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Full text of "Report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran- Contra Affair : with supplemental, minority, and additional views"

Y l.l/2:Serial 13742 

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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987 



Senate Report 

No. 216 




IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION 

APPENDIX B, VOLUME 1 
DEPOSITIONS 



United States Congressional Serial Set 

Serial Number 13742 



United States Government Printing Office 
Washington : 1989 



Union Calendar No. 277 
100th Congress, 1st Session 
S. Rept. No. 100-216 H. Rept. No. 100-433 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the 

Imn-Contra Affair 

Appendix B: Volume 1 
Depositions 



Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, 
Senate Select Committee 

Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman, 
House Select Committee 



U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives 

On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate 

And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

November 13, 1987. — Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. 

November 17, 1987. — Ordered to be printed. 



Washington : 1988 



Bnittd 3tattB Senate 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY 

ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE N1CARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480 



March 1, 1988 

Honorable John C. Stennis 
President pro tempore 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: 

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to 

Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the 

Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 

and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes 

of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become 

available. 



Sincerely, 




Warren B. Rudman 
Vice Chairman 




III 



U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE 

COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN 

UNITED STATES CAPITOL 

WASHINGTON. DC 20S15 

(202) 225-7902 

March 1, 1988 



The Honorable Jim Wright 
Speaker of the House 
U. S. Capitol 
Washington, D. C. 20515 

Dear Mr . Speaker : 

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st 
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the 
Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair , 
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session. 

Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the 
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of 
Appendix B have been declassified foF-Yelease to the public. 




Lee H. Hamilton 
Chairman 



United States Senate 

Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance 
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman 
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman 

George J. Mitchell, Maine 

Sam Nunn, Georgia 
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland 
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama 
David L. Boren, Oklahoma 

James A. McClure, Idaho 

Orrin G. Hatch, Utah 

William S. Cohen, Maine 

Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 

Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

To the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 



VI 



United States House of Representatives 

Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran 

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman 
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman 

Thomas S. Foley, Washington 

Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey 

Jack Brooks, Texas 

Louis Stokes, Ohio 

Les Aspin, Wisconsin 

Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts 

Ed Jenkins, Georgia 

Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican 

Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan 

Henry J. Hyde, Illinois 

Jim Courter, New Jersey 

Bill McCoUum, Florida 

Michael DeWine, Ohio 



John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



VII 



United States Senate 



Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to 
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition 



Arthur L. Liman 
Chief Counsel 
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro 

Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel 

to the Chief Counsel 

Mary Jane Checchi 
Executive Director 

Lance I. Morgan 
Press Officer 

Associate Counsels 



C. H. Albright, Jr. 
Daniel Finn 
C. H. Holmes 
James E. Kaplan 
Charles M. Kerr 
Joel P. Lisker 



W. T. McGough, Jr. 
Richard D. Parry 
John D. Saxon 
Terry A. Smiljanich 
Timothy C. Woodcock 



Committee Staff 



Assistant Counsels 



Legal Counsel 
Intelligence/Foreign 

Policy Analysts 
Investigators 



Press Assistant 
General Accounting 
Office Detailees 



Security Officer 
Security Assistants 



Chief Clerk 
Deputy Chief Clerk 



Steven D. Arkin* 
Isabel K. McGinty 
John R. Monsky 
Victoria F. Nourse 
Philip Bobbitt 
Rand H. Fishbein 
Thomas Polgar 
Lawrence R. 

Embrey, Sr. 
David E. Faulkner 
Henry J. Flynn 
Samuel Hirsch 
John J. Cronin 
Olga E. Johnson 
John C. Martin 
Melinda Suddes* 
Robert Wagner 
Louis H. Zanardi 
Benjamin C. 

Marshall 
Georgiana 

Badovinac 
David Carty 
Kim Lasater 
Scott R. Thompson 
Judith M. Keating* 
Scott R. Ferguson 



Staff Assistants 



Administrative Staff 



Secretaries 



Receptionist 
Computer Center 
Detailee 



John K. Appleby 
Ruth Balin 
Robert E. Esler 
Ken Foster* 
Martin H. Garvey 
Rachel D. Kaganoff* 
Craig L. Keller 
Hawley K. 

Manwarring 
Stephen G. Miller 
Jennie L. Pickford* 
Michael A. Ray nor 
Joseph D. 

Smallwood* 
Kristin K. Trenholm 
Thomas E. Tremble 
Bruce Vaughn 
Laura J. Ison 
Hilary Phillips 
Winifred A. Williams* 
Nancy S. Durflinger 
Shari D. Jenifer 
Kathryn A. Momot 
Cindy Pearson 
Debra S. Sheffield* 
Ramona H. Green 
Preston Sweet 



VIII 



Committee Members' Designated Liaison 



Senator Inouye 
Senator Rudman 

Senator Mitchell 

Senator Nunn 

Senator Sarbanes 
Senator Heflin 



Peter Simons 
William V. Cowan 
Thomas C. Polgar 
Richard H. 
Arenberg 
Eleanore Hill 
Jeffrey H. Smith 
Frederick Millhiser 
Thomas J. Young 



Senator Boren 

Senator McClure 
Senator Hatch 

Senator Cohen 

Senator Trible 



Sven Holmes 
Blythe Thomas 
Jack Gerard 
Dee V. Benson 
James G. Phillips 
James Dykstra 
L. Britt Snider 
Richard CuUen 



Part Time* 



Assistant Counsel 
Hearings Coordinator 
Staff Assistants 



Interns 



Peter V. Letsou 
Joan M. Ansheles 
Edward P. 

Flaherty, Jr. 
Barbara H. Hummell 
David G. Wiencek 
Nona Balaban 
Edward E. 

Eldridge, III 
Elizabeth J. Glennie 
Stephen A. Higginson 
Laura T. Kunian 
Julia F. Kogan 
Catherine L. Udell 



Document Analyst 

Historian 

Volunteers 



Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 
Edward L. Keenan 
Lewis Liman 
Catherine Roe 
Susan Walsh 



*The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during 
the life of the Committee, provided services. 



IX 



United States House of Representatives 



Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 

Majority Staff 

John W. Nields, Jr. 
Chief Counsel 

W. Neil Eggleston 
Deputy Chief Counsel 

Kevin C. Miller 
Staff Director 



Special Deputy 

Chief Counsel 
Staff Counsels 



Press Liaison 
Chief Clerk 
Assistant Clerk 
Research Director 
Research Assistants 



Charles Tiefer 

Kenneth M. Ballen 
Patrick J. Carome 
V. Thomas 

Fryman, Jr. 
Pamela J. 

Naughton 
Joseph P. Saba 
Robert J. Havel 
Ellen P. Rayner 
Debra M. Cabral 
Louis Fisher 
Christine C. 

Birmann 
Julius M. 

Genachowski 
Ruth D. Harvey 
James E. Rosenthal 



Systems 

Administrator 
Systems 

Programmer/ 

Analysts 
Executive Assistant 
Staff Assistants 



Catherine L. 

Zimmer 
Charles G. Ratcliff 
Stephen M. 

Rosenthal 
Elizabeth S. Wright 
Bonnie J. Brown 
Christina Kalbouss 
Sandra L. Koehler 
Jan L. Suter 
Katherine E. Urban 
Kristine Willie 
Mary K. Yount 



Minority Staff 



Thomas R. Smeeton 
Minority Staff Director 

George W. Van Cleve 
Chief Minority Counsel 

Richard J. Leon 
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel 



Associate Minority 

Counsel 
Assistant Minority 

Counsel 
Minority Research 

Director 



Robert W. 
Genzman 
Kenneth R. Buck 

Bruce E. Fein 



Minority Staff 
Editor/Writer 

Minority Executive 
Assistant 

Minority Staff 
Assistant 



Michael J. Malbin 

Molly W. Tully 

Margaret A. 
Dillenburg 



Committee Staff 



Investigators 



Director of Security 



Robert A. 

Bermingham 
James J. Black 
Thomas N. 

Ciehanski 
William A. Davis, 

III 
Clark B. Hall 
Allan E. Hobron 
Roger L. Kreuzer 
Donald Remstein 
Jack W. Taylor 
Timothy E. Trayior 
Bobby E. Pope 



Security Officers 



Editor 

Deputy Editor 
Associate Editor 
Production Editor 
Hearing Editors 

Printing Clerk 



Rafael Luna, Jr. 
Theresa M. Martin 
Milagros Martinez 
Clayton C. Miller 
Angel R. Torres 
Joseph Foote 
Lisa L. Berger 
Nina Graybill 
Mary J. Scroggins 
David L. White 
Stephen G. Regan 
G. R. Beckett 



Associate Staff 



Representative 
Hamilton 

Representative 
Fascell 

Representative 

Foley 
Representative 

Rodino 

Representative 

Brooks 
Representative 

Stokes 
Representative 

Aspin 



Michael H. 

Van Dusen 
Christopher Kojm 
R. Spencer Oliver 
Bert D. Hammond 
Victor Zangla 
Heather S. Foley 
Werner W. Brandt 
M. Elaine Mielke 
James J. 

Schweitzer 
William M. Jones 

Michael J. O'Neil 
Richard M. Giza 
Richard E. Clark 
Warren L. Nelson 



Representative 

Boland 
Representative 

Jenkins 
Representative 

Broomfield 
Representative 

Hyde 
Representative 

Courter 
Representative 

McCollum 
Representative 

DeWine 
General Counsel to 

the Clerk 



Michael W. Sheehy 

Robert H. Brink 

Steven K. Berry 
David S. Addington 
Diane S. Doman 

Dennis E. Teti 

Tina L. Westby 

Nicholas P. Wise 

Steven R. Ross 



XI 



Contents 

Volume 1 



Preface XXI 

Airline Proprietary Project Officer 7 

Alvarez, Francisco J 179 

Allen, Charles 236 

Arcos, Cresencio 1238 



Depositions 



Volume 1 



Airline Proprietary Project Officer. 
Alvarez, Francisco J. 
Allen, Charles. 
Arcos, Cresencio. 



Volume 2 



Volume 3 



Armitage, Richard. 
Artiano, Martin L. 
Associate DDO (CIA). 
Baker, James A., III. 
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter. 
Barnett, Ana. 
Bartlett, Linda June. 
Bastian, James H. 
Brady, Nicholas F. 
Brown, Arthur E., Jr. 



Byrne, Phyllis M. 
Calero, Adolfo. 
Castillo, Tomas ("W"). 
Cave, George W. 
C/CATF. 



Volume 4 

Channell, Carl R. 

Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer). 

Chatham, Benjamin P. 

CIA Air Branch Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief. 

CIA Air Branch Subordinate. 

CIA Chief. 

CIA Communicator. 

CIA Identity "A". 



XV 



Volume 5 

CIA Officer. 

Clagett, C. Thomas, Jr. 

Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink). 

Clarke, George. 

Clarridge, Dewey R. 

Cline, Ray S. 

C/NE. 

Cohen, Harold G. 

Volume 6 

Collier, George E. 

Cole, Gary. 

Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA. 

Conrad, Daniel L. 



Volume 7 



Cooper, Charles J. 
Coors, Joseph. 
Corbin, Joan. 
Corr, Edwin G. 
Coward, John C. 
Coy, Craig R 
Crawford, Iain T.R. 



Crawford, Susan. 
Crowe, Adm. William J. 
Currier, Kevin W. 
DCM, Country 15. 
DEA Agent 1. 
DEA Agent 2. 
DEA Agent 3. 
deGraffenreid, Kenneth, 
de la Torre, Hugo. 
Deputy Chief "DC". 



Duemling, Robert W. 
DIA Major. 
Dietel, J. Edwin. 
Dowling, Father Thomas. 
Dutton, Robert C. 
Earl, Robert. 



Volume 8 



Volume 9 



XVI 



Volume 10 



Farber, Jacob. 
Feldman, Jeffrey. 
Fischer, David C. 
Floor, Emanuel A. 
Former CIA Officer. 
Fraser, Donald. 
Fraser, Edie. 
Fuller, Craig L. 



Volume 11 



Furmark, Roy. 

Gadd, Richard. 

Gaffney, Henry. 

Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A. Rudd). 

Galvin, Gen. John R. 

Gantt, Florence. 

Garwood, Ellen Clayton. 

Gast, Lt. Gen. Philip C. 

Gates, Robert M. 

Glanz, Anne. 



Volume 12 



George, Clair. 
Godard, Ronald D. 
Godson, Roy S. 
Golden, William. 
Gomez, Francis D. 
Goodman, Adam. 
Gorman, Paul F. 
Graham, Daniel O. 
Gregg, Donald P. 
Gregorie, Richard D. 
Guillen, Adriana. 



Hakim, Albert. 



Hall, Wilma. 
Hasenfus, Eugene. 
Hirtle, Jonathan J. 
Hooper, Bruce. 



Volume 13 



Volume 14 



XVII 



Hunt, Nelson Bunker. 
Ikle, Fred C. 
Jensen, D. Lowell. 
Juchniewicz, Edward ! 
Kagan, Robert W. 
Keel, Alton G. 
Kellner, Leon B. 
Kelly, John H. 
Kiszynski, George. 



Koch, Noel C. 
Kuykendall, Dan H. 
Langton, William G. 
Lawn, John C. 
Leachman, Chris J., Jr. 
Ledeen, Michael A. 



Leiwant, David O. 
Lilac, Robert H. 
Lincoln, Col. James B. 
Littledale, Krishna S. 
McDonald, John William. 
McFarlane, Robert C. 
McKay, Lt. Col. John C. 
McLaughlin, Jane E. 



McMahon, John N. 
McMahon, Stephen. 
McNeil, Frank. 
Makowka, Bernard. 
Marostica, Don. 
Marsh, John. 
Mason, Robert H. 



Meese, Edwin IIL 
Melton, Richard H. 
Merchant, Brian T. 
Meo, Philip H. 
Miller, Arthur J. 
Miller, Henry S. 
Miller, Johnathan. 



Volume 15 



Volume 16 



Volume 17 



Volume 18 



XVIII 



Miller, Richard R. 



Motley, Langhome A. 
Mulligan, David P. 
Nagy, Alex G. 
Napier, Shirley A. 
Newington, Barbara. 
North, Oliver L. 
O'Boyle, William B. 
Osborne, Duncan. 
Owen, Robert W. 
Pena, Richard. 
Pickering, Thomas. 
Poindexter, John M. 



Posey, Thomas V. 
Powell, Gen. Colin L. 
Price, Charles H., II. 
Proprietary Manager. 
Proprietary Pilot. 
Radzimski, James R. 
Ramsey, John W. 
Ransom, David M. 



Volume 19 



Volume 20 



Volume 21 



Volume 22 



Raymond, Walter, Jr. 

Regan, Donald T. 

Reich, Otto J. 

Revell, Oliver B. 

Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman). 

Reynolds, William B. 



Volume 23 



Richard, Mark M. 
Richardson, John, Jr. 
Robelo, Alfonso. 
Robinette, Glenn A. 
Rodriguez, Felix I. 
Roseman, David. 



\ 



XIX 



Rosenblatt, William. 
Royer, Larry. 
Rudd, Glenn A. 
Rudd, Glenn A. 



(See Henry Gaffney). 



Volume 24 



Rugg, John J. 
Russo, Vincent M. 
Sanchez, Nestor. 
Scharf, Lawrence. 
Schweitzer, Robert L. 
Sciaroni, Bretton G. 
Secord, Richard V. 



Shackley, Theodore G. 
Sigur, Gaston J. 
Simpson, Major C. 
Sinclair, Thomas C. 
Singlaub, John K. 



Slease, Clyde H., IIL 
Smith, Clifton. 
Sofaer, Abraham D. 
Steele, Col. James J. 
Taft, William H., IV. 
Tashiro, Jack T. 
Teicher, Howard. 
Thompson, Paul. 
Tillman, Jacqueline. 



Volume 25 



Volume 26 



Volume 27 



Thurman, Gen. Maxwell. 

Trott, Stephen S. 

Tull, James L. 

Vessey, John. 

Walker, William G. 

Watson, Samuel J., IIL 

Weinberger, Caspar. 

Weld, William. 

Wickham, John. 

Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark). 



XX 



Preface 



The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran 
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing 
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290 
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation. 

The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses 
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the 
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings. 

Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority 
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the 
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals 
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents 
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents. 

Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet 
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded 
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review 
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc- 
tions to the Select Committees. 

At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege 
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were 
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were 
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals 
retained their own counsel. 

The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted 
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that, 
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid 
answering a question, his or her compelled responses— or leads or collateral 
evidence based on those responses— could not be used in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order. 

An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House, 
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some 
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some 
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons. 

In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious 
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information 
not considered germane to the investigation. 

In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow- 
ed by exhibits. The exhibits— documentary evidence— were developed by Select 
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Committees' investigation or were 
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the 
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for 
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original 



XXI 



exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the 
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in- 
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate. 

The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages, 
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts 
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order. 



XXII 



Publications of the Senate and House 
Select Committees 



Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 
1 volume, 1987. 

Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix B: Depositions, 21 volumes, 1988. 
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988. 
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988. 

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 



XXIII 



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Take #1 



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EXECUTIVE SESSION 
DEPOSITION OF | 

Friday, June 12, 1987 



U.S. House of Representatives, 
Select Committee to Investigate Covert 
Arms Transactions with Iran, 



H "^ 1 I o - :^ ^\£. .1 






Washington, D.C. 



40-^"^ 



The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:10 p.m., 
in Room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, Patrick 
Carome (Staff Counsel of the House Select Committee) 
presiding. 

Present: Patrick Carome, Staff Counsel, House Select 
Committee; Timothy Woodcock, Associate Counsel, Senate 
Select Committee; and David Pearline, Counsel, CIA, represent 
ing the witness. 



under cio\rttlonl rf E-0. 12? 5 



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Whereupon , 



was called as a witness by Counsel for the House Select 
Committee, and having been duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEES 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q ^^^^H^^^H just for the record, I am Patrick 
Carome, I am staff counsel with the House Select Committee 
to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. Also 
present is Tim Woodcock, an attorney with the Senate Select 
Committee looking into the same matters. 

Our committee has been set up pursuant to the 
resolution and rules which I have just given you a copy of 
and which the CIA has been earlier provided copies of these 
rules. This deposition is being conducted pursuant to these 
rules. 




UNCLASSIFIED 









UNcimEFT 



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10 

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Q But it was beginning June, 1985 that you became 

Project Manager with respect to^^H^^IH^^^^^^^H is that 
right? 

A Right. 




l/NCUSSIflED 



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im^ffl^T 



A In other words,] 

answered to me on financial matters and what 
we were doing and so forth, and then I would give him in- 
structions from our side. 

Q And when you say "from our side", you mean the CIA 
is that right? 

A Yes, right. 

Who withir^^^^^^^^^^^^B did you deal with as 
project manager for| 

A Primarily the Branch Chief or Deputy Branch Chief 





Q So I get a better idea of these people, the Branch 
Chief, during 1985, ^^^^^KKjK^^Kt ^^ ^^^^ correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And the Deputy Branch Chief during 1985 — 
A 

Q Was 

A Right. 

Q And the^^^^^^^Bsection Chief — is that what 




you said? 



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Q And the position held by^^^^^^^^H toward the end 
of 1985 was essentially the same position that you held! 




Q The primary timeframe that I am interested in 
talking to you about today is really the second half of 1985. 




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Q I take it that^^^^^^^B during the time I am 
talking about, the second half of 1985, performed both 
straight commercial operations and special operations at the 
behest of the United States Government, is that right? 

A Yes. 




10 



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Okay. I take it that your primary contact with the 
[proprietary was^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^f is 
A Right. 

Q Was all of your contact ^^th^^^H^^H through him? 
A Right. 

Q Did you ever speak directly with crew members and 
pilots, et cetera? 

A Not during that timeframe. Probably in January -- 
sorry, March of '86 would be the first time that I had a 
daily contact with crew members and actually flew on some 
flights and had a chance to meet the people individually. 

Now, during the first six months I had met a few 
people, I had met them in the office as the result of being 
in the office and passing through the office, but not daily 



contact. 



IIUPI AttlFIFfl 



I 



11 



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11 



Q When you say office, what office are you referring 



to: 




^^^^Hf^^^l^l of f ice , the officel 
itself, and the -- we didn't have an office 
se, but our aircraft was based^^^^^^^^^^H so I met the 
crew there. 

Q I take it that you worked out of an office' 

is thai right? 
A Right. 




12 



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Q When^^^^^^^Hperformed straight commercial cargo 
carries, what type of information or what type of contact 
would there be between^^H^^^^Band you? 

A Other than keeping track of what we were doing or 
trying to keep track of what we were doing so that I would 
know where the aircraft were, the flyable status of the air- 
craft, he had the authority and in fact did contract the air- 
craft and run that schedule. I didn't know on a daily 
basis who we were flying for that day necessarily or where 
the aircraft was going, except we did have a recurring con- 
tract f^^K^H^^^B that we flew most of the time, hauling 
^■freight and one thing or another. 
So I didn't get involved in that except to try to 
personally keep myself abreast of where the aircraft were 
located in case a requirement come up that we had to fulfill, 
and the flyable status of the aircraft. We had an agreement, 
we operate I shou»l<t say beyond even an agreement. He had 
the authority to accept any commercial contract and fly that 
aircraft without notifying me as long as it didn'tl 

[and that type of stuff, and if he had an 
offer to do so, then he would call me, and we would get 
clearances, or I would get clearances, I should say more 
correctly. 

Q 





Iran was 



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considered one as well. 

Q And these are countries that it is particularly 
sensitive for a U . S . -associated company to fly into, is that 
right? 

A Right. Even though we were not U.S. associated ,^B 




We do have, you know, in fact, we owned the air- 
craft and so forth. 

Other than^^f^^^^^^^^H, were 
there any other restrictions on^^^^^^^^^Hability to 
accept a contract for a flight? 

THE WITNESS: Other than practical, no. In other 
words, he would have to justify later as a fact why we would 
have taken a flight. 

MR. WOODCOCK: How about cargos? 

THE WITNESS: Cargos , no, except to be legal. In 
other words, he is not obviously going to be, what would 
you call it, smuggling or that type of stuff. It would be 
legal, contracted type flights. He wouldn't have the 
authority to go out and personally generate a load somewhere 
and transport it. As long as we were hauling for someone 
else under a contract or a trip contract type thing. 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q He could, for example, contract to perform a ship- 
ment of military equipment or armaments without having to 



■■" Ml tfW^lff^D 11! 



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double check with you, is that right? 

A Depending on the destination, yes. 

Q It is the destination that drove whether or not he 
had the authority? 

A And who we were flying for, yes. 

Q And what do you mean by "who we were flying for"? 

A As an example, any time he flew for -- there was 
like one broker, we knew any time we flew for that one -- 
because they were kind of known as arms dealers worldwide -- 
so even though it would be, say, fron^^^^^|or somewhere, 

something, he would advise me of that flight 




^^—,—^^^^^^^^-,^^ to let us know this was in fact 
going on. 

And I think you have a copy of some of his reports 
where he reported flights for Iran previous to this time- 
frame we are talking about thatjhe had picked up from these 
people . 

Q What was the normal method of communications 
between you and CIA and between you and 

when there was a need f^^^V^^^H^^Hto 
perform a special flight on behalf of the U.S. Government? 

A It would vary depending on the urgency, obviously. 
A lot of it was by commercial telephone and talking around 
as much as we could. A lot of it would be, I would get a 




\\m AQQidcn 



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phone call^^^^^^^^^Hfor a briefing and would actuallyl 
^Hand physically get the briefing and then go back and 
relay it back to^^^^^^^Bor to actually implement the thing. 




Q Normally what would take place, I take it, is that 
someone at CIA would call you up and say "We have a task 
for^^^^^^^H to cai^^^^^^^Bj do Is 

A Right. 

Q And who would normally be the person to make that 
phone call to you? 

A One of the three: the Branch Chief primarily, 
or his deputy, and then^^^H. In this case, you are interests 
in what was probably the first one that we worked with^^^B 
directly, and that was with he and the Branch Chief the same 
night, same weekend. 

Q You are referring to the November, '85 shipment, 
is that right? 

A Right. But most of my flights would come directly 
from the Branch Chief, or at least notification of it would. 




Q That would either be -- that would usually start 



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with a phone call to you, is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q And depending on how quick things had to happen, 
you handle i^^^^^^^^^H' ° ^ ^^^^H^^^I^^^H 

^^■CIA Headquarters, is that right? 

A Right. 

Q And what about the communications between you and 
how would those work in this special flight area? 

A Either by telephone or, based on sensitivity, 
face-to-face with^^^^^^^^f I would either go to his place, 
or he would come to mine for a face-to-face briefing if the 
time allowed, or if circumstances allowed. Otherwise, it 
was by telephone. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I ]ust want to establish, for the 
record, when you say^^^^^^^V you are referring toj 



THE WITNESS: Right j 
BY MR. CAROME: 



yes, right. 




Q And when a tasking came down from the Central 
Intelligence Agency, did you instruct^^^^^^^^^^^H that he 
would do this, or would you ask him, "Do vou want to do this 

IINPI m\^M 



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CIA tasking?" 

A It would be more of an instruction with, obviously 
taking his advise and counsel as to safety and whether we 
should do it or not, but it would be in the form of orders, 
if you will, saying, "This is the flight", you know, "Do 
it" and "How do we do it" and whatever. It wouldn't -- not 
a cold block order, saying, "Do it" and no if s, ands or buts, 
if he had a concern about saf ety^^^^^^^| or whatever, that 
wold obviously be entertained and the flight would, you know, 
take that -- go and take that into consideration. We never 
did not do a flight because he said he didn't want to do 
it or anything of that nature. So that was the point I was 
trying to make. 

Q Okay. 

A Fortunately, v;e never ran into that situation where 
he said, "I won't do it" or "We can't do it", or whatever. 

Q But the flow of authority or command was from you 
down to him, is that right? 

A Right. 

Q How many times, to your knowledge, has 
flown to Iran? 

A Twice. Two flights. 

MR. PEARLINE: In what time period? 

MR. CAROME: I guess I am talking about your total 

THE WITNESS: Twice. 



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MR. PEARLINE: Okay. 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Which two times are those? 

A We did a strictly commercial flight in August, 
1985. Then we did a second flight in November, 1985. 

Q And just to refresh your recollection, I believe 
that there was also a flight, at least one flight, into Iran 
in May of 198 -- sorry, I withdraw that question. My con- 
fusion . 

A The August, 1985 flight, you understand, was not 
an agency flight. 

Q Why don't you tell me what that flight was? 

A That wasi 

you know, that we found out after the fact. We knew at the 
time we booked the flight that it was supposed to be^^^fH 

[received a request for flight, as we have 
several others other than that one, and relayed it to me 
that a brother had approached him to make this flight. It 
was a J 
and at that time I was told 

and possibly ^^^^^^^^Bl had something to put 
on board the flight. We made a pickup — the flight was 
scheduled to pick up in^^^^^^^^HH ^^ fact, we did pick 
up^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l he gave me the details of the flight, 
I reported them to Headquarters and asked approval to make 




iMAssra. 



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HNSt/ISStPIIST 



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Who did you make the report to at Headquarters: 

To| 

Did he tell you, you made that report by telephone: 

Yes. 

And did he tell you on that phone call, "Yes, go 



1 the flight 

2 We got approval to make the flight, and, in fact 

3 did 

4 Q 

5 A 

6 Q 

7 A 

8 Q 

9 ahead"? 

10 A' No, it was, in fact, a couple days later before I 

11 got the clearance to go ahead and make the flight. As a 

12 matter of procedure, when some of these flights come up, 

13 we would continue to negotiate the flight, 

14 structions were to not turn the flight off in case we 

15 decided we wanted to make the flight, but always leave an 
15 out, so we would not have to make the flight in case I got 

17 a "no responssj"./ In this flight, I got a "yes" response. 

18 Q And that, again, came bj 

19 by phone? 

20 A Yes. 

21 MR. WOODCOCK: Was there any report of that 

22 consultation process that was put down in writing? 

23 THE WITNESS: Not during that time. 

24 made a report to me, and I think I made a comment in one of 

25 my weekly or monthly reports to^^^^^^^^^^^^ In fact, 



my weekly or monthly reports to j 

liMPiAccinrn 



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^mmm 



20 



'' I remember turning in a copy of the flight manifest that 

2 ^^^^^^^Hhad provided to me. 

3 BY MR. CAROME: 

4 Q How did you learn that some of that material 

5 originatei 

6 A As it turned out -- this is from^^^^^^^f his 

7 verbal to me, which he had gotten from the brother that 

8 this is where the cargo was supposed to have come from. As 

t o^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^H s t u f f 

10 didn't show up, so to be able to say exactly where the cargo 

11 came from I don't think we can do so. 

12 But his was verbal from the brother to him, and 

13 then to me. 

14 Q Okay. 

15 A I think the only thing I can remember, and you are 

16 stretching it for a year-and-a-half , is part of the documenta 

17 tion showed some| 

18 which I remembered recognizing. 

■)9 Q Did you play any role in that August, 1985 business 

20 coming to' 

21 A No 

22 Q It came t' 

23 A Right 

24 Q Were there] 

25 let's say, prior to November, 1985^^^^^^|cargo shipments 




Mim 



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into Iran that you know of? 

A Yes. I received a call, and later I got it in 
writing, and there is a question in my mind as to when I 
actually got it in writing, I think it was after the November 
flight when I finally received a memo of^^^H^^^^^^ dated 

do ^sc^H m^^^^ii^^^^^p^^^^^^^^^^^^^^i3 

flights or 13 loads from^^H^^^to Tehran. And this was 
more for information 




Q I had understood fr 
yesterday that this 

^^^HJoccurred sometime in November, 1985. Is that consistent 
with your recollection? 

A Yes, that is consistent. His memo — and I don't 
remember the exact date -- his memo was like three days 
prior, three or four days prior to the time that we entered 
into the, the 23 I think it is of November flight. I think 
his memo was dated the 19th or 20th of November. 

But preceding the memo was a phone call, and then 

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later I got the memo. Like I say, I don't think I had the 
memo at the time we currently discussed the flight. 

Q Just so the record is clear, with respect to this 
lyou recall receiving a phone call from 

have m^l^^^^^^^^^^^^^B these from 

|to Iran", is that right? 

A Right. And it wasn't a specific phone call for 
that subject. It was mixed in among some other reporting. 
Normally he would give me information by phone and would 
follow it up with a memo that, because of the mail or because 
he would hand carry it to me a few days later so we probably 
discussed other things as well, was not a specific phone 
call saying "I received that one flight"; that was the extent 
of it. It may have other business matters as well. 

Q That was part of a general report to you? 

A Right. 

From^^^^^^^^^^^ is 

A Yes. 

Q And he would periodically make such reports, is 
that right? 

A Yes. 

Q How often would he do that? 

A We would talk at least weekly, sometimes daily, 
depending on what activity were going on, both financial, 
commercially or officially. 



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Q And he would follow those phone calls up with 
rnemorandums, is that right? 

A Sometimes, most of the time. He should have in 
most cases, yes. But there was obviously gaps where he 
wouldn't do that. 

Q And what do you recalJ^^^^^^^^^^B telling you 

t h i ^^^^^^^^^^B s h i pme n t^^^^^^^^^^B t o 
A Basically, what -- at that time, basically what I 
had told you, until I got the call on the flight that we 
finally did do, when I first described the flight to him, 
he said, "That sounds like the same flight that I told you 
about earlier," and I said, "No, the destination is wrong, 
and I don't think it could be that." 

And then we dropped it, and that was the extent 
of the reference to that period. 

Q All right. Could we go off the record for a 
second. 

(Discussion off the record.) 



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HNt^SSIPKS'^ 



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MR. CAROME: Let's mark this as Exhibit^^-1 
[The document marked Exhibit No.^^k-1 



follows : ] 



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MR. CAROME; ^^^^^^^m I am putting before you 
what has been marked as Exhibit 1. I ask you if you 
recognize that to be a November 21, 1985 memorandum from 
■ to you? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q recognize as^^^^^^^^^^^^Hmemo, 
even though it doesn't bear his name on it, is that right: 
A Yes. 

Q I have a couple of questions about this Exhibit 
1. First you will note on the first page that there are 
several paragraph items and a couple of them have been 
blacked out and paragraph 3 is one which has been blacked 
out. I have seen an unredacted version of that document 
and I know that paragraph 3 deals with] 

^several flights] 

to Iran. 

Are you familiar with the test of that paragraph? 
A I haven't seen it for a while, but yes, that is 
the memo I was referring to. Like I say, the date was the 
21st. I don't think I had this on 23rd at the time 

lasked me the question is this the same flight, 
but he at that time reported to me verbally the report. 
He referred to in his After Action Report or whatever that 
this is the flight I referred to you earlier and I said 




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no, I don't think it is. 

Q Did^^^^^^^^^^^B tell you when you talked to 
him the first time about this. 



A I don't remember. I don't remember that coming 
into it, no. 

Q Paragraph 3 in its unredacted form states that 
the nature of the cargo was I 
believe munitions or armaments of some sort. Is that how 
described it to you in the telephone call? 

A Yes.. 

Q So you knew that that was a shipment of military 
armaments or munitions, is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q Did ^^^^^^^^^^1 ask I 




A No. 1 

In fact I think he was reporting it more 
as a "This has been on the street for a week 




27 



UNsmssieEK' 




I which was involved! 

A I would almost say^^^^^^^^^^^^^H rather than 
or something to that effect. I don't 
remember seeing this recently but I think it was! 



Q Is that an airline company? 

A Yes, to my knowledge it is. I am not familiar 
with the company but to my knowledge it is^B^^^^^^Hair- 
line or some airline doing business 

Q. 




Q I^ic^^^^^^^^^B^Bfl ^^^-^ y°^ that while the actual 
nature of the cargo was armaments or munitions, it was 
being billed on the market as medical equipment? 

A I don't think so. I don't remember that coming 



Q Before we move forward in time, I want to ask 
you, do you know prior to the matters we have already been 
talking about, were there other offers that] 
received to perform flights into Iran? 

A Durin2_my_ tijie^-^Qfi'^ ^,<^%^t know prior to 

111. Jltll] 




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June '85. The first one I have memory of is the one 
in August that I got approval for us to do. In fact I 
felt good that we had gotten approval to do, that was what 
we were supposed to be out there doing anyway. To my 
memory that was the first one that we had been approached 
or at least he told me that he had been approached to do 
and we went in and got approval to do. 

Q We have been told at some point and I don't 
remember the details precisely that there was an offer made 
to^^^^^^^^l to fly believe|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hto Iran 
at some point. Are you aware of such an offer? 

A I don't remember the word^^^^^^^^^f I remember 
that we did have an offer or in fact we started out to 
do a f light ^^^^^^^^^1 I believe, somewhere | 

in January of '86. In fact he gave me the flight. 
I just don't remember the word |^^^^^^^^^-- he gave me 
the flight as a proposal, I submitted it to Headquarters 
tc^l^^^^^^^^Und for some reason they weren't as respon- 
sive on this one as they had been previously. In fact 
I had to bug them a couple of times because we were getting 
close to the time we had to move the aircraft to do the 
f fight. This stretched out over a couple of days. We 
finally got to the point where we had accepted the money 
to do a flight and had to move the aircraft. We had a 



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fuel and crew rest stop scheduled^^^^^^^^^^^H x got 
approval to proceed that far and not let the aircraft 
proceed further until I had approval from the Agency. 
After arrival of the aircraft prior to the scheduled 
take-off of the aircraft, I finally got a phone call from 

[saying we were disapproved for 

the flight. 

Q Did he say where the disapproval came from? 
A I didn't ask, but normally the DO staff. In 
fact at that time we were talking onj 

Q Was this an opportunity that came to BS^ ^M 
through commercial channels unassociated with the Agency? 
A Yes. 

Q Much like the August flight? 

A Just like the August flight, right. In fact 
if I remember correctly it was from the same broker. 
Q Is thati 
A Yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Were you told why the flight 
was refused? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Have you ever learned afterwards 
why it was refused? 

THE WITNESS: No, I never asked. I told 
Iwhy the flight was refused but that was between 



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he and I and more to cover our relationship than mine with 
the Agency, and that my explanation to^^^^^^H was let's 
don't question it, they must know something we don't know, 
as far as safety of the aircraft or so forth. 

MR. CAROME: You recall that that was — let me 
rephrase the question. You don't have a specific recollec- 
tion of whether that was^^^^^^Hon that flight, is that 
right? 

THE WITNESS: I don't remember there were] 
no. I knew that it was^^^^^^^^fof some sort or at least 
we understood that that was what it was, and I don't 
recollect him saying to me^^^^^^^f per se. 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Let's go back to Exhibit 1 for a moment. 
Paragraph 4 is headed Tehran Situation. Can you explain 
to me what that item is in this report? 

A He was reporting to me a flight that had taken 
place to Tehran that he had apparently gotten from 

lor one of the brokers there and how the flight 
was conducted and the fact that they were escorted by 
fighter aircraft. That he found interesting, that that 
had transpired. 

Q And I take it there is no question in your 
mind that that was not a flight performed by^ 

A No, I know it wasn't, or I feel like I know it 

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wasn't I should say. In fact that question did come up 
later that could he have possibly made this flight, as 
somebody could have misread it, that maybe he made the 
flight and didn't report it or we didn't get approval for 
it. I went back into my files and was able to satisfy 
myself that our aircraft in fact was in the paint shop 
at that time. I didn't physically see it there, but I 
bought the paint and we were out for a period of time, 
that we were satisfied thatim^^^did not make a flight. 

Q I gather that you checked into that matter 
in late '86 when this same question came up? 

A Right. 

Q And you provided^^^^^^^^^f with some records 
substantiating the account that the plane appeared to have 
been in a paint shop at the time? 

A Right. 

Q Could you describe how the second Tehran flight, 
this is now the November '85 flight that^^^^M^^did 
perform, how that matter came to your attention and 
what happened when it did? 

A I received a call late afternoon, early 
evening the 22nd, I guess it was a Friday afternoon or 
evening, whatever day of the week it was. 

Q Perhaps to assist you let me -- 



Please 



iiKipi ACQinrn 



32 



liNttJI^iPIST 



32 



Q 1 Q __ put before you an exhibit that deals with 

2 this matter. 

3 MR. CAROME: Could you mark this as 

4 Exhibit 2, 

5 [The document marked Exhibit No .^^^2 follows: 
6 
7 
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inwHSSi^T 



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BY MR. CAROME: 
Q l^^^^^^^^^k I am putting before you what the 
reporter has just marked as Exhibit 2 and I ask if you 
recognize what that is? 
A Yes. 
Q What is it? 

A It is some handwritten notes of mine made during 
that weekend under question. 

Q Were you making these notes as events were 
transpiring? 

A Yes. 

Q Why don't you go back to telling us the story of 
how this activity or the need for a flight to be made came 
to your attention? 

A Okay. I see they have x ' ed out names. Should I 
refer to it as this or give the name of the individual. 
MR. PEARLINE: Could we go off the record? 
[Discussion off the record.] 

THE WITNESS: I received a call at 1600 hours 
on the 22nd from] 

MR. CAROME: Sixteen hundred hours 



THE WITNESS: Yes -- requesting availability of 
the aircraft for a possible sensitive flight. He gave me 
the dimensions of the cargo, c;avgm^-4he pickup and 



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mil 1 

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destinati 





I iiTunediately callet^^^^^^^H to determine the location o£- 
the aircraft and flyable status, to which if I could read 
it it would refresh my memory -- one aircraft, the 

[aircraft was on a flight at that time. 

Lone was a leased 707 with a 
U.S. registration number, the second was one that we 
owned and had^^^^^^^^| registration numbers,] 

lit was on a flight at the time. 
The in registered aircraft or the U.S. registered 
aircraft was on the ground^^^^^^^^^^Kcheduled for a 
flight the next mornini^^^^^^^^^^^ I relayed that 
information back^^^^^^^^^^^^^I am not sure who that 
call was to, either^^^^^^^^^^^^B b^c^use in the interim 
I talked to those two indivi^i«als exclusively and sometimes 
it would be to^^^^Band sometimes it would be ^°|H^^|' 
since both of them were_ war^y-pj^^b^^light . 



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I gave that back to them after a period of time. 
It looks like here 1730, about an hour and a half later. 
I got a call from^^^^Hin this instance telling me that 
we were to do the flight, and that we were to give it to 

Iwith the name Richard Copp, that he would be 
contacting through the flight and it was in our interest 
for him to do the flight, but to handle it as a commercial 
flight, which meant as far as^^^^^^^Hwas concerned that 
yes, we wanted him to do the flight, in fact he asked me 
specifically how much should I charge, and I told him to 
charge the normal commercial rate and that he would be 
responsible for collecting the money, it would not be 
a payment by the Agency for the flight. There was a period 
of waiting for this to happen. In fact he returned a call 
to me I see here 2000 hours that Mr. Copp had in fact 
called him and questioned him did he have any knowledge of 
the flight, which^^^^^^H denied to Copp, so Copp 
explained again what he had, a flight from Tel Aviv to 

iescribed the cargo that I had earlier described 
the cargo as being dimensions only. 

I believe at the time the words "mining 
equipment" come into play, I am not certain who said that 
first. But in any case it was the — oil drilling 
equipment, not raining equipment — that we were going to 
haul that. ^^^^^^H reported ba£ls_t&.me that the 



iffi 



reported ba 



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customers agreed to the price they had said and agreed on 
the fact that he was only going to use one aircrafti 

I The agreement wasi 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ le aircraft could not 
take off untili 





agreed that the aircraft would take offj 
to Tel Aviv to pick up the cargo. 

They said we need pallets and we had no pallets, 
(called and said rather than transport the 
pallets during the nigh^^^^^^^^^H that he wanted to take 
off^l^Hand go to^^^^^^^^^^^^^mto up the 

I agreed that that would be more or less an administrative 
flight on our behalf but to pick up the pallets that way. 
The aircraft was delayed on departure, that was one of the 
next calls I gc 




^^^^^^^^^^ am not sure how much 
detail you want. 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Go on . We will let you tell the story and go back 



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over It and ask particular questions. 

A Obviously there were several phone calls 
back into^^^^^^^^^^ to let them know the status, the 
fact that we were delivering and that we were using the 
U.S. bird rather than our aircraft. The aircraft 
arrived in Tel Aviv and met with a Mr . -- the Captain met 
with a Mr. Swimmer, which was the f irst^^^^^^^Wreported 
this to me and that was the first time I heard that 
name. 

Q How was that reported to you? 

Froii^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hreceived from the 
Captain and I received it ^ron^^^^HH Somewhere during 
that conversation it became apparent that the cargo was 
final destination Tehran, and they wanted us to fly it 
directly into Tehran. The captain balked at this, 
obviously, since it was a change for him. He called 

land^^^^^H called then called^^^^H 
[to inform him that that is what we had come up 
against. We had the U.S. registry aircraft was there. 
We made the determination that there would be no circum- 
stances we would allow the U.S. registry aircraft to go, 
we would call the other aircraft into play and continue 
to do the flight even though we knew the destination was 
Tehran at that time. That is when it came to 
come to me and said it is the same load and I denied it 




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and I did it more to get him off the subject rather than 
]ust to continue the discussion over^^^^^^^^^ltelephone 
where there was — speculation as to whether it was the 
same load 

I denied to him I didn't think it could possibly be the 
same. Without a real feel either way. 

We were on a commercial phone and I was trying to 
cut down the amount of discussion of this if we could. 
Later we did recall the aircraf 

Q By aircraft, which aircraft are you referring 
to? 

A The^^^B aircraf t , the one we owned, once it was 
determined that we could not use the United States registry 
aircraft and had it diverted into Tel Aviv. They had already 
started loading the aircraft as a matter of fact, the 
U.S. registry aircraft when this was discovered. So when 
our aircraft arrived we had to off-load the one into 
ours and a decision was made to ship it bac 
That was a decision between^^^^^^H and myself. He had 
reported to me, this guy, the guy on the ground there must 
be crazy, he was trying to talk the captain into changing 
the numbers and flying formation and they were upset that 
we were pulling that aircraft out of the deal, but we stood 
our ground and off-loaded it and took one crew out and 



flew them back 



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The next thing that come along, as I was 
reporting this back to^m||||^^| the question come up as 
to who would provide overflights, since we had obviously 
not requested overflights for this flight. And I was told 
once again to handle it as a strictly commercial flight 
but to be aware that the overflights would be granted 
and the way paved, I should say, that the overflights would 
be granted and the people there responsible for providing -- 
Q Who told you that? 
A This come from either^^^^^^^^^^^H^ i think 

I feel fairly conf ident^^^^^^relayed that to me. 
He assured me the overflights would be granted but 

would have to handle it commercially with the 
people on the ground there. 

So then we got into some planning as far as the 
flight itself went because in order for them to make sure 
that the overflight was expedited or at least would be 
granted, I passed to them the FIR times for the aircraft 
from take-off and since we didn't have a take-off time 
because the loading was going so long -- 
Q What does FIR stand for? 

A It is the air international boundary — I should 
be able to tell you what the initials stand for -- each 
country has an imaginary line as to once you cross that 
line you are into their =* 1 r Fi nf^^t ^ Jtt' " *" in essence is what 



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It is, you are transferring from one country's air space 
into another country's air space at an internationally 
agreed upon point. Part of over flight clearances is you 
must tell them what time you will be at the point and if 
you are crossing the country, what time you will leave 
their FIR. I passed those two times into headquarters. 

Q Who did you pass them to? 

A To| 

Q What happened next^ 

A The next instant I got a call froml 
because he was handling this pretty much on his own and 
things were going pretty smooth or at least we thought they 
were^^^^^^^Hj had told me they were going to fly 
directly to Tel Aviv, they were going to file fori 
but overf l^^^^JHHand fuel the aircraft to do so. After 
the aircraft was fueled they informed him they were telling 
him they had to land^^^^^^^^H and this would involve 
defueling of the aircraft because they were too heavy to 
land. 

He wanted me to stop it. I made no effort 
to stop that other than to inform eitherl 
that this was the case and of course, the decision was made 
we would defuel the aircraft and land^^^H^^^^as they 
had instructed the crew to do. So they did defuel the 
aircraft and eventually t^qj(^p^,flji^he flight. 




41 



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^checked with you and he checked with 
someone at^^^^^^^^^Kto make sure that was okay? 

A To inform them, rather than checking -- we knew 
that we weren't going to interfere at that point. 

was either^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^that you 
spoke to on that matter? 

A Yes. The next communication I had with! 
was the aircraft took off, I got the take-off time. A few 
hours later I got a call from him that on landinc 

that the crew had called that they were in trouble. 
They had no documentation on the cargo and their impression 
was that nobody at the airport were expecting them and 
consequently they had shown up with an aircraft without a 
proper manifest and so forth. 

Iwas in sort of a panic and a little mad 
at this point at how disorganized this thing was. I called 

informed him of the problem. He put me 
off and called me back later with the information that 
we would have to handle it, that he couldn't help us, that 
the crew would have to work it out somehow themselves. To 
which I calledf^^^^^^Bback and this all took place in a 
matter of I would guess an hour or so. 

When I callec^^^^^^^H back to tell him that the 
crew would have to handle it themselves, he informed me 
the crew had in fact done that, that they had and written 



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out a manifest and given it to the local authorities|^^B 
land apparently to their satisfaction. 

Then the next call was the fact that they were not 
able to take off because they didn't have^^^^^^f overflight 
Before any action was taken on that, I did get a call 
back saying that they had been granted take-off clearances 
and they were talking to^H|^HH^| air traffic control 
people and apparently everything was going well. They in 
fact made it through the flight and landed at Tehran. 

The next call I got after that was reporting the 
aircraft had landed in Tehran giving the time it had 
landed and basically that was the extent of that conversa- 
tion. We were off for some time while the crew was off 
resting and one thing and another .^^|^^^^^|talked to the 
crew, I think they were in the hotel while they were on the 
ground in Tehran and had instructed the captain to fill the 
aircraft up full of fuel and to be prepared to divert -- 
to call him by HF radio and be prepared to divert from our 
planned rest stop. Our planned rest stop coming out of 
Tehran was to go back into -- 

i t flf^^^^^^^^B? 
going into^^^^^^^^^^B planned stop. 
alerted the crew to make sure they had plenty of 
fuel to make^^^^^^^^H in case he gave them the signal 



over the radio. 



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Q I take it that this question about whether to 

Iwas really a question as to whether 
to carry on with sorties from Tel Aviv or to drop out of the 
operation? 

A Yes. I had instructions that even though they 
were talking five flights at the time that we were to do 
the one flight and after the one flight, we would get 
clearances as to whether we would do the second flight or 
not and that was the signal^^^^^^^^ was to pass to the 
crew, whether we were going to do the second flight or 
not . 

MR. WOODCOCK: Who gave you those instructions? 
THE WITNESS: 



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BY MR. CAROME: 
Q What happened next? 

A For the flight itself, he passed the word for them 
to divert^^^^^^^^^H They went^^^^^^^H and refueled, and 
at that time he talked to them, I believe by telephone, and 
told them to go on back^^^^^^^^^| because he and I had 
talked in the interim, and I told him to go back! 
with the aircraft, that we wouldn't do any more flights. 

To back up, I should say that I was in Washington 
on Monday, the -- 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^fthat morning, that right? 
I A Yes. 

Q And arrived — what time did you arrive in 
Washington? 

A Normally I guess 10:30. I don't remember the date, 
the norma l^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H I 
arrive in the building about 10: 



Why you come^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
A Per discussions witn^^^^^^^^^^^Hover the weekend 
on Sunday night, I guess, that I would come^^^^HMonday to 
catch up on — all of this at that time had been done by 
telephone. We had come to a blank spot as far as the schedulfe 
was concerned, to get on top of the situation better, to see 
where we were going with it £xQni_tlaAfiA or what 




\\m i\!s; 




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Q That meeting had not been set up a long time in 
advance, is that right? 

A No, it had not. 

Q It was set up over the weekend? 

A Yes, I can't really say a meeting other than it 
was agreed that I would come^^^^^^^^^in the branch on 
Monday. In other words, it was not a scheduled meeting to 

'talk about this subject only; it was just to 
catch up as to what all had transpired. 

Q By the time^^^^^^^^^^^^HWashington, when you 
arrived then, had the decision been made whether the! 
flight was to proceed 

A Yes. But the decision was made that we were going 
to do that. 

Q To do what? 

A Go back^^^^^^^^^H and not go back immediately, but 
that my understanding was that we may go back. This was 
during the day on Monday, or I would say throughout the day 
on Monday, that was my understanding, that we were not to 
make a second flight, but the possibility still existed. 

Q Who were you communicating with on that subject? 

A 

Q Okay. 

A I am sure ^^^B being in the office all day, I am 
surel^^Hwas in on it as well, but^^^^^| primarily since 



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I was physically in the office at that time. That evening, 
by this time, we had moved hi 
to debrief the crew and find out what transpired and ]ust to 
be closer to the thing, to collect the money we had not 
collected at that point in time. 

That evening I was waiting on^^^^fto give me a 
ride to the hotel. He received a phone call from 

lad already left for the day. ^^^^^received 
a phone call f rom^^^^^^^^^^^ that they had to go to the 
OGC, Office of General Counsel's office. 

Q By "they", who are you referring to? 

^^^^^^^^^^^|an(^|^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hinvited me to 
go, which I decided was inappropriate, that I didn't need 
to be there. So I left and went to the hotel . ^^^^Bwent to 
the meeting. Later that evening, he called me, and I have 
thought about this, and I can't say for a fact that he 
told me that evening that we were not to do another flight 
for certain, or if he told me that first thing the next 
morning, but either that evening by phone, which would have 
been 10:00-11:00 at night, or the next morning when I arrived 
in the office, the decision was made we should not and would 
not do any future flights. 

Q It was^^^^^^^H who coirununicated that to you? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he tell you why that decision was made? 



UNflASSm.. 



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A I guess that the -- my understanding, it was not 
our show; in any case, I found this out only on Monday, that 
this was an NSC project and that we shouldn't be involved m 
It. I didn't question as to why the decision was other than 
that we would not do any more flights. 

Q And you were told that either late Monday night or 
first thing Tuesday morning? 

A Or first thing Tuesday morning, right. 

Q What happened next? 

A We went back to normal. 

Q Did you go back that da^ 

A On Tuesday, yes . ^^^^^^B was still| 
I think until later that week and brought me the -- when he 
returnec^^^^^^^^^^^^H and I don't remember, he brought me, 
he typed up an after-action report. 

Q A particularly lengthy after-action report, is 
that right? 

A Yes. I hand carried that to Washington on my next 
visit, and I honestly can't tell you when that was. It was 
the next week, I am certain, but I don't know the day of the 
week or what date it was. 

Q By next week, you are talking early December, is 
that right? 

A Right, sometime after the first week in December, 



I would say. 



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48 



af ter-actior 




Q You would have provide 
report to the CXA^^^^^^^^^ is that right? 

A Yes. To 

Q And I take it that is about where the story ends, 
IS that right? 

A Until you guys come on the scene. 

Q I now want to ask a number of specific questions 
about the time period you have just described. 

First of all, on the subject of what the cargo 
was, what exactly did ^^^^^^^^H tell you in the first phone 
call about what the cargo consisted of? 

A ^^^^^^^^^^1 ^° ^^^ best of my recollection, 
referred to it as sensitive cargo and gave me the dimensions. 
And we never discussed what was in the boxes. 

My best recollection is that it was never mentioned 
during the time we were doing the flight. On the Monday that 
I spoke of that I was in the Headquarters Building in a 
conversation with^H^^^^^^B I relayed to him th 
or the crew members, I should more correctly say, thought 
that it was missiles, and I relayed to him that the co-pilot 
had made a joke, I guess, that we should be firing them at 
Iran rather than flying them into Iran. That was the onl-y 
substance of that to me. 

Q In that conversation you are talking about that 
took place Monday at Headquarters, is that right? 



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about. 



By telephone with^^^^^^^^f yes. 

I am confused now 

MR. WOODCOCK: It is two conversations he is talkinc 



BY MR. CAROME: 
Q First of all, let's — 

A I had a conversation with^^^H^^B by telephone 
from Headquarters with him^^^^^^^^^^^^T 
MR. WOODCOCK: When was that? 

THE WITNESS: Sometime Monday after I arrived in. 
Headquarters, the flight actually returned while I was en 
route to Headquarters, if I remember the timing correctly. 
And sometime later that day, on Monday, I was able to talk 
to^^^^^^^l and find out the flight had been completed. 
And I got that from him at that time. 

MR. WOODCOCK: That is the vehicle joke about firin<| 
the cargo rather than delivering it by plane, is that right? 
A Yes. 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q AndHHH|^^^^H told you in that conversation 
that the crew and himself believed that the cargo had been 
missiles, is that right? 

A I can't say that he said himself. I think he 
said, as he had gotten it from the crew, they believed it 



was missiles. 



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Q Let's, if we can, focus in on this as much as we 
can. In the first conversation, that was the conversation 
with^^^^^^^^l is that correct? I am talking now about the 
conversation where you are being given the task of what is 
to be done. Is iti 

A The initial call I got was from, yes] 

Q And this Exhibit 2 uses the phrase "sensitive 
high-priority cargq'T.) Do you believe that is a phrase 
^^^^^^^Hused in describing the cargo? 

A Yes, I think that was his words exactly. 

Q Did you ask him more specifically, "What is the 
cargo?" 

A No. We were on a commercial telephone, and I 
probably wouldn ' t have wanted to hear it over a commercial 
telephone beyond his description. He was being very guarded. 
Both of us were being very guarded over what we said over 
a commercial telephone. I was at 1600, I hope I was at my 
office; still I can't remember. 

In any case, we were on a commercial phone . ^^^^H 



Q Did you suspect it was weapons? 

A I don't think I speculated honestly. To me it 
was a flight. I think I remember questioning only the 
dimensions. There was some question, could we get those 
dimensions through the cargo door of the aircraft, and I 



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don't think I speculated at any time during the time as to 
what we were hauling. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did you assume that he knew what 
the cargo was? 

THE WITNESS: No. I don't think I did. I would 
assume -- yes, I would assume so, but I don't remember 
consciously at that time. Yes, I would assume that he would 
have known. 

MR. WOODCOCK: But you don't recall an active 
assumption on your part that he knew what the cargo was? 
THE WITNESS: No. No. 

I think I previously mentioned that I have trouble 
recollecting who first mentioned oil drilling equipment, 
whether I got that from^^^^^Hor whether I got it in 
this mirage of conversations during the night, but the words 
"oil drilling equipment" had come into place, and it seemed 
logical to me at that time that maybe we were expediting a 
commercial shipment of some oil drilling equipment to Iran. 

If I were speculating at all, I would have accepted 
that untilfl^^^^^^^|comment later as to what he thought 
the crew suspected it was. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You don't recall whether you got 
that from^^H^H or CIA Headquarters? 

THE WITNESS: I think I got it from^^^^^H, but 



I don't recall. 



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MR. WOODCOCK: It could have been either place? 
THE WITNLSS: Could be. 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q And it is your testimony that it was not until 
Monday that anyone said anything to you to the effect that 
the cargo was missiles, is that right? 

A That is right. 

Q That is the first inkling you had of that? 

A Yes. And it was not confirmed even then. In fact, 
to my knowledge, it has not been confirmed to this day. 

Q Did you pass along to anyone ^''^^^^^^^^^H ^^e 
fact that^^^^^^^H had made this comment about missiles? 

A Yes, tc 

Q What did you tell him? 

A As I mentioned earlier, the commentB^^^^^^I had 
made about the co-pilot saying "We should have fired the 
cargo at them rather than hauling it in." And it wasn't 
a lengthy discussion, I think it was just in passing as, 
you know, while we were doing other things that day as well. 

Q Did^^^^^^^^Hact surprised? 

A I don't remember him acting surprised, but then I 
don't remember making a note of it, like I say, it was in 
passing conversation more than anything else. 

Q Did he say, "No, it wasn't missiles"? 

A No, he did not deny it. 




UNCLASSIFIED 



53 



UNSffl^FlFT 



53 



MR. WOODCOCK: Who else was present? 

THE WITNESS: No one. I think it was he and I 
standing in the middle o^JH^^^Hj^H There was other people 
around, but nobody was within the conversation. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did you tell anyone other than 



THE WITNESS: No. 

BY MR. CAROME: 
Q About what time do you think that conversation took 
place? 
A 
Q 



It would have to be in the afternoon. 
As you said, you probably arrived at Headquarters 
around 10:30 a.m. that day. 
A Right. 

Q And when was the first time that date that you had 
a conversation with] 

A Shortly after my arrival into — because I felt 
very bad that I had not talked to him 

so^ 

am certain after amenities, whatever, I got into the Branch 
and made the phone call. 

Q Was it in that first phone call Monday that 

made the comment about missiles? 
A I would guess, yes, I think I talked to him several 
times that day, but I would guess it would have been the 





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first one. 

Q Oic^^^^^^^^^^^H in that conversation indicate to 
you whether or not he believed the pilot's statement that 
It had been missiles? 

A No. 

Q He didn't indicate one way or the other? 

A No, we didn't discuss it. I think the extent of 
our discussion was that he was going to remainj 
debrief the crew, and would return! 
give me a copy of the debriefing. 

Q And that debriefing was taking place that day, 
Monday, Washington time I take it, is that right? 

A I don't think so, because my recollection is that 
the crew had not made it backj^^^^^^^^^H that day. I 
think it was to take place at like the next day, Tuesday, 
or so. I can chase it through the paperwork and tell you 
where the aircraft was at that time, but my feeling for that 
now is that the aircraft had not made it back yet, so he 
had not had a chance to set face-to-face with the crew. 

MR. WOODCOCK: What was your reaction when you 
received this information about the possibility of missiles 
being on the plane? 

THE WITNESS: You mean personally? 

MR. WOODCOCK: Correct. 

THE WITNESS: I don't remember having a real 



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1 reaction. I would have guessed that we were, you know, 

2 doing something at a much higher level than me to question 

3 It. In other words, I didn't feel bad about it, if that is 

4 what you are getting at. I would probably have felt that 

5 maybe, my personal opinion is that we were long-time 

6 delinquent in not having some sort of relationship with Iran 

7 from a geopolitical point of view. 

8 MR. WOODCOCK: That is not what I am driving at. 

9 You testified earlier that Iran was on the list of prohibited 

10 countries, is that right? 

11 THE WITNESS: Right. 

12 MR. WOODCOCK: You have also testified, and your 

13 notes reflect, that the cargo being carried on this airplane 

14 was a large -- large volume boxes. 

15 THE WITNESS: Yes. 

15 MR. WOODCOCK: That is right? 

17 THE WITNESS: Right. 

1g MR. WOODCOCK: You then received information from 

ig j^H^^^^^^^^^^^^Hon November that the large-volume 

20 boxes may well have been missiles. 

21 THE WITNESS: Right. 

22 MR. WOODCOCK: And being large-volume boxes, they 

23 would be large missiles presumably. 

24 THE WITNESS: Right. 
MR. WOODCOCK: Now, this would then be in 



\\m t^M 



56 



BWBISSW 



56 



contravention of long-standing U.S. policy, correct; that is, 
giving arms to Iran? 

THE WITNESS: I can't say that I could make that 
statement. As I understand, after the fact, yes, I would say 
that it is. I must correct you also in that I did not make 
the natural assumption that it came from the U.S., as we 
had been involved in other countries shipping stuff in. 

If I had to give you a feeling or impression as 
the flight materialized, I thought we were expediting -- I 
felt we were expediting Israel probably or a commercial 
entity getting the stuff in there. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Let me back up then. I am speaking 
as of 11/25. You come to the CIA, correct? 

THE WITNESS: Right. 

BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

By the you ^° ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 ^^'^ ^°^ 
been told this is a NSC operation? 

A Yes, I think I was told that when I got into the 
building on that Monday. 

Q So in any event, whether the arms came from the 
United States or not by the time ^^^^^H^^^^^^^H calls you 
you have an understanding that if these are missiles, they 
are missiles being transported to Iran under some approval 
of the NSC, correct? 

A Yes, that would be true. 



IIM£US;S1£I£II, 



57 



IMSeiSStREIT 



57 



Q So now you received this information, and you 
simply mention it m passing '^°^^^^^^^^^^^H is that 
correct? 

A Yes. It was a report -- as I remember the thing, I 
hung up the phone, and as I was walking out to fmd^^^^^H 
he was standing there in the middle of the Branch and we 
talked about the aircraft was located wherever they were, 
and the comment^^^^^^^Hmade about the cargo. 

It wasn't a formal report. It was saying by that 
time we knew the cargo had been delivered, we knew our air- 
craft was safely out of Iran, we already knew that, and that 
was kind of a followup, if you will, that let him know of 
the conversation I had with^^^^^^^Band the agreement I 
made with^^^^^^H. 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Was it^^^^^^fwho told you it was a NSC mission? 

A Yes. 

Q And, again, did he exhibit any surprise when you 
told him about the pilot's comment that it was missiles? 

A I don't remember him being surprised or acting 
surprised or -- 

Q Did he act like he already knew that information? 

A I don't have a memory of him reacting to it really 
other than I just said -- didn't pick up on it and we didn't 
discuss it further than that. I didn't get the impression 



liMCU^SML 



58 



umssiiftT 



58 



1 he was evading discussion of it either. In other words, 

2 It ]ust, you know, I didn't form an impression of that. 

3 Q Did it seem to you that that was information he 

4 already had, did he react that way? 

5 A I can't say. I honestly don't remember a reaction, 

6 period. I think it was just that I passed it to him. The 

7 only reaction I can remember that^^^^^Hdemonstrated to me 

8 through that whole day, as a matter of fact, when I was there 

9 personally was that we had managed to do a good flight, and 

10 he was very, you know, proud, as I was, that we had pulled 

11 it off and nobody got hurt. We felt we come through looking 

12 pretty good on the thing, that my crew had successfully 

13 delivered the cargo, whatever it may be, and had made it 

14 out of the country without any problems, because there was a 

15 certain amount, at least on my part, apprehension because in 
<g that part of the world you don't know what is going to go 

■^j wrong. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I gather he didn't deny that it was 
missiles? 

THE WITNESS: No. No. 

MR. WOODCOCK: He didn't try to correct any im- 
pression that you may have had that it was missiles, is that 



23 right? 

24 

25 



THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You did not mention this tol 



59 



(webi^R^ 



59 

^^^^H is that 

THE WITNESS: No, I don't think I did at all that 
day. To my recollection, trying to think of this after the 
fact, I think that was the only time it was mentioned of 
what the cargo was. To me, it wasn't that big a deal what 
the cargo was. The big deal to me was we made the flight and 
got out okay. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You later learned that day that HH 
^^^^|was going to brief the General Counsel on this flight, 
is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: That evening, yes. That wasn't a 
briefing, he was going to meet with the General Counsel 
with reference to this flight. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You understand it was this flight 
that was the subject of that meeting, is that right? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You didn't take it upon yourself to 
say, "Look,^^^^| you ought to know there is a possibility 
that this flight was carrying missiles"? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Why not? 

THE WITNESS: I don't think it was germane to the 
thing at the time. As a matter of fact, we were getting our 
coats on, in the process of locking the door to leave, when 
he received the phone call that they had to go to the 

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General Counsel's office, and he said, "Do you want to go?" 
Or something to that effect, and I said, "I don't think that 
I should be there. I will go on to the hotel. Call me 
later. " 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Why did you not think you should be there? 

^Hf^l^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^I try to 
keep my profile as low as possible so it gets around the 
building as little as needed, as well as around the com- 
munity.. 

Q Did you have any indication that^^^^Hwas already 
aware that it might be missiles on the flight? 

A If I had to make a statement, I would say that he - 
not necessarily that he was aware of the missiles, but he 
was aware of the flight. He had more knowledge of the cir- 
cumstances of the flight than I did or had a need to know, 
because he obviously was inside the building working this 
thing the whole weekend, as ^^^^^| was. 

Q Now you understand that both I 
^^^^H were at CIA Headquarters over the weekend? 

A Yes. 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 



"Working the flight' ,i as you sayj 

Yes. 

Okay. 

At various times singly, and other times I would 

AOOinrn 



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61 



talk to one, and three minutes later talk to the other at 
the Headquarters Building. 

Q How do you know that? 

A That they were at the Headquarters Building? 

Q yes. 

A I guess I would have to say that I felt that is 
where they were at. 

Q You were making phone calls to them, is that right? 

A And that is where the phone was being answered, and 
when they called me, I had no way of knowing where they were 
calling from, but maybe I made that assumption that is where 
they were. 

Q But you made calls to Headquarters? 

A Yes. 

Q And spoke to both ^^^HB at some point an< 
at some point at CIA Headquarters, is that right? 

A Right. 

Q In that initial phone call, did^^^^Htell you 
what it was that made this a sensitive cargo or what it was 
that made it a high-priority cargo? 

A No. 

Q Did he mention that — 

A Maybe I should have that question again. I don't 
remember that anywhere other than the fact he said it was 
sensitive, high-priority cargo, and he gave me the weight 



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and dimensions. 

Q And those are the weights and dimensions shown in 
this Exhibit Number 2, is that right? 

A That is correct. 

Q I take it, from your testimony, that you didn't 
learn of the NSC aspect of the mission until that Monday, 
is that right? 



told you about that at the 



A That is correct 

Q Neither 
time, is that right? 

A No. 

Q Did you speak to^^^^^^^^at all about this flight? 

A No. First time I saw^^^^^ I guess, was on .Monday, 
and I had the impression that it was a bigoted project with- 
in the Branch, because he never attended any of the meetings 
or discussions that I had with^<^H^^| or with^^^^^^^H that 
day. In other words, he was out the whole weekend. I don't 
know if he was out of town that weekend or what. I never 
discussed the flight with him, though, no. 

Q How about^^^HH^^^^H did you ever discuss the 
flight with him? 

A No. No. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did you see him there at all? 
THE WITNESS: No. I didn't even see him that night 
when he and^^^Hleft to go to OGC. ^^^^|met him apparently 



iiMoi Accinrn 



63 



ilNSLMIBIr 



63 



up front of the building, or something. 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Wa^^^^^^^^^^^^^of f ice down th€ 



roon? 



No. 



He was in another part of the building? 

Yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did^H^^^^ tell you why it was 
that he was going to brief the General Counsel? 

THE WITNESS: No. He didn't know himself. I say 
that, that was my impression, he didn't know himself, because 
we were on our way to get a drink and take me to the hotel 
when the phone rang, and he hung up the phone and said, "I 
have to go to see", not brief, "see the General Counsel with 



MR. WOODCOCK: He knew the topic. 

THE WITNESS: He didn't say the topic. 

MR. WOODCOCK: But you understood the topic to be 
the flight, is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: Right. I don't know why. 

MR. WOODCOCK: If he didn't say the topic, why did 
you think it was the flight? 

THE WITNESS: I don't remember him saying the topic 
I just have that feeling that I knew that that is what it 
was. I don't know where I got tJaatrTrom. As you ask the 

IIWPI Accinrn 



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18 



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ONftASSfFKlT 



64 

1 question, maybe he did say, reference your flight or somethir. 

2 I don't know, 

3 MR. WOODCOCK: You knew he invited you along, 

4 however. 

5 THK WITNESS: Yes 
5 MR. WOODCOCK: Presumably he did that because he 

7 presumed you had information that might be relevant to what- 

8 ever he was doing with the General Counsel, is that right? 

9 THE WITNESS: Yes 
10 BY MR. CAROME: 
•)•) Q Also, I take it, you were aware that this flight 

12 was probably the major matter on which -• 

13 A That day. 

1^ Q ^^^^^^^^^H had worked on over the weekend and that 

15 day, is that right? 
1g A Yes. That is true 



.•y Q Do you know who it was that asked 




speak to the General Counsel? 
,.g A It was my understanding that it ^^ ^^^^^^^^^^H °^ 

2Q the phone. I didn't ask. I guess he informed them they were 

21 going to see the General Counsel. 

22 Q Did you at any time learn that this cargo movement 

23 



was associated with an effort to free hostages? 

A No. Not until the first cali 1 got reference you 
guys investigating it, and the television coverage in 



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whatever, Noventser, '86, or whatever timeframe that was. 
Q Did you know at the time who Copp was? 
A Not as this developed. In November — sorry, 
sometime after this, after I turned in the after-action 
report and the subject come up one day, I am not sure in what 
spirit or whatever, I was given to understand from^HH that 
Copp was Lieutenant Colonel North and that was in passing. 
There was no real reason to have said so or anything else. 
And I accepted that. 

I had never talked to him or never had any deal- 
ings with him. He was the guy that had contacted 
until, what, last week or two weeks ago, when General Secord 
was on the television, and in another conversation wit 
he made the comment to me, "What did you think of Copp ' s 
testimony?" And the next time I said, "I thought North was 
Copp." "No", he said, "I did, too, at one time. But 
Secord is Copp." That was the extent of my knowledge. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Was that the first time that you 
knew that General Secord was in any way associated with this 
flight? 

THE WITNESS: With this flight, yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: That is when you heard him identify 
himself as Copp on the television? 

THE WITNESS: I didn't hear that, but^^H made 



that comment to me. 



iiMpi AQQinrn 



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1 BY MR. CAROME: 

2 Q When was the first time you heard North's name in 

3 connection with this flight activity? 

4 A I never heard his name connected with this 

5 particular flight. Later in May of '86, we made another 

6 flight to which I was told that McFarlane would be a 

7 passenger on the flight. Af (tar'sfciiat flight, I was told that 
3 North was on the flight as well — after the flight, not 

g prior to the flight. 

to Q' When did^^^^fmake his commen4^^hat Copp was 

■J1 North? 

•)2 A This was in, this first came out in November, '86, 

13 late November, '86. 

•J4 Q If we can go back to the initial conversations, 

15 what did you understand to be the CIA's role with respect to 

•jg this flight activity? 

.y A My understanding was we accommodated someone, 
whether it be Israel or who it was, at the time of the 



ft, /obvious 



ig f lightonow,"'obviously found out since then that we were 

20 deeply involved /(I guess within NSC or whatever, through the 



media or whatever, but at that time my feeling was that we 



22 were accommodating the flight taking place. 



If I had consciously knew what I thought at the 
time the flight was taking place, it was probably Israel 
shipping some stuff to Iran and was having trouble arranging 



iiMoi Aooirirn 



67 



ira^flEiFT 



67 



air transport, and we had this as an accommodation to them. 

Q This flight was handled quite differently than the 
way a normal commercial flight would be handled, is that 
right? 

A No, I would say it was handled more like a com- 
mercial flight would be handled than a normal operational 
flight that we may be involved in^in that our crew dealt 
with an individual on the ground in Tel Aviv, 
dealt with an individual by the name of Copp and later by 
the name of Swimmer, as far as the money transaction portion 

A 

of it and so forth. So it would be as if a regular com- 
mercial flight in that sense. I may have not understood 
your question. 

Q Let me see if I can sharpen it a little bit. You 
were in almost hour-by-hour contact with! 
during this flight activity throughout that weekend, isn't 
that right? 

A Yes. In that regard, yes, you are right. 

Q That is quite different than the way a normal 
commercial flight would be handled by^^^^^^^^f isn't it? 

A Yes. 

Q In fact, usually you wouldn't be in contact with 
[during the course of a normal commercial 
flight, isn't that right? 



A That 



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Q And also you knew that the ^^^^^^^^H people were 
in on a weekend actively following and monitoring this flight 
activity, isn't that right? 

A Yes. 



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#4 bp-1 

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MR. CAROME: And that wouldn't happen during a 
normal commercial f.'.igut? 

THE WITNESS: No. 
BY MR. CAROriE: 
Q And in fact you even^^^^^^Hto Washington to 
speak to people at^^^^^^^^H Headquarters specifically 
about this flight; is that right? 
A Yes. 

Q And that never happened with respect to a regular 
commercial flight; is that right? 

A Yes. I misunderstood your question. I'm sorry. 
Q And it was clear to you that this was while maybe 
the CIA — let me withdraw that question. 

It was clear to you that this was a flight that 
the U.S. Government was interested in; is that right? 
A Yes. 

Q Wanted it done? 
A Right. 

Q And^H^H^|HH was aware that you were checking 
in regularly with CIA headquarters, isn't that right? 
A Yes, he was. 

Q I gather that frequently when over that weekend 
called you, you would relay what 



was saying to] 



is that right? 



A That is t 



iWi<;<ilFlFn 



I 



bp-2 



imeaMBpT 



70 



1 Q And you would pass messages fromj 

I^HH^^^^^^H as 

3 A Yes. No messages direct to him, but impact of the 

4 flight, what was the decision as to what would be done. 

5 In other words, giving me guidance that I would provide him 

6 with. 

7 Q Was this the only special flight that you are 

8 aware of where payment was made tG^^^|B|B by a private 

9 person? 

10 A Yes, it is. 

11 Q And you saw this as a special flight, as a U.S. 

12 Government special flight, right? 

13 A Yes, I did. 

14 Q What did you tellH^^^^^^^^^H namely; about 

15 how to go about negotiating the price? I think you 

16 mentioned something before on the subject, but I want to 

17 pursue it a little further. 

fg A I told him to treat it as a normal commercial 

19 flight. He said, "What should I charge," because we 

20 had conversations as to availability of the aircraft and 

21 the fact that it was looking like a regular commercial 

22 flight. 1 said, "Make money off the flight, but you 

23 neogtiate the price and you deal with Mr. Copp directly, 

24 and you collect your money with Mr. Copp." Because we also 

25 had questions on the earlier phone call as to how we were 
I going to by gas IAm^PIjA V^&anFlL ^" <^^°^ ^°^ ^^^ 



71 



bap-3 



HWW 




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the crews to walk around with. I told him Mr. Copp should 
make those arrangements directly. 

The only statement I told Jbira was we being the 
agency want you to make that flight, but deal with Mr. 
Copp financially and the details of the flight. 

Q Are those pretty much the instructions that 
you received from 

A Yes. 

Q And was it your understanding that the initial 

was to 



arrangement reached between Copp and| 
-y make ^'St consecutive flights using both airplanes for a fee 
of $60,000 plus various expenses -- that seems to be what 
your written report here reflects. 

Does that conform to your recollection? 

A Yes. 

Q And you understood that these three flights 
were going to take place between Tel Aviv and] 
according to the original plan; is that right; 

A The original plan, right. The original conflict. 
There was some discussion and the reason I was checking 
my nOf^s here, there was some discussion that they were 
saying three flights. Our crew was saying they would never 
get it on three flights, the number of boxes, because of 
the shape and the way we were having to load. 

That is l»#if T%^? checking batk to see how many 

IIMPLAOOlTirit^ 



\ 



bp-4 



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72 



1 flights we were talking about. In other words, the 

2 discussion was internally. The guy on the ground was 

3 saying three flights, and the crew said we will never do 

4 it in three flights. 

5 Q Who was the guy on the ground? 

6 A Schwimmer was saying three flights, and the captain 

7 was saying they would never get that on three flights. 

8 Q There were 80 pieces to be moved? It is hard to 

9 read, because of the copy. 

10 A I think that is 80. It looks like 80. I 

11 don't remember it. If I could see it better, I could 

12 tell you — yes, 80. 

13 Q The record can reflect that the witness was looking 

14 at a somewhat clearer copy of Exhibit 2. 

15 Did you have any other discussions -- let me back 

16 up a little bit. I take it thatj^^^^^^H told you what 

17 the terms that he negotiated with Copp were at about the time 

18 that this was all happening; is that right? 

19 A Yes, he did. 

20 Q And did you say that sounds good or that -- what 

21 did you say? 

22 A Yes. I think I probably said okay or it sounds 

23 good. I am not sure what I would respond, but it was 

24 okay by me in any case 

25 Q Did you_la^j^ UiJl J^'t'tf^l'I^H ""^ '' ^^^ question of 



mmm. 



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what the customer would be charged? 

A ^^^^^^^^asked me what to do about the one 
aircraft that we had taken in there and let the aircraft 
sit, and then had to turn around and send it back home; 
what should he do about charging the customer for that. 
My statement to him was that it was a commercial contract. 
Charge him as you would any other commercial contractor, 
positioning and depositioning cost of the aircraft. 

At that time I knew the price would change from 
the previously agreed upon $60,000. 

Q Do you know what the basis would be or how you 
would figure the additional charges? 

A So much per flight hour depending on whether they 
are buying the fuel or you are buying the fuel or what.^ 




I don't know how he ccune up with his price. I nevei 
made an attempt to find out. 

Q If you would refer to page 2 of your hand-written 
notes about five or six lines down, there is a reference to 
the fact that manager indicated this was the same load he had 
earlier reported to us 

Do you know what that is a reference to? 



IMUSSMD,. 



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A Yes, that was the 13 flights] 
Tehran. ^^^^^^^^^^^ 

Q And that was something that^^^^^^^^^^H had 
earlier reported to you as being munitions or armaments; 
is that right? 

A Right, on the market, right, to use his words. 

Q Was it^^^^^^^^^^^^Hquestion 
in part --"Isn't this the armamentsj 



A The question was not armaments, I don't think. 

The question was the same flight. 

Q But he was then referring to — 

A He was referring to the armaments or the 

same cargo, right. 



Q Had 
rephrase that question 

Whe 
armanent shipment 



ever told you that he — let me 

described to you the 

did he make any 




mention of the fact that it was big boxes and small 
boxes? 

A Yes. 




75 



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Q Part of what I was asking was did I 
say anything about that flight or that cargo being in part 
very large boxes and in part smaller boxes? Did he 
talk about two different sizes of boxes? 

A No, I don't recollect that. I asked him how did he 
recognize it, and he said because of the size of the 
boxes I had related to him was how he mentally made the 
association, because the destinations were different. I 
was telling him from Tel Aviv ^'^'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l ^^'^ 

I to Tehran, so he was saying there was 
the leg the f lights ^^^^^^^^|^^^HH|^^^^^^H 

Q oi(d^^^^HH^^^|ever describe to you this cargo 
^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bbeing a mixed cargo, part armaments 
and part something else? 

A I don't recollect him saying that. 

Q As far as you understood it, it was a shipment of 






76 



bap-8 



MASStPUST 



76 



1 armaments; is that right? 

2 A Right. 

3 Q I take it he posed this question to you: "Csn't 

4 the same f light^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H" you 

5 him, no. Is that correct? 

6 A That is right. 

7 Q Why did you say, no? 

8 A To stop the discussion because it was leading 

9 nowhere. I had no way of knowing and didn't see it 

10 germane to this flight. Should I go to headquarters and 

11 ask them -- part of the dealing with a guy like! 
^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H is you 

13 trapped into talking about more than you should talk about 

14 to get the job done, so that was my effort, to shut him up 

15 on that point and let's get to doing the flight and not 
15 worry about if it was a previous flight. 

17 In fact, I never thought about it later. 

18 Q In the conversation in which you denied it was 

19 the same flight, I think you were placing it in time as 

20 having occurred after the destination was changed^^^H 

21 ^^^^^^|^° Tehran. Does this review of your handwritten 

22 notes that we have just done change your recollection and 

23 in fact indicate to you that actually that conversation 

24 took place earlier? 

25 A I may have misspoke. I understood that it took 



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place earlier before I knew the destination. The only 
destination I knew was from Tel Aviv^^^^^^^^f I presume 
he was making the connection these guys were going to Tehran 
with this stuff ultimately, and I stopped the discussion 
at that point. 

Q The next sentence of your handwritten notes, 
it is difficult for me to read, but it seems to say 
if we decided to this — I'm sorry, maybe you can read it 
better than I. If you could read the next sentence of 
this r-eport. 

A It says, "If we decided to do this, he indicated 
he needed to^^^^^^^^^^^^Mroordinate and take money." 

Q I take it that the "he" there is| 
is that right? 




yes. 

Did hel 

No. In fact, I think in the next sentence — 

What does the next sentence say? 

It says I passed this on to — I presume that was 



Chief! 



That is Dewey Claridge. He called back that they were 
considering it, but did not want^^^Hto get out of touch 
with the customer long enough to make the move, and that 
is when I told him not to go. 

Q I actually see in looking at this paragraph in 

IIMPI l OOJririk. : 



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your notes that by this time the subject of taking the 
cargo to Tehran had in fact come up. I see the sentence 
before the first one we were looking at makes a reference to 
Tehran, again on page 2; is that right? 

It appears to say -- "The customer also requested 
we further move cargo to Tehran. " 
A Yes. 

Q So that ultimately perhaps in fact the conver- 
sation you had about whether or not this was the same 
cargo that had been turned down perhaps did come up at the 
time when the Tehran location came up? 
A I am sorry, I misspoke. 

MR. WOODCOCK: In fact, if you refer to the page 
immediately preceding that, this appears to be 1,000 hours 
on the 23rd; is that correct? 

THE WITNESS: That is correct. 

MR. WOODCOCK: One thousand hours is 10:00 a.m? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 




BY MR. CAROME: 
Q I take it that what was being passed tol 
and Dewey was the new destination of Tehran; is that right? 
Is that what you were referring to here? 



Yes, as well as the f aot -tHa^l 



thought he 



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WMt^gg' 



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needed to go. 



^ 



Q You used the name, "Dewy," here in this 

r 

document. I take it that that meant Dewey Claridge; is 

A 

that right? 

A That is correct. 

r 

Q How did you know that Claridge was involved 

A 

with this operation? 

A I know that^^^^^Hmust have told me that is who 
he had to clear it with or who he had to discuss it 
with. 'I don't remember^^^Hever mentioning Dewey, but 
I do know that^^^^^Hin this instance said he would 
talk to Dewey and would call me back. 

If you want to make an assumption, I assume 
that Dewey, knowing his job in that area of the world, 
maybe he would be involved. 



ing with Claridge on this mission? 

A That was the only other name I heard, yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Had you heard it before you noted 
it here? 

THE WITNESS: I don't think so. So this 
instance, page 2 of this exhibit — when he said he would 
talk to him, yes. 

MK. CAROME: The-neiMa ssvlwrtclk J bdbl-d you read it 
and tell me what it means? 



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THE WITNESS: He called back that they were con- 
sidering it, but did not want, I presume that is^^^k, to 
get out of touch with the customer long enough to make the 
move. 

BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Do you understand what that meant? 

A Yes. 

Q What did that mean? 

A That meant that he was constantly talking 
to the customer by telephone, and if he left his quarters 
or home to^^^^^^^^^^H to meet with the customer, he 
would be out of touch for the period of 10 or 12 hours 
that it would take to fly over there commercially. 

Q In any event^^^^^^^^f at some point--perhaps 
later this day or some time on Saturday, did go ovei^^^^H 
You understood that; is that right? 

A Yes. I think it was Sunday, but I don't know -- 
I would have to read through and see if I could figure 
out when it was. 

Q There is some writing on this page 2 of Exhibit 
2, which runs vertically ujS the page. Can you tell me what 
that means? 

A No, I couldn't. I don't have any recollection 
as to what it meant. I am sure it meant something at that 



time, but it doesn't now. 




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Q Can you tell me what it says? 

A 2:00 p.m. Looks like 4:00 p.m. 
^H^H and I am not sure what the other one could be. It 
looks like a word starting with^^Hor something. 

Q Do you know what the word ^^^^^^H that appears 
towards the bottom of the page refers to? 

A I would think -- I recognize the word -- it was 
actual ly^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^I suspect, was the 
name of the fuel company or the people at^^^^^^B that we 

were using to handle the aircraft as it landed. With a 

U 

large aircraft, you have to have setps, you have to have 

A 

ground power, air and that type stuff. 

I don't have a firm recollection of that is what 
it is, but since I have not used that name or seen it since, 
then I suspect that is the name he gave me that was doing the 
handling of the aircraft while it was on the ground at 

Q Turn to the next page of Exhibit 2. Do you have 
any recollection of what the first two lines say or 
mean? 

A At the very top? 

Q Yes. 




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Q Are there parts of this third page that do relate 
to the^^^^l^l flight that we have been talking about? 

A In the center of the page where it says "routingj'|j 
that on the|^^|^m flight. 

Q What about just above that, the few items above 
that? Do they relate to th^^^^^HH flight 

A No. 




So when you get to the middle of the page where it 



len you ycu uu i.n= ...^w.>»^». -- 



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says routing those are again relating to thel 
flight? 

A Yes. 

Q What do those entries mean? 

A Apparently I was asking him for the routing, the 
entry/exit points and time, estimated time of departure for 



I made a note "no direct routing available, exr;=rct 
indirect routing, planned route dangerousrl/ and I wrote 
the word "norma]/" J i I presume I wrote the word "normal" aS 
saying although told it would be dangerous, it would be 
normal. 

Q Why was "dangerous" used in these notes? Was 
that — was thatf^f^^^^^^^^^phrase? 

I that was^^^^^^^^^^Bphrase, 
I wouldn't want to be specific on that because I don't 
remember, but I do think it was^^^^^^H^^^^ statement . 
Q Can you tell what the remainder of the notes on 
the page refer to? 

A "Eight miles a minute." That would be the first 
entry you are looking at. ^^^^» whatever that -- that must 
be one of the FIR boundaries , ^^Hminutes after takeoff". 
Q Would that be| 

A Yes, and I say that because of where it is 
positioned on the paper, "J°5g ^^^^-'^''JjiJ'y • 




le paper, more than memor: 

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The other position was^^^^^B Apparently I 
started to write;^^^Bsomething or other, and changed it as 
to an hour and 24 after^^^| Tehran was^^Hminutes after 
I presumel 

Across the page from it I am not sure what those 
are, "1400 local, 1600 local estimated time of departure('w 
Probably converting time. 

Q What about the reference to Tabriz? 

A There is a time next to it. If I could look at a 
map, I could almost tell you. I assume that Tabriz is the 
northwest corner of Iran. 

That is what the notes mean to me now in any case. 

Q Did you have discussions over that weekend about 
the flight possibly going to Tabriz? 

A I don't recollect that, no. 

Q As far as you are concerned, that subject just 
didn't come up? 

A Yes. I don't recollect it coming up. 

Q Can you tell what the remainder of the notes at 
the bottom of the page mean? 

A "In air^^^^^^^^^B" , that, I presume, would be 
reference to the U.S. registry aircraft. 

Q The aircraft that didn't go to Iran, is that right? 

A Right. And the note beside that would be "aircraft 
ready but no money, no traffic rights, and no guidance." 



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This apparently was the note -- a call fromJ 

notes I made as a result of a call f roir^^^^^^^l that we are 
ready to go, but we don't have money or guidance or 
traffic rights. 

Q Is there a time there? 

A It looks like 9:50. 

Q Would that be local time? 

A I would presume so. 

Q If you could turn to the next page and the 
last page, do you have any idea what thel 
reference is, the second line? 

A If I am not lost — this apparently was taking 
place while they we re^^^^^^^^H they were discussing how to 
transitj^^^^^^^^^^^^^P That was something thatj 
had passed to me that they were going to have to gc 

and I am not sure what the "8,000" meant. 
It could mean altitude, but I don't think that is the case. 

guy at ^^^^fl^^^^^^l^^H ^'^^'^' 

can go in twof'\y and I presume that is two hours. 

"At 1150 I received a call they had released the 
aircraft based on people at the site, assurances of traffic 
rights." That would be^HHm traffic ^^'3^^^' 
Q What does the next reference refer to? 
A I write bad enough, and the copy is bad. I think 
that is^^^^^^^H but I don't know. If I could see the 




3^^^H|HH but I don't know. 

^TWPI A<JQIFIFn 



UWa^FfHFT 



86 



:aS-6 ' original -- "ETA"yy' estimated time of departure, and then 

it says "slant via" -- I am sure it meant something to me at 
the time, but it doesn't now. ETA is estimated time of 
arrival; ETD, estimated time of departure. 

Q What about the bonus for employees reference? 

A H^^^^^^^Hmust have mentioned whenever we get 
through we better pay these guys well. This was after the 
discussion that the captain had talked himself out of 
troubl^^^^^^^^^^Brather than us helping him out of trouble 



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Q What about the next -- 

o 
A I say here that we have to deffuel and land at 

6,000. That is the fuel we would have to take off. 

I am not sure why that came up at that point. 

As you can see, I was getting tired of this thing 

and my notes get worse as time went on. 

Q This is actually very helpful to have you decipher 

some of this. 

What does the next line refer to? 

A "1400 hours to unload." ^^|^H^s telling me 

what the captain reported to him — to onload, not unload. 

He said there were two groups of people in Tel Aviv. 

Q Do you know what that meant? 

A Apparently they were dealing with two groups of 

people in the loading process. I think he refers to that in 

Aooicirn 



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his debrief later on, the confusion going on in Tel Aviv 
and that they were apparently being told not to come back 
direct, but to goi 

He was saying something, speculating that at the 
rate they were going to go it would take 24 hours to load 
one aircraft. They are very rich guys, in reference to 
Schwimmer. I found out later that is who he was 
referring to. 

Q And that is the person he was dealing with in 
Tel Aviv? 

A And talking to and about what the captain was 
dealing with. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Directing your attention to the 
prior page, at the bottom of the page, I believe there is a 
reference already to Schwimmer. So you already knew that 
Schwimmer was involved by that time? 

THE WITNESS: I knew the name, yes, or he had 
relayed that name to me, yes. In fact, I think he related 
to me that the captain was in Schwimmer 's home in Tel Aviv 
during the phone conversation, because I was concerned that 
this was taking place over HF radio and he denied it, "no, no, 
I am not stupid." 



UNamiElFJ). 



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#5 
BOYUM 3:15pm 

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WtBlSSffiF 



BY MR. CAROME: 

Q What about these series of numbers then 
between the "very rich few" reference and the giggly 
line? 

A They obviously have to do with estimated times 
of departures. I would guess the first on the right 
side -- I am not sure of the one on the left -- depart T, 
looks like I scratched in 15, I don't know why. I would 
take that now to mean Tel Aviv at 2000, arive 

depart^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H arrive 
Tehran 0010 on 24, depart Tehran 1410 Zulu on 24. 

I am guessing that those were the times we 
were estimating rather than the actual times. I would 
have to go back to his report to give you the actual times 
I guess. 

Q And below the jiggly line can you tell me what 
those two lines say and mean? 

A That is in reference to my earlier comment about 
when the aircraft 1 and ec^^^^^^^^^^f they were in trouble 
because they had no cargo docks or no manifest of any form 
to give the people and it was — the appearance was they were 
not expecting them as they had been led to believe that 
everything would be okay on landing, not to worry about it 

Q And the second line there, can you tell me what 



that says? 



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A I think it says will check J^^^^lbut I can't 

tell you for certain. 

Q What does that mean? 

A Well, because of where it falls in the 

sequence, ^^^^B being in our cryptic conversation over the 
telephone that I would say tod||||||||H"that I will call 
I" meaning CIA Headquarters and find out if I can 
get him. 

Q 




Q I see, ]us1 

A We refer tc ^^^^^^ 

^^1^^ for the CIA, and Europe is^^^^^|usually when we 
are discussing these things on the phone. 

So it looks like a^fland a check mark and the 
word ^^^^ 

Q Can you do the same description or explanation 
of what the remaining references on this last page of 
the document Exhibit 2 refer to? 

A As I had mentioned earlier I calledl 
asking for help to get the aircraft captain out of trouble 
and get the aircraft moving and had received the word 
that there would be no help forthcoming that we could 
not intercede at this point, that he would have to get 



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himself out of trouble. As I returned the call to 

:o tell him that, he reported to me the aircraft 
was ]ust off, just airborne I guess is what that would be 
more appropriate. 

And that they were airborne 2.5 hours after landing 
and I can't tell what the time is over this, this is 
blocked by th^^B He gave me an arrival time apparently 
for someplace. 

Q Then there is a reference to 

A Yes. That was our planned, where they would go 
for crew rest unless we told them to 9<^^^H^^^^B told 
them otherwise. I presume that would be the time we 
estimate they would be^^^^^^^Hor time enroute 
vould be more appropriate. 

Q As I understand from your testimony earlier, 
the plan was to make a decision after the first flight 
had gotten to Tehran whether or not the additional 
flights would take place, is that right? 

A I knew at the time we were making the first 
flight we would make only one flight and then we would 
maybe get approval for the second. In other words it 
would be decided at that time. I had passed that to 

We were not automatically going to go back and 
make a flight. You know, it is not to be that obvious 
that that is the case. In other words it — he had approval 

IfllAl a MM. 



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to make one flight from me although they were talking 
three flights at one time, and I think five was even men- 
tioned and his question to me, as I recollect, was "do we 
do all five flights without checking back in?" I said 
"No, we will make this flight and then we will determine 
if we go beyond that." 

Q Let me see if I can sharpen this point a little 
bit. I take it originally that it was going to be fine 
for there to be three flights from Tel Aviv tc 
IS that right? 

A I don't think so. I think what I am saying 

Q I am talking to Tel Aviv toj 

A Tel Aviv to^^^^^H yes, sorry. 

Q When you were in the original plan there would 
be no question that you move the whole load, there would 
be a series of flights, is that right? 

A My understanding was that we would move the whole 
load, whatever the load was, yes. 

Q I take it then that when the subject of going 
to — 

A — to Tehran came up — 

Q When that subject came up that you then got in 
with^^^^^^^^^l and point^^^^^|^^^ told 
you we are going to do these one at a time? 

A That-wpyld be my recollection, we will do one 



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and evaluate and see whether or not we do any more. 

Q And do you recall who it was you were talking 
to on that particular subject? 

A No, I can't. 

Q Would that approach have been adopted in the 
first telephone call or first conversations you had 
with^^^^ 

A After the Tehran destination was determined, yes. 

Q Who made the decision that a second flight would 
not happen right away? 

A Not happen right away? 

Q That is right. 

A In other words the possibility existed still of 
a second flight? 

Q Yes, I take it that — 

A That would have been — 

Q Let me see if I can break it down into more than 
one question. 

There was a decision to be made after the 
plane had landed in Tehran whether the plane would return 
or return^^^^^^H is that right? 

A That is correct. 

Q And if it returnec^^mi^^^that would have 
meant that you were going to pretty much just continue 
on with the operation with consecut^^ flights, is that 



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right? 

A That IS not true. The return ^^^J^^^lwould 
have meant that they were going to crew rest and before they 
took off again we would have made a decision whether 
they would go in fact back or not. 

My recollection is that^^^^^^^Hon his own made 
the decision to divertj^^^^^^^ as a result of the way 
things were going even though we had not said there would 
not be a second flight. He was waiting on the signal from 
me to know whether we would go back at all. 

Q Before you gave him a signal to gol 

[he made a decision ^'^'^^^^^^^^^M> ^^ that right? 

A When the crew was airborne if my recollection is 
correct, after they were airborne from Tehran and he 
apparently — they gave him some feel for what had 
transpired on the ground and he told them at that time to 
go and^^^^^^^^^^^H rather than| 

Q Did that reflect his desire to no longer be 
involved in this operation? 

A I would say no. He had never indicated that 
"I won't make another flight if you say make another 
flight" but it probably reflected his feeling that we 
would probably not do it. Again because it went so bad. 
That is, we had the probleros^^^^^^^^| the problems with 



itwrnfj^rFrrn 



ions that the 



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captain received f ron^^^^^^^^^Hcontroller as he was 
leaving that they would not allow him back through next 
time unless^^^^^^^^^^Kiad been coordinated with and 
those types of problems that were unforeseen and would have 
been expected to have been taken care of by someone. 

From that standpoint he made a decision while 
on the radio with the guy to tell him to divert] 
and call him I 

Q In fact — 

A Some of that is speculating as to how he did 
that but that is my understanding and my acceptance of the 
way we went. 

Q So he told you that the plane was on its way 
back^^^^^^^Haf ter he made the decision to take it back? 

A Right. 

Q To| 

A Right. 

Q What did you tell him when he said that to you? 

A I am sure I said okay, I will get back with you -- 
or something to that effect. I didn't have any objections 
to that, in other words, I concurred with him. 

Q Had you at that point already learned fromH||^| 
[that CIA wanted to bail out of the operation? 

A No. No. It is not my recollection that that 



is the case. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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Q This would by now be sometime Monday morning 
when the plane was airborne after leaving Tehran. 

A I think so. What time was it? I think it is 
Sunday night or early Monday morning before I left for 
Washington. Let's see, 1900 GMT would be, must have been 
Sunday afternoon. You probably have another sheet that 
would make that clear as far as where the aircraft was 
when. 

MR. CAROME: Why don't we mark this as the next 
exhibit. 

{The document marked Exhibit No.^^B-3 follows:] 



lCLASSm_ 



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MtOD^ieDr 



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BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 3 

to your deposition. Do you recognize what that is? 

A Yes, I do. 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 typewritten report 
you on the flight activity, is that right? 

A That is correct. 

Q Can you tell from this document when -- would 
this document refresh your recollection as to when the 
flight departed from Tehran? I believe if you go to 
page 6 there is a reference to the return flight. 



'on the 2 5 November. 
And that would have been by my calculation 



On Monday afternoon, is that right? 
That is correct. 

So that it was sometime Monday afternoon that 
nade the judgment to take the plane back 
Irather than^^^^^^^^^^^lis that right? 
Yes. 

And it was sometime Monday afternoon that he 
told you that he had made that decision, is that right? 
A That is correct. 

Q Did you tell him any time Monday afternoon whether 
it was CIA's desire that^^^^^^H not be further involved 




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in this operation? 

A No. I know I didn't because I didn't know that 
was the case at that time. I felt we were not going to 
make another flight until I had received instructions 
to do so. The feeling during the day on Monday was that we 
probably would not be making another flight. It had not 
been decided we would or could or whatever until that night 
when I got the call from^^^Hor Tuesday morning, like I 
say I have trouble recollecting that. My recollection was 
Tuesday and since conversation with^^^H you know, there 
IS no doubt in my mind he may have told me about midnight 
that night or whatever time he called me. 

Q What were the discussions you were having at 
Headquarters on Monday? What were they related to? 

A I think I had made the position that if we were 
going to make another flight that we best get better 
organized or we were going to lose an airplane and crew 
because of the problems we had experienced! 
because of the problems we had experienced going inj 

that, you know, obviously the first one was 
an impromptu thing, we threw it together, and did it in a 
hurry. Let's take the necessary time if we were going to 
do a second or third flight even, let's take the necessary 
time to make sure the proper clearances and so forth were 
in place and it is my remembrance that part of that day 




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was spent addressing those issues and although I wasn't 
a party to those meetings my only contact that day was with 
|ans 

Q What meetings did you understand were taking 
place that day? 

A I don't know that there was a formal meeting other 
than them going and talking to other people. I don't know 
who the other people would have been. 

Q Who is "them" that went and talked to other 
people? 

^^^^^^^^Hlana^^^^^^^^^^ In 
was more than^^^^^^^^^^than^^^^^^^^^Bin 
think^^^^^Hwas back running the whole thing at that time. 

Q . You don't know who it was who he was talking to? 

A No. 

Q Were you aware that a Spot report had been 
prepared that day? 

A No. 

Q Let me just show you that document to see if it 
might by chance refresh your recollection. 

[The document marked Exhibit No. ^m-i follows:] 



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BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 4. 
It is a Spot report dated at the top 25 November 1985. 
For the record, I believe that this was a document 
prepared by^^^^^^^^H Does that document refresh your 
recollection on that subject? 

A I have never seen the document. 

Q Were you aware on Monday, that Monday that we 
were talking about, Monday the 25th that a report of the 
weekend's activities had been made to John McMahon? 

A No. I couldn't say that I was. I would have 
probably assumed as such but I can't say that I was aware 
that one had been made. 

Q Why would you assume that? 

A Having worked for the Agency^^^^^^^^H knowing 
that we don't do many things without the DDO at least 
knowing what is going on, that OGC even in most cases I 
assume would have blessed it legally or something. 
That would be an assumption on my part. 

Having been the proprietary case officer that 
would have been the normal procedure, once it was put 
together you would take it through the different elements 
to make sure you had their blessings and that you were 
in consort. So from that knowledge I would assume that 



that would be 



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Q So this would have been a type of operation 
that you would have thought would have been blessed in 
advance by the Office of General Counsel, is that right? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you later learn that was not the case? 

A No, I can't say that I ever learned that it was 
not the case. I do know that af ter^^^^^Vmeeting with 
the Office of General Counsel it was determined that he 
should not make any more flights. I don't know that I 
was ever told that we should not have made this flight, 
if that is what your question is. 

Q But you didn't hear anything that Monday about 
Mr. McMahon being very angry or having hit the overhead 
when he heard that — 

A No. 

Q — that^^^^^^^fhad made this flight? 

A In fact that surprises me because I think every- 
body was elated, you know, was very happy that we accomplished 
the flight. That was my impression of my contact with 
^and^^^^^^^^B that we had been, you know, 
been successful in making the flight happen. 

Q Did you see Mr. Clarridge at all on that Monday? 

A No. 

Q And what were you doing that Monday in the 



Headquarters ? 



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A Geeze, I -- other than having conversations 
with ^^^^Biand^^^H and I am sure I was meeting with 
[in reference toF 

My recollection goes that we did spend time 
discussing that problem. 

Q This is another unrelated matter? 

A Unrelated matter, that is correct. Normal 
administrative things, bringing in memorandums and 
whatever just^HHJU^^^^^^^^^Hif was 
required. I really don't have any recollection as to what 
all I did do that day but it was not devoted just to this 
flight. I do know that. 

Q But it was your understanding that^^^^^^^^^| 

were devoting their time to organized planning 
for additional flights on this matter, is that right? 

A I won't say organized planning, I would say 
discussions because we never did get into organized planning 
of any additional flights. In fact as I was preparing to 
leave the building that night my understanding is that if 
we were going to in fact do it and there was still a 
probability I presume, that we would hopefully do that the 
next day, but in any case we were slipping or not automa- 
tically going to go back and do another flight, and it was 
very much in discussion as to whether we would in fact do 
it or not. My impression is there was no decision made 



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that we are not going to go back or that we are going to 
go back until I received a call either Monday night from 

lor he informed me that was the result of the 
meeting on Monday night on Tuesday morning when I came in. 

Q Were there discussions about how this 
remaining cargo in Tel Aviv was going to get to Iran on that 
Monday? 

A No. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did you have any discussions 
about Tiow amateurish the operation had been? 

THE WITNESS: Only to — you are speaking of 
Monday? 

MR. WOODCOCK: Correct. 

THE WITNESS: Only to the extent that I was upset 
that in fact I became upset that night before I think it 
was or whatever time it was that the aircraft was sitting 

land I was told they would give the crew no 
assistance, I beceime personally a little upset at that time 
that we had got these guys into this situation and now 
there was no diplomatic or whatever. I had visions of 
based on^^^^^^^^H phone conversation the guys being 
under arrest going to jail or whatever for doing what we 
had asked them to do. That is the way it come across to me. 

I relayed that, my concern tq^^^^^Hor to 

and ^i»S" ^y call back to the extent that there 

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was nothing we could do at this point, it was out of our 
hands and to tell the crew to get themselves out of the situa 
tion as best they possibly could. That upset me as I knew 
It would upsetlf^^^^^B Fortunately as I was calling 
^^^^^^Hback with this information to tell the crew the 
next time you talk to them that we would not be helping 
them, that they would have to work their way out of it, he 
informed me that they had in fact solved the problem and 
were gone. That was the point of discussion on Monday 
when I got into the office. That if I am to be the project _ 
manager in a project of this nature, that if we get our peoplje 
in this situation again we must be prepared to back 
them up. 

MR. WOODCOCK: So you get into the office on 
Monday and you are already a little upset because 
your crew has been jeopardized^^^^^^^^^^ is that 
right? 

THE WITNESS: Well, by that time I am sure I had calmed down 
considerably, yes, but that was to be the subject of 
discussion, yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You are concerned. You get to the 
office and find out among other things this is an NSC 
operation, is that right? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. WOODCOCK: And'dicT'y'o'u 'iWP' ^t any point and 



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say, look, who are these clowns? 

THE WITNESS: No, no, and maybe I let you let 
me misspeak when I said it was an NSC operation. I never 
considered that it was an NSC operation to the extent that 
maybe you are referring to, in other words it was to me a - 
the way I took that reference is that it was the source 
of the flight request rather than it being the President 
or the CIA saying we will do this. We were doing it 
to accommodate the NSC. That had no bearing on my 
attitude about the flight. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q Let me ask the question again then, since 
you understood that NSC was at least requesting the 
flight, whether it was NSC operated or not, were you not 
concerned about the character of the people who were 
behind the flight? 

A No. Because I didn't know anyone there. 

Q You knew this was a flight undertaken at NSC 
request, right? 

A That is correct, or so I was told. 

Q You did not have an assumption that NSC itself 
was operating the flight, is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q Therefore there were persons on whose behalf 
NSC had interceded to request the flight, is that correct? 



(M!lii<^'flEA.,. 



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Was that your understanding? 

A I wish you would restate that last part because 
I read something in there that -- 

Q Was it your understanding that NSC interceded 
on somebody else's behalf in order to arrange the flight 
for the CIA proprietary? 

A Yes, that is correct. 

Q But not necessarily NSC people, correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q Well, given -- did you understand that the CIA 
knew the identities of these people? 

A I didn't understand it or I will say I 
didn't understand it but I assumed as much. Back to my 
earlier statement that I knew that we or I felt I knew that 
we were accommodating either some other country or someone 
in making this flight happen, and that was still my 
understanding at the end of that day even. I don't think 
I understood until much later I am sure that it was in fact 
an NSC mission at their request. Does that clarify it? 

Q I understand what you are saying, but you have 
been exposed to a really bumbling, poorly organized 
operation that has jeopardized your crew and you come to 
Washington and you are not particularly happy about the way 
things have gone over the weekend, right? 



That i 



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Q And you come to Washington and you find out 
that really what has happened here is that persons wno 
are probably not NSC people are being helped out by your 
proprietary at an NSC request, is that right? 

A That is correct. 

Q Did you try and satisfy yourself that your 
colleagues had established the bona fides of these people 
who were jeopardizing your crew? 

A No, I didn't. I think it would probably be 
inappropriate to question that. 

Q Well, I am not asking the question that you 
yourself be satisfied but did you try and satisfy yourself 
that at least they were satisfied that these were genuine 
individuals and not some series of cowboys who were jeopar- 
dizing your crew? 

A Like I say, I didn't ask that question and I 
guess I was comfortable with the fact that that is where 
it cVme from. If I may, in fact the tone that I found 
out it was NSC may have been to the effect that you know 
because I do know having been associated with the Agency 
for some period of time now, that we do run a better show 
than that and it may have been presented to me that, you 
know, some of the confusion was that it was an NSC^ 
generated mission rather than one we generated internally. 
That is not self-serving to say that but I think 



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m20 ' that would be the vein that I picked that up that day. 

And I may have ]ust said well, that probably explains it, 
it was someone else. I don't remember directly or the 
feeling I had at that time. 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Returning to a subject that you have testified 
about a little bit already, I believe I am fairly 
stating^^^^^^^^^^^^^l testimony when say that 
yesterday he told us that when he informed you that he had 
made the decision to take the plan^^^^^^^^^^^H rather 
thai^^^HJ^^^^^H you replied to him, that's good, 
fact^^^^^Bhasal ready told us to get out. 

Does that change your recollection about what 
might have happened at this point? 

A No, in fact I think that may be a misstatement 
because my recollection of that at the time of the 
event then would not have been that we are going to get 
out of it but that we are not going to go back until we get 
some clarifications. 

I don't think — I know in my mind that we had 
not been cancelled as far as knowing we were not going to 
go back absolutely cancelled. There was suspicion we may 
not go back at that time. 

Q Was it the status at that point that there 
would be no further flights without some further go-ahead 



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from higher authority than CIA? 

A Without some further discussions, I would say. 
Whether we were waiting on further approvals or not I had 
no way of knowing except I had permission to do the one 
flight and we were not to move the aircraft until we had 
further clearance and I didn't ask for clarification or, 
are you waiting for higher approval or what. That was 
just my understanding as to what my instructions were 
to do. 

Q If we could turn to the subject of overflight 
rights^^^^^^^^^B you have testified that the 
plane had troublesl 

[is that right? 

A . That is correct. 

Q Did you ever talk tcj^^^^^^^^^^B about the 
nature of the application for clearances for flight 
clearances | 

A Maybe to the extent — I don't remember a 
specific conversation other than it seems like I 
vaguely remember him making a comment that we would 
get our own clearances in the future or any future flight 
that we would get our own clearances rather than allow 
someone else to get them. 

Q You had had a conversation with the| 
people about at least assistance? 




HASiSra- 



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A That IS correct. 

Q Assistance by them in getting flight clearances 

is that right? 
A That is right. 

Q Who did you deal with on that point? 
A That would have been I am sure 
Q There is a CIA cable that refers to a 
telex from the carrier stating that the cargo being carried 
by the plane was medical supplies. 

Do you have any knowledge of that telex? 
A No, but I am sure that it happened because that 
[favorite for cargo that we don't know what 
it is, it is either medical supplies or construction 
equipment , 




But I have never seen the telex 
and I don't remember him dictating that to me that he had 
sent a telex to that effect. 

Are you saying it originated from 

Q I believe that is right. 

A Yes. 

Q And when you say that is^^^^^^^^^^^| favorite 
when he doesn't know what the cargo is, might it be somethinc 
he would use when he prefers not to tell the ground 
authorities what the true nature of the cargo was? 

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A That is correct;ywhich in this case, number one 
you don't know and secondly, even if you did know you 
wouldn't want to tell them that it was armaments and so 
forth. 

Q This same cable states and I will read from 
it, the pilot told the ground controllers he was 
carrying military equipment. 

Did you ever learn that the pilot gave that 
information to ground controllers! 

A No, I don't think it is in^^^^^^^^Vreport . 
I don't remember that being mentioned before. 

Q You know nothing about that subject. 

A No. Unless I missed it when I read 

report and I don't remember reading that, that 
he told them it was military equipment. 

Q Do you know whether or not the telex request for 
clearances sought clearances for one flight or for a 
series of flights? 

A No, I don't. In fact I am a little surprised 
that there is a telex because that would be news to me. 
I do know we were hopefully trying to get overflight 
clearances but it would have been my understanding that 
Mr. Swimmer or someone was arranging them at that time. 
So it doesn't surprise me that it happened but I never saw 
a copy of the telex and it was not told specifically that 



:^£Jf acd it was not told 

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we put in a telex asking for clearances. 

Q What problems do you understand that the pilot 
had while flying overl 

A From recollection he did not have a diplomatic 
overflight number that usually works like magic that gets 
you past air traffic controllers. Not having a number 
and having been told he was cleared to go byl 
he was apparently third degreed, he was vectored of 
course and in fact he I guess attempted to evade radar 
somewhat to get through and in numerous conversations 
throughout the flight he was able to actually succeed in 
going completely^^m^mUmair space without having 
been forced down or stopped. 

But he never did have carte blanche authority to 
proceed but he did proceed. 



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-■AS-1 2 

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BY MR. CAROME: 
Q And what about the problems with| 
authorities on the way back? 

A On the way back I guess he really didn't have any 
problems other than he was informed that he would not be 
allowed back through unless he hadJ 

Icommercial approval. Apparently that was the 
genesis of the problem beforehand, is that the civilian 
community or commercial author it ieslHm^^^HH had given 
overflights, but^^^^^^^^^^Hwas not made aware or had not 
granted their overflight. 

So^^^^^^^^^^^H was made aware that he would not 
be allowed back in unless heJ 




Did^^^^^^^^^^^l inform you of how the 
[flight was received in Tehran? 

A In this report, yes. 

Q What did he tell you as to whether or not the 
people on the ground in Tehran with whom the flight crew 
was dealing were pleased with the flight and the cargo? 

A Just that, that they were pleased and that they 
were wanting us to be the ones who brought in future flights, 
the impression that our captain had was that we want you to 
be the ones who come back in and that was in his report. 
Somewhere I remen|;:pft ItAjt A>^SinC% i.pp'tliMl^ebrief ing. 



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1 Q Do you know whether or not anyone on the ground 

2 inspected the cargo in Tehran? 

3 A No. In fact, I think it was not inspected, as I 

4 remember reading through in the discussion of it, that they 

5 3ust offloaded it. In fact, our crew was amazed that they 

6 offloaded it so quickly compared to how long it took to 

7 onload. 

8 Q Did you at any time either on that Monday, the 

9 25th, or anytime thereafter, hear anything about the fact 

10 that the Iranians were unhappy with the cargo? 

