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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 27 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13768 



United States Government Printing Office 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Iran-Contra Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 27 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. - Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987. - Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



lanittfl Starts 3cnate 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 

ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 
Senate Select Cominittee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 
available. 



Sincerely, 




Warren B. Rudman 
Vice Chairman 




III 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON. DC 20515 

(202) 225-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr . Speaker : 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, lOOth Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, lOOth Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified fo^-Yelease to the public. 

Sincerely yours. 




Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudnian, New Hampshire. Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCollum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staffs Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Ken- 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parr> 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
intelligence /Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R Thompson 
Judith M Kcatmg* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Raynor 
Joseph D. 

Small wood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. I son 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cmdy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 

Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 

Senator Cohen 

Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard Cullen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, III 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



*The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 



Majority Staff 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



John W. Niclds. Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Palrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratcliff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Kathcrine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

CiHinscI 
Minority Resean h 

Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Robert W. 
Gen/man 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis, 

III 
Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Traylor 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
G. R. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courter 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Doman 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 27 



Preface XXI 

Thurman, Gen. Maxwell 1 

Trott, Stephen S 75 

Tull, James L 169 

Vessey, John 230 

Walker, William G 289 

Watson, Samuel J., Ill 353 

Weinberger, Caspar 456 

Weld, William 580 

Wickham, John 645 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark) 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez, Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Volume 3 



Armitage, Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Barnett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF. 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagctt. C. Thomas. Jr. 

Clark. Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke. George. 

Clarridge. Dewey R. 

Cline. Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier, George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig R 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford. Susan. 
Crowe, Adm. William J. 
Currier. Kevin W. 
DCM. Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
dcGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC. 



Duemling. Robert W. 
DIA Major. 
Dictel. J. Edwin. 
Dowling. Father Thomas. 
Dutton, Robert C. 
Earl, Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber, Jacob. 
Feldman, Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor, Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A. 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Rudd). 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D. 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus, Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt. Nelson Bunker. 
Ikle. Fred C. 
Jensen. D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward S. 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly. John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Volume 15 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn. John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., 
Ledeen, Michael A, 



Jr. 



Volume 16 



Leiwant, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald, John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



McMahon. John N. 
McMahon. Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese. Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 17 



Volume 18 



XVIIl 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhome A. 
Mulligan, David R 
Nagy, Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., II. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, Jr. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revell, Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson, John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinette, Glenn A. 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Roseman, David. 



XIX 



Rosenblatt, William. 
Rover, Larry. 
Rudd. Glenn A. 
Rudd, Glenn A. 



(See Henry Gaffney). 

Volume 24 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo. Vincent M. 
Sanchez, Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer, Robert L. 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley, Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H.. IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack. T. 
Teicher, Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman, Jacqueline. 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

Tull, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., III. 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (Sec Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses— or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses— could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits— documentary evidence— were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



XXIII 



mussm 



THIS IS A COVER SHEET 



FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 



ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT 
IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

HANDLING. STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED 
DOCUMENT WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE 
ORDER(S), STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS. 



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1 DEPOSITION OF GENERAL MAXWELL R. THURMAN 

2 Friday, June 12, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Committee on Secret 

2 Military Assistance to Iran 

5 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C. 

8 Deposition of GENERAL MAXWELL R. THURMAN, 

9 called as a witness by counsel for the Select Committee, 
at the offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart 

11 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C, commencing at 

12 3:03 p.m., the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL 

13 ANN SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the District of 

14 Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by Stenomask 

15 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her 

16 direction. 
17 



?ci3isified.'r,eleared n.i ieT>gce7 
-■•^rprovltKjnSof £ J. i2?~6 



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1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 JOHN SAXON, ESQ. 

6 Associate Counsel 

7 On behalf of the House Select Conunittee to 

8 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

9 JOSEPH SABA, ESQ. 

10 .ROGER KREUZER 

11 On behalf of the witness: 

12 ROBERT J. WINCHESTER, ESQ. 

13 Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 

14 for Legislative Affairs 

15 COLONEL JOHN WALLACE 
16 



u(^ni;.sL/nv:JUM nM 



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1 




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N T E N T S 




2 










EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 


3 


WITNESS 








SENATE 


HOUSE 


4 


G«n«ral Maxwell R. Thurman 






5 


By Mr. 


Saxon 






4 




6 


By Mr. 


Saba 








9 


7 


By Mr. 


Saxon 






11 




8 


By Mr. 


Saba 








15 


9 


By Mr. 


Saxon 






16 




10 


By Mr. 


Saba 








37 


11 


By Mr. 


Saxon 






38 




12 


By Mr. 


Saba 








49 


13 


By Mr. 


Saxon 






49 




14 


By Mr. 


Saba 








50 


15 


By Mr. 


Saxon 






50 




16 


By Mr. 


Saba 








51 


17 


By Mr. 


Saxon 






52 




18 


By Mr. 


Saba 








64 


19 


By Mr. 


Krauzer 








65 


20 


By Mr. 


Saxon 






71 





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UNWSffi 



1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon, 

3 GENERAL MAXWELL R. THURMAN, 

4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Cominittee and having been duly sworn by the Notary 

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION 

8 BY MR. SAXON: 

9 Q Would you state your name, please, for the 

10 record, sir? 

11 A Maxwell Reid Thurman. 

12 Q What is your profession? 

13 A I am a military officer. 

14 Q What is your rank, sir? 

15 A I am a General. 

16 Q And your current position? 

17 A I am the Vice Chief of the U.S. Army. 

18 Q And did you assume that position on 6/22/83? 

19 A That's correct. 

20 Q And what was your immediate prior assignment? 

21 A I was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 

22 in the U.S. Army. 

23 Q I understand you will be relinquishing this 

24 position shortly. 

25 A That is correct. On the 22nd I will 











1 relinquish the position. I will assume a new command on 

2 the 29th of June. 

3 Q And what command is that, sir? 

4 A Command of the Training and Doctrine Command, 

5 United States Army stationed at Ft. Monroe, Virginia. 

6 Q General Thurman, during the course of this 

7 deposition I will make reference to the fact that we have 

8 spoken earlier and that you might have told us something 

9 in particular, and for the record I have in mind the 

10 interview that Mr. Kreuzer and Bud Albright of the Senate 

11 staff and I conducted with you on April 17, 1987, with 

12 Colonel John Wallace present. 

13 A Very well. 

14 Q Let's begin, if we could, by discussing TOW 

15 missiles and how you got involved in what is Project 

16 SNOWBALL or what became known as Project SNOWBALL. And 

17 if you would, sir, just start from day one, which I 

18 believe was January 18, 1986, and correct me if I'm 

19 wrong, and walk us through that involvement. 

20 A Okay. I will be happy to do that. As the 

21 Vice Chief of Staff of the Army I'm called upon in the 

22 absence of the Chief of Staff to act as the Chief of 

23 Staff, and on the 18th day of January, 1986, the Chief of 

24 Staff was absent from Washington, so I was acting Chief 

25 of Staff. 



IIMPIAOC 




1 Q That is General John wickham? 

2 A That is correct. Now sometime in the morning 

3 of Saturday, 18 January 86, General Colin Powell, who was 

4 at that time the Military Assistant to the Secretary of 

5 Defense, came to see me in my office and he issued me an 

6 instruction, and the essence of that instruction was I 

7 want you to be prepared to ship 1,000 TOW missiles on 

8 short notice and to be prepared to ship another 3,000 to 

9 3,500 TOW missiles subsequent to that. 

10 'I asked him are the TOW missiles to be with 

11 night sights or launching equipment, or just vanilla TOW 

12 missiles, meaning basic TOW missiles. And he indicated 

13 to me at that time only basic TOW missiles, no night 

14 vision devices and no ground launch or any other kind of 

15 launcher devices. 

16 And I said to him, now this Is an order and 

17 you are acting as a relay point for the Secretary of 

18 Defense, or words to that effect, and he said yes, I am. 

19 And I said will there be any paper to follow, because 

20 normally we would get requests like that through a system 
which we call theJUj^mH^mB He 

22 would not be and that I was to treat that as close hold 

23 material. 

24 And then I asked him what would be the time 

25 line, given short notice to ship, and he said anywhere 



umssffi 



1 from 12 to 16 to 72 hours. And I said, I roger your 

2 transmission and he exited the premises. 

3 Q Sir, did he tell you from whom he received 

4 this order? 

5 A He did not. 

6 Q Was there any mention at that time of the 

7 destination of the CIA as the receiving agency? 

8 A There was not, to my knowledge. 

9 Q Was there mention at that time of the ultimate 

10 destination of Iran? 

11 A Absolutely not. 

12 Q Was there any mention of Israel as an 

13 intermediary? 

14 A Absolutely not. 

15 Q Was there any mention at that time of this 

16 requirement being done pursuant to a Presidential 

17 Finding? 

18 A He did not state that, but the key point there 

19 is at that instant he issued me a "be prepared" order, so 

20 I didn't know what would subsequently come about that. 

21 And so I understand a be-prepared as opposed to a 

22 shipment order. A shipment order comes later in the 

23 sequence of events, but at that particular instant he did 
2 4 not indicate any destination, and I don't know whether he 
2 5 knew or not. I just don't know that. 



nCJ 




8 

1 Q And, sir, for the record I am correct in 

2 saying, am I not, that at that point beyond saying basic 

3 TOWs or vanilla TOWs there were no specifications as to 

4 condition code, price, et cetera? 

5 A Absolutely not. He got into nothing about 

6 that. 

7 Q Anything else you can recall that we should 

8 know about this first conversation with General Powell? 

9 A No, not that I can recall. You might prompt 

10 it by questioning, but I don't have anything else. I got 

11 the order. I interpreted the order to be from a 

12 responsible authority because he was in fact the 

13 executive officer to the Secretary of Defense, and it was 

14 a be-prepared order, and that is a legitimate order to go 

15 and be prepared about. 

16 Q And, General Thurman, is it your understanding 

17 he came to you in your capacity as the Acting Chief? 

18 A Absolutely. I was the senior ranking officer 

19 in Washington in the U.S. Army. I just happened to be on 

20 duty that morning at the Pentagon and he came to see me — 

21 called up on the telephone, asked if he could come and 

22 see me, and I said sure. And the conversation ensued. 

23 Q And in that capacity, then, and not in your 

24 capacity as the |^^^^H|^^^^^HlTor the Department of 

25 the Army? 



llHEtAPffi^' 



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That's right, although I serv« as both on that 



day. 



Q It might be h«lpCul for us to try to as)c all 
of our questions about this conversation at this time. 
Roger, Joe, do you have any questions? 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SABA: 

Q Yes. Did you have any reason to believe that 

when he was addressing you he was addressing you not only 
as the Chief Army officer in Washington that day but also 
as the person in charge of the\ 

A I don't have any idea what went through his 
mind at the time. As will come later when I describe my 
actions subsequent to that, I Intruded the process into 
the Army ' sIH^I^^mH^^^H but that process may not 
have included the Department of Defense. I don't )cnow 
what went on at the Department of Defense. 

Q So is it fair to say that when General Powell 
came to you he came to you aa the senior ranking Amy 
officer in Washington' 

A That is correct. 

Q In fact, you took it to be that and you did 
not take it to be that he was coming to you as head of 
thel^^^^ 

A I took it to taai that he was coming to me as 



WOl!fti?«0 



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the senior officer of the United States Army, as the 
Acting Chief of Staff on that day. 

Q Did it occur to you on that day that the order 
which he gave to you might also be one of concern to the 



A Well, it did, because later, if I describe 
what happened after that, you will determine that I put 
it into at least a piece of the Army's 
simply because I had to make sure that the Chief of Staff 
was going to be properly advised about it. 

Q I understand. But I'm trying to be very 
narrow in my time frame. 

A Okay. 

Q And that is on January 18, 1986, was your 
state of mind on that day that this was a matter to be 
put through the^ 

A State of mind at that day was issue the order 
because it was a be-prepared order, a be-prepared order. 
We can ask to be prepared to do anything, but the execute 
order is yet to come, and in the execute order you go 
through another rationale. But at that particular 
instant I issued the instructions to go to the inventory 
and the like and I also notified myj 
to pick up the action in my absence. 
BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 



ysrJ^ff^^?TfWl 



12 



UNElftSSlBitt 



11 



1 Q All right, sir. Tell us what you then did 

2 upon having received the be-prepared order from General 

3 Powell. 

4 A Okay. I did two things after I received the 

5 order from General Powell. One is I contacted Lieutenant 

6 General Register. He is the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

7 Logistics. I don't recall whether he was in the building 

8 or not, but I ordered him into the building if he wasn't 

9 in the building. Anyway, I face to face went down to see 

10 Lieutenant General Register and I gave him the following 

11 order. 

12 X said I want you to do an inventory of where 

13 our missiles are located and be prepared to ship on short 

14 notice 1,000 missiles, whether it be on 12, 16, 32, 72- 

15 hour notice, and I further said to him it is a very close 

16 hold operation but it's a be-prepared order and I don't 

17 want you talking on the telephone about it. So if you 

18 need to do some transportation from Washington, D. C. to 

19 Redstona Arsenal, which is the national inventory control 

20 point where we keep records of all of that, then you have 

21 my authority to order up an airplane to do that, fly 

22 either way, in order to get the action officers. 

23 I didn't even know whether we had 1,000 TOW 

24 missiles in the system, much less 3,000 more after that 

25 or their whereabouts, but I said get onto it swiftly and 

1 



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report back and be prepared to ship when we tell you to 
ship. 

Then the second thing I did after that is I 
called forl^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

I through which these 
projects normally would flow. 
Q And that's the' 





[the principal head, the 
head of that. And I gave him an instruction. I said, 
I'm going to give you the same order that I received from 
General Powell and that I have relayed to General 
Register, and I want you to go back and make a memorandum 
for the record and I want you to follow up with the 
action officer and the Deputy Chief of Staff of Logistics 
and make sure you record the names of everybody that has 
his hand in this particular operation. 

And I said, furthermore, you keep the Chief of 
Staff of the Army apprised of the action because I'm 
going to leave town this afternoon, Saturday afternoon, 
the 18th of January, on or about 1800 hours to fly to 
Europe and therefore I will not be here and you keep the 
action in focus and report to the Chief of Staff of the 
Army- ^ -y^-.f-n*' 






14 



usai^sssi^ 



13 



X The third action I took was the Chief of Staff 

2 returned that afternoon, on or about 1330, and — 

3 Q This is all still on the 18th? 

4 A On Saturday, the 18th, and is customary when 

5 th« Chief of Staff has been absent and particularly when 

6 I've been the Acting Chief of Staff in matters pertaining 

7 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I went to his quarters at 

8 this particular time, since I didn't want to impose upon 

9 him to come to the office, to give him a dump on the 

10 meetings that X had conducted in his absence or that I 

11 had been a participant in in his absence. 

12 And one of the things I informed him of was 

13 the fact that General Powell had come and given me a 

14 warning order, that I had set in motion the response to 

15 that, to inventory to locate the whereabouts of the 1,000 

16 TOW missiles, and that I had inf ormed^^^^^^^^^^| and 

17 that ha would be apprised as th« situation developed. 

18 Q Did you tell General Wic)cham that this had 

19 COB* from the Office of the Secretary of Defense? 

20 A I surely did. I named General Powell. 

21 Q And did you tell him that it was a close-hold 

22 ssnsitlvs? 

23 A I did. I told him it was very sensitive, very 

24 close hold. It was also a be-prepared mission and that 

25 we would just have to see how that developed. 



ifi^nri!!TfFfri] 



15 




'4bU 



14 



1 And then the fourth action I took that 

2 afternoon is before I departed I called back to General 

3 Powell and I said to General Powell, reference the 

4 conversation you and I had had earlier today the wheels 

5 are in motion and we are ready to execute subject to the 

6 wheels in motion producing the information necessary. 

7 And that terminated my activities on the 18th with 

8 respect to the TOW missile business. 

9 I then departed for Europe 1800 or thereabouts 

10 to go to visit troops on REFORGER in that particular 

11 activity that week. 

12 Q Sir, was this an unusual type of request to be 

13 transmitted — (a) the type of request that it was and 

14 (b) to come into the Army the way it did? 

15 A The number of TOW missiles was unusual. 

16 Q Unusual? 

17 A In the nvimber. 

18 Q Meaning large? 

19 A Like 1,000, yes. The number of 1,000, the be- 

20 prepared to ship 1,000 versus the 3,000; that was 

21 unusual. Normally we do not get those kinds of 

22 instructions from the executive office of the Secretary 

23 of Defense. Normally when we are reacting to inquiries 

24 and to requests they are channeled through a system 
called the I^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hl f^iri^ would come to 




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principally thro 




Q If you would, sir, take a moment for the 

record and give us a Hit of the history of the creation 
of 

MR. SABA: Could I as)c a time question? 

MR. SAXON: Sure. 

BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

Q Just so it's clear, General, when you departed 
for Europe you still did not )cnow and I presume you had 
not informed^^H^^^Bthat this would be a transfer to 
any other United States agency? 

A I didn't know a thing about who was going to 
get it, when it was going to be shipped. I didn't know 
anything. 

Q So it would be correct to say that when you 
departed for Europe it would not have occurred to you 
that this was necessarily a matter which would have gone 
thej^^^^^^^^^H^^^H in any 

A No. I guess what I'd say about that is my 
concern was to assure that there was some accountability 
process, given that I was the officer of the Chief of 
Staff and my accountable processing agent was 
But at the instant I had no idea where they were going 



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UKGLASSKra 



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and I didn't know when they were going, nor did I know 
about any later papers or authorization or fund sites or 
whatever, because in the instruction it was simply a be- 
prepared order. 

And so we always can respond to be-prepared 
orders without being explicit in the final accomplishment 
of all the documentation. 

Q So for all you knew the missiles may have been 
intended for a direct transfer to a foreign country? 

A I had no idea at the moment. I just had no 
idea about that. 

BY MR. SAXOK: (Resvuning) 

Q If you would, General, walk us through the 
creation of I 

in brief form. 

A A month after the Chief of Staff and I came on 
board as a teeuu at the same time, 22 June 1983, a month 
after that 





As a result of that we began the processes of 
trying to understand what! 




That is to say those matters pertaining 



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:o material acquisition, for exampla 




So not long tharaaftar wa hava a bubble-up 
from below which indicates there is some allegations of 
misappropriation of funds in one of our black programs 
which adds further stimuli to the process of trying to 
set up an appropriate oversight mechanism to control the 



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actions, the orders, the shipments, the funding channels 
and the like. 

Q Would that have been VELLOW FRUIT? 

A That is an operation called the YELLOW FRUIT 
operation, which commenced in October, the investigation 
of which commences in the arrival of a particular 
individual who alleges malfeasance of office in late 
October 1983. We subsequently turned that into an 
Inspector General inquiry, subsequently into a 15-6 
inquiry, subsequently into a Department of Justice 
inquiry that later takes on its own course of events and 
ends up in prosecution in both military and civil court. 
As a result of all that, I believe in 1984 I 
; set up the formal 
system after we had gone through the various staffing 
inside the Army as to how to assure that we had the 
appropriate mechanism to review our process, and] 




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Q And that is for transfers of Army materiel and 
equipment to other agencies of the government? 

A Yes. 

Q .Not exclusively but primarily the CIA? 

A Primarily, and it does not include military 
assistance cases, military assistance cases coming under 
the auspices of the Director of Security Assistance, 
General Cast in the present instance. His cases, if they 
are — and they are all open and in the white, to the 
best of my knowledge — those cases are not processed 
through thel 

Q Is it fair to say that at least in concept and 
the [^HH^^f^^^Hj was 
exclusive system for handling transfers to the Agency? 

effective|^HH|^^^^^^^A And we have 
some ongoing operation to gather up all of the — 
subsequent tol^^^^^^^^^^H^ we have the 
going out and interrogating and collecting all the 
information that is resident in agencies outside of the 



<^j«^^w;^^f&5^iHi.-;' 



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Department of the Army itself — in other words, in the 
Army Materiel Conunand, in the special operating forces or 
elsewhere — in other words, getting our arms around the 
process took us some time subsequent to the initiation of 
the office. But from that point onward ^^^ |^^^^^^^^B_ 
interests that came into the Army came in through that 
system. 

The procedure for that is an inquiry may come 
in from the Agency! 




Q And there would be ^.a^fing on the readiness 



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issue at some stage; is that correct, sir? 

A Yes. That would be a part of the staffing 

process. 

Q And there would be legal review, as I 
understand it, at three different leve] 




A That is correct. 

Q 'While there were individuals involved in the 
^^y,sB^^^^^^H|Bwho vera i" SNOWBALL 
and CROCUS, is it f air to say that those two transactions 

bypassed formal ^^^^^^^^IHH^^^^W^^^^^^^^^^^k 
They bypassed forma l^^m|^^^^^^^^^^ 
the ingress line, other than to say it came to me as the 
HH|H|^^H^^fion the SNOWBALL, and 
Chief of Staff on the CROCUS. So you could technically 
say that it entered at a nod. but it didn't come through 
th. normal staffing procedure, which would then have been 
a piece of paper that transmitted that. Most of th. 
transmission was oral. 

On the outbound leg on both counts, at least 
on the count of th. TOW, th. first shipm.nt is mad. 
without a compl.t. wringout through all of th. proc.dural 
steps that I just described, although subsequent to that 



silW^RS'ltFP 



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there is a touching base with the General Counsel and the 
Judge Advocate General that begins to say time out, wait 
a minute, and that precipitates the General Brown letter 
on notification and the like, which I believe is dated 7 
March. But that is subsequent to the first shipment, as 
I recall it, which occurred on the 13th of February. 

Q '^^^^^^^HI^^^^^^^^^B^^^ reorganized 
or formalized concurrent with the formulation ofl 

are you aware of any other transfers to 
the CIA from the Army that have not gone through the 
formal 1^^^ 

A I'm not aware of it. 

Q And that would include, I assume, some fairly 
sensitive transfers that we have made? 

A To the best of my knowledge I know of no 
transfers that haven't been made through the i 



Q But of thos* that have been made, some of them 
have been quite sensitive in nature? 

A Yeah. 

Q If you would, then, let's return to the 
chronology. I believe that you returned from your trip 
to Europe on or about January 26; is that correct, sir? 

A I came back on the following Sunday, which 
would have i^een thf 26th; that's correct. 



24 




5E»OTCr 23 



1 Q And in the interim I believe that then-Major 

2 General Vincent Russo had been given the requirement to 

3 actually work the TOW missiles by General Register; is 

4 that correct, sir? 

5 A That is correct. He was the Deputy DCS/LOG. 

6 Q Were you involved in any way with any of the 

7 action once General Russo took over or were you totally 

8 out of it from that point forward? 

9 A I was not into the TOW missile actions. I had 

10 come into the CROCUS along about 21 April, but I am not 

11 in the TOW missile action after that. 

12 Q For the record, then, let me ask a couple of 

13 questions, the answers to which I think I know. Is it 

14 safe to say you were not involved in any discussions with 

15 General Russo or anyone else about pricing of TOW 

16 missiles? 

17 A Absolutely correct. I was not. 

18 Q Is it correct to say you were not involved in 

19 any of the discussions about whether replacement cost 

20 would be allowed for the TOW missile transfer? 

21 A I was not involved in that. 

22 Q Did you ever discuss with General Powell in 

2 3 your initial discussion or at any other time whether this 

2 4 would be done under the Economy Act? 
2 5 A I did not. 



25 



UWUSSUP 



24 



1 Q Were you ever involved in discussions with 

2 General Russo or anyone else about the problems that 

3 resulted which necessitated an I-TOW downgrade and a 

4 reconfiguring of the basic TOW with the MOIC, et cetera? 

5 A I did not know anything about that, and I was 

6 as surprised as anybody else when I learned about that 

7 several months later. 

8 Q When you had your conversation with General 

9 Powell on January 18 did he mention from whom Secretary 

10 Weinberger had gotten this tasking? 

11 A He did not. I don't remember him saying 

12 Secretary Weinberger either. I asked him are you 

13 representing the Secretary of Defense. He said yes. 

14 Q So you would have assumed he got his marching 

15 orders from Secretary Weinberger? 

16 A I would assume so. 

17 Q But you did not know that for a fact? 

18 A I do not know that for sure, but I would 

19 assume that. I want to make clear that he is executive 

20 officer to the Secretary of Defense and when I asked him 

21 the specific question is this a legitimate order from the 

22 Office of the Secretary of Defense he said yes. So I 

23 made the assumption it was from the Secretary of Defense. 

24 Q Which would have been necessary, I assume, 

25 because normally a two-star general doesn't give a four- 



mmm 



26 



UNCkASKD 



25 



1 star general orders. 

2 A No, but I know who he is. He represents the 

3 Office of the Secretary of Defense in that he is the 

4 executive officer of the Secretary of Defense, and so I 

5 make the assumption that he is giving me a legitimate 

6 order, particularly when I interrogate him about that and 

7 he responds in the affirmative. 

8 Q All right, sir. I understand it was a be- 

9 prepared order as opposed to an execute order. 

10 A That is right. 

11 Q But I want to get at a distinction between a 

12 requirement or an order or a mission that would be 

13 imposed on the Department of the Army versus a request 

14 coming laterally from the CIA. 

15 Did you assume that this was a requirement 

16 imposed on DA or a mission given to DA over which it had 

17 no discretion? 

18 A I made no interpretation of that. I looked at 

19 the legitimacy of the office issuing the instruction, and 

20 that was, in my belief, that when the Office of the 

21 Secretary of Defense, given the civilian control of the 

22 military which ensues, that the Office of the Secretary 

23 of Defense ia issuing us an instruction, a valid mission. 

24 Q Would you say that the|{ 

25 ^^^^^^Vworked fairly well? 



iKS^?tfSii 



27 



uNSk^ra 



26 



1 A Absolutely. 

2 Q Have they worked so well that in fact the CIA 

3 sometimes complains now that you don't play ball with 

4 them as much as you did before? 

5 A There have been complaints that we have taken 

6 longer to answer inquiries than we used to. 

7 Q Sir, when we met with you earlier you 

8 characterized this, if my notes are correct, as follows: 

9 We have tightened the noose around this sucker that is so 

10 tight they .have accused us of strangulating time lines. 

11 Would that be a correct characterization? 

12 A That is a little harsh perhaps, on my part, 

13 but we have tried to do our best to tighten up our 

14 procedures to the point that they are adequately staffed 

15 and that the appropriate recommendations are given to our 

16 civilian master, the Secretary of the Army. 

17 Q As far as you aware, even though you were 

18 personally not involved in any discussions about price 

19 for the TOWs, are you aware of any pressure applied on 

20 anyone wearing an Army uniform or in an Army civilian 

21 capacity to come up with a low price? 

22 A I am not. 

23 Q Are you aware of any ceiling that would have 

24 been imposed by the CIA on how much money they could 

25 spend for TOW missiles? 






28 



UKebftSKO 



27 



1 A I am not. 

2 MR. SAXON: All right. I am ready to go to 

3 CROCUS. If you guys have some questions, we should 

4 probably get them now. 

5 MR. SABA: I have no further questions on this 

6 matter. 

7 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

8 Q General Thurman, you told us that you picked 

9 back up in these matters sometime in April and I believe 

10 in the interview you previously told ua that on or about 

11 21 April you ran into General Russo and found out that 

12 there was sort of a follow-on. Can you tell us about 

13 that, sir? 

14 A He said that — we had a hallway meeting 

15 engagement and he said that he had been given 

16 instructions to proceed on some HAVTK parts, like the 

17 TOWs. And I said who gavs you the instruction? He said 

18 the Chief of Staff. I said is th« Chief of Staff, 

19 General Wickham, monitoring your activities? He said 

20 yes, he is. I said, in that case I will not intrude 

21 myself. 

22 Q So it was sort of a thanks for the 

23 information, carry on, type of discussion? 

2 4 A No. It was useful because if in the absence 

25 of the Chief of Staff the matter came up, it was not as 



29 



IKUSyiSftD 



28 



1 if I hadn't heard about it. But the point is we don't 

2 try to do each other's work, and in this particular case 

3 he was dealing with the Chief of Staff and therefore he 

4 did not need to include me on the details about that. 

5 Q And were you involved in any of the details of 

6 the HAWK repair part shipments? 

7 A I get involved in it much later in the time 

8 sequence. I get involved when I am again the Acting 

9 Chief of Staff, and that occurs on or about the 22nd to 

10 the 24th of September, 1986. 

11 Q All right, sir. Before we go into that, then, 

12 let me ask a few questions for the record on the HAWK 

13 repair parts. 

14 Were you aware that the repair parts list was 

15 prepared abroad and when it came to DA from the CIA there 

16 was a lot of outdated and confusing information? 

17 A I was not aware of that until later, after the 

18 Inspector General inquiry was conducted, much later. 

19 Q Were you aware of any of the statements that 

20 Army officials made to the CIA, primarily through Major 

21 Simpson and, to some extent, through General Russo, that 

22 the way to have done this for not much more money would 

23 be to rebuild the whole HAWK missile rather than to spend 

24 the money for these repair parts which were requested? 

25 A I was not aware of that. 



letM 



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Q So all of those particulars, and any others-- 

A I had nothing to do with the action, so I am 
not aware of that. 

Q And any concerns about the readiness impact of 
providing any of these items — 

A Those papers did not come through me. 

Q You say then that your next Involvement comes 
on 22 or 24 September. What happened then? 

A Well, at that particular time again I was the 




And there was an action memorandun that was brought up by 
^^^^^Bat that particular time which represented 
additional spare parts for the HAWKs. 

And he said there was some anxiety in the 
staff about that particular process and therefore we 
n««d«d to ralsa that to the Secretary of the Army and 
make sure that it was appropriate for us to continue to 
ship those parta. 

He then went in to see the Chief of Staff the 
next day, talked to the Chief of Staff about that, and 
the Chief of Staff then said make sure that it is run 



l]FSS!f!!I) 



31 



BNttjssra 



30 



1 through the TJAG or the General Counsel, and it is. And 

2 then the last action I have on that is about 22 October, 

3 when again I'm the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army. He 

4 brings up a paper which says we should tell the Secretary 

5 of the Army to go up and see the Secretary of Defense in 

6 terms of full disclosure with respect to the recipient 

7 agency and the destination and the like. 

8 And the Secretary of the Army acts on a 

9 recommendation and does that at that particular point in 

10 time. The action with respect to those HAWK parts is 

11 suspended. 

12 Q Sir, was that set of meetings and those 

13 memoranda, were they generated by the follow-on request 

14 for HAWK repair parts that came after the April request 

15 for HAWK repair parts? 

16 A Ves. 

17 Q And it was the opinion of the Department of 

18 the Army that rather than simply being an addition this 

19 was in essence a new tasking or a new request? 

20 A That's right. 

21 Q For which reason the earlier approval and the 

22 earlier instructions which came down from the Office of 

23 the Secretary of Defense would not have been governing 

24 because this in fact came laterally from the CIA; is that 

25 correct, sir? 




32 



iiHty^s^® 



31 



1 A I can't attest to that latter. All I know is 

2 that the troops doing the work in the action process -- 

3 and I'm not sure of the connection on whether it came 

4 laterally because I was not in on it on the inbound leg, 

5 but in the staffing process that was going on they raised 

6 some concern about the dimension of it and the 

7 destination of it and the like, and therefore they raised 

8 the red flag. 

9 So we reacted to that. 

10 Q .Were you involved at any point, General, on 

11 the HAWK radars? 

12 A I was not. 

13 Q The Congressional notification issue about 

14 which the Department apparently had great sensitivity and 

15 appropriate sensitivity is something you mentioned 

16 earlier. You mentioned the memorandum that General Brown 

17 prepared and which he provided to General Powell and 

18 which we now know General Powell sent to Admiral 

19 Poindexter at the White House. 

20 A Yes, sir. 

21 Q Mrs. Crawford, the Army General Counsel 

22 prepared a memorandum on this issue. Are you aware of 

23 whether anyone at the Department of the Army actually 

24 inquired after those memoranda w«r» sent forward of 

25 whether notification had been provided by the CIA to the 



\|^H^^^!?»»ii 



33 



\n<6tfiS^*'> 



32 



1 Congress? 

2 A I'm not aware of that personally. 

3 Q And did anyone ever comment orally or in 

4 writing that perhaps somebody should check that and see 

5 whether that had taken place? 

6 A I don't specifically recall that. It may be 

7 in the documents, but I just don't recall it. 

8 Q You mentioned earlier that when you had your 

9 hallway conversation with General Russo and he briefly 

10 read you onv if you will, to this tasking on the HAWK 

11 repair parts that you would perhaps, if General Wickham 

12 were out of town, become the Acting Chief again and there 

13 might be some action on that, at which point you would 

14 become active. 

15 A That's right. 

16 Q Now for our understanding tell us how that 

17 process works if you are not being briefed or kept 

18 apprised daily, and if we have any concerns about that 

19 disabuse us if we should be so disabused. 

20 A In the process of doing business there are 

21 occasions when the Chief of Staff of the Army can be read 

22 on to a program that even I am not read onto, unless I 

23 have an express requirement to be read on for his 

24 explicit absence. Actions like that include arms control 

25 and very sensitive matters ._ And s<^there may be times 




34 



1 

2 
3 

4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1] 

i: 

12 
14 
1! 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2] 
22 

2: 

24 
2! 



llHWSra 



33 



when h» and I both are in town, whereas he would be read 
onto a specific action over which I had no knowledge, and 
therefore I am not kept up to date on a day-to-day basis. 

Now if he then departs I may have to be 
•xplicitly brought on on a particular subject matter in 
order to be acting as the Acting Chief of Staff, in which 
case I am brought on. I then follow it on a day-to-day 
basis. 

Now the presumption on my part with respect to 
the HAWK business was that it was being handled by the 
Chief of Staff, so I didn't intrude myself in that 
process. And again it was not going through the nonnal 




So that is the process. So, you know, I guess 
from my standpoint relatively uncommon that those kind of 
compartmentations exist, but then there are some of 
those. So I raised no hackles about that when I was told 
there was an action under way and it was a sensitive one 
because he, Russo, had told me that it was like the TOW 
caper and the TOW caper was a sensitive one, and I did 



ii'<!*]tS^fSO 



35 



\j' 





1 not intrude myself into that. 

2 Q I understand that explanation. Let me put one 

3 possibly different interpretation on things. You have 

4 already indicated that the initial request from General 

5 Powell on the TOWs was perhaps a bit unusual and it did 

go the normal ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H of which 
you were the ^^^^^^^|H^^H as you have described it. 

8 And General Powell indicated there would be an 

9 initial request probably to ship 1,000 TOWs and that 

10 there might be additional requirements up to 3,000 or 

11 maybe 3,500. And then in April you find out that there 

12 is a request for HAWK repair parts as a follow-on, and 

13 given that this is sensitive, a sensitive matter one can 

14 ask whether it is wise as a matter of practice or policy 

15 to have periods when you are not aware of what is 

16 happening in sequence, and whether if General Wickham did 

17 go out of town and you then became the Acting Chief, 

18 whether if you are read onto something which ariees 

19 whether you have got the proper context for making 

20 decisions. 

21 A I think that's a fair question, and 1 would 

22 just say that in the past I have handled actions and been 

23 read on in the context of his being departed from town 

24 and handled the actions in a reasonable manner while he 

25 is absent and then when he comes back he picks up the 




1 action, and I may have a breakage at that particular 

2 point in time because of the sensitivity of the action. 

3 So in hindsight one might say, Thunnan, you 

4 should have got yourself in there with a great deal of 

5 gusto, but at the time I had absolutely no idea where the 

6 stuff was going and there are many countries in the world 

7 who have been the recipients of TOW missiles through 

8 legitimate foreign military sales, and many owners of 

9 HAWKS. 

10 'And so that fact, I know that, and so that 

H fact sort of told me that I didn't need to know any more 

12 than I needed to know at the time, so I didn't pressure 

13 Russo at the time about it, and if I then get back into 

14 it later when I'm the Acting Chief, I'm brought into it 

15 and I take constructive action on it. 

16 Q On October 24 I believe you indicated that 

17 Secretary Marsh paid a visit to Deputy Secretary of 

18 Defense Taft on the readiness question with regard to the 

19 HAWK request; is that correct, sir? 

20 A Well, I'm not privy to exactly what he said. 

21 What we said in our recommendation to hin on the 22nd is 

22 we need to make sure that Project CROCUS needs to be 

23 provided the appropriate authorities within DOD and legal 

24 review should be accomplished, and we shouldn't release 

25 any more material until that occurs and the legal 



UL 



hmi 



37 



iimsns 



36 



1 position is described about that. 

2 And it does have said in that particular 

3 memorandum that the opinion of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

4 for Logistics was it would have minimum impact on Army 

5 readiness. What the exact conversation Secretary Marsh 

6 had with Secretary Taft I am not privy to, but I am told 

7 that he did go and discuss matters with Secretary Taft 

8 and as a result of those discussions then the project was 

9 put in abeyance. 

10 'MR. SAXON: Joe or Roger, do you have anything 

11 on HAWK repair parts? 

12 MR. SABA: No, John. I would think it would 

13 be useful, though, that the record reflect that the 

14 General used a memo of a particular date, if we could get 

15 that to help him with that answer. 

16 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

17 g Th« memorandiui to which you just referred, 

18 sir — 

19 A That is dated 22 October 86, which I used to 

20 refresh myself with respect to the time line on the 

21 action that later resulted in the Secretary of the Army 

22 talking to Secretary Taft. 

23 Q And that is a m«Dorandun from whom to whom? 

24 A It is from our ^^^^^^^Hto me or through me 

25 to the Secretary of the Army, and I gave you the 



38 



vimmm 



37 



1 constituent parts. 

2 Q General Thurman, did you have prior to these 

3 matters becoming public any knowledge of or involvement 

4 with any efforts by the Department of the Army to 

5 replenish Israeli stocks of TOW missiles in the late 

6 1985-early 1986 time frame? 

7 A I did not. Now they could have occurred 

8 through the foreign military assistance channel, which 

9 would have been a legitimate sale, because there are a 

10 number of people overseas, customers that are permitted 

11 to buy through appropriate authorities up through the 

12 logistics channels into the Department of Defense to 

13 approve sales of TOW missiles. You are talking about 

14 TOWS? 

15 Q Yes, sir. 

16 A But I don't recall any specific event about 

17 that. But I am also saying ther* could have been sales 

18 at that time. 

19 Q All right, sir. Let me ask the same c[uestion 

20 with regard to entire HAWK missile systems, whether you 

21 are aware of or had any involvement with efforts to ship 

22 HAWK missiles in late 1985 to Israel or, for that matter, 

23 to Iran directly. 

24 A I'm not aware of that. 

25 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 



ifsssinto 



39 



}immm 



38 



1 Q What about HAWK missiles? 

2 A HAWK missiles to Israel? 

3 Q Yes. 

4 A Again, I can't attest to it, that I know 

5 specifically about it, although I don't rule out the fact 

6 that there may have been some through a legitimate FMS 

7 sale. I just don't know. 

8 Q Apart from FMS sales in 1985 were you aware of 

9 any efforts to determine our inventory of TOW missiles 

10 for purposes of transfer to a third country? 

11 A I am not aware of that. 

12 Q Or another agency? 

13 A I'm not aware of that. I mean, we get 

14 inquiries all the time like that, but I'm just not aware 

15 of that. 

16 Q I'd like to ask the same question with respect 

17 to HAWKS, which is whether in 1985 you were aware of any 

18 requests as to our inventory of HAWKs for the purposes of 

19 a transfer, whether to a foreign country or to another 
2 agency . 

21 A I'm not aware of that. 

22 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

23 Q As you know, we've been focusing on the Iran 

24 part of the Iran-contra affair. Let's give equal time to 

25 the contra side. 




40 



UNCti^HD 



39 



1 A Okay. 

2 Q And let you tell us anything you would like. 

3 Are you aware of any activity by the Department of the 

4 Army or DA personnel or military personnel with the Army 

5 who may be assigned or detailed or attached somewhere 

6 else being involved in assisting the contras in Central 

7 America during the period when the Boland Amendment cut 

8 off all funding for the contras by the U.S. Government? 

9 A I am not aware of that. 

10 Q Are you aware of any efforts by Army civilians 

11 or military personnel to assist in what we have come to 

12 know as the private supply operation or the private 

13 benefactor network which was operating outside of U.S. 

14 Government channels to aid the contras during the period? 

15 A I'm not aware of that, of any direct 

16 assistance given to those people. 

17 Q Are you aware of any indirect assistance? 

18 A Indirect either. 

19 Q All right, sir. I asked you when we met 

20 earlier about any discussion you may have had with 

21 General John Vessey, the retired Chairman of the Joint 

22 Chiefs. 

2 3 A He was the Chairman at the time. 

24 Q In the winter of 1984-85 regarding General 

25 Singlaub and the fact that General Singlaub was aiding 

M 




W^mm 



41 



UNeiftssm 



40 



1 the contras and raising money for them in certain ways 

2 with regard to the names of any retired military 

3 personnel who might like to provide operations or 

4 logistics advice to the contras. 

5 A Yes. 

g Q Tell us about that conversation. 

7 A Okay. General Vessey asked me if I could 

8 supply him a list of retired military officers who spoke 

9 Spanish who were logisticians, and I said well, I'll go 
10 check that out. 

j^j^ Q Did he ask you that in your capacity as Vice 

12 Chief of Staff of the Army or because you had been 

13 formerly head of the Army's personnel shop? 

j^4 A I guess he asked me for both because I was the 

15 Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, but he knew I knew the 

16 personnel system. So he asked me if I could ascertain 

17 some of those people. 

j^8 I prepared a list of about ten or fifteen 

19 people, to the best of my knowledge it was that number. 

20 Th«n, the more I thought about that the less I thought of 

21 it and, to the best of my knowledge, the issue died. The 

22 reason I say it died is because in my own view I felt 

23 that having somebody report to somebody's house and say 

24 would you like to come to work for us was an imposition 

25 on +-h« reclnient oartv. Aui Aft AftrJ^he best of my 



42 






1 knowledge, "although there was a follow-up telephone call 

2 from Admiral Moreau, who was executive assistant to that, 

3 but I recall stalling that off, to the best of my 

4 recollection. 

5 Q So after the initial conversation with General 

6 Vessey you did not talk with him again about this issue? 

7 A I did not. 

8 Q And you did get a follow-up from Admiral 

9 Moraau? 

10 . A <I did. 

11 Q And what do you recall about that? 

12 A I recall that I said roger, I'll work on it. 

13 Q Was that a hallway meeting? 

14 A No, that was a telephone call. And at that 

15 time I had the piece of paper, but I didn't do anything 

16 with it, to the best of my knowledge. Now if somebody 

17 has the piece of paper, than I guess I did something with 

18 it, but I hav* looked for that piece of paper. I did 

19 not, to th* bast of my knowledge, do that because I was 

20 apprahansiva that we shouldn't ba doing that. 

21 Q So to tha bast of your kitowladga you did not 

22 provide that to Admiral Moraau? 

23 A To tha bast of my knowladga. I have tried to 

24 reconstruct that since you asked ma that, and to the best 

25 of my knowledge I did not provide that. 



5M:rKl^tSt1] 



43 



3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

10 

11 




42 

1 Q I'd like to ask you some questions about 

2 YELI/)W FRUIT. We have yet to ascertain on behalf of the 
Senate Committee, at least, whether that is directly or 
even indirectly related to our inquiry. There are 
certainly some parallels there, so I'm not asking you to 
give us the entire history of YELLOW FRUIT, but if you 
could briefly and quickly walk us through an overview of 
what the problems were and the concerns were, and if you 
can update us as to whether in fact there are any Swiss 
bank accounts that may have Army officials names plus 
those of General Secord and Colonel North, et cetera. 

^^ A The YELLOW FRUIT exercise is kicked off in 

13 October 1983 by an allegation in INSCOM, the Intelligence 

14 and Security Command, U.S. Army. 

^^ Q Commanded by Major General Stubblebine? 

■""* ^ A^ that time, yes, now commanded by Major 

General Soyster. At that time the allegee said that 
there had been some misappropriation of money. He talked 
to the General Counsel of INSCOM. The General Counsel of 
INSCOM then proceeded to run that into an Inspector 

21 General inquiry. 

^^ Q ^^^ th« principal party making the allegations 

23 named William T. Golden? 

^* ^ That is correct, and Golden appears later in 

25 the Swiss bank account connection. As a result of that 



44 



uNSbssra 



43 



1 allegation to INSCOM and the subseq-aent Inspector General 

2 inquiry the then-Deputy Inspector General of the U.S. 

3 Amy, General Soloaon, apprises me of a situation which 

4 has more far-reaching tentacles than just the mere 

5 allegation of some misappropriation of money. 

6 So on or about the 29th of November, 1983 I 

7 issued an order to Major General Ed Peter, who is the 

8 ADCSPER of the Army, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff 

9 of Personnel for the Army, to conduct an informal 15-6 

10 inquiry into the allegations of Mr. Golden. He does that 

11 and I gave him a time line of reporting back, as I call 

12 it, of 5 December. 

13 Q And is a 15.6 regulation investigation, is 

14 that a collection investigation? 

15 A The interrogator will have a lawyer present 

16 with him and he's able to take testimony which begins to 

17 illuminate the issue, but there is a more formal inquiry 

18 process than that, which is called the Article XXXII 

19 investigation under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

20 So this is the preliminary inc[uiry which tries to 

21 ascertain if there is a sufficient amount of information 

22 that warrants a full scale, flow-blown inquiry. 

23 Peter comes back in on or about the 4th or 5th 

24 of December and he reports that not only is there 

25 sufficient evidence for the full-scale inquiry but that 



yiffetssfifo 



45 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



uirisssifiiD 



44 



we must also bring in the FBI and the Department of 
Justice and the CID. And so we do that in the course of 
events, and that starts the investigation of YELLOW 
FRUIT. 

Now YELLOW FRUIT grows out of a black program 




And the more we dig into that, the more we find 
out that it goes into agencies using money, procuring 
supplies, procuring airplanes, procuring all sorts of 
materiel. And that investigation runs a substantial 
course of time. 

And it contributes to what the Chief of Staff 
had suspected when he 




YELLOW FRUIT than goes Into the Department of 
Justice. There are then certain allegations that are 
turned over to the Department of the Army for prosecution 
under the UCMJ, and there are other elements that are 
retained by the Assistant U.S. Attorney, and then actions 
continue to go even up to the present time -in terms of 
essentially we are through in the Department of Army and 
the UCMJ, except for the appellate routine* about that. 



iMStiSiit^ 



46 



lINCIiASSMl 



1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



And essentially we are through with respect tc 
the Assistant U.S. Attorney's case,; 




So that is a short litany of the genesis of 
the YELLOW FRUIT investigation. When it becomes Jcnown 
about the whole Iran-contra connection, the Secretary of 
the Amy asked me to revisit the YELLOW FRUIT 
investigation to see if there were any things that should 
be further pursued, that even though there had been a 
considerable amount of effort were there some blind 
alleys in which progress was stopped because of time or 
press of going to trial or whatever else. 

And so in early April of 1987 l reconvened 
some specific agencies within the United States Army, the 
CID, Criminal Investigation Detachments, the Army Audit 
Agency, H^m^^l^^^l^^^^^^Q^ which has 
cognizance over the implication, and a review of the 
Intelligence and Security Command incjuiry into where did 
SOB* of the money go, to make sure that we were tracing 
to find out to the best of our ability where we had 
preliminarily determined that there was some money not 
properly inventoried and controlled as it went through 
the expenditure procedure — that we go and chase that 



1 t ^^$JJ^ SE£»^t/CQl3E*(jRI^J 



47 



10 



umssMs 



46 



1 one more time to see if any of that could have arrived at 

2 or been intruded into any of the process of the 

3 connection between YELLOW FRUIT and the contra 

4 connection. 

5 Q And is this relooking effort or these 

6 reinvestigations, is that under your control or 

7 supervision? 

8 A That's under my jurisdiction, and we report 

9 out weekly and popping up in all of that is the 
reappearance of Mr. Golden. Mr. Golden reappears in that 

11 same time frame on or about 2 or 3 April 1987. He 

12 appears as a result of a CBS News inquiry to the 

13 Department of the Army Pxiblic Affairs Office that says, 

14 oh, by the way, we have evidence that Mr. Golden, who was 

15 involved in YELLOW FRUIT, is a signatory to a Swiss bank 

16 account. What have you got to say about that. Amy? 

^"^ And the Army said we don't know. Apparently 

18 they also sold Mr, Golden reports. They also called him, 

19 in which case he referred the matter to the Department of 

20 the Amy. Later Golden calls us and says, oh, by the 

21 way, I think I recall signing soma signature cards when I 

22 was in the YELLOW FRUIT operation. 

23 As a result of all of that, we pursue with 

24 some diligence trying to determine if in fact Golden is a 

25 signator to accounts in Credit Suisse. 



i|f5^W!^fD 



48 




47 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Q And to date have you found any evidenc* which 
would confirm that? 

A We have not found any evidence to confirm 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H Now whether 
that's conclusive or not, I don't know. 

Q Is the Xray Xudlt Agency currently taking a 
look at all offshore bank account usage by Army covert 
programs? 

A 'no. 

Q Are you taking a look at the usage by the Army 
oC any Swiss bank accounts? 

A Ask that again. 

Q Is the Army Audit Agency, as part of this 
relooking at YELLOW FRUIT, looking at any and all Swiss 
bank accounts which the Army does use in any covert 
cparations? 

A No. The Army Audit Agency is looking 
•xplicitly at an unaccounted for $12 million. We say 
unaccounted. We have some leads onto 




But none of those 
involve, at the moment, to the best of our knowledge, a 
connection with any Swiss accounts. 






49 



UNKASSIFIED 



48 




1 In the case of the larger number it appears 

2 th at was used inj 

I^^I^H^^^^^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^B that 

4 has nothing to do with a Swiss bank account at this 

5 moment, to the best of our knowledge. 

6 To the best of your knowledge is there any 

7 connection between Colonel Oliver North and all of the 

8 things that the Army subsumes under the heading of YELLOW 

9 FRUIT? 

10 A 'We have found no connection, no explicit 

11 connection or implicit connection between Colonel North 

12 and anything to do with YELLOW FRUIT. 

13 Q The same question with regard to Richard 

14 Secord? 

15 A The answer is the same with Richard Secord. 

16 Now if you ask me, if you produce tomorrow a card which 

17 shows it is all connected, you know, it may be, but to 

18 the best of our kr.owledge and based upon all of the 

19 inquiries that v* have mad* we have not been able to 

20 ascertain that any connection between the Army and 

21 Colonel North and the Office of the Army and Secord. 

22 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

23 THE WITNESS: We asked ths intelligence people 

24 to go out and make a complete audit and inventory of 

25 everything overseas, and they have done th&t. And so it 



--' •• ' ■■■■ • - •■■ -v' . ' . « )<.. I,' 



50 



lU^ASSIflED 



49 



1 is th« Offic* of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

2 Intelligence that is doing the probing of those accounts 

3 which are principally in the 

4 And so far w« have seen no connection between those 

5 accounts and anything to do with any of the matters we 

6 have discussed today. 

7 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

8 Q So there is an examination? 

9 A There absolutely is an examination, but the 

10 Army Audit 'Agency isn't in that examination. 

11 Q All right, sir. Thanks for that 

12 clarification. 

13 ~ BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

14 Q Have you found any connection between what was 

15 referred to as YELLOW FRUIT and Richard Gadd? 

16 A I've got to refer to some notes about that 

17 because I can't recite that. I believe that I can say to 

18 you — well, let b« make aura. 

19 (Pauae.) 

20 I believe that I can say to you that the name 

21 Gadd appears in work done by our investigative agencies. 
2 2 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

2 3 Q In connection with 

24 A Yes. But I can't tell you specifically about 

2 5 that. In other words, I'd have to get J|^^^^HB over 



1 ifttf, (SBCRilVCObEWORD ' ■ 



51 



UHCk^sra 



50 



1 here or^mj^^^Bover here or one of those lads to give 

2 you the explicit inventory. I just can't personally 

3 attest to it. 

4 BY KR. SABA: (Resuming) 

5 Q Do you know if in connection with the $12 

6 million, accountability for which is being sought, Mr. 

7 Gadd or his company, American National Management 

8 Corporation, is connected or involved? 

9 AX can't tell you off tha top of my head, no. 

10 I can't tell you that. I'd have to get the people over 

11 here from our CID to go into that with you in some 

12 detail. I just don't know. 

13 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

14 Q General Thurman, when you were talking with 

15 Secretary Marsh after the Iran-contra affairs became 

16 public and he said perhaps we need to revisit YELLOW 

17 FRUIT, did h« ever make a statement to you that he 

18 thought perhaps in YELLOW FRUIT we would find the origins 

19 of the Iran-contra affair? 

20 A I don't recall him saying that to me. What he 

21 did say and one of the processes I took under way is to 

22 try to get a taxonomy of people over time that then might 

23 trigger the relationships that were just asked about, 

24 about Mr. Gadd, because it could be that the aftermath of 

25 the Iran rescue, which than caused the creation of the 



52 



llNiitfiSSIfttfi 



51 



1 Agency's and the U.S. Army, which were classified for the 

2 purpose of if we ever had to do this again, that then 

3 began the operation of the YELLOW FRUIT that then was 

4 terminated. 

5 It could be that some of the names connect in 

6 all of that, and so one of the things I have asked my 

7 criminal investigation apparatus to do is do a taxonomy 

8 over time of the names and the people who pop up in 

9 various inquiries so that we could see if there were any 

10 connections yith what might be termed the origins of 

11 YELLOW FRUIT, which are really the residue of Desert One, 

12 which then lead into YELLOW FRUIT becoming a cropper and 

13 us then taking firm control of our enterprise. 

14 So if you ask me are the names connected with 

15 that, yes, there are names that go back and forth in 

16 that, but I just don't know the names well enough off the 

17 top of my head to give you that. We'd have to bring some 

18 information to you about that. 

19 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

20 Q Sir, who would be the best person we might 

21 talk to about that? 

22 A I would say the criminal investigation part of 

23 our Army would do that, and they are capable of giving 

24 you a detail of what those relationships are, or] 
^^^^^^^^1 one those two people. 



icbJi -^AsRq? Aft^y fRD i ' j jj 



53 




1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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BY KR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

Q General Thunnan, let me ask a specific 
question about one particular aspect of YELLOW FRUIT. 
There was a point in, I believe, mid-1983, when Colonel 
Duncan thought it desirable. Colonel Dale Duncan thought 
it desirable to move their cell of operation out of] 

and 

operate under a business cover, and in fact that was 
done, and I believe they located in Annandale, Virginia 
and took the name of BSI. 

A That's right. 

Q As a cover. And he appeared to have retired 
and so forth. We have been told that as that decision to 
go under cover of BSI and move out of the Pentagon worked 
its way up for approval that you ultimately signed off on 
that; is that correct? 

A I may have. 

Q But you don't recall for sure? 

A I don't recall for sure because, you see, I 
took over in the Vice's job on the 22nd of June, and if 
the paper came through after that I may have signed it, 
although it may have been a previous Vice at a previous 
time. I just don't recall that particular piece of 
paper. 

Q I want to go back for a second to SNOWBALL and 






54 



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1 CROCUS. After these matters became public there was a 

2 fairly thorough investigation by the Department of Army 

3 Inspector General. 

4 A Yes. 

5 Q Into the shipment of HAWKs and TOWs to the CIA 

6 for Iran and pricing issues, et cetera. As far as you 

7 know, would you agree with the conclusions and the 

8 accuracy of the DA/IG report? 

9 A I would. Now there may be some error in the 

10 pricing even in the IG report, but in the main I believe 

11 the IG report is a fair inquiry into the events. 

12 Q I'm not sure that we would have any evidence 

13 to the contrary, but, as you probably know, the General 

14 Accounting Office did a review of the same matters and a 

15 critique of sorts of the DA/IG, and they reached the 

16 conclusion that with regard to four specific pricing 

17 matters — that being specifically the price of the basic 

18 TOW, the price of the I-TOW, the price of the MOIC, and 

19 the cost the Army charged for crating, handling and 

20 transporting to the CIA — that in all four of those 

21 items the Army's estimates and prices were too low. 

22 For the record, the DA/IG agreed on three of 

23 those four that the GAO cited. Is it simply coincidental 

24 or to you is that curious, or how should we react to 

25 those data? 



mmM 



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1 A I don't have any particular reaction to it. 

2 Auditors are auditors and when they get in there and 

3 count the numbers if there's a mistake I think in the 

4 case of the Inspector General of the Army it is probably 

5 a legitimate, honest mistake about it. We asked him to 

6 do the very best inquiry that he could. We put some 

7 pressure on him to do a reasonable time line of effort 

8 about that. If he missed something in the pricing, I 

9 don't think it was willful negligence on his part. 

10 Q ,I'm not suggesting that the IG report was 

11 deficient. I'm saying that the DA/IG concluded that on 

12 three discrete pricing items the 'Army came in too low. 

13 The GAO said it wasn't three; in fact it was four. But, 

14 in any event, they both agreed that on those matters 

15 where the Army had to make a judgment about price it came 

16 in too low, and I simply ask the question, going back to 

17 my earlier question to you when we first began about low 

18 balling or pressure to come in at a low price — 

19 A Okay. I understand the context of the 

20 question. Again, I believe the IG fairly represents what 

21 th« young action officers in the system say and, to the 

22 best of my knowledge, nobody in the Army was pressured 

23 about low-balling the numbers. So as I understand the 

24 inquiry, yes, the Army did make an inaccurate 

25 determination of cost and clearly in the build-down 



ii^HissiltfB 



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1 sequence of improved TOWs to tnaJce them basic TOWs 

2 obviously their pricing was in error. 

3 I think all of that was done not necessarily 

4 with malice aforethought, but more through the rapidity 

5 of the action or inattention to what we were doing. 

6 Q Is it possible those mistakes came because 

7 this was too close a hold and people who would have 

8 nonnally had the expertise were not included? 

9 A Probably. 

10 Q 'Do you have any knowledge of any involvement 

11 that Mr. Noel Koch may have had in pricing decisions with 

12 regard to TOW missiles? 

13 A Absolutely not. 

14 Q Do you have any knowledge of any involvement 

15 that Dr. Henry Gaffney of DSAA, the Defense Security 

16 Assistance Agency, would have had on questions involving 

17 HAWK missile shipments to Iran? 

18 A I 2m not aware of that. 

19 Q Would you have any awareness or knowledge of 

20 involvement by Glenn Rudd, the Deputy Director of DSAA, 

21 with regard to TOW missile pricing? 

22 A I'm not aware of that. 

23 Q General Thurman, you have had a distinguished 

24 military career and in the number two position in the 

25 Department of the Army for uniformed personnel. As you 



57 



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1 look back on the Army's involvement with SNOWBALL and 

2 CROCUS, are there any lessons that you could offer for 

3 our Committees on how to do it or how not to do it? 

4 A Well, I guess the answer in retrospect is to, 

5 one, obey your civilian masters and be responsive to 

6 them. Two is to make sure that it is carried out with — 

7 that any operations that are carried out are carried out 

8 in the complete context of complete staff work, and if 

9 there's a lesson in it from hindsight it may be that we 

10 did not do enough staff work on those two particular 

11 items. 

12 Q But it would seem, then, that your first 

13 lesson and your third lesson are in conflict, because you 

14 probably didn't do the staff work because you were 

15 obeying your civilian leaders, 

16 A Nobody said take any shortcut approach to 

17 pricing. Nobody said take any shortcut approach to 

18 correct staffing processes. So if there's a lesson in 

19 that I would say that the lesson In that is be more 

20 careful in doing the staff work. 

21 In the end game you may be still shipping TOWs 

22 someplace that the high command, national command 

23 authority, chooses to have you ship them to. 

24 Q For the record, I ask this question with 

25 regard to you personally, but let me ask it with regard 



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1 to all of your Department of Army counterparts, excluding 

2 General Powell, who wore an Army uniform but was acting 

3 in his capacity as the Military Assistant to the 

4 Secretary of Defense. As far as you know, did anyone at 

5 the Department of the Army know these missiles were going 

6 to Iran? 

7 A To my knowledge, nobody knew that. 

8 Q If you had known that when General Powell 

9 called you on 18 January and said, sir, not only should 

10 you be prepared to ship 1,000 missiles, but we're going 

11 to give them to the CIA and they are going to ship them 

12 to Iran, what would have been your reaction? 

13 A I think my reaction to that would have been to 

14 issue the be-prepared order. Then I would have been in 

15 some conversation, more fulsome, with the Chief of Staff 

16 of the Army to make sure that he was informed that they 

17 were in fact going there, and that would have probably 

18 caused us to do a considerable amount of legwork about 

19 that. 

2 Now shipment isn't going to take place until 

21 w« go clear it with the Secretary of the Army, so having 

2 2 known the destination and having known what the current 

23 status was with respect to embargoes and the like, then 

24 I'm sure that when that came up as a matter of 

25 information to the Secretary of the Army there would have 




" viiriLL 




58 

1 been yet a considerable amount of debate about that 

2 further as to the ultimate course of whether they would 

3 have been shipped or not. 

4 I am not competent to tell. 

5 Q Sir, you mentioned embargoes in place. Am I 

6 correct in saying that at the time there was an embargo 

7 against arms shipments to Iran by the United States? 

8 A Well, I don't have the time lines on that, but 

9 as far as my recollection is there were. 

10 Q 'And in fact were we not pressuring our allies 

11 for them not to ship arms to Iran? 

12 A As far as I know, we were. That was at least 

13 the open policy. 

14 Q We will be asked — I say we meaning the 

15 respective House and Senate Committees and the Members, 

16 and perhaps even in the recommendation from the staff to 

17 the Members — to make recommendations about any 

18 requirements for change, whether it be procedures, 

19 Executive Orders, regulations or new legislation. 

20 At this point in the look-back on the Iran- 

21 contra affair and particularly in terms of the Department 

22 of the Army's SNOWBALL and CROCUS, do you have any 

23 recommendations you can pass on to us which we should 

24 pass on to our bosses? 

25 A Well, I would commend the I 



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Ln terms of having 
a central referee organization that reports only to the 
Office of the Chief of Staff and the Office of the 
Secretary of the Army to assure that there is appropriate 
civilian oversight into matters, some of which we have 
discussed today. 

'That is helpful to the civilian leaders. I 
think it would be particularly helpful to have that 
institutionalized as it is in the Army. That's not to 
say we are perfect. In this case we had a breakdown, but 
if the procedures had been followed to their fullest 
there would probably have been less chance of breakdown, 
although they could still have been shipped wherever they 
were shipped. 

But at least it provides the forun under very 
tight control that would also transcend administrations. 
In other words, this process could be then 
institutionalized. Now whether the Secretary of Defense 
regulatory matter is sufficient about that or whether 
there is a statutory obligation about that, I don't know. 
But in the main it is a good thing that we did that, 
because we now have a more substantive handle on it. 






61 



IGlfftS 



1 That is not to say, though, that there are not 

2 forces at work which would try to bypass that, and I 

3 think you have to be careful in the Federal statutes that 

4 in the creation of the Special Operating Forces commands, 

5 which are currently extant by the most recent 

6 reorganization act of the Department of Defense, that you 

7 do not bypass the Secretaries of the several services 

8 when included in the legislation is a notion that the 

9 commanding officer or the commander in chief of the 

10 Special Operating Forces has his own budgetary 

11 allocation. 

12 That sounds a little complicated. So if you 

13 would like for me to explain that a little bit more, I 

14 would be happy to. 

15 Q Please. 

16 A At the moment forces are allocated by the 

17 several services to the gaining commanders in chief. In 

18 the enthusiasm to empower the commanders in chief in the 

19 field with more responsibility and to give them more 

20 control and authority over the forces assigned to them, 

21 there has also run along on that track some notion of 

22 apportioning forces by the commanders in chief in the 

23 field, which, if carried to their fullest, might then 

24 conflict with the responsibilities of the Secretaries of 

25 the several services to discharge their overview of their 



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individual services. 

So let me hypothetically set that up. You 
could be running a clandestine operation that has the 
clandestine person who is trying to carry out the 
clandestine activity move — I '» talking about a 
legitimate clandestine operation, one that has all the 
approval authorities and all of that — but he moves from 
one theater of operations to another and therefore the 
jurisdiction goes from one commander in chief in one area 
of the world to the juri»<liction of another commander in 
chief in another area of the worldr~ 

And if you carry to extreme the notion of 
territoriality, then you could get the notion that the 
clandestine handoff might cause a gap which is better 
handled by the Department of the Army with its global 
responsibilities. So, therefore, in the«J 




or the like, or in the Special 
Operating Forces which we supply to the commander in 
chief of Special Operating Command, or to gaining 
commanders in chief in the Pacific or in Europe some of 
that fund control, that oversight you might want to keep 
requisite at the Office of the Secretary of the service, 
each principal service. 

Now in the legislation that is currently 

' ;x,T«'^si 



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extant in the most recent reorganization act of 1987 
states that the fund controls for special operating 
forces shall be by the commander in chief of the force 
and so there is some ambiguity in the law that at the 
present time we are trying to work out inside the 
Department of Defense. 

But 1 would just suggest to you that as an 
aftermath that the ^^^^^^^H^^fl has 

really served us very well because it serves as a central 
reposd 




provides us careful 
command and control by th« Offic« of th« Secretary of the 
Army. 

So I think th« lesson out of it all is we do 
need a central repository and you ought to use it. 

Q Sir, I only have one more question or perhaps 
one more line of questions. Vou work under and for the 
Chief of Staff of th« Army and in his absence you are the 
Acting Chief of Staff of the Army. 

A I am. 

Q So I assume you would be familiar with the 



64 




63 

1 operations of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff? 

2 A I am. 

3 Q For what it's worth, Admiral Crowe, the 

4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did not find out that we 

5 were shipping TOW or HAWK missiles to Iran until mid- 

6 1986, in late June or early July. He not only did not 

7 know about it prior, had not been informed, not been 

8 apprised, not been asked for his advice or his input with 

9 regard to shipping arms to a country, as you say, that 

10 was on the embargoed list, where we were pressuring our 

11 allies not to ship arms to that country — that country 

12 was involved in open hostilities with another country in 

13 a war in which we had professed our neutrality; in fact, 

14 it's not inconceivable we ourselves could find ourselves 

15 in hostilities with Iran. 

16 So here is our top man in uniform not 

17 knowledgeable and not consulted. If I can ask you for 

18 your opinion, sir, is that the way we ought to do it? 

19 A I would recommend that the Chairman of the 

20 Joint Chiefs be apprised of those types of actions. 

21 Q So a close hold shouldn't be so close it would 

22 exclude the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 

23 A I would think that any activity that goes on 

24 within a military department ought to be privy to the 

25 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 



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1 MR. SAXON: That's all I have. Maybe my 

2 colleagues still have something. 

3 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

4 Q In the period roughly May 1986 did another 

5 agency ask for your agency's assistance in extracting the 

6 hostages from Lebanon? 

7 A I think that is a matter you will have to take 

8 up with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

9 Q Sir, does the term DRAGON NEAT missile mean 

10 anything to you? 

11 A Tell me that again. 

12 Q DRAGON NEAT, two words — D-r-a-g-o-n, space 

13 N-e-a-t. 

14 A DRAGON I know. NEAT doesn't ring a bell. I 

15 mean, DRAGON is an anti-tank missile, hand-held, sort of 

16 small missile used by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine 

17 Corps. But DRAGON NEAT doesn't ring any bell. 

18 Q Could it be DRAGON HEAT? 

19 A DRAGON HEAT? 

20 MR. KREUZER: DRAGON HEAT? 

21 THE WITNESS: DRAGON HEAT? It could be DRAGON 

22 HEAT, HEAT being High Explosive Anti-Tank. 

23 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming) 

24 Q Sir, do you have any knowledge of any request 

25 from another U. S. agency for a transfer of those 

SlijfflRBt/^nfflWORD , ' 



WIEMy 



66 



UNCIASKD 



65 

1 missiles in 1986? 

2 A I don't recall., but there may be. 

3 Q Do you have any recollection in the period 

4 1985 or 1986 of any transfer of DRAGON missiles to a 

5 third country.outside of the uaual THS system? 

« A r just don't recall off the top of my head. 

7 I'd have to go back and research the records. i just 

8 don't recall it. That's not to say there wasn't any; I 

9 just don't recall it. 

^° '"K- SABA: All right. I have no further 

11 questions. 

^^ EXAMINATION 

^3 BY MR. KREU2ER: 

" ^ Sir, if I may, I'd like to go back and discuss 

15 a little bit about what you were talking about earlier. 

16 It's my understanding that what used to be REDCOM is 

17 going to be the new Special Forces Command or there is 

18 going to be a new — 

^' A It's going to be retitled. 

^° Q So what we were talking about earlier, it will 

21 b« the Special Forces Command? 

22 A Yes. 

'^ Q So would that be headquartered, say, in 

24 Florida and the commander in chief would be there? 

25 A That is correct. 



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Q So they will be building some units. Would 
they be sort of like the equivalent of maybe the Soviet 
Spetznatz kind of — 

A Oh, the units are already built. The units 
are already built "^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hy 

Q So we have all these folks like we did before, 



A 

Q 
A 

Q ^ 

A That's right. 

Q So in case of, say, an emergency, probably the 
kind of a quick reaction kind of operation, maybe 
something like that 18th Airborne Corps operate on the 
same quick reaction to an alert situation to move out to 
a trouble spot or something like that, or are these going 
to be chopped to U&S Commands around the world? 

A The way it is structured is all of the 
peacetime operation of the commander in chief of the 
Special Operating Command will do the peacetime training, 
and then in either peace, during exercises, or in the 
case of hostilities he would chop those forces to the 
gaining commander, who is the theater commander — 
Europe, Pacific, SOUTHCOM, LANTCOM, those various 



68 




1 commanders . 

2 The commanders in chief of those particular 

3 regions would have those forces chopped to him. In other 

4 words, he is a provisioner of forces. 

5 Q Are they going to more or less have their own 

6 type exercises or are they going to climb aboard some of 

7 the JCS-sponsored? 

8 A They would go aboard JCS-sponsored exercises. 

9 Q So to expand a little on what we were 

10 discussing .before, I'd like to get it clear these 

11 commanders in chief of the U&S Commands would be gaining 

12 these special units from time to time. 

13 A That's right. 

14 Q And will these special units have a lot of 

15 unilateral authority to act? 

16 A No. They would act under the authority of the 

17 gaining commander in chief. So the peacetime training is 

18 under the commander in chief at Tampa, when it is 

19 committed for wartime use, then they are committed under 

20 the auspices of the commander in chief overseas and they 

21 do not hav* autonomy at that time. They fall underneath 

22 the command and control of the overseas gaining commander 

23 just like all of the forces. 

24 In other words, you take a division out of the 

25 United States and you ship it to Europe, it comes under 



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the operating cognizance and command and control for all 
of its livelihood under the gaining commander in Europe. 

Q So in consideration of these points you were 
pointing out earlier where we have to watch for control 
of not only materiel but personnel who are involved here? 

A Look. What I was trying to explain is in 
peacetime you may have an intelligence-gathering 
operation that is centrally directed. It may be a result 
of a Presidential Finding that begins then to go between 
geographical regions of the country simply because you 
are following the intelligence lead as it goes from one 
area. The man may be in Bern, Switzerland tomorrow and 
the next day he may be in Warsaw, the next day he may be 
in Tokyo. 

Well, when you have done all that you have 
moved through several geographical regions, and all I'm 
saying is that I think the system is well served in its 
present mod* — that is to say where the Secretary of the 

Army, | 

retains centralized control and 
observation of all of that, even though the man may move 
geographically from point to point. 

Q Even while he is chopped, going through 
different units, commands? 

A I'm trying to make the distinction between 
f J3r6©*$E(3M(r/COO;EWO»0, 







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69 

some of the implied authorities that are associated with 
the most recent changes to the law, which says that an 
intelligence operative might be in Switzerland and 
therefore be expected to report to the CINC/EURA, let's 
say, if he's an Army military guy, and he may do that, 
but you want the continuity of operations so that the 
CINCs, between the two of them, don't come to disjointed 
action with respect to the oversight that we have just 
been talking about for two hours. 

Now that's complicated, and it is not clean. 
All I am saying to you is as you look at peacetime 
operation you, where you may find there la some gaposis, 
the saving grace at the moment is that you have the 
Of f icei^^^^^^^^^^H^^^H^I^B^H that has 
total cognizance of everything about that, and there 
could be an opportunity for falling through the cracks In 
the floor if there is not a central cognizance point 
which in our case is located in J 



So that second string will always be from the 



A X would hope so. All I'm saying is there ii 
some ambiguity in the current law. 

Q I understand the concept now. 

A That you asked me for, and X did no 



oEiSS^ii 



71 





70 

1 preparation work for. I gave you a spontaneous response. 

2 But based upon what I )cnow of what goes on in the black 

3 program world, when you consider the totality of it — 

4 research and development, special operating forces, 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hjand the 

6 all of those processes we now have a stranglehold on that 

7 in the Office of the Secretary of the Army. I would say 

8 you would not want to give that up through ambiguity in 

9 the law. 

10 You asked me what I thought, and that's what I 

11 think. Now other lawyers, other commanders, other Vice 

12 Chiefs, other Secretaries, might take a different view of 

13 that, but you asked me what my opinion was, and I think 

14 that the lesson of all of this is you want some 

15 centralized control because even as we sit there may be 

16 people who think they are doing the government's business 

17 honestly and legitimately, who make a telephone call to 

18 Ziggy Belcher in some remot* plac* that starts a 

19 particular chain of events going, all thinking that it is 

20 authoritatively approved. 

21 So the point about it is we have now invoked a 

22 system, at least in our place, where it's all got to go 

23 through central referral. So I believe that is something 

24 that we have learned that would stand us in good stead as 

25 we proceed down the line, and I believe the Secretary of 




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th« Army is comfortable with it. 

MR. WINCHESTER: Can we go off for a minute? 
(A discussion was held off the record.) 
BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 
Q General Thurman, a few minutes ago you were 
talking about the centralizing process and you said that 
we need a single repository for review and you said that 
would be ^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^^l^l ^3 ^^ your 

comments, you were specifically referring, though, to the 
office that would administer that, and that central 
repositor^^^H^^fe^Bis that right? 

A That is right. The notion is a central 
referral point, and we call that ^^^ /^^^^^^^^| 

an office like that where all the 

actions pertaining 

^^^^^^^^^^^^ whatever in 
a centralized management of 

MR. SAXON: General, we have nothing further. 
Let mc simply say for the record that we appreciate the 
fact that you have appeared here voluntarily and have 
been very candid with us. You have allowed us to 
interview you previously. We have got nothing but the 
utmost of support and cooperation from the Department of 
the Army, from Secretary Marsh and General wickham on 
down, and Mr. Winchester and Colonel Wallace, and we want 




iiffFMO 



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72 



1 to thank you and all of your people. 

2 THE WITNESS: We will be happy to respond to 

3 you in any way we can. 

4 (Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the taking of the 

5 instant deposition ceased.) 

6 



7 Signature of the witness 

8 Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day 

9 of , 1987. 

10 ' 



11 Notary Public 

12 My Commission Expires: 






74 



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^5\:i''V^ 




DEPOSITION OF STEPHEN S. TROTT 



Thursday, July 2, 1987 



U.S. House of Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate Covert 
Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m., 
in Room 2226, Rayburn House Office Building, with Pamela J. 
Naughton (Staff Counsel of House Select Committee) 

presiding. 

Present: Kenneth R. Buck, Assistant Minority 
Counsel, on behalf of the House Select Committee on Covert 
Arms Transactions with Iran; W. Thomas McGough, Associate 
Counsel, on behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. 






Pirtitny D«h«aied/Pete8sd w I'^i-^ 
under provisions of LO. 12356 
by N. Meiun. M«to»1 5«airit/ Counci 

UNCUssra 



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BOYUM-1:40 
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Whereupon, 

STEPHEN S. TROTT 
having been .first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein, 
and was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
MS. NAUGHTON: This is the beginning of the 
deposition of Stephen Trott. My name is Pamela J. Naughton, 
House Staff Counsel to the House Select Committee to 
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. 

If the people in the room would please identify 
themselves? 

MR. McGough: Tom McGough, Associate Counsel to 
the Senate Select Committee. 

MR. BUCK: Ken Buck, Assistant Minority Counsel. 
THE WITNESS: Steve Trott, Associate Attorney 
General, United States Department of Justice. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Mr. Trott, are you represented today for purposes 
of this deposition? 
A No. 

Q Do you wish to have counsel? 
A No. 

O Now, could you give us just a little background 
in terms of your career after graduating from law school? 



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A Between 1966 and 1981, I was the Deputy District 
Attorney for the County of Los Angeles, serving at various 
times as the Head Deputy of the Organized Crime and 
Narcotics Division, and Chief Deputy District Attorney. 

In 1981, I became the United States Attorney in 
Los Angeles for the Central District of California. In 
1983, I became the Assistant Attorney General in charge of 
the Criminal Division in the Department of Justice here in 

D.C. 

Last September I was elevated to the position of 

Associate Attorney General of the United States. 

Q So that is September 1986? 

A Yes. 

Q Excuse me, when did you become Assistant Attorney 

General? 

A 1983. Summer of. 

Q Mr. Trott, it is my intention to just ask you 
some questions in some limited areas and not go over all 
of the things we went through before. 

A Sure. 

Q For purposes of the deposition I would like to 
start with the case in Miami, which has been named several 
things, started out being the Garcia case, and also known 
as Corvo, and so forth. It involves allegations involving 
the neutrality act and gun running to^the^ontras, and so 
forth. 



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Do you know of which case I am speaking? 

A Yes, generally I do. 

Q Could you tell us when you first became aware of 
this case? 

A No, I really can't without any documents to refresh 
my recollection. I can't even come close. 

Q Do you recall when — there came a point in time 
in the case in which the Assistant U.S. Attorney and a 
couple of FBI agents went down to Costa Rica to interview 
people in prison there? 

Do you recall if you learned about the case 
before that? 

A Yes, before that. Leon Kellner talked to me a 
number of times about the case, just essentially describing 
what it involved and what was going on. Later on complaining 
bitterly about the media and people making allegations of 
misconduct on his part. 

Q Did you first hear about the case from Mr. Ke]|ner 
or from someone at main Justice? 

A I couldn't be able to even guess what the answer 
to that is. I just don't know. 

Q Correct me if 1 am wrong, I believe last time 
in the interview you mentioned that you had spoken about 
the case with Mr. Jensen? 

A I have spoken to Mr. Jensen about it, Mark Richard 



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about it, I read about it in the newspaper. But I have 
no current recollection as to the very first person from 
vrtiom I heard about the case. 

Q Do you recall if you spoke to Mr. Jensen about the 
case prior to the FBI agents going down to Costa Rica? 

A I must have, but again I have no current recollection 
of the time sequences on this. 

Q Did you or Mr. Richard prepare any memoranda 
for Deputy Jensen? 

A I don't believe so, and I asked Mark recently 
about that, and all he did was provide to me a memo that 
the FBI had prepared for Mr. Jensen. I think it was from 
the FBI to the Deputy Attorney General, who would have been 
Mr. Jensen, and attached to it was a note from me to Mark 
saying, indicating that Lowell wanted Mark to keep an eye 
on the case, something to that effect. I am sure you have the 
note. I do in my office. I should have brought it. 

Q Were you given a copy of this FBI memo? 

A At the time, for my own files, I don^t think so, 
but I did see it. 

Q Do you have it with you now? 

A No, it is in my office. 

Q Would you be kind enough to provide a copy to the 
committee? 

A You have never seen that memo? 



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Q No, no. I have never seen that. 

A Okay. I can probably get it over here right now, 
if you let me use the phone. 

Q That would be fantastic. 
Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THF HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Do you recall when you read the memo, whether it 
be then or now, if it made any reference to the National 
Security Council or to Oliver North? 

A I have not read it in a long time. I just got it 
this morning for the purpose of reading it, but I didn't 
read it, so why don't we wait until it comes over and you 
have a copy of it. 

Q Okay. 

Do you know what Mr. Jensen did with the memo? 

A From my own personal knowledge, no, although I 
believe he may have used it to brief somebody in the National 
Security Council, but that is just a sense that I have. I 
wasn't there, as I say, I don't know specifically what he 
did with it. 

Q Were you aware that he had received an inquiry 
from the National Security Council about the case? 

A I think I have learned subsequently that he did. 




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Q Do you know who at the National Security Council 
made the inquiry? 

A No, I don't. 

Q Do you know who it is that Mr, Jensen briefed 
at the National Security Council? 

A No, I don't. As I say, I was not with him. 

Q Were you aware at the time that he was going to 
brief someone at the National Security Council? 

A No, I don't believe I was. 

Q When did you learn that? 

A It has to have been some time after all the fur 
started to fly. 

Q How did that come up? 

A Well, I was generally aware of this case, but 
not paying that much attention to it. It was something 
that was on my radar screen, and I know Lowell was aware 
of it, and he asked me to ask Mark Richard to keep an eye 
on the thing, whi» is standard operating procedure whenever 
you had a case with those international ramifications to 
them. But it really started to surface on my screen when 
the allegations started to come out that either Jensen or 
Meese had said something to Kellner in the nature of, manage 
the case so that nothing happens with it. That is when Leon 
KeHner went ballistic and was just furious and called me 
up, and mad as hell, and told me that nobody^ ever said 



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anything like that to him and he was sick and tired of the 
BS and blah-blah this and blah-blah that, and he only talked 
to Meese on a couple passing occasions about it, and 
Lowell may have inquired as to the status of it once, but 
that is it. That is when I really began to track that 
there was something involved in the case, more than just the 
usual case. 

Q Did you meet with Mr. KelJner in August of 1986? 
If I can refresh your recollection, he brought with him some 
affidavits in your civil law suit. 

A August 1986? 

Q Yes. 

A Don't you have a better date? 

Q It would have been latter August? 

A I remember meeting with Leon in my office on a 
couple of occasions. I guess the record ought to reflect 
that I have my appointments book before me for the year 1986, 
which you are welcome to look at, if you want. 

I don ' t show anything in my book , I do have a 
hazy recollection of meeting with Leon on the case when, 
but I don't remember when. I can check my phone logs. 

If this is wasting your time or taking — here 
is a call from KelAier on August 4, at 11:44 in, 1:45 out, 
so I talked to KeJfrier August 4. 

Here is Kelfner August 5. That may have been just 
a call in, I don't show — no, wait, that is out. 



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Q Well, the timing is not that critical for purposes 
of my question. 

A Okay, 

Q My question, I guess, is simply in relation to 
a summer conversation with Mr. Kellner or visit from Mr. Kellner, 
did he ever express to you any concerns about any — any 

7 political concerns about the Garcia, or that politics were 

8 involved, or any statement about the substance of the affidavits 

9 and Senator Kerry? 

10 A Leon Kellner never told me that somehow politics 

11 were influencing his decisionmaking. To the contrary, 

12 he at all times stated he was making all the calls on the 

13 case based on the facts, based on equity, on the interests 

14 of justice, and I am repeating myself, but he was mad as hell 

15 that people were insinuating that something else was happening 

16 in the case. So many people — he beefed to me that some 

17 of Kerry's people were mucking around in it. But that was 

18 about all. 

19 Q Did you know or did you ever hear of anyone at 

20 the Department of Justice telling Mr. Kellner to slow down 

21 on the investigation? 

22 A No . 

23 Q Did you brief Mr. Jensen on the investigation 



when it first came to light? 

A rf I did, it was no more than 30 seconds, I 



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may have told him that there was a case down in Miami 
involving allegations of gun running and things like that, 
but nothing in detail. 

Did you ever brief the Attorney General on the 
case? 

A I have no recollection of ever briefing the Attorney 
General on it. 

I am hesitating — I don't even know whether I have 
talked to him about it after. I very v/ell may have told 
him at one point that Kellner — very well may have mentioned 
in Lowell's presence that Kellner was mad that people were 
insinuating that something was funny in the case. 

Q Do you recall what either the response of the 
Attorney General or Mr. Jensen was? 

A No. There was no notable response, 

Q Did you ever speak to anyone from the National 
Security Council about this case? 

A who from the National Security Council — North? 
no. I don't think I have ever spoken to Poindexter or 
McFarlane ever. 

Who else, can you give me some names? I don't think 



so. 



Q Those would be the main ones we would be interested 



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Q Did you ever speak to Buck Revell about this 
case? 

A Buck Revell about this case? 

I must have. I must have, but I don't remember. 
Q Did he ever mention to you briefing anyone at 
the National Security Council? 
A No. 

Q I think those™ 
A If he did, I don't remember it, 
Q Those are the only questions I had on that 
area. 

I will leave it to my colleagues to follow up, 
if they want to. 

.MR. McGOUGH: Do you want to do that at this time? 
MS. NAUGHTON: It might be best. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q Mr. Trott, I recognize you don't remember exactly 
wfien Ke]lner or the Miami investigation came to your 
attention, or who brought it to your attention. Do you 
remember why? 

A I very well could have read about it in the newspaper 

for the first time. 

Q But do you recall why it was brought to your 

attention? 

A No, it came to my attention in no different way 



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12 

than the kinds of cases that happen in the Department of 
Justice come to my attention. 

Q I believe you said that he 

A Nothing sticks out in my mind. 

Q I believe you said that you had learned subsequently 
that Mr. Jensen may have received an inquiry from the 
NSC; is that correct? There was a series of questions 
where you were asked if Mr. Jensen used the memo to brief 
the NSC, and I believe you said that you thought that was the 
case, but you didn't know from personal knowledge? 

A Right. 

Q You were asked whether you knew — whether Mr. 
Jensen had received an inquiry about the case from the NSC 
and I think you said you learned subsequently about such a 
contact? 

A I think so, but these are things to which I was 
not a witness. 

Q Do you remember how that might have come to your 
attention? 

A I think, that didn't come to my attention until 
after this investigation started last fall, when all the 
information started to float around. I don't believe I had 
any information as to that at all, until long after the 
fact. 

Q What information did you receive about that? 



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A You mean after the fact? 
Q Yes, after the fact. What were you told? 
A Somebody told me, I think it may have been Mark 
Richard, that I had a note on one of the memos asking him 
to keep an eye on it, and I got that. That is what I am trying 
to get over here, so I can show you the note that I wrote. 
It probably has a date on it. It would reflect the con- 
versation that I had with Lowell, where he asked me to have 
Mark keep an eye on it. Mark Richard is the guy who would 
watch those kinds of things in the ordinary course of the 
Department of the Justice. 

Q And what about that led you to infer or conclude 
that Mr. Jensen had had an inquiry from the NSC? 

A Mark may have said something to me about it. 
I don't know. I have talked to Mr. Jensen about it since 
the thing came up, came around. But I think he told me he 
may have had an inquiry from the NSC. I didn't ask him 
any great detail about bow the memo came to be, but I am 
pretty sure he told me he may have had an inquiry. I am 
not positive of that. 

Q I know we are going to get it ultimately, but 
just for the sake of contextualizing my questions and not 
breaking up the continuity, do you remember the date on the 
note, or was there a date on the note to Mark Richards? 

A I didn't look at it this morning. It is the only 



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• thing I didn't bring over here — wait a minute. Let me 
2 triple-check something — No, it looks like it didn't 

come in this. 

- Q It will be over here, I just wondered if you 
had noted that? 

A No, there are two of these and it is the other 
one. 

Q You mentioned that you had a conversation with 
Mr. Jensen in which he may have indicated that he had 
gotten an inquiry from the NSC. Do you remember when 
that conversation took place? 

A A couple months ago. 

Q What was the occasion for the conversation? 

A I talked to him periodically, he and I are 
very good friends, and I call him up and I tell him, for example, 
the Hamadei case isn't going well; a lot of stuff he worked 
on when he was in the department, and I think it was the 
occasion of he told me that, I guess, this committee was coming 
out to talk to him about it. 

As a matter of fact, he told me that yesterday 
again when I was talking to him, that you were on your way 
out there next week to talk to him about it. 

Q Did he indicate who at the NSC may have inquired 
about it? 

A I don't recall. I didn't get into it in any 



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detail at all. 

Q I notice you were referring to your telephone 

logs? 

A Yes. 

Q While we have them in front of us, do they reflect 
a call to or from Leon KeUner on April 4, 1986? 

A NO, I looked at that before I came over here because 
it is in a letter. April 4, 1986, right? 

MS. NAUGHTON: For the record, the committee sent 
a letter to the Department of Justice recently asking for a 

telephone log or logs. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, you can loot at all this stuff 

if you want. 

It has driven me crazy. Here is March-April 1986. 

You want April 4? 

MR. McGOUGH-: Aoril 4, yes. 

THE WITNESS: Absolutely crazy. If I ever leave 
the government, I won't come back simply because I am 
never going to go through this again. 

MS. NAUGHTON: When you have to rule on discovery 
issues, you will be in empathy with the parties. 

THE WITNESS: Here is April 1986. I went over 
this with my secretary. This is not her regular writing, 
but you can see -- wait. I am showing you March 31, Dr. 
Mark, a personal friend. Steve McMee, U.S Attorney in 




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Arizona, and Art Grubb, used to work for the organized crime 
unit. Up here, you have Darryl Mclntyre, White House 
tickets — Assistant U.S. Attorney in LA, coming back to 
Washington and wanted to visit the White House. 

Judy Freedman; Steve Sullivan, the AUSA in LA. 
Pete Nunez, U.S. Attorney in San Diego. Meulenberg, DOJ 
lawyer; Doug Bailey, Charlie Heitiger, worked on the Hill; 
Bob Werthein, then back to April 2. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 

Q This is the entry for April 4? 

A Yes. 

Q Can you tell me a little bit about how these 
logs are compiled? 

A Usually my secretary, who is working there, makes 
notes of incoming and outgoing calls. These are not 
complete. She misses some on occasion, and I must admit 
I aiB bad, sometimes I make calls and don't tell her. 
Sometimes I pick up the phone myself and answer it myself. 

Q So these would be calls which she was directly 
related. She placed it or received it? 

A Yes. As I say, these are not — this is not her 
handwriting either, this is scHnebody else' s handwriting. 
But this is her's starting here. There are a lot of KeUner - 
some KelJner calls in here around that date. 



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MS. NAUGHTON: Could you, while you are there, 
check April 11? 

THE WITNESS: Sure. 

Mark Richards, Gerry Martin, DiGenova , so on. 
McGinnis; the garbage call; Jack King; Tom Greelish, [)oug 
Bailey; Gary Shone; Buck Revell. Tnen it goes to the 14th. 
Was that a Friday, the 11th? 
Anything else? . 
MS. NAUGHTON: No. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 
Q Not on the telephone log, I don't think. 

