got from 
the White House, Bob, of wherever his documents came from, 
this document happened to be found in Howard's files. That's 
why I'm asking about it. I don't know whether he's seen it, 
can identify it or what. 

But that's my question — whether you've seen it 
before, whether you know what it is. And if it helps --I'm 
not going to mark this -- the document, the way we got it, 
was attached to a memo entitled Discussion Paper, 
International Relations with Iran, November 10, 1986. 
(Pause. ) 



mmmiii 



792 



UNCMWffl- 



24 



Howard, do you recognize the document? 

A Yes. 

Q Can you tell me what it is, now referring to 
Teicher Exhibit 3? 

A I recall it being some notes I wrote based on an 
assignment from Admiral Poindexter relating to what I would 
describe as the normal staffing work that was done following 
the revelation of the Iran initiative. And he directed me to 
work with appropriate members of the staff to prepare a 
background paper, which is this November 10 discussion paper, | 
that 'could be provided to the State Department for them to --[ 

and I believe Defense as well — for them to circulate to 
our posts overseas as background for their use with 
governments regarding just what everybody was really doing 
with Iran. 




Q These were notes, then, that you made of things 
that the Admiral was telling you? 

A To write a paper about. That's what I recall it 
being. 

Q And the discussion paper, which I'll mark in a few 
moments as Teicher Exhibit 3A, is dated November 10, 1986. 



i)»Assife 



793 



mmm 



Was your conversation with the Admiral a day or so before 
then? 

A I can't be sure what date. 

Q But around then? 

A Presumably a day, probably two or three days 
before, but I don't recall. 

Q And after the revelations about the Iran 
transaction? 

A Yes. 




Q Could we just go through these notes and tell me, 
first, at the top it says "put myself in Shultz position 
defending what we have done". Was this the Admiral telling 
you to put yourself in the position of the Secretary of State 
and give him a defense? 

A I can't recall whether those were the Admiral's 
exact words, but I see my meaning here was to prepare a 
background paper that would be helpful for the State 
Department, Secretary Shultz representing the State 
Department, to enable them to defend diplomatically what we 



had done. 



uNetftssw 



794 



l)H(ii*SS» 



26 



Q Then there's a note which reads: "Enough to make 
it acceptable to allies/Arabs, save face with allies/Arabs." 
What did that mean? 

MR. BENNETT: Well, let me just ask you this. I 
don't have a problem with him telling you what it means to 
him. He wrote it down. 

MR. BELNICK: That's all I mean. 

MR. BENNETT: I don't want him opining as to what 
Admiral Poindexter was meaning. 

MR. BELNICK: I just want him to explain what he 
understood by what he was writing down. 

THE WITNESS: I would preface my remarks by noting 
the, shall I say, wild environment that we were operating in 
then, so I genuinely do not recall the specific meeting 
except in general terms here. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q Howard, I don't mean it to be in some literal 
sense, but what was the point? 

A Again, I think it's straightforward — to prepare 
a background paper that would provide arguments that would 
make the initiative on Iran sensible — I'm trying to choose 
words other than what I wrote down — to allies and Arab 
leaders. 

Q Now you see the next portion of the notes reads: 
"Several scripts, allies, Arabs, intelligence committees, so 
?ET/ CODEWORD 



S 



795 



iiHumim 



ORD 27 

forth". What did you mean by that? 

A Poindexter directed the preparation of several 
"scripts". Script is a word of art that became popular in 
this Administration for reasons that I don't know. 

Q It may have been from the top-down, but go ahead. 

A I would say he was referring here to the different 
presentations that would need to be made, and in the case of 
allies and Arabs I participated with several of my colleagues 
at the NSC and State Department in preparing two different — 

I recall two different diplomatic telegrams to be sent to 
posts' that provided what we call talking points for demarches 
to host governments, different ones for the allies and the 
Arabs, and I believe two separate telegrams, maybe more, were 
sent out. 

The State Department may have further expanded 
that. And he asked for the documents to be prepared for, I 
assume, the briefing of the Intelligence Committees and the 
Foreign Affairs Committees. And we were also preparing 
something that has since been published called the National 
Security Strategy, and he wanted to make sure that there was 
the proper input into that. 

Q Do you recall what kinds of materials he was 
asking for to be prepared for the Intelligence Committees and 
the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress? 

A No. I didn't have a role in that. 



UNCtmiFIED 



796 



ONCLASSm 



23 



Q Who did; do you remember? 

A I believe it was Colonel North. 

Q The last note on the page, "not less important 
that you sell; more important that you not", what did that 
mean? 

A I don't know. 

Q Do you remember work on preparing chronologies of 
the Iran initiative in November 1986? 

A I remember that part that I was involved in. 

Q What part were you involved in? 
■ A I contributed primarily to the introductory 
section of the chronology. 

Q And what was your contribution? 

A That dealt with explaining why it was in our 
interest to have a relationship with Iran, the sorts of 
factors that went into that relationship, the diplomatic 
exchanges that had gone on with other governments regarding 
their view on the importance of the United States 
reestablishing a relationship. I did a little research on 
the Brzezinski-Bazargan meeting in Algiers and included that 
as a discussion paragraph. 

Q Who asked you to participate in this effort? 

A Admiral Poindexter. 

Q And what did you understand was the purpose of the 
chronology that was being prepared? 



UHWSIflED 



797 



UNCmWJ) 



29 



A I assumed — I shouldn't say I assumed. I 
understand it was for the Intelligence Committees and Foreign 
Affairs Committees. 

Q Did you know that the chronology went through more 
than one draft? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q And did you know that there was something called 
the maximum version of the chronology and then a shorter 
version? 

A I only learned that there were these titles and 
actually different versions after it was revealed that there 
were different versions. 

Q At the time you thought there was one version 
being prepared, one type of chronology? 
on To Tehran in Hay uf ' ac. Who else was working on 
the chronology that you observed? 

A I'm not sure. I think I observed about ten 
different people at different times working on the 
chronology. 



UNCIISSW 



798 



l/NJUSSft 



30 



Q Can you tell me who you recall having observed? 

A I recall Colonel North, Colonel Earl, Commander 
Coy, General Secord, Mr. Cave, Mr. McFarlane. I believe I 
saw Keel at one point, Dr. Keel, looking at it. Myself. 
Those are the people that come to mind right now. 

Q How about Admiral Poindexter? Did he work on it? 

A I understand that he did, but I did not personally 
observe it. 

Q Commander Thompson? 

A Again, I understand he did, but I did not observe 
it, and I did not discuss it with him. 

Q Did you hear any discussions by the people who 
were working on the chronology about any troublesome events, 
discussions of how any of the events ought to be portrayed? 

A No. 

Q Do you remember the President gave a press 
conference on November 19, which was a Wednesday evening? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall Bud McFarlane being on the premises 
that day? 

A Was he on the premises that day? I don't recall 
that he was or was not. 

Q Let me see. It's a tough question and answer to 
pick out one day and say was he there. Were you at the 
office when the President spoke? 



UNElASSffe 



799 



mmssm 



31 



A No. I was at home. 

Q Were you at the office that day before he spoke? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall hearing a conversation on that day 
or thereabout — maybe a day before — between McFarlane and 
North to the effect of North being exuberant about the 
chances of the public accepting the President's explanation, 
saying in effect we're out of the woods, anything like that? 

A Do I recall a conversation between North and 
McFarlane where North was exuberant, as you have described 
it? I don't recall any such discussion. 

Q Do you recall overhearing any discussion in which 
Mr. McFarlane said to North, in words or substance, we're not 
out of the woods yet; there is still this matter of money 
being channeled down to the contras from Iran? 

A No. 

Q As I understand, Howard, then, the first time that 
you heard about the possibility or the allegation that monies 
from Iran had gone down to the contras was when the Attorney 
General announced it at the press conference on the 2 5th? 

A That's correct. 

Q You again don't recall prior to then overhearing 
any conversation between North and McFarlane in which 
something like that came up within days of the Attorney 
General's disclosure? 



llMtl*SSW 



800 



iiNtAssife 



A That's correct. I do not recall any such 
discussion. 

Q Do you know Michael Ledeen? 

A Yes. 

Q How long have you known him? 

A I met Mr. Ledeen in 1982 when I joined the staff 
at the State Department as a staff assistant to Mr. 
McFarlane, who was then the Counsellor of the State 
Department. 

Q And did Mr. Ledeen have an official role at the 
National Security Council staff that you were aware of in 
1985-1986? 

A I understood he was a consultant to the NSC staff. 

Q Did you deal with him at all during those two 
years in his consulting role? 
(Pause. ) 

I don't remember the question; give me any answer 
you want. My question was — don't do that. 

MR. BENNETT: Don't take him literally. He is 
trying to make you feel comfortable when he says that. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q Did you deal with Michael Ledeen in his official 
role as a consultant to the NSC staff in 1985 and 1986? 

A No. He was not a consultant to my group and while 
we occasionally had discussions about Middle East issues I 



oframp 



801 



uNeuwftft 



33 



would characterize them as of an informal variety. 

Q When you wrote — and I'm now drawing on what I 
understand from your prior testimony — when you drafted the 
NSDD that went out for discussion and which suggested the 
possibility of an opening to Iran, which would include 
relaxing a little bit on letting allies and friendly 
governments ship weapons — you understand what I'm referring 
to — that NSDD? 

A The NSDD draft. 

Q The draft, the one that the Secretaries of Defense 
and State — 

A It's important. It never became an NSDD. 
Q I understand, the draft NSDD, the one that the two 
Secretaries took issue with, when you were preparing that 
NSDD draft did you talk to Ledeen? Did he have any input 
into it? 

A I don't recall having any discussion with Michael 
Ledeen regarding the NSDD draft. 

MR. BENNETT: Excuse me. I just want the record 
not to have a misimpression. There's almost an assumption in 
the question that he was the author of the NSDD. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q Participated in drafting. I'll make the record 
clear, who else worked on the draft NSDD? 

A I would describe it as co-drafted by Don Fortier, 



UNClSSSIFe 



802 



Uiibua))U 



btfcil 



34 



with inputs from several other staff members of the NSC, as 
well as inputs from other agencies. 

Q And one of the prior inputs, as I understand, was 
Graham Fuller's SNIE on Iran? 

A Graham Fuller wrote a memo to the Director of 
Central Intelligence. He did not write an SNIE. His memo 
was titled "Toward a Policy on Iran", dated May 17, '85, did 
contribute to the NSDD. The SNIE was wholly apart. 

Q Going back to Ledeen, let me show you some more 
PROFs memos. I'll asic the reporter to mark these as Teicher 
Exhibits 4, 5, and 6. 

(The documents referred to were 
marked Teicher Exhibit Numbers 4, 
5, and 6 for identification.) 
( Pause . ) 

While the witness is looking at those PROFs, would 
you mark this document as Teicher Exhibit 3A? 

(The document referred to was 
marked Teicher Exhibit Number 3A 
for identification.) 
Let me for the record, while the witness is 
looking at the documents, describe them. Teicher Exhibit 4 
is a copy of a PROF message dated November 17, 1986 from Mr. 
Teicher to Dr. Keel. It's Bates-numbered N-8507. 

Exhibit 5, Bates-numbered N-17817, are certain 



mmsm 



vmmm 



35 



PROF notes concerning subject Michael Ledeen. And Teicher 
Exhibit 6, which is N-17816, are again certain PROF notes 
concerning Michael Ledeen, or copies of PROF notes. All are 
dated in the time frame between 11/17/86 and 11/21/86. 

Actually, I think in chronological form Exhibit 6 
precedes Exhibit 5. Why don't we just reverse it? Teicher 
Exhibit 5 will now be N-17816 and Teicher Exhibit 6 will be 
N-17817. 

(Pause. ) 

Howard, you've had a chance to look at these three 
exhibits, 4, 5, and 6 and, as you can see, the subject matter 
of them concerns whether or not Michael Ledeen — at least as 
I read them — should be permitted, encouraged, allowed, 
whatever, to go public about something concerning Iran. 
Indeed, Exhibit 4, which appears to be a note from you to Dr. 
Keel, says Ollie and I discussed the pros and cons of 
unleashing Ledeen, et cetera. 

Could you tell me what this whole issue is about 
and what you recall of it? 

A Well, to the best of my recollection Ledeen was 
being asked by various news media to appear to talk about the 
revelations, and he was seeking Poindexter/Keel's approval to 
do that. And I was asked for my opinion about the pros and 
cons of "unleashing him". 

Q Teicher Exhibit 4, I take it, is a PROF note that 



DNCtHSSIFIfB 



804 



t you look at it, senJlWq 



you recall, now that you 

A Yes. 

Q And it refers to a discussion that you and Ollie 
had about the pros and cons. What can you tell us about that 
discussion? 

A I really don't remember the discussion. 

Q Do you remember what the cons were? 

A The cons would just have been that Ledeen might 
say things that either in a way — or reveal that at the time 
decisions had been made not to reveal them, because of his 
style when he dealt with the media. 

Q What was that? 

A His style? 

Q Um-hum . 

A He tended to be verbose and to, I would say, 
describe his functions in an official capacity to the maximum 
extent possible which might not have been accurate. 

Q On balance you concluded, though, that he ought to 
meet the press? 

A On balance I had a principled view of a need for 
us to deal much more straight- forwardly with the media and 
that was, I believe, known among members of the staff. And I 
felt since others, since officials were not speaking to this 
issue, I felt that in the battle for public opinion it was in 
our interest to have people out there making the case that 



KNKSSSIRES 



805 



MMm 



.en 



37 



this made sense. 