11 A No. I never did. Until the T.V. told me in 

12 December, I guess. No, I never heard that. And apparently 

13 the crew never heard it, as it wasn't mentioned in this 

14 report, to my recollection. 

15 In fact, maybe it will save you some questions, 

16 once this report was written and turned in our focus was on 

17 other things. The flight, we never talked about it or 

18 discussed it. 

19 It wasn't a day-to-day type thing. It was over 

20 and behind us and I never thought anymore about it until the 

21 investigation started. 

22 Q Are you aware that^lHHl^^lreceived about 

23 $127,700 in payment from 

24 A Yes. 

25 Q — from the Lake Resources for the flight that was 



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performed. 

A Yes, I am. 

Q Did you know at the time that it was Lake Resources 
that made the payment? 

A At the time they made the payment I did because 

we received the accountings. I didn't focus on that, to be 

frank. The reason I say I knew at the time is I approve 

all paper transactions as they come through the office and 

as they are booked, so I am sure that I saw the name and the 

amount and tied it to the Iran flight. 

I put it in the file. I didn't know who Lake 

Resources was. nor did I question it. When I was questioned 
r 

as to who it was, I couldn't remember and I had to go back 
to the file and dig it out. 

MR. CAROME: Could you mark that as the next 
exhibit, please? 

(Whereupon, the document referred to was marked 
for identification as Exhibit^^^l 5.) 



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BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I show you what has b-en marked as Exhibit 5 and 
ask if you recognize what that document is. 

A Yes, I do. 

Q For the record, it is a one-page, typed memorandum, 
re: Tel Aviv/Tehran flight; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q This something that f^^^^^^^^^H prepared 
and sent to you; is that right? 

A That is correct. 

Q Do you know if he is responding to a particular 
question you had to him in this written report? 

A I think so. And I can't give you a specific 
consideration but I think I may have made the comment that 
what do you think our exposure was on this flight as far as 
me being concerned with cover and security in the future of 
the project. 

And this would have been the response he gave in 
response to that query as to did he think that at some point 
in the flight did it become very obvious that we were CIA- 
sponsored or whatever and this was in response, I think, to 
that question. 

I don't specifically remember that, but I do think 
that would have been the beginning of this particular annex 



to the report. 



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"AS-S ^ Q And I take it it was important to you and 

that both Copp and Schwimmer not become aware of 
the CIA background °^^^^^^^^^^M ^^ that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q And it was that concern that caused you to ask 
to prepare this memorandum; is that right? 

A I don't think I asked for a memorandum. I think I 
asked him and he verbally briefed me and gave me this on 
one of the papers in which he expounds on how screwed up 
it was, but he gave me the report as a result of a verbal 
conversation. 

And as I read through the thing, I do remember 
discussions -- probably a specific question for me is how did 
he explain to^^^^^four missing the flight and actions 
they would take as a result of our missing the flight we had 
scheduled . 

Q Were you aware that the loading of the flight in 
Tel Aviv was being handled by high rzmking military officials? 

A Yes. 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^^M made you aware of that at the time? 

A Yes. 

Q Did he also make you aware that the loading was 
taking place in a hot cargo area? 

A Yes. 

Q He did tell you that? 

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1 A Yes. 

2 Q Did that cause you to conclude that this was 

3 probably munitions that were being carried on the flight? 

4 A I can't say that I recollect having that light 

5 come on and say it must be munitions because we often unload 

6 in hot cargo areas. 

7 That would probably be a tip-off that that would be 

8 it. I don't remember elaborating on the fact that it was 

9 a hot cargo area, it must be explosive or something. 

10 MR. WOODCOCK: That information you are receiving 

11 f rom B^^H^^^^^Hon the military involvement and the 

12 loading in the hot cargo area is information you are 

13 receiving roughly contemporaneously with those events; is 

14 that correct? 

15 THE WITNESS: That is correct. In fact, I 

16 remember that a civilian was obviously running the show, but 

17 the military was involved and the civilian was very abusive 

18 to the military. I remember him making that statement. 

19 BY MR. CAROME: 

20 Q Did he tell you that that civilian was Mr. Schwimmer 

21 A Later he did, yes. 

22 Q On page 4 of Exhibit 3 there is a reference to the 

23 aircraft being parked at the same location that it had been 

24 parked on the last night to Tehran a few weeks ago. Do you 

25 know what that is referring to? 



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A Yes. That was referring to the August 1985 flight. 

Q And even though it says a few weeks ago, you still 
believe that to be the flight that was a few months ago, 
is that right? 

A Yes. That is the only flight we had made so that 
would be the only way I could refer to that. 

Q Did^^^^^^^^^^^^ tell you over the phone on 
Sunday or Monday that the Iranians on the ground in Tehran 
had said they were expecting four more flights? 

A I don't recollect him telling me that. I 
recollect reading it in his report after the fact, but I 
don't recollect it being a point of the conversation by 
phone. 

By that time it would have been an international 
call and we were very guarded as to what we were saying by 
telephone. 




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MR. CAROME: Could you mark this as the next 
exhibit? 

(Whereupon, the document referred to was marked 
as Exhibit^^A 6.) 



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BY MR. CAROME: 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^^I am placing before you Exhibit 6. This 
actually is a cable that I was reading from before and 
hadn't made a part of the record here yet, but now i would 
like to. 

This appears to be a cable from' 

Ion the 25th of November, that would have been 
the Monday where you were at headquarters. It is the cable 
that refers to the pilot having told the ground controllers 
he was carrying military equipment. 

The time on the cable, time of receipt appears to 
be^^H^^^ltime. I gather that would be about! 
on Monday morning? 

A That is correct. 

Q At the top there is a reference to "advance 
notified C/EU^\j I take it that that is Clarridge, and 
then^^^^^^H^^B, spelled^^^^^^^^^B know 

whether or not that is the^^^^^^^^Vor not. It seems 
that it might be. I am asking you whether or not you have 
ever seen this document before, whether you might have seen 
it on that Monday? 

A No. 

Q You have no recollection of ever seeing this 



document? 



No. Th 



it^iMraFiFn 



have seen it. 



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5"^° '' "R- CAROME: Would you mark that as the next 

2 exhibit, please? 



(Whereupon, the document referred to was marked 
for identification as Exhibit^^R 7.) 



UNCLASSIFIED 



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BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I show you what the reporter has just marked 
Exhibit 7 , as I ask if you recognize what that is? 

A Yes. That is a paper that I prepared for 

lat his request. I think -- it could be one of 
two things. It is a paper I prepared for^^^^^r it is 
something I prepared for the auditors when they were down this 
year — I did it for both, I think. 

Q Is this a listing of the special flights, that is, 
the fli/ghts carried on at the Jsehest of the U.S. Government 
that^^^^^HHHperformed in 1985 and 1986? 

A Yes. I am sorry. That would not be a total 
list, okay? This would be the list of special flights with 




So it would not be all inclusive is what I am 
saying. 

Q And the one item — let me rephrase that. The 
fifth item on that list, do you recognize that to be a 
reference to the November 1985 flight that we were just 



discussing? 



A That i 



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w. .w«. .WW.. ..i.r 123 

Q Can you read to me what that item says? 

A Part of it is blocked out, but it apparently would 
be Boeing 707, 23-25 November 1985, Tel Aviv social. 

Q Can you read the word underneath that? 

A No, I can't. 

Q Does it say "cash"? 

A Maybe it does say "cash" -- it looks like it does 
say cash and I have in the remarks there "p»id direct by 
customer^ and I did not have the hours or the amount there 
either', but I can't tell whether it was there or not. But I 
did have 707, 1-27-7, plus -- 8-7. I don't know what that is. 
In fact, I am not sure that is my writing. 

Q It may be that the last column is someone else's 
writing; is that right? 

A Yes. "^ 

Q Do you know what the^^^B numbers might refer to? 

A No. 

Q There is a handwritten note in the middle of the 
page that says "no cargo manifest available '1. Do you know 
what that refers to? 

A That is not my writing, but that would mean that 
I have no cargo manifest for those flights. If it would be 
proper, I can now tell you whose writing that is or whatever 
the source is. 

The ai 



T^ v^Sen wie investigation was started, 

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the auditor plus one individual come down to my office to 
audit the flight records for all of the flights we had 
conducted for the agency and this is a copy of -- in fact, 
it is a copy of a manila folder that I keep handwritten notes 
to myself of date and time of flights. 

Q Is this audit something that was conducted as a 
result of the public disclosures of the Iran affair? 

A I would say yes. I had a — after the disclosure 
of the Iran affair, I had a debriefing with our internal 
auditors and the I.G. staff, O.G.C. 

After I had the session with them, the auditor 
left Washington with me that evening and went back^ 
^^^^1 and spent two or three days looking at the 
paperwork I had in my office. 

Now that I pay close attention to that, that is the 
origin of it, I think. That would be his co^e on the 
as well. 

That is his writing. Just to clarify it more, 
normally I would put the amount of money that we collected 
for the flight I said "paid direct by the customer" and 
at the time I made the entry I didn't know what the amount 
was. 

That is his writing in the right-hand column. 

Q Did the subject of insurance ever come up in 
connection with the November^^^^^^^^^Bf light to Iran? 



the November^^^^^^^^|Hi 

IINHI il<WBff 



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A Not to my recollection. We had a discussion on 
insurance back during the August flight but I don't 
remember^^^^^^^Hasking me about insurance or me 
questioning him about insurance for the November flight. We 
had to buy special insurance for the August flight. I 
remember that. 

Q Do you recall how much that special insurance 
cost? 

A I want to say $3,000, but I don't know where I am 
getting that, so I would rather say I don't know. 

Q But it was probably less than S5,0Q0; is that 
right? 

A I would think so, yes. I think I can safely say 
that we did not insure for this flight because it was a 
weekend and we didn't have time and the subject never came 
up, so we didn't contact our broker. 

MR. CAROME: Could you mark this as the next 
exhibit? 

(Whereupon, the document referred to was marked 
for identification as Exhibit^^^^ 8 . ) 



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BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 8. 
Do you recognize what that item is? It is a one-page 
document dated 30 November 1986. 

A No. I haven't seen this. 

Q Is that also a document that is in the auditor's 
handwriting? 

A Yes. Thel^^^apparently collates back to the notes 
he has in the margin. 




Q There are several -- do you know what the term 
"special interest" means at the bottom of the page? 

A I would assume — looking back I would assume that 
it would be the flights that they were looking at to see 
whether they were properly approved or executed or whatever. 
That is his word, but that is what I would gather from looking 
at it and tieing the two together. 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HtTii s 
equipmenty^'iy and those words are in quotes, to Tehran. Do 
you know why it says "drilling equipment" there? That appears 



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to be a reference to the November 1985 flight. 

A No. I am not sure where he got the words from 
except that that was used at some point -- as I testified 
earlier, that it was said that it might be drilling equipment 
that we were transporting and I am not certain where that was 
coming from. 

Q Do you know why that would be in quotes? 

A No. 

Q Let's see if we can sharpen up the reference to 
drilling equipment that was made in 1985. Who do you recall 
saying that the cargo was drilling equipment? 

A My recollection would be when we were trying to 
apply for our overflight rights, part of the request has to 
include cargo, consignee, consignor, and that type stuff, 
and my recollection would be that I would have asked either 

and I don't recollect which, for this 
overflight to get our aircraft^^^^^^^^^^H to Tel Aviv — 
I am sorry, from Tel Aviv^^^^^^^^H what the cargo would be 
and someone in the process told me to use the term 
"drilling equipment r(,i or it could have been that^^^^^^^^H 
said I will use the word "drilling equipment(''\./ I don't have 
a clear feel for that. 

Q Did you understand that drilling equipment was an 
actual description of the cargo or rather something that was 
being suggested as a good l4£)^ -fflSJil^ cargo for air 



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clearance purposes? 

A I think I held that that is what it was at the 
time and that is why I am having problems remembering as to 
who gave it to me, is that maybe that was my understanding 
that it was drilling equipment being shipped because of the 
sizes. 

That would have been a feeling at the time that was 
later gone as a result of finding out or hearing the 
description that it might be missiles. I have an unclear 
feeling did I get that f ron^^^^^^H or was that something that 
^^^^^^H suggested. 

Q I^^^^^^^^Hsuggested it, presumably that was 
being suggested as a good label for it and a good cover for 
it rather than an actual description; is that right? 

A I tend to think I got it from^^^^^| Yes, that 
would be a true statement if that is the case. 

Q It is your testimony that at the time — let me 
rephrase that question. 

It is your testimony that at the time you were told 
it was drilling equipment or at least at the time you were 
told to describe it as drilling equipment, that you felt that 
was an accurate description of the true nature of the cargo? 

A Yes. I didn't speculate that it might be anything 
different at the time. That is why I tend to believe that 
I got it from the 




people rather than from^ 



a. 



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not being able to recollect exactly where the words 
"drilling equipment" -- to be honest, I thought that I had 
been told that in the first phone conversation with^^^^H 
When I went back and read the notes that said "very 
sensitive cargo'.i, I realized that is not where I got it from. 
Q Is there any reason why drilling equipment would be 
a very sensitive cargo? 

Those are kind of inconsistent concepts, aren't 
they? 

Pi- Yes and no. I guess I consider myself fairly 
well read that we weren't trading or were trying to 
discourage other countries from trading with Iran and the 
fact that we were ordering drilling equipment would be 
almost on the same level of shipping missiles. 

If you say you are not going to give them anything 
and all of a sudden you are helping them because of oil and 
knowing that Iran is a big oil reservoir, I would say in 
international politics that might be just as important as 
missiles. 

That is off-the-cuff. I didn't think about that 
at the time, I am sure. 



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Q In any event, by Monday you no longer believed it 
was oil drilling equipment; is that right? 

A When^^^^^^Hmade the comment to me by phone on 
Monday . 

Q At that point you no longer believed it was oil 
drilling equipment; right? 

A That is right. 

Q And you believed it was missiles; is that right? 

A Well, I can't say what I believed, but, yes, I 
accepted it on faith that the' crew thought it was missiles. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Let me pursue this line just a 
minute in a different way. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q When you first heard from — when you hear from 
Ion the 23rd at 10:00 a.m., he is telling 
you that this is the same cargo] 

land you understood that to be a ship- 
ment of arms; is that correct? 

A Shipment of munitions, yes. 

Q He then later tells you that he has been in touch 
with the captain, he has arrived in Tel Aviv, that he is 
at a military portion of the airport and that military people 
are involved in loading the cargo up; is that right? 

A Yes. 



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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q You also were told that was being loaded in a 
hot cargo area; is that right? 

A Yes, by him or in a report, but I feel sure he 
told me by telephone. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q Up to that point is it correct to say that the 
information coming f rornj^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ would lead you 
to suppose it is military equipment rather than something 
else: is that right? 

A If I had been questioned at that time I would 
have to say, yes, yes, that the fact they thought it was 
the munitions flight, but you have to recognize that I 
don't think we had a description of the cargo other than 
what^^^Hgave me earlier from the crew or anybody at that 
point, but when the destination changed or whatever tipped 
him, he thought it was the same flight. 

I honestly did not dwell on it at that time. We 
were trying to get the thing going. 

Q The reason I am asking these questions is I am 
trying to separate in your mind to a greater certainty 
where this information about oil drilling equipment may 



have come from. 



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Up until this point, until the point where you 
are talking tc^^^^^^^Hand he is giving you ' information 
on the hot cargo area, the military area, and they think 
it is the cargo he turned down, your impression is that he 
is talking about a military cargo; is that right? At 
leastj^^^^^^^^^Hunderstands the impression that it is 
a military cargo? 

A Yes, I would guess that would be true, yes. That 
is about the same time we found out the destination was 
changed, to clarify my recollection of that, 
i f ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^P s u d d e n 1 y 
the term oil drilling equipment, that either means he has 
come across startling information or he just made up a label 
for it; is that right? 

A Yes, I think I have to agree with you on that. 
That is probably correct — from that perspective. It would 
probably not have come from him. I think it did more than 
likely come from within! 

Q Let me follow that down a little bit further. 
Since it is likely that the information came fromi 

that it was oil drilling equipment, that would 
have been contrary to the information you were receiving, 
or at least the impression you were receiving fromj 
is that correct? 

A If I_ had ieroed_.ii. p2i.J:ii^ij yes. But I don't 



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remember zeroing in on that or focusing on that at the time. 

Then you come into headquarters on Monday and 

Igives you the final piece of information and that 
is that the pilots who were involved in act(4jUly seeing the 
cargo, believe it was missiles; right? 

A That is correct. 

Now, do you at that point think that your colleagues 
ire mistaken or that they have just made 
up a label to falsify the character of the shipment? 

A _ I don't have any recollection of focusing on that, 
but I guess the fact would be that maybe they had falsified 
the shipment to, either because we were on the clear from -- 
I am not trying to excuse them, don't misunderstand what 
I am saying — just never asked the question beyond what I 
would normally ask, what I show is a commodity, and so forth. 
Even though they would have told me it wouldn't mean I 
would genuinely believe that is what it was, but understand 
the circumstances here, I would have thought that would have 
been the case. 

Q If you had thought they were genuinely mistaken 
about the character of the shipment and you were well 
persuaded it was armaments, and not oil drilling equipment, 
wouldn't you have wanted to make sure they were disabused 
of any illusion? 



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A If I had been more sure — and that is the problem 
with this, because we didn't press that point. 

In fact, in pressing^^^^^^H-- no, not pressing 
him -- in discussing this later he wasn't convinced what it 
was in that the crew mentioned as I described, the co-pilot 
said, "We should have fired them instead of delivered them," 
and they thought because of the shape of the box and the 
way they were handled, they must be missiles. 

But they never made a firm statement that they were 
missiles to the degree that I could come forward and with 
any degree of assurances, give a good, intelligent report 
saying, you guys thought it was something else, and in 
fact, it was missiles. That part was never clear enough. 

Q But they are in a better position to know that 
than you; right? 

A I would suspect so. Yes. 

Q If you have a reservation you are not in a position 
to find out to a certainty what the cargo is; is that right? 

A Without asking, without making a point of it with 
them. If it had been something I thought to pursue, I could 
have asked them. I didn't. 

But your CO 1 league ^^^^^^^^^^^^H are presumably 
in a position where they would be able to take the informa- 
tion you gave them on it and corroborate it one way or the 



other; is that right?_. _ ___- 

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A I would say so, yes. 

Q So you wouldn't know until you knew something to 
a mathematical certainty until you came to them and 
said, guys, this is really armaments; is that right? 

A Yes, I would agree with you, correct. Yes, in that 
assumption. 

So you would 

A I would not expect an answer back. 

Q Right. But you would say, look, I don't know 
whether this is important to you or not, but all my 
conversations with^^^^^^^^B including this last one, 
would indicate it is military hardware. You can take that 
and do with it what you want. 
Correct? 

A Yes, that is correct. 

Q Is that what you did when you got tc 
You had this final phone call and you are talking, it is 
second-hand information, but it is based on an eye-witness 
account, that act^)illy the cargo is armaments. Is that what 
you then do witJ 

A I don't remember it that way. I remember reporting 
to him the status of the aircraft, and what H^^^fH had 
reported to me, and part of that, part of my recollection of 
that is that I would have told him that^^^^^^^fsaid the 
crew thinks that it was missiles, and that was the — 



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dropped it there. I don't remember discussing it any further 
or me asking was that true, or could it be, or something else. 
I just don't remember pursuing that issue. 

And it is my nature that I would not have, because 
if you want to talk about some other flights, I couldn't 
tell you what is on those flights either-- you know, 
exactly. I never saw the cargo documentation. I wasn't 
physically there for the loading. I can relate a humorous 
thing to you, we hauled one box and the crew said it had 
to be money, they weren't paid that much to ship that small 
a package. 

That is the comments, I guess. I don't pursue 
them. 

Q Wouldn't you pass that on as intelligence? You 
are a proprietary. 

A I did. And I think I did that in debrief in 
as to^^^^^^^^l comments that the crew had thought they were 
missiles. That would have been the extent of the pass on. 

Q I understand your role. Your role is not to find 
these out, but your role is to pass information on? 

A Yes. 

Q And let them make a determination; is that right? 

A Sure. 

Presumably that also employs that you give them 
as much information as you can so they can make an intelligent 



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decision; is that right? 

A That is right. I would suspect that -- I shouldn't 
do this 1 suppose -- but I would suspect they either knew 
or it was not important or germane afterwards , because I 
never got quizzed again; where did that source come from? 

Nobody ever pinned me down to say, you said it 
was missiles, what made you think so, or whatever. I 
don't remember one conversation I had. It never came 
up again. 

' In fact, the flight never came up again after that 
cay. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q On explanation might be they knew and therefore 

they didn't need to check back with you? 

A That is the part, as I say, I shouldn't speculate, 
but, yes. 

Q That is one possible explanation? 
A Yes. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q You testified earlier that you anc 
went out to get a drink after work and that he was called 
at that byl^^^^^^^l is 



In' t qo. We were on th 

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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 
Q Do you remember what time of day that was? 
A I would guess 1800, 1830. That is normally the 
time we would leave the office during a visit. I don't 
specifically remember it being that time, but I would guess, 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q 6:00 or 6:30 p.m.; is that correct? 
A Yes. 

Q You also testified that^^^^f called you up you 
thought, either late that night, or early the next 
morning; is that right? 

A If it was the next morning -- I know he called 
me that night. Whether he told me that night that we 
definitely would not be making a flight for whatever reason, 
that night or if we waited until the next morning, I don't 
know. That is my problem of recollection. He tells me 
that he told me that night, and I remember we purposely — 
if you don't have to talk on the phone you don't usually, 
and you wait until the next morning. 

In my recollection, he told me the next morning. 
In his recollection, I think he told me he told me that 
night. I don't dispute that. 



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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 



139 



BY MR. CAROME: 

Q You came into the headquarters the following 
Tuesday morning; is that correct? 

A Yes. 
EXAJ^INATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q When you get to see^^^^^the following day, 
did he mention what had occurred at his briefing of the 
general counsel? 

A Only to say it was determined we could not would 
not make any further flights; that that was the end. 

Q Did he say any discussion was -- as to whether that 
flight was even legal or appropriate , in any event? 

A No. I can't say that he did. 

Q He didn't say, for your information you ought to 
be aware that in future flights like that we are going to 
check out all the numbers. 

A I can't say thatthe even inferred that to me. In 
fact, if I had to give you my impression, I would say 
that I don't know that that happened because I don't 
recollect him coming and saying we shouldn't have done that 
flight; if that is what you are asking? 

I do recollect him saying we cannot do those flights, 
and that was what I got out of that conversation. 



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Q You don't recall at any time, I gather from your 
earlier testimony, telling^^^^^^^Habout the remark that 

[ had told you on the 25th about the missiles' 

A No. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q Did^^^^^^Hsay anything about a discussion of 
need for a covert action finding like that after his 
discussion with the headquarters? 

A No. I don't remember if he did. Like I say, I 
would assume that we had all that before we went. I 
haven't done that job before. I know no matter what time of 
day or night or weekend, whatever, you did that, like a 
check list. 

Q To make sure there would be a covert action finding 
before this occurs? 

A The OGC would provide that. I never look at the -- 
as the case officer, I never would see that, but everything 
would be staffed through, all the way up to the DDO,to release 
the flight or whatever. 

Q You understand 

A I naturally assumed that had been done in this case, 
and as I assume it is on the rest of the flights. 

Q You understood that to be the norm? 

A That is correct. 



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Q For special flights, is that right? 
A That is correct. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q Let me ask you on a slightly different "ifctack 
here, you earlier testified that you operated under guidelines 
that prevented you from delivering to certain 
is that right, without special permission? 

A Without permission, yes. Or we just didn't do it 
without special permission. 

Q You have also testified that in your opinion the — 
°"<=€ ^mm^H^^^^Hproblem taken care cargo 
really isn't all that important, is that correct? 
A That is rightg) 
^ I would say that I may have misspoken if I did 
say that. I would say that the cargo would be just as 
important as the destination 
^^^^^^^^^B I presume we are talking about commercial 
"°^' ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H the Iran 
flight, whatever, ^^^^^^^^^^^V we would fly into, we 
would obviously want to know what cargo we are transporting 
to the best of our ability, so that would be to me as important 
as the destination. 

Q But you are speaking in terms of knowing what the 
cargo is in order to get the information back so it can be 



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analyzed and taken care of by the CIA. 

A That is correct, 

Q You are not speaking of this in terms of whether 

the cargo would make the flight permissible or not; is that 
right? 

A That is correct. 

Q Now, I just want to pinpoint this because it, 

frankly, confuses me. If you had a commercial individual 
call you up and say, look, I would like to transport a 
thousand tons of C-4 explosive to Libya, wouldn't the cargo 
also create a problem for you as well as the destination? 

A Yes, it would. And, in fact, to elaborate on 

that, if he said he would transport a thousand tons of C-4 
to Germany, that would be a tipoff that I would pass that 
to headquarters, say, we are moving froih Israel or any place, 
because of the type of cargo in that regard. -^ 

It would be of interest to me, would ^(MJwPiTiy 

K 

interest more than if we were transporting chickens or 
cattle, or anything else. So, in that regard, even though -- 
this is almost — ^^^^H|^| didn't have a piece of paper in 
his hands from rae or I from anybody else saying, if you 
ever get approached about a flight to Iran or Russia, or 
whatever, report it. It is our understanding that if it is 
a flight, if the flight looks out of the norm, whether it is 
the cargo or destination, or combination of both, that we 



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would report it to be sure we had concurrence to do that 
flight. 

Q Presumably the customer or the destination, even 
no €^^^^^^^^^^^^H or a 

recipient, would prompt you to seek further authorization; 
is that right? 

A That is right. 

Q So if it were a flight of a thousand pounds of 
C-4 explosives to Ireland, but the recipient was the IRA, 
you would want to check with headquarters to make sure that 
that was okay? 

A That is correct, that is a correct assumption; yes. 

Q Just wanted to be clear on that. I will sleep 
easier tonight knowing that. 

A Or drugs. The reason I balked at that question, 
is because we have had flights from, since this whole thing 
has come up, 




wouldn't be hard to determine if that 
is true, of course, but we would not make that flight in 
there because we are exposing the aircraft, crew and et 
cetera ^^^ 

Q In this August flight to Tehran, did you have 
the crew prompted so that it could, it would corroborate 
that what was going was this gunpowder rather than something 



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else? 

A I didn't, because I didn't talk directly to the crew 
My only question to^^^^^^^Hwas to try to get -- normally 
we would not have a copy of the manifest that we can keep, 
although the crew handles the manifest. Once we got approval 
for the flight, I coached ^^^^^^Hto try to have the crew 
get the paperwork on the flight so we can see what he had 
been told, whether it be true or what we could glean from 
that paperwork. 

It was some time afterwards we got it, because 
maybe the captain had it in his bag and we had to go back and 
ask him for it rather than it being an automatic thing. 

Q That flight ran, according ^°^^^^^^^B didn't 
go exactly as planned, and according to his testimony 
yesterday, he was not sure it had made its way all the way 
to Tehran out of that flight? 

A I have recollections that initially my understanding 
was — I am going from memory, but if you give me a piece 
of paper, I can confirm it -- we had cargo 

I don't remember cargo specifically 

5ther than the flight was originatin 

buti 

I remember^^^^^^^^Vcoming to me that th 
cargo did not show up and we went out much later than we 
thought we would, and that was the cajgo that was missing. 





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Q Some of the information that was created contem- 
poraneously with that flight, indicated the cargo might also 
include detonators for the explosives? 

A Yes, I remember seeing that on the manifest. 

Q There are a wide variety of detonator explosives; 
isn't that right? 

A That is true. 

Q Some are extremely sophisticated, and are extremely 
small; is that right? 

A That is right. 

Q In fact, so small you could put it in a letter and 
if somebody opened it up that would be the end of them; 
is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q Were you and^^^^^^^^^^^H on the same wave length 
so that those detonators were nqt being brought into Iran 

by|[H^^^H 

A No. 

Q Thank you. 

A We had no restrictions to enforce, in other words, 
enforce -- if I understand your question, we had no 
restrictions to go on board the aircraft and say we will 
take the black powder, but we won't take the detonators. 
There was no guidance to that degree. 



IIMPiACCinrn 



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WKUmSF 



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I don't remember detonators being mentioned 
until after the flight, and they showed up in the manifest. 
Originally we were told it was munitions or black powder. 

Q That would be a point of concern to you looking at 
the manifest afterward, seeing that the detonators were on 
on there? 

A It was a point of concern, not that we were deliverir 
to Iran, but because you don't as a rule carry detonators in 
the same flight with black powder and because you have a 
dan'-2r^ of in-flight explosion because of static electricity 
or whatever. 

Q You don't know if you have those super-sophisticated 
detonators that, say, ^^^^^^HciA might be able to produce, 
but most people can't? 

A I wouldn't say that is my job, no. I can't say 
that I would have any concerns about that. I would think 
that once I — the one thing I find as these go in my 
years of experience, is most of the stuff I report is not new. 
It verifies something they know already, or something like 
that, or it helps them verify something. So beyond the 
reporting and saying, yes, you got my clearance to make the 
flight I wouldn't question anything. I wouldn't have 
reason to. I aim not a 

Q You would make sure that CIA knew that these were 
suDer-sophisticated detonators? 

IIMPI APOinrn 



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A If I knew they were on board that would be part of 
the intelligence, yes. 

Q But not necessarily part of the approval? 
I just want to understand how this process works. 

A It would be after-the-fact. I don't know that 
the fact that there were detonators onboard would impact the 
approval or not. I don't think so. But that is my opinion. 

Q Might depend on the detonators? 

MR. PEARLINE: Off record a second. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

MR. CAROME: Back on the record. 
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I believe that yesterda^^^^^^^^^^^^^testif ied 
that one reason that he diverted the aircraft^^B^^^^J rather 
than having it go back^^^^^^^Hwas that he had not 
received payment from Mr. Copp on that Monday; does that 
conform to your recollection? 

A I do know that we had not received payment. 
I don't remember him relating to that to me in the con- 
versation. I knew we had not received payment and we were 
then in a position as to even if we had gone ^^^^^^^H how 
would we refuel the airplane to go back. The crew was out 
of money. I think he started out with a slot of 310,500, and 



ad the money to continu 



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BKOtWer 



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funds. I don't remember that being a discussion point. 

Q You don't remember whetherg,r not there had been 
payment being made, a factor in the decision whether or not 
the plane should go back] 

A No, in fact — no, I would say that wouldn't 
impact it. If I had had instructions to go back we would 
have went back ^^regardless of payment. But I didn't have 
those instructions. I did not have those instructions. 

MR. CAROME: Could you mark this as the 
next exhibit? 

(The document was marked Exhibit^^|9 for 
identification: ) 

INSERT ^V- 9 



iihini mm^w 



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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I am putting before you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 9, and I ask you if you recognize what that 
document is? Is this a document that you prepared? 

A Yes, it is. 

Q And do you know who it was written to? It is 
blacked out there, but do you know who this would have 
been prepared for? 

A" I believe, I would have probably addressed it to 
chie^^^^^^^as a formality, but it was requested by 




And do you know when he requested that you prepare 



A The date there tips me off of December 1, and I 
think I stated in the thing 30 November, yes, that refreshes 
my memory. That is the date. 

Q Did you come^J^to Washington to work on the 
review of the 1985 flight activity? 

A No. In fact, I can't remember the purpose of my 
visit, but I was surprised if this is the correct date even, 
that is I come into the building, I have to get a visitors 
badge and be escorted from the front door and the secretary 

me^^^HM for a i noj^^^^^H 

for normal business. She said, I think you. are supposed 

IIMPUOOinrn 



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to be in a meeting at 11 o'clock, and at that time it was 
like ten to ll-rJBfl": I said, I was not aware of it. I went 
witt^^^^^and by tim^^^^^^^^^^^H and 
come 11 o'clock, they said let's go. I said, I will see you 
later and they said, no, you are going, too. That was my 
first indication. 

The purpose of the trip was not for a meeting 
but I did attend the meeting. 

Q What was the subject of that meeting? 

A Apparently an internal investigation or internal 
audit as to who did what during this thing, this flight 
series that we had done under question. 

Q 1 notice that the second paragraph of this Exhibit 
9 says, I believe he listed oil drilling equipment as the 
cargo as this is what we were orginally told the load was. 
At the time you are writing this, you understood 
that the load was not oil drilling, I take it; is that 
fight? 

A Right, well, I still don't know for a fact. But 
yes, I would assume that that was not the case. I am saying 
what I think he wrote down. 

Q That is right. 

And does this reinforce your recollection that it 
was probably^^^^^^who told you that it was oil drilling 



equipment? 



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tMASSIFIS'^ 



A Reinforces the feeling that I was told it 

drilling equipment. I can't say it reinforces that 
^^^^H who told me, but I do believe that is who it 
Q You mark this as the next exhibit. 

(The document was marked as Exhibit^^^lO for 
identification: ) 

INSERT B-10 



151 

was oil 
it was 
was . 






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152 



BY MR. CAROME: 

Q I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 10. 
I ask if you recognize what that docu.iient is? It says 
at the top "reimbursement." Is thanyour handwriting? 

A Yes -- no, no, I don't think so. Probably 
looks a little too neat for me. It even looks -- because 
of the eiTth'l, six, seven -- I would guess that is the 
auditors. It could be the guy with him and I don't know his 
name.^^^^^^l I do remember that. He had another gentleman 
with him. It could be his handwriting. 

Q Do you know why the subject of reimbursement 
would be discussed in the same context as the $127,000 pay- 
ment to Lake Resources? 

A I don't know why it would have been discussed 
in this, except that that was part of the subject of the 
internal investigation or the internal deal when the auditor 
came down is to determine how do we get paid for this flight 
and why was it different than the other , because they are much 
the same as you are, coming in not having any prior knowledge 
of it. We went through a deal to explain why that was the 
case,bs far as I understood it, that I was told we would 
be paid directly by the customer, and in which case, we were 
paid directly by the customer. That would be my only 
explanation. That is speculation on my part, I should say. 



end jm 



\\m K^^inrn 



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»8 
STEIN 4:45 



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(Wssw 



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MR. CAROME: Who was it that told you that the 
NSC had requested that this flight be done? 

THE WITNESS: I would say ^|^B on Monday 
after I had talked to him about the problems that we had 
had. My recollection I had never heard the NSC mentioned 
by telephone over the whole weekend until that Monday. 
Sometime during that day I was told and I think as I 
testified earlier I think it was in the vein that I am 
talking about how messed up things were and they said well, 
we were responding to a request -- they were giving the 
excuse to me that it was not a normal flight, therefore 
they didn't screw up, someoby else did. 

BY MR. CAROME: 

They were passing the blame to the NSC, is that 



We didn't do the planning part, not the staffing 



Q 
right? 

A 
part . 

Q What do you understand Dewey Clarridge's role 
was with respect to this '85 flight? 

A I would assume that he was the, for lack of a 
better word, action officer that^^H^ was working with and 
^^B as well because that is the only way I knew the 
name was the comment made that I will check with Dewey or 
whatever. I never questioned nor nobody every explained 
to me. That would be normal, that whatever desk or division 



rp 





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we were working with would be the people you would have 
to coordinate with, so that would be my assumption. 

Q And you were not aware at the time that 
Clarridge was working closely with Oliver North, is that 
right? 

A No, I wasn't aware of that. 

MR. WOODCOCK: You testified earlier that you saw 
portions of Richard Secord's testimony on television, is 
that right? 

THE WITNESS: That is correct. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 

Q In your days with the Army^^^^^^^^Hdid you ever 
come across Secord? 

A No. 

Q He was a new person to you — 

A When you said Army^^^^^^^^H, that covers two 
areas. In the Army, no, I had never met him. 

Q How about in your capacity as having 
responsibility for any proprietaries of the CIA, had you 
ever come across Secord before? 

A Not him personally, but the name, yes. 

Q How was that? 

A Another project I was working before I took 
the project over when I was a proprietary case officer we 
had requests for General Secord and one other individual 



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to visit the project and I processed the action on that. 

Q You did what? 

A I processed the action on that request, which 
my understanding is after the fact that the visit never 
took place. 

Q Did anybody inform you as to what happened with 
the request for Secord ' s clearances on that project? 

A Informally I was told it was denied but officially 
I don't know. 

Q_ Did you have any other -- 

A On one occasion I dropped one of our other 
officers off at General Secord' s house. He was visiting 
the city or the headquarters and that evening or that 
afternoon or for lunch I had occasion to take him in my 
private automobile as I was going that way, and drop 
him off at General Secord 's house. I did not meet him. 

Q When was that? 

A I left Headquarters in October '83 so prior to 



then. 



Who was the officer that you dropped off? 

Do you know why he wa|gVi^%jpng General Secord? 
I didn't question it, but I had knowledge that 



they were friends, that they were acquaintances I should 



say. 



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UNCM^RpT 



What was^^^^H posit ion with CIA? 
He was a proprietary manager. 



156 



At the time he was? 
Yes. 

Is he still? 
Yes. 

Did you have any understanding as to what their 
relationship was, Secord and ^^^^^| 

A Not beyond the fact that they were friends from 
years before, personal acquaintances, my assumption was 
that it was not business-related. 

Q Was Secord still in the Air Force at that time, 
do you know? 

A I think it was shortly after his retirement. 
I seem to have that recollection because I read the 
newspaper and the association with the Wilson -T*aa^SFS thing. 
But I seem to recall that that was after his retirement 
and I can't swear to that. I can't testify to that but 
that was my impression. 

Q Did you have any concern that^^^^Kwas visiting 
somebody associated with Edwin Wilson? 

A I can't say I did, no. I did know that they 
were acquaintances apparently from the Vietnam era and 
probably in my mind wrote it off as simply that. 




157 



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Q I have a couple more things I want to show you. 
These are not in clean form but they are the universal 
indicator, CIDJ No. 2554 and CIIN No. 2553. Let me first 
show you No. 2553. Do you recognize that? 

A I would recognize it as a bank transaction form, 
a deposit slip or something. I don't recognize the 
amount or the date. 

Q Let me show you now 2554. Do you recognize that? 

A I would recognize it as one of the checks that 
I would have passed tc^^^^^^Hfor a flight that we 
did, an operational flight. 

Q Do you know whether those two items have any 
relationship to the November '85 flight? 

A No. 

Q In other words, they have no relationship? 

A They have no relationshd 




159 



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IWCM^ffilF' 



159 



BY MR. CAROME: 



Q ^^^^^^^^B do you have any knowledge of why 
the payment for the November 1985 flight was done m two 
parts, one of which for $127,000 and one later for 
$700? 

A It is after the fact, but somewhere, and I 
presume you have a copy of it. I produced my paperwork 
on It. We had a copy of the invoice, telex, from 

to — Mr. Swimmer I thwnk was the addressee 
on it, 'giving him an invoice of $127,700 and later telling 
him that only $127 showed up and he remitted the $700 
later. He apparently had paid $127,000 and had not remitted 
the $700 and then did that later. 
BY MR. WOODCOCK: 
Q I have two more questions I think. 

With reference to Exhibit No. 6, I gather that 
Inever discussed any part of that exhibit 
with you while you were in Washington on November 25-26, 
is that right? 
A No. 

Q Did you see Dewey Clarridge during that period? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q Had you ever met him? 
A Yes, when he was in Headquarters^^^^^B 




160 



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MR. CAROME: I don't have anything more. Thank 
you very much. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I would like to thank you on the 
record, ^^^^^^^H for your patience and comingj 
and staying over an extra day. 

MR. CAROME: Yes, thank you very much. 

(Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the deposition of 
[was concluded.) 



UtUHASSlEIEL 



161 



A\RLIt^E T^oP. PftoJ: OFFICE!^ 2 I *<>o^^i 
KEMO 211 183 /^^SSSmh^ 2u 



smoN 



ONCUSSIFIED 



Paniallv Ceclassilied/Released nn "^ '^ /U3 g8 
unacr provisions ol E 12356 
dy K Johnson. National Security Council 




M^n^ 





•:. TLH£RAK SiniAlION 



flight w«» B«d«^^^^^^^^^^^^^|t^T«h«r2^v^h 

was ch*rt cstertTcb^Tranlanfiahitn until 1^ rtachec Te'.«rjr. 
T.-.«r« It oa« bor* fit coslag la D«caab«i 

IvMeh v» trt nagetlatlng praitn tlvj 
^Bort ii:t «rt plantwd ^•ginning 86 to go| 
< vill b* irfor^ec about thoaa'. 

mmmmmmmmm 




■•'::i:^-f::>:iUJ''i 



0-88-7 



162 



raK« 4, Hi fiaiMi iMiOJ 



S. VARIOUS FITS. 



flNMSIflEO 



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*»-:"^';^.f:;v;;:>- 



163 



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HNCUSSIfe 




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164 



MDIORJoIWh 301185 









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(jj^^llT*-^^'"^.^<»l»«i«" TLV/THR 




CHRONOLOCICAL RIPORT '~,.-^^,^- 



ttfi._ fUA5t«r - Contacc and Contract 

'*Triday afternoon 22 Nov first info to oe vlj 
that 1 would b« contacttd concerning an urgent flight and 
that It was in our Interest to pcrfora those upcoming fits. 
At a bout 20 00 Loc«l_tlae_I_m_aflailS ted by a certain Mr. Richard 

Cop pflHHj^l^H^^^^^H^miH' 

He aslted'ae wneth^^^ nad ^a lready been informed about a. mission, 
which I denied. He then~*T^ained tome that there had to 



' 1 1 






be 3 flights done 
from Tel Aviv 
we could do 1 
of 60 000.00 USD 
Further It was agr 
on request should 
During By subseque 
CO my MEMO JlllSS 
to me aod supposed 
Indicated. This wa 



PHASE II - Position 




kly as possible " Government to .Covernxcn 
ter a short discussion we agreed that 
raft consecutively for a flat fee 
landg.handlg had to be paid by hin. 
t second Boeing would be nade available 
ter get urgent. ^^^^^^^_ 
e to °ur|^HHHHBl 

and questioned the way it was displayed 
his cargo was the sane as in my memo 
d. 



3, 3^ >h 



UNCLASSIFtll 




Llr c raft was taken o ver 

had the order* that upon the receipt of the code "Celia" he would 
find an excuse for the customer and depart 
officially foc^HBH^Traffic rights ^^\^^^^^^^^ 
HHKwerc tea^^vcly applied for by ourJ^^^^l^^^^H should 
this become necessary. 

Our second Boeing was parked ln| 
the airport opened the next morning^ 
At the t ime I ha d made the agreement 

Thccrewfl^l^^whlchwa^suDPOsed to ^ 
MMH||ithe ncx« ^'y^m^^H"** 
^^early departure o^ttu^^^raf tj 

airport had opened^ 

aircraf t^^miHH^^HHIHIV At 

Jlnformed bv Cop p tn ac paU ets_had to be taken along. 

^"^ " own pallets were storec 

■ • ^ '■ ^ 




^^r«l Aviv. A«M«he 

SfiCevailable foiNcfuill: 



165 



'•|t 2 of MDW 301115 



UNCLASSiFikD 



-i-^JiAagjr.l^^^^Mi^^ Du^^tht»hort*|t of timt w« decided 
::'l«c:^tht ilrcrtfc fly^^HIHHMto pick 




Itcs had bttn put on • forklilt In cne 
inlc was wiitlni for tht. aircraft to 
arrivt. Aftar tht aircraft -had arrlvad th« pallets were loaded and 
the aircraft continued to fly to Tel Aviv after having refuelled 
a little because of the exti ~ 




In Che aeant ine 'Ca 
additional Joadmaste. 
were also on board 
arrived 

Due to this departu^ 
put the second alrci 
urgency of the aiss^ 
Therefore the code 
unloi 

granted In the scar 
on the 23 Nov lo 



cop" 
arrived £ro« Paris via train ar.i 
arted finally at about 
(23 Nov) 

Copp had requested froa ne to also 
>to this operation due to the utaost 

ir UMS ^^^^^^^ 

rtransaltted ^[JJ|^J||^^K jmi < f i |i 

^cd and departed toTV^B^I^Hi^BB 

_The overflight r_lghts had beei^^^ 

atl^^^HH 



PHASE III - Loading 



^^^^ 



Although Richard Copp, ^^P^H^^| had to ae that the 

loading waso^nned to^^S^^ihoursbut would be speeded up to 

2 hours .^WB^uhirh had first arrived, 

piece out of 19 pieces in 4 hours. The 

concerned parties were concerned that 

long at possibly 24 hours. Therefor 

traffic rights had not been granted 

that now the load had to be transport 

confiraed ay Initial suspicions and It 

several things had to be changed. 

before that the traffic rights in 

crew told me that in TLV evcrvonc kr 



iNCLASSIFIED 



-Lo 



rned dovn and that the real dc$t wa 

DO 




166 



J./,: 85 



UNCLASSIFIED 



------l w*s givtn Che contact of Mr . A. 0:hvlanD.r In TLV by Mr .Copp and^^' 

tV .'■ -.-t«lk«d to Schvimmer $««r*l tla«s on tht phon«. ^^^ 



S!^**^ 




1 V 



itold-hia that we ccuM not fly to THR "^''^^^^^^r 

'" a nd that we i.erefore ^-^d to unlo«<i^MJ^»«in|^ 

^^^JHHBf Ht crj"«V7«ver»l Cl»«» to convince ac »na-Tven 
o:i?fe^^«lnt • different registration on the «lrcr«ft .nd 
do some kind of formation flying Into THR. Keeping In alnd that 
,hone conversation, to Israel .Ight be listened to. I told 

we were a oonwl Airline and wanted to stay In business 

tine to coae and chat rhmly vav to do It was the correc 
us to do It. Thereforel|^Mri'STTmIW7eT-iiaTtrr—-frc.lw 
■dditlon to that 1 .xplaineffffTS that we needed traffic rigr-,, 
,rn?*iliiBwhich we had applied fo^|ntatlvely the aooent 

., ,.^..'A .-mint .11. t;'.t.. ftt^ *?' 1 ( 

TTv all the tlaean^/rlfled all 
the.. In f«<:tHH|was In Schwimmers 
•u>*te that we needed 30 000 USD In 
"istinatlon because we had not planned 
T^ enough cash with us. Also we did 
vthlng was paid in THR. SchwiMer came 
enghty discussions because it was Sunday 
could not gst Bore money. 



rr.ucr. 



home and w* r.««oti 
order to go to th 
on It and thereto 
not trust them ih 
up with 8000 USD 
in tne meantime 



PHASi 




performed 



^ 



.1«^ 




viHCUSSmtO 

^ DPUIPM/ 



REVIEWEB^FOR Pt| 
'^ «. -a •« ^t« 



Accoro'.np -.0 t.». a«v iJ-' «'>•»« between Schwia 
had bten unloaceo assir and departed 

^on 5« .-.-ay tne 24 Nov. 

^^^*id th.. flight and took .11 .xtr. crew back except 

lenghty loading .nd -. . .ct.d ""^^'J* ^',f ^»,i,hts for 

m the •••"SiSt^Sfiar'/v'Tfl^d^^^* could go 

ov.rfUfht^Hi*'^''T !°^ i^^^ 

wlthiiii|as"s^oTr-it*«« lo.ded. /|^^^^„, agreement 

HovelTT th*^«st moM- '^^ifiggiJKl^^ini on to TH 
that the aicmft sbou. t'^^fV^PlW' ^K »,,<, to 
This required ^ditiW* : -nds by «* jj^yaKli f or landins 
defuelied in TT.V becaus it would h»< 

MSiflbnd had to refwe ."^bis mis 

^^^^^^^ -r 'sit---' ■» -sney but 
"." .• - . .. r--*"^ ^.no:her 2 
i ,..ii_... - jog,.-t. yith the 

f 3<^ 



B FOK K|L£AS£ 




it){ 



>-•«« 



of KErtO 30U85 



UNCLASSIFIED 



n cht 24 N 



^< 




cl.Uy ch. «llui-ry i„ TLV h*d aoc only not jlv.o hi. ,ny 

"fov.d that th« .Ircrifc vat in TLV. 

_cher«fort did not want to rtltasc th« aircraft 

locu»«nts w«rt productdandjh.refor. th. load aUo ^ «, 
insp.ct.d. II MKB H' 

which was accepted although It had no ttaop of" th. 
point and finally he could talk his way out of this 
. Finally he therefore left «t ^BMB direct ion 
as planned. _ ^^^^^^^ 

HS^T^Tr. nothing was prepared for overflight ^^^B and s, h.,H 

onTH<°,"'\'"/'=' '''°"«''- ''"'• '^'^ r.pTT^^nslste 
on a diplomatic clearance nuaber, he oade one up which was 

not accepted after longnegotlatlon^n^hen he filibustered 

^^^ud^s. position s and esclnates that he'told l — '" 

viousljr in radio contact. 



'ith whc 



obv 



Uowtvar, ra< 
for arguaent* and 
AC ch« TUK bordar 
not have to say thi 
because fUdar treat 
Finally h« landed 



Ms off- positions which gave additional re 
I lays. 

received without any problems but he did 
■d coda "I aa coming for Mustafa" 
■ Uy. 
[on the 25 Nov(monday) 



PHASE V - UnloadlnJ 




After landing in THR cht aircraft. J>ad to remain on the runway 
for about 10 aln until a "follow ■•" came and directed them to 
th« parking area which was on the military side. 
Thalandlng had b«en done on njnway 29 r and the aircraft was 
directed Co the south of this runway c-to :h« t>-e rorth/vesc 
part of th* southern military apron. At this location the 
•4rer^U^4 parked aiao duiing vui laac fl 
«BAfl^ft It Is a special area which is 
to th« outsld* so that people outside the 



3<^ 



^^ rt f^ uniO»».*f.^ A«v«4 aiiu wiiQ woia nx 

^/^j3 '■^^* flight and were surprised that 
' 30 mln afcar arrival a civilian wic 



UNCLASSift'EDl 



was first contacted by an office 
badlng later and who told him th 

h 
back arrived at the aircraft ilU askc 
"Vhat arc the nationalities of the 
where do you come f rom ?" 

he talked to4|M||^ telling J^a^hat 

'-'oil 2 »ar« 2J} 




- 5 - 



168 



p«|« 5 KEHO 301185 



UNCLASSIFIED 




he 



-S'-^ttLl-anyont Including the BlUtiry whtr« th« »irer«ft rttlly 
^*i <*w >CM«^^oB . Ht chin Bcncioncd chat th«y wen txpcctlni 4 Bort 

flfftt«|-frQB TL \^H«woul^_mn to st« the •«•« erev then due to 

Vhcn^^^H|was ••king foe aoney or airanieacot* 
of fuel, perklni etc. he (.old his not to worry tnd that everything 
would be taken care of. 

'Itor then etarted to direct the unloading, one ■llicary 
rclvllian with subnachlne gun. 

wa« tent t^ the officer* Headquarters where they vert 
lin by the civilian to keep their south thut about this 
.talk to anyone about their aittion. 

then tpld hi* t>ut ovr cre w did not want to pas* 



thr ough pa**port and cu«to «« eoocrol b e cause ' during TSe Tjsc flit 

it had takan several hour* an d _chey wanted to a void that this 

time as they expect ed_. TQuick"unloadint a n3" t he n had to leave agai n. 

Therefore the civllian'cook the« in a ear chrough back roads 

off the airport and was noc checked or stopped at the gate although 

even ailitary had to prefrtrt their id - cards ac chat gate. 

The trip co the HotcI^Apk one hour and finally they arrived 

at the foraer Sher j cplrtifo tel. (Different nana now, could obt 

reaesber) 

All rooas were occ 

cogecher. After be 

curprlse of the cr 

unloaded and that 

This was 6 hours a 

remained at Che ai 

really took place 

tiae in the office 

soae else.) 

However, after this alerc ic cook 2 hours undl the car finally 
arrived. In the aeanclac the civilian had apologized several 
tiaes and the crcv was offered coffee and cakes. 
After arrival at the airport through th^jbackdoor ^_^ 
required a peralt nuaber for overf ligh^fHHj^^ in order 
avoid the problea he had coalng In. He refused to leava without. 
Therefor e he and the civ ilian went to the Tower froa where chty 
tried to^^^^H^^^^HVobtaln this Dumber. After about 2 




nd therefore they had to take a suite ' 
the hotel for about 2 hours to the 

got a phone call that the aircraft was 
uld be picked up In a fei^d nutes. f^P^ 
c aircraft had landed . AjmimiudTH-^'A 
for soae tlae to see that the unloading 
t it was done correctly. Then the 

and the trip to the Hotel had taken 



^ 



3 3^ 



yNCLASSlFe 



.... l^A-h 



hours of cryiog^^^^Kcold chea chat 
but they could not get a nuaber. Alsof 
Air I>«fente of Iran was inforaed and 
which ha finally accepted. 
When the crew was taken over to the aii 
Che aircraft had been cowed co Che civi 
and that it w as being fuelled by civlj 
When^mPf^ksked for full tank* (oi 
after all those problems which I wa) 
had called^Qjvla Telcfone froa the 

to take th^alrcraft directly backl ^^ 

the civilian who had received him was'-'-very disappottit*d«be cause 
he realizedthat so much fuel was not needed to go back to TLV . 
However flBflHH|c old hia that he nttotd the extra for security. 

J /I 








169 



p«|t 6 of KXXO 301 18S 



4iNCLASSlf;cD 




- Return flight 



on th« 23 Nov, after U:35 hours 



Tht aircraft took of at | 

on tht (round In THA. ^^^^^* 

Th« aircraft wai directed by radar off the airways a little sore 

than normally, close to the Russian border. 

was given a special exit tine which he had to aeet 

omply with the Iranian Air Defense, 
ching Tabti« th* aircraft «*«orde«^down fron FL 350 
1. 280, shortly before reachingJ^^^^H^H border again up 
to FL 350. (reason unknown) . ^i^f^t*^^ 

No transponderwa^ije^llWh^Iranlanairspacj^^X^T^ 
After •rrival |H[H|||||^m^^|BH||K^Sstold by radar 
tiac he was ac^pted but -lit^t In futuretor further flights, the 
ok of the clvilalr was noC, enough but that he had to get also the 
ok .of the Ministry of foe«ifn affairs and that otherwise the 
aircraft would be tur ned back. --jA^§r^ 

Based on all thi s IqGfgtlon. 1 ordered HHIPvi^ radjo to 

dlreccly^^MHHlHB^^^^Hi^^^HBH) which 
had planned Inlti 




GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 



■n^ 



,v>^^«'' 










The Mission was poorly planned and directed by our contract 

pactnars In a aaat«url«lL«^L^_^ 

I. tf^^^n>JM4JkBKK «IWlk«t for about • weak with 



2. 



Copp was sitting In^HJ^ although<MI 
and he a* our contract partner cov^7 
goini 00 in TLV. 

In TLV the aircraft wa* on cht alllt 
high ranking ailitary' personnel who 
this type of work. (The lowest rankla 
In addition they did not work such a 
coffc brakes. 

A certain Mr .A. Schwiamer which was^;^.i;— _ 

the representative in TLV of Copp,'v'w*ir'«ry 
military, sometimes to a point where he was 
he did not understand the special aviation p 
not have th ings urd^ control. I.E. He sriou 
the I 1 1 I I I I^BBBUB change the registr 



not flown to 




'xaJOJ Copp as 
push)'t,vttlj,th* 
Insulting, but 
rotltas ar.c i'.i 
sl>- proposed cc 
n c: tr.e 



170 



Pag* 7 of 



MEMO 301183 



UNCLASSIFIED 




t- ■^^^^^'^^^''•f' '"d to ■ fl* thirr* sp*cclvc paper* " lo 2 hours" 
K*'- This was Curntd down by^B||||[||^and also by aysalf when 
,-i^SchwiBm«r Mntlontd ic o^th^phon* du* to ch* b«£or* ■•ntloned 
' n«. ~«>^-r 

ch« caih aoncy which Copp had proai*«d was ooc available 
aad Schwlnmtr apparandy did not kjiow abouc thl* raqulrtacnc. 



outing changts. dastlnaclon chang**. Involved traffic 
t* were don* too lac* and th* er«w gr*w aor* and bore 
•cure as th*y ar* not usad to this cyp* of aakcshlfcr 
tllne dlr*ctlon and control. 






The Blsslon was still p*rfor«*d successfully because of the 
initlaclv* ch* cr*w had dlsplaysd and bacaus* they ar* used 
also under advcrs* clrc««stances to coaplcte the mission 
before probleas will b<: discussed. How*v*r, this Is not the 
way It can b* don* r*p«»Mdl.y 'b*cause th* good will will be 
worn ouc. 



PROPQiM. 



As Aviation la • v 
*xp«rl«DC* froa al 
Information la so 
•aploy**s hav* to 




ipl*x busin*ts which r*qulr*s a- lot of 
road and also bacausa the faad back 
or Ch* oparadon, ch* directly Involved 
of Ch* d*cl*loa aaking' and planning 



as aarly a* during ch* concracclng scag*. 

Had It not b«*n a special flight, I would hav* d*Iay*d for about 

2 days afcar I had leamad about ch* chang* of D*stination in 

order Co hav* *oough ciaa for corr*cc planning and ch* aquisltion 

of th* n*c*ssary traffic rights. 

Th* llctl* radar concroll* do«s not know pollclcal daclslons and wil 

noc *v*n b* Inforaad by his superiors. We experienced that tiae and 



again. Therefor* all those things hav* to b« 

way so thac ch* controll*r slaply has a 

nuabar Ilk* h* hat for *v*ry otb*r alrcra 

will look cocally normal for hla. 

In othar words: Thos* flights can b* p*r 

by only with th* proper planning. 

In ordar to have propar planning, th* 

happans to b* aysslf, should b* h*atd 

aaking cooaltaaocs to chlrd parcl*s a 

planning procass. 



nc*d In a normal 
clearance 
this flight 

any problec 




nuA/ 0-^33 



if'ji^^' ^^cussffki) 



^ o ^ 



/4^ 



<,<r 



171 




^~**f s of tton 301 iss 



J^rafor* •uigttt th«c durlB» tht pr«p«r«tlon proctst 1 should 
tad to tho ■••tlni of th« doportBonH which art Involvad 




.^ ._ ••eurlty and that tha 

hava to b« dona In a clandaatlna way. Howavar. It cannot 
rat chao It waa during this last mission and It could 
,«a parformod totally clandastloa, had tha abova propostd 
"Mating takan placa In advanea. ^ .^ism- » — - 

-In aadditloo to eh*t. ay prasanco *!lliak2|i^,?lgiP&*f *^ ^ 
provtda tha eoncarnad of f Icara who TifHiHW tho dtWarant 
dapartaants with usaful faajback Information so that for futura 
planning som things can ba- nilad out right away without avan 
going into datall wharaas_fltT>ars can ba accaptad right away 
without chacklng datalls. 



In addition to that! 
should ba part of al 
I aa not awara of iS 
would ba aaslar to 
casiar to plan tha 
alrplanas hava to bl 



jlngla missions or tasks to ba parfohiad 
Itf whlcl> I «• •*»" •*i*'«' *»•' which 
111. Knowing tha all-ovar stratagy it 
lartaln aisslons and it would avan ba 
(udgat which daflnas whathar naw 
Ihasad/laasad or othars hava to ba sold. 



In short: I would sHd'Ca If I could b. glvan «»" '••P'"*^^'^''^ 
by baini aora part i^D taaa as far aa tha planning of tha 
ivaltioS Mpacts arHl.mad. I think it is a wasta of .xp.rl.nc. 
and ii^oraation wh.Hi. noc aada part of tha P '"i"* P";;' " 
I also Ilka to aaka sura that I aa not on a "ago trip . but that 
I hava tha succaas of our coapany In alnd which last not laast 
is also tha succosa of this country. 




C/^/\/36l^ 



172 



UNCtASSI^ED 



2S November 1985 

SUBJECT: NSC Requirement for Covert Airlift 

At the request of the NSC on 24 November,! 
^^^^^^^^fproprietary Boeing 707 transported sensitive cargo fron 

Tel Aviv to Iran. This was a fast breaking requirement for a 

controlled non-U. S. registered commercial airlift, w* are pl<>ased 
^^^^^^H^^lproprietary was able to successfully handle this 

sensitive and dangerous airlift which involved a routing from 

Tel to^^^^^^Pover^^^^^Hinto The 

unloading in Teheran and should depart this morning. Hore flights 

are expected this week. 



a^:5^. 2 9 Nov SS 



Distribution: 
Orig - 

2 -^^V:hronoi 



-^> 






ijnder provi'.;:ns of E.0. 12356 
hy 2. Reger, Nr.ticnal Security Council 



nm]^:^^^ 



M 







CL «-y| 

DKCL7 OATT? 
HRV '^W 4-H2 



173 



UNCLASSIFIED 

'" I! 






KQIORANSUM 3/1 1 




;!•..: ILV/TM fit 




Display of cospany 



ielal concaec vlth Copp and also latar In dlacustloa* 
lanar, I acrasaad th« financial points and gavt 'thca 
silon that I vas aalnly Intarastad in the aonty. 



«nd SchwiBBcr 

told hla that cha 
that bafora wa discuss 



first flight whan I had 
callad aa on Tuasday in ay offlca 
■ooay had not arrlvad yat as promisa 
it furthar, wa oaadad our aonay 

Ha than said that ha was notju^eontraet partnar, but Copp> 
callad again trov^^f I told hla that ha should 
to aast with aa and to discuss his payaant. Ha was 
had not coaa in yat and that ha 



Whan Co 



vary asazad that tha aona 



could not coaa baca< 
Ha than proaisad to 
. .... as foon as poaaibla 
Alltogathar thay aua^ 
daaling with a aarc 
a Job to aaka aonay., 

Tha saaa iaprassioa 
by Capt 

TM-^T^ way ^«^ 
final ok by aysa 





iyad to go back 
ra-tha aonay wou 



to''sava 225 OOOUSO" 
transfarrad 



had tha iaprasslon that thay wtra 
iXllna and that wa wara Just doing 



da in TLV in discussion with Schwioaar 
tha aain points wara how to gat 
to handla things tha co^rcial 
iWi^Mr that ha would only fly aftar 
lould coaa aftar X had agraad with 



Schwiaoar about cha aooay and tha cash which ha had to gat. 

__^ [wa had tha axcusas of having a urgant raliaf 

flight/landing gaar preblaas and aftar tha airplanas ratumad 
fro* tha crips avaryching wane back co noraal and no quaations 
_tiW^wara askad. 
under provisions oi E 12356 Tha craws did not talk to anyona about any coapany aattars 
by K Johnson. National Security Council in TLV or THX and all concarnad ahould h^va ]BB^||^ iaprasslon 
that a businass «as conductad in a profass 



Partially Dticiassilied/Releascd on_ 



^jm iiNCiASsm 








174 




Hadialli: PeElassified;/Releas?d on^i^Y^^^ 

Cndir provisions of E,0. 12356 

By B. Reger, National Security Council 



.SUBJECT t_MSC-REQUEST 
REF:'^ 

1. ACTION REQUESTED: 
FOLLOWIMC.__ , • ■ . ■ 

ALSO'CONVOKED. MMBllQUIT^iPSET 
RECEIVED. FACT F I RST. FLIGHT. CAME Dl 
NOT REQUEST CLEARANCE BE FOREHAND A N 
PLANE'S CARGO. ■MTOLDM^BilT 
TTrrrrwrn-CffiR lER STATED MEDICAL S 
GROUND CONTROLLERS -HE WAS^CARRYIHC 

• 3.iHBcARRIED THE CAN ON THIS 
AND DEpTRtmENT (DEMARCHE WILL' NOT B 
CHANNEL). ■■■^^m 

k. BOTTOM LINE IS THATflB^TIL , 
nPVFinp gP A LITTL E CYNICISM ABOITT OU 
MATTER .JIPBiiiiACREED -THAT- FU RTHER 

SUBSEQUENT ._ _^ 

PLANES FOLLOW NORMAL PROCEDURE 
AND THAT THEY 00 NOT SHUTTLE FRO 
PLANES MUST NOT COME DIRECTLY FROl 
MD PICl UP OTHER ^amiriM. EVEN B 
AT ALL 



FLASH RESPONSE SOONEST TO REF AND 




URS.. AMBASSADOR WAS ' 
LT I PLi- FLIGHT PLANS. 

.romSHBBand DID' /r' 

XtlHG-STORIES -ABOUtl.': ■ 
INDUSTRY SPARE PARTS, 

AND THE PILOT TOLD . 
EQUIPMENT.^ 

IT. TO I NVOLVE ' AMBASSADOR 
ED OTHER THAN IN THIS 



TO ASSIST BUT HAS 

_Ua ION WtTH. THEM ON THE, 
FLIGHTS COU LD PROCEED" 

kLSO INSISTS THAT 
7ERFI 
AS NOTE! 
THEY SHOU 

ILIZE 



/\lRLIMF f^P. 



F U^^LEARANCE. 'BRJ 
SHoffWufWrtST ^^O 



5. ANOTH 
AIRCRAFT. 




MATTER REQUIRING CLARIFICATION IS THE QUESTION; 
'HAS IMPRESSION FROM PAPERS F HEP BY CA RRIER T"' 

I UTILIZED AND SHUTTLE FROrHMBH THAT IS 

MPRESSION FROM EARLIER TRAFFIC. TLS CLARIFY. 



6. THE SITUATION NOTED PARA 2 REF, I.E. -SECOND FLIGHT 
THIS MORNING DID NOT EVENTUATE. WE NEED. HOWEVER, TO TRY 
EXPLAIN AWAY THE MULTIPLE FILED FLIGHT PLANS., IS IT PROB, 
THEY RFPRE SENT PLANNING PRIOR TO THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED 
FLIGHTS ByBHI if SO. WAS THERE A BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNI 
CHARTER CAR RiTr DID NOT GET THE MES SAGET THIS IS A POS 

explanationBHpresenteo to 



^^^^^NJ^VENT^^R^OIH^^JAV^^RY 

^^^^^^B^^^T^^HA^t^EM^^TOCIRCUMVENT THE 

^EITHER CONSCIOUSLY OR THROUGH POOR COORDINATION) RUN^llI 
LEAK AND BAD PUBLICITY. HAAMF^Jb MORE TO U.S. THAlAHHp 





7C 



175 




■7— ^"f :^'-^ 



UNCLASSIFIED 



-*-^ T^ru^.^,^ J1-, 



3 3^ ;j4i- 



Partiaiiu Oer.lassilied/Released on ^JJ^'^B S 
unher provisions ol E 0' 1?356 
by K Johnson. National Security Council 




Cii^ ^krV9 



i-'-'t ■.'•>• >^ -;)*. ■'ij. 



i.-^jii-c, >[^,J^^ 



176 



/^^oo^ 



<2— 



aamifiB 





:^■'^) 



-Partially Dectosilied/Released nn ZWj»1->>-<88 
undef pcovisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson National Security Council 



3f3c :>/v3 




Cl'A/ 3545 



177 



/ Ot,c H 




707 REVEWUE VOUCHERS k RIGHT TIME REPORTS 



MEMO 

-SUBJECT 

FROM 



Accache? please find copies of fllghc«tlae reports covering 
daces of Interest for both 707 's Kffl &venue vouchers showing 
paynenc for the flights, plus $8.0MBw cash given to captain. 



As. I told you yesterday, 3 Mov 
lading. In fact on landlni 
vrlte on a plain piece of paper 
I believe he listed oil drUllng 
Is what we were originally told 

If I can be of further help pie 
paperwork Is the extent of Info 
flight. 




Is and was no bill of 
Che Captain had to hand 
t aanlfest to be released, 
nt as the cargo as this 
d was. 

■e know . however this 
In ay office re: this 



Parlaiiv ne^.iass.t,ed/Beleased on_^ _ 

unfe- provisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson, National Secunty Counca 



\Jf\W>r 



*%/i 



m 




pr- rsnnr.'ijy; 

\ - I?t2. 



178 



UNEIASSIFIED 



/Jo Of^Tc- 




■"a'-.-.iiv neciassified/Released mjMS^^^S 
under provisiooi of E i2356 
bv h Johnsofi, Nalioriiil Setur.ty Council 



rwA/ D5<^(p 






o-^ C J 



179 




OF PROCEEDINGS 



UNCLASSIRB) 



UNITED STATES SENATE 



HSIS -^2- /87 



SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 

IRAN AND THE NICARAGUA OPPOSITION 



Deposiclou of FRANCISCO J. ALVAREZ 



WashingCon, D.C. 
28 May 1987 




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Partially Declassified/Released on /"V'^^ 
under provisions of E.O. 12356 
by N. Menan, National Security Council 



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Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 

Sitnotype Ftporten 
444 North Capitol S«peet 
VN&shington, D.C. 20001 

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Nationwide Coverage 



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Partially Declassified/ Released 



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UNITED STATES SENATE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 

IRAN AND THE NICARAGUA OPPOSITION 

i 
DEPOSITION OF FRANCISCO J. ALVAREZ j 

Washington, D.C. , 

Thursday, May 28, 1987 | 
Deposition of FRANCISCO J. ALVAREZ, called for ! 

examination by the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military! 
Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, in Room 
902, Hart Senate Office Building, 9:15 a.m., before 
LOUIS P. WAIBEL, a Notary Public within and for the District 
of Columbia, when were present: 

JOHN SAXON, Esq. 

Associate Counsel 

United States Senate 

Select Connnittee on Secret Military 

Assistance to Iran emd the Nicaraguan 

Resistance 

Room 901 

Hatrt Senate Office Building, 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

On behalf of the Committee 



ROBERT L. KREUZER, Esq. 
House Select Committee 



isions of E.G. 12356 ROBERT J. WINCHESTER, Esq. 

[national Security Coun(3lpecial Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 

for Legislative Affairs 

The Pentagon 



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TABLE OF CONTENTS 



WITNESS 



PAGE 



Francisco J. Alvarez 

By Mr. Scucon and 
By Mr. Posey 



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Whereupon, 

FRANCISCO J. ALVAREZ 
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 

EY MR. SAXON: 

If you would, sir, state your name for the record. 

.Framcisco Jose Alvarez. 

And what is your current rank? 

Major, United States Army. 

What is your current position? 

I an a student at the Command and General Staff 



Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 

College. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 



And that's at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas? 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

And when you graduate, where will you go? 

I*m being assigned down to United States Army 
South in Panama. 

Q Prior to CiG School, where were you? 

A I was in the Office of Defense Cooperation, 



Saur Jose, Costa Rica. 



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Q What were the dates of that assignment? 

A I reported on 15 September 1983 and departed on 
15 July 1986. 

Q And in your position. Major, in Costa Rica, to 
whom did you report? 

A To LTCOL John Taylor. 

Q If you would, I'd like to ask you some questions 
about what we discussed previously in our interview with 
you regarding private supply operations to aid the contras 
in Costa Rica, any refueling stops which you are aware of 
that took place. 

What can you tell us about the refueling of 
airplanes? 

A 1 know of three incidents where C7 Caribous came 
into the International Airport in San Jose for refueling. 
I personally was involved in the actual refueling and the 
coordination of it down at the airport on two of the three. 
The original one was handled by the OPS NCO, Sergeant First 
Class Sanchez, who also had been on the other two. 

Q When you were told that these planes were to 
be coming in, how did you get that tasking? Who told you? 
How did it come through the chain, et cetera? 



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A It came to me at ray level from LTCOL Taylor. 

Q And from whom would you get the information that 
a plane was coming in that needed to be refueled? 

A It would have had to have been a combination. 
He would have possibly gotten the particulars on it from the 




Q And that would 

^^^^^^^^^^^^H yes , sir; however. 
Colonel Taylor and the way he operated, I have got to assume 
it was also being reinforced or directed by the Ambassador 
at the time. 

Q That would be Lewis Tambs? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q When you assisted on those three occasions or that 
yon were aware of those three refueling flights, and you 
assisted on two of them, are you able to put any time periods 
on when those took place? 

A The first one I remember, which was the one I 
did not physically assist on, but I am informed of, I am 
not really sure if it was late '85, early '86 time frame. 
The other ones were in the spring of '86. 

Q Was there a flight which came in that had actually 



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not dropped its load at the time? 

A Yes, sir. That was the very first one that I 
just mentioned. 

Q Okay. The other two came in for refueling, and 
they had already made their air drop? 

A They were empty when they came in, yes, sir. 

Q Tell us about the flight — I believe it was a 
Caribou 7 ~ which had not dropped its load yet. 

A ' Yes, sir. It had come in in the early hours of 
the morning, right predawn time frame. There were 
problems in terms of clearing, because when they cleared it 
with the Costa Rican officials at the airport, to be able 
to get the plame refueled emd get it back out, it was under 
the assumption the plane was empty. In fact, it was reported 
to me by Sergeant Sanchez that the plane was full of what 
appeared to be mail bags. Tbe sane bags that U.S. mail is 
carried in, which were stenciled with the letters "UNO." 

The plane, after a quite of, you know, minor 
hassle and problems in getting out, because it was full, 
departed and developed some type of trouble '-'^ engine or 
what, I don't know •<— but it did, in fact, return a short 
while later. At that point, it took the efforts of Colonel 



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Taylor, who was very good friends with the Commander of the 
Costa Rican Air Section, who is dual-hatted in the Costa 
Rican Civil Aviation, to be able to work together to get 
that plane out at that point. 

Q And did that plane ultimately get out? 

A It ultimately did depart, yes, sir. 

Q Do you have any knowledge of whether it made its 

A No, sir. I do not know, from that point. 
Q Do you have any knowledge of what was in those 
bags which appeared to be mail bags? 



drop; 



A 
Q 
A 
Q 
plane? 
A 
Q 



No, sir. I could not say what type of aid it was. 
You didn't see them yourself; is that correct? 
No, sir, I did not. 
Sergeant Sanchez saw actually what went on the 



He was the one that reported it to me; yes, sir. 
And what do you normally assume the letters UNO 
stand for, or what would that represent? 

A It would have been the acronym for the United 
Nicaraguan Opposition. 

Q What did you understamd or assume about these 



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flights? I believe you told us yesterday, in the interview, 
that you assumed that these were flying cargo! 




Is that what you told us? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q What does that mean? 

A 




We assumed that they were flying cargo, assistance 
of one form or another, to the contras. 

Q Either on behalf of the CIA or at the request 
or under the contract — 

A At least coordinated and directed by. I didn't 
know the inner workings. 

Q Now in terms of things that you, and I guess. 

Sergeant Samches, in an assisting role, would actually do 

for these planes, what would that consist of? I believe 
were 

there /about three things described to us yesterday. 
A Yes, sir. 

The main things we would do is — not necessarily 
in order — but we would coordinate for the customs 



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clearance, basically. Every plane coming into Costa Rica 
has got to go through customs when it first enters, the 
same as here, so that type of thing. 

Now we coordinated with, based upon the 
relations we had built with the people in the airport, 
because the planes did not have the normal dociunentation that 
planes would carry, to include manifests, flight loads and 

all that type of stuff. t 

1 

.And secondly, it would be the clearing, basically,; 
of the flight plan. 

Q This would be with the tower? 

A Yes, sir, with the airport tower. Now that we 
would actually begin before letting them know this plane 
was coming in. I believe yesterday I indicated in 
clarification that if it had what I would have called a 
bogus flight plan to come into the country, that would have 
been where it originated, but then something to be able to 
permit it to get out. And then the actual coordination with 
the Costa Rican refinery people who handled the fuel 
distribution at the airport for the actual refueling of the 
plane . 

Q And in terms of the customs clearance process. 



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ver tell you or Colonel Taylor how you 



did 

should try to see to it that these planes were not searched 
] by Costa Rican customs? 

^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^Hdidn' t The i 

received with Colonel Taylor — and instructions is perhaps 
the wrong word, because we, more or less, would discuss how 
was the best way to do this. I got the indication that he 
had been at least requested to keep people away, if possible.' 

Q Did you ever have occasion to talk to any of the 
crew members of these planes? 

A No, sir. On occasion, yes, but as far as 
actually talking, no. The would come in, and they were 
busy refueling. We coordinated things and, you know, there's 
that concept of "need to know," basically, and I just felt 
I didn'-t have a lot more "need to know" at that time. 

Q So you basically would make small talk with them? 
A If that. 

Q And did you ever see any crew members in a 
recurring role, people who came back a second or third time? 
A I can't say. I don't know. 

Q Major, what do you understand to have been the 
mission of these planes? What do you believe, based on the 



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tilings you were either told or the inferences you drew, that 
they were actually doing? 

A Dropping some kinds of supplies for the rebels, 
operating in the southern part of Nicaragua. 

Q And what kinds of supplies do you think they were 
dropping, or did you know? 

A Those particular planes I am talking a bout at 
this time, sir, I do not know. 

Q Who told you anything that would permit you to 
draw tiiat inference about supply drops in Southern Nicaragua? 

A Well, sir, it was partly deduced just from the 

nature of the missions and what we were doing. Otherwise, it 

been 
could have completely, you know, /handled by just routine 

types o f things. 

And then, secondly, was again. Colonel Taylor and 

I talking, based on what we had received from| 

that that's what these planes were doing. 

Q Is it fair to say you were reasonably safe in 

assuming these drops were intended for the contras? 

A Yes, sir. 

THE WITNESS: Can we go off the record for one 

second? I just want to ask a question. 



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MR. SAXON: Sure, 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. SAXON: Let's go back on the record. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Major, did you ever ask Colonel Taylor if what 
you were doing in assisting these flights in refueling was 
okay or sanctioned or approved or whatever? , 

A Sir, the environment, the atmosphere we were ' 
operating under, at the time, at this particular point, aid, '; 
generically speaking, had been approved, the limited $27 
million at first and later on. 

Ambassador Tambs had repeatedly stated to anyone 
within hearing distance that his purpose or main mission in 
Costa Rica was to open up the second front, and he did it in 
quite an open fashion. Not just in secret conversation or 
whatever. Therefore, I felt no need to question the 
legitimacy of what we were doing. 

Q Okay. Let me make sure then I understand what 
you aure telling us. 

You are saying that Ambassador Taunbs said — by 
"publicly," I don't mean to the general public, but he said 
openly to staff meetings or country team meetings or 



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whatever on more than one occasion, his purpose in being 
there was to open up the southern front; is that correct? 
A Absolutely, sir. 

Q Would it have been at staff meetings, country team 
meetings, political-military meetings? 

A Sir, it was all of the above. Conversations with 
him in hallways. He stated that quite often, quite 
frequently. I 

Q And so there's no mistaking that, in your view? I 
A No, sir. 

MR. WINCHESTER: Can we go off? 
MR. SAXON: Sure. 
(Discussion off th.e record.) 
MR. SAXON: Back on. 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Major, you, I think, mentioned a second front a 
moment ago, and I may have thought you said "southern front." 
Is this more or less the same thing? 

A They are the same situation, sir. 
Q Okay. Did Ambassador Tanbs, in making these 
statements, ever indicate who sent him there with that 
mission or from whom he got such guidance? 



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A No, sir, he never stated directly. 
Q Let me ask you about the general guidance or 
^nst^iction^r approval that you may have gotten from the 
^^^^Hm— Taylor — terms of your 

assisting these refueling operations. 

What, did^^^^^^Hever say or 

do to indicate that this was sanctioned? 

A I'm not sure I understand your question, sir. 
He was the one who provided the information to Colonel 
Taylor as to when they were arriving, when we could expect 
them, and that type of stuff. Obviously, he was the one who 
knew it, indicating they were the ones who had coordinated 
o^^east it was relayed to me through Colonel Taylor that 
^^^^^■in talking to Taylor, had indicated that to him. 

Q And Colonel Taylor more or less took that as a 
tasking or an assignment? 

A I would not believe so, knowing Colonel Taylor. 
I'm sure, as a matter of fact, just knowing Colonel Taylor, 
that before he would do anything like that, he was going to 
get the direction to do it from the Ambassador. I don't 
believe Colonel Taylor would have done that on his own. 

Q So you assume that anything he did or instructed 



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you to do in the resupply operations, the refueling operations, 
he would have gotten approval, either expressly or 
implicitly, from Ambassador Tambs? 

A Oh, absolutely. 

Q What, if anything, did you tell Sergeant Sanchez 
about these missions and what it was you were doing or why? 

A Sir, nothing specifically. First of all, even 
though the rank structure is different, in a very small office 
in Costa Rica, Sergeemt Sanchez also reported directly to 
Colonel Taylor. He did not report through roe, so he would 
get this information directly from Colonel Taylor, also on 
everything else. So Sergeant Sanchez and I would have 
talked eibout them basically in terms of what was happening 
and what we were doing, and, you know, here we are, going 
back out to the airport again, that type of thing, but not 
in a direct type of thing. 

Q Now, how did you understand that the fuel was 
paid for? 

A I saw them paying in American dollars. It was 

not a matter of understanding, 
would 
Q And what At normally have cost to refuel a 



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Caribou? 

A 
of $2000. 

Q 

A 

Q 

A 



If I remember correctly, sir, it was in the realm 



And you're saying they would pay cash? 
They paid cash. I saw that. 
How did that work? 

The guy reached into his pocket, pulled out a wad 
of bills and started counting them off after we calculated 
what the oonversion was. 

Q And did you ever hear Ambassador Tambs make other 
statements along the lines of generally being supportive to 
the contra effort? 

A Oh, absolutely, sir. 

Q And what would be the circumstances under which 
he would have made such statements? 

A Any time he had a public opportunity to talk. 
By "public," again I'm referring, you know, in a group, 
not necessarily out in front of the general public. 

He was quite a strong supporter of the contra 
movement, no holds barred and no equivocation in his manner. 

Q Did he ewer make any of those comments in the 
presence of other government officials at either an 



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equivalent or higher level than his own? 

A There were meetings held where personnel from 
Washington had gone, sir. You know, discussions in that 
time, in some instances, just involved in a very general way 
without any real specifics about the whole rebel movement. 
I tiiink anybody who knew him, particularly above him or 
coequal, would have been quite sure of Ambassador Tcuobs' 
sentiments . 

Q Was there anyone ever there in the command ranks 
at South Com, when he made such statements? 

A I really cannot remember. I remember one meeting 

that this was not the ejcact topic, that General Galvin may 

have been there, but I just am not real sure. I can't place 

it definitely. 

MR. SAXON: Let me say, for the record, that when 

we make reference to the fact that you told us something 

yesterday, I should have said from the outset that 

you 
Mr. Kreuzer and I interviewed /Yesterday morning at the 

Pentagon in the conference room of the Army General Counsel, 

and so that is the interview to which I make reference. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q I believe you told us yesterday about seeing 



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fluctuations from tjjne to time in the number of people working 




What can you tell us about that? 
A Yes, sir. When I first arrived in '83 and maybe 
in the very early part of '84, a certain amount of people 
in the '84 time frame. That number went way down, then m 
early '85, I believe it was, it started climbing back up 
again, until by the time 1 left, it had just sort of gone 
up and down. 

Q Was that a particular section that you have 
reference to? 




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Q And what would have been the triggering event 
or the causal factor to make that number fluctuate? 

A Thinking back on it, sir, I would have to say 
approval of some form of assistance. 

Q Assistance to whom? 

A To the Nicaraguan opposition. 

Q Major, we covered yesterday, in some detail, the 
existence of an air strip that was constructed in Costa Rica, 
which the committee staff understands to have been used for 
resupply operations. 

Tell us, if you would, first, more or less where 
that air strip is located. 

A Yes, sir. That air strip is in 




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Q Do you have any judgment 'you could offer as to 

wisdom of that location, if you wanted to keep it secret? 

A 1 thought it was a dumb place to build it. 

Q Why is that? 

A Well, sir, two major reasons. One is the 




Q Commercial flights? 

A Yes, sir. And even from the air, it's not 
improved enough to be a country's international airport, but 
it's too improved to be a clandestine drug strip, and that 
lent — you know, if you have any knowledge at all, you've 
got to suspect someone is flying things in and out of there. 

Q You're saying it was a bit conspicuous? 



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A I felt it was: yes, sir. 

Q How did you first learn of its existence? 

A In the first manner I just mentioned. I was 
going up, basically conducting a visit at the Training 
Center that was over there, flying with a Costa Rican pilot 
and a Costa Rican Air Section plane, who was quite fluent 
in English. And we happened to fly over it. He looked down 
and said, "Holy shit, what's that?" At which point I ! 
looked down and repeated what he said. He was going to 
report that back when he returned to San Jose immediately . 
I asked him just to hold off before reporting it and let me 
just check a few things out. When I returned to the Embassy, 
then I spoke with Colonel Taylor and got the run down. 

Q And what did Colonel Taylor tell you? 

A That that, in fact, was an Agency-built strip or 
at least financed strip, being used to reserve or refuel any 
planes that were going to be making drops. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KREUZER: 

Q At the point when you arrived with this Costa 
Rican pilot at that strip, tell me, was that a flight where 
he genuinely had just discovered the air field, or was that 



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a flight that may have been a pretext on his part or on the 
part of somebody in the Costa Rican government to take you 
up and let you see hira just discover the air field? 

A Sir, I can't answer. Let me just say, the route 
we took was the most common one to get to the^^^^^^^^^^^l 
He would not have had to fly out of his way to show it to me, 
when I said, "i want to go up there." I was the one who 

on the to go to thd^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l 
Now whether he had seen that before or one of the other 
pilots in the Air Section had seen it and were trying to 
figure out and learn more about it, I don't know. However, 
Costa Rica, at this time, was very big on identifying all 
■anknown air strips in the country in an effort to close down 
on drugs. So I suspect that if they had seen it, without 
anybody having said anything else to them, they would have 
reported it. And to the best of my knowledge. Civil Aviation 
in Costa Rica at that time did not have any knowledge of it. 
Does that answer your question? 
Q That was a common route? 
A Yes, sir. 

Q So would it be fair to assume, possibly, that 
that route had been flown many times before by Costa Rican 



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pilots looking for — 

A No, sir, because it is a corainon route to get up 
to the^^^^^^^^^^Hwhere we were talking or, you know, the 
coinmercial planes, as I indicated. But unless you are going 
to that^^^^^^^^^^^^they just didn't fly up there too 
often. 

Q Would there be any occasion for the Costa Rican 
Air Force to fly up to that^^^^^^^^^^^at 

A • Very, very few, no, sir. The Air Section, 
basically, yes, you're getting down to the base section, the 
Costa Rican Air Section, basically operated an air taxi 
service. That's aibout what it anounted to. 
MR. KREUZER: Thank you. 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Major, I believe you said, when you returned from 
flying over this air strip, you talked to Colonel Taylor 
about it. 

Did he indicate whether he had been briefed by 
anyone about the air strip? 

A Yes, sir. In his emswer, he indicated to me that 
Ihad briefed him on the strip. Possibly even 



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before the actual construction, in help^^^?, or in finding 
someone to undertake the effort. 
II Q Was it your understanding that in some way the 
construction of the air strip was an Agency project? 

A It was ray understanding, the Agency completely 
footed the bill for the construction of that air strip. 

Q Was there any individual whom you came to know 
or understand would have been what we normally think of as 
the general contractor for this construction? 

A Again, sir, without any concrete proof, but just 
on a lot of basically circumstantial type evidence, that it 



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Q And how did you conclude, or what led you to draw 
the inference he may have been involved in sort of a general 
contracting role? 

A There were two things. For one, he suddenly. 



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even though he was- by Costa Rican standards, a wealthy man 




second incident was where he had come in to the Embassy and 
had gone somewhere else in the Embassy. Now I cannot say 
for a fact where, but suddenly he showed upstairs in our 
office, escorted. He had been down to see another 
individual who he thought was selling a car, and he was 
carrying just a regular paper bag with $20,000 in $20 bills 
in it. 

Q Is that U.S. dollars? 

A Yes,, sir. 

Q $20,000 cash? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q That he wanted to use to purchase a vehicle? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q As far as you know, did he purchase a car? 

A Yes, sir, he did. He purchased a pickup truck. 



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Q Was it a new or used truck? 

A It was used. A 1982-83 pickup truck. 

Q I hope he had a few dollars left over. 

A I understand he had quite a few of them left over. 

Q Did you ever discuss the air strip yourself with 




A He discussed it with me. I didn't discuss it 
with him. 

Q . And, Major, how did that discussion come about? 

A There was one individual who worked] 
that I had a good working relationship with. 

Q This would have been a man namec 

A 




A few days after this. Colonel Taylor was out of 
town, and I ran into him in the hallway and just started 
joking with him eibout it. 

Q Excuse me, a few days after you had first seen 
him and talked to Colonel Taylor? 

A Yes, sir. 



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Q You ran into your friend| 
A Yes, sir. So I started just jibber- jabbering, 
asking him if they were going to open up a tourist resort 
up here, since no other reason for a strip of that type, and 
he gave me just a totally blank look. I mean, he had no 
idea — and I am convinced he had no idea what I was talking 
about . 

As it turned out, there was another individual, 
whose name I don't remember, but I always called hiroj 
who was standing by the other door, and apparently! 
had been the guy who had originally coordinated or done the 
leg work for the building. He reported it tc 

Q He overheard your comments? 

A Yes, sir, he did. So he reported tc 
that I knew cLbout it and was talking abodt it. 

■called, actually wanting to speak to 
Colonel Taylor. As I indicated, he was not in, so the 
call was given to me, at which point he informed me that — 
the first thing he asked me was if Colonel Taylor had told 
me about it, and I indicated no, indicated to him how I found 
out about it, emd that then I had spoken to Colonel Taylor, 
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originated with Colonel Taylor. At which point he told me 
that the way his operation and organization worked, not 
everybody knew what everybody else was doing, and that he'd 
rather I didn't talk about anything that I may find out that 
soTC of his people were doing with any other people from his 
own organization, because the way they were set up, they 
didn't necessarily, as I say, know what each other was doing. 

Q Was this entire conversation on the phone, or did 
he ask yqu t-^- 

A No, sir. this was entirely on the phone. 
Q Did it end with any admonition to you to not talk 
about the air strip? 

A Yes, sir. It was, you know, not formal or strong, 
but a mild rebuke. At least I took it as such, you know, 
that I don't need you talking about it. 

Q To the e xtent yo u care to comment, did you form 
an impression about^^^^^^Hand those people who were 
working for him? 

A Yes, sir, I did. In three years there in dealings 
with them on different matters, some of which totally 
unrelated to this whole issue, I just felt it was about the 
most incompetent organization I had ever seen and, frankly. 



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I was terrified that those were the guys who were trying to 
conduct any part of U.S. foreign policy. 

Q Did there come a time when a particular airplane 
that was using the air strip for refueling operations had 
a problem of getting out? 

A Yes, sir. There was one that landed, and in 
taxiing to the end of the runway to turn around, it came off 
of the strip and got stuck in the mud. 

Q Was this a loaded or unloaded plane? 

A It was loaded, sir. 

Q And how did you come to know about it? 

A By this time. Colonel Taylor and I, who had 
really developed a very good working relation, was keeping 
me apprised of what was happening. I am, as I indicated, 99 
percent sure this was sometime after the 8th of May 1986. 

Q And why do you date it that way? 

A Sir, because the Costa Ricans ' inauguration, if 
I remember right, was the 8th of May 1986. 

Q Inauguration of? 

A Their new president, who had been elected early 




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Colonel Taylor, basically, had kept me apprised, 
but at the same time, indicated to me, if I am ever brought 
in on it by either the Ambassador or the Agency, that would 
be the first time I was hearing it, and that's hov I found 
out about; it. 

Q Did Colonel Taylor — let me ask it this way. 

Was Colonel Taylor asked to make recommendations 
for the plane to get the plane unstick from the mud? 

A Yes, sir. By this time — Colonel Taylor is a 
seasoned pilot, both fixed wing and helicopter, knows a 
great deal about planes, and when they were talking about 
trying to get another plane in there to pull it out, he was 
the one saying, "Forget that idea." So he, in fact, was 
requested or brought into the conversation. 

Q And did he offer a proposal? 

A Ves, sir. He and I pretty much together, in 
discussing the possibilities had come up with what we felt 
was probably the best workable solution, because what it 



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amounted to at that particular time was, the only way that 
plane *'as going to get unstuck was going to be to offload 
its cargo. 

A And did you know or were you made aware of what 
its cargo was? 

A Yes, sir. I was told straight out that it was 

aiomunition. Ammunition and — small round ammunition and 

! 
hand grenade mortar ammunition. 

Q Continue with your discussions with Colonel . 

Taylor about the plan to get it out. 

A Okay. Sir, what basically we had come up with, whic 

was then presented to^^^^^^^^^^^^and the Ambassador, was 

that I would go up there. At that particular time, the 

construction at this^^^^^^^^^^^Hl mentioned earlier 

going on. I would go up there and basically borrow -- and I 

was convinced I could — a couple of construction trucks that 

they had. 

Even though there was no road out to this strip, 

you could follow the coast line, which was hard enough to be 

able to be able to work your way through it, you know, after 

a whole lot of hours for a few miles. We would offload all 

)f the ammunition, take it to the^^^^^^^^^^Hand just 




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donate it to the^^^^^^^^^ as if it had all along been 
an actual security assistance delivery coming into the 
country that was initially intended for that! 

anyhow. 

What they felt, that covered the base if anybody 
asked, "What the hell is it doing up there?" It could have 
simply been just kind of brushed off with the belief it was 
supposed to go to the airport in Liberia which was in that 
general area, and that a new pilot got confused, saw this 
big strip and thought that was it and landed in the wrong 
place. 

Q This was a civilian aircraft? 

A It was a C-7 model. Most of these flew with no 
tail markings of any kind. I am trying to think of the 
English word for — registration number. Most of them were 
some kind of — the ones I saw were like a yellow base 
camouflage pattern. 

Q Did you have reason to learn the origination 
point for this flight? 

A Sir, I was told that that flight had originated, 

as had the others, in | 

bee 
Q That would have 



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I was not told exactly, you know, where in 

I assumed it would have been^^^^^^H, since 
that was military controlled. 

Did Ambassador Tambs ever comment on where this 
plane was destined. 

A Yes . When we were having the meeting where it 
was determined I would go up there to try and offload it, if 
need be, he indicated that that plane was going to make a 
drop of those ammunition and supplies to the southern front 
forces who were in Niceuragua. 

Q In Nicaragua? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Tell us about that meeting. Colonel Taylor 
apparently had been asked to come up with a plan, you and he 
talked cibout it, and then there was a meeting. 
Who was present at the meeting? 

A Colonel Taylor, 
and myself were the only members. 

Q And it took place where? 

A In the Ambassador's office. 

What transpired? 

A Colonel Taylor had a requirement to go to Panama, 



Ambassador Tambs 



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I don't remember the exact nature of it, but he would have 
to leave. As a result, I was brought in and briefed by 
Ambassador Tambs , as I said, as if it was the first time I 
was hearing it# since neither Colonel Taylor ror I let on 
that he and I had spoken about it. 

I was told by Ambassador Tambs how that plane got 
there, when it got there, what had happened to it, what it 
was for and that something had to be done to get it out. I 
was told by him that Colonel Taylor had come up with what they 
felt was an absolutely brilliant plan to get it out and that, 
based upon all recommendations emd knowledge of the people, 
area and all, I would have been the only guy really available, 
as such, to be ahle to execute it, and then they proceeded 
to brief me on what the plan was. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KREU2ER: 

Q In fact, you were, were you not, one of the 
architects of the plem? 

A Yes, sir. Colonel Taylor and I, basically, were 
sitting in * place in front of the Embassy, you know, about 
3:00 o'clock, in a very private area, just kind of mulling it 
over, and sort of got synthesized out of both bits of 



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information. 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Just in case we haven't overlooked anything for 
s-uBsegnent readers of this transcript, the air strip itself 
was not paved; is that correct? 

A No, sir, it was not. It was packed. 

Q So the entire thing was unpaved, so it is not a 
matter of xinloading the plane, getting it back up on the 
concrete runway and putting the cargo back on? 

A No, sir. Even though it was packed hard, it was 
not paved. However, that is exactly what they did do to 
eventually get that plane out. They unpacked it where it was, 
which removed the weight, and whoever they had, you know, 
pushed it out of the mud up onto the runway into a hard part, 
hard packed, then reloaded it, and it could take off. 

Q What was the result or disposition of things in 
this meeting with Ambassador Tambs, Colonel Taylor and 
and yourself? 

A I would be on call, because they were still 
trying to get this plane out. There's no comraxinications 
from that strip to Sem Jose, sir, so it was kind of like 




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I' periodically they'd hear something. The determination was 

|| that if they couldn't get it out of the mud, I was on call 

to leave, you know, on a moment's notice to go and execute 

|l that plan. 

i| 

'( Q And was that the point at which you were told to, 

!| 

il in essence, stand down? 

A Yes, sir; if a phone call came during the evening, 
I was told to stand dovm, it's going to make its drop, and 
we can forget about it. 

Q Were there comments made to you by other 
individuals? I believe you told us yesterday, perhaps some 
people involved with that^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwould indicate 
that traffic did come in and out of this air strip? 

A Yes, The personnel up at the^^^^^^^^^f 
Iwould coimnent etbout the number of low level flights, 
you know, buzzing them in the early hours of dawn that were 
just mysteriously disappearing behind that hill, and then 
later they see it again, heading north. They would come 
from the north and then go back towards the north. I can't 
give you any figure on the quantities. I just don't know. 
But it wasn't at all an uncommon occurrence either. 

Q Is there any doubt in your mind what that air 



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strip was used for? 

A No, sir. 

Q And what would you say it was used for? 

A It was used to refuel and do whatever needed to 
be done to any of the planes that were making aerial drops 
in the southern part of Nicaragua. 

Q Were you aware of any news stories in the earlier 
part of 1986 about this air strip before these matters as 
we now know them became public in November? ! 

A Any news stories? 

Q Yes, sir. By newspapers about this strip and this 
construction and what it might have been used for? 

A None of the newspapers, sir. Not that I remember. 

Q And I would assume from that answer that you have 
no knowledge of any efforts by any individuals in the U.S. 
Government to concoct a cover story for what that air strip 
was being used for? 

A Not that I know of, no, sir. 

Q Let me ask you. Major, about any meetings, 
briefings or dealings you may have had with Colonel Oliver 
Nortti. 

Have you ever met Colonel North? 



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A Yes, sir, I have. 

Q And I believe you told us yesterday that you 
briefed him on two occasions? 

A I didn't brief him. I was in a briefing where 
he was at on two occasions, yes, sir. 

Q Was there anything of significance or note about 
the first meeting? 

A Not that I remember, no, sir. 

Q If you would, then, I think, focus on the second 
meeting and tell us about that. When would that have been, 
approximately? 

A Sir, that was sometime ~ I would have said in 
April, March, but I'm thinking more April 1986 time frame. 

Q Where did this meeting take pl ace? 

A 




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the 



A 


Sir, 


Colonel North, 


^^nbassador Tambs was there — 


Q 


Was 


th^^^^^^l 


^B there? 


A 


Yes 


sir.^^^^^^l 


^^^|was there. I believe 


^^^H 


^H 




^^^^^^pv 


■ 


^^^^^^^^■who 


at that time was an individual 



Spell that last name. 



Was Secretary Abrams there? 
Secretary Abrams was there . 
Mr. Burghardt? 
Mr. Burghardt. 

And would^^^^^^^^^^H^ave been there 
Sir, I'm almost sure that was the meeting I was 
alluding to, where he was. 

Q But you're not as sure aUaout him as about the 



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others? 

A No, sir. There was one other individual. If i 
hear the naune, I'll remember it. 

HR. KREUZER: 

TH£ WITNESS: I believe that's it, yes, sir. 
To be honest with you, I was just meeting a whole lot of 
people, and it was hard to keep straight, particularly when 
my function there, as in many other meetings, was to be an 
interpreter. 

EXAMINATION 

BY MR. KREUZER: 

Are you sure^^^^fwas there? 

I believe he was. The neune rings a bell. 

And you believe Salvin was there? 

Correct. 

All the other people, you're sure about? 

I'm pretty sure about. 
EXAMINATION 

BY MR. SAXON: 

You were there then to be translator? 

Yes, sir. 

And other than translating duties, you normally 



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would probably not have been at such meetings? 

A Oh, absolutely not. No, sir. 

Q What do you recall as having been the subject 
matter of the meeting? 

A Well, that was the funny thing, as I mentioned 
yesterday. The way these meetings were conducted, the first 
part was all the social amenities. That takes a 




Q And particularly including this air strip? 

A Yes, sir. Now this was just, you know, little 
comments made off and on. Then when they really started 
talking business, they started talking about what had been 
done up until this point. 

Q In terms of resupply of the southern front? 

A In terms of the general assistance towards the 
anti-Sandinista movement. At this time, one of the 
individuals — I don't remember, you know. I'm thinking 



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Mr. Burghardt and^^^^^^|, siraply because those were the 

two I had never met before . 
|| 
!l 
i; Q I believe you said yesterday, a tall, red-haired 

gentleman. 

A Yes, a tall, red-haired gentleman is about what 
I remembered, interrupted the meeting, saying, hey, you know, 
he had no doubt as to my patriotism, fidelity and valor, but 
ray clearance he didn't think was high enough to listen to the 
rest of it and I should he excused from the meeting. 

Q What clearance did you at the time hold? 

A Top secret, sir. 

Q Did anyone at the meeting know you had a top 
secret clearauice? 

A Everybody in the meeting knew I had a top secret, 
sir. 

Q But, for whatever reason, this gentleman thought 
that might not be high enough? 

A Apparently so, sir. 

Q So what happened after he made that statement? 

A I went to drink coffee with tlxe secretary, sir. 

Q And that would not be Secretary Abrams? 



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So, suffice it to say you left the room? 
Yes, sir, I left the room at this point. 
And did the meeting continue for some period? 
Yes, sir. I would say 45-50 minutes. 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KREUZER: 
Q This person who asked you to leave, you say he 
was the tall, red-headed person? 

A I say red. I'm not talking carrot top, kind of 
reddish. 

Q You can't identify who he was? 
A I can't recall. He was the one who raised the 
issiie. There was a lot of mumbling about it, basically 
mumbling from everybody involved, and Ambassador T2UQbs was 
the one who said, "Well, okay, Paco, just so we can continue, 
why don't you step out." 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Pace is your nickname? 

A Yes, sir, that's my nickname. 
Q Now, you were present, I think, with some of these 



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individuals riding in the car to the meeting and other 
conversations? 

A Correct, sir. 

Q Before and after the meeting? 

A Correct, sir. 

Q In the course of that entire period when you were 

in the meeting and the conversations before that, did you 

j 
hear bits and pieces of discussions that would allow you to i 

draw inferences about the subject matter? 

A Yes, sir. That is part of what I alluded to when 
I said little bits of information compiled led me to believe 
that the purpose of that meeting was what I had just 
mentioned. 

Q And you actually heard people talk about the 
contras? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q Is there amything else we should know about that 
particular meeting? 

A Not that I can remember, sir. 

Q 




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A No, I can't answer tiiat one way or another, sir, 
definitely yes or no. I just don't know. 




EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KREUZER: 




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EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Major Alvarez, let me ask you about a gentleman 
named Ton Posey — P-o-s-e-y — and an organization with 
which he is affiliated called Civilian Materiel Assistance 
or CMA. 

Did you ever have occasion to see Mr. Posey or 



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know that he came to Costa Rica? 

A Yes, sir. I knew that he came through. 

Q You personally didn't met him? 

A No, sir. He was traveling with a Colonel Winberry 
— now Wing with a "g" in it or without, I don't know. 
W-i-n, I believe, based on pronunciation, Winberry. 
They came through — 

Q This would be active duty or retired colonel? 

A Retired, sir. And I got the impression that. 
Posey was retired military, but I may be wrong. They had 
talked with Sergeant Sanchez, and I believe they met with 
bolonel Taylor. Colonel Taylor indicated to me that something 
just didn't seem right, so he said, hold off. He sent some 
messages out, I believe, you know, and whether or not they 
went to State, Defense Department, I don't know just where, 
came back saying, hey, we will not deal — out of this office, 
we will not deal with these guys. 

Q What was Mr. Posey and Colonel Winberry — what 
were the proposing? Wh.it Wiis their parpose in being there? 

A They were offering military assistance to the 
Costa Rican Government for the outfitting and the equipping 
of the Costa Rican Civil Guard, so as to be able to use them 



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along the border better. 

Q What kind of equipment? What was your 
understanding in that regard? 

A Small arms, small arm ammunition and the 
possibility was even mentioned of a couple of planes to be 
used for border reconnaissance purposes. 

Q As far as you know, did they ever make contact 
with any individuals in the Costa Rican government? 

A Yes, sir. They made contact with the Costa 
Rican Vice Minister of Public Security. 

Q What is that gentleman's name? 

A His first name was Johnny and his last name was 
Campos •< — CT-a'sn-:P''^'^s . 

Q And how do you know this? 

A Johnny Campos told me. 

Q And what did Mr. Campos say they proposed to you? 

A Just they basically had — I can't say an actual 
lanndry list, but he related a whole long list of items 
of things that they could get. Most of it, Campos at least 
was led to believe was as a donation. It would not have 
cost Costa Rica anything. Primarily, small arms, as I said, 
small arm aramiinition, and there was definite mention of a 



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couple of planes that could be used for spotter reconnaissance 
purposes . 

Q Old Mr. Ceunpos indicate whether they gave him 
anything as a gift or token? 

A Ves, sir. They gave him a Llama 9 millimeter 
matched grade automatic pistol, which was in its own 
wooden presentation box and everything. He showed that to me^ 

Q Did they make amy statement as to whether there 
could be mpre of these pistols, if he was interested? ! 

A Well, I don't know if they could have offered too 
many of the matched grade, but, yes, there would have been 
more in the way of 9 millimeter and other small arms. 

Q From either your discussions with Colonel Taylor 
or with Mr. Campos etbout Tom Posey and CMA, was there any 
indication that any arms were either intended or could be 
made availaible for the contras? 

A No, sir, not that I know of. 

MR. KREUZER: You said earlier that Mr. Ceunpos 
had told you jUsout Tom Posey and Colonel Winberry's meeting 
with him and that they said that — did they say at that time 
that equipment would be made available to the Costa Rican 
military without charge? 



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THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. The impression that 
Mr. Ccunpos got was that this equipment would come as a 
donation. He told me that what Mr. Posey and Colonel Winberry 
had said was that there was this large group in the United 
States ~ Mr. Campos, in fact, mentioned the name of a retired 
General Singlaub, saying that this was one of the names, 
because he asked me if I knew the name, because it meant 

i 

nothing to Campos — who were very concerned about the spread] 

of communis in Central America and had raised all of this I 

i 
private money, so as to be able to donate equipment to those 

countries who were involved in the fight to stop the spread 

of communism. 

BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Did he mention the World Anticonmunism League? 

A Yes, sir, he did. 

Q Did he mention Barbara Studley's name? 

A No, sir. 

Q Or the company of GeoMiliTech? 

A No, sir, he did not. 

EXAMINATION 

BY MR. KREUZER: 

Q Did he then say that weapons and perhaps some 



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reconnaissance aircraft were going to be made available 
from these people? 

A He was led to believe at that meeting that he 
was going to get something. 

Q Did he indicate or did you have any knowledge 
eibout the amount or the value of the donation? 

A No, sir, I could not put a price on it. I 
didn't have that information. No, sir. 

Q , Did he tell you, specifically, what equipment 
and how much would be available? 

A In planes, he mentioned the possibility of two 
Cessna type. Now whether or not they would be two or six 
or what, I don't know. He was talking 'about sufficient 
M-j6 rifles, so as to be able to outfit the Guard. 

Q How many would that be? 

A That would have been 4500 to 5000. He mentioned, 
but without quantities, automatic weapons, and be mentioned 
it generically. He didn't say 50 calibers or M-60s. He 
just said machine guns, basically. Grenades, some type of 
armored vehicle, whether recoilless rifle or what, I don't 
know, because, again, they were just using the generic term. 



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EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAXON: 
Q Did anyone ever ask Mr. Posey where he was going 
to get these weapons, or did Mr. Posey volunteer where he 
was going to get this quantity of weapons? 

A As I said, sir, I felt the indication Campos had 

got was that this orgiuiization as such that Mr. Posey and ' 

i 

Colonel Winberry made reference to was raising the money and j 

I 

that orgjuiization would purchase — - all of these weapons are { 

readily available on the market, if you get an export 

license. And, you know, that was what Mr. Campos basically 

assnmed. 

EIXAMINATION 

t 

BY MR. KREDZER: 

Q What was the name of that organisation that they 
referred to? 

A Which one, sir? CMA? 

Q Associated with General Singlaub? 

A No, sir. They mentioned General Sin^ub's name; 
they mentioned the Anticommunist League , but I don ' t know 
that the two were mentioned together rather than just 
Mr. Campos asking me if these names meant anything to me. 



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So that is the only reason that I remember his 
mentioning those. 

EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAXON: 

Q Did you ever see General Singlaub come through 
Costa Rica? 

A No, sir, I did not. 

Q Do you know, personally, an American named John 
Hall, who is living in Costa Rica? 

A I do not personally know Mr. Hall, no, sir. 

Q Have you ever heard o£ him? 

A Yes, sir, quite a bit. 

Q And what have you heard? 

A The story that has been out in the Costa Rican 
newspapers and in the media and on everybody's mouth from 
the time I arrived in the country, basically was that 
Mr. Hall, who was quite a wealthy cattle owner in the north 
central part of Costa Rica, had a training center there for 
contra forces, provided a facility for R&R of contra forces, 
and that the private landing strips that he had on his 
property were being used in an resupply effort of the contras. 

Q He had a ranch, I believe? 



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Yes, sir. It's a ranch. 

Did you ever go to his ranch? 

No, sir, I did not. 



56 




Q Are you aware of anyone from the Embassy who ever 
went to his ranch? 

A No, sir, I cannot say that for a fact. 

Q Did you ever discuss John Hall with] 

A I did not; no, six. 

Q 'When you completed your tour of duty in Costa 
Rica and were preparing to leave,.! believe you told us 
yesterday, you had sort of a goodbye session with 
Ambassador Tcunbs and also present was the Deputy Chief of 
Mission, Mr. Tull; is that correct? 

A That's correct, sir. 

Q Vfhat, if anything, did they say to you, either 
Ambassador Tambs or Mr. Tull, in terms of your good service? 

A Both were, I know, quite thankful and very 
effusive in their thanks, as they put it, not just for what 
the office had done, but for all of the other things that 
I personally had done to help the cause, whatever that was, 
and for helping out! 

Q Did you understand what they meant by that? 



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A I thought he was thanking me for helping them with 
the planes and, you know, matters like that. 

Q And this was Ambassador Tambs speaking? 

A Ambassador Tambs and Mr. Tull both. 

Mr. Tull, basically did what he was best to do, 
and that was pcirroting Ainbassador Tambs . 

Q Major Alvarez, is there £my thing we have not 
thought to ask you, which you think either committee should 
know? 

A I can't think of anything. 

MR. SAXON: Let me say a couple of things for the 
record. 

Number one. Major Alvarez has appeared here 
voluntarily. He has spent a fair amount of time and 
inconvenienced himself and changed his schedule to do this 
for us, emd on behalf of the Senate Committee, and if I can 
speak for the House, we thank you very much for doing that. 
Let me say, in the course of this investigation, 
we have had in excess now of 50 interviews at the Pentagon 
and with Pentagon officials, and I think Major Alvarez has 
probably been as forthcoming and as helpful as anyone we 
have spoken to, and I want to thank you for that, sir. 



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MR. KREUZER: Thank you very much, sir. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 

(Whereupon, at 10:20 a.m., the taking of the 
deposition was concluded.) 



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TESTIMONY OF CHARLES E. ALLEN 
Tuesday, April 21, 1987 

United States Senate 
Committee on Secret Military 
Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition 
Washington, D. c. 
Deposition of CHARLES E. ALLEN, called as a 
witness by counsel for the Select Committee, at the offices 
of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate Office 
Building, Washington, D. C, commencing at 10:08 a.m., the 
^^jgtpBj^9.yi^^flS^J^3^^^oj^ by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, a 
Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, and the 
testimony being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER 
and transcribed under her direction. 



Partially Declassified/Released on .-. 
under provisions of E.O 12355 
by N. Menan, National Security Council 



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237 



lINGUiSSIFe 



APPEARANCES: 

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition: 

ARTHUR LIMAM, ESQ. 

CHARLES KERR, ESQ. 

TIMOTHY WOODCOCK, ESQ. 
On behalf of the House Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

GEORGE W. VAN CLEVE, ESQ. 
On behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency: 

KATHLEEN A. MC GINN, ESQ. 

RHONDA M. HUGHES, ESQ. 

Office of Congressional Affairs 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Washington, D. C. 20505 



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238 




CONTENTS 



Charles 


E. Allen 


By Mr. 


Kerr 


By Mr. 


Liman 


By Mr. 


Kerr 


By Mr. 


Liman 


By Mr. 


Kerr 


By Mr. 


Van Cleve 


By Mr. 


Kerr 


By Mr. 


Van Cleve 


By Mr. 


Kerr 



EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 
SENATE HOUSE 



3 

87 

99 

99 

102 

174 
179 

183 
184 



AFTERNOON SESSION, p. 59 

EXHIBITS 

ALLEN EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION 

1 25 

2 30 

3 41 

4 41 

5 42 

6 42 

7 55 

8 67 

9 141 

10 170 

11 172 

12 186 

13 186 



uNeiAssm 



239 



mmm 



PROCEEDINGS 
Whereupon, 

CHARLES E. ALLEH 
was called as a witness by counsel for the Senate Select 
Conunittee, and, having been duly sworn by the Notary Public, 
was examined and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
BY MR. KERR: 

Q Mr. Allen, would you state your full name for the 
record? 

A Charles Eugene Allen. 

Q Mr. Allen, I'd like to start by having you trace 
your educational background. 

A I was educated at the University of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill, with a bachelor's degree in political 
science. I attended the Air War College, 1971-72. I also 
did graduate studies at Auburn University, 1971-72. 

Q Do you have any advanced degrees beyond that? 

A No, not awarded. 

Q And you received your bachelor's degree when, Mr. 
Allen? ]^^^ 

A 1957. 

Q And you would have joined the Agency immediately 
thereafter? 

A 1958. 



Diwsra 



240 




k. \. i .(• ZL^k 



Q If you would, could you trace through for me your 
career with the CIA, kind of going in chronological order up 
to the present? 

