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100th Congress — 1st Session • January 6-December 22, 1987
Senate Report
No. 216
IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION
APPENDIX B, VOLUME 15
DEPOSITIONS
United States Congressional Serial Set
Serial Number 13756
United States Government Printing Office
Washington : 1989
Union Calendar No. 277
100th Congress, 1st Session
S. Rcpt. No. 100-216 H. Rcpt. No. 100-433
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the
Iran-Contra Affair
Appendix B: Volume 15
Depositions
Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman,
Senate Select Committee
Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman,
House Select Committee
U.S. Senate Select Committee U.S. House of Representatives
On Secret Military Assistance to Iran Select Committee to Investigate
And the Nicaraguan Opposition Covert Arms Transactions with Iran
November 13, 1987. -Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed.
November 17. 1987. -Ordered to be printed.
Washington : 1988
DANItl It INOVT^E HAWAII CMAJRMAN
SAU NOtaN GIOnC'A
^AUl 1 SAMtANtS MAMTLAMD
xOWtll t H<ri'N ALAIAUA
DAVID L lOWN OKLAHOMA
*^SHi«t vic( Chairman
JAMIS* M<CLU«U IDAHO
OOOlN C HATCH UIAH
WHUAMS COHIN MAINE
^AUi S tPieiE J« VIRGINIA
MARR A IIINICI »A0l BARtADOnO
IXICUTIVI ASSISTANT Dt^uTY Cm£» COuNStL
TO tH( CHiff COUNStl
CH AIBMiChT ja
OANItL MNN
JAMIS t UnAN
ASSOCIATE COUNSELS
JOH P KSKER
RiCHAAO 0 PARRT
john d sax on
terrt a smiljanicm
Timothy c woodcock
United States 3oiate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
WASHINGTON. DC 20510-6480
March 1, 1988
Honorable John C. Stennis
President pro tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to
Senate Resolution 23, Appendix B to the final Report of the
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes
of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become
available.
Sincerely,
i/cui^
Warren B. Rudman V^^
Vice Chairman
III
Lfl H hamhtdm iiiicuana chairman
OAMTI • lASCill llOKOA Vict
THOMAS S 'out WASMINCrON
rftfMW KOOINO 11 Nfwjtnsiv
MCs laoocs TIUS
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lis AS^N WISCONSIN
lOAAROf eOLANO UASSACNUSETIS
10 JtNKiNS C£OIW,tA
JOHN W NrtlDS jn CHItf COUNSEL
W Nlll fCClfSTON OEfUTT CHIlf COUNSEL
CASir WillER ST*« WRECTOIt
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN
UNITED STATES CAPITOL
WASHINGTON. DC 20515
(202) 225-7902
Diet cmsfy SVTOMING
WM S BROOMflflO MICHIGAN
HENflT J H»OI aiiNOIS
JIM COuntER NEW .JERSEr
eui McCoiiuM Florida
M'CHAEl DlWINE OHIO
THOMAS n SMEETQN MINORITY STA'I OIRECTOK
GEORGE VAN CI Eve CHItF MINOR'TY COUNSEL
MCHARD lEON OfPUTT CHIEF MINORITY COUNSEL
March 1, 1988
The Honorable Jim Wright
Speaker of the House
U. S. Capitol
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr . Speaker :
Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and
330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st
Session, I transmit herewith Appendix B to the Report of the
Conqressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,
House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session.
Appendix B consists of the depositions taken by the
Select Committees during the investigation. The contents of
Appendix B have been declassified fq,p-^f elease to the public.
yours ,
Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman
United States Senate
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance
To Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition
Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii, Chairman
Warren Rudman, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman
George J. Mitchell, Maine
Sam Nunn, Georgia
Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland
Howell T. Heflin, Alabama
David L. Boren, Oklahoma
James A. McClure, Idaho
Orrin G. Hatch, Utah
William S. Cohen, Maine
Paul S. Trible, Jr., Virginia
Arthur L. Liman
Chief Counsel
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro
Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel
To the Chief Counsel
Mary Jane Checchi
Executive Director
Lance I. Morgan
Press Officer
VI
United States House of Representatives
Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms
Transactions with Iran
Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana, Chairman
Dante B. Fascell, Florida, Vice Chairman
Thomas S. Foley, Washington
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., New Jersey
Jack Brooks, Texas
Louis Stokes, Ohio
Les Aspin, Wisconsin
Edward P. Boland, Massachusetts
Ed Jenkins, Georgia
Dick Cheney, Wyoming, Ranking Republican
Wm. S. Broomfield, Michigan
Henry J. Hyde, Illinois
Jim Courter, New Jersey
Bill McCollum, Florida
Michael DeWine, Ohio
John W. Nields. Jr.
Chief Counsel
W. Neil Eggleston
Deputy Chief Counsel
Kevin C. Miller
Staff Director
Thomas R. Smeeton
Minority Staff Director
George W. Van Cleve
Chief Minority Counsel
Richard J. Leon
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel
VII
United States Senate
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to
Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition
Arthur L. Liman
Chief Counsel
Mark A. Belnick Paul Barbadoro
Executive Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel
to the Chief Counsel
Mary Jane Checchi
Executive Director
Lance I. Morgan
Press Officer
Associate Counsels
C. H. Albright, Jr.
Daniel Finn
C. H. Holmes
James E. Kaplan
Charles M. Ken-
Joel P. Lisker
W. T. McGough, Jr.
Richard D. Parry
John D. Saxon
Terry A. Smiljanich
Timothy C. Woodcock
Committee Staff
Assistant Counsels
Legal Counsel
Intelligence /Foreign
Policy Analysts
Investigators
Press Assistant
General Accounting
Office Detailees
Security Officer
Security Assistants
Chief Clerk
Deputy Chief Clerk
Steven D. Arkin*
Isabel K. McGinty
John R. Monsky
Victoria F. Nourse
Philip Bobbitt
Rand H. Fishbein
Thomas Polgar
Lawrence R.
Embrey, Sr.
David E. Faulkner
Henry J. Flynn
Samuel Hirsch
John J. Cronin
Olga E. Johnson
John C. Martin
Melinda Suddes*
Robert Wagner
Louis H. Zanardi
Benjamin C.
Marshall
Georgiana
Badovinac
David Carty
Kim Lasater
Scott R. Thompson
Judith M. Keating*
Scott R. Ferguson
Staff Assistants
Administrative Staff
Secretaries
Receptionist
Computer Center
Detailee
John K. Appleby
Ruth Balin
Robert E. Esler
Ken Foster*
Martin H. Garvey
Rachel D. Kaganoff*
Craig L. Keller
Hawley K.
Manwarring
Stephen G. Miller
Jennie L. Pickford*
Michael A. Ray nor
Joseph D.
Smallwood*
Kristin K. Trenholm
Thomas E. Tremble
Bruce Vaughn
Laura J. Ison
Hilary Phillips
Winifred A. Williams*
Nancy S. Durflinger
Shari D. Jenifer
Kathryn A. Momot
Cindy Pearson
Debra S. Sheffield*
Ramona H. Green
Preston Sweet
VIII
Committee Members' Designated Liaison
Senator Inouye
Senator Rudman
Senator Mitchell
Senator Nunn
Senator Sarbanes
Senator Heflin
Peter Simons
William V. Cowan
Thomas C. Polgar
Richard H.
Arenberg
Eieanore Hill
Jeffrey H. Smith
Frederick Millhiser
Thomas J. Young
Senator Boren
Senator McClure
Senator Hatch
Senator Cohen
Senator Trible
Sven Holmes
Blythe Thomas
Jack Gerard
Dee V. Benson
James G. Phillips
James Dykstra
L. Britt Snider
Richard Cullen
Part Time*
Assistant Counsel
Hearings Coordinator
Staff Assistants
Interns
Peter V. Letsou
Joan M. Ansheles
Edward P.
Flaherty, Jr.
Barbara H. Hummell
David G. Wiencek
Nona Balaban
Edward E.
Eldridge, III
Elizabeth J. Glennie
Stephen A. Higginson
Laura T. Kunian
Julia F. Kogan
Catherine L. Udell
Document Analyst
Historian
Volunteers
Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt
Edward L. Keenan
Lewis Liman
Catherine Roe
Susan Walsh
*The staff member was not with the Select Committee when the Report was filed but had, during
the life of the Committee, provided services.
IX
United States House of Representatives
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran
Majority Staff
Special Deputy
Chief Counsel
Staff Counsels
Press Liaison
Chief Clerk
Assistant Clerk
Research Director
Research Assistants
John W. Nields, Jr.
Chief Counsel
W. Neil Eggleston
Deputy Chief Counsel
Kevin C. Miller
Staff Director
Charles Tiefer
Kenneth M. Ballen
Patrick J. Carome
V. Thomas
Fryman, Jr.
Pamela J.
Naughton
Joseph P. Saba
Robert J. Havel
Ellen P. Rayner
Debra M. Cabral
Louis Fisher
Christine C.
Birmann
Julius M.
Genachowski
Ruth D. Harvey
James E. Rosenthal
Systems
Administrator
Systems
Programmer/
Analysts
Executive Assistant
Staff Assistants
Catherine L.
Zimmer
Charles G. Ratcliff
Stephen M.
Rosenthal
Elizabeth S. Wright
Bonnie J. Brown
Christina Kalbouss
Sandra L. Koehler
Jan L. Suter
Katherine E. Urban
Kristine Willie
Mary K. Yount
Minority Staff
Associate Minority
Counsel
Assistant Minority
Counsel
Minority Research
Director
Thomas R. Smeeton
Minority Staff Director
George W. Van Cleve
Chief Minority Counsel
Richard J. Leon
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel
Robert W.
Genzman
Kenneth R. Buck
Bruce E. Fein
Minority Staff
Editor/Writer
Minority Executive
Assistant
Minority Staff
Assistant
Michael J. Malbin
Molly W. Tully
Margaret A.
Dillenburg
Committee Staff
Investigators
Director of Security
Robert A.
Bermingham
James J. Black
Thomas N.
Ciehanski
William A. Davis,
III
Clark B. Hall
Allan E. Hobron
Roger L. Kreuzer
Donald Remstein
Jack W. Taylor
Timothy E. Tray lor
Bobby E. Pope
Security Officers
Editor
Deputy Editor
Associate Editor
Production Editor
Hearing Editors
Printing Clerk
Rafael Luna, Jr.
Theresa M. Martin
Milagros Martinez
Clayton C. Miller
Angel R. Torres
Joseph Foote
Lisa L. Berger
Nina Graybill
Mary J. Scroggins
David L. White
Stephen G. Regan
G. R. Beckett
Associate Staff
Representative
Hamilton
Representative
Fascell
Representative
Foley
Representative
Rodino
Representative
Brooks
Representative
Stokes
Representative
Aspin
Michael H.
Van Dusen
Christopher Kojm
R. Spencer Oliver
Bert D. Hammond
Victor Zangla
Heather S. Foley
Werner W. Brandt
M. Elaine Mielke
James J.
Schweitzer
William M. Jones
Michael J. O'Neil
Richard M. Giza
Richard E. Clark
Warren L. Nelson
Representative
Boland
Representative
Jenkins
Representative
Broomfield
Representative
Hyde
Representative
Courter
Representative
McCollum
Representative
DeWine
General Counsel to
the Clerk
Michael W. Sheehy
Robert H. Brink
Steven K. Berry
David S. Addington
Diane S. Doman
Dennis E. Teti
Tina L. Westby
Nicholas P. Wise
Steven R. Ross
XI
Contents
Volume 15
Preface XXI
Koch, Noel C 1
Kuykendall, Dan H 239
Langton, William G 479
Lawn, John C 731
Leachman, Chris J., Jr 871
Ledeen, Michael A 941
Depositions
Volume 1
Airline Proprietary Project Officer.
Alvarez, Francisco J.
Allen, Charles.
Arcos, Cresencio.
Volume 2
Armitage. Richard.
Artiano, Martin L.
Associate DDO (CIA).
Baker, James A., III.
Barbules, Lt. Gen. Peter.
Bamett, Ana.
Bartlett, Linda June.
Bastian, James H.
Brady, Nicholas F.
Brown, Arthur E., Jr.
Volume 3
Byrne, Phyllis M.
Calero, Adolfo.
Castillo, Tomas ("W").
Cave, George W.
C/CATF.
Volume 4
Channell, Carl R.
Chapman, John R. (With Billy Ray Reyer).
Chatham, Benjamin P.
CIA Air Branch Chief.
CIA Air Branch Deputy Chief.
CIA Air Branch Subordinate.
CIA Chief.
CIA Communicator.
CIA Identity "A".
XV
Volume 5
CIA Officer.
Clagett. C. Thomas, Jr.
Clark, Alfred (With Gregory Zink).
Clarke, George.
Clarridge, Dewey R.
Cline, Ray S.
C/NE.
Cohen, Harold G.
Volume 6
Collier, George E.
Cole, Gary.
Communications Officer Headquarters, CIA.
Conrad, Daniel L.
Volume 7
Cooper, Charles J.
Coors, Joseph.
Corbin, Joan.
Corr, Edwin G.
Coward, John C.
Coy, Craig R
Crawford, Iain T.R.
Crawford, Susan.
Crowe, Adm. William J.
Currier, Kevin W.
DCM, Country 15.
DEA Agent 1.
DEA Agent 2.
DEA Agent 3.
deGraffenreid, Kenneth,
de la Torre, Hugo.
Deputy Chief "DC".
Duemling, Robert W.
DIA Major.
Dietel, J. Edwin.
Dowling, Father Thomas.
Dutton, Robert C.
Earl, Robert.
Volume 8
Volume 9
XVI
Farber, Jacob.
Feldman, Jeffrey.
Fischer, David C.
Floor. Emanuel A.
Former CIA Officer.
Fraser, Donald.
Fraser, Edie.
Fuller, Craig L.
Volume 10
Volume 11
Furmark, Roy.
Gadd, Richard.
Gaffney, Henry.
Gaffney, Henry (With Glenn A.
Galvin, Gen. John R.
Gantt, Florence.
Garwood, Ellen Clayton.
Cast, Lt. Gen. Philip C.
Gates, Robert M.
Glanz, Anne.
Rudd).
Volume 12
George, Clair.
Godard, Ronald D.
Godson, Roy S.
Golden, William.
Gomez, Francis D.
Goodman, Adam.
Gorman, Paul F.
Graham, Daniel O.
Gregg, Donald P.
Gregorie, Richard D.
Guillen, Adriana.
Hakim, Albert.
Hall, Wilma.
Hasenfus, Eugene.
Hirtle, Jonathan J.
Hooper, Bruce.
Volume 13
Volume 14
XVII
Hunt, Nelson Bunker.
Ikle, Fred C.
Jensen, D. Lowell.
Juchniewicz, Edward S.
Kagan, Robert W.
Keel, Alton G.
Kellner, Leon B.
Kelly, John H.
Kiszynski, George.
Koch, Noel C.
Kuykendall, Dan H.
Langton, William G.
Lawn, John C.
Leachman, Chris J., Jr.
Ledeen, Michael A.
Lei want, David O.
Lilac, Robert H.
Lincoln, Col. James B.
Littledale, Krishna S.
McDonald, John William.
McFarlane, Robert C.
McKay, Lt. Col. John C.
McLaughlin, Jane E.
McMahon, John N.
McMahon, Stephen.
McNeil, Frank.
Makowka, Bernard.
Marostica, Don.
Marsh, John.
Mason, Robert H.
Meese, Edwin IIL
Melton, Richard H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Meo, Philip H.
Miller, Arthur J.
Miller, Henry S.
Miller, Johnathan.
Volume 15
Volume 16
Volume 17
Volume 18
XVIII
Volume 19
Miller, Richard R.
Motley, Langhorne A.
Mulligan, David R
Nagy, Alex G.
Napier, Shirley A.
Newington, Barbara.
North, Oliver L.
O'Boyle, William B.
Osborne, Duncan.
Owen, Robert W.
Pena, Richard.
Pickering, Thomas.
Poindexter, John M.
Posey, Thomas V.
Powell, Gen. Colin L.
Price, Charles H., II.
Proprietary Manager.
Proprietary Pilot.
Radzimski, James R.
Ramsey, John W.
Ransom, David M.
Volume 20
Volume 21
Volume 22
Raymond, Walter, Jr.
Regan, Donald T.
Reich, Otto J.
Revell, Oliver B.
Reyer, Billy Ray (See John Chapman).
Reynolds, William B.
Volume 23
Richard, Mark M.
Richardson, John, Jr.
Robelo, Alfonso.
Robinette, Glenn A.
Rodriguez, Felix I.
Roseman, David.
XIX
Rosenblatt, William.
Royer, Larry.
Rudd, Glenn A.
Rudd, Glenn A. (See Henry Gaffney).
Rugg, John J.
Russo, Vincent M.
Sanchez, Nestor.
Scharf, Lawrence.
Schweitzer, Robert :
Sciaroni, Bretton G.
Secord, Richard V.
Shackley, Theodore G.
Sigur, Gaston J.
Simpson, Major C.
Sinclair, Thomas C.
Singlaub, John K.
Slease, Clyde H., IIL
Smith, Clifton.
Sofaer, Abraham D.
Steele, Col. James J.
Taft, William H., IV.
Tashiro, Jack T.
Teicher, Howard.
Thompson, Paul.
Tillman, Jacqueline.
Volume 24
Volume 25
Volume 26
Volume 27
Thurman, Gen. Maxwell.
Trott, Stephen S.
Tull, James L.
Vessey, John.
Walker, William G.
Watson, Samuel J., IIL
Weinberger, Caspar.
Weld, William.
Wickham, John.
Zink, Gregory (See Alfred Clark).
XX
Preface
The House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran
and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, under authority contained in the resolutions establishing
them (H. Res. 12 and S. Res. 23, respectively), deposed approximately 290
individuals over the course of their 10-month joint investigation.
The use of depositions enabled the Select Committees to take sworn responses
to specific interrogatories, and thereby to obtain information under oath for the
written record and develop lines of inquiry for the public hearings.
Select Committees Members and staff counsel, including House minority
counsel, determined who would be deposed, then sought subpoenas from the
Chairmen of the Select Committees, when appropriate, to compel the individuals
to appear in nonpublic sessions for questioning under oath. Many deponents
received separate subpoenas ordering them to produce certain written documents.
Members and staff traveled throughout the United States and abroad to meet
with deponents. All depositions were stenographically reported or tape-recorded
and later transcribed and duly authenticated. Deponents had the right to review
their statements after transcription and to suggest factual and technical correc-
tions to the Select Committees.
At the depositions, deponents could assert their fifth amendment privilege
to avoid self-incrimination by refusing to answer specific questions. They were
also entitled to legal representation. Most Federal Government deponents were
represented by lawyers from their agency; the majority of private individuals
retained their own counsel.
The Select Committees, after obtaining the requisite court orders, granted
limited or "use" immunity to about 20 deponents. Such immunity means that,
while a deposed individual could no longer invoke the fifth amendment to avoid
answering a question, his or her compelled responses— or leads or collateral
evidence based on those responses— could not be used in any subsequent criminal
prosecution of that individual, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the court order.
An executive branch Declassification Committee, located in the White House,
assisted the Committee by reviewing each page of deposition transcript and some
exhibits and identifying classified matter relating to national security. Some
depositions were not reviewed or could not be declassified for security reasons.
In addition, members of the House Select Committee staff corrected obvious
typographical errors by hand and deleted personal and proprietary information
not considered germane to the investigation.
In these Depositions volumes, some of the deposition transcripts are follow-
ed by exhibits. The exhibits -documentary evidence- were developed by Select
Committees' staff in the course of the Select Conmiittees' investigation or were
provided by the deponent in response to a subpoena. In some cases, where the
number of exhibits was very large, the House Select Committee staff chose for
inclusion in the Depositions volumes selected documents. All of the original
XXI
exhibits are stored with the rest of the Select Committees' documents with the
National Archives and Records Administration and are available for public in-
spection subject to the respective rules of the House and Senate.
The 27 volumes of the Depositions appendix, totalling more than 30,000 pages,
consist of photocopies of declassified, hand-corrected typewritten transcripts
and declassified exhibits. Deponents appear in alphabetical order.
XXII
Publications of the Senate and House
Select Committees
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,
1 volume, 1987.
Appendix A: Source Documents, 2 volumes, 1988.
Appendix B: Depositions, 27 volumes, 1988.
Appendix C: Chronology of Events, 1 volume, 1988.
Appendix D: Testimonial Chronology, 3 volumes, 1988.
All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S.
Government Printing Office.
XXIII
1
JiNCLASSIFiED __
Stenographic Transcript of ^^
HEARINGS
Before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO IRAN AND THE NIGARAGUAN OPPOSITION
UNITED STATES SENATE
TESTIMONY OF NOEL C. KOCH
Wednesday, May 20, 198T
Partially Declassified/Released on l±Jf_^-,
under provisions of E 0. 12356
by N. Menan, National Security Council
UNCLASSIFIED (SOiX;
Washington. D.C.
AR
ALD£=SCN -EPCPiriG ^^ ^~~~-l':^:zX , rowFy
(202) 623-9300
20 F STREET, N.W.
82-716 0-88-2
UNei^SStRED
1 TESTIMONY OF NOEL C. KOCH
2 Wednesday, May 20, 1987
3 United States Senate
4 Select Committee on Secret
5 Military Assistance to Iran
6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition
7 Washington, D. C.
8 Deposition of NOEL C. KOCH, called as a
9 witness by counsel for the Select Committee, at the
10 offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate
11 Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 1:30
12 p.m., the witness having been duly sworn by RAYMOND R.
13 HEER, III, a Notary Public in and for the District of
14 Columbia, and the testimony being taken down by Stenomask
15 by RAYMOND R. HEER, III and transcribed under his
16 direction.
17
UMCOSSIf^ED
UN(^ASStFSED
1 APPEARANCES:
2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret
3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
4 Opposition:
5 JOHN SAXOM, ESQ.
6 On behalf of the House Select Committee to
7 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran:
8 ROBERT W. GENZMAN
9 ROGER L. KREUTZER
10 ' JOSEPH SABA
11 On behalf of the witness:
12 ROBERT M. ADLER, ESQ.
13 Ninth Floor
14 1667 K Street, N.W.
15 Washington, D. C. 20006
16
UNCLASSIFiED
UNCi^SmED
1
C
0
N
T
E
NTS
2
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF
3
WITNESS
SENATE HOUSE
4
Noel
C. Koch
5
By Mr.
Saxon
4
6
By Mr.
Saba
79
7
By Mr.
Kreuzer
97
8
By Mr.
Saxon
102
9
By Mr.
Saba
124
10
.-
E
X
H
I
B
ITS.
11
KOCH
EXHIBIT
NUMBER
FOR IDENTIFICATION
12
1
9
13
2
26
14
3
59
15
4
65
16
5
70
17
6
118
18
7
120
UMOlASSlflED
liNOLA^SIffED
1 PROCEEDINGS
2 Whereupon,
3 NOEL C. KOCH,
4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate
5 Select Committee and having been duly sworn, was examined
6 and testified as follows:
7 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE
8 BY MR. SAXON:
9 Q If you would, sir, please state your name.
10 ■ A My name is Noel Koch.
11 Q And what is your current employment?
12 A I'm the president of International Security
13 Management.
14 Q And what is the nature of that business?
15 A That deals with security for international
16 corporations, private families and people who may be
17 subjected to terrorist and other kinds of threats.
18 Q And where is that located?
19 A It's located in Arlington, Virginia. It has
20 offices in Europe and the Middle East.
21 Q What were you doing previous to this position?
22 A I was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
23 of Defense for International Security Affairs.
24 Q That would have been March of 1981 until May
25 30, 1986?
UNCtftSStflfD
ON^ASSfFlfD
1 A That is correct.
2 Q And did you have other positions co-extensive
3 with that one?
4 A That is right. I had also the position of
5 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa Region, and I was
6 the Director for Special Planning.
7 Q And to whom did you report in those positions?
8 A As the principal Deputy and the Deputy
9 Assistant Secretary I reported to the Assistant Secretary
10 of De'fense for International Security Affairs. As the
11 Director for Special Planning I reported to the Under
12 Secretary for Policy and frequently to the Secretary.
13 Q And who was the Assistant Secretary for
14 International Security Affairs?
15 A Richard Armitage.
16 Q During that entire period?
17 A No, not during that entire period. He came
18 in, I think, in '83, probably, late '82- '83.
19 Q He was preceded by Mr. West?
2 0 A Preceded by Mr. West.
21 Q That is Bing West?
22 A That is Francis something or another West.
2 3 Q And who was the Deputy Under Secretary to whom
2 4 you reported?
25 A I misspoke. It's the under Secretary.
UKCkASSt^^D
UNCkftSSmED
1 • Q That would be Dr. Fred Ikle?
2 A Fred Ikle, right.
3 Q And to whom did you report with regard to your
4 terrorism duties?
5 A To Dr. Ikle.
6 Q And tell us a bit about what that portion of
7 the job entailed.
8 A I had responsibility for policy related to
9 counterterrorism capabilities, which addresses
10 essentially reaction to a terrorist event and rescue of
11 victims, and finding other ways to make life inconvenient
12 for terrorists. At the same time I did that umbrella was
13 antiterrorism activities which we construed to mean
14 defensive actions, which can be hardware, anything from
15 fences to training people to what things to look for,
16 what things to try to avoid to keep themselves from
17 becoming victims of terrorist events.
18 In addition, I also had responsibility for the
19 restoration of our special operations forces.
20 Q Who was your principal point of contact at the
21 White House for your terrorism activities?
22 A Well, it varied. In fact, it was the subject
23 of a great deal of controversy within the Administration.
24 There was an issue — I guess it changed over time, John.
25 When Mr. Clark was there, I guess I would have said it
UNglftSSIFSED
8
{illOmSMD
1 would have been John Poindexter. It seems to me John was
2 there at the time.
3 Q When Judge Clark was the National Security
4 Advisor his military assistant was Admiral Poindexter?
5 A That's my recollection because I recall
6 Poindexter being there from the time we began to have any
7 controversy about the necessity of putting the capability
8 in the white House, that Admiral Poindexter was involved
9 in that.
10 ' Q Did there come a point at which your principal
11 point of contact would have been Colonel North?
12 A That came about later.
13 Q Okay. If you would, start at the beginning of
14 the story in terms of your involvement with the Iran arms
15 shipment side of these matters and walk us through that,
16 if you would.
17 A My involvement with the arms shipments to Iran
18 began in early November, as best I can reconstruct it.
19 Q November of?
20 A November 1985.
21 Q And how did they begin?
22 A They began with a call from the military
23 assistant to the Secretary of Defense, General Powell.
24 He asked me to find out how many HAWKs we had in
25 inventory and where they were.
UN6Lil&SlfiED
i/WCt#SSfF?EO
8
1 Q That's HAWK missiles?
2 A Yes, sir. And where they were. And my
3 recollection is not clear whether I was asked about the
4 cost or not, but the concern was the number.
5 Q At that point did General Powell tell you
6 their ultimate destination?
7 A He did not.
8 Q And did you ask?
9 A I did not.
10 Q Was Israel mentioned as a possible go-between?
11 A There was no mention of a go-between because
12 there was no discussion of where they were going. It was
13 just a simple question. It could have been related to
14 anything.
15 Q And wh3it did you do then after General Powell
16 gave you that requirement?
17 A I called someone in the Defense Security
18 Assistance Agency, Dr. Hank Gaffney, and asked him how
19 many HAWKs we had, and I got the answer and I relayed it
20 to General Powell.
21 Q Do you recall what that answer was?
22 A It was, as I recall, it was a fairly gross
23 answer, but I think it was something in the vicinity of
24 ^^^^1 that were on hand, and then we had so many in depot
25 and so many in t.he pipeline.
imetftSstF^D
10
UJiCLASS(FJ£0
1 Q I believe you told us before it was something
2 in the neighborhood °1^^^^^^| Does that sound about
3 right?
4 A It would have added up, once you took what was
5 being repaired and it would go in excess of that if you
6 considered what was in the pipeline. Do you understand
7 what I'm talking about?
8 Q Yes. And did Dr. Gaffney give you that in the
9 form of a verbal response or something that was written?
10 ' A I think the initial response was verbal and
11 then there was a follow-up.
12 Q Do you recall whether you and Dr. Gaffney
13 speculated about why this requirement was being imposed
14 or where they might be going?
15 A No, we had no speculation initially.
16 Q Was there a point at which your best
17 recollection is that Dr. Gaffney gave you something in
18 writing?
19 A Yes. It was a refined assessment of this and
20 it would have been within a reasonably short period of
21 time, but I don't know exactly when it was.
22 Q Let me show you what I would like marked as
23 Deposition Exhibit 1.
24 (The document referred to was
25 marked Koch Exhibit Number 1
yWCmSTFlED
11
T/CODEWORD 10
1 for T.9feWif ication. )
2 Take a moment, if you would, to look at that.
3 (Pause.)
4 A His own notes I wouldn't have seen in any
5 event, I'm sure, and I don't remember this document. It
6 doesn't have adding on it.
7 Q The heading is slightly obscured due to
8 numerous instances of photocopying, but it says at the
9 top Point Paper, right up above, HAWK missiles for Iran.
10 .A There is no addressee, no signature on it.
11 Q That is correct. Do you recall having seen
12 the point paper itself prior to today?
13 A I know that Hank brought back a paper.
14 Whether it was this one or not, I don't recall.
15 Q Let me walk you through, if I can, some of the
16 statements in it, and while I understand you are saying
17 that you may not have seen this particular document
18 before today I would really like to have you comment on
19 some of the statements which he makes.
20 This is, as he says in his cover note, written
21 on Defense Security Assistance Agency letterhead and
22 dated 12 December 86, he recalls that the talking points
23 were prepared by him on or after 19 November 85, at the
24 request of either you or at the request of you and
25 General Colin Powell, and he says they were furnished to
UltCLASSIF?ED
12
UN£lASSIEe)
11
1 you to take to General Powell.
2 A Right.
3 Q On page one of the point paper, with the
4 heading HAWK Missiles for Iran, he says the missiles at
5 Red River Arsenal cost $300,000 apiece and replacements
6 could cost as much as $437,000. Does that roughly
7 comport with what you know to be -the price of a HAWK?
8 A Yes, I thought, my recollection was it was
9 somewhere in the area of $440,000 and change, so that
10 would be right.
11 Q About halfway down the page he mentions
12 modality is for sale to Iran, and he says that Iran is
13 not currently certified for sales, including indirectly
14 as a third country, per section 3 of the AECA, which
15 would be the Arms Export Control Act. Would that be
16 consistent with your understanding of the law and policy
17 at the time?
18 A Yes, it would be.
19 Q The next paragraph, the paper states:
20 "Congress must be notified of all sales of $14 million or
21 more, whether it is a direct sale or indirect to a third
22 country, and the sale cannot take place until 30 days
23 after the notice." Does that seem to be a correct
24 statement of the Arms Export Control Act and the
25 reporting requirements?
bKCIlASStfi^
13
UN0ki^lil£O
12
1 A That is my understanding.
2 Q Below that he says "even if the missiles were
3 laundered through Israel Congress would have to be
4 notified." Does that seem to be correct, as best you
5 recall?
6 A I would not know that.
7 Q He says "it is conceivable that the sale could
8 be broken into three or four packages in order to evade
9 Congressional notice", and then he goes on to say "while
10 there 'is no explicit injunction against splitting up such
11 a sale, the spirit and the practice of the law is against
12 that." Do you have any knowledge yourself of whether
13 that statement is a fair statement of the practice as you
14 knew it?
15 A That is my understanding.
16 MR. ADLER: Are you asking for his legal views
17 at the time?
18 MR. SAXON: Just his best understanding as an
19 administrator who had DSAA under him, whether this seems
20 to be -- I'm not asking for a precise legal --
21 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
22 Q I understand the question. I'm not asking for
23 that, just whether this generally is consistent with what
24 you understood at the time.
25 A That was my understanding.
(iNe^lASStF?ED
14
UN€LASStFI£D
13
1 Q The next page he talks about some of the
2 political drawbacks to such a policy initiative, and he
3 says "If Iraq ever found out, they would be greatly
4 irritated" — and these are his opinions. Is that a
5 statement with which you would probably agree?
6 A Certainly.
7 Q He says that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf
8 states would also be irritated and alarmed. Does that
9 seem to be a fair statement?
10 • A That's a fair statement.
11 Q He says "If Israel were used as the laundering
12 country they would be greatly encouraged to continue
13 selling to Iran." Would you agree with that opinion?
14 MR. ADLER: Is the question, is that his view
15 now or was that his view at or about the time the memo
16 was written?
17 MR. SAXON: Mainly the latter, yes,
18 THE WITNESS: I would not have agreed with
19 that. I think the substance of these objections are to
20 try to dissuade, to mount as many objections as possible.
21 I think that is probably one of the lighter ones, that
22 they wouldn't have needed any encouragement to do it if
23 they felt they could or they felt like it.
24 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
25 Q In his next statement he says: "If the sale
^HCtftSStHtD
15
U1tCLASSI(i£D
14
1 became known that bars would be removed from sales by
2 such countries as Spain, Portugal, Greece, the U.K.,
3 Italy, Germany." This has reference to our policy called
4 OPERATION STAUNCH or our program to try to get our allies
5 to cease sales to Iran. Would you more or less agree
6 with that statement?
7 A Absolutely.
8 Q And then he says: "In short, the risk is that
9 of prolonging and intensifying the Iran-Iraq war." What
10 would be your sense? What would have been your sense at
11 the time?
12 A Well, I would have thought that that reflected
13 his understanding of the correlation of forces, and it
14 wouldn't necessarily prolong it unless you thought Iraq
15 was strong enough to fight forever, that it might have
16 the effect of shortening it.
17 Q Do you recall having given him any
18 instructions when you talked with him to prepare a
19 document, a talking point paper, with the express
20 intention of coming out on the negative side, to try to
21 shoot down the initiative? Do you have any recollection
22 of that?
23 A I don't have a recollection of it. I
24 disapproved as much as I understood it with what was
25 going on and I was preaching to Jt^g^hoir, as it
16
UNCLASSISiED
15
1 happened, within the Pentagon, because everybody
2 disagreed with it. But I don't remember that I told Hank
3 to prepare a document. I could have done this as well as
4 Hank. If I were going to, I would have, but I may have
5 said -- you know, I just don't have a recollection that I
6 did that, but that wouldn't be unusual.
7 Q Okay. At the point at which Dr. Gaffney got
8 back to you with his initial assessment of the numbers
9 and the inventory, et cetera, did you then go back to
10 General Powell with that information?
11 A I'm sure I did.
12 Q And do you recall anything about that
13 conversation — what you would have said, what he would
14 have said?
15 A Well, to try to go back a little bit here, I
16 mean, there was the initial request and then I would have
17 gone back, and I don't recall that I asked him questions
18 or that he proffered any explanations at that point. As
19 I said, some document came back. Whether it was this one
20 or another one, I don't know. I'm sure it's this one.
21 But at some point not too deep into this
22 procedure he did tell me what it was about, and the
23 reason I am a little nonplussed is that I was not aware
24 that at what point Hank became witting of the objective.
25 Q My understanding is that when you got back
UNCLtSStFtED
17
lJNe4ASSIfl£9
16
1 with General Powell for the second conversation, at least
2 the second one we've discussed this afternoon, after
3 having gotten a response from Dr. Gaffney, that whether
4 you asked or he volunteered, in any event he told you
5 that these were going to Iran. Is that your best
6 recollection?
7 A That is correct.
8 Q Do you recall any reaction?
9 A Yes. I said it was insane and we needed to
10 stop it.
11 Q Do you recall what his feelings were, whether
12 they were consistent with yours?
13 A They were consistent with mine.
14 Q So he likewise would have been outraged,
15 upset, disturbed, bothered?
16 A Correct, yes.
17 Q Do you recall whether you asked if Secretary
18 Weinberger knew about this?
19 A In fact, I did, yes.
20 Q And what was his answer?
21 A I think he said yes and that he was equally
22 disturbed about it.
23 Q And that he likewise opposed it?
24 A That is correct.
25 Q At that point was it your understanding that
uNcrrar^ED
18
UNCl/tSSfFSED
17
1 these arms were to be sold to Iran or were they to be
2 given?
3 A Well, my understanding was fairly spotty at
4 the beginning, and it may have accounted for my initial
5 outrage about this, but I thought that they were to be
6 given.
7 Q So you would have viewed it as a ransom?
8 A I would have viewed it as a ransom, correct,
9 with virtually no redeeming virtues.
10 'q Would you have gotten back with General Powell
11 after getting the information from Dr. Gaffney, the same
12 day, the next day, closely thereafter?
13 A That would be a guess. I don't know.
14 Q If you were asked to detail your objections at
15 that time to this initiative, what would you have said
16 they were?
17 A That it completely undercut our position vis-
18 a-vis our allies, who we had been beating on regularly
19 about arms sales to Iran, that it would probably
20 stimulate additional hostage-taking, that it was totally
21 inconsistent with this minimal remnant of any policy that
22 we had with regard to terrorism, which was a policy, by
23 the way, with which I was not necessarily in agreement —
24 this question of not making concessions. My sense would
25 have been it might be useful to as a practical thing not
i
mci'JiSlEo
19
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
HHCmsWRo
18
make concessions, but not make a big issue of this as a
public matter.
Our experience were statements of that sort
had gotten our hostages killed in the past, but
nevertheless this was our general position. It was the
only little shred of cover we had of any pretense at a
policy toward dealing with terrorism. It was what was
left of swift and effective retribution, if you like.
Q So, to make sure the record is clear, you are
saying our stated policy was that we did not make
concessions?
A That is correct.
Q Any other thoughts or objections?
A No. We did not pay ransom, which is more to
the point. The question of concessions gets to be
semantical. You can differ on what that means.
Q So you would have thought that it generally
would have been counter to our terrorism policy?
A Absolutely.
Q Would it have been impolitic?
A It would have been impolitic, yes. I want to
be clear as we go on here that as this evolved I did not
remain in the same position of obdurate opposition to
this.
I understand. But at the time I'm trying to
UNiIlBSfnEO
20
UNCbASSifO
19
1 get a sense.
2 A At the time my understanding was we were going
3 to give these missiles to Iran to ransom hostages which
4 Iran didn't even hold to begin with.
5 Q Was it your understanding at the time,
6 November of '85, that we had tried as best we could to
7 make life difficult for the Iranians?
8 A That is correct.
9 Q And that we had tried as best we could to make
10 it difficult for them to get arms?
11 A That is correct.
12 Q What would have been your understanding at the
13 time in terms of U.S. policy toward trade with Iran in
14 general?
15 A My understanding was that we had no exchange
16 in the area of lethal hardware, lethal materiel. I was
17 not sufficiently familiar with our trade position to know
18 whether there was any sort of non-lethal exchanges
19 between us, and that we were also putting as much
20 pressure as we possibly could on our friends, on anybody
21 that was susceptible to our pressure, to not provide
22 these things to Iran.
23 Q In terms of arms, lethal materials, is it safe
24 to say there was an embargo in effect at the time vis-a-
25 vis Iran?
UN€kASSIFiiD
21
liN€i4$SfFI€D
20
1 A That is correct.
2 Q What would have been your view at the time if
3 somebody asked you whether it was "legal" to sell arms to
4 Iran? Here I'm not asking you for a legal opinion, but
5 as an administrative official at the Pentagon what would
6 have been your best sense?
7 A I would not have known. I would have had to
8 inquire.
9 Q At what point do you recall Israel being
10 mentioned in all of this?
11 A I don't believe — I'm not sure I recall
12 Israel being mentioned within the context of the
13 discussion over the HAWKs.
14 Q Do you recall there being any discussion with
15 General Powell with regard to the HAWKs of a Presidential
16 Finding pursuant to which the HAWKs might be delivered?
17 A I don't remember that.
18 Q What would you say, then, in chronological
19 sequence came next? You have spoken to Dr. Gaffney.
20 You've gotten some input. You've transmitted that to
21 General Powell. What happens?
22 A The matter of the HAWKs just went away and I
23 don't recall at what precise point that happened. But my
24 practice was not to try to be overly curious about what
25 was going on. I assumed if people wanted me to know
wwei/rssrfrj£o
22
UNCbASSll4ED
21
1 something they would tell me. The things I needed to
2 know I would ask about, but this was not one of them.
3 And so I didn't dig around to try to find out
4 what had happened to the HAWK deal, why I wasn't being
5 consulted further or anything else. It just went away.
6 Q In terms of the HAWKs, is it fair to say that
7 at this point there was no discussion of modalities of
8 transfer, no discussion of FMS sales versus the Economy
9 Act transfers from the CIA, et cetera?
10 -A I have no recollections of those kinds or of
11 that kind in relation to the HAWKs.
12 Q Do you recall in relation to the HAWKs telling
13 Dr. Gaffney that they were destined for Iran after you
14 learned that from General Powell?
15 A I do not recall that.
16 Q Do you recall what numbers were being
17 discussed, how many HAWKs to Iran?
18 MR. ADLER: Discussed between himself and
19 Powell?
20 MR. SAXON: Yes.
21 THE WITNESS: I guess — let's see. The
22 information tended to dribble in. I don't know initially
23 what I thought. what I have in my mind is that we were
24 looking at something that totalled out to a quarter of a
25 billion dollars and I don't know why I had that. But in
GflCtllSStFtED
23
UNCtftSSIftED
22
1 the end, as I recall, we were looking at something on the
2 order of 500, I think.
3 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
4 Q Do you recall discussing in November '85 vis-
5 a-vis the HAWKs the issue of Congressional notification
6 with General Powell?
7 A I do not, no. I may have. I don't remember.
8 Q And I believe you stated with reference to
9 Exhibit 1, Dr. Gaffney's point paper, that you did
10 understand that any sales in excess of $14 million would
11 require notification of Congress; is that correct?
12 A That's right.
13 MR. ADLER: Just so that the record is clear,
14 it is my understanding from his testimony that that
15 Exhibit 1 was not a document that he could identify as
16 having seen but it was the point within the document
17 which he has confirmed as being his understanding at the
18 time.
19 MR. SAXON: Sure. And, to make it clear for
20 the record, from our standpoint I am not asking you to
21 verify the accuracy of any representations Dr. Gaffney
22 made, simply to ask you if it seemed consistent with what
23 you knew or understood at the time.
24 THE WITNESS: Sure.
25 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
OflCtASStFlED
24
\JN(H.ftSSJE;£0
23
1 Q What do you recall being the nature of your
2 first discussion with Colonel North about any of these
3 matters as opposed to strictly your discussions on
4 terrorism matters and when might such a discussion have
5 taken place?
6 A This is the best I can reconstruct. I think
7 it was in December.
8 Q Of '85?
9 A Of '85, and I think that it came in a secure
10 call from, probably from Ollie to myself -- it could have
11 been the other way. And there was a discussion of what
12 this was all about.
13 Q Let me interrupt for one second and see if I
14 can help clean this up. Is it safe to say you had no
15 discussions with Colonel North about the HAWKs?
16 A I don't recall having one. I mean — well, up
17 until this conversation that I'm discussing with you
18 right now, I don't recall anything.
19 Q Continue.
20 A But when we finally talked — and again my
21 recollection would be it would be December, and this
22 seems to be borne out by this document here for reasons
23 which I can explain — without trying to give a verbatim
24 recounting of the conversation I can give you elements of
2 5 it.
U#CLA^ift£D
25
UNCLASSHO
24
1 It was to the effect I was very concerned
2 about this, and said so. I saw it as purely a ransom
3 deal. Now we are discussing the HAWKs for the first
4 time, to my knowledge, and we're sort of discussing
5 what's going on.
6 Q Excuse me. You mean HAWKs or TOWs?
7 A The HAWKs. And you would have to take these
8 building blocks and reconstruct them and you get a
9 conversation out of this thing, I guess. But one of the
10 points that Ollie wanted to make I had myself and had had
11 for many, many months -- more than a year or two years, I
12 guess -- a great concern about the absence of any
13 sensible policy toward the Gulf, toward Iran most
14 particularly, and I felt that it was extremely dangerous
15 and it was going to be extremely costly to us at some
16 point down the road.
17 I thought it was a luxury to effectively
18 . improvise our way through anything as important as this.
19 I thought that of the nations in the region that Iran was
20 by far the most important from the purely geostrategic
21 standpoint and that we needed to find some way to
22 reconstruct our relationship. And furthermore I felt
23 that it would be necessary to do that while Khomeini was
24 still living.
25 And this wasn't something I went out preaching
UNOtftSSfflED
26
UfiObASSfflED
25
1 in the churches across the land, but it was internally my
2 views, and it was shared by other people. There was
3 objection to that at higher levels, but nevertheless that
4 was known. And when we had this conversation it was to
5 the effect of what the hell is going on. And Ollie
6 agreed himself with this problem that we had in the Gulf
7 and having no policy to deal with it and presented his
8 view of the legitimacy of what we were trying to do, and
9- it was this.
10 .. It was obviously these hostages, insofar as
11 they seemed to be either within the reach of Iran, they
12 are or they are not. They are there. That's an
13 impediment. That is an impediment on our side that has
14 got to be resolved. There are people in Iran who have to
15 be strengthened, obviously, but we think there are people
16 we can deal with in there.
17 And this whole thing Bud coughed it up
18 somehow.
19 Q Bud McFarlane?
20 A Bud McFarlane and then shuffled it off to me
21 and he went off to make a living.
22 MR. ADLER: "Me" being North?
23 THE WITNESS: Me, being North. And this would
24 not be unusual for the simple reason that Ollie was one
25 of those peculiar people who would work, and so we all
UNClISmfcO
27
UN€Li^Si;^D
26
1 know how bureaucracies run and you find somebody that's
2 willing to work and there's a hell of a lot of work to
3 do.
4 And so Ollie -- it was plausible, I mean, his
5 explanation that this was one more thing that devolved
6 upon me. Now having some way or some point in this
7 sloppy reconstruction of this thing disposed of the
8 question of the HAWKs, we get into what I think was the
9 point of the telephone call, or before it was all over it
10 was the point of it, and that was the TOWS.
11 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
12 Q And in your best recollection when would that
13 call have taken place?
14 A I can only give you an estimate of that, and
15 the estimate is based on a personal note that I made to
16 myself which says the TOWs were discussed separately with
17 Rudd and Gaffney in December.
18 Q Let me ask that this personal note be marked
19 as Deposition Exhibit Number 2.
20 (The document referred to was
21 marked Koch Exhibit Number 2
22 for identification.)
23 This bears the letterhead on memo paper of
24 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
25 International Security Affairs, Africa Region. Is that
UN€tftSS#tiD
28
UNCimH^EO
27
1 the memo to which you referred?
2 A That is correct.
3 Q And Item 1 says TOW discussed separately with
4 Rudd and Gaffney in December, and that is the item you
5 were using to refresh your recollection?
6 A That is correct.
7 Q And the understanding being you would have
8 only discussed TOW after having gotten a call from
9 Colonel North with him discussing TOW?
10 A ThaC^ould be my -- what would seem to me to
11 be the most plausible construction to place on it.
12 Q Now if you would then continue with the
13 conversation and tell us what Colonel North told you.
14 A Okay. So now we got into he said -- the
15 discussion about Bud's role in this thing was not — it
16 was one of those things that was said with a sigh, kind
17 of resignation — I've got another hot potato. But then
18 the people that McFarlane had working with him, chiefly
19 Michael Ledeen, he was not quite as kind about that.
2 0 Q He, North?
21 A He, North.
22 Q What did he say in that regard?
23 A He indicated that Michael had had, for
24 whatever reason, which he found puzzling, responsibility
25 for dealing with this thing, and that he had —
UlfCLASSIF'ED
29
8
10
UN@l^^^l^>)
26
1 Q Meaning negotiating with the Israelis?
2 A Negotiating with the Iranians. He was in the
3 Iranian deal. Ollie couldn't find out why he had been
4 put in it, and then he said that it was screwed up, that
5 he attributed its being screwed up to Michael Ledeen.
6 Q Anyone else?
7 A No. It was Mike. But then he went on to say
— and I believe it was in that conversation — he
9 indicated that he thought Mike was making money on the
deal." And when that came up, then the question then
11 Schwimmer was the other name that was associated with
12 that and that there was money in this thing I think was
13 what he indicated.
14 Q And I understand that you're not making that
15 as your statement and attesting to that, but you're
16 saying Colonel North thought there was some skimming or
17 something?
18 A That is what he said to me. And part of the
19 problem was that in addition to other things he couldn't
20 imagine why Ledeen was in it, was that Ledeen literally
21 did not know anything about most of the things that he
22 was involved in, least of all weapons.
23 Q Or weapons pricing?
24 A Or weapons pricing or terrorism or anything
UN(^*SStRED
30
UttOLA^rF^D
29
1 Q Now What do you understand Ledeen to have done
2 in terms of negotiating the price for U.S. Army TOW
3 missiles?
4 A My understanding from Colonel North was that
5 he had negotiated a price that was laughably low. I
6 mean, it was simply that there would be no way that you
7 could put a construction on that price that would make it
8 defensible under the most benign efforts to rationalize
9 this.
10 - Q And in a ballpark way what do you recall that
11 figure having been?
12 A I thought it was something on the order of
13 $2,500. And so he said that you have got to meet with a
14 man, an Israeli, and renegotiate the price and get back
15 to me with this.
16 Q And did he give you the name of the Israeli?
17 A The Israeli was a man named Ben Vosef. They
18 had a code name, the Bookkeeper. I don't know why, but
19 at that point I was given a code name or asked to adopt
2 0 one.
21 Q Do you know what that was?
22 A That was Aaron.
23 Q Aaron?
24 A Yes.
25 Q A-a-r-o-n?
UNtJt1ISS!F?ED
31
WNettS^ED
30
1
2
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8
9
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25
A Right.
Q And did you ask Colonel North exactly what you
were supposed to do when you met with Ben Yosef?
A Just to make that price better and get back to
him.
Q And at this point were you talking about TOWs
to Iran or backfilling the Israeli previous shipment of
TOWs to Iran?
A My understanding at that point was we were
backfilling a delivery and, I think the number was 508.
We have always had this eight here. I mean, it always
prompted the inevitable question and of course the answer
is always simpler, but it turned out to be that is how
many would fit on an airplane or something.
Did you ask Colonel North that question
yourself?
A
Q
A
Q
I don't believe I did.
Do you recall him addressing that number?
No.
Tell us then about your meeting with Ben Yosef
and would there have been anything else that intervened
in the interim between Colonel North saying you were to
meet with him and then you met with him?
A I would have had a discussion with DSAA to get
a sense of the pricing here and what made sense.
UNCllSSmED
32
UMG4ASS{Kk:D
31
1 Q And who would you have spoken with at DSAA?
2 A I think I probably would have spoken with Glen
3 Rudd. It would have been natural for me to try to
4 compartment my discussions. And then I talked to Hank
5 about availability. I would probably have gone looking
S very innocent to Glen Rudd and said, suppose, you know —
7 what's a TOW cost? If you sold it, how much could you
8 sell it for?
9 Q And is it your best recollection you had that
10 discussion in December of '85?
11 A If you had asked me prior to my finding this
12 in my diary, I would have said it would have to have been
13 probably in January. I just don't know. All I know is,
14 as I see that it says it, we had the conversation in
15 December. I'm sure I was looking to Gaffney to know
16 where these things might be to pick them up, if
17 necessary. That would be the kind of information that
18 . would have to be passed on.
19 And then I would have spoken separately to
20 Rudd about the pricing and other modalities, and I don't
21 mean in terms of how you move them but are there any
22 constraints on those and how do you do it.
23 Q Before we get into that conversation, first
24 what is your best recollection of when Exhibit 2 was made
25 — that is, your handwritten memorandum — at some point
UNCLASSIflED
33
(JMClASSJ^tD
32
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
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25
later?
A That is my handwritten memorandum and you
cannot tell from the copy but from the original you will
see that some of this is in pencil. Some of it is in
ink. The order of points on here -- you know, it goes
one, two, three, four, and then it goes back to the top
of the page, five. That is blanked out, but I think I
can safely tell you that the reference there is tc
_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^J and
that would be a point. I can't recall the precise date
of that, whether it was December of '85 or what.
But there were circumstances pursuant to that
which I recorded there. But then there is point four,
which says the TOW paper is locked in Armitage's safe and
he wouldn't let Rudd keep a copy. And there again I have
— my best recollection was that Armitage was not in the
box until pretty late in this game.
Q By in the box what do you mean?
A That he was aware of what had gone on. In
other words, the Secretary had not shared it with him.
The Military Assistant had not shared it with him. And
he did not know it. So that may mean that I made this
note to myself sometime in February or March, whenever he
did know it.
Q So your best reconstruction would be February
uiiCtass?f^.o
34
UKCtl^StFtED
33
1 or March of 1986?
2 A That's right.
3 Q For the record, what was Glen Rudd ' s position?
4 A He was Deputy Director of DSAA.
5 Q The Defense Security Assistance Agency?
6 A Yes, sir.
7 Q Now if you would recount for us what you
8 recall of your conversation with Rudd in December of '85.
9 A Well, the only part of it I can recall,
10 whenever it was held -- and I can't be firm on that --
11 would have been -- I'm extrapolating from that as much as
12 I can recall, and that would have been I was saying
13 something about this won't work. We have to have a
14 different pricing theory or something to that effect.
15 Now, as I said, as I extrapolate from that,
16 what I am saying here is Glen is telling me this is what
17 these things cost, this is what we are really selling
18 them for, and I'm in my mind not confident that that
19 price is one which the guy I was going to negotiate with
20 could live with. I wanted to know how much room I've
21 got. I know the floor has got to be somewhere higher
22 than S2,500. I mean, that much we don't know, what the
23 Israelis are reselling them and what's happening. That I
24 don't know until later, and I never did know and still
25 don't know to this day.
UNCLASSIFffiD
35
UNCtJ^SIflfD
34
1 But that that is a question I think is
2 probably not something that entered into this.
3 Q Do you recall Rudd giving you a price of the
4 least we had ever charged for a TOW missile when we sold
5 it through FMS sales, foreign military sales?
6 A I don't recall, but I'm sure he did, and I'm
7 sure that that was a higher price than I felt confident I
8 could negotiate.
9 Q If I told you his recollection is he gave you
10 a price of, on checking the records, of $6,800 as the
11 cheapest price we'd ever sold it before, does that
12 refresh you at all or not?
13 A That doesn't ring a bell.
14 Q Do you recall this discussion centering around
15 4,000 TOWs in terms of number for $12 million in terms of
16 price?
17 A Four thousand TOWs for $12 million?
18 Q Which would work out to $3,000 per TOW?
19 A I remember the number $12 million.
20 Q Where do you think that number came from?
21 A I don't know. I don't know. I mean, one sees
22 where it might have come from, but I don't know.
23 Q Might it have come from Colonel North?
24 A Well, in terms of sources I couldn't speculate
25 on that. I mean, the point of $12 million is clearly
UNCMSSTRED
36
UN€USSKI£D
35
1 below the threshold for notification, it seems to me, if
2 you were trying to stay under the threshold. What I find
3 illogical about this is that you link a number that is
4 under the threshold with a specific number of TOWs so
5 that if it was your object to stay under the threshold
6 and still negotiate a price that was reasonable, that
7 would go through the system without raising eyebrows,
8 that you would say you would divide that reasonable price
9 into $12 million or $13,999,999.99 and come up with this
10 will 'buy you 2,116 TOWs.
11 But you wouldn't try to squeeze these things.
12 You've got one constraint and that's hard enough to live
13 with, so why you would put two constraints together and
14 make it an N-squared problem, I don't know. That is what
15 I find difficult.
16 Q When you went to see Glen Rudd did you go to
17 him for any particular reason? In particular, did you go
18 to him because General Cast, his boss and the Director of
19 DSAA, was out of town and he was the acting director, or
20 would there have been another reason to go to him?
21 A I don't remember where Phil was. I would have
22 gone to Glen as a matter of course because what I would
23 have gotten from Glen is on the one hand a very
24 comprehensive -- a very comprehensive answer -- and yet a
25 short one. He was very knowledgeable and very
I
UN(H.ftSStFEd
37
UNCl^SlFoltO
36
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
professional -- bing, bing, bing -- and wouldn't have
asked any questions and I assume would not call around
saying what does Noel want.
Q Do you recall at that time telling Mr. Rudd |
where these TOWs were destined for?
A I don't recall that. I may have, but I don't
recall that.
Q And do you think that your discussions, your
discussion or discussions, with Glen Rudd would have been
preparatory to your discussion with Ben Yosef?
A Yes, I think so.
Q Do you recall discussing with Mr. Rudd the
issue of Congressional notification?
A I don't recall him discussing it, but I would
be virtually certain that it would be one of those things
that he would have raised with me. It wouldn't have been
a concern of my own. I would have had other concerns.
Q Do you recall him saying something to you like
the Israelis can manufacture the basic TOW themselves and
are now purchasing from us improved TOWs or I-TOWs and
TOW-IIs and therefore if we sell enough of these to
exceed the reporting threshold and have to report to
Congress it will appear transparent because the folks up
there are pretty savvy and they will know these are not
ultimately intended for Israel but are destined to be
TOP SECRET/CPDEWO
38
UNMSSJifJID
37
1 transferred somewhere else?
2 A I don't remember that. And let me say is
3 resonates, but I can't recapture it.
4 MR. SAXON: Let's go off the record a second.
5 (A discussion was held off the record.)
6 MR. SAXON: Let's go back on the record.
7 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
8 Q Do you recall any discussion whatsoever with
9 Mr. Rudd about notifying the Congress?
10 ' A I am sure that he brought that up with me,
11 that this is one of the things that had to happen in
12 order to get it done, but I don't think it was brought up
13 in the sense that this is how you would avoid it, avoid
14 notifying the Congress.
15 Q Do you recall any discussion about the need to
16 m.ake this a covert operation, perhaps transfer the
17 missiles from the Army to the CIA as a means of avoiding
18 notifying the Congress? This is with Glen Rudd in
19 December.
20 A No. I don't have a recollection, but I do
21 have my notes and I have a note here that said "Cast said
22 the best possibility of cover was do it black."
23 Q By "do it black" that means what?
24 A It would have been through some covert means,
25 and it would most likely be under the Agency.
UN€LASSfft£D
39
liJlQUSMiti)
38
1 ■ MR. ADLER: Would it be helpful — I don't
2 mean to interrupt your examination, but his handwriting
3 is only slightly better than mine and mine is the worst
4 that anyone has ever seen. Would it be helpful to have
5 him just read this memo into the record?
6 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
7 Q Sure. If you would then read everything after
8 the letterhead and the memo, read Deposition Exhibit 2
9 into the record.
10 'A All right. Point one is "TOW discussed
11 separately with Rudd and Gaffney in December." We go to
12 point four, which says "TOW paper locked in RLA's safe,
13 wouldn't let Rudd keep copy."
14 Q Let me interrupt and ask who RLA is.
15 A That's Richard Armitage.
16 Q Let me also say for the record that the House
17 and Senate counsel understand that the items that are
18 blacked out have no relevance to these proceedings and we
19 have agreed to this arrangement. Continue.
20 A There is a line and then there are notes which
21 appear to pertain to these two above points. The first
22 says: "Original was 3,000. Definitely this much in
23 stock." The next line says: "No way to keep transfer
24 secret." The next line says: "Cast said best
25 possibility of cover was do it black." The next says:
uNctAs^re
40
\| ri^ ""^^/^O DEWORD
39
1 "Through Israelis would attract notice — even if we try
2 to waive section 36(b) (notice to Hill)."
3 Q And that would be section 36(b) of the Arms
4 Export Control Act?
5 A That is correct. The last line says: "CIA
6 purchase (through ACSI?j and transfer which is
7 contracted."
8 Q And what would ACSI be?
9 A I can never remember -- the Assistant Chief of
10 Staff for Intelligence.
11 Q And what are those last?
12 A The last squiggle at the bottom says:
13 "Replace with TOW-II." There's a word which could be
14 "completion of sale" or it could be "condition of sale."
15 There is a number, which is S45 million. And then
16 there's another word under that which appears to be
17 "scattered". And then there is a note which is a
18 calculation that says "four C-130s equals 500", which
19 would mean that you could put 150 TOWs on each C-130, or
20 125, I guess.
21 Q Do you recall going away from your discussion
22 with Mr. Rudd in December of '85 with the sense that the
23 best way to proceed was for this to become a covert
24 operation?
25 A No, I don' t. iracili^at precisely. I will
\. No, I don't reciliJJ-iat
41
UN€LASSIfJ€D
40
1 tell you -- and again I tend to telescope dates and
2 discussions and so forth -- but I have a recollection
3 that as part of my conversation with Glen, whenever -- I
4 mean, at some point obviously the question of Israel's
5 involvement in this thing was there and that we were
6 talking about how to make it simple, and the question was
7 why is it not possible to simply, you know, whatever the
8 Israelis are doing, they are doing, and they purchase
9 this thing in a straight FMS buy and then they make the
10 transfer and we can write that off to TOWs are
11 consumables in a place like Israel. They use them up in
12 Lebanon or in training and so forth and so on.
13 So this is just a replenishment. Now one can
14 see how that might have prompted Glen to say well, we're
15 going to replace them with basic or whatever the intent
16 is to replace them with basic and then you run into the
17 fact that people the^ are manufacturing their own basic.
18 I have on this note, as you see, replace with
19 TOW-II. That could mean a number of things. It could
20 mean likely, meaning that it was necessary for us to
21 replace in our own inventories the basic TOW with the
22 TOW-II. Again, I don't know. Or it could mean, I guess,
23 that we would have replaced the basic TOW that they were
24 selling to Iran with TOW-II. I just don't know.
25 Q Were you ever made aware or do you know that
UlfCtfSSnKED
42
UN€L4SStRiD
41
1 the 508 TOWS the Israelis transferred to the Iranians in
2 1985 were TOWs that they had received from the United
3 States under FMS sales?
4 A It was always my understanding that the
5 initial transfer, and in fact it was not even clear to me
6 but what they had not gone ahead and done that deal prior
7 to any of this discussion.
8 Q That gets to the point I want to ask you
9 about. What would have been your understanding at the
10 time, if in fact it differs from your understanding now,
11 of any kind of preclearance that would have been required
12 on the part of the United States to give a go-ahead to
13 the Israelis to make that transfer, if they had received
14 those TOWs under FMS sales? Are there any requirements
15 that they get approval from the United States to transfer
16 them to a third country?
17 A Well, if we had an embargo they would have, I
18 am pretty confident, at a minimum be required by national
19 disclosure policy to let us know. I mean, we had to
20 disclose and anybody that we provided to who provides to
21 a third country it seems to me has this disclosure
22 obligation, and so there would have been that. And there
23 would have been, of course, the existing policy of an
24 embargo against Iran that would have to be circumvented
25 in some fashion.
UNGLASSiftB
43
ii^tASSmtB
42
1 But let's be clear in all these things in what
2 we're dealing with so far. We were still in an
3 informational mode. I mean, I'm asking for information
4 and I get information. The first time I go outside that
5 is in this discussion with the Bookkeeper.
6 Q Before we get to that -- and I do want to get
7 to that -- if I told you that the law that governs FMS
8 sales requires prior approval by the United States for a
9 recipient country to transfer to any third country, would
10 that Seem to --
11 A No, no.
12 Q That's correct?
13 A That's correct.
14 Q And has the President not delegated that
15 authority by Executive Order to the Secretary of State?
16 A That is correct.
17 Q And as far as you know did Secretary Shultz
18 ever give approval to the Israelis to transfer these TOWs
19 to Iran?
20 A I have no way of knowing that.
21 Q And in fact isn't the contract that a country
22 actually signs for FMS sales, the letter of acceptance
23 and contractual document with the DSAA, doesn't that
24 contract actually require the approval in writing?
2 5 A Yes.
mctnmm
44
UNOLASS{FI€D
43
1 Q And you don't know whether --
2 A And there's a time delay here in which you
3 have to notify and then there's time, I think, for the
4 Congress to make its feelings known.
5 Q A 50-day period, with 20-day advance notice?
6 A And thirty days, yes.
7 Q And your statement is you don't know whether
8 those provisions were compiled with?
9 A No, I don't know. I mean, to have raised the
10 question is to have suggested your government is going to
11 break the law, and so I would assume whatever things you
12 required in terms of compliance that at some point it
13 would be taken care of.
14 Q Let us go then to the discussion with Ben
15 Yosef. You apparently would have gotten the necessary
16 factual information from Mr. Rudd as prefatory to that
17 meeting.
18 A Right.
19 Q How did this meeting then come about? Did you
20 place a call or did he call you?
21 A I think I called him. I don't remember
22 because Ollie worked both sides of the link. But, at any
23 rate, we spoke.
24 Q Walk us through this, if you would.
25 A We talked. The conversation on the telephone
I
i^NeUJSff/Eg
45
MCiASSJflED
44
1 would have been rather cryptic. There's a question
2 whether I should go to New York or he would come to
3 Washington.
4 Q Was he operating out of New York?
5 A He was in New York. And the circumstances
6 were such at the time — I mean, clearly this was not
7 something that I could go down to travel and say I am
8 going to New York. I mean, I could have done that. I
9 could have covered or I could have flown up on my own,
10 hut r just didn't feel like going to the inconvenience,
11 and I suggested he come to Washington, which he did.
12 We met at the passengers' lounge, the first-
13 class lounge, the TWA lounge at National Airport.
14 Q Were you able at all to date this meeting?
15 A No.
16 Q Can you give us a ball park?
17 A Well, I'm going back to my note here which
18 says I discussed this with Rudd and Gaffney in December.
19 I'm sure that part of that discussion was pursuant to —
20 I mean, I shouldn't say I'm sure. I don't want to be
21 that categorical about this, but it seems to me very
22 probable.
23 Now if I could take a look here, and let's
24 look in there as well, but let me quickly go through.
25 Q And, for the record, you are looking right at
UNCWSSfF'FJ
46
UNa^S^FI^D
45
1 this moment at what?
2 A At my daily logs, my appointment book. These
3 were kept by my secretary. They are complete except with
4 circumstances where I would walk out of my office and not
5 tell her where I was going or if I did something on a
6 weekend.
7 Q Your meeting with Mr. Yosef was on a weekend;
8 is that correct?
9 A That is my recollection, yes. Now I am
10 through November and I am sure there are places in here
11 that I could recognize the beginnings of all of this.
12 MR. SABA: Could we go off the record for a
13 moment?
14 (A discussion was held off the record.)
15 MR. SAXON: Let's go back on the record.
16 THE WITNESS: I have a meeting on January 7 at
17 2:00 with Hank Gaffney, which is briefly interrupted by
18 . one of my Africans, and then we go back to this meeting
19 with Hank Gaffney. At 2:44 I meet with Glen Rudd and I
20 would suspect that these were two separate meetings. And
21 I would be reasonably certain that the TOW were the
22 subject of these because I don't remember in that period
23 of time that we had anything. I mean, as a matter -- I
24 didn't deal with DSAA on a regular basis. It wasn't a
25 daily thing.
uwceh^sDUd
47
liiteti^sifi^D
46
1 It was at one point.
2 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
3 Q So as I infer from what you are saying, your
4 best sense is you would have had no reason to meet with
5 both Gaffney and Rudd together or back to back other than
6 this topic?
7 A I think so, yes, particularly Gaffney.
8 Q And that date was January 7?
9 A January 7.
10 ■• Q And, for the record, I'm not sure if we said
11 what was Dr. Gaffney 's position at that time.
12 A I'm not sure. Was he head of operations? Can
13 you tell me, help me out?
14 Q Would he have been Director of Plans for DSAA?
15 A Yes. Okay.
16 Q Continue.
17 A On Wednesday, January 8, this is the day after
18 the meeting with these two guys, I have a meeting with
19 General Powell at 11:00 and my secretary has a notation
20 here that I've gone with a paper. That may have related
21 to this. On the 9th, at 1:00 in the afternoon I go down
22 to see Glen Rudd. Usually that wouldn't have been
23 scheduled. I would have just walked down and said I was
24 going to see Rudd. So there's a lot of ad hoeing in
25 here, which would be consistent again with discussions.
UWCLHSSIFHED
48
UNOLASSIEIED
47
1 On the 10th at 10:35 I meet with Colin Powell
2 again.
3 Q What day of the week was the 10th?
4 A The 10th I think was a Wednesday. No, it was
5 a Friday. I'm sorry.
6 (Pause. )
7 You see, in this period of time it's a little
8 confusing because I was putting on a conference at Ft.
.9 McNair on the 15th. There was a dinner on the 14th and I
10 had written the Secretary's speech for that and this was
11 a fairly big deal for us. This was a special
12 operations/low intensity conflict conference, the first
13 one we'd had, and I had him and Shultz and people like
14 Ted Koppel and others come to this thing. And so I have
15 a notation here at 9:50 to SecDef, but she has a question
16 mark next to it, and I don't know whether I saw him then
17 or not. I saw him certainly at 3:30 the same day.
18 I only raise that because there's the
19 possibility that after the series of meetings with
20 Gaffney and Rudd and Powell through the week of the 6th
21 of January that I may have met with Ben Yosef on the
22 weekend, either the 11th or the 12th of January. That's
23 possible. But if I did, then of course I don't have
24 phone logs and it may not be in the log anyway, and there
25 is no indication on the 13th that I talked to anybody
UN€t^Slf^D
49
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
WVettS^£0
48
about that.
The first time would have been on the 14th.
Now we go forward to wherever we were and I'm out of
town, and there is a considerable hiatus in here now
until Friday the 24th. I go to see Colin Powell and that
could have been anything.
Q So your best sense is that you very likely met
with Ben Yosef the weekend of January 11 or 12?
I would say that would be likely.
Do you recall if it was?
Not absolutely. --•■: " ' "' '
Do you recall if it was a Saturday or a
A
• Q
A
Q
Sunday?
A I don't recall that. It might well have been.
I'm sure it would have been a Sunday. I would guess a
Sunday.
Q If you could then tell us what transpired in
that meeting.
A Well, there wasn't much preliminary discussion
because we both knew why we were there and that it
involved coming up with a different price than had been
previously negotiated by Ledeen or, to my knowledge. And
so I said whatever the floor was. I knew what it was. I
think it was $2,500. And I had a bargaining position in
my mind and I had an absolutely irrevocable floor, one
IIN11»ED
50
UN^ASMED
49
1 that I would not go past, and that was — I think that
2 was $4,000.
3 Q And what do you recall is your goal that you
4 were shooting for? what was your upper price you were
5 trying to get it up to?
6 A Well, I wanted to get as much as I could, but
7 I'm sure that I didn't go over $6,000 and it may not have
8 gone that high.
9 Q Now tell us why it was necessary to get the
10 price up. What was Colonel North telling you in terms of
11 the need to get the price up?
12 A He never said anything about the need to get
13 the price up. The price had to get up to the point where
14 it wouldn't raise eyebrows, the eyebrows of the people
15 from whom we were taking the TOW.
16 Q So basically you had to get it up high enough
17 to get the missiles out of the Pentagon?
18 A Yes, pretty much, or at least to have a
19 defensible position or defensible price on these things.
2 0 You couldn't give them away, you see.
21 Q I believe you put it before that it had to be
22 high enough for the person to have a credible argument to
23 work with when he went to Secretary Weinberger to sell
24 him on the idea. Does that sound about right?
25 A That is a reasonable construction. But as far
U1tCtfl^tF1£D
51
uwctassrED
50
1 as the Israelis were concerned, I mean, I don't know. I
2 didn't know what their value was -- whether they were
3 reselling them or what or how much for and the rest of
4 it.
5 Q Did you in fact ask Yosef if they were making
6 money on this deal, what they were selling them for, et
7 cetera?
8 A Yes.
9 Q And what was his reaction?
10 ' A He was noncommittal and I did not ask the
11 question in a very severe way. I mean, I assumed -- at
12 least I think I assumed, and I'm not even sure yet
13 whether it was clear that these were being sold rather
14 than given and exactly what all the details were, but I
15 believe it was they were being resold. Colin certainly
16 thought they were being resold. In fact, for sure that
17 was a part of the discussion.
18 And he and I both said yes, they probably are
19 making a killing on this thing.
20 Q Do you recall him telling you that Secretary
21 Weinberger also believed they were making a killing?
2 2 A Yes.
23 Q Do you recall when that conversation would
24 have been?
25 A Well, it would have been preparatory to my
UNCtHiSSTFfED
52
^N^^SSirlci)
51
1 meeting with Ben Yosef, whenever that was, and so in the
2 conversations with Ben Yosef he is trying to keep the
3 price down where it was. I don't know whether there's
4 any reference to the previous negotiation, and the
5 authority of that negotiation. I don't recall that. But
6 at length we caroe up with the number that I could take
7 back and that he felt he could take back.
8 Q Do you recall him making a comment or do you
9 know whether Ben Yosef was involved in the earlier
10 negotiations with Ledeen?
11 A I don't know. I'm not sure whether he was or
12 not. I had the sense that he was. At any rate, he was
13 in the loop. He was in the loop clearly before I was.
14 Q And what price do you recall agreeing upon?
15 A $4,500.
16 Q And was anything put in writing in that
17 regard?
18 A No. No. I mean, I had no absolute authority.
19 We weren't there to cut a deal. We were there to prepare
2 0 the ground for one.
21 Q And I believe you made a statement something
22 like "and I assume you guys are making a profit".
23 A Well, in the course of the negotiation I said,
24 Christ, you know, we don't know what you guys are making
25 on this thing. I can't believe you're doing it for
unccissmed
53
^|:p|\ffcra^ OT CTTO R D
52
1 nothing, or something like that. And he didn't say. I
2 mean, he may have said I don't know, and he may not have
3 known.
4 Q Had you told General Powell before this
5 meeting that you were going to be meeting with Ben Yosef?
6 A I don't remember that. I had a couple of
7 meetings with Colin or had at least one meeting with
8 Colin at his house. I may have met with him at his house
9 after I met with Ben Yosef, for all I know.
10 'Q Did there come a time, though, shortly after
11 this meeting when you thought you might should tell
12 General Powell in case you hadn't and maybe even —
13 A I'm sure I did, yes.
14 Q Did he suggest maybe you ought to inform
15 Secretary Weinberger?
16 A I'm sure he did that, too, and I mean I can't
17 put it all together very well, but what would be strange
18 about it — I mean, I would have figured I will tell
19 Colin. Colin will tell the Secretary. But in this case
20 I know I carried this back to Colin and he said we'd
21 better go tell the Secretary. And so I went in with him.
22 Q And that would have been the three of you.
23 Was anyone else at that meeting?
24 A Taft was in there, and I guess he was afraid
25 he was goina to_miss 5.oaetiliJUI— SC J^e couldn't get him
ijii}M^iri£0°
54
UN€L^aSH^SED
53
1 out of there. We waited for a while and he didn't take
2 the point.
3 Q That would be the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
4 William Taft?
5 A Yes.
6 Q And did you immediately jump into the topic?
7 A Well, we sidled into it in a way that would
8 have suggested to somebody of normal sensitivity that
9 maybe their presence was not required. But that didn't
10 work, so finally we said we talked to the Israelis and
11 this was the price we came up with.
12 Q And did Taft at that point seem to be witting
13 of the topic you were discussing?
14 A Well, you never can tell with Taft.
15 Q Tell us what you recall from that discussion
16 with Secretary Weinberger. Would this have been in his
17 office?
18 A Yes. My recollection is — I have a
19 recollection there were at least two meetings with
20 Weinberger in his office. Now it may have been at this
21 one or it may have been at another one. I don't remember
22 anything ^distinctive about either of these, except that I
23 do know that there were at least two, and that this one--
24 I believe it was this one -- the Secretary was extremely
25 agitated about this.
UN&LAS$II.'ED
55
UN&LASSIFSED
54
1 And, as I indicated, my concern always had
2 been that the political dimensions of this thing and what
3 it was going to do to our position with our allies and
4 what it was going to do to our position in terms of
5 dealing with this problem of terrorism, and I thought
6 those were his concerns. I mean, he made it clear he
7 didn't like Iran and he hated the Ayatollah. He wanted
8 to discuss the question of any efforts at a
9 rapprochement. That was one of the impediments, was
10 Weinberger's views on this thing.
11 And so only because I had been through
12 Watergate and I guess he had, and there was kind of an
13 understanding because we had had, in the very little bit
14 of chat we had ever had previously, things related to
15 Watergate came up. And so for no reason other than that
16 I said, I mean, he said this is a disaster and it should
17 be stopped and so forth.
18 And I said --
19 Q Did he say something along the lines of it
20 would be terrible for the country?
21 A Yes. Well, yes, he did. And again I thought
22 this was all related to our credibility on the
23 international scene. But I said not in any awfully
24 serious way, but sort of semi-jocular way, are we apt to
25 go to jail over this. And I don't know whether he looked
mtft^SfflED
56
A
UN^AS^RED
55
1 at me or there wasn't an immediate follow-up and one of
2 us or the other sort of said, you know, like what does
3 this mean? Is there a legal problem with this? And he
4 said yes.
5 And then I think he said something like, yes,
6 we could go to jail, or somebody could.
7 Q At that point was there any discussion about
8 whether this had been blessed at the White House by a
9 Presidential Finding or by a legal opinion from anyone?
10 A My recollection is the Secretary did say that
11 the President wants to do this because I felt that I was
12 in an awkward position. I wasn't making it any easier.
13 Weinberger, as nearly as anyone could discern, clung to
14 this question of the pricing of these missiles and the
15 necessity for us getting a replacement price, which could
16 range up to something on the order of $13,000.
17 And that was one of the things that he saw as
18 a possible impediment. I don't know. I don't know what
19 was in his mind, but it was clearly understood by me
2 0 through whatever means that this was what they were going
21 to have to pay us for these missiles, and so I had
22 undercut that by negotiating this price of $4,500, which,
23 whatever it was, was defensible. It paid for the
24 missiles. It was more than we had paid for the missiles.
25 And so I probably would have had a certain
I
uwctftssif^^
57
uNettssinED
56
1 amount of sensitivity to his feeling that I had undercut
2 this, so I said it was my understanding that the
3 President wants this and he confirmed that, yes, he does,
4 but it's wrong. He said that this is crazy.
5 Q You don't recall, though, a mention of a
6 Presidential Finding?
7 A No.
8 Q And you don't recall mention of the Attorney
9 General has looked at it and he said it's legally kosher?
10 'A I don't remember that being discussed.
11 Q When you said you knew the price of $4,500 was
12 more than we paid for them, what do you mean by that?
13 A Well, that harkened back to the discussion
14 that I had with Rudd and what I was looking for was some
15 way. I mean, what you were dealing with in a certain
16 sense there are aspects of this which are somewhat
17 arbitrary. The question of paying replacement costs in
18 my mind, you know, I could do this a lot better than you
19 guys, was a theory.
20 And it seems to me that your point of
21 departure would be what did we pay for these things. Are
22 we losing money on the deal? I mean, are we giving them
23 away? Are you going to have a problem with that? And so
24 what we paid for them, as I understood, was something
25 53,300, $3,500, something like that. But after you put
UNClftS^fifcO
58
UNCUSmP
57
1 the bells and whistles on them they peaked out around
2 $3,800, $3,900.
3 Q So when you say that you got reference to the
4 price we actually paid for the basic TOWs that were in
5 the Army inventory at the Army depot --
6 A And that is what we were going to sell or
7 divest ourselves of in some fashion.
8 Q And if I gave you a price of $3,469 for those,
9 that sounds about consistent with what you recall?
10 A Yes.
11 Q Do you recall in that session with Secretary
12 Weinberger at which Mr. Taft and General Powell were
13 present Secretary Weinberger making any comment about the
14 arms exceed the Economy Act and that we would transfer
15 these to the CIA under the Economy Act and any hope on
16 his part that that might in some way be an impediment to
17 this?
18 A I do not recall that. There might have been
19 some conversation between Colin and myself. Again, it
20 would have involved modalities, I mean, sort of in the
21 sense that if you are going to do it, how is it going to
22 be done. But I don't recall that.
23 Q When were you made aware that there had been a
24 meeting at the White House in early December of '85 with
25 the President, Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Shultz,
i
\imMmB
59
UWCtftSStflED
1 Colonel North, Mr. McMahon, the Deputy Director of
2 Central Intelligence, to talk about this? You were not
3 aware at the time?
"* A I was not aware at the time, and I don't know.
5 It was so long after the fact that it was totally out of
6 the calendar context of this thing that I guess I was
7 6u«pprised, when I heard that such a meeting had been held.
8 Q And when you had this meeting we have just
9 been talking about with Secretary Weinberger, were you
10 aware that a meeting had been held in early January with
11 more or less the same principals -- Mr. Casey was there
^^ ^" ^^is meeting in place of his deputy -- and they had
13 agreed to and blessed the project and a Presidential
14 Finding resulted?
■"•^ A I think I knew at the time that there were ^-^
16 meetings on this thing and that Weinberger had tried to
17 murder this whole thing and had not succeeded. But the
18 timing, who the players were, and the outcome, the rest
15 of it, I didn't know. i mean, I just had a general sense
20 that part of the Secretary's agitation related to losing
21 the battle.
22 Q And when you left that meeting with Secretary
23 Weinberger, General Powell and Secretary Taft, was there
24 a disposition of things? Were you given some action
25 items to go forvard and work? Where were things left?
liNdllSSmED
60
(iNmSSJFIID
59
1 A I don't know. i didn't have an action in this
2 thing other than, as I said, I did that negotiation.
3 Then what were the next steps? I don't know, and I
4 didn't know. I think Colin then enlisted the Army in
5 this thing and whether that deal went through and if it
6 went through at that price, these are things that I don't
7 know.
8 Q Let me have you mark as the next deposition
9 exhibit a document which we have obtained from the
10 National Security Council that bears the number at the
11 top N-1331. That is the Senate Select Committee's
12 notation for NSC documents.
13 (The document referred to was
14 marked Koch Exhibit Number 3
15 for identification.)
16 You've seen this before last week. It, we
17 believe, is a document prepared in the handwriting of
IS Colonel North. Let me ask you for the record do you
19 ^ recall having seen it prior to last week when we showed
20 it to you?
21 A I do not.
22 Q Now you'll see, a third of the way down the
23 page, there is a heading in what we believe to be Colonel
24 North's handwriting that says "people who know", and then
25 there are a dozen or so names, and I will read them:
UNULlSSmfD
61
liNCLASSlEiED
60
1 Shultz, Weinberger, Powell, Koch, Casey^^^^^^^^H
2 McMahon, Allen, Gates, RR, JMP, Don R., Don F., VP, Peter
3 and Howard. Now where you see Weinberger, it is broken
4 out separately with two names under it. What would you
5 take that to mean in terms of those two names?
6 A Well, without a date on this thing I wouldn't
7 know. It could be that we were the only ones who knew
8 about the President's surprise birthday party.
9 MR. ADLER: I would interpose an objection.
10 You are asking him to speculate about a document that he
11 didn't write and he has had no connection with.
12 MR. SAXON: Fine. I withdraw that.
13 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
14 Q Let me ask you in the time frame of early
15 1986, do you have knowledge that any of these individuals
16 knew about the arms shipments to Iran?
17 A I knew that the Secretary did, that General
18 Powell did. I knew that I did. And I believed that the
19 President did and Admiral Poindexter did.
20 Q From your own personal knowledge were you
21 aware that any of these other individuals would have
22 known about the arms shipments?
23 A I'm not sure, Mr. Saxon. I mean, there were
24 occasions in this whole thing when Colonel North would
25 make reference to Mr. Casey, but those things kind of
UNULIiSWSlD
62
UNCI#SSPED
61
1 float around in the cosmos here. I don't know that I
2 could nail them down. I mean, at some point I had a very
3 strong certainty that Mr. Casey did know, but in the
4 framework of what you're asking me — I didn't mean to be
5 flippant, but I can see from the context, this rationale,
6 you see, there's never any reference to hostages here,
7 and Ollie in his thinking, or at least his thinking when
8 he wrote this, had to do with what we hoped to accomplish
9 if this thing went through and hostages were very much a
10 second order of consideration.
11 Q Let me ask you a few questions about your
12 relationship with Colonel North and some things he may or
13 may not have said to you. Do you recall a conversation
14 in December of 1985 in which he talked to you about how
15 the issue of the hostages might have been weighing on the
16 President?
17 A Yes. And thAt;gjgj»"|^a illli]'^ ^^'I^U ~ ^^^^ ^^V 3<^<^
18- . weight to my fnnl J rtg^ that this discussion about the TOWs
19 did occur in December, but it is important to know that
20 on a very consistent or a regular basis you can see from
21 my logs here, and if you read my phone logs you would
22 see, that Colonel North and I talked a lot. We met a lot
23 on circumstances that surrounded a lot of these things.
24 Q So it may very well be that you are saying
25 that statement he made to you was not in connection with
imetftssfnED
63
l^i^Sff^ED
62
1 the conversation about TOWs?
2 A It may not have had anything to do with TOWs,
3 but that's one possibility. The other possibility is
4 that was just a general comment. You know, Ollie was
5 always -- I mean, he worked himself. He just worked
6 very, very hard and one always had a sense that you just
7 sympathized with the guy never getting any rest and not
8 seeing much of his family, and having to carry the load
9 that everybody shoveled off on him.
10 , So that I said at some point how are you doing
11 or how do you feel or whatever, and whatever it was, he
12 said that the hostages, that it's driving the President
13 nuts, and words to that effect. And he's on me all the
14 time and he's driving me nuts. And he said he wants them
15 back by Christmas.
16 Q Meaning the President wants the hostages back
17 in the U.S. by Christmas?
18 A That's right.
19 Q And that would be late '85?
20 A That would have been late '85. And '^ said,
21 you know, can we do it? And when I said "we" I don't
22 know whether I made that collective, but I said can we do
23 it, and he said I think so.
24 Q At any point when you were talking with
25 Colonel North about TOWs, HAWKs, things that specifically
UMCtUfSSTPED
64
UNi^ASSfRED
63
1 pertained to arms shipments to Iran, whether direct or
2 indirectly through Israel, do you recall any statements
3 he made about the President's role, the President's
4 desire that this happen, the President's having mandated
5 that it be done, et cetera?
6 A No, I don't recall that. I don't recall him
7 telling the President the specifics of this thing other
8 than he wants the hostages back.
9 Q Do you recall any statements he may have made
10 to you, more or less the same question, with regard to
11 Admiral Poindexter and the arms shipments?
12 A About John knowing about the shipments?
13 Q Yes.
14 A I don't recall him saying anything about that.
15 Q And did he ever make any statement that would
16 indicate he knew you might be in an awkward position in
17 that you worked for Secretary Weinberger and worked at
18 the Pentagon but that the Secretary was fairly adamantly
19 opposed, I think it would be fair to say?
20 A No. But as time went on, once Armitage got in
21 the box on this thing, of course, he was always very
22 diligent about ingratiating himself with the Secretary,
23 and so he immediately decided this was all crazy and it
24 was all nonsense and whatever bad words Cap had for it,
25 Rich always squared them all. So that obviously injected
UNCLASSIFIED
65
16
17
18
19
20
24
25
IrNei^^rSk^D
64
1 a certain amount of tension into this thing, because
2 Armitage's manner of dealing with this was not simply to
3 criticize what was being done but to criticize the people
4 who were doing it, and that meant saying that Ollie was
5 crazy and everybody knew it, and it was part of his
6 service record and that Jim Wick could tell you, and that
1 all his decorations were fraudulent and things to that
8 effect.
9 So it introduced a degree of tension into this
10 thing,
H Q What is your understanding of when Mr.
12 Armitage came in the box, as you say?
^^ A Well, I don't know. I don't have -- the best
^* ^ '=3" deduce from reading^ from reading the footnote in
15 the Tower Commission report he wasn't in it in '85. I
don't want to get too much into speculation, but I think
that what I do recall is that there was a point where I
was away, I was TDY and Colin said — he and I had a
conversation on the phone about this, and it was an open
line. It was a very cryptic conversation. And he said
21 I'™ going to have to tell Rich. I need to get something
22 done. I'm going to have to tell Rich because you can't
23 do it your way.
And as I look at my book here and I see the
one place that I was TDY for a long time was —
liNrassrnED
66
imetAs^HtD
65
1 • Q Your recollection is it might have been about
2 the second week in February of '86?
3 A No. My recollection now, having gone back and
4 looked at these -- let me just look at this thing
5 quickly.
6 (A discussion was held off the record.)
7 THE WITNESS: I go away to Europe on the 28th
8 of February, and then I had to go to Berlin on a matter,
9 and so I was stuck there and I didn't come back until the
10 11th of March. And now I'm coming back on short rations
11 and I'm tired, and I get in to Dulles at 1710, and my
12 home is closer to Dulles than the Pentagon is, I can
13 assure you, but rather than go home I am met there by a
14 Pentagon driver and I go to see Colin Powell at 6:45.
15 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
16 Q And your best recollection is that during that
17 period when you were in Europe —
18 A I think that is when Armitage got in the box.
19 Q And did you actually work with him on any of
20 this, coordinate with him?
21 A No.
22 Q Let me ask you to take a look at what I will
23 have marked as the next exhibit, Exhibit 4.
24 (The document referred to was
25 marked Koch Exhibit Number 4
UNrCLA^SIFIED
67
yNSlftSSfF?ED
66
1 for identification.)
2 This is a draft of the testimony to be
3 provided by Director Casey, who you see in the upper
4 righthand corner, DCI, 20 November 86. It says Iran
5 Testimony to be delivered 21 November. I am not giving
6 you the full text because it is not relevant, but I have
7 given you the cover page and then a page which bears the
8 Senate Select Committee number C-5210, which means CIA
9 document, page 5210.
10 If you will look at the first full paragraph
11 on the second page, it says "using these procedures" —
12 which were described above -- "funds were deposited in
13 the CIA account in Geneva on 11 February 1986 and on 14
14 February 1,000 TOWs were transported to Israel for
15 prepositioning. These TOWs were transferred by CIA from
16 DOD U.S. Arroy stocks in Anniston, Alabama, and
through ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H^us ing
18 ' CIA/OOD^^^^^^^Hviogistics arrangements. Policy level
19 coordination for these arrangement was effected by NSC
20 (North) with DOD (Armitage and Koch) and CIA (Clair
21 George) . "
22 I'm not asking you to vouch for the accuracy
23 of that, but this is reflected in Director Casey's
24 testimony and it strikes me as a bit curious because --
25 what do you think could have been any involvement you and
UftCtft^iF^B
68
(/JiCLASSIII£D
67
1 Mr. Armitage had? Was it none?
2 A We had no joint involvement with this. I did
3 not include him in anything that involved terrorism or
4 special operations all the way to the end. He wanted
5 very much to be a part of this and where he could collect
6 information that related to something that I might be
7 doing he could come by my office and wanted to create the
8 impression of being knowledgeable and want to talk about
9 it, and of course we were friends, and he would see if he
10 could. peter that out.
11 Q And is it possible he could actually
12 independently have had a piece of this?
13 A It is possible. I'm a little surprised at the
14 date, although it's possible. I mean, there were other
15 periods in which I was TDY. There was never one that was
16 as long as that. That concludes with this great
17 punctuation mark of my coming back and going right to see
18 Colin Powell and Colin Powell being in the building
19 waiting to see me. That is what makes me think that it
20 was that one, that is in March, and this could be wrong.
21 I don't know. I don't have to accept this. As a matter
22 of fact, it isn't made clear.
23 Well, okay. This is on Valentine's day. I
24 don't know that he had it right. I think in some cases
25 there was a lack of awareness of how this special
imCtfl^SfFllED
69
ei^tflSl^fFlED
68
1 planning system work-ed and since I was the principal
2 deputy in ISA, that may have been in some quarters and we
3 left it that way because it suited me to have them think,
4 to be wrong about it, to suppose that it was under ISA
5 but it was not ever under ISA. And I was very specific
6 at the beginning, when we set this up, that it was not be
7 under the Assistant Secretary of Defense, and that was
8 agreed to.
9 And so I don't know --
10 MR. ADLER: What was the question?
11 THE WITNESS: The question was were we working
12 on this thing together at this time and the answer is no.
13 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
14 Q Let me make clear that I'm not vouching for
15 the accuracy of that and I'm not trying to impeach your
16 statement by showing that you did. I'm simply saying
17 that one particular account says that the two DOD people
18 who may have worked t2ti» weri you and_Ann"itaq*, and that
19 maybe you did that with no coordination between the two
20 of you. I simply wanted to know if you recall any
21 coordinated effort with Armitage, and your statement is
22 no, and that is acceptable.
23 A It is a wrong construction utterly, because
24 this whole notion of policy level coordination, we didn't
25 really coordinate, you know. The Secretary didn't want
UNciffss^rnED
70
UNOtlSSfFIED
69
1 to do this, so our position was de minimis from the
2 beginning and it was a question of finding out where are
3 and then figuring out how much you have to charge for
4 them.
5 And then actually a decision moved then. That
6 I didn't get involved in and I didn't think — Armitage
7 may at this time may have known something about it, but
8 I'd be surprised. My understanding was the guy who
9 pulled the levers was Colin.
10 Q Let me ask you to reflect on a meeting you
11 attended in early February of 1986 at the White House, I
12 believe on the 8th or 9th of February 1986, and we have
13 talked about that before. What do you recall about that
14 meeting on this topic?
15 A I think as a result of having my memory
16 refreshed on this I recall that General Secord was there
17 and there was a representative from the Agency there who
18 was not normally part of these meetings, and this wasi
19 ^^^^^^^Vand that^^^^^^Hwas the expediter on the Agency
20 side, and Secord I had only somewhere in that period of
21 time come to know that he was involved in this at all.
22 And there was a discussion of sorts about
23 where things were and how things were proceeding.
24 Q Let me offer as Deposition Exhibit 5 a
25 document that is a CIA document. In the upper right
ONetlBStBED
71
UN^RSSIFIfO
70
1 corner of page one it bears the number C-4531, which
2 means that it is part of the Senate Select Committee's
3 files received from the CIA, and this particular page is
4 numbered 4531.
5 (The document referred to was
6 marked Koch Exhibit Number 5
7 for identification.)
8 It bears the title of Working Draft and it is
9 dated 3 December 86 and purports to be a chronology of
10 CIA involvement in the Iran-contra affair. I have not
11 included the entire document because it is not relevant,
12 but if you will look at what is page two for you you will
13 see a paragraph with the date notation 8-9 February 86.
14 Let me give you a moment to read that.
15 (Pause. )
16 Have you had a chance to read that?
17 A Yes.
18 Q Does this seem to refer to the meeting I just
19 asked about?
20 A Yes.
21 Q As far as you recall, is this statement an
22 accurate reflection of what transpired?
2 3 A Yes.
24 Q Is there anything else you can recall about
25 that meeting?
Utl€tftSSif4tD
72
UH€iiiW^u:*»^>^
71
1 A No. I'm trying to remember the details. As I
2 recall, Ollie had a very precise timetable which he had
3 related to me on a secure phone.
4 Q Meaning shipments this day and release this
5 day?
6 A Yes. They get so much and we get so much.
7 And, if I'm not mistaken, all of this was to conclude
8 with -- it was to conclude with us getting Bill's body
9 back.
10 . Q Bill meaning Mr. Buckley?
11 A Mr. Buckley, yes. But it would be concluded
12 with some kind of a meeting between ourselves and
13 representatives of Iran. And again we were not -- at
14 least I. was not, and my sense was that the others were
15 all looking towards advancing of rapprochement with Iran,
16 and I don't know whether that was discussed in that
17 meeting or not. But when Ollie would talk about the
18 timetable that is where it eventuated.
19 Q As I understand what you are saying, then,
20 your testimony is that it would have culminated in some
21 meeting with some of f iciallysanctioned government
22 delegation meeting with a government delegation?
23 A Yes.
24 Q Was that given any kind of date? Was there an
25 end time frame to what you recall about these
OnCLHSSIftED
73
imG4#S^ED
72
1 transactions?
2 A Yes. Eventually there was. In fact, I have
3 some difficulty now with the timing on this thing. I
4 just don't recall when this was discussed, but I do know
5 that it was all supposed to stop with some kind of a
6 restoration of relations.
7 Q Do you recall being made aware of why General
8 Secord was at that meeting?
9 A No.
10 -Q Do you remember if it was mentioned at the
11 meeting?
12 A No, I don't. It was a part of it that — I
13 mean, most of it I wasn't paying a hell of a lot of
14 attention because it seems to me it involved logistical
15 questions. I'm not sure. When do you move this stuff,
16 how do you move it, and what's going on at the other end?
17 Q Do you recall if you were aware prior to that
18 meering that General Secord had some role in this?
19 A Ollie told me, not in the first conversation,
20 I think, but in some subsequent conversation that we had,
21 that the guy who was running it was Dick, because I said
2 2 do we have somebody who knows what the hell they are
2 3 doing, and he said yes, somebody you would have
24 confidence in. I said who, and he said Dick Secord.
25 Q When he said he was running it or whatever the
UNCiASStFSEE)
74
BN€tft&S4Kts^
73
1 statement was which came out along those lines, do you
2 recall what, if anything, else he said?
3 A I don't remember very well. I mean, it should
4 be clear that there are big gaps in my knowledge of this
5 thing. Ollie had this thing rigorously compartmented and
6 this is the way this work is done. If you do this work,
7 you know if somebody's not telling you something then you
8 don't need to know and you don't ask. I mean, it
9 requires a suppression of curiosity. So I didn't know
10 exactly what Dick was doing and I didn't ask him either.
11 Q But it is your sense that at the time this
12 meeting took place m February of '86 that you would have
13 known he had some role in it and therefore it was
14 legitimate and appropriate for him to have been there?
15 A Yes. I knew before he was there that he was a
16 player.
17 Q you referred, I believe, to this meeting
as ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H Is
19 correct? I don't mean today, but earlier. And your
20 sense is that that was the group that was meeting on this
21 particular occasion?
22 A I think we expected to meet, that that is what
2 3 I thought I was going over there for. It wouldn't have
24 been unusual to be invited, I guess, to a meeting that
2 5 you thought -- you know, that you were mistaken about
liirCLH^IHED
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1 what its purpose was.
2 Q The^^^Blater became what? It became a
3 different group by a different name?
4 A Well, let me just point out to you, Mr. Saxon,
5 before we go any further that this -- wait a second.