Q Did you know at that time what role Ledeen had 
played in the Iran initiative? 

A I had some familiarity with trips he had taken 
earlier in 1985, yes. 

Q From whom had you obtained that? 

A From him. 

Q When? 

A At the time of his travel. I don't recall the 
exact time — in early '85, summer of '85. 

■ Q Do you recall what he told you about his 
involvement? 

A Well, all he told me was that he was going to try 
and make some things possible with the Israelis to improve 
our ability to establish a relationship with Iran. That was 
the thrust of it. 

Q Did he ever tell you whether he was involved in 
negotiating any of the arms transactions? 

A No. 

Q Did you ever hear whether he was involved in any 
of that kind of activity? 

A No. 

Q For example, did you hear or learn whether he was 
involved in any discussions on pricing of the weapons that 
were sold to the Iranians? 



iJfiCElOTlO 



806 



UNCL-ASm 



A No. 

Q Did you hear whether he himself was making a 
commission on any of those weapons sales? 

A No. 

Q Have you ever heard that? 

A I read about it. 

Q Leave out allegations in the papers. 

A No, I've never heard about it. 

Q Were you advised, as these PROF memos indicate, 
that Bud McFarlane gave instructions that Ledeen should not 
be unleashed? I'm looking at one PROF note on Exhibit 5 
which is from McFarlane — it doesn't indicate that it was 
sent to you — in which he says he doesn't know what role 
Mike played in this matter and so forth and then another on 
Exhibit 6 which is a short message from Alton Keel, Bud says 
do not, repeat, do not get on the subject. 

A That would have been my only awareness. 

Q Did anyone tell you what Bud's reason was? 

A No. 

Q Did you speak to Ledeen directly about his desire 
to meet the press on this issue? 

A No, he was not in touch with me about it. 

Q When did you first hear about — strike that. 

Did you have any dealings with representatives of 
Khashoggi on this Iran initiative? 



UmSSIFIED 



807 



UMfiLftSSMS 



39 



A NO. 

Q I have some PROF memos that I*d like to show you 
about Mr. Khashoggi. Let's just mark these as the next 4 
Exhibits — 7, 8, 9 and 10. 

(The documents referred to were 
marked Teicher Exhibit Numbers 7, 
8, 9, and 10 for identification.) 
These are some PROF messages, again, starting with 
the first one, which is Teicher 7, Bates number N-17810. It 
appears to be, as you can see, Howard, a copy of a note from 
you concerning Khashoggi dated October 22, 198 5. Do you 
recall that message? 

And again I think we've got these in reverse 
chronological order to an extent, but if you look at Teicher 
Exhibit 8, it is forwarding a note to you also dated October 
22 from Wilma Hall about a call from Bob Shaheen and a 
question to you about whether you could see Shaheen on Bud's 
behalf. 

And then I believe Exhibit 7 is your response 
beginning "I will be glad to". 

Okay, did you meet with Shaheen at that time? 
A No, I don't believe I met with him at that time. 
Q Did you talk with him or any Khashoggi 
representative? 

A I'm not exactly sure at the timing of all this. 



UNtmssra 



808 



UNCLASSIFIED 



TOP SECRET/ CODEWORD 4 

There was a luncheon that I believe American University put 
on for Khashoggi that summer — we could check calendars and 
things if we had access to them — at which Shaheen was there 
and was the first time I ever met Shaheen, and this may be 
where I made this point. That was my only meeting with 
Khashoggi or Shaheen, at that luncheon. 

Q And what did you talk about? 

A It was a large group, so we didn't talk. It's not 
appropriate. 

Q And that's the only time you ever saw them? 

A I talked with Shaheen separately in an effort to 
arrange an interview with the President for a leading Arab 
correspondent that Shaheen and Khashoggi were doing and I was 
on the phone and my secretary over a period of weeks — 
again I believe that was the summer of '85 — no; well, maybe 
the summer of '85. I really don't recall exactly when it 
was. 

Q Your memo. Exhibit 7, refers to a Khashoggi memo 
and there are other PROFs about that memo. Apparently at 
some time everybody was looking for it and then came up with 
it. Do you remember that? 

A Yes. 

Q What was the Khashoggi memo about? 

A Khashoggi prepared a long memo that dealt with the 
state of the world, US-Soviet relations, the international 
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 



UNCIASSIFIEP 



809 



mimm 



41 



economic situation, the situation in Iran, the peace process, 
the PLO — I mean tour de resol would be the diplomatic term 
that he, I guess, as an international entrepreneur was 
interested in and wanted to share his thoughts with the White 
House on. 




810 



VHomfi^ 



Q Okay, we won't go further with it. Howard, have 
you read the Tower Report? 

A Yes. 

Q I want to ask a general question and I don't want 
you to get too excited. My general question — 

MR. BENNETT: He is very clever, so now sit back 
and relax. 

MR. BELNICK: I know you're going to get excited, 
so I wanted to prepare you. My general question is going to 
be whether Howard, in reading it, saw any, to the extent he 
had knowledge of events, an* material inaccuracies which 
struck him, recognizing that he doesn't have the Tower Repor 
here, that I'm not asking him to go through it line by line, 
that he may forget something. You have it there but he's no 
reading it. 

MR. BENNETT: I get you. 

THE WITNESS: Do you authorize me to answer? 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) ] 

Q With those caveats that you may not remember 
everything but it's more of an impressionistic question — 
I'm trying to qualify it as much as I can without taking you 
page by page through the report. 

A To the extent that it dealt with what facts that : 
was aware of I considered it to be accurate. I cannot speak 
to large portions of it. 



UimSStftED 



811 



ONeMflffi 



Q I'm not asking you to vouch for the report. 
You're answering within the bounds I'm asking. 

A The only inaccuracy with respect to me and which I 
believe has been clarified had to do with the suggestion that 
the NSC staff pressured the CIA to draft the Special National 
Intelligence Estimate in a manner that would support the 
NSDD, which I helped draft. I believe Director Gates sent a 
clear letter to Senator Boren which stated unequivocally that 
the NSC played no role in the drafting and coordination of 
that SNIE, and I believe that took care of the one inaccuracy 
that I'm familiar with. 

Q Okay, fair enough. I'm just going to do a couple 
more things and then we'll be finished. First, I'd like you 
just to verify the record that what we've now marked as 
Teicher Exhibit 3A, Bates number N-8714, et seq. , entitled 
Discussion Paper International Relations with Iran is the 
discussion paper you were referring to earlier which grew out 
of your conversation with Admiral Poindexter, which is 
reflected in Teicher Exhibit 3, the handwritten notes. 
You participated in the preparation? 

A Participated in the preparation. 

Q Of Exhibit 3, I take that. And who else worked 
with you on it? 

A Commander Coy. I believe that several other 
members of the NSC staff. 



UNKMflED' 



812 



ilNClASSW 



I 



Q But my main interest was that it relates to the 
notes that you took. 

A That's my understanding, and if you read it I 
think there's — but, if I may suggest — 

Q Yes, please. 

A What you should seek from the White House or the 
State Department, perhaps, would be the actual telegrams 
which were transmitted as a result of the assignment and that 
I was part of a process of over a period of weeks. That was 
the actual outgrowth of that assignment. 

■ Q It's a good suggestion and I will make sure that 
we get those, if v,'e don't have them already. Just, lastly 
and really more for the record, have you hade any recent 
discussions with Bud McFarlane, or Poindexter, or anyone 
aside from your counsel, aside from your counsel, about your 
forthcoming testimony here today? 

A No. 

Q When's the last time you had any conversation that 
you remember with Lieutenant Colonel North? 

A The last time I saw him was very briefly passing 
in the street at 17th and I Street. I think he was going to 
see BriTnd^n Sullivan or something and we said hello in the 
street and that was the extent of it. It was, I think, 
probably in early January, I don't know. 

Q But the last time you had any substantive type 



UMCL^iBSm 



813 



UNettSStftElI 



discussion was back in November before he was let go? 

A Yes. 

Q The same question vis-a-vis Michael Ledeen. 
When's the last time you had any discussion with Michael 
Ledeen that touched on any of this? 

A I've had no discussion with him that touched on 
any of this. He did recently call me to see if we could have 
dinner with him and his wife — strictly social. 

Q I'm not interested in personal. 

A No, I've had no substantive discussion with him 
about any of this. 

Q Or with any representatives of the ^^^^^H 
government? 



UNeiASSffe 



814 



ONCUSSIEP. 



A I've had no discussion with representatives of the 
^^^^H government with respect to these matters. 

MR. BELNICK: I want to thank you and your 
attorney for your appearance here and for your cooperation 
and for your service to the country on the NSC staff. I 
appreciate your coming down. 

THE WITNESS: Thank you. 

(Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the taking of the 
instant deposition ceased.) 



Signature of the witness 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 

, 1987. 



Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: 



BNStfflffe 



815 



■HZMCRANCUM TOR HCWARO TEICHER 
FROM: ROBERT C. McfARlANE 



^C/9/^/?^'/ N 105' 

April 20, 1984 

T5)Cher ^/± 



1 g a s e draw upon th« following points in your meeting 
without others present) . 



Possible Meeting With 



-- It 
before Ion 



possible that 
Khassoghi cam« 





ay be contacted by Xhassoghi 
a week ago after having tal)<ec 



to ward the purpos* 
while fearful, agreed" ii 



According to Khassoghi, 
the meeting were entirely private." 

There would be no preconditions, although flB^ was 
motivated toward establishing some conf idence-builcTTng "measures 
over time. These too, would be based upon tacit performance by 
both sides and without formal agreement. 

I stated that I agreed with the purpose of such contacts 
and with the view that any meetings would need to be private. 

Finally, I expressed willingness to arrange such a 
meeting ( althoug h Khassoghi is in a position to do that himself). 
In short , IfHIf seemed to be wanting US endorsement of the 
pro]ect rather than any specific US role. That's OK with us too. 



(Note: Khassoghl's interest was brought to my attention by Geo; 
who had been contacted by Khassoghi. As of bow^jb have not beer 
as)(ed to do anything. Your mention of it ^4BpiV '^'^u^*^ only be 
for informational purposes and good faith in^tirt^g them 
informed) . 



Help With the Contras 



— As we di 
already heard fro 



d, please reaffirm to 
that: 






Declassify on: OADR 

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unaer prc»rsions oi E 12356 
by K Jotinson National Secuiily Council 



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1) We will not press them on the question of 
assistance to the contras. 

2) It is an important matter to us and we face a 
temporary shortfall in goods. 

3) We are, of course, very cnascious of the 
vulnerability it would create for che|HHf 

4) If they Should decide that they can help, it ought 
to be done bilate rally although we w ould be pleased to orovide a 
point of.contact ^HI^HI^^^I^^^^MH^I^^HHI^^iB^^H^^^^M 



5) Please also let it be known that, in your view, 
I am a little disappointed in the outcome but we will not raise 
It further. 

Destroy this memo. 



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TOP SECRET 



November 10, 1986 



DISCUSSION PAPER 
International Relations with Iran ^ 87 I 4 

The Islamic Republic of Iran has maintained diplomatic, economic, 
and military relations with a variety of countries throughout the 
world. Recently, there has been much speculation over a change 
in U.S. policy toward Iran. In order to intelligently respond to 
either criticism or this speculation, the facts behind Iran's 
international relations need to be considered. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Throughout the seven year existence of the Islamic Republic, Iran 
has maintained diplomatic relations with all of the European 
nations and all of the Middle Eastern/Arab countries with the 
exception of Egypt. Despite the war, even Iraq maintains normal 
diplomatic relations with Iran. Relations with Egypt were broken 
when the Shah was committed to exile in Egypt. The only western 
countries not to have diplomatic relations are the United States 
and Canada. 

Economic Relations 

Iran's gross national product in 1985 was more than $80 billion, 
despite the deteriorating situation created by the revolutionary 
chaos. Major trading partners in 1985 were: 



Japan 


$ 1,360M 


Turkey 


1,000M 


West Germany 


1,647M 


Italy 


611M 


Netherlands 


270M 


Spain 


284M 


France 


160M 


United KingdoQi 


678M 


United States 


74M 



Exports 

$ 2,525M 

1,500M 

642M 

1,502M 

1,042M 

888M 

803M 

80M 

763M 

Trade between Iran and other Middle Eastern/Arab countries is 
negligible and primarily conducted on the black market. Iran 
does provide Syria with oil in payment for trade concessions. 
Petroleum constitutes 98% of Iran's $16 billion exports, although 
it IS interesting to note that $280 million of their exports to 
the United States are in agricultural products (pistachio) . 
Machinery, food stuffs, pharmaceuticals, and military supplies 
up the bulk of their inputs. 

t^J'-*iy OeclassifieJ/Reteasetf'on ZM^~- ^ 
untier provisions ot E 12356 

I'lty Cooncil/ 



TOP SECRET 
Declassify: 



mmm 




821 



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TOP SECRET 



Military Relations 



715 



Military shipments to Iran can be divided into four categories- 
(1) non-lethal military equipment; (2) ammunition and small arms- 
(3) spare parts far. U.S. wea pon systems; an d (4) maTor combat 
'Stems .^^^^^^■^""■*""' ' -~ -"^ 




TOP SECRET 



822 



wimm 



TOP SECRET 



N 8716 




Attachments 
Tab I 
Tab II 




TOP SECRET 



mmm 



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824 



From SSHRT --CPIA 1 « » « a • ^. '^^'^ ^""^ ^"-""^ 11. WS- ^8 »i if 

To: NSHP --CPLA ^ ^ - . _ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



■NOTE FROM: Howard Teiche 
SUBJECT: message to dr. keel 
ollie and i dis.cussed the pros and cons of "unleashing" ledeen. 
on balance, we now conclude that is long as he convinces us that 
he will not say things that he must keep silent about, we should 
agree to his going public, ue should be able to talk him through what 
not to say tomorrow.! don't be 1 leve he wants to go before the 
cameras until Wednesday night. 