A I was originally assigned to biographic 
intelligence, 1958 to 1962. I was assigned for a year doing 
systems analysis work. I later went on, from 1966 to 1971, 

ir^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hp r oduc i ng 
current intelligence assessments principally on Eastern 
Europe and Sub-Sahara Africa; 1971 to 1972, I attended the 
Air War College; 1973 I worked on the President's daily 
brief, which is a very restricted publication for the 
President's eyes only. 

In 1973 and '74 I became Production Manager for 
current military productior 

^^^^^^^1 In late 1974 I spent a tour overseas with my 
family, returning in 1977. I headed a staff that was engaged 
in the worldwide dissemination of finished intelligence to 
foreign liaison and to support U.S. missions and U.S. 
military commands worldwide. 

I headed, in 1979, up until August '80, I headed 
an office for presentations and publications, which did all 
the publishing and editorial work for the Agency. In August 
1980 I was assigned as a Special Assistant to Frank Carlucci 
to work on a special compartmented program. I worked on that 
first for Mr. Carlucci and then for Admiral Inman directly 



intSStFIED 



241 



KUiSmD 



until November 1982, when I was assigned to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, where I worked on strategic 
mobilization issues. 

I returned from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense in January 1985 at the request of Mr. Casey. I was 
appointed the National Intelligence Officer for both 
counterterrorism and counternarcotics. The latter position I 
held from January 1985 to February 1986. I remain today as 
the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism. 

I also served from February 1986 until March 1986 
as Chief — 1987, as Chief of Intelligence of CIA's 

Q Thank you. With regard to the 1980-82 period, 
when you were Special Assistant first to Carlucci and then to 
Inman, during that period of time, particularly focusing on 
the fall of 1980, did you^BM^any involvement with the Iran 
hostage situation? 

^^^Mone. 

Q I would be correct, then, that you had no 
knowledge of and no involvement in contacts that were made 
with Bud McFarlane and other members of then-candidate 
Reagan's campaign organization regarding the Iran hostage 
situation? 

A None , whatsoever . 

Q With regard to your contact with Mr. McFarlane, 



UNtbtSSffl 



242 



UNtUSSD 



can you tell me when you first came to know or met Mr. 
McFarlane? 

A He probably attended meetings in the 1981 to '85 
time frame. That occurred very rarely on the special program 
that I worked both with the intelligence community and with 
the Department of Defense. He sat in on briefings that I've 
given and in the area of counterterrorism I, of course, 
briefed him during the TWA 847, which occurred in June 1985. 

Q In terms of making his acquaintance, though, that 
would have occurred after the Reagan Administration took 
power in January 1981; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q With regard to Colonel North, you would have met 
him for the first time approximately when? 

A August 1981. 

Q And Colonel North was employed in what capacity at 
that time? 

A He had been sent over by the Department of Defense 
along with two other military officers to work on getting 
Congressional approval of the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi 
Arabia. Because his performance was so extraordinary, it was 
suggested that he become a member of the National Security 
Council staff. I was working with Lieutenant General — I'm 
sorry, he was a Major General at the time — Major General 
Schweitzer, and Major General Schweitzer introduced Colonel 



UNmtSffiD 



243 



UlWSIPliD 



North to me and to other people in August 1981. 

Q That would be Robert L. Schweitzer? 

A Yes. He later became a three-star before he 
retired. 

Q And you would have met Colonel North through 
General Schweitzer; is that correct? 

A Well, he was introduced to me because Colonel 
North essentially replaced and took some of the roles of 
Major Christopher Shoemaker, who had served in the Carter 
Administration as well as during the first year and a half of 
the Reagan Administration. 

Q At that point in time, when you first came to know 
Colonel North, do you recollect who his immediate superior 
was? 

A within the National Security Council staff? He 
reported at that time to General Schweitzer. 

Q In terms of your relationship with General 
Schweitzer, at that point were you actually working with 
General Schweitzer at that time? 

A I was the senior official of the intelligence 
community interacting with General Schweitzer on a regular 
basis. General Schweitzer was chairman of a working group of 
an interagency nature that was engaged in some national 
security planning. 

Q So that I understand, was your function 



ONotitsstfe 



244 



UIWSIFIED 



8 



essentially a liaison function on a broad spectrum? 

A No. I was representing the Director of Central 
Intelligence and the Intelligence Community on a specific 
activity reporting directly to the Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence but working on behalf of the Director of Central 
Intelligence. 

Q In connection with that work did you begin to work 
with Colonel North? 

A Yes, sir, very closely. 

Q I'll come back to that in a moment, with regard 
to the AWACS matter, did you have involvement in the AWACS 
effort? 

A None whatsoever. 

Q And you did or did not come to know General Secord 
during that period of time? 

A I did not know General Secord during that period. 

Q When would you have met General Secord for the 
first time? 

A The first time I met General Secord directly was, 
to the best of my knowledge, was the 29th of January, 1986, 
when he attended a meeting with Colonel North, ^^^^^^^^^H 
Mr. Koch — that's K-o-c-h — and myself in Room 370 of the 
Executive Office Building. 

Q We'll come back to that, but if I understand you, 
you would not have had contact or a relationship with General 



mmms 



245 



mmm 



Secord prior to that time; is that correct? 

A No, sir. I had heard of General Secord in the 
fall of 1985, but I was not aware as to who he was or any of 
his background until later. 

Q You had mentioned the AWACS matter. You did not 
become familiar with General Secord's role in the AWACS 
matter; is that correct? 

A Not at all. 

Q Returning again to Colonel North, the matter that 
you were working on with Colonel North in 1981, can you 
describe that for us? 

A That's a compartmented program. We were working 
on a sensitive national security program which I'm not 
authorized to discuss, but I can assure you it had nothing to 
do with Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Central America. 

Q In terms of what it had to do with, you are not 
prepared to tell me today; is that right? 

A No, sir. 

Q Can you describe the nature of your contact with 
North during that period? Would you be dealing with him on a 
daily basis? 

A Frequently on a daily basis because it required a 
great deal of planning, coordination, preparation of 
memoranda, coordination with senior officials of the 
intelligence community, discussions with Mr. Carlucci and 



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246 



uKCk^sra 



10 



later with Admiral Xnman and occasionally discussions with 
Mr. Casey or briefings of Mr. Casey. 

Q With regard to the CIA personnel that worked on 

that project with you. Director Casey would have been kept 
apprised. )iau woujft ha¥« vorkmA ^Sjet ifci f^o else w^ld have 
-JMorked on" it at th lFC^ :g- " .y-.^- "^- _^^"\_ "^' ^^ ^ 
y^ A^ Wi^^ < ^SJ^^ .r.j ^j^Mf^^i^,^^- j^ lilMitBliijil #i&iB>ber 
of atrMtjbrat«s and I w i| ^ ad«^ t jg i d ^3a ift-||^g ^^ipJiigf jp>. 




I Eiad me ec.,t%fo .i:hi 





yu n«!t wha 
i^elli^no 




:t«>d"^aigpn, 
^l^^as^'n^^that typlTof *eti 




in terms of your involvemenC with him, what period of^iiBF 
was spanned in terms of this particular project with North? 

A From August 1981 until 16 January 1985. 

Q And during that period of time you were working on 

the same project or a succession of projects? 

A I was working on one from the intelligence 



iimsfflD 



247 



DNCUiSSIilED 



11 



community perspective, and then I was appointed, at the 
request of Mr. McMahon and with the approval of Mr. Casey, I 
joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense and worked — I 
worked in a more senior capacity. 

Q You joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
when? You mentioned it before, but I missed it. 

A November 1982. 

Q And in your position with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense you continued to work with Colonel 
North; is that right? 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And again that would be on the same subject matter 
that you'd been working on before? 

A Yes. 

Q And as to that period of time you do not feel at 
liberty to describe what that work was; is that right? 

A I'm not authorized and will not provide details on 
the substance of the program, except to state that it had 
nothing to do with Iran, Central America, Saudi Arabia, or 
any type of foreign intelligence operations of any sort. 

Q During the period up through January of 1985 the 
principal responsible for that project would have been whom? 
Would it have been the National Security Advisor or someone 
else? 

A I'm not authorized to say. 



BNttftSStFtED 



248 




12 

Q From whom would you require authorization, Mr. 
Allen? 

A I would have to consult with senior officials in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which I can do. 

Q And again, so I understand, your contact with 
North would have been on an essentially daily basis up 
through January of 1985? 

A Essentially daily. We met frequently. We talked 
on the secure telephone frequently. We compared memoranda. 
I was Deputy Director of a program in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and there were other senior officials 
who were in contact on this program with Colonel North. 

Q Did Mr. Duane Clarridge have any responsibilities 
vis-a-vis this matter? 

A To the best of my knowledge, none whatsoever. I'm 
not even certain he was authorized access to it. 

Q With regard to the briefings of Director Casey, 
you indicated that he would be briefed periodically on the 
matters that-,you and Colonel North were working on; is that 
correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Would it have been your custom to have Colonel 
North present when those briefings of Director Casey took 
place? 

A I don't think Colonel North was ever present. 



wmmi 



249 



uHtussm 



13 



Q So your briefings of Casey would have been 
briefings that you yourself conducted; is that correct? 

A Yes, sir. And also I worked for a program manager 
at Defense who on one or more occasions briefed Mr. Casey on 
the progress of the program and I sat in on those briefings. 

Q Can you identify the program manager at Defense? 

A I'm not authorized to do so. 

Q Now from the interview that we had with you, you 
characterized Colonel North's^ role in this matter as not 
being operational. Does that continue to be your 
characterization? 

A Absolutely. He was the NSC staffer responsible 
for this specific account. He carried out, I think with 
remarkable ability, the coordination role. He first reported 
to General Schweitzer and then later to Thomas Re id, and then 
later to William Clark on the program. He did an 
extraordinary job of coordination of an extremely difficult 
interagency activity. He excelled in every respect. 

Q General Schweitzer left the NSC approximately at 
what point in time? 

A General Schweitzer had a tendency to talk about 
how the Soviets were going t^ iav ada Boland.4U|^jhe latd a 
^ygroc^A speech that he gave during his meetings; 
unfortunately, he gave it to the press, he gave it to a group 
of Army cadres with the press present, and he left the NSC 



imebtsstFtED 



250 



\missm 



14 



about — I was in Los Angeles and I remember seeing the 
headline when he was dismissed from the NSC. Can I take that 
for the record and get that date back to you? 

Q If you can give me an approximate year, that would 
help. 

A 1982, I suspect. 

Q The main thing I wanted to focus on was what 
contact you had with General Schweitzer after he left. Did 
you have any contact with him? 

A No, sir. I saw him in the EOB in the halls a 
couple of times and said hello and we chatted a little bit, 
just personal pleasantries — no substantive conversations. 

Q Specifically do you recall having any contact with 
General Schweitzer in the period September 1986-forward? 

A _v;.AdB|fa,|j Wltg t5|p|fe,ftig^n the October '86 time frame 
where we simply exchanged pleasantries. He indicated he was 
doing some special consulting work for the NSC. 

Q Do you re^^l discussing with him at that time, or 
any time subsequent to September 1986, his employment with a 
firm called Geomilitech Consultants Corporation? 

A No, sir. I did not. General Schweitzer and I 
simply reminisced about the program that we had worked on 
jointly before he was asked to leave the NSC. 

Q You have no recollection of discussing with 
General Schweitzer his efforts to obtain covert procurement 



mtmma 



251 



M^SIEliD 



15 



contracts for Geomilitechl 

A I did not discuss that with him. 

Q Did you have knowledge that General Schweitzer was 
endeavoring to obtain such contracts for Geomilitech? 

A No, sir, I did not. 




Q With regard to the appointment that you received 
as NIO for Counterterrorism, can you describe for me how you 
acquired that job? 

A In the October time frame of 1986 John McMahon — 



Q 1980 



MkftSSIKD 



252 



UNCUWKD 



16 



A 1984, I'm sorry — called me on secure at the 
Pentagon and asked me to come see him. He offered me the 
position of National Intelligence Officer for both narcotics 
and counterterrorism, stating that Mr. Casey would welcome my 
return to the Agency. There was some negotiation over this 
because I had been asked and offered an even more senior 
position at the Pentagon, so there was some deliberations 
which did not really come to closure until the January time 
frame. So I finally came back in mid-January 1985 to assume 
the position. 

Q with regard to that position, there had been one 
prior NIO for counterterrorism? 

A That's correct,] 

Q Did you have discussions with Mr. McMahon or Mr. 
Casey zJsout changing, broadening the mandate of the 
counterterrorism NIO? 

A Mr. NcMeihon and Nr. Casey indicated that they 
wanted a more activist National Intelligence Officer. As I 
recall, Mr. McMahon said that he expected me to shake the 
intelligence comunity up a bit, that terrorism was an 
extremely high priority of the Administration, and that more 
work needed to be done in that arena. 

I proceeded to undertake a number of initiatives 
that I thought would satisfy Mr. Casey and Mr. McMahon and by 
the time Mr. McMahon had left the Agency I think he was 



m&mm 



253 



yi(UM0i4i>iiii.i^ 



17 



satisfied we had a lot of activity under way, and Mr. Casey 
encouraged me to take a very active role within the 
community. 

Q Let me focus in on the gestation period, if you 
will, October-November 1984 when you were considering taking 
the job. Did you at that point have discussions with McMahon 
or Casey in more specific terms on the new policy, new 
direction, new approach that you would take to the NIO 
position for counterterrorism? 

A Not in any great detail. Mr. McMahon and Mr. 
Casey indicated I should come in and take a hard look at what 
needed to be done. Mr. Gates also supported it. He was 
chairman of the National Intelligence Council. So I did that 
immediately, but we did not have any detailed discussions on 
just what needed to be done. The idea was that we were in a 
more reactive mode than we should be; we needed to be in a 
more active way in counterterrorism. 

I was familiar with National Security Decision 
Direct ive^^Hbecause I had discussed it with Colonel North 
some time earlier. I also was aware of National Security 
Decision Directive^^^ which was issued, I guess, in 1982, 
because I had worked closely with Major Chris Shoemaker, who 
was Colonel North's predecessor. So I was aware that there 
was dissatisfaction throughout the government on the United 
States counterterrorist policies. s ^*°": 



wmwrn 



254 



UNCUSSiED 



Q Let li c^^|iudr^to~Nat^on^t S*eun^i£»ireot ive 
HH| You-dtt^ ypt^tjeugaii^fanlr TrttdBji^th . When would you 
have discussed that with North? 

A Probably — I think it was issued in April of 
1984, about that time fram«pE^i>6ias he was helping 
coordinate the final drafts of that. 

Q Can you relate for me your best recollection of 
the nature or content of your discussions with North about 
National Security ^^g^^n^^^| ' "«^- "^ ~?" . .,~ "^ 

..A I-ipwib ^5PVBgbri*lE^|scussion. I was in his 
office discussing the other classified common project, and he 
indicated that he had been working on the draft trying to 
coordinate with a variety of agencies, and that he felt he 
had in this draft the proper direction to government agencies 
and departments so that a more activist approach to 
counterterrorism could be undertaken. He was working at it 
quite hard, as I recall. 

Q What was the nature of the activism that he was 
trying to inculcate, if you will, at that time? 

A Well, he wanted, for one thing, an intelligence 
fusion center which would bring together on a 
multidisciplinary nature! 

Iso that they could quickly compare intelligence and 
integrate the intelligence. That was one of his greatest 
desires,.^ 



255 




19 

^^1S Ifoi^ou woul4^ M'^^iiiad that ig^^Bsnctkon. in the 
spring of^'^84. or^lBiereabouts wij^ regard to*tha€^T»tioh of 
fusion, if you will, of intelligence matters on terrorism. 
Was that something you considered and discussed with North at 
the time you were contemplating becoming NIO for -^a^ 
counterterrorism? 

A We had a discussion, I believe, in the December 
'84 time frame when I was still weighing whether to come back 
to CIA and join the Agency as the National Intelligence 
Officer. He went over that and his views on that in late 
1984. It made a lot of sense to me, and we have subsequently 
implemented that type of integrated center at CIA. 

Q When did the implementation take place at CIA? 

A That occurred in February '86 with the formation 
of CIA' s^l^^^HH^H^^I^^H with as 

director. 

Q So in a sense you would see the gestation at least 
of some aspects of^^^Jgoing back North's concerns and 
interests in 1984; is that right? 

A That's correct. I think he had a very inspired 
idea, which I think has proved correct. 

Q In terms of your discussions with Colonel North 
about the NIO position for counterterrorism, did you have 
discussions with Colonel North about whether he thought it 
was a good idea or not a good idea that you take that 



IIHCIISMD 



256 




20 

position? 

A He wanted me very much to stay in the Department 
of Defense. He opposed my returning to CIA very strongly. 

Q Why was that? 

A Because he felt that the country's national 
security, because he believed that the project on which I was 
a senior manager, the number two manager — and I would have 
been elevated to the overall manager — was more important by 
far than coming back to work on counterterrorism. I'm. 
convinced that was a very sincere belief on his part and 
there was a very major struggle over whether I should come 
back or not. And I remember Mr. Casey joking that Defense 
had kidnapped me but that he had liberated me. 

Q Do you know if North discussed with Director Casey 
the merits of your return to CIA? 

A Very definitely more than once, and both Mr. 
McMahon and Mr. Casey said that Colonel North adamantly 
opposed my return. 

Q Do you have any present recollection of when 
Colonel North would have had these conversations with 
Director Casey? 

A I would believe that would be in the November- 
December time frame of 1984. 

Q As of that period of time, November-December 1984, 
did you have any impression of the relationship between 



wmmw 



257 




21 

Colonel North and Director Casey, as to whether it was close, 
a working relationship? Can you describe that? 

A Well, it seemed to me that it was certainly a 
developing relationship and one where Colonel North had a 
great deal of respect for Mr. Casey because he spoke highly 
of the Director. 

Q As of that time, the fall of 1984 — winter of 
1984 — did you have any understanding of the extent to which 
Colonel North was in contact with Casey? Were they meeting 
on a regular basis, to your knowledge? 

A It was my understanding that they met 
occasionally, based on what Colonel North stated. 

Q When you say "met occasionally", do you have any 
sense of how frequently they were meeting? 

A I can't state that. They occasionally, I think, 
had breakfast on Saturday mornings together, but that was 
only what Colonel North told me. 

Q In terms of the knowledge that you had in the 
latter part of 1984 about occasional breakfasts on Saturday 
between Director Casey and Colonel North, it was your 
understanding from Colonel North that such breakfasts 
continued through '85 and '86; isn't that correct? 

A I don't know whether they had breakfasts. They 
continued to have regular contact. 

Q In the early part of 1985 when you took over your 



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22 



position as NIO , let me focus on the first quarter of 1985, 
to what extent would you have had contact with Director Casey 
during the outset of your new position? 

A Mr. Gates, as Chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council, encouraged the National Intelligence 
Officers to meet on a regular basis with the Director to 
discuss substantive issues of concern to each NIO, to brief 
the Director on intelligence estimates that may be under way 
or important intelligence issues. One of my activities was 
to chair the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, 
a committee I still chair, to explain how each agency was 
approaching counterterrorism issues, so I met periodically 
and regularly with Mr. Casey one-on-one. 

Q With regard to your work, to what extent would you 
have been in contact wltW'lifS^rKLam Fuller, who 
th^^^SlF East and South Asia at '"^ 




A We had occasional^ii^Rnft^sations. He was a Middle 
Eastern specialist. Fifty percent of all international 
terrorist inci^lKs o<^St in the Middle East or originate out 
of the Middle East. It was important that he and I maintain 
regular contact; 

Q And you did in fact do so? 

A We did, yes. 

Q In January-February 1985 were you aware that 
Director Casey Wi^ maiking an approach to^^^^^^^^^Hto seek 



259 



ONCUSSIHED 






A No, sir. 

Q And you were not aware at that time of an approach 
by Director Casey toH^^^^^^^^^for assistance to the 
Nicaraguan contras^ is tlat correct? 

A I was not aware. 

Q Were you aware of any approach by Casey] 
|support I 

iNicaraqrua? 

A I was not aware of that. 

Q So, to understand you, you would not be aware that 
on February 25, for example, Director Casey was meeting with 
Admiral Poindexter to discuss those matters and funding for 
the contras more generally? 

A I was not aware of that. 

Q Were you aware at that time, February of 1985, of 


pwn as the I^nimbo that was bringing arms, thought 



to be bringing arms and ammunition from Korea to Nicaragua? 

A I don't think so. The name is familiar and there 
was some publicity, I think, eibout this. 

Q There's been f i i i 1 j . Wii eiil^liiAi^mWMMMl \ nii 
have any contemporaneous knowledge? 

A At the time I had no knowledge. 



260 



wmssm 




A No, I was not aware of that^ 

Q You did or did not have knowledge of a trip tj^t 
General Singlaub would have made t^^^^^^^^^^^^^H in 
January o^R.*lfe? 

A No, I'm not aware of it. 

Q Did you know GeMRral ^S^laub at that tli 
ion't know General Singlaub at all. 

Q In April of 1985 Mr. Fuller prepared a memorandum 
for the Director with some thoughts on Iraig T?cjyou recall 
seeing that memorandum? ^^^s^ ^^£ .^^^^F' \^^^^^L 

A I don't recall seeing it. I recall discxrtt mjgiig .jgg 
our mgn ^lfc jSBf f meetings of the National Ir 
Cq^l^J. where Mr. Fuller talked about Soviet initiatives ~- ~ 
^^^VQl^t^ly directed again^^UBSB^^^e need for the United 
States to find proper countermeasures to whi'C^^thought was 
increasing Soviet aggressiveness. It is conceivable that I 
saw the memorandum at the time. I HtSv^^Sml^^^^O^^^^- ^^ • 

But I recall discussions and I recall that Mr. 
Fuller was working on an estimate, I believe, in the May '85 
time frame on Iran, and that~wsi^ra^^WBP^^3iWy SC staff 
meetings. 

Q Let me show you the memorandum. It's a memorandum 
dated April 4, 1985 from Graham Fuller to the Director which 








261 



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25 



I'd like to have marked as Exhibit 1. —"^^ 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 1 
for identification.) 
Q Mr. Allen, if you'd take a moment to glance 
through the memo — take as much time as you like. What I'd 
like you to do is tell me first if you've seen this 
memorandum and, secondly, your best recollection of when you 
would have seen it. 

(Pause. ) 

It has an NIC number on it, NIC 01799-85. It's 
carried in our records — that is, the Senate Committee 
records — as Document Number C-2519 to 2520. 

A I think I was aware of the fact that Mr. Fuller 
was concerned about this issue at the time it was discussed 
in the NIC staff meetings. I saw the estimate that was 
produced in May of 1985. I cannot recall reading this 
memorandum until, I believe, after the 25th of November 1986. 
It is conceivable that he sent me a copy. This is what I and 
other NIOs do frequently, where we will become seized with an 
issue, discuss it with specialists in the community, and put 
together our own think piece, as Mr. Gates has explained, and 
send it to the Director for provoking thought. 

We do this without necessarily informing the 
Chairman first. We give him an information copy. We would 



262 



uHsyiSsra 



26 



send copies to key people in the Department of State, 
Defense, and the National Security Council staff. I did it 
frequently. 

Q In terms of what would have prompted Mr. Fuller to 
prepare this specific memorandum, you do not know what would 
have prompted him to do it? 

A I don't want to speculate on that, except in the 
context of what he stated at the staff meetings, where he saw 
the disintegration of the Khomeini regime, a very ill 
Ayatollah, factional infighting, and Soviet initiatives both 
through military exercises to the north of Iran and through, 
as I recall, subrosa subversion. He felt it was a matter of 
real concern at the time. 

Q In terms of prompting a request or the language 
that you all seem to prefer, tasking by either the National 
Security Council or staff, or Mr. Casey, do you have any 
knowledge of any such prompting or tasking to Mr. Fuller in 
April 1985? 

A I understand that he was tasked by the NSC at the 
time. 

Q And you have that understanding from what? 

A Mr. Fuller, I believe, indicated he had a tasking 
from the NSC to produce an estimate. In the summer of 1986 
Mr. Ledeen indicated that he had encouraged Mr. McFarlane to 
ask for an estimate. 



ItNetJtSSMD 



263 



WJ^i 




27 



Q And Mr. Ledeen indicated that to you in the summer 
of 1986; is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Let's go back now to contemporaneous knowledge, 
though. In the spring of 1985 did you yourself have any 
knowledge of a request for this kind of work product going 
from the NSC to Mr. Fuller? 

A As far as the estimate was concerned, it is my 
understanding that it came from the NSC, and I can't recall 
who did the tasking. 

Q Now as an NIO your staffing resources, your own as 
counterterrorism NIO or what — who did you have as a staff? 

A In 1985? 

Q Yes, sir. 

A I ha 
|l had chief of staf 

Q In terms o 

A That's correct. 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^^Hhome , if you will, where was he from 
at that point? ^=&,- r. 

A ^^^^^^^^^^came from the President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board, where he had worked for a period 
of time. He had also worked with Air Force intelligence at 
one time. He worked on the Soviet Union. "^'l: 
^^^^^^^^^B background? 
■:cl 





264 



musMn 



28 



A ^^^^^^^^^^^H background is out of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency as a current intelligence officer. He 
worked then at the Intelligence Community Staff and began 
around 1982 focusing on counterterrorism, and he joined me 
when I came aboard, shortly after I came aboard as the 
National Intelligence Officer. 

Q Anc 

A She came out of the Intelligence Community Staff, 
too. 




individi _ _^^^ -,=-—, 

in th^^iiAeilliMlica pir«<^ii:iit^^ 

A Yes , and I tasJcthAm f requaifg 



MtSWO 



265 






29 

is the office d^ctorsP^ l?«^li«^J^ angijgfsts on a 
frequervfe^lwsais. *''" 7 '~ .iy..;=^^^p:^ ,■ --C^"*-:-^ * -^ 

Then there ^^I^^H^^^^^^^^I ^^ ^ 

recollect. 

A That's correct, sir, and that wa 

an(^|^^^^^^H^^^^and I, of course, would task that office 
for support. 

Q As betweei^^^^^^^^^^Boutf it anc 

"^ith one of these groups 
as opposed to the other more^ftoiey 

A Well, at the time, in 1985 ^^^^^^H had a 

counterterrorist staff withir 
Tha t ~(Am^if^rnr t^^^ftiT WHK^I xi 





H 

February 

A 

counterterrori 

Q And tracing that back in time, in 1985, insofar as 
you were looking for Intelligence Directorate assistance 
basically you would have worked with the Counterterrorism 



mwm 



266 




tHi 




30 



group of analysts that were inl 

A That is correct. And I did tasking of those 
analysts, along witt^^^^^^^^| in particular. 

Q Moving into May of 1985, Mr. Fuller did another 
memorandum for the Director. I am certain that you are 
familiar with that memorandum as of today. Do you recollect 
when you would have become familiar with that memorandum? 
A -^-.^an _youg^entify the doci fflwnf ? _ 
'^ -Q -^ '^IM^' Wi^ f w t show it^^ yo^ Lat ^^^^v'^ytia vt . 
Fullecfs-aAmo of Hay 17, 1985 to the Director, subject" 
matter: Toward a Policy on Iran. My copy of this document 
has attached to it Talking Points for the Director dated May 
22, 1985, which I will show you as well. In terms of 
identifying the document, t:her«'s^^l kin^kof numB^jp- on it. 
Th«Jai>jri^. frmpj tti pt^ ra^lOK ging system is document number C- 
2243 tfif?ough^348. Executive Registry numbering system is 
Executive Registry 235 through 240. And God knows what the 
other numbers on those mean. 

After Mr. Allen has a chance to look at it, would 
you mark it as Exhibit 2? 
(Pause. ) 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 2 
for identification.) 
A I recall reading this in the spring of 1985. Mr. 



y 



267 




Fuller provided me a ^py',y^ .^I~' ^~ * 

Q To heip^u^ft^s in on t*atx it would be your 

recollection'that you v^BU^M MI^w n this -^^^ent at or 
about the feime of iS dftlt-r^ffli«l-ittty J.9*5? "^ 

A I feeL,jeonf4!^nt ^%^id. .^_'" 'W*^ _ Wt. 




ItedEJjyt Mr. Fuller about 
p writitHJkby Iff. 






this matter Prior t^; ft 
Full^^ 

Xk ^miiii ^tanTiiTi'lll^^^^itT 

Q There's a reference on page 3 of the memorandum to 
a suggestion by Mr. Fuller that one avenue for improving 
relations with Iran or establishing relations with Iran would 
be to open up arms sales by American allies to Iran. Do you 
see that? 

A Yes, I recall that. 

Q Do you recollect discussing first with Mr. Fuller 
that suggestion in May of 1985, you yourself? 

A No, I did not discuss it with him. 

Q Do you have a recollection of discussing that 
suggestion with Mr. Casey in May of 1985? 

A I have no recollection of discussing this 
memorandum with Mr. Casey. 

Q Do you recall your reaction to Mr. Fuller's 
suggestion of opening up arms sales to Iran? 

A I don't recall my reaction to that aspect. The 



UNCtJtSSIFIED 



268 



UHEkl^W 



32 



idea of trying to end the geostrategic vacuum in Southwest 
Asia I endorsed, that we ought to do some probing into 
Southwest Asia, and I firmly believed that was an appropriate 
issue to suggest, that all the options be explored. -v^~^ 

Q frankly I suspect that that notion in a general 
sense ranks alongside motherhood and apple pie. When we get 
down to the nitty-gritty of having allies sell arms to Iran, 
do you recollect your reaction to that notion? 

A I don't recall. I think I mentally dismissed it 
as not a very likely proposition. 

Q Specifically focusing in on what allies Mr. Fuller 
might have had in mind, if I am remembering that portion I 
think he does make mention of Israel as an ally that he might 
have been contemplating. Whether he does or doesn't, do you 
recall understanding in May of 1985 that Mr. Fuller had in 
mind the sale of arms by Israel to Iran? 

A I never had such a conversation with Mr. Fuller, 
and I have no idea what he was thinking. I just can^ 



SSSt ^^ou^Mk* occasion to discuss wit 




in May of 1985 his reaction to Mr. Fuller's May 17 
memorandum, specifically his suggestion that the United 
States contemplate its allies selling arms to Iran? 

A I did not have a conversation witt^^^^^^^^H 
Q Mr. Allen, in the late spring-summer 1985, the 



«(tCt«SIFIED 



269 



|Jl\'viiW'Wvi«3M'5KD 



33 



period May, June, July, 1985, what responsibilities, if any, 
did you as NIO for counterterrorism have with regard to 
tracking efforts to release the American hostages that were 
held in Lebanon? 

A I did not have a direct and central role at the 
time. The White House, Mr. McFarlane in the White House had 
diracted th&t. aF ^gltaf« r**^inri tjllii fapiin be estabfisl^d, X 




270 




My role was not direct. I had global 
responsibilities in counterterrorism and I did not have an 
operational responsibility. But analytically I continued to 
look at the issue. 

Q Let me sort of back up and go step by step. First 
of all, how do we spell J 

A 

Q And his titl« 

A He was chief of what was then called the — it's 
changed its name. It's now cal] 





Q And, if I am understanding you correctly, there 
was no formal working relationship between you and your group 
and him; is that correct? 

A That's cotrect. But we interacted and I had 




271 



UHCUSSlEe 



35 



weekly meetings witt^^^^^^^^^ or tried to have weekly 
meetings or biweekly meetings to exchange views. We had a 
very mutually-supportive type relationship. 

Q Now I didn't really understand your reference to 
McFarlane and the White House direction. Take me back. 

A Prior to the establishment in late December 1985 
under me an interagency hostage location task foi 




individuals were not dedicated full 
time to locating and determining the condition of the 
hostages, but these were agency representatives to an 
interagency working group. 




I read the reports of those 
meetings. It included agencies like^^HoiA, DEA, State, as 
well as CIA. 

Q You were not formally designated to be part of 
that working group? 

A Not at all. 

Did that group have a name? 

Called the hostage location task force. 

Was Colonel North a member of that group? 

Colonel North attended many of the meetings but 



Q 
A 

Q 
A 

not all. 



SfCl 



272 




Q You became aware, did you not, in mid-June of 1985 
that Director Casey had heard from a friend or business 
acquaintance by the name of John Shaheen that a gentleman by 
the name of Cyrus Hashemi had made a proposal on how the 
hostages, U.S. hostages in Beirut might be exchanged or 
freed? 

A I was not aware of that initiative in the summer 
of 1985. Mr. Casey later recounted that to me, I believe 
more than once. But not in 1985. I believe he recounted 
those incidents in 1986. 

Q Let's go with your memory in terms of when you 
recall becoming aware. That you would place that in 1986? 

A I believe it was in 1986. He mentioned his old 
colleague Mr. Shaheen, who I believe worked with him in the 
Office of Strategic Services, but it was more anecdotal than 
anything else. 



273 




fi*!!: 



r'^T 




37 

Q Again, let's go over what you're recollecting. 
What is the context that you recall Casey bringing this to 
your attention? 

A It probably was in the context r , 

which occurred, I believe, in the summer of 1985 
that Mr. Casey was talking about his old colleague Shaheen. 

Q When and under what circumstances did Casey 
mention to you that his colleague, friend, business 
acquaintance, Shaheen had mentioned this? 

A You're going to have to give me a moment to 
contemplate that, if you will, please. 

Q Take your time. 
(Pause. ) 

A I cannot recall precisely the date, but it seems 
to me it was around the time of the McFarlane trip to Tehran. 

Q So that would be May of '86? 

A In that time frame. He provided details on that 
as well as details on his understanding ot 




was more or less in the context 
of that discussion, but I can't put a precise meeting and a 
precise date on it. 

Q Give me as much specificity as you can on what it 
was that Director Casey told you eQjout what Mr. Shaheen had 
told him. 

•»im m-viLiL 



m\'. 





274 



uNcmnED 



38 



A Only that this was an old friend who had cancer, 
who was terminally ill, and that Shaheen had been in touch 
with Cyrus Hashemi and Hashemi, I guess, was under indictment 
for some violation of U.S. Code, and that there was a 
proposal, and I cannot recall the details of that proposal as 
described to me by Mr. Casey. 




Q Shaheen, it was your understanding, was dying of 
cancer in June of 1985? 

A In that time frame. 

Q And you had this conversation with Mr. Casey in 
May of 1986, to your best recollection? 

A I can't put a time frame, but I'd say maybe in the 
spring of 1986, about the time of the McFarlane trip to Iran. 

Q Is it your recollection that Mr. Casey indicated 
that Mr. Shaheen had spoken with Mr. Casey directly or had 
some intermediary spoken with Mr. Casey? 



BNWSSffJED 



275 



uNcusm 



39 



A It was my understanding that Mr. Shaheen had 
talked to Mr. Casey directly, but that's just my 
understanding . 

Q Do you have a recollection of Mr. Roy Furmark's 
name being mentioned in connection with the Hashemi 
information that Mr. Shaheen has passed on? 

A I don't recall that name in that time frame, no. 

Q Do you have a recollection of reviewing this 
matter as it was mentioned in the Tower Commission report? 

A May I see the Tower Commission report? 

Q Vou can see it and let me read the passages. 

A I thought you were going to read it; I'm sorry. 

Q Quoting from page B-13 of the Tower Commission 
report, which says "On June 17, reference 1985, the Director 
of Central Intelligence heard from his long-time friend, John 
Shaheen, that a Dr. Cyrus Hashemi, under indictment -for 
attempting to sell arms to Iran, claimed to have discussed 
with the Iranian Foi^^m|p||0bry an exchange of hostages for 
the release of the Da'wa prisoners in Kuwait, TOW missiles 
and a nolle prosequi for Hashemi." The reference is a Casey 
to the Chief, Near East for Operations, who was then^^^B 
^^H I think, June 17, 1985. 

A I recall reading that in the CIA Inspector 
General's chronology. I also recall reading that in the 
Tower Commission report. 



HNEtASSIflED 



276 



UNClASSIEe 



40 



Q with that reference before you as kind of a memory 
hook, if you will, do you have any further or additional 
recollection of knowledge that you would have had, and I now 
really want to focus on contemporaneous knowledge in June of 
1985 that Shaheen had made such representations to Director 
Casey? 

A I had no knowledge at the time of this activity. 

Q Let's pursue it just a few more moments. It would 
be your testimony here today that you had no knowledge in 
June of 1985 not only about this matter but also in June of 
1985 you had no knowledge of a joint business venture 
comprised of Mr. Hashemi, Mr. Adnan Khashoggi, Mr. Roy 
Furmark and Mr. Ghorbanifar to engage in sales of goods to 
Iran in exchange for oil from Iran; is that right? 

A I have no contemporaneous knowledge in June of 
1985 of that activity. As you recall, Mr. Furmark described 
something like that in my discussion with him on 16 October 
1986. 

Q Yes, sir, and eventually we will get to October of 
1986. But in June of 1985 you had no knowledge of these 
activities? 

A No, none at all. 

Q Mr. Allen, let me pursue the thought a bit 
further. Let me suggest to you that following the contact 
that's referred to in the Tower Commission report there were 



DNEliSMD 



277 



UHGU^ffi 



41 



additional contacts made to the Central Intelligence Agency 
to the effect that Mr. Hashemi and other folks with contacts 

Iran into^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^fand Manucher 

Ghorbanifar in June and July of 1985 who were proposing an 
exchange of American hostages for various items of interest 
to the Iranians, including TOW missiles in June-July 1985. 

Again, did you have any contemporaneous knowledge 
of those contacts with the Central Intelligence Agency? 
A I had no contemporaneous knowledge. 
Q Let me show you materials that have been provided, 
regrettably in an expurgated form, which I hope to remedy at 
some point with the Central Intelligence Agency, but let me 
show you first a cable dated July 9, 1985, which has all 
kinds of numbers all over it. The Senate's number is C-1477. 
The Central Intelligence Agency number is CIIN 1034, which 
I'd like to have marked as Exhibit 3. 

(The document iStKf^B^^^^ 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 3 
for identification.) 
Second, let me show you a document from Peter to 
Arnie, dfi^UJuly 11, 1985, which has a Senate number on it 
somewhere which I can't find for the moment, but also has a 
CIIN number, 1033, on it, which will be Exhibit 4. 

~'i^:. ^ (The document referred to was 

marked Allen Exhibit Number 4 



llNttfSSW 



278 



UHSkASSIEIED 



42 



for identification.) 
Exhibit 5 has a Senate Select Committee number, c- 
1475. It has a CIIN number, 1032, and it is a cable dated 
July 12, 1985. Again, regrettably it's also been expurgated 
by the Central Intelligence Agency, which is a matter we will 
take up with them once again at a later time. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 5 
for identification.) 
Let me show you another part of the set. It's a 
companion to one of the cables that you've already seen, but 
it has Senate number C-1477, CIIN number 1034, and is a cable 
of July 9, 1985. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 6 
for identification.) 
A Exhibit 3 and 6 are duplications. 
I'm ready to respond to questions. 

loo)( 

any tima? 



,,^«^^ 



those do 




contemporaneous -knowled^l^^h^^'yq|ph«d o^^lisiie isatt« 

lISSfftfD 



279 



UHCL^iED 



•~iA ijlfiacl no con%imporw«oui^ IcnowiedM offfiese ,76- -. 
matters, of whe^^as Joiy-T.sfflK' - _..£.. .^ny::- :"""X,. ■- ' 

- Q J^ aifl^ time dfit ItrcggW tS ig«ar._attentJb>n tfift the 
Central "Intel l ij p ft ce Agency, though its Operatiojut^ 
Directorate^ or any other DiFagtorate^ waa engag«;^ is^ the-r 



activit 




ill thoui 



^^__^ ^ ., ?ig context ;:gE 

ha^BBo JbowleJItC Spuftydll^i^^^Bi*'- - Cj^^l n-a generic va.%z 
was I -TTr-nr nn-r^ifiT'TmilliMl mil j-T- D^Sf^t<^f 
Operations to try to locate and determine the condition of 
the American hostages. 

Q Have you at any point in time, up through and 
including today, had discussions with any Central 
Intelligence Agency employee with regard to the contacts or 
attempted contacts by Manucher Ghorbanifar in July of 1985 
relating to the American hostages in Lebanon? 

A Including the conversations up until today, yes, I 
certainly have. I had Mr. Ghorbanifar's 201 file for a 
period of time and reviewed it. I don't recall the specific 
cables here, although unquestionably they were in his file. 
He has about a three-volume file. 

Q Four, as I recollect. 

A It's hard to remember them all. I may have 
actually read these at some time. I don't recall it. I, of 



lEtKSfftEO 



280 



uKey^sKO 



44 



course, have discussed the fact with Mr. Cave that Mr. 
Shackley met with Mr. Ghorbanifar in the fall of 1984 when 
Mr. Ghorbanifar made some proposals relating to the American 
hostages. I, of course, discussed with Mr. Furmark in the 
October and November time frame discussions that he had had 
in 1985 with Mr. Ghorbanifar. 

Q When did you have Mr. Ghorbanifar's 201 file? 

A I believe I had it a couple of times. I had it, I 
guess, in the fall of '86. I became more focused on it. 

Q The fall of '86? 

A Yes. 

Q Can you be a little more specific? Vfhen in the 

fall of '86? 

MR. VAN CLEVE: Excuse me. Did you mean in 1986? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. I was looking at it in the 
fall of 1986. I had the burn notice on Mr. Ghorbanifar in 
December of 1985 after I became aware of who a certain 
individual known ^^^^^^^^^Bas Ascari really was. I don't 
think I ever reviewed M^g^Si^SJi^^hOrBan 1 f «r 2 Of^lTt J e ^^^ 
untiSfch#; f a&^of ittK-^ - -si " ''^^^fe,..J& - - -^ia ar: - ^^- 

1986?^ ■" -^'-^^ ' '-^"^i^-^ —-^- "_^:-."-; ---y- 

_^ -^ I^i^tea pwas aSS^theP^^^Sa^nmi wijar i T l was 




281 




45 

becoming concerned over what I call the first channel, and I 
wanted to again go back and read everything I could about 
Ghorbanifar. I never got through it all because I had at the 
time numerous other duties, but I scanned through it. And it 
sat in my office for a couple of weeks, I recall. 

Q Is there any particular event that you can 
associate your interest in reviewing the 201 file to? Was it 
the trip Mr. Nir made into Washington, D. C. in September of 
'85? Was it the concern over pricing in August of 1985? Was 
it Furmark's visit — excuse me, '86? 

A I suspect it was a combination of those. I wanted 
to review, particularly to go back to see what was in the 
file because Mr. Furmark spoke about Mr. Ghorbanifar having 
raised the issue relating to the hostages, I believe as early 
as January '85. And then, of course, I had heard from other 
people that Mr. Shackley had had a conversation with Mr. 
Ghorbanifar in the fall of '84. 

Q I apologize. I did misspeak. The Nir visit was 
September of '86. Was it at that time you looked at the 
Ghorbanifar 201? 

A I can't' recall the specific date. 

Q You did mention Mr. Furmark. The first occasion 
that you would have had to speak with Mr. Furmark would have 
been in October of '86? 

A 16 October is the first time, 1986, was the first 
hi 



282 



UNCUSSIHED 



time that I met Mr. ^sartc.^rreel^. _ "^ 

Q Is it your racolleeC^ien you would have reviewed 

^je Ghoctenifar sar^n preparatifli^fpr'that conversation in 
Octob«^of 19B6? _ '^'\~~- z^^-'"^--^ 

A .' Itdwt-%-recall 9S^o th^dHMWon. '"1 believe it was 
probably after the «lr vii^^in^o^p^^mber that'll looked 
•^ at the 201, file-. _^ ,^- ", . ^^ ^"^^^ ^-^ ...^^ - ^: 

Q ~But^^a^^ eg^ t^hffT^r^f"^^>^simpJ^^did not 
'^^^^ve knOWle#e of tlye Hj^ aj en J l^jg tji^ WSffiei^Sf^^en 
'""tnl^r^ve WSSSSSt mi^l^^^4l^^^ii^ iJL^«^ c:o^»:t?' 

^-^'Q -,_^^3SrrfPone JegFlttt n U " jULjt g ^lfJB fefe jffia WJt J^^ in July 

: iilFnnT ifl^'HiB jljiiffjl nTjtriJili*' niiJITi Tinii iiTifii it did 

l;%y jUishemi w&^ 




w ^^^ 

Q I'm sorry to be tedious on this, bu 



on LUsiUBUBss _thee4fc^atters 
"tha& c^^itr^^hese 



^lative 



did not 



yiffittsaiifo 



283 



UNWKJ) 



47 



raise with you the Hashemi contacts in June-July 1985 when 
you talked with ^^^^^^H in December of 1985? 

A To the best of my knowledge I did not. 

Q At the same period of time as these cables, July 9 
through 12, 1985, Mr. Bud McFarlane is said to have met with 
Mr. Schwimmer and Mr. Kimche in the Tower report. Did you 
have any knowledge of those meetings going on at that time? 

A Not at that time. 

Q Secretary Shultz told the Tower Commission that he 
knew of Ghorbanifar's identity by July 16, 1985 and indeed he 
knew by July 16, 1985, of the Ghorbanifar burn notice as a 
result of reviewing intelligence reports at that time. Again 
using that as a way of trying to focya. your recollection, 

3U ^MBuself woOia 



d9*»^hat xAfce^L your.^«coll*ttion ,^< 

have iowwiT'e^ffte "l&sheai-^lJferbanirar^^initiati^Fr 

time £rame. 



^.Jt-."-;' 





284 




0^ ^iT 'ji'i* third week of August 1985, according to the 
Tower Commission, Mr. McFarlan^j^yrjJi^^^'gilnp^lt^ ji^jdaen 

r rim liBTwljtt 1 1 in turn had been prepared by Ghorbanifar. That 
col lectUi^ i^g ^tKti^lS^llt0S at^^ l^^^tSarjaJ&k!£w^ 
August of 1985; is that correct? 

A I was not awai 

Q In late August 1985 the National Security Council 
appears to have imposed certain responsibilities on Colonel 
North with regard to the American hostages in Iran and among 
other things had issued or ordered issued to Colonel North an 
alias passport in the name of Willieun P. Goode. Did you have 
any knowledge of Colonel North's involvement in matters 
relating to the American hostages in Lebanon in late August 



of 1985? 



UNCtfflFIED 



285 




. ^ 49 

A Not in that context, but only in the fact that as 
essentially the NSC staffer responsible for coordinating 
counterterrorist activities he was exceedingly active in the 
area of the American hostages in Lebanon. He indicated that, 
but at that point I was not aware he had an alias passport. 

Q Let me come at it another way. You had mentioned 
to us in your interview and in other contexts that the first 
assignment you received from Colonel North relating to these 
matters ddC^ui^lHP on or about September 9, 1985; do you 
recollect that? 

A I recollect it. That is correct. 

Q Do you have a present recollection of any 
assignments that you would ha^Vv reti^ved Ji^l^nL Aiel No^h 
reiatif^ ^^^ttM Ibnerican hostages in Lebanon prior to 
September 9, 1985? 

" A ■^' B* ^Si^l^HBblflBll^rom time to time on the 



Iranian involv^||Bnt in the holding of American hostages in 
Lebanon and assessment of captors involved. But th e taski ng 
was sporadj 




286 



DC 


50 


D^M Eh 


■i 





\OTAl- 



287 




Q Let me drop back and kind of come at it this way. 



tiCtJtSStFlEO 



288 



uHcussra 



52 



The September 9 date, what is it that jogs your recollection 
that that's when Colonel North got in ^6tieh with you? Why is 
the September 9 date one you can pick out with that kind of 
definition? ~ 

A Well, because he called in the morning on secure. 
He spoke with some excitement and stated that it was 
imperative that the intelligence community be tasked with 
increasing collection immediately on Iran and Lebanon, that 
he could not provide details but that he anticipated an early 
hostage release from Lebanon, perhaps involving William 
Buckley. He provided a name, quite garbled, but with the 
research of a Directorate of Intelligence analyst I was able 
to i dentify the 

I provided that i nformation 

began the 

tasking. It is my understanding ttit 

[does not recall that conversation and that tasking, 
and I've been over that witf 

several times. They do not dispute necessarily my 
version. They apparently have no written records at the time 
of the tasking. 

Q You are putting your finger on one of the things 
that puzzles me. Do you have a written record, a 
contemporaneous written record of Colonel North getting in 

icj 





289 



UNEUSSiku 



53 



touch with you on the morning of September 9? 

A No, I did not because of the extreme sensitivity. 
I felt it behooved me not to put that in writing at the time. 

Q Mr. Allen, I've got high regard for your memory, 
but there must be something else that you are holding onto 
that ties your memory into that date of September 9. what is 
it that helps you feel certain? 

A Because, as I said, we researched the nane'^^^^H 

The Directorate of 
Intelligence analyst assisted me in that effort and her name 

I recall going through this effort in 
order to perform the 




^^^^^ >lonel North called me back more than once that 
week r 

It was only on the evening of the 13th of 
September we saw^^^^^^^HB^H 
things very distinctly and that call from Colonel North I 
recall with exceptional clarity. 

Q Believe me, I'm not disputing that with you, but 
do you have or have you seen a piece of paper, a document, a 
writing, a tangible item with the date September 9 on it 
which you use to bolster your recollection? 
A I do not have that. 

Q Moreover, Director Casey also remembered September 
Is I 



82-688 0-88-11 



290 



QHsy^^i^ 



54 



9 with some -clarity with regard to testimony that he was 
going to give in December of 1986. Anything that you can 
think of that would have that magic date on it that would 
help us focus in on that? 

A Well, the Independent Counsel has my files. It's 
possible that the research that was done on the individual's 
name might well be in that file because the analyst prepared 
a little brief summary of what we )cnew about the individual, 

and the information we had on him. But I 
don't have my file, so I cannot go back and research it. 

Q Well, I'm not going to beat this horse much 
further, but you may recall that on October 7, 1985, you 
prepared a memorandum foi 

lin which you recited the history of your 
involvement in the Iran initiative] 

Do you recollect that memo? 

A ^^^^^1 yes. I don't recall that date, but I assume 
it was in — 

Q I'm going to show you the memo in a minute, ,but 
the reason I want you to focus on the memo is that it talks 
about September 12 as the date that you were contacted by 
Colonel North as opposed to 'tPrtflatTTg ff pirj tff h tta fl f irt BT^It ^* 

-fi^Mm sew- 



t^t iiiiwl rp~illil iHnfTiTiri T MJff IIT^ laars aitei something 
that had September 9 written on it, which changed your 
recollection. Is that possible? Anything's possible. Do 




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\imsmi 



55 



you recall such an event taking place? 

A No, I don't. It's my view that the call occurred 
about the 9th of September, on or about. 

Q Let me show you the October 7, 1985, memorandum 
which appears to be signed by you that went via 
^^^^^H whose name I probably am mispronouncing. 

A No, that's excellent. 

Q To^^^^^^H That will be Exhibit 7. 

A I reca] 




A I recall that memorandum. 

MS. MC GINN: Can I see that for a moment? 

MR. KERR: Sure. 

THE WITNESS: Clearly there is a discrepancy 
between my recollection of the 9th and my written statement 
of the 12th. 

BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 
Q Yes, sir, and that may not amount to a tinker's 
damn ~ you'll pardon the expression ~ but I'd like to know 
what it is that causes the discrepancy, what it is that 
causes you to be fixed on September 7 when this earlier 
memorandum — excuse me, September 9, when this earlier 
memorandum has you mentioning September 12. 



U 




292 



UNEl^SMO 



56 



A Only that I recall that it was three or four days 
before^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H that we to 
research in the meantime, and that Colonel North called back 
two or three times] 

And he is a rather impatient individual and I 
explained to him that the world didn't work that way, that we 
couldn't manufacture it, that ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H we 



wee* worl&Lng^ Very hard to do so. 



2 th, 



aiid 



»cy of three days. 

MS. MC GINN: May I just ask you, Mr. Kerr, 
whether you got this from ^^ ^^^^^Qj^^^^l We're trying 
to write down a file to identify it for our records. , 

-"-i_,M%^gRR: We got it from the Senate Intelligence 
Committee. My unders ^B ^i^^is ^h <t^gj ate Intelligence 
Committee got it from the Central Intelligence Agency. 

MS. MC GINN: We're just perplexed because there 
are none of the usual identifying numbers on this which would 
help us to identify J^plKCk it^^^-fili^^jjr^r. ^, St 

MR. KERR: Moreover, while we are talking about 
files, I would very much appreciate getting a copy of that 
document that has not been expurgated. I am sure Mr. Allen 
wrote it without those black splotches on it. I would like 
to receivtfl tt^ iii ^*^ l Mlj| fciL<yWh<B^^gBdi<^iei6M 

MS. HUGHES: If we can i(^g3gi.fyjsi^l>ack in our 



iww«r 



293 



DNCkASSn 



57 



files, we'll see what we can do. 

MR. KERR: knov^^^^^^^^^^^^B had 
as I glanced over his shoulder, that vary document in an 
unsplotched format. 

To assist my brother from the House, let me 
identify what we hM^-on: J^h^ : 



It has a Senate Select 
Committee identification — this is the Senate Select 
Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran, et cetera — 

of 1-0644 through 0646. And I believe it^b*«^^_ executi^ye 
rjpgistrj^ n^|^eE_«f ^^k&^^^^em^ t^ yj^^^ y^n •rror. 
Th« mtmitm^SH^^^']^^ th*Vl^ nui^^ orl3^aXT-9^ r^ 
I'm sur« any nOTBtfTToT otiB|||^iBOt>er*TBHr*-"«wi^i*<i to this 
document at the time. 

BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 
Q But in terms of a quest for a piece of paper that 
has the date September 9 on it, this doesn't assist us and 
you can't tell me any other document that I could look at 
that would tell me what happened on September 9? 

A When the Independent Counsel returns my files I 
will certainly research that question. 

MR. KERR:^ Mvsuggestion would be that we break 
for lunch in light of the 12:00 suggestio^^nd return at 
1:00. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: I think I may be a few minutes 
late, but you all pu^ht to go ahead. 



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UNClMS'tRED 



58 



(Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the taking of the 
instant deposition recessed, to reconven«^jit 1:00 p.m. the 
same' day . i ^.^s, . -^ 




295 



UNIMSSMD 



59 



AFTERNOON SESSION 

(1:08 p.m.) 
Whereupon , 

CHARLES E. ALLEN, 
having been previously duly sworn by the Notary Public, was 
further examined and testified as follows: 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE - Resume 
BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 
Q Mr. Allen, let me sort of pick up where we left 
off with regard to the Israeli shipment of 100 TOW missiles 
which occurred August 30 or thereabouts 1985. You did or did 
not have contemporaneous knowledge of that shipment? 
A None. 

Q We understand that there were some reports in the 
Operations Directorate in September about that shipment, 
related to that shipment. Can you tell me when you became 
aware of the fact that the Israelis had shipped 100 TOWs on 
or about 30 August? 

A I think the specific number of 100 I only knew 
about when we were putting together the chronology after the 
25th of November 1986. I knew that there had been some cable 
traffic in October '85 becaus*^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

— had 

commented about some unusual activity. He did not have any 
particulars, but he knew that there had been an emergency 





296 



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60 



landing of an aircraft in Tel Aviv on 15 September 1985. 

He asked what I )cnew about it, and I did not give 
him a direct response. 

Q Did you have knowledge of it at that point? 

A I did not have knowledge of the 100 TOWs, no. 

Q But you had knowledge of the flight? 

A I had knowledge that a flight had made an 
emergency landing in Tel Aviv on the 15th of September 1985 
from press 




Q To help me along, at the time that North first 
talked to you in early September, the 12th or the 9th, he did 
not apprise you of the fact that a shipment of TOWs had been 
mads by Israel to Iran; is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Hfcjawi* Wp^»-aJ^^^^^jjip^r^ ^L 9P you had with 

Kovttij, J^R^^a by pmltg^one ri^ ^at ^rz 

A 

^« 
recollection of what was said in that telephone conversation? 

A I can paraphrase what he said. Essentially, he 
said that there was a veiry sensitive initiative under way 
relating to the American hostages in Lebanon, that there was 
bcKE 





297 




a good potential that a hostage or more than one hostage 
would be released in the coining days, that this information 
had to be handled on a very strict need-to-know basis, that 
he would not wish me to discuss it beyond i9i'e ^rec«or or the 
Deputy Director. 

He indicated that an individual in the Iranian 
government holding a senior position] 





had a garbled name 
that, as I have stated previously, that I researched with the 
aid of an analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence. We had 
a small amount of information on this individual] 

Q You got^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H from North as well as 
the garbled name? "^ 

A .^^feds in the negative. 
Q No . Okay . 

was the essence. He did not explain any other aspect of this 
initiative, provided no background whatsoever, emphasized 
strongly the security aspects. 

Q Elaborate for me a bit on how you all determined 



298 



UIWkASSIHED 



A Well, the name was — he said that thi»^indiv.idual 
hanl rfKo^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H And he 

knew, except that the man had been involved, he thought, in 

terrorist operations. Could we find some information on this 

individual! 

W^K, stt»T~ some "r«Bfe*Sff^5y"'^Sfi" anS^^t , she came 

to me with just a couple of sentences on who this indiv idual 

was. There was an individual namedl 




way of a name 



Mr. North provided 

Q Tfia«»i?ixaipl^i^ ^ma 

trace through the CIA's own 201 files? 

A She did both a trace in the overt files, as we 
call them, on the Directorate of Intelligence side, and she 
also ran a trace, as I recall, through the Directorate of 
Operations. 

Q Again, so that I am perfectly clear, the only name 
that^cu ^^ S^Ru^gy^jft that point was what you ultimately 
determined to be^^^^HH is that right? You had not been 
given the name of any other persons! 

A That's absolutely correct. 

Q When and under what circmnstances did your focus 
broaden beyondl 




IraouniLO 



299 



UNCbASSra 



63 



When we obtained on the 13th of September 1985 the 
The name Ascari 




Now let me pursue. You got that on the 13tr 

What efforts, if any, did you make to 
determine the identity of Ascari at that point? 

A We tried for several hours on the night of the 
13th and the 14th. Colonel North asked us to research the 
name. He said he didn't know who this individual was. Could 
we research it? I called in a biographic analyst, who found 
a couple of names in Iran that were possibly identical, and I 
provided that information to Colonel North, but I was not 
confident that this was the case. It seemed like this was 
another individual or at the time we,] 

Isaid that given the fact we can't identify 
this individual it may not be a true name. 

Q In the course of the search you all made on the 
13th and 14th did you hit, so to speak, on Ghorbanifar's name 
in the course of that search? 

A No. 

Q Do you know whether or not a request was actually 
made to the Operations Directorate to search its files for 
this individual Ascari? 



I! 



I^m 



300 



UNCiASsra 



^* «^ I irri I i in W %mitj^\ recollecld^an of you or people 
working for you getting in touch with eithei^^^^^^Hor^^H 
Ion this aspect of things? 

A No, I don't. 

Q Just pursuing why that is so, again within this 
mode of extreme discretion was that what was preventing you 
from calling up the folks in the Near East Division or what? 

A I believe that security was very much a 
consideration. However, I can't recall. The analysts ^^ay 
we^r^B^^ aska^BKIHKirch of the DO files. I don't know. 




That MUftjfthe only name we had. 

Q Let's talk about what the CIA has access to. The 
name Ascari appears repeatedly in the Ghorbanifar 201 file. 
It is something that he's used for quite some time. I would 
have thought that had you J0^^ft(BM|^^^V™^ Ascari the CIA's 
filing system wdiQ?<L j^JKp^ii'iBi 'Ji'^ ^M^M^^s a possible 
identity. If it didn't happen, I'm curious as to why it 
didn't happen. Is the f 1 1 iniy ■ri^M_"';JiLlMto"ILA*'CLrj' 'i °^ 
what? 

A I can't answer that. 

Q You can't answer that. In terms of who did a 
search on the name, who actually did that for you? 

A I don't recall the analyst's name. 




301 



MklttP 



65 



Q Did you have more than one analyst working for you 
at that time? 

A Conducting the research on this name? 

Q Yes. 

A One or two did the research. 

Q Can you give me the universe of possible analysts 
that would have been working for you at that time? 

A I can't at this stage. I do not recall their 
names. I do know that I recall asking the DDI analyst on 
Iran,|B^^^^| to research that name and she was unable to 
shed any light on the individual's identity. 

f il< ~ 



^^ list, among other things, of the various 
passports that Mr. Ghorbanifar had used going back to 1982 
and that Ascari and several other names, like Krai is and 
several other others, showed up in that file? 

A I recall that that was an alias used, yes. 




Q But you were left with the distinct impression at 
the time North called you in early September that he himself 
did not know the identity of Ascari; is that correct? 

A He stated he did not know who Ascari was. That's 




mm 



302 



uNeussn 



66 




the reason he asked me to do the research. 

Q I understand. In that period of time, September 

9-13, at the outset ware th«r»~ iy>y otta^r tasks given to you 
by Colonel NoiAhl 

*^" "^^ Relatin«^S» Iran'ti^^,^.. 

Q Yes, I'm sorry. 

A Not to my knowledge. 

Q Let wk_ nhew yc 

A 

^. 

A Nine to 13 September? 

Q Yes. 

A Okay, thank you. 

Q In September, let's go at it that way, did there 
come a time when your tasks were broadened, your assignment 
became greater than simply trying to collectl 

Iwith regard to the Iranian situation? 

A I can't r^All a n aaj » g *<ij 'fA ^jt*^ y^pi^^<iPP'^ know 
that there might not have been something relating to Iranian 
terrorism at that time which I was tasked by the NSC and by 
other people on Iranian terrorism throughout the two years 
I've served as the National Intelligence Officer, but I can't 
recall anything specific. 

Q Let me give you a more specific focus. Do you 
recall in this period of time, certainly by the 18th of 



303 



UNCI^SMl) 



67 



September, being told by North of a possible arms deal 
between Iran and international arms dealers] 

»nd a request that you find out 
as much as you could about such a deal? 

A I recall that on the 26th of September 1985 there 
wa s ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^H 

conducting a seminar at an offsite facility of the Agency and 
Colonel North called me and asked why I was down there doing 
that. And I said because I have other r«SB^8ibilities, but 
that ' if anecdotal . 

He asked me to look into ^^^^^^^^^^ 

and he said 

this has nothing to do with what we are doing, what really is 
going on. 

Q We'll come to that in another way, but let me show 
you a memorandum dated September 19, 1985, which appears to 
be from you to Colonel North, which has attached to it a 
memorandum dated September 18,1985 fron^^^^^^^Hof ^^H 

lin the Intelligence Directorate. For 
reference purposes, it's Senate Select Committee document N- 
6224 through 6246. If you would mark that as Exhibit 8. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 8 
for identification.) 




mmwB 



304 



mumm 



68 



Mr. Allen, if you would take a moment to glance 
through that document, I'd liki^eu^ f iraa fejfetell me whether 
it's your memo eid then we'll se» T^'it refreshes your 
recollection on assignments you had gotten from Colonel North 
on the transaction that seems to be referred to there. 
(Pause. ) 
A You have questions on this? 
Q Is that your memo, first of all? 
~ A^feThat's 

meworandum^ 

% «f ■ ■ 

Colonel North, correct? 
A Yes, I did. 
QnL 



p,0tlihtiat 




:erial to 




gov^miSnt or 

for Co^lgaiil HgjrJJu=X' 

A I'm not certain I was checking into it for Colonel 
North because it doesn't say that. It says it was my request 
to the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence for any impending 
arms negotiations between Tehran and possible international 
arms dealers. Conceivably this could have been a request 
from Colonel North, although I may have initiated this on my 
ownl 



305 



uNaASSiBtn 



69 



Q The reason I'm asking you to look at it is, you 
see, I'm trying to get, stir a recollection on the breadth of 
the assignments that you would have had in the first two 
weeks of September 1985. It appears to me that however it 
happened you had some interest in arms transactions in 
Tehran, and I'm trying to get a sense of why it was that you 
had that interest and what you were looking for. 

A Well, the interest was precipitatec 

labout arms deals between I 

and the Iranian 





gover nment 

I may have actually done this on my own to try to 
discern what was occurring on the international arms market 
and then routed this tOiXaasBiR„NMitt||^^^^^M^e«r£ain iSfi 




on the 26th of 
September — ■^■BS^^^B^^^HHi^^H^Hi but I think it was 
the 26th of September — where he called me offsite on secure 

sa id^^Q^HH^^^H^^^^^^^^^H^^^^fH 
HH^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^^flj^fl^^^HB^^^^^^^n He 
find out what this means because this does not concern any 
initiative that we have under way. And I said I would do 
that. 

But I don't know that he requested this. 



I! 



^JiJh «L? 



306 



utttussra 



70 



Q And you have no additional recollection of North 
telling you about a potential arms transaction of which he 
had heard as of September 19? 

A I don't know. I don't recall. 

Q As you are aware, at the present time, on 
September 14, 1985, Israel shipped an additional 400 TOWs. 
We talked bria^y 'about the airplane. You were aware — I 
take it you are telling me that you were aware from cable 
traffic and the like in October that there had been — you 
were not aware in October? "^_,j£^^^-- ^' ^' ' 

^ A^ I want to correct what vou said. I was aware that 




raised in the context of a discussion with 
me — and I do not recall why he raised it — but he 
Indicated that there had been an aircraft into Tel Aviv with 
an emergency, that made an emergency landing, and which 
received international press attention. This aircraft 
allegedly had come out of Tabriz, declared an emergency over 
Turkey and landed at Tel Aviv. 

He said he was unable to obtain any information 
about it and I told him — at that stage I told him nothing. 
I just listened to what he had to say. 

Q Had you reacted to what he said, what would you 
have known at that point is really what I'm trying to find 
out. What familiarity did you yourself have? 



'"^mm 



307 




s 



71 



A All I would have )cnown would be the activity that 
occurred over the weekend of 13 to 15 September; the release 
of Reverend Wei 




That would have been 
all I could have told him. I could not have told him any 
further details, I don't believe. .^afe--'-' " 




con were 

not being^».vM"^lfomat4^ by Colonel North at all on what 
was transpiring; is that a correct assessment? 

one cduld suxni^gfitftt- aJm^^^^a^l^ons^K sene--tiature were 
involve 




Inte^ig* 

cables out of 

relating to the aircraft traveling on September 18 and 19 

that we have just been alluding to. Were you reading that 

cable traffic? 



Q During that same period of time, mid-September 
1985, again according to the CIA's memorandum of the events 
of September, the Israeli censors killed a story that there 



UNftASSfRED 



308 



DHSlkS^^ 



had been a flight into Tehran based on a meeting of David 
Kimche and Bud McFarlane. Again, as to what you knew, were 
you aware that there had been that effort by the Israeli 
censors to block publication of this? 

A No, I was not aware. 

Q So in terns of what you yourself were receiving, 
you were receiving^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hjj^H is 

A On this initiative I was receiving that. 

Q In terms of the Operations Directorate cable 
traffic that would be coming out <3'^^^^^^^^H ^^^^ ESist 

ind the like, you would not have been tied into 
that; is that correct? 

A Not unless they disseminated the intelligence as 
what they called telegraphic dissemination. 

--rAr^'-'^^tlf^ *jB^ ^y again what I'm trying to get a sense 
of. You ^'*<''8^^^^H^H^M|^Bs@iH^B|i^^§£^® operations 
Directorate loop on cjiiil*' tragic coming out of the Middle -r 

A '^NoT 

Q Yes, that is correct? 

A Yes, that is correct. I would not want to 

mislead. From time to time there might have been^^g^sable 



showed me on something on terrorism of an operational nature, 
but I was not regularly reading the operational traffic. 

Q With regard to standard or traditional roles for 



309 



UNCussn 



73 




CIA personnel, was what you were being asked to do for 
Colonel North ' 

was that within the ambitT^ 
of your standard or traditional duties or was this an unusual 
kind of task to have assigned to you as an NIO? 

A It was probably unusual. It fell within the 
purview of Caskin^^ The National Intelligence Officers 
regularly develop r« 




this 

was a more intensified, selective type of requirement, and it 
was unusual to a certain extent. 




Q Well, forgive perhaps my not really understanding 
the roles of the various directorates, but I would have 
thought that what you were gathering was the kind of thing 
that either the folks in the Directorate of Intelligence or, 
more likely, the Operations Directorate, would in the 
traditional assignment of roles have been responsible for. I 
would have thought that the NIO would be more into the 

TDi 



310 



UHtkl^W 



74 



business of making analyses than collecting raw data. 

A He does estimates, but he also sets priorities. 
He coordinates intelligence community activities relating to 
counterterrorism. That's under the Vice President's Task 
Force on Combatting Terrorism. I suggest you read the 
responsibilities given the NIO for Counterterrorism. 

Counterterrorism tends to be an operationally 
oriented type activity. There are certain long-range 
estimative aspects^^^^ ^Hr^^F i^ls noiii£ai^- l^e'^tf^toiptor 
of CentjaK I^liilJsisgpihg when I advised him of what I was 
doing personally on the 16th of Septemlser, directed that I 
continue to work with Colonel North on this activity and on 
this ^latection effort. 

I also discussed it in detail over the entire 




He and I conversed many times. We met 
persone(RfB« tiOBber of times. 

Q Let's pursue that. During the period September 13 
until you met with Casey on September 16, had you alerted 
anyone in the Operations Directorate — Mr. George or any of 
his subordinates — that you were taking on this role? 

A No. 

Q Had not? 

A If you will recall, I testified a few minutes ago 



ijilEi 



311 



; .*>, f^ f^ ' ' 



fFtlsU 



75 



that Colonel North asked that I restrict this to the Director 
and Deputy Director, which I did. 

Q Well, did you call the Director or the Deputy 
Director between the 9th, by your date, and the 16th? 

A I talked to the Director of Central Intelligence 
on the 13th by secure telephone and discussed] 
lover secure telephone. 

Q So the first conversation you had with the 
Director about this assignment you received from Colonel 
North would have been on the 13th| 
is that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q As to whether or not the assignment was one that 
the Director approve^ youjdid not seek that approval from 
the Director at the time the assignment was made; is that 
right? 

A That's correct. Would you repeat the question? 
There was an inference there I did not care for. 

Q You did not seek the authorization of the Director 
or his Deputy to carry out the task given to you by Colonel 
North at the time the task was initially given to you; is 
that right? 

A That's correct. I had similarly taskedf^fin 
other circumstances. In my view, it fell within the tasking 
and coordination role of the National Intelligence Officer 



mmsm 



312 



Hi 



76 

for Counterterrorism. I have yet to find anyone dispute 
that. 

Q Well, don't despair. It may happen before it's 
all over. 

A Well, you can challenge it if you want to. 

Q with regard to when you did advise Casey of this 
assignment, it would have been on the 13th| 
is that right? 

A That's correct. 

Q Now what did you tell Casey about why you were 
[at that time? 

A I told him at the request of Colonel Oliver L. 
North I was 




Director li ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

that he 
wished for me to stay in touch vS^||£im oii.^mppopm4| 

He^affd not sa«a IBPtae quite aware of what the 
initiative that Colonel North was pursuing and, as I recall, 
'•'T^ht'-htfiWBff^BFTMni'FT^tlfl' i "n . he stated it might relate to 




from anyone as to why this- a^Lgnmaiit^ «af_ne»^£ven to tlte' 
Opezratiofis Dizl^^rate or tKe 4Rt«llig«nce Directorate «f^he 



UNKI^IFIEO 



313 




77 

CIA? 7 jj ~ j; -lll-s. ' ^-_ ' ^5t _. 

A M6y"-a0h* t you ask the question again., because I 
don't understand it. 

Q Could you read it back? 
"^ THE REPORTER: Question: "As of that time had you 
received any explanation from anyone as to why this 
assignment was not given to the Operations Directorate or the 
Intelligence Directorate of tW«i^8^|i?*^ -—_ "i^ -^ 

THE WITNESS: As of that time Colonel North had 
come to me. He stated because as ^^fe"giljirai IfflSSlligence 
Officer I could task agencies of the intelligence community, 
not just CIA, ar^ he believ^' th^^^ was tWi, intitiatMUal who-^ 
couXid coo^iiSti^^l^fc^a^ivfl^y . ^K one «l8e of fared ^ny 
views one way o fcth * bth«i^ lb:. MeMahon and'%r.'^"OMcyB^9K 

th at wee kend, and they expressed 




13-16 September. ThereH^^^H 
ivailable to the Director of Operations, 
Mr. Gaorge, as I refi&ll. 

BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 
Q All right. Let me pursue that. I was not aware 
of that. Mr. George would have been receivli 
that began on the 13th of September'^ 

A He was receiving to read and return to the 
Director the copy that came. We were getting it in one copy, 




314 



vmmm 



78 



hard copy. Electronic dissemination was not feasible. If 
you try to disseminate it electronically and ask for one 
electronic copy the computer system will produce 32. I can 
assure you that is a fact. 

Q I believe aaything afag u^a cos^^er. 

^ So_l uifdlfeatJSd/'^tili thajStttaet Trith regard to ^ 
receiving^^^^^^^ByowF^^^^bac^oaj^^^^lttpet^^air George 

was mad«j^g^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^^^^^ ^°^^^^^ ^* ^ 

A I )uiow he saw ^^^^^^Vthat were received on the 

13-16 September. 

Q How do you know that? 

A Because they were taken to him. 

Q By whom? 

A I believe in some cases I made certain he saw 
other cases ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H who, 
out of steam and couldn't stay awake any longer, substituted 
for me. But I recall numerous times walking into Mr. 
George's office and showing himl 

Q And this would be numerous times in the period 
September 13 through 16? ^^ ~ sa^^fct -^ 

A No. I'm speaking in the succeeding months. 

Q Let's stay in September. 

A Well, I just want to make sure. I don't know the 
number of times that one walked down to see Clair George 
between the 13th and 16th. 

|ol 



315 



mmm 



79 



Q On any of those occasions between the 13th and 
16th, when you walked down to Mr. George's office did you 
discuss with Mr. George why it was you were collecting this 
material? 

A I don't recall that. 

Q You just kind of came in and plunked it on his 
desk? 

A Let me correct the record. I explained to him 
that this was '^^^^^^ 

[at the request of Colonel North. I 
gave him that background at the outset. 

Q All right. Pursuing that, when you goti 

ind you hand-carried them down to Mr. George's 
desk, you Vould not have discussed with Mr. George what 
[about and what they might imply? 

A I don't recall the specific conversations, but I'm 
certain there was some conversation as to the substance 





Q I would assuae ^^t MP%he ordinary course you 
receive your assignments from someone other than Lieutenant 
Colonels on the National Security Council staff, isn't that 
right? 

A I receive requests from a variety of people. I 
receive requests from senior officials of various departments 
and agencies, from the Director of Central Intelligence, the 

■ B <iK«%i- lid iik^ 1.1 



316 



iiNfiiA&$ra 



80 



Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and especially the 
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. 

Q Well, help me out. The National Intelligence 
Council is the organ that you are a part of. There is 
Chairman and Vice Chairman of that body, is there not? 

A There is a Chairman and a vice Chairman. 

Q In terms of assignments being handed out to NIOs, 
are the assignments given by the Chairman or the vice 
Chairman or are they made in some other fashion? 

A No, the taslcing^^y come directly, say, from 
Ambassador Bremmer, Director of the Office of Combatting 
Terrorism. I normally inform the Chairman and vice Chairman 
of the task. I just did an estimate on the insurgency and 
counterinsurg«ncy^^^^^^^^^ft The tasking came from 
Ambassador Bremm^^F ^ _, 

Q Is there and was there in 1985 a policy or program 

for clearing assignments that came, for example, from the 
White House by way of the NSC? 

A No. I obtained numerous requests from the NSC. 
We normally kept Mr. Gates, the Chairman, involved on 
anything that was at all significant. Any type of 
substantive analytical assessments one would certainly as a 
part of our normal meetings with Mr. Gates, we would inform 
Mr. Gates of this. 

Q But again so I understand, you felt it was 

|e(j 



317 



wmmm 



81 



perfectly within the standard operating procedure of the 
National — 

A I report to the Director of Central Intelligence. 
I don't report to the Chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council. The National Intelligence Council chairman acts as 
a dean of the faculty. He clearly has certain authorities 
over us, but we act as the faculty for the Director of 
Central Intelligence. So I feel that on cases of tasking at 
the national level from the White House it was perfectly 
feasible for me to take that tasking and to inform the 
Director of Central Intelligence. 

The Director of Central Intelligence is my boss 
and if he saw anything wrong with the tasking he would have 
told me at the outset. Mr. Casey is not a man to mince 
words . 

Q So I can follow the lines of authority here, you 
got a call from Colonel North on either the 9th or the 12th 

of September asking you tc 

land you did not check on 
whether or not you could do that with anybody until after 

Ls that right? 

A I don't it^^^^H^^^^^^^^Hl He asked 
ni^o try to^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand 
deC^Ti^En^ 





318 



UNStMi 




I felt that this was an appropriate request from 
the NSC. This was an appropriate task which I discussed with 
and on the 13th I explained to Mr. Casey what I was 
doing. He saw no problem with my performance from the 9th 
through the 13th of September. 
Q In terms of| 

that was something that you initiated, isn't 
that right? You're the one that^^^^^^^^^^^^Hsaid do 
it; isn't that correct? 
A I 




Q And at the time you did that you did that only on 
the authority of Colonel North; is that correct? 

A I did it on my authority. 

Q At the request of Colonel North. 

A At the request of Colonel North. 

Q And you cleared it with no one else in the Central 
Intelligence Agency? 

A That's correct. I didn't have^^^^^^^H to 
clear the Once had^^^^^^^^^^Hlthen 
discussed it with Mr. Casey at some length on the secure 
telephone. And I believe I talked to him more than once on 



319 



um^ssiEra 



83 



the secure telephone that weekend — he was in New York — as 

came in, and I also discussed with him 
when Mr. Weir was released on Sunday morning the I5th of 
September. It all seemed very pro foma to me. 




Q Was it your belief and understanding as of mid- 
September, the 13th through the 16th, that Mr. Buckley was 
still alive? 



Of September? No. It was my belief that he was 



dea. 



MR. KERR: Thank you. 
(A brief recess was taken.) 
BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 
Q At the time we broke, Mr. Allen, you indicated in 
September 13 to 16, 1985 it was your belief that Mr. Buckley 
was dead; is that correct? 

was my belie f^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^f We 
no conclusive proof that he was dead. 

Q with regard to the hostages in Lebanon, you had in 
fact, as of September 13 to 16, been working closely with 
Colonel North as to location of the hostages and efforts to 
get them out by way of ransom money; isn't that correct? 



320 



uNeymED 



84 



A That is not correct. 

Q Do you have a recollection, sir, of working in the 
summer, spring-summer-fall of 1985 with agents of DEA for the 
purpose of working with them to ransom hostages in Lebanon? 

A I don't have any recollection of meeting with any 
DEA agents in that time frame, and that specific time frame, 
to the best of my )tnowledge and recollection I did not meet 
with any DEA agents relating to hostages in Lebanon. 

You must remember I was the National Intelligence 
Officer for Narcotics. I met with a lot of DEA officers, but 
not on hostages. 

Q Do you recall meeting with any DEA officer, 
official, representative in the period between May and 
September 1985 for the purpose of discussing with them an 
arrangement to ransom American hostages in Lebanon? 

A I do not recall. 

Q Do you know a DEA agent representative by the name 




A I have me^^^^^^^^^^^H but only and based on my 
recollections I met him only after I was named Director of 
the Interagency DCI Hostage Location Task Force in late 
December 1985. 

Q You do not recall meeting with him in the period 
May through September 1985 with regard to a plan in 
conjunction with Colonel North to ransom hostages for several 



321 



UNCI^SiFe 



85 



hundreds of thousands of dollars in Lebanon? 

A I can't recall that, no. 

Q Did you ever become aware at any time of any plan 
in which Colonel North participated with representatives of 
DEA to ransom hostages in Lebanon 

A I was aware that Colonel North had two DEA agents 
apparently seconded to him from that agency with the approval 
of the Director of that agency, but I don't recall exactly 
when I became aware of it. 

Q What were the names of those agents? 

A One waa^^^^^^^^^H and you clearly know the name 
of the other. If you will refresh my memory I would be 
grateful. 

Q 

A ^^^^^^ 

Q Do you recall meeting witl^^^^^^^^^Bat his home 
or at yours to discuss matters relating to hostages? 

A After I became Director of the DCI Task Force they 
both came to my home one evening to discuss their contacts 
and initiatives relating to freeing the hostages in Lebanon. 

Q And that would have been approximately^J^jp^^n.^- 1 



/85,^^rly 









b«ai|tes the two of 



^?Lny 



82-688 0-88-12 



322 



UNfiMHIO 



86 



you, the two of them and yourself, at that meeting? 

A My wife and daughter, but they werenft in the same 



room. 

Q 
A 
Q 

such me* 
—A 



Were any notes or memoranda made of that meeting? 

No, not that I recall. "^^^ 

And it's your recollection that you only had one 

At my home. I believe that they were introduced 



to the operations subgroup of the TWIG or its predecessor in 
about the December '85 time frame, because I recall they 
appeared at Colonel North's request at a meeting in the White 
House situation room. 

Q And that would have been when? 

A Around December '85, where we talked about the 
location of the American hostages in Lebanon, their 
condition. 

Q At the time that these two gentlemen met with you 
at your home did they relate to you their activities with 
Colonel North in the summer of 1985 in an endeavor to rescue 
the hostages? 

A I don't think they went into any specific 
operation. They spoke about, as DEA agents, DEA has 

ind that they had some contacts ^^^^ 
[back into Lebanon. 
MR. LIMAM: Could I ask a question? 







323 



wmm 



MR. KERR: Sure. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you ever learn of a plan to use 
DEA agents to pay ransom to ere^.^atck the hostages? 

THE WITNESS: Did I ever learn of it? 

MR. LIMAN: Yes, sir. 

THE WITNESS: At any time during this whole 
episode? _^^ 

MR. LIMAN: At any tiwr means ever. 

THE WITNESS: I don't recall ever being told 
directly by either the agents or by Colonel North that such 
an initiative was under way where ransom would be paid for 
the securing of the release of the hostages. I do recall 
that the DEA agents were to be used to try to track down the 
location of the American hostages. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you ever learn of any plan — I 
mean ever, ever learn of any plan — to use DEA agents to pay 
money to get back the hostages? 

THE WITNESS: A specific plan at a specific time? 

MR. LIMAN: Any idea. Was that ever discussed 
with you that DEA agents were being used in an effort to get 
back the hostages by paying money? 

THE WITNESS: By paying money, not in the 1985- 
1986 time frame. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you hear of it earlier? 

THE WITNESS: I recall when I was working on an 

scl 



324 




88 

project in the Department of Defense where Colonel North one 
evening in his office alluded to the fact that he was hopeful 
of obtaining release of American hostages in Lebanon, and he 
was dealing with a chap name<^^^^^^^^B-- a DEA officer — 
and he mentioned some sums of money, but I do not recall any 
specifics of that. 

I was working on something totally different and 
had little or no interest in hostages, counterterrorism or 
anything relating to that. 

MR. LIMAN: Roughly what period was that? 

THE WITNESS: That would have been in the late 
summer-early fall of 1984. That's the only thing I can 
recall. I can't recall anything more specific. 

MR. LIMAN: And that's the only time that you ever 
heard of, heard any discussion about the possibility of 
paying money to get the hostages back? 

THE WITNESS: Specific information from Colonel 
North or from the DEA agents? 

MR. LIMAN: Anyone. 

THE WITNESS: I can't recall specific information. 

m«ana.dMfe MlMl^ 6^^Bpr yo" ever hear anyone discuss a 
possibility of paying money through DEA agents to get the 
hostages back other than that one incident you talked about 
in the Department of Defense? 



«Nwwe 



325 



wmmm 



89 



THE WITNESS: I don't recall any specific. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you ever hear that Colonel North 
had raised some money for paying to get the hostages back? 

THE WITNESS: In the August 1986, Mr. Clarridge, 
who was a member of the Operations Subgroup, and I attended a 
meeting at the White House and Colonel North had told Mr. 
Clarridge sometime during the meeting that there was an 
effort under way by Mr. Perot to secure the release of 
hostages in Lebanon through the use of private monies and 
that Mr. Perot had sent some of his officers to Cyprus to try 
to conclude such a deal. 

MR. LIMAN: Did Colonel North say he was assisting 
in this? 

THE WITNESS: I did not discuss this with Colonel 
North. I only discussed it with Mr. Clarridge. 

MR. LIMAN: Did Mr. Clarridge tell you that 
Colonel North had said he was assisting in this? 

THE WITNESS: He didn't put it in those terms. 

MR. LIMAN: What did he say about Colonel North's 
role? ^^^ ^,,- 

* ^^ THE WITNESS: He said Colonel North had told him 
that Mr. Perot had sent officers to Cyprus with some private 
funds to try to obtain the release of American hostages in 
Lebanon. Mr. Clarridge and I speculated that this probably 
wouldn't work. 



326 



\immm 



90 



MR. LIMAN: Did Mr. Clarridge mention to you that 
DEA agents were involved in this effort? 

THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

MR. LIMAN: And when the DEA agents came to your 
home, did they talk to you about the fact that they were 
going to be spending money to try to get the hostages back? 

THE WITNESS: Not in those specific terms that I 
can recall. 

MR. LIMAN: Did they talK aboul money at all? 

THE WITNESS: I don't think so. I interviewed 
them at the request of Colonel North in order to determine 
what type of access that they had, who were they informants, 
and what were their level of access within th^tebanese 
society. 

MR. LIMAN: Did they tell you that they were 
paying informants? 

THE WITNESS: Well, DEA officers pay informants 
for information on narcotics. 

MR. LIMAN: But this was not information on 
narcotics, was it? 

THE WITNESS: They stated they ha 




But I did 



327 



iiHCUissffe 



91 



not find the leads that they had all that promising. 

MR. LIMAN: Were they sent to you so that you 
could evaluate whether they were likely to be successful? 

THE WITNESS: Well, to evaluate, and then I had on 
my hostage location task forc^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^He 
took a trip with one or both of these officers to vis 



to discuss the value of these people and to evaluate 
them. 

It was more a valuation of their potential. 

MR. LIMAN: Now was that trip paid for out of the 
CIA budget? 

THE WITNESS: Um-hum. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you ever hear that the NSC was 
using its own funds to finance this effort by the DEA agents? 

THE WITNESS: I was never told what funds were 
being used by these officers, what was the source of their 
funds. No one ever indicated that to me. 

MR. LIMAN: Did anyone say how much they were 
spending? 

THE WITNESS: No, sir. 

THft.l«TNESS: No, sir. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you discuss the DEA's role in 



4 i3»' W ^ X fi^m'r^ 



328 




92 

attempting to locate the hostages with anyone at the CIA 
other than Mr. Clarridge? 

THE WITNESS :^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand I 
Mr. Casey on the DEA initiative. 

MR. LIMAN: And when did you brief him? 

THE WITNESS: Well, that was after^^H 
Ihad taken his trip, I believe. 

MR. LIMAN: Tol 

THE WITNESS: Yes, that was probably in late 
winter. 

MR. LIMAN: Of 1986? 

THE WITNESS: Well, let us say in early spring at 
the latest, 1986. 

MR. LIMAN: And before that you didn't brief the 
DCI? 

THE WITNESS: I don't think there was anything 
really to brief hin on. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you brief anyone else in the CIA 
hierarchy on this? 

THE WITNESS: I don't think so. 

MR. LIMAN: Did anyone ever tell you that there 
was a Presidential Finding with respect to this DEA endeavor? 

THE WITNESS: I never was aware of any 
Presidential Finding. 

MR. LIMAN: Did anyone ever tell you about any 



329 



mtmrn 



93 



discussions with the Attorney General about this venture? 

THE WITNESS: Only in the sense that colonel 
North, when he asked me to evaluate their potential, to take 
a hard look, he indicated that^^^^^^Hhad agreed to assign 
these two officers to the NSC for this purpose and that the 
Attorney General was aware of it. 

MR. LIMAN: Now what precisely did Colonel North 
tell you before the DEA agents came to your home for a 
discussion with you? 

THE WITNESS: He just suggested that now that I 
was director of the Hostage Location Task Force that they 
might have information on their capabilities to provide 
additional intelligence. 

MR. LIMAN: And what did they tell you that they 
were doing? 

THE WITNESS: They simply told me about their 
informants and that they felt that they had fairly good 
access. My view of it and my assessment was that it was 
probably worth pursuing further, but that these officers did 
not have access to the real individuals that I wanted access 
to. I wantec^^^^^^^ 

and these people did not have that 
access. 

MR. LIMAN: Was there any policy at that time that 
you were aware of at the CIA with respect to paying money to 







330 




get the hostages back? 

THE WITNESS: We had a policy of the U.S. 
Government that we would not pay ransom for hostages, yes. 

MR. LIMAN: What about paying bribes to their 
captors? 

THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know in what context 
your question relates, because I don't have the specifics of 
the event that you are referring to. But it is the 
counterterrorist policy of the U.S. Government that we will 
not negotiate nor will we ransom hostages from captors. 

MR. LIMAN: Now when the agents came to your home 
was it your understanding that they were talking about paying 
money to get the hostages out? 

THE WITNESS: No. They were simply going to 
discuss with me their capabilities as far as access agents 
that might have intelligence relating to — that might have 
intelligence relating to the captors of the American hostages 
in Lebanon. 

MR. LIMAN: And suppose that they had information 
that the hostages were being held by,1 
^^^^^^^1 what would you have done with that? 

THE WITNESS: Well, I think that would have been 
something in which we would have been greatly interested. I 
was not greatly interested in pursuing this specific 
operational opportunity because I did not think that they had 



331 




95 

the access that I was looking for. 

MR. LIMAN: But I take it from what you're saying 
that you did not understand that they themselves, the DEA, 
was proposing to get the hostages back. 

THE WITNESS: Who is "they"? 

MR, LIMAN: The DEA. 

THE WITNESS: You mear 

MR. LIMAN: No, the DEA and its agents. 

THE WITNESS: That' 

MR. LIMAN: Well, he's only one person. 

THE WITNESS: He is in charge. 

MR. LIMAN: Right. 

THE WITNESS: You are sayin^^^^^^H had approved 
an operation to go after the agents? 

MR. LIMAN: Did you understand that? 

THE WITNESS: If that's what you're saying, I had 
no knowledge of that. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you have any knowledge from this 
meeting that the DEA personnel with whom you were meeting had 
proposed a plan for getting the hostages back? 

THE WITNESS: A specific operation? 

MR. LIMAN: A specific proposal. 

THE WITNESS: No. Your inference of your question 
is that they had a specific proposal relating to bribes, and 
I don't know of any specific thing. 




332 




-— — 96 

MR. LIMAM: What about a general proposal to get 
the hostages back? 

THE WITNESS: Well, that was the reason they were 
seconded, as I understand it, to the NSC — to worlc on the 
problem of trying to locate the hostages and to determine 
their condition. 

MR. L^g^smamm^t. oiAt to ^Kate the hostages? 

THE WITNESS: Well, I never heard of any specific 
rescue plan that was proposed by DEA agents. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you ever hear of any general 
concept that they had about getting the hostages back? 

THE WITNESS: I have no detailed recollection that 
they had a specific plan to get the hostages back once they 
had located them. 



^^^JSJI^MR. LIMAN: What about a general recollection of a 
general concept to get the hostages back? 

THE WITNESS: I don't have any general 
recollection of a general plan to get the hostages back. 
MR. LIMAN: Any concept? 

THE WITNESS: They felt — let me state what my 
impressions of these chaps were, is that they overestimated 
their agents! 




I never heard then talk about a specific 
operational plan where they would in some way free them. 

U 




333 



mmrn 



97 

The only thing that I do recall is that — and 
it's been a long time since we had those discussions — is 
that they felt that 




MR. LIMAN: Would a proposal to pay money to the 
persons holding the hostages have been inconsistent with 
United States policy as you then understood it? 

THE WITNESS: Restate that, please. 

MR. LIMAN: Would -fiiau yiy^at thaAC*^" .^ 

THE REPORTER: Question: "Would a proposal to pay 
money to the persons holding the hostages have been 
inconsistent with United States policy as you then understood 
it?" 

THE WITNESS: Sure, if it was a proposal to pay 
money directly to the captors. If it was a proposal to payH 

that would be something 
different. 

MR. LIMAN: And did you hear of either proposal? 

THE WITNESS: No specific plans. There was a 
generic comment 




MR. LIMAN: And who made that generic comment? 
THE WITNESS: I thinW^'SbSl^f fliqjte -cr«ntUSnen did 

Id 



334 



UlMSIHiD 



-- and what was the other chap's name? 
MR. LIMAN: Did they say what it would tak< 




THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. LIMAN: Did you ever discuss that with Colonel 



North? 



THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. LIMAN: What did you tell Colonel North after 
this meeting? 

THE WITNESS: I told him I would send — I 
believe, and I don't recall the precise dates or sequence — 

send^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l to to some the 
ind i V idua 1 s^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

MR. LIHAN: Anddi^^^^^^^^^^^^^ report 
to you? 

THE WITNESS: Yes. 

MR. LIMAN: What did he tell you? 

THE WITNESS: Well, he had mixed feelings about 
the individuals and their potential. 

MR. LIMAN: Did he ever write a report to you? 

THE WITNESS: He wrote a memo at one time, and I 
don't ]cnow where that memo is. Maybe you have it. 

MR. KERR: Do you have any objection to my showing 
this to the witness to refresh his recollection? He may have 
his recollection refreshed. 



1 



335 



\mm 



99 



BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 
Q Mr. Allen, let roe show you a memorandum dated the 
7th of June, 1985, reference numbers in the Senate Select 
Committee files at N-7419 through N-7431. I'd like you to 
look at it and tell me first if you've ever seen it before. 
But beyond that I'd like you to focus on the setting forth of 
a DEA operation that begins on page two, and I'd like you to 
read that with care and then tell me whether or not it 
refreshes your recollection of knowledge that yai wt^^tf^va 
had in 1985 of the operation being planned. 
(Pause. ) 
A I don't know anything about that. 
Q You don't know anything about it at all? 

MR. LIMAN: Colonel North never told you about 
this? 

THE WITNESS: In June of '85? 
KR. LIMAN: At any time. 

THE WITNESS: If he did, I do not recall it. It 
made no serious impact on my recollection. 

MR. LIMAN: Isn't it the type of thing that if he 
told you, you would have remembered paying this kind of money 
to get the hostages back? 

THE WITNESS: The only recollection I ever had 
related to the summer of 1986, where direct — where private 
funds allegedly were to be paid directly to free one or more 



!lira!!F!R) 



336 



WyiSSIiKD 



100 



hostages, and that was the Ross Perot initiative. I don't 
recall that initiative in 1985. ^^^ j:^ -^ 

MR. LIMAN: Did Mr. Clarridge tell you whether he 
thought it was a good idea for a private American citizen to 
pay ransom to get the hostages back? 

THE WITNESS: You mean from a policy perspective, 
and you're talking about t^|e^l986 Ifisuli?^ 

MR. LIMAN: The Perot incident. 

THE WITNESS: I think both of us had serious 
reservations about that initiative. 

MR. LIMAN: Was it the United States Government's 
policy, as you understood it, not to pay money itself but to 
encourage private citizens to pay money to get hostflfttfe )^k? 
,_THE WITNESS: There is such a thing called ransom 
insurance, sir, which corporations pay all the time — 
Bechtel, you name it. We can't stop those kinds of private 
ransom initiatives. 

MR. LIMAN: Was it the policy of the government to 
encourage the payment of ransom to get hostages back? 

jr— THE WITNESS: It is the policy of the government 
to discourage the payment of ransom and in fact, as part of 
the Vice President's Task ^°^^^HHfe|^y:"<3 Terrorism 
ransom insurance was an issue of continuing study because we 
wished to discourage corporations from paying insurance 
premiums in order to protect themselves from kidnappings of 



I 



I 






337 



uHCi^sra 



101 



their employees in certain field operations. 

Mfti. L^ yiM ; When Mr. Clarridge told you about the 
Perot incident in 1986, did he say that this was a bad idea? 

THE WITNESS: I don't recall that we specifically 
discussed the fact that this countervened U.S. policy as the 
fact that we seriously doubted the effectiveness of it and 
questioned the ability of the Ross Perot organization to 
operationally succeed in something like that. 

MR. LIMAN: Did he explain to you why this was 
being discussed in the White House situation room? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. LIMAN: Did he explain to you how the 
participants in that meeting knew of Mr. Perot's plan? 

THE WITNESS: You misquoted what I stated. I 
stated that there was a meeting of the Operations Subgroup 
and that Colonel North only and to the best of my knowledge 
mentioned this to Mr. Clarridge, that he did not mention it 
to other members of the Operations Subgroup. 

MR. LIMAN: Did he tell you how Colonel North knew 
of it? 

THE WITNESS: No. 

MR. LIMAN: Did he tell you that Colonel North was 
in touch with Mr. Perot? 

THE WITNESS: That was my understanding from what 
Mr. Clarridge said. 




338 



UMtLASSD 



102 

'^^^^^^ik-. ' 'UlBES^^bitt^fwu ever get in touch with Mr. 
Perot? 

THE WITNESS: I have never met Mr. Perot and have 
never spoken to him. 

MR. LIMAM: Or any of his representatives? 

THE WITNESS: Or any of his representatives. That 
is a fact. 

BY MR. KERR: (Resiuning) 

tc|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H they 
made a number of trips to Cyprus. What knowledge do you have 

A I have no knowledge. 

Q No knowledge? 

A No. 

Q And similarly you have no knowledge of Colonel 
North's payment of those expenses out of funds that he had 
access to; is that correct?- >»-= 



A I have no knowledge of how the travel for those 
individuals was paid. 

Q Did you know that they were making trips to 
Cyprus? 

A I knew they were making trips to Europe and to 
Cyprus . 

Q And you came by that knowledge how? 

that^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ftnentioned 




339 



iiHeuss 



-r^ 




It. Colonel North may have mentioned it 
may have mentioned it. I don't recall. And I did not track 
the activities of these individuals. They were what one 
might say basically a separate channel of the NSC and not one 
that concerned me. I was more concerned with collecting and 
coordinating intelligence on what Mr. Ghorbanifar was doing. 

Q You would not have dealt with them wearing your 
narcotics hat either, I take it? 

A Absolutely not. 

Q Do you know a gentleman by the name of Ed liickey 
at the White House? 

A Yes. 

Q How do you know Mr. Hickey? 

A I first met Mr. Hickey in, I believe, 1981. X was 
working on a compartmented classified project for Mr. 
Carlucci and later Admiral Inman. 

Q Is this the sane project you were working on with 
Colonel North, or a different project? 

A The same project. 

Q And Mr. Hickey's relationship to Colonel North for 
that project was what? Were they working together on this 
project? 

A Mr. Hickey was a very interested participant. 

Q Was one working for the other or were they working 
side by side, so to speak? 



340 




104 

A Mr. Hickey was a very senior official who was 
director of the White House military office; certainly he was 
not working for Colonel Oliver L. North. 

Q Sometimes I wonder about that. 

A No, sir. I can assure you. You've got to know Ed 
Hickey. 

Q Ed Hickey would not? 

A He's one hell of a man, okay? 

Q Fair enough. With regard to the 
matters, do you recall having conversations with Mr. Hickey 
about them as it related to hostages in Lebanon? 

A No. I talked to Mr. Hickey after I became the 
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism about 
hostages in Lebanon briefly at a meeting at the White House. 
We used to have meetings prior to travel by the President 
overseas in which we'd do a threat assessment of potential 
terrorist threats against the President, and early in 1985, 
shortly after taking over as the National Intelligence 
Officer, Mr. Hickey chaired something called an Operations 
Planning Group, now defunct, which did this kind of 
assess! , 

And I know that Mr. Hickey knew William Buckley 
and wanted to have assurances that the intelligence community 
and Central Intelligence Agency were doing their best to try 
to locate and free Mr. Buckley, and I just assured him that 



341 



umsH« 



105 



kname cone 



I don't think so. I really don't believe it did 



ve were. 

Q In that context, die 
up? 

A 
at all. 

Q So you have no recollection of knowing through Mr. 
tha«^^^^^^^^^^^^were engaged 
an effort through be it ransom or bribery but money changing 
hands to free Mr. Buckley in 1985? 

A Through Mr. Hickey I had no knowledge. 

Q And, as I tried to understand you, you don't have 
that knowledge from any source whatsoever; is that correct? 

A I have no specific knowledge of whei 

I had a plan to offer ransom to the captors of 
the American hostages in Lebanon in any direct sense. All I 
know is the incident in 1984 where in the context of another 
meeting with Colonel North on another project he just 
incidentally told me that he was hopeful that he could free 
some hostages in Lebanon, that he had been meeting wit( 
Z believe his name is, of DEA. 

Q Hickey never asked you, to the best of your 
recollection, to meet witn^^^^^^^^^^^^^with regard to 
releasing the hostages in 1985? 

A I'm certain he did not. 

Q Do you know a CIA operative by the name ol 



'iMCBISSflED 



342 




UNKIS^D 



106 



A ^^^^^^^^^^^H Can you identify him further? 

Q That's the best I can do for you. If you don't 
know, you don't know. 

A Well, the name is very familiar. That may come 
back to me. If it does, I will so tell you. 

Q With that frolic, let's return to September 1985. 

A That was an interesting movement to the side. 

Q Reverend Weir was released on the 15th of 
September, and on the 16th of September you have indicated 
that you met with Mr. Casey and had a discussion with him. 

A I think I testified I met with him on the 16th. 

Q I'm sorry. That's what I meant to say. 

A Okay. 

Q On the 16th of September, can you describe for me 
the meeting? Before you I^^^^WIHSEp^m interview 
correctly, you said the only people who were at that meeting 
were yourself and Mr. Casey; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q All right. Could you give me your best and 
fullest recollection of what transpired at that meeting 
between yourself and Mr. Casey? 

A I recounted what had occurred over the weekend and 
that arrangements were being made to fly Reverend Weir to the 
United Statei 



343 




p 



107 



that something was under way 
that I did not understand, and that^olonel North had urged 
that only Mr. Casey and Mr. McMahon be told and no one else 
be advised, that it was an initiative of extreme sensitivity. 

Mr. Casey stated that he had had the opportunity 
to discuss^thCii^cC Adt^^ J^pi^pii^^^talsad tb^t ^, 
^iic^iana^ndigaad^jjplt, tt^^ a^gp^ ifetttiv ^^-7 -p 
initlaM:ivr, ^ta^^»~imha^ig^^mtm iaw-that ir was 

vet^i 




lat^fc ^ it l i i « Mf S|^t gi i u » t «»at poItPi^' "^^" 

A Yes, sir. 

Q You had testified earlier that Casey, when you 
talked to him on the 13th of September, had indicated he 

to do vit^^^^^Hjj^^^^l^HIJ^^^ Now 
you're saying that on the leth^SFW^FB^^OBlf^^l^fe't right. 
It's a McFarlane initiative. Were you left with the 
impression at that time that Casey had not been privy to 
McFarlane 's involvement in these activities earlier on in the 
summer — July-August? 

A At the time it was my impression that Mr. Casey 
was unaware of this initiative and that he had not been 
previously told about it. 




344 





108 

Q Let me pursue that thought with you. Has there 
ever been an occasion since that time when either directly 
from Mr. Casey himself or by way of other information that's 
come to your attention you reached the conclusion or the 
surmise that Casey was aware of the, for lack of a better 
expression, Iran initiative at a time preceding September 13? 

A Only in reading the chronology that's been put 
together where I believe Mr. Casey indicated that perhaps 
sometime in August he and Mr. McMahon had been apprised of a 
potential Iranian initiative. At the time that I discussed 
the matter with him on the 13th and the 16th of September 
1985, he seemed at first completely at sea as to what the 
hell this was all about, and then on the 16th he seemed to 
have recovered a bit, and he stated I have discussed this 
with Mr. McFarlane and it is a very special initiative being 
handled out of the White House. 

Q You had occasion to talk with Mr. Casey in the 
November-December period of time before his recent illness, 
did you not, about the testimony he was going to give on the 
Hill? 

A I talked to him quite a bit. 

Q During those conversations did it ever come to 
your attention or did you come to conclude from talking with 
him that in fact he had been mi^gBt^^^S^IS^S^^ <?uys like 
to say, of this operation than he had appeared in September 
i\ 



345 



• rsri 




109 



when you talked to him in September of '85? 
A More witting? 



Q 
A 

summer? 
Q 



In the sense that he knew about it. 

t 
That he kn^w about what was going on in the 



Ves, sir 




ra«r 



l^guXl^a had ,j»lt^t^ im 
ri#fed 




||<I.. iMl^l^BrJE^w hfih was 
Monday . I 
»n ill while I was overseas. 
But he was consistent in not showing, to me at least, any 
detailed knowledge prior to that phone call on the 13th of 

Q Focusing on that sane period of time now, the last 



346 







110 



contacts that you had in October-November with Mr. Casey, did 
he in any of those conversations either state or suggest to 
you that he by that time was aware of a relationship between 
the Shaheen-Cyrus Hashemi contacts in June and July of 1985 
and what ultimately became the Iran initiative in September 
of 1985? 

A I'm sorry. You'll have to reread that. 

Q I'll restate it. Did it come to your attention in 
speaking with Mr. Casey in October-November of last year, 
1986, that he himself had concluded that the Cyrus Hashemi 
effort to set up a dialogue on hostages was connected to the 
McFarlane-Kimche Iran initiative that we now know was also 
taking place in that time? Did he ever connect those two up? 

A I don't think he ever did. When we were 
reconstructing the chronology of the Iranian initiative and 
the Agency's participation in it, he recalled the Shaheen 
conversations and the fact that Shaheen and Cyrus Hashemi 
were connected, and I don't recall at that time — he may 
have mentioned, I think he mentioned in fact Roy Furmark. 
But I don't think he ever quite put that initiative as 
directly linked to the initiative that is now known 




347 



uHctftssra 



111 



conlS^km, and l^i^o^ tfcPae ty, Kiacba ai«S oth«ra%w^^ 

doing? ..■?»- "^ 'T* ""^ - ^ 

A Not~spe<^flc3i^^to^ius«i^^ber« was a proposal, I 
guesft^ by^biSiemi that hs could„4St ^jbf^hostages rsleas«d if 



csrtain anis «D|r« pntiailsd t6' Irajt,^ X twlieve Shabesn was 
told, jf^: be cias; nayb*^ v« codid 9^"^i^Sie nfliftcines. The 
Director, I believe, said he tried to interest the Department 
of State in this and the whole thing just sort of faded away 
and Shaheen died of cancer. ^pS'^fe:-^^^^'^*^ 

% -'g^ ' jtrr iii^Yeu^ 'WJiBl contacted again by colonel Xorth 
on or about September 28, 1985, I believe from last time that 
we met. Could you relate for us what it was that Colonel 
North was seeking from you at that point? 

A Yes. He believed that there would be a release of 

American hostages in the 3 to 5 Oc^ol3*<^^^|^^^lV^^ 

He for^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^I He also — 

think he also indicated that Ascari was coming to the United 

States. But I didn't get any particulars on that until one 

Saturday afternoon and evening, that he was coming under a 

Greek a£tts p wiKr t,gBUPWMfcHi» tws l&»ti|$§II^^HBS^^^ a^ 
nan — - -~- - - - -— .^ - 




348 



MASSiJ£D 



112 



description o^^N(t tHSTT^ 
were doing the l>«i^yoa 



^y^^ I ^J»34<M^iNi^fiffeady 



X^ .^tall , eolonfti NorHIl up an"^insatial»le ^^tlte for 
intelligence and he would frequently call and Tn^ca^ to me 
that lui was not m&ii^^ i^£h- 
efforts. 




Q Putting aside that type of intelligence gathering, 
did he ask you to undertake any other kind of gathering of 
intelligence as of September 28? 

A No. ^^^^^^ 

So basically^^^^^^^^^Hm^^^^that you 
were focused on at that point? 

A That's correct. 

Q Now with regard to Ascari coming to the United 
States, do you have a clear recollection of him raising that 
possibility on the 28th of September or did that in fact come 
later? 

A I don't have a specific recollection, but I 



iff * a S 



349 




believe he indicated that Ascari was coming to the United 
States. 

Q Let's hold that rjriU9«i^^^^^iiOK>lBea^'^^ttr'^ take 
you back to that letter we looked at which I think we still 
have, the October 7 letter. In that letter in paragraph 3 on 
the second page you talk about being contacted by North on 
September 28 and you talk about William Buckley in that 
context. Then there is a reference a little further down to 
the White House talking to you on October 5, which I think is 
Colonel North again. 

But what I'd like you to do is to take a moment, 
look at what you were writing in October of 1985, and let's 
see if we can focus in your recollection on the events of 
that September 28 through October 8 period. 
( Pause . ) 

First, Mr. Allen, I assume one could correctly 
conclude that your recollection of events in terms of their 
sequence and precision with regard to which they happened 
probably would have been better in October of 1986 than it is 
— 1985 than it is today. 

A That's correct. 

Q The sequence of events set forth in paragraph 3 of 
Allen Exhibit 7, as I understand it, is that you get a call 
on September asking f or ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^| tells 
you that there is continuing interest in Buckley, I take it. 



...lief...,. 



350 



tiNeraiiiD 



at that point; is that right? Is that what's going on? 

A (Nods in the affirmative.) 

Q Did you tell Colonel North, Colonel, I think 
Butkley's dead? 

A Sir, I tol 

1985 twj^m^ie^ 




ll had concluded almost 
certainly that William Buckley had died. 

Mr. Casey agreed with me. I remember riding in 

the car mmi^^BH^IB^K"'^ 

in some detail with Mr. Casey. I rode down to the 






351 




115 

Intelligence Community headquarters and also rode back with 
Mr. Casey, and he agreed with me that William Buckley was 
probably dead. 

Q So that I'm clear — 

A And Colonel North was told of this. 

Q That was my next (question. Colonel North was in 
fact told by you at the time this material was being 
generated. 

A Yes, sir. I told him in detail that we had no 
conclusive proof but it was my best judgment as a long--term 
intelligence officer that William Buckley had died. 

Q Okay. Did Colonel North express to you any basis 
for his apparent belief or perhaps hope that Buckley was 
still alive, or am I misunderstanding what Colonel North was 
doing. Was it your impression Colonel North still thought 
Buckley was alive? 

A It was my impression that he had a hope. He had 
known William Buckley when he had first arrived on the 
National Security Council staff, because William Buckley was 
working on counterterrorism and interacted frequently with 
Colonel North. I think he just had a slim 




352 




Q I want to stop here _^^^ moBCifl^^enl^het^^ 
traclrthiv again, ^^ott've -toelff^e that essentially what 
you're finding out about this operatior^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hind coi^^iiions you draw fro;n 
It's not as if North sits down and briefs you on the program; 
is that right? 

A That's correct. He indicated very strongly that 
this had to be compartmented and I had to live with just 
enou^j^^formation which to do^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
worked in that world all my life and that was satisfactory. 

Q I haven't, and it seems a little strange, so bear 
with me as I go through it once more. 

A It's very normal. 




353 




117 



A I suspected Colonel North was involved, and I 
wasn't certain who else might be involved. 

Q But you yourself didn't ask Colo nel Wort h that 
question; is that ric 




A I think Colonel North indicated, either directly 
or indirectly — and it was most of the time that he 
indicated he was indirectly, through intermediaries, 
providing what should be told this Iranian intermediary in 
Western Europe. 

Q The mechanics of that communication with the 
Iranian intermediary, did you know what the mechanics were at 
that time? 

A He did not tell me at that time. 

Q But did you yourself know in any event, either 
from reconstruction or from other sources? 

A Vou mean later on? 

Q Really at this time. 

A At this time I suspected — and we're at the 28th 






82-688 a88-13 



354 



I Pra pf ^'^ codeIc|(^ I 



118 






suspected Isra«ris_wer#iinvolved'bssad j3if what the Dirifctor 

had jt^^ iB«^B^^^|HHH|H|^^^^^^HH|H||[|^ I 

i^su^^ctei^j^ruM intennediarl«8j_not i^^essarily^l^ the 

government, aiaybe in tlie i^^iata jiedror -^ j^gpi sn't cei^in - 
and oth«: AmericanK'-^^^^stu*p«c^^^XlS&|g^^e .oSicr Americans 
-: invo^e<^t)Ut ^ ^^ rat. 1awr-^iai^aa^r;;-^^^#^~ ' ,_ ~lv 

—"'Q Now l<^aM>:-juWFTi8^^^i^^^^p''^^^ ■u^^amdve^.a 
~blt further.. Th^„tte»gBwSCg''!gg**** ^■»* -j^» pagyraph 3 
.;^;:^a%~a# a:" ja^lfc ofl tamfc I gp^ij^j^ Anl^BHyy$^yi^z^9 m^ 
dai^tegttiraartr^ 

"^ — =*— - " "^ ti^slrau had 



.sarie« :oi^iB«ging|^« 

-qftrjjets^ ;^^:foTlair 

]^oit£oh iirliiniiiniiFri 





Ini^dt-^^ 
it seemed to me that the White House was either directly 

^*)l VVILIL , 




355 



119 
i nvo ly^^ wiJfe^^aa^ggveriBiBnt eij^sriirl_6F^^^ire^l^fe — r^'^ 

dealers lilci^Ascai*^ «ho-«« thia ej«B«llent eont4£t in the 
office of the PSifellni«U*l^-^^ -^- 




Q Jgf3«i» 



j t; jJCT>Bg | [_" ^ l ilN^ * »*|Utwp here. 
Yai- saifc th^^aa^u n ngaB «i**^ j]^ » JSr^-n»Tiiiii^Ji had oguthe 



thiid W CffltoSer tbiat^tt :iiaia»*^^>w^^ft^U. 1 lam: Bucl^y 

cr^^^ rijl^Rjninf^i^tnrtt^^^^gfira^-eontaclUi "^bf^giso^ 

i)i&M ai£ bla^^»i^^^^^^^^^[^ lEt^^^ige^=^ 

^Jndi^a^sd ia§MEBB ^ttg^ j^gga i^SggiirtanC ^^fea t^^be come to-^e 

U.S. -^r^|^'^o^^^^in^s«a»iE^t^|j^leST^»xi^^^ 




A Well, let's first go to the Islamic Jihad. On 
October 4 it claimed that it had — it would execute William 
Buckley and that his body would be presented as revenge for 
the Israeli attack on PLO headquarters in Tunis on 1 October. 
So that information was public knowledge. 