6 This is '86, right? Or is it '85?
7 Q '86.
8 A It IS '36. And this book is '86, and the
9 reference here is to a meeting held the 8th and 9th of
10 Februat-y, this meeting was held, but the dates are wrong.
11 The 8th and 9th is a Saturday and Sunday. I don't recall
12 having any meetings in the EOB on this subject on a
13 weekend. I -may have done it, but I would be surprised
14 about that.
15 The question on ^^^^^^| anyway, and this
16 doesn't have to detain us, but we had a number of
17 meetings at the White House in the aftermath of the Vice
18 President's Task Force.
19 Q On Terrorism?
20 A On Terrorism, and this had to do with a
21 protracted disagreement within the Administration on
22 where was the necessary site from which you would plan,
23 manage, direct, guide your whole terrorism program. And
24 this had always been cause for terrible turf battles.
25 The short of it is that anybody with any expertise
ilNCtmiFSEE)
76
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75
1 whatsoever concluded very early on that it needed to be
2 in the White House and time and time and time again we
3 had had incidents where we lost people and so forth,
4 which demonstrated that the way we were structured was
5 totally wrong, but it didn't matter.
6 We were going to proceed with the luxury of
7 keeping it wrong in order to gratify the sensibilities of
8 various bureaucrats and political appointees at the top
9 of those bureaucracies. And so in the afterroath of the
10 Vice President's Task Force, when we agreed at the
11 conclusion of the task force to leave it the way it was,
12 again in the face of all evidence and so forth to the
13 contrary -- that it needed to be moved -- it was quietly
14 moved. It did go to the White House.
15 But it was under a kind of cover name and
16 again it was just one more collateral duty for Ollie.
17 Q Was that the TIWG, the Terrorist Incident
18 Working Group?
19 A No. This is not the TIWG. This is this
20 and it has a meaning, but it's totally beside the point.
21 And that eventually metamorphosed into what became to be
22 called the OSG, the Operations Subgroup, and that didn't
2 3 mean much either.
2 4 Q When you left the Pentagon, who took your
25 place on the OSG?
UfK^LASSIFSED
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4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
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14
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17
18
19
20
21
22
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24
25
A My understanding was that it was Armitage.
Q And when did you leave the White House --
excuse me. When did you leave the Pentagon?
A I left the Pentagon -- I resigned the 30th of
May. I remained, at the request of Armitage and Ikle and
the Secretary, for that matter, until this fellow Ropka
was brought in, and that was the first of August, and
that's when I left.
Q And he was your replacement?
'A He was my replacement, but he didn't do any of
the things that I did, as near as I could tell.
Q And his name is what?
A Ropka.
Q' R-o-p-k-a?
A Right.
Q First name?
A Larry.
MR. SAXON: Let's go off the record.
(A discussion was held off the record.)
MR. SAXON: Back on the record.
BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
Q What can you tell us as to your reasons, Mr.
Koch, for leaving the Pentagon?
A As I indicated earlier, part of my
responsibility was for the restoration of special
78
yNCLA^Ifv£D
77
1 operations forces, and this had been a running battle
2 within the Pentagon. Initially the Secretary supported
3 it completely. Once it became not merely problematical
4 but publicly problematical, then one had a sense of a
5 certain softening there and it was passed over to Taft to
6 handle it and Taft's handling of it was such that
7 eventually it created a situation that I thought was
8 untenable in that he would make one decision this week
9 and another decision the next week and it looked an awful
10 lot like the Congress' position on the contras or maybe
11 even a little worse than that.
12 And so finally this thing came to a head over
13 the question of airlift and the Congress had required
14 that certain things be done by the Pentagon. The
15 Pentagon, under Taft, acted in a way that circumvented
16 and totally violated the spirit of the Congressional
17 decision and I thought did it dishonestly. And finally
18 it came to a head on that point. I felt that my situation
19 was one -- and I can submit letters for the record, if
20 you want — that I could not stay there in the building
21 and be loyal to the Secretary any longer, because we had
22 a clear division on this question of special operations.
23 And so I submitted my resignation over the
24 objections of Armitage and Ikle and the Secretary called
25 me within a matter of less than an hour and effectively
UNCllSSIFSEO
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UN€tft$Sfff£D
78
1 refused my resignation. he said he wanted me to stay.
2 He needed me there and so forth and would I think about
3 it. And I thought about it for a couple of days and then
4 I sent him a letter that explained why I was leaving,
5 that said that I thought that the management of some of
6 these issues, particularly the airlift issue, had been
7 duplicitous and it had violated the intent and the spirit
8 of Congress and that I didn't feel that I could stay
9 under those circumstances.
10 ■' And I must say also this question of my
11 loyalty in the building, I had always been open, direct
12 and public about my views on this thing, as I think
13 generally is known, and the Secretary, that had never
14 seemed to trouble him. But I felt that it was going to
15 be necessary to take steps that he would have objected to
16 ultimately, including in legislation, to oblige the
17 building to solve these problems everybody recognized we
18 had.
19 Q And just to make sure the record is clear, is
20 it safe to say, then, that your resignation had nothing
21 to do with any of the matters that our two Committees are
22 investigating?
23 A No, not really. Only insofar as I must say
24 that the management of this whole terrorism business has
25 been a consistent, I felt, was a disgrace. But it wasn't
UNCLftSStF^fD
80
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1 in and of itself sufficient to make me decide it was
2 necessary to leave.
3 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
4 BY MR. SABA:
5 Q Mr. Koch, if you don't mind, I want to go back
6 over a few things that we have already covered so that we
7 can understand a little bit better. Going back to early
8 November 1985, when General Powell called you concerning
9 the HAWK missiles, why v/ould he have called you as
10 opposed to anyone else in the building on this subject?
11 A I have wondered about that myself, and my best
12 guess -- and you would have to ask Colin -- but this was
13 sort of my line. I dealt with, even though in a policy
14 sense, generally an involvement with people who did
15 covert work, who were not on the intelligence side but
16 special operations, and this was, I think in Colin's view
17 at least in the earlier part of this thing, pursuant to a
18 situation that had been created by terrorism and was
19 associated in our minds with terrorism.
20 Q So could we say that the request to you
21 implied an unusual request or implied that the request
22 had some involvement with terrorism?
23 A You could say that. I mean, as I say, you are
24 asking me to look into Colin's mind, and I can't.
25 MR. ADLER: Is your question as to what was
UNCLffSSTRED
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80
1 his state of mind when he received the call or
2 reconstruction?
3 MR. SABA: Yes, it is what is his state of
4 mind unless the answer is institutionally that's who he
5 would always go to.
6 THE WITNESS: No, no. Institutionally he
7 could just as well have called Phil Cast or he could have
8 been very rigorous about the chain of command and called
9 Fred and Fred could have called Rich, and Rich could have
10 called Cast or me.
11 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
12 Q But you would say then that the call to you
13 was not in the rigorous chain of command?
14 A It was not rigorous at all. Colin and I had a
15 good informal, friendly relationship and I was in and out
16 on issues that were a little bit strange, if you like,
17 and so I didn't see anything peculiar about this. And
L
18 when we asked me, of course, just to be clear about this,
19 in the initial exchange there was no discussion of these
20 going to Iran, Israel or for hostages or anything else.
21 It was just how many HAWKs are there.
22 And the manner in which it was asked me I knew
23 that he was trying to hide something initially for his
24 own, whatever reasons.
25 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
b'MCllSStF^EO
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81
1 • Q Perhaps I was remiss in the beginning by not
2 asking you to detail specifically what your duties were.
3 As I understand it, though, one of your duties as the
4 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary was that DSAA was
5 under you in terms of reporting channeltlsj is that
6 correct?
7 A That's right. That is right. That is what
8 the papers which delineate my responsibilities say, and
9 in fact that is true. But each Assistant Secretary works
10 a little differently. When I was Principal Deputy under
11 Bing West, I had a very close and intimate relationship
12 with DSAA, to the point of replacing its director at one
13 point. Then, when Armitage took over, he wanted to play
14 with this and could we go off the record on this?
15 (A discussion was held off the record.)
16 MR. SABA: Let's go back on the record.
17 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
18 Q Just to establish where we are, in your first
19 request to Gaffney you did not indicate where the HAWKs
20 would be sent or mention any other countries?
21 A In my first conversation with Gaffney? I
22 don't think that in my first conversation that I knew.
23 Q When you asked him how many HAWKs were
24 available, did that include HAWKs in the pipeline to
25 other countries?
(JMGIASSfflED
83
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1 A Yes, it probably did. I don't know if I was
2 explicit about that. But I just wanted to know how many
3 HAWKs we had. I think I probably did ask him that.
4 Q Did you intend in your question?
5 A It may have been asked to -e that way. You
6 see, what I said was I think that the way the question
7 was put was that there was an initial effort to cover
8 this thing. I mean, let's remember that. Colin Powell
9 is a creature of the Secretary of Defense in this world,
10 and the Secretary of Defense doesn't want to do this, and
11 so at each step there would have been a certain amount of
12 keep it as minimal as possible.
13 And so he asked the question because somebody
14 else needed the answer, but why tell me what it's for if
15 there's a possibility if they would never have to go
16 through it anyway. So initially the question was posed
17 m such a way that it would be so all-encompassing to get
18 the answer that he wanted, but it wouldn't tell me what
19 the answer was for. You see what I'm saying?
20 Q I think I understand. Were you aware at the
21 time that there were HAWKs being processed for shipment
22 for transit to Israel?
23 A No, I was not.
24 Q Were you aware that there was an outstanding
25 letter of offer and acceptance for 100 HAWK missiles for
84
TOP SECRET/ CODEWORD 83
1 Israel?
2 A Not to my recollection, no.
3 Q Were you aware that on approximately between
4 the 19th and the 21st of November HAWK missiles were
5 being loaded on a ship in New Jersey for shipment to
6 Israel?
7 A I was not. I don't think I was.
8 Q Did Gaffney provide you information as to that
9 shipment of HAWKs either after your first request or at
10 any time thereafter?
11 . A I don't know that I ever knew that they were
12 loading up HAWKs.
13 Q " Did Gaffney provide you any information about
14 that 100 HAWK shipment to Israel at any point?
15 A I don't think he did. I mean, when the
16 question of Israel came up he must have thought it was
17 strange, as I reflect on it, that we were sending these
18 things over there for whatever reason, and we already had
19 1,000 going. I don't remember that he told me that. He
20 may have known more than I knew about this. I don't
2 1 know .
22 Q In regards to your last answer, how would
23 Gaffney have known that your question was in respect to
24 HAWKs destined for Israel?
25 A I didn't say that. What I said was I didn't
llNeLftSS!F*.ED
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84
1 think -- I asked him the question in as generic a manner
2 as possible, and I don't remember that my first question
3 that I knew what the destination was, so I couldn't have
4 conveyed it to him. And then as the thing went forward
5 and it was refined and it came back on paper then there
6 were subsequent discussions and obviously — I mean,
7 that's why I was a little puzzled by this document.
8 Q In your subsequent discussions with Gaffney
9 following your first request to him as to how many and
10 where; was there mention of HAWKs in relation to Israel
11 in any way?
12 A I'm sorry?
13 Q After that first question to Gaffney, did you
14 then have a conversation with Gaffney in which Israel was
15 mentioned in relation to this request concerning HAWKs?
16 A I don't know. I would assume that I did, but
17 I don't recall that. The HAWK things were curious. It
18 started out and then it stopped insofar as my
19 involvement.
20 Q In your reporting the information you had to
21 General Powell did you relate to him the information that
22 Dr. Gaffney had provided you?
23 A Yes, sure.
24 Q In your request to Gaffney did you request any
25 legal advice?
iJH^lSWSED
86
UNObA^SIffED
85
1 A No.
2 Q Was any request made of you to seek legal
3 advice concerning HAWKs?
4 A Mo, not that I can recall, anything like that.
5 Q When Gaffney provided you with the point paper
6 or discussed it with you, was there any in-depth
7 discussion of the legalities of a hypothetical transfer
8 to Israel and then to Iran?
9 A I don't recall that. There certainly weren't
10 in the early discussions. I would guess when he came
11 back with the paper and I see this is the paper he came
12 back with that if there were others that he would have,
13 just in the interest of thoroughness, he would have sort
14 of given me a comprehensive answer. But I'm still trying
15 to get clear in my mind that there was an understanding
16 of what it was we were doing when that understanding
17 came, and then if there was a discussion of legalities it
18 would have been -- and again I'm sure that Hank would
19 have looked at this the same way I looked at it -- it was
20 not that we were setting out to break the law and we
21 wanted to find out which law it was we could break it
22 better or figure out how best to get around it.
23 But that for the sake of people who don't work
24 with this thing on an hourly basis, so to speak, they
25 would give you this is what you are doing so you know.
i
UNCtftSSfflED
87
S6
1 Q Do you know if -- did you ask or make any
2 legal inquiry of Silber, the General Counsel for DSAA, as
3 to the legalities of the transfer?
4 A No. You see, keep m mind whatever else was
5 clear from this, it was that this was a secret operation
6 and of necessity and it was secret not for any reasons
7 involving legality.
8 Q Just so I understand, do you draw the
9 conclusion that it was secret because the question was
10 put to you by Powell or did he tell you that this
11 involved a secret operation?
12 A • Christ, I was smart enough to figure that out.
13 I didn't need to be told that. I mean, for all these
14 reasons that Hank has laid out it's pretty rudimentary.
15 I mean, we understood, or I understood, having
16 responsibility for this terrorism business, what would be
17 the effect of this or the probable effect of it would be.
18 And since I had been concerned for as long as I had about
19 the question of the absence of any policy in the Gulf
20 toward Iran or anybody, the fact that that would be a
21 destabilizing, have destabilizing consequences there, all
22 of these things, you know, made it very clear that if you
23 began with the assumption that this was the dumbest
24 goddam thing you ever heard of it, and then work from
25 there to the very short conclusion that you are going to
liNCWSSfF^lli
88
l/N€WSSfFSfD
87
1 do it anyway, then there is a tendency to want to keep
2 the dumbest things you've ever heard of, if you are going
3 to do them, do them secretly and not do them out in
4 public.
5 Q But it was your state of mind, then, rather
6 than anything General Powell said to you that led you to
7 believe that this somehow involved Iran and Israel?
8 A You know, it was part of the environment. It
9 was the atmosphere. It was come on, I've got to see you,
10 come on down.
11 MR. ADLER: Wait a minute. I don't think you
12 heard his question. Would you repeat the question?
13 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
14 Q So it was your state of mind then, rather than
15 anything General Powell said to you, which led you to
16 believe that this was a secret operation, that the
17 request was in relation to a secret operation involving
18 somehow Israel and Iran?
19 ■ A I wouldn't try to get into my state of mind.
20 The point was simply that I was asked to come down there
21 and so immediately it was clear that he wants to talk to
22 me about something that he doesn't want to talk to me
23 about on an open line. True, he could have called me
24 secure, but you don't get the same sort of intimacy on a
25 secure line. Therefore, this is something that is
I
iiliCtftSStf^D
89
4
10
14
15
18
19
20
(/N€k4SSIfSgD
88
1 sensitive, extremely sensitive.
2 And what that sensitivity is you don't know at
3 that point. Just how many of these things are there?
Where are they? That kind of thing. And then as it went
5 forward in our discussions it was clear that this was a
6 secret operation.
"7 Q As it went forward was it discussion between
8 you and General Powell about Israel and Iran in
9 connection with HAWKs?
A I don't remember when the question of Israel
11 presented itself. I mean, I think it was presented in a
12 very gross way at first, and that was that we were giving
13 them to Iran and giving them to Iran for the hostages,
and whatever the number was -- I don't remember what I
have -- and it was just the two of us, in effect, not
16 kibitzing but sort of trying to figure out what does all
1"^ of this mean, working with numbers the best we knew at
that moment, and we estimated that what we were doing was
paying a quarter of a billion dollar ransom for these
people and I just thought it was crazy.
21 So then there was the question of Israel. How
22 was it being done? And it turns out that we were deep
23 into this thing before I realized it was not a giveaway
24 but it was a sale that we were talking about.
25 Q At that time, focusing on HAWK discussions.
OUTCLASSIFSED
90
I
UN&LA^FItD
89
1 did General Powell indicate from where the request came
2 as to HAWKS?
3 A No.
4 Q What caused him to originate his question to
5 you?
6 A No.
7 Q Did he indicate in any way that he was
8 involved in conversations with Colonel North on the
9 subject of HAWKS?
10 -A Not in our early discussions.
11 Q In what discussions then would he have been
12 involved with Colonel North and HAWKs?
13 A Subsequent discussions.
14 Q When would they have taken place?
15 A Well, we're talking about an event that is
16 somewhat compressed anyway. It begins in maybe the first
17 or second week of November and by December I'm into TOWs
18 here. As I said, this thing just went away. And when
19 Ollie was discussed in conjunction, or even if he was, I
20 don't know. I mean, I just can't recall how we made the
21 transition from the general to the specific, from fairly
22 close hold to it is Iran, Israel's in it, Ollie's in it
23 and so forth.
24 Q In this compressed conversation over those
25 several weeks in November was there any discussion of
UNetftSSfF'ED
91
^^smic^
90
1 HAWKs in the pipeline in connection with any of these
2 people or matters?
3 A I don't remember that there was.
4 Q I'm about to begin another area. Roger, if
5 you have a question on the pipeline, I'm going to move to
6 another area.
7 MR. KREUZER: I have a different area.
8 MR. SABA: Do you want to wait until we get
9 there?
10 • MR. KREUZER: All right.
11 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
12 Q Moving down to the matters concerning your
13 meeting with Ben Yosef, how did you understand it to be
14 that Ledeen had negotiated a price for U.S. TOWs with
15 Israel?
16 A I didn't understand it all. All I knew was
17 what Ollie had told me, was that Bud had started this
18 thing and Ledeen had been the operator in it and had
19 screwed it up, as he said. But why Ledeen would be in it
2 0 I couldn't figure that out. Ledeen had worked for me for
21 a while and was on my payroll as a consultant and
22 eventually I squeezed him out of there because he didn't
23 know anything about terrorism, when he was supposed to be
24 an expert on terrorism.
25 So how he got into this I didn't know except
bwairaFfo
92
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91
1 he tended to float from department to department, from
2 State to Defense to the White House and then he tried to
3 come back to Defense.
4 Q Why does Ollie tell you to negotiate with Ben
5 Yosef, and I'm asking again in an institutional sense?
6 A No reason. This is -- what Ollie is trying to
7 do is to keep to an absolute minimum the number of people
8 who are knowledgeable about this, for whatever reason,
9 which had to do with Colin or something else, I don't
10 know, but I'm in the box now, and so you suddenly, once
11 you make that departure from bureaucratic norms, you're
12 in a state of willy-nilly.
13 And so he says I need this done, and this
14 becomes this little band of brothers that are functioning
15 in effect. Why me? Because suddenly, as nearly as I
16 could make sense of what Ollie was telling me, was that
17 here was another hot potato that had been handed to him
18 and it was alive and cooking, whether anybody liked it or
19 not, and so -- I mean, there may be a certain amount of
20 improvisation in this thing where it started out to get
21 the hostages but I think there's no question in my mind
22 it started out to get the hostages back.
23 I mean, I could almost go back to little
24 signals I got from the Israelis and so forth, but it
25 began there and then as Ollie took it over he began to
urctB»D
93
UNCtftSStflEO
92
1 think in terms of the larger purposes of what values
2 might be served by this.
3 But however this was, he had it and what he
4 was doing was compartmenting this thing and limiting it
5 to people he could depend upon.
6 Q When he asked you to speak with Ben Yosef, did
7 you report that fact to Powell?
8 A I'm sure I did.
9 Q In preparing for your conversation with Yosef
10 you mentioned that you had a floor on a price for the
11 TOWs. Did you indicate that you knew of a ceiling on the
12 price?
13 A No. I don't remember that there was a ceiling
14 on the price. The ceiling on the price was just like if
15 you've ever been to Rasuk's to buy a rug, you know. The
16 ceiling of the price is what he is willing to pay.
17 Q So you weren't informed there was a number
18 above which you couldn't go other than what's
19 ■ commercially reasonable, of course?
20 A I don't understand. Well, the answer is no.
21 MR. SAXON: Make sure there's no confusion
22 here. In your question, Joe, you are talking about per
23 TOW, a ceiling -- whether it's $5,000 or $6,000 or
24 $8,000.
25 THE WITNESS: Do you mean the numbers of TOWs?
94
UirCLAI^S^IFIED
93
1 MR. ADLER: You are talking dollars, price?
2 MR. SABA: I'm talking about price.
3 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
4 Q I asked the question because I understood you
5 to say earlier that Rudd gave a higher price than you
6 were willing to negotiate.
7 A No, no. I think what was said was that he
8 said the lowest they had ever sold one before was $6,800
9 and I didn't -- nobody else put a restriction on me. But
10 as I sort of doped out or calculated the negotiation in
11 my mind I was pretty confident that they wouldn't go that
12 high, particularly if you are beginning at $2,500, which .
13 has no absolute authority. But it is there. It has been
14 negotiated once by an agent of the U.S. Government,
15 legitimate or not.
16 And to drag them up there to almost three
17 times what had been negotiated --
18 Q Was there any discussion between you and Ben
19 • Yosef as to the price of HAWKs?
20 A I don't remember that ever being discussed.
21 Q Was there any discussion of the price of any
22 weapons other than TOWs?
23 A I don't remember that either. I think it was
24 just TOWs.
25 Q Was your discussion with Ben Yosef limited to
UMtl/iSWlID
95
UNaitSSIFIED
94
1 those TOWs which Israel had already transferred? That
2 is, was it a retroactive negotiation or was it also
3 prospective as to possible future transfers?
4 A I think it was both. I think it was both. I
5 don't remember. Even to this day it is not clear that
6 they recovered the initial tranche that went in. I just
7 don't know. But I think I don't have a good recollection
3 of that. I mean, it seems to me we were talking about
9 dollars and it wasn't like Major Major's eggs where you
10 can make it up on volume. If you bought one TOW it was
11 whatever we came up with. If we bought 5,000 it was the
12 same thing.
13 Q Turning your attention to the meeting at
14 roughly somewhere in the first ten days of February '86
15 at the White House where General Secord took part in the
16 meeting, you indicated that you were aware prior to the
17 meeting that he was involved. How were you aware?
18 A Because Ollie had mentioned that in one of our
19 conversations. That was something along the lines of
20 who's running this thing. Who do we have doing it? And
21 he said somebody that you have confidence in.
22 Q Did Ollie mention in particular why Secord was
2 3 involved?
24 A No.
25 Q wj's there any discussion as to —
yNCLBSlHED
96
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95
1 A No. As soon as he mentioned, it would have
2 been self-evident.
3 Q Was there any discussion or questioning as to
4 the need for a commercial cutout?
5 A No, never.
6 Q Was the discussion at this February meeting at
7 the White House concerning a transfer of TOWs which the
8 CIA would shortly make?
■ 9 A Yes, I guess so. I think so.
10 Q And was there any discussion in that meeting
11 as to the role Secord would play?
12 A I don't remember exactly. Secord was — let
13 me try to elaborate this for you a little bit here, for
14 what it's worth, just as an explanatory footnote. You
15 say was there any discussion of why you had to go private
16 and the answer was no, and that may sound a little
17 strange to you because why would you do that when you've
18 got this vcist panoiily of stu£f .that the taxpayers had
19 bought to do things i.i^ that. '"■ -^-
20 =4pd if you 1?ent tht» «oute you. amst.ije trying
21 to circwHCBnt ttt^S^^ST. ^^Bqtt^vfiac^^A iiMl'-«xperJ:ence
22 after «acper^picji^^^t^ jBtggrian^fe^i^g^wrth^j^gaverrim^ft —
2 3 to ^ry to get j|K^ y>vegfta«ntr to "^a thtngpt i4 ought to do ,
2 4 to try to get^tha Central I^»lli^nc« Ager^ to take
25 certain m^ps or^tJt- leaiW' to corwider tb^^posslbility ot^^
mtm^rmi
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1 certain steps to deal with^ agong other things, th«
2 problem of terrorism. '-- _ --
3 We had had instances in which we needed to get
4 the military to respond and almost invariably they would
5 screw it up somehow. There was one event where we had
6 three airplanes broken trying to get them off the ground
7 in the Middle East to take a survey team over there to
8 work on an incident that was live at the time. And so it
9 was -- and then, of course, you had the differences of
10 opinion, you know, between the services.
11 The Army has no confidence in the Air Force.
12 The Air Force doesn't care whether the Army has any
13 confidence in it or not. It is going to go its own way
14 and do its own thing regardless. And so the Army then
15 goes out and hires its own airplanes in the private
16 sector. I mean, you've got this kind of stuff. So when
17 you live in this environment after a while you decide
18 that if you're going to do anything in furtherance of
19 your country's interests then you're not going to do it
20 through this damn bureaucracy.
21 And it doesn't have anything to do with
22 circumventing the law. It has to do with circumventing
23 the absence of leadership and people's willingness to
24 make the goddam thing work. So if you can't get it to
25 work, you go and you find people that do know how to do
viiiciisstf*^^
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1 it, and if they are willing to do it you hire them and
2 get them to do it.
3 Q Was there any discussion in the meeting
4 concerning the financial arrangements?
5 A Not that I know of. There may have been.
6 MR. ADLER: With Secord?
7 MR. SABA: With Secord.
8 THE WITNESS: For how they were being paid on
9 this thing? No, I don't know anything about that.
10 ■' BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
11 Q That was my first question. The second one
12 were financial arrangements concerning the sale of the
13 TOWs, first the procurement by CIA from DOD and, second,
14 the price of CIA to Israel.
15 A I don't remember. You would have thought I
16 would have taken a proprietary interest in that, but I
17 don't remember.
18 BY MR. KREUZER:
19 Q Sir, you mentioned earlier that one or perhaps
20 a primary consideration for your resigning and you were
21 asked to think over a couple of days and you thought it
22 over, and I put in my resignation, and one of the things
23 you mentioned was you didn't like the management of the
24 airlift issue.
25 And lait week we were discussing airlift
UNCLftSSif?€0
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1 contracts and I believe we were discussing the fact that
2 Richard Gadd had an airlift contract with Army and that
3 Air Force took exception to the fact that he had that
4 contract. And you said that in spite of the fact the Air
5 Force could not provide the service, they didn't like the
6 fact that Gadd had this contract.
7 A The Army had the contract.
8 Q The Army had the contract with Gadd and
9 therefore they wanted the Army to kill this contract with
10 Richard Gadd and they wanted to have the contract in
11 spite of the fact they couldn't provide the services.
12 A That is not exactly the way I stated it.
13 That's not the point. I mean, it's so bizarre that maybe
14 it's difficult to get the point. But the thing is the
15 Air Force position was anything that has wings on it is
16 our domain. Now helicopters don't have wings on them.
17 They don't give a damn about them.
18 They wanted the Army to have the contract for"
19 fixed wing aircraft. They also wanted to contract
20 themselves so they would administer the contract. That
21 may not sound bizarre to you, but it does to me. Once
22 you've got to go down to Acme to hire your own air force,
23 what the hell difference does it make who does the
24 hiring?
25 Q Now was this what you were referring to just a
umH^^SIFlt^
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1 few minutes earlier when you said this was a
2 consideration that drove me to resign?
3 A It was that sort of thing, yes. That was only
4 one. That would almost be one of the acuter symptoms of
5 the problem.
6 Q Now when you left or maybe just prior to the
7 time you left you mentioned that you were offered a
8 position by Mr. Gadd with I don't know what firm.
9 A No, no, no. I don't want to overload that,
10 Roger. What I said was that Dick had talked to me about
11 either would I like to ^ome with him or, barring that,
12 could he be helpful to me in any way in setting up a
13 company. And it was really just a good faith offer.
14 I've spent a lot of time in the last six years doing
15 things that have not ingratiated me with the Pentagon and
16 therefore with all of the defense contractors and
17 everybody else — the sort of thing usually go to the
18 Pentagon to get rich.
19 You know, you spend a year and so many weeks
20 and days there and then you go out and take a job as a
21 Vice President for Rockwell or someone like that. And so
22 I sort of had done things that this small community, the
23 special operations people appreciated, and so it was not
24 unusual for them to be helpful to me where they could be,
25 purely out of, as much as anything, gratitude.
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Q Would Gadd qualify as a member of that small
community of special operations types?
A Sure.
Q Did you maybe perhaps -- you, I believe, last
week said you started your own operation. You were in
the antiterrorist business. Was that perhaps a reason
why you didn't go m to work for Gadd? I mean, he is not
exactly in the same kind of business as you are.
A Well, I don't know if there is any particular
reasoh why. I just didn't want to do it. I just wanted
to do what I wanted to do.
Q Did you maybe subsequently strike any
contracts with him?
A No. So there's no confusion, so this doesn't
come up out of the blue anywhere -- and I don't care
whether you take it off the record or not -- there was an
effort on my part while I was still in government to
design a computerized exercise for purposes of training,
UlfCLA^SIFTED
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1
2
3
4
5 talked to some people who were smarter than I about
6 computers and tried to, in as innocuous a way as
7 possible, without divulging anything, to devise a game
B that a person could play against a personal computer that
9 he could carry with him on a plane or whatever and that
10 was a- terrorist game. It was a terrorist exercise in
11 effect.
12 And so Dick had the kind of people that could
13 do this. Some of these guys who come out of these deals.
14 And so for a long time we played with it and eventually
15 we came up with a proposal, or they did, which sounded
16 sensible and it went to -- it was a sole source deal. It
17 was wired and American National Management had it. Then
18 apparently there was some kind of — some sort of a
19 disagreement within the company and there was an
20 allegation that the follow-on contract for the computer
21 or the implementation of this thing had been bid and it
22 just was such that it began to look like there would be
23 not any illegality or wrongdoing but the appearance of
24 it.
25 And I didn't want to be involved with any
UftCLA^tPED
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1 appearances or realities, and so I immediately told the
2 people who administered these contracts that I wanted
3 this thing stopped. I want a complete investigation run
4 to see whether I or anybody else had done this. And that
5 was stopped and the investigation was run and it was
6 discovered, as we all knew, that everybody was totally
7 clean. By that time I had left. Ropka was there and I
8 think it was his decision not to resume this.
9 Q Now was this all more or less in the
10 compartment of special operations?
11 A Special plans.
12 Q And in your special plans role did you get
13 involved with any kind of planning with the contra
14 effort?
15 A Ko.
16 Q Nothing about that?
17 A No.
18 Q In your discussions with Mr. Gadd did he ever
19 discuss contra operations?
20 A I don't recall that he did, no. I don't think
21 he did.
22 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
23 Q Let me see if we can cover a good bit of
24 ground in the 30 minutes or so we have remaining. Mr.
25 Koch, you were involved in November of '85, late '85, in
UNCM^IB
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1 discussing HAWK missiles but you were not involved, were
2 you, with the later April '36 HAWK missile repair parts
3 issue; is that correct?
4 A I know nothing about that.
5 Q Were you involved at any point in looking at
6 the HAWK systems in late '85 or the TOWs in early '86 in
7 looking at the issue of readiness and whether there would
8 be an adverse impact on our readiness to make these
9 transfers?
10 -A No. I wouldn't be in a position to make that
11 call anyway. That would be kind of the sort of baggage
12 that would sort of come back to you just like the laws
13 that govern and the rest of it, and that would be one of
14 the things that they would automatically tell you when
15 you got into one of these things and you could ask the
16 question pursuant to your kid's homework that night, you
17 know. I mean, that would be one of those things that
18 they would tell you automatically.
19 Q I believe you told us before that readiness
20 was sort of the battle cry of a lot of people at the
21 Pentagon.
22 A Well, readiness was always an excuse for not
23 doing anything. You could always say they are saving
24 themselves for the prom.
25 Q At what point did you fill in Dr. Ikle on the
UNtLASSIft£9
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1 issue of TOWs to Iran?
2 A I don't remember. I didn't say anything to
3 him initially, and then I began to be concerned because
4 it put me in a position where I was going around him.
5 Now it didn't bother me to go around Armitage, because
6 Armitage wasn't in this loop to begin with. I mean, I
7 saw myself dealing with this thing with my special
8 planning hat on, and in that regard it seemed to me it
9 was all right to be working directly with the third
10 floor.
11 But I did not want somewhere down the road for
12 this to come o'lt and to have Fred, purely on the basis of
13 personal relationships, to have Fred feel that I had
14 colluded and gone around him. And I suspect that I
15 probably did it -- I may have even done it after I
16 realized Armitage was in the box. I may have done it
17 then because I was afraid he wouldn't tell Fred, and so I
18 thought Fred should not be in a vulnerable position.
19 ■ Q Do you recall what his reaction was when you
20 told him?
21 A I don't know what you know about the Swiss,
22 but they are not awfully demonstrative.
23 Q But it was clear, I believe you said earlier,
24 that when you told him it was clear to you that he had
25 not known.
U^fOtlWfD
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1 A No, he didn't know. And I think he just asked
2 a few casual questions. I mean, if I said that to you
3 out of the blue, it is sort of w/i/afrd anyway and you
4 wouldn't know. I mean, one might ask the penetrating
5 questions, but you don't have them available.
6 Q Let me ask you a question or two about this,
7 and I don't want to be misunderstood. I'm not trying to
8 prejudge and we certainly have the benefit in asking
9 these questions of hindsight and all of this. But you
10 have indicated fairly strongly that you thought there
11 were some policy problems at least in the early stages
12 with this as to how we dealt with our allies and stated
13 policy on terrorism and a different policy and practice,
14 et cetera.
15 And Dr. Ikle was the Deputy Under Secretary
16 for Policy. Did you not at least ask General Powell at
17 some point does Fred know about this? Should we clue him
18 in? What does he say? Et cetera?
19 A No.
20 Q Compartmented operations just don't work that
21 way?
22 A Well, that would be one excuse for not doing
23 it, sure. I mean, I would just leave it at that. I
24 didn't ask him and I didn't expect him to tell Fred.
25 Q What was the point at which you first learned
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that some funds from the arms sales to Iran might be
diverted to the contras?
A November 25.
With the Attorney General's press conference?
Yes.
So Colonel North never told you prior to that?
No.
And General Secord never told you prior to
Q
A
Q
A
Q
that?
No.
,A
Q Is it clear to you that when you were talking
about TOWs in early '86 and you were negotiating with Mr.
Yosef on the TOWs that you had a ceiling of $12 million
with which to work?
A I have somewhere in my mind that $12 million.
You didn't put it there. You sort of called it back to
life, I think. I don't remember how it got there.
Q And I don't want to put words in your mouth
either, but do you recall that wherever that figure came
from that it was fixed and that that is what we had to
work with? And if not, fine.
A I don't know. I don't know. I'm just
fascinated by the way the thing jumps around. I don't
think the point of that $12 million was to elude the $14
million threshold, and I can't reconstruct enough of it
e
108
y
107
1 in my mind to know where it came from, whether it came
2 from Ollie, was there some fund that was fixed that they
3 were going to pay for it with, or what. I don't know. I
4 don't remember.
5 I do remember $12 million.
6 Q Do you recall Mr. Rudd saying to you that in
7 his best judgment there was no way 4,000 TOWs could be
8 provided for less than about $25 million?
9 A Yes. I mean, I can see that in the
10 conversation which involved pricing numbers.
11 Q And that some of the TOWs were old and maybe
12 there could be some discounting here and there in terms
13 of shelf life, but by no means would it get down even
14 below $14 million?
15 A Well, again, I mean, I don't put these things
16 together — the threshold and the $12 million.
17 Q Can you recall any other statements that
18 Colonel North may have made to you during this time
19 period, any of these time periods, about the President's
20 statements to him or the President's state of mind on
21 these matters?
22 A Just what I told you. You see, it may have
23 been that somebody told me that. I mean it may have been
24 in conjunction with -- well, I don't know. I don't want
25 to speculate too far, but if somebody else had in mind to
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stay under tTiaT notification threshold, I may have been
told whatever you do, don't go over $12 million.
And it would be like the initial request of
tell us where all the TOWs in the world are, where all
the HAWKs in the world are. It's intended to cover
intent, and so if you asked, you know, stay under S12
million, one could see that that might have been intended
to cover the intent.
Q If you had been told that, is it fair to say
that likely there are only two people who would have told
you that -- either Colonel North or General Powell?
A Yes, I would say sure.
Q And you think one of them might have said
that?
MR. ADLER: Said?
MR. SAXON: Might have said you've got $12
million and that's all we've got to work with?
THE WITNESS: Yes. It would have had to have
been.
BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
Q Do you know which one it might have been?
A I would have to flip a coin. You know, I
understand the point, but if Ollie is the daddy rabbit in
this thing, either I got it directly from Ollie or I got
it from Colin and he got it from Ollie.
IMISSMD
110
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1 Q What can you tell us about Colonel North's
2 relationship to Director Casey?
3 A Only that he wasn't invoking the name or name-
4 dropping or anything like that, but in context Mr.
5 Casey's name would fit periodically in discussions that
6 we were having.
7 Q Do you specifically recall Casey's name coming
8 up in the context of HAWKs to Iran in late '85 or TOWs to
9 Iran?
10 A No, I don't. I mean, I know that Casey's name
11 came up a lot, and it came up, and I'm not being snide or
12 anything but we're dealing with a hell of a lot more
13 things than this, and so even these players were dealing
14 with more things than this on a regular basis. So there
15 were a lot of things that we were doing in which the
16 DCI's position and thoughts or Ollie's relationship with
17 him would have been a natural part of the thing. So
18 inevitably that would get mixed up in my mind.
19 Q You said you told us earlier you thought you
20 had two meetings with Secretary Weinberger about TOWs.
21 You've talked about one of them. Are you able to recall
22 anything about the second one or why you even thought
23 there was a second one?
24 A Occasionally I would be in there talking to
25 Colin and the Secretary would come into the office. I
Ill
110
1 mean, this was in the air. It was very much between us.
2 But I do have a recollection of two meetings in the
3 office, but I can't give you any more information, I
4 mean, what was the other one like or not.
5 Q Did you ever see Secretary one-on-one on this
6 topic?
7 A Never.
8 Q Was there any particular reason you wouldn't
9 have done that?
10 . A I would have preferred to have somebody there
11 so there would have been no question about what was said,
12 and I think Cap would for the same reason. The only
13 times we ever spent any time together would be in the car
14 driving back and forth to the White House.
15 Q But you say that in the context of a covert
16 operation and the fact that with things being covert
17 there is a good likelihood of misunderstandings?
18 A Well, in the context of something that the
19 ' players find distasteful, and one of them is in the
20 position of authority and he doesn't have any way on this
21 thing and doesn't necessarily want it to happen in the
22 first place. I mean, in some measure it would have to do
23 with keeping people's hands on top of the table. I don't
24 mean there's a lack of trust or anything like that, but
25 you know how these things play themselves back later on.
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So I would just have preferred to have Colin
there and I think he would have, too, and I think Colin
would have preferred to be there, because you want to
minimize in anything this delicate the opportunities for
misunderstanding or miscarriage.
Q Are you familiar with the^^^^^^^^H system?
A Yes.
Q To your understanding did the shipment of Army
TOW missiles to the CIA with the destination of Iran go
the ^^^^^^^^Bsy stem?
A My understanding would be that would bg the
normal procedure, that they would go throughj
Q That would be the normal procedure?
A I think so.
Q Do you understand that that happened in this
case?
A My understanding from being told, I think, by
yourself was that it didn't happen.
Q But that really came later in your involvement
in this?
A Yes. I didn't know how it was done. As I
said, I didn't know. Any time anything moved, I didn't
know anything about it.
Q At the point at which you left the Pentagon or
subsequent to having left the Pentagon but prior to all
\3W S
0
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112
1 of this breaking within the November '86 time frame, the
2 Attorney General's press conference and the weeks
3 preceding, did you ever ask any of your former colleagues
4 whatever happened on the arms to Iran initiative, if they
5 had gone forward or whatever?
6 A I would have occasional -- understand I didn't
7 leave the Pentagon until August and this thing went tits-
8 up in November and so I was on a fairly regular basis
9 apprised of what was happening from within.
10 .Q Who would have kept you apprised?
11 A There was a long period of time in which
12 nothing happened. There would have been times in which
13 Rich would come over and say sort of where things were
14 and I can't give you chapter and verse, but there were
15 other times when I knew from talking to Dick.
16 Q And so when you talked to General Secord did
17 he tell you about his full role in all of the arms
18 shipment end of it?
19 A No, he never did. And my interest, of course,
20 my most profound interest was in what was going to happen
21 to eventually get this relationship with Iran on track,
22 since there was no way to defend it. I mean, it was a
23 mess militarily. And the other thing was, in a more
24 casual way, was getting this hostage things straightened
25 out. And, of course, in the meantime more hostages had
mia^STFJED
114
113
X been taken.
2 And so from time to time he and I had
3 conversations about that.
4 Q Were you ever party to any discussions at the
5 Pentagon or with your former Pentagon colleagues after
6 you left the Pentagon that the taking of additional
7 hostages was in any way related to our willingness to
8 swap arms for hostages?
9 A I'm sorry. Say that again, please.
10 Q Were you ever in any discussions in which
11 Pentagon officials linked, speculatively linked, the
12 taking of additional hostages to our apparent willingness
13 to make concessions or swap arms for hostages?
14 A I don't remember. The Secretary made the
15 point, that was one of his arguments, that that would
16 happen, and it did. But I don't remember that.
17 Q In your conversations with General Secord did
18 he ever mention to you his contra side of all this?
19 A No. We had one conversation which was
20 prompted by, again going back to my earlier comments
21 about this community being fairly small and people
22 talking to each other, and at some point in this there
23 came up, maybe through General Singlaub or whatever it
24 was, that some complaint that Dick had made a lot of
25 money on some aircraft that he had sold to the contras.
UNffiHSStflEO
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1 And so X asked him. One night we were having
2 a drink. I said I understand that, you know, some people
3 are upset with you and they said that you have made a
4 killing on some Maules, and he said how can you make a
5 killing on an airplane that cost $65,000 or whatever it
6 cost? I mean, he totally dismissed and denied it and I
7 believe his denial.
8 MR. ADLER: Let me ipterpose something. Your
9 question about conversations with General Secord, I think
10 we sitting here had a time reference but could you give
11 us a time reference in terms of up until what date and
12 make certain then that his answer was responsive to that
13 date?
14 MR. SAXON: Sure.
15 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
16 Q Prior to the Attorney General's press
17 conference — and let's say from November 24- backward,
18 with the AG's press conference taking place on the 25th,
19 prior to that period with anybody who knew anything about
20 contras in any conversations you had with General Secord,
21 did he ever mention that in addition to working some
22 deliveries, whatever, on the Iran side I've been doing
23 some things for Ollie on the contra side?
24 A No.
25 MR. ADLER: Let me get one other thing on the
UNCLISMO
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1 record. That rather lengthy answer you gave, what time
2 period was that responsive to in your own mind?
3 THE WITNESS: What lengthy answer?
4 MR. ADLER: About your conversations with
5 Secord about the Maules and so forth.
6 THE WITNESS: It would have been sometime in
7 the summer of '86 probably, maybe even earlier.
8 MR. ADLER: Okay.
9 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
10 ■ Q Since the time you left the Pentagon have you
11 — let me retract that. Let me ask you more generally
12 what is the nature of your relationship with General
13 Secord?
14 A I consider him a close friend of mine.
15 Q And how long have you known him?
16 A Since 1981.
17 Q You met him when you first went to the
18 Pentagon?
19 A Right, and presently I am a trustee for a
20 legal assistance fund for him.
21 Q When you left the Pentagon did you continue to
22 have conversations with him, see him periodically, et
23 cetera?
24 A Yes, regularly.
25 Q Have any of those discussions or conversations
imctissififD
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116
1 involved doing business together?
2 A Yes.
3 Q And are you currently in business with General
4 Secord in any commercial enterprise?
5 A I don't know how you define that, but the
6 answer, I guess, is no.
7 Q Excepting the legal defense fund are you doing
8 business with General Secord?
9 A No.
10 .Q But you have had some discussions along those
11 lines?
12 A Yes.
13 Q This would be in terms of your security kinds
14 of things that you are currently doing?
15 A Yes. I mean, it would all be tied together,
16 sure.
17 Q When you were at the Pentagon was General
18 Secord a consultant to ISA after he left?
19 A I guess he was. I mean, he left under pretty
20 outrageous circumstances and I think they did him a
21 consultancy just to salve their own consciences. I don't
22 remember that he ever did anything.
23 Q Can you tell us what the SOPAG is?
24 A The SOPAG is a unit that I set up back in
25 probably '82- '83 which is the Special Operations Policy
ui^jf iLU
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1 Advisoiry Group.
2 Q And after you left the Pentagon was there a
3 point at which General Secord became a member of the
4 SOPAG?
5 A He was on the SOPAG before he left the
6 Pentagon, I think. I'm not sure when he came on. I
7 mean, I think I asked him when I immediately formed it,
8 and I don't remember whether I formed it before he left
9 or not.
10 • Q Do you recall were you a party to discussions,
11 decisions or just know generally the circumstances under
12 which he left the SOPAG?
13 A He didn't leave. He was taken off it by Rich
14 Armitage.
15 Q And why would that have been?
16 A Well, I don't know. I mean, ostensibly the
17 reason was because he hadn't submitted a financial
18 disclosure statement, but Dick would have seen the delay
19 in that submission as related to the legal situation in
20 which he found himself, in which he had, through some
21 chain of legal causation, had to do with his Fifth
22 Amendment rights. And so that was taken as an
23 opportunity to put him off the SOPAG.
24 Q Let me have you mark as Exhibit 6 these
25 documents, the cover of which is a letter from
mmm
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1 Congressman Lee Hamilton as Chairman of the Permanent
2 Select Committee on Intelligence to Secretary Weinberger
3 bearing the date of November 25, 1986. The cover letter
4 simply says that enclosed is a transcript of some
5 testimony the Secretary provided and then also some
6 questions for the record.
7 (The document referred to was
8 marked Koch Exhibit Number 6
9 for identification.)
10 • If you would look in this letter, by the way,
11 it bears the numbers D-51, and that is the Senate Select
12 Committee's document number D-51. The next page has D-83
13 on it, and it says the subject is Questions and Answers
14 for the Record from the Secretary of Defense.
15 If you look down at number four, it asks did
16 General Secord have any kind of consultant contract, et
17 cetera, and it goes /^nto basically tell us what you just
18 told us. The next page, D-84, numbered paragraph five:
19 Was General Secord dropped from one of our committees for
20 failing to execute a financial statement?
21 And further down the paragraph it says in
22 Secretary Weinberger's answer: Major General Secord' s
23 membership on the SOPAG was terminated effective 4 August
24 1986 based upon his failure to provide the Department
25 with financial information as required in form SF-1555.
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1 A So that would be before all this came up,
2 right.
3 Q It would be before it all broke, yes, in terms
4 of the press in November. And then Secretary Weinberger
5 references, he says amplifying information is enclosed at
6 Tab C, and if you look at the last page, D-101, is that
7 attachment, that Tab. And under the date of appointment
8 column it says "termination based on Secord's refusal to
9 provide SF-1555."
10 A But this was, it says, forwarded.
11 Q Forwarded to Personnel on 10/23/86, with the
12 effective date of 8/5/86. That is correct.
13 A The 23rd of October, then. Well, so what's
14 the question? Let me point out some things that are
15 interesting here. Dick is the only one that I know who
16 never took, who was never paid. He was on this SOPAG.
17 He did come to meetings and he never put in for payment.
18 It's his understanding, and it is mine, that
19 ■ the failure to provide the financial information which
20 was essentially a spurious reason for putting him off —
21 why he didn't provide it, I don't know — but I thought
22 it was benign, and I will until I hear a better
23 explanation.
24 Q That's fine. We're simply showing you this to
25 see what, if anything, you can say to shed light on the
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situation.
A
mind.
0 Let me ask you now about and let me have
:^arked as Deposition Exhibit Number 7 a newspaper article
that appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer on
1987.
March 24,
(The document referred to was
marked Koch Exhibit Number 7
for identification.)
For our purposes really the first few
paragraphs are the ones that are relevant. it talks
about General Secord's problems and says: Retired Air
Force Major General Richard E. secord, a key figure in
the Iran-contra affair, acted "at the bidding of the
highest levels of the U.S. Government" according to a
fundraising appeal by Noel C. Koch, fonner Director of
special operations at the Pentagon. And that would be
you.
First of all, do you recall making such a
statement?
A^ I don't j-emember ever s^i^ 4Car^|=ie, iut
youjiainfca «opy of that letter? "^ '" ' ' "^
Q We do not.
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1 A I guess you need one, right? I don't happen
2 to have one with me, but I'll get one ^d send it for the
3 record. But that comes out of there. sTfd what you're
4 asking me about specifically, "acting at the bidding of
5 the highest levels of the U.S. Government" comes from, is
6 a quote. I mean, I'm quoting here_fron a newspaper
7 article which may have been the New York Times magazine.
8 I'm not sure.
9 Q You have anticipated the question. I'm simply
10 trying to find out what the basis was for the
11 representation that he acted at the bidding.
12 A I don't know. I wasn't there when the
13 President said go forth.
14 Q Let me just ask then, for the record, did
15 General Secord ever tell you at any point before or after
16 these matters broke that he was acting at the behest of
17 the President, at the specific request or instruction of
18 the President, et cetera?
19 A No. I don't think he ever did.
20 Q Let me ask you --
21 A I'm sure he never did. He wouldn't have.
22 Q Let me ask you about a phone conversation or
23 two conversations that I think took place on the morning
24 of the Attorney General's press conference, which would
25 have been November 25, 1986. Do you recall having placed
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a call to General Secord or trying to contact him?
A On the morning of the press conference?
Q That is correct.
A Yes, I do recall,
Q And do you recall that the first time you
called you spoke to him personally or whether you spoke
to someone else?
A I think I talked to Bob Dutton.
Q And Mr. Dutton worked with or for General
Secord?
A Yes.
Q So you placed a call to Stanford Technology?
A Well, I placed the call to Dick, as I recall,
and he wasn't available. Then I talked to Bob, and then
I talked to Dick later.
Q Do you remember what, if anything, you said to
Mr. Dutton?
A I don't really remember. I don't have a good
recollection. It seems to me that we were -- I mean,
Iran was cooking along and getting more and more
interesting and I don't know if I knew that there was
going to be a press conference, whether it had been
announced in advance or what that day.
Q Do you recall Mr. Dutton saying something to
you along the lines of yeah, something's going on and
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1 Dick will know?
2 A I don't remember what he said to me.
3 Q So you had a short conversation with him and
4 then what happened? Did General Secord get on the phone,
5 or you placed a second call, or what?
6 A I guess I called him again.
7 Q And do you remember anything about that
8 conversation?
9 (A discussion was held off the record.)
10 MR. SABA: I have a few questions, so I can
11 continue until he returns.
12 (A discussion was held off the record.)
13 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
14 Q What do you recall, if anything, about your
15 conversation that morning of the AG's press conference
16 with General Secord?
17 A I have no recollection about the substance of
18 that conversation.
19 Q Do you remember him railing against Secretary
20 Shultz and Don Regan for not being supportive of the
21 President and protecting the President?
22 A I don't remember it, but he probably did.
23 Q Do you remember him saying that he himself
2 4 would go public with what he knows except he was
25 concerned about our hostages and the compromise of any
I
yirasrtro
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1 Iranian intermediaries?
2 A Yes, I think I do remember that.
3 Q Do you recall him saying that he had already
4 notified these agents, these Iranian intermediaries, that
5 something was about to break?
6 A I don't remember that exactly.
7 Q Do you recall him saying that he had spoken
8 the previous evening to Admiral Poindexter for about ten
9 minutes?
10 . A I remember him saying he had a conversation
11 with John, but I may be telescoping whether that
12 conversation occurred the previous evening or that day.
13 MR. SAXON: Do you have a quick one?
14 MR. SABA: Are you finished entirely?
15 MR. SAXON: Enough.
16 MR. SABA: Are we going to resume or if I can
17 finish quickly.
18 MR. SAXON: Take two minutes or whatever and
19 see what you can do and then we will regroup later to see
20 if we need to convene again.
21 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
22 Q Do you know Albert Hakim?
23 A Yes.
24 Q How do you know him?
25 A I met him through Dick.
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Q At what time?
A It would be after Dick left and after he went
with Albert in Stanford Technology, or whatever it's
called, Trade Group International.
Q Could it be as early as the summer of '83?
A It could be. I don't remember exactly when
Dick left, but it could be, sure.
Q And what was the occasion for your meeting and
relationship since?
A Well, as you see, Dick and I were close
friends and he had started this business, and he brought
Albert around and I don't know exactly why but it was
like a courtesy call, which wouldn't have been unusual.
I mean, a lot of people, business people, do come by, and
it was in that nature. And we simply got acquainted.
Q In your official duties, one of your duties
was to be concerned with Africa.
A That's right.
Q Did you coordinate your activities with Ollie
North on Africa?
A No. I don'trec
Q Did you have any connection with any special
operations in Africa?
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A No, I don't think there were any that 1 can
recall
The special operations?
Generally.
No.
MR. SABA: Let's go off the record.
(A discussion was held off the record.)
MR. SAXON: Back on the record. Let me say,
first of all, for the record, Mr. Koch, we should
acknowledge that you have appeared here voluntarily and
without any effort to seek any immunity or without even
being subpoenaed. We appreciate that, we appreciate
your candor and your frankness and your time in trying to
help us piece this all together.
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I do have a few more questions and so it looks to
me like we will have to convene at an another time, but
let me say for today we thank you and we will be back in
touch.
(Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the taking of the
instant deposition recessed, to reconvene at a future
date.)
Signature of the Witness
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
, 1987.
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
\smmm
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UJWSS!
CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
Ravnond R. Heer III
Che officer before -jhom the
::;regoing deposition was ca<en, do hereby certify that the witness
whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was dulv sworn
b y i^* ; that tne testimony of said witness was
taken by ae to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting
uader ny direction; that said deposition is a true record of tr.e testimony
given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor
employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition
was taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any
attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.
JJs^^^uU
NOTARY PUBLIC
DISTRICT OF C0L;>1BIA
My Commission expires : ^V 3^' ^^^^
"NWXS/f/ffl
131
Stenographic Traiflscript of
o^{iW°' '
I i.J »
HEARINGS '''^'
Before the
^'^CUSS/F/£D
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
UNITED STATES SENATE
TESTIMONY OF NOEL C. KOCH - Continued
Friday, May 29, 198?
Pirtally Declassified/Released on
J-'f-^r
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by N. Menan, National Security Council
UNCLASSIFIED
Washingron. D.C.
meSiREDUNIilliSIFIED
^fe^^l V cop^ NO. IC^tw — I — copies
ALD6=SCN ^EPCRTNG
(202) 628-9300
20 F STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
133
UNMSHD
12 S
1 TESTIMONY OF NOEL C. KOCH - Continued
2 Friday, May 29, 1987
3 United States Senate
4 Select Committee on Secret
5 Military Assistance to Iran
6 and the Nicaraguan Opposition
7 Washington, D. C.
8 Continued deposition of NOEL C. KOCH, called
9 as a witness by counsel for the Select Committee, at the
10 offices of the Select Committee, Room SH-901, Hart Senate
11 Office Building, Washington, D. C. , commencing at 10:21
12 a.m., the witness having been previously duly sworn, and
13 the testimony being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN
14 SCHAFER and transcribed under her direction.
15
Partially Declassified/Released on ' ' " "
under provisions of E.O- 12355
by N. Menan, National Security Council
wmm\i
134
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1 APPEARANCES :
2 On behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Secret
3 Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
4 Opposition:
5 JOHN D. SAXON, ESQ.
6 On behalf of the House Select Committee to
7 Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran:
8 JOSEPH SABA, ESQ.
9 On behalf of the witness:
10 ROBERT M. ADLER, ESQ.
11 Ninth Floor
12 1667 K Street, N.W.
13 Washington, D. C. 20006
mtfts^^D
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1 CONTENTS
2 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF
3 WITNESS SENATE "' HOUSE
4 Noel C. Koch
5 By Mr. Saxon 4
6 By Mr. Saba
1 EXHIBITS
8 KOCH EXHIBIT NUMBER FOR IDENTIFICATION
9 1
10 2
11 3
12
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1 PROCEEDINGS
2 Whereupon,
3 NOEL C. KOCH,
4 called as a witness by counsel on behalf of the Senate
5 Select Committee and having been previously duly sworn,
6 was further examined and testified as follows:
7 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE - Resumed
8 BY MR. SAXON:
9 Q . Mr. Koch, I want to remind you that since this
10 is a continuation of your deposition you are still under
11 oath.
12 I'd like to start by covering a few points we
13 didn't cover before. In your meeting with Ben Yosef to
14 negotiate the price on the TOWs, to negotiate it up from
15 the lower price that apparently Mr. Ledeen had fixed, I
16 believe you told us, as best you are able to date, that
17 meeting took place around January 11; is that correct?
18 A The dating is related to the meetings that
19 were held then in the Pentagon, so we're fixing it as
20 exactly as possible. I don't consider it a very exact
21 procedure.
22 Q And your best recollection is that the meeting
23 was on a Sunday?
24 A That's correct.
25 Q Let me have marked as Deposition Exhibit 1 of
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1 the continuation -- I don't know the exact number from
2 the previous exhibits -- some appropriate and relevant
3 dates from your calendar for 1985 and 1986, your desk
4 calendar or desk diary, and ask that you would look at it
5 and walk us through it quickly and tell us why you think
6 you are able to date this on the 11th.
7 (The document referred to was
8 marked Koch Exhibit Number 1
9 for identification.)
10 A January 2 is a Thursday. I have nothing in
11 the morning, and it doesn't look like the kind of day
12 something like this would have happened on. It was
13 during the day.
14 Q All I know is that their records show, their
15 report shows January 2 of '86. I don't know time of day.
16 I don't know place.
17 MR. ADLER: You were at work? You were at the
18 Pentagon?
19 THE WITNESS: Yes. I was at work. It was a
20 Thursday and I had meetings and there's no reflection of
21 my doing anything that morning, and it would be on here.
22 If there was a meeting with these people on that day,
23 there would at least be some notation by my secretary
24 that I'm at the White House, that I'm somewhere. I feel
25 much more comfortable with my interpretation.
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1 Okay. Let me, if I can, just walk through
2 from the beginning without trying to fix precisely.
3 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
4 Q What I'd like you to do is on the dates that
5 you have provided to us from your desk diary, if you
6 would, for example, on 19 November 85 tell us what it is
7 that's of relevance there and why you are providing that
8 to us.
9 A 19 November is the first time within this time
10 frame that the thing is happening that there is an
11 indication that I have had a meeting with someone who
12 would have been involved in the sale of missiles, whether
13 HAWKs or TOWs, and we can take it all around. On the
14 19th at somewhere between 12:00 and 12:30 I go to see
15 Colin Powell with Hank Gaffney. That tells me that I
16 have had a meeting with Gaffney prior to this. I mean, I
17 wouldn't have gone directly to him because I know that
18 the request came from Colin sometime before this.
19 It was just for information. I relayed the
2 0 information and then I think there was a refinement of
21 the process and my sense — and it would have been
22 consistent with my normal operating procedures — there
23 wasn't any point in me being a pipeline. If Gaffney had
2 4 the information, then he ought to convey it directly.
25 But I didn't completely take myself out of it, but
DNClftSSIfe
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1 Gaffney went with me on the 12th.
2 Q Is there anything else of relevance on the
3 19th of November?
4 A I have an interview with a reporter at 2:00,
5 and that's interrupted for me to talk to Gaffney, and
6 then there's no further indication.
7 Q The next date, then, is January 7, 1986.
8 A Excuse me. There's a time here that I haven't
9 given you that I didn't notice when we went through this,
10 and that's the 20th.
11 Q Of November?
12 A Of November. And it indicates that after the
13 SecDef staff meeting that I talked with General Powell.
14 That could have been on this subject, could have been on
15 1,000 subjects since I was Acting Assistant Secretary at
16 the time.
17 Okay. Now we go then to 1986 and you asked
18 me, I think, the first date that I find here of interest
19 is the 7th.
20 Q So, for the record, let's look at January 2
21 and clean that up. I believe your statement is that on
22 January 2, according to your records, there was no
23 meeting with anyone which would appear to have any
24 relevance to our inquiry; is that correct?
2 5 A That's what the diary shows.
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1 Q And in particular there is no meeting with
2 Richard Secord, Oliver North, General Meron?
3 A There's no indication.
4 MR. ADLER: Let him put his question on the
5 record and then answer.
6 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
7 Q So, for the record, on January 2, 1986, your
8 records show there was no meeting at which you were
9 present with General Manacham Meron of Israel, Colonel
10 Oliver North, General Richard Secord, and Abraham Ben
11 Yosef; is that correct?
12 A That's correct.
13 Q Okay. Well, on that point do you recall ever
14 having been in a meeting with those individuals on
15 whatever date, if it was not precisely January 2, within
16 that late '85 or early '86 time frame?
17 A I don't recall that, no.
18 MR. ADLER: Was it your secretary's practice
19 to have noted on your calendar such a meeting, had such a
2 0 meeting taken place?
21 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. She's very diligent
2 2 about that.
23 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
24 Q So you feel reasonably safe, then, in assuming
25 that if it wasn't on there it didn't take place?
URCtltSStft!!)
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1 A That's right.
2 Q Now let us look, then, at your entries on your
3 calendar for January 7, 1986, if that's the next date
4 that you think has relevance.
5 A On the 7th, at 2:00 I meet with Hank Gaffney.
6 Then I'm interrupted by one of my Africans, and I spent
7 some time with him and resumed the meeting with Gaffney,
8 and then at 2:44 I have a meeting with Glen Rudd.
9 Q Can you think of any other reason you would
10 have met with those two particular individuals other than
11 to talk about TOW missiles, TOW prices, TOW availability,
12 et cetera?
13 A Well, there was a range of possible issues,
14 but I can't imagine the proximity in time to what was the
15 central issue here, it seems to me. I didn't meet with
16 these people on a regular basis. When I met with them it
17 was usually an unusual situation. If I had a question
18 that would be one that I would normally have with them,
19 it could be covered in a staff meeting that I would have
20 in the morning or I could call them on the phone. I
21 could even call on secure.
22 I would work it through another staff member,
23 very likely, so there would be very, very few things. It
24 would be unusual for me to meet particularly with Hank
25 Gaffney with any regularity at all, and so this suggests
142
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to me that that's what that meeting was about.
Q Is there anything else on January 7? Is there
a 4:30 meeting with Rudd?
A That says returned.
On the 8th —
Q That's January 8 of '86?
A Correct.
Q Go ahead.
A There's a meeting — not a meeting
necessarily, but I go to see Colin Powell at 1100 with
paper.
Q That says "to General" -- ,
A Powell.
Q With paper.
A Correct.
Q And "with paper" , what do you take that to
mean?
A Well, I have no idea. I can only speculate
that I had to give him the sequence of events that were
occurring in this time, that it was related to that, but
I don't know. It could have been an invitation to my
birthday party, but that's in March.
Q Now there is a 12:30 entry with regard to
Ollie Korth. what does that say?
A It says lunch sponsored by National Defense
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erhaps — Capitol Hill
On low intensity warfare. But below that —
Ollie and I went to that together.
Anything else of relevance on 8 January?
No. I don't think any of the subsequent
meetings are relevant.
Q The next entry we have is 9 January. What can
you tell, us there?
A At 1:00 I go to see Glen Rudd. The fact that
I went to see him is not necessarily unusual, but if it
was something that was on my mind that I wanted taken
care of right away I would just go do it rather than call
him to come to me or do it on the phone. So I suspect
that again this was something that I preferred to discuss
in private and expeditiously.
Q Any other relevant entry on 9 January?
A None that I think are relevant, no.
Q The next entry you provided is 10 January.
What can you tell us about that?
A Well, again I have a meeting at 10:35 with
General Powell. Again I want to remind you that I was
Acting at the time and so it could have been on a whole
range of issues.
Q And then you have an entry at 2:40 p.m.
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1 A But I should point out that we had a SecDef
2 staff meeting that morning and anything that would have
3 been germane probably would have been discussed there,
4 unless it was unusual, and that might be the reason I
5 went back to see General Powell, and this thing would
6 have been unusual.
7 Q And then at 2:40 p.m.?
8 A Oh, yeah. Okay. Well, that was a meeting
9 with Glen Rudd.
10 Q So at a minimum, if we look at those dates and
11 the next day, on 14 January, another meeting, there was
12 clearly some activity, some project, some issue you were
13 working with Mr. Rudd?
14 A Yes, that's true.
15 Q On 14 January, then, the next entry, Tuesday,
16 what is of relevant there for us?
17 A I have a meeting at 10:52 with Glen Rudd.
18 Q Anything else?
19 A No.
2 0 Q And the next to the last date you have
21 provided us is 24 January. What can you tell us about
22 that?
23 A I go at 10:40 or 11:00 to meet with General
2 4 Powell and now Rich Armitage is back and I have meetings
25 with him that day. In fact, I have a meeting with him at
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10:40, but then I go to see Powell at 11:00. It would be
unusual for both of us to go see General Powell together.
I assume that I went to see him. I'm certain I went to
see him by myself or, if I went to see him by myself it
was probably on that subject.
Q And then the last entry you provided us is 11
March.
A Right.
Q What is of relevance there?
A Well, I'm not sure what's relevant, but what's
interesting to me about it is that I had been out of the
country now. I went over to Europe on business on the
28th for a conference, and then I had to go to Berlin,
and so my trip was extended and it was a long trip and I
didn't return until the 11th, which was a Tuesday.
I got into Dulles at 1710 and rather than
going home I went to the Pentagon and met with Colin
Powell at 1845. Normally coming back from a trip like
that I would have gone home. The subject of the trip
would not have been anything that I would have been apt
to discuss with anybody in the Pentagon.
Q Now you mentioned this meeting to us before.
Do you recall what it was about?
A I do not recall. I have no idea.
Q Anything else?
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1 A I think at some point in this thing Colin
2 Powell said to me -- it was a period when I was out of
3 the country and up until then Rich Armitage was not in
4 the box, and then he said to me at a meeting while you
5 were away I needed this and that and the other thing
6 done, and he did say to me at one other point, I think,
7 that he felt Rich not knowing about this, and so I think
8 when I got back, it may have been to tell me that he had
9 cut Rich in on it. I'm not sure, but at some point he
10 did tell me that.
11 He told me that face to face. The only thing,
12 again, that I find curious is that I went from Dulles
13 downtown when it would have been much closer to go home.
14 But then I have meetings at 7:00 and again at 7:30 with
15 my special operations staff and I have a meeting also
16 with Armitage that night. So I can't really figure out
17 what was going on.
18 Q So to the best of your knowledge and
19 recollection we've covered the relevant entries for these
20 dates?
21 A That's correct, yes.
22 Q Let me go back then to your meeting with Ben
23 Yosef to negotiate the price for the TOWs and ask a
24 couple of follow-up questions there. For the record, was
25 anyone else in attendance at that meeting other than you
lEttSStfttD
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1 and Mr. Vosef?
2 A No, there was not.
3 Q And to the best of your recollection how many
4 meetings did you have with him?
5 A To the best of my recollection I had one
6 meeting.
7 Q Do you have any knowledge which would go
8 toward the confirmation of the fact that there may have
9 been a meeting on 2 January 1986 between General Meron
10 and Mr. Armitage to discuss replacement or replenishment
11 of Israeli TOWs?
12 A ■ No. My sense is that would have been early in
13 the game for Armitage 's involvement, but I have no
14 knowledge.
15 Q In terms of your negotiations with Mr. Yosef
16 on price what was said by either of you regarding the
17 need for that meeting, the need to be there to
18 renegotiate price at all?
19 A I don't believe that anything was said between
20 us on that. I mean, you know, we had a specific point to
21 this meeting. We had talked on the telephone prior to
22 the meeting mostly about the modalities for the meeting
23 and when we got together we got together with a full
24 understanding that it was to revise the price to be paid
25 for the TOW, and there was really very little extraneous
!1NS^^*![0
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2 We went through the subject and we concluded
3 it.
4 Q Let me see then if I can just clear up one
5 thing that may be odd in the record to anyone reading
6 this subsequently. The previous price that Mr. Ledeen,
7 possibly with the assistance of Mr. Schwimmer, had
8 negotiated with the Israelis was either $2,500 or $3,000
9 per TOW; is that correct?
10 A My understanding was it was $2,500.
11 Q And normally most people would think that the
12 buyer of an item would prefer a low price and would not
13 willingly submit to a renegotiation of a higher price
14 after they had fixed on a lower price. That's what
15 normal commercial practices would tell us.
16 Is it fair to say then that the Israelis, from
17 what you were able to gather, viewed this as also being
18 in their interest and they wanted to help the deal go
19 forward so they were willing to negotiate the price up?
20 A Well, it would be a reasonable assumption. I
21 don't think they went into it — I mean, they weren't
22 looking for an opportunity to have the price negotiated
23 up. They were going to do the deal or not, and I think
24 that Ledeen 's authority was so sketchy, in addition to
25 which his understanding of the pricing was to limited
naerscanaing or zne pric
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1 that nobody could reasonably have held that this number
2 that he had worked out had any weight.
3 So as I understood the situation it was either
4 get the price up or forget it.
5 Q I believe you told us that you took away from
6 this negotiation nothing in writing; is that correct?
7 A My recollection is I did not.
8 Q Did you have any working papers in front of
9 you, any papers with figures, notations as to price,
10 numbers, et cetera?
11 A I do not recall that I did. If I did, they
12 would have been very cryptic and I would have thrown them
13 away afterwards. I think I went in, as you would into a
14 negotiation, with my own parameters and with an estimate
15 of what I thought the other fellow's parameters were.
16 Q Is it your best recollection that you did not
17 keep any notes, records, documents of any sort pertaining
18 to this meeting?
19 A That's my recollection.
20 Q Once you left that meeting having agreed on
21 the price I think you told us before of $4,500, how was
22 that communicated by you and to whom was it communicated?
23 A It was communicated to General Powell
24 • certainly, and I'm quite certain that I also communicated
2 5 to Oliver Nc
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1 Q ^dUI(^rT"fi'ave~been by means of a phone call?
2 A I probably would have told General Powell face
3 to face, and I probably would have told Ollie on secure.
4 Q While I don't want to put any words in your
5 mouth, do you think it would have been a fairly brief
6 conversation in which you simply said we had the meeting
7 and here's the price?
8 A Yeah. I couldn't reconstruct that. It seems
9 to me that I have a recollection that the discussion with
10 General Powell then moved into the Secretary's office. 1
11 mean, certainly more than one of them did on this
12 subject, and it seems to me that this question of the
13 price, of having gotten the price into what could be
14 swallowed, you know, was a hurdle for the Pentagon, and
15 I'm not sure that the Secretary was delighted to manage
16 to clear that hurdle.
17 But I did it, and I think we went in and told
18 him that. And General Powell wanted me to do that rather
19 than doing it himself. And my recollection is that he
2 0 was rather agitated about the whole thing.
21 Q Now is your thinking that that was the meeting
22 that you and General Powell had with Secretary Weinberger
2 3 at which Secretary Taft was present and wouldn't absent
24 himself?
25 A I think it was. That gets a little stretched
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1 out, but I think it probably was.
2 Q Is it your recollection or perhaps your sense
3 that Secretary Weinberger knew there was an earlier price
4 that was not one that the Pentagon could swallow? Do you
5 think he knew the Ledeen-negotiated price of $2,500?
6 A I don't know. I would have to — I mean, the
7 price was not a minor issue in this, clearly. It would
8 be pure speculation to say that he did, but it seems to
9 me a fairly sensible speculation.
10 Q All right. It's clear after that session with
11 Secretary Weinberger you fairly well know his views on
12 all of this. Do you think you knew that he was rather
13 negative to the idea before you had your negotiation
14 session with Ben Yosef?
15 A Oh, yes, of course. We knew that going in. I
16 knew what my own feelings were and I know what General
17 Powell's feelings were, and I knew that reflected the
18 Secretary's feeling. So that awareness of the attitude
19 of the leadership came immediately with knowing what
20 these items were for. And that much preceded the
21 question of the price of the TOWs.
22 Q Had you met Ben Yosef prior to that meeting?
23 A I do not have a recollection of having met
24 him.
25 Q Have you met him or spoken with him since that
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1 meeting?
2 A I have not.
3 Q What do you sense was Colonel North's
4 understanding of TOW pricing that would lead him to
5 believe, when you communicated this price back to him,
6 the $4,500, that it was reasonable enough a basis to get
7 the TOWs from the Pentagon?
8 A I'm sorry? Just to explain, there was no
9 enthHsia^m in the building for doing it. Some of that,
10 of course, some of that lack of enthusiasm, to put it
11 euphemistically, reflected on Ollie. You know, they were
12 not happy. Ollie was in the middle of this thing,
13 running it, not that he had dreamed it up but that he had
14 it handed to him and he had been dealing with it and
15 finding solutions to these problems.
16 So the idea that it was possible to get an
17 acceptable price, a defensible price, as I said before,
18 was not a happy situation. And, of course, there was a
19 consensus, a very small consensus in a very small group
20 of people within our building that there was money being
21 made somewhere in this thing. Certainly somebody was
22 getting screwed and the Israelis were not passing these
23 things on for what they were paying for them.
24 And what that price was, we didn't know. That
25 of course is what complicated the negotiation. But
UNfilfflftEB
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10
148
1 Ollie, I think, you know -- I don't know that Ollie had
2 an idea in mind what the price should be. It had to be
3 something that could get those birds out of the Pentagon.
4 Q Okay. I understand that, and maybe I didn't
5 ask my question precisely enough. But as we now know, it
6 is possible to make a case and justify selling a TOW for
7 less than 54,500 if one looks at the AMDF price for a
8 basic TOW of 33,169, adds a MOIC for roughly $300, and
9 gets a price of 53,469. If you add some money for
crating, shipping, handling, et cetera, you are clearly
11 within the ball park of 54,500.
^2 People at the Pentagon, as we know, later in
13 - January, from roughly January 13 through the next week or
1* two, as this began to be worked by the Army, began to
15 come up with that price. It began to surface. There had
IS to be some time at which that information, either that
17 precise information or something in that nature in terms
18 of price, was communicated to Colonel North to let him
19 know that 54,500 was not only the price you had come up
20 with but that it was workable.
21 A Um-hum.
22 Q Now you may not know the answer to this, but
23 my question is do you have any information, were you
24 provided any information by Colonel North or General
25 Powell or anyone else that would lead you to believe
154
149
1 somehow this basic TOW price information had been
2 communicated to Colonel North so he would understand
3 $4,500 was good enough to pry the TOWs out of the
4 Pentagon?
5 A I don't know that. I know that, as I
6 indicated in previous testimony, that he knew that the
7 price that had been negotiated by Ledeen wouldn't fly and
8 therefore it had to come up, and we were dealing with
9 sets of theories in this thing, basically, as you would
10 in a negotiation. It had to come up to where, you know,
11 you could plausibly peel Weinberger off the ceiling.
12 That was sort of — and that's what we tried to shoot
13 for.
14 I don't think there was any magic in the
15 numbers that we were dealing with. We just knew that he
16 had a number that was so low that it couldn't be used.
17 It was not a useful number.
18 Q On that point, do you have any idea of why he
19 knew $2,500 was too low? I mean, if we look at the data
20 w« now know in terms of the $3,500 roughly clearly $2,500
21 i3 too low. Did he tell you he had checked and that that
22 was too low?
23 A I don't know that he told me he had checked.
24 He knew it. It was clear to me both from my discussions
25 with him and J^pm my discussions with General Powell that
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1 h« had ha3 prior discussions with General Powell, so I
2 wasn't present at the creation of this, and who he found
3 out from that $2,500 was an unacceptable price, I don't
4 know, but he did know it. And it seemed to me that he
5 was knowledgeable on the matter.
6 Q Okay. It's clear from what you've told us
7 that you played a pretty important role in this early
8 pricing stage, but that you pretty much phased out of
9 things from that point on. But were you ever provided
10 sort of updates or status reports by General Powell or
11 Colonel North or anyone else through the time you
12 remained at the Pentagon on where all this stood, whether
13 it had gone forward, whether it was succeeding, et
14 cetera?
15 MH. ADLER: Let me object here. I mean, he
16 has testified that there were meetings and discussions
17 and there's been a fair amount of testimony along those
18 lines.
19 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
20 Q I guess what I'm getting at, beyond one
21 session for sure with Secretary Weinberger and possibly a
22 second one, and beyond a February 8-9 meeting that
23 involved ^I^^^Hand Secord, which we've already gone
24 into, I don't believe there are any other specific
25 matters in teras of lieetiRgs 'oF"'dl'«^ssions.
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1 And I guess what I'm asking is, as you may
2 have been talking with General Powell about something
3 else or you may have been talking with Colonel North
4 about something else, did anybody ever tell you where
5 things stood on all this?
6 A No. I mean, I can't believe that nobody did.
7 It seems to me my recollection is that after that
8 negotiation and then after the information was conveyed
9 and so forth then, as it had done with the HAWKs, this
10 issue died as far as I was concerned, and I was involved
11 in a number of other things totally unrelated to this.
12 If I can recapture as a way to do this thing,
13 I know it may sound very strange to you but I didn't know
14 who else knew about this. I knew Ollie knew it, and I
15 knew that Colin Powell and the Secretary knew it. I
16 didn't know whether Bob Oakley knew it. I didn't know
17 whether Dewey Clarridge knew it or any of the other
18 people involved. And we had other actions going on
19 related to the hostages.
2 0 We could sit in a meeting in the sit room and
21 be discussing these other activities, and fall into
22 almost a kind of, you know, warp in which you wouldn't
23 know whether you were talking — I mean, the use of
24 shorthand and so forth in the discussions, you couldn't
25 tell whether we'd suddenly slipped into this question of
Us^V
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152
1 selling arms to get them back this way or whether we were
2 still discussing the other thing.
3 And it was the most intricate interweaving of
4 subjects and half meanings and innuendos and so forth,
5 and it was like something out of a Parandello play.
6 Q I understand that you were, and you testified
7 earlier, that you were not clear. Vou did not know
8 exactly who was in the box, as you put it. But of those
9 people who you knew were in the box -- and that would be
10 Colonel North, General Powell and Secretary Weinberger
11 and possibly General Secord — if in fact there was an
12 early February meeting did you ever have occasion, given
13 that you had been involved in negotiating with the
14 Israelis on TOW missile prices, which is not your normal
15 duty, did you ever simply say, by the way, did we ever
16 get the TOWs, did we ever sell them, did the Iranians
17 ever get them of any of those people you did know had
18 knowledge?
19 A I would, I'm sure, on occasion say where's
20 thing stand or how is it going, and I would get some kind
21 of a progress report because, you see, again there are
22 other actions proceeding on separate tracks, so the fact
23 that they are proceeding tells you that this thing hasn't
24 been brought to fruition, if you see what I mean.
25 So from time to time this came up, as I said,
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WM
153
1 and, you know, it might be after a meeting at the White
2 House and I would have an aside with Ollie and say where
3 does this thing stand? And I don't remember what the
4 curve looked like on this. It would be like a fever
5 chart. There were peaks and valleys and periods when we
6 were for sure we were going to have it, and then it would
7 fall apart. But I was not a player in this.
8 It was just because I was working the
9 terrorism stuff and I was involved in all the other
10 things these people did. There would be occasional
11 casual references as would pass between knowledgeable
12 colleagues, but I didn't consider that I had a particular
13 need to know in any detail and I didn't try to be
14 informed in any detail.
15 Q Now normally I believe Lynn Rylander would
16 have staffed you on certain matters, either terrorism
17 matters or special operations matters; is that correct?
18 A That's correct — not terrorism matters. I
19 kept that compartmented and kept him away from that.
20 Q Special operations?
21 A That's right.
22 Q I don't know if Rylander is a he or a she.
23 A There is some question.
24 Q I don't know whether the name Lynn is a male
2 5 Lynn or a female Lynn.
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1
2
3
4
S
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
•A It's a male.
Q Did you ever have occasion to task Mr.
Rylander to do anything in terms of these matters you
were working on on TOWs -- pricing, price issues, price
data, et cetera?
A I don't think so. That would be extremely
unusual. If I did, he wouldn't have known what he was
doing.
Q Let me ask you a couple of general questions
regarding your dealings with the South Koreans in your
job at the Pentagon. Did you hav* occasion to deal
regularly with the South Koreans?
A Ves, I did.
Q And to meet with people or to deal with people
at the South Korean Embassy?
A Correct.
Q And did you ever have occasion to use their
embassy facility if you were there to make a phone call
or whatever?
A I would have occasional meetings. I think
while I was in the government the normal procedure would
have been for them to come to me. That would have been
the nature of that relationship. When I left I
iji^ijteatsiTitO
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155
1 maintained the relationship and still do with the Korean
2 Government in a private capacity, and the man who was
3 their defense attache
4 ^^^^^^^^H And so that relationship has continued.
5 And if I was there to meet with him and had to
6 call my office or call a colleague or something on a
7 subject it would not be unusual for me to use the phone.
3 Q Just as you and Mr. Adler used our phones here
9 this morning, since that's where you were and you needed
10 to make calls?
11 A That's right.
12 Q Did you share with Colonel North Secretary
13 Weinberger's concerns about the legality of the TOW
14 missile transfer?
15 A Did I share Secretary Weinberger's concerns?
16 Did I share them with Ollie North?
17 Q Vca, and I don't mean to characterize them in
18 any way particular way, but you did indicate there was
19 some discussion.
2 0 A He knew that the Pentagon was damned unhappy
21 about this and specifically that the Secretary of Defense
22 was.
2 3 MR. SABA: How did he )cnow that or how did you
24 know he knew that?
2 5 THE WITNESS: You know, I don't know. I mean,
uiltt^^'rrtb
161
Mj^ie
156
1 I just know. I don't remember that at a certain point
2 somebody said, by the way, how does the Pentagon feel
3 about this. To most of us this came as a shock in the
4 beginning. It began with the assumption that what you
5 were doing was outrageous and then you worked back from
6 there. You know, how was this being done and, if so,
7 damned outrageous.
8 But the point of departure was that this thing
9 is screwy.
10 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
11 Q Let me separate out, if I can, general
12 Pentagon concerns or even the Secretary's concerns about
13 the wisdom of the policy and simply go to the fact that
14 there was at least some question about the legality of
15 the action. Was that ever conununicated back to Colonel
16 North?
17 A That I don't know.
18 Q It was not communicated by you at least?
19 A It was not communicated by me. I never
20 thought that that was a concern, frankly.
21 Q As best as you know —
22 MR. SABA: I'm sorry. So that's clear, you
23 never thought that was a concern?
24 THE WITNESS: I never thought there was a
25 question about the legality. I would have thought it was
V 'i * '^
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1 dumb for other reasons, but I didn't know whether it was
2 illegal. But it didn't occur to me that it was until a
3 point at which it almost sent me -- in a jocular way I
4 asked the Secretary, you know, do we have a legal problem
5 here. Could somebody go to jail over this? And he said
6 yes.
7 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
8 Q As best as you know, were there ever any
9 discussions or meetings which you had with Colonel North,
10 General Powell, General Secord, Secretary Weinberger, Ben
11 Yosef, Glen Rudd, Dr. Gaffney, anybody to whom you might
12 have spoken or dealt with in these matters, which were
13 electronically recorded?
14 A Well, you don't know, do you?
15 Q But to your knowledge none of these sessions
16 or discussions were recorded?
17 A I didn't record any of them, and that's the
18 only thing I can sign up to.
19 MR. ADLER: Let me ask a question. Going back
20 to your question to the Secretary about could anybody go
21 to jail about these activities, did you have in mind when
22 you asked that question any particular statute which
2 3 might have been involved, or were you focused on a
24 particular law?
25 THE WITNESS: No, n^..^-^ It was just that — I
;, ■ f.XO>^S£CI^'r%CG
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1 mean, there was, as I said, a consensus among us that
2 this was dumb. Now obviously some of us might have come
3 to that conclusion for different reasons then others. I
4 worked terrorism. I understand this business and I
5 understood that what we were doing was going to produce
6 more of what we had, more of the problem that we already
7 had, and I assumed that this was the Secretary's concern,
8 in addition to which he had sort of a visceral apparent
9 dislike ior Iran anyway, at least for the regime.
10 And I thought that these were the reasons.
11 But it didn't seam to me that any of those in and of
12 themselves justified what appeared to me to be a very
13 substantial degree of agitation. And so in looking for
14 the additional reason I said, have we got a legal
15 problem. Is somebody going to go to jail over this? I
16 didn't say it in any serious way. I didn't think the
17 answer was yes. It was just almost a sort of to cut the
18 tension a little bit. But he said yes.
19 But he was concerned not so much, it seemed to
20 me, and he said — I mean, it wasn't that he sort of
21 ranked his concerns and my sense of it was that the very
22 top of it was that this was going to be a political
23 disaster for the President, a domestic political concern.
2 4 And that seemed to me was what was before everything
25 else. I don't think he thought that the legal dimensions
' -; T6p^ sl;cR£'iy'<?(|Ei|«toJ
164
159
1 of this were that important eitKer, and I felt that if he
2 did feel that way, and the reason I didn't take it very
3 seriously, to be perfectly blunt about it, was that he
4 was clearly not prepared to resign over it.
5 And if what we were doing was illegal, it
6 seemed to me that -- and it had all the attendant dangers
7 of doing something illegal, that he would have said I'm
8 sorry, I can't be a part of this any mor« and he would
9 have left. I would have thought I would have done that.
10 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
11 Q In your tenure at the Pentagon had you ever
12 seen him express views which would suggest that he was
13 ready to resign over a particular matter if it didn't go
14 the way he wanted?
15 A No. I never did see him do that. But I was
16 not exactly an intimate of the Secretary's.
17 Q Let me ask you about some of your hostage
18 dealings. We understand that some things you were
19 involved with are not relevant to our inquiry so we don't
20 intend to get into those matters. But, as you probably
21 Icnow from testimony that the Committees have heard thus
2 2 far, there is the DEA, Drug Enforcement Agency angle on
2 3 some of this. So let me ask you a few questions about
24 that.
25 First, did you have any involvement yourself
TOP. SECSET'/aDdBWORD'
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160
1 in the recruiting that apparently went on by General
2 Secord of DEA agents to be used for certain portions of
3 these operations?
4 A No.
5 Q Were you aware of General Secord 's involvement
6 in the DEA portion of the hostage rescue operations?
7 A Was I aware of General Secord 'a involvement?
8 Q Yes.
9 ^ A. I don't think I was. I don't think I was.
10 Q Were you aware that there was a plan to
provide cash payments for^^^^^^^^^^^^^f as they
12 have been characterized, in the Middle East for
13 information as part of this DEA operation?
14 A My recollection is yes, that I was, but you
15 had a number of — I mean this was sort of amorphous
16 information or ambiguous because — and I think the
17 question that confronts us today is when does a payoff
18 become a ransom. I mean, if I'm paying you and you're a
19 bounty hunter and I say if you can get these guys back
20 it's worth $50,000 or for information or for anything
21 else, it seems to me that's a very legitimate.
22 If it gets up high enough to where you can
2 3 make money and you can buy, you can do that too. I never
2 4 thought that money was going to get this deal done no
2 5 matter how high the numbers got. In my judgment, we were
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1 not going to be able to buy these people back.
2 So no matter what sums of money were disbursed
3 I would have assumed that it was for information, for
4 setup. It costs a lot of money to run a rescue. We had
5 limited assets there.
6 MR. ADLER: His question had at the end of it
7 were you aware of that knowledge in connection with the
8 DEA operation? Were you aware of what you testified to
9 in connection with the DEA?
10 THE WITNESS: Well, I knew, and while I was
11 not directly involved in it, I knew from discussions that
12 we had some drug people who were helping us there, and
13 whether the money was for them or what money or where it
14 went, that I didn't know.
15 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
16 Q Let me make clear, too, that when I say cash
17 payments I guess that's a bit loaded and has a pejorative
18 connotation. But I simply mean that in the sense of it
19 being wholly appropriate and proper in this context. I
20 don't mean to make fine distinctions of what's expense
21 money and walking around money and payoff and ransom and
22 so forth but as a shorthand way to ask the question.
23 Were you aware that there was a desire or a
plan to wor^^^^^^^^^^^Lnd that
25 agents vent^^^^^^^Mtpit'.t^nmv (Hat was given to them by
y : <^ -^^^oi^/^q QE waaCM
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162
1 Hakim, Mr. Albert Hakim, to be used in this operation?
2 A No.
3 Q As far as you know, at the time that this was
4 going on were you aware that Mr. Hakim had any
5 involvement at all?
6 A No. I was not aware of it. I mean, you know,
7 Albert was a fixture, but I didn't know that he was
8 involved in this.
9 Q Were you aware that any Swiss bank accounts
10 were being used in this operation?
11 A No.
12 Q For the record, in your tenure at the Pentagon
13 have you ever had occasion in official capacities to use
14 Swiss bank accounts?
15 A No, I have not.
16 Q To your knowledge does your name appear
17 anywhere as a signatory to a Swiss bank account?
18 A I don't think I want to answer that in front
19 of my lawyer.
2 0 (Laughter.)
21 I have to pay my bills. The answer is no.
22 Q For the record I thought we ought to ask that
2 3 one. Were you aware on the DEA operation that there was
24 a plan to use a ship purchased by General Secord and Mr.
25 Hakim?
; J MB '^CRET/CODEWtjftoS ,
168
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163
1 A No.
2 Q Were you aware generally that the DEA agents
3 in this operation, more or less reporting to Colonel
North, had developed various^^^^^^^^^^^^^hat were
5 going to be used?
6 A Again, no, I don't think so, not specifically.
7 Q Is there anything about this particular
3 portion of the hostage rescue plans, of which there were
9 apparently many -- the DEA angle — anything that you
10 know that we should know that I have not asked about,
11 particularly as it involves Colonel North, General
12 Secord, Mr. Hakim and the things that have been made
13 public thus far in these hearings?
14 MR. ADLER: Off the record.
15 (A discussion was held off the record.)
16 THE WITNESS: The plans for a rescue were
17 perfectly legitimate. The procedure was legitimate and I
18 don't know how much you know about that or how deeply you
19 want to get into it, but it was a straight-out, honest
20 deal that wouldn't have required Swiss bank accounts. It
21 certainly wouldn't have required anything that couldn't
22 be sold to a court.
23 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
24 Q Was Project SNOWBIRD the code name for all of
25 the rescue operations for the hostages or some particular
■:XOP ^CaET/COfcEWpilDl I
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1 one?
2 A Probably some particular one. It sounds like
3 it would have involved drugs, so maybe it was part of the
4 DEA thing.
5 Q Does that ring a bell to you?
6 A It doesn't, but these code names, we had so
7 damn many of them, they changed with some frequency, so,
8 you knew, when you were talking privately you tended to
9 talk generically. I mean, are we getting the sons of
10 bitches or not? And of course since you were the only
11 g^ys who were talking to each other, the whole question
12 of code words seemed in and of themselves silly.
13 Q For the record, let me have introduced and
14 marked as Deposition Exhibit 2 the two letters you have
15 provided us which reference and further explain some
16 things we went into earlier in the first session of the
17 deposition, and that is simply your resignation letter to
18 Secretary Weinberger dated 5 May 86.
19 (The document referred to was
2 0 marked Koch Exhibit Number 2
21 for identification.)
22 As you have explained it to us, after the
23 Secretary received this letter he asked you not to
24 resign, and then after some consideration you followed
25 that with a letter dated 7 May 1986 in which at greater
UNfMSSIFfED
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1 length you explain some matters. Let me simply note we
2 are receiving these and will make them part of the
3 deposition and part of the formal record.
4 Is there anything that's of great relevance
5 that you want to say with regard to these letters?
6 A Only that the question has been raised, and
7 I'm aware of that question having been raised, about why
8 I left the Pentagon, and that seems to be related to was
9 there some wrongdoing. And then there is another
10 question of whether I was forced out because of my
11 activities in trying to restore a special operations
12 force. And neither of those are true and not only wasn't
13 I forced out, but the Secretary was very vociferous in
14 requesting that I not leave.
15 And so I wanted it made clear exactly why I
16 did leave, and I think that second letter does make it
17 pretty clear.
18 Q One final question before Mr. Saba for the
19 House has some further questions. Have you spoken with
20 the Independent Counsel in these matters?
21 A No, I have not.
22 Q And other than the sessions you have had with
23 myself and other members of the House and Senate Select
24 Committees, have you talked with any investigative or
25 governmental authorities or bodies about these matters?
mmmn
ONCLASSm
RO 166
1 A I had yesterday my former military assistant
2 received an award at the Pentagon and I went to the
3 Pentagon for that praising. The award was held in Rich
4 Annitage's office and he asked me if I would stay. He
5 told me that the reason that he had been calling me --
6 and I had not returned his calls — was because he wanted
7 to tell me what he was hearing.
8 He said, I don't want you to tell me what
9 you're doing or anything like that, you know. One had a
10 sense it was an overture of friendship, really.
11 Q Your impression, for the record, was that
12 there was nothing improper or unhealthy about his wanting
13 to talk with you?
14 A Well, he's pretty prudent and conservative. I
15 assumed that whatever he was doing, you know, was all
16 right. I didn't say too much. He told me generally —
17 as much as anything he was talking about what the press
18 was questioning him about.
19 Q Did he tell you what he had been hearing?
20 A Yeah.
21 . Q Are you at liberty to tell us?
22 A In general ways. I don't think the question
23 of, you know, what was my involvement. He said they
24 deposed me for about three hours. You occupied about 15
25 minutes of that. There was a question of our
UNCMFIED
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1 relationship. He said I told there that I considered Noel
2 to be a friend, but I don't think he considers himself to
3 be my friend. And I had a sense he was fishing for some,
4 you know, like oh, well, you know, when it's all over
5 things will be fine.
6 And he brought this up again later in the
7 conversation and I said, I just made it clear that we
8 were very close friends and it was a problematical
9 relationship and it could not be characterized to say we
10 were enemies. So that was part of it. It really was a
11 kind of an effort to clear the air as much as anything
12 else. I don't think he told me much that was
13 particularly useful to know so that I could avoid getting
14 in trouble or anything like that.
15 Q Did you tell him that you had been deposed?
16 A I'm not sure I did. I was fairly
17 unforthcoming, as a matter of fact. I told him that I'd
18 been interviewed. I did tell him, in fact. I told him
19 that I had been — that's right, I did.
20 MR. SAXON: I believe that's all I've got.
21 THE WITNESS: Before we finish this portion of
22 things, I want to go back on the question of subsequent
23 discussions on the disposition of this effort — you
24 know, what's happening. There was, I think — I'm not
25 even sure I was still in the government. There was one
|EiiOi
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1 delivery that I was aware of, and I can't recall now.
2 I remember I was supposed to have lunch with
3 Dick Secord and he had to cancel it or something, but the
4 point was that he had something else to do and rather
5 than cancel it I came along. And I was told that I would
6 not be introduced.
7 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
8 Q You accompanied General Secord to a meeting?
9 A To lunch. But they would not introduce me at
10 the lunch because they didn't want the people they were
11 having lunch with to know who I was. It seems to me I
12 was still in the Pentagon during this period.
13 Q So it would have been prior to when?
14 A Well, it could have been, because even though
15 I officially resigned the 30th of May I stayed on in
16 accordance with a commitment that I had made until they
17 brought Ropka in, and that was in August, so there was
18 this period and it could have been in that period.
19 Q Who was present at the luncheon meeting you
20 attended?
21 A There was Secord and Dick Gadd and two or
22 three other people who were the crew of the plane that
23 was going to take this stuff down.
24 Q The TOW missiles or the HAWK parts as opposed
25 to the contra side of thir
ntra side of thina=L?^_^
174
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1 A Oh, yeah, it was Iran. It wasn't contras.
2 Q And did they discuss the mission itself and
3 delivery at the meeting?
4 A No. I think I had a sense that they were
5 going to later on or something. They were getting
6 together. Either this was just a work break, that they
7 had had a discussion and were going to continue it, or
8 something like that, but the discussions at the table
9 were pretty innocuous.
10 Q Was Colonel North there?
11 A No.
12 Q These were Secord's people and Stanford
13 Technology people, the best you know?
14 A The crew?
15 Q Yes.
16 A I think they were probably SAT people.
17 Q Southern Air Transport?
18 A Right. And then the last tine was, of course,
19 when this thing went down once and for all was in
20 November, and it happened that Dick and I were in London
21 at the same time and I guess I knew, you know, that we
22 thought they were going to close it and so I suggested as
23 a reason for being there that he accompany a conference,
24 accompany me to a conference where I was speaking, and he
25 thought that was a good idea.
ItHEtftSHED
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And as it happened the afternoon ha was
supposed to speak he had to disappear, so I mean they
were working this thing actively.
Q Roughly when would that have been?
A That would have been November 1, 2, 3, 4,
something like that.
Q Early November 1986?
A Yes. And then I also invited him for dinner
with friends of ours in London that evening and ha joined
us for that. And, of course, we were talking about this
at the time.
Q At that point had the news story from the
Lebanese paper about the McFarlane Tehran trip broken?
A No.
Q But was there a sense things were winding down
in terms of the activities or about to break in terms of
public?
A No, no. The idea was we were going to get our
people and he was confident. And we had all been up and
down on this thing, but he thought that they'd got it
now. And so there was a sense of tension. He had other
people there. Albert was there. I did not meet with
Albert or see him, but I knew where he was and we were
staying in different hotels.
Then whether it was pursuant to this dinner
176
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1 that I was hosting or what, I don't remember, but I
2 called him. We had -- was it Jacobson that was the last
3 one we got out? I guess that's who came out.
4 Q I'm not sure. I think that's right.
5 A Anyway, my sense was we were going to get a
6 package —
7 (A discussion was held off the record.)
8 A I think my sense was that this was a package
9 deal and , then it started to unravel. And so I was
10 talking to him. I called him on the phone and I probably
11 said something about who would be attending dinner that
12 evening and I could tell. I said how's it going. He
13 said, we got one, and I could just tell by the tone of
14 his voice that this thing had just gone to hell in a
15 handbasket.
16 I said you're upset, aren't you? And he said,
17 yes. And I said, what's the matter? He said, there's a
18 delay. I said, can you fix it? And he said, I don't
19 know. I'm trying.