N 8507 



^,noe.p.ovr..onsolEO 12356 
by K Johnson, National Secuntv Council 



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MSG FROM: NSHRT --CPUA TO: SSDRF --CPVA 
To: NSWFM --CPUA ROBERT MCFARUNE NSVRP --CPLA 
NOTE FROM: Howard Teicher 
SUBJECT: adnan khashoggi 

adnan expressed his complete appreciation for your inability to get 
back to him in the foreseeable future, he hoped that you would 
authorize mc to "help him understand u.s. policy in the middle 
east" in the next week or so. the more interesting substantive 
jomts mc iuded^^MMHM 

- he mcL wi-.t^H|H|arlythis past ueek. he does not have mucn 
hope for him in terms of displaying anv^tatesmanship ^n the 
near future^^^^o took cred;; fo 

- he mpt witn^^^^^Ln new york. he believes tna 
taking us for granted and is therefore pushing us into a 
position where we cannot «serve as an intermediary (he made 
this same point in his memo.) 

irbosc abou 



10/25/85 17:50:07 
ROBERT MCFARLANE 




MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA 
To; NSWTM --CPUA 



Reply to note of 10/25/85 17:56 



JOHN M. POINDEXTER 



10/25/85 18:08:33 I 



^^^ 



^^C 



Kl' 



NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARUNE 
Subject- adnan khashoggi 



°<)ttially Decl3S5ilied/Peleiisea on Z6.^ji~^ 9g 
under p'ovrsinns of E 12356 
by K Jonnson Nalional Security Council 







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Deposition of Paul Thompson 



Select Committee to Investigate 

Covert Arms Transactions with 

Iran, 

U.S. House of Representatives, 

Washington, D.C. 

Monday, March 9, 198 7 



The deposition was convened, pursuant to notice, at 
3:30 p.m., in Room H-328, The Capitol. 



Partiatl]( 



siiuj h 




3in 




UH^iA^HiftT- 



(833) 



834 



UNCtASSlEKiT 



Mr. Eggleston. Just so the record is clear, this deposi- 
tion, as it is conducted, is classified. The names of various 
individuals who are mentioned in this deposition have not been 
revealed publicly and care should be taken in dealing with this 
deposition to assure that the names are not revealed. 

Mr. Raul. Fine. 

Mr. Eggleston. I am Neil Eggleston, Deputy Chief Counsel 
of the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran, and also present is George Van Cleve, 
who is Chief Minority Counsel. 

Mr. Van Cleve. Yes. 

Mr. Eggleston. The witness is Paul Thompson. Immediately 
before we went on the record, Mr. Alan Raul, who is also attend- 
ing as --- 

Mr. Raul. Associate Counsel to the President and represent 
ing Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Eggleston. Mr. Raul has asked for a copy of the 
deposition. I have told him that the rules provide, to my 
understanding, at the very minimum, for his client, for Mr. 
Thompson to have an opportunity to review the transcript and 
make any corrections. 

I am uncertain about whether or not the rules permit, on 
his request, to give him a copy of the transcript. I will get 
back to him on whether or not he can have it, but I certainly 
achnowledge here that he has made a request for the transcript. 



UViCkA^liEMr 



835 



IHU&A^^^Efi' 



Whereupon, 

PAUL THOMPSON 

was called as a witness for the Select Conunittee, and, having 

been duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testifie 

as follows: 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q As you probably know, this committee has a broad man- 
date to investigate various activity including various activitijes 
of individuals in and outside of the government relating to wha 
has now been colloquially referred to as the Iran Contra Affair 
YOU have been asked to appear pursuant to that and we thank you 
for coming today. I don't think this deposition is going to 
take very long. Just so there is no confusion. I will cover 
several different areas and I will just review the areas so yo. 
know what will be coming. I will ask a few questions about yo| 
background, military background, questions about your first 
involvement when you first came to the NSC. a little about the 
NSC. and I will ask you specific questions about your role theije 
and focus on some of the last events that took place recently. 
Those are the areas I intend to cover. 

I don't intend to ask you anything about things you might 
have done at the NSC that are not included within the scope of 
this investigation. I am not going to ask you about other thir 
that you might have worked on. I think that might cover areas 
I am not cleared to hear, so I will not ask you about that. 
Where were you born, Mr. Thompson? 



836 



UHCtASSlEKBT 



_ _ 4 

A I was born in Keene, New Hampshire 

Q What is your date of birth 

2 A September 27, 1946 

3 Q So that makes you how old 

4 A Forty years and some months 

5 Q Mr. Thompson, could you tell us about your educationajl 
background 

A Certainly. I completed eleven years of school in 
the normal public school system. I spent my twelfth year in 
g Germany as an exchange student. I then spent four years at 
Boston University, earning a Bachelor or Arts degree. I then 
spent a year in post-graduate work at the University of 
^2 Maryland in International Political Science. I then entered 
<3 the United States Navy and went on a four-year tour. I then 
^^ spent three years in law school at the University of Baltimore 
-c I then entered active duty with the Navy and spent another 

three years at the Georgetwon University School of Law, earning 
a Masters in Tax 

Q What year was it that you entered the Navy? 
A I entered the Navy in September of 1969 
Q What is your current rank 
A Commander 

Q What year is it that you began law school? I think 
you said the University of Baltimore 

A Right. It was in August of 1973 

Q And what kind of responsibilities did you have with 



'«%5,>Jt. 



l^ijO^fftRflr 



837 



10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



IWdEA^JfiiJigT 



the Navy between September '69 and August of 1973? 

2 A Well, my first assignment was on board ship, the 

3 USS Cambria. I was a second division officer and boat group 
commander, basically a line job. 

g Q And where were you principally located? 

A Well, the ship deployed to the East Mediterranean, 
7 so I was part of the 6th Fleet. 

Q Did you go to law school continuously then from 
9 August '73 through '76 or so? 

A Through December of '75. 
Q December '75? 
A That is correct. 

Q And you indicated that there came a time when you 
went to Georgetown to get a Masters in Tax? 
A That is right. 
Q When was that? 

A I started that program, it was a night program. So 
I started it in September of 1976 and completed it in December 

of 1979. 

Q Does that mean that throughout the period '75, reall 
through '79, you were principally located in the greater 
Washington area? 

A Yes. I was stationed right here at the Navy Yard. 

Q You did not have a line assignment? 

A No. Upon completion of law school I transferred to 



.*;iMa.Afta!fcK* 



838 



iMi^fNS'' 



1 the Judge Advocate General Corps and I was a member of the 

2 JAG Corps in the Navy since 1976, so I was in a legal assign- 

3 ment here in Washington while I was in law school. I should 
point out that I attended law school under a Navy program 
called the Excess Leave Program, so I have actually been on 
continuous active duty since September 1969. 

Q During the course of this period of time, '69 to '73 
when you were engaged in active duty, in that period of time 
did you have any training or involvement in any special 

10 operations type assignments? 

•)1 A No, none whatsoever. I should also point out that I 

12 spent, my initial tour was on board ship. That lasted for one 

13 year. I then spent about two and a half years in Turkey 

14 assigned to a military mission. 
Q What did you do when you were in Turkey? What did 

it mean to be assigned to a mission? 

A I was primarily the flag lieutenant and aide to a 
rear admiral who was stationed in Turkey who was the chief of 
the Navy section of the Joint U.S. military mission for aid 
to Turkey with the responsibility of JUSMMAT, as it was known 
as to assist the Turkish military in upgrading their capability 

Q Who was the admiral that you were assigned to? 

A An admiral, two admirals, actually, one was Walter 
N. Dietzen, Jr., and the second was John G. Williams, Jr. 

Q Dietzen is spelled? 

mmm 



839 



UNiS9§sffifFT 



A D-i-e-t-z-e-n. 

Q And if you could just take me from 1976 when you 
graduated from -- excuse me -- when did you graduate from the 
Georgetown program? 

A 1979. 

Q After that time, what assignment did you have? 

A You are not interested in what happened between '76 
and '79? 

Q I am. But I would like to get forward first here. 

A We come in the middle of a tour in that case. 

Q Let me ask you about the beginning of the tour, then. 

A In 1976, when I was admitted to the Bar, and I arrived 
in Washington, D.C., I was attached to the Navy Legal Service 
Office here at the Navy Yard and I was the trial attorney for 
about a year and a half, both trial and defense. At the end 
of that time I became what is kaown in the military as Head 
of Military Justice, which means I was like the senior trial, 
senior trial attorney for both trial and defense sections. I 
then left the trial activity and was transferred to the appellatje 
activity where I spent the next twenty months as a government 
appellate attorney arguing cases in front of the Court of 
Military Appeals. 

Q What years was that? 

A And writing briefs. This would have been mid- '77 to 
mid-'79. 



nilPJJi^giriica.. 



840 



wstimfw 



Q All right. 

A In May of '79 I was then transferred to the Naval 
Audit Service where I performed a job known as staff Judge 
Advocate to the Auditor General of the Navy who was an admiral 
by the name of James B. Busey. That job entailed, in contrast 
to my previous two assignments in which I was primarily doing 
criminal and military justice, that job entailed fraud, waste, 
and abuse, white collar crime, fiscal law, and so on. In July 
1980, I was then transferred to the Department of -- to the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense where I became a member of 
the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary for Legislative 
Affairs as a legal and legislative counsel. 

Q How long did you remain there? 

A I was there for three years until June 1983 at which 
time I went to the White House to the National Security Council. 

Q Let me focus on that period, July '80 through July 
'83 when you were assigned to the position of Office of 
Secretary of Defense. What were your duties when you were at 
that position? 

A Primarily a liaison function and my areas of respon- 
sibility were within the Office of Secretary of Defense, the 
Assistant Secretary for Control, Communications, and Intelli- 
gence, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, 
C-Cubed, as it is called, so I was liaisoning with the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the counterpart 



»mAS^^ 



841 






on the Senate side, as well as the Judiciary committees because 
I also performed liaison between the General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense and Congress. 

Q Were you the principal liaison between that office? 

A I was for the area of intelligence and for the legal 
matters, yes. 

Q What would be included within what you call the areas 
of intelligence? What kind of areas would you mean by that? 

A Well, the annual authorization, the appropriations 
bills which covered the national foreign intelligence programs, 
all matters of programmatic matters arising during the course 
of the year which would fall within the oversight responsibiliti 
of the committees. 

Q Would areas like particular relevance to questions I 
have coming up, areas like Congressional notification about 
various things that arise under various statutes, would that 
fall within your area? 

A Arguably, it could have. It seems to me the Intelli- 
gence Oversight Act, as it is called, was passed just about as I 
arrived or shortly after I arrived there which articulated the 
reporting requirements to particular chairmen and Members over 
here. 

Q Were you ever involved in reporting -- I won't ask 
you what they wre -- but involved in reporting any particular 
activities during the period of time that you were there? 



am^§§»:j£ar 



842 



A No. 

Q If there had been aomething to report within your area 
would that have been something you would have done or would you 
have just coordinated that on behalf of somebody else? 

A I would have done the coordinating at best since I 
was the liaison person. I was not a substantive portfolio 
person. But I would not probably have gotten involved in the 
actual reporting. I don't recall any incidents while I was 
there. 

Q During this period of time when you were at the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, were you involved in the AWACS sale 

A No. 

Q You didn't have any? Didn't that take place in '81 or 
' When I say the AWACS sales, I don't mean the actual sales, 
but involved in the Congressional effort to get the AWACS sales 
passed. 

A That was another part of the office altogether. 

Q So, you were not involved? 

A No. 

Mr. Raul. Let me interject for a second. Commander, were 
you in the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs? 

The Witness. Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Legislative Affairs, but we provided the exclusive legislative 
support to the Secretary. 



843 



ows^mm 



1 

2 

3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Let me ask you, I would like to ask you if you knew 
a number of people prior to June of 1983. 

A Okay. 

Q Prior to June of 1983, did you know someone who is 
now Lt. Colonel Oliver North? 

A No. 

Q How about Richard Secord, did you know him? 

A No. I knew of the name because he worked in the 
Pentagon at the same time I did. I had never met him. 

Q v/hen I say, did you know him, to your recollection had 
you ever even met him in any fashion? 

A No. 

Q How about a man by the name of Robert Dutton? 

A No. 

Q Richard Gadd? 

A No. 

Q Did you know Robert McFarlane? 

A I knew the name only in his capacity as the Deputy 

National Security Advisor. 

Q But you had not met him? 

A No. 

Q And Admiral Poindexter? 

A No. 

Q You did not know him prior to the time you were 



WlfiiftSSifRif^ 



844 



transferred to the National Security Council? 

A No. 

Q You indicated that you were transferred to the Nationa . 
Security Council in, I think you said June of 1983. 

A Correct. 

Q And what job did you have when you were first trans- 
ferred? 

A My first assignment was Deputy Director of Legislative 
and Legal Affairs. 

Q Who was your supervisor? 