This was what I was told by Colonel North, was 



356 



UNCMSSm 



120 



that Ascari was going to come to the United States because we 
were at a crossroads with the possible death of Buckley — 
and I believed strongly he was dead at the time — as to 
whether there was any potential to continue this effort. 
That's all I knew. 

Q Bear with me. I got the impression from reading 



that sentence tha t you . had knowledge t hat ttjpBiite Hoi^se had 
in^^t^ Amri:^^ ^M to tiM^»rTO3^taiS^^=^it;pe^^ of 




Q As to those links, however, you still did not know 
what the linkages were between the White House and Ascari; is 
that correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q So you didn't know whether it was Michael Ledeen 
or the Israelis or some other person out there that worked as 
the intermediary? 

A That's correct. I did not know. 

Q ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

Ihad you reached any 
conclusions as of the time of this letter, in October 1985, 
as to whether^^^^^^Hhad played any role in kidnapping 




ifttsssra 



357 



•/C6DE\. 



121 




Buckley? 

A Based on the intelligence that I had seen up until 
that time and based on what little we knew or didn't know 
abcuti^^^^^^^H there was no evidence that I saw that would 
suggest that^^^^^^H was involved in his kidnapping. We had 
strong evidence that the kidnapping of William Buckley, 

Jeremy Levin and others was] 

I to secure the leverage 
against the United States. 

Iwanted the United States 
to influence Kuwait to release some of the Da'Wa prisoners. 

Q Did it ever come to your attention, Mr. Allen, 
that Mr. Ghorbanifar had told the Central Intelligence Agency 
at or about the time of Mr. Buckley's kidnapping that^^B 
[was responsible for that kidnapping? 

A No, it did not. 

Q You don't recall seeing that information in 
Ghorbanifar 's 201 file? 

A I don't recall seeing it. 

Q Just to nail it down, Ghorbanifar himself never 
alluded to that aspe<^^l^^^^^^^^^H.llC« i% r«lati«^hip 

to i&: jtac^p^^tti^you iatMK5 ».^dBg^^gB«;mth- 

is that right? 

A He never stated _^ 




iither th» abduefeJS^og^ tS it d wt ^ oC^Wi^lwr 



H! 




358 




359 




THE WITNESS: Could I take a five-minute break? 



UlffitftSSMO 



360 




361 



y 



SECRET/CODfiWOMi 



125 



.-? Q ^^^^^QU say on the first page of the October 7 memo. 
Exhibit 7, that the release of Reverend Benjamin Weir was 
effected by the White House, working through intermediaries 
who were in direct contact with blank, who in turn was 
dealing directly with blank. Those conclusions, that 
statement in your memorandum, is that a representation made 
to you by North that you were passing onl 




Q So I understand, you felt you could reach the 
conclusion that there was indeed a cause and effect 
relationship between the initiative and the release of 
Reverend Heir? 

A Absolutely, and I suspected that there had been a 
transfer arms Irar^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

Q Now Weir didn't have any knowledge about who had 



362 





MM- 




# 



UNtA^m 



released, I believe, on the evening of 14 September. He was 
asked to take letters from the other hostages to their 
families, and he was taken to the British Embassy in West 
Beirut and dumped out. It all flowed together that- this 
movemmt of what ^^|pfcar«d j a r» « L^ gnBs^nto I#jf[~onittr« weekend 
of 14.'HS Sep^«gy»er h#d;^;dij^^ correlation wi^his release 
in^=W*st Jfeixut. _^-^S^- , _^^~r-._ .- ^^^i 

*i^ Q Okay, ^q^ le^» g^ to-.pct^§^^^,^jAich- is what 

■ "^Sr- "■• -^ ■-.■:. - -^ ,- rr 

real^t-lnspireaj this 1 e t tjSPF ^fott : ga t a rfH-^ f riinprtfT ^lgL . ^^ 

North on Saturday, October 5. 

A Well, I got a telephone call at the office on 

Saturday the "^^^ "'^'^^'*ftijBfrff|W^i i3'flWji|^'^ ^*"'9n^#g'^*^- """^ 
to come to the office. Colonel North is not always prompt. 
I think I arrived in the afternoon and I think he did not 
arrive until about 1900 hours that evening. 

Q For us civilians, that would be more like 7:00? 

A Yes. And at that time he stated that he had 
information he wanted to convey to me about the fact that 
Ascari was coming, traveling on a Greek passport and he was 
known by an alias as Kralis. He also was being accompanied 
by Yaacov Nimroc 




He stated that Nimrodi was an Israeli who had 
worked for the 




^ i V '>ji i" 



363 



UNCl^""' 



■i 1 x< i> • 



127 




I said, well, when is this chap coining, and I 
believe he said he was coming on the 7th, and this was on the 
5th, I 




364 



Pc] )Z8 




loTAL- 



365 




Q Let me focus in to that. At the time you're 
dealing with Mr. McMahor 




fou know the person that we now know to 
be Ghorbanifar as Ascari or using an alias name of Nick 
Kralis, correct? 

A Ascari and Nicholas Kralis, which is all I knew at 
the time. 

Q You did not know the actual identity of this 
person? 

A I did not, and neither did Mr. McMahon. 




366 




Lfffy^Tn^ 



130 



determine- th«^raal identity ifi^iK^. sBtei^ ^^feKralis, 

alia*es for GhorbanifSf' at tiw^yLine^B eim. in? -^ 
"^ -A ^ Bft^ no ef forlun ' -^^ "^^^ ^- 

' Q^" Vfflfy rs-th*t? " ^. ^TT-.^ "'- ~^=#^~ 

Jk ^I-^HB n^^ked t^^>E,^g» lenq^^baaed on* 
di«ci^'ions with "^xe^DirTCtor^.this, «as: iPfiiS^^Kouse _; 
init fa^^E^. ^^Is <rai^g^8£ite-iig^%»'iri> ted ^iwGWit y . W« 
were not asked at this stage to provide 

lany type of additional efforts to identify 





Q Was it your impression as of October 7-8 that 

Colonel North knew the identity of Mr. Ascari-Kralis? 

A It was my impression that he did not know, but he 

did not tell me that this individual was known by 
Ghorbanifar. 

^^Q ^^BS^^- what I'm trying to find out. I'm just 
curious why it was that you all didn't want to know who it 
was! 



It was not our operation. 



"mm 



K\ 



367 



iST/coDEwe|L II 1 

i i ■t' «^ a » ■ L> I-' 

Q So essentially you did what Colonel North asked 
you to do, but you didn't question why or do any more; is 
that right? 

A It was not our operati 




Q Did you have occasion to talk to Colonel North 
about the contact he had on the 7th and 8th of October with 
the folksV^^^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^HB^I 

A I believe that after the visit he indicated to me 
that he had had a discussion with Ascari and told him that he 
expected this activity to result in the release of Americans 
in Lebanon. 

Q Let's focus specifically on that. Do yc recall 
him telling you that he had met at his office in the Old 
Executive Office Building with Mr. Ascari, Mr. Schwimmer, Mr. 
Nimrodi, Mr. Ledeen? 

A No, he^ did not mention^ aey of^tJaose individuals. 




sons^aiwr* Mr. Ascari «rtB|^ai¥*n^; 
^Q ^\if o you have no kndSled^, ev«B tho^h today, of 



m 



368 



UNCtASffiO 



132 



what transpired At a mfeting in Co^|^ .*lortte'-s-:=ssarice with 
Ledeen, Nor^|^|Iimrodi , ^chwiapeKainA'^^feanifar? 

A Only what X've read in chronologies and 
information that's been developed since the initiative was 
exposed . 

^^^^^^^^^ wbfiOL,€pla0elr:l||^p!j^l:£.$Pirtteit he had had a 

discussion with Ascari, did you conclude that he knew — 

A Let me c^^^e^^t the.esCOrds^SJhen Jftr. "Ledee^ talked 
to B» 3on - X^^jja^i»?f ^ 8 ^iP - in41fi|i^^^hat\ the individual by 
the name of Ascari was Mr. Manucher Ghorbanifar, that -Mr. 
Ghorbanifar had met with some individuals at the White House, 
including Colonel North in the early October time frame, and 
I don't recall who all he said was at the meeting. 

Q When Colonel North told you in October that he had 
had a conversation with Ascari, this would have been within a 
day or two of Ascari coming in on the 7th? 

A I think shortly afterwards. 

Q Where did that conversation take place between you 
and Colonel North? 

A The Old Brogue Irish Inn in Great Falls. 

Q And what was the occasion that caused you and 
Colonel North to be together at that watering hole? 

A Beer. We stopped just for a social drink that 
evening. 

Q Was your relationship with Colonel North one of 



• --5 1 ■,■ vt J ; ? f.r. ■'-f 



369 




133 

friendship? I mean, did you socialize with him at all at 
that point in time? 

A I had socialized with Colonel North prior to that 
time, when I was in OSD. This was not anything unusual. 

Q I'm not suggesting it was, but he was someone that 
you dealt with outside of the office as well, a fellow you'd 
have a beer with from time to time? 

A Well, yes. We tended to focus on problems at 
hand. 

Q Couldn't leave it at the office? I understand. 
Was there anyone else present when you had this 
discussion with Colonel North? 

A I don't think so. 

Q Did you make any memorandum for the record or any 
other documentation of the conversations you had with him? 

A No. 

Q Can you give me your best and fullest recollection 
of what the Colonel told you at that meeting? 

A He stated that he had made some very strong 
remarks to Ascari about the need for success in obtaining the 
release of the American hostages. I don't recall the exact 
language, but he was adamant that this had to go forward to 
quick fruition, that this individual keep his commitments and 
not deceive in any way the U.S. Government in this effort. 

Q Did he outline to you what his program was. 



370 




134 



looking toward the future? 

A No, I don't think so. We talked about a number of 
other issues, including the old program that we had at OSD. 

Q Was it your impression at the time that you had 
this discussion with Colonel North that Colonel North in fact 
knew the identity of the man that he identified to you as 
Ascari? 

A He didn't state that he knew him other than as 
Ascari. He said that this individual was an Iranian who was 
an arms dealer and as a result he had some doubts as to his 
trustfulness and this was the reason that he had spoken in 
rather strong terms to Ascari. 

Q He did not ask you at that point to develop 
further background information on who this person was? 

A Not at all. 




371 




Q So that I'm clear on what you at least knew to be 
the status of knowledge in the Operations Directorate,. were 
you keeping Clair George apprised of the work that you were 
doing with Colonel North as of October 1985? 

A I don't know that I discussed with him all the 
details, but in general he knew] 




Q Did he know 

A I can't recall and I don't know. 

Q similarly, you would not know whether or not he 
knew that Ascari was in the United States on October 7 and 3, 
1985? 

A I suspect — I believe he did, becaus* 
^^^^^^H^H being made available to the Deputy Director 
and to the Director, and I believe the Director tried to keep 
the Deputy Director of Operations informed. 

Q Vou believe that based on what? 
lEO 



372 



IINCmSlflED 



136 



A Based on the fact that we were only getting one 
copy of these documents, but I believe that at least some^^| 
were being made available to Mr. George. 

Q Apart from whatever conclusions he could have 
drawn ^^^^^^Hj^^^l^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^l^l^^^^^H do 
you have knowledge of any other elaboration of what was going 
on being given to Clair George? 

A No, I don't know. 

Q Similarly^^^^^^^^|and his deputy 

A I don't know what they were being told at the 
time. I left that to Mr. Casey and Mr. McMahon to decide 
what to tell 
that^it'i^^Mi^^lei 

a. ^ xmderstand. ' Agft ^r«^f^ka f^^V ^° *"y meeting 
that t^k ^Bf?*fe]^^^'*8fe*Jlgfe^hif^i^^ion» Direc|^ 

project? 

A 

Q 

A 
recall 




In the October time frame 1985? 

Correct. 

No. I didn't attend any meetings that I can 




373 





Q Just so I can keep your role in perspective, you 
still as of October 1985 are principally involved^Bf^ta 

l^^^^m^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m^^^^^^^^^^^H f o r 
North? 

A "®^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

I was aware in 

October, during the Achille Lauro event. Director Casey spoke 
about the initiative. We were getting ready for a National 
Security Planning Group meeting on the Achille Lauro with the 
President and Mr. Casey brought up the initiative and stated 
that he was convinced that Mr. Schwinuner was involved in the 
activity. He did that on, I believe, about the llth of 
October . 

Q Let's focus on that aspect. I think maybe the 
best way to lead into it is to talk a little bit about the 
Achille Lauro incident. That occurred about the same time 
Ghorbanifar came into the United States. That would have 
been October 7, 1985; correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q You were involved in the CIA's response to the 
Achille Lauro? 

A Very heavily. 



374 




138 

Q And Colonel North was also involved, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q You also would have gotten to work with or at 
least to meet Michael Ledeen at that time; isn't that right? 

A I did not meet Mike Ledeen. I talked to him on 
the secure telephone several times during the week of the 
Achille Lauro. 

Q Why was it that you were in contact with Mr. 
Ledeen at that time? 

A Well, when the Achille Lauro was first hijacked by 
the Palestine Liberation Front terrorists I called Colonel 
North immediately and Mr. Ledeen answered the telephone, and 
I told him to immediately page Colonel North, who was at the 
Department of State, which he did. Mr. Ledeen asked me to 
continue to transmit information as it arrived until Colonel 
North returned, and I did that. 

And I guess I talked to Mr. Ledeen a few times 
during that week, particularly from Wednesday — Thursday, 
about noon-on, when it was clear that we had a golden 
opportunity to intercept the four hijackers along with Abul 
Abbas. 

Q Was Mr. Ledeen introduced to you in any fashion? 
You get a strange voice on the other end of the telephone? 

A I had to correct the record because I had had 
lunch with Mr. Ledeen in August 1985, I believe, at the 




375 




139 

request of Colonel North. He said Mr. Ledeen was a 
consultant on counterterrorism and wanted to meet the 
National Intelligence Office, so we had a lunch at Jean 
Pierre. So I had met him once and we had talked mainly about 
his background, living in Italy for eight or ten years, the 
Papal assassination attempt. It was a very generic 
discussion on international terrorism trends. 

Q Was there anyone else at that luncheon with you 
and Mr. Ledeen? 

A No. 

Q Was there any discussion at that luncheon of Mr. 
Ledeen 's travels to Israel? 

A No. 

Q And no mention of his relationship, new budding 
friendship with Manucher Ghorbanifar? 

A None whatsoever. So when Mr. Ledeen answered the 
telephone on 7 October I at least could put a face with the 
voice. 

Q And it did not come to your attention in this 
series of telephone calls that take place 7th, 8th, 9th, 
10th, whatever, of October, that Mr. Ledeen was at that very 
time meeting with, dining with Manucher Ghorbanifar? 

A Not at all. I was focused totally on the Achille 
Lauro that week. I'm afraid Mr. Ghorbanifar was very much a 
back-burning issue at that stage. 





D 



376 



flMMSVB 



140 




Ghorbanifar that he met with and had dinner with Roy Funnark 
on 8 October? 

A No, I did not know that. 

Q Do you have knowledge of any contact that Mr. 
Furmark would have had with Mr. Casey at that time? 

A No, I have no knowledge that he was in contact 
with Mr. Casey at that time. 

Q Now in terms of actually having another face-to- 
face session with Mr. Ledeen, that would not have occurred in 
the week of October 7; is that right? 

A That did not occur. 

Q When next would you have had such a meeting with 
Mr. Ledeen? 

A I believe it was November 1985. He called on Mr. 
Clarridge and me at the Agency — the specific date probably 
is available somewhere in the records of visitors to the 
Agency — where he brought in some information that he stated 
related to Iranian terrorist networks in Western Europe. He 
did not name the source of that information. In fact, he 
refused to do it, and he brought — I think he brought a 
photograph or so with him at the time. 

Q During this period of time, as we move into later 
October, do you recall preparing a memorandum for Colonel 



HNicm 



377 



uwGtA^^^"^ 



141 



North on Near-Term Middle Eastern Terrorist Threat? 

A I probably prepared that particular report more 
than once. I don't recall the specific paper. 

Q Let me show you a memorandum addressed to Colonel 
North dated October 29, 1985, which appears to be by you, Mr. 
Allen, which we will make our next exhibit. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 9 
for identification.) 
( Pause . ) 
A This sounds pretty good to me. I recall the 
threat data at the timefj 




So this is just a 
regular assessment. 

Q That was my question. This is addressed to 
Colonel North. With regard to this particular memorandum, 
why were you sending Colonel North this kind of material? 

A Because he was the coordinator within the National 
Security Council staff for terrorism and these were some of 
the thoughts that I had of the current threat and some of the 
possible countermeasures that might be taken to deal with the 
threat more effectively. 



378 



Ewq^ 



T/CODEWqM)| 142 



Q Colonel North's responsibilities with regard to 
countering the terrorist threat, he had held those 
responsibilities throughout '85; is that correct? 

A ff*^» ha toaJCh over from Major Christopher 
Shoemaker in August 1981 as. having responsibility for 
counterterrorism on the National Security Council staff. 

Q I want to focus on '85, though. At that time was 
he the principal coordinator of counterterrorism activity for 
the NSC? 

-- A He was the principal coordinator of NSC-related 
counterterrorist activity. 

Q Had he given responsibility over that area to any 
subordinate of his? Was there someone else that sort of 
carried on day-to-day responsibility? 

A He didn't have any staff members at that time who 
worked for him. 

Q You would have prepared reports such as this how 
frequently — on a regular interval? 

A Well, I do a monthly threat assessment. That's 
what I was going to do Friday morning, hold my warning 
session on the current threats to Americans and American 
facilities worldwide. I do this on a regular basis. 1 
normally prepare that for the Director and the Deputy 
Director on a monthly basis. I sent this, evidently, to 
Colonel North. Perhaps I wrote it at his request or perhaps 




379 




143 

I had written a paper and I decided to send the paper to him. 
I don't recall whether he asked for it or whether I just sent 
it to him because I thought it would be of interest. 

Q That's what I's trying to pursue. 

A I suspect I felt that this was something of 
interest to him at the time. 

Q I have not encountered periodic reports of that 
kind addressed to Colonel North, and I'm just curious whether 
you would have done this on a monthly or quarterly basis for 
Colonel North or not. 

A No, I didn't do it on a monthlyaiSpti Sm TS t Mm 




actually requested. I suspect he did; otherwise, I wouldn't 
ha^% sent ^t^Jhin^' "^3^ wi SHaii ^^a^ ^»te ^-|flff^v"'ca£ent_ 

wrote . 

Q Now let's drop back again. You said that Director 
Casey had — and I hope I'm not mischaracterizing -- some 
kind of a meeting or session or discussion in the context of 
the Achilla Lauro in which you talked about the Iran 
initiative. 

A We were walking to his office, where we were going 
to have lunch and then go to the NSPG meeting chaired by the 
President, and we were discussing the initiative and t^CSact 



&i 3 ft t.t L.ny V ! I i L 



380 



UNSMFB 



144 



that th«^ InAil^^al Xr )cn«w ii@Bl^iE»^ ^s in Washington about 
that tine, or had been in Washington that week, that he was 
there with an Israeli^'liamed Niorodl«: I dc gjS belilve Mf . 
Casey had beafdo^SiB* ^^.-^^^^ ~ jSIC'" =?-' 

Mr. Casey stated that he felt that Mr. Schwinuner 
was involved and that Mr. Schwinuner was a man who could get 
things done, but Mr. Casey specifically indicated he had some 
doubts about the total reliability of Schwinuner. I recall 
walking to his office and Mr^^^Acy ^Mking these statements. 

Q Was there anyone else present when you all took 
this walk? 

A 

Lac^fe ^"data j# ^^- ^'^-^^ ."^ ■ 
A. "^Aroxas^^^Sac ll^^ X-jCag ^v^r i f y that, but it was 
around the 10th^<»r7^^-.aJ^litob*iBS^hi^xIite of the NSPG that 
was held on the Achille Lauro. 

Q with regard to Director Casey's knowledge of Mr. 

Schwinuner, did he indicate to you the basis for his knowledge 
of Mr. Schwinuner? 

A No, he did not. 

Q The source of his knowledge? 

A No. 

Q As of the time you had this conversation with Mr. 
Casey, did you know of Mr. Schwinuner or his involvement in 
this matter? .,.^„„, „_ 
■; KJB'jsJcai'Kr- 




I 



i 



381 



UNCUSSiBEO 



145 







A I had heard of Mr. Schwimmer, who was involved 
with the Israeli aircraft industry, but I knew nothing about 
Mr. Schwimmer or his background or his credentials. 

Q And specifically with regard to the context of the 
Iranian intermediary you had not encountered Mr. Schwimmer 's 
name before Mr. Casey raised it? 

A No, I had not. 

Q Did you explore with Mr. Casey who he would have 
been discussing these matters with? 

A No, I did not. 

Q Was it your impression that he was having 
conversations o£ his 
■»(:ter? - -•'?% 

Casey's ilnd_at.-.^« ^g|| ^ _^^p^^> . I 'W '"" "^^""^iBP ^' 

indicated something to you that would have told you — 

A He didn't say that he had talked to Colonel North 
about this issue. You'll find other memoranda from me to 
Colonel North assessing threats, so it's not unusual to send 
something to the National Security Council staff. 

Q It sometimes is unusual for us to actually receive 
those materials, but this is the only one I've gotten on that 
point, 

A Actually, it's quite a good assessment. 

I jtdibf iiici 



i^f he' 



I i! i 



382 



UNWHD 



146 



Q A dynamite assessment. I'm glad we had it. 

The Tower Commission report indicates that Colonel 
North, on 12 November, was in London and met with, 
separately, Mr. Ghorbanifar and Terry Waite. Did you have 
knowledge in early November that Colonel North was making 
that kind of a trek ta liBaidon? 

A, I believe I knew he wm in London, but I had no 
knowledge of what transpire* "nor, "to the best of my 
knowledge, did he give any details. 

^ Q Old there eyei ag ej B l gi: « . ^t ^fe when (^lone^#rtlf^ 

on- or ajbutrlfesfiiaber 12 wtth Hr.-~^Ghorten£IKlr^ ^^ 




^pt~^C^l that~iie ever talked s^licitl^ 
about ~a neej&Jji? on 37 No^mher in London. — ^^ -^- 
'\^-'_Q^ DlifelitfTever J3>|l :^u abotit j^aeeting in" early 

WW ou-|0^ 12tH^^ 

Q^ Mi^Spiloiwl Nortl^Mt^ you eil^t a meetii^ he'd 
had with Ghorban^^ in ^ndowr^in early November? 3^ 

a:; I^oi^rxecalT. r^^ :P°s*^*>5* hejraid. I^ga 

iff^^ti^»" 

>f anyoi^^^iSiQs^raVeled 



^U 




383 



UKGLMffiD 



147 




A No, I don't. 

Q Do you have any knowledge of a recording device 
that Colonel North would have taken with him,] 

^^^^^Ito make a record of what 
transpired in the rooml 

A Not at that time. 

Q When did the existence of such a device in the 
possession of Colonel North come to your attention? 

A When I met with Colonel North along witl' 

Mr. Koch, Major General Secord, in Room 370 at the 
Executive Office Building on 29 January 1986. 

Q Prior to January of '86, though, you were not 
aware of the fact that Colonel North made use of such 
recording devices? 

A I can't recall that I was ever aware of that prior 
to 29 January 1986. 

Q November 14, 1985, according to the Tower 
Commission report, Mr. McFarlane met with the Director, Mr. 
Casey, and the Deputy Director, Mr. McMahon, and told them 
during the course of that meeting on the 14th that the 
Israelis were going to be giving arms to Iran. Were you made 
aware of that session between Casey, McMahon, and McFarlane? 

A No, not that meeting. I was not aware of it. It 
wasn't until the 16th, I believe, of December that I had the 
opportunity to discuss the initiative at some length with Mr. 






384 



iiNot«e 



HcMahon. 



Q ^ Again focusing y^iur attantion on th« late November 
— excuse^HWty late October-first o^ple-of wee)cs of November 
period of timet .did it comtt>~to ^jpour attention during that 
period of time that Mr. Ghorbanifar, under the guiae-of 
Krai is, -Ascari or Anx, other nwna h*A returned ^ t he United 
stattesl 

A- In the Novem^[a^^M,:S«ine7 

Q " LaJep=<re&ober-fliM^L NoveidMi*. 
~ ^ it^a^ttS^Tp 

g^ 4..aW B^<icality.yi»FiM iJ^kt ^ asl 





S^A =r^t tojthe luMffe oggty2^°'^^^>*>__;P^^*^ "^J*^ ^'^^^ 




a dart f ron a^onel VBetSt i^^I^lpColonel North told you_-^ 
thathe was going to- be going^ to Geneva SMwtimAr in the not 
too dia tact ggutnre . ^%_ rx^_ — • 

A No, sir. 

Q I am misrecollecting. 



stat«i^»rt- important meeting was occurring in Genev 




385 




imB 



that he felt a 

solution to the American hostage problem in Lebanon would 
shortly be at ha 




Q Let's back up on that. First, when do you recall 
that conversation taking place? 

A Around 22 November. 

Q Circumstances. Was it a telephone conversation? 
I was theH^^^H^mHof when 
contacted CIA and asked that I call him immediately. -I did 
so. It was in the evening, as he is wont to call, and I told 
him thati 




| l would work very 

assiduously 

Q Now, to help me try to fix this in time, you will 
recollect that on November 22 and 23 activity was under way 
with regard to ultimately the CIA proprietary delivering 
goods . 

A I was not aware of that until the 23rd. 

Q But to help you fix on when this conversation took 
place, would it be your recollection this was the night 
before? 

A It was either the night before or Thursday 
evening, which would be the 21st. It could have been 



B2-688 0-88-14 



386 



iiNim»D 



150 



Thursday evening the 21st. 

Q The conversation would have been via the secure 
telephone, correct? 

A Always. 

Q Did you make any notes, memoranda, anything on 
this telephone conversation with North? 

A Well, the Independent Counsel has all my 
handwritten notes, and it is conceivable that I made some 
notations, but until I. can see my notes I cannot verify that. 

Q Do you recall going the next step of putting your 
notes into a more polished format? 

A No. 




Q I'm with you. Now let's take it step by step, 
though. Colonel North told you that it was going to take 
place at a particular point in time, the meeting? 

A Well, on the weekend in Geneva. 

Q 

A Something like that 

Q And he said it was going to take place in Geneva, 
Switzerland? 

A That's correct. 



So that would be the weekend oj^ the 23rd and 24th? 



387 



m&m 



151 

Q Did he tell you who he anticipated being at the 

meeting? 

A No. He stated that Ghorbanifar — not 
Ghorbanifar. He stated that Ascari would be there, that 
there would be some intermediaries involved, and I believe he 

indie ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

that^^^^^^^^^BwouI 

ird for me to recall the 





388 



TpTAL- 



389 



ivsmm 



155 




Q - Fin« >— -tt B problem. With regard to the 
conversation with North on the 22nd, it was restric 



390 



P^^^i^il^ll^ri 



yr 

North at that time? 

A Well, he stated that he felt that if the meeting 
went successfully that there would be a sequential release of 
American hostages and possibly the return of William 
Buckley's body. He did not delineate just what type of 
transaction would produce the recovery of the hostages and 
Mr. Buckley's body. 

Q Bear with me. When you said he didn't delineate 
it, did he give you a broad hint of what was coming down or 
not? 

•^^{-i^ go he said he thought it was going to happen but 
he didn't tell you the basis for that thought? 

A That's correct. 

Q Did he ask you to play any role in accomplishing 
something in the same time period as this meeting was taking 
place in Geneva to facilitate the release of the hostages? 

A No role at all of an operational nature. 

Q Specifically as of the time this telephone call 
took place you were asked to do nothing with regard to 
arranging for airplanes or getting clearances or setting up 
anything for him in the Agency? 

A No other activity whatsoever. 

Q And you did not know at the time of this telephone 
call that there was going to be a need for airplanes or 



mmms 



391 



wmm 



157 



schlepping goods from one part of the world to another? 

A I did not know that. 

Q Now let's move to November 23, 1985. You did 
become aware of November 23, 1985, of an airplane or airline 
arrangement relating to the hostages; isn't that correct? 

A I don't think I would phrase it that way. 

Q I hope you wouldn't. Phrase it better than that. 

A I was called at home and Colonel North wanted to 
know why I was at home. He wanted me to show| 
materials on this Iranian initiative to Mr. Clarridge,- who 
was Chief of the European Division, and said why don't you go 
to work. So I did that, and I went to work and I went up and 
obtained my f ile^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand took them down -to 
Clarridge, who was there in his office, and most Directorate 
of Operations Chiefs are there on a Saturday morning. 

And so it wasn't unusual to find him there. He 
read them. I said I'd been asked to do this by ColtfflB North 
because Colonel North" vantme^tn^S understand that this was 
a very serious initiative under way by the White House. 

And Mr. Clarridge leafed through them — by that 
time there were quite a number^^^^^^^^^^^ — and indicated 
that yes, he believed this was a serious initiative. And he 
told me that Colonel North had requested some assistance in 
oti^ijalEev^m name of a reliable charter airline. He had been 
trying to do this. I believe |L^lP-tl8.U}^<^3^^<^ ^^ ^^^ going 



I believe alfp.he in( 



392 




158 

to try to obtain some form of clearance tor a' 

aircraft to land 
in a certain country that fell within his divisional 
responsibilities. 

And that country, I believe, wasi 

Q Let me sort of walk yoggthreugh this step by step. 
You would have gotten a telephone call from Colonel North on 
the morning of Saturday, November 23. 

A That's correct. - -<^.- i -.^ 

Q ApE^ximately what time? 

A ^<^^^ I think he called — I was going to go to a 
football game with my family, and he called about 8:30 or 



come to the off ig« and h^p hjm-Jjecause he wanted to make 

sure Mr. Clarridge was aware that thi^twas a serious 

--« 

And when I arrived at the office I called Colonel 
North on secure, I ^s^i-sve^^^a^^p^^yi ^^Ip a^^^ ee^Bg: 
effort( aa>h at he was having some problems, that things had to 
be accelerated and for me to go down and see Mr. Clarridge, 
which I did. 

And then Mr. Clarridge explained that Colonel 
North was looking for a reliable charter airline to move some 
equipment to Iran. 

Q Mr. Clarridge had not been privy, to your 
knowledgej^&Q^^^^^^^^^^^^^prior to this time; is that 




S«B 



393 



\mmm 



159 



correct? 

A To the best of my knowledge he'd never seen them 
and indicated so when I showed them to him. It came as a 
surprise to that^^^^^^^^^^^^^H existed. 

-Q^ I'm having a little trouble following why it was 
that you would have shown^^^^^^^^Hto Clarridge to help 
establish North's bona fides. I'm having trouble with that. 

A Not North's bona fides but the bona fides of the 
initiative, which was clearly directed at getting hostages 
out of Lebanon, also clearly directed at Iran. 

Q Oo you recall any discussion with Mr. Clarridge or 
anyone else or Mr. Clarridge talking either directly or 
indirectly to Mr. McMahon about whether or not he ought to 
proceed with this matterl^ :;~^r*J2fe'-^"" ^5«- -c=r>->^=_^; 

A I don't recall that at all. 

Q Do you recall talking to Mr. Juchniewicz about 
that^l^Se^^^«ings on the morning of the 23rd? 

A No, I did not talk to Mr. Jncht^SSlc^' ~-^ 

Q with regard to Mr. Clarridge, he wa^Qwre at the 
time you arrived, right? 

A He was in his office when I came down from the 
seventh floor to the fifth floor, where he is located. 
ife.riT Q And that would have been approximately — 

A Fourth floor. 

Q That would have been approximately what time of 



(ma^HD 



394 




day? 

*^- X imagin* I if rived there about 9:30, 10:00. 

Q So you arrived at his office about 9:30, 10:00? 

A I arrived probably in my office about 9:30. I 
picked up my mail and I think I had another! 

I looked at that and I included that in the 
reading material for Mr. Clarridge. 

Q Then, when you walked down to see Mr. Clarridge, 
Mr. Clarridge indicated to you that he'd been there for some 

tim«, ^ada«^..-^_^^^^^^^=^^ff ^^^r - ^' • 

A He didn't say how long he'd been there. 

Q Did you know how long he'd been there? 

A No. 

Q Do you know today how long he'd been there? 

A No. 

Q In terms of what Mr. Clarridge told you he was 
about, what did he tell you? 

A He stated that he was working on obtaining a 
charter, trying to help Colonel North obtain a charter 
airline, and that Colonel North needed the name of a reliable 
airline that could be passed to an intermediary working this 
problem ^^^^^^^^^1 Mr. Clarridge didn't seem to know much 
about the initiative except that he said Colonel North was en 
route to his office and that he would have more details. 

Meanwhile, I believe he was working on the problem 






-ii i 51 



■? 1 «u. 



395 




161 

and the idea had occurred that they might use the CIA 
proprietary, might just use this as a normal charter 
activity. 

Q That idea was abroad as of the time that you met 
with Clarridge that morning? 

"A -^ »8j^ld say it certainly had occurred to Mr. 
Clarridge. 

Q Was there anyone else present when you had this 
conversation with Mr. Clarridge? 

A I don't think so. Later in the day Colonel- North 
and^^^^^^HH^^^K I who head 
arrived. 

Q Now you were present when Colonel North arrived? 

A I think I went back to my office and then later I 
returned and Colonel North had arrived. 

Q At what point was a representation made to you 
about the cargo to be carried by this jMai *tt^ M^ jj ^Mte r 
aircraft it might be? 

A I can't recall specifically, but Colonel North 
stated emphatically that this was oil-drilling equipment that 
was being sent into-^HBifc It IrteBa B^faM tj^ to the meetings 
occurring in Geneva. I believe in my presence and Mr. 
Clarridge he made a call to the Deputy National Security 
Advisor, at the time Admiral Poindexter, to get Admiral 
Poindexter's endorsement to proceed with this activity. _ 



UNCtSSSfflfD 



396 



M4fflED 



162 



Q I'm sorry — Admiral Poindexter or Mr. McFarlane? 

A Well, I think he may have called both. He made a 
number of telephone calls while I was there. 

Q Was Colonel North actually present and were you 
present when Colonel North actually said that this was oil- 
drilling equipment? 

A Yes, I heard him say that. 

Q You heard him say that? ^ "^ 

A Yes. I've testified to that and I'll testify 
again. I heard him say it. ~ 



-•='^*-igR "-Vbu during this period of time, up to the time you 
had the meeting with Colonel North, were you aware of or were 
you sho#n any of the cable traffic that was being generated 
to and from Mr. Clarridge? 

To and from Mr. Clarridge? 
Q Um-hum. 

A I knew that cables were going out ^^^^^^^H and 
also believe^^^^^^^^^^^^H because 
Clarridge felt if an agency proprietary was used it would 
have to have some clearances. I don't recall the specific. 
I don't think I read any of the traffic specifically at the 
time. -^ 





issue of apprbpriat* cov«r 



UNIitAtrMU 



■ alrlin* «o -it would look 



397 






163 

like a rtornol chairter actXvity. - All ttutj^^s required was 
for, I believe, the manager of the airliner^ the CIA 
proprietary, toybe put in eofltact.irit^ iEJJr. Coj 

Q ^ With regard to time dif ferences^^^^^^^Bln 
Itranslates^iio rougHii^^^^^^^ in the United 
Stains IT Do^ ^at sound~llt?oiit 
fe ^ Sound^^bou^X^ight . 
. -^ ^ S«^^^Senv4^sa€loir3that took place ir^^^^^^lat 
|on ttuij^d^et KoveBb«r would translate to 
aboul^^^^^H f^ tti^23^^in^^« United 4|at9s; is^'-t that 
rigHp "^ "^ * ^ 




No, 




It would be about^^^^^^H here, abouti 
[difference between^^^^^^ and the United States. 
Q All right. Did it come to your attention that 
there was a cable fromi 

[of a conversation that he had on the evening of the 
23rd with a man he )cnew as Copp, who we now Jcnow is General 
Secord? 

A No, I did not )cnow of that at all. 
Q Do you know of it today, that there were such 
cables? 

A I knew there were cables, but I don't know where 

the matter with Mr. 



^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^d i rect 1 y 



398 




164 

Copp, known to us as Major General Richard Secord. No, I had 
no knowledge of that. 

Q You had no knowledge during those meetings that 
you had on the 23rd of a cable fron 

to Mr. Clarridge stating that he had had a 
conversation with the man we now know as Mr. Copp in which 
Mr. Copp indicated that the cargo to be carried was HAWK 
missiles? 

A No, I did not know that such a cable existed. 
Q And you've never seen such a cable? 
A I have never seen that cable, to the best of my 
recollection. 

Q Have you ever had occasion to speak with the 
gentleman wa^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^^^^^^B at 
that time? 

A I have not had the occasion. I don't know whi 
■was at the time. 
MR. WOODCOCK: His name was 

THE WITNESS: I've heard of^^^^^^^^^ but I've 
never discussed this issue with him. 
BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 
Q It's never come to your attention that 

[stated under oath that he sent such a cable to Mr. 
Clarridge on the 23rd? 

A I have no knowledge that he sent such a cable. 




UNebWED 



399 





165 

vrhen Colonel North spoke about oil-drilling equipment, ^^^^^| 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B, say and 

I've testified to that, as to whether Colonel North was being 
totally candid as to the cargo. 

Q I understand. Let's pursue it from that angle. 
You did not suggest to Colonel North that he ought not to be 
lying to you all about what that cargo was? 

A I did not confront Colonel North on that issue. 
He had stated emphaticall y it w as oil-drilling equipment. 

Ion the 

22nd or 23rd, probably that morning, it raised some questions 
in my mind as to the reliability of that statement. However, 
this whole operation had been shrouded in great secrecy by 
the White House and there were many parts that I was totally 
in the dark about, and I did not know at that stage just 
precisely what was occurring. 

At the same time, inwardly I had serious doubts, 
and I think Mr. Clarridge had some doubts, too, and concerns. 

Q In terms of Mr. Clarridge 's doubts, did he express 
those doubts to you? 

A No, I don't think so. 

Q You did not have occasion to talk with Mr. 
Clarridge about his assessment of what this cargo was? 

A No. 

Q You have never heard^ Mr. ^J^ridge state whether 



e never heard Mr. Clarrid 



400 



IIN£mFIED 



166 



Ithat the cargo to be 




or not he received a cable fron 
carried was HAWK missiles? 

A I've never heard him state that at all. 

Q When, if ever, did it come to your attention that 
Mr. Clarridge gave instructions tol 

to destroy all of the cables that had been 
sent out oi^^^^^^on this matter? 

A I have never heard of such an order having been 
given by Mr. Clarridge at any time. 

Q Do you have any knowledge of the destruction of 
the CIA headquarters copies of that cable? 

A Absolutely not. Since I didn't Jcnow it exists, I 
don't know anything about its destruction either. 

Q The cable in question would have sent to Mr. 
Casey, Mr. McMahon, as well as Mr. Clarridge. Have you had 
any occasion to talk to Mr. Casey or Mr. McMahon about the 
cable they would have gotten froa 

indicating that the cargo to be carried was HAWK 
missiles? 

A No. I never discussed the cable traffic between 
and^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hj^^H w i th 
Mr. McMahon or Mr. Casey. Mr. Casey was out of the country, 
wasn't he, during that period? 

Q I can't answer that question; I don't know. 

A I'm almost ^z^atfift M}#% M»i aSqA^y was 



msnr 



401 



mmmm 



during that period. 

Q I have no idea how one delivers the mail to the 
Director when he's out of the country. 

A You certainly don't deliver every incoming cable 
when thousands arrive every day. 

Q In terms of who was keeping an eye on things for 
Mr. Casey, Mr. Casey's executive assistant at that point 
would have been a guy named ^^^^^^^^Hf is that right? 

A I don't know. I can't recall who was his 
executive assistant at the time. I thought it was 

Q You don't recall having any dealings wit 

on behalf of the Director? 
A I don't recall any specific dealings with 





Q With regard to the flight of th€ 
aircraft, you were aware that Mr. McMahon was concerned about 
that flight when he returned to work on the 25th of November; 
isn't that correct? 

A I understand he was very concerned. Mr. Clarridge 
told me that he was concerned. I talked to Mr. clarridge 
briefly on the 25th. 




402 




Iby the morning of the 2 5th or by the morning of the 
26th I was fairly well convinced that it wasn't oil-drilling 
equipment. 

Q It was not oil-drilling equipment? 

A That's correct, and I've testified to that. 

Q I understand that. McMahon was quite convinced on 
the 25th it wasn't oil-drilling equipment, too; isn't that 
right? 

A He was upset at the activity on that weekend and 
had ordered the General Counsel to look into it, and Mr. 
Clarridge had expressed concern about the reaction of Mr. 
McMahon and stated that the General Counsel was looking into 



it. 



uHcyissui^ 



403 



DNCLASSflED 



169 



Q Now with regard to assignments, you recollect, do 
you not, that Mr. McMahon felt strongly that a Presidential 
Finding was required for this activity; isn't that right? 

A I'll have to put it in the context of the 
conversation I had with Mr. McMahon on the 16th of December, 
where Mr. McMahon described in some detail the meeting that 
had occurred with the President on the 7th of December where 
he was present for about an hour and a half in which this 
initiative was discussed. 

And Mr. McMahon had at that point argued, I- 
believe, against the initiative or had certainly pointed out 
that the intermediary involved — we knew who that individual 
was by that time — was unreliable and had emphatically 
stated that if the Agency was to support the White House 
Iranian initiative it would require a Presidential Finding, 
and he was quite adamant on that and told me so in no 
uncertain terms. 

Q I'm with you, but I want to take you back to 
November. Do you recall being aware on November 25 or 
November 26? 

A On the 26th Mr. Clarridge stated that Mr. McMahon 
felt that there should be some sort of Finding possibly 
developed on this whereby there was an approval received at 
the top from the President saying that this was a legitimate 
activity for the Agency to have undertaken. 




404 



mmma 



170 



Q You're getting this information from Mr. 
Clarridge. You did not actually discuss it with Mr. McMahon 
on the 2 6th? 

A I didn't discuss it with Mr. McMahon, to the best 
of my recollection. 

Q On the 26th? 

A No, sir. I did not. 

Q And you did not have a similar discussion on the 
2 5th, the day before? 

A No, sir, I did not. . - 

■ ■ =*^ ^ 

Q You were or were not aware that on the 26th of 
November Mr. Casey asked for a Presidential Finding on this 
matter? 

A I know that from the chronology, but I did not 
know at the time. 

Q So you didn't have knowledge this was being sought 
as of the 26th of November? 

A No, I didn't. 

Q Let me show you a note of November 26, 1985 from 
Mr. Casey to vice Admiral Poindexter enclosing a proposed 
Finding which I'd like to have marked as Exhibit 10. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 10 
for identification.) 

A I was aware, I believe, that something was under 



405 



iwetAsstfifD 



way as a result of Mr. Clarridge's statement, and I sort of 
termed it a mini-Finding, and that term apparently persisted. 
At the time, though, I did not pursue it. I did not obtain 
any additional information. I recall, however, I believe 
that Mr. Makowka was involved in trying to prepare something 
that would have been a Presidential Finding to support future 
action as well as ratifying past actions. 

Q with regard to Exhibit 10, have you ever seen that 
document before? 

A No, I have not seen it before. I've heard about 
it. Mr. Makowka has described it. He described it in the 
November 1986 time frame when I raised the issue of a mini- 
Finding. I was told by Colonel North that a mini-Finding 
doesn't exist, because nothing was ever signed. 

Mr. Clair George stated that it did not exist to 
me, I believe in the November 1986 time frame. 

Q You are aware, are you not, that Mr. McMahon 
prepared a memorandum for the record on this incident dated 
December 7, 1985? 

A Yes, I am aware of it. 

Q Have you had occasion to read that memorandum? 

A I have read it, I believe, yes, but I'd have to 
look at it to make sure it's the same memorandum that I 
recall reading. 

Q Well, let me show it to vai^fMid I specifically 





406 



DNeWSSfflED 



172 



direct your attention to paragraph 3 , although you are 
welcome to read the rest of it as well, but I'd like to have 
the memorandum of December 7, 1985, marked as Exhibit 11. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 11 
for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 

A I've read this before. I'm aware of the 
memorandum . 

Q Does reading the memorandum now give you a. fuller 
recollection of the )cnowledge that you had on the 25th and 
26th of November of the acts of Mr. McMahon with regard to 
getting a Finding? 

A Not in any great detail, only what Mr. Clarridge 
had told me, that the General Counsel was involved and that a 
Finding might be required, that Mr. McMahon was upset at what 
had occurred over the weekend. 

Q You were aware, were you not, at that time that 
Mr. McMahon was seeking a Finding that would be retroactive, 
that would bless what had occurred on the 23rd and 24th? 

A That was my understanding, that it would bless 
what had occurred. 

Q Now with regard to the responsibility of keeping 
track of what had happened on the Finding, bird-dogging the 
White House, if you yill, there's an allusion to Mr. 




407 




173 

McMahon's interest in finding out what had happened with the 
Finding in this memorandum? 

A That's correct. 

Q Is it not a fact that you and Mr. Clarridge had 
the responsibility of checking with the White House, 
specifically the NSC, to determine whether or not that 
Finding had been signed? 

A No, sir, that is not a fact. I can't speak for 
Mr. Clarridge, but no one ever asked me to pursue this issue 
with the National Security Council staff, with Colonel North 
or any of Colonel North's superiors to determine whether this 
has been signed or not. 

Q Specifically, Mr. McMahon, to the best of your 
recollection, did not task you with the responsibility of 
finding out what happened with the mini-Finding that you've 
described? 

A To the very best of my recollection, Mr. McMahon 
never tasked me to pursue this with the NSC. 

Q And you did not in fact pursue it? 

A No, sir. 

Q Did Mr. McMahon ask you to pursue it with anybody 
else on whether or not the President had signed this Finding? 

A To the best of my recollection, I can't recall Mr. 
McMahon ever asking me to do that. 

Q And with jregard to Exhibit 10, which is what you 
ICB 





408 



ietASSIHED 



characterize as the mini-Finding, it continues to be your 
best recollection that you have not actually seen that 
document before; is that right? 

A To the best of my recollection I don't recall 
seeing it before. I don't recall seeing that specific 
Finding. As you know, on the 24th of December there was a 
conversation in Room 392 of the Executive Office Building 
with Colonel North, Bernie Makowka and myself. That 
conversation almost certainly alluded to this draft 
Presidential Finding. 

Q It alluded to somethijMN^ ^^i at'B a Bontli:^t«r, 
December 24, 1985, and we've got a long way to go to get 
there . 

A I know. I keep moving you along. 

A I know, and I sympathize with you, but let me turn 
it over to my colleague, who has more questions on the 
weekend of the 23rd. 

EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT CO^iXTTEE 
BY MR. VAN CLEVE: 

Q If I might, just a couple of brj^ef m^i^^ ons to 
fo^tO W J4P on what Mr. Kerr has been asKing about, ^ihg baek 
to the morning of Saturday, November 23. Could you please 
explain why it was necessary for Colonel North to get you to 
vouch for his request to Mr. Clarridge with respect to — 

A I can't ^n^y?"^ that question. Colonel North will 
Isfci 



409 



mmmm 



175 



have to answer it. He simply stated it, that he wanted Mr. 
Clarridge to feel assured that there was an important 
initiative under way relating to the American hostages in 
Lebanon, that this is one very tangible way of demonstrating 
to Mr. Clarridge that something had been under way for a 
number of weeks. But I can't answer that beyond what Colonel 
North explicitly told me. 

Q When you arrived at the CIA and found out that Mr. 
Clarridge had been asked to supply the name of a reliable 
charter airline and get some landing clearances 
were you surprised at the nature of the request? Was that an 
unusual request? 

A Well, it was not something that occurs every day 
because the destination of the aircraft was Iran. 

Q To your knowledge had Colonel North ever made a 
similar request to you or to Mr. Clarridge previously? 

A I can assure you he'd never asked me for that. 

Q How about Mr. Clarridge? 

A I've never heard that -S» «9ked Mr. Clarridge any 
type of rec[uest of that nature in the past. 

Q I take it, then, that it's fair to say this was a 
relatively unusual request. It came up on a Saturday 
morning. It was represent«I"l^Btt^^liat this is something 
the White House wanted to get done and so forth. 

A Well, I (jQQ'.t-know. You know, you are 



Bn't know. You know, y 
teSSIflfD 



410 



UNWSIFIEO 



176 



characterizing it as unusual. The fact that it was a White 
House request and that the White House was involved in what 
appeared to be operational activity was not a norm, and I 
don't want to characterize it in any way. It did not shake 
me to the roots by any means. The Agency has done a lot of 
things over the last 30 or 40 years. 

Q I think we're all aware of that. Did it occur to 
you that there might be a question about whether or not the 
CIA could legally comply with Colonel North's request? 

A I did not address that issue with Mr. Clarridge 
orally at all. Mr. Clarridge is a very senior officer of the 
Directorate of Operations. Mr. Clarridge clearly would 
understand when he has to obtain authorization from more 
senior officials to conduct activity of this nature, so I did 
not question. 

Q So it did not occur to you that there might be a 
question? 

A No. I did not question it. And I did not dwell 
on it. 

Q I believe that you told us that when Colonel North 
stated emphatically that the cargo for the shipment was oil- 
drilling equipment that you had serious doubts about whether 
or not that was a correct statement. M 

A I had reservations. 

Q I believq argvi^iaedfti^^bBaf^ serious doubts about 



mmmi 



411 



(IHttWB 



177 



five minutes ago. Would you like to stay with that? 

A I had serious doubts. 

Q Thank you. Would you please explain why you did 
not raise the question with Colonel North about whether or 
not that was a correct statement? 

A As I explained to Mr. Kerr, there were many gaps 
in my knowledge relating to this initiative. I had only 
certain parts of the effort. Clearly this was an initiative 
of unusual sensitivity involving senior officials of the 
Administration, and almost certainly the President. 
Therefore, there might have been reasons why Colonel North 
did not wish to speak more explicitly about the cargo. 

So I did not challenge him directly on it at all. 

Q Suppose Colonel North had told you that in fact 
HAWK missiles were being shipped. 

--__^^--^T^Thl$;lq_iOJfe*^g5'^^^B|ps^i°" • He didn't do 
that. 

Q That's right. Pardon? 

A He didn't ask me that. 

Q I'm now going to ask you a hypothetical question. 
Suppose Colonel North had told you directly that HAWK 
missiles were being shipped. Would it have made a difference 
to you or Mr. Clarridge? 

A That's a hypothetical question. I can't answer 
it. 



mMM 



412 



l)N6tAS«D 



178 



Q I think you can answer the question. I just made 
it clear it is a hypothetical question, and I'd like an 
answer. Suppose you had been told on the morning of November 
23, 1985 that HAWK missiles were being shipped. Would it 
have made a difference? 

A I'd have to know who was shipping them, from what 
stocks, what were the legalities involved. That was a 
different equation and I wasn't asked that, so I can't 
respond to your hypothetical question. 

Q I think you just have. I think the answer you 
have just given is that it would have made a difference in 
the way you handled the request. 

A I can't answer it beyond that. 

Q I think now I'll just ask you a question I think 
calls for a yes or no answer. Would it have made a 
difference to you in the way you handled the request if you 
had been told that HAWK missiles were being shipped? 

MS. MC GINN: That's the same speculative question 
you just asked him. 

MR. VAN CLEVE: I made it clear to the witness 
it's a speculative question. 

THE WITNESS: It is speculative and that didn't 
arise. I had a National Security Council staffer who made a 
telephone call in my presence to the Deputy National Security 
Advisor stating that this was authorized, appropriate, 

?ol 



413 



UNeWFIED 



179 



proper. I had no reason to question him or confront him 
directly because there were so many un)tnowns about the 
initiative at that time. In December I knew much more about 
the operation and in January 1986 I knew many detailed 
parameters, but at that stage it was being handled at the 
White House level and I am certain Mr. Clarridge had only 
fragments of what was occurred. 

BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

Q Why are you certain of that, sir? 

A Just based on the way he spoke to me that morning, 
the fact that he was surprised! 

I think I'm not going to speculate further. But 
I think that I only knew certain elements of that and at that 
stage I didn't feel that I could challenge Colonel North on 
this issue. 

Q Did Mr. Clarridge ever tell you the state of his 
knowledge at that time — any time up until this morning? 

A He indicated to me that morning! 

that this was something that was clearly under way 
at the White House level. 



Q Have you had occasion to talk to Mr. Clarridge at 
any time up till five minutes ago in which Mr. Clarridge 
indicated to you the amount of knowledge that he had about 
this transaction when the transaction was occurring? 



/hen the transaction was c 



414 



Ji dc^ti recall that ffir. Clarrl^c 



180 



' A" Ji d«Mt recall that Mr. jpiarriage, based on what I 
know of Mr. Clarrid^, htf had no knowledge of this initiative 
until hS: was~ ai9ced ?Ee=:^ssist Colronel North~'^&. finding a 
proprietary charter airline that week in November. 

TBPL^ We'll go into what it is that you conclude later, 
but have you ever had a conversation with Mr. Clarridge in 
which he has indicated at any point in time how much he knew 
about this transaction on the 2 3rd and 24th of November? 

A No, he has never indicated that he Scnew any more 
prior to that date than what he told me that morning. • 

Q Has he ever indicated since that time, up until 
today? 

A No. 

Q What his state of knowledge was? 

A No. He has never indicated that he knew anything 
in addition to what he told me that morning on the 23rd of 
November 1985. 

Q And he has never indicated to you at any time that 
he was aware of a cable out^^^^^^^f indicating on the 23rd 
of November that the cargo in question was going to be HAWK 
missiles? 

A No. 

Q Do you kno* 

A Yes. 

Q Have you ever had occasion to disbelieve something 



DNCttSSfflED 



415 



,has told you? 

A She's a very reliable employee of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, to the best of my knowledge. 

Q Do you have any understanding or knowledge of the 
basis for her conclusion that you and Mr. Clarridge had the 
responsibility of seeing whether or not this November 26 
Finding was signed? 

A No. 

Q If that is her perspective, it is inaccurate from 
your perspective; is that right? 

A I was never told by Mr. Casey or Mr. McMahon or 
Mr. Sporkin or any other senior official of the Agency that 
it was my job to pursue the so-called mini-Finding to ensure 
that it was signed. 

Q Mr. Allen, you try to be a careful man. I don't 
care if the janitor told you, but did anybody at the CIA or 
within 200 miles of the CIA tell you to check out this 
Finding to determine whether or not it had been signed? 

A Never, no one. And this was my first knowledge 
that anyone would assert that I ever had the responsibility 
to undertake that activity. I did not. I never pursued it 
with Colonel North, with Admiral Poindexter or with Mr. 
McFarlane or any other official. 

Q Do you have any knowledge today as to why the 
document that we've looked at ^4£aV<tti ^3|<ibit 10 was not 

m 





416 



UNwsife 



signed? 



A I don't know why it wasn't signed. 

Q Have you ever had a conversation with anybody in 
which a decision was made for senior CIA officials to tell 
those outside the CIA that they did not )cnow the nature of 
the cargo of this aircraft until January of 1986? 

A I need that question repeated. 

Q Let me try to do it better. That might be a 
better way to do it. Has it ever come to your attention, 
sir, that CIA personnel concluded that they should tell folks 
outside the Central Intelligence Agency that Mr. Clarridge, 
yourself, for example, did not know that the cargo of this 
aircraft was weapons until sometime in January of 1986? 

A I don't know why senior officials — let me 
respond to that this way. By the 26th of November 1985, 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 it arms were 

involved. The nature of those arms, the specific types of 
those arms was uncleat.* ^,^^ ^--=- ^^v-rr -^f^^ 
-:^^~ ^^ 13_ January 1986, Manucher Ghorbanifar sai^ tSat 
it involved 18 HAWK missiles on the aircraft and that the 
United States charged four times t ^i^ go ^jB^ g«ic(^ £o r those 
missiles. So to the best of my knowledge the specific cargo 
I did not know until 13 January. 

Q Do you have any knowledge of a decision being made 
by or among CIA personnel that if asked by folks from outside 



ONElilBSlflED 



417 



UNEi4S$lfe 



183 



the CIA when the CIA )cnew of the cargo of this aircraft that 
they would reply that they did not know until January of 
1986? 

A When we were preparing the Director's testimony 
the question came up in trying to reconstruct the chronology. 
Mr. Casey was there, I believe, and we all tried to 
reconstruct those days back in November and December, and no 
one, to the best of my knowledge, could actually at that time 
— that was about, and I'll have to get the date, but that 
was the week that the Director put together his testimony — 
no one could remember specifically that the cargo was 
actually 18 HAWK missiles until the January time frame. 

Now I didn't know it was anything. I did not know 
it was HAWK missiles until 13 January 1986. 

Q Well, let me come at it another way. Do you have 
any knowledge of anyone at the CIA concluding that because 
there was no Presidential Finding signed until on or about 
January 17, 1986, that it would be imprudent for CIA 
personnel to say that they knew about the content of this 
plane in November? 

A I know of nothing relating to that. If I or 
anyone else had expj^ <^t_ jjjj< 3 ?7T|i*^ '^Sij-^i^'^^^^" ^^ would 
have testified to that. ~~ " 

BY MR. VAN CLEVE: (Resuming) 

By the same token, if Oliver North had told you 



Q 



mmmm 



82-688 0-88-15 



418 




184 

that HAWK missiles were being shipped, I take it that you 

would not have complied with his request without a Finding; 

is that correct? 

A Well, I was not responsible for provision of the 

proprietary airline to Colonel North and to Major General 

Copp, also known as Secord. I simply provided the 

intelligence that had been collected. So I don't think that 

was my role. My role was to task, collect intelligence and, 

s 
from time to time, asses what that intelligence meant. 

BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

Q I'm about to shift to another area, so if you all 
want to break, we can do that or we can plunge ahead and see 
where we go for another fifteen minutes. 

A What time are we finishing? 

Q I think I made a commitment to quit by 5:30 at the 
latest. 

A Why don't we hang on for 15 minutes? 

Q Let me give you a slightly different focus. You 
met in late November with Michael Ledeen, did you not? 

A I met with Michael Ledeen and, I believe, the 
November time frame, with Mr. Clarridge where he provided 
some intelligence on alleged Iranian terrorist networks in 
Western Europe. At that stage he refused to reveal the 
source of that intelligence. We ran some name traces. He 
gave us a photograph that he had obtained from his source of 




419 




Q All right. Let's try to pin it down vis-a-vis the 
aircraft. Did you meet with Mr. Ledeen before or 
after that flight from Tel Aviv to Tehran? 

A I don't know. 

Q Would you have any records in your possession that 
would show when you would have met with Mr. Ledeen in 
November of 1985? 

A It's possible. 

Q Could I ask you all to check on that between now 
and Friday? 

A That's impossible. The Independent Counsel has my 
files. 

Q He's got your calendar, too? 

A Yes, he has everything. He's had it for six, 
eight weeks. 

Q He should have it memorized by now. We'll see if 
we can talk to him about that. 

In terms of the way that meeting was set up, how 
did it come about, your meeting with Ledeen? 

A I believe Mr. Ledeen called me and stated he 
wanted to come out to the Agency in his capacity as a 
consultant to the Niflflpfi^cpuiiterterrorism, that he wanted to 

IS] 



I 





420 




Slcfll^dbin^t)!! 186 



meet with me and Mr. Clarridge because he had some 
operationally sensitive intelligence on Iranian terrorist 
activities in Western Europe, and we met in Mr. Clarridge's 
office. 

Q your recollection would be that Ledeen called you 
direct rather than Morth or someone on North's behalf? 

A That's my understanding. We're talking about the 
November meeting. 
Q Yes. 

A Which I cannot pin down specifically. 
Q Well, let me ask you to take a look at two 
documents which have been identified to us as documents that 
came into your possession in November from Ledeen, at least 
CIA has told us that. The first is an undated document. 
It's R-C219 and C220, which will be Exhibit 12. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 12 
for identification.) 
The second is a document with Senate number C-230 
to 241, which we've also been advised by the CIA came into 
your possession from Ledeen in November 1985, and that will 
be Exhibit 13. 

(The document referred to was 

marked Allen Exhibit Number 13 

Lcation. ) 



iwetftSM 



421 



mmmi 



187 



If you'd look at those two documents and identify 
them for me, if you can, Mr. Allen, and we'll talk a little 
bit about them. 

A Ah-ha. Why don't we talk about C-220? That one 
came to me first. Now this one I believe came later. I 
don't believe this was obtained in November and I think CIA 
is absolutely inaccurate in that. 

Q It's hard to believe, but we'll come to that in a 
moment. Let's deal with Exhibit 12 first. 

A Let's look at Exhibit 12. 

Q Exhibit 12 is a document you recognize? 

A Yes. 

Q And it's a document that came into your possession 
in November of 1985, correct? 

A Yes. I gave a copy to Mr. Clarridge as well. 

Q And you would have gotten this document at the 
time that you met with Mr. Ledeen? 

A Yes, I 




Q Did Mr. Ledeen provide you with any other 
documents at that time apart! 

A I don't believe so. 

Q So the only document with writing on it that you 

recall receiving is what is now marked as Exhibit 12? 

A That's my understanding 
i S 



422 




s 




188 

Q The style of this document is, in the gray ways of 
lawyers, somewhat flamboyant. Was this your understanding 
this was Mr. Ledeen's work or the work product of someone 
else? 

A I believe this was Mr. Ledeen collecting this from 
his source and writing it up. 

Q And if I'm understanding you correctly, Mr. Ledeen 
declined to identify to you all who the source was; is that 
right? 

A At the time, he did not identify the source' to 
either Mr. Clarridge or to me. 

Q Did he characterize who this person was, an 
Iranian? 

A He just said he was a reliable source. 

Q A reliable source. He didn't say his nationality, 
background? 

A He said he was an Iranian who was a reliable 
source. So Mr. Clarridge ran some name traces, as I recall 
on these individuals. 

Q So you ran name traces on the names that appeared 

in the memo? 

Um-hum^^^^l^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B on whom there 
was probably something in the files, and I thi? 

1 1 don't believe we found anything on him. 

Q Help me a bit in terms of what Ledeen was telling 




423 



unssn 



189 



you. Why did Ledeen say that his source wanted this 
information to be brought to the attention of Central 
Intelligence Agency? 

A Well, he didn't say that. 

Q What did he tell you? 

A Mr. Ledeen stated that he had obtained this 
information from an Iranian in Western Europe, that the 
information he felt was pertinent to the Agency's 
counterterrorist mission, and he was bringing it to our 
attention for possible follow-up operational activity. 

Q Did he tell you that he had obtained this 
information while he himself was in Western Europe? 

A Yes, I believe he did. 

Q Did he tell you when he was in Western Europe? 

A I don't recall that he did. 

Q Do you recall where in Western Europe that it was 
that he had this meeting? 

A No. 

Q He didn't mention Switzerland, by any chance? 

A I don't think — to the best of my recollection, I 
don't think he specified where he collected this. 

Q Do you know today where it was that he got this 
information? 

A I don't know where he obtained it. 

Q You do know the source today? 




424 



UNGUSSm 



190 



A Yes, I do. 

Q Manucher Ghorbanifar? 

A Manucher Ghorbanifar (its the soutbe of this 
intelligenos. 

Q But where did Ledeen acquire this information? 
You don't know that? 

A No, I don't know that. 

Q Did Ledeen indicate to you in this initial 
conversation that you and Mr. Clarridge had with him the 
extent of his familiarity with Mr. — with his source? 

A No, he didn't describe the source in any detail at 
all, except that he did not want to provide the name because 
he stated that the source was a very delicate one and that he 
did not feel comfortable with providing the information to 
us. 

— -.^^^^^^SJ^^^Pmi^S^^^B at that time that this 
delicate source had had prior relationships with the CIA? 

A No. 

Q All right. Apart from what is related in the 
memorandum itself and what j^':j^^ta£d ^» afliiSgg;"%^ t Mr._ 
TninnifliimMBIBUT timr tTn aoapiired tfris infgaftttlon, 

lis Beeting?^ 
A What else? I don't recall anything else. They 
exchanged cigars because they both smoke cigars, but other 




Ise 



425 



Ul^L^dlfltt) 



191 



than that '^T'can't recall anything. 

Q Was there any writing made of what transpired at 
this nesting? 

A I don't think so. 

Q You did not prepare any kind of memorandum? 

A No. 

Q Would you have prepared in any handwritten notes 
on this meeting? 

A Well, if I did, it's in the hands of the 
Independent Counsel. 

Q Now with regard to the other exhibit that we 
looked at, that docuiii^t^^" $W|^ja a # r«^n i z e ? 

A Yea^ ThtS-UBSI^cteculWBft^^hat Mr. Ledeen pulled 
together based on information that - ha^ WitP provided to him 
and it's my belief that he probably put this together in the 
December time frame, not in the November time frame. 

As you know, Mr. Kerr, there was a meeting between 
Mr. Ledeen and myself on the 3rd of December, first with Mr. 
Clarridge and Mr. Ledeen and myself, and then Mr. Clarridge 
stated that since this was so focused on this Iranian 
initiative and the factions within the government that it 
would be best that I meet with Mr. Ledeen and prepare a 
memorandum on just all that Mr. Ledeen had to transmit. 
It was at that meeting Mr. Ledeen identified 
Manucher Ghorbanifar. 



moffltfifD 



426 



mm^m 



192 



Q My recollection is that the meeting was on 
December 4 as opposed to December 3 from your memorandum. 

A Well, you have an advantage. 

Q We'll show it to you in a minute, but in terms of 
the document that's Exhibit 13, it would be your best 
recollection that you would have received that document at 
the meeting on, by your memo, December 4; is that right? 

A Well, I'm not certain when I obtained the 
document. Mr. Ledeen either in the November meeting or the 
December meeting stated that he believed he had insights into 
the factional alignments within the Iranian government. I 
know that Mr. Clarridge stated it would be helpful if he 
could put this down in some form. Mr. Ledeen indicated that 
he had obtained this not just from his source, Mr. 
Ghorbanifar, but that he had had discussions with some 
interesting Iranians, including a very senior Ayatollah. 
And I believe I and Mr. Clarridge said if you 
really wish to be useful in providing us with insights, put 
this down in some coherent way, because each faction has 
various groups within it, that this is a very complex and 
poorly understood issue within the U.S. intelligence 
community. 

Q With regard to this document, though, it was 
delivered to you by Ledeen himself; is that right? It didn't 
show up in the mail |ane^c|ay? 



Wi^L^^MO 



427 



193 

A It was given to me at some point by Mr. Ledeen. I 
can't recall where and when. 

Q That's really the problem. 

A Well, I can't help you. I recall that Mr. Ledeen 
was expounding information on the factions within Iran. I 
believe Mr. Clarridge said, look, for this to be helpful, 
it's got to be put in a coherent framework and that was what 
Mr. Ledeen did. He went to his home, he took his notes, and, 
as I understand it, labored away to produce this document. 

Q And he told you that he labored away, correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q You weren't there where he was laboring away? 

A No. I only have his word. 

Q How many meetings did you have with Ledeen in 
December 1985? 

A I think only one. 

Q Right, and that was on December 4, right? 

A You say December 4, so I take your word for it. 

Q Well, I'm taking your word for it, frankly. 

A Well, you have the advantage, as I said earlier. 

Q And I'm a great believer in your word, Mr. Allen. 
It looks good to me. So if there was only one meeting and it 
was, according to your memo, on December 4 and you did 
receive this in December, you would have received this at the 
December 4 meeting; 



yii^HD 



428 



« 



WsfjtJJffff// 



194 



A It seems likely. 
Q Before we go into the rigors of the December 4 
meeting, it is 5:30. I'll let you all get out of here. 

A The rigors of the December 4 meeting; that's going 
to be interesting. 

MR. KERR: See you all at 9:00 on Friday. 
(Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the taking of the 
instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at 9:00 a.m., 
Friday, April 24, 1987.) 



W^SSfFfffi 



429 




HEARINGS HSlTS_^^?:?. /87 



Before the 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE 



UNITED STATES SENATE 



TESTIMONY OF CHARLES E. ALLEN - Continued 
Friday, April 24, 1987 

'II 



Partially Declass;r,:d/r,de3S3d on M^ 
under provisions of t.O. UJOo 
by N.Menan. National Security Council 



W5ishingTon, D.C. 



UNII0S$IR»UpUStlfltl) 

OOPY NO /a OF — ^ — 




.COPIE 



ALDE^SCN REPC'fiT'NG 



(202) 628-9300 
20 F STREET, N.W. 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 200 01 




430 



1 

2 
3 

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5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
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15 

16 he 
17 



TESTIMONY OF CHARLES E. ALLEN - Continued 
Friday, April 24, 1987 

United States Senate 
Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition 
Washington, D. c. 
Continued deposition of CHARLES E. ALLEN, 
called as a witness by counsel for the Select Committee, 
at the offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart 
senate office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 
9:12 a.m., the witness having been previously duly swcirn 
by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the 
District of Columbia, and the testimony being taJcen down 
by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transccibed under 



UNOASSra 



431 



mmm 



196 



1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5. CHARLES KERR, ESQ. 

6 TIMOTHY WOODCOCK, ESQ. 

7 On behalf of the House Select Committee to 

8 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran: 

9 DIANE DORNAN, ESQ. 

10 On behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency: 

11 KATHLEEN A. MC GINN, ESQ. 

12 RHONDA M. HUGHES, ESQ. 

13 Office of Congressional Affairs 

14 Central Intelligence Agency 

15 Washington, D. C. 20505 
16 



UNCttSStFtEi) 



432 



mimm 



197 



1 








C 


N 


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E 


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2 
















EXAMINATION 


ON 


BEHALF OF 


3 


WITNESS 












SENATE 






HOUSE 


4 


Charli 


as E. Allen - 


Resumed 


















5 




By Mr. Kerr 


















198 






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AFTERNOON SESSION, 


?■ 




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ALLEN 


EXHIBIT NUMBER 
















FOR 


IDENTIFICATION 


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211 


12 




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220 


13 




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231 


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25 29 352 



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EXHIBITS (Continued) 

TOMBER FOR IDENTIFICATIOK 

353 
355 
356 
359 
365 
383 
388 
393 
393 

400 ^ 

406 
409 

433 ^ 
'^^^'•^'- 449 '^._^ 




449 

450 
454 
463 



' ^S-r. ^- 



UHCMiP 



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25 



UNCLASSKe 



199 



1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon, 

3 CHARLES E. ALLEH 

4 called as a witness by counsel for the Senate Select 

5 Committee, having been previously duly sworn by the 

6 Notary Public, was further examined and testified as 

7 follows: 

8 THE WITNESS: In the discussion last Tuesday 

9 you asked a number of questions about a program that I 

10 was involved in as a senior manager between 1981 and '85. 

11 I had two positions — first as directly responsible to 

12 Mr. Carlucci and Admiral Inman, and then I worked in the 

13 Department of Defense, OSD. 

14 I have been authorized to tell you that^^^H 
^^^^■^■[^^HHIIH^H|m^^^nd that if 

16 important that information be derived about the program 

17 that it has to be discussed with Senator Boren on the 

18 Senate side and Congressman Cheney on the House side. 

19 Both of those individuals are aware of the program. At 

2 this point it's my understanding that no staff members on 

21 either the House or Senate Select Committees on the Iran 

22 affairs are accessed to the program and that there's no 
2 3 intention to access any of the staff. 

24 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE - 



fillTOffi^ 



435 



MASSHD 



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Q With regard t»^«oi^wft«r that we discussed 
when we last talked, Mr. Allen, are there any other 
matters that you'd like to correct or amend or amplify 
on? You've had a couple of days to think about things, 
and I believe you may have had a chance to go through 
some additional doasaents since you and I last talked. 

A There were questions asked by Mr. Liman, I 
guess, about knowledge of a certain activity relating to 
June and July 1985 involving Colonel North and two DEA 
agents. I have no knowledge of that particular 
operation. I do, I believe, hav« ^^ocument that we have 
found in my files dated January 1986 in which an officer 
who worked for me was requested by Colonel North to 
travel with the two DEA agents in question. 




to their capabilities 
or access to individuals that might have ways to free 
American hostages in Lebanon. 

I believe Miss McGinn here is willing to 
submit the memorandum that^ I found in my files, in my 
Hostage Location Task Force files, to you at this time. 

MR. KERR: Super. Thank you very much. 

MS. MC GINN: We just have to get somebody to 
sign for this. Vou can take a look at it right now. 

(The document was handed to Counsel.) 




436 



UNtUSSWiD 



201 



1 THE WITNESS: I believ« th« last question that 

2 you had asked me when we ended our deposition on Tuesday 

3 was the date when I met Mr. Ledeen, and I have checked my 

4 file and I believe you are correct. It is 4 December 

5 1985. 

6 BY MR. KERB: (Resuming) 

7 Q Thanks. Bear with me a moment while I glance 

8 through this memorandum. The memorandun that's been 

9 provided to us is a memorandum dated January 15, 1986. 

10 It's a memorandum for the record, subject Trip Report; 

11 It bears CIIN 2799 as its number and it appears to be 

12 written bi 

13 (Pause.) 

14 When I get to January 15 and that period of 

15 time 

16 — and, believe me, we wil-l gtf^&et^nt^atiud^i^- I'll 

17 tarry on this thing. We'll look at it a little bit more 

18 then. 

19 .Mrir^j^en . ^^^^m ay tmdera^imll^^^hat between 

20 th« l^st^^m^ v«^«TSM^nd now some documents were 

21 located by the CIA that apparently are a box of your 

22 notes and some other documentation that hadn't been 

23 provided to us yet. I was called about it yesterday and 

24 was not able to get 'over and take a look at the documents 

25 they found. i 



WLASSIPIED 



437 




P ffECRfeTTtOBStJbSlT'"^ 202 

1 Have you had a chance to go through that box 

2 in the last day or so? 

3 A This was a box of materials that were sent to 

4 the Independent Counsel six weeks ago, I assume, at least 

5 six weeks ago. I had not had a chance to review them 

6 because they had been retained. I asked for them back. 

7 They are in my office now. Very candidly, I've not had a 

8 chance to go through them. I looked at just one small 

9 file last night briefly. They are available, of course, 

10 for your inspection. 

11 I will be gone for one week, and if you have 

12 questions on thos^fr- and -Mp|£lon-^fiBL yeu. pasBbably vdll 

13 bJicause tha;^ involve just a lot of -Itendwri^en notes out 

14 of notebooks that^ X ^and^t^lce^ — I wouiiiS^'ltt^i^llable 

15 af t^t one we^ to^^talk Airliiwr about^SRfiB^ '" -:^^- -^ ' W 
16 

17 havs 3^ P^BpiyhricJEB^ ^tin^^c>t«r ^g^t^ l '^^ ^ ^' "^ 

18 1^1^ Netss. WOff ^ £~ th*.. discuMnfe* in^&at box are 

19 already in. tbiL possession 1^ the Sen^» Select CovsiXttm' 

20 because many o^ th4||s.J£» Jia«t_du pi4ifli|H JjB'og dspoumsnts 

21 already furnished to you. Unquestionably there may be 

22 some notes, an odd piece of paper, here and there that 

23 you have not seen. But my secretary has them and you 

24 certainly can look at them at any time. 

25 Q Thank you. We had ended at about December 4. 




DNEiissira 



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203 

We were about to start talking about a meeting you 
attended with Mr. Ledeen. Before we do, a couple of 
matters had come up as a result of some documents that we 
received at the deposition of^H|^^^^H that I wanted 
to touch base with yovLon. 

If I understood your testimony correctly, you 
indicated that you did not know Mr. Ghorbanifar's actual 
identity until you met with Mr. Ledeen on 4 December; is 
that correct? 

A That is correct. I personally did not know' 
his identity. 

Q In terms of the identities, were you aware • 
that Colonel North had asked the Central Intelligence 
Agency 




A No, I did not know that. 

Q Has that come to your attention subsequently 



In late October 1985? 
land I did not know! 

knew that Mr. Ghorbanifar was in this country^^^f course, 
in early October, so it's quite likely that Colonel North 
could have for^HIH^^^^^H without 
knowledge, because my role was to collect intelligence, 




mxmm 



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DNMSIFiED 



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not to involve myself in direct operations. 

Q Let me show you a series ot cables and some 
Xerox copies ^^^^^^^^^^H that were given to us the 
other day under cover of a letter dated April 22, 1987, 
Senate numbers C-62 67 through 6297. It's not necessary 
for you to spend a lot of time with them, unless you want 
to. But I'd like you to take a look at them for a two- 
fold purpose — one, to tell me if you've ever seen the 
documents before. Beyond that I'd like you to tell me if 
it gives ^you any further refreshed recollection of 
knowledge you would have had at the time that the events 
descr^^a in the documents were taking place. 
They will be Exhibit 14. 

/gfThe document referred to wa^f 
Kti9b«;^4 




A 

seen thtfB. 

Q -^ With rt^rd Mr^^^^ ^»^**^^t*^^ 
theril, l«t^(r:^row JUt a flir ni^«.jM»„o 



that" com* fi»m rttc«rk^- 
have "any kso^^Nn^^BK/Un 




t»^M.|#-,^ ^-v-^ 




440 



UNtussm 



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As the cables indicate,! 
They were hand-delivered back to Washington, D. 
C. approximately November 5 and^^^^^^^^^Hindicated 
that he took ^^^^^^^^^|^B himself over to 
North and met with Colonel North, at which tin* — and 
frankly I think it is indicated on th« cabla which is 
Director 610726 — North identified one of the people! 
|as Manucher Ghorbanifar and the other ' 
person was determined to bel 

North, as an aside, apparently had] 
[confused, but he had the right names, 
went back to^^^e shop, did a trace on the names, and got 
a hit on the GhorSaniSr ftfe. He wasn't clear on what 
he got on th^^mmfile. As I understand from 
testimony that was given by Mr. Juchniewicz yesterday, 
Juchniewicz was apprised of what was in the Ghorbanifar 
201 and, according to Mr. Juchniewicz and what he 
recalls, he asked^^^^^^^H to apprise Colonel North of 
the fabricator notice, the basic background on 
Ghorbanifar at that time, which would have beiit tl** first 
we^C£^ )•« of November 1985. 

Were you privy to any of those events at that 
time? 




441 



IINGIASHD 



206 



1 A Not at all. 

2 Q So as far as you knew, in early November 

3 Ascari was still an unknown? 

4 A That's correct. 

5 Q And you didn't link him up to anything at that 

6 point? 

7 A And Colonel North did not tell ma that he knew 

8 that Ascari was clearly Manucher Ghorbanifar. H« 

9 continued to keep me in the dark on that as part of his 

10 compartmentation efforts on the project. That's not 

11 unusual. Unfortunately, sometimes compartmentation 

12 hampers actual intelligence operations. '^ 

13 Q You must have been talking to North, though, 

14 from time to time during this period in November. 

15 A I talked to .h4 a^vi^ day, but you must 

on this|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hx 

17 would call and brief it to him because my copy was always 

18 delivered to me by courier before either Defense or the 

19 White House,] 
20 

21 But ^tal)^||pL<^N<^tfh ffi) -ttii|«8s things 

22 because I was focused on worldwide terrorism. 

23 Q That was my impression. Your turf arri^sfeg?' 

24 crossed paths a great deal, I would think, and you would 

25 have been talking to each other a lot. 




uimssra 



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A I talked to him numerous times every week, and 
I saw him every week for the last several years. 

Q You would have been talking about this 
project, at least intermittently, in November? 

A That was correct. 

Q Did you have any sense that he either knew or 
did not know the identity of Ascari? 

A He never offered that he knew who this 
individual was. 

Q I'm really going beyond what he said. 

A I had no sense that he knew that. He did not 




Q Let me just pursue that a little bit further, 
though. It's curiosity as to what the CIA's information 
systems were reporting back. Do you have a recollection 
of name trace product or^^^^^Hf in November, what it 
was showing you that you all knew about 



wBtmm 



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MUSSUiB 



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A wa had run, as I think you r«call, bacJc in 
September traces onm^and th«r« was a v.ry limited 
amount of intelligence, and even in 1986, when this 

became a prioritv^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ .i. 

^ ^^^'^^^^^^^^^^ at my request, levied 




a list of requirements on 
It was a very extensive list. I looked at it 
and said this is fr«at, an4 sh« s«iaEJ.t to th* 
Directorate of Operations. 

So even by early 1986 our amount of knowledge 
°"^^^|''as' as I recall, fit on on* pag*.?. 

% ft-s^=-Tl»t*-ior»j|g|, puzzles ma, Mr. Allan. That's->why 
I want to pursue it, because I'm not sure what wane awry 
hara-g^ Wa kno|f ^^ tha, cahla. that wa saw the other day 
that there was a substantial amount of cable traffic and 
the like on the Cyrus Hashemi connection ta||^H|H|^H 
Manuchar Ghorbanifar that I gather didn't make much of an 

impraaaitfb- on you, even if it was turned up, and I ittdn^ 

— -ij^- — 
gat a clear impression of whether it was tumad up.*^ ^ 

Did you all know that there had been this 

Shaheen to Casey inqtitrjg&that has resulted in the 

identification of Manuchar Ghorbanifar |^^H^H|as 

wanting to do something for the hostages in June and July 

of '85? ■ r^ 

A I had not heard of Shaheen and Mr. Casey did 



UNGtltSSinED 



444 



\immm 



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not enlighten me at that time. 

Q And when you did the trace it didn't trigger 
that paper history is what I'm really asking. 

A There was a very limited amount of 
intelligence^^^^^^^^Hthat I saw as a result of the 
trace, a very small amount. 

Q So in November of '8|^~ - ^,. v^' 

A And could Z jul^t^ntii|M«t. 2; knov that Mr. 
Cave and I talked abovt thir lack of^^Bif oraatiten on 

and Mr. Cave kept saying well, I can't 
understand why we do not have more intelligence on 
That must be another alias. It must be 
someone else in the Iranian government. And I remember 




But what troubles me is that the prior 



UNCtlBSIftED 



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IGUWftO 



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ov«rtur« didn't pop and you have no recollection of 
having a conscious awareness in November that there had 
been this overture from Manucher ghorbanifarfl|^^^^^|B 
in June and July of '85 relating to exchange of weapons 
for hostages. 

A ifo, sir, { know nothing of that. 

Q In terns — one the things^^^^^^^^lsaid 
in his deposition, which I really hadn't focused on 
before, is that you all don't have direct access — "you" 
being th* 4|itel|^9fnce a^k — to th« 201'T$ype fi.r« 
material that the Directorate of Operations has; is that 
correct? 

A X did as Chief of Intelligence ir 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H but the time was a 
of^^^^^^^^^^H^f^^^H. the authority to 
have the Directorate of Operations search their files for 
intelligence, and I exercise that authority from time to 
time. 

Q Do you recall this instance when the Ascari 
name came up whether you gave that kind of task to the 
Operations Directorate? 

A I had the Office, I believe,! 

the analysts who came in on the night of the 
13th, and I believe they pursued it even the next week, 
have traces of the names run through the Directorate of 



UNCtASMD 



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211 

Operations. So yes, the name Ascari was run through the 
Directorate of Operations. 

Q And that run, to the best of your knowledge, 
did not hit Ghorbanifar? 

A It did not. Our information processing 
systems, as you know, are very imperfect. 

Q The important thing is for me to know that you 
went through the system. The checks were made, but you 
didn't get a hit. 

A I didn't personally make the call, but I had 
an officer who said it had been traced through the 
Directorate of Operations. " 

Q During this period of time, the September 
through November period of time, did you have occasion to 
talk to the folks in^^H^f^^H office who do 
intelligence analysis work on Iran? 

A I believe I task£iP^is I^ftan analyst ,^HH 
I can't recall all the tasking. She certainly 
looked for^^H^^Hand sent the requirements out for 
additional collectionson^^^^^B I also talked, I am 

tc^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B and 
paper on arms sales to Iran. I'm fairly confident I 
asked that. I did not go down and talk tc 
about this initiative, because clearly I was not 
authorized to either by Mr. Casey or by Colonel North, 



mimB 



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MASSffi 



212 



1 since Colonel North, working with Mr. Casey, sort of set 

2 the parameters on who could or who could not be aware of 

3 this operation. 

4 Q A couple of other minor cleanup matters that 

5 have come up since you and I talked. Let me show you a 

6 cable that does not have a date but which appears to me 

7 from its content to have been generated probably in the 

8 early fall of 1985. It's a SecretH||^H|^H cable to 

9 ^^^H although it appears to relate to you as well, Mr. 

10 Allen. It has our number N-9293 and that will be Exhibit 

11 15. 

12 (The document referred to was 

13 marked Allen Exhibit Number 15 

14 for identification.) 

15 Again, it's a twofold purpose that I'm giving 

16 the memo to you for — first, if you can tell me if 

17 you've ever seen this particular memorandum; second, 

18 after reviewing its content, if you have any knowledge of 

19 the matters that are being described in the memorandum. 

20 A What is the date of this? 

21 Q That was one of the things I hoped you could 

22 help me out with. My reconstruction of the facts set out 

23 in the memo suggests to me it occurred probably in the 

24 early fall of 1985, but I don't know. One of our hopes 

25 is perhaps you can tell me when this was generated. 



UNCtASStPIED 



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Thi3 would b( 



As you 





recall, he at time substituted when I was no longer able 
to sustain myself. 

Q Refresh my recollection, Mr. Allen. ^HHj 
position was what? 

A Was Deputy Chief of the — he's Deputy Chief 
of the current^^^H and I can't recall what it is, but 
it ' s ^^^^^^^^^^ 

Q I don't know how you guys keep track of the 
vegetablf ~ 

A Well, it used to be called 

I would assume that this must ^ 
relate to the mid-September 1985 activity 

Q That was my guess. 

A And I assume that, as Z recall, I worked for 
about 48 hours straight and Z finally vent home and 

Iwas working at my desk using my own] 
system. He must have asked fori 
priorities and these were the priorities that were 
provided to^^^^^^^^^^H by Colonel North. 

Q Let me just linger on this for 9iSfm«^ In 
terms of the system that generates this kind of paper, 
is the^^^^^^^Hsystem? 

A That is one of the more remarkable systems 




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UNKmiFliD 



started by Director Casey. It is a system that he, on 
the spur of the moment, initiated to bring the 
intelligence, counterterrorist — the intelligence 
community counterterrorist elements together analytically 
and in times of crisis. It's simply a secure electronic 
comnunicatio nfl.-,»^ tem inyoJt^J nK-al l principal 
intelligence agencj 




And Colonel North used it frequently to 
communicate with the intelligence community 
counterterrorist analysts and with me, on occasion. v 

Q Do you get an electronic display or does it 
spit out a messaa£, or what haMen^ ^gTr: ^'^ir" 

^. A^^^j^^get a display and then, of course, you can 
havl" fT'printed. It's just a very simple electronic 
system. It's a secure communications line, a PC and 
printer — very simple. CIA pays for its operations and 
maintenance. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

I manageiton behalf of the Director of Central 
Intelligence. ,^^s^j^^^—' 

Q With regard to a record, a memory of what 
passes across the system, can you describe for me «$uit 
system there is, if there is one, to record and maintain 
messages that are placed on the system? 



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82-688 0-88-16 



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A I "^n explain to you in generic ■terms. There 
is, in case the system crashes, there is a controller^H 
^^Hthat retains the messages for a brief period of time. 
In the January time frame I believe I alerted the 
Inspector General, Mr. Hauver, of the potential that 
there could be^Hj^^H^Hmessage relating to this 
initiative. 

Q jSpETanuary of '87? 

A '87, between me and Colonel Norttl. 

Ifs 

my understanding that the memory or the memory capacity 
is very brief and that they can only hold messages a " 
month to six weeks. Therefore, any messages that could 
have been transmitted during this initiative between, 
say, September '85 and November '86 would not be 
available. 

Q To the best of your knowledge, there is no 
master disk or other electronic record kept? 

A There is no master disk or storage, to the 
best of my knowledge. Mr. Carroll Hauver looked into 
that only at my suggestion. I took the initiative in 
that in order — because there may ^a%r« ^^len ^mmber ^ 
messages ^l|&o^^«« MtSKS^Ba^^S^'^H^SSuSB^&St 
initiativ. 







451 



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1 hard copy of messages on the^^^^^^^^H system? 

2 A Absolutely not, because the idea is it's an 

3 informal analyst-to-analyst communication system. It is 

4 not a system for formal recordkeeping at all, and we did 

5 not want it to be that way. 

6 Q So there is no clerk assigned somewhere? 

7 A Absolutely not. There are certain guidelines 

8 under which it is used. I established those guidelines 

9 and I can make those available to the Committee. I mean, 

10 I established it in consultation with the other 

11 intelligence agencies. 

12 Q To the best of your knowledge is there a ■ 

13 writing, a memorandum, regulations, standard operating 

14 procedure, that would set forth the record retention 
policy for the^^^^^^^Hsystem? 

16 A To the best o£ J^g ^ ^ff^ j^'J ^.^"^" ' " "° 

17 specific document as farBJ^^Hl^HjjH^nda^^Si which 

18 would require retention. The idea is for ifefomal 

19 analyst-to-analyst communications. For crisis management 

20 we use it and we generate hundreds of messages a day over 

21 it. I loolfe-«tgit wh«fcirc«*in in «!• motnlTg. "Z was 

22 using it laa^night^o d^utr'* 'Specific issue, for 

23 example, with a Defense Intelligence Officer on 

24 counterterrorism, a specialist in ShSi ftJroamentsK sn . 

25 It's a very, veri^food?aystem and we would not 



UNfiUtSSIFIfD 



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uNCki^sira 



217 



1 want to make it a formal system because I think it would 

2 thwart the objectives of the system and make it a formal 

3 system that was not needed. Director Casey is very proud 

4 of the system and I think it's just one more of the 

5 contributions he has made tJg^he i»t«iligence community. 

6 Q To the best of your knowledge it is not tied 

7 into a larger computer system that would automatically 

8 maintain an electronic record? 

9 A To the best of my knowledge that is th« case 

10 becmsa^ifr^ Hauver ^a^ssA^this ^^^im in^th* M^eh 

11 tlBtt,^aB«^ Z b«^ev«^^S ^ had verified that the 

12 records are kept only briefly. -^» i i^. r 

13 V- - MS.. DQBtlAN: Chuck, may I add that I heard 

14 about that system in connection with some investigations 

15 in counterintelligence, and they said pretty much the 

16 same thing. TtiljL'''^ '' ' ^ year and JaMli tW»99i fe: 

17 '=^* ^^^ ^!3Bii^^^i^^"^ ^^^ analysts are reluctant to 

18 exchange information often because of security reasons, 

19 so security was one of the big reasons they didn't want 

20 to retain a record or have a printout capability. 

21 THE WITNESS: I'm afraid I didn't understand 

22 your statement for security reasons. We use it as 

23 analyst-to-analyst communications. We do not put on the 

24 system anything that's prohibited. We can go through 

25 codeword information at any time. It is not a system for 



M/tSSftED 



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formal tasking. That's one thing w« want to avoid. But 
for security reasons I really don't understand your 
point. -^ ~ 

MS. OORNAN: That Wis What th« CI p«opl»^ 
emphaiizedr They AtbtTt: iouit to exchftnge information on- 

- THE _«lTNEi^:^Wel^ ^^ ft»t%«^ gor^^. ^' - 
sensitive operat ional._exch4»(!Ag^ , But it^ibSMd fpr 
sutostantlve anAly^^ie lucchcnMit and ite )grt^aiarly^se it 
^^H^^HH^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hduring 
man»7«M^r He €l^use'^ wit^jKer<^M . .'^H* just did 

^^^^^^^^^^^r;.ubl3\ E:~h«!^ed manage. - 

■ -^MS. 0OSirXM:^^«B*t it aor* ^ less so^NSbat of 
an eqi^^lent of a jM curr^l^phgn* only you can get mor» 
format i^^*^^g;r :.^ ^ _ ^ ^^ -. .I^"^^" .Se»'^ -^ 

. jiL i^Tp^Bj^Ljiiii T infr iTiMi ijrhfT iM ^j^fnctrt liit 

r J^iiliffifll^'i or you ^e^^p^eiiduto 'pdint> jmd on:^BBe 
thing tbat you want^ s^y epecificallaF^Qg Colonel North, 

on this inltia^s"^ *'^%,''**. ^^"^^ P*^'^* ^"* ** 
did not wi» it vry %ftMr for_tM« feitif^^ bec««« I 

so^^l' coii&iiia. -Por^ v-i^ 
-- ^^BY mS^ tS^\ (J 

Q ^^x« tidre ^nytittn? oi»^|his document thet would 




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UNCl^Sffi 



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enable one by looking at the lirtters and tiM numbers to" 
tell what the date of the document ia? I confess X 
puzzled with it last night and I was left bafflsd. 

A I could ii^iuire^^^^^^Hand^ woald be pleased 
to. Oh^ the content tells me that it's] 



^- Q But there-' s noth^|g|^.^atf^unps out at you as 
being a calendar code of - sons s^fC? -^ ii^'*? 

A 5^^ Z "don't thiak tt^e^t^** nqv~becauM these 

are considered very, very tempf^^ type exphaiifes. ^ey 

_ ^^ 

are very current. 



*- Q - sS^er^'s a ref«rence here, rfai* i|j|il^or^, 
-saying we should nake^ every Effort to steer people away ^ 

^jl.cp« B^=an y Jgf ogagtloyj^Pectad^ Z ':;;~^ 
wa{^i^kJ^Klpior«ithat^:^^ M 

sensitive i^ti^tiv«^,-T'vh«t^ il^^^L#^iaeti^t,3^^ V^Ut^' 
give or ffRre j^^riv^ to w;^ reg^j ^^ not distriirattng 
particularly HHH^HH^H||H^| th^^^aa being 
collect^*auring th^period^f tlap^^pt d^teibuting^^o 

the normal c^^v^'^*l^'|||m|H^^^^^^E. '- " '^^""^ -' 
A . _ ^^B^t ^^en a^^structl^ ^l^^==fe»w 

of, nor couICI sqa^(h it to^ s t | grt5^ tc»g I^gaa 
always makes the defeifion oi^ wh««i«*^-tfl|^^MB eBipil • 

not. Sometime^^^dwould ask me if they should put it in 





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could it be related to this initiative, but I never told 
them they couldft't disseminate anything, nor would that 
be my position. 

Q So I'm clear, in the period September through 
early December 1985, you neither gave instructions nor 
were you ^ are of a decision to not distribute! 

to normal recipients of such intelligence? 

A I have no knowledge that an^ 

■was not disseminated because of this 
initiative. I never gave any instructions not to 
disseminate. I only gave guidance if it appeared tha^ 
there was something very senvltivm: relating to this 
initiative or to sensitive hostage matters perhaps it 
should be disseminated in the hard copy format rather 
than the electronic distributiSlLi. l^^featBC.Wi fcvery 
infrequent occasion. 

Q Even in that J^mpiH ,:,:^ JgH^ September through 
early December period, do you have a specific 
recollection of that kind of guidance being given by you? 

A Never. I'd like to point out, as you recall, 
when I tried to-dia 




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221 

Q There is another memo, and 1 lose tracJc of 
which system these things come off of, but this is an 
Ollie North memorandum of November 9, 1985, which appears 
to me to be making reference to a close-down of normal 
distribution and, in this particular memo, opening it 
back up again. Again, if you'd look at it — it's very 
brief — maybe you can tell me what was going on at this 
period, which is November 9T~^985,_jind t^t will be\ 
Exhibit 16. 

(Th« <docOD«nt referred to was 
marked Jai«n E^ibit J^^«r 16 

Q November 9, 1985. 

A I don't know what they mean b y "we hav« told 
^^Hto down on^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hand normal 
closed clistriMIH^i^^^^^^^fl^^^^^^HH" I'm 

certain down on^^^^^^^^^^^^^^f , 

have no knovladg* of what he means th«r«. 

- Tha^BSfty thing that I know that ha must ba 

talk ing a bout! 

I did arrange, as you 
know and as I've testified, at Mr. McFarlana's guidance, 

through Colonel North, for hov 

would be disseminated^^^^^^^^^^^fend that that 





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dlssaminatlon excluded the Secretary of State. 

Q You've been very clear on that in terms of^H 
but again to the best of your 
recollection there was no shunting process in place to 
keep the normal f low^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H on Iran 
the hands of its nonnal consumers? 

A I am convinced there was nothing of that, and 
certainly nothing came from me. The integrity of the 
intelligence process is 




Absolutely there would be 
no constraints on dissemination^^^^^^^^^^B only how 

^^^Lwas handled in order to restrict 
its dissemination. 

And, at McFarlane's guidance, through North, I 
arranged foi^^^^^^^ldisseminatior 




Q With regard to this particular memo, you don't 
recall having seen it contemporaneously; is that correct? 

A I did not see that memo. 

Q Have you had occasion to discuss this memo 
with anyone else before? 

A I have never seen, never did know it existed, 
never discussed it with anyone. 

Q And yotf told us ^ha€^i« references to 



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November-December period of 1985 do you have any specific 
recollection of meetings, conferences that you would have 
had with 

A Would you repeat the date of that? 

Q September 1985 through early December 1985, do 
you recall meetings that you would hav« had with| 
|or conversations? 

A I don't recall a specific meeting, but I know 
Z talked to him on the secure telephone about the 
initiative and I must have met with him once or twice' 
during that time frame on the initiative, but Z can't 
recall specific dates, it would be on my calendar. I'm 
sure be in^^^^^^^^^^H calendar. 

Q The decision on distribution would have been a 
decision tha^^^^fand his people would have made? 

A Distribution ol 

Q Yes. 

A On I 

Q Yes, sir. 

A Well, I have testified to the Senate Select 
Cbmnittee on Intelligence and to the Tower Commission 

when ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M asked 
for a dissemination 




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226 

waited for an hour while Colonel North obtained guidance 
from Mr. McFarlane. Mr. McFarlane made the decision that 
the dissemination should be to him and Colonel North, to 
Mr. Casey and Mr. McMahon, and to Secretary Weinberger. 

Q And as to Secretary Weinberger, that was by 
way of Admiral Moreau; is that correct? 

A Well, that's the way it actually worked, and 
Admiral Moreau talked to me^^^^H^HH|^|^|several 
times, and as long as Admiral Moreau was Assistant to the 
Chairman of the JCS,1^HHHHIhad no problems with 
_control over the disseminatior 




Q I'm sorry. I did recall your testimony on 
that initial contact. Subsequent decisions on 
distribution, if they had to be made, would they have 
been mad^mi^^or would they have been made by someone 
else through you? 

A ^^^^^would have asked for guidance. I know 
^ha^^^^^^^^H as verified, believe with 

Admiral Poindexter, that the dissemination was correct. 
I believe Admiral Poindexter affirmed that this was the 
way Mr. McFarlane wanted the dissemination. 

Q How do you know that? 



I believe 




told me that. 



ONeefOTD 



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imcusiiED 



227 

1 THE WITNESS: Could I take a coupl.-minut. 

2 braak? 

3 (A brief recess was taken.) 
* BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

5 Q Mr. Allen, let's go to the December 4 meeting. 

6 Let me ask a few questions about the context. When you 

7 testified the other day, you indicated you met with 

8 Ledeen at his request in November, and we looked at some 

9 materials that had been provided to you by Ledeen in 
10 November. 

^^ A Along with Mr. Clarridge; he was present 

12 throughout the session. ^ 

^3 Q Then there is a subsequent meeting on December 

^* *• ^°^ di<i the second meeting come about? How were you 

15 all apprgached? 

^* A I bfiii^ l^^Ledeen called Mr. Clarridge. 

17 Mr. Clarridge set up the meeting. I met initially in Mr. 

18 Clarridge'* cgj^e.^ Mr. Clarridge asked what could we do 

19 for you, Mr. Ledeen, and Mr. Ledeen started talking about 

20 Iran, the problems of a lack of a political relationship. 

21 He confided that he had been a consultant to the NSC and 

22 to Mr. McFarlane, that he had, at McFarlane's direction, 

23 undertaken some initiatives, that he had b #m involved 

24 withthis^ activity relating to information that we had 
^^^"^^^^^^^^^^■■^^^^■■that Colonel North 



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had mad* available to him at the NSC,^^^^^^^^^^H 

and that he brought 

hin^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hon Manucher 

Ghorbanifar, along with^^^^^^^^^^^^l I believe of a 
man called^^^^^^^^^^^B whom he identified asj 



He said he had a good deal of inforaation that 
he had obtained not only from Mr. Ghorbanifar and others 
but that he with^H^H^^^^^^^^and 
had insights into Iranian terrorism, factions within the 
government. He also started talking about the NSC 
initiative. Mr. Clarridge, who I believe was getting 
ready to go to Europe, said well, why don't you meet now 
with Charlie and give him all the data and let Charlie 
write it up, and we retired to my office, which was just 
a couple of floors directly above Mr. Clarridge '■ office, 
and he gave me some information which I then recorded in 
a memorandum, I think dated 18 December 1985. 

In that he started talking about the various 
factions within the Iranian government, and I said this 
is very confusing. I can't write this up. If you have 
what you think is unique information, you must go home 
and develop a coherent statement. I believe he did that 
and I believe he did it in a matter of a couple of days. 



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1 And he sent that back to the Agency and I don't recall 

2 how it came back, but I think it was included as an 

3 attachment to my memorandum oC 18 December. 

4 He talked also about the initiative and the 

5 fact that he had become convinced, and so had Mr. 

6 HcFarlane, of the need to probe elements within the 

7 Iranian government, that he had met Mr. Nimrodi — and I, 

8 of course, by that time had heard of Mr. Nimrodi — ^H^| 
^^^^^|^^^^B^^^^^|R|H||^|^^^^H He 

10 about Ghorbanifar. That was the first time I knew that 

11 there was a man named Manucher Ghorbanifar. 

12 He talked about, I believe, David Kimche and 

13 some of David Kimche 's activities. He was quite guarded 

14 in his conversation. He did not want to tell me too 

15 much, and he claimed, as I recall, that he had not put 

16 much of this down on paper but he had restricted his 

17 reporting to Mr. McFarlane to sort of oral conversations. 

18 But he thought that there was promise to proceed with an 

19 initiative towards Iran. He said that Ghorbanifar was a 

20 good fellow, praised Ghorbanifar to the hilt. 

21 I put all this into a memorandua. He also 

22 talked about the shipment of weapons that had occurred in 

23 November. In reviewing my memoranduB it is clear that he 

24 mentioned HAWK missiles were sent. I had testified 

25 earlier, I believe, to the Senate and to the Tower 



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230 

Conunission that I did not learn that it was HAWK missiles 
until I met Mr. Ghorbanifar on the 13th of January 1986. 
It now appears that I did know about it on 4 December 
1985. But when we were trying to reconstruct the 
chronology in November, trying to get Mr. Casey ready for 
testimony on the 21st of November, I did not recall Mr. 
Ledeen mentioning HAWK missiles. 

I've always testified, however, that by the 
26th of November I was fairly well convinced^^^^^|^^H 
m^^^^^^^that Colonel North's story that this was 
oil-drilling equipment was falsa, that for reasons that I 
could not understand, I guess — but I can understand," 
given Operation STAUNCH — that Colonel North did not 
want to tell me that it was weapons being sent into Iran. 
I believe that, very briefly, summarizes that 
conversation. I did take the paper that Mr. Ledeen 
prepared on the various factions and who belonged to what 
factions and Ict^m^m^m review it. She thought 
it was a good paper in some respects. I think she said 
it added to her knowledge, but it was generally in 
alignment with her views of how the factions were 
developing in Iran and each faction had elements within 
them and some members of one faction would converge with 
members of other factions. 

So it's not an easy situation to assess. 




[ 




466 



UWSSED 



231 



1 Q Let me just pursue a few other points. In 

2 terms of Mr. Clarridge and his trip to Europe, do you 

3 recall where Mr. Clarridge was going on his trip in 

4 December of 1985? 

5 A Europe. 

6 Q Do you recall what part of Europe he was going 

7 to? 

8 A I don't think he told me. He was off on an 

9 operational activity. I'm sure he would have told ma if 

10 I had asked, but I had no need to know, so I did not ask. 

11 Q Do you today know where it was that Mr. 

12 Clarridge actually went? 

13 A No, sir. 

14 Q The Director also was out of pocket during the 

15 early part of December 1985. Do you have any idea where 

16 he might have been in that period through 7 December 

17 1985? 

18 A No, sir. I don't recall. He traveled 

19 frequently. 

20 Q I understand. Do you know if he and Mr. 

21 Clarridge met in Europe in the period of the 5th through 

22 the 7th of December? 

23 A I don't know, sir. 

24 Q Do you have any knowledge of a meeting with 

25 Mr. Ghorbanifar, a person contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar, 



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in the first week of December? 



The first week of December? 
Yes. 



A 

Q 

A I believe Mr. McFarlane went to London to meet 
with Ghorbanifar. 

Q That would have been the 7th or 8th? 

A The 7th or 8th. And they met. Colonel North 
was there and Colonel North gave me a brief readout when 
he returned. 

Q Do you have any knowledge of Clarridge or 
Casey having been involved with those meetings in, I 
believe it was, London? 

A No, I have no knowledge of that. 

Q Mr. Clarridge's deputy at that time was a ^|B 
|whose name I am probably mispronouncing. 




A 

Q Do you have any recollection of either 
briefingJI^^^^^^^^Hon what was about on this 
initiative or the November arms transaction or in any way 
bringing him up to speed in Mr. Clarridge's absence? 
A During the first week of December? 
Q Ves. 
A I don't recall that. I know] 

but I don't recall that. I just don't recall. 
Lejt_me have you, if you don't mind, identify 




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(iNcussn 



233 



1 the December 18, '85 memorandum of your December 4 

2 meeting, which I'd like to have marked as Exhibit 17. 

3 (The document referred to was 

4 marked Allen Exhibit Number 17 

5 for identification.) 

6 A I recall writing this memorandum and some of 

7 the content. 

8 Q In terms of just timing, there was a passage 

9 of time, apparently, to the 18th of December until this 

10 memorandum was prepared. Were you out of the country 

11 during that period of time? 

12 A No, sir, I don't believe I was. But I was* 

13 busy on numerous things — estimates, interagency 

14 meetings, conducting and coordinating intelligence 

15 community priorities on terrorism. I sort of worked on 

16 this as I could find time to put it down clearly, and I 

17 know I sent a copy of this to Mr. Clarridge and I don't 

18 know where else I sent it. 

19 Q That was my next question, and that was the 

20 distribution of it. 

21 A A copy went to Mr. Clarridge. I hop* I sent a 

22 copy to the Director. I don't recall. My secretary 

23 might have something on this. 

24 Q Do you recall whether or not it went to Mr. 

25 Fuller? 



UNClASSIFIfD 



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mMMH 



234 



1 A No, I did not send it to Mr. Fuller because I 

2 was not authorized to send it to Mr. Fuller. 

3 Q Explain that. 

4 A You must remember that this was the most 

5 compartmented effort under way of the U.S. Government at 

6 that time. The NSC was setting the guidelines on access, 

7 and so Mr. Casey within the Agency would not want me to 

8 disseminate something this widely. 

9 Q That's what I'm trying to pursue, and let me 

10 come at it another way. Ledeen had contacted you and' 

11 Clarridge in November. He then comes back and meets with 

12 you on December 4. Was it your impression that Ledeen 

13 was coming to you and Mr. Clarridge under the authority 

14 of or with the knowledge of Colonel North? 

15 A I believe he indicated that Colonel North knew 

16 he was coming out to talk to us, yes. 

17 Q Was it your understanding that he was giving 

18 you a briefing on what he'd been doing at the behest of 

19 Colonel North? 

2 A It was not that impression. It was my 

21 understanding that Colonel North was the focal point for 

22 Mr. McFarlane, but what he was doing as far as the 

23 initiative was at the direction of Mr. McFarlane. At no 

24 time did he indicate he was taking guidance or direction 
2 5 from Colonel North. 



IWetitSStffiD 



470 




235 

1 Q I'm still having trouble, Mr. Allen, so bear 

2 with me. He comes to see you and Mr. Clarridge on the 

3 4th of December and he gives you a fairly elaborate 

4 discussion of the history of some of the things that you 

5 actually were now working on in terms of intelligence 

6 gathering. 

7 A And my first top-down view of what might be 

8 occurring, although I had made a lot of suppositions. 

9 Q Did he present himself as being someone who 

10 was giving you a briefing because Colonel North or Bud 

11 McFarlane, for that matter, had asked that you all be 

12 briefed? 

13 A I think he said that Colonel North had agreed 

14 that he should give this kind of top-down briefing, but 

15 he made it crystal clear that his work was for Bud 

16 McFarlane, not for Colonel North. 

17 Q You will recall, perhaps, the last time that 

18 we talked in the interview that there is a memorandum, 

19 November 26 memorandum, McFarlane to Poindexter which 

20 basically says that Mr. Ledeen should be taken out of the 

21 loop, out of the ongoing negotiations with Ghorbanifar. 

22 Were you aware that McFarlane had expressed such a thing 

23 at the time you met with him? 

24 A Not at all. 

25 Q That was Ledeen, I'm sorry. You were not 



471 



236 

1 aware of that? 

2 A No. I had absolutely no knowledge. I did 

3 have knowledge that a transition was under way. Mr. 

4 Ledeen did indicate to me -- and I don't believe it's 

5 recorded here — that he expected that Mr. Poindexter, as 

6 the new National Security Advisor, would not want him to 

7 work directly on hostage-related activities in regards to 

8 the Iran initiative. He still would remain as a 

9 consultant to the NSC on counterterrorism, but that it 

10 was clear that there would be a distance between him and 

11 John Poindexter. 

12 He still seemed to have the view that John • 

13 Poindexter did not object to his pursuing the broader 

14 geostrategic objective of looking at ways to find steps 

15 that could eventually lead, over time, to rapprochement 

16 with Tehran. 

17 Q So it was your impression from what you recall 

18 Ledeen telling you on December 4 that Ledeen still had 

19 the assignment or at least the leave of the National 

20 Security Advisor to be involved in an attempt to open a 

21 door to Iran; is that right? 

22 A That's my understanding, but not specifically 

23 involved in this operation relating to the hostage issues 

24 and the specific operational activities relating to 

25 dealings with Ghorbanifar and^^^^^^| It seemed to me 




472 



\mmm 



23' 



1 that Colonel North had the prime job of doing that. 

2 Q But as to what Ledeen's role, function, where 

3 he was in the compartment, did you have an impression of 

4 that? Did you understand what Ledeen's function was 

5 going to be? 

6 A Ledeen stated that, you know, in the future he 

7 would not want to talk about the specifics of any 

8 activity relating to trying to find ways to obtain 

9 release of the hostages, that that was not to be his 

10 role, that he would have a broader role of advising the 

11 National Security Advisor and others on opportunities for 

12 finding political rapprochement with the government of* 

13 Iran. 

14 Q There is a reference in the memorandum to 

15 Ledeen telling you about McFarlane's becoming involved in 

16 this matter oveiSlpyear before. Did he talk to you at 

17 all about what McFarlane was doing in late 1984 vis-a-vis 

18 an Iran initiative? --.■^-^ aier 

19 A No, he did not. 

20 Q So he didn't go into any more detail on that 

21 score? 

22 A No. He was quite guarded in his conversation. 

23 Q There is a reference in the memorandum to 

24 Ghorbanifar's prior relationshipiS' with the Central 

25 Intelligence Agency and that they had been, from his 



UNGUtSSm 



47c 



UWMSSIFIED 



238 



1 perspective, from Ghorbanif ar ' s perspective, bad. Did 

2 you explore that any further? 

3 A No, I didn't. 

4 Q As a result of this meeting did you make 

5 efforts to determine the nature of Ghorbanifar 's prior 

6 history with the Agency? 

7 AX don't think I did. I know that information 

8 was provided to, as I recall, to Mr. McMahon, who I 

9 believe had a search made of the records, and then when 

10 he attended the meeting in the Oval Office on the 7th I 

11 don't know when this memorandum came forward, but I know 

12 that Mr. McMahon told me that he had apprised, I believe, 

13 the officials that met that morning of the lack of 

14 reliability of Ghorbanifar. 

15 Q At paragraph 8 of your memorandum you say that 

16 Ledeen noted that he, presumably Ledeen, would be 

17 traveling again short^tjeto Europe and would be discussing 

18 the proposed Libyan operation further with Ghorbanifar. 

19 He was hopeful that in the meantime some reaction could 

20 be obtained from CIA. Ledeen noted that he had discussed 

21 this issue with Oliver North of the NSC, who favors the 

22 undertaking of this operation. 

23 In reading that I assume that you were saying 

24 that Ledeen told you that he had discussed the Libyan 

25 scam, if you will, with Colonel North; is that right? 



tINtttSStFIEB 



474 



mmmn 



239 



1 A That's what he told me, yes. I discussed that 

2 with the Director, who was not enthused. 

3 Q Did you discuss it with Colonel North? 

4 A I believe I did, and he endorsed if. But 

5 Director Casey never endorsed it. And also I think Mr. 

6 Clarridge had serious doubts and certainly this came up 

7 three or four times. Mr. Ledeen, I believe, surfaced it 

8 with Mr. George, and he surfaced it with the Director. I 

9 don't know whether he ever discussed it with Mr. Gates. 

10 And he was quite persistent in this over a period of 

11 months, and at no time was he ever given any 

12 encouragement by anyone, certainly not by me, that this 

13 would be a f ruitful ■ effort . 

14 Q That suggests to me that Ledeen was working 

15 for somebody, but I'm not sure who he was working for. 

16 Was it your impression that he was carrying out — in 

17 terms of he says he was going to go talk to Ghorbanifar, 

18 I take .it^in December, who was Ledeen working for?^ Was 

19 he working 'Ifbr McFarlane? 

20 A I thinic he viewed that as part of his 

21 activities as advisor and consultant on counterterrorism, 

22 that here we had a terrorist state, which is Libya, and 

23 on which we have absolutely incontrovertible evidence of 

24 continuing terrorist activity against a number of 

25 targets, including the West and the United States. And I 



UNtblSStFe 



475 



uNCLASsmm 



240 



1 think he felt very strongly that if there was some action 

2 that could assist in bringing about a change in the 

3 government in Tripoli that would be a good thing, that 

4 that would decrease terrorism. Fifty percent of all 

5 international terrorism stems from the Middle East. 