20 Q Is it your statement, then, that in those
21 first discussions, I guess earlier in the day at the
22 conference, that if it was Jacobson he had not been
23 released and the expectation was to get either more or
24 all?
25 A He had not_
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172
1 Q And then later the day you had the
2 conversation that Jacobson had been released and he was
3 the only one?
4 A Yeah.
5 Q At any point in those discussions was General
6 Secord -- and I think we asked you this before, but let
7 me ask it for the record -- did he ever in any way
8 mention or allude to or expressly tell you about his
9 involvement on the contra side of these matters?
10 A Never.
11 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
12 BY MR. SABA:
13 Q I'd like to change the subject for a few
14 moments. Mr. Koch, could you tell us when you first met
15 Mr. Michael Ledeen and just briefly review your
16 relationship with him?
17 A I think the first time I met him was probably
18 at a Young Presidents organization meeting in Las Vegas.
19 This gets racy, doesn't it? And I don't know when that
20 was — '82 probably. Let me see. Yes, it would be '81,
21 I guess, because, come to think of it, Ledeen was just
22 around, in a sense.
23 He seemed kind of ubiquitous, you know. He
24 did some writing and he did seem to be on Ikle's calendar
25 and he was over at the State Department. And the reason
WtMi
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1 I can date -- we seemed to know each other casually and
2 this meeting in Las Vegas may have been in '81. But by
3 the time of the kidnapping of Jim Dozier Ledeen was
4 trying to play some sort of a role in this.
5 Q How do you mean?
6 A How do I mean? What kind of a role?
7 Q Yes,
8 A Well, he would call me, you know, at the
9 Pentagon -- how are things going and so forth. And I
10 wouldn't say too much because it wasn't too much to say.
11 And I remember at one point he indicated that he was
12 trying to make sense out of a communique that had come
13 alleging to be a statement by Dozier. It wasn't clear
14 what we had at first because it hadn't been translated.
15 It wasn't clear whether it was a statement by the Red
16 Brigades, the people that were holding him, or whether it
17 was by him.
18 But Ledeen speaks Italian and he was going
19 through this, and the sense was I'm trying to help you to
20 see if there is a coded message in here somewhere. It
21 was all sort of very amateurish.
22 Q What did Mr. Ledeen indicate was his interest
23 in such matters?
24 A Well, he was supposed to be an expert on
25 terrorism and, of course, he had spent a fair amount of
179
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1 time in Italy, and that was one thing that he did seem to
2 know. He was acquainted with Claire Sterling and so
3 forth. But one had a sense that he was legitimate. He
4 was around. He was in and out of the building and he was
5 working for Haig, and so I thought he was okay.
6 But he just didn't come into my work because
7 he didn't seem to know too much about it. But he was
8 pegged as a terrorist expert.
9 MR. SAXON: Let's go off for a second.
10 (A discussion was held off the record.)
11 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
12 Q All right. Continue.
13 A So then, as I said, you know, we were just
14 preoccupied with this thing. There wasn't much time to
15 deal with Ledeen on it because he wasn't somebody who
16 played, who seemed to know much about it. So he wasn't
17 useful. And on that account, you know, I didn't have
18 much to do with him, but he did call a few times and I
19 thought it was just in the interest of being helpful.
20 And I had no indication. I mean, I had no
21 convictions about his understanding of his business. But
22 in the specific instance in which we were working, there
23 was no use for him. and he wasn't part of my operation so
24 I didn't pay much attention to him. He was very
25 friendly.
UNKSW
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1 And as things went on, I don't know, I think
2 probably in '82, at some point, General Haig left and
3 then somehow or other as a consequence of that Ledeen was
4 out at State, as near as one could determine. All this
5 was always very vague. Again, as I say, he was part of
6 the group of people that one had a sense knew people.
7 Again, he knew Ikle. He knew others, and he always
8 represented himself as somehow part of the family. He
9 knew Perle. Perle and he were pals.
10 Q This is Richard Perle?
11 A Yes. And Bryan, Steve Bryan. So, you know,
12 it wasn't one of those things where you asked to see his
13 credentials. Why are you in the building?
14 And at length he asked if he could come over,
15 you know, that he couldn't stay at the State Department,
16 I think, or something like that. And so one way or
17 another — and I don't know whether it was directly with
18 me or whether it was through Ikle, whether he was already
19 a consultant and I used him or whether I put him on my
2 0 books — but in one fashion or another we had a
21 consultant relationship.
22 And there are others also. I mean, Bob
2 3 Kupperman, it seems to me, was another one who was in
24 this position. It was just sort of a list of people that
25 are there. JLf you don't use them, you don't pay them.
■ - -i * 1 ■ I
a v^v
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UNCinssife
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1 But Ledeen would come around with some frequency to read
2 the classified, and we'd chat. How are you doing? What
3 do you think about what's going on? And it was casual.
4 It became somewhat social. We had them over
5 for dinner once or twice with others, and we visited them
6 the same way -- nothing intense. We didn't do a lot of
7 visiting back and forth. It was a very casual
8 relationship. And this is stretched out over an extended
9 period of time, by the way.
10 Then somewhere in the late '83 time frame I
11 took Ledeen on a trip with me. I was going to Italy. I
12 thought it might be useful for me if he knew people in
13 Italy that I didn't know, that that might be helpful to
14 us. And the itinerary of the trip, in no particular
15 order, involved Italy, Turkey, Israel and Germany, I
16 think. When we got to Italy there was problems right
17 away because evidently there was a great deal of distress
18 in the embassy that I had brought him, that ha was in-
19 country.
20 And so that was the first time that I
21 discovered that he had had problems with the embassy and
22 with the Italian government, evidently.
23 Q Could you very briefly outline what that
2 4 concern was?
25 A Well, I never really quite understood. It
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dribbled out over a period of time that he claimed that
they had hired him to do work as a consultant and that
they had never paid him. Their story was that he had
never done the work.
Q By way of a contract dispute, then?
A Apparently. But there was more than — then,
at that time, or a later trip, the people in the embassy
told me that he had started rumors in Itali
Then again I don't recall the time sequencing,
but he came to see me one day and was upset about
something, and what it was was there was a story that ran
in L'espress or whatever their Time magazine is
indicating that the new director of SISMI, which is their
external intelligence — S-I-S-M-I — Admiral Martini,
and I'm paraphrasing this, that h« had gone before
Parliament shortly after his accession to this job and
among other things had been asked what are you doing for
your country. And, as Michael put it, he said well, the
first thing I've done is PNG Michael Ledeen, on which
account Michael was suing, he said, suing this magazine.
He couldn't figure out why Martini didn't like
him. He said I4v^iaiiW2w A Aniwni^mf^his, and it turned
liftssiffl"
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out he said he wasn't a friend of his. The whole damn
thing was like a soap opera. And so ha went off, you
know, to sue either Martini or the magazine, or whatever.
Anyway, so you know, these kind of vexations
in the middle of a professional relationship are not_
particularly useful.
know, it wasn't something I was
working or that I thought I cared about awfully much.
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I asked him to join with Kapperman m
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1 producing a white paper on terrorism or trying to drive
2 the State Department, which wasn't doing very well in
3 this business of terrorism.
4 MR. SAXON: That's Bob Kupperrnan at CSIS?
5 THE WITNESS: Yes. I thinJc Kupperrnan made his
6 contribution to that. To the best of my knowledge,
7 Ledeen never did, and that dropped. But Ledeen, you
8 know, came around and he would read the classified on a
9 fairly regular basis, and that bothered me because, first
10 of all, it occurred to me it was finally obvious that he
11 didn't know anything about terrorism, except possibly
12 what he gleaned in Italy from people he knew there.
13 And second I was concerned that he wrote and
14 that he clearly rolled this information over, even if it
15 was only in the building or within the Administration.
16 He was of no use to me, so I told my military assistant
17 not to show him the classified any more.
18 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
19 Q When did you cut him off from the classified?
20 Do you recall?
21 A I can't be real positive, Joe. It would have
22 been late, probably sometime in '84, mid to late '84.
23 The cause and effect of this was immediate and he stopped
24 coming around. After about two weeks we didn't see
25 Michael around.
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There was one other thing that I considered
strange, and that was that he gave me -- he asked me if I
could get two documents.
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3«8n't know
anytnrr^ Em's be«n reading the classified. He's asking
for stuff that he can't get. You know, those pieces
didn't fall together in any sequential way.
And then the next thing I knew was, of course,
we were in the middle of the Iran deal. But the other
thing that I thought might possibly be germane was the
fact that in most of the places we went, except for
Italy, the people who dealt with terrorism he was meeting
S
188
:ir^ time in a rather goggle-eyed wa
183
1 for the first time in a rather goggle-eyed way. These
2 were all great names. He didn't know any of these
3 people. I found that surprising a little bit.
4 And I can't recall very well, but it seems to
5 me that if I was there, whenever I was there, I would
6 have met with Rafie Eitan, so for sure if I met with
7 Rafie, if I was there, I would have met with Rafie, that
8 Ledeen would have been with me. On one of those
9 occasions, and it may have been one when he was with me,
10 there was the possibility of an Iranian link floated. I
11 had a sense that it was just a trial balloon and I didn't
12 follow up on it.
13 MR. SAXON: When would you date that?
14 THE WITNESS: September of '83. And so, you
15 know, afterwards it occurred to me that Michael may have.
16 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
17 Q Would you say that at that time Ledeen had on
18 that trip met Eitan?
19 A Yes. I think he did.
20 Q You do not think he had known him previously
21 to that trip?
22 A No, no.
23 MR. SAXON: When you say there was an Iranian
24 link discussed you mean in the context of —
25 THE WITNESS: The discussion with Rafie. You
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1 know, I had been -- who f«l^ o,r-i„
"no felt early on we needed to get
straightened out w.th Iran anyway, and although the
hostages were a .ajor part o. thxs question it was „ore
the difficult.es that we were having in Lebanon as .t
related to Iran, and xt was also, you know, being able to
deal in Lebanon. And this foTi^^ k.^
i-nis reiiow had a man who had a
background that could do that.
So anyway I thought that that was the first
time he met a number of the people had been on that. And
then, as l said, i .new he was involved when this thing
cranked up again. When he left me or when I basically
cut the Classified off, then he just disappeared and he
reappears at the White House.
BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
Q This is in what time period?
A Well, it's probably now we're into mid- '84,
17 somewhere in there, up through -85. Then McFarlane
18
19
20
21
22
23
leaves and it's not Mike so much. I mean, Mike would
come around once in a while and pay a social call, and
the thrust of his - i .ean, he was telling me he was at
the White House and what was going on over there and that
Poindexter was a great impediment to all the things that
needed to be done, and he didn't get along with
2* Poindexter.
^^*" ^° ^"<^ behold Poindexter becomes National
UlfCKSSlFIED
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1 Security Advisor, and it was not him but, I think,
2 probably his wife who I saw in the hall and she said, you
3 know, Michael will have to leave the White House and
4 you'll have to take him back. And it was said about that
5 way, like we're all friends in the family and you'll do
6 that, won't you. And I just was non-committal.
7 Q Do I understand his wife worked for Steve
8 Byron?
9 A Bryan, right.
10 Q What was her title, do you recall?
11 A I don't know.
12 • So then, as I indicated in earlier testimony,
13 I think, Ollie, in our first discussions on this thing,
14 affected a certain amount of exasperation that this had
15 been Bud's thing that had been handed off on him and that
16 Bud had used Mike. Somewhere Mike came into it and Mike
17 didn't know anything, and Mike screwed it up, and they
18 think he took money. So he was that way about Ledeen.
19 Ledeen, as far as I was concerned at that
20 point, was out of it and yet as it progressed it became
21 clear that he was playing some separate game. He was in
22 it, but I didn't know why and Ollie seemed to be worried
2 3 about it.
24 MR. SAXON: Were you aware that in roughly
25 September of 1986 Ledeen went to Rich Annitage to get
iimissififD
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1 Armitage to open the door for him with Secretary
2 Weinberger and that in fact Ledeen went in to see
3 Secretary Weinberger to talk about these matters?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes. We talked about that
5 yesterday, by the way, because Rich and I talked about
6 that when that first happened. I said, you know -- he
7 said to me. Rich said, once he was knowledgeable and we
8 both knew that the other was, he made it clear that this
9 was stupid, in his view it was stupid. We could all
10 stipulate that; it wasn't a problem because somebody's
11 going to do it and if the President wants it done, you're
12 going to do it or you leave.
13 And so the question in the course of that
14 discussion came up with Ledeen, and I knew Ledeen was
15 coming in to see him, and I said, you know, Ollie was
16 worried about this guy. Is he dirty? And he said no.
17 And I said are you sure? And he said no, I took him
18 right down to the Secretary and he told the Secretary a
19 very plausible story about his involvement.
20 He also told me that much more recently Ledeen
21 had tried to strike up a relationship and calls him up
2 2 and says, you know, why don't we get together with our
23 families and go to the movies and things like that. And
24 so Rich totally ceased any relations with him because,
25 you know. Rich is not social that way. He's very private
ONCtitSSIFe
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1 in that sans*. H« wouldn't do it with soreabody that ha
2 didn't much know and who was sort oi sailing his body in
3 that case.
4 MR. SAXON: And you say ha talked about it
5 yesterday?
6 THE WITNESS: Ha talked about it yesterday,
7 yeah, but the point was that Mike has been trying to
8 somehow get back in this thing or what. I don't know —
9 to cover himself or explain his side of the story or just
10 what is not clear. But what's always been puzzling is
11 that h* didn't get out of it when they wanted him out of
12 it.
13 And the question, of course, is why ha didn't.
14 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
15 Q During your acquaintanceship with him did he
16 have occasion to mention to you Schwimmer or Nimrodi?
17 A No.
18 Q Did you know those gentlemen?
19 A I think I might have heard Schwimmer 'a name at
20 on* point, and Nimrodi is just one of these names, you
21 know, another merchant of death. Nimrodi may have been
22 one of the guys that Rafia had in mind for ma to deal
23 with, but I never let it go to that point. And the only
24 name — in fact, the guy that was there is a guy named
2 5 ^^^^^^I^H who was the only one I knew for sure that he
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had in mind to try to put me together with.
And this came up again. Rafie again tried to
rope me into this thing much later.
Q Other than Colonel North, did anyone else tell
you that Ledeen was making money off of this deal?
A My recollection was that Meron told me that
and I don't know to a dead certainty if Mindy said
himself that he thought he was or if he said that he knew
others thought he was.
Q What was the context of that provision of
information?
A It was a casual meeting. Mindy's a friend of
mine and I was in Israel on business and stopped by to
see him, and it was at a period when this thing was
exploding, and it was in the early days, and it was a
question of who knew it, of course. I don't know who
knew it.
MR. SAXON: So this would be late '86 when the
matters were becoming public?
THE WITNESS: Yes. I guess it would be late
'86. It seems to me that's about right, or early '87.
It had to be late '86. And, as I said, it was as we were
speaking, it was popping. And a lot of people were
saying I didn't -- remember, this is in the early days of
who hit John, and Shultz was saying I didn't know and
UNeiASSfftED
194
|E«2Y*P})|'«D|| 189
1 Other people were saying oh, yes, he did. Bud said I
2 told him all the time. And nobody had their fibs
3 straight yet.
4 So we were just sort of wondering.
5 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
6 Q Did Meron say that he knew for certain that
7 Ledeen was taking money or did you take it to be
8 speculation?
9 AX don't remember exactly. It seemed to ne
10 that there was speculation in the air, that's all, and it
11 turned up somehow in the Tower Commission report and
12 Ledeen was going to sue the Tower Commission or
13 something.
14 MR. SABA: I don't have any further questions
15 on the Ledeen line.
16 MR. SAXON: Do you have something else?
17 MR. SABA: I do.
18 MR. SAXON: Let me do a couple of quick
19 things.
2 0 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
21 Q One, for the record, your involvement with
22 this negotiating with the Israelis TOW missile pricing,
2 3 et cetera, did you ever discuss that with Admiral
24 Poindexter?
25 A I don't think so.
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
195
UNfiklfflffl
190
1 Q Did you ever discuss it with the President?
2 A Never.
3 Q Let me offer as a final deposition exhibit a
4 photocopy of your entry in your desk calendar or diary of
5 2 January 86, which simply reflects that there was no
6 meeting, as we have discussed a short while ago, with
7 General Meron, General Secord, Colonel North, Mr. Ben
8 Yosef to discuss TOW missiles. That will be Exhibit 3.
9 (The document referred to was
10 marked Koch Exhibit Number 3
11 for identification.)
12 ■ And this is what is purports to be?
13 A That is correct.
14 MR. SAXON: That's all I hava. Joe?
15 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
16 Q Mr. Koch, in view of the time and the
17 constraints I know you are under I'd like to ask a few
18 questions concerning your role in special operations in
19 the Pentagon. You have given us some of your background.
20 Could you tell us briefly how your office relates, if at
21 all, to the operational components at the Pentagon that
22 were being established at that time in the Army and the
23 Air Force?
24 A Well, there were no operational components
25 being established. My office related in the largest
tJ
;- J
s
196
yNCiRSStfe
191
1 sense to trying to restore the capability to conduct
2 special operations. That meant restoring those forces
3 and driving the system toward some kind of policy as to
4 what it was going to do with them.
5 MR. SABA: Can we go off the record a moment?
6 (A discussion was held off the record.)
7 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
8 Q All I want to do is I am trying to understand
9 the connection, if any connection between you and the Air
10 Force XOXP and the ODSO group over at the Army. You
11 know, they had a number of programs called SEA SPRAY and
12 those I would view as operational programs. They
13 acquired assets; they did things.
14 A I understand. The answer is I wasn't involved
15 in that.
16 Q You were not involved?
17 A In many cases I had no knowledge of it. I
18 mean, one of the units was one that got itself thrust
19 into the public eye rather forcefully, which was the so-
20 called Intelligence Support Activity, which I felt we
21 needed and I tried to salvage, and we had some success
22 there, although not we but General Stilwell was the one
23 that had to deal with that.
24 But the activities, I didn't feel that it was
25 my charter to be involved in these things. I was not an
PRET/TQPEWORD
197
UlttASSIIiED
192
1 operator. It was a policy matter and the opportunities
2 that might be available to dabble in these things it
3 seemed to me it would be presumptuous to do it. I did
4 attend exercises. I did try to keep track of what people
5 were doing, mostly in terms of being able to assist them
6 with their needs and to get a sense of their problems,
7 but not to get involved.
8 And so things like SEA SPRAY, a lot of people
9 would drop references in a casual way on the assumption
10 that I knew what they ware talking about, and there was
11 just a certain amount of by accretion I began to get a
12 sense of what was going on where, but I was never in any
13 of those boxes.
14 Q Was it your duty to establish the means
15 whereby such special operations would be contained
16 entirely within the Department of Defense?
17 A I construed my duty not to do these
18 establishings, if you like, but just to drive the
19 military. As I say, here's what is necessary. Here's
20 the problem. This is what the world looks like. This is
21 the geostrategic situation in the 1980s and in the future
22 these are the kinds of wars we are going to fight. And
23 you don't have what to fight them with now. I want you
24 to get what to fight them with, and that's basically it.
25 You guys decide what you need. It's not for
198
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD 193
1 me to tell you what we need, but they would never — I
2 mean, they didn't want to acknowledge that the world
3 looked like this.
4 Q So is it correct to say you did not recommend
5 specific programs of implementation?
6 A I did not, no. I recommended. As
7 circumstances revealed themselves, as it became clear,
8 first of all, that we had institutional shortcomings, you
9 know, that we weren't structured to make the kind of
10 progress that needed to be made in this thing, that there
11 needed to be some structure, we again said to the
12 military do you see this, and they said yea, and we said,
13 well, you fix it.
14 You come up with your own solution. Any
15 solution would have advanced the cause of special
16 operations. So they didn't want that. So we began
17 little by little to pust^or^hinqs like the creation of
was the^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hp That was
19 done because there was a vacuum, because the military
20 refused to fix it. So we said, okay, this is what this
21 thing should look like, so that was how that was created.
22 And each step along the way, whenever it was
23 can you do this, will we do this, how many of these
24 airplanes do we need, do we have enough, you'd get crap,
25 and so at efcSa ■ ttf B ^u got more and more deeply involved
fdn PfCB zpv^got more ar
199
U<^"" SECRET/ CODEWOI
194
1 in trying to force the solution.
2 Q Did you get involved in making recommendations
3 for or implementing any program for funding these
4 operations?
5 A No.
6 Q Did you get involved in structuring procedures
7 whereby these operations would become effective -- that
8 is, what would the command structure be and what would
9 the reporting obligations be?
10 A No, not really. I got involved on sort of the
11 philosophical side of that, but I wasn't directly
12 involved in saying this is what the wiring diagram is
13 supposed to look like, let's do it.
14 Q Was it your understanding that such programs
15 would follow a structure similar to that of th«
^^^^^A system?
17 A No, it was not.
18 Q Did you coordinate your duties in a close way
19 with any other agency outside the Department of Defense?
20 A Well, not on the special operations side. On
21 the terrorism side, of course, there was a close
22 collaboration with others, but on the special operations
2 3 thing that was an in-house problem and that's where we
24 did it. The only place I looked to for help really was
2 5 the White House, and the only source of help over there
IJfV
in
200
(INI^^SIHED
195
1 ultimately came to be Ollie North. Prior to that we had
2 gotten an endorsement, you know, the Good Housekeeping
3 seal of approval from McFarlane, but that's about what it
4 was worth, you know. We never got any overt support from
5 over there because nobody over there really had any
6 strength to get anything done.
7 Q What type of help would you have asked the
8 White House and specifically Mr. North for?
9 A Well, I mean, the bureaucratic game would have
10 been I need leverage here. I need all the help I can
11 get, and the Secretary is supportive but he's not
12 supportive beyond the point where things get noisy, where
13 he has to prevail on the Chiefs to do what they don't
14 want to do. And he's not going to tell them what to do.
15 So at that point, when you have no leadership
16 in the Pentagon, at least on this issue, I mean, you can
17 discover on something else, that's true. But on this
18 issue, you know, increasingly it was a tradeoff between
19 Koch, you know, going out and making the quotation of the
20 day in the New York Times, like we've got bands at a
21 higher state of readiness than our special operations
22 force. I mean, they just didn't need that.
23 And if that was the cost of the restoration
24 period, then there wasn't going to be a restoration, and
25 I didn't think after three or four years of dealing with
I
201
UNeMRED
196
1 this it was realistic to assuTue it could be done any
2 other way, and the only way you get movement with the
3 services is you inconvenience them or you embarrass them.
4 But to think you can reason with them is very naive. You
5 shouldn't be in the building if you think that.
6 Q What type of help would Mr. North have given
7 you?
8 A Well, he wasn't in a position to give me any
9 help. That was mostly moral support. McFarlane could
10 have, but North was too low-ranking and once North
11 stepped outside the magic circle at the White House to a
12 large extent he was trading on illusion and rainmaking,
13 but when he walked in the Pentagon and he got anywhere
14 near close to the military he was just one more
15 Lieutenant Colonel and one they didn't particularly like
16 a lot because he was at the White House.
17 You know, that's not a place to get your
18 ticket punched if you are serious about a military
19 career.
20 Q Would you have sought similar help from
21 McFarlane and then Poindexter?
22 A What we got from McFarlane was about as much
23 as I thought McFarlane was capable of giving, which was a
24 letter saying the President wants this done, which was
25 fine, but Poindexter, I saw Poindexter as too closely
Isl
202
1 allied with that part of the power structure in the JCS
2 that was deathly opposed to this whole initiative. I had
3 enough problems with John just on terrorism without
4 getting into the special operations.
5 The difficulty with this was always that the
6 animosity that was generated by the special operations
7 initiative would from time to time spill over, you know,
8 when we had a real time terrorist operation.
9 MR. SAXON: Did you have any input into the
10 decisions about the services' own records retention and
11 records destruction for these kinds of operations?
12 THE WITNESS: No. I'd be amazed if they ever
13 destroyed anything.
14 MR. SABA: I have nothing further.
15 MR. ADLER: Off the record.
16 (A discussion was held off the record.)
17 BY MR. SABA: (Resuming)
18 Q Subsequent to your discussions in 1983 with
19 various Israeli officials did you have any subsequent
20 discussions or meetings related in any way to the
21 provision of weapons or money to any third parties in
22 return for release of one or more hostages?
23 A You know, we dealt very closely with the
24 Israelis on a regular basis but specifically there was
25 never any discussion with them about arms for hostages.
203
KUSSD
198
1 That last discussion, to my best recollection, was held
2 with Ben Yosef at the airport and that was that. But
3 there was a discussion with Rafie Eitan.
4 BY MR. SAXON: (Resuming)
5 Q At the time you had that discussion who was
6 he?
7 A Well, he wasn't anybody at that point as far
8 as I knew. I think he had become the head of their
9 chemical company or whatever. I don't think he acceded
10 to that job yet. Rafie Eitan was the Prime Minister's
11 advisor on terrorism and well qualified for that job, and
12 a protege of General Sharon, who obviously was a heavy
13 breather. He was the one that I would deal with on these
14 matters.
15 Now when the coalition government came in and
16 Peres — it was his turn on top -- he got rid of Rafie
17 and brought in a man named Amiram Nir, who was the son-
18 in-law of one of his major supporters, who is a publisher
19 of a major newspaper. And that transition was pretty
20 smooth. We sort of missed Rafie because just
21 establishing a relationship with him and the screaming
22 and shouting that that required, once you'd done that you
23 didn't want to see it wasted.
24 But Rafie went away and then, you know, the
25 Israelis would come over here. You know, there would be
ONttffilFfO
204
)Q£MR
199
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
13
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
a message Rafie said hello or this sort of thing. And
the word was that Rafie was taking this thing hard.
Rafie wasn't very well. Rafie had cataracts and he was
going to have an operation. It was kind of family, you
know, this sort of thing and the way you get in this
business after a while, it's very personal.
205
aqe
^m
ifO
206
•■taMk
UNIIASU
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
iO
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
iBA: I Tiav* nothing further.
MR. SAXON: Let me simply say for the record,
Mr. Koch, we appreciate your having inconvenienced
yourself to come bac)c a second time because we weren't
able, for our reasons, to finish the first time and it
should be noted you appeared here voluntarily. You have
been very open with us and on behalf of our two
committees I want to thank you very much. You have been
MSffEB
207
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
202
very helpful.
MR. SABA: Thank you.
(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the taking of the
instant deposition ceased.)
Signature of the Witness
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
, 1987.
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
IINWMD
208
mm
f^c^iri
Michal A. jc'.-.afer
REPORTER
che officer before whom :h(
foregoiag deposicion vas taken, do hereby certify that the witness
whose tastiaony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn
by ; that the testimony of said witness was
taken by ae to the best of ay ability and thereafter reduced to typewritin,
under ay direction; that said deposition is a true record of tne testimony
given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor
employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition
was taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any
attorney or counsel •mployed by the parties thereto, nor financially
or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.
.^
NOTARY PUBLIC L
Hv Coam
ission expires: ^•loA^/^L'
UNCLASSIRED
209
lilLASSiFlEO
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGE-^CV
^emo For .£^^^^£22^^
'3^^^ Oar). Colir-s Pi?vo<iJl (3Wy
^
0 90
:e-
aided \R: .
5e replaced,
liable difficulties •
sales, incLudin?
ec. 3 of the ^ECA.
es "of Hi million
or indirect to a
nc lass if led (except
ot take place until
ys can be waived for
transfer has no such
given in any case.
dered through Israel.
ken into 3 or ^
tice .
n against splitting
, the spirit and the
and all Administ rat icr.s
cj ^ -■:
It is conceivable that, upon satisfactory consultation Kith
Chairmen Lugar and Fascell and their minority counterparts,
they might agree to splitting the sale into smaller
packages .
, - ■ J . •.
The custorer countries ''J;E and Korea) would have to be
their deliveries had been rescheduled, but we would not h3\e
/
tell ther wh>
deliveries .
We would not uant
charge
■ere
Mimm
210
o 91
..-.ere
'J ^ E a •
but :^
'^3--3r.e r:;"". r. ox, sjitarl?
":5 3:les at .Red .Ri\er Arse- a!
• : r e a . S e \ e -. of : - e s e are :
:i~ -e fere;:-. e.
-. r t - e : e ; .= a r : 1
ai S-'",""; ar
■.a .
c : ; r .■ .■
rerlace'f-'
_^ ^ ;^
l<b
a>
00
Thus, the t:tal nil fcr 110 .-.issiles v,ould be Sl-j-s:.: -:ll;:-
To thi; . aprl.caole cTarjes would have to be added SRI ccst.
adr.i.iis: rat .0.-. c.-^ar^e, packing and transport c.-.arjes , plus
storage ' .
The missiles for Korea and 'J,\E would have to be replaced, so
DSAA will need the money to replace them.
The modalities for sale to Iran present formidable difficulties:
-- Iran is not currently certified for soles, including
indirectly as a third country, per Sec. 3 of the AEIA.
-- Congress must be notified of all sales of S14 million
or more, whether it is a direct sale or indirect to a
third country. The notice must be unc lassif led (except
for some details), and the sale cannot take place until
50 days after the notice. The 30 days can be waived for
direct sales, but the third country transfer has no such
provision, and notice must still be given in any case.
-- Thus, even if the missiles were laundered through Israel,
Congress would have to be notified.
It is conceivable that the sale could be broken into
packages, in order to evade Congressional notice.
3 or J
i3S5
While there is no explicit injunction against splitting
up such a sale (subiect to check...), the spirit and the
practice of the law is against that, and all .Administ rat ic?.;
have observed this scrupulously.
It IS conceivable that, upon satisfactory consultation with
Chairmen Lugar and Fascell and their minority counterparts,
they might agree to splitting the sale into smaller
packages .
The customer countries (UAE and Korea) would have to be told tha:
their deliveries had been rescheduled, but we would not have : :
tell
'. er w.-.^
Ke would not uant to c>
. u._ _,
r.cre
deliveries
211
UNCLASSIFIED
H F
0 92
:^aj
aq e\er frund c
3 , . h D .> e \ e r
. - r ; : . 3 a -. ; : .- e :
: a: ec a-.: alar-ei
r a e . ■> e r e j ? e : a •
te crea: I- e-.::uracei
exrar.i :-.e ir ja les .
, • J
- - e ^ v> 0
u-.Tl are -ore rea^.. 3-, = ;5.7
3t-. ere -ouli be no e::e:
- 1 3 •
itates ^Qu]
,e laur.derir.g cou:
c:r.:ir.-e sell.-;
Isc
. r a r. , ar.
I: r-.e sale reca-e n-.:--., all bars would be reTo\ed fro-
sales b\ s jc'r. cc-ir.tries as 5pa:n, Portugal, Greece, '-'k,
Iralv, and FRG, countries who are only barely restrained
from overt, large sale; to Iran now.
In short, the risk is that of prolonging and intensifying
the Iran-Iraq war, while seriously compromising US influence
over Israel and other countries to restrain sales to Iran.
mmm
r.
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
Mtmo For.
H F
0 93
^^■'y Oeciassiliea/Reieaseo oo
unaer crov«,r,s Of E 0 liST
C /^K' ^°''"'°" '^"""''> Security Cou//l
c^
0^^
^d^'
1^ . Tr^ ui>^aca.t ^^'^n^
5^^ vt»^ oHur
213
UNGUSSIFIED
4, ^fffx^LO^
iiNmsim
214
UNWSS
W F
0 94
/v. n
— Or '^ ,
215
H F
0 95
ist(M
216
^5v
"5567
.■» :•»
/■•Vt5p>?g»:>a».;-.
'-'zy^.-
-r >/A.
UNCLASSIFIEI
M L.-^C
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
FRICA REGION
"(^voi J --^V ■^*'*'
V<.<,** C-^. i.*v
^rv>— v^ V^'-^ v..^^^ -^V--^ -'-^•^
. ^c.
217
-••. UNWSSIfiED
f\jL he'
N 1331
-■>^
UNCLASSIFIED
Partially Deciassifiea/Re'easefl on .10 fjilt -- ^ _
undef provisions 01 f 0 '.''356 ■* I \
by K Jonnson Naticai Security Council Mm^WtB-^T^/ I ^^
218
Inn TesHmony
21 Noveflbcr 1986
OCI '^
20 Nov 86. 1200
C 52.05
Administration, both the natic-al security comunity
and ^^^KelHgence community have been keenly aware anc constantly concerned
about^^^MopoHtica^B|Ution and the strategic signifi:ance of Iran. Much
(hQugl^^^Hw^^H^^^^n devoted to how we night deve^. :p contacts and
relation^rH^^^^^^)*] provide a better understa'cin; :' what is happening
there and establish contacts and relationships which migh*. lead to improved
relationships later on,
I recall speaking t
In the fall of 1985, Bud McFarlane, after a weekly mtiting which he and
his deputy had with me and my deputy, asked me to stay be'^nd. He told me
about discussions he had had at the highest levels in Isri^l ur
desirability of discussions with officials in Iran ard of^^rij
access. 1 distinctly recall McFarlane emphasizing that tr=
discussions would be the future relationships with Iran ar-:
in the East-West and Kiddle East-Persian Gulf equation.
to put us in touch with an Iranian expatriate. The IsraJ
Irei
checked out this man's background and contacts exhau;: W^^nd had high--| J
.in t-e ciuility of his relationship with t-cr l-:-ian of f ici a1 s H*^ "-^^^ ^^
conf idence
:onf Idence ..m :!-e ciu
LUkC SS
fcjumEii
;4 6L
219
UNCIJfSSIFIED
C 5210
//y
^would trjnsfer funds to a sterile U.S.-controllee
^verseas bank,
fusing these funds, the CIA would covertly obtain materiel
jauthorized for transfer from U.S. isilltary $tocits,*aa_irAaipa£t
■for onward movement to Iran.
Usi'n'^^^^^^B^res, funos were deposited In the CIA account i:,
Geneva on 11 February 1986 and on 14 February 1,000 TOWs were transported
to Israel for pre-positioning. These TOWs were transferred by CIA fron OoD
(U.S. Army stocks 1n Anniston, Alabama) and transported througl^^^^lH
^using standard CIA-0oD^^^^^^Hlog1st1cs arrangements. Policy-
level coordination for these arrangen^^^Bs effected by NSC (North] with
OoO (Analtage and Koch) and CIA (Claf
covert Israeli facility awaiting onwa
On 19-21 February, U.S. and Ira
In Germany to discuss problems in ar
). Ttit TOWs were place<j In a
lent.
Iclals (NSC and CIA) met again
a meeting among higher-level
officials. At this meeting, the U.S. side agreed to provide 1,000 TOWs to
Iran as a clear signal of U.S. sincerity. This delivery was canmenceo on the
morning of 20 February and conpleted In two transits to Tehran on 21 February.
Transportation from Israel to Iran was aboard a false flag Israeli aircraft.
On 7 March, U.S. (CIA and NSC) and Israeli representati
Iranian intermediary in Paris to determine whether any furth
possible in arranging for a hiyh-level meeting with U.S. a
During these meetings, the intermediary emphasized the d
situation in Iran and Iranian anxieties regarding Increa
effectiveness.
d IJ^ «LI 1/ 5
RCVIEWEO FOA KClCASC
6
^rrcf
DO
67::.
UNCUMim
220
I
.\t'\
WMmm
\
7
NTRACT/ORCON
_ MORKINC DRAFT (3 0«cti)&«r 1986)
(This drtft rtflicts facts tvtHtblt tMt aornlng.
4531
TMi
Rtvlslons My bt ntcisstry <s «(jdUlon«1 facts surface)
\
US-IranUn Contacts and tht Anarlcan Hostagts
Chronology of CIA InvolvtMnt
9 Stottuber 1985: LTC OMvtr North calls Charlts E. AHtn. National
Inttlltgtnct Offlctr for Counttrttrrorlsa (NIO/CT) on sicuri tiltphont. North
statts that ht is worliing a Mttir of hightst laportanct and str«ssts th* ntcd
r
to hold th« InforMtlon hi has to Imrt on a strict nttd-to-kno« basis.
t
Rtqutsts Allan. In NIO rolt. to task InttlHgtnct Co— unity to tncrtasf
colltctlon on Iran and Ltbanon. Assirts that an Aatrlcan hostagt. possibly
Nllllaa Bucklty, sight bt rtltastd 111 ntit stvtral days. Provldts a garblfd
surnaM of an alltgtd stnlor Iranian official who was said to bt Involvtd In
tht rtltast. Alltn rtstarchts na~* ■'
Alltn rtqutsts Nhitt Houst guldanct on
should bt dlssTmlnattd. LTC North, afttr consulting with N«t1ona1 Stcurlty
Advisor MacFarlant. dirtcts that dlsstnlnatlon bt llalttd to Stcrttary
diJN /?Zt
325)^
221
f
mmm
RACT/MCOH
T-^ ^tbrur
Lie- North rtqutstsi
«nd Alltn to coiw to
tht Eucutiv* OfftCf luHdtng for « mtttlng on futurt Actions rtUtlnq to tht
IrtnUn InltUtlvt. Also tn «ttindtnct it this Mttlng «rt Stcord ind No«1
Koch. LTC North pnstnts « dttiHid schtdult rtUtInf to shipntnt of tms to
Iran.Wch co1nc1d)A9 «Uh tht rt)i«si of «n Aatrlctn hosttgi tnd, ultlatttly.
tht rttJrn of tttt body of A«trtc«n dtplo««t Minttn Bucklty.
n ftbrutry 1986: Irjnltn tip«trUtt irringtd ftntncing for 1.000 US TOM
■Issllts: $3.7 alinon aovts Into « CIA account. Tht total ucunt of funds
which aty havt bttn Involvtd In tht optrttlonal trtnstctlons Is not known to
CIA btcaust tht financing and all otter transactions art handltd by privatt
Invtstors and inttratdlarlts. Thost 'transactions of which wt art awart art
stt out in stqutnct btlow. |
I
I
13 Ftbruary 1986: CIA obtains 1.000 JOMt fron OOO's Ar«y Logistics Connand.
Thtst TONS art transftrrtd by CIA froa 000 (US Aray stocks In Annlston.
Alabaaa) and transporttd throug|
logistics arrangtatnts.
jsing standard 000-CIA
15 Ftbruary 19>6: CIA dtllvtrs TOMs to Ktlly Air Forct Bast., NSC arrangts
for privatt transport to Isratl by Southtrn Air Transport, a foratr Agtncy
proprlttary. / ^
I \
19 Ftbruary 1986: OOO/OC/NE and LTC North attt in Frankfurt with Iranian
tipatrlatt.
ci//vqi
13
^".^^
222
UNDbA^ED
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
pfMUMMT teicr coMMrrm
WASHmOTON. OC MtK
Ciff-/ /C,
51
ftovmber 2S. 1986
Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
Washington, O.C. 20301-1000
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Enclosed is a transcript of a briefing before the Permanent Select
Coratittee on Intelligence of Noveaber 21, 1986. This transcript contains
Covert Action oaterial and aust be protected accordingly. Pursuant to Rule 4
of the Rules of the Cooaittee, it is requested that appropriate corrections be
oade and oorapleted transcripts returned within five days following receipt.
This sane rule provides that "Corrections shall be liititad to grannar and
tiinor editing, and nay not be made to change the substance of the testimony."
Pursuant to its procedures to protect transcripts of executive sessions,
the Connittee is transmitting the enclosed transcript with the understanding
that it is provided on teaporary loan and that no copies will be made thereof.
Also enclosed are questions for the record. It is requested that your
responses to these questions and the edited transcript reach the CoRnittee by
Oecenber S, 1986.
With best wishes, I aa
SincW^
y yours.
Lee H. Huailton
Ouinan
Enclosures
223
MfmM
• 83
tUBJICTi Ou«ttlon« and Answer* for tha Kaeord frea ••eratary
of "Dafanaa Taatiaony lafora tha Houaa Parmaaant
lalact Coaalttaa oa Intalli^aaca, it Dacaabar 198« (U)
1. Tha Co««lttaa raquaata a copy of tha Ktmy laapactor Oanaral/
Caaaral Couaaal raport oa thalr invaati9«tioa of tha pricia9 of
TOW fld.asilaa tranafarrad to tha CIA.
Ai (U) Upoa eoaplatloa of tha raport, a copy will ba provldad
to tha Coaalttaa.
2. Tha Coaadttaa raquaata a copy of tha Sacratary of Dafaaaa
BMaorandua and margiaal notaa on tha Draft MSDO of Juaa 198S
At (U) Thaaa ara provldad at TAB A.
3. Was tha baaic TOW aold to any othar country in tha laat
two or thraa yaara?
Ai (C) Yaa. Froa rt 1903 to FY 19t<, basic TOW waa aold to
tha following couatriaa (quaatitiaa la paraathasaa) t Jap«n
^^^|, Kanya ^^f, Koraa^^l' Morocco ^^^|, Somalia |
and Thailand
f
4. Did Canaral Sacord hava any kind of Consultant contract,
or othar ralatioaahip or poat, with tha 0•par^aaat of Oaf ansa
aftar his ratiraaaat?
At (O) Tm. rellowiag his ratiraaaat oa 1 May 19a3, HO
Sacord was approvad as a conaultaat appoiataa for tha
Offica of tha Assist«at 8aerat«ry of D«fanaa ( Xntaraational
Sacurity Affairs), spaeifleally for tha Haar Bastara aad
South Asiaa Affairs Raqloa. Effactiva 11 July 1983. HO
Sacord was authorisod 130 days at a rata of 1342.00 p«r
day, but ha did aot aarva any days la a pay statua. On 11
July 1984, no Sacord waa aqain approvad as a consultant
appointaa and authorisad 90 days at a rata of $242.00 par
day. but ha did net sarva any days in a pay status. MO
Partially DeciassiMed/Reitased onj-^ ^W* ff^
undei Dfovisions ol E 0 12356
by K Johnson National Securiiy Council
-VN^illFm
VIA COMIMT CHANVELS
224
mms0
84
Sccord'a appolntacnt w«s t«rminat«d on 10 July 198S. On 5
August 198S MG S«cord w«a appolntad aa a conaultant without
coBpanaation for up to tan days. Thla appclntaant waa
tarminatad on 4 Auguat 1986, and tha Oapartaant haa no
racord of hla having b«an on a duty atatua on thla appolntmant,
with tha following axcaptlon. On S Auguat 1985, MO Sacord
was appolntad as a conaultant, without co^anaatlon, to
tha Sp«clal 0p«ratlon8 Policy Advlaory Group (SOPAO). His
tara on tha SOPAG azplrad affactlva 4 August 1986. During
thla ona-yaar tarn. HG Sacord partlclpatad In ona aaatlng
of tha SOPAG, on IS Novambar 1985. Ha has not p«rtlclpatad
slnca, and thla is tha laat conaultlng activity In which
ha partlclpatad, according to Oapartaant racorda. Partlnant
documantatlon is anclosad at TAB B.
5. Haa Ganaral Sacord droppad fro* ona of our coaimlttaas for
falling to azacuta a financial stataaant?
At (U) MO Sacord sarvad on tha Spaclal Oparatlons Policy
Advisory Group (SOPAG) froa January 1984 to August 1986,
although ha last partlclpatad In Bovaabar 1985. ^W Sacord 's
aaabarship on tha •OPAfl was taralnatad, affactlva 4 August
1986, baaad upon his failura to provlda tha Oapartaant
with financial Inforaatlon (as raqulrad In fora sr 1555).
Aapllfylng Inforaatlon Is ancloaad at TAB C.
6. Hava any TMS or othar aras aalas by tha Oapartaant baan
aada to any 'aganta or alddlaaan' as opposad dlractly to a
raclplant country?
A I (U) No FMS or othar aras aalaa to foralgn countrlaa
hava baan aada by tha Oapartaant through a prlvata agant
Ti-
i»fn
225
UNCUSSIFIED
nCHAXO V. SICORO CONSULTANT HISTORY OSO ■ ^OUCY
0
101
Oatt of Appointment
Office
Days
Approved
Salary
ptrOay
Initial Appt -07. 11-«3
ISA/10/NESA
130
S242.00
R«n«wiltff-07-n-«4
ISA/10/NESA
90
S242.00
Tannlnatlon tff -07.10-«
ISA/lO/NESA
Appt to SOPAC tff -t-S-iS
ISA/SP
10
woe
Appointment txpirtd 1-4-M -
RMutst to r«n«w app fwdtd
toNrsonnalJ-ll-M
Tamynation 52 fwdtd to
^nonnti 10-23-46
«w^rM|utsttd tff data of »-S-
M, based on S«<ords refusal
to provide SriSSS
'Spedal Operations Poliq^ Advisory Group
226
19 November C^rO ^^i^
324/4:
ffi^^p
2 >-/
8 30 A
t <_>,
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9-30
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iMiLHSSlP
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<;^30
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233
March 1
234
ttC\jmiT V A r ' A,tm%
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D C 20301-2400
UNCUSSIFIED
fell &^" 1
5 May 1986
Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
The Secretary of Defense
Wash ing tor. . DC
Dear Mr. Secretary,
I request that you accept my resignation as Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
effective 31 May 1986.
I leave with a good heart, inspired by your own example of
tenacity in the service of those objectives and values to which
you are committed. I am gratified to have been able to serve in
the Department of Defense under your leadership, and most thankful
for the support you provided to the efforts in which I was engaged.
It has been a special privilege to serve, however remotely,
a grand and gifted President in a time in our history exalted by
his own skills and character. He may yet redeem the 20th Century.
If I can render any service to the Department or to yourself
at any time, I shall be honored to be asked, and quick to respond.
Thank you, and God bless you and all your efforts.
Respectfully yours.
^
Noel C. Koch
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs
UNCIASSIFI['
235
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D C 20301-2400
■ ■WTlaMATlOX) AC
\mtm»B
7 May 1986
Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
The Secretary of Defense
Wasfiinqtor, DC
Dear Mr. Secretary,
I have thought carefully on your request that I withdraw my
resignation. It Is always agreeable to be needed, or at least
told that one is needed.
It is important to understand that my decision to resign
much preceded the recisslon of the 3 October 1983 memo. To the
extent that internal events were determinant, it was far more
the management of the SOF lift issue, and the report to Congress,
than any other single factor that convinced me I should proceed
with plans to leave. I have no great difficulty supporting a
decision with which I disagree, but I do have trouble supporting
one that I can't even understand, which is arguably no decision
at all and which, in any case, is indefensible in light of the
Department's own pr i or i t i es--economy not least. In addition, to
put it plainly, I don't believe the matter was managed honestly,
in good faith. It stinks of duplicity. Now it's finished — or
my part in it is, and I Intend to be silent on It.
There is the matter of my replacement, and I have to say
the following on this point. The Special Planning operation was
jury-rigged from the outset and, among other problems, plagued
with nanpower shortages. Half my small staff are borrowed from
the Services and other agencies. There are nine people in all,
with one secretary, crammed Into a miniscule space. These few
people do what OJCS does with 60 plus people, what our State
counterpart — the Office for Combatting Terrorism — does with
nearly 40 people. In spite of repeated efforts, I am ashamed to
say I have not succeeded In correcting this situation. In spite
of all this, these people have done exemplary work, unrewarded.
Even now, I would not advise a large Increase in the staff, but
there should be adequate secretarial assistance and suitable
space. I have not the slightest doubt that we break every
record in the Department for insufficiency in both areas. All
of this, compounded by the need to keep terrorisn issues com-
partmented even within Special Planning, has made It Inpossible
to bring up a replacement for myself. This deficiency has also
been pointed out to me, and complicates my efforts to leave.
nuiimm DLUUJjiliui;Reie;)se(i on j) fiSi
'jnae' provisions oi E 0 !_' '55
by K jonnsun National S;; . :, j.-oncil
UNCUSSiFIED
236
iifimim
Along with yourself, both Dr. Ikle and Rich Armltage have
urged me to reconsider my decision to resign. There are personal
reasons for me to proceed. I want to spend time with my children
and my wife, and I would like to try to provide for them a little
better than I can now. To do this, and still to meet my obliga-
tion to my duties In the Department, I propose to continue as a
full-time consultant beyond 31 May 1986, and Rich Armltage Is In
accord with this approach. I believe this will assure an orderly
transition, and I hope tt will be acceptable to you.
Respectfully yours.
0>i^
Noel C. Koch
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs
ttSWSStt®
iCxr.^-
7)
2^nuary
_ J ■
■V'^7
8:30
iSESfft
2:30
9-30
10
10-30
11
11:30
12
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7=7=^
238
239
STENOGRAPHIC MINTJTES
Unr«Tij«d m/id I'ncdltcd
Not for QuoUtion or
Duplication
UNCLASSIFIED
r
''"'^^^%£D'
Committee Hearings
oftlM
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
w (^
PM«My DKilHified/ Released on ^-^^ ^^- ^^<f^
under provitloni of LO. 1235* OFFICE OF THE CLERK
, . • b)f O. SWu>, NUUonil Security CouKQfnce of Omcl«l Reporten
UNCLASSIHED
oopr nOu
240
I
2
3
U
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 1
12
13
m
15
16
17
18
19
20
2 1
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME HIR22U000 llllll I H V V I L I L 1 1 PAGE 1
RPTS MCGIMK
DCHN DANIELS
DEPOSITION or DAN H. KUYKENDALL
Wednesday. August 12, 1987
U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Conitittee to Investigate Covert
Arns Transactions with Iran,
Uashington. D.C.
The conmittee net, pursuant to call, at 900 a.m.,
in Roon 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, with Spencer
I
Oliver presiding.
Present: r. spencer Oliver, Chief Staff Counsel to '
the Foreign Affairs Coimittee; Thonas Frynan, Staff Counsel;
and Kenneth Buck, Assistant Minority Counsel. |
I
Also present: Uilliaa Coston, on behalf of the I
I
witness .
UNClASSinED
241
NAME
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
3 1
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
HIR224000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE
> DKlMifled/ReWaiMl on
unde
MR. MALLON: I ara Charlie Mallon from the Sergeant
at Arms' Office. I am a notary and I am going to suear you
in .
t Ui tnass sworn . ]
BY MR. OLIVER-
2 Mr. Kuykendall. ua are going to try to make this as
brief as ue can, although our experience is that these
things have run on much longer than wa anticipated. But if
ue could start, sir, I wonder if you cold give us a little
background about yourself for the record, education and so
on. your activities leading up to your election to Congress,
and so forth .
A I was raised on a ranch in Cherokee, Texas. I
graduated from Texas ACM after nilitaiy service. ny college
education was interrupted by military service. I was a B-29
pilot in Uorld War II and came back to college and finishe'^.
a year and a half and graduated in 1947; went to work for
the Procter C Gamble Company immediately.
I was with the Ptoctat £ Gamble Company in Houston,
Dallas. Corpus Christi. Louisvilla. and Kamphis.
I arrived in Memphis in lata 1955. so effectively I
bagan work there in early 1956. as Regional Manager for the
Hidsouth States in tha Food Products Division, where X
stayed until 1965, where I resigned.
I became active in politics as a volunteer in 1960
i)/, J/, /f,jr7
er provWoni of LO. 12356
by O. Stio, NUtionaJ Security Council
UNOlkSSW
242
(imssiFIED
NAME: HIR22>4000 U I ■ IJL^a !■ Ill II il PAGE
U7 and ended up being a candidate for office in 1964. I uas
48 defeated.
U9 I went in the insurance business for a short time
50 and uas elected to Congress m 1966.
51 I stayed in Congress four terras representing the
52 city district of Memphis, Tennessee. I uas defeated m
53 1974. I opened my oun business, at that time called D.K.
54 Consultants. Ua still have the same business. The name uas
55 changed about four years ago to the Kuykendall Company.
56 Neither ray wife nor my partner ever liked D.K.
57 Consultants, so we changed it in about 1981, I believe.
58 . I am not certain what that date uas. Ue have
59 represented a cross section of primarily pr ivatelylouned
60 businesses. I did represent one trade association at one
6 1 time. Furniture Manufacturing Association because of my
62 connection with the Broyhill family in Congress. But I did
63 that only for about two years. I have had a pr ivately.itouned
64 consulting firm involved primarily with pr ivatelyfouned
65 businesses or closalyMhald corporations.
66 S You mentioned that you had a partner. Who is your
67 partner?
68 A Elizabeth Powell who was my eKacutive assistant on
69 tha Hill and has been with ma for actually 20-1/2 years.
70 She is still my partner.
7 1 2 Uhat committees did you serve on?
wmm
243
NAHE
72
73
714
75
76
11
78
79
80
81
82
83
SU
85
86
87
88
89
90
9 1
92
93
94
95
96
HIR22'j000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE
A I served on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and I
was ranking on Aviation and Transportation when all of that
uas over in Commerce Remember that uas split up about
1974, but It all us4' to be over m Commerce, all
transportation which I uas ranking on that subcommittee.
2 Hou many eraployeas doas your company have?
A Tuo besides myself.
2 That is Elizabeth Powell and another?
A Richard Marino. Ha has 3ust left us. We will be
getting another legislative assistant before long.
2 Does your company have a PAC?
A Ho. I hava administered two different PACs
through the years, but wa do not hava a PAC.
2 Are those PACs connactad? Are you still the
administrator of those PACs?
A No. Neither of than exists.
2 Did they exist in 1986?
A Yes.
2 What PACs ware those?
A Tha Broyhill Furnitura Conpany's PAC and there was
a PAC that was in existence for only a year called Venture
PAC. which was an offshoot of the sane PAC. It was
connactad with tha Broyhili Furnitura Company only.
2 Mow, in addition to tha Kuykandall Company, are you
an officer or director of any other companies that are
UNCUSSinED
244
NAME :
97
98
99
100
10 1
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
1 10
1 1 1
1 12
1 13
1 m
1 15
1 16
1 17
1 18
1 19
120
121
HIR224000
UNClASSra
PAGE
related to the work that you do? I think in particular Gulf
and Caribbean Foundation.
A I thought you were going on a different path here.
I was nanager. I was never an officer of Gulf and Caribbean,
but I did manage their affairs on the Washington level.
2 Uho were the officers of the Gulf and Caribbean
Foundation?
A The President was Uillian Blakemore, front Mid-
Atlantic. Texas; and General Counsel and Treasurer is David
Witts fron Dallas. Texas.
2 Are there any other menbers of the board of that or
officers of the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation?
A Ko . They were the active menbers of the board and
the directors also. Elizabeth Powell was Assistant
Treasurer, so she could also write the routine checks.
2 When was the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation formed?
A I will have to tell you within a month or so
because it was founded clear back in 1983 in approximately
June, X would say, of 1983.
2 The purpose for the founding of the Gulf and
Caxibbean Foundation was?
A To begin somehow to get a flow of unbiased
Iniornatlon ixoa Central America to both the media and to
the Congress and the technique that was decided upon was the
use of independent scholars and people of impeccable
QHCUiSW
245
VNCIASSIHED
NAME: HIR22MO00 III «tJL.n%#«#l I l^ar PAGE
122 credentials that would be accepted by the media and by the
123 Congiass as having information that didn't have a label on
124 It from Central America and other areas.
125 2 What gave you that impulse to set up this
1 2 6 foundation?
127 A One of my clients and several of ray friends clear
128 back to college days, some of ray friends, have properties
129 uithin the immediate proximity of the Rio Grande River and
130 remember, this was the Salvador days. This did not have
131 anything to do with Nicaragua at all at that time. JWk^^'^is
132 flow of innigrants had begun to really start hitting that
133 border and they had begun to get worried about it and
13U wondered if a group of independent citizens could do
135 something to have an intelligent approach to the situation
136 m Central America. And we sought out ways to do this.
137 The thing that seemed to be lacking most was a flow
138 of non-ftainted information Every so-called expert was
139 either pro-Reagan or anti-Reagan, Denocrat or Republican,
1U0 anti-Chuzch or pro-Church, consazvative or liberal,
mi Everything we looked at was slanted one way or the
1'42 other and the whole idea was to get scholars that simply
1U3 war* not pazt--that were of such prestige that you knew that
lUU thay couldn't ba bought with a retainer or sonething like
ms that.
1U6 Q You set this up as a 501(c)C3) foundation?
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A That IS correct. Absolutely.
2 When did you get your 501(c)C3) tax exemption?
A I think we got it somewhere along about September,
October of 1983.
Q And how was the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation
funded at the outset?
A By contributions from about, I would say, a maximum
of about 30, 35 people.
2 And what was the general order of magnitude of the
contributions?
A The entire amount of money spent during the entire
life of Gulf and Caribbean Foundation was only S225,000.
2 Is It still m existence?
A It IS still in existence. It is not functioning
now, but It IS still in existence.
p
2 How would you break down that *225,0a, say, in
1984--1983, 19814, 1985, 1986?
A 1983, 19814, my recollection is a large majority of
the money was spent in 1983, 19814, at least 60 percent of it
on some oiiicial projects that we administered all the way
through. 1985, 1986, the expenditures were quite small.
2 Was your association with this foundation youx
first real interest and involvement in Central America?
A Oh, yes. I never have been involved in a committee
or anything on this subject here on the Hill.
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PAGE
This carae through your friends in Texas?
A Absolutely.
2 You were concerned about the refugee problem'
A Uell. the whole impact of the--uell, one of the
things that I remember specifically, Mr. Oliver, during some
elections that took place in Mexico in either 1982 or early
1983, there was a very prominent communist influence and you
could go across the river at Matamoros or some place and
find the communist signs on the telephone poles and it
distressed a lot of people.
That was one of the things that caused them to get
worried and then the walking of those refugees thai wa^iA be
"" 1 V VUI across the countryside .
You could be out deer hunting on one of the ranches
and see them walking across the countryside going north. So
It worried a lot of good people down there.
2 In an interview earlier with some of my colleagues,
you indicated that you called Lyn Noiziger for his advice
about what to do about this problem?
A Uell, I called Lyn Nofzigei to ask him to find out
from Judge Clark, who was then head of the NSC, if there was
anything--this was the caquest I got from two or three people
in Texas--is there anything a voluntary group can do to help.
Remember now, that was a specific thing, the
question I asked. I called Lyn. I said, ''Do you have a
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yNCUssra
PAGE
way to get to Bill Clark and ask hira this simple question:
'What can a volunteer group do to help?''*
He said, ''I ara having dinner with him tonight. I
uill come back to you.''
And Clark said, ' 'If you can figure out any uay to
get information that is not tainted back from down there, it
uill be the greatest service you can do to your country,''
and that was where that came from.
2 Uhat did information that was not tainted have to
do with the refugee flow problem?
A Well, the people were going a whole lot deeper into
the root cause. Remember, these refugees waaw beginning ^«>
b« Salvadorans. They weren't just Mexican workers. They
were beginning to be Salvadorans coming across down there
and they wanted to know the root cause of it, the root cause
of why this Xyou know, UiteLi! 'li* people coming across th^
the Rio Grande Rivei to work m Texas is not new to
Texas .
It is who the new people were and lUti l.lie^ ume and
where thay wttre coming from.
You will remember the early days of the Salvadoran
crisis. This is when it was. There had been no elections
down thai* yat.
e So this is when Lyn Hofziger suggested if you could
get some factual, unbiased information?
mmm
249
wmvm
KAHE HIR22U000 lJlllJL.riW W ■■ ■■■■^ PAGE 10
222 A No. That was Judge Clark's suggestion. Lyn
223 Nofziger was only an intermediary.
224 2 And that was uhat caused you to set up the Gulf and
225 Caribbean Foundation'
226 A That was the thing that caused us to have the
227 challenge to set it up. The idea of using the scholar
228 approach-- two iniormal meetings took place before that uas
229 arrived at, is the only uay we knew of and could work with.
230 Ue had a meeting at the University of Texas LBJ
231 Library to discuss this.
232 Dr. fi»n was our host to discuss how you could do
233 something like this and still stay absolutely intellectually
231 and scholas tically pure in that sense.
235 Thl = — UA» xhe final decision to set this up was made
236 at the LBJ Library in about Hay or June of 1983 and then the
237 actual organizational meeting took place at Trinity
238 University about six weeks later, something like that.
239 fi So you began to involve scholars m this?
2*40 A We recruited a group of scholars in the late summer
2U1 and early fall of 1983. I renenber we had Dr. John Silber.
2^2 "* ^'^ *i 1 a "' top of our list and Henry Kissinger beat us to
2(43 hia.
2i4>4 This is when the Kissinger Commission was created.
2145 So we ended up with two other scholars from Boston
2U6 University, Dr. Joachim Itaitra and Or. Peter Berger.
UNCLASSIFIED
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PAGE 1 1
It IS very interesting that Speaker O'Keill used
Dr. Maitre also as a briefing scholar for his people, as a
result of the same trips.
2 You sent Peter Berger?
A Berger did not go to Central America. He did a
study for us and it was published in the ■j-riHi'-*"*" Revieu.
Maitre went to Central America at least five times in 1983,
1984 clear into 1985.
2 Old you send anyone else?
A Dr. Elie Ueisel went with Maitre one tine. That is
when he discovered the i^sC^^k. of the Miskito Indians. He
was on a trip in a dug-'-out canoe when he discovered that,
2 Did you go with then on this trip?
A No. I have never been to Central America.
2 When ha returned from these trips. Dr. Maitre to
Central America, did he write reports, write articles?
A The first trip Dr. Maitre, Dr. Max Singer went down
and they, in conjunction with soma other people, wrote a
book called ''The Democratic Revolution in Central
Anarica.'* This was the first tina that our side, Mr.
Oliver, uaza ever called the democratic revolution.
I think all tha connittaas have copies of that book
that was published in 1984.
2 I an sura wa do .
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PAGE 12
'The Futuia of the Democratic Revolution in
Central America. '" I think, is the
name . I am not
sure what the exact name is. but the use of the term
''democratic revolution'' came out of the use of that book
that was published and distributed.
In fact, copies of it went all over the world.
2 You also employed the services of Michael Ledeen?
A Ha was the person who actually edited the book
Itself. He never took a trip for us. Ha edited and got the
book published. He is a very talented author and he was the
one that debriefed our scholars and wrote the book.
fi In what capacity did he dabriaf them? How did he
come into this?
A I don't know. I was not there.
2 Well, was it your understanding he was a Central
American expert?
A No. It was our understanding that he was a very
fine scholar. I had never met hin before he was actually--
S So it was Dr . Maitra or Dr . Singer or Elie Ueisel
or someontt else who made this contact?
A I don't remember. My recollection is maybe it was
soaabody at Georgetown University that did it for us . X
don't laaambar who made the initial contact with Michael
Ledeen.
2 You paid him to edit?
UNcussra
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UNCUSSinED
PAGE 13
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298
299
300
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303
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3 10
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314
3 15
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317
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320
32 1
A We paid him to actually write the book and then he
also, because of some contacts, arranged for a publisher.
2 Other than those people, did you involve any other
scholars or any others m trips or study tours of any kind
to Central America?
A Well, ue continued to employ Dr. Kaitre. I say
•'employ.'' In many cases, the only thing ue covered uere
simply his expenses. In some cases, ue didn't even do that
because he uas working with someone else and he would simply
come back by and report^to us.
He becaroe/1 in the production of op-ed pieces and
also as an adviser to several congressional committees that
he talked to--not testified. 4u^ he would simply go and visit
with them on both sides of the aisle.
/rrir. ' /.^t * '^^ »»*y close friend .a^clh Congressman Murtha, Plaitre
he used nim as an adviser.
Uhen we began to get into the Nicaraguan thing,
which didn't take place really until late 1984, people began
to come into the country from other parts of the world and
our treatment of the scholar approach and the fact that when
we took someone to Capitol Hill, number one, the neraber knew
that I was going to introduce them and lease. They could
talk to then as they saw fit and th« Hember knew there would
be no publicity. So--
2 Why did you do that?
T^^^is, ^'
wtmm
253
HIR22U000
UNCLASSra
PAGE H4
NAHE
322 A So that tha Member of Congress uould have a chance
323 to talk to a person from another country who uas--l had
324 generally screened to see if they had an ax to grind ^hat I
325 thought uould not be interesting to a Member of Congress and
326 a Member of Congress likes to feel that he can talk to
327 someone and not have a reporter sitting out the door with a
328 microphone in his faca that says, ''Did he talk you into
329 changing your position?'' You know hou important that is.
330 2 Yes.
331 . Did you decide which Congressmen to call upon or to
332 have these peopla--
333 A Yes. Sometimes I would get requests.
33U 2 Did the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation fund tha
335 travel of the people who cane up from Central America?
336 A Ue had many different variations of that. He did
337 everything from pay part of a plane ticket for a person that
338 uas described to me. In soma cases, all we uould do uould
339 be to escort a parson who was already m the country.
340 Ha did quite a bit of that. Simply sitting down
3U1 and talking to the parson ahead of time and seeing if the
342 picture that was attempting to be filled out over on the
343 Hill hara, if thay added anything to it.
3'4'« S These ware primarily rafugaas? I am talking about
SUS Hicaragua now.
3U6 A One way or the other, yes.
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350
35 1
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353
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363
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369
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37 1
HIR224000
ONCUSffD
PAGE 15
But they might be people living m exile in Costa
Rica?
A He had a Salvadoran guerrilla defector that proved
to be an excellent asset to several flerabers of Congress in
finding out relative costs of an insurgency.
2 When you didn't pay all of their expenses, who paid
the rest of them? Did you share them with other
organizations or individuals?
A No. There were nany, raany organizations around
town that Knew these people were coming to town and there
uas Kind of a clearinghouse group that met over at the
American Security Council every Tuesday morning. I uas
there about every other week.
The American Security Council had kind of a think-
tank group and this seemed to be kind of a clearinghouse of
people that were in town that might be of interest.
S Hh«n did you start to attend these meetings of this
c JMiii pmijft JtoxxsmT
A Oh, 1985, thereabouts.
S Hho else sat in on this clearinghouse?
A Twenty people.
S Do you remember uho some of then uere?
A Virtually none of them uere Hill activists. These
uere think-tank people, various and sundry think-tanks
around Yyiiii"' There would be members of congressional staff
UNCLASSIFIED
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389
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391
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394
395
396
HIR22U000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 16
uho would show up occasionally. But these uere mostly
paoplo that uara involved in think-tank organizations.
There uere very ieu activists in this iield.
8 Do you reraeraber which think-tanks?
A I really can't at this stage of the game. It's
been a uhile. They floated around on different ones. I
really don ' t .
2 Is this the group you told my colleagues earlier
you were sort of the chaiman of this informal group?
A No , no . no .
2 This is a different group?
A The only thing I ever did with this group was give
then a Hill briefing if they asked me for it as to what the
status of the legislation was.
2 The American Security Council?
A Yes. The whole group, if they wanted to know what
the status of legislation was. they would call on me.
2 Well, let me see if I can refresh your memory a
little bit about who night have been involved in this. The
American Security Council is chaired by whom?
A John Fisher .
2 Did he host these meetings?
A Mo.
2 Uho hosted them?
A Colonel Sam Deacons.
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397
398
399
1400
40 1
402
403
uou
uos
U06
1407
<408
1409
1410
I4l 1
1412
1413
14114
ms
■416
417
418
m9
420
421
HIR224000
UNCUSSinED
PAGE 17
Colonel S'ara Deacons?
A Mho is a full-time employee, a retired Array
colonel. West Point-type.
2 And were there people frora the Heritage Foundation
there ?
A Sometimes .
2 From CSIC, Gaocgetown Center ior Strategic and
International Studies?
A Not regularly. Occasionally and that person would
usually be a guest of somebody's.
2 The American Enterprise Institute?
A I never saw anybody there irom there.
2 Brookings?
A No.
2 PRODEHCA?
A Yes .
2 Who would be there from PRODEHCA?
A Oh, several diiietent people. I don't remember
anyone that was particularly regular there.
2 What about the National Strategy Information
Center?
A That doesn't ring a bell.
e But it would be about 20 people and it would be a
shifting cast of characters?
A Yes.
I
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430
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44 1
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443
444
445
446
HIR224000
UNCLASSIHED
This began in early 1985?
PAGE
18
A No. I don't know when the group began. I do not
know when the group began. I know uhen I began to attend it
fairly regularly.
Q Uere there people iiom the Citizens ior America
there '
A Yes.
2 Jack Abramoii?
A Yes .
Q Was he there on a regular basis?
A They uere kind of latecoi»ers . Yes. He was there
fairly regularly.
2 Peter Flaherty?
A Sone times .
2 He was with the Citizens for Aaerica?
A No. Peter Flaherty was Citizens for Reagan.
2 Citizens for Reagan.
Penn Kenble?
A He is PRODEHCA. He was seldom there.
2 Danise O'Leary?
A The PRODEMCA group were not regular. I have
probably seen all these people there at one time or anotj.^r.
I couldn't tell you with any certainty when they uere
there. They uere not regular.
2 Jim Denton?
UNCLASSIFIED
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4U7
UUS
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450
451
452
453
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455
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457
458
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462
463
464
465
466
467
468
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470
47 1
HIR224000
DNtUSSIFIED
Earliex. yes .
PAGE 19
2 He was uith what organization?
A I can't think. If you mentioned a name, I might
remember it, but I can't remember.
2 Glenn Bouchez .
A Yes.
2 And what group did he represent?
A I never did know the name of his group.
2 This group would meet on Tuesday morning and
discuss uhat uas going on in Nicaragua?
A Oh, no. All over the world. We had people there
from all over the world from Afghanistan to Mozambique.
This was a broad-guaged group. they were literally people
from every hot spot in the world.
2 Sort of freedom fighter-type people you are talking
about ?
A This was a late thing, the presence of the actual
freedom fighter people. This was more of a strategic group
to discuss an ovei{all situation. We have had ambassadors
from the countries to here and back and forth to come to
that meeting. This was a strategic group, very, very little
knowledge of or relationship to Capitol Hill.
2 Did Oliver North ever attend any of those meetings?
A I was never there when he attended one of them.
2 To your knowledge, did he ever attend any of them?
UNCIASSIHED
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NAME ■
472
473
14714
475
1476
477
478
479
480
48 1
482
483
484
485
486
48''
488
489
490
49 1
492
493
494
495
496
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 20
A Not to ray knowledge. To my knowledge, no. But I
in no way want to say he didn't.
2 I can only ask you about your knowledge .
A But to ray knowledge, no.
2 Did anyone from the White House attend any of those
raeetings to your knowledge?
A I recall that the Office of Public Liaison had
people there frora time to time. I don't even remember who
it was, but I think that office from tirae to time had people
there .
2 Do you remember whether or not Linda Chavez ever
attended 7
A Not when X was there.
2 Bob Riley?
A I think so.
2 Nanes CoDalis? -'
A No, not when I was thaxe. I never met him but once
and X didn't aaet hin there.
2 Anyone from the State Depaitaant?
A As a guest a couple of tiit«s> we had State
Department people.
2 Do you remember who they were?
A No. X never did know.
2 Otto Reich?
A Yes. Otto Reich had been there.
iiNcussro
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500
50 1
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
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510
51 1
512
513
514
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516
517
518
519
520
521
HIR224000
UNCIASSIHED
PAGE 21
2 Jonathan .Miller ?
A Not that I know. I have never met Jonathan Miller
He could have been there. I wouldn't have known hira.
e Ifou have never met Jonathan Miller?
A No. Not that I knew who I was meeting.
2 Did Elliot Abrams ever attend any oi those
meetings ?
A Not in ny presence.
2 Were you ever told that he attended any oi those
meetings?
A Yes.
2 Who told you that he attended?
A Just a meeting that I missed and I think he was
there. I was told that he had been a guest at the meeting
when I was not there.
2 Do you remember who told you?
A No.
2 Here you ever told Oliver North had attended a
meeting ?
A Ko.
2 This gtoup you said began to mat in lata 1984.
•atly 1985?
A I don't know. I only know when I began to meet
with tham.
2 Has in?
UNciAssra
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S22
523
5214
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
5140
541
542
543
544
545
546
HIR224000
ICIASSIHED
Late~g8i4. early 1985,
PAGE ?. 2
2 And you said you sort of gave them advice on
legis lative--uhat was going on on the Hill?
A Status.
2 You told them what you thought about what the
situation was ?
A Right.
2 Did they ever act on any of your status reports, to
your knowledge?
A I ara sure they did.
2 I don't want to ranga too far afield, but
originally you indicated soma of the people who mat with
various Congressmen came to your attention through your
meetings with this group.
A Yes.
2 That you would find out these peopla were in town.
A Right.
2 And these paopla would ba refugees or exiles or
even in soma cases, I assume, people who were still in
Nicaragua, but ware out of tha country at that tima?
A In soma cases, yes.
2 And youz organization, tha Gulf and Caribbean
Foundation, had paid soma of tha expanses for soma of tha
people who came to town and mat with various Congressmen.
A Occasionally. This was a very, vary small thing.
UNCLASSIFIED
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SUVI
S48
SU9
550
55 1
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
56 1
562
563
56U
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566
567
568
569
570
57 1
UNCIASSIRED
HIR2214000 IllWIal U.l.lll II II PAGE 23
2 Did any ,of the other organizations or individuals
who were at the American Security Council share the expenses
with the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation for the travels of
any of these individuals?
A Not on a known basis.
2 You mean not to your knowledge?
A Not to my knowledge.
2 Did you discuss at those meetings when someone was
m town--let's take, for exanple, Unta El Salvador^def ector .
When this gentleman was in town, did someone there at the
meeting say this man will be in town and he has a real story
to tell and those of you who may wish--how did it work?
A That particular person did not come to me through
that meeting. That particular person did not come to me
through that meeting.
2 How did he coma to you?
A Frank Gomez of IBC knew of the man. Frank Gomez is
bilingual, of course, and could discuss it with him and the
IBC was our PK firm up until mid- 1985 and because of his
relationship with these people and with the State Department
in the past and so forth and being bilingual, Gomez was ray
primary person that we dealt with with^IBC, «mls — Fnnlr Oumu^
during virtually the entire period after the formation of
the organization and when Frank Gomez left the State
Department and cane with IBC, we dealt almost entirely with
UNCUSSIHED
263
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572
573
57U
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576
577
578
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583
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590
59 1
592
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596
HIR22M000
hira .
ONUSIFIED
PAGE 24
2 How did you come to know Frank Goraez?
A I didn't. Ue had retained IBC in the very
beginning of the creation of Gulf and Caribbean to do our PR
work. Ue couldn't afford Lyn Nofziger.
2 In late 1983?
A Ko . Early autumn 1983, thereabouts, ue retained
them. They did our PR work almost entirely as far as
straight PR uas concerned, never lobbying, never the Hill.
They didn't go near the Hill. »n lii^ ■* J <^e!J.
2 Hou did IBC come to your attention?
A Through Lyn Nofziger.
2 Did you ask him at the time you asked him to ask
Judge Clark about what a private group could do, is that
uhen he suggested to you IBC?
A Later than that. I had thought to retain Lyn at
first and uhen he got through going over his rates uith me,
ue couldn't even come close to affording him, so I said
''Who is young, going into the business, and is
knowledgeable?'' and he lecomnended Richard Killer, who had
]ust created IBC.
2 Do you remember uhen that uas
A This would have been in late summer of 1983.
2 Was Rich Miller uorking out of Lyn Nofziger's
offices at that time?
UNCLASSIFIED
264
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597
598
599
600
60 1
602
603
60U
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606
607
608
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610
61 1
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613
61>4
615
616
617
6 18
6 19
620
621
HIR22M00O
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 25
A Would ypu explain the question a little iurther?
2 I asked whether Rich riiller was working out cf Lyn
Nofziger's offices at that time when you retained him?
A He was in the same building, but had his own
offices .
2 He wasn't in the suite of offices?
A Oh, no, sir. " ' i rf 1 r ' That is why I asked you to
restate the question. It was definitely not in the same
offices .
C How many employees did IBC have at that time?
A Very snail. I don't remember.
2 They were just starting out?
A Yes .
2 So you hired IBC to do what?
A To do normal PR work, to arrange for things like
trips to Salvador, to arrange press conferences, to do the
type things that PR firms do.
2 So you paid then how nuch to do that?
Jl It is a natter of record. We had then on a
retainer for about a year at »2,500 a month to do all of our
PR work. During that tine, I did not nanage any of that.
During that tine, ny' VariM fron Gulf and Caribbean was zero.
2 But you ware the one that arranged meetings on
Capitol Hill?
A Yes. PR did not include Capitol Hill. That was ray
iifimsim
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HIR224000
turf totally.
fifimsim
PAGE 26
2 I understand. But uhat did they do?
A Op-ed pieces, a great many of them, particularly
during 1984. This was a very large number of op-ed pieces.
They continued op-ed pieces, Maitre continued clear on into
1986. The meetings with editorial boards, the trips around.
speaking tours for the visitors of one kind or another
2 This uas primarily Rich Miller?
A No .
2 In 1983 and 1984?
A I don't know whan Frank cam* back, but you see,
when I began to have any relationship whatsoever with
Spanash-speaking people, it becana necessary that I have an
inteipreter. Frank Gomez uas tha logical person. He is a
simultaneous interpreter. So almost my total relationship
with IBC for about a year uas Frank Gomez.
2 Do you know uhen Frank Gomez :oined IBC?
A No, I do not. It has to have been m maybe late
1984 or early 1985. It has to have been late 1984.
2 But you retained IBC in late 1983.
A That is right.
2 So it uas about a year later?
A I an not certain.
2 Frank Gomez uas introducad to you by Rich Hiller?
A Oh, certainly.
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2 So it was whenever Rich Miller and Frank Gomez got
together is when you uere introduced to Gomez, when Gomez
became part of IBC?
A Yes.
2 Were you aware that IBC was about to obtain a State
Department consulting contract?
A No, I was not.
2 Did you ever know that they obtained a State
Department contract?
A Yes.
2 When did you learn that?
A I don't remember. Shortly after they obtained it,
whenever it was.
2 That would have been late 1984?
A I don't know.
2 Did you ever discuss their State Department
relationship with Miller or Gomez?
A Ho.
2 Did you know that the State Department contract
that they had called for then to do many of the same things
that they were doing for you?
A Ho. I did not know that.
2 So you were not aware of what they were doing for
the State Department?
A Ho.
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When did you first meet Oliver North?
In approxiraately--it must have been Hay or June of
1985
2 Do you knoH what was the occasion?
A Oh , yes .
2 What was the occasion?
A Dr. naitre, on a trip to Salvador, had come back 4a~
and visited uith m-^afi^ pointed out that at that time there
was a freak part of the law of selling materials to another
country that caused the American Defense Department to have
to grossly overcharge the Salvadorans for things like
helicopters .
And he said, "'I have been led to understand that
there is some freak clause in tha law that makes it
necessary that our Pentagon charge these people those
exorbitant prices, '' and he happened to have the price on a
world market of a Huey helicopter and it was about 2-1/2
times what they were charging them.
he came to sea me and told ma about it *frt it
sounded aJ
^^.-.4.
It sounds bad ,
•m%^^M- President of Gulf and Caribbean happened to be in
town at that time. He and I uant to see Congressman Duncan
Huntax. Duncan Hunter said, "'This is too ridiculous to be
true .
I can't believe it.
]a^ picked up tha phona at his desk and called Bill
"Ncussm
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Casey and sa
unmssHQ
PAGE 29
? • •
2 Duncan Hunter picked up the phone and got Bill
Casey on the phone :ust like that?
A Just like that and said, ' ' Is this true?'' He
said, ''I don't know. I have heard a ruraor that it was.
There is a fellow over at the American National Security
Council named Ollie North. You should call him and he will
know . ' '
And I immediately turned to Duncan Hunter and said,
'•Who is this guy?'' And he said, ''Well, he is a real
comer over at the National Security Council. So a couple
hours later, the President of Gulf and Caribbean, Blakemore
and I, went to see Ollia North and he immediately confirmed
mil illijiiii I li I letter of the law and said, i ip i u« t , if you
wanted to have a little further information on the effect of
this on the situation in Salvador, General Gorman is going
to be in town, I think, the next day or whenever.
So wa visited with General Gorman. He confirmed
It. I don't remember the exact time span, but I know that
Congressman Stratton and Congresswonan Holt introduced an
amendment and got it fixed vary shortly after that.
So that IS the episode. That is what ixmt happened
is ona thing^wa are vary proud of at Gulf and
Cazibbaan'that wa ware able to bring this thing to a
conclusion almost immediately. It was very important.
A-r
^nmsim
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So that was in the summer of 1984?
A That was in the summer of 1984.
HR. COSTON: Uait a second; 1985, I thought.
THE WITNESS; 1985. I am sorry. I an sorry.
Thank you. Counsel. 1985.
MR. OLIVER: Uell, I had the notes--
MR. COSTON: His testimony earlier uas tlay or June
of 1985.
THE WITNESS: It IS 1985.
MR. OLIVER: I had in a raeraorandun done by someone
uho had interviewed you earlier the spring of 1984.
THE WITNESS: No. It was 1985. It is 1985.
BY rtR. OLIVER:
2 Let ma--you think it uas in the summer or the spring
of 1985?
A I an —
2 That uas the first time you met Oliver North?
A Yes. Wait a minute. Just a minute. Just a
minute. It uas 1984. It uas 1984.
2 And after you--
A Because it uas still Salvador. It uas still
Salvador. It wasn't Nicaragua. It was still Salvador. It
had to b« 1984. It uas El Salvador.
2 After your meeting with North and the passage of
this legislation, did you work uith North during this period
WNcussm
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HIR22'4000
ONCUssm
PAGE 31
of passage of thi-s legislation:
A Oh, no.
2 You sau hira one time?
A Actually, somebody m the Executive Branch notified
the Armed Services Committee. We had nothing to do with
lobbying that passage. They took it and handled it
immediately. Me didn't have to inform thera . It uas done
C No. I uas asking you what North's involvement uas.
A I don't know.
2 So after this meeting that you had with North in
the spring or summer of 1984, when uas th« ne^ time that you
had any contact with him? Do you remember or can you
approximate ?
A I think there was probably one instance maybe in
late 1984 that I may have had lunch with him--11r . Blakeraore
and I had lunch with him, I believe, sometime in that
period .
2 Uhat was the purpose of that lunch?
A Just friendship.
2 It wasn't any discussion of Nicaragua?
A Ho, not at that time.
2 When did you see him again, to your knowledge,
after that luncheon in late 1984?
A I don't recall. I really don't. The whole issue
began to heat put on the possibility of getting the
CNCUXSIflEO
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UNCUSSIFIED
MAKE: HIR2214000 U I 1 Ul-fllJlJ 1 1 II II ^^^^ 32
772
773
77U
775
776
777
humanitarian aid in late 1984. You remerabei that.
2 Yes.
A And the possibility of achieving this began to heat
up in late 19814. began to become a real possibility m early
1985 and then that lasted clear on through the spring and
early summer, is uhan it finally passed^ thA mi!a»4ire .
UNCIASSIHED
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795
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797
798
799
800
80 1
802
HIR22U000
RPTS MCGINN
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 33
DCHN PARKER
2 You became involved in early 1985 in the efforts to
achieve that goal of humanitarian aid?
A That is correct. That is correct.
2 Were you paid to do that?
A No, I was not.
2 It was 3ust a voluntary thing?
A Yes. It was totally voluntary on my part. I
happened to have good enough clients. I could afford to
volunteer and my efforts on this effort clear through that
whole episode in 1985 was voluntary. I was registered to
lobby for my own company. I was registered to lobby for the
Kuykendall Company or D.jtJ. Consultants.
2 Here you involved in the Nicaraguan Refugee Fund
dinner which took place in April of 1985?
A No .
2 Here you asked to be involved in it?
A Yes .
2 Who asked you to become involved?
A Edie Fraser .
2 Did you turn her down?
A Ho. I faded away.
2 In other words, you went to some of the meetings--
A I did not go to any of the meetings.
HNCussro
273
UNCLASSIFIED
NAriE^ HIR22t4000 IflltfbfflWH Ik^ PAGE 34
803 2 Why did you fade auay?
SOU A I wasn't interested.
805 2 Uhy were you not interested? You were interested
806 in the subject. You had been involved in it.
807 A This was not our thing. Fundf raising and this type
808 of thing we were simply not involved in. Ue never were
809 involved m fundf raising . We did not get involved m fund/
8 10 r ais ing .
811 2 So you were asked by Edie Traser and you :ust sort
812 of stopped returning phone calls or told her you were not
813 interested or didn't do it?
Sm A I just didn't do it.
815 2 Did any of the people that ware involved with you
816 such as Rich Miller, who is retained as your (R • P •; firm, were
817 they involved in the Micaraguan dinner?
818 A I do not know that they were.
819 2 lijinm uaia, you don't know?
820 A If they were, I don't know it.
82 1 2 So you were conplataly separate from that in terms
822 of your activities?
823 A Absolutely.
824 2 And your activities related to humanitarian aid?
825 A That legislation at that tine was the total
826 lobbying goal of the lobbying part of my business.
827 2 Do you remember how you got involved m the
UNCLASSIFIED
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NAME ;
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83 1
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833
83U
835
836
837
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840
8m
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8143
81414
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847
8148
8U9
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851
852
UNCLASSIHED
HIR2214000 IIIVIbI U.^.'^ I T I I~ 1 1 PAGE 35
lobbying business in 1985 on behalf of humanitarian aid?
A Yes. A group of the people that met at the
American Security Council asked me to take kind of the -'
informal chairmanship of the group "f jaf r 1 f that those
names, most of the ones you read to me < ^rn^ it uas a loose
coalition. My history of Capitol Hill uork, going clear
back to 1980 and even before, uas involved very much m
creating coalition, coalition founding. This has always
been ray thing, working with coalitions and coordinating
coalitions .
'^C^Jthere is such a limited number of active
lobbying organizations even involved m this issue on Llia L
side that tS&f met at least three times a month to compare
notes .
2 And this is what you told ray colleagues earlier in
k an interview, that you sort of became chairraan of this
mforraal coalition?
A Right. They asked me in the beginning to be the
informal chairman of it.
2 Who asked you?
A Th« group did. They had obviously had phone calls
or something because they decided to ask me .
2 And when did they ask you?
A I would say this was in early 1985.
2 In January?
UNCLASSIHED
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MAHE
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85M
855
856
857
858
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HIR2214000
UNCLASSIHED
PAGE 36
A I don't know. Ther^ abouts .
2 Shortly after they asked you, did you all have a
meeting with Oliver North?
A He attended one of our meetings, yes.
2 Where did that meeting take place?
A In ray own town house .
2 Was that a luncheon?
A I doubt it. I don't recall the group ever having
lunch in ray town house as far as a working session.
2 How raany people were at the meeting at your town
house ?
A There were usually around six or seven. This was
about the usual group.
2 Do you reraeraber who was there at that first meeting
with Oliver North?
A Oh, no, I wouldn't renenber, but I think you can
assune the whole group would have been there.
2 Uas Sam Dickens there?
A He was a raerabar of the group.
2 Jin D«nton?
A Yes .
2 Us^
A Yes .
"IS/k^H^
2 Frank Gonez?
A Probably. I don't know.
uNCUSsra
276
HiRaauooo
UNCUSSIHED
PAGE 37
Rich Miller?
A Mo.
2 Why would Frank Gomez be there and Rich fliller not
be there?
A It is just that during this period ue did most of
our work with Frank Gomez.
2 What did you discuss at that meeting?
A Usually the status of the individual vote count.
This was always a subject of all discussions as to who is on
the undecided list, where are they, what is the status of
the people on the undecided list and so forth.
2 According to Colonel North's calendar that was a
luncheon which took place at your town house on February the
11, 1985. Would that be correct? Does that refresh your
memory ?
A That would not have been the same group. I just
don't remember this group ever having lunch at ray place.
2 What time of day did the meetings take place?
A Usually in the early morning or late afternoon.
2 Do you remember what month or what date that first
meeting took place with Oliver North?
A This meeting with Oliver North was not related to
this particular effort at all. This is a luncheon group
that I am a member of that we rotate hosting of guest
speakers and he was the speaker at the group at the
UNCLASSIHED
277
NAHE ■
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904
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906
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HIR22M000
UNcussra
PAGE 38
At ray town house. KaiFr'^n' have board rooms and
r f II f f iaii n fhilt "i 1 1 over town, but this us
particular monthly meeting.
2 At your town house?
A
^-^i:* t all over town, but this was a private
luncheon group that we invite guest speakers in and Oliver
North was the guest speaker at this particular group.
2 On February 1 1 ?
A li that IS what his calendar says--that is what my
calendar would say, I an sura. Has nothing whatsoever to do
with a lobby group because this group is not a lobby group.
2 Now the meeting that you had with Oliver North, to
your recollection it would have been early in the morning or
late aiternoon at your town house sometime in early 1985.
Generally, the people who I mentioned a feu moments ago
would probably have been there or were there to the best of
your recollection.
A Yes.
2 At that point you discussed vote counts and what
the situation was?
A Any tim* Ollie North cane to a meeting it was for
tha purpos* of his giving us a situation briefing.
2 On?
A On his famous slide show if nothing else. Ollie
North was never part of a lobbying effort because he simply
was not part of our lobbying strategy. I neverAdiscussed
UNCIASSIHED
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HAME :
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HIR224000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 39
vote counts with OlTie Morth. He never suggested strategy
uith rae on actual lobbying on the hill. But he gave
briefings. I have never called Ollie North to attend a
meeting for any purpose other than a briefing.
2 How many times did you see his slide shou?
A Several .
S Well, according to what ^our staff has put together
from Ollie North's calendar, you met with hira some 28 times
at least on his calendar and most of those meetings took
place in your town house .
A No, sir. Absolutely not.
Q Do you remember how many times Oliver North
attended meetings at your town house?
A He never attended meetings in my town house more
than over a period, now, of three years we are talking
about, two and a half years.
2 Me are talking about 1985 and 1986.
A Okay. That period? I don't think there is any way
he was in my town house to meetings more than four or five
times .
fi You remember him being there at a lunch on February
the 11th?
A That date I do not remember. He was guest to give
his briefing at a luncheon at ay toHn"house with a group of
my friends that were not connected with this effort at all.
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HIR22H000
PAGE UO
2 Let me ask you about a meeting which is indicated
on his calendar on March the 1st at U o'clock Your town
house 1 si
A Yes. Probably one of those meetings.
C You we re there '
A I don't have ray calendar. I can't say. If he was
there, I was there.
2 And Mr. Jack Abraraoff would have been there'
A A group would have been there. There is no way I
can tell you now eKactly which of the group might have been
absent that meeting.
2 Let rae ask you about the people we thmk--
A The circle. This group was never--
2 There was a man named Blair there, part of the
group ?
A The name is not familiar.
2 And San Dickens was part of the group.
A Yes .
2 And Jilt Denton was part of the group.
A Yes .
2 And r/nn iwMThSrVas part of the group.
A Yes .
2 And Walt Raynond was pact of the group?
A No, sir.
2 Did he ever attend meetings?
\
BNWsm
280
HXnZ- HIR22U000 Ulllll M.VMriMP'' ^
978 A Not ct my toun house he didn'T"."" My recollection is
979 Halt Raynond--! can't recall Walt Raymond ever coming to my
980 town house. I have met with Halt Raymond, but I don't
981 recall ever doing it in my town house.
982 2 What about Otto Reich'
983 A I can't recall. I cannot reneraber whether I met
984 Otto Reich in ray town house.
985 2 Jonathan Hiller .
986 A No, sir.
987 2 You never net Jonathan Hiller?
988 A I told you that before.
989 2 How nany times did this group--how often did this
990 group that net early in the norning and late afternoon get
99 1 together ?
992 A And/or.
993 2 And/or late in the afternoon. Has it a weekly, bi-
994 weekly, semi-fweekly ?
995 A Hell, let's see. He are talking about a three-
996 month period just about.
997 2 In 1985?
998 A 1985. I would say we net at one place or
999 anoth«r--all neetings are not in the town house.
1000 fi Hhare else did the meetings tak* place?
100 1 A I remember we met over Jim Denton's place one time
1002 He had several different placas . Each of them had their
VNCUSsm
281
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HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE U2
own meeting at one time and when ue say meetings in my town
house. I ara really talking about the meetings period. I
can't remember which of them was in the town house
The group met probably a dozen times during that
period. :ust about once a week.
2 And you talked about legislative strategy?
A Ves.
2 And your goal was to acquir«--to get congressional
approval for humanitarian aid?
A Yes, 27 million.
2 for the contr as .
A Right.
2 You were successful in that endeavor ultimately.
A That is light.
2 When did the vote take place?
A Remember we had two votes. The first vote was lost
by two votes .
2 In 1985.
A 1985. That was tha vote that Ortega went to Moscow
the next day.
2 R«n«nbar that.
A £v«rybody remembers that. Then about six or eight
w*«ks later ue had the second vote that was fairly heavy pro
111 rail'lion.
2 That would have been in--
UNCLASSIRED
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HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
In about June 1, thereabouts.
PAGE 43
2 Early June, 1985.
2 Could you sort of recollect or reconstruct uhat
would happen at these meetings? How long did they last and
did you have a check list of votes?
A Uell, the undecided lists were all over town
T^o—
always. Everybody had their own undecided list»that was
the business at all/'fand ' the soft center, it is always the
same on any legislative issue, is where the targeting of any
legislative activism takes place, and we would discuss the
status of the individual people as thay would come off of
the undecided list, whether they went off of it against us
or whether thay went off of it for us.
So tha flux of the undecided list was always the
first thing to be discussed> »a=:tD 64f4\ere are the people,
where are the votes, how do we put together the 219 votes.
inH <j>^ 3^-fMa^^hai- was pretty wall-viewed on a week-to-week
basis, who has moved, each of these people had their own
grass roots organization. Renamber we did not have a grass
roots organization. Ua had no organization. I was strictly
the coordinator.
2 Now which people are grass roots organizations?
Who ware the people?
A I think all those people did except San Dickens. I
think all tha paopla that mat with us one way or another had
UNClASSra
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MAKE HIR22'4000 LI 11 U&_I l^JtJ 1 1 IkV PAGE UU
1053 a membership organization around the country that uas fairly
lOSU large,
loss 2 You indicated m your earlier interviews of some of
1056 our colleagues that some of the people who had participated
1057 in that and in addition to Linn »»u»><tc, Sam Dickens--
1058 A Sam Dickens had no organization.
1059 2 Jack Abramoff.
1060 A Had the Citizens for America, fairly large and very
1061 attractive organization.
1062 2 And Peter Fla^herty.
1063 A Had Citizens for Reagan, fairly large, highly
10614 active organization.
1065 2 And PRODEHCA?
1066 A PRODEHCA. yes.
1067 2 Who attended these meetings from PRODEMCA?
1068 A Penn Kemble or Denisj^ . Leary . In those early days
1069 It uas usually Penn Kembla .
1070 2 In these meetings when you discussed legislative
1071 strategy, did you give assignments to people or did people
1072 volunteer?
1073 A Ho. People would say I will handle--remember now,
10714 these organizations are not Capitol Hill arm twisters. They
1075 are basically grass roots organizations. Several of these
1076 people had their own radio programs, their own newspaper
1077 ads, their own--I guess some oi them, I think--I don't know
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110 1
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HIR224000
ik^L
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE US
whether -«ft was any. TV run in 1985 or not. I can't remember.
This was very early. So the targeting of their publicity,
oi their intensive grass-roots activity would be based on
where the need was, certainly.
They did their own thing. I never got involved at
all in the inner activity of any of the organizations . I
wouldn't have presumed to give them advice on how to run
their show.
2 But was there sort of a coordinating plan that
was--that the group was involved in related to that vote?
A Uell, the plan, of course. The list was the same
for everybody in town. Remember, the other side had the
same list. Everyone has the same list because you have to
assume that there is equal intelligence on all sides of
every issue. So everybody in town had the same list and so
they were targeting both the pro and con.
Contra aid people were targeting these same
individual areas, beca\tse there wasn't any coordination to
The only coordination was a&. to 4«i^% waste money on
It. The only coordination was a&. to
people that are decided. That is about the only
coordination there is to it.
fi Did you discuss this legislative strategy with
Oliver North?
A No, not that I renenber. I don't have any
recollection of discussing that.
UNCLASSIHED
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KAHE: HIR22U000 LIIIIJLnVwII IkV PAGE U6
1103 MR. COSTON- Fine .
1104 I Recess . 1
1105 MR. OLIVER: Mr. KuyKendall, I would like to shou
1106 you a docunent and have it entered as an exhibit and natked
1107 as Exhibit Nunber 1.
1108 [The docunent refected to. was marked as Exhibit 1
1109 for identification. 1
1110 BY MR . OLIVER:
1111 2 I would like to shou you that document and ask you
1112 li you have ever seen that document or a similar document
1113 before?
111U A Yes. I have seen this document.
1115 2 Where did you see that document?
1116 A I was laid on ny desk by a reporter when it should
1117 not have been.
1118 2 And when?
1119 A About siK weeks ago.
1120 2 Uell. that was the first time you had ever seen
112 1 that docuaent?
1122 A Yes .
1123 2 I would like to ask you to look at that document
112U and you will see your name in there. The highlighting was
1125 done by our staff in preparation for this deposition.
1126 A Yes .
1127 2 It appears from that document that you were
UNCLASSIRED
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PAGE 47
pie an the legislative effort
HIR224000
involved with'
in 1985.
A Right. Now, well, counsel, would you define
legislative effort?
2 Well, It was the effort to try to obtain
congressional approval for aid for the contras in 1985.
A So you put the broad definition.
S Yes. I assume it is a broad definition.
A So you have given a broad definition.
2 Well I am ^ust stating it was a legislative effort.
A Okay. The first group, the FDH coremanders , uere up
here to testify before the House Intelligence Coranittee. The
people that were testifying, only Bernudaz could speak
English at all. Tigrillo, Lina and there was another one,
could speak no English. They were terribly nervous, very
concerned. X was asked by Frank Gonez to cone and meet uith
them on a Sunday evening before they were going to testify
the next day to give them assurances that these members of
Congress ware nice people and that all they had to do was
answer the questions and so forth.
So Frank Gomez and I stroked these people, these
three men, and there may have been another one. I am not
sure. These were field commanders--in a briefing session and
the next day I escorted them up to the outside office of the
House Intelligence Committee in the Capitol. After that
UNCLASSIFIED
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1 175
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UNCLASSIFIED
HIR22>4000 llllll.l U.A.Iiril II PAGE US
theie was a piess conferance uhera these people ueie present
and a fairly large press conference dountoun. I believe it
uas at the press club. I are not certain where it was. This
was work we did. press relations. PR. using Frank Gomez.