Am I correct, did you not make the trip with the 
Attorney General, with General Meese, and Mr. Jensen, when they 
visited the wounded FBI agents in the hospital in Miami? 

A I made the trip, but I went a different way. That 
was the Cancun trip; right? 
Q That is right. 

A I went to Florida and they went somewhere else. 
I was down there when they met with the Mexican people. 

Q Did you ever discuss the case of the investigation 
you are referring to with anyone else in Mr, KelJner's office, 
other than Leon Keener himself? 

A He has a woman who is a press officer, something 
like that. 






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Q Ana Barnett? 

A Yes, I may have talked to her about some part of 
the stuff that was going on, but it was nothing of substance. 
And the lawyer that everybody is worried about, what is 
his name? 

Q The assistant on the case? 

A Yes, who supposedly wrote the memo? 

Q Mr. Feldman. 

Q I don't know him. I have never talked to him. 

Q How about Mr. Gregoj^ 

A I don't think so. 

Q Mr, Sharf, or s-h-a-r-f, or s-c-h — 

A Jerry Sharf? 

Q Yes. 

A No. 

Q You know him? 

A r knew since Philadelphia. 

Q But you haven ' t spoken to him? 
I think, it is Larry Sharf. 

A Larry Sharf, that is right; yes. I haven't spoken 
to him since Philadelphia. 

Q Did you ever see the memorandum sent by Mr, Feldraan 
to the Justice Department, sent over Mr. Feldman's signature, 
and sent by Mr. Keljner to the Justice Department? 

This would have been about a 20-page memorandum. 



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dealing with the case? 

A I have seen all kinds of stuff from it, after the 
fact. Again, when all this investigation started, mostly 
in the newspapers, but I don't think I have — no, I don't have ai 
recollection of it, at least. 

Q Did you ever request such a memorandum from Mr. 
Kellner? 

A I don't believe so. 

Q Do you ever recall discussing with Mr. KeJjner 
the advisabiliJy of going to a grand jury with any evidence 
in the case? 

A Prospectively? 

Q Prospectively. In other words, discussing with 
him whether or not the case should go to the grand jury? 

A No, but I think at various points he has told me 
that he was going to handle it right, and it was going to 
go, when he decided it was going to go, but this may have 
been a lot of yelling and screaming that he was involved in, 
after he got so mad that people were accusing him of 
misconduct. But I don't have any recollection of a meeting 
during — wherein we discussed the advisability or the timing 
of any grand juries. 

Leon, as far as I was concerned, was making all 
the decisions himself, down in his office. The only thing 
I have ever told him was I agree with you, Leon, keep doing 



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it right. 

MR. McGOUGH: I think that is all I have. 

THE WITNESS: Have you deposed him, or talked to him 
about this? 

MS. NAUGHTON: Yes, we have. 

THE WITNESS: Was he calm? 

He wasn't calm when I talked to him. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Probably relatively. 

MR. McGOUGH: That is all I have. 

MR. BUCK: I don't have any questions. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Okay. 

Moving right along, now I would like to get into 
the Iranian arms transactions and your involvement in the 
investigation. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Prior to the Attorney General's press conference 
on November 25, 1986, did you have any contact with the 
legal analysis of the Iranian arms transaction or investigation 

A Absolutely none. I never — I had never heard 
a word about any of that until the press conference. The 
whole thing came as new information to me as I was watching 
it on television. 

Q Certainly you were aware that the United States 
had sold arms to Iran before that? 



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A I was? 

Q Well, the papers had printed stories up until 
then that there was an Iranian arms sale, it wasn't until 
the Attorney General's press conference that it was stated 
there was a diversion to the contras. 



6 ' ' 

A That is probably so, from the newspapers. But I ' 



had not paid any attention to that at all. 

Q Well, let me ask it this way. The Evans case in 
New York arose about that time, and the defense apparently 
brought up the issue that perhaps these were government- 
sponsored shipments and should not — and therefore, the 
indictments should be dismissed, and the government had to 
respond to that. 

This is in the time frame of mid-November, 
early November 1986? 

A I do know about the Evans case, you are right. 
So, hang on a second. You are probably right. I did know 
about the Iranian arms sale — I knew about it when it became 
public, but in any case, I cidn't know about it beforehand. You 
are right. The whole contra thing, I didn't know anything 
about it until it got on television. Whenever the whole 
thing got public, yes, I knew about it. But from having read 
about it in the newspapers, not from any information I 
received as a member of the Department of Justice. 

Q Let me ask you about that Evans case for a minute. 



you about that Evans cas 

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• ' 22 
When the request came in from Mr. m&LiI I ^iKfj office 
to somehow certify that his case had nothing to do with the 
government-sanctioned Iranian arms sales, were you involved 
at all in those discussions? 

A Yes, I talked to Lowell about it, and Mark Richard 
about it, and there was concern that we get accurate information 
and I am pretty sure we talked to the Attorney General about it, 
and we eventually got back information from someplace, 
I don't know where, that there was no connection. That 
the Evans case was quote "clean." 

Q Did the Attorney General take this to the National 
Security Council? 

A I never asked him; I don't know. 

Q He didn't mention to you that he was going to 
speak to Admiral Poindexter or anyone else? 

A He may have. I have a vague recollection of some 
talk about Poindexter being involved in it. Mark Richard 
probably has a better recollection of this than I do. 

Q Was Mr. Weld involved in these discussions at all? 

A I think so. 

Q Was it ever expressed to you or in your presence 
that perhaps the Attorney General shouldn't involve himself in 
gathering the facts? 

A Shouldn't? 

Q On these issues? 



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A Gather the facts on what issues? 

Q On the Iranian arras sales issues? 

A You are broadening the whole thing now? 

Q I say either in the context of the Evans case, 
or in the context of the government-sanctioned NSC arms 
sales? 

A Not until I told him after the news conference, 
and I can find specifically in my notes that he may appear 
to be a fact witness, and that was one thing that should be 
taken into consideration in the independent counsel decision. 
That is the only time that I was ever involved in something 
that sounds like that. 

Q Okay. Okay. 

A I can probably pinpoint that in my notes, if you care 

to have me do that. You have a copy of this; don't you? 

Q We just got it last night. I want to get to that 

later, but I want to lead up to the press conference, if I 

may.. 

The week before the press conference, say, starting 
from November 16, and on, were you in Washington at the 
Department of Justice during that week? 

A I left that week to go to Connecticut, but I was 
there, let's see, I was there the 17th, I was there the 18th, 
I was there the 19th, I was there the 20th, and I was there 
the 21st, and I left at 3:59 p.m., on U.S. Air for Hartford, 
Bradley, Springfield. I was gone on the 22, and I came back 

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on the 23rd. 

Q 23rd is a Sunday? 

A Yes. 

Q Now, prior to November 21, then were you aware 
that Assistant Attorney General Cooper and the Attorney 
General were participating in the drafting of Mr. Casey's 
testimony before the House Intelligence Committee? 

A No; here are my calendars; copies of my calenders, by 
the way, if you want them for the times I just referred to. 

Q May we keep those copies? 

A Yes. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If we could mark these 

THE WITNESS: 21 through 29. You are welcome 
to take a look at the originals I have with me, if there 
is any part of that that is blurry. 

(Exhibit No. SST-1 was marked for identification.) 

THE WITNESS: Here is December 1 to December 31, 
unredacted. 

(Exhibit No. SST-2 was marked for identification.) 
MS. NAUGHTON: Let the record reflect that 
Deposition Exhibit No. 1, includes the November dates of 
the 21st through the 30th; and the Exhibit No. 2 represents 
December 1 through the 31st of December. 

THE WITNESS: Then you have a copy of the chronology 
notes that I kept between November 25 and the beginning of 
the year? That is what that is in your file? 

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MS. NAUGHTON: Yes, we do. We got these last 
night. So long as we are on it, let me ask you one question 
about . 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Were these made contemporaneously, or after this 
had all happened and you went back to reconstruct? 

A Both. You will see the first entry says, reconstruct, 
11-28. Shortly after this whole thing started I began 
to keep this notebook, and it was on November 28 that I 
started to do that, and the first entry was November 25. 

I went back and reconstructed for the 25th, and 
everything up to the 28, then they were kept pretty much 
contemporaneously. Sometimes I would write it as it was 
going on; other times, 10 minutes later, one minute later, 
two hours later; but I was trying to keep up with what was 
going on. Also, I have a typed copy of that, too, which 
is a lot easier to read. My handwriting is impossible. 

Q Would it be possible, during a break in the 
deposition, for us to make a copy of the typed version, 
because in going through your hand-written version — we can 
make a copy of this? 

A Sure. 

Q Thank you. 

A I think that is accurate, that is a typed copy that 
I just handed you. 



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26 

We appreciate that very niuchT 
I had a little difficulty this morning. 
A You can't believe how long it took us to do that. 
My secretary tried it the first time, it must have had 
4000 errors in it. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Back on the record. 

Mr. Trott, you just said that you had recovered 
the notation that you made to Mr. Richard regarding the 
Garcia case, do you want to tell us what that is? 

A I just talked to my secretary. She pulled it out 
of my box, and read me a note dated March 24, indicating that 
it was a note that I sent to Mr. Richard, indicating that 
Lowell Jensen was going to give a briefing to the NSC on 
the whole matter; and that file is on its way over right now. 
Q Thank you. 

And, therefore, I would assume that if you put the 
note on there, you knew that Mr. Jensen was going to go to 
the NSC? 

A Yes. 

Q When you wrote the note? 

A That would indicate to me that he told me he was 
going to do that. 



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Q Getting back to the third week, I guess, in November 
of 1986, in looking at your calendar for Friday the 21st, I 
gather here you attended a staff meeting at 8:30 in the 
morning? 

A Yes. 

Q Do you have any notes of that meeting? 

A No. 

Q Does anyone regularly take notes at the morning 

staff meetings? 

A You mean like minutes? 
Q Or just a designated notetaker? 
A Cathy Appiard, the AG secretary, sits in there 
behind me. She has, I have never really looked, I have a 
recollection of some sort of a notebook in her hand, but I 
don't know what she is doing. The Attorney General himself 
sits there with a yellow tablet and writes subject matters 
and some notes to himself, but I have never really seen or 
reviewed those. Those are his own. 
Q Okay. 

DO you know if John Richardson takes notes? 
A Well, he takes notes, but I mean not as a secretary 
or a minute taker, but he does take notes. We all take 

notes, of one degree or another. Like the Attorney General 
asks me to call somebody and I have this thing that says, 
■to do," and I just write down, you know, what I am supposed 



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28 
to do, and I check it off, so I take notes to that extent . 

Q Do you know whether or not you took any such notes 
on Friday morning the 21st? 

A I have no way of knowing because sooner or later 
I throw all that stuff away. But I can t^ll you for certain 
that the investigation being conducted -'.id not come up. 
Whether it was intended to or not, I aon't know. But I 
never heard about that until the press conference. 

Q Did the general subject of Iranian arms sales 
come up during that meeting? 

A I don't know, 1 don't remember it coming up. 

Q Do you recall who was in attendance at the 
meeting? 

A No. I can tell you who the regular players 
are, but I have no way of telling you who was there on any 
particular day, 

Q Tell me who the regular players would be? 
" A The Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, 
the Associate Attorney General, John Bolton; John Richardson, 
Charles Freed; Bill Weld, Steve Galbach, Cribb, whenever he 
was around; Joe Morris, Steve Markman, M-A-R-K-M-A-N— — 

Q Who was that? 

A He is the Assistant Attorney General in charge of 
the Office of Legal Policy. 

Randy Levine, he is an Associate Deputy to Mr, Burns. 



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103 



either Terry Eastland or Pat Gorton in the National Office 
of Public Affairs, and then I may have missed somebody, 
but that is the usual cast of characters, 

Q okay. 

A There is an b:10 meeting before the 8:30 meeting 

usually. 

Q Who would that normally include? 

A That is the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney 

General, the Associate, the counselor to the Attorney General, 
and Chief of Staff John Richardson. 

Q Give me that again; Attorney General, Deputy 

A Counselor to the Attorney General, and Chief of 

Staff, just five of us. 

Q DO you recall whether or not at the 8:30 meeting 
there was any discussion or anybody brought up the subject 
of whether or not the Criminal Division should take a look 
at the Iranian arms sale? 

■ A I don't believe so. 

Q Do you recall whether you would have attended 
the whole meeting or whether you would have left early? 

A Oh, 99.9 percent of the time I attend the whole 
meeting. Oily on rare occasions do I not, such as this 
morning when my wife called me up and said, where are my 
car keys? I was running the meeting this morning and had 
to leave to figure out where her car kep were, but usually 




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30 
I am there the whole time. 

You should talk to Bill Weld on this subject, 

though. 

t 
Q Why is that? . • • ' 

A Because he was in charge of the Criminal Division, 
and I think he did have a conversation with Meese about this 
at some time. When it was, I don't know. 

Q What did Mr. Weld tell you? 

A He told me that Mr. Meese had explained to him 
why the Criminal Division had not been brought in or was 
not being brought in, or something like that. 

Q And what did he tell you Mr. Meese had said about 
why the Criminal Division wasn't brought in? 

A He just said that Meese had called him and told 
him the Criminal Division was not being brought in. I didn't 
ask him what reasons did he have for not doing that . And 
I didn't find out about this until after .the weekend. 

Q Was it shortly after the weekend, or currently, 
or do you recall? 

A It was probably during the week, of November 24. 
It has to have been after noon on November 25. 

Q So, it was after the press conference? 

A After the press conference and before the 
end of the week. Either Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday, 
or Friday, I remember Bill telling me something about that. 



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Q In what context did this conversation come up? 

A Just in the general context of discussing the whole 
thing. 

Q All right. 

What was — was it your feeling that the Criminal 
Division should have been called in earlier? 

A Not at that time, no, because I didn't see any — 
the way it was described to us, there was no predicate for 
a criminal investigation at that time. That Mr. Meese was 
simply gathering the facts in order to make sure that 
they were fully known by everybody involved, and that any 
testimony that was going to be prepared would be 
completely honest and accurate. And we were told, 1 was 
told there was no — it was not a criminal investigation 
in that there was no predicate for a criminal investigation 
that had been perceived by etnybody. As a matter of fact, the 
first meeting that we held was in order for Meese to ask that 
the criminal experts discover the facts so they could 
discern whether there was a predicate for a criminal 
investigation and whether the FBI ought to be brought in. 

I can refer to my notes, Tuesday November 5 — 25, 
1986, and 12:05 p.m., press conference, followed by meeting 
with EM 3 in his office. Meese briefs group, requests that 
I assemble the best Criminal Division legal analysts to 
examine the knovn facts to determine in the light of the contra 



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32 

revelations if any criminal statutes are implicated. 
Then I went through and identified Mark Richard and Bill 
Weld as people who ought to sit down immediately, ASAP, 
with Cooper to go over what they had found, and to discern 
whether there was a possible criminal predicate in all of 
that. 

Q Well, you stated that at the time when you learned 
that the Attorney General's first purpose was to investigate 
the discrepancies in the prepared testimony that Mr. Casey 
was to deliver, that there was no predicate for involving 
the Criminal Division at that time; however, once the diversion 
memo was found on Saturday, around noon, on the 22nd of November 
did you feel that at that point the Criminal Division should 
have been involved? 

A I didn't stop to think about it in those terms 
at that time. 

Q What is your opinion now? 

A Opinion now? 

Q Yes? 

A It would have been appropriate to bring in the 
FBI at that time. It would have appropriate to bring in 
the FBI — it is awfully hard to pinpoint, but probably 
after what I understood from watching television, was Sofaer's 
second conversation with Chuck. 

Q On Novemher— 



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A This is with the benefit of hindsight. I can 
say that now because I have seen you refer on television to 
things that I had never heard of before, like what they 
call the PROF. 

Q PROF messages? 

A PROF messages and things like that. So I am possessed 
of so much new information it is very difficult f'or me to 
separate the new information and view it only perspectively 
from where Chuck and everybody else was. 

Q Well, let me put it this way then. In these 
terms. And let's put it at Sunday evening then when Mr. 
North is interviewed by the Attorney GeneraL with Mr. 
Richardson, and Reynolds, and Cooper, and verifies that, indeed, 
there was a diversion of funds and described in detail how 
it was done. Just given those facts of the diversion memo, 
and Mr. North's corroboration of the facts in the memo, 
do you feel it would have been appropriate at that time to 
involve the FBI and the Criminal Division? 

A On the basis of that only, it could have been 
appropriate, but I don't think if you just view it as that 
alone, that it would have been necessarily inappropriate to 
do what was then done. I understand the Attorney General 
still did some checking to see whether this in some way had 
been sanctioned, so, again, I say I don't know whether it 
was inappropriate, but had somebody brought in the FBI 



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34 
at that point/ it wouldn't have been inappropriate. 

Q You mentioned that there were many new facts you 
learned after listening to Mr. Cooper's testimony over 
the television? 

A Yes. 

Q Can you tell us what some of those were? 

A Nearly all of it. I didn't know the precise 
details of the first entry of Chuck into the matter, for 
example, and I didn't know what Chuck's mission was. 

I did not know that Chuck and the Attorney General 
and the rest of the group had sat down after having received 
what has been identified as a generally accurate chronology 
from the CIA. and NSC, to go over the testimony. I did not 
know anything about what happened at that meeting. 

I did not know that Oliver North began to change 
the testimony and indicate in a meeting that nobody in the 
United States Government knew that Hawk missiles were 
involved. I did not know that shortly thereafter that 
Sofaer called and started to raise the roof. I knew none 
of the stuff in the Sofaer deposition that came out. I 
didn't know that Chuck called the Attorney General at West 
Point. I didn't know that Sofaer had a couple of conversations 

I didn't know that Sofaer raised the contemporaneous 
notes. I didn't know anything about that. I didn't know 
anything about the PROF messages. This all came as news 



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35 

to me. And I didn't know some of the details, sketchily 
known they had interviewed people and all that, but all that 
first business with the — I guess the record should show 
that my secretary has just come into the room and delivered 
to me a document titled, "secret." 

You might want to interrupt and hit this? 
Q Might as well; yes. 
A Okay. 

This is the original — this is a copy, too; no. 
Mark must have the original. 

This is a routing and transmittal slip. This is 
Mark Richard's handwriting that I identified. It says, 
"3-26-86, spoke to Keliner, AUASA not back from NO." I 
don ' t know what NO is. 
Q New Orleans. 

A "File contra folder ," these are Mark Richard's 
initials. The second is a routing slip and transmittal slip 
in my hand, "3-24-86" to Mark Richard. It says, "Coordination 
and see me"; and it says, "Please, get on top of this, 
DOJ is giving heads up to the NSC." He would like us to 
watch over it. "Call Keljner, find out what is up, and advise 
him the decision should be run by you." 

That would be Mark. 

Then this is a memorandum that I referred to earlier 
from the FBI to the Deputy Attorney General, which 



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would have been Lowell. This shows — this writing down 
here, SST 3-24-86, shows that it came to my office. This is 
the control slip;the secretary would write on it. So I 
got this — I don't know where I got it. 

And this is what I sent down to Mark, and this 
speaks for itself. 

This is a copy. you can have. 
You are entitled to have secret classified 
information? 

Q Yes. 

A Are jou sure? 

May the record reflect she has said, yes; and I am 
handing it to her. 

I thought you had that? 
Q No. I have never seen it before, and I have 
gone through all the documents that we have. 



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MS. NAUGHTON: Off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 

THE WITNESS: You will notice in here it says the 
FBI has pursued this investigation with concurrence of the 
Internal Security Section of the Department of Justice. 
Mark Richard is the supervisor of the Internal Security 
Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of 
Justice . 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Okay. 

If we may go back — 

A To what else I had not learned? 

Q Yes, to what else. 

A Most of it came as new information to me . As I 
said, the PROF notes, all that stuff was new. I had not 
heard anything about McFarlane briefing Shultz. As I said, 
the contemporaneous notes, all that came as new information. 

Q So when you were briefed, in other words, by Mr. 
Cooper and the Attorney General and Mr. Reynolds and 
Richardson on the 25th and 26th of November, this outline 
was not communicated to you? 

A See, I wasn't really briefed. My job was to set 
up the structure to handle this th4.ng, not to be either 
the lawyer on the case or to be the investigator or to 
actually find out what happened. If you take a look at the 



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notes, you will see — I am more of an organizer in my function 
— first Meese wanted to get the Criminal Division people 
in to listen to whatever information it was they had, and 
it was never completely clear to me everything they had. 
The contra memo was the thing that kept jumping up and down 
like some sort of a jack-in-the-box. 

So, I did get Mark and Bill and say, "Okay, sit 
down with Chuck and find out from Chuck what is involved 
and then come back and tell us." So, I never got any of the 
original information at that point. I did not sit in with 
the FBI when it interrogated or questioned Chuck and Brad 
and John Richardson and all the rest. I sat in briefly 
when Ed Meese talked to them, but that was about it. I 
was more involved in organizing it rather than finding out 
what happened. 

Q Mr. Trott, you referred to the second Sofaer 
conversation with Mr. Cooper. Are you referring to the 
one on Sunday? 

A I don't know when they took place. I — my 
recollection is that there was a first conversation with 
Sofaer and Cooper and a second conversation. I say second 
because I think I remember it was the second one where 
Sofaer said, "He got notes of this where McFarlane said 
that there were Hawk missiles involved." 



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Q So, as of that point, would it have been, in your 
opinion, wise at that point to call in the Criminal Division 
to find out exactly what was happening at that point, 
being, if it were, it might have been a violation of the 
Arms Export Control Act? 

A Yes, with the benefit of hindsight, it would not 
have been inappropriate to bring in the Criminal Divison at 
that point. 

Q Do you know why, Mr. Trott, during this weekend 
inquiry, you were not included? 

A Well, that is a question that you really ought 
to address to the Attorney General. My — we were essentially 
told that the reason was that they were not engaged in a 
criminal investigation; that there was no predicate for 
one until the contra memo began to come into focus, and that 
the objective of the operation was to discover what had 
happened, all the facts, and to make sure that everybody 
knew what the facts were before somebody made a mistake, 
and either give testimony or started to talk about the thing 
in terms that were not accurate. 

Q I understand that is the position. 

Do you have any feeling or belief that you were 
not included for any other reason? 

A No. 

Q Do you have any feeling or belief as to why 



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anyone in the Criminal Division wasn't included in that 
weekend inquiry? 

A Feeling or belief? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't have any reason to believe that what I 
was trld was not true in terms of the motivations of 
people . 

Q Have you spoken to anybody at the White House 
about the weekend inquiry? 

A White House? 

Q Yes. 

A. Can you be more specific? 

Q Either the White House or the National Security 
Council? 

A That is a — I can't track that question. You mean 
when, now, yesterday, two weeks ago? Six months ago? 

Q What I am getting at in terms of the last question 
I asked you, you say based on what I have been told, is 
what you have been told, does that emanate only from the 
Department of Justice, or have other people in the White 
House or in other government agencies or outside of 
government, informed you as to what went on during the 
weekend in question? 

A That is a long question. I don't remember any 
discussions with anybody from the White House or any . _ 



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other agencies about the weekend inquiry. My notes will 
reflect that I did talk to Peter Wallison, I talked to 
Jay Stevens, talked to Brendan Sullivan, talked to a 
number of people, but not about that subject. 

Q so you were not aware, until after the fact, 
that Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Cooper had met with Mr. Green, 
Tom Green, the attorney? 

A What do you mean, after the fact? No, Green 
shows up in my notes. 

Q According to Mr. Cooper's public testimony, they 
met with Mr. Green on ther-Monday the 24th at approximately 

2:00 p.m. 

A Let me see, I have Green in here somewhere. 

Q . Mr. Green meets again with Mr. Reynolds on 
December 1st. I am asking you about the first Green 

meeting. 

A I never met with Mr. Green. Here is a reference 
in my notes. He came up, however, Wednesday, November 2 6th, 

8:10, 8:30. 

MR. McGOUGH: How about the last note on there 

before Friday, November 28th? 

THE WITNESS: Hang on a second. It says here 
at the end of, there are no secrets, lawyer for-- then 
I got Green scratched out, North, et al.. Green, discussed, 
WBR to hemd him off to Weld. 



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Reynolds indicated that some guy, a lawyer 
for these characters named Green, was talking to him about 
the whole thing, and it was my sense and the sense of the 
group that it was not appropriate at that juncture for 
Brad Reynolds to be talking to this guy about the case, 
that he should be as a lawyer for possible suspects, 
subjects on an inquiry to hand him off to Bill Weld who was 
running it for the Criminal Division. 

You point out another one . 

MR. McGOUGH: Yes, that day's reference. 

MS. NAUGHTON: May I explore that reference for 
a moment? 

THE WITNESS: End of what day? 

MR. McGK)UGH: Just before Friday, the last entry 
before Friday, November 28th. 

THE WITNESS: "Green may want to give us their 
story, pluses and minuses discussed, team will decide." 

It was brought up that Green wanted to talk and 
the pluses and the minuses of that were discussed. The 
minuses obviously being that we were not in a position to be 
able to judge the truth of anything that he might say, but 
the investigative team would make that decision. That is 
where we came out on that one . 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q When it was brought up that it_MCuld not be 



as brought up that it wou 



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appropriate for Mr. Reynolds to meet with Mr. Green, did 
you bring that up with Mr. Reynolds? 

A Yes, that probably is a bad formulation of it. 
What was brought up was it would be appropriate for the 
guy to meet with the investigative team, not Brad. I am 
not sure anybody told Brad it would be inappropriate for 
you to meet with him, but the proper way would be for the 
guy to talk to the investigative team on the case. 

Q Why? As opposed to Mr. Reynolds, why, since he 
had been with the initial team? 

A He was out of it now and we were running a 
criminal investigation. And lawyers for subjects, targets, 
all the rest, should talk with the people handling the case. 

Q Okay. Do you know why it is that he decided to 
meet with Mr. Green anyway? 

A No. You have to ask him. 

Q Did he ever tell you? 

A No. 

Q Who did you understsmd on Novenvber 26th that 
Mr. Green represented? 

A My notes say North, et al. I just remember him 
being for North and there obviously must have been somebody 
else. Green must have been purporting to represent other 
people, but I didn't know anybody else's name. 

Q Did you think it was curious to meet with basically 



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a criminal defense attorney at this juncture in an 
investigation on Monday afternoon? 

A For Brad to? 

Q Yes. 

A Not really. I mean at that point the thing was 
really swirling and I don't know how the contact occurred. 
I think Green contacted Brad and if somebody would have 
called me and said, "Hello, I am Green", I would have said, 
"Hello, how are you?", and apparently he laid all of this 
stuff on him. That is my understanding, but again, I 
wasn't there. You would have to ask Brad or Green exactly 
how it came about. 

But the assessment was that it would be--the 
appropriate way to do it would be to, if he wanted to talk 
to anybody, it would be for him to talk to the investigative 
team, the lawyers and the investigators, and they would 
make the judgment as to whether they wanted to get any 
information from him or not, or when and how, and all the 
rest. 

Q Let me ask you one more hypothetical here, 
assuming that you were part of the weekend inquiry team, 
at what point would you have been involved, the FBI or 
the Criminal Division? 

A Boy, that is a very difficult question to answer 
because hindsight is always much clearer than foresight 



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and with all the information that I now have, that I have 
gotten from watching television and reading the newspapers 
in the last few weeks, it so floods my mind with facts, I 
am not sure that I can separate what I now know from what 
I would have known had I been standing there then. 

It's very difficult to say. It would have been— let 
me put it tl.is way, what is the most accurate way to put 
this— it would not have been impossible for somebody, 
after the phone call from Sofaer, to call a time-out and 
bring in some criminal law investigators. 
Q Okay. 

A On the cold facts, at that time, you could say 
that probable cause existed to believe that some violations 
of Federal criminal law may have occurred. 

Q If you had done anything differently, do you think 
you would haver-that that is what you would have done 

differently? 
- A You are asking me to guess, to go back and say 

What I would have done. I don't know what I would have done, 
It's hard to say, but somebody could have, whether it would 
have been me or somebody else, somebody could have called 
a time-out and brought in the criminal investigators and 

the FBI. 

I am not going to sit here and tell you that I 
would have because it makes me sound like smarter than 



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HIJHraFIED 



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maybe I am. 



Q Well, Judge Sofaer has said that he — in hindsight, 
he wishes he would have called you instead. Has he ever 
expressed that to you? 

A Yes. 

Q When did he express that to you? 

A I think after Chuck's testimony. 

Q Did he elaborate on that as to what that meant? 

A Do I know what he meant? 

Q Yes. 

A Yes, I think he meant that — you have to ask him 
what he meant. I took it to mean that he believes that 
somebody with criminal law experience might have spotted 
something at that juncture. 

Q What else did Judge Sofaer tell you about Mr. 
Cooper's testimony? Maybe I should start with one question 
at a time. Was there anything in it that he disagreed 
with? 

A No. He didn't say anything like that to me, 
whether he did or didn't though, you would have to ask him. 

Q This is Judge Sofaer--did he express any opinion 
as to how the inquiry was handled based on what ha heard 
in Mr. Cooper's testimony? 

A He said something to the effect that somebody 
with more criminal law background might have seen more in 



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this than Chuck did, something like that. 

Q Did he say anthing else to you in that conversation 
regarding this topic? 

A This topic? 

Q Yes. 

A Yes, he told me that he had not told Arnie Birns 
anything about contemporaneous notes. That all he told 
Arnie was that he was concerned that the story was not 
accurate, the story about oil-drilling equipment or something 
like that was not accurate, but he didn't give Arnie all 
kinds of details. 

Q How did that come up, that you were discussing Mr. 
Birns? 

A I don't know. It just came up. 

Q Had you read Judge Sofaer's deposition? 

A No. 

Q Okay . 

A I had read the parts of it that were reprinted in 
the newspaper. 

Q So you were aware when you talked to Judge Sofaer 
that he had called for the Attorney General and that 
Deputy Attorney General Birns had relayed a message from 
the Attorney General . 

A Yes. 

Q What did Judge Sofaer tell you about what Mr. 



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Birns told him in terms of relaying the message from the 
Attorney General? 

A Just that he had relayed the message from the 
Attorney General and the Attorney General signaled back to 
the effect that everything was — somebody was on top of it, 
it was under control or something like that. 

Q So that how did it come about that Judge Sofaer 
mentioned the notes or made a point of saying that he did 
not tell Mr. Birns about the notes? 

A I think he brought it up. He seemed to think that 
Arnie was getting a bum rap in the newspapers or something 
like that. 

Q Have you spoken to Mr. Birns about that incident? 

A Yes. 

Q When was that? 

A Shortly after Cooper testifed about it, or it came 
out in testimony. 

Q And what did Mr. Birns say about it? 

A He told me that he didn't have a distinct 
recollection of the conversation, because he didn't know 
what the — he didn't know anything about the subject 
matter. So, that he simply passed on the information 
from Sofaer in haec verba, verbatim, to the extent he 
was capable of doing that, and that he passed it to the 
Attorney General and the Attorney General passed back the 



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information to the extent that he was aware of it, that 
he was on top of it or somebody was on top of it, or 
something to that effect and he passed that back to Sofaer 
and that was it. 

Q What did Mr. Birns tell you specifically as you 
can recall, what did he tell you that he had been told by 
Judge Sofaer? 

A He didn't seem to remember very much about what 
he was told. I don't think he remembered very much at all. 

Q Did he seem surprised that this had come up? 

A Surprised? 

Q In other words, had he forgotten about it until 
this point? 

A I don't know, you would have to ask him. 

Q Did he say where the Attorney General was when 
he talked about it? 

A He didn't seem to know. He seemed to think the 
Att.orney General may have been in his car. 

Q Had he spoken to the Attorney General about this 
recently after Mr. Cooper's testimony? 

A I don't know. 

Q In other words, he didn't reference to you that 
he had just spoken to the Attorney General about this to 
refresh his recollection for any reason? 

A Yes, I was with the Attorney General and Mr. Birns 



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said something about, I don't even remember where you were 
when I called you; and the Attorney General said, I don't 
remember where I was either. Birns said, "I think you may 
have been in your car." The Attorney General said, "I am 
just not sure where I was, but I may have been in the car." 
It was something like that. 

Q So, when you discussed this with Mr. Birns, this 
was in the presence of the Attorney General? 

A That part of it was, yes. 

Q What did the Attorney General have to say about 
this episode? 

A That he had received a message from Mr. Birns, 
that he believed it related to what they were already looking 
into, and that, therefore, he had simply told Mr. Birns to 
tell Sofaer that they were on top of it. 

Q What did he say about the fact that they were 
already looking into it? 

A Nothing more than that. This was not a very — 
this was not a deep conversation. It was almost like the 
kind of conversation that you would have after reading 
something in the newspapers, somebody would say, see that 
business in the newspapers about such and so, I don't 
remember where you were, you remember where you were, 
hell, I don't remember, I think I was in the car, yes, you 
may have been in the car. The Attorney General said 



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something like all I remember is you called me with a message 
from Sofaer that something about this and I told you that, 
and there was no particular signal in it that alerted me to 
anything. It was just like that. Just like a casual 
conversation not a specific discussion as to what does all 
of this mean? 

Q Okay. Did you discuss Mr. Cooper's testimony 
with the Attorney General? 

A Discuss Cooper's testimony with the Attorney 
General? 

Q Yes. 

A I told him he ought to watch the tape of the 
testimony. I asked him if he had seen the tapes or have you 
seen Cooper's testimony; and he said that he had not. I 
told him that he should watch, should get a tape of it 
and look at it. 

Q Was there — 

A Hold on a second. I am still thinking. There was 
just a general discussion about it. You asked if there 
was any reason why we were talking about this? 

We were talking about his scheduling in terms of his 
deposition and preparation for his testimony. 

Q All right. What was that discussion about? 

A What ? 

Q What was that discussion about? 



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A Just the timing of the whole thing, he had a 
scheduling problem or something like that that was 
coming up and that was being discussed. 

Q And what was discussed in terms of what he needed 
to do to prepare for his deposition? 

A That he was going to have to sit down and go 
over all of his notes, material, and information to refresh 
his recollection about what had happened before the testimony; 
that it was probably going to be very arduous in terms of 
the way Chuck's testimony had been; and that he ought to 
take some time and do it so that he would be well prepared. 

Q In terms of the timing of his testimony, was there 
any discussion relative to other people's testimony, in 
other words, did the Attorney General express any desire to 
do it before or after any other testimony? 

A No, I don't remember anything like that, not in 
my presence, not that I remember. 

Q So, in terms of the timing issue, it was only 
dependent on his ability to prepare? 

A I think so, but again, I don't really know for 
sure . 

Q Did you discuss the substance of Mr. Cooper's 
testimony with the Attorney General? 

A Substance of? 



Yes. 



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A I didn't. 

Q Do you know if anybody did? 

A Chuck did. He just outlined it and only parts of 
it, I think. It wasn't a detailed briefing at all. It 
only took about maybe three minutes. 

Q Were there any portions of--during his debriefing, 
were there any portions of his testimony with which the 
Attorney General disagreed or his recollection differed? 

A Chuck's testimony? 

Q Yes. 

A No, not that I remember. 

Q Was there any discussion of what questions the 
members would be asking during those discussions? 

A Questions? 

Q Yes. 

A The only thing that I can remember is that, was 
the general sense that he was going to be asked why he 
didn't bring in the FBI earlier. That was described as the 
general drift of a large part of the questioning that Chuck 
had undergone which came as no secret. That was all over 
every television channel and newspaper in the country by 
that time. 

I think somebody simply said to him that that was one 
of the drifts of the questioning was probably going to be 
what he knew, when he koew it , and why he d^n ' t bring 



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in the FBI or the Criminal Division earlier. 

Q What was the Attorney General's response to that? 

A That he was, at that time, not running a criminal 
investigation; that the facts were simply being assembled; 
and that it didn't appear that a criminal investigation 
ought to be started until he came back and started 0"°. 

I can't remember the exact words he used, but it 
was just short, just something like that. 

Q Was there anything else discussed in that 
conversation about the Attorney General's proposed testimony 
and preparation for it? 

A Somebody said--and I can't remember who it was — 
that he ought to take as much time as he needed to get 
ready for the testimony because a lot of stuff was going to 
be gone over. 

Q Now — 

A Wait, wait, there was one other thing. When Chuck 
said — was it Chuck, I think it was Chuck who said the drift 
of it was going to be, one of the drifts was going to be 
that he had not brought in the FBI or the Criminal Division 
as early as he could have. 

I said, "With hindsight it is arguable that Chuck 
was an eye witness to a crime when North was cooking up the 
testimony" — Casey's testimony I guess it was. 

That is about all that I can remember that was said 



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about that. 

Q Do you know or did you know, either through 
personal knowledge or other ways, whether or not the Attorney 
General had contemporaneous knowledge of the November 
1985 Hawk shipment? 

A I have no knowledge, no information on that one 
way or another. I have never heard from him that he did. 

I never heard from Chuck or Brad or John Richardson or I 
any other people that he did. 

Q All right. And I gather that prior to November 
26th, 1986, that you were not aware that the Attorney General 
had been involved in the January '86 finding? 

A I did not know anything about that . 

Q Did the Attorney General ever come to you around 
that period of time and ask for any help? 

A General, when? 

Q In 1986 and ask for any type of research regarding 
such a finding? 

A No. 

Q Do you know whether or not he went to anyone in 

the Internal Securities Section or any other section? 

A I don't know. I don't believe so. I have never 
heard that he did. 

Q I had one other question regarding your conversation 
with Mr. Birns on the episode with Judge Sofaer. Did Mr. 



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Birns tell you that he had taken notes? 

A No. 

Q Did he say either way? 

A He didn't say either way. I got the impression 
that he had no notes, that it was just one of 10,000 
phone calls thot a Deputy Attorney General gets a year on 
various subjects. Very few of which one even remembers 
much less verbatim what was said. 

Q Well, when he got this message, did he call the 
Attorney General promptly, do you know? 

A Yes. But that is not unusual. I mean, he must 
do that five-six times a day, if not more. There is a 
constant flow of information back and forth between the 
Deputy and the Attorney General and the Associate and the 
Attorney General and the Assistants to the Attorney General. 
That is the way it goes on ten hours a day. 

If you asked me to reconstruct a single day last 
week, I would be hard pressed to do it. 

Q Join the crowd. I understand. 

A That is one of the reasons I kept these notes. 

Q If you have no objection, what we thought we 
would do is take a break and get a drink of water, or they 
have a cafeteria here, while we look through your typed notes 
and then, hopefully, that would short-circuit my questions 
so we don't have to go through day-by-day or minute-by- 



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UHEEISSIFIED 



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minute . 

A Okay, whatever you would like to do. 
Q Let's go off the record then. 
(Discussion off the record.) 



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MS. NAUGHTON: Back on the record. 
I want to direct your attention to November 26, 
1986, Mr. Trott, in the afternoon. I understand that at 
a meeting with the Attorney General that Deputy Attorney 
General Birns had been instructed to contact Mr. Wallison 
at the White House to secure the documents at the White 
House? I believe in your notes it's on the 22nd sometime 
around 1:30. 

A 22nd? 

Q 26th, excuse me. 

A 26th. 

Q If you can just tell me what you recall, we have 
your notes. 

A We were sitting in the meeting and Meese turned 
to Arnie and he said, did you call Wallison and ask him to 
get all these documents secured; and I can't remember the 
exact words he used but Arnie looked somewhat ruffled and 
sai-d, no. 

Q Why hadn't he? 

A I don't know. 

Q He didn't give a reason or explanation? 

A No. 

Q What did the Attorney General say? 

A He came, became visibly quite upset, combination 
of upset and angered and I, think Arnie then got up on his 



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own power and went out of the room, apparently to do it. 

Q When you say he got visibly upset, can you explain 
v*iat those manifestations were? 

A I don't think he anticipated that answer. I think 
he was just making sure that something that he had requested 
had been done. It was almost like a rhetorical question, 
did you call Wallison and ask the documents to be secured? 
And Arnie kind of went, and I can't remember whether he 
said I forgot or no, and the Attorney General kind of went - 
and that is the best I can recreate it. Kind of like this, 
like his body was saying, what? 

Then I remember Arnie getting up and motoring out 
of there. 

Q 
record. 

A 

Q 

A 

Q 
Mr. Birns. 

A Right. 

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Birns did indeed 
do that then? 

A Yes. 

Q All right. That would have been the afternoon of 



It would be hard for me to describe it on the 

I can't describe it. 

Other than perhaps a grimace. 

Grimace, yes. Or gritting of teeth. 

Okay. That is the Attorney General, not 



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the 26th? That is Wednesday, correct? 

A If that is what my notes show. 

Q Do you know whether or not the documents had 
been secured by White House security people prior to that, 
in other words on their own direction? 

A I don't know. 

Q So when Mr. Birns reported back he didn't 
mention, oh, they had already done it, or anything to that 
effect? 

A No. 

Q I point out there will be an investigation of 
our investigation. 

MR. McGOUGH: An understatement if there ever 
was one. 

BY MS. NAUGHTON: 

Q Mr. Cooper testified in public session that he 
got the sense that the FBI, particularly Mr. ClarkC but 
the FBI was a little uncomfortable with having him in the 
investigation . 

A Yes. 

Q Did they express that to you? 

A Yes. 

Q Could you tell us who expressed that to you? 

A Floyd Clarke. 

Q What did he say to you about Mr. Cooper's 



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involvement . 

A Simply that Cooper was a fact witness to many 
of the events that had gone on and under the circumstances 
it would be appropriate to have him not a part of the 
investigative team. 

Q Did you do anything about Mr. Clark's opinion? 
A Yes, we took steps to get Chuck onto the sidelines, 
Q What were those steps? 

A On Friday November 28 I got a call from Jack 
Keaney advising me that Cooper had participated in an 
interview with McMahon at the CIA and that FBI had 
expressly requested that no such interviews be attended 
by our people. I called Cooper and met with him, told him 
of the FBI concern that he will be a grand jury witness. 

He agreed, and indicated that he would not 
participate at that point unless part of a team approach. 

But I remember later he was moved out of the 
thing completely. 

Q Did anyone from the FBI ever express to you that 
they would not share information from their investigation 
with Mr. Cooper? 

A Not share it with Cooper? 

Q In other words not report the results of their 
investigation if Mr. Cooper were involved? 

A I don't think so, but the FBI stopped reporting 



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information to us shortly after I got involved in it when 
they started to smell an independent counsel. 

Q Okay. 

A Which is standard. At one point I was told the 
FBI was not sharing information with any of us anymore. 

Q Did either Mr. Hendricks or Mr. Carver make 
that complaint to you? 

A It really wasn't — was it a complaint? It was 
more an observation. Hendricks may have mentioned it. 

Q Okay. 

A But I didn't read anything into that because that 
is what they would do, if we are going to be recused because 
there is a conflict, it would be at that point that you as 
the investigator who was going to move over, should start 
to back away. That is the way it should work. Not that 
you back away from the investigation, but you begin to 
back away from the people who might not be in charge of it 
anymore . 

Q For the record, is it clear from your notes of 
November 28th that that is the date on which the FBI 
actually went to the White House to begin their search of 
the documents in Colonel North's office? I believe it's 
towards the end of your notes . 

A What happened on the 27th? 

Q The 27th is Thanksgiving. 



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A Oh, 26th, it looks like -- I don't know when the 
FBI did it. All 1 know is we discussed the documentary 
evidence in the early afternoon on the 26th, documentary 
evidence was discussed, checking it for prints. I went 
from the meeting to Birns to ask him to tell Wallison to 
make this stuff available immediately to the FBI. Arnie 
told me that he had already done that. The orders were 
to freeze and make available. 

Jay Stevens had been named as the contact for 
Floyd Clarte Then we discussed the letter to all other 
agencies. But when the FBI actually went over there, 
when the White House counsel grabbed the documents and 
when the FBI actually went over there I don't know. 

Q I believe you have a note further on if you look 
on the 28th, maybe on the next page. I should have marked 
it down. 

A Okay . 

It says Friday, November 28, Cooper has Meese 
agency letters, I approve the request they be signed and 
delivered today. Called to Clark to make sure documents 
under control and that everything is in order. He wasn't 
there. 10:30 call from Weld, FBI at White House, 7 a.m. 

Q so that indicates that on, at 7 a.m. on Friday, 
November 28, the FBI was at the White House. 

A Yes, he will receive periodic reports from the 



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team. Measures to prevent document destruction is reported 
in papers under review, possible grand jury subpoenas, yes, 
so that is what that indicates. 

Q Do you recall Mr. Clarke telling you that sometime 
during that week Mr. Poindexter had been interviewed? 

A I have a recollection of Clarke saying that. When 
it was, I don't know. 

Q Do you recall whether or not he discussed the 
substance of Mr. Poindexter 's interview with you? 

A I don't think so. I doubt it. I don't have 
any recollection of that. 

Q You don't recall asking him what Poindexter had 
to say? 

A No. I don't. 

Q On that issue, it has been testified to by 
Mr. Cooper that the Attorney — doesn't believe the Attorney 
General took any notes of his meetings Monday morning the 
24th with Admiral Poindexter, Mr. McFarlane, the Vice 
President, Mr. Regan. Do you know whether or not the 
Attorney General took any notes? 

A I have never seen any such notes and I never 
asked the AG if he had any. 

Q Do you know of anybody who has alluded to any 
notes during that meeting? 

A Who was at the meeting besides Meese? Was Cooper 



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there? 

Q On Monday morning, no, he testified he was not 
there. 

A Oh, then I have no knowledge of that one way or 
the other. Was the AG the only person present at these 
meetings, these interviews? 

Q Cooper testified as far as he knew that was t^e 
case. 

A I have no knowledge of any notes one way or the 
other. 

Q Were you aware on or about November 28th of a 
Los Angeles Times story that claimed that there had been 
a shredding episode at the White House? 

A Yes. 

Q How did that come to your attention? 

A Probably read it in the morning clips. 

Q Did you bring it to anybody's attention? 

A Everybody knew about it. Everybody was talking 
about it. Everybody had seen it at the same time. I didn't 
have to. 

Q What was the substance of the discussions then at 
the Department of Justice regarding this particular article? 

A Whether or not anybody was aware of any document 
destruction and nobody seemed to be. 

Q Do you recall that this article, did this article 



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come out after the FBI was actually at the White House? 

A I don't remember. What was the date of the 
article? 

Q I believe it was November 28. I would have to go 
back and check. 

Regarding the diversion memo and the whole subject 
of the funds from the Iranian arms shipment being diverted 
to the contras, had you heard at any time whether or not 
anybody within the Department of Justice mentioned any 
discussions occurring during the weekend of November 21 
through 23 regarding whether or not the fact that a diversion 
could be kept quiet from the public or from Congress? 

A No. 

Q On page 9 of your notes, if we could proceed 
there, there is an allusion to Brendan Sullivan. 

A Beeper? 

Q Calling, yes. 

A Yes. 

Q And regarding North's subpoena to testify before 
the Senate. 

A Yes. 

Q Could you tell us what that conversation was 
about and give us the date, please. 

A Sunday, November 30, at 8 o'clock. That was 
while I was in Tyson's Corner and my beeper went off and it 



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UmFIED 



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was a call from the command post, Brendqn Sullivan wanted 
to talk to me. Actually Brendo^n Sullivan was calling for 
Meese and Meese told the command post to have me respond. 
I called Sullivan, he told me he represented North, that 
North had gotten a call to — gotten called up here before 
a congressional committee and Sullivan wanted to know 
whether this would be a free for all or whether people should 
sit down and discuss how it should be handled — questions 
like executive privilege, classified information, whether 
Ollie was on his own to make these decisions or whether 
there were any expectations with respect to all of this 

stuff. 

And he named things like executive privilege, 
classified information and all the rest. As I say in my 
notes, I listened only, and told him I would call him back. 

I then called Meese, reported to him what this 
was, what the substance of the phone conversation was, and 
I recommended that I put Sullivan in touch with the White 
House, with Wallison and Stevens, Jay Stevens indicating 
that we should not be involved in anything like that. 

Meese mentioned that in any event North does 
not have the power to assert executive privilege and he 
mentioned to me that the President had given instructions 
to cooperate with Congress, expecting that there will be 
a responsible way to protect sensitive national security and 



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all the rest. 



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68 



Sullivan also mentioned that Poindexter and 
McMahon had subpoenas. I called Wallison, filled him in, 
told him it's improper for us to counsel North. He 
agrees. Said he was trying to reach agreement with the 
committee for the handling of national security information. 
Vtallison agreed that he would call Sullivan. I suggested 
that Jay Stevens be involved because of his special 
expertise and background. Jay was involved in the 
Watergate stuff and he was assisting the United States 
Attorney and is a very experienced Justice guy. 
That is the way that went down. 

Q When Mr. Sullivan called you on November 30, 
did he express to you that Colonel North did not want to 
testify before Congress? 

A No. 

Q Did he discuss with you Colonel North's plans to 
assert the 5th Amendment? 

A No. 

Q So his remarks to you were limited only to 
executive privilege and — 

A And classified information. He was an employee 
of the Executive Branch and all of a sudden he was going 
to be over there in a committee and he could be asked a lot 
of questions about things and it was more of a call of, you 



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know, what is the guy supposed to do? Is this a free for 
all, or is he supposed to answer all the questions or is 
the White House going to expect him to say no, that is 
national security information or I am sorry, that is 
executive privilege and this, that and the other thing. 
It was a very lawyerly-like call. 

Q Okay . 

A It's the type of call I might have made if I had 
been representing Oliver North and somebody said come 
over here and talk about what you did in the White House. 
You don't want to go over there and make a mess out of it 
so I assume he was told to cooperate. 

Q I guess what I am getting at in terms of the 
flavor of his remarks was, was he trying to hang his hat on 
executive privilege? 

A No, not at all. He just wanted to know what the 
signals were — I mean "signals" just in a straightforward 
way, not in a sneaky way either. You know, "What is my 
client supposed to do? 

Q You have a note on your — December 2 note 
around 10 o'clock in the morning. 

A Yes. 

Q If you would look at that. Just for the record 
is that on or about the time that the Attorney General 
decided to go ahead and apply for independent counsel? 



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A I got it — on December 1 I talked to Bill Weld. 
I was at Harvard and he was down here. He told me all 
options are still being reviewed, no final decision on the 
independent counsel. Six o'clock. Weld told me that there 
would be a meeting at 8 o'clock the next day. December 2 
at 9 o'clock, meeting EM 3 and staff — I think that should 
be has decided to apply to the court under 591 to seek 
independent counsel. So it is sometime between December 1 
and the early morning of December 2 that he made the 
decision. 

Q Now on page 15 of the notes there is a notation 
regarding apparently a conversation you had with Mary 
Lawton concerning the fact that CIA may have taped 
conversations regarding the White House or White House 
employees perhaps improperly. Can you tell us what that 
is all about? 

A I got a call from Dave Dougherty from the CIA 
who told me they had tape recording of somebody named 
Ambassador Kelly relating to the Iranian arms deal. They 
said they were going to make transcripts and turn them over 
to everybody, including Congress, but they wanted to make 
sure this was done right and also that the integrity of the 
original tapes was preserved. 

He said he thought the taping wasn't illegal 
because it was their private system that was being used and 



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nobody could expect any privacy vis-a-vis the CIA 
when using this system. 

Q Could you -- who is "they"? In other words, who 

had taped? 

A I guess it was a CIA employee. 

Q And Ambassador Kelly — is that an American? 

A Yes. 

Q An ambassador to a foreign country? 

A Yes. 
Q Okay . 
A I think so. 

Q And where was he taped, at the CIA? 
A I don't know. So I immediately called the FBI 
and said there are some tapes, and to call Dougherty and 
get on it. But then Mary Lawton apparently thought that 
these tapes were illegal and that it might be a crime to 
give them to anybody so then we got involved in this big 
circular investigation to see whether these tapes could 
be given to anybody without violating the law. There are 
some rules that say if you illegally intercept somebody's 
communications those can't be disseminated. 

Q Your reference to the White House, what is that? 
A These calls were somehow made involving the 
White House. I don't know. 

Q Your note says Mary Lawton advises CIA did tape 



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White House. 

A Yes. That meant these calls from Ambassador 
Kelly. This was some private system or special CIA 
system or something like that that was being used. All of 
this stuff has been turned over to the FBI. 

Q Was that eventually turned over to the committees, 
do you know? 

A I don't know. 

Q You don't know the outcome of that? 

A No. We dropped out of the whole thing. I don't 
know a lot of what happened after we dropped out. 

Q Also on page 15 there is a reference at the bottom 
of the page to — I don't know how this is pronounced — 
L-u-y-t-u-e-s, apparently a criminal defendant who claimed 
to have bank accounts with Oliver North. Can you tell us 
what that is all about? 

A That was a case up in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, Harvey Eisenborg was the organized drug 
task force coordinator and he called me up to report that 
this guy, Luytues, who was a ^IHI^HBB in Pennsylvania 
said some money in a Swiss bank account somehow is tied in 
with North. Luytues' company was called Air Services and 
apparently Luytues was fooling around with a CIA defense — 
which is not unusual — and the CIA originally said there 
was no problem, not tied to him, and Harvey told me the 



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FBI was already aware of this and I turned around just 

to make sure and called Floyd Clarteand he said he already 

knew about it. Where that went from there, I don't know. 

Q And on page 18 you refer to a January 16, 1987 
I guess exchange between Brend<\n Sullivan and the Attorney 
General. Apparently Mr. Sullivan wishes to get access to 
the President. Could you tell us what that is about? 

A Yes, I got a call from Brendan Sullivan who said 
he wanted to talk to Meese about the Iran-contra matter. 
He said he had something he wanted to get through to Ronald 
Reagaifi, that he tried Abshire but he didn't have any luck. 
He didn't want to go through Wallison. 

I told him that we, the entire Department of 
Justice^ are recused. Meaning we are not involved. We 
can't do that. He said it has nothing to do with the facts 
of the thing. I said look, we are out of this. What about 
Walsh? I said what if we tell Walsh, you know, get his 
permission, he said he didn't have any objection. I 

said — 

Q Excuse me, who had no objection? 

A Sullivan. 

Q Had no objection to your consulting Walsh? 

A Yes, he said I don't care if you tell Walsh. 

I said you're putting Meese in a bad situation 
because what if somebody makes authorized admissions to 



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Meese and all of a sudden he becomes a witness to the 
whole thing? He said, no, no, I am not talking about 
facts, this is just something important that I want to get 
through to Ronald Reagan. 

He said I am calling you because you are the 
only ones with any spine to do what is right. He said 
I don't intend to tell anybody about this meeting but 
there were no restrictions on us. 

I said that is fine because we wouldn't hide it 
from anybody anyway. 

I will tell him, I will pass it on to Meese. 
Then I went to Florida. 

I talked to Meese on Sunday, January 18, I was 
talking to him about Hamadei, also, and he said, "Well, 
think about it and take it up on Tuesday." 

Then Ken Cribb calls me in Florida and apparently 
Walsh, this had been run by Walsh and Walsh said it was 
not appropriate for Meese to talk to Sullivan under these 
circumstances, and I was told to tell Sullivan to call 
Abshire, that he is inclined to accept the call. That is 
the last I heard of it. 

Q For the record, Mr. Abshire is — or was? 
A Special Counsel to the White House for Iran- 
contra purposes, or something like that. I can't remember 



his exact title. 



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UliiM^ED 



75 



Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sullivan did 
speak to Mr. Abshire? 

A No. 

Q You do not know? 

A No, Brendan told me, he said I don't care if 
you tell the press about this or not, is what he told me. 

Q What did you understand the import of that remark 

to be? 

A I hadn't the — just that this is no big secret. 
I am not asking for something improper. In other words, 
there is nothing sneaky about this. 

Q Did he indicate, ever indicate to you in any 
way why he wished to meet with the President? 

A No. 

Q Do you know whether or not it was to discuss the 
possibility of a pardon for Colonel North? 

A I haven't the slightest idea. I did not get that 
impression but as I say I hadn't the slightest idea what he 
was talking about. I didn't want to know what it was 
because again, I always believed that we were recused and 
we shouldn't have anything to do with Oliver North or his 
lawyer at that time under those circumstances. 

Q There was a reference in your note to him saying 
you guys are the only ones with spine enough to do it or 



something. What does that mean? 



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A You would have to ask him. 

Q Well, when he made that remark what did he mean, 
to do what? 

A To do what is right — I just thought it was a 
throw-away BS comment. 

Q Could you tell us what the context was that it 
was made in? 

A Well, you know, that everybody else was running 
and hiding and the Department of Justice, he seemed to 
think, were the only -- was the only operation that would 
continue to try to function while everybody else was running 
around in circles. That is the way I sort of took it. 
I didn't pay any attention to it one way or the other. I 
wrote it down because I thought it was kind of quaint. 

Q Were you ever aware either prior to November '86 
or thereafter that the FBI had interviewed Oliver North 
on other occasions prior to when the Attorney General did 
on November 23rd? 

A Interviewed him? 

Q Yes. 

A In connection with what? 

Q In connection with several different cases. 

A As a witness? 

Q Yes. 

A Interviewed him? I don't think so. 



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Q Did Mr. Revell ever discuss Oliver North with 
you? 

A Oh, yes, had a lot of discussions with Oliver 
Revell with Oliver North. They were on the OSG together. 
I had talked to Oliver North on a couple of occasions, one 
involving^^^^^^^^^^l^^^Hthe other involving Southern 
Air Transpor^^another involving a criminal investigation 
being conducted by the FBI . 

Q Could you just give us the general parameters of 
that last one? 

A We have a number of indictments against airplane 
hijackers and like the Hamadei case that I mentioned earlier, 
and obviously we were out there looking for these sons of 
bitches so we can get them arrested and bring them back to 
trial and 




iT hat is the 
general parameters of it. 

Q What was Mr. Revell 's opinion of Oliver North; 

A At that time? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't think he ever expressed an opinion of 
Oliver North. He was just a person who was involved in 



some of this process, 



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Q You mentioned^^^^^^^Hto us a while ago; 
I really had only one question on that. When Oliver North 
spoke to you and others on behalf of^^^^^^^Hprior to 
his, I guess his sentencing, did he ever express to you any 
fear that unless^^^^^^^^Kwas treated with leniency that 
he may reveal sensitive national security information? 

A Yes. 

Q Could you tell us what he said to the best of 
your recollection? 

A That was about it. 

Q Did he say what that information would be? 

A No. 

Q Did you get any indication what the subject 
matter was, in other words was it contras, was it Iran, was 
it terrorism? 

A It was U.S. involvement in Central America. This 
is just — I am sort of piecing it together — I assume it 
h^d something to do with Honduras and Nicaragua but the 
substance, I never got into the substance of what it was. 

Q Did you assume that from the facts of the 

:ase? 
"A Yes. General Gorman was involved. Here's a 
calendar date of September 24, I have a copy that shows 
the meeting that I had on^^^^^^Hwith Ollie and Jim 
Michels and Buck Revell. 





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Here is my little calendar thing that shows the 
same deal for September 24. 

MS. NAUGHTON: If we could mark these Exhibits 3 
and 4 . 

(Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4 were marked for 
identification. ) 

THE WITNESS! 




BY MS. NAUGHTON: 
Q Were you aware of any involvement by DEA agents 
to locate or extricate the hostages held in Lebanon? 
A I am now. 

Q What are you aware of now? 

W 
A Well, Jack Laian has told me that there were 

some DEA people who were involved and I was at the time, 

I have known for quite a long time that DEA was tasked with 

checking to see whether their informants had any 

information eUsout where these hostages might be. That is 

what I thought. I knew that apparently everybody who might 

have some way of knowing where the hostages were had 

been tasked to check to see what could be found out. 

w 

Q Recently has Mr. La;fn told you that their 



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involvement was more operational than that? 

A Yes. 

Q What did he tell you? 

A He has a report on the whole thing. Apparently 
he was concerned that they may have been out there doing 
things that they shouldn't have done. He conducted a whole 
investigation on it and just in a couple minutes he told 
me some things but I don't remember the details of what 
they were. 

Q Do you know whether or not there was a Finding 
prepared for the DEA activities? 

A No. 

Q Is that a no? 

A I don't know way way or the other. Sorry. 

Q Do you know whether or not the Attorney General 
was briefed on what the DEA agents were doing? 

A I don't know. I know Jack briefed him after the 
fact, after somebody in Congress started calling it a rogue 
operation or something like that. I know Jack looked 
into it in great detail and I know he briefed the Attorney 
General on what his findings were. And he, Jack among other 
things told me it was not a rogue operation. 

Q What was it? 

A I think the tasking may have come out of I 



the original tasking to look for 




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umsiriED 



81 



information that may show us where these hostages were. 

Q Did Mr. L^n tell you that any agents were 

assigned to the NSC? 

A No. 

Q Was it your understanding that they were or were 
not or did you have an understanding? 

A I didn't think they were but I could- 't be sure, 
I didn't get into the details of it. 




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In a decision? 



IflWwSSiflEO 



84 



A Yes, it was discussed and it was determined he 
didn't have to be under the standards that exist, that he 
didn't have either a personal or professional relationship 
with her of a kind that would create a conflict of interest. 
With the understanding that the independent counsel statute 
in the first instance is a recusal statute and what you 
are trying to decide is whether to recuse the Department of 
Justice. 

So you can't — the attorney general can't, I 
mean if you are going to take a double recusal then the 
attorney general would be recused on all of those people, 
theoretically, as a men±)er of the cabinet and as somebody 
who knows many of them and the statute doesn't say that. 

So all those things were discussed and only in 
very unusual circumstances where there is a relationship 
above and beyond the relationship that is inherent in the 
structural relationship do attorneys general rec use th em- 
selves. 




Q Did anybody object to that position? 

A I don't think so. 

Q Okay . 

A 




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MS. NAUGHTON: Those are all the questions I think 
I have. I will give you over to my colleagues and return 
this phone call. Thank you. 

THE WITNESS: Sure. 




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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. McGOUGH: 

Q I would like to return if we could, 
Mr. Trott, to the Miami case now that we have the two-page, 
not the two-page but the two-buck sheets if I can call ^,hem 
that and five-page memo attached to it. 

A Yes. 

Q You have read them into the record. Let me go 
to the one that you sent to Mark Richard dated 3-24-86. 

A March 24? 

Q March 24, you are right. 

The first sentence reads please get on top of 
this, DLJ is giving heads up to the NSC. 

DRJ is Mr. Jensen, is that correct? 

A Right, 

Q What did you mean by a heads up to the NSC? 

A Briefing. What is it? Factual briefing is what 
I mean by heads up. 

Q Does it carry its usual connotation meaning 
watch out? 

A Well, something that they ought to know about, 
yes. 

Q Okay. My next question is obvious, why should 
the NSC know about it? 



Why? 



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Q Yes. 

A Are you kidding? 

Q No, I mean that is a serious question. Why 
would the NSC be briefed on a case like this? 

A You just take a look at the memo itself. 




Q And what was it about the NSC's role that made 
them a subject for that information? What was it that the 
NSC was to do with that information or what was its connection 
with those issues? 

A I don't know. It just struck me that those are 
the kinds of things that the National Security Council takes 
a look at, activities in foreign countries involving 
sensitive interests of the United States. They are talking 
about — there is stuff in here that said, for example 
on March 5, '86, Terrell was interviewed by New Orleans 
FBI, claimed knowledge of an assassination plot and CHA 
plan to attack embassies; although he stated target 
embassies were Embassy in Costa Rica as well as the Soviet 



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Embassy in Costa Rica. I would hope the National 
security Council would want to know about talk like that. 

Q Let's look at page 3 if we could, of the memo. 

A Furthermore, it was being looked at by the 
Internal Securities Section of the Department which 
handles espionage and the things that impact on national 

security. 

Q Let's look at page 3 of the memo if you would, in 
the first full paragraph, second sentence, developments 
have been promptly disseminated to interested affected 
agencies including th ^epart^nents of Justice and State, 

^^pj^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand the 
Naturalization Service. 

A Yes. 

Q Why did it not occur to the FBI to brief the 



NSC? 

A YOU would have to ask the FBI. I don't know. 

Q IS it clear from that that the FBI didn't consider 

the NSC an interested affected agency? 

A No, it's not clear to me at all. 

Q Whose decision was it to give a heads up to the 

NSC? 

A I don't know. 

Q DO you recall whether it was your decision? 



Mine? No. 



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Q Do you recall it was not your decision? 

A It wasn't my decision at all. This was conununicated 
to me by Mr. Jensen, I don't know whether it was the 
NSC's request to him or whether he thought that he 
ought to go over and tell the NSC about it. I just don't 
know what generated it. It may well have been generated 
inside the NSC, somebody was asking what this was all about. 

Q Now then the memo is addressed to the Deputy 
Attorney General and that would be Mr. Jensen, is that 
right? 

A Right. 

Q And it's dated March 20, '86? 

A Right. 

Q Having looked at this memo and the routing slips 
assorted with this, does this refresh your recollection as 
to when you first learned of the case? 

A No. 

Q Do you know if you had any prior knowledge before 
receiving, before March 20, 1986? 

A Yes, I probably did. 

Q That doesn't — when you say probably, do you have 
any fixed recollection of having been aware of this case 
at the time? 

A No, I don't. It was on or about that — sometime 
around then but precisely when it. was I can't- tell you. 



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I would just be guessing and pulling things out of the air. 

Q All right. Do you know if Mr. Richards, 
Richard, had any prior knowledge of it? 

A You would have to ask Mark. 

Q YOU don't recall whether you were advising him 
for the first time or whether you believed you were advising 
him of it for the first time? 

A My vaguest of recollections is that he already 

knew about it, too. 

Q Then the next sentence says he would like to 
watch over it, is that right? This is your handwritten 

note. 

A He would like us to watch over it. 

Q us to watch over it. What did you understand 
you were to do? What did you mean by watch over it? 

A Keep an eye on it, monitor it, if we saw anything 
that looked like it was getting out of control or 
somebody needed help to assist the neutrality statutes and 
matters like that are very complex and Mark Richard is 
a wizard when it comes to stuff like that, and this 
was Jensen's way of making sure that the best people in the 
Department were making sure it was done right. 

Q Then the last sentence, would you read it? Your 

handwriting is not — 

A call Keimer, find out what is up, and advise 



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him that decisions should be run by you. 

Q By decisions "run by you", what decisions 
were you referring to? 

A Any major decisions. 

Q Decision to indict? 

A Yes, decision to decline, stuff like that. 

Q A decision to go to a grand jury? 

A I wouldn't necessarily have thought that would 
have been one. 

Q That would have been one that normally Mr. Kellner - 
you would have expected Mr. Kellner to make? 

A Sure. Absolutely. 

Q Okay. 

A I have to tell you that people seem to be looking 
for Lowell Jensen up to no good and you won't find that. 
I have known this man for years, and the guy is Mr. Integrity. 

Q I have no reason to doubt that. 

There is a reference in the last paragraph to 
departmental attorney Thomas Marum. 

A Yes. 

Q He is with the Department of Justice Criminal? 

A He works in the Internal Securities Section 
of the Criminal Division and he is probably — one of the 
guys that was assigned to this system, DOJ coordinator. 
A lot of things like the Neutrality Act and Espionage Act, 



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you probably know this, in order to work with these 
you have to keep in contact with John Martin in the 
Criminal Division. You can't field espionage charges 
without approval of John Martin's shop and stuff like that. 
It's a standard procedure. 

Q And that coordination would have taken place 
between FBI and Mr. Marum or would it have taken place 
between Mr. Kellner's office and Mr. Marum? 

A Looks like mostly FBI and Mr. Marum which is the 
way the Bureau works those things usually. 

Q Would Mr. Kellner's office, that is Mr. Kellner's 
and the Assistant, Jeffrey Fellman in his office working on 
that case, be aware of Mr. Marum' s involvement? 
A I don't know. 

Q As a normal operational matter, would there be 
communication between Mr. Marum and — 

A There could be. I just don't know whether you 
can discern a pattern in those things. There could be. There 
probably was but again that is just a total guess. The only 
way to find out is to ask Feliman, Kellner or Marum. I have 
never talked to Marum about this. 

Q In the context of the investigation that took 

place — 

A Of what case? 

Q The investigation that took place starting 



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November, "our involvement started November 24, '86. This 
was the Iran-contra investigation. 

A Mine started the 25th. 

Q 25th, sorry. 

Do you recall — there is a reference in your 
notes to no leaks, and the importance of not having any 
leaks in the investigation. 

A Yes. 

Q Do you recall just generally that note? I don't 
think there is any need to refer to it. 

A Yes. 

Q Do you ever recall the Attorney General discussing 
leaks with Mr. Richardson in particular? 

A On this thing? 

Q On this matter, yes. Let me rephrase the 
question because it may be a little awkward. Do you ever 
recall the Attorney General discussing leaks by Mr. Richardson 
on this matter? 

A By Mr. Richardson? No. 

Q By Mr. Richardson? 

A No. John Richardson is — well, he is the one 
that usually discusses leaks, they anger him. So I have no 
recollection at all of the AG discussing leaks from 
Richardson. 

Q Are you aware of any person in the Department of 



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me of Murray 



Justice speaking with a reporter by 
Waas on the night of November 24? 

A Murray Waas? 

Q Murray Waas; on the night of November 24, the 
evening before the Attorney General's press conference on 
the 25th. I know you were not in the loop at this point 
but did anyone ever discuss any conversation with a reporter 

by that name? 

A No, because I don't even know that name. For 

whom does he report? 

Q He is I suppose they call in the trade a stringer. 

A How do you spell Waas? 

Q W-a-a-s. 

A Nope. 

Q I think that is all I have. 

MR. BUCK: I don't have any questions. 

THE WITNESS: Pam? 

MS. NAUGHTON: You will be disappointed, but, 

no. 

THE WITNESS: You don't have any other questions? 

MS. NAUGHTON: No. If we can hold you for one 
second we would like to get these Xeroxed so you can take 
back the original. 

THE WITNESS: Sure. 

MS. NAUGHTON: Thank you. 




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'"^S 1 (Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the deposition was 

2 adjourned.) 
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immi^lFfl 



169 

Original 



no«rapnic Transcript oi 



Stenograpnic Transcript of 

HEARINGS ^^ 



Before the 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



UNITED STATES SENATE 



TESTIMONY OF JAMES L. TULL 
Wednesday, May 6, I98T 



:'!" neclassi'ied/Keleasc' nn 2.'2.t>6c87 

.:'-'lii D;0'.'is:-.'n^ of L'J. 12r56 
h' Ml^Bl Nationai Security Council. 

*^.v)OHNS0r( 



ALD£=SON REFCfiT'NG "^"^ ^o— '-i^0F.._..i. 




(202) 623-9300 
20 F STREET, N.W. 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001 



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UNCLA^SiF:iiD 



1 TESTIMONY OF JAMES L. TULL 

2 Wednesday, May 6, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Committee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D.c. 

8 Interview of JAMES L. TULL, a witness herein, 

9 called for examination by counsel for the Select 

10 Committee, pursuant to notice, the witness being duly 

11 sworn -by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for 

12 the District of Columbia, at the ninth floor. Hart Senate 

13 Office Building, Washington, D.C, at 1:09 p.m., 

14 Wednesday, May 6, 1987, and the proceedings being taken 

15 down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed 

16 under her direction. 
17 

18 
19 
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21 



'-•itially Declassifier;/ Release 1 on. 



22 L'nder pr ovis: -n; of E.O. 12756 
byHm 'J;j!'o;i3; Security Council 

23 K. Johnson 



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APPEARANCES : 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: 
TERRY SMILJANICH, Esq. 
Associate Counsel 
901 Hart Senate Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 

On behalf of the House Select Committee: 
TIMOTHY E. TRA^ 




UNCtASSIFED 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



1 

2 PROCEEDINGS 

3 (Witness sworn.) 

4 Whereupon , 

5 JAMES L. TULL 

6 was called as a witness by counsel for the Senate Select 

7 Committee and, having been first duly sworn, was examined 

8 and testified as follows: 

9 EXAMINATION 

10 BY MR. SMILJANICH: 

11 ' Q Give us your full name for the record, please? 

12 A James Louis Tull. 

13 Q Mr. Tull, this is a deposition being taken by 

14 both the Senate Select Committee and House Select 

15 Committee on the Iran-contra matters. I'm going to be 

16 asking you several questions. If there's anything I ask 

17 you that you don't understand, please let me know and 

18 ^ I'll be happy to rephrase my question. 

19 A Fine. 

2 Q You are a carer foreign service officer; is 

A 

21 that correct? 

22 A Yes. 

23 Q How many years of service do you have? 

24 A 29 years as of April "f^ »hiff Yyrr---cjE>f^rtJ| 

25 in mtT<^, iq^h of^m^Bl£^ 

liNCLftSSIFSED 



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UNCLA^IFIED 



j_ Q What is your current position? 

2 A I'm assigned temporarily to the Bureau of 

3 Personnel in Washington since my departure from San Jose 

4 on the 11th of March. 

5 Q Are you waiting on a particular assignment 

6 here in Washington? 

7 A Ves, I am. I'm waiting on one of the 

8 positions that I've asked for in Washington. 

9 Q In your foreign service career, have you 

10 primarily specialized in any particular geographical 

11 region? 

j_2 A I've spent more time in the Latin American 

13 bureau than in any other. I have only had two out of 

14 Latin America assignments overseas, one to London in the 

15 early sixties and to Cyprus about five years ago — four 

16 years ago. 

^■j Q Do you speak Spanish? 

18 A Yes. 

Q What was your tenure in Costa Rica? What were 

the dates of your tenure? 

A I arrived on direct transfer from Bogota 
the 5th of July, 1985. And I left -- I was continually 
in service there until my departure on the 11th of March 
24 of this year. 

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A 1987. 

Q Prior to your assignment in Costa Rica, where 
had you been assigned? 

A I had been assigned the previous year in 
Bogota, Columbia, at the embassy, and prior to that I had 
been assigned for three years at the American embassy in 
Nicosia, Cyprus; prior to that, three years at the 
American embassy in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic/ — 
all with ttM same position, depu^ chi^ of mission. 

Q As_^ ^^uty chief of ^tfeios^ lare you ^aji^[illy 
the second.jc||^%iSf^^^^p«ice^^ tRe Miba^Q^ s^-' -k^ 



Q And when the Ambassador is gone, you become 
the charge? 

A Yes, sir. I was charge after Ambassador Tambs 
left Bogota for about six or seven months before my 
departure, and again when he left CoKta Rica in January I 
took over as charge until my own departure on the 11th. 

Q When did you first meet Ambassador Tambs? 

A I met Ambassador Tambs for the first time wlfen 
I was as^ll^ed^ to him from Cyprus in, it would have been, 
in August of 1984,'Wen^^laft Q^jpttg^ J^^ sna assie 
as his ._ . 

chief of mlB^ibn ia^rtkistai^^lLici ~ 




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SECRET ■-■■' 



1 A He asked for m%^, TOat^t** ?«ason I served " 

2 only one year in Bogoti^because^if 8 any" Aaibassador'B 

3 prerogative to select his number two. And since we had 

4 worked together, and well, I thought, in Bogota, he upon 

5 his own appointment to Costa Rica asked that I be sent 

6 there as his number two. 

7 Q What kind of working relationship did you have 

8 with Ambassador Tambs? 

g A I had a very fine working relationship, 

10 probably one of the c^Mft waking relationships I have 

11 had with any American Ambassador. 

3_2 Q Ambassador Tambs was a political appointee? 

13 A Correct. 

14 Q What did you think of his capabilities as an 

15 Ambassador during the time you served under him? 

j^g A Well, I served under him at two posts. I 

17 thought he was unusually qualified to be a chief of 

mission, because he had spent literally his entire adult 
life in one fashion or another in Latin America, as a 
student? laterihe had -ii»3Sm, nof-oil company, but it 
was a company that was contracted, I think, by Creole oil 
22 in Venezuela doing construction for them. 

I think his degree was in engineering. But 
his time was spent in Latin America. And then he went 
back, took his university degrees, and is now a professor 



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of Latin American history at Arizona State University. 

So he had a very, very long, practical and 
intellectual association with the hemisphere. 

Q When you arr ived in Costa Rica in July of 
198 5,|^^B^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwhoni refer to as 
pseudonym^^^Hof Tomas Castillo, is that correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Had you known Mr. Castillo from^^Hprevious 




Q When you arrived in Costa Rica and after 
Ambassador Tambs arrived to take his post, did the 
Ambassador call a meeting of certain people to discuss 
what his mission or missions were in Costa Rica? 

A Yes, he did. He arrived there, as I recall, 
toward the end of July. I think I had been in charge of 
the post for about two weeks when he arrived. 

And immediately upon his arrival, I think it 



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was the following day, he asked Castillo and I to his 
home, and I think that's the meeting you're referring to. 

Q Who all was present for that meeting? 

A The Ambassador, Castillo, and myself. 

Q At some time in this meeting, did Colonel Lent 
— did Colonel Lent attend the meeting, do you recall? 

A It's possible. John lived nearby. It's 
possible. I don't recall him being there, but it's 
certainly possible. 

Q What did Ambassador Tambs tell you and Mr. 
Castillo about his mission in Costa Rica? 

A Well, he said that one of the important and 
priority goals and duties thS^P^pbeen assigned there 
was such assistance as he could give to the opening of 
the southern front, a military front in Nicaragua. 

Q What did you understand he meant by a southern 
front in Nicaragua? 

A Well, at that time there were some resistance 
fighters in Nicaragua, in southern Nlcaragua^^ruf^J^**^ 
basically th» only thing I know about, the only thing I 
was associated with. 

There ve j^mm^^*lS^f*9^^^W.^^ TM»e 
were 8<as^nder Eden Pastora, ARDE. Th ey were located 
above the Costa Rica border. 




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UNCLftSSiFIED 



1 And as I understood it, what Ambassador Tambs 

2 was telling us was that one of his priority objectives he 

3 had been assigned was to do what he could to strengthen 

4 the effectiveness of those forces then in place. 

5 Q Where did Ambassador Tambs say he had gotten 

6 those instructions from? 

7 A He used the White House and the NSC, as I 

8 recall, trying to think back now and be a little more 

9 precise. Those terms were used sort of interchangeably. 

10 But my understand was the NSC. 

11 ■ Q Did he name any particular person at the NSC? 

12 A No, sir. 

13 Q Was there a discussion held at that time as to 

14 how this mission could be accomplished? 

15 A No, there wasn't. There wasn't. 

16 Q Did Mr. Castillo discuss the various 

17 personalities in the south as military leaders and his 

18 impressions of them? 

19 A I don't recall on that occasion or not, but 

2 certainly, you know, early on — of course, I had arrived 

21 there before the Ambassador and I had received from him 

22 the standard agency briefing t^r^^^^deputy chief of 

23 mission gets when he arrives at a post. 

24 And so I knew an early knowledge of Eden 

25 Pastora and Chamorro. Castillo was very frank in his 



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evaluation, particularly of Pastora. So I don't recall 
whether we discussed it that first day, but it certainly 
was one of the early things, yes. 

Q What did Mr. Castillo say about Mr. Pastora? 

A He had a very, very low opinion of Eden, both 
as a leader and as an experienced military officer. I 
gathered that Castillo had found him to be erratic, 
highly emotional, untruthful, not to be trusted. 




Q Did Mr. Castillo say that he hoped to wean the 

other troop leaders away from Pastora? 

A Not at that point. That developed later on. 
I mean, It might have been part of the work at that time. 
I just don't tie it to that early period. 

But certainly, yes, as the months, early 
months went on, it was clear that what he had hoped to do 
would be to take those military commandantes 

land split them away from Pastora and get 
them fightingl 




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They weren't anything but an enorroous problem 
for the government of Costa Rica, because] 

[they were acting like rural bandits. 
They were stealing cows and chickens and harassing the 
fanners. 

And at that point, with the Sandinistas right 
on the border^^^^^^^^^^^^Hthe fanners thought they 
were having a hard enough time anyway, because there were 
incursions by the Sandinistas, probing patrols. They 
later on did some mining on the Costa Rican side. 

And in the middle were these absolutely 
ineffectual, worthless groups that Eden had, doing 
noth^Tf llBt increasingly l^p^ning part of the problem 
instead of part of the solution. 

And I'm sure what was in Castillo's mind was, 
what was in all of our minds, is the war is inside 
Nicaragua^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Band those guys 
to do something, they ought to go back in there and do it 
and not harass the poor farmers up in the northern 
jungles. 

Q Did Castillo early on describe to you or tell 
you about some of his past experiences with the CIA, with 



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12 

the Agency, and how he intended to conduct himself in the 
future as a result of that experience? 

A No. I knew — I can't tell you where I knew 
it, but I knew that he had had difficulties early on with 
association with the famous comic book for guerilla 
warfare or something like that. So I knew that he had 
had a difficult time. 

But I can't tell you — he didn't tell me 
that, but I knew it. 

Q Didn't he once tell you, though, that he had 
been burned before and that he was going to get his 
instructions in writing from now on, so he'd have a paper 
trail? 

A That's true. But it wasn't in that context. 
It would be more in the context — and this went on 
several times. I can remember him saying: I was called , 

recordjg^ye me a written instruction; I don't want any 
oral instructions. 



KnBt Hnowit 
it appewMd to me that he was being more than usually 
careful not to be, in effect, on.the 
again. -''^"'^^^^^ ^ ^ 

Q ~^^4t^di*-you iiilJHiliinTi 1 1 f^i oUc ynajgLng^ -orgjOE^ 
to be that was _4n charge Hr «|lving digaa1»-CT th^[^ 



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mission in Coa%a Rica? 

A Well, it was the RIG, the Restricted Inter- 
Agency Group. In thinking about it — and I can't tell 
you when the RIG was formed. I just don't know. I don't 
recall in my month or two of service in iSo^SrRica 
references to the RIG. I just don't recall that at all. 
But that quickly became the mechanism that we 
all referred to. 

Q And who did you understand to be the members 
of the RIG? 

A Well, the ones that I know of were Colonel 
North in the National Security Council, Elliott Abrams in 
the State Department, and] 
Intell^^ ^.^ . _„ 

connect«<rjE^ it^£h^ th«% BUtiihos^Wre ^^;^bb 
principals so far as we were concerned. 

Q Okay. How did the RIG communicate its various 
instructions to the nissJ 

A The y came through Castillol 

Q In other words, the communications were 
tightly held] 





A That's correct. Almost exclusively, I'd M# 
that that was the channel used. And so far as being very 



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UNCUSSSF9EB 



SECRET 



14 



closely held, as I mentioned to you before, one of the 
things that Tambs told me very early on is that, in view 
of the very sens^ive nature or this, he intwdad to keep 
the foreign service as f^«rOT it is hej&osal^ could. 
And without goinr^nto, yoi^dw. instru^ions or 
guidelines, we've Twv^r talked about that, but my «leai- 
understanding of that was that he would keep me as well 
informed as he thought I had to be, in other words need 
9 to know, and that would be that. 
3_0 And that was the way we operated on this, and 

I did- not engage with him on the kinds of questions that 
I'd normally ask an Ambassador about other policy goals 
or implementation. I waited for him to tell me. 

And you know, he was within his own confines, 

15 I think, open with me. 

16 Q Okay. Now, the RIG was officially, at least 

17 on paper, a rather large organization, composed of 

18 representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Department of Defense, other groups. But I just want to 
make sure I understand this. 

Your perception oftheRIG seemed to be 
primarily Elliott Abrams,^^^^|»nd Oliver North, 
23 , is that correct? 
24 



A That's correct. And I'm not aware that DOD 
was involved. Perhaps they were, but not in my 



184 



15 

1 perception at all. 

2 Now, when I say those three, I know that they 

3 had staffs. I know there are other people involved. And 

4 as I mentioned earlier, one of the problems that we 

5 always had which was never resolved was who knew what? 

6 And so we were always very careful in discussing anything 

7 with Washington visitors, because it was never clear to 

8 me who was in the loop and who wasn't. 

9 Q In other words, for example, from the State 

10 Department you would know that Elliott Abrams was 

11 knowledgeable, but below him and who on his staff was 

12 brought into it you didn't know? 

13 A No, I did not. 

14 Q Now, back to your initial time in Costa Rica, 

15 did there come a point when the possibility of creating 

16 an airstrip in^^^^^^H Costa Rica became a matter that 

17 related to the opening up of the southern front? 

18 A Yes. 

19 Q Tell me about that? 

20 A As I best recall it, it was in the fall after 

21 we arrived there of '85. I vould say, oh, in sort of the 

22 October time frame, that Tambs merit ioned to me and, as I 

23 recall, Castillo — the three of us were in his office 

24 and he said to me that there was a private group of 

25 Americans that wanted to open, reopen an old air field in 



tJNCE^ir.ED 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



16 



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:o9ta Rica, as an 

emergency airfield for air supply flights; and that he 

, .■i^lHI^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hcosta 
been taskedf^^^^^H^^^^m^l^^^HHi^H 

Rica as to whether they would be willing to entertain a 
proposal of this kind from this group. 

That's the first mention of it, and it was, I 
think, as I say, in October '85, something like that. It 
might have been September, but I just don't recall. 

Q Now, did you have the impression from what 
Ambassador Tambs told you that this air strip was his 

idea?' 

A NO, absolutely not, abs^tely not. This is 

that hwT^ftTa^jgBtS^^ Ho»?^^& T^tey -MX 
that h. didn't- f»^< ^ it. %> di <t^-B^ thought that if 
l^^^^^approved^^l^it could be kept quiet 
because it obviously was going to be a tremendously 
sensitive political issue - that it would be a good 

idea. 

And the reason for that is that the distances 
that airplanes had to fly, they needed^ an emergency 
place. My uSeMtawlii^^-*!** tli^^as t^ only ba 
u««Altojr 

«_« «-K»*- i« the extreme sensitivity 
The reason for that is tne ^*^Jr 







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of Costa Ricans to anything military entering their 
country. 

Q So the site was to be used for refueling 
purposes and not for the offloading of any cargo itself? 

A No, no, there was to be no storage and no 
warehouse, nothing of that. It was to be used as an 
emergency refueling stop. 

Q Well, did Ambassador Tambs or anyone else ever 
say where these instructions or ideas regarding the 
airstrip had come from? 

-A No, sir. And I never asked him. I assumed 
they came from Washington. It wasn't the type of thing - 
- it ' s not the type of thing that Ambassador Tambs would 
have dreamed up and put into motion. He is not that kind 
of an Ambassador. 

Q Okay. Now, the Ambassador then did have^^H 




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I can't tell you what the time was, but it was 
very soon afterwards. ^^T' _ -'^ ^ - „ "^^ 

Q -3: Did there cone a tiine when the airst rip was 
discussed with Secretary Abrams ,^^^^^^^^^^Hand Oliver 
North at 30X»«^ype of a meet^^- or jF«^^og«ther? 

X Yes. "And I have %Sed fo — se^^lllatttook 
over as AsrfBtaBfei|«retary,^~thin]tj^i«r^&y ot '85, and 
his first visiEmi^ "recall^t 4iiiL some tia« ,.>«rond°r^ 
ChristaM of ^t j|Mr 





1 did not attend that meeting, but my 
perception is the airfield might have been discussed at 
that meeting with^f^^^^^^Bwho had already approved 
it. 

The next day, I recall as Elliott and others 
were leaving we were standing in the Ambassador's office, 
a bunch of us, and they were literally ready to leave for 
the airport right then, and the Ambassador clea red the 
room with the exception of Elliott and Castillo, ^^^^B 
believe, himself, and me. And we discussed for perhaps 



u 






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five minutes or less, he discussed where the airfield 
stood, what was happening. 




It was a very brief discussion. We were 
literally standing up inside of his closed door. And at 
that point, why, the parties left. That was the first 
discussion that I recall of it at which Elliott was 
present. 

whole Tt»i^i1mni|g[r|fii iffijTTiiiirfti^rfB ■■iji^n i,!jij[^__ ^ 

pursuayat to ii^^^^otw &o» Wasl%igtdn. ' -- 

Q -i: We]^^^^fc#=«s tbau^^^a og jfchl* caorersation, 

of c oiu^jIj^,^ "ll^^^ ia^^agl fel iWll1 ■ the section of 
Pri 




not a finlshc^greductl 

A No. I want to emphasize that this was not, as 
I've read, this is not a new airstrip at all. I think 
that that strip had been there in the late forties and 
fifties, and then it just had been allowed to decline, 
disused. 



UN^^SSIHED 



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UNCUSSIFIED 



SECRET 20 

1 And basically the construction was, as I 

2 understood it, was basically grading, because there was a 

3 small river that went, along, right along inside, and 

4 there had been a lot of degradation of the old gravel 

5 strip. So it wasn't this big sort of grandiose project 

6 that you think about when you're constructing an 

7 airfield. The basic part of the strip was still there. 

8 Q And when this brief discussion was held before 

9 Secretary Abrams left, it was certainly treated as a 

10 sensitive discussion, because other people in the room 

11 were asked to leave? 

12 A Absolutely. 

13 Q Now, you mentioned the possibility °^^^^^B 

14 ^^^^^being there. I'd like you to stop and think about 

15 that. If you can tell me you remember him being there, 

16 he might have been there, or you just don't know; think 

17 about that for a minute. 

18 (Pause.) 

19 Q As I recall it, it was Elliott's first visit 

20 in the area, and he had — it wasn't just a visit to 

21 Costa Rica. I mean, he had visited, I think, other 

22 places. I am quite certain^^^Hwas with him, quite 

23 certain. 

24 Q Now, there was a chief of missions conference 

25 in Panama in, I believe, early September of 1985. Now, 



SECRET 

0NCCASS!F^E0 



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NCLA^F 



21 



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as the deputy chief of mission, you wouldn't go to that, 
is that right? 

A No. 

Q Did Ambassador Tambs ever talk to you about 
discussing with anyone at the chiefs of mission 
conference this airstrip or the opening of the southern 
front? 

A No, no, he wouldn't do so. 

Q What do you know about the airstrip after 
that, how it was built, who built it, any people that 
participated in it? 

A Well, I knew that the strip — I never saw the 




The discussions that then occurred through the 
winter months of '85 and into '86 were, you know, fairly 
brief, the type of thing, well, you know, what's 
happening out there? Well, we're having grading 
problems. When is it going to become ready for use? 
We're not sure yet. 




to who the private Americans 
were and what arrangements they made with the owners, I 



191 



UNCUSSIFIED 



22 



1 frankly don't know. 

2 As I mentioned to you the ether day, the only 

3 name I ever heard was a nickname, One-Eyed Jack. I don't 

4 know who One-Eyed Jack is to this day. I did know that 

5 there was an American businessman there who was one of 

6 the owners of that property, Joe Hamilton, who is a 

7 resident there in Costa Rica. And it was from his group, 

8 whatever group it was, that the property was leased or 

9 purchased or whatever arrangements were made. 