6 Q Accepting all that, I am puzzled who you 

7 thought Ledeen was working for at this point. 

8 A I don't know. You are asking me to speculate. 

9 I'm only saying he was a consultant on counterterrorism 

10 and I assumed he felt that was a plausible thing to 

11 suggest. I just can't speculate on that. 

12 Q I'm really not asking you to speculate. What 

13 I'm trying to find out is what perception you had of 

14 whose mandate Ledeen was working under. Was he working 

15 as an independent contractor? 

16 A No, sir. He was working, when he met with me 

17 and Mr. Clarridge, each time he represented himself as a 

18 consultant to the National Security Advisor on 

19 counterterrorism. 

20 Q The National Security Advisor, i.e., Mr. 

21 McFarlane and then subsequently Mr. Poindexter or Admiral 

22 Poindexter? 

23 A That is correct. 

24 Q It was your impression that this memorandum 

25 was to be distributed to Clair George; is that correct? 



msimm 



476 



uNcussm 



241 



1 A I don't recall to whom I disseminated. I know 

2 I sent it to the Director, to Mr. Clarridge, who was a 

3 division chief in the Directorate of Operatfens, and 

4 where he further diss^aiinated it within the DO, I don't 

5 know. I would have to check on the dissemination. There 

6 must be a dissemination page somewhere. I don't see it 

7 with that copy. ^ffS 

8 Q And you don't have a current recollection of 

9 what the distribution was. ,^- 

10 A No, I don't. 

11 Q In terms of the date that you did this, 

12 December 18, 1985, just tarrying on that for a moment,'- 

13 the Tower Commission^ndicates that Director Casey met 

14 with Mr. Ledeen on the 19th of December. Do you have a 

15 recollection of preparing Director Casey to meet with 

16 Michael Ledeen? 

17 A I believe I talked withMr. ^feey at some 

18 point prior to Mr. Ledeen meeting with Mr. Casey. I told 

19 him that one of the ideas that would be suggested would 

20 be the Libyan sting op^ation, if that's what you want to 

21 call it. I don't think Mr. Casey was enthused about it. 

22 And also I think each time I met with Mr. Casey, as NIOs 

23 do, we talk about a wide variety of subjects. We 

24 normally talked at some point during the conversation 

25 about this initiative, and I'm certain I told him what I 



UNCIASSffl 



477 



ONCUSSffl 



242 



1 knew about Ghorbanifar. 

2 Q You did not sit in on Casey's meeting with 

3 Ledeen on the 19th? 

4 A No, sir, I certainly did not. 

5 Q Did you have a discussion with Director Casey 

6 about his meeting with Ledeen immediately after his 

7 meeting with Ledeen? 

8 A I don't recall. I believe Mr. Casey said that 

9 he had discussed it. He had had a discussion with Mr. 

10 Ledeen, that he enjoyed talking with Mr. Ledeen, who has 

11 a very sharp mind, but I don't recall the substance of 

12 that conversation. At no time do I believe that Mr. 

13 Casey or anyone else encouraged Mr. Ledeen that the 

14 Libyan sting operation was one we were willing to 

15 contemplate. Activities relating to the Libyan operation 

16 was run by^^^^^^Hat the time, and they had a lot of 

17 other ideas other than this one. 

And in talking with^^^^^^^^^and others 

19 about this, and Mr. Clarridge, no one in the DO would 

20 engage in this operation, a sting operation of this 

21 nature, as long as Mr. Ghorbanifar was an elemeht in that 

22 operation. 

23 Q Let me pursue that. Your meetings in December 
1985 with^^^^^^^H or^^^^HH| do 

25 specific recollection of you talking with them about 

[:c|Ct7t9|^wl 



478 



UNCLASSm 



243 



1 these matters? 

2 A I recall having lunch wlt'i^^^^^^^^H, and it 

3 might have been in early January '86, where we talked 

4 about Mr. Ghorbanifar over lunch, and! 

5 reiterated a view that he has held consistently that 

6 involving Ghorbanifar in clandestine operations is not a 

7 feasible approach, that Mr. Ghorbanifar is 

8 uncontrollable, duplicitous. He made it clear that he 

9 was concerned at that time by the NSC's use of 

10 Ghorbanifar in this very sensitive Iranian issue. 

11 Q Do you recall that you had discussions of this 

12 kind with ^^^^^^Bduring this period? 

13 A I don't ycil^fcl tbat^ixo. ~^BUt Z'b certain^^^ 

14 ^^^^shared the same views, because Z think you know 

15 sometime during the last year we have discussed Mr. 

16 Ghorbanifar with^^^^^^ It's quite consistent with 

17 his views on Ghorbanifar. 

18 Q Do you recall having a lunch or a meeting, a 

19 face-to-face meeting of some kind with^^^^^^^^relating 

20 to his views of either Ledeen or Ghorbanifar in the 

21 December 1985 period? 

22 A I d8Stl^P**ft^^&**^afc5^ •• ^s^^^lffe^iM -.^..^-^Ste 

23 - ~Q ^^^^SMr4^sr^^^^M^ni^Pi«t^^' McMahon had with 

24 various people about the Iran initiative on December 5. 

25 ^^^^^^^^B^^notes on that meeting do «ot indicate Aat 



icttsstfe 



479 



1 

2 
3 
4 

5 
6 

7 
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13 
14 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



UNGUSSm 



244 



you were present. Do you have a present recollection of 
attending a meeting with McMahon at ^at tim^ 

A No, I was not at that meeting. 

Q You did prepare a memorandum, I believe, on 
December 6 on the Iran political scene. Do you recall 
preparing such a memorandum? 

A I recali^^t Mr. Crtifftp dix«cElon that "1.; 
prepare some^ing and c^^dinat* it with,^ b«\|,«|r«,^^H 



er^6^19»S 
vhlch will )}e 



_ Qs - Let 'W,Bjf.j|^gt- tshew -jpbu «^ 
memorandttB on t^ Iranian pd^^ical 
Exhibit 18, I wi5«v*T .1- -^-,^ -j-^-m^ ^ - ~^-'i 

__^ ^~-- (f Stgdo caaig^ r«fczrr*d to was 

-^- n8^)c«^-All«n^xM^i« ^iavc is^ 
'^^^^'^'' -y-~ fnrr taJntffl-ntlwiiMjd i, ---^ 





La 
wit%:th^l§tnian"4«^an|_withl^^a^I*^«^ He 
tho\ ^|hfe^ ^ Vx. -^i^mct^ui. aoa» as«^l inUgSiraa a 
result of^mh^iia1bfcriji*=Jfegu«t», which Mr . I*4a«n had 



UNCIXSSm 



480 



UNCUSSIRED 



245 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



made available to m». ^ -.t 

Q In December of 1985 the National Intelligence 
Officer on the Near East was Graham Fuller, is that 
correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Why were you being asked to deal with matters 
that were within Mr. Fuller's area of responsibility? 

A That's a good question. I probably shouldn't 
have written it. It was one that Mr. Casey said just you 
take your own look at this and see what you can come up 
with, and I did that at his request. 

Q Do you have as of today any knowledg* as^taT 
why Fuller was not included l^^hfs aa:ttarr~ln early 
December? .^^^,^"" .=.? :.3S^"«^^v '". _^j. ^. '• _-- _. '^ 

It's j uj^. _^!^Sha»- ^^Sn '^^jsl^B i ijijljij^^' ^ww ligT" I 94ytt.. . 

purposes, andFl deh'% knoiF ^at^-jpurposc" h^^ua«4--it for. 

Q Do ^u have a r*coir«ction of^atng told not 
to.jdlscuss thes*- Battttz:)|^lth ll^lail*r? 

A 




— A tr^annot. :^ I ia?t ^ataT t^E»ow-: _ 

knov,^ke a look at'what''Mr. Ledeen is providing, see if 



wsmm 



481 



mmm 



246 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

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13 

14 

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25 




it coincides with what w« think, and I^acall showing 
this to someone ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 
probably^^^^l^^^^^H^ She thought was good. She 
made some adjustments to it. I think it drew heavily on 
some of their analysis as well. 

Q In terms o£^^^^^H^^Hboss, who 
reporting to at that point? 

A Well, she was reporting to — well, 
waa the director of the office. 

Q Hasf^l^Hher immediate superior? 

A No. I don't know who her immediate superior 
was, probably^^^^^^^^HH who was the Iranian analyst. 

Q Do you know the extent to whict^^^^^^^^Hwas 
aware of your involvement in these matters in December of 
1985? 

A I don't know whethert^H||^H||^talked to him 
or not. 

Q In terms of working with^H^^H^ had you 
discussed withV^^H^^Hwhether or not ha was agreeable 
to you working with^^^Hon these matters? 

A I told her that she could discuss it with him, 
and I told her it was extremely sensitive, and this was 
sort of an offline type of activity, very unusual, and I 
don't know whether she did or not. 

Q You do not remember clearing with] 



IWKftSStnED 



82-688 0-88-17 



482 



iiNtmiiD 



247 



1 your discussions of these matters with| 

2 A No, I don't recall that. 

3 Q Do you recall knowing that Mr. McMahon was 

4 preparing for a December 7 conference at the White House 

5 with the President at the time that you wrote this 

6 December 6 memorandum? 

7 A No. 

8 Q Was this December 6 memorandum prepared by you 

9 to prepare McMahon for such a meeting? 

10 A I don't know. I just gave it to the Director. 

11 As far as I can recall, it was jsomething the Director. 

12 asked for. 

13 Q I understand that. But you're telling me, 

14 though, it was not being done by you as a way of 

15 preparing McMahon. 

16 A Not at all. Now whether Mr. McMahon used it 

17 or not I have no Jcnowledge. 

18 Q You would not have basn nesting with McMahon 

19 at this point in time, then, to prepare him for a meeting 

20 with the President? 

21 A No. 

22 Q I was left with the impression from our prior 

23 interview that you debriefed McMahon immediately after 

24 his meeting at the White House with the President. Is 

25 that impression incorrect? 



UNCtASStra 



483 



mussm 



248 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

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18 

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21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A That is incorrect. He told me about the 
meeting on the 7th of December on the 16th of December, 
when we I believe were en route to attend a meeting of 
the Vice President's Task Force for Combatting Terrorism. 
We discussed it in the car all the way down and we spent 
most of the time discussing the initiative all the way 
back. 

Q But insofar as McMahon had responsibilities on 
the 7th of December, he would not have discussed the 
responsibilities with you contemporaneously? 

A No, sir, he did not, I can assure you. He .was 
aware and was seeing the intelligence that was being 
collected^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^H He was 
aware that I was coordinating the tasking on it. 

Q Again I'm having trouble figuring out roles 
here. Bud McFarlane was dispatched to meet with 
Ghorbanifar and he did that in conjunction with Colonel 
North in the period December 7-8. Your involvement in 
that trip was what? 

A One of tasking. 

Q And when you say that what are you telling me? 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H I knew 
Colonel North was going there; he told me he was. So it 
was strict^ fi^oa^y 



484 



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Q Colonel No rth asked you tol 

^^m^^^^^^^^^^^^Hon trip to 

London at this time? 

A Ko. On the fact that he would b« meeting with 
Manucher Ghorbanifai 




485 



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250 



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BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

Q Mr. Allen, so that you understand what we are 
interested in — 

A I guess that's what I need to know. 

Q Let me try to focus you on what our interest 
is because it really does not go to that area. 

A Okay. 

Q Our interest, or at least my interest, is in 
direction, instruction, requests that you w ere g etting 
from Colonel North. 




486 



mmm 



251 



1 1985 that he wanted! 

2 is that what you're telling me? 

3 A Yes, sir. 

4 Q That suggest to me that clearly you knew North 

5 was going to be in London to meet with Ghorbanifar in the 

6 period December 7-8; is that correct? 

7 A Yes. He indicated he would b« meeting with 

8 the Iranian intermediary, yes. 

9 Q And likewise you knew that Mr. McFarlan* would 

10 be in London for this effort? 

11 A I'm not sure when I learned of that. I may 

12 have learned that McFarlane was there when Colonel North 

13 returned and said Mr. McFarlane was there. I don't think 

14 he told me in advance that Mr. McFarlane was going to 

15 London. 

16 Q Again that's what I'm trying to get a sense 

17 of. Did you know prior to them going to London that they 

18 were in fact going to make that trip to London? 

19 A I knew Colonel North was. I cannot recall 

20 being told in advance that Mr. McFarlane was going. 

21 Q And when you say you knew that from Colonel 

22 North, did you know from Colonel North the purpose of the 

23 meeting in London? 

24 A As I understand it — and this was after he 

25 returned -- the objective of the meeting was, following 



mmm 



487 




252 

1 this rather serious debacle that had occurred in lata 

2 November, was to have one final exchange with the 

3 Iranians to determine the feasibility of whether there 

4 could be continuing contact, whether there could be an 

5 opening determined with the Tehran government, and 

6 whether the hostage problem could be resolved as an 

7 impediment to the opening of those relations. That was 

8 my understanding of the meeting. 

9 Q And you have had that understanding — 

10 A After the meeting occurred. 

11 Q After the meeting occurred? 

12 A Ves. 

13 Q And you had gotten that understanding because 

14 of conversations that you would have had with Colonel 

15 North after the meeting? 

16 A That is absolutely correct. 

17 Q Okay. Thank you. 

18 Nov from the Tower Commission report we know 

19 of a memorandum that Colonel North wrote on this meeting 

20 in which he talks about a number of things, but one of 

21 the things he talks about is utilizing General Secord as 

22 a conduit in this initiative. At this period of time, 

23 December 7 and 8, 9, 1985, were you knowledgeable of 

24 General Secord being involved in this matter? 

25 A As a conduit to the Iranian government? 



UNCDiSSIFIED 



488 



Mmm 



253 



1 Q Um-hum . 

2 A I was not aware that ha was going to b« used 

3 in a sense as a conduit or a negotiator. I was aware 

4 that an individual named Copp in the November time frame, 

5 the week of November 21, was in^^^^^Hand that he was 

6 somehow involved in assisting in the shipment that 

7 occurred the weekend of 24-25, and I later was able to 

8 decipher from Colonel North's comments that the man named 

9 Copp was really a man named Major General Secord, whom I 

10 had not heard of previously, to the best of my 

11 recollection. 

12 Q What I'm driving at is that as of December 7, 

13 8, 9 — 

14 AX was not aware that he was involved as a 

15 conduit or a negotiator or that a proposal had been made 

16 that he would be a negotiator. As far as I can recall, 

17 to the best of my recollection, I don't think Colonel 

18 North said anything about General Secord at that time. 

19 Q So you were not witting, so to speak, of 

20 General Secord 's function in these matters in early 

21 December? ~^^^.-^ ":^ "- --^ -^ 

22 A .. "^hat is correct, not in the sense of being a 

23 negotiator between the United States and Iran. I knew 

24 that there was an individual named Copp who was in some 

25 way involved in logistics, movement of equipment to Iran. 



UNetAmiED 



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Q I think I understand what you're telling me, 
but let me just pursue it one step further. Copp was the 
name that you knew. Copp's identity as Secord you did 
not know. 

A I'm not sure when I learned that Secord was 
the equivalent of Copp. 

Q My impression is, from what you have been 
telling m», "that Colonel North during this period of time 
would go to various people in the government and ask them 
to do certain specific narrowly-defined things for him to 
assist him, and in that sense he made use of you; is that 
correct? ' 

A That's my impression, that, as with many 
sensitive operations, you frequently compartment it. You 
utilize various people for various purposes. He utilized 
me for the colle ctio n tasking coordination, which was not 

an lflH^iipii|.~triii1rT1Tni^'"' "11 iilM'ltfJ 1 in the 

intensity, duration and specificity of the task. 
Normally NI Ofc-taa k on a more gen«ric*lMsif, But blouse j 

te^ tuid j|^tm~m«~ for" 

reason he had to 



turn to someone that he could trust. 

I had a thousand other duties. It was an 
extra burden for me and took away a lot of nights and 




\mmm 



490 



Winm 



255 

T"^V 

1 weekends from my TamiiirVAtti4(t.,.Jl<'4J,d^* because Colonel 

2 North said it was important and the Director and Deputy 

3 Director endorsed my activity. 

4 Q What we're trying to do to some extent, 

5 though, is come to an understanding of — 

6 A How he compartmented? 

7 Q Exactly. 

8 A He did a very good job of it, I think. 

9 Q So he would not have shared with you how what 

10 you were doing fit into a grander scheme, if you will? 

11 A That is correct — not in all its 

12 ramifications. It was clear from the meeting that 

13 occurred. He told me after he returned from London that 

14 McFarlane was there and that he and Ghorbanifar had not 

15 had a meeting of the minds, and it was not a good scene. 

16 Colonel North was unhappy that McFarlane was not more 

17 positive toward continuing the initiative. I do recall 

18 that. 

19 Q And it's in that context — 

20 A Let me just continue. Later on, after the 

21 Presidential Finding and after I certainly became aware 

22 and after Mr. Cave and I worked •y«ry day to gatba r — I 

23 h aul-m any ^har dijfc) . ri |jmTr'TTr^JYi.£nnrtnrr'Tn vrark out of 

24 my office — I was cognizant of broader aspects of the 

25 operation. But up until the Presidential Finding Colonel 



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1 North kept things highly compartmented and I think that's 

2 the way in some operations you have to actually function 

3 if you want to keep absolute security. 

4 It didn't bother me so much so long as the 

5 Director approved it. 

6 Q Fine. What I'm trying to determine is the 

7 extent to which you would have been apprised by Colonel 

8 North of the broader implications of what he was doing at 

9 this time, and what you're telling me is that you would 

10 not have been brought into this program at that level of 

11 generality; is that correct? 

12 A Only in a general sense. I knew clearly what 

13 was being involved, that we were trying to open a 

14 relationship. I felt that Mr. McFarlane was trying to 

15 open a relationship to Iran, that he had given the 

16 activity principally to Colonel North to bring focus to 

17 the activity, and that Colonel North was very sensitive 

18 to the hostage issue and that tactically he felt before 

19 geostrategic relations could be accomplished that there 

20 had to be this preliminary obstacle, that the American 

21 hostages in Lebanon had to resolved. 

22 And it became a question, and that's one thing 

23 where I did get involved and where I did have sxibstantive 

24 responsibility, was trying to evaluate the degree to 

25 which elements within Iran had control over the captors. 



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1 I've spent a lot of time' •Dver^^1ie"'ta»t year writing about 

2 that, convening analysts to talk about that, and we still 

3 have a dispute within the intelligence community over the 

4 degree to which Tehran can control the elements holding 

5 the American hostages. 

6 Q Okay. Again, bear with me on where I'm trying 

7 to come from here. One of the things that North is 

8 mentioning in a memorandum that he writes on December 9 

9 is a whole host of things about the arrangement. He's 

10 trying to spell out to Poindexter in a memorandum at that 

11 time a variety of things that are going on. One of the 

12 things he mentions in that memorandum to Poindexter is' 

13 what he describes in the memorandum as a kickback 

14 arrangement. 

15 I take it from what you're telling me you were 

16 not aware of a kickback arrangement at that time? 

17 A I knew nothing of the financing. 

18 Q So your function in this arrangement, as you 

19 are describing it, was narrow, limited, compartmented, 

20 confined. 

21 A At that period of time, and I knew absolutely 

22 nothing about the cost of the weapons or what commissions 

23 were being earned by Iranian intermediaries, what 

24 officials in Iran were paying for any of this equipment. 

25 I had absolutely no knowledge. 



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1 Q And In terms of the system, the scheme, the 

2 program, that was not something Colonel North discussed 

3 with you in this period of time? 

4 A Not at the time, not in any depth. It was 

5 clear that weapons — it appeared that Israeli weapons 

6 were involved, at least during this time frame, were 

7 being sent with at least the concurrence of the United 

8 States in some respect — I'm not certain what — to 

9 Iran, and that out of this was to come a release of 

10 American hostages. 

11 He spoke frequently of the need for broader 

12 relations with Iran. He at that stage, I thought, had. 

13 some strategic ideas that I am sure Mr. McFarlane had 

14 impressed upon him. But detailed, you know, how much 

15 equipment was shipped, what equipment was shipped, what 

16 did the Iranian intermediaries charge the Iranian 

17 government, until I met with Mr. Furmark, I guess in the 

18 October-November time frames, I think that's when I had a 

19 broader view of the actual costing, although I'm sure 

20 you'll get into questions of cost because I started 
becoming aware the cost^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

I^^^^^^^Hin the June-July time frame. 

23 And that's when suddenly things seemed to be 

24 going awry. I was quite surprised over that, plus other 

25 indicators which I've testified to. By late August of 



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1986 I was worried that things were amiss. 

Q But so we don't lose focus here — 

A I don't want to lose focus. I wanted to say 
when I became aware. Back in that time frame, Mr. Kerr, 
I just want to tell you I was so focused on hundreds of 
other things that this was an extra duty, took an extra 
hour or two, took a lot of weekends. Every tineH^^B 

[l came in, whether it was 3:00 a.m. 
or 2:00 a.m. to read the darn thing, then had to either 
stay at the office and work on it. So it was a very 
exhausting and onerous duty, in fact. 

Q ' Let me back out so we can come into focus. 
What I'm looking at right now and what I'm interested in 
is the decisionmaking process that's going on in December 
of 1985 and I'm trying to identify the players and roles. 
Your role in December of 198 5 is to help Colonel North 

essentially 

gathering of information. 

A ^^^^^^^^1 tasking] 




Q What I am interested in is the evolution of a 
decisionmaking process in this period of time and what I 
see as a meeting on the 7th of December that McMahon 



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1 attands with tha Presldant, which rasults in McFarlana 

2 going to link up with North and Ghorbanlfar In London. 

3 You knaw that they wara going on that trip, but you 
A raally didn't know why. 

5 A I knaw that Colonal North was going. Z don't 

6 recall that I knaw Mr. McFarlana was going. It was to 

7 discuss the fallout that had occurred after what Colonel 

8 North had described as a very disastrous meeting in 

9 Geneva, and he was bitterly disappointed, very downcast, 

10 and he came back and was still not happy with the results 

11 of that meeting, because I believe Mr. McFarlana had . 

12 expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of continuing 

13 the effort through Mr. Ghorbanifar. 

14 And Z assumed at that stage that the 

15 initiative probably was dead and I ran into Colonel North 

16 a few days later, I believe at the Department of State, 

17 and he indicated that the initiative was back on. 

18 Q You're going to lose me if you move too fast. 

19 Where Z am is London, December 1985. 

20 A The seventh. 

21 Q Right. And at that point you're trying to 

22 help Colonel North^ 

24 —---=- 

25 




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1 Presidential meetings at this point. There is a meeting 

2 that McMahon has on the 7th of December that he attends. 

3 • There is another-meeting that afS^rently occurs on the 

4 10th of December thati^asey attends. -I needHbe know the 

5 extent- to^whiph you were d«±rtg the kind "©*: staff ing work 

6 that CIA <^es o^jplping McMahoi^^t^ready to asst with 

7 the Pzasldenl^^n the 7th. i^ tafejg^^ping Caf«]g^o (^1%^. 

8 ready to meet with' the President on the 10th of December. 

9 And I think what you're telling me is that you 

10 really were not playing a staffing role to McMahon or 

11 Casey in that period of time. 

12 A To the best of my recollection, I did not 

13 assist either in preparing them for the meetings on 7 and 

14 10 December. 

15 Q So in terms of what they were telling the 

16 President and how they were reacting to what the 

17 President was doing, you can't help me with McMahon and 

18 you can't help me with Casey in this time frame; is that 

19 right? 

20 A Not in that time frame. 

21 MS. DORNAN: I'd like to follow up on North's 

22 reaction to the London meeting. Even though he thought 

23 the meetings were disastrous, why was he then 

24 disappointed with McFarlane's negative reaction? What 

25 made him think the initiative should continue? 



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1 THE WITNESS: What made — 

2 MS. DORNAN: North. 

3 THE WITNESS: I really don't recall. He felt 

4 that he waa convinced.„that a release Jaad occurred of 

5 Reverend Benjamin t»*ir, that-Mr. Ghorbanifar did hav« 

6 extrao^^inariLysgooA conta^^^n th« Iranian government^ 

7 regardle«« of the fact ^EjSffiiAJ^very control laBla, ^at 

8 this was our only link to continuing efforts to free the 

9 hostages, which Colonel North thought waa a worthwhile 

10 objective in itself. 

11 -^ ,^gaA^^^»^,ol<^g^ North, ragSifdlaaa of iirhat ^is- 

12 said in t|^presri^lxi hw**n»- bro«|iEt yii^of the ' 

13 prob^M of seu^^tf^Asia tStd the polR^y^^acuum that^V 

14 exists between the U.S. and Iran. He was just 

15 disappointed. He said that Ghorbanifar had represented 

16 himself well at that meeting and stated that the United 

17 States needed to find ways to get closer to the Iranian 

18 government because he was fearful that radical elements 

19 which he considered pro-Soviet — and indeed many of them 

20 are pro-Soviet — might become predominant. 

21 And I recall some anguish on the part of 

22 Colonel North upon his return. But then later — I don't 

23 want to get ahead of Mr. Kerr — he indicated that the 

24 initiative would proceed, and that could be after the 

25 10th of December. 



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1 BV MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

2 Q Your conversations with North upon his return 

3 on the 9th of December would have taken place at that 

4 time, the 9th of December? 

5 A About that time. He had just returned. 

6 Q And you would have talked to North face to 

7 face? 

8 A Yes. 

9 Q Face to face? 

10 A In his office. 

11 Q Who would have been with you at the time you 

12 met with North? 

13 A There was someone else with d«. 

14 Q Do you know who it was? 

15 A No, sir, I don't. 

16 Q The context that you were dealing with North 

17 was what? What were you talking to North about? Why 

18 were you there? 

19 A 1 think it had to do ~ I don't know. I don't 

20 know. I don't remember. I talked with North about many 

21 counterterrorist activities. I assume it had to do with 

22 some other — I don't think I went there just to get 

23 debriefed on this trip because he could have told me that 

24 on the telephone. 

25 Q You were not or were you — when you met with 



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1 him, would it have been the 9th of December? 

2 A Around that time. He had just returned, and 

3 don't hold me to a specific date, please. But he had 

4 just returned. 

5 Q And the conversation that you had with him 

6 about the meeting in London would have been just a 

7 passing remark, a glancing blow? 

8 A No, it was a serious conversation for a period 

9 of minutes where he indicated he had met at some home — 

10 and that was when I learned that McFarlana had joined him 

11 — and that the conversation had not gone as well as he 

12 expected and that Mr. Ghorbanifar had expressed anguish 

13 that Mr. McFarlane was backing away from the initiative, 

14 that he was condemning Iran to possible Soviet 

15 penetration in future years. 

16 And the Colonel was tired and disappointed. 

17 Q Were you aware at the time that you met with 

18 Colonel North, when he told you these things, that Casey 

19 would be meeting with the President to also discuss and 

20 review what had happened in London? 

21 A No, sir. Colonel North did not indicate to me 

22 that he knew such a meeting was to take place. 

23 Q And Director Casey likewise had not advised 

24 you or talked to you about a meeting that he was going to 

25 have with the President? 



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1 A To the best of my recollection, Bill did not 

2 talk to me about it. 

3 Q Again, just to try to move things into focus, 

4 let me show you a memo which I gather from what you're 

5 telling me you probably didn't see. It's Bill Casey's 

6 memorandum of 10 December directed to the Deputy 

7 Director, Mr. McMahon, which will be Exhibit 19. 

8 (The document referred to was 

9 marked Allen Exhibit Huober 19 

10 for identification.) 

11 I'd like you to look at Exhibit 19 primariJLy 

12 for the purpose of trying to focus your recollection an 

13 what you would have known about events at the White House 

14 on this Iran initiative at this time. 

15 (Pause.) 

16 A I have never seen the nemorandua until now. 

17 The first paragraph, McFarlane's impressions of 

18 Ghorbanifar, coincide with what Colonel North had stated. 

19 I don't recall Director Casey talking to me about this 

20 meeting of 10 December, although I did hear him say at 

21 some point that it was hard to constrain the Israelis, 

22 that they would tend to proceed in some way regardless of 

23 what we do to comt^s^ th« 
24 
25 




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1 Paragraph 3, Colonel North raisad that at the 

2 Operatio ns Sub group meeting of the T WIG,| 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 

8 Q Okay. Mr. Casey's memo suggests to m« that at 

9 this point the Iran initiative was at low ebb. 

10 A Ves, sir. 

11 Q But that Bill Casey thought that something, 

12 still might turn up. 

13 A And the President was still essentially in 

14 favor of trying to find something, and that's precisely 

15 what Mr. McMahon told me on the 16th. 

16 Q That's precisely what he told you on the 16th, 

17 and you've hit a time window which is very important to 

18 me, which I want to try to focus you on. It looks to me 

19 like on the 10th of December a lot of people thought 

20 things were at low ebb, yet we know they come back to 

21 life. What I want to know is what you knew from talking 

22 to North at that point about where things stood. 

23 A Well, after I talked to him at the White House 

24 in his office I accidentally, and purely accidentally, 

25 ran into him in the Department of State just at the 



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entrance, the C Street entrance, shortly after the 9th or 
10th of December. And he smiled, and I said, you're 
smiling. I said I thought everything was ol 




And he said the initiative is back on. He 
said there has been a discussion with the President and 
that the initiative will continue. 




Q What, if anything, did you learn at this 
conversation or from any other circumstance that caused 
the change, the shift? 

A He indicated there had been a discussion in 
the Oval Office. 

Q By whom, with whom? 

A He didn't say. He said he had been in 
attendance, I believe, and that the President had 
approved of continuing to utilize — I shouldn't reach. 
I don't recall whether he said that the Israelis would 
continue to be involved or not. He just said the 
initiative would continue. It was a brief conversation, 



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1 but Colonel North's attitude and outlook was quite 

2 different. 

3 Q And the contrast is between your impression of 

4 his attitude as of 9-10 December and something which had 

5 occurred a few days later? 

6 A Yes, sir. 

7 Q And it turns out what precisely had caused the 

8 change? You don't know what it was? 

9 A Except that he stated the President had 

10 approved continuing the initiative, the President of the 

11 United States. 

12 Q Now let's go to December 16 and a meeting with 

13 Mr. McMahon. Again, your recollection is that you met 

14 with McMahon and had some discussion with McMahon about 

15 the status of the Iran initiative; is that correct? 

16 A I was traveling with Mr. McMahon because Mr. 

17 Casey was not available to attend the Vice President's 

18 meeting with Agency heads on the report that he was 

19 submitting to the President on steps that must be taken 

20 to improve our counterterrorist strategies and programs. 

21 So I rode with Mr. McMahon and we talked on the way down 
2 2 and on the way back about the Iranian initiative. 

2 3 He did not, to the best of my recollection, 

24 talk about any meeting the Director had had on the 10th 

25 of December, but he talked about the^m^^ing ha had ^_ 



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1 attended in the Oval Office on the 7th of December with 

2 the PresidiSfeV Secretary of state, I think the Secretary 

3 of Defense, McFarlane. 

4 He stated that he had expressed serious 

5 reservations, I believe, at that time about Ghorbanifar, 

6 about the intermediary involved, concern over the Israeli 

7 involvement. 

8 Q You lost me for a second. You said that he 

9 expressed reservations about Ghorbanifar and then you 

10 said and the intermediary. Are we talking about the same 

11 person? 

12 A ■ The intermediary involved, the Iranian *■ 

13 intermediary involved. 

14 Q That would be Ghorbanifar? 

15 A Yes. And that the conversation had gone on, 

16 if I recall correctly, for an hour and a half, which was 

17 an extraordinarily long discussion. He seemed 

18 displeased. He said that Kimche was involved, Schwimmer 

19 was involved. He felt — he didn't say so in so many 

20 terms, but I gained the impression that he felt that the 

21 Iranians were trying to unduly influence the United 

22 States in this regard and that hostage issues had deeply 

23 affected the President. 

24 He spoke very respectfully of the President, 
2 5 said that the President was very strong in the meeting. 



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(W6USSIFIED 



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1 And it was his impression at that meeting that the 

2 initiative would continue. 

3 Q And again he is still talking about the 

4 December 7 meeting? 

5 A Ves, sir. He did not, to the best of my 

6 knowledge, ever mention the 10 OaoifflMr meeting. He said 

7 that he told the President that if it was important to 

8 continue the initiative that the Agency would support the 

9 Executive Branch and the President, as is the Agency's 

10 duty to do so, but that a Presidential Finding was 

11 absolutely necessary. 

12 Q Did you apprise Mr. McMahon of the fact that 

13 you had met with Mr. Ledeen on the 4th of December? 

14 AX think I did. I think I said Mr. Ledeen had 

15 indicated that Kimche was involved and that this was an 

16 operation utilizing the Israelis. Also, I think I 

17 probably apprised him that Mr. Ledeen had sort of been 

18 put to on* side by Admiral Poindexter, that Admiral 

19 Poindexter at this stage, as I recall, was taking over as 

20 National Security Advisor. 

21 But we did not dwell on the conversation with 

22 Mr. Ledeen. We talked at great length about — he asked 

23 a lot about] 
24 
25 




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1 

2 H* said who is Battery, and at that stag* I 

3 said I believ* that that refers to the vice President, 

4 but actually it's a code name used by Colonel North, that 

5 there had been an agreement by someone at the White House 

6 that somehow Ghorbanifar would be led to believ* that 

7 somehow the Vice President himself was behind the 

8 initiative, and, to the best of my )cnowledge, Ghorbanifar 

9 never met with the vice President and this was simply . 

10 sort of a ploy to push Ghorbanifar harder to make it 

11 succeed. 

12 Q As of the time of this December 16 

13 conversation that you had with Mr. McMahon, did you know 

14 that Director Casey would be meeting with Mr. Ledeen 

15 subsequently on the 19th of December? 

16 A I knew that Mr. Ledeen was_seeking an audience 

17 with Director Casey. 

18 Q Did you discuss that with Mr. McMethon? 

19 A No, sir, not to the best of my knowledge, Z 

20 didn't. 

21 Q Did Mr. McMahon indicate that he was familiar 

22 with or knowledgeable of Mr. Ledeen? 

23 A I know at some point he mentioned Ledeen, but 

24 I don't know that there were any comments in that 

25 particular time frame. I know that he had some concerns 



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UNCUSWD 



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1 over Mr. Ledeen's role, but I don't recall — 

2 Q Do you remember what those concerns were? 

3 A That here was an individual, very bright, 

4 extremely able, but he felt that perhaps he was too 

5 single-minded in his pursuit of this and that he was 

6 exceedingly close to senior Israeli officials. 

7 But I want to make it very clear for the 

8 record I don't know that he said that during that 

9 conversation. I don't know he said that at all. 

10 Q Can you place the subsequent — 

11 A I can't. I really can't, and it wouldn't be 

12 ;l^ir for me ^p^^«eulatfl^ 



13 MS. DSntWU^, Did'youjret a fe^Iin^ at this 

14 tin*. th»t ^tore ««(ca any^di'ff«s^c«a b*tv«*n Mr. Casey 

15 andr. .:Hr ;/-- HgMft&aj^^^^^^fc^^p.. ta^ ^JMB Utiva? 

16 THE WITNESS: I think Mr. Casey was more 

17 sancfuine <St tlA flfeitial efficacy of the initiative. I 

18 believe that Mr. Casey believed that the President could 

19 ride out any firestorm that could develop. He said to me 

20 once, who is going to condemn the President of the United 

21 States for trying to saw Aaaricans held in severe 

22 captivity under se^reggtama^ons it^^poano^ 5^'^^ 

23 ?■ ^liE^ ''■'ff 6aig<w3^»«>- at^^^fet^ K^J ^g" was my inqprfesion 

24 that he did not relate that to something involving 

25 diversion of funds to Central America. He was putting it 



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1 only in th« context of Iran. Let me just finish, if I 

2 may, please. 

3 He spoke frequently about the need to find a 

4 way to eventually have closure with this government of 

5 Iran to try to check the spread of Shia fundamentalism, 

6 which he felt was a great dynamic change in the Middle 

7 East, particularly in Lebanon, potentially in some of the 

8 Gulf states. He spoke very broadly of those very grave 

9 problems of national security. 

10 MS. DORKAN: Did you receive the impression 

11 that Mr. McMahon attempted to influence Mr. Casey on 

12 this? 

13 THE WITNESS: I don't recall Mr. McMahon 

14 speaking about Mr. Casey's view of this. I'll think 

15 about it, but at this stage I can't think of it. -t' 

16 ^^ BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

17 Q Let me move yovuf^ittle further ahead. We've 

18 talked about the December 19 meeting between Mr. Casey 

19 and Mr. Ledeen. Vou at no time, I take it, spoke to 

20 Casey about what transpired at his meeting with Ledeen on 

21 the 19th of DecesOl^RHI 

22 A I think I did. I think at some point Mr. 

23 Casey told me, after the 19th meeting, that Mr. Ledeen 

24 had indeed proposed this Libyan sting operation and that 

25 it just wasn't going to happen,] 



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20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




Q Do you have a recollection or Icnowledge of the 
role Ledeen played in the decision that Mr. Casey made to 
instruct the Near East Division of the Operations 
Directorate to do further evaluations of Ghorbanifar? 

A The role that Mr. Ledeen played? 

Q Yes. 

A I don't know precisely. I know that in the 
January time frame, after Mr. Ledeen, I think, learned 
that Ghorbanifar had miserably failed the polygraph that 
he was in touch with Mr. Casey and th^^t \^ when Mr. > 
Casey called me one morning on secure and told me to move 
out and cancel my appointments and go meet with 
Ghorbanifar. 

Q Let me sharpen up the focus. On December 20, 
according tc^^^^^^^^Hand others in the Near East 
Division of Operations, Mr. Casey did indicate that he 
wanted the Operations folks, specifically the Near East 
Division, to engage in a further evaluation of Mr. 
Ghorbanifar. 

A I've read the chronology. 

Q In terms of how that came about, you are not 
really sure what caused Casey to do that? 

A The only thing that I know, I knew that Mr. 



IINtt^SSIFIED 



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lEUSSiED 



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1 Ledeen was to see Mr. Casey, and each time Mr. Ledeen met 

2 with me or Mr. Clarridge or anyone else he always praised 

3 Mr. Ghorbanifar, and I anticipated that he would strongly 

4 urge that Mr. Casey endorse Mr. Ghorbanifar 's efforts. 

5 So it's no surprise whatsoever. 

6 Q The date that^^^^^^^H gives for when he was 

7 first told to get in touch with Ledeen to try to set up a 

8 meeting with Ghorbanifar is December 20, 1985. According 

9 to the Director's records, that same day, December 20, 

10 1985, General Secord met with Director Casey. 

11 Do you have any knowledge of what transpired 

12 at such a meeting on December 20, 1985, between General 

13 Secord and Director Casey? 

14 A Absolutely none. I wouldn't even have 

15 recognized Mr. Secord if I'd seen him. 

16 Q When did you first meet, if you ever did, 

17 General Secord? 

18 A 29 January 1986. 

19 Q So prior to the January 29 meeting that we'll 

20 cone to, you had no acquaintance with him at all? 

21 A I did not know General Secord. 

22 Q You knew him by reputation, newspaper clips? 

23 You had some familiarity? 

24 A No, I didn't. I worked in Defense, but I 

25 didn't recall General Secord. He apparently is a very 



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1 bright officer who was headed for four stars but didn't 

2 quite malce it. 

3 Q In that regard, General Secord's involvement 

4 in the Wilson matter, that was not something that you 

5 were conscious of in December of '85? 

6 A No. I was not conscious at all of it. I read 

7 Manhunt by Peter Mass in the summer of '86. 

8 Q But December '85 that was not something that 

9 you had a conscious memory of? 

10 A No. I tried not to read about Ed Wilson. 

11 Q And the reason you tried not to read about Ed 

12 Wilson is what? It was just a disagrceabl* matter? * 

13 A I never knew of him, I never met him. I never 

14 met him or Mr. Terpil, and I thought it was a bloody 

15 disgrace, so I had no interest in that case. 

16 Q Now let me move you again — we are inching 

17 along here — December 21, 1985,^^^^H^H[apparently 

18 got ahold of Mr. Ledeen to set up a meeting which toolc 

19 place on December 22 of Ledeen .^^^^HHchorbani far, 

20 Colonel North comes by, and the like. Did you know 

21 contemporaneously? Did you know December 21, 22, 23, 

22 that these meetings were taking place? 

23 A No, sir. No one apprised me of then. 

24 Q And as to the December 22, 1985 meeting, you 
AC 

25 had •■ contemporaneous knowledge of that meeting taking 



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UNCkASSKlED 



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place at all; is that right, contemporaneous? You might 
have known later? 

A What was the date? 

Q December 22, 1985. 

A No, sir, I did not know it was occurring. 

Q There was a meeting on December 23, 1985, 
apparently attended by Director Casey about 
impressions of Ghorbanifar. Vou were not aware of a 
meeting taking place on the morning, that is a Monday, of 
December 23? 

A No, sir, know nothing about it. 




Q I understand. There was a meeting that you 
had wittJ^^^^^^^Band Colonel North on Christmas Eve, 
the 24th of December. 

A That is correct. 

Q There was nothing about that meeting — the 
reason I'm curious .^^^^^^^^His involved later on, as 
you know,! 




A No, sir. I met with Colonel North and| 
[to discuss one part of the Vice President's Task 



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1 Force for Combatting Terrorism. That was very sensitive 

2 but had nothing to do with the Iranian initiative. 

3 Q Let's go to the meeting at North's office on 

4 the 24th of December 1985. During the course of that 

5 meeting apparently there was some mention by Colonel 

6 North of the Finding or something that you all took to be 

7 the Finding. Can you give me again your best 

8 recollection of what transpired in that regard on the 

9 24th of December, 1985? 

10 A At some point, I think at the beginning of the 

11 conversation, before we began to discuss the other 

12 matter, Cdlonel North thanked^^^^^^^^^^for some of "the 

13 work that had been under way by Mr. Sporkin and other 

14 members of the Office of General Counsel on a Finding 

15 relating to the Iranian activity, and he wanted^^^^ 

16 ^^^^^^B^° convey his thanks back to Judge Sporkin. 

I thin)^^^^|H^H indicated that some work 

18 was under way at that time and Colonel North made a 

19 cryptic reference to the effect the President has signed 

20 one Finding. There's only one copy, and it's locked in 

21 By safe. ^^^^^B^| took that to mean that that was a 

22 Finding that was prepared after the 24-25 November flight 

23 into Tehran and that it would sort of be retroactive and, 

24 I guess, covered future activities. I had not seen the 

25 Finding even in draft. 



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1 But then we passed on to discusB oth«r matters 

2 and that was about the extent of the conversation. And 

3 reconstructing the chronology of that and when we were 

4 trying to do the chronology in the November 198,6 tine 

5 frame I^^^^^^^^^Hv is i ted me and he had forgotten about 

6 that, but then he recalled it and actually found a draft 

7 of the Finding in his safe, and he then, as his memory 

8 was refreshed, even in my presence said that he thought 

9 it could have been a Finding that had been sent to the 

10 White House by the Director in early December '85. 

11 Q Let me just block out the Finding process. 

12 There has been a suggestion by ^^^^^^^^fthat she 

13 thought possibly you and Mr. Clarridge had been assigned 

14 responsibility by Mr. McMahon, which we talked about the 

15 other day. You have no further recollection of that 

16 assignment other than what you testified the other day, 

17 which was that you had none; is that right? 

18 A I have absolutely no recollection that I had 

19 any responsibility to pursue that Finding, which I had 
2 sort of heard rumors was being prepared, to pursue it 

21 with Colonel North or with even people like Admiral 

22 Poindexter to ensure that it had been signed. I don't 

23 think that that was my responsibility. That's the 

24 responsibility of the General Counsel, as Z see it. 

25 Q Just to nail it down, there is a reference in 



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Inotes of December 5 for Mr. McMahon that he 
had been told by somebody — there's a suggestion even 
that it was 

A I'm sorry. Who? 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 a reference 

in the note to^^^^^^^HH^|possibly being the source of 
the information on the 5th of December that the Finding 
had been signed. Again, you have no recollection of 
knowing that early, December 5, of a Finding being signed 
by the President; ia that correct? — ""_ 

A I don't have any recollection at all. I have 
no knowledge of it being signed on the 5th. 
if I can clarify what you're saying, has testified or has 
written a memorandum which said that Mr. Clarridge and I, 
she thought, were possibly responsible to pursue with the 
White House this Finding to ensure it was signed. 

I have no knowledge of that whatsoever. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I don't think it's a 
memorandum. Chuck, is it in that memorandum? 

MR. KERR: No. As a matter of fact, the 
memorandum is under, what it says is that under the 
heading of what^^^^^HBwas talking about, then there's 
a subsequent note of December that says McMahon doesn't 
know who said these things. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I think just to make the record 



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1 clear, I don't believe that^^^^^^^^^^^^l comments were 

2 ever — with respect to the possible tasking of Mr. 

3 Allen and Mr. Clarridge to find out whether the Finding 

4 had been signed was ever memorialized in a memorandum. 

5 Those were simply oral comments. 

6 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

7 Q So we don't further confuse matters, the 

8 bottom line is that you simply have no recollection of 

9 being involved with the responsibility in December 1985? 

10 AX have a lot of responsibilities, but making 

11 certain the President signs Findings is not one of them. 

12 Q One last passing note on the Christmas Eve >- 

13 meeting with Colonel North. Do you recall being aware 

14 that Colonel North had met just prior to meeting you with 

15 certain Israel i ofj 
16 

17 A Yes, sir. 

18 Q Do you have any knowledge of discussions that 

19 Colonel North would have had with those officers? Do you 

20 know what he was talking to them about? 

21 A I think he was talking to them about hostage 

22 issues. I just briefly was in the office just as they 

23 were leaving. It was Colonel Moshe" Zur and General — 

24 you'll have to help me; I know him. He is retired now. 

25 Oh, General Yuri Simhoni and Colonel Moshe Zur. 




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Q Do you have any knowledga of discussions that 
Colonel North would have had with these two Israeli 
officers relating to Mr. Ghorbanifar that evening? 

A No, sir, none at all. 

Q with regard to Mr. Ghorbanifar, you became 
aware that a polygraph of Mr. Ghorbanifar was 1^ the 
works at what po^flt-in t lm^ -j g- P aeambar '85, January '86? 

A "^ SoBwtiB qj^yt January , Z believe. Someone 
mentioned that that was occurring but I can't recall the 
precise date. _^ _,,-^.- —^ 

Q Do fW. reeeti^ whci iiMg^^Ma it to^u? 

h - No> I don '^"^^6~ recall that the first 
specific recolIect^ljtJajdib.was ^ Janu iry^Bhen th^ 
Director called ne.^-^^ - -^= ~ ""'" 

Q Your relationship with Mr. Ledeen as of that 
period of time was what? Had you developed any kind of 



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1 social relationship with him? 

2 A No. I did not know Mr. Ledeen. I had never 

3 met his family or anything. 

4 Q Had you been to his home at that point? 

5 A No, never been to his home. 

6 a. _At any li^»? - ^^^ ;^ ■*' — -^^ ^; ■ 

7 -A -r N«v»r pri«r to^l3 January. ' - i_ 

8 Q--^- And in tery* «i: Mating with ICE>..Ghorbanifar, 

9 had you'Sftt vj^sgTIir. Ghottanif M^ ^^r to -|3 Jj^nuary ^^ 

10 1986? — ^-'^^^■■' — «EU;. — ^^fiag. -- - 

IX A Never. What date is the 13th? That'* a 

12 Monday? I think I had met him on Sunday afternoon 

13 briefly at Mr. Ledeen 's home. He had asked me to come 

14 over socially. ^^ 

15 MR. WOODCOCK: January 13, 1986 was a Monday. 

16 THE WITNESS: Okay. I met him on the 12th. 

17 BY MR. iSSS^ (Resuming) 

18 Q The Sunday? 

19 "A For about an hour, so that was the first time 

20 I'd been to Ledeen 's house. 

21 Q With regard to the memorandum prepared by the 

22 Operations Directorate on the meetings that^^^^^^^^H 

23 had with Mr. Ghorbanifar and others, did you have 

24 occasion to review that memorandum at that time, during 

25 that period of time? 



URCLJKSra 



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1 A The morning of the 13th of January, prior to 

2 meeting with Mr. Ghorbanifar? 

3 Q Yes. 

4 A I don't think so, not to my knovladg*. 

5 -_ , Q _ Have you ever reviewed the memorandum that was 

6 prepared of the December 21, 22, 23 meetings? 

7 A Which involved the polygraph? 

8 Q This is prior to the.-polyqraph . 

9 A No, I don't think so. 

10 Q Let me show you a memorandum referring to 

11 those meetings, which will be Exhibit 20. That was 

12 prepared by the Chief of the Hear East Division on th^^ 

13 meetings, which we now know to be by^^^^^Hwith 

14 Ghorbanifar on December 22, also with Ledeen. 

15 (The document referred to was 

16 marked Allan Exhibit Nuaber 20 

17 for identification.) 

18 Could you look at that memorandum. Exhibit 20, 

19 and tell me if you've ever seen it before? 

20 (Pause.) 

21 A No, Z don't believe I have ever seen that 

22 prior to this moment. 

23 Q At any point in time have you had occasion to 

24 meet witl^^^^^^^^^and discuss with him his 

25 impressions of Messrs. Ledeen, Glii^rbanifar, North which 



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are related to some extent in this memorandum? 
A Have I discussed — 

Any of these matters withi 

That are mentioned in this? 

Correct . 

Well, let me read the memorandum, I guess, 
first; then let me respond. 

(Pause.) 

I have not seen the docviment before. I had 
with^^^^^^^^H I know with^^^^^^^^H 
think I've ever discussed the specifics of this document. 
W« have discussed -- and I can't recall when these ' 
conversations occurred, but certainly in the winter and 
spring of calendar year '86. I think there had been 
comments to the effect that Mr. Ledeen jjimjitn .tlUXP ^^ 
uiiddV Bflniration of Mr. Ghorbanifar. This paragraph 
dealing with overcharging the Iranians and that $200,000 
had been used to support Ghorbanifar'* JAlri^^^^^ contacts 
inside Iran, that's very new information. I've never 
heard that from anyone. :#" ^ i 

Q ""^fg^Mf • ISTT-' ^|*-^in^. I U4^(9L to yiait 
with you. You don't recall having discussed with^ 
this specific information? 

A In this specific paragraph. No one ever 
mentioned it to me from anywhere in the Agency, and 
IS] 




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1 neither has Mr. Ledeen, I might add. That's the type of 

2 thing that would stand out in one's mind. 

3 Q I want to ask you a series of questions. 

4 Rather than do it piecemeal, let me show you a cable from 

5 the late December period of time, and the cable, my 

6 impression is, seems to relate to information that you 

7 developed at your December 4 meeting with Ledeen and 

8 clearly makes reference to what was then the anticipated 

9 lie detector test that was going to be taken of 

10 Ghorbanifar. 

11 I want you to look at it not simply to 

12 familiarize yourself with the fact that it went out and. 

13 to tell me whether or not you knew about that, but 

14 because it suggests to me that there must have been or 

15 there may well have been discussions between you and 

16 Operations personnel during this period of time on the 

17 information that you and they had gathered from Ledeen 

18 and Ghorbanifar. 

19 So if you look at it, again kind of a way of 

20 refreshing your memory on the events, and then maybe you 

21 can tell me if you recall discussions that you would have 

22 had with Operations personnel on Leqtftijfcfc^ Ghgrbanif ar^^ 

23 conte^p^ in D«^wto«r^_of iSjP-_jK« ^3H^b« Ixhtbit-ii. 

24 ^ ^ 'jiuf'i'' ^^« TThe^^t MBiL^g Trad to' vi» 



25 ~ i^rlcwPltlXi^-BihibAt Muabar 21 



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for identification.) 
A This went out on 27 December 85. 
Q Correct. I don't know if this document will 
be of any assistance. This is the decoding of identities 
which seems to relate to that cable. We'll mark that 22. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 22 
for identification.) 
You've got to forgive me on that, Mr. Allen. 
The Tower Commission said it was having trouble tracking 
what really happened in December of 1985, which has 
inspired me to try to figure it out on my own. 

A Well, there was some information passed to me 
by Ledeen,^^^^^^^^^^^^|^mH^^^^^^^H as 
you recall, and there was information that^^^^^^^^^^H 

land that inspired, I 
think, soma^^^^^^ri activity, I believe while Mr. 
Clarridge was in Europe, because I think I was talking to 





One of the reasons I was interested in 
checking this out was to see if this guy Ghorbanifar 
really had any information at all of any value, and I 



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remember Mr. Clarridge came back and we talked briefly 
about the information that had been provided by Mr. 
Ledeen, which he had obtained from Mr. Ghorbanifar, and 
Mr. Clarridge said something's going on^^^^^^^^Hbut we 
can't figure it out. 




Q Let me just kind of break it down. Mr. 
Clarridge apparently was out of pocket and the 
information we have apparently was| 

A He was] 

Q The last two weeks in December. 

A Sir, I take back my original statement. I 
know he went|^^^^^|Hbecause we talked about this 
information when he returned and ha said he had beer^H^B 

[and had talked to H|^|^^H about the 
information. 

Q Taking it a step along, it appears to me that 
at least some of the information that you had developed 
on your December 4 meeting with Ledeen had been passed to 
Operations. 

A Yes. I made that immediately available. I 



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think Mr. Clarridge was leaving that day for Europe. I 
gave ^°^^^^^^^|B ^ ^^^'^ ^ think you ought to 
send this sort of^^Hto Europe to make sure Mr. 
Clarridge sees it, and see if] 

[obtain any verification of this information. 

Q Now Clarridge comes back, from what I gather, 
in mid-December from his trip. It was apparently an 
eight to ten-day trip| 

A Yes, sir. 

Q You would have then talked to Mr. Clarridge at 
that point when he came back? 

A I believe I did, briefly. ■^• 

Q And at that time — and again w« know your 
memo was December 18 , so you would have had a writing in 
mid-December which went through in some detail your 
meeting with Ledeen — you would have shared that 
information with Mr. Clarridge; is that correct? 

A Yes, sir. ^ 

Q Can you tell from this cable whether this was 
generated through the good offices of Mr. Clarridge or 
him in conjunction with the Near East people as well? 

A I believe this must have been — I'm sure it 
was signed off on by the Near East people. It looks like 
some of this I did not obtain. When you get over here to 



page 3 , that clearly was! 



and others 



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collecting. It appears, looking at this, I would assume 
that — we don't have the originating office, but it 
certainly was coordinated carefully between the European 
Division and the Near East Division. Those things are 
highly coordinated. 

Q Looking at the references at the top — 
A It would be the Near East Divisioi^^^Hthat 
had put it together and clearly the European Division 
shared the information that Mr. Ledeen had provided or 
they nay have actually made a contribution in the 
preparation of the cable. 

Q Can you now, with that again as a way of 
focusing your recollection, tell me if you have a 
recollection of discussions that you would have had with 
Near East Division personnel, eitherl 



A I didn't discuss this infonnatl«il%S9i «ither 
then. do believe^^^Hj^^HH said that 

something might be going on, but I remember clearly Mr. 
Clarridg* saying that! 




Q Is it fair'tb say that one can at least draw 
the inference from this material in this cable that at 
least portions of the materials that you developed in 
your December 18 memo from your DecemJser 4 conversation 



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war* baing clrculatad through tha Oparatlons Dlractorata 
In Dacembar of 1985? 

A I don't know. Well, I would assume that, yes, 
some of the people had seen that memorandum in tha Near 
East as well as the European Division. Tha European 
Division got a copy immediately. 

Q All right. But in terms of meetings or oral 
communications, you simply do not have a recall of having 
such discussions with tha Near Eastern people? 

A Not in the December time frame in reference to 
the specific types of requests from headquarters to the 
field to look into certain activities. 

Q Now let me go another step. In your testimony 
to the Tower Commission you apparently told them that you 
had an understanding that Mr. Nir had come to Washington, 
D. C. in December and been briefed by Colonel North on 
December 23 on the Iran initiative. Do you recall 
telling the Tower Commission that? 

A I think he was here about that time frame. 
You know, I believe that Mr. Nir became involved right in 
the December-January time frame, and I remember Mr. Nir 
made a visit to this 




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1 

2 Q Let me read the excerpt from th« report, 

3 because what I really want to get a flavor for is the 

4 extent to which you knew that Nir was being apprised of 

5 U.S. thinking, if you will, as a result of the McFarlane 

6 visit in December. The excerpt from the report says: 

7 Charles Allen told the Board that he understood that Nir 

8 came to Washington in December and North briefed him on 

9 December 23 "on this initiative" — that is, on the 

10 program in light of McFarlane's meetings in London. And 

11 there's a reference to your transcript. 

12 In late December Allen gave the NSC staff « 

13 copy of the August 1984 CIA burn notice on Ghorbanifar to 

14 the effect that he was a fabricator. And then there's 

15 also the reference to the North meeting with General 

16 Simhoni and Colonel Zur on the next day, December 24. 

17 And with that way again of focusing your 

18 recollection, can you tell me what you knew in late 

19 December about the Israelis, North and the Iran 

20 initiative? 

21 A That throws a lot of sins together in one 

22 statement. I believe Mr. Nir was here in the December 

23 time frame and the reason December 23 sticks in my mind, 

24 at some point I believe Colonel North in November, when 

25 he was putting together a chronology — 



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1 Q November '86? 

2 A November '86, the NSC chronology, I believe he 

3 said it was the 23rd of December when he actually brought 

4 Nir into the operation. I only have his word for that. 

5 I do recall having a beer with Mr. Nir at the Key Bridge 

6 Marriott around that time. 

7 Q It must be a nice watering hole. 

8 A No, sir, that was in Great Falls. Great Falls 

9 is much nicer. So during that meeting I was paged by 

10 Colonel North. I called him and I believe he was at the 

11 White House and he said he had to talk to Nir, and I 

12 believe there was a conversation, and I don't know what 

13 the substance was, but Mr. Nir had accompanied Defense 

14 Minister Rabin to this country and Rabin was in 

15 California. 

16 And Rabin made some calls to California. The 

17 substance of the conversation, IUdB't Im^:. They spoke 

18 in Hebrew. 

19 Q That's makes it tough. 

20 A I heard it, but I certainly couldn't translate 

21 it for you. That gave rise, in my mind, in addition to 

22 what I saw in the NSC chronology in November '86, that 

23 Mr. Nir certainly at that stage had entered into this 

24 inner sanctum of the very few people that were aware of 

25 this extremely sensitive NSC initiative. We didn't 



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1 discuss it. He was not willing to convey any intonnation 

2 as to what Colonel North wanted or why he called Defense 

3 Minister Rabin. 

4 Then he called Tel Aviv. Okay? 

5 Q All right. The other juxtaposition of events 

6 in that paragraph is the statement that you passed on to 

7 the NSC the Ghorbanifar burn notice at about this period 

8 of time. First off, do you recall doing that? 

9 A Well, yes. I had had it for some time, I 

10 guess, after it became apparent that someone said that 

11 this was Ghorbanifar and there was a bum notice. 

12 Someone in the Directorate of Operations gave it to oe, 

13 and Colonel North called and said he wanted a copy of the 

14 burn notice, and he claimed he didn't have one at the 

15 time, so I sent him a copy. 

16 Q In that cortnection, when you talked to North 

17 about his request for the burn notice do you recall 

18 discussing with North him having been told of the 

19 Ghorbanifar burn notice by^^^^^^^Hback in early 

20 November? 

21 A Well, I think I knew that he had been told. I 

22 didn't know what time frame. 

23 Q Did you know by whom? 

24 A I wasn't certain. It could have been^^^H 

25 ^^^^^^B yes, but I don't know that. Let me be very 



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1 clear. I knew that Colonel North knew there waa a burn 

2 notice and that the Agency had a very poor opinion of 

3 this source. I thought Colonel North had a copy of the 

4 burn notice, but he claimed if he did he couldn't find 

5 it, and he wanted a copy. So I just had my secretary 

6 send a copy to him. 

7 Q And as to who had talked to North about 

8 Ghorbanifar's history as known by the CIA, you didn't 

9 know that in December; is that right — or you did know 

10 it but you don't know now? 

11 AX can't say specifically who first discussed 

12 the Ghorbanifar problem with Colonel North. ^^^^^^^^^H 

13 as I said, when we had lunch, whenever it was in 

14 December, in January, we spent a good deal of time 

15 talking about Ghorbanifar and^^^^^^^^^lexpressed great 

16 concern about the use of this man. 

17 Q Now your discussion with^^^^^^^^H at lunch, 

18 I want to put up a divide, would that have been before 

19 the January 17 Finding or after the January 17 Finding? 
2 A I think it was before. As I recall, it was 

21 before. 

22 Q And^^^^|HH| during the course of this 

23 lunch is expressing his concern, dismay, something of 

24 that sort about Ghorbanifar; is that correct? 

25 A That's correct. 



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1 Q Did you have occasion in this latter December 

2 period to discuss with North what the role of the 

3 Israelis was, what Nir was doing, what the General and 

4 the Colonel were doing, what the Israeli agents were 

5 about? 

6 A At some point I did, but I can't say it was in 

7 December '85 time frame. It could have been in January. 

8 It was clear that Amiram Nir was entering the picture in 

9 some capacity to represent the Israelis because Colonel 

10 North at some point after the dismal failure in Geneva 

11 had indicated that he attributed it not just to the 

12 Iranians but to Mr. Schwimmer and Mr. Nimrodi, that he 

13 felt they had not been totally honest. 

14 Q Honest about what? 

15 A Well, about what was being shipped. But I 

16 have never learned all the details of that. But it was 

17 clear that the Iranians thought they were getting a 

18 different model and they got an older model. Colonel 

19 North wanted a more reliable intermediary and said he had 

20 arranged for this to occur, and I don't know with whom. 

21 Clearly he had to go to high echelons of the Israeli 

22 government to have performed such a feat, to get Amiram 

23 Nir involved. 

24 Q Hang on, Mr. Allen. Colonel North said he 

25 wanted a more reliable intermediary* 



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1 A On the Israeli side. 

2 Q Which intermediary are we talking about? 

3 A On the Israeli side. 

4 Q He wanted someone more reliable than Schwimmer 

5 or more reliable than Nimrodi or what? 

6 A Both. I don't think he had confidence. I do 

7 not believe he retained confidence that Mr. Schwimmer and 

8 Mr. Nimrodi would perform well. Clearly Mr. Ledeen had 

9 been put to the side by Admiral Poindexter, as I 

10 described earlier, so Colonel North had first met Amiran 

11 Nir in August of 1985 when he arrived here as the special 

12 assistant to the Prime Minister on counterterrorism. - 

13 That's when I first met Mr. Nir. And he and Colonel 

14 North immediately had excellent rapport. 

15 Q So it was your impression — am I correct that 

16 it was your impression that Colonel North had asked the 

17 Israelis to come up with somebody other than Schwimmer 

18 and Nimrodi and had expressed a preference for Nir; is 

19 that what happened as you understood it? 

20 A It would be my judgment that that's what 

2 1 occurred . 

22 Q And that's a judgment not based on what 

23 Colonel North or anybody else had told you but inferences 

24 you drew from the circumstances? 

25 A And the fact that Colonel North, at least in 



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1 th« January time frame, I believe, indicated that Mr. Nir 

2 was becoming involved as part of this very small number 

3 of people in the United States and Israel that knew about 

4 this initiative. 

5 Q Now by virtue of the fact that you had sent 

6 the Ghorbanifar burn notice to Colonel North I assume 

7 that means that you'^tfraad it? ^^^ ^' — 

8 A Z read' it very carefully, si;. 

9 Q An^you weuld^la dS piyw^tainlliarizadi-yoursalf , 

10 at least in a general waijp jiriSh the Ghorbanifar 201 by 

11 that point, correct? 

12 A • I don't think I had looked at his 201. It«-s 

13 not that it was denied to me. I just didn't bother. 

14 Q Tell me what had happ«9ad. You simply asked 

15 for an excerpt, the burn notice, from the 201 rather than 

16 the entire 201? 

17 A I guess I just asked^^^^^^^^^to get me 

18 copy, and I think he sent a copy over. 

19 Q Given that and what you must have known about 

20 the Operations Directorate's attitude towards 

21 Ghorbanifar, what was your own sense or impression of 

22 Ghorbanifar as of late December 1985? 

23 A What was my impression? 

24 Q Yes. 

25 A I had not met the man. I had conflicting 



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1 testimony from Mr. Ledeen and the Operations Directorate. 

2 I had not formed any strong opinion one way or the other. 

3 I simply sent the burn notice down to Colonel North for 

4 his view. 

5 Q Bear with me. You heard Ledeen had met with 

6 Ghorbanifar and you heard what he thought of Ghorbanifar, 

7 and he thought Ghorbanifar was good, right? 

8 A And Colonel North had met Ghorbanifar. 

9 Q What did Colonel North tell you by way of 

10 impression of Ghorbanifar as of December '85? 

11 A I think he had doubts as to the man's total 

12 reliability, but it was my impression, if that's the . 

13 right phrase, that Colonel North felt that with enough 

14 effort that Ghorbanifar could be managed to some degree, 

15 and I think that of course the fact that an individual 

16 who in many quarters is highly esteemed, David Kimche, 

17 had recommended Mr. Ghorbanifar. 

18 Q How did you know that? 

19 A Mr. Kimche is well known. 

20 Q I know Kimche is well known. How did you know 

21 Kimche 's view of Ghorbanifar? 

22 A Because of what Mr. Ledeen had told me and 

23 what Mr. McMahon had affirmed, and also Mr. Casey, as you 

24 recall, on 11 October had talked about Kimche and 

25 Schwimmer, as I recall it. 



iMSIflED 



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\mmxm 



300 



1 Q But you'd never heard from Kimcha's own mouth 

2 what his view of Ghorbanifar was? 

3 A No, sir. I had never met Mr. Kimche. 

4 Q So you are hearing this from other folks who 

5 were relaying what Kimche had said, correct? 

6 A That is correct. 

7 Q And then you also have the paper record, that 

8 Ghorbanifar has earned a burn notice. That's a rather 

9 unusual document, is it not? 

10 A Well, we have burn notices on fabricators from 

11 time to time. There are a lot of fabricators out there, 

12 sir. 

13 Q Even that being the case, not all fabricators 

14 have the good or bad fortune to warrant a fabricator 

15 notice, though, right? 

16 A That's correct. If the person becomes a 

17 nuisance and begins to appear in a lot of embassies or 

18 trying to make contacts with a lot of services, yeah, 

19 it's helpful sometimes to put out a burn notice. 

20 Q What is your understanding of why that kind of 

21 thing happens? It's not simply because somebody had lied 

22 to the Agency, I take it. 

23 A Well, it's my sense that this occurs when we 

24 have sources who have come in. We would only put out 

25 information on a source who has come to us and that we 




536 



UNeUSSIflED 



301 



1 have, evaluated, maybe utilized, and then found that the 

2 man was lying and totally deceptive, or not totally 

3 deceptive but deceptive on some fairly major elements of 

4 what he was telling us. 

5 Q When the Agency puts out such a notice on a 

6 source, is it more often than not because the source 

7 tried to hustle the Agency for money or some advantage? 

8 A I can't generalize, but there are a variety of 

9 reasons why people fabricate information. When they 

10 become a nuisance, it's useful to make that information 

11 available to consular officers or to embassies and posts 

12 around the world so when this chap again knocks on yoOr 

13 door you have his name there in some file and you 

14 immediately know to turn him off rather than to start 

15 writing cables and saying this guy has sensational 

16 information. 

17 Q It's the kind of once-burned, twice-shy rule 

18 at work here? 

19 A That's right. It doesn't mean that it's an 

20 infallible system by any means. 

21 Q Thank you. I promise you we will go into 1986 

22 when we return from lunch. 

23 (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m. the taking of the 

24 instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at 1:15 p.m., 

25 the same day. ) 



IINetASSiFIED 



537 



wei^^rB 



302 



1 AFTERNOON SESSION 

2 (1:19 p.m.) 

3 Whereupon, 

4 CHARLES E. ALLEN, 

5 the witness herein, having been previously duly sworn by 

6 the Notary Public, was further examined and testified as 

7 follows: 

8 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE - 

9 Resumed 

10 BY MR. KERR: 

11 Q Mr. Allen, we had one question basically based 

12 on reactions. You had told us you were not aware of the 

13 cargo of the proprietary flight into Tehran but that you 

14 suspected it was something other than oil-drilling 

15 equipment. You were aware, if I am remembering 

16 correctly, that Mr. McMahon, by his expression, went 

17 through the overhead and was upset on the 2 5th of 

18 November; correct? 

19 A That's what he said. 

20 Q And then you had become aware on the 4th of 

21 December from your conversation with Mr. Ledeen that the 

22 cargo of the flight was in fact HAWK missiles; is that 

23 right? 

24 A Yes, sir. 

25 Q When you had that brought to your attention on 



uNcnssm 



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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



th« 4th of December, can you describe your reaction to 
it? Was it information you felt ought to be placed 
immediately in the hands of Mr. McMahon, for example, who 
apparently was concerned about those sorts of things? 

A I didn't think about it at the time. As you 
recall, I testified that on the 26th of November at 0200 
hours! 




ind anyone^^^^^^^^^Bwould surmise that that's 
not oil-drilling equipment. That had to be weapons 
systems. 

So it was no secret among the people at the 
Agency and recipients^H|^^^^^^^^^^|and those 
that followed that the aircraft on the 24th-25th must 
have carried arms. 

Q It's certainly no secret to you as to what Mr. 
McMahon would have known and when he would have known it. 
To what extent did you convey to him what you knew about 
the cargo of that flight? 

A I don't recall. I don't recall. 

Q You do not then have a recollection of 
perceiving this information to be particularly 
troublesome, a source of significant concern that you 
would want to raise with higher levels in the Agency, 



wrnmm 



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mmmm 



304 



1 nothing of that kind in December after you learned of the 

2 information Mr. Ledeen had on the cargoes; is that right? 

3 A I don't recall thinking about it as 

4 significantly new information because based on the 

5 intelligence we were receiving that was available to Mr. 

6 McMahon and Mr. Casey, the White House, either directly 

7 or indirectly, was involved in ensuring that arms and 

8 weapons were being shipped into Iran in small quantities, 

9 but nevertheless they were going there with the explicit 

10 purpose of attempting to secure release of American 

11 hostages in Lebanon. 

12 Q How conscious were you in the period November 

13 24 through the end of December of McMahon 's apparently 

14 fairly strong concern that the Agency needed a Finding to 

15 provide the legal foundation for doing what it had done? 

16 A 24 to 30 December? 

17 Q Starting November 24, running to the end of 

18 the year, during that time. 

19 A I was quite aware that he felt very strongly. 

20 Mr. Clarridge had expressed that to me on the 26th of 

21 November, that Mr. McMahon had referred the matter to the 

22 Office of General Counsel and that a Finding might be 
2 3 necessary. Mr. McMahon reiterated that to me in no 

24 uncertain terms on the 16th of December, and he indicated 

2 5 that to proceed a Finding was a fundamental necessity for 



uNCUtsstre 



540 



wmmm 



305 



1 th« Agency. 

2 So from my perspective the Deputy Director of 

3 Central Intelligence was up front on the issue of a 

4 Presidential Finding. 

5 Q In terms of a Presidential Finding, did you 

6 have an understanding or knowledge of who in the Agency 

7 was responsible for obtaining a Finding? 

8 A It was my understanding that the matter had 

9 been referred to the General Counsel. The General 

10 Counsel was involved in the process. 

11 Q So it was your impression that it was under 

12 the aegis of OGC; is that right? 

13 A That's correct. 

14 Q The Finding process in terms of the paper kind 

15 of breaks down into the proposed Finding of November 26. 

16 There is the reference in McMahon's notes of him thinking 

17 the Finding was signed on December 5. We talked about 

18 the Christmas Eve 1985 conversation which lee 

19 to think that a Finding had been signed. 

20 At no point, though, in December 1985 did 

21 anyone actually tell you that a Finding had been signed 

22 by the President; is that right? 

23 A I don't think so, other than the comment made 

24 by Colonel North in his office on the 24th of December. 

25 Q So you actually didn't see a Finding, signed 



\mmm 



541 



uHi^Msn 



306 



1 or unsigned? 

2 A I did not see a Finding either in a draft or a 

3 signed Finding. 

4 Q Moving into January, again from the documents 

5 there appears to have been a series of drafts and 

6 ruminations by lawyers in the period January 1 through 

7 the time the Finding actually gets signed on January 17, 

8 Did you have any role at all in that evolutionary process 

9 leading up to the January 17 Finding? 

10 A No, sir. I knew that Judge Sporkin had met 

11 with Colonel North on the development of the Finding. I 

12 remember Judge Sporkin calling me after talking with * 

13 Colonel North at one point around the 3rd of January, 

14 1986, where Judge Sporkin stated that he had discussed 

15 the Finding with Colonel North. He did not say he had 

16 discussed it with anyone else at the White House. He was 

17 talking on a non-secure telephone, and he said the 

18 Finding troubled him. It was a difficult Finding to 

19 prepare. 

20 Q It troubled Sporkin? 

21 A Yes, sir. 

22 Q I take it because of the phone situation he 

23 was not able to elaborate on that? 

24 A No, sir, he was not able to elaborate. 

25 Q Did you have an occasion in that time period 



UNtnSStFIED 



542 



wem 



307 



1 when you talked in greater detail with now-Judge Sporkin 

2 about this matter? 

3 A I don't recall in the January time frame 

4 talking about it in any detail at all. I probably saw 

5 the Judge during that time frame, but I don't recall 

6 sitting down and discussing it with him. 

7 Q Let me shift gears again. Let's go to the 

8 Ghorbanifar polygraph session. You became aware that 

9 Ghorbanifar was going to come back to the United States 

10 in January when? 

11 A I don't recall, but probably Mr. Ledeen told 

12 me he was coming back, but I don't recall the date. When 

13 Mr. Ledeen asked me to meet him on the 12th of January 

14 clearly I knew Mr. Ghorbanifar was there. 

15 Q I understand. Let me come at it another way. 

16 Do you recall conversations with Ledeen in which he said, 

17 well, we thought he was coming out on the 6th but it got 

18 postponed? 

19 A No, sir. 

20 Q Was Ledeen keeping you apprised during the 

21 period between December 4, when you met with Ledeen, and 

22 January 12 on what he knew Ghorbanifar was up to? 

23 A No, sir. I didn't know anything in detail 

24 about that. 

25 Q And in terms of the folks from the Operations 



UNimsm 



543 



oNiMssm 



308 



1 Directorate, as I understood your testimony before lunch 

2 you didn't see the reports on their meeting with 

3 Ghorbanifar? 

4 A No, sir, I did not see them. 

5 Q And am I also correct that you did not discuss 
then with Hjj^^^^^^^^^^^^H^Hwhat come 

7 their meeting with Ghorbanifar? 

8 A On the 20th, on the 21st of December, no, not 

9 that I recall. I can't recall. 

10 Q Had Director Casey given you any direction or 

11 heads-up or anything that you might end up tending to Mr. 

12 Ghorbanifar in December of 1985? 

13 A Absolutely not. I would have been surprised 

14 had he asked me to do so, given my other heavy 

15 responsibilities. 

16 Q Had you had a conversation with Casey or 

17 McMahon — let me strike that. Had you had any 

18 conversation with Mr. Casey on what his intentions or 

19 hopes with regard to Mr. Ghorbanifar were in December of 

20 1985? 

21 A I don't recall. I don't think so. I do not 

22 think so. I do not recall a conversation. 

23 Q Ghorbanifar was in town on the 11th of 

24 January. He met with^^^^Hfor lunch and then they went 

25 and had the polygraph test taken. You knew he was in 



mmm 



544 



mmmm 



309 



1 town on the 11th, l assume. Is that right? 

2 A Yes, I think I knew that he was here on that 

3 weekend. 

4 Q In terms of the meeting on the 12th, do you 

5 recall talking to Ledeen the preceding evening, the 

6 evening of the 11th? 

7 A No, sir. 

8 Q Do you recall knowing on that weekend, the 

9 weekend of the 11th and 12th, that Mr. Ghorbanifar was 

10 complaining about bruises and the like as a result? 

11 A He told me that on the 12th, showed a bruise 

12 on his arm. 

13 Q But you would not have met with him on the 

14 11th? 

15 A No, sir. I never met him on the 11th. That's 

16 a Saturday, and I clean house on Saturdays. 

17 Q When you met with Mr. Ghorbanifar and Mr. 

18 Ledeen on the 12th, it was at Mr. Ledeen 's home? 

19 A Yes. 

20 Q Can you give me your best recollection of what 

21 transpired at that meeting on the 12th? 

22 A It was mostly just a social meeting. I was 

23 only there for a brief period, an hour, hour and a half. 

24 The Redskins were playing and Mr. Ghorbanifar was 

25 complaining about that in fact he had taken a polygraph 



mmm 



545 



MASSmED 



310 



1 and he was having after-effects, in his view, from the 

2 polygraph. 

3 Q Did he request or did you offer to get a 

4 doctor to assist him on the 12th? 

5 A Absolutely not. 

6 Q And you did not make arrangements for a CIA 

7 doctor to treat Mr. Ghorbanifar on the 12th? 

8 A No, sir. 

9 Q From what you could tell, did he appear to be 

10 badly injured or ill on the 12th? 

11 A No. Mr. Ledeen was planning to arrange a 

12 medical doctor to examine him, as I recall. 

13 Q What was Mr. Ghorbanifar' s attitude vis-a-vis 

14 the test? 

15 A He was rather negative toward it, but I didn't 

16 )cnow the results of the test at that time. 

17 Q Has he suggesting to you that he had been 

18 mistreated, mishandled? Was that part of his chatter on 

19 the 12th? 

20 A The general comments he made were the it was a 

21 rather painful experience for him and it went on for five 

22 hours or something along those lines. And it was very 

23 uncomfortable for him. 

24 Q At that meeting he was or was not aware of the 

25 results of the test? 



msn 



546 



MMmw 



311 



1 A To the best of my knowledge, I don't think 

2 anyone talked about the results of the test. I wasn't 

3 aware of it and had no knowledge of it. 

4 Q Had Mr. Casey as of that time asked you to be 

5 in touch with Mr. Ghorbanifar? 

6 A No, I don't think so. I think Mr. Ledeen 

7 suggested I stop by and meet him socially that afternoon. 

8 Q So this meeting really was at Ledeen's 

9 initiative? 

10 A Um-hum. 

11 Q I assume because he had told you about 

12 Ghorbanifar and it was a chance for you to see him live. 

13 A Um-hum. 

14 Q Did you tell North or anyone else that you 

15 were going to have this meeting with Ghorbanifar on the 

16 12th? 

17 A I don't recall. Certainly it wasn't a secret. 

18 Q You did not make any record of this meeting 

19 onthe 12th? 

20 A No matters of substance were discussed that I 

21 recall. 

22 Q Now the following day, on the 13th of January, 

23 the folks in the Operations Directorate met and made 

24 known their views on Mr. Ghorbanifar. Were you aware 

25 that they were meeting to discuss Mr. Ghorbanifar? 



VNCDCTED 



547 



UNCIAS^IED 



312 



1 A No, sir. 

2 Q Were you aware on the 13th of what they had 

3 passed on as their position and perspective to Director 

4 Casey? 

5 . A Mr. Casey stated that there had been a meeting 

6 with DO officers with him, or with — I believe with him 

7 — and that the results of this polygraph were very 

8 negative. Mr. Casey stated on the secure telephone that 

9 he would like me to go out and meet with Mr. Ghorbanifar 

10 to determine and make a record of all the information 

11 that he possessed on terrorism, especially that relating 

12 to Iranian terrorism — just take another look at thia- 

13 individual, which I proceeded to do. 

14 Q Were you aware at that time that Ghorbanifar 

15 had been asked a series of rather specific questions on 

16 his Icnowledge of terrorism in the polygraph test? 

17 A I did not see the polygraph questions in 

18 advance. Mr. Casey may have shown them to m^TT I think 

19 I also went down to see him. I can't say specifically. 

20 I think I talked on the telephone. I saw the questions 

21 at some point, but I'm not certain it was that day. 

22 Q Do you think you saw them before you actually 

23 met with Ghorbanifar? 

24 A I don't know. It's been so long ago. 

25 Q When Casey gave you this assignment was 



KRSSIflfD 



548 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



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313 



anybody else present either on the phone, to your 
knowledge, or in his office? 

A Well, sir, if they were on the secure phone 
listening in, that was not appropriate. 

Q All right. It's not a party line operation. 

A No, sir. 

Q In the meeting with Mr. Casey was anyone else 

present for that? 

A No, sir. 
- ' fa ■ -^ ' ' j^*~ j r . "' 

Q ^ Wh«h yoit-iwt wfth 8f . Ca»ax;^m"1Bi€t5l3th did he 

^^■^'-^ 

tell you during: th»-cocrtTS«5i3f ''BBlt; B««tln^»r any-.^aK«r 
me«tln<^^U. had with hisnoA^^^^^^^ Uie mttiULlS^ th«.. 
Iraniin initiatiifEt—^ _ ^.=J^ . f^^ i* „ - "-":* ^^ _ 

- A No, sir. " I 'dontt^.ttiink hi, to the baat.of jgg 
recollection, tallceif^fn any aftt»i\^^pu^ith^ygwlao 









Ghorh^g^r Wt tStr^^fiii Wd vImJH any^|Cussion&~at 
all with th« Op«rati<^ns p«&pl^mo hid (Cptductad-^iBfr 
polygraph tjtit ? 

A ^No. 

Q "^^=^1^Srytm^are not t^tJtin wl^^r cr^not jjgu-s;^ 
reviewed tha ta*t (^i<|j|^^^r any^sf -thajMsera 
weeg generated 'by th*-t»lfti i^Uiat_rigbtfe;-^ ^ 

A In advaac<gj, f don* t reca^ll .1 read th» 

mi 



wmmi 



549 



vmmm 



314 



1 questions at som|^»|}oint and I gues« wh«r« th« OB«rator 

2 felt deception Sad occurred. ^ — 

3 Q Let me show~you a Isemorandu* for the record on 

4 the Ghorlsanifar polygrapii exam v^ich will be Exhibit 23. 

5 --^ ^^ (TRe document referred to was 

6 marked Allen Exhibit Kumber 23 

7 for identification.) 

8 And a memorandum by the polygraph operator on 

9 the examination, which will be Exhibit 24. 

10 (The document referred to was 

11 marked Allen Exhibit Number 24 

12 for identification.) - 

13 I'd like you to look at both of those and ask 

14 you to please tell me whether or not they are documents 

15 you -would have seen on or about, in the vicinity of the 

16 date. 

17 MS. MC GINN: May I interrupt? I think I am 

18 missing Exhibit 22. 

19 MR. KERR: Exhibit 22 is a cable. 
2 (Pause.) 

21 THE WITNESS: I have seen — let me let you 

22 ask the questions. 

2 3 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

24 Q As to Exhibit 23, first have you ever seen 

25 that memorandum? 



KH^SW 



550 



iweraFiED 



315 



1 A I've seen, I think, the attachment. 

2 Q The attachment? 

3 A Um-hum. 

4 Q The MFR itself? 

5 A I don't recall the cover MFR. 

6 Q And as to Exhibit 24, do you recall having 

7 seen that memorandum at any time? 

8 A I don't think I've seen — I've seen the 

9 questions that were asked, but I don't think I've seen it 

10 in this form. Maybe I'm thinking of the attachment. And 

11 I can't recall the date that I saw it. It certainly — I 

12 did not see them before I went to see Mr. Ghorbanifar en 

13 the 13th. 

14 Q The MFR does say that neither Ghorbanifar nor 

15 Ledeen had been advised about the results of the test. 

16 At the time that you met with Ghorbanifar on the 13th, 

17 was he knowledgeable about the test? 9m he know how he'd 

18 done on the test? 

19 A I don't recall. 

20 Q Do you recall telling him how the test had 

21 gone? 

22 A No, sir, I don't think I made any comment on 

23 it. 

24 Q Do you recall there ever coming a time when 

25 you discussed either with Mr. Ghorbanifar or Mr. Ledeen 



ONcotssro 



551 



UNCUSSIID 



316 



1 how Mr. Ghorbanifar had done on th« t«at on January 11? 

2 A I don't recall that. It's my understanding 

3 that Mr. Ledeen had knowledge he had failed the polygraph 

4 test. 

5 Q That likewise is mine. I'm wondering if you 

6 have any idea what the source of that knowledge. 

7 A I don't want to speculate. He clearly had 

8 knowledge that Mr. Ghorbanifar had failed, that he had 

9 failed 14 out of 15 questions or sosttthlng of that 

10 nature. 

11 Q Is it your recollection that he had that 

12 knowledge on the 13th when you went over to Ledeen 's ' 

13 house or was it some other time that he had that 

14 knowledge? 

15 A I don't know when he obtained that knowledge. 

16 I don't recall. 

17 Q To put it more precisely, you don't recall 

18 when you acquired that knowledge of what Ledeen knew? 

19 A I don't recall when. Certainly^ by th« tlma. I 

20 8a%i>3lr. Ghorbanipar — and it was on the 26h of January - 

21 - Mr. Ledeen and our friend -«r. Ghorbanifar knew too — 

22 put "our friend" in quotation marks. 

23 Q Business acquaintance or some such thing? 

24 A No, sir. 

25 Q Not even that? 



m&mm 



552 




317 

1 A I want to go on record and say absolutely no 

2 business acquaintance whatsoever. 

3 Q Let 3ne come back to what you know about what 

4 Casey knew about the Iranian initiative. I want to show 

5 you a memorandum that's dated January 13, 1986, that 

6 seems to have been prepared for or perhaps even by 

7 Director Casey. I'd like you to look at the memo, tell 

8 me it you've ever seen itJuttozm, andr^g. y<apfaVil wa'll 



9 explore ' ti jj i|i Tr jiMii li i 'jjuji't iiu jH^TlliV Jjyyul ^^Wiii ii at. 

10 it for the^«ubstl|Ber-aosi th«n"«»gnr3oing to see what 'you 

11 knew about the matters that are discussed in this memo of 

12 January 13, 1986. That will be Exhibit 25. 

13 (The document referred to was 

14 __ „ _ atai,^ - marked Allen Exhibit Number 25 

15 for identification.) 

16 (Pause.) 

17 A I have not seen the memo previously. 

18 Q Can you tell from looking at the memorandum 

19 who the author of the memo was? 

20 A Well, I assume it was written by the DCI since 

21 it has his initials or at least the letters of DCI in the 

22 upper righthand corner. 

2 3 Q That's a question I have. I have no idea what 

24 the format would be for this kind of a memo. Would that 

25 in the custom and business of the Director's office 



UlflMIFIED 



553 



UNKASSfflfD 



3X8 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



indicate this was probably his memo? 

A I can't make that judgment. All I see is DCI, 
13 December 1986 and I must assume that that is his memo. 

Q Were you familiar with the events and 
circumstances that are set forth in that document as of 
January 13? 

A No, sir, I was not aware as of January 13 on 




uNciisra 



554 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




first paragraphs, at 
that stage I had no knowledge. 

Q Let's shift ^ars again. I'd like you to take 
a look at your January 29, 1986 memorandum describing 
your meeting with Ghorbanifar on January 13, which will 
be Exhibit 26. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number -2 6 
for identification.) 
Could you look at that document and tell me if 
that is in fact your memorandum of the meeting with Mr. 
Ghorbanifar? 

A Yes. 

Q With regard to the meeting that you had on the 
13th of January, did you record that meeting in any 
fashion other than by making notes? Did you record it 
electronically? 

A Mr. Ledeen provided a tape recorder, but I 
don't know. No, I don't think it ever worked. I don't 
ever recall getting a tape. 

Q You did make handwritten notes, I take it, as 



ONCtASSm 



555 



lINMSIflED 



320 



1 you went through the course of the afternoon with Mr. 

2 Ghorbanifar? 

3 A Yes. 

4 Q Now the memorandum, I would assume, is a good 

5 . and relatively accurate, as best as you could do it, 

6 summary of the conversation that you had with Mr. 

7 Ghorbanifar. 

8 A It is a detailed record of what I thought was 

9 principally important, because the Director asked me to 

10 obtain information on terrorist networks which Mr. 

11 Ghorbanifar claimed to possess. 

12 Q The memo indicates, and I would asstune it was 

13 the case, that Ghorbanifar ranged a bit further than 

14 terrorist networks in the course of his five-hour 

15 conversation with you and touched on things other than 

16 simply terrorist networks. Am I correct? Among other 

17 things, he griped about the Agency a little bit in the 

18 beginning. 

19 A Yes, and I recorded that. I thought I should. 

20 He also talked about, I believe, the cost of the missiles 

21 that were sent in the November shipment, that in fact 

22 they were the wrong missiles and that the price was four 

23 times an appropriate price, somewhere in here. 

24 Q It's in there. It's in the first page or so. 

25 With regard to the pricing and the missile aspect of 



UNcmFe 



556 



ilNKA$SIFIED 



321 



1 things, did he elaborate on that point with you at all? 

2 Did he tell you what he thought had become of the money, 

3 whether there had been a misappropriation, if you will, 

4 or diversion of funds on this particular transaction? 

5 A No. That is about all he said. It struck me 

6 as of interest because it reinforced what had actually 

7 occurred in the November 24-25 dispute in Geneva, 

8 something I didn't quite understand, and I recorded it 

9 because that convocation ended on such a very bad note. 

10 He said the Prime Minister and others believed they were 

11 cheated. I thought that was a significant thing to 

12 record. -"^'■~"' ^^S^" _« 

13 Q When you're making reference to a November 24- 

14 25 convocation, what are you referring to? 

15 A I'm talking about the meeting between 

16 individuals including^^^^^^^^f^Band Ghorbanifar and 

17 unknown other individuals who were in Geneva, as I've 

18 testified earlier on the 24th-25th. 

19 Q You are talking about! 
^^^^^^^^^^^^H is 

21 A Well, yes, ^^^^H|colonel North saying there 

22 was an important meeting occurring in Geneva. 

23 Q On that November trip — and I promise not to 

24 go back into '85 too many more times — do you know 

25 whether or not Colonel North had any kind of recording 



wmmm 



557 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



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device he toolc with him on that trip? 

A As you recall, on the 24-25 meeting in Geneva 
Colonel North was in Washington. 

Q I had lost that. You are right. In terms of 
what happened at that meeting, let me come at it another 
way so I understand what you are telling me, Mr. Allen. 
Your knowledge of what occurred at that meeting was based 
on what resources 




[Colonel North's ' 
reaction at 0200 hours on the 26th of November where he 
said that the talks had broken down. He was bitterly . 
disappointed. On the 22nd, when he had called and asked 
f or^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H he was sanguine. 

Q Let's come back to the 13th. During the 
course of your conversations that you had with Mr. 
Ghorbanifar on the 13th of January thera is an itan that 
Mr. Ghorbanifar raised with you that is not in your 
notes. You recollect, do you not, that Mr. Ghorbanifar 
made apparently explicit reference to engaging in 
transactions which would generate money for the 
assistance of the Nicaraguan centres? 

A I recall after I went through my notes, which 
were retained, from that meeting in November or December 
'86 that there was a reference there to that fact. I at 



UNWSIflfD 



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1 th« tima did not consider it important or even relevant 

2 to my particular mission as given to me by the Director, 

3 so it was simply a comment I did not find incredible or 

4 of interest since I did not record it in this memorandum 

5 of 29 January. 

6 I did not find it relevant; ergo, I did not 

7 put it in the memorandum. It seemed far-fetched and 

8 nonessential. 

9 Q Let me show you a letter of 24 February 1987 

10 to Mr. Liman from Mr. Rizzo which has attached to it a 

11 series of tabs, and with regard to the meeting on the 

12 13th the tab or attachment that is referenced as 

13 Attachment A, I'd like to have the letter marked Exhibit 

14 27. 

15 (The document referred to was 

16 marked Allen Exhibit Number 27 

17 for identification.) 

18 What I'd like you to do is take a moment to 

19 refresh your recollection of what your notes contained 

20 both on this and perhaps the other meetings as well, and 

21 then I want to come back and see, first, if they are your 

22 notes and then if you have any further recall of the 

23 events that are referenced. 

24 (Pause.) 

2 5 A Okay. May I comment on these individually, if 



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324 



1 that Is appropriate? 

2 Q Sur*. 

3 A As you know, this first on*, Attachasnt A, as 

4 I racall, ar* notes from ths 13 January 1986 Basting with 

5 Ghorbanifar, and w* went through what h« knsv about 

6 Iranian terrorism, I bslisvs Syrian terrorism, and then 

7 he claimed ^^^^^^H^^connections to Libya. He said he 

8 thought his Syrian relationships were the best and he 

9 said, you know — and Z don't know exactly what he said - 

10 - we can thwart some of these terrorist activities. We 

11 could fund the contras, I assume. But I don't know vhat 

12 he said. It was all in three words. '' 

13 And we're off on many more of his rather 

14 grandiose plans. 

15 Q Let me stop you. In terms of what he was 

16 saying about funding the contras or how to fund or 

17 whether to fund or what to fund, you can't elaborate any 

18 more? 

19 A I'm sure he didn't say anything more than 

20 what's probably recorded here, probably in one phrase. 

21 Q Let me keep you on January 13 for the moment. 

22 Frankly that strikes me as a strange phrase. You didn't 

23 see that as something you wanted to explore further with 

24 him? 

25 A Absolutely not. 



UNtbtSSIFIED 



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UNGlASmiED 



325 



1 Q Why not? 

2 A Because I am interested in credible plots by 

3 terrorist groups or states that sponsor terrorism, and 

4 that didn't even begin to touch my consciousness as an 

5 issue worthy of exploration. 

6 Q Well, let me explore it. He was essentially 

7 trying to interest the Central Intelligence Agency in 

8 joint venturing with him on some project? 

9 A And I reported that early on. He's a turnkey 

10 man and he gave a number of illustrations where he could 

11 be of great help to the United States for appropriate 

12 compensation. *' 

13 Q And he was looking for a benefit to be gained 

14 for himself from the joint venture operations he was 

15 proposing, correct? 

16 A That's right, and I tried to convey that 

17 thought in paragraph 2 . 

18 Q I think you do. It comes clear from that and 

19 that's why I want to pursue a bit more. You had the 

20 feeling on the 13th, didn't you, that to some extent you 

21 were listening to a sale pitch by a fellow who wanted to 

22 become a contractor to the CIA? 

23 A Absolutely. I think that comes clear in the 

24 memo. The man has a lot of grandiose ideas. 

25 Q I understand that. In terms of the pitch that 




561 




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6 
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9 
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21 
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23 
24 
25 



326 

he was making, were you left with the impression that he 
thought he would be more attractive to the Central 
Intelligence Agency if he offered to share part of the 
take in such a way that it benefitted the contras in 
Nicaragua? 

A It didn't occur to me at the time that it was 
any more significant than anything else he was saying as 
part of his overall sales pitch which, of course, went on 
for five hours. He spoke about his excellent contacts. 

Q As of that time, Mr. Allenf you werft or v^e* 
not ftWari^iir contributions for the contra cause by folks 

in ^H^^^^^^^H^Hj^B 

A fhatc;vafc;gafeary 1986? I had n^lBcplicit ~' 
knowledge of that. I tgJrUc there had beenirumor^tp that 
effect^. 

Q As ^HHiB ^JtaittBlfe i^Bry 1986 , wei^you^^««yi 
Of ■ iiiiitiiyn|ftiii"'" 

Khashoggi? 

A At that stage I don't think I knew that 
Ghorbanifar had a relationship with Khashoggi. 

Q Let me come at something that's not there at 
all, and I'm not sure whether it happened. Were you 
aware at this time of a relationship between Ghorbanifar 
and Roy Furmark? 

A 1 don't think I had heard of Roy Furmark at 




UNtnSStFlEO 



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1 that stags. 

2 Q Or John Shaheen, for that matter? 

3 A And I don't believe the Director had talked 

4 about John Shaheen. He talked about John Shaheen, I 

5 think, about the time the McFarlane trip was occurring, 

6 or thereafter. 

7 Q The McFarlane trip in May of '86? 

8 A Yeah, and I don't know. 

9 Q Nothing struck you about the reference to the 

10 contras that suggested that there was a thought on 

11 Ghorbanifar's part that this would be plsa«ing to your 

12 ears or the ears of Oliver North or anyone else? 

13 A Well, if I did, I would have recorded it and 

14 put it in the memorandum, because I gave a copy of this 

15 memorandum to Colonel North and it would have been in the 

16 memorandum. 

17 Q Hell, that raises the natural next question. 

18 Did you discuss this point with Colonel North even if it 

19 wasn't in the memo? 

20 A No, sir. I didn't think anything about it and 

21 promptly forgot about it. 

22 Q You met the next day, January 14, with 

23 Director Casey, I believe, from what you told us in your 

24 interview, to discuss what you had learned from Mr. 

25 Ghorbanifar; isn't that correct? 



UNttASStHED 



563 



imssiwD 



1 A Yes. 

2 Q Did you at the meeting with Director Casey 

3 refer to your notes and tell him that there had been this 

4 suggestion of potential benefit for the contras as part 

5 of the Ghorbanifar sales pitch? 

6 A No, sir. 

7 Q So you do not recall in January addressing 

8 that point to Casey at all? 

9 A No, sir. It did not enter my consciousness as 

10 a significant point. 

11 Q Were you aware in January of '86 of Colonel 

12 North's involvement in contra matters? 

13 A Well, I certainly was in the sense that there 

14 was considerable press publicity in August of 1985 where 

15 he and his family were harrassed, where there was 

16 considerable publicity in a number of newspapers, 

17 including the Washington Post and the New York Times, and 

18 I was attending interagency meetings at the White House 

19 with Colonel North at that time and he had some real 

20 harrassment by people who opposed the American 

21 Administration's policy in Central America. 

22 Q I would have thought, particularly given that 

23 kind of environment, it would have led to, if nothing 

24 else, casual conversations between you and Colonel North 

25 about what he was doing in Central America. 

[d| 



564 



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329 



1 A I would re j set that b«cau«« I juat don't think 

2 that that va^^islgnrf leant statenant. It was on* 

3 phrasA^^ K« dldn ' t go into «n^«laborata axpla^l^ioh of 

4 What h« meant^ Mr. GhorbaniSB' spudn with graat 

5 rapldity^. HlsEnglish is garbled at times, and trying to 

6 cope with all this outflowing of information on his 

7 alleged knowledge of terrorism more than kept me busy. for 

8 those five hours. 

9 I didn't ask for the assignment. The Director 

10 sent me on the assignment. So the fact I didn't record 

11 this did not to me seem significant, and I. certainly 

12 didn't even recall it after that January meeting. 

13 Q Bear with me. At the time of your meeting 

14 with Ghorbanifar on the 13th were you aware, directly or 

15 indirectly, of Colonel North playing a role in raising 

16 money to assist the contras? 

17 A I was aware there had been statements to that 

18 effect, that he was involved in at least encouraging 

19 private donations to the contras. 

20 Q Apart from whatever you saw in the newspapers, 

21 had he himself indicated such things to you? 

22 A I don't think he had spoken. We never 

23 discussed Central America and the contras, except in the 

24 most generic ways. I recall when we were in OSD in the 

25 summer of 1984 we needed Colonel North's assistance on 



ONCnSSIFIED 



565 



IMASSIIIED 



330 



1 the project, the very sensitive project I was on in the 

2 summer time frame, and he was unavailable and he later 

3 told me in some time frame that he was traveling at the 

4 direction of Mr. McFarlane and it was related to the fact 

5 that funding had been cut off for Central America and he 

6 was traveling various places in the world to try to have 

7 donations made, private donations made, to people 

8 interested in continuing the anti-communist effort in 

9 Central America. 

10 But I don't have a time frame for that 

11 converation. 

12 Q During the course of your conversation with* 

13 Mr. Ghorbanifar was Mr. Ledeen present throughout? 

14 A No. He walked out and stayed in the other 

15 room. 

16 Q So it's more likely than not that he was not 

17 present when this statement was made; is that correct? 

18 A I would say that he was not present. 

19 Q If I can borrow that back for just a second, 

20 Tab B, I take it, at least from Mr. Rizzo's letter, is 

21 likewise a portion of your notes from the January 13 

22 meeting, and Mr. Rizzo's letter, which I assume was 

23 written after talking with you, indicates — 

24 A I want to correct the record. Mr. Rizzo wrote 

25 the letter and it showed up on my desk. I did not see it 



mmsm 



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1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



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in advanca. 

Q If you would look at Tab B in conjunction with 
Tab A and tell me if there is a relationship between the 
$100 million proposal that's referenced on Tab B and the 
funding of the contras, which is on Tab A, I would be 
grateful. Mr. Rizzo seems to think that there was. 

A Well, I can't conjecture what Mr. Rizzo 
thinks. I don't know that there's a relationship 
whatsoever. I recall that Mr. Ghorbanifar talked about 

he was aware of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^| 
that he wanted the help of the United 




}cnow, clearly he wanted sob* of the money 
for himself, but he thought that the other money could be 
used for some form of action. I was simply recording 
what this man was stating, and I don't see any relevance 
necessarily to what occurred in Attachment A. 

Q But for Mr. Rizzo' s suggestion, I might not 
either. 

A Well, I'm not here to suggest what Mr. Rizzo 



wmsm 



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iiciAssife 



332 



1 thought. I didn't tell Mr. Rizzo that. 

2 Q Mr. Allen, my guess is that you must have had 

3 a discussion with somebody about these two sets of notes. 

4 Did you talk to the IG? Did you talk to somebody else in 

5 Mr. Rizzo's office? 

6 A The Inspector General went over all my 

7 documents and asked me questions, but I don't know that I 

8 connected the two in discussions with the IG. I 

9 certainly don't connect them now. 

10 Q Let me make a suggestion to try to connect 

11 them up for you. There are a series of conversations on 

12 this point, which we're going to go through, '"alnP^t * 

13 appearis that one of Mr. Ghorbanifar's suggestions was 

14 that the $100 million could be split in various ways, one 

15 of the ways being to provide a substantial contribution 

16 to Colonel North's efforts in Nicaragua. 

17 A Well, if you will go on to whatever, 

18 Attachment D, I believe that came from my notes in 

19 London. I wrote that down and again when I came to that 

20 in writing up the record that seemed so preposterous I 

21 don't think that I wrote anything specifically on this. 

22 It's so farfetched and again, you know, it was one of 

23 many notes. So I didn't put it in the memorandum for the 

24 record. 

25 Q I think all of us now know Mr. Ghorbanifar to 



UNttJSSinED 



568 




333 

1 be a fairly persistent fellow. What I am suggesting to 

2 you is wouldn't it be correct that on January 13 he 

3 formulated to you for the first time this proposal that 

4 there would be $100 million deal that ho could do and 

5 that some portion of that $100 million could be used to 

6 fund the contras? 

7 A He made that statement, but he didn't offer — 
8 

9 Q I just want to make sure he made that 

10 statement at that time. 

11 A I recorded that he said something about we 

12 could get $100 million, and I don't recall $100 million 

13 in relation to the contras in the conversation on 13 

14 January. I recall some very farfetched statement he made 

15 on the 2 6th of January that was so extreme that no 

16 rational man, in my point of view, could take it 

17 seriously in any way. 

18 Q That raises another question I have that I'll 

19 throw out right now. We'll come to the 26th in more 

20 detail in a bit. 

21 But if Mr. Ghorbanifar is coming up with 

22 farfetched and preposterous schemes on points like this 

23 which you dismiss, why do you take him seriously on other 

24 schemes like freeing hostages? 

25 A Well, actually it turned out that on| 

ccJ 




569 



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1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




>o what Mr. Ghorbanifar told me had some 
substance to it. So in retrospect it was not all 
bravado. 

Q I'm perfectly prepared to believe that he was 
prepared to come up with $100 million and help Ollie 
North out. I suspect that that was maybe very sincere. 
What I want to know is what caused you to think he was 
credible in certain areas like releasing hostages and -not 
in others, like $100 million to go to the contras? 

A Why don't you tell me why I said he was 
credible in releasing the hostages? I didn't quite make 
that judgment in this memorandum. 

Q That's helpful. You do not feel as of January 
13 that he was credible in terms of being able to be 
helpful to release the hostages; is that right? 

A I did not have enough Scnowledge of the release 
of Benjamin Weir. I did not have enough knowledge of all 
of the activity under way by Colonel North, as you know, 
as we went through this morning, the compartmented 
nature, and I know that other people have told you about 
how compartmented we operate, that I simply at that stage 



mmmn 



570 



mmm 



335 



1 was trying to record, on the 13th of January, everything 

2 he could tell me about terrorism 

3 And he told me a good deal, and he said he had 

4 more to tell me, but I wrote all I could up and sent this 

5 widely throughout the DO, to the Director, to the Deputy 

6 Director, to everyone so not just I but others could make 

7 judgments on the matter. 

8 Q It's the judgment that I am trying to come to 

9 grips with. He had just failed rather strikingly a 

10 polygraph test. He had an established track record of 

11 being someone whose word could not be relied upon in the 

12 Agency. You are now having a meeting with him on the* 

13 13th where he's telling you things which you perceive to 

14 be preposterous. 

15 A Some aspects. I did not say that all was 

16 preposterous. I said some of it seemed very, very filled 

17 with hyperbole. I think that it was important, if he 

18 really knows all of this, I think my recommendation was 

19 it's time for us to work our way through very, very 

20 carefully and try to evaluate this. 

21 Z said he is impatient if one tries to pin him 

22 down on specifics of some of the complex plots that he 

23 describes. I talked about a careful and direct approach 

24 to try to nail down just what he really did know as 

25 opposed to what he was manufacturing, was the essence of 



IINCDI^SinED 



571 




336 

1 my reconunendation. 

2 Q So you felt as of January 13 that it was worth 

3 continuing to try to work with him, correct? 

4 A I was talking generally on the terrorist 

5 aspects, because that's what the Dircector asked me to 

6 do. 

7 Q But even on that you felt that on the 
e terrorist aspects it was worth a try to work — 
9 A We have thousands of people out there 

10 providing a lot of data which we report conscientiously, 

11 soB« of wltich *Bi v<i3ry au rfetched on terrorism. For evert* 

12 serious plot we may get a thousand threats or reports -of 

13 threats, so it's a very difficult process. We're dealing 

14 with very sleazy, unreliable people in the world of 

15 terrorisir. Tr*- •'^"'JLiltiT** *"ljL1 '"^ discuss that aspect, 

16 but let me assure you it's hard to find a good, reliable 

17 source because you're dealing with people who deal in 

18 duplicity, who commit political violence themselves. 

19 MR. WOODCOCK: Let me just ask you one 

20 question on this same topic. The portion of the 

21 memorandum that you just quoted on your suggestion for 

22 handling Ghorbanifar also goes on to say that for this 

23 reason the best strategy is to go back over details in a 

24 series of meetings so that all aspects of the plot can be 

25 determined. 



UNCbmtFHD 



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1 That suggests a somewhat tlme-consvunlng 

2 procedure. How precisely wfts it that you were 

3 envisioning Ghorbanifar might be able to be used, given 

4 that he required that kind of straining? 

5 THE WITNESS: At that point I didn't really 

6 think deeply about it. I just simply summarized it for 

7 the Director and other people in the Directorate of 

8 Operations. If we are really going to pursue this 

9 individual's knowledge on terrorism, it's going to take a 

10 lot of management of the source. This man has contacts. 

11 He lives in a very fast lane. He has a lot of underworld 
characters- he deals As you know,^^^^^^^^^^^^| 

13 ^^^^^H^are some of the most insidious individuals in 

14 the world, drug dealers, terrorists, gray arms merchants. 

15 We really do have to deal with him almost day by day, 

16 point by point. You can't let the man go off and try to 

17 become a principal agent. 

18 It was absolutely — that was the thrust of 

19 what I was trying to say. It would take an immense 

20 aaount of management. That's what I was talking about. 

21 MR. WOODCOCK: Had you made a judgment at that 

22 point as to whether he would be useful simply as a source 

23 of Intelligence or whether he could at all be used In an 

24 active operation? 

25 THE WITNESS: I didn't reach that conclusion. 



UNCtASSm 



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1 What I was just trying to do was to canvass broadly what 

2 he claimed to know. 

3 MR. WOODCOCK: The reason I ask that is 

4 because again of the procedure that you are suggesting 

5 there. It would seem that in the course of an active 

6 operation it would be very difficult on a minute-by- 

7 minute basis to strain through his knowledge and then 

8 take actions based on a judgment. 

9 THE WITNESS: Yeah, and I don't know that I've 

10 quite articulated it this way before. I think this 

11 paragraph, this summary about the time and attention is 

12 needed to keep a rein on Ghorbanifar, I think that was 

a-' 

13 what made mf uncomfortable about using him in the NSC 

14 initiative, because he was on the go every day. He was 

15 in one city after the other. He was constantly on the 

16 move. Someone almost had to be at his side in order to 

17 know what he's doing and to maintain control of any 

18 operation, because, as we know, he lied to both sides all 

19 the time during the NSC initiative. 

20 MR. WOODCOCK: Thank you. 

21 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

22 Q Let me just ask you one question about your 

23 note. We've got two pages that have been identified to 

24 us as being notes of the January 13 conversation. I 

25 assume that there are more pages because these things 



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1 sort of start and stop. Do you know at the present time 

2 where a complete collection of your notes of the January 

3 13 meeting might be? 

4 A =2iJfes, sir. __^ 

5 Q Good. Where might they be? 

6 A Well, I think the notebooks are being held as 

7 part of the box on the part of the Independent Counsel. 

8 I didn't throw them away. I don't know why I kept them. 

9 Q Okay. Have you recently seen whether or not 

10 there is a complete collection of your January 13 notes? 

11 Did you happen to notice that? 

12 A Yes. I turned thea in,.^. 

13 Q So when they were last in your possession 

14 there was a complete set? 

15 -Jbff When last ijv-fogcjsQSsession there was a 

16 complete set. 

17 Q Unfortunately, they tiT'W'iffiili 'ifen rniiher of 

18 lawyers in them since tht:S^^iBa,. aoCl^tf knows the 

19 condition they are in. 

20 With regard to^te^-iS^ting with Director Casey 

21 on the 14th, can you give me a synopsis of what you 

22 talked to Casey about on the 14th? 

23 A Yes. It was generally a summary of what I 

24 later put in my memorandum, that he claimed to have all 

25 this access. He showed me a few documents relating to 



IINetA$«D 



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ONCtASSm 



340 



1 his access, you know, Ghorbanifar. I think he gave me — 

2 I think he gave me a photograph or two — I can't recall 

3 — of people he claimed had terrorist connections. 

4 I said it was very hard to pin down the individual 

5 in any concrete way. He is very flamboyant. He's very 

6 clever, cunning. I described him as a con man to the 

7 Director. I said it doesn't mean that, pr op4H;fa L,jaanaq>d» 

8 and it might take a lot of effort, that you cannot manage 

9 a con man to do this. And I remember the Director joking 

10 and saying well, maybe this is a con man's con man then. 

11 He used that phrase with me after I came back. 

12 Q When you had this conversation with him, did 

13 he give you any suggestion at all that he had former 

14 clients or friends or business acquaintances who were 

15 actually in business at that time with Ghorbanifar? 

16 A No, sir. 

18 A I don't recal^^mythfrfg'^^^^wcept the 

19 Director said well, take a look at it, and he . -ged me to 

20 write the memorandum, which I was very slow in getting 

21 together. 

22 Q Did he give you any instruction or direction 

23 or assignment to be Ghorbanifar 's keeper at that point? 

24 A No, sir, not at that point. 

25 Q With regard to what happened next, on January 



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341 

1 17, 1986, the Presidential Finding is signed, the one 

2 that becomes operative, in any event. Were you aware of 

3 the Finding being signed contemporaneous with its 

4 signing? 

5 A No, sir. 

6 Q When did you find out about the Finding? 

7 A I believe on the 24th or 23rd of January, when 

8 I knew that some intelligence was being prepared for 

9 eventual transmission to the Iranians. To my surprise I 
10 was told by Bob Gates that he had ordered^H^^Hj^f' 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hthe Directorate Intelligence 

12 to prepare a small sample of intelligence that contained 

13 order of battle information on Iraqi dispositions on the 

14 northern front, and he said you will be contacted bj 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B and they provide 

16 , you that intelligence, and I've ordered that it be 

17 conpleted, I believe, by the 24th of January, 1986. 

18 I don't }cnow why he did that, because that was 

19 an unusual request. I think simply because he knew I had 

20 been a focal point for the collection tasking and I 

21 assume that so few people knew about this initiative, no 

22 one )cnew the real story except Bob Gates at that time as 

23 to what this was about within the entire Directorate of 

24 ^^^Hpeople. -sss- - :-._i^„^--ifei 

25 So he didn't have many people to turn to. So 



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h* turned to me for that. So when the material was ready 

the 24th^^^^H^^^|^|^^^|^^^|brought over to 
me and explained what they were providing. In fact, I 
think they had contacted me as early as the 2 3rd and had 
showed me what they were planning to put on this 
intelligence sample, and they wanted to know if that was 
adequate. 

And, as I recall, we made a few adjustments to 
what was being prepared, but it seemed adequate at the 
time. It was very bare bones. 

Q Let me show you a document that I'd like you 
to look at and tell me if you've ever seen it before. ♦If 
you have, great; I ^'^^^xj^oea^utMl^^^ is- It's a 
document that's headed Milestones and appears to have 
been created about January 17, 1986, dealing with 
essentially possible conse^guicM^jf the Finding. That 
will be Exhibit 28. 

(The document referred to was 
:3i ^^cM«i_All«n IjKhiJ^t- Huaber 28 
f or^i Ojflb^ lcati^e^ 

^fej^^ypcH^ at^^XM. to aggeuUt^^ Z1^|S««rs to 
have 6riglnate*"at the tfflit« ffous« 



'm^ 




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82-688 O-88-20 



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1 Q Can you tell me how you reach that conclusion? 