2 Vou said that Frank Gomez did this P.R. for you.
A For Gulf and Caribbean.
2 For Gulf and Caribbean.
A Yes .
2 So why did ha call you about these people?
Wouldn't it have been you calling him if he was working for
you?
A No. He was doing--I do not know who had told hin
that they uaza appaazing bafora the House Intalliganca
Conmittaa. but some parson, soma acquaintance of is told him
these people wara hara and they ware terribly nervous,
terribly concerned about appearing before this committee.
How. incidentally. I am a former member of
Congress. I was a vary obvious parson to call to give then
assurances as to the kind of recaption they were going to
get; that thay uara meeting nice people. They wara going to
gat a good zacaption. They had nothing to worry about. This
was the basis of our whole meeting.
fi Mho was at this meeting besides the FDN coirmander"
and you and Prank Gomez?
A Probably Bosco Hatanozos was there and I don't
UNCIASSIFIEO
288
NAME
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1 179
1 180
1 181
1 182
1 183
1 184
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1 186
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II 98
1 199
1200
1201
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HIR224000
lemerabec .
msimm
PAGE 49
2 Was Oliver North there?
A No. He was not there.
2 Was Otto Reich there?
A No .
t
2 Uas Bob Kag-an there?
A No.
2 To your knowledge there was nobody else there
except Bosco Hatanoros?
A There very well could have been sone other people
there. You were naning nanes and I have a specific
recollection of people who were not there.
2 But you don't renenber who others night have been?
A No.
2 Uas Rich Miller there?
A I don't think so.
2 You had indicated earlier, at least according to
our colleague's recollection of your interview in March that
Oliver North had called you and asked you to--
A This was a aistake that I corrected later. It was
Frank Goaez that called ne .
2 It was not Oliver North?
A It uas not Oliver North. I corrected that later on
on the records. I corrected it at the special counsel's
office; isn't that correct, counsel?
wu^ssro
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UNCUSSIHED
PAGE 50
HR. COSTOK: Yes
THE WITNESS: I chacked ray own records, and that
was not true. It uas Frank Gomez.
BY MR. OLIVER:
2 Hell, did you discuss with Oliver North this
meeting either prior or after the meeting?
A I don't think so.
2 Did you ever discuss the FDN commander's activities
in Washington with Oliver North?
A Certainly.
fi Why would you have dona that?
A I really can't think of anything else I would
discuss with Oliver North aMcept things like that.
2 What did you say to him and what did he say to you
about their activities in Washington?
A Thaia being here was to support the effort. His
inquiries of me would be always on the sub^act of
effectiveness to support the aiiort. Is it affective, is it
being well dona.
S Othaz than their appaazance before the Intelligence
Comaittea, did you arrange or cause to be arranged any other
■aatlngs with members of Congress for these individuals
whlla thay uaza in Washington?
A With these individuals?
2 With these FDH commandazs we ara referring to on
uNcukssra
290
UNCLASSIHED
NAME: HIR22U000 Ul 1 lH-T^UlJI I ||_U PAGE 51
1228 that particular occasion.
1229 A My neraory says that there was one raeeting, maybe
1230 tuo, in the Capitol with a group or two. I don't
1231 specifically remember who it was, but my bell rings and says
1232 that they did meet with some congressmen. I can't quite--!
1233 am reasonably sure they met with some Congressmen.
12314 e And these meetings were arranged by you?
1235 A rtay I define a word here?
1236 2 Please.
1237 A This was a two-way street. Whether the initiative
1238 was taken by me to ask the group do you want to hear these
1239 people or whether a group had heard about then and said will
12140 you arrange for us to have then, that happened both ways. I
12141 have no recollection in any single event as to which way it
1 2<42 happened .
12U3 An I making nyselx clear?
121414 2 I think what you are saying is sonetimes they asked
12>4S you to arrange meetings for then.
1246 A Right.
1247 2 Sonetines you asked them to visit.
1248 A If they wanted these people.
1249 nx. COSTON: I think we have a problem with the
1250 ''they.'' By "'they,'' you are referring to congressmen?
125 1 THE HITMESS: Always X an talking about nembers of
1 252 Congress .
UNCLASSIFIED
291
UNClASSiriED
NAKE: HIR22U000 1JI1U&.I1WII ai***^ PAGE 52
1253 MR. OLIVER: I see. I see.
125U HR. COSTON: That is the members of Congress
1255 occasionally asked you?
1256 THE UITNESS: Yes.
1257 BY MR. OLIVER^
1258 2 Did you meet with the group aiter they had appeared
1259 before the Intelligence Connittee?
1260 A To meet uith then substantively, no. To meet with
1261 them to escort them, yes.
1262 fi Well, did you attend any of the meetings that they
1263 had with any members of Congress?
126'4 A I recall hearing congressmen request these
1265 commanders. Of course, it had to be done through an
1266 interpreter. I can't even recall where it was. There were
1267 several meetings. Sometimes these groups meet in a member's
1268 office. Sometimes they meet in meeting rooms, and I simply
1269 cannot remember where these meetings took place.
1270 2 When you discussed uith Colonel North the
127 1 effectiveness of these people, what was the discussion based
1272 on? If you didn't attend the meetings and didn't talk to
1273 them after they appeared before the Intelligence Committee
1274 and Colonel North wasn't there, how could you evaluate the
1275 eiiectiveness?
1276 A I don't evaluate. Congressmen do.
1277 2 You said you discussed the effectiveness uith
wiAssra
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HIR22U000
Oliver North
yNtiASsra
PAGE S3
A I would have found out what happened in the
neetings as far as the effect is concerned. If a
congressman either agrees to or wants an appearance at a
briefing of some kind or another, I don't go to the person
that gave the briefing and say, ''Were you any good?'' I go
to the congressman and say, ' ' Uas he effective?''
2 Did you go to congressmen after these people
appeared ?
A X always did that.
Q Uhich congressman did you talk to after thaix
appearance ?
A Uhoevax was there.
fi You talked to mambars of tha Intalligance
Committee ?
A Mo. I didn't ever do that. I considered that
privileged, and I never questioned a member of the
Intelligence Conaittaa about testimony before the committee.
2 So you don't know whether they were effective
before tha Intalligance Committaa?
A Not in tha Intelligence Committaa, no.
Q Uhich congressman did you talk to after they mat
with tham?
A Hhoavar thay mat with at that time that were
individual members. I do not remember who they met with.
uNoussm
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HIR22'4000 UllllLHl llliril II Pl<^^ 514
After all, there uere scores of congressmen and there were
scores of meetings.
2 But there was a targeted list. You said everybody
kneu--
A I would not ask a target if it uas effective. I
would ask a person that was not a target sitting there and
ask if the performance was effective. You don't go ask a
target if the work I was doing on you was effective. You
don ' t do that .
2 But why would they meet with congressmen who were
not on the targeted list. If their minds uere already made
up one way or the other, why would they bother to meet with
them?
A Because they probably put the meeting together, the
individual member of Congress.
2 If they are talking to members of Congress who are
already for or against contra aid and their mind is made up--
A The groups are always mixed. The groups uere
always mixed .
2 Haybe I am not making myself clear, but I am trying
to find out how you determined their effectiveness and--
k Ultimately their effectiveness about whether or not
they come off the undecided list. That is what you
ultimately do and if those that don't ever come off the
undecided list, you find out the day they vote. That is the
UNCLASSIFIED
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1328
1329
1330
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HIR224000
UNCUSSIHED
PAGE 55
ultimate. You find out ultimately on the day the vote takes
place whether you were eiiective or not.
It IS kind of a sudden death proposition. You
can't vote naybe on that final vote. All right? A group of
people meet with a visiting expert of one kind or another.
Let's consider these people m then own field are visiting
experts .
Now> there are ^mbers of Congress Ln both sides of
the aisle, on both sides of every issue, who are also,
remember, working the sane undecided list in the various
UHl^ organizations. Mow. these people will say. all right,
there is a group called the ninety something group that is a
group of moderate Republicans and about half of then axtt
invariably on undecided lists.
They invariably ask for expert witnesses to corae
in. They almost always do ask for expert witnesses to come
in. I don't ever attend those meetings. They are usually
in private offices with a group of 15 people in an office.
After It is over I will usually ask the host how did he do.
How did ha perform. Did he do well; that particular witness
or that particular presenter. So on effectiveness
immediately the question is did he perform well.
Then later on you find out did it have any
substantive effect on that person.
fi But you don't remember who you asked whether or not
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1369
1 370
137 1
1372
1 373
1 3714
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1377
HIR22M000
UNCLASSIRED
PAGE 56
they perform well
A No, no. I asked somebody at each meeting whether
these people were effective.
e But do you recall any of the names?
A No. no. I asked somebody at each meeting whether
these people were effective.
2 But do you recall any of the names?
A No, no, no. I don't recall. Because the meetings
were always all different.
2 In this, m Exhibit 1 on this confidential check
list which I have shown you, it says, ''State LPD,'" and
j
then in parentheses ,'' Gomez and Ku^Kendall . ' '
A I don't know what LPD means. Do you know?
2 That is the Office of Latin Diplomacy at the State
Department. You don't know what that is?
A I have heard of the Latin American. Public
Diplomacy, yes. This is a town of
s . If you will
pardon me, counsel, a lot of times I don't remember
2 H«ll, that was--
A Hhat is the question?
2 The question was why were you and Gomez listed
under State and LPD on Oliver North's check list?
A I don't know.
2 Here you familiar at the time with the Latin
"WJUSS/fe
296
UHCIASSW
HXnZ HIR22'4000 Ul llJbl V^' ^^ " "^ PAGE 57
1378 American Office of Diplomacy?
1379 A I never worked uith them knowingly. That doesn't
1380 mean I didn't uork--I didn't talk to somebody from that
1381 office because I didn't even know who they were with.
1382 2 Did you know Otto Reich?
1383 A Certainly.
1384 2 Did you know he was the head of the Office of Latin
1385 American Public Diplomacy?
1386 A I knew he carried a title of ambassador at large
1387 when he was over there and that was his title.
1388 2 Did you know that Frank Gomez and Rich Miller had a
1389 contract with the Office of Latin American Public Diplomacy
1390 at the State Department?
139 1 A I knew uh«* they got the contract. I do not know
1392 anything further about it.
1393 2 Well, they had several contracts which ran from
1394 October 1st of 1984 until October 1st of 1986 and it was
1395 during this period of time in 1985 when this check list was
1396 compiled that they were under contract to the State
1397 Department.
1398 A I was very, very, very much not involved in the
1399 private workings of IBC. I did not know where their
luoo business was, whera it cama from ot how much they had. I
1U01 retained them up until July 1st or thereabouts of 1985 to do
1U02 a :ob for us and I worked with Frank Gomez doing these
"NMWD
297
NAME
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mou
1405
1U06
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1U10
mil
1412
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1422
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1426
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UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 58
specific projects like these right here. These are very
typical of sorae of the things ue did
2 But you didn't know uho the other clients uere'
A I knew they had a :ob with the State Department. I
kneu that. They were very proud of it. I knew nothing
else. I really didn't know uho their other clients uere. I
can't say that. I kneu a couple of commercial clients they
had that had nothing to do with the government.
fi But you did not know the contract with the State
Department they had during this period of time that they
also uere enployed by the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation for
Public Relations. You did not know that that contract
related directly to refugees in Central America and
Hicaragua?
A Yes, I knew that, that they uere working with sorae
of the same people ue were working with.
2 Did you regard that or did you ever think there
might be a conflict of interest there?
A No. I thought our interests were identical. There
was no conflict. After all, I was doing my uork
voluntarily.
2 You ware paying them to do the sane kind of work
that th«y w«ra being paid by the State Department to do at
the sane time.
A Correct. Right. I did not know which of the
wmssm
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wiAssro
PAGE 59
different things that ue did together that they were
involved with the State Department on a concurrent basis or
not I had no idea.
e Later on m this check list there is a reference to
Joachira tlaitre State/LPD, ''congressional meetings,
speeches, and OPEC pieces.*'
A
2
list?
A
2
A
Maitre
That IS the same description I gave you earlier.
Uhy would your name appear on Oliver North's check
On that?
On that particular subject.
Because he knew of my relationship with Joachim
I think we were the very first people to sponsor
Haitre in his trips to Central America.
HR. COSTON- Is your question why did Oliver North
put Hr . Kuykendall's name down? I think he testified he
didn't see this document until six weeks ago.
MR. OLIVER: I am asking why your name would have
been on Oliver North's check list.
HR. COSTON: You are asking him to speculate on
that.
HR. OLIVER: I am asking how Oliver North came to
know Joachin Haltta was involved in congressional meetings,
speeches and OP^D pieces.
THE WITNESS: I can't imagine his not knowing it.
nmma
299
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UNCUSSIHED
PAGE 60
BY MR. OLIVEI: ~*
2 Did you tell him?
A I ai» certain I told hii».
2 Did you tell hira in connection uith this, uith the
efforts to influence the vote in the Congress?
A I couldn't answer that question at all. I wouldn't
know how to separate then, counsel.
2 Let the record show I was referring to the
reference on page UV document paga number 137 1 in our
documentation. "T- _^ i
A Let me clarify something. I don't want to make it
appear at all that I did not discuss this with Oliver Morth.
I do not remember, and I don't remember the context.
2 On page five, document number 1372, there is a
reference to Reverend Valardo Antonio Santeliz, Pentacostal
minister, an atrocity victim, congressional media meetings,
March 22, 23 and under the column headed,
' 'Responsibility, • • it says, ''State LPD,'' and then in
parenthesis, ''Kuykendall and Gomez.'' Did you arrange
congressional and media meetings for Reverend Santeliz?
A Congressional meetings?
2 Who did you arrange meetings with? Which members
of Congress? Do you recall?
A It was at least one group. I did not arrange any
individual meetings for him. There were at least one, maybe
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UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 6 1
two groups of the , diif erent study groups and the 90 some odd
group. Those were generally a couple of groups that met
uith people and this type thing. I do not remember at that
time . It would not--there is no way I could have a
recollection exactly which groups they met with. I do
remember specifically that they did meet with groups and no
individual congressman.
2 Further down on the same page there is a reference
to--I will read from the document.
''Invite President Ouarte, Monge. Suazo and
Barletta to a very private meeting in Texas with key
congressional leaders so that CODEL can here unvarnished
concerns for Sandanistas and Democratic leaders' support for
the FDN.'' And under the responsibility column, it has in
parentheses, ' ' Kuykendall , ' ' and then below that, ''NSC
(North. ) • •
My question to you, rtr . Kuykendall, is did that
meeting ever take place?
A No . J[ never heard of that meeting. I don't know
where that caae from.
2 Did anyone ever discuss that meeting with you?
A No. I don't have any idea where that came from. I
think you know by now if I did, I would tell you.
2 I would like to ask you about the names of some of
the other people that are on this check list on which list
#6\>safta
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your name appe
mssiFIB
PAGE 62
k Sure
2 I have already asked you about Jonathan Miller and
you indicated you had never met hii» to your knouledge
A To my knouledge .
e And Halt Raymond. You indicated earlier you had
met uith Walt Raymond.
A Yes
2 Uhen did you meet Halt Raymond?
A I think I met Halt Raymond m about February of
1985 or thereabouts.
2 And what uas the occasion?
A He introduced me to]
[who uas in this country on private
business and Halt Raymond introduced me to the man. That
man. since then, and I have become close friends and our
uives are friends even.
2 But that uas the first occasion you met Hr .
Raymond ?
A Yes.
2 Hho introduced you to Hr . Raymond?
A At that time he uas right across the hall from
Ollie North's office, but it is not my recollection--!
believe I got this call from Halt Raymond, but uhen I uent
up to meet Raymond. Ollie crossed the hall and introduced
UNCLASSIFIED
302
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1528
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1 532
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ism
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ISUS
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US .
Q
A
2
A
call .
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 63
So Ollie North introduced you to Ualt Raymond?
But Ollie uas not part of--it was a introduction
He introduced you when he uas across the hall?
I don't think Ollie North instigated the phone
2 When Hr . Raymond called you, what did he say he
wanted to talk to you about or wanted to meet with you
about?
A He said, ''There is a man m this country on
private business that I think for you all's cause of
information, world-wide strategic information, that you
would find extremely interesting. Would you like to have
breakfast with him or meet with him and find out if he would
be useful, would be of interest?''
2 When you talk about the cause, are you talking
about the contras or a broader cause?
A Much broader in this case.
2 There was the cause you referred to earlier that
was the subject of many of the meetings at the American
Security Council.
A Absolutely. Absolutely. To give you an example,
we did have breakfast together. I did escort the Count to
Capitol Hill. The second place he went was to meet Chairman
Hamilton .
HHtmsw
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HIR22U000
UNCLASSIFIED
What was this gentleman's name'
PAGE 614
A The Count AleKander de tlarenches
2 Uhat does he do nou'
A He is a retired private citizen.
2 Does he live in France or the United States?
A He lives in France and Suitzetland both. He lives
in South of France and Viviers, Switzerland and Pans His
mother uas American and his English is perfect.
2 Vou met him in Walt Raymond's office?
A No , no . I did no t .
2 Where did you meet him?
A I met hira at the Madison Hotel m the lobby. I
have never seen him and Walt Raymond together.
2 Halt Raymond did not accompany you to this meeting?
A No , he did not .
2 You met with Halt Raymond. He indicated he thought
this gentleman might be helpful, and he arranged for you to
meet him at the Hadison Hotel.
A That IS correct.
2 And the two of you met alone?
A Yes.
2 Has Nicaragua discussed at this--
A No, s.ir . I have never heard the Count mention
Nicaragua^' It was always a broader picture than that. But"
Kussro
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mssro
PAGE 65
because o f ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B I him
to meet Chairman Durenberger. I always excused myself
because it was classified. I took him to meet Chairman
Hamilton. I excused myself, because it uas classified He
met the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee on a
private meeting.
I think he met the staff of the House Intelligence
Committee. I can't remember for certain whether he did or
no t . ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
'l left because
thought it was proper that I do so. And by the way. each of
the people that met with hin were most impressed about the
breadth of this knowledge.
2 Did he speak to your luncheon group?
A Yes, he did, much after the fact. He spoke to our
luncheon group in January or February of this year or maybe
December of last year. He was over here on his own private
business early, I think it was December And he came m as
a guest and spoke to us.
2 Did you ever have any business or financial
ralationship with the Count subsequent to your first meeting
with hii»?
A Othar than paying his expenses for a second trip'
2 The Gulf and Caribbean Foundation paid his
expenses ?
UNCLASSIFIED
305
HIR2214000
WIHS«B
PAGE 66
HAHE
1603 A No, no. This was done thiough--wi th ray own piivate
ISOM funds and reimbursed by Ollie North.
1605 2 Why uould Ollie North reimburse you ior the Count's
1606 trip?
1607 A Now that whole matter is a matter of record. I
1608 will go over it. I just want to tell you it is a matter of
1609 record, both here and downtown.
1610 MR. COSTON: In fact by way of background, ue spent
1611 several hours with Mr. Woodcock identifying travelers'/^
1612 checks that were used for the reimbursement.
1613 THE WITNESS- We, m 1985, a couple of months
16114 after, whatever, after the Count had been here the first
1615 time, m a discussion about who was quite effective with the
1616 moderate elements in Congress that would look at the big
1617 picture, this name came up. And Ollie North asked rae . ''Can
1618 you bring him back over^'* He had volunteered to come, bu':
1619 he said I will never charge you anything, but I do have to
1620 have my expenses paid.
1621 BY MR. OLIVER:
1622 2 Hou did his nana corea up? Did you raise his name?
1623 A Yes, as being a tremendous asset to us.
162U 2 Did Oliver North know him? He met him before?
1625 A I don't think so. Not this trip. He met hira
1626 later, but ha did not meet him on this first trip.
1627 2 You discussed tha names of people who could be
UNCUSSIFIED
306
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIP.22'4000 lllllll_r^^mi IkV PAGE 67
1628 effective with Congress.
1629 A Right.
1630 e And you indicated that this fellow was impressive,
1631 and you thought he would be effective.
1632 A Right.
1633 2 North asked you if he could come back over.
163U A Right. I said we didn't have the money, and he
1635 said, ''If I can get some of our friends to pay for it, will
1636 you or can you underwrite it on the front end?'' And I
1637 said, ''Yes, I can do it that way.'' So that is what we
1638 did. And I wrote a check after the Count got back. He rode
1639 the Concord, by the way.
16U0 He is partly crippled and it travels very fast, and
1641 so the total bill for the trip, the entire trip, was $6,100
1642 and some odd dollars, which I wrote hire a personal check for
1643 that, and I was reimbursed with those traveler's checks in
1644 three, two thousand increments to reimburse me for that.
1645 2 And those traveler checks were given to you by
1646 Oliver North?
1647 A Yes.
1648 2 War* they blank when they were given to you?
1649 A Yes.
1650 2 Where did Oliver North tell you he had gotten those
1651 traveler's checks?
1652 A He did not.
UNCIASSIRED
307
NAME
1653
165U
16S5
1656
1657
16S8
1659
1660
1661
1662
1663
16614
1665
1666
1667
1668
1669
1670
167 1
HIR22U000
uHtussra
PAGE 68
2 Did he explain to you why they were on a Central
American Bank or Cayman Islands Bank? You noticed what kind
of traveler's checks they were, I assume.
A The first time he gave me checks, he made notes on
his notebook of the numbers and said be sure and sign those
things. They are cash. I don't have any recollection of
having noticed what kind of traveler.'fe checks they uere,
what kind of--I am not sure they weren't Barclay's Bank or
traveler's checks.
I don't know what they were. I don't have any
recollection of that really. They were reimbursing me for
money I had already spent, the traveler's checks. I had
already spent the money and paid for everything and simply
they were reimbursing rea for money already spent.
2 Sorry to put you through this again. This is my
first awareness of this, and this is for the record.
A Frankly, it is relevant. They were Visa traveler's
checks. I knew they had some familiar thing on the front.
They were Visa.
UNCLASSIFIED
308
NAHE
1672
1673
16714
1675
1676
1677
1678
1679
1680
1681
1682
1683
168M
1685
1686
1687
1688
1689
1690
169 1
1692
1693
169U
1695
1696
HIR2214000
RPTS HCGIHN
DCHK LYHCH
UNCUSSIHED
PAGE 69
MR. Oliver :' Would like to enter copies of these
traveler's checks. Hark thera as Exhibit 2 and ask you to
look at these photocopies of travelei;*s checks.
(Exhibit 2 was narked for identification)
BY MR. OLIVER:
2 I would like to -isk you if those are copies of the
traveler's checks you received from Oliver North and uhether
or not that is your signature on those checks?
A Oh yes . Yes .
Q You will note that those traveler's checks cone
from two different banks . One is the AC Bank and one is the
Banco Del Pichmcha, I believe.
Did you ask Oliver North why these checks came from
two different banks?
A No, I did not.
2 Did ha tell you what the source of these traveler's
checks were?
A No. No. he did not.
fi Did ha give you these checks in his office?
A Yes .
S Did ha remove them from a safe in his office?
A Mot that I remember. There was a safe there but I
do not remember his removing than from it. Ha had a book in
\iHtm»B
309
HIR22U000
UNcussm
PAGE 70
NAME
1697 uhich he noted the numbers and there were several sequences
1698 there. These were three different transactions of «2.000
1699 each.
1700 2 Were you concerned about taking cash from a White
1701 House official?
1702 A No, because of the fact he had indicated in the
1703 beginning that this was money of friends of his. of course
1704 he said, and he had indicated that it was a nongovernmental
1705 source by saying friends of ours, when he made the request
1706 m the first place.
1707 2 But you never inquired as to the source of the
1708 funds?
1709 . A No , no .
17 10 2 Did the Count ever inqulra?
1711 A He never saw it. He got a check from me.
1712 2 Did you tell him who had paid for his trip?
17 13 A No, I did not.
1714 2 And when did that trip taka place?
1715 A Soneuhera lika March, April of '85.
1716 By tha way, tha datas on ona whole batch of those
1717 traveler's checks is wrong by ona month. When I said a
17 18 whole stack of than I put tha wrong data on them by exactly
1719 ona aonth. It should have bean U-S instead of 3-5. We
1720 discovered that by tha fact my bank racords didn't give with
1721 the date on the check and then wa realized that.
UNCUSSIFIED
310
HAME ■■
1722
1723
1724
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1735
1736
1737
1738
1739
1740
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
1746
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
AGE 7 1
2 Some of there indicate March 5, 1985?
A That was April 5th.
2 April 5, 1985?
A It is :ust the fact I simply sat down and signed
them with the wrong date on then.
2 And then you deposited thera
A Directly into ray personal bank account and then
transferred it to ray company account.
2 It was April 12?
A Ves . That was cash. I had to get those out of ray
hands .
2 This was after the Count had come to the United
States and returned to Europe?
A Yes, yes. I had already written the check.
2 So the trip took place in
A Say narch.
2 (larch of 1985. How long was the Count in the
United States?
A Under ny umbrella, five days.
2 And what did ha do during those five days that he
was under your unbrella?
A Ha spent three full days on the Hill.
S What did you do and who did you sea?
A Visiting again with soma of the sane people. The
Intelliganca Committaa staff I believe was on the second
UNCUSSIHED
311
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 72
NAHE HIR2214000
171*7 trip. I rcraeraber Durenberger sau hira again.
1748 2 On the Senate side?
17U9 A On the Senate side, I can't remember whether Lee
1750 Hamilton sau him a second time or not. I do not remember.
1751 ny recollection is that ue sau the ranking member of
1752 Intelligence. Hho was it at that time? I have forgotten.
1753 on this side. Would that have been the guy from Arizona.
1754 Congressman
1755 2 Bob Stump'
1756 A Yes, Stump. I remember one of the moderate to
1757 liberal groups of Republicans asked him to come in and
1758 visit. He specifically remembered that meeting because he
1759 considered it a very constructive meeting.
1760 2 Did you attend these meetings?
1761 A No. Uell, I did one of them, but these, this is
1762 Private Study Group stuff and I could have sat in, but I
1763 just thought it better if I didn't. And so ue spent three
1764 full days on the Hill and when I asked him to come over
1765 here, he said you are not going to work me for a full ueek,
1766 are you?
1767 I said no. I will tall you what I can do. I uill
1768 taka you to Texas and let you sea a ranch. So some of the
1769 Gulf and Caribbean paopla mat with hia as tha primary guest
1770 at a summer place outside San Antonio at Hunt, Texas, for
1771 kind of a picnic at noon tina on a Thursday, on that
uNtussm
312
NAHE ■
1772
1773
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
1779
1780
1781
1782
1783
178H
1785
1786
1787
1788
1789
1790
1791
1792
1793
1794
1795
1796
uNcussra
HIR22U000 limill Malllll It-U PAGE 73
Thursday And that trip--and it is necessary that you knou
this because it is my record in both other places. I don't
want you finding things you are going to have to come back
in here for. It is on the record m the other places.
2 Thank you.
A Mr. Blakeraore. who is President of Gulf and
Caribbean, sent his own airplane up here and Ollie North,
the Count--this is the first time Ollie had met the Count--and
I and a member of Gulf and Caribbean, by the way--that
happened to be in town, a r ancher--f lew back to San Antonio,
drove privately to Hunt, Texas where the Count was the
guest, honored guest.
S Flew from Washington to San Antonio?
A On a private plane that belong to Mr. Blakemore ,
President of Gulf and Caribbean, okay? And nr . Blakemore
was not on the airplane because he knew it was going to be
full. I think it was a Lear. I forget what kind of
airplane it was. He gave--011ie North gave z. portion of his
brief in9--remeiiber it was outdoors at a picnic. He had no
slide projactozs or anything. It was mostly ^ust a short
verbal briaiing . He was not the guest of honor.
Then the Count gave his overview of the whole
strategic situation uotlduid«--actually , insofar as he called
It the Soviet Enpira.
Ollia had to return imnediately , so one of the
wmm
313
NAME
1797
1798
1799
1800
180 1
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
181 1
1812
1813
ISIK
1815
1816
1817
1818
18 19
1820
182 1
UNCLASSIfe
HIR22M000 Ul VllLn|ll]l| iril ^kGE 1^
guests uas from San Antonio. Ollie drove back over to San
Antonio in an automobile -••d lA^smaller private plane then
fleu the Count and me and fit. Blakemoie out to a ranch
fairly close to the Rio Grande, :ust north of Big Bend Park.
One of the things that the Count wanted to do
actually uas to fly up and down the Rio Grande River some
He wanted to actually see the terrain. I remember asking
hira why are you doing this? Why do you want to do that? He
specifically asked Mr. Blakemoie if the plane could fly hira
up and down the river.
He said, when I return to Pans I want to be able
to tell my friends I have seen the place that the American-
NATO Army will be if Central America ever falls. -*«al ^hat
was his specific comment and I have got a good memory for
that.
Then we went back to Midland, spent the evening,
and he flew back to New York on Friday, directly back to New
York from Midland.
Ollie fleu directly back to Washington from San
Antonio and the only transactions that Gulf and Caribbean
ever had with Oliver North, we purchased that ticket--and it
is a matter of tacord--fot Olivet North, a one way ticket
from San Antonio back to Washington, and that is a matter of
record that wa have turned over.
2 He gave you these traveler's checks on two separate
UNCLASSIRED
314
NAHE :
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
HIR224000
UNCUSSIFO
PAGE 75
occasions, three separate occasions'
A Correct.
2 Why did it happen on three separate occasions'
A I have no idea.
2 Did you tell hira hou much the expenses were'
A Yes.
2 Did you give him any receipt for the expenses?
A No sir.
2 You :ust indicated to him that this uas the amount?
Did you give him any kind of letter or anything for his
records ?
A No. I did not.
2 Why, uhen he gave you the first batch of checks,
did he indicate to you that he would reimburse you for the
balance at a later time?
A There was never any certainty until all the money
came m, that there would be any more. There uas never any
absolute guarantee on the front end that I would get any
money. He said if you will do it, I will get our friends to
help us on it. There was no written guarantee from him that
I would evai get any of the money. There was no written
guarantee any mote than our discussion. So I had assumed.
frankly, ii I got as much as S4,000 back I would be lucky.
I never expected to get all of it back, the S6,000, or *6 1
something .
WIKSSW
315
UNCLASSIFIED
NANE HIR22(4000 1 1 1 lULrilJlJ ■ I Ikf PAGE 76
18U7 2 Why did you give some of the traveler's checks to
18U8 Elizabeth Pouell?
18149 A Elizabeth Pouell? I don't knou. This uas--in the
1850 sense of giving then to her. She picked ree up out m front
1851 of the Old EJOfJon the uay to the airport. This particular
1852 envelope of checks I had never opened. When I got m the
1853 car. she uas going to the airport. I handed her the
18SU envelope. I said get th ■^e things in the bank and I didn't
1855 even think about the fact that they weren't signed. She had
1856 to sign them to put then in the bank.
1857 2 This uas the last batch of checks?
1858 A The last batch. And ue had forgotten about the
1859 fact that it happenad this uay until she realized it quite a
1860 uhile later when ua couldn't find *2.000 worth of those
1861 checks, and it turns out that she had put them in her
1862 account and then moved them over the same uay we did the
1863 other. They showed up in her bank account, but the transfer
186U over to the company accounts happened in the sane way?
1865 2 At the sana time?
1866 A Mo. Well
1867 2 Uhan did she reimburse the company from hei
1868 accuont?
1869 A Hithin a day or two latar.
1870 2 Within a day or two?
187 1 A That is in all tha bank records. They have all the
BNCUSSW
316
UNCUSSIHED
NAME- HIR22U000 ^^ • ■ w — PkGl. 77
1872 bank records here about that order of events.
1873 HR. COSTON: The Senate I think does, and the FBI
18714 does.
1875 THE WITNESS: The Senate does and the FBI does, as
1876 far as those sequences of events were concerned. Hou
1877 remember, it uas our money, period. I told the FBI guy I
1878 don't uant any snou tire story. This uas reimbursed money
1879 for money ue had already spent as far as the way she handled
1880 it IS concerned. But ue did make a complete record here.
1881 The bank records are total. It all moved into the account
1882 that I wrote the check on in the first place.
1883 BY MR. OLIVER^
188U C Hou, when you made the arrangements on Capitol
1885 Hill
1886 MR. COSTON: For the record, I uant to make sure
18871 you have got--ue also turned over Elizabeth Powell's bank
1888 records showing a document captioned K-8 and K-9, the
1889 transfer of money from her personal account to the
1890 Kuykendall Company account.
1891 BY MR. OLIVER:
1892 S When were those dated?
1893 A nay of '85.
189<4 S Uhan you made the arrangements fot the Count visit
1895 with people on Capitol Hill, uhat did you tell the people he
1896 uas going to talk about? What did you tell them the purpose
UNCUSSIHED
317
KAHE
1897
1898
1899
1900
190 1
1 902
1903
190U
190S
1906
1907
1908
1909
19 10
19 11
19 12
19 13
1 9 1 U
19 15
19 16
19 17
19 18
19 19
1920
192 1
HIR22M000
of the meeting
lEUSsra
PAGE 78
A My recollection is the Count's entire presentation
was to describe the uay the Central American-Cuba initiative
fit into the worldwide Soviet strategy This was always his
agenda This was one of the reasons it was so interesting
to the members of Congress is because of the breadth of
knowledge of it .
S When you say the Cuba strategy
A As Cuba relates to Central America and as it
relates to us. This was his presentation.
2 So ha discussed the dangers of Cuban influence in
Nicaragua and in Central America in general?
A As I told you earlier, counsel, I have never heard
hira even discuss Nicaragua. H« looked at Central America as
an entity, one whole entity. He looked at HeKico as a
different entity. He called it that powder keg--nexico He
considered it indefensible. In other words, we would ^ust
have to pull back and draw the lino, because he said that
country is not defensible at all. This was his comment.
S Wall, did ha regard tha establishment of a Cuban-
Soviat basa in Nicaragua as a danger to all of Central
Aaarica and to tha United States?
A Absolutely.
S And ha articulated that vary well?
A Yas.
UNCLASSIFIED
318
UNCUSSIflfi)
PAGE 79
NAME: HIR22I4000
1922 2 I assume fhat vias the raam reason that you and
1923 Oliver North wanted him to come back to the United States'
1924 A That is right. He uas not provincial in his
1925 picture. In other words, he did not discuss the contras or
1926 anything like that.
1927 2 Did he discuss the need for United States
1928 assistance to the contras? Did he discuss the importance of
1929 It?
1930 A In the specific discussion of legislation, no. In
1931 the necessity of the United States somehow preventing the
1932 establishment of a well established Havana-Soviet base on
1933 the mainland of North America and Central America, yes. He
1934 considered the prevention of that as essential to the
1935 overall strategy.
1936 2 Can you remember the names of some of the
1937 Congressmen and Senators with whom he met besides Senator
1938 Durenberger and Lee Hamilton and Bob Stump, whom you have
1939 mentioned?
19U0 A Yes. Congressman Bob McEwen of Ohio had a private
1941 luncheon in his office for I think eight or ten
1942 Con9EessBen--buf f et there. I don't remember who was at the
1943 masting even. The Congressman from Pennsylvania, Bill
1944 dinger. Congressman Clingei, who was the head of that, what
1945 IS It, the 92 Group. 93 Group. I don't remember the name of
1946 It, 90 something Group. Congressman dinger was chairman of
uNcussra
319
NAHE
19U7
19148
19U9
1950
1951
1952
1953
19SU
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
196 1
1962
1963
196'*
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
197 1
miASsm
HIR22U000 |H^||I r^VJ yil •■■— ' PAGE 80
that group and he hosted the group in his office also where
the Count attended.
2 Do you remember any others?
A Ho , I don' t .
C Did you arrange any media events for hira?
A No, absolutely not.
2 Why not?
A Again, because I did not \ant the media descending
upon the Congressmen, because, after all. this is right in
the midst of a political vote situation and if a person in
ray position is to maintain the trust of the members of
Congress and say I have a very important guest that wants to
visit uith you. if the Congressman thinks that there is
going to be a reporter standing right outside the door
saying well, did he change your mind, did he put pressure on
you, all those questions. If I allowed that to happen, I
would have no credibility with the members of Congress in
our Gulf and Caribbean attempt to give them a position
without any pressure.
S To give them a position on Central America?
A Right, or anything else. If I were conducting
another issue on another lobbying job. This is a level of
trust that I have built up personally on Capitol Hill and ^
will keep that level of trust.
S But this particular lobbying job related to an
UNCUSSIHED
320
ifimim
NAME HIR22U000 -^ ^^ H f£.tj PAGE 81
1972 effort to obtain huraanitarian aid for the contras?
1973 A That is right. Absolutely right. In this case it
1974 was. It uould be no different than any other lobbying job.
1975 If a person is to be able to listen to an established expert
1976 and he is undecided on an issue, he simply doesn't uant the
1977 flack of saying have you made up your mind yet.
1978 Q You were doing all this as a volunteer?
1979 A Yes. At this time, yes I was, at this time. There
1980 came a time that I did receive some lobbying money, but not
1981 at this time.
1982 Q Uhen did you receive lobbying money? Uhen did that
1983 time come?
198U A The first time? June of '86.
1985 2 Where did that money come from?
1986 A Sentinel.
1987 2 We will come to that in a minute, but I would like
1988 to go through this chronology if we could, and I would like
1989 to ask you about some meetings that are indicated in 1985 on
1990 Colonel North's calendar. We have already talked about the
199 1 luncheon at your town ^ouse, this luncheon group that Oliver
1992 Horth appeared before.
1993 We talked about the meeting on March 1st late in
19914 the afternoon at your town_housa .
1995 Do you remember a meeting which took place in the
1996 White House between 12^30 and 1^30 on March the 27th with
«usa«®
321
KAHE
1997
1998
1999
2000
200 1
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
20 10
20 1 1
20 12
20 1 3
20 14
20 15
20 16
20 17
2018
20 19
2020
2021
HIR22U000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 82
Ml. Calero, nr . Cruz and Mr. Robelo m Oliver Morth's
office ?
A In the White House' No sit. I have never been to
such a meeting.
2 Were you ever at a meeting in Mr. North's office
with Robert Owen?
A No sit, not that I remember.
2 You don't recall ever being at a meeting with
Oliver North and the Triple A, as they were called?
A In the White House?
2 Well, do you remember being in a meeting with
Oliver North and a Triple A anywhere?
A Oh I am sure I have, but not in the White Housa .
2 Where would those meetings have taken place?
A Either in ray town house or at possibly receptions
of one kind or another. There were several leceptions
around that those people were there and I attended.
2 There were several meetings in your town house?
A No, not with Oliver North, maybe one. I don't have
any specific recollection of any naating including them
other than a reception, which I had after one of the votes
to that the people that had worked with us, where the Triple
A were guests and I am reasonably suia Ollie came.
2 That was in June or July of '85, tight after the
final vote?
UNCLASSIFIED
322
NAHE:
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
203 1
2032
2033
20314
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
204 1
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
HIR224000
UNCLASSIHED
PAGE 83
About that time, yes.
2 But you don't evei cemember being in a meeting uith
Robert Owen and the Triple A'
A Counsel. I didn't know who Rob Ouen was for a year.
I would see him standing on the wall and I wasn't even
aware he existed. I didn't Know who he was or what he did
or anything bout him. There was. sometimes there was a guy
standing over there in ' ^ corner. I didn't Know his name.
2 When did you find out who he was?
A Probably well into '86 and even then I wasn't sure
who he was. He never said anything, never did anything as
far as I was concerned. Never opened his mouth. I have
never had a conversation with him.
2 Do you remember a meeting on March 28, 1985 with
Oliver Korth. probably a breakfast at 7^30 m the morning'
A Who besides me?
2 Just you .
A Does it say where?
2 Well, it doesn't indicate where. It might have
been in his office because it doesn't have a place.
A I have never had even a coke in his office, much
less breakfast.
2 Did you ever have breakfast with him in the White
House mess?
A Not that I remember.
uNciftssra
323
NANE
2047
20148
2049
2050
205 1
2052
2053
2054
2055
2056
2057
2058
2059
2060
206 1
2062
HIR22H000
CNCUSSIflfD
PAGE 84
Well, did you ever have breakfast with hire just the
two of you?
A I could have, but I have no recollection of it.
C Do you remember meeting on April 1st with Oliver
North and the Triple A at 5 30 in the afternoon?
A Where'
2 I don't know. Do you remember such a meeting'
A I don't know. The only thing I can tell you for
sure. Counsel, is I have never mat with him in the White
House. Other than that--becausa of the fact that I was with
the leadership many times--and so I really don't know.
2 At 5:30 in the afternoon. Would that probably have
been at your town house?
A It could have been.
2 Because that was usually the time of this meeting?
A Yes. could very well have been.
UNCUSSIFIED
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HIR22U000
RPTS HCGINN
ONCUssm
PAGE 85
DCHK LYNCH
2 And the Triple A would come to these meetings?
A Uhat is the date on that again?
2 April 1st, 1985.
A No, no. I uas thinking about the possibility of a
reception but anything in the way oi a reception would have
been after a vote and there was no vote there.
2 When did the first vote occur in 1985?
A Somewhere in April, because I remember specifically
the conservative and moderate Democrats asked the Speaker to
give them another vote and about six to seven weeks later he
gave them another vote, and that vote took place in June.
So we had to back off from that, so it had to be around mid-
April .
2 Do you remember a meeting on April 2nd or 3rd at U
o'clock at your town house where there was a steering group
meeting and a head count and Oliver North attended?
A Not specifically. I don't remember Ollie ever
attending but about maybe two of those.
2 Hera those prior to the first vote?
A Yes. That would have been prior to the first vote.
Halt a minute. I am sorry. Strike that. I got my--when
you say first vote, you mean first vote in
2 1985?
minssw
325
NAME
2088
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2090
209 1
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2097
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2 10 1
2 102
2 103
2 lOU
2 105
2 106
2 107
2108
2 109
2 110
2 111
2 112
HIR22'4000
UNCLASSIHED
PAGE 86
A Let's go back and strike.
2 Ue are still in 1985.
A We are still in 1985. That is uhy I stuttered
here. The Triple A leadership?
2 No. This uas a steering group and head count
meeting that I believe took place on April 2nd at U o'clock
in the afternoon?
A That very uell could have been a steering committee
meeting and a head count, yes.
2 And Oliver North attended?
A He very uell could have.
2 Uhat happened at these meetings when you went over
the head count? You chaired the neeting, is that right?
A Yes. The first thing ua did uas report any
movement. Ollie North sat there and listened. I don't
recall hm ever participating because he sat there and
listened to the status of the situation. He really had
nothing to add here, because ue were supposedly the experts,
he uasn't. So each of the people had talked to staff, had
talked to naiibers, had had their eaz to the ground, and hey
would zepott, well, so and so has come over or so and so has
decided against us. The first thing you do is correct the
list. You do that every time you meet.
S Did you keep the master list as the chairman of the
group as the thing fluctuated?
UNCIASHD
326
NAME :
2113
2 114
2 115
2 116
2 117
2 118
2 119
2 120
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2 129
2 130
2131
2132
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2 13U
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2136
2137
HIR22I4000 llllll.l II X XlfclLM PAGE 87
A There was no masFer"li?!. I kept a list and
virtually every one of those people had lists also. They
uere almost identical.
2 But basically it was a list you worked off that
changed ?
A It was a floating list we worked on and each time
when a person cane back to the meeting each list would be a
little different. So ue would combine the list again.
2 At these meetings did any of these people report on
the grass roots activities of their organizations that were
designed to influence?
A Occasionally, but very, very little, because this
IS a tough town, remember. Everybody had his own turf and
one of the reasons that I have always been a good
coordinator of coalitions is that I don't have a grass roots
organization, so I don't get on anybody's turf. Ue didn't
presume to tell anyone how to run his own show.
2 Uhy was Ollie Korth there?
A He just wanted to know what was going on. He
wanted to know the status, I am sure.
S Of the head count?
A Right. After--ny recollection is that after one or
two such meetings that Ollie did not come to those meetings
any more because there was nothing there for him.
2 Did anybody from the legislative office in the
UNCUSSIHED
327
NAHE
2 138
2 1 39
2 mo
2 1 14 1
2 1U2
2 1U3
2 lUU
2 1U5
2 1146
2 1U7
2 lUS
2 149
2 150
2151
2 152
2153
21514
2 155
2 156
2157
2 158
2159
2 160
216 1
2162
HIR22U000
uNCUSsra
PAGE 88
White House attend those meetings?
2 No sii They were never at those meetings. They
were not alloued to. There uas sorae lau or something.
2 Ollie North uas allowed to but the Legislative
Office uas not ?
A I don't knou that. I an ^ust telling you I uas
told by the Legislative Office, uho I uas very close to,
very good friends uith, ue cannot come to your meetings
because of some law.
2 But you discussed the head count uith them
yourself. I mean, separately from these meetings?
A In the hallways they were there, I was there.
Sure, we discussed individuals, what is the status, and so
on. After all, there were three or four of those people-
around the chamber all the way around all the time, as you
well knou. I knou them, sure.
£ When the House wasn't in session
A I never mat with them then.
2 Never talked to them on the phone?
A Seldom, if ever.
2 Here those the White House legislative people oiz^i
th« State Department legislative people?
A White House. White House.
2 You never met with the State Department?
A Only time I ever saw them uas the day of a vote* and
uNWSsro
328
NAME ■■
2163
2 16U
2 165
2 166
2167
2 168
2169
2 170
2 17 1
2 172
2 173
2 17i«
2175
2176
2177
2178
2 179
2 180
2 181
2 182
2183
2 1814
2185
2 186
2187
HIR224000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 89
I never was sure who they were.
2 Do you remember a meeting on April 17, 1985 uith
Oliver North, yourself, Rob Ouen, Frank Gomez and Rich
Hiller at 1^30 m the morning?
A No. I don't have any recollection.
2 Why would such a meeting be indicated on Oliver
North's calendar?
A Probably because it took place. I said I have no
recollection of it. I don't swear it didn't take place. I
3ust don't have any recollection of it.
2 If a meeting took place between Oliver North and
yourself, Rob Owen, Frank Gomez and Rich miller m the White
House ?
A In th« White House?
2 Yes.
A No.
2. Would such a meeting have taken place somewhere
else ?
A It could hava .
2 Whar« would it have taken place?
A It could have taken place in my town house. It
could have taken place in Rich Hiller's office. But it did
not take place in the White House.
2 You don't remember such a meeting ever occurring?
A No. And I think I would have. I think I would
UNCLASSinED
329
NAME
2188
2 189
2 190
2 19 1
2 192
2193
2194
219S
2196
2 197
2198
2 199
2200
220 1
2202
2203
220U
2205
2206
2207
2208
2209
2210
221 1
2212
HIR22'4000
have remembered that.
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 90
2 Do you remember a meeting on May 30 at U o'clock--
A Are we still in '85?
2 Ue are still in •8S--with Trent Lott and Pat
Buchanan and yourself uith Oliver North'
A No. In '85?
2 In 1985, May the 30th. Do you remember a meeting
with Trent Lott and Pat ichanan?
A Yes, but not until '86. This doesn't ring a bill
at all Later on, yes. but not in '85.
2 Ue may have the year mixed up.
A Excuse me a minute. I an not going to talk to
anybody. I will be right back.
(A short recess was taken. )
MR. OLIVER: Let's go back on the record.
BY MR, OLIVER:
2 You don't recall a meeting in May of 1985 with
Trent Lott and Pat Buchanan and yourself?
A Ho , I do not .
HR. COSTON: And Oliver North?
MR. OLIVER: And Oliver Horth?
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. OLIVER:
2 Or without Oliver North?
A No.
UNCLASSIFIED
330
NAME ■■
22 13
22114
22 1 5
22 16
22 17
22 18
22 19
2220
222 1
2222
2223
222U
2225
2226
2227
2228
2229
2230
2231
2232
2233
2234
2235
2236
2237
HIR22U000
mm\m
AGE 9 1
2 You said that you had receptions at your toun house
in 1985 after the vote?
A I think I did. I had one in '86 after the vote.
2 Do you remember, uould June 19th have been an
approximate time?
A Yes. it sure would have.
2 In 1985?
A My recollection is the members of that team and
some others, of that coalition team, that I had a reception
and invited the contra leadership and invited some
Congressmen. That is my recollection. I don't have a
record of it. but that is my recollection that that is what
ue did and it would have been a natural thing to do.
2 Do you remember meeting a Father Tom Oowling at
that reception?
A At that reception? No. I seem to remember meeting
him later than that.
2 You don't remember whether he came to that
reception?
A No .
S Aft«r the vote in 1985 did this coalition that you
had built, sort of then disburse and there was no other
activity for a period of tine?
A I wouldn't use the word disburse, counsel.
2 They still stayed m town?
MNOussra
331
NAME ■■
2238
2239
22(40
22M 1
22<42
2243
22M14
22U5
22146
2247
2248
2249
2250
2251
2252
2253
22514
2255
2256
2257
2258
2259
2260
226 1
2262
HIR22'*000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 92
It ceased to be active. Ue felt like for a short
time there we could get back to other business.
2 So you didn't have any raore strategic meetings?
A No .
2 When did you begin to think in terras of the vote in
1986?
A In late '85, then business.
S Did you have--did any neetings take place to discuss
the strategy for 1986?
A The sessions for breakfast continued, renerober,
because they were not contingent upon Central America.
2 That was the American Security Council breakfasts?
A That was about the only brainstorming place that ue
would generally meet and discuss movement. I don't remember
any formal planning sessions during that five month period
in there. It could have happened, but I don't remember
them .
2 So do you remember coming back together late in
1985 with this coalition to start to put it back together
again?
A I cannot put a finger on the date at all. I
remember that we began to coma back together for obvious
t
reasons, ^o seek further aid and the possibility of actually
being able to achieve military aid began to become viable in
late '85.
uNWssro
332
NAME :
2263
226U
2265
2266
2 2.6 7
2268
2269
2270
227 1
2272
2273
22714
2275
2276
2277
2278
2279
2280
2281
2282
2283
228>4
2285
2286
2287
inmsim
HIR22U000 ^* '^^'"lUlJIf f PIf P*'^^ '2
2 Were there any new additions to your group m 1985,
late '85, early '86. who hadn't been involved in '85?
A PRODEKCA began to play a more active role and they
began to become a separate center group. We called them the
missionaries to the Democrats because it was kind of an
assumed thing. PRODEHCA had a great many good contacts on
the Democratic side. Some of the PRODEHCA people were quite
close to HcCurdy and his group, so PRODEHCA began to emerge
as a more important player than they had been before, and
during that period, from then on, when it came to working
With anyone eKcept the Boll Weevil type Democrats, and we
considered them virtually all on the decided list anyway,
that became more and more the role separately of PRODEHCA.
2 I would like to go back for just a moment to 1985.
You indicated in 1985 IBC, you had hired IBC as your public
relations firm?
A Right.
KR . COSTOK: By you you are referring to Gulf and
Caribbean?
HR. OLIVER: Gulf and Caribbean Foundation?
MR. COSTON: Yes.
HR. OLIVER: Our records indicate that in 1985 Gulf
and Caribbean Foundation received just under SIM. 000 from
IBC. Why would Gulf and Caribbean Foundation receive
payments from IBC.
llNCUSSintB
333
NAME :
2288
2289
2290
229 1
2292
2293
22914
2295
2296
2297
2298
2299
2300
230 1
2302
2303
2304
2305
2306
2307
2308
2309
2310
231 1
2312
HIR22U000
iiNcussra
PAGE 9U
THE WITNESS: Here ue go. counsel.
MR. COSTON: The frustrating thing about this
eKercise is to have to say it tuice, one to the Senate and
once to the House .
THE WITNESS: Your figure is not correct, and
♦14,000 is not correct, and I have ended up with a lousy
neuspaper article that ue have had to call the lawyers and
'Wi»e — »*-t-e** , almost sue there because of that.
BY MR. OLIVER:
2 Could you eKplam to ne why these ?
A Counsel, let ree vent my spleen for :ust a moment,
all right? In 1986--by the way, the committee voluntarily
has the entire file even including pictures of what I am
fixing to tell you.
MR. COSTON; You will find it in document CH-050t3.
CH-0S36U .
THE WITNESS: When I mention the name of the case
you are going to remember it. The prosthesis case. You
probably heard of it now that I say it.
BY HR. OLIVER:
S All right , yes .
A What you have there is very incomplete. That is
only one of the two checks. We had guaranteed a prosthesis
manufacturer m Miami, working with a Dr. Gonzalez. Ue had
guaranteed there being able to complete the manufacturing of
UNCLASSIFIED
334
NAME ■■
2313
231U
231S
2316
2317
2318
2319
2320
232 1
2322
2323
23214
2325
2326
2327
2328
2329
2330
2331
2332
2333
233U
2335
2336
2337
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 95
prostheses for some contra uho were in the hospital in El
V
Salvador. The prostheses were manufactured in riiami and the
doctor was a Cuban- American doctor, uho was supervising this
and donating his time. The money was to come from an
overseas source and we guaranteed it in personal phone calls
with Dr . Gonzalez .
By the way, the whole file is on record, even
including the pictures of the amputations and all that
business .
So over a period of appcoKinately four or five
months, we paid a bill for *1U,000 some odd dollars. That
was about «13,000 of that was around prostheses, some of it
was for travel .
In eaily fall, we paid another bill for «6 or
«7,000, a total of ♦2 1 some odd thousand. In each case, ue
were reimbursed with a cashier's check from a Cayman Islands
account to pay invoices that we had guaranteed so that they
could be finished with a Dr. Gonzalez in Miami. This was
the Prosthesis case.
2 So you received «21,000 from IC , Inc. in the Cayman
Islands?
A I did, yes. I didn't know until months later who
it came from because the first check I got did not have an
acknowledgement. It was simply on Barkley's Bank and it
said nothing about I.C.. The second payment, which we had
UNCUSSIHED
335
NAME ■
2338
2339
2340
234 1
23t42
23U3
23414
2345
2346
2347
2348
2349
2350
2351
2352
2353
2354
2355
2356
2357
2358
2359
2360
236 1
2362
HIR224000
UNtLASSra
PAGE 96
made, was put into ray file by Pis. Powell and again paid, and
until this whole thing came out in I think February
MR. COSTON: February of '87.
THE WITNESS: Yes. We had all of our records and
there was a little note on the end of the second check that
said I.e., that we have been instructed by I.C. or NOINTEL.
MR. COSTON: You have a copy of that document in
the materials and the Senate has had it for months.
MR. OLIVER: I see that. I wasn't really asking
about the payments from I.e., Inc. I was asking about
payments from IBe to the Gulf and eaiibbean Foundation.
THE WITNESS: ibc to Gulf and earibbean?
BY HR. OLIVER:
S Yes. Fifteen hundreo' dollars on January 23, 1985,
a thousand dollars on February 12, 1986.
A IBC?
2 Yes.
A That is not correct.
2 You never received--would they have been reimbursing
you for rent ot expanses of some kind, oi telephone bills?
A He paid them money. They didn't pay us any money.
It has got to be either
2 Hayb* it is a typo. Maybe it should be to IBC then
m '85.
A It has to. Oh yes.
UNCLASSIFIED
336
NAME
2363
2364
236S
2366
2367
2368
2369
2370
2371
2372
2373
2374
2375
2376
2377
2378
2379
2380
2381
2382
2383
2384
2385
2386
2387
HIR224000
UNCUSSIHED
PAGE 97
2 How rauch did you pay them in 1985, do you remember?
A Oh, probbly «1S,000 or thereabouts. I am :ust
guessing .
2 Then this might be, should be to instead of irora?
A I thought you uere
2 This IS a reconstruction. I am glad you cleared
that up .
X would lik« tc isk you abut soma indications
from--that are based on excerpts from Oliver North's
notebooks about meetings with you.
A All right.
2 Do you remember a meeting on Harch 31, 1984 with
General Gorman and you and Oliver North?
A Yes. That is what I mentioned to you before.
2 That was the first meeting?
A Okay, within two days before that would have been
the first time I ever met Oliver North. That is the '
Gorman meeting. That is the date. Now I know exactly when
I met Oliver North.
8 That was based on the Salvador pricing thing?
A On the Salvadoran weapons thing. That is the first
time I have known exactly when X met Oliver North.
MR. COSTON: Assuming his notebook is accurate.
THE WITNESS' Assuming his notebook is accurate and
X am not sura soma parts of his notebook are accurate.
ifumssiFiB
337
NAME ■•
2388
2389
2390
239 I
2392
2393
2394
2395
2396
2397
2398
2399
2400
240 1
2402
2403
2404
2405
2406
2407
2408
2409
24 10
24 1 1
2412
HIR224000
UNCUSSIHED
PAGE 98
BY riR. OLIVER:
2 On the 24th of May did you receiva a phone call
from Oliver North about a trip involving an air fare of
about «2S00 in 1984' Do you recall that?
A You say about a trip?
2 Yes, a tup to someplace for S2S00f, an air fare
was «2500. A discussion with you?
A No .
HR. COSTON: In 1984'
MR. OLIVER: 1984.
BY HR. OLIVER:
e Do you renembet discussing with him any
humanitarian organization or changing the name of any
organization for any purposes?
A I am try ing--counsel , I an trying to put this m
context m my mind of that date, and that time, and uhat uas
going on at that time and I am having a little difficulty
even putting it into context. But can you go on down your
list a little bit and let me see if I can bring it into
focus ?
2 SOBtt of these are v6ry--his notes are not always
coapleta sentences .
A I can understand part oi it.
2 That is why I am trying to reconstruct f^om some of
these notes, but you don't recall that at the moment?
KIASSW
338
MAHE :
2U13
2mu
2U 1 S
24 1 6
2417
2U 18
2419
21420
2U21
2>422
2>423
2t42>«
2U25
2U26
2U27
21428
2U29
2(430
2131
21432
21433
2U314
21435
21436
2437
HIR2214000
No .
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 99
2 All right. Do you recall a meeting, Oliver North
calling you or you calling hire and someone named Vaughn
arranging help for a foundation m July of 1985?
A Vaughn? Ho.
2 Uould that have been Vaughn Forrest?
A I don't know hin . Doesn't ring a bell even.
2 You don't know Vaughn Forrest.
A No sir.
2 Did you ever discuss a freedom ball or liberty ball
in 198U with Oliver North?
A No sir.
2 Did you ever discuss in July of 1985 any assistance
for Eden P^ora, expenses for Eden Pastora with Oliver
North?
A
2
Ho sir. What year are you in?
I an in July of 1984.
HR. COSTOH: You said '85.
HR. OLIVER: I am sorry. I meant "84.
THE UITHESS: Goodness no.
BY HR. OLIVER:
Q Do you recall a man named Montenegro, Montenegro?
Was that the Salvadoran defector?
A I think so.
2 And Frank Gomez? 1984?
UNCLASSIFIED
4
339
HIR22U000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 100
NAME
2438 A It IS too early.
21439 2 All right.
2<440 A The name Montenegro rings a bell, but that is all.
2441 and it is too early to have had anything to do with the
2<4'42 o ther issue .
2'»U3 C Now, did you--you remember a meeting with Oliver
2141414 North on the 5th of Februry 1985 about bringing together
2'4itS these 15 groups for the Central American Coalition?
2'4U6 A I remember such a meeting. I have no idea who was
2'4i47 there, but I remember that we certainly had such a meeting
2U'48 to discuss the coalition. This was about the time that I
2U149 mentioned to you earlier. I have no idea whether Oliver
2U50 North was at that meeting.
2U51 S Do you remember where the meeting took place?
2452 A I think that meeting took place at PRODEHCA .
2U53 2 Do you remember establishing some subcommittees
auSM related to this coalition?
21455 A No, I do not.
2t456 2 Do you know a man named Lou Lattarman?
2457 A No.
2458 2 Do you know Chris Hanion?
2459 A I mat him several different times where he would be
2460 an obsarvaz ovat at tha American Sacurity Council. I don't
2461 remember being with him in any other meetings.
2462 2 Ha wasn't involved in any of your coalition
iiNcussiro
340
NAME
2463
2464
2465
2466
2467
2468
2469
2470
247 1
2472
2473
2474
2475
2476
2477
2478
2479
2480
2481
2482
2483
2484
2485
2486
2487
HIR224000
activities ?
llNKUSSro
PAGE 1 0 1
A Mo. He was over on the Senate side you remember,
and virtually everything ue did uas on the House side.
Q You worked only on the House side^
A Primarily, because of the circumstances.
2 Do you remember discussing with Oliver North an
interview that had taken place with Senator Lugar?
A No.
S Do you remenber discussing Senator Lugar or Senator
Lugar 's position with Oliver Nortji, on contra aid m 1985?
A Sir, I don't remember^enator Lugar's position on
contra aid was avttr m question at any time.
2 Did you aver meet with Hax Friedeisdorf related to
the 1985 contra aid?
A No sir.
2 On the 4th of March in 1985 there was an occasion
of a call from you to Oliver North that had to do with going
to see Lugar's staff and something about Hamilton's staff
canceled. Would that have been related to the council
meeting ?
A Yes. Lugaz, we did not get to see Lugar on that
visit.
2 And Hamilton's staff counsel had canceled?
A No. We saw Hamilton. Hamilton's Intelligence
Committee staff had had to cancel. We did not get to see
UNCLASSIRED
341
NAME
2U88
2489
2U90
249 1
2492
2493
24914
2495
2496
2497
2498
2499
2500
250 1
2502
2503
2504
2505
2506
2507
2508
2509
25 10
251 1
2512
HIR224000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 102
them Renieraber a while ago I said I wasn't quite sure about
that' Hamilton's committee staff had to cancel, but
Hamilton did see hira.
e And you called Oliver North to tell hira these
things ?
A Probably.
2 Did you have any discussion with any discussion
with Oliver North in early 198S about private funding for
the contr as ?
A No sir .
2 Uare you aware of any solicitation of assistance
from Third Countries?
A No sir .
Q During that period of tina?
A Never .
2 Do you reraanber a meeting on the l&th of April, a
short meeting with Oliver North, yourself, Jonathan Miller.
Rich Miller and Rob Owen?
A No sir.
2 You don't recall such a meeting taking place?
A I an sure such a meeting with those characters,
that set of characters, never took place.
2 Did you ever discuss with Oliver North a protest at
the Nicaiaguan Embassy?
A No sir.
UNCUSSIHED
342
NAME
2513
25 114
25 1 5
25 16
25 17
2518
25 19
2520
2521
2522
2523
252U
2525
2526
2527
2528
2529
2530
2531
2532
2533
2531*
2535
2536
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HIR22U000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 103
2 Did you euer discuss with Oliver North an Op Ed
piece signed by all the leaders, the Triple A, as they are
referred to, all the leaders of the Democratic Resistance'
A I could have discussed such an Op Ed piece after
the fact, not before the fact.
2 Did you ever discuss with Oliver North a plan ItiaC
from Robelo that involved the firing of Enrique Berraudez?
A No sir.
L
2 Did you ever meet Bob Kagifn?
Yes .
In what context did you meet Bob Kag;ui'
He would sit in on sone of the larger meetings.
That meeting over at PRdTEHCA that I mentioned, he was at
that meeting speciiically , and ha would sit in on some
meetings to kind of comment on the State Department point of
view .
2 These ware the strategy naatings, coalitions?
A In '86 when wa got into the larger group. See,
the small group of about seven, seven or eight, was a 1985
phenomenon only. That group expanded and we began.
Eenaabai. a kind of joint operation between the PRO^EnCA
group for the Democrats and so forth, and at those meetings
t
at least onca ot twice, Kag'^n was dafinitaly there.
2 And thasa maatings whan you ware discussing the
vote m 1986, not 1985.
UNCUkSSIHED
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UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE loy
A That IS correct
Q Uhen you say the larger meetings, this uas a
separate group from the one that met at your town house'
A That IS right. See, the town house meetings were a
1985 event only. That group became a much larger group uith
a lot more dimensions and ray toun house wasn't big enough to
have such meetings in my toun house in '85. I don't recall
ue ever had a meeting of 'hat group in the toun house.
2 Did you chair the larger group too?
A No, I did not. And I don't remember uho did.
2 Would it have been Richard Miller?
A Oh no. Ha uas not a player on this scene.
2 Who uere the players in the legislative evaluation
strategy?
A I uould think that--my recollection is that whoever
uas hosting kind of acted as a moderator more than a
chairman. I continued to report to the group primarily on
the movement of the Republicans and conservative Democrats.
The PROT^EHCA Group were almost totally responsible for the
quota ' ' tha HcCurdy Group and company.'' You uell knou uhat
I am talking abut.
2 Yas , yes sir .
A It is my tacollaction ua pratty much had parallel
cooperating joint reports. I don't remember one person
actually being tha king of the group.
\mtmsw
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UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 105
2 Well, hou.raany people participated in the larger
group '
A I remember that it uas as many as 15 people.
2 And Rich Miller uas one of the people uho attended
those meetings?
A He uould attend but I don't recall his ever
participating .
2 And Spitz Channell?
A Once or tuice . fty earlier recollection of meeting
Spitz Channell uas at such a group.
2 Dan Conrad?
A I don't remember hin aver being at one of those.
2 Bruce Cameron?
A Yes, Bruce uas there.
2 And uhat uas Bruce's
A Bruce uas the missionary to the Democrats. He uas
the Democrat that reported on--uell, he just had very good
intelligence, Bruce did.
UNCUSSIRED
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NAME
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HIR22U000
DCHN STEVENS
#t\>ss^^*
PAGE 106
fi Were you aware that he uas being paid by Spitz
Channell ?
A No , I uas not .
2 Uere you auaie that PRODEMCA uas receiving money
from Spitz Channell?
A No . I uas not .
2 Uas Peter Flaherty involved in these groups?
A Yes. ,
Q And you have already mentioned Bob OM^en uas
participating .
A Yes.
C Did Elliott Abrans ever attend any of those
meetings ?
A Not in my presence .
2 Did you ever hear of him attending any of those
meetings ? j J
A Not those meetings. Bob ri^tftyn was there in his
stead. I cannot swaar that some tine, some place, a meeting
took place that I was not there but I think I would have
heard it.
2 Did Oliver North attend any of those meetings?
A Kot that I recall.
2 Did anyone from the White House attend any of those
meetings ?
iifimim
346
NAME
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2608
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26 12
26 1 3
26 lU
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2623
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HIR224000
uNtussra
PAGE 107
A There could aluays have been somebody there from
the Office of Public Liaison. That could have been there
and I wouldn't even have known who they were so I cannot say
there was not a presence there, but there was not an active
presence the re .
2 Lynn &o-uohef^Mar ticipatad in 1986?
A Yes.
2 And Sara Dickens?
A Sara Dickens was not a part of this group because,
reraeraber, Sara Dickens is not part of any lobbying
organization .
2 In late 1985, did you neet or becorae aware of the
involvement of David Fischer and Martin Artiano in the
Central Araerican freedom plan?
A No .
2 Did you ever raeat David Fischer or--
A I met David Fischer probably for the first time
probably in lata spring of 1986.
2 What was the occasion?
A X just met him over at IBC .
S Uh«n was the first meeting in 1986 that you recall?
A I think it was the date that you mentioned, the
maetlng I said I thought was at PRODEKCA. Check back on
that date. I balieva that is it. You have better accurate
records than I have in my mind.
uNcussm
347
UNliLAb^iritU
NAnE :
2631
2632
2633
263M
2635
2636
2637
2638
2639
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26UU
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2652
2653
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2655
HIR224000 PAGE 108
2 The date is on the record.
A That would have been pretty much the kick off of
the I986--
a Eabruary of 1 985 .
A 1986.
e 1986.
Now, did Bob or Adan Goodman ever attend any of
those meetings?
A No, sir.
2 Were you auara of the fact that Spitz Channell had
retained the Goodman agency to do television ads?
A I became aware of it a little later than that.
2 When did you become aware of it?
A Probably lata February or March.
2 Did you discuss with Rich Miller or Spitz Channell
the districts in which those ads should be run m order to
influence the vote?
A At a later date, yes. I first started my
discussion with them on basic semantics and content of their
ads the previous year. The coalition had had some serious
problems with badly constructed and badly run commercials
that actually did more harm than good.
e These were also run by Spitz Channell?
A No, no. I don't know anything about what Spitz
Channell did in 1985. I hadn't met the man. I don't know
mUkSSW
348
NAME
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2659
2660
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2672
2673
2674
2675
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2677
2678
2679
2680
HIR22U000
"Ncussm
PAGE 109
he even existed .
2 Who ran the ads in 1984?
A I can't remembec uhich group it was. I remember
specifically that there was a Congressman in Ohio that uas
turned off so badly I had to go see him. Now, because of
that and because of my discussions on that. I uas asked
strictly as a volunteer to look at some language and some
ads to give my opinion of the semantics, which I did.
Q Uho asked you to do that?
A Rich Miller asked ne to do that for the ads that
Goodman uas doing for Channell . So I went over story boards
and went over actual language for him ]ust sitting there m
the office. I said, look--
S Who uas present at that meeting?
A It uould have been Channell and Miller and probably
one of the Goodmans.
Q And that uould have been in--
A This uould have been as early as March.
fi Of 1986.
A Right. This uas the first time that I had ever had
any sort oi relationship uith any of the Channell
organization .
S Did Channell mention to you hou much money they
intended to spend on these ads?
A I think he probably did. They were big numbers, I
UNCLASSra
349
NAME
2681
2682
2683
268U
2685
2686
2687
2688
2689
2690
269 1
2692
2693
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2695
2696
2697
2698
2699
2700
270 1
2702
2703
2704
2705
HIR22<4000
UNCUSSIFIEU
AGE 1 10
reraenbet. lots of money being spent on advertising at the
time. The earliest advertising I saw, of course, did not
mention specific legislation. They were what I would almost
call institutional type ads. They mentioned the cause, but
there was never mention of a vote and things like that.
But my whole mission with these people was to be
sure that they were not counter '-productive with the very
people I was trying to help sail.
2 Do you remember Spitz Channell holding a press
conference in early 1986 indicating that they were going to
spend several million dollars to run television ads to try
to influence the vote on contra aid?
A Yes , sir .
fi That was prior to th« time that you met with him;
is that correct ?
A That is correct.
S Did you aver inquire as to what source of funds
were for these ads?
A I don't recall.
2 You never said to Rich niller or Spitz Channell who
is going to pay for all this?
A Well, I knew the name the National Endowment for
the Preservation and Liberty and they were a fund raising
organization. I knew they were running ads. This was not
ray concern.
*MMte
350
UNCLASSIHED
NAME' HIR22U000 UllULnUUII IkV PAGE \\^
2706 I hav« never been in the iund-. raising business and
2707 my nam concarn from day one was to be sure that the ads did
2708 the job that they hoped they would do and not just the
2709 opposite .
2710 2 When you discussed with Spitz Channell and Rich
27 11 Hiller and Adam or Bob Goodman the districts in which the
27 12 ads should be run, did you suggest that these ads be run in
2713 the districts where the/ uould have some affect on the vote?
27114 A Certainly.
2715 C Did you provide^ them with a list?
27 16 A Wall, remember everybody in town has got the same
2717 undecided list. Remember also that there are certain things
2718 that are vary obvious that you do and don't do. For
2719 instance, thara is not a single undecided vote in the LA
2720 area. Why run ads in the L.A. area?
2721 There hasn't been an undecided vote there for
2722 years. So I said you are wasting money to run ads there.
2723 Where are the undecided votes? Okay. Can you make a good
272'4 media buy in those towns? Can you cover that district with
2725 any sort of madia? I± you are going to do this, put it
2726 Hhaia it is supposed to ba dona.
2727 2 So you indicated which Congressman ware in that
2728 mazginal suing area?
2729 A Everybody knew that. I had my undecided list, but
2730 Rich Hiller also had one ha got from somewhere. Everybody
Mussiro
351
NAME
2731
2732
2733
273U
2735
2736
2737
2738
2739
27140
27U 1
2742
27143
271414
2745
2746
27U7
2748
2749
2750
2751
2752
2753
2754
2755
onmsim
HIR224C00 ^' * VL/1|J|1I| iril ?tiOt 112
in toun has one, an undecided list. There are no secrets
there .
As I say, the other side uses exactly the same list
that--each side uses the same list. So the targetting of
individual d is tr ic ts- - f or instance, when I first started
looking at somebody's list they uould have Hiarai in there
I said uhy in the world are you running an ad in Miami?
There is not an undecided vote in the area. Again, this
type thing .
2 Did you review the story boards on the ads that
were going to be run against Hike Barnes?
A Mo, I did not. I saw them, but I did not review
them. I had nothing to do with them.
2 But you saw the ads?
A Yes, I saw them.
2 Here you aware that the choice of Mike Barnes as a
target for these ads was related to the fact that he was in
the Washington area and that these ads would be seen in
effect by all 535 Members of Congress?
A Yes.
2 Did you discuss that strategy with Channell and
Miller or Goodman?
A I didn't discuss it. I said it was probably a good
idea.
2 Because you could get them all at one sitting?
UNCIASSIHED
352
MAME ■■
2756
2757
2758
2759
2760
2761
2762
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2773
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2778
2779
2780
UNCIASSIHED
HIR22'4000 IIIUI_I II^Xini"ll PAGE 113
A You could let everybody knovT uhat the ads look
like. This is a common practice, by the way. in any sort of
emotional, philosophical- type issue, to run ads here so
everybody can see them.
2 So It was not Dust Mike Barnes that was targetted .
It was the whole Congress and Hike Barnes just happened to
be the fellow in the adjacent district who was against
contra aid?
A That IS exactly correct.
2 So It was an effort to sort of make an example of
Hike Barnes in terms of what kind of--
A Mot to make an example of Hike Barnes m that
sense. Why do people run ads in the Washington Post?
Because they want the entire Congress to see the ad. not
because they are targetting six Congressmen in this area.
Because they want the entire Congress to see the ad. A full-
page ad in the Washington Post is run for exactly the same
reason .
2 So you are aware that they were running the Hike
Barnes ad to have an impact on the whole Congress.
A Right.
2 And that they selected 10, 11 other Congressmen in
particular districts to have the ads run who were m effect
swing votes .
A Yes.
iiNtmsro
353
HIR22>4000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 1 1 4
KAME
2781 2 And that list uas agreed upon by you and Rich
2782 Miller and Channell and Goodman?
2783 A There were two different, entirely different story
278U boards for those ads. I considered the Mike Barnes ad--and
2785 this uas my advice to thera--as being counterproductive other
2786 than right here. My advice to there uas don't run that ad
2787 against any Congressman if you ever expect to get his vote
2788 because you uon't.
2789 That uas ray advice. By the uay , they did not take
2790 ray advice on some of those and they did not get a single
279 1 vote uhere they ran that ad.
2792 Nou, there uas a diffeiant type ad uhich did not
2793 have the strong language, did not have the heavy language
2794 that uas run in some districts that, if you can judge by the
2795 vote, proved to be productive.
2796 2 A different kind of ad?
2797 A Yes. It named the Congressman but it uas not
2798 something to raise the emotion.
2799 2 Uas this the ad that said ua aia m search of tuo
2800 votes?
2801 A Ho, no. That uas in 1985.
2802 Q That uas the 1985 vote.
2803 A I know nothing about what they did in 1985. I know
280U zero. I didn't know they even ran ads in 1985. I heard
2805 that much later.
UNCUSSIFIED
354
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 1 1 5
NAME
2806 2 Was there a discussion in addition to the
2807 television campaign of other campaign style activities that
2808 uere designed to influence the vote?
2809 A No.
2810 e Do you know a man named Jack Lichens tein?
2811 A I have met Jack Lichenstein. He came to ray office
2312 once, maybe twice, with a program that I never considered
2813 even looking at.
28114 2 What was the program?
2815 A Sir, it was very easy to forget.
2816 2 Was it a directmail program?
2817 A I don't think so.
2818 2 Uas it a grass roots organizing program?
2819 A Not in the sense that I consider grass roots. I
2820 simply don't remember the details of his program. I
2821 remember I was not interested enough in it to ever take part
2822 m It or even advise him on it. I don't remember that his
2823 program, if I may be so presumptuous, uas worth my
282U attention.
2825 2 What about Edie Fraser? Were you aware of Edie
2826 Fraser's activities a part of this effort m 1986?
2827 A Mo.
2828 2 Do you know Steve Cook?
2829 A No.
2830 2 I would like to enter this as Exhibit number 3 and
UNCUSSIFIED
355
NAME ■■
2831
2832
2833
2834
283S
2836
2837
2838
2839
2840
2814 1
28U2
2843
28UU
2845
2846
2847
2848
2849
2850
2851
2852
2853
2854
2855
UNCUSSIFIED
HIR224000 lllMlal H.l.lll II II PAGE 116
ask you to mark this exhibit and ask you to look at this
latter, which is from Spitz Channell to Rich Pliller, dated
April IS, 1986.
[Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification. 1
BY HR. OLIVER:
2 Have you had a chance to eKanine this letter?
A Yes. Certainly I have never seen the letter
before. My impression is--
2 My question is that letter indicates that there was
some kind of financial arrangement between Spitz Channell
and the people who are listed on page 2 and there seems to
be an instruction from Channell to Miller to tell these
people, these subcontractors, that there will be no more
financial assistance forthcoming bacause the vote will have
taken place on this particular day.
My question to you is had you been receiving or had
you received any financial assistance from Rich Miller or
Spitz Channell during that pariod of tine?
A No. You will notice that this really is a two-part
latter. Ha says, plaasa convey my smcara thanks to
avaryona. I had given the story board advice earlier and
tha first actually contract that I aver had with any
Channell organization was not until June. I received a
payment of 45,000 from Sentinel voluntarily. They called
and asked us to bill then and I specifically asked that it
UNCUSSIHED
356
BNCUSSIfe
NAME: HIR22'4000 ^'VVkniJIJII II II PAGE 117
2856 be done through S«ntinel because even any presumption of
2857 possible lobbying with the money. That uas their lobbying
2858 organization, but that uas without a contract and that was
2859 not until June.
2860 2 The letter says, ''please call the following
286 1 business and individuals and notify then that the program
2862 has ended and retstate that all financial arrangements
2863 between the National Endowment for the Preservation of
286U Liberty and them are terminated as of tonight.''
2865 A He had no financial arrangements.
2866 2 Do you know of the financial arrangements that any
2867 of the other individuals on this list had?
2868 A Let me sea the list.
2869 2 --with the National Endowment for the Preservation
2870 of Liberty or the National American Trust?
287 1 A I don't know who Artiano and Cook are. At that
2872 time I knew nothing about David Fischer. I know who Edie
2873 Fraser is. I never knew he had a relationship with Edie
287U Fraser. I know who Bob and Adam Goodman are. I knew Jack
2875 Lichenstain. I never knew he had a relationship with him or
2876 Penn Keable or the UNO office until it was revealed in the
2877 hearings.
2878 2 Your testimony was you had no financial arrangement
2879 with Spitz Channell until June of 1986?
2880 A Arrangement two different times, once with Gulf and
UNCLASSIRED
357
NAHE ■
2881
2882
2883
28814
2885
2886
2887
2888
2889
2890
289 1
2892
2893
289U
2895
2896
2897
2898
2899
2900
290 1
2902
2903
2904
290S
HIR22H000
"immu
PAGE 118
Caribbean and one with rae direct. They called and said ue
want to make a contribution after the fact of services
already rendered without any discussion whatsoever that I
was going to get paid for it.
They called rae up somewhere around like April and
said we want to make a contribution to the cause. Do you
want it to come to you or do you want it to come to Gulf and
Caribbean ?
I said send it to Gulf and Caribbean. They need
the money, which they did. It went from 501(c)(3) group to
another. This was some time in the spring of 1985.
I don't remember the exact date. At that time the
only thing we had dona was give advice on things like the
story boards. Kow. because of my presence on the Hill on
the issue, I lust felt like that I better be squeaky clean
and get some lobbying money from then if they were going to
give us money. So they offered to give us, to pay us some
more money.
I said let's call it lobbying. I will register to
lobby for your lobbying organization. Sentinel. They gave
us S5,000.
After the vote was over, for the first time ever I
had a one-to-one meeting with Spitz Channel; we met and
discussed a personal consulting axrangenent between Spitz
Channell and ne which ue completed and it was simply a
wmsw
358
NAME ■■
2906
2907
2908
2909
29 10
291 1
2912
2913
29 14
2915
2916
2917
2918
2919
2920
2921
2922
2923
2924
2925
2926
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2928
2929
2930
HIR22U000 IIIUI.I ll\.XILILII PAGE 119
political consulting aFrangeraSiWVetueen Spitz Channell and
mo uhich took place some time around June.
2 And there was a contract?
A Right, there was a contract. In late fall or early
winter that contract was expanded.
MR. OLIVER: I would like to have this document
entered as exhibit M and ask you to look at that. Would you
please let the reporter mark the exhibit.
[Exhibit No. 4 was marked for identification. 1
THE HITMESS: That is the June contract. Now, that
was after the vote, totally after the vote on contra aid
took place . •
BY HR. OLIVER:
2 For the record, this exhibit U is a memorandum to
Spitz Channel for the National Endowment for the
Preservation of Liberty from Dan Kuykendall, re
confirmation of consulting arrangements between Spitz
Channel and Dan Kuykendall dated June 10, 1986, signed by
Carl Russell Channell and Dan Kuykendall. Were you aware at
the time that the National Endowment for the Preservation of
Liberty was a 501(c)(3) organization?
A Yes.
Q And did you feel that it was proper for a lobbying
company such as yours to have a contract with a 501(c)(3)
for political consulting?
UNCLASSIFIED
359
MAKE :
293 I
2932
2933
29314
293S
2936
2937
2938
2939
2940
294 1
29U2
2943
29U14
29U5
2946
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2948
2949
2950
2951
2952
2953
2954
2955
HIR224000
ONCUSSIFIED
PAGE 120
Sir, 75 percent of ray business is done on
consulting, not lobbying. I ara a consulting as uell as a
lobbying firm. This is not for lobbying. Later on in the
year when lobbying began I specifically asked that money
that carae to rae come from Sentinel and it is a matter of
record. I took the initiative each ^«« — that I thought it
uas appropriate .
2 What kind of consulting did you do based on this
particular contract for the National Endowment for the
Preservation of Liberty?
A This uas at the beginning of a planned SDI program.
I think the vary first thing we did on this program was sit
down and go over with Finkalstein th« make-up of the poll, a
very great, in-depth survey that they ran for SDI, which
proved to be a very fine document that Finkelstein r'^n I
helped him put that together.
I helped hm select I think 36 congressional
districts that I thought would be typical of the entire
United States to give a true picture of the entire Nation
with 36 districts.
I helped him select those. Now, counsel, that is
what I consider to be consulting. The selection of these
districts had nothing to do with lobbying.
It had to do with their feel on an issue to get a
good picture of the Nation.
UNCLASSIFIED
360
NAME :
2956
2957
2958
2959
2960
296 1
2962
2963
2964
2965
2966
2967
2968
2969
2970
297 1
2972
2973
29714
2975
2976
2977
2978
2979
2980
HIR22'4000
UNCLASSinED
PAGE 121
So the fj.tst project that ue got into--reraerabe r . the
contra issue had gone by than. It uas over with as far as
ue were concerned. , and tor the next three months our entire
attention was on SDI.
flR. OLIVER: I would like to enter this document
dated May 5th, 1986 as Exhibit nunber 5.
(Exhibit no. 5 was marked for identification. !
BY MR. OLIVER:
2 This is a letter dated May 5, 1986 from Dan
Kuykendall to nr . Dan Conrad regarding an agreement for
consulting, research and resource information from the Gulf
and Caribbean Foundation. I would like to ask you to
examine that.
A This was the first agreement that we made until I
decided that it was not proper and I changed this request to
Sentinel from the Kuykendall Company and that is the way it
came out and that is a matter of record.
2 you received a »5,000 contribution?
A Gulf and Caribbean did not receive it and it did
not come from the Kational Endowment. It came to the
Kuykendall Company from Sentinel.
2 A *5,000 check was given to you?
A Yes.
2 And your letter says this sum covers our advisory
and consulting contribution to the contra aid effort for the
UNCLASSffl
361
NAME
2981
2982
2983
298U
2985
2986
2987
2988
2989
2990
299 1
2992
2993
299U
2995
2996
2997
2998
2999
3000
300 1
3002
3003
30014
300S
HIR224000
remainder of 1986
liNcussro
E 1 22
A That IS right. I reviewed that, decided it was not
proper, decided I didn't uant to do it that way and I asked
for a different approach.
HR. COSTON: For the record, we provided a document
dated June 2, 1986, which was an invoice that superseded the
document you just identified.
MR. OLIVER: Thank you, counsel.
I would like to enter as exhibit number 6, this is
a raemorandun to Spitz Channel from Dan Kuykendall dated June
10, 1986. It contains a monthly budget for the Gulf and
Caribbean Foundation.
[Exhibit no. 6 was narked for identification. 1
BY HR. OLIVER:
2 I would like you to look at that document and tell
rae what that was all about. I ask you to tell me what that
was about .
A Spitz Channel at one tiiia had requested rae to see
if there was any possibility of his having a relationship
With the a^¥»i Gul± and Caribbean Foundation. He asked me
for a budget of the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation^ which I
gav« to hill. Shortly after this he approached rae about the
id«a of virtually--and I say '• virtually ' ' because we never
allowed it to go far enough to know what it really
raaant--acquiring the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation.
unuLhooii ii^u
362
NAME :
3006
3007
3008
3009
30 10
30 1 1
30 12
30 1 3
30 lU
30 IS
30 16
30 17
30 18
30 19
3020
302 1
3022
3023
30214
3025
3026
3027
3028
3029
3030
HrR22i4000
UNCLASSIFIED
AGE 1 23
He wanted our list of members for one thing. Ue
turned hini down completely and did not even consider any
sort of merger, formal or informal. So this went no further
and was not even considered by the board.
2 You indicated that your agreement uith the National
Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty was expanded m
the late fall or early winter of 1986.
A It was not early winter. I think it was late fall.
S What was the purpose of the expansion of that
agreement '
A He wanted more of my tine.
2 In December of 1986?
A Earlier than that. I think it was.
HR. OLIVER: I would like to ask the reporter to
mark this as Exhibit number 7 and indicate for the record
that this is a communication from the Kuykendall Company to
fir Spitz Channell dated December 22, 1986, for a fee due
for services rendered for December 1986, in the amount of
»12,000 and ask you to look at that document.
[Exhibit no. 7a was marked for identification. I
THE WITNESS: That is correct.
BY HR. OLIVER:
C What were the services that you rendered to the
National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty in
December of 19867
miASsra
363
NAHE
3031
3032
3033
303U
3035
3036
3037
3038
3039
30U0
3014 1
3042
3043
3044
30U5
3046
3047
3048
3049
3050
3051
3052
3053
3054
3055
HIR224000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 124
A You have somewhere in your records, I assume, a
contractual breakdown on our array of services itemized
Now that list uould--here it is.
Counsel, would you like to review this yourself
HR. OLIVER: Let the record indicate that Mr.
Kuykendall has supplied us with a document which I would
like to have marked as Exhibit number 8.
MR. COSTOH: You have a copy of this.
MR. OLIVER: Maybe I have a copy. Let's see if I
can find one here.
HR . COSTOM: Let's go off the record.
I would like to have this marked as Exhibit number
8.
MR. COSTOH: For th« record, the last one was
Exhibit 8; is that correct?
Could we have this one marked 7b so the two
exhibits are considered together, 7a and 7b rather than 7
and 8?
MR. OLIVER: That is fine.
[Exhibit no. 7b was marked for identification. 1
HR. OLIVER: The document which was dated March 6.
1987, is termed the final arrangement between the Kuykendall
Coapany, Dan Kuykendall, and Spitz Channall and his various
organizations .
THE WITNESS: That is the same arrangement that we
mukssro
364
UNCLASSIFIED
Hkni: HIR22I4000 Ul llJL.ri%#WII *i^*^PAGE 125
3056 had arrived at virtually and maybe nothing but a verbal
3057 agreement as early as around December 1.
3058 Bi HR. OLIVER;
3059 2 I would like to ask you, Hr . Kuykendall. why that
3060 arrangement was not put m uriting until March the 6, 1987'
3061 . A Sir, I think that arrangement is in writing in
3062 other documents. I believe you have this m other
3063 documents. This was a r fineraent of it, but I think ue have
3064 that m other documents.
3065 Q Why was a refinement made in March of 1987?
3066 A I don't remember why it was rewritten at that time.
3067 Hy recollection is that his counsel asked for it because
3068 there was an arrangement on record with exactly the sane
3069 amounts of money.
3070 2 Was this the amount of money that had been paid to
3071 you by the Spitz Channell organization?
3072 A Yes. Since I believe there was a November figure
3073 at that level. I am not certain. But now sometimes we got
30714 more than one check from the Channell organization,
3075 depending on whether X felt like that I was exposed to
3076 lobbying restrictions during that period.
3077 If I felt like I had dona anything that could be
3078 construed under the law as lobbying during the mcney, I
3079 would ask them for a separate check from Sentinel.
3080 2 When did this arrangement, what period of time did
UNCUSSIFIED
365
NAME ■
3081
3082
3083
308U
3085
3086
3087
3088
3089
3090
309 1
3092
3093
3094
3095
3096
3097
3098
3099
3100
3 10 1
3102
3103
310<4
3105
HIR22U000
this arrangement covet?
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 126
A The ♦12.000 a month arrangement uith vaiious
i
configurations of the 12,000 lasted for appr oKiraate 1 y six
Beginning when?
Beginning either November 1st or December 1st.
1986?
1986. Tha 3500 a month iigura preceded that up to
months .
2
A
2
A
that time .
2 Did you receive monthly fees of «12,000 m
November, December of 1986, January, February and March of
1987?
A Well, tha checks uere seldom ;ust for «12,000.
They uere sometimes I would get a check for half that from
Sentinel. Sometimes I would get no money form Sentinel
So tha 12,000 total was tha same, counsel, each
month. Who it cama from varied according to my instructions
based on uhathar or not I detarnined that I had done
anything that could be construed as lobbying under the House
rules .
2 Hou much money did you receive from tha Channell
organization based on this arrangement total?
Under tha total life of it figura--
A Have you got something to write with? Write this
down and add it up. You have got a law degree, not a math
UNCUSSIHED
366
NAME
3 1 06
3107
3 108
3 109
3 110
3111
3 112
3 113
3 114
3115
3116
3 117
31 18
3119
3 120
312 1
3 122
3123
3 124
3 125
3126
3 127
3128
3129
3 130
HIR22U000
degree .
UNCLASSIflEO
PAGE 127
2 I ais willing to do anything to move this along.
A Do four months at 3500 and eight months at 12.000
That ought to be it.
2 That IS «1 10 , 000 .
A That IS about right.
2 You received »1 10,000 from the various Channell
organizations ?
A Correct .
Beginning in November of 1986?
No. Beginning June.
June of 1986.
With that first contract you sawf
And running through when? When did you receive
your last payment?
A We terminated I think Hay.
2 May of this year?
A Yes. Nou, let me remind you that this was not a
normal consulting arrangement in the fact that I billed in
arrears. I normally bill in advance for consulting. In this
particular client, I billed in arrears instead of in
advance .
It is the only client I have ever had that I did
that, but I did this.
2 You billed in arrears for what period of time?
ONCUSSIFIED
367
NAME ■
3131
3132
3 133
3 1 34
3 1 35
3 136
3137
3 138
3 1 39
3 lUO
3 lU 1
3 142
3143
3 mu
3 ms
3 146
3 147
3 148
3 149
3150
3 15 1
3 152
3153
3154
3155
HIR224000
iinmsim
AGE 128
The whole time ,
2 Beginning in June of 1986 until May of 1987?
A Correct .
2 And could you break down how much money you got
from each of these different entities? How much came from
Sentinel, how much came from NEPL and whether any came from
any of the other Channell organizations?
A Counsel, if you wished us to do a separate
accounting on that, I can furnish it for you. I can't do it
at the time .
tlR. COSTON: Let me make a couple of record
observations first. You had asked first for the prior
agreement. Ue have located a document turned over to you
dated Movember 7, 8, document CH0S47U, which is the $12,000
retainer and should be in your pile of material.
And, second, as far as a breakdown of Sentinel
versus NEPL payment we have already provided documents
showing bank receipts from June of 1986 through April of
1987 that break down the NEPL contribution and the Sentinel
contribution and that breakdown is found on the deposit
slips .
HR. OLIVER: Could we go off the record for Dust a
minute?
[Discussion off the record. ]
MR. OLIVER: Back on the record now, I would like
wmM
368
NAME •
3156
3157
3 1 58
3159
3160
316 1
3 162
3163
316U
3165
3166
3167
3 168
3169
3170
3 17 1
3172
3 173
3 1714
3 175
3176
3177
3 178
3179
3 180
HIR22U000 ^'vuL/iooir/r// '*''' '"
this set of documents marked as c>nribit number 8 Let the
record indicate this series of documents contains details of
the arrangements between the Kuykendall Company and
Kuykendall and Spitz Channell and his various organizations,
a letter dated September 29, 1986, to Spitz from Dan
Kuykendall related to^ SDI initiative, a letter dated
September 15, 1986, to Spitz Channel from Dan Kuykendall
also related to the SDI initiative, a letter dated July 23,
1986 from Dan Kuykendall to Spitz Channell related to the
effort m the spring of 1985 to obtain military aid to the
contras, and the effort m 1986 to obtain military aid to
the contras. It also contains another copy of the June 10,
1986 memorandum which was marked as an earlier exhibit.
[Exhibit no. 8 was marked for identification.]
BY HR. OLIVER:
2 May I ask you, Hr . Kuykendall, to tell us what you
did for Spitz Channell that was not related to the
legislative efforts to obtain aid for the contras or support
for the SDI program?
A Hhen you are considered a consultant on a personal
basis with Spitz Channell that means literally you are on
call all the time. The first time Spitz Channell ever asked
me to consider being a consultant to him, I specifically
said what do you expect of me? He said I want the right to
talk to you and ask your advice on issues constantly; and
UNCLASSIFIED
369
KAHE HIR224000
DNCUSSIflEO
PAGE 130
3 181
3182
3 183
31814
318S
3186
3187
3 188
3 189
3190
3 19 1
3192
3193
319U
3195
3196
3 197
3 198
3 199
3200
320 1
3202
3203
3204
3205
that IS literally what it amounted to. day and night, seven
days a weak, a phone call saying can ue meat or what do you
think of this particular approach to public relations, what
do you think oi this particular approach to an idea, uhat do
you think about this particular approach to a newspaper or
television program.
I never took part in actually -m#»aing the
material. He would invariably consult me. He considered me
a pure consultant on ray opinions on virtually everything he
did that had to do with these programs in the sense of the
response that I thought that he could causa with the
Congress in the sense of is it good language, is it bad
language. Do I think it will be productive or
counterproductive and this type thing.
But we went into great depth in many cases of
programs that most of them never surfaced. Most of them
never became a program. But when ha said a personal
consulting contract that is what it really meant, just that.
Now, when the tima cama to expand upon it, we get
into tha area of legislative status reports. We get into
tha area of information retrieval and certainly you
gantleman know what that means in tha sense hare, the normal
ssrvicas givan by a full sarvica consulting firm. If they
wanted to call up and say what is the status of such and
such a bill, where is it, can you gat us tha record on the.
UNCUSSIFIED
370
KAHE
3206
3207
3208
3209
32 10
321 1
32 12
32 1 3
32 m
32 1 5
32 16
32 17
32 18
32 19
3220
322 1
3222
3223
3224
3225
3226
3227
3228
3229
3230
HIR22'4000
UNCUSSIRED
PAGE 131
debate on such and-such sometimes months or years ago,
obviously we know how to do that. That is uhy the
separation of these particular things here. The only part
of this that I felt like must of course be very meticulously
adhered to m the sense ue must always have enough money to
cover It IS lobbying because the mix of the rest of it is
irrelevant if you are giving a total service but the
lobbying is the only one that is covered by law and it is
the only one that is covered by a statute or legislation
inside the House of Representativas .
So the only one you know we varied from month to
month is when I felt like that I could even possibly be
criticized for not having dona that money with lobbying
money .
2 Did you bill Mr. Channell on a monthly basis'
A Not on that. I don't bill anyone on an hourly
basis .
2 How did you communicate to him what account you
wished to ba paid from?
A Hall, tha only account I aver designated was
Santinal because the rest of it is irrelevant to me because
tha rest of it could hava coma from any one of the accounts.
I didn't raally cara as long as it was not lobbying because
everything alsa I did was straight consulting or things like
information retrieval and this type thing was the services
CNCUSX/Fe
371
KAHE :
3231
3232
3233
3234
3235
3236
3237
3238
3239
32140
32U1
32(42
32143
3214U
3245
32U6
3247
3248
3249
3250
3251
3252
3253
3254
3255
HIR2214000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 132
of an normal consulting firm. The only thing I felt like
that I was concerned about and legally bound to be
meticulous about was lobbying. For that reason, I separated
out lobbying money on any month that I had done anything
that could be construed with any definition of lobbying.
2 Mr. Kuykendall, in being meticulous in order to
avoid taking money from the wrong pot--
A Right.
2 --did you maintain records of this separation of
activities, lobbying and consulting?
A Remember, redundancy is okay. In other words, if I
collect too much money for lobbying, there is nothing wrong
with that. As long a I am under a lid for the entire
organization for the month. I knew any money I had been
this active or this active or this active, a little bit,
medium or a whole lot, and I simply used a matter of
judgment to be sure it was covered.
My normal billing, if I were working by the hour,
would probably be around ^00 to «125 an hour. I 3ust was
certain that anybody checking back on me would find that I
had collected enough money to cover my activities regardless
of what they were. So, no, I didn't keep books.
I was always redundant because I was on an agreed-
upon total and everything I billed had to be within that
total. So that was not important.
KNCUSSm
372
MAHE ■
3256
3257
3258
3259
3260
326 1
3262
3263
326U
3265
3266
3267
3268
3269
3270
3271
3272
3273
3274
3275
3276
3277
3278
3279
3280
HIR22'4000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 133
2 But you didn't bill on a monthly basis.
A Yes, I billed on a monthly basis.
2 You did bill on a monthly basis?
A Oh, yes . Yes .