10 But what the modalities were and, you know, 

11 the later press accounts of Udall Corporation in Panama, 

12 I wasn't privy to that. 

13 Q Did you ever hear any mention of a Panamanian 

14 corporation that was involved with the strip? 

15 A I did not. 

16 Q I might as well finish up with the airstrip. 

17 What happened when President Arias was elected? 

18 A Well, the airstrip — elections were on the 

19 8th of — 15th of February of '86. And of course. Arias 

20 won and' I recall the Ambassador on several occasions 

21 saying, you know, what's going to happen to the airstrip 

22 is going to be one of the things that he early on is 

23 going to have to get to President Arias about. 

24 The airstrip was finished in that period 

25 between election day on the 15th of February and the 8th 



UNCCflSS!F"ED 



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of May. By inauguration, the strip could be used, to my 
understandir 




So I was gone from the 17th of May for four 
weeks, and got back on a Saturday, which I think was the 
15th or 16th of June. And one of the first things the 
Ambassador told me was, the President's just told me that 
the airstrip cannot be used. 

Q Okay. To your knowledge, was the airstrip 
ever used for refueling purposes? 

A Well, as I said to you the other day, to my 
knowledge there was never an operational flight off of 
that airstrip. But how then do you fit that with the 
famous stuck airplane? 



UNCt*SS!FlED 



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iiNCUSSIREO 



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And those dates, I just don't know. In other 
words, when did the airplane get stuck and when did the 
President say to Ambassador Taitibs, no, it can't be used? 
It might have been like that — in fact, it could be that 
as a result of that airplane getting stuck out there, 
this could have caused the President to say, don't use 
it, because President Arias, much moraso than President 
Monge, was extremely, extremely sensitive about any 
involvement by Costa Rica in the Nicaraguan conflict. 

There were a number of reasons. I think his 
own personal predilection for very strict neutrality 




It could well be, and I don't know — Tambs 
could answer that, I think — 

Q I don't want to put the thought in your head, 

but^Sf^lPB- recall ^^t ib9i^g$jbciMm tmek, ^ g^Eyp u xjyjyy - ^ 
abseiw^in Ifcj^g^t^g into^a=-^IS that lMUmwMi»^~-jt --- 



194 



25 



UNCLA^IFiED 

1 Tambs told ydEa3K>utr3^e stxSfe plane-^^ttfwit when you.- 

2 came bacJc^ .^^ : -7^ _ ■ ''-'■^■'-'''^i^^ ^s^?^:^^""-"-^^^^-^ 

3 A^- Castillo told me first, as I recall. The 

4 following Monday, my first day at work, as I recall. 

5 Q So you do recall that you learned about this 

6 incident when you came back from your vacation? 

7 A Yes indeed. Almost at the same time 

8 Ambassador Tambs told me that he had gotten — that Arias 

9 had told him that the airport could not be used. 

10 Q Did Castillo tell you what was on t^i^^^na 

11 when it was stuck? 

12 A No. 

13 Q Did he tell you anything was on it? 

14 A No. 

15 Q What did he say happened ass« r^i glV Wg^^ i s ; 

16 incideirt? ^-fc-f^-';^ 

17 X j jMJBiBHR ie landed and got stuck in the mud 

18 out there, that's basically it. Now, I have assumed — I 

19 never asked about this — that when the airfield was 

20 finally occupied by the Costa Rican civil guard finally, 

21 they picked up gasoline drums of gasoline there. My 

22 assumption was that the plane brought that gas in to 

23 preposition it in case it could be later used for 

24 operations flights. 

25 This is why I say to my knowledge there was no 



IJNCEfl^lF'iO 



195 



UNCLA^IFSEO 



26 



1 operational flight. I had assumed that that gas was 

2 brought in and put there for later use and the plane got 

3 stuck. 

4 Q Now let's go back, actually not too far, but 

5 let's go back to March of 1986. Some time toward the end 

6 of that month. General singlaub and an ass<»ciate of ^ia=^ 

7 named Barbara" Sudley — you don't know about her? 

8 Well, General Singlaub came to Costa Rica. 

9 When did you first hear that he was coming or that he was 

10 there, and in what context did you learn it? 

11 • A It was a Monday morning, as I recall it. The 

12 Ambassador called me in to say that he had been called 

13 that weekend by General Singlaub. We didn't know that he 

14 was coming, didn't know he was there. 

15 Singlaub called to say: I'm here, I've been 

16 talking to Eden Pastora, and I want to come in and tell 

17 you what I've been talking to Pastora about. And that 

18 was on a Monday morning, as I recall. 

19 I seem to recall then that Singlaub came in 

20 the next day, on Tuesday morning. I'm not quite clear on 

21 that, but I remember learning of the Ambassador telling 

22 me, well, Singlaub 's here, he just called me over the 
2 3 weekend and said he wanted to come in and talk to him. 

24 And he did come in and spend, as I recall it, 

25 about two hours, from about 10:00 o'clock until noon. 



IjNCLASSIFlED 



196 



UNCLftSSlF'EB 



27 



1 Q Who was present in this discussion? 

2 A Well, first the Ambassador met with him alone 

3 for I would think an hour. Then he called me in, and 

4 then called Colonel Lent down later on. I think I came 

5 in, it must have been around 10:00 o'clock, and Colonel 

6 Lent must have come down about — let's see. 

7 I went in about 11:00 o'clock. I think 

8 Colonel Lent came down later, about 11:30. The 

9 Ambassador had to leave. He left about 11:30. I don't 

10 ■ recall why. 

11 But at the end, it was just Lent and I and 

12 Singlaub having a rather vague conversation. Certainly 

13 he did not discuss with us what he had talked to Pastora 

14 about. The conversation and one of the reasons we 

15 brought John down was, while the Ambassador and I were 

16 with h^ gi^^aub was talking about Pastora, but seemed 

17 not to know too much about him. 

18 John Lent had been military attache in 

19 Nicaragua and knew all of the characters probably better 

20 than any of us. And as I recall, the Ambassador called 

21 him down for that reason. 

22 And that last half hour that John and I were 

23 there, it was Singlaub talking about Pastora and what 

24 kind of a man he was. John did not think very highly of 

25 him, either. Neither did I, Pastora. 



ONCLffSSIF^ED 



197 



UNCLASSiFiED 



28 




1 But that was basically the substance of the 

2 conversation. And then Singlaub said he had to go back 

3 to his hotel to get a suit, and I was going to lunch, and 

4 so I put him in the van that I had and drove him over to 

5 the hotel and dropped him off for lunch. And that's the 

6 last time I have ever seen him. 

7 Q Do you specifically recall that Castillo was 

8 not present for this conversation? 

9 A I don't think Castillo waB in the country that 
10 day\. 
11 

12 It's my recollection he was not, because I recall 

13 Castillo telling me when he came back that — it was just 

14 a few days, that he was very glad he had been away. 

15 We did not know Singlaub was coming. 

16 Q Did you get any indication from Castillo that 

17 he knew that Singlaub was in the coxintry? 

18 A No. 

19 Q Now, Singlaub in this meeting gave to the 

20 Ambassador the terms of an agreement he had reached with 

21 Eden Pastora, is that correct? 

22 A Evidently so. 

23 Q Were you there for that part of the 

24 conversation? 

25 A No, I was not. 



UN(^#SSiFPED 



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Q Do you know whether or not the Ambassador had 
a written agreement that was given to him or not? 

A No, he did not — he told me he did not ask 
for it, nor did Singlaub offer him any copy or anything 
like that. As a matter of fact, it was some time later, 
a month or two later, when the Ambassador was having one 
of his periodic interviews with the visiting press, in 
this case Tom Golden of the Miami Herald, and at the end 
Golden — I got this from the Ambassador when he came 
back from across the street, where he was giving the 
interview. _ _ _ 

't~*^"tr^^^^^^ '■'''^'''Tyii|f*'i»aader «iJ^tita€^6Dldaai%- 
had~-begim~t^^ress1EtSi'^r]^^^E#^ SiJKrl«fe^^^^^3HM di4 - 
you talk to hEtT'lticL you in€^vene f or"^^? Afefoa 
coo]d.n9~~u^ an a^ praaa ent^i :^~ 

Td <^i4i^ 



jasadB^^HBd i iil Ib(i f'tt^i'lHU \H lijii poc^BK&^ 
out "^ pl^a jai paper~and sa^f* if. yaii^^Btt to re£5 tt,^- 
here it ig . " ^ 1- '^-M' ~ '■^-d'^ 

-^-~~"=And tlfe ^daas— dwr %ai^ 
read^^ "iTh* .Jts^uaador 
cohversation'id.th^iti||la9^^~^St af^Snoe 




Ff I <S>t?^ WMlt fcO^ 





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UNCLA^IF 



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But on that^ I ^ m tH L^m •t tJ SSvH urti 'on 
record, to my knowledge — and as a matter of fact, 
before he left Costa Rica in January, I asked the 
Ambassador about this — there was never any single^^^H 
^^^^^^message sent from the embassy in Costa Kica by 
the Ambassador that was sent anywhere bu^j^^^HHJjJIl 
[to Elliott Abrams. 

And I know in this case it was sent to Elliott 
Abrams because of the nature of the reply we got back. 

Q But what you're saying is the Ambassador told 
you that any time he used thisj 
I he dii^^^ 

Iwithout informing Secretary Abrams? 
A Absolutely not, absolutely not. That again 
would be very, very contrary to Tambs' nature. 
Q Anyway, there was a little bit of a 
controversy that erupted in the cables when the agreement 
was cabled back, is that right? 

A Indeed there was. I did not see — the 
Ambassador just as an operating style, whenever he had a 
report to do he would sit down and make notes during a 




UNCCRSS-rED 



200 



liNCLlfSfFSEI 



31 



1 conversation, then sit down and dictate it off. if i was 

2 there, invariably he would show it to me. If I happened 

3 to be away for some reason, he would just send it out, 

4 and usually in those cases I'd pick it up later. 

5 In this case, for whatever reason, I never saw 

6 that mes sage. I could have by I 

7 ^^^^^^B^^^^^imply pulling a copy and reading it. 

8 But we got a very hot reply back from 

9 Washington, that had evidently chosen to interpret the 

10 message in a way that made the Ambassador the broker of 

11 some kind of a deal between Singlaub and Pastora, which 

12 is absolutely untrue. 

13 And the message that came back was from 

14 Elliott for the Ambassador in State channels, the NODISS 

15 channel, and it was hysterical, I would say. It 

16 questioned the Ambassador's loyalty to the President. It 

17 was so unexpected, I can't tell you. 

18 What I had thought the Ambassador had sent is 

19 he had sent a reported cable up of his conversation. 

20 Elliott evidently did not choose to interpret it that 

21 way. 

22 So immediately another message was sent to 

23 clarify to Elliott and others: Look, there was no 

24 brokering, there was no deal; it was just Tambs hearing 



25 out Singlaub and reporting what Singlaub said. 



MMwm 



201 



UNCLASHD 



32 



1 Q Did you ever get any indication from the 

2 Ambassador that he was for, against, or neutral about the 

3 terms of the agreement between Pastora and Singlaub? 

4 A I think he thought the whole effort was 

5 foolish, absolutely foolish, because it would have been 

6 clear to most anyone, certainly clear to anyone in the 

7 embassy in Costa Rica, that Pastora was not a man who 

8 could be trusted an inch. 

9 He was — as the Ambassador used to say, he 

10 envisaged himself as a social democratic Somoza. We were 

11 dealing with an ego of epic proportions there and no 

12 ability behind it. And the Ambassador just dismissed it 

13 as a waste of time. 

14 Q Can you recall any other occasions other than 

15 the two you've mentioned in which the Ambassador used^^H 

16 ^^^^^^^^^B^° communicate with Secretary Abrams and 

17 others? 

18 A It was very infrequent. 

19 Q The two, being the Pastora-Singlaub agreement 

20 and the Golden press conference; do you recall any 

21 others? I realize it wouldn't be frequent, but do you 

22 have any other specifics? 

23 A Now wait a minute. I don't think he reported, 

24 there would be no reason to report the Golden press 

25 conference, in^^^^^^^^^H The Golden press conference 



wmim 



202 



fitU ■ " 

1 was like a month later, and the relevance to the singlaub 

2 thing was Golden saying, do you want to read it, and the 

3 Ambassador said, no, I don't want to read it. 

4 Q As a matter of fact, we have a copy of the 

5 cable, the matter about Golden, and that was ^^^Hi 

6 ^^^^^Hjcommunication to Abrams, ^^^^^^Und North. 

7 A Fine. I didn't know about that. 

8 Q Anyway, aside from that, do you have any 

9 specific examples you can give us of when that^^^^^^H 

10 was used? 

11 'A By the Ambassador? It was infrequent. 

12 Q That's what I mean, by the Ambassador? 

13 A I don't really recall. 

14 Q Can you tell me that there were other 

15 occasions in which it was used, you just don't know what 

16 they were? 

17 A Yes, yes. But you know, as I said earlier on, 

18 the things that remain high points in your memory are the 

19 very unusual, the out of the ordinary. None of this for 

20 a year and a ha_f was itself sort of out of the ordinary. 

21 I mean, we were operating under a very tight 

22 set of guidelines from Washington, and I'm sure — I know 

23 that there were other occasions, and I just don't recall 

24 what they were. J^ -^^^^ ' ~5 ^^S^t " ^^^ ■- 

25 ''%^ -;3N^^«L~tiM>.^S(n^w*lier ''private Americans,'* 

f% 5 if ! 



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and I think the last time we talked you used the term 
"private patriotic Americans." Where did you get that 
term from? 

A That was Tambs' sort of smiling phrase. 

Q Did he ever say where he got that term from? 

A No. 

Q Going back to the airstrip, there came a time 
later on in the year in 1986 when information came your 
way that the minister of public security was going to 
have a press conference in which he was going to 
announce, and perhaps denounce, the strip, the airstrip. 




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And so in that intervening period after Arias 
said no — and I think initially they did send some civil 
guardsmen there, maybe for a week, but then they were 
withdrawn. And Tambs felt strongly that they should keep 
that airstrip under surveillance, and nothing was done. 

So then we had the information on a Friday in 
August, late August — the Ambassador was on home leave 
then ~ that Garron wus going to go public with this, and 
we assumed would denounce it as a violation of Costa 
Rlcan neutrality, on a Saturday morning. 



Tambs — no, he wasn't on home leave at that point. He 
was at a conference at Greensboro, North Carolina. He 
was out of the country for only just several days, and he 
told me when he came back, which I think was the next 
Sunday, that the news of this had created a good deal of 
turbulence in Washington, and that he had been contacted 
on it, saying that it was going to be veiry, very 
difficult in Washington. 

It was politically very sensitive. It was 
Bci 



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going to be very difficult in Costa Rica. And Tambs told 
me that he talked to President Artisrby telepKOhe 
midnight Friday- or early Saturday_^|&riiing, first to say, 
do you lenow that your minister of public security Garron 
is going to giyj^.thtls press conference? 

And the President did liot know. And according 
to what^ go^^rom the Sibaffsador, he=^intS out JEo the 

President th«* t^4ftjras going to ha a vary Stiff icult 

" - ,_a^' "^ — - ■ ^— ^- ' ■ 

political issue, both in"K£slting^iai-and.-^fc^^as'ta~Rica. - 

-^ - J- ^ " - ^m- _.^ , - ^^■ 

The terms ;igfr tftatjefi i sgvjsaj^n T don't, frarrtcly, knqj^^ __; 

^^ut ia„^^^cass, t^9 i^JlJIiht c gig^ BBaca^as^ 

cancelled. 




on a prifBs ceaXerenc»^^l£-vith. J|l^e^ify %3j»|BS -and 
Oliver llorth in e«uiinection with that issue? - 



^^ 




_ _ 'S&f thiSlt- 

cancellea, whicK B* didl_» ««- ^^.""^k' -^ 

_St"^- ^PW/ afteSth< >iiffM Wfeff 8 »porgj^^-out«;sbi whicSJ^ 
it quoted a mes s age.^firoin "61 i ve?=lk*th_t o Admfc^ '^ 

P-^ i n t1 r yrSr: jJTT^^dJl^l^^llcad J^BlljT }tittfiJ»^^lMd, og-: -..^^ 
implied jhat - hi^^ talked, with PrS^iiafe Ag l a» ' jp ^Tta^^^ 

nil I ii mTirr^tniynB[jir st»tA*-H^«'^ thatre^at caaa^^t tt^ 




206 



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37 

you had a conaretsalion T/itl^PresideifflSpiB In ifech that 
subject was breugh^ip, ifidn*4: yxp? ~- ' ' ^fc.^" 3#-'- 

A^Correct/l di*P^^^foEiB 1 lefT'Sj^^iKa on 
the 10th of liiirch, I iiti<a^ ^rawell courtesy call,^ 
farewell on 




And he was upset by that, because he said, who 
is this North? He said, I've never talked to him, I've 
never seen him.£r !ia^ fe a c i r^--j|jfe •■ti<l^|a|JpM ^Sar.. a bout. 
}.d is absolutely ridiculous. 




207 



UHCUASSl 



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Q But he basically stated that he never to his 
knowledge ever talked to Oliver North in his entire life? 

A Absolutely. =^c i 

Q Were there one or more occasions on which 
airplanes, private airplanes making drops, supposedly 
making drops of supplies into Nicaragua to the contra 
forces, had to make emergency landings at the San Jose 
International Airport? 

A That happened three or four times. 

Q Tell me what you can recall about those 
incidents? 

A They were basically fairly straightforward, in 
the sense that we would learn — I assume that the 
information would come from Castillo on the basis of UNO 
radio contacts with the plane. And it was an 
unexceptional procedure, in the sense that the plane 

airport t^^^^JSTl^ml eo^S^S^^L^Oit^ SS^^ ^ ^Ifi^^^e -^^^_j- 
was nothing. '?^ v^ -^ r^; -^^ -^ — - 

I recall, r^ontt •ver.^^KaiJ.lilt H^j^wiiaig Jjk^^iMir^- 

think all in '86. 

Q Do you recall the Ambassador telling — 
A Excuse me. 




But my impression is 



UNCtISS!F^EB 



208 



UNCLJrSSIF.^ED 



39 



1 that a lot of that infonnation was coining| 

2 from UNO, from their own radios. 

3 Q Do you recall the Ambassador telling you that 

4 he had given any instructions to Castillo about any such 

5 possible flights during any time you might be absent from 

6 the country? 

7 A During any time I might be absent? 

8 Q Any time he might be absent from the country. 

9 I'm sorry. 

10 AX recall he told Castillo on occasion where he 

11 was geing to be out — he was invited out to make 

12 speeches and things. I retugggjf hii"a'*<'illing Castillo 

13 that he did not want to have any resupply flights during 

14 the time he was absent from the country. I recall that 

15 once, yes. 

16 Q During your tenure in Costa Rica, did you ever 

17 have the impression that the Ambassador was free-lancing, 

18 so to speak, was off on his own on the various matters he 

19 was Involved with that we have discussed? 

20 A Absolutely not, absolutely not, just 

21 \inequivocally no. This would not be in keeping with 

22 Tambs as I know him as an Ambassador. He was not a timid 

23 man, but he was not one that would freelance, 

24 particularly on an issue of this sensitivity. No, 

25 absolutely not. 



bNOtftSSIF^tB 



209 



UNCUSSIFKO 



40 



1 Q You certainly had the feeling that he was 

2 getting his directions and keeping informed these three 

3 members of the RIG we. discussed earlier? 

4 A Absolutely. As I mentioned to you when we 

5 talked earlier, you know, quite the reverse was true. 

6 One of the problems that we had there was what I'd say 

7 micromanagement from Washington. 

8 There were things going on, for instance there 

9 were conversations with Pastora, particularly after he 

10 decided to throw in the sponge and leave the struggle. 

11 There -were conversations here with various Meskito and 

12 Masurisata Indian groups. There were conversations here 

13 with UNO. 

14 Q Here, you mean 

15 A In Washington or other places. And contacts, 

16 certainly none of which we knew about, none of which we 

17 were informed about, and the normal fashion would hav«r 

18 been bji- 

19 And it was very disquieting, because at that 

20 time when we were cheered that Pastora had finally given 

21 up and gotten out and those people that he had that 

22 wanted to fight had gone into fight and the rest had 

23 simply become refugees, and that was a very great plus, 

24 there were obvious contacts to Pastora by Washington 

25 urging him to continue in the struggle. It was 



UNCtftSSIF'E^ 



210 



yNCU^SIFJED 



41 



completely counterproductive. 




211 



uNcusstre 



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Q When you said earlier they, you learned that 
they were having discussions in Washington with^^nHGSMJS 
with some Indian groups, who is "they"? 

-A Well, one of the to me quite embarrassing 
things V3sH^^H^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^S^B(^^^^| 
^^^^^^^^^^Hnl'^la'^oJ^^RV^i^^S^rcies had been 
talking to Pastora on the phone, urging him to stay the 
course, and had even gone to Panama to meet Pastora. 
Q Do you know who this deputy was? 
Yes. 

Who was it? 

Bill Walker, so we were informed. 
So you were told. 

You know, when you're out there, allegedly 
trying to carry out a policy and you don't know what's 
going on and you're not kept informed, particularly a 
policy of this sensitivity, it's a very disquieting 
experience. 



mohm$im 



212 






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Q Okay. Tell us what you can recall about the 
time that Admiral Poindexter came through with Elliott 
Abrams and X believe^^^^^^^^^lvisiting various 
countries? 

A That was a meet and greet session. He didn't 
just visit us. I think he stopped right down through. 
He was in Costa Rica I wouldn't say more than two hours. 
It was a meeting in the morning, a kind of getting to 
)cnow you meeting. 

He had just taken over, and I think it was 
within a month after he took over he came, maybe earlier 
than that. The meeting was held at a hotel near the 
airport and was, I'd say, an "attaboy" meeting, 
Poindexter saying: You know, I've just taken over; I 
wanted to come down to meet all you and tell you, keep up 
the good work. 




Q Do you recall whether or not any discussions 
were held with the Admiral about the secret airstrip? 
A No. 
Q Do you recall whether the Admiral said 



liNCEES^F^EB 



213 



1 anything about, you know, conf inning this idea about 

2 opening up the southern front? I think you told us last 

3 time you recalled he said something about it, how it was 

4 important to get the southern front open? 

5 A You know, by then Pastora — I think Pastora 

6 had left. I can't get the chronology. Certainly what he 

7 was telling us is that we should continue to do whatever 

8 we could to assist with the military front on southern 

9 Nicaragua. 

10 Q Did you ever ^ave the impression from any of 

11 your discussions with Castillo that he was freelancing or 

on his own ventures^^^^^^^^^^H 

13 A Well, as I said earlier, quite the contrary. 

14 I always felt that the bad times that Castillo had gone 

15 through earlier — and I think he was on probation, as a 

16 matter cf fact, with the Agency for most of this period - 

17 - appeared to me to make him super-sensitive to this 

18 issue. 

19 No, I did not. 

20 Q How could you tell that he was keeping his 

21 superiors informed? Is this just basically from your 

22 conversations with him, what he was telling you? 

23 A It's an impression that I got over the whole 

24 period. He and I would talk. He and I and the 

25 Aiabassador would talk. My impression was that ha was 

SECRET 



ONCLASSSREO 



214 



UNClMSii 



45 



1 receiving almost daily continuous, a continuous series of 

2 messages and all, some of which, particularly when they 

3 were oral, he did not. — these were the occasions when he 

4 said, put it in writing, send me an instruction, get it 

5 on the record. 

6 No, you know, I did not have the impression at 

7 all that he was freelancing. 

8 Q Okay. Now, when the Ambassador left Costa 

9 Rica at the end of 1986, so to speak — 

10 A It was January of '87. 

11 ^Q January of '87, okay. Did you all feel at 

12 that point that, as far as his original mission of 

13 opening up the southern front went, that things had been 

14 relatively success fulH^^^^^H^H[[ 

15 A Well, looking at them in say October of '86 

16 and comparing that to July of '85, yes, I think clearly 

17 in terms of the number of anti-Sandinista forcesB^^^^ 

|HH^^H^HH|H|H|^^^|^^H|H| i it 

19 was substantially improved. 

20 Success, no, I don't think you could term it a 

21 success. And obviously, when the events of November 

22 broke out, that was the end of it. 

23 Q Perhaps "success" is too strong of a word, but 

24 it certainly had improved? The situation had improved? 

25 A Ves. 



liNetsssiFiiD 



215 



UNCLASSIFIED 



SECRET 46 

1 Q Well, given the fact that the airstrip was to 

2 your knowledge never really used for its intended 

3 purpose, what was -- to what was the improved situation 

4 attributable to? 

5 A More people; that is, anti-Sandinista forces 

6 had grown. I think that the humanitarian aid had helped 

7 in the sense of steady supplies of food and non-lethal 

8 materials. That had certainly helped. 

9 The efforts of the private American groups in 

10 getting lethal supplies in was certainly evident. They 

11 had something to fight with. 

12 Yes, I'd say those three reasons. 

13 Q Did you ever know that Castillo was assisting 

14 the private patriotic groups in getting lethal supplies 

15 into the southern forces? 

16 A No. 

17 Q Did you ever know that Castillo was assisting 

18 in coordinating air drops of any kind for the southern 

19 forces? 

20 A I can't say so of my own knowledge. I don't 

21 find that exceptional because I never talked about 

22 operational details with Castillo, nor did he with me. 

23 Q He never talked with you about those matters? 

24 A (Shakes head negatively.) I knew that they 

25 would occur. Sometimes he would say, you know, that 



216 



iSSirin^ 



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there was a successful drop, or I understand that the 
troops ^^^^^^^^^^^^riare out of anununltlonl 




So I certainly knew there were drops going on, 
certainly. 

Q Did you ever learn that CasfSllo ^fiKl a^npa^tal 
encryption devic^J^at^^^ been.^«l£li|eeddtpJ|lB by which., 
he could cooununicafe «^^-the suppi 



^ -A Ho. I ba(i-«Iwa^|^ as8flmed -th«t-th at- ~ '_ - - ' 
comrrunicatiMteafa thro^gh.-jbh>5p!i^la]^^^^^^^^«^hnelr 

This whole issua of, the^^nparata jBOimnunication 
gacilitieff±tt ._ __ 

'.«bout 

"^ ^_ "Tfe^B^PJti^er »a^^'^^ t«^H*er.aay7 I mi^t 
hava aStEiiBirin — 7'l'n just ast »ura_wh«ther I ever met 

whea I waagjHfc t h«-ar aa WS«^ our two^ secrt^sr lea sat i 
when liii 'r iiirfliiiriMTnr 1 litf lifiaiiaiimHi"iiiT""nii| airiiiiirTIITiii " 
said, yc 



I'mjust sura tha t 'tbat even happened. But if 





bNCL#SS^F"E8 



217 



1 I ev«r saw the man, it wm^d have been no more than that, 

2 a handshaketSr. "" . -" 

3 MR. TRAYLOR: Just ft Cou^e of questions. 

4 BY MR. TRAYLOR: .- ~~'~" -^ 

5 Q I'd like to go back t<>;;^the discttasion that you 

6 participated in where TeunbS-briefed^Elliott Abrams, 

7 around^^hrtBtmaff, y«» balievey o KSa t*^: ' 85-or early ''%S. 

8 You said this was, you believed, Abrams' first trip to 

9 Costa Rica? 

10 A I recall it as his first trip to Costa Rica, 

11 and that's what puzzles me about the dates. I just can't 

12 think of what the dates were that he visited, because he 

13 took office in July and I have a feeling that he was down 

14 there before the end of the year. 

15 Q I just wanted to see if you could recall any 

16 more details about that conversation. In your 

17 impression, was Abrams surprised or was this news to him, 

18 or was it your impression he knew about this airstrip? 

19 A No, it was my impression — now, I emphasize, 
2 it was a very brief conversation. It might have been 
21 less than five minutes. They had their bags, they were 
2 2 ready to go. 

23 • As I recall it, it was the Ambassador telling 

24 him where the airfield matter stood. I just don't know. 

25 There was no surprise that I recall expressed at all. 



ONCOISIF"?^ 



218 



yNCLAS^iFiiiti 



49 



1 Q Did he say anything, Elliott? 

2 A I don't recall. I just don't recall. 

3 Q Were there other Abrams trips to Costa Rica? 

4 A Yes. He was there with Ambassador Carlucci 

5 fairly recently. He was there for the inauguration in 

6 May. I have the impression that he was there then. He 

7 was there two or three times while I was there, 

8 independently of the two occasions I've just mentioned, 

9 always, as I recall it, on multi-stop trips. I don't 

10 think that he ever flew to Costa Rica and flew back, I 

11 don't think so. 

12 And the first of those occasions was the one I 

13 recall that the airfield was mentioned very briefly. 

14 Q Were there other occasions during these other 

15 trips down there by Abrams where the southern front was 

16 discussed, like the one about the airfield? 

17 '^^^^^^^— -^,=,A— ^2a ^^^"^ ®*^ ^^^^ ■"■ ^®°*^^ that. Elliott.-- 

19 In other words, he never visited there while I was 

20 charge. And usually when he would come it would be the 

21 Ambassador that would grab him off to go to see the 

22 President or otherJ, 

23 I didn't accompany him on those calls, and he 

24 never stayed very long. These were always very brief 

25 trips, you know, in and out. 



UNCLl 



219 



m 

1 No, I can't say that I ever heard that matter 

2 discussed. 

3 Q That matter or any other related matter — I 

4 guess my question is, was it clear to you that Abrams was 

5 involved in the southern front operation? 

6 A It was absolutely clear to me, yes. Now, you 

7 say how was it clear, you know — 

8 Q Aside from the one conversation? 

9 A . W«ll, you lt^3w> ;Sfe3» M_ ^ry "^^g^ffwrtThe waa 

10 involved wJ^' Vtt6. conversatfon \/i%l!^HSB^^p^n^^&; Re 

11 certainly responded ver^j^p6ngljE^|o thafe- I jijat^^you ^3 



12 know, I ha\fii_ to '^ve ^ofigpy iigpreaalQns aC*tha^ and 1 i^ 

13 just -Had nevec^ha(^th^^f eeUn gjgbhap Etll a» u | g p t put of 

14 the loop. ^7 :2,- . ' ~g?^~" 3^ 

15 Did I sit down and tallc- to Afan about these 

16 matters? No, I nevetdid, wMi. r^^S^ :^- ^__. _ 

17 Q Were ^^^^qualiited wil^^gve^. N(^^? -^^^^^ 

18 A^ i^t t^ onc^'~S&actV^JaSm£jm^^isi^ai,^€r^ 

19 the AmbaaMdor's^rrival. He vi^^d Cg»te^^ijafr^'T'^:3xini. ^ 

20 for the purpos«aLof talking'to some of t^ UNO people, as r 

21 I recall it. And I met him at the Ambassador's house, 

22 9:00, 9:3 Oin tl^-^vening, when I got there: fr<» my ^, 
2 3 house. _ ^ __ 

2 4 We-_i^nt into the faaily dining room, and as a 

25 matter of fact they ware fixing some sandwiches or 



220 



UNCLASSIFIED 



51 



1 something like th^i^ and North was basically killing time 

2 there waiting to go on to an appointment, as I recall, 

3 that was around 11:00 o'gldck or somethin^^i^e ; thatS^ "^ So 

4 I was with him and the Ambassador and Castillo for -^ 

5 approximately an hour. ~'^^., 

6 There was no substantive coiwersa^ian t^t I 

7 recall. - — ' 

8 ''Nowt Erjthink :fae ^ mi|gpE haya jfisited ^'grtfr^ _^ 

9 another" timw on vacatiornVrth 'his familj^ ^ jusfel^^e 

10 the impression tSat haiieaBe <^krn and we n^^ ; > 1SS^b» -~-- i^- 

11 coast," thsjK»r€^soa«fc . Z _^ ^^ - ^S^S -S ^ 

12 Q .fflfefc^as^our '^erc^^on :Of_-North'jfcrole wlt^S^ 



13 the extras ^^ tJjfjjKthte-amgiaaeat '^^nl":^pr^^B^- 

14 A 1^ impres«fen~wa« that he wa«^^8y^^[^" ~ ^_%^ 

15 operational ,^hat much of the woiJ^5'^ " W itepression uas 

16 much of the work with the private American groups he was 

17 doing. That was my impression. 

18 I don't have the impression, for instance, 

19 whatever arrangements were made, legal arrangements that 

20 bought or purchased the land, with the owners of the land 

21 for the airstrip, and the Panamanian company, I don't 

22 have the impression that, for instance, Elliott was 

2 3 personally in an operational sense involved with that at 

24 all. 

25 I'm quite certain that he knew about it, but 



mamwi 



221 



UNCU 



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3 

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it was a type of thing that I think was managed between 
the Agency and North. That was always my impression. It 
would be customary, that kind of operational stuff. 

Q Mr. Tull, are you aware of any third country 
solicitations by North or anyone else for the contras? 

A No. 




222 



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MR. TRAYLOR: Thank you. That's all the 
questions I have, 

THE WITNESS: Could I mention one other thing? 
You asked me earlier about where did the Boland amendment 
fit into all of this. 

BY MR. TRAYLOR: (Resuming) 
Q You mean during the first interview? 
A That set me to thinking, and I guess my 
assumption was and is that we were down there carrying 
out a policy or carrying out policy instructions, and the 
Boland amendment was certainly a factor, but it was not a 
factor that I ever felt we had to worry about. 

In other words, that was Washington's problem. 
We were getting marching orders, and I assumed that as 
part of the evolution of these program ideas that the 
Boland amendment and how close that was skated to was 
part of it. 

I never had the feeling that that was 



ONCIISSiF'ED 



223 



54 

1 something — that that was a litmus test that we had to 

2 use in Costa Rica. I just never had that feeling. 

3 Q I take it that you never received written 

4 instructions or any kind of refinement from Washington 

5 regarding the Boland amendment, what you could or could 

6 not do with respect to the Boland amendment? 

7 A Not that I recall. 

8 BY MR. SMILJANICH: (Resuming) 

9 Q Do the names — 

10 A You might check — you see, the one that was 

11 concerned about that — and again, it was in connection 

12 with what I heard him say several times about, give it to 

13 me in writing, I don't want it on the phone — would be 

14 some of Castillo's messages on the subject. 

15 I have the feeling that, of the three of us, 

16 that he might have been more sensitive to that than 

17 either the Ambassador or I, certainly than I was^^^^^^H 

19 swear to that. 

20 I heard him say that frequently enough that 

21 maybe he was concerned abour that. I'm guessing. 

22 Q Do the names Rafael Chi<-Chi Quintero, Richard 

23 Secord, Felix Rodriguez mean anything to you as far as 

24 people you were aware of that were involved at all with 

25 these private patriotic Americans during your tenure? 



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A No. 

Q After this press conference came up and 
President Arias had the press conference called off, 
shortly after that did Ambassador Habib visit the country 
on another matter and bring that topic up again with the 
President? 

A You know, I think that Ambassador Habib did 
come. I th^?}^ that th« 3U]»l»ct: C3B«=ap tSlmgart^ill^ 




225 



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Q Mr. Tull, one last area I wanted to ask you 
about. Ambassador Tambs resigned his post as Ambassador 
in January of this year, 1987. Based on your 
conversations with him throughout the latter part of 
1986, does his resignation have anything to do with the 
controversies that erupted in November? 

A Absolutely not. And as I told you before and 
I've told him, I still don't understand why he hasn't 
made that clear, because there's nothing mysterious about 



82-740 0-88-9 



226 



UNCLASSIF 



i£ge.. 5, 



1 Ambassador Tambs and his family were on home 

2 leave in August and September of 1986. I had the 

3 impression, something that his secretary mentioned even 

4 before he left for home leave, that perhaps he was 

5 thinking of going back to Arizona State. He was a 

6 tenured professor at Arizona State. He was on leave and 

7 had been on leave for four years. 

8 And I knew that they were anxious to get him 

9 back. I knew that when we served together in Columbia, 

10 that they were anxious to get him back even then. I 

11 think- he was even listed in the catalogue for 1985. 

12 The day he and Phyllis and family came back, 

13 as I recall, about the 2 6th of September, my wife and I 

14 met them, went over to the house and sat down, and almost 

15 the first thing he told me he said: Jim, I'm going to be 

16 leaving in January. 

17 And that was sad news. It was a real shock 

18 since we had worked well together. And as it happened, 

19 he said: Well, I was back in Phoenix and talking to the 

20 President of Arizona State, and he told me that his job, 

21 his the Ambassador's position, had been vacant for four 

22 years, that they had never filled it, never hired anyone 

23 to fill it, and that the time had come when either the 

24 university had to have him back in a teaching capacity or 

25 he would have to resign and lose tenure. 



UNCL^SIFgED 



227 



UNCUSSlFiES 



1 And of course, Ambassador Tambs, with a large 

2 and still growing family, as he laughingly says, he'll be 

3 working while we're all at the Shady Acres Rest Home, 

4 he'll still be working, could not in any way, shape, or 

5 form lose tenure. He is not independently wealthy or 

6 anything like that. 

7 And so as a consequence of that, he told us 

8 that night, my wife and I, that night that he would be 

9 leaving in January. But he said, I^m not going to tell 

10 anyone about it now because as soon as you do that you 

11 become a lame duck, not only in the eyes of the host 

12 government, but also in the eyes of Washington. 

13 And he also said, I know that there are those 

14 in Washington who do not want to see this trip by 

15 President Arias to Washington come off, and if I tell 

16 them I'm leaving my leverage is gone, and they'll find 

17 some way to postpone this thing until a new American 

18 Ambassador arrives. 

19 And he said, I'm not saying anything. And so 

20 we said fine. And he stuck to that, even after the 

21 events of November broke, and it was clear, you know, 

22 everyone was going to make the perfectly logical 

23 assumptions from this. 

24 But nevetheless, not a word to anyone. On the 

25 1st of December, it was a Monday, he sent a telegram to 



228 



uNCLA^iFStD 



59 



1 the director general of foreign service, George Best, 

2 announcing that he would be resigning in January. On 

3 Tuesday the 2nd, we had a regular senior staff meeting. 

4 He told them that he would be leaving. 

5 And when he got on the airplane with Oscar 

6 Arias on the 3rd, Wednesday, he told the President. And 

7 that was not well received in Washington. We had talked 

8 about this through the fall and I told him, you know, 

9 Ambassador, you ought to think of at least tipping off 

10 Elliott or somebody. 

11 - And he said, no, he would just keep that to 

12 himself, and he did. And of course, everybody respected 

13 his confidence. 

14 And it's unfortunate, I think, in some fashion 

15 Elliott found out about it before he told him, and you 

16 know that never makes for good relationships. It was 

17 just unfortunate, but he was absolutely adamant to do it 

18 that way. 

19 So it had absolutely nothing to do with it. 

20 And when Senator Dodd was down right before I left, we 

21 were sitting down talking to some of the staffers and 

22 they brought up this, a Ms. O'Connell. And I said, you 

23 know, there's no mystery, and I told them the same story. 

24 And I said, you can believe it if you want to, it's up to 

25 you, but I know what the facts were, and those were the 



UNCLABSIF.ED 



229 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 



yncmSSIFItO 



60 



facts. 



And I just simply don't understand why he 
hasn't made that clear. But I have no problem doing so 
for him. 

^^^^^DCI Casey^^^^^^^^^^^^^^lat 
point in 1986, did you participate in any meeting with 
him? 

A 




I met 

him, but we had no conversations, nor was I in a 
conversation where matters of substance were discussea. 
I did meet him, that's all. 

MR. SMIUANICH: Okay, that's all I have. 

(Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the interview was 
ad j oumed . ) 



Signature of the Witness 

Svibscribed and sworn to before me this day 

of ^, 1987. 



Notary Public 



My Commission Expires: 



liNGt#SS!Fi!0 



230 



1 

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. (USA, Ret.) 
Friday, April 17, 1987 

United States Senate 
Committee on Secret Military 
Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition 
Washington, D. C. 
Deposition of GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. (USA, 
Ret.), called as a witness by counsel for the Select 
Commit,tee, at the offices of the Select Committee, Room SH- 
901, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. , 
commencing at 7:25 a.m., the witness having been duly sworn 
by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the 
District of Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by 
Stenomask by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her 
direction. 




ONCIASSIFIED 

.^y9K. ^x^^/ OOPT NO— Ll Of i COPIES 



' provWoiM of E.0. 123M 

•^ % a m«» NMiHHl Smrily CookO 



231 



Mtmm 



APPEARANCES : 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition: 

ARTHUR LIMAN, ESQ. 

MARK BELNICK, ESQ. 

JOHN 0. SAXON, ESQ. 

CLARENCE H. ALBRIGHT, ESQ. 

VICTORIA NOURSE, ESQ. 
On behalf of the House Select Committee: 

ROGER KREUZER 

JAMES ROSENTHAL 



UNCLASSIHED 



232 



UNCUSSIFJED 



3 

PROCEEDINGS 
Whereupon, 

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. (USA, Ret.), called as 
a witness by counsel for the Senate Select Committee, havinc 
been duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and 
testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. BELNICK: 
Q Good morning. Just for the record, would you 
state your name. General? 

A John W. Vessey, sometimes John W. Vessey, Jr. 
Q General Vessey, you were Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff? 
A Yes. 

Q During what period of time? 

A From 18 June 1982 until 30 September 1985. 
Q And you retired from the military at that time? 
A Right. 

Q General, I'd like to show you a document that I'll 
ask the Reporter to mark as Vessey Exhibit 1. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Vessey Exhibit Number 1 
for identification.) 
For the record, this document is dated May 1, 1985 
and it's labeled as a memorandum for General John W, Vessey, 



s;:^-ilCLASSIFIEO 



PMjJrniriiiiniii'ReteMcd 

^ ■■*«t — 

'^^ D. Skko, NAtkMul Security Council 



233 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Jr. from Oliver L. North, Subject, FDN Military Operations. 
General, I'd like you to take a moment to look through the 
document, and my question will be if you recall receiving 
this memorandum on or about May 1, 1985. 

A No. I can tell you I do not, and in fact do not 
recall ever receiving any memorandum from Oliver North. 

Q Have you talked to people in your office who were 
associated with you during your chairmanship of the Joint 
Chiefs about whether they have any recollection of this 
memorandum? 

A Yeah. I heard about this after the Tower 
Commission report came out and I talked to my Executive 
Assistant, Major General George Joulwan, and he has no 
recollection. The only other one who might know about it 
would be Admiral Art Moreau, who died in December, 
unfortunately, who was my assistant. 

It's possible that if it ever did arrive over 
there there's one other person who might know. That is, if 
something like this arrived, it would be either me. Joulwan, 
Moreau or Art Moreau 's Executive Assistant, who was a Navy 
Commander named Gail Dady. 

MR. LIMAM: How does he spell his name? 
THE WITNESS: It's a she — G-a-i-1, D-a-d-y. And 
I don't have her address at the moment, but she is at some 
air station on the east coast. 




234 



UNCUSSIFIED 



5 

BY MR. BELNICX: (Resuming) 
Q What was her position in 1985? 
A She was Admiral Moreau's Executive Assistant. 
Q There is reference in this memorandum, if you loo 
on page three, to current donors who were making 
contributions to the contras in 1985. As of May 1985 were 
you aware of contributions from any foreign governments to 
the Nicaraguan resistance? 

A I can't tell you whether it was May of '85 or whe 
it was. My general recollection is that it might have been 
later than May of 1985, but perhaps it was earlier, ^^^^| 
^^^^^^mHQQU^^^^^H who one day me 

else , ^^^^^HH||^|^^^^HB^IIH|^H^^^H 
H^B^^^^I^^H^Q^^^^^^mi^HJ^^V and 
was probably the summer before. 
Q Summer of 1984? 
A Whenever the restriction was in. 

MR. LIHAN: When the funding ran out; is that whe 
you identified? 

THE WITNESS: Pardon? 

HR, LIMAN: Was it when the funding by the United 
States Government ended? 

THE WITNESS: After the funding by the United 
States Government ended, after the Congressional restrictio 
was on. It was at some time after that, and I frankly can' 



UNCIASSIHED 



235 



UNCLASSIFIED 




tell you what the day was. I could probably look back and 
tell you when ^^^^^Hcame to visit me. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q Do you have a diary in which you record those 
sorts of appointments? 

A No. But I've got some little cards that I kept 
with my day's activity, and it may or may not include 
visit. 
You still have those cards? 
A I think I have them. 

Q If you could take a look for that date, we would 
appreciate it, and if you'd advise us. 

MR. LIMAN: How often did ^^^^H visit you? 
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'd say maybe four or five time 
while I was Chairman. 

MR. LIMAN: And do you identify this as occurring 
before ^^ 

THE WITNESS: I can't. It was a non- important 
event from my point of view. But, at any 




But that number could be wrong. 
I reported it to Secretary Weinberger. His 
reaction was about the same as mine, sort of surprise first 



UNCLASSIFIED 



236 



isussra 



that^^^^H would do it and, secondly, that he would tell 
either one of us. And that was the end of it. 

MR. LIMAN: Could it have been| 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. LIMAN: Did he tell you whom he dealt with to 



THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. LIMAN: He didn't tell you that it came up in 
a conversation between him and Mr. McFarlane? 

THE WITNESS: The only thing he told me was that 

and he said that 
he believed that it was important because the United States 
had supported these people, that it was important that they 
succeed, and he didn't want to see another United States 
failure. And that was — 

MR. LIMAN: Sorry, Mark. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q Was anyone with you when! 



A No. 

Q Did you have any further conversations witJ 
or anyone else aboutj 
A No. 
Q 




USSIFIED 



237 




8 



A NO. 

Q Did he tell you which official or officials of th 
United States Government, if any, he had discussed it with? 

A No. He made no reference to any officials of the 
United States Government. 

Q Did Secretary Weinberger get back to you with any 
further comments about^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hafter you reported 
it to you? 

A I think, frankly, that Secretary Weinberger forgo 
that ■! told him. 

Q Why do you think that? 

A Because it just never came up again. 

Q Mr. McFarlane has testified to the Tower 
Commission that he was informed by you 




)id you see that testimony recorded in the Tower 
Commission? 

A I saw that. 

Q Do you recall telling Mr. McFarlane that? 

A I have no recollection of any conversations with 
McFarlane, at least I had none, and since that time I have 
wracked my mind trying to think of a conversation with 
McFarlane. And it seems to me that at one time we came out 
of a National Security Council or National Security Plannin 
Group meeting in the NSC wing of the White House, and that 



wmmB 



238 



UNCUSSIFIED 



some conversation with McFarlane took place^^^^^^V 
^^HHp^^l^l^^^B^^I^^^HJjj^^^BBut recall 
the substance of it or anything other than it being sort of 
a casual thing as we went out. 




ONCLASSIFIED 



239 



UNCLASSIHED 



10 




Do you know who John Singlaub is? 
I know John Singlaub very well. 

UNCLASSIRED 



240 



UNCUSSIFIED 



11 

Q Have you had occasion to discuss with him at any 
time his efforts in raising funds for the contras? 

A I never discussed his efforts in raising funds for 
the contras. John Singlaub saw me in probably the winter of 
'84, I would say — that is, the '84-'85 winter. He came to 
Washington and wanted to see me, and I met him and had 
breakfast with him. 

And he told me that he was helping the contras. 

Q Did he tell you how he was helping the contras? 

A He told me he was trying to help them with 
organization, trying to find retired people who might give 
them some operational and logistical advice. 

Q Anything else? 

A Not that I remember. 

Q Did he tell you that he had any involvement in 
fundraising? 

A I don't recall that he told me he had any 
involvement in fundraising. He said people were 
contributing money. It's just a thing that was not high on 
my list of things to do. 

Q What did you say to him when he told you about his 
efforts? 

A I don't recall that I said anything to him, except 
okay. 

Q Well, did he ask you for any advice? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



241 



UNCLASSIFIED 



12 
A He asked me if I knew of any guy who was retired 
who might be a good logistician. He said the contras are 
getting their clocks cleaned by arms merchants and he said 
he was looking for somebody who might assist them in 
organization and that sort of thing. 

Q What did you understand him to mean by that? 

A That they were getting fleeced. 

Q Ripped off? 

A Ripped off. 

Q Did he mention any specific arms merchants who he 
thought were ripping off the contras? 

A No, he didn't. 

Q Did he mention the name of Secord at the time? 

A No. 

Q Did he mention Thomas Klines? 

A No. 

Q Did he mention Raphael Quintero? 

A No. 

Q Any names at all? •> 

A No. 

MR. LIMAN: Hakim? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q Did you know somebody to recommend to him? 

A No, I didn't. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



242 



UNCUSSIFIED 



13 

Q Did you recommend somebody he could ask for a 
recommendation? 

A I told him that I would ask the Army if they knew 
of anybody, and I don't remember whether I ever did it or 
not. 

Q Whether you ever asked the Army? 

A Right. It seems to me that I told probably Max 
Thurman, who was the Vice Chief of Staff, and asked him if 
he would know of anybody, but I really don't recall whether 
I did it or not. 

Q Do you have any recollection. General, of getting 
a recommendation back from General Thurman or someone else? 

A No, none. 

Q Do you know Bill Masterpol? 

A No. 

Q I imagine you were concerned when General Singlaub 
told you that the contras were getting fleeced by arms 
merchants . 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ask him what he knew about that 
specifically? 

A Well, he gave me some examples at the time — I've 
forgotten what they were — about the contras paying high 
prices for things that ought to cost a small amount of money 
and the delays in getting them there. 



UNCUSSIFIED 



243 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



14 

Q Bad equipment? 

A I don't specifically recall that that — it could 
have been. 

Q Did you report Singlaub's allegation about the 
ripoff to anyone at the Pentagon? 

A No. 

Q Or in the White House? 

A No. 

Q Did you make any record of the conversation with 
Singlaub — memo, notes? 

A No. 

Q Where did you see him on that occasion, do you 
remember, General? 

A Yeah, my house for breakfast. 

Q Did you see him again after that? 

A I never had another meeting with him, but I've 
seen Jack Singlaub from time to time, perhaps at Association 
of U.S. Army meetings. He's in and out of town. 

Q Let me broaden it. Have you had any discussions 
with General Singlaub since the one in the winter '84- '85 
zUDOut the contras, anything to do with the contras? 

A Not that I recall. 

Q And no discussions at any time in which he told 
you more specifics about the arms merchant ripoff? 

A I don't recall any. 



iiNCUssm 



244 



UNCUSSIFIED 



15 

Q Do you recall him telling you about his efforts a 
any time in '84 or '85, '86, about fundraising 




A He said — as a matter of fact, I think it was at 
this particular meeting — 

Q The breakfast? 

A This particular meeting. Now that you mention 
that, it seems to me that he said that it would be nice if 

knew that he was helping the contras in the 
interest of the United States or something like that. 

Q Did he ask you to help get that message to^^H 



A I can't tell you whether he asked me. It was sot 
of by inference, I think. You know, I think Jack understoc 
that I was in a position in the United States Government an 
we were by law prohibited from helping the contras. 

Q Did you indicate to him that you could or would 
make any communication or message to ^^f^^^^^^Kbout his 
efforts? 

A No , none . 

Q General, you mentioned the cards before that you 
have that show your appointments. Do you know whether you 
would have a card that would indicate the date of this 
meeting with General Singlaub? 

A I might. I don't know. 



cNfussra 



245 



UNCLASSIFIED 



16 

Q Again, if you would be kind enough to take a look 
and let us know whether you can fix the date of the meeting 
with General Singlaub more precisely, that would be most 
appreciated. 

A Okay. 

Q I mentioned General Secord before. Do you know wt 
General Secord is? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you ever hear, apart from recently, since 
November 1986 when there have been all these press stories, 
but prior to November 1986 had you heard that General Secorc 
was involved in any way in assisting or purporting to assist 
the contras? 

A Everything I know about Secord and the contras 
I've gotten from the Washington Post or the Minneapolis Stai 
Tribune. 

Q In 1984 you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and 
you recall that it was in that year that Congress shut off 
at least temporarily American aid to the contras. What 
planning were you aware of in the government for keeping th( 
contras viable or seeing that the contras remained alive 
during the period that the United States Government was 
banning any funding? 

A I was aware of none. Supporting the contras was 
not our business, was not JCS business or Defense Departmen 



UNcussra 



246 



UNCLASSIFIED 



17 



business. The CIA was doing that. In fact, for us it posei 
some additional problems in figuring out what was going on 
in Central America, because up to that time we got 
information about the operation of the contras from the CIA 
And, of course, we were concerned with the overall security 
in Central America and had to find new ways to find out wha 
was going on between the contras and the Nicaraguans and in 
fact had to focus some intelligence in that direction to 
find out what the contras were doing. 

Q You received intelligence reports, though, from 

DIA as well concerning the contras, not only CIA? 

A Oh , sure . 

Q Did that reporting by DIA continue throughout the 
period that you were Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? 




ONCUSSIFIED 



247 



UNCLASSIFIED 




Q Now the funding restriction went into effect in 
October 1984. Would that have been the time that you — 




UNCLASSIFIED 



248 



ONCLASSIHED 




Q General, have you heard that there was a time that 
the CIA asked the DIA to keep its nose out of the contra 
matters and not to be involved, for example, in reporting 
anything to do with Nicaragua? 

A I don't recall it. 

Q Never heard anything like that? 

A No. And I must say that my technical contacts 
with the CIA were pretty slim. 

Q Would you mark this next document as Vessey 
Exhibit 2? 

(The document referred to was 



UNCUSSIHED 



marked Vessey Exhibit Number 
for identification.) 



249 



BNcussra 



20 
For the record, Vessey Exhibit 2 is a memorandum 
dated March 11, 1985, addressed to a number of persons, 
including General Vessey. It's from Robert c. McFarlane. 
The subject is assisting Guatemalan progress toward 
democracy. The memo has attached to it in the form we 
received it from the NSC certain documents that we have 
numbered N7188 through N7199. 

General, if you take a look at the exhibit my 
question will be whether you recall receiving at least the 
memo which is the first page of the exhibit and, if you do, 
whether you recall receiving it with the attachments. 

A Yeah, I have a vac^ue recollection of seeing the 
first page, but I'm quite confident that I didn't receive 
the attachments. 

Q Okay. Then if I could ask you to please look at 
the first page, this appears to be a memo from Mr. McFarlane 
urging an increase in assistance to Guatemala in order to 
assist their progress towards democracy based on 
conversations he had in Guatemala in January. Do you see 
that in there? 

A Right. 

Q Do you recall any discussions about this McFarlane 
proposal after you received this? 

A Not really, but that doesn't mean there couldn't 
have been. This is the sort of thing that, you know, it's 



UNCLASSIHED 



250 



UNCUSSIFIED 



21 
$300,000 in IMET and $10 million in security assistance. 
It's pretty much down below the noise level of things that 
worried a lot about. 

Q It sounds good to me, though. 

A It sounds good to me right now. 
(Laughter. ) 

Q My mortgage is due today, so it sounds better. 

A I just paid my taxes. 

Q You win. 

(Laughter.) 

A It's the sort of thing that we would, you know, 
give to the security assistance people and tell them to get 
on with it. And our connections with Guatemala were, you 
know, almost zero then. 




UNCUSSIRED 



251 



UNCUSSIFIED 



Q General, let me ask you a few questions about 
Oliver North. You knew him while you were Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs? 

A Vaguely. That is, if you put me in a room I 
probably could have told you which one was Oliver North. 

Q We went through the first memorandum. Exhibit 1, 
which you don't recall ever having received. Do you recall 
ever getting memos from Oliver North of any kind? 

•A I don't think so. I don't think I ever got one, 
but it doesn't mean that Oliver North might not have 
addressed a memo to me. 

Q I understand. Do you know what his position was 
at the NSC? 

A Well, I knew that he was — that he had Central 
America as one of his areas of concern. 

Q And what did you understand his role to be on the 
Central American account? 

A That he was representing the NSC staff in the 
interagency deliberations that had to do with Central 
America. That was my knowledge about North. 

Q Did you hear whether he had any involvement in 
facilitating supplies or other forms of assistance to the 
contras, whether money, humanitarian aid, any sort? 

A No, except that if that were to be done and the 



BNCUSSm 



252 




23 

NSC Staff knew anything about it, it would have certainly 
been Oliver North who knew that. 

Q But did you know whether that was — 

A About the details of what he did, I don't know. 
And North was vigorously involved in the Central American 
activities. I know that he made trips to Central America 
every once in a while. I'd hear that North was in Central 
America. 

Q Did you get reports on those trips, on his 
activities? 

A I don't recall any reports I got about Oliver 
North's specific activities. I'm sure that I was told by 
the CINCSOUTH that North was there or, you know, he 
routinely told me when Congressmen were there or special 
visitors were there. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you understand that the NSC had 
taken over some of the CIA's role once the funding 
restrictions came into effect with respect to Central 
America? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. LIMAN: How often would you meet with the 
National Security Advisor? Was it a weekly meeting? 

THE WITNESS: We met whenever a meeting of the 
National Security Council or the National Security Planning 
Group took place. 



UNCUssm 



253 



Mmim 



24 

MK. LIMAN: Was there any regularly scheduled 
meeting with the President of the United States? 

THE WITNESS: Well, for me there were two sets of 
meetings with the President — those previously mentioned, 
the National Security Council meetings or National Security 
Planning Group meetings, and they weren't regularly 
scheduled but they occurred frequently, sometimes three 
times a week; there may have been times when there were 
more, but perhaps one could expect one or two a week, but 
there' were weeks without any. 

Then, the other meetings were the quarterly 
meetings with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the President. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 

Q General, do you recall any NSC or NSPG meeting on 
the issue of Central America during 1985? 

A Oh, I'm sure we had meetings in 1985, but we 
didn't have as many meetings as we should have had, it 
seemed to me. The Chiefs raised concerns with the Secretary 
that we were not meeting on Central America. In earlier 
years we had met more often on Central America. 

Q And what was the Secretary's reponse? 

A Well, I think the Secretary probably agreed with 
me. 

Q Do you know whether the Secretary conveyed the 



UNCLASSIHED 



254 



UNCLASSIFIED 



25 

Chiefs' concern to the President? 

A I don't know that he did, but I hoped that he did. 

Q Did you hear any feedback from him? 

A I probably did, but I don't recall specifically 
what it was because there were other things that we were not 
meeting on, too, in 1985. 

Q But, in any event, the meetings on Central America 
did not become any more frequent in response to the concerns 
you voiced? 

A They did not. 

Q General, the quarterly meetings that you had with 
the President, was that you alone with the President? 

A No. It was the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of 
Defense, and then whomever the President brought to the 
meeting, and almost always the National Security Advisor — 
in fact, always, I would say, the National Security Advisor. 
And usually the Chief of Staff. 

Q Those meetings were held at the end of the 
calendar quarter? 

A No, they were held when the President said they'd 
be held. 

Q That sounds familiar. Do you recall discussion of 
how the contras were doing at any of those quarterly 
meetings in 1985 before you left? 

A I don't recall that that was a subject of those 



UNCLASSIHED 



255 



WSSIflf 



26 

meetings. 

Q General, you said that you received reports from 
CINCSOUTH about North's visits. Who was CINCSOUTH at the 
time? 

A There were three during my time as Chairman — 
Wallace Nutting, and then Paul Gorman, General Paul Gorman, 
and the present CINCSOUTH, Jack Galvin. 

Q Do you know Colonel Steele? 

A I know Colonel Steele. 

Q And you were familiar with his mission in El 
Salvador? 

A Righf. 

Q Were you aware of any activities that Colonel 
Steele had or any responsibilities he had vis-a-vis the 
contras in 1984-1985? 

A So far as I know, he had none. 

Q Did you ever receive reports that Colonel Steele 
was involved in any way in facilitating contra resupply? 

A No. 

Q So as far as you knew before you left the Joint 
Chiefs Colonel Steele had no involvement in assisting the 
contras; is that correct? 

A Correct. 

Q Did you receive reports from Colonel Steele at all 
about any North activities in Central America? 



UNCLASSIFIED 



256 



INGUSSIFIED 



27 
A I received no — you know, Steele is a guy — I 
wouldn't receive reports from Steele. I saw Steele during 
my visits to El Salvador. Steele's report would have gone 
to the Director of DIA. 
Q Do you know 
A No. What country is he from? That doesn't ring 
well. 

Q That doesn't ring a bell. Let me show you this 
next document, which has been marked as Vessey Exhibit 3. 

, (The document referred to was 

marked Vessey Exhibit Number 
for identification.) 
For the record, it's a memo dated January 3, 198f 
from Secretary Weinberger to the President's National 
Security Advisor, showing a copy to the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

General, have you seen that document before? 
A I'm sure I have. 

Q Do you recall whether there was an NSPG meeting 
scheduled in early 1985, as the Secretary recommended, to 
work out a new policy towards Nicaragua? 

A I cannot tell you whether we had one. This was - 
you know, this goes back to what I told you earlier in 
trying to get that sort of thing glued together. 

Q Do you recall that there was a draft? I'm sorry. 




257 



mmmi^ 



28 
General. Did you have something else? 

A I was just going to say to the best of my 
recollection I think I urged the Secretary to send this 
memorandum or a memorandum like that. 

Q Do you recall that there was a draft NSDD on 
Central America prepared at the beginning of 1985? 

A You know, we had draft NSDDs. I'm sure there 
probably was. 

Q But you don't recall the fate of that NSDD? 

A I don't recall it. 

Q General, let me turn to another subject for a 
moment — the Iran arms transactions. Did you have any 
information at any time while you were Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff of American involvement with arms shipments 
or sales to Iran? 

A No. 

Q Had you heard that we were approving Israeli 
shipments of arms to Iran? 

A No. 

Q Facilitating transfers from any third country to 
Iran? 

A No. As a matter of fact, when I went to Israel I 
urged the Israelis not to send arms to Iran. 

Q When was that, sir? 

A It would have been '84, I guess. 



i/Ncussm 



258 




:fl 



29 



Q And who did you meet with in Israel at that time'' 

A I met with General Levy, the chief of the general 
staff, with what's his name, the guy that was the Defense 
Minister who had previously been ambassador here. 

Q Not Rabin? 

A No. 

Q I know who you mean. 

A He was ambassador here and went back to become 
Defense Minister. And, of course, I met with — 
■Q Moshe Arens? 

A Moshe Arens, right. I'm not sure that I raised i 
with Arens, but I certainly raised it with Levy. 

Q General, have you ever heard of something called 



A No. I don't recall having heard of it. 

Q Are you familiar with a covert program involving 




I don't know. 






259 



ONMSSiflED 



Q When you went to Israel in 1984 




Were they asking your opinion on it? Wer< 
they selling at the time, to your knowledge? 

A No, no. It was rumors or reports, I suspect 




Q Did General Levy or Minister Arens, if you spoke 
with 'him, respond! 



They acScnowledged the message. Levy acknowledged 
the message. 

Q When is the first time you heard about our 
involvement in sales or transfers of weapons to Iran? 

A The first knowledge I had of transfer of weapons 
to Iran came out in the newspapers, whenever it was, 
November or December. The Secretary of Defense, I believe, 
told me — I met with the Secretary of Defense each day and 
we exchanged information or, more importantly, I gave him 
information about what was going on in the armed forces and 
from time to time he gave me information and direction. 
It seems to me that in the summer of 1985 the 
Secretary almost — he was in a state of incredulity and 
said would you believe that somebody is proposing that we 



ffiSSffl 



260 




31 

have some contacts with the Iranians or something like that 
But I don't believe the idea of arms was mentioned. But it 
was sort of a passing thing. 

And the Secretary — it was kind of one of those 
nutty idea that has been proposed by somebody that will hav 
no opportunity or no chance of succeeding. 

Q Did he mention who was proposing it? 

A No. It clearly came from a meeting at the White 
House . 

'Q Apart from that you recall no other references to 
the Iran matter and didn't know anything until you read it 
in the newspapers? 

A Right. 

Q General, have you ever heard of an operation 
called^^^^^^^^^ YELLOW 

A I can't tell you. You know, I've looked at 
military names for operations for 46 years and I don't have 
much recollection of which one is which. 

Q Do you recall, though, an operation that was 
either aP 




A I do recall the Army setting up an operation to 



which was outside the regular procurement system. 
Q Do you recall when that was established? 




261 



wwssiFe 



^ 32 

A After Desert One. 

Q Was General Vaught involved in that program? 

A Vaught may well have been involved in that. 
Vaught was at that time, it seems to me, Director of 
Operations on the Army Staff. 

Q But that's the extent of your recollection about 
an operation like that? 

A Well, I recall that we did procure 
and we converted some^^^^Hto special sorts of ships. 

■Q Do you recall at all an op eration in which it was 
proposed that weapons be soldi 

A I not only don't recall it, but I'm sure I would 
have recalled it. 

Q If there was? 

A If there was. 

Q General, was it your practice at all to make note 
or memos of meetings that you attended as Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs? 

A From time to time, if I attended an important 
meeting when some of the Joint Chiefs were out of town, I 
might have made a memorandum and circulated it to them. 
Otherwise I usually got them together and told them what it 
was. 

Q And any such memos would be at the Pentagon? 

A Any such memos would be in the records at the 



UNCUSSIFIED 



262 



ifumm 



33 



Pentagon. Memos I made are over there. 

Q General, I have nothing else right now. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: If I may, just 




And I can't tell you what his name is, but I'm 
sure I met him. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q General, one final question. As I understand it 
no one ever asked you to solicit any funds for the contras 
from any government or any private party? 
A No. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



263 



34 
Q Or to appear at any fundraisiB^dinner or event 
run by private benefactors? 
A No. 

Q And you were never involved in any of that kind of 
activity? 

A No. 

MR. BELNICK: My colleagues on the House, do you 
have any questions for the General? 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. KREUZER: 




UHCLASSIHED 



264 






R 



ages 2x^ -34 



^aJ/bT) )^ 



T^^Tfirl^ 



IINWSSIFIEO 



265 



UNCUSSIFIED 




Q Did we have any U.S. Government-sponsored trainii 
programs for the contras? 

• A I can't tell you what we had for the contras. I 
wasn't my bailiwick. I'm sure at the times when the CIA w; 
supporting it they may well have provided some training, bi 
I can't tell you of my own knowledge. 

Q What was your relationship with the CIA? Was 
there an opposite number who kept you informed and who wou! 
discuss things with you? If they said hey, we're about to 
get into some territory that normally is in your bailiwick 
would they coordinate? Was there anybody to talk with? 

A What the CIA was doing in Central America is, yoi 
)tnow ~ my main mission was to make sure that we weren't 
attacked by the Soviets by nuclear weapons, and that would 
have been coordinated through CINCSOUTH, I would suspect. 

MR. LIMAN: I think what he's asking is were the; 
regular meetings that you had with the Director? 

THE WITNESS: Well, I saw the Director at these 



UNCLASSIFIEO 



266 



UNCLASSIFIED 



38 

other meetings, at the NSC and NSPG meetings. I tried to 
set up a series of meetings with John McMahcn, and we agreec 
to set up a series of meetings, not on Central America but 
on defense, CIA, and we met a couple of times. 

MR. lilMAN: But you didn't have a weekly meeting 
with the CIA? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. LIMAN: That's what I think was being asked. 
BY MR. KREUZER: (Resuming) 
■Q He didn't discuss, nobody discussed any of this 
with you from CIA? 

A Well, you know, that would be inaccurate to say 
because I met with the Chairman at the NSPG meetings. My 
deputy met in the interagency meetings that had to do with 
Central America, and he would have been more the 
representative that dealt with — he saw John McMahon 
probably a couple of times a week, but I did not. And to 
say that we didn't discuss Central America, I'm sure that 
every time John McMahon and I did meet — and I don't 
recall; I thin/ he came to my place twice and I to his once. 
I'm sure that Central America was discussed. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q Just to wrap it up with one point, when you spoke 
with^^^^^^^^^^H whenever that was — and we're going to 
get the date from you — do you remember whether he asked 



liWUSSIFIED 



267 



UNCIASSIRED 



39 



for any quid pro quo or said that he had asked for a quid 
pro quo? 

A No. I was surprised that he told me. 

Q Had you ever heard. General, that there was any 
understanding with the^^^^^^^^^Hgovernment thati 

|would be provided in con nection with assistance] 
:o various causes. 





A No. In f act ,^^^^^^^H that decision, I don't 
know, what relation^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H but it was 
made long before my time, far before my time. 

MR. SAXON: General, I've got one question for yo 
sir. During the period when General Gorman was the 
CINCSOUTH, and roughly this would have been in the February 
'85 time frame, do you recall any discussions with him or 
seeing any paper flow from him in which he talked about the 
use of Felix Rodriguez in Central America, particularly 
providing assistance to the Salvadorans? 

THE WITNESS: I don't recall Felix Rodriguez, eve 
the name, being mentioned. 

MR. BELNICK: General, I want to thank you on 
behalf of the Senate and House Committees for coming in 
today at no small inconvenience and for your cooperation. 
We all respect you for your service to the nation and it's 
privilege for all of us to meet you. 



UNCLASSIHED 



268 



Mimm 



40 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 

(Whereupon, at 8:25 a.m., the taking of the 
instant deposition ceased.) 



BUSSffl 



269 



V 



• TOP t t C Bt T 



mimm 

K«y 1, 1385 




^ <': 



N 10598 

SENSITIVE 



KEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL JOHN W, VESSEY, JR. 

The Chaimcr. , Joint Chief f of Staff 



FROM: 
SUBJECT; 



OLIVER L. NORTH 

FDN Military Operations 



Attached at Tab A is a auniniary anaiytia of how the FDN has 

expended funds which have been made available since USG funding 
expired in May 1984. From July 1984 through February 1985, the 
FDN received SIM per month for a total of $8M. From February 22 
to April 9, 1985, an additional $16. 5M has been received for a 
grand total of $24. 5M Of this, $17,145,594 has been expended for 
arms, munitions, combat operations, and support activities. No 
additional funds have been received by the FDN since April 9 
e<'er. t^c^;^^. there is i corritn-er.t for a total of 52;.M. T^e 
fr.llcwi.-.g ir.icrraticr. is r.cteworth/: 

most expenditures have been for purchases of arms, 
ammunition, and other ordnance items; 

th<» S2.5K indica ted for upkeep of base camps on -he||[^^^^H 
^mi^illBHHl''^"'*''* includes costs of approximately 
T350Kpermont^(an expense which will increase as the 

number of recruits continues to grow) and $50K for the 

operation conducted in Managua against the ammunition depot 

at the EPS military headquarters; 

the funding has allowed the growth of the resistance from 
9,500 personnel in June 1984 to over 16,000 today-all with 
arms; 

when the May 1985 sealift arrives ($5M has already been 
deposited for this delivery), an additional 6,000 fighters 
can be equipped and fielded after a 3 week training period; 

the relocation of base camps a longflHpHBHH border has 
been ordered for mid to late AprilTSBS in order to disperse 
the target for a Sandinista attacli (cost for this relocation 
have hot- yet been fully quantified); 

the acquisition of two small transport aircraft at the cost 
of $186K is prud ent given the. i ncreased patrolling activity 
by the EPS along BpHlHIHlyborder, thus complicating 
trail-borne resuppTyforcoTuSirs oper.n— -""o inside , U ^'^ 
Nicaragua. •? C\ 

""P,"'""' TAD CCnDCT SEN SITIVE <r/^ 

Declassify: OADR ' vr OtllKc T ; 



/■ 



■^V' 



, Partially Declassified/Released on 5(^0^X217 
' Under provisions o{ LQ. 12356 ' 

Jy 3. RegSr, Natfotla! Security Cciincil 



Ves^EV 

Exhibit 
^1 



270 




N 10599 

. TOP S t CB W - 2 SENSITIVE 

Suinmary of Operations to Dat> 

The rrs has grown nearly twofold since the cut-off of USG 
funding. In this period, they have reoriented from conventional 
to guerrilla warfare tactics. Despite the lack of any internal 
•taff organiiation (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4) when the USG withdrew, 
the FDN has responded well to guidance on how to build* staff. 
Althougfi' there was a basic lack of fanlllarity with how to 
conduct' guerrilla-type operations, since July, all FDN convnanders 
have been schooled in these techniques and all new recruits are 
now Initiated in guerrilla warfare tactics before being committed 
to combat. In short, the FDN has well used the funds provided 
and has become an effective guerrilla army in lest than a year. 
The listing of combat operations at Tab B (confirmed by signals 
Intelligence) is indicative of what the FDN has been able to 
accomplish with funds already made available. It is important to 
note that although funds started to flow in July, purchases made 
i;csssible h'- this fur.dir.g did rot arrive ir. FCV hands until 
ic'cte: 1984. 

Future Operations 

Plans call for remair.ir.g resources on hand (S",354,c:o) to be 
used as follows: 

increasing the force to a total of 25,000 by mid-Sunmer; 

a major special operations attack against Sandino airport 
with the purpose of destroying the f.:-24 helicopters and the 
Sandinista Air Foree raintenance capability; 

a major ground operation against the mines ccrplex in the 
vicinty of Siuna, Bonanza, and La Bosita (Nicaragua) — the 
purpose of the operation is to secure the principal lines of 
communication in and out of Puerto Cabezas; and 



of a southern front along theJ 
J|Hnborder which will distract EPS units 
eoSSintd to the northern front. 

It Is apparent that the $7M remaining on hand will be 
insufficient .to allow the resistance to advance beyond these 
limited objectives, unless there is a commitment for additional 
funds. The $14M which the USG may be able to provide will help 
to defray base camp, training, and support expenses but will not 
significantly affect combat operations until several months- after 
Congressional approval due to lead-time requirements. Efforts 



UN^^ilSSlFIED 



271 



UfiOMIED 



N 10600 

SENSITIVE 



should, therefore, be made to have the current dor.crs deliver the 
remainder of their S25M pledne ($8. SMI and to seek ar additional 
S15-20M which will allow the force to grow to 35-40,0,00. If a 
commitment for these funds is made batwesn now and June 1985, 
supplies could be ordered in July, allowing the force to reach 
these lAvels by the end of October 1985. 

Recommendation 

That the current donors be approached to provide the remainder of 
their S2SH pledge and an additional S15-20M between now and 
June 1, 1985. 



Attachments 

Tab A - Summary Analysis of FDN Expenditures 

Tab B - Summarv of Combat Operations: Oct 1984-Har 1985 



V f *vfi.i Vmfn 'I L U 



SENSITIVE 



272 



UNGiASSIFIED 



N 10601 

Al of April 9, 1985 



FDN Expenditure! «nd Outlay 
July 1984 through February 1985 



Quantity 
Independent Acqujaitlon 



februarv 198S 




G-3 rifles 
Magazines 
Rounds 7.(2 x 51 
Rounds 7.62 x 51 
Hand grenades 



eiinm grenades 
60min grenades 
50 cal API 
Rounds 7.62 X 
Rounds 7.62 X 
. Ins., etc. 



Rounds 7.62 x 39 
RPG-7 grenades 
Hand grenades 
60isn mortars 
. C-4 

Fuses and detonators 
G-3 rifles 
G-3 magazines 
Cleaning kits 
60mm grenades 
, _ 50 cai links 
Freight, Demurrage, Ins., etc. 

Sealift il -'ACril ArrWul 



RPG-7 rockets 
Rounds 7.62 x 39 
Rounds 7.62 x 51 
Belts for 7.62 x 39 
SA-7 launchers 
SA-7 rockets 
M-79 grenades 
and other exp 




Cost 






M-79 grenades 




w mm 



TBt A 



273 



UNCLASSIFIED 



rPN Expenditures and Outlavt N 10602 

July 1984 tnrouoh February 1985 (Cont'd...) 

g"«"titv Item Cost 

Seali'ft «2 - Mav Arriv al 

Round! 7.62 x 39 

Round! 7.62 x 51 

Round! linked 7.62 x 51 

Hand grenades 

M-79 grenades 

60nn grenades 

Sinn grenades 

8 2nm grenades 

RPG-7 rockets 

Claynore nines 

50 cal API 

12.7 aanno 

S7bb recolless rlfl«s 

S7nsii amino 

Anti-tank nines 

G-3 rifles 

G-3 cleaning kits 

AX rifles 

C-3 magazines 

AK oagazinas 

Swedish K magazines 

HX-21 machine guns 

RyG-7 launchers 

M-79 launchers 

9min pistol! 

AK-39 link! or belts 

C-4 

Fuses and detonators 

Deposit paid 
Estimated cost 





Miscellaneous Expenses Since July 1984 



Onlfoms 

Boots 

Radio and com equip 

Air and ground transp 

Military gear 

Aid to southern front 

Aid to Mlsuras 

Food, family asst, 

upkeep of base 

canps, air force 

hospitals, etc. 
Political activity - 

offices In various 

countries and cities, 

travel, p.r. 
Acquisition two 

tranap airplane! 



ll^flASSIFIED 



274 



wmmm 



N 10603 




X^ f> ,0 locoJ- /^io(.io 



^JUJ^ 




mumB 



TAR ff 



275 



UNCLASSIFIED 



{/ AiAi 



THC WHITE HOUSC 

WASHINGTON 

March 11, 1985 



MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ 
The Secretary of State 

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER 
The Secretary of Defence 

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY 

The Director of Central Intelligence 

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. 

The Chairman, Joint Chief* of Staff 



SYSTEM IV 
NSC/ICS-400215 

N 7187 

SENSITIVE 



SUBJECT: 



[Progresa toward Democracy (C) 

During my briej stop in JM 

^^^^^^^^^^^B^B^^^^^^Vma^e a convincing ^as? 

reTTtivf?v ^«Jf»°=^«=y^P«y "I'O noted their critlcafn^d for 

Ind sunnor. f^i \r°""** "' "curity assistance, economic aid, 
and support for tho^r struggling agricultural sector. (C) 

i"!-^^???' "!!"*,: *^'''* appears to have been an increase in 
guerrilla attacks and subversion. It is entirely likely that 
will see more polarizing activity of this kind as the(MH|^ 



elections approa ch. .Unless th e Army has adequate sup^STtT 

rel^on^to d»f!:"^P'S""""'y "" '**• guerrilla action a. a 
reason to defer election! or to justify counter-productive, 
r.nr»..,ve measures. Unfortunately, the Congress only orovided 
lin FY-85 IMET funds from the Administration' silHl 

^rity assistance request. While the FY-86 reouest for 
in security assistance provides hope for the 'future, 
eem that w^ need to lock for w?ys in which we can help 
between now and their elections. (S) 

It is, therefore, requested that Sta te take tj)e lead 
aeveloping imaginative alternatives A^^Hl^^^^^M can be 

uation. 





Our goal in all of 
assistance to"^ 



CECnBT 



Declassify: OADR 



Partially Deciassiliea/Released nn <0Pff6 8C 
under Dfovistons ol £ 123i6 
by K Jonnson. National Secuniy Council 



,d be to provide all possible 
progress toward democracy, (S) 

j Robert C. McXa^ne 

SENSITIVE 



mJk 



HOOll 



Vessp/ Exhibit ^2. 



276 



A ; >; . 



'^^ \M^ 



>T/- ^ 



mmm 



N 7188 



mjmm 



277 



ONCLIiSSiFIED 




N 7189 



O-l^rinCACIu:: P^ U^iUi.C r'j.'.AL 



14 de febrero de 1,985. 



Senores: 

ENiHGY RiSOUSCES INTEHNATICNAl 

**0 Kaple Ave. East 

Viena, ''a. , 22180. 



Senores: 

?vos dirigicos a ustedes, para manifestarles que per es 
te medio estaacs extendiendo CERTIFICJIC:: Li DESTIKC FII.'AL 
por DIZZ MIL (10,000) riries autoniticos, los cuales seria 
destinados pera uso exclusive del Ejircito <ie z^^^^^^By - 
no Eer4.T reexportados ni vecdidcs a orro pais, siendo/^^HR 
^^^■el destine fical. 

Zi- ozTs particular, ajrovecio li oporfw.iiid para s-^ 
cribirae atentamente. 




Paflially D«l3S5ilie*Rei«a«(l nn /o'^'^^8g 

under prov'S'Ons ol £ !2356 

by K Jortnson National S«cunrv Council 



)m:^M (7^ 




278 







uNCUssra 




N 7190 



14 de febrero de 1,935. 



Senores: 

ENERGY RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 
440 Kaple Ave. East 
Viena, Va. , 22180. 



Senores: 

Nos dlrigiBOS :. ustedes, para sanifestarles que por es, 
te medio estaros exteadiecdo CIRTI51Ca::o;; DE DESTT.rO FZNAL 
por DIE2 MIL (10,000) libras de explosive (HE) - C4 o TNT y 
TO ML QUINIENTOS (1,500) detonadores variados, los cuales 
ser&n destinadcs para uso exclu-sivo del Ej^rcitc <^s^^^^||| 

^■7 no seriA reexportados ni vendidos a otro psis, eier.d; 

I^^HHfel destir.o 

Sia otro particular, aprovecho la oportunidad para su£ 
cribirme atentaaent*. 




Panialiy Dec;35siti»i/oei(,jseo on 1 0^66 6% 
unoe." o.'Ovisions ol E 12355 
Ov K Johnson, National Sec'jnt\ Csoncil 



ONdli^^lFIED 




279 



UNCLASSIFIED 



N 7191 




14 de febrero de 1 ,985. 



S.nores: 

ENEHGY RESOURCES INTE3NATI0NAL 

440 Maple Ave. East 

Viena, Va. , 22180. 



iCos dirisimoa a ustedes, para manifestaLrles que por es- 
ts medio estaios extendiendo CI3TI?ICACI0:; DI DISTIIfO ?II:aX, 
del material que a coatinuacidn se detallajC^^^al serS des_ 
tlnado para uso exclusive del EJircito de(BH^^^^I;: ap se- 
ri reexportado ni veadido a otro pais, siendc 
destine fiaal: 

A. 130 aaetralladoras 

B. 150 morteros de 60ma. -coepletos-. 

C. 100 aorteros de 8lmm. -completos-. 

D. 150 laazagranadas K-79 

E. -30 fusiles sin retroceso de 57ini. 

Sin otro particvdar, aprovecho la oportunidad para sus- 
cribirme atentaaente. 



el 




unoer provisions 0l E 12356 
>i\ K Johnson National Secunty Council 




280 



UNClASSIFi * 




N 7192 



14 de febrero de 1,985. 



Senores: 

ENERGY RESOroCES IKTEHKATIONAX 

^'^O Maple Av«. East 

Viena, Va. , 22180. 



Senores: 

Kos diriglEOS a ustedes, para manirestarlss que por e"s 
te r.edio estasos extendieado CIHTIFICACIC:: 21 DESTIirO FI^^J 
del material que a ccncinuaci6n se detalla, ^^^a^s^4 
destiaado para u&o exelusivo del Ejerclto <le^|^^^^H_7_, 
serS reexportado ni vendido a otro pais, siendoj 
el destine final: 

A. 10,000 rranadas 11-79. 

B. -3,000 granadas de SOsa. 

C. -2,000 granadas de Sima. 

Sin otro particular, aprovecho la oportunidad para s. 

cribiriEe atentaaeate. 




ojiBiiv Decia55itiel/Rrt3S«d on /0^^8'& 

under orovisions ol E 12356 

^ K Jonnsoiv National Secuniy Council 



«'a» (g^^ 



281 



UNCLASSIFIED 




7193 



^^ll4 de febrero de 1,98^. 



Se Sores: 

EKSHGY RESOURCES IKTERNATINAL 

440 naple Ave. East 

Viena, Va. , 22180. 



ro: dirigtios a usteles, para canif estarles que por es 
te medio estaaos extendi3ado CIRTIjICACICir DE DESTIKO TZ^l 
del csterial que a continuacicn se detail 
tintio para uso exclusive del Zjlrcito d 
ri reexportalo ai vendido a otro pals, si 
destino final: 

A. 3»000 grar.adas RPG-?. 

B. — 100 laazagranadas HPG-7. 

Sin otro particular, aprovecho la oportusidad para sus- 
cribirae etentanente. 



el cual_, serS de£ 

M S9- 

'dOi^^^^Mel - 




"irtally DeclasaiiediReleaStd nn /offCSS t. 

unfler provisions ot E '235^ 

'iH K Johnson National Secuniy Council 







282 









.■i 

.*■;■• 




^^ N 7194 

CERTIFICACION TTE DESriHO PINAL 

14 de febrero d« 1,985. ' 




SeSores: 

ENIHGT fiZSOOHCES INTERMATIONAI, 

4AO Maple Ave. East 

Viena, Va. , JZISO. 



Sef.ores: 

Nos dirigiaos a ustedes, para aanift staples que por e_s_ 
te medio estamos exteadiendo CHP.TIFICACIOJ; DE DESTrJO FI.VAL 
por DOS MIL (2,000) ainas anti-perscaales y DK KIL (-i.OOO) 
fflinas antl-taaque, las cuales ser&a destinadas para uso ex- 
cluslvo del ^Jjrcito '^^f^^^^^m 7 '^<' serdn reexportadas - 
ni vendidas a otro pals, siendcfl^l^^H'el destlao final. 

Sia otro particular, aproveeho la oportunidad para 3U£ 
cribirae ateatameate. 




naiiv OecijssiScd/Re!easea nn ye^g<^fl fe 

liooei pfovisions ot E "SSSS 
Ov K Joftnson, Nationa) Secunty Council 




283 




N 7195 



14 de rebrtro de 1,985. 



Senores: 

ENERGY RISOUECES IKTZSHATIONAL 

440 Maple Ave. East 

Viena, Va. , 22180. 



Senores: 

Hos dirigiaos a ustedes, para nanifestarles que por es^ 
te Eeiio estazios extendiecdo CEHTIFICACICr DE DESTINO TV/.fX 
por TSES hIL (3,000) LAW ROCKETS, que vienen destiaados pa- 
ra uso exclusivo del Ej<rcito d^^H^BHSr &<> serin reex- 
cortados ni vendidos a otro pais, siendd^^^^^^^^^ el desti^ 
no fiaal. 

3ia otro particular, aprovecho la oportunidad para s-_ 
cribirme atentasente. 




(■visions 01 e I235S 
NI National Securily Council 



UNCLASSIFIED 




284 



»j vi/-^ r., 

UNCLASSIFIED 




N 7196 



1ft de febrero de 1,985. 



SeSores: 

ENERGY RESOUSCES INTERNATIONAL 

440 Maple Ave. East 

Viena, Va. , 22180. 



Senores: 

Nos dirlgiao3 a ustcdes, para eajiifestarles que por 'es- 
te Eedio estates e:ctendiendo CIHTIT ICACICi: DI DZSTIKC Flil.iL 
por DIEZ (10) lanzacohetes tierra-aixe y CINCUENTA (50) niai 
lea tierra-aire, los cuales vieaen destinados para uso exclu 
sivo del Ejercito '^^(■H^HL7 do serin reexportados ni — 
vendidos a otro pais, siendo^^^^^^Vel destino final. 

Sin otro particular, aprovecso la oportunidad para su: 
cribirme atentamente. 




, CeciasiliediR^leased r.n/oAS^SS 
udOirt Dfov.sicns 0* E 12355 
■pf'sw. National SecLtiiv C:jf.cil 



285 



% 



UNCussra 



s/rT 




N 7197 



CL '.IIFICACION PS DEaTIHO TIUHL 




14 d* febraro d« 1983> 



SeSores WZRGY BESOURCES INTERNATIONAL 
440 Maple Ave. £«8t 
Viena, Va. , 22180. 



Sencrss: 

Nos dirigiicos a ustedes, para manifestarles que por es' 
te medio esta=os extendiendo CSRTIFICACICli DE DE3TIN0 FINAL 
por OlliCO MILLONES (5.000,000) de cartuchos Ball Aamo, call 
bre 7.62irjn. , los cuales aerin destlnados para use exclusivo 
del EJtrcito ^'/w^^K^^T ^° ser&a reexportados ni ve&di- 
dos a otro pais, siendoH^H^^^Vel destino fiaal. 

Sin otro particular, a'srovecho la epcrt-jnidad para su_5 
cribirme de ustedes atentaaente. 




:jiri N3!iGn3l SecuTir/ Csancil 




286 



yNCUSSlFIED 



- 



N 719J8-' 



r 



^'l^-^^ 



287 



(iNCUSSIFIED 




MILITARY EQUIPMENT REQUIR£HENYS 

N 7199 

The following military equipment a n^ ^ervic^i have bte n 
identified as the higheat priority (|ViiH|BHHHIIIH|'^'^y ^" 
combatting the Coramunist guerrillas. They^re^^Tte**in sequence 
of highest to lowest need within each category. 

Aircraft ; 

New or refurbished helicopters and spare parts for existing 
Inventory. 

Spar* parts for fixed wing cargo aircraft. 

New or refurbished ground attack aircraft and spar* parts 
for existing inventory. 

New trainer aircraft and related spare parts. 

Ground Forces Equipment ; 

Communications equipment, including secure voice systems. 

Various vehicles for troop and logistical transport. 

Engineering aqulpment, Including bulldozers, road-graders, 
and survey instruments. 

Weapons and Munitions ; 

Light and medium weapons. Including M-16 rifles, M-60 
machine guns, pistols (9mm and .45 caliber), 81mm and 60mm 
mortars, and 90mm recoilless rifles. 

Ground force munitions, including mortar, recoilless rifle, 
and artillery rounds, assorted mines and explosives, and 
7.62 X 51 linked ammunition, plus hand grenade*. 

Aerial munitions, incl iding 200 and 500 pound bombs and 2.75 
Inch rockets with appropriate warhead mixes. 

Additional Non-Tactical Supplies and Equipment ; 

Field hospital equipment, general medira^ supplies, and 
training for paramedic*. 

Tactical radars for u** In d*tectlng border infiltration. 



;ii.!*ti5*as«) on je^fc*?* 
„";s.-..-i of E.O. 12350 



^^ihcMB 




288 





WASMINCTON TMC OlSTffiCT OT CO(.U*«iA 



A^^ 



l^lQs 



SYSTEM II 
90013 



3 JAN 1965 



MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTJVNT TO THE PRESIDDJT FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY AFFAIRS 

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Niearagua (U) 



(C) I baliava it' urgent that we updata our policy toward 
Nicaragua. In particular, whan Congress returns, we will have 
to address the problem of funding for the Freedom Fighters. 

(S) So far as I know, your four objectives for Nicaragua 
(established by NSDO 124) are still fully valid: 

- genuine implementation of democracy; 

- verified end to export of subversion; 

- verified removal of Cuban/Soviet bloc personnel : and 

- verified reduction of Nicaraguan military forces to 
regional parity. 