2 A Well, simply the :.scenarios and the 

3 transactions~and the way they aire being- proposed, ^th« 

4 fact that the Economy^Act — you know, I heard comments, 

5 I gueaa, by Colonel North or others at this stage that 

6 thdughts were being given on how to proceed, but I don't 

7 recall seeing this specific document. 

8 Q Would you ha_^ se«a one liki^t^ _^ _- 

9 J^ I ««ii^*aoe^Bent which was briwght by Colonel 

10 North on the 24th, I believe, of January 1986, which was 

11 a schedule, and you are aware of that. 

12 Q We'll touch on that in a minute. ^. 

13 AX don't think I've seen this one. 

14 MS. MC GINN: Could we take a break here for a 

15 few minutes? 

16 ■■ (A brief recess was taken.) 

17 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

18 Q Mr. Allen, let me take you back to your 

19 knowledge of the efforts to prepare some intelligence on 

20 Iraq for Iran. My notes on our earlier interview 

21 suggested that you had said it was about January 19 when 

22 DDI Gates asked you to get involved, but apparently is 

23 wrong. Do you remember what the date was? 

24 A I don't know. It could have been as early as 

25 the 19th and I may have misspoken a few moments ago. 



wmmm 



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344 

1 Q Is there anything you can attach your memory 

2 to, any event? 

3 A No. I know Bob Gates called me and said that 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B would working on this issue 

5 and that they would be visiting me about it, and that he 

6 had ordered it be completed, I believe, by the 24th of 

7 January, and I didn't know that the work was under way or 

8 had been requested until Mr. Gates called me. And, as I 

9 said earlier, he called me basically because so few 

10 people knew what was going on; he didn't have anyone to 

11 deliver the material to. 

Who are^^^^^^^^^^^^^l What are" 

13 they with? 

14 A As I said earlier, they are with the^^^^^^^f 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H Directorate 

16 Intelligence. ^^^^^^ 

Q This would be under^^^^^^^^^H group? 
s i r , |H|^H^^^^^^Boff i c e . 

19 Q It doesn't make a great deal of difference, 

20 but when I spoke with^^^^^^^^I was left with the 

21 impression that he got that task on very much a hurry-up 

22 basis around the 2 3rd or 24th, just before the 

23 intelligence actually gets delivered. Do you think it 

24 was a few days earlier? 

25 A Well, I don't know. I really don't know how 



wmssm 



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345 

1 quickly they did this. I do recall as my memory is 

2 refreshed that^^^^^^^Htalked about working very late 

3 hours in preparing the intelligence, so it could have 

4 been the 2 3rd that the request came. I do recall it was 

5 during "thflr3««)bt I t-^gts a j<orki»»-<l «^ ijthT« Mr . Gates 

6 callod me on^ecure aa^.saJH^ ^n^'this^^s ^^ppening and 

7 that Z sh ^^^k await a:3/1i ^ f roa] 

8 because th«y gA4|iar' r«iUi eLj^°»»a^^^^ti9*» 

9 As I recall, I didn't give them any guidance. 

10 What they prepared seemed to be perfectly satisfactory. 

11 Q In terms of the way the Agency was dealing 

12 with Ghorbanifar at that time, would you have been aware 

13 in that period, the period between January 17 and the 

14 time you actually go to London yourself that further 

15 communications were taking place with Mr. Ghorbanifar 

16 about the Iran initiative? 

You mean^^^^^^^^^^^l^^^^^^Hwould 

18 I have been aware? 

19 Q That's one place. 

20 A Of further meetings? 

21 Q Were other people telling you about them? Let 

22 me give you a better questions, Mr. Allen. That wasn't 

23 terribly helpful. 

24 In terms of a meeting with Ghorbanifar planned 

25 to occur at or about the 24th or 25th of January, would 



wmmB 



581 



wm&mi 



346 



1 you hav* known about that meeting before you got the 

2 assignment to go out there on the 26th and, if so, how 

3 soon before the meeting? 

4 A No. X wasn't aware that a meeting would have 

5 occurred on, I guess, the night of the 25th in London. I 

6 do know that Colonel North was impatient around the 23rd 

7 to get an intelligence sample to Mr. Ghorbanifar. This 

8 was after Mr. Gates had told me one was being prepared. 

9 Q From the Tower Commission report it appears 

10 that North went to London on the 24th of January; is that 

11 accurate or inaccurate according to your recollection? 

12 A Colonel North went to London just prior to«the 

13 24th, I believe, because Mr. Ghorbanifar gave him a whole 

14 series of photographs and these were very interesting 

15 photographs of some fairly nefarious-looking people. He 

16 had a whole stack of them that he brought to the meeting 

17 on 24 January in Mr. McMahon's office. 

13 Q I tei^^Swhat. I thiSl^e best way to do 

19 it is you can take me sequentially in terms of events as 

20 you recall. 

21 A As I recall, recognizing that my recall on 

22 this may be imperfect, sometime either prior to the 23rd 
2 3 or on the 23rd Mr. Gat^^.-^iljil an intelligence sample was 

being that^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwere 

25 involved. Colonel North was talking to me at that time 



rolonel North was talking 

Mmm 



582 



DNStteSIFIEfr 



347 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



about the need to get intelligence quickly to 
Ghorbanifar. He didn't suggest that there would be 
necessarily a trip required to London that quickly. 

It's my understanding that Colonel North had 
been to see Mr. Ghorbanifar just around that date, the 
22nd or 23rd, and that he had obtained a set of 
photographs of people that Ghorbanifar claimed had 
connections to terrorist networks or were actually 
terrorists themselves. I was told, I guess by Mr. Gates, 
to be at headquarters on Saturday the 24th of January' 
because the sample would be addressed. 

I arrived there that morning. I think I made 
contact with^^^^H^^I^HH^^^Hand 
finishing up the sample and explained to me how to 
interpret it. I took the material up, as I recall, to 
Mr. McMahon's office. ^^■■■^^B was there, Mr. McMahon 
was there, Mr. Gates was there. I was there. And along 
with — Colonel North arrived later. 




583 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UNCl/ISSiED 



348 




iims by Mr. Ghorbanifar that 
he had had contact with, I believe, the Vice President 
and perhaps even the President] 




Q The President and Vice President of the United 
States, I take? 

A Ves, which certainly was not true. So, as 1 
further refresh my memory, it's possible that Mr. 
Ghorbanifar was here and Colonel North did not go to 
Europe and that that may not actually be accurate in the 
Tower Commission report. I'm trying to reconstruct the 
sequence of events. Nonetheless, there was a lot of 
discussion there on the 24th, and I believe Colonel North 
was at the beginning of developing a schedule, but he 
didn't have much of a schedule at that stage. 

We sat there discussing the intelligence. 
John McMahon stated that he was against providing 
detailed order of battle information to the Iranians, and 
Mr. Gate seconded that comment. They told Colonel North 
that this was being done at the direction of the White 



mmsm\i 



584 



IINCmWD 



349 



1 House, but they wanted to note jointly that this was 

2 against their best judgments. But they qualified this, 

3 as I recall, by saying they did not consider this to be 

4 intelligence that would be of any significant import to 

5 the Iranians, given that this was in the mountainous 

6 northern front and was not a likely point of attack for 

7 the Iranian military. And I think they were correct in 

8 that. 

9 Then a whole argument ensued as to who should 

10 take the darn stuff to London. I had no desire 

11 necessarily to go to London, but when Ollie showed all 

12 these photographs McMahon seized on the idea that I 

13 should go because if these are terrorist somebody that 

14 knows something about terrorism should try to obtain from 

15 Ghorbanifar who these individuals were and why did he 

16 have their photographs and what did it mean — a rather 

17 ominous-looking set of characters. 

18 So suddenly I found myself getting ready to go 

19 to London that afternoon. So they sealed this 

20 intelligence sample in sterile paper and I put it In my 

21 garment bag, went home, packed and had my wife drive me 

22 to the airport and went to London. 

23 Q Let me give you a date and even to help us 

24 focus in on things. On January 23, according to the 

25 Tower report, you met with a follower of Ayatollah 



UmtDSStFIED 



585 



UNCLASme 



350 



1 Sharazzi who was visiting the United States apparently at 

2 Ghorbanifar 's request. Do you recall such a meeting? 

3 A Yes. I don't think he was coming to the 

4 United States necessarily at Ghorbanifar's" 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 Q Would you have met with him before this 

10 meeting with McMahon? 

11 A Yes. J 




snphe 



12 Q Okay. So that took place onphe 23rd. Youi^ 

13 meeting with McMahon would have been the 2 3rd or the next 

14 day, the 24th? 

15 A The 24th. It was a Saturday morning. I 

16 thought this was an opportunity to evaluate a contact of 

17 Ghorbanifar. I was impressed ^^^^^^^^H He was very 

18 good. 

19 MR. WOODCOCK: Mr. Allen, do you want to look 

20 at that? It's an old '86 calendar, to give you some idea 

21 of th« dates. 

22 THE WITNESS: Oh, the 24th is a Friday. I'm 

23 sorry. My dates are all wrong. 

24 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

25 Q Let's go back and try and piece it together. 



UNELJSSlfffifl 



586 



351 

1 You were in London on Sunday, right, which would be the 

2 26th? 

3 A I arrived in London on the morning of the 

4 26th. 

5 Q So the meeting with McMahon and company would 

6 have been that Saturday? 

7 A Ves, sir, the 25th, the morning of the 25th. 

8 I flew to London the afternoon or the evening of the 25th 

9 and met with Ghorbanifar the evening of the 26th and 

10 returned to Washington the morning of the 27th. 

11 Q So the sequence would be 23rd you meet with* 

12 the follower of the Ayatollah, 24th you are told by Gates 

13 about the Iraqi intelligence, is that right, and then 

14 meet -- 

15 A Well, I don't want to put a specific time 

16 frame in view of what I said earlier, what you have 

that^^^^^^^^said.^^^^^^^^^should have 

18 better information than I do. It was, you know, sometime 

19 during that time frame, during that work week, that Mr. 

20 Gates told me that he was having an intelligence sample 

21 prepared related to the Iranian initiative and that I 

work with^^^^^^^^Bpeople 

23 Q But, in any event, the departure from the U.S. 

24 to London would have occurred — would you have flown 

25 that evening, the 25th? 



UNCOtSMD 



587 




Pan Am 106 to London. 

Which would mean a flight out Saturday 



The 24th, yes. I'm sorry, forgive me — the 



- . .^„. , 352 

1 A 

2 Q 

3 evening? 

4 A 

5 25th. 

6 Q So you would have flown out Saturday 

7 evening, the 2 5th? 

8 A Yes. I definitely flew out the 25th. 

9 Q Before we go to that meeting let me just ask 

10 you a bit about what the Agency believed it was doing.' 

11 You would have )cnown, I assume, on the 24th and 25th that 

12 you were about to go meet and talk with Ghorbanifar. - 

13 Were you aware that the Agency was putting out a cable 

14 saying that it planned no further contact with 

15 Ghorbanifar? 

16 A No, sir. 

17 Q Let me show you a cable dated January 17, 1986 

18 which will be Exhibit 29, and I ask if you are familiar 

19 with it. 

20 (The document referred to was 

21 marked Allen Exhibit Number 29 

22 for identification.) 

23 (Pause.) 

24 A I've seen this. I don't recall when. 

25 Q Do you remember where you saw it — 



uimssra 



588 



wmmm 



353 



1 contemporaneously? 

2 A No, sir. I didn't see it contemporaneously. 

3 Q At a late date? 

4 A I saw it at a later date, although I'm not 

5 certain when. 

6 Q To your knowledge was the Operations 

7 Directorate aware of the meeting that was about to be 

8 held with Ghorbanifar at the time they sent this cable? 

^^H^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas the meeting 

10 in during the entire session on Saturday morning on the 

11 25th. He saw the intelligence. He saw the photographs. 

12 He knew I was going to London to meet with Mr. •• 

13 Ghorbanifar. 

14 Q And^^^^^^mt that point was still deputy, or 

15 was he chief of the Near East Division; do you recall? 

16 A He was the Deputy Director of the Near East 

17 Division, Directorate of Operations »t that time. 

18 Q One other detail from that period of time. 

19 Let me show you a January 21, 1986 memorandum from Clair 

20 George on a re^esl^or sensitive support equipment, 

21 which will be Exhibit 30. 

22 (The document referred to was 

23 marked Allen Exhibit Number 3 

24 ^, for identification.) 

25 The same drill. If you have seen this memo 




u 



589 



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2 
3 

4 

5 

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7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

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15 

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17 

18 

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21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



umssffl 



before, please tell me; if not, I'll just use it as a 
reference point. 

(Pause. ) 

A At the time I did not see that, 

contemporaneously. I knew on the 29th of January 1986 
that he had such equipment. 

Q Why did you know that on the 26th? 

A He brought it with him when he had returned 
from the aaetiii^ in3^don^^Tbel^ev«>_j^^E:^ri?*- 




on yojar 
trip^ dieT'you borrow frcnn COlbnUSSorth thia^ec^fii^liht «r ' 
nakA us« of similar iquJBB^"^ ^^ X****^ trj^g?^" ' ^_ . -^^' Jt 

this equifiMn^n y«»«iiqr:, did tlSEn , W i i- _¥r«fr -"f tii»r- * 
when you actually «iw a tran«;ript-br h^Brd^ a^tape made 
by 3Bh±« aqu ipna^!iaMi^anqagf o f ta«¥ "" ^"^-^^^t^I - 

Q Vav you ,i^^i^ ^^ yoS" wj^^Sra^^that Hr. 
McMahoiv:i«wFcone«rn'3i6a^it. naleing thia Inl aiTi^T^ I^ - 
available, wafa^ou "^^kra ^h0. McMahon :«t8 tryiSgr-Ao - 
maK^gaure that_j6ip5ira^^^^pro\£^_3!^f ^*=f«w«ing o^ 





590 



1 

2 
3 
4 

5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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12 
13 
14 
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17 
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24 
25 



licume 



355 



intelligance? - _ \^ . 

A 1 dor?t remember. • %-- 

J^Q^ Do yfiu know where the Director was on January 
24 and 25^986?^The cable S!^^|^HH ^* ^^''^ 



A ^h«S:'!^^^^^H JHJflduu overseas, an^;^ _., 
probably Jm«w iB"%h^jys^^s^|Sc« h«^wa«~bjiit._l don't 
recall now precisely fffgffi^-* waii-«»s .k^eaS V " _' - -" 

Q _l^^^^^k« a p<»i'^n In t^iic a^i^g^uih 
North on Trtiet^- m" rint jr ifif^j jlijTiiF iir TMir'tiTfTi to-J 
th i^gfentiSliaiOc*^^ 3^ ^M_J^S^»is?> 
^- ^P bf<y^r^',_^.7" 

Q You were there'll* .aiiK^tl t^ffT . ^eb&s were 
talking about whether it -was a good idaa?^ 




'- I 



»^fe«*-'**^«' J**,g^^«rt*Srrorl«t^ 




speak for the propriety" of~pas3lifig intelligence to the 
Iranians. 

Q Let me show you the cable, which will be 
Exhibit 31. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 31 
■me ^JbM^4^cat4pB^*!^~- 
Just if you would review it briefly and tell 
me if you sjug-^it at or about the time of its date. 



UNCDtSSn 



591 




356 

1 A I have never seen the cable until now. 

2 Q Did you have a meeting with Ghorbanifar the 

3 weekend of the 25th and 26th of January that was attended 

4 by Mr. Ledeen? 

5 A I had a tape recorder that kept running when 

6 Mr. Ledeen arrived after traveling from Rome to 

7 Ghorbanifar 's room, 926, in the Churchill Hotel. 

8 Q So the transcript that we have of a meeting 

9 which is dated the 25th of January would have been a 

10 transcript of a meeting that took place in London; is " 

11 that right? 

12 A That was, I believe, and I don't know the •, 

13 accuracy of the transcript because I have never looked at 

14 it in detail, but that was taken from the tape recorder I 

15 used in a meeting with Ghorbanifar, I assume. I would 

16 like to see it to identify it properly. 

17 Q Let me show you a transcript of what's called 

18 Cassette Number 7, marked Ghorba (MC 2), Senate numbers 

19 C-3991 through 4015, CIIN 1527/A, which will be Exhibit 

20 32. 

21 (The document referred to was 

22 marked Allen Exhibit Number 32 

23 for identification.) 

24 (Pause.) 

25 A Yes, this is part of the tape that I retained 



imssm 



592 



WA^ffD 



357 



1 after I wrote up my memorandum, I think, of 18 February 

2 1986. 

3 Q Tell me a little bit about how this tape was 

4 made. Was this an overt tape recorder or a covert tape 

5 recorder? 

6 A Overt. 

7 Q Overt? 

8 A Ves, sir. I put it on the coffee table and 

9 said I'd like to tape record what you have to say, and I 

10 assume that you will agree, Mr. Ghorbanifar, and he said 

11 yes. 

12 Q And this tape would have been made in your* 

13 hotel room in London? 

14 A No, sir. It was in his hotel room, Room 926, 

15 Churchill Hotel, Portman Square. 

16 Q And Mr. Ledeen joined you at some point in the 

17 conversation? 

18 A Very late in the conversation and I think we 

19 stopped our conversation essentially substantively. 

20 Q How did Mr. Ledeen know that you and Mr. 

21 Ghorbanifar were going to be getting together in London? 

22 A He kept close track on Mr. Ghorbanifar and he 

23 showed up unexpectedly from Rome. 

24 Q So you didn't anticipate that he was going to 

25 be meeting you? 



wmmm 



593 



358 

1 A No. 

2 Q Th« tap* appaanTto starfF tii^te* «iddle of a 

3 conversation. Do you know of any additional transcripts 

4 that might be outstanding on this conversation? 

5 A I have turned in all the tapes I have. I 

6 don't know of any other cassettes that I have. 

7 Q If you could just glance at the transcript. 

8 Is there any other typewritten transcript that you know 

9 of of this conversation other than what appears before 

10 you? 

11 A Well, I wrote the entire substantive content 

12 in the 18 February memorandum. 

13 Q I mean a verbatim transcript. 

14 A I have no other verbatim transcript. 

15 Q So in terms of what might precede where this 

16 tape starts you've not seen a transcript of that 

17 material? 

18 A No, sir. 

19 Q If you don't mind, the first paragraph or so 

20 talks about ^HH^^Lnd the like for Mr. Nir. What was 

21 that conversation relating to? 

22 A I think it's in my memorandum. And I'd have 

23 to refer to that. I believe there's something about 
^^^^^^^1 in the 

25 Q It didn't jump out at me. 



UNCUtSSIFIED 



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UNClASSm 



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5 
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7 

a 

9 

10 

11 

12 
13 
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15 
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18 
19 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



A I'd be very surprised if there wasn't. 
Q Let me have you pick it out. Let me show you 
your 18 February memo of the January 2 3 meeting, which 
will be Exhibit 33. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 3 3 
for identification. ) 
(Pause. ) 




595 



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17 

18 

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21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




Q During the course of this conversation Mr. 
Ghorbanifar again made a reference to helping Ollie for 
his work in South America, did he not? 

A Yes. I did not recall this until after I 
started looking at my notes and having talked to the 
Inspector General's staff, I guess, in November-December 

He raised ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^m^H^^where 
he made what I thought was a rather grandiose statement 
thatH^H^^^Hwould provide at this time not $100 



UNCtASMD 



596 



um4ssn 



361 



1 million but $50 million, and I notice in my notes $25 

2 million for him and $25 million for Ollie North. 

3 It seemed to me sort of a very ingratiating 

4 type comment which had little or no substance so 1 

5 certainly didn't record it in my memorandum for the 

6 record, because that seemed so far-fetched. I had no 

7 confidence that it had any meaning and, of course, I did 

8 not pursue it, as my notes indicate. 

9 Q You didn't pursue it in the sense of even 

10 asking him how or what he knew about Colonel North's ' 

11 activities in Central America? 

12 A ■ I never discussed what he knew about Colone^l 

13 North or Colonel North's activities in Central America. 

14 Q Well, me why not. I don't understand that. 

15 A Well, I focus functionally worldwide on 

16 counterterrorism, and when I waa^ it^^eji^artment of 

17 Defense working with Colonel North I dfd^ not work on 

18 Central America, so I had little or no interest except as 

19 just another average citizen in what was going on in 

20 Latin America. I'm interested in Latin America from a 

21 terrorist point of view and I have focused from time to 

22 time on Central and South American terrorism. 

23 But basically on the contra issue I had no 

24 knowledge and did not follow it at all. I wasn't even 

25 reading the press in any detail about the contra issue. 



UNCtJtSSIFIED 



597 



ONi^J^SIFIED 



362 



1 so it was really not in my frame of reCerenc*. So to me 

2 an outlandish statement like this did not merit any 

3 particular pursuit. 

4 Q You were aware at this time that it was not 
5 . lawful for the United States Government to be 

6 contributing money to the Nicaraguan contras? 

7 A I had heard of the Bolartd Amendment and the 

8 approach in the Boland Amendment, but I had not focused 

9 on that whatsoever. 

10 Q Just in terms of your responsibility as a 

11 Federal official, if someone told you that there was an 

12 illegal act going on, no matter what the level in the * 

13 government, you would have explored that? 

14 A If I had bona fide hard evidence that some 

15 illegality was occurring I would have taken it to an 

16 appropriate official. The fact that somebody was saying, 

17 you know, what I want is to join hands with the Agency, I 

18 am a turnkey project individual, I have all these very 

19 excellent contacts with terrorist groups, Iranian in 

20 particular, some with Syrians, some with the Libyans, and 

21 I know this great project and if we handle it right and 
^^^^^^^^^^^1 they us 

23 million for me, $25 million for Ollie's boys in Central 

24 America. 

25 The only thing I recorded which caught my 



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attention was the possibility of an opera tic 

That was 

not out of bounds. That was plausible. Something like 
this seemed absolutely implausible and I totally forgot 
about this. 

And the first time I recalled this was after 
talking with the Inspector General's staff and they 
brought to my attention in March of 198 6 George Cave had 
written a memorandum on a yellow piece of paper, one 
sentence that Ghorbanifar said, you know, that we canget 
some profits out of these arms sales and use them for the 
contras in Central America. And they said did you not 
recall reading that, and I very candidly at the time, I 
said I read the memorandum and I may have read that 
sentence, but it didn't stand out in my mind and Mr. Cave 
and I never discussed it. 

And a similar couple of comments in my notes 
like this, I never considered it valuable enough or 
significant enough or credible enough to put down or 
bring it to anyone's attention. If I had detailed 
information and evidence that an illegality was 
occurring, I certainly would bring it to the rttention of 
the responsible officials. 

Q Vou do not recall making a conscious decision 
not to inquire into these matters? 

?c( 



599 




WllOl I 364 



1 A NO, sir, not at all. It just wasn't in ay 

2 plana of reference. I'm sorry, but it was not. 

3 Q All right. You recall, do you not, that after 

4 you put out your memorandum on your conversations of 13 

5 January and 2 6 January with Ghorbanifar the Operations 

6 folks from the Near East division also put out a 

7 memorandum commenting on matters which you had touched on 

8 in your memoranda? Do you recall receiving that 

9 memorandum? 

10 A I don't think they sent me a copy at th« time. 

11 I've read that memorandum at soma point. ^^^^^^^^^H 

12 said ha was anxious to get my memorandum of particular^ 18 

13 February because they wanted to do soma research and 

14 analysis on it. I don't recall that ha aver passed that 

15 to ma at the time when that memorandum was written. I 

16 have read it at soma point. I read it at soma point. 

17 I did not attempt to, you Jcnow, do research on 

18 this. I felt that was his role to do so. ' Mf^ Job was 

19 simply to elicit from Mr. CRorbanlfar what ha knew, 

20 record it in detail. Operational research, name traces 

21 and evaluation was beyond my scope. I just didn't have 

22 time to do those things. I am unhappy that it was not 

23 sent to me immediately. It would have, I think, put a 

24 little bit of perspective on Ghorbanifar for ma. 

25 Q It was apparently addressed to the Director. 



DNtASMD 



600 



UNCLASSIFIED 



365 



1 Did Director Casey not talk to you about this memorandum 

2 in light of the fact that you send him two memoranda on 

3 Ghorbanifar? 

4 A No, sir. 

5 Q He did not. Okay. Let me show you the memo. 

6 A To the best of my recollection he never 

7 mentioned it. ;_ 

8 Q Let me show you the memorandum, which will be 

9 Exhibit 34. 

10 (The documan%.r«i*rra^ to was 

11 marked Allen Exhibit Number 34 

12 for identification.) 

13 If you would look at the memo and identify it 

14 as the memorandum that you were given at some point. 

15 A I believe I reviewed it much later. 

16 Q When you say "much later", can you give me a 

17 referenc*? Would it have been in late '86, ejuTly '87? 

18 A I I think it was probably in late '86. 

19 Q How did it come to your attention? 

20 A ■■=J[, 4>m't recall. I did not see it at the time 

21 of the, say, February-March time frame. I did not see 

22 it. 

23 Q Now let's go to your meeting of January 29, 

24 1986. There is a passing reference to that meeting in 

25 the collection of your notes that's attached to Mr. 

iEJ 




601 



366 

1 Rlzzo's letter, if you want to use that as kind of a way 

2 of focusing your recollection. 

3 The note, Attachment C to Exhibit 27, appears 

4 to be a handwritten time chart or schedule. Can you tell 

5 me, first, what this is an excerpt from? 

6 A It's from notes that I took at the 29 January 

7 meeting in the Executive Office Building, Room 370. 

8 Colonel North had just returned that day from, I believe, 

9 London. He arrived from the airport and called a meeting 

10 late in the afternoon or early in the evening — it may 

11 have been 6:00 or 7:00 when we came together. 

12 His secretary called, Ms. Hall, and said that 

13 ^^^^^^^^^|and I were requested to come to the Executive 

14 Office Building, that Colonel North had some important 

15 information to discuss. So X went with^^^^^^^^H We 

16 probably went separately, but^^^^^^^^Hand I were 

17 there, along with Mr. Koch and Colonel North introduced 

18 me to Major General Richard Secord. 

19 Q Just another preliminary. North was returning 

20 from London, who had he been meeting with, if you know, 

21 in London? 

22 A I think he had met with Amiram Nir and 

23 Ghorbanifar. I think. 

24 Q I understand you weren't there. 

25 A I wasn't there and don't have any notes at 



I wasn't there and don't 

mumM 



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1 this stage. 

2 Q But to help me out, on the 26th you were 

3 meeting yourself with Ghorbanifar and Ledeen. Did North 

4 pass through along the way at that point? Did you see 

5 him in London? 

6 A No, sir. I turned around and returned on the 

7 27th. 

8 Q When you were meeting with Ghorbanifar did he 

9 indicate that he was anticipating a meeting with Korth in 

10 London? 

11 A I don't recall that he did. I haven't 

12 reviewed that transcript. 

13 Q I don't see anything in there. I would have 

14 pointed it out. 

15 A I don't recall he mentioned it. 

16 Q All right. Do you have any current knowledge 

17 of what North and Ghorbanifar and Nir would have been 

18 talking about at that meeting in London? 

19 A The only knowledge I have is what Colonel 

20 North told me, told at that meeting, and because Mr. Koch 

21 was not fully into the program or the initiative but only 

22 partially, he was somewhat guarded as long as Mr. Koch 

23 was around during the meeting. 

24 But he stated that he had had a meeting with 

25 an Iranian and that an arrangement had been agreed upon. 



wwmm 



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368 

1 a detailed schedule worlced out, and then he proceeded to 

2 read from a notebook a very detailed schedule, starting 

3 one date after the other. And that schedule, that 

4 handwritten schedule, later became a printed schedule and 

5 he had a very finely developed scenario where eventually 

6 a certain amount of equipment, particularly TOW missiles, 

7 would be sent to Iran. 

8 As certain segments occurred, hostages would 

9 be released, eventually including the remains of William 

10 Buckley. At some point Ayatollah Khomeini would step 

11 down. And I recall that I laughed aloud at that stage 

12 and I believe ^^^^^^^^H joined me in that. 

13 We didn't think that was terribly plausible, 

14 but he was quite serious in the scenario and schedule 

15 that he had drawn up. He indicated that that could well 

16 slip but that the sequence should remain about the same. 

17 He felt that there would be a relatively early resolution 

18 of the hostage issue and he spoke briefly, as I recall, 

19 about broader aspects of U.S. -Iranian relations. 

20 And I don't recall exactly how he explained 

21 all this to Mr. Koch, because he knew that I knew in 

22 detail what was happening, as well ^^^^^^^^^^B ^'^'^ 

23 certainly Major General Secord, but he was somewhat 

24 cautious in describing some of this because Mr. Koch was 

25 going to have to arrange, working I guess with CIA, for 

[ci 



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1 th« movement of the TOW missiles from depots where they 
eventually go ^°H^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H be 

3 repackaged and sanitized, and then moved on in some way 

4 to Israel and eventually on to Tehran. 

5 So the meeting went on for an hour and a half, 

6 I guess, something like that. 

7 Q Vour recollection of why Koch was there was 

8 primarily because of the need to get the missiles from 

9 DOD stocks; is that right? 

10 A That was my impression. And Colonel North Z 

11 recall cautioned me during the meeting that Koch was not 

12 witting of the entire initiative and it was important * 

13 that we try to keep it as compartmented as possible and 

14 that we not be fully open in our conversations. He 

15 cautioned me in an aside, saying — which Z appreciated, 

16 because he did not give me any advance guidance. Z 

17 thought Mr. Koch may have known a great deal. 

18 Q With regard to what you and^^^^^f knew about 

19 one another. You and^^HH|||||||had both known that you 

20 were involved in this project before the 29th of January? 

21 A Well, we had known of the initiative for some 

22 time, yes. And we knew that there was a Finding. Z had 

23 not read the Finding, but Z knew in general the terms of 

24 the Finding. 

25 Q So I can be more precise, so far as you 



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understood it.^^^^^^H^Hwas aware that Colonel North 
was working with and through you on certain aspects of 
this initiative; isn't that correct? 

A I don't think he was working through me. I 
think he was working concurrently. It was clear that^^H 

[would be doing the operational support to the 
NSC. ^^^^^^^^Hat that stage was very interested in 
the intelligence, the tasking and collection of 
intelligence; therefore, we worked out an agreement where 
I would ensure that he would seel^^^^^^^^^^K I tried 
to faithfully do that throughout the rest of the year. 
I recall once or twice he didn't see 
land he was quite annoyed that I didn't 
promptly get them to him. So I tried to rigorously give 
him that information as well as my memorandum for the 
record. I tried to send him all copies. My secretary 
was under instructions to hand-carry them tc 
loffice. 

Q Let me phrase it another way. When you met 
with^^^^^^^^l and the others on the 29thl 
did not evidence any surprise that you were involved in 
this matter at that time? 

A No, sir, at least I don't recall it, since 
we'd had lunch and discussed the initiative and he 
already had some of my memoranda. 



UNCIKSSIFIED 



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UNCLASSra 



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1 Q That was my recollection, yes, sir. 

2 with regard to the money flow that's outlined 

3 in this note, I take it that Colonel North outlined the 

4 flow of money in this meeting. 

5 A There were some costs spoken about, shipment 

6 costs, I see. Yes, he outlined some broad figures which 

7 I tended to jot down. 

8 Q But he also outlined at this meeting, I take 

9 it, how the money was going to pass — that it was going 

10 to go from the Iranians to the Israelis and from the 

11 Israelis to Ghorbanifar — excuse me, from the Iranians 

12 to Ghorbanifar, Ghorbanifar to the Israelis, and the ■■ 

13 Israelis on to Secord. Isn't that basically what he was 

14 telling you? 

15 A My arrows would suggest that you are correct 

16 in that statement. 

17 Q Was that the first occasion that that kind of 

18 flow of money had been outlined to you? 

19 A Absolutely. That came as a revelation on just 

20 how monies might actually flow in this and that Mr. 

21 Secord would then send the monies that it cost the Agency 

22 to repay DOD as well as associated costs of packaging and 

23 sanitizing the materials and transporting. 

24 Q Was there discussion of why General Secord was 

25 being inserted as a conduit in the money flow at that 



UNCCKSStFI!!) 



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1 point? 

2 A No, sir. 

3 Q There was not? 

4 A No, sir. He was quite silent. 

5 Q Secord was? 

6 A During most of the hour and a half he only 

7 occasionally made a comment — very, very quiet. 

8 Q with regard to the reason for the Israelis 

9 being inserted in this flow of cash was there any 

10 explanation of that given to you at this meeting? 

11 A No, sir. 

12 Q If I'm understanding what happened. North " 

13 basically said this is the way it is but he didn't 

14 explain why this is the way it was; is that right? 

15 A He indicated that the money flow would be this 

16 way and that the Agency would be reimbursed. We had to 

17 have assurance, as I recall, that the actual money would 

18 show up into a CIA account before we moved the equipment. 

19 I recall .«one discuss^ft «^|ffi9- <@tos«iiJ.in||f • But I.was 

2 more, you^know, looking^^^tlji^fp aniop^B^ptwriyuL-lSpE'do 

21 more collection tasking and knowing the schedule. 

22 Q "In terms, though, of what you do recall about 

23 the meeting, do you recall any discussion of the risks to 

24 operational security of having intermediaries outside of 

25 both governments inserted into this kind of a process? 



\immm 



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1 A Out of both governments? 

2 Q Instead of government-to-government transfer. 

3 A Outside of? 

4 Q Let me come at it another way. Was there any 

5 discussion of operational security concerns arising out 

6 of using private intermediaries in this kind of a 

7 transaction? 

8 A I don't think there was any discussion, 

9 certainly at that time, and during the course of this 

10 initiative I think Mr. Cave and I thought about this on a 

11 number of occasions, but at that time there was no 

12 discussion of those operational risks. 

13 Q One curiosity I have, based on what a number 

14 of people have said from the Agency, you all treated this 

15 thing, I gather, in January as being essentially a 

16 support function. You were going to do what the NSC 

17 needed help on, but it was their baby. Is that the way 

18 you all perceived it? 

19 A We had been assured by Mr. McMahon and Mr. 

20 Gates that there was a Finding — at least I had been 

21 assured at the meeting on 25 January — that we were 

22 going to provide some intelligence support and we were 

23 going to provide some assistance in moving U.S. weapons 

24 through a number of cutouts ensuring that that money — 

25 those weapons. ariLl^ed in^&da^lteWthere was a funding 





609 



ONCimiflfD 



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1 mechanism that had been set up to ensure that the United 

2 States and the Agency would be paid before it undertoo)c 

3 this activity, but that this was Presidentially-approved, 

4 that the Directorate of Operations was to support it. 

5 My role was to continue to ensure that we had 

6 some checks on the intermediaries in the best way 

7 possible, that we had to know what Ghorbanifar and other 

8 elements in Iran were up to. So I looked — the reason I 

9 was asked to come there was that Colonel North wanted 

10 intense intelligence collection and checks the best we 

11 could on Iran, the government of Iran, and on the Iranian 

12 intermediary. 

13 So yes, I viewed it as a fact that the Agency 

14 had been asked to support this by the President of the 

15 United States. 

16 Q You were all aware, however, that Colonel 

17 North, whatever his virtues and skills, was not an 

18 experienced operations officer in his own right — that 

19 is operations in the sense of covert operations? 

20 A I was aware he was not part of the Agency and 

21 considered an experienced operations officer. I'm not 

22 going to comment on Colonel North's qualities or 

23 abilities. 

24 Q I think it is worth commenting, Mr. Allen. 

25 Let me tell you where I'm coming from so you don't take 

|E<; 




82-688 0-88-21 



610 



ONftJBSIHED 



375 



1 it amiss. It would seem to me that you anc^^^^^H in 

2 particular are very experienced men in this line of work. 

3 ^^^^^^Hhas been doing it for decades, I guess — a long 

4 time. 

5 A He's much older than I am. 

6 Q What I'm curious about is you all apparently 

7 for some reason didn't feel it appropriate to advise and 

8 counsel Colonel North when, if you did, you thought he 

9 was making operational judgments that might be 

10 questionable, and I would like to know why. Why didn't 

11 you say, 01 lie, wait a minute. Maybe you ought not to do 

12 it that way. 

13 A You mean at this juncture? 

14 Q At that juncture. 

15 A Right now? 

16 Q Yeah. 

17 A At the time we, as I told you, I had already 

18 had discussions with Mr. Casey about this and I think he 

19 viewed it as a high risk operation. At this stage I was 

20 simply trying to absorb a lot of new information on 

21 funding technic[ues, on schedules. There was a feeling 

22 that this would be over with fairly quickly and 

23 successfully. 

24 In retrospect, if we could always think back 

25 and do differently, I probably would have cautioned him 



wmma 



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ONCUSSMD 



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1 that Colonel North was an individual I could talJc to 

2 candidly. Particularly in my OSD days I took Colonel 

3 North on a number of times successfully. But I did not 

4 question at this stage. 

5 Q Is that because you — let's talk about you — 

6 you did not really see an unacceptable level of risk at 

7 this point? 

8 A I think that's basically it. I know and I had 

9 dwelled on the point that, certainly mentally and 

10 internally, that there would be political fallout if this 

11 was suddenly exposed, but at the same time I recognized 

12 the political value if this was a success, particularly 

13 in narrowing the problems in southwest Asia, and that was 

14 my principal concern at that time. 

15 I had suddenly been saddled for 3 days with 

16 the hostage problem, which was taking up an inordinate 

17 amount of my time. I also wanted that resolved, very 

18 candidly, very pragmatically, and I did not think that 

19 was an ignoble objective, to try to save the lives of a 

20 number of Americans in Lebanon. 

21 Why I did not question it? At this stage it 

22 had not been tried. This was a new approach and there 

23 was a certain plausibility to it, that it might be — 

24 sometimes private initiatives in our history have proven 

25 to be very successful. 



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Q Let me deal with the risk factor, though, as 
it relates to intermediaries because that's what truly 
puzzles me, and maybe it is the benefit of 20/20 
hindsight, but I want your thoughts on it. It would seem 
to me here, where I gather you were not being told of how 
you would determine what the Iranians were going to pay, 
that that was kind of left out there, something you all 
weren't going to know about. 

Nothing causes people to get mad and take 
revenge quicker that I can think of aside from being 
scorned in love than stung for money. And that danger 
would be inherent in this kind of a setup. ' 

A It was potentially there, and I agree with 
your comment, that people who are out money can be very 
revengeful. At this stage, though, I had no inkling that 
there would be a true falling out in the summer of '86 
and that this thing would go on. He had the feeling, 
really, that there was a finite process in motion, that 




I think that also shaped my thinking, 
recognizing that the Israelis would like nothing better 
than to influence us in certain ways to further Israeli 
interests. I think we always realized — at least I did 



UmSSIFIED 



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UNCLASSIFIED 



378 



— the Israeli agenda here. I can't speak for others. 
But at this stage it was a plausible scheme 
and potentially workable. The schedule, as you recall, 
was typed up and a copy was made available which I think 
was kept in Mr. Clair George's safe, as I recall — I may 
be wrong in that — but it was kept in someone's safe. 

Q Let me give you another operational security 
question. You certainly were aware, whether you read it 
or not, that General Secord had unkind things said in the 
press about his involvement for money with Wilson. You 
were not aware of that? 

A Let me jump ahead a little. As soon as I 
recognized Mr. Secord was involved, I recall discussing 

this with^^H^^H^|^H^^^^^^H|^HH|^^HH 

^^^^^^^^^^E^said this name sort of rings a bell. You 
better check into some people^^^^^^^^^H 

what they know about General 




And he discusaed this, I think, with^^l 
and^^^^^^^^^^|recalled Major 
General Secord had resigned from the Pentagon. He was on 
the list to make three-star, and just at the time he was 
on the list to be promoted it came to the attention of 
Mr. Carlucci that Mr. Secord was involved in some 






614 



UNCUSMO 



379 



1 problems with Mr. Wilson and the star was taken away and 

2 Mr. Secord retired from the military. 

through^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Jmade known 

4 the background on Secord and indicated that he had had 

5 some problems in the past. But I got that, I think, you 

6 know, sometime in February and that worried me, yes. 

7 Q With that worry, did someone, you for example, 

8 go to Colonel North and say. Colonel North it's not 

9 necessarily a good idea to get somebody that the New York 

10 Times is particularly interested in in the position of 

11 being the guy that's handling the money going to and from 

12 Iran? Any suggestion of that sort raised to Colonel <- 

13 North? 

14 A I don't recall raising Major General Secord's 

15 reliability in the February-March time frame. 

16 , Q Any recollection of^^^^^^^^Hor operations 

17 people would have brought that to the attention of 

18 Colonel North as something to give some thought to? 

19 A Z recall that they never told me about it. 

20 Let me put that properly. To the best of my 

21 recollection, they never discussed --^^^^^^^^H never 

22 discussed that with me. 

23 Q Let oe flip 1 1 nrminrU HIJ ignfBneT ^Hnrt j>.. rrrr 

24 tell you in the January-February-Marc^^^riod of^'lkae why 

25 he was placing jpartieular reliance or confidence in 



mmm 



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UNeLASSIHED 



380 



1 Ganaral Sacord? 

2 A H« spoks highly of Ganeral Sacord 's ability to 

3 (juickly gat things dona and to cut through tha 

4 bureaucratic process. It's clear he had high regard for 

5 Major General Secord. 

6 MK. WOODCOCK: Let ma ask a quick question. 

7 Did you share withf^^^^^^^Hthe information that you 

8 received on Mr. Secord? 

9 THE WITNESS: I don't think so, but I don't 

10 recall. 

11 BV MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

12 Q What was your relationship with^^^^^^^^^| 

13 during that period of time? Was it strained or did you 

14 have a very comfortable relationship? 

15 A It was cordial. He was working in a different 

16 aspect of this and quite busily, along with all of the 

17 operations of the Near East/South Asia, and I was focused 

18 on global terrorism. This clearly took extra hours of my 

19 week, but I did not have time much to sit and reflect on 

20 this from an operational security point of view or 

21 reliability of intermediaries. If I had nothing else to 

22 do but focus on this — and that was, I think, the beauty 

23 that Mr. Cave came in on 5 March and ha essentially ended 

24 up spending most of his time working out of my office. 

25 Q Just one other question on that. By the end 



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UNKASffiD 



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1 of January, moving into early February, Mr. Clarridga has 

2 done his report which ultimately is used as the basis for 
^^^H^^^^^^Hj^^^^^^^l process was under 

4 way by the end of January '86; isn't that correct? 

5 A Yes. A decision had been made to form^^^l 

6 ^^^^^^^^ 

7 Q Had the decision that you would be a part of 

8 i^^^^^B^^^° been made at that point? 

9 A Sometime around that time frame, yes. 

10 Q Was there thinking at that time of taking the 

11 hostage issue, at least as it related to Lebanon, away 

12 from the Hear East Division and putting it into] 

13 as of January-February '86? 

14 A There was. Mr. Clarridga wanted it under his 

15 aegis, but that process was negotiated over a period of 

16 , months after that, and even though 

17 ^^HHH followed hostage issues it wasn't until later in 

18 the spring or early summer that the entire account came 

19 to^^HfroB an operational collection point of view. 

20 Q You were aware thaajj^H^HB^opposed having 

21 the hostage matters in Lebanon taken from the 

22 jurisdiction of Hear East and put into^^H^H isn't 

23 that correct? 

24 A It's my understanding from discussions with 

25 Mr. Clarridga thatfl^HHj^^Hj would have preferred to 



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1 hava kept the hostage issues under his aegis. ^^^H 

2 ^^^^BBwas making what he believed to be good progress 

3 at the time. In fact, I was quite encouraged with soma 

4 of the collection efforts undei^HjHj^H^^HBaegis. 

5 Q Did that jurisdictional evolutionary process 

6 affect adversely your relationship withl 

7 A No, I don't think so. That was a matter 

8 between senior officials of the Directorate of Operations 

9 and I was not involved in that decisionmaking. I was 

10 more interested in the coU^rip^pn results, also in 

11 getting requirements to the field as Director of the 

12 Hostage Location Task Force. That was my focus. 

13 Q By this point in time, late January or early . 

14 February 1986, you had become aware, had you not, that 

15 Mr. Ghorbanifar was doing business with Mr. Khashoggi on 

16 arms deals? 

17 A Can we take a break? I'm starting to fade and 

18 I want to be able to answer these questions as precisely 

19 as possible. 

20 (A brief recess was taken.) 

21 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

22 Q Where were we? We were going to talk about 

23 Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi. Mr. Allen, I wa« trying to 

24 ask a question before we broke. Let me try it again. 

25 la terms of your knowledge of Khashoggi being 



in terms or your Knowieagi 



618 



UNIlASSra 



383 



1 a part of Mr. Ghorbanifar 's, the business side of Mr. 

2 Ghorbanifar 's efforts on this transaction, were you aware 

3 that Khashoggi was playing a role by late January-early 

4 February of '86? 

5 A I don't think so. I don't think that I knew 

6 he was involved in the financing aspects. Sometime 

7 during the late winter or early spring of 1986 Mr. Ledeen 

8 mentioned that he had had dinner in London with Khashoggi 

9 and Ghorbanifar and spoke of what an extravagant dinner 

10 it was indeed. So I won't proceed further with any more 

11 descriptions. 

12 But that suggested to me, at a minimus, the 

13 two knew each other, but he did not speak, Mr. Ledeen, of 

14 Khashoggi being involved that I can recall, being 

15 involved in the financing. 

16 Q Let me try to refresh your recollection, if 

17 not as to this transaction at least as to the existence 

18 of major transactions that Khashoggi and Ghorbanifar 

19 appear to have been putting together. Let me show you a 

20 menorandUB froo^^H^^H dated February 10, 1986, CIIN 

21 number 1025, and with it is CIIN 1026, 1027 and 1028, the 

22 last of which appears to be addressed to you, ^. Allen. 

23 That will be Exhibit 35. 

24 (The document referred to was 

25 narked Allen Exhibit Number 3 5 



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7 

8 

9 
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18 
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20 
21 
22 
23 

24 

25 



for identification.) 

A Yes, I recall seeing this last document at 
some point. 

Q Oo you recall it being in the February '86 
time period? 

A Z can't put a date on when I saw it. Z take 
it on faith that this was sent to me in the February time 
frame . 

Q End of February or beginning of February? 

A I said in the February time frame. I assume 
at the beginning of February. -[ 

Q Do you recollect who sent it to you and for' 
what purpose? 

A I don't recall who sent it to me. It clearly 
came from the Directorate of OpiKrations and it could be 
someone in the Near East Division sent it to me, and I 
ass\im« that's where it came from, for my information, 
because they knew that at that stage I was maintaining 
some, at least, telephonic contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar. 

Q In terms of the reference to Mr. Khashoggi and 
his relationship to Mr. Ghorbanifar, did you make any use 
of that information? 
A 




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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 

8 So after soma discussion I don't think Z 

9 pursued it. I've always regretted I didn't. 

10 Q Oo you recollect bringing this Khashoggi 

11 aspect to Director Casey's attention? 

12 A I don't think I did. I don't recall ever V 

13 doing it, no. 

14 Q So in this period of time you have no at least 

15 present recollection of having a discussion with Casey 

16 that Khashoggi was involved in some fashion with 

17 Ghorbanifar? 

18 A No, sir, I don't have a recollection. 

19 Q And similarly nothing was said to you by Casey 

20 about business relations or acquaintances he had that had 

21 dona business with Khashoggi? 

22 A No, sir, he didn't. 

23 Q According to the Tower Commission, Colonel 

24 North was in London to meet with Ghorbanifar and Mr. Nir 

25 on February 5, 1986 and he returned on or about February 



UiaSStFtEO 



621 



msimm 



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either^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^V Mr. 

2 Koch and General Secord. Do you recall the events of 

3 February 5 through 7, '86? 

4 A Well, I think I can clarify that. I think 

5 that that particular reference was to the 29 January 

6 meeting and I believe there was only one meeting, and I 

7 think I caused the confusion by stating that I thought 

8 the meeting occurred around February 7 and^^^^^^^^^B 

9 said he felt that that was the wrong date. He couldn't 
10 put a time frame on it, but he thought it was in January. 

^^^^^^^^Hwas 

12 discovered my notes saying it was 29 January. There was 

13 only one meeting, sir. 

14 Q The only problem with the chronology is 

15 apparently the Tower folks are making reference to a 

16 North calendar that shows him returning from London on 

17 February 7. Do you happen to have a calendar that would 

18 show when you would have met with Secord, et al. to have 

19 this meeting which shows up on your notes? '-' " 

20 A The Independent Counsel has my calendar, 

21 doesn't he? "^ 

22 MS. -MC GINN: I'm not sure. If you gave it to 

23 us, he has them. - -»- - 

24 THE WITNESS: I don't have my '86 calendar, 

25 sir. It has been gone for weeks. I as a general rule. 



iiNWStFsn 



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ICUSSiEO 



387 



1 however, instructed my secretary on sensitive meetings 

2 relating to this initiative never to put it in the 

3 calendar. 

4 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

5 Q All right. So the meeting that we have been 

6 discussing as being the January 29 meeting by your 

7 recollection would be the meeting the Tower Commission 

8 references as being in the February 5-7 period of time? 

9 JV I think so, and I think I contributed to the 

10 confusion. I think ^^^^^^^^| had the correct time 

11 frame, although he didn't have a specific date. He said 

12 late January. 

13 Q That's fine. Thank you. 

14 Now I want to break away from Ghorbanifar, 

15 Iran and the like for a moment and go to knowledge that 

16 you would have had of a potential money for hostage 

17 transaction, specifically the payment of money, whether 

18 one characterizes it as bribes or ransom, to folks 

19 holding American hostages. We talked about that the 

20 other day. 

21 Z wanted to show you two docxunents, one that 

22 we talked about this morning, the January 15 document, 

23 but also a memorandum dated February 7, 1986 which refers 

24 to you, Mr. Allen, I think, in passing, and I don't mean 

25 to suggest to you that you necessarily even saw this 



UNetASW 



623 




388 

1 memorandum, but I'd like you to look at it and keep in 

2 mind the January 15 item that I showed you earlier this 

3 morning and see if it gives you any further recollection 

4 of knowledge that you would have had in the January- 

5 February '86 period of a proposal or program or possible 

6 operation involving the payment of money to people 

7 holding American citizens hostage. 

8 The item I am going to show you is a February 

9 7, 1986 memorandum, our number N-9213, and consists of 

10 one, two, three pages relating tol 

11 (The document referred to was 

12 marked Allen Exhibit Number *36 

13 for identification.) 

14 A I think his name ^^^^^^^^^H ^° Y^^ want me 

15 to comment on this? 

16 , Q Yes, sir. 

17 A When I became Director of the DCI Hostage 

18 Location Task Force I became aware that a consultant to 

19 the Department of State's Office for Combatting 

20 Terrorism, Mr. Terry Arnold, had been working on a number 

21 of projects for Ambassador Oakley and that he had had 

with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^^^ 
^^^^^^^^ He ,B|^^^^^^^^^|was under 

24 time, had had his passport lifted. He was either under 

25 indictment or had been indicted, had been tried. I don't 




624 



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12 

13 

14 

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20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




B 



389 



know precisely what It was. 

He had come through Ross Perot's, a senior 
official in Ross Perot's organization had asked Colonel 
North to look into the fact that^^^^^^^Hhad some 
extraordinary contacts 




lad lived life truly in the fast lane — 
and that he felt that this individual might have contacts 
that could assist in freeing the American hostages. 

Mr. Arnold, at Colonel North's request, had 
been working witt^^^^^^^^^H and Mr. Arnold is 
rather benevajjieot- jgetired Foreign Service Officer bac]c on 
contract — or was back on contract. Colonel North 
wanted someone else to assess this fellow. I met him 
once in Washington. ^^^^H^^Hhad been interviewed 
one or more times by the FBI. 

I bought this chap dinner. I did not like 
what I saw. He was talking about contacts. I gave him 
no encouragement whatsoever, called Colonel North the 
next day and said that this man is untrustworthy. I 
don't think he had the access. I gave him an assignment^ 
said if vo^ really have access) 




625 



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25 




When you give nel 

X think perhaps you have some 
credentials. I don't know any of the details on some o£ 
his grandiose schemes. ^^^^^^^^^^^Hcontinually tried 
to stay in touch with Arnold. He continually called the 
Department of State. He had some officials of Ross 
Perot, I think, calling Colonel North on this. He was a 
genuine nuisance. 

The last time he caused problems was in the' 
late summer of 1986, when he confrontedj 

land frightened j^^^^^^^^H and I called Mr. Buck 
Revell and Mr. Buck Revell sent some agents to visit^^^H 

and I think that's about the last I've dealt 
with him. 

Q So in terms of knowing anything that you would 
consider concrete in terms of a proposal to pay money for 
American hostages, this does not stir any further 
recollection? 

A That doesn't hold water. Colonel North, Mr. 
Arnold, no one in the U.S. Government had any confidence 
in this individual that I consider sleazy. 

Q Do you know who the author of this memo is? 

A It looks like it's prepared on White House/NSC 
type print. The material clearly is Mr. Arnold, because 



rnmmw 



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391 

ha used to send me memos or^^^^^^^^^^H and I have a 
file, or the hostage location task force has a file on 

It may be that Mr. Arnold had that composed 
over at the White House, but I shouldn't speculate. It's 
not my business. 

Q Thank you. 

A I think Colonel North accepted my view that 

[was a man that offered nothing for the U.S. 

Government . 

Q With regard to your relationship with Mr. 
Ghorbanifar, we have a number of memoranda of telephone 
conversations that began in February and continued in -one 
fashion or another for quite some time thereafter. How 
did it come to pass that Mr. Ghorbanifar and you became 
correspondents, if you will? 

A This was basically while he was working for 
the NSC. It was believed, and Colonel North asked that I 
remain in contact with him as a way to stay in touch with 
where ha was. 




At the same time, Mr. Casey had made a 
decision that we would continue to, if I can use a 
colloquial expression, string Mr. Ghorbanifar along, 



imtssra 



627 



wmmm 



392 



1 showing interest in counterterrorism, that as soon as he 

2 helped resolve this NSC initiative that we would 

3 certainly turn to him on counterterrorism. Now whether 

4 Mr. Casey was really serious in this, I don't know, but 

5 that was the idea. 

6 I was to, and the idea was conveyed to him, I 

7 believe, by more than just me, that we were interested in 

8 what he had to say about terrorist matters. So it became 

9 sort of a habit that he would call once in a while and 

10 convey to me some certain information and then, as we' 

11 cane closer to the McFarlane trip Colonel North asked me 

12 to contact him from time to time on specific 

13 developments. ^ 

14 Q Why was it felt that these kind of contacts 

15 could not be turned over to someone else? 

16 A It could have been handled by someone «lse. 

17 -Qs-- To put it another way, Mr. Ghorbanifar is 

18 getting a very highly paid, higRly •killed, by government 

19 standards, case officer support h«r«. 

20 A Well, it took a little time to converse and 

21 for him to convey some information. Then I would write 

22 it up and make it available ^°|^^^^^^| ^^- <^^ve, Mr. 

23 Clarridge, Colonel North, and I'd keep a copy for myself. 

24 And if it were of sufficient interest I'd send a copy up 

25 to the Director and Deputy Director. 



uimstnED 



628 



wmsm 



393 



1 Q In terms of the decision, though, that you 

2 were going to be the contact point, was that simply a 

3 matter of evolution or direction by Casey? 

4 A I remember Clair George talking to me one day 

5 on secure. I was at the White House, and I can't 

6 remember quite the topic. But he said, well, you're in 

7 essence his case officer for the time being. Just stay 

8 in contact with Ghorbanifar, and I did. 

9 Q Let me show you a couple of memoranda, a 

10 memorandum dated February 10, 1986, a February 8 and ■ 

11 February 9 telephone call. We're not going to spend any 

12 time with them, but if you'll just identify them as bding 

13 yours. 

14 (The document referred to was 

15 marked Allen Exhibit Number 37 

16 ■ for identification.) 

17 And then a February 19, 1986 memorandum on a 

18 February 10 telephone call. That will be Exhibits 37 and 

19 38. 

20 (The document referred to was 

21 marked Allen Exhibit Number 38 

22 for identification.) 

23 (Pause.) 

24 A Those are my memos. 

25 Q In terms of these conversations that you were 



mmmn 



629 




394 

1 having with Mr. Ghorbanifar, apart from making notes and 

2 ultimately preparing a memorandum did you record those 

3 conversations in any fashion? 

4 A I recorded some of those conversations, and 

5 . I'm not sure. I think that started in February '86. 

6 Q February '8 6? 

7 A Yes. 

8 Q Could you tell me how you would have made 

9 those recordings? 

10 A With a recorder provided to ma by CIA's Office 

11 of Security. J^^^^^^^^^^l made them available to ma. 

12 Q 

^^^^^^^1 as 

14 Q And this device would have been attached to 

15 what phone — your phone at the office or your phone at 

16 home? 

17 A Both. 

18 Q Is it a portable device you just plug into the 

19 telephone? Okay. And it would have generated cassettes? 

20 It's not a reel-to-reel, I assume. 

21 A I had a couple of cassettes that I used. I'd 

22 use them over and over. 

2 3 Q That's the next question. When you recorded a 

24 conversation in February 1986 and did a memo, would you 

25 retain the recording? 




mmm 



630 




395 

1 A No, sir. I kept no master list. 

2 Q So you would use the recording to prepare your 

3 memorandum. 

4 A Yes, sir. 

5 Q And then recycle the tape. Is that what 

6 happened? 

7 A That's correct. 

8 Q On the February 10 call just one note in 

9 passing. The date of that telephone call, February 10, 

10 is the date that $3.7 million came into the CIA's] 

11 account. There's nothing I recollect about that being 

12 mentioned in the telephone call, .^iq you Jiave any recajLl 

13 of Ghorbanifar keeping you abreast of money flow during 

14 this period of time? 

15 A No. I learned of those either from Colonel 

16 North, that they had showed up in, say, Mr. Secord's 

17 account, or I learned it from the Directorate of 

18 Operations that it had showed up -'^|^^^^^^^| or I 

19 remember one time I think Mr. Juchniewicz mentioned it 
2 had shown up. No, he did not talk about fund flows. 

21 Q The next day, February 11, 1986, General 

22 Secord is shown as having met with Director Casey at 

23 Director Casey's office. Any knowledge that you had of 

24 the meeting between Secord and Casey on February 11, 
25 



1986? 



\mmm 



631 




1 A NO. 

2 Q February 13 and 14, 1986, the Army delivered 

3 its TOW missiles to the Central Intelligence Agency. 

4 Were you being kept posted on the status of the TOW 

5 arrangement at that time? 

6 A Yes. 

7 Q And this would have again been North that was 

8 keeping you posted? 

9 A I believe I was obtaining that from talks with 

10 Operations Directorate people. 

11 Q At any time — 

12 A And I didn't try to keep minute following of 

13 this, but I generally was aware of when the TOWs were 

14 being moved and the status of their sanitization and 

15 packaging. 

16 Q We know that HAWK parts got talked about later 

17 on in the year. Were you aware of any discussion of HAWK 

18 parts at this period, January-February 1986? 

19 A HAWKs. I recall HAWKs became a subject when a 

20 list was prepared of 240 items and Colonel North was 

21 anxious that a copy of this be made available, I believe, 

22 to the Director of Operations and somehow either I picked 

23 up the list that he had acquired — 

24 Q I'm going to trouble you with that in a 

25 moment. Most people place that in March. What I'm 



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UNOtASSMD 



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looking at is whether you have any recall of basically 
two HAWK part situations, one occurring early in 1986, 
earlier than March, and then the actual list coining in in 
March of 1986. 

A I don't know. I'd have to go backj 
There may have beenl 
:o HAWK missiles. I would not be surprised if 
I found them, but I don't recall. 

Q There was a mention in, was iti 
interview where he mentioned the HAWK parts? 

Ihad some recall of spare HAWK missiles or spare 
HAWK parts. 

MR. WOODCOCK: f^H^^^^H recalled two 
different HAWK spare lists. He recalled one in January 
of 1986 and another in March of 1986. 

THE WITNESS: Please identify thel 





THE WITNESS: There' 
who also knew about this initiative. I know who you're 
talking about. I can't recall a list in January. I know 
in early March a list was provided of 240 line items by 
the Iranians to Mr. Ghorbanifar, who provided it, I 
guess, to the United States. 



iiMf^iMH) 



633 



mmKn 



398 



1 BV MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

2 Q I want to come back to this Ghorbanifar 

3 raising of money — raising of the issue of money going 

4 to the contras. Thus far we've talked about a reference 

5 to it that occurred on January 13. There's another 

6 reference of January 26 that we saw relating to the tape- 

7 recorded conversation and your notes on that meeting. 

8 There apparently is another reference to money 

9 for the contras in a conversation that is said to have 

10 occurred February 18, 1986, between yourself and Mr. 

11 Ghorbanifar. That is the Tab D reference to Exhibit 27. 

12 If you would look at Tab D perhaps you can "" 

13 tell me first how it is that we know that that was a 

14 February 18 telephone conversation. 

15 A Well, as I pointed out, Mr. Rizzo did not show 

16 his memorandum to me. He did not clear it with me, and I 

17 did not see it until it showed up on my desk. These are 

18 notes, Attachment D, these are notes that I took in 

19 London on the 26th of January, 1986. 

20 Q So Mr. Rizzo 's attribution of these notes to 

21 February 18, 1986, is in error; is that right? The Tab D 

22 reference is in the letter on the second page. 

23 A That is absolutely in error and Mr. Rizzo 

24 should have checked that with me before he sent the damn 
2 5 memo down here. 



wwnmm 



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Q Let me come at you another way on that, Mr. 
Allen, You have written notes of the January 26 meeting. 
Were they collected as a group somewhere when last you 
saw them, marked as your notes of the January 26 meeting? 

A Were they collected and properly marked? 
Properly or improperly, but at least kept 



Q 
together. 

A 
notebook. 
Q 
A 
Q 



They are in a separate notebook, sir, spiral 

When last did you see that spiral notebook?' 

Probably in January. 

Okay. And you don't know, sitting here today 



A January or February. The Inspector General 
may have asked me about it in the February time frame, so 
they showed it to me, but they took it away, I think. 

Q You don't know today whether that notebook is 
on the box I've not seen yet? 

A I'll take a look at it tonight. 
MS. MC GINN: Off the record. 
(A discussion was held off the record.) 
BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 
Q There's a reference in the Tower Commission 
report to a meeting Mr. Ghorbanifar had with yourself and 
Mr. Allen on the 18th of February. Do you have a 



ltNfitftS«D 



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25 



ONKiBSIflfD 



400 



recollection of such a meeting? 




You said a meeting with Mr. Allen? 

I'm sorry, 

That Mr. Ghorbanifar met with me an 



on 18 February 1986? 

I think I've gotten that scrambled, so let me 

I recall no such meeting. 

You are right. My error, Mr. Allen. I 



with regard to the meetings that took place in 
Frank£/rt on February 20, whe^^^^^^^^^fand Mr. North 
and Mr. Nir went out to meet Mr. Ghorbanifar and 
apparently hoped to meet^^^^^^^^^H did you 
participate in the preparation for that attempted meeting 
on 20 February? 

A No, I did not participate in the preparations. 
I was aware the meeting was 




Q Mr. Ghorbanifar apparently tried to reach you 
or did reach you during that period of time. On February 
23, we have a transcript of that call. This will be 

Exhibit 39. 

(The document referred to was 



\mmB 



636 




401 

1 marked Allen Exhibit Number 39 

2 for identification.) 

3 If you would look at Exhibit 39, I would like 

4 you to identify it for me, if you can, as a transcript of 

5 a telephone conversation that you would have had on the 

6 23rd of February 1986 with Mr. Ghorbanifar. 

7 (Pause.) 

8 A I believe that's a conversation I had with Mr. 

9 Ghorbanifar. . ^ 

10 Q 1%at BMBO appiiars to b« a verbatim record of 

11 the conversation. Can you tell me in some instances we 

12 would have had verbatim transcripts and others summaries? 

13 A I guess I had more time. I probably asked my 

14 secretary to do this one. I didn't — if it — I can't 

15 answer that question. I don't recall. 

16 ' Q As to that tape, it too went the way of the 

17 others? 

18 A I don't know that I have that tape. I reused 

19 the tape again and again. 

20 Q Mr. Ghorbanifar appears to be objecting to Mr. 

21 Hakim in this telephone conversation with you. Do you 

22 recollect that objection being voiced, and am I right 

23 that it's Mr. Hakim that's being objected to? 

24 A At the time, I wasn't certain, as you can see 

25 from my conversation of the individual to whom he was 



IHietA$«D 



637 



iuwytssffl 



402 



1 referring, and based on my knowledge at this point it 

2 appears that it was Mr. Albert Hakim. 

3 Q Did you bring that issue to Colonel North's 

4 attention? 

5 A I don't recall. I made this available, 

6 probably, to Colonel North because my secretary had a 

7 very limited dissemination list for these sensitive 

8 contacts. 

9 Q Nonetheless, on the period February 26-27, 

u 

10 when the trip to Frankf/rt is made, Mr. Hakim goes on the 

11 trip; isn't that right, acts as translator? 

12 A On the 26th and 27th of February? I don't* 

13 know. 

14 Q You don't remember? 

15 A I don't recall being told that Mr. Hakim was 

16 there, unless there's reference in my notes somewhere to 

17 this effect. I was not aware that Mr. Hakim was there as 

18 a translator. It's conceivable that I was told that, but 

19 I don't remember. I just frankly don't remember. I 

20 thin]^Hfl^^^^|was there. Colonel North, Mr. Nir. I 

21 thought Mr. Secord was there, but I don't know — Major 

22 General Secord. I think Major General Secord was there. 

And I believe ^^m^^^^came up. 

24 Q The only thing I'm really interested in is 

25 whether or not you recall any discussions with any of 



UNCtJtSSIFe 



638 



vwssm 



403 



1 those folks about taking the risk of offending 

2 Ghorbanifar by having Hakim join the gathering in light 

3 of his concerns about Hakim. 

4 A I can't recall that. The memo, I am certain, 

5 was made available to some of the participants in the 

6 meeting. 

7 Q When the meeting broke up, which would be 

8 about the 26th of February, 1986, North sent a memorandum 

9 to I believe it was Admiral Poindexter saying that Mike 

10 Ledeen appeared to have a financial interest in the arms 

11 transfer. Was that concern on the part of Colonel North 

12 about Ledeen having a financial interest in these matters 

13 ever conveyed to you? 

14 A What was the date of Colonel North's 

15 memorandum? 

16 Q It would be February 27, 1936. 

17 A At that time frame I believe I had heard 

18 Colonel North express concern that Ledeen was in some way 

19 financially involved in the transaction, but I do not 

20 recall the specifics. At that time I heard no specifics 

21 on such types of financial arrangements that Mr. Ledeen 

22 may have had. 

23 Q All right. Do you have any further 

24 recollection of what it was that Colonel North said he 

25 was relying on to have these concerns or reach the 



limKSSIflfD 



639 



immm 



404 



1 conclusion that Ledeen had a financial interest in the 

2 transaction? 

3 A At that specific time? 

4 Q At or about that time. 

5 A Not at that time, no, sir. 

6 Q Did there come a time when you learned the 

7 basis for Colonel North's view that Ledeen had such an 

8 interest? 

9 A Not Colonel North's view. Mr. Nir, when he 

10 was in Washington in September 1986, cane to the Agency 

11 to meet on a variety of counterterrorism developments^ 

12 and I recall walking him out to the front entrance and he 

13 stated that it was his belief that Mr. Ledeen had a 

14 financial interest still in the transactions involving 

15 the United States and Mr. Ghorbanifar, and he made some 

16 statement to this effect. 

17 Q Did you ever have occasion at any time to talk 

18 to Mr. Ledeen about whether or not he had such an 

19 interest? 

20 A He called me after the Tower Commission report 

21 was published and vehemently denied it. 

22 Q Other than that conversation, post-Tower 

23 Commission report, you had had no conversations with Mr. 

24 Ledeen about this matter; is that correct? 

25 A Not that I recall. To make the record full, I 



HNWstffin 



640 



\mmm 



405 



1 did convey w at Mr. Nir had told me in September to 

2 Colonel Nortn. 

3 Q Yes, sir. Thank you. 

4 With regard to the trip that was made by 

5 Colonel North ,^^^^^^^^| and Mr. Cave to Paris on March 

6 7 and 8, 1986, what role, if any, did you have in 

7 preparing them for that trip? 

8 A Mr. Cave had come by on March 5. That's when 

9 he was first briefed on this sensitive White House 

10 initiative. H^^^^^^^^ Stbught him over, Z believe, to 

11 ay office ant^A^ated ^ was inj^i^ant for mmr^ brief Mr. 

12 Cave on everything th^^ltcA^ tr£hspir«d to^ipte. It wa"^ 

13 also important "that^ Mr. Cave b# shown! 



14 Z had known. &at Mr. Canre was coming aboard, at least was 

15 coming to ats fBL ot^ ^^^ Sftg*u«<^^^^^^^^Bhad —#- 

16 cooMAtSlFi,!! .^p^'^bruary time frame, because we were 

17 trying to have lunch about once a week, that he felt it 

18 was important to put someone full time on who was an 

19 experienced Iranian specialist and Farsi speaker, and I 
2 certainly agreed v^^ih that. 

21 So I prepared Mr. Cave as best as I could on 

22 what I knew about the activities to date. 

23 Q With regard to the March 7 meeting, March 7 

24 and 8 meeting, did you have discussions with North and/or 

25 Cave and/or^^^^^Kifter they returned about what 



IINCEHSStFfFn 



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transpired at that meeting? 

A Yes. I talked certainly with Mr. Cave. I 
also talked with^^^^^^^^H who expressed optimism that 
^^^^^^^^^Hwas indeed a powerful individual reporting 
directly to the Prime Minister, and I recal] 
having some optimism that the initiative would succeed. 

He said this man,^^^^^^^^^^K can make 
decisions, 




|he's tough and h« 

can get things done. 

MR. WOODCOCK: I gather he didn't mention »t 
that point that he had also met with — 

THE WITNESS: That came in the May time frame 
and Mr. Cave cited it to me numerous times. George has a 
way with words at times. 

BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 
Q Mr. Allen, you testified a little bit earlier 
that you had seen Mr. Cave's memorandum of what occurred 
at the March meeting. 
A Yes, sir. 

Q Let me show you Mr. Cave's memorandum of that 
meeting which I'd like to have marked as Exhibit 40. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 40 

^rI 



642 



UNCIASSMD 



407 



1 for identification.) 

2 If you'd look at Exhibit 40, I'd like you to 

3 tell me if that is the Cave memorandum following the 

4 early March meeting. 

5 (Pause.) 

6 A I've read the memorandum. Mr. Cave probably 

7 put it together over in my office. 

8 Q And you would have read it in early March, I 

9 take it, the first couple of weeks of March? 

10 A Yes, sir, I would have read it as soon as it 

11 was typed, as soon as copies were made. 

12 Q And this memorandum is the memorandum that ~ 

13 does in its conclusion make reference to funds for 

14 Nicaragua; isn't that correct? 

15 A That's in the final paragraph, sir. 

16 Q Right, the paragraph that says: He — being 

17 Ghorbanifar — also proposed that we use profits from 
these deals others to fund ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M 

19 ^^^^^^^^^H We could do the same with Nicaragua. 

20 Now, as I understood what you told us a little 

21 bit ago while you read that, that did not make any . 

22 significant impact upon you; is that correct? 

23 A That's correct. And after the Inspector 

24 General's staff raised this with me when they were doing 

25 their investigations, I went back, I believe, and read 



wmmm 



643 



*4SS/f/ffl 



408 



1 the memorandum again, and I don't know that it helped my 

2 memory all that much. I may have vaguely recalled a 

3 reference to this in the memorandum. 

4 Q And sitting here today you have no recall of 

5 having discussed this matter with Mr. Cave? 

6 A No, sir. 

7 Q Have you and Mr. Cave had occasion within the 

8 last several months to discuss this memorandum and 

9 compare recollections on whether or not there was 

10 discussion on this point between the two of you? 

11 A After the Inspector General had raised this 

12 memorandum of Mr. Cave and after I had looked in my no'tes 

13 of my meetings with Ghorbanifar, I mentioned to Mr. Cave 

14 that there had been a couple of passing references by 

15 Ghorbanifar to the same matter but that I had forgotten 

16 it. We did not at that stage recall ever having 

17 discussed this memorandum that Mr. Cave prepared as to 

18 the final reference to Ghorbanifar and profits. 

19 Q In a word, he had no further recollection of 

20 having had discussions on this item with you any more 

21 than you did, is that correct, given what he told you? 

22 A Yes. I think we both commented that, you 

23 know, Ghorbanifar was wont to make these kind of sort of 

24 sweeping statements and we paid little heed to them. 

25 Q There are a series of conversations that you 



wmmn 



644 




409 

1 apparently had with Mr. Ghorbanifar and, from time to 

2 time, Mr. Nir in March, including conversations relating 

3 to his apparently being in financial difficulty. I want 

4 to run those memos by you quickly. 

5 Let me show you a series of memoranda which I think 

6 we'll just mark collectively: Memorandum dated March 9; 

7 call dated March 11, 1986; a memorandum of a March 20 

8 call dated March 21, 1986; memorandum of a March 24 call 

9 dated March 24, 1986; memorandum of March 28 call dated, 

10 excuse me, March 27 call dated March 28, 1986; another' 

11 March 27 call dated March 28, 1986; yet another dated 

12 March 28 on a memo dated March 30, 1986; another on Match 

13 28 dated April 2; and March 30 a memo dated April 7, 

14 198 6; and March 31, and that one's dated April 2, 1986. 

15 Let's mark it collectively as Exhibit 41. 

16 (The document referred to was 

17 marked Allen Exhibit Number 41 

18 for identification.) 

19 Mr. Allen, all I need to do is essentially 

20 have you flip through them and tell me if they are your 

21 memos of those conversations. Let me add two more to the 

22 list — a March 17 telephone call and March 18 memo, and 

23 a March 11 call and a March 12 memo. I think that does 

24 March. 

25 (Pause.) 



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umssifiED 



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A Those are my memoranda. 

Q With regard to what's related in thosa 
memoranda, by the time we get to late March, March 24, 
1986, there's an indication in the memorandum that 
Ghorbanifar is in financial difficulty and that Mr. Nir 
is supporting Ghorbanifar. Apart from what the memoranda 
themselves say, what did you know about the nature of 
Ghorbanifar' s financial difficulty and the nature of the 
support he was getting from Nir? 

A 




Other than that, I have no specific 
knowledge of Mr. GhorbanfiEi^s financial troubles, except 
what Mr. Nir had asserted, that he had to go into, I 
believe, his wife's account in order to cover some of the 
cost, I 

land that Ghorbanifar was helpinc 

I have no specifics except what's in these 
memoranda on what Mr. Nir and the Israelis were doing for 
Mr. Ghorbanifar. So I can't offer any further 
enlightenment. It's the first time we had any evidence 

IfW^imiftrn 




646 




411 

1 that Mr. Ghorbanifar was beginning to suffer financial 

2 problems. 

3 Q But in terms of how Nir or how Israel was 

4 helping Ghorbanifar, you didn't get any flesh on those 

5 bones? You didn't know what they were doing? 

6 A I've dealt with the Israelis and they don't 

7 give you much flesh on bones. 

8 Q Do you have a notion of whether it was 

9 business transactions or a loan or they put him on 

10 salary? None of that? You do»*t know?" 

11 A I don't know, Mr. Nir in essenc^-iifaS^cting 

12 as Ghorbanifar 's case officer on a day-to-day basis. 

13 Q The March 27, 1986, telephone conversation is 

14 from an unnamed NSC person. Was that Micha*l. Ledeen that 

15 you were talking to? 

16 A That was Mr. Ledeen. ^^'- .' ''"^ 

17 ~$ Q 'Sv^^^&ripwii^Miig^i ;-^-^^pgx,«^Mm ^^^^^1 ^n? 

18 you in Usance that Ghorbanifar was mMa at the CZA; is 

19 that right? 

20 A Precisely. 

21 Q Now why was he unhappy about the Central 

22 Intelligence Agency? 

23 A tB^^ he-tad h«*rd from his friend in 

24 California, who said that her apartment had been entered. 

25 He also conveyed that a man named Furmark — and I did 



UNEtiHSStFtED 



647 




412 

1 not know how to spell Furmark at that stage — a business 

2 associate in New York had had his office entered as well, 

3 and Mr. Ghorbanifar suspected the Central Intelligence 

4 Agency . 

5 Also, Mr. Ledeen, as I point out here, stated 

6 that we were not assisting him in his work in the area of 

7 counterterrorism. So I only recorded what Mr. Ledeen 

8 conveyed to me. As I have indicated, my role was to 

9 string Mr. Ghorbanifar along on the issue of terrorism, 

10 keeping him focused on the principal matter. Those were 

11 the instructions of Mr. Casey and I carried out Mr. 

12 Casey's instructions, I think, very faithfully. 

13 Q In terms of Ghorbanifar 's relationship with 

14 Furmark, any elaboration on that at that point? 

15 A I never even researched the Furmark aspect. I 

16 don't kn^^wSy I didn 'tg^I vi»j&."-r ha^^ 

17 ^ -Q~ ,^o yj^ di^Kt raise FurBnBi* a^^fin^^^^a^Ay 

18 and you didn't do any kind of tracing to see who this 

19 Furmark character was at that time? 

20 A No, sir. 

21 Q You would have circulated this memo, correct? 

22 A Yes, sir. 

23 Q Would you have circulated it to Mr. Casey? 

24 A I don't know. 

25 Q All right. 




UNWStFIED 



648 




m 




413 



1 A Certainly the Deputy Chief of NE would have 

2 obtained it, and Mr. Cave, and Colonel North and people 

3 of that nature, because^^^|HH|H came over and 

4 discussed the alleged entering of the girlfriend's 

5 apartment in California. I remember him mentioning that 

6 to me. 

7 Q Why was that of interest tq 

8 A I don't know. 

9 Q There was no CIA involvement in that action, I 

10 trust. — ^ -fc 

11 A Not to my knowledge. I don't think that that 

12 occurred as fa^p^B CIA is concerned. 

13 Q Did you then or do you now have any knowledge 

14 of who might have been entering one or both of those 

15 locations apart from common thieves? 

16 A I have no evidence. I have no knowledge. 

17 Q Did Mr. Furmark ever talk to you about the 

18 entry into his office at this period of time? 

19 A No. 

20 Q Which is another way of saying you never had 

21 occasion to talk with him in which he indicated that 

22 there was no theft of money or goods but documents 

23 appeared to be missing as a result of this entry, not 

24 because it says it in the memo but because you have talk 

25 to Furmark? Furmark never told you about this entry in 



mmrn 



649 



BfMSIflEO 



414 



1 any respect, I take it. 

2 A No, sir. And when I met Mr. Fumark in 

3 October '86 I had not connected him with this memorandum 

4 at all and had forgotten the name Furmark had been 

5 recorded in such a memo. 

6 Q When we come to March 28, just reading the 

7 memorandum it seems to me that Ghorbanifar was still a 

8 bit on a raw edge and that you were given the job of 

9 sorts of trying to calm him down; is that right? Was one 

10 of your functions to kind of smooth down Mr. 

11 Ghorbanifar 's feathers at that point? 

12 A Yes, sir. ' 

13 Q And Z take it one of his grievances by March 

14 28 is he is right upset that Hakim has approached 
^^^^^^^H^nd suggested that^H^^^Hdo business without 

16 going through Hakim; is that right? I'm sorry, without 

17 going through Ghorbanifar. 

18 A Mr. Nir told Mr. North that Ghorbanifar was 

19 outraged and was a problem, and Z recall it was on a 

20 Friday evening, I believe. I had just delivered my 

21 Hostage Location Task Force report to the White House and 

22 I was paged twice going over the Woodrow Wilson Bridge by 

23 Colonel North. I don't know how he did it twice in the 

24 span of a bridge, but he did. 

25 I had, I guess, my mobile telephone with me, 



DNtWIEn 



650 




415 

1 and I called Colonel North, and he said as soon as I 

2 arrived home call Ghorbanifar and try to give him some 

3 assurances and invite him to the United States 

4 immediately. 

5 Q Can you tell me how it came to pass that Hakim 

6 made this run ^^hII^^HI ^^^ this something that was 

7 discussed? 

8 A It was discussed, but the decision was not 

9 made when I was around. Mr. Cave probably could convey 

10 more direct information on that. Z prefer not to. 

11 Q Do you recall playing a role in the decision 

12 to have Hakim make this — 

13 A No, sir. I did not play any role in that. I 

14 did talk to Mr. Cave that I felt it was a mistake to try 

15 to bypass Mr. Ghorbanifar, that Mr. Ghorbanifar knew too 

16 much and could make us pay dearly at thac stage if we 

17 went directly into^^^^^H and I think Mr. Cave, after 

18 reflection, agreed with me. 

19 Q Gotcha. 

20 (A brief recess was taken.) 

21 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

22 Q In any event, the way that the ruffled 

23 feathers of Ghorbanifar were handled was that Colonel 

24 North suggested to you that you contact Ghorbanifar and 

25 suggest that he come in on the double-quick for a meeting 



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UNGLASSm 



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in Washington, D. C; is that right? 

A Yes. That was what occurred. 

Q And, as I understand the traffic here, you 
even agreed to pick up Mr. Ghorbanifar at the airport. 

A Which I did, along with Mr. Cave. 

^^I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HHlHi the 
meeting, which would have been April 3-4? 

A Yes. He arrived on April 3 and stayed until 

the 4th and then left for Cal ifor nia to visit his 

girlfrier 




I paid the bill, 
actually paid the bill and gave it to 



I believe. 




Needless to say, Colonel North was not happy. 




Q With regard to what occurred on April 3-4, can 
you give me a summary ojt the meetings that you attended 



'wnitSStftED 



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417 

and the discussions that were had? 

A The only meeting I attended was we picked him 
up at the airport when he arrived on the Concorde and 
took him to his room where I had made reservations, at 
the Ramada Renaissance Hotel near Dulles Airport, and we 
had lunch. And then in the evening Colonel North, I 
believe,^^^^^^^^^ and Mr. Cave met with him. I 
believe there was another meeting involving mayb^^^B 

Mr. Cave, and Mr. Ghorbanifar in the afternoon 
on the 4th just before Mr. Ghorbanifar left. 

Mr. Ghorbanifar called and told me he was 
leaving early and that was when I alertedH|HH^^H and 
Colonel North and Mr. Cave to this, and Mr. Cave and^^^J 
ll believe, went immediately to see him for a few 
moments before he left for California. 




Q It's apparently at about this time, April 4, 
that Colonel North prepares the draft memorandum which 
attracted the attention in the Tower Commission report 
which does reference diverting money to the contras. Did 
you have any information at all in early April that such 
an operation was at work on the Iranian initiative? 

A None whatsoever, sir.- »! knew nothing about 
that, knew nothing aQjeut the memorandum that was being 



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prepared by Colonel North. 

Q With regard to the HAWK missile parts, the 
list for which had come into the possession of the Agency 
in early March, did you have any involvement in the 
efforts to obtain prices for the parts, any role in that 
at all? 




Q With regard to negotiating a price, if you 
will, that th« Xzanianfi, w«r« to pay^ f or thesa goods, did 
you haw any understanding of how that process was 
worlcing and who was working it? 

A It was my understanding in discussions with 
Mr. Cave and with Colonel North that Mr. Ghorbanifar was, 
as had been understood, was trying to find financing in 
order to finance the cost of HAWK missiles, and I think a 
certain number of TOW missiles, which would sort of come 
together with a perhaps a concurrent visit by senior 
officials like Mr. McFarlane to Tehran. 

So I was aware that Mr. Ghorbanifar was having 



"wpfwmrn 



654 



WMMli 



419 




1 trouble or allegedly was having trouble raising funds, 

2 

3 

4 Q Let me focus on that, though. In/T terms of 

5 what the CIA needed to know, it needed to )cnow that it 

6 had enough money to cover whatever it was paying DOD? 

7 A That's correct. 

8 Q But taking it the next step, what it was 

9 Ghorbanifar was joing to pay for t h ^ j j f | )art8, whatf ^=- 

10 understanding did y^rhav* as of April as to who was ' 

11 responsible for giving a price to Ghorbanifar for hin to 

12 pay? 

13 A It was my understanding as far as the price 

14 that would be given to Ghorbanifar this would be 

15 something that the NSC, working with U.S. intermediaries 

16 like Major General Secord, would provide a price to Mr. 

17 Ghorbanifar. 

18 Q In terms of individuals, though, did you have 

19 a perception of whose role that would be — Ollie North 

20 as opposed to someone else? Do you get my drift? 

21 Somebody had to actually talk — 

22 A Who came to the final price which we would 

23 submit to the Iranian intermediary, who was arranging the 

24 financing? It was my impression — and I don't think I 

25 ever discussed it in detail — but the NSC would present 



•iRimsinED 



655 



UNCtASSIflED 



420 



1 a price to the Iranian intermediary and say you will have 

2 to finance this amount of money. 

3 Q When you use the term "NSC" , who are you 

4 referring to? 

5 A Well, Colonel North was the focal point for 

6 this activity. 

7 Q Was it your assumption that Colonel North 

8 would be the one to reach that price agreement with 

9 Ghorbanifar? 

10 A I don't think I ever thought it through vefy 

11 specifically, but it was my feeling that because Major 

12 General Secord was involved that there would be a prioe 

13 that he would want out of this for transporting the arms 

14 and that perhaps by then I believe I understood that a 

15 man named Hakim was also involved with Major General 

16 ' Secord, thajt there wouM.-bc — "^WP — ^^"^ -° ^ price 

17 whi^^t^ v^l 1 d-jIB^glr tBgfeatanattoiife-n rtri^ll^ vo! ^d cover 

18 all the costa^^ '-- '"^ "• ~' ^ 

19 Q Were you conscious of the fact that the CIA 

20 personnel apparently were bein? excluded from that 

21 negotiation? 

22 A Yes, sir. All we knew was we would submit a 

23 bill and say you have to have X number of dollars in a 

24 CIA account before we do anything, and all we did, as 

25 I've explained earlier and as you know, was handle the 



'iMfittSStRED 



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UimMSIFliD 



421 



bill. Wa were excluded from the overall pricing process. 

Q Did you have an understanding as to why you 
were excluded from the overall pricing process? 

A Well, again we felt we were a support activity 
and an intelligence collection support mechanism and that 
this was an NSC-Presidentially-approved initiative. It 
was apparent that we were not co be included in those 
types of final decisionmaking on the pricing. 

Q Did there ever coma a point in time whan that 
was actually explained or North took that position? 

A Ko, sir, not to my recollection. 

Q Kot to you anyway? 

A Not to me. 

Q The Tower Commission report indicates that 
Ghorbanifar was arrested on April 22 as a result of 
aspects of an American criminal investigation. Did you 
have knowladga of Ghorbanifar being arrested in lata 
April? 

A 




he had been arrested by 



Swiss police because of work that was — because of 
activities with Cyrus Hashemi. 



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UNCLASSIffiD 



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So Mr. Cave and I discussed it. 

Q Now when the Cyrus Hashemi point came up in 
connection with the arrest of Ghorbanifar, did anyone 
that you were talking with recall the role of Cyrus 
Hashemi back in June and July of 1985 in bringing forward 
Ghorbanifar initiative at that point in 




No. 



You yourself had no awareness? 
You're talle%ig about — 

Let me take you back. June 17 Casey %et« a. 
call from John Shaheeh mentioi^i? Cyrus Hashemi. Cyrus 
wants a nolle pros, all that good ««uff. 

A Yes, X recall. No, no one raised that 
subject, 1^ the beat of m; recollection, certainly not 
with JM. 1 cert^nly remeaber talking to^-^asey abouls^he 
arrest ot ahorbshifar Wnd alseT discussed it with 
Colonel North, that he had been held for 24 hours but 
then released by the Swiss police. 

Q Did you ever have occasion to discuss that 
with Ghorbanifar — the arrest? 
A No. 




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H-ASSIRED 



423 



Q Did there ever come a time when he actually 

admitted to you he had been arrested? 

A I don't recall. I don't think he mentioned 
it. I know that Mr. Nir became aware of his arrest 
because Mr. Nir mentioned it to me, that Ghorbanifar had 
discussed his arrest and Ghorbanifar had protested his 
innocence to Mr. Nir. 

Q With regard to that arrest, did that give rise 
to concerns about the security of this operation at that 
time? 

A No, not to my knowledge. This was a separate 
activity. It was viewed as Mr. Ghorbanifar perhaps being 
involved in another financial 




It appeared that he had other deals under 
way with a variety of elements. So the fact that he 
might have been involved in some form of arms transaction 
with Cyrus Hashemi certainly was not beyond question and 
we were not surprised. 

Q Was any effort made at that time to contact 
other law enforcement services of the United States to 
determine if they in fact had intentions of proceeding 
against Ghorbanifar? 

A I think, as I recall, that Colonel North 



"NurMm 



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UN(liASS(HED 



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obtained a list of all those individuals who had been 
arrested in that sting operation, and I don't believe Mr. 
Ghorbanifar's name appeared on it. 

Q May 6, 198 6, Colonel North and Mr. Cave met 
with Mr. Ghorbanifar in London. Did you have any role in 
preparing Cave and North for that trip? 

A No. I saw it as a preparatory trip perhaps to 
work out final arrangements relating to a senior level 
visit ! 

land occasionally during these 
meetings with Mr. Ghorbanifar ^nd^^^^^H^^^I or when 
the second channel was opened Mr. Cave would call me Co 
provide me with what one would call tip-offs 



Q North apparently came back to the States about 
May 8. Did you participate in any debriefing of Colonel 
North on the London meeting? 

A I don't recall what I did. I'm certain I 
talked to him on the secure telephone each time he 
returned. There were always occasions to discuss a 
variety of matters, so I'm sure that at soma point he may 
have discussed it with me. 

Q Do you recall that this meeting of the 6th, 
7th, 8th of May, that period of time, had to do with 
assuring that there would be financing for this 



IINfitftSStffffl 



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IINCt*SSfflEB 



425 



transaction? 

A That was my understanding, that that was a 
meeting to ensure, to see what the final arrangements 
were relating to the financing for the movement of HAWKs 
and perhaps TOW missiles. 

Q What aspect of financing was, to the best of 
your knowledge, discussed at that meeting — in other 
words, whose f inane ing^it ^ was|_ h ere? 

A I don't know. And if there's a memorandum 
that details that, I don't know of that either. 

Q Unfortunately, neither do I. Did it come to 
your attention in this first two weeks of May how mucfl 
Ghorbanifar and his confederates were going to be putting 
up? 

A I don't think I knew th« amount that they were 
having to financ 




Q But let me set that aside for a moment. In 
terms of what he and whoever his investors were, we now 
know Khashoggi, but in any event did you know during that 
period of time how much they were going to be paying? 



No. 



^"^WSSIflED 



661 



\mmm 



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Q You did not? 

A To the best of my knowledge I didn't )cnow at 
all. 

Q It appears that Khashoggi made his 
contribution and that a S15 million deposit was placed in 
a Lake Resources account about May 14, 1986. You had no 
contemporaneous knowledge of the amount Khashoggi was 
paying into Secord's account; is that correct? 

A No, sir, I did not. 

Q You did know, I assume, that two days later. 
May 16, $6.5 million was put by Secord into CIA's 
account? - 

A I thought it was on the 15th of May. Yes, I 
did know that the money had moved into the CIA account. 

Q But in terms of a difference between what had 
gone into Secord's account and what had come out to the 
CIA, you war* not conscious of that at the time? 

A I had no understanding of that figure, that 
total figure. 

Q With regard to the May trip, if you could give 
me an overview description of the role you played in 
preparation f°i^^^^^^^^B^^^^^|^^* trip. 

A Well, this became an extremely high priority 
after the meeting occurred, I guess, in Londor 




uHCHSSire 



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Q With regard to the trip itself were you 
monitoring event s in Tehran as they occurred? 

A 

and there was a little command post set up in the Near 
East division and staffed around the cloc}c by a variety 
of officers. Also, Colonel Earl and, I believe, from 
time to time Commander Coy at the White House managed a 
small command post in the NSC in Room 302. 



"^wntSSIREfl 



663 



(INCLASSn 



428 



1 I maintained my own command post, with 

2 occasional help from|^^^^^^^BIH| I didn't sleep much 

3 for those days. 

4 Q During the course of the trip did it come to 

5 . your attention that the $24.5 million figure as the price 

6 of the goods had come up and been brought to Cave and 

7 North's attention? 

8 AX recall upon the return preparation of a 

9 memorandum by Mr. Cave, and I don't have the memorandum 

10 in front of me, but there was a memorandum where X 

11 believe Mr. Cave talked about pricing and the fact that 

12 there were concerns for pricing. ' 

13 Q You would have had a debriefing session of 

14 some sort, I assume, with Mr. Cave when he returned? 

15 A Mr. Cave, as soon as he returned, he and I 

16 went to see Mr. Casey, I think. I think Mr. Cave saw Mr. 

17 Casey almost straight away and I sat in the meeting. 

18 Q During the course of that meeting with Mr. 

19 Casey was this pricing aspect discussed with Mr. Casey? 

20 A I don't remember. I'm sorry, I just can't 

21 recall. Generally it was a conversation where we were 

22 disappointed there was no resolution, and I believe Mr. 

23 Cave also talked to Mr. Casey about the fact that 

24 ^^^■^^■came to the airplane and asked to stay in touch 

25 directly with Mr. Cave, that he wanted to see this 

II 



"'mitSSIflfD 



664 




s 




P|Slt^^f1»f»)l 429 



1 initiative continue. 

2 Q Let me focus again, though, on the pricing 

3 piece of it. Mr. Cave has related to us a concern that 

4 the $24.5 million figure was put out by Ghorbanifar. 

5 They were told — that is. Cave was told that if the 

6 Iranian officials asked about the $24.5 million figure he 

7 was to say it was okay, and he has told us that he was 

8 concerned about that price, that Colonel North was 

9 concerned about that price. 

10 There was a discussionj*ith NffT^which wasn't 

11 terribly enlightening, ab<»ut why that price was arrived 

12 at. Nit^jthat as. kind of a Imd-in^can you tell me v/hat 

13 you knew about that pricing situation within the days 

14 that followed the trip to Tehran? 

15 A Not a great deal in addition to that. Mr. 

16 Cave did discuss with me the pricing, the fact that a 

17 couple of million may have been added to the price to 

18 cover a $1.7 million debt that Mr. Nir owed for some 

19 obscure reason that I still do not know the reason for, 

20 that it was $24 million, that this seemed to be 

21 relatively high considering the quantities of the weapons 

22 and spare parts. 

23 I didn't focus in any great depth on it. It 

24 appeared that this was a problem at that time, although I 

25 certainly began to focus on the pricing around 20 June 



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and then throughout Julj 

[But at that stage, not knowing 
what price the NSC had provided to the Iranian 
intermediary, it was very difficult for us to discern — 
Mr. Cave and I — what the differential was between this 
$24.5 million and what was actually being charged Mr. 
Ghorbanifar and his financiers. 

In any event, it was a hefty price, and I 
recall being extremely annoyed that it looked like Mr. 
Ghorbanifar was charging a very exorbitant price. 

Q Do you recall taking that up with North and 
asking Colonel North what was going on here with the ~ 
price? 

A Not at that stage. I certainly took it up 
later on ^^H^^^^^^^^^^l^^^^^^^^^^'^^ ^^^ more 
started looking at that, the more confused I became. 

Q Did you ever, up through the end of the trip, 
have a conversation witlj^^B^^^HS in whict^^M^^^H 
described to you what was happening at the cost side, if 
you will — his activities — to make sure the costs were 
kept down? 

^^^^^^^^1 during the — I guess 
don't understand your question. 

Q Let me take you back to the TOWs, back in the 
beginning of '86. Did you ever have a conversation with 



umssiffti) 



666 



ONfittSSffSfl 



431 



1 ^^^^^^^^^H^" which he outlined for you how the decision 

2 had been made to go get obsolete TOW missiles so that the 

3 price per missile would be substantially reduced from 

4 what that price would otherwise have been for an on-the- 

5 shelf, non-obsolete missile? 

6 A I knew we were giving the older version of the 

7 TOW missile and that we were doing this deliberately. It 

8 was explained by Colonel North, who said we didn't want 

9 to give them the highest quality TOW missile. 

10 Q Do you ever recall a discussion wit^ 

11 where it became apparent to you that the reason for the 

12 type of missiles that were being sought here was not 

13 because you didn't want to give inferior goods but 

14 because of the price? 

15 AX don't recall a conversation with 

16 on that. 

17 -rq^^^All- 

18 A I'D not saying it couldn't have happened, but 

19 Z don't r*call it. 

20 Q You did not know of the conversations that 

21 were had with General Russo, for example? 

22 A Ko, sir. I didn't get involved. That was 

23 what I considered very much a ^^^^Hlogistical work. At 

24 that stage I didn't get involved. I was a little more 

25 aware in the fal]tpf,'^6 on individual pricing. 




667 



432 

1 Q Let me move you to the HAWK parts, then. With 

2 regard to the 240 or whatever they were HAWK parts, did 

3 you become aware of a budget that the folks in Operations 

-•^ — they were trying to 

5 meet — i.e., that they could not exceed — for the price 

6 of these HAWK parts that they would pay DOD? 

7 A I think they were given some sort of quota, 

8 but I didn't have the details on that. 

9 Q Who gave it to them? 

10 AX don't recall. I assume it was the NSC arid 

11 Colonel North. 

12 Q Do you have any recollection of a meeting err 

13 an occasion where that actually occurred, where it was 

14 said you can't go past $4.7 million,^^^^ Get me some 

15 more budget parts. Nothing like that? 

16 A I don't recall that, and I'm sure I didn't 

17 participate in such a discussion. 

18 Q Would you have been conscious of an intention, 

19 an effort on the part of North, carried out by^^^^^ 
2 and company, to maintain a spread, to keep the price 

21 down, to make sure that there was a fund to slush in this 

22 transaction? 

23 A No, sir. I'm not aware of that whatsoever. 

24 All I know is that it was clear that Colonel North wanted 

25 older missiles, the oldest in the inventory possible. 



"limSSIFlEO 



668 



UNCLASSn 



433 



1 But the pricing, I didn't focus on that. I didn't have 

2 time. 

3 Q In terms of a conscious perception, though, 

4 you were not aware — I think you've answered the 

5 question, but you were not aware of an effort to try to 

6 make sure there was a money gap between what was being 

7 paid and what had to be paid to DOD to try to create that 

8 kind of fund? 

9 A No, sir. I was not aware of that. 
10 (A brief recess was taken.) 

H BY MR. KERR: (R«auming) 

12 Q ' Let me come back to the theme of ransom and 

13 hostages. Apparently at a meeting between the Director 

14 and Admiral Poindexter on June 5 that topic came up and 

15 the figure $10 million as a ransom figure for the 

16 American hostages was raised and discussed. 

17 Were you aware in early June of such 

18 discussions within the Administration? 

19 A That's a familiar statement, but I cannot 

20 pinpoint it unless I have something to have specific 

21 reference. 

22 Q I'll show you a memorandum for the record by 

23 Mr. Gates dated 8 June 1986. Paragraph 4 is the 

24 paragraph of interest. That's Exhibit 42. 

25 (The document referred to was 



""iffiSIFIED 



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1 

2 

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marked Allen Exhibit Number 42 
for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 
A I don't know. Somehow that $10 million figure 
rings a bell. It's something the Director said to me 
about that time frame, but for the life of me I can't 
remember where that $10 million figure came from. I 
remember discussing with the Director the intelligence 




Q The note makes reference to a policy question 
on whether or not the Administration, given articulated 
policy, was prepared to pay ransom. Did that question 
get resolved and brought to your attention on whether or 
not the Administration was in fact prepared to arrange 
for ransom to be paid? 

A It's my understanding, based on all the 
meetings I attended as part of the interdepartmental 
group on terrorism, which I still remain a member of, and 
the Operations Subgroup of the Terrorist Incident Working 
Group, that this Administration could not tolerate this 
kind of concept and in fact coming out of the vice 




V^'' 



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President's Report on Combatting Terrorism one of the 
issues of continuing interest was to have the Department 
of Justice review ransom insurance that even private 
corporations carry for high risk areas in order to ransom 
potential employees who become hostages. 

So I think it was a fairly clear policy. 

Q What I'm driving at is the $10 million figure, 
however it came up or whatever the circumstances, was it 
your impression that^that was being thought through as an 
option, a potential change in policy? 

A No, I don't think so. I think that the 
Director, as I remember, there must have been something, 
a private resource or another country was prepared to do 
something along these lines. And if it comes back to me 
I certainly will convey this. But it's certainly a 
familiar figure for some reason. 

Q All right. Thank you. 

Let's move to the pricing problems in June. 
You've testified that you became aware that the pricing 
problem had indeed become a problem of some moment by 
Juna, particularly as it moves into late June. Can you 
tell me what you knew and when you knew it and what the 
problem was? 




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stated he had 

a microfiche dated 1985 which gave the base price of all 
these items, and he is being charged five and six times 
the amount that was reasonable for the cost of these. 

I think he said he himself was not so 
concerned but that clearly other officials involved in 
this transaction in Tehran were, and he would not agree 
to pay the funds, rt Was clear, I know, that Colonel 
North gave instructions to Mr. Nir to tell Mr. 
Ghorbanifar that the reason for the costs were that these 
were one-time items manufactured years ago and very 
costly to remanufacture, and we had to get some of them 
out of current stocks. 

We had to go overseas to retrieve so me from 
countries which had HAWK missile 




I raised, I know, on on* or 
more occasions about this impasse over funding, that it 
was creating a very, very difficult situation and was 
endangering resolution of the hostage situation. 

And Colonel North insisted that we had to 
pursue this very hard and he wanted anyone talking with 
j^^H^^^such as Mr. Cave, I believe, to be very 
resolute that this was a legitimate price. And he 



HNniiOTni 



672 



UNCI^SSffl 



437 



1 constantly — 

2 Q Let ma stop you. How on earth can you be 

3 resolute that something is a legitimate price when you 

4 don't know what the price is? I mean, apparently nobody 

asked^^^^HHH^^^^H what you pay for 

6 these goods? why not? 

7 A Apparently no one asJced. 

8 Q Ask^^^^^Hwhat are you paying for these 

9 goods? Did you all ask him how much he paid for these 
10 goods? 

A B^I^H^Hr'^^ ^^* °"* that was refusing to 

12 pay the amounts. ^. 

13 Q Maybe I haven't articulated correctly. 

14 A On July 21 he finally sent $4 million to pay 

15 for the HAWK spare missiles that had been taken off the 

16 • aircraft in May. 

17 Q Let ma try to articulate it a different way. 

18 In June, when he's saying Z have a microficha and the 

19 goods cost — 

20 A I'm not sura when he first mentioned the 

21 microfiche. It may be in July. 

22 Q I can show you a tape June 30 where he talks 

23 about the microfiche six times. In any event, June 30 

24 we've got him describing the fact that ha has the price 

25 list. What is missing from the conversation is George 



II 



wfssm 



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UNElASSlie 



438 



1 Cave asking^^^^^^^^Hall right, what it is you were 

2 going to be charged Cor these goods. 

3 I'm just curious about that. The guy's 

4 complaining about a price. Why wasn't he asked what it 

5 was he was being charged? 

6 A You'll have to ask Mr. Cave because he was 

7 handling this telephone call at the direction, detailed 

8 direction, of Colonel North. I recall that he made this 

9 conversation, that he made this call tc 

10 Why didn't he ask^^^^^^^^^Hwhat he was really being 

11 charged? 

12 Q What price was being quoted? 

13 A I don't know. I cannot answer that. 

14 Q Let me put a context here, Mr. Allen, because 

15 I find it inexplicable. You've got a situation here 

16 where you've got the buyer IH^^^^H saying he's being 

17 beaten to the tune of four to six times the going rate. 

18 You all know what it was you were going to charge for 

19 these parts. You know the parts are about $4.7 million. 

20 In order to assess whether or not there has been 

21 something that went awry, one clear bit of information 

22 that you need to know is what is it that^^^^^^^is 

23 being charged for these. 

24 A I thought the cost to the Agency was $6.7 

25 million. 



82-688 0-88-23 



674 




439 

1 Q It depends on what you are adding in. If you 

2 add in the TOW missiles, you bring it up. 

3 But, in any event, it certainly isn't $24.5 

4 million. 

5 A Mr. Cave and I discussed that and I thought 

6 about it quite deeply during the July time frame. 

7 Q My point, very simply, is that you all knew 

8 what it was that DOD was going to charge you for the 

9 whole wad of goods. You knew exactly what that price 

10 was. What I don't understand is why you — and you're' 

11 talking to Ghorbanifar during this period of time, Cave 

12 when he's talking ^°^^^^^^| — vhy don't you ask what 

13 it was that Ghorbanifar was charging so at least you 

14 could know what the ball park is? 

15 A I think I talked to Ghorbanifar perhaps once 

16 about the pricing. You recall I have some handwritten 

17 notes where he said I'm only charging a 60 percent 

18 premium and this is insane. 

19 Q Hang on. What I'm trying to drive at is you 

20 had other conversations with Ghorbanifar during this 

21 period of time. Ghorbanifar loves to talk to you, Mr. 

22 Allen, and that is clear. 

23 A I don't recall how many times he talked to me. 

24 Q You could have asked him on the occasions 

25 there. 



UNCUtSStFI!]) 



675 



UNCIASSIEIED 



440 



1 A I could have asked him. 

2 Q Okay. Why not? Why not unravel this thing by 

3 simply asking him, Merchant, what is the price tag you 

4 are putting on the goods? You know, why not tell him 

5 that? 

6 A That's a good question. I don't think that I 

7 ever put it quite that way, but reading what Mr. Cave 

8 derived from this conversation witl; 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^fl knew something was 

10 particularly when Colonel North wanted perhaps to create 

11 a new prie«, lirt. 

12 Q Exactly. That's where really I lose this " 

13 thing. 

14 A And that bothered me very deeply, sir, because 

15 that was about the August time frame when this was 

16 occurring, and that's when I talked to Mr. Kerr in late 

17 August, according to my recollection ~ Mr. Kerr cannot 

18 give a precise time frame on it — where I said maybe 

19 something is occurring that's really amiss. 

20 Q Let's stop there for a moment because it seems 

21 to me that's an inference one almost has to draw. It has 

22 been described to me by a number of people, fron 

23 to a number of others, and the only conclusion I can come 

24 to is that North gave an instruction not to unravel the 

25 pricing problem but to come up with some justification 



mmm 



676 



441 

1 for a price that wasn't accurate. 

2 A For rationale, and I did not give any 

3 rationale when Mr. Ghorbanifar made this impassioned call 

4 in August. I simply listened and said I would convey the 

5 information to Colonel North, which I did. 

6 Q What did North say to you when you passed that 

7 on? 

8 A Well, I don't recall the specifics, but he 

9 insisted again that we had to maintain the integrity of 

10 our stories relating to the price, that we don't know 

11 what Ghorbanifar was charging; therefore, you know, Ift's 

12 just ensure — let us ensure that we all make it clear to 

13 Mr. Ghorbanifar and, in the case of Mr. Cave, to] 

14 that it was very difficult to obtain these parts and the 

15 costs were very high. 

16 So I never knew at that stage what price the 

17 NSC had put on it with the intermediaries. I didn't 

18 focus on the issue greatly, but by the end of August, 

19 believe me, Z had started to privately focus on the issue 

20 deeply. 

21 Q And as you are focusing on it, take me through 

22 the thought process. What is it about that second price 

23 list that causes one to be a bit queasy in the stomach 

24 about what's going on here? 

25 A I'm "Sorry. You're going to have to explain 



iweiAssffe 



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*4SS^/) 



442 



1 the second price list. 

2 Q By August a suggestion has come by Ollie North 

3 that there ought to be a new price list prepared that 

4 would inflate the numbers. 

5 A Yes. That bothered me. I know we 

6 manufactured a little card which I saw, a pink card. 

7 Q Now in your own words tell me why is that 

8 troublesome? 

9 A Well, it seemed to me that the problem was, at 

10 that stage I had come to the conclusion that — and I'm 

11 talking late August — that the NSC was charging an 

12 exorbitant price for these weapons and spare parts. 

13 Clearly I knew that Ghorbanifar was also charging heavy 

14 prices and had heard about Mr. Nir's covering $1.7 

15 million. 

16 But r thought there nuat hav«^^en a very 

17 heavy price charged by the NSC to the financiers and the 
is only thing that I could conclude, because at this stage I 

19 had become aware that Mr. Hakim and Mr. Secord were 

20 trying to open a second channel to Iran, Mr. Hakim and 

21 Mr. Secord were directly in the middle of moving 

22 equipment and military weapons to Central America, 

23 logically I began to think that perhaps the additional 

24 charges were being made of the Iranian middle man and 

25 financiers to cover costs of supporting the contras in 



UNttASSIFIEir 



678 



IIMMSn 



443 



1 Central America. 

2 Q Did you take that to Ollie North? Did you ask 

3 him to deal with it at that level? 

4 A No, not without specifics. I said to Colonel 

5 North that this impasse was really bad and it was 

6 creating real problems. On September 9 I pointedly said 

7 you've opened up a second channel. You've shut down the 

8 first channel. And you've got creditors out there 

9 yelling for SIO million, $11 million. What are we going 

10 to do about it? 

11 And he said something, well, maybe we'll have 

12 to take it out of the reserve. That was a devastating 

13 statement to me. 

14 Q I was going to say, did he advise you what 

15 reserve he had in mind? 

16 ' A No, sir. 

17 Q At this conversation on the 9th of September, 

18 was anyone else present? 

19 A I can't recall. Colonel Earl was in the room 

20 or nearby, but I don't know that he heard that remark. 

21 Q What was the occasion? Why were you meeting 

22 with North? 

23 A I was at the White House on another matter, 

24 seeing someone else. I just stopped by and Colonel Earl 

25 was in Colonel North's office, and I said where is 



MJOTtir 



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UNousstfe 



Colonel North. He said he is meeting with Poindexter. 
Poindexter and Colonel North are discussing the Iranian 
initiative. 

So I just waited and Colonel North came 
charging in and said to me, tell Casey] 

Tell Casey that the first 
channel is shut down, that the second channel is now 
open, and get to him right away. That's when the 
conversation occurred. 

I put that in a memorandum to Mr. Casey, which 
you have. I also called him as soon as I returned to the 
Agencv 




Q And on the point of the reserve, did you raise 
that point orally with Casey or anyone else? 

A Not at that stage. 

Q Not at that stage? Why not? 

A Well, I had already — t believe I was 
worrying over this situation. I had mentioned this 
issue, I think in the late August or early September time 
frame, with Mr. Kerr. Mr. Kerr has difficulty putting a 
precise time frame on that, and I respect him for that. 

I have difficulty putting all this into 
precise time frames. I know talking to Mr. Kerr, saying 
that the fallout could be very devastating and Mr. Kerr 



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agreed. I became involved. I had many other activities. 
I hate to keep repeating it, but I really did. 

And I became involved shortly after that 





Q I'll go through these things in a moment, 
but — 

A So I guess the worry conti nued! 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^11 went to 
Mr. Gates on 1 October. 

Q Now let me just touch on a couple other 
points. Tha July 29, 1986, briefing of Vice President 
Bush by Nlr, did you have any involvement in the decision 
that such a briefing should take place, any knowledge 
that such a briefing was taking place? 

A I had no knowledge that a briefing was being 
planned. Let me back up on that because that's not a 
very good answer. I knew that the Vice President was 
going to Israel and I knew at some point prior to the 



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visit or while he was traveling to Israel that Colonel 
North wanted to have Mr. Nir meet with the Vice president 
to discuss the Iranian initiative. 

I knew that a briefing had occurred because I 
believe it was on a Saturday morning. Mr. Nir had tried 
to contact Colonel North and couldn't, so he called me 
and said that he had talked to Mose's deputy and that it 
had gone well and that he had given him a good briefing 
on the principal matter and could I convey all this to 
Colonel North because he couldn't locate Colonel North 
that morning, which I think I did. 

That was in July 1986, I believe. 

Q To the best of your knowledge was this 
briefing the first or primary occasion that Vice 
President Bush became aware of this initiative, or had he 
been brought into these things along the way? Do you 
know? 

A Well, it's my understanding that the vice 
President was aware of the initiative and the 
Presidential Finding. 

Q What is that based on? Is that just the way 
things are done, or did somebody tell you that? 

A I think Mr. McMahon may have mentioned that at 

some poi nt back in 1985. 

^^^^^^^^^^ have no knowledge 
SI 





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that Mr. Ghorbanifar ever had any contact with the Vice 
President. It was a convenient way to build credibility 
of Mr. Ghorbanifar — I think a very unwise way, very 
candidly. 

Q Did you ever see a report on the Bush briefing 
prepared by Bush's staff? 

A Mr. — Craig Fuller — no. The only thing I 
saw was what was published in the Washington Post. 

Q So there was not anything generated that you 
saw within the Agency? 

A No, sir. I talked tc 

lat some point in the fall of '86. I guess it 
was in the fall of 1986. He was unaware that Mr. Nir had 
met with the Vice President and he has no idea when it 
occurred^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 
^ He has no 
knowledge to this day. ijr 

Q There came a time in July when you apparently 
were in almost daily contact with Mr. Nir because Colonel 
North had decided he wasn't going to talk to Nir any 
more. Can you tell me a little bit about that, what 
happened and why? 

A Well, I was giving a briefing or sitting on a 
panel, rather, with Mr. Revel 1 and others on 
counterterrorism at the Office of Personnel Management in 



UNCtASStffB- 



683 



10 



UNCLASSKe 



448 



1 early July and I was paged by Colonel North, who stated 

2 that he wanted the community alerted that does hostage 

3 debriefing and he wanted intelligence collection 

4 increased on Lebanon, that he had been assured by Adam, 

5 which of course was a code name for Mr. Nir, that a 

6 hostage would be released within 24 to 48 hours. 

that^H^^^^^^^^Hjj^H went^^H 

^ ^^^^^^|and waited for the release of an American 

9 hostage. It did not occur. I was told by Colonel North 
~ and I have reason to believe that that indeed was the 

11 case — that Admiral Poindexter was quite vexed over this 

12 and Colonel North stated that he didn't want to talk io 
^3 Nir, that Nir had not checked out the story well and that 

14 he had lost a good deal of his derriere from Admiral 

15 Poindexter on the issue. 

16 Clearly Colonel North's ploy was to cut off 

17 contact for a period of time. All I did was to be a 

18 conduit. When Nir called I would convey to Colonel North 

19 what Nir stated. Colonel North gave no directions in 

20 reverse. I was simply a listening post for Mr. Nir as he 

21 struggled to resolve the issue and he made trips to 

22 Western Europe. It was clear he was involving the Prime 

23 Minister, the Defense Minister. It appeared that Mr. Nir 

24 and, I assume, some of his superiors were quite disturbed 

25 and almost frantic over the fact that they had lost this 



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soon as 

that hostage was released I certainly stopped contact and 
Colonel North continued the contact. 