2 Did you bill separate organizations, one time you
would bill Sentinel, another time you would bill National
Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty?
A Yes. No, no. I called the bookkeeper at the end
of every month.
2 Uho was the bookkeeper?
A Dan Conrad, and told him how I wanted the checks
issued .
2 Were the checks issued sometimes, would there be
two checks, one from Sentinel--
A Yes. Many times. It is all in there. I suppose
half the time I got two checks.
2 Well, if a check came from KEPL in 1986 that was
related to lobbying, how did you deal with that knowing that
they were a 501(c)(3)?
A I did not get any checks from NEPL relating to
lobbying in 1986. I was careful not to do that.
2 On July 23, 1986, there was a letter to Spitz
Channell, attention to Steven HcHann. a consulting fee for
July of 1986, and in the amount of »3800 and then there is a
note saying that charges for mailgrams will appear on the
uHCUSsro
373
NAHE
3281
3282
3283
32814
3285
3286
3287
3288
3289
3290
329 1
3292
3293
329(4
3295
3296
3297
3298
3299
3300
3301
3302
3303
33014
3305
HIR22M000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 134
August bill. What were the raailgraras that were referred to
in that letter?
A Those were invitations to a reception.
2 For?
A The celebration of the victory in June.
2 Wouldn't you consider that as related to lobbying'
A That was a rainbuzsement for expenses I didn't
get any money. That was not ray money. That was
instructions from Spitz Channall for me to ask if I would
send the mailgram and I sent them and billed hira for it.
And, by the nay, it was after the fact on a piece
of legislation anyway. The legislation was over with. So I
am giving you two separata answers here. I think either one
of them are adequate. In tha first place, you can't lobby
an issue that is already passed.
2 But you can be billed m arrears?
A No, no. This was for an event that took place well
after the vote .
2 ^o calabrata tha victory?
A Right.
2 You don't consider that part of the lobbying
effort?
A Ko, sir. That is my first answer.
Tha second answer that was a reimbursement for
money I had spent.
miAssra
NAME ■■
3306
3307
3308
3309
3310
331 1
3312
33 13
33 m
3315
3316
3317
3318
3319
3320
332 1
3322
3323
3324
3325
3326
3327
3328
3329
3330
HIR224000
liNCUSSIflEO
PAGE 135
2 When did you receive your first check from
Sentinel ?
A Around June 5th or something like that of 1986.
That IS a pretty good guess. It was June Sth, 1986.
2 The checks that you received from NEPL were not
related m any way to that lobbying effort? Is that your
testimony ?
A No .
2 Could I ask you other than the charges related to
the prosthesis matter that ue talked about earlier, you
received no other checks from I.e. Inc.?
A It would have had to be a correction of a
bookkeeping error or something like that which I am assuming
you are not covering. Never would I.C. have had any reason
to pay us any money and never did they pay us any money.
2 Our records indicate that in 1986 the Kuykendall
Company received S20,113 from NEPL. The Gulf and Caribbean
Foundation received «10.000 from NEPL.
A I told you that was a contribution.
2 That was a contribution?
A To Gulf and Caribbean from NEPL that was made in
1986 as a voluntary contribution.
2 What was the puipos« of it?
A Remember my going over with you, counsel, earlier,
that I had been asked to give them some services on
UNCLASSinED
375
Hknt HIR22'4000
ONcussra
PAGE 136
3331
3332
3333
333U
3335
3336
3337
3338
3339
33U0
3341
3342
3343
33U14
33U5
33U6
3347
3348
33U9
3350
3351
3352
3353
33514
3355
consulting on their story boards and everything uhich I did.
voluntary with no bill and no remuneration. Somewhat later,
I don't remember the dates that you have there, ue received
a phone call. We uish to compensate you for services for
what I had previously done. They said who do you want it to
go to .
B Who did you receive a phone call form?
A I think Dan Conrad. I am not certain, but that is
probably who it was. He said who, and I said make the check
out to Gulf and Caribbean.
2 There was no written solicitation of a
contribution?
A No , Sir .
8 Was thara an indication on the check that it uas a
contribution?
A I don't remember.
2 Your checks from Sentinel in 1986 were dated--this
is to Kuykendall, dated July 21, September the 10th and
December the 12th, 1986, in the amounts of »3500, »1803 and
»6000 respectively for a total of »1 1,303, according to our
records .
A From Sentinel.
Q rtoB Sentinel. Sentinel was the lobbying
organization; is that correct?
A Right. Correct.
UNtUSSW
376
KANE ■■
3356
3357
3358
3359
3360
336 1
3362
3363
33614
3365
3366
3367
3368
3369
3370
337 1
3372
3373
3374
3375
3376
3377
3378
3379
3380
PAGE 137
etueen July 21, 1986,
HIR22U000
2 What were -you lobbyinc
and December the 12th, 1986?
A I visited with various Members oi Congress to
discuss the SDI program. If someone had been uatchmg me or
listening to rae , they could have construed that as lobbying
because there was possible SDI legislation coming up.
2 Was there any SDI legislation pending during that
period?
A It never did come up. Some votes that would have
possibly taken fs^ce never took place. I don't remember
specifically what it was, but there was a continuing
resolution that there was going to be some SDI money in it.
It didn't ever happen.
2 Do you remember any particular Congressman you
talked to about SDI?
A Sure. But I was on the Hill and I was active.
This IS a matter of ray own conscious and my own sense of the
legal, and if I wished to be redundant on that, that is a
hell of a lot better than being deficient.
2 Did you register as a lobbyist for Sentinel at the
time that you received or prior to the time you received
payments ?
A Shortly after. I registered as lobbyist for
Sentinel. I believe, in January.
2 Of?
UNCLASSIFIED
377
NAME HIR22L1000
OiiASSIflED
3381
3382
3383
338U
3385
3386
3387
3388
3389
3390
339 1
3392
3393
339U
3395
3396
3397
3398
3399
3400
340 1
3402
3403
3404
3405
PAGE 138
I think It was the first quarter after, I
A Of 1987
am not sure
2 You first payment uas in July of 1986'
A I registered to register to lobby for thera a little
bit later .
2 And your second payment uas m September?
A Right.
2 Those uere both in the third quarter?
A Yes .
2 You did not register until the first quarter of the
following year?
A That is correct.
2 Did you register as a lobbyist for any of the
activities that you were involved m on the contra aid vote'
A Well, I was registered to lobby for the Kuykendall
Company, that is me . I was registered to lobby for the
Kuykendall Company on n-***9«r- Kational Security.
You will see Kuykendall Company has Dan Kuykendall
listed as a lobbyist and even if it is my own company, I
registered to lobby for that in other issues, too.
2 But you did not lobby for contra aid. You did not
register as representing any other organization, even at
this tiiia or individual or othar than the Kuykendall Company
during the period of time in 1986 that you were lobbying for
contra aid
UNCLASSIFIED
378
NAHE :
3406
3U07
3408
3409
34 10
34 1 1
3412
34 1 3
34 14
341S
34 16
34 17
34 18
34 19
3420
342 1
3422
3423
3424
3425
3426
3427
3428
3429
3430
HIR224000
ONCL/iSSIFlEO
PAGE 1 39
A I registered to lobby for the Gulf and Caribbean,
but as far as actual physical lobbying is concerned, in 1986
uould have been the only period that I could have been under
them because I drew no money from Gulf and Caribbean until
the first of June or July of 1985. That uas after the 1985
program uas over .
So I registered to lobby for Gulf and Caribbean
back m 1985.
I routinely register to lobby for all my clients,
whether I lobby or not. For instance, I represented the
"Jir^fi " T 1 1 n jir-mrTny I never went on the Hill, but I
registered for them.
2 You were registered to lobby for the Gulf and
Caribbean in 1985 and 1986?
A Right. fly partner those. That is the reason I
have to look at then.
e Isn't the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation a
501(c)(3)?
A Yes .
2 Aren't 501(cJ(3) organizations prohibited from
lobbying ?
A No, they are not.
2 Hhat were you lobbying for on behalf of the Gulf
and Caribbean Foundation?
A As far as I know, I did no legal lobbying for the
BNMSm
379
wume
NAHE: HIR22U000 ^'■^•Wvll ILIJ P*GE 140
3U3 1
31432
3433
Gulf And Caribbean Foundation. But I could have spent ten
percent of their total gross for lobbying under the
regulation .
m.m\m
380
NAHE
3143U
3U3S
3436
3437
3438
3439
3440
344 1
3442
3443
3444
3445
3446
3447
3448
3449
3450
3451
3452
3453
3454
3455
3456
3457
3458
UNCLASSinED
HIR224000 mill. I ilAAiririi PAGE 141
DCHN KOEHLER
2 But you didn't?
A I did not. But I could have.
2 You were registered as a lobbyist but didn't.
A Yes.
2 You were not registered to lobby for any of the
activities related to the contra aid vote in 1986?
A Yes, I uas for Gulf and Caribbean foundation and I
was registered to lobby--and I could have, but did not, but I
uas registered to lobby for the Kuykendall Company.
2 But the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation is a 501 C 3
and IS It your statement they axe permitted to lobby for
contra aid as a 50 1 C 3?
A Yes, sir. The ao-1
that out.
2 What IS the stated purpose in the charter of the
Gulf and Caribbean Foundation of that corporation?
A Education.
2 On what subject?
A Hatters of national security. I can't--I'ra not
certain .
2 Did you report any expenditures during that period
of time related to lobbying on behalf of the Gulf and
___ j_tj.£AX. hearings clearly spell
UNCUSSIRED
381
NAHE
3U59
3460
3U6 1
3U62
31463
3464
3U6S
3U66
3467
3U68
3U69
3U70
3U7 1
3472
3473
3474
3475
3476
3477
3478
3479
3480
3481
3482
3483
HIR224000
wmsim
PAGE 142
Caribbean Foundation?
A Ho. As far as I was concerned. I did nothing that
uould be considered as lobbying for the Gulf and Caribbean
Found a tion .
2 So ray question again is. then you did not report
any expenditures or register to lobby on behalf of contra
aid in 1986; is that correct?
A That's right for the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation.
I registered for the Kuykendall Company.
Q Was the Kuykendall Conpany reirabursed for lobbying
in 1986?
A No . I own the Kuykendall Company. I could have
3ust as well done it as a private citizen and not registered
at all.
2 Did you report any expenditures by the Kuykendall
Company on behalf of lobbying for contra aid?
A I would have to look at my records. I don't know.
I'm a sole owner of the company, so and it's not a
corporation. It's an individual ownership.
2 I would like to ask you, if I might, about the
differences in the amounts of these checks and why they
differed from time to time. The first check from NEPL to
the Kuykendall Company was for »5f000 and you have testified
that It was for general consulting for Spitz Channell; is
that correct.
UNCUSSIHED
382
NAHE ■■
3U8U
3485
3486
3U87
3U88
3489
3490
349 1
3492
3493
3494
3495
3496
3497
3498
3499
3500
3501
3502
3503
3504
3505
3506
3507
3508
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 143
A The first check?
£ In June of 1986.
A It was from Sentinel for *5i000. You are looking
at the bills, not the checks. That's the bill I told you I
changed entirely.
2 Originally you received a check from NEPL?
A I never received the check. I changed the entire
billing .
2 Your testimony is that that »5^000 check was from
Sentinel and not from NEPL and that was for lobbying?
A Right.
2 In June of 1986 you received that check. You uere
lobbying at that time on behalf of contra aid for Sentinel?
A I had previously-remember this was all retroactive
billing, okay? This was retroactive. I had previously done
some things that, depending on whose definition of lobbying
you use, and as you know, sir, there are several around,
that could have been construed as active lobbying. For that
reason, I asked that that check come from Sentinel.
2 Did it originally come from NEPL?
A No, it did not.
2 It originally came from Sentinel. That was one
A That is correct.
2 That was for lobbying for a period of covering what
check .
UNCLASSIFIED
383
NAHE :
3509
35 10
35 1 1
35 12
35 13
35 lU
3515
35 16
3517
35 18
3519
3520
3521
3522
3523
352U
3525
3526
3527
3528
3529
3530
3531
3S32
3533
HIR22UOO0
liNmsm
PAGE 1 HU
period of time? You said it was retroactive.
A Advice for consulting everyone and resource
information. That was what I put in the Gulf and Caribbean
thing .
2 I'm talking now about the »5)000 check.
A Right.
2 Wasn't that check to the Kuykendall Company or to
the Gulf and Caribbean?
A That check went to the Kuykendall Company from
Sentinel .
2 For lobbying.
A For lobbying.
2 On behalf of contra aid.
A Yes. That was all--
2 For what period of time was that, did that check
cover you lobbying activity?
A Ue had no contract. This was an offer from the
Channell organization to pay my company for services that I
had given them voluntarily of »SaOOO. They voluntarily
offered to give us that much money for services previously
rendered .
2 So previously rendered would go back to beginning
February 1986 period?
e
A Whatever, yes. So I thXn determined after having
changed my mind that I should get that check from Sentinel.
m&mm
384
HIRZa^OOO
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE IMS
NAHE :
353U 2 So this oheck covered lobbying for the first half
3535 of 1986?
3536 A Not formally, no.
3537 2 For what period of time?
3538 A There was no period.
3539 2 The check was received in June of 1986.
3SU0 A Right.
35U1 2 That was the second quarter.
35142 A Counsel let me make something clear here. I could
35'43 as easily have gotten no check at all. This was voluntary,
351414 all right? If I got a check at all from them, then I ceased
35145 to be voluntary and. for that reason, I got it from their
3546 lobbying company.
35U7 2 I understand. My question, what's confused me here
3548 He. Kuykendall--
35149 A I have no billing, I have no records, I have no
3550 books. I thought the most honest and stiaight-tf oiwar d way
355 1 to take it was to take it for lobbying instead of the
3552 possible charge that I might have done some lobbying and not
3553 gotten it--and have gotten it from the other organization.
35514 2 I understand that concern. My question is, if that
3555 was your concern at the time, why did you not register as a
3556 lobbyist on behalf of Sentinel until the following year?
3557 A It was an oversight. Ifr ■.iS~ an uwaLaiglik,
3558 2 And the same thing would apply to all the checks
MNtussra
385
NAME :
3559
3560
356 1
3562
3563
356U
3565
3566
3567
3568
3569
3570
3571
3572
3573
35714
3575
3576
3577
3578
3579
3580
3581
3582
3583
HIR22M00O
UNCLASSIHED
PAGE m6
froi» Sentinel in 1986. All the reimbursements.
A Right. But the checks that were received from
Sentinel do not m anyway say that that much time on a
billing basis was used iot lobbying.
[Recess ior lunch at 130 p.m.)
BY HR. OLIVER:
2 Ml. Kuykendall, we were talking earlier about the
money that you received ^rom Spitz Channell's entities m
1986 .
A Yes.
2 You had indicated earlier, and I :ust want to be
sure that I have this absolutely straight, you received a
check from KEPL for «10,000 in March of 1986?
A Gulf and Caribbean did.
S And you sent the check back in December of 1986
A Right. Right.
2 Why did you wait so long to do that?
A In the first place let me remind you, let .»c> give
you a little preface and answer your question. Remember I
had a choice where the check went in the first place. They
asked me, do you want it to go direct or do you want it to
go to Gulf and Caribbean. The 15th of December or
thereabouts, our attorney called us and said you are a few
dollars over on the allowable on major contributions on your
501 C 3 status, okay?
UNCLASSIFIED
386
NAHE ■
3S8U
3585
3586
3587
3588
3589
3590
3591
3592
3593
3594
3595
3596
3597
3598
3599
3600
3601
3602
3603
36014
3605
3606
3607
3608
HIR22>4000 IllWItl U \ ^lf>IL II PAGE 1<47
2 I'm not' clear about that.""Trs there a limit on--
A Yes. There's a formula uhich, by the uay, had
changed and we didn't know it.
MR. COSTON: You are not a lawyer, so you shouldn't
offer a legal opinion. There isn't a limit. There is a
difference between a private foundation and a public
foundation. It turns in part on how many tax contributors
you have and you should not disclose the advice of
counsel--and it wasn't me, by the way--but you can indicate
why the check was returned without getting into the detailed
advice of counsel.
THE WITNESS: All right. So I Simply returned the
check and got a--let me get the order of things. I returned
the check and af ter--inmediately they wrote checks to myself
and two of my employees for the same amount of money exactly
which we accepted as ordinary income and in turn, gave it
back to Gulf and Caribbean.
BY HR. OLIVER:
Q Where did the checks come from to your employees?
A MEPL.
fi So HEPL wrote checks to you and to--
A And to two other people totalling «10,000.
fi That was to Ric Marino.
A And Elizabeth Powell and Dan Kuykendall. We were
simply, in the spirit of the original intent of the
UNCUSSIFIEP .
387
UNCIASSIFIED
PAGE 1L|8
NAME- HIR22M000
3609 contribution, taking auay what would hava been a artificial
3610 major contribution to be sure that ue were under the
3611 percentage allowed, and it is not an official percentage.
3612 It's kind of an administrative percentage. This happened in
3613 the last five days of the year of ]ust adjusting that.
36114 2 Contribution m March from NEPL to Gulf and
36 15 Caribbean foundation was not related m anyway to the
3616 lobbying activities?
3617 A Ho, sir. Remember that was whan I told you they
3618 called us and said you have been a help to us and talking to
3619 us about all this media, and giving advice and so forth. Ue
3620 want to make a contribution. Do you want it to come to your
3621 company or do you want it to come to Gulf and Caribbean?
3622 I had no idea at all at that time that this other
3623 thing might have been a problem with the percentage of major
36211 contributors. If I had known that, I woul<^ have taken it in
3625 the first place and I didn't learn that until about late
3626 December that that was a mistake to have taken it.
3627 Q Did they believe or did they ever lead you to
3628 believe at any time that they thought it was related in some
3629 way to th« sacvices that you had rendered on behalf of
3630 contra aid?
3631 A Again counsel, let's all understand that oui only
3632 reason for being on the Hill, and their only reason for even
3633 existing at that moment, was contra aid, because that was
UNCIASSIFIED
388
NAME
363U
3635
3636
3637
3638
3639
36U0
3614 1
36M2
36143
36>4>4
36(tS
36146
3647
36148
3649
3650
3651
3652
3653
3654
3655
3656
3657
3658
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 149
the only issue before us. The question is not whether ue
were trying to push contra aid. The question is whether ue
were legally lobbying. Goodness sake, let's remember here
that the United States Hous^ of Representatives voted for
contra aid, ^ cast o^^Ml^ na^or ity of £hA vote for contra
aid. and we have to assume every one of them made an
intelligent decision based on his own information. •m^A.o go
talk to a person hadr^wtt or to go through grassroots and try
to tuist him, is my definition of lobbying.
But to--for your information that does not either
refer to a piece of legislation or a member of Congress or
tell him hou to vote, I don't consider that lobbying. So,
in the sense of what KEPL and I did together, we do not
consider it was lobbying before the *10,000. See this was
before any directed advertising had been done.
2 If I may, I would like to submit two documents and
have them marked as exhibits 9 and 10.
[Kuykendall Deposition Exhibits 9 and 10 marked for
identification. 1
BY HR. OLIVER:
e Th*s« exhibits are a bank statement from the Gulf
and Caribbean Foundation on Republic Bank, Dallas, Texas,
dated March 31st, 1986, and an accompanying letter, March
12th, 1986 to Dan Conrad from Dan Kuykandall related to a
«10.000 contribution to the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation.
UNCLASSIFIED
389
NAME
36S9
3660
366 1
3662
3663
36614
3665
3666
3667
3668
3669
3670
367 1
3672
3673
367U
3675
3676
3677
3678
3679
3680
3681
3682
3683
HIR22U000
nmssm
PUCE 150
The second exhibit is a check from the Gulf and Caribbean
Foundation dated 29th of December, 1986 for «10,000 and a
deposit m the Palmer National Bank is reflected on the
back .
I show you this letter, Mr. Kuykendall, and ask you
to look at it. I would like to read the notation on the
bottom of the page that says. ''This sura covers our advisory
and consultation contribution to the contra aid effort for
the remainder of 1986.'' My question to you is. what does
that notation reaan and is that in your handwriting?
A No, that's not my handwriting -aai^jthat's not ray
handwriting .
2 Do you know whose handwriting it is?
A I think it's Elizabeth Powell's. After the
contribution was nade to us. for their records Dan Conrad
asked roe to write this letter in the area of consulting,
research, and resource work, which is what I did. What it
very caraiully lixtiliBi j lus is it is not lobbying.
2 What was the contra aid effort in 1986 that was not
related to lobbying that you ware involved in?
A All of the HEPL institutional type advertising that
does not qualify as lobbying is where I lead thera. This is
all that w« got into up to this data. Tha lobbying ads were
run later .
2 In 1986 tha contra aid effort was pxinaxily
UNCLASSIFIED
390
NAHE :
368U
3685
3686
3687
3688
3689
3690
369 1
3692
3693
369U
3695
3696
3697
3698
3699
3700
370 1
3702
3703
370U
3705
3706
3707
3708
iiNCussm
A Counsel, I really wish you had read the testimony
: r o ra the poi
HIR22U000 Ulllll M.l.linr II PAGE 151
directed at the votes uhich took place in Congress, isn't
that correct?
from the po^^mi*^! hearings. I'm sincere about this.
2 I uill certainly go back and take a look at them
after this deposition.
A Please do. Because for something to be lobbying,
there has to be a direct appeal for a vote on a given piece
of legislation. There was no appeal for a vote on a given
piece of legislation on any of the NEPL advertising.
S This contribution was in narch of 1986.
A Right.
Q Prior to that time that any ads were run.
A They ware institutional ads that had been going on
for SIX months .
2 Related to contra aid?
A Yes
contra aid.
Q I understand that but I had thought that in our
earlier discussion that you had indicated that these meeting^
related to contra aid started in January or early February
oi 1986, and that your discussions with Richard riiller and
Goodman and Channall came in Match of 1986.
A Th« obsatvation and discussion of tha advertisement
that had been praviously run. thay btoka off somewhere
Aiding to contras may be duiibe i JlUd from
mmm
391
KANE
3709
3710
37 1 1
37 12
37 13
37 m
37 1 5
37 16
37 17
37 18
37 19
3720
372 1
3722
3723
372U
3725
3726
3727
3728
3729
3730
3731
3732
3733
HIR22U000
PAGE 152
around, I would say, the 15th of of March, thereabouts, and
started running directfuf advertising. In other words, they
broke off and went from NEPL to the Sentinel on actually who
paid for th« ads. This is clear in here that at that time
It broke off .
Raraeniber my telling you that m re tros pect--and
everything on here is done in retrospect-- that that's the
reason I asked for that Sentinel check was because there was
a point there that thay started running lobbying ads. And
even though all I did was advise there, it could have been
construed as lobbying on ray part, and I chose to construe it
as possibly lobbying on ray part, and that's the reason I
asked for the Sentinal check.
S Which you rec«ived in June of 1986?
A Right. Renember everything I did for thera was
previous, I mean, was billing after the fact. Even later,
that's tha way it operated. At this time there wasn't any
billing to it because thay volunteered m each case. But ray
pattern throughout with then was knowing after the fact
whether I did lobbying or not.
8 This letter is to be considered an invoice at your
raquast, tha text of at.
A Thay asked me for it, for their records.
2 But it is your testiaony that it is not related to
the contra aid lobbying effort in 1986?
iiNCUSsro
392
UNCLASSIFIED
HAKE HIR22'4000 Iflllll HllllIB 31 IfAGE 153
3734 A The »10,tlOO is not related to contra aid lobbying.
3735 The «5l000, yes. That's the reason I separated them.
3736 e I would like at this time if I may, Mr. Kuykendall.
3737 to ask you some questions about one of the great puzzles of
3738 our time and I would like to mark this as exhibit 11 and ask
3739 the reporter to mark it.
3740 [Kuykendall Deposition Exhibit 11 marked for
3741 idenif ication . ]
3742 BY HR. OLIVER:
3743 Q I would like to identify exhibit 1 1 as the chart
3744 with various boxes and designations that was found in Oliver
3745 Korth's safe by the Tower Comnission and published as part
3746 of the Tower Commission report.
3747 I would like you to look at that chart, Mr.
3748 Kuykendall, if you would.
3749 it You have a copy in front of you?
3750 -^' Yes.
3751 A Uould you just like to ask me questions about it?
3752 I know so little about the total chart I would remember, if
3753 possible, if you would simply question ne about the chart.
3754 fi Very well. Hr . Kuykendall, on the top line of that
3755 chart I which contains six boxes there is a fourth box from
3756 the left which indicates G and C Foundation. Is that Gulf
3757 and Caribbean Foundation.
3758 A I would assume it is, sir.
UNCLASSIHED
393
mmiB
KAHE HIR22U000 ---■—■■■■ iW */ 1 1 II Iff PAGE 15U
3759 2 And why would that be on Oliver North's chart'
3760 A First, you uould know it has no lines leading to or
376t from it in any way.
3762 MR. COSTON: Let me just interject something. I
3763 assume you do not want Mr. Kuykendall to speculate and you
3764 are asking hire for factual knowledge. The purpose of this
3765 inquiry is to gather facts, not to gather speculation. Is
3766 that a fair assumption?
3767 MR. OLIVER: That certainly is a fair assumption
3768 MR. COSTON: Your question is what does he knou
3769 about the chart and does he knou why it was prepared. I
3770 think that's a good place to start.
3771 MR. OLIVER: That was my quastion.
3772 BY MR. OLIVER:
3773 A I do not know about tha chart. I do not knou why
3774 It was prepared.
3775 2 May I ask you about some of tha other organizations
3776 on here. Going across from left to right, the first
3777 organization is MEPL.
3778 A Right.
3779 2 You are familiar with that organization.
3780 A Yes, sir, I an.
3781 2 Wara you familiar with any of tha activities that
3782 NEPL was engaged in other than those that ware directly
3783 related to tha Gulf and Caribbaan Foundation, tha Kuykendall
UNCLASSIFIED
394
NAME ■■
378U
378S
3786
3787
3788
3789
3790
379 1
3792
3793
3794
3795
3796
3797
3798
3799
3800
380 1
3802
3803
380<4
3805
3806
3807
3808
HIR2214000
DNCUSSIflffl
PAGE 155
Company, and to you personally?
A The answer first, sir, is no and at this time I
knew nothing about any of those organization^.
2 Did you know that NEPL was paying substantial
amounts of money to IBC, to Richard Miller and Frank Gomez?
A At a much later date. yes.
2 You did not know it at the time that IBC was on
retainer to your company?
A Oh, certainly not.
2 Richard Miller or Frank Gomez never told you of
their relationship with Spitz Channall?
A No, sir. I knew they had a relationship. I did
not know to what extent it was. I kneu that they had a
relationship but it was strictly a public relations
relationship working with Goodnan on advertising and things
like that. That's the only relationship I was aware of.
2 Were you aware of the next organization on that top
line, which is ACT, which I assume it the American
Conservative Trust. Here you familiar with then?
A At that time. no. I later found out it was a
2 Hhan did you find that out?
A When I got that book.
HK. COSTON: Uhich is when, about November of 80--
v'^
'^
THE WITNESS: This book, I got it in February of
1987 ,
UNCLASSinED
395
HIR22U000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 156
NAHE
3809 BY MR. OLIVER:
3810 . 2 This IS the book that was prepaied for you by Spitz
38 1 1 Channell ?
3812 A Right.
3813 2 --In early 1987?
381U A Right.
3815 2 The next box on there is the Institute for North
3816 South Issues, I assume. It looks like NC . Uere you
3817 familiar uith that organization?
3818 A No. sir.
3819 2 Did you knou that the principals in that
3820 organization uere Frank Gomez and Richard Miller?
3821 A I did not.
3822 2 Uhen did you learn that Frank Gomez and Richard
3823 Miller uere the principals m IC, Inc. in the Cayman
3824 Islands?
3825 A In probably January.
3826 2 Of?
3827 A 87.
3828 2 1987?
3829 A Yes.
3830 2 Had you not received checks from IC , Inc. in 1986
3831 related to the prosthesis matter that ue discussed earlier?
3832 A Sir, remember my telling you in the testimony that
3833 the first check I received did not have any mention of IC .
UNCLASSIFIED
396
KAME :
3834
3835
3836
3837
3838
3839
3840
384 1
3842
3843
3844
3845
3846
3847
3848
3849
3850
3851
3852
3853
3854
3855
3856
3857
3858
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 157
The second check 1 leceived was put m the bank by ray
sacretaiy and I never had even seen the accompanying letter
that went with it until January, and I uas not aware of who
IC uas until later in January.
2 With whom did you make arrangements for--
MR. COSTON: Could I also, the document, in fact,
that you are referring to says Intel in any event not IC .
THE WITNESS: You are right.
BY riR. OLIVER:
2 It was Intel Corp. later changed to IC or vice
versa. I think.
A That's right. Vice versa. You kept saying IC .
S Were you aware Frank Gomez and Richard Miller were
principals in Intel Corp.?
A No . I was not.
Q With whom did you make arrangements for those
payments ?
A Kith Dr. Gonzalez in niami.
fi And Dr. Gonzalez, you asked Dr. Gonzalez--
A To tall me how much money was going to be required
and when.
2 Hy question is how did you make arrangements to get
th« payments?
A I called Richard Hiller and told him how much money
I needed .
UNCLASSIFIED
397
UNCLASSIFIED
NAHE^ HIR2214000 " - PAGE 158
3859 e And what did he tell your?
3860 A Ha didn't tell rae anything In a feu days the
386 1 check would come in. Actually it uas only two. reraeraber
3862 One of then cane in a blank envelope The other one had an
3863 announcement with it from Intel which I didn't see until
386'4 probably February.
3865 2 Did you inquire of Richard Miller after these
3866 checks came in as to where or what their origin was?
3867 A No. I did not.
3868 2 Doesn't a 50 1 C 3 corporation have to report on its
3869 990 forms the source of its contributions?
3870 A That uas a pass -through . It uas a simple pass-
3871 through. We guaranteed a bill and simply passed the money
3872 right on through.
3873 2 Did you put the money into your bank account?
387U A Yes.
3875 2 And then a check uas uritten?
3876 A Right immediately. To keep from having any
3877 overhead cost added to it like long distance fee and
3878 everything; ua charged them a tuo percent fee for doing this
3879 for then and that's m the figures. So this uas a fee paid
3880 to do a ]ob, not a contribution^^ them.
3881 HR. COSTOM: You ought to clarify as uell too, you
3882 do not file the 990's nor are you a corporate officer and
3883 you don't knou hou G and C handled that.
miAssiFe
398
NAME :
388U
3885
3886
3887
3888
3889
3890
389 1
3892
3893
3894
3895
3896
3897
3898
3899
3900
390 1
3902
3903
3904
3905
3906
3907
3908
HIR224000
yNCUSSIFIED
THE UlfNESS^ That's right.
PAGE 159
BY HR. OLIVER:
2 Did the corporate officers ever ask you what source
this money was that went into the bank account?
A No. I called the corporate officers before I ever
did It and told them, said I have investigated, found
out--one thing I uanted to know if it was clean money
Remember this happened at the time that the contras were
being accused of dope running and things like that and that
uas my only question, is this clean iioney.
2 And that uas your question to Richard Miller?
A Yes.
2 And did ha tell you it uas clean money?
A Yes. That's all I uanted to knou .
2 Did ha tell you uhere it came from?
A No. I didn't ask hira. As long as the money uas
clean, counsel, and tha cause uas uhat I kneu it to be,
there uasn't any question about what the causa uas--there
uasn't any uay I could see anything urong uith it.
2 Did you aver lecaiva any other checks from any
offshore bank accounts or ftoii any entities outside the
Unitad Statas?
A Ho, sir. Wall, not unless you consider tha
travelers checks.
2 Tha travalais checks which you got from Oliver
wim\m
399
NAME ■
3909
39 10
39 1 1
39 12
39 1 3
39 lU
39 15
39 16
39 17
39 18
39 19
3920
392 1
3922
3923
3924
3925
3926
3927
3928
3929
3930
3931
3932
3933
HIR22UO0O
North'
IINCUSSIFIEO
PAGE 160
A Yes.
2 Did you ever get any other travelers checks from
Adolf o Calero ?
A No .
2 Are you aware of anyone else getting any traveler
checks frora Adolfo Calaro?
A Everything I lf>-'rned about Adolfo Calero I learned
probably about the sane time you did on the source of those
checks. I never had anything to do uith Calaro.
2 You never knew Calato had a lot of travelers checks
he uas passing around to various and sundry people?
A No.
2 Old you ever discuss uith Adolfo Calaro where they
were getting their funds?
A No, sir. When I first met Adolfo Calaro there were
no funds coming froa the United States Government so every
dollars ha was getting was coming from soma private source
somewhaza .
2 Uhan was tha first time you mat him?
A In tha summer of 19814.
2 Ware you sort of rasponsibla as part of this
coalition that you ware involved in m setting up
appointments for Adolfo Calaro on Capitol Hill?
A Yes.
UNClASSm
400
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR22>4000 UllULnWH ■ k tirr pAGE 161
3934 2 Did you 'accompany him to many of those meetings?
3935 A To the door.
3936 2 But you never sat in on any of the meetings?
3937 A To some group meetings I have sat in on. I never
3938 sat in on individual meetings. Uell, a feu of them I did.
3939 Congressman de la Garza, I en:)oyed hearing them talking
3940 Spanish to each other. But there were very feu. But my
39U1 practice was to escort them and let the Congressmen do all
3942 the interviewing with the principal involved, particuJarly
3943 one of the leaders. I have nothing to add to that.
39U14 2 Uas Adolfo Calero, in the times you were with him
39U5 and in the meetings m which you were with him. uas he
39U6 indicating to groups and to individuals the dire need of
39'47 financial assistance by the contras?
39U8 A --yes, certainly. That was his purpose for being
39U9 here.
3950 2 Was raising funds?
3951 A Uell, no. Ue are talking about he was trying to
3952 get the «27 million and then the hundred million. I have
3953 never been with Adolfo Calero or Spitz Channell or anyone
39SU els* raising private money for these sources.
3955 2 Did Adolfo Calero indicate m any of those meetings
3956 or to you, the source of the funds that ware keeping them
3957 alive at that point?
3958 A Not specifically, no.
UNCLASSIFIED
401
NAUE
3959
3960
396 I
3962
3963
396U
3965
3966
3967
3968
3969
3970
397 1
3972
3973
397U
3975
3976
3977
3978
3979
3980
3981
3982
3983
HIR22U000
UNCIASSIHED
PAGE 162
2 Did he indicata that they were getting some funds
at that point?
A Sir, that uas so obvious. They didn't have to
indicate it .
2 You never asked and he never volunteered.
A I'm thinking about it. You used the word never
now. That's a pretty conclusive word.
2 Do you recall ?
A I can assure you I never asked. I have no
recollection of his every volunteering. I can't swear to
It. I have no recollection. On ny side I will say never.
On his side, I can't be sure.
2 Did Oliver North ever indicate to you he knew where
the funds for the contras were coming from during that
period of time in 1985 and 1986?
A No, sir.
2 Did Oliver North ever tell you the air resupply
operation m Central America?
A Mo, sir.
2 Did he aver mention to you Albert Hakim?
A No, sir.
2 Richard Secord?
A No, sir.
2 You never met any of those individuals?
A No, sir.
UNCLASSIFIED
402
NAME -
3984
3985
3986
3987
3988
3989
3990
399 1
3992
3993
399U
3995
3996
3997
3998
3999
4000
400 1
4002
4003
4004
4005
4006
4007
4008
HNMSSiro
HIR224000 iJl^ MIUB IW^' • " PAGE 163
2 You first learned of thera after this story broke'
A Same time you did.
2 Same time the rest of us did. Going back to the
chart for a minute, next to the Gulf and Caribbean
Foundation is something called IDEA. Do you know what that
IS'
A Mo .
2 Did you aver heat Oliver North mention it?
A No.
2 Next to that is a box which says Intel Youth Cora.
Do you have any idea what that is?
A No .
2 Next to that is the Institute for probably
Democracies. Do you have any idea what that is?
A No .
2 On the next line, of course, you are familiar with
IBC. They were on retainer to you from early 1985 to--
A Mo. They ware on retainer to ma from late summer
or early fall of 1983 to mid 1985.
2 To mid-1985. Why did you ceasa to retain them in
mid-1985?
A ftostly because wa tan out of money. Ua just, out
rasourcas uara--wa were always vaty narrow, with out
commissions to what to do.
HR. COSTOM: Perhaps you could identify we.
UNCLASSIFIED
403
mimm
NAME HIR22'4000 ' ■ • ■»■ ^# ■ 1 ■ |Li £/ page 16U
4009 THE WITNESS- The Gulf and Caribbean, ue . the
UOIO group. We never raised money for the sake of staying in
4011 business. We raised money for a project that fit our
4012 declared intent or we didn't raise money at all.
4013 BY HR. OLIVER:
401U 2 How did you inform Richard Hiller and Frank Gomez
U015 that you could no longer afford their services'
M016 A It wasn't in the writing, I don't think. Oy
U017 recollection is I just told him this would be the last
4018 check.
•4019 2 Was that--
U020 A That's my recollection.
402 1 2 Did they tell you at that time that they were
4022 getting substantial funds from other sources?
4023 A I knew they had the State Department contract The
4024 size of it, I did not know. I knew they had other business.
4025 I knew they were prospering but I know none of the details.
4026 2 How did you know they were prospering?
4027 A Because of their living quarters, because of their
4028 activities, the obvious trappings of a prosperous business.
4029 2 Did you spend time over at their offices?
4030 A Very little. Haybe two hours a month.
4031 2 In going on across this chart, we discussed IC ,
4032 Inc. or Intel Cooperation and you did not learn what that
4033 was until much later, until after this story broke, is that
UNCUSSIFIED
404
HAHE: HIRZaUOOO
UOay correct?
*«s;fe
PAGE 165
U035
M036
14037
14038
14039
UOUO
UOMI
140142
U0143
1404 4
4045
4046
4047
4048
4049
4050
405 1
4052
4053
4054
4055
4056
4057
4058
A That's correct.
2 And then there is an ICSA . Did you learn that
there were two IC • s ?
A No .
2 And below that are Lake Resources . Did you know of
the existence of Lake Resources?
A I did not .
2 Or any of the other--
A You mean below that?
2 Yes.
A Right, I do know about FDM and UNO but nothing
below IC or any of that lower right-hand corner had I aver
heard of at the tine or even until I read it at the same
time this came out.
2 Have you ever discussed this chart with Oliver
North?
A No.
8 Hav« you ever discussed this chart with Spitz
Channell ?
A Yes.
Q And what was that discussion about? What did Spitz
Channell tall you about this chart?
A Ha didn't know anything mora about the chart than I
did.
iiNcussm
405
NAHE -
4059
U060
406 1
4062
4063
406<4
I406S
14066
U067
(4068
14069
14070
1407 1
4072
4073
4074
4075
4076
4077
4078
4079
4080
4081
4082
4083
HIR224000 ^1 MlJl Mm^.\tt»IL.Ii PAGE 166
2 He knew that he was on^f^n a couple of places
A He probably learned that the same time I did
C Did he indicate he kneu what some of these other
boxes uere?
A No. He never did.
2 He didn't indicate that ha kneu about Lake
Resources ?
A He did not.
2 Have you ever discussad this chart with anyone else
who indicated to you that thay kneu what these other boxes
stood for?
A No , sir .
2 Thank you very auch. Hr . Kuykandall, you
registered as your clients in 1987 and I'll just list them
as a matter of public record. Alpha Environmental, Inc ,
Alpha 21 Corporation, First Construction Fund, Guards Mark,
Inc., Gulf and Caribbean Foundation, National Endowment for
the Preservation of Liberty, and the Ehvip^' Corporation.
Other than the Gulf and Caribbean Corporation and the
National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, were any
of those clients involved in any way in Central America or
aid to the contras?
A All tight. You used that term any way. The
president of Alpha 21 Corporation is Hr . William Blakemore.
He is not involved business-^wisa in any way at all in
ONCIASSIFIED
406
NAME :
U08U
4085
4086
4087
4088
4089
4090
409 1
4092
4093
4094
4095
4096
4097
4098
4099
4 100
4101
4 102
4103
moM
410S
4106
4107
4108
HIR224000
wussm
PAGE 167
Central America or Mexico. He was the interested party, he
and two or three other unrelated people asked us to look
into creating Gulf and Caribbean.
C For the record I an looking at a publication
called, '"1987 Washington Representatives'' published by
Columbia Books, Inc. This is a 1987 edition. Other than
Mr. Blakemore, who is the same Mr. Blakemore who is involved
with the Guli and Caribbean Foundation, did any o± these
other corporations or officers of these corporations have
any relationship whatsoever to Nicaragua or aid to the
contras ?
A No. Counsel advises na there's a very indirect
connection that the president and CEO of Alpha Environmental
was Ambassador-at-Larga , Director of Refugee Affairs for
President Reagan before ha went to Austin and headed up that
company .
e Uho was that?
A Ambassador Eugene Douglas. You have probably met
him .
2 But ha was not involved in any of the activities
that you waza involved in that related to the Central
Amarlcan freedom project or tha lobbying effort?
A That's right. Alpha Environmental is an Austin
company and ha left tha government and heads that up.
S What services did you perform for tha National
tJNClASSIFIED
407
KAHE
14 109
14 no
M 11 1
14 n 2
4113
14 1 m
4 115
4 116
"4 117
U 1 18
4 119
4 120
4 12 1
4 122
4 123
4 124
4 125
4 126
4 127
4128
4 129
4 130
4 13 1
4 132
4 133
HIR224000
UNCUSSIFIfD
PAGE 168
Endowment for the Preservation of Liverty in 1987'
A ny 1987 services to the group of organizations,
probably 75 percent of it, is advice and consulting and
planning with Spitz Channell himself.
2 What kind of planning was he doing in 1987?
A Mr. Oliver, if you knew Spitz Channell, he has a
new plan every week and there wete--until later in the year
when the conclusive things happened to him, he cc itmued to
make plans for projects for the Constitutional celebration,
for a freedom torch in Berlin, for several other ma:or
projects. Ha had planned a group of lectures on summitry
that were all m the planning stage when the end came for
him . '<'
2 The book that he prepared for you at your request
related to where all the money had come from for his
activities. I believe this was a reaction by you to the
local Sun article, is that correct?
A That's correct.
2 You went to him in December of 1986?
A Th«raabouts .
2 Hhat did you say to him? Did you call him on the
phona or did you go meat with him?
A I don't remember because I hava done both. I
simply said I need for my own information, and I need to be
able to say whan anyone asks ma where your money came from.
wmsw
408
HiRzauooo
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 169
NAME
4134 This charge has bee,n made. I'm your representative and li
4135 I'll going to be your representative, I must have an answer.
4136 2 Were you his representative at that time?
4137 A Yes. Remember I uas on retainer, consulting
4138 retainer with him in--
4 139 2 December .
4140 A I went to $3,500 a month. That personal retainer
4141 on, I think, July 1st, thereabouts. Remember it was $3(500
4142 and then--
4143 2 He paid you 43^500 a month from July 1st through
4144 December?
4145 A Up to December. I believe.
4146 2 On a regular basis?
4147 A Right.
4148 2 Then it uas changed to «12,000 a month.
4149 A Correct.
4150 2 This was after Oliver North had resigned from the
4151 Uhite House, is that correct?
4152 A Correct.
4 153 2 Were you concerned at that time after Oliver North
4154 had resigned from the Uhite House that you might become
4155 embroiled somehow in this contretemps? Here you concerned
4 156 at that time?
4157 A Ho. Hot after I received the information that I
4 158 asked for. I was concerned enough to ask for that
iNcussm
409
MAOE
M 159
U 160
4 16 1
m62
4163
4 164
U165
U 166
4 167
4 168
4 169
4 170
4 17 1
4172
4 173
4174
4175
4 176
4177
4 178
4179
4 180
4181
4182
4183
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIEO
PAGE 170
information and receive it A direct charge had been made
about funds that came to him either illegally or irregularly
and that uas the reason for asking for the receipts, the
bookj.
2 Hou long did it take hire to prepare that book from
the time that you asked for it and the time you received it?
A Well, remember that was over Christraar^. I would
say SIX weeks .
2 Did you participate in any way in the preparation
of the book?
A No .
2 Were you aware that IBC was participating in the
preparation of that book?
MR. COSTOH: Are we referring to the same book, the
binder we brought with us today?
HR. OLIVER-- Yes.
A To the extent that they participated in that book.
yes. I was famliar with the fact that they contributed to
that book. I was not familiar with how much or when or how
because I remember asking Richard Killer Where's the book,
because I need it. I want it.
2 He knew that you had asked Spitz Channell for this
book?
A Yes. That's the reason the question that you asked
was a little more appropriate, I think, that you thought.
UNCLASSIFIEO
410
NAHE ■■
4 184
4185
4 186
4 187
4 188
4 189
4 190
4 19 1
4 192
4 193
4 194
4195
4 196
4 197
4 198
4 199
4200
420 1
4202
4203
4204
4205
4206
4207
4208
lihi
V AOf^jr:?"
HIR224000 ^r ■ » ^rB»» i^r *r ■■ aMaa^ PAGE 171
Yes, he knew I had asked for the book and I would imagine I
know he participated in putting it together.
2 Uere you aware IBC was retained or was paid in
early 19*7 to help Spitz Channell reconstruct the flow of
money that had gone from his organization to IBC?
A Yes.
2 How did you learn that?
A When he called me and asked roe for the books on the
prothesis file. That's when I first learned about it.
2 Did he ask you for any other documentation?
A No, just that one. That's the first time I knew it
was Spitz Channell's money, the prothesis file.
2 Did you participate in any meetings with Richard
Pliller or Spitz Channell in January or February of 1987 that
were related to the compilation or reconstruction of the
records of IBC, NEPL, Sentinel, and your companies?
A Counsel, may i make a fairly broad and absolute
statement?
2 Please .
A Never from that day forward until I have seen that
hook, have I participated in any event or any discussion or
any participation with anything that had to do with any
legal matter with either IBC or any of the Channell
organizations. I have not discussed, }.n advice of their
counsel. In advice on my own.
ONCUSSIflEO
411
NAME
U2 09
142 10
"42 1 1
42 1 2
42 1 3
^^ lu
142 1 5
142 16
42 17
142 18
42 19
•4220
1422 1
■4222
14223
U2214
U225
14226
U227
U228
14229
14230
4231
•4232
•4233
HIR22U000
vnmm ■■
GE 172
2 Hy question wasn't related to a legal matter. It
was a natter of pulling together the records and the
documentation
A In all of j^js massive numbers that caree out
concerning IBC, all of these other organizations, were
absolute news to me. I was as shocked when I saw that book
and the invoices of those contributions and the amounts of
them as you probably were the first time you saw it. I had
know idea of the total amounts or the individual invoices
that anyone had given to Spitz Channall because I took no
part, none, in any fundjraising ever done by Spitz Channell.
2 In 1987 through May or until some time in May, you
were retained by Spitz Channell for a fee of «12,000 a month,
according to the contract that was renegotiated or changed
in December of 1986?
A That's right.
2 And you indicated that you had talked to hin about
some of the ideas that ha had. Did you discuss with him the
investigations that were undeijway in the Congress of the
Iran contra affair?
A Only as it limited my ability to function up here
because I simply, I did not get on the subject. If it
affected him, if it had anything to do with him. In respect
to a member of Congress, I simply would not discuss it on
the Hill.
WUSSW
412
NAME ■■
U23U
U23S
4236
4237
14238
"4239
U2U0
U2U 1
4242
4243
4244
4245
4246
4247
4248
4249
4250
4251
4252
4253
4254
4255
4256
4257
4258
HIR224000
Kussm
PAGE 173
2 Hy question was did you discuss it uith hira?
A No.
2 So you were being retained--
A He discussed other projects. Ue never discussed
the subject of this investigation or the cases as far as he
and his organization and Miller and his organization were
involved, or any relationship with Ollie North.
2 You didn't discuss that, any of those subjects, the
subjects of these investigations or the activities of these
investigations ?
A Roughly from the time I got the first subpoena, and
you know about when that was. until this day.
2 Prior to the time you got the first subpoena did
you discuss these investigations with Spitz Channell or
Richard Miller or Frank Gomez?
A Other than say how are you doing or when are you
going to get this thing over with, or when are you going to
get the special prosecutor to give you a clean bill of
health, and that type of things, which I asked him
constantly, but never substantively. I kept constantly, I
said when axe you going to get through with this? When are
you going to get back in business? When are we going to get
soae things going here or when are you going to get a clean
bill of health from the prosecutor?
2 You had not been called prior to the time you got a
I
I
UNCLASSIFIED
413
UNClftSSIFlEO ,.
HXnE- HIR224000 ^^■^^••■•w — - p^^^. ^^^
4259
U260
U26 1
<4262
4263
4264
subpoena from this coraraittee'
A Right. This was the very first. The Senate
subpoena .
e That was in February or March of 1987?
NR. COSTON: It was dated March.
THE WITNESS- March.
BNCUSSIFIED
414
NAME
1(265
•4266
4267
14268
14269
4270
427 1
4272
4273
4274
4275
4276
4277
4278
4279
4280
4281
4282
4283
4284
4285
4286
4287
4288
4289
HIR224000
UNCUSSIHED
PAGE 175
RPTS MCGINN
DCMN SPRADLING
BY MR OLIVER:
e Have you discussed this investigation and hou it
relates to you or to Spitz Channell or Rich Miller or IBC or
NEPL with any of the members of this committee or their
staffs other than the individuals who participated m this
deposition and in the interviews with the Senate?
A Since I got my subpoena?
S No. Since the exhibits were named.
A Uould you read the question.
S I'll repeat the question and try to rephrase it to
make it a little mora clear.
A Remember, I still function on Capitol Hill.
2 I understand that. My question was, and I will
maybe break it into several parts. Have you discussed this
matter with any of the members of this committee since the
time they were named, the individuals were named to this
committee or just prior to the tim« they were named to this
committee up until the time you received the first subpoena?
committee By this matter, what you do mean?
MR. COSTON: By this matter, what do you mean?
BY HR. OLIVER:
2 I mean the investigation that this committee is
conducting .
UNCLASSIHED
415
NAHE ■■
4290
"429 1
4292
U293
42914
4295
4296
4297
4298
4299
4300
430 1
4302
4303
4304
4305
4306
4307
4308
4309
4310
431 1
4312
43 13
4314
HIR224000
ONCUSSiFIED
PAGE 176
A To ny recollection, no. I have personally called
on one member of the committee on another matter formally.
Over on the floor, (cloakroom and so forth I have seen
probably half of them. But not to discuss or say how are
you doing or hou long is this thing going to last, stuff
Ilka that. Substantively, no. I had a discussion- -and you
remember this--uith Timothy Woodcock when that leak happened
Mtat" I know ha blew his stack about whan ray subpoena ended
up in tha hands of the reporter the next day, and M ualked
in and put it on ray desk. Renenber when that happened or
raaybe you don't. It was a hall of a shock when I walked in
and had my own subpoena laid in front of me by a reporter.
I called Timothy Woodcock and told hin about it and he blew
his stack and then told Iinwy ^and I^wy blew his stack and
that is when ha made his pronouncement. So if that counts
as a discussion with a member of the committee, yes. that is
the only actual substantive discussion.
Than rauch later, just recently. I had a very bad
article for na run in the Hiani Herald and the Hew Orleans
paper, which was written by a ni jht """l t^'" reporter. It was
a total fabrication and we iilHII h1mi -rnliri tha Bureau
chiaf, askad him to have the rapoitar meat with us and I met
with counsal and thay issued a totally new article and
also, that raportai laid that document that you have been
using on tha front of my desk and said ha got it directly
UNCLASSIFIED
416
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME ■
4315
U316
4317
43 18
43 19
4320
432 1
4322
4323
4324
4325
4326
4327
4328
4329
4330
433 1
4332
4333
4334
4335
4336
4337
4338
4339
HIR224000
PAGE 177
from a member of the congressional staff and this leak is
supposed to come from that.
I reported that to Tim Woodcock.
2 Uhen did this article appear?
A About five uaeks ago.
2 Which document were you talking about?
A The one you had--
2 The time line?
A The log of Ollie North.
2 The time line document?
A Yes.
That IS the reason I said yes. I know about this
document. I said I wish I hadn't seen it but the Hiami
Herald, the reporter said even the parson that gave it to
him admitted it was a false story.
2 Did you ever--did Spitz Channell ever ask you to
give him advice about how to deal with this congressional
investigation while you ware on retainer to him in 1987 or
in lata 1986?
A Ha askad na to discuss with him the personalities
and the attitudes of the different neabers of Congress that
Z knew. I responded to hin verbally and at lunch one day
about tha different people that I knew wall and how I
thought they ware likely to conduct themselves.
2 Members of tha comnittaa?
UNCUSSIHED
417
'''^'CM^SIF'ff;
HAME HIR2211000 ■.' J'* ' j • ] i . ' '• '- pftGE 178
U340 A Herabets of the coraraittee.
14341 Q On the House side you mean.
4342 A On the House side, yes. Ue are talking here about
43143 manner, not content, who is a hard driver, who isn't and so
4344 forth. Ilka that.
4345 e When did this conversation take place, this lunch
4346 that you mentioned'
4347 A I don't even know that it was a lunch. I said it
4348 could have been a lunch. Oh, probably three months ago.
4349 When the Senate committee was first formed.
4350 2 The House committee you mean.
4351 A They were both named the same time, weren't they'
4352 2 They were both named m December, I think of 1986.
4353 2 It was that far back--whenever that was, was when
4354 the committee was first formed.
4355 2 Since that time you haven't had any discussions
4356 with hira about the conduct of this investigation?
4357 A Oh, no. His lawyers wouldn't let him discuss it
4358 with ma.
4339 2 I would like to go back to something else. I would
4360 like to hava this marked as Exhibit No. 12. That is a
436 1 maBOzandua xzon Spitz Channall to Dan Kuykendall dated March
4362 26, 1986 and I would like for you to look at that document,
4363 nr . Kuykandall, and tall ma what the purpose of it was and
4364 what It indicatas.
ICUSSiFIED
418
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR2 24000 PAGE 179
'*365 (Exhibit' No. 12 was marked for identification . 1
U366 THE WITNESS: My recollection here is that Channell
U367 uas probably I think considering trying to get a working
U368 relationship with roe and needed to know something about my
•4369 contacts and so forth.
U370 BY MR. OLIVER:
U371 2 You had already received at that time a $10,000
4372 contribution.
4373 A That is correct, a contribution.
4374 B So he probably kneu--
4375 A He never considered retaining me at all. He knew
4376 practically nothing about uhat I do other than sit there and
4377 tell hira how he ought to run his TV commercials, his content
4378 of then. So he really knau very little about ray overall
4379 function here and he knew very little about who I knew and
4380 who I knew well and uho I didn't knou uell.
4381 2 Had ha not been participating with you from time to
4382 time in the neetings of the larger group which took place in
4383 Rich rtillax's office?
4384 A Sea. Spitz Channell knau absolutely nothing about
4385 Capitol Hill. Ha didn't even relate to it. Even in the
4386 maatings uhara--I only have a recollection of one or possibly
4387 two such maatings hara that ha attended. This type work uas
4388 simply not his thing as far as Channall himself was
4389 concerned. Ha saw in me the possibility of making contact
'-A mm
419
UNCLASSIFIED
NAHE HIR22M000 IIIVIII nilllll II IJ PAGE 180
4390 uith a totally nevi dimension for his whole company and his
4391 group of companies. It is ray recollection that he asked me
4392 for an outline of the type performance that ue were capable
4393 of doing and this was a summary of it.
4394 Now, on tha last page here--all right. Roughly,
4395 right here is what you had seen that you asked me about
4396 earlier. I said the year was wrong.
4397 2 Yes.
4398 A See it?
4399 2 I don't have that document in front of me. I think
4400 counsel has a copy of it.
4401 A Right here is what you are referring to. Now does
4402 that ring your bell about what you asked rae ?
4403 2 Well, I an not sure that is the same meeting but
4404 this IS a maeting--
4405 A I said I could not recall one m '85. It must have
4406 been in '86. Okay. X will explain this.
4407 2 Hall, in looking at this document Item 1 indicates
4408 that you made three different initiatives, personal escort
4409 and scheduling for Adorliho Caleio and to a lesser extent
44 10 Alphonso Rob«lo and others, reorganize guidance and
44 11 monitoring of volunteer group and personal lobbying and
4412 congressional coordination by you.
4413 A Right.
4414 2 That IS all correct
420
NAME ■■
44 1 5
44 16
44 17
44 18
44 19
4420
442 1
4422
4423
4424
4425
4426
4427
4428
4429
4430
443 1
4432
4433
4434
4435
4436
4437
4438
4439
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIEO
PAGE 181
A Right. ,
2 Then tha next thing on number 2 is the scheduling
of AdolKho Calero with the Republican Policy Committee, the
Republican Study Committee, the East Coast group.
Congressman Jim Courtar's office, uith four Members, and the
leadership group of Congressman Bob Livingston's office uith
r /
four Members. I assume this indicates that you had Adol^o
Calero meet with each of these groups.
A Ho, I said scheduling. I don't remember which of
the four cases I uas tha initiative or they were the
initiative. It could have been 100 percent either uay. I
simply do not remember but I do remember that I uas tha
person that asked for Adolimo Calero's schedule and probably
escorted him personally to each of tha meetings.
2 Well, tha top line said that this uas the
performance of Kuykendall et al for contra aid vote in the
U.S. House of Representatives so I assume you were taking
some credit for Adol^o Calaro naating with these groups.
A Hall, I don't see that I deserve any less or any
more credit if a Congressman thinks enough of me to ask my
halp or I offer my help. I know you uouldn't uant to judge
which would be mora impressive. So there is probably some
of both Kara. Tha events took place and I uas responsible
for escorting Hx . Calaro there.
2 This nanorandum is from you to Spitz.
UNwssife
421
IINCUSSiflfO
NAME HIRaaUOOO •'*^'*^tt Ig^tJ PkGZ 182
UUUO A Right.
MUUl 2 Were you trying to establish a working relationship
u^^2 with spitz?
MMMS A I wasn't sure yet.
^'^UU 2 Why did you write this raeraor andun ?
^^^S . A He asked tie to :ust in case You know, you build
U4M6 up a relationship that has to be mutual
4'4'47 2 Do you mean three indicates under the heading of
UUUa contra aid volunteer group Point A, that you met together
MMUg for kickoff and briefing by Pat Buchanan, Ollie North,
UUSO Congressman Trent Lott, Congressman Dick Cheney, Aldo^aho
UMSl Calero, Alphonso Robelo and Enrique Bermudez and then under
4452 that one, parenthesis, 18 of the top business lobbyists
•4453 attended the meeting. Where did this meeting take place'
MUSU A Capitol Hill Club.
MMSS . Q And it was the kickoff of what, the effort for
UU56 contra aid?
4M57 . A No, no, no. I will give you the very quick version
UM58 of this.
U'459 Hh*n I bacana deeply involved in the 1986 phase of
4460 this issua> and I had bean heavily involved in all kinds of
UUbl business lobbying all these years, and in looking at who was
U>462 lagistaiad to lobby on this issue on tha pro-contra side in
i4<463 Washington, none of what I considered the best lobbyists in
>4<46>4 town were even on this issue, none of them. And all of
UNCLASSIFIED
422
NAME :
4465
4466
4467
4468
4469
4470
447 1
4472
4473
4474
447S
4476
4477
4478
4479
4480
448 1
4482
4483
4484
4485
4486
4487
4488
4489
HIR224000
ONCUSSIFIED
PAGE 183
these people. I had worked with in coalitions on the budget,
on the tax bills, on the labor law. on a whole bunch of
other things. I had worked with all these top lobbyists.
So I knew that the Office of Public Liaison at the
White House had an absolute failed policy in trying to
recruit business help on this kind of issue. They had tried
to recruit business help, corporations, through the Office
of Public Liaison, which is their :ob. and businesses,
corporations, just simply would not do it.
All right. I knew from ray own personal axperience
that a lot of the bast lobbyists m town were very much
interested in this issue. So I conceived of the idea, and
It took us siK weeks to get it cleared by White House
counsel, to get a volunteer group on their own time and
their own initiative, of business lobbyists to volunteer to
work on this issue on their own time. This is what this
was .
Kow, I first asked i£ the White House could ask
them. They said no. I asked could we have a meeting at the
White House. No. Than I said wall, if thay go ahead and
volunteer can Pat Buchanan coma and thank them? They said
yas . So that is what that was .
Q But it says that it is a kickoff and briefing.
A All right. The famous Ollie North briefing is what
this was
UNCUSSIFiED
423
NAHE :
4490
4149 1
UM92
4493
4494
4495
4496
4497
4498
4499
4500
450 1
4502
4503
4504
4505
4506
4507
4508
4509
45 10
45 11
4512
45 13
4514
HIR224000
2
A
Q
aid .
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 184
What was the kickoff?
This was the first time they had met together.
So this was the kickoff of their efforts for contra
A Right.
2 And did you arrange for Pat Buchanan, Ollie North,
Trent Lott, Dick Chenay and Calero, Robelo and Bermudez to
be there and to speak?
A Yes. They all did. Robelo, Calero and Berraudez
were surprise guests. Ue didn't even know they were in town
but we were able to get then at the last minute.
2 And this raaeting took place in February of 1986?
A Ho. It was probably later than that. It was
probably not until Hay, April-May.
2 This nemorandun is dated March 26.
A Then it was earlier than that. Must have happened
on that first vote.
I an really hung on this date. I am surprised it
was as early as this but anyway, this was the kickoff of the
effort on both votes I guass.
2 Hall, you indicatad that these 18 top business
lobbyists attandad the raaating at your invitation.
A Yas.
2 You zaczuitad than.
Yas .
UNCLASSIFIED
424
HAME
U515
4516
US 17
145 18
US 1 9
4520
452 1
4522
14523
4524
M525
4526
14527
4528
4529
4530
453 1
4532
4533
4534
4535
45i6
4537
4538
4539
HIR224000
\immw
PAGE 185
2 Could you tell us uho those 18 lobbyists were?
A Frankly. I wouldn't want to give you an incomplete
list and I don't have a complete list. If I gave you a list
it uould be an absolute memory on ray part as to uho was
there and it uould ba inaccurate.
2 You don't have a list in your file of uho the
people uere that were invited?
A If I do have, I will let you have it.
2 Thank you very much.
A I don't think I do. I probably have an invitation
list but I don't think I have an attendance list.
2 Well, either an invitation or an attendance list
uould be very helpful if you could produce that.
A I'll see if I do. I made the calls by phone. I
did not urite any letters.
2 Did Spitz Channell attend that meeting?
No . he did not .
Did Rich niller attend that meeting?
Not that I remember. He could have.
Did Frank Gomez attend that meeting?
No, not that I remember. I uould suppose either
niller or Gomez probably did.
2 Did they help you organize the meeting in any way?
A No, they didn't. This is not their turf.
2 Did any of the other people from your coalition
mmm"
425
HAME
U5U0
USU 1
■4542
45M3
usuu
45MS
4546
U5147
U5U8
14549
U550
455 1
4552
4553
4554
4555
4556
4557
4558
4559
4560
456 1
4562
4563
4564
HIR224000
liNcussm
PAGE 186
that you had built attend that meeting'
A No. These uere my contacts. These uere ray
personal business contacts.
2 Did anyone frora the State Department attend the
meeting'
A No .
2 Th« next item on that list numbered B says confirm
calls uere made on the following rienbeis with designated
results .
A These uere the reports back to raa on calls made by
the 18 people, okay? Now, a high level oi influence would
be ten. In other words, the person that called on Dante
Eascell didn't claim any credit for Dante Fascell voting for
contra aid .
2 You mean it is not the influence level of the
Congressman. It's the influence level they thought they had
on that call .
A On that call. Now for instance, they had pretty
good reason to believe that some of the calls made on Jim
Jones war* effective. Down at McKarnan and Grayd^on they
had reason to balieve that the calls made on those people
had soma influence. Three is as low as any of them went.
S Tha naKt number, number 4, says personal nember
contacts by Dan Kuykendall . Did you call personally on each
one of those Members on that list?
UNCLASSIFIED
426
NAHE
456S
U566
4567
U568
4569
4570
457 1
4572
4573
4574
4575
4576
4577
4578
4579
4580
4581
4582
4583
4584
4585
4586
4587
4588
4589
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 187
A I said contacts. Those uere virtually all
Cloakroore hi. how are you doing, and hou are you going to
vote or out m the hallway. I think probably the only
person on there who--in fact I uill tell you flatly the only
person on there I had any discussion uith and he is too good
a friend for me to ever push hira. is Ed Jones.
2 The next number 5. the summary says it should be
recognized that all the contacts referred to in this report
are uith the actual Member of Congress. Staff contacts are
not referred to in this report. So this would indicate all
these people you personally talked to.
A Yes. Of the 18 people and myself, I am not sure I
understood the content of your question.
2 You said some of these were Cloakroom conversations
but what you are saying is they were real, all face- to- face ,
eyeball to eyeball conversations.
A Yes.
2 In the last line of this memorandum you said had it
not been for the total KEPL effort the Speaker would not
have had to pionise a secret vote to obtain the temporary
victory on Harch 20. What did you mean by total HEPL
effort?
A I was going back to their institutional advertising
that had been running for six months before.
2 Six months before?
UNCUSSIflED
427
NAME
U590
US9 1
U592
U593
U591J
4595
4S96
4597
4598
4S99
4600
460 1
4602
4603
4604
4605
4606
4607
4608
4609
46 10
46 1 1
46 12
46 1 3
46 14
HIR224000
mUSSIFlEO
PAGE 188
A At least six months before.
2 They were running--
A None of those--I don't reroembet but it could have
been those hard hitting ads didn't run until that second
vote. That is ray memory, that virtually all the ads run
before March 20 were run on the institutional level by NEPL.
2 You thought that the institutional effort by HEPL--
A It was more effective than the directed effort.
S These uere the first ads.
A Right. This was the kind of issue, and you
remember it uell. counsel, that people didn't want to be
pushed on. This was the Kind of effort that took deep
thought, deep consideration, deep thinking and it :ust
wasn't the kind of issue that a Congressman could or would
be pushed on.
2 I would like to ask the reporter to mark this
document as Exhibit No. 13.
[Exhibit No. 13 was narked for identification. 1
BY MR. OLIVER:
2 This IS a letter dated July 23, 1986 to Spitz
Channell from Dan Kuykendall and I would like to read some
portions of it and then give it to you and ask you to
coBBent on it.
It said, in paragraph 3, ''Having been retained by
the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation and private Texas clients,
UNCLASSIFIED
428
NAHE ■
46 15
46 16
46 17
46 18
46 19
4620
462 1
4622
4623
4624
4625
4626
4627
4628
4629
4630
4631
4632
4633
4634
4635
4636
4637
4638
4639
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 189
I coordinated the outside Cprivate) lobbying efforts to
obtain this aid. Ue lost our first shoudoun--nichel I--by tao
votes but due to an intensive lobbying effort we won
approval of Michel II by 63 votes.''
A That was referring to 1985 effort.
e It goes on to say in the next paragraph. ''In early
1986 Gulf and Caribbean received its first direct support
from NEPL. This support enabled us to intensify our efforts
to obtain mlitary aid for the contras . ' '
Now, I would like to ask you to look at that
document. I think you have a copy of it in front of you; is
that right? Counsel has given you a copy?
A Yes.
2 is this an accurate reflection of your activities
on behalf of contra aid in 1985 and up until July 23. 1986?
A Okay. First let ne point out that the effort that
is referred to here on the two vote deal, in those cases I
had not received any money from Gulf and Caribbean
whatsoever directly to ne . The Gulf and Caribbean effort
was being done in the escorting the type thing that you saw
m the first document that you handed me and so forth. Ue
felt like that this was very effective in helping but it was
the type educational type effort that was the charter of the
Gulf and Caribbean Foundation.
But up until the time this vote took place in '85
UNCLASSIFIED
429
NAME
U640
464 1
4642
4643
4644
4645
4646
4647
4648
4649
4650
465 1
4652
4653
4654
4655
4656
4657
4658
4659
4660
466 1
4662
4663
4664
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 190
ue had not received any monies during '84 or the first half
of '85 from the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation even for rent
or anything else. Ue :ust simply didn't receive any money
from thera . There uasn't any money there and ue didn't
receive it. So the coordinating of the private lobbying
effort is a reputation of that group that I told you about
that uas formed that I was the acting chairman of.
This uas the group that m late '84, whenever that
actually began, and all during that effort in '85, there uas
none of this big huge coalition. There uas none of the big
money spent on TV and everything. This uas a very, very
small effort and uith very feu people involved. The group
that I spoke to you about earlier uas the group that I
coordinated. That uas in the '85 effort. I mentioned here
that I realized in late '85--I became aware of NEPL and their
TV advertising as a result of both of us using IBC In
1986, of course, what is that date on that early
contribution?
2 March .
A March, uas obviously the first time that KEPL had
seen fit to contribute to Gulf and Caribbean because they
sau there a dimension that we added to the effort that they
sinply didn't have.
2 You indicated in the next sentence this support
enabled you to intensify your efforts to obtain military aid
UNCIASSIFI[
430
NAME
4665
U666
M667
U668
14669
14670
U67 I
14672
4673
4674
4675
4676
4677
4678
4679
4680
4681
4682
4683
4684
4685
4686
4687
4688
4689
HIR224000
*/issm
PAGE 191
for tha contras
A Right.
2 That was through lobbying .
A Mo .
e What was it' hou did you intensify your efforts to
obtain military aid for the contras if it uasn't through
lobbying ?
A Again ua get down to tha definition of lobbying.
This IS where obviously you and I have an absolute
difference of opinion as to what constitutes lobbying and
what does not constitute lobbying. Lobbying is the material
and tha type thing that I did in the previous document.
That IS that type thing and that is calling on those
individual rtanbars of Congress and asking then to vote a
certain way on a bill. That is lobbying. That is clearcut
lobbying and things like that are the reason I obtained
money for lobbying for that purpose.
But tha escorting of different people at the
request of Hambers of Congress to aaatings on Capitol Hill
for educational purposes for tha purpose of their seeking
their knoiiladga--le t ' s face something here. One of the
things that tha White House was severely criticized for in
tha lacant haaiings has bean keeping paopla in tha dark. My
whole effort was to try to present a point of view to enough
Members of Congress to win this vote and 221 of them decided
iiNWSsife
431
liNClASSIflED
NAME: HIR22I4000 — ■■■^r^tl^^n I L. LJ PAGE 192
U690 to vote for this issue. It was passed by the United States
U691 House of Representatives. It passed the Senate and became
4692 the lau of the land. That was our goal, was to create
4693 enough information for these people to make up their raind on
U69M this issue. This uas a very narrow issue. This was an
4695 issue that had the smallest undecided list month after month
4696 that I have ever seen. There were never more than about 50
U697 names on the entire undecided list.
M698 So the question becomes here about the part ue
4699 played in it. Very minor part of it uas what I would call
4700 lobbying. A very major part of it was sheer information
14701 carried to Members of Congress at either their request or
U702 their knowledge.
U703 MR. COSTON: Let's take a short break and rest your
47011 voice. It's been an hour-and-a-half .
4705 [ Recess . 1
4706 BY HR. OLIVER:
4707 C Me were discussing Exhibit 13 which uas a letter
4708 from Spitz Channell to you. Is it your testimony that these
4709 activities that are described in here by you are primarily
4710 related to educational efforts and not to lobbying?
47 11 . A Primarily educational, some lobbying.
4712 Q So it is your testimony that you were lobbying.
47 13 A I uas doing some lobbying, yes.
4714 C For HEPL and Spitz Channell.
UNCLASSIFIED
432
NAME
47 15
47 16
U7 17
47 18
47 19
4720
472 1
4722
4723
4724
4725
4726
4727
4728
4729
4730
4731
4732
4733
4734
4735
4736
4737
4738
4739
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 193
A For Sentinel Spitz Channell.
2 I might call your attention to the bottom line on
the first page of that document uhich says the months of
April, nay and June saw the most intensive educational and
lobbying efforts by NEPL, Sentinel and Gulf and Caribbean
that this issue has ever received.
A Hell, you read the sentence. It's accurate. It's
lobbying. Sentinel, education, MEPL, and Gulf and Caribbean
2 I would Ilka to--could ue go off the record?
[Discussion off the record. 1
BY MR. OLIVER:
2 Let's go back on the record.
I aust want to ask a few questions about some notes
that the committee obtained from files of Spitz Channell in
which your name appsazs in several instances.
On July the 16, 1986, there is handwriting on a
••to, do'' list from Hiller's files that says, and I will
read it to you, it says ''Dan Kuykandall to get Congressmen
to question on the floor of Congress and than sand Kurt
Hurge analysis to Dan Kuykandall. Do you remember what that
might hava baan in reference to?
A At this time I had never meet Kurt Hurge. I didn't
avan know who ha was. Ha is Spitz' lawyer. He is obviously
checking out the legal aspect of something.
2 Did he aver sen^ you an analysis of any kind that
UNCLASSIFIEO
433
NAME
4740
it7m
147U2
U7U3
U7UU
U714S
47146
47147
147148
147U9
4750
475 1
4752
4753
4754
4755
4756
4757
4758
4759
4760
476 1
4762
4763
4764
HIR224000
OlLASSiFiEO
PAGE 194
you recall?
A I'm not sura uhat he is talking about here because
m spite of uhat you may have heard. Spitz was pretty damn
careful about running things by his lawyer. I really don't
knou uhat ue uere talking about hare because at this time I
did not knou Kurt Hurga
2 Do you remember Spitz Channall or Dan Conrad ever
asking you to get some Congressman to ask questions on the
floor about any subject. SDI or contra aid'
A Oh, that's fairly common.
2 Did they particularly in the summer of 1986 ask you
to get Congressmen to ask questions on the floor about SDI.
for instance ?
A I have no recollection of it but I certainly can't
deny 1 t .
2 Do you remember Spitz Channell or Dan Conrad
discussing with you af fort^^ to gat a list of SDI contractors
for the Strategic Defense Initiative?
A Oh . yas .
2 Uhat was the purpose of getting that list of
contractors ?
A To compare them to the congressional districts and
the list of support by Congressmen.
2 There is an indication on there that says get
endorsements for SDI program from Congressmen in the
UNCLASSiFlEO
434
HAHE
4765
4766
4767
4768
4769
4770
477 1
4772
4773
4774
4775
4776
4777
4778
4779
4780
478 I
4782
4783
4784
4785
4786
4787
4788
4789
HIR224000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 195
Districts of SDI contractors and then beside it, that note,
it says Dan K, which I assume may be you.
MR. COSTOH: I'm going to instruct you to not
ansuer. Tha subpoena uas issued by the Select Committee
investigating arras sales to Iran and tha contra operations.
I think ua ara pretty far afield here. Ua are talking about
SDI. That has nothing to do with tha scope of your
investigation and unless there is a proffer of relevance, I
am going to instruct tha witness not to answer and to move
on .
MR. OLIVER: Wall. I was, counsel, asking Mr.
Kuykendall about his relationship|l with Spitz Channall and
he indicated there ware a number of idaas for which ha uas
paid by Spitz Channall in 1986 and in 1987.
MR. COSTON: Is It tha Select Committee's charter
to examine SDI issues and any lobbying or educational
efforts on SDI issues?
MR. OLIVER: I was really trying to determine for
what services Mr. Kuykandall was paid^by Spitz Channall but
If you object I will ba happy to withdraw that question.
HR. COSTON: I do. It IS 4: 15 and wa would like to
finish up today.
HR. OLIVER: Fina.
Tha latter that wa rafaiiad to a few moments ago as
Exhibit 13, did Spitz Channall or Dan Conrad ask you to send
UNCIASSIFIEP
435
HAHE ■
4790
4791
4792
4793
4794
4795
4796
4797
4798
4799
4800
480 1
4802
4803
4804
480S
4806
4807
4808
4809
4810
481 1
4812
4813
4814
HIR224000
DtWSSIFlEB
PAGE 196
them that letter about perfotraance and analysis of the vote''
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. OLIVER:
And you did '
Yes .
There was reference in some notes under a category
headed by your nane on several occasions to the Southwest
Cattleman's Association board membac list. Do you knou what
that was all about?
A That IS a list that Channell spent six months
trying to get out of me and never did.
2 I wondered why it appeared on his to do list for
such a long period of time.
A He tried to get ray list too, and never did.
fi In Exhibit 13 thera was a line that indicated m
the letter from you to Spitz Channell saying, ' 'Having been
retained by the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation and private
Texas clients, I coordinated the outside private lobbying
effort to obtain this aid.*'
Who were the private Taxas clients?
A All of my clients obviously paid me enough money to
uhara I didn't have to usa all my tima to--and I could afford
to volunteer. No Taxas client zatainad ma to do this, but
my Taxas clients allowed ma to do it by the fact that they
didn't keep ma occupied full time, which most clients don't.
ONCDISXiFe
436
MAME
M81S
MSU
4817
U818
14819
4820
482 1
4822
4823
4824
4825
4826
4827
4828
4829
4830
4831
4832
4833
4834
4835
4836
4837
4838
4839
HIR224000
UNClASSIRfO
"^ PAGE 197
2 I would like to ask you about a feu people, :ust
sone names and ask you if you know thera or knou of there or
have any relationship with them and if I mention a name, if
you would describe to me whether or not you knou them and in
what context you do.
Clifford Smith.
A A young man who worked for Spitz Channell as a fund
raiser. That's about all I know about him.
2 How did you meet him?
A he was around Spitz at the office quite a lot. I
»ny function with him. /I never went onA» trip
never had any
t>At A 6t^\ieci
with him\or a meeting with him^ike that, but I knew him.
2 Did ha participate in any of the large group
meetings ?
A Oh, no .
2 He did not?
A Ko.
2 Chris Littladala?
A Even less. I mat him and that's all.
2 Jana ncLioCughlin .
A No.
2 You did not knou Jana ncL)^ughlin?
A X know Jana ncLji|ughlin . I did not participate with
2 Did ha participate in any of those large group
her.
yNCLASSIFIED
437
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME
4840
USUI
14842
1*843
U8U5
U8U7
U8U8
48149
4850
U8S1
4852
14853
148514
4855
14856
U857
U858
14859
14860
486 1
4862
4863
4864
HIR224000
PAGE 198
meetings at which you were present?
A Ko .
2 Do you retain any bank accounts outside of the
United States?
A Ko .
2 You have indicated that you saw Rob Owen but you
only met hira. You had no dealing with him? Has that your
earlier testimony?
A I didn't even know who he was.
2 Ed EoK?
A No .
2 Bruce Cameron?
A Yes.
2 You testified aarlier you mat Bruce Cameron in the
context of the efforts in 1986.
A With him working with pro-Democrats on the
Democratic side, me working on the Republican side.
2 Did you know that he had a separate entity called,
I think the Council for Democratic Education and Assistance?
A Ytts. Ha operated on tha Hill under a separate
entity.
2 Did you know that ha was retained or ha was paid by
a grant from Spitz Channall?
A Vary late I learned that.
2 After the vote?
yNCUSSIFIED
438
NAME:
4865
U866
4867
U868
4869
4870
1487 1
4872
4873
4874
4875
4876
4877
4878
4879
4880
488 1
4882
4883
4884
4885
4886
4887
4888
4889
HIR224000
KNCUSSm
PAGE 199
A After the vote .
2 How did you learn that?
A I think I read it in the paper .
2 Penn Kemble .
A I know hire , yes .
2 What was Penn Kerable's role in the lobbying effort
for aid to the contras?
A I don't believe you could say Penn Kemble ever even
cane close to what you would call lobbying. That wasn't his
thing .
2 What was his thing.
A He pretty nuch operated. Institute for Legislative
Democracies which is strictly an educational group. Penn
K^bla IS ^ust not a lobbyist, as far as I am concerned.
2 He participated in those large strategic meetings,
either he or Denise O'Leary.
A Yes. Now Denisa was active in lobbying but I
never--Penn Kemble could have done some lobbying. I am :ust
not familiar with it. Denise was definitely a lobbyist, a
good one .
Q And she was lobbying at the direction of this
coalition?
A Ko. No. Thay handled, the Democxatic side, the
ncCuidy group, that Demociatic undecided group almost
entirely. Occasionally thay would work with the moderate to
yNCLASSIFIEI
439
NAME
1*890
489 1
U892
U893
uagu
4895
4896
4897
4898
4899
4900
490 1
4902
4903
4904
49 0 5
4906
4907
4908
4909
49 10
49 1 1
49 12
49 1 3
49 14
HIR224000
UNClASSIflEB
PAGE 200
liberal Republicans, but mostly ue divided out duties in
1986 as compared to "85.
2 Were you auate that Penn Kj^mble uas receiving money
from Spitz Channel?
A Not at all.
2 Did you know that Spitz Channell had funded the
group ads that ProDemca placed in the Washington Post and/or
the New York Times?
A No. I did not.
2 --neat the time of the vote?
A Ho .
2 Do you recall the ads?
A I recall ProDemca ran ads. I do not recall the
ads .
2 Steve Cook?
A No .
2 You don't know Steve Cook?
A No.
2 John Blaken?
A No.
2 Otto B^btE?
A Yes .
fi How did you know Otto lt^«Jtf
A I think I first met Otto
lL
probably at the
American Security Council breakfast. He would occasionally
IINClASSinEO
440
NAME ■■
14915
49 16
49 17
U9 18
49 19
U920
492 1
4922
4923
4924
4925
4926
4927
4928
4929
4930
4931
4932
4933
4934
4935
4936
4937
4938
4939
HIR224000
Mmmi
S"* PAGE 201
come to that.
2 Did he participate in any way m the effort to get
aid for the contras?
A Not through me or with me. I have no idea what he
did on his own. .
Cxr
,2
No. Not at all.
You know~i*3^ Nofs'iAgar'
Oh, yes, certainly.
Did you know frj*"* Nof^mger received funds from IBC
in the fall of 1986? I believe it was IBC. It may have
been NEPL.
A Yes. It was NEPL.
2 It was NEPL?
A Yes .
2 How did you know that?
A Because I sat in meetings with him and Spitz.
2 What was the purpose of those meetings?
A To try to teach Spitz how to get along with the
d^
right wing of the Republican party.
S And ha was paying. Spitz was paying laiWn Nof^i^ger
to give him that advice?
A Yes. Not very long, but he did.
2 Was there any discussion in those meetings about
ads that Spitz Channell was running in the 1986 campaigns?
'W
IFI
441
NAME HIR22'4000
yNClASSIflEO
PAGE 202
U940
U9H 1
49142
4943
4944
4945
4946
4947
4948
4949
4950
495 1
4952
4953
4954
4955
4956
4957
4958
4959
4960
496 1
4962
4963
4964
A No
2 Uere you aware that Spitz Channell was tunning
television spots in congressional campaigns in 1986'
A In the elections?
2 In the elections.
A He did not.
2 You did not know of any?
A He did not run ads in congressional races. He ran
ads in about four Senate races but he did not run any m any
congressional ads.
2 how do you know?
A Because I know. I talked hin out of running three
or four because it was a waste of his money. I was an
adviser to hiio at this time.
2 You knew of the ads he produced to be run.
A Right.
2 But you talked him out of tunning them.
A Right.
2 Those were the ads that were going to be run
against Jim Wright and Ron Coleman?
A Y«s. I talked him out of wasting his money.
2 But did you advise him to run the ads against Tim
Hitth and Bob Graham?
A Hell, I advised him to run ads for--
2 Kan Kramer and Paula Hawkins. These were wide open
UNCLASSIFIED
442
NAHE ■
U965
4966
U967
4968
4969
4970
497 1
4972
4973
4974
4975
4976
4977
4978
4979
4980
4981
4982
4983
4984
4 985
4986
4987
4988
4989
UNWSSIflED
HIP.224000 lilVIll £4.1.^ I f" I V" I R PAGE 203
Senate races. We were using a PAC. using PAC money and I
took part m those without any apology uhatsoevei. But
there were no ads run, and I ara 99 percent sure they simply
uere not run in the House races.
2 I think you are right about that. Uhy did you
suggest to hin that he run these ads ior Paula Haukms and
Ken Kramer?
A Well, he had some money to spend for advertising
and this was a political campaign and I'm a Republican.
2 Did anyone ask you, did anyone from the j^aukms
campaign or the Kramer campaign contact you or Spitz or Ifmm
Nof^i^ger and say it would be most helpful if you could--
A No. Channell would not give money direct to
candidates hardly at all. Ha insisted upon running his own
advertising. I did not agree with this. I had long
experience with PACs . That's the way I believed in running
a campaign. That is the way I liked it when I was a
candidate and I did not agree with his strategy of running
independent campaigns. This was Channell's idea. This was
the way ha was doing things. I did not make the decision.
I was against the decision to go independent.
Once ha made the decision to go independent. I
said thasa ara the places where ha is needed.
2 you indicated four Senate races. Can you recall
what the other two were?
UNCUSSIFIEO
443
UNUlA^vNIMt'l
NAHE-
4990
1499 1
4992
4993
4994
4995
4996
4997
4998
4999
5000
500 1
5002
5003
5004
5005
5006
5007
5008
5009
50 10
501 1
5012
50 1 3
HIR224000 PAGE 204
A We:i. you have got Florida, Korth Carolina,
Colorado and California.
Q And did you recommend those four Senate races'
A Probably. They were obvious as being marginal and
needing help and so forth that this uas where it was put
There uere several people that ended up being defeated that
weren't even considered marginal, so you have to think back
about six weeks before the election and look at that.
2 Did you have any contact with the Republican
Senatoral Campaign Conmittee or the Republican National
Committee during this period of time about these races and
Spitz' activities?
A Not Spitz' activities. I discussed it with them to
analyze the races. Their information wasn't very good But
I am well enough knoun I don't have to go somewhere and
represent Spitz Channall . I can get information on ray own
because after all. I uas administering a PAC myself at the
time .
fi Hr . Kuykendall, I thank you for your patience and I
have no fuxthez questions.
HR. rRYHAH: Thank you Hr . Kuykendall, I have no
questions .
(Hheteupon, at 420 p . « . , the deposition uas
concluded . ]
DNWSsra
444
'^
c r- ^ r^
^
UlWI^^SmED
March 20, 1985
CHRONOLOGICAL EVENT CHECKLIST
February 21-28, 1985 (completed)
Event Responsibility
Send resource book on the Contadora process State/LPO
process to congressmen, media outlets, private (Miller)
organizations and individuals interested in
Nicaragua.
FDN to select articulate freedom fighters with NSC (North)
proven combat records and to na)cc them available
for contact with U.S. media representatives.
Assign U.S. intelligence agencies to research, NSC (North)
report, and clear for public release Sandinista (Raymond)
military actions violating Geneva Convention/
civilized standards of warfare.
Prepare themes for approaches to Congressmen NSC (North)
based on overall listed perceptions which will
directly attacJc the objections listed above.
Encourage U.S. media reporters to meet NSC (North)
individual FDN fighters with proven combat State/LPD
records and media appeal. (Gomez)
Contact internal eyewitnesses/victims to NSC (North)
testify before Congress about their abortive
attempts to deal with the FSLN (deadline
March 15) .
J"ij', D"c.3«^:!,ed/Rei.3sed on I0£C^%% V ■> ^ W ^
unne. iircvitc-s ot E 3 12356 ^•^,_ -^
t)v K jo^?soii Nalio.nal SecuMy Council
1368
casr«>gw¥TAL
S-/2-n ^T^
445
COt:riDE»JTI Al
UN€tWSS(FiED
Karch 1-8, 1965
Event
Prepare list of publicly and privately
expressed Congressional objections to aiding
resistance and voting record on the issue.
Provide State/H with a list of Nicaraguan
emigres and freedom fighters to serve as
potential witnesses to testify before
hearings on aid to Nicaraguan fxcedom fighters
(due March 15) .
Nicaraguan internal opposition and resistance
announce unity on goals and principals
(March 2, San Jose) (completed).
Request that Zbigniew Brzezins)ii write a
geopolitical paper which points out
geopoliticalconsequences of Comnunist
domination of Nicaragua (paper due March 20) .
Briefings on Nicaragua for liey Congressional
members and staffers. North on NU aggression
and external involvement, Burghardt on
diplomatic situation.
Supervise preparation and assignment of
articles directed to special interest groups at
rate of one per wee)i beginning March 18 (examples:
article on Nicaraguan educational system for NEA,
article by retired military for Retired Officers
Association, etc.).
Assign agencies to draft one op-ed piece per
wee)c for signature by Administration officials.
Specify themes for the op-eds and retain final
editorial rights.
Conduct public opinion poll of America
attitudes toward Sandinistas, freedom fighters,
National Press Club news conference for FDN
comir.anders Bermudez, Tigrillo, Mi)ie Lima
(March 5) (follow-on Congressional visits
(March 6) (completed) .
Martha Lida Murillo (9 yr old atrocity
victim) visit to Hashington--media interviews.
Congressional visits, possible photo-op
with First Lady (March 6-8) (completed) .
Responsibility
WH/LA
State/H
NSC (North)
State/ARA
(Michel)
State/LPD
(Reich)
State/LPD
(Miller)
NSC (North)
NSC (Menges)
NSC (North)
(Burghardt)
State/LPD
NSC (Menges)
HH (Rollins)
State/LPD
(Gomez)
llaykandall)
State/LPD
(Gomez)
(VfeyKendall)
(WH/OPL)
CONFIDENTIAL
UNeill^SII«IED
13G3
446
c<^ rite fell A^
UNCLI^WIED
March 9-15, 1965
Event
WH/L«9islative Affair*, State/H and ARA
complete list of key Congressmen interested
in Nicaragua.
Intelligence briefing for White House
Administration and senior staff by CIA
(Vickers, Room 208, OEOB, 30 minutes).
Bri«f Presidential meeting with Lew Lehnn«n
and other leaders of the influence groups
working on MX and resistance funding.
Responsibility
State/H(Ball/rox)
WH/LA
State/ARA
(Michel/Holwill)
NSC (North)
NSC (Raymond)
(North)
State/LPD and WH Media Relations prepare a
list of )cey mediaoutlets interested in
Central American issues, including newspapers,
radio, and TV stations (including SIN) . Where
possible identify specific editors, commentators,
tal)c shows, and columnists.
NSC update tallying points on aid to Nicaraguan
freedom fighters.
Briefings in OEOB for members /Senators:
Shultz, McFarlane, Gorman, and Shlaudeman to
brief Lehman (requires General Gorman to b«
placed on contract) .
Call/visit newspaper editorial boards and
give them background on the Nicaraguan
freedom fighters.
Brief OAS members in Washington and
abroad on second term goals in Central
America. Explore possible OAS action
against Nicaragua.
VP at Brazilian inauguration. Discuss
possible OAS initiative on Nicaragua with
Core Four, Colombia, Brazil, and Uruguay
(March 15 and 16) .
Prepare a 'Dear Colleagues* Itr for signature
by a responsible Democrat which counsels
against "negotiating* with the FSLN.
NSC (North)
State/LPD
(Miller)
NSC (North)
NSC (North)
(Lehnan)
State/LPD (Reich)
WH/PA
NSC (North)
OAS(Middendorf)
NSC (Menges)
State/LPD (Reich)
VP (Hughes)
NSC (Lehman)
137(1
447
m\'^i
.^msx,f(%%\M \
March li-27, 1985
Event
Results due on public opinion survey to see
what turns Ajneracans against Sandinistas
(March 20) .
Joachim Maitre--Congressional meetings,
speeches, and op-ed pieces.
Review and restate themes based on results of
public opinion poll.
Presidential drop-by at briefing for American
evangelicals on MX and Nicaraguan resistance.
Congressional hearings (Foreign Relations/
Affairs) and testimony by Nicaraguan emigres
and atrocity victims.
Prepare document on Nicaraguan narcotics
involvement.
SSCI CODEL Boren^Rockefeller, McConnell,
Wilson mUlUB^^^^I meetings
resistance (March II
VP in Honduras; meeting with Pres Suazo
(March 16) .
Argentine state visiti President emphasize
need for OAS case (March 19) .
Pastora and Calero meeting with
Congressional Bispanic Caucus (Jorge Mas)
(March 20) .
Production and distribution of La Prensa
chronology of rSLN harassment.
Responsibi lity
NSC (HincXley)
State/LPD <^
(Kuykendall)
State/LPD
(Reich)
NSC (North)
(Raymond)
WH/OPL (Reilly)
NSC (North)
WH/LA
NSC (North)
(Lehman)
Justice
(Mullen)
NSC (North) w^
(Lehman)
VP (Hughes)
WH (Elliott)
State/LPD V
(Reich)
COST ID
UiCLASSIEHB)ENTlAL
13
/, i
448
CONFIDENTIM.
March 23-31, 1985
Event
Re«pon«ibility
State/LPD
(Gomez)
WH/LA
NSC (Lehman)
(North)
State/LPD
(Miller/Gonez)
Rev. Vallardo Antonio Santcliz (Pentecostal
Minister atrocity victin) — Congressional/
Kicdia veetings (March 22-23) .
McFarlane, Friedersdorf meeting with key
Congressional leadership (Rn 208 or WHSR) to
brief situation and proposed course of
action (March 23-2S) .
Presidential breakfasts, lunches, and WHSR
meetings with key Congressional leaders
(March 24 through vote) .
Pedro Juaquin Chamorro (Editor La Prensa)
U.S. media/speaking tour (March 25-April 3)
President to meet in Roon 450 w/'Spirit of
Freedom," concerned citizens for Democracy.
Representatives from 8 countries (180)
(March 25) .
Release of DOD/State paper on Soviet/Cuban/
Nlcaraguan intentions in the Caribbean;
possible WH backgrounder.
Distribute Bernard Nietschmann paper on
suppression of Indians by FSLN.
Antonio Farach (Former FSLN Intelligence
Officer) — media and Congressional meetings
regarding Sandinista espionage. Intelligence
activities.
Invite President's Duarte, Monge, Suazo,
and Barletta to a very private meeting in
Texas with key Congressional leaders so that
CODEL can hear unvarnished concerns re
Sandinistas and Democratic leaders' support
for the FDM.
Release paper on Nlcaraguan media manipulation. State/LPD
/
State/LPD(Reich)
WH/PA (Sims)
State/LPD
Republican
Study
Committee
(Kuykendall)
NSC (North)
Publish and distribute as State Department
document Nicaragua's Development as Marxist-
Leninist State by Linn Poulsen.
Declassify Nicaragua's Development as a
Marxist-Leninist State by Linn Jacobowitz
Poulsen for publication as State Department
document (clearance request w/Casey) .
CONFIDENTIAL
State/LPD
(Reich)
State/LPD
(Blacken)
g^BISM\tu
1372
449
U::?fS;bpai^l^--«'
cc<r:zi
■:w.
M»rc
^ 23-31, 1985
Event
Rev. Vallardo Antonio Santelii (Pentecostal
Minister atrocity victim) --Congressional/
media ireetlngs (March 22-23).
McFarlane, Friedersdorf iTieetinq with Vey
Congressional leadership ( Rjn 208 or WWSR)
brief situation and proposed course of
action (March 23-25) .
Responsibi lity
State/LPD
(Xuykendall)
(Gomez)
WH/LA
to NSC (Lehman)
(North)
Presidential brea)^fasts, lunches, and WHSR
ineetirgs with \ey Congressional leaders
(Karch 24 through vote) .
Pedro Juaquin Chajnorro (Editor La Prensa)
U.S. media/spea)Qing tour (March 25-April 3)
President to meet in Fooin 450 w/*Spirit of
FreedoE,* concerned citizens for Democracy.
Representatives from 8 countries (180)
(March 25) .
State/LPD
(Miller/Gomez)
/
/
Release of DOD/State paper on Soviet/Cuban/
Nicaraguan intentions in the Caribbean;
possible WH backgrounder.
Distribute Bernard N let schrr.ann paper on
suppression of Indians by FSLN.
Antor.io Farach (Former FSLN Intelligence
Of ficer) --media and Congressional meetings
regarding Sandinista espionage, intelligence
activities .
Invite President's Duarte, Monge , Suato,
and Barletta to a very private meeting in
Texas with key Congressional leaders so that
CODEL can hear unvarnished concerns re
Sandinistas and Democratic leaders' support
for the FDN.
State/LPD (Peich)
WW/PA (Sims)
State/LPD
Republ lean
Study
Committee
(ICuy)^endall)
NSC (North)
Release paper on Nicaraguan media manipulation. State/LPD
Publish and distribute as State Department
document Nicaragua's Development as Marxist-
Leninist State by Linn Poulsen.
Declassify Nicarag\ia's Development as a
Marxist- Leninist State by Linn Jacobowitz
Poulsen for publication as State Department
docurent (clearance request w/Casev).
CCNFIDENTIAJ, . ,. . .t. ■ (I. AA'T"
State/LPD
(Reich)
State/LPD
(Blacken)
137:-
450
coNri
UMCLASSIPSilD^NTI&L
April 1-7. 1985
Event
Request Bernard Nictschmann to uf>d«te prior
paper on suppression of Indians by FSLN (to
b« published and distributed by April 1) .
AXI t Sponsor media events w/print and
television media for Central America
resistance leaders (April 1-7) .
European Parliinentary delegation to
meet with President Reagan (April 2).
Visit by Colombian President Betancur
(April 3-4) ! possible Joint Session speech
by Betancur.
Proposed Presidential television address
on Nicaragua (April 4) .
Second round of SFRC hearings on Soviet
build-up in xegion (Helms) (prior to recess) .
CODEL visits during recess (April 4-14).
Nicaraguan refugee camps in Honduras and
Costa Rica (Include visit Ao^rAedom fighter
base camp and hospital in I
CODEL visit during recess (April 4-14) with
regional leaders of Central America. Regional
leaders convey importance of resistance fighters
in NU.
Administration and prominent non-USG
spo)iesroan on networ)i shows regarding Soviet,
Cuban, East GenB«n, and Libyan, Iranian
connection with Sandinistas.
Publish updated 'Green Booli;* distribute
personally to Congressmen, media outlets,
private organizations, and individuals
interested in Nicaragua. Pass to Lew
Lehrman and other interested groups.
Distribute paper on geopolitical consequences
of Communist domination of Nicaragua.
Release paper on Nicaraguan drug
involvement .