A Director of Legal and Legislative Affairs was a 
gentleman named Christopher Ma nit - . 

Q How long was he there? 

A He was there -- at the NSC or within that directorate 
as my supervisor? I only remained in that directorate for about 
nine months. 

Q Let me ask you in a similar fashion to describe the 
variuos jobs you had at the NSC if that wouldn't take too long, 
between June '83 -- are you currently there? 

A Yes. 

Q Until the present, then. 

A Sure. 

As you know, the NSC is organized into directorates. 
It has an Executive Secretary and about 12 to 14 directorates, 
so when I first arrived there I was assigned to the directorate 



uiifeiiAsaeKitT 



845 



of Legal and Legislative Affairs. As the Deputy Director for 
Legal and Legislative Affairs, I had -- the reason I say this, 
I need to correct one other aspect -- I had as my supervisor 
Chris Lehman for legislative affairs and then general counsel 
to the NSC a gentleman named Robert Kimmet'las my immediate 
supervisor for legal affairs. So, I actually reported to two 
individuals. 

After nine months, I moved down to the Executive Secretaria 
of the NSC and became the Deputy Executive Secretary and retaine 
my deputy or my legal counsel role, so I was both the staff 
counsel and the Deputy Executive Secretary for another nine 
months. 

Q We are talking now about March or so of 1984? 

A Right. I was in that capacity in my first assignment. 
I then became the Deputy Executive Secretary and Deputy Staff 
Counsel until December of '84. 

Q Just to clarify, you started in June or so of 1983? 

A Right. 

Q When did you take the job as Deputy Executive 
Secretary? 

A Spring of '84, it would have been around March or 
so, April. 

Q You remained there until about December '84? 

A Correct. 

Q And what job did you take then in December '84? 



i2MA i /|C^C> O gar. 



846 



ON^/^Sffi^ 



A Starting January 1 of '85, I became the military 
assistant to Mr. McFarlane. 

Q Okay. 

A I still retain my hat as the deputy legal officer to 
the NSC. 

Q Who did you report to then as the deputy legal officer 

A To the General Counsel, Robert KimmetT 

Q It was still Robert Kimme#at that time? 

A Yes, and that continued up until June '85. So, from 
January 1, 1985, until January 5 of 1986, I was the military 
assistant to Mr. McFarlane. 

Q Okay. 

A January 5 was his last day, although in effect he left 
in early December '85. I stayed in that job and became the 
military assistant to Admiral Poindexter. 

Q Okay. 

A Now, in June of '85, when Kimmetf left to go to the 
Department of Treasury, I then became the primary legal officer 
at the NSC. 

Q Had those been joint jobs prior to the time that you 
took them? 

A Yes, Kimmetfwas the staff counsel or legal counsel 
when I arrived there. I actually relieved him and while he was 
doing that he had also done other things. He had done security 
assistance and legislative affairs. It is not unusual to be 



PIlAiS^J^ 



847 



liKSFAlSfJW 



double hatted. 

Q Right. I just wondered whether that had been covered. 
Do you still retain the current job that you had since then? 

A Yes. Well, up until November 25 I retained those jobs 
and then we had a transitional period during which time Mr. 
Al Keel was the acting National Security Advisor. 

Q Right. 

A That takes us through 2 January of '87. I kept both 
jobs through that period of time. 

I then became the military assistant to Mr. Frank 
Carlucci, which I am currently still doing. In late January of 
this year, 1987, a gentleman named Paul Stevens arrived and he 
assumed many of my legal duties and became the legal advisor to 
the National Security Advisor. 

I have been still performing some legal functions? 
however, Paul now has the primary responsibility. 

Q Let me just take you through a few more background 
questions about yourself and then we will move to a few other 
specific areas. What are your principal duties as military 
advisor? 

A Military assistant to fte National Security Advisor. 

Q Yes. 

A It encompasses serving as that individual's special 
assistant and being responsible for basically the main issues 
which he faces in a given day, everything from the paper that 



UNiPMi&F 



848 



uirai^flii'^ 



16 



rosses his desk to the meetings that he is required to be 
prepared for, liaison with the rest of the staff. I deal with 
his counterparts if he is busy. I anticipate whatever problems 
and demands will be on his time. 

Q Were you then, just to put it in terms that I can 
understand it, were you his principal deputy then? I am startinj 
first with Mr, McFarlane, during the time of a year or so that 
you had that job. 

A No, that would be inaccurate. 

My role was strictly in support of the incumbent of 
the National Security Advisor, that individual. He had a deputy 
who would stand in for him in his absence who was his principal 
deputy. 

Q Who was that? 

A Well -- 

Q Who was that in 1985 and 1986? 

A In 1985, throughout '85 it was Admiral Poindexter. 

Q Right. 

A In 1986, it was initially Don Fortier, until he 
succumbed to cancer. 

Q When is it Mr. Fortier ceased to work actively at the 
INSC? 

A He went home ill in May of 1986, and never returned. 

Q Okay. I knew there came a time prior to the time that 
you were there. 



..HM JWt'^SECia?r 



849 



A Yes, and he died in August, 

Q Did someone take his place? 

A No. During that time we had the NSC under Admiral 
Poindexter. It had been configured to have two other deputies 
in addition to the two principal deputies. So those two 
individuals assumed a little more responsibility and the 
Executive Secretary who is normally the third or fourth in line 
anyway as far as responsibility management goes also assumed mor 
responsibility. I did a few more things, but that was the 
primary responsibility. 

Q Who were the five people under Admiral Poindexter 
after Mr. Fortier left? 

A There were two other deputies, one named Peter Rodman, 
Deputy Security Advisor for Foreign Policy, and William Cockell 
was the Deputy National Security Advisor for Defense Policy. 

Q In 1985, where was your office? 

A From March '85 until the end of the year it was 
located in an ante-room right next to the National Security 
Advisor's office. 

Q And in 1986, did you remain in the same location? 

A Same, yes. 

Q I was there the other day, are you the office immediat 
next to the National Security Advisor's office? 

A That is correct. 

Q In that position that you held in 1985 and 1986, did 



«?WHia3SIHiftT 



850 



UNfiUSSHti&lElT 



you routinely review paper, documents that were forwarded or 
transmitted to the National Security Advisor? 

A Yes, I did. 

Q Did you also review his, the PROF memos that were sent 
to him? 

A No, only if they were copies to me. In the PROF 
system you can send messages to the addressee exclusively or 
you can copy individuals. So it depended on what the originator 
of the message did. 

Q Let me ask it this way: I understand that in particul 
situations there may have been arrangements such that someone 
sending a message can send a message to that only the recipient 
can review that, the recipient or someone who has the recipient' 
password or machine or something. 

A Yes. 

Q Apart from those, apart from those that would have 
been sent under some sort of special system, did you review any 
of his other PROF messages that were sent to him? Would you 
routinely review any of the others? 

A No, I was never aware of any messages that would be 
sent to him unless I were copied on them. 

Q Okay. 

A Each member of the staff has his own user ID and his 
own password and they dial up their messages and dispose of the 
or forward them and do whatever they want with them. I was 



mmm 



851 



UHQA^ESfillT 



never at any time aware of anybody else's password other than 
my own. 

Q There is a PROF, series of PROFs that are now famous 
called Private Blank Check, that had a title of Private Blank 
Check. Were you aware during late '85 nad '86 that such PROF 
messages under the title of Private Blank Check were being sent 
back and forth? 

A No, I am not familiar with that title. I am aware tha 
a lot of staff officers had the capability of communicating 
directly with Admiral Poindexter via PROFs. 

Q But you were not aware of that particular track? 

A No, no. You know, the way the PROFs are structured, 
it is so as to prevent the National Security Advisor from being 
bombarded with hundreds of messages in any given day. Most of 
the staff had to send their messages via the executive secretary 
who then would filter them and only forward select ones and 
when that individual forwarded them he would copy me so if they 
came up through that system I would be aware of what they were, 
normally. He would copy me out of courtesy and of necessity so 
I could track various action items. 

Q Who was the executive secretary during this period of 
time? 

A Well, it was once again more than one person. 

Q I thought it might have been. 

A It started off -- we have a high attrition rate. 



JMLASi^^ 



852 



(/N€f)l§§)flgT 



20 



Q Really, particularly recently. Really, I was thinking 
'85 and '86. Was it several different people in that time 
period? 

A Yes, it was. It was three different people. 

Q Okay, if you could just tell us. 

A Bob Kimmetr f rom January 1 of '85 and in a continued 
role up to June 17, '85, then when he left, William Martin took 
over and he stayed as executive secretary until around February 
1986. During February, early February, he was relieved by 
Rodney McDaniel, who stayed in that position up to January 2 of 
7. 

Q So is it fair to say that the messages that were sent 
to Admiral Poindexter by the Executive Secretary , you routinelv 
saw those? 

A Most of them. He had to put the copy to my user ID 
below. He didn't always do that. I should point out, also, 
that there was one other individual who did most of the PROFs 
forwarding, that was a gentleman named Robert Pearson, Deputy 
Executive Secretary throughout that period of time. Pearson 

ame and relieved me from being Deputy Executive Secretary back 
in January of '85. 

Q' Okay. But if I were to look at any particular PROF 
memo, can I tell whether you read the PROF memo or whether that 
nemo was sent to you by looking at the memo itself? 

A Yes, you can look at the bottom and if you see 



UN€bA$SH:{j^ 



853 



l/N§f)\§$lfPigT 



21 



"cc: MSPBT," generally I was sent it. 

Q If it was not there that would mean you would not 
have seen it? 

A Absolutely, That is the case unless it were handed 
out and sent to me. 

Q Let me ask you about paper flow. I have noticed an 
enormous number of memoranda that were writen, again, for exampl 
by Oliver North to Admiral Poindexter. He seemed to be a fairly 
prolific writer. 

A Yes. 

Q A number of these were suggestions or what I call 
action memos, although there may be another term, suggesting 
Admiral Poindexter take various action. Those could range any- 
where from authorizing a trip that Mr. North wanted to take, to 
briefing the President on a particular item or particular event 

Did you routinely see memos of that kind in your 
position? 

A Routinely, I did. There were always some that were 
hand carried in by a staff officer in an appointment or handed 
to the Admiral elsewhere that I did not see. 

Q So you didn't necessarily see them? 

A No. 

Q Was there a method by which the action that Admiral 
Poindexter took was recorded? 

A Almost always. He would document on the memo, as you 



IHlAUSfilRltniT 



854 



Uffl$EffS^HR«E:T 



probably notice, they called for disapproval or approval, he 
was very careful usually about documenting that. 

Q When those were documented or the document itself 
usually by his initials or some initials and a note, what 
happened to that piece of paper? Where would it go? 

A It is important to distinguish as to whether or not 
they were what we call system items or not. If they were 
identified by a system number, either a system 1, 2, or 4, which 
can be identified by a log number in the upper righthand corner 
they were sent back then via our Executive Secretary where they 
were recorded and they were entered into our chronology as a 
recorded decision. 

Q What kind of things fall within 1, 2, or 4, what kind 
of decisions? 

A Well, we devised this, these categories of systems 
sometime ago to try to make more sense out of the vast amount 
of paper that comes through that, and System 1 was primarily 
administrative, internal action or administrative type system. 

Q Would North's request for authorization to travel fall 
within System 1? 

A Yes, right. Those would normally be dealt with at 
the Executive Secretary level, rarely even come up to the front 
office. 

Q Okay. 

A System 2 was primarily an NSC type system of 



Wtf^flSStEfffiT 



855 



\}ll€10^SSt%^T 



23 



sufficient sensitivity to be dealt with in a classified manner 
and therefore almost all items and systems were classified. 
They usually deal with most of the main functions of the 
National Security Council which require some sort of either 
action or information to be taken by the National Security 
Advisor or by the President, so they were on their way to that 
level and they are usually of significance. 

System 3 is defunct and has been for years. 

System 4 is designed primarily for intelligence documents 
most intelligence, originally it was defined by items coming ou|t 
of the intelligence directorate. It then was expanded somewhat 
to include highly sensitive items which a staff officer could 
use by contacting our System 4 custodian, get a System 4 
number and using that to have an item sent forward to the 
National Security Advisor. System 4 is usually hand-carried, 
usually put in an envelope so it receives more protection than 
the System 2. 

Q Well, let me just take an example which is not going 
to shock you, but take an example where Mr. North is writing a 
memo to Mr. Poindexter and suggesting that Poindexter advise 
the President or brief the President on a particular event. 
If Poindexter says "concur" or initials the "yes" box, is that 
a System 2 document? 

A Probably should be. In most cases it would be. 

Q The document itself is sent to some central file? 



milCf>A$$t&Ef^ 



8.% 



UNOtASfilf]^ 



A Oh, yes, sure. 

Q Does Mr. Poindexter also keep a copy of the document: 

A No, he rarely kept any paper at all. A chronology 
IS maintained for him within the Secretariat of his action, 
usually the original document is stored there. That becomes 
the record copy and a copy of the decision is sent back to the 
action officer who perpared it. 

Q There was a memorandum that is oft referred to as 
being undated but which the Tower Commission concludes is 
dated April 4 or so. It is, I think, quoted in some length in 
the Tower Commission report - - I am starting to forget where I 
saw things. 

Prior to November 1, '86, had you seen that memoran- 
dum? 

A No. 

Q When is the first time you saw the memorandum? 

A I saw it either the Monday or the Tuesday at the end 
of November, the 24th or 25th. 

Q I would get to that in ordinary course, but you did 
not, to your recollection, see it around April or so of 1986? 