Q And the hostage in question was Father Jenko; 
is that correct? 

A Father Jenko. 

Q And then you wrote a memorandun or, excuse oe, 
Director Casey wrote a memorandum in which he indicated 
that even though only one hostage had been released it 
was his view and yours and Mr. Clarridge's that the 
initiative should continue. Let me show you the memo and 
we'll pick up on that. It will be Exhibit 43. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 43 
for identification.) 
Let us make the transcript Exhibit 43 and the 
July 28 memo be Exhibit 44. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 44 
for identification.) 
A I'm familiar with this memorandum. I did the 



UmSSfFlfD 



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UNCLASSIFe 



450 



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basic draft. 1 think Mr. Casey made a few amendments to 
it and he signed it and sent it to Admiral Poindexter. 
Colonel North asked my assessment of the Jenko release 
and he also asked that I clear with Mr. Clarridge what I 
wrote. It appeared that Admiral Poindexter had the view 
that the Syrians had somehow secured the release of 



Father Jenko, ^^^| 


^■^■^H 


HH 


^^^Hwho changed his mind promptly 



and said indeed this is a correct assessment. 

As I understand it, vice Admiral Poindexter 
also agreed that it was fairly compelling evidence that 
the Ghorbanifar^^^^H^ channel worked in this instance, 
with a great deal of push from the Israelis. 

Q In conjunction with that let me show you a 
memorandum to the President which although it bears a 
June 27, 1986 date I believe was actually July 27, 1986, 
which will be Exhibit 45. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 4 5 
for identification.) 
Could you look at Exhibit 45 and tell me what 
role, if any, you had in the preparation of those 
materials? 

luini livviLii 




686 



WMMim 



451 



1 A You say you think the date was what, sir? 

2 Q It is July 27. If you place it in the context 

3 of the others, it appears to be a July document. 

4 A I had no part in the memorandum except for the 

5 fact that I was author of the attachment relating to, and 

6 which I believe was part of Exhibit 44. 

7 Q In terms of what's going on at this period of 

8 time, I gather that there's a decisionmaking process on 

9 whether or not the initiative should continue, given the 

10 fact that one hostage but not all the hostages has been 

11 released. Is that what was going on at that point in 

12 time? 

13 A I'm sorry. I didn't hear your question. 

14 Q I'll try again. The decision process that 

15 these documents reflect, what was the decision that had 

16 to be made? What was the President being asked to 

17 consider at this point? 

18 A It was my understanding that he was being 

19 asked to continue the initiative, to approve additional 

20 explorations with this specific channel. This was in 

21 June. 

22 Q It's really not. It's July. 

23 A July, sorry. But this was before the 15 

24 August meeting in Brussels where Colonel North saw an 

25 opportunity to develop what he considered a more reliable 



687 



y 



452 



1 second channel. So at this stage, as 1 understand it, 

2 the President was being asked to approve continuance of 

3 this effort to free the other hostages. And, as you can 

4 see, there was considerable discussion about how to open 

5 broader relations with the government of Iran. 

6 Q Kow what that suggests to m« is that by the 

7 end of July, beginning of August a decision had been made 

8 to continue with the Ghorbanifar channel and, as we know, 

9 in mid-August the new second channel comes on the 

10 horizon. Were you aware that the second channel was 

11 being courted before the courtship began, or did that 

12 come as something of a surprise to you? ■" 

13 A I was aware that Mr. Cave had gone to New York 

14 to meet with Mr. Hakim and a contact of Mr. Hakim, an 

15 Iranian, 

16 was aware of that and I was aware, I believe, in some 

17 conversations thatflH^U^Hand Mr. Cave had wheri^^^^ 

18 ^l^^^^lwas trying to elicit from Mr. Cave something 

19 about a meeting that occurred in Brussels. 

2 I was not aware that it was going to flourish 

21 into full bloom until that 9 September meeting, at which 

2 2 I was taken aback. I remember returning to the Agency 

2 3 very nonplussed at that stage because I couldn't figure 

24 out why we would so abruptly shut down the first channel 

25 unless we had a very good plan for shutting it down in a 




SI 




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453 

way that Ghorbanifar and other creditors of Ghorbanifar 
would feel assuaged, that if they got their money back, 
if they didn't feel they had lost that then we wouldn't 
have an operational security problem. 

The second channel at that stage I didn't know 
anything about. I didn't know who these people were or 
their reliability. And, of course, I anc^^^^^^^^^Hind 
others were trying to find out who this individual was 
who suddenly appeared on the screen. 




len I went to see Mr. Gates on 1 October part 
of our conversation was my worry over the second chanrfel, 
that we had so abruptly moved to a second channel without 
clearly understanding the bona fides of an individual on 
whom we had no information. 

That really disturbed ma more than I think 
anything disturbed me throughout this whole process. 

Q Did you articulate those concerns to North? 

A Only in the sense of what I told you earlier, 
that I e>;pressed surprise and I said what are you going 
CO do about this first channel, because the creditors and 
Mr. Ghorbanifar are unsatisfied. I also remember 
discussing this whole thing with Mr. Cave. I said I 
think Mr. Ghorbanifar is a man, is an individual who is 
going to extract revenge at some point. 




689 



UNMSaFE 



RD 454 

1 Q And you would have said that at what point in 

2 time? 

3 A I think in the September time frame. 

4 Q Let me get you to identify a document, if I 
5. can. Let me show you a document that I believe was 

6 generated in August of '86. It will be Exhibit 46. I 

7 ask" if you can identify it. 

8 (The document referred to was 

9 marked Allen Exhibit Number 46 

10 for identification.) 

11 (Pause.) 

12 A That is my handwriting. This is the frantic 

13 call from Mr. Ghorbanifar in August of 1986, his 

14 impassioned call where he said, look on your list. Vou 

15 know, I am not charging 600 percent. My charge is, I 

16 ' think he said, I guess he used the figure 41 percent 

17 narlcup that he was charging. He said the middle man is 

18 being unfairly blamed. He indicated that he wanted this 

19 message conveyed in clear and distinct terms to the side 

20 of the U.S. Government. 

21 Why he called me at that time, I don't know. 

22 I don't think I talked to him in recent weeks, in fact, 

23 because he had been interacting with Mr. Nir. Mr. Nir 

24 had been interacting innumerable times with Colonel 

25 North. 



t 



690 



mmm 



1 Q In terms of what he's trying to tell you, he's 

2 talking about what his margin is, but I didn't spot it. 

3 Maybe it is in there. I didn't see it. Did he tell you 

4 what he had paid or was told he was supposed to pay for 

5 these goods — that is to say, what he was marking up 41 

6 percent? 

7 A He said his average overall markup on the cost 

8 charged him for making all the arrangements and ensuring 

9 the final delivery was 41 percent. 

10 Q But I'm asking, though, do you remember him' 

11 telling you my mark is X, the amount of money I paid is 

12 whatever it is and I'm adding 41 percent to that? Did he 

13 ever tell you what his figure was, what he was being 

14 charged? 

15 A I think he did over here — these notes are 

16 cryptic — where he says $15 million and I'm charging, 

17 the financiers are charging me 20 percent interest and 

18 it's Adnan Khashoggi who is the supporter. 

19 Q That is at page what? 

20 A 212, sir. 

21 Q Good. So at that point in August you have 

22 been given what Ghorbanifar says he's being charged by 

23 our end of the transaction; isn't that right? That's the 

24 $15 million? 

25 A Sometime in the August time frame. Mr. Cave 



UNffiSSaflEIf' 



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13 
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15 
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& 




was in the office when that call came in. 

Q So at that point you got the $15 minic 



Lon 



figure. YOU or Mr. Cave also knew what the DOD figure 
was; isn't that right? Vou knew what the CIA was paying 
5 for these goods? 

A $6.7 million, r guess, if you threw in the TOW 

7 missiles, so we're talking about a considerable markup. 

8 Q NOW at that point is that when the bells go 

9 off that there's something awry here? 
^° A Pretty much so. 

^^ ^ °° y°" ^^^^ to Cave about how you are going to 

go about figuring out what's going on? 

A I discussed it with Cave, I believe, about 
that time frame, after this call. i also conveyed, I 
think, a fairly literal description of what Ghorbanifar 
had told me to Colonel North on the secure telephone, and 
I can't recall exactly what his response was, but it was 
a response that was not responsive, i think he continued 
to adhere to the other line that, you know, you can't 
trust this fellow and what he is telling you. 

^^ Q I understand. I understand. 

^^ A So I conveyed the information. 

^^ Q And you conveyed it to? 

2* A Colonel North. 

" Q And you did it what — orally, by phone, by 

UNCLKra 



692 



UNeiASStRiD 



457 



1 letter? 

2 A By secure telephone, sir. 

3 Q And what did North tell you? What did he tell 

4 you about the $15 million? 

5 A I don't know that I recall, except he said, 

6 you know, as I said, it's important to adhere to this 

7 continuing story that this is a legitimate price and what 

8 Mr. Ghorbanifar has charged is Mr. Ghorbanifar'a problem. 

9 He's got to collect that money from the Iranian 

10 government, something along those lines. I can't recall 

11 specifically. 

12 Q Let me step into where your thought processes 

13 are at that point. If it were me and I was sitting 

14 there, knowing that I had been involved in the sale of 

15 $6.7 million of U.S. Army goods that someone had then 

16 marked up by twice and made a profit of' me, I would have 

n 

17 gotten concerned about that. 

18 A I was concerned, and I conveyed that along 

19 that time frame to Mr. Kerr and, as the situation did not 

20 resolve itself, I went to Mr. Gates — maybe not as 

21 promptly as you would, but I did do it. And I feel good 

22 about doing it. 

23 Q Did it cross your mind that even if it wasn't 

24 going to Nicaragua it was going into Dick Secord's 

25 pocket? 



umme 



693 



CWCUSSfflffl 



458 



1 A Yes, sir. That was one of my thoughts, is 

2 that maybe these private Americans involved in this 

3 activity were taking considerable profits, and I didn't 

4 )cnow how to go about proving that. I remember that at 

5 one point I expressed some concern about the reliability 

6 of Mr. Hakim. Colonel North reacted in a very volatile 

7 way, saying that this man was a good American and I had 

8 no right to criticize him. And that was in September. 

9 He said that Hakim — I think I said, I think 

10 Hakim's about one cut above Ghorbanifar and I got a very 

11 violent explosion from Colonel North on that. He said, 

12 you don't know Mr. Hakim and that's a very unfair 

13 accusation. I said that's true; I don't know Mr. Hakim. 

14 Q Did you get the feeling that North was being 

15 disingenuous with you in a sinister way? 

16 A No, but that he was not being totally candid 

17 as to what was happening. 

18 Q Did you have a sense of why he was not being 

19 candid? 

20 A No. Colonel North — I don't consider him in 

21 any way a sinister individual, and I'd like the record to 

22 state that. I certainly did not think Colonel North was 

23 being candid with me. 

24 Q These notes, if you were trying to give your 

25 best shot at when they occurred in time, when in Aucfust 




694 



UNCLASSife 



459 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



would these notes have been made? 

A The second half of August. 

Q The second half? 

A And I believe Ghorbanifar was aware of that 
meeting in Brussels. If^^^^^^Hwas aware of it, 
Ghorbanifar was aware of it because there was this 
feeling on the part of Colonel North — and I think at 
least initially on the part of Mr. Cave — that Mr. 
Ghorbanifar could be cut out and that w« could directly 




And I think Mr. Cave quickly came to the 
judgment that you couldn't bypass Ghorbanifar because he 
and^^^^^^Hhad a very close relationship. 

Q The last page of this collection of notes says 
"middle man being unfairly blamed." That I can figure 
out. "41 percent" — that we've discussed. Then it says 
"don't want to silence", and then below that it says 
"nice", underlined twice. Do you have any recollection 
of what it was you were trying to communicate there? 

A I don't know what "don't want to", and that is 
Nice. 

Q Nice as in Nice, France. 

A Mr. Ghorbanifar has a very nice home in Nice, 



695 



UNCUssra 



460 




1 and that's where he stays most of the time. 

2 Q That explains that. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 Q You did not, I take it, put this information 

10 in a typewritten format? 

11 A No. 

12 Q Why not? Was it simply the press of time dr 

13 was there some security reason? 

14 A Press of time. No security reasons. There 

15 was no reason in the world why I couldn't have written 

16 that up. I had the equivalent of three positions at that 

17 stage and frantically busy on Syria and Libya and Iranian 

18 terrorism — just frantically busy. 

19 Q One other phrase, just to pursue it. 

20 "Merchant says the problem is because of A." I assume 

21 that's Adnan Khashoggi, or do you know? 

22 A Please let me look at it. 
'23 (Pause.) 

24 I believe so — that he was being pressed 

25 heavily by Adnan Khashoggi. 



wmmm 



696 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 




P SECRET/CODEWORD 



461 



Q Did he express to you what he would do in the 
face of that pressure? The clock is running. The bus is 
about to leave. Help me out. What did he say? 

A That was clearly the import, that something 
had to be done, that the Americans should make some sort 
of gesture. 




So he was expecting soma 
immediate gesture to close this gaping wound, as I saw 
it, this gaping wound in this project. 

And it was sort of he had been conveying this 
on a daily basis, 1 believe, to Mr. Nir. Mr. Nir had 
been calling Colonel North and finally Mr. Ghorbanifar, 
one day, one night — it was nighttime because I got this 
call in the afternoon — it was nighttime in France, 
called me and said Charlie, what can you do. I simply 
conveyed this on to Colonel North and discussed it with 
Mr . Cave . 

And Mr. Cave and I agreed that the prices were 



mwm 



697 



iimssve 



462 



1 extraordinarily high. And I believe at that stage I 

2 conveyed the view that it could be a move of sending 

3 money not just to feather the pockets of perhaps 

4 intermediaries but for some other project. The only 

5 project that came to mind at that stage was Central 

6 America. 

7 Maybe we are very dull, Mr. Kerr, in coming to 

8 those judgments and for that I do apologize, but my days 

9 were running 14-15 hours a day on counterterrorism across 

10 the board and I could not focus but a few minutes here 

11 and a few minutes there on this specific initiative. I 

12 took one day of leave in the last two years, I think -^ 

13 two days of leave, one day to be with my wife, who was 

14 injured. 

15 Q I promised I would get you out of here, and I 

16 have not finished. I think ultimately I may need another 

17 hour with you. I'm going to try to let you out of here 

18 now, but there is one memorandi.un on this point that I did 

19 want to run by you. 

20 A Ves, sir. 

21 Q It's a memorandum dated September 2, 1986 and 

22 it has to do with — well, let me have you read it. 

2 3 Unfortunately, we are missing a page. If you will just 

24 give me a minute, I will pull the other page out and 

2 5 we'll give you the whole memo. 



UmSSIFIED 



698 



l/Nft4SSIf/ffl 



463 



1 (Pause.) 

2 If you will mark this page, I will have to 

3 make a copy of the rest of it. 

4 (The document referred to was 

5 marked Allen Exhibit Number 47 

6 for identification.) 

7 The Exhibit is September 2, 1986, memorandum 

8 from Mr. Allen. It's a memorandum for the record. It's 

9 Senate number J-5957 through 5959, and it relates to a 

10 conversation that you apparently had with some FBI agents 

11 and Customs agents on a TOW diversion. I'd like you to 

12 take a moment and read the memo to refresh your 

13 recollection about the incident and I'll have a few 

14 questions about it. 

15 (Pause.) 

16 A I'm familiar with this memorandum. I'll await 

17 your specific questions on it. 

18 Q The memorandum makes reference at paragraph 5 

19 to the footprints of the merchant and the banker or his 

20 banker. The merchant in question, I assume, is 

21 Ghorbanifar, and the banker Khashoggi? 

22 A Yes. 

23 Q Now in terms of what is happening here, it 

24 appears to me that you have been asked by North to give a 

25 heads-up, at the very least, to the FBI and Customs 




699 



464 

1 S«rvic« on an illegal arms transaction. 

2 A Yes, sir, just to tip them off. I had no 

3 information. This is the first time I ever had any real 

4 discussions with Mr. Hakim. I called Mr. Revell of the 

5 FBI and Bill Rosenblatt of Customs and stated what can 

6 you do about this. This is a White House request. I 

7 said I have no information. I believe there are tapes of 

8 at least two or three of these conversations between Mr. 

9 Hakim and myself which are fairly verbatim, and I think I 

10 fairly accurately — I hope I fairly accurately recorded 

11 the substance of that in this memorandum. 

12 Q Let me focus you on Mr. Goode. That is 

13 referring to Mr. North, I assume. 

14 A That is Mr. North. 

15 Q And you say at the request of Mr. North, 

16 Colonel North, on the 29th of August you contact Abe, and 

17 that would b« Ab« Hakim; is that correct? 

18 A Mr. Albert Hakim. 

19 Q What instruction did you get from North? Why 

20 was North asking you to do this? 

21 A He stated that from the point of view of the 

22 U.S. initiative if this was a bona fide TOW missile 

23 diversion it would take away the leverage that the United 

24 States had through the channel then being pursued — the 

25 channels Z knew, the Ghorbanifai^^^^^^^^- for possible 




iir 



700 



UNOA^ra 



465 



1 release of other hostages because we're talking about a 

2 substantial amount of TOW missiles. 

3 He wanted to know if we had any intelligence 

4 from any source on it. In checking with ^^^^^^^^^HH 

5 ^^^^^^^^^^^^1 no intelligence was available. I simply 

6 conveyed this to both the FBI and Customs. 

7 Q Let me pursue it a bit. VThen you say that 

8 Hakim says the footprints of the merchant and banker are 

9 all over this transaction, he was basically telling you 

10 this deal looked like it was being done by Ghorbanifar 

11 and Khashoggi; correct? 

12 A That's what he stated and I recorded it here. 

13 We couldn't find any information on this and Mr. Wall 

14 from Customs later told me they couldn't find any 

15 activity relating to this. I was never able to discern 

16 ' just what all this alleged TOW nisaile diversion was all 

17 about. 

18 Q Were you aware as of 2 September that Colonel 

19 North intended to or wanted to shut down the first 

20 channel, Ghorbanifar? 

21 A No, sir. I was not aware of it. I was aware 

22 that he was highly dissatisfied with the lack of a 

23 reliable conduit to the Iranian Government. I think we 

24 all were. 

25 Q T)-:*- .in trrm'^ XX'^VYTHT'fr^'^ ^^' ^° "^ <=^" 





ff 



701 



UNCUSSHJ) 



466 




1 place it properly chronologically, you were not 

2 )cnowledgeable of the second channel until a few days 

3 after this event took place? 

4 A No, sir. Well, I was aware that, one, Mr. 

5 Cave had met with Mr. Hakim's agent in New York. 

7 '^^^^^■who had a contact at the senior level inside the 

8 government in Tehran. I was aware of a meeting on 15 

9 August. I was aware that Mr. Hakim and Mr. Secord had 

10 met with someone in Brussels, an Iranian, but I was not 

11 aware that the second channel was moving to a rapid 

12 fruition and adoption until 9 September, sir. 

13 Q That's the point I'm trying to focus on. Did 

14 it come to your attention at this time or any other time 

15 that what Colonel North had in mind was taking care of 

16 the first channel by getting hin indicted? 

17 A At that point it did not occur to ma. It was 

18 clear that Mr. Hakim — and I knew from Mr. Secord and 

19 from what Mr. Ghorbanifar told me, as well as Mr. Nir, 

20 that Mr. Secord had an intense antipathy towards 

21 Ghorbanifar. I wrote down what Mr. Hakim said. It 

22 seemed rather suspicious to me. 

23 Q What I'm really asking — 

24 A That here is some sort of alleged diversion 

25 out of Houston and suddenly here's Ghorbanifar. Here Mr. 

3RD 




702 



467 

1 Hakim is stating that Mr. Ghorbanifar and his banker, 

2 Khashoggi, are suddenly involved in this other activity. 

3 That came as a surprise and I had doubts as to the 

4 reliability. 

5 Q Did you ever reach the conclusion or suspect 

6 that you were being manipulated in early September 1986 

7 to endeavor to cause criminal action to be taken against 

8 Ghorbanifar? 

9 A No. 

10 Q You did not suspect that? 

11 A No, not in that respect. The fact that Mr^. 

12 Hakim was speculating, and I put this in the context of 

13 speculation, he presented no evidence. I looked somewhat 

14 askance at that statement in paragraph 5. But as far as 

15 a conspiracy to get Ghorbanifar indicted, I didn't see 

16 that, nor, based on this, can I see how that could have 

17 ever occurred. How could that link? If Customs and the 

18 FBI couldn't find any linkage to Ghorbanifar, how could 

19 they indicate him? 

20 Q In terms of suggesting that there was such a 

21 linkage, were you asked to pass that suggestion on to the 

22 FBI or the Customs Service? 

23 A No, sir. I don't think, very candidly, 

24 Colonel North gave me no indications. I think he kept 

25 insisting he thought an alleged diversion might be 



uNC[rae 



703 



wmmm 



468 



1 underway. Could be, if you want to speculate, that Mr. 

2 Hakim was trying to manipulate Colonel North, sir. 

3 Q I suspect that that's a live possibility. 

4 What I'm trying to get a sense of is why on earth Colonel 

5 North would want to take any risk of criminal action 

6 being taken against Ghorbanifar at this delicate stage. 

7 A I couldn't envision it, and I just attributed 

8 the statement in paragraph 5 to the fact that Mr. Hakim 

9 and Secord were partners and they both had expressed 

10 intense antipathy towards Mr. Ghorbanifar. And if they 

11 can somehow muddy the name of Ghorbanifar, Mr. Secord and 

12 Mr. Hakim were most willing to do so. 

13 You can see earlier, as you recall, earlier 

14 Mr. Ghorbanifar did not like Mr. Hakim. 

15 Q I know there was no love lost. 

16 A Based on my memorandum of the spring of '86. 

17 Q All right. Vou were not conscious, then, of 

18 being privy at this or any other time to an attempt to 

19 take care of Ghorbanifar by creating a situation where 

20 criminal charges were brought against him? 

21 A No, I don't. I don't think that would hold 

22 water. I don't see how this — they would have had to 

23 have had specific evidence linking Ghorbanifar to this 

24 alleged diversion. 

25 Q Well, the only reason I pursue it is because 




704 




469 

1 it looks to me like Hakim was suggesting to you that 

2 there may be such evidence when he talks about the 

3 bankers and users certificates, letters of credit and the 

4 like. Were efforts made to get that kind of evidence? 

5 A Not to my knowledge. The fact that Khashoggi 

6 can get end user certificates I think is not unknown, 

7 given the fact he is one of the world's — 

8 Q For American TOWs that could get to be a more 

9 serious problem. 

10 A Well, that's right, and that was Colonel 

11 North's concern. How could this happen when TOW missiles 

12 are very sensitive items and carefully accounted f or? - 

13 Colonel North, in his conversation with me, said he just 

14 didn't believe that this could be happening, but he had 

15 to have it checked out. I think he was quite sincere. 

16 Now whether Mr. Hakim was trying to manipulate 

17 Colonel North I can't speculate on that, and I will not. 

18 Q Did you suggest to the FBI, the Customs 

19 Service officers, the name of Ghorbanifar? 

20 A No, sir. 

21 Q You did not? 

22 A No, sir. 

23 Q So you described the potential transaction but 

24 you didn't identify people that they should talk to; is 

25 that correct? 



BNCWSSIfe 



705 



UNtlASSn 



470 



1 A That is correct. I would not at that stage 

2 raise the name Ghorbanlfar to either of those 

3 organizations, given the fact that we had an exceedingly 

4 sensitive Presidential initiative under way. 

5 Q That's very helpful. I appreciate that, and I 

6 do apologize for keeping you so late. I need to talk to 

7 you at some point about the Furmark conversation and the 

8 Nir conversation in September, but that point doesn't 

9 have to come for a while. 

10 A Could you refresh my recollection on the Nir 

11 conversation? 

12 Q On September 11. 

13 A Oh, sure. That's easy. 

14 MR. KERR: Thank you very much. You have been 

15 very patient, Mr. Allen. Thank you. 

16 (Whereupon, at 7:14 p.m., the taking of the 

17 instant deposition ceased.) 

18 



19 Signature of the Witness 

20 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 

21 , 1987. 

22 



23 Notary Public 

24 My Commission Expires: 



UNfiUSSffl 



82-688 0-88-24 



706 



mmsm 



CERTIFICATE OP REPORTER 
I, Miciial Ann Schafer, the officer before whan the foregoing 

deposition was ta)cen, do hereby certify that the witness 
whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was 
duly sworn by me* that the testimony of said witness was 
taken by me to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced 
to typewriting under my direction; that said deposition 
Is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; 
that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed 
by any of the parties to the action in which this 
deposition was taken, and further that I am not a relative 
or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the 
parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested 
in. the outcome of the action. 



") U^:ib^Ctbuv^dLi.) . 



NOTARY PCBLIC 
My Coaaiasion expires February 28, 1990 



UNCLASSIFIED 



707 







'^^ - /87 




ranscnpt o 
HEARINGS 
Before the 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 



CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF CHARLES ALLEN 
Monday, June 29, 1987 



HASsro 



ztArtose 



Partially Declassified/Released on. 

under provisions ol E 12356 
by K Johnson. National Sscurity Council 



Washington. D.C. 






(202) S23-930O 



708 



mwm 



471 



1 rowTTWUED DEPOSITION nv rw&BT.gfi at.t.bm 

2 Monday, Jun« 29, 1987 

United States Sanat* 
Salact Conalttaa on Sacret 

Military Assistanca to Iran 
and tha Nicaraguan Opposition 
Washington, 0. C. 
Continuad daposition of CHARLES ALLEN, eallad 
as a vitnass by counsal for tha Salact Coaaittaa, in Room 
SH-219, Hart Sanata Offica Building, Washington, D. C, 
coBBancing at 2:45 p.a. , tha vitnass having baan 
previously duly sworn by MZCKAL ANN SCHAFER, a Notary 
Public in and for tha District of Coluabia, and tha 
tastiaony baing takan down by Stanomask by MICHAL ANN 
SCHAFER and transcribad undar har direction. 



UNcyssM 



709 



i)Netfts« 



472 



1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 CHARLES KEHR, ESQ. 

6 TIMOTHY WOODCOCK, ESQ. 

7 TOM POLGAR 

8 On behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency: 

9 KATHLEEN McGINN, ESQ. 
10 RHONDA HUGHES, ESQ. 



UNSkA^^O 



710 




1 




2 




3 


WITNESS 


4 


Charles AH«n 


5 


By Mr. Kerr 


6 




7 


^TiTifiK EXffTnTT mmDnn 


8 


48 


9 


49 


10 


50 


11 


51 


12 


52 


13 


53 


14 


54 


15 


55 


16 


56 


17 


57 


18 


58 


19 


59 


20 


60 


21 


61 


22 


62 


23 


63 


24 


64 


25 


65 



473 

CONT ENTS 

EXAMTNATT9N ON BFTfi^TiF ?F 

5EHAIE HQjisE 

475 
EXHTR;Tg 

FOR iDgWTTrT?ftTT?P 
475 
479 
479 
484 
486 
490 
490 
493 
497 
502 
508 
514 
521 
528 
530 
537 
547 



mmma 



549 



711 




474 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 



EXHIBITS (Continued^ 



ALLEN EXHI BIT hfUMBER 



FOR IDENTIFICATION 



66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 



560 
562 
562 
569 
579 
580 
584 
589 
593 
596 
600 
603 
605 
605 
606 
606 
609 
610 
613 
613 
615 




s 




712 



ffiUSSiP 



7CDDEW0RD 475 

1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon, 

3 CHARLES ALLEN, 

4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Committee and having been previously duly sworn by 

6 the Notary Public, was further examined and testified as 

7 follows: 

8 EXAMINATION 

9 BY MR. KERR: 

10 Q Mr. Allen, essentially we're going to 

11 concentrate on the last part of 1986 today, but we now 

12 have gotten copies of various things that were found in 

13 the box of notes and miscellaneous documents of yours 

14 that the Independent Counsel had, and I'd like to start 

15 today by going through soma excerpts from those documents 

16 that ara not dated to sea if you can give me a sense. 

17 A I have not seen those since January, so I have 

18 no idea what's in it. 

19 Q Lat me show you a document that's called "Add- 

20 ona, Coantents.'* It's our number C-0955 and 956. It will 

21 ba Exhibit 48. 

22 (The dociunant referred to was 

23 marked Allen Exhibit Number 48 

24 for identification.) 

25 (Pause.) 

TOI 



1!IW8IF!F.D 



713 




476 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



A I'm sure this was a conversation that occurred 
in the July 1986 time frame. As you will recall, Colonel 
North was assured by Mr. Nir in early July that another 
hostage would be released. Colonel North paged me — and 
I was attending a seminar at the Office of Personnel 
Management with Constance Horner — and I was called to 
the telephone, where he had stated that Nir had made this 
statement, that it was imperative that we increase 
intelligence collection, 

land that he was going to notify 
other senior officials of the government — I think 
ostensibly those members of the Operations Support Group. 




hostage came out. Colonel North then 
called and stated that Admiral Poindexter had chastised 
him severely, that hopes had been raised and then dashed, 
he was in bad odor with the Admiral, and that from his 
perspective it would be good if I received phone calls 
from Aairam Nir until the situation improved. 

Nir was very disturbed that he had lost direct 
contact with the White House — extremely disturbed. He 
called me every day or every other day after that for the 
next two to three weeks, where he worked very hard with 
Manucher Ghorbanifar to attempt to release, to obtain the 



ifflcreinF 



714 



liCliSSiED 



477 



1 r«leas« of a hostage. 

2 This is one of those conversations where he 

3 was trying every avenue, clearly, and he indicated that 

4 he had talked to Prime Minister Peres, Defense Minister 

5 Rabin, about this, about the fact that the government of 

6 Israel had lost this direct link into the White House, at 

7 least temporarily. And he, in this conversation, 

8 described the efforts to which he had gone to try to get 

9 some movement on the release of American hostages in 

10 Lebanon. 

11 Q To sort of place it by dates, my notes 

12 indicate that that passing of the baton to you would have 

13 occurred very early in July and probably would have ended 

14 about July 26, when Jenko was released. 

15 A That is correct, sir. 

16 Q So this would have been generated in that 

17 three and a half-week period? 

18 A In that time frame, yes, sir. 

19 Q And this reflects a call from — 

20 A From Mr. Nir in Tel Aviv to me in Washington, 

21 and the strenuous efforts to which he has gone — that 

22 is, Mr. Nir has gone — to try to obtain some movement on 

23 the hostage issue, including even looking at — he talked 

24 in oblique terms, but he was pushing very hard and had 

25 talked to some people that he indicated were not the 

JDEWORD 




IS 




715 





478 

1 nicest individuals in the world. 

2 Q In terms of people he's apparently referring 

3 to on the second page there is a reference to the Hashemi 

4 brothers. Do you recall what that might have been about? 

5 A Well, I pressed him. He said that he was 

6 exploring all channels and that one channel was connected 

7 to the new initiative, and I wasn't certain what that 

8 meant and I still don't know what that means. But he 

9 said that the channel was connected to bad guys, and when 

10 I pressed to try to explain to me what he meant, since I 

11 was serving essentially as a cutout or a conduit for 

12 Colonel North, he said well, he had talked to some 

13 members of the Hashemi brothers, and Z wrote that down. 

14 That's all I have. I don't have any additional 

15 background . 

16 Q Do you know if this is the Cyrus Hashemi 

17 family that he was referring to? 

18 A Z assume that is what he was referring to, at 

19 laast some of the Hashemi brothers. Cyrus Hashemi died 

20 in July '86, as you recall. 

21 Q That was my next question. You don't recall 

22 whether this conversation took place before or after 

23 Hashemi died? 

24 A Z didn't know that Hashemi had died in July. 

25 Z later learned that Hashemi, who was caught in the sting 



716 



UNCUSSIEP 



479 



1 in April of 1986, latar dlad rather suddanly, prasuaably 

2 in London. 

3 Q Nir did not relat* to you Israeli attitudes 

4 toward Cyrus Hasheoi in this conversation? 

5 A No, not at all, except he clearly stated this 

6 was a risky channel. 

7 Q There are two documents that have the nanes of 

8 Dick Secord and a reference to Olmstead on thea that were 

9 in your files, and Z wanted to refer thea to you and see 
if looking at then will give you any recollection of when 

you might have been discussing these items. 

The first is CIIN 4012, and second is CZXN 
4011. They will be marked as Exhibits 49 and 50. 

(The documents referred to were 

marked Allen Exhibit Numbers 49 

and SO for identification.) 

(Pause.) 

A The document number 50 looks familiar. In Kay 

of 1986 we were making final arrangements relating to Mr. 

20 Menurlane's trip to Tehran. One of the things that Mr. 

21 Ghozbanifar needed because he was part of the advance 

22 party was a flight profile, and Mr. Secord had developed 

23 such a flight profile. As I recall, also Colonel North 

24 had some material that he wished passed to Mr. 

25 Ghorbanifar. 

TOPI 



WASSJFIED 



717 




1 

2 

3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



480 

Mr. Secord stated that in view of the feict 
that the Government had no courier to convey this 
information to Mr. Ghorbanifar in London he would provide 
a courier, and I too)c some material to Mr. Secord and he 
brought in the courier. And I don't recall the name of 
the courier but I gave the material that Colonel North 
provided, plus General Secord showed us a flight profile 
and I obtained a copy of the flight profile. 

Q When you use the term "flight profile", what 
are you referring to? 

A That is the departing time, the specific 
routes, the specific air routes, when it was going to 
make calls back to its communications center, how it 
would go in over Iran, what would be the checkpoints 
inside Iran. 




718 



i) I 



481 



control lT8^_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 So w« 



1 Ghorbahlfar needed In ordar to giv* to the Iranian air 

2 

3 

4 General Secord brought in a young nan and I don't recall 

5 whether his name was Olmstead. I see Olmstead is written 

6 down, but I don't )cnow who Olostead is. And he said this 

7 individual will carry the material to the Churchill 

8 Hotel, Portoan Square, in London, and when it's delivered 

9 he will call you and say all is well and you can then 

10 infom Colonel North. 

11 And that did occur in May. 

12 Q Now you actually saw the person that was held 

13 out to be the courier? 

14 A Yes, sir, I saw him. 

15 Q Could you describe that person to me, please? 

16 A I can't describe him. He was just a young 

17 man, probably in his late 20s or early 30s. And I don't 

18 recall whether he ha* black hair, brown hair. I just 

19 don't recall him. He came in for a few moments and he 

20 aaJud for a physical description of Mr. Ghorbanifar, and 

21 b«tiM«n General Secord and myself we gave a description 

22 so that when he transmitted the information to Mr. 

23 Ghorbanifar he wouldn't mistake him for another Iranian. 

24 And I recall that he probably travel under the 

25 pseudonym of Smith, and he stayed, I believe, at the 




719 




482 

1 Hilton' on Park Row. He stayed overnight before. he flew 

2 back to the United States. And he called me from the 

3 Hilton and said that the mission had been accomplished, 

4 and I conveyed that to Colonel North. 

5 Q The second document we just marked as 49 also 

6 has reference to Olmstead on It. It also has what 

7 appears to be an address. Do you have any recollection 

8 of that document? 

9 A I don't have any recollection of document 49. 

10 Q Is It In your handwriting? Can you tell? 

11 A This looks to be In my handwriting, yes. It 

12 looks like It's in my handwriting, but I don't have any 

13 recollection of what that is. 

14 Q And with regard to Olmstead, you don't have a 

15 clear recollection of whether or not the courier that you 

16 saw was the person that was represented to be having the 

17 name Olmstead? 

18 A I don't think General Secord gave me his name. 

19 But he said, to the best of my recollection, he stated 

20 this man would be traveling under the name of Smith and 

21 that he would call me from the Hilton once he had 

22 accomplished delivery. It was absolutely essential from 

23 our perspective that we get the flight profile to Mr. 

24 Ghorbanifar in order to ensure the safety of Mr. 

25 McFarlane. 





720 



483 

1 Q With regard to the Olmstead reference that's 

2 on Exhibit 50, that is in your handwriting? 

3 A That looks like my handwriting. 

4 Q The name Olmstead doesn't have any particular 

5 meaning to you today as to whether that was the courier 

6 or had some other connection to this transaction? 

7 A I don't know. I don't recall. The man was in 

8 his late 20s or early 30s. He had short hair. But 

9 that's all I can recall. 

10 Q Did he appear to have the use of both of his 

11 eyes? 

12 A I can't recall, sir. He was young. He spoke 

13 sort of southern English, seemed like me might have been 

14 from the south, but beyond that I have no distinct 

15 recollection. He was only in the office for a few 

16 moments. I probably was in the office less than 15 

17 minutes. 

18 Q Whose office did this take place in? 

19 A This is General Secord's office. 

20 Q General Secord's office at Stanford 

21 Technology? 

22 A Yes, in Vienna. I ran over and dropped the 

23 material that Colonel North had given me, as well as 

24 picked up a copy of the flight prof ile^^^^^^^B 

25 Q Why was it that there was not a government 



WSSSIFIEB 



721 



se» 



484 



1 courlar available? 

2 A I can't answer that question. Colonel North 

3 was the one who was making the arrangements with General 

4 Secord. Generally the number of Agency people cleared 

5 for this was kept, as you know, to a handful, so I guess 

6 consideration was given to keeping it to a very small 

7 number of people, and Mr. Olmstead did not seem 

8 unfamiliar with the initiative. I mean, he didn't 

9 express surprise that he was going to London — if it was 

10 Mr. Olmstead. 

11 I want to make sure. He was not introduced to 

12 me by name, but General Secord said he will use the name 

13 Smith when he calls you from London. 

14 Q My primary curiosity is where the name 

15 Olmstead came from. You heard it from somebody and put 

16 it on this piece of paper, and if you can tell me where 

17 it came from that would be helpful. If you don't recall, 

18 you don't recall. 

19 A I don't recall, sir. I just don't recall. 

20 Q I'll show you a two-page document that's 

21 headed "Mr. GhorbRnifar", which will be Exhibit 51. 

22 (The document referred to was 

23 marked Allen Exhibit Number 51 

24 for identification.) 

25 (Pause.) 

Tol 



UNtftSSiflED 



722 



W 





485 



1 A This, I assume, was some telephone call from 

2 Mr. Ghorbanlfar In the summer of 1986 where he again 

3 tried to state some of his concerns over the financing of 

4 the HAVnc spare missile parts, since we have the term 240 

5 and, as you recall, there's 240 HAWK spare part line 

6 items . 

7 I don't recall many of the details of this, 

8 but again he was talking about the cost, what he had 

9 charged. I guess he says $3 million had to go to the 

10 financier. But I don't understand the financing here. 

11 This is Mr. Ghorbanlfar talking very excitedly and very 

12 rapidly over the telephone. 

13 He talked about his senior official in the 

14 Prime Minister's office being angry and not calling, and 

15 that in fact he cbuld cause problems. I guess he said 

16 "could cause damage". Beyond that I don't have any good 

17 ideas on all of this. 

18 Q In trying to place it more precisely in time, 

19 nothing about this document — 

20 A I would state that this probeUsly occurred — 

21 it must have occurred in the July time frame, because I 

22 think you also showed me notes at our last session of an 

23 August call where he talked about that he was only 

24 charging a 41 percent premium and that the United states 

25 charging five or six times that, that something was very 

lEC 



723 



m.mm 



486 



1 much amiss. 

2 Q The last reference on the page to action in 

3 north and south, do you have any idea what that refers 

4 to? 

5 A Ko, I don't know. Z don't recall. 

6 Q Let me show you another collection of document 

7 titled "Numbers". Again, if you can place it for me as 

8 best you can in time and give me the context, I'd 

9 appreciate that. This is Exhibit 52. 

10 (The docxiaent referred to was 

11 marked Allen Exhibit Number 52 

12 for identification.) 

13 (Pause.) 

14 A This is a conversation with Amiram Nir, the 

15 special assistant to the Prime Minister of Israel on 

16 counterterrorism. I can't precisely put the date on 

17 this. It looks to me like that this might have been a 

18 telephone call or when I met with him face to face in 

19 September '86. We're talking about an Aucfust or 

20 September time frame where he tried to convey to me the 

21 financial arrangements, as he understood it, involving 

22 the HAWK spare missile parts, and Mr. Ghorbanifar's 

23 problem. 

24 He talks about only 177 line items being 

25 supplied of the 240 requested. He talks about the cost 



724 





'ORD 487 



1 to Ghotba instead of being $15 million — as you recall, 

2 Ghorba, Ghorbanifar, borrowed $15 million. Cost to the 

3 Israelis $19.6 million. Twenty percent financing cost. 

4 A total of $24 million. 

5 I don't recall precisely. I just wrote these 

6 down. I think I mentioned then to Colonel North, that 

7 this was the financing as Mr. Nir saw it, and he said at 

8 best Mr. Ghorbanifar could only achieve a $2 million 

9 profit, that he had paid bribes and he had other costs. 

10 He said the problem, as I recall, related to the official 

11 in Iran who had found a 1985 microfiche which really set 

12 the base manufacturing cost of the HAWK spare parts, 

13 which had created problems since the cost had been 

14 escalated fairly heavily when the costs were given to Mr. 

15 Ghorbanifar from the NSC. 

16 So we're talking about an August-September 

17 1986 time frame. I suspect that this was a face-to-face 

18 conversation in September, because that's the first time 

19 I heard Mr. Nir talk about the new channel, and here he 

20 cl«arly is talking about the new channel — does it exist 

21 — and he was asking me, as I recall it, the searching 

22 question is he real. Does the new channel really have 

23 connections to the most senior officials in the Iranian 

24 government? 

25 And I simply wrote it down. I did not, as I 



ictssstnfD 



725 



W&MB 



488 



1 recall', glv* him any sp«ciflc answer at that stag*. I 

2 said I really didn't know anything about the new channel. 

3 I suspect that's a September '86 document. 

4 Q The reference to Zebra. I lose track. Zebra 

5 was a hostage? 

6 A Yes, sir, absolutely. For 14 months we've 

7 referred to hostages as zebras or bank drafts. 

8 Q And what Nir is asking you at that point is 

9 will this get us another zebra? He's asking whether this 

10 new channel has the potential for getting another hostage 

11 out; is that it? 

12 A Yes, absolutely. That was his concern. And, 

13 as you recall, initially at least it appeared that Mr. 

14 Nir was not feuniliar with the new channel or was learning 

15 about it belatedly. I sensed from Mr. Nir's conversation 

16 that he and his govemaent were concerned that they might 

17 be cut out of the new channel or that thair role would be 

18 certainly reduced in the new channel. 

19 And, as Z understand it. General Secord took a 

20 trip to Israel to indicate that we would use Israel as a 

21 support Bechanisa but that the Israeli role would be less 

22 direct. Let's put it that way. 

23 Q I'm going to come back to that here in a bit. 

24 Let me do some clean-up work on a couple other documents 

25 that we picked Jif^ , Let me_take you to November of 1985, 




«HED 



726 




489 

1 There apparently was a meeting with David Kimche in early 

2 1985, November 8-9, 1985. It is mentioned in various 

3 notes we have that Kimche had lunch with Ledeen or North 

4 on or about the 8th of November and that Kimche then met 

5 with North and McFarlane on or about November 9. 

6 Were you aware of those meetings during that 

7 period of time? 

8 A No, sir, I was not. I was not aware of Mr. 

9 Kimche 's activities until December 3, when Mr. Ledeen 

10 started providing background on the Iranian initiative. 

11 Q So in terms of Kimche being in the U.S. and 

12 whatever meetings he was having with the NSC, that wasn't 

13 something you were privy to at the time? 

14 A No, sir. I was totally unaware of it. 

15 Q We also touched the last time — this is for 

16 purposes of settling the chronology — on the fact that 

17 McFarlane apparently told Casey November 14 and McMahon 

18 that Kimche had said that the Israelis were planning to 

19 send arms to Iran at the end of November. 

20 Am I correct that you were not aware of that 

21 meeting that McFarlane would have had with Casey and 

22 McMzOion at the end of November? 

23 A I was not aware at all. 

24 Q You have a couple of notes dated November 15, 

25 1985 that were sent about meetings that you were having. 



o«»sifi£e 



727 




490 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



Th« first Is a meeting with Nir which apparently was 
scheduled for November 18, 1985, and the second is a 
meeting with Colonel Zur scheduled for November 20, 1985. 
Let me have those marked. 

(The documents referred to were 
marked Allen Exhibit Numbers 5 3 
and 54 for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 
A Yes. I don't recall the subject of either 
meeting. Z recall meeting Mr. Nir initially in August of 
1985. I met hia again in Israel in October '85. He 
came, I believe, to Washington in November, but this was, 
as I recall, at that stage because Mr. Nir was not part 
of the first channel to Iran. Our discussions related 
essentially 




Q Specifically you have no recall of discussing 
with Nir orj^lon the 18th of 20th of November the 
planned hawk shipment? 

A I 'a certain I did not discuss it with Mr. Nir, 
and I never discussed the Iranian initiative at any time 
with^^^^l^V 

Q Mr. Rabin was in the U.S. during this period 
as well. Did you have knowledge of him being in town 

hmu 



728 




491 

1 discussing things with McFarlane? 

2 A Mr. Rabin, yes, the Defense Minister. Yes. I 

3 think Z met with Mr. Nir at that stage. 

4 Q So the Nir meeting would have been in 

5 conjunction with the Rabin meeting? 

6 A Yes. He traveled with Defense Minister Rabin. 

7 He was very close to the Defense Minister, veiv close. 

8 Q McFarlane placed the date of the call that he 

9 got from Rabin while he was in Geneva as November 17, 

10 again the same period of time as these two meetings. 

11 A Yes, sir. 

12 Q That did not spill over on you, I take it. You 

13 weren't advised on the 17th that Nir and/or RaUoin were 

14 trying to get in touch with McFarlane, trying to get some 

15 help on the HAWK shipment? 

16 A Not that I know of. Z met — this is November 

17 '85. I don't recall that. I believe Mr. Nir returned, 

18 did he not, in January '86? 

19 Q Correct . 

20 A Okay. During this period it was very much 

21 related to our respective counterterrorist activities. 

22 As I think I have at least testified to someone — I 

23 can't remember whether it is you or the Independent 

24 Counsel — in January '86 it was clear that Nir was 

25 unaware of the initiative, because Colonel North paged me 




729 



mmssuB 



492 



1 vhan w« w«re having a beer, and I had my mobile. phone 

2 with me, and Nir talked cryptically to Colonel North and 

3 then made a phone call to Defense Minister Rabin, but he 

4 spoke in Hebrew so I have absolutely no idea what he 

5 said. 

6 Q But you have no present recollection, then, 

7 during the time that you were involved with Dewey 

8 Clarridge on this HAWK matter having any contact with 

9 either Rabin or Nir? 

10 A I had no contact at that stage about the 

11 Iranian initiative. As you recall, Z was called on a 

12 Saturday morning and told by Colonel North that I should 

13 go see Mr. Clarridge, that I shouldn't be at home doing 

14 housework and things like that. 

15 Q Let's move in to another document that v.'e have 

16 that appears to be dated December of 1985. Again to put 

17 things in context, on December 4 you had your meeting — 

18 you and Mr. Clarridge had your meeting with Mr. Ledeen in 

19 which he went through in some detail his prior experience 

20 with the Iran initiative. 

21 Using that as a kind of a way of focusing your 

22 recollection, I'd like you to look at this document and 
2 3 do your best for me in terms of placing it in time and 

24 giving me the context. That will be our next numbered 

25 exhibit, which is 55. 

TOP llORCnfOIl 




730 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



iiWSll 



493 



(The document referred to. was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 55 
for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 
A That's a very curious set of notes. 
Q Yes, sir. 

A On the Director, I believe that was — the 
Song of Solomon has to do with a letter written by Terry 
Anderson which came out in about the November-December 
time frame of '85 to his, I guess, common lav wife who 
lived in Lebanon by whoa he had a child, and he wrote 
this letter which was filled with passages from the Song 
of Solomon. And if you've ever read them, they are quite 
interesting. 




Mr. Ledeen is, and I can't explain the note 
where apparently Mr. Ledeen saw me and told me something, 
except that, as you know, Mr. Ledeen 's charge from Mr. 
McFarlane was to use the Ghorbanifar channel and any 
others that he could develop from that to talk to 



wmsm 



731 



im^i 



imiLo 



494 



important officials of th« Iranian government. And. 
presumably this relates to that, where Mr. Ledeen said 
that he had identified other potential senior officials 
that he could talk to. 

As you }cnow, he claims to have had contact 
with a very senior ayatollah whose name has appeared in 
the press. 

As far as Director Casey, this must have been 
a call or a direct contact with Mr. Casey in which he 
wanted me to evaluate any information that Ghorbanifar 
had on terrorism to see how valid it was, and he said 
something to the effect, as I recall, you Icnow, we're 
only going to give him minimal support in the area of 
terrorism right now. We must keep him focused fully on 
the back channel to Iran, on opening and developing 
contacts in Iran, and on freeing the American hostages. 

Don't encourage hia that somehow you're going 
to get heavily involved with him on counterterrorist 
activity. And, as I recall, I believe Mr. Clarridge even 
wrote • memo at that time to either Mr. Casey or Mr. 
Clair O«orge which laid out how our relationship would be 
with Mr. Ghorbanifar. At least Mr. Clarridge did that, I 
think in the late winter of 1985-86. 

Q Try to place these notes. Would you put them 
in early December? 
TOP SI 



'MASSIHED 



732 



msMi 



495 



1 A ' I would put these — yeah, early December, 

2 because I believe it was about that time we received this 

3 letter, which we pored over eagerly, that had been sent 

4 out from the Hezbollah captors to the common law wife of 

5 Mr. Anderson, the AP correspondent. 

6 Q There are a couple of references in the DCI 

7 category that I'm curious if you have any recall about. 

8 There is a reference to "shipments are dead". Do you 

9 recall what that meant? 

10 A No, sir, I do not. I don't have any idea. 

11 Q You recollect that around December 9 -December 

12 10 there was a view that the program was over. 

13 A I thought it was over. As you recall, I 

14 described fairly vividly ninning accidentally into 

15 Colonel North at the Department of State and we talked at 

16 the C Street entrance, where I said Z was there working 

17 on counter-narcotics and I said well, the initiative is 

18 gone, and that was when he told me it was not gone. 

19 Q If that's the case, then this thing would be 

20 nollitten sometime probably before December 10, right? 

21 A Yes, sir. I would say that might be a good 

22 time. 

23 Q At or about December 10? 

24 A Yes. 

25 Q And essentially I guess what was being said 



f(\ 



•asstfffD 



733 





496 

1 h«r« Is ydu w«r« told that tha shipments ar« dead, ^ut 

2 Casey wants to do the following things nonetheless — 

3 revitalize linkages to Iran, pursue terrorism, that kind 

4 of thing. Is that what is being said here? 

5 A That's what's trritten there, and Z can't put 
€ it in a precise context as to why I wrote those notes. 

7 But presumably it was either direct conversation with Mr. 

8 Casey or what Mr. Casey was told or what Mr. Casey 

9 instructed the specific line to be. 

10 Q There's another reference: "Bud wants 

11 Findings." Do you have any idea what that refers to? Is 

12 that Bud McFarlane? 

13 A That would be Mr. McFarlane. 

14 Q What Findings did he want, if you can recall? 

15 A I don't know, but I assume it was after the 

16 November 24-29 event. It was clear that this initiative 

17 couldn't proceed without a Presidential Finding, and I 

18 cannot put that in any specific context. 

19 Q That doesn't stir any further recollection 

20 that you would have today about what you knew about the 

21 status of Findings as of early December 1985? 

22 A Only what, as Z think Z've testified or 

23 deposed earlier, that on the Tuesday following the 

24 weekend of the so-called airlift to Iran Mr. Clarridge 

25 told me that Mr. McMahon felt that a Finding was required 



leassiftED 



734 



tJfietftS«8 



497 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



and that the General Counsel, Mr. Sporkin, and others 
were working on it. 

I had no role in the Finding. I did not 
monitor the status of the Finding, contrary to what 1 
think someone testified that I should have been doing. 
The only other reference I know to the Finding was when 
Mr. Makowka and I were in Colonel North's office on 24 
December, when he made some very cryptic remarks as to 
the fact that something had been signed and the only copy 
was in his safe. ^ 

Q The bottom line is you can't give me anything 
further about what Casey was telling you about Findings 
at the time these notes were written? 

A No, sir. 

Q Let me show you another Ledeen reference. 
This occurs five days after your December 4 meeting. 
It's December 9, 1985 , and it has references to the 
travel plans of ^^^^^^^^Hwhich will be Exhibit 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 56 
for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 

A This is my chief of staff clearly took a call 
from Mr. Ledeen on 9 December and I'm not sure where I 
was. But, in any event, he talked about the senior 

D.fSSIFI 



735 




498 

1 Iraniah official flying to Frankfort, and I can't recall 

2 that anything ever cam* of that particular development. 

3 Q The reason I'm bringing it to your attention, 

4 and some of these other documents relating to Ledeen at 

5 this period of time, I'm trying to get a clear picture in 

6 my mind of what you understood Ledeen 's role to be at 

7 this point. We're in the first week to two weeks of 

8 December. You've had your December 4 meeting. 

9 What did Ledeen tell you? What was his role 

10 in the Iran initiative as of that time? 

11 A Mr. Ledeen at that stage told Mr. Clarridge 

12 and me, and told me, I remember, c[uite directly, that he 

13 remained as an NSC advisor on countert error ism, that 

14 Admiral Poindexter did not want him working directly on 

15 the issues relating to American hostages in Lebanon and 

16 possible shipment of arms, that he was to work more 

17 broadly to look at the whole issue of Iran and Iranian 

18 terrorism, how to deal with the government of Iran. 

19 Admiral Poindexter wanted him to suggest 

20 ld««s, but Admiral Poindexter was keeping it at arm's 

21 length. So this was in keeping with this guidance, which 

22 I assumed was legitimate because he continued to draw a 

23 salary, a consulting salary from the HSC on terrorism and 

24 he provided, at that stage, information which he clearly 

25 was receiving from Mr. Ghorbanifar. 




736 



499 

1 Q • That's really my curiosity. Mr. Ledeen tells 

2 you all that he has been taken off of the arms for 

3 hostages. 

4 A Yes. Colonel North indicated that, too. 

5 Q Yet nonetheless he is apparently in fairly 

6 close contact with Ghorbanifar. That didn't strike you 

7 as being at odds with what you understood his 

8 instructions to be? 

9 A Yes, it always struck me at odds. But he 

10 continued, as far as I knew, with a considerable degree 

11 of contact with Ghorbanifar. 

12 Q Indeed, December, January, February you knew 

13 that he was having dinner with Ghorbanifar and meeting 

14 him at various European locales and the like, didn't you? 

15 A That's correct. 

16 Q Did you have any understanding from Ledeen on 

17 the extent to which he was reporting his activities back 

18 to either North or Poindexter? 

19 A Z assumed he was reporting all of his 

20 contacts. That would relate to the broader issue of 

21 probing various elements of the Iranian government. As I 

22 understand it, Mr. Ghorbanifar was one channel, however 

23 legitimate or illegitimate. Beyond any question he had 

24 contacts at the highest levels of the Iranian government. 

25 Q Did North ever indicate to you the extent to 



WMife 



737 





500 

1 which ha was familiar with the fact that Michael Ledeen 

2 was continuing to have an ongoing social relationship? 

3 A I recall he generally was aware that there was 

4 continuing contact. But — go ahead, please. 

5 . Q He didn't disapprove it? That's what I'm 

6 looking for. 

7 A I think he expressed concern from time to time 

8 over Mr. Ledeen 's activities, that he would get into the 

9 whole issue of trying to resolve the hostage issue. But 

10 Mr. Ledeen came to the NSC, as far as I knew, and he 

11 called me from the NSC on secure during 1986, so he must 

12 have had a continuing relationship with the NSC that gave 

13 certain legitimacy. 

14 Q Were you aware as of early December 1986 that 

15 Poindexter and North had given instructions that Ledeen 

16 was not to have access to classified materials on the 

17 hostage situation? 

18 A What was the date, sir? 

19 Q This would be early December. 

20 A Yes, and I didn't give him information on the 

21 hostage situation. 

22 Q Again bear with me. It strikes me as a little 

23 hard to understand why he would be compartmented out^^H 
^^^^^^^^^^^H^Hof things people 

25 still going ahead and meeting on a day-in and day-out 




82-688 0-88-25 



738 




501 

1 basis. 

2 A How to differentiate the two areas? 

3 Q Yes, sir. 

4 A I agree with you. That question arose in my 

5 mind, certainly. 

6 Q Did you have occasion to discuss that with 

7 North to try to get a better picture of what role Ledeen 

8 really had in all this? 

9 A I never had a clear role, but Colonel North 

10 made it clear that on hostage matters I was not to 

11 discuss then with Mr. Ladeen. 

12 Q But as to what Ledeen 's function was in terms 

13 of dealing with Ghorbanifar, did North ever really spell 

14 that out for you? 

15 A He never spelled that out. He continued to 

16 consult with the NSC and to read material which was 

17 classified on terrorist developments. 

18 Q All right. 

19 A I'm not sure how long he maintained his 

2 clearances and his consultancy to the NSC, but it was 

21 wall into 1986, so far as I know. 

22 Q Was it your impression or understanding that 
Ledeen had a special mission to deal with^HH^^^Hm 

2 4 ^^^^^^spects of this matter as opposed to the arms- 

2 5 for-hostages aspects? 
TOP SECF 




739 



l^^\ ^QC 



OP SECRET/ CODEWORD 



502 



1 A ■ I would say th at '3 one. I would broaden it 

beyond^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hin the sense that he looking 

3 substantively at the whole issue of Iran to try to 

4 detemine what could be done about opening a relationship 

5 there. It was very imprecise to me and it was never 

6 spelled out to me. 

7 Q Let me show you another document that relates 

8 to Mr. Ghorbanifar, and what I would like you to do is 

9 spend a little time looking at it to see if you can tell 

10 me when of the various interviews that you had with 

11 Ghorbanifar these notes appear to correspond. That will 

12 be Exhibit 57. 

13 (The document referred to was 

14 marked Allen Exhibit Number 57 

15 for identification.) 

16 (Pause.) 

17 A This was the interview I had with Mr. 

18 Ghorbanifar in the Churchill Hotel on the 25th of January 

19 1986 at Portaan Square. 

2 Q And that is the interview about which we have 

21 a partial tape; is that right? 

22 A You have a partial tape. You also have a very 
2 3 complete, very detailed memorandum which carries 

2 4 everything that he told me of any importance so far as I 

25 knew at the time, of 18 February 1986. 

'CODEWORD 




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503 

Q SO this exhibit, this Exhibit 57, would be the 
notes that you took while the interview was going on? 

A Yes. 

Q Now, using these notes as a reference point, 
there are a couple of things I would like to have you 
elaborate on a little bit further. 




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A A3 you know, Mr. McMahon sent me to interview 
Mr. Ghorbanifar and to just convey the intelligence, and 
he was talking generally across the board about all his 
)cnowledge of terrorist groups — Libya, Syria, Iran. 

I can't put this in any specific context, 
except Mr. Ghorbanifar kept talking about the fact that 
there were Iranian elements in Europe, there were 
Revolutionary Guard elements in Lebanon, and I assume in 
this case he claimed to have at least in his pay or 
someone close to him involved in this type of activity 
that^^^B^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^Hwas aware 
perhaps targets. 

Most of the terrorism, as I recall, was 
against Iranian dissidents in Western Europe. He 
spacifically talked a about^^^^^^^^^^^^^Kieing 
clos« to him and being in his pocket, so to speak. 




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There's a reference at 09390 to Ollie North 
and it's a little bit hard to read. But I'd like you to 
give it your best shot. There's also a reference to Mr. 
North on the succeeding page, 91, but I'm particularly 
interested in the question of $10 million in cash. I'd 
li.'ce you to tell me as best you can what it was Mr. 
Ghorbanifar was telling you about his plans for Ollie 
North at this point in your conversation on the 2 5th and 
2 6th of January. 

A The only thing I recall is that he had some 
vary elaborate statements to make about the Hezbollah and 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps networks in 
Lebanon, as well as Iranian networks I assume even 
outside of Lebanon. I don't know what — he talked 
something about $10 million in oil. I really have no 
idea what all this is about. 
TOP fctUEItlCOi 




744 




507 



1 ■ I simply was writing furiously as he was. 

2 speaking. But in retrospect it makes little or no sense 

3 to me. He says he wanted to know how to deal with the 

4 United States, how to deal with the Central Intelligence 

5 Agency. It's important for him to know that he felt that 

6 Ayatollah Khomeini would step down and Montezari, with 

7 whom we now know ha was in close contact, would come in. 

But ^^^H^^Hj^^^^Hhad no 

9 support. So it all was involved in what I envisioned at 

10 the time, this being only the third time, I guess, that I 

11 had ever met the man, was soma grandiose scheme. And I 

12 can't put it in any better context than that. 

13 Q Do you have recall of this program being 

14 discussed as a way of generating funds for Colonel 

15 North's activities in Central America? 

16 A Only in the sense that toward the end of the 

17 conversation somewhere hare he apparently said something 
to the effectJ^Bflj^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

if w asaiate jM^^Bii^^^BH^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^B 

1^|H^^^H^^^^^^^^|^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HHE^^^P^Ht h a t 

21 could get whatever, $25 million for himself, $25 million 

22 for Oliver North's boys down south. That's the only time 

23 I ever heard any specific projects being mentioned. 

24 That seemed so absurd I didn't even put it in 

25 my memorandum for the record. 



TOP 



ULfiy 






745 



WSSIFIED 



508 



1 Q All right. 

2 A I wish I could put it in better context. I'm 

3 not sure whether that portion's on the tape or not. 

4 Q It's not, and I was hoping perhaps you could 

5 tell me a bit more. It looks to me as if a proposal was 

6 being suggested here to generate large sums of cash 

7 having to do with a program of acquiring oil at below 

8 market prices. But you can't tell me any more about 

9 that, the program? 

10 A No, I cannot. It did not seem terribly 

11 likely. 

12 Q All right. Turning again to Mr. Ledeen, this 

13 is a February 3, 1986, memo from yourself to, I believe, 

14 Dewey Clarridge, and that will be Exhibit 58. 

15 (The document referred to was 

16 marked Allen Exhibit Number 58 

17 for identification.) 

18 You might take a moment to familiarize 

19 yourself with the memo. 
2 (Pause.) 

21 A I simply recorded what Mr. Ledeen told me, and 

22 I recall that he did that. I did not offer any promises 

23 to Mr. Ledeen. I passed it to Mr. Clarridge. Mr. 

2 4 Clarridge and I discussed the matter and it was Mr. 

25 Clarridge's opinion that given the direction of Mr. Casey 



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that we should not really get involved in this, that Mr. 
Casey's direction was to focus on the Ghorbanifar channel 
and work on that. 




So it came to naught. Nothing ever occurred 
from this. But at least I went through this activity at 
the request of Mr. Ledeen. Again, he represented himself 
as representing Admiral Poindexter. 

Q At this same period of time Ledeen was going 
to former NSC Advisor McFarlane and making similar 
requests that McFarlane intervene to get^^^^HHvisas 
ind the like. Old you know that? 

A No, sir, not at all. Ha never told me that he 
had gone through any other channel on this. He had only 
com* to us to see if we could be of any help. 

Q Did he tell you why he was so anxious to 
a s s i s t ^^^^^^^^^I^^^^^^^H 

A He had already briefed, of course, me on his 
contacts ^^^^l^^^^H^ind that was recorded in earlier 
memoranda ,^^^^^^^^^^^^as you may know, is looked upon 





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as very much a very hard line supporter of Islamic . 
fundamentalism, yet our analysis indicates that he has 
more than one side to him, like many Iranians. 

This is an individual of very significant 
prominence with whom one might be able to establish some, 
at least, contact, so it wasn't surp rising that he would 
want to contact an individual likeJ^^^^^Hgiven 

jstensible credentials. Yet we have found 
another side where he wants to actually play in the west 
or deal with the west under the table. 

But I had no idea he had gone to Mr. McFarlane 
with this same request. 

Q But he says in this memorandum that he claims 
to have met with^^^^^Hon two occasions — he being 
Ledeen. 

A Yes, sir. 

Q And L«deen asserted that Bud McFarlane wishes 
to mest^^^^^^^^^Hin the near future ^^^H^^^^^HH 
Did you explore that with him at all, on why it was tha t 
Bud McFarlane would want to meet 



A No. I could speculate, but I don't have any 
specific Information. 

Q Were you aware of any direction at the NSC 
level to pursue this^^^^^Haspect of things the way 



TOP 




mm 



748 



IfliSStflffl 



511 



1 L«deen wad pursuing it? 

2 A I had no specific guidance from the NSC on 

3 that except he had always asserted that he remained a 

4 consultant to the NSC and he had this broader 

5 responsibility to loo)c at Iran in the micro sense to see 

6 what could be done and to advise the NSC Advisor. 

7 Q Did he tell you what the two occasions were 

8 that he -- that is, Ledeen — had met with! 

9 A No. He mentioned those meetings, though, in 

10 the 3 December 1985 conversation, and I asked very 

11 specifically, I said that's very interesting. I'm sure 

12 our operations officers and our analysts would like to 

13 have memoranda of conversation on those meetings; could 

14 we have them? And he said he had never put anything in 

15 writing. It was too sensitive, in his view. 

16 Q Did he ever tell you what had occurred at the 
meeting he attendec^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H in 

18 late October 1985? 

19 A No, sir. 

20 Q He did not? 

21 A No details. 

22 Q McFarlane is retired, relatively long retired 

23 from the NSC at this point. What was he telling you 

24 about McFarlane? 

25 A I think I would correct the record on that. 



^^jjU^i^'^^fr 




nu. 



749 




512 

1 As I understood it, Mr. McFarlane retained his clearances 

2 — I was aware of that — and that he also, even though 

3 he in essence had left the National Security Advisor post 

4 that he had made himself available for other duties that 

5 the President might so direct. 

6 Q Were you aware of any role McFarlane was 

7 playing in any aspect of the Iran initiative as of 
3 February 3? 

9 A Not any specific role. When the discussion 

10 turned in February to an American delegation going to 

11 Tehran his name immediately came up. 

12 Q Can you place that in the context of this 

13 February 3 memo? 

14 A No, sir, I can't. 

15 Q Was it before or after? 

16 A I cannot answer, but I would think it would be 

17 after that. I think it was in the February-March time 
13 fram* that McFarlane 'a name rose to the forefront as the 

19 individual who would represent President Reagan in 

20 Tahran. 

21 Q Now I don't want to beat this thing into the 

22 ground, but it's still not clea r to me what it was that 

23 McFarlane would be doing^^^^^^^^Bin February of 

24 1936. Ledeen didn't elaborate on that at all with you? 

25 A Only that this was part of the continuing 

T0P.'4Bt:W^i'cd|^( 




750 



JgkMED 



513 



1 effort to .probe key officials of the Iranian government 

2 as to what their attitudes were toward the west. Did 

3 they really fully believe Islamic fundamentalism was a 

4 way for the future? What type of minimal contacts might 

5 be developed over time with the Iranian government? 

6 He put it in a very realistic context. 

7 Q Did you discuss this request with North at all 

8 during this period of time? 

9 A I don't think so. I don't recall it. I 

10 discussed it with Mr. Clarridge but not with Colonel 

11 North, to my knowledge. 

12 Q When Ledeen made this request of you, did he 

13 make it saying that he had the authorization of either 

14 North or Poindexter to make this request to you? 

15 A It was in the context of authorization that he 

16 had from Admiral Poindexter to continue efforts with key 

17 Iranian officials. He put it in that context. I didn't 

18 question his. 

19 Q That was my next question. You didn't have 

20 oceaaion to check? 

21 A No. He clearly had direct access to Colonel 

22 North's office and was there on an occasional basis. 

23 Q I'll show you a document that has a couple of 

24 parts to it. The first — well, maybe the first is 

25 marked DEA Agents, and frankly I don't know if it goes 



TOlf I 



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751 



i««D 



514 



with 



1 

2 A Would it be possible for me to take a five- 

3 minute break? 

4 MR. KERR: Sure. Let's take a break. 

5 (A brief recess was taken.) 

6 (The document referred to was 

7 marked Allen Exhibit Number 59 

8 for identification.) 

9 THE WITNESS: This is clearly a DEA agent 
-•^^^^^^^^Lind|HH|HmHH| This 

11 occurred in January '86 where ha first — where Colonel 

12 North wanted me to meet with these people to get some 

13 idea of their access. 

14 Colonel North was always pushing |HH^^^^pnd 

15 ^^I^^^^^^B^'^ true operators who worked the streets and 

16 who could really deal with the world's sleaziest 

17 characters. 

18 MR. WOODCOCK: That was not untrue, was it? 

19 THE WITNESS: No, sir. They dealt with the 

20 world's sleaziest characters. They are DEA agents and 1 

21 did spend a year with DEA agents as the NIO for 

22 narcotics, and I know the kind of life they lead. And he 

23 spoke about some of their sources,] 

which I know that^^^^^^and^^^^^^^|spoke about 

25 this source several times. 




TOP isti^: 



?WSlflED 



752 




515 



1 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

2 Q Let me stop you for a second, what we have 

3 here is what appears to be your notes of conversation you 

4 would have had with North? 

5 A Probably — no. I misled you. I suspect that 
with^P^^^^Hland^^^^^H^^H They 

7 their contacts, so this — where this conversation 

8 occurred I don't recall. I know that ^J^^^B^Bind ^^^M 

9 I^^^^Hflcane to the White House situation room once wherf; 

10 I was present, and it could be at that stage they talked 

11 about this source, and I suspect that probably was in the 

12 January '86 time frame. 

13 There were other people present at that 

14 meeting. London. The ones indicated London is clearly a 

15 separate conversation. 

16 (Pause.) 

17 This is the famous meeting that occurred in 

18 Room 370 Executive Office Building on or about 28 or 29 

19 January 1986. Present at that meeting were Colonel 
Mor^, Major Secord,^^^^^^^^H|^B Chief 

21 the NE Division, or at that time he was Deputy Chief of 

22 the NE Division of the Directorate of Operations. I 

23 think Mr. Noel Koch was there for at least a portion of 

24 the meeting, and myself. 

25 And this is where Colonel North laid out his 

TOpf l&i^ftlCfi 



753 




516 

1 famous schedule which ended up with, I believe, the 

2 Ayatollah stepping down. 

3 Q Yes. I believe there is a reference to that 

4 event. 

5 A At which point I laughed very uproariously, to 

6 Colonel North's annoyance, although he laughed, too. But 

7 he found it also doubtful. 

8 The next one has to do with — I see there is 

9 a heading called DDCI. That would be Deputy Director of 

10 Intelligence. 

11 Q Let me stop you for just a second. The 

12 document now we're referring to is 09403? 

13 A Yes. I would assume this was a meeting that I 

14 had in Mr. McMahon's office on the 24th of January 1986. 

15 Mr. Gates was present 9H^^^^^HH^^9 Colonel North 

16 joined us at some point. I was there. That was when we 

17 were putting together an intelligence semple. 

18 Q And this was in preparation for the trip that 

19 you took January 2 5-2 6? 

20 A Well, I left on the 24th. I didn't Icnow I v,'as 

21 going to London. Mr. McMahon made the decision sort of 

22 on the spot. I simply was working with the Directorate 

23 of Intelligence in the preparation of the intelligence 
2 4 package. But then Mr. McMahon said for me to go to 

25 London to deliver it, so I did that afternoon. 



mmm 



754 




517 

1 The next series of notes appears to be the 

2 meeting that occurred at Mr. Ledeen ' s house on the 13th 

3 of January where he said he was a turnkey project man. 

4 He didn't want to just be used as a foreign intelligence 

5 source. 

6 Q That's C-09405? 

7 A Yes, sir. 

8 This evidently is a telephone call from Mr. 

9 Ghorbanifar that occurred late in the afternoon, 

10 Washington time, on the 18th of February, 19 86, and he 

11 was discussing the fact that^^^Hj^^B^^^^Hwas going 

12 to be in charge of operations outside of Iran 

13 Q Let's try to pick up the number of that page. 

14 It would be 09410; is that right? 

15 A Yes, sir, that's correct. 

16 Q Now on that score I'd like to clear up an 

17 identification that wa had on a previous exhibit. In the 
13 previous testimony you gave we looked at a series of 

19 attachments to a Februairy 24, 1987 letter and we were 

2 trying to place them in time. 

21 The document that was attachment D to the 

22 Rizzo letter of February 24 had been identified by Mr. 

23 Rizzo as steno pad notes of a February 18, 1986, 

24 telephone call, Ghorbanifar to Allen. During the course 

25 of your testimony when last we spoke you indicated that 




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518 

that page, you thought, reflected notes that were taken 
on January 25-26 at the meeting at the Churchill Hotel. 

A Yes. I clearly was wrong in my previous 
deposition on this. It clearly -- this occurred clearly 
now as part of a telephone conversation. 

Q And the reference specifically that we are 
looking at has been stamped in the Senate files before as 
C-183 and now bears number C-09412. You will note at the 
bottom quarter of the page there is a reference to $25 
million for OLN's project in Central America. 

We previously discussed that, but I take it 
this refreshes your recollection that this conversation 
with Ghorbanifar took place on February 18 in the late 
afternoon? 

A That's correct. 




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Q The note that says London in the document that 
you've identified as being the notes of the meeting with 
Colonel North, ^^^^^^^^Vand others on the 28th or 29th 
of January, do you recall what the London reference was? 

A That was the way I titled it simply because 
Colonel North had just arrived from London. He had just 
st«pp«d off an airplane at Dulles and in fact we had 
recaived a call,^^^^^^^^|and I, think from Miss 
Fawn Hall before he had arrived. As soon as he g ot in to 
calling range, he had placed a call and said that^^Hand 
I were to appear at the Old Executive Office Building. 

Q I'm trying to place this by date. There's a 
reference that says on Tuesday (28 January) Ghorba will 




757 




520 

1 get Tehran response. And then there's a reference to 

2 Wednesday. So this would have taken place, in all 

3 likelihood, a day or so before January 28? 

4 A Well, I thought it occurred — it could have. 

5 I was thinking it occurred on the 29th of January. I had 

6 just returned from London myself, but Colonel North had 

7 followed me promptly to London. 

8 Q You came in about the 27th? 

9 A Twenty-sixth. I flew back on Monday and 

10 arrived Monday afternoon. 

11 Q Okay. 

12 A But it was only a day or two later that 

13 Colonel North had flown to London and had flown back 

14 virtually the same day without stopping. He had spent 

15 maybe 24 hours in London, but no more than that. 

16 Q There is some pricing material in this 

17 collection of notes that I'm not sure I follow and maybe 

18 you can help us out. There's a reference to DOO pricing 

19 of $6,000 par item, I guess it is. 

20 A Per TOW, yes. 

21 Q For a total of $24 million. Were you being 

22 told at this time, the third week or so of January, that 

23 the cost per TOW was in the range of $6,000? 

24 A That's what Colonel North, I believe, read 

25 off. It could be that he obtained that price from Mr. 




lU 



758 



1 Noel Koch, who was at the meeting. I don't loiow where he 

2 obtained that specific price. But I simply jotted 

3 hurriedly down everything he was trying to say, because 

4 he was laying out a very specific schedule. I wanted to 

5 get back and get that schedule^^^^^Has I recall, which 

6 I did that evening. 

7 But those are, as precisely as I could record, 

8 those are statements I believe made principally by 

9 Colonel North. 

10 Q There's a reference down here to Iranians and 

11 Israelis now trust us, $24 million commitment from 

12 Iranian. Do you recollect what that was about? 

13 A I assume that had to do with the price that 

14 would flow from the shipment of what then, I guess, was — 

15 at that stage we had not gotten on to the HAWK spare 

16 parts; we were still into the TOW missile era. I can't 

17 elaborate more on that at this stage. It's just too long 

18 ago. 

19 Q Let me take you back to Ledeen. We have 

20 another memorandum on Michael Ledeen. It's a memo from 

21 you to Deputy Director Gates of May 28, 1986. I'd like 

22 to have it marked as the next exhibit, which I guess will 

23 be Exhibit 60. 

24 (The document referred to was 

25 IIMI#* marked Allen Exhibit Number 60 



»A I4%i marKea a 



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for identification.) 
Take a look at it and I will have a few 

questions. 

(Pause. ) 

A I recall the memorandum. 

Q With regard to this request from Ledeen, did 
this meeting actually take place? 

A Yes. It's my understanding it did. 

Q Did you attend the meeting? 

A No, sir, I didn't. 

Q DO you have any knowledge what transpired at 

the meeting? 

A No, sir. I don't know. But it is my 
understanding, I believe, based on what Mr^^edee^id 
later, it dealt with what wa s indicated "H^IH 

^^^^^^W^tnTlcnowledge of Ledeen talking to 
cat*, about th« Iran initiative at this meeting? 
A No, sir, I don't. 

Q we know from other things that have been 
generated in the course of the investigation that Ledeen 
was talking to Rodman and some other folks about this 
time, basically telling them that he didn't think the 
arms-for-hostages approach was a good idea. 




760 



523 

1 Q That he did think pursuing ^^^^^Hvas a good 

2 idea. But he articulated a strong sense that the arms- 

3 for-hostages approach simply should not be pursued. Were 

4 you aware of that attitude on Ledeen's part by May of 

5 1986? 

6 A Ves. 

7 Q Had he expressed that notion to you before May 

8 of '86? 

9 A I believe so. I believe that he began to 

10 express that concern in December '85, when he was 

11 apparently kept at arm's length and told by Adairal 

12 Poindexter that he would no longer be part of the so- 

13 called Iranian initiative that related to securing the 

14 release of American hostages in Lebanon. 

15 It's my understanding that Mr. Ledeen seemed 

16 very nonplussed by this and he commented to me more than 

17 once in 198 6 that he felt that this was too narrow a 

18 focus for the American government to pursue, that he 

19 recognized that the hostages were a stumbling block to 
2 bett«r relations, but he felt that the focus was 

21 misdirected. He said that several times. 

22 Q But you do have a recollection of Ledeen being 
2 3 of that view as early as December of '85? 

24 A He articulated that view more clearly, I 

25 think, later on. I clearly remember having lunch at CIA 






mmm\i 



761 



mmms 



524 



1 headquarters in the executive dining room sometime in 

2 1986 where he articulated that view. He just said in 

3 December of '85 he thought it was a mistake, the wrong 

4 way to go. I think he was rather consistent. 

5 Q That's good to know. 

6 With regard to the role he was playing vis-a- 

7 vis Ghorbanifar during this period of time, you are aware 

8 that he did know that Ghorbanifar was in fact playing a 

9 role in these arms transactions that took place in the 

10 December through May period? 

11 A I'm certain that he knew something of this 

12 because Mr. Ghorbanifar is a talkative individual. But 

13 Mr. Ledeen never discussed the issue with me in any 

14 detail. He just indicated general knowledge that that 

15 effort was continuing between Colonel North and Mr. 

16 Ghorbanifar and others. 

17 Q Did ha speak favorably of Ghorbanifar 's arms 

18 transactions, or was he opposed to them? Did he 

19 articulate that to you? 

20 A As I said earlier, I think that he felt that 

21 this was a fairly narrow way to go, that he didn't think 

22 it was very productive, that we should be looking much 

23 more broadly and we should not subordinate the broader 

24 interest of our relations in southwest Asia by focusing 

25 only on American hostages in Lebanon. 



762 



f. 



525 

1 • He thought that was an unfortunate situation 

2 but one that really shouldn't drive the project or drive 

3 efforts to end this vacuum that was created with the rise 

4 of the Ayatollah in 1979. 

5 Q Did he, during this period of time, December 

6 to May, relate to you an awareness on his part that Mr. 

7 Ghorbanifar was or was trying to make a profit on these 

8 arms transactions? 

9 A Not in those terms, I wouldn't say that was 

10 what he said. He clearly understood Mr. Ghorbanifar 's 

11 motivations. Mr. Ghorbanifar is an individual who felt 

12 he deserved a profit and was a wealthy man, or allegedly 

13 a wealthy man, even during the days of the Shah, and that 

14 he was driven principally as a businessman to make money. 

15 Q I'm having trouble pulling these disparate 

16 elements together here. He was dealing with Ghorbanifar 

17 as a social acquaintance or friend during this period of 

18 time, was he not, to your knowledge? 

19 A I don't know how he characterized that 

2 relationship. I know that he continued to, on his trips 

21 to Europe, which were frequent, that it was clear that he 

22 saw Mr. Ghorbanifar because he would make mention of it. 
2 3 Q Well, was it your impression, standing back 

2 4 and trying to look at this period of time at where 

2 5 Michael Ledeen was, that Mr. Ledeen was favorably 






763 




526 

1 disposed to Mr. Ghorbanifar engaging in arms transactions 

2 and thereby profiting from them or not? 

3 A I don't think he was unfavorably disposed to 

4 that. He felt that Mr. Ghorbajiifar offered opportunities 

5 for contact to key people, 
^^^H^^^^^^^^^^Pand he was to 

7 the idea of Mr. Ghorbanifar making arms deals 

8 necessarily. He never spoke that he was against those 

9 kinds of transactions. 

10 What he spoke of critically was the U.S. 

11 Government's focus on hostages in Lebanon rather than 

12 looking at the broader range of issues, and that we were 

13 not scrubbing down the policy options toward Iran and 

14 that he had spoken to Mr. McFarlane but Mr. McFarlane was 

15 very tired about the time he was leaving the NSC and that 

16 he had been unable to obtain the ear of Admiral 

17 Poindexter on the issue. 

18 These were general complaints, and I'm 

19 characterizing them in summary form. But I heard those 

20 froB Mr. Ledeen on a number of occasions. I can't say I 

21 totally disagreed with his judgments on it. 

22 Q When you say he thought the U.S. should have a 

23 broader perspective on these matters, are you suggesting 

24 that he thought that whatever trade or transactions there 

25 were with Iran — there should be such transactions and 



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they should not be tied to hostages? 

A Whatever transactions — transactions in the 
broadest sense — yes, that was my understanding -- that 
we should look for ways to inform key officials in the 
Iranian government who were not fully aligned with 
Islamic fundamentalism, leaders who still remembered days 
of extensive contacts and relationship with the West, 
that our efforts should be directed to establishing 
contacts with those individuals and providing them 
whatever support might be required. 

And clearly he was thinking in terms of some 
form of broad covert action, although he never 
articulated it in any specific terms. 

Q 




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Q Let's pursue a couple of other documents and 
tie them down in time. This is a document that's CIIN 
number 3995. It has a July '86 date on it. If you would 
look at the document, which will be Exhibit 61, and try 
to place it for me. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 61 
for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 
A Well, this is, I believe, Mr. Nir, and I 



Wfm SE£aET/ CODEWORD 



766 



-.-,^^,x -If Sj 529 

1 believ.« this call occurred when the impasse had occurred 

2 over pricing and the Iranian repaying Mr. Ghorbanifar and 

3 the financiers, as I recall — and this would be the July 

4 time frame when Mr. Nir was calling me every day or every 

5 other day fairly frantically trying to continue some 

6 movement on the hostage issue. 

7 This is where he tal)cs about the fact that the 

8 senior official in Tehran had bean told by the Iranian 

9 military that the price being charged was very, very high 

10 — six and six-and-a-half times the price in the 

11 catalogs. So that's what that's Jibout. 

12 I simply relayed such messages to Colonel 

13 North on the secure phone orally. 

14 Q Your recollection, however, is this would be a 

15 conversation with Nir, and I take it that Nir is telling 

16 you that as far aa ha could tall Ghorbanifar 's prices 

17 were not outlandish. 

18 A About 60 percent mar)cup. 

19 Q That ha had bean, in at least this line of 

20 work, reasonable. 

21 A Yes. 

2 2 Q That the problem was that^^H^^was 

23 refusing to pay money now to Ghorbanifar; is that 

24 correct? 

25 A Yes. That was the real critical issue, yes. 



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Q Let me show you another document which I think 
is probably from the same period of time. It will be 
Exhibit 62. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 62 
for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 
A I believe this is something Mr. Cave must have 
told me about a conversation that he had with the senior 
official in Tehran and I just jotted down what Mr. Cave 
told me. 

Q Would you also place this in July? 

A I would place it in late June or July. 




BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 
Q I want to focus in on the activities relating 

to this pricing problem and make one more sweep of that. 
By late June/early July you were aware of the microfiche 
and the concerns that that was causing. From the 



?^,fAifif^^^f?ff!f 



.^l^.'{*^UO 



768 




1 documents that we have it isn't altogether clear to me 

2 what the CIA response to that was and the role that you 

3 all were playing. 

4 I gather that you were picking up calls from 

5 Nir and talking to him about the pricing problem. 

6 A Occasionally. 

7 Q Cave was having conversations with^^^^^^H 

8 and other Iranians; is that correct? 

9 A Just] 

10 Q Justi 

11 A Ves. 

12 Q And with regard to the microfiche problem we 

13 have references in these documents to the microfiche 

14 being made available to U.S. representatives. Was the 

15 microfiche ultimately made available? 

16 A It's my understanding that a microfiche was 

17 flown out to Frankfort, or a copy of a microfiche, but I 

18 n«ver saw it. 

19 Q Do you know when that was done? 

20 A It would have been in the July/ August time 

21 frame. When I raised the microfiche issue with Colonel 

22 North he stated he doubted that it existed and there was 

23 skepticism on the U.S. side that such a microfiche 

24 existed or, if it did exist, it was an old microfiche and 

25 didn't have current — it wasn't a current price list of 






769 



m\.mm 



1 the cost of manufacturing the HAWK spare missile parts. 

2 There were all kinds of explanations given to 

3 me by people at the Agency and Colonel North. I came to 

4 the conclusion in late July that there probably was a 

5 legitimate microfiche because I had talked to analysts 

6 that follow Iranian arms and the Iranians are quite good 

7 and they have very current catalogs. I learned the 

8 London procurement office knows the price of arms, 

9 American and others. 

10 So it didn't surprise me that they had a 

11 fairly good fix on the price. 

12 Q Did you talk to the CIA logistics people? I 

13 mean, weren't you aware that they too knew that most of 

14 the western world gets access to these microfiches? 

15 A I don't think I talked to anyone in Logistics, 

16 no. I talked to Mr. Cave about it, but I don't recall 

17 talking to anyone in Logistics. I talked probably ^°^H 
^^^^1 about 

19 Q With regard to the response of the U.S., we 

20 hav« heard that you all were concerned about the price. 

21 Was your reaction initially that Ghorbanifar was involved 

22 in some kind of a scam or not? 

23 A I had an open mind. That was the original 

24 judgment, I think, on the American side, that this is 

25 just Mr. Ghorbanifar having been caught short in rhe 22 




82-688 0-88-26 



770 




533 

1 April sting, had some very heavy indebtedness and was 

2 trying to cover it by greatly upping the price that he 

3 was charging the Iranians. 

4 That story stayed on for a long time. I'm not 

5 sure whether Mr. Ghorbanifar was really caught in the 22 

6 April sting or not. I know he was arrested for 2 4 hours. 

7 But I began to believe that there might be other 

8 problems, you know, in the August time frame that could 

9 account for such a heavy price problem. 

10 Q And we looked the other day at the notes that 

11 you took which showed a pricing breakdown that made it 

12 rather clear that there was something substantially 

13 amiss. 

14 A Mr. Ghorbanifar gave me line item costs of 

15 what he was charged and what he charged the Iranians. He 

16 gave, I don't know, 15 or 20 examples in a rather 

17 hysterical conversation on the telephone. I can only 

18 describe it as hysterical because he was screaming most 

19 of the time on the telephone, and said the average price 
2 marlcup was about 41 percent. 

21 Q Now when that occurred you knew what the 

22 prices were that DOD was charging. 

2 3 A Well, I don't think I had ever seen that 

24 pricing on the HAWK missiles. The information — I could 

25 obtain that information. I knew the total price which 



ii»: 




771 



UN£*SW 



534 



1 DOD charged CIA, which was $3.2 million or $3.6 million. 

2 I knew it precisely at the time, but I can't recall it 

3 today. 

4 Q In any event, you knew that between the $15 

5 million or so that had been charged Ghorbanifar and the 

6 $4 million or so that had been charged to the CIA there 

7 was a right large gap between them, right? 

8 A There was a wide gap, yes, sir -- very wide. 

9 Q With that information in hand, you knew that 

10 there had to be some explanation other than Ghorbanifar 's 

11 mendacity for this pricing problem? 

12 A That seemed to be the case. 

13 Q What I'm trying to do is trace the genesis of 

14 that awareness, when it actually began. 

15 A In August, for me, that there was a legitimate 

16 price gap that I couldn't reconcile mentally — I 

17 couldn't calculate it — that we had a price/cost when we 

18 sent the price to the NSC which was — don't hold me to 

19 it — but around $3.6 million or something like that, and 

20 it was clear that we had charged about $15 million, or 

21 that allegedly, based upon what Mr. Ghorbanifar had 

22 asserted, that we had charged $15 million — something 

23 like that. 

24 So there seemed to be, and I'm not sure just 

25 how I had all these calculations at that time, but I 



772 



IJiLOE! 



535 

1 recall when I talked to Mr. Nir in early September I had 

2 the calculations down fairly concretely. 

3 Q Let me take you back into August, though, 

4 before Ghorbanifar said I was charged $15 million or 

5 whatever for these goods. You had not heard what was 

6 charged to Ghorbanifar before them? 

7 A I had heard that we had sent a bill off to the 

8 NSC for $3.6 million, but at that stage I don't recall 

9 explicitly that I knew what the NSC had allegedly charged 

10 Ghorbanifar. But somewhere along the line I think Mr. 

11 Ghorbanifar was telling me or telling Mr. Nir, at least, 

12 and from Mr. Nir to me, what the charge was, that they 

13 had borrowed $15 million for 30 days at 15 percent 

14 interest on 15 May. 

15 All this came much clearer, I think, in the 

16 September/October time frames. But I hadn't focused on 

17 it greatly until the August time frame because at some 

18 point I had been told that Mr. Ghorbanifar was so 

19 dishonest that somehow he was creating the crisis. 

20 Q Who told you that? 

21 A Well, that was just a general feeling on the 

22 part of a number of people at the Agency. And there was 

23 also a feeling on the part of Colonel North that Mr. 

24 Ghorbanifar was not dealing straight up. 

25 Q One of the things that troubles me and is a 



wmwi 



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536 

little hard for me to follow — and there's evidence of 
it in a lot of sources -- but here's a fairly clear 
example. This is a memo of August 13, 1986, where I 
gather George Cave is giving you a status report, and one 
of the things he gives you a status report on is 
microfiches. 

And he says in essence we've got a problem, 
not because we've got a problem with the price but 
because we can't produce a phonied-up microfiche. And 
that strikes me as a troublesome development. If in fact 
we thought we were charging legitimate prices, we 
wouldn't have to phony up a microfiche, I wouldn't think. 
A In the August time 




began to worry me a great deal. Why should 
we go through doing something that elaborate? And there 
was talk at that time of duaunying up a price list. That 
did bother me. 

Q I would have thought that would be a clue that 
there was something amiss. 

A I may be slow, but that was a clue, yes, sir. 
As you know, I was focused on a thousand issues every 
day, but this one was on my mind, certainly on the off 
hours I wasn't at the office. 

Q Let me show you this. It does appear to be 



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dated August 13, 1986, and that will be Exhibit 63. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 63 
for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 
A What's the classification of this? 
Q I don't )cnow. 

MS. MC GINN: Has this been disseminated? 
(A discussion was held off the record.) 
THE WITNESS: It was conversations like this 
that troubled me greatly. When I found out that we were 
even beginning to consider manufacturing a price list 




775 




XmK) 538 

1 that I probably obtained that from Mr. Cave. The 

2 microfiche turned out to be laser-printed and it was hard 

3 to reproduce all these new prices. 

4 Q Did you and Cave talk about this microfiche 

■ 5 situation? Quite frankly, I would have thought, were I 

6 in your position or Mr. Cave's position, and Ollie North 

7 responded to this kind of crisis by saying print up a new 

8 price list we would have chatted a bit — something to 

9 the effect of what the hell are we up to. 

10 A I think I had a conversation at that. stage 

11 with Mr. Cave, something along the lines that something 

12 is really wrong here and this isn't right. And I think I 

13 suggested that it appeared at that stage that Mr. Hakim 

14 and Mr. Secord were playing a far more prominent role 

15 than they had previously. 

16 Previously they had been in a moral support 

17 role, and now they ware the principal intermediaries. I 

18 said something is wrong here. Something is euniss. 

19 Q Let's just kind of throw that into context. 

20 A It was along this mid-August 1986 time frame. 

21 Q By the third week in July were you aware that 

22 North gave Nir — let me put it this way. In terms of 

23 the second channel, when did you become aware of the 

24 possibility of the second channel existing? Was that in 

25 September or did you know in July? 



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A I knew in July that Mr. Cave, I believe,, had 
met a contact of Mr. Hakim in New York and that they were 
going to polygraph him to determine his reliability. I 
learned, I guess in August, and it probably was about the 
third week in August, that Major General Secord and, I 
believe, Mr. Hakim had met with a new group of Iranians 



I also became aware that Mr. Ghorbanifar and a 
senior official in Iran had become aware of it because 
they were pressing Mr. Cave about what about the meeting 
that occurred in Europe^^H^^^^^H^^ It's amazing 
that secrets are not kep-w long in the Iranian government. 

So I was aware that we were moving toward 
potentially a new channel, that Colonel North had long 
wanted to get rid of Mr. Ghorbanifar. I believe the 
Directorate of Operations, as you know, had long 
expressed its serious doubts about the reliability of Mr. 
Ghorbanifar. 

I wasn't fully aware until 9 September that 
th« new channel was official, and it became official that 
day, I believe, by Admiral Poindexter's decision. 

Q I'll stop there in a moment, but let me come 
back to this period of time In mid-August, with regard 
to making the fake microfiche, who did that? Was that 
done by^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hin the CIA? 




SSSMO 



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A Well, if you had to fabricate a new price 
list, presumably that would be the group that did it. I 
don't )cnow that it was ever tasked. 

Q That was my next question. Do you know if 
they actually got the assignment? 

A No. You will have to talk to someone else. 

Q I may not have heard you correctly. You did 
not actually ever see a fake microfiche; is that right? 

A Not a fake microfiche, no, sir. 




Q When Mr. Cave was doing this task, trying to 
create ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H the fake 
was he doing it with the knowledge ofj 



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|do you know? 
A I'd be very surprised if he wasn't. He 

t o^^^^^^H^^^^ 
Q So ^^^^^^^^Bwas kept apprised, to the best 
of your knowledge, during this August period of this 
pricing problem and the way of dealing with it? 

A Yes. To the best of my knowledge, that's the 

way the Agency operates. 

Q Did you have occasion to discuss ^^^^JHH 
Qfwhat the implications were of preparing a false 
microfiche? 

A No, sir. 

Q Did you bring it up to a higher level, to talk 
to Bill Casey or Mr. Gates about this problem? 
A No, sir. 

Q Tell me again why, Mr. Allen. 
A Because this was being conducted under the 
aeq ia of the Directorate of Operations, Mr. Clair George 
2j}^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^Bthat they were 
operational logistics support to the NSC. I was doing 
the collection, intelligence collection and coordination. 
I felt that they were the proper channel vertically to 
bring this to the attention of Mr. George and other 

officials. ^^^^^ 

Q But you didn't talk to^^^Babout whether 




779 



yimiiSSO 



542 



1 or not he had raised it to the level of Clair George? 

2 A I just assumed it had been cleared up the 

3 line. I would naturally assume that. And today if the 

4 same situation replicated itself I would probably react 

5 the same way because we are taught to report up the line. 

6 Q This kind of situation, it seems to me, would 

7 also raise concerns about operational security. If you 

8 found yourself in a situation where you got some very 

9 angry Iranians who feel they have been grossly 

10 overcharged and the Agency ' s response is we have to 

11 create a false pricing list, I would think that would 

12 cause people to be concerned about the operation being 

13 blown in short order. 

14 Did you have those concerns? 

15 A That was my principal concern. My principal 

16 concern was that the operation would be exposed, and I 

17 was alarmed and I told Mr. Kerr that sometime, in my 

18 recollection, in the August time frame. 

19 Q Now Mr. Kerr at that time was DDI? 

2 A Yes, sir. He was Deputy Director of 

21 Intelligence. 

22 Q And with regard to the conversation with Kerr 
2 3 you would place it sometime in August, I gather. 

2 4 A Yes, sir. He cannot, I believe, put a time 

2 5 frame on it, but I would put it in the August period. 



780 



wcussm 



543 



1 Q • Was there anybody else present at that 

2 conversation? 

3 A Not to my knowledge. 

4 Q What motivated the conversation? What caused 

5 you to have it with Mr. Kerr? 

6 A I believe Mr. Kerr asked me for a verbal 

7 update on the initiative because he'd been aware of it 

8 for a considerable period of time. He had closely 

9 followed the McFarlane trip into Iran. And I believe I 

10 gave him an update and I talked to him of this strange 

11 and rather bizarre impasse that had occurred that had 

12 been dragging on for two months, or at least six weeks, 

13 and that something was wrong. 

14 And at that stage I was just speculating. I 

15 said I wouldn't be surprised but what perhaps we are 

16 overcharging at least the middleman on these matters in 

17 order to send money to the contras. And he expressed 

18 concern and we ended up talking about the operational 

19 security of the problem, and I believe Mr. Kerr said it's 
2 not a matter of whether it's going to be exposed but 

21 whan. 

22 And I said yes, I'd have to sort of agree with 
2 3 you that this has been holding for a long time. And I 

24 said it's going to be extremely messy if there is 

2 5 something amiss about the operation. 

;ei 




781 



mm 



1 Q This question really is not intended to be 



2 critical, but you write that kind of memo in October. 

3 A I didn't write it. That was a verbal 

4 statement. 

5 Q I understand. But by October clearly you are 

6 bringing these kinds of thoughts to Casey and Gates in a 

7 written format. 

8 A Yes, sir. 

9 Q Why in August when you had these concerns 

10 didn't you take them to Casey or Gates? 

11 A It was all speculation. I didn't have any 

12 pieces of information. In retrospect I wish I'd walked 

13 in or at least, you know, Mr. Cave and I or someone could 

14 have sat down and analyzed the situation. I just didn't, 

15 and I can't offer any dynamic explanations on why I 

16 didn't. I saw and worried more than anything else over 

17 the potential exposure. 

18 Q Did you have any reason to think in August 

19 that either Casey or Gates already knew there was an 

20 ovarcharge going down on the situation? 

21 A No, sir. 

22 Q You did not? 

23 A No, sir. I don't think they were necessarily 

24 aware, unless they were told by someone out of the 

25 Directorate of Operations. I don't believe I brought it 






IS«D 



782 



PiSf^i 




545 

1 to •ither Mr. Gates or Mr. Casey's attention until 

2 October. 

3 MR. WOODCOCK: You and Mr. Cave didn't have 

4 that kind of a conversation either in August; is that 

5 right? 

6 THE WITNESS: I told him I thought that 

7 something was amiss and maybe something was happening in 

8 respect to the contras. 

9 MR. WOODCOCK: You told that to Mr. Cave? 
1° THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 

^^ MR- WOODCOCK: Did you expect that he would 

12 have then reported that up his line? 

13 THE WITNESS: I don't know. it was a 

14 conversation of where we were expressing mutual concern, 

15 since he usually spent most of his day in my office or 

16 around my office. 

^"^ MR- WOODCOCK: Do you recall that coming as a 

18 surprise to him? 

^^ THE WITNESS: I don't know whether it was a 

2 surpriM, but he certainly was troubled. I remember 

21 Mr. C«v« being troubled by the whole situation and 

22 worried, but it is so hard to recall it precisely. We 
2 3 both were mutually concerned at the time. 

2* MR. WOODCOCK: And he would have been, of 

25 course, a part of the DO. 



TOP SECI?^ 

F P. ■' 



MISIFIFJ 



783 




546 

1 ■ THE WITNESS: Yea, sir. 

2 MR. WOODCOCK: Did you assume that he would 

3 have taken that information to his superiors? 

4 THE WITNESS: Not at that stage, because it 

5 was a matter of real speculation. And I really didn't 

6 personally become convinced that my judgments might be 

7 right until the 9 October meeting. That really hit me. 

8 So I can't speculate on what I thought at the time he 

9 might do or what he did. I don't )cnow. 

10 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

11 Q Let me come at it another way. In terms of 

12 Cave's role, here's one example, but there are a number 

13 of others, where Cave is talking to^^^^^H and takes it 

14 upon himself to, it says, press but otherwise encourage 

15 ^^^^^^1^° P*y Ghorbanifar. Cave's in a situa tion, I 

16 take it, to your knowledge, that he is lobby ing^^^^^H 

17 to pay these sums of money to Ghorbanifar that 

18 Ghorbanifar said he was owed; is that right? Were you 

19 awar* of that? 

20 A I was aware of most of the telephone calls 

21 that Mr. Cave made. He made them, I think, basically 

22 from my telephone because it had a tape-recording device 

23 on it, and we wanted to get fairly verbatim the 

24 conversations. 

25 Yes, I was aware he was calling Mr. — the 





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547 



1 senior official in Iran and was encouraging 

2 accommodation. I saw all the memoranda of conversation 

3 at least that were developed. 

4 Q He was doing this at whose behest? At yours? 

5 A Not at mine, no, sir. He was doing this in 

6 support of the NSC and with the knowledge of the 

7 Directorate of Operations. He simply was using my office 

8 as an operating point. 

9 Q How does he get the message, the task? Does 

10 that come by way °'HH|hB<^i^ ^^y way of North, or do you 

11 know? 

12 A It was my understanding that the tasking 

13 essentially came from Colonel North, although this was 

14 closely coordinated with the NE Division. That's ray 

15 understanding of th« way things happened. You can ask 

16 Mr. Cave. But he kept his superiors within the Agency, I 

17 think, very well informed. 

18 Q Are you feuniliar with what is now going to be 

19 Exh.ibit 64? 

20 (The dociment referred to was 

21 marked Allen Exhibit Number 64 

22 for identification.) 

23 (Pause.) 

24 A I remember this conversation, yes, sir. I 

25 remember seeing this memorandum. 






iSSffEO 



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s!?ke; 




54S 

1 Q So essentially what George Cave would da was 

2 he would keep you apprised on a daily basis, so to speak, 

3 of what was going on between him and^^^^^^| and he and 

4 Ghorbanifar, correct? 

5 A Yes. Well, he didn't call |^^^H|^^H ^ha^ 

6 often, and he did not really interact with Mr. 

7 Ghorbanifar. It was Mr. Nir that interacted with Mr. 

8 Ghorbanifar. Mr. Nir was the principal interlocutor with 

9 Mr. Ghorbanifar because there was clearly a dislike 

10 between Mr. Ghorbanifar — Mr. Ghorbanifar clearly didn't 

11 like to deal with Mr. Cave, particularly in the summer 

12 time frame. 

13 Q Why was that? What was your sense of what was 

14 causing that discontent on Ghorbanifar 's part? 

15 A Because Mr. Ghorbanifar learned through his 

16 contact in Iran that Mr. Cave was calling the individual 

17 directly and that upset him. Again, after being told he 

18 would not b« cut out, ha believed he was being cut out. 

19 And, of coursa, the only Farsi speaker he knew that could 

20 b« aalcing those calls was Mr. Cave. 

21 So there was not a lot of admiration on the 

22 party of Mr. Ghorbanifar for Mr. Cave. 

23 Q Let me show you a memo of August 28, 1986, 

24 from yourself relating a conversation you apparently had 

25 with Mr. Nir, and that will be Exhibit 65. 



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(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 65 
for identification.) 
(Pause. ) 
A Yes, I recall this conversation. 
Q Could you describe the context of this 
conversation? What were you and Mr. Nir about at this 
point in time? 




And in that conversation Mr. Nir asked whether 
Mr. Cave had bean in touch with the senior official in 
Iran. I said no, under instructions that I was not to 
discuss thia. Aa I racall, I was under instruction from 
Colonal North on this issue, but I was undone by the fact 
that tha aanior official then turned around and described 
this conversation in great detail to Mr. Ghorbanifar, who 
in turn called Mr. Nir. 

Mr. Nir found I was being duplicitous with him 
TOl 



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and called Mr. North to complain about me. So I recorded 
that. I thought it was worth recording. 

Q Well, I agree with you. What I don't 
understand is why Colonel North gave you that kind of 
direction. It seems to me what happened was something 
that should have been anticipated. 

A He made it very clear that he was working, Mr. 
Cave was to work back channel with the senior official in 
Iran and that in conversations with Mr. Nir I was not to 
acknowledge that any of these conversations had occurred. 

Q Well, let me just put it in perspective. You 

were aware that Colonel North and company ha d been 

previously burned on the direct contact with^^^^H^His 
that correct? 

A Yes, that's right, and that bothered me, but I 
carried out the guidance. He was setting, Colonel North 
was setting the strategy, using Mr. Cave, and I was 
perforce very careful in what I told Mr. Nir. 




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MS. WOODCOCK: You are awar* now that Albert 
HaJclm acted as an interpreter in the FranXfort meeting on 
February 25, 1986? 

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. To the best of my 
recollection, I did not know that until I heard General 
Secord's testimony. Maybe I )cnew it, but I didn't 
corre late Mr. Ha kim with that meeting in February where I 
think ^^^^^^^^1 went to that meeting and Colonel North 
and Mr. Nir. And they didn't have a Farsi speaker and 
they needed a Farsi speaker. 

MR. WOODCOCK: When does Hakim become a person 
that you're aware of, then? 

THE WITNESS: I think in July I started 
hearing the name Hakim with the trip by Mr. Cave to New 
York to meet a contact, a Mr. Hakim. And then I became 
more aware of Mr. Hakim when he called me directly on the 
weekend of, I believe it was. Labor Day weekend, where he 
had this incredible story that thousands of TOWs were 
going out of Houston. 
TC 



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■ And we had a lot of people trying to find out 
if this was true, and Colonel North insisted that this 
man Hakim was very reliable. You can trust him, totally 
reliable, and if TOWs are going out of Houston there must 
be something to it. 







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can spea)c with^^^^^^Hthen does malce contact with 
i3 that right? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correc 




KR. WOODCOCK: That's correct. Now what I ' a 
wondering is, my recollection on this -- and I may not be 
crystal clear on it -- was that following this phone call 
Ghorbanifar complained. 

THE WITNESS: He certainly did -- bitterly. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did he complain to you? 

THE WITNESS: He complained, I believe, to Mr. 
Nir very/ very bitterly. And this was about the late 
March time frame, and I've told the stoiry about how 
Colonel North found out about this and the fact that 
Ghorbanifar was essentially beside himself. Mr. Nir felt 
a very sad mistake had been made in strategy, and Colonel 
Horth paged me twice going over the Woodrow Wilson 
Bridge. 

I recall my pager going off twice, and I 
called him back on my mobile phone, and he said call 
Ghorbanifar, invite him to the United States. And that's 
when I went home and made a call. 




792 



^'llfTll^lC^Sfflt/tHMPlI 556 



1 MR. WOODCOCK: Where you made aware at that 

2 point that part of Ghorbanifar 's unhappiness was that 

3 this unauthorized contact had been made directly? 

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, absolutely. 

5 MR. WOODCOCK: But I gather you did not know 

6 that the person making the unauthorized contact was 

7 Albert Hakim? 

8 THE WITNESS: I recall now the name Hakim, 

9 yes, sir, but I didn't relate it to a particular person. 

10 I was told that this was an Iranian expatriate or some 

11 such living in this country. 

12 MR. WOODCOCK: That would have been North who 

13 told you that? 

14 THE WITNESS: I believe Mr. Cave told me that. 

15 I believe Mr. Cave. Mr. Cave was working. In fact, he 

16 was in my office more than anybody else. He was there 

17 hour after hour, so I'm sure Mr. Cave told me. 

18 MR. WOODCOCK: Did you get any information 

19 froB either North or Cave on who Hakim was, this person 
2 wtxo suddenly out of the blue is talking ^°^^^^^^^H 

21 THE WITNESS: Only that he was an expatriate 

22 Iranian and that he was someone that had contacted 

2 3 Colonel North. It was my impression that Mr. Cave was 

24 not totally unfamiliar with Mr. Hakim, but that might be 

2 5 wrong. I shouldn't speak about impressions. 




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MR. WOODCOCK: Were either Colonel North or 
Mr. Cave, from your recollection, at this time in a 
position where they were able to vouch for Mr. Hakim? 

THE WITNESS: I don't )cnow that Mr. Cave was. 
I )cnow that Colonel North was willing to vouch for Mr. 
Haki 




MR. WOODCOCK: In your capacity at this point 
would Hakim's reliability have been something that would 
have been a concern for you? 

THE WITNESS: I don't know. I just didn't 
know enough about the situation, and it was clear that 
Colonel North, as he operated throughout this initiative, 
he did not tell me what he thought I didn't need to know. 
We operate under a need-to-know principles and I didn't 
need to know that for tasking and trying to collect 
intelligence. 

So I didn't raise issues about it. But I knew 
it was considered at that stage by Colonel North as a 
tactical error and that Mr. Nir felt it was a very 
serious error. And we had Mr. Ghorbanifar over and Mr. 
Ghorbanifar went away very pleased and reassured. He 
went away to visit his girlfriend in California. 

MR. WOODCOCK: There was more than one phone 



i^Msire 



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558 

1 call, too; Is that correct? Is that your recollection 

2 that it was more than one? 

3 THE WITNESS: I believe there was more than 

4 one telephone call. I believe there was. And 

5 essentially the Iranian official turned around and told 

6 Ghorbanifar all about these calls and it seemed to me 

7 that we sort of repeated that mistake later on in the 

8 summer. And I guess, getting back to Mr. Kerr's 

9 questions a few moments ago, that bothered me, that we 

10 were repeating from as strategy point of view a mistake 

11 we had made in the spring. We made it again in the 

12 summer. 

13 MR.- WOODCOCK: Did anyone ever explain to you 

14 why Hakim was imported in at this early point? 

15 THE WITNESS: Yes. I think that there was a 

16 general feeling on the part of Colonel North and Mr. Cave 

17 that this was not a trustworthy individual, Mr. 

18 Ghorbanifar, and we ought to try to set up an alternate 

19 means of talking to his interlocutor in Tehran and to cut 

20 out Mr. Ghorbanifar. 

21 And I recall that I talked to Colonel North 

22 and told hla that was a mistake. I know Mr. Clarridge, 

23 who was aware of this, thought it was a very serious 

24 mistake and told Colonel North that Mr. Ghorbanifar, if 

25 nothing else, knows too much. If you really want this 

TOP si 



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highly, sensitive, highly secret initiative to continue, 
how can you cut out Mr. Ghorbanifar? Maybe he's 
inconvenient. Maybe he's difficult. But you're already 
into this situation in a very deep way. 

And I remember sitting beside Mr. Clarridge 
when he talked to Colonel North. I thought Mr. Clarridge 
was absolutely right. I think he's been proven right, 
and I think my view has proven right, too — that if 
you're going to extricate yourself from Mr. Ghorbanifar 
you've got to do it very carefully and with appropriate 
amends or, as Mr. Hakim said in th« fall, September, I 
guess, or October '86, with payoffs. But that never 
happened. No one ever attended to Mr. Ghorbanifar even 
in the spring or in the summer. 

(A brief recess was taken.) 

BY MS. KEKR: (Resuming) 




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Let me take you into early September. Let's 
go to the Septembtr 9, 1986 meeting, which I think we 
touched on when last we talked. But v« ought to try to 
wrap that up. The September 9 meeting is when you are 
briefed by North and are told of the second channel and 
the intention to close down the first channel; is that 
correct? 

A That's correct. 

Q Now from other documents we have it appears 
that you also briefed Casey that same day. Oo you 
recollect that? 

A Yes. I recall calling Mr. Casey on the secure 
line. 

Q So you would have net with North first and 
then apprised Casey of what had happened in your meeting 
with North? 

A Late that afternoon or early evening, because 
it was late In the afternoon on the 9th when Colonel 
North — I stopped by his office. He came bursting in 
and said that Admiral Poindexter had just approved the 
second channel. 

T5?! 



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Q ■ Do you recall seeking approval from Casey to 
go along with the second channel aspect of things? 

A I guess no. I didn't seek any approval from 
Mr. Casey. I just told Mr. Casey that Admiral Poindexter 
had approved a new channel i 




Q Let's just take a look at a couple of pieces 
of paper. Let me show you a PROF note to North from 
Earl, which apparently is reflecting a telephone call 
that you made to him the following day, September 10, 
reporting on the conversation that you had had with Casey 
on the evening of the 9th. That will be Exhibit 67. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 67 
for identification.) 
Then I'm going to also show you your memo of 
September 10 to Director Casey reviewing the matters that 
you discussed with North the day before, on the 9th, and 
that will be Exhibit 68. 

(The doc\iment referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 68 
for identification.) 




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A . I recall that this opening of the second 
channel occurred about the same time Mr. Frank Reid was 
kidnapped in Lebanon, and Mr. Casey I guess — I recall 
that Mr. Casey was fairly strident in saying that if 
we're going to proceed with this we ought to try to 
pressure the Iranians to show their good faith by 
securing the release of Mr. Reid. 