(S) There seems to be no prospect of accomplishing these 
objectives without improved assistance to the Freedom 
Fighters. This calls for planning to generate the requisite 
Congressional approval. He may wish to consider mixtures of 
support: overt and "covert"; direct and indirect (through 
third couticries- lor exaaple) ; political, humanitarian, and 
military. Th<. joint Chiefs of Staff share my view that our 
•upport for the resistance to the Sandinistas must continue 
and also that we must bring our political, diplomatic, and 
•conoaie strength to bear. 

(C) Z reconnend that you have an NSPG meeting scheduled, 
aa soon aa feasible in January, to develop an updated approach 
toward Nicaragua, with particular focus on an effective ap- 
proach to Congress. /^"^ 



cet Chairman, JCS 



} 



^^ 








y>i/»^ 



!:\t>5 



289 



DNeemED 

THOMAS ^5\ 5- 4(o [^1 



2 SPRADLING 

3 

4 DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM GRAHAM WALKER 

5 

6 Thursday, May 21, 1987 

7 

g U.S. House of Representatives, 

Select Coiranittee to Investigate 
9 Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D. C, 
.10 

11 

12 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 4:00 p.m. 

in Room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, Terry 
14 

,- Smiljanich presiding. 

Present: Tim Traylor, Special Agent, FBI, on behalf 
of the House Select Committee. 

Terry Smiljanich, Associate Counsel, on behalf of the 
Senate Select Committee. 



20 

2 1 ?3(ta1)f OciisalfeJ/Releasei "" j2//>g<^S7 • y z-' — 
3Bto 5L««:3ir of E.G. 12:56 / //^"^ ^ 

22 I tyBBB, .Nationai Security Council ^^ 
< Johns orv 

3^4^ 



unanssw 



oxr/^PTT'T' 



290 



li6®(ED 



1 Whereupon, 

2 WILLIAM GRAHAM WALKER, was called as a witness, and 

3 after having been first duly sworn, was examined and 

4 testified as follows: 

5 MR. SMILJANICH: Okay, on the record. Firstly, 

6 let me say before we get started, that I understand the 

7 reporter with us today is a notary in the Commonwealth of 
S Virginia and the State of Maryland and I have no objection 
g to this reporter administering the oath for the purpose of 

jQ this deposition, and I have no objection to the form of 
the oath. -•>^, 

EXAMINATION 

BY MR. SMILJANICH: 

Q This is a deposition being taken by both the 

Senate Select Committee on the Iran contra matter and the 

House Committee. I represent the Senate Committee. Tim 

Traylor is here representing the House Committee. ^ 

Mr. Walker, I am going to ask you some questions 
concerning your knowledge about certain matters. If you 
do not understand any of my questions, please let me know 
that you don't understand them and I will be happy to 
rephrase them, 

A I will. 

Q Firstly, for the record, state your full name. 

A William Grahcun Walker. 



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I) 



Q And you are currently Deputy Assistant Secretary 
in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs? 

A Yes, I am. 

Q Is that a deputy assistant secretary position 
that encompasses a specific subsection of the Inter- 
American Affairs? 

A Yes, my area of responsibility is loosely 
described as Central America, loosely described because 
it includes Panama. 

Q Panama is not in Central America. 

A No, Panama is not in Central America. 

Q You report directly to Assistant Secretary 
Elliott Abrams? 

A Yes, I do. 

Q And under you, what is the organization under you 
in Central America? 

A For most of the time I have been there, I have 
been responsible for supervision of one country directorate, 
it is called the Country Directorate for Central American 
Affairs, headed by an officer called Richard Melton. He 
has three deputy assistants under him, plus I believe 
roughly 18 desk officers for the various countries. 
Q What are your duties as Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Central America? 

A I generally have responsibility for oversight and 



IINTlliilllild 



292 



13 



UimSMD 



1 direction of the Office of Central American Affairs, that 

2 is, our geographic desk which handles the bilateral 

3 relations with the countries of Central America, the 

4 multilateral affairs that involve any and all of the 

5 countries of Central Americajf and the United States. 

6 Q And you have been Deputy Assistant since July 

7 '85? 

8 A The exact date I have my entry on duty was, I 
g believe yes, July 21, something like that, 1985. 

JO Mid July, '85. 

J] Q When you accepted your position as deputy assistant 

j2 secretary, was there a restricted inter-agency group in 

existence which dealt with Latin American matters? 
j4 A . Yes, there was. 

jj Q What was the structure or organization of the RIG 
when you first came on as deputy assistant secretary? 

A The RIG throughout my tenure was a variation on 
theme of an inter-agency continuing committee . The RIG 
that I sat in on dealing with Central American Affairs 
usually consisted of representatives from the NSC, the 
State Department, the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 

Q Did you say the Agency? 

A The Agency, Central Intelligence Agency. 

Q How often did the RIG, this RIG, when it dealt 



jM^i^lED 



2d3 



It 

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13 
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20 
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UfWiqwjw^Lu 



1 with Central America, how often has it met during your 

2 tenure on average? 

3 A Really there would be no average figure. I think 

4 I was told when I arrived on the job that they tried to 

5 meet once a week. Sometimes they would be called together, 

Q we would be called together several times a week. Sometimes 
7 it would go for two or thr^e weeks without a meeting, 
g During periods of intense activity, they might 

g gather as often as twice a day. No set time of the week or 
jQ no set day of the week when they met. 

.Q On the RIGs that you attended, who were the usual 
participants from the various agencies? 

A This varied over time. When I started out, from 
the NSC, it was Ray Burkhart, who was the Latin American 
expert on the NSC staff. Colonel North from the Agency. 
It was^^^^^^^|Ahead of the Central American Task Force 
and his supervisor who occasionally sat in. 



From the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was Admiral 



since deceased. 

From the Pentagon, it was almost always 
Nestor Sanchez, quite often accompanied by a Colonel Steve 
Kroker, I believe is the way he pronounces it. 

From the State Department it was, which usually 
chaired the meeting, it was the Assistant Secretary, 
Elliott Abreuns, myself and quite often, the Senior 

iiMoi AQQinpn 



294 



UNlOTfO 



1 Deputy Assistant for the Bureau, Jim Michael.. 

2 Did I cover all the agencies? 

3 Q I think you did. 

4 Were minutes or notes kept of the RIG meetings 

5 that you attended? 

6 A No, there were not. 

7 Q What was the purpose of the RIG? 

8 A The RIG meeting was a sort of offshoot as I 

9 understand it of the IG system which was the inter-agency 
JO coordinating mechanisms. The IG which also met from time 

jl to time, and occasionally dealt with Central American matters, 

12 sort of co-existed with the RIG. The RIG as its 

j3 title implies the restricted inter-agency group was 

j4 supposed to be the key players from the various agencies 

that dealt with Central American Affairs and it was a 

coordinating mechanism, exactly that. 

Q Was there a smaller working group exposed of fewer 

members of that same rig that dealt specifically with 

matters involving the Nicaraguan resistance? 

A The RIG itself, when it met on Central American 

affairs, dealt with many issues having to do with Nicaragua. 

There was no formal smaller group but people have referred 

to a mini-rig or a smaller informal group that sometimes 

met. Yes, there was. 

Q And who usually comprised that smaller group? 



mm^^ 



295 



mmmi 



t A As I say the smaller group was sort of an ad hoc 

2 thing that would come together more often at the end of a 

3 regular RIG session. It came together most often because 

4 the RIG itself in spite of its restricted title seemed 

5 to grow and become unwieldy, the conversation tended to drag 

6 on interminably, decisions tended not to be made. If 

7 they were made they were confusing. So quite often three 

8 or four of the key players would stay behind and talk about 
g some of the issues that had just been discussed, or other 

issues. Those key players were most often Elliott Abrams, 
^^^^^^^Bfrom the Agency, sometimes with his boss, 
sometimes not, and Ollie North, occasionally Ray Burkhart 
would sit in, sometimes not — I sat in on some of those 
and others I guess took place that I didn't sit in on. 

Q Would it be fair to say that more often than not 
this smaller working group subcategory of the RIG, whatever 
you want to call it, comprised of Elliott Abrams ,^H|^| 
^^^Hand Ollie North, as the usual three that met to 
discuss these matters? 

A Yes, I would think if you looked at the list of 
participants in that over time, the most consistent pattern 
would show those three or those three plus Mr. or me 
or those three and four or a fifth person. Jim Michaels 
also would come into these meetings, drift in and drift 

" IINCUSSIFIED 



296 



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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



UMMSflED 



8 



t Q Can you give me any approximation of how often 

2 the smaller group would get together to discuss matters 

3 concerning the Nicaraguan resistance? Once a week, twice 

4 a month? 

5 A I would say that a very rough approximation — 

6 and this would only include the RIGs that I attended, you 

7 would be talking about maybe one out of every two RIGs 

3 would produce those three or four people staying afterwards 

9 to talk about other things. Quite often the smaller group 

JO came about as a result of the other players having to 

11 go back to their agency, grabbing their cars, this sort 

12 of thing, and it would be reduced to the people who really 
f3 were on a day-to-day basi«^»erjHiiaay~iyB»iaB<a -ii»^fa» Central 
f4 American l^SQeSr^in^lvmng the Mj^ra^HUt^sni*-. 
fj Q ^. -Ig^^ijj. iiSh '^ thjjg way . The reason I ask so many 
jc questions about this is that I can tell you there are four 



people, four various people who whenever they have 
described what they perceived of as the RIG, have said 
that the RIG they understood this RIG to be exposed of 



Elliott Abrams ,^^^^^^H',and Ollie North. Whether they 
are right or wrong, there must have been something to lead 
to perception among more than one person that the RIG 
which formally was ocnposed of many more people, was 
actually as a working matter comp)a»»4jL#<[7 jus t three 
people, and I just wonder what you can tell me. I can't 



\imissm 



297 



bnKId 



1 tell you who the various people are, but what you can tell 

2 me what you observed there, whether or not these people 

3 are just out in left field or have any basis for their 

4 perception? 

5 A There is a great deal of confusion even among 

6 the players themselves, the people who were ostensibly 

7 members of the IG or the RIG, and we haven't even 

8 discussed the SIG, and this smaller mini group that had no 
g formal structure about it. 

jQ There were IGs, that dealt with any issue that 

)f was in Elliott Abrams' portfolio which includes all of the 
J2 Western Hemisphere from Mexico south. 

j3 I would occasionally be called to attend some of 

^4 those when the issue was something having to do with Central 
America. 

Those groups were quite large and would bring 
in other players, sometimes from within the State Department, 
from the Pentagon, that were not participants in the RIG. 
That was why the RIG, I understand it was before my 
time was formed, to bring it down to more manageable size 
and only the major agencies dealing with Central America 
were inYiJbe<^^^[ ^^a^^ gLJ«»gl^ ai^ln^^f^i^ dga|:epresen- 
tatives and those representatives were supposed to come and 
not send substitutes. 

I assume at one time those people considered 



liNCLAMP 



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UN«£ft^fHED 



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t themselves members of a smaller group dealing with Central 

2 American issues, however this sort of mini group formed 

3 would come into being after many of the regular RIG meetings, 

4 maybe some of the other players perceived that as where 

5 the real decisions were made. The decisions were actually 
g made throughout that system. I could not, if you gave me a 
7 decision that I sat and watched being made, I would have a 
3 hard time remembering in which forum it took place. 

Q Let me see if I can paraphrase that and see if 
you agree with the accuracy of the statement. 

The large RIG wasn't some front organization which 
everybody got together and talked and then the real people 
stayed behind when it was over with and made the real deci- 
sions and the large group was just a pro forma get 



.e together, but on the other hand the large group would 



sometimes make decisions, sometimes these three particular 
people very often would either stick around after the end 
of the meeting or would sometimes meet separately and would 
sometimes make its own separate decisions about matters, 
specifically concerning the Nicaraguan resistance, but that 
sometimes the decisions were made by large groups, some- 
times they were made by the small group, there was nothing 
formal about any of this structure. 
Is that fair to say? 
A That is fair and correct. 



299 



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Q When did you first hear about a secret airstrip 
down in Costa Rica somewhere? 

A I might have heard reference to the existence 
of an airstrip or building an airstrip by people friendly 
to the contras, earlier, my first real recollection of the 
existence of an airstrip in Costa Rica was at the time there 
was going to be a p-ess conference by the Director of 
Public Security in Costa Rica, and I was up at the United 
Nations with Elliott Abrams when this appeared in the New 
York Times. 

So it would have been in September of 1986 when 
the UN General Assembly got started and we would go up 
sort of en masse to hold bilateral talks with the various 
Latin American governments. 

Q There were RIG meetings throughout the fall of 
'85 concerning the startup of the Nicaraguan Humanitarian 
Assistance Office, some of which you attended; is that 
correct? 

A Yes. 

Could I answer? 

Q Yes. 

A I arrived in my job just after the Congress 
had decided to supply $27 million in humanitarian assistance 
to the resistance. The first three, four, five months 
that I was on the job, a very sizeable portion of my time 



\missm 



300 



U{ffiS3St%D 



12 



1 went into trying to formulate a system to implement that 

2 piece of legislation. I spent the first month trying 

3 to just get on top of the issue what was $27 million in 

4 humanitarian assistance, what was it to be used for, 

5 coming up briefing the Congress on various plans to 

6 implement it, having some of them thrown out, going back and 

7 helping, talking to the RIG and the IG and people in the 
g Department as to how we might put this all together. 

g So, yes, there were many meetings in the fall 

^0 of '85 trying to establish the structure with which we would 
|] administer the $27 million and, yes, I participated in any 
f2 that I was in Washington at the time as, especially where we 
^3 are talking about that program. 

f^ Q Ambassador Dumal ing kept notes of RIG meetings 
]5 that he attended throughout this time period, one of the 
<g people who did and one of his RIG notes references it is 
October 1 or October 8, somewhere in there of '85, one of 
his RIG notes shows a list of attendees and it shows you as 
one of the attendees. It shows Elliott Abrams was not at 
that particular RIG meeting. I think Jim Michael was the 
chair of this particular RIG, and there is a reference in 
there under Costa Rica to an airstrip being built. 

Do you have any recollection that during that 
time frame there was any kind of reference made at a RIG 
meeting to an airstrip being built in Costa Rica. In other 






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words, does that jog your memory at all? 

A As I said, there probably were references to an 
airstrip being constructed or having been constructed 
in Costa Rica. My memory of any such reference is very 
faint. I certainly don't recall it being at a RIG or a, 
certainly any specific rig. My faint memory would be of 
Colonel North mentioning that people who were trying to 
help the contras were trying to do something in northern 
Costa Rica with an airstrip which would let them supply 
drops into Nicaragua. But specifically that meeting, those 
circumstances it doesn't jog my memory. 

Q Did you have any idea that there were actual 
negotiations going 




■dealing with allowing such 
an airstrip to be constructed by private people? 

A To the best of my recollection, no. 

Q You have read about this airstrip, it is now being 
in the newspaper quite a bit and all, and Ambassador Tambs 
has been quoted in the newspaper about his role in connec- 
tion with that airstrip. 

Are you at all surprised that as Deputy Assistant 
you were not aware of the fact that our Ambassador to Costa 
Rica was engaged in suchj^ 



matters? 



UNClASmiR 



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1 A No, I am not surprised. 

2 Q Why is that? 

3 A Of the embassies that I had general responsibility 

4 for supervising, and liaisoning with, the embassy in 

5 San Jose, Costa Rica was by far the least known to me or 

6 ! the least understood by me. Ambassador Teunbs was a 

7 political appointee, whereas with the other embassies, 

3 I would have once a week telephone conversations with either 

9 the OCM or the Ambassador. During the entire time he 

10 was there, I spoke to Ambassador Tambs twice on the phone 

11 and both times sort of to express our astonishment at 
t2 some things he had done that were very surprising to us, 
j3 and were unknown to us and were not what we would have 
j4 thought. he would be involved in. 



On the three or four times I met Ambassador Tambs 
personally, a couple of times going through Costa Rica 
on visi):s and maybe once here in Washington when he was up 
in consultations, we really had no substantive discussions. 

It is somewhat hard to explain, but Ambassador 
Teunbs was sort of a mysterious figure to me. So in the 
hypothetical situation you are giving me that he ^^^^^^H 

I helping 

people set up an airstrip, it does not come as a terrible 
surprise to me even though it is Sranewhat shocking. 

Q Did you have any impression or belief that during 



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303 



UlflWriED 



15 



1 Ambassador Tambs tenure in Costa Rica, he was getting 

2 instructions from someplace other than the Bureau of 

3 Inter-American Affairs for his mission in Costa Rica? 

4 A Without being able to point to anything very 

5 specific, yes, that was the general impression I had. 

g Q What was your impression, understanding it was 
7 just a general feeling, as opposed to specific f=cts, 
g what was your impression as to where he was getting his 
g guidance from? 

A My impression was that his contacts in the White 
House and perhaps messages or signals received from the 
Central Intelligence Agency sort of combined to give him 
13 what he thought were his instructions. 

Q The White House and the Agency? 
A Yes. 

Q You mentioned two occasions when you talked with 
Ambassador Tambs on the telephone. I think you said you 
were down there a few times, there were two times when you 
talked to him on the telephone during his tenure? 
A Yes. 

Q Describe for me each of those occasions? 
A I am trying to remember the circumstances of the 
second one. Let Bej^escribe the first one. 

The first one dealt with a cable that appeared 
out of the blue. 



nuclide 



304 



mmtt 



16 



1 Q We have the cable. You don't have to try to 

2 guess. Late March? 

3 A March, early April '86 which described a meeting 

4 he had had at the embassy with General John Singlaub in 

5 which Singlaub in turn talked about an agreement that he 

6 was trying to reach with Eden Pastora, having to do with 

7 U.S. assistance to Eden Pastora in return for meeting 

8 certain conditions. 

9 Q Did you have any idea before this cable came in 
JO that General Singlaub was going to be meeting with Eden 

11 Pastora? 

12 A No. -^--i^^ ^ 

13 Q Go ahead. 

j4 A The cable cfPi the face of it raised a lot of 
f5 questions in my mind and in taking it to Elliott, in 
jg Elliott's mind — a first reading and a second reading 

it looked as though our Ambassador in Costa Rica had lent 
the prestige of the embassy and the U.S. Government and 
his own to what appeared to be an agreement between a private 
U.S. citizen and a self -proclaimed contra leader for that 
contra leader to receive assistance. 

Elliott Abrams as I remember took that cable 
up to the 7th floor iimnediately. I don't remember if he 
discussed it with the Secretary ot^ jttg g^ with Charlie 
Hill, the Executive Secretary of the Department. But when 



mmm 



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UIKIAS^tu 



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1 he returned he said that they had agreed with us that this 

2 was a very unusual thing to have happened, and we should 

3 query the embassy to find out greater detail as to exactly 

4 what had taken place. 

5 If my memory serves me, the legal adviser was 

6 also brought in at about that time. Judge Sofaer. I 

7 believe it ••as the next day I was told to take the in- 
g coming cable up to Judge Sofaer 's office and sort of brief 
9 him on this and tell him what we knew, but more importantly 

,0 what we didn't know, which was this came out or the blue. 

The judge agreed that we should send a follow-up 
cable to the embassy with very specific questions due to the 
appearance of possible illegality. 

If I am not mistaken. Rick Melton was asked to 
draft the reply cable, the second cable in which we 
expressed surprise and chagrin that Tambs had put himself 
in this position, and then asked a series of questions. 

A few days later a reply came back with his 
responses and our reaction to that was this is almost worse 
than the first cable, and again this was sent up to Judge 
Sofaer and if I am not mistaken, the Inspector General of 
the Foreign Service was at some point called in to this 
to take a look at it to see if the Ambassador specifically 
had really been out of line. 

Whether anything happened after that I don't 



306 



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1 know. In the middle of that someplace, I called 

2 Ambassador Tambs and sort of said we really need your 

3 answers to this, this really looks kind of strange. As I 

4 remember he told me he had some other things he had to 

5 do and would get around to it, and I was telling him, look, 

6 damn it, this is very important, we need your answer. Judge 

7 Sofaer is involved, this is a very serious matter, 

8 whatever else is on your plate could not be as important as 
g telling us what you have done. 

jQ That prompted his cable. 

f] Q Did he talk to you on the phone about his 
j2 explanation for any of this? Did he tell you what he had 
done? 

A My memory is we were on the secure phone. I have 
virtually never had a conversation on the secure phone 
where you could really carry on a good conversation, it is 
a very poor system. I don't think we went into much beyond 
just talking about, hey, the cable that you sent in has 
stirred things up, we have sent you a strong reply, we 
need the answers, that sort of thing. 

Q I want to come back to this in a minute. Do 
you recall the second time you had a telephone conversation 
with the Ambassador? 

A No, but it was something along the same lines 
in which the embassy had not performed well. Xt was not 



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\ as serious a matter, that is. I was calling up to say 

2 that damn it, we don't understand what you are doing down 

3 there, please tell us, and he sort of came back in kind and 

4 we didn't have a very successful phone call. Those were 

5 the two calls that I remember having direct conversation 

6 with Lou Tambs about substantive matters. 

7 Q You don't recall the substance of the second 

8 conversation? 

9 A No, I don't. 

10 Q Going back to the first matter involving 
It General Singlaub, shortly after this series of cables 

12 back and forth. General Singlaub had a series of meetings 

13 with Rick Melton, with Elliott Abrams, and there are 
various memos that were churned out as a result of 

f5 these meetings, and you are shown as the memos being 
•e routed through. 

My question is, were you present at any of those 
meetings? 

A I was present at what I believe was the final 
meeting of that series which Singlaub came in and was seen 
by Elliott Abrauns in Elliott Abrams' office. I had also 
been involved in that. Rick Melton had originally told 
me of a visit or phone calls from General Singlaub who 



said he was going out to ^^^^^^^^H and was^^sking 
essentially if we '"" JltJjJtjM" t»-ltit ISrf^^pg 



308 



ONfSSSIffiD 



20 



1 assistance for the contras from one or two of the 

2 governments out there that he had longstanding contact 

3 with. 

4 When Rick Melton got that request he sent a 

5 memo I believe to Elliott through me, I am sure I saw it, 

6 I am sure I saw some subsequent memos because I 

7 understand Singlaub called Rick several times] 
8 
9 Q The final meeting, was this after he -tflBBe back 

JO or before he left? 

\\ A This was after he came back. 

(2 Q Go ahead. 

]3 A I don't remember now becai^at-^^Mven ' t seen those 

j4 memos since they passed over my desk in early '86. 

15 Q Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. SMILJANICH: Back on the record. 
He are back on the record. 
BY MR. SMILJANICH: 
Q You have just gone through a series of memos 
dated at various times in May of '86 that concern these 
meetings with General Singlaub, both before and after his 
visit ■H||H|^^^^^Pl Having read those memos now, what 
can you tell me as far as your own recollection of your 
involvement in the various meetings which you understood 



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were going on? a*. -^ 

2 A If my recollection is correct, I met with 

3 General Singlaub in Elliott's office shortly after the 

4 problem had arisen in the Costa Rica context, and Singlaub 

5 essentially came in, whether at his request or our request 

6 I can't remember, to explain what had happened in Costa 

7 Rica with Ambassador Tambs and Eden Pastcra. 

8 I have a fairly specific memory of Elliott not 

9 wanting Singlaub to discuss his private efforts to get 
jQ help to the contras, Elliott thinking that would be 

f] inappropriate. However, when Singlaub came in he did make 
reference to his contacts in ^^^^^^^^^^S a little bit 
about his reasons for helping the contras. I have a 
recollection somewhat faint now that my impression was that 
General Singlaub thought we knew more about what he was 
talking about than we did. 

Q You meaning concerning his private efforts? 

A Yes. 

My memory of the Melton memos and a lot of 
reference in there doesn't mean anything to me, and I have 
the impression, again somewhat vague, that I might have 
been traveling at that time and just sort of came in on 
that at various points. I do remember Rick telling me that 
Singlaub was going off to^^m^^^^f and had made a 
request to him for guidance from either Elliott or the 

Ml 



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1 U.S. Government. I remember seeing some of the memos that 

2 you just showed me but I can't recall having any knowledge 

3 of some of the explanations that were given to Singlaub, 

4 come back and I will tell you some important things. I 

5 don't know what those things are talking about. I have a 

6 feeling I was only there for bits and pieces of that 

7 exercise. 

8 Q In the one meeting that you attended between 

9 Abrams and Singlaub, firstly, this was a meeting that took 
JO place before Singlaub was leaving for 
]l A From the sequence of those memos I have to believe 
\2 yes. Melton talks about a previous meeting with Singlaub 

J3 and I think I was in the first meeting that Elliott 

j4 had with Singlaub after the Costa Rica thing. So that in 

J J my mind means that it was an earlier meeting. 

Q Do you recall whether or not Elliott Abrams 
gave General Singlaub an answer one way or the other 
concerning the sending of a signal to a foreign government 
that General Singlaub' s efforts were sanctioned or 
authorized by the United States? By that I mean do you 
recall either 'way? In other words, either Elliott's answer 
telling him no, we can't do that or yes, we can do that? 

A I have no distinct memory of that issue being 
in the conversation, although it might have been. 

The majority of that meeting dealt with what 



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had happened in Costa Rica and Singlaub told us why he 
thought Eden Pastora's involvement in the liberation of 



1 

2 

Nicaragua was essential, that he was perhaps the only 

national and internationally recognized figure. We 
talked a bit about problems the U.S. Government had had of 
time in dealing with Eden Pastora. We talked a bit about 
how Eden Pastora was trying to make himself eligible for 
the humanitarian assistance monies, but up to that point 
had not been able to do so and, therefore, was in fairly 
desperate straits in Costa Rica. 

I had been as I said previously quite involved 
in the humanitarian assistance program. Specifically I 
had been quite involved in many of the events in which 
Eden Pastora tried to get his share of that $27 million. 



So I do remember quite a bit of discussion with John 
Singlaub about who he thought Eden Pae ti f oa was , and why 



he thought he should get U.S. assistance on the humanitarian 
side. 

Q Do you recall what General Singlaub said about 
the role Ambassador Tambs played in that episode in Costa 
Rica? In other words, did he confirm what Tambs had said 
or have any new light on it? 

A I don't have any exact memory of what he 
might have said. 

Q At one of your interviews we have had in the 

Hi 



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1 past several weeks, you have made reference to a time at 

2 a meeting between Secretary Abrams and General Singlaub 

3 in which General Singlaub started to talk about his private 

4 resupply efforts, and Elliott Abrams cut him off, I think 

5 were the words you used, said he really shouldn't talk 

6 about that. 

7 Is this the meeting you were referring to? I 

8 think you sort of said that just a while ago when you 

9 said General Singlaub was talking about his fund-raising 
JO efforts or whatever. 

|] A Before the meeting took place, as quite often 

f2 w^s the case, Elliottt asked me what might come up in the 

)3 meeting with Singlaub#. We were anxious to hear his 

j4 version, of what had happened in Costa Rica, and at some 

15 point in that process, Elliott conveyed to me that he 

]g did not want General Singlaub to be talking about whatever 

jy he was doing as a private citizen for the contras. 

jg Whether or not at the meeting he actually cut 



him off I don't remember, but it was certainly on my mind 
through the meeting that Elliott did not want it to go in 
that direction. 

As I say. General Singlaub did talk in very 
general terms, sort of gave us a little bit of history 
of how he had traveled a lot inj^^^^^^^^Hand gotten to 
know people in^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hlplaces 




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and I believe I recall him saying, indicating by some words 
that that was where he was getting some help. 

Q While General Singlaub was ^"^^^^^^^^V '^° 
you have any recollection of being apprised of any 
telephone calls that were going back and forth while he was 
over there? 

A As I say, I remember Rick Melton telling me that 
he had either seen or talked to Singlaub on the phone, 
either before Singlaub had gone off toH||H|B9P or 
when he had first gotten ^°W^//I//^^ Singlaub had posed 
certain questions which I believe were covered in the 
memos that he , Melton, received one or two follow-up calls 
from Singlaub presumably from|||||^^BB wherever he 
was, asking for replies. 

Q But you don't recall what the substance of those 
conversations was supposed to have been? 

A No, that is why I am relatively convinced I 
was either about to travel or had just traveled or was 
occupied with something else, because reading the memos and 
my memory, leads me to believe that Rick was dealing 
directly with Elliott and then got his reply off to Singlaub 
without it coining through me. 

Q There are references that you saw toward the 
end of those memos concerning other things being in the 
offing, or other matters going on which preclude at that 



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t point his efforts ^"^^^^^^^^^| Do you have any idea 

2 what those references are to? 

3 A At this point, no, I doojt. If I coul«fctalk to 

4 Rick for five minute*, he might say something that would 

5 make me remember, but reading the memos and my own private 

6 recollection doean't lead m6 to any further light. 

7 Q Fair enough. 

8 Just to finish with General Singlaubn, after the 

9 Hasenfus plane was^^hot dqagfti-jfii^iaraybiif ; I believe you 

IQ got a call shortly thereafter from General Sweitzer who was 
If conveying a concern or message from General Singlaub 
12 about his ncune being linked to the mountain area, do you 
recall that? 

A That is correct. 



U Q Tell me about that. 



A After the Hasenfus plane went down, and we 
realized there were Americans on board, there were a 
couple of Americans killed, that sort of thing, there was 
naturally some speculation and guessing in my office, in 
Rick Melton's office, as to who might have been responsible 
for that aircraft being where it was when it was. At one 
point in the nexjf*couple of days, we thought of trying to 
get ahold of Singlaub to ask him if that was part of his 
operation and we were told, how I don't remember, that 
General Singlaub was in the Far East, I believe in the 



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1 Philippines. 

2 Rick Melton or someone in his shop might even 

3 have tried to get a call through to him unsuccessfully. 

4 A few days later, I got a call from Retired 

5 General Robert Sweitzer, who I had never met, still haven't 
g as far as I know, but who called me by my first name, said 
7 he was trying to get through to Elliott and wanted Elliott 
g to know that he had been in touch with General Singlaub 

g who was headed home or headed to Washington from his trip 
jQ to the Far East, and he wanted us to know that Singlaub 
I) was very upset with the Department of State and with 
Elliott Abrams. 

I asked him why, and he told me something to the 
effect that Singlaub was reading the newspapers and was 
coming to the conclusion that the State Department or 
people in the State Department were trying to make him, 
John Singlaub, a patsy for the downing of this aircraft, 
that it was not an aircraft that John Singlaub had anything 
to do with, and he was upset that newspaper stories were 
quoting informed sources in the State Department or 
high officials in the State Department and referring to 
this as a Singlaub operation. 

I told Sweitzer that by all means, if Singlaub had 
such a complaint that he should come and see Elliott Abrams 
or me and that we would tell him as I was going to tell 



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t General Sweitzer, that we were not trying to make anyone 

2 the patsy, we had no idea who or what was behind the 

3 Hasenfus flight. I suggested -that someone in the Department 

4 might have been gotten to by a reporter and used the term 

5 "Singlaub operation" in the generic sense of the word, 

6 that General Singlaub was known far and wide as someone who 

7 solicited money and assistance for good causes around the 

8 world, and it was almost as I say a generic term for private 

9 assistance to resistance fighters and that maybe someone 
JO using in this way had been misinterpreted by the reporter 
\\ or Singlaub 's lawyer has misinterpreted reading the story 

j2 and had taken offense when none was meant, if Singlaub would 
j3 come in I would be sure Elliott would say something along 
the same lines. 

Sweitzer took the point and said he still thought 
it was important for John Singlaub to talk to Elliott and 
a few days later, such a meeting was held and I sat in on 
the meeting. 

Q And firstly before we go to that meeting, wasn't 
it in fact true that you were aware of the fact that the 
State Department had unofficially put out the word that this 
was a Singlaub or Singlaub-like operation. Were you aware 
of that? ^ ^ 
A No. 
Q Going forward to the meeting, you attended a 



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t meeting between General Singlaub and Secretary Abrams. What 

2 occurred at the meeting? 

3 A Pretty much what you would expect. Singlaub 

4 described reading the newspapers in the Philippines and 

5 seeing his naime associated with the Hasenfus doing and 

6 claimed he had no connection with it whatsoever, expressing 

7 his concern that newspaper stories were quoting State 

8 Department officials, unnamed, as having referred to him, 

9 and I gave him this thing about his name now being a 
household word and it was now a generic term for private 
assistance to freedom fighters. 

Q And he seemed satisfied with that explanation? 

A Yes. The meeting was not in any way confronta- 
tional or unfriendly. 

Q Do you recall General Singlaub at all in this 
meeting saying w«iRt^fe the effect that he didn't mind 
being tied to the flight, even if he weren't tied to the 
flight, as long as he knew about it ahead of time that he 
was going to be playing that particular function? 

A No. 

In other words, acting as a lightning rod for other 



Q 
people? 

A No. 

Q You don't recall him saying anything like that? 

A No, I don't. 



318 



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30 



1 Q Okay, now let me go back now a couple of 

2 months to a meeting that took place in August of '86, when 

3 you were asked to accompany someone to a meeting at Don 

4 Gregg's office for the Vice President. Tell me your own 

5 best recollection of how you came to — firstly, how you 

6 came to attend that meeting. 

7 A Ambassador Ed Corr, American Ambassador in San 

8 Salvador, and someone that I served as Deputy Chief of 

9 Mission to between '82 and '85 in Ti^ijniii ilnliWir^ came to 
]Q town on consultations in that week of August 1986. He 

J I went through a very busy round of meetings all over town, 

12 all the agencies dealing with his country, inside the 

13 Department of State, outside the Department of State. 

^4 Other than the meetings that I might have had with 

fg him one on one, or in Elliott's office, I did not participate 
in any of his except this one meeting in Don Gregg's 
office, in the old Executive Office Building. I attended 
essentially because Ed Corr asked me to be with him. 

He was busy before the meeting, I was busy before 
the meeting, I really had no idea what the meeting was 
about until we were heading towards the old Executive 
Office Building. On the way over, Ed gave me the rationale 
for the meeting, which went something like this: He 
said that he, Ed Corr, had it had come to his notice that 
there was a fellow named Felix Rodriguez who was in 



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El Salvador, who had a contract under our military 
assistance program with the Government of El Salvador, 
the Force Salvador{^^^^H|^^^H^HH 
j^^^^^^l^^^^l^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V but who also 
to be involved in the private donor assistance to the 

c on t r a s ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

Ed said that this operation was sloppy and could 
sort of blow up in the faces no t only of the people involved 
. ^^^^B^B^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^nd 

1 t^^^^^^l^^m^m^^^^lHHHI^H^^r, 

fellow, Rodriguez, was going around saying that he had 
connections in the Vice President's office and this was 
very worrisome to Ed Corr and he wanted to sort of get 

to the bottom of it. 

And my impression from, as we went into the meeting 
and my recollection as I think I described to you before, 
was that Ed Corr had asked for the meeting, that it was 
his initiation we were there. 

Q NOW then, when you then arrived at the meeting, 
- firstly, tell me who you can recall being in attendance. 

A My memory is that there was Don Gregg, these are 
for sure in my memory' participants, Don Gregg, Ed Corr, 
myself, H^^^H Ray Burkhart, Lieutenant Colonel — 
Q Ear]^ 
A Bob E&r% from Ollie North's office. 

I have ^somewhat vaguer recollection that Colonel 



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James Steele, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B was at the 

2 meeting. 

3 Q What about Sam Watson? 

4 A I have a vaguer memory o£ two other participants, 

5 one being Sam Watson, and it just occurred to me on the 

6 plane today coming up from Honduras that Don Mattis, who 

7 was a U.S. officer serving in the White House Press Corps, 

8 might have been at this meeting, but that is a vague memory, 
g If you check with Don and ask him if he was 

JO there, that would be the end of it. If he said he wasn't, 
If then. my memory would be incorrect. 

12 Q Other people that were at the meeting, I don't 

13 think have mentioned him as a participant, for what it is 
worth. Tell me then your own best recollection of the 
course of the conversation there. Firstly, let me ask you 
this. Based upon the course of the conversation was it 
still your impression that thfs meeting was called together 
at Ed Corr's request? 

In other words, did the meeting seem to confirm 



14 
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2- to you what you thought? 

A Yes. 

Q Tell me what you recall about the meeting? 

A I vaguely recall Don Gregg saying some words 
of wisdom and turning it over to Ed Corr who gave in some 
detail what I have just described as what he told me was 



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t the purpose of the meeting, a fellow named Felix Rodriguez, 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V might take 

4 some hits if this somewhat shoddy operation were to come 

5 out and then specifically the fact that he, the 

6 Ajnbassador, was hearing, whether directly or indirectly I 

7 don't know, he was hearing th=»t Rodriguez was telling lots 
of people that he, Rodriguez had connections in the Vice 
President's office, and that he, Ed Corr, wanted to know 
if that was true or not, and if it was true, if they could 
get back to Rodriguez and tell him that was not the wisest 

j2 thing to do. 

My memory is that Don Gregg confirmed that he knew 
Felix Rodriguez, had worked with him in Southeast Asia, as 
I recall, did know he was in Salvador, and did express 
concern that his friend, Felix, was using the Vice President's 
office or the Vice President's name to give him some 
importance or give him some protection or whatever, and 
my recollection is that Gregg essentially ended that part 
of the conversation by saying something to the effect well, 
the next time I see Felix I will communicate with Felix he 
had better knock that sort of stuff off. 

^m^l^^Kwho was there, head of the Central 
American Task Force at the Agency, came in and said something 
to the effect that the private donor operation, this was 



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typical of the private donor operation, amateurs, 
doing work that could really only be done by professionals, 
and that this sort of thing would be overtaken and 
reserved by our getting\lOO million in the Congress, which 
at that point in time we were all assuming was going to 
happen fairly soon, and that this would drive the amateur 
operation cut of business, and thank God that that would 
be the end of it. 

I recall some conversation about the fact that 
the operation that Rodriguez was involved in was using 
terribly worn down aircraft, and it was only a matter of 
time before they all fell out of the sky and some 
reference to the fact that Rodriguez was perhaps thinking of 
trying to underload this equipment on the program once 
it started. 

^^^^^^^^Hsaid that this was a very bad idea, 
indeed that list of eligibility sources indicate that the 
equipment was well beyond the end of its natural life, 
and that under no circumstances would the Agency touch 
that stuff if and when they came into running the $100 
million progreun. 



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Q Go ahead. Let me see, why don't I ask you some 
specific questions here. 

DO you recall hearing that Felix Rodriquez was 
concerned about other people who were involved in the private 
operation and names being brought up that were of unsavory 

characters? 

A If that was mentioned, I don't remember it. 

Q DO you recall the names of General Secord 
and Thomas Clines coming up as people who were involved in 
the operation which caused Don Gregg and others some 

concern? 

A No, I do not. 

Q Did the names Secord and/or Clines mean anything 

to you? 

A They meant nothing to me at that time and to this 
day I am not sure who Tom Clines is. I obviously know who 
General Secord is from his recent television appearances^. 

Q in other words, if you had heard the name General 
■secord back then, it may not have stuck in your mind as 
something you could recall now six or eight or ten months 

later? 

A That is correct. 

Q DO you recall a concern that the private group of 
people who own these assets were hoping to have the agency 
purchase their assets with the $100 million new legislation 



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and a concern that this would be a total ripoff to reimburse 
these people for this junk? 

A Yes, that is what I was referring to earlier. 

Q In other words 

A In terms of^^^^^^^^^Hsaying no, no, we are not 
going to do that, It is junk. 

Q What he was referring to was the possibility of 



having the agency purchase this stuff? 

A I assume so, since at that time we were all of a 
mind that agency would run the $100 million program when 
it kicked in and whether or not that was specifically said 
by^^^^BiI don't know, but since he was saying no, no, no, 
I assume he was talking on behalf of the potential purchaser 
saying no, we don't want that equipment to be used in the 
new program because it is junk. 

Q Do you recall Don Gregg or anyone else stating 
that his infomation was that the contras were being ripped 
off by several of the private people down there in the 
prices they were being charged for some of the equipment they 

**' were buying. 

2' A No, I don't recall that. 

22 Q What about specifically the fact a reference 

23 being made to three-dollar grenades being sold for nine dollars 

24 to the contras? 

25 A I have no recollection of that. 



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Q I asked this last time, did you have any 
impression that Don Gregg had just met with Felix Rodriguez 
a few days before this meeting? 

A I had no such impression. 

Q From your independent recollection, it sounds like 
that it was Don Gregg who was being presented with this 
and saying yes, I confirm the fact he knows Felix Rodriguez? 

A That is my distinct impression. 

Q And it was your impression that the complaints 
were about Felix Rodriguez and his role with the private 
people as opposed to complaints by Felix Rodriguez about the 
private people? 

A That is correct. 

Q Do you recall what the outcome of the meeting was? 
Was there any decision made or task assigned in connection 
with this problem? 

A The two outcomes I have already described. One 
was some judgment by Don Gregg that he would straighten 
out Felix Rodriguez in terms of dropping names in El Salvador 
that he shouldn't be dropping, and two, the i^^^^^^^Vi 
assurance that this sort of make-shift operation would 
disappear when and if the $100 million U.S. Government 
assistance program kicked in. 

Q I mentioned the names of General Secord and 
Tom Clines. Do you recall the nam^oL,|aphael or ChiChi or 



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Ralph Quintero coming up? 

A No, I don't. 

Q Is that a name that would ring any bells anywhere? 

A No, it doesn't. 

Q Do you recall any reference being made to a person 
ncuned Ed Wilson, who achieved some notoriety a few years 
ago by training Libyans and selling ex-supplies to Qadhafi? 
Do you recall that name being raised at this meeting? 

A I know the name Ed Wilson. I know what he 
signifies. I have no recollection of his name being raised 
in this meeting. 

Q Let me go back. 

A I can say one other thing? 

Q Please do. 

A All through this meeting, as I think I have 
described, with some other meetings that I attended, I wasn't 
terribly sure why I was there. I wasn't terribly sure I 
knew some of the things that were being discussed about 
names, that sort of thing. 

After the meeting I found out that Ray Burkhart 
had a similar disconnect. 

Q As a matter of fact, he told you something to the 
effect! what was that all about? 

A After the meeting he asked me sort of what was that 
about, and we sort of agreed that we didn't quite know what 



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39 

• was going on 

2 Maybe there were others there in the same boat, 

3 I don't know. 

^ Q What about the Ambassador, did you discuss the 
5 meeting with him after you all left, what his impressions 

were? 

A No, I guess 1 can only assume now he was going 
off to the rest of his schedule and I went back to my office. 
I don't recall ever discussing that meeting with him again. 

Q Go ahead. 

A No 

Q A while ago I had made reference to the fact that 
Ambassador Duemling had kept some RIG notes. In that same 
RIG note which I just located, the date was October 1st, 
1985, there is a reference in this note* to Ollie North bringin< 
up the name of Felix Rodriquez at this RIG meeting as early 
as October of 1985. Does that jibeil with your memory as you 
sit here as to when Felix Rodriquez became a name that was 
associated in any way with the contra effort in Central 
Amercia? 

A I have no recollection of hearing that name Felix 
Rodriquez and associated it with anything prior to the 
meeting in Don Gregg's office in August of 1986 

Q What about the name Max or Maximo Gomez? 

A Similarly, no recollection of that name until 



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40 
the Hasenfus downing of the plane and he mentioned someone 
named Max Gomez. I had never heard to this date MaxiKb Gomez 
in connection with being the same person as Felix Rodriguez. 

Q This RIG note reference is the fact that Ollie 
North said something about anybody who wanted to talk to 
Felix Rodriguez, AKA, Maxie or Maxi^no Gomez, could use the 
phrase "Mr. Green sent me," sounds like something out of a 
cheap spy novel. Do you recall any such discussion of that 
at a RIG meeting? 

A I swear no. 

Q Actually the words were "Mr. Green said to call." 

A No. 

Q Well, I know these are going to be some broad 
questions, but everyone seemed to have had pretty good 
suspicions throughout the second part of 1985 and all through 
1986, that Ollie North was awfully active in Central America 
and was engaged in unspecified things that people seemed 
to wonder about. There were press reports in August of 
1985 that accused him of being a master mind of military 
planning for the contras, so there was a lot of publicity 
Ollie North was getting and a lot of general suspicion by 
various people about him and his activities. As a Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Central America, it would seem that 
you would be somebody who would have some level of curiosity 
about that subject. What can you tell us about your impression 



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UNfflSSffftii 



41 
. of Ollie North and his activities thoughout that time 
_ period? 

A As I mentioned earlier, I came aboard after the 
$27 million had been approved in humanitarian assistance. 
The very first day I was in the office, I was told to go to 
a meeting in Jim Michael's office in which some of the Central 
American mayors were going to discuss how we might set up 
a structure, what sort of structure, where, who would be 
on it, to administer the $27 million program. 

1 walked in and was introduced for the first time 



to^^^^^^^H/and to Oliver North and there might have been, 
Jim Michael was there, there might have been one or two ^ther 



mayors. They had started a conversation dealing with how 
to administer the $27 million. 

I walked in a total blank page as 9t all of the — 
and by the end of the meeting the decision had been reached 
that the structural, the office that was going to be set 
up to administer the $27 million was going to be in the 
National Security Council and it was going to have a certain 
form, it was going to have certain people in it, and a local 
number of decisions were made as to how the progreun would be 
administered. 

A day or so later I was told to go up on the Hill 
and brief some of the committees that had been involved in 
voting for this assistance and to tell them how we were 



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1 

, coming along in the planning. 

_ The first meeting I was sent up to brief was 

- chaired by Jack Brady who was the Chief of Staff of the House 
_ Foreign Affairs Committee. I remember when I got to the 

- part where this office was going to be placed in the National 
o 

Security Council, that Jack Brady and the other staffers 
in the office started laughing and said, we see what you 
are trying to do, you are going to put that $27 million in 
Ollie North's shop, he is going to really run with it. 

When I left the meeting, I remember wondering what 
I had gotten myself into. I felt like an idiot because I just 
didn't know why this was so funny to everybody , and went back 
to the department and told Jim Michael and Elliott Abrams 
and others that this was going to have a very tough time up 
on the Hill putting it in the NSC. 

They seemed to think that was synonymous with 
going to Ollie North and everyone seemed to think he was doing 
"things, that were aiding the contras and they weren't going to 



what was eventually a sort of semi-autonomous state office 
manned by mostly people from State and AID, and a few outsiders 



ThE OJag te^h£it. prjgcess , I kept coming up^ the 
Hill to.jferiet^j^fehflirjyt was shaping up and people kept warning 



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rae about letting Ollie be too close to this. From the 
beginning I assumed that people had this sort of feeling 
toward Ollie North. In the meantime I am meeting with him 
in various context a couple of times a week, RIG meetings, 
IG meetings, SIG meetings, and from everything he is 
saying, from everything he is doing in these meetings, 
he is impressing me with the fact that he is doing no more 
than he can in terms of support for the contras, the resistance 

By no more than he can, I mean he is, if — if 
people come to him and ask H 

he would give thent' an'JJnagH^^o fcjj^^ ^nttA aafaa i^dicate .^p.t -^ie 
the^ c owq i a ,- z'^^^^^^sxve them a 



was involved In 

gonra - f ^aawecp^-^T th^R'''l^HM?aX^^ t'&Bk-f l^lprdSftim jexpresSicj^ 
I don't remeirfSifc^f it waft the -beglriSSg^or the middle or ~" 
near the end, he would express the fact that he was doing 
nothing that was against the law, that everything he was 
doing was in conformity with the various restrictions 
placed on government officials ^"in^ 

Q Eet*«. ^top thSift. "Let 1Si^ just interrupt your 
train. 

Did he ever indicate he was running close to the 
edge or walking close to the edge of permissible conduct? 

A I can't remember any specific comment to that 
effect, although my assumption was "ttiat, yta^t^-^%e would be 
out there doing wha^^^^pf j^f ^ im47fV^C^^^ nothing not 
permitted. 




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Q Go ahead. 

A As I was briefing staff, conunittee members, on 
the Senate side, trying out the different arrangements 
we were hoping to put together, in that give and take I 
was finding out that not only was it a very complicated, 
cumbersome, difficulty to adminisfr $27 million, but that 
many people up here on the hill had differing opinions on 
what was humanitarian assistance, what could we do to get 
it to them, whet^ could we put peo^^', ^^It' sort of 
control»^^Mttl^^ve tajse in pl^^^T -^ "^. "^^a gg^ „-. 

:laime<f^t^y gjfetd^^^ j^vcl vflj^^^ fefe^^ooraaebarto^ iid»re- ^ 
figure, $ f» mil J^im ,- had "gprne fraS^^ n^ ^ ia ii had a different 
recollection of wt^ that tis»T^ was^^osen,_ and yet 
they is:/turnI^^^^1(^lttg^ae^±3^2^pi^nSi enoa^iT'^ ''^^ 
"Is that too much? Is that not enough?" And 
my distinct impression was that no single person really 
quite knew with total precision what was permitted, what 
was not permitted. We were going to have to go back to the 
committees and make a request when we could do this or that 

as we went through the program. 

O 
There were infinite number of questions about 

if you buy the boots, can you pay for the transportation? 

If you pay for the transportation, can you pay for it just 

to the forwarding base or can you pay for it to go into 



Nicaragua. 



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can it also take something else? All these were questions 
that we would bring up to the intelligence committees trying 
to get guidance from them. These were questions that Bob 
Duemling was facing every day in bringing to the rig, 
via me or via Elliott -- this is probably why he took notes 
because he wanted to have fairly precise instructions. 

In that context, yes, I was curious as to what 
North had done in the past because in the past he had been 
much more active »** in what his present role was, but 
nothing he said or did indicated to me that he was doing 
anything more than learning, giving moral support to the sort 
of people who were trying to help resistance fighters, which 
he considered had been blessed by Congress in terms of 
the $27 million that we were back in the business of 
helping thera with human assistance. 

Q Okay, fair enough. 

How many trips did you take to Central America 
in which Ollie North was also a fellow traveler? That is 
not a good question. 

How many trips did you take where he was along? 

A I would have to go back and check vouchers and — 

Q Roughly. 

A I would say four or five. 

Q Tell me what you can recall in very general 
terms about each of those, how many of those were large 



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ictS 





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entourages of people going through several places, how many 
of those were that? 

A Let's put it this way. I only made one trip with 
Ollie North, the two of us. All the other trips I made 
with him were in the context of groups most often doing 
the multicountry stops, most often down in a day or two, 
so you are talking about two or three hours in each of 
the Central American nnnn^ir^s. 

So you are talking if we made five trips, if I 
made five trips with them, four of them were of the big 
variety and one was of the individual variety. 

Q Did any of the larger trips concern policy matters 
or meetings regarding the Nicaraguan resistance as opposed 
to bilateral discussions with various countries? 

A Well, the big trips were generally to take the 
rig down to Central America. The best example of that was 
a week or two after John Poindexter became new national 
security adviser, it was thought it would be good to expose 
him to Central America and Central America to John 
Poindexter. 

It would demonstrate the high priority that 
Central America would be assuming in John Poindexter 's 
work plans and that was Paneuoa, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
maybe one or two C(umtri«e. »4!fe did £AUXL^pun tries in 24 
hours4 




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The most typical stop-over would have been to see 
the ambassador for the country team out there to tell us 
what the situation was in terms of the hospital, the 
country and since all of those countries with the exception 
of Panama had some direct relationship to the Nicaraguan 
problem that was obviously a subject of discussion virtually 
every stop. 

Q In the series of meetings in which John Poindexter 
was involved, that particular series of mettings, were you 
present for any discussions between Admiral Poindexter 
and other people concerning a request that the various 
countries do certain things to aid the contras? 

A No. 

Q Asking for them to facilitate in some way, for 
example, through end user certificates or sales of weapons to 
the contras, anything like that. 

A No. Again, from the perception of my involvement 
which had to do with the humanitarian assistance, there 
were questions about whether hujan i tagian assistance could 



for that matter. If there were any references in any 
conversations during that trip about aid to the resistance, 
anything that I heard had to do with I 




our getting the $27 million in 



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assistance to the contras. 

Q Now the one trip you took down with just Lieutenant 
Colonel North, did that trip — first, where was it to? 

A 

Q Did that trip have anything to do with matters 
concerning the Nicaraguan resistance? 

A Again, I would have to go back and look at the 
timing of the trip and right now I have absolutely no 
recollection when we made that trip, but it came after 
something that shook 





Q Can I stop for a second? Let me give you two 
possibilities, and see if either one of then ring a bell. 
In October of 1985, the problem came up with the press people 

on board the NHAO flight 

I caused a major problem 
which ramifications lasted for several months. 

In April, March, April of 1986, the Congress 
voted originally voted down the $100 million, in 
legislation, and there were sane trips, but I believe 
Secretary Abrams went dov 

and then in the midst of that trip, the Sandinistas 
crossed the border. 



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Could it have happened on either one of those? 
A It could have been the first. I an by no means 
certain, but it could have been the first because my 
recollection as of now is that it was well before the second 
one you mentioned, because I also went on that trip which was 
a collection of people including Armitage, E.^Mott, 
I think North was there. I am not absolutely sure- 
The earlier trip with North it could have been your first 




(Recess. ) 

BY MR. SMILJANICH: 
Q Back on the record. 

We were talking about the one trip you took 
down with Oliver North. During the course of that trip, 
this is probably the longest time you ever spent just with 
Oliver North. You probably had more chit-chat with him 
in that one time than probably any other time. 

In the course of that trip, did you learn anything 
aibout what he was up to, that added to or subtracted from 



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what you thought before the trip. 

In other words, did he talk any about any of his 
activities? 

A We talked. We flew commercial both ways so we 
had a total of five or six hours seated next to each other. 
My memories of those conve'-sations revolved around why he 
was in the Marine Corps, his family situation, his 
relationship with Bud McFarlane. 

Q How did he describe that? 

A He told me about the NSC being probably the end of 
his Marine Corps career because the Marine Corps didn't 
like him to go off and do jobs like such as what he had 
at the NSC. The proof of this had been Bud McFarlane 
as national security adviser being passed over by the 
Marine Corps and leaving as a lieutenant colonel. 

He thought the same fate was awaiting him, that 
Bud McFarlane was trying to help, giving him good efficiency 
reports or whatever the name is in the Marine Corps, but 
that Bud McFarlane had left the Marine Corps somewhat 
embittered and was always giving him advice as a man that 
Bud McFarlane knew was a good Marine and wanted to remain 
a Marine. 

He talked a bit about his experiences in Vietnam 
and whence came his feelings about the contras and helping 
people who were fighting Communism. That sort of thing. 



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He told me a great deal about his family. 
I was just a few months into the job and very concerned 
about his relationships with my wife and my kids and 
buying houses and being in debt, and he was telling me 
about how he had worked some of these things out. 

Q Some personal matters. 

A Yes, a lot of that. I don't recall any 
conversations about his extracurricular activities with the 
contras. He told me things about — I think I remember him 
telling me at that time the first time I recall hearing the 
name Rob Owen, and what a fine young man this guy was, 
a Stanford degree and all this kind of stuff and someone 
who had worked with him and was now maybe someone who 
should work with know-how. 

Q This does help place the timing of the 
conversation. 

A Yes, it was back about probably — 

Q Early October. 

A November, something like that, yes. 

He did tell me about someone who was a senior 
enlisted man in the Marine Corps, I believe, someone he 
had known for years, who had terminal cancer, but was 
such a patriotic American that he had just volunteered 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|HH|^H^^^^| to help 



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the supplies through to the contras. At that point I assume 
he was talking about helping the humanitarian supplies get 
through. And it was that sort of conversation. Nothing 
more specific. 



Did he put a name for that person? 

He did, but I don't recall it. 

Does the name William Haskel ring a belli 

No. 

Robert Omof a d? 

No. 



I am not sure I would know it if I heard it. 

Q One last question. Let me go back one more time 
to the August meeting in Don Gregg's office. Off the 
record. 

MR. SMILJANICH: On the record. 
BY MR, SMILJANICH: 

Q I had asked you the name Ed Wilson or 
Edwin Wilson Terpil Group had come up, and you said you had 
no recollection of that. 

A That is correct. 

Q Let me ask you this: knowing that those names 
did have some association in your mind with some sort of 
very dramatic negative aura about them, would it be fair to 
say that if those neunes had come up in association with 
this group of people supplying or assisting in the contra 



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logistics, that is something you probably would remember if 
that were said, and so it is your best recollection at 
the time that that wasn't said because you would probably 
have remembered it. Is that fair? 

A That is fair. I have read the popular press storie 
of Ed Wilson and the t^rar connection, and all that 
dramatic stuff. I am almost sure that if his name had come 
up, because at this point in time he was either in jail or 
about to go to jail for some of the things he had done, if 
I had heard anyone's name who I knew was a convicted 
felon having association with the program that I was 
dealing with, I would hope to God it would have stuck in my 
mind. 

I have no recollection of his name coming up. 
The other fellow, Terpil, I don't know about. 

Q 1 think that is all the questions I have. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. TRAYLOR: 

Q I have one question. Do you recall, Mr. Walker, 
when we last met we showed you two documents. They were 
both dated October 15, 1986, and J^ essentially were from 
Richard Miller, one transferring $10,000 to American 
Security>!<(i^ Trust Bank-l State Department in your name, 
and the other canceling that transfer, and we asked you to 
explain or if you knew anything about that, could you 



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54 

could you relate your knowledge of those two cables? 

A Right. First a preface: I didn't recall until 
you just mentioned that Richard Miller's name was 
associated with those two cables. 

I didn't know Richard Miller's name until recent 
events have put that to my memory bank. But, what 
I know about those two cables although I never saw the two 
cables until you showed them to me a few weeks ago, is 
the following: after the Hasenfus plane went down, we 
not only had an American citizen captive in Managua, we 
also had the body of two American citizens. 

Q Those names were? 

A Throw them at me. 

Q Sawyer and Cooper. 

A Yes. 

The Sandinistas held a press conference, held 

up documents to the cameras, that indicated that these were 

/^ 

two American citizens. A fellow named Bill ScoKrfield, 

who works for Rick Melton, he was sort of a half-time Belize 
desk official, and half-time Nicaraguan desk official, 
was contacted by the relatives of these two Americans and 
the question arose about the repatriation of the remains of 
the two Americans. 

In the meantime, in Managua, we had exchanged 
several notes with the Nicaraguan government — who started 



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the series I can't remember. They came in and protested 
an American crew plane flying over Nicaragua and helping 
the contras. We came back and were asking for consular 
access to Hasenfaus, because that was a big issue the 
first days. 

Would he have a lawyer? Wculd they put him on 
trial? Could we send down an American lawyer, this sort 
of question, and we were demanding consular access. We 
were also mentioning in these notes that we understood 
they were claiming they had the remains of two Americans, 
and essentially what were we going to do about them. 

One day not too long after the crash, they notified 
our embassy in Managua that they would be delivering the 
bodies to the embassy and they proceeded to do so. They did 
so by bringing them down in the back of a truck. They had 
already pre-positioned a crowd out in the front of the 
American embassy that was sort of protesting the Hasenfaus 
flight, and U.S. government involvement therein, and this 
truck that came up with the bodies could not — 
Sandinistas later claimed could not get close to the 
embassy, so they just took the two coffins off the back 
of the flat bed and sort of carried them through the mob 
and just put them at the door of the embassy. 

The embassy was then confronted with the question 
of what can we do with these bodies. In the meantime, as 



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I said before the relatives were asking for the return of 
their relatives. 

As I understand, funeral homes in Nevada and 
wherever the other fellow was from were calling the 
Department saying they had been retained by the families 
to take care of the body once they got to the States. 
When are they coming, this sort of thing. 

We had the problem of having no idea of who was 
responsible for the Hasenfaus flight. Normally in the 
cases of Americans who die overseas, the first thing 
the consular official has to do is find out who the 
relatives are back home, or who is going to pay the expenses 
of shipping the bodies back, this sort of thing, and 
there is a normal exchange of cables that takes place. 

In this case, we had the pressure off the bodies 
actually being in the embassy, and at some point in these 
very, very hectic days, the first days after the shoot-down 
someone, I believe it iras Elliott Abrams, contacted Ollie 

Q Why did he contact Oliver North? I am curious 
as to why North was contacted. 

A I assume it was the same sort of query we were 
trying to make to General Singlaub, which I mentioned 
earlier. We were trying to contact — we thought at first 
he might be in town. We found out he was in the Philippines. 

m 



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We were trying to contact him without success to find out 
if he had anything to do with it. If we had reached him 
and he said, yes, we would have said, "Are you willing 
to foot the bill for getting the bodies back?" That 
channel went nowhere. 

As to why Elliott thought he should call Ollie, 
I don't know. I presume it had something to do with 
maybe Ollie might know. Whatever, that took place. I 
got home late that evening, and while eating dinner and 
getting to know my children again, the phone ran ■ and I 
took the call, and a female in a very low and mysterious 
voice said something to the effect, "Mr. Walker?" "Yes?" 
"Hi. I represent the employers of Sawyer and Cooper. 
We understand there are expenses involved in bringing 
their remains back to the states. We will pay for them. We 
will send $10,000 to the State Department tomorrow in your 
name. " 

And I said — she must have asked me what is your 
room number or something -- and I said, "Wait a minute. 
Don't send me $10,000. That is not the way it happens. 
This is suppose to go through Consular Affairs." And 
she said, "How should I do it?" I said, "I understand 
Consular Affairs has an account in the American Security 
Trust Company, the bank in the State Department. I don't 
know the number. I don't know anything other than I have beer 



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told that they have an account there for this sort of thing." 
And she said, "Okay, I will send the check, but with your 
neime on the envelope or something, and you can tell them 
tomorrow that this is coming in for the Hasenfaus thing." 

I said, "Well, you know, usually we know exactly 
what the cost is. The Consulate tells us what the exact 
fee is. That is what we have. Ten thousand might be 
enough. It might not be enough. It might be too much." 
She said, "I have been told to tell you if there is any 
extra money that you can use that for the Hasenfaus family." 
And I- said, I asked her a couple of questions. She 
said she didn't know any further answers, but the money would 
come the next day. 

To me it seemed like a way to get the money to 
pay for the repatriation of the remains and funeral or 
whatever. The next day when X got to work, I got together 
I believe with Rick Melton, and with Bill Scofield and told 
them about this mysterious call. One or the other checked 
with the Bureau Consular Affairs to see if this would work, 
and this answer came back and said, no, that is irregular 
and a check coming in under these circumstances that is 
not the way we do it. 

I guess we told Elliott this and he said something 
to the effect, well we had better go back to Ollie because 
apparently my call to Ollie precipitated this mysterious call 




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UUffilED 



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to you. Maybe we can go back to Ollie and tell him 

this will not work. That was done, I don't remember 

quite how, either Elliott or I or maybe Bill Scofield called 

up Ollie 's office and sort of said, you know, whoever 

it is that is sending the $10,000 check in care of William 

Walker, that is not going to work. It is too far out of the 

Consular Affairs procedures for it to work, and that was 

the last we heard of it. 



Did the female that called you state her 



name? 



A I don't believe so. 

Q Did you ask her? 

A I believe she gave me some title of an organization 
which had something to do with Friends of the Freedom 
Fighters or something like that. It was a title that 
I forgot by the end of the phone call that it was. 

Q It was a — 

A Not a name I had ever heard before or ever 
heard since. 

Q Did she identify who the employers of Sawyer 
and Cooper were? 

A No, other them this sort of name which sounded 
phony, and I suspect was phony. 

Q Did you ever have any subsequent conversations with 
North about this mysterious call that you received? 



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A No, not that I recall. 

Q I don't have any further questions. 

A For the record, the sort of question of paying 
the expenses of the repatriation and delivering the 
bodies to funeral homes in the two locations where the bodies 
went, was unresolved for months and months af terv-ards. 
The funeral parlor in Nevada called several times, I 
guess, and talked to Bill Scofield about, "Hey, we 
did this. You told us that payment was coming, and 
it hasn't happened, or part of it hasn't happened." 

The Consular Affairs Bureau was upset because 
we had told the embassy you have got to ship those 
remains out of there and of course Eastern Airlines or 
whatever airline they used presented a bill to the embassy. 
We questioned how do we pay for them, and under normal 
circumstances even, abnormal circumstances, the Bureau 
of Consular Affairs does not have its own fund to do this 
sort of thing. It is usually paid for by the family, but 
these were such unusual circumstances, i.e. the bodies 
actually being in the embassy, that the way it came out was 
the way it came out. 

Q One final question. Did you ever hear any 
rumors throughout this timeframe from the time that you 
came to ARA, all the time that you knew North, about 
North's activities? .^. M/^Ainf^ri 




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A I guess it depends on what you mean North's 
activities? 

Q His activities in Central Anerica and in the 
Middle East. There were a lot of rumors throughout the 
State Department in different areas about his activities 
that he was involved in helpiny the resistance fighters 
in Nicaragua and that he was doing something via the hostages 
and arms to Iran. 

A Okay, arms to Iran zero, no knowledge whatsoever 
that he had, that there was a arms to Iran deal before the 
revelation of last October and November. 

The hostages, I heard about various things, 
maybe including things that Ollie himself might have said; 
that he was involved in counterterrorism sort of things 
in the Middle East, in Europe. By what method, I know not. 
I understood that he was involved in the Achille Lauro 
operation. Can I give you a vignette? The trip took with 
Oliver North ^^^^H^^| the IG/RIG said it would be a good 

to go down^H^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hx I 
to go from the State Department. Oliver North was chosen 
to go from the NSC. 

I went to the National Airport at 8 o'clock 
in the morning to catch the Eastern flight to Miami. There 
was some problem with my GTR. In the meantime I am telling 
the agent, there are two of us on the plane. "We want 



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seats together. He is not here yet. His name is Colonel 
North. Please save two seats." 

He goes into his computer and says, "No, 
there is no Colonel North on this flight." And I 
said, "There must be." First, I am screwed up in my 
GTR. "You aro not sure. Can you tell me? You are 
telling me he is not on the thing?" 

He said, "Don't worry. It is a half-full flight, 
but there is no Colonel North", Ollie appears out of the 
airport with his bag on his shoulders, looking somewhat 
unke^t and he had just gotten off a flight from Europe, 
had been flying all night. And he is somewhat discombobulated 
to find out he is not in the computer, and he says, "I 
bet my secretary made it in my name. Try Good/or something." 

GooJe 

Q Bill 



A Yes, sir, and I think he even threw out a third 

ncune. The guy clicks on. 

Q Green? 

A So Ollie had to change his passport and hand up 
another passport and I remember saying this guy plays in 
the big leagues. He comes in from Europe and there was 
something like Achille Lauro going on at that time, and I 
assumed he was coming from that and had flown all night. 

The other thing I had seen him the day before when 
we got assignments that meant between the time when I saw 



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him and the next morning, he had flown to Europe, flown 
back and the only thing that got even discorabobulated 
was that Fawn had made the reservation in the wrong 
name . 

Anyway that is my vignette. Yes, I knew he was 
involved in other things, and in other parts of the world 
and for some reason I had picked up it had to do with — I 
also remember at one point trying to clarify with Ray 
Burkhart, who Oliver North was in the context of the NSC's 
Latin American operations, and Ray Burkhart is a Foreign 
Service^;&i»«qr on loan to the NSC. He had the title of 
Special Assistant or something to the President or to the 
National Security Adviser for Latin America, and I remember 
asking him does Ollie work for you. He is always going to 
Central America, seems to know a lot of Central America. 

And Ray sort of implied, "Yes, he does, but 
he is a little hard to hold down, and he does other things, 
and therefore it is sort of overlapping unclear 
relationship with me and him, but I am really his boss." 
Later I believe it was on the trip that I made with him 
so it must have been the early thing in October, November. 
I remember trying this out on Ollie — do you work for Ray 
Burkhart? And that greatly upset him. Greatly upset him. 
And he said, "Hell, no. I have got a whole platter full 
of things, and even when I am involved in Central America, 



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it has got to do with my other matter. It really 
isn't sort of under Ray Burkhart." 

There was*certain distance between those two 
guys first, evident by his reaction to being asked if he 
worked for Ray Burkhart. So, surely I knew he did other 
things. 

Q Thank you, Mr. Walker. 

MR. SMILJANICH: That will conclude the 
deposition. Thank you. 

(Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the deposition was 
concluded. ) 



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P?^" Stenograpl^rcTranscnprdr ■••' - 



jft'feateft.^-- HEARINGS. 





Before the 



- ■^!fe^\^^^^^^^^ 



SENATE SELECT COMMITtlB-. 



■ •"■'air. - 



pNrrED STATES 



DEPOSITIOH OE SAMUEL J. WAISOB" lll^^^^^ii- 




-VJ 



'c/ 

PAGES I thru -« 



?AGES I tnru -a* ^ 

nr /artiaily Declassified /Relewed « /'^«f%8 <V ^ 
Washington. D.t.. ^^^^^ ,j^^ ^^ £_<,_ 52355 



June 16. 1987 



under provisioM 1 
by Bw Raiib-iMawl SmiK^ CoiiocU 



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DEPOSITION OF SAMUEL J. WATSON III 

TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 1987 

Ninth Floor 

Hart Senate Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 
Deposition of Samuel J. Watson III, a witness herein, 
called for examination by counsel for the Senate Select 
Committee and, pursuant to notice, the witness being duly 
sworn by SUSAN A. HARRIS, a Notary Public in and for the 
District of Columbia, at the offices of the Select Committee 
at 10:32 a.m. and the proceedings being taken down by 
Stenomask by SUSAN A. HARRIS and transcribed under her .• 
direction. 



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APPEARANCES: 

2 on behalf of the Senate Select Committee: 

3 MARK K. BELNICK, Esq. 
VICTORIA NOURSE, Esq. 

5 

6 On behalf of the House Select Committee: 

7 CLARK B. HALL, Esq. 
RICHJiiRD J. LEON, Esq. 

9 
10 On behalf of the Witness: 

JOHN P. SCHMITZ, Esq. 
12 Deputy counsel to the Vice President 

13 

ALAN CHARLES RAUL, Esc 
15 Associate Counsel to the President 

16 



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1 iBOCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon, 

3 SAMUEL J. WATSON III, 
a witness herein, was called for exanination and, having 

5 been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and 

6 testified as follows: 

7 EXAfllNATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SENATE 

8 SELECT COMMITTEE 

9 BY MR. BELNICK: 

10 O State your name for the record, 
n A My name is Samuel J. Watson. 

12 Q Your position in the government? 

13 A My position is deputy assistant to the Vice 

14 President for national security affairs. 

15 Q A member of the United States military as well? 

16 A Yes. 

17 Q Rank? 

18 A Colonel, United States Army, active duty. 

19 Q Colonel Watson, how long have you been the Vice 

20 President's deputy national security adviser? 

21 A Approximately one and a half years, beginning, I 

22 believe it was, November 7th, 1985. 

23 Q And from that time to this you have reported to 

24 Donald Gregg? 

25 A I have. 



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Q Your office is in the same suite as his at the 

2 OEOB? 

3 A Yes, they are. 
Q What are your duties as deputy assistant to the 

Vice President for national security affairs? 

A My duties include the normal things that a 

deputy does: backing Don Gregg up, filling in for him when 

he is not available in meetings; and then I have specific 
9 responsibilities for managing the office; some personnel 
'0 and logistical things. Substantive issues: the Soviet 

union, arms control, Europe, Western Hemisphere, Latin 
12 America, Central America, international economics, 
'3 international organizations, and some other things which are 
'* in the bottom of my file cabinet. 

15 o It sounds like a full plate. 

16 A Yes. 
O so matters relating to Nicaragua and the contras 

18 would fall within your bailiwick? 

19 A Clearly. 

20 o What responsibilities specifically in outline 

21 form, if that is not a contradiction in terms, have you 

22 shouldered with respect to contras and Nicaragua in the 

23 last one and a half years? 

24 A well, I've taken it and assumed that it was my 

25 duty, that anything to do with Nicaragua or Central America 



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that came through the office of the Vice President was of 
^ interest to us, because the Vice President is a principal of 
the NSC, the National Security Council. Dealing with the 
contras would be among my responsibilities. 

Q i The same, of course, with respect to the war in 
El Salvador? 

A The same there . 

Q Let's talk a little bit about of f ice routine. How 
frequently do you see the Vice President on a regular basis? 

A Oh, I would say once or twice a week, when a 
visitor to the Vice President is coming through. 

Q Do you sit in at those meetings? 

A Prepare the Vice President, prepare the briefing 
memoes, and sit in on those, take notes. 

Take notes of those meetings? 

A If I think it is appropriate to take notes. 
Frequently I don't. 

Q If you take notes, where do '.you keep them? 

A I would keep them in either a notebook which I have 
occasionally kept or just on a piece of paper to stick in my 
file, or destroy them if nothing really significant came out 
of the meeting. 

Do you typically do memoranda of meetings that you 
attend with the Vice President? 

A No, I typically do not do a memo for the record. 



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And unless there is some action requirement coming out of 

2 the meeting — then I might do one, or if it is something 

3 that I think embassies or the Departments and agencies 
should know about, then I will do a memo for the record. 

5 But most often, if it is a meeting with a foreign 

6 visitor the State Department will have someone there who 
^ will be the notetaker. 

0. Aside from meetings with foreign visitors, do you 
9 have a regular time during the week that you brief the 
10 vice President? 

A. I oersonally do not. If I were to have a matter 
12 to discuss with the Vice President, I would ask for an 
'3 appointment with him or I would go with Don Gregg to the 

morning meeting that he has with the Vice President, usually 
at 3:15 in the mornina, where the CIA comes in and briefs 
IS the Vice President. 

17 g. ordinarily you are not at that morning meeting? 

18 A. Ordinarily not. 

19 Q, YOU will be there if you are reouested to be 
there or if you have made a request to be there? 

A. That's correct, or if Don Greag is not in town 



22 and I fill in for him. 



How long are those morning meetings ordinarily? 



24 A. 15 minutes. 



& When did you first meet Felix Rodriguez? 



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A. In late December 1985. 
0- What was the circumstance? 

A. The Vice President's office each year has a 
Christmas party. Felix was a guest at the Christmas party. 
^ I met him there . 

0. Who introduced him to you? 

A. I precisely do not know. I suspect Don Gregg did, 
^ but I cannot affirm that. 

0. Prior to that time, had Mr. Gregg told you anything 
about Mr. Rodriguez? 

A. I don't recall whether he did or not. 
0. Do you recall if prior to that time Mr. Gregg had 
told you that Mr. Rodriauez was doing any work in Central 
America? 

A. Well, I don't remember whether Don and I talked 
about Felix or not. So it's hard to answer that question. 
Q. Let me mark this document as Watson Exhibit 1. 

(The document referred to was 
^^ marked Watson Exhibit tlo. 1 

for identification.) 
Q. For the record, Watson 1 is a two-page document 

bearing our numbers N-36451 and 36452. 
^^ Do vou recognize the document? 

A. I recognize the document as a summary that I made 
in December 1986, trying to summarize from memory and from 



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some notes I had of different contacts I had with Felix 

2 Rodriguez. 

3 Q. For what purpose did you prepare Watson Exhibit 

1, Colonel? 

A. Well, as this event unfolded and the Attorney 
6 General and others were beqinnina to conduct investigations 
and Felix's name became fairly oublic, I felt it would be 
a qood idea if I tried to. remember for my own purposes my 
9 different contacts with him and why I had contacted him. 
10 For no other purpose. 

Q. And did you submit these notes to the FBI, Watson 

12 Exhibit 1? 

13 ft. Yes, I did. 
0. The first contact listed is Decemger 20, 198 5-. Is 

that the occasion that you were yast testifying about when 

16 you first met Felix Rodriguez? 

17 A. Yes, I believe that was the day of the Christmas 

party. 

19 ft When do you recall learning that Felix Rodriguez 

20 had a mission in Central America? 
A. Well, we have since learned, since August 9th, 

that he had a different mission than the one I was 
introduced to him as the mission he had. 

Q. well, let's start with the mission that you were 

first told about. Who told you about it? 



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Pi. It probably came up in a conversation that Don 

^ Greaq and I had when, being new to the Vice President's office 
^ and not having worked Latin American affairs before, we 

discussed a f aJtiiliarization and orientation trip for me to 
take to Central America. 1 

And in the course of discussing that trip and the 
itinerary, Felix's name came up as someone I should probably 
contact or be in touch with, who was knowledgeable of 
counterinsurgency in the area. 

Q. That was a trip you took in January of 1986? 

A. That is true. 

0. IVhat did Mr. Gregg tell you about Felix's role in 
Central America at that time? 

A. That Felix Rodriguez was in El Salvador working 
with the Salvadoran military to try to counter the Marxist 
insurgency that was olaguing that &overnment, and he was 
working with the Salvadoran air force in helicopter 
operations which were called^^^^^^^^Voperations, very 
similar to helicopter operations many of us, Don and I, 
were familiar with in Vietnam. 

Q. Had you served in Vietnam with Mr. Gregg? 

A. No, I never knew Mr. Gregg until I met him in • 
the interview process. 

Q. Had you been in the military in Vietnam? 

A. I spent two years in Vietnam as an infantry 



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officer. 

2 0. Did Mr. Greqg tell you about his relationship with 

3 Felix Rodriquez in Vietnam? 
A. Don explained that he and Felix worked toaether, 

that Felix was one of his officers, that Felix conducted 
highly successful helicopter operations against the 
Vietnamese communist insurgents; and that he had a very 
qood and trusting relationship, that he held Felix Rodriguez 
in high regard, found him to be a man of integrity. 
10 Q. Did Mr. Gregg tell you how it was that Felix 

Rodriguez haopened to go down to El Salvador? 
12 ft. I don't recall whether we discussed that. 

Q. Well, did you come to learn shortly after your 

trip or by the summer of 1986 that Mr. Gregg had in effect 
sponsored Felix Rodriguez's mission in El Salvador? 
16 A. Yes. At some point, whether it was on the trip 

in January '86 or whether it was during the spring, at 
18 some point Don - I asked Don about Felix, more about him, 
.9 after coming back, and he explained that Felix had been 
20 looking for work and had gone to El Salvador at Don's 

2' suggestion. 

22 c Did you know the name under which Felix was 

23 operating in El Salvador? 

24 A. Yes, I did. Max Gomez. 

25 Qi And Don told you that? 



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A. Yes, he did. Well, either Don or Felix. I do not 

2 recall. 

3 QL Let us run through looking at Watson 1. These 
trips, January 19 to 21, or these contacts between you and 

5 Rodriguez. January 19 to 21, 1986, you were in El 

6 Salvador? 

7 A. That's correct. 

8 Q. You saw Felix Rodriguez at that time? 

9 A. That's correct. 

10 g He acquainted you with his work at the air base 

11 there? 

12 A. He did. 

13 0- "^id he tell you that he was doing anything on 

14 behalf of the contras? 

15 A. No, he did not. 

16 Q. At any time between January and the summer of 1986, 

17 did you come to learn, either from Felix or from any other 

18 source, that Rodriguez was performing any role whatsoever 

19 on behalf of or in support of the Nicaraguan resistance? 

20 A. No . 

21 Ql Your discussions with Felix, then, in January 

22 1986 pertained solely to his work in El Salvador? 

23 A. That's correct. 

24 0. The next entry on Watson Exhibit 1 is April 1986, 

25 phone calls from Felix Rodriguez, subject helicopters. 



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vihat can you tell us about that? 
A. The context of all of my discussions with Felix 
Rodriguez, with the exception of August 8th and thereabouts, 
were concerned with helicopter operations in El Salvador. 




He had a small group of helicopters, I think they 
were Hughes 500 helicopters and light observation helicopters 
with 2f^"s and radios, and they were constantly breaking 
down. Poor maintenance, repair parts, that sort of thing. 
And Felix wanted some new helicopters. 

So he would call me up and plead with me or ask 
me to use my nosition in the office of the Vice President to 
cut pressure on the Pentagon to either give him new 
helicopters or get repair teams or repair parts to El 
Salvador. 

So we discussed that January 19th to 21st. He 
showed me his broken helicopters, ones with bullet holes 
where his copilot had been shot, things like that, and 
described the problems with maintaining them. 

Q. Again, exclusively about El Salvador? 

A. Exclusively concerning his helicopters in El 
Salvador. 

0. Let me go back for a moment to your January 1986 
visit to Central America and ask you about a document that 



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the reporter will now mark as Watson Exhibit 2. 

2 (The document referred to was 

3 marked Watson Exhibit No. 2 

for identification.) 

5 Q. For the record, Watson Exhibit 2 is a four-page 

6 document bearing our stamp numbers N-36450 through 454, and 

7 the first page is dated December 16, 1986, memorandum for 

g Craig Fuller, Marlin Fitzwater, Don Gregg, from Sam Watson. 

9 Do you recognize this as your memorandum? 

10 A. I recognize it as a document I preoared. 

11 Qi On the date indicated? 

12 A- On the date indicated, and in the form that I did 

13 it. 

14 0. There's a handwritten not-.tion on the first page" 
,5 that appears to be: "This looks gccd. DG." Do I read that 

16 correctly? 

17 A. You do. 

18 & Is that a note from Don Gregg? 

19 A. That's Don's handwriting. That's his note. 

20 & Now, this pertains to the same visit to Central 

21 America during which you saw Felix Rodriguez in January 1986, 

22 right? 

23 A. Correct. 

24 Q. And the memo responds to questions raised 

25 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 ^ s to whether it was legal for you 



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to-visit'FDN locations in 

A. That's correct. 

Q. While you were ^"^^^^^| '^^^ ^°" '^°'"® " learn 
about any of the resupoly operations that were then in 
progress for the contras, January ^586^^^^ 

A. Yes, I did- I visited the j^^^^^^ir field in 
■■■■■ When I visited it, it was described to me as the 
base for the FDN, Hicaraquan Democratic Force, military 
force, the base from which they conducted their resupply 

operations . 

Q. And who did you understand was involved in those 

resupply operations, based on what you learned in Central 

America? 

A. My understanding was that, the FDN, a colonel, "l 
believe his name wasj^^ an FDr colonel ^^ontra 
colonel, was running that operatic.-, out °^^^^H 

Q. Did you learn whether any U.S. government agencies 
or officials were involved in that resupply operation, 
indirectly or directly? 

A. There were s everal, it may have been two, CIA 
officers at^^^^| They were there to advise the FDN 
air force on resupply techniques. 

0. Apart from that, did you learn of any other U.S. 
government involvement, either throuqh individual officials 
or agencies? 

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1 "A. No, I did not. 

2 Q. Did you learn anything about the so-called private 

3 ■ supply network that was assisting the contras in January 
1986? 

5 A. No, I did not. 

6 gi Prior to going to Central America in January 
1986, but subsequent to assuming your role with the Vice 
President, had you heard anything about the private contra 

9 resupply effort that was under way? 
'0 A. No, I had not. It was always the rumor around 

Washington that somebody was giving money to the contras, 
'2 some other countries. That was in the Washington Post 
13 frequently. But I had no specific direct or indirect 

knowledge. 

15 gi nid you ask anyone whetner any of those stories 
'6 about foreian countries' assistance to the contras were 

true? 

A. Not in connection with this trip. 

19 Qi Let's forget about this trip. From the time you 

20 became employed as deouty assistant to the Vice President 

21 for national security affairs in November of 1985, straight 

22 through until the disclosures of November 1986, did you 

23 inquire of anybody as to whether there was truth to the 

24 stories that foreign countries were assisting the contras? 

25 A. I may have, but I don't recall a date or a who. 



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g - Do you recall asking anyone? 

A. I don't specifically recall asking anyone. 

Q. Did you ask Mr. Gregg? 

A. I don't think so. 

Q. Did you ask anyone else? 

A. Not that I can remember. I just never thought 
about that issue. 

Q, Do you recall whether you learned at any time 
prior to November 198 6 that any countries had contributed 
moneys or materiel to support the contras? 

A. Felix Podriguez on August 8th when he came to 
visit had a meeting with Don Gregg and myself, raised the 
I believe he said^^^^Ufwere contributing 

money . 

0. Anart from that occasion, which we will get to, 
did you learn through anyone else about foreign countries 
giving moneys to the contras or materiel? 
A. No, I did not. 

(J At any time prior to August 8th, 1986, did y)u 
ask anyone about the orivate — the efforts of private 
American citizens or a private network to supply the 
contras during the period that Congress had restricted 
American aid, U.S. aidrfT rath er? 

A. Only when I w as in^ ^^^^Band the| 

U^^^^^^^^^^^^m talked about what they could 



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do and not do, and they laid out" f5/ Tn# *«H#: they could not 
do, that they could not provide materiel, moneys, supplies, 
go on combat operations, and they ran through that. 

And on the other hand, they said they were allowed 
to give advice. 

Q. I am talking, though, about the private network. 

Had you heard at any point after November 1985 that there 
were orivate Americans who were engaged in helping the 
contras? 

A. I heard somewhere, whether it was a newspaper or 
whatever, that General Singlaub was involved, and that they 
were donating a helicopter at some point. I think it was 
early '86. 

Q. Oo you remember — and vife will get to it -- that 

on August 8th, 1986, Felix Rodriguez provided certain 
details of American citizens who were down purporting at 
least to help the contras, correct? 

A. That's true. 

0. Prior to then, had you heard about any private 
network of U.S. citizens that was engaged in resupplying the 
contras or facilitating contra resupoly? 

A. Not as a result of my questioning or asking anybody 
but it was in the air, in the atmosphere. 

Q. Surely you had heard the stories. 

A. Surely. 



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ft - YOU were aware of newspaper stories, for example, 
in 1986, the first half of 1986, that Colonel North was 
somehow engaged in helping the contras in various ways? 
YOU were aware of stories to that effect? 

A. I was aware of the stories, aware of the 
Conaressional interest. 

ft Aware that Congressional inquiries had been made, 

8 correct? 

9 A. Correct, 
ft Did you make any efforts to find out whether any 

of those stories were correct, were true or not? 
,2 A. I can't recall any specific inquiries to that 

effect. I made the assumption that somebody was contributing 
.oney because the intelligence reports daily said that^-the 
contras were in combat and they seemed to be an effective 
fighting force and getting supplies from somewhere. And 
without inquiring, I made the assumption, because of the 
intelligence, that they were being supnlied somehow, or 

19 monied, provided ammo. 

But the answer to your question is no, I did not 

21 make specific inquiries. 

a central America, the contras, you said was an 

23 area that was your resoonsibility? 

24 A. That's correct. 
Why didn't you try to find out how the contras 



25 Q. 



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were getting all this money and military assistance? 

A. Two reasons. One is what I mentioned earlier, all 
3 the other things that I had to do. 

Qi But this was an important priority. 

A. It's an important priority. 

0. You're not saying you didn't have enough time to 

ask, are you? 

A. Yes. I'm not sure I'm saying it quite that 
9 negatively, but I'm saying that when you have an awful lot 
of other things to do you don't spend all your time on one 
thing, and vou have a lot of other responsibilities. 
Q. But this was one responsibility? 

A. This was one of many responsibilities. 
0. So one reason you didn'-- ask was because — •• 
A. Because I had so much else to do and so many 
things to do that it didn't seem to me to be a high priority 
thing to ask about. And the second reason is, one never 
knows what is compartmented or committed or authorized in 
a classified, compartmented government action, and I didn't 



20 see fit to ask. 



Q. Well, you would find out if it was compartmented 

if you asked and were told it is none of your business, 



23 right? 



A. I would have. 



25 Q. Did anyone tell you, don't ask these questions? 



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A." NO, nobody has ever told me not to ask questions. 

2 g. Did you feel that if you asked you would get an 

3 answer you didn't want to hear? 

" A. No . 

5 0, DO you know — did you ever discuss with Mr. 

6 Greqg how the contras were being resupplied and assisted 
^ during this same period? 

A. I don't think so. You have to remember that we 
9 see intelligence every day and it shows the contras acting, 
and so you're assuming that they're getting something. 
And so it's not necessary to ask where they're getting it 



' 2 f rom . 



13 



YOU see the results of their actions in the 



'^ combat reports. 

15 Q. These combat intelligence reports were coming 

'6 to you from the CIA? 

17 A. That's correct, or the Defense Intelligence 

'8 Agency. 

19 Q, Did those reoorts ever indicate the source or 

20 sources of the contras' materiel and money? 

21 A. I don't think so. 
0. Let's turn back, if we may, to Watson Exhibit 1, 

your list of contacts with Rodriguez. And we are at 
April 30, 1986, 7:30 p.m., drinks, Washington, D.C. 
25 Felix was in Washington? 



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A. " Yes, he was. 

0. And you just had a social qet-toaether? 

A. We had drinks. Actually, it wasn't Washington; it 
was Tyson's Corner. ■ 

Q. What did you discuss with him at that time? 

A. The general conduct of the insurgency and the 
counterinsurgency in ^1 Salvador, Felix describi ng how the 
the m^^l^H^^and 

combat operations in El Salvador. 

Qi Let's turn to May 1, 1986. 11:00 a.m. meeting in 
office room 298. Whose office is 298? 

A. Room 298 in the Old Executive Office Building- is 
the office of the National Security Adviser for the vice 
President, to wit, Don Gregg and r'self and others. 
Q. Is that still your office? 
A. Still is. 

Q. YOU and Felix were at the meeting and am I right 
from this nuestion mark that you're not sure whether Gregg 
was at this meeting? 

A. I'm not sure whether he was. 

Q. And this was a meeting that preceded, iirmediately 

preceded, a meeting with the Vice President, correct? 
A. That's right. 

0. What do you recall having transpired at this 
pre-meeting before the Vice President's meeting? 

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A. - Felix arrived early for the 11:30 meeting. For | 
someone like Felix, we would usually have them stop by our 
office to say hello and then walk down to the Vice President's 
office or, in this case, ove;-. 

Felix stopped in earlier than expected and we sat 
6 there and talked. 

Q. About what? 

A. We talked about how things were going, how his 
need for parts was going, what he was going to raise with 
the Vice President. And he told me he was going to describe 
for him what had been accomplished since the last time he 
had met with the Vice President. I think it was Januacy 
'85. How he had succeeded in getting a 4 number of 
helicopters, his concent of operations, his need for 
supply parts, his need for more helicopters, that sort of 

,6 thing. 

,^ g. All right. And then there was a meeting that 
followed with the vice President in Vr. Bush's West Wing 
office? 

A. That's correct. 

Qi And the vice President was there, you were there, 
Felix, Don Greag? 

A. Also, not listed here, former Senator Brady, 
Nicholas Brady, Republican from New Jersey. At the end of 
the meeting, Ollie North and Ed Corr knocked on the door, 



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poked their head in, and said: We hear that Felix was in 
the building seeing you, so we would like to say hello 

also. 

gi Okay. What was discussed at the May 1 meeting 

with the Vice President? 