A No. 

Mr. Raul. Can we go off the record for a second? 

Mr. Eggleston. Sure. 

(Discussion off the record.) 



"/V^ljWWfTTO^f 



857 






25 



Mr. Eggleston. Back on the record. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 
Q Did you attend meetings of the National Security 
Council? 

A I did occasionally. 

Q And on what kind of occasions would you be asked to 
attend? 

A Oh, if legal issues were being discussed, or if my 
appearance there would be of assistance to the National Security 
Advisor. 

Q That was essentially the decision of the National 
Security Advisor? 
A Yes. 

Q Did you attend both under Admiral Poindexter and 
under Mr. McFarlane? 
A Yes. 

Q Do you know the number of times you attended? 
A No very many. 
Q Well --- 

A Probably four or five. 
Q About two under each or so or more under one than the 

other? 

A I would have to look it up. i suspect I went two or 
three times under McFarlane and perhaps more under Poindexter, 
but we had meetings which were not strictly statutarily National 
Security Council ™..r,n.._ _bux w£ im -««.>»~r« - <> 1 meetings with 



' l^j^^^Sf^ 



858 



iiR@f)i§§fri@^ 



several members of the NSC plus other senior advisors which I 
attended, so "NSC meetings" is a word of art. There are also 
what are called NSPG meetings which are equivalent in many 
respects. 

I would say perhaps in the two years I was there I 
went to a total of ten meetings which were considered NSC 
related meetings. 

Q During the times that you were there, were there note 
takers? 

A Yes, I recall there were. 

Q Was there during the time that you were there, times 
that you were there there was a particular person designated to 
be the note-taker? 

A Sure. 

Q < Who were the persons designated, and you may well 
answer it was different people on different occasions. 

A It normally was. Ideally, the Executive Secretary 
would perform that function. 

Q Did the Executive Secretary also attend the meetings? 

A Mr. McDaniel tried to go most of the time unless it 
was just a problem with space. We always tried to keep these 
meetings small. If it was really an exclusive meeting, then the 
Deputy National Security Advisor would take notes. If it were 
somewhat broader, the Executive Secretary would. Or, ideally, 
the action officer responsible for that particular area would 



UNfliA^OilT 



859 



UNSlASSffTKElT 



go and take notes. He was usually the most conversant and took 
the best notes. 

Q .\nd when you referred to "if it was an exclusive 
meeting and the Deputy National Security Advisor was taking 
notes," are you referring to yourself? 

A No. Once again, I am referring to -- I am referring 
to Fortier, Keel, or Poindexter. 

Q Okay. So, after the period of time where Fortier 
dropped out, no longer is actively involved — 

A Then it would have been, during the interim period it 
would have been Rod McDaniel and then Al Keel came in September 
of "86. 

Q Okay. Did Admiral Poindexter take notes? 

A As Deputy? 

Q Right. 

A I am sure he did. I can't recall being at meetings 
when he was there as note-taker. 

Q Okay. 

A Normally, the action officer took notes. 

Q By "action officer," you mean the lower level officer? 

A The staff officer, right, whose meeting was his area 
of responsibility. 

Q Was there a routine manner of dealing with those notes 
after the meeting? Were they taken back by the officer? 

A Yes, they were. 






860 



UNmsaE^T 



Q And were they filed in any central location or were 
they filed wherever that person filed his materials? 

A In most cases, as I understand, they were typed up 
and sent forward for approval by the National Security Advisor 
and they were either looked at by him or in most instances by 
the Executive Secretary who approved them and sent them back 
for filing, but they were in the system. They could be identifi 
by number. 

Q And they would have been put into this chronology or 
whatever it was? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you participate in the preparation of the Presi- 
dent's daily briefing book? 

A No. 

Q No? 

A No. Well, I would often participate in adding items 
to it. The make-up of the book is done by the intelligence 
analyzers. 

Q Do you know what happens to the book after the 
President is done with it? 

A Yes. 

Q What happens to it? 

A It is sent back to our office where it is looked at 
either by me or the National Security Advisor and then it is 
sent downstairs to the Executive Secretary who also looks at it 



iiWa>AS£iW»r 



861 



URClASflfffiiT 



and then it is sent to the Situation Room where it is dis- 
assembled . 

Q And the various parts are returned to the agency 
that prepared it? 

I should have asked the question this way: What did 
you mean by "disassembled"? 

A That is correct. The information items are taken 
back out and sent back to the staff officer that prepared them 
and the intelligence documents are taken out and I believe they 
are filed in the White House because they have the Presidential 
initial on them. If not, they are sent back to the agencies. 

Q Did the President on occasion, to your knowledge, 
write notes on the side asking about things? 

A Sometimes he would. 

Q What is this about? 

A Yes. 

Q Is there someone responsible for responding to those 
questions? 

A Yes, sure. We would immediately take them and staff 
them to the respective staff officer to prepare a memorandum 
from the National Security Advisor back to the President 
answering the question. 

Q And those notes would have been retained, those notes, 
I mean the President's marginal notes? 

A Yes, those would normally become a tab in the memo 



**!.- 



'P6fcASilFJigT 



862 



iJM)i§§fr^T 



going back to the President answering his question. 

Q Was there a particular area of legal expertise that 
you had when you were at the National Security Council or when 
you had the legal job at the NSC? 

A No, I would have to say I would be known as a house 
counsel, or general counsel. The NSC staff is comprised of 
about 40 to 50 professionals and another 100-plus support 
personnel and they are a quasi-agency for a lot of persons. We 
are subject to the Freedom of Information Act. We have normal 
agency obligations as far as budget and personnel matters go, 
so that I would spend some of my time just administering to the 
agency in its agency capacity. 

My external responsibilities, I participated in the 
interaction process. My counterparts were mostly the general 
counsel of the area agencies or the national security community 
and the issues there were very diverse, ranged all the way from 
intelligence-related matters to international law to defense 
law and normal legal issues that come up to the President for 
decision making. 

Q I had one or two more structure type questions that I 
wanted to get to. Did Admiral Poindexter have regular meetings 
of his executive staff? 

A Oh, yes, every day. 

Q Were you part of those staff meetings? 

A Yes. 



iw/^M&miftT 



863 



UNCOtSSff^EBET 



Q Did Colonel North attend those staff meetings? 

A He did. He was there for most of the morning staff 
meetings every day at 7:30 throughout Admiral Poindexter's 
tenure, also during McFarlane's and now during Carlucci's, there 
is a 7:30 office director staff meeting. 

Q How many people attend that under Admiral Poindexter? 

A It always averaged around 20, between 20 and 25. 

Q How long did they last? 

A From 7:30 to 8:00. 

Q And did 

A Four days a week. 

Q Did Mr. McFarlane similarly have such staff meetings? 

A Yes. They were started by Judge Clark in August of 
1983 and they have been going ever since. 

Q Same substantial group of 20 or so? 

A That is correct. 

Q At what level, the director lev/^l and above attended? 

A Well, one representative from each directorate. That 
is the standard. Ideally, the senior director would be there. 
If he or she can't make it, they would send their representative 

Q Did Colonel North nearly always attend? 

A Yes. He was there almost all the time. 

Q He was not the senior person in his directorate 
though, was he? 

A No, he wasn't. He was there because a lot of times 






864 



uNCfiffssms^T 



he was working issues that were of interest to the National 
Security Advisor due to their time sensitivity. His portfolio 
included terrorism, and it was quite often a relevant topic to 
be discussed. There was space for him, so he normally showed 
up. 

Q Again, maybe there is more than one, but who was his 
supervisor throughout this '85, '86 period? 

A His supervisor up until -- I guess until December of 
1985, would have been Don Fortier. 

Q And after that? 

A After that I guess it became Howard Teicher. I am 
not entirely sure. North was in the Political-Military Direc- 
torate. 

Q Right. 

A His area of -- his geographic area of specialty was 
Latin American Affairs, so he always came underneath the 
senior director for Latin American Affairs and that was a 
number of people through the years. 

His other portfolio included terrorism and crisis 
management within the context of terrorism and under that he 
worked, I guess, for Teicher. 



22 Q Would his supervisor frequently attend these meetings 



as well? 

A Yes. 



25 So, on those occasions when Colonel North would be 



865 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



there - 



A There were both, Latin American and Political -Military 
Affairs would have been represented. 

Q Were there notes taken at those meetings? 
A No, not in a systematic way at all. Those were 
really, the purpose, the meeting is to face the issues of the 
day, prepare the National Security Advisor to go meet with the 
senior staff of the White House and the President and get 
guidance and talk to the press and things like that. 

Q Let me get back to some of the legal questions. I had 
asked you about your legal role and you generally outlined the 
various areas that you covered. 

In October 1984, the Boland Amendment, October or 
so of '84, the Boland Amendment was passed. 
A Yes. 

Q During the time that you were at the National Security 
Council, at the NSC. were there any formal memoranda or any 
formal responses written advising members of the National 
Security Council about the Boland Amendment, whether it applied 
to them, various aspects of the Boland Amendment? 

A We had some discussion on the Boland Amendment, I 
know, in 1985. In '84, I don't recall specifically any memos 
being written for the benefit of the staff, although each time 
there would be a passage of a legislative bill, regardless of 
whether it involved Latin America or any part of the world. 



UIK^Illr 



866 



uwas^jRBET 



normally, these were brought up in the morning staff meetings 
by any number of staff members concerned about their meaning. 
Of course, the Boland Amendment affected one of the 
major policy initiatives of the administration, so it was 
frequently discussed. 

Q Was the effect of the Boland Amendment on the National 
Security Council ever discussed? 

A Yes, I believe it was. 

Q Do you recall a specific time when it was discussed? 

A Well, I believe it was discussed during the summer of 
1985, when we were responding to a number of Congressional 
inquiries concerning the activities of North and perhaps others, 
other NSC staff members dealing with Contra-related activities. 

Q Were you involved in the responses to the Congressionap. 
inquiries? 

A Yes, I was. I was involved in that I was aware of 
the fact that we did a search of documents which might have a 
bearing on the Congressional concern. 

Q As I recall, there was a spot of activity in the 
summer of '85 and then another spot or burst in the summer of 
'86. Is that consistent with your — 

A Congressional activity? 

Q Yes, Congressional inquiry about Oliver North. 

A That is what I recall. 

Q Were you involved in both phases in '85 and '86? 



UMOiASSlEjEjL 

w'V'SeukEt 



867 



A I was involved primarily in '85. That was one uhen 
which Mr. McFarlane actually signed a number of letters to the 
committees and he also met with the leadership of some of the 
committees . 

Q Right. 

Under Mr. McFarlane, were you the principal person 
responsible for responding to these inquiries? 

A Well, it was like all issues that come to the NSC, 
we have a system by which we use these directorates with over- 
lapping responsibilities so if a letter came in from Congress it 
would have been assigned for primary action either to our Office 
of Legislative Affairs or to our regional office and in this 
case it would be the Latin American Affairs to draft the 
response' or to do an appropriate memo for McFarlane back to 
Congress. 

I would have been down for either concurrence in that 
response or for information, I can't recall which it was now. 
At any rate, I do recall seeing the letter. I am aware of a 
search and I know a number of documents were turned up which 
were relevant to North's activity, all of which were presented 
to the National Security Advisor. 

Q Let me focus just on the summer of '85. 

A Okay. 

Q First, in response to the Congressional inquiries, and 
I guess Chairman Hamilton was among the people who was bombard 
ing the NSC with If Jt^rs, ii^ tesDOiis^ t1 A,^^ Congressional 



W^AIiilW< 



868 



uiteui^SiiiT 



inquiries in the summer of '85, did you conduct an investiga- 
tion into the activities of Colonel North with relation to his 
contacts with the Contras? 

A Well, what we did was to search within our files for 
all relevant documents dealing with that matter. We then, I 
believe, talked to North as well as the rest of the members of 
his, of the Latin American Directorate to find out the scope of 
their activities and we then -- I recall them giving the 
documents , and I believe there were 15 or 20 which would have 
been relevant to activities as well as the proposed draft 
response back to Congress, to McFarlane who then took that 
under advisement and then, I can't recall the sequence, but he 
then either met with the members or signed the letter or did 
both during that time. I recall another letter coming back with 
more questions which were then answered. 

Q Right. Do you remember what kinds of documents you 
turned up in the search? 

A They were all either System 2 or System 4. I can 
recall specifically a couple of innocuous ones dealing with the 
visit of Cruz, Calero, and so forth to meet with the President 

I really can't recall the content of any of them, 
but 

Q I take it though that nothing in the documents that 
you saw alerted you -- let me not use the word "alerted" -- 
caused vou to conclude that Colonel North's involvement with 



«NfiLftS$4E^» 



UNDDiSSffl^T 



the Contras was excessive? 

A No. I recall talking to North in my office and he 
said that it was true that he was, he had made trips down there 
and that he was familiar with the leadership of the Contra 
movement, that he and the other members of the Latin American 
Directorate either accompanied Kissinger or other people to the 
area, that they considered that to be part of their duties to 
maintain liaison, gather information, that sort of thing. 

Q Okay. 

A On the fund-raising side, I asked him specifically 
what his involvement was and he told me he did give a lot cf 
speeches to various groups, either at the request of our Office 
of Public Liaison at the White House or to civic groups, he 
would show slides and things like that and explain what the 
plight of either the Contras or the Miskito Indians was. 

Q Did he tell you whether he had been involved in 
providing military equipment to 

A As I recall, that was the other thrust of the 
Congressional interest, tactical military advice. 