Q Just so I understand what it was youj^ were 
conveying, were you going to Casey to get Casey to say 
yes, this is authorized to proceed with the hostage 
channel, or were you going to Casey apprising him, and he 
said — 

A I was going to Mr. Casey to apprise him of 
Admiral Poindexter's decisic 




Q But when you relayed, as you apparently did, 
to Earl that Casey said fine on going ahead with the 
hostage project, provided we get Reid back, he was just 
reacting rather than having an approval function is what 
you are telling me? 

A That's right. And I notice I wrote down here 
"Reid released immediately." That must have been the 
next day, or I must have recalled Mr. Casey's caveat that 



iiJiLASSiriED 



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Mr. Raid should be released before we proceeded with the 
second channel. But we proceeded with the second channel 
in any event. 

Q But you were not of the understanding that 
proceeding with the second channel required Casey's 
approval. This was still very much an NSC initiative 
from your perspective? 

A From my perspective Admiral Poindexter had 
made the decision and what was being required was that we 
should proceed as the Central Intelligence Agency in 
support of that decision. 




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TOP SECRET/ CODEWORD 




565 




Q Th« reference of Ghorbanifar being cut out, 
which says "to cut Ghorbanifar out Ollie will have to 
raise a ninimum of $4 million", what did Ollie tell you 
about $4 million when you talked to him? 
TjpP, SECRET /CODEWORD 




802 




566 

1 A . That was all he said. He said that he 

2 believed that tor the United States to move to the second 

3 channel that a payoff had to be made to Mr. Ghorbanifar 

4 in some foi-m, and it would be a minimxim of $4 million. 

5 So I put it in the memorandum. 

6 Q He didn't tell you how he came up with the 

7 figure? 

8 A No. 

9 Q He didn't tell you where he planned to raise 

10 $4 million? 

11 A No, sir, he certainly didn't. That certainly 

12 raised — 

13 Q That's more than your average lieutenant 

14 colonel's salary, as far as Z recollect. 

15 A That's true. But it was at that time — and I 

16 didn't put it in that memo — that he says maybe we will 

17 have to take it out of the reserve. 

18 Q I wanted to come to that. This is the point 

19 wh«n this notion of the reserve was explicitly raised to 

20 yon by Ollle North? 

21 A Yes, sir. And when he said reserve little 

22 wheels clicked in my mind, that all my fears were 

23 probably true. 

24 Q Now you didn't just write a memo to Casey. 

25 You also talked to him about this. 




803 




567 



1 A I talked to him on the secure telephone. 

2 Q Did you talk to him about the reserve idea? 

3 A I sent a copy of that to Gates and Mr. Casey. 

4 I just let it stand. At that stage I didn't because, 

5 again — well, I probably should have, but these were my 

6 own private musings at that stage, and my own worries 

7 that the security — I guess what focused my mind with 

8 the opening of the new channel was that Colonel North was 

9 moving rapidly into this channel and that he had not shut 

10 down the first channel in a way that would be damage- 

11 limiting. 

j^2 And I remember great concern at that stage. 

13 Q Again bear with me, Mr. Allen. I have trouble 

14 dealing with these no concepts. But when somebody who's 

15 a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps says. A, 

16 that he'« going to have to raise $4 million, and, B, that 

17 he's got a reserve, back home in Baltimore that would 

18 cause some eyebrows to go up. Did you ask Ollie where on 

19 fBTth he wa« planning to get $4 million? 

20 A NO, I didn't. But, you knov, it occurred to 

21 ma that even the Israelis could find ways to raise money. 

22 It wasn't ~ at that stage I was worried that there were 

23 reserves and there were monies in some accounts somewhere 

24 that could be used for this purpose, but it wasn't out of 

25 the question ^Ut what, given the fact that Peres and 




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568 

Shaair and Rabin were also heavily involved, that maybe 
even the Israelis would find a way to take care of 
Ghorbanifar, "take care of in a good sense. 

Q I understand. I didn't know the Israelis had 
a reputation for laying $18 million loaves of bread on 
the table. 

A I'm from North Carolina, and $4 million is a 
sun I can't imagine, but I didn't question that. We had 
been through several sequences where substantial 
financing had been raised by mysterious middlemen, so it 
didn't daunt me about the fact that Colonel North was 
mentioning $4 million. 

What bothered me and what bothered me 
afterwards was the fact that there was a major 
operational security problem developing, because he had 
been talking about taking care of satisfying Ghorbanifar, 
Ghorbanifar being pursued by his creditors. 




I felt that this was a very dangerous period 
in the July/ August period, so I was very concerned. I 
just felt that the situation was getting out of control. 

Q But you did not feel it was something you 
could sit down and grab the Colonel by the scruff of the 



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necJc and aay, Ollie, what is it you are planning to do 
here, my man. You didn't as)c him that? 

A No, I didn't. And Mr. Casey and Mr. Gates I 
thinJt just initialled off. 

MR. WOODCOCK: Did you discuss the notion of a 
reserve with George Cave at all? 

THE WITNESS: I don't recall discussing it at 
that stage, no. 

BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 




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Q All right. Let's move on a little bit further 

in September to the meeting with Nir. Nir comes in about 
September, a little bit before this, about September 10. 
Is that your recollection? 

A Somewhere around that. 

Q This would be just after the meeting you had 
with Colonel North? 
TOP SI 



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A That's correct. 

Q And Nir met with a number of people. You and 
Nir met; is that correct? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you meet one-on-one? 

A We met generally at the Agencyl 

Ito discuss mutual items of 
concern. I met with Mr. Nir at the Agency on a Saturday, 
I recall, and I met with Mr. Nir just before he left. 

Q And ha also met with Poindexter and North, to 
your )cnowledge — or do you )cnow that? 

A I don't know. I )cnow he met with Colonel 
North, but I don't know if he met with Admiral 
Poi ndexter. 




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time? 



Did you meet with North and Nir at the same 



Yes. 



Where would that meeting have taken place? 

That was at CIA headquarters. 

Anyone else present for the meeting? 

Yes. Mr. Cave and Major General Secord, 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Earl. Mr. Clarridge was 
present part of the time, but just to say hello; he 
didn't sit in on the meeting. And I can't recall whether 
— there may have been someone else from the NE Division 
there, but I can't recall at this stage. 

Q Can you give me a synopsis of what you recall 
about what happened at that meeting? 

A It was an unusual meeting, I thought, bizarre 
in the sense that Colonel North was there and we were 
going through trying to supply the remaining HAWK spare 
missile parts using the first channel. We spent two or 
thrss hours that morning talking about the first channel 
as if it was still operational. 

I found that unusual, but I was asked by 
Colonel North to come to the meeting so that any data 
relating to the shipment I would havel 

So we spent a couple hours 




810 



574 

1 that morning. 

2 Q Nir was not witting, as you all like to say, 

3 of the second channel at that point? 

4 A I think he probably was, but I don't know that 

5 he was officially witting because toward the end of the 

6 morning he raised some questions which implied that he 

7 was aware that other contacts were occurring by the 

8 United States with Iran, and he was asking probing 

9 questions. 

10 Q Was he getting answers? 

11 A Not from me. 

12 Q How about from Colonel North? 

13 A I don't think Colonel North was all that 

14 forthcoming at that stage. I think there was an effort 

15 to deflect the questions. 

16 Q The morning was focused primarily on 

17 delivering th« remaining HAWK goods through Ghorbanifar; 

18 is that correct? 

19 A That's correct — pricing the individual 

2 parts. And Colonel Earl was sitting there writing out 

21 the costs of the parts and costs of packaging and costs 

2 2 General Secord had for transporting. General Secord had 

2 3 charged a healthy price on this. 

24 Q And that's what he was telling you about. 

25 With regard to these pricing discussions, were these 



oirams 



811 



IS! 



575 

1 prices that were going to be charged Ghorbanifar or the 

2 prices that were going to be charge somebody else? 

3 A These were the prices that would go from the 

4 DOD and CIA to the NSC. I didn't see any of the ultimate 

5 price that would be charged to Mr. Ghorbanifar. 

6 Q Did that issue come up? 

7 A No, sir, not to my recollection — not to my 

8 recollection at all. But someone had to know, because 

9 Mr. Ghorbanifar had to raise a certain amount of money. 

10 Q You didn't bring it up. You all had just gone 

11 through two months of pricing difficulties over HAWK 

12 parts. Nobody talked about the problems that you'd been 

13 living with for two months at this meeting? 

14 A There was some discussion of it. Mr. Nir 

15 raised it. 

16 Q Do you recall what he said in that regard? 

17 A Only that he felt that there were some 

18 problems that couldn't be explained and that he thought 

19 Mr. Ghorbanifar was being relatively straightforward. As 

20 you know, in my final conversation with him before he 

21 caught the plane at the airport he went again through the 

22 pricing where he expressed concern over pricing. 

23 Q But that was you and he together, right? 

24 A No one else was present. 

25 Q In this group session, though, there was no — 



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576 

I mean, you know, Nir didn't look somebody in the eye 
and say what on earth are you people doing? 

A Not quite like that, no. But there were 
concerns, and he felt that Mr. Ghorbanifar was relaying 
the guidance that was being passed by Colonel North 
rather faithfully. You know, we went out. We couldn't 
get all these parts. We had to go back to start up the 
manufacturing line or we had to go out to six different 
countries to get them back out of their inventories. 

You know, there were some fairly elaborate 
stories that were told b y Hr. Ghorbanifar to hi s 
interlocutors in Tehrar 




Q These were stories that I assume George Cave 
was feeding to Ghorbanifar at the instruction of Ollie 
North . 

A No, sir. I don't think Mr. Cave was involved 
in this. I think Mr. North was talking to Mr. Nir, and 
Mr. Mir was talking to Mr. Ghorbanifar. You've got to 
remember my earlier comment that Mr. Ghorbanifar and Mr. 
Cave did not talk directly after Mr. Ghorbanifar found 
that Mr. Cave, in June or July, was in direct contact 
with his interlocutor in Tehran. 
TOP g 33CMff i CQDEVQFD 



813 



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1 Q . SO your picture of what's going on at this 

2 period of time is that in terns of setting up the sales 

3 pitch, if you will, to Ghorbanifar to pass through to the 

4 Iranians it would go North to Nir to Ghorbanifar? That 

5 was the connection? 

6 A Yes, sir. I was told by Colonel North, 

7 though, that if Mr. Ghorbanifar called he gave me some 
, 8 cover stories of the great difficulty in getting these 

9 and that the microfiche was the manufacturer's price, it 

10 wasn't the wholesale price, that you had to add all these 

11 additional costs on if you try to get it through, say, 

12 covert means, that one should expect to pay a very hefty 

13 increase over the base price. 

14 Q Well, if he goes that far, we've talked about 

15 fake microfiches of August 13. Now we've got this rather 

16 interesting collection of stories of things that didn't 

17 happen. By September 10 everybody in that room must have 

18 known that there was an enormous spread between what was 

19 being paid CIA to DOD and what was being charged to 

20 Ghorbanifar. 

21 A I can't speak for the other people. I was 

22 aware, and 1 found the meeting unusual, that there was 

23 clearly two or three hours of discussion with Mr. Nir, 

24 this very senior Israeli, there as if we were continuing 

25 with the initial channel of Ghorbanifar. I went away 

JDEWORD 




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froa th« meeting ill at ease because of that. 

Q Was^^^^^^^at this meeting, do you remember? 

A I can't recall. There was someone else, I 
think , from the NE Division there. I just can't recall. 
Maybe ^^^^^^^^Hwas there; I don't ]cnow. I'm sure the 
record will show, and I'm sure you can find that out. 

Q Apart from the activities you discussed in the 
first part of the day, is there anything else you 
remember about that meeting? 

A I think^^^^^^^^^lwas there because he's the 
one that was working on the logistics. 

Q Apart from the first channel aspect was there 
anything else that was discussed with Nir that you recall 
in that group ses sion? 

A 




Was there simply one other meeting you had 
;aET/CODEWORD 




mim 



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OMSiOED 



579 



1 with Nir? Did you meet with him — 

2 A Well, I met with him with a group once or 
when we had^^^^^^^^^^^^Hdiscussions. He asked 

4 me to stop by and see him before he left or to meet me. 

5 I guess he was staying at the Key Bridge Marriott. He 

6 called and said why don't you just come by. I've got to 

7 leave in a matter of an hour or so to catch the plane 

8 back to Tel Aviv, and I just want to talk over some 

9 matters. And somewhere there should be some notes on my 

10 conversation with Mr. Nir. 

11 We just met and had a beer in the lounge and 

12 he went over the pricing again, over the pricing impasse 

13 that had occurred in June, July and August. 

14 Q I haven't been able to locate a piece of paper 

15 that looks quite like that, although I've got a couple 

16 that refer to Nir. 

17 A Certainly there should be notes on this 

18 somewhere. I don't know. I remember writing down the 

19 notes, saving them, and I'm sure they were turned in. But 
2 th« Independent Counsel took those away so I haven't been 

21 able to look at these things. 

22 Q If you would mark this as Exhibit 70 — 

2 3 (The document referred to was 

2 4 marked Allen Exhibit Number 7 

25 for identification.) 

!« 



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And this will be Exhibit 71. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 71 
for identification.) 

(Pause. ) 

I know what this is. 

Exhibit 70? 

Yes, sir, Exhibit 7( 




stated that he had to neet directly with Mr. Casey with 
no one else present other than myself, and could I not 
slip him out of the room. 




Nir wanted to discuss the 
Iranian initiative with Mr. Caseyl 




817 



y*^4*H4^\3M*t*r-n 




D 



1 ' And that did occur and these were the notes of 

2 that conversation. I thought about doing a memorandum 

3 for the record and I should have, but I just kept the 

4 notes as sort of a record of what we discussed. 

5 Q So these notes would have been done about 

6 September 10; is that right? 

7 A Yes. I'd say 11, 12, something like that. 

8 Q But on the September 10, 11, 12 trip Nir made 

9 into the States? 

10 A Yes, and it was a long conversation. It went 

11 on for probably 3 minutes, a full 3 minutes. Mr. Casey 

12 was quite taken by Mr. Nir, by his intellectual vigor, 

13 his ideas, and Mr. Casey talked to me afterwards about 

14 what a remarkable individual Nir was, which is true. He 

15 is a remarkable individual. 

16 Q If you would take a look at Exhibit 71 and 

17 identify that. 

18 (Pause.) 

19 A I can't put a precise time frame on this, but 

20 this aust be — I see a date 30 September 86 written 

21 th«r«, but I think this was earlier. I think this must 

22 have been in the summer because that was when they 

23 checked out these HAWK spare parts that were, I guess, 

24 the rest of the HAWK spare parts that were delivered. I 

25 guess they were delivered in August. 



4,V ;1 1 i 



i?! 



SlFIFn 



818 



y^?}^fE||ac/\cTyvfpq|| 582 

1 / Q They were delivered early August. 

2 / A That 65 items were not working. It could be 

3 August-September. But this was Mr. Nir talking about the 

4 pressure that Mr. Ghorbanifar was under, that he was not 

5 making money. Yeah, this had to be in September because 

6 he said let him know when the package was put together -- 

7 that is, the package of the remaining HAWK spare parts 

8 that we discussed at what I thought was a fairly 

9 artificial meeting in September. 

10 He said, you know, please call me when all 

11 these items are put together, when the logistics people 

12 have gotten it all done. And he said the Australian — 

13 that is, the senior official! 

14 ^^^^H — would not come out, that 

15 was in trouble. 

16 So this would be in the September time frame 

17 after he was here, after we went through this artifice of 

18 having a meeting ostensibly to continue channel one, when 

19 clearly no one had any faith that we were continuing it. 

20 But we went through this charade. At least I never had 

21 any faith. And Mr. Nir kept calling and saying when is 

22 the package going to be ready. 

23 MR. WOODCOCK: Why was Secord at that meeting? 

24 What was his role? 

25 THE WITNESS: He was giving the prices. He 




819 



ytiaASSlBED 



583 



1 gav« some pricing that he had for charging the flying of 

2 the additional HAWK spare parts into, I guess it was — I 

3 believe it was HAWK spare parts and also TOW missiles 

4 were involved at that stage — what would be his rates 

5 for leasing his aircraft. And he gave a figure that one 

6 aircraft he charged $193,000. I remember that figure; 

7 • that stuck in my mind, which is a little higher than MAC 

8 rates. 

9 BY MR. KEKK: (Resuming) 

10 Q The dollar figures that are listed in this 

11 document that have the September date, do they mean 

12 anything to you at all — Ghorbanifar 's $13 million to 

13 Nir, for example? Does that mean anything to you? 

14 A No. _There are so many figures thrown around. 

15 Q ^^^H^^^l ^ assume that's $13 million to Nir. 

16 A Clearly he was saying that Ghorbanifar was 

17 about $12 million under. According to my calculations at 

18 that stage he was probably $10 million under, perhaps, 

19 that he owed creditors that much. Because then later I 

20 found out from Mr. Furmark what Mr. Furmark said the 

21 situation was. And I assumed that was the truth. 

22 I can't offer any explanations of what that 

23 meant. I wish I could. 

24 Q Let me just touch on a couple of other 

25 documents in September. We said that the second channel 




mifn 



820 



Us 



't^l. 

534 



1 cam« in the 19th to the 21st of September. 

2 A That's correct. 

3 Q This document C-09340, which will be Exhibit 

4 72, was in your files. Can you tell me what it is? 

5 (The document referred to was 

6 marked Allen Exhibit Number 72 

7 for identification.) 

8 A This is something Mr. Cave drew up. It's not 

9 my doc\iment; it's Mr. Cave's document. I believe it's 

10 Mr. Cave's document, at least Mr. Cave obtained it. He 

11 tended to just throw his files in with mine, as you 

12 probably have gathered. 

13 Q The handwriting at the bottom is Cave's? 

14 A Yes, that's Mr. Cave's, I believe. These were 

15 the seven points arrived at during the 19-20 September 

16 meeting in Washington, and that's when the Iranians came 

17 in and proposed a joint commission and also they 
requested intelligence^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H I 

19 r«call that. 

20 ' This was Mr. Cave's understanding of what 

21 happened, the seven points that they agreed to at that 

22 time. 

23 Q And the "they" would be the Iranian 

24 representatives? 

25 A The Iranian representatives at the 19-21 



top?|e*||^/ 

.1 " ,■.(, ■ ■" 



imp 



821 




585 

September meetings^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J^^^^^^^^^^H 

2 MR. WOODCOCK: Did Mr. Cave tell you at that 

3 time that the Iranians were looking for a meeting with 

4 someone as high as the Under Secretary of State? 

5 THE WITNESS: I don't recall. I don't recall. 

6 I don't recall that he explicitly said that. He talked 

7 about a joint commission. 

8 MR. WOODCOCK: Do you recall during this 

9 period of time — this would be in the September 19-20 

10 and immediately thereafter — Mr. Cave saying that it was 

11 important at this juncture to bring the State Department 

12 into the effort? 

13 THE WITNESS: Yes. I recall some conversation 

14 along those lines. 

15 MR. WOODCOCK: Do you recall what his 

16 reasoning was at that point? 

17 THE WITNESS: I think he felt if we moved 

18 towards a broader relationship -- he was quite excited 

19 after this meeting had occurred, and I stayed in touch 

20 with him, I guess, over the weekend or early the next 

21 vaak — - he was quite excited about what he saw was real 

22 progress. 

23 And we had reached a point where they were 

24 talking about joint commissions, one to look at economic 

25 relations, one to look at political relations, one to 
.TOPJIIM^Cl 



iims 




822 





586 

1 look at other areas, and I can't remember all of them — 

2 maybe intelligence, military issues, the need that we 

3 could no longer deny — that is, the White House should 

4 no longer deny direct participation by the Department of 

5 State, something along those lines, yes. 

6 And I agreed with him that we had reached a 

7 point, and it was no secret in the Department of State 

8 there were a number of officials in the Department of 

9 State that were aware of this initiative. 

10 MR. WOODCOCK: That you knew of who were aware - 

11 of it? 

12 THE WITNESS: Well, I knew Mr. Oakley was 

13 aware of the initiative. He didn't have the details, but 

14 he was aware that it was under way. And Z think there 

15 were probably others. Mr. Amacost certainly was not 

16 totally unaware of this. Mr. Oakley told me there were 

17 13 officials at State that were aware of this initiative. 

18 He told me that in the presence of Mr. Carlucci in 

19 January '87. 

20 BY MR. KERS: (Resuming) 

21 Q Let's move on. October 1, 1986, you have your 

22 meeting with Gates in which you express concern about the 

23 Iran initiative, operational security, that sort of 

24 thing. At that meeting with Gates, who was there — just 

25 yourself and Mr. Gates? 

TOP s^fiYfPP^K^^fK^lClCn 



823 



mssffe 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



587 

A Yes. 

Q If you could give us a summary of what you 
said to Gates and what he said to you on October 1, 1986, 

A Yes, sir. I went up to discuss the new 
channel with Mr. Gates and to brief him on it. 




told him that the new channel, I didn't have any sense of 
confidence at that stage in the new channel. I said 
other people were quite impressed by the results of the 
19-20 September meetings. 

I went over the original channel and my whole 
concern of the operational security as an intelligence 
officer. I went through all the reasons why this thing 
seemed to be going off the rails, that we were reaching 
some very serious decision points, that the first channel 
had not been satisfied, and that millions of dollars were 
owed to creditors. 

I said that this was going to be quite a 
disaster. I said there is a pricing impasse that has 
occurred and it's been going on — and he, I think, had 
some general awareness of this, not any detailed 
awareness — and that I feared that this issue would blow 
up. 

And also at the end of the conversation I said 
TC 





824 



Bfefcssro 



588 



1 I can't prove it, but based just on the indicators I've 

2 come sort of an analytical judgment that money was 

3 perhaps being diverted to the contras, that the pricing 

4 impasse has occurred because the United States, believe 

5 it or not, was actually overcharging the middlemen 

6 involved in these transactions. 

7 And I remember he was very startled at this. 

8 He started to laugh because it sounded absurd, but then 

9 he became very serious and said, well, that would be a 

10 very serious thing. Operationally you can't commingle 

11 two operations. You can't commingle this operation with 

12 our duties in Central America, that this was very 

13 serious, that in the past he had admired Colonel North 

14 because of his work in crisis management and things of 

15 this nature, but that this was going too far, and asked 

16 that I see the Director. 

17 Q So he told you that he wanted you to see 

18 Director Casey? 

19 A Yes, sir. 

20 Q And he appeared to you to be genuinely 

21 sxirprised by the information you were conveying to him? 

22 A I'm absolutely certain he was surprised, that 

23 this thought had never reached his mind and no one had 

24 ever suggested it previous to my raising it. 

25 Q October 5 through 7, '86, North, Cave, Secord 




825 



UilftSSlEB 



589 



1 meat the second channel in Frankfort. You were aware 

2 that that was happening? 

3 A Yes, sir. We collected intelligence on that 

4 meeting. And I guess we took the intelligence over and 

5 provided it to them, to the Iranians, at that meeting, 

6 and we taped the meeting. Our technicians taped the 

7 meeting. I obtained the tapes when they came back. ^^^| 
^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l You have a 

9 of those transcripts. 

10 Q Now we have another Cave memo. It's Exhibit 

11 73. 

12 (The document referred to was 

13 marked Allen Exhibit Number 73 

14 for identification.) 

15 You were not in Frankfort for the meeting; is 

16 that correct? 

17 A Not at all. 

18 Q Cave was at that meeting? 

19 A Yes, he was there — Mr. Cave, Mr. North, 
2 General Secord, Mr. Hakim were there. 

21 Q And did Cave give you a briefing when he came 

2 2 back on what had transpired at the meeting? 
2 3 A Yes. 

24 Q And he also brought this collection of nine 

25 points back to you, I take it. 



^IfflOTEn 



826 




590 

1 A ■ I don't remember seeing them at the time. I 

2 don't know that he even showed them to me at that time. 

3 We talked generally about the meeting. I don't recall 

4 seeing the nine points until later. 

5 Q When do you recall seeing the nine points? 

6 A I really don't recall seeing the nine points 

7 until sometime in December of '86, after the diversion 

8 had been determined by the Attorney General . 

9 Q Oo you have any knowledge on how these nine 

10 points were arrived at, who the decisionmaker was on the 

11 Anerican side? 

12 A I don't know. 

13 Q Cave didn't tell you that? 

14 A He didn't tell me that. It was my impression 

15 that they were drawn up in mutual discussions with the 

16 Iranians. I didn't see this. I saw it later, in the 

17 December tin* frame. You know, it could well have been 

18 in my files and I had not read it. Mr. Cave just put 

19 folders in a little safe I had. 

20 Q Let's move on to the Furmark aspect of things. 

21 Fumark has testified that he saw Director Casey on 

22 October 7. It's my understanding that you and Mr. Gates 

23 also saw Mr. Casey on October 7 and Casey has said that 

24 he talked to Poindexter on October 7. So a lot of things 

25 were going on. I don't know if there is any relationship 



n 



827 



yUCLISS^iEB 



591 



1 between all of them or not. 

2 Let's start with your meeting and Gates' 

3 meeting with Casey. Do you recall that you met with 

4 Casey? 

5 A Very distinctly. 

6 Q And what was the purpose of that meeting? 

7 A It was to inform him of the operational 

8 security aspects of this initiative and the fact that 

9 this program was spinning out of control and to tell him 

10 also of the potential — just sheer speculation at that 

11 point; we had no evidence — that money might have been 

12 diverted to the contras in Central America. 

13 I remember raising that and Mr. Gates chiming 

14 in behind me, saying yes, that Charlie had raised this 

15 issue with him and that this was an issue of real concern 

16 if there was any truth in it. 

17 Q Kow on that score how did Casey react to that? 

18 Did he seen surprised or he had heard it someplace 

19 b«fore? 

2 A He seemed very surprised. He said he had just 

21 had a call from Mr. Furmark. Mr. Furmark had come down 

22 and had talked about some of the problems relating to the 
2 3 initiative. And he said yes, there's a real security 

2 4 issue involved here, and he asked me. At that stage I 

25 said all this .troubles me greatly, and he directed that I 



828 



(iiUiSSi 



592 



1 prepare a. memorandum that would lay out the concerns and 

2 he said that he had talked to Admiral Poindexter after 

3 Mr. FurmarJc. 

4 Q What did he say he was talking to Mr. 

5 Poindexter about? 

6 A About the initiative, about the fact that he 

7 had done a memorandum for the record which he had sent to 

8 the Chief of the Near East Division. And I went down and 

9 obtained, I think, a copy f rom a member — maybe^^H 
^^^^^^1 I a copy from^^^^^^^^H of the memorandum 

11 he had written. And he said that Mr. Casey expressed 

12 real concern that this thing was indeed coming apart and 

13 coming apart very rapidly. 

14 Q So Casey said he had sent a memo to the Chief 

15 of the Near East Division? 

16 A That's correct. 

17 Q Did ha tell you what instructions, if any, he 

18 had given to Near East? 

19 A No. 

2 Q Did they have a role in this matter, as far as 

21 you ware awara? 

2 2 A He didn't say that he wanted them to take any 

23 action. He asked me — he just mentioned Mr. Furmark was 

24 an old friend at that stage. He was a man with whom he 

25 had done business ten or so years ago, that he had not 



829 



iiMniAQQiPii 



593 



1 seen Mr. funnark in five or six years, and that he 

2 thought Mr. Furmark was a very straightforward, reliable 

3 man. That's what he said, sir. 

4 Q I understand. Let me show you the October 8 

5 memo, which will be Exhibit 74. 

6 (The document referred to was 

7 marked Allen Exhibit Number 74 

8 for identification.) 

9 A Yes, I have read this memorandum. 

10 Q And that is the memo that you got a copy of 

11 from the Near East Division? 

12 A Yes, sir. 

13 Q The way t hat's written, it looks like it's 

t o ^^^^^^^^^^H 

15 A That's correctT^^^^^^^^^^Hwas Chief of the 

16 Division at that time. 

17 Q Did you and 

18 this time? 

19 A I don't recall discussing it with 
2 I Bay have. I w ouldn't be su rprised but what I discussed 

21 it. I know that^^^^^^^H was also becoming concerned 

22 over the security of the program in the fall of '86. 

2 3 Q Now apart from the security breach aspect of 

2 4 things and what Furmark might or might not portend for 

2 5 that, I gather from what you've just told me that you 
T|)#^^i3«T^CapD*0RD 



discuss this matter at 



830 




594 

1 laid out for Casey the possibility that there had been a 

2 fund of money created by the way pricing had been done on 

3 these transactions; is that right? 

4 A I didn't belabor the point, but I said that I 

5 believed that there had been perhaps overcharging of the 

6 Iranians in order to secure money to support the contras 

7 in Central America. 

8 Q Let me just stop you for a second on that 

9 point. Your impression was Casey was also surprised to 

10 hear that or not? 

11 A He expressed surprise, that he had not heard 

12 of this. And Mr. Gates, I know, made a comment or two at 

13 that stage, stating the seriousness of the issue, and 

14 this would certainly be — again, I think he talked about 

15 his admiration for Colonel North as a man that gets 

16 things done, but that this was going too far, if this was 

17 true. 

18 And I didn't have any evidence of this fact. 

19 Q Was it your impression that Casey had spoken 

20 to Poindexter before you all met with him that day? 

21 A Absolutely, before we met with him that he had 

22 already talked with Admiral Poindexter after having met 

23 with Mr. Furmark. 

24 Q And what he was conveying to Poindexter was 

25 the concerns that he had that Furmark had related? 

S ECRET/ CODEWORD 






831 




595 

1 A That there was a real problem in the repayment 

2 of the creditors and that Adnan Khashoggi was a creditor, 

3 and that he had borrowed money from some Canadians and 

4 that this was a very serious issue. And I can't recall 

5 exactly what he said Admiral Poindexter's response was. 

6 I don't precisely recall, although at some point — and 

7 it may have been when I met with Mr. Casey after meeting 

8 with Mr. Furmark — after I had prepared the memorandum 

9 and he had showed it to Admiral Poindexter, at some point 

10 — and it's in the Tower Commission report and right now 

11 my recollection is a little fuzzy — but Mr. Casey said 

12 you've got to get the White House counsel involved, and 

13 Admiral Poindexter said I don't know that I can trust the 

14 White House counsel. 

15 I recall Mr. Casey telling me that. 

16 Q At the time you were meeting with Casey after 

17 he had had his telephone conversation with Poindexter, 

18 did he indicate to you all that he had heard from Furmark 

19 about the possibility of funds being diverted? 

2 A He did not indicate that. He did not add to 

21 my coaments and Mr. Gates' comments, Mr. Gates simply 

22 echoing what 1 had said about the possible diversion. 

23 Q Let me show you another set of notes dated 

24 October 9, 1986, which will be Exhibit 75, and ask you to 

25 identify them for me, please. 



WMRFD 



832 



1% 





596 



1 (The document referred to was 

2 marked Allen Exhibit Number 75 

3 for identification.) 

4 (Pause.) 

5 A Yes. This is a call from Mr. Nir. 

6 Q And that call you would have gotten from Nir 

7 the 9th of October? 

8 A Absolutely. I recall the call. 

9 Q And the purpose of the call, as you recollect 

10 it, is what? 

11 A The purpose is to just say the situation is 

12 very bad relating to Mr. Ghorbanifar, the financing — 

13 his finances, repayment of creditors — and a warning, in 

14 essence, a very serious warning that Mr. Ghorbanifar is a 

15 man who is not easily reckoned with, that he will take 

16 his revenge, that he will not stand in awe of the United 

17 States, that he believed he had been hurt and that his 

18 whole financial status, his legal status, was in question 

19 and that something had to be done. It was a rather 

20 serious call. 

21 Q Did you pass that message on to Casey? 

22 A 1 don't know that I passed it specifically, 

23 but I passed the message on that yes, this whole 

24 situation was really out of control. 

25 Q Had North been apprised as of October 9 of 



833 



0!^Nfie 



597 



1 thasa concerns and the Furmark visit? 

2 A I don't know whether Mr. Casey discussed it 

3 with Colonel North or not. He never told me. 

4 Q You hadn't had such discussions with North as 

5 of October 9? 

6 A No, sir. I later talked about the meeting 

7 with Mr. Furmark to Colonel North. 

8 Q Later in October? 

9 A Yes, absolutely. After I met with him on the 

10 16th I talked to Colonel North. And after I went up on 

11 the 24th I told Colonel North, and I think Mr. Cave also 

12 talked about the meeting on I guess it was actually the 

13 22nd, the night of the 22nd. And I believe I was getting 

14 ready to go on a quick trip to Europe and Mr. Cave talked 

15 to Colonel North on the 23rd about Mr. Furmark. 

16 But I told Colonel North after I met with Mr. 

17 Furmark on the 16th, and Colonel North said well, he 

18 wasn't certain this was a man we could really trust and 

19 for me to take that into consideration, that he had his 

20 own agenda involved and I should not take him at face 

21 value. He was very emphatic. 

22 Q" Did North give you any indication of what he 

23 was planning to do to take care of Mr. Ghorbanifar? 

24 A Well, he had said more than once that some 

25 effort would be made to get him involved in other 

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 

mm 



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82-688 0-88-28 



834 




598 



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10 

11 

12 

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14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

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20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



projects, . that the second channel would find ways to get 
him involved. Mr. Hakim had told me in the only meeting 
I ever had with Mr. Kakim that Mr. Ghorbanifar would be 
"bought off". 

Q When did Hakim have this meeting with you? 

A There's a memorandum for the record on that. 
I think — I don't know. It was September or October. 
You have the record of the conversation. 

Q I would have shown it to you if I had it. 

A I have inundated you with documents here. 

Q That one got by me. What can I tell you? 

A Well, it exists. 

Q This was a meeting of just you and Hakim? who 
else was present? 

A Mr. Secord was present for a brief period. 
Mr. Hakim flew into town. Major General Secord called 
and said that Mr. Hakim wanted to talk 




And I raised the whole subject with Mr. Hakim 

of Ghorbanifar. What are you going to do about it? And 

he said we'll buy him off. 

Q Did he give you any indication of what 

resources they were going to use to buy him off and what 
.3 



?0P| 



u\ 



835 




599 

1 the price. would be? 

2 A No. But by then I had — my instincts were 

3 telling me that there was a reserve, there were funds, 

4 there were bank accounts somewhere. I didn't want to 

5 accuse Mr. Hakim since I had just met him. I just took 

6 that data in and it's in the memorandum for the record. 

7 Q I'll track it down. 

8 A It exists. 

9 Q I have no doubt about that, Mr. Allen. I'll 

10 talk to the computer and see if they can locate it for 

11 me. 

12 The Director and Mr. Gates had lunch with 

13 Lieutenant Colonel North on October 10. Were you aware 

14 that they were having that lunch? Did you receive a 

15 report after it? 

16 A No, I didn't know they had it. 

17 Q So no one told you what transpired at that 

18 meeting? 

19 A No. I did not know that that meeting existed. 

20 I aay have known Colonel North was in the building, but I 

21 didn't know that they had lunch. 

22 Q Neither the Director nor the Deputy Director 
2 3 gave you any description of what had happened at the 

2 4 meeting, the questions they had asked, anything of that 

2 5 kind? 



W^IFIPn 



836 



^ 



600 



1 A . No, sir, not at that time. After the 25th of 

2 November, I believe — no, I'm sorry. After the exposure 

3 of the initiative I believe Mr. Gates mentioned it to me. 

4 No, it was after November 25. Mr. Gates discussed that 

5 with me and the fact that he had done a memorandum for 

6 the record. And he showed me the memorandum for the 

7 record when he discussed it with me. 

3 Q Now you prepared a memo for the Director and 

9 Deputy Director on concerns that you had about the Iran 

10 initiative. 

11 A Yes. 

12 Q Which is dated October 14, and that will be 

13 Exhibit 76. 

14 (Th« document referred to was 

15 marked Allen Exhibit Number 76 

16 for identification.) 

17 A Um-hun. 

18 Q That is your memo? 

19 A Yes. 

2 Q That memo was presented by you at a meeting 

21 that you and Gates and Casey had on the 14th? 

2 2 A No, sir. I took it, the original, to Mr. 

23 Gates' office. Eyes Only, to his secretary on the morning 

24 of the 15th and I said I have a very exceedingly 

25 sensitive memorandum. I said I didn't want to give it 

TOi 



, ^E^RET/ CO DEWORD 



837 




601 

1 directly to Mr. Casey because I wasn't certain what he 

2 would do with it. I wanted Mr. Gates to look at it 

3 carefully first and decide what to do with it. 

4 I said Mr. Casey might go down and just hand 

5 it to someone at the White House straight away, and I 

6 said there's a lot of potentially explosive material in 

7 this memorandum, and I kept calling. And then I found 

8 out later, on the 16th, I was called in by Mr. Casey and 

9 Mr. Gates and they said that not only had they read the 

10 memorandxim on the 15th, that Gates had taken the original 

11 in, and Mr. Casey and Mr. Gates had called Admiral 

12 Poindexter immediately after reading it and set up a 

13 meeting. 

14 They took it down and not only let Admiral 

15 Poindexter read it, but they gave it to him. And I said, 

16 oh, my God. If I'm wrong in this, Colonel North will 

17 never speak to m* again. And he says, well, we don't 

18 think it's that kind of memorandum to find fault. We 

19 think it was a good memorandxua. 

2 They said Admiral Poindexter read it very 

21 carefully, asked who wrote it. They told him that I 

22 wrote It and Admiral Poindexter said he would study it. 
2 3 And that was on the morning of the 16th, I guess. 

24 Q All right. So the memo was not discussed in 

2 5 your presence with Gates and Casey; correct? 



■WtfV SECRET/ CODEWORD 



838 



ilMSIE 



602 



1 A , No, sir. I gave it to Gates because I thought 

2 maybe I had gone too far in just totally condemning the 

3 initiative in essence. 

4 Q And you were not present at the meeting with 

5 Poindexter? 

6 A No, sir, I was not. 

7 Q Did you ever have occasion to discuss this 

8 memo with Poindexter? 

9 A No, sir, I never did. Never had the 

10 opportunity. I never received any indication from him or 

11 from Colonel North. I don't know that Colonel North ever 

12 read the memorandum. I suspect he did, but he never told 

13 me he did. 

14 Q You did meet with Furmark on the 16th; isn't 

15 that right? 

16 A Yes. When we met on the morning of the 16th 

17 in the Director's suite with Mr. Gates present he said I 

18 think it's essential you talk to Mr. Funnark. I'll call 

19 hi». And I said well, okay, I'll go to New York and Mr. 

20 Caa«y said no. You're busy, why don't you just have Mr. 

21 Furoark come down here? 

22 Well, that turned out to be an unfortunate 

23 decision, I think, because Mr. Furmark came down. He got 

24 delayed in transit and it ended up we had only about 4 5 

25 minutes of discussion. I met with him in Mr. Casey's 



839 



imsifjEo 



603 



1 office in the Executive Office Building, and Mr. Casey 

2 invited Mr. Furmark to fly back with him to New York on 

3 the Director's plane, and Mr. Furmark did that. 

4 So I wrote up the memorandum, which again said 

5 that this only reinforced all my worries, concerns, 

6 fears, but I didn't have enough time to talk to him, to 

7 Mr. Furmark. And I told Mr. Casey it was absolutely 

8 essentially I get right back with Mr. Furmark, but 

9 unfortunately I didn't see him for, I guess, a week — 

10 almost a veek, for six days. 

11 Q Let me just show you a couple of pieces of 

12 paper from this time period. We have what appears to be 

13 an October 16, 1986, set of notes, one of which in the 

14 middle seems to refer to a conversation you had with the 

15 Director about Furmark. 

16 (The document referred to was 

17 marked Allen Exhibit Number 77 

18 for identification.) 

19 A Yes. This was clearly the morning of the 

2 16th, Z guess, when Mr. Gates and Mr. Casey and I were 

21 tog«th«r. I was called up by Mr. Casey, walked in. Mr. 

22 Gates was there. That's when they started talking about 

23 what had happened with my memorandum. And he again 

2 4 talked about — I wrote down Fred Furmark, but it was Roy 

2 5 Furmark. 

Ti 



limSSfFIED 



840 



MlftSSiiO 



604 



1 . He said he was a patriot, that he did have 

2 business relationships with Mr. Khashoggi. It turned out 

3 that he was in at the beginning of the Iranian 

4 initiative. And that he had Khashoggi raise the money. 

5 Mr. Casey said he thought Khashoggi was essentially 

6 politically well disposed towards the United States. 

7 Q Did Casey indicate that he had talked to 

8 Furmark in addition to the initial contact of October 7- 

9 October 8? 

10 A I don't know that he said he had talked to Mr. 

11 Furmark again, but he had called Mr. Furaark while I was 

12 there and set up the meeting. He couldn't get through to 

13 Mr. Furmark ininediately, but Mr. Casey called me back 

14 later in my office, when I was back in my office, and 

15 said that Mr. Furmark will meet you at such and such a 

16 time and why don't you use my office down at the 

17 Executive Office Building. 

18 So that's what we did. But it turned out that 

19 Mr. Furmark had several hours of information to tell me 

20 and I tried to squeeze it in to 45 minutes. 

21 Q And it was just you and Furmark; is that 

22 right? 

23 A That is absolutely correct. 

2 4 Q And what resulted from that meeting was your 

25 October 17, 1986, memo? And that will be Exhibit 78. 




841 




Msttfkl^±t)^«i^ 605 



1 (The document referred to was 

2 marked Allen Exhibit Number 78 

3 for identification.) 

4 A That's correct. 

5 Q Now did you ever get a report from Casey on 

6 what he and Furmark had talked about on that airplane 

7 ride? 

8 A No, sir. He never mentioned the substance of 

9 that airplane ride. 



Q All right. We have another reference to 



10 

11 Furmark that appears to be dated on or about October 22, 

12 1986. Let me show it to you. This will be Exhibit 79. 

13 (The document referred to was 
3^4 marked Allen Exhibit Number 79 

15 for identification.) 

16 A I think this must have been when I came back, 

17 around the 22nd — around the 23rd. 

18 Q That assessment of Furmark, was that yours or 

19 Casey's? 

2 A No, that was Mr. Casey's. And we briefed, Mr. 

21 Cave and I briefed Mr. Furmark at 9:00 — Mr. Cave and I 

22 briefed Mr. Casey on our conversations with Mr. Furmark 

23 at 9:00 on 23 October 1986. 

2 4 Q Okay, we'll move right along here. Let me 

2 5 show you another set of notes which is headed Roy 







842 



fk 



606 



1 FumarJc/N^w York, date of birth 9/28/31. That will be 

2 Exhibit 80. 

3 (The document referred to was 

4 marked Allen Exhibit Kumber 80 

5 for identification.) 

6 (Pause.) 

7 If you could identify those notes? 

8 A Those are the notes — I believe those are the 

9 notes I took on the 16th of October. 

10 Q These would have been the notes you would have 

11 taken when you were meeting with Furmark at the EOB? 

12 A That's correct, sir. Yes, I would say that 

13 this is absolutely the case. 

14 Q Okay, good. Thank you. 

15 Let me show you notes that are dated October 

16 22, 1986, and I think these are probably your notes on 

17 the meeting you and Cave had with Furmark up in New York. 

18 (The document referred to was 

19 marked Allen Exhibit Number 81 

20 for identification.) 

21 A That's correct. I jotted down some notes at 

22 dinner using the notepad of the Roosevelt Hotel, and 

2 3 those are the notes, as I recall them — as I recorded 

24 them at that time, rather. And then Mr. Cave used these 

2 5 notes to put together the memorandum that was sent to 
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 

311 



i^ini m\m 



843 



il 




607 



1 Mr. Casey; 

2 And that's when Mr. Furmarlc stated that 

3 Ghorbanifar believed that the $15 million went to 

4 Nicaragua and Mr. Ghorbanifar was relieved when $100 

5 million was passed by the Congress. 

6 Q So the first time that you were advised or 

7 heard that Furmark believed there had been a diversion 

8 was at this October 22 meeting; is that right? 

9 A That, to the best of my recollection, is the 

10 case. I do not believe he mentioned that on the 16th of 

11 October; otherwise I would have recorded it. It came as 

Y 

12 no great surprise to me that he would asset that on the 

13 22nd. 

14 Q Now there are references in these notes to 

15 Cyrus Hashemi. Do you recall being told by FurmarJc that 

16 he was aware that Hashemi had been involved in an effort 

17 in the summer of 1985 to begin the Iranian initiative? 

18 A I recall something along those lines, that he 

19 claims that Cyrus Hashemi was involved at some point and 

20 knew Oiorbanifar. I don't recall the details of that. 

21 And whan I met with Mr. Furmark, I guess around November 

22 7, he also mentioned, just as he left to catch a plane, 

23 something about Cyrus Hashemi being involved. 

24 And he said that of course Cyrus Hashemi was 

25 not a trustworthy individual and look what happened to 



WDSSSIflf 



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IN«L*SSlfli 



608 



1 him. And I said I knew he died but beyond that I don't 

2 know. 

3 Q Specifically the reference that I clipped 

4 talks about Hashemi and what he was offering back in '85, 

5 that he would deliver the hostages if his indictment was 

6 lifted. 

7 A That's right. 

8 Q And that then in August of 1985 Khashoggi and 

9 Hashemi and company parted ways. When those references 

10 were made, did that refresh your recollection of 

11 knowledge that you would have had from a year previously 

12 about this contact? 

13 A No. I knew nothing about Hashemi being 

14 involved in anything in 1985, at least I don't recall any 

15 knowledge. 

16 Q Did Casey at any point relate to you the fact 

17 that he had been contacted by Hashemi in July of 198 5? 

18 A I think he mentioned it to me when we were 

19 trying to reconstruct the chronology, that there was a 
2 man named John Shaheen and Cyrus Hashemi was involved, 

21 y«a. He recounted all of that to me in his suite of what 

22 was occurring in the summer of '85, but that was my first 

23 detailed knowledge of that. 

2 4 Q That conversation with Casey would have taken 

25 place after October 22? 
TC 



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3 

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12 

13 

14 

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17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




A . Yes. That would have been sometime in 
November or early December when we were trying to 
reconstruct what really had happened over the last couple 
of years. 

Did you ever have occasion to find out what 
role in the Hashemi initiative had been? 
No. I don't )cnow what his role was. 
You never discussed that? 
I've never discussed that with! 
In terms of the October 22 meeting, Cave 
prepared a memorandum for Poindexter on that meeting. 

(The document referred to was 
marked Allen Exhibit Number 3 2 
for identification.) 
A We discussed that on the morning of the 2 3rd 
about we needed — that this was incredibly sensitive. 
We needed perhaps to compose only one copy, an original 
and a copy, and that we would keep the copy in my office. 
And the Director says prepare the memorandum to 
Poindexter for my signature. 

And that's what occurred. ^^^^^^^^^ 

Fand I 
gave my notes to Mr. Cave, and I certainly support the 
substance that's in this memorandiim. 

Q Now you also met again with Mr. Furmark in 




846 




IE 



610 



1 early Kovember, on November 6. 

2 A That's correct. 

3 Q What caused you to have that meeting? 

4 A He called and said it's urgent that I see you. 

5 I want to fly dovm and talk to you briefly about the 

6 situation. He said it's getting totally out of hand. I 

7 said fine, I'll be happy to talk to you. And I met him 

8 at the Key Bridge Marriott, listened to what he had to 

9 say. 

10 He at this stage named the Canadians, 

11 allegedly the Canadians involved in pressuring Khashoggi 

12 on the matter. He spoke about the urgent need to do 

13 something to salvage the situation. He brought along a 

14 headline that indicated that the U.S. Government had 

15 contact with Iran. This was after the article had 

16 appeared in Al-Shiraa on November 3. 

17 I listened to all of this. I recorded this in 

18 a memorandum that you have. At that stage it just seemed 

19 to me not all that significant because the whole thing, 

20 the boil was going to be lanced very quickly. 

21 Q Let me show you what appear to be your notes, 

22 November 6, 1986, which will be Exhibit 83. 

23 (The document referred to was 

24 marked Allen Exhibit Number 8 3 

25 »■.. for identification.) 



u^m 



847 



110 

1 (Pause. ) 

2 A Those are my notes from the meeting with Mr. 

3 Furmark. It was in the afternoon of November 6. 

4 Q There are a couple of things I wanted to talk 

5 to you about there. In paragraph III, I guess it is — 

6 IV, excuse me — there is a reference to the Canadians, 

7 $10 million, and it says "pay $10 million into G's 

8 account." And then what appears to be the account 

9 number is listed. 

10 A That's correct. 

11 Q In terms of what Furmark was telling you, was 

12 he telling you that the price for Mr. Ghorbanifar was $10 

13 million? 

14 A I think he was saying that a way to salvage 

15 this is to, without suggesting how the money would be 

16 raised, what would be the source of the money, that the 

17 way to salvage this situation that Ghorbanifar 's Swiss 

18 bank account had been blocked, this was the number, that 

19 if the money was paid into this number at Credit Suisse 

20 that the money would go to the people to whom money was 

21 owed, and somehow somebody should do this straight away. 

22 I just simply wrote that down as fact. 1 

23 think I recorded at least — I think it's recorded in the 

24 memorandum for the record. He laid it straight out. 

25 Q So essentially what Furmark was suggesting was 



!!triwr» 



848 



iimssm 



612 



1 that the price of silence was $10 million into this 

2 account? 

3 A I think he was implying it, in all candor. 

4 Q He went into some detail, apparently, with 

5 regard to the diversion of money. You all discussed this 

6 as set out in your typewritten memo. 

7 A Yes. He talked about there was a diversion. 

8 Q In terms of the proprietary that was being 

9 used, your notes reflect Lakeside. The earlier note from 

10 Casey had used Lake, I believe. Lakeside was the name of 

11 the proprietary given to you by Mr. Furmark; is that what 

12 was happening? 

13 A Yes. But I think he was wrong. X think it's 

14 Lake Resources, based on what I've learned since. He had 

15 the name incorrect, and he kept repeatedly misstating the 

16 name. 

17 Q You've got a note here. He described Miller 

18 as being froB Toronto, real sleazy and corrupt. Did he 

19 tell you anything that caused him to reach those 

20 conclusions, what facts he was relying upon? 

21 A No, he didn't, but that was his description — 

22 that this individual was a very difficult individual, as 

23 I recall. But he didn't offer any rationale. 

24 Q Did he indicate to you that he had met them? 

25 A It was my impression that he had, that they 

r/ CODEWORD 




^■'^riijf^ 



849 



immm 



613 



1 vara assoeiatas and they had been associated in business 

2 transactions with Adnan Khashoggi and that he had had 

3 contact, directly or indirectly, with them. He implied 

4 he knew who they were and that they were not the most 

5 pleasant types, yes. I would say that he implied he knew 

6 them . 

7 Q Why don't I show you Exhibit 84, which is your 

8 memo of November 7? If you will just identify it and 

9 we'll pass it along. 

10 (The dociimant referred to was 

11 marked Allen Exhibit Number 84 

12 for identification.) 

13 A That's a memorandum that I prepared on the 7th 

14 after meeting Mr. Furmark on the 6th of November, 1986. 

15 Q And that memo is based on the notes we just 

16 saw as Exhibit 83? 

17 A Absolutely, and no one aver gave ma any 

18 reaction to the mamorandiun . I sent it to Mr. Gates and 

19 to Mr. Casay. 

2 Q Let ma show you one other memorandum that's 

21 dated Novambar 3, 1986, regarding the Frankfort meetings 

22 that were going on at that period of time. That would be 

23 Exhibit 85. 

2 4 (The dociiment referred to was 

25 /filA. marked Allen Exhibit Number 85 



//AlAf marked f 



850 



614 

1 for identification.) 

2 Can you tell me why that memo was prepared by 

3 you? 

4 A It was not prepared by me. 

5 Q Okay, sorry. 

6 • A It was prepared by Mr. Cave, I believe, and my 

7 secretary, in typing it up, accidentally put my name on 

8 it. 

9 Q So that's not your work product? 

10 A No, sir. 

11 Q My understanding is you were not at those 

12 meetings, correct? 

13 A That is absolutely correct. It's an 

14 interesting memorandum, but I am not the author. 

15 Q Now after the November 6 meeting with Furmark 

16 did you have occasion to meet with him again? 

17 A No, sir. 

18 Q Did you have occasion to talk to him again? 

19 A Yes. 

2 Q When? 

21 A He called me for some reason in late February 

22 or early March of '87, after the publication of the Tower 

23 Commission. 

24 Q Do you have any recall of what he discussed 

25 with you? 

TOI 



nmim 



851 



mmsm 



615 



1 A . It was some complaint that he had in the 

2 memorandum that was prepared by Mr. Cave following our 

3 meeting on the 22nd of October, where there's some — I 

4 need to have that memorandum back, but there was some 

5 allegation in there that bothered him. He said it wasn't 

6 true and he could not understand why that was included. 

7 He said, I believe, in paragraph four that 

8 with regard to this deal the financiers, Ghorbanifar and 

9 Nir met and agreed that $3 million would be added to the 

10 price to cover profit and expenses and also another $2 

11 million would be added to cover monies owed to Mr. Nir. 

12 And he claimed ha never made this statement about the $2 

13 million and he wanted to know how to correct the record. 

14 I said why don't you write Senator Tower? 

15 Q We have one other document I need a little 

16 help with. It has DCI 20 November 86 written on it. I'd 

17 like you to look at it and tell me if you can place this 

18 document in time. I eun primarily interested in the 

19 materials that appear on the bottom half of the page. 

20 (The document referred to was 

21 marked Allen Exhibit Number 8 6 

22 for identification.) 

23 (Pause.) 

24 A This was about the time, I guess, Mr. Casey 

25 was preparing to give his testimony before the House and 



mCLlSSMD 



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2 

3 

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5 
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\3 
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616 

Senat» Select Conunittees on Intelligence. 

Q I believe that occurred about the 21st. 
A I was with Mr. Casey that day. I was called 
unexpectedly by M r. Secord that day, who said that he h ad 

personally spoken| 

He went to see him on Sunday, 

Th^le^eT 'sunday was , prior to, say, the 20th of November, 

and that ^^^^^Hwas supportive of the United States' 

efforts to reestablish some contact with Iran, and that 

^^^^^Hendorsed the methods and the objectives of the 

initiative. 

It seemed to me — and why General Secord 
called me, I don't know, except that he clearly wanted to 
say that he was trying to salvage something that seemed 
to me at that stage hardly salvageable. And I wrote it 

down. 

Q Did he give you any further reason on wh y he 

thought anybody would be interested ^"^^^H^^^B 
rooting for the initiative at that point? 

A Well, it was the belief, I think, even at that 
stage that the second channel was so good it should be 
kept open at all costs and that the Department of State 
and others were trying to shut it down, and he thought 
that was wrong, given the labors of the past 14 or 15 
months. 1 1 Si .^ I 




853 



Ui 






617 



1 Q I have run past the allotted time. I just 

2 wanted to ask you a couple more questions to clear things 

3 out in terms of the testimony that was prepared for 

4 Director Casey. 

5 Casey flies in from Central America. 

6 A Yes. 

7 Q And begins the process of trying to prepare 

8 for his testimony. What role did you play in either 

9 directly preparing Casey or reviewing the materials that 

10 were utilized for his testimony? 

11 A I, along with other senior officials, 

12 participated in the revie w of some of the drafting that 
was done. McCullough.^^^^^^^^^^Hsf the 

14 Directorate of Operations who worked in the front office, 

15 and others started preparing some of the basic drafts. 

16 That particular weelc that he was to testify, we had a 

17 meeting, I guess, and I forget who chaired the meeting, a 

18 preliminary meeting earlier in the week to start pulling 

19 together all the data because we had the Inspector 
2 G«n«ral, w* had the General Counsel, we had several 

21 people trying to pull together chronologies. 

22 I was being asked by^^^^^^^^and others to 
2 3 con tribute t o chronologies, Mr. McCul] 

^^^^^^^H I did that. So I was pulling together, 

2 5 adding to chronologies, looking at the testimony. We had 
TOPSSBCRIfJc 

m 





854 



t^?<|D|^iali 618 



1 a meeting, I believe — and perhaps Mr. Gates chaired the 

2 meeting — to set the stage for preparing the testimony. 

3 And then Mr. Casey chaired a meeting, I guess it was on 

4 Thursday night before he went up on Friday, where he met 

5 with about 20 of his top officials — I, among others, 

6 was there — who had had some )cnowledge or part in the 

7 initiative. 

8 I ]cnow we had two meetings that week, and it 

9 was amazing our inability to put in precise terms just 

10 when certain events occurred, because there had been no 

11 so-called diary kept. This was not necessarily our 

12 operation. We supported it. Various segments of the 

13 Agency supported it. So 1 contributed to it in that 

14 sense. 

15 The following week I was asked by Mr. Casey 

16 and Mr. Gates directly to put together the master 

17 chronology, which I did, which formed the foundation for 

18 the Inspector General's final chronology that was passed 

19 to you and to the Intelligence Committees. 

20 Q Let me focus specifically on the November HAWK 

21 flights into Tehran. 

22 A Yes. 

23 Q You had been a participant in that matter. 

24 You had received the Ledeen briefing of December 4, which 

25 certainly brought you current in terms of what was in 



855 



yma 




619 



1 tho8« planes and what had happened in that circumstance. 

2 Were you not troubled by the testimony that 

3 was to be given to the House and the Senate on the 2l3t 

4 of November that described the events in November? 

5 A What we )cnew contemporaneous and what we )cnew 

6 ■ after the fact are two different things. I think I've 

7 already testified under oath and earlier in my deposition 

8 that, one, I thought that our first concrete Icnowledge 

9 that we had it was HAVnc missile parts, to my knowledge, 

10 was when Ghorbanifar told me on the 13th of Januairy. 

11 Clearly 1 was in error because Kr. Ledeen told 

12 me on the 3rd of December what was there. I didn't have 

13 that memorandum that I had written. I don't know where 

14 the memorandum was. Maybe it was in my files somewhere. 

15 I have so many memorandums. We were struggling to find 

16 out when we knew precisely HAWK missiles were on board 

17 that flight. 

18 I have testified under oath again and again 

19 wh«n we knew precisely HAWK missiles were on board that 

20 flight. I have testified under oath again and again that 

21 when I arrived at the office, too> 

22 down to Mr . Clarridge two floors below my office and 

him^^^^^^^^^^^fand he was already involved, 

24 clearly, in sending messages overseas, that Mr. Clarridge 

25 had been told it was oil drilling equipment. 




856 




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8 

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620 

colonel North showed up sometime during the 
morning and said here-s oil drilling equipment and w. 
need to move it into Tehran. We can't do it the way we 
would like to do it, and we've got to have an airline 
available immediately because this is very important. He 
called the National Security Advisor and the Deputy 
National Security Advisor in my presence. I had, as I 
have testified, very grave doubts that that was oil 
drilling equipment, but I didn't know for certain. 

And colonel North stated emphatically that it 
„„. I felt if there were shipment ^ccurrin^^ga. 

colonel North was using a cover story and had 
THTTuthorized to do so by the National Security 
Advisor. It was very difficult for me to challenge that 

at that moment. 

2nthjnightof25^^jovember, 




And I remember when we congregated, I guess on 



CTVOaDEVlORD 



857 




RET/ CODEWORD 621 



1 Monday or Tuesday, and it must have been on Monday 

2 evening because I missed my planning commission meeting — 

3 I do have another life — that we talked about this, that 

4 by the 2 6th of November we were pretty certain that some 

5 form of arms was involved, but I didn't recall that we 

6 knew precisely it was HAWK missiles. That is, I did not 

7 personally know it was HAWK missiles until January 13. 

8 And I can't recall what the Director's 

9 testimony precisely said on the 21st, at this stage. 

10 Q Well, were you aware of the controversy and 

11 Mr. Sofaer and Mr. Cooper being concerned? 

12 A No. 

13 Q You weren't present at that meeting the next 

14 morning on the 21st? 

15 A Not at all. I knew nothing about that until 

16 bits and pieces I have picked up in recent days. 

17 Q Were you present when the Director actually 

18 testified? 

19 A Y«a. 

20 Q His testimony before the House doesn't have 

21 th« deletions that Cooper took out. His testimony before 

22 the House says in essence we were told it was oil 

23 drilling equipment and that's what he's representing to 

24 the House of Representatives. That didn't concern you 

25 all, that the representation was made to the Housa of 



iii 



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DHeUSSiEB 



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Repraaantatives? 

A That's what w« vara told. Mayba that's a 
legal fine point, but that's what tha NSC told us. 
Clearly we knew later, and I thinJc in tha testimony we 
}cnev later it was HAWK missiles. 

Q The testimony suggests that you all didn't 
know it was HAWK missiles until sometime in January. 

A That's what I'm saying. And whan we were 
struggling to know tha pracisa cargo I probably am 
responsible as anyone — and I'll take that 
responsibility. Twenty of us sat around tha table and we 
were trying to recall precisely whan wa knew HAWK 
missiles were aboard. But I stated at that meeting, 
whenever it occurred — on the Monday — that wa knew 
soma form of armaments probably were involved by the 2 5th 
and 26th. 




But I had forgotten that Ledeen had told me 
aaphatlcally what was aboard on tha 3rd of December. I 
had totally forgotten that. 

Q Let ma coma at it another way, Mr. Allen. You 
heard Casey's testimony. Did you hear both tha Senate 
and tha House testimony? 

A Yes. 

Q Did you come away from that testimony troubled 




859 




CRET/ CODEWORD 623 



1 that Casay had mislead th* Senators and Congressmen or 

2 not? 

3 A I didn't think he had misled them at the time. 

4 I think w« were scrambling to try to reconstruct. I 

5 don't want to sound disrespectful, but there were so many 

6 things overwhelming normal senior Agency officials, and 

7 this was held so compartmented and so fragmented the fact 

8 that errors were made, mistakes were made, and 

9 misstatements were made does not surprise m«. 

10 But Z do recall a very detailed conversation, 

11 I believe on Monday and then again on Thursday, as to 

12 just when we knew precisely — when we knew precisely, 

13 when Ghorbanifar himself told me at Mr. Ledeen's house 

14 that HAWK missiles were on board. We thought it was 

15 January 13. Clearly we were totally wrong. 

16 You showed me in my last deposition a 

17 memorandum that I had forgotten that I knew as early as 

18 the 3rd of December, and that memorandum went to a number 

19 of people. That went to the Director and the Deputy 

20 Director. It went to McMahon. It went all over. 

21 Q It's my understanding that it came to the 

22 attention of the Director the night of the 20th, that Mr. 

23 Sporkin was also knowledgeable of the fact that weapons, 

24 missiles, had been on that flight on November 25, that 

25 that was brought to the attention of Mr. Dougherty and 

TolSMAi/j 



860 



0&M^ 



624 

1 that Dougherty suggested that was a reason for modifying 

2 the testimony that evening. 

3 Was Sporkin's knowledge brought to your 

4 attention during that period of time, November 2 0-21? 

5 A No. I didn't know he had contemporaneous 

6 knowledge. I knew after the fact, when he was briefed on 

7 the shipment, that he said this was a covert action and 

8 perhaps some ex post facto Finding needed to be made on 

9 this. 

10 Q The Finding goes up November 26. It's quite 

11 specific in trying to retroactively take care of the 

12 initiative. Sporkin and Makowka apparently told somebody 

13 on the night of the 20th of November preparing for the 

14 testimony that they recalled that they knew about 

15 armaments being on that flight. But that message didn't 

16 get to you that day? 

17 A Which day are we talking about? 

18 MS. MC GINN: Object to the form of the 

19 question. Can you just clarify that what you are saying 

20 is that Sporkin informed Mr. Dougherty or Mr. Makowka 

21 that h« thought he remembered knowing about the weapons 

22 after the flight took place? I think we're getting 
2 3 confused here on what took place. 

24 THE WITNESS: See, I'd be very surprised that 

25 Mr. Sporkin knew contemporaneously on the day of the 24th 



861 




625 

1 and 25th that HAWK missiles were aboard that aircraft 

2 because he didn't even Icnow about the operation. 

3 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

4 Q He ]cnew on the 25th. 

5 A Yes, sir. He knew something had occurred on 

6 the 25th — 26th. 

7 MR. WOODCOCK: He was briefed on the 25th, 

8 according to his testimony, that missiles were on board 

9 the plane. He believes that he was told specifically 

10 HAWK missiles at that briefing, and that would be 

11 November 2 5, '85. 

12 THE WITNESS: I never heard that. I don't 

13 know anything about that. 

14 MR. WOODCOCK: And he Is supported In that by 

15 Ed Dletel, who was present at the same briefing, and 

16 Makowka, who then followed Into the briefing and was told 

17 by Sporkln and Dletel that It was missiles. This is 

18 November 25. 

19 BY MR. KERR: (Resuming) 

20 Q What I'm trying to focus you on Is what you 

21 kn«v in preparing for Casey's testimony. Casey's 

22 testimony on this point isn't even close. 

23 A I knew that HAWK Missiles, but at the time 

24 that the flight was being arranged and the flight was 

25 under way I had deep suspicions that Colonel North was 

tI 



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862 



afflElEL 



626 



1 not honest with us, that he was, for his own reasons, 

2 giving us a cover story. I believe that Mr. Clarridge 

3 and I discussed that. 

4 But when we prepared the testimony we probably 

5 could have done a better job in how we phrased it. But I 

6 thought that, you know, I didn't know what Mr. Dietel and 

7 Mr. Sporkin had been briefed on the 2 5th of November, 

8 1985. I know that when we were preparing the testimony 

9 prior to 21 November 1986 there were a lot of imperfect 

10 memories and a lot of struggling to try to get it very 

11 accurate that week. 

12 And if Mr. Casey misspoke or misled the Select 

13 Committees he did it because his staff didn't do a good 

14 job. That's my belief. 

15 Q You are not conscious of a decision being made 

16 at the higher levels of the CIA to give this testimony 

17 that knowledge happened in January even though you all 

18 knew that that was not the case? 

19 A You're going to have to restate that one 

20 b«caus« this is a fairly serious question. 

21 Q The testimony that was given to Congress 

22 suggested that in January of 1986 is when the Agency 

23 learned for the first time that there were HAWK missiles 

24 aboard this flight. That's the testimony that came 

25 across to Congress. 

TOP SI 



■mWiFIED 



863 



"|i 







627 



1 A That's correct. 

2 Q You ara not awar* that a dacision was made by 

3 people at Casey's level to give such testimony even 

4 though they )cnew it not to be true? 

5 A No, I'm not aware that anyone tried to 

6 deliberately mislead the Congress — either Mr. Casey or 

7 any of his senior officials. I ha ve no toowledge of 

8 that. We honestly were 8truggling| 

10 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^khis was not oil drilling equipment, 

11 but I don't Icncw S7 any deliberate decision by Mr. Casey 

12 or any senior Agency official to mislead the Congress. 

13 Q We have a chronology prepared prior to his 

14 testimony by the CIA which quite clearly indicates that 

15 the shipment of November 1985 was a shipment of munitions 

16 at the initiative of NSC. Someone at the CIA prepared 

17 that chronology, and yet Casey's testimony doesn't 

18 correspond to that. 

19 Do you have any )cnowledge of how the 

20 chronologiea got changed or altered during that period of 

21 time? 

22 MS. MC GINN: Object to the form of the 

23 question. First of all, that chronology does not state 
2 4 and you cannot show us any chronolocfy that states that 
2 5 they )cnew contemporaneously that those shipments were 




864 



1 HAWK Bvlsslles. Any chronologies that were prepared were 

2 prepared In the November 1986 time frame. What they )cnew 

3 in November 1986 is very different from what they )cnew in 

4 November 1985. 

5 MR. KERR: Certainly what the CIA has been 

6 telling us they )tnew is very different. 

7 MS. MC GINN: That's the testimony and that's 

8 what the facts indicate. 

9 MR. KERR: No, ma'am. That's not what the 

10 facts indicate. 

11 MS. MC GIKN: Well, you show me a chronology 

12 that indicates — 

13 MR. KERR: We will show you a report that goes 

14 through in soma detail what the facts really indicate. 

15 MS. MC GINN: We look forward to that. But 

16 you show right now, if you want him to answer that 

17 question, you show him a chronology. 

18 MR. KERR: I'll ask him to answer the 

19 question. If you tell him not to answer it, you can deal 

20 with the Committee on that. 

21 MS. MC GINN: I objected to the question, and 

22 if hra wants to answer it under those confused 

23 circumstances, he can answer it. Do you understand the 

24 question? 

25 THE WITNESS: I've lost the question. I've 



'Wl'/BSfFB 



865 



1 lost Ui« whola train almost. 

2 BY MR. KERR: (Reauning) 

3 Q With regard to th« chronologias that were 

4 b«ing pr«par«d during th« Nov«mb«r 19, 20, 21 period of 

5 tim«, did you review those chronologies as they were 

6 . prepared? 

7 A I contributed to thea. I know that 
^^^^^^Hand^^^^^^^^Hand others scrambling 

9 around to put together a chronology. I Icnow that the 

10 Inspector General had started a chronology and the Office 

11 of General Counsel had started a chronology. And I 

12 contributed some of my toowledge as to the chronology, of 

13 what had occurred at the beginning of the initiative up 

14 through the November 1986 time frame. 

15 So there were a series of chronologies being 

16 prepared by a variety of people. No one was 

17 strategically in charg* overall, and that was one of the 

18 problem* that when w« met in the Director's conference 

19 room on two occasions that we earnestly were struggling 

20 to get the chronology correct. 

21 And I recall considerable conversation of when 

22 we Jcnew explicitly what was on board that flight. But on 

23 the chronologies that were prepared prior to the 

24 Director's testimony on the 2l8t I was not in charge of 

25 it. I contributed to it, and I can't remember which 



82-688 0-88-29 



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pi»c«« I nec«ssarlly contributed! 



But th« next w«ek Mr. Gates called and said on 
behalf of Mr. Casey I should put together the master 
chronology and I did put together the master chronology. 
And I think it was a very fine chronology. But neither 
Mr. Casey nor any senior official, to my knowledge, ever 
made a decision to mislead — to the best of my 
knowledge, to mislead the Congress on what was on that 
flight. 

If there's confusion, boy, confusion abounded 
at the Agency that week. 

Q With regard to Mr. Clarridge, did he too play 
a role in drafting that chronology during that period of 
time? 

A He sat in on the two meetings, sir. 

Q But teUcing pen In hand or writing? 

A I never saw him take pen in hand. He talked 
about — I was witness to the fact that Mr. Juchniewicz 
was there for at least the first meeting and Mr. 
Clarridge, and they had different recollections over just 
how that NSC request occurred and to what degree was Mr. 
Clarridge authorized to conduct the activity. 

There was a lot of confusion. There was a lot 
of sincere men trying their very best at that time. 




867 




631 

1 Q Was ther« one person that had responsibility 

2 for putting that chronology together, who had overall 

3 responsibility for it? 

4 A Well, I thin k that was part of the problem. I 
think^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas taking bits 

6 along with Mr. McCullough, in trying to put together the 

7 best chronology. The Directorate of Operations took the 

8 initial effort of the chronology, but then the Inspector 

9 General had a responsibility, the General Counsel. So 

10 there were a series of chronologies begun. 

11 I'm afraid we did not perfora with real 

12 professionalism that week. It just took us another week 

13 or so to get a very detailed chronology down. I wrote 

14 the baseline chronology on which the Inspector General 

15 built a very detailed chronology, but, you know, I would 

16 be very surprised if Mr. Casey or any senior official 

17 advocated misleading the Congress on what was in that 

18 shipment. 

19 But I knew there was considerable confusion at 
2 the two meetings that I attended where you had 20 — 

21 maybe 15 to 20 — people struggling to get the thing 

2 2 right. And I don't think we got it right. 
2 3 Q You were not aware of Colonel North playing a 

2 4 role in adjustments being made to the CIA chronology 

2 5 during that perioc^?. ^ . _ 
TOP N., ... 




868 



632 



1 A I heard something about that from Mr. Gates, 

2 but I had no direct toowledge. I saw a version which was 

3 probably in my files of the chronology that was being 

4 developed at the NSC. I thinlc I have a copy of something 

5 called a maximum version. There is probably something in 

6 my files. Some of that did not track with my knowledge, 

7 particularly the shipment in August and September of '85. 

8 It didn't seem correct to me. It was a draft. 

9 Q But in terms of who at the CIA was getting 

10 that information from NSC, can you identify that person 

11 for me? 

12 A Mr. Cave was down there working with Colonel 

13 North at the time. He brought back the version that was 

14 put in my files. 

15 Q Was it your impression he was the contact 

16 point for NSC input on such a chronology? 

17 A No. I don't think he was necessarily the 

18 input at all, not the contact. He was dotm there, and 

19 the only part that he could contribute to the NSC 

20 ohronology was after the 5th of March when he joined the 

21 op«ration. He had no contemporaneous knowledge of what 

22 occurred in 1985 and could in no way be held to what was 

23 prepared. 

24 Q What did Gates tell you, if you can recollect 

25 it? 



869 



18 




633 

1 A H« told m« that he had challenged Colonel 

2 North at a meeting at the White House that had to do with 

3 some parts of the chronology prepared by the NSC, which I 

4 guess related to the use of the proprietary aircraft, and 

5 he challenged Colonel North and Colonel North changed it 

6 to the way Kr. Gates — Mr. Gates will have to tell you 

7 explicitly what it was. 

8 MS. HUGHES: Could we go off the record for a 

9 minute? 

10 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

11 (Whereupon, at 7:15 p.m., the talcing of the 

12 instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., 

13 Thursday, July 2, 1987.) 

14 



15 Signature of the Witness 

16 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 

17 , 1987. 



19 Notary Pxiblic 

20 My Coaaission Expires: 







870 

ONCLASSlHtU 

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 

I, NICHAL ANN SCHAFER, th« Officer before whom the foregoing 
deposition was taken, to hereby certify that the witness 
whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly 
sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by 
me to the best of my eUaility and thereafter reduced to 
typewriting under my direction; that said deposition is a 
true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am 
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the 
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and 
further that I em not a relative or employee of any attorney 
or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially 
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. 



Notary Public 
in and for the District of Columbia 



My Cooaission Expires: February 28, 1990 



UNCUSSIflt 



871 



TOP liltWSIEtlDEWORD 



Scenograph; : Transcript of 

HEARINGS 

Before the 



"srrs.__:^ 



/87 



SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION 



UNITED STATES SENATE 



CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF CHARLES E. ALLEN 
Thursday, July 2, 198? 




Partally Declassified/Released on 



1-20-^ 



under provisions of E.O. 12356 
by N. Menan, National Security Council 



Washington 



TOPS 




ORD 






(202) 523-9300 
20 F STRZZT, M.W. 



COPT PIO- 



_COP»ES 



872 







1 CONTINUED DEPOSITION OF CHARLES E. ALLEN 

2 Thursday, July 2, 1987 

3 United States Senate 

4 Select Comnittee on Secret 

5 Military Assistance to Iran 

6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition 

7 Washington, D. C. 

8 Continued deposition of CHARLES E. ALLEK, 

9 called as a witness by counsel for the Select Committee, 

10 in the offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart 

11 Senate Office Building, Wo-.shington, D. C. , comEencing at 

12 10:35 £.m., the witness having been previously duly sworn 

13 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the 

14 District of Columbia, and the testimony being taken down 

15 by Stenomask by RAYMOND HEER and transcribed under his 

16 direction. 



Partially Declassified/Released on 



under provisions of E.O. 12355 
by N. Menan, National Security Council 



}immm 



873 



umssMo 



635 



1 APPEARANCES : 

2 On behalf of the Senate Select Conunittee on Secret 

3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 

4 Opposition: 

5 CHARLES KERR, ESQ. 

6 TIMOTHY WOODCOCK, ESQ. 

7 On behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency: 

8 KATHLEEN McGINN, ESQ. 

9 RHONDA HUGHES, ESQ. 



UNGl^Sm 



874 



UNElAfflB 



636 



1 CONTENTS 

2 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF 

3 WITNESS SENATE HOUSE 

4 Charles E. Allen 

5 By Mr. Woodcock 637 

6 EXHIBITS 

7 ALLEN EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION 

8 87 645 

9 88 645 



UNOASSiED 



875 



BNOUSSW 



637 



1 PROCEEDINGS 

2 Whereupon, 

3 CHARLES E. ALLEN, 

4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate 

5 Select Committee and having been previously duly sworn by 

6 the Notary Public, was further examined and testified as 

7 follows: 

8 EXAMINATION 

9 BV MR. WOODCOCK: 

10 Q Why don't we go on the record? Mr. Allen, 

11 this is a continuation of our deposition, which now has 

12 been going on for three days over, I guess, about an 

13 eight-week period now. I want to remind you, as I think 

14 you know, that you are still under oath in this 

15 deposition. 

16 Mr. Allen, as I explained before we started, I 

17 am going to be covering some scattered topics that I have 

18 made notes on in the course of Mr. Kerr's examination of 

19 you.' Let m* begin by asking you with respect to George 

20 Cava, George Cave became involved in this operation 

21 around March 4 or 5, 1986; does that square with your 

22 recollection? 

23 A That is correct. As I understand it, it was 5 

24 March 86 that he became involved in the operation. 

2 5 Q Now what was Mr. Cave's relationship to you? 



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H«r« you hlfl suparior or how did that work? 

A Ko, I was not Mr. Cave's superior at all. 
In January, who was thenV 

of the Directorate of Operations, 
stated that he thought It was Important to bring on the 
Farsl speaker and an expert on Iran, and he mentioned 
Mr . Cave . 

After the meeting, I believe, that 
attended In February where I believe perhaps even Mr. 
Hakim was Interpreter ,(^^^^^^H^| pressed to have his 
own Agenc y expert in the operation. So Mr. Cava reported 
throughV^^^^^^H and up to Clair George and up to Mr. 
Casey. He did not have a desk in the Directorate of 
Operations, and because the Intelligence that we 
collected on a daily or certainly a weekly basis was of 
value to Mr. Cave as he undertook his work, he tended to 
work out of ay office. 

At that time we were relocating. 




Then I moved into my own 
private office. Mr. Cave tended to work in my office or 
at a' desk that belonged to me just outside my office, but 
his reporting chain was clearly through^^^^^^^^l 
Q Now let me clarify your testimony from the 
preceding day. _ You testified, I guess it was on Monday, 



UNKASHD 



877 



UNSU^M 



639 



1 that you war* not awara of Albert Hakim actually having 

2 attanded the February 2 5 meeting until sometime long 

3 after the meeting. Is that correct? Did I understand 

4 that correctly? 

5 A To the best of my recollection — and I must 

6 testify to my recollection — I did not recall the name 

7 Hakim being involved in the February session at all. 

8 However, I became aware of Mr. Hakim in March or April 

9 when he made this direct call to the senior official in 

10 Tehran 

11 and I was told that Mr. Hakim at that time was an Iranian 

12 expatriate living in this country who in some manner was 

13 related to the initiative and to Colonel North. 

14 But I did not focus on his role at the time, 

15 and it wasn't until the summer of 1986 in, I guess, July 

16 that I bec2une aware of just how significant a figure he 

17 really was. 

18 Q Did you understand when George Cave czune on in 

19 early March that he was supplanting someone? 

20 A No, I did not understand that at all. I 

21 thought he was coming in as a CIA officer in whom we had 

22 confidence to serve as a Farsi linguist and also, I 

as ^^^^^^^Hsaid, to serve 

24 negotiator but as an advisor to the NSC or to assist the 

25 NSC in the initiative. 



IIN6ttS«D 



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Q When Mr. Cave came on were you present at any 
of the briefings that were given of him or for him? 

A I don't think I was present at any of the 
briefings. However, ^jj^^^ either saw me or called 
me and said it was important that I sit down with Mr. 
cave and explain what my role had been in intelligence 
tasking, direction, 




And that I did. 
AndT of course, Mr. Cave then continued to — 
he spent some time over in the^Division, but he spent 
a lot of time working out of my own office. 

Q Let me shift to another topic. You were head 
of the DCl Hostage Location Task Force that was 
established in late 1985; is that correct? 

A That is correct. 

Q That Task Force focused at one point, did it 
not, on securing the release of Peter Kilboume; is that 

A It was aware of the Peter Ki lb o um e operation 
and we reported on the Peter Wtb^ wne operation from 
time to time to Admiral Poindexter 




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uNcusn 




H« report ad and analyztd th« Kilbourw cas* on 
a weekly basis, and sone of our reports vent in to 
Admiral Poindexter on that case. That case was under way 
when the Hostage Location Task Force was formed. 
Q 




Q So I gather from your testimony that in that 
undertaking you did not as the DCI Hostage Location Task 
Force have emy direct responsibility for it, but it was 
more intelligence gathering and support? 

A Support, analysis as to what was happening, 
reporting to Admiral Poindexter and Colonel North on the 
progress of the operation. 




tmm 



880 




9 



Now was there anything in particular about 



Now was there anything 

DHiitftSW 



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Kilb^um^ himsalf or was it simply this person's contacts 
that caused the effort to focus on Kilbj^urn^? 

A Kilb^urne was looked upon as another hostage 
and Colonsl North always indicated that ve treated all of 
these hostages equally in our attempts to free them. We 
always felt that Kilb^urne was held by a different group, 
and I think that is convincingly the case — more of a 
criminal group, perhaps in collusion with some Syrian 
non-commissioned officers. 

But we worked on it just as we worked — in 
the spring of 1986, w« had thought ve knew where the rest 
of the Americans vero, bas^d en other reporting, and we 
worked very hard on th^it as well,( 




Q Nov let ae shift to the area of the second 
chiihnel. The second channel began, I gather, through the 
efforts of General Secord and Albert Hakim; is that your 
understanding? 

A That is correct. 

Q When were you aware that the second channel 
contacts were really under way? 

A I was aware in the August time frame that 



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contacts war* under way with a new group of Iranians, 
probably in the second half of August. I was aware that 
there had been contacts in New York between Mr. Cave, I 
believe, and Mr. Hakim and the individual' 
with whom Mr. Hakim had been in contact. And I believe 
that a polygraph was conducted of this contact which 
proved good. 

Therefore, there were initiatives under way in 
the July time frame that I was generally aware of, and I 
was more aware after the meeting of 15 August in 
Brussels. 

Q Now to the extent George Cave was involved in 
this, I gather he would have kept you contemporaneously 
apprised? 

A He generally kept me apprised of the second 
channel. Clearly Colonel North was very cautious about 
information on the second channel, and Z was not really 
focused on the second channel until after he told ae on 9 
September that this was very important, officially 
aj^roved „ 




Q Let ma show you a couple of documents. I 
don't know where we are in the Exhibit sequence at this 
point. 

(A discussion was held off the record.) 



DNCmo 



883 



mMmi 



645 



1 (Th« documents r«ferrad to were 

2 marked Allen Exhibit Numbers 87 

3 and 88 for identification.) 

4 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

5 Q Now, Mr. Allen, if you would take a moment and 

6 read each of these and first let me know if you recognize 

7 either of them or both of them. 

8 (Pause.) 

9 A Just before I read them carefully, I have seen 

10 both of these memorandums in the past, in the summer of 

11 1986. 

12 Q Now we have the testimony of George Cave to 

13 the effect that he wrote those memoranda himself and your 

14 testimony is that you saw them in the summer. Do you 

15 believe you would have seen them eibout the time they 

16 would have been created? 

17 A I remember seeing this one about the time this 

18 was created and I remember having lunch with Mr. Cave and 

19 he described his visit to New York. I believe this was a 
2 visit that occurred in New York. 

21 Q And by "this one" you are referring to the one 

22 that is marked 87; is that correct? 

23 A That is correct, yee. And I listened to Mr. 

24 Cave describe his meeting and he felt that this 

25 individual, I^^^^B) looked like a reliable individual 




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UNCbASSIFKD 



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and I racall that he was talking about setting up a 
polygraph. 

Q Did he tell you that he knew I 



A I believe he said he knew hin or knew of him. 
I can't recall precisely. 




Q Let me ask you, then, if the July date on that 
squares with your recollection of when you would have 
become aware of the contacts that led to the second 
channel. 

A Yes, sir. It would be, and it would be 
shortly after that. In fact, Mr. Cave and I had lunch 
two or three times a week to talk over this activity. 
When Mr. Cave was at the office he would usually stop by 
and' if I did not have a luncheon appointment he said 
let's go to lunch. And so we had a considerable time to 
discuss about this. 

Q Now I gather from your testimony th at you wer e 
contemporaneously aware of plans to place | 
a polygraph; is that correct? 

A Yes, I knew of that. 




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Q . Do you )cnow whether that was going to be an 
Ag«ncy-conducted polygraph or, as I think it says in the 
memo, a private polygraph? 

A I think it was a private polygraph Mr. Hakim 
was going to arrange, and I may be inaccurate on that 
because I didn't get directly in involved in these kinds 
of sessions, but I think it was, I thought it was a 
private polygraph. I don't know whether the Agency ever 
ended up polygraphing him or not. I just don't know. 




Q I gather, then, from your testimony that you 
received no confirmation one way or the other as to 
whether the Agency itself had polygraphed this 
individual . 

A Mo. I don't recall. ^ But I re call Mr. Cave 
indicating that he thought that(^^^^Bwould be a 
reliable asset. 

Q Based upon his own personal understanding of 
the man; is that correct? 

A Yes, that's right. And just to continue for 
the record, I remember seeing the 11 July memorandum 
sometime in July. Mr. Cave, when he wrote memorandums 



UNWSW 



886 



UNStASSIFieo 



648 



1 Ilk* this, h« mad* a copy availabl* or ha actually put 

2 his own original In ny flla. 

3 Q Do you racall knowing at this mid-July period 

4 of Hakim's plans to compensata — 

5 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

6 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

7 Q In reviewing Deposition Exhibit 88, do you 

8 recall knowing at about that time, which would be about 

9 July 11, 1986, that Hakim had some plans to compensate 

10 ^^^^^Hfor his efforts In opening up the second 

11 channel? 

12 A I think there was some mention of that, but I 

13 don't recall any specifics. 

14 Q Did you have any understanding as to whether 

15 that was going to be a flat payment or a promise for 

16 (j^^^^HH/to participate in business ventures in the 

17 future? 

18 A It is the latter. As I recall, it had to do 

19 with business ventures, and I think Mr. Cave commented 
2 something along those lines. 

21 Q Do you recall receiving any Information — and 

22 let me now take you from this point, which would be July 
2 3 11, to the end of the Iran initiative, when it became 

24 exposed in November -- any point at which Mr. Hakim 

25 complained that he was unable to satisfy demands from 



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lor any other Iranian contact who had facilitated 
the opening of the second channel? 

A There was some comment along those lines, and 
can't recall who made the comment, that Mr. HaXim and 
the relationship was not that warm and 
there was some indication at one time that Kr. Hakim 
wanted to cut (^^|^^^^^Hh sort of out of being a 
participant in this activity. But I can't put a time on 
this. 

Q Do you know how that information came to your 
attention? 

A I can't recall, ^^^^^^^^ 

laybe Mr. Cave 
mentioned that there were some problems, but I can't 
recall. 

Q In September you had some direct communication 
yourself with Mr. Hakim. 

A Yea, indeed I did. 

Q Do you recall him telling you of these 
problems? 

A No, sir, he didn't, not to the best of my 
recollection. This was Labor Day weekend. It was on a 
Friday evening. I recall Colonel North calling me and 
saying that Mr. Hakim believed that there was this 
alleged diversion occurring of TOW missiles and that this 




l)NetASStf1fO 



888 



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650 



1 would cartalnly undermln* the ability of th« U.S. 

2 GovaxTunant to continua to provide an Incantlva for Tehran 

3 to deal since there were several thousand TOWs allegedly 

4 Involved In this. 

5 And I had a series of conversations that 

6 weekend and over the next several days which I summarized 

7 In a memorandum that you have, around 2 September 198 6, 

8 where the Customs and the FBI, I think, looked for 

9 Information to substantiate Mr. Hakim's allegations, and 

10 to the best of my knowledge they were never able to do 

11 so, and I siimmarlzed all of this and gave the memorandum 

12 to Colonel North. 

13 Q Indeed, and we do have that memorandum. I'm 

14 not going to ask you to repeat your testimony on that 

15 topic. As the second channel developed in September, was 

16 it your Impression that this channel promised a more real 

17 political benefit than the first channel? 

18 A I was ambivalent in September about the 

19 reliability of the second channel. 
20 
21 

^^^^^^^^HH^^^^^^^^^^^^ I guess we knew a 
bit about the Individual ,(^^^^^^^^^^^m^^B but 

24 we could not from our perspective say that this was a 

25 very solid channel. 




Iftyswo 



889 



IIKCLASSilO 



651 



1 
2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



. But as September continued, after 9 September 
Colonel North said that th is was j ust an absolutely 

reliable channel 




And when I talked to Mi". Gatts on 1 October 
about the reliability of the srcond channel I said it vas 
yet to be completely authenticated, thet we really 
couldn't say it was all that reliable, although there 
w«r« some indicators along thosa lines. 

Q Do you recall Mr. Cave's assessment at this 
time of the second channel, and let me speak now of the 
period subsequent to the meeting on September 19-2 0? 

A I Ahiriic.MJi. ^^^ .ai^^P'^®^^®"^ after the 




890 



1 

2 
3 

4 
5 

6 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



iwcyissiwD 



652 



initial Beating ^^^^^^^^^Hj I thinX Mr. Cava — I 
remambar that ha called ma, I believe the afternoon of 
the 19th, and that was a Friday — no, I guess the 20th 
was a Friday — and he talked about a joint commission 
that the Iranians had proposed, a joint commission, that 
the individual, ^^^^^aHJ^^^^^^^^^^^v was very self- 
assured. 

It was quite a responsive statement on the 
part of Mr. Cave that he felt we were into a very 
promising development in this whole effort, and I think 
in my conversations with him the following week after the 
meetings of 19-21 September that Mr. Cave felt that this 
offered a lot of promise,/ 




and he appeared to be exactly who he said ha was. 

Q Old you have an understanding as to what 
precisely this joint commission was supposed to do and 
how long its duration was intended? 

A Hall, I believe they talked about covering a 
nuabar of areas — that they would look at economic 
relations, political relations, that they were prepared 
to name their members to the commission and for the 
United States to do the same. I was surprised by the 
Iranian aggressiveness in this, but I had no idea as to 
how long it would be in existence. 



BNfitASMB 



891 



1 

2 
3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UNClASSIFe 



653 



Q . Were you awar« that during th« September 19-20 
meeting Colonel North had in fact named members to the 
commission? 

A I was aware in October that he had named some 
people to the commission. I didn't think — and I guess 
I didn't think that Colonel North in September had named 
the U.S. members. I thought this occurred in October and 
that the members were Colonel North, General Secord, I 
guess Mr. Hakim, and I guess Mr. Cave. 
But I can't recall. 




Q We will focus on the date of the naming of 
persona to the joint commission in a moment, but your 
understanding of the personnel on the commission 
included, among others. General Secord. You were aware 
at that time, of course, that General Secord was not a 
U.S. Government employee; is that right? 

A I didn't know that he was a government 
employee. I thought in a sense that he was at least a 
consultant to the NSC in order to carry out this role. 



IINIitftSSiflfD 



892 



HHaiMHilj 



654 



1 Q How did you come by that understanding, Mr. 

2 Allen? 

3 A Well, I think I want to say that that was my 

4 assumption at the time because I had, as you recall, met 

5 General Secord for the first time in late January 1986, 

6 and for some reason the fact that he was part of this 

7 enterprise -- I'm not sure I would use the term 

8 "enterprise", but this initiative — I just assumed that 

9 there might be some consulting relationship with the NSC. 

10 I never was told that. I never saw any 

11 documentation to that effect. It was probably a false 

12 assumption on my part. 

13 Q Now I'm going to show you, Mr. Allen, just for 

14 the sake of clarifying this aspect of your testimony, a 

15 document you may or may not have ever seen. I don't have 

16 a copy of it, so I won't mark it as an exhibit, but it 

17 bears the Committee identifiers N-28774 through 28780. 

18 And it contains in the middle of it a docximent which I 

19 believe the CIA has, and that is a three-page summary or 

20 four pages, excuse me, summary of the September 19-20 

21 m««tlng prepared by George Cave, who was not himself 

22 visibly listed as an author but who has confirmed that in 
2 3 fact he was the author. 

24 On the third page of this document, in 

25 paragraph six, there is a reference to joint committee. 



yueasstfifD 



893 



UNfilASSm 



655 



1 and in particular I would direct your attention to, it 

2 looks like, the third sentence of that paragraph. 

3 (Pause.) 

4 A I didn't recall that this had been stated at 

5 the time. I just had the impression that things had not 

6 gone that far, as far as this memorandum. I think I have 

7 seen it somewhere. 

8 MR. WOODCOCK: Let's go off the record for a 

9 second. 

10 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

11 MR. WOODCOCK: Let's go on the record. 

12 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

13 Q I will summarize what you just said, Mr. 

14 Allen. You've had an opportunity to briefly look at the 

15 interior memorandum which starts with the heading 

16 Secret/Sensitive, and then Subject: Rundown of visitors; 

17 Comments on 19-20 September 86. 

18 A I've seen that. 

19 Q Your testimony is you've seen that before? 

20 A I've seen the memorandum, but I've not seen 

21 th« cover. I have not seen the cover documentation. 

22 Q Thank you. Now in this immediate post- 
23 September 19-20 period do you recall any discussion 

24 either from Mr. Cave or anyone else within the CIA about 

25 the appropriateness of formally bringing the State 



BNCttSSfftED 



894 



UNCLASSIFiD 



656 



1 Department into this Iran initiative? 

2 A I recall some discussion that as this 

3 initiative proceeded and bore fruit and that there was a 

4 feeling on the part of the NSC, I assume, that the 

5 hostage matter would be resolved with this new, reliable 

6 channel — and I put "reliable" in quotes — and that it 

7 would be imperative at this time to bring in the 

8 Department of State in order to more formally set up the 

9 still-secret links with Iranian elements. 

10 I believe Mr. Cave, as I recall, was an 

11 advocate of this and he mentioned that to me in the late 

12 September time frame, if I'm correct. And we discussed 

13 it, Mr. Cave and I, and I think Mr. Cave indicated that 

14 he had advocated this. 

15 Q Did you agree with him? 

16 A Yes, sir. 

17 Q When you say that you believe he advocated it, 

18 is that to Colonel North or Admiral Poindexter? 

19 - A No. It would be my belief and my recollection 

20 as wall that this was just something that he discussed 

21 with Colonel North. 

22 Q Are you aware of a meeting involving the 

23 Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. Poindexter on 

24 September 24, 1986? 

25 A No, sir. I'm not necessarily aware of it, to 



UNCbtSSIflfO 



895 



KASffD 



657 



1 the best of my knowledge. 

2 Q The purpose of the meeting would have been to 

3 give both the Director and Admiral Poindexter a summary 

4 of the meeting that had just occurred on September 19 and 

5 20. Does that give you any further basis for a memory on 

6 that? 

7 A I know that there was a briefing of the 

8 Director. I was not a participant. But I don't 

9 specifically recall Mr. Casey and Mr. Poindexter being 

10 jointly briefed. I could well have known that and have 

11 forgotten it. 

12 Q Do you recall whether Mr. Cave ever told you 

13 that? I think your testimony was he addressed this, but 

14 let me put the question differently. Do you recall Mr. 

15 Cave ever telling you that he spoke directly face-to-face 

16 with Admiral Poindexter and advised him or emphasized to 

17 him that it was important to bring the State Department 

18 into this matter? 

19 ' A I don't recall that he told me that he talked 

20 directly to Admiral Poindexter, but I heard that he 

21 discussed the matter. Particularly after this joint 

22 commission had been proposed he had discussed it with me. 

23 He said it is time to very carefully bring the Department 

24 of State into this initiative, and I know that he 

25 discussed it with Colonel North, but I cannot testify 



DNetitSSIFlEO 



896 



mmmn 



658 



1 that h« talked to Admiral Polndexter. 

2 Q Wara you aware — and this would be in the 

3 same time frame, the immediate post-September 19-20 time 

4 frame — of any effort on the part of Lieutenant Colonel 

5 North to narrow the field of those who were aware of the 

6 second channel? 

7 A I sensed that something might be under way 

8 along those lines, but I never had any direct evidence. 

9 No one ever spoke to me specifically about it. I have 

10 heard that that is the case, that (^^^^^^BH and Z were 

11 to be excluded from the initiative. 

12 Q So you had an understanding that you yourself 
13 

14 A Hall, I had a sense that that might be under 

15 way, and I can't remember why. But during the Tower 

16 Commission report the Tower Commission investigators 

17 indicated they had documentation that stated that ( 

18 ^^^^^^^and I should be excluded. 

19 Q Now given that you really were the liaison to 

20 th« intelligence community for this initiative — 

21 A Yes, sir. 

22 Q — how does it stand that you would be 

23 excluded from this kind of an undertaking? 

24 A Well, I didn't have any direct knowledge at 
25 



897 



UNCUS»S 



659 



1 intelligence which would help you measure progress or 

2 evaluate the bona fides of the foreign nationals involved 

3 in this initiative. You would need intelligence. So it 

4 would not make good sense. 

5 Q So Colonel North never came to you and said it 

6 was time to restrict you out of the program? 

7 A No, he never raised it directly with me, to my 

8 knowledge or to my recollection. I know I would remember 

9 that very distinctly. I continued the collection. 

10 Q I gather from your testimony you first became 

11 aware of this when you appeared before the Tower 

12 Commission; is that correct? 

13 A Yes. But, and I don't want to overstate it, 

14 there was a sense, I think in the October time frame, 

15 that there was great concern about the security of the 

16 initiative. Colonel North was constantly worried over 

17 that. I was worried over it, too. But I was at that 

18 time very worried over the operational security. 

19 Q Your concern was arising largely from the 

20 Ghorbanifar difficulties; is that correct? 

21 A Yes, and the fact that the unexplained 

22 pricing, the fact that something was awry in the pricing 

23 issue. But yes. Colonel North was constantly reiterating 

24 the security of the program. But I came very directly, 

25 and I guess knowledgeable from the investigators at the 



mmssm 



82-688 O-88-30 



898 



uNcyisstfe 



660 



1 Tov«r Commission, who stated — they did not show m« any 

2 documentation, but they stated that there was 

3 documentation — that they had direct Information that 

4 Colonel North wished to exclude^^^^^^^^H^M)and 

5 myself from the Initiative In the fall of 1986. 

6 Q Now I need to sharpen that question so that I 

7 understand whether in the fall of '86 you understood when 

8 you realized that Colonel North had his own operational 

9 security concerns, did you also understand that you were 

10 part of his concern about operational security? 

11 A I can't attest to that directly. I can only 

12 say that there was heightened concern about the security. 

13 Q Which affected you in any way? 

14 A Well, it did not in a sense, because I knew of 

15 impending meetings. Mr. Cave and I continued to work 

16 every day. I worked on a thousand other things and Mr. 

17 Cave worked directly on this project. And no way did I 
13 feel that if I needed information on the initiative I 
19 could always ask Mr. Cave and he would always be very 

2 op«n to what was going on. 

21 But I am just saying that there was a 

22 heightened sense of worry and concern on the part of 

2 3 Colonel North in the October time fraune. But I will not, 

24 I cannot testify that I was aware that he had explicitly 

25 planned to exclude me from the initiative. 



ONCtlBSinED 



899 



llf^£UiSSIfHf 



661 



1 Q And I gather can you testify as to whether you 

2 had any intuitive feeling that you were being restricted? 

3 A No, I can't testify to that. 

4 Q So whatever those documents that the Tower 

5 Commission had had said, you saw no tangible 

6 manifestation of that attempt during that period of time, 

7 the late September-October period? 

8 A No. I saw no specific, direct effort on the 

9 part of Colonel North, nor did he ask Mr. Casey to 

10 restrict me from the initiative. 

11 Q Do you recall whether an effort was made to 

12 bring medical supplies as part of the U.S. offering to 

13 Iran along with arms in the fall of '86? 

14 A Yes, sir. 

15 Q What do you recall about that? 

16 A I recall that in the fall of 1986 there were— 

17 ideas ceune out of either the NSC or from some other 

18 source that it would be good to show that non-lethal 

19 material was included in the shipments and that I believe 
2 tha Agency was asked to secure some medical supplies, 

21 $40,000 worth of medical supplies, and there would be a 

22 pallet of medical supplies, too, that would go in to 

23 Israel and then on into Tehran with one of the shipments. 

24 And I can't precisely recall now which 

2 5 shipment was to include those medical supplies. I think 



IJNCttS«D 



900 



rouble getting tne iifetftCa 



662 



1 they had trouble getting the Tirewfcal supplies onto the 

2 plane and into Tehran. I know that the Agency helped 

3 gather or procure the medical supplies. 

4 Q Was it your understanding the Agency paid for 

5 these medical supplies out of its own funds? 

6 A I don't know. 

7 Q Let me put the question differently and see if 

8 this elicits a recollection. Do you recall whether the 

9 monies for the medical supplies would have come from 

10 monies that were deemed as excess following the August 3 

11 delivery of HAWK parts? 

12 A It was my understanding that the Agency would 

13 be compensated for those medical supplies and they would 

14 be compensated from one of the transactions, and it could 

15 have been the HAWK. I believe that, like the rest of the 

16 initiative, it was my understanding, and I don't know 

17 that I am completely accurate in this, that the Agency 

18 would not pay for any of these materials, whether they be 

19 lethal or non-lethal, but funding had to be found for 

20 thaa and, as I recall, it was a nominal amount. $40,000 

21 is th« figure that comes to my mind, and one pallet. 

22 Q Let me throw out alternative figures just to 

23 see if they affect your recollection at all — about 

24 three pallets at $180,000. 

25 A I don't think I ever heard that much. I 



iiNtttsstnto 



901 



UNCLASme 



663 



1 raoambcr th« $40,000. That is oora than I recall being 

2 involved. That is substantially more. 

3 Q Do you recall whether these medical supplies 

4 were in any way represented as being handled by or 

5 derived from any of Albert Hakim's business organizations 

6 — and when I say "represented", I mean represented to 

7 the Iranians? 

8 A I don't recall at the time. There are other 

9 details about the medical supplies that I know I knew at 

10 the time, but I cannot recall that. Z may recall it 

11 sometime, but at this time I just can't recall. 

12 Q Let me pull two documents together and see if 

13 they assist in your recollection at all. The first is 

14 what has been marked as Exhibit 88 and the second is an 

15 18-page single-spaced summary of the September 19-20 

16 meeting taken from the notes of General Secord, who, as 

17 this event would indicate, is a copious notetaker. 

18 The first document. Exhibit 88, states in 

19 paragraph three that Hakia spent a lot of time explaining 

20 ^^^^^^^H that he wanted to set up some legitimate 

21 business with Iran for cover purposes. He was willing to 

22 sell medicinals at cost or on a credit basis with up to a 
2 3 year to. pay if he could get some benefit out of it. 

24 Now that's statement number one. The second 

2 5 is Korth is the narrator in the meeting — and this is 



UNftASSIftED 



902 



1 

2 
3 
4 

5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 



14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 



21 
22 
23 
24 



WiCL^lEe 



664 



the meeting on Septen^ber 19-20 - and the statement goes 
as follows: One reason why the President agreed to the 
TOWS and HAWK parts which have been shipped so far is 
because they are defensive, help against Iraq and the 
Soviets as well. Again, I say don't think too small. 
For example, we have offered to send medical supplies 
through Albert Hakim's organization. He believed that 
medical supplies could be more valuable perhaps than all 
the military ammunition we could send. 

Talcing those two statements together, do those 
give you any further definition to your memory about the 
medical supplies and Albert HaKim's represented role with 

13 respect to them? 

A I'm afraid it doesn't. I remember reading 
paragraph three in the 11 July 86 memorandum, and, of 
course, I have never seen the lengthy NSC document. I'^n 
sorry. I recall there was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing 
about the medicines, that I felt at the time it was only 
on. pallet, and substantially less cost than what is 

20 indicated there. 

And clearly I have read this memorandum, but 
it did not stick in my mind that Mr. Hakim was going to 
do the procurement and was going to do actually the 
financial transactions on the medicines. I'm sorry. I 



25 just can't recall 



uKWsm 



903 



UNCIASSMD 



665 



1 Q Do you know whether the medical supplies ever 

2 actually made It to Iran? 

3 A I thought some medical supplies did go in, as 

4 I recall, in one of the shipments in October. That was 

5 my understanding. 

6 Q Do you know where you gained that 

7 understanding? 

8 AX believe in conversati ons with Mr. Cave and 
probably ^^^^^^^^B of thel^^^^^^H Division. 

10 also discussing the medical supplies probably with 

11 Colonel Earl at one point. I just can't recall. I 

12 thought that at least one pallet of medical supplies went 

13 into Iran. That has been my understanding. I may be in 

14 error in that. I just have to testify that that was my 

15 thoughts at the time. 

16 Q Let me shift on to another topic. Do you 

17 recall Mr. Cave ever telling you that in his meetings 

18 with the Iranians in the fall of 1986 they advised him 

19 that they had only recently determined who Robert 

20 McFarlane and — 

21 A Yes, absolutely. That struck me. I was 

22 stunned. That was the 19-20 September meeting, 1986, 
vher^J^HH|^^^^^^ he said that they didn't know 

24 who Mr. McFarlane was and they later discovered that he 

25 really was a very significant figure. 



mtmm\i 



904 



UNCLASSn 



666 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



Q And they also did not )cnov who Colonel North 
was; does that square with your recollection? 
A That's absolutely the case. 




905 



IINCUSSIflEO 



I (UiJL, ^^7 






UNCLASSIREO 



906 



1 

2 

3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
S 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




Q L«t B« bring you back to November 23, 1985. 

A Yes, sir. 

Q You have testified that on that day you were 
at CIA headquarters. 

A Yes, Z was. 

Q Your office Is on the seventh floor. Has It 
there at that time, too? 

A My office at that time was in ^^^H 



ONCBSstre 



907 



1 

2 
3 
4 

5 
6 

7 
8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 






669 



Q And whera in relation to your office was Mr. 
Clarridge's office? 

A It was directly down two flights, almost 
beneath my office two flights. 

Q Where is Mr. Juchniewicz in relation to you? 

A Mr. Juchniewicz at that time was up next to 
the Director's office on the seventh floor, 7D corridor. 

Q And you were assisting Mr. Clarridge, I 
gather, at that time by analyzing intelligence for him; 
is that correct? 

A I wasn't. What I did was I came into the 
office at the request of Colonel North and Colonel North_ 
indicated that I should show Mr. Clarridge' 




colonel North stated that this would 
demonstrate to Mr. Clarridge the legitimacy of his 
initiitive -- and I'm paraphrasing Colonel North -- but 
that this was important that Mr. Clarridge see these 




908 



1 

2 
3 
4 

5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



UNfUSSII^D 



670 



tiin«; is that correct? 

A Colonel North arrived an hour or an hour and a 
half after I arrived. 

Q Did you have any assistant with you? 

A I did not have an assistant. I had another 
senior official who came with me. 

Q And that was 

A 

Q What was his role? 

A 





Q And what was he doing specifically on that 



day? 



A Well,^^H— and I don't guess I've testified 
up here, but he is a longtime friend of 




ind so he was a loncptime friend of Colonel 
North. And when Benjamin Heir was released, when I ran 
out of steeuB that weekend, h« can* in and helped ne and 
worked with Colonel North on all the activities relating 
to arranging for the debriefing of Benjamin Weir. And so 
he was aware of the initiative. 



WNttffiSW 



909 



ONcussra 



671 



1 Q So what was his duty on that day? How was he 

2 helping? 

3 A I recall we came down and at that stage Mr. 

4 Clarridga Indicated there would be a flight into Tehran 

5 and that I believe the only thing that I recall |||||^l 

6 ^^^^^^^By^id that day, he obtained sone maps. He 

7 obtained some very excellent maps of ^H^^^^^Vjthe 

8 Middle East so that Mr. Clarridge could look at flight 

9 routes . 

10 I don't recall that he did anything else. I 

11 recall the guards complained that Colonel North's car was 

12 sitting at the south loading dock. Ha went out and moved 

13 the car for Colonel North. But other than that I don't 

14 recall that he did anything significant. 

15 Q Now were you in Mr. Clarridge 's office most of 

16 the time or part of the time on Saturday? 

17 A Off and on for about five hours. 

18 Q And would that period span from roughly 10:00- 

19 10:30 until 2:00 or 3:00? 

20 A Well, about 2:30 because I went to a football 

21 game that afternoon. Herndon High School was playing for 

22 the regional championships against T. C. Woodson, and 

23 Colonel North wanted to go to the game, too, but he 

24 stayed on and I went on to the game and got there at 

25 half time. So I must have been there about five hours. 



yNeiissm 



910 



1 

2 
3 

4 
5 

6 

7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



BNCtASSlflffi'' 



672 



Q With testimony like that you raally are going 
to persuade us that you do have another life. 

A That is correct, sir. 

Q Do you recall in addition to Mr. Clarridge and 
I and yourself anyone else being present in 
Mr. Clarridge 's office on that Saturday? 

A Ves. ^^^^^^^^^^H) ^ believe, was there off 
and on. 




an excellent man. 

Q Now I believe you've already testified and I 
don't want to misconstrue your testimony, but my 
recollection is that you did not see cable traffic on 
that day; is that true? 

A I didn't rdad C2ibl« traffic, but I Scnew that 

C2ibles were being sent 

)and I 

knew generally at times some of what was being contained. 
X don't recall reading the cables. 

Mr. Clarridge, he didn't keep them from me, 
but when I was there they were talking about getting a 
flight clearance for a 747, an Israeli 747 coming out of 
Tel Aviv and it flew halfway over the Med and the 
clearance could not be obtained^ 
as I recall, and the plane turned around and went back to 




iWeUSSIFifD 



911 



1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 




673 

T«l Aviv. 

Q Do you recall Mr. Clarridge either going to 
see Mr. Juchniewicz or vice versa during this period? 

A I don't recall that at all. But I was in and 
out. I went up to my own office because Colonel North 
was in contact with an individual Mr. Copp, whom I later 
learned was General Secord, 




I was in and out, but off and on I 
was there for five hours probably. 

Q It has cone to our attention through testimony 
of other witnesses, in particulai 

I that on November 23 he sent a ciible summarizing a 
conversation that he had had with Mr. Copp, now )tnown to 
b« General Secord. In that conversation General Secord 
related to him that the cargo aboard the planes or the 
plane heading towards |^^mP was HAWK missiles. 

Do you recall any discussion of the arrival of 
a cable with that kind of information coming in on the 
23 rd? 

A No, I don't. But I want to maXe certain that 
I understand your question. You indicated that there was 
a cable saying that the plane coming into\^^^^H would 
have HAWK missiles on it? 

Q Correct 



\1SQISSW 



912 



1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 



UNCLASSn 



674 



A I don't recall a cable of that nature, nor do 
I recall any conversations by Mr. Clarridge or Colonel 
North to that effect. 

Q No one brought that cable to your attention, 

then; is that correct? 

A That is correct. I have testified Colonel 
North asserted several times that oil-drilling equipment 
was involved. I found that, as I have testified, very 
cur i ousW^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B^H^^^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^H 
^^^^E^^^MfHI^^^^Wit inconceivable, one 
would think that this initiative had involved arms in the 
past. 




But I had no evidence that it was not oil- 
drilling equipment. I recall no cable. I never read any 



«NettS«D 



913 



1 

2 

3 
4 

5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 



mm 



cabl« to that effect 



Mfj^^ 



675 



Q Did you share your suspicion at the time with 
Mr. Clarridge? I'm saying at the time on November 23? 

A I don't recall saying that. I don't recall 
sharing that, no. 

Q Do you recall Mr. McMahon being there at all? 

A No. I do not recall seeing Mr. McMahon on 
that Saturday. 

Q Given that you had a suspicion that arms might 
be Involved and you were aware that Iran was also 
involved, would it not have been prudent to bring this to 
the attention of the DO personnel? 

A Well, I assumed Mr. Clarridge had done that 
through the ranks. Mr. Clarridge is a very senior 
official. 

Q But I gather you assumed he )cnew? 

A I assumed that if there was anything, any 
aberrations involved in this NSC request and CIA support 
of this request that he would have the reason, the logic 
to bring this to the attention of more senior officials. 
And I did not question this. 




I didn't occur to me 
that he would not get all of the appropriate clearances 



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at av^ry level. 

Q But he can only report what he knows; correct? 

A That Is correct. 

Q So what I'm driving at is was it your 
impression that he either }uiew or suspected as well that 
this shipment involved arms? 

A I couldn't help but believe that he suspected 
that. 




Q But you don't recall actually confirming with 
him your suspicion? 

A I recall that Colonel North arrived and 
Colonel North asserted that it was oil-drilling 
equipment. He placed calls both, in our presence, to the 
National Security Advisor and the Deputy National 
Security Advisor and it seemed to me that — and he 
placed thea through White House signals, so he wasn't 
talking out there to anyone other than the National 
Security Advisor and the Deputy National Security 
Advisor. I am very confident of that. 

So it seemed to me that whatever was occurring 
that there was a very strong authorization at the highest 
level of the U.S. Government, and that I assumed that Mr. 



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1 Clarridge had cleared this through his hierarchy. I 

2 believe that Mr. Juchniewicz was the Acting Director of 

3 Operations at the time. 

4 Q Let me go back and see if I can summarize. 

5 You don't recall directly sharing with Mr. Clarridge your 

6 suspicions that perhaps this was really arms, and I 

7 gather that the reason that you feel you didn't do that 

8 was because you assumed he already knew. 

9 A Well, I would assume that he would also have 

10 suspicions. 

11 Q Right. In other words, let me put this 

12 question to you and see if this is correct. I'm talking 

13 about your own habit. At this point, if you had detected 

14 that Mr. Clarridge did not know what you suspected or did 

15 not suspect what you suspected, would it have been your 

16 practice to tell him that you suspected that arms might 

17 be on this flight? 

18 MS. MC GINN: I object to the form of the 

19 question. If you understand it, you can answer it. 

20 MR. WOODCOCK: No. Excuse me. Let m^ explain 

21 what I'm doing here. Let me go off the record. 

22 (A discussion was held off the record.) 

23 BY MR. WOODCOCK: (Resuming) 

24 Q Mr. Allen, bringing you back again to November 

25 23, you have testified that you yourself suspected that 




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there were arms aboard this pla