A. I think it was a 10 or 20 minute meeting 
scheduled. It went over. Felix had a briefcase and in 
his briefcase he had a ohoto album| 




He showed the Vice President the picture album. 
He described to him what was going on in El Salvador, 
showed him pictures of the helicopters, bullet holes in 
the helicopters. 

It was a discussion o* counterinsurgency 
operations in El Salvador. 

gi Mow, was there any discussion at that meeting 
of the situation with respect to the contras? 
A. None whatsoever. 

Qi No discussion of Nicaragua at all? 
A. I don't recall any, other than there may have 
been discussion -- I am only speculating -- of Nicaragua 
as the source of the insurgency. But I don't recall any. 
0. Any discussion of how the contras were doing? 
A. I cfon't recall any. 



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0. Any discussion of — 

2 A. In fact, I think I can be more emphatic than that. 

3 I'm almost nositive there was none. Felix was very wrapped 
up in this meeting in the helicopter operations and showing 

5 the Vice President that he was really down there with his 

6 helicopters, really fighting in El Salvador. 
0. And nobody asked how the fight in El Salvador was 

affectina the fight in Nicaragua or vice versa? 
9 A. I don't recall it. 
10 Q. Aren't those two subjects that are related? 

A. I just don't recall whether there was or not. But 

12 I don't think there was. Felix was leading this discussion 

13 very heavily with his picture album. You may have seen it. 
Q. But the Vice President I assume asked questions 

15 during this? 

16 A. I don't remember whether the Vice President asked 
questions. On something like this, usually the VP's mode 

18 is to listen to what someone has to tell him. 

19 g. Is it your testimony that at this meeting on May 1 

20 there was no discussion about the contras? 

21 A. To the best of my recollection. 

22 Q. Understood. 

23 Now, let's mark as Watson Exhibit 3 this group of 

24 documents. 

25 (The documents referred to 



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the same May 1, 1986, meeting with Felix Rodriquez that 
you and I have just discussed? 



A. Yes, it is. 



24 Qi 



Exhibit 3, which of them, if not all of them, do you 



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were marked Watson Exhibit 
No. 3 for identification.) 
Q. Watson Exhibit 3 for the record are three pages, 

consisting of an Aoril 30, 1986, briefing memorandum for 
the President; then an April 28th, 1986, form memorandum 
6 to Mr. Gregg from Debbie Hutton, subject approved Vice 
Presidential activity. The third page is an April 16, 
1986, schedule proposal. 

I take it you have seen these documents before 

today. Colonel Watson? 

A. I have seen them before. 

12 Q. When for the first time? j 

,3 A. somewhere on or about May 1st of last year, when | 

the meeting came up, and then a. a in yesterday, and some j 

time like December or January of this oast year. | 

16 Q. December '86 or January '87? j 

17 A. December '86, January '87, we were asked to | 

18 search for documents. | 

19 Qi Now, is the meeting to which these documents 

20 refer, looking specifically at the briefing memoranda, j 



And of the three documents that comprise Watson j 



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3 

4 

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recall seeing around May 1, 1986? 

A. I recall seeing the briefing memo. I believe my 
secretary probably gave me a copy in preparation for the 

meeting . 

Qi What about the schedule proposal, which is the 

last page of the exhibit? 

A. I do not recall seeing the schedule proposal. 

Qi Now — 

A. Which is not unusual. 

Q. Let's go to the briefing memorandum first, which 
is the one you saw. Did you see it prior to the May 1 

meeting shortly before? 

A. Probably shortly before. 

Qi Did you read it? 

A. Glanced at it. 

Qi Did you — 

A. There's nothing there. 

Q, Did you notice what the ouroose of the meeting 



was listed to be? 



Yes. 

And that included resupply of the contras? 

Yes. 

Did you ask anyone about that at the time? 

No, I didn't. 

Did you know where that purpose had come from. 



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who had^ supplied that information? 

ft. No, I don't. 

0. Take a look at the schedule proposal, the last 
page of the document, but the first in time, dated April 
16, 1986. When is the first time that you saw that 

document? 

A. I don't know if I have seen the schedule proposal 
before. We do so many of these things, come and go. 

0. HOW are schedule proposals prepared in your 

office? 

A. If State Department or, say, the Defense 
Department is. suggesting a ^ l ^^^ l f^itaSm , they will send a 
memorandum over listing, sometimes in great detail, why 
they think the meeting, if that's the case. I or one "Of the 
other officers in the previous time used to take them and 
rework them, and our secretaries would prepare the 
schedule proposal, and they would go in. 

At some point last year, I don't remember when, 
Phyllis Byrne started preparing the schedule proposals 
based on the State or Defense Department requests. 

Another, second way a meeting could be established 
or requested and the proposal made is for somebody to 
write or telephone directly to our office, and that's not 
unusual at all. And we would take the information off of 
the phone or out of a letter and prepare a schedule 



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proposal . 



To anticipate your question, I don't know whether 
Felix wrote, called, or what to set this meeting up. 

0. Did you -- have you supplied information for 
schedule proposals from time to time? 

A. From time to time. 

0, Do you know how this schedule proposal was prepared? 

A. No, I don't. 

Q. DO you recall telling Phyllis Byrne or providing 

Phyllis Byrne with the information that appears next to the 
word "purpose" on the April 16, 198 6, schedule proposal? 

A. HO, I don't. What I do recall — and my memory is 
very fuzzy because, as I said, we sometimes -- so many of 
these things are coming and going, and we are always aslcing 

for meetings. 

I don't recall whether it was in preparation for the 
April 16th schedule proposal or in preparation of briefing 
memo, I remember — 

0. The April 30, 1986? 
A. Yes, I'm sorry. 

I recall at one time Phyllis turning from her desk, 
because her desk is as close as you and I are, three or four 
feet apart, and she is outside the door of my office, and she 
said: HOW do we describe Felix? And we settled on the 

rds "a counterinsurgency expert visiting from E) Salvador." 



wo I 



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/ 

g " Do vou recall telling Phyllis Byrne that a purpose 
of the meeting requested by Rodriguez was to discuss 
resupply of the contras? 
A. No, I do not. 

Ql Would it affect your recollection if I told you 
that Phyllis Byrne recalls that it was you who gave her the 
essence and substance of what appears as the purpose of 
the meeting on the schedule proposal, namely to brief the 
Vice President on the status of the war in El Salvador and 
resupply of the contras? 

If I tell you again that Ms. Byrne recalls that 
it was you who told her that what I just read in effect was 
the purnose of the meeting, would that change your 
recollection in any way? 

A. That would not change t'V recollection. 
Ql Your view is that Phyllis is wrong? 
A. I can't say she's wrong. I can't say she's wrong, 
I can't say she's right. 

0. She recalls that it was you who told her. 

A. Well, she can, but I do not recall giving those 



21 words. 

22 g : Let me tell you where we are with this, Colonel 
Watson. Mr. Gregg says he didn't write it. You say you 
didn't give it to Phyllis Byrne. She recalls that you 
did give it to Phyllis Byrne, that you did give it to her, 



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' DO you have any explanation for where this language 

2 came from? 

3 A. The only- explanation is that the Congress and the 
President and everybody was in the midst of a request for 

5 a vote, a request for an appropriation of funds, and the 

6 whole subject of continued or resumed military assistance 
for the united Nicaraguan Opposition was something that was 

8 being much discussed. 

9 There were meetings going on constantly during that 
sprina involving different members of the Administration to 
advocate the President's policy of supplying, providing 

'2 supplies to the Nicaraquans that were seeking freedom. And 
'3 it was not an unusual issue. 

14 The specific words "resupply of the contras" 

15 could have devolved or evolved from that general 

'6 atmospheric. But as for the specific, no, I still do not 
1' know where that came from. 

18 g IS Phyllis Byrne a reliable secretary? 

19 A. Yes, she is. 

20 g^ YOU have a high regard for her skills? 

21 A. Yes. 

22 Q_ She does not, though, create or initiate 

" information that goes into schedule proposals as far as you 

2* know, right? 

25 A. No, quite the contrary, she does. 



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g- She makes up, she specifies what the purpose is? 
A. She either takes the State Decartment or Defense 



Department memoranda and extracts from it. If she talks 
to somebody on the phone, she takes the information from 

5 the phone, digests the information, evolves it, puts it 

6 together. 
Q, I understand that. But she is not the one who 

decides what the purpose of the meeting is? She gets that 
information from somebody else? 
A. Not necessarily. 

Q. She decides what the purpose of the meeting is 

with the Vice President? 

A. If the State Deoartment says, this is why we want 
to have a meeting, she may take the paragraph - they may 
write a paragraph - and she will boil it down to a 
sentence as to the purpose of the meeting. 

But she gets it right, correct? If they say the 
purpose of the meeting is to discuss China, she doesn't 
say the purpose of the meeting is to discuss Africa? 
^ Obviously not. 

Q, SO the information as to what the purpose of the 
n^eeting is comes to her. Phyllis Byrne has not achieved 
a uniaue position in the government where she decides 
What the purpose of meetings is with the Vice President, 



7 
8 
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10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 O. 

18 



25 right? 



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A. 'no . 

Q. So presumably -- 

A. But I think you're putting more formality and more 
specificity on a schedule proposal than — you have to 
understand the process. It's not that precise that, if you 
put down the purpose of the meeting is this, that either other 
things can't be discussed or that that will be the actual 
totality of the meeting when it comes about. 

0. I understand that. But I assume that these forms, 
the schedule proposal and the briefing memorandum, are 
completed for a purpose, riaht? 
A. Correct. 

0. It's not just a make-work exercise to send forms 
around. You are going to look at .he briefing memo, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. The Vice President's going to look at it? 

A. Yes. 

Q, so there's a purpose to doing it, and that means 
there's a purpose to doing it accurately, porrect? 

A. That's correct. At the same time, you have to 
realize that there are meetings which occur m my area 
and in the areas of the other officers in the office which 
Phyllis does the schedule oroposal and we don't ever see 
them, where Don will tell her to setup a meeting or she will 
prepare it on her own initiative and give it to Don. 

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Q. I hear vou. ' Bat when you said before that the 

general atmosphere at the time was one in which there was 
attention being oaid to the contras and to the prospect of 
getting renewed assistance from the Congress and so forth, 

5 I am trying to understand how that testimony relates to my 

6 question of where Ms. Byrne would have gotten the information 
from as to the Durpose of this meeting? 

A. I can't tell you where she got it. 
9 Q. Were you suggesting that she made it up based on 
10 the general atmosphere in Washington at the time? 

A. I wouldn't want to suggest that maybe she did 

12 anything. I can't read her motives or her intentions or her 

13 role in preparing this schedule. I can't do that. But what 
I can tell you is that I am fairly certain that I did ndt 

15 provide those words. 

,6 Q. Because if you didn't provide it and if Mr. Gregg 
17 didn't provide it, and if she didn't come up with it on her 
own, and if Felix Rodriguez didn't provide it, then this was 

19 ghostwritten literally, because there's nobody who provided 

20 it. 

21 Would you think that there would have been 

22 something wrong with discussing resupply of the contras 

23 with the Vice President in May of 1986? 

24 A. I would not have phrased it "resupply of the 

25 contras." I would have phrased it -- I would have phrased it 



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"the need for legislative effort" or "to discuss the 
situation to nrovide background for support of the President's 
budget request for military aid to the Congress." 

0. VThat does "resupply of the contras" mean.? 

A. To ne, "resupply" is a very specific technical 
thing, which means kicking bundles out of airplanes. 

Qi And you came to learn as of some point, I guess 
as of August 1986, that Felix Rodriguez was involved in 
resupply of the contras, right? 

A. That's correct. VJell, that he had something to 
do with access to the airplanes on the ground and refueling 
them and that sort of thing . 

0. Facilitating? 

A. I don't know if he was the person who got on the 
airDlane and did that. 

Q. I understand. But that he was involved in 

facilitating? 

A. Facilitating. That's a good word. 

Q. And that you came to understand in August 1986, 

riaht? 

A. That's correct — now wait a minute. August 
1986, we didn't learn that he was involved in it. We learned 
that he had a lot of information about the people* that were 
doing it -- Secord, Clines, and those folks — not that he 
himself was involved. 



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Ql "vmen did you learn that he himself was involved, 
"he" being Felix Rodriguez? 

A. Well, the first allegation was when Eugene 
Hasenfus was shot down in October, or his airplane was, and 
the Sandinistas paraded Hasenfus out. It was the first 
allegation. 

Then at some time later, maybe October, November, 
December, as the information began to roll out which you are 
investigating, Felix Rodriguez's role became more known. And 
I understand he came to Don and confessed that he had been 
much more heavily involved. 
Q. When? 

A. I think it was December '96. I was not a party 
to it and Don has only told me that later. 

Q. understood. Let me go back one more time, then, 

to Watson Exhibit 3. It is your testimony that you are not 
the source of the language that resupply of the contras was 
a purpose of the m.eeting between Felix and the Vice 
President, correct? 

A. That is my testimony, to the extent that all humans 
are both fallible and wish they were infallible. 

Ql All humans except Senate staffers are fallible. 
But to the extent of human fallibility? 
A. To the extent of my — 
Ql YOU have probed your recollection, correct? 

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1 . A. ' Yes, sir. 

2 Q. And you are not the source of the information that 

3 appears as the purpose of the meeting between Mr. Rodriguez 
* and the vice President set for May 1, 1986; that's correct? 

5 A. No, no. When I said earlier — 

6 Qi Tell me what it is? 

7 A. At some point, and I believe it was either the 

8 schedule proposal or the briefing memo, Phyllis said: How 

9 do we describe Felix Rodriguez? 

10 Ql And you said counterinsurgency? 

11 A. Counterinsurgency expert visiting from pi 

12 Salvador. 

13 The question I think you're asking is where did 

14 the ohrase resupply of the contras come from. That I 

15 testified that I do not know, 

16 Ql What about the phrase "briefing on the status of 

17 the war in £1 SaJvador"? Where did that come from? 

18 A. I don't know, but that would be a normal thing 

19 you would expect with a meeting with Felix. 

20 Q. But you don't know where that came from, any 

21 more than you know where the resupply of the contras purpose 

22 came from? 

23 A. That's correct. 

24 Ql Have you discussed these documents, the briefing 

25 memo and/or the scheduling proposal, with Mr. Gregg before 

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today? 



\ 



A. We discussed it briefly when we discovered the 
document in our files back in, whenever it was, December or 
January, whenever. I think it was in response to the 
Congressman Hamilton request in January, 
gi Of 1987? 
A. Of 1987. 

We looked at it, and Don's question was: Where did 
"resupply of the contras" come from? 
Qi And what did you say? 

A. I said "beats me" or words to that effect. 
Q. And what did he say? 

A. He said "Oh" or words to that effect, "beats me," 

I don't know. 

Qi That was the substance of the discussion? 

A. I think so. I don't think we had an extended 

discussion on it. 

Q. Have you learned from that day to this where the 

words "resupply of the contras" came from in these documents, 
this document that went to the Vice President? 

A. No, I have not. 

MR. LEON: Before you move on, could I ask a few 

questions? 

MP.. BELNICK: Sure. 
BY MR. LEON: 



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Q - At the risk of beating a dead horse, did Phyllis 
tell you that she had snoken with Felix before she typed 
up the schedule proposal? Do you remember? 
A. No, not that I recall. 

Q, DO you recall her telling you that he had called 
and asked to aet an appointment with the Vice President? 

A. He may have. He may have, and she may have told 
— remember, Felix calls a lot. 

0. Well, certainly, since the time that this was 
written up, we now know today that he was involved in 
resupply of the contras. And like you say, this is a very 
specific phrase. This is the kind of phrase that he wiuld 
use, "resupply of the contras"? 

A. Felix would use a phrase like that, because •■ 
Felix was not a global strategist; he was a technician, in a 
sense a very smart fellow, but he saw a very -- he is a very 
precise fellow in what he wants to do and what he wants 

done. 

SO Felix — and again,- it's unfair for me to 

attribute to someone else what they may have thought or 

what they may have said. But my knowledge of Felix, what 

I have known of him over a year and a half, is that he 

focuses. He is a very compulsive person. He focuses on 

what he wants to get done and he drives towards that and 

excludes extraneous matters. 



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gi What I'm getting at i.s , when he called to ask for 
an aopointment to see the Vice President he might have used 
the phrase "resupply to the contras" when he spoke with her? 

A. I don ' t know . 

Q. And let me ask you — 

A. It's conceivable, because Felix is a precise 
person. 

MR. BELNICK: Except that you just testified that 
he didn't. 

THE WITNESS: I testified that I didn't know. 
MR. BELNICK: I'm saying Phyllis Byrne. 
BY MR. LEON: (Resuming) 

Qi As far as she recalls. 

Now, turning to the first page of Exhibit 3, the 
briefing memo, you just testified a minute ago you met with 
Felix before you went in to see the vice President? 

A. That's correct. 

0. And you were chatting with him, I guess, in general \ 
about the El Salvador situation? 

A. Correct. 

Q. Now, at that point, before you went in with him I 

to see the vice President, would you have had a copy of the 
briefing memo with you? 

A, Possibly. Realize that a briefing memo for someone I 
like me for a meeting, I rarely carried the briefing memo to 



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the meeting. And if I have done a briefing memo, once I have 
done it I probably leave it on my desk or in my safe. I 
don't necessarily take it to the meeting, because it's of no 
value at the meeting. 

It's not something I will haul out and be paging 
through at a meeting. It's not good form. 

Q. ^"That I'm trying to help you recollect, if possible, 

is whether or not when you were meeting with Felix before you 
went in to see the Vice President, do you recall looking at 
the briefing memo, noticing this phrase, and then — "resupply 
of the contras" — and then, you know, making that fact? 

A. That's a good and fair question. No, I don't recall 
reviewing the briefing memo with him. 

Ql And you don't recall meeting with Don Gregg or 
the Vice President before Felix met with him and then reviewing 
the memo also? 

A. No. 

Q. And noticing that phrase? 

A. No. We almost, almost, almost never meet with the 
Vice President ahead of time, unless it's a very complicated 
meeting and there are very good reasons to ore-brief him. We 
almost never sit down with him to review what the meeting is 
going to be about. 

He is smart enough to read the memo or to read the 
cards. 

Q. And you have no recollection or knowledge, do you, 

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of the vice President- asking you, either you or Don Gregg, 
about this reference to resupply of the contras before the 
meeting? 

A. No, I do not. But can I make a point, though? The 
Vice President aets four by six cards, which every senior 
government official gets briefings by his staff, and he relies 
on those cards more than he does, quite honestly, the briefing 
memo. 

Qi Did he get a card for this particular meeting? 

A. One is not listed. If there was a four by six 
card, it would be listed here as an attachment. 

But he relies on the cards, and he pulls them out 
of his pocket if he needs to review the issues. 

Qi Let me make sure I have this clear. Are you 
telling us that he doesn't get this specific page, this 
document. Exhibit 1, page 1? 

A. No, I'm not telling you that. I'm telling you that 
he gets the briefing memo and its attachments. But my 
experience is that he relies almost solely on what's on the 
four by six cards and rarely on what's really in the briefing 
memo. 

Ql And you have no way of knowing whether he ever 
got a four by six card as to this? 

A. I have no way of knowing that. But my inclination 
is to say that he didn't, because it's not listed. 



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-MR. BEI^NICICrv On Exhibit 3. 
MR. LEON: Page 1 of Exhibit 3. 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Q. Could we go back to Exhibit 1. I notice this 

again is your list of contacts with Felix. In May of 1986 
you have another phone call with him about helicopters, right? 
A. That's correct. 

Q. And certain operations, correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Then there is a phone call from Felix on July 29, 

1986? 

A. Correct. 

Qi What do you recall about that phone call? 

A. Not much . 

MR. BEI.IIICK: Let's nark this dociiment as Watson 

Exhibit 4. 

THE vniTNESS: Unless you have a memory aid. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Vlatson Exhibit No. 4 
for identification.) 
BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
0. I may, but first I want you to tell me what you 
recall without my memory aid. 

A. somewhere in my notes, in my notebook or whatever, 
I have a comment that Felix called me on July 29th. 

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1 Qi " Here is Watson Exhibit 4. 

2 A. If he did, then I took some notes. 

3 Qi Is Watson Exhibit 4 your notes? 

4 A. v;atson Exhibit 4 are notes from a spirai-bound 

5 notebook which I maintained during parts of 1986, at least 

6 the first four or five pages, and then there are a lot of othe 

7 things attached. 

8 Qi The notes go through the fifth page, which has our 

9 Bates number N-46663. 

10 A. Correct. 

11 Q. And after that, other things. 

12 A. After that other things. 

,3 gt Let me just for the record state that the whole 

14 of Watson Exhibit 4 consists of pages numbered N-46659 .- 

15 through 673. And Colonel Watson ]ust identified pages 46659 

16 through 63 as consisting of notes that he made. 

,7 And I take it those notes were contemporaneous 

18 with the events that are recorded, correct? 

,9 A. I don't know whether I took them as Felix was 

20 talking or whether I jotted them down afterwards. 

21 Q, The first page of Watson Exhibit 4, page N-46659, 

22 has a listing for Tuesday, 7/29. I take it that's July 29, 

23 1986? 

24 A. That's correct. 

25 Q. "ODSM," what did that refer to? 



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A. - That means' that on Tu'esday, July 29th, 1936, I 
went to the ODSM, which is the National Security Council 
staff meeting at 7:30 in the morning, Monday, Tuesday, 
Thursday, and Friday. And I believe it stands for "Office 
Director Staff Meeting." 

ql That's — 

A. In the Situation Room. 

Ql And that's with the President's National 

Security Advisor? 

A. It is chaired by whomever — at that point it 
would have been chaired by Poindexter or whoever his deputy 

was . 

Q, The note under "ODSM," if I read it correctly, 

says "Max shut down pilots' resupoly"? 



Correct. 

Did you take that note at the meeting? 

No, I wrote it down afterwards. 

What does it mean? 

It probably means that at that meeting Ollie 
North or someone like that made a comment to me personally 
and privately that Max shut down a resupply, shut down 
the pilots, stopped the pilots from conducting the 

resupply. 

g. A resupply of whom? 

A. I presumed he meant the contras. 



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Q. ' VVhat specifically do you recall ttiat North, if 

2 it was North, told you about what Felix had done in that 

3 reqard? 
A. As I recollect the meeting, I came to the ODSM -- 

5 I was not a normal participant. Don, I believe, Gregg was 

6 out of the country. I sat down in an empty seat which 

7 happened to be next to Ollie North, and at some point either 

8 during the meeting or after the meeting he whispered to me. 

9 He said, without using foul language here, but words to the 

10 effect that Max had shut down the resupply of the pilots. 

11 And I said: \-That are you talking about, Ollie? 

12 Tell me more? And he brushed me off and said: Don't bother 

13 me; it's none of your business. And that was it. 

14 & First he told you and then when you asked him 

15 what he meant he told you it was none of your business? 

16 A. He told me it was none of my business, don't get 

17 involved. 

18 gi But this was after he initiated the conversation? 

19 A. After he initiated it. And I think you will find 

20 another note somewhere, maybe not here, that on the next 

21 day and several days later either Craig Coy or Bob Earl, 

22 one of the other or Ollie, made these same types of 

23 comments. 

24 ql You made a note of Ollie 's comment. Did you 

25 pass it on to euiybody? 



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A. - I did not. " I don't recall passing it on. Don 
and the vice President were out of the country. 

Ql Did you understand from what Ollie North told 
you that Max had some connection with contra resupply? 
A. I took that to mean that Max Gomez had some 
connection with it. That's why I asked him, tell me more, 
because it surprised me. It shocked me. 

Q. And this was something, then, that you intended 

to pursue with Don Gregg when he got back? 

A. I don't know if I had that specific thought at 
that time of oursuing it with Don. Usually when he gets ^ 
back from a trip, we will sit down and talk about things 

that occurred. 

Q. How would you decide what things to make note of 

in your notebook? 

A. Something that I thought was important or 
unusual, that I needed a memory aid on. 

0. Let's turn to the next page of this Exhibit 4, 
N-46660. It says at the top "Felix," and then there are 

notes. 

Are those notes of your telephone conversation 

with Felix on July 29th? 

A. Without knowing whether these are pages, page by 
page in the exact sequence that are in my notebook, I cannot 
say that. But I would presume it is because July 29th -- 



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and the next one is July 30th. ' So I would assume that it 

is. 

ql I will tell you, this is the sequence in which 

the notes were produced to us. 

A. And I don't recall how I Xeroxed them, but I would 
presume that this is the phone conversation of July 29th. 

Q, Why don't you go through the notes and tell us 

what you recall that Felix discussed with you on July 29, 

1986? 

A. First, I don't recall who initiated the phone 
call. Apparently it means that Congress has been notified 
that congressman Obey, who had put a hold on a number of 
helicopters going to El Salvador of the type of helicopters 
Rodriguez wanted for his operation -- apparently the 
notification had been made and was then working its way 
through the Congressional waiting period process. 

Felix probably asked me: what about the repair 
of my helicopters? And I said "Repair, nothing yet" in 
quotes means that I've heard nothing yet or got nothing 

yet. 

The next, "Visit to other side." Felix must 
have sai^^ad^ visit to the other side, whi^^^c 
to ^ean||^H|H ^^ he was visits ^°^|^| 
He was in El Salvador, making visits all around, talking 
to military chiefs of staff or senior people about 



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coordinating their thinking, trying to get to know people. 

The next one, "To Washington 8/11/86," must mean 
that on August 11th he knew that Ed Corr and General Galvin 
were coming to Washington. 

"CANF" I suspect is Cuban-American National — is 
Cuban-American National Foundation. They are helping to give 
aid to El Salvador. It says "mid-August 





0. We can pass that. 

"Coordination," does this have something to do 

Well.^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and 
I suspect that means that he is ccring to^^^^^^^^^H on 
Wednesday. 

& Reference to a Lieutenant Colonel Rankin? 

fl. Lieutenant Colonel David H. P-ankin, with a 
serial number. He was an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel in 
the United States MIL group in El Salvador, military group. 
He worked with Colonel James Steel, and Felix was sayina: 
You'sze got to figure out how to get him promoted. So I took 
his serial number down. 

Q. I'll give you a few names after we're finished. 

"Resupply," what does that say? "Resupply, yes, 
problem, waiting for new." 



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A. " "Waiting- for new h^icopters"? 

2 Qi I don't know. You tell me. 

3 First of all, resupply of whom? 
A. I don't know. I don't know what that means. 

5 That doesn't trigger anything. 

6 Qi Is that a term thatvyou associate with El 

7 Salvador, resupply? 

8 A. I could associate it easily with the helicopters. 

9 Q. tVhat is the reference under "resupply," 27-19-96 
'0 A base," and then "home," and then "Jim Steel, 11-15 

Auaust"? 

12 A. Well, the Jim Steel part is he will be here 11-15 

13 August, as will Ed Corr and Steel's boss, Galvin. 

14 2L vjhat about 27-19-96 A base? 

15 A. It's a mystery. 
0, You don't know what it neans? 
A. It doesn't ring any bells whatsoever. 

18 I ql When you spoke to Felix on the 29th, did you 

19 question him about what Colonel North told you earlier that 

20 morninq, namely that he Felix had shut down the pilots who 

21 were resupnlying the contras? 

22 A. I don't think so. I'm just looking at the 

23 27-19-96 A base and home. I don't know if thaf means that 
2* Felix was flying home. I don't know. 
25 Ql Did you ask Felix about the cryptic statement 



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that North had made to you'^that morning? 

2 a. No, I did not. 

3 gi Did you decide not to ask Felix that? 
A. I believe I decided not to ask him that, because 

5 it was Ollie North mentioned it very briefly in a teasing, 

6 almost a teasing manner. Ollie was always known to be a 

7 very secretive type of person. He wanted people to think 
he was doing things very special, and I took it to be part 

9 of that. 
,0 But I also took the information on board, not 

11 just that he was playing a game of being important and 

12 secretive, but also here was some information that was 

13 interesting. But I'm not in the habit of taking one little 

14 bit of information like that, an accusation like that, and 

15 repeating it back to the oerson and sayina: You've been 

16 accused of, without trying to get more information. 

17 gt Haveiou now given us everything you recall about 

18 the July 29th telephone conversation with Felix? 

19 A. Yes, I have. 

20 ft Please turn to the next oage of your notes, 

21 N-46661, Wednesday, July 30, 1986. And then under that 

22 it says "Thursday, 7/31 - Bob Earl - Max - problems." 

23 Tell us what that entry means? 

24 A. That means that, to me now, and I believe I made 

i. - «->,=.♦• Rnh Earl, probably at an OESM, had 

25 some other notes, that Bod tan, ^'-^'-'^ -r 

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1 done the same thing 01 lie had, had leaned over and said: 

2 Max is really aiving us problems. And my response was: 

3 Bob, what are you talking about? What do you mean? And it 
was either at the meeting or I called him later and said: 

5 Bob, what's going on? 

6 And he refused to tell me anything further. 

7 Bob Earl, at some point in one of these meetings 

8 — I don't remember whether it was the August 12th meeting 

9 or what — but Earl made a comment to the effect, a 
10 sarcastic comment: Well, Max is your friend and your 

problem. 

12 ft I must tellysu, these are bizarre conversations. 

13 People start talking to you and then when you ask them a 

14 question then don't answer? 

15 A. Do you know Ollie North? 

16 ft No. 

17 A. Have you talked to him? 

IS g. There's a certain Constitution standing between 

19 me and him for another day or so. 

20 A. Have you talked to Bob Earl? 

21 ft Yes. 

22 A. Okay . 

23 ft But they answer me. 

24 A. Well, you're in a different position. 

25 Q. Maybe so. But what I'm trying to understand is 



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the "nature of these routines. Either North or Earl say 
somethinq to you, we have problems. And then you say, okay, 
what are the problems, and then they decline to answer? 

A. That's' riqht. That bothers me, too, and it 
ticked me off . 

Qi Did you tell him: Don't tell me you've got 
problems unless you're going to tell me what the problems 
are when I answer? 

A. I may have said something. 

Qi Why the teasing? 

I don't mean to be facetious. You are all . 
professionals. You're working in matters of greatest 
sensitivity, correct? 

A. Correct. 

Q. These are national security matters, correct? 

fl. Yes. 

Q. Two members of the National Security staff, 

.Council staff, are telling the Vice President's deputy that 
they've got some kind of nroblem with a man that the Vice 
President's office sent down to El Salvador, correct? 

A. That's right. 

ft And then when you ask what the problem is they 
say it's none of your business? 

A. That's right. 

Ql Well, didn't you think you ought to go to Don 



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Gregg about that and say, something's got to be done about 

2 Earl and North? 

3 A. Don was not in country. 
Q. Well, he was coming back. 

5 A. He was coming back at some point. 

6 ft And I take it you had had experiences like this, 
from the way you're talking now, with North and Early prior 

8 to July 30th or July 29, 1986, correct? 

9 A. With Bob Earl when he was part of the counter- 
10 terrorism task force. He was very snippy about things. 

0. Well, after the Vice President's task force, when 

12 he now appeared as a member of North's unit, you had had 

13 experiences with North and Earl, I take it, which was not 
dissimilar from what was going on m July? 

,5 A. Well, the experience was more observing them at 

16 ODSM's or whatever, when they would be very close hold and 

17 keep the information to themselves. But I don't remember 
whether I discussed these specifically with Don when he got 

19 back. 

20 But recall that the August 8th meeting occurred a 

21 week later, where we had a chance to air all these problems 

22 with Felix Rodriguez. 

23 Q. At this stage, though, as of July 31, you now 

24 had received two cryptic communications, one from North and 

25 one from Earl, that there were some kind of problems involving 



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A. That's correct. 

Qi And that the problems were relating to the contras 
correct? 

ft. Correct. And if you go on to Friday, August 1st, 
you will see another comment to that effect. 

Qi We are going there right now. Friday, August 1, 
on the same page, N-46661, this was a comment to you by 
Ollie North? 

A. That's correct. 

ft And it says: "F screwed up S front." 

A. Felix screwed up southern front. 

Q. What did you understand the reference to the 
southern front to be? 

A. That Felix had done something — and I pieced it 
back together to the July 29th — zhat Felix had done 
something eUsout resupplying the southern front that Ollie 
North didn't like. 

gi The southern front against the Sandinistas? 
A. Against the Sandinis tas 

gi And that Rodriguez, North is tellinq you, did 
something to screw up that southern front military operation 
against the Sandinistas, correct? 

A. That's what I understood him to mean. 




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a Mow, the noce continues. I guess there are 

ditto marks, meaning Felix screwed something else up, right? 

A. It means that Felix screwed up by taking the 

mayor y-iani ^°^^^^^^^^H 

Q. And then it says "et cetera." 

A. I think he said, and bringing 
down, and that he shouldn't have done that, that it was 

8 too much visibility. 

9 Q. From looking at these notes of yours on Friday, 
8/1/86, now tell me in one series of statements what you 
recall North telling you at that time? 

A. What I believe they were telling me on July 29th, 
n July 30th, July 31st, August 1st, was that Felix Rodriguez 
was involved in some kind of resupply operation out of ■— 
in Central America to resupply the contras; that they didn't 
like his involvement and that he was doing things with which 
they didn't agree. 

That they were telling me that because as a 
member of the Vice President's staff we had a special 
relationship with Rodriguez. They knew that ve could point 
him, so to speak. I think they presumed we had more 
authority over Felix than we did; and that they were 
telling us there were problems with Felix, but -they didn't 



24 Dursue them. 



I believe at some point that I even went up to 



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Bob Earl's office and sat down and said, what's going on, I 
just got the real brushoff. 

Q. I believe you testified that you were surprised, 

stunned, to learn that Felix was involved in some way with 
contra resupply at that time? 

A. Surprised, yes. Stunnea — surprised. 

gi Before I go on to that, let me ask you to turn 

to the next page, N-46662. There are notes there. Can you 
tell me what those are notes of? 

A. They appear to be my notes of the August 12th 

meeting. 

0. So they are out of sync? 

A. They appear to be the August 12th. 

Q. If you look at the next rage, we're going to hit 

the August 8th meeting. Okay, we will get to those in a 

moment . 

Let's go back, though, to where things stood as 
of August 1. You were surprised at what you had heard. Was 
Don Gregg back in the country by then? 

A. I don't recall when he got back. Can you tell me? 

Q. I don't know. I know that you had the meeting 

with him on August Sth. I don't have his calendars here. 

A. Let's see. Auaust Sth? I think August 8th was 

on a Friday. 

CL some time between the 1st and the Sth he returned? 

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A. ' I have a sense that it was Auaust 5th, 1986. 

0. Aoproximate is good enouah. 

A. That's about right. 

Q. When Don Ccime back, when Don Gregg returned on or 

about August 5, 1986, did you tell him what you had heard 
about Felix? 

A. I don't know with specificity. I suspect I did, 
because I believe that, as a loyal deputy, that I tell my 
boss everything that I am involved in and what I am doing. 
I have no record that I did tell him, but I have nothing to 
the negative. 

And my general way of doing things is to tell my 
boss what I'm doing and keep him informed. 

0. Well, particularly here, you were dealing with 
somebody who had, as you say, a special relationship with 
the Vice President's office, right? 

A. Correct. 

Q. About whom you had received surprising information 

from North and Earl, correct? 

A. Correct. 

Qi And so it's likely that you would have, of all 
things, reported that information to Gregg, who had his own 
special relationship with Rodriguez, right? 

A. It's nrobable that I did, but I could not testify 
that I did. I could not affirmatively testify that I did, 

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1 nor could 1 negatively testify that I did not. But it is my 

2 pattern to do that sort of thing. 

3 0. But what you are telling me, I guess, is that you 

4 don't recall whether you did or you didn't? 

5 A. That's right. 

6 Q. You have no recollection of a conversation? 

7 A. I have no recollection of a conversation. 

8 MR. LEON: Before you go to August 8th, can I ask 

9 a question? 

10 MR. BELNICK: Yes. 

11 BY MR. LEON: (Resuming) 

12 0, Colonel, I don't know if you're following any of 

13 the testimony today, Felix Rodriguez's in particular. 

14 A. I am. 

,5 Q. You have? Okay. You miiht recall Felix testified 

16 that on June 25th he met with Colonel North in Colonel 

17 North's office. When that meeting was over, he pulled North 

18 aside and expressed concern one on one with North with 

19 regard to problems down in the resupply effort. 

20 He was with Bob Dutton at that time, and it was 

21 during that meeting, before he pulled North aside, that 

22 North had chastized him with regard to his conduct down 

23 there, and North was concerned about it. 

24 After that, speaking to North, he testified that 

25 he and Dutton went down to the Vice President's office, that 



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Donald Gregq was not nxesent, but that he met with you for a 
very short time. • - / 

A. I listened and watched that testimony. 

Q. Do you have any recollection of meeting with 

Felix Rodriguez on June 25th, 1986? 

A. Yes, I did. I met with Felix Rodriguez on June 
25th. I would make a correction, though, based on what you 
said and what Dutton and others said. He did not visit the 
Vice President's office. It's a rather large complex of 

offices. 

He came to my office. Room 298, which is not the 
Vice President's office. Technical point. 

gi I notice it's not on your chronology. 
A. It is not on Watson 1. It was a mistake and an 
error. When we discovered it was not, we out out a press 
release May 15th, something like that, of this year making 
that correction. 

Qi I just want to make sure the record is clear on 
that. And what is your recollection about that conversation 
on that occasion with Felix? 

A. First, I don't recall that it was a scheduled 
meeting that was on my schedule. I think it was put on at 
the last minute or telephoned in or something like that. I 
don't know how the meeting came up. 

I recall that Felix came down and wanted to say 



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hello. He was in the building, wanted to pick up some 

2 photographs from Natalie Wozniak, one of the secretaries, 

3 of either the May 1st or May 20th meeting, something like 
that. 

5 And he wanted to tell me he was here, the 

6 standard stuff: What can you do for me? 

7 Ql Was it one on one? 

8 A. Yes, my meeting with Felix was one on one. I 

9 think it was in my office. It may have been in Don's. I 
10 may have used Don's office for the meeting. I don't 

recall. 

12 I remember that either at some point before, 

13 during, or after the meeting — rr.eeting Bob Dutton, Robert 

14 Dutton, whom I had never met before and never seen or 

15 heard of before. 

16 Q. Was he introduced as Colonel Dutton? 

17 A. No, not that I recall. And I remember that 

18 Felix and I were talking. I remember meeting this fellow 

19 when I was standing in the doorway. I think Felix 

20 introduced him as one of his assistants. 

21 But I have since heard that 01 lie North says 

22 that Ollie or Dutton say that he introduced him to me. I 

23 don't recall whether it was North or not. 

24 Ql Did Felix mention during that conversation on 

25 that day anythinq about resupply? 



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A. - Nothina whatsoever. Not that, nor did he mention 

2 that he was having any problems in El Salvador other than 

3 dealing with the helicopters. 
Q. Did he mention the fact that he had just come 

5 from a meeting with Colonel North? 

6 A. I don't believe he did. 
Q. And did you talk to Colonel North subsequent to 

8 that meeting with Felix on June 25th about what happened 

9 during the meeting? 
10 A. Well, I didn't know they had a meeting. 

Q. Okay. Well, did Colonel North bring it to your 

12 attention? 

13 A. He did not bring to my attention that he and 
Felix met on June 25th. Thus I was not able. 

15 Q. Fine, thank you, 

16 BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Ql Let's go to the Auaust 8th meeting and your notes 

18 pertaining to that meeting appear two pages in from where 

19 you are, N-46663. 

20 It was a Friday, and your notes indicate the 

21 meeting started about 9:30 in the morning, right? 

22 A. Yes. 

23 Ql And present were you, Don Gregg, and Felix 

24 Rodriguez? 

25 A. That's correct. 



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Ql - Tell us wh^t you recall and everything you recall 
about that meeting on August 3th? 

A. The meeting was scheduled. Felix came in and 
said he wanted to talk to us about some problems in Central 
America, and now that the Congress had authorized military 
assistance and aid to the freedom fighters, those seeking 
freedom in Nicaragua, that he wanted to tell us about a 
group of neople that were conducting resupply. 

And I recall him saying that he heard about it, 
knew about that, now that it was authorized, that the CIA or 
somebody would be setting up a resupply operation to fly 
resupplies into Nicaragua, to drop them; and that he wanted 
to tell us that there were a bunch of crooks involved. 

He mentioned SimmX v;il3on as one. Most people 
know -UtaBw Wilson and the people he ran around with. He 
mentioned Tom Clines, Richard Secord, and he said that these 
people are running such a corrupt, shoddy, unsafe operation 
down there, the U.S. Government should not get involved 
with them; and that if these people approached the United 
States Government wanting to sell their resupply operation 
to the government, that they should be turned down. 

He didn't feel that they were of the professional 
or moral character to be associated with the U.S'. Government 
and anything that we were now authorized to do via the 
Congress and the President's signature. 



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~ He raised several specific problems that I alluded 

2 to a moment ago. One is that they were the wrong crowd of 

3 people: Secord, who left government under quite a shadow 
in I believe 1984, allegations of profiteering or money 

5 under the table; Clines, who had a reputation as a bad 

6 apole out of CIA; and EJiiiui'nl Wilson, who had supplied the 
Libyans with plastic explosives. 

8 So he indicated first that this was a bad group 

9 of people. Secondly, he said this group of people was 
'0 profiteering, that they were buying and; selling arms, 

weapons, military supplies, to give to the contras whether 

12 they were buying them for them or on their behalf, or 

13 however he phrased it, and that they were buying this stuff 
at low prices and charging the cor.-ras high prices. 

15 And he called it: Here are these freedom fighters 

'6 in Nicaragua who are trying to regain their democracy, 
17 democracy that I as a Cuban lost in Cuba, and these people 
are profiteering on it while people are giving their blood 

19 and their lives. These people are making immoral profits. 

20 He cited an example of a hand grenade, three 

21 dollars purchase, nine dollars sale price to the contras. 

22 Thirdly, he mentioned the quality of the 

23 aircraft, that the aircraft were unsafe, they were poorly 

24 maintained; and that he feared that they would either get 

25 lost or crash, losing a life. 

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The people, the profit, the quality of the 
aircraft, and I think thera. was one other major subject, 
or there was another subject that I think I raised with him, 
fourthly, that he had been accused by Ollie and company of 
having stole n some c-123 ' san^nove^them from tliami to 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M And 

about that. 

And Felix explained that these had been donations 

to the FDN, t o UNO, and as donation: 

.t that 

they were donations and that they would stay there and not 
leave; that Secord and company had no right to take them 

away. 

That was the essence of the conversation. 
0. What about the accusatLon that he had stolen or 
skyjacked one of these planes? 

A. Well, that's the last one I just mentioned, that 
Felix rebutted that by saying, no, these were donations to 
the contra cause and he saw them as donations 
^^^^^^^|H^^^^| saw them as ^^'^ 

North and General Secord had no right to take them' and take 
them away and then resell them to the United States 

Government. 

The implication -- I don't know if he used the 
specific words, but his implication was that Secord and 



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company were tryina to sell them to the CIA, but they were 

2 donations. 

3 gi Did he tell you how he happened to be involved with 
planes donated to the contras, he Felix? 

5 A. I don't think he told specif ica! 
6 




o Miami 
and I believe he said that at one point 
9 he flew — he brought one of the planes back. It was ready 
10 to leave, it was loaded with supplies, and so he brought it 
back down to Central America. 

12 He didn't consider it skyjacking or air piracy. 

13 He considered them the property of the FDN, and it was there 
ready to come back, so he would brir. ? it back. 

15 Q. What did Felix tell you acout North's involvement 

'6 with this group? 

17 A. As I recall, he mentioned that — I didn't take 
'8 any notes. These were notes I wrote down afterwards. I 

19 think he mentioned that Ollie North was involved with these 

20 people and Ollie had some kind of directional role. I don't 

21 recall him discussing specific technical directive role that 

22 Ollie had; that Ollie was more the conceptualizer, the 

23 chairman of the board. 

24 Those are my words, not his. 

25 g That's what you understood from Felix? 



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A. " That's what' I understood, correct. 

Ci And did Felix associate North with the effort by 

Secord and theo^r^^^^Y from the contras the planes 

. J^^l^^^^^^^^^^^lsaid been 
F e 1 i><^^H^^^^^^^^^^H 

contras, right? 

A. Rather, Felix said that rather vehemently. 

ft And that North was one of those who was trying to 
take those planes away from the contras, correct? That's 
what you testified a few moments ago? 

A. Yes, generally. 

ft YOU testified that Felix said that North and _ 
Secord had no right to take those planes away from the contras 

correct? 

A. Yes, I said that. 

ft And that's whatiou recall Felix communicated to 



you? 



North, in the sense that he was chairman of the 
board; Secord, in that he was the chief operating officer. 

ft NOW, do you recall whether Felix told you at the 
August 8th meeting anything about where the contras were 
getting money from or where the money was coming from to nay 

for contra weapons? 

;, NO. What I recall was that he said that these 
people are buying the weapons or providing them to the 
contras. I don't recall him - he may have said that money 

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was being- donated by forei gn governmen ts. I think he said 
they were being donated ^V'^^^|[|H ^"^^ ^ didn't take 
detailed notes. Don was writing madly. 

0. Have you ever seen Don Gregg's notes? 

A. Yes, I have. 

Qi Let's look at those notes. When did you see them 
for the first time? 

A. I don't know if I saw them after the meeting. I 
may have. I just don't recall. My most recent recollection 
was that I probably saw them in December, November or 

December. 

Q. Did you look at them in getting ready for today's 

examination? 

A. I read them over yester ay, because I had a copy 
that I made back in December or Jar.uary. Some time I made 

myself a copy. 

Qi You had not been given a copy by Don around 

August '36? 

A. No, I don't recall having been given one. If I 

did, it's lost. 

Oi Here is — this is a document that was marked at 
Don's examination as Gregg Exhibit 2. It's a copy of -- do 
you recognize it as a copy? 

A. I recognize it as Don's notes. 

QL l-mich you looked at yesterday? 



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A. " Yes. 

Qi And there of course is a reference in those 
to the August 8, 1986, session with Felix, to Felix saying 
— and you will see it in what looks like the first 
paragraph or so, the second paragraph actually -- Felix 
saying that Clines, C-l-i-n-e-s, "was getting money from 

A. That's correct. 

ft Does that square with your recollection? 
A. Let me find it in the documen^Point it out, 
Don-s writing -- getting dollars f rom^^^^ okay . 

0, DO you remember Felix saying something like that 

at the meeting? 

A. r think he did. 

gt Look up the page a lit.le. These are Don's 
notes again. We are looking at Gregg Exhibit 2. There 
is discussion that "Green equals Rafael Ouintero," 

correct? 

A. Correct. 

ft Then if we go a couple of lines down from there, 
the fourth line down, let me read what Don has written: 
"A swap of weapons for dollars was arranged to get aid for 
contras." Do you see that there? 

A. I see it and that's what it says, 
ft What does it mean? 



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A. - To ne what it means, and reading it here, but also 

2 recalling the discussion at the August 8th meeting, was that 

3 Felix was talking about it in the sense that somebody is 
giving money to provide, to support the contras, their 

5 military aid; somebody is providing that, a foreign 

6 government, ^^^^^^^^^1 and that Secord and Clines were 
going out on the world arms market buying things. 

And he cited the hand grenades, buying them and 
9 giving them to the contras. It means nothing more than that. 

10 Qi Isn't it another wav of saying we're buying 

11 weapons, to say a swap of weapons for dollars was arranged? 

12 A. Well, that's what you do. I give you dollars,. 

13 you give me weapons. That's a swap. 
0. But when you go to the -perraarket you don't 

15 typically say a swap of oranges for dollars took place at 
le the Giant Food Store, rioht? You say, I bought some 

17 oranges. 

18 You'll agree with me, this is not the usual way to 

19 say arms are beina purchased, a swap of weapons for dollars, 

20 right? 

21 A. You could say it this way if you wanted to. I 

22 mean, colloquial Enalish may not. 

23 0. Is that how you remember Felix saying- it? 

24 A. I don't remember Felix using the word "swap." 

25 Qi Don Gregg is fairly easy with the English language, 



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right? I "mean, he knows how to — 
A. He is facile. 

QL I'm just saying, you would agree with me, I think, 
that one would not ordinarily write down, we are buying 
weapons with money supplied by ^^H to someone else, 
this way, a swap of weapons for dollars? 

A. I might not write that down and you might not. 
But I can't tell you why or whether Don would. I mean, he 
did. That's all I can say. 

Q. In any event, you don't recall any reference at 

the meeting on August 8th to moneys from other transactions 
being sent down to aid the contras, right? 
A. No, I do not. 

ft Like something we would -.owadays call diversion? 
There was no discussion of Iran ar-3 sales or anything like 

that? 

A. I recall none whatsoever. 

Qi Do you recall any discussion at that meeting — 

well, strike that. 

Let me -- referring again to the fact that^w 
lines down it says "Clines is getting dollars fron^^^ 
and wherever," correct? 

A. Correct. 

a DO you recall any discussion at that meeting m 
which Felix reported that he had heard from Tom Clmes or 



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somebody -else associated with Clines boasting about their 
ability to aet money from 

A. I don't recall any discussion of boasting about 

0. Well, talking about their ability to get moneys 
f rom^^^^" 

A. I recall words to the effect that the contras are 
getting money f rom ^^^^^^^^^ but nothing more than that. 

Ql Do you recall Felix discussing howl 
had been persuaded to give money to the contras? 

A. No, I don't. 

Ql And what^^^^^^^^^were getting in return for 
giving moneys to the contras? 

A. No, I don't. 

0. Do you recall him saying what Clines, reporting 
what Clines, anything that Clines Wad said about hov 
^^^^^|had been induced to give mcr.ey to the contras? 

A- No , I don ' t . 

Q. Was this the first time you heard that^^H 

[were giving money to the contras? 

A. No. 

You had heard that prior to August 3th? 



Leaving aside those sources. 

I had never heard it in my function as a 



government official or in the context of government meetings. 



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It. was always outside that, in the newspapers, reading of j 
congressional inquiries or investigations. ' 

Q. Are you familiar with an NSPG meeting that had 

taken place on t'.ay 16, 1986? 

A. Tell me the subject? There are lots of NSPG 

meetings. 

Q, I thought you had them all memorized, just like 
I do, because I knew about one of them. Sonow, every one 
I know about I have memorized. 

Had you heard, as of Auaust 1986, that the NSPG 
had discussed at a meeting in the spring the possibility 
of soliciting at high levels of our government, by high 
levels of our government, foreign countries to provide 
assistance to the contras? 

A. r don't think I did. 

g, so this was on Auaust 8th, that was, as you have 
said, the first occasion when in y^^^^ as a 
government official you heard tha^^^^^^^e-^e 
contributing? 

A. That's correct. 

g, And again, you don't recall Felix sayi^ 
anything about what he had heard concerning how| 
had been induced to contribute or compensated in some way 
for their contribution? 

A. I have no recollection. I think I would go 



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further than no recollection. I just don't think it was 
discussed. 

Ql And you don't recall anything being discussed 
that would explain Don's reference to a swap of weapons, 
et cetera, except the statement that foreign countries were 
supplying money and that money was being used to buy weapons 
for the contras by this profiteering group, correct? 

A. That's correct. And I would defend the right of 
anybody to take notes and use the words as they desire. 

0. I certainly would join you in that defense. It's 
just an unusual way of saying weapons were bought, wouldn't 
you say? 

A. Well, I dont know. 

Ql Unless Don was getting very poetic. 
A. Well, Don is a learned man. I think he majored 
in philosophy in college. 

Ql Maybe that explains it, the ghost-written document 
and the swap of weapons. 

Let's mark this as Watson Exhibit 5. 

(The document referred to 
was marked Watson Exhibit No. 
5 for identification.) 
Ql That is a one page document dated December 17, 
1986, entitled "Meeting with Felix Rodriguez on August ath, 
1986," our Bates stamp N-36456. 



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' Did you orepare this document? 

A. I did. 

Q, Why did you preoare this, this document, about 
an August meeting in December? 

A. Your or other — maybe not you specifically — 

0. You can't blame me. I was not even a gleam in 
the Senate's eye in December of 1986. But go on. 

A. Whomever, the issue was starting to heat up and 
people were starting to look into it and ask a lot of 
questions. We noted that David Hoffman on December 15th and 
16th was asking a lot of questions, writing articles. And 
I thought it would be good for my own memory aid to jot 
down everything I could remember of the meeting, self- 
generated for my own use. 

Qt Did you look at anything —did you have any 
notes you were looking at when you prepared this, or was it 
all from independent recollection? 

A. I probably went back to my note, which you 
entered as an exhibit a couple of minutes ago, about the 

meeting. 

Qt The one which appears at N-46663 on Watson 

Exhibit 3? 

A. That's correct. 

^ we can compare it, but you will agree with me, 

I think, that your typed notes of the meeting which you 

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1 prepared in December, Watson Exhibit 5, have a lot more 

2 detail than the handwritten notes you took back on August 

3 8th, right? 

4 A. That'-s correct. 

5 Qi V7here did you get this additional detail from 

6 when you prepared Watson 5? 

7 A. I believe I did it out of my own mind. I cannot 

8 — I don't know if I had any other sources. I think it 

9 was just out of my own recollection. 

,0 Q, Did you talk to Don Gregg at all? 

11 A. I don't know. 

,2 Q. You don't recall, or do you, looking at Gregg's 

13 notes before you prepared this? 

14 A. I just don't know. 

,5 Q, There's no reference to Oliver North in Watson 

16 Exhibit 5. Can you tell me why not? 

,7 ft. Probably because I didn't remember it. 

,8 Qi Didn't it strike you on August 8th as fairly 

19 significant information that Rodriguez was telling you 

20 North was involved with this private contra supply network 

21 and in effect was the chairman of the board, to use your 

22 terms? 

23 A. I thought it significant, but apparently it 

24 wasn't in my notes, my handwritten notes. It wasn't in 

25 there. 

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"MR. LEON: Let me stop you a minute. These aren't 
notes, are they? This is after the fact. 

THE V7ITNESS: This is something I wrote hours, 
within hours after the meeting, the same day. 

MR. LEON: This is not during the meeting? 

THE WITNESS: Not verbatim notes by any extent. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Qi You wrote it within a few hours of the meeting. 
North's name does not appear on those notes and doesn't appear 
on Watson Exhibit 5. And I was asking you to account for 

that. 

I can't explain why it doesn't appear. No special 



A. 

reason. 
& 
A. 



Let' s go back — 

You will note, though, tr.at in my August 8th 
meeting I mention Clines and Secord, and in my December 17th 
note, your Exhibit 5, it mentions Clines and Secord. 

0. Yes, I noticed that. 

A. And since I don't have North, you know, I didn't 
transpose one to the other. 

0. There's also no reference here to money coming in 
to the contras from^H|^H But again, is there any 
reason that that did not appear either on your notes, 46663, 
or the memo. Exhibit 5? 

A. No explanation for that. It does talk about them 

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buying hand grenades, about buying stuff, selling it for higher 
prices, which is the equivalent of buying and selling. 

0, Is it at the point, at you said before, that — 
strike that. 

You said that you saw Don Gregg making what seemed 
to you to be comprehensive notes and you were not as concerned 
with the notes that you were going to make of the meeting? 

A. That's correct, taking notes. Comprehensiveness — 
Qi He seemed to be taking lots of notes? 
A. Taking lots of notes, yes. 

Qi Throughout the time that Felix was speaking? 
A. Yes. 

Q. He didn't stop at some point and let Felix go on 

and just give up taking notes, that you recall? 

A. There may have been lapses in the conversation or 
lapses in note-taking. I was not riveted on Don. 

Ql I understand. But generally, you saw Don taking 
notes on the discussion? 

A. Yes, and I relied on that. 

Ql Did you ask Felix at the meeting on August 3th 
about the allegations that you had heard from North and Earl 
a week or so before that he, Felix, was giving problems to 
the contra resupply operation? 

A. I asked it in the sense of the stolen aircraft 
allegation, not in the sense of, are you running an operation 



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or are you' involved. 

Ql Well, on July 29, as your notes reflect. North 
told you that Felix had shut down the pilots who were 
resupplying the contras. Did you ask Falix about that claim 
when you met with Felix on August 8th? 

A, I don't think I did specifically, because Felix 
was telling us all about the aircraft, that they were not 
good aircraft, and going into long expositions of that. And 
I felt that that sort of covered it, that he had some kind 
of involvement or that he knew something about them. 

Qi Well, you said, understandably, that you were 
surprised in the week before when you heard from North and 
then from Earl that Felix was involved with the resupply 
operation in some way, correct? 
a. Yes. 

0. Given that surprise, why didn't you ask Felix 
point blank, are you involved with this resupply operation, 
or what is the nature of your involvement with the contra 
resupply operation? 

A. First, I didn't know there was a resupply 
operation. I only had Ollie North's allegation that Felix 
had shut it down, he had screwed it up; that, whatever the 
words he and Earl had used. 

Q. Why didn't you ask Felix point blank about that: 

IS there a resupply operation? Are you screwing it up? Are 

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1 yoa invorved with it? What are North and Earl talking 

2 about? 

3 A. No good explanation. 
0, Did Gregg ask, or you, at the August 8th meeting, 

5 ask any probing questions about North's involvement? 

6 A. I don't think we did. 
Q. Did you ask any probing questions about North's 

8 relationship with Felix, how it was that they knew each 

9 other or what communications they may have been having? 
10 A. I don't recall any. 

Qi Did you advise the Vice President, you personally, 
'2 after this meeting on August 8th, of what you had learned 
'3 from Felix? 

A. I did not. 

15 Q. Did Don Gregg? 

16 A. Not that I know of. I'm told that he did not. 

17 0. I'm sorry? 
A. I'm told that he did not. 

19 Q, By whom are you told? 

20 A. Don . 

21 ql Did you have any understanding when the meeting 

22 ended as to whether Felix's allegations were going to be 

23 brought to the attention of the Vice President?- 

24 A. I don't recall. I don't believe we had an 

25 understanding that it would go to the Vice President. 



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CL ' Did you have a view as of the end of the meeting 
on August 3th, 1986, as to whether the information that 
Felix Rodriguez had just nrovided you should be brought 
to the Vice President's attention? 

A. Mo, I think the more proper thing was to take 
these alleaations and talk to other people in the U.S. 
Government about them before you take something like this 
to the Vice President of the United States, a series of 
allegations, a case of many little pieces, of which nothing 
gels. 

Qi I don't want to put words in your mouth, but was 
it your view at that time when the meeting ended that the 
information you had just received should not then be 
reoorted to the Vice President? 



A. 
the word. 

0. 
issue? 

A. 

& 

A. 



I don't think it was neaative in that sense of 



Did you have a view one way or the other on that 



No. 



You didn't think about it? 

No. My thought was — and I think Don's thought 
was — that we ought to have a meeting of other government 
people and find out more about it; let's pass the word 
out to them, tell them what these warnings were. 

Qi You discussed that with Don after the August 



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3th meeting? 

A. I don't know whether we discussed it immediately 

thereafter, but we had a meeting on August 12th. 

Q. When the meeting ended, did you and Don talk 

about what you had just heard from Felix? 

A. I don't recall whether we did or whether the 

press of events carried us off to something else. 

Qi And this was fairly shocking news that Felix 

was giving you? 

A. Yes, we may well have. It's just that I don't 

recollect every single thing that we do in a day. 

Q. I understand. But Felix was now telling you 

that one of the most notorious, corrupt, and treacherous 
groups that had ever infected the Vnited States Government 
was now involved in the contra resapply, correct? 

A. Yes. 

Qi These were people that were well known to Don 
because he was at the CIA, correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And they would have therefore also been well 

known to the Vice President, who had been DCI, correct? 

A. Well, I guess they would have. 

Q. They were known to many Americans? 

A. They were known to many Americans. 

Ql He told you also that, lo and behold, involved 



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with this group as in effect chairman of the board was a 
member of the staff of the National Security Council, 
correct? 

A. Yes. 

Qi Would you not consider this extremely significant 
information for the vice President to have? 

A. At some point probably, but not immediately. 
Q, You and Don Gregg were and still are the Vice 

President's two senior national security advisors, 
correct? 

A. True . 

Q. What do you brief the vice President on? 

A. We brief him on things which we think are 
important, but also on which thers is substantiated 
information. These were allegat-ons made by one person 
and the proper course of action to me is that, rather than 
running to the Vice President, who may not even have been 
in Washington at the time -- 

Q. Well, he would be back. 

A. He would be back eventually. But the proper 
thina to do is, since Felix was giving us information as 
a warning that the CIA should not pick up this operation 
because of the Congressional appropriation, that we would 
talk to the CIA and others in the government that knew 
about it and say: Hey, guys, here is a warning; let us 



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give you this information, and you guys think about it and 
get back to us. 

Ql Colonel Watson, you know that Don Gregg and Felix 
go back over a decade, correct? 
A. That's correct. 

Q. They have a very close relationship; you were 

aware of that? 

A. I'm aware of that. 
Q. You knew that in August of 1986. 

A. Yes. 

g. You knew that Don had rec oiunended Felix highly 
for his position in El Salvador, correct? 
A. Correct. 
' QL You knew that Don had an enormous amount of faith 
and trust in Felix, correct? 
A. Yes. 

g. Did Don Gregg indicate to you on or after August 
1986, August 3, 1986, that he for one^inute doubted the truth 
of what Felix was reporting to you and to Don Gregg at that 
August 8th meeting? 

A. I don't think he told me that he doubted it. 
Q. This was not just one man coming in and making 

allegations? 

A. This was Felix. 

gi This was Felix Rodriguez, who had a very close 

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relationship of trust and confidence with the Vice President's 
national security advisor, correct? 

A. Correct. 

Q. So it's not to say that some isolated man landing 

from Mars and saving that there are bad thinos happening 
down there. In that light, didn't you consider that this was 
information that ought to be brought to the Vice President's 
attention? 

A. No, I would not speak to the Vice President 
immediately. 



Would you take it to him after you had checked it 



out? 



A. I would want to get more information. 

Q. Because you doubted Felix? 

A. Not because I doubted Felix, but because I would 
want to check and find out what CIA knew about it, what 
State Department knew about it. 

Remember, to jump out of this context for a 
minute, there was a Restricted Inter-agency Group. There were 
IG's and SIC' 5 on Nicaragua going on, meetings which we were 
having a hell of a time -- which we couldn't bust into. We 
were refused entry to the RIG on Ce.^tral America, where the 
rumors were that these things were going on; that- they were 
making decisions about Central America. 

I tried endlessly to get into those. So I didn't 
have good information on what was going on. And so what I 

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wanted to ^o was to — I thought, not what I wanted to do, 
but what I thought was that the way you pursue these things 
is that you talk to more people about them. I conducted 
investigations in my military positions in the past. 
MR. LEON: Was Earle brought down to this 

meeting? 

MR. BELNICK: Let me go on with this questioning 
and then I'll turn it over. I don't want to lose my 
thought. 

BY MR. BELNICK: (Resuming) 
Qi Let's talk about the RIG for a moment. Who 
chaired the RIG on Central America? 

A. My understanding was Elliott Abrams. 

Qi And you said you had beer, refused entry into that 



RIG? 



Yes. 



Who had refused you entry? 

Well, I think Elliott. 

When? 

I can't say specifically, but there were at 
different SIG meetings, Senior Inter-departmental Group 
meetings, on the Micaraguan humanitarian assistance that 
would go on, and you walk up to a conversation and you would 
hear the words: We will talk about that at the RIG. 

And a couple of times I made the request at 



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Elliott' s" of f ice that I be invited to the RIG, given my 

2 responsibilities. And the answer always came back, no. 

3 Qi Did you tell Don Gregq that had happened? 
A. r think so. 

Qi And what did Don say about that? 
A. Keep trying. 
0. Did you? 

8 A. Yes. 

9 0. And you kept getting refused? 
10 A. Keep getting refused. 

Q. By Elliott Abrams? 

12 A. Yes. I can't say that it was two times or €en 

13 times that I made the request. 

14 Qi It happened more than or.ce? 

15 A. More than once. 

16 Qi Did there come a time, then, that you or Don 
Gregg went to the Vice President and said: We, the senior 

18 advisors to the Vice President, are being refused admission 

19 to the RIG on Central America? 

20 A. I never thought of going to the Vice President. 

21 I prefer to deal with things that I can deal with, and I 

22 don't have to go tattling to the Vice President to tell him 

23 my pm^lans that I can't solve. So the way I dealt with it 

24 was to continue to try, to listen at the SIG's on tJicaraguan 

25 humanitarian assistance. 



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In the fall, when the NSTD was done after the 
Congress had authorized aid, I asked to be included in the 
IG on Nicaragua, and I had to write a memo saying, please 
include me, and I was. 

0. Let's go back to the RIG. Elliott Abrams 
chaired the RIG. Who did you understand was on the RIG 
aside from Chairman Abrams? 

A, I got the impression that it was| 
and 01 lie North. 

g. Anyone else? 
A. Not that I know of . 

Oi From where did you get the information that 
it was the three of them? 

A. Because it was at a SI& on Nicaragua n humanitarian 
assistance, Elliott would say to, orMBwould say, 
talk about at the toj^^^^^^or to 
North, something like that. So I knew that at least they 

were on it.. 

(3. Did anyone ever tell you that it was the three 
of those persons who comprised the RIG? 

A. Ho. 

Q. Who chaired the SIG meetings? 

A, Usually Mike Armacost. 

0. Did you ever complain to Armacost that Abrams 

wasn't letting you into the RIG meetings? 

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A. No. 

Qi Did you ever tell anyone on the seventh floor of 
the State Department that that was happening to you? 

A. No. 

Q. And you never got into the RIG meetings? 

A. Never got in. 

Ql Did you ever confront Elliott Abrams and say, why 
the hell are you keeping me out of these meetings, in words 
or substance? 

A. I think I did on one occasion. 

Ql And what did he say? 

A. He said, well, we'll think about it. 

Ql Did you tell him that was unacceptable, that you 
as the Vice President's deputy wanted to be at those 
meetings? 

A. I think I did. 

Ql And what did he say? 

A. I'm not sure if I ever heard anything back on it 
or whether, when I checked later in the week — I think they 
were on Fridays — he might have said no. 

Ql In any event — 

A. I never got there. 

0. Now let's go back to August 8th. Do you recall 
during the discussion with Felix and you and Gregg Bob Earle 
entering into it? 

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A. -Just a minute. Can I go back? 

You've got to remember that in the United States 
3 Government,- covering as many issues as I have to cover, from 
the Soviet Union and arms control to international economics 

5 to Mexico and those kinds of things, that you go to a hell of 

6 a lot of meetings. And you have to sift and sort what 
meetings to go to that are important and what aren't. 

0. Well, you thought it was important to go to the 
9 RIG, didn' t you? 
10 A. It was important enough to ask about. 

Q. Therefore important enough to go? 

,2 A. It's important enough to ask, and then there must 

13 have been something sensitive going on. But at the same , 

14 time, the broad picture of the United States Government ■" 

15 policy that was being formulated at NSC meetings and SIG i 

16 meetings and that sort of stuff also gave me enough inforroatiorj 

17 to have a general idea of what the President's policy was. 

,g And yes, I would want to go, but it wasn't enough | 

19 to fight about. It wasn't enough to want to know that specific 

20 technical information — 

21 0. It was important enough that you volunteered it 

22 here. One of the things was that you had been refused entry 

23 into the RIG on Central America, and you had tried endlessly? 

24 A. Yes. 

25 0. So it was important to you. 



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1 A. Several times. 

2 Ql And it was so important to you that you were cut 

3 out of those meetings that you had wanted to attend, 
correct? 

5 fl. Yes. 

6 Ql And you thought it was wrong for you to be cut 

7 out and you still do, correct? 

8 A. And I still do. 

9 Ql Now, going back to August 8th — 

10 A. Well, there are a lot of things that are wrong 

11 in the world, but you're going to have to draw the line on 

12 where do you — how far do you fight and when do you stop 

13 bothering about it? 

14 Ql I understand that. But Central America was an 

15 area that was one of your responsibilities, correct? 

16 A. Correct. 

17 Ql This was the RIG on Central America. What did you 

18 understand the RIG's function was? 

19 A. To talk about sensitive subjects dealing with 

20 Central America. 

21 Ql And to do what aside from talk? 

22 A. Didn't know. It was one of those things where you 

23 hear something is going on and you want to be — -you want to 

24 find out what's going on, and so you try. 

25 Ql Did you ask anyone at the SIG what the RIG was 



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all about? 

A. I think I gathered that they were dealing on 
sensitive issues dealing with Central America. I presumed 
it was diplomatic neactiations or dealings, back channel 
dealings with the heads of state, that kind of thing^ 

gt What did you understand that the Abrams 
North RIG was doing vis a vis the contras? 
A. I didn't know. 

Q. Did you know what issues they were dealing with 

with respect to the contras? 
A. Didn't know. 

Q. Did you ask anyone that question? 

A. I don ' t know . | 

gi Did the RIG make reports to the SIG meetings r 
that you attended? 

A. No. I 

Ql And you never asked Mike Armacost, what is it thati 
the Central American RIG does aside from talk about ; 

sensitive issues? 
A. No. 
Q. You never asked him what the sensitive issues 

were that they talked about? 
A. I don't think so. 

Q, NOW, going back to the August 3th meeting, do 
you remember Gregg calling Bob Earle to come down to the 



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meeting when he couldn't meet North? 

2 A. I remember that we tried to reach Bob Earle, and 

3 it was either the August 8th or the Auaust 12th meeting, 
to come down. I don't recall which it was. I think 
Phyllis had to make several phone calls to try to get them 
down, and they were very reluctant to come down. 

7 I think we tried initially to get North, and 

8 Earle showed up at some point. But I don't remember which 

9 meeting it was. 
10 Qi But to go back — and then we will go forward — 

your view at the time the August 8th session ended was that 

12 this was not something that should be brought immediately 

13 to the Vice President's attention, at least not until it 
H had been further checked out and discussed, correct? 

15 A. Correct. 

16 Q. What did vou do to check out Felix's assertions 
'7 about North's involvement with the private network that 

18 was operating for the contras, the Secord-Wilson group? 

19 A. AS I remember, we had an August 12th meeting 

20 with representatives from different agencies and 

21 departments of the government, and Don briefed them on the 

22 . points which Felix had made and asked them to take 

23 information on board and consider it. 

24 Q. That was four days later, right, August 12, 

25 1986? 



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A. That's correct. 

Qi At that meeting — and I believe your notes of it 
appear at Exhibit 4 at page M-46662 — do you recall whether 
Gregg told the assembled group that North was involved with 
this Wilson gang down in Central America, and that he was 
directing their efforts vis a vis the contras? 

A. I don't specifically recall that. 

Qi Do you remember if Gregg mentioned anything like 
that at the meeting? 

A. I don't recall that. 

Ql Nobody else does, either. 

Now, in light of that can you tell me how you 
checked out Felix's allegations that North was involved with 
this corrupt group? 

A. I'm not sure we did. 

gi Do you have a recollection of checking it out? 

A. No , I don ' t . 

Ql Did vou ever personally confront North about the 
allegations? 

A. No, I did not. 

Ql Did you confront Earle about the allegations? 

A. No, I didn't. 

Q. Do you know if Gregg confronted North or Earle? 

A. No , I don ' t . 

Ql Tell me what you recall — and you may look at the 

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notes if they help — about what occurred at the August 12th, 
1986 meeting? Who was there and what was said? 

A. Well, my notes said that the meeting was at 1:30 
on August 12, that Don, myself, Ray BunkhaA, senior director 
of the National Security Council staff. Bill Walker from 
State, Ed Corr, the Ambassador i^^^^^^^^^Bfrom the Agency, 
Jim Steel of the MIL group, and that Bob Earle came late. 

And as I remember, Don went through his notes with 
the people or went through and talked them through the 
meeting with Felix. Mainly the focus was Secord, Clines, 
shoddy equipment, selling hand grenades; and that the 
aircraft operation was slipshod, an unsafe operation; and 
that would these people take the information on board and 
consider it as the government was se-.ting up its resumed 
military assistance. 

0. And what do yo u recall othe rs saying at the 
meeting? Let's start with^^^^^^H Do you recall him 
saying anything? 

A. As I remember, he was fairly quiet. I think most 
people were quiet. 

Ql Do you remember whe the i^^^^^^^H took notes of 

the meeting? 

A. No , I don ' t . 

1^ Did^^^^^^^|nake any statement about what the 

CIA's intentions were regarding this private group? 

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i 

A. "I don't recall a ny. 

gi Do you recall if^^^^^Hmade any statement as 

to what, if anything, the Agency knew about this Clines- 
Wilson group? 

A. r can imagine, if he said anything, what he 
probably said. But no, I don't. 

ql You don't recall him saying anything? 
A. No, I don't recall him saying anything. 
Qi I-Ihat about Ambassador Corr? 

A. I remember Ed making some comments, but 1 just 
don't remember what he said. 

QL \^at about Bill Walker from the State Department? 
A. I remember Bill was awfully quiet, too. 
0. Colonel Steel? 

A. I think he said that Feli>: was doing a good job 
on the helicopter kind of stuff, but I don't remember whether 
there was any discussion by Jim on the other thing. 
Q. What about Colonel Earle? 

A. He got to the meeting late and I don't remember 
whether he ever took a seat with us in the meeting or whether 
he stood back leaning against a bookcase. I remember, I 
vaguely remember him standing outside the sort of circle of 
people that were sitting. 

Ql How long did the meeting last? 

A. I don't think more than 20 minutes or 30 minutes. 



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Qi - Did anyone take notes that you saw? 

A. r don't remember anybody taking notes. 

0, Did you? 

A. Only afterwards, to write down who was there. 

So aside from that, did you make any memo of that 



meeting? 
7 A. No, I didn't 



8 & 



What did you understand to be the result of the 
9 meeting when it ended? 
,0 A. That we were telling the people around the 

government what we had heard, that they ought to take that 
information as the government set up the military aid effort, 
they ought to take it into consideration and be warned by at 
least us and one person, Felix, that there were problems' 
with these people, and that the Aaer.cy especially should 
think very hard before they became associated with these 
people or bought the resupply operation that Secord and 
Clines were running. 

Q. mat assurance did you have by the end of that 

meeting that the Agency would not pick up these people? 

A. I'm not sure that we had a specific assurance. 
I think the only assurance we had was that everybody would 
take the information and think about it, compare- it to what 



24 you knew. 

g, Did you ask any of these people to verify or to 



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\ get back to you on whether they could verify the information 

2 that Felix had provided? 

3 A. I think we probably did. 

4 Q: Did you? Do you have a recollection of asking 
s anybody to do that? 

6 A. I think Don probably did ask them. 

7 ql Do you recall that he asked them to or are you 

8 just thinking he probably did? 

9 A. I'm only thinking that he probably did. 

10 Ql You don't have any recollection? 

11 A. I don't have any. 

12 Ql do you recall hearing back after the meeting 

13 from any of these people? 

14 A. Don told me at some lat;r point tha 

15 had come back and said that they were not going to associate 

16 with these people. 

17 Ql When did he tell you that? 

18 A. I don't remember when it was. I wish I could be 

19 more helpful. 

20 Qt Well, whatever you recall. 

21 After the meeting, did you report to the Vice 

22 President on this information and what had been done with 

23 it? 

24 A. I did not. 

25 Ql Did Don Gregg to your knowledge? 



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A. " I don • t know . 

DidvDU ever ask Gregg if he did? 



2 Ql 

3 A. No, I didn't. 



Has he ever told you whether he did or did not 

5 report this to the Vice President? 

6 A. Well, I think I have heard subsequently that 
he didn't. But I don't recall Don ever telling me that he 
did or did not. 

9 Q. From whom did you hear that Gregg did not 

report it to the Vice President? 



10 



11 A. 



I think it was in the newspapers. 



Q, Did you have a view, after the August IZth* 
meeting, on whether this information ought to go to the 

14 vice President? 

15 A. No. 
Qi No view one way or the other? 
A. I thought that once we got the information 

together, once it coalesced, and if we heard something, 
that it probably should at some point. 

20 Q. When? 

21 A. Whenever the information comes back. 

22 0. What information? 
A. Well, if somebody comes back and says that, 

yes, we know somethina about this, or that, no, we're not 
going to associate with him, that that would be an 



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appropriate time, if somebody told me, that I would then 

2 prepare a memo to the VP summarizing it. But it never — 

3 Ql If^^^^lhad gotten back to you and said, we the 
Agency are not going to associate with those people, you 

5 would have reported that to the Vice President and 

6 summarized what had led to it, correct? 

7 A. Yes. 

g Q. Now, the — did you do anything yourself to see 

9 if anybody was going to get back to you with information as a 
10 result of the August 12th meeting? 
A. No. 

12 Qi Were you concerned as of August 12 still that 

13 a member of the National Security Council staff was involved 
with this notorious group? 

15 A. Yes, I was concerned because Earle was being — 

16 they didn't want to come to the mee-ina and all that, and it 

17 concerned me that they were trying to either avoid the 

18 information or avoid discussing it. 

19 Qi Absolutely. Now, two and two could equal four, 

20 right? This would explain why you were getting cryptic 

21 references from North and Earle about this, correct? 

22 A. Yes. 

23 Ql This would explain why Earle was not eager to 

24 come to the meeting, correct? 

25 A. It could. 



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Q. ' This could also explain why North himself didn't 

2 apoear at the meeting, correct? 

3 A. Yes 
Q. It could possibly explain why you were being cut 

5 out from RIG meetings, correct? 

6 A. It could 
Q. Therefore, this was highly significant 

8 information, was it not? 

9 A. All the individual pieces were 
10 Q. And that means information that a National 

Security Advisor should get to his- principal , correct? 

12 A. Should have. But I was derelict and didn't 

13 Ql The information should have gone to the Vice 

14 President, correct? 

15 A. When it was mature information. 

16 0. And certainly by some time in September it was 

17 mature, if not earlier? 

18 A. I couldn't say it was mature in September, because 

19 I didn't know whether we had any information. 

20 Ql How long would you have felt it prudent to wait 

21 to tell a principal of the National Security Council for whom 

22 you worked that a member of the National Security Council 



staff was the chairman of the board of an organization that 
was utilizing the good services of Tom Clines and company? 
A. I susoect I would have at some point, if I got 



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another trigger event or some more information. 

2 Qi And if there was not a trigger event, would you 

3 have waited endlessly? 
A. No, I don't think so. 

5 Qi This was information that should have gone to 

6 the Vice President as promptly as possible; would you agree 

7 with that? 

8 A. No, I wouldn't. 

9 Q. Well, then when? 
A. I don't agree that it should have gone promptly, 

because it was not information that was mature enough or 
that was filled out enough to pass on to him. 

gi What did you do to make it mature enough? 

A. We passed it out to those different people at the 
August 12 meeting and said: Take it on board, think about 
16 it, work on it. 

Ql Did you ask them to do it promptly? 

A. I don't recall whether we did or not. 

Ql Well, did you expect that it would have been done 

20 promptly? 

21 A. Well, I would have expected that it would be 
done before somebody started setting up an operation. 

Ql And if you didn't hear anything back, -you would 

24 have checked it out? 

25 Q, Yes. But remember what I said: At some point 



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t back to Don, but I don't recall when it 



Q. But whenever it was, at that point at least you 

would have expected that a report should have been made to 
the Vice President, correct? 

A. One could be made orally, one could be made 

verbally. 

Qt Orally, verbally, in writing. I'm talking about 
a report to the Vice President. At least as of the time 
■■reported back, the information should have gone to 
the Vice President in your opinion, correct? 
A. Yes. 

MP. BELNICK: Let's take a break. 
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the taking of the 
instant deposition was recessed, to reconvene at a later 
date. 



Signature of the witness 



SIGIIED AND SWORN TO before me this 



day of 



, 198 



Notary Public 



My Commission expires: 



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COPY W H . 'Br ^ O F,-,^. .. KOPJES 



Wednesday, June 17, 1987 



2 

3 

4 DEPOSITION OF CASPAR W, WEINBERGER 

5 

6 

7 House of Representatives, 

8 Select Coitunittee to Investigate Covert 

9 Arms Transactions with Iran, 
10 Washington, D. C. 
11 
12 

13 The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m., 

14 in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon, 

15 Washington, D. C, John Nields presiding. 

16 On behalf of the House Select Committee: John Nields, 

17 Robert Genzman, Roger Kreuzer, and Joseph Saba. 

18 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: John Saxon. 

19 On behalf of the Witness: H. Lawrence Garrett, III, 

20 and Edward Shapiro. 

21 _ _^ |9bec87 



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DEPOSITION OF: 
















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Caspar W. Weinberger 


















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By Mr. Nields 
















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1 Whereupon , 

2 CASPAR W. WEINBERGER 

3 was called as a witness and, having been previously duly 

4 sworn, was examined and testified as follows; 

5 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF 

6 OF THE 

7 HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 

8 BY MR. NIELDS: 

9 Q Mr. Secretary, I would like to say just at the 

10 outset on behalf of both the House Select Committee and 

11 the Senate Select Committee we very much appreciate your 

12 making time available to us. I know it is time that is 

13 precious to you, but it is of great assistance to the 

14 members of the committee to have testimony on the record 

15 that they can review prior to — 

Ig A I am glad to help. Everything I have had to say 
is on the record at least twice, and maybe you said three 
times. 

Q We are hoping that with the use of some documents 
perhaps we can help refresh your memory further on some of 
these matters. 



17 
18 
19 
20 

21 

22 A My memory will probably need plenty of refreshing. 

It is fading in all aspects, I am sorry to say, but go 
ahead. 

Q Thank you very much. 



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1 When, to the best of your recollection, did you 

2 first become aware that there was under consideration 

3 within the administration the idea of opening up further 

4 relations with Iran including possible sale of arms? 

5 A Well, I think when this memorandum came in, which 

6 I see is dated June 18, 1985. There was a memorandum that 

7 came over that asked to — opinions on the possibility of 

8 this kind of an opening. I think -- I see it is dated 

9 June 18. That roughly accords with my memory, the 

10 memorandum making the request and attaching an intelligence 

11 assessment was dated June 17. So I would say I probably 

12 saw it on the 18th of June. 

^3 Q Now the Secretary is referring to a document I 

14 would like to mark as Exhibit 1 

.g (Exhibit No. CWW-1 was 

^- marked for identification.) 

._ THE WITNESS: That's the memorandum plus the 

•J8 attachment. 

BY MR. NIELDS: 
Q Correct. I will just put it in front of you, 
Mr. Secretary, and ask you if Exhibit 1 isn't the memoran 

22 dum you were just referring to. 



A Yes, it is. 

Q I take it what came to you first was the memoran- 
dum itself with a cover letter from Mr. McFarlane? 



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1 A Yes. 

2 Q I think that's on the third page of the exhibit, 

3 the cover letter? 

4 A That is. Yes. 

5 Q And then the memorandum. To the best of your 

g recollection, prior to that time, you were unaware of any 
•7 such idea? When I say such idea, I mean selling arms to 

Iran? 

Q A I have no memory of anybody raising it before 
■jQ then , no . 

Q I take it that you personally read this memoran- 
dum? 

A I did. 

Q That was at about the time it was received? 

A That's my custom. In this case, I remember 
specifically that I did. 

Q And did you then make certain handwritten 
comments? 

A I did. 

Q Are those on page — the first page of the 
exhibit? 

A Well, they are on a cover memo from General 
Powell to me which asks if the memorandum should be 
passed to Mr. Armitage. I have noted on that the subject 
matter, the suggestions in the proposed NSDD is, as I have 



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1 said here, a direct quotation, "Almost too absurd to comment 

2 on. By all means, pass it on to Rich" — meaning Mr. 
Armitage. "The assumption here is that Iran is about to 



4 fall and secondly that we can deal with that or with them 

5 on a rational basis." Then I put, "It's like asking 
Qadhafi over to Washington for a cozy lunch or chat." 

In other words, I was totally against the whole 



7 

3 idea 



Q It seems clear. What you were just reading into 
the record is your own handwritten notes? 

A On the routing slip, I think we should call it. 



^2 Q Which is the first page of Exhibit No. 1? 



A Yes. Right. 

Q Above your handwriting, I take it, is the hand- 
writing of General Powell? 

A Of General Powell. That's what I read. He 
said, "This came in 'eyes only' for you. After you have 
seen it, recommend I pass it to Rich Armitage for analysis. 
It is signed by C.P., General Powell. It was then I added 
my comments, "Almost too absurd even to comment on." 

Q I take it that means General Powell would have 
read it first and then routed it to you? 

A Yes. That's the invariable custom in this 
office. Everything coming in for me goes to his desk 
first That's been the case with the military assistants 



462 



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1 since I first took office. 

2 Q When you wrote, "This is almost too absurd to 

3 conunent on," what did you find absurd? 

4 A The whole idea that we could get a better relation- 

5 ship with Iran or that we should do any of the things that 

6 were suggested in this memoranda. The idea that we could 

7 have — "urgent new efforts are required. In moving forward, 

8 we must be especially careful to balance our evolving 

9 relationship with Iraq in a manner that does not damage the 

10 longer term prospects for Iran." 

11 The idea that there was any possibility of any kind of 

12 better relationship with the leadership, with the government 

13 of Iran, or that Iran was about to change governments and 

14 that the sucessor government would be somewhat better. 

•J5 "The U.S. position in Tehr2m is unlikely to improve without 

1g a major change in U.S. policy." I disagreed with this 

17 strongly. I think that they needed a major change in Iranian 

1g policy and personnel. 

ig And "a more conservative regime, still Islamic" — 

20 quoting now — "might lessen the emphasis on revolution 

and terrorism and could move cautiously toward a more 

correct relationship with the U.S." 

That would not be true with any of the present 

leadership or with any of the people likely to succeed in 

my opinion. And there are a great many other points I 



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1 could go through in detail here, but basically my view was 

2 that we needed a total, complete change, not only with the 

3 Ayatollah Khomeini but with all of his likely successors, 

4 since he had complete domination of the government and that 

5 they weren't likely to fall in the sense that the government 

6 would change as completely as it did when the Shah fell and 

7 Khomenei came in, but that that was the kind of change we 

8 did need; and that barring that, we didn't have the slightest 

9 possibility of getting any kind of an improved relationship 

10 with people like that, whom I regarded basically from our 

11 point of view as irrational lunatics. 

12 Q So I think you made this abundantly clear, but 

13 your objection to the memo, to the proposed NSDD was not 

14 limited to the proposal to sell arms? It was the entire 

15 concept that you felt was — 

1g A That was I think one of the things that set off 

17 the barely suppressed fury in my tone, but the whole idea 

18 was clearly — obviously the whole includes the lesser and 

19 the lesser was selling arms or opening any kind of — 



attempting to open or having a policy to open any kind of 
dialogue or relationship with a country that has behaved 
as Iran does all the time and as they had with our 



23 previous hostages. 



Q That was going to be my next question. I think 
you've already answered it. 

JUN£LASSlf:ED 



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1 You did focus, I take it, on the proposal that 

2 involved arms? 

3 A Oh, yes. Yes, indeed. Let me see if I made a 

4 special comment about that. 

5 Q You don't need to read it. 

6 A Develop an action plan, support a basic policy 

7 objective both for near-term contingencies as well as long- 
3 term restoration of U.S. influence in Tehran, increase 

g contacts with allies and friends on the evolution of the 
^Q Iranian situation. 

■)■( This at a time, not quoting now, when I aun trying 

•J2 my best to stop the flow of arms from various people to 
•jg Iran. And increase — I have forgotten where the actual 
4^ suggestion was. 

Q There was a suggestion in there, I think later on, 
toward the bottom of the page. I can find it for you. 

In any event, there is a reference to selling 
arms and I take it, as you said, that that was not your 
sole objection but it was one of the things that set you 
off? 

A Indeed , yes . 

Q Did you have — other than writing your comments 
in a more formal way somewhat later and sending them to 
Mr. McFarlane — did you have any — 
A You have got here — 



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Q There has been a mis-Xerox on that copy which 
we will correct. 

A You have page two and three of my response, I 
believe. 

Q And not page one. It is missing. 

A That's right. 

Q But we have it in our offices and will substitute 
it. 

A My recommendations reflect my very strong view — 
this is my memorandum commenting on this — formal memorandum, 
not the note — "reflecting my very strong view that U.S. 
policy must remain steadfast in the face of international 
lawlessness perpetrated by the Iranian regime. Changes in 
policy and in conduct, therefore, must be initiated by the 
Iranian government. By remaining firmly opposed to current 
^6 Iranian government policies and actions, yet supportive of 

17 moderation and a longer term improvement in relations , we can 

18 avoid the future enmity of the Iranian people. . . " so on 
1* and so on. 

20 Yes . 

21 Q Did you have any oral discussions with any other 

22 officials outside the Department of Defense? 

23 A I certainly had plenty with the Defense people. 

24 They were all in full agreement with the views I expressed, 

25 I think I probably talked to George Shultz about it once 



JitlCLAS&]21c:a 



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^ or twice. I'm sure I did, yes, about the enormity of the 

^ nonsense contained in the proposal and found that he was in 

^ full agreement. I think, that was a telephone conversation. 

^ I couldn't give you the date. It was probably sometime 

^ between the time I received the document on June 18 and made 

6 

my response. 

^ You don't have page one of my response? 

^ A I apologize. We simply for. some reason it didn't 

' get copied. 

^0 A Do we have it? 

11 MR. GARRETT: No. 

12 THE WITNESS: In mid July, about July 17, I sent 
■•3 McFarlane my comments suggesting that the Khomenei govern- 

14 ment's continued unacceptable behavior didn't merit revision 

15 of our policy. Under no circumstances should we now ease 

16 our restrictions on arms sales to Iran. That was the 

17 sentence I was looking for that I couldn't find. 

18 BY MR. NIELDS: 

19 Q Did you have any discussions with Mr. McFarlane 

20 about it or did you respond solely in writing to him? 

21 A I can't remember. I may have. I may have called 

22 him up and howled a bit on the phone about what an absurd 

23 thing this was. But I'm not sure I did. I'm almost 

24 positive I did with George Shultz. I don't know whether 

25 I did with McFarlane or not. 



467 



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1 Q I take it you have no recollection of doing it 

2 with any other government official? 

3 A No. I don't think so. I don't remember doing it 

4 with anybody else. A lot of internal discussion among a 

5 small number of people. They marked it top secret so it 

6 didn't go all over the Department. But it was a unanimous 

7 opinion here that it was absolute nonsense. 

8 Q Did you focus in any way at that time on the 

9 legalities of selling arms to Iran? 