Q Yes. Right. 

A I can't recall what his specific response was, but he 
assured me that he was not involved in the technical side of 
things. He was aware of the status of the military mission. 

Q By that you mean he was aware of the status of the 
battles down in Nicaragua? 



JjlifiUI.%£inniT 



870 



Otttti^tBBr 



A Well, no, just overall numbers and things like that, 
how many Contras, military individuals there were, and, you know 

recall his having any specific combat-related activities. 

Q Did you, in the course of preparing this response, did 
you search Mr. North's own office, his personal office? 

A No, I did not. I relied on a normal system search 
and that was performed under the auspices of our Directorate of 
Information Policy, Brenda Reger. 

Q Do you know whether there was a conscious decision not 
to search his office? 

A I am not aware of any decision not to. 

Q Do you recall anything else that was done to prepare 
the response to Congress for the inquiries that took place in 
the summer of '85? 

A No. It was primarily handled under the direct super- 
vision of Mr. McFarlane who was very interested in the whole 
matter because of the Congressional interest, because of the 
fact that North had been subject to some scrutiny and harassment 
that had come to McFarlane 's attention. McFarlane looked into 
it personally. 

Q Did Colonel North ever consult you about aspects of 
the Boland Amendment? 

A I can't recall his having done so specifically. As I 
was saying earlier, the minute there would be a modification to 



yft^pfla Sjfin&r 



871 



UNttlBSEIIBET 



the Amendment or to the change in the status as to what the 
government could or could not do, that was being looked at. 
None of these things were done in a vacuum. They were all the 
result of a carefully, very extensively lobbied effort on the 
part of the administration and then they were passed the very 
next day at the staff meeting. Either Department of State, CIA 
or Defense would be coming forward with a position memo on 
pieces of paper as to what people could or could not do. So, 
people generally knew immediately what the extent of their 
limitations were. 

Q Okay. 

You don't remember having a specific conversation 
with Colonel North where he came to you and asked whether 
specific things were permissible? 

A No, I don't remember anything like that . 

Q Did you have conversations with Mr. McFarlane about 
specific applications of the Boland Amendment, if you recall? 

A I can't recall. I do recall when I presented him with 
documents which we had retrieved from the system I also presented 
him with a copy of the existing legislation, whatever it was 
at the time, and I believe we had a discussion on whether that 
would apply to North. 

As I recall, there was at the time some question as 
to whether or not that would apply to members of the NSC and 
I think McFarlane's solution, which I agreed with, was that, 



"HmSStfifeftiT 



872 



UROEASSfF^ 



whether it was intended to or not, we would consider that it 
applied to members of the NSC. I think we pointed out that 
since North was a military officer it should apply to him any- 
way. Just because he was on detail to the White House, that 
wouldn't remove him from that restriction. It was both DOD and 
CIA -- perhaps I am thinking of the humanitarian aid. 

Q No. I think you are right. I think it refers to 
the DOD, CIA, or any intelligence agency. 

A Yes. I believe we even put that in the letter or at 
least made that representation to the members that whether it 
applied or not, we considered it to apply. I really haven't 
seen that file for a long time. 

Q Other than that occasion where you discussed it with 
Mr. McFarlane in preparation for the response to the letter, 
do you recall discussions with him about the Boland Amendment 
and how that would apply to the NSC? 

A To the NSC. 

Q Yes, to the NSC or restrictions the Boland Amendment 
might place on NSC staff activities? 

A No, I don't recall any discussions. 

Q How about Admiral Poindexter? 

A No. Normally, the National Security Advisor, his 
position or his role was to find out what he could do to help 
persuade Members of Congress to change the legislation, but 
once it was passed and that was the law, that would be the end 



.^./.ijj^.i _ 



JiNftiil.^iStHai'T 



873 

UHOASQSStT 



of his involvement. 

Q As part of your role as legal advisor, were you also 
aware and involved in Congressional notification provisions 
under the military sales statutes? 

A Not usually, no. Those were done either by Department 
of Defense or Department of State. 

Q So, you don't think that you were involved in those? 

A No, no, I know I was not involved. 

Q In August, late August and early September of 1985, it 
has now been reported and generally accepted as true, that Israel 
sent various TOW missiles to Iran. Were you aware that that 
was occurring at the time? 

A No. 

Q When is the first that you heard about the August, 
late August or early September missile transfers, as best you 
recall? 

A Some time in November of '86 when it was all being 
discussed. 

Q I am going to go ahead and ask you for each of the 
subsequent ones just so the record is clear, but I anticipate 
your response is going to be the same. 

A Sure. 

Q It was also reported a transfer was made from Israel 
to Iran of HAWK missiles in November of 1985. I can't remember 
the exact date, 24th or something. 



X,!^*?' 



(ieM§g(Ei^ 



874 



UNOtASStEEfiT 



A I think it was the 18th. 

Q 18th, might have been. 

A 18 missiles. 

Q It may have been on the 22nd or 23rd or 24th, when is 
the first you learned that that was taking place? 

A Same, in mid-November, '86. 

Q And were you aware that in February of '86 there was 
a transfer of a thousand TOWs or so from the United States to 
Iran? 

A No. 

Q And were you aware that McFarlane was -- took a trip 
in late May '86? Were you aware at the time the trip took place 
and McFarlane took a trip? 

A Yes. 

Q Were you aware that as part of that he was transport- 
ing HAWK spare parts to Iran? 

A No. 

Q Let me ask that question more generally. Were you 
aware that that was, that he was transporting military goods of 
any kind? 

A No. 

Q When is it that you first learnedabout McFarlane 's 
trip to Iran in late May of '86? 

A Shortly before he went. 

Q Let me back way up and come back to that. 



\ m*^wm^ 



875 

l^MCiEASStfJliT 



On January 17, 1986, there was a finding signed by 
the President regarding Iran and it permitted various activities 
and permitted delayed notification of the finding. When is it 
that you were first aware that that finding was signed by the 
President? 

A The first time I physically saw the finding was the 
following Monday which would have been the 20th of January? 
Yes, I think he signed it on the 17th. 

Q Were you involved in the drafting of the finding? 
A No. 

Q Monday is the 20th? 
A Monday, the 20th of January, yes. 

Q Let me ask you a general question. Were you consulted 
with respect to the signing of the finding? 

A No. Let me state very specifically my recollection 
and I want to do this because I have been so involved in the 
chronology and in discussion of it during November that it is 
hard for me also to distinguish from what 1 learned after the 
fact. 

Q Okay . 

A I can recall very vividly on Thursday night, the 16th 
of January that I was called by Admiral Poindexter on the inter 
com to quickly research the status of the current arms embargo 
to Iran and I did that primarily by looking up to see whether 
or not the Carter Executive Orders were still in effect. 



Ulpylift^^Wlj^ip^ 



876 



uttcfflsaEXfiT 



And I also, I believe, had a conversation with Arnie 
Rayfall over at the Department of State who was involved in 
Middle Eastern affairs, just to confirm the fact that the Carter 
EO was still in effect, it had been renewed on an annual basis 
by the President. 

Q And that was in effect? 

A That was my finding. I did go into Admiral Poindexter 
office and in there were Admiral Poindexter, Director Casey, 
Stan Sporkin, General Counsel of CIA, Secretary Weinberger, and 
Attorney General Meese. They had been in there for some time 
and I went in and Mr. Meese met me at the door and said, Is it 
still in effect?" or words to that effect and I said, "Yes, it 
is." 

I believe at the time he asked me also whether or not, 
or else Weinberger asked me whether Iran was on the terrorist 
list. I can't remember my response. Any way, we had a brief 
exchange. I then left. So my time in the room was perhaps five 
minutes at the most. 

At the time I was not aware that my research was 
related to a finding. I then saw -- that answers your general 
question. 

Q Right. 

A I then, on the 20th of January, was given the finding 
I went down to the Situation Room at the White House and I 
showed it to three individuals from CIA. 



m^APfiP^ 



877 



wmm 



Q Do you recall who you showed it to? 

A Yes, I do. It was^'^^BBC^eorge, I believe he was the 
DDO,^^^^|^^H who I believe was the Middle Eastern expert, 
and to Stan Sporkin, also, who came down. 

Q Do you know the reason that you showed it to them? 

A I suspect it was so that they could see that the 
President had in fact signed it and they could then go execute. 

Q Did you have custody of it? 

A I had it during the time I took it and showed it to 
them and I returned it to Admiral Poindexter. 

Q And immediately prior to showing it to them you 
obtained it from Admiral Poindexter? 

A Yes. 

Q And showed it to them and returned it to Admiral 
Poindexter? 

A Yes. '" 

Q Did you have any discussion with them at the time you 
showed it to them? 

A The only discussion is ««■» George asked about 
reporting and Stan Sporkin pointed out to him the clause which 
said the President directed that there would be no immediate 
reporting. 

Q Do you recall any discussion at that time about how 
long that would be, how long that time would be? 

A No, I don't. There really wasn't, that question 



rHNiiLiimiHULlI ■ 



878 



really wasn't asked for how long. It was just, the big operati 
question of concern at the time was this item that required 
immediate reporting. 

Q Did you know that a finding had been signed on 
January 8, signed dated January 8? 

A Not at the time, no. 

Q Did you learn that in mid-November '86? 

A Yes. 

Q I think you answered this, but as of the time that 
you were called in and given this request to do some research on 
the evening of January 16th, did you know the reason that you 
were being asked to do the research? 

A No. 

Q Did you have any conversations with Admiral Poindexter 
after January 17 or after about the reporting requirement? 

A Yes, there was one conversation, I think it was, I 
believe it was the night of the 20th. 

Q Would this have been before or after you showed 

A After. I showed it to them at 3:00 in the afternoon 
and it would have been -- I believe that was a holiday, I 
believe that was the first Martin Luther King holiday. But I 
seem to recall that night talking to the Admiral about the 
philosophy of using the National Security Act to have the 
President direct an action such as this. One aspect of the 
finding, I believe, called for third parties or third countries. 



i^m^SSIHiEI'rp 



879 



Q I think both. 

A Yes. And we talked about the pros and cons of having 
the third country or the third party being an adversary as 
opposed to a friend of the United States. I said it is ironic 
that we always end up dealing with our adversaries when we 
could just as easily or just use the same devices or mechanisms 
to deal with our friends. In other words, we could deal with 
our friends in a covert manner if we wanted to instead of 
always with our adversaries. 

And I think the thrust of that was in the case like 
this if we are going to deal with Iran, why not deal with 
Israel instead of with Iran and I think his point was that the 
third party was sufficiently vague so that it was not problemati 

Q Let me phrase it this way: One of the differences 
between the January 6th finding and the January 17th finding 
was the addition of the words "or third parties," as I recall. 

A Yes. 

Q Did you have a conversation with him about why that 
was added as opposed to just dealing with third countries? 

A No, no, not specifically that part of it. I now am 
familiar with where it was handwritten in. It seemed the party 
discussed with him was in the upper section where we talked 
about the capability of dealing with -- perhaps it is not. I 
can't remember any more, whether it appears above that paragraph 
or not on the third countries, but I do recall talking about 



ifilKSAiA^Sill^RMr 



880 



Ultt»A^6i&T 



that at any rate. 

Q From the time of signing of this finding on January 
17 of 1986 through mid-November, were you involved at all in 
what has now been called the Iran initiative? 

A No, not really. I was, you know, as it turns out I 
was in and out of discussions in which I would be in parts of 
meetings or parts of discussions dealing with aspects of the 
initiative. It is very hard to be specific. Sometimes it 
would be as simple as North's dropping in the office to report 
on a meeting that he had overseas, sometimes it was to assist 
in a phone conversation dealing with a hostage release. I 
always traveled with the National Security Advisor and the 
President, so a lot of times these ells would come in the 
middle of the night, especially if they pertained to a hostage 
release. So, I inevitably got involved with the logistics side 
of it, sometimes without being aware of what it was. 

Q Was this initiative discussed in the morning staff 
meetings? 

A No. 

Q It was not? 

A No. 

Q Did you have access tol 



I had access. I could have access to it, 
I guess I phrased it wrong. 

WCtflgBCRBT 



881 



UtiCtASSK?EBT 



49 



A I guess it did, yes. 

Q Did you --- 

A No, it was never addressed to me. It was usually 
eyes only to the Admiral. 

Q you were reading^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

^^^^Hwith respect to the initiative? 

A No. 

Q From the period of January '86 to mid-November '86, 
did you hear from anyone at any time about a proposed or actual 
diversion of proceeds from the sale? 

A No, absolutely not. 

Q North never told you that he was proposing a diversion 

A No. 

Q And to avoid a loaded word, I guess I should say, a 
transfer of the part of the sales price to the Contras? 

A No, I was never aware of any of that. 

Q Okay. 

Do you recall ever being asked the following question 
this is in the fall of "85 or early '86 -- I suppose it would 
have come to you in a hypothetical, but I will give it to you 
with countries inserted -- whether if the United States had 
sold weapons directly to Israel knowing that they were going to 
be transferred to Iran, whether that would have required some 
reporting requirement to the United States Congress? 

A I was never asked that question. 



ii^^i^iT 



882 



UHQ^l^SgiU^T 



Q You were not? 

A No. 

Q I can't remember if I asked you about whether or not 
-- I expect the answer is no -- whether or not you were aware 
that in December of '85 the CIA had indicated their view that 
there was a necessity for a finding to cover the November '85 
activities? 

A Right. I was never involved with that either. 