CONFIDi
^'^t^SSI/lflDENTIAL
Responsibility
State/LPD
(Blac)ien)
State/LPD
(Reich)
WW/OPL (Reilly)
•y
National Forum ^
Foundation
WH/OPL (Reilly)
WHSpeechwr iters
(Elliott)
NSC (North)
State/H
NSC (North) }/
(Lehman)
NSC (North)
(Lc^unan)
HH/PA (Sims) \/
WH (Buchanan)
State/LPD
State/LPD (Reich)
Vffl/LA
State/H (Fox)
State/LPD
State/LPD
(Blac)(en)
NSC (North)
451
COKTIDENTlXl,:. ^ ''-■
■'■■ ^ ' 1 T n ;■ .- .
April 8-14, 1985 (During recea»)
Event
Reiponsibility
25 Central American spokesmen arrive in Miami
for briefing before departing to visit
Congressional districts. Along with national
television commercial campaign in 45 nedia
markets.
Targeted telephone campaign begins in 120
Congressional districts. CITIZENS FOR AMERICA
district activists organize phone-tree to targeted
Congressional offices encouraging them to vote for
aid to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua.
Lew Lehman speaking tour of major U.S. cities.
CFA (Abramoff)
CFA (Abramoff)
CFA
Telephone campaign.
Central American spokesmen conduct rallies
throughout the country in conjunction with
CITIZENS FOR AMERICA activists (starting
April 12) .
Nationally coordinated sermons about aid to
the freedom fighters are conducted (April 14)
Naval Institute Seminar in Newport, RI
(Lugar, McFarlane (April 12]).
CFA
1371
mmmm mmmi\
452
April lS-21, 1985
Event
Micaraguan Refugee Fund (NRF) dinner,
Washington, DC; President as Guest of
Honor (April 15) .
Presidential report to Congress on reasons
for releasing funds to freedom fighters
(April 15) .
AAA available to Washington press.
Central American spokesmen visit Congressional
offices on Capitol Hill (April 16).
SFRC Nicaraguan issues, open hearing
(April 16-17) .
Washington conference "Central America:
Resistance or Surrender* (Presidential
drop-by?) (April 17) .
Barnes' subcommittee hearing on Nicaragua}
Motley, public witnesses (April IS)
(2170 Rayburn, 2i00 p.m.).
Presidential Radio Address (April 20) .
Responsibility
State/LPD
(Miller
NSC (Raymond)
)
NSC
State
State/LPD
(Gomez)
■/
Abramoff
/
NSC
Abramoff
v/'
WH (Elliott)
liSSi»ENTIAL
I37r)
453
Xprll 22-29. 1985
Event
Ke»pontibility
House Appropriations (Obey subcoonittee)
intelligence brief on Central America/
Latin Ajnerica (April 23).
Obey subconmiittee (panel on Central Aaerica) ,
public witnesses (a. v. ) /Administration
witnesses (p.m.) (April 24).
Major rally in the Orange Bowl in Miami,
Florida, attended by President Reagan and
important Administration figures
(April 28) .
Presidential calls to Icey members.
Cuban American
National
Foundation
State/LPD
(Reich)
WH (Friedersdorf)
NSC (Lehman)
CONFID
^KliSSIflipNmL
137f^
454
t
April 15, 1986
Mr . Richard Miller
1912 Sunderland Place, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Dear Rich:
As promised, the final House votes to decide the fate
of freedom in Nicaragua are today (April 15) being taken.
With the House acting on the President's request for
the last time, the usefulness of our Central American
Freedom Program comes to an end. The program has
been tremendously successful. It has made a significant
national and international impact for good. Most
Important, it has remained true and steadfast to Ronald
Reagan's goals to extend freedom wherever possible.
You, as Program Director, have executed your multiple
leadership responsibilities with the highest degree of
professional excellence. You are a gifted and unique
leader. The team of IBC staff and subcontractors you
assembled to carry out specific aspects of the Central
American Freedom Program is also worthy of great
admiration and appreciation from everyone supportlv jf
the President's goal.
Last week I began to notify our subcontractors and
consultants that all National Endowment for the
Preservation of Liberty financial arrangements with them
would be terminated on April 15. Please call the
following businesses/individuals and notify them that the
progran has ended and restate that all financial
arrangements between the National Endowment for the
Preservation of Liberty and them are terminated as of
tonight. Your follow-up call will ensure that we have
contacted everyone.
Please convey my sincere thanks to everyone. Tell
them that I will personally contact them about future
projects. Everyone involved in the Central American
Freedom Program will shortly receive a heartfelt personal
thank you from me.
, .i^~' ^^w^
1
^l-ti
455
Please cal 1 :
Marty Artlano
Steve Cook
David Fischer
Edle Fraser
Bob and Adam Goodman
Dan Kuykendal 1
Jack Lichensteln
Penn Kemble
UNO office.
I cannot express to you my appreciation for the
incredible contribution you have made in support of
freedom. Thank you for being instrumental in making this
program a success
/
Very sii/cereyy,
Spitz
President'
National Endowment for the
Preservation of Liberty
456
SECRETARY -- Active Subcommittee seeks secretary to work for staff
director and committee counsel. Word processing and dictaphone
experience helpful but not required. Typing 60 wpm. Salary
commensurate with experience. Send resume to DSG, Job Referral
No. 2806.
STAFF ASSISTANTS -- Progressive office seeks several detail-oriented
people to work as number crunchers. Interested persons must be
able to add, subtract, multiply, and divide. Minimum thirty hours
per week. Send resume to DSG, Job Referral No. 2807.
STAFF ASSISTANT -- House Committee seeks entry-level staff
assistant. Word processing experiepce, knowledge of committee
procedures, and strong interpersonal skills desired.
Responsibilities include general typing, research, recordkeeping,
and dissemination of information to Congress and the public.
Send resume to DSG, Job Referral No. 2808.
*PRESS SECRETARY -- Active Democratic Senator seeks press secretary
for competitive media market. Will supervise press department of
three. Duties include TV, radio, and print inquiries, newsletter,
cable TV, and radio show production. Op Eds, and occasional speech
writing. Hill and campaign experience preferred. Salary: Low-
to mid-forties. Send resume to DSG, Job Referral No. 2810.
*PRESS SECRETARY -- Northeastern Democrat seeks press secretary
for busy office. Must possess an enthusiasm for local press
assignments, as well as excellent writing skills, attention to
detail, complete follow-through, and good political skills. News-
letter and cable TV production experience a must. Send resume to
DSG, Job Referral No. 2811.
*SECRETARY -- House Subcommittee has immediate opening for full-
time secretary. Duties include typing, filing, handling mail,
incoming calls, and document requests, clerical work in preparation
for Subcommittee hearings, and some legislative correspondence.
Typing: 60 wpm. Willing to train on word processing equipment.
Salary: High-teens. Send resume to DSG, Job Referral No. 2812.
*LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT -- Moderate Democrat seeks LA/LC with ex-
perience, especially in labor and business issues. Excellent
opportunity to advance to LD position in 1988. Salary negotiable.
Send resume to DSG, Job Referral No. 2813.
*COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT -- Midwestern Democrat seeks individual
with at least one year comparable experience to handle preparation
and follow-through on press and other "visibility " -related projects,
including press releases, newsletters, targeted and mass mailings,
speeches, and media events. Crisp, concise writing skills, sound
organizational and political instincts, and mature judgement are
essential. Familiarity with Upper Midwest a definite advantage.
Send resume and original cover letter stating interests and salary
expectations to DSG, Job Referral No. 2814.
-5-
457
*PRESS AIDE -- Democratic Senator seeks well-organized, energetic
assistant to help press secrfstary manage media operations. Emphasis
on radio, TV, maintaining local contacts. Hill experience
mandatory, media experience desirable. Send resume and writing
sample to DSG, Job Referral No. 2823.
/
/
♦LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT -- Liberal Member of Armed Services Committee
seeks legislative assistant to handle committee work and foreign
affairs issues. Previous Hill experience or defense and foreign
affairs background a plus. Salary: Low- to Mid-twenties. Send
resume to DSG, Job Referral No. 2824.
*S1AFF ASSISTANT -- Northeastern Democrat seeks general staff person.
Position will entail a broad range of duties, including telephone
and incoming mail routing, computer data entry, and some legislative
correspondence. Typing ability a plus; good writing skills essen-
tial. Entry-level position. Salary: $14,000. Send resume to DSG,
Job Referral No. 2825.
♦LEGISLATIVE CORRESPONDENT -- Western Democratic Senator seeks
legislative correspondent to cover labor, health, education, and
women's issues. Good writing skills necessary. Salary: $18,000.
Send resume to DSG, Job Referral No. 2826.
♦LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT -- Committee Chairman seeks legislative as-
sistant for congressional office to handle correspondence on a wide
variety of issues, draft statements, initiate mass mailings, and
brief Member, etc. Must be efficient and show initiative! Minimum
one year Hill legislative experience required. Send resume to DSG,
Job Referral No. 2827.
♦LEGISLATIVE CORRESPONDENT/RESEARCH ASSISTANT -- Senior Democrat on
Senate Finance Committee seeks junior staff person to handle tax
issues. Excellent writing skills essential; some background in tax
and/or accounting preferred. Salary: $18,000. Send resume to DSG,
Job Referral No. 2828.
♦TYPIST -- Democratic Senator seeks good, accurate typist (55 wpm
minimum) for newsletter and press-related material. Good gram-
matical and proofreading skills required. Word processing helpful.
Must work well under pressure and be able to meet tight deadlines.
Salary: $18,000. Send resume to DSG, Job Referral No. 2829.
♦COMPUTER OPERATOR -- Democratic Member seeks part-time computer
operator for three and one-half month assignment. Prior experience
with computers and typing (50 wpm minimum) required. We're looking
for someone with a lot of initiative and strong organizational
skills. Willing to train; hours are negotiable. Send resume to
DSG, Job Referral No. 2830.
♦STAFF ASSISTANT -- Legislative service organization seeks mature,
organized individual for general office management duties, light
correspondence, and meeting planning. Requires considerable
telephone work. Should be a self-starter with good writing skills
and attention to detail. Hours: 9 am to 3 pm. Salary: up to
$9/hour. Send resume to DSG, Job Referral No. 2831.
-7-
458
KUYKENDALL COMPANY
June 10, 1986
MEMORANDUM: SPITZ CHANNELL FOR THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR
THE PRESERVATION OF LIBERTY
FROM: DAN KUYKENDALL
RE: CONFIRMATION OF CONSULTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN
SPITZ CHANNELL AND DAN KUYKENDALL
Dan Kuykendall hereby aorees that he will be available to
Spitz Channell or his specific desianee for consulting in the
area of politics, public affairs, and government operations
for twelve (12) months beginning on June 1, 1986.
It is agreed that Kuykendall will be available for personal
or phone consulting whenever that service is needed on a
reasonable basis.
The Kuykendall Company will bill the "National Endowment for
the Preservation of Liberty" for §3,500 at the end of each
month, plus the cost of any travel or entertainment done by
Kuykendall with pr;'.or approval of Channell.
Signed this 10th day of June, 1986,
■?/'/■
, ,^ / ^ - ' '
Carl Russell Channell
National Endowment for the
PerservatioB of Liberty
'' : - :/ '
Dan Kuykendall
Kuykendall Company
IP
. "-■■-;'
517 ird 6( reel ^\. • Wa»hinglon DC 20OC^ • 207/546 21% "'
459
KUYKENDALL COMPANY
May 5, 1986
Mr. Dan Conrad, Executive Director
National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty
305 4th Street, NE
Washington, D. C. 20002
Dear Mr. Conrad:
As per our agreement please consider this letter as an
invoice for consulting, research, and resource information
from the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation. Please forward your
contribution of S5,000 to my attention at the following
address:
Gulf & Caribbean Foundation
P. 0. Box 40841
Washington, D. C. 20016
This sum covers our advisory and consulting contribution to
the CONTRA Aid effort for the remainder of 1986.
Very truly yours,
Dan Kuyk
DK:lp
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517 3rd Alrcct. At • Wa»hiii«loii D C 20003 • 201/546-21%
460
Dm K..kr.JJI
Pr...i...
KUYKENDALL COMPANY
v! . if
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June 10, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO
FROM
RE
SPITZ CHANNELL
DAN KUYKENDALL
YOUR REQUEST CONCERNING MONTHLY COSTS
OF OPERATING GULF & CARIBBEAN FOUNDATION'S
PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON
MONTHLY BUDGET FOP GULF & CARIBBEAN FOUNDATION
Consultina Services, Dan Kuykendall
Adininistrat ive Services, Kuykendall Company
Telephone, Postage, Supplies, Rent, etc.
Consulting Services, IBC
TOTAL FIXED BUDGET
Travel (Monthly average, to be billed.)
TOTAL INCLUDING VARIABLE
$1 ,300
750
450
S2,500
1 ,500
54,000
450
54,450
IP
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*B«hinglon lU' l<X<i^
461
"^
'/-'
KUYKENDALL COMPANY
December 22, 1986
Mr. Spitz Channell, President
National Endowirient for the Preservation of Liberty
1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW - Suite 350
Washington, D. C. 20002
Attention: Mr. Dan Conrad
Fee due for services rendered for December, 1986 $12,000.00
TOTAL DUE KUYKENDALL COMPANY §12,000.00
KC:lp
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462
FINAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE KUYKENDALL COMPANY, DAN
KUYKENDALL, AND SPITZ CHANNELL AND HIS VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Continue the presently existing personal
consultina contract between Dan Kuykendall
and Spitz Channell. Monthly Retainer.
1. Advisor to all Channell organiza-
tions regarding political and
legislative matters. Monthly.
2. Lobbying services. Monthly.
3. Unlimited information retrieval,
legislative tracking, legislati'^e
analysis, social events. Monthly.
Kuykendall is available to travel out of
Washington for expenses only and, with
reasonable notice, to speak to any Channell
group, including PAC activity in which he
is a spec lal ist .
TOTAL MONTHLY FEE
?3,500
2,500
3,500
2,500
$1 2,000
The above includes personal services of Dan Kuykendall,
Elizabeth Powell, and Ric Marino on a reasonable basis
which, of course, means a major portion of each person's
t ime .
Payment Schedule (to be determined)
1. Retainer payable monthly, in advance at the first of
each monthly period: $12,000 monthly.
2. Retainer payable guarterly, in advance at toe first of
each quarterly period ( (^ $11,500 per month): 333,500
Quarterly .
3. Retainer payable semi-annually, in advance at the
first of each six month period (3 $11,000 per month):
$66,000 semi-annually.
KC: Ip
3/6/87
/
463
DETAILS OF ARRANGEMENT RETV.'EEN THE KUYKFNDALL COMPANY, DAN
KUYKENDALL, AND SPITZ CHANNELL AND HIS VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
A. Continue the presently existina personal
consultino contract between Dan Kuykendall
and Spitz Channell. Monthly Retainer. $3,500
1. Advisor to all Channell oraaniza-
tions reqardinq political and
leqlslative matters. Monthly. 1,500
2. Lobbyinq services. Monthly. 3,000
3. Unlimited information retrieval,
legislative trackina, leqislative
analysis, social events. Monthly. 2,000
B. Financial and Campaign Financial Services.
Kuykendall Company owns one of the most up- ^
to-date and successful fund raisino systems 0"^
in Washington today, includina the services >^
of Bic Marino who was responsible for the \,
staging of Washington events for the
Broyhill Campaion, raising PAC contributions
in excess of $1,200,000. Monthly. 2,000
Kuykendall is available to travel out of
Washington for expenses only and, with
reasonable notice, to speak to any Channell
aroup, includinq PAC activity in which he
is a specialist.
TOTAL MONTHLY FEE $12,000
The above includes personal services of Dan Kuykendall,
Elizabeth Powell, and Ric fiarino on a reasonable basis
which, of course, means a major portion of each person's
t ime.
KC:lp
1 1/7/86
1c^i
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464
September 29, 1986
^ os*''^ I
Mr. Spitz criannell
SENTINLL
1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW - Suite 3b5
Washington, D. C. 20004
Dear Spitz:
Durinq ny twenty years as a Conaressnian and Consultant in
Washington, I have participated in scores of worthwhile
projects. Your SDI initiative is one of the snost excitino
and essential such efforts in which I tiave been involved.
The completed book and overlay rrap with which I worked for
the first time last week rray well be the n^ost coi^plete and
useful political document I have ever used.
It is obvious that much expense and iponumental detail work
went into the preparation of tnese documents. Ty experi-
ence tells nie that most research projects never succeed in
relating their work directly tc the political situation in
a useful way. Your package does that beautifully.
Congratulations on a job well done; I'm usino it!
L^incere ly ,
ban i.uykendall
DK:lp
465
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unglun, I) G, :!0U16
September 15, 19B6
C H
05476
Mr. Spitz Channell, President
National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty
1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW - Suite 350
Washington, D. C. 20004
Dear Spitz:
During my twenty years as a Congressman and Consultant in
Washington, I have participated in scores of worthwhile
projects. Your SDI initiative is one of the most exciting
and essential such efforts in which I have been involved.
The completed book and overlay map with which I worked for
the first time last week may well be the most complete and
useful political document I have ever used.
It is obvious that much expense and monumental detail work
went into the preparation of these documents. My experi-
ence tells me that most research projects never succeed in
relating their work directly to the political situation in
a useful way. Your package does that beautifully.
Congratulations on a 30b well done; I'm using it!
'■'^y^^
DK: Ip
466
July 23, 1986
C H 05477
Mr. Spitz Channell, President
The National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty
305 4th Street, NE
Washinoton, D. C. 20002
Dear Spitz:
Now that we have aotten a favorable House vote on our first
cooperative effort, I will take this opportunity to give you
my analyis of the accompl ishir.ents.
In the Spring of 1985 the first atteirpt to obtain military
aid to the Contras was decisively defeated with our receiving
only 180 votes in the House.
Due to this very poor showing we were forced to change our
tactics to seeking only humanitarian aid. Having been
retained by the Gulf & Caribbean Foundation and private Texas
clients I coordinated the outside (private) lobbying efforts
to obtain this aid. We lost our first "showdown" (Michel I)
by two votes but due to an intensive educational and lobbying
effort we won approval of Michel II by sixty-three votes.
In late 1985 I had my first experience workina in a voluntary
coalition with NEPL and Spitz Channell. This was a result of
our both using the services of IBC. In early 1986 Gulf &
Caribbean received its first direct support from NEPL. This
support enabled us to intensify our efforts to obtain
military aid for the Contras.
It became very obvious to ire that NEPL was the only oraan-
ization with both the ability and the resources to run
productive advertisina on aid to the Contras. Some other
groups actually did more harm than good with their
advert ising.
On our first try in March we were able to qet 210 votes for
military aid to the Contras, an improvement of thirty votes
but still eight votea short.
The months of April, "ay, and June saw the most intensive
educational and lobbyino efforts by NEPL, dentinal, and Gulf
and Caribbean that this issue has ever received.
467
Mr. bpitz ('hannfll
Washinaton, D. C.
July 23, 1986
n
bt/8
We beoan the campaign with a taroet list of approx irrately
forty members of Conaress. About ten of them were considered
"soft" even thouah we Qot their votes in March. The taroet
list of forty was about one-auarter Republicans and three-
quarters Democrat.
The educational type TV plus the various lobbyina efforts
beqan to shorten the undecided list to the point that two
weeks before the vote we specifically tarqeted thirteen
Congressmen for the last push TV effort. Efforts beaan in
earnest to remove people from the undecided list and,
therefore, enable us to cancel the TV in their markets. We
withdrew TV in Louisville and San Antonio before the schedule
actually began because of commitments from three r;embers.
Since I was retainer' hy Sentinal as Senior Consultant on June
1, I became even more involved in media and lobbyino strateay.
Even thouah we continued to work hard on an additional ten
undecideds until the very last, our estimated vote count on
June 23 was 222 votes with a proiection of an additional five
Republicans and seven Democrats over ana above the March
total of 210. We actually received all the original 210 plus
five additional Republican and six Democrats.
Immediately after our 221-210 victory on the Presiot-nt's
package vs. the House Democratic leadership packaae, another
interesting vote took place. A very liberal packaae with no
military aid was offered against the President's packoqe.
Twelve to fourteen people, all of whom had been on our
orioinai undecided list, chanaed anc voted for the
President's packaqe, includino military aid.
All these last twelve to fourteen chanoes, plus the eleven
additional votes we received on the initial vote or. the
President's packaqe, were the successful tarqets of intensive
educational and lobbyina efforts. I can say with total
confidence that our various combined efforts were a major
factor in more than half of the total.
I am hopeful that this new relationship with its rultifaced
capability will bring us many more victories in tlie future.
Very truly yours.
Dan Kuykenciall
DK : 1 p
468
June 10, 1986
0S*19
MEMORANDUM: SPITZ CHANNELL FOR THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR
THE PRESERVATION OF LIBERTY
FROM: DAN KUYKENDALL
RE: CONFIRMATION OF CONSULTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN
SPITZ CHANNELL AND DAN KUYKENDALL
Dan Kuykendall hereby agrees that he will be available to
Spitz Channell or his specific designee for consulting in the
area of politics, public affairs, and government operations
for twelve (12) months beginning on June 1, 1986.
It is agreed that Kuykendall will be available for personal
or phone consulting whenever that service is needed on a
reasonable basis.
The Kuykendall Company will bill the "National Endowment for
the Preservation of Liberty" for $3,500 at the end of each
month, plus the cost of any travel or entertainment done by
Kuykendall with prior approval of Channell.
Signed this lOth day of June, 1986.
/
\
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Ca<;l_Russell Channell
National Endowment for the
P^servationyof Liberty
V
yDanKuykerjdSll
Ip
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469
^ RepublicBank
P 0 BOX 225961
DALLAS, TEXAS 75265
DALLAS
TYPE OF ACCOUNT
ACCOUNT-NUMBER
COMMERCIAL
282-7<«6-8
CHECKING
DATE: 03-31-86
PAGE
GULF S CARIBBEAN FOUNDATION
P. 0. BOX ^08^1
WASHINGTON, D C 20016
SUrttMT OF ACTIVITT FOB THE PERIOO 03/01/86 THRU 0V31/86 TAXPAYER NUMBER 00-0000000
TOUn BALANCE ON 02/28/86 MAS 163.38
THERE MERE DEPOSITS AtC OTHER ADDITIONS 32,600.00 NUTCER OF DEPOSIT? MO OTHER ADDITIONS «
THERE MERE CHECKS AM) OTHER SUBTRACTIONS 7,766.73 NUTBER ({F CHECKS AMI OTHER SUBTPACTIOtS 9
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470
March 12, 1966
Mr. Dan Conrad, Executive Director
National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty
305 4th Street, NE
Washington, D. C. 20002
Dear Mr. Conrad:
As per our agreement please consider this letter as an
invoice for conaultina, research, and resource information
from the Gulf and Caribbean Foundation. Please forward your
contribution of $10,000 to my attention at the followina
address :
Gulf and Caribbean Foundation
P. O. Box 40841
Washington, D. C. 20016 ,
Very truly yours.
Dan Kuykendall
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474
March 26, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO: SPITZ CHANNFL
FROM: DAN KUYKENDALL
RE: PERFORMANCE OF KUYKENDALL, ET AL , FOR
CONTRA AID VOTE IN U. S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
I. The Kuykendall effort was made up of three different
init iat ives ,
A. Personal escort and scheduling of Adolpho
Calero and, to a lesser extent, Alphonso
Robelo ar^others.
B. Reorganization, guidance, and monitoring
of volunteer group.
C. Personal lobbying and congressional
coordination by Dan Kuykendall
II. Scheduling of Adolpho Calero.
A. Republican Policy Committee - 40 members
B. Republican Study Committee - 25 members
C. East Coast Group: Congressman Jim
Courter's office - 4 members
D. Leadership Group: Congressman Bob
Livingston's office - 4 members
III. Contra Aid Volunteer Group.
A. Met together for kick off and briefing by
Pat Buchanan, Ollie North, Congressman
Trent Lott, Congressman Dick Cheney,
Adlopho Calero, Alphonso Robelo, and
Enrique Bermundez.
(1.) Eighteen of the top business
lobbyists attended meeting.
B. Confirmed calls were made on the following
members with designated results:
\(^\^a^jJS
Ljop
d-\^-wi 'f'^
475
Paae 2.
Memo To: Spitz Channel
From: Dan Kuykendall
Date: March 26, 1986
NAME
Daniel, Dan
Fascell
Jones
Robinson
Tallon
Biaqgi
Boner
Hefner
Pickle
McKay
Stall inas
Mazzol i
Whitley
Coughl in
McKernan
Grad ison
Roukema
Rinaldo
Green
Hor ton
Rowl and
Tauke
INFLUENCE
VOTE
LEVEL*
Y
3
Y
3
Y
6
Y
3
Y
5
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
4
Y
6-7
Y
7-8
Y
5
Y
3
N
N
N
N
IV. Personal Member Contacts by Dan Kuykendall:
Mica
Y
Jones (Tenn)
N
Cooper
N
de la Garza
N
Daniel, Dan
Y
Coughl in
Y
Meyers
Y
Goodl ina
Y
Reaula
Y
Schulze
Y
Roukema
Y
Smith, Denny
Y
Smith, R. (Ore)
Y
Frenzel
N
Wylie
N
Tauke
N
Hopkins
N
(Released )
♦Based on a scale of 1 to 10.
476
Page 3.
Memo To: Spitz Channel
From: Dan Kuykendall
Date: March 26, 1986
Summary
The performance of any group or idividual
must, of course, be considered in the context
of the total effort. It should be recoanized
that all the contacts referred to in this
report are with the actual Member of Congress.
Staff contacts are not referred to in this
report.
The three "yea" votes that I have rated as
6 or more are ones where I feel that our
influence was decisive. The other ratings
of under 5 are those where I feel we
contributed to the total effort.
I strongly feel that we have won the total
effort since there is little doubt that we
will prevail on the April 15 vote. Had it
not been for the total NEPL effort the
Speaker would not have had to promise a
second vote to obtain the temporary
victory on March 20.
477
July 23, 1986
Mr. Spitz Channell, President
The National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty
305 4th Street, NE
Washinaton, D. C. 20002
Dear Spitz:
Now that we have aotten a favorable House vote on our first
cooperative effort, I will take this opportunity to give you
my analyis of the accompl ishir.ents.
If. the Spring of 1985 the first atteirpt to obtain military
aid to the Contras was decisively defeated with our receiving
only 180 votes in the House.
Due to this very poor showing wo were forced to change our
tactics to seeking only humanitarian aid. Having been
retained by the Gulf & Caribbean Foundation and private Texas
clients I coordinated the outside (private) lobbying efforts
to obtain this aid. We lost our first "showdown" (Michel I)
by two votes but due to an intensive educational and lobbying
effort we won approval of Michel 1 1 by sixty-three votes.
In late 1985 I had my first experience workina in a voluntary
coalition with NEPL and Spitz Channell. This was a result of
our both using the services of IBC. In early 1986 Gulf &
Caribbean received its first direct support from NFPL. This
support enabled us to intensify our efforts to obtain
military aid for the Contras.
It became very obvious to me that NEPL was the only oraan-
ization with both the ability and the resources to run
productive advertising on aid to the Contras. Some other
groups actually did more harm than good with their
advertising.
On our first try in March we were able to get 210 votes for
military aid to the Contras, an improvement of thirty votes
but 3till eight votes short.
The months of April, May, and June saw the most intensive
educational and lobbyino efforts by NtPL, dentinal, and Gulf
and Caribbean that this issue has «^ver received. r t <^ t-^
478
Pacie I.
Mr. bpitz Channpll
Washinaton, D. C.
July 23, 1986
We beaan the campaiqn with a taroet list of approximately
forty irembers of Congress. About ten of them were considered
"soft" even though we qot their votes in March. The target
list of forty was about one-quarter Republicans and three-
quarters Democrat.
The educational type TV plus the various lobbying efforts
began to shorten the undecided list to the point that two
weeks before the vote we specifically targeted thirteen
Congressmen for the last push TV effort. Efforts began in
earnest to remove people from the undecided list and,
therefore, enable us to cancel the TV in their markets. We
withdrew TV in Louisville ^nd San Antonio before the schedule
actually began because of commitments from three members.
Since I was retained by Sentinal as Senior Consultant on June
1, I became even more involved in media and lobbying strategy.
Even thouoh we continued to work hard on an additional ten
undecideds until the very last, our estimated vote count on
June 23 was 222 votes with a pro;iection of an additional five
Republicans and seven Democrats over ana above the March
total of 210. We actually received all the original 210 plus
five additional Republican and six Democrats.
Immediately after our 221-210 victory on the President's
package vs. the House Democratic leadership package, another
interesting vote took place. A very liberal package with no
military aid was offered against the President's package.
Twelve to fourteen people, all of whom had been on our
original undecided list, changed ano voted for the
President's package, including military aid.
All these last twelve to fourteen changes, plus the eleven
additional votes we received on the initial vote on the
President's package, were the successful targets of intensive
educational and lobbying efforts. I can say with total
confidence that our various combined efforts were a major
factor in more than half of the total.
I am hopeful that this new relationship with its multifaced
capability will bring us many more victories in the future.
Very truly yours.
Dan Kuykendall
DK:lp
479
Dotson/drg
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ONCLASSIFIED
ML.
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40QHiS
DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM G. LANGTON
EXECUTIVE SESSION
Thursday, March 12, 1987
House of Representatives,
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with
Iran,
Washington, D.C.
The select committee met, pursuant to call, at
in Room B-336, Cannon House Office Building.
Piftiatly Declassified/Released on J-^f-^'^
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by N. Menan, National Sacurity Councfl
'"'fl/Uj/f/fn
480
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iCUSSIFIEI
MS. NAUGHTON: We are on the record.
This is the Langton Deposition, it is March 12,
1987. My name is Pamela Naughton , staff counsel to the House
Select Committee on Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. And
if the people in the room will identify themselves.
MR. LEON: My name is Richard Leon, I am Deputy
Chief Minority Counsel for the House Select Committee.
MR. BUCK: My name is Kenneth Buck, and I am Assistant
Minority Counsel for the same committee.
MR. BECKMAN: I am Robert M. Beckman, attorney for
Southern Air Transport, Inc.
MR. LANGTON: William G. Langton, President of
Southern Air Transport.
Whereupon,
WILLIAM G. LANGTON,
was called as a witness on behalf of Select Committee and,
after having been first duly sworn, was exaunined and testified
as follows:
MS. NAUGHTON: For the record, you have already
received a copy of the rules of the committee, is that correct?
MR. BECKMAN: I have.
MS. NAUGHTON: And a copy of our House Resolution?
MR. BECKMAN: Yes, I have.
UNCLASSIFIED
481
UNCIASSIRED
1 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE
2 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
3 Q So the record is clear, the information Mr. Langton
4 will provide is confidential, because it is a business-type
5 material that will be treated as if it is Executive Session
6 material. However, it is not classified, and I explained to
7 the reporter already before this that the deposition- will not
8 be classified, although we will treat it confidentially.
9 THE WITNESS: I appreciate that.
10 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
11 Q Could you give us your age please?
12 A I am 40.
13 MR. BECKMAN: Excuse me, ma'am. You mentioned,
K when we talked on the telephone, you might want us to put on
^8 the record why we are not providing the telephone records.
'8 Would you like us to do that at this time?
17 MS. NAUGHTON: Sure.
18 . MR. BECKMAN: We were requested by the Chairman's
'8 letter, dated February 25, 1987, to provide, among other things
20 in 'paragraph 6, all telephone tolls and SAT records of long-
2^ distance telephone calls, together with an explanation of the
22 code numbers signifying the caller.
23 The Southern Air long distance calls are made mainly
2* on Watts lines using a computer that stores the information
28 on the number called and the c^all^ within Southern Air in- its
>r called and the caiier
UNCIASSIHED
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UNCIASSIHED
memory, and that memory is routinely erased at the end of a
month so that the period we had agreed to search, January,
1985 through October, 1986, was all unavailable.
We did, however, advise you that there were telephone
records of the MCI calls and AT&T calls. The MCI bills do
not have information signifying the caller, nor do the ATST
bills.
We could provide some identification based on the
AT6T credit card number. However, each month's bill ran
between 300 and 400 pages in length, and we indicated to you
that unless we heard otherwise, we respectfully submitted
this was more burden than would be justified by the limiting
information that would become available.
MS. NAUGHTON: For the record, I agree with that,
and if we have a specific question for a specific date or
time or credit card number, we will get back to you and provide
that specific information.
MR. BECKMAN: Thank you.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
" Q Mr. Langton, you told us your age is 40. Could you
give us your address?
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H that
Q Your home phone number please?
Your social security number?
UNCLASSIFIED
483
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e
7
8
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11
UNCLASSIHED
A
Q Is that the only number you have had, social security
number?
A Yes.
Q Tell us what your educational background is please?
A I have a Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration
from the University of Washington in Seattle.
Q Any post graduate work?
A I did some post graduate work at Pacific Lutheran,
a few classes at various universities around the country.
Q Can you give us a rundown of your employment history?
12 A Upon graduation from the University, I worked for
13 Flying Tigers Line in Los Angeles, '72 through '75. I
14 then relocated to Seattle with Alaska Airlines, from '75
15 to '79, I think it was, Sunstrand Data Control, from '79 —
16 no, I guess '78 to '79. I left Alaska in '78, and then '79
17 through '83, Evergreen International Airlines.
18 Q From what, "78 —
19 ~ A '79 through '83. And since May of '83, I have been
20 wirh Southern Air Transport.
21 Q Let's start with the Flying Tiger employment. You
22 were with them for how many years?
23 A Three years.
24 Q What was your position there?
25 A I was first an operations analyst, then I later becam
UNCUSSIFIED
484
24
25
mussra
operations and maintenance analyst, and later manager of
fuel administration. I am sorry, fuel and off-route planning
3 I think was the proper title.
4 Q During the time you were with Flying Tigers, did
5 you know of any either contracts with or association between
6 Flying Tigers and the Central Intelligence Agency?
7 A No.
8 Q Do you maintain any contact with anyone at Flying
9 Tigers anymore?
10 A What do you mean by contact?
11 Q Have you talked to anyone at Flying Tigers in the
12 past five years?
13 A Sure. I still have some acquaintances there.
14 Q Now, are you aware of, either through personal
15 knowledge or otherwise, of any flights Flying Tigers have
16 made to Iran?
17 A No, I ajn not.
18 Q Now, you mentioned you were with Evergreen for
19 eibout four years?
20 "A You mean recently?
21 Q I mean since 1979.
22 A No.
23 Q You mentioned you were with E>/ergreen for four years.
Again, I will ask you the saime questions. Were you aware of
then, or are you aware of now any connection between Evergreen
UNCUSSIFIED
485
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and the Central Intelligence Agency?
A No, I am not.
Q Did Evergreen ever perform any contracts of which
you are aware with the Central Intelligence Agency?
A Not that I am aware of.
Q Did Evergreen perform contracts with the Department
of Defense?
A Yes, they did.
Q What was the nature of those contracts?
A Log Air.
Q Do you want to explain that?
A Log Air is a pattern flight for the Department of
Air Force. It's a re-distribution of general goods from air
base to air base. It is a routine pattern clause.
Q Would those be classified necessarily?
A The — no, I don't believe so.
Q I had another question for you regarding another
carrier, Burlington Northern. Do they have an air unit that
does charter flights?
' A No, they do not.
Q They do not?
A No.
Q They are simply freight haulers?
A Yes.
Q Now, you started with Southern Air Transport in May
UNCLASSIFIED
486
18
19
UNCLASSIFIED
1 of '83, is that correct?
2 A That IS correct.
3 Q What is your title?
4 A I am President/Chief Operating Officer.
5 Q Do you own any stock in the corporation?
6 A No, I do not.
7 Q Do you have any other sources of income other than
8 your salary from the Corporation?
9 A No, I do not. I am sorry, yes, I do. We have a
10 bonus program, which is a source of income.
11 Q Is that an annual program?
12 A Yes, it is.
13 Q Is that paid from the profits of the Company?
14 A Paid from the profits of the Company, correct.
15 Q Have you held the same title throughout your employ-
's ment with Southern Air Transport?
17 A Yes, I have. I never got promoted.
- Q Why don't you just describe, in general, your duties
at Southern Air Transport.
20 "a I am Chief Operating Officer. I am responsible for
21
the daily flight activity and the general running of the
*2 Company .
23
Q Were you aware when you went to work for Southern
2* Air Transport that it had previously been owned by the CIA?
25
A Yes.
UNCUSSIFIED
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UNCUSSIFIED
10
Q How were you made aware of that?
A Just common knowledge in the industry.
Q At the time you went to work for Southern Air, did
you have to go through any clearance process?
A Not at the time I went to work for the Company, no.
Q At a later time?
A Yes.
Q For what purpose?
A For our Log Air contract. A standard of any
company that flies for Log Air is it must have a facility
clearance, and its managment receives a Secret clearance
check.
Q Is that done through the Department of Defense?
A I believe so.
Q Now-, let's go right into the transactions in question
the committee is concerned about, and I guess we should start
once you became employed with Southern Air Transport m meeting
DickGadd. Do you recall when you first met Mr. Gadd?
A Yes, I do.
Q When was that?
A Summer of 1983.
Q Had you known him prior to this?
A No, I didn't.
Q What were you told about him prior to meeting him?
What do you mean?
UNCUSSIFIED
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Q Did he just walk in off the street one day and
introduce himself?
A
Q
A
contract
Q
firm?
A
Q
A
Q
A
No. I was introduced to him by Mr. Bastian.
What did Mr. Bastian tell you about Mr. Gadd?
He was employed by Sumarico with which we had a
Did Bastian say he was an employee or broker for the
I don't know.
He ]ust said Gadd worked for Sumarico?
He was President of Sumarico.
What was the nature of that contract?
We had an agreement for which we provided an air-
craft and trained flight crews and provided aircraft to
Sumarico.
Q For what purpose did Sumarico need this training?
A The training was for our purposes, to assure the
crews were of our standards and could be put in our --
Q So you leased your aircraft for tl/iler use?
A That is correct.
Q For what purpose?
A They had a contract with, I believe, the Department
of Defense.
Q Do you know who their contract was with in the
Department of Defense?
UNCLASSIHED
489
UNCLASSIFIED
12
\ A I do not.
2 Q Did you ever meet with Mr. Gadd or any employees
3 of the Department of Defense?
4 A No, I didn't.
5 Q Did he ever tell you what division that contract
g was with?
7 A No, he did not.
8 Q Do you know if it was with Air Force or Navy?
9 A I do not.
10 Q Where were these flights to go?
11 A I don ' t know.
12 Q Well, when he leased the aircraft from you, did you
13 ask him where they were going?
14 A Some of the flights were within the Continental
16 United States-.
16 Q Were they all?
17 A I believe most of them were. I don't know for a
18 fact that all of them were.
'9 Q Did they haul anything on the flights?
20 - A Not at all.
21 Q Did you get compensated by the hour?
22 A By the hour, yes.
23 Q Do you recall how long the contracts were for?
24 A The contract expired in May of 1986.
25
UNCLASSIFIED
490
UNCLASSIFIED
13
1 BY MR. LEON:
2 Q When you say you don't know where the flights were,
3 does that -- are you saying that you can't recall, or you
4 didn't know then?
5 A I can't recall.
6 Q Is that something you could determine?
7 A Yes.
8 Q By looking back in records?
9 A Sure.
10 Q So if we were to ask you to look, would you be willing
11 to look through your records to determine that?
12 A Yes.
13 Q Do you believe you still have those records to look
1* through?
16 A I believe our flight records, yes. That is all we
^6 would have.
'7 MR. BECKMAN: You can get the logs?
THE WITNESS: I think our flight logs are retained
for five years, so I am sure they are available.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Mr. Langton, have you heard of the Delta Force?
A Yes, I have.
Q Did these flights have anything to do with the
Delta Force, to your knowledge, whether it be hearsay or direct
18
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*' knowledge?
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UNCLASSIHED
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MR. BECKMAN: Could we go off the record?
MS. NAUGHTON: Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
MS. NAUGHTON: You can go back on.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Do you recall how you received payment for these
flights from Sumarico?
A Yes. We were paid by check.
Q From Sumarico?
A From Sumarico, correct.
MR. LEON: Could we have that spelled for the record,
if you know how to spell it.
THE WITNESS: S-u-m-a-r-i-c-o.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Was. there any problem in payment?
A Never .
Q Now, there came a point — first of all, I am about
to Etart/|^^^^^^^^^H flights to Central America arranged by
Mr. Gadd. I want to know, prior to this time, was there any
otiTer activity with Mr. Gadd other than the flights we have
just discussed?
A No.
0 So the next enterprise by Mr. Gadd is the]
Central America flight, is that correct?
A That is correct.
UNCLASSIFIED
492
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Q Could you tell us how that came about?
A Which ones? The very first ones?
Q Well, the first flight occurred, do we agree, in
January, 1985?
A We didn't perform a flight then —
Q Correct.
A -- but I was contacted by Mr. Gadd and asked if we
could perform, which we could not, and we arranged for sub-
service.
Q Do you recall when you were contacted by Mr. Gadd?
A December of '84.
Q What did he say he wanted done?
A He said he would like to have a charter]
to, X believe it was^^^^^^^^^^^H/with Class C explosives.
Q Class C?
A Yes.
Q Did he tell you what for?
- A No.
Q What kind of equipment did he need, what kind of
airplane?
A He needed a jet to carry about 100,000 pounds.
Q Did he say for whom he was working?
A No, he did not.
Q Did you assume it was a government contract?
A No.
UNCLASSIFIED
493
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UNCUSSIHED
16
Q Did you think it was a private contract?
A I didn't know.
Q Do you recall when he had -- excuse me, where you
were when you had this discussion? ;,
A I think I was in my office.
Q He called you on the phone?
A Yes.
Q And what did you tell him regarding these flights
he wanted to do?
A I told him I would love to do it on a Here. That's
all we had.
Q That IS the Hercules aircraft?
A Yes.
Q v«/hat was his response?
A He thought that would be great, but he didn't want
to pay the price because it would take two Hercs to do the job
of one jet. So it was very simple. I couldn't help him.
Q V«rhen he first approached you about this, did he
ask for just one flight, or was it going to be a series of
flights?
A I believe it was just one flight.
Q And when he rejected the idea about using the
Hercules aircraft, what did you suggest?
That he find a jet.
And what did he say:
UNCLASSIFIED
494
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UNCUSSIFIED
17
1 A He said, can you help me?
2 Q And did you?
3 A Yes.
4 Q And how did you help?
5 A Turned it over to the Vice President of Operations,
6 Dave Mulligan, and he sub-serviced it with Arrow Air.
7 Q Did your company receive a commission?
8 A I hope so. I don't know for a fact, but I hope so.
9 We should have.
10 Q Why arrange with Arrow Air? Why them and not someone
11 else?
12 A No reason. They were ^ust available. I know we
13 made several phone calls to different carriers to see who had
availability of aircraft, and they happened to have it.
15 Q Do you know personally the man who owns Arrow Air?
16 A Do I know him personally?
Q Do you know the owner — first of all, do you know
who the owner of Arrow Air is?
A George Baskin.
Q Do you know him personally?
A Yes.
Q Are you aware of any other air carriers that he owns?
A Well, at that time I believe he owned Capitol.
What else was available? I don't know. That is the only
one I can remember at the time. They may have been out of
'."^A
yNClASSIflHL
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business by that time.
Q Have you ever heard of International Air Leasing?
A Yes.
Q Does he own that?
A I believe he owns it, but I don't know for a fact.
Q What kind of work do they do?
A They are a leasing company.
Q Same as Arrow Air?
A No. Arrow Air is an operating company.
Q Could you explain that for us?
A Which?
Q The difference.
A Between a leasing company and an operating company?
Q What does a leasing company do?
A They drive leased airplanes. They are a financial
organization. That is basically all they are. They have
assets and lease them for a rate of return.
- Q Do you know whether International Air Leasing has
done work for the CIA?
A I do not.
Q Do you know whether Arrow Air has done leasing?
A I do not.
Q Do you know whether or not Arrow Air has flown any
flights to Iran since 1979?
A I do not.
UNCIASSIHED
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ONCLASSIFIEO
19
Q How about, do you know whether or not Arrow Air
has flown any flights to the Contras in Nicaragua or around
Nicaragua since the^^^^^^f lights?
A I don ' t know .
Q Now, what was your personal involvement with these
flights, if any? Could you describe that?
A The initial one was just simply getting the phone
call, and they turned it over to Mr. Mulligan.
Q Did Mr. Mulligan report back to you?
A Yes.
Q What did he tell you?
A He said he had arranged with Arrow to sub-service
the flight, and it went smoothly.
Q He told you it went smoothly?
A Yes,
Q He didn't tell you there were any problems?
A Not that I can recall.
I take that back. There was one. They were late.
Q Who was late?
* A Arrow.
Q With what?
A They ran a common carriage operation between New
York and San Juan, and they were delayed almost 12 hours, if
I recall, coming off of that before they were availeible to
do the charter.
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
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Arriving ^^^^^^^B
A Late, yes.
Q Did he mention any other problems in loading?
A No.
Q Do you happen to know where ^^^^^^^^h-- now, I am
speaking about all ^^^^^^^^H flights generically for a minute.
Do you know where these airplanes were actually loaded |
In other words, there are several runways at the
airport; there is civilian, military, there is]
Do you know which were used?
A No, I do not.
Q Who would have that information?
A Gees, I suppose one of the crew members that were
there would know where we were loaded.
Q That doesn't narrow it down too much for us. Can
you tell us how we should frame our inquiry to your company
so that we could get that information?
- A I think if you asked specifically where the aircraft
was loaded, I will get you the answer. A specific location.
BY MR. LEON:
Q Would your flight logs indicate who the pilot was
that day?
A Flight logs would indicate it, yes.
Q Would the flight logs indicate where it was loaded?
A The flight log would indicate who the pilot was.
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That would be it.
Q Perhaps the pilot would recall?
A That is what I just said. I could check with a few
of them and see if they recall exactly — I am not familiar
with the airport, so we would have to get a jet chart out
and have them point.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Did Mr. Gadd call you after that first flight in
January to arrange for any more f light s^^^^^^^^^H to Central
America?
A Yes. He asked us to do another one, I think it was
in March of "85.
Q How did this come about?
A Phone call. Same thing. He said "I will give
Dave a call and see what he can do."
Q How did Mr. Gadd pay for the first flight?
A Check.
Q From Sumarico?
A I believe we got a check.
Q From Sumarico?
A I don ' t know .
Q If you received a check, whose account would you have
credited?
A We would have credited Southern Air's account, and
then we would have charged, written a check for Arrow's account
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Q What I am saying, when the money would have come in
from Mr. Gadd, whose account would have been credited for
receiving that?
A Mr. Gadd's account.
Q But he didn't have a personal account with your
company .
A It was Sumarico and later beceune East. Whatever
g company it was at that time is the one that would have gotten
g charged.
^Q Q Did you know at this point, in January, 1985,
^^ whether he was East or whether he was Sumarico?
^2 A I don't recall. I don't recall which one he was.
13 I know there was a name change, but I don't know when.
14 Q When you say there was a name change, is it your
15 understanding- they are one and the Seune company?
16 A Yes. Just a name change.
17 Q Do you know why there was a name change?
18 To your information, who owns East?
19 A I don't know.
20 " Q Do you know who owns Sumarico?
21 A No, I do not.
22 Q Now, to your knowledge, did the first flight, that
23 is the January, '85 flight, land in]
24 I don't know.
25 Q Do you know who accepted delivery?
:now who acceptea aeiiver
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y A • I do not.
2 Q On the subsequent flights that SAT f lew i
3 to Central America, where would the records be of the landings;
4 in other words, where did the plane actually land?
5 A On the flight record.
g Q Are those completed after the flight is performed?
7 A Yes, right.
8 Q So if for some reason, for some emergency, some
9 reason, the pilot had to sit down in a place other than he had
10 planned on, that would be recorded in the flight —
11 A Yes, it would.
12 Q If you would wait until I finish my question, he can
13 get the answer down. He can't get it when we are both talking.
14 A I thought it was a statement.
15 Q If you wait, the question mark will be at the end.
16 So the plan that the pilot might file or should file
17 before the flight actually takes off might be different from
18 where he indeed flies if there is some emergency or some reason
19 to put down in another spot, is that right?
20 A That is correct.
21 Q Now let's go to the second flight then in March of
22 '85. You said Mr. Gadd called you again for the same reason,
23 and you again directed him to Mr. Mulligan, is that correct?
2* A That is correct.
28 Q What happened then?
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A He flew the charter, sub-service charter by Arrow.
Q Whose idea was it to call Arrow again?
A I imagine Mr. Mulligan's, I don't know.
Q You didn't direct him to call Arrow?
A No.
Q Do you know why he called Arrow if he had had less
than adequate service from him before?
A I don't know that was the only one he called. I just
don't know.
Q Okay. Do you know what sort of plane they used5
A Yes. They used a DC-8..
Q How do you know that?
A I was told.
Q By whom?
A By Mr. Mulligan.
Q And where did they pick up|
do you know?
on this flight.
- A
^ Q
A
Q
flight?
A
No, I do not.
Where did they land on this flight?
I don ' t know .
And how was your company paid for the March, '85
The same way as the January flight.
BY MR. LEON:
Let me ask you this, Mr. Langton. Would you have
3 the January tiignt.
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1 known — before you asked Mulligan to arrange for the sub-
2 contract with Arrow, would you have known where they intended
3 to fly to? Is that the kind of thing Mulligan would have told
4 you, or Gadd would have told you?
5 A Sure.
6 Q If they had told you they were flying to a place
7 that you don't normally fly to, would you remember that?
8 A Probably.
9 Q Were there some places in Central America where you
10 either didn't normally fly or wouldn't fly to?
11 A We do charters all the time.
12 Q Let me give you an example. Back there at that time,
13 did you have any flights to Nicaragua?
14 A No, we didn't.
15 Q If someone had come in asking for you to do a deal
18 with them where you would fly something to Nicaragua, would
17 that have caused you to pause?
1* - A It most certainly would.
Q Okay. So do you think it is probably safe to say
this wasn't a flight to Nicarag\ia?
A That would be a safe assumption.
Q But you could check this anyway in your records,
is that right?
A Well, we don't have the records. We didn't fly the
flights, so we wouldn't have any records. Arrow would as
uxVii uiicuA. uiixa anyway xii
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to what they flew.
Q How about back at that time, Costa Rica, were you
doing deals with flights to Costa Rica?
A I believe so.
Q So that might not necessarily have caught your
attention.
A No.
Q How about El Salvador back at that time?
A We did flights there as well.
Q How about Honduras back at that time?
A Yes.
12 Q So you are not recalling today, if it had been a
13 flight to one of those three countries, Costa Rica, Honduras
14 or El Salvador, it might be because it wouldn't have been an
IB uncommon flight at that time.
16 A No, it was a straightforward charter. We do them ai:
17 the time. I just don't recall exactly where the destination
18 waa^ I don't have the records for it, so I am sorry, I can't
19 help you.
20 Q But it would have been flagged in your mind and
2t Mulligan's mind if it was a place you didn't normally go to.
22 A It would stand out. It sure would.
23 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
24 Q After the March, 1985 flight by Arrow Air, when was
26 your next contact with Mr. Gadd regarding any more/
ii. . x^ auxc wuuxu.
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Central America flights?
A In December of '85.
Q And what happened in December of '85?
A He asked for another flight.
Q To the best of your recollection, tell me what he
g told you.
J A He called me and asked if we could perform a flight
with class C explosives ^^^^^^^^^|to Central America.
g They said, certainly you have a plane to do the job.
^Q Q You since acquired an airplane?
^\ A Since acquired an airplane.
^2 Q What type of airplane?
^3 A Boeing 707C.
t4 Q Would you explain to me the difference between a
)5 class C explosive and class A explosive?
fS A I can't. There is all kinds of categories of
17 explosives, and I really don't know the difference between
18 the two.
19 Q Who filled out the hazard materials form?
20 A The consignee would.
21 Q That would be Gadd's responsibility?
22 A No, probably the customer, whoever that was, in
23 ^^^^|W Whoever the_ shipper was would fill out all the proper
24 paperwork.
25 Q Now, Mr. Langton, is it your position, then, that
the shipper was would fi;
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as carrier you had no responsibility to any Federal agency
to complete any form?
A Our responsibility is to assure there is proper
paperwork with all shipments, yes. Then we fill them out.
Q My question is to you then: Who filled out the
hazard materials, the Department of Transportation hazard
materials?
A This is a foreign flight.
Q So then —
A Nothing touched the U.S., so I am not even sure we
were required to fill out any DOT hazard materials. There
would have been a notification requirement. I don't know what
all our requirements are on a foreign flight such as that.
.. But whatever they were, they would have been filled out properly
or we couldn't take the trip.
Q If the customer were to fill them out, who was the
customer?
A As I said, I don't know.
fg Q Well, your statement is then —
20 A Mr. Gadd is a broker.
2\ Q Your statement is then that your planes were carrying
22 hazard materials, it was not your job to fill out the paper-
23 work, but you don't know whose it was?
24 A My statement is we had a charter. They constantly
25 would fill out all the paperwork, and we would fly the charter.
to lixi out tne paper-
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We would fill out our portion, and^Wey would fill out theirs.
Q Would you have a copy of that?
A No.
Q You would not keep a copy?
A We were required to keep that paperwork for 90
days, and it is routinely destroyed.
Q Who requires you keep it for 90 days?
A DOT.
Q Do you know what sorts of explosives these were?
A No, I do not.
Q Were they for commercial or military use?
A I do not know.
Q Did you ask?
A No, I didn't.
Q Why not?
A I don't know why I would.
Q Well, wouldn't it concern you if they were carrying
daixgerous materials on your aircraft?
A We routinely carry explosives around the world.
That is the business we are in.
Q Do you take special precautions or special safety
arrangements?
A Yes, we do,
Q Do you then not have to know the type of material
and substances you are carrying?
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A Yes. Right.
Q Then I ask you again: Did you know or did you ask
what type of substances were being carried?
A I did not.
Q Who wouid have asked that question?
A Probably Dave Mulligan.
Q Anyone else?
A Bob Parison.
Q Bob who? • ' ■ .
A Parison.
Q Could you spell that?
A p-a-r-i-s-o-n. Director of Operations.
BY MR. LEON:
Q Is that because, Mr. Langton, they would have to
assure that the packaging was adequate to assure it didn't
go off in raid air or something like that?
A That is correct.
Q That was their responsibility?
A That IS their responsibility to be sure that everythin
is done according to our regulations.
Q Is it common for you to get. involved in the details
of that kind, of making sure the packaging is proper, or what-
■■ UNCLASSIFIED . , .
A I don't normally get involved in those details, no.
Q Let me ask you this: Since you have been with Souther
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f Air, going on quite a few years now, at least three years, fou.
2 years, have you had any occasions where you got involved becaui
2 of the packaging before they put it on the plane or while they
4 were putting it on the plant, it was inadequate, and they
g wanted to abort the mission because -- can you recall that
g happening?
■J A No, I can't.
g BY MS. NAUGHTON:
g Q Do you know where these came from?
10 A I do not know.
tt Q Were they U.S. made?
^2 A I do not know.
13 Q Who besides Mr. Gadd would know?
14 A You would have to ask the crews^^^^^^^|if they saw
IB anything on it.
16 MR. BECKMAN: The consignor might know?
17 THE WITNESS: The consignor or consignee would
1 8 know .
19 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
20 Q But you don't know who those people are, is that
21
22 A I don't know for a fact. I was told it was defects
23
24 Q Did Mr. Mulligan tell you that or Mr. Gadd?
2B A Mr. Mulligan told me. that.
Know ror a. zacz.. x was
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1 Q Did Mr. Mulligan explain to you the difficulties
2 he had in having to call defects and so forth?
3 A No. I didn't know we had any difficulties.
4 Q What do you know about defects?
5 A Nothing.
6 Q Well, you just brought up the nautie , so is all you
7 know about defects what Mr. Mulligan told you?
8 A Yes.
9 Q How were you paid by Mr. Gadd for all these flights?
10 Is it your testimony it was by check?
11 A No, that is not my testimony. It was by check or
12 wire transfer. I really don't know how we were paid. I know
13 we were paid.
14 Q Were you paid the entire balance?
IB A Yes.
18 Q And on time?
'7 A Yes,
^* Q Do you know what Trans World Arms, Incorporated,
is?
A No, I do not.
*' Q Have you ever heard of that company?
*2 A Not to the best of my knowledge.
23 Q When was — did you fly a flight for Gadd from
24 ^^^^H to Central America in December of '85?
28 A Yes.
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Q That was a SAT plane?
A That was a SAT plane, yes.
Q Was a flight plan filed?
A Yes.
Q Where did the plane land?
A I don't know. I don't have it in front of me,
UNCLASSIFIED
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0 All right. Could you check that this eveQing and
come back tomorrow and tell us?
A Sure.
MR. BECKMAN: How can you check this evening?
THE WITNESS: I will call the office and tell them
to pull the flight.
MR. BECKMAN: Is there going to be somebody there
this evening?
THE WITNESS: There is somebody there 24 hours a
day.
MR. BECKMAN: What is it we are going to get?
THE WITNESS: We are going to get the December '85
flight plan for the Boeing from^^^^^Hto whatever.
MR. LEON: Whoever the pilot was.
MR. BECKMAN: Are you sure we haven't provided this?
THE WITNESS: You did provide it. But I'll call the
office.
MS. NAUGHTON: There is a blank in that. I wouldn't
hav£ asked the questions otherwise.
MR. BECKMAN: Could you show it to us?
MS. NAUGHTON: I have stacks of documents. I
couldn't haul them all over here.
THE WITNESS: There cannot be a blamk.
MR. BECKMAN: Cam we go off the record a second?
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes.
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(Discussion off the record.)
MS. NAUGHTON: Can we go back on.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Now, after December of '85 did you make any more
flights for Mr. Gadd ^^^^^^^^^^H to Central America?
A Yes.
Q Do you recall when those were?
A No, I don't, not off the top of my head.
Q Would that have been February 7th through 9th of
1986?
A Could have.
MR. BECKMAN: What is this?
THE WITNESS: She is asking me about the next flight.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Mr. Langton, your attorney has provided a chronology
of these flights. Did you review that with them —
A Yes, yes.
. Q Could you wait until I finish the question.
Did you review that with them prior to them
submitting it to this Select Committee?
A I did not, no.
Q Have you seen it since its submission?
A Yes, I have.
Q And is there anything in there that to your
knowledge is incorrect?
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A I think I had better see specifically what you are
referring to. What I have looked at is factual.
Q Okay.
MR. BECKMAN: In fact, you told me eibout one thing
there you couldn't agree with, something I had in there
happening in January.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q I would like to show you -- it has not been numbered,
but it is a chronology prepared by Mr. Beckman's office, dated
January 23, 1987. Do you recognize that chronology?
A Yes, I do.
Q Now, correct me if I'm wrong, Mr. Langton. My
information is that on February 7th through 9th that your
company performed a flight for Mr. Gadd ^^^^^^^^Hto Central
America landingf^^^^f^H Is that
Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
MS. NAUGHTON: Let's go back on the record.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Mr. Langton, are you aware of a flight on March 2,
1986 at^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hby
A Yes, 1 am.
Q Could you tell us about that?
A It was a routine charter.
Q For vrtiom?
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UNCLASSIRED
For Mr. Gadd.
Where did it originate?
I believe!
37
A
Q
A
Q So it was part of these flights that we have been
discussing?
A Yes, it was one of those flights.
Q All right. To your knowledge had you landed at
for any other customer during 19 86?
A Yes. I believe we have landed there for our MAC
flights.
Q Those are Department of Defense flights, and that
is MAC for the record; is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q So the March 2 entry could have been for Department
of Defense flights; is that correct?
A No, that's not correct.
Q All right. How do you know it was a Gadd flight?
. A It went ^^^^^^^^^H to Central America. We don't
fl^ international foreign flights for the Department of
Defense .
Q Okay. Good.
Go ahead, did you want to —
A I mean it is to- foreign locations, we don't do
it for the Department of Defense.
Q What would Mr. Gadd or your operations pebpre~need to
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do to land at a U.S. Air Force Base?
A We would need to receive clearances.
Q And when is that accomplished? Prior to the time
the flight is in the air?
A Usually, yes.
Q And could you tell me how that is done?
A I cannot. The director of operations would have to
answer that.
Q Who would obtain the clearance? Would that be your
company or would it have been Mr. Gadd who made that arranqe-
ment?
A It would be our responsibility to assure clearances
have been received, aind it could have been done by us or
verified by us.
MR. BECKMAN: Excuse me. I might be able to be
helpful here because the witness and you might be on slightly
different wavelengths. Are you asking more than contact the
Air- Force Base in advance, telling them you want to land and
have them tell you you cannot? That much you know yourself.
right?
THE WITNESS: Yes,
UNCUSSIFIEO
MR. BECKMAN: But you are thinking Ms. Naughton might
be asking for something more detailed and precise than that.
THE WITNESS: We would make sure we have landing •
rights wherever we are going before we depart. That would be
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the normal procedure.
MR. BECKMAN: And these landing rights could be in a
telex message?
THE WITNESS: Sure. Normally are.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q My question is: Is there anything special that has
to be done to land at a U.S. Air Force Base?
A Nothing more special than contacting and asking for
landing approvals.
Q All right. Do you have to tell them what the nature
of your flight is?
A Yes.
Q All right. And do you recall for this particular
flight what the Air Force was told was the nature of the
flight?
A No, I do not.
Q Would Mr. Mulligan know that?
- A Possibly. . •
BY MR. LEON:
Q Let me ask you this, Mr. Langton. Do you fly into
U.S. Air Force Bases when you are not flying on U.S.
Department of Defense business?
A Seldom.
Q What kind of circumstamces or what kind of situations
have you done that where it wasn't on Department of Defense
UNCLASSIFIED
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1 business?
2 A A diversion.
3 Q Could you explain what that means.
4 A We may have a weather diversion and that may be the
5 only base, air strip to divert into or there may be —
6 other than the Department of Defense movement, like the
7 Department of Interior, State Department, other qovernment
8 agencies. .,■;-•■.
9 Q Let's put it this way. Can you recall under what
10 circumstances, other than a diversion because of weather or
11 you were on government-related business, where you did land
12 at a U.S. Government Air Base?
13 A Repeat that.
14 Q All right. Other than when you were flying on a U.S.
'5 Government contract, either for the Department of Defense or
18 some other agency of the Government, other than that and
^' other than the circumstances surrounding a weather diversion,
^^ can. you think of any other situations where your planes have
19 landed on U.S. Air Force Bases or U.S. Bases other than this
**^ one here involving —
2' A I cannot, no.
22 Q other than this situation here involving Mr. Gadd's
*■' request.
2* So, in other words, this was pretty unique?
25 MR. BECKMAN: Excuse me. You haven't established
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from the witness whether this was or was not a government
operation. Are you assuming you have already established
that Mr. Lemgton knows for whom Mr. Gadd was operating?
MR. LEONs Oh, I shouldn't assume that, of course.
MR. BECKMAN: Make the record complete.
BY MR. LEON:
Q Do you know or did you know then -- do you know now
or did you know then on whose behalf Mr. Gadd was operating?
A No, I do not.
Q But when you went to the Air Force Base to request
authorization to land, did you inform them on whose behalf
you were delivering the materials?
A Let me clarify one thing. I don't sit down in the
operations center and arrange for flight clearances, et cetera.
So I don't know 2my of this.
I don't know.
MR. BECKMAN: Is it conceivable Gadd arranged it?
THE WITNESS: It is very conceivable. Often our
customers will arrange for clearances and all we need is a
verification that it has been done- That is enough to
satisfy us.
BY MR. LEON:
ONCIiSSIFIED
Would you note that somewhere in your records, that
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you had received the verification?
A Well, the very fact that we arrived and landed and
left —
MR. BECKMAN: Without being shut down.
THE WITNESS: — would indicate we received the
clearance .
BY MR. LEON:
Q Do you get them usually orally over the phone or
in writing?
A Most of them are on a telex copy, but there are
occasions when we get it orally. •
Q Do you keep those on the telex copies?
A We keep it in the flight log and then they are
routinely destroyed after 90 days.
Q Is it entered onto the flight log?
A No. I don't think there is a box there.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Now, by this time, Mr. Langton, you had done
business with Mr. Gadd for about a year and a half or more ;
is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q And what sort of relationship did you have with
Mr. Gadd?
A Define relationship. What do you mean?
Q Did you have a friendship >LLth_Ml.. Gadd as well as
iwimm
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business association?
A What do you mean by friendship?
Q All right. Did you ever meet socially with Mr.
Gadd?
A No.
Q Did you ever have dinner with Mr. Gadd?
A Yes.
Q All right. But you consider those business dinners?
A Yes, I do.
Q All right. Did you ever attend a sporting contest
with Mr. Gadd?
A I don't think so.
Q Did you ever play golf with Mr. Gadd?
A No.
Q Did you ever attend a cocktail party with Mr. Gadd?
A I believe so.
Q Could you tell me when and where?
- A It was at Mr. Bastian's house, and I have no idea
wheQ that was, but it was a business cocktail party we had.
I cannot recall when it was now.
Q Is that the only cocktail party you ever attended
with Mr. Gadd?
A Yes.
Q Approximately how often did you speak to Mr. Gadd,
let's say in a month's period of timell
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1 A Which month?
2 Q Well, would it depend then —
3 A Yes
4 Q -- are you saying, on the kind of business you
5 were doing?
6 A Right
^ Q How often did you visit his offices?
8 A Very seldom
^ Q Could you give me a ballpark figure?
''0 A Numeric number?
Q Yes.
A Five.
^3 Q Where were his offices?
'^ A In Vienna
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Q Virginia?
A Virginia, yes.
^^ Q Now, did there come a period of time at which Mr.
Gadd approached you and Mr. Bastian regarding supplying the
eontras in Nicaragua?
A What do you mean "supplying"?
Q Well, doing anything to help the cause of the
Contras?
A Yes.
Q Could you tell us how that came about?
A Yes. He gave Mr. Gadd a call on the phone, said he
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' had an issue which he felt was important and wished to discuss
2 and wished to come to Miami, and I said please come to Miami.
3 Q Do you recall approximately when this was?
* A I believe it was in the mid fall of '85.
5 Q Where did you meet?
6 A We met at Mr. Bastian's house,
7 Q Why
® A I'm not sure. I think Mr. Bastian was sick that
9
day.
Q Who else was there?
A Mr. Gadd, Mr. Bastian and myself.
Q Was Mrs. Bastian at home?
A She was at home.
Q What time of day was this meeting?
A It was in the afternoon, aporoximately two o'clock.
Q And what did Mr. Gadd tell you?
A Mr. Gadd explained that there was some private
investors who were interested in setting up a resupply
operation in Central America to assist the Contras. He
wanted to know our interest in participation.
Q What did he wamt you to do?
A He asked us if we would set up that operation.
Q What do you mean, set up the operation? What does
that mean?
A That means go down, set up a maintenance base and
ou mean, set up tne oper;
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fly aircraft.
Q Where was this to be set up?
A He didn't have the location yet.
Q Where were you going to fly to?
A To the Contras.
Q In Nicaragua?
A Not specifically.
Q All right. To where were you to fly?
A Wherever the Contras were .
Q So if they were in Nicaragua, did he want you to
fly into Nicaragua?
A Yes.
Q What kind of aircraft did he say this would take?
A He didn't have an aircraft.
Q All right. So he wanted to lease yours; is that
correct?
A No. He wanted us to -- his first -- to put it
ainply, his request was could we go down and set up this
-ip^nti rn It would require buying airplanes, it would
require setting up a maintenance base, it would require
hiring mechanics, et cetera. We said no.
Q Now, when you say "we" —
A Mr. Bastian and myself.
Q Both of you were in agreement?
A Yes.
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Q Why did you say no?
A Because that -- we were in the midst of major growth
in the company. It would take a tremendous amount of time
and talent away from our mainstream business to do this, and
we did not want to divert our attention.
Q Wouldn't this have been a very lucrative thing for
Southern Air?
A I don ' t know .
Q Did you discuss money?
A Yes.
Q What did you discuss about it?
A We discussed what kind of capitalization they had,
and Mr. Gadd really had no idea. There was private funding.
He didn't know how much there was. He knew it was going to
be very tight.
Q Did he give you any figures?
A No.-
Q None at all?
- A No.
Q Now, when he said private funding, did he give you
any indication specifically where the money was coming from?
A No.
Q Did you ask him?
A No.
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Q Did he say why he —
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' A He was asked to.
2 Q By who?
3 A I don' t know.
Q Had you met Mr. Secord at this time?
A No .
^ Q Had you heard of Mr. Secord before?
' A Never heard of him.
® 0 Did Mr. Gadd indicate who had asked him? Did he
indicate this was supported by anyone in the government or
anyone in authority?
A It was very clear this was a private enterprise
program. He did indicate the Federal Government was very much
supportive of it and was hopeful it could be set up and
quickly assist the Contras survive it. At that time there was
dire need, they were unable to receive the supplies, the little
supplies that they did have, and all was not going well for
them.
Q Did he expect government monies would soon take
art?
A He specifically said — I'm sorry. Yes. He
expressed that he felt in due time government money would
take over. This was a bridge. It was purely a bridge to
keep them alive until the funds started flowing.
Q You were about to _say he^ spe_c_i_f ideally said something.
What was that?
ut to say he specificall
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1 A I thought you had asked me if he had said government
2 money would be injected into this operation, and he specifically
3 said that it was prohibited by the Boland Act, no government
4 money would be injected, and that's why private enterprise
5 was stepping forward to try to breach this gap.
6 Q Did he say that they had already established some
7 sort of supply network or was this definitely from the icratch
8 concept?
9 A It was my impression that it was starting from
'0 scratch.
Q Did he ever mention the use of foreign national
pilots that had been used in 1985 to supply the Contras?
A No. No.
Q Did he give you any specifics at that time as to
what had been going on, who was supplying them at that
particular time?
A No, he didn't.
BY MR. LEON:
_ Q Did he give you any idea where you would be landing
your planes?
A Not yet. Not yet. Not in that conversation.
Q Were you worried about them being shot down?
A I wasn't worried about anything. It was a conceptual
problem and that was to resupply, in-country resupoly.
Q I don't think I follow you. What do you mean by a
timk I toiiow you. wnat
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^ conceptual problem? Could you explain that a little?
2 A There were no airplanes, there was no ooeration.
3 What he was asking is could this be set up and could you set
4 it up. The answer is no, I can't set it up, so I had no
5 worry about airplanes.
6 Q You didn't even get to the point of thinking about
7 the problems of trying to land in a war zone?
8 A No.
9 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
10 0 Did Mr. Gadd at that meeting indicate how you would
11 be paid, what mechanism would be used?
12 A Only that it would be funded with private funding
13 and that would pay for the operation.
14 Q So did you discuss whether it would be an hourly
16 basis or monthly stipend?
16 A Yes.
17 Q What was discussed?
18 A Simply that. How could you structure it? In our
19 business you can pay by the hour, if you have sufficient
20 hours, or if you don't know what the hourly activity is, you
21 would probably go on to a day charge and then an hourly rate.
22 Q What did he say to that?
23 A He didn't know. He didn't know what the scope of
24 it would be. He was trying to find out from us what we would
25 be willing to do and how we could fit into it.
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' Q Did he tell you or did you qet the imoression he had
2 spoken to any other companies about this?
3 A I didn't. Neither of those was a point of discussion.
^ Q Did you discuss insurance?
A No.
^ Q Now, when you turned him down —
^ A I think we did discuss insurance, said you got to
° have insurance. I think we said you have to have landing
rights, you have to have all -- all of those things have to be
established or you can't even perform.
Q Did you discuss under what flag the ships would be
flying?
A We did. We said you got to have a flag.
0 And what was his response?
A That would all be taken care of.
Q By whom?
A He didn't say.
■ Q Has Southern Air flown under othe r flags?
_ A Not that I ctm aware of.
Q All right. If he had asked you to fly under another
flag, would that have been xinusual?
A It would be unusual, yes
Q Would you do it?
A I don't know, I would have to —
MR. BECKMAN: I think, again, you are getting on
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' different wavelengths because if an airplane is registered
2 in one country, are you asking whether Southern Air as a
^ hypothetical would consider falsifying the certification —
^ MS. NAUGHTON: No.
5 MR. BECKMAN: I didn't think you were.
BY MR. NAUGHTON:
^ Q To your knowledge, during your presidency at Southern
Air, has the nomenclature ever been taken off any of your
aircraft?
A The name?
Q The name or the number.
A I know we have taken the name off. I ]ust got
through doing that and put another name on, which is my
customer's name. We would do that for a long-term contract.
If they want the airplane painted in their colors, that's fine
wi th me .
Q But what about a blank airplane with no nomenclature
on "there?
— MR. BECKMAN: Do you know the N number? Is that
meaningful to you?
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes, I understand what you say when
you say N number. Let's take it one at a time.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Has SAT ever flown an SAT plane with no logo,
nothing on it but an N number?
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' A Yes. We flew it for years,
2 Q When?
^ A Before I got there,
'• Q Why?
^ A Because they didn't want to spend the money to paint
the airplane. One of the very first things we did was start
' to paint the airplanes.
Q When you say "we," who do you mean?
A The previous managers, Mr. Grundy, Mr. Bastian.
Q When you first got there the planes had no markings
on them?
A They were just as clean as chrome. I mean it was
just a metal airplane with an N number on it.
Q My question is: Once you assumed the presidency,
to your knowledge for any mission was the nomenclature of a
plane completely taiken off and another substituted for it?
A Not that I am aware of.
Q Now, after this meeting, this initial meeting betwee
Mr,^ Gadd, Mr. Bastian and yourself in Mr. Bastian's home, how
was the meeting left? In other words, did you tell Mr. Gadd
absolutely not or did you leave the door open?
A We left the door open.
Q And did he come back to you with a counterproposal?
A He asked us to come to Washington where we could
talk about what roles we could play, and what it really boiled
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1 down to was our technical expertise was for hire and we provided
2 that.
3 BY MR. LEON:
4 Q Had he implied to you in any way, Mr. Langton, or
5 stated directly, either stated directly or implied to you that
^ if you were to get involved in this kind of a project it would
^ be favorable or helpful to Southern Air down the road in
® getting government contracts later on?
A No.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Now, after he invited you to come to D.C. did you
go?
A Yes, we did.
Q Who went?
A Mr. Bastian and myself.
Q Do you recall when this was?
A No, I don't.
Q Do you recall how long after the initial meeting
in Jthe fall of '857 Was it one month later? Was it a year
later?
A It was more like a month later;
Q Okay. Did anyone else go besides you and Mr.
Bastian?
A No.
Q What was discussed then at that meeting?
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A At that meeting the discussion was how to organize,
how to set up a resupply operation. We spent several hours
discussing the mechanisms, you know, how to build the company,
what operating rights were necessary and that full gamut.
Q Did Mr. Bastian actively participate in this
conversation?
A Yes.
Q And what was agreed to at that conversation?
A Nothing was agreed to other than he thanked us for
the information and that, you know, continue helping from' a
technical standpoint. He said fihe.
Q So it was basically a meeting where he asked
questions of you. Is that a fair assumption?
A I'm sorry. Who is "he"?
Q Mr . Gadd .
A No. We were still on the discussion if a company
was to be set up to resupply, what would be necessary. Mr.
Bas-tian is an attorney, an aviation attorney as well as an
airline executive, and had a great deal of good advice to give
to this group.
Q Okay. There were just the three of you at this
meeting?
Yes, I believe so.
UNCLASSIFIED
Q No one -else was with Mr. Gadd?
A No, I don't think so.
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Q Did Mr. Gadd give you any indication at this meeting
who he represented?
A No.
Q Did he tell you anything about government aporoval
of this project?
A No. As I said earlier, he indicated right from the
beginning that the government was very hopeful that this
project could be put together by private investors, private
individuals who were very anxious for it to occur.
Q Did he give you any more indication regarding the
capital he had or expected to recieive?
A No. We really still were a long ways from talking
about what kind of money was in — no aircraft had really been
acquired or laid out or even the scope of the operation really
identified.
0 Okay. Did Mr. Gadd mention or to your mind was there
any connection with ^^^^^^^H flights and the Contra resupply
operation?
_ A No.
Q There was never any indication perhaps the cargo
on that flight was used to supply the Cohtras?
A No.
Q Did you suspect that?
A I would say I suspected it, yes.
Q Why?
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A It makes complete sense to me.
Q Did you get the sense that the^^^^^ flights were
somehow government-sp>on3ored or his client was the government?
A No.
Q Did you get the sense it was private?
A Yes.
Q What gives you that sense?
A I don't know except that it was an impression I
got it was in the end privately funded, and that was my
impression all along.
Q But he never had trouble financing
flights?
A No.
Q What happened -then after the meeting in Washington?
KR. BECKMAN: Do you think we could take a break?
MS. NAUGHTON: Sure.
(Recess.)
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BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q I was going to ask you about your next contact
with Mr. Gadd after this meeting occurred in Vienna, Virginia.
This is on the subject of Contra re-supply. When was your
next contact with him?
A It was really within days.
MR. LEON: Did you go back to Florida?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Did he call you?
A Yes.
BY MR. LEON:
Q Who paid for the trip up?
A He did.
Q Did you take it as a business expense, like future
business development, something like that?
A Just like all of our travel is paid by ourselves,
except this trip you guys are going to pay for it, right?
Q I will leave that to Pam to answer.
A That's part of it.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q When Gadd got back to you, what did he say?
A The conversation really becaroe, can you help me
identify aircraft that fit in? And I would say, yes, I would
work on it. I worked on that, and I concluded the Caribou
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was probably the right airplane for this operation. We had
STOL aircraft —
Q What does that mean? Is that STOL?
A STOL. Short takeoff and landing.
Q For the record, describe why that is necessary.
A Well, it IS a characteristic that any time you are
working m the third world, what we call under-developed
areas, STOL aircraft has good value? You don't have these
big international airports where you can go down rambling
10,000 feet; and in this situation, it was apparent that would
not be the case. They would not have an international airport
to run in and out of.
Q The Caribou, is there a military equivalent for
that aircraft?
A No, not that I am award of. I know many were sold
to the military, but I don't know whether -- it was a commercial
aircraft.
Q Why did you determine -- aside from the short take-
off and landing, why did you determine Caribou would fit
his needs?
A Because one of the criterion was an aircraft capable
of making air drops, and it has a rear door and fit the bill.
There is not that many aircraft in the world that fit that
bill.
Q When you say air drops, equipment was to be
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parachuted from the aircraft?
A Yes.
Q Did he tell you that?
A Yes.
Q Did he tell you that they would be parachuting
weapons?
A No.
Q What did he say they were going to be delivering?
A Supplies.
Q By supplies, was that limited only to non-lethal
material?
A No.
Q Rather than my saying what he said, why don't you
tell me what he said? What was he going to drop?
A Supplies.
Q Did that include weapons?
A I don't know. I didn't ask.
Q So it could have?
A It could have, yes. Let me offer to you, it's
logical that some of it would be.
Q Now, what else did you discuss other than what kind
of aircraft were purchased?
A How we. Southern Air, could help this effort.
Q And what specifically?
A I said the way we could help the effort would be to
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UNCLASSIFIED
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lend our technical expertise in identifying aircraft, looking
at them, kicking tires, doing some maintenance if required.
Basically, that was it.
Q When you discussed doing maintenance, was that to be
maintenance only m the United States at the site in Central
America?
A Well, at that time, at that discussion I was really
referring to Miami. The idea was to prepare the aircraft.
The idea was in Micimi to get them ready for service.
Q At what point was it decided you would send peojsle
A When they screamed, panicked.
Q Who screamed?
A Bill Cooper, specifically. That they had problems
with the aircraft and they needed somebody down there. I
should make it clear, we never assigned anybody down there.
We did send several of our mechanics. We also sent some of --
arranged for vendors and mechanics to go down and try to
repair engines and whatever was required.
Q Mr. Coopier was not on your payroll?
A No.
Q Now, if he didn't disclose to you where he was
getting the money to do this, why did you agree to help him?
A Because I thought it was the right thing to do. I
didn't see any reason not to. The concept itself made perfect
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sense.
Q What do you mean?
A Nicaragua is a Marxist State, the Contras are
freedom fighters. They are in trouble, they need help. Why
not help them?
Q Did Mr. Bastian share this opinion?
A Yes, yes.
Q Did anybody in the company object?
A No.
Q So as far as you are aware, everybody shared that
opinion that you havejust expressed?
A Yes. I didn't go out for a vote.
Q I understand. Did you ask for -- in terms of the
mechanics that went |^HHp "**= ^^^^ ^^""^ ^^^ ^""^^
or did you get volunteers, or how did that work?
A Well, there most certainly was volunteers, but the
aircraft is not the type of aircraft we operated. We needed
to find somebody who knew something about round engines,
and we only had a few guys who knew anything about them, and
we asked if they could go down and help get these engines
working.
Q Were they given any kind of bonus for it?
A No.
Q Did you charge higher rates than normal for a .
rather dangerous area?
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A ^^^^^^^Hi wouldn't consider a dangerous area.
Q Was that the only place that you send mechanics?
A As far as I know. But I will qualify it. It is
not inconceivable they might have moved over ^^^^^^^^H at
one time or another.
Q For the record,]
A
MR. LEON: How far would that be from
Roughly.
THE WITNESS: 300, 400 miles.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q To your knowledge, were you or any of your
employees at the air strip in Costa Rica that was built?
A No.
Q Were you aware of that?
A Yes.
Q Who made you aware of it?
A Mr. Gadd.
Q What did he tell you about it?
A He said they were building an airstrip in Costa
Rica, showed me where on a map.
Q How did he say this was being financed?
A Private funding.
Q What did he say regardir
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A Nothing.
Q He 3ust -- did they buy the land?
A I don't know. As far as his involvement or what he
told me about it was really the construction end of it.
BY MR. LEON:
Q Did it come up in the context, Mr. Langton, of your
planes being landed there?
A No.
Q Did it come up in the context of it might be a
place we will need your mechanics to do some work on planes?
A I think what it was was- in the context of what they
were trying to achieve, and he showed me --
Q What do you mean, "they"?
A They, his operation. By the time this came up, he
was then directing a flight activity in Central America. Okay?
Q For this private-funded organization?
A Yes, right.
Q Did it have a name, by the way, this private-funded
KUISSIFIED
organization?
A No.
Q So this was separate from Sumarico?
A Oh, yes, absolutely. Yes. And what he did is he
showed me this point in Costa Rica where they^had hoped to
develop an airstrip. He already hadJ
In between those two and!
which is ai
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UNCLASSIFIEO
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they felt they could service all of the Contra troops m the
field. I said, that is interesting.
Q They had their own pilots?
A Yes.
MR. BECKMAN: Excuse me. I don't know if you focuse
onthe question; it wasn't very precise. You were asked
separate from Sumarico.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. BECKMAN: Which by this time is East, which
implies East wasn't in any way involved.
THE WITNESS: Right.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Let's get into that. Do you recall at that point
you decided to go ahead and do this venture?
A Well, immediately at the meeting in Mr. Bastian's
house, we said this is the type of service we could provide.
It is third-party maintenance. We do it for many customers.
Q So it was just a matter of working out the logistics
then?
A It wasn't a matter of anything. We said that we
could do, that we could do.
Q Whose idea, then, was it to open up the account
A Mr. Gadd asked if we could, if we would do that. I
thought it was a good idea.
UNCLASSIFIED
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IIWSSIFiED
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A Because I basically wanted to keep thac operation
totally outside this Southern Air operation, and I felt that
an offshore account would be, keep it at arms length.
Q Why did you want to keep it separate?
A Well, I had several reasons. One, I didn't want
the diversion of our time and talent within the company wasting
a lot of time on this; and, secondly, I did not want to raise
a -- I didn't want to have a bunch of demonstrations in front
of our building or a political situation occurring. I didn't
want any of that.
And, to me, the easiest way to do it is to have an
offshore company that is a customer and performer of third-
party maintenance, and that's all there is to it.
Q So your intention was that your books would reflect
you were doing this business for ACE?
A Yea.
Q And ACE, for the record, is the account in|
A Yes.
Q Did you give Mr. Mason instructions to set up the
account?
A Yes.
Q Who gave you the name of the person to contact!
Mr. Gadd.
UNCUSSIFiED
Did Mr. Gadd say he had used this fellow before
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to set up accounts?
A No, he did not.
Q How did he get the name, do you know?
A I don't know.
Q When Mr. Mason went down, how much money did he
deposit in the ACE account to get it started?
A I don't know. I think it was S3, 000 or $4,000.
Q Was SAT reimbursed for that?
A Yes.
Q By whom?
A By the ACE account.
Q To your knowledge, who paid the pilots who were
flying these missions?
A I really don't know.
Q All right. WEre any of these pilots pilots who had
flown for SAT at some prior time?
A Yes. Bud Sowers.
Q By whom was he employed?
_ A By Gadd .
Q But you don't know by which company?
A I am sorry?
Q Do you know what company?
A What company what?
Q Was he personally employed by Dick Gadd, or was he
employed by —
UNCLASSIFIED
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A Oh. By East, by East. He was one of the contrc>ct
pilots .
Q When you say contract pilot, what do you mean?
A That he was under contract to East, and we flight
trained him and brought him up to our off-spec requirement,
and we periodically used him for our own flights and paid
him by the hour.
Q Were there any other people in that category?
A There was two complete flight crews. I think we have
already provided the names. I can't remember. Bonzo Von
Haven was the other captain, and I can't remember the co-
pilots .
Q Would Mr. Kilburn be one of them?
A Kilburn?
Q Yes.
A That name doesn't ring a bell at all.
Q Now, were these the people, Mr. Von Haven and Mr.
Sowers, were they among the people who were doing the training
in the earlier Sumarico contract?
A Yes.
Q Now, on occasion, SAT provided cash to the pilots.
is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q For what purpose?
UNCLASSIFIED
Well, primarily for the fuel account. At
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UNCIASSIFIED
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in order to get fuel for the aircraft, they required cash.
And we had the same problem in our own flights, our own MAC
flights that would service^^^^^^B We couldn't use the Air
Force Carnet and had to take cash with us to get the fuel.
It is not uncommon around the world.
Q Why didn't they get this cash from ACE?
A Usually what happened is it was a -- it got to a
crisis mode that they just didn't have enough cash down there;
and they were doing a crew swap, and we would advance them
some cash, and it was very seldom, I don't know how many times
that happened, but it was not very many. Most of the time,
they got their operating expense funds already taken care of.
Not out of ACE. ACE did not pay any of the operating funds.
Q By whom were you paid, ACE?
Yes.
So ACE was set up simply to pay Southern Air?
Yes. Yes, I would say that's correct.
BY MR. LEON:
Who had the banking records?
Bob Mason.
A
Q
A
Q
A
For ACE?
For ACE, yes.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
DNClASSIFiro
Q When you did provide cash to the crews, do you
remember what kind of amounts we are talking about?
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A Probably $9,000. That's the usual.
Q Nine?
A Yes.
Q Did you ever provide more than $10,000 in cash?
A No, I don't believe so.
Q Did you ever provide more than $10,000 in cash to
Mr. Dutton?
A No, I don't think so.
Q When that cash was provided, through whom would that
have to be cleared at SAT?
A Bob Mason and myself if I was there, and it still
wouldn't occur without Dutton 's approval.
Q Dutton 's?
A Yes.
Q What about prior to June of '86, who would approve
it?
A Gadd .
Q All right. So Mr. Gadd or Mr. Dutton would come
to you and ask for the advance?
A They would call me.
Q But my question was: At Southern Air, who would
have to approve such an advance?
A As I said, either myself or, if I wasn't there. Bob
Mason would probably go ahead and do it himself.
Q Mr. Mason had the authority?
uNCussra
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UNCUSSIRED
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A Yes.
Q Was that for up to a certain amount or --
A He knew what he could and couldn't do.
Q To your knowledge, did Southern Air fill out any
Customs declarations form regarding this money that was being
taken out of the country?
A I don't know.
Q Now, as to the airplanes that were purchased, we
went through in great detail with Mr. Mason on the financing,
but I would like to run down with you so I can get it clear in
my mind as to exactly how many airplanes were purchased by,
shall we say, Gadd Enterprises during this period of time?
Why don't you tell us first about the two Caribous.
A Well, again, I helped acquire those aircraft and
provided technical and I guess business aspects of it. I
went to Rouyn, Quebec in the middle of winter, looked at the
aircraft with one of our technical representatives, looked
at the records, determined that the aircraft were suitable
aircraft, spoke to Mr. Provonose, and tried to establish a
price. Mr. Gadd was with me on that trip. And we did that,
came to an agreement.
BY MR. LEON:
Q Did you negotiate it?
Yes.
UNCLASSIFIED
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BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q That IS for both Caribou?
A Well, we started with one, but I tried to roll the
package in and give them the, as usual, give them the
expectations of their being, we'll take them both and all the
parts, which we eventually did, and were able to negotiate a
better deal that way. They did want to sell both.
Q The person from whom you purchased these planes
was whom?
A Luis Provonose.
MR. BECKMAN: Excuse me. I don't think you listened
to the question.
The question was, the person from whom you purchased
the aircraft was whom?
THE WITNESS: I didn't purchase the aircraft, number
/
there.
MS. NAUGHTON: I understand. You negotiated.
THE WITNESS: I was the liaison.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Was this plane previously registered in Canada?
A It was currently registered in Canada when I was
Q And who registered it in the United States?
A It was never registered in the United States.
Q What happened with its registration?
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A I don't know,
Q Well, then, how do you know it wasn't registered in
the U.S.?
A It was never operated in the U.S.
Q It was flown directly from Canada to where?
^^^^^^^^^^H the
Q What about the second one?
A The second one stopped in Hiami for repairs and went
Q The second one was never registered in the United
States either?
A No.
BY MR. LEON:
Q How did you happen to go to Quebec to get those
planes?
A It was in the paper. There is a paper called
"Trader Planes". I went through that and looked for Caribous,
and there was a broker in Canada, I don't remember his name,
he_had them, and we talked to them and it sounded like the
type of aircraft that would fit the bill, and I recommended
that we go look at them.
Q Did Gadd pay all of your expenses to fly up there,
hotels and —
Yes.
UHClASSra
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< BY MS. NAUGHTON
2 Q How was the actual <. nancing of those two planes,
3 those transactions made?
4 A I don't know. Mr. Mason would have to answer that.
5 Q All right, but did Mr. Gadd ]ust pull out a check
6 and write it --
7 A No.
8 Q Was It done through Southern Air?
9 A No.
10 Q Then why would Mr. Mason know it?
11 A Because he was involved m the activity. It is
12 my understanding that ACE bought the airplanes and then trans-
13 f erred the title to Udall Corporation immediately.
14 Q Was that true for all of the airplanes?
15 A No, no.
16 Q Let's go to the C-123s.
17 First of all, is there a civilian equivalent?
18 A No.
'9 Q Let's start, first of all, with the C-123 that was
20 shot down so that we have a point of reference. From whom was
21 that purchased?
22 A I think that was the Harry Doan airplane, wasn't it,
23 the one shot down?
24 MR. BECKMAN: I don't remember.!
26 MS. NAUGHTON: Yes, that was the Doan one.
ONCUSSIFIEO
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THE WITNESS: That was purchased from Harry Doan.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Doan what?
A Doan Helicopters.
Q And did you scout that plane as well?
A We really had nothing to do with that airplane.
I think I did send a mechanic" to go up and kick tires and
make sure the flaps were on, and I think that we did, but we
did not participate in negotiations or anything else on that
airplane. It was my recommendation to stay away from those
airplanes.
Q Why?
A Because they had no commercial value.
Q What do you mean?
A I couldn't use them in any commercial enterprise.
They were a military airplane.
Q Well, you knew, didn't you, that Mr. Gadd was using
them for military --
_ A He hadn't used it yet.
Q What is your point?
A My point was I didn't recommend buying those airplanes
I didn't participate in buying those airplanes.
Q My question is: Why wouldn't you recommend a military
style aircraft for a military style -
A I go back to the premise, the idea here, the funds
UNCIASSIFIED
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were private funds donated in order to get this operation off
the ground, to bridge the gap until Federal funds were flowing.
I thought it would -- the proper thing to do is to buy an
airplane that youcould re-sell when things were all done, and
you get part of their investment back.
Q Obviously Mr. Gadd didn't agree with that.
A Yes.
Q Why?
A Performance of the aircraft is a little inferior
to the Caribou.
Q What was his level of sophistication regarding
these aircraft? Did he have a great deal of experience with
It, very little? How would you characterize it?
A Some. Nobody has a great deal anymore. They are
quite an antiquated airplane.
Q Now, as to the purchasing of the aircraft from Doan,
could you tell me how that worked?
A Our involvement, is that what you are asking?
Q Yes.
A Mr. Gadd had struck a deal with Harry Doan for the
aircraft. I believe that a bank transfer was made to Harry
Doan. I got a phone call from Mr. Gadd about the transfer,
they couldn't find it, it was misplaced, could we. Southern
Air, help get a cashier's check up to Harry so they could fly
the airplane away. And we said yes.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Q Why?
A Why not?
Q Well, isn't that a big risk you are taking?
A No, I didn't consider it a big risk. We have been
in business together and we had always been paid promptly, and
we did have money in our account, advance payments for mainte-
nance and so forth.
Q You mean in the ACE account?
A There were some in the ACE account, but I think we
also had some in our own account. Southern's account, for
advance payments on maintenance and so forth, that the
real risk was rather minimal, maybe S70 , 000, something of
that nature. And I was assured we would be reimbursed
immediately, which we were.
Q How much was the check for?
A $475,000, I believe.
Q What did you think in terms of —
A Is that right?
MR. BECKMAN: I don't know. What did you say?
THE WITNESS: 475.
MR. BECKMAN: That is not what sticks in my mind.
Is that correct?
MS. NAUGHTON: I would have to look.
MR. LEON: I think he previously stated that.
THE WITNESS: It was somewhat in that area.
iiNr.1 A!;f;iFiFn
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BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q What did you think of the value of that plane?
Was that paying more than it was worth, less than it was worth
or about right?
A Harry was asking, when he first called, for $750,000
for the airplane. And, again, I'm a commercial operator. I
think it has no value. So what is the right number? It beats
me. I don't know.
Q For instance, what was paid for the other C-123?
A That one I don't know at all. I wasn't involved in
the other one at all.
Q That plane, the one that was shot down, to whom was
it registered after the sale?
A I don't know.
Q You weren't involved in the registration?
A No.
Q Do you know if it was registered in the United
States?
_ A It was registered in the U.S. at the time of purchase.
Q Was this registered to Udall?
A I don't know. You mean before or after? In the
U.S.?
Q You told me before -
UNCIASSIFIED
A Harry Doan had it registered in the U.S.; it had'
an N number on it. What happened after that, I have no idea.
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Q You told me earlier in discussing these planes in
general that most of them were sold back to Udall.
A No. I said two of them were.
Q Which two?
A The two that were purchased by Ace were immediately
sold to Udall.
Q Those are the two Caribous?
A Yes. And the balance of them --
BY MR. LEON:
Q Where is Udall located?
A It is a Pancimanian corporation.
Q Had you dealt with them before?
A No.
Q Have you dealt with them since?
A No.
Q Had you known of them before?
A No.
Q How did you first find out about them?
_ A As soon as the aircraft were purchased, we were
instructed to transfer title to Udall.
Q By?
A By Gadd.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Was your address mistakenly put on one of the
registrations?
UNCIASSIRED
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A It wasn't a registration. It was an application for
registration; and, yes, they put our physical address on it.
Q Who is "they"?
A I don't know. I wish I knew. I would kill them.
I would have a long chat with whoever did it. I don't know.
Q When did you find out about that?
A When it hit the newspaper.
0 Did you ask Gadd or Secord or anyone about that?
A Yes.
Q Whom did you ask?
A Both. I actually asked Gadd and Dutton, and neither
of them knew a damn thing about it.
Q Did they admit it was a mistcike?
A Of course it was a mistake.
Q But they didn't know who had made it?
A Didn't know who had made it. I got a copy of it.
The signature didn't mean anything to me. But, in any case,
it was an application that -- the FAA would have never
processed it.
Q Why?
A Because it was signed by an agent. That's what it
said, "Agent." The FAA doesn't process those things.
Q It was not signed by the owner?
A No. So unless — if you want my theory, I would, say
the press sat down and filled it out iu^ to create a story.
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yiLAS31fi[0
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Q That's for another lawsuit.
A Maybe they did. I don't know. It just dawned on
me.
Q Do you know a man named Asher Ward?
A I do not.
Q How about a guy n-euned Joe Cappa?
A No.
Q You don't know from whom the other C-123 was purchased
is that correct, the one that wasn't shot down?
A No. . "
Q What about the Maule aircraft?
A I don't know anything about the Maule.
Q Did you know Mr, Gadd had purchased a Maule?
A I didn't know it was his.
Q Did you know of a Maule being used?
A Yes.
Q What did you know?
A I knew it flew in and it flew out.
_ Q Of where?
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
Out of Miami.
Flew into SAT?
Into SAT, yes.
Who was in it?
UNCLASSIFIED
A bald-headed guy. I don't know his name.
How did you know that was part of the Contra resupply
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UNCLASSIFIED
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activity?
A Because he was talking to Cooper and they seemed to
have a rapport going.
Q Could you describe this Maule aircraft? What are we
talking about?
A We are talking about a single-engine airplane. It
is like a little Beechcraft, but it has an over-sized engine
on it .
Q What is its purpose?
A I really don't know much about small airplanes. I
just don't know. Its purpose was to carry people and goods,
but not very far or very much.
Q Is it a passenger aircraft?
A No, it is a small private — it's two wings and a
single engine and one pilot. It is not a passenger type of
aircraft, no.
BY MR. LEON:
Q Is it a STOL aircraft?
A Yes, but when you get down to that size, they are
all STOL aircraft, with the exception of Lear jets and so
forth. I mean, any of them will tcike off on 3,000 feet. But
I do know this was specially — the Maule is a derivative. It
has a bigger engine, and I think it is a Beech airplane, but it
is mod. And that's why they call it a Maule.
UNCLASSIFIED
560
UNCLASSIFIED
83
1 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 Q Was this a new aircraft or an older one?