10 A I don't think so. I just assumed it was -- as 

11 I said, I just felt it was almost too absurd to waste my 

12 time on. The idea of selling arms to Iran when we were 

13 trying to prevent everybody else around the world from 

14 doing that was such total n'~nsense that I didn't do it. 

15 I undoubtedly was aware of the various rules governing 

16 such things but I didn't order a legal opinion on it. It 

17 wasn't on a legal basis that I opposed it. It was on a 

18 policy basis with the very strongest possible views. 

19 Q Understood . 

20 Was it — I take it it was your understanding 

21 subsequent to your having expressed your views in writing 

22 that nothing came of this? 

23 A That was the basic feeling I had, yes. 

24 Q When is the next conversation that or next event 

25 that you recall dealing with the subject of arms and Iran 



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or further initiatives to Iran? 

A Well, I don't know whether — I don't have 
personal memory of having been present at any White House 
meetings in August on this subject. There may well have 
been some discussion but I don't have a specific formal 
recollection of it. 

The next point that I do remember was that — 
and I assume this is all classified now? 

Q Yes. 




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I think at that point I demanded to know what all 
this was from Mr. McFarlane. Ultimately a meeting was 
called in the White House, I believe on December 7th. 
Q Okay, n ow. So that your memory of the time 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■would be 
f r ame ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I^^^^^^H^^B 

A sometime in the fall, November, something like 
that. The meeting in early December would indicate to me 
that my complaints had had some effect perhaps and at least 
we were — I was now going to be told what was happening, 




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Q I would like to go back in time and see if any- 
thing might refresh your memory with respect to the August 
time period. 

A All right. 

Q First, do you recall having any meetings either 
in the hospital or in the President's residence after he 
got out of the hospital? 

A Yes. Not in the hospital, but upstairs in the 
White House. There was a meeting and I don't know what date 
that was. But memory is that it was a Saturday. I'm not 
sure. But I think it was a Saturday. 

Q And what do you recall about the meeting? 

A Well, I think there was some discussion about 
the idea of this, of this arms sale possibility or proposal 
and I argued against it and made the points that I have been 
making repeatedly here this morning as well as every other 
time the issue came up. But I don't have specific memory 

of that. 

I do have a memory of a meeting with the President. 
I believe he was in his hospital bathrobe or something, and 
it was up in the White House, upstairs, the end of the long 
corridor, in the residence quarters. I just am not sure 
whether it involved this issue or not. We did have occa- 
sional meetings up there, budgetary issues and other pending 



lipl l| yMgp/7f P-ijyfTi 



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1 problems and so on. 

2 My appointment sheets have been given to you. 
If it shows I was at the White House on a Saturday or 

* something, why, that may have been that meeting. 

5 Q We were just checking. 

6 There is both the August 7th and August 8, there 

7 are references, one, to an NSPG meeting and the other to a 
6 cabinet meeting at the White House. 

9 A Those would — they would have been held down- 

10 stairs, either in the Situation Room or in the Cabinet 

11 Boom. I don't have specific memory of what came up at 

12 those meetings, but undoubtedly my appointment sheets,! am 

13 sure, are correct. They show where I went and what I was 

14 doing. 

15 Q Your best memory is it was a Saturday? 

16 A The meeting upstairs which is comparatively 

17 unusual with the President in his bathrobe , quite unusual , 

18 I do remember that. But I don't remember the — all of the 

19 topics that were discussed. I do know that every time this 

20 issue aurose, I opposed it very strongly and I remember that 

21 the December 7th meeting, after this problem ^^^^^H 

22 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H that we did have a rather 

23 discussion of the whole thing and Mr. Shultz was there, I 

24 was there, I think Mr. Casey was there. I am not sure. 

25 Maybe Mr. McMahon. I think Mr. Casey and Mr. McFarlane. 



472 



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21 
22 
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1 Q Before you get — I do want to get into that, but 

2 there are other matters that I think it is important to do 

3 before we get to it. 

4 Just so I understand, are you saying that the 

5 references in your calendar to NSPG meetings and cabinet 

6 meetings on the 7th and 8th which were not Saturdays — 

7 A Of August? 

8 Q Yes. 

9 A Yes. 

^0 Q -- are unlikely to be the event you are recalling? 
^^ A Yes, I would think so. First of all, I don't 

12 think there was any discussion of this matter in any very 

13 large forum, that is this Iranian thing. The December 7th 

14 meeting was a small group I believe in the Oval Office. 

15 The January meeting, January 7th was also a small group 

16 in the Oval Office. And so the NSPG is a somewhat larger, 

17 more formal body with people at the table and people on the 

18 back benches and so on. Cabinet meetings are very, very 



19 large gatherings. 

I would — the fact I was at the White House 
on those types of meetings would indicate to me that these 
this Iranian thing was not discussed then. 

Q So it could have been and your memory is a 

24 Saturday? 

-g A Somehow that is in my mind, yes. 



473 



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^ Q I will say I don't know whether you can help us on 

2 this, but I notice that in most instances, Saturdays are 

3 blank on your calendars. I drew the inference that that 

4 might have been because whoever keeps them may or may not 

5 have — 

6 A No. If I have some scheduled appointments, they 

7 appear. I have, as far as I know, calendars. I don't 

8 normally make very many appointments on Saturdays. But I 

9 will come down here and do some work and things like that. 

10 But don't have too many formal appointments on Saturdays. 

11 But there are Saturdays when I have had. Yes. 

12 Q At this meeting, whatever the exact date may have 

13 been — 

14 A What I am saying is that we had the two memoran- 

15 dums we discussed, the request for comments and my comments 

16 about them. 

17 Q Right , 

13 A The only other next time I remember really very 

19 formally discussing this matter with the President or with 

20 anybody else was the December 7th meeting. 

21 Q I understand it. I still need to just ask the 

22 questions. 

23 Q In between, the only thing I remember very 

we r e^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
^^^^^^^^^^m^^^^^^^Btfhich, as we 



474 



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discussed. 

Q Well — 

3 A That isn't to say there couldn't have been some 

^ meeting in August or something at which this was discussed 

5 with the President. 

6 Q It is no secret, of course, and you may or may 

7 not be awar^ of it, that, for example, Mr. McFarlane 

8 recalls a meeting in that time frame, August or so. 

9 A Yes. 

10 Q And recalls your taking a position at the 

11 meeting? 

12 A I hope of opposition? 

13 Q Opposition, and indeed, he said specifically that 

14 it was on, among other grounds, legal grounds that there 

15 were — 

16 A Well, I trotted out all the arguments I could 

17 think of. Certainly I would have raised that. Whether 

18 I did that before December 7 or not, I don't know. i 

19 certainly did it December 7th. So it is quite possible, 

20 but I just don't recall. 

21 Q I take it also you do not recall specifically a 

22 proposal in the August time freime which involved Israel 

23 in some way? 

24 A No, I don't. I read about that in the Tower 

25 Commission and got questions on that in other hearings. 



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1 I don't have any recollection of that. I think McFarlane 

2 at one of these meetings referred to a man named Kimche or 

3 somebody, an Israeli agent of some kind whom McFarlane 

4 placed great reliance on as a person who was recommending 

5 or who supported this course of action. But whether or not 

6 that was in the fall or whether it was only at the December 

7 meeting, I don't know. The December meeting is the one I 

8 have the major memory of. 
g You understand that there are hundreds of meetings 

10 about every subject. I can't possibly recall what the NSPG 

11 or the cabinet were, and those dates you mentioned. But 

12 somewhere I am sure we have some records of them. 

13 Q That's a good point. I would like to get to that 



later, too. 

There has been some — also some public record 
information that in September there was a shipment of TOWs 
by Israel to Iran and the following day the release of 
Benjamin Weir. I guess the question I want to ask is, to 
the best of your recollection, were you aware of the 
reason for Mr. Heir's release at the time it occurred? 

A No. No, I was not. I remember vaguely that a 
man named Weir was released, that he made a lot of rather 
damaging anti-U.S. comments and his wife worse, but I don't 
recall anything about the circumstances. I don't know 
anything about Israel transferring weapons to Iran. 






476 



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^^«Sffl»lft:T 



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1 Q And I take it that — 

2 A In that specific event. 

3 Q And in that time frame? 

4 A No. 

5 Q I take it you don't recall any requests you 

6 were aware of to the Department of Defense for replenishment 

7 of those weapons? 

8 A No. No. 

9 Q Okay. 

10 Now I'd like to move forward into this 

11 time frame. 

12 A Yes. 

13 Q And I guess the best way to get at it is have 

14 this document marked. 

(Exhibit No. CWW-2 was 

1g marked for identification.) 

17 MR. NIELDS: This is the one you have just 

Ig opened to. There is another one in this book. Larry, you 

ig can just turn the page. 

20 THE WITNESS: Prepared by me on the 19th of 

21 November . All right . 
BY MR. NIELDS: 

Q I guess my first question is, have you seen this 



2A document recently? 



A Well, I've seen it within the last perhaps month. 



«w^/» rvHrai«ri lA I/i i 



1? 




477 



22 

1 maybe two weeks, as I was reviewing material for this. 

2 Q So you are generally familiar with its contents 

3 at least as you — 

4 A Well, yes, generally I am familiar with it. I 

5 can refresh my memory as I go over it now. 

6 These are the availability of Hawk missiles and 

7 he talks about the pros and the contra points and all of 

8 that. It was not a document I saw contemporaneously. I 

9 didn't see it at the time. Don't remember seeing these 

10 penciled notes or anything. 

11 Q The penciled notes would have been notes of 

12 Mr. Gaffney. I guess we need to put his first name on 

13 the record. 

14 MR. GARRETT: Yes. Hank. 
BY MR. NIELDS: 

15 Q Hank Gaffney, as is this little buck slip on 
17 the first page. 

^g A All right. 

19 Q But he has indicated to us that the point paper, 

20 Hawk missiles for Iran, was a document which he was asked 
2'j to prepare by General Powell and Noel Koch and that it was 

22 his understanding that it was to be used by you at an NSC 

23 meeting and that he understood you wanted some arguments 

24 against the transaction that appear to be contemplated in 

25 the talking points. 



liWilIAiJi;;;;^^ 



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A Well, that is conceivable it would have been for 
that December meeting. I don't have a specific memory of 
it. 

The practice of the NSC was to schedule meetings 
and then reschedule them. I can't remember a single 
meeting that was held on the date it was originally sche- 
duled. This could have been done — what is the date of 
this? 

Q Well, I think we have — our best idea of the 
time this document would have been created is towards the 
latter part of the week of the 18th of November. 

MR. SAXON: I believe he created it the 18th or 
19th or at least began working on it at the request of 
General Powell and Mr. Koch. 

THE WITNESS: As I say , after we had t he problem 
the or whatever^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Band 
out ^^^^^^^^I^^^^^^^Hand 
the extent of this kind of thing, then I made my strong 
demand for a meeting and at least to fin d out w hat was 
going on and what all of this related tol 




And it may have been then — I can't remember 
when we were told such a meeting would be held. In the 
normal course, when a meeting is scheduled, a lot of 



yiiCLA^S!2:2a 




479 



24 

1 material is prepared for me and the staff in order to do that 

2 find out from the staff of whoever is holding the meeting, 

3 the NSC in this case, generally what the agenda is. So 

4 this may have been the origin of it. I don't have a specific 

5 independent memory of it. 

6 I did see it in the last couple of weeks here in 

7 general preparation here. 

8 MR. GARRETT: May we go off the record a minute, 

9 John? 

10 MR. NIELDS: Sure. 

11 (Discussion off the record.) 

12 MR. NIELDS: Let's go back on the record. 

13 BY MR. NIELDS: 

14 Q Mr. Secretary, we have just been off the 

15 record. Maybe I should put on the record I think what we 

16 have established or believe we have established, which is 

17 that this point paper was the one, the file copy which 

18 Mr. Gaffney kept and he believes that he gave the original 

19 to General Powell sometime around November 21. 

20 We have White House documents that indicate 

21 that Israel was very anxious to have some Hawk missiles 

22 replenished right at zibout this time. These I am referring 

23 to now — you probably heard of these PROF notes? 

24 A I have heard of them. I have never seen one, 

25 but I have heard of them. 



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Q I will be showing you a couple later on. 

In any event, they indicate the Israelis were 
very anxious to have very prompt replenishment. 

A These are White House documents? 

Q White House documents -- of Hawk missiles and 
at just about the same time, apparently, this point paper 
was created by Dr. Gaffney. 

A Well, it could be that the request came from 
some NSC staff person and went into our staff. They do 
have some relationships at staff levels, particularly, as 
I say, in getting ready for meetings and in carrying out 
things. But go ahead. 

Q Well, I guess my real question is, do you have 
any recollection at all of learning that the White House 
was trying to replenish Hawk -- Israel's missiles or was 
proposing to sell Hawk missiles to Iran, and do you recall 
getting ready to deal with such a proposal in this time 
frame? 




UI£USSl<^ 



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26 




1 

2 But I don't have any other recollection of any -- that that 

3 was necessarily going to be the subject of the meeting or 
^ anything of that kind. 

5 The meeting, as I recall it, was finally held 

6 in December on the basis of my complaints and my request 

7 for more information and presumably some sort of conclusion 

8 by McFarlane that he'd better have a wider group of people 

9 know about this . 

10 But as far as the Israelis wanting to replenish 

11 or whatever, no, I don't have any specific memory of that. 

12 Our weapons sales to foreign countries are handled all 

13 through DSAA, a very — and follow very specific formulas, 

14 have to be approved by the Congress, have to be paid for. 

15 Various undertakings have to be signed by the recipient 

16 country that they won't use them except for defense, that 

17 they won't resell them except with specific authorization, 

18 et cetera, et cetera. 

19 I don't recall anybody asking us to do something 

20 in any different way or anythingof the sort. Once authori- 

21 zation is approved, I don't get into the details of the 

22 transaction. I don't ask if the planes for Honduras went 

23 out last week or anything of that kind. It flows along, 

24 along an established normal path. 

25 Q Would a request of this nature, of the kind 



482 



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27 



1 that's covered in this point paper which went through 

2 General Powell, would that be the kind of thing that in 

3 the ordinary course would be brought to your attention? 

4 A Oh, yes. If there was a proposal that that be 

5 done, this could be General Powell preparing himself or 

6 getting material ready that he thought I would need for an 

7 NSC meeting or something of that kind. 

8 Before any use was made of it, before -- this, 

9 as I read it now, seems to be a general discussion of the 

10 background and the pros and cons of such a procedure, such 

11 a proposal. He would in the normal course assemble that. 

12 If the meeting wasn't held, or the thing took 

13 care of itself otherwise, I might not hear about it. We 

14 would not be able to transfer weapons out of inventory 

15 to any country without a specific understanding from me 

16 and without specific direction. We would have the ful- 

17 fillment of congressionally approved arms sales or something 

18 of that kind would go forward without specific authoriza- 

19 tions, in each case me. 

20 If you are talking about sales to a country that 

21 has never had them and is not authorized, and indeed is 

22 forbidden to have them, obviously yes, that would come to 

23 roe. 

24 The point paper which purports to prepare the -- 

25 purports to set forth the background and various points 



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on the subject wouldn't necessarily come to me. It might 
be the first cut. 

General Powell may have said that isn't good 
enough, or I need something a lot better than that, or the 
Secretary will need such and such, or this is not going 
to be on the agenda so we don't need it. Under those 
circumstances, I wouldn't get it. 

Q Were you aware during this time period that 
Israel had shipped Hawk missiles to Iran? 

A No. I have no memory of that whatever. I am 
sure I would remember it because, in my opinion, it would 
be a violation. 

Israel receives our things for their own use. 
They are not allowed to re-export them without our 
specific permission. We have had two or three cases of, 
oh, technologies that they have incorporated in some of 
their engines and things like that that they then wanted to 
export the engines. In each case, our permission is 
required. 



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Q So it would have been -- you are saying it would 
have been a violation of law for Israel to have — 

A I don't know of anything that would have taken it 
out of the normal course. I haven't researched the problem 
and had a legal opinion on it. My view is that our 
Arms Export Control Act would make that kind of transaction 
illegal, yes. That is just my o-n conclusion. I haven't — 
as I have not researched the problem. 

Q That kind of transaction, referring to a transfer 
by Israel to a third country of military equipment bought 
from this country under the Arms Export Control Act? 

A Yes. Yes. 

Q And I take it you were aware of -- at the time of 
no arrangement for — involving arms and hostages in which 
Israel participated? 

A No. 

Q Moving forward to this December 7th meeting, I take 
it that you recall no discussion of any actual transaction 
involving Hawk missiles that had already occurred? 

A I don't think there was a transaction. I do 
recall McFarleme was sustaining his arguments as to why this 
would be basically a good thing or something we could do, or 
something of that kind, by references to Israel, to the 
interest Israel had in Iran and to this man Kimche or 
Kimche whom he apparently regarded very highly and who I think 



485" 



\;f|OEASfitgi^ 



30 



CAS-2 he kept referring to as a source for the — or as a source 
of support f o r his argument. 

Q Just — I want to make sure. I think you answered 
this, but I want to make certain. You do not recall any 
discussion of any transfer of arms that had already taken 
place? 

A No. No. It was still the December 7th meeting, 
that was still in my mind, a meeting at which the proposal was 
being thrashed around and considered and which I was 
opposing, George Shultz was opposing as strongly as we 
could, but certainly not anything had been decided. That is 
why I was so unhappyi 



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Q I take it there was no mention at this December 7th 
meeting of any finding that had been signed? 

A No . No . 

Q Okay. Well, maybe I should just let you describe 
the December 7th meeting which you have done somewhat. 

A I think basically it was a basic idea of having a 
better relationship with Iran, that it was — had great 
geostrategic importance, that they had some things they 
needed and that there were various people there that 
McFarlane was explaining the people that had been dealt with 



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CAS-3 ■ and so on in his travels; that they represented a different 
group. 

As far as I could bring out by my questions, they 
were all either relatives of or office holders of the present 
group. My repeated conclusion — I am sure at tiresome 
length — was that they couldn't be either expected to 
nor would have any different viewpoints or they wouldn't 
be holding office in that kind of government. 

I also talked msmy times about the incongruity at 
least of selling arms to Iran when we were trying to persuade - 
other countries not to sell and that any likely benefit 
in the way of hostage release or generally better relationship 
that might lead to hostage release would be viewed by most 
people as trying to buy the release, which we strongly 
opposed. 

Negotiations with the kidnappers, so to speak, and 
all of that. These points, as well as the way it would look 
to our moderate Arab friends, I described a long antipathy 
the Saudis had to the Iranians, the even stronger antipathy 
the Jordanians had . 

All of these things I thought would be very adverseljf 
affected by attempting to make any such opening with this 
country. 

Q Where was the meeting? 

A I believe the meeting was in the Oval Office. 



487 



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Q DO you have any recollection of it being in the 
President's residence? 

A No. It is possible. It is possible. 

Q Who else was present? 

A Well, George Shultz was present and made the same 
basic arguments I did. 

Q Mr. McMahon? 

A McMahon may very well have been there. There was 
one or two of these meetings when Mr. Casey was travelling. 
McMahon may have been there. 

McFarlane was there. Don Regan was at almost 
every meeting I attended. I believe that is generally the 

case. 

Q Admiral Poindexter there? 

A usually was with McFarlane. I can't say whether 
he was or was not at this meeting. Might very well have 
been. He was frequently there. 

Q was it McFarlane that was doing the presentation, 

so to speak? 

A Pretty much in my memory, yes. 

Q What was his position? 

A Well, I think he was talking about the benefits 
that could be obtained if we could get a better relationship 
He talked a lot about geostrategic terms, things like that. 
Nobody doubted or denied that Iran was in a very critically 



iMiw flssir:;^ 



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'^cn*'*' 




33 



CAS-5 ' important position. I think I made the point — as I 

frequently did — that we needed a good relationship with Iran. 
We used to have one. 

It was our fault we didn't now, that we let the 
Shah fall without doing the things we should have done. And 
we got, because people were worried about the oppressive 
government, we got instead the most oppressive government 
since the middle ages in the fall of Khomeini, that we 
couldn't do business with them, they were fanatically 
anti-American, virulently anti-Western and anti-American. 
The people he was talking about were not people who could be 
expected or indeed were any different and we shouldn't do 
this. 

George Shultz made the same point. I think he 
emphasized particularly the problem with other relationships 
with other Arab countries and the way it would be viewed 
by other friends whom we had been pleading with not to make 
sales to the Iranians. 

All of these arguments were set out in great --at 
great length. 

Q Did McFarlane argue the other side? 

A Not a great deal, no. He rarely did that kind of 
thing. I always had a great deal of difficulty knowing 
what either McFarlane meant or where he stood. He was 
very, very close-to-the-vest type of approach in almost 



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everything. 

But he would frequently make points that were designed 
to show that there was another side or things like that. 

Q How about Poindexter? What was his point of view, 
do you recall? 

A I don't think Poindexter spoke very much at meetings 
where McFarlane was present. He was the deputy and he was 
basically a quiet fellow anyway. McFarlane was certainly 
not a flamboyant arguer in favor of this, but he was very -- 
he was — struck me as a person who basically favored it, but 
was not, was not getting too far out in front. 

Q Regan? 

A I think Don was mostly listening at that meeting. 
I don't recall that he had anything very much to say. 

The President also did not have a great deal to say. 
What he said seemed to me to be basically in agreement with th^ ; 
points that George Shultz and I were making. 

He expressed understanding of the noise this would 
cause in other countries. That kind of thing. 

Q Do you recall McMahon speaking out? 

A I think McMahon basically was opposed to it. I 
think he generally took the position that their intelligence 
estimates and their intelligence activities — first, their 
intelligence estimates were basically in agreement with points 
I was making, that we couldn't really expect anything from 



(Ml 



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these people and that the effect on intelligence gathering 
in other countries might be adverse. Something like that. 
My impression was McMahon was against it. 

Q Do you recall — 

A And I also felt the President was against it. 

Q Do you recall raising the issue of legality? 

A Not specif icallv, but I am rather sure that that 
was one of the points that I did make, that you couldn't 
sell arms without congressional approval and that there 
was, indeed, I believed at that time, a — some sort of formal 
boycott or ban on this holding over from the hostage days. 

Q Ban on sales to Iran? 

A Yes. Yes. I was not reading a legal opinion. 

Q Understood. 

A I was freewheeling my own legal opinions. 

Q Forcefully? 

A Oh, I am afraid always, yes. 

Q Now, I need to ask you some very specific questions. 

A All right, 

Q Do you recall the President saying in response to 
your legal arguments that the people would never understand 
it if he failed to release American hostages simply because 
he was worried about breaking the law? 

A No. Not that. 

Q Let me keep going and ask you — because I want to 



ijicliusu::rx 



491 



QNitfeflS^AB^ 



36 



1 give you the whole thing to see if it refreshes your 

2 memory . 

3 A All right. There is no question — start with 

4 this -- no question the President was very, very worried and 

5 very concerned about the hostages being held and always had 

6 been. 

7 He is a very humane man and a person who worries 

8 a great deal about the fate of Americans being held anywhere. 

9 Ther e is no secret about that. He mentioned that not just in 

10 this connection, but at many other meetings. This has always 

11 troubled him very much. 

12 Q Do you remember him saying something to the effect 

13 that he was willing to take that risk and in an undoubtedly 

14 jocular vein visiting days are Wednesdays, or visiting days 

15 are Thursdays? 

16 A No. 

17 Q And let me complete it. Do you recall saying to 

18 him, yes, Mr. President, but the problem is you won't be 

19 alone? 

20 A No. No. There wasn't anything of that kind. I 

21 made the point that it was — at some point, then or in the 

22 January meeting, maybe both, that it was illegal among other 

23 things, but I also talked on the policy aspects of it. I 

24 talked on the effect it would have on our friends. I 

25 talked on the idea that it wouldn't accomplish what we wanted 



1 liilrSi r%Mc<^i ^ if LI VJV 1 1 



492 



y^CWSflfSftiT 



37 



CAS-9 ^ to do in any event because of the kinds of people in Iran. 

2 The only thing that strikes at all a home chord 

3 was that the President at some time, some meeting, said 

* the American people or no one could forgive me if I didn't 

5 do everything possible to get Americans who are held anywhere 

6 released, but it was not in the connection of violating the 

7 law or anything like that. 

8 The phrase I would — the American people would 

9 never understand if I didn't do everything possible, 

10 something along that line, to release, or to get Americans who 

11 are held anywhere in the world freed. 

12 It was more in that general vein. I don't recall 

13 anything about the President ever saying anything about 

14 violating the law. But there were an awful lot of 

15 other meetings. 

16 Maybe somebody else heard that. I didn't hear that. 

17 Q Well, I guess I should say there is a report that 

18 something like that was said and that you replied, yes, 

19 but the problem is you won't be alone. 

20 A No. I don't have any memory of that whatever. 

21 Q I don't know if that was in a jocular vein. 

22 A It doesn't sound like anything anybody would joke 

23 about or anything of that kind. I don't know who your 

24 source is, but in my time in Washington, I have encountered 

25 some extremely unreliable sources. 



493 



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38 



TAS-IO 



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Q 
source. 
A 



I don't think this would qualify as an unreliable 

All right. I don't recall that conversation. 
Okay. Fine. 




Q Anything else about that meeting that you recall? 
A No. Except that the impression I came away from 
that meeting was that the President had understood and 
basically agreed with all of these arguments, still was 
sort of frustrated at not being able to do anything about 
getting the hostages out. There is one other point that is 
extremely sensitive. 

I don't know quite how to make sure that it 
doesn't go any further, because it still is a live possibility 
I will rely on everybody here. 

That is that — 

MR. GARRETT: Mr. Secretary, maybe as a way of 
explaining we could go off the record if it is that sensitive. 

THE WITNESS: I would rather go off the record. 



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MR. NIELDS: Let's go off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. NIELDS: Let's go back on the record. 

We have just been off the record. The Secretary 
indicated while we were off the record that at some 
point during the meeting on the 7t 




MR. SAXON: I believe you said, Mr. Secretary, 
that was also discussed at the January meeting? 

THE WITNESS: I think so, yes. It was mentioned 
two or three times by me. I am pretty sure it was at 
both meetings that it was mentioned. Each time he indicated 
that this is what he would like to do. 

BY MR. NIELDS: 
Q Okay. Anything else you recall about the 
December 7th meeting? 

A No. Except the general impression I had coming 
away from it was that the President had concluded that 
this thing would not work, that arguments that George and I 
made were right, and that he was accepting it and that that 



finished it. 



W»*Wt4 ^CvBinNlB l'tiI 



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I believe I reported that back to very few people 
So far as I know General Powell, when I got back. I 
indicated this little excursion had been finished. I think 
I used the expression that it had been strangled in its 

cradle. 

MR. SAXON: May I ask a couple of quick questions? 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q DO you recall having been given any piece of paper 
by Richard Armitage prior to the December 7th meeting that 
explained the workings of the Arms Export Control Act and 
outlined legal positions? 

A Not specifically, but Mr. Armitage did give me 
advice and background material whenever I requested it. It 
may have been that General Powell had assembled such a 
document in preparation for the meeting. 

I don't have a specific memory of it. 
Q Second, sir — 

A At almost every meeting where we had an idea what 
the agenda was. there would be preparatory material arranged 
for me and given to me by the staff here 
Q 




you recall Mr. Armitage 
telling you that he called Colonel North over for lunch on 



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December 3 and, in fact, asked him, Ollie, who is doing this, 
and Colonel North said, "it is me"? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he report the gist of that? 

A He reported that. I can't tell you what time it 




at some point right in 
that range, he told me that. 

Q He has consulted his calendars and dates it in his 
deposition on December 3rd and says he recalls having briefed 
you before the December 7th meeting? 

A Yes. Colonel North responding as you have just 
said. 

Q Finally, I don't think we got on the record, John, 
the Secretary's statement that the Gaffney point paper — 
you indicated you had not seen it contemporaneously. I 
think you told us off the record also a search of your 
files did not surface this document; is that correct? 
A That is correct, yes. 
MR. SAXON: Thank you. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. NIELDS: 
Q What is the next event you recall in this Iranian 



story? 



I Mn^ uHd0#v ^2PiwfTi 



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yfHeCISSlBtE^ 



42 



CAS-14 1 A A meeting in January. A meeting in January at 

2 which time -- 

3 Where? 

4 A Oval Office, again, I believe. 

5 Q Who was — 

6 A Pretty much the same cast. I believe — 

7 Q McFarlane is now missing. 

8 A Yes. But — he has left the government. Whether 

9 he was at that meeting or not, I don't know. He may very 

10 well still have been at the meeting. Otherwise — and 

11 Mr. Casey was there. 

12 Q Was this something that was on an agenda? 

13 Were you advised in advance? 

14 A No. This was -- well, I am sure we had a day or 

15 so notification of it, although the NSC will call meetings 

16 sometimes at half-an-hour ' s notice or sometimes they will 

17 call them and postpone them for several days. 

18 In any event, I got over there. It was a noticed 

19 meeting of some kind. I don't know whether there was 

20 anything on the agenda or whether a formal agenda circulated 

21 ahead of time or not. 

22 I don't think it was. It was not a NSC meeting. 

23 It was a small group. It was in the Oval Office. 

24 Q Were you aware in advance of what the subject matter 
25 



of the meeting was? 



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fsmfsexsM: 



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CAS-15 1 A Yes, a little bit. I have to confess with some 

2 irritation, because I thought the subject had been finished. 

3 We went over and essentially went through the same points 

4 and same arguments again. 

5 There were various reports of continuing 

6 negotiations as it seemed to me, procrastinations with the 

7 Iranian people, these people they had been meetina with 

8 from time to time. Nothing had happened. 

9 Nothing had come of it. I made the same 

10 arguments I thought as effectively as before or as 

11 ineffectively, certainly as strongly. George Shultz did the 

12 same. 

13 In fact, George Shultz ticked off a whole list of 

14 points. I think he even had some notes and was making very 

15 strong arguments against it with which I told the President 

16 I fully concurred and made my own arguments. 

17 Some of the same points, some others. But this 

18 time the President's reaction was quite different. I got 

19 the strong impression he had concluded he was going to do 

20 it anyway, was going to go ahead with it, had decided he 

21 was going to do it. 

22 I don't know McFarlane or Poindexter said a great 

23 deal, although the points were — again, got the impression 

24 they were basically for it still, although McFarlane was 

25 reporting some troubles he had with some of the Iranians 



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mifsmsass: 



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CAS-16 1 he was dealing with. I think one of the points George Shultz 

2 made was that one of the Iranians was one of the widely 

3 known liars of the Middle East or something. 

4 Q Mr. Ghorbanifar? 

5 A I guess so, yes. About four or five different 

6 names. They all were equally bad as far as I was concerned. 

7 Q Do you know what day this meeting occurred on? 

8 A I think it was January 7th. I think it was -- 

9 I believe that. 

10 Q Your records that you provided to us reflect 

11 that you went to the White House on the 7th, leaving here 

12 at 1046 and returning at 1308. 

13 A Those were undoubtedly correct. They keep very 

14 meticulous watch on me. 

15 Q So the best of your recollection and judgment would 

16 be that it was during that trip to the White House? 

17 A Yes, I believe so. I think it was on January 7th 

18 and as the other meeting had been on December 7th 

19 Q Your calendars also reflect a meeting with 

20 Admiral Poindexter,so far as I could determine it would have 

21 been here, the day before attended by General Powell? 

22 A This would have been January 6th? 

23 Q January 6th? 

24 A It may have been that he came over to talk about the 

25 fact that this was going to be on the agenda of the meeting 



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CAS-17 ^ next day or something. Sometimes he did that, but not 

2 usually. But bear in mind, this was obviously a very 

3 closely held activity at the White House. 

^ He may conceivably have done that. 

5 Q Do you have any recollection of it? 

6 A Not specifically, no. 

7 Q Do you have any recollection of there being 

8 any discussion either in advance of the meeting or during 

9 the meeting of the way in which the transaction would be 
"10 structured? 

11 A This was the January 7th meeting? 

12 Q Yes. 

13 A No. Because at the January 7th meeting, there was 

14 not a formal decision that we were going to do this. I 

15 got a strong impression that the President was leaning that 

16 way and had pretty well concluded that that was what he was 

17 going to do. But we didn't leave that meeting with the 

18 President saying, well, I am going to do this or anything of 

19 that kind. 

20 But I got the strong impression from that meeting 

21 that he was going to do it as I had the strong impression 

22 exactly the other way in December. 

23 Q Do you recall whether Israel was discussed at the 

24 January meeting? 

25 A No. I don't. Though, again, it may very well have 



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been mentioned in the same connection that they had 
interests in Iran also and this would serve their purposes. 
And then there was some discussion of Israel's cooperation 
in some way with it. 

Some joint — I remember making the point that we 
would be — if this came out at all, that there would be 
some additional risk to breaking the confidentiality 
of it because of getting more and more people involved. 

I think Israel was mentioned in that connection. 
I think George Shultz made that same point. 

Q I take it arms was discussed at the meeting? Were 
discussed at the meeting? 

A I think arms were discussed as one of the ways of 
getting this better relationship, yes. 

Q And hostages? 

A The hostages were part of the discussion always. 
The principal benefits that were to come from it were always 
this better relationship with Iran and the need for that and 
that a side benefit, so to speak, or there would be some 
increased possibility of hostages and, of course, the 
President was always very, very concerned, as I have said, 
about hostage — any American being held hostage or kept 
against his will anywhere in the world. 

Q Whose arms were being discussed to your recollection|' 

A Well, I think that we would, as part of the 



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OKSCIIfiSifEiBlr 



1 transaction, there would be -- or part of the way of showing 

2 good faith, I believe is the expression, the way it was 

3 phrased. I had a lot of adverse comments about how you 

4 showed good faith to the Iranians and all. 

5 One of the ways you did that was to transfer 

6 arms because that is what they wanted most. And I think I 

7 made the point, of course, that is what they wanted most, 

8 that is what we had been trying to block all over the world 

9 and things like that. 

10 Q Do you recall — and if you don't recall, that is 

11 fine. But do you recall whether it was U.S. arms direct to 

12 Iran that was being discussed? 

13 A I think they were down at the January meeting to 

14 some specifics about the TOWs. I think that is when I 

15 first — although it conceivably may have been raised by 

16 Poindexter the day before. 

17 But I believe they were now talking about the TOW 

18 missiles in some specifics. 

19 Q Were these U.S. TOW missiles that would be sold 

20 directly to Iran or were these — 

21 A They were U.S. TOW missiles that would go to Iran 

22 and we knew the destination of them, yes. 

23 Q Do you recall any discussion that it would be 

24 Israeli TOW missiles that would go to Iran and U.S. TOW 

25 missiles that would go to Israel? 



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A No. I don't recall that aspect of it. I have seen 
a lot about it since, but to the best of my memory, 
trying to go back and focus on what was discussed at that 
time, I don't have memory about that. But certainly I have 
read a lot about that. 

But there is no doubt McFarlane in the initial 
discussions and I think later John Poindexter all emphasized 
the fact that this was something the Israelis were also 
very interested in and would work with us on, I expressed 
reservations about that as another of the means by which this 
desire to hold this very closely , which obviously was part of 
a whole scheme, would not be able to be realized. 

Q Was it your-- I take it you said it was your 
impression at the end of that meeting that the President was 
now leaning in favor? 

A Yes. Very much so. 

Q But that there had not been a decision reached? 

A That is correct. 

Q Do you recall being told one way or the other 
whether there was a finding? 

A No. No discussion of that. 

Q No discussion of a finding? 

A No discussion of that. 

Q I take it you are reasonably certain of that? 

A Yes. Yes. I didn't know about a finding until 



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very much later. 

Q As you may have heard, there were two findings 
signed, one of them on the 6th of January and one on the 
17th of January? 

A I have heard that, yes. I did not see it for very 
much longer, way past that. And the first one I was shown was 
not signed by the President. It was a blank finding. 

Q What is your next -- what is the next event 
that you recall? 

A The next event is that sometime after this meeting, 
Poindexter, called and said there had been a decision and that 
they were going to send TOWs to Iran as part of this to get 
this better relationship and to show our good faith, show the 
negotiators of Iran that they really -- our people really 
represented the United States. 

And I made a lot of objections and strong protests 
about that and was told that it was a presidential decision 
and that it would be necessary to proceed. 

We then discussed it internally here and concluded 
that the only way that it could be done was to transfer it 
to another agency, to the CIA, which is the way covert 
operations are handled and that it would have to be what I 
called an Economy Act transfer. 

That is to say, that it would have to be a 
transfer to another U.S. Government agency, the CIA, and 



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"AS-22 1 they would pay us the proper value for the TOW missiles and 

2 that they would then do whatever they did or were directed 

3 to do, but that our transfers and everything we did would 

4 be from Defense to CIA only, nothing more, and that we would 

5 have to be paid for them and it would be a legal, normal 

6 transfer of the kind that we make to other agencies on a 

7 reimburseable basis. 

8 Q Now, was this notion of doing it as an Economy 

9 Act transfer and then as an intelligence activity, was that 

10 something that was arrived at after the decision to proceed 

11 or was it — 

12 A Yes. 

13 Q I want to make sure I get the full question on the 

14 record this time. 

15 Was it something that had to be resolved before the 

16 decision could be made? 

17 A To the best of my memory, we didn't consider the 

18 possibility of doing it at all until after the January 7 

19 meeting and after the call from Admiral Poindexter. 

20 And it was at that time that we started to work 

21 out how we would do it, this being a direct Presidential 

22 order. 

23 Q Do you remember exact dates of these calls? 

24 A No. Not really. 

25 Q Okay. I would like to show you some things and 



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see whether it is going to help any. I promised you some 
PROF notes. 

I want to let you look at one. They are in your 
book there . 

Let's mark this exhibit 3. 

(Exhibit No. C.W.W. 3 was marked for identification. 



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TOP SECRET 

UNCLASSIFIED 



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(Discussion off the record.) 
BY MR. NIELDS: 

Q Mr. Secretary, I am putting in front of you a 
document which has been marked Exhibit 3 — rather, it is a 
copy of a document marked Exhibit 3. It is one of the 
so-called PROF notes to Poindexter dated the 15th of January, 
1986. 

A 15th of January? 

Q Yes. That is up in the upper right hand corner. 
It even tells you 101 and 6 seconds. That is the time. 

A Yes. I see. 

Q And it — I will just read into the record the 
beginning of it. "Casey believes Cap will continue to 
create road blocks until he is told by you that the 
President wants this to move now" — in capital letters -- 
"and that Cap will have to make it work. Casey points out 
that we have now gone through three different methodologies 
in an effort to satisfy Cap's concerns and that no matter 
what we do there is always a new objection. As far as Casey 
is concerned, our earlier method of having Copp deal 
directly with the DOD as a purchasing agent was fine. He did 
not see any particular problem with making Copp an agent for 
the CIA in this endeavor, but he is concerned that Cap will 
find some new objection unless he is told to proceed." 

That raises a number of questions I want to ask you. 



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One is, do you have any recollection of different 
methodologies being tried out on you and you objecting to 
each one? 

A Well, I don't have any very specific -- this 
certainly is an interesting note. I hadn't seen this one 
before. 

I think there was a proposal that we simply transfer 
these to Iran directly or that we give them to somebody 
who would do that directly, and I had some legal work going on 
and had some staff work going on and was pointing out 
that -- all the objections and all the problems to that and 
that we had really no way in which we would sell to Iran and 
that we could — my advice was that we could sell to a 
government agency, the CIA, that we did covert operations 
this way. That is to say, when we had a regular covert 

16 operation involving maybe one of a number of countries that 

17 were all covered by findings and all, that we would transfer 

18 to the CIA and that they would then carry out the covert 

19 finding. 

20 But I guess I was as recalcitrant here as Casey 

21 points out. I don't know. I didn't know about this. I don't 

22 know who Copp is. 

23 Q That was going to be my next question. That is 

24 General Secord. - - 

25 A I never heard of Copp. 



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Q That was a code name for General Secord. Were you 
aware that General Secord was involved in this thing at that 
time? 

A No, not really. At some point, Mr. Armitage 
told me that Secord, whom I had not seen really since he 
retired from the Army, from the Air Force, was going to be 
one of the agents he used or something of that kind, and — 
but I don't remember the time at which he did this. 
I know he was helping out — Armitage, whom I have the greatest 
faith and confidence, and who worked with General Powell 
very closely on this, was one of the other people -- only other 
people in the Department who knew about it because of the 
White House desires to hold it so closely. 

He advised me he had found out Secord was going to 
be involved in some way or the other. 

16 Q Did ~ 

17 A I made the continued position that the only thing 

18 I thought would do it would be to sell it to the CIA and let 

19 the CIA deal with them as they did with other covert 

20 activities. 

21 Q what this PROF note implies is that somebody wants 

22 this transaction to happen? 

23 A Oh, yes. 

24 Q And that you are making legal objections? 

25 A Yes. 



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You were telling them no, you can not do it? 

That is right. 

They try another way, and you still say you can not 



Q 

A 

Q 
do It? 

A Very recalcitrant. 

Q That is also illegal. 

Now, is it — again, ycu may not have a 
recollection on this, but is it your recollection that this 
time period in which you are raising legal road blocks, as 
they call it, was after a decision in principle had been made 
to go forward or before? 

A To the best of my knowledge, after the January 17th 
meeting, the first — 



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Q Do you mean seventh? 

A The seventh meeting. The first time we learned 
there was an actual decision was when Poindexter called 
and told me that that had happened and my memory is that 
that was around the 17th, the 18th, something of that 
kind, at which point I got General Powell in and told him 
that apparently ^hat order is to be done. I was very 
unhappy with it. 

Q Let me show you another one. 
A All right. 

(Exhibit No. CWW-4 was 
marked for identification.) 
THE WITNESS: This is January 15th? 
BY MR. NIELDS: 
Q I put in front of you a copy of a PROF note 
from North to Poindexter that has been marked Exhibit 4. 
It is the same day but later in time. It is about 6:37 p.m. 
that this note is written. 

At the bottom of the note, it says, "In 
accordance with instructions have invited Secretary 
Weinberger to meet with Casey in your office at 1700 on 

Thursday." 

I should tell you that Thursday is the 16th 
of January. So it is the next day. 

As you can see, it is all on the subject again 



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of the TOWs and the hostages. 

A The Israelis are very, very concerned they can't 
make a delivery of the TOWs without a promise to replenish, 
et cetera, et cetera. The Israelis may withdraw. 
I never saw it before. 

Q No. I am sure you hadn't seen it. 

Again, I'm simply seeing whether this refreshes 
your memory and we can piece the events together using 
these documents . 

Exhibit 3 has North telling Poindexter that 
somebody is going to have to tell you to stop raising 
roadblocks and then later in the day, apparently he has 
received instructions to have you come down and meet with 
him and Casey the next day at 5:00 in the afternoon. 

A Yes. Which would have been January 16th. 

Q January 16th. 

A What do my diaries show? 

Q Your diaries show at 5:00 p.m., you saw — well, 
your handwritten calendars, which are prospective, as I 
understand it, show a 5:00 meeting with Poindexter. 
Your actuals — 

A Rubbed out everything on the handwritten notes 
on the calendars. Keeps getting rubbed out 22 times. 

Q This one looks like it occurred. You left for 
the White House at 1615 and returned at 1856. 



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A All right. Then I wouldn't challenge that for a 
moment . 

Q So it looks as though you did go down and actually 
have a meeting with Poindexter? 

A It does, yes. 

Q It looks as though from Poindexter 's point of view 
the purpose of the meeting was to somehow or other remove 
you as a roadblock or convince you that -- 

A Well, I would -- that may very well have been 
the place at which the formal Presidential decision was 
conveyed to me . I don't know. It wasn't so much a road- 
block. I was simply saying that we weren't going to do 
this in the way that if we had to do it at all, we weren't 
going to do it in any way that was illegal. 

Q Illegal? 

A I didn't know we had any direction to do it 
until Poindexter -- my impression was that Poindexter 
telephoned me and he may have telephoned before this 
meeting. That's the way I learned about it. But this 
would indicate that I attended a meeting in his office, 
which I did from time to time. Frequently Mr. Casey was 
there and so on. 

Q I should tell you we have some other information 
and nothing is unimpeachable in this world, but we have 
other infornation that Mr. Sporkin, who was the CIA General 



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Counsel, attended that meeting? 

A With Mr. Casey? 

Q Yes. On the 16th? 

A All right. 

Q And with you. And that it was at that meeting 
that it was determined to use the Economy Act and the 
finding as a way of solving the — 

A To the best of my memory, the Economy Act was 
my idea. I was familiar with it from 0MB days. It seemed 
to me that this was important for the Department to be 
reimbursed for any transfers and that that was one of the 
requirements of transferring from one agency to another. 
I don't remember meeting with Mr. Sporkin, but 
it is perfectly possible he was there with — was Mr. Shultz 
at this meeting? 

Q We have no evidence that he was there. 

A In any event -- 

Q Mr. Sporkin — 

A There was an insistence on my part, which I 
remember repeating many times , that we had to — it had to 
be an Economy Act transfer and it should be just to CIA. 

Q Sporkin has a recollection that you took the 
final proposal back with you and said you wanted it -- to 
run it past your lawyers? 

A That sounds right. 



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60 

Q As the record now reflects, it was on the 17th 
that the finding that was actually used was finally signed. 

A I didn't see it. 

Q I take it you can't be sure whether, as you say, 

the decision to proceed was communicated to you on the 
16th or the 17th or earlier? 

A No. No, it was in that general time. 

Q I think you've put it as a fact that it was 
communicated to you that this was a requirement? 

A A decision of the President. 

Q Yes. 

A Yes. 

Q Does that — is it normal that decisions are 
communicated to you in that fashion? 

A It's not abnormal. No. Sometimes you get a 
decision paper. Sometimes you get an oral report of it 
and I knew that Mr. Poindexter met with the President 
every day and I knew he'd never lied to me before. 

Q No, I am sorry. I am not asking my question 
correctly. 

What I am getting at is, is there a distinction 
in your mind between a requirement that DoD do something and 
a request that it do something? 

A Well, not when I'm told the President ordered 
it. 



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1 Q So any time the President makes a decision, it 

2 would be a requirement in your mind? 

3 A Yes. That's right. We also had this general 

4 view at that meeting -- and as I said and recall, Mr. Sporkin 

5 wasn't there — the general view at that meeting was this 

6 was the only way it could be done. I did as you mentioned. 

7 I said. Well, I want to consider that further and see if our 

8 people are in agreement. 

9 Q Do you recall an issue with regard to the price 

10 that the Israelis would pay for DoD TOWs? 

11 A No. 

12 Q Do you recall an event in which Noel Koch came 

13 to your office in early to mid January and indicated that 

14 he had just met with the Israeli purchasing agent at 

15 National Airport and had negotiated a good price on the 

16 TOWs? 

17 A No. No, I don't. 

18 MR. SAXON: This would have been a meeting at 

19 which General Powell and Secretary Taft were also present. 

20 THE WITNESS: Don't have any memory of that. 

21 I don't recall Noel Koch being very actively in this or 

22 at least at meetings. It may be that General Powell used 

23 him from time to time, but discussions I had were primarily 

24 with, as far as I can recall, with General Powell and 
25 



Richard Armitage 



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BY MR. NIELDS: 
Q Do you recall -- does it ring any bell -- 
A Are you talking all the time now about sales to 
the Israelis? 

Q I ?m talking about sales, as you can see from 
these PROF notes, there is apparently a discussion at this 
time of the Israelis selling to the Iranians and the U.S. 
replenishing the Israelis? 

A Yes. I think I raised objections. Maybe this 
is one of those roadblocks I was supposed to have been 
throwing into the thing. But my feeling about that was, 
as I've mentioned to you earlier, that the Export Control 
Act doesn't permit a blanket approval in advance or anything 
of that kind and does not permit exports, did not permit 
exports to Iran, neither that Act nor some others, and did 
not permit the Israelis to export anything we hadn't 
specifically authorized. 

Q So if Israel had earlier purchased weapons 
from the United States under the Arms Export Control Act 
and not pursuant to an intelligence activity, your position 
was that the law forbade them to transfer them to any third 
country without going through various kinds of waivers 
and reporting requirements? 
A Yes. Right. 



And -- 



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A You said the law what? The law did not permit? 

Q Did not permit. Forbade is the word I used. 

A Yes. 

Q My question is, do you recall that there was one 
of the problems that was -- that came up in connection with 
dealing through the Israelis was price? 

A I really don't, no. I don't have a memory of 
that. That's not to say that wasn't the case, but I don't 
have any memory of it. 

Q Understood. 

Now, your calendars also reflect a meeting with 
Casey but not McFarlane early on the morning of the 17th. 
Do you have any recollection of that? 

A Was this Friday? Was this Friday? 

MR. GARRETT: It would have been Friday the 17th. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. We have a regular Friday 
breakfast with the CIA every Friday morning. 
BY MR. NIELDS: 

Q You have no particular reason to suspect the 
subject of arms came up during that meeting? 

A No. They were all very anxious to have this 
so closely held. I don't recall any of this -- this coming 
up at one of our regular breakfasts. Regularly on Friday, 
one week at the CIA, one week down here, we would meet 



for breakfast. 



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•J Q I take it oi^ce the decision to proceed under the 

2 Economy Act and a finding had been made and had been 

3 communicated to you that the President had made his decision, 

4 you implemented it? 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q Did you other than giving instructions to your 

7 subordinates at the very outset that weapons should be made 

8 available to CIA and DoD should be compensated for them, did 

9 you have any further involvement in the — in any of the 
10 mechanics of supplying the weapons? 

A No. I discussed with Colin Powell whether we 
had the stocks to do this, what would be left, whether we 
are depleting the stocks, what effect it would have on 
readiness. And emphasized that we were to be fully 
reimbursed and that the transfer was to be the CIA and 



11 
12 
13 
14 

15 

^g the CIA only. 

As far as I know, the matter then proceeded. 

Q were you aware one way or the other whether the 
18 




[had been utilized? 
A No. The only people who knew about this was -- 
that I knew of were General Powell and Richard Armitage . 
I may have known Koch had been involved or had been 
mentioned at one meeting, but I don't recall his being 
particularly pres ent at any of them. 

But the^^^^^^^^kw^W"'"^^^'-"^ 






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different. The^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^H had been up by me 
internally, informally, to make sure that a situation that 
had arisen in the Army earlier was not repeated. 




There were then charges that some of the money 
had been diverted, improperly used. In the course of 
investigating that and finding out what kind of internal 
controls and audits and approvals were required, I found 
that we had put in a system under which the Vice Chief of 
Staff of the Army and others would have to pass upon these 
requests, that nobody could task the Army and the Army 
couldn't -- intelligence people couldn't come and task the 
Army comptroller and say we need blank dollars for a covert 
purpose. That there had to be prior understandings and 
approvals within the Department. 

Some people started to call that a I 
I don't quite know why. That was for this one 
particular purpose, and it was applicable to all services. 

It was to make sure that there weren't actions 
being taken and funds being handed out to — for so-called 
intelligence activities without any oversight or overview. 



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And in this case, this was a decision by the President that 
there were to be sales made and our decision that they were 
to be made to the CIA and with full reimbursement and there 
wasn't any need to refer anything to anybody or anything 
of the kind. 

Q Did there come a time or was there any time when 
either you or the Department, to your knowledge, was asked 
for an assessment of the military consequences in terms of 
Iran and Iraq of supplying weapons? 

A I think I raised that and discussed it generally 
with General Powell and I think Mr. Casey, in his presen- 
tations, in his arguments in the Oval Office meetings, 
basically in support of this whole proposition, made the 
point that there would not be any significant impact on 
the military capabilities. It was not a major issue, but 
the fact was understood that these were obsolete weapons, 
that they are no longer in production, and that there were 
not a great many of them involved and that it was not -- 
it was not anything which would add significantly to the 
military capability. 

The point was made frequently that they were -- 
the old production line had stopped — they were no longer 
being made, and that they didn't add very much. 

Q I take it there was no formal study or assess- 
ment done at the DoD or asked for by the White House? 



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A Not that I know of. 

Q Now, when the newspaper articles began in November 
of 1986 on the subject of this initiative, did you partici- 
pate in any discussions with others outside of DoD as to 
how the publicity ought to be handled? 

A There was a meeting in the Oval Office sometime 
in November. Let's see. 

(Exhibit No. CWW-5 was 
marked for identification.) 
THE WITNESS: Well, it was ~ I don't know. It 
was sometime in late November. I guess shortly after 
this. There was a meeting. 
BY MR. NIELDS: 

Q I have a document here which I have marked as 
Exhibit 5. My first question is, does that document 
record the meeting that you were just about to testify 
about? 

A Well, this says November 10, but where did this 
come from? 

Q It was provided to us by — 

A Oh, this is my own notes of this meeting. Yes. 
This is a meeting at which I made notes. This would be 
it. That's correct. Yes. Yes. I remember that intro- 
duction. I dictated this. 

Q Good. Well, actually the best thing would be 



HHMWTl_ IVV^d^^^^^nrn 



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1 for you to say simply what you remember about the meeting? 

2 A On the basis of this memorandum, which I dictated 

3 after the meeting, I -- what took place at the meeting is 

4 what is reflected here in the memorandum here. 

5 Do you have a recollection of what the central 

6 focus of the discussion was? 

7 A Well — 

8 Q Was it a question of how fully to report the 

9 facts to the public at the time? 

10 A No. I think it was primarily to deal with these 

11 reports that were coming out of the Mideast which I guess 

12 had all been foreseen as one of the reasons for not doing 

13 it and more or less bringing everybody up to date. There 

14 had been no — the hostages had not been released and we 

15 had a disclosure there had been a finding made then. 

16 Poindexter continued that we assisted Israel initially 

17 because we found Israel was sending arms to Iran| 
fg ^^^^^^^^^nnd also wanted the Iran-Iraq war to end as 

19 soon as possible. 

20 McFarlane went to Iran in May. There — a lot 

21 of this was the first time I had heard of that. Worked 

22 througt^^^^^^^Hsf Rafsanjani. Previously we used an 

23 Israeli agent called Ghorbanifar. 

24 "^^^^H^^^^^^^lothers proved no good because 

25 the Iranians always insisted that the Dckwa prisoners held 



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by Kuwait be released. We finally did authorize release 
of 500 TOWs sold by Israel to Iran." 

Someone was giving the formal permission to 
Israel to re-export, I gather. 

"I reminded John Poindexter he had always told 
me that there would be no more weapons sent to Iran, after 
the first 500 TOWs from us until after all of the hostages 
were returned, but unfortunately we did send a second 500 
because it 'seemed the only way to get the hostages out,' 
according to Poindexter." 

The memorandum goes on and speaks for itself. 

Q Well, it does speak for itself. 

A This is — this was my recollection of the 
meeting recorded right after the meeting. 

Q There appears onthe basis of the memorandum to 
be — to have been some issue of how fully the facts should 
be disclosed at the time. 

A I think there was a lot of talk about how — 

Q I think you seemed to be arguing that there are 
going to be congressional hearings anyway and that we will 
just get blackmailed by selective bits of information. 

A Yes. 

Q Do you have any recollection of that as being an 
issue that arose? 

A I used that term, I think. I think there was 



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also the problem of whether or not this source was any 
good in Iran and whether he would be -- he or they would be 
endangered by our admitting the allegations in the article. 
That's what this seems to say here. 

Mr. Shultz felt the Israelis sucked us up into 
their operation so we could not object to their sales to 
Iran . 

Q Did there ever come a time -- did you have any 
other discussions with officials outside of the Department 
of Defense on the subject of what should be said about the 
Iranian initiative? 

A No. No. Until these articles appeared, the 
basic statements and requirements, rules, had been laid 
down by the White House that there wasn't to be anything 
said about it. 

Q I mean other discussions after the articles 
started to come out? 

A After the articles? Well, no. I think just more 
along this line and again going back to Poindexter and 
expressing unhappiness that so much had happened that we 
hadn't heard anything about, things like that. 

Q Did — were you ever sent a copy of proposed 
testimony by Mr. Casey? 

A In connection with this? 

Q Yes. 




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A No. I don't think so. 
Q Were you ever sent — 
A I don't believe so. 

Q Were you ever sent, to your recollection, 
chronologies prepared by the people at the NSC, after-the- 
fact chronologies? 

A Now I read that they had done that, that they 
had prepared such a chronology. I don't believe that — 
when I talked to the Senate Intelligence Committee, which 
I believe was the first one that I talked to, I didn't 
have any of that — anything of that kind. I don't have 
any memory of it; I did read they had prepared chronologies. 

(Exhibit No. CWW-6 was 
marked for identification.) 
BY MR. NIELDS: 
Q Mr. Secretary, I am putting in front of you a 
document marked Deposition Exhibit No . 6 . It is a letter -- 
a copy of a letter. It appears to be a letter from you 
to Secretary Shultz with a memo attached. 
My first question is — 
A "Attached is a memorandum about which I feel 
very strongly. I think the memo discusses a very bad 
business. I hope we will have an NSPG to prevent what I 
see is sxibstantial further damage that can come to the 
administration in the continuation of the same practices 



mx. 




I nil 



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that have caused so much of the trouble we are experiencing 
now. 

"It is particularly unfortunate the State 
Department's public statements are now denying that we are 
continuing contacts with the Iranian government through 
third-country representatives, \.-hich is true only in the 
most technical sense of terms, and which I am afraid will 
cause further adverse reactions when the truth is known." 

This is a memorandum of mine of December 22 
attached to this. 

Q I take it the front page of Exhibit 6 is a copy 
of a letter from you to Secretary Shultz? 

A Yes, indeed. Right. 

Q The attachment is a memorandum also by you? 

A Yes. 

Q Which relates to it? 

A Yes. It is signed by me. 

Q It raises vigorous objection both to continuing 
meetings with Iranians and to the fact that you have not 
been advised of it? 

A I was astounded therefore to learn on Friday, 
December 19, after my testimony to the congressional 
committee, we had stopped all of this, that U.S. nego- 
tiators were still meeting with the same Iranians. I 
learned this not from our State Department or from anyone 



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was finally advised we did 
have a negotiacor, namely Mr. Raphael of the State Depart- 
ment probably negotiating with the same elements in the 

Iranian group. 

"I was told that we were no longer talking with 
them about selling them arms and I hope this is true, but 
I have no way of knowing if it is." 

This was a memorandum from me to the then acting 
National Security Adviser, Mr. Al Keel. 

Yes. This is my memorandum and my letter. 
Q I take it just in substance, it raises objec- 
tion to both the fact that you were excluded from the 
process and to the fact that the process was going on? 

A The process was going on. The exclusion wasn't 
the problem. The problem was that I testified to the 
direct contrary on the Senate committee that we had stopped 
all this and then learned that some of it was still going 

on. 

"I am sorry to be so blunt about it, but it seems 
to me to be incredibly wrong that the precise mechanisms 
of secrecy and attempts to exclude advisers who, it is 



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feared, may have different views, which helped cause so many 
of our present difficulties, are apparently being pursued 
by the State Department at this time. 

"I have now learned, thanks to your forthcomingness 
with me, and by reason of our investigations, that McFarlane 
had actually offered the Iranians sensitive intelligence 
information, passed by the U.S. as to Iraq, and that State 
plans another meeting with the Iranians on December 27 
in Geneva. I urgently urge no such meetings be per- 
mitted . . . " so on and so on. 
Yes. 
Q Do you recall learning at some point that^^^^H 
^^^^^|or some people connected with^^^^^^^^H provided 
funds for the contras? 

A No. I don't have any memory of any contra 
funding or of anything connected with ^^^^^^^H that I 
can remember now. 

What have you got? 

MR. NIELDS: Let's mark it. 

(Exhibit No. CWW-7 was 
marked for identification.) 
BY MR. NIELDS: 
Q I know it is difficult to read. I have marked 
as Exhibit 7 a memorandum for the record from the CIA 
dealing with a — 



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A From the CIA? 

Q Yes. This is — in fact, John McMahon wrote the 
memo. There are a number of topics blanked out, but on the 
second page, the last sentence, it says, "In closing, the 
Secretary" — and tha t would appear to be you — "stated 

that he ^'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^H^ 

had earmarked $25 million for the contras in $5 million 

increments . " 

A I don't have any memory of that. This is a 
note from whom to whom? 

Q This is a memorandum from John McMahon to the 
file relating to a breakfast meeting with you and the 
deputy secretary of Defense on the 15th of March, 1985. 

A "The Secretary stated he had heard that^^^^HH 
had earmarked $25 million." 

I have no memory of it. I don't know what the 
basis for that would have been. 

Q Would — could that possibly have come to you — 
A What was the date of this? 
Q Fifteen March, 1985. 

MR. GARRETT: Fifteen March, 1985. 
THE WITNESS: Fifteen March, '85? 
BY MR. NIELDS: 
Q Yes. 
A I just don't remember that at all. This is 



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long before any of this other. I don't have any memory 

of it. 

Q This is a little over two years ago now. 

A Y es. 

Q i^^^^^^Vsomeone that you spoke to from time 

to time? 

A From time to ti 




A Yes. Yes. We — I don't know what time it was. 
I can get that from our r« 




Q Was^^^^^rfinvolved in the negotiating process? 
I am sure he ^^^^^^^^^H^| 

I guess, at that time. 

Q Do you recall there being any discussion about 
funding for the contras arising in connection with the 



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Q Do you maintain or does anyone maintain on your 
behalf any kinds of records of telephone conversations, 
for example? 

A Oh, I think the offices does, yes. They keep 
records of telephone conversations. I mean, they have 
records of people to whom they go. 

Q Right. 

A I think they do have that. I think they are 
comparable to these records you have shown me about the -- 
my whereabouts from time to time. 

Q That would be very helpful, particularly in 
that November, '85, time frame. 

A All right. Let's take a look. Who do you want 
to see if I called? 

Q Either people in the NSC? 

A November, '85? 

Q Yes. 

A Or '86? 



'85. 



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1 A November, '85. All right. 

2 Q In particular, I think it would be useful if 

3 there is -- if there is a -- if there is such a log or 

4 records to have it for the same time frame that we have 

5 these appointment calendars, but that's the time period 

6 that is of greatest inte<.est to us , I would say. 

7 A November, '85? 

8 MR. GARRETT: John, may I make a comment for 

9 the record? We have requested telephone logs. We talked 

10 to C&D? 

11 MR. SHAPIRO: Executive secretariat. 

12 MR. GARRETT: They advised us in writing the 

13 memo telephone logs were not maintained. That's why they 

14 were not produced. 

15 We will go back and visit that issue. It should 
15 go on the record that that was a reply we received. 

17 THE WITNESS: I — 

IS MR. SHAPIRO: Is that accurate? 

•J9 THE WITNESS: I am told that lists of — I am 

20 very, very — try to be meticulous about returning calls. 

21 I think there may be some kind of record kept of calls 

22 that need to be returned or something like that. I don't 

23 have any memory of it. I have not seen it. 

24 BY MR. NIELDS: 

25 



Okay. How about — 






534 



79 

1 A I hadn't seen a lot of these whereabouts sheets 

2 before all this either. 

3 Q We have gone over a number of meetings? 

4 A Yes. 

5 Q Of course, your recollection is better on some 

6 and fainter on others. 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q Is there any way that you have of making a 

9 record of the highlights of meetings of this nature? 

10 A Now? 

11 Q No, then. 

12 A No. There wasn't. I did dictate a memorandum 

13 on this particular one, but I've often said that I under- 

14 stand that Henry Kissinger made a memo of every meeting he 

15 ever attended and that enabled him to write his book 

16 rapidly. I wish I had done that with day one of the 

17 administration. I am usually getting ready for the next 

18 meeting and don't have time to write these memorandums. 

19 I took notes about this one and dictated this memorandum 

20 because it seemed to be important. 

21 Q Do you ever take notes that are not dictated 

22 or make jottings when you get back? 

23 A Yes, occasionally, but comparatively rarely. 

24 I don't know we kept those in any formal way. I don't 

25 think they have been filed or labeled. My handwriting is 



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UNCLA 



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1 notoriously bad. I have trouble even reading it myself. 

2 Occasionally take a few notes, but not really very often. 

3 Q If there is any chance there are -- 

4 A I think we made this examination and whatever 

5 there is is in our so-called C&D, correspondence and 

6 directives. They have been asked to paw through every- 

7 thing. 

8 Q Do you ever give something by the way of 

9 debriefing or briefing to aides? 

10 A Yes. 

11 Q Immediately following a meeting of this nature? 

12 A Yes. And did so on a couple of these matters. 

13 With General Powell, particularly, where we came back and 

14 were told that we had to make this sale and so on by 

15 Presidential direction. Yes. We do that on other occa- 

16 sions when action is called for usually. 

17 Q Would he have, as a practice, make a record of 
•J8 what you tell him? 

19 A I don't know. We had the meetings. What I 

20 told him was always done. So in one way or the other, 

21 he either had a very good memory or he was able to 

22 accomplish these things. 

23 Q Are you aware of any other potential source of - 

24 that might be — have made a record that might supplement 

25 your memory of some of these meetings? 



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A Well, I don't really think of anything. We 
could paw through everything again. We have done that, I 
think, pretty well. 

MR. SABA: Is there a record of all people who 
come to your office, day and time? 

THE WITNESS: There may very well be. 

MR. SABA: So if someone passed through the 
front office, there would be a record of somebody passing 
through the front office? 

THE WITNESS: There may very well be. I have 
not seen it. But they may keep records out there. 

BY MR. NIELDS: 
Q I didn't see anyone making a record of us coming 
in today. 

A Well, that would be the acid test. 

MR. NIELDS: Well, I have nothing further. 

I very much appreciate your responses. I think 
that the Senate counsel, and I don't know whether our 
Minority has any questions. 

MR. GENZMAN: Just a couple of quick ones. 



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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 
THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. GENZMAN: 

Q Mr. Secretary, I heard you say earlier there 
was no formal assessment done on the possible effect of 
this weapons transfer. Was any required to be done xn 
your opinion? 

A I was not asked for one. In the normal course 
I would not have been. That would go to — a request like 
that would go to the CIA. When I say formal assessment, 
I mean obviously a formal product of the Intelligence 
Community. We discussed it informally here. I discussed 
it with General Powell, I believe with Mr. Armitage in an 
informal way, and was advised that because of the age and 
basic lack of capability of these weapons, there wasn't a 
significant military advantage. But that was not an 
intelligence assessment by any means and I don't know of 
any — whether there was any formal request made to the 
CIA for that or not. I do not know of any. 

Q Also, sir, regarding Exhibit 6, I heard you say 
that you raised objections to the fact that there were 
continuing negotiations with the Iranians. 

A Yes. Yes. 

Q Because you had testified to the contrary? 

A Oh, yes. That's the letter to Mr. Shultz. 



538 



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Q To Mr. Shultz. 

A Here it is. 

Q Just so the record is clear, at the time you 
testified to the contrary, did you have any knowledge of 
these continuing negotiations? 

A Oh, no. No. That was my point. I said I had 
assumed -- when the President announced in late November 
or early December all further arms shipments had ceased 
and after it became apparent the channels we were using 
to discuss hostage releases and other matters with the 
Iranians were at the very least ineffective and, as is 
easily apparent now, totally counterproductive, I had 
assumed we were finished with that entire Iranian episode 
and so testified to the congressional committees during 
last week. 

I was astounded, therefore, to learn on Friday, 
December 19 after my testimony, the negotiators were still 
meeting with the Iranians. 
No. 

Q You had no knowledge of any negotiations of 
any sort? 

A I thought finally we had finished with them. 
MR. GENZMAN: Thank you. I have no further 
questions . 



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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q We have been talking about things provided and 
things that haven't. Your calendars which have been 
referred to today and entered as exhibits by the House 
were something the Senate has asked for since early April. 
I believe the date was April 4. They have yet to be 
provided . 

Just for the record, I think that should be 
noted. 

A I thought this was a joint operation. 
Q We have not received them, sir. It would have 
been useful for this purpose. 

MR. SHAPIRO: For the record, the materials 
you requested on April 4 are different from the materials 
that the House requested late last week, and which were 
provided yesterday. 

MR. SAXON: The materials on April 4 asked for 
all diaries, calendars, et cetera. 

MR. SHAPIRO: They were strictly limited by 
subject matter. I think rather than further discussing 
it here, we can resolve it later. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Mr. Secretary, were you informed in January 



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of '86 by either General Powell or Noel Koch that Mr. Koch 
was involved in negotiating price for the TOW missiles with 
the Israelis up from a level that Michael Ledeen negotiated 
at $2500? 

A No. No. I have no memory of that at all nor 
of Mr. Ledeen until much later. 

Q Were you informed that Mr. Koch had negotiated 
the price up to $4500? 

A No. 

Q Do you recall a meeting in your office with 
Secretary Taft, General Powell, and Mr. Koch in which the 
legality of this operation was discussed, the transfer of 
the TOWs? This would be January, '86, sir. 

A January, ' 86? 

Q Yes, sir. 

A No, not really. As a matter of fact, I don't 
recall any meetings with Mr. Taft on the subject. But 
I raised legal questions myself and we were told that the 
transfer to the CIA under the Economy Act and all — had 
information that that was a legal way and indeed so far as 
my memory is concerned, that was the only legal way the 
matter could be done. 

Q Do you recall Mr. Koch asking you if anyone 
could go to jail because of this operation? 



No. 



[JAIP-I flgglUFJl. 

mrm-NUiiivjiFrfi 



541 



21 



86 



1 Q Do you recall telling him -- 

2 A I don't recall Mr. Koch being that heavily 

3 involved in this at all. I think General Powell had talked 

4 with him once or twice, but I don't recall — I don't 

5 recall his being active in the thing at all. 

6 Q No discussion alou^ those lines that you recall? 

7 A No. Nothing with regard to that, no. 

8 Q With regard to the decision to use the Economy 

9 Act, Mr. Nields asked you some questions in the January, 

10 '86, time frame about how that decision might have been 

11 made . 

12 A Yes. 

13 Q Do you recall having been provided any input 

14 from either General Powell or Noel Koch to the effect that 

15 when the numbers of missiles that were being requested 
15 were looked at and the prices were looked at, that there 

17 was no way that these could be provided under the $14 

18 million threshold for purposes of reporting to Congress? 

19 A Well, it was apparent that that -- that the 

20 value of the weapons systems was such as that, but there 

21 was an oral opinion from the Attorney General given to the 

22 President in my hearing that these rules basically didn't 

23 apply, that there were other Presidential authority that 

24 existed, that he could use to make these kinds of transfers. 

25 Q This would have perhaps been a discussion before 



liMfvTul^MriJpUiMn 



542 



0f^A^ff«^ 



87 



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those decisions were reached. 

Internally, when the Pentagon was taking a look 
at what was available and what the price would be, was 
there a decision made that the best way to go was the 
Economy Act and to transfer these TOWs to the CIA because 
that woula eliminate the need to notify Congress? 

A No. The reason for the sale to the CIA as 
opposed to Iran was because that that was the way in which 
covert activities were handled and that that was the way 
that was recommended as the proper way to do this and the 
legal way to do it, and my memory is that I am the one 
who urged the use of the Economy Act and that we would have 
to be reimbursed the value of these by CIA and it would 
be our sale to them that would be a straightforward sale 
to them, and that they would have to pay us and that would 
end it as far as we were concerned. 

Q Mr. Secretary, do you recall telling General 
Powell that you thought the Israelis were — or that 
intermediaries were making a killing on the TOW missiles? 

A No. 

Q Meeming that they were making a profit? 

A No. This whole business obviously came up 
later in all the discussions, and I read about it in the 
papers and all of that. There wasn't any discussion I 
remember of any kind other than the fact that we had to 



(IMAMlAfiKiFiE^ 



543 



23 



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get value, not more value or anything else, certainly not 
less, but value for the TOWs and that that was being nego- 
tiated by our people in the Army who owned the TOWs and the 
CIA and that this was not all that unusual, that in support 
of other covert actions and operations, that was the way 
the transfers had been made. 

Q Sir, with regard to the January 17 finding. 
Presidential Finding, do you have any recollection of 
whether you were involved in recommending that the words 
"third party" be inserted into the finding? 

A No. The finding I didn't see until very much 
later and I did not know of its actual existence, to the 
best of my memory. I was told about it -- when I was told 
about it sometime, oh, maybe as late as April or something 
of that kind, they — the one that was shown to me , I 
believe by Mr. Keel -- I am not sure -- was not signed by 
the President. And I made that point. 

He said, "Well, this is just an office copy." 

Q Do you recall being told by Admiral Poindexter 
in mid May of 1986 that Mr. McFarlane was to be going to 
Tehran? 

A Mid May of '86? 

Q Yes, May 19. Do you have any recollection that 
you knew about the McFarlane Tehran trip before it took 



place; 



rprvtr crr^T? rnn 



544 



ffMi^iniff 



89 



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7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

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18 

19 

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22 

23 

24 

25 



A No. No. There was a -- there was a discussion 
afterwards and McFarlane in that post-meeting discussion, 
post-trip discussion, to the best of my memory, indicated 
it had been very unsatisfactory and unsuccessful. 

Q Who do you recall having that discussion with? 

A I think that was a report that McFarlane was 
giving. Whether it was in the President's office or not, 
I don't remember. Some kind of gathering such as that. 

Q Sir, I believe it is correct that Admiral Crowe, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was not know- 
ledgeable of the Iranian initiative and the TOWs and Hawk 
repair parts to Iran; is that correct? 

A That is correct. To the best of my knowledge. 
He may have known about it. I did not talk with him about 
it. 

Q Do you recall when he found out about this in 
late June or early July of 1986 and coming to see you to 
register his dissatisfaction at not having been brought in: 

A No. Not in that form. I don't remember when 
he knew about it. 

Our instructions from the President were to 
hold the thing very closely and not to involve anybody 
or bring anybody in who hadn't been in the original 
discussions. It was not an operational matter in the 
sense that it would have involved the Joint Chiefs and 



UN€i>A&Sif«^f)r 



545 



25 



Mim^ 



90 



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it was -- they were not, in a sense, not authorized to 
discuss it. I don't recall any time at which he came and 
complained about that. 

I think it was in November when the first article 
appeared and when the discussions were held. 

Q I believe I am correct in saying that in early 
November of 1986 -- and you wouldn't necessarily have any 
independent knowledge of this -- Secretary Shultz cabled 
Admiral Poindexter saying that these matters, once it began 
to be known about the Iran initiative and arms to Iran, 
that these should be publicly disclosed. 

Do you recall a phone call from Admiral Poindexter 
that was triggered by Secretary Shultz' cable in which 
Admiral Poindexter sought your opinion on that? 

A Yes, I do remember something about that. I 
don't remember what the outcome was, but I remember he 
called and George Shultz was overseas and he had — he was 
I guess responding to a suggestion there should be a full 
publication or something of that kind. 

Q If I told you there's at least one account that 
says you counseled a closed-mouth strategy on this to 
Admiral Poindexter, would that sound correct? 

A No, it doesn't sound correct. The only points 
at which I would be worried about disclosure were, of course, 
anything that involved either the hostages or our own 



Wl^wftwp'PwT 



546 



26 



P^R^IK^ 



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25 



military attempts to deal with the problem. I don't have 
any idea what a closed-mouth strategy means. This was the 
expression used, I take it. 

Q That's the characterization, yes, sir. 
A I don't have any memory of counseling that. 
I think that the outcome of that phone -all that you 
mentioned to me a moment ago was that I thought we should 
have a meeting on the subject and discuss what these articles 
were saying. 

I have never seen the articles . These were from 
these Mideast magazines or something. They were being 
reprinted here. I don't have any recollection of urging 
a closed-mouthed strategy or anything of that kind. 

MR. SAXON: Mr. Secretary, I have nothing 
further. I associate myself with Mr. Nields' comments 
earlier. The Senate appreciates your time. 

THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. 

MR. KREUZER: Are the lawyers through? Can I 
ask my question now? 

MR. NIELDS: Is there one? 

MR. KREUZER: I have one. 



wwi^iEm- 



547 



92 



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21 

22 

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25 



EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 
THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. KREUZER: 

Q Sir, subsequent to the 16th or the 17th of 
January when it was decided that the sale was going to 
occur with the TOWs, jOu mentioned that you started giving 
orders that this would be an Economy Act transfer? 

A Yes. 

Q And at some point in time, there was a meeting 
in the Oval Office with Mr. Casey? Did you say that? 
There was a meeting in the Oval Office -- 

A No. I thought you showed me some papers that 
said I was asked to come to a meeting with Mr. Casey in 
Admiral Poindexter's office. 

Q Was that -- I believe that was the place where 
there was a discussion about impact on readiness? Did 
Mr. Casey make -- I have in my notes Mr. Casey commented 
there would be no impact on readiness resulting from the 
sale of these TOWs? 

A No. I talked with our own people about the 
impact on readiness and whether or not we would have 
enough left and what our stocks were, and was told at that 
time that we had very substantial stocks but that it was 
an obsolete weapon, no longer being manufactured. And 
that the basic impact on our readiness would not be in 



548 



28 




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93 

any way severe or in any way marked. But those were dis- 
cussions that I had with General Powell and I think 
Mr. Armitage here in the building. 

Q So that was decided here. I'll change my notes. 
A As far as I remember, yes. I don't recall 
anything about the other. The other meeting was apparently 
mostly to discuss the -- remove my roadblocks, as it was 
phrased in one of these memorandums, and to discuss proper 
ways to make the transfer. - 
Q Thank you. 

THE WITNESS: Have we got a schedule now of any 
of the next events on any of this? 

MR. NIELDS: I think we can go off the record 
now. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

(Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the deposition was 
adjourned, ) 



eci 




549 



ONCLASSIF^EI 



^ ri-Tc 




orricc or tmc sccpictahy or ocrcNsc 

SEC DEF 
ex, IJe^ "AS SEEN 

JUN18S85 

// 






X' 






5 CAmc:, 









/^tx /^*^<:. ^^<:^ Xynv-rv^e^^ 
— — ^^ • ^ 

PawiWI^ DECiassitied/Releaseq on. ■^?J>9t 06& ' ^ r -S?- ^ ^ S^^^ g^^S^^ ^ 



^. 



unnec pruvisicns ol E 12356 
by K Jofinson. National Secuiity Council 






UNCLflSSIFJFn 





550 



mm 



. errei or TMi.ticiinAJiY o» mfimm 

TM«RIT4M«SMTA«T 19 JWt tS * 

NOR rat UBD<») 

Y<ouT» far •ctlon. Sm ay nonmwtdation 
«rd S«cOtf*s oGRnant on th* «ttadMd. 
S«efitf' s aammu rt«d m fellows: 

"Diis U Alaost too absurd to ecansnt 
on. By «11 Mans ;us it to Rich, but 
t}» M«Mption h«rt is: 1) that Xrwi is 
about to fall, and 2) w« can ^bal with 
that on a rational basis. MSfe^lik* 
asking Osdhafi to Nashington toe a 



<2-v^ 



PjiliaipCecia'isitiea/Relejssc) on 2SJ<iiOg 

under provisicns ol E 12356 

by K Jotmson. National Secuniy Council 



Colin L. Powell 
oKajor Gtntral, CB)^ 
Sanior Military Assistant 
to tht S«crttary of Otfans* 



DapSaOf 




1Uimjts.^iFgFn 



551 



UNIBSmED 



THC WMITC MOUaC 



W*ftMINOTOM 

Jun* 17. IMS 



91 



WAS sec}^ 



SEC R£T /WITH 

to? S£ CRf7"ArrACHMrKT 

t . 

KCKOKASD'CK FOR THE HONOIUBLE GEOXGS ?. SNULTZ 
Thtt S«cr«t4ry of St«t« 

TKS HONOIUBLE CASPAX H. HEINBEXCEX 
Th« S«crttary of D«f«ns« 

S'J3JECT: U.S. Policy Toward Iran (S) 

7>.* Diraetor cf Cantral Intalliqanet has just distributee an sr-lZ 
or. "Iran: Prospaets for Maar-Tar» Instability", which I hc?« you 
hava racaivad. This SNIE i&akas claar that instability in Iran* is 
accalaratin^, v. J) potentially noiMntous consaquancas for U.S. 
strataeic intar sts. It saass sansibla to asX whathar our 
currant policy toward Iran is adaquata to achiava our intarasts. 
Ky staff has praparad a draft KSM (Tab A) vhich can sarva to 
•tiaulata our thiakinf on O.S. policy toward Iran. X wevld 
appraciata your roiri«wi»9 Dm dzaft oo an ayaa only basis and 
providing mm with your ceoBoats and svf^astiens. X aa concaraad 
about tha possibility of laaka^o ahoold «m docida not to pursua 
tbis eha.-.ga in policy with tbo Pxasidont. If yo« faal that w« 
should considar this ebaafo* than X weold rafar tha papar to tha 
S16(FP) in praparation for aa VSPC nootiaf with tha Prasidant. 
(S) 




_ a i„,,Qo ^ fwwwrt C. Nefarlano 

Declassified/Released on Z t-lfliO ^R ^ 

under provisions ot E 0. 12356 ^^ ""S^ 

by K Jonnson. Nalicnal Secii:iv Council 



liNCLASSIFIED 



s2C.-£T.v;:'a« 
jT'* Sit? IT vrT.ir-*^**-? 



552 



THC WMITC MOUSC 

DRAFT 



T0» StCWT 

92 

MATIONAl SeCUflTr PICISIOH 
PIlfCTIVE 

O.f. Fcliev TewTd Iran 

Oy.iamic politic*! •volition" i« ttkin) pl«et intid* Iran 
ln»t«biiity caused by th« prtsaurts of tho Iraq*lrar. vt- 
•conomic dottrioration and rtfiM infishtin^ ertato tho'^ottntiil 
for isajor changes in Iran. Tha Soviat Union it bottar Do«iti««.i 
than tha U.S. to axploit and banafit from any pcw.r atrS^J'i ?J!t 
rasults in changas in tha Iranian ra^iaa. at vtll at incraltine 
socio-political prassuras. In this anvirownant. tha aaarcane. a- 
a ra^ima swsra coapatibla vith Aaarican and Vastarn intarasts it " 
ualikaly. Soviat succast in taking advanta^a of tha anaroine 
pcvar atrusgla to insinuata itt all in Iran would chan ca tha 
ttratagic fcalanca in tha araa 

-^ _ _^^^^^Khila w« purs-ca a r.u.T.bar of broad 

lon^-tam soait, our prTEary short- tam challarca mutt b« 'o 
block Kctccv's afferts to incraasa Soviat i.".fl'janca (-ov «nd 
aftar tha daath of KhoMini) . This vill ra(;uira an activa a-c 
sustai.tad prceraa to bvild both our lavara^t a.'td our 
undarata.tdin^ of tho iatamal situation so as to a.iabla us to 
•xart a fraatar and aera ceoatnactiva lAf leanca ovor Iranian 
polities. Ma east ia^oivo oar ability to pzotaet our intarasts 
duri.i^ tha strofflo for svccassieo. 

C.8. Intarasts and Coalt 

. Partially Declassified/Released on i5A5i? 88 

Tho ooat iavadlAtO O.S. intoraats iaelnda* under p<ovision^ of e.o i2356 

•* •*•*■ *••• •»*•*■■*■ *■**'■• -jy K Johnson. National Secunty council 

11) rr«v«atia« tho disiata^ratioa of Iran and prasarvine it as 
aa i:id«p«Bd«at stxato^ic boffar which saparatas tho Soviat 
Onion frea t&« Farsiaa Coif; 

(3) Liaitinf tho scepa and oppertuaity for Soviet actions in 

Iran, whila positieain^ oursalvas to cepa with tho chan^inq 
Iranian iatoraal situation; 

(3) Maintaining aceass to Parsiaa Calf oil and.anauria^ 
uni»padad transit of tho Strait of ■oraua; and 

(4) An %r\4. to tho Iranian 90varnaMat's spcr.sorthip of tarrorisn 
•nd its attaapts to daatabiliaa tha fcvorrjMr.ts of othar 

:*.!::*•"*• UNCLASSIFIED 



553 



amussmED _ 

■„.^ , DRAFT 

. D 93 

W« alto tok eth«r bro«d «nd iaportant. If Itss ii8n«di«t«lv 

(1) lx^n*% r«»u»ption el a aodaratt and conatruetiva rola as a 
aaakbar raapaetivaly of th« nen-coa«uniat political 
eoMaanity, of ita ration, an4 of tha world potrolaua 
aconoaty ; 



(2) 



eontinuad Iranian raai-atanca to tha axpanaion of Soviat 
powar in 9anaral, and to tha Soviat occupation of 
Afghanistan in particular; 



by 



(3) an airly and to tha Iran-Iraq war which ia not madiatad dv 
tha Soviat Union and which doas not fundacantally altar th« 
balanca of powar in tha ragion; 

(4) aliaination of Iran' a flagrant aboaas of hua^n rights; 

(5) movaaant toward avantual nomalization of O.S. -Iranian 
diplonatic consular and cultural ralationa. and bilata*al 
trada/cooaarcial activitiaa; 

(6) raso.ution '^f AMrican lagal and financial claims through 
tha Hagua l.'ibur.al; and 

(7) Iranian aodaratioa on OttC pricing policy. 

Many of our iataraata will b« diffievlt to aehlov*. tot givan 
th« rapidity with wbieh o««ats ara aeviaf , aad th« aagnitudo of 
tho ataJias. it is elaar that vrgoat now af forts aro roquirad. Ib 
■ewiag forward, wo aDSt bo ospocially carafal to bolaaea oaz 
«velvia9 ralatloasliip vitli Iraq ia a mua^x tbat doas not daaaga 
tbo loaqar tors ygo spa cts for Xraa. 

>rosoat Iraaiaa »olitlcal la^ironiant 

Tho Xraniaa laadorahlp facos its aest diffioalt ehalloagaa aiaea 
1911. Tbo ragiaa*s popolarity has daoliaod sigaificaatly ia tha 
past sis aoaths. priaaxily bacaosa of iatanaifiod diailloaionaani 
with a aaaaiagly aaaadiag war, tiM cootiaoad iapesitioa of 
XslsMie social pelieias oa 4 pe^latioa iaeraasiaqly raloetaat t< 
aecapt soch harsh ■aasoros, aad a faltorlao aco w ow y brought on 
priaarily by doellaiaf oil ravaaoas. Tha ia^ct of thasa 
problaaa is iatansifiad by tha raalisatioa that Ayatollah 
Xhdheiai's aantal and phyaical haalth is frafila, which in turn 
caats a pall of uacartaiaty ovar tha daily dacisioa-aaking 
proeass. 



•OP ««r»»- 



UNCLASSIF!EO 



554 



UNCMSMFJED DRAFT 

D 94 

Onlais th* •eetUrttien of •dv«rt« ■ilittry, politictl «nd 
«eone«ie 4«v«lepMnt« is r«v«rs«d, th« Rho^ini ra^ijM win fae* 
••rieas in»t«bllity fi.«. r«p«attd «nti>r«9iM d«nonstr«tions 
•trika*. assAftiMtiea attsapts, Mbota9« and eth«r d«tt«fciliiij»« 
Activities threv^bevt, iacrsasinfly involvinf th« lew«r elasMsT 
This condition will sap officials' an«r«ias and fovarnMnt 
rasoareos, intansifyin^ diffaxaneas aawa^ Iranian laadars as tha 
fovarnaant trias to avoid Aistakas that would provoka popular 
ttphaaval and thraatan contimuad control. 

Whila it is impossibla to predict tha coursa o£ tha tmaroine 
powar stru99la. it is possible to discern savaral trends which 
^anist be accounted for by U.S. policy. As doMstic pressures 
C aount, decision-SMkins is likely to be aonopolized by individual! 
\ representing tha saaa unstabla aix of radical, corsarvatlva ar* 
J ultra-conservative factions that now control tha Iranian 
] 90vernaent. Tha longer KhosMini lingers in povar, tha aere 
/ likely the powar ttni99le will intensifv, and tha creater the 
/ r.ttarier of potential leaders who ai^ht affect the outcome of tha 
V^stru99la. 

The ultieate strength of various clerical groups and tha pov*- 
coalitions they aay fora are not known. Bewevar, tha w«aknass«s 
of various opposition froups ~ inside Iran and abroad — are 
evident, especially the lack of a leader with sufficient statute 
r to rival XhoaMiai aad bis ideas. The aost likely faction ia a* 
) power •tz«9«l« to sMft Iraaiaa policy ia directions aore 
\ acceptabla to thm Wast — shoald their iaflaeaea increase — are 
/ eonservaUves werkiaf fros within tha fovermMat afaiaat the 
I radicals. Madicals witl^a tba rafiae, aad tha leftist 
\ opposition, •xm tba frovpa aoat likely to iafla«>ee the course of 
^avaats ia ways ialaleal to Vestera iaterests. 

Tba Xxaaiaa rsfalar araed forces represent a potential source of 
hath paMsr aad iacllaatioa to aeve Iraa back late a aore 
pco-vaatara poaitioa. lapraseatativas of every factioa inside 
and oatsi4a tba safias racofaisa tba poteatial iaportanee of the 
ailitary aad aro ealtivatlaf contacts with those forces. 
■owaver, as leof as tho Axay ra a s tns coHiitte4 ia the war with 
Iraq it will aet ba ia a poaitioa ta iataxvaaa ia Tehraa. i 

Tha other iastraaaat of state poMsr* tbe llevolotionary 6«ard, is 
beceadaf increasiafly fraetared. It will probebly cooe apart 
follewiaf Kheaeiai'a death, aad aifbt evea eaqaqe in a aajor 
power stm^fle before thaa.' Ia aay scenario, the Guard will be 
at tha center of the p ow e r strvnle. 



TOP StCMEX 



UNCLASSIFIED 



556 



imCL^SIFlED 



T0> StCMT 



DRAFT 

D 95 



Th« Soviets *rt w«ll awart of th« tvolvinf 4«v«le;ift«nts in l-*n 
Th«y will continue to apply e«rrot-and-stick inc«ntiv«s to lr«n' 
in tho hop« of brin^in^ Tohrtn to Mo«eow'» ttns for «n iaprov«d 
bilateral ralationahip that could t«rv« at a basis for Aaior 
growth in Soviet infloenee la Iran. Moscow will clearly resist 
eny trend toward tb« restoration of a pro-vestera Zraniaa 
foverneeat. 

Oospite strong clerical antipathy to Moscow and eoMniaisa, 
Tah^aw' e leadership teeas to have conelud««i that ; iBp»>s«^«^^^ f^ t_ 
relations with tne 5cv > «r nwiww < ■ - ^ - ^ s imi'i) n ' t- i ^ i a 
interest , xney ao not teea interested in iAprovin^ ties with us. 
This Iranian assessment is probably based on Tehran's view of 
what MOSCOW can do for — and a9ainst - Iran rather then on an 
ideological preference to conduct relations with Moscow. The 
USSR already has auch leverage over Tehran — ia stark contrast 
to the U.S. 