Q Were you ever consulted prior to again mid-November 
'86, after the signing of the finding, about how long the White 
House could delay notification under the January 17, 1986 find- 
ing? 

A No, I was not, not consulted under that. 

Q In the summer of 1986, as I have been told by our 
sources, I think that you actually appeared before Congress, 
before HPSCI to testify; is that correct? 

A Yes. It was a briefing, I believe. 

Mr. Raul. I believe it was an interview, not 

Mr. Eggleston. I withdraw the word "testify." A briefing 
of some nature. 

The Witness. I provided a briefing to several Members of 
the Committee. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q It was not a testimony under oath, is that correct? 

A No. that is correct. 



IfNfiJiAftSiHEdT 



883 



51 

Q Do you recall whether it was transcribed? 

A I don't think it was, no. No, I appeared up there 
with Ron Sable? 

Q Was that again with reference to questions about 
Colonel North? 

A No. 

Q What was the purpose of that? 

A It had nothing to do with North. It had to do with 
the alleged disinformation campaign that was directed against, 
appearing in the press at the time and Chairman Hamilton wanted 
to find out some of the background as to how the thing came abou 
so I went up and explained it to them. 

Q So you never appeared before Chairman Hamilton or 
before the House Permanent Select Committee personally with 
respect to Oliver North? 

A No. I don't think I did. I may have accompanied 
McFarlane up here, up there when he had his meeting with him 
in '85. I really can't recall that. They all came to the White 
House in '86. They met with North and I was not there. 

Q Were you involved -- was that again in the summer of 
'86? 

A Yes. That was in response to the resolution. 

Q Resolution of inquiry? 

A Yes. 

Q And were you involved in the preparation of the 



I Inl^fcnwv H* thIhti 



884 



UHCIA^CMt 



response to that resolution of inquiry? 

A Yes. We put together a book of all documents and 
other items pertaining to North's activities, I should say all 
official records and documents, and we made North available to 
the committee. He met, in fact, with the Chairman and other 
members in the White House Situation Room. I was not there at 
the time. I was on the West Coast with the President, but the 
Deputy Legal Advisor, Robert Pearson, attended that meeting on 
my behalf and also our legislative people were there and North 
himself was made available for any questions they might have. 

Q Do you recall what kind of investigation was done to 
prepare for that meeting? I take it the systems were checked 
again? 

A Yes. 

Q For the relevant files? 

A We checked the systems, got out the previous corres- 
pondence and this time it was Poindexter who was in charge and 
he talked to North. 

Q i How do you check the systems? 

A You do a computer search, actually feed in key words. 

Q Is your system, I guess what you call full text, or is 
it by document title? 

A It is document title, key words basically. 

Q Key words in the titles? You don't have the full text 
of all the materials? 



"JSyp^ 



mmsxmr 



885 



SVRAil^ISiESr 



A That is true. However, if you feed in the word 
"Nicaragua" or "North" and "Contra" and two or three other items 
then it spits out every possible title that any of those would 
fall under. 

Q So, in preparation for the summer of '86 visit by 
Members of HPSCI , you conducted again a systems search? 

A Yes. 

Q I take it again you did not search Mr. North's, 
Colonel North's office? 

A No. 

Q Did you interview Colonel North again? 

A I can't recall personally interviewing him. I know 
that when the resolution was passed it may have been discussed 
at a staff meeting or at a smaller meeting attended by our 
legislative people and Admiral Poindexter and North. And we 
discussed how we were going to deal with the resolution. I 
think it was referred to three committees. We wanted to be as 
responsive as we could because I believe it was passed on the 
eve of the Contra vote up here in either April or May, and we 
were eager to be as responsive as we could. The big question 
was, since we did not have McFarlane there who had taken it on 
in earlier years to meet with the committees, the question was 
would we make North available, which is what they always wanted 
to do, was to talk to North directly. And we made a decision 
that we would. 



-•j»^i^" 



'^'VIMSfifSBT 



886 



UltCUSlSif^T 



Q Who attended that meeting? 

A That would have been the discussion between our 
legislative director, Ron Sable, and probably Bob Pearson, the 
deputy counsel, and Admiral Poindexter. 

Q Would that have included North as well? 

A Probably. 

Q Do you recall any discussion about what questions he 
would likely be asked by the Members of Congress? 

A Well, we expected what the resolution contained would 
certainly be asked. Plus, we expected to go much wider than 
that. I don't think we had any conditions put on it at all. I 
believe there was also a memo prepared by Ron Sable to Admiral 
Poindexter recommending that he contact Chairman Hamilton and 
make North available or something to that effect. I think that 
is what eventually transpired. 

As in all these cases, we have to work out how we are 
going to best make people that are potentially subject to 
executive privilege available to Congress. 

Q I understand. 

A That seemed like a good compromise, just to open it 
up to questions. 

Q Do you recall whether there was a conscious discussion 
not to search his office, Mr. North's office, in response to 
the resolution of inquiry? 

A No. I don't. I don't recall that. Normally, searchink 



l^^^Ml&E 



887 



yite^^fiiiiT 



the office has almost a connotation of a criminal aspect to it 
or something. We would have to really have a greater cause to 
go over and do something like that. Having him appear before 
the National Security Advisor and explain his actions which he 
did in two subsequent years seemed to be sufficient. 

Mr. Raul. If I could interject for a second for clarifi- 
cation, Commander, do you know whether anyone might have asked 
North to search his office or whether anyone else searched his 
office? 

The Witness. No, I don't. You know, the way our systems 
are -- our file systems are kept, any copies of documents that 
North would have would be either entirely out of the system 
which I guess is what you are getting at, or we would have the 
record copies of them anyway. So, if you are talking about his 
working papers or anything that might be incriminating that he 
would have tucked in his briefcase or in his desk, no, we 
never did that sort of thing. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q I want to ask you whether you, during the course of 
'85 or '86, had meetings or conversations with some disparate 
group of people. I am asking whether or not you had conversa- 
tions or meetings with each one. I am not asking whether you 
had meetings with all of these people at one time. 
Did you ever meet with Adnan Khashoggi? 



. ^RTOr^^'^J^^TWlfr 



888 

UNOASSGIilT 



Q Or speak with him? 

A Never. 

Q How about Mr. Ghorbanifar? 

A No. 

Q Mr. Schwimmer? 

A No. 

Q Mr. Nimrodi? 

A No. 

Q Nir? 

A Yes. 

Q Let me get back to him. Mr. Ledeen? 

A Yes. Ledeen, you said? 

Q Yes, Michael Ledeen. 

A Yes. 

Q Tiny Rowland? 

A No. 

Q When do you recall having a meeting with Mr. Nir? 

A I met Mr. Nir. 

Q Okay. 

A That would have been early January of '86. I believe 

he came to the White House to meet with Admiral Poindexter and 

he came to my office first and we chatted for a few minutes. 

Q Do you recall the subject matter of your conversation 
with him? 

A No. It was just amenities. 



! 24IIHiftSflHH* i?T 



yflOtlVSfitB^ 



Q Did you attend the meeting that he then had with 
Admiral Poindexter? 
A No. 

Q Did Admiral Poindexter tell you afterwards what 
the meetings was about? 
A No. 

Q And any other times that you met with Mr. Nir that 
you recall? 

A No. That was the only time I ever saw him. 
Q How about Michael Ledeen? 

A Well, I used to see Mike Ledeen occasionally, 
expecially when McFarlane was the National Security Advisor. 
He would come around on Saturdays to have meetings with 
McFarlane and he and I would chat. It happened several times, 
but that was the extent of it. I was involved in his suitabilitjy 
to be a consultant to the NSC early on. He has some lingering 
problems, I believe, with the Italians as far as his background 
goes. 

Q I seem to recall that in the newspaper. 
A Yes, I had to look into that just to ascertain 
whether or not he would be acceptable from a security point 
of view to get a clearance and I also confereed with the deputy 
counsel to the President, Dick Houser, as to whether or not he 
should be given a White House pass. 

Q And I take it that the conclusion was made that he 



OTkibnwSWtte'P 



890 



UNO^SHiSBStT 



was not a security risk? 

A That is correct. 

Q He was a consultant to the National Security Council 
for terrorism-related issues? 

A That is right. 

Q Did you know the reason he was meeting with Mr. 
McFarlane in 1985? 

A No, I don't. I didn't at the time. 

Q What you know now is from reading the Tower Commission 

A I suspect he was in there talking about various 
initiatives. He was also a friend of McFarlane's, personal 
friend. 

Q In the fall of 1986, around the time of October 4 or 
5 of 1986, a plane in which a nan by the name of Hasenfus was 
riding was shot down in Nicaragua. Thereafter, if you recall, 
there was a substantial trial and all sorts of public materials 
Around this time it is my understanding that the Department of 
Justice, and the principal investigative agency was the United 
States Customs Service, began an investigation or I should say 
was involved in an investigation into a commercial cargo 
company called Southern Air Transport. 

Were you aware in the fall of 1986, October of '86, 
that such an investigation was on-going? 

A I don't think I was, no. 

Q Let me just ask you a few specific questions, although 



jHmftft«fcP 



891 



UNBl)ftSSfl(Sfl{^T 



I suppose now I know what your answer will be. There are some 
documents which suggest that members of the NSC staff may have 
contacted the FBI about slowing up that investigation into 
Southern Air Transport. Were you aware of that at that time? 

A No. 

Q Did you have any involvement in that at the time, 
assuming that what I have told you is true? 

A No, I did not. 

Q Did you indicate to me that you did not know Admiral 
Poindexter prior to the time that you began working at the NSC? 

A That is right. I met him in June of 1983. 

Q Did you become social friends with Admiral Poindexter? 
Ever see him out of work? 

A No. I have never even been to his house and I have 
never been to any non-NSC related events with him, social events 
although I would describe myself as being certainly close to him 
When we were on the road we always ate and traveled together, 
so I have had several meals with him in a social environment 
while on the road. 

Q And where did you travel with him frequently ? 

A Yes. Everywhere he went, I traveled with him, so I 
have been, I have probably spent five or six weeks traveling 
with him. 

Q So, you were part of the group of people who always 
traveled? 



UNfibO^SIfJ^ 



892 



UNO^SmEBET 



A Yes. 

Q Did you become close to Mr. McFarlane? 

A Yes. I would probably say I became closer to Admiral 
Poindexter than I did to Mr. McFarlane, but I similarly traveled 
extensively with Mr. McFarlane, also for probably six or seven 
weeks out of the year. 

Q Did you become social friends with Mr. McFarlane? 

A Similar to my relationship with Admiral Poindexter, 
it was a professional one more than a social one. 

Q How about Colonel North? 

A No. All of us on the NSC staff have a colleagial 
relationship to each other, but I never socialized with North 
either other than at NSC, White House events. 

Q Did you travel with Colonel North? 

A I did. I went to Central America with him twice. 

Q Did you go to Central America with Colonel North at 
times when Admiral Poindexter or Mr. McFarlane were not present? 

A No. 

Q So, you only went on two occasions? 

A I was only there because the National Security 
Advisors were there. 

Q Those were two trips? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you remember when those were? 

A Sure. The first one with McFarlane was mid- January 
of '85. 



iUi£JLflS»»Cd. 



893 



yfnaHSSHBIttlT 



Q Where did you go? 

A Well, we went to five countries in two days. We went 
to Panama, and then -- actually, our first stop was Guatemala 
n&Jd we spent the night in Panama, and the next day we went to 
El Salvadore, and spent that night in Honduras, and then went 
to Costa Rica and went home. 

A year later in December of '85 -- yes, December '85 
around the 18th or so I went to the same five countries with 
Poindexter in a little shorter time. 

Q And was Colonel North on both of those trips? 

A Yes. 

Q You have indicated that in the summer of '85, or '86, 
you did some investigation into Colonel North's activities with 
respect to the Contras in response to Congressional inquiries. 

A Yes. 

Q Did you have any other -- did you have any knowledge 
apart from that about his involvement with the activities 
relating to the Contras? 

A Well, I knew he was very much in favor of helping out 
the cause, the Contra cause. When the Congress passed the 
Humanitarian Assistance money, the $27 million, there was some 
question as to whether or not that particular program could not 
be administered out of the White House, rather the National 
Security Council and North consulted me as to whether that 
might be do-able. I recall joining in with the opinion of my 



counterparts from, I believe, CIA and State in agreeing that it 
was not a good idea at all that it be administered from the 
White House. And the Nicaraguan Assistance Office, whatever it 
was called, ended up being run out of the State Department. So 
I was aware that North was very involved. I know he sat on the 
inter-agency group of individuals interested in advancing the 
Administration position in Central America and he was an active 
member of that. 

Q Prior to the summer of -- prior to November of 1986, 
had you heard of a company called Lake Resources? 

A No. 

Q Or Udall? 

A No. 

Q I will go down the list. Cf Toyco? 

A No. 

Q Or Hyde Park? 

A No. 

Had you heard of a company callec 



A No. 

Q Did you during 1985 or -- '84, '85, or '86, I think 
I asked you this, but in a slightly different way. I think I 
asked during the period of time you were in the Office of the 
Secretary for Legislative Affairs, but did you in '84 through 
'86 meet Richard Secord? 



ii«»i^(!ig¥ 



895 



UlUtbftSmfJI&lT 



65 



A I met Secord once at the White House and that must 
have also been in January of '86, but I just can't recall when 
it was. He came by and it may have been right around the time 
that the finding was actually signed and I showed it to the 
CIA representatives, I believe I saw Secord. He came to the 
White House. 