3 A It looked new to me. It was really nice and clean.
4 I walked out and looked at it. It looked brand-new to me.
5 Q Did it have any markings on it?
6 A No.
7 Q Just an N number?
3 A I think. I didn't even see an N number, but I'm sure
9 there was one on it.
10 Q Do you know where it was registered?
11 A I don't know anything about the airplane.
12 MR. BECKMAN: Then you can't be sure it had an N
13 number.
14 THE WITNESS: No, I can't even be sure of that,
15 that's right.
16 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
17 Q Now, Mr. Cooper spent a great deal of time at SAT;
18 is that correct?
19 A Yes,
20 Q What was he doing there?
21 A When the aircraft were acquired, he was there
22 overseeing the maintenance work on it.
23 Q But he was not paid by SAT?
24 A No, he was not.
25 Q Do you know who paid him?
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84
' A I don't know.
2 Q Was it a Gadd-related company?
3 A That I don't even know. I just don't know.
^ Q What did he say? I mean, did he refer to anyone
5 as his boss?
6 A Yes. At first Gadd and then later on Dutton.
' Q What is Maule Air? Is that the company that makes
® them or leases them or are you aware?
3 A What' s what?
Q Maule Air.
A I think, and I'm just not an expert in small air-
planes, but what I understand is that it is a modification,
and it sounds to me — I don't know what Maule Air is, but
it sounds to me like they are the ones that bring the airplanes
in to modify them, put a different engine in them.
Q What anout the Jet Star; why don't we start that
story from the beginning. There came a time at which you were
thinking of purchasing a Jet Star?
_ A Yes .
Q For what purpose?
A We have an extensive system of Boeing 707s and L-lOOs
that fly around the covmtry daily, and the one thing we found
was we couldn't rely on getting parts or people to AOG air-
planes in a timely fashion. So we determined what we needed
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to do was buy a corporate type jet that had range, very cheao
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UNCLASSIFIED
85
' and could pack a decent load. So we went out and looked,
2 and the Jet Star was the airplane. It could go 17,000 miles
3 with 200 pounds on board and only cost a quarter of a million
dollars. And the idea was the airplane would spend most of
' its time just sitting on the ramp waiting until we needed to
° move men and equipment to an airplane.
Q From whom did you buy it?
A I can't remember. It was a broker in one of the
airports, Opa Locka, I believe.
Q Where is that?
A It's One of the little airports in Miami. I can't
remember the guy's name.
Q To whom was the Jet Star registered?
A Southern Air.
Q At your Miami address?
A Yes.
Q Now, prior to its purchase, did you allow Mr. Gadd
to fly in the plane or arrange a flight?
_ A Yes .
Q Could you tell me how that came about?
A When we were looking at the Caribous and we at the
Scune time were looking for a Jet Star, this airplane fit it
and so we convinced the owner, I did, why don't you let me take
it for a little ride, we will buy the fuel and see if you
will like the airplane. So we flew up to Fort Wayne first and
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HHtUSW
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1 dropped some parts off there. We have a major hub there and
2 dropped some parts off and went on to Rouyn and looked at the
3 airplane and came back.
A BY MR. LEON:
5 Q Do you have to put a bond up when you do something
6 like that?
7 A You should, but these are deals that -- we rented
his crews. It wasn't our crews or anything. We were
9 satisfied with it "and he wanted to sell the airplane. So this
'0 was a demonstration flight. It worked out real well. Mr.
Gadd was on that flight with me.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Were there any other demonstration flights involved
^* with Mr. Gadd?
A No.
Q Did Mr. Gadd contribute at all to the financing
' and purchasing of the aircraft?
A Mr. Gadd did not.
Q Tell me about then the check that was received from
him for the aircraft.
A I'm unaware that we received a check from him.
Q All right. Let's start at the beginning. Did anyone
other than SAT —
A Yes.
Q — purchase aircraft?
UNtmSSIFIED
564
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1 A Yes.
2 Q Who was that?
3 A Mr. Secord.
* Q Mr. Secord?
5 A Right.
6 Q Can you tell me how that came about?
^ A Well, I was in the process of buying the airplane,
and I had explained to Mr. Gadd our criteria: very little
8
^ use, low capital cost and the high operating cost. The airplane
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is not cheap to operate. And he said, "Gee, I know some -guys
that are looking for that type of airplane."
I said, "Well, I'm looking for a partner." And so
as it turned out, Mr. Secord wanted to participate in the
ownership of the aircraft. So he said he had trips that they
wanted to run periodically.
BY MR. LEON:
Q From Washington?
A Wherever.
_ Q Didn't Secord live in Washington?
A Yes.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q When did you first speak to _Mr^ Sgj^jyJ^bout
anything?
A The first time I met him was in Mr. Gadd's office.
Q When you and Mr. Bastian went there?
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A No. This was January of '86. I think it was Dave
Mulligan and myself.
Q I want to get into all that later.
A That was the first time I ever met him.
Q So you know Mr. Secord at that point was affiliated
with Mr. Gadd?
A Yes.
Q And Mr. Secord was interested in purchasing the
Jet Star?
A He was interested in having a jet aircraft available
for them as well and we were interested in having a partner
so we shared expenses . . .
BY MR. LEON:
Q What did you believe to be his use, their use?
You said "their use."
A He said they had wanted to be aible to move people
once in a while in a very quiet fashion. I said that's great.
Q Who did you believe he was 'referring to?
A I didn't.'
Q What company did you believe he was with?
A Stanford Technology.
Q Located in Washington?
A I think in Washington here
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Now, did Mr. Secord send you a check?
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1 A That's what I don't know. I don't know how we got
2 paid on that one.
3 Q What was your understanding in terms of the percen*
4 of the ownership?
5 A We'd split it fifty-fifty. It wasn't just the
6 acquisition costs; we also had spare engine parts, but our
7 intent was to split it fifty-fifty.
8 BY MR. LEON:
9 Q How is he to get access to the plane when he is up
10 in Washington?
11 A Just give us a call. We would have our crews sent
12 out and charge him our out-of-pocket expenses. It would not
13 be capital costs and so forth.
1* Q So it would be kept in Florida?
15 A Yes.
16 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
'^ Q To your knowledge — first of all, who owns the
1* plane now? Did you buy him out?
'* A Yes. It was ours in our name 100 percent.
*" Q But did you ever give him back his 50 percent?
*' A He still owes us money, so we called it square on
2* that deal.
2^ BY MR. LEON;
llNClASSra
^* Q Did he take depreciation?
*" A No. You know, that kind of thing —
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1 Q Did he take tax benefits on it?
2 A No.
3 Q Did you?
4 A I don't think we did. I think we just expensed it.
5 It was really too small of an cimount of money to try to work
6 out a depreciation schedule. I'm not sure. Mason may have
7 done something, but it would surprise me. I would think we
8 just expensed it.
9 Q You believe they didn't?
10 A I believe they did not.
11 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
12 0 Now, let's say from the time of its purchase, which
13 I believe was in April of '76; isn't that correct? Would you
14 disagree with that?
'5 A No, I wouldn't disagree with it.
Q Until, let's say, November of '86.
A Okay .
Q How many times did either Mr. Secord or Mr. Gadd
or Mr. Dutton request to use the aircraft?
A I don't know. No more than twice.
Q Do you remember when the first time was?
A Gee, I really don't.
Q Would it have been near the time of purchase? In
other words, did they take a test run themselves to see --
A Yes. We arranged a flight for them prior to the
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uHtinssm
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1 purchase of the aircraft. We thought we would get one more
2 trip out of the owner, and we did. We arranged for a flight
^ for them. Again, we didn't have any crews. I don't know
^ exactly what his flight schedule was
Q All right. These were not your crews?
A No.
' Q Whose crews were tiney?
8
A Contract crews. Again, there is a lot of pilots
around the country. Once they get checked out in a certain
piece of equipment, they hire themselves out by the hour. And
the crew on this flight was one that the previous owner often
used to fly the Jet Star.
Q Who arranged for the crew?
A The owner, I believe.
Q And do you know where this flight went?
A No. But that stack we gave you that is not Gadd
related, there is — do you have it with you?
MR. BECKMAN: No, but I have a note of it.
THE WITNESS: Well, that won't help.
MR. BECKMAN: It's document 698 through 700 of the
Jet Star flight.
THE WITNESS: It is the only one in there. That is
the flight. It's in that batch we just gave you last night.
But I said it is not Gadd related. It is not. It is Secord.
If you have it there, I can show it to you..
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MS. NAUGHTON: I do not have it.
THE WITNESS: To the best of tny recollection, the
flight left here, went to Washington, went to Dulles, picked
up Gadd and some other passengers, flew to]
MR. LEON: Do you know who the other passengers were?
^ THE WITNESS: No, I don't. Returned to Washington
and came back to Miami. That I think was the trip.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q When they came back to Miami, from, let's say,
[were there any employees or mechanics or employees
of SAT on the flight?
A No. There was one on the other day. I checked.
Q When you say the owner arranged for the crew, for
that type of aircraft how mamy people are we talking about?
A Two. The pilot and co-pilot. I think that would
have a flight attendant as well.
Q Who actually arranged this? In other words, was it
Gadd or Diitton or Secord?
A I don't remember. I think it was Gadd. I think
Gadd actually arranged it and Paul Gilcrest. I just put those
two in touch. I didn't talk to them amymore about it.
Q And was it your understanding that Mr. Gadd was going
with these people on this flight?
A Yes.
Q And when the flight returned, did you speak to Mr.
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Gadd or Mr. Secord?
A No.
You didn't ask them how they liked the plane?
I don't think so. I asked the crew.
And what did the crew say?
They liked the airplane.
How did they like"
They thought it was interesting.
What did they mean by that?
Well,
BY MR. LEON:
Q Who was the pilot?
A A gentleman by the naone of Phil SobeLman.
Q Spell his last name.
A S-0-B-E-L-M-A-N.
Q Do you know where he is now? Miauni?
A These people don't work for us now. They are
corporate type pilots.
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etiun-1
(4:30)
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BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q We are on the Jet Star flight. When you spoke
to the crew, did they mention anything about the passengers?
A No.
Q They landed in Miami. Let's correct that. From
where did they go?
A Back to Dulles, I believe.
BY MR. LEON:
Q When a pilot flies a plane from one country to
another, when it is a private plane like the corporate ]et,
do they have to check the passports of the people who are
flying with them. A, to see if they have a passport, and
B, if they don't?
A Gee, I don't know.
MR. BECKMAN: I think what you are thinking of,
Mr. Leon, is the responsibility put on a common carrier by
the Immigration Service to be sure that it doesn't bring
in someone who doesn't have proper travel documents, and can
be fined $1000 per passenger. You are used to having your
travel documents checked when you go out. I don't think
that happens with a private plane.
BY MR. LEON:
Q I wanted to know if he knew from experience.
A I don't travel by small airplane very often. I
don't know. Somewhere you have got to go through
ire you have got to go tl
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Immigration.
Q You own a Jet Star now, right?
A Right.
Q If you were going to fly a group of people to,
let's say. Central America from Miami, would you or would
someone in your organization first check to see the passports
of the people you are flying?
A There are two parts to that question. One, the
airplane is not for hire. We can't take passengers. We
only can carry company personnel. That is the way it is
certified. And, yes, we would tell everybody to take their
passport .
MR. BECKMAN: Just as a courtesy, but do you feel
there is a need by Government regulations or whatever to
check.
BY MR. LEON:
Q It could be company policy that the pilot, for
exaunple, checks everyone's passport to make sure they have
it with theira.
- A It wasn't my flight, and I 3ust don't travel in
a small airplane enough to answer your question.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q After this flight, then did you receive the check
from Mr. Secord?
Yes.
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Q And do you know on what check, in other words,
on what company and what account it was written?
A No , I don ' t .
MS. NAUGHTON: Mr. Beckman , did you provide us
with an answer to that question?
MP. BECKMAN: Which question?
MS. NAUGHTON: As to on what account Mr. Secord
wrote the check?
MR. BECKMAN: Which question was that?
MS. NAUGHTON: Mr. Kirstein and I discussed the
check for, I believe $150,000, it was either S115- or
$150,000.
THE WITNESS: One fifty.
MR. BECKMAN. I think that this must be the check
that I spoke to David on the telephone and he said he asked
Mason, must have told you he was going to ask Mason and
Mason was checking, but the answer is, I don't have the
intormation today.
MS. NAUGHTON: Fine. We will make a request for
the record to get a copy of that check.
THE WITNESS: You are assuming there is a check.
I am not sure that is even the case. I will find out.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q I am assuming that because I was told that by
Mr. Kirstein.
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A I will find out how it was paid. I don't know what
vehicle or what. It could very well have been ACE.
Q But through whom did you conduct these negotiations;;
In other words, was it your understanding that Secord was
going to pay for it and so it is through Secord that you
did the negotiating?
A Actually it was very simple. I told Gadd what the
airplane was going to have them costing, and the next thing
I know he said -- in fact, I knew, it was money transferred
to ACE; I am sure of that. We will verify that. We will
look for 100-1/2.
MR. BECKMAN: I think we gave you all the
financial records. There weren't that many.
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes, but I don't recall there being
one for the Jet Star. It certainly wasn't in Mr. Mason's
chronology because we sort of focused on flights.
MR. BECKMAN: What did Mason —
MS. NAUGHTON: I was not here for most of his
deposition.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q But it was your understanding that this contri-
bution was for Mr. Secord, not for Mr. Gadd?
A Right.
Q Was there another requested flight for either
Mr. Secord or Mr. Gadd or Mr. Dutton after this one that
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you have juBt described, the sort of test run?
A Yes, and I really don't know exactly when it was,
but we were requested to make a trip from Miami to|
and return.
Q Without a stop in Washington?
A Without a stop in Washington and who got the crews
for that?
A We did. It was now Dur airplane.
Q Was that an SAT crew or contract crew?
A The SAT crew.
Q Do you remember who the pilot was?
A I think it was a combination. I think we had
one of ours checked out in the right seat and somebody else's
in the left seat.
Martin Fernandez was our employee who flew that
trip .
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
And is he still an employee of yours?
Yes, he is.
Do you know who was flown from Miami t
Yes.
Who?
Where is he from?
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Who else?
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A And Max Gomez.
Q Had you met Mr. Gomez before?
A I don't know. I met him twice, I think, once
this time and one other time in the hall, I don't know.
Q And who did you understand him to be?
A I understand he was liaison for
and working with Bill Coopei
Q So ^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas helping with the logis-
tical problems
A Yes, he ran the base.
Q Did you ever come to learn or was it ever your
understanding that any of the cash that was used to send
down there was used to
A No.
Q Do you have any reason to believe that?
A No.
Q Was there anyone else on the flight besides
the crew, ^^^^^^^|^^^^^B| and Majc Gomez?
A We had a flight attendant on that flight as well,
Q Do you know who that was?
A No, I don't.
Q Do you recall approximately when that occurre^^
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A I don't know. It was sometime in the summer.
Q Was It after Mr. Dutton had taken over?
A Yes, I believe so.
0 So It would have to have been July or thereafter?
A June or thereafter, yes.
Q Did Mr. Dutton arrange this?
A I don ' t remember .
Q Were there any other trips taken with the Jet
Star by Secord or Dutton?
A Not that I am aware of.
Q To your knowledge was Oliver North on any of
those flights?
A Not that I am aware of.
Q Did you ever meet Mr. North?
A Never have, no.
Q Do you know whether Mr. Gadd , in supplying the
contras and conducting this contra resupply, ever paid for
aircraft parts through his own companies or did he do it all
through SAT?
A I have no way of knowing. That was our function.
I don't know why he would, but I really don't know.
Q Would it be tinusual for him to have paid a bill
to an aircraft supplier company for $9000 for such a round
sum;
Gee, I don't know. You know Mr. Gadd has many
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enterprises, and I really couldn't guess what all he pays.
Q Do you know where these supplies came from that
were shipped to the contras?
A Maybe you could be more specific. Which supplies?
Q Any of them.
A No.
Q Did they all come from the same freight forwarder,
or were they shipped to a central point, or do you know
where they were picked up?
A I guess I don't know what the question is.
Q In the contra resupply operation, supplies were
sent to the contras?
A Yes.
Q Do you know from where they came?
MR. BECKMAN: I think one of your problems is
you haven't established, to move the interrogation, what
Southern Airlines' involvement was with any supplies.
MS. NAUGHTON: I understand. They claim it was
purely maintenance. I understand that. I am asking him
his own personal knowledge, though.
MR. BECKMAN: They did. They did on a number of
flights, didn't they?
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes.
MR. BECKMAN: You are talking about NHAO.
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BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q When I say contra resupply, I mean this privately
funded organization.
A I don't know what all was shipped by that organi-
zation. If you want to ask my opinion, a good part of it
had to be what NHAO sent down; it went to^^^^^^^H it went
to ^^^^^
Q Those are separate flights we can get into, but
now I am talking just about the privately funded portion
of it.
Do you know where those supplies came from?
A No, I don't.
Q Did Mr. Gadd ever discuss where he was getting
them or whether he had difficulty getting them or what he
was getting or anything along those lines?
A Yes. He said the petrts were what was staged at
with the relief goods from NHAO.
Q He told you on or about October of 1985 that he
was going to put together a privately funded channel to
supply the contras , correct?
A A privately funded mechanism to supply, not to
buy supplies, only to deliver supplies. That is all we
ever talked about. We never talked about what the supplies
were or where they came from. It was somebody else's
problem. This was only for the delivery of those goods.
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Q So you didn't know if the goods were from
Government- sponsored programs or where the goods were coming
from; is that what you are saying?
A Right, that is what I am saying.
Q But you know that the NHAO flights were sponsored
by the Government? And did you think there was a difference
between those flights and the ones that Mr. Gadd was trying
to arrange privately?
A Yes.
Q As far as the NHAO flights, do you know why it
is that Mr. Gadd conducted those through Air Mach as opposed
to through EAST?
A No, I do not.
Q Were you paid by EAST?
A Yes, I believe.
Q Did you have some difficulty with the State
Department?
A Yes, I did.
Q Could you explain what that was?
A Let me go back and reconstruct the NHAO flights.
I was asked by Mr. Gadd if we could work out some pricing.
He wanted to bid on this NHAO contract, and have us sub
service. The question to me was, if you flew out of Miami
what would you charge. So I told them. He
says. Do you think you have the availability to do this on
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a routine basis? I said I don't know, but I am sure if
giving a 72-hour or more window, I could always arrange to
have an airplane to make that flight, so I gave him my price
and he went and bid on the contract. Okay, the first trip
was not from Miami, I don't believe. It was out of New
Orelans, if I recall, so there is quite a difference in
flying from Miami to New Or lean/ s^^^^^^^^^^| and back
to Miami, and I said, Dick, this isn't what we agreed on.
And he says. Yes, I know, and we are going to have to get
this straightened out.
So he did discuss it with the NHAO office,
you know, if the flights were going to deviate, we had to
get paid for the additional hours, and an agreement was
struck that any hour over and above the basic trip would be
at $3000 an hour.
Then we were hit with an insuramce problem.
Immediately we went down there. Any time you go^out of
country, you notify your insurance company. We said. We
are going to El Salvador. They wanted a $5000 per transit
s€bp charge. So that was a problem for us, because that was
not built in the price either. We have worldwide coverage.
So I threw that back at him, and it became quite
a hassle and I met with Mr. Duemling in my office. He was
going through, and just to show him an insurance bill for
the flights. I said, I am not making this up; it is a fact
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of life and we are going to work on it and try and get it
into a reasonable rate, but right now I have got to add it
to the bill.
He said, I understand, and that was it. Well, it
wasn't it. I think we were paid for the first few flights
and then it became a debate with the State Department what
was the proper charge and so forth.
The other thing is then they wanted us to go to
and
you can't fly from there back to the States. You have got
to go someplace and get fuel, so we had quite a few more
hours of flying involved tham what the original contract
was .
To make a long story short, I guess we made 15
trips for higi, and came to a settlement on insurance, because
we were able to get a package insurance rate. We went back
and adjusted all the billings to accommodate our actual
insurance charge, and I guess that was the extent of it.
I told them I really didn't care to ever do
another flight for these people again. It was too much of
a hassle.
Q What was your impression of Dueraling?
A A quiet guy.
Q Why did the contract cease? In other words, did
you refuse to perform any more flights or did the contractors
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run out?
UNCUSSm
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A I think basically they used much of the money for
supplies by then. Now, they did fly two more after we did
with another carrier.
Q Do you know who that was?
A Yes, Mark Air.
Q Where are they located?
A Alaska, Anchorage, Alaska, but I think it was
mutual. I think that I was not pleased with the way the
whole thing was coordinated and I think that they felt that
maybe we were being unreasonable and they went and looked
for other carriers to operate it.
Q Was there anything else you were dissatisfied
about with the NHAO flights other than the insurance
problem?
A Well, we had I think three ourstanding issues.
One is the extra flying involved, because we did have to
go back. Actually, we went back to Saui Salvador to get
fuel. If we went to^^^^^^^H we couldn't go direct out
[back to the States, so we had a lot of extra flying
We had a dispute over, I believe, a prepositioning charge.
We had an aircraft in Dallas that we moved to Dulles and
charged them for it, and they wanted us to cibsorb that
charge on our own, and I said that is outrageous. I guess
that was the extent of it.
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The gentleman that ran the program was a rather
unusual man.
Q Who was that?
A I guess Phil Buechler .
BY MR. LEON:
Q State Department?
A Yes.
Q B-u-e-c-h-1-e-r perhaps?
A It sounds like that, yes.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q When you say it was unusual, what do you mean?
A Irrational. If you have got to fly, why debate
It? And we don't fly for nothing, and that is what the
charge was .
My- contention was that if they had a problem
with the billings, he should have told us immediately and
we had a choice then to either fly at the rate they wanted
or forget it, and it was very clear to me that they wanted
us to continue to fly, and it was clear to me that we had
told them what it is going to cost them to fly.
BY MR. LEON:
Q How did they get your name?
How did who get my name?
Buechler .
UNCLASSIFIED
Mr. Gadd . He came down on one of the very first
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flights.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q When did Mr. Gadd ever approach your for doing
any NHAO flights?
A I don't recall. It was within a month of when
we actually did it.
Q So he approached you for the NHAO flights?
A Yes.
Q After or before you had the conversation
regarding the private resupply network?
A Probably after.
Q And what did he tell you about this when he
approached you about it, the NHAO flights?
A It was a bid that he would like to bid on. We
could get some extra trips, just ad hoc charters.
Q Did he indicate to you in any way how this would
dovetail into what he was doing with his private supply
network?
A The only dovetail was that the supplies being
by the L-lOOs to^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M V^s ,
those were the goods that had to be delivered to the troops,
boots, canteens, blankets and so forth. That was the whole
purpose of it.
Q And he indicated that those would be sent to the
canteens
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and so forth?
A Yes.
Q Were all the flights to
A No, that is what I said, they werel
Q
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0
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So you did go to|
Yes, we did.
Any other places in Central America?
No.
Q Do you know whether or not the goods supplied
m the NHAO flights were United States made? In other
words. United States military surplus?
A I think most of them were.
Q And was a single freight forwarder used for
those, do you know?
A Mario Calero was the guy who went around buying
all the stuff, and I don't know what the freight forward
company he used, but he was the guy buying it.
Q But you don't know who was buying the stuff that
was being supplied through the private netowrk, or was Mario
Calero buying that as well?
A I don't know.
Q How did you know Mario was buying it for the
NHAO flights?
A I j'fent on a flight and I met him in New Orleans,
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and watched the load, and he was out there. I don't know
that he was the only buyer, but he most certainly was on
that load. It was all surplus goods.
0 Did Mario tell you anything about shipping arms?
A No.
Q On the NHAO flights, did you pick up at different
points or was it always the same loading point?
A The same loading point.
0 New Orleans?
A It was Miami and New Orleans. Most of it was
outlof New Orleans.
Q Where m New Orleans?
A Right at the airport.
Q Did SAT make any flights in either 1985 or 1986
to Havana?
A Sure.
Q Why do you fly to Havana?
A For the State Department.
Q For what purpose.
A We have a mission there. Gee, we probably
flew on an average of once a month down there ^ust taking
goods to the people in the mission.
Q What kind of goods?
A Oh, construction material, autos , everything that
they wanted, whatever they had. At Christmas, booze.
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turkeys .
MR. LEON: You don't get those down?
THE WITNESS: They have got a lot of room. It was
]ust goods. Most of it was construction material for some
reason. They were in the Swiss embassy, and they were
rebuilding .
BY MR. LEON:
Q Did you fly into Guantanamo Bay?
A No, into Havana.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q I don't understand. What were you saying about
the Swiss embassy?
A That is where our mission is, is in the Swiss
embassy .
Q Oh, okay.
MR. BECKMAN: We don't have relations?
THE WITNESS: We don't have any.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Do you recall reading a story -- I hate to
bring up the press, but I want to get it on the record and
you can flail away — in the Philadelphia Inquirer regarding
SAT flying parachutes out of the country, supposedly pur-
chased from a man named Joe Smith?
A Gee, I —
UNClASSm
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took, IS that It?
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BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Yes, to supply the contras, that he claims were
actually flown by SAT.
MR. BECKKAN: Bought from Joe Smith?
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes.
THE WITNESS: I don't know anything about it.
BY MS . NAUGHTON :
Q Why don't you supply for us that one flight that
SAT ended up flying into Nicaragua, not SAT flights into
Nicaragua, but the April, 1986, incident.
A That was SAT.
Q Why don't you describe that?
A I was asked if we could do an air drop to the
contras, that they were again in extremely dire need of
supplies .
Q Was this by Gadd?
A Yes. I said, yes, we could. We had already been
over many times that we could not fly into Nicaragua for
insurance reasons, but we most certainly could do an air
drop, was ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^R there
problem with that, and so we did, went down, and made an air
drop and as far as I knew it was very successful and never
even heard of it until December.
Now, that IS my fault, because I didn'Jt ask for
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any debrief mgs afterwards. I ]ust heard that it was
successful and I said. Great, that is fine. That is the
best I can tell you.
Q Who told you it went fine?
A Actually Gadd did. I didn't debrief the crew.
Q And when did you find out that the plane had
actually flown into Nicaragua?
A In December .
Q How did you find out?
A My chairman called me.
0 How did he find out?
A He read it in the press.
Q How did they find out?
A I don't know. They talked to somebody.
Q Who was aboard the plane?
A No, I don't think so. I think that by then all
the people involved there had gone to the winds and they
had talked to somebody that was involved in the operation,
and said yes, they flew an air drop into Nicaragua, and then
as we checked further, said, yes, as a matter of fact we
did.
Q Who told you that they had?
A Who told me that we had?
Q Yes.
A I think Paul Gilcrest. I think he was one I asked
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UNCLASSIFIED
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to check on it for me.
BY MR. LEON:
Q Did he fly?
A No. '
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Who did?
A Bonzo Van Haven and Martin Fernandez.
BY MR. LEON:
Q Do you have a flight log of that trip?
A Yes.
Q Is that something we have?
A Yes.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q At this point were they contract pilots for you
or what?
A Bonzo was, yes, but Martin was our chief pilot.
Q And did they indicate to you that they felt they
had to have authority to go into Nicaragua?
A The crew?
Q Yes .
A Again, it is another flight. I didn't check
with the crew.
Q I mean afterwards when this all hit the paper,
what did they tell you?
A They felt that this was ^21lfiUl^"'3 '^^^^ everybody
jlt that this was somgUii
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was gung-ho for/ and I aiti sure they were. I am sure they
got all kinds of -- Colonel Steele was out giving briefings
before they even departed, so I mean there wasn't any
question in their mind that this was a well-approved flight.
What did Colonel Steele tell them?
I don't know.
But he gave some kind of briefing?
Yes.
Do you know where that was?
Q
A
Q
A
Q
Q What did he tell them if it was gung-ho?
A Well, you don't have a U.S. Army officer out
there briefing you if you didn't feel that it was a U.S.
Government flight, and they just followed their instructions
explicitly. . They told them what flight quadrants and
patterns to fly down, what to look for. I am not saying
Steele did it all, but he was most certainly along there
with this staff. This is second-hand. This is what I was
told.
BY MR. LEON:
Q Who told you that, Gilcrest?
A Gilcrest, who in turn heard that from Fernandez.
BY MS . NAUGHTON :
Q Do you know what they dropped?
No, I don't.
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Q Also m April of 1986, SAT transported a washer and
dryer to Switzerland for a Willard Zucker.
A What?
Q Do you know anything about that?
A No . A washer and dryer?
Q Yes.
A To Switzerland?
MR. BECKMAN: Who was it for, Willard?
MS. NAUGHTON: Willard Zucker, Z-u-c-k-e-r.
MR. BECKMAN: Who is he?
MS. NAUGHTON: He is a businessman in Switzerland.
MR. BECKMAN: Have you discussed with this --
MS. NAUGHTON: I think I did a couple of weeks
ago .
MR. BECKMAN: With me?
MS. NAUGHTON: No, not with you, I am sure it
was with David. It was EAST invoice No. 08709.
MR. BECKMAN: EAST invoice zero —
MS. NAUGHTON: 8709.
MR. BECKMAN: What did David tell you, or did he
say he was checking?
MS. NAUGHTON: I don't recall. This was several
weeks ago. We discussed a numberbf things, but I ]ust
wanted to ask Mr. Langton whether or not you knew anything
about It.
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THE WITNESS: It sounds absurd.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Why would that sound absurd?
A They have washers and dryers m Switzerland.
Why would we want to send them one, plus I never heard of
the name before, but it doesn't make any sense to me.
Q This was a flight from Lisbon to Switzerland.
Would you have flown to Lisbon for any other purpose?
A You are really throwing some curves at me.
I am not aware of any flight from Lisbon to Switzerland.
Q Is that a route that you would remember?
A I would think so. It sounds like a charter, but
I don ' t know why we would --
MR. BECKMAN: What airplane was used, do you
know?
MS. NAUGHTON: I don't know that it would even
say that on the EAST invoice, but I could look.
MR. BECKMAN: This is an invoice to EAST?
THE WITNESS: I have got a feeling that we have
got some locational codes all mixed up here. It doesn't
make sense to fly a washer and dryer from Lisbon to
Switzerland.
BY MS . NAUGHTON :
Q It didn't to me either.
A Maybe if you can find what it is, where it is
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1 that you have got. It is an EAST invoice?
2 Q Yes.
3 A Maybe we can get some clarification. I know we
4 bought a washer and dryer as Air ACE did for some of the
5 people m Central America.
6 Q While we are on that, can I show this invoice for
7 a minute? This is another invoice from EAST, Inc., made
8 in 1986, invoice No. 80782, and it relates to an L-lOO
9 on a Defense Department contract apparently brokered by
10 Gadd.
11 Was this an ongoing contract?
12 A This contract we have, and this is a service
13 fee that I approved to pay E.^ST.
14 Q Is this a separate contract?
15 A Yes. It has nothing to do with Central America
18 or Iran.
17 Q Or Sumarico?
18 A Or Sumarico.
19 Q This is a separate contract?
20 A Right.
21 MR. BECKMAN: This is not a document we provided
22 though, is it?
23 MS. NAUGHTON: No.
24 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
25 Q When did this contract come into being?
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A May 1
UNCLASSIFIED
119
Q Was it ]ust for one month?
A No, it went for five months.
Q And what was it for?
A For his services, his offices. We have a contract
which is a classified contract and there are functions that
he helps us with. It is professional services.
Q For his personal --
A His company's professional services. I hired him.
Q For a five-month period?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell me for what agency this contract
was?
MR. BECKMAN: He has already said it is
classified.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q Can you answer that question?
A No, it is a DoD contract.
Q Rick, do you want to ask your questions now?
BY MR. LEON:
Q Let me ask for a few questions. We are going
to break at 5:30 and reconvene tomorrow morning.
THE WITNESS: You mean you have more?
BY MR. LEON:
Q Let me just ask a few now and I will have some
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more tomorrow morning.
You were in the Coast Guard?
A Yes.
Q What years were that?
A 1965 through 1969.
Q Was that right out of high school?
A Yes.
Q Where were you stationed?
A The first year I was stationed -- well, the
first year I was in school in Connecticut, became a radio
man, and I was stationed in Seattle.
Q Where is the school in Connecticut, New London?
A It IS actually in Groton, which is right in New
London. I don't even think that is a Coast Guard school
ar.iTTiore. I believe it has turned into a community college
since then.
Q Your specialty was radio?
A Yes. I was stationed in Seattle for two years
and the last year in Vietnam.
Q So you were in Vietnam 1968-69?
A Yes.
Q Where in Vietnam did you serve? What was your
unit?
A It was on the Coast Guard cutter Wachusett,
W-44 ,
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Q Where was that located or stationed?
A Well, we were part of what was called market
time operations, so we served from the DMZ all the way
around to the Gulf of Thailand.
Q So you were there, what, a ten-month tour?
A Yes.
Q Were you on a ship the whole tour?
A Yes.
Q What was your job on the ship?
A I was radio man.
Q Did you have the sajne commanding officer the
whole time?
A Yes.
Q Who was he?
A Now he IS Admiral Lucas, L-u-c-a-s.
Q Where is he stationed?
A I think he is here.
Q Coast Guard?
A I think he is here now in Washington. The last
I heard he is not commander of the Coast Guard yet but he
is one of the --
Q Pretty high up?
A Yes.
Q At that time he was just, what, a Captain?
He was a Commander.
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Q As a radio man, do you work with codes?
A Yes.
Q Secret codes?
A Yes.
Q What was your clearance back then?
A Secret crypto.
Q When you got out of the Coast Guard, you went
to college? _ -
A Yes, I did.
Q At the University of Washington?
A No, first I went to Shoreline Community College,
and then I went to the University of Washington.
Q Where is Shoreline located?
A In Seattle.
Q Did you ever get a pilot's license?
A Never did. I am not a pilot.
Q When you started out with Flying Tiger, what kind
of work were you doing for Flying Tiger?
A I was an analyst, numbers.
Q Did you have an accounting degree?
A No , I did not.
Q Business administration?
A Business administration.
Q Have you stayed active in ham radios?
No, I have not.
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Q Amateur radio?
A I hated it.
Q Have you stayed in contact with Admiral Lucas
over the years?
A I think I have met him twice since then, once
m Alaska and he was Chief of Coast Guard Operations m the
State of Alaska many years ago. In fact, that was the last
time. I haven't seen him in months.
Q You were first introduced to Gadd by Bastian,
IS that correct?
A Yes .
Q Was he introduced as a lieutenant colonel?
A No.
Q Was he referred to as Colonel Gadd?
A No.
Q Did Bastian explain to you then when he intro-
duced you how he knew Gadd?
A Yes.
Q What was it?
A Mr. Gadd came down with another gentleman who
I really don't know, and introduced themselves, and explained
what their needs and requirements were, so they introduced
themselves.
Q They introduced themselves to Bastian?
A Yes.
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Q Were you present when that happened?
A No, this was before I joined the company.
Q You don't know to this day who that other person
was who came with Gadd?
A No.
Q Do you know a description of him?
A No, I don't.
C Do you believe Bastian knows who the other person
is?
A He may. I don't know.
Q Have you ever had that person pointed out to you
as having been the one who came with Gadd?
A No. r
Q So you have never met or seen that person?
A I am starting to get confused. When I met Gadd,
he was with one otherjindividual , and I don't remember who
he was, and I haven't seen him since.
Q Oh , I thought it was Gadd and Bastian, Gadd met
Bastian, the other person was with him.
A At that time there was more than one and I don't
know who they were.
Q You don't?
A It was Gadd and several others, and I do not
know who they were.
Q But when you met Gadd' the first time with Bastian
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A Yes,
Q — there was also another person present?
A Right.
Q Were you introduced to that person?
A Yes, I was.
Q Do you recall his name?
A No, I don't.
Q Can you recall his description?
A He was maybe 40, five foot, I will say, 11,
slender .
Q White male?
A White male. He was also an attorney.
Q He IS an attorney?
A Yes.
Q You have never seen him since?
A No.
Q Can you recall if Gadd has referred to him since
in your presence, referred to him?
A No.
Q Did he have any kind of title or nickname or
anything like that that sticks in your mind?
A It would stick in my mind but I don't recall
any, no.
Q How about when you first met Secord?
A Yes.
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Q Was it Gadd who introduced you?
A Yes.
Q And who else was present?
A I believe Mulligan was with me and Dick Gadd and
the General.
Q Was his title brought to your attention?
A No.
Q His position?
A He introduced himself as Mr. Copp .
Q Mr. Copp?
A And then the secretary came in in a few minutes
and said. General Secord, you have a phone call.
Q Where was that? Where was that meeting?
A In this conference room, Mr. Gadd ' s conference
room.
Q Out in Virginia?
A Yes, so we didn't call him Mr. Copp anymore.
Q Would that be Copp, C-o-p?
A C-o-p-p, I think is the way the Tower Report
3p>elled it.
Q Did Mr. Gadd fill you m on General Secord 's
background?
A No .
Q Has anyone ever filled you in on General Secord 's
background?
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A Only what I have read in the paper.
Q Have you ever informed Mr. Gadd of your background
in the military?
A Yes, I believe so.
Q Gadd?
A Yes.
Q Do you remember how long it was after you had
met Gadd that you had done that?
A No. It IS not a very exciting military back-
ground .
Q
A
Q
How about General Secord?
I doubt that I ever discussed it with him.
Were you ever paid in cash by Mr. Gadd for any
of the services that SAT rendered?
A No-
Q How about by General Secord?
A No.
Q Who if anyone do you know in Arrow Air's
management? For example, do you know their president?
A You are asking me who I know over there?
Q Yes.
A Oh, I know George Bachelor.
Q What is his position?
A He is the owner.
Q Does he .have a .person under him who runs the
UNO hmm
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ONCIASSIFIED
128
business on a day-today basis?
A His son was, John Bachelor, I have talked to him
on the phone several times but he is no longer president.
Now there is a new president and I don't remember
what his name is as of last week. George goes through
presidents on an annual basis.
Q Mr. Bachelor, the owner, was he the owner back
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
Yes ,
When you first did some subcontracting?
Yes.
Did you bring Mr. Gadd over to meet him?
No.
Do you know if anyone in your company did?
No.
No, you don't know or no, they didn't?
No, they didn't.
Have you ever had any discussions with Mr.
Bachelor about Mr. Gadd or General Secord?
A No, I have not. I doubt that Mr. Bachelor even
was aware of the sub services flown. That is ]ust something
that is just a routine piece of business.
(Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the deposition adjourned,
to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., on Friday, March 13, 1987.)
ONCUSSIFltD
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RPTS CANTOR
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UNiiuSiFlta
COPY Nl><
DEPOSITION OF UILLIAFI G. LANGTON (RESUMED)
1
JC»«£S
Select Coraraittee on Investigate Covert
Arms Transactions with Iran.
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC.
Friday, March U , 1987
The coraraittee met, at 9^30 a.ra., m room B-336 Rayburn
House Office Building, the Honorable Lee H Hamilton,
Chairaan of the Coraraittee, presiding.
PRESENT: Richard J. Leon, Deputy Chief Counsel for thfc
Minority; Kenneth Buck. Assistant Minority Counsel.
ALSO PRESENT: Robert Beckman, Counsel for Southeastern
Air Transport .
unaei \)i^ Ceruntv Council
by N. Menan, National iecuruy v.
UNaAoolBtB
608
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HIR072000
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HS . NAUGHTOH: My name is Paraela Naughton. This
IS the second day oi the deposition of Mr. William Langton.
li everybody in the room can identify themselves, give your
name for the record please.
Mr. LEON: ny name is Richard Leon, Deputy Chief
Counsel for the Minority.
Mr. BUCK: Kenneth Buck, Assistant Minority
Counsel, same committee.
Mr BECKMAN: Robert M. Beckman, Counsel for
Southeastern Air Transport.
Mr. LANGTON: William G. Langton, President of
Southeastern Airlines.
MS. NAUGHTON: To start off, Mr. Beckman wanted to
put some answers on the record regarding questions that
arose at yesterday's session.
Mr. BECKMAN: Yes, Ms. Naughton. You asked us to
try to get the destination in Central America of a flight
performed by Southeastern Air Transport with its own
aircraft in December of 1 985 ^^^^^^^^^^^^car rying Class E.
explosives, and also the name of the pilot.
The destination is^^^^^HHand the pilot's nme is John
nooza .
You also asked us to identify the bank from which the
*150,000 was transferred regarding the Jet Star airplane.
In this document number 1667, that we have produced, which
609
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shows that raoney carae from Credit Suiss
via the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York.
Ms. NAUGHTON: Thank you.
BY MS. HAUGHTON:
2 Mr. Langton, is Mr. Moore still employed with
SAT?
A Yes , he is .
BY MR. LEON: uhat is his first name?
THE WITNESS : John.
MS. NAUGHTON: ue were on the subject yesterday
I think we left off on the subject of contra supply, support
functions performed by SAT. I only had one other question
in that area for now.
a Has there anything unusual that happened during
that operation from the time you began running it in around
January of "86 until the time it ceased' Is there anything
unusual that comes to your mind regarding any particular
crisis ?
MR. BECKMAN: Excuse me. Just on the basis that
one day this transcript may become public, and some official
of the press will take your question literally, you implied
that Souther Air Transport was running the contra supply
effort in your question.
MS. NAUGHTON: Ho. I said support.
MR. BECKMAN: Ue weren't running the support
UNCIASSIHED
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75 effort there. I don't mean to pick on you, because uithin
76 the context of the way we have developed this, we all
77 understand what ue are talking about. I :ust wanted to ask
78 you if you might want to clarify it a little.
79 BY ns . NAUGHTOH:
80 . 2 In the course of your maintenance functions for
81 the aircraft that was purchased by Gadd related companies to
82 supply the contras, was there anything unusual that happened
83 during that, let's say, nine month period from January
84 through September of 1986 that you can recall?
85 A No, I can't.
86 . 8 It was 3ust routine maintenance services?
87 A Yes. I mean, the whole function itself was
88 unusual, so to say something more unusual, nothing I think
89 stands m ray mind now.
90 . 2 Can you tell us why Mr. Gadd was replaced by
91 Mr. Dutton?
92 A No , I cannot .
93 8 What were you told when Mi . Gadd was replaced
94 by Hr . Dutton?
95 . A I was told by Hr . Gadd that Mr. Dutton,
96 primarily General Secord, wanted to take a more direct
97 operational control.
98 2 Did he say why?
99 A No, he did not.
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100 S Uhat uas Mr Gadd's attitude when he told you
101 that? Has he angry at Mr. Secord? Uas he glad to be rid oi
t02 It?
103 A I think a little bit disappointed, but in the
lOLi same sense, he is a realistic individual. That is uhat they
105 wanted to do, fine.
106 . C Had Gadd given you the impression then that Mr.
107 Secord was the one running the operation?
108 A Yes.
109 . e With anybody?
110 A No .
111 fi If we can turn now to the subject of the
112 flights to Tel Aviv and Iran, could you tell us how that all
113 came about to begin with?
1 1 ij . A In, I think it was January, 1986, I received a
115 call from Mr. Gadd asking me if I could come to Uashmgton,
116 and for raa--which I did. I believe that was the meeting that
117 I was introduced to General Secord as Mr. Cop, which within
118 a few moments was clarified, and in that meeting, it uas
119 proposed, number one. it uas a U.S. Government flight. Uhat
120 thay wanted to do uas fly out of Kelly to Iran. I took doun
121 tha infornation and said we had problems for us to perform
122 and we would get back to him.
123 2 Uho explained to you this mission? Has it Mr.
124 Secord or Mr. Gadd?
wnssra
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125 A Mr. Secord.
126 2 And could you tell us as carefully as you can
127 remember, what exactly he told you about the mission?
128 A I can give you m general terras uhat it was.
129 It uas well over a year ago. I can't tell you exactly uhat
130 uas said, but the gist of the conversation uas that they
131 uere trying, the U.S. Government uas trying to establish
132 relations uith some moderates in Iran, and thus far, they
133 had uorked out an agreement that ue would supply the
13U Iranians with some Tou missiles.
135 I will take that back. I am not even sure ue discussed
136 uhat the cargo uas at that meeting, but that there uas some
137 cargo to be moved into Iran, uanted to knou if ue could
138 assist them, and I said, ue had been happy to assist the
139 government in their endeavor but ue could not fly into Iran.
140 e Why not?
14 1 A Insurance. It uas very simply we have a loan
142 at the bank that one of the very strict covenants is that ue
143 do not fly where ue don't have insurance coverage and there
144 IS no insurance coverage flying into Iran.
145 2 Uho uas at this meeting besides Mr. Secord, Mr.
146 Gadd and yourself?
147 A I believe Dave Mulligan came with me on that
1 48 meeting .
149 2 Was this in Mr. Gadd's office?
mM^
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A It was in his office, yes.
2 In Vienna. Virginia?
A Yes.
g What did they say about the pickup in Kelly Air
Force Base specifically?
A Nothing .
2 Mho was going to make the arrangement?
A The arrangements were made by Mr Gadd's
office .
e Did they tell you about any prior shipments
made to Iran?
A Hot in that meeting.
2 Later did they tell you?
A Yes.
2 Uho told you?
A I think it was fir. Gadd.
2 What did he tell you?
A He told me that some shipments had been made,
and had not gone well. They needed a reliable carrier.
That is why we were asked to assist.
2 What did he mean hadn't gone well?
A They were unreliable. I am assuming they
didn't hold to the schedule that was laid out for thera.
2 Did he say who the carrier was?
A No, he did not.
icussra
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HIR072000
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8
2 What did Mr. Secord say about whether or not
this had White House approval or Administration approval?
A He said It did have Administration approval.
e Hou did he say it, do you recall?
A No, I don' t .
2 Hou did you get that impression?
A It was very straightforward that this was a
U.S. Government operation, and had the White House approval.
2 Hou were you to get paid?
A We uere paid by General Secord.
2 But uhen you discussed it at this meeting, when
you asked hou you uere going to get paid
A I didn't ask at this meeting. I didn't even
have a price uorked up or anything.
Once you did, did you ask hou you were going to
get paid?
A
e
A
e
A
2
Yes .
And what was Mr. Secord's response?
We would receive a bank transfer.
Did he say from where? \
Ho.
Did Secord give you the impression that it was
he who was aizangmg the finances, or someone he looked at,
to someone else? In other words, would he say like "'I will
go to the bank'' or ''I will get the bank draft for you'' or
vm&B
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'"I will have the funds uired'' or did he say ''My people
Will, or someone uill. or I uill see to it that someone
does' • •
A I don't recall any of those statements.
2 I am not asking did he say those specific
things. What I are asking is did you get the impression that
he controlled the money or someone else did?
A I got the impression he did.
B That he personally was sending the wire
trans f ers ?
A That he was either personally or instructing.
He controlled it. That was the impression I got. These
transfers would not occur without his
BY MR. LEON:
2 I was DUSt going to ask st some point, did
Secord introduce you to, or mention any of his subordinates,
people who were working for him?
A Well, I met Mr. Button.
2 Okay. How about besides Mr. Dutton.
A Ho, I never met anybody else.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 Did you ask either Mr. Secord or Mr. Gadd about
getting a government bond to fly in?
A Yes.
2 And was that at this first meeting?
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A I don't think so. I really at the first
meeting it was a conceptual raeeting--is it something you
could assist m, and what would it take. I then had to go
back to the office and really discuss it.
2 Did Mr. Secord or Mr. Gadd tell you that they
did not want to get a government bond?
A Yes.
2 Or couldn't? What did they tell you about
that?
A He received a phone call at Mr. Bastian's house
in which we basically--this is with Mr. Gadd. Me said, look,
there is only several ways of doing this. He cannot fly our
airplane in there, unless we go to our insurance company and
ask for a coverage, or the government can provide us
indemnity, or buy your own airplane and basically self-
insure. As far as I could see, that was the only three
alternatives .
2 What did he say as far as the possibilities of
a governnant bond?
A Mr. Gadd took that information and said thank
you, and we really never came to a conclusion on that.
Latar, Mr. Gadd called back to me, said they did have a
solution for it, and wanted somebody to come up to
Washington. The discussion was that they didn't want us to
go to our insurance company. They didn't want a government
'JNCLASSIFIEO
617
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NAME: HIR07200111^111 rtW^#"" " PAGE 11
250 mdennity, and they weren't going to buy an airplane, but
251 they had a solution. So I said, fine, and they sent Mr.
252 Gilchrist up to meet with thera, lay out the operations.
253 The reasoning uas they did not want to have a broad
254 disclosure of the operation. It uas very, very sensitive.
255 . 2 That is why they didn't want the government
256 bond?
257 . A That is why they didn't want a draft, get an
258 indemnity, nor did they want us to go to our insurance
259 company.
260 . 2 And who was it that proposed this solution?
261 A I believe I did. after discussion with Mr.
262 Bastian. That uas the only ones ue could come up uith to
263 get into Iran.
264 2 And hou did you know you could use Israeli
265 planes?
266 . A That uas their solution.
267 . MR. BECKMAN: No, I think you two missed. You
268 uere ansuering uho proposed, who thought up the three
269 alternatives you put up. Ms. Naughton is asking who
270 proposed the solution that uas actually implemented.
271 . THE WITNESS: I am sorry, I misunderstood.
272 . BY MS. HAUGHTOH:
273 . 2 Whose idea then uas it to use SAT crews but an
274
Israeli plane'
oNcussra
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NAME ■
275 A ■ General Secord.
276 . Q What did he tell you about the Israelis?
277 A At that point I was not in the meeting, so
278 nobody told me about it. I was briefed by Gilchrist when he
279 returned.
280 B And what did Gilchrist tell you?
281 A Just siraply that they had some 707s, the
282 Israelis did, that they were willing to let us use, and they
283 could not use Israeli crews, and the question was could we
28U provide crews , and the answer was yes .
285 2 Did you have the crews file any kind of waivers
286 or anything? Did you have them especially insured, anything
287 like that?
288 A No. I did not.
289 . Q Did you all for volunteers?
290 A Yes, I did.
29 1 . S At what point were you aware of what the cargo
292 would be?
293 A I believe after that meeting with Gilchrist,
294 when he went up, that was when we found out exactly what the
295 cAxgo was and so forth. That was an operating meeting.
iiNOHssro
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lINClASSiFIEJ
BY MR. LEON:
2 He was going to be the pilot'
A No, he was not the pilot on the first trip, but
he was going to organize it.
BY nS. NAUGHTON:
2 Were there any special preparations you uould
have to make to ship Tow missiles?
A None .
2 Can you give me an idea of how many Tow
miss iles--uhat Kind of a plane did you use for this
operation?
A A Boeing 707.
2 And how many Tou missiles can fit m one?
A Pretty close to 500.
2 And so for the February flight you used two
airplanes ?
A Yes. Ue flew two aircraft into Tel Aviv, right
A And they were each loaded with 500 Tows?
A Yes .
MR. BECKHAM: How do you know that?
THE WITNESS: My recollection is
HR. BECKMAN: Based on what?
THE WITNESS: Based on what I was to do.
ONtUSSIflEB
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HR. BECKMAN: Okay. That is the only point I
thought should be brought out. I have sat through a lot of
interviews, and there uere :ust boxes. What is happening?
Unfortunately. Ms. Naughton. there is so much people read
subsequently that is being fed m, and I was thinking that
what you are trying to get is a distillation of what he
knows, not what he has read in the press.
MS. NAUGHTON: That question was simply a frame of
reference question. There uere so many flights I :ust
wanted to get straight which flights we are talking about.
MR. BECKMAN: Sure.
BY MS. NAUGHTON: While you were making
arrangements with Gadd and Secord to do these flights, did
you ever get the impression that Secord or Gadd had done
these kinds of flights before? That is flights into Iran
from some other point?
A No .
2 When you say no, what is the basis for that
answer ?
A
baiore .
C
for thei»?
A
I didn't get the impression that they had done it
Did you get the impression this was a new venture
Well, as I said a little earlier, I was told that
some flights had gone in there. I don't know that either
UNClASSiPiEO
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HIR072000
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Secotd or Gadd were involved in them. In fact, I don't
think Gadd uas involved in them. Possibly Secord. That it
had not gone well, and they were looking for a carrier that
could take care of the problem. Their customer could have
been the one that uas looking for the solution, so I don't
knou how involved they uere, I have not idea, but the
information that at least a flight had been done prior to
our involvement uas very clear.
2 Let's say, for instance, m terras of information
that they gave you about landing in Teheran, hou to do it,
who uould be there, hou to conduct yourselves or uhatever.
Uho gave that kind of information to either yourself or Mr.
Gilchrist?
A As far as I knou, all of the information for the
flights into Teheran uas done in Tel Aviv by I believe
Gilchrist, telling me Israeli intelligence.
2 When you uere introduced to Mr. Secord, or even
subsequently, what uas it that you understood that he did
for a living ?
Gadd is
2
A
2
Hy impression uas that he uas a broker, much as
For uhat company?
For the governnent.
Did you associate him uith any particular
corporation, any
mmm
622
NAME ■
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UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 16
With Stanford Technology.
Uhy did you associate hira with that?
That IS uho answered the phone when I called.
Uhen you called Secord?
Yes .
Did you know uhat his position was at Stanford
Technology?
A No
BY MR. LEON:
Did you check out Stanford Technology in any way?
No, I didn't.
You were relying on Gadd's vouching for him in
e
2
es sence ?
A Yes.
2 Was it your experience, had it been your
experience before, Gadd, dealing with Mr. Gadd, that there
were people, a lot of people out there, who would broker
deals on behalf of the United States Government?
A It is like any industry. There are people who
specialize in certain facets of it, and there is without a
doubt people who specialize in brokering work for the United
States Government.
2 Maybe I an just naive or inexperienced in this
area, but it would seem to me that if someone were to
represent to roe that they were representing the United
UNCLASSIFIED
'1
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NAME
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397
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400
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HIR072000 PAGE 17
States Governraent m trying to make a deal. I would want
some kind of letter or some kind of assurance, something to
indicate, since they don't work for the governraent. they are
not members, folks of the Department of Defense, that they
are actually doing that. Unless I have misunderstood you,
Secord never gave you or showed to you any type of
authorization from the United States Government indicating
that he was acting on their behalf, is that correct?
A That IS correct.
2 So basically, you were relying, as I understand
It. on his word that that is what he was doing?
A That IS correct.
2 So I guess ray question would be why would you
:ust rely on his word?
A Uhy not'
2 Since you didn't know hira prior to that first
meeting with hira .
A I don't know uhy I would challenge it. I mean,
Mr. Gadd, Gadd had worked with hira for several years.
Everything that he had said was done, and in any case, what
h« Has proposing would not come about without total
govarnaent involvement.
2 Gadd--correct me if I am wrong again--uhen you were
dealing with Gadd, Gadd wasn't brokering on behalf of the
United States Governraent. He was dealing on behalf of a
UNCLASSIFIED
624
mussra
HAME- HIR072000 V»'^^ PAGE 18
421 private fund-raising concern. Isn't that right?
U22 A Mr. Gadd had DOD contracts, okay? And our
•423 arrangement with him on Suraer ico--later to become East--uere
424 involved in DOD contracts. So separate that from Central
425 American activity.
426 When I was introduced to General Secord, I was relying on
427 Mr. Gadd's knowledge and contacts, that he was in fact
428 representing the United States Government.
429 2 Did Mr. Bastian, did Mr. Bastian ever ask you to
430 get some kind of an assurance or some kind of written
431 confirmation to insure that Secord was in fact acting on
432 behalf of the United States Government?
433 A No, he did not.
434 2 To your knowledge, did Mr. Bastian and either to
435 you or anyone else, ever ques tion--that is all, just
436 ques tion--the legitimacy of Secord's representation that he
437 was acting on behalf of the United States?
438 A No, we did not.
439 . BY MS. NAUGHTON:
440 2 I would like to get back to Kelly Air Force Base
441 for a moment. Had SAT ever picked up material before at
442 K«lly Air Force Base for any reason?
443 A Yes, we fly in and out of there everyday on our
444 Log Air System.
445 2 And those are domestic runs?
UNCUSSIflED
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NAME •
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t4M8
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A
2
^ ^ PAGE 19
Yes
Is that correct?
Right.
Did you ever pick up any material from Kelly and
go on an international group'
A I don't believe so.
2 So there never have been any SAT flights from say
Kelly to let's say Central America?
A None .
2 You seera fairly definite about that. Why is
that?
A I would know about them. He have an operations
meeting every morning, at 9 o'clock, which I attend when I
am in town, and that would be an unusual run for us.
2 Do you know whether or not there are foreign
commercial carriers that pick up at Kelly Air Force Base'
A No , I do not .
2 Could there be?
A I suppose. I have no idea, no way of knowing.
2 Is there a Fly America policy with DOD contracts?
In other words, fly American airlines?
A I think there is a United States Government
policy m general that says Fly America First. I like to
think there is .
2 Have you or any member of your industry that you
xfnussim
626
^r,'^-' :.•>
KM
NAME: HIR072000 V ■ 1 Wksl IW ># ■ • ••-I-' PAGE 20
471 know oi , made any complaints to either the Department of
472 Transportation or the Department of Defense regarding the
473 use of foreign carriers as opposed to American carriers?
474 A In what respect?
475 2 In respect to Defense Department contracts.
476 A I don't now of any Defense Department contract
477 that was lent to a foreign carrier. I have never heard of
478 such a thing .
479 2 Do you know whether any of the people working at
480 SAT had ever seen foreign carriers at Kelly Air Force Base?
48 1 A None that I have ever heard of.
482 2 When you pick up at Kelly on a government to
483 government run, are there any sort of customs procedures
484 that you have go through?
485 A I don't know. I don't know.
486 2 Are those runs logged on your 217s that you file
487 with the Department of Transportation?
488 A Which runs?
489 2 Your Defense Department Log Air runs.
490 A Mo.
49 1 2 Hhy not?
492 A The 217 only calls for commercial charters.
493 2 So am I right in saying that the only government
494 agency that would have a record of those actual routes,
495 actual runs, would be the Department of Defense?
UNCmSSIFI
LU
627
NAHE
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M97
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500
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PAGE 21
Y«S.
2
k
S
A
e
A
fi Gattlng back to th« Iian flights, that* war* son*
flights nada fiom Kally to Tal Aviv and then from Tal Aviv
Into Iran in May of 1986. Is that correct?
A That is correct.
2 And then In the return flight froa Tel Aviv to
the United States, there uas a back haul
that correct?
A That Is correct.
What uas hauled
Class CX eKploslvas.
And who arranged that baok haul?
In our company or where?
Mo, who gave you the instructions to stop and
pick It up?
A That was coordinated witli Hr . Gadd's office.
Gadd personally or soaaone else?
I think Gadd personally.
Was it his idea to back haul?
Ko, I baliava he was requested. The back haul
H«« a request.
fi rroK who?
A Froa General Sacord.
2 Uas there anything else taken in that back haul
besides explosives?
UNCLiSSSIflE!
628
ii ir triiitliiiil -Tgnnf-^^
mOgUfgUl
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KAnZ: HIR072000
UNCIASSIFIEO
PACK 23
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522
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A
fi
A
S
A
S
Not that I an awaia oi.
And whara did it ily? Did it pick up
Yas .
Do you know axactly uhaxa
Ho, I don't.
And uhara did it fly to
A I don't have the flight schedule. We gave it to
you. I don't Know.
fi Has li
A I don't know on those flights.
8 Was it at least Central Aaetlca?
A Yes.
fi Were theie any stops in the United States?
A Ho.
fi Do you know whether or not these were United
States nade explosives?
A I don't know.
2 Do you know who accepted delivery?
A Ho, I don't.
fi When you deliver something, I assuae you nake the
receiver sign for it, is that correct?
A That would be a nornal activity, yes.
fi And do you naintain those records?
A For 90 days.
fi And then you destroy thea?
WWSWD
629
HIK072000
IINCUSSIFIEO
FAGS 23
Hkni>
5146 A ¥•■, wa do.
5U7 fi Mould that ba tha aanliatt?
SMS A I would think that would ba on tha nanliast, yas.
5149 Q Uhat happans though ii a custonor disputas that
550 ha cacalvad a cartain itaa aftai 90 days. How would you
551 raconclla that claln?
552 A I supposa I would tall hlB to iind hinsali a good
553 lawyai. I hava navai haazd of such a thing.
55U fi But that nanifast than Is thair only zacord of
555 tha custonat, tha lecaivar, acKnowladging thay hava lacaivad
556 whatavar naterials you haulad, is that corzact?
557 MR. BECKMAK^ Excusa aa . You ara not suza bacausa
558 thata ara bills of lading, thara ara all sorts of documants?
559 THE WITNESS: Tha *anifast is tha shipping
560 docunant. I don't know.
561 BY HS. MAUGHTOK!
562 fi Okay. For tha Hay Iranian trip, and tha back
563 haul, do you know how you wara paid?
56U A I ballava wa racaivad a bank transfar.
565 fi And did tha transfar oovar both actlvitias? That
566 is, tha Iran flight, and tha back haul?
567 i Yas.
568 BY HR. LEOK:
569 Corract na if I am wrong . Has It your iaprassion that the
570 sacond half of tha j our nay-- tha ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H~ was it
UNClASSiFlEO
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UNCUSSIFlEi
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NAKE
57 1 your impression that that also was a United States
572 Government response order activity?
573 A No, it was not.
574 2 Then why wouldn't it surprise you that you were
575 getting paid for two separate acts, two separate missions
576 from the same United States Government pay?
577 A You understand the role of a broker?
578 2 Ho. Go ahead.
579 A Brokers is a function that goes out and brings
580 the customers, collects the funds, arranges and pays for the
58 1 service .
582 2 ^nd Secord was the broker?
583 A Right.
584 2 In that situation?
585 A Right, and so I would expect that he had gathered
586 his payment from the government for the first part. From
587 whoever else on the second part.
588 2 Let me stop you there. Mho--was it your
589 impression the others
590 A Pzivate investigators.
59 1 2 Private investigators. Did he represent that to
592 you--General Secord?
593 A Yes.
594 2 And did he give you the name of the organization
595 that these private investigators were in
ONCLASSlFiEE
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HIR072000
A
2
A
Ko .
A coraraon interest in?
No .
Okay , go ahead .
PAGE 25
A And then I would get paid from the broker. It is
3ust as normal as can be. We often try and put tuo packages
together to give both parties the benefit of not having to
pay for an return airplane.
2 And on your books--if you know, ftr . Langton--did
you record those payments that you received separately, on
your books?
A I don't know.
2 On the other hand, payments for two separate
transactions ?
A I don't know.
2 You don't know. Is that something you can
determine ?
HR. BECKHAN: We went into this in great detail
with Mr. Mason. Every scrap of paper.
MS. MAUGHTOH: We are not disputing that.
THE WITNESS: I don't know why I would separate It,
but if ha did--you know. Bob has his own reasons for keeping
tha books .
BY HR. LEON:
2 Did you direct him to do that?
UNCLASSIFIED
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No .
PAGE
26
2 You relied on his judgment in that regard?
A Yes, I did.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Did SAT ever participate in the shipnent of Israeli rocket
propellers to Tel Aviv in the fall of 1986?
A Israeli what?
2 Rocket propellers.
A I don't even know what they are.
2 Did you do any shipments to Tel Aviv in the fall
of 1986 that you can recall?
A Hot that I am auare of.
2 Do you know whether Evergreen did?
A I have no idea. What is a rocket propeller?
2 Does SAT have a C-130?
A No , we do not .
2 Uhy don't you explain to us what a C-130 is?
A It IS a military version of the L-100, which we
operate .
S Would it be safe to say that there are many
carriers that have C-130s or is that an unusual aircraft to
havA in your inventory?
A Ho conaercial carriers operate C-130s. It is a
military airplane, with the exception of TAB.
2 What is TAB?
ilCLASSiREll
633
yNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 27
HKnZ' HIK072000
b^b . X It Is Bolivian Air foro«. It is a transport of
6<47 Bolivia. Sosa oountrlas hava a dlifloulty daolding who Is
6U8 coMsaroial and who Is nilitary, and that is on« of tham. I
SUg hava coitplainad about it sevaral tinas to tha DOT and no
650 action has baan taken.
65 1 2 Why did you complain?
652 A Bacausa it is a iiilitazy airplana painted in
653 conaerclal colors.
65'4 S I sea.
655 A There are thousands of thea out there. You let
656 one start it and pretty soon I don't have a aarketplace.
657 2 Are they tha only ones that do that to youz
658 knowledge?
659 A The only ones I have ever seen, yes.
660 e To your knowledge, does the CIA ever take a
66 1 military plane, take off and put on coanercial narke^s?
662 A I don't know.
663 2 Old you aver, did SAT to your knowledge ever,
66M let's say since 1985, sii^ you have been with the coapany,
665 fly any radar tubes either^^^^^^^^V or to Israel?
666 A Not to ay knowledge.
667 fi Old you ever do any ilights for Stanford
668 Technology?
669 A No, we did not.
670 2 After the plane went down--was it in Nicaragua
UNC!-SS';i?![:
n
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NAHE :
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HIR072000
ONCLASSIFIED
PAGE 28
that it actually was shot down, the C-130?
A Yes, I believe it was.
2 After it went doun in Kicaragua, could you tell
me hou it is you heard about that?
A Well, first I got a call from Bob Dutton, who
said the airplane was missing. This was the first I heard
of It.
2 What did he say about it' What was he going to
do about it?
A They were looking for it. It was Dust
information that he was passing on to us.
Q What IS the next piece of information you hear?
A Press out in the front yard. The plane was down.
I saw it on the news .
2 Did you call anybody to confirm this?
A No .
2 You :ust accepted the press accounts?
A Yes .
2 Did you talk to Dutton after that initial phone
call about tha plane?
A I an sure I did .
2 And what was the gist of that conversation?
A I think I asked him who was the crew, if they new
who the crew was, and he told me who he thought it was.
2 Who did he think it was?
yNCLASSIFIED
635
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME :
696
697
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HIR072000
PAGE 29
A He thought it was Bill Cooper and he wasn't sure
about the co-pilot.
2 What else did you discuss?
A That uas all. I had bigger problems at the time.
Ue just lost our own airplane at Kelly, and that was taking
all of our time, and so I really didn't spend a lot of time
discussing that loss.
2 Hou did that happen at Kelly?
A At where ?
At Kelly?
It was pilot error.
And it was your crew?
Our crew.
Uas It on one of the Log An flights?
Yes . it was .
Would you recall what you were hauling at that
2
A
2
A
2
A
Q
paint .
A Just general cargo.
2 Did you talk to Mr. Gadd about the C-123 going
down in Nicaragua?
A I an sure I did .
2 What was the gist of those conversations?
A Did ha know who the crew was and does he know
what happened. I mean, I uas curious.
2 What did he say?
UNCIASSIFIEO
636
NAHE :
721
722
723
72M
725
726
727
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UNCLASSIFIEI
HIR072000 MIUI.I- U A MTir H page 30
A I think by the time I got to hira they did confirm
that. Buzz Sawyer was also on the aircraft, and they didn't
know whether it was shot down or just crashed. They weren't
sure .
A When you discovered, I assume from the press,
that they had connected SAT with that plane, first of all,
did you wonder how they had done that?
A Host certainly.
2 And what did you do to discover how?
A The press very clearly asked us whether it was
our airplane, and we said no, it is not.
fi Didn't you wonder how they got your name?
A Hell, the airplane had been parked on a ramp for
months. It didn't seem odd that they would ask us.
2 Did you discuss with either Mr. Dutton or Mr.
Secord whether or not any documents, any SAT documents, were
aboard the plane?
A No.
2 After the plane went down, which I believe was
the first week in October, did you have any meetings with
nt . Dutton or Hr . Secord?
A Ho, I did not.
2 Old you have a meeting with Mr. Secord after
these flights became public knowledge?
A Yes .
liNClftSSlFIED
637
Mussro
NAME :
746
7U7
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7^9
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HIR072000
PAGE 31
2 Let me ask the previous question again. Did you
hava any meetings with Mr. Dutton or Mr. Secord after the
first week in October of '86?
A Xes.
2 Hou many?
A One .
2 With whom?
A With Mr. Secord and Mr. Dutton.
2 Anybody else?
A And Mr. Bastian.
2 Where did this meeting take place?
A At the Viscount Hotel m Miami.
2 What happened at this meeting?
A Well, Mr. Bastian and I asked him to come doun.
We had :ust spent nearly three weeks of reporters camping at
our doorstep, climbing over our fences, of just simply being
around, and we were very tried of it, and then on top of
that, we had received a subpoena from the U.S. Customs for
records, et cetera, and we thought it was time to sit down
and talk, and so they were kind enough to fly down and
raassura us .
S What did you say to then?
A G«t the heat off, and they said there is nothing
they can do about the press. We knew that, and everyday was
a new revelation anyhow. What I was finding out is we were
imssm
638
UNCUSSIFlEi
MAME: HIR072000 IlHU^niJIJII I ft. L/ PAGE 32
771 a very good host, even better than I thought ue were.
772 2 What do you mean?
773 A As they were going through, ue became the
774 stopping point for most of the crews, and ue were very good
775 to thera. He helped them get tickets. We didn't need to do
776 that. We could have turned it over to a travel agent, and
777 ue were good hosts, but ue uould do that for any customer.
778 2 You learned that through the press?
779 A Yes.
780 2 So you discussed getting the press off our back
781 and they told--Secord and Dutton told you there is nothing
782 they could do about that?
783 A Right.
784 2 What else did you ask him to do?
785 A The other thing that was clear, when ue looked at
786 the subpoena and they uere asking for banking records and--a
787 very broad subpoena--you know, basically it uould be easier
788 just to coma in and thumb through all of our files.
789 One thing was clear to us is if ue turned over those
790 records, than it uould immediately disclose the Iranian
791 ofaration, and ue wanted to make them aware of that. At
792 tikis point it was still a totally sensitive operation.
793 BY HR. LEON:
794 2 At this point, you hadn't said anything to the
795 press about who Dutton or Secord uere or Gadd or anything
"HWSW
i
639
NAME
796
797
798
799
800
80 1
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803
804
805
806
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81 1
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81 3
814
815
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818
819
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HIR072000
like that'
KimiB
PAGE 33
A Nothing , no .
2 Had they m the past, either Button or Secord or
Gadd, given you any directions with regard to how to keep
records as to their business dealings uith you?
A None at all .
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 When you told there that disclosure of these
records uould reveal the Iranian operation, uhat was Nr .
Secord's response?
A Well, he was distressed, because the project was
not complete yet. and he felt that they were very close to
some raa^or successes on it. and he said he uould go back and
discuss It in Washington and see if there was a way ue could
focus the investigation, what was the Customs ' --what did they
want and focus on that. We were hoping they could do that.
BY MR. LEON:
B Had he given you the impression that by major
successes the delivery of arms was linked to the release of
the hostages in Lebanon?
A At that point, yes.
2 At that meeting, at the Viscount?
A Yes.
2 Has that the first time?
A The first time I discussed it with him, yes.
UNCUSSlFltD
640
UNCUSSIFIEO
NAHE ■
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8U 1
8U2
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HIR072000
PAGE 34
2 That wasn't going to be ray question. It was
close. Has that the first time he had given you that
impression, that there was something between delivering the
arms to Iran and the releasing of hostages m Lebanon.?
I had never discussed that with General Secord at
all
A
A
Q
A
2
A
2
Hou about Dutton?
Dutton I had .
Hon early on?
I uould say in the summer.
Of '86?
Of '86, yes.
So after you had already made some
deliver ies--because the first ones were in May, correct?
A No, the first one was in February.
2 February, excuse me.
A Yes.
2 How did that corae up? How was that Dutton
brought that to your attention?
A Uell, I guess it was just in a general
conversation. In the very first place, it was an unusual
r»quest--to fly into Iran, okay--to say the least.
2 I would say so .
A The motive seemed right to me. If the government
wanted to establish relations and there were modernists, we
UKWSSW
641
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HIR072000
uNCUssm
PAGE 35
should do what ue could to assist. It seemed only natural
if we gave there something they wanted, that we in turn, for
a show of good faith, they should give us something we
wanted, and it did seera clear that the Iranian Government
had some influence in Lebanon, and the only thing--it wasn't
Padre we wanted, and we had enough rugs from the Shah's
regime--so the only thing that would make sense that we would
like to get out and have some influence, would be the
hostages .
e So this meeting at the Viscount was the first
time you had discussed that with Secord?
A Yes.
BY US. NAUGHTON:
Uhat did Mr. Secord tell you about the Customs
investigation?
A Just simply that we go back to Washington and
see, meet with whomever, and try and see if it couldn't be
focused. He was very clear that there should be no cover-
up, and it would have appeared to be a cover-up, you know,
to have a subpoena withdrawn or exert some influence, but he
fait that there was a bona fide investigation, and that he
would, at least at this point, try and see if it couldn't be
narrowed down a little bit.
2 Did you hear from hire after that?
Ho .
HEiKssro
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HIR072000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 36
Q Have Vou spoken to hira since that meeting?
A No, I haven't.
2 Has anyone at SAT, to your knowledge?
A No one has .
2 What about Mr. Dutton? Have you spoken to Mr.
Dutton since that meeting?
A Yes , I have .
2 Hou many times?
A I don ' t know .
2 Five or 500?
A Maybe five .
2 And what did you discuss?
A Of course the first, when the Prime Minister of
j_ran came on TV, in that portion--Let me go back a step. One
thing that Secord did want to know is would ue , could we fly
the final trip?
The answer is yes. Okay, we flew at the end of October.
Everything came apart in the newspaper, and I did discuss it
with Dutton, what was going on, basically what is going on,
and he didn't know. Basically that was the conversation.
2 He didn't know what?
A He didn't know what the hell was going on with
the press leaks. In ray mind, this should have been and had
been top national security, and here the press is disclosing
an international negotiation, and it was obviously just
yNClASSlrlED
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NAME
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899
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90 1
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HIR072000
eNCUSSIFIt!)
PAGE 37
coming apart at the searas
2 Uhat did Dutton tell you to do?
A Nothing .
2 Told you to do nothing?
A Right. I didn't asK hira uhat to do. I just
wanted to know li he knew uhat uas going on.
2 Did you tell hira to do anything?
A No .
2 When did you talk to Dutton again?
A I don't know. Within days or ueeks .
2 And what uas the substance oi those
conversations ?
A Really, I guess more of the sane. He still had
never gotten any relief from the press. They uere still
writing the most outlandish articles in the uorld, and I
guess all conversations thereafter uas more of consult--not
consultation, but condolences to one another for the kind of
pressures that uere being built in both of our companies.
2 Uho did you understand Dutton to have worked for?
A General Secord.
2 What company? Stanford?
A Stanford Technology.
2 When is the last time you spoke to Mr. Dutton?
A I think about two or three ueeks ago.
2 What did you discuss then?
yEMFiM
644
NAHE: HIR072000
«msw
PAGE 38
92 1
922
923
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931
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933
934
935
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938
That he has a new product that he is selling. It
IS not wax but it is a coating put on aircraft to smooth out
the air flow, and he wanted to know if we would like to do
one of the aircraft and see if we could gather some
statistics on improved fuel burn.
2 Is he still With Stanford Technology?
A Yes.
2 And what was you response to that?
A I would like to try it. It would interesting to
see if we could save some money in fuel.
2 And did you discuss this investigation?
A No .
2 Why not?
A Well, what is to discuss now?
2 Did you ask hire if he had been interviewed?
A I don't think.
2 Did he ask if you had been?
A I don't think so.
ONCliSSinEB
645
NAME
939
9140
914 1
9U2
943
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945
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HIR072000
RPTS THOHAS
*^«to
PAGE 39
DCMN LYNCH
10 ; 30 A . n.
BY HS . NAUGHTON:
2 Okay, ue are back on the record.
Ue were discussing this meeting at the Viscount Hotel uith
General Secord, Mr. Button. Could you tell us, aside from
the issue of the press and the issue of the subpoena from
the Customs Service, what else was discussed?
A As I said, they asked us if we uould not get cold
feet and perform one more flight into Iran with, not a
flight but provide crews for one more flight.
S Uhat was to be transported for that last
shipment?
A I am not sura .
2 Did they say that they expected to release over
all the hostages after that mission?
A I an not exactly sure. There was an indication
in the conversation that they were very hopeful of the
release of the hostages.
Q Has there indeed another flight--! believe on
Kovenber 7th--frora Kelly to Tel Aviv, to replace some of the
missiles that had been sold? Did SAT participate in that?
A No, we did not.
2 So, October 28th was your last flight?
il;i
646
NAME :
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HIR072000
A
2
A
m\m
PAGE 40
That I's correct.
The Customs subpoena, was it withdrawn?
No. it Dust kind of went dormant when I finally
talked to the agent, and I think he said he had the flu for
a week and a half and he called rae to see if I gathered all
the documents, and I said we were in the process of doing
that, and then I di.dn't hear from him for another week, and
so it just kind of drug its own feet.
2 Do you remember his name?
A Lasata .
2 Rich?
A Yes .
2 And that was an administrative subpoena, is that
correct ?
A That is correct.
2 Mhat happened to it, then? Did you produce all
of those records?
A I don't remember.
Bob?
HR. BECKMAN; If I may try to give you my best
racollection . Ue were told to hold the response to the
ad«inistrativa subpoena because he got a grand jury
subpoena. We were told then they withdrew the grand jury
subpoena at the last minute and we had all the documents
ready for Customs
? i
mmm
647
NAME
989
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99 1
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993
99U
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996
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1000
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lOOU
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HIR072000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE U 1
THE WITNESS: I think we did deliver them.
MR. BECKHAN: I can recall getting a receipt in
your office .
THE WITNESS: He came and picked some up. I don't
knou if it uas all of it.
BY MS NAUGHTON:
S Do you recall uas this after the grand :ury
subpoena had been served?
MR. BECKHAN: And withdrawn.
. MS. NAUGHTON And withdrawn'
. : nR. BECKMAN: Yes.
BY nS . NAUGHTON:
2 So, as I recall, you were scheduled to produce it
before the grand jury or about December 18th?
MR. BECKMAN: Mo . I think it was about the 9th.
Let me look at the calendar. I think I have a note.
THE WITNESS: i think he is right. It couldn't
have been the 18th.
MR. BECKMAN: No, I caraa down on Monday night the
8th
THE WITNESS: Yes sir.
MR. BECKMAN: It was originally for the morning of
th« 9th.
MS. NAUGHTON: Well, at any rate, you have provided
for the record the grand :ury subpoenas now and I have
UNCUSSIFIEl'
648
naue
10 14
1015
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HIR072000
reviewed thera .
*%/•©
PAGE 42
BY nS . NAUGHTON:
2 Hou, as I understand it. your appearance before
the grand jury, your custodian appearance before the grand
jury was canceled, is that correct?
A Yes .
2 Was it ever rescheduled?
A No .
2 Have you been interviewed by the FBI?
A I have been interviewed by FBI agents on
assignment to the Independent Counsel.
2 Okay, let's break that down now. Prior to
December of '86, were you interviewed m Miami by any
agents ?
MR. BECKHAN: Of the FBI counsel?
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes.
THE WITNESS: I was not, no.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 Was anyone at Southern Air, to your knowledge?
A I believe Charles Carson met with two FBI agents
in Hovember, I think. I don't recall. We never heard any
mora from them.
HR. BECKMAN: I think that they were referred to
talk to me .
THE WITNESS: FBI?
UNCLASSIFIED
649
i]HWS»B
NAHE HIR072000 '-* ■• ■• — — PAGE M3
1039 MR. BECKMAN- I think it was the same people.
lOUO THE WITNESS: Hemz is with the Independent
1 OLi 1 Counsel .
1042 MR BECKMAN: When we finally actually looked them
10U3 in the face, he told us that he was with Independent
lO^Li Counsel, but I believe that he was referred to rae and I said
10M5 you will have to get in line, I am busy right nou . Are you
1046 urgent? He said no, I am not urgent, I can wait. Then he
10U7 finally said okay, now it is ray turn.
1048 BY MS. NAUGHTOH:
1049 2 Who IS Charles Carson?
1050 A Our Senior Vice President of Marketing and
1051 Administration.
1052 2 Why did they want to talk to hira?
1053 A I think he was the only one in the office that
1054 day.
1055 2 So, correct me if I am wrong, the next contact
1056 you had with a FBI agent was after the Independent Counsel
1057 was appointed, is that correct?
1058 A That is correct.
1059 . MR. BECKMAH: Subject to what I have said, that I
1060 b«li«ve that on our behalf they had talked to rae They were
1061 ref«iring these calls all up to raa .
1062 BY MS. NAUGHTOH:
1063 2 And Mr. Langton, when did you finally speak to an
yflCUSSIFIED
650
NAME :
106U
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1 07 1
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
108>4
1085
1086
1087
1088
yiussife
HIR072000 |i
FBI agent regarding this matter?
PAGE UU
THE WITNESS: Bob. do you have that' It was the
first oi January. I don't know if it was the 5th or 6th.
Whatever date that came m.
MR. BECKMAN: I came on down the 13th, ray calender
shows I was down there on the 14th, ISth, and 16th.
THE WITNESS: That is right, middle of January,
that is right.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 Is that the only time you spoke to the FBI?
A Yes .
S Hou long did that interview last?
A My interview with them was three hours , maybe .
Was it longer than that?
MR. BECKMAN: A day and the next morning.
THE WITNESS: It wasn't a whole day. Yes it was.
It was all day and part of the next morning. That is right.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 And what questions did they ask you that we
haven't asked you so far?
MR. BECKMAN: I provided a memo of that.
MS. NAUGHTON: I would like his answer.
THE WITNESS: I don't know.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 Is there any area that they went into that we
wu»e
651
NAME
1089
1090
109 1
1092
1093
109M
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
1 100
110 1
1102
1103
1 104
1 105
1 106
1 107
1 108
1 109
1110
1111
1112
1113
HIR072000
mmM
PAGE 45
haven't gone into so far in this deposition?
A I don't believe so.
2 Did you give any answers to thera that are
different than your answers that you have given to us?
A I sure hope not .
2 To your knowledge are there any
A Not to ray knowledge , no .
2 Did you want to ask your questions before you
left'
MR. LEON: I will ask a few now.
.^ US. NAUGHTON: I have more.
BY MR. LEON:
2 Uhen you first raet nr . Gadd . the first time you
were introduced to him, ray recollection is it was nr .
Bastian that introduced you?
A Yes sir .
2 From that tirae forward, did fir. Gadd give you any
specific instruction or directions with regard to secrecy or
confidentiality of what you were doing?
A Hall, Mr. Gadd continuously impressed us with the
sansitivity of his work.
2 Mould that apply equally to Iran related work'
A Iran related, we even went so far as to ask all
the crew members to sign a secrecy oath.
2 All right. Mho provided that form?
!INCIJ1,SSIFIED
652
MAHE :
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1 120
112 1
1 122
1123
1 124
1 125
1 126
1 127
1 128
1 129
1 130
1131
1 132
1 1 33
1 1 34
1 135
1 136
1 137
1 138
HIR072000
A
2
A
WlkSSW
PAGE 46
The form came from Mr. Gadd.
Was it a standard type of form?
I don't know. It is the only one I have ever
seen .
2 Have you turned a copy of that over?
MR. BECKMAN: Yes.
THE WITNESS: I ara the only one that didn't sign
It.
BY MR. LEON:
2 Really?
A I think so.
2 They didn't ask you to?
A No.
2 Hou about with respect to the work you had done
for Mr. Gadd in Central America?
A Never .
e When Gadd came to Southern Air Transport, did he
ever explain to you either on that occasion when you first
met hm or afterwards, why he came to Southern Air
Transport, SAT?
A Mo.
2 As opposed to some other air line?
A No.
2 Did ha very indicate why he felt he could trust
and rely upon Southern Air Transport to do these sensitive
653
NAHE
1 139
1 mo
1 m 1
1 1142
1 11*3
1 1 44
1 ms
1 146
1 1U7
1 1 48
1 1 49
1 150
115 1
1 1 52
1 153
1 1 54
1 155
1 156
1 157
1 1 58
1 159
1160
116 1
1 162
1163
IIR072000 I n ^ , : n
typethings. •••»."'
PAGE 47
A He never told me anything. We never discussed
that other than the obvious. Ue are a very proiessional
o r ganizat ion .
e Did your organization do a lot of uork of this
nature, those highly confidential that shouldn't become
publicly known ?
A No.
2 What assurance did you think he felt that you
wouldn't go public with what you were doing?
A Our company in general keeps all whatever we do
for our customers propr-ietary other than what we routinely
report to the United States Government, Department of
Transportation, we have never felt compelled or any desire
to discuss with the public what we do for our customers.
That is a company policy we have and
2 nr . Bastian agrees with that?
A He agrees totally with it. It is one that I
insist upon and you need to understand air freight. In the
first place, it is based on somebody's mistakes, so you
normally don't like to talk about it.
2 What do you mean? I don't think I understand
that--somebody ' s mistake?
A Most of your charters are always--if you really
want to go back and dig into it, it is usually somebody
UNCLASSIFIED
654
UNCLASSIFIED
KXnZ' HIR072000 PAGE U8
116U didn't ord«r in tin*, soaabody brok* 8on«thing, or if you
1165 raally wantad to, you could dig back and find out sonebody
1166 nakas a mistaka and theiaiora you got to nova it by air now.
1167 That is why I say it is usually somabody's nistakas. Tiaa
1168 is of tha assanca. In any casa, wa hava saldon ever
1169 discussad what wa do in tha public forun. Ko nead to.
1170 2 All right, but tha idea of transporting
1171 explosives and othai supplies to tha contras, that must have
1172 struck you, didn't it, as being something that would be very
1173 newsworthy, if it should become known?
11714 A Are you assuming that wa transported supplies to
1 175 the contras?
1176 S Well, correct me if I a* wrong, didn't you tall
1177 us yesterday that you were assisting Hr . Gadd in moving
1 178 supplies tol
1179 A No, NHAO flights. Why would that be newsworthy?
1180 MR. BECKHAM- It was in the news, wasn't it?
1181 THE HITHESS: Yes, it was a normal part of tha «27
1182 million donated by United States Government to nova
1183 humanitarian goods to tha contras. Ha navat tried to keep
1 18<4 it a secret.
1185 fi You realized that was the kind of thing news
1186 Bight ba interested in?
1 187 A Yas sir.
1188 2 How about the assistance that you were giving him
UNCLASSIFIfO
655
HIR072000
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE ijq
NAME
1189 with the special individuals that uete piivately raising
1190 funds ?
119 1 A Yes .
1192 e That was the kind of thing that
1193 A Ue uere concerned about it.
1194 2 Was that something he wanted kept quiet, uas it
1195 your impression?
1196 A Without a doubt it is something that for obvious
1197 reasons you would not want to go public with it.
1198 2 When you agreed to do it. did you realize that if
1199 it became public your company would become part of a focus
1200 of media attention?
1201 A Not to the degree that it turned out. I can
1202 guarantee you that. No, there was no question that the
1203 disclosure of the operation would be of media interest and
1204 that would be too bad. The degree of which we have been
1205 turned into the focal point of this was nothing any of us
1206 ever dreamed of.
1207 2 When, before you met with Mr. Bastian, and Mr.
1208 Secord and Mr. Dutton, at the Viscount Hotel, had you and
1209 Mr. Bastian considered the possibility of explaining to the
1210 madia what your role was and what you had been doing?
1211 A We did explain that.
1212 2 Prior to meeting at the Viscount Hotel?
1213 A That is right.
656
NAME: HIR072000 V '1 » !.'*" • * ^^^ *^ » ■ " » ■»■ PAGE SO
1214 2 How did you do it. in a forra of interviews?
1215 A Ue passed out press releases, we did not--we, I
1216 guess he did several short interviews, but none of that
1217 information was ever published
1218 2 The information you gave the press?
1219 A Right.
1220 2 Why do you think that was?
1221 A Because it wasn't a good story. They felt their
1222 story was more, they sensationa.lized everything, okay, and
1223 we laid the facts out to not only the press but to our
122U employees and gave the press a copy of that letter, what our
1225 total involvement was.
1226 2 Even with respect to the stuff, the activity that
1227 related to the secrets?
1228 A No, no.
1229 2 Had you been told that you couldn't discuss that
1230 with the media?
1231 A Ue signed a secrecy oath, most of the people m
1232 the company, and I was not about to discuss that with the
1233 media. It was of national security interest.
1234 2 You were specifically told that you were not to
1235 discuss it with the media?
1236 . A I don't think anybody wasted their time to try to
1237 tell me not to discuss it with the media. X was not about
1238 to discuss it with the media.
657
UNCLASSIFIED
NAHE^ HIR072000 UIIUI ^alilll II II PAGE 51
1239 . 2 When you got those signed by your employees, uho
1240 did you turn there over to?
1241 . A I didn't turn them over to anybody, I :ust kept
12142 there.
1243 . 2 Dutton had given you the forres?
12'44 . A No, Gadd had given me the forms.
1245 . 2 Has Gadd ever asked ior those forms back?
1246 . A No.
1247 2 You still have there?
1248 ' . A Yes. You have a copy of there
1249 Don't they. Bob?
1250 HR. BECKMAN- Yes.
1251 . BY riR. LEON:
1252 2 With regard to Secord, had he ever reerephasized
1253 that at any time when you reet with hire?
1254 A No.
1255 2 Did you hire Mr. Gilchrist?
1256 . A Yes.
1257 2 Was htt already there before you got there?
1258 . A No, ua hired hire.
1259 2 Can you tell us a little about his background?
1260 How old is he, for starters, roughly?
1261 , A I would say he is in the raid-thirties.
1262 2 Heisapilot?
1263 A He is a pilot. I think we have a profile on him
Kwssife
658
ONCLASSIflH
NAME :
1264
1265
1266
1267
1268
1269
1270
127 1
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284
1285
1286
1287
1288
HIR072000
PAGE 52
in there but the best I can tell you he is married, has
three children, he was a corporate pilot until I believe
1977 or '78, which he was hired on at Air Florida and rose
rapidly to be their chief pilot before they folded.
He went to Airborne Express, and in less than a year, we
had hira ^oin us .
£ Was he a former military pilot?
A No.
2 Had he ever served in the military?
A Not that I am aware of. I don't believe so.
2 Do you Know where he got his pilot training then,
his flight training?
A Out at the local airport.
2 When you first hired hira, what was his position
with you?
A He was Director of Operations but our Vice
President of Operations, he was the replacement. He was
ready to retire and within six months I suppose we promoted
him to Vice President of Flight Operations.
2 Who would ha answer to?
A Dave Mulligan.
2 In the chain of command?
A Yes.
2 In your meetings with Secord, General Secord, did
the discussion of your record Keeping ever come up?
UNCLASSIFIED
659
MAKE
1289
1290
1 29 t
1292
1293
129U
1295
1 296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1 30 1
1302
1 303
1 304
1 305
1 306
1 307
1308
1 309
1310
1311
13 12
1313
HIR072000
Ko
How about uith Mr Dutton?
No .
Or nx. . Gadd?
No.
PAGE S3
Let rae qualify that. What do you mean by record keeping'
2 Just the records to the extent that you have any
records of your uork for thera?
A No.
nR. LEON: That is all.
BY MS. NAUGHTOH:
2 When is the last tirae you spoke to Mr. Gadd?
A I think the last time I spoke to him was at
dinner in December. No, I talked to him since then. Middle
-f^< *
* c -
of January I believe. I till — tit** that back February.
Probably middle of February is the last time I spoke to him.
2 What did you discuss?
A I don't recall totally but the basics of the
discussion DUst was again nou it was his turn in the barrel,
he was getting a tremendous amount of media interest, and he
was having some insurance problems as a result of some of
th« paper reports, and I consoled him.
2 What did you tell him?
A I told him I had been at it five months and I
feel real bad for you. Hopefully it will all go away when
MLmim
660
I
NAME :
13 lU
131S
1316
1317
13 18
13 19
1320
132 1
1 322
1323
132tt
1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1 333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
HIR072000 '•^'^ww IKbI/ PAGE SU
all the investigations are over.
2 What kind of insurance problems did he
A He had some again Department of Defense contracts
and they called for bonds and his insurance company uas
raising rates and doing all the normal things that irritate
one .
2 For whom was he working now?
A The same East, as far as I know.
2 Did he mention that the FBI had interviewed hira?
A No.
2 Did he mention if anyone from the Congress had
interviewed hira?
A What he told me that he had received some six or
nine subpoenas in the matter of two days covering various
companies and as of yet, I don't believe anybody has
interviewed him. He has, on advice of counsel, I believe he
IS pleading the Fifth and he is not talking, but he
apparently has provided company comments of which you
already receives some.
2 Okay. Did he express any concern regarding any
criminal liability?
A Hone at all.
S Did he explain why ha wasn't cooperating?
A On advice of counsel.
2 So it was his response was in the area of I
iimsifB
661
NAnE
1339
1340
13t1
13U2
1 343
1 3^^
UUS
1 346
1 347
1 348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1 353
1 354
1355
1356
1357
1358
1359
1 360
136 1
1362
1363
HIR072000
^msim
PAGE 55
didn't do anything wrong but ray lawyers told rae not to talk.
A I guess. I wasn't there.
2 Did he mention whether or not he had received any
threats or promises from anyone regarding any cooperation?
A No .
2 Did he seem to have been threatened or been
frightened of anything or anyone?
A No, only he is concerned about his business.
2 Had his business been threatened by anyone?
A No .
2 I have the same question about fir. Dutton. In
your conversations with hm did he express that anybody had
threatened hire or
A Not at all.
2 Did he seem frightened or m any way hesitant to
cooperate with investigators?
A I think if I recall, both Dutton, as well on
advice of counsel, was not discussing anything with any
investigator until they narrowed down what they wanted to
discuss. I guess, I don't know, that was the advice of
counsal.
2 But ha did not appear to be nervous or scared of
anyona? , ■
A No.
2 Did you tell us that after that meeting at the
UNCLASSIFIED
662
wussm
NAHE: HIR072000 ~' *^fc'lt/UI| || || PAGE 56
1364 Viscount Hotel you had not spoken to Mr. Secord since then?
1365 A That is correct?.
1366 2 Have you been contacted by anyone on behali oi
1367 Mr. Secord?
1368 A Just the last time I talked to Mr. Dutton.
1369 . e Okay.
1370 A About the new product.
1371 2 But with the exception of Dutton and Gadd, has
1372 anyone from a Secord related company called you?
1373 . A No.
13711 2 Now, did you and Mr. Bastian meet with Mr. Gadd
1375 in December of '86?
1376 . A Yes.
1377 2 Was that toward the end of the month?
1378 A I think it was the 30th, if I recall, it was
1379 right at the end of the month, yes.
1380 2 Why was that?
138 1 A Because Mr. Gadd decided to take a couple of days
1382 with his wife and get out of Washington and he came down and
1383 we invited him out for dinner.
1384 2 Did you discuss the investigation at the dinner?
1385 . A yes.
1386 . fi What was said?
1387 A Very simply his counsel was advising him to go
1388 the route of the Fifth Amendment, and we said wa were not
"Ncussm
663
NAME
1389
1 390
1 39 1
1 392
1 393
1 394
1 395
1 396
1 397
1398
1 399
1U00
1 40 1
1L|02
mo3
1 404
1405
1406
1407
1408
1409
14 10
14 11
14 12
14 13
HIR0720C0
WUSSffl
PAGE 57
going to do that, ue at Southern Air Transport were going to
be 100 percent totally cooperative with any bona fide
investigative group. That was our position and that was his
position.
2 What did he tell you about your position, was he
happy with that or upset?
A Neither. If I recall one comment, I don't
remember the exact words, but the gist was he wondered why
his counsel was not giving hira the same advice.
2 Why? Because he thought he had done nothing
wrong ?
A Yes.
BY MR. LEOM:
2 Did it turn out by any chance that you and Gadd
or Button, or Secord, had any acquaintance or friends in
common from Vietnam, your experience in Vietnam?
A Mine?
2 Yes.
A I was only a liCtle boy. I had no acquaintances
in Vietnam that they would know. But I do believe that
Secord and Dutton and possibly Gadd, knew each other in
Vietnam. That is only from some press article I read
recently.
2 Served together?
A Crossed paths. They were all in the Air Force.
KNCUXSm
664
NAHE ■■
14 14
14 15
14 16
14 17
1418
14 19
1420
142 1
1422
1423
1424
1425
1426
1427
1428
1429
1430
1431
1432
1433
1434
1435
1436
1437
1438
HIR072000
*u«/fe
PAGE 58
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 As a point of information, the invoice I asked
about regarding the washer and dryer to Switzerland, I will
give you the information. I don't have the document with rae
because a colleague of mine has it. But apparently the
document or the transaction occurred, the flight occurred on
February 26, 1986. I have as invoice number 087019. Now, I
have that listed as SAT invoice but I believe it is an East
invoice .
MR. BECKMAH: It is not our number. I don't think
we have produced 8,000. Is that an invoice number or the
document number?
MS. MAUGHTOM: Mo, invoice number.
MR. BECKHAH: Ho.
MS. NAUGHTON: It did not come from your documents?
MR. BECKHAN: I see.
THE WITNESS: Did not?
MR. BECKHAM: It is an East do
ns . NAU6HT0M: Yes. However, they received an
invoice from SAT< that is my point.
THE WITNESS: For it?
ns. MAUGHTOM: That uould be invoice 80709. It was
apparsntly paid on in October of '86. The amount is
$1,269.54, with their check number 1035.
THE WITNESS: Southern Air's check number?
wm,m
665
UNClASSIFltD
KAME' HIR072000 TkGZ 59
1H39 HS. KiUGHTONi Eait paying Southarn Air Transport.
1I4C40 THE WITKESS: Okay.
mm HS . HAUGHTON: for dalivaring this washar and
II4I42 dryer.
lUMS . HR. BECKHAH: This is a flight that occurrad on
1(«M(4 Fabiuary 26, 19867
lUUS . MS. NAUGHTOM: I balieva so.
1>4(46 . HR. BECKMAN: It was paid ior in Octobat of '86?
1I4M7 HS. NAUGHTON: I beliava so.
14148 HR. BECKMAK: Aia thay that slow in paying?
1t4>49 THE UITKESS: Tha whola thing bafflas na so.
1U50 . HR. BECKHAH' What would you lika us to do?