Kcscov views Iran aa a key area of op 




In return, Moscow is certain to offer eeonoaie and 

technicaT^lsis* r.ce, and possibly even military e^ipaent. 
While they have heretofore belked at providing eajor weapon 
•ystejBs, the Soviets aight relex their eiaberfo if tho right 
political opportunities presented theaselves. Kbile Moscow would 
prebebly oot act ia a aeaaer that severely disrupts its relatioas 
with laghdad, givea Iraq's depoadeacy oa the OSSt for ground 
forces equipment. Moscow pessessee considerable roc« fox aaneuvez 
if it senses aejer epeaiage ia Tehraa for the esteblishaent of a 
position of sigaifieaat iaflooaca. 

Moscow SMy also parsoo « streto^ besod oa sepport of seperatist 

aeveaaats . Tbo Soviet Oaioa has *^i mrlt wrart1"*i*^ *^ 
oaltiwate "BgT^ ' I t t t«*-"r* **'* ""* ■■-"- *^^ •^.-«^-t^.^-.. 
-aafi^i^- Noet etaaie froitpo era aalikaly to ebelleago the central 
geveraaaat ia Tahraa as leaf as they fear severe reprisals. Bat 
ia tbo Ax^M of Irsa adjaceat to the Soviet border, tho Soviets 
can provide a secarity oBbrella to protect rebellioos ethaic 
groups froa reprisals. 

Th« O.S. position ia Tehra n isualikelv to iaprow withaa^ m. ^^^*- 
■ajor e ha»y iB o.y. ooliev T ti»« caaileage to the O.S. ia the 
-pou-HMUiai period will ba severe. Aay successor regiae will 
prcbebly seiie power ia the nesM of Islaa and the revolution and 



Tc? sec?rr 



i]NriJL<(<(iFiFn 



556 



WCIASSIFIED 



DRAFT 



T0» ttCMT 



D 96 



e«n b« cxpttcttd to h«vt • built-in anti-AMricAa bi««. _i-ft,* 
eon.. rv# t ix«. M^la*^ tAXl-i^i«.<> ««,^y y,... >w^ ■mhnTi im 
r«vel9tioa •DA.t*zM»iM-nie-ee«ld-«ev«.e«tttioati«.t^«rd • Zai-I 
'feorr«ct roUtionthip vjth th« d On tlM otiMx luadTTnTST^ 
— tor€««-'^li, try to w«ctA«t« Mti-AMrieM fMllMt to 
•tzon^thon thoir own pooitleao «t tho oxponM of tbo 
conoozvo tivos . 

Oor l«v«ra9« vith Ir»i» is sh«zply r«dae«d by tho e«rr«at do«r*« 
of hostility th«t spring* froa tho idoolo^y of tho r«dlc«l 

clorgy, •tpocially at it torvos thoir foroi^a policy aeols 
Moroovox« tho MOdoratt and coasorvativo olooants of tho elorov 
may also sharo tho radicals' boliof that wo aro iavotaratolv 
hoatilo to tho lalawic 90v«rna«nt. aakinf aecow»odatioa with th« 
U.S. i«pofsiblo. Tho clorical rofiao cootiaoos to boli«v« that 
tho O.S. has not aceoptod tho rovolution and intonds to rovarso 
tho courso of ovants and install a puppot govornBont. This 
porcoption has boon rainforeod by ouz rostoratioa of diploaMtie 
rolatior.a with Iraq, afforts to cot tho flow of ansa to Iran and 
diroct throats of oilitary action in rotaliatien for 
Iranian-inspirad anti-O.S. tarrorisa. 

g.S. yplicv 

Tho dynanic political sitaation in Iran and tho eonsaouancas for 
O.S. intarasts of ^rowin^ Soviat and radical infloaaca, eospol 
tho O.S. aadoxtako a ran^o of abort- and looq-tora iaitiatlvos J 
that will onhanco ovz lovoxa^o la Tohraa, aad, if posalbla 1 

■laialso that of tho Soviots. Particolar attaatioa aost bo paid 
to avoiding aitMtiens wbieh eoapol tbo Iraaiaas to ton to tho 
Sewiots. Sbert-tozB aaasoraa ahoold bo oadortakon in a aanaor 
that forastalls Sowiat prospacts J»rd tnhancas oor aMlitv 
diroctly «r=<i ir.«!i-^r*ly, •* Ssj : ? J.S. and w«9t<rr. influonca in 
Iran to tho aaxiauui axtant possibla in tho futu:«. rlannine for 
tJio fellowiaf ialtiativos sboold thoroforo procood oa a fast and 
loasor-toa track. Tbo coapoooats of O.S. policy will bo tot 



(1) tncoorofo Woaton allioo and frioada to bolp 2raa aoot its o 

ij^ert roqoiroaoata ao aa to rodoco tbo attractiYoaoss of ]| 
Soviet asaiatanco aad tzado offers, wbilo doaeaatratia^ thai 
valao of eorroct rolatioas with tbo Vast. This iaclodos ] 
prevision of selected ailitary e^ipMat as dotoraiaed on a 
e«so-by-cas« basis. 




TC? S2C?xy 



m?.\ BQCIEI^n 



557 



TOP ftCMT 



(3) 



[/NCLAS^rp 

2n«r««M,|oBt«et» Vith allitt and fritod* 



DRAFT 



97 



^f-f 



^ _ - _ on th« tvoltttiea of tiM IrtAiTfiTitvItie^TA^ 

^ -pe»si»l* MAM for iaflMBciaf tlM dirtctien of cIujm*. aL 
b« r««dy ta^cewaimiMf with Ixm Urpp^ h thM« •» iiSi^ 

eoontri«t 




(4) 



Take aevanta9« of ^rowia^ political fra«Mntatioa by: 

diaertatly eoMHUAieating euz daaixc for correct c\ 

relations to potantially racaptivo Zraniaa loaatrs; ^ 



r 



(5) 
) 

(7) 
(t) 

(») 



^{ 




providiit^ axappert to alaacnts oppesad to Xboaoiai and > 
th« radicals. 

Avoid actions which ceald aliaaata freops potantially 
raeaptiva to iaprovad O.S.-Xraaiaa relations. ^ 

Aospond to Xraniaa-svpportad tarroriaa with cilitary action 
a^aiast tarrorist infrastnictara. 

Snhancc ck,: •ftoxt to discredit Moscow's Zslaaie cradantials 
with • aora vigoreas VGA offort tarfotad on Iran. 

0«v«lo9 action plaa la support of tho basic policy I 

cbjactivo, both for aoax-tara eontiagoacias (o.f. doath oq 
Khoe«iai) as woll ea tho loaf tarB rostoratioa of O.S. ' 
inflaoaco ia Tahraa. 

with raspact to the Calf wart 

Coatiaoa to aacoora^o third party iaitiativoa to ^««h i* 
«a iaad to tha wax; 

lacraasa ailitary cooporatiea with 6si; Cooperation 
Cooaeil ceontries, aad bolster O.S. sdlitary y 

capabilities ia tho 6«lf area to enable dUTCON to be 
folly capeble of earzyiaf o«t its aissies} aa4 

Seek to carb Iraa's collaberatloa with ita radical v% 
allies (i.e. Syria aad Ubya). ^ 



7C? *£C?X8. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



558 




m ° 



98 






Political 



— Through contact* with •Hi.. an<« #,i«.^- 

cr.«tly co««unic.t« o«r dMirl for «r^;/* ?^**"^^ «*i«- 
pot.ntl.Uy r«c.ptivrir.J5i« i.rLfrT^^"^*^^®"* *«> 
r.nunci.tion of .tit.-i«Sir^.d *f! " ^*'*^ "» ^»'«^' 

th.i, non-i„t:r?:n;crrj "j«t;;j *? 2*.?'"-'"^ ""- 

cr..,in9 PcUtic«l-Ii?iSi3'™ •n«»^th« conflict .nd in- , 
.tlon clul^iicSlitSi.^ cooperation with Gulf Coop.r- J 

- In light of r«c«nt avidanc* that our alll*. ^-.4 
parmit aporadie tranafars of .lii^^^w -^°^*""* ^® 
to Iran and that nagotuJlSL^i^ .^w?**'"^ •quip-.at 
«— •relax fix» and irIilS^J5L?!.*'*^°« J*^'** ^t^'^ 
tha praaaura orooTalllli L^fif Jj^i '^ •^**^* iacraaaa 
•^ poaaibla awcSoI. ^ «o«-i<»«rlng public atataaanta 



Public DlpioMaey 



Oar public atataaanta en Iran a)K»ii<i t>.4 

diaagraa or oppeaa ragiaa polielas. """* ^" '"" ^« 



gconoaie 



A full ranga of US arport eontrola 



(unclassified 



_*ra alraady in affact. 



curbing all but .trictly civilian axpS";? "^^ 



559 



WttCittJSffffD 



D 99 



* iLf!^^**^**?^''^**' di«er««t politic. 1 eentaet* p,opo««d 
•boy«. «« could •U99««t to th* ZrMlaM that cori.et rl- 

latioM ^ould inelado r«l«i«tloii of current OS tr.di 
rMtrictioM .nd aoraal trad« ralatloos with «a Xr«al«n 
90v«rnMat that la aot heatlla to OS iataraata. 

-.,.#. *I2i« f e««»c«» *'ith tha balanca of tha racenMndatieaa ia tha 
draft MOD ia .o far aa thay support carraat OS policy. My raco^ 
saadationa raf lact ay vary stron? vlaw that US policy -Jat ramain 
ataadfast ia tha faca of intarn.tional lavlaa.nM* parp.tratad bJ 

iraaiaa ra^lM. Chan^as in policy and ia conduct, tharafora 
auat ba iaitiatad by tha Iranian 90varna»nt. Sy raaaiaiao firi*; 
oppoaad to currant Iranian govarnaant policiaa and actioae. vat 
•upportiva of aodaration and a longar tar* invrovaaant ia ralationa 
wa can .void tha futura analty of tha Iraaiaa^paopla and davaioo thi 
il«Tf*'?J?***"'^ ^* countar a poa.ibly ^ry daagarou. iacraaH ia 
Sovlat influaaca. Ia particular, wa naad to ba praparad for a 
pooaibla paried of turwil aa tha raglM ba^ia* to chaaga, by 
bulldia^ up affaetiva iaatnwanta of influaaca and accaas to paopla 
and orgaaisationa withia Iraa, so aa to ceuatar a Soviat attaint to 
proEota a pro-Soviat auceaaaor ragiaa. 



eet Saeratary Shu Its 



UNCLASSIFIED 



560 



UNCLASSIFIEI) 



100 



UNCLASSIFIED 



561 



uNcussffe 



OCrCNSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY 



OOC apiece. This i= 

ts could cost a; -■j.z' 



be S36-52.3 millior. 
added (KRC cost. 
charges, plus 



ir 1 fur ifvZv^^^ 'or foreign sale. 

- "" intended for 

TT^e. g:Hc3^^'^«2j^ Hoiking po'irrbs- 
A<3h'n3^.rcicW;a>5ftA, On or 

<3^->^ Oar). Colin PcT^oJlCjW^ be replaced, so 

OOC^C. ?v>miih0:^ -^ (%. kach-b idable difficulties: 

-fate -b G(2n.(?o^l. :?^"3'o^f"tle'rElx. 

es of S14 million 
or indirect to a 
nclassified (except 
ot take place until 
ys can be waived for 
transfer has no such 
given in any case. 

dered through Israel, 







"'" y 



ken into 3 or 4 

/ Declasaried/Reteased nn Z'^ Jfr*J 6fi f ^ ^ ^ J ^ts^ t i C e . 
under provisions ol E 12356 V Js J V U 

by K JohrBon. NalKwal Security Couflcil V,^^ ^wQ J ^ against Splitting 

the spirit and the 




and all Administrations 

ith 



packages . 
The customer countries (UAE -d Korea) would have to be told that 
their deliveries had been ^"chedu ed. but ve vouia ^^^^^ 
tell ther. whv. We would not want to ch-. i,e tner uot 
deliveries. I:! DWOSITION I 



562 



liMASSIFlED 



Havi 



- ; J ile^ for Iran 



Missile- are available right now. suitable for _fcreign sale 
Thire are lo^ ^.issiles at Red River Arsenal - intended for 
UAE and £- ::r Korea. Seven of these are intended for tests, 
but the tests can be foregone. 

-he nis^ile- at Red River Arsenal cost 3300.000 apiece. J^t^ :; 
;.ot necessarily a firm price, and replacements could cost a. .uc. 
as 543*. ":^3 apiece. 

I3,,r„i:;r;i?;i"hlrgl'"l"ing .»<■ ^anspo,. cUr^.s . plus 

storage 1 . 

The missiles for Korea and UAE would have to be replaced, so • 
DSAA will need the money to replace them. 
. The modalities for sale to Iran present formidable difficulties: 

-. Iran is not currently certified f°%5^^*V.f"tle''AEC; 
indirectly as a third country, per Sec. 3 of the .AECA. 

for some details). »"« "* i?^ ,q ^ can be waived for 
4^-^^ "fT but tSetSird^ountry transfer has no such 
^onlnAd'notrc: iJsiStiU b^e given in any case. 

- Thus, even if the -'"i" ^tlf iir'"*' ''""'' '""'' 
Congress would have to be notified. 

u . ♦»,- caTe could be broken into 3 or 4 
- jL^Uer!ro?i:r^5reJ^de^?ing"sLonaI notice. 

.- While there is no explicit injunction ^^ainst^splittiag^ 

"?a'crice%rt^e^!fw^!s^;ain2rthat!'and al? Administrations 

have observed this scrupulously. 

T, •= ronceivable that, upon satisfactory consultation with 
"■ rw '' !r?u«r and Fascell and their minority counterparts. 

S:yTi"ght"lgree"to'sriitting the sale into smaller 

deliveries . 



UNfildlSSIFSED 



563 



UNCLA^IFSED 



e political drawbacks are e:uall\- for-.idable: 

-- If Iraq ever found out, thev would be greatly irritated. 
Their sources of supplv are nore readilv accessible than 
Iran's, however, so tnere would be no effect in that 
respect . 

- Saudi Arabia and the other Culf States would also be 
irritated and alarned. 

- If Israel were used as the laundering country, they would 
be greatly encouraged to continue selling to Iran, and to 
expand their sales. 

- If the sale became known, all bars would be remo\-ed fro-i 
sales by such countries as Spain, Portugal, Greece, UK, 
ItaJy, and FRG , countries who are only barely restrained 
from overt, large sales to Iran now. 

- In short, the risk is that of prolonging and intensifying 
the Iran-Iraq war, while seriously compromising US influence 
over Israel and other countries to restrain sales to Iran. 



UNQJtflMIFIED 



r, 



DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY 



565 







566 



UNCLASSIFIED 






UNCLASSIFIED 









i 



567 



UNCLASSIFIED 




^'f'. 



1 (jlO^* 

* ^ f ONCLASSIRED 

T«e*aMaa/iHii eM*MMj«af :-k-« c. 




568 



/ ^ J/ut^C 






-'•PCA 



•4e« «nd ciaa 



ii/«» 13 :i.;« 



lUyly. CO noct o( 01/91/IS 13:2« 



UNOtASSIFIED 



subj««t: raivAti iuM[ cncx 

CoaciRMACloa e< 1m« mm vhie SCND wh«a I M«at to hie ADO L:mCS) ... 
C«s«y b«ll«vM tlut e«9 will eoaclau* to erMta re«dble«>u uatll h« it 
told by you that tho Prasldoat waata ttila to aova NOW aa« what Cap wiU 
hava to aaka it work. Caaay peiata out that wa hava oow naa threufh 
thraa diffaraat oathedoloflaa la aa affort ts tatlafy Cap s eoacaraa 
aa4 that no aattar what wa do thara ia alwaya a aoM objaetloa. Aa far 
aa Caaay la eeacaraod oar aarllar MChed o( havla« Copp daal dlraetlf with 
tha DeO aa a purebaaia« agaat waa flao. Ha did not tao aay particular preb* 
las w/ aakiag Cepp aa 4«aat for cha CIA la ihla aadaavor but ha ia ceacanad 
that Cap will flad toaa naw objaetloa ualaaa ha la tfld to precaod. Colia 
PowoU, who aat naxt to aa during Cap' a tpaaeh aakad tho followia( quaatleaa 
(aqr aaawara ara ladleatad): 
Q. Oe«8 Copp daal w/ Iraaiaaa or laraalia? 
A. With tha laraalia 



li i t 

t / ^ .t 




Q. What coat ara tha laraalia wlUiat to pay (or tho baaie TOWST 
A. Thay (thru Copp) hava (uada to pay Fair Harkat Valua (HIV ahould 
b« about $4900«S400 •». dapoeding oa ago) aad to eevar tha coat of 
craaapertatioa. Thay do not havo anough to pay (or I TOV (about 
J9S00 •t or TOW II ((abeufc SISOOO aa.)- Wo hava (roquaatly aold 
tha Israalis waapa/aatarial at FMV viea tha raplaeaaoat coat to tho 
U.S. Sinea wa hava ovor lOOK of tha baaie TOW ia our iavaatory aad 
caaaot avoa uao it ia traiaiag duo to ita ago, wa ought to look at thla « 
aa opportuaity to eolloct oa a woapoa which wo araa't uaiag (all ara la 
m accordlag to Koch) aatf will ovoatually havo to diapoao of boeauao 
wo caaaot tail thaa off othaiwtaa. (I'a told that Hughaa Acft. tha ofgr- 
haa an agraa*aat w/ OaO that all aotaal ms traaaaetiooa will ba haadlad 
aa a producar sala ia ordar t« kaay OoO (■ viadoreuttlag tha producttoa 
lino by salliag off oM aMcka). 



Tha aeat roaoac p r opeaal (C«fy aa agoac (or tha CIA aad aalaa to tho 
laraalia wha tbaa dallvar waapa to tba Iraaiaaa) eaa oaly work if 
wa caa gat tha laraalia ta easa up oa thair prieo. ^mc^om 
unabla t« eaataat Nil «k« la ia Curepo for a Mahlag^^^l^H Ho 
still dcoa aac kaav «Imc wa ara awaro that tha IraaiAa hava offorod 
$10K par TOW. Xa haa hawavar laft a aaaaaga taac wa oua*. hava a ga/ 

daclaloa today aad_tlr" >>M.^in<iag m tr« iwHimi ta datariorata. 




Partially Declassified/Released on_25~i^es 
unCer nrovision; ol E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Secufity Council 



UNCLASSIFIED 




569 



/5 J>^^^(. 



Ttam. ^SCLN --CPl-A 0«t« and cim 01/15/S«i 

1o: KSIMP --Cf'U 



*M Mply CO nee* of 08/31/83 13:Z8 



UNetASSIFIED 



23735 



NOTT FItOH: OLIVU NOnH 

Subj«ec: PRIVAII 8U» CMICX 

Nir jiut call«4 Main. H« hu «dvi*«4 that ha baliavaa tha GOI is awout 

CO fersally withdraw its offar to assist on this aattar so that it cannot 

b« blaaad whan tha AHCITS ar* killad. I askad hia about tha mac. chat ona 

had alraady baan killad. Ha rapliad that it was probably anothar of tha 

Jaws sine* thay (Hisballah) will undoubtadly kill tha Jaw* txrst to aaka 

tkmit peine. 

I then askad NIR to raconfira. th* raquiraaants as ha understood tha*. H* 

said that th* Iranians want 1000 TOWs, 2S noslaa* ralaasad by Lahad 

aoil tha AMCIT* and any surviving J*ws wd be ralaasad along w/ tha Brit 

if thay (tha IRG) can still find hla. 

Th* Israelis ar* vary v*ry eone*m*d that thay cannot eake a dallvary of 

1000 TOVs w/e e preaisa to replenish. Nir points out that he is operating 

in aa anvironaenc which is very hostile since the USG never aada good on its 

proaise to proaptly replenish the original 504 TOWs that they shipped la 

Sepceaber and that if we had but sent chaaa TOWsas proaised it eight have 

beea peaaible to take tha further risk of anothar 1000. 

lAV instructions have invited See W'bgr to etg w/ Casey in yr ofe at 1700 

Of) Thursday. It is ay sense that by that tiae we will have a asg fa the 

GOI that they are withdrawing their offer. Is it possible to arrange a 

secure conference call tonight to see if we can aaka this work? V/R North 



Partially Declassified/Released on Ji^rL^ ®^ 
under oruvisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 




UNCLASSIFIED 



570 



msnsfriED 



/O/uO-f 



Sfe 



MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 

SUBJECT! Meetino on November 10, 19S6, with th« President, 
Vic« President, Secretary Shultx, DCl Casey, 
Attorney General Meese, Don Re^an* Adniral 
Poindexter, and Al Keel, in the Oval Office 




The President 
-.4>i »^ ^4^ n»«. ^« .nv fcradlno with^ the eneay-r<S^ our ho«tage«. 
we do need to note thatMBMll^^H (Khomeni) will be 
gone someday, and we walJP better leverage with the new government 
and with their military. That is why we felt it necessary 
to give them some small defensive weapons. 

We can discuss that publicly, but no way could we ever 
disclose it all without getting our hostages executed. (We 
must make it plain that we are not doing business with terrorists. 
We aren't paying them or dealing with them.) We are trying 
to get better relations with Iran, and we can't discuss the 
d-tails of this publicly without endangering the people we 
are working through and with in Iran . I pointed out we must 
bear in mind we have given the Isr^ies and the Iranians the 
opportunity to blackmail us by reporting selectively bits and 
pi^es of the total story. I also pointed out that Congress 
could -and probably would — hold legislative hearings. Admiral 
Poindexter pointed out that we do want a better relationship 
with Iran. 



In "^Hse 19867 the President*|Sade a formal finding under 
Section 501 of the Arms Export Control Act which directes the 
DCI not to notify Congress until further notice, and authorizes 
discussion with friendly groups which are trying to 9et a better^ 
government in Iran. I had not know»n of this finding before ^"^V^ 
-- Shultz said he had not known of it either. Me needed to -^ 
help those elements to get a more pro-O.S. government in Iran. 
Poindexter continued that we assisted I«aeWnitiallj^ec^e 
we found Israel was sending arms to Iran^lB^^^^B^^I^B 
and also wanted the Iran-Iraq war to end as soon as possible. 
Admiral Poindexter said that McParlane went to Iran in May 
1986, and that was the on ly trip he made, and then we started 
workina through^Hi|B|of Rasfanjani. Previously we had 
used aa Israeli agent called 6orban<far. w^lsouse^^r 
channels to try to get the hostages back. ^B^^HIHIp 
others proved no good because the Iranians always insisted^ 
?hat ?hS Sa^A prisoners held by Kuwait be released. We finally 
did authoriie the release of 500 TOMS sold by I»rael to Iran, 
and another 500 were sent last week. ThLava^l^xrMq^^-. 
as a result of a meeting with Rasf an jani ' s^^^^HB^^^^^ 
came here to show that he was a legitimate representative of 
the government. Poindexter re ported t here were several meetings 



Partially Declassrtiefl/Released nn .gOft> ^-^S- 
uncet provisions ol E 0. 12356 
by K Johnson, National Security Council 



UNfibASttfvtED U 



DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 



^7/lrf/W 



571 



liKSStFIED 



in Burop* and alacwhcr*. 

Z roiindcd John that h« had always told m« that thara 
would b« no mora weapons sent to Iran, after the first 500 
TOWS, until after all of the hostages were returned, but unfortunately 
we did send a second 500 because it "seemed the only way to 
get the hostages out', according to Poindexter. 

Poindexter pointed out the hostage taking had stopped 
for a year. 1 pointed out that they took three more quite 
recently. Poindexter pointed out that this was not done by 
the same people or Iranians. 




felt he had to speak 
out against the O.S. and the McParlane trip. Because of the 
obvious errors in Rasfanjani's speech, Poindexter thinks he 
is sending a message that he "wants to work with us." Colonel 
North thinks we can get two more hostages out by the weekend. 
I don't. (We didn't.) We have told all our friends in the 
Mid-East, and according to Poindexter they agree, thi 
like a negotiated settlementand th^ra^to 




The President said this is what you had to do to reward 
Iran for the efforts of those who could help. Actually the 
captors do not benefit at all. We buy the support and the 
oportunity to persuade the Iranians. 

I again pointed out we will have to answer many questions 
and have Congressional hearings. The President said we need 
to point out any discussion endangers our source in Iran and 
our plan, because we do Want to get additional hostages released. 
Mr. Shults spoke up for the first time, saying that it is the 
responsibility of the government to look after its citizens, 
but once you do deal for hostages, you expose everyone to future 
capture. He said we don't know, but we have to assume the 
captors will get someone. He said he felt the Isralies sucked 
us up into their operation so we could not object to their 
sales to Iran. He pointed out there will be a lot of questions 
after any statement, even after a statement such as Mr. Casey 



UNCLASSIFIED 



572 

proposed to read. The President said we should release the 
statement, but not take any questions. Mr. Regan said we are 
being hung oat to dry, our credibility is at stake, and we 
have to say enough. Shortly thereafter the meeting adjourned 
on the note that revised drafts of the Casey proposed statement 
will be sent to us. 



UNfiiEiMiArnFn 



573 




THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
WASHIN6TON. THC DISTRICT OT COLUMBIA 



2Z C^S^ 



D«ceab«r 23, 1986 



Honorable George P. Shultx 
Secretary of State 
Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520 

Dear George: 

I attach a memorandum which I have sent to the White 
House, and about which I feel very strongly. I think the 
memo discusses a very bad way to do very bad business. I 
hope that we will soon have an NSPG to prevent what I see 
is substantial further damage that can come to the 
Administration from a continuation of the same practices 
that have caused so much of the troiible we are experiencing 
now. 

I think it is particularly unfortunate that the State 
Department's public statements are now denying that we are 
continuing contacts with the Iranian government through Third 
Country representatives, which is true only in the most 
technical sense of terms, and which I am afraid will cause 
further adverse reactions when the truth is known. 

Sincerely* 



^Declassified/Released on_ 2-^--> ^ ° 
under provisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 




IWCUSSIFlEir 



574 




.lim^sifi^D 



THI 
WASHINOTOM. THK OtSTmCT OT O0CU»«< A 

22 December 1986 

MBMORANDOM FOR THE ACTIMO AS8I8TAMT TO TBI PRESIDENT FOR 
NATIOHAI. SECURITY AFFAIRS 

When the President announced In late Rovea^ or early 
December that all f\»rther araa ahlpMnts to Iran had ceaaed, 
and after It becaae apparent that the channel* we were usin? 
to diacuaa hostage release, and other matters with the Iranians 
were, at the very least, ineffective, and, as is easily apparent 
now, totally counterproductive, I had assumed th«t we were 
finished with that entire Iranian episode and so testified to 
congressional Committees during last «••*. ^ I «" astounded, 
tSelefore, to learn, on Friday, December 19, 1986, a|£e£ my 
testimony, that Onited States -negotiators' were still «e«ting 
with the same Iranians. I learned this not from our State 
Department or from anyone in the American government, but by 
the same route 1 learned Initially of the original discusslonf 




with the Iranians about arms sales, that is to say 

^^^^^^^^m^^i^^^^^^^Kk When we in quired of 

NS^^^h^Saning^^BI^Bi^Bif I finally advise 
that we did indeed hif^TJSgotiatorf, namely, Mr. Raphael ot 
the State Department, and probably others, still negotiating 
with the same elements in the Iranian group. I was told that 
we were no longer talking with them about selling them armi 
and I hope this jj. true, but I have no ^*ay of knowing if it 
is true. 

I must point out as strongly as I can ^* "Y ***«fP^ 
to conduct major activities in the security field with th. 
deliberate exclusion of those who have sc^ responsibility fo: 
security cannot succeed in anything but adding to the trouble. 
we already have. 1 would very much have appreciated ai 
opportunity to present to the President arguments as to wh] 
we should not continue dealing with these channel* i" J'" 
Their totalWeliability and inability to produce anythin. 
except public accusation* againat the Onited State* makes th< 
entire procedure not only fruitless, but particularly dangeroui 
in view of today's Iranian problems. 

I think the President was entitled to have the advice ol 
all of his security advisors, and I must strongly object thai 
the continuation of thi* practice of secrecy and •"empts tc 
exclude various advisors whose advice it is apparently feare< 

Partally Oer.lass'lied'fieleaseO on_2.fia:£?^ y^ *^ Iri*^ 

wft^a-'ww/-; *( f .0 12356 f J f \id^^ J 

by K joftf.Mfl. National Setuidy CeuncU - ^ -^ - 



575 

■ay not support th« «9«nda ^'\KMMtlCaK«rt»«at/ in this 
CAM. or soe* ethor assnda in othor ensos* can only got as in 
■oro and aoro difficulty, and sorvos tho Prssidsnt vsry badly. 
I thoroforo ask that thara ba a Mating of tba National Socurity 
piABBlna Oroup so this nattor can bo dlscussad proporly, and 
orosontod proporly. to tho Prosidant, and that our so-callad 
nlaatiators with tho Iranian govarnMnt, wharavar thay ara, 
hl^ broooht homm and instructod not to taka any furthar action 
of any kind to aaat with or discuss anything with Iranian 
aovamiant officiala unlass and until thara is a Prasidantial 
dacision growing out of an M8P0 Boating to do so. And if thara 
la such a docislon, I would ask that tha Oaf ansa Dapartaant 
and tho NSC ba kapt fully inforMd and advisad, and consultad 
as to what is ha^aning or about to happan. 

I aa sorry to ba so blunt about it, but it saaas to aa 
incredibly wrong that tha pracisa aachanisas of secrecy and 
atteopts to exclude advisors who, it is feared aay have different 
viewsT which helped cause so aany of our present diff icultiea, 
ara apparently being pursued by the State Departaent at this 
tiao. 

I have now learned, thanks to your forthconlngness with 
Be and by reason of our invest igationa, that McParlane had 
Ic4ually offered the Iranians sensitive intelligence inforaation, 
oassed by the O.S. as to Iraq, and that State plans another 
^tino with tha Iranians on Doceaber 27 in Genena. I urgently 
urg* that no such aeetings be paraitted until we have had the 
NSPG you very forthrightly of fared. 

I will urge, at that aaeting.- that we tell all Iranians 
in whatever channel or channels there aay be that we will discuss 
nothlnq with any of thea until all Aaerican hostages are returned 
SSSrSJdT n»a teras of reference you kindly showed ae today 
,««■ to ao to be wholly inadequate. 



CCS Don Regan 







UNOMSUIP 



576 



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C 2710 



MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD 



SUBJECT: 



Breakfast with Secretary and Deputy 
Secretary of Defense. 15 March 1905 



H DEPOSmoN 
' EXHIBIT 



Part^illy Oeciassitied/Released on 2 "^ J^i Ogft 
under D'uvisions of E 12356 
Dv K, Jonnson. National Security Council 



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HIX197002 

XPTS HAZUR 
DCHK OOMOCK 



PAGE 1 



DEPOSITIOK or WILLUn WELD 
Thursday, July 16, 1987 

House oi Representatives, 
Select Cownittee on Investigate 
Covert Arns Transactions with Iran, 
Washington, D.C. 

The select committee «et, pursuant to call, at 2=00 p.. 
in Room B-352, Rayburn House Oiiice Building, Pamela J. 
Haughton (Staff counsel to the select committee 1 presiding. 

Present: on behalf of the House Selict Committee: Pamela 
J. Kaughton, Staff Counsel; and Ken Buck. Assistant Minority 
Counsel. 

on behalf of the Senate Select Committee. Thomas McGough, 
Associate Counsel. 



I 



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NAME: 

22 
23 

214 

25 

26 

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MU1197002 

PAGE 2 

«S. HAUGHTOH: Okay. Me are on the record. 

It is a deposition of William Held, and the witness 
has already been sworn. I a» famela J. Haughton. Staii 
counsel to the House Select Committee to Investigate Coveri 
Arms Transactions With Iran. 

Will the people present around the table introduce 
themselves ? 

HR. ncGOUGH: I am Tom HcGough. Associate Counsel 
with the Select Committee. 

MR. BUCK: Ken Buck, Assistant Minority Counsel for 
the House Committee. 

THE witness: William Weld, Assistant Attorney 
General, Criminal Division. Justice Department. 
Whereupon, 

WILLIAM WELD 
was called for as a witness and, having been previously duly 
sworn, was examined and testified further as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MS. HAUGHTON: 
e Mr. Weld, when did you become the Assistant Attorney 
General for the Criminal Division? 
A September IS or 16. 1986. 
B And before that, you were? 

A From November 1, 1981 until September IS, 1986. I 
was 4MMN-.. United States Attorney for the District of 



582 



HknZ- HIR197002 PAGE 3 

m nassachustttts with my duty station in Boston. Hassachusatts . 
••7 B Prior to your becoming U.S. Attornay. did you hava 

te experience in criminal law enforcement? 
*•' * Not much. I had been ior 10 years with a Boston law 

50 iirm. Hill and Barlow, where I was a litigation partner. 1 

51 had a total of three or four criminal defense cases that I 

52 had taken on referral from the Public Defender. I had nine 

53 months of working on the Watergate impeachment matter in 
)^ SM 1973 0mt — I was Associate Minority Counsel for the House 

55 Judiciary Committee on the impeachment inquiry. 

56 . I had taken six months off to run for Attorney 

57 General of the State of Massachusetts in 1978, and I had 

58 been a judicial law clerk for the Supreme Judicial Court of 

59 Massachusetts, where most of the business was criminal, but 

60 by no means all of it. 

61 B And I gather in your capacity as U.S. Attorney, you 

62 have supervised probably hundreds of criminal prosecutions? 

63 A Thousands, yes. 
6i| fi Okay. 

65 Kow, I want to address the issue of the Iranian arms 

66 sales. In early November, around the 3rd or *4th, newspaper 

67 stories started breaking regarding tha sal* of 

68 Israeli — excuse me; of American-made arms to Iran. Do you 

69 recall when you first heard of that? 

70 A Oh. I probably read about it at the tiaa the storias 



583 



NAME: 

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HIR197002 PAGE K 

ueie iiist published. I think the first tine I becane 
engaged with respect to the natter was in dealing with the 
Evans case that was pending in Hew York City, and upon ^ 
reviewing ny records, it looks to ne as though that was • 
November 10, 11, 12, that year. 

S Prior to reading about it in the newspapers, did you 
have any knowledge of the U.S. participation in arms sales 
to Iran? 

A I don't believe so, no. 

e Okay. Can you tell us what your involvement was 
then, and with the Evans case, beginning on or before 
November 10 of 1986? 

A Yes . That was a case pending against one Samuel 
Evans, an American lawyer, and others for violating the 
export control laws by conspiring to have weapons go to 
Iran, and as I learned in Novenber, one of the defenses 
offered by the personj scheduled to go to trial was that they 
believed they were acting in a manner authorized by the 
United States Government. 

2 Excuse me. Has this a defense that was recently 
posed after the public revelations or is this a defense that 
they had been asserting prior to the first week of November? 

A I believe it is a defenstt they luww been asserting 
prior to the first week in November. 
Q Okay, please continue. 



584 



M*nE. HIR197002 

PACE s 

all.g.d oifxci.i *«„iea„ sal.s oi .„s to r 

•ras to Iran obviously 

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supervisor, c.olty i„ th.t oHic.. 

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carrying the message upstairs — t 4.k , 

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585 



^«^, 



N»HE: HIR197002 PAGE 6 

121 2 Okay. 

'22 Mas there any sort of afiidavit or declaration to 

123 appear, or was this simply to be a statement deposed in t)\e 

. 12M motion papers? 

125 A I think it was in a motion paper. I do recall that 

126 there was a document that I was working ofi at some time, 

127 and I think it was--you have it. I saw it when we did ray 

128 interview. I think it was in the nature of a representation 

129 in a motion paper. 

130 Q Okay. And they are looking to Main Justice for 

131 confirmation of that position; is that correct? 

132 A Yes. They sent down a draft, and I think the first 

133 draft I saw said something such as, well, the events 

13^ discussed by President Reagan at his recent news conference 

35 a*^ no connection with the events at issue in case--somethin3 

A 
I 

136' broad and conclusory like that. 

137 I was not terribly comfortable with that language. 

138 I mean, how would the author of that memorandum know that? 

139 I think Mark Richard felt the same way, so our theme was 
1M0 more homework has to be done here. 

mi . S Did the Evans at all involve Adnan Khashoggi? 

m2 A I think that Sam Evans used to represent Adnan 

1*43 Khashoggi, although I am not positive about that. I think, 

IMU yes, his name definitely came up in that case. He was not a 

IMS named defendant--! don't think, but I recall the names 



586 



NAIKE 

me 
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IMS 
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152 
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157 
158 
159 
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HIR197002 PAGE 7 

Khashoggi and De la Rocque both being associated with Evans 
and Evans' defense. 

2 Were there any other shall I say common denominators 
between the Evans case and what you know oi the U.S. 
Government Iran initiative? 

A I should say that I am no expert on the U.S. 
Government Iran initiative, but one topic that came up 
quickly was the type of materiel being shipped to Iran. 
There were TOW missiles, HAWK missiles, F-IM spare parts, 
night vision equipment and something else that I can't 
remember--with the five categories involved in the Evans 
case, and I remember asking early on, well, you know, were 
these involved in the shipments to Iran, and I recall nr. 
Meese saying at one point, ''Ko, only one or possibly at 
most two oi those things are common — "' so there was some 
common link, I believe, in the type of equipment shipped to 
Iran. 

C Okay. 

A Again, as fax as I am concerned, this is allegedly 
in both cases. 

e Sure. Did you take this eventually to the attention 
of the Attorney General? 

A Yes. 

fi Do you recall when? 

A Hell, it got quite quickly to the attention of the 



587 



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172 
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MIR197002 PAGE 8 

Attorney General. I--I believe I nust have taised it at an 
8=30 staii meeting, because during that week, between 
November 10 and November 17, the Attorney General 
essentially undertook to supply the iniormation which would 
be necessary for the motion papers in the New York case, or 
to perform due diligence work, if you will. 

& Prior to this, do you know whether or not the 
Attorney General undertook to ask Admiral PoindsKter whether 
or not the arms sales that were in the Evans case were 
sanctioned? In other words, did he do this in the summer or 
early fall of 1986? 

A I have no knowledge about that. After--you know, one 
or two meetings with the Attorney General on the Evans 
moving papers, I said, look, how can we be sure about this, 
and I was talking with — with him and Ken Cribb, C-r-i-b-b — and 
either Ken or the: Attorney General suggested that the matter 
be run past the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, who is Hr . Poindexter. 

Q Okay. 

A And if you look at the drafts of the moving papers 
or affidavit, whatever it is, that I was working off of, you 
will see on one of them that there is inserted in my 
handwriting the words, ''and after consultation with the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.*' 
That was done at a sitdown I had with Ken and the AG one 



588 



NAME: 
196 

197 

y/ 198 

.199 
200 
201 
202 
203 
20M 
205 
206 
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212 



^^ 



213 
21M 
215 
216 
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HZR197002 PAGE 9 

Boxning, at which K«n ■•ntioned that tha language in tha 
moving papers had baan. ''fly-specked past PoindeKtex. * ' 
meaning as I understand ihat reviewed in detail. 

e Uho had done this? 

A The AG was my understanding. 

e Has there any discussion at that time oi the 
Attorney General doing this on his own? 

A Having done It earlier? 

C Yes. 

A No. 

e Okay. 

What about at this particular time? Has there any 
discussion when he said we should go to Polndexter as to whc 
should do that? 

A Gee, I have always thought the AG did it personally. 

S Oh. I am not Indicating any knowledge to the 
contrary. Hhat I am saying Is, did tha Attorney General 
say, ''I will do this myself' or did he say maybe someone 
else should do it, or was there a discussion of who should 
do it? 

A 

one meeting where he said he would do It, and then this 
morning masting with him and Kan Cribb was a later meeting 
where I learned that it had baan dona, and that Is when I 
wrote in my copy of the moving papers which I later sent up 



I think he im**m»»4v«4< to do it himself. There was 



589 



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223 

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225 

226 

227 

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229 

230 

231 

232 

233 

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239 

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2Hit 

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HIR197002 PAGE 10 

to John Richardson, I think on Novenber 17. you know, "after 
checking with Poindexter .** 

Q Okay. 

Do you know when that went out to the Southern 
District of New York? 

A Ko. 

e Was it shortly after you sent it up to Mr. 
Richardson? 

A I don't know. I would think so. 

2 For the record-- 

A It would have gone out presunably from Hark Richard, 
not from John Richardson. I would think in the ordinary 
course, I would have been sending it to John Richardson for 
clearance, and then the Internal Security Section or Deputy 
Assistant AG, Mark Richard or whoever was directly in 
contact with Denny Young or Benito Romani or Lorna Schofield 
would have sent it up. I could be wrong. Maybe it went 
from Richardson. 

e At any rate, you did not send it to Kew York? 

A That is right. 

8 Was this a Customs case? 

A Yes. I kept forgetting that, but Customs was the 
investigative agency. 

S Okay. And did you discuss this language with 
Customs ? 



590 



KAHE: HZI1197002 PAGE 11 

2i|6 A No. 

2t|7 e Okay. 

248 Kow, at this tins, of course, there were revelatioi^s 

2*49 oi the U.S. initiative uith Iran in the ams sales. Was 

250 this — let's say prior to the Novenber 17 — was this a subject 

251 of discussion at any of the staff meetings? 

252 A Yes. 

253 2 Can you give us a flavor of what those discussions 
251 were? 

255 A Uell. the thing I remember is a discussion about who 

256 should deal with the press concerning inquiries regarding 

257 Iran--because fM iaene l t office in Kew York, among others, was 

258 getting questions about whether the activities under 

259 indictment had actually been sanctioned by the government, 

260 and his was only one of a dozen or more Iran arms cases 

261 pending around the country. 

262 I remember the Attorney General suggesting that when 

263 it comes to questions concerning Iran, that no comment 
26U should be made by the field. 

265 e And what was decided regarding how those press 

266 inquiries would be handled at Main Justice? 

267 A Oh, I assume they went to Terry Eastland as per 

268 usual. Terry Eastland being the Press Secretary. 

269 e Okay. 

270 Here there any discussions of the substance of the 



591 



MAHE: HIR197002 PAGE 12 

271 facts surrounding the ains sales? 

272 A Well, there was sone discussion at the morning 

273 meeting on Friday, November 21st, concerning statements 

27M being made to Congress and whether they hung together, that 

275 sort of thing. 

276 2 Okay. Prior to that, though, in the staff meetings 

277 was there discussion of the substantive facts revolving 

278 around the Iranian arms sales as they were coming out? 

279 A rty impression is that that was closely held, and 

280 that there was no discussion of what was going on with the 

281 Iranian arms sales. 

282 Q Okay. 

283 Were you aware of Assistant Attorney General 

28M Cooper's activities in trying to fifid the facts and apply 

285 the law? 

i 

286 . A Ho. 

287 Q Okay. Do you know whether or not anyone in the 

288 Criminal Division was aware of that? 

289 A I would be reasonably sure that no one was. 

290 Q Okay. So. his activities prior to November 20. 

29 1 let's say, were not discussed in any staff meetings of any 

292 kind that you can recall; is that correct? 

293 A K^ght. There's an 8=10 a.m. and an 8:30 a.m. every 
29>4 day. I go to the 8:30. I don't go to the 8:10. I can't 
295 speak to the 8:10. 



y 



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NAME: 
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MXt197002 PAGE 13 

e Okay, in th« 8=30 Bastings, than, you don't recall 
that baing — 

ft I a» pretty clear that was not discussed. 

e Okay. 

By the way— strike that. 

Okay. now. as to Noveaber 21. you attended the 8:30 
meeting . 

A Yes. 

e Okay. And did the subject of the Iranian arns sales 
cone up? 

A Yes. I believe the Evans case came up, and I recall 
saying that I wasn't sure it was such a good idea for the 
Ciininal Division and the FBI not to be involved in the 
process oi researching the government to be able to make «^ 
representation to the court as to — you know, what was in 
accordance with official policy and what wasn't. 

fi Okay. 

When you say in researching the government, you mean 
the U.S. -Iran initiative arms sales as opposed to the Evans 
arms sales? 

A Right. 

Q To see whether or not there was — 

A ny point was in order to make a representation to 
the court, you have to have somebody who knows all the facts 
of the Evans case and all the facts of the U.S. arms sales. 



593 



•' 



NAHE.: 
321 
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323 

321 
325 

326 
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HIX197002 PAGE IM 

and that it didn't make sans* fox vaxy high-ranking 
officials to ba icsaazching the U.S. Govatnment side of the 
ease unless they were intimately familial with the Evans 
side of the case as well. 

fi Okay. J 

Hhy did you suggest the Ctiminal Division ^>«f the FBI 
to do this? 

A Hell, you know, I think this is--I think this is one 
of those tines when I focgot that Customs had the Evans 
case. I was thinking the AUSA, the agents on the case, 
maybe someone fzom Internal Security, Joe Tafe. who was 
already serving as a liaison on that case. 

e And fox the record, the Internal Security Section is 
part of the Criminal Division? 

A It is part of the Criminal Division, yes. 

fi So, basically people who were familiar with the 
general facts of Iranian arms sales to begin to look into 
the--the U.S. initiative regarding sales of weapons to Iran. 

A Right, in order to be able to answer the defense 
motions . 

C All right. 

A And when I said Criminal Division and FBI. I think 
what I really mean is attorneys and agents. Some of the 
Iran arms cases around the country are FBI cases, and some 
are Customs. 



594 



HA!)E: HIR197002 PAGE 15 

3M6 2 Okay. 

3M7 When you — I take it that you were the one who 

3M8 mentioned this at the neetingt is that correct? 

3U9 A Yes. 

350 C All right. And when you said that, what was the 

351 response? 

352 A People were surprised, because I — this was a new 

353 topic I was raising, and I raised it with sone feeling, and 
*^ 35M I remember Mr. Trott looking at me with what I thought VJ*-J 

355 surprise. 

356 I am not certain whether Mr. Burns was there as 

357 well. I think he was. I am certain that Mr. Meese was not. 

358 e Okay. 

359 MR. McGOUGH: You are certain about Mr. Meese was 

360 not at the meeting? 

361 THE WITNESS: He was not at the Friday, November 

362 21st, 8=30. 

363 BY MS. NAUGHTOH: 
36M e Was Mr. Reynolds there? 

365 A Yes, definitely. 

366 Q And Mr. Cooper? 

367 A Yes. 

368 e And you nentioned Mr. Ttott-and Mr. Burns. Has 

369 there anyone else there that you can recall? 

370 A Oh, there was a full table, because I was sitting 



595 



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HIR197002 PAGE 16 

down at the very end, so there would have been 10 people 
there anyway. 

e Okay . .< 

A The people who customarily attended that meeting, 
although I don't recall anyone eifcept for Trott, Reynolds 
and Cooper definitely being there, but the people who 
usually attended would include Terry Eastland, John Bolton, 
who is the Legislative Assistant AG: Steve Harknan, who was 
at the Office of Legal Policy — 

S Does Kathy Appleyard usually sit in on those as 
well? 

A She has been for a number of months. I am not 
certain whether that was the practice in November. I would 
say no. Also, although I never thought about it before, I 
tend to think she is there only when the AG is there. 

8 Okay. 

Has Hr . Richardson or Mr. Cribb there? 

A Could have been — yeah, I should add them to the list 
of customary attendees. 

MR. ncCOUGH: Mr. Habicht? 

THE HITNESS: Ko , he is not a customary attendee, 
although he sometimes does if there is a matter involving 
the Lands Division. 

BY HS. NAU6HT0N' 

e Okay. Do you recall, was Hr. Cooper ttiere 



596 



HAHE: HIR197002 f*"^ '"^ 

396 throughout or did he come late or 

397 ft You know. I don't recall that. The reason I say 

398 Brad Reynolds and Chuck Cooper were there is I recall 

399 talking to them at the conclusion of the meeting. I have 
MOO read recently in the press that Hr . Cooper «as at an 8 a.m. 
HOI meeting at the CIA on that day, and I am trying to think if 
M02 I am crazy for remembering that, but I think he and Brad 
M03 were there at least at the conclusion. 

^Q^ conversely, it is conceivable that Mr. Heese had 

MOS been there early, and then left, but he wasn't there when I 

406 made my statement about the Criminal Division and the FBI. 

407 . fi Hr. Cooper did testify he did not spend a great deal 
1408 of time at the CIA that morning. Do you have any 

M09 recollection how long the whole meeting took? 
mo A They usually break up around 9 = 00. 
mi 2 Okay. 
1,12 A But they sometimes go as late as 9 = 20. 

1*13 e Okay. 

m4 You stated that you enpressed your feelings rather 

1415 strongly. Can you give us a sense of what you said? 

MU . A Hy exact words, as best I can recall, were I am not 

M17 sure it makes very much sense for the Criminal Division and 

ms the FBI not to be involved in this. 

•4 19 fi Um-hum. Did you also make any comments regarding 

M20 the Attorney General being used as a fact-gatherer? 



597 



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HIR197002 PAGE 18 

A I had discussed that with Mazk Richazd dounstaizs 
that I could not see the wisdom of that. I cannot now 
recall whether I said that at that morning meeting, but if I 
so stated at my interview, then — 

S Hy notes indicated you referred to that the Attorney 
General should not be a gumshoe — 

A Okay; that sounds like me. 

e --was what I wrote down. 

A That sounds like me. 

e Okay. 

A I don't now recall saying that at that meeting. I 
certainly said that in conversation with Hark Richard. 

C Hhat did you mean by that? 

A Well, he has got limited number of hours in the day. 
If there are — if there is factual research that needs to be 
dane to support a statement being made in — you know, one 
motion in one of the 30,000 cases we have pending, get 
some — somebody from the office or the Internal Security 
Section to do it. 

It is a question of his time. And the point I made 
earlier about, you know, he is going to have to take time to 
get steeped in all the Evans facts in order to be the 
signatory as it were on the representation to the court. 

e Sure. 

Did you know at this time that the Attorney General 



598 



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HIR197002 PAGE 19 

had actually participated in drafting of the January 17 
finding? 

A Ko , I had never heard of the January 17 finding at^ 
that point. Had I? Had that been — 

8 I wouldn't know. 

A Any way, the answer is no. 

8 What I aik getting at is, was there a concern solely 
for the Attorney General's tine, or did it also encompass or 
concern about being a fact-finder if one was involved with 
the initiative? 

A No, I think it was just a nanagenent issue. It is 
crazy to have the top people going out doing fact research. 

8 Okay. 

After you Mentioned this--and I believe you stated in 
your interview rather warmly. I wrote that down, too. 

A Yes. 

8 What was the response? Do you recall what people in 
the room had to say about that? 

A No. The discussion. I recall, was after the meeting 
broke up, Mr. Cooper and Mr. Reynolds were still seated next 
to each other at the table, and I came over on the other 
side and said something like, well, you know, I don't mean 
to overstate this point, but it just seems to me that we 
ought to be able to manage it a little bit better. 

I was trying to take back from the warmth of my 



599 



NXnS: HIR197002 



PAGE 20 



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statenent so that people wouldn't think that I was 
particularly angling for business, but I just want to wake 
sure this got done in a way that nade sense, and that led ^to 
a conversation involving Chuck and Brad, where Brad I 
believe said, ''Well, sonebody has got to get involved here, 
because there are a lot of statements going around and 
statements being prepared for the Hill, and these things 
aren't hanging together.'* 

And I said, ''Hell, that is way over my head,*' and 
Brad said, ''Well, that is way over all of our heads. •' 

2 Okay. Do you recall if Hr . Cooper said anything on 
that subject? 

A Yeah, I think he did more or less along the lines 
that Brad was saying, but I am not sure, 
fi Okay. 

Did either of them mention Director Casey's 
testimony specifically, that you recall? 

A I wouldn't be surprised. I think that Director 
Casey's testimony had been in the news either the day before 
or the day of, so that it would have been topical. 

e Well, did either of them tell you what was being 
done about that, these dissimilar statements that were 
coming out? 
A No. 
e Okay. Did they indicate — either of them indicate to 



600 



NAME: HIR197002 



PAGE 



21 



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you that the Attorney General was personally involved in 
helping to review drafts of the Casey testimony? 

A No, I don't think so. It wasn't that in-depth a 

' ■ ' ^ - - •* saying , 



V si: 



y 



516 
y / 517 



518 
519 
520 



conversation. Brad was being <TntiiDA in a way 

''Yeah, you are right. Someone has got to get in here and 

have a look around.'' 

2 But when he said that, did he indicate that someone 
was ? 

A No. I don't believe that I understood that Mr. 
Reynolds or Mr. Cooper was doing that. 

e Okay. 

Was there anything else on that subject at the 
meeting or--after the meeting? 

A I don't think so. 

2 Okay. 

4 

After you returned to your office, did you assign 
anybody to do research on the legal issues involved? 

6- 

A I called up ferry McDowell, who is head of the 
Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Section at some 
point; I guess it was that Friday, and said, ''Hey, #erry, 
about Iran, why don't you have somebody have a look see 
whether4»if the stories in the papers are true. «r there 
might be any violations of law implicated.'' 

2 By calling the Public Integrity Section then. I take 
it you were focusing on public officials? 



601 



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22 



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,,a Hno«. ^^'^ ^hat ^^'♦^ ,. it was 

S^\ o^'^'"'^" ^ ,,. crl«i-^ ^-*^'^ ^,,,e o* any 

\ .v^vt none of *»^* ^^^e VO« *** _ ^ot a'^V 

S35\ tl^** "" .^ that ti»e' ^l^ethei^ or n 

\ ,« activi^^* y or the 

\ „x those a»^ one *•»» 

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o\ ^ HO. X "* ^^U you 

53'\ ■ ^ rney General 

\ e 0^*^- did the attorney 

^A ■ on the 2'»*^' *'* 

5UM • .^^.s subject. 

\ .A to this 

\ <« regard ^" 

\ Ji ''«*• . « that w**' .„- with »V 

S'^al • recall when th ^^^^„g 

o DO yo^ '**= .^^ a meeting I 
5UU • ^ ,, it was during 

\ . well' 




602 



HAHE: HIR197002 

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PAGE 23 



deputies, and those ate often «1m 10 or 10-30 a.m., so I 
would say it was between 10 and 11 a.m. 

8 Okay. 

Do you know if he was calling from his office? 

A I don't know where he was calling fxos. 

C Okay. Do you recall anybody placing the call for 
him? 

A When I got on the line, I think he was on the line, 
but that is his style. 

S He places his own calls? 

A Hot all of them, but if it is — I think he was on the 
line. I don't know that anything turns on it. I am 
uncertain about that. I think he was. 

Q And when he called you, what did he say to you? 

A He said words to the effect of, ''I just want you to 
know with respect to tiis Iran matter that the fact that the 
Criminal Division is not involved is not negligence or a 
product of sloppiness. and you should not be concerned that 
matters are, you know, falling between the cracks. This is 
being done that way on purpose.'' 

e Okay. 

Did he allude to what was being done? 

A Ho . I took his statement to refer to my expression 
of concern at the Friday meeting. Hy inference was that 
someone had reported to him that I had expressed this view 



603 



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57i| 
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KIR197002 pj„ 2, 

with some warmth, and h« should— that he night want to giva 
■a a call to aaka suxa that I understood that tha matter was 
being handled. 

e But did he tell you by whom or what was being done? 
A Ho, that is just about all he said, 
e Do you recall what your response was? 
A I said. '"Ed. I— I gather—or I did— I did register a 
concern at the Friday meeting about you doing this research, 
and my only thought is that if you »mifa< to carry too much 
water here that some may spill on you.*' Those were my 
words . 

Q Can you tell us what you meant by that? 
A Well, if you are going to be responsible for making 
a representation to a court in a court paper, you have to be 
very sure of your facts, and I guess my meaning was that it 
would be difficult for him to be sufficiently on top of ijoth 
the facts on the Iranian arms sales by the government and 
the facts in the Evans case to be able to make a clean 
statement that, you Know, the activities in Evans had no 
connection with the activities that the government had been 
carrying on. 

fi Um-hum. Did you mention to him the research that 
you had had done? 

A Mo, I don't even think it was in my mind. As I say. 
I didn't see it until sometime later, and when Z did, it was 



604 



1/ 



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HIR197002 PJIGE 25 

an anti-cllitax. I didn't tftally du«ll on it until I saw it 
in docuaent production in February of '87. 

S Between the tiae oi that phone call and the Attorney 
General's press conference the next day, where obviously the 
whole word was told it was happening, did you have any other 
discussions or learn anything or read anything pursuant to 
the subject matter? 

A Read anything-'you mean other than in the newspapers 
or — 

5 Correct. Yeah. Has anything going at the 
Department of Justice regarding this issue? 

A That I was involved in? 

Q Yes, sir. 

A I don't think so. I think I got off that train and 
the next I heard was when Hark Richard called ae #and said 
there had been a press conference and Poindexter resigned 
and North had been fired. 

6 Did you have any knowledge on that day, on the 2<4th, 
that Brad Reynolds and Chuck Cooper had met with Tom Green, 
the attorney for Oliver North? 

A No. 

2 Or actually for Secord? 
A No. 

S After the Attorney General's press conference, what 
did you do? 



605 



NAME: 
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MIR197002 PAGE 26 

k UmlX. Hark llchazd callad ■• . I was in ay of flea . 
Ha said that this prass confatanca had occuctad. Poindaxtaz 
zasignadi Kozth had baan f izad . I said. *'Hait. wait. 
Tinaout. You battaz gat in haza and bzing aa up to spaad on 
this. ' ' Ha said okay. 

As soon as ha got into ay oifica, which would hava 
bean 30 saconds lataz. wa racaivad a call to go up and see 
Steve Tzott on tha iouzth f looz . 

fi For the zecozd. Stava Tzott is? 

A He is the Associate Attorney Genazal. 

fi Okay. 

A Steve said, ''You two guys.'* aeaning Kichazd and 
Meld, ''are to go aeet with Chuck Cooper now and a***^ out 
what the possible criminal iapllcations of this scenario as 
described by the pzess confezence aight ba.'* 

So. we pzoceeded fzoa Tzott's office to Coopez's 
office to do that. 

fi Okay. What did ha tall you? 

A What did Tzott tell us? 

fi What did Coopez tall you when you went to see him? 

A Ha gave us a little bit of a chronology on past 
sales — I think he mentioned September *85. Kovambar '85. 
February '86. Hay '86. August '86 and either September or 
October '86. Ha talked about 508 TOH missiles heze and then 
some Hawk missiles that got zatuzned. and what types of 



606 



NAHE 

6117 

6148 
. 6(49 
650 
651 
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653 
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661 
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663 
66>4 
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667 
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669 
670 



PXGE 27 



IIIK197002 
tt^uipment. 

H» talksd about Iranian middleman and God knows who 
elsa making a buck on the side, you know, as possibilities. 
He talked about the CI» and BOB and the price between them, 
and you know, what the implication of that might be for 
whether or not American dollars were involved. 

And basically, it is like the first year law school 
exam question, what torts? This is: what crimes? 

Q Did he discuss the diversion of the money to the 
contras? 

A Oh. yeah. He did. He must have. That was the 
topic of the press conference, although you know. I didn't 
get a--a transcript of that until later, but in Mark's first 
call to me, he had mentioned the diversion, so. yeah, that 

was very much discussed. 

< 

2 Okay. 

A And the Boland Amendment was discussed. During the 
initial narrative by Chuck, he took a call from Dick 
Armitaga at Defense and learned — he said that 508 TOW 
missiles was all that the Army had in stock at the time that 
the 508 missiles went from Israel to Iran which seemed to 
make an impression on him. 

B All right. 

Which — when Armitage said that the 508 were all the 
U.S. had in stock, what was Cooper's response? Why would 



607 



HJIHE: 
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PAGE 28 



HIR197002 
that aake an iapxession? 

A His response was, "Oh, wow." i infer that the 
reason it would make an impression is that it might support 
an inference that the decision by the Israelis to select a 
number 508 to send was the product of some colloquy with the 
Americans, but I am not even sure if I got the countries 
right. 

I am going on my memory of notes of a conversation 
that I didn't understand in the first place. 
S Okay. When you were — 

A I have detailed notes of this conversation, which I 
am sure would enable me to be more precise, but for whatever 
it is worth — 

C I think we have those. 
A Ua did those last time. 

e Yeah. Uhat I want to try to pinpoint is when you 
were discussing what particular criminal statutes might be 
involved, were you focusing on the diversion of the funds or 
on the legality or illegality of the arms sales themselves? 

A Hark Richard and I were answering it as a what- 
crimes question. First thing that occurred to me was 
conspiracy to violate the Boland Amendment, 371. conspiracy. 

The second thing that occurred to Hark and me both was 
conspiracy to defraud the Congress in the faithful 
administration of the foreign military sales program but. 



I 



608 



NAME : 
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697 



l/t/( 



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699 

700 

701 

702 

703 

7014 

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716 

717 

718 

719 

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you know, we considered everything, nail fraud, wire fraud, 
munitions statutes, arms export control, tax violations, a 
6^1 U.i.Vj.\. from the government, assuming that there ulz*. 
some spread between the price paid to the government and 
what the property was worth to the Iranians. 

So. I think that our response was directed to both 
halves of the situation at that meeting— speaking for Hark 
Richard and myself. 
6 Okay. 

After you laid these out. did you put it in any sort 
of a written form? 

A I have notes, and I think I recapped my notes into 
five broad headings when we went in to see the AG at 5:30. 

C Did you communicate with anybody from the TBI' or 
Customs during this time period, that is. Tuesday afternoon? 

A That afternoon. 

2 On this subject? 

A Ko. I don't think I got out of meetings all day. I 
went from Trotfs office to Cooper's and from Cooper's to 
the AG. 

e And when you met with the Attorney General, did he 
tell you he had spoken to anybody at the FBI? 

A I had — I have to look at my notes. There was one 
meeting where he suggested— but I think it was the next 
morning, where he suggested that he had spoken to Buck 



609 



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^ l^^ 

. 72«4 
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7MS 



HIR197002 PAGI 30 

Ruuellt and that he and I and Trott should be briefed by the 
Buieau latex in the day--I think that was Wednesday mozning, 
the l i^fci , 

S Okay. 

A It would appear in my notes. 

2 Okay. When you met with the Attorney General at 
5:30 on Tuesday, do you recall what it was he told you? 

A He said, ''Okay, Bill. Let's hear about the 
potential criminal theories--criminal violations.'* There 
was a bunch of people in the room, eight or 10, and I laid 
out a summary oi what Richard and I had come up with with 
Cooper . 

Q Okay. And did the subject oi authority come up 
regarding the 1985 shipments? 

A Hell, I think it was recognized that the answer to 
the' criminal questions could be a lot diiierent depending on 
whether--varlous shipments were taken with authority or not. 

2 Hell, I guess what I am getting at is at this 
meeting, did the Attorney General volunteer any facts that 
he had found out over the weekend or at any other tim« to — 

A No, I think that came up at the Hednesday 2:30 
meeting . 

2 Okay. Dld--when you were discussing the Arms Export 
Control Act, which 1 assumed you did during this 5:30 
meeting — 



82-740 0-88-21 



610 



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HIR197002 PAGE 31 

A Briefly. 

fi — and the National Security Act, did the Attorney 
General tell you that they had proceeded under the Kational 
Security Act so to allay the problems of the Ariis Export 
Control Act? 

A No, I don't think he did. 

fi Okay. 

Did he impart to you that he had participated in the 
finding in January of '86? 

A No, ue didn't get into that at all. 

2 Okay. So this is mainly a recitation by you? 

A He talking nou. 

Q Okay. And what was his response after you finished 
going through your laundry list? 

A Thank you very much. 

fi Okay. 

So there was no sort of discussion or — 

A Well, I think my notes make reference to the 
Attorney General mentioning some vague conspiracy charge or 



something like that. I led off with conspiracy, 



mA. 



fraud 



locstr 



and wire fraud, three of the Attorney General's 

titei^m%A statutes, and then I thought of 44»* false statement, 

which is another one of his lAdM^ favorite statutes. 



fi And recently, the Supreme Court 's.oOi 

A And recently the Supreme Court's. But there was 



611 



HAHE: HIR197002 
771 



PAGE 32 



1/^77 2 

773 

»/^ 77H 

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789 
790 
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795 



soiie--you know, you ate asking about the discussion. There 
was sone discussion about »eat-and-potato statutes wt i you 
know, specific prohibitory provisions versus these vague • 
conspiracy mail iraud, wire iraud type of statutes. 

Q After the meeting then with the Attorney General and 
others, did you do anything else on this issue Tuesday 
afternoon? 

A I would think I probably went downstairs and 
continued to kick it around with Mark Richard, because 6:00 
is not usually when I go home . 

2 Okay . 

Then on the 26th, there was a meeting — actually a 
very large meeting which a lot of people attended to try to 
get the game plan going. Did you have any meetings prior to 
that meeting? 

I think the record will indicate that took place 
around 2:'«5 in the afternoon. 

A Yeah, we had a morning meeting as well. 

2 And was this with Hr . Cooper and Mr. Reynolds? 

riOvJ 
A Yes. I am *♦*• consulting the three pages of notes 

that I made of the meetingjthat I attended. I had a 9:15 on 

the 26th with the Attorney General, Hr . Burns. Hr . Trott. 

Mr. Reynolds, Cooper, Bolton, Cribb, Korten, K-o-r-t-e-n, 

and John Richardson. 

2 Okay. As a general matter, does Mr. Burns usually 



612 



MAKE: HIR197002 PAGE 33 

796 take notes at these meetings? 

797 A Hot usually, I don't think. 

798 fi And at that meeting, did you discuss how the 

799 Criminal Division was going to handle this new 

800 investigation? 

801 . A I think the very first thing that was said was that 

802 the Attorney General said. ''Bill, today is the day ior 

803 handoii to the FBI and to the Criminal Division. ' ' 

80>4 fi Is there anything that made Wednesday different than 

805 Tuesday night? 

806 A I don't know. 

807 fi In other words, when you left the Attorney General 

808 Tuesday night, did you get the impression that you now had 

809 the authority to go forward and investigate? 

810 A No. I had the impression that was on hold until the 

81 1 next day . 

812 fi Okay. So, the next day is when you actually heard 

813 of his decision to go forward with the criminal 
81M investigation? 

815 A Yes. Hy best recollection is that I formed the 

816 impression somehow on Tuesday night that that was on hold 

817 until the next day. 

818 fi Okay. 

819 A So, I would infer that the subject had come up on 

820 Tuesday night. 



613 






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HIR197002 PAGE 3M 

S And what else was discussed at this neeting? 
A I believe at the 9=15, the conposition of the 
investigative — or excuse me, the prosecutive t iiw. was 
discussed, and I said I would probably go with a couple 
senior people iron the Public Integrity Section, which 
handled Special Prosecutor and Independent Counsel matters. 

There is a guy over there. Bill Hendricks, who has a 
lot of experience in CIA matters, as well, so he was a 



a|W 



natural. I think we put on Alan Carver as well, who Eq(a 
ftfL^jiul 4nterest j f t i ialij bi , '^and a military background, t 

The AG said he wanted me to personally supervise 
this in the interest* of speed. He wanted both Jack " 



who is my principal deputy and supervises the Public 
Integrity Section, and Hark Kichard, who is my second 
principal deputy and supervises the Internal Security and 
International Affairs Sections, to be involved, and that 
Chuck Cooper would be a member of the prosecution team as 
well. So it would be six in all. 

e Did he say why he wanted Mr. Cooper to be involved? 

A I don't believe he did. 

8 Did the Attorney General ask to be kept informed on 
a routine basis? 

A Oh. sure. I mean, I think that was the point of 
having me supervise it closely. It was John Richardson said 
at that meeting--said if anything comes up hot. get it to the 



614 



MAKE: HIR197002 PAGE 35 

846 AG innediately . 

8147 & Okay. 

8U8 Kou. was it at this meeting or the afternoon meeting 

^ 849 that it was brought up as to whether some facet should 

850 proceed civilly as opposed — 

851 . A It was at that meeting. 

852 e Okay. 

853 A Mr. Cooper said it was his understanding that the 
8514 criminal investigation would focus on the diversion to the 

855 contras, and that the investigation that he and Hr . Reynolds 

856 had been conducting of the Iran side of the fence would 

857 proceed on a civil track, although it might throw off leads 

858 for the criminal investigation. 

859 S Okay. And what was the response to that? 

860 A I am not sure anyone said anything. I probably gave 

861 negative body English, because I didn't draw a distinction 

862 between the two. I know I wrote a question mark in my notes 

863 in the margin, and the--I don't think the idea was kicked 
86M around much after that. 

865 2 What--my notes indicate you told us at your interview 

866 what that that suggestion did not survive the meeting. 

867 A Well, it was never raised again. 

868 e Okay. 

869 A I don't think we kicked it to death at the meeting. 

870 I think it was a trial balloon that didn't go anywhere — that 



615 



y 



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HIR197002 PAGE 36 

is unfair to Mr. Coopei. It was a thought that didn't go 
anywhere . 

2 Nevertheless, you did not see that as any indicati9n 
that you shouldn't proceed in any area criminally? 

A I mean no way was I going to look only at the 
Nicaragua side of the fence, 
e Okay. 

A You know, I an trying to remember. I think most 
likely I scratched my head or gave some affirmative sign 
that I found that suggestion puzzling and people didn't 
salute it. It was run up the flagpole and not saluted. 

2 Later on then, there was a very large meeting about 
2:tt5 or so in the afternoon with a «*S« of thousands. 

A Yeah. ^^^^ 

2 Including some people from the FBI, including Mr. J- 
a-m-jj-r--I believe Mr. Floyd Clazk was there, and others. 
Did the Attorney General at that meeting describe to them 
that you and Mr. Cooper would be team leaders or leading 
this investigation--anything to that effect? 

A I don't recall a joint command concept. I do 
believe it was stated that Mr. Cooper would be on the team. 

2 Okay. Mr. Cooper testified publicly that he had the 
sense that that did not sit well with the FBI. 
A Ha, ha, ha. 
2 Does that comport with your recollection? 



616 



v^ 



KAKE 
896 
897 
898 
899 
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901 
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903 
90«< 
905 
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909 
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91 1 
912 
913 
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920 



HIR197002 

A Yes. 



PAGE 37 



Okay. Has that expressed to you by the FBI? 
Yes, it was. 

Do you recall who expressed it to you? 
Every FBI person that I talked to. 
Okay. 

What did they tell you? 

Hell, it was really more questioned than telling, 
but I think we went after the big 2=30 meeting— I think 
Cooper and I and Hendricks and Carver— and Hark Richard and 
Jack Keiiney went back down to my ofiice with all the FBI 
guys, ha, ha. ha. and we sat around and nobody said too 
much, and at one point. I think Chuck said that he— he 
certainly hoped that, you know, no major actions would be 
taken in his absence or without him participating, and the 
Bureau guys just looked at him, and afterwards Jeff Jamar or 
one of the Bureau guys asked me, "Hey. what is Cooper going 
to do?' ' 

B Did you respond? 

A I don't recall what I said. I would have said 
something like, "Well, you know, he is on the team." 

fi Okay. So. the FBI wanted to know basically what 
role Cooper was going to have in the investigation. 

A Yeah. I think it was stronger than that. I mean, I 
didn't follow Chuck's public testimony, but if he said they 



617 



KANE: 
921 
922 
923 
. 92M 
925 
926 
927 
928 
929 
930 
931 
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933 
93M 
935 
936 
937 
938 
939 
9U0 
9>41 
9M2 
9M3 
94(4 
1/ 945 



HIR197002 PAGE 38 

didn't seen conioitable with that, I would agree with that. 

2 And did they express why they did feel comfortable 
with that? 

A Ho, I don't think they did. I thought at the tine 
it was because they viewed hin as a ''political'' Assistant 
AG. 

S What is kind of clear from the record that develops 
is that the FBI does not inpart anything of what they are 
doing, basically, to the people that are supposed to be 
working on it. 

Did they say anything to you at that tine that they 
did want to discuss the details of the investigation with 
Hr . Cooper ? 
; . A I don't know whether they said it or not. It was 

abundantly clear to ne« fhey didn't have to say that for ne 

i 

to pick that up. 

S Okay. 

Later on, on December 1st, 1986, Mr. Reynolds and 
Mr. Hendricks neet with Ton Green, who now is representing 
only Secord. Prior to that meeting, when it was being set 
up, did you discuss with Mr. Reynolds the — the advisability 
of his neeting with flr.-- 

A Yeah, I got wind of this — I can't renenber how — but I 
called Brad, and he calls ne back again, I think, during a 

•e, 

deputies' meeting, because Z remember Jack Ke^ey and Vicky 



618 



NAME: HIR197002 PAGE 39 

\^6 TiiTigrtni^^nd naybe Katk Richard sitting right in front of me 



l/ 



X 
X 



y 96 



6 
9>47 
9(48 
949 
950 
951 
952 
953 
954 
955 
956 
957 
958 
959 
960 
961 
962 
963 
964 
965 
966 
967 
968 
9 
970 



when I uas talking with him, and I said, ''Look, you night 
be a fact witness in this whole shouting match about your 
weekend investigation, so it may not be advisable for you to 
go meeting with counsel^, and--'* this incidentally had been 
discussed at the 2=30 meeting with the FBI, the advisability 
of having Tom Green bring in Secord for a proffer. 

Bill Hendricks had argued against it. Reynolds had 
argued — Brad Reynolds had argued in favor of it, but anyway, 
now this meeting was going ahead on the first, and I urged 
Brad not to--not to have the meeting with Green. 

He didn't buy «A scenario about fact witness. He 
said, ''Well, isn't every FBI agent who conducts an 
interview a fact witness, and why isn't he debarred from 

conducting any further fact interviews?*' 

i 
Z said, ''Well, you know, we don't agree, but I 

think if you are going to have the meeting in a minute, you 

should have Bill Hendricks there. Hendricks is a career guy 

from the Public Integrity Section, now Chief of the Fraud 

Section,*^ and Brad said, ''I have no problem with that.*' 

Q Um-hum. Uhat was your understanding of the purpose 
of the meeting was to be? 

A A minl-pxoiier by Green as to what his client night 
have to say^ ^ 

e Okay. And at that point, was it clear he 



619 



H- 



Hxnt- 

971 
972 
973 
974 
975 
976 
977 
978 
979 
980 
981 
982 
983 
98M 
985 
—^ 986 
987 
988 



'>^'\t\ 989 



990 
991 
992 
993 
994 
995 



HIR197002 PAGE 40 

repxesented just Secotd alonft, ox uex* you undex the 
impxession he xepxesented noxe than one of the paxticipants ? 

A I am not suxe when it changed ixoB all thxee to just 
Secoid in my undexstanding . 

2 Thank you. 

Hell, by the time you spoke to Mx . Reynolds on the 
1st oi Decembex, did you have an undexstanding who Gxeen 
xepiesented? 

A Quite suxe on the 26th Bxad said he xepxesented moxe 
than one. but it looked as though he was going to have to 
get out fox one ox the othex. Now, the 1st o£ Decembex 
would have been my next business day in the office , so I 
don't know if I leaxned that in the intexim. 

Just in the intexests of completeness, aftex I hung 



up fiom talking with Mi. ReynoldSj^^^called Hx . Txott, who 

■■5>-TEr 
was somewhexe out of the office. ^ESysaid, ''Look, I have 



had this convexsation with Bxad. Do you think I should ^go, I 
ovex the cliff on it, you know, xaise it up to the AG.^^mM^ 
, >■> a il i v t > W i t n n I r I because the way I left it, it is 
going to go ahead, but with Hendxicks pxesent.'* 
And Steve said, ''Yeah, that is pxobably 
suxvivable . ' ' 

e Did Hx . Reynolds give any affixmative xeasons fox 
wanting to be paxt of this meeting? 

A Hell, he had axgued in the Novembex 25 aftexnoon 



620 



KAHE: 
996 

997 
998 
999 
1000 
1001 
1002 
1003 
100M 
1005 
1006 
1007 
1008 
1009 
1010 
101 1 
1012 
1013 
101(4 
1015 
1016 
1017 
1018 
1019 
1020 



HIR197002 PAGE Ml 

meeting that sometimes you can get more at the beginning 
then you can after a position freeze, which is true, and Mr. 
Hendricks had argued that you don't uant to have somebody 
come in before you can intelligently cross-examine them and 
tell you their stories, because then later, you get so you 
know your case, and you want to ask them questions, and they 
tell you. ''Look. I already told you my whole story'*, and 
that is also true. 

S But what reasons did Mr. Reynolds give for himself 
wanting to participate in the meeting? 

A The impression I got was that he thought he could 
advance the ball. I pressed him pretty hard, and his 
response was the one I just related about the FBI agents and 
thfc fact — 

C Did he mention at any time that he had a long- 

4 

standing relationship with Hr . Green? 

A No. I don't think I knew that. 

S Okay. 

For the record, you are the person that drafted the 
application for Independent Counsel; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

e Okay. Colonel North, in his testimony, which you 
may have missed — 

A I missed it. 

Q You were lucky, but made much ado about the fact 



621 



NAIIE: 

1021 
1022 
1023 
10214 
1025 
1026 
1027 
1028 
1029 
1030 
1031 
1032 
1033 
103(4 
1035 
1036 
1037 
1038 
1039 
lOMO 
lOMI 
10142 
1043 
101414 
10M5 



HIR197002 PAGE i42 

that he uas the only peison mentioned in the application iot 
Independent Counsel, a fact which apparently rankled him a 
bit. Do you recall any conscious decision to only put his 
name in the application? 

A Well, I guess the reason I started with him was a 
ieeling that ii there was anybody who Knew what was going on 
here< it was he. 

Mow, the next question is, why not throw in 
PoindeKter and a bunch of other people? The answer to that 
is, we were a little short on facts at the time this was 
being drafted, which was on the night of December 1. 

e So, you didn't know exactly what Admiral Poindexter 
had done, in other words? 

A That is correct. 

S Okay. Did you have anybody else in the government 
in mind? 

A Hell, no. I mean, my thought was, let's draft it 
broadly and let the facts take us where they will. 

2 I guess, then, my question is, then why did you add 
Colonel Horth at all? 

A I guess to give context. I have been involved in a 
couple of these things before and none of them with no 
names . 

S Was there any discussion in any of the drafts that 
were circulated to add more names or to delete his name? 



622 



^ 



NAME: 
10U6 
10M7 
t0i48 
10M9 
1050 
10S1 
1052 
1053 
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1055 
1056 
1057 
1058 
1059 
1060 
1061 
1062 
1063 
106M 
1065 
1066 
1067 
1068 
1069 
1070 



HIR197002 p,CE ^3 

A I don't recall either of those changes being raised. 
There were a lot of — there was a lot of discussion about 
adding more violations or subtracting violations. 

e Would it be normal procedure in drafting such an 
application to add people uho aren't in the government as 
possible co-conspirators? 

A It has happened in a number of cases. 

e Okay. 

Did you give any thought then to adding Mr. Secord 
or Hr . Hakim or-- 

A Oh. no. This is December 1. I don't think I was 
that i'^m along in terms of knowledge. 

e By the way, did you ever receive Mr. Cooper's notes 
that he had taken at the interviews over the weekend 
inquiry? 

A No . I have never seen then. 

2 Did you ever ask for then? 

A I don't believe so. 

e Did you ever see Hr . Richardson's notes of the North 
interview? 

A I have never seen then. 

2 So, you never actually received any notes fron 
anyone taken that weekend; is that correct? 

A That is right. 

2 Okay. 



623 



HAKE: 

1071 
1072 
1073 
107U 
1075 
1076 
1077 
1078 
1079 
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1081 
1082 
1083 
108M 
i 1085 
1086 
1087 
1088 
1089 
1090 
1091 
1092 
1093 
10914 
1095 



HIR197002 PAGE ^^ 

A I became aware that they had given their notes to 
the FBI. 

2 Okay. Were you aware that the FBI had or was going 
to interview Adniral Poindexter? 

A Yes . 

8 Okay. Did they relate to you the outcone of that 
interview? 

A No. 

8 Was there some discussion or concern about Fawn Hall 
and whether she had retained an attorney or had been 
contacted by the FBI? 

A There was some discussion about her having retained 
Plato Cacheris# who was looking for immunity, and I recall 
Jeff Jamar and myself both being frustrated by our inability 
during the preliminary investigation phase ofjpan Independent 
Counsel case either to grant immunity or to issue subpoenas, 
because as I looked at it. she would have been a red hot 
candidate for immunity on day one in a garden variety 
criminal investigation, but we were hamstrung. 

8 Did anyone else step forward other than her attorney 
and Mr. Green? 

A Yeah, there was a guy named Sherw|^n Harkman or 
Karkham. who called me from Switzerland, who wanted to come 
in and speak on behalf of Willard Zucker and somebody else. 
I think they might have been American lawyers in 



624 



y/ 



y 



KxnE: 

1096 
1097 
1098 
1099 
1100 
1 101 
1102 
1 103 
1 10<4 
1 105 
1 106 
1 107 
1 108 
1 109 
1 1 10 
1111 
1112 

I 113 

I I m 

1115 

I 116 
1117 
1118 

II 19 
1 120 



HIR197002 PAGE MS 

Switzexland . 

C Do you lenenbec who they were? 

A He is ixom Hogan and Hartson. 

S Yes, but who the othexs were in Switzerland? 

A No. I don't, but I should have notes of that. There 
was Willard Zucker and sone company which later nade the 
news — some Societe 



2 Has it err for short? 

A I think so. 

2 Uhere did llr . Markman work? 

A This is on December 9. Hell, by that time, we had 
filed our application for Independent Counsel. I think that 
was filed on the Mth. So, he came in with John Ke«ney, Jr., 
Jack's son--Jack recused himself, obviously--representing 
these witnesses from Switzerland, and the phone message I 
had, or maybe it was the message jgiven to me through my 
assistant, Mark Robinson, was that these people wanted to 
shed light on a whole extraordinary web or tangle of events 
in Switzerland. designed to make it sound as appetising as 
possible . 

Shortly before the meeting, Z concluded that I 
should not meet with them, because — suppose they mentioned 
the word ''immunity.*' Then they might later feel that they 
had negotiated immunity with the Criminal Division while the 
application for an Independent Counsel was pending. 



625 



y 



y 



y 



HAHE: 
121 
122 
123 
12M 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 

mo 

1U1 
11(2 

m3 

1(4 14 
1«45 



HIR197002 PAGE (t6 

So, I opted out of the neeting and sat then doun--I 
believe uith the FBI alone. 

Q And would these have been the FBI agents who were 
then assigned to the Independent Counsel staii? 

A Yeah, the Chinese Wall at the Bureau had already had 
already been established, and the brieiing that the Bureau 
gave--gave us on--I guess it was December 1st, Keil Divers was 
the--yeah, ^rcrtl a 14:05 neeting on December 1st, and this was a 
much-postponed brieiing by the FBI. 

And it was clear to me that they were holding the 
cards close to the > nu a f t it»«H^FW^ and just telling us the 
categories and subject matter headings of their 
investigation without any of the meat, which I must say I 
found appropriate.. 

That **# bother ne , because we all knew an 

4 

Independent Counsel was coming down the road within a natter 
of days . 

2 So, you never heard of the outcome of their meeting 
with Oack Ke«ney, Jr., or Mr. Harkman? 

A Correct. 

C Were you aware of any efforts on the part of Brendan 
Sullivan to contact either the Attorney General or the 
President on behalf of Colonel North? 

A Ko, I don't think so. 

2 Okay. 



626 



v/ 



HIR197002 .,„..obvio«sly a"« Kovember 

"- -'"' "'""•' ""1t: .u ,=.. - "- 

X a nardon Mhen i^ "- 
-"''""' «' '" ,, ,„„..„ o„ .< ««-^ 

,.>.« topic caite up in the 
„ece..e. U. -e ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^_,,,..3 

to what w. would do ^^ poindexter 

. „„ity for colonel Koxth or 
,,a vote .n.»unxty ^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ . 

, .„ 18 use 6005 or whateve 
,„!.• l—i"- " " '"' .„! .t hi. Chri.«" 

..,..-^>=— •--r^":":.^.- 
question o. x»»unxtv ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^,,, ,o 

.„4-«s burden axxei 
that the governments). ^ .,,,y one.^ 

absence of taint is^J^^^Ul!!:! ^ 

show an absenc i^^Tr . taint 



ami:- 
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11614 

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1166 

1167 

1168 

1169 

1170 



a ^-- -^ '''.^! Z:^--^'^:::-::^Z7. pro.le. is a 

• ^^^^^^'^^^^^"' '"""' is granted at this stage. 

,nd if iamunity is g^- 
very severe one. prosecution of 

.. .».. »«v ..- "-" "-" "• ": , ,,„.. ..« i. » 

»d«iral Poindexter. ana 
1 wnTth or fcaiiir<*-»- 
Colonel Horxn 



627 



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1191 
1192 
1193 
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PAGE «8 
HIR197002 

precipitous and we ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^„4 



precipitous and we- ^.^^ ^^ ^^ ^^„, 

X.e request X »ade o* Hi» was tHat ^^ Jj^-^; 

^ h* said that I can be ^ ! n i i t " " 

• ' °''" .. .tsee«. you Know. overwKeln.in.1V 

• ' ^""1 .. was .us. so.e.n.n. tnat 
co»..tted to the xdea. e.ther. 
,.a co^e UP on the plate. ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^, 

2 well, at that tx«e. there 

.s try.ng to PUsh Congress in that 
the White House was trying 

direction. ^ 

^ I think that is right. 

• ' °"" . discussion o. Whether or not the 

- ^^" -" ^ ".,,. ..prove that or go along 

. * lustice was going to app 
Department of Justic 

with that or support that- 
n Right, 
ft —push. j^ave an 



628 



>/ 



\/ 



HAME: HIR197002 PAGE i»9 

1196 so I think 1 also argued to the AG it would be doubly 

1197 inappropriate for us to exercise an authority which would 

1198 belong at least in part ^'C the Independent Counsel within a 

1199 matter of days. 

1200 fi Did anybody at the Department of Justice, including 

1201 the Attorney General, express the opposite view, that it 

1202 would be good for them to receive immunity? 

1203 A Uell, I am just trying to remember whether--! 

120(4 remember the Attorney General at some point making a public 

1205 statement along the lines that this immunity is limited and 

1206 not total, but I can't remember when that was, whether it 

1207 was after this happened or whether it was back in--back in 

1208 December. 

1209 Let me just think whether anyone in the--I think it 

1210 is possible that one or two of the many people I discussed 
12 11 this with may have said that in their view, it was more 
1212 important to get the story out for the good of the country 
12 13 than it was to preserve the option of prosecuting North and 
121U Poindexter. 

1215 8 Do you recall who that may have been? 

e 

1216 A Possibly Jack Ke^ney, although I am not sure. I 

1217 was--you know, stalking around waving my arms, and he may 
12 18 have been trying to slow ne down. 

1219 e Are there any other things that you think we should 

1220 cover that the committee should know? 



629 



NAME: 
1221 
1222 
1223 
122M 
1225 
1226 
1227 
1228 
1229 
1230 
1231 
1232 
1233 
1234 
1235 
1236 
1237 
1238 
1239 
12M0 
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12UI4 
12>45 



HZR197002 PAGE 50 

A There was a part B to your question which was. did I 

ever hear any discussion oi a pardon for North? 

C Oh. yes. < 

A Z heard the word once. A fellow iron the Vice 

President's oiiice. C. B. Gray, who is a social friend of 

Bine, called me up on two natters. One, a — I think Criminal 

Division Christmas party that I had invited him to, but two, 

he had some question relating to Fifth Amendment and waiver 

involving Colonel North, and I remember saying to him, 

•'Look, I am not advising anybody about anything. Ue are in 

total conflict position here, but you know you people should 

be very careful how you talk to Mr. North or his lawyer,"' 

and I remember C. B. saying, yeah, that people will come 

back and say it was all a[ big deal for a pardon. 

Having worked though the Watergate years, the word 

< 

leapt out at me. 

e Are there any other things that you think we should 
cover in this that I didn't ask? Ue obviously skipped over 
a lot of meetings and things that you participated in, but I 
sort of just wanted to hit the main points. 

Please feel free at this point to put anything on 
the record that you think the committee should be aware of. 

A No. 

e Okay. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMHITTEE 



630 



NAME: 
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12X9 
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1253 



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12514 
1255 
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^ 1257 
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1261 
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1267 
1268 
1269 
1270 



»/l2i 



HIR197002 -.^, 

PAGE 51 

BY HR. McGOUGH: 
e Okay, Hr. Weld, at one point you teierred to 
discussions at a staff .eeting regarding who is going to 
speak to the press about Iranian matters, and this was in 
the content of the Evans case. 

Do you recall approximately when that took place? 
A Yeah, I think it would have been between the 10th 
and the 17th, probably closer to the 10th of Kovember. it 
was the first time Iran had bubbled up to my consciousV*an'd 
the question was. well, what should the United States 
Attorney say when the press begins to ask them, you know. 
"Are youfcases going to survive or are they all going to 
fall because of what the Administration has been doing?' - 

2 You mentioned that on Friday-get my dates confused 
sometimes-but Friday. Kovember 21. which would have been a 
Friday, you asked a member of the Public Integrity Section, 
/erry McDowell, to look into possible criminal violations, 
and that was, I believe, the same morning that you 
indicated, too. at the staff meeting, that you thought the 
Criminal Division ought to be involved in the investigation. 

A Well, that I thought that the Criminal Division 
ought to be involved in getting the answers for the motion 
in Kew York. 

C Right, and I guess that really brings up my 
question, which is at the time of the staff meeting and the 



631 



NAHE: 
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1272 
1273 
127M 
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129K 



y. 



tine of your stafi i.eeting, did you have any inkling or any 
belief, any— well, any belief or inkling there night be 
criminal activity involved, not on the Evans side of the 
matter, but on the Iranian initiative side of the case? 

A Well, I think the reason I put the question to 
ncDouell nust have been with a view to our responsibilities 
under the Independent Counsel statute. I don't like to sit 
around waiting for a referral. If there are natters 
publicly reported that night possibly support or night 
possibly constitute "sufficient grounds to investigate a 
person covered by the Independent Counsel Act has connitted 
a Federal offense," so I wanted Jerry just to take a quick 
look to see whether there was sone obvious crininal 
possibility in the Iranian initiative as reported, because 
if so, I wanted to know it. 

e What, if anything, about the Iranian initiative 
suggested to you there night be crininal activity? Let's 
take events out of it for a second. I view the Evans 
situation as being different from the Iranian initiative 
itself, and it seens to ne what was it about the Iranian 
initiative that — 

A I an having trouble reconstructing how nuch was in 
the press by November 21, but if the press accounts had 
reported that this was being done on an unofficial basis or 
with private sorts, and there were, you knowi, phony 



632 



^/ 



NAHE: 
1296 
1297 
1298 
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1300 
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1303 
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1305 
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1307 
1308 
1309 
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1311 
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1313 
13m 
1315 
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1318 
1319 
1320 



HIR197002 PAGE 53 

manifests on shlpnents, that would be a 1001 or possibly an 
export violation. 