Q Do you know who he had come to the White House to see' 

A I suspect -- I believe it was with Ollie North. 

Q He was with North? 

A Yes. 

Q Had you ever met him before that time? 

A No, I never met him before. 

Q Did you have a conversation with him then? 

A Once again, I think we just exchanged amenities. I 
can't recall whether it -- I believe we sat down with Admiral 
Poindexter in January of '86. There may have been a meeting 
in Poindexter 's office or North brought him up to the office 
area and I can't recall any of the other details. But I did 
meet him. 

Q Do you think -- we are not calling for speculation -- 
do you think there may have been a meeting between Secord and 
Poindexter in Poindexter 's office? 

A There might have been, yes. 

Q If there was such a meeting, I take it you don't 
recall the content of the meeting. 



uNCbASfSIilK/ViT 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



896 



64 



A No. 

Q Did you attend the meeting, if there was such a meetin; 

A No. I think I did, that is why I am trying to recall 
more. It may have just been a, you know, a hand-shaking 
situation. You know. Admiral Poindexter in that time was, had 
only been in the office for about a month and he was trying to 
structuralize as much as he could the various initiatives and 
items that we were involved with across the board in arms 
control and every other area. I think he was meeting and hold 
ing a lot of courtesy calls in that time. I think that is why 
Nir was there and I suspect that is why Secord came. 

Q Did you know at that time what Secord 's relationship 
was with the NSC? 

A No. 

Q Did there come a time prior to November '86 when you 
learned anything about Secord 's relationship to the NSC? 

A Well, I seem to recall his name coming up occasionally 
by North through conversations he had with the Admiral. As 
I recall, Secord' s name came up, but I can't recall much else. 

Q Was it in the context of the Iran initiative? 

A Yes. Yes. 

Q Do you recall him ever being mentioned in connection 
with the Contras? 

A No. 

Q Were there any other times other than that one time 



■>'-^*«. 



mtASMPr 



897 



UNCGRSSMBSET 



that you met Secord? 

A That was the only time. 

Q Did you meet Albert Hakim? 

A No. 

Q Again, I asked you about these two, but I think my 

question was confined to the earlier time pre- '83, Robert 
Dutton? 

A Yes. Never met him. 

Q Richard Gadd? 

A No. 

Q How about Tom Clines? 

A No. 

Q Edward DeGaray? 

A No. 

Q Did you ever meet during the period of time that you 
were there Felix Rodriguez? 

A No. 

Q He appears to have the most well-known alias of any- 
one, Max Gomez. 

A No. 

Q Ramon Medina? 

A No. 

Q Or Rafael Quinteros? 

A No. 

Q Never met any of them? 



f^f 



iiNeiASSIEiiiT 



898 



ui|«)#M!^ 



66 



A Not to my knowledge, unless I was in a group with 
them in Central America. 

Q But to your knowledge you have not met him? 

A No. 

Q Do you recall Ollie North talking about any of them 
other than Richard Secord? 

A No. 

Q Did you ever hear North refer to Secord as under a 
different name, a name Copp? 

A Yes. In fact at one time I had a list of code names 
by which all these players went under including the President 
and all the major players in the national security community, 
so I was generally aware of some of these names. 

Q And did you know in what context that list had been 
prepared? Do you know the purpose of it? Did you know the 
purpose for the preparation of the list? Did you know it 
related to the Iran initiative? 

A Yes, I believe I did because North was usually, when 
he was traveling he would leave that with me or if we traveled 
he asked me to take it with me so we could communicate with him 
if necessary. 

Q Did you communicate with North when he was off working 
on the Iran initiative? 

A Yes, we would occasionally receive messages or cables 
or very classified phone conversations. 



(JMU4$S(HE0T 



899 



UlK^JfSSRW^ 



Q And I don't want much detail about this, but did 
those messages that you received relate to the operation of the 
Iran initiative, the operational details of the Iran initiative? 

A Yes, it seemed that they had to do with logistics 
matters, the authority to approve, some sort of transaction, 
perhaps a shipment, or they would pertain to the release of a 
hostage. 

Mr. Eggleston. This might be an appropriate time for a 
brief break. 

(Brief recess.) 

Mr. Eggleston. Back on the record. 

BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Let me just ask you a few more questions about Colonel 
North's involvement in the Contra resupply operation. I would 
ask you questions about the time period of November, essentially 
late October to November '86. 

A Okay. 

Q Then I will turn it over to Mr. Van Cleve. 

I just want to ask you now whether you, during the 
course of 1984, '85, '86, met any of the following individuals 
and whether you had contact with any of them, Carl Channell, 
who has a nickname of Spitz, apparently. 

A No. 

Q He has two organizations called the National Endow- 
ment for the Preservation of Liberty and the American Conservativ 



laiPl ASStfiED.. 



900 



UNCOKSfffEBET 



Trust. Did you have any involvement with any of those entities? 

A Never heard of him. 

Q Robert Owen? 

A Never heard of him. 

Q For a period of time he might have been an associate 
of a consultant or something to the NSC, although that is 
uncertain. You don't know him? 

A No. 

Q I must be wrong then about that. 

Did you know a man by the name of Andrew Messing? 

A No. 

Q Dan Kuykendall? 

A No. 

Q Did you know a company by the name of IBC Internationa 
Business Communications? 

A No. 

Q Richard Miller, Frank Gomez? 

A No. 

Q Did you ever speak at any of these civic groups about 
which Colonel North told you? 

A Did I ever speak? 

Q On Contra issues, public speeches on Contra issues? 

A No. 

Q No, do you recall any discussion or were you consulted 
by anyone in '85 or '86 about the issue of soliciting private 



JSMftNbftiPSPflfw^T 



901 



UNeUSffiCBKT 



money in order to support the Contras? 

A I don't remember any discussions. 

Q You don't remember anyone consulting you on that 
issue? 

A No. 

Q Do you remember any discussions in your presence that 
did not result in you being consulted? 

A I don't recall any, no. Most items dealing with that 
regional problem were dealt with in the inter-agency group that 
was set up to study it. 

Q Who was in that inter-agency group? 

A Well, I don't know very many of the players. I do 
know from State, Elliot Abrams, I th:nk, was the chair of it, 
and prior to him, I believe. Otto Rank and some of his people 
were involved. From CIA, I believe it was^^^^^^^^^| but I 
am not positive that he was the only one involved. I don't 
know who the representatives might have been from other agencies 

Q I take it North was from 

A North was an active member and Ray Bur^hardt who was 
the Senior Director of Latin American Affairs may have also been 
involved. But the way we worked, we live and die by the inter- 
agency process, as the Congress does by committee, I guess, and 
we relied on the inter-agency recommendations to advise us of 
the status of situations down there, our relations with Congress 
and what was going on. So, the chairman of that particular 



UNCift&SW^cnb 



ifF 



902 



UNCMsaEagST 



inter-agency group would have gone to his in-house lawyer for 
most of the legal advice. They would not come to me, normally, 

Q So, by "in-house lawyer," you mean the lawyer 
associated with that individual's agency? 

A If it is chaired by State, he would go to the State 
legal advisor. 

Q You don't think this group had its own legal advisor? 

A I doubt it. No, I am not familiar if they did. 

Q Similarly, do you recall ever being consulted about 
the issue of third country solicitations? 

A No. 

Q Similarly, you don't recall being consulted on that 
issue about third country assistance m aid to the Contras? 

A No. 

Mr. Raul. Can we go off the record? 

Mr. Eggleston. Sure. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. Eggleston. Back on the record. 
BY MR. EGGLESTON: 

Q Did you go to the Tokyo Summit? 

A Yes. 

Q And that is because Admiral Poindexter went to the 
Tokyo Summit? 

A Yes. 



iHIQkAiitEiir 



903 



Ull€@lS§f$liT 




Q Let me direct your attention to mid-October of 1986, 
there is an event referred to in the Tower Commission report 
where Charlie Allen, whose name I think is not protected, 
refers to Casey, to Director Casey, tnat he may have had some 
concerns about a diversion. 

A Yes. 

Q Were you aware of that in mid-1986, October '86? Had 
you be advised of that? 

A No. 

Q Had you been consulted on that in any fashion? 

A No. 

Q I believe that that concern resulted in the meeting 
between Gates, Poindexter and Casey. 

A Yes. 

Q And have you read about that in the Tower Commission? 



WfifcBSStHjftT 



904 



UffOIASSIPSBT 



Do you know the event I am talking about? 

A No. I learned about it in November, I think at the 
very end. 

Q During the course in time that you were involved? 

A At the very end of that course, around the 25th 
probably is when Admiral Poindexter told me. 

Q But prior to that time you had not -- you were not 
aware of this concern by Mr. Allen? 

A No. 

Q That there may have been a diversion? 

A No. 

Q Now, there comes a time in early November 1986 when 
at least in a BeraiJt newspaper or magazine, whatever it is 
that has now become famous, certain details were revealed 
about McFarlane's trip. 

A Yes. 

Q Did you become involved in this process shortly 
after that? 

A Yes. 

Q And what was the nature of your -- maybe I will let 
you brief me or go through in your own fashion the process of 
your involvement from early November through late November 1986 

A Well, the first operative event was the release of 
the hostage, Jacobsen^/^ich I believe occured late on Saturday 
night in early November. And I was in Santa Barbara at the 






905 



UWBiSSm 



time with Admiral Poindexter and the President was up at the 
ranch and we were in contact all night long with the Situation 
Room back in Washington where there were some staff members who 
were relaying information to us which they were receiving on 
the ground in Lebanon and from North, wherever he was, both by 
telephone and PROFs notes and secured calls and I was basically 
the point of contact, so I spent virtually the whole night in 
Santa Barbara going back and forth to the communications center 
from my room relaying messages and at the same time talking to 
the other players, Larry Speakes, I can't remember whether Don 
Regan was there or not, I suspect he was, Poindexter, we had a 
number of conference calls all night long and we kept discussing 
whether or not we would get the hostage Jacobsen out and how it 
would happen and so forth. 

I believe now that I think about it Regan had gone 
back to Washington to be on a talk show. At any rate, sometime 
towards morning I believe we got Jacobsen released and then it 
became a question of when and how to announce it. I believe 
Larry Speakes did it that Sunday morning and that prompted 
immediate interest from the press as to how it h appened. 

I recall a lot of questions regarding 
questions regarding Syrian involvement. Regan went on a ta" 
show that day and said, when asked, that the Syrians had very 
little to do with it and then immediately focused the press's 
attention on who else in the Middle East might have been 




UflUHl li^mf^twiPnn 



906 



i;f)§@\§$)^7 




I can't recall whether the newspaper article you referred 
to in the Lebanese aagazine was before or after that, but at 
any rate by either that Sunday night or Monday there was 
tremendous press interest in whether or not the Iranians were 
involved in the release and I believe it was on Monday that the 
Speaker of the Iranian parliament, Rafsanjani, gave a long 
speech in which he divulged several facts involving the 
possibility of U.S. dealings, governmental dealings with Iran. 
He divulged the McFarlane trip that he said occurred in Septem- 
ber and he talked about symbolic items such as the cake and 
the Bible and so forth. 

Ke in the meantime had lef: Santa Barbara and had 
gone to L.A. to campaign. The President gave his last campaign 
appearance that afternoon. I believe on Tuesday we then had 
ample discussion with the experts involved back on our staff 
and decided that the message coming from Iran in the form of 
Rafsanjani's speech and other messages being passed through 
intermediaries back to us were that the official U.S. government 
response to this revelation should be "no comment." That is 
precisely what we tried to do for several days, was to "no 
comment." 

We thought the message from Rafsanjani was intended 
for domestic consumption and that he was putting enough 



m^ 



907 



mFAllfFf^ 



inaccuracies in what he said to cause us to believe that he was 
intending to send us a signal that he knew that we knew that 
what he was saying was not accurate. 

So, we then, the first item we had to comment on was 
whether or not we had still in effect the arms embargo to Iran 
and I recall on Air Force One a statement was drafted up in 
which we said we did in fact still have an arms embargo and 
that we were not in favor of either side winning the Iran-Iraq 
War, or words to that effect, which Larry Speakes went back and 
gave to the press on board Air Force One. 

We then arrived in Washington and for the next 
several days the press interest heightened, Congressional 
interest heightened, and it became obvious that it would be 
necessary to put together a presentation of all this informatior 

At that point from my vantage point this had been, 
the Iranian initiative had been just that, a covert operation 
pursuant to a finding which was carried out primarily by the 
CIA and one for which they had primary logistic responsibility, 
one which the NSC staff, either in the form of North's or 
Teicher or McFarlane was, or Poindexter, was one of obvious 
interest from a policy point of view, but not that much 
different from most of the other initiatives we have around the 
world. 

So, it became quite a normal challenge for us to 
assemble all the facts, put them together in some coherent way 



rai/MT«e.ei RiSflm 



908 



maiiSiitfe 



and to start presenting it to the various groups that were 
asking us, the press, the Congress, et cetera. 

Q Do you recall approximately when it was that you had 
-- you had said a couple days or several days later -- do you 
have a recollection about when it was that you started your 
process of actually putting the chronology together? 

A Well, no, I can't recall precisely. It seems that we 
got pretty much through that week. The election was on Tuesday, 
we then had the rest of that week to more or less discuss the 
initiative conceptually rather than concretely or specifically. 
We just had a number of discussions on, is there an embargo, 
is there not an embargo, could an embargo be circumvented, 
thi