Again> that is speculative since I can't reraenber • 
what was in the press, but that is one possibility. 

e But at least when you spoke to Mr. ncDouell. there 
was sone thought you night have that there might be some 
criminal activity on that side of the equation. 

A There must have been, or I wouldn't have put the 
question. I recall a feeling of lack of knowledge on my 
part that week, which I think is what led to the slightly 
frustrated tone with which I said at the morning meeting, 
you know, I don't think even this investigative fact finding 
work on the Evans case should be done without Criminal and 
FBI, so I wanted ferry to, you know, give me some comfort 
there . 

fi At the staff meeting that morning, given that you 
had this staff meeting the next morning, did you express the 
Criminal Division's interest in those terms? I mean, let me 
back up for a minute. I believe you said at the staff 
meeting, you said, ''Ue have got this Evans case, and we 
have got somebody investigating this Iran initiative and the 
same person ought to be doing both, so they can make the 
affidavits and the proper representation in the Evans 
case. •• 

Did you, in addition to that, say, ''and there may 



633 



NAHE: HIR197002 



PAGE SU 



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1322 
1323 
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13145 



be sowe crlninal activity on th« Iran initiative side'*? 

A I don't think I did. I wouldn't even fix the date 
of my request to HcDouell as having been Friday the 21st, ^ 
except that he and I later had sone by-play about whether 
the request had come over on a Friday or a Monday. 

Turned out to be a Friday. And it could conceivably 
be Friday the lUth. But in other words, I have no iteraory of 

asking Hr . HcDowell on any particular day. But I did ask 

Jo /*«»1 _ 
him for quick and dirty, and the fact that J »>ww t Fafrington 

got to it on Saturday the 22nd suggests to me that it was 

probably Friday the 21st. 

2 All right. And Hiss Faftington's memorandum was 
dated the 22nd, as you recall? 

A In hand . ' 

2 In hand on the 22nd. 

A There is a handwritten date of the 22nd on it. 

e Okay. 

Did the Attorney General ever ask you at any time 
prior to November 26 to brainstorm the Iranian situation and 
see if there are any criminal violations in it? 

A Ko. 

C So that Hiss Faffington's memorandum was done 
independent of any requests-- 

A That was me on my own hook. There was one other 
thing that the Attorney General did ask ma to do, which was 



634 



NAME: 
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13147 
13t48 
13149 
1350 
1351 
1352 
1353 
13514 
1355 
1356 
1357 
1358 
, 1359 
1360 
1361 
1362 
1363 
13614 
1365 
1366 
1367 
1368 
1369 
1370 



HIR197002 PAGE 55 

to get iuzther iniotnation about the Evans case. I thinK I 
should put this on the zecozd, in fairness to the Attorney 
General, who the defendants were, bring over a copy of the 
indictnent, and I did. 

I had Joe Tafe iron Internal Security bring that 
over, and I gave it to John Richardson sometime shortly 
before November 17. so if I left the impression earlier that 
the Attorney General was purporting to opine on the Evans 
case without knowing anything more than the name of the 
case, that is not quite accurate. He did have the papers. 

S You indicated that after the press conference on the 
25th, you met uith--first with Mark Richard and then with Kr . 
Cooper, and Mr. Cooper gave you some chronology and a 
briefing on some of the facts. 

Did Hr . Cooper mention to you that he had also been 
looking into possible criminal violations? 

A No, I don't think so. 

2 So that any discussion of — well, strike that. 

Did you ever discuss with the Attorney General what 
Mr. Cooper's roles could be on the investigative team? You 
indicated at the meeting on the 26th. he said Mr. Cooper 
will be a member of the prosecution team, but didn't say why 
at that time. 

Did you every discuss with him Hr . Cooper's role on 
that team? 



635 



HAHE: HIR197002 



PAGE 56 



1371 
1372 
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A Ko. I don't think so. I am just trying to think 
whether I questioned that at the meeting or not. I have a 
din memory oi a little bit of back and forth, but then the 
conclusion being, okay, let's do it this way. 

2 And shortly thereafter it was that the FBI expressed 
some reservation to you about his participation? 

A More by deed than word, but it washed out because it 
wound up that the entire prosecutive team was not getting 
information out of the FBI# **« Bill Hendricks called over 
for reports on this and that. They weren't coming over, and 
it's not that the FBI doesn't trust Bill Hendricks, just 
that they knew they were going to have a new prosecutor in a 
few days, and as I said earlier, I think they behaved 
appropriately. 

2 I guess really following up on that, or maybe you 
answered it implicitly, were there ever any steps taken to 
remove Mr. Cooper from the prosecution team, or did the 
issue simply moot itself? 

A I think it just dropped out. There may have been 
meetings held, you know, between Carver and Hendricks on the 
one hand, and brick agents as opposed to supervisory agents 
on the-- 

2 But not at your level. 

A You mean with me, but not Cooper — no. 

2 Did you at some point become familiar with a case 



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HIR197002 t\(iX 58 

Statement regarding, you know— the statement regarding those 
conversations Mould be soiiehow included in this letter to 
Judge Halsh, and I recall telling Leon Kelln^r that I 
thought the letter had to go. and we couldn't, you know, 
comnent on a iragment of the evidence •*• comiient on 
something that wasn't even a fragment of the evidence. He 
had to just send the letter. 

e And did you ultimately send the letter? 
A Yeah, it was for Trott's signature, as all the 
letters to Judge Walsh were. But I think it went— it was 
about the Posey case, and I not sura of--and I think-- 

2 The case we are referring to has gone under a lot of 
names, but Posey may have been one of the people involved. 

Did you ever conduct within your own Division or 
elsewhere any independent investigation or investigations to 

4 

determine exactly what happened in that case? 

A You know, I— I believe that Jack Ke^ney has had 
telephone conversations, maybe even taken actions with 

1439 respect to that. The lion's share of the dealings with Leon 

1440 on this matter have been conducted by Jack Ke»ney. There 
144 1 was at one point something that happened involving a 
1442 subpoena by the Customs Service. 
,^^3 I would place this probably in December of '86. 

1444 where Leon had a subpoena out. but It was so broad that it 

1445 swept into Judge Halsh's territory and Jack told him. 



638 



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HIR197002 



PAGE 59 



l^l^ 



••Look, you ought to tti» this so you don't step on the 
independent Counsel's.*^,., and somehow that got back to 
Leon as "You have to close down the entire case," ot 
something like that. * 

It was a misunderstanding, later cleared up, so that 
was action taken by the Criminal Division that uould have 
had some impact in Florida. 

2 When you read these newspaper articles and fielded 
this call from Mr. Kelln^r, did you at that point attempt to 
get up to speed on what had happened? Did you talk to Mark 
Richard, for example, about the case? 

A I think Ke^ey, for some reason, was my designee on 
this one. He dealt with Leon on the J^- between Southern 



District of Florida and the Independent Counsel. There were 
two cases in the Southern District of Florida which ^as 
quite anxious for the Independent Counsel to tak* over, but 
I couldn't blow them past t «. ,1 / OiUu. K who is the FBI 
Agent working for Judge Halsh. 

And one of them, I think the Independent Counsel nay 
have changed his mind on, but I can't recall. Anyhow, that 
is the context in which Kellnti: rose-in which these cases 
rose to my attention. Whether or not they were going to 
Independent Counsel-- 

S Did you ever speak to Mark Richard about the 
allegations? 



y 



HAKE: 
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1492 
1493 
1494 
1495 



HIR197002 PAGE 60 

A Uell> if they involve gun-tunning , I probably did. 
yeah. I nean, there is the Posey case, something called 
Corbo. a case called Garcia. There is the case about the' 
guy who testified yesterday. Morales, and I have heard all 
those names. 

I would think I probably did talk to Richard about 
it. At another time. I either asked ox had Vicky I wwja t a i y 
ask Leon ior a synopsis oi all the allegations people have 
made about gun tunning or improper conduct by people 
involved in his cases down there, and he sent something up, 
so that is something else that the Criminal Division did. 

e All tight. I guess when you say you spoke to Mr. 
Richard about the allegations and mentioned allegations by 
Corbo and' Garcia-- 

A I can't remember who Corbo is. 

e I understand. Hhat I teally meant was. did you 
speak to Mr. Richard about tha allegations that the case had 
been slowed or stalled by anyone in DOJ? 

A I think I would have been mote likely to have spoken 
to Mr. Ke|lney about that, because that would be a Public 
Integrity natter. 

2 So, the answer is no, you don't zecall talking to 
Mr. Richardson. All I can do is ask you if you xacall 
speaking to Hark Richard about thos* allagatlons. 

A If it is a gun-running case — I rely on *my senior 



640 



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HIR197002 



PAGE 61 



1510 
151 1 
1512 
1513 
1514 
1515 
1516 
1517 
1518 
1519 
1520 



deputies all the tine. i«p Ke^ney and Richaid. 

e I want ity question to be clear so the lecord makes 
some sense. All I am really asking is, do you recall ever 
speaking to Hr . Richard about the allegations that someone 
in the Department oi Justice had stalled or slowed down 
Kelln^r's investigation in that case? 

A I think I must have discussed it with one of my 
deputies, because I wouldn't have let it sit there. I don't 
recall discussing it with any oi them in particular. I 
recall receiving the impression that the thing had been 
looked into and laid to rest, that there were three AUSAs 
who had sworn mighty oaths that it never happened, words to 
that effect. 

S Do you recall any discussion with Hr . Richard about 
his own conversations with Mr. Kelln/r on the case? That 
is. Did Mr. Richard ever say, ''Yes, I have spoken to Leon 
about this matter on a number of occasions''? 

A I am just drawing a bla a l i on Richard about this 
case, but if it is gun running, it may well be. 

Q Do you recall discussing this case, in particular 
the allegations that the case was slowed or postponed, with 
nr . Trott or the Attorney General? 

A No, I am quite sure I didn't discuss it with Trott, 
and I am certain I never discussed it with Hr . Heese. 

2 And just to complete the set, have you ever 



641 



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HIR197002 PAGE 62 

discussed this case uith Lowell Jensen? 

A No. 

Q i)oes the Crininal Division have any policy or , 
standards for briefing or--describin9 the types of cases in 
which the NSC would be briefed on an investigation? 

A I would just be guided by what Hark Richard told ne 
on that. 

S You are not faniliar with any criteria? 

A You mean written down? 

Q Either written or precedential. 

A Uell, I am developing some knowledge about that> but 
at this point, X would be very much guided by Hr . Richard 
and John Martin from the Internal Security Section. 

S In your tenure as. Assistant Attorney General, have 
you ever come across a case in which a briefing has been 

4 

given to the NSC, special briefing to the NSC? 

A Yes. 

B Without--I don't want to obviously penetrate--I don't 
want to penetrate any departments I am not entitled to — 

A Don't worry. If I told you I would blow up. 

S Can you give me any indication what triggered the 
briefing to the NSC, what it was about the case or cases 
that caused the Department to brief the NSC? 

A Extremely sensitive foreign policy. Relations with 
other countries. 



642 



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HIR197002 P»" " 

e I think that is all I have. 

A You know. I ani--I sense that I am forgetting 
something that nay have happened. Let me tell you one other 
thing I remember about Hark Richard which may relate to this 
case of Kelln^r's that I draw a blank on all the time. 

There was an KSC meeting that Hark once mentioned to 
me that he had attended which might have been on this case. 
I don't know. And Colonel Horth was there. And Hark 
mentioned to me that he had forgotten that he attended it 



until much later, but maybe that has something to do with 
this case of Kelln<^r's. 

HR. HcGOUGH: Okay, that's all I have. 
HR. BUCK: I don't have any questions. 
MS. KAUGHTOH: I have one more. 
EXAHIHATIOK OH BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COHHITTEE 
BY HS. KAUGHTOH •• 
e Getting back now to the 2Hth of Hovenber, on that 
Honday when you received the phone call from the Attorney 
General, did you at some point later tell Steve Trott about 
it? In other words . did you discuss with him or the AG 
calmly on holding off on the Iran arms investigation? 

A Well, let's see. Trott had been present on the 
21st, so he knew my view. 

2 How— can you tell me something about his 
participation in that meeting that makes you sure that he 



I 



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643 



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HIR197002 PAGE 6U 

was thete? 

A I recall him looking at ne with suiptise the way he 
does uhen--this is i»y inf erence--uhen he thinks maybe I have 
stepped out a little bit. 

No, I do not recall telling Trott the AG called me 
and said, it is no accident that Criminal is out oi this. 
The whole thing would have been overtaken by events the next 
day, because by the aiternoon o£ the 25th, Criminal was in. 

2 But you say your deputies were present during the 
phone call; correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you relate what the Attorney General had told 
you to them? 

A Yes. 

S Was there any discussion of that? 

A Yeah, Mark Richard thought it was crazy. But he and \ 
I l >>» t been telling each other for a week that it didn't 
make sense to have the AG doing the investigation. Both 
these calls that happened during deputies' meetings there 
was some discussion oi-- 

e Okay. Has Kz . Ke^ney there? 

A Yes, I think so. 

Q Did he have any comment about it? 

A I would think that it would have been negative. It 
might have been just a, you know, facial expression. 



644 



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1 DEPOSITION OF JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR. 

2 Friday, August 14, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Conunittee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C, 

8 Deposition of JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR., called as 

9 a witness by counsel for the Select Conunittee, at the 

10 offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate 

11 Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 10:05 

12 a.m. , the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN 

13 SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the District of 

14 Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by Stenomask 

15 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her 

16 direction. 
17 




Partially Declassified/Released on I ~ i^^' ^ '' 

under provisions of E.O. 12356 

by N. Menan, National Security Council 



e»T NO U^OF L 



-COPIES 



WttSStflfD 



646 



UNCUSSIEe 



1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 JOHN SAXON, ESQ. 

6 On behalf of the House Select Committee to 

7 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

8 ROBERT GENZMAN, ESQ. 

9 ROGER KREUZER 

10 On behalf of the Department of the Army: 

11 COLONEL JOHN WALLACE 



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EXAMINATION 


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John 


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Wickham, 


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By Mr. Saxon 














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648 



UNIMSW 



1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon, 

3 JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR., 

4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Conunittee and having been duly sworn by the Notary 

6 Public, was examined and testified as follows: 

7 EXAMINATION 

8 BY MR. SAXON: 

9 Q Would you state your name for the record, 

10 please, sir? 

11 A My name is John Adams Wickham, Jr. 

12 Q And what is your current position. General 

13 Wickham? 

14 A I am U.S. Army, Retired. 

15 Q And you were Chief of Staff of the Army from 1 

16 July 83 until very recently; is that correct, sir? 

17 A 1 July 1983 to the end of June this past June. 

18 Q And prior to that you were Vice Chief of Staff 

19 of the Army for one year? 

20 A For one year. 

21 Q Before that you commanded U.S. forces in Korea 

22 in the Eighth Army? 

23 A For three years. 

24 Q And in previous assignments you have been at 

25 various times_ Director of the Joint Staff of the Office 



649 



ONeiASSIlJifi 



1 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 

2 A That's correct. 

3 Q And Military Assistant to the Secretary of 

4 Defense? 

5 A For three years, right. 

6 Q And you are a combat-decorated veteran of the 

7 Vietnam war? 

8 A Yes. 

9 Q General, as you know, we are here today to 

10 cover a number of items under investigation by our two 

11 Committees dealing with the Iran-Contra affair, and I am 

12 going to segment things into the Iran arms sale first and 

13 then, toward the end, cover a few of the contra-related 

14 matters . 

15 I think what might be most helpful is if you 

16 would start on the Iran side of the equation with the 

17 shipment of TOW missiles, which as we know came from Army 

18 stocks, and walk us through that chronologically from 

19 when you first became aware and how you became aware and 

20 what happened next and what happened next and so forth. 

21 A I had returned from a trip in January, I guess 

22 it was '85. 

23 Q '86? 

24 A January '86, on a Saturday and the Vice Chief 

25 of Staff came over to the quarters in the afternoon. 



650 



UNGUmEl 



1 Q That would be General Maxwell Thunnan? 

2 A General Thurman. He was off on a trip shortly 

3 after we met, to bring ne up to date on things that had 

4 transpired in my absence, and one of them concerned a 

5 request by Colin Powell, a warning order, to be prepared 

6 to turn over to the Agency a number of TOW missiles, 

7 plain type missiles. 

8 Q And that's then Major General Colin Powell? 

9 A Who was Military Assistant to the Secretary of 

10 Defense. And no destination, just turn them over. It's 

11 not an unusual thing when we receive a request like this 

12 as a result of a Presidential Finding, although we didn't 

13 talk about a Finding, to make availzUsle assets to the 

14 Agency and not know the destination. 

15 I believe then Monday — it may have been 

16 Tuesday — that following week — 

17 Q At this time that would be about January 21? 

18 A Thereaibouts — the 20th or 21st — the 

19 Secretary bad been on a trip and when he came back I 

20 apprised him of this matter. He and I always have been 

21 very close zmd everything very open, a lot of sharing of 

22 knowledge here, particularly in areas of the intelligence 

23 business. 

24 Q Are you referring to Secretary Marsh? 

25 A Secretary Marsh, right. And that was in the 



yKEussm 



651 



imeuissKe 



1 morning of the 21st, I believe. It could have been the 

2 20th. But, in any event, as soon as he came back, and 

3 about 1800 that same day I received a secure phone call 

4 from Major General Colin Powell and the purpose of that 

5 phone call, it was in my telephone log — execute. 

6 I'm not sure of the exact number of missiles 

7 to be delivered. It may have been part of 1,000, the 

8 first tranche of that. I don't know the number. I can't 

9 recollect the number. And I went in and told the 

10 Secretary, called in General Russo, who was involved in 

11 the process there, and gave him the execute instructions. 

12 Q General Russo was the Assistant — 

13 A He was the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for 

14 Logistics, a Major General, and he was one of the 

15 principal officials involved. He had some Indians that 

16 were working for him that took care of the details. So 

17 that was the beginning of the process. 

18 The Secretary and I conjectured about all of 

19 this, where are these things going. It was really none 

20 of our business to ask because we were given a lawful 

21 direction to carry out the responsibility. We knew that 

22 we would be reimbursed by the Agency for these assets. 

23 Q Was it your understanding that General Powell 

24 had told General Thurman that this was to be a close-hold 

25 operation, with no notes and very little in writingl 



652 



llMdtlSSW 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A Yes. General Thungan had mentioned close 
hold. It was a little unusual to do it this way — all 
personal visit or secure ph one c all, nothing in writing- 
because normally through the! 
procedure is established so that records are kept in a 
much more formal process. But this was very high level 
and that's why Secretary Marsh and I conjectured what is 
this all about. 




Q Did Gene ral Thurman tell y ou whether this was 
to of the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H because those 

were any express instructions he was given, or was it 
simply that if we handle it close hold, no notes, that 
means ve don't use that system? How did those 
Instructions come to you? 

A They just came to us as this is so sensitive 
that very few people are to be informed about it, and 
you're not even supposed to tell your execs. So I've seen 
that in my service — directions like that — even in the 
JCS during Grenada, for example. No notes were allowed 



653 



mikssra 



1 to be taken out of the tank where the JCS meet, just 

2 because of concern about leaks. And so it wasn't unusual 

3 in the sense of directions to do this. 

4 Q But if I understand what you told us 

5 previously — and by that I should say that the House and 

6 Senate staffs interviewed you on April 17 of this year — 

7 and from what we understand from the course of our 

8 general investigation, it was unusual if the service was 

9 to be providing military equ ipment to the Ag ency that you 

go the ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B is 

11 correct? 

12 A Right. Normally on provision of assets to the 

13 Agency we would have a much more formal process. 

14 Q Did there come a time when Secretary Marsh 

15 thought it prudent, however, to keep some records in 

16 terms of a chronology of what was happening, even though 

17 the instruction had been more or less no notes? 

18 A He and I talked about that, and I felt very 

19 uneasy about this process. And I also felt uneasy about 

20 the notification dimension to the Congress because we 

21 aight approach or would appear to be approaching asset 

22 value that required notification. And he and I talked 

23 about that, and so we had a small office that was 

24 starting up, 

^^^^^^^^^^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Binvolved 



654 



wmmm 



10 



1 in keeping a chronology and records here. 

2 And we did then also have a memorandum which I 

3 believe Lieutenant General Brown signed as the Director 

4 of the Army Staff to General Powell apprising them of the 

5 Congressional notification requirement and that they were 

6 to accept that responsibility. And we got basically an 

7 answer back from General Powell, roger, yes, we 

8 understand that and we will take that for action. 

9 Q General, let me show you a document which I 

10 will ask be marked as Wickham Exhibit 1. This is the 

11 unclassified version. This was a Top Secret document 

12 which the White House has since unclassified. 

13 (The document referred to was 

14 marked Hickham Exhibit Number 1 

15 for identification.) 

16 If you look at the back page, sir — 

17 A That's the memo. 

18 Q That's the memorandum from General Brown to 

19 General Powell. If you will note, then, the page on top 

20 of that — and you may not have had a chance to read 

21 that— 

22 A I saw that. Powell just sent it over to 

23 Admiral Poindexter. 

24 Q And then, for the record. Admiral Poindexter 's 

25 note on the top says "Paul, put tjiis with the Finding. 



ynuf 



655 



\it(cyiS^B 



11 



1 JP." That was Commander Paul Thompson and this was 

2 placed in the safe with the Finding. 

3 So, for the record, this is the memorandum 

4 General Brown did? 

5 A Yes. 

6 Q And what did you say was the response that 

7 General Powell gave to the Army's concern about 

8 Congressional notification? 

9 A To the best of my recollection, when he 

10 received this memorandum he said we understand the 

11 recpiirement and we have it for action. So in a sense we 

12 were off. I mean, they had taken it, and therefore we 

13 did not have to initiate any further action. 

14 Q To your knowledge did anyone ever notify the 

15 Congress? 

16 A No. 

17 Q Was there a point at which the Army, either 

18 yourself or Secretary Marsh or anyone acting on your 

19 behalf, did anyone ever re-initiate this question to 

20 General Powell or to anyone else subsequently, such as to 

21 say, by the way, did the CIA ever notify the Congress or 

22 did the White House ever notify the Congress? 

23 A I can't say from personal knowledge that that 

24 was raised with Powell. Again, conceivably it was, but I 

25 just don't know that it was raised. 




656 




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Q There came a point in the spring of '86 when 
General Powell left to assume command in Europe and vice 
Admiral Donald Jones became Secretary Weinberger's 
military assistant and, as we'll get into later, we had a 
follow-on to the TOHs, which was the HAWK repair parts 
requirement. When that came in did anyone ever raise the 
issue anew about Congressional notification, to your 
knowledge? 

A Not to my knowledge. See, Powell left around 
the end of March, early April, and that's when vice 
Admiral Jones came in. 

Q Let me go back for a moment to a couple of 
things that we've covered that I want to elaborate on 
just a bit. You mentioned the creation ofl 

If you could, while we've 
got some of this in the record from previous witnesses, 
take a few minutes and tell us the history of the 
creation ofl 

^^^^^Jand, if you would, sir, render your judgment as 
to whether that system works when it's properly utilized. 

A ^^^^ 

' Secretary Marsh and I talked at some 
length about the desirability of formalizing oversight 





umiifA^ 



I i^.v 



657 



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JjM 




iDlfOl 



because various things were 
being done. 

Q Or eve n, I guess, as we learned with SEA 
SPRAY,! 




A JVes, yes. That's the thing. Sol 

I signed a memorandum 
to the staff to formally organize such an activity, 
beginning wiW 




■anything that we were being tasked 
to do by the Agency on the basis of a Finding, the 
process of civilian and military review to include legal 
and fiscal review. And that was the genesis of the 




It took a little longer to get organized than 
I had wanted. I expressed some aggravation that it took 
as long as it did, but finally we got the office going, 
and I believe that it has been very successful. There's 
not a day that has gone by that I'm in Washington, the 
Secretary's in Washington, that we don't get one or two 
papers on^^^^^^^^H^Hfor his approval or my approval, 
and there's probably not a week that's gone by that the 
head^^^^^HBersonally ha£i not talked to the Secretary or 



n 



(ersonally ha 

SI 





658 



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uHsuissra 



14 



me about an issue. 

Now it may have produced some discomfort on 
the part of the Agency. We've heard about some of that 
because of what they perceive to be a little more 
bureaucratic process than had heretofore existed. They 
claim it took a little longer to get things approved, but 
I would argue I moved things out of my office within an 
hour when I got them, and if I was gone the Vice moved 
them, and if the Secretary was gone, the Under moved 
them. So I don't see that as a problem. 

I do see it as a legitimization of our 
civilian control and legal responsibilities for these 

programs . 

Q Sir, as I understand thea^^^^^^^^lprocess, 
there are several levels of legal review that are 
involved,! 




There's a readiness 
review. So there are steps built in. But if I 
understand what you're saying, that process can be 
covered very quickly in the course of meeting the 
Agency's needs; is that correct? 

A Yes. And if there is some urgency about a 
particular issue then that's hand-carried, but it's hand- 
carried through various wickets that involve legal 



mf^mw 



659 




15 



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review, that involve fiscal review, that involve 
uniformed and civilian review. By civilian I'm talking 
about appointed civilians who have responsibility, legal 
responsibilities, like the Secretary of the Army or the 
Under Secretary of the Army. 

As you know, in the fall of 1983, there was 
considerable exposure about actions that had gone on in 
the Army staff — YELLOW FRUIT, all of those names that 
you are very familiar with. 

Q Sir, would that be in '83 or '84? 

A That w as in the fall of '83,1 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 And out of that came then indictments 
and court martials, I guess in '84. So we recognized the 
problem of activities being conducted in the bowels of 
the Pentagon without adequate control. 

And^^^^^Hwas part of our process of trying 
to establish an architecture for civilian and military 
oversight. But, more tha n that, we establ ished command 
control over programs 




660 



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Q In your opinion, 
system worked"? 

A 

I think it's worked exceedingly well. 

Q And I take it from your testimony that there's 
no doubt that the Army and, for that matter, the 
government needs to have this kind of intelligence 
activity and operational capacity, if we have the proper 
safeguards and checks built in? 

A Yes. There are things that the Agency is not 
equipped to 




we do provide assets, equipment to 
the Agency. So there are legitimate intelligence 
activities that the Department of Defense is equipped to 
undertake. We do need to be sure that we have a thorough 
oversight structure to assure that we are complying with 
fiscal controls and Congressional notification, checking 
that Findings in fact do call for providing this kind of 



^ifift^sstrw 



661 



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UNCtASSiED 



activity. 

There was one other thought there that crossed 
my mind. 

Q Sir, one of General Russo's Indians named the 
projects which involved the Army shipping TOWs and HAWKs 
projects SNOWBALL and Project CROCUS. Are you aware of 
any request by the Agency which the Amy has met other 
than SNOWBALL and CROCUS which have bypassed 




A No. 

Q And would it be safe to say that among those 
items which went through the 
that includes some very sensitive matters, very sensitive 
transfers? 

A Yes. Oh, the thought I was trying to pick up 
there — it escaped me for a minute. As a result of the 

the Secretary kept Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger fully informed about what we were doing, and 
wa periodically briefed him,^^^^^^^^Mdid and the 
Secretary and I were there, i 
■o that he was aware of the structure we had established, 
and also then aware of the substance of select programs 
that we thought were valuable for him to know about. 

So that brought in then a CaUsinet official 
into this process. Where we ran into some discomfort 




ijHtiiiS^Slflffi 



662 



UHCUiSSiED 



18 



1 with the Agency because of laggardness or that kind of 

2 thing, the Secretary of Defense was always informed about 

because he knew^^^^^^^^^^^^^J because he 

4 have breakfast from time to time with Mr. Casey and we 

5 didn't want to have any misinformation coming to him. 

6 Q Is it your opinion that Secretary Weinberger 

7 was supportive of this structure and this process? 

8 A Very much so. 

9 Q And to your knowledge has the structure and 

10 process the Army has implemented been duplicated in the 

11 other services? 

12 A I don't know that. 

13 Q I'm going to jump ahead to one of the 

14 questions that I would ask you toward the end or at least 

15 the end of my examination before my colleagues jump in. 

16 I am going to ask you about recommendations that you 

17 would have for these Committees. 

18 As you know, we finished our public testimony 

19 and we're now in the process of taking some final private 

20 testimony and then writing a report, and that report will 

21 contain various recommendations that we have consensus 

22 on, and I'll come to some broader areas later, but let me 

23 just ask you, while we are on this subject, if you would 

24 recommend that if in fact the other services don't have 

25 such a process and a system and office for administering 



yfif^wssw 



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UNfik^HD 



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their support to other government agencies whether they 
should have such a process and a system. 

A Well, I think that^^^^^Jhas served the Army 
well. 




Now the other services, they may be unique, 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 some very sensitive programs that 
they have with very limited knowledge by people, they may 
not want tc^^ 

So the other services may have some unique 
circumstances that would legitimately argue against 




But for the Army I think it's served us well 
and we do have some highly sensitive programs that are 
known to only a few people and they are highly 
compartmented. So I would think that if you wanted a 
recommendation, in principle the idea makes sense but it 
■ay need to be tailored by virtue of special 
considerations in the other services. 

Q All right, sir. To go back to the chronology 
of Project SNOWBALL, the TOW missiles, you indicated that 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V a nd 
think you toJ(f(|a«^p i^5^1_that you and Secretary Marsh 



JldMas^s Apci.1 that you 



664 



UHGy^Slilil 



20 



1 and General Thunnan, the Vice Chief, were kept informed 

2 of these matters; is that correct, sir? 

3 A Yes. We also brought our execs into the 

4 circle because that is a double check. The Secretary and 

5 I and the Vice Chief are very busy people, although I 

6 don't think the Vice Chief brought his exec in, but my 

7 exec. General Peay, Brigadier General Peay was involved 

8 and knowledgeable, and Brigadier General Kavessa, the 

9 Secretary's military assistant, were knowledgeable. 

10 Q Am I correct in saying that you and Secretary 

11 Marsh never got involved in the pricing issue on the 

12 TOWS? 

13 A Never, other than we were going to be 

14 reimbursed, whatever the reimbursement figure was. 

15 Q I'll have a couple of pricing questions for 

16 you later just to see if certain issues percolated up to 

17 you. 

18 Did you keep Mr. Taft, the Deputy Secretary of 

19 Defense, apprised from time to time of these 

20 developments? 

21 A Yes, I did, on secure phone or face to face, 

22 that we were in fact complying with the requirement. 

23 Q Is this just mainly to tell him that the Army 

24 was executing on the next delivery? 

25 A Yes, just to^ close the loop with him. Now he 



liN^WfPfj 



665 



UN£kASSl(B 



21 



1 did tell me one time, he said, don't tell my exec because 

2 he doesn't know about this up here. Only I do or the 

3 Secretary of Defense, the Military Assistant to the 

4 Secretary of Defense, and probably Mr. Armitage. Those 

5 are the only the only four that knew about it. 

6 Q Mr. Taft told you that? 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q Did he mention Noel Koch in that listing? 

9 A No. 

10 Q For the record, did you ever, prior to these 

11 matters becoming public, did you ever hear Mr. Koch's 

12 name from anyone in connection with these matters? 

13 A No. But that doesn't mean that somebody up 

14 there took it on his own, as I did, the Secretary and I 

15 did, to keep our execs knowledgeable. 

16 Q Yes, sir. Were you aware contemporaneous with 

17 the meeting of these requirements that the CIA was 

18 operating with any ceiling on the amount of money that 

19 they had at their disposal? 

20 A No. 

21 Q Were you ever made aware of any pressure by 

22 anyone within the Army or outside of the Army on Army 

23 officials to keep the price down that was charged to the 

24 CIA? 

25 A No. We didn't get into, as I say, the pricing 



tlNCLSSSinED 



666 



uNsy^n 



22 



1 at all. 

2 Q All right. I want to walk you through a few 

3 exhibits and I want you to understand why I am going 

4 through them. You have clearly indicated that you 

5 weren't involved with the pricing decision but what I 

6 would like to do, and I think I can do this fairly 

7 quickly, is to show you some things that are curious to 

8 us as we attempt to finalize where the facts are and 

9 piece this together and write our report. 

10 I'm going to go through these individually, 

11 but I can do it fairly quickly, and I recognize. General, 

12 that these documents were executed at a very low level 

13 and I'm not expecting you necessarily to have ever seen 

14 them before or to be familiar with how they were created 

15 or who created them. 

16 Let me have this marked as Exhibit 2 . 

17 (The document referred to was 

18 marked Wickham Exhibit Number 2 

19 for identification.) 

20 I'll give you a few moments to look at it. 

21 ifhat you are looking at, sir, is something called a 

22 Material Release Order or MRO, and it's an Army MICOM 

23 form 496, and I apologize for the poor quality. These 

24 are many generation copies. But what you are looking at 

25 is the release order prepared by the Army Missile Command 



wcisstfe 



667 



IIKClASStfe 



23 



1 at Redstone Arsenal. You've got three pages there. The 

2 top page is for the first shipment, the second page — 

3 and you can tell that under the quantity block, the first 

4 shipment on page one shows the quantity here of 1,000. 

5 A And there's the unit price, 8935. 

6 Q $8,435. The second page is for the quantity 

7 of 508 and it bears the unit price of $8,435. And then 

8 the final quantity on shipment three is 500, and bears 

9 the unit price of $8,164. 

10 Now this was prepared by the TOW item manager 

11 and that price was put in there. Now let me say, for 

12 your information, to refresh you and also for subsequent 

13 readers of the record, as we now know, if you went at 

14 this time to the AMDF, the Army Master Data File, to look 

15 up a basic TOW missile you would see that the price for a 

16 TOW, a 71-Alpha, was $3,169. 

17 Within the first week or so of working the 

18 requirement the Army ascertained that in order to provide 

19 these missiles in Condition Code A, which the Agency had 

20 specified, they would need to have a safety modification 

21 or a missile ordnance inhibitor circuit, a MOIC, which 

22 costs roughly $300. And the Army, General Russo's 

23 Indians, apparently added $3,169 and $300, as it seems 

24 logical to do, and concluded that the price for the basic 

25 TOW with MOIC would be $3,469. 




668 




24 

1 Unfortunately, as we have learned, if you go 

2 to the AMDF you find that a basic TOW with MOIC has a 

3 separate stock number. It becomes a 71-Alpha-II and it 

4 has a list price in the AMDF of $8,435, and it's that 

5 price that was entered into the Materiel Release Order by 

6 Army officials at Redstone Arsenal. 

7 Now as this process, as the requirement worked 

8 its way through the system, the next document we see — 

9 and that is Exhibit 3 — is the ammunition planning work 

10 sheet. 

11 (The document referred to was 

12 marked Wickham Exhibit Number 3 

13 for identification.) 

14 And this is prepared at Anniston Army Depot, 

15 where, as you know, the TOW missiles were stored. And 

16 what is relevant here is in the quantity block of 1,000 

17 you see that the total price is $8,435,000, which our 

18 quick division will tell us works out to $8,435 each for 

19 the unit price. So that was the price provided at 

20 Anniston Army Depot as this was made known to them. 

21 The next document that I ask you to look at, 

22 it's a number of different iterations of the same 

23 document. 

24 (The document referred to was 

25 marked Wickham Exhibit Number 4 



ii?^,b»fe 



669 



UNKASSIFIED 



25 



1 for identification.) 

2 This is something called the DD Form 1348, and 

3 it is a standard transfer document, and it's to transfer 

4 from Anniston Army Depot to the Army Missile Command at 

5 Redstone and if you look in the quantity block you will 

6 see quantity of missiles of 1,000 and then the unit price 

7 again is $8,435. This was prepared at the Depot to go 

8 with the missiles physically as they are transferred up 

9 to Redstone Arsenal , where they were then subsequently 
10 turned over to CIA. 

H The next bit of the paper trail as we get to 

12 Redstone — and there's one of those. They broke up the 

13 lot of 1,000 TOWs into so many per, I guess, truck or 

14 pallet or whatever, and so that's why you've got several 

15 iterations, because each one represents some portion of 

16 that 1,000. 

17 And that's the same for the next exhibit. And 

18 this is essentially the same document as it gets to 

19 Redstone Arsenal, with two exceptions. 

20 (The document referred to was 

21 marked Wickham Exhibit Number 5 

22 for identification.) 

23 You will notice a signature block and a 

24 gentleman named Chris Leachman signed for these TOWs at 

25 Redstone. Mr. Leachman at the time was the chief of the 




yr^frTO^virt! 



670 




''kn£«/%Drf«cii 26 



1 Logistics Branch in the TOW missile project office. He's 

2 now the Deputy TOW Project Manager. But if you look in 

3 the upper righthand corner at the price block, you will 

4 see that it now is blank. 

5 So as these missiles got to Redstone and as 

6 the transfer documents accompanied them, somehow at 

7 Redstone the price gets removed or doesn't show up as 

8 that document is created. 

9 Then if you would look at the next exhibit, 

10 sir, this is again the DD Form 1348. 

11 (The document referred to was 

12 marked Wickham Exhibit Number 6 

13 for identification.) 

14 And the signature there at the bottom is Major 

15 Chris Simpson, who worked — 

16 A For General Russo. 

17 Q That's correct, sir, and he was taking receipt 

18 of these missiles on behalf of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

19 for Logistics. And again the cost block is blank. 

20 The final exhibit is to show you — and these 

21 are all with regard to the first shipment — to show you 

22 what happens as we get to the level of transfer from the 

23 Army to the CIA. These, by the way, have all been 

24 declassified by the White House, so what you see here, 

25 the names of certain Agency officials have been redacted. 



671 



mmm 



27 



1 and Major Simpson has signed at the bottom. 

2 (The document referred to was 

3 marked Wickham Exhibit Number 7 

4 for identification.) 

5 There is an Agency individual who has signed 

6 and then the price reappears on the DD Form 1348 and the 

7 price there is $3,469, which, as I said earlier, is the 

8 price that was initially determined by Major Simpson to 

9 have been the correct price for the basic TOW with the 

10 MOIC. 

11 My question to you, sir — and again I don't 

12 expect you to necessarily have seen these documents 

13 contemporaneously — has this I'll call it a price 

14 discrepancy, even though that has a pejorative 

15 connotation, it's a curious element to us, has this ever 

16 been brought to your attention? 

17 A We did an Inspector General review of the 

18 pricing after all of this came about, the discrepancies 

19 about the prices, and what we were actually owed by the 

20 Agency and had they paid us enough, and that's when we 

21 began to unearth this kind of administrative discrepancy. 

22 It is confusing. It's confusing to have two prices to 

23 begin with, and I don't know the reason for that. 

24 So the Secretary and I were aware of it sort 

25 of ex post facto when U^^fW4li>*\the issue of well, what 






672 




WORD 28 



1 was the price and why was there any negotiations about 

2 pricing, et cetera, et cetera. And that's when we said 

3 we'd better get an IG investigation and take testimony 

4 and look all through this. 

5 And, as I recollect, as a result of that 

6 investigation — and I don't know whether you've seen 

7 that ~ 

8 Q Yes, sir, we have, and in fact that was the 

9 first document. 

10 A There was a discrepancy on price, but it 

11 appeared from the result of that there wasn't any 

12 negotiations with the Agency. This was sloppy 

13 administrative error that led to this variation. 

14 Q My question is, to your knowledge did the Army 

15 Inspector General report specifically address the paper 

16 trail and the discrepancy in the documents and, second, 

17 if it did, do you know whether they reconciled the 

18 different prices that existed on the paperwork at 

19 Redstone? 

20 A Well, let's see. I have not seen these 

21 documents before. Whether they were in the IG report in 

22 detail, I can't say. The IG was charged to examine the 

23 whole subject from the alpha to the omega, and it took 

24 some time to get an answer. We were under considerable 

25 pressure from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to 



IfiWSSW 



673 



Mmmi 



29 



1 get a report so that he would have an accurate knowledge 

2 so that he could explain the issue to whomever needed it 

3 explained. 

4 So I really can't say that the report 

5 completely explained the discrepancy other than it made 

6 the judgment, as I recollect, that it was simply 

7 administrative error, sloppiness, that led to this kind 

8 of variation, that in fact the Agency did owe us more 

9 money . 

10 Q Has it ever been brought to your attention 

11 that the Agency was billed on the third shipment of 500 

12 missiles for missiles being in condition Code A — that 

13 is, missiles with the safety modification provided — and 

14 yet on the third shipment no safety modifications were 

15 put on those missiles? 

16 A That's news to me. I didn't know that. 

17 Q Let me ask you if you were aware of any 

18 request to the Army or tasking on the Army in late 1985 — 

19 this is before SNOWBALL in January of '86 — to either 

20 directly provide arms to Iran or provide arms to Israel 

21 to replenish TOWs or HAWKs which they had already sent to 

22 Iran? 

23 A I'm not aware of any entreaties that way. 

24 Q Now let me show you a document that I don't 

25 have any reason to believe you would have seen yet you 



sason to believe you woul< 



on n An r\ oo oo 



674 



llHKbftSSlflH) 



30 



1 may have heard of its existence because it's been an 

2 exhibit on a couple of occasions. It was an exhibit in 

3 June at our public hearings when Dr. Gaffney, the 

4 Director of Planning for DSAA, testified, and it was an 

5 exhibit when Secretary Weinberger testified. 

6 This is something that we call, for lack of a 

7 better term, the TOW paper. 

8 (The document referred to was 

9 marked Wickham Exhibit Number 8 

10 for identification.) 

11 It was prepared at the request of Mr. Armitage 

12 by Glenn Rudd, the Deputy Director of DSAA and Dr. 

13 Gaffney, and I would specifically address your attention 

14 to the bottom half of the page where it talks about I-TOW 

15 and note that it doesn't talk about basic TOW but it 

16 talks about I-TOW. Let me give you a moment to read that 

17 and then I'll tell you what you're looking at. 

18 (Pause.) 

19 A Well, this is all news. I've not seen this 

20 before. It looks like this is something to replenish 

21 stocks. 

22 Q Yes, sir. Let me tell you. I'll ask you some 

23 questions and certainly give you a chance to reply, but 

24 let me tell you what the history of this is and it will 

25 make a little more sense to you. 



675 



UHtU&SIEIED 



31 



1 In the Novmeber '85 time frame Colonel North 

2 was looking at the prospect of us supplying the Israelis 

3 with 3,300 I-TOW missiles, and in fact they had also 

4 looked at the prospects of supplying the Israelis 500 

5 HAWKs, not repair parts but entire missiles — 500. 

6 Colonel North asked General Powell to look into the 

7 availability of 500 HAVfKs. General Powell contacted Dr. 

8 Gaffney, who immediately determined we didn't have 500 

9 HAWKs available. We had perhaps 120 in the pipeline 

10 intended for other countries through FMS sales that we 

11 could divert. 

12 So the number of 120 was being used. Although 

13 we never provided 120 HAWKs to Israel, that was the plan, 

14 for Israel to ship 120 HAWKs to Iran, and in fact 18 

15 HAWKs were shipped, although 17 of them subsequently came 

16 back from Iran to Israel. Then they looked at the 

17 possibility of 3,300 I-TOWs. As we know, that never 

18 happened. 

19 My question to you first is simply a 

20 refinement from the previous question. Were you ever 

21 made aware that the Army might be tasked to provide 3,300 

22 I-TOW missiles to Israel and, second, if you had been, 

23 what would have been your response in terms of the 

24 readiness impact? 

25 A I was not awar^ .q^.t^w&r I don't believe the 




676 



mmm 



32 



1 Secretary was either. That's not to say that there 

2 wasn't some low level staff communication between DSAA 

3 and the Army staff to gather this kind of information. 

4 My reaction would have been that, as is laid out here, 

5 that's a substantial number of TOWs to deliver to Israel. 

6 Q Of I-TOWs? 

7 A Of I-TOWs, improved TOWs. 

8 Q I take it there would be a difference in terms 

9 of readiness for us providing I-TOWs versus basic TOWs? 

10 A Oh, yes, because the I-TOW is in the hands of 

11 our troops. It's not unusual for the Army to take a 

12 negative position on providing of assets to foreign 

13 governments, and periodically we are overruled for policy 

14 considerations. 

15 Q All right, sir. I thnk you've covered this, 

16 but at any time as the Army was executing on the TOW and 

17 HAWK requirements were you ever made aware that this was 

18 being done pursuant to a Presidential Finding? 

19 A No. The word Finding never came up, nor did 

20 we ask about it. We accepted the directions from 

21 legitimate authorities, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

22 Taft and Colin Powell, acting for the Secretary of 

23 Defense, and I think it's appropriate to make a comment 

24 here. 

25 I used to have the job that Colin Powell did. 



!!NfHmiflffl 



'jilt-i\!>K.r^f.M%^>' *i^V 



677 



UNMffD 



33 



1 as you mentioned very early here, for two Secretaries of 

2 Defense — Schlesinger and Rumsfeld. 

3 Q That would be from 1973 to 1976? 

4 A Exactly. And so I understood the importance 

5 of that office, military office. He is probably more 

6 valuable to the Secretary of Defense in carrying out 

7 actions than most officials in the Department of Defense. 

8 And Colin Powell had a special relationship with the 

9 Secretary of Defense. Therefore, when Colin Powell spoke 

10 you better pay attention that he sort of spoke with the 

11 authority of the Secretary. The Secretary was aware of 

12 it. 

13 So even though the Secretary didn't directly 

14 say it, when Powell called you knew where it came from. 

15 And in that sense we recognized these must be legitimate 

16 orders, so we didn't go back and say well, now, show me 

17 the piece of paper. I want to see the Finding itself. 

18 You can't conduct business like that in the building and 

19 get things done. You've got to have an element of trust 

20 by trusted officials. 

21 Q Let me simply say for the record that in the 

22 questions we have asked, based on all of the 

23 investigation we have done, there is no hint that there 

24 would be anything improper about the Army simply taking a 

25 directive from General Powell^ ^jou have stated, on the 

13 




678 



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34 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

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16 

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18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



authority that he had and execute it 

A I must say, however, we are now as part of 
|process eyeballing the Findings 

Q As I understand it, that is a change that's 
been implemented by Mr. Carlucci, the new National 
Security Advisor, to provide the Army General Counsel 
with a hard copy of the Finding; is that correct, sir? 

A I don't know whether when Frank arrived over 
there or whether it began before that, but that may be. 
You may be right on the timing. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

me go back^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Vfor 
just a moment and this deposition is codeword-cleared. 
Let me just ask you for the record when I asked you 
earlier about the fact that we had provided some very 
sensitive support to the Agency and those requests have 
gone through^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H I take it that would 
include such things asl 




is that correct, sir? 
A Correct . 

Q And those are very sensitive important 
national security matters. 
A Yes. 

Q But we still put them through the system? 
A That's right. An interesting point there. 



UNeWMfB 



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35 

Through^^^^^^^^^^^^^^rt and going back to an 
earlier question, you said are you ever aware of things 
that get outside of it. Occasionally the Secretary and I 
got reports that the Agency had been dealing with 
elements in the Army Materiel Command without our 
knowledge, and so you may have seen — I put out a couple 
of memorandums as Chief of Staff to emphasize again the 
importance of^^^^^^^^^^^^^land that there was to be no 
transactions without 

So it's not inconceivable from time to time 
that through ignorance or other reasons that there may be 
contacts made the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^0is 
not followed to the letter. 

Q But if I understand what you're telling us, 
and we've been told that by any number of individuals, 
you are talking zUsout something at a lower level where 
somebody at the Agency has a personal relationship with 
somebody in the Army. 

A Exactly. 

Q But, as I understand it, the effort has been 
■Ml* to force those back through the system when you find 
out about them. 

A Yes. 

Q All right, sir. Before we leave this point — 
and I'm about ready to go into the HAWKs — I want to 
SCI 




680 




36 

1 Show you the next exhibit, and you are probably familiar 

2 with that. That is a memorandum from General Vuono, who 

3 then was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and 

4 Plans, to th e Director of the Joint Staff last April, 

with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|and requests from the 

6 Agency . 

7 (The dociiment referred to was 

8 marked Wickheun Exhibit Number 9 

9 for identification.) 

10 Are you familiar with that? 

11 A Yes. General Vuono was my Operations Deputy 

12 in the JCS arena. He and I talked about this process 

13 here and that it appeared we were not doing it strictly 

to^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H and 

15 would be valuable to have him communicate directly with 

16 the Director of the Joint Staff to try to be sure that 

17 the magnitude of these requests and the process of 

18 handling these requests was cognizant — was a matter of 

19 cognizance to the JCS. 

20 Q Let me ask you a couple of questions about 

21 this Demorandum. First, the actual substance which 

22 generated this was not SNOWBALL or CROCUS and didn't 

23 directly bear on the matters our Committee is looking 

24 into; is that correct, sir? 

25 A As I recollect, no. It was just the general 




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UNCyiS«D 



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process . 

Q Let me ask you to look at one or two 
statements in it and simply see if you agree. In the 
first sentence — now you are looking at the declassified 
version of this. The White House has deleted thel 

I from this document. But it says: "Thel 
Isystem provides a single channel for requests for 
support from the Central Intelligence Agency to the 
Department of Defense." 

I want to fo cus on th e word "single". Is it 
your that^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bwas 

the exclusive means by which support was provided to the 
CIA? 

A Hell, I would agree with that. 




the system that I 

familiar with. 

Q It would at least be true in terms of the 
Army? 

A Yes. I guess that's right. You focused it. 
Q And in the last paragraph General Vuono says: 



l!lWJ^1TO 



682 



UKEUi^ll 



38 



1 "Requests which bypass ^^^^^^^^^^^^systeo receive 

2 less service and no Joint Staff scrutiny, yet can impact 

3 the service's warfighting capabilities." Would you agree 

4 that if we go past the system we don't adequately get 

5 these matters staffed in the way that they should be? 

6 A Amen. That's what^^^Hs all about. 

7 Q And it's conceivable that we could have a 

8 readiness impact that wasn't fully staffed out if we 

9 didn't go through the system? 

10 A Correct . 

11 Q And, finally, for the record, sir, I believe 

12 it's true that General Vuono is now in your previous 

13 position and that he's the new Chief of Staff of the 

14 Army? 

15 A Yes. He and I talked about the magnitude of 

16 the requests and that they would be impacting on the 

17 service's ca pabilities, wa rfighting capeUailities — 
^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H HAWK 

19 parts, TOWs — • and our conclusion was that's something 

20 the Chiefs need to be aware of because it is impacting on 

21 the warfighting capabilities of the services. 

22 ^^^^^^ So we need to be sure that it' 

23 ^^^^^1 ^° that's what generated this memorandum. 

24 Q Let me go back to something you said earlier 

25 and in fact that you talked about when we interviewed you 



M 




683 



UHClASSIiSS 



1 in April. You said from time to time the Army may make a 

2 negative recommendation in terms of some requirement and 

3 you will be overruled, and I think we should talk about 

4 that for a moment. 

5 I guess it's fair to say there's nothing 

6 improper about people at a higher level who have a 

7 broader vision or broader mission to look at things in a 

8 broader, more general way than you might or the Secretary 

9 of the Army. There's nothing wrong in them saying that 

10 in the broad national interest it's more important that 

11 we go forward than the Army have a few more of its 

12 missiles or whatever in a stockpile. 

13 Is that a fair statement? 

14 A Yes. 

15 Q Would it be your sense that you would not 

16 object to that process, as long as that decision at the 

17 top is an informed decision and it's been fully vetted 

18 and staffed? 

19 A Correct, right. 

20 MR. SAXON: I am prepared to leave the TOW 

21 topic. Maybe Bob or Roger has a TOW question they could 

22 ask now rather than later. 

23 MR. KREUZER: I don't have a question. 

24 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

25 Q General wickham, let me focus now on the HAWK 

X 




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aissile tasking and simply for the first minute or two 
get you to walk us through what the chronology was there. 
I think that tasking did come directly to you from Mr. 
Taft when you were in a meeting on or eibout April 9 with 
the Joint Chiefs in the tank; is that correct, sir? 

A That's correct. Mr. Taft called down on a 
secure phone and wanted to talk to me, and so I came out 
of the meeting, sat in a secure room there, and took the 
phone call from him. And he said now we need — we've 
been on the HAWK — I mean, we've been on the TOW issue 
here, but, John, we need to now move into some HAWKs with 
the Agency, and I think he mentioned the figure 240 line 
items of HAWK parts, and if you would arrange for your 
logistics people to dea l — I think the man's ne une in the 
Agency was^ — with^^^^^^^^Habout the 
details of it, reimbursement, where and all of that. 

Okay. So I called General Russo down to the 
tank and in that secure room I gave him the same 
instructions, and he then subsequently — I'm sure you've 
talked with him, got a deposition from him — did get 

and that process began. And then 
subsequent to that time Russo told me that some of the 
deliveries had already been started. 

And so I kept Taft Informed about the process 
here. Now that doesn't mean that I was aware — the sane 



685 




41 

1 way with the TOWs — aware of every transaction. We may 

2 have delivered 100 here or 200 there. I was not aware of 

3 that, of the detailed transactions. 

4 Q And we understand that once the Army begins to 

5 execute it's not necessary for those kinds of details to 

6 come to your attention. There are one or two details 

7 that I want to ask you about on HAVfKs. Is it your 

8 understanding, did Mr. Taft make clear to you that this 

9 was a follow-on to the TOWs? 

10 A yes. 

11 Q And did you understand that to mean that it 

12 would be the same project or the same customer? 

13 A Clear in my mind, because he related them. 

14 They were related. Once again, no destination, but I 

15 suppose you could say well, if you thought about 

16 months earlier, now with HAWK missiles, wasn' t there 

17 something incongruous because I don't bel level 

18 HAWKS, and the thought never crossed my mind, to be 

19 honest . 

20 Q And did Mr. Taft make clear that this was sort 

21 of to be handled in the same way — few people, no notes, 

22 close hold, et cetera? 

23 A Yes. 

24 Q Let me ask you about the readiness impact with 

25 regard to these HAWK o^rts. _When_we talked back in April 




686 




42 

1 I believe you told us that you didn't see any of the 

2 readiness data before the fact; is that correct, sir? 

3 A That's right. 

4 Q The Department of the Army Inspector General 

5 report indicated that with regard to the 234 repair parts 

6 which were requested that 221 were actually provided, and 

7 when the Army Missile Command specialist who worked the 

8 HAWKS began to look at this list of repair parts they 

9 made an initial determination that to provide them would 

10 result in significant depletion with regard to 46 of 

11 those parts if they provided the quantities requested. 

12 They broke that number of 46 down in the 

13 following manner: 15 of the parts would deplete Army 

14 inventories 100 percent; 11 of the parts would be 

15 depleted in excess of 50 percent; and 20 of the parts 

16 would be depleted less than 50 percent but still to a 

17 significant level. 

18 The first question — and I think this is 

19 answered by your previous statement — but those specific 

20 figures were not brought to your attention; is that 

21 correct, sir? 

22 A Correct. 

23 Q Now to just state that would be a bit 

24 misleading because, as we have learned, that readiness 

25 figure of 46 in large part was keyed to the quantities 



687 



Wtl^B 



1 requested, and as this was worked and there was a lot of 

2 back and forth between the Army and the CIA some of those 

3 quantities were decreased so that even though the parts 

4 were provided it wasn't in the same quantities so the 

5 readiness impact wouldn't be the same. 

6 A I seem to recollect — I can't tell whether 

7 it's after the fact or during the process — I seem to 

8 recollect that with the HAWK parts there was some 

9 discussion of readiness impact. It's not as easy to 
10 accomplish as with the TOWs. But I can't be sure that 
H this was after the fact, the way we are talking sibout it 

12 now, or whether it was in the process. But I have in the 

13 back of my mind some awareness that there was a readiness 

14 implication. 

15 Q Do you know when that awareness came? I mean 

16 was it contemporaneous with this or was it after, later? 

17 A I'm not sure. See, it's all kind of a 

18 melange. Is it a result of this kind of discussion or 

19 did Russo mention that we may have some implications here 

20 on readiness to me? I'm not sure, but I have something 

21 in the back of my mind that says yes, it's not as easy as 

22 it was with the TOWs. 

23 Q We clearly understand the difficulty in asking 

24 people, number one, to recollect things that took place a 

25 year and a half ago and, number two, to separate out what 




?\Ft.^O.O<^ iV}j 



688 



UNfiUISSIHED 



44 



1 you knew then from what you've learned since, so we 

2 sympathize with that problem. 

3 Let me ask you about a specific part and a 

4 specific matter that I just found out about this Monday 

5 when Colonel Wallace and I were at Redstone Arsenal 

6 interviewing and deposing some of the HAWK repair part 

7 specialists. We spent time with two individuals, a 

8 gentleman who oversees all air defense systems — the 

9 Redeye, the Stinger, the HAWK and others, I guess — and 

10 the individual, both Army civilians, who oversees 

11 specifically HAWK repair parts. 

12 And we talked through these numbers and the 

13 readiness impact and we were told that with regard to one 

14 of these parts — something called 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 

23 As they worked this requirement and looked at 

24 the availability, they determined that they had^^^Bof 

25 these in Army inventories worldwide. The Iranians 




mmsm 



689 



mmim 



45 

1 regueste(^^Hof them — I say Iranians. Obviously they 

2 didn't know these were intended for Iran, and in fact you 

3 didn't, as you've told us, but the customer requestec 

4 They indicated to Major Simpson that. A, they couldn't 

5 provide^^Hwe only have^^^^^and they would prefer not 

6 to provide those because, as they indicated to us, this 

7 part is of such critical ity that if it goes down it will 

8 entirely deadline the system. 

9 In fact, there was some back and forth between 

10 Simpson and the Agency, but ultimately a listing of parts 

11 that were required to be provided was datafaxed from DALO 

12 down to Redstone and in fact the Army provided all^^^^B 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hto the for 

14 We were told on Monday that this has still 

15 presented some readiness impact because even though the 

16 Army Missile Command has attempted to accelerate the 

17 procurement of those in the pipeline and accelerate those 

18 that are being maintained at various depots that we still 

19 have active Army units with stockage shortages. 

20 The first question: were you ever made aware 

21 of any of this? 

22 A NO. 

23 Q Had you been made aware of it, assuming that 

24 what I have stated is an accurate representation, would 

25 that have concerned you? 



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A Yes. And that is the kind of thing that we 
would have gone to Will Taft about and said, look, we've 
got a requirement here you've laid on us, but now we have 
some serious implications and we recommend strongly 
against it. 

MR. KREUZER: John, when we speak of system 
here, 




[could go down because this 
part was not functioning? I mean, I was just saying that 
to clarify. 

MR. SAXON: Is that correct. Colonel Wallace, 
as you understand it? 

COLONEL WALLACE: Yes. 

BY MR. SAX ON: (Resuming) ^^__«.^^ 
Q ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
^^^^^^^■H|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B as 
understand it, if that's correct. 

A Well, these may have been spares that were 
generated as a result of maintenance floats, and so you 
need a degree of a float, anc^^^Hdoes not sound like a 
large float to me, and to draw it to zero sounds like not 
very sound judgment. 

MR. SAXON: I think that's all I've got on 




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HAWKS. Gentlemen, do you have anything further? All 
right. 

BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming) 

Q There are one or two things I want to ask you, 
sir, before I look at a couple of contra-related matters. 
What would be the possible reasons why the Army would 
choose not to meet a request from the Agency? When we 
talked with you in April you told us there would be 
several possible reasons. Readiness might be one. What 
would the others be? 

A Well, readiness is the legitimate issue. 
There have been occasions when we have taken issue with 
them, for example on 




Why don't we have a 
better procedure for controlling them? We are uneasy 
about the numbers that are being provided in the case of 




Can't we have a better arrangement on 
procedures rather than sort of an open letter of credit? 
One might argue that's none of your business, Mr. Army; 
the Finding calls for a certain number and the only 
legitimate basis you have to take issue is one of 
readiness. But the Secretary and I, and Jim Ambrose, the 



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Under Secretary, have gone beyond just readiness. 

The JCS have talked about that also in the 
case ofl 




Q Don't tell us there is a new fact here we have 
missed. 

A No. 

because we were uneasy for the same reasons about just 
numbers. So that's the basis. 

Q So if I understand what you're telling us 
today and what you told us in April, readiness would be 
one reason. Second would be 




A Procedures for accountability is the other 
one. 

Q And would it be possible that one of them 
would simply be a difference of opinion about the wisdom 
of providing the support? 

A That's a third one, because 




But that's a policy issue that's got little to 
do with readiness. And we've had some discussions about 



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that. 

Q All right, sir. I realize I do have one 
leftover HAWK question. Simply for the record I believe 
it's correct that you never got involved with the two 
HAWK radars that were part of the request that were 
located but found to be part of the Iranian frozen 
assets; is that correct? 

A Right. 

Q Did you ever get involved in what we call the 
which came from the Agency for 




rand ultimately Secretary Marsh took this issue to 
Mr. Taft, and the support was not provided? Was that 
something you became aware of? 

A I was not directly involved. I was aware of 
it. I may have been out of the country and the Vice 
handled it. 

Q And while I think I asked this in the context 
of the questions about 1985, as far as you know, the Army 
was never asked to provide any HAWKs or HAWK repair parts 
prior to April of 1986 for Iran or for replenishment to 
Israel ; correct? 

A To the best of my knowledge; that's right. 



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50 




Let me ask you briefly about something called 
Let me take a minute to explain 
what that is because, as we've learned, there are many of 
these operations and while you may at the time know 
exactly what that one means they probably, at least for 
me they tend to blu r together ^ 

This 




that something 
that you were aware of at the time? 

A No. 

Q Have you subsequently lear ned any t hing that 
you could share with us about 

A No, other than what I read in hearings or had 
seen on the hearings and read in the newspapers. 

Q All right, sir. Let me turn for a moment to 
the contra side of these matters and let me start by 
asking just a general and open-ended question. I guess 
for the record you had no knowledge of any effort to 
divert arms sale monies to the contras; is that correct? 

A No knowledge. 

Q Are you aware of any efforts while you were 
Chief of Staff or, I guess, conceivably while you were 




«»!' 



695 



UHJli^ffl 



51 



1 the Vice, during periods when the Boland Amendment or one 

2 of the other of the Boland Amendments, cut off direct 

3 U.S. Government funding to the contras, are you aware of 

4 any efforts in which the Army was involved to bypass the 

5 Boland Amendment and get arms to the contras? 

6 A No, not to bypass the Boland Amendment. I 

7 obviously am aware that we were providing materiel to the 

8 Agency consistent with authorized funding. 

9 Q And there were times when that was appropriate 

10 and legal, so my question doesn't include that. 

11 Sir, I want to ask you about the activities of 

12 our two SOUTHCOM commanders at various periods, first 

13 General Gorman and then General Galvin, with regard to 

14 one or two things that they may have known or may have 

15 been involved with in terms of what we call the private 

16 supply operation or the resupply operation which Colonel 

17 North, I think it's fair to say, directed. 

18 I guess for the record the SOUTHCOM commander 

19 in no way reports to the Chief of Staff of the Army; is 

20 that correct, sir? 

21 A That's right. 

22 Q That reporting channel is direct to the JCS? 

23 A Right. However, being Army he does wear an 

24 Army hat in the sense that he has Army forces, and so 

25 there is a relationship, formal and informal, with the 



696 






52 



1 Army. 

2 Q General Wiclchain, the Conunittee has heard 

3 testimony, sworn testimony, from a gentleman named Felix 

4 Rodriguez, who spent some time in Central America working 

5 in, I don't think it's unfair to say, ways at the 

6 direction or request of Colonel North to aid the resupply 

7 operation during the time when the Boland Amendment cut 

8 off all U.S. Government funds for the contras, 

9 Were you ever made aware by General Gorman 

10 that he was in any way involved in discussions with Mr. 

11 Rodriguez, facilitating his arrival down there, or giving 

12 him any advice as to what he should be doing in terms of 

13 the contras? 

14 A No. 

15 Q Let me show you for the record the next 

16 exhibit, which I believe will be Number 10. 

17 (The document referred to was 

18 marked Wickham Exhibit Number 

19 10 for identification.) 

20 Let me just give you a minute to take a look 

21 at it and then I will ask you a couple of questions. 

22 (Pause.) 

23 A I don't recollect seeing this. This is a 

24 NODIS? 

25 Q As far as I know, sir, you would not have seen 



5jff^.TOra 



697 



UNCU^IEIED 



53 



1 any of these, although if you did you can certainly tell 

2 us. 

3 (Pause.) 

4 A Hell, General Gorman had extensive connections 

5 back in Washington here with the Agency and with State, 

6 and General Gorman as a style of operation was very non- 

7 bureaucratic. 

8 Q Well, we've discovered that in terms of some 

9 of these back channel communications. Let me just walk 

10 you through parts of each of these. 

11 The first is a State Department cable from 

12 Ambassador Pickering and it's dated 12 February 85. 

13 within it it contains the text of a message. He says: 

14 "The following message was received by Ambassador 

15 Pickering from General Gorman on February 8", and it 

16 deals with Felix Rodriguez who was the subject, and it 

17 states: "Subject has been put into play by Ollie North. 

18 Ollie assures me that he will pass word to Rodriguez to 

19 get in touch with me before he goes any further. I will 

20 arrange to have Rodriguez come to SOUTHCOM for 

21 discussions. We can then decide whether it will also be 

22 useful for him to inspect El Salvador air force 

23 operations. But Ollie assures me that his intent was to 

24 focus Rodriguez on forces operating elsewhere in Central 

25 America." 




•7^ 



QO lAn r» QQ OA 



698 




'/CODEWORD 54 



1 And then the last sentence: "Ollie rogered 

2 and said that Rodriguez can be much more useful in other 

3 places where aid and advice is much scarcer." 

4 If you would look at the second document in 

5 this exhibit, it's dated 14 February, two days later. 

6 It's for Ambassador Pickering and Colonel Jim Steele, who 

7 was the Army colonel who was the Mil Group commander in 

8 El Salvador from General Gorman, subject Felix Rodriguez. 

9 I just want to read a couple of sentences from it. In 

10 paragraph one General Gorman states: "I have just met 

11 here with Felix Rodriguez." 

12 In paragraph two: "Rodriguez' primary 

13 commitment to the region is in^^^^^^^Bwhere he wants 

14 to assist the FDN. I told him that the FDN deserved his 

15 priority." 

16 In numbered paragraph four. General Gorman 

17 says: "I recommend that Jim Steele meet with him." And 

18 then, in the last paragraph: "Assuming your approval, I 

19 will send Rodriguez tc^^^^^^H tomorrow, 15 February, in 

20 one of my C-12s.** 

21 Then, finally, the last document is from 

22 Ambassador Pickering back to General Gorman, and there's 

23 no date on it, but from the text of it it's about this 

24 same time and follows in sequence. He says, in paragraph 

25 one: "I had a valuable meeting with Felix Rodricfuez 



mm 



699 



10 



imClftSSiED 



55 



1 February 15", which would suggest that General Gorman's 

2 proposal that he leave SOUTHCOM and go up was followed. 

3 And then in the last paragraph on that page he 

4 says: "Rodriguez will return in three to four weeks to 

5 work with Bustillo, FAS and Steele. Steele will monitor 

6 closely." 

7 My question to you, sir, very simply is were 

8 you ever made aware of any involvement by General Gorman 

9 or Colonel Steele in working with, discussing, assisting 
or facilitating any of Mr. Rodriguez' operations? 

11 A No. 

12 Q All right. The next questions are along the 

13 same lines with regard to General Gorman's replacement as 

14 SOUTHCOM commander, General Galvin. Let me just ask the 

15 general question if you were ever made aware of any 

16 involvement or knowledge that General Galvin had of the 

17 contras resupply operation? 

18 A No. 

19 Q And I guess it's implicit in your answers, but 

20 I should ask for the record did you ever give any 

21 guidance or instruction to General Galvin or General 

22 Gorman that they should in any way aid the resupply 
2 3 operation? 

24 A No. 

25 Q All right. Let me give you this memorandum. 



i^hW^W* 



700 




56 

1 Before you look at it let me simply tell you what you are 

2 looking at. It's a hard copy memo from Colonel North to 

3 Admiral Poindexter dated January 15, 1986, in which he is 

4 proposing — General Galvin is coming to town and he is 

5 proposing that they meet regularly. 

6 (The document referred to was 

7 marked Wickham Exhibit Number 

8 11 for identification.) 

9 Really what I am directing your attention to 

10 ' there is the last paragraph. 

11 (Pause.) 

12 The question, sir, as you look at the last 

13 paragraph. Colonel North states: "You should be aware 

14 that General Galvin is cognizant of the activities under 

15 way in both Costa Rica" — parenthetically, that had to 

16 do with the private air strip there — "and ati 

17 ^^^^^^^^^^1^" support of the DRF. General Galvin is 

18 enthusiastic about both endeavors." 

19 I should say that we have shown this document 

20 to General Galvin in his deposition and he said that in 

21 fact that is an accurate statement, that he did know 

22 about those activities and that in a general way, in 

23 terms of the contras needing assistance, that he was 

24 supportive of those endeavors. 

25 Let me simplj; J.ilmi^'^'WV were ever made aware 

M 




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UNMSIFIED 



57 



that General Galvin or anyone in an Army uniform was 
knowledgeable about the resupply operation during this 
time period. 

not ^H^^^^^^^^^^H I knew we were 




But I'm not 

aware of any of this kind of direction with Rodriguez or 
the^^^^^^^^^Sthing. That was news to me also. 

Q All right, sir. I've just got one or two more 
questions about the topic I'm sure you are probably tired 
of talking about now, and that has to do with! 

[yellow fruit. We have ample testimony 
from other individuals about that in terms of a lot of 
the details, and so in the interest of time we're not 
going to walk you through that. You've already talked a 
bit about some of that. 

But when we talked with you in April you 
indicated that you probably thought some of that kind of 
activity had been going on in the Army staff for years 
and maybe in the other services, and you stated word s to 
the effect that I 




they develop relationships and so 
forth, it gives rise to that kind of possibility. Is 




wm 



702 



UNGUiS»D 



58 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



that a fair statement? 

A Yes. 

Q I indicated earlier that the Committees will 
be writing a report, are in fact beginning to put 
together a report as we speak, and we will need to make 
recommendations about anything that strikes us as worthy 
of a recommendation, whether it be a need for new 
legislation or a new procedure or whatever. 

My question to you about YELLOW FRUITl 
assuming, as I think you have already 
testified, we need some of the capabilities that those 
operations were d irected at^_b eyond what th e Army has 
already done with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^fand a 
better awareness generally about these kinds of 
operations are there any recommendations you think we 
should make — structural, institutional, legislative or 
otherwise — that would allow us to have that capability 
but help us avoid the abuses that we have seen? 

A I think I mentioned earlier that the conduct 
of these operations should 




703 



Vim»ED 



59 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



And we have tried to insist on that. If the 
activity then needs additional capabilities — aircraft, 
you've got to arrange for an aircraft, you've got to buy 
them, you've got to go to the Air Force to get them, for 
example, or we need to buy some other capabilities — 
then you have an established procedure 




a service is concerned about disclosure of information, 
very sensitive inf ormation . You car 
^^^^^^^^^^H but^^^^^^Bdoes 
management, oversight, and legitimate civilian, military, 
legal, budgetary review, and also, at the proper time, 
Congressional oversight. 

So I would commend the 

Q Would we needlessly create problems of 
inflexibility if the Committees recommended that that 
kind of structure be institutionalized by legislation? 

A I think you would be well advised to give a 
degree of flexibility to the Secretary of Defense to make 



umssw 



704 



UNMSffi 



60 



1 modifications to a structure, a structure 'in principle, 

2 based on legitimate security considerations. 

3 Q You mentioned the need at appropriate stages 

4 for Congressional notification. As you know, our 

5 hearings have focused on that issue to a great extent, 

6 and there are legitimate concerns within the Executive 

7 branch about Congressional leaking and so forth. 

8 My guestion to you along two lines is, one, do 

9 you think that we need a joint intelligence committee 

10 smaller in number than the two committees which now exist 

11 and smaller in terms of the staff, if that would be a 

12 positive recommendation? And, second, how we can better 

13 address the problem of the need for Congressional 

14 notification and yet the competing consideration for 

15 sensitivity in certain matters? 

16 A Well, I know the Tower report recommended a 

17 combined committee to reduce the numbers and access, and 

18 there may be some legitimacy to the argument of reducing 

19 the numbers of people that are exposed to information. I 

20 think the Administration supports the Tower 

21 recommendation. 

22 I would argue for fewer being knowledgeable. 

23 I would also argue that the Congress itself needs to be 

24 very careful about assuring professional stature on the 

25 staffs of their committees. I think the House does a 

lei 




705 




1 particularly good job there. I'm not sure about the 

2 Senate. You know, you invest heavily in developing 

3 experience here and in getting security clearances, and 

4 then the Senators or the House members change and they 

5 bring their own people in and get rid of these other 

6 people that have developed the expertise and the security 

7 clearances and bring in fresh people. 

8 I'm not sure that that is a useful process, so 

9 I would urge that whether you combine the committees or 

10 keep the two committees that you have plenty of need to 

11 know and minimize the size of the staffs but you 

12 thoroughly professionalize the staffs rather than allow 

13 the staffs to become a hiring ground for the elected 

14 officials. 

15 And I sense there is a little bit of the 

16 latter. I may be speaking out of pocket here, but I 

17 think you do a disservice to yourself by letting people 

18 go. 

19 Q I think it's those kind of candid assessments 

20 that the Committees want. Can you conceive of any 

21 circumstances in which no Members of Congress should be 

22 notified of covert operations that are being conducted? 

23 A I can't conceive of some right now. Timing of 

24 notification may be a factor. The individuals that you 

25 single out may be factors. The Majority, Minority, 




VV. 



706 



BRttiSSBM 



62 



1 senior member — you may limit it to that kind of a 

2 thing. But I can't conceive of subjects where we should 

3 not consult adequately with the Congress. I'm not sort 

4 of trying to play to your strength here, but I've always 

5 been a strong believer in the constitutional process of 

6 our government — cumbersome, to be sure, but it is 

7 established in our Constitution, and I have been a strong 

8 believer in it. 

9 Q Sir, there's been a lot of concern expressed 

10 about the detailing of military officers to the National 

11 Security Council staff and how long they should stay 

12 there and so forth. Do you have any thoughts along those 

13 lines and should we make any recommendations about limits 

14 on the time that military officers can spend on the NSC 

15 staff? 

16 A No. I think good judgment argues for 

17 flexibility. You may get someone who gets to be 

18 especially expert and you reach a crisis point in a 

19 particular situation and you may want to keep him there. 

20 So I don't see any limit there, and I do believe you need 

21 to capitalize on detailing of military officers who have 

22 got a lot of experience. 

23 Q Let me put to you an argument or a sense that 

24 was conveyed to us in sworn testimony that we have 

25 received — and I won't identify the specific individuals 



imi'i^'-von'v^ 



707 



uHtyiSW 



1 but they are colleagues of yours — who suggest that 

2 although what you say is true, you put somebody on the 

3 NSC staff and they do develop that kind of expertise, in 

4 fact the exact kind of expertise and institutional memory 

5 you said that the staffs on the intelligence committees 

6 on the Hill need, they said that there comes a time when 

7 those individuals become too invaluable in that they do 

8 become the institutional memory for the staff and people 

9 then begin to look to them, and having an individual such 

10 as Colonel North, who had been there through four 

11 National Security Advisors, people — at least the 

12 argument was put to us — tend to look at him and say 

13 well, that's the military input so we don't need to 

14 notify the guys in the tank. 

15 Do you have a sense that that — 

16 A That's going to be the case whether you have 

17 someone there five years or one year. The temptation 

18 might be that you've got the military input because this 

19 guy's resident. 

20 Q So that's not really a function of time? 

21 A I don't see that that is a problem. Yes, the 

22 individual has got to be concerned for his career and the 

23 service needs to be concerned about the individual and 

24 his career because you begin to miss various gates of 

25 command opportunity and schooling, and I think Colonel 



708 



lEUiSSffO 



64 



1 North missed' some of those gates, and there is a 

2 potential for an officer detailed to become enamored with 

3 the position he has and to want to make a career out of 

4 it and stay over there and forego all of these other 

5 opportunities. 

6 That's not to say that the government is going 

7 to be badly served by an individual. It had been badly 

8 served. 

9 Q Any other recommendations you've got for us? 

10 A No, sir. I have not followed all of the 

11 hearings, so I can't really speak knowledgeably. 

12 Q For what it's worth, some of us haven't 

13 either. We've been over in your building. 

14 Bob, Roger, do you guys have anything that we 

15 haven't covered? 

16 MR. GENZMAN: I think you've covered what I 

17 needed. Thank you for your time, sir. 

18 MR. KREUZER: Thank you. 

19 MR. SAXON: Sir, let me simply say for the 

20 record that even though you are now a civilian you 

21 weren't up until a few weeks ago. You have had a 

22 distinguished military career in serving your country. 

23 We appreciate your insight and wisdom and let me just say 

24 in your previous capacity that we have found the Army 

25 incredibly helpful to us both in a personal way and in 

mmm 



709 



UNey^M 



65 



1 terms of the subject matter of our investigation and for 

2 your role in that in the earlier part of our 

3 investigation we are deeply in debt, and the Committee 

4 thanks you for your time. 

5 THE WITNESS: Good. Well, it came at a time 

6 when Jacm Marsh and I have known each other for a long 

7 time and we served together when I was in OSD and he was 

8 there, so the efforts that he and I took to establis 

9 ^^^Hand get a better handle on^^^^^^^^^Hprograms 

10 think came as a result of the close relationship that he 

11 and I shared and our common view about the need for the 

12 Constitutional process. 

13 MR. SAXON: And that will be the last word. 

14 Thank you. General. 

15 (Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the taking of the 

16 instant deposition ceased.) 

17 



18 Signature of the witness 

19 Stibscribed and Sworn to before me this day of 

20 , 1987. 

21 



22 Notary Public 

23 My Commission Expires: 




710 



UNCIASSVII 



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589 






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i-'. ''J^.a! Sec^'.-:.. r^„-;. 



Sec.',-;,, cojfici; 



) 



<^ 



RECE.'VZD 

NOV 29 1930 
CoDy IS Rece'C 



^ 



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UNCLASSIFIED 




711 




orricc or rwc sccmctamv or ocrcNSC 



589s 



13 N«reh \Ui 



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(•WORAMOOM rO» VICB^^^WrtML POIMOCXTt« 



Th« «ttaeii«d Miwcandu* froa th« Olrtctor of th« Amy Staff 
ii ••lf-«ipUn«torv. It rtfUett th« unvatt of th« Aray General 
Couna«l'i office over tna tranaftr of ittM with which you art 
fasillar A« you know, *• have b««n handling thla program on a 
vary clo.o hold baaia, and tha Ar.y h«« boon told nothing with 
ratpoe? to doatination. Par quidanea racalvad fro« l«C, tha Ar«y 
h-t boan told that thay hava no raaponaibllity for Con^raaavonal 
notification. Tha Ar«y haa alao boon told that ^^"•;" «f,^«^- 
cationa ara to b« made will ba taltan cara of at tha appropriate 
time by tha appropriate aqency and that tha Attorney General haa 
provided an ooinion that supports this poaition. » 

Tha Secretary asked that I aaka you aware of the Aray's 
concerns in the event vou wish to advise tha DCI or tha Attornev 
General. /" 




Colin L. Powan 
Ha^or General. USA 
Senior Military Aaaistant 
to the Secretary of Defense 



J eclafii :.-'./ 

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OIPAKTMCNT Of TMC AMMV 



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9900 



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OACS-SO 

MEMOKANOON fOR THI NZLITAIIT^>«ifsTAirr TO Tit SKRtTAJtY OP OBPeNSB 

SOBJICTi CoMfrstsloBal. NetlCleatlen eC St«nltle«nt Zat*Illg«ae« 
Activities (0) 



1. rrs/Moro«a) on II January 19ti, th« Aray raapendad to a vacbaL 
taakinf froa your offiea to prevido 1,000 TOM ■iisilaa to tha 
Caatral Intalliqanea A«aacy with a eoatia^aney for 3,S0« aero at a 
latar data. Tho first 1,000 •issilas wara dalivarad on 
14 Pobruary 19K to tha CXA. 

9 

TPS/NOyOK N) Thla raquatt for support eircuavantad tha noraal ■ 
Isyataa for raasenc of saeurlty, yat tha support 
•wewim^ iff SI aillion threshold astablishad in tha PTK ,. 
Xntalliqanca Authorixation Bill for raportinf to Coagrass as a 
■significant intalliganca activity.* Funds in aseass of S3. 5 
aillion vara provided by tha CZA to raitbursa tha Aray for tha 
firat 1,000 aissilas. lilliaf and payaaat will occur within CO 
days, or vhan all aissilas ara dalivarad, wttichavar is shorter. 
The Agency axpacts to eeaplate tha project within (0 days. 

3. mT<aQ£QlH^|CDg^J|M£AAd)|^f 13 Juaa 1913, subject! OeO 
Support^HBHHI^BB^HH^B^'' ' ••tsbHshes responsibility 
for aetitieatioB of Coe^raas of BoO support to the A«eacy with the 
Deputy Onder Saeratary of Oaeenae for reliey. It also eenfiraa 
that priaary raspensibllity resides with the Director, Central 
Intelligence. Xa tha eaaa of the TO«f aissiles. the Aray 
understandiaa ea reapeaslbilltias for notification conferaa with 
year Jooa 1913 aaaoraodua. 



line < 
1913 

4. rM/mrOM) This aaae Is to aasure understanding of statutory 



raqulreaents sbeald this Isaue 
Congressional iatelll^eace 



ba raised by one of the 
litteas la the future. 



^3rt;,-.;i 



Oe:'->ss;'>rf /Released on.a!i^^«ti3Sn 

-.•i:',:T '-..^iscf £.0. 12356 
7 .. Rc'-r, ..dt.:.::! Secu/ity Council 



AIITIDK I'. MOMM, JK. 
Liaatenaat Oaaeral, GS 
Oiraeter of the Aray Staff 




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SUSJtCT: ^^^^^^^■Syt%«a (0) 




18 APR im 




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r«qu«sts eSmipport^ea th« Ctntral Zat«IIi««ne« M«acy ts th« 
0«p«ruMnt of 0«f«n««. Th« tyatta proMCts «atr«a«ly Mntitlv* 
iaferMties froa both ia«dv«vt«ae aad telib«rat« diaeleaasa, 
allow* for eevart auppert to K^macf ep«ratioaa «erUvid«« and 
laauraa adoquata Sarviea ravlaw of th« r«40«at«. 

3. (S) Meaatly, a nuabar of ra^uaata lavelvia* tranafar ef'til«b 
t«ehaele«y ««apeaa, Urga quaatitiaa of liaitad, aophlatleatad 
- t«atlaa> ,^d/or a^araa for lew danaity waapoaa h«*a bypaaa«d th 

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aay d««rad« aocarity overall and iapair aatieaal aeeurity. 



vouln 



naif *-iiX-:'a cf iD. T235A 
b'/ S. H»iK '4MkUi ilta^ Covnclt 



tiautanant Canaral, OS 
Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operaciena and flana 



i 







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■WC A WH maiM nmntm, 
Mnaununn Mtaammm 



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StRuw iJroT«im RkACSi. imtnw ax» ano aovic« t« *<ch 

SCAHCSR. 

wXUU »«t^ TOU XNi»0«l«O. 

ino Ttxr. 

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C N ? I D I ••< 

"OQQ 

nZS ONLT//ETES 

MACT IflMEDlATED 

lOR AMBASSADOR PIC>;f^I^2, . 

^"^'^i'V /giJi j3sT S?T hFrE -ITH IELIX RODRIGUEZ, 
clROH^KlAHJ/%i JllSL A VETERAN Of GUIRF.IIU 



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ONLT//ITES ONLTj;^£IES__0NLT// 

KD^COL'STEELpEROM GEN GORMAN 




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ONS, 



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TT-FTrTiT. AS A !!??B^?fffi?^g?I?TcQUA'lNTAVcESdlt' ^ ilH-lHI VP 
»Hif.i HE WANTS ^^ ASSIST TLl EliJ. I iwji' J ^gj. p^^^ ^^j 

,,,,s, -I'^r.rTocS'V' t£ucin "vuo-'itT ilia »"fJ"„",Si"^- 

r;t,jA:;,MunSSs'»NS":«S?-Ct TOR !..'»» HUSTS T3A» X«I U B»» 

C:-.-hATEL IK iJEIORE. ...p -q tstABLISH HIS 

,, (C) SE %IU *ANT TO ilT JJjB Til "*" ^^ -^J^ jOXH UNNECESSARY 

CK-.:iBI-ITl, flviT TEAT i«IT CF MACHI-SMO SS.F^5 TU n- rw 

a'^j Of.ilSI. ^ _ _..._ -,. .nvicr #111 RIIKFORCE OURS, AND 

4.-- (C) MT JU:;;mINT is ^aAT HIS ADV CE .ILW.-i ^^^ .^^^^ 

•-:.T\i SEOOLC P'JT NO OBSTACLES IN BIS *Ar TO C0J|uj.^^^jqj^5^ ^ 

- :iVNLON OR rUSTILLO UNLESS AND JNTIL »E &|ymi|Up^ND Art3ASSAl-0R 

- : -n^KyNP TEAT JIM STEELE rrET %ITj Hjl^l^^^^^ ^S I S.Z 

'''^n^^^. js ist'i^i! ii"is\'i;?]!?SNjs;^j5. 3ustiu^ 

SSO NOTE: CILIVER IMMEDIATELT. Under provlsiwfl of W- 12356 

- ^4-220 jjy 3, Reggr, National Security Council ; 



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725 



BACK CHANNEL 



*-1ttlllASSIfl£0 

Partialli Declassified7fi«lMied nri ^OA^IwR ft^ 
undir pRfflSloa of LO. Um 
Jt 3. mtjf, MaMonal Security CounHJ 



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ACTION: STATE RCI, IMMEDIATE 
USSOUTHCOM, IMMEDIATE 

EYES ONLY ?C' ASA MOTLEY AND JOHNSTONE; SOUTHCOM FOR GENERAL 
GGF.r.AN FRC^■. PICKERING 

SU5J: FEETING WITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ 

1. I HAD A VALUABLE MEETING WITH FELIX RODRIGUEZ FEBRUARY 15. 

2. HE HAS C'JTLINED A TACTIC WHICH I BELIEVE HAS MERIT AND SHOULD 




OBVIOUSLY OTHER VARIATIONS ARE POSSIBLE, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO . 

integrateAHHSHBHI^^^^^ *'**^ 

BEFORE IF IT IS TO WORK, SOMETHING I AGREE WITH ON ITS OWN. 



3. RODRIGUEZ WILL RETURN IN 3-4 WEEKS TO WORK WITH BUSTILLO 
(FAS) AND STEELE. STEELE WILL MONITOR CLOSELY. RODRIGUEZ UNDER 
STANDS MY GENERAL RULES — NO CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND HE IS NOT 
TO ACCOMPANY FAS ON COMB** #«i*iOl»S^»tf . IGSEiL.. WE WILL START 



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726 



UNCWFIED 



SLOWL'Y AND CAREFULLY TO SEE WHAT APPROACH CAN PPOOUCE. HE WILL 
TAKE ON HIGHER PRIORITY^HrilSSION FIRST. 

4. FOR ARA: PLEASE BRIEF DON GREGG IN VP'S OFFICE FOR KE. 



muissiM 



727 




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NATIONAL sceunmr council 

WASMINOTON. OX. lOlM 




ACTIOW January IS, l»t6 

MEMOBAHDOM FOK JOB» N. POIMDEXTn 

FROHs OLIVCT L. BOMH|/ \\ 

SUBJECT I Maating with Gaaaral Jack Galvin, 0S8O0TCBOM 



307 



You ara schadulad to aaat with Ganaral Jack Galvia on Thursday, 
January 16 froa 10t30-lltOO a.m. Ganaral Galvia haa toaa spaeific 
racosnandationa on futura plans for mora affactiva support to tha 
Daaocratic Rasistanca ?oreas (DRT) in Nicaragua. In this ragard, 
Elliott Abraham advisad today that Sanator Oola is drafting a 
bill which will provida ovart military aupport for tha DKT. Ha 
raportadly has Sanators Lugar, Buapars, and Boran aa eo^sponsors 
and Sanator Sam Nuna is considariag whathar or not to *siga-oa.* 

Ganaral Gormaa was and is aa active propoaaat of a graatar rola 
for tha Spaeial Forcas ia traiaiag/advisiag both tha Salvadoraa 
military tha DBF. Gaaaral Galvia sharaa this baliaf. Botb 
ramaia coavincad that tha CXA lacks tha militazy axpartisa v ^ 
nacaaaary to adaquataly train and advisa tha DBF ia aa approptiata 
stratagy or avaa tha propar tactics. Thair coaeara is aet 
uafooadad. To this data, tha CXA has baaa oaabla to produca a 
coharaat military atratagy, tha tactics to support such a 
stratagy, or to adaquataly traia tha forea to accoavlish aithar. 
Admittadly, sosm of tha problaa is bacausa of our *oa agaia- 
off agaia' Coagraaaioaal rastrletioas. But, ao small part of tha 
problam ia a lack of azpartisa ia tha paramilitary sida of tha 
CZA oparatioaa diracorata. 





Fiaallf^r ilMral Galvia has askad that yen agraa to parlodic 
(about oam • aoath) aaatiaga with you to discuss saaaitiva , 
issuaa. ^Ye« should b« awara that Gaaaral Galvia i^oaBl||at of 
tha activitia a uadarvay ia both Coata Rica vA •tWB|BB .j 
[ia support of tha 0«». Gaaaral GalviS is aatauaiastiq/ 

„ ^aavors. I will ba flyiag with Caaaxal Galvia to 

Coata Bica aftar tha *aatlag with a ratuxa Tuasday merniag. 

RECOHMgWDATIOW 

That you raviaw tha poiata abova prior to your aaating. 
Approva ^JM"^' * *"' 









728 



ZINK, GREGORY. See CLARK, ALFRED. 



o 



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 

Illllllllliil 

3 9999 06313 231 8