1U51 HS. HAUGHTOH: What I would lika to do is for tha
1U52 record--this is an inpoztant araa for us
msa HR. BECKHAK: Can you tall us why?
lUSH THE WITNESS: It is iaportant?
1U55 . ns. NAUGHTON: yas . For tha racozd wa would lika
1456 to request any information you can giva us about that
1457 flight. Who azzangad it, why it was dona, perhaps what
1U58 other cargo was aboard. I doubt that Southern Air Transport
1459 transported a washer and dryer by itself.
1460 HR. BECKHAN: Can you give us the points of tha
1461 flight?
1462 HS. NAUGHTON: All I know is that there was a
1463 charter ^^^^^^^Hwith ultimate destination in Switzerland.
Kmsim
666
UNCLASSIFIED
KANE '
1I46U
1465
1(466
1H67
1>468
1469
11470
1U7 1
1472
1473
1474
1475
1476
1477
1478
1479
1480
1481
1482
1483
1484
1485
1486
1487
1488
not 60
HIK072000
I do not know If SAT ilau th« lag ^^^^^^^^| to
Switzerland . That would ba ona oi tha things I would want
to know.
MR. BECKMAH: Excusa na , If SAT Is billing for
transportation ^^^^^^^^^1 to Switzerland, wouldn't it imply
that Southern Air Transport flaw batwaan Lisbon and
Switzerland?
HS. HAUGHTON: I an not sura. Southern Air aay
only have flown fron the United States ^^^^^^^^|
THE WITNESS: What is the total dollar?
HR. BECKKAK: One thousand two hundred sixty nine
dollars and fifty-three cents. We are not
HS. MAUGHTOH: I understand all that.
THE WITNESS: I will find out whatever I can about
that.
MR. BECKMAN: What are you going to ask?
THK WITNESS: i an going to ask for that check.
HR. BECKHAN: It is not our oheck.
THE WITNESS: We got paid for soaething.
HR. BECKHAN: East's check would go back to East.
What inforaation do you have that is going to enable you to
get people to look
THE WITNESS: I will ask around.
HS. NAUGHTON: The only thing I have right now, I
will send you a copy of the East docunent and aaybe that
I'lLASSIFlEO
667
...uASSsm
NAME
1'489
11490
1 49 1
1492
1493
1 494
1495
1496
1497
1 498
1499
1500
150 1
1502
1S03
1 504
1505
1506
1507
1508
1509
15 10
1511
1512
15 13
HIR072000
PAGE 61
will help you. but it is SAT invoice number 087079.
THE WITNESS: That is an SAT invoice.
US. NAUGHTON: If that reference does not help you,
then I will send you a copy.
THE WITNESS: Okay. It blous ray raind anybody would
send a washer and dryer all the way to where did you say,
Swi t2e r land ?
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes.
MR. BECKHAN: What is the date of the SAT invoice?
MS. NAUGHTON: 2/26/82.
HR. BECKMAN: That is the date of our invoice?
MS. NAUGHTON: Yes, I believe so. I don't know.
Your invoice, I don't have a copy of the information.
MR. BECKMAN: You implied the flight was on the
26th.
MS. NAUGHTON: I don't know, but that is the date
on the invoice. I don't know the date of the flight or the
date of the invoice .
MR. BECKMAN: All info re washer and dryer.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 I am going to ask you a series of questions now
ragaiding individuals and ask you whether or not you have
either met them, spoken to them, or know of them. If the
answer is yes to any of those three questions, then I would
like you to elaborate what you know about them, or if you
ittASsra
668
KAHZ'
15114
1515
1516
1517
1518
1519
1520
1521
1522
1523
152U
1525
1526
1527
1528
1529
1530
1531
1532
1533
1534
1535
1536
1537
1538
HIlt072000
UNtUSSW
PAGE 62
hava B«t th«it, uhan, und«x what clrcunstancas . and so on. I
won't lapaat all thraa quastions for avazy individual.
HR. BECKHAM: Mould it ba corract clarification
that knows than of own knowladga as opposad to having raad
in the prass?
ns . HAUGHTON: That is f ina . if you know of thea,
if someona tol^ you about then, as opposed to reading about
then in the newspaper or on television. All right?
THE WITNESS: Yes. I raad a lot in the last few
nonths .
KR. BECKHAM: Excluding what you read. It is hard
to differentiate.
THE WITNESS: I will do ay best.
ns . MAUGHTOM: If you have heard of soneone but you
don't recall where, fine, say that.
BY HS . MAUGHTOM:
S Frank Gonaz.
A Frank?
2 Yes .
A Mo.
e What about Hax?
A Yes .
fi Who is Hax Gomez?
A Hax Gonaz was the liaison batueen|
land Bill Cooper .
jHMSlFltD
I
669
»»
NAME ■
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2
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liaison'
A
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PAGE 63
And you met hira twice I believe?
I believe so .
Do you know what his function was other than as
As far as I know, :ust liaison.
Edward de Garay.
Yes .
And have you ever met him?
Met hira once .
Edward, did you meet hira?
Yes, I met him once.
Under what circumstances.
I believe it was in Mr. Gadd's office and he was
explaining to me that he was going to organize the pilots .
2 Did he say anything?
A No .
2 He was silent?
r
A I :dt met hira for a moment. I was never in a
raeeting with him.
2 And who told you he was going to organize the
pilots?
A nr . Gadd.
2 Did you aver speak to Mr. de Garay other than
that occasion?
A No .
mussm
670
HIR072000
ijHtUiSSW
PAGE 64
NAME :
1564 2 Did y'out mechanics or anyone else ever discuss
1565 Mr. de Gary's functions with the contra resupply opieration?
1566 A No.
1567 2 You never heard about him after that meeting?
1568 A I heard from one of our technical guys, that ue
1559 sent to take a look at an airplane that I think he uanted to
1570 fly auay immediately, or something of that nature, and ue
1571 said uait a minute, there is a lot of paperwork and a lot of
1572 thing that have to be done. He was a rather flighty
1573 individual. Ed Freize told rae that. But I very seldom
1574 heard any more of him.
1575 2 What about Raphael 2uintero?
1576 A Yes.
1577 2 Have you met him?
1578 A net hira once, yes.
1579 2 Under what circumstances?
1580 A He was with flax just in the lobby I believe,
158 1 waiting to see Cooper.
1582 2 The lobby of the SAT?
1583 A Yes.
1584 2 And what was his task m the organization?
1585 A I don't know.
1586 fi Uhen you were introduced to Kin, how were you
1587 introduced?
1588 A That this is Ralph.
ONCLASSIFIEO
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HIK072000
UNCUSSlFiED
Did you spaak to hliiT
PACK 65
A No, I just said hi.
fl Did you aval say anything alsa to hln othaz than
that naatlng?
A No.
Q Do you know whara ha llvas?
A I ballava he livas In Hlanl .
2 How do you know that?
A I don't know. Somabody told na ha had a conpany
in Miaai . I think I read it in the paper, as a natter of
fact.
S Do you know whether or not he is there now?
A I don't know.
fi What about Ration Hedlna?
A Yes . I net him
2 How many tines do you go
A Once .
2 That was on NHAO flight?
A Yes.
2 Hhat was Xaaon Medina doing when you net hin?
A I think he drove na to the hotel.
fi From the airport?
A Yes.
2 Hhat was his task in the contra resupply nission?
A As far as I could tell he was a gofer.
UNCLASSIFIED
672
NAME ■■
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HIR072000
*t/i»ife
PAGE 66
2 For uhora?
A I think for Cooper.
2 Did you ever see hin in the Unxted States?
A No , I never did .
2 Do you Know where he lives?
A No. I don't.
2 What about Luis Posada Carrilles?
A No.
2 Uhat about Eelix Rodriguez?
A Eelix Rodriguez is Max Comez .
2 How do you know that?
A I read it in the paper.
2 So when you were introduced to him. which nane
was he using?
A I think it was Max.
2 Now. Mr. Cooper you knew. I assume, iairly well.
Better than the others?
A Yes.
2 Did he spend a lot oi time in SAT?
A Yes. he did.
fi What did he have to tell you about the operation?
Has ha happy with it. was ha dissatisfied?
A Mo. I would not say he was happy. He was doing
the best he could to run the operation.
2 Uhat did ha say about the financing? Did he ever
i
UNCLASSIFIED
673
ilNCUSSifitO
NAME: HIR072000 PAGE 67
1639 explain about lack of funds?
UNCLASSIFIED
674
NAME
1640
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HIR072000
RPTS THOMAS
DCMN LYNCH
MmSlfB
PAGE 68
A I think yes, this fuel money was a problem for
him. He told me once that everybody wanted hira to fly and
then they go out and couldn't get fuel for airplanes, didn't
have enough money, enough cash. Everybody wanted cash and
that was always an ongoing problem for hira.
e Did he ever express to you the suspicion that
part of the money might have been siphoned off by any of the
contra leaders?
A No.
2 Did anyone ever express that to you?
A No .
2 Did they feel they ware getting all the money
that was coming in?
A Who?
2 Did Mr. Cooper?
A Mr. Cooper only expressed problems with getting
the funds that he needed for his daily operation, as I :)ust
explained. There was nothing beyond that.
fi Did he ever complain about the behavior of any of
th« crews?
A I think so. I think he fired a guy one day.
2 Do you know what for?
A No, I don't.
rnkmii
675
OfJCUSSlFO
NAME HIR072000 ><»•-■ PAGE 69
1665 2 Was it ever expressed around SAT, either involved
1666 in the contra resupply operation or involving the Iranian
1667 flights, uas the National Security Council ever mentioned?
1668 A No.
1669 2 Did Mr. Secord ever mention the National Security
1670 Council?
167 1 A No .
1672 2 Did fir. Secord ever mention Oliver North's name?
1673 A No.
16714 S Did nr . Gadd every mention Oliver North's name?
1675 A No.
1676 2 Did Hr . Dutton?
1677 A No.
1678 2 Was Oliver North's name ever mentioned at SAT by
1679 anyone, to your knowledge?
1680 A Yes sir.
1681 2 What?
1682 A Aiter we flew McFarlane and the crew to Teheran
1683 in flay, Mr. Gilchrist came back and debriefed me.
1684 2 Did you know who Oliver North was?
1685 A No.
1686 fi Did you ask him?
1687 A Yes.
1688 2 What did he say?
1689 A He said he though-'he was with the National
mm\m
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NAME :
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PNCUSWD
HIR072000
Security Council.
PAGE 70
2 What else did he tell you about Mr. North?
A That was all. Said he carried a Bible.
2 He carried a Bible?
A He carried a Bible.
2 Did you think that was amusing?
A It was, after reading all the articles.
2 Did you ever meet Mr . North?
A No , I never did .
2 Every speak to him?
A No .
2 What about Mr. McFarlane?
A No .
2 No to both questions?
A No to both questions.
2 What about Poindexter?
A No.
2 Was his name ever mentioned at SAT?
A No.
2 What about Charles Tyson?
HR. BECKMAN: I was writing instead of listening
What was the answer on McFarlane?
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. BECKMAN: You said you didn't hear about
ncFralane?
I
i
ONCLASSIFIED
677
ONCLASSIFIED
NAME: HIR072000
PAGE 71
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1739
THE WITNESS: she asked me if I ever met him. I
said no, or spoke to hira.
BY ns . NAUGHTON:
2 You obviously herd of him from Mr. Gilchrist.
A Yes.
2 At any other point was he mentioned at SAT other
than the May '86 flight?
/
A No .
e What about Adnan Khashoggi?
A No .
2 What about Donald Fraser?
A No .
2 Ernest Miller?
A No .
2 Yaacov Nimrodi?
A No .
2 Al Schwinmer?
A No.
2 Michael Ledeen?
A Ho.
2 David Kimche?
A No . I
2 Willard Zucker?
A No, except for you just mentioning it.
2 Very good .
wussra
678
NAHZ<
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A
dzy«t .
e
A
2
A
fi
A
Q
A
2
A
S
A
ICUSSIFIED
PAGE
72
Plzs I hava haazd oi tha guy ha got a uashez and
Jacqua Mossaz?
Mo.
Thonas Cllnas?
Yas .
This is C-L-I-M-E-S?
Right.
Firstly, have you evaz mat Hz. Clinas?
No, I havan't.
Hava you spokan to Hz. Clines?
I don't knoH. I don't think so.
What makes you think you hava?
Uall, as I said yesterday, whan we were iirst
asked by Mr. Gadd for the^^^^^Htr ip , when we didn't have
an airplane, he was--once we arranged for the sub-service,
his nane was given to ^^ ^^^^^^^^H ^ gave it to Dave, but
I an not--I can't reaamber during that period if I nade a
call just as part oi the coordination or not. I really
don't recall. I know Dava talked to hiit several tines.
fi And who does Hz. Clinas work for, to your
knowledge?
A Z don't know.
S And his nana was given to you by Hr . Gadd?
A Yes sir.
HiJ^sw
679
Hxnz
1765
1766
1767
1768
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1771
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1773
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HII1072000
yiussiFe
PIGK 73
fi What did Mr. Gadd tall you Ht . Cllnas could or
would do7
A Tha gist was coordinating tha charter at tha
!nd.
2 So in othar words, Ki . Cllnas Is rasponslbla ioi
having tha cargoj
A Right.
2 Has thara a problan with that facat of the
flight? You told us that alia air was lata in getting to
[Has thara a problem with tha loading thara?
A Mr. Mulligan could explain it better. I thinK
there was a problem on one of those two flights where the
flight bringing tha cargo in was delayed--snow storm or
sonethlng--and it was putting tha whole schedule into
jeopardy .
2 Did you hear any information or rumors or
anything that this cargo had coma from Poland or other
Eastern Bloc countries?
A Yes .
From whom did you hear that?
Dave .
And what was his information?
Hell, I don't know ha told me that. Tha delayed
flight was coming from an Eastern Bloc country and I don't
recall if it was Poland or Hungary or Albania. I don't
S
i
e
A
yNCLASSIFIED
680
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HZK072000
know.
ii?-
iUSSIFlEO
PAQE
7M
fi Old you oz anyona In your oonpany hav« any
dealings with Mr. Clines aftar that?
A Mot that I an aware oi.
e Did Hr . Gadd «var spaaK of Nr . Cllnas aitar that?
A Kot that I can racall.
2 Did Hr . Dutton?
A Not that I can racall.
S Did Hr . Sacord?
A Ho.
e What about Albart HaKla?
A I think I spoke to hin onca .
fi Do you ramemher under what clrcunstancas ?
A It was tha sane tine as Cllnas, and frankly, I
don't even know if I spoka to hia either. But he was
another nane given to ne to help coordinate this January of
'85 charter and I recall he had a California phone nuaber .
I don't know, I raaeabar--! don't know what good he is going
to do raa in California when tha trip is out of|
S Who had given you his naae?
A Dutton had. I aa sorry, not Dutton, Hr . Gadd
had.
fi And this California nuaber, do you recall was it
a coapany or private residence?
A I don't racall.
■•r-i
mm
1
681
NAME
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1839
ONClASSiflEO
HIR072000 UllWLtffiWII timW PAGE 75
2 Did you call it from your office?
A No, I don't even remember if I even called it. I
know I had it. I think I called them. If I did, I probably
called from my office..
2 Do you still have that number?
A I might.
2 Could you please check on that for me?
A Sure .
2 Uas Mr. Hakim's name ever mentioned after that
episode ?
A Ho.
2 Uas his name ever mentioned in your discussions
with Mr. Dutton or Mr. Gadd after the story broke?
A Mo.
2 They have never refetred to Dr. Hakim?
A Ho.
e What about Robert Lilac?
A Ho.
2 What about a Ouane Clarridge?
A No.
S Do you know him by Deuey?
A No, I don't know anybody by the name of
Clarridge .
2 What about H. Ross Perot?
A I have heard of the name.
01! liSSIflED
682
NAME :
18140
1841
1842
18U3
leUM
18H5
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1847
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UNCLASSIfiEC
HIR072000 ^ PAGE 76
2 Have you met him?
A No .
2 Have you ever spoken to hira?
A No .
2 Do you know hira only through the media?
A Yes .
2 Uhat about Constantine Henges?
A No .
2 What about Nestor Sanchez?
A No .
2 What about Ted Shackley?
A I read it in the paper a couple of days ago. I
don ' t remember .
2 Were you given his name as an associate of Nr .
Clines ?
A No .
2 What about llanuchehi Ghotbanifar?
A Only what I read in the paper.
2 What about John Hull?
A No.
2 What about Jack Terrell?
A Yes. What I have read in the paper.
S Do you know anything else about Mr. Terrell?
A No.
2 What about Faith Ryan Uhittlesley?
UNCUSSlflED
683
NAME ■
1865
1866
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mR072000 Wl lUL.fl4ll III iril PAGE 77
A
Q
A
2
A
2
A
e
A
2
A
2
A
2
A
2
A
Israel .
2 What about, what did Mr. Hir do in Israel?
A Hr . Gilchrist told me he thought he was head of
tha antiterrorism reporting to the Prime Minister.
e Did he brief Mr. Gilchrist on Iran?
A Yes. According to Mr. Gilchrist. He could
answer that better than I. I believe he was on the flight.
2 Okay. Did Mr. Gilchrist ever tell you or did he
Do you know who the Ambassador is to Switzerland?
No .
What about Richard Brenneke?
Mo.
What about Claries Allen?
No.
John McMahon?
No.
Stanley Sporkin?
No .
Arairam Nir?
Yes.
Had you met him?
No.
How do you know?
Mr. Gilchrist told me he was, that he met him m
yNCLASSiFIEU
684
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HIR072000
yNCUSSIFlE!
PAGE 78
to your knowledge did he ever have the impression that any
of these Israelis had shipped arras to Iran before this?
A No .
2 What about Graham Fuller?
A No .
2 Roy Furmark?
A I have read that in the paper as well. I have
never met him.
2 Carl Spitz Channell?
A No .
2 Halter Millet?
A No.
2 Merman (loll?
A No.
2 Guri and Israel Eisenberg?
A No .
2 Sam Watson?
A No .
2 Colonel James Steele?
A I have heard the name.
2 Where did you hear the name?
A I believe he was military attache in El Salvador.
2 Did you ever meet him?
A No, I didn't, I don't think.
2 But some of your crew members did, is that
iJNCLASSIFIEg
685
NAME
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HIR072000
correct ?
ONClASSIfitD
PAGE 79
A No, I don't believe so. Except for the April
(
:^ght that ue did, I think, I believe, that our crew did
meet hira on that flight.
2 Hho did the most liaison with Colonel Steele?
A I don ' t know .
2 Uhat about General Singlaub?
A I have heard of him.
2 Did you ever meet him?
A No .
2 Did you ever hear of hin from General Secord?
A No .
2 Ever hear of him from Hr . Gadd or Dutton?
A Yes sir .
2 Hhat did they tell you, what did Mr. Gadd tell
you about Singlaub?
A That he was, I guess, I don't know, involved m
trying to gather relief goods for the contras . I think Gadd
mentioned to me at one time that he considered him actually
as a competitor.
2 So he was not working in conjunction with Mr.
Singlaub?
A Ho.
2 What else did he say about Singlaub?
A That is all.
ymOTO
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NAME ■■
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,...„ yUCUSSifiED
PAGE 80
What did he think of hire?
A I don't knou.
2 Did you ever speak to General Singlaub?
A No .
2 Ambassador Dueraling. Other than the incident you
described during the NHAO flights, did you have any other
contact about Ambassador Duemling?
A No .
2 Did you ever discuss uith Ambassador Duemling the
shipment of lethal weapons?
A No.
2 To your knowledge, was he aware of the private
funding aspect of the contra resupply?
A I don't know.
What about a man named John Mattes?
No .
Adam Goodman?
No .
Howard Teicher?
No.
Elliott Abrams?
No. I have seen him on TV.
Have you ever spoken to him?
No.
Have you ever met hia?
2
A
2
A
2
A
S
A
fi
A
e
\1EUSSW
687
NAHE ■
1965
1966
1967
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1984
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HIR072000
*«S/flfn
PAGE 81
No.
2 Did either Mr. Secord, Mr. Gadd or Mr. Dutton
ever talk about either Mr. Teicher or Mr. Abraras?
A No . '
2 Do you know of any of your creu members or anyone
associated uith SAT had ever met Mr. Abraras m Central
America?
A No.
2 You don't know, or they didn't?
A I don't know.
2 Donald Gregg?
A They never record to me and I would think that
would be something they would report.
Donald Gregg?
A No.
Robert Owen?
No.
How about a Bobby Owen?
Bobby Owens. I have h#id the name from Gadd I
2
A
2
A
believe .
2 Hhat did Gadd say abut Bobby Owens?
A No, he was helping m Central America. I don't
recall what aspect of it, but he was somebody that Gadd had
talked to about Central America.
2 What contact did Owens' name come under, why did
UNCUSSIFIED
688
NAME: HIR072000
UNCLASSiflEO
PAGE 82
1990
1991
1992
1993
199M
1995
1996
1997
1998
he ever mention hira?
A I don't really recall. I think there was an
operating snaiu and I think he told me Bobby Owens was
trying to get it worked out.
2 Okay. Did he express and opinion of fir. Owens to
you?
A No .
I will take that back. He said he was a very sharp guy, I
remember that.
ymnssffl
689
NAME:
1999
2000
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HIR072000 .;*.C' . •-;, PAGE 83
RPTS CAMT
DCHN MILTON
! 1 1 : 30 1
BY nS . NAUGHTON:
2 Back on the record.
I just have a couple more names to ask you, and
again the same three questions apply. John Cupp?
A Yes, he worked for Dick Gadd, I believe.
2 When did you meet hira?
A I am not sure I have ever met him. I have talked
to him on the phone .
2 About what?
A About Central America.
2 What specifically do you recall?
A No .
2 What does he do?
A He IS one of his operations guys. I don't know
uhat he does .
2 And what was your impression of Mr. Cupp?
A A nice guy.
2 What about a man named Tom Posey?
A No.
2 I am going to ask you the same kinds of questions
about some corporations, and ask you whether or not you have
m^^
690
NAME
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HIR072000
yNCLASSIFiEO
PAGE 84
heard of them other than through the media or have had any
dealings with them. CSF?
A Only the bank transfer we received.
2 You have had no other business uith thera?
A Mo.
2 What about Project Democracy; have you ever heard
that?
A Just what I read.
2 The Vinnell Corporation?
A Yes> I have. I believe Mr. Gadd used to work for
them .
2 How do you know that?
A I think Mr. Bastian told me.
2 Did you ever discuss that period of his employment
with Mr. Gadd?
A No .
2 American National Management Corporation?
A yes.
2 What do you know about them?
A That is one of Mr. Gadd's companies.
2 How do you know that?
A It is on the door of his office.
2 Where is EAST then? Is EAST on another door?
A Ho. I never saw it on any door.
2 How do you know he is from EAST then?
wussffe
691
J'ilft- •! .^
^hifkii
NAME^ HIR072000 PAGE 8S
20U9 A I'ra sorry?
2050 2 How do you know he represents EAST then?
2051 A Just because that is where I send ray invoices.
2052 C But to the same address as ANM?
2053 A Yes.
2054 2 Corporation?
2055 A Yes.
2056 2 What about the National Endowment for Democracy?
2057 A No.
2058 2 How about the National Endowment for the
2059 Preservation of Liberty?
206 0 A No. ■
2061 2 Air Mack?
2062 A '-^es.
2063 2 How do you know Air flack?
2064 A This was a company Mr. Gadd used in contracting
2065 with NHAO?
2066 2 Is Air Mack also located at the same address as
2067 EAST? ■'
2068 A Yes, I believe so.
2069 2 Is Air Mack on the door anywhere?
2070 A No, I never saw it.
2071 2 Corract ne if I are wrong; your only knowledge of
2072 Air Mack is just that that is whom he used to bill the State
2073 Department?
I
692
KAnz>
2074
2075
2076
2077
2078
2079
2080
2081
2082
2083
208U
2085
2086
2087
2088
2089
2090
2091
2092
2093
20914
2095
2096
2097
2098
HIK072000
biiljLhOxiiiiiu
PtGK 86
A That Is cotzact.
fi Explain this to a*. If Ht . Gadd conttaotad with
Alt Hack as a zaptasantatlva oi Alz Mack to pzovlda thasa
natazlals to tha Stata Oapaztmant. to NHAO, why Is It that
SAT blllad EAST Instead oi Alz Hack?
A To us thay waza all ona and tha Sana, and wa
alzeady had a iila on EAST. It Is just aaslar that way for
ouz own zacozds.
2 What about Suitnlt Aviation?
A I hava just haazd oi than. I think thay aza tha
pzadacassoz oi Sumazlco. This is long baioza ay tlaa .
fi Civilian Hllitazy Patzol?
A No.
2 Energy Rasouzcas?
A No .
S Daiex?
A Deiax is tha handler in Lisbon for our chaztezs out
oi Lisbon.
S To youz knowledge, aside iioa the ilights that we
have discussed ,^^^^^Hto Centzal Anezica, have you dona any
othaz chaztezs involvlns
A Gee, I am suze we have at one tine or another.
fi That would not be unusual?
A No.
fi The Council ioz Deaoczacy and Assistance?
UNCLASSIFIED
693
KAME ■
2099
2 100
2 10 1
2 :02
2 103
2 lOU
2 105
2 106
2 107
2 108
2 109
2 110
2 111
2 112
2 113
2 1 1U
2115
2 116
2 117
21 18
2119
2 120
212 1
2 122
2 123
HIR072000
Mmsim
PAGE 87
A Ho .
2 International Business Communications?
A No .
2 Udall Research?
A Yes.
2 What do you know about Udall?
A That was the company that uhen ACE acquired the
Caribous, that the titles were transferred to the next day,
and from what I r^ad in the paper, they are also the company
that developed the air strip in Costa Rica.
2 To your knowledge, who owned the C-123s?
A I don't know.
2 Albon Company?
A No .
2 Vertex Finances?
A No .
2 Euro-Commercial Finances?
A No.
2 Triad America?
A No.
2 International Procurement and Sales, Inc.?
A No.
2 Galaxy Trading?
A No.
2 Operational Sub Group? Have you ever heard of OSG?
UNCLASSIFIED
694
NAnZ< HIR072000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 88
212U
2125
2126
2127
2128
2129
2130
2131
2 132
2 133
213U
2135
2136
2 137
2 138
2 139
211*0
2 141
2 1i«2
2143
2mu
21((5
2146
2 1147
21U8
A
A
fi
A
fi
A
A No.
fi Hav* you haard of a projact callad Projact Condor
Danavand?
A KO.
2 What abou-t
A Say that again?
S
A
2
A
fi
A
Yas.
Yes .
What do you know about tha«7
I guass that was all.
Jfhaza aza thay locatad?
as iaz as I know.
Did ha aaat with you or just phona you?
No, I nat with hla.
In youz oiilca?
In ay ofilca, zlght.
Hhan was this?
198'( sonatina. I don't racall.
Did you go into this joint vantuza?
695
KAHE
2 149
2150
2151
2152
2153
215"4
2155
2156
2157
2 158
2159
2160
2161
2162
2163
216U
2165
2166
2167
2168
2169
2170
2171
2172
2173
^
HIX072000
Waxj/r;:,;
fXQt 89
No.
fi Why not?
i Ha was a conpatltor. I spant a yaar filing
conplalnts to tha DOT on Fifth Fiaadom.
2 Do you want to axplaln that?
A It maans--Bob, you ara battar. That is your baby.
HR. BZCKHAH: Fifth Fteadoa is a term of art which
aeans flights by an alrlina of country A that oparata
betwaan countries B and C. in this easel
was seeking authority froa tha
United States to oparata between tha United States and other
countries in the Caribbean and Central Anerica other than
■which would be Fifth Freedon flights, and are
nornally approved only on a limited basis.
Wa objected that the voluaa of tha flights and
other characteristics ^^^^^^^^^^^His unproved
background, and other defects that wa pointed out qualified
it in our subnisslon for the approvals that the Department
of Transportation gives as a matter of grace. There is no
obligation to give them.
BY nS. NAUGHTON:
fi Has that complaint rejected or what happened?
A Continuously.
HR. BECKMAH: Ue sort of got--
THE WITHESS: He never got anywhere, but it wasn't
m0^^
696
NAnz
217M
217S
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180
2181
2182
2183
218M
2185
2186
2187
2 188
2189
2190
2191
2192
2193
219>(
2195
2196
2197
2198
UNCLASSIREO
HIR072000 ^"" -— -' PAGE 90
just^^^^^^^^^H All th« caxtl*rs wax*
rr«*doM just as xoutlnaly as can ba .
BX MS. NAUGHTOH:
fi What daiacts did you point out In using this
aiillna. In your complaint?
A Hall/ basically ua fait that thara was an aMcass of
It. Sea--I Hill taka you back a stap--thaia was no coaneicial
reason in tha wozld f oz ■^^^^^^^^■as a nation ot anything
else to buy^^^^^^^^^HThalt application laid out a system
of flights f rot
f and thaza is no tzafflc, and
that was ona of our complaints. To us it was a flag oi
convanlanca, claar and siapla flag of convanlanca. And wa
objectad to it.
Q What do you mean?
A Flag of convanlanca is ona that you would register
your aircraft under a country that has no laws or no rules,
and then fly wherever you want.
HR. BECKKAN: The significance of that in context,
if I may try to be helpful, is that in international
aviation, ona country, in this case tha United States,
grants rights to tha airline of another country, in this
casa^^^^^^^^^^H as a matter of International reciprocity
and comity, but fundamental to tha exchange of reciprocal
rights is that the airline is a bona fide carrier of the
ONCIASSIFIED
697
KAME
2199
2200
220 1
2202
2203
220M
2205
2206
2207
2208
2209
22 10
221 1
2212
22 1 3
2214
22 IS
2216
2217
2218
2219
2220
2221
2222
2223
HI11072000
I'NCLASSiFIED
PAGE 91
oth*t country. And w« thought that th«t* was no avidanca
that this company was in fact a bona fida national airlina.
Indaad, wa polntad out that theza was avidenca to tha
contrary .
HS . KAUGHTON: What was tha avidenca to tha
contrary ?
MR. BECKHAM: That all of tha officars, directors
and operators wera ^^^^^^Hand people that had no connection
with tha country, that there was no ° ^ ^^^^^^^^^^^1
citizenship that seenad to have any control or ownership
interest in tha airline, and that is what Mr. Langton means
by flag of convenience. It is an airlina that is really
only controlled by people other than^^^^^^^^^^B who are
carrying the ^^^^^^^^^Hf lag as a
THE WITNESS: Just as in shipping, most ships are
registered in Panama or Liberia, flags of convenience.
BY nS. HAUGHTOH:
2 Is that the only aircraft, do you know of, that
they own?
A I understand that is the only one that I saw or
eveiu cared about, but I understand that they also had an F-
27 ^^^^^^^^^^H and a as
never did see those .
2 What would you use r-27s for?
A Moving people, passengers.
*j
mmm
698
NAHZ'
222(4
222S
2226
2227
2228
2229
2230
2231
2232
2233
223(4
2235
2236
2237
2238
2239
22(40
22(41
22(42
22(43
22(4(4
22(45
22(46
22(47
22(48
H1R072000 UIISmE il\ L'lrSP't^ P*GK 92
fi P«opl*7
A y*s.
2 Hon nany pass«n9«rs would It hold?
A I aa not sura. I think it is about a 25-passangai
aitplana, somawh«xa in that aiaa. It would ba a comnon one
in tha Caribbaan.
UNCLASSIFIED
699
Mmim
?^o ^s^"'" ""^
£'aJ/SD /'J
~7':> Ti^U
■mm%m
700
NAME
2324
2325
2326
2327
2328
2329
2330
2331
2332
2333
2334
2335
2336
2337
2338
2339
2340
234 1
2342
2343
2344
2345
2346
2347
2348
cir
Ififi
PAGE 96
HIR072000 ^» » wl
A No .
2 Did either Mr. Secord, Plr . Gadd, or Mr. Button ever
mention that airuay?
A No . I take that back. I think Hr . Gadd did.
2 What did he mention?
A But I think I mentioned it to him. I said. This is
just crazy what is happening to us, and I think I asked him
if he knew anything about them?
2 What did he say?
A He said no .
2 What about Dolmy Business, Inc.?
A No.
2 Hyde Park Corporation?
A We received a bank transfer from them.
2 Any other business with them?
A No.
2 Any other business with Lake Resources?
A Any other business?
2 Yes .
A I didn't even know we had any business with them.
Did we?
HR. BECKHAN: I don't know whether we got a bank
transfer or something.
THE WITNESS: I don't recall anything from them.
BY ns . NAUGHTON:
yNCIiSSIFIED
701
HIR072000
UNCLASSIHB
PAGE 97
NAME ■
231*9 2 Ttansuorld Arms?
2350 A I ara not sure if that first sub service ue did with
2351 Arrow, I think Transworld Arras might have been involved in
2352 that. I can't renembei. Are they a Canadian firra?
2353 2 I asked about them yesterday, yes.
2354 A They may have been involved in that first shipment,
2355 I don't know.
2356 2 But do you know how?
2357 A No, I don't.
2358 2 Had you ever done business with them since?
2359 A No.
2360 MR. BECKMAN: I am sorry, did you testify that you
236 1 had ever done business with them?
2362 THE WITNESS: No.
2363 MR. BECKMAN: Okay, because the question was, have
236U you done any business since, and that might imply you had
2365 done business before.
2366 THE WITNESS: Mo.
2367 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2368 2 I want to show you what you I have marked as SAT
2369 docunents 2025 and 2026. They are billing instructions for
2370 th« January 17, 1986. flight and a March 1st, 1986, flight.
237 1 Could you look at those documents, please, sir. and just
2372 tell me what they are?
2373 A They are billing instructions for two flights.
mimm
702
--■( ..
NAHE' HI11072000
KIASSIFIED
PAGE 98
2374
2375
2376
2377
2378
2379
2380
2381i
2382
2383
23814
2385
2386
2387
2388
2389
2390
239 1
2392
2393
239(4
2395
2396
2397
2398
on, it
This is th> Haroh Ist flight, is a flight
looks llke^^^^^^^^l
Q Could you d«clph«c tha thtaa lattec codas for aa ,
first of all?
k This is Brownsvilla. Taxas . Ua had an aircraft
basa thara at tha tima . That
BY MS. KiUGHTOK'
Q Is this a flight parfozmad by SAT or by Arrow?
A By SAT, 525.
2 And is this part of the Gadd-ralatec
flights?
A Yas.
2 Uhy would thara hava baan all thosa stops between
A For fual, I suppose.
HK. BECKHAK: It is a long way.
THE HITKESS: Hhan you hava a full load onboard,
you can't go very far.
BY HS. NAUGHTON:
oSIF|[[!
703
KAHC
2399
2400
2M0 1
2U02
2403
2404
2405
2406
2407
2408
2409
2410
241 1
2412
2413
24 14
2415
2416
2417
2418
2419
2420
2421
2422
2423
HIR072000
UNCUSSIFIED
PAGE 99
Q To tha bast oi your knowladga, thosa fout stops
thosa thraa s t o p s . ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H a r a
iual stops?
A Yas.
2 What Is tha stop inl
A Fuel. I don't belleva thara is any iual in
[so they needed iual to get home.
2 It as your understanding thai
2
A
2
A
2
And the January billing instructions?
This is 3ust a charter down to, it looks like
lis, and they went over to
land back to Hiani.
Miaai .^^^^^^^^
Lami .
What was this ior, do you recall?
It looks like a NHAO .
Regarding the supply efiorts, I want to ask you a
coupla of questions about what you knew, not necessarily
what SIT paitlcipated in, but waia you aware that South
Airican pilots were being used?
A No.
i-'Ncussm
704
UNCLASSIFIED
NAME ■
2M2U
2425
2U26
2427
2128
2U29
2430
2431
2432
2433
2434
2435
2436
2437
2438
2439
2440
2441
2442
2443
2444
2445
2446
2447
2448
HIR072000
PAGE 100
2 In the operation?
A No.
2 Do you know specifically that they were not, or you
just don ' t know?
A I not only don't know but I don't believe they
were .
2 Do you know whether they were used in 1985 to
supply contras?
A South African pilots?
2 Right.
A I just said I don't beliave they ever were.
2 Uhat makes you think they were not?
A As far as I know there were two pilots that were
not Americans or not Latins in that operation, and I
remember Cooper told me. There were two English pilots that
cane down, sent down by Secord . Cooper told me all they did
was they drank for two weeks and chased the brown-skinned
girls, and they got rid of them.
2 Could they hava been Rhodasian rather than English?
A I don't think so. What Coopai told me is they came
doMn. they didn't know how to fly the airplanes that were
thara, this 123 or tha Caribou, and he didn't know why they
ware thera except thay were sent down by Sacord, and they
made claims of having been involved in the--what was the
island?
JNCLASSIFIEO
705
UNCLASSifiES
KAME
2449
2U50
245 1
2U52
21453
2454
21455
2(456
2U57
2458
2459
2460
246 1
2462
2463
2464
2465
2466
2467
2468
2469
2470
247 1
2472
2473
HIR072000 PAGE 101
2 The falklands?
A The Falklands war, so that is why I assumed they
were English.
2 Do you recall approximately when this was? Was
this early in the operation or late?
A I don't think it was early, and because Secord was
involved, I became more aware of who he was; I would think
it was probably in Hay, April-May, sometime m that time
frame. There wasn't any airplanes down there really before
that. In fact, it was probably nay.
2 So no airplanes until late April?
A The first Caribou got down there m February, and
there was not another airplane until April, and that one was
having a hell of a time running.
2 Was that a C-123?
A No, it was Caribou.
2 the other Caribou. One other company I forgot to
ask you about was Saf air . Could you explain, first of all,
who they are?
A '^hara are two Saf airs. Which one are you referring
to?
A Why don't you tell me about both of them?
A Safair South Africa is a cargo airline that
operates L-IOOs and has a major maintenance base in
Johannesburg, and then there is Safair U.S.A., which has
ymnssiFiEO
706
UNCUSSIFIED
HIR072000
PAGE 102
NAME
2'47<4 since been renamed Globe Air, and we lease three aircraft
2475 from that corporation.
2476 2 The one in the United States?
2477 A The U.S. company, right.
2478 2 What aircraft do you lease?
2479 A Three L-IOOs.
2480 2 Tor what purpose?
2481 A For commercial purposes.
2482 2 But a particular contract?
2483 A No.
2484 2 Why do you lease then? Why not buy them?
2485 A In the beginning I came in 1983, the company had
2486 three aircraft. We needed to bid into Log Air, which was--we
2487 needed cash flow, a good steady cash flow. We made the
2488 lease arrangement with Safair U.S.A. to lease three
2489 aircraft. That gave us enough points for the craft system,
2490 and allowed us to go ahead and by in and get part of the Log
249 1 Air route .
2492 We didn't have enough money to buy any airplanes,
2493 and besides that. Safair U.S.A. did not want to sell them.
2494 They only wanted to lease them, and it was a perfect
2495 opportunity for both of us.
2496 fi Ware these fairly new aircraft?
2497 A Yes, they were very low time. I think they had
2498 less than 10,000 hours on them.
UNCLASSIFIED
707
UNCLASSiFlEi)
NAME :
21*99
2500
250 1
2502
2503
2504
2505
2506
2507
2508
2509
2510
251 1
2512
2513
2514
2515
2516
2517
2518
25 19
2520
2521
2522
2523
HIR072000
PAGE 103
2 Did they have any special features or functions
othar than a normal L-100?
A No.
2 Could they be used for air drops?
A Any L-100 could be.
2 Would you know offhand the tail numbers of these
aircraft ?
A November 250, Sierra, Foxtrot SF, November 251
Sierra Foxtrot, November 965. That is not the full number,
though, and no SF after that.
2 Is there any particular like time you have these
aircraft and time that Safair has them?
A No.
2 You just work it out on an ad hoc basis?
A No, it is a dry lease. They are under our of spec
2 Put that m English for me.
A We control them. They are our airplanes for all
practical purposes.
2 So any flights floun should be SAT flights?
A Yas.
2 By these aircraft?
A Yes.
2 And when did you lease them?
A 250 and 251 in 1983, and 965 in 1984.
2 To the present?
mimiwj.
708
NAME:
252U
2525
2526
2527
2528
2529
2530
2531
2532
2533
25314
2535
2536
2537
2538
2539
25140
25141
2Si«2
2543
2SUU
2545
25146
25147
25148
HIR072000
ONCUSSIFiEO
PAGE lOM
A Yes, ue still have them.
2 Did these planes ever fly missions to the Roosevelt
Roads Hospital in Puerto Rico?
A I am sure.
2 What for?
A We have a Mac contract. Roosevelt Roads Hospital?
2 Yes .
A I don't know anything about a hospital. There is a
Roosevelt Roads Naval Base ue fly to daily.
2 And that is part of the Defense contract?
A Yes.
2 You told me then that the Defense contracts I
thought were only domestic.
A The Log Aix-2uik Trans is domestic and then there
is a Mac contract short-range international.
MR. BECKMAN: It is called overseas.
BY MS. NAUGHTOH:
2 When you say short, does that mean Central America^
A No, a long-range international there is a criteria
you have to have an airplane that flies so many miles and
carries so many tons, and it was designed around 707s, DC-
8s, now DC-lOs, and 7i47s, and so there was--they just called
the long-range international, it had to have that endurance
capability .
Short-range international is exactly that; it is
mmmB
709
Mini I
251(9
2550
2551
2552
2553
2554
2555
2556
2557
2558
2559
2560
2561
2562
2563
25614
2565
2566
2567
2568
2569
2570
2571
2572
2573
«\1SSW ....
HIR072000 1 llllj|_riV V » ■ P»GI 105
for alroraft liX« 727 or L-100 or any alrorait that doam't
n«o*ssarlly hava to ba long-laggad.
fi I want to ask you about soma spaoliio flights than
that thosa planas night hava flown. Tha first ona would ba
January 11, 1986, from Gulf Port Blloxl to ^^^^^^^Hand
than on ^^^^^^^^^^^kDo you know anything about that
flight?
X
fi Yas.
First of all, lat's start with this: uara Buzz
Sawyar, Van Havan, Hilburn and Huff avar anployad by StI?
A I don't know if Huff Is.
S Lat's do Wilburn, Van Havan?
A Ha was employad by us, yas.
Q Do you know whathar or not thara was a January 1 1 ,
1986, flight?
nx. BECKnAN: Is that Andy Huff?
ns. NAUGHTOK: I don't hava a first nana.
m. BZCKHAN: Ha was ona of tha paopla, ona of tha
craw to Iran.
THE WITNESS: Yas, ha was.
To answar your quastion, whan was that, January of?
BY ns. KAUGHTON:
2 1 1th of 1986.
A Of 1986, Sawyai, Van Havan, Hilburn?
mmmm
710
2S7^
2575
2576
2577
2578
2579
2580
2581
2582
2583
258(1
2585
2586
2587
2588
2589
2590
2591
2592
2593
25911
2595
2596
2597
2598
HIR072000
UNCLASSIFIED
4Lt
PAGE 106
i Thas* aia all EAST pilots undar our of spaos
oontractad by us.
8 Contiactad by you. and did you avai usa any Saiali
planas. tha thraa wa aza talKing about, that waza laasad ioz
any oi tha HfAO flights?
A I don't know. I don't know why wa wouldn't. It is
antiraly possibla.
e So ii thaza is a January 11, 1986, flight with this
czaw ^^^^^^^^^^^nould thara ba any taason othar than tha
NHAO flight?
A I don't know. It could hava bean a chaztar.
HR. BECKHAM: Excusa aa . Could wa go off tha
racozd for a ninuta?
[Discussion off tha zacord. ]
MR. BECKHAN: Can wa go back on tha racozd now to
clarify this point?
THE WITNESS: Ha hava a flaat of aircraft. All ara
capabla of flying anywhara in tha world whara wa hava
insuranca covaraga, and I don't know that I would
particularly axcluda ona aircraft over another fron any
operation.
BY HS. NAUGHTOK:
S Let's start with tha crew. Froa January through
March of 1986, the people whose naaes I laentioned earlier.
UNCLASSIFI
711
2599
2600
2601
2602
2603
260>4
2605
2606
2607
2608
2609
2610
261 1
2612
2613
261(4
2615
2616
2617
2618
2619
2620
2621
2622
2623
NII072000
Mimm
PAGE 107
th«y u*ra on oonttaot to SAT?
A Y«s.
e Corract? So ii th«y flaw to Cantial Anatlca, it
was ior an SAT flight, and not a Gadd contia lasupply
mission?
A Yas.
2 Cortact?
A Corract.
fi So in that casa I would liKa to ask you to provida
to tha connittea, and I will giva you tha spaciiio datas, oi
what thasa flights wata. That would ba January 11. 1986, in
tha louta I had mantionad aaxliar, BiloKl to^^^^^^^^ and
Fabtuary 19 through 20--
HR. BECKMAN: Biloxi andj
ns. KAUGHTOK: Yas . Than Fabruary 19 through 20,
iiom Kew Orlaans , ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hto
niani .
THE HITNESS: That was NHAO.
BECKHAK: ^^^^^Hwhara
ns. NAUGHTON: It was niami.
Lat ma giva you tha third and I want to go back.
1 986 ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bto
BY ns. NAUGHTON:
fi On that flight that you mantionad in Fabruary. is
that tha tima you want tol
^i\
?;cussifi[D
712
NAHK'
262(4
2625
2626
2627
2628
2629
2630
2631
2632
2633
263(t
2635
2636
2637
2638
2639
26U0
26M1
26>42
26U3
26(t>(
261(5
26tt6
2647
26U8
HZB072000
I Y«S.
fi
A
fi
A
0 "" '
08
A
fi
A
Why did It stop
ru«l.
Why
That was as far as wa could gat. Thara Is no fual
and wantad to 90 back to Miaal. and that uas
light in routa, and so It stoppad^^^^^^|B^<' pick up iuel.
e Did you pick up anything al^
No.
Do you ranaaber whara you pickad up fual ln|
At tha aliport.
MR. BECKHAM: Pan, I an not claax. Wa hava glvan
you, I am sura> tha flight logs. Ua hava given you avaty
docunent wa could find.
HS . KAUGHTOK: Yas .
nR. BECKHAM: Relating to thasa flights. You want
aota than wa hava givan you?
HS. NAUGHTOM: Tha only thing I want to know is if
thasa wara MHAO flights or othar charters.
THE HITMESS: Yas. that one I know is KHAO flight
bacausa I was on that one .
BY HS. MAUGHTOM:
fi Just as far as tha other two.
A Tha other two we will be happy--well, I can
guarantee you--the third one was
yiUSSIFIED
713
HIK072000
"WMSte
PACK 109
NAHE<
26U9 fi Y«s.
2650 A It is a NHAO flight.
2651 2 And tha ilist ona
2652 A I don't know.
2653 C night ba , night not ba?
265U A Might ba . might not ba . I will chacK on it. I will
2655 just hava to chack on it.
2656 MR. BCCKMAH: Lat ma naka a nota.
2657 THE WITNESS: That was on January 11, I baliava .
2658 . HR. BECKHAN: Yas . Is that right, Pam?
2659 . — HS. KAUGHTOK: January 11, right.
2660 HR. BECKHAM: January 11, 1986.
2661 BY HS. KAUGHTOK:
2662 2 Do you know of any visits or contacts by South
2663 African officials to Costa Rica or Honduras regarding help
26614 to the contras?
2665 A Ko, I do not.
2666 2 Do you know of a man named Colonel, it is Van Der
2667 Hesthuizen?
2668 A Ho, I do not. Tough names, aren't they?
2669 2 Yes. I suppose ours are to them too.
2670 Do you hava any knowledge of an SAT plane being
2671 shot down In Zambia by tha Zamblan Air Force, which was
2672 rumored?
2673 A Shot down?
UNCLASSm
714
ONCUSSIFIED
NAME: HIR072000 -"■"•»»■-»•*# \* I I tS^lJ PAGE 110
2671* 2 Forced d-oun .
2675 MR. BECKHAN: Do you know when this plane was shot
2676 or forced down?
2677 BY ns. NAUGHTON:
2678 e October of 1986?
2679 A Just a minute. He were diverted into either I
2680 thought it was Zaire. October of 1986, that would be about
2681 right.
2682 We came out of Angola to Johannesburg for a seat
2683 check on one of our aircraft, but I don't remember whether--!
268U thought it was Zaire. Maybe it was Zambia.
2685 . MR. BECKHAN-. Diverted?
2686 THE WITNESS: Just diverted, yes. They didn't have
2687 overflight rights. They changed the airways and the crew
2688 had to--what is Lusaka? That is Zaire, isn't it?
2689 MR. BECKHAH: I think it is Zambia.
2690 THE WITNESS: It is Zambia, yes.
2691 MR. BECKMAN: You went to Zambia?
2692 THE WITNESS: We were diverted into Lusaka.
2693 MR. BECKHAN: For fuel or something?
2694 THE WITNESS: No. They filed a flight plan that
2695 took us down the coast of Angola across down into South
2696 Africa, and then they changed the air traffic control,
2697 changed the airways, and so the crew went over I guess
2698 Zambia and then they said. Please come on down, so the crew
^Ivji^m
715
NAME ■
2699
2700
270 1
2702
2703
27014
2705
2706
Z10-!
2708
2709
27 10
27 1 1
2712
27 1 3
27 m
2715
2716
27 17
2718
2719
2720
2721
2722
2723
HIR072000 PAGE 1 1 1
landed and tried to get the overflight squared auay , and
they were actually arrested, and I had to go to--I came up
here and worked with the State Department, and after two
days they released there and they went on to Johannesburg.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 Who did you work with at the State Department for
that?
A There is an office specifically for U.S. citizens
that are in problems in other countries, but I worked with a
woman who had the Zambian--! mean that was her--
2 Her desk?
A Her area, yes. her desk, Robin something.
2 Robin was her first name?
A Her last name was Robin Davis or something of that
nature, one of those dashed names.
2 And did you get the crew out?
A Yes.
2 Why did they arrest them?
A Well, six months earlier South Africa made a raid
into Zambia, and attacked--
HR. BECKMAN: International Congress or something?
THE WITNESS: Yes, which they thought was a
stronghold, and this scared the Zarobians, and so every
foreign aircraf t--this is not uncommon, any foreign
registered airplane is routinely stopped and people are
716
NAME: HIR072000
liNCUSSififl
I
PAGE 1 12
2724
2725
2726
2727
2728
2729
2730
273 1
2732
2733
arrested and questioned and then released, and in our case
that IS what it was.
It took several days, but they just let them go.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 Do you remember who was m the crew?
A Yes. Basil Morns was the copilot. That was why
we were kind of concerned. Our copilot was black, and often
Africans are not kind to their own. They can be very
brutal .
The captain was--I forget right now.
UNClASSIFIEfl
I
717
2731
2735
2736
2737
2738
2739
27U0
27U 1
27K2
27«43
271414
27145
27146
27147
27148
2749
2750
2751
2752
2753
27514
2755
2756
2757
2758
HIK072000
XPTS THOHAS
DCMH LYNCH
12 : 30 PH.
2 Anybody aIsa? Just a two nan craw?
A No, It was a full craw, plus u« had a MiXa
Connally was ■•chanio in our Angola projact. Ha was on tha
flight as well. Ha had an eya inf action that wa wanted him
to go down with the airplane and also get some medical help.
There were actually four individuals on the flight.
2 And it started in Angola?
A Yes.
2 What was its ultimate destination?
A Johannesburg.
2 What was the cargo?
A There was no cargo. Might have been an engine on
board for repair.
2 Has there anything secret about this flight?
A No.
2
718
KAHK!
2759
2760
2761
2762
2763
27614
2765
2766
2767
2768
2769
2770
2771
2772
2773
277M
2775
2776
2777
2778
2779
2780
2781
2782
2783
MII1072000
sum
PiGi im
In Angola?
Y«S .
Mho told you that?
I i«ally don't laoall.
Whan was that?
Whan was I told that?
Yes.
AT least two years ago.
Did SAT evez fly to the Kanina Ait Base in Zaire?
Not that I am aware oi.
Did you ever have any contact with Savlabi
No.
Either inside or outside of Angola?
No.
Did you evez supply them with supplier?
No.
A
fi
A
fi
A
fi
A
fi
A
fi
forces ?
A
fi
A
fi
A
Q
A I don't know.
fi Why would he be persona non grata there if he
hadn't flown there before?
A I am sorry?
2
719
NAME
278U
2785
2786
2787
2788
2789
2790
2791
2792
2793
27914
2795
2796
2797
2798
2799
2800
280 1
2802
2803
280(4
2805
2806
2807
2808
HIR072000
*^»® ,..: .
fi I sa«i to th* 90v«rnii«nt?
1 Right.
Q I s«* what you ar« saying.
BY MS. NAUGHTOK:
MS. NAUGHTOH: In tarns oi tha cargo going into
Angola and so forth, on you''^ diamond . diamond mining
contract?
A Yes.
S Did you avaz hava any assistanca from U.S.
raprasantativas of any agancy uhatsoavar in conducting thosa
flights?
A Ho.
2 He mantlonad a Stata Dapartmant at ona time.
Has that your only affiliation regarding any flights in and
out of Africa?
A Hith U.S. Govarnmant?
fi Yes .
A Yes. nayba wa flan soma AID flights in the past.
I don't recall any but
fi OKay. Has this business, did that come from what
uas formerly done by Trans Am?
A Yes. Same contract,
fi I do want to, so you can set the record straight.
m^mm
720
HIR072000
UNCIASSIFIED
PAGE 116
NAME
2809 ask about a coupla of articles, one appearing in the Post on
2810 Dttcember 20. and why don't you tell me if you have ever had
2811 any contracts inside South Africa involving oil spills as
2812 reported in the Post?
2813 HR. BECKMAH: December 20?
28114 ns. NAUGHTON: Yes.
2815 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2816 2 Inside South Africa?
2817 A No.
2818 2 Have you ever done any work for the Government of
2819 South Africa, either in South Africa or outside of South
2820 Africa?
282 1 .A No.
2822 2 Hera is the Post article if you would like to
2823 look at it.
282U KR. BECKHAN: Yes, please.
2825 BY ns. NAUGHTON:
2826 Then I would like to also look at the independent article,
2827 which I guess I will paperclip the independent article. If
2828 you could look through that.
2829 THE HITHESS : What is the Independent?
2830 HS. NAUGHTON: That is a good question.
2831 There is it the Post article?
2832 MR. BECKHAN: Thank you.
2833 (Document handed to counsel for his inspection.)
ONCl/ISSIFIED
I
721
MIHSSW
MAHE: HIR072000 II | f V Wl »*"* " ' "^ PAGE 117
283U . THE WITNESS: Uhat do you want me to look at here?
2835 US. NAUGHTON: You said you haven't seen it. I ara
2836 providing it. Apparently there is a reference there to
2837 contracts you had in South Africa, one involving oil spills.
2838 . MR. BECKHAH: Did you mark this?
2839 . THE WITNESS: I read this article. In fact, here
28^0 is uhat ue thought got through taking 105 flights betueen
28'4l Dulles and Bengala in one month is physically impossible. I
28'42 remember this article.
28'*3 BY HS. NAUGHTON:
28'4i4 Q Was that because the codes were different?
28>45 A Yes. I don't see anything about oil spills.
28>«6 2 That is fine, your answer is on the record, so I
28U7 gave you a copy of the article for your reference.
28U8 Could you turn to the independent article please, and .a
2849 can :ust get your answer on the record.
2850 A Are we in here somewhere?
2851 2 The details--is this the December 9 article?
2852 A Yes.
2853 2 Details three separate arms shipments to South
285U Africa, and the question is, does SAT have anything to do
2855 with those?
2856 A Ho.
2857 2 According to this, they are sending arms from
2858 Honduras to South Africa.
yNCUSSlFIED
722
MAME ■
2859
2860
286 1
2862
2863
28614
2865
2866
2867
2868
2869
2870
287 1
2872
2873
2874
2875
2876
2877
2878
2879
2880
2881
2882
2883
HIR072000
it.
UNCIASSIFIED
PAGE 1 18
Anyhow, if you want rae to read it, I will read
The answer is no, we never shipped anything. As far as I
know, we never have even shipped anything to South Africa.
2 Okay.
MR. BECKHAM: Certainly not have any business
since, with them since the sanctions went into effect.
THE WITNESS: No, no.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
2 You are are aware of the Clark Amendment?
A Yes.
MR. BECKMAN: Tell me.
MS. NAUGHTON: ^he Clark Amendment is similar to
the Boland Amendment. It is an amendment dealing with the
forces in Angola, and the government forces in Angola, and
as of 1985, actually from '76 to '85, barred any assistance,
covert or overt, to insurgent forces m Angola.
And so I ask you, Mr. Langton, to your knowledge, have you
or anyone in Southern Air Transport provided any assistance,
covert or overt, direct or indirect, to insurgent forces in
Angola?
MR. BECKHAN: No, we have not.
2 One other question on the leasing of the EL-IOOs
in Zaire. Has any official of the American Government
involved in that or helped out or assisted in that m any
ItUSSM
723
NAME:
28814
2885
2886
2887
2888
2889
2890
289 1
2892
2893
28914
2895
2896
2897
2898
2899
2900
290 1
2902
2903
29014
2905
2906
2907
2908
HIR072000
Hay ?
wssife
PAGE 1 1 9
A Mo.
2 And any official of the South African Government?
A No .
(IS. NAUGHTON: Those are all the questions I
have .
BY MR. BUCK:
2 Mr. Langton, I am wondering a few things. Would
about a few things I want to get through quickly. One is. a
wire transfer I believe on June 18 of '86. Do you lemeraber
that? It is in the amount of «2'42,000?
A No, I don't.
2 You don't remember it?
A Ho.
2 See if I can refresh your recollection. It is
$150,000 went to ACE and the *2,000 went to a flight
account. Do you remember? Does that help any?
A Doesn't help me.
2 I think we can leave that alone then.
A Okay.
2 Did Mr. Gadd give you instructions to set up the
ACE account?
A Yes sir.
2 You pass that on to Mr. Mason?
A Yes sir .
vmmfi
w
724
ilNCUSSifiEfl
NAME ■■
2909
29 10
291 1
2912
29 1 3
29 m
29 IS
2916
2917
2918
2919
2920
292 1
2922
2923
2924
2925
2926
2927
2928
2929
2930
2931
2932
2933
Did he give you money before you set up that ACE
No.
Did you have any money to set up that ACE
HIR072000 PAGE 120
S
account?
A
2
account?
A Yes, ue didn't know what it would take to set it
up and I think Bob, I think he put ♦S or ♦U.OOO in to open
the account. I don't recall.
S Okay. Who owned ACE?
A It is a bare share company.
8 Did Southern Air Transport own it?
A No.
Q Does Mr. Gadd own it?
A As I said, it is really a bank account and the
ownership really laid--I don't know.
2 From January oi '86 to November of '86, did you
hear of fir. North's involvement with the resupply operation
for contras, this private funding organization?
A No.
2 Hr . Poindexti^r?
A Ho.
Q Hr . HcFarlane?
A Ko.
2 Did anyone ever tell you who was raising money in
the private sector?
725
KAHI
293<4
2935
2936
2937
2938
2939
29140
2941
29t42
29U3
29(4M
2945
29>46
29U7
29<48
29U9
2950
2951
2952
2953
295M
2955
2956
2957
2958
HIR072000
UNCUssinti
PAGE 121
A No. is Z said, I thought Ganatal Sacord, that
Mas Mhat ha was out and about.
fi So ha Mas raising aonay and than also diracting
opaiatlons?
ft As iar as I KnaH, yas.
S Did you faal that tha raising nonay want bayond
Ganaral Sacord? Has thara anybody abova him?
A I don't knoH. I navar avan askad. I assuma
thara Mara planty of paopla around tha Morld that Maie
raady. Milling and abla to donata monay.
fi Did monay iloM through SAT accounts to pay
salarlas and axpansas of Individuals that Mara statlonad
doMn In Cantral Amarica? I am talking but tha pilots
spaciilcally > and soma oi tha oparations?
A Hot that I am aMara of.
fi Did Hr . Gadd avar idantlfy Mho ha brokarad ioz?
A You maan Mho his customar Mas?
fi Right.
A No.
fi Did you avar gat tha faallng that tha customars
flights and tha ACE account Mara tha sama?
A I don't avan--mayba you can raphrasa that?
fi I am trying to gat a faal for — ha obviously
raprasantad savaral dlffarant customars. Did you aver gat a
faallng ha Mas raprasantlng a iaM of thasa customars or that
for
726
KANE
2959
2960
296 1
2962
2963
2964
2965
2966
2967
2968
2969
2970
297 1
2972
2973
2974
2975
2976
2977
2978
2979
2980
2981
2982
2983
HIR072000
yNCUSSlHED
PAGE 122
It was one customer for several different activities?
A I never got that impression, no.
MR. BUCK: That is all the questions I have.
BY HS . KAUGHTON:
S I would like to go to one other area.
Along with what Kr . Buck asked, were you yourself ever
asked to contribute to either contra resupply mission or any
political action committee?
A nyself personally?
9 Yes .
A Mo.
Q Was the company?
A Not that I an aware of .
Q And we were discussing yesterday, as you recall,
there was an invoice I showed you regarding a contract for
Mr. Gadd's personal services from Hay of '86 for about a
period of five months. Do you recall that?
A Yes .
Q What services was Mr. Gadd to perforn for that
contract?
A
fi
A
Consulting services.
What kind of consulting?
Hx . Gadd has DOD contracts that he performs
routinely. We have a contract that I felt his services,
his knowledge, would be 4)eneficial and act as our Washington
UNeUiSSiFlEO
727
NAME :
298U
2985
2986
2987
2988
2989
2990
299 1
2992
2993
29914
2995
2996
2997
2998
2999
3000
300 1
3002
3003
3004
3005
3006
3007
3008
HIR072000 "*' ' PAGE 123
office liaison office, and that is what I hired him fot--his
office, his corapany.
2 Were you aware at that tirae that Mr. Gadd was
going to be terminated from Secord's operations m Central
America?
A Not at the tirae that I made the agreement with
him , no
2
A
2
So that did not influence you?
It didn't have anything to do with it.
I want to ask you some questions regarding that
contract, and you indicated yesterday that that was
classified material. Can you tell us what compartment
classification?
A I am sorry?
2 Can you tell us what compartment or
classification it required?
HR. BECKHAN: I think top secret, or secret or
confidential. What is the classification?
THE WITNESS: I think, I don't know for sure, I
think it is secret.
MS. NAUGHTON: Mr. Beck, do you have clearances?
HR. BECKHAH: No.
MS. KAUGHTOH: What I an going to do, I understand
Mr. Buck doesn't yet either. The reporters, however, are
cleared. What I am going to do at this point is treat it
mmwiB
728
NAME :
3009
3010
30 1 1
30 12
30 13
3014
3015
3016
3017
3018
3019
3020
3021
3022
3023
30214
3025
3026
3027
3028
3029
3030
3031
3032
3033
KIR072000
mmwB
PAGE 124
like a grand jury session. I am going to ask about this
contract of Hr . Langton. He is free to consult with you
beiore and after every question, but unfortunately, no one
without clearance can hear the answers.
riR. BECKMAN: I understand, but I think we have an
even more serious problem that maybe Mr. Langton has too.
Could ue go off the record?
MS. NAUGHTON: All right.
(Discussion off the record).
MS. NAUGHTON: Back on the record, and since this
does involve some sort of classified material, what we wish
to do is Hr . Langton. through his attorney, has agreed to
provide us with the Defense Department contract number and
the contracting officer whom this committee can contact for
information, and for any clearances for any further
testimony on this area.
Mr. Beckman, when do you think you will get that to us?
MR. BECKMAN: i don't know when. I can get that to
then early next week.
THE WITNESS: Host certainly, early next week.
MR. BECKMAN: Hill that be satisfactory?
HS. NAUGHTON: That is fine.
THE WITNESS: He have to get back to the offices
though .
HS. NAUGHTON: If I am not in my office that will
i«msffl
729
HAHE: HIR072000
SOSU ba fine.
3035
3036
3037
3038
3039
3040
yilCLASSlFIED
PAGE 125
Okay .
Hr . Buck, do you have anything else?
HR. BUCK: Ko .
HS . NAUGHTOK: That concludes the deposition.
Thank you.
(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the deposition was adjourned.)
mmB
730
731
MCGINN/ bap
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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23
24
25
Ufim^ffiffT
^^^\-^-\^^c"^-
DEPOSITION OF JOHN C. LAWN
Thursday, August 20, 1987
U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee to Investigate Covert
Arms Transactions with Iran,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m.,
in Room 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, with Pamela
Naughton, House Select Committee, presiding.
Present: On behalf of the House Select Committee:
Pamela Naughton, Robert W. Genzman and Robert A. Bermingham.
On behalf of the Senate Select Committee: Hank Flynn
and Tim Woodcock.
On behalf of the Witness: Dennis Hoffman, Chief
Counsel, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Panially Declassined/Released nn l^=0»'088
under otivisions ot E 0 12356
by K Johnson. National Security Council
eaet uo^
1
J3f.
COP«IS
uiKU^Bl'
732
bap
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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12
13
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15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
MR. LANKFORD: My name is Tom Lank ford. I am
a Notary Public for the District of Columbia. Raise your
right hand.
Whereupon,
JOHN C. LAWN
having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein,
and was examined and testified as follows:
MS. NAUGHTON: My name is Pamela Naughton. I am
staff counsel of the House Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. I would ask people
around the room to please identify themselves.
MR. GENZMAN: Robert W. Genzman, the House
Committee Minority Counsel.
MR. BERMINGHAM: Robert A. Bermingham. I am an
investigator with the House Select.
MR. HOFFMAN: Dennis F. Hoffman, Chief Counsel,
Irug Enforcement Administration.
THE WITNESS: John C. Lawn, L-A-W-N, Administrator
of the Drug Enforcement Administration.
MS. NAUGHTON: Let the record reflect we will be
joined shortly by Tim Woodcock, Associate Counsel of the
Senate Select Committee.
Mr. Lawn, are you personally represented here
today by counsel?
THE WITNESS: I am represented by Dennis Hoffman,
UMSfeftSfinifiit
733
bap
uiieft§sff*s9^
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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24
25
yes, who is the Chief Counsel of the Drug Enforcement
AdiTunistration. Dennis has been asked to come because of
his responsibility to respond to all of the requests for
files and for information and he is most knowledgeable
about that information that is in the DEA file system.
MS. NAUGHTON: Okay. According to House rules,
you can only be -- let the record reflect Mr. Woodcock
and Mr. Hank Flynn, an investigator of the Senate Select
Committee, have arrived.
Mr. Lawn, is it your decision or pleasure today,
then, to be represented by Mr. Hoffman?
THE WITNESS: Yes. Mr. Hoffman is representing
me.
MS. NAUGHTON: Okay. Fine. If we could get
some background here first to start off with, could you tell
us when you began in law enforcement?
MR. HOFFMAN: Before we start, I would like the
record to reflect prior to the start of the deposition we
did produce to you at your request a December 9, 1986 memo
f ron^^^^^^^^^^H to Mr. Lawn, captioned, "DEA in Support
of U.S. Hostage Situation."
This document was not produced to the Congress
before this date because of a request from independent
counsel, Walsh, that it not be produced. Independent
counsel has now waived nonoroduction of that document, and
WiSi
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1 we have made it available today.
2 MS. NAUGHTON: Thank you.
3 EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
4 BY MS. NAUGHTON:
5 Q Could you give us background, then, on your
6 law enforcement experience then?
7 A Certainly. I became a special agent of the
8 Federal Bureau of Investigation in July, 1967. During the
9 course of my FBI career, I served in Savannah, Georgia;
10 Monterey, California; San Francisco, California; Washington,
11 D.C.; Kansas City, Missouri; and San Antonio, Texas.
12 In April of 1982, the Attorney General designated
13 me as acting Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
14 Administration in Washington, D.C., and in July of 1985,
15 I became the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
16 Administration.
17 Q In what month? July?
18 A July of 1985.
19 Q And who was the Administrator from, let's say,
20 January 1985 until you assumed the post?
21 A My predecessor was Francis Mullen, Jr. Mr.
22 Mullen retired as the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
23 Administration in February, 1985. I was named as the
24 Acting Administrator until such time as I was confirmed
25 by the Senate.
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We are going to start off discussing the activities
"^^■VT -a I
of^^^^^^^^^and^^^B i^egarding the hostages held in
Lebanon and perhaps go into a couple of other areas.
Were you faroiliar with an organization called
the Hostage Location Task Force?
A Yes, I was.
Q Could you tell us how that came to your attention?
A The Hostage Locator Task Force was formed in 1985
and It was formed from the Terrorist Incident Task Force--
workmg group. I'm sorry. It was formed from the
Terrorist Incident Working Group.
The purpose of the Hostage Locator Task Force
was to have all government agencies furnish intelligence
information made available to them or available to them on
the potential location of the -- our ajnerican hostages
in Lebanon, most specifically the location of Mr. William
Buckley, who was a government employee.
Q And what precipitated the DEA's participation m
this? In other words, whose idea was it and how did it
come to your attention?
A The initial contact of the DEA was an informal
meeting between an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration ,^^^^^^^^V Special
and a neighbor of his, Mr. Ed Hickey. Mr. Hickey
was then as_-i.gned to the White House. Mr. Hickey asked.
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m^^^
if DEA could be in a position to furnish intelligence
infonnation on the potential location of the hostages in
Lebanon.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 remembering that DEA had an office
Lebanon -- our office in Lebanon closed in 1975 after the
kidnap of our agent, the agent who is assigned in Lebanon.
But the informants who were involved at that time
continued to be handled!
did not have any updated information on informant activity
in Lebanon, approached another agent ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H who
was more familiar with overseas operations.
ind^^^^^Bthen met with Mr. Hickey
in the White House in January of 1985 to discuss the
potential for us to ask the informants currently furnishing
us with drug information if they could also provide for
us information on the hostages.
Q But what I aia asking about is how much of this
did you know was going on. In other words, that they had
been contacted by Hickey and asked these questions?
A I was certainly aware they were contacted. I
was aware that they were -- they met with Mr. Hickey.
They subsequently, after their meeting, after the meeting
of^^^^^^^^^^^^lwith Mr. Hickey, they came back to DEA
headquarters and met with Mr. Frank Monastero, who was
Chief of Operations for DEA and with his deputy, Mr.
I4(§^i§iEffi3L
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David Westracle, to determine whether DEA would approve our
supplementing our drug intelligence with trying to furnish
information on the location of the hostages. This was
approved by the Administrator.
I was aware that it was approved by the
Administrator. And we initiated what we called an SEO, a
Special Enforcement Operation, targeted at drug intelligence
coming out of Lebanon, and it was from this SEO that we
hoped to task the same informants with furnishing us whatever
information they could develop on the location of the
hostages in general, but specifically on Mr. Bill Buckley.
Q So — now this SEO is that 471?
A That is SEO 471. We then, in initiating the
operation, then put $20,000, DEA funding, into the
initiation of this SEO.
Q Now, you say this was targeted at drug intelligence
that you would obtain from sources in and around Lebanon.
What I am asking is if a source gave only drug information,
would it come from that account or would it come from
some other account that was already established?
A At this point we didn't know. We didn't know
whether our sources were in a position to furnish any
mformatic ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
le SEO
was merely to determine whether or not we could be an
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8
effective mechanism in developing positive information
on the location of the hostages. So this was just a query
by DEA headquarters to determine whether informants,
most fcuniliar with Lebanon, could be in a position to help,
nothing more.
Q Was that account established with your approval?
A The account was established with my tacit
approval. I was the deputy. Mr. Mullen was the one
who initiated the SEO, but I certainly was aware that it
was initiated.
Q Do you know whether or not^^^^^^^^^^Hmet
with Mr. Mullen over there?
A No. ^^^^^^^^^^Hdid not meet with Mr. Mullen
to my knowledge. The meeting that was held to initiate
the SEO was a meeting between Frank Monastero and Bud
Mullen.
Q If we can get this straight, then, from the
outset, from the beginning of the activities, then let's
say in January, February of 1985, through November 1986,
who exactly reported to you about the activities of
A Okay. The SEO was established and at the same
time we had assigned Mr. Abraham Azzam, A-Z-Z-A-M, as our
point of contact with the Hostage Locator Task Force. Mr.
Azzam was tasked with Toinmg the Hostage Locator Task
::age L
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Force. And this was based upon a memo that we received,
that all agencies received from the White House, a memo
dated February, 1985, indicating that this Hostage
Locator Task Force was being formed. So Mr. Azzam was
then our representative to the Hostage Locator Task
Force.
Mr. Azzam himself was familiar with Lebanon
and was familiar with some of the informants that we
would be contacting in this SEO, and the reporting
procedure was f or^^^^^^^^^^^^^fto be contact with
Azzam so that whatever information was developed, Azzeim
was sharing with the HLTF.
In May or June of 1985, because of lack of com-
munication among the agent personnel, I believe I received
a phone call. I don't recall a phone call, but as well as
we can construct it, I received a phone call from Colonel
North telling me that there was a lack of cohesiveness
between^^^^^^^^^^^^^|and Azzam; that Azzam was being
not cooperative in our actively pursuing the location of
the hostages, and asked if^^^^^^^H could be the point of
contact for DEA.
Again this was May or June. At that point I
called^^^H^H and told^^^^^^Bhe would be the point
of contact with the -- with Oliver North and the National
Security Council, because Abe was given a new assignment
HD^^SecrI
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10
with a new deputy coming into DEA. At that point
point of contact was ostensibly me. I would contact
Ion a periodic basis, ask him to come to my office
to give me a status report on whether we were having any
success or no success, and I met with^^^^^^H perhaps on
five occasions to get an update as to whether we were
having any success or lack of success in locating
hostages in Lebanon.
Q Did you ever meet with^^^^^^^^lon this
subject?
A At this time -- I never met separately. I did
not meet separately with^^^^^^^^^H X don't think I
met with^^^^^^^^^fat all on this operation.
Q All right. And while Mr. Azzam was in it,
until about June of 1985, did you meet with him on this
sub:ject?
A I met with Abe -- met with -- I talked with Abe
about our efforts in Lebanon in May of 1985 and this
conversation in May of 1985 had to do with some information
that was developed by one of the sources in Lebanon which
was ostensibly some proof that spies in Lebanon had located
Buckley, and that Buckley could be found and Buckley could
be successfully taken out of Lebanon. And it was because
of this meeting and the confusion that this meeting
engendered that I believe I received that call to cut
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u
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In the
Abe Azzain out of the reporting plan.
Q If we can go back, then, and take it
chronologically --
A Sure.
Q Now, please correct me if I am wrong,
initial conception, the case was thati
and Azzam were going to be working to gather information
for the Hostage Location Task Force, of which Azzam was
the DEA representative. Is that correct?
■^ A Right.
Q It was not a separate operation in your mind.
A That IS right.
Q Did you receive any call from Ed Hickey at the
White House on or around March of 1985 regarding this?
A. I don't recall a call from Mr. Hickey.
Q In my notes of your interview, I have that you
received a call in March of 1985 from Ed Hickey regarding
whether or not Agent^^^Hcould be made available to the
White House for this operation. Do you recall that?
A I don't recall.
Q You had told us earlier Hickey had called you
about a personal problem of^^^^^^Band this was the
second time.
A Well, he had called Bud Mullen about the other
problem, but that was prior to Bud ' s recrement . No.
\J^»^ffiEET.
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S'fifti^SRBJ'
12
I'm sorry. I don't recall that call.
Q This is just what my notes say, and please tell
me if you recall it or you do not.
You stated, according to my notes, that Hickey
had told you he anticipated this would be just a one or
two tune meeting or that might have been your understanding
from your conversation, and then later Hickey called you
to request that Agent^^^^^^^^^^^Halso participate in
this.
A I don't recall, but if the call was received, it
would not have been in March or April because!
[and Hickey and^^^^^^^^^|had met several times
in January and February and it just doesn't seera logical
that Hickey would call me in March to ask if they could
meet because they had already met several times.
Q Do you recall discussing with Mr. Hickey at all
the o^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l ^^ ^^y
A No, I don't.
Q Do you recall^^^^^^^^^^H telling you in or around
March of 1985 that he had met with Oliver North on this
issue and North had asked him to do several things?
A I know now that at a February meeting at the
White House — this was a meeting with
General- C»lf lald, I believe, and Poindexter,
mention was made that the agents ' should meet Colonel North.
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^£pglSffj®r
13
Colonel North was not available at that time.
But in late February North did inviteJ
over to the White House Mess for breakfast, where they
discussed the potential for SEO providing any information
at all on the hostages, but specifically on Bill Buckley.
Q You mentioned that you know that now. How as
it that you came to know that now?
A Well, we have -- m May of 1986 -- in May of 1987
we had asked two of our senior personnel to conduct
background information on what had actually transpired
between^^^^^^^^^^^^^^fand Oliver North, exactly where
the agents involved with it, and it is as a result of
those interviews that were conducted by our two senior
personnel that we now know about these other meetings.
Q All right. Was that for the purpose of gathering
information to report to you?
A That was -- the purpose of that was to determine
whether administrative action will be appropriate against
those individuals involved in this hostage location
intelligence probe, if they were not furnishing me all the
information with which DEA was involved.
Q All right. Is this in the nature, then, of sort
of an internal affairs investigation?
A Administrative inquiry, yes, internal affairs,
if you will, OPR. We had to clear it with the special
otV^'t^wHirkt
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presecutor so that we won't ]aundice any ongoing investigation
with which they were involved because when we conduct an
internal inquiry, we have to indicate to the personnel
whether it is an administrative inquiry or a criminal
inquiry. So in this case we spoke with representatives
of the special prosecutor, told him we were going to go
forward with this inquiry, and it is based upon this, that
I now know about the given chronology of meetings.
Q So these interviews included interviews of
A Yes.
Q If you could then in response to my questions,
if you could specify to us the state of your knowledge
that was contemporaneous with these events happening as
opposed to what you have subsequently learned so we
keep it straight in the deposition.
A Sure.
Q I don't want to impart knowledge to you that you
only recently learned.
A Do you want me to go through chronologically
what I knew? Would that make it easy?
Q That is what I thought we had been doing.
A I was trying to fill in some other activity. Okay.
Q Okay.
A January of 1985 I was aware that we were going
to initiate an SEP 471 based upon the recommendation of
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Chief of Operations, Frank Monastero, with Administrator
Bud Mullen. I certainly was aware we put 520,000 into
that MEO. That is normal procedure. I was aware that
m February the agents made their initial contact with
one major source and subsequently a second source who
were to enter Lebanon and to return with some preliminary
analysis .
Q Okay. If I can stop you there, then.
A Okay.
Q The person to whom you have referred to as the
major source, we have been calling source one and not usinq
any names so that we know who we are talking about.
A Fine.
Q Do you know source one?
A No.
Q Okay. Do you happen to know whose source he was'
In other words, was it Mr. Azzam's source oi
source? Did you have a clear indication either way?
A No, but I know -- I am not sure I knew -- that
both Mr. Azzam and ^^^^^^^^^H had worked with this
source at some time during the ir».cjkr£«si«..^ Who -d««vs« loped the
source, I don't know to this day.
Q Did anybody report to you after this February
meeting that they had with this source?
No.
*
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Q So when you --
A Let me just throw in another -- on the 7th of
February, 1985, we had an agent kidnapped in Guadalajara,
Mexico. The entire focus of DEA worldwide was ongoing
in Guadalajara, Mexico, until the body was recovered on
March 12. So that is not unusual for a SEO to be initiated
and for me not to get a daily briefing on the status of an
SEO.
Q Right. What I am asking is did you have contem-
poraneous knowledge m February of 1985 that this meeting
had either occurred or was --
A No, I did not.
Q So you never received a report about that meeting?
A No, I did not.
Q When is it, then, that you first learned that
they met in February of 1985 with the source?
A I don't think I ever had direct information
that they met other than the fact Mr. Monastero in .March
told me that several of the sources who had been contacted
land were ready to be debriefed on whatever
information they developed and that he was going to contact
Mr. Azzam, who was out of the country attending an
international drug enforcement meeting somewhere in Europe,
I believe, to ask Azzam^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hto meet with these
sources to get whatever information they could develop on
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17
the hostage location. Monastero and I did talk about
diverting Azzam's trip for this purpose.
Q Okay. I gather you gave your approval?
A Yes.
Q I have sort of a general question at this point,
e 1 the ^^^^^^^^^^H^^^^^^^^^H would on
this account and for this purpose, would they seek
permission from you?
A No.
Q Do you know whether or not they would seek
permission from anyone in your office?
A Absolutely. Not from the administrator's office,
but certainly from operations. They would seek approval
from their djnmediate superior, who at this point was
^ and they would prepare
vouchers.
They would do what we normally do in the course
of our activities.
Q Wou Id ^^^^^^^^|H report to you at all?
A No.
Q The cutoff date is somewhere around July of 1985
when they ceased using DEA funds to fund their operational
expenses. Would they then, to your knowledge, report to
of their travel olans and so forth?
A I believe when I told North that Azzam would be
UAICLASSIfjEd,
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UM)\9S(FIEBT
18 ,
,'19
assigned to a different function that they could deal
directly with^^^^^^K I had asked John McKernan, who was
my Executive Assistant at the time, that in my absence if
[were to ask authority to travel for the SEO, that
McKernan should grant that authority, and that was in the
May, June, July time frame.
Q So let's say after June of 1985 wher
needed to travel or^^^^^^^^M needed to travel, would
they then seek your permission or that of Mr. McKernan?
A If I were there ,^^^^^^Hwould ask my permission.
If I were not there, he would seek McKernan' s permission.
Q And the times you can recall where he did seek
your permission, did he tell you what the trips were for?
In other words, would you discuss it in any
kind of detail?
A General terms. We are going to meet the informants
in New York. The informant has just come out of Lebanon with
some information. We need to travel, so forth.
Q Did he ever report to you any operational plans?
A None.
Q And when^^^^^^^Bhad to travel after this June
1985 time period, would^^^^^^^^^H ask you for permission
to travel?
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A I was unaware of when^^^^^^was traveling in
point of fact, after June of 1985 I was unaware when
was traveling.
Q All right. Now you have got me confused.
A Well, in June, I guess I was involved in seme
travel and I don't know what travel I was involved with,
but I had told Mr. McKernan if^^^^^Hhad to travel
and I was not available, McKernan was to approve it. After
that^m^^^H did not come to me for authority to travel.
.Mr. McKernan retired m November of 1985, so he certainly
didn't come to McKernan for authority to travel.
Q All right. So is your testimony that after
June of 1985 you were not aware of eithei
Itravel?
A Right. That is right. Is that clear now?
Q Yes.
A I know it is difficult because as a matter of
fact Dennis followed up with John McKernan and asked
McKernan did he recall when he authorized travel, and
John didn't recall. He remembered the conversation when
I gave him authority to give^^^^^^Bauthority . He didn't
recall how long he exercised that authority.
Q Did he recall it at all, ever authorizing?
A He recalled my giving him the authority, but
I don't believe he recalled ever using that authority.
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ONfilfl^t^i^
21
Q Let the record reflect the witness has consulted
with counsel prior to answering that question.
Now, at some point in the spring of 1985, were
you aware that Oliver North was either part of the task force
or at least had the account, for the hostages and was
involved in this effort?
A In April or probably iMay of 1985 -- it was May of
1985 -- I went into Mr. Azzam's office and Mr. Azzam
showed me
Mr. Azzam told me that he was skepticall
land that he had discussed
this evidence, if you will, with Mr. North at the White
House and had suggested to Colonel North that Colonel
North contact the CIA because the CIA also -- was also
skeptical!
that was important was becausel
Iwas necessary to bribe individuals in Lebanon
to assit in getting Buckley out.
The FBI^^^^^^^^^BCIA believed that
^^^ Mr. Azzam
Did Azzam tell you that?
m-^^
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A
Q
A
URCCASSK^T
Yes.
That both the FBI and --
And CIA did not believe tha
22
were
bonafide and that North was upset with Mr. Azzam because
Azzam was holding up what could be a good opportunity
to effect the release of Mr. Buckley.
Q What, if anything, did you tell Azzam to do?
A I agreed with Mr. Azzcun's position that we should
not move forward and continue an operation or ask for
financial support for an operation if we were not satisfied
that what we had received was any good evidence that
Buckley had been located.
In drug law enforcement, special agents talk about
not fronting the money and Abe said that this was clearly
not good information, and that we should not encourage
the CIA to produce the money to further this part of our
effort because the information was not valid. Instead,
Abe had recommended that the informant be given specific
questions to ask to the individuals in Lebanon, questions
relating to the family of Mr. Buckley, Nicaraguan names,
something that only Buckley would know before the operation
moved forward and Mr. Azzam told me at that time that
North was clearly unhappy with Azzajn's decision.
Q Now was this the first you were aware that Oliver
North had any involvement in this operation?
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A T would say, yes.
Q If we could digress for a minute, at around the
same time did you have any experiences with Oliver North
concerning any drug cases, specifically regarding the
shipment of cocaine from Colombia through Nicaragua?
A There was a meeting held in the White House
about an ongoing investigation that we had involving cocaine
trafficking from Colombia through Managua, Nicaragua into
the United States involving a pilot defendant, now deceased,
and we were attempting to develop that information or to
develop that investigation.
The participant from DEA headquarters who conducted
that briefing when he returned from the White House indicated
to me that there was one person at the briefing who
expressed some concern over that investigation continuing.
But that is the only reference that we have to North involv-
ing himself in any DEA investigation.
Q Okay. The DEA agent, after briefing the White
House--was Oliver North part of that briefing?
A Oliver North was part of that briefing.
Q And your agent reported back to you that —
A Right. He didn't report back to me. He
returned to brief his superior, to brief Dave Westrade on
the meeting. I said, "How did the meeting go?" He said
the briefing went fine, but he
ords with
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somebody at the briefing, Colonel North, about the jeopardy
we might be putting our informant in by sending the
informant back into Nicaragua to pick up the investigation.
Q So North's concern was -- were that the informant
would be in peril if he went in?
A I am not sure what his concerns were at the time
because quite frankly, it didn't matter what his concerns
were. We continued our investigation nonetheless, but
as I say, I do recall that conversation with our
individual, and I received subsequent calls from several
other individuals expressing their concern about the
investigation continuing.
Investigators call investigative shots. "l don't
depend on parliamentary procedure for conducting an
investigations .
Q Did North request a briefing?
A No.
Q Who requested a briefing?
A I aim sorry. I don't know.
Q And did the passing through of these drugs through
Nicaragua involve anyone connected with the Sandinista
Government?
A We had sent an aircraft back to Managua during
this investigation, which we had equipped with cameras and
the cameras recorded the loading of cocaine on the aircraft
^WSr^cMr
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by individuals who were in uniform.
Q And would that be the uniform represented by the
government of Nicaragua?
A Could be. Could be. We assume that it was.
One of the individuals identified in the photograph, I
believe, was a Fredricko Vaughn, who was an under secretary
or former minister. At a prior -- this goes back a while --
but at a prior meeting between the informant and
individuals in Managua, the informant flew into Managua,
landed at what he believed to be a secure part of the
facility pro',:ected by the military. It appeared protected
by the military, and I believe that was a trial run.
I believe the informant was to fly in to see
where he would land the aircraft when at a future date he
would be taking cocain from Colombia. As he took off — he
came under ground fire. The military shot him down.
He was arrested and within a day was released based upon
the personal intervention of Fredericko Vaughn.
Q Because presumably Vaughn thought he was part
of this conspiracy to move the drugs.
A Oh, Vaughn knew that the informant was part of
the conspiracy, certainly.
Q All right. Was North briefed then on this facet
of the operation?
A On which facet?
m-AS^^9<
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Q In other words, the photographs showing that
the military people or people in military uniforms were
loading the cocain and so forth?
A Yes, yes. North was part of that group who saw
the photographs which were photographs, I believe, that
were circulated at the meeting by a member of the Intelligence
Coinrai ttee.
Q What you told us last time is that when the DEA
representatives arrived to do the briefing on the operation
that North actually had the photographs already
Do you recall that?
A That could be, yes.
Q All right.
A We did not bring the photographs to the meeting
that is right.
:he photographs were already available to the people who
were briefed.
Q All right. So North already had the photographs
A Had them, certainly had them during the meeting.
Whether he had them prior to the meeting, that is speculation
I don't know that to be a fact.
Q Was information of this operation also leaked at
some point to the press, specifically the Miami Herald?
MWe'saffiltfT
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A
A
A
Information was leaded to the press.
Do you know the source of that leak?
Do I know the source? No, I don't.
27
Q Do you have an opinion as to who the source was
or did you at that time?
A I may have an opinion, but I am not going to share
that opinion.
Q All right. What was your reaction when you
found out that North had received photographs of that
operatior
A North was part of the briefing. I was disturbed
that anyone would share information on a very sensitive
investigation, ostensibly involving the lives of DEA agents
or people cooperating with DEA. I was upset with any of a
number of people for being or becoming aware of our operation.
Q Did you or any of your people make this known
to North, this concern of yours?
A I did not. I am sorry. I did not. Someone
in our organization did, and I don't recall who specifically
did because I believe it was Frank Monastero who told me
that -- and this was perhaps several weeks later -- that
North told DEA -- whom he told, I don't know -- that he
was not the one who leaked the information.
Q So supposedly Mr. Monastero had approached the
subject with Colonel North.
HMQkftSSfflfe^
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urroeRsSBffli^T
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A Either Mr. Monastero or someone else, perhaps
the briefer at the initial White House meeting. I don't
know who. But Frank -- Mr. Monastero, was the one who
told me that North said that he was not the source of the
leak.
Q Did you subsequently receive any information
regarding North's use of these photographs in any fund-
raising activities for the contras in Nicaragua?
No, I did not.
Is that a closed case now?
Yes. The investigation is closed.
Is the informant still living?
No. The informant is dead. The informant was
A
Q
A
Q
A
killed.
Q Can you tell us when?
A I don't know the exact date. The informant was
a defendant informant, was tried in Louisiana, was acquitted
and was on probation at the time he was shot and killed
by individuals hired by the so-called Madaine (ph.) Cartel,
the Colombian traffickers, that subsequently were arrested
in Louisiana, I think. Baton Rouge, and were recently
acquitted of the crime.
Q Were they acquitted for killing him because he
was an informant in this particular case you just described?
A They were acquitted of killing him. They were
758
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sasiisp
29
acquitted of murder, I believe.
Q Now, this episode that we have just described,
did that take place in the spring of 1985?
A As near as I can recall it was the spring of
1985.
Q Had you had any contact with or did you know
of Colonel North prior to this, the briefing of Colonel
North regarding this cocaine operation?
A I may have heard his name mentioned, but, no,
I had not met Colonel North. I think^^^^^^Vseveral times
had mentioned that Colonel North was pleased with the
progress that was being made in the development of
information, but, no, I had not met Colonel North in any
of the meetings I had attended.
Q If you can place these two events in time for
me, then, that is the April or May meeting with Azzara where
rand you discussed the validity
ind the episode involving
Colonel North and the drug operation, which came before
which?
A I am sorry. I can't do that. The meeting with
Abe would have been , mid May. Our operation in Colombia —
I'm sorry. I don't know. Certainly within a 60-day time-
frame. It would have been April or May, perhaps early
June of 1985, but without going back into the chron file,
mfmm
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smiis^FiEv
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I ]ust don ' t recall .
Q Now, if we can get back to Mr. Azzarol
Was It your understanding, then, when you
left your meeting with Azzcun that they would try to
take additional steps to glean more information?
A Yes. It was my understanding that we would task
the informants to go back to Lebanon to contact their
sources and to specifically task their sources with
answering specific questions which give us better indication
as to whether someone was in fact in contact and talking
to Mr. Buckley.
Q And what is the next thing you remember happening?
A That would have been the time frame that Azzam --
that someone asked me and I presume it was North -- called
and asked me to change the reporting procedure to not have
Azzam as the point of contact for^^^^^^^V Again , now
I know the reason, part of the reason was that when Azzam
expressed concern over^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Band
suggested to North that North contact the CIA, who would
be in a better position to have someone who knew Buckley
iNorth didn't do that.
Azzam, hunself, went to the CIA, showed the
CI/^^^^^^^^^^Hand at a subsequent meeting Azzam indicated
that North was unhappy with Azzam; that Azzam went to the
CIA for -- ostensibly for the CIA to agree with Azzam not
mmm
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^ _..w ^-'■
to f uraish^^^^^^^^^^Hf or the operation.
Q You did not know that at the time?
A No.
Q The next thing you knew after your mid May
meeting with Azzam was you got a call from Oliver North
Is that right?
A I don't remember the call, but I did contact
Ithat Azzam was out of the chain of command, that
[would be reporting directly to me on any future
endeavors with which we were involved involving the
hostages in Lebanon.
Q When you say you don't recall the call from
North, I know you testified earlier about it. Unless you
have talked to Oliver North, how did you get your
recollection refreshed?
A Because something must have precipitated my
telling, my taking Azzam out of the chain of command. It
was not a conversation between Azzcun and myself. I
can only assume that if North was unhappy with Azzam and
was unhappy with reporting through Azzetm, because
Azzam was a negative influence on the endeavor, that I
received a call from someone. I can only assume it was
North because Azzam had the run-in with North.
Q Okay. What was your assessment of Mr. Azzsun's
abilities?
m^^"-^
CRET
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32
1 A Mr. Azzam is a most competent investigator who
2 has served m any of a number of senior positions in DEA,
3 most knowledgeable about the Middle East.
4 Q Would you say he is more knowledgeable about the
5 Middle East thar
6 A Absolutely. In addition, Mr. Azzam traveled with
7 me to many of the international meetings in which we
8 continued to meet with foreign diplomats. Abe speaks
9 Lebanese and always at meetings would go to Middle
10 Eastern officials, re-acquamt himself with the Middle
11 Eastern officials because of his remaining interest in
12 that part of the country, so Mr. Azzam was perhaps
13 withm DEA one of those people who was highly qualified
14 to assess information coming out of the Middle East.
15 Q Okay. Then here is my question. At this point
16 you said in mid May you agreed with Azzam' s assessment
17 that more information was needed before the money would be
18 paid to the informants. You had high regard for Mr. Azzam' s
19 abilities, yet on what you believed to be a call from
20 Oliver North you decided to basically get Mr. Azzam out
21 of the picture, and allow^^^^^^^H to go forward.
22 A Right.
23 Q Given your prior experience with Oliver North
24 why did you make that decision?
25 A Number one, I had no prior experience with Oliver
UMfiii^l^
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35-40
spectrum on whether the information developed by the
sources was good information.
Q I gather, then, that^^^^^^^^^^^was in favor of
paying
A Yes.
Q Were you aware of that at the time?
A No.
Q So you never spoke to^^^^^^H^^B contemporaneously
regarding his feelings about the validity of the proof?
A No. I did not. Because when I talked to
Azzam, I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^HAzzamat that point told me
what the CIA reaction wa^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H what the FBlJ
reaction^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas , and I was satisfied that
if the experts said that that was not what it was said to
be, there was no need for me to talk to anyone else about
it.
mtsm^
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41
Q Did you ever have any contact with either Mr.
McFarlane or Admiral Poindexter regarding this operation?
A No, none.
Q Now, after Mr. Azzam Left the picture, and let ' s
talk about approximately the July 1985 time frame, wer';
Istill working at DEA or had they actually been
assigned either on a reimbursed or unreimbursed basis to the
NSC?
A Neither^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas assigned to the NSC.
Both had functions at DEA headquarters . ^^^^^^Bj had been
assigned toth^^^HJI^^^^^B'jnd^^^^^fhad been assigned to
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H during frame. They
there now.
Q Was It vour understanding that -- let me ask you,
what was you understanding after July of 1985 as to how it --
what funds would be used to finance both the operational
expenses of the agents and any payments to sources?
A It would have been about that time frame that --
again, the time frame being May or June of 1985 -- that I
explained to^^^^^^Bthat by law, DEA can only fund those
operations that had to do with drug law enforcement, 31 U.S.C.
628.
And I said, if we are involved in contactirg
informants solely for the purpose of locating hostages, then
any money generated or any money necessary to pay for that
UM£bASfiieEhi
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35-40
spectrum on whether the information developed by the
sources was good information.
Q I gather, then, that^^^^^^^^^^^was in favor of
paying ^~
A Yes.
Q Were you aware of that at the time?
A No.
Q So you never spoke to^^^^^^H^^B contemporaneous ly
regarding his feelings about the validity of the proof?
A No. I did not. Because when I talked to
Azzam, I^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H Azzam at that point told me
what the CIA reaction wa^^^^^^^^^^Hj|^H what the FBIJ
reaction^^^^^^^^^^^^^fwas , and I was satisfied that
if the experts said that that was not what it was said to
be, there was no need for me to talk to anyone else about
it.
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41
Q Did you ever have any contact with either Mr.
McFarlane or Admiral Poindexter regarding this operation?
A No, none.
Q Now, after Mr. Azzam left the picture, and let ' s
talk about approximately the July 1985 time frame, were
[still working at DEA or had they actually been
assigned either on a rei.Tibursed or unreimbursed basis to the
NSC?
A Neither^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hwas assigned to the NSC.
Both had functions at DEA headquarters . ^^^^^^Hj nad been
assigned to the^^^Jj^^^^^Jand^^^^^yhad been assigned to
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H during frame. They
there now.
Q Was It vour understanding that -- let me ask you,
what was you understanding after July of 1985 as to how it --
what funds would be used to finance both the operational
expenses of the agents and any payments to sources?
A It would have been about that time frame that --
again, the time frame being May or June of 1985 -- that I
explained to^^^^^^Bthat by law, DEA can only fund those
operations that had to do with drug law enforcement, 31 U.S.C.
628.
And I said, if we are involved in contacting
informants solely for the purpose of locating hostages, then
any money generated or any money necessary to pay for that
bRfit&Saifimhi
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Wliim)
42
information cannot come out of DEA funding. At this point,
if I can back ud a little bit, I had mentioned that the SEO
initial was a $20,000 fund. In May of 1985, we added additiona
520,000 to that fund. So, our funding for the effort was
540,000 plus some travel exoenses, and what have you.
Because of my concern that if we were now solely
involved m gathering intelligence or developing informants
to find hostages, that is outside the purview of what we are
authorized to do.
Q When you called this to -his attention, could you
tell us how it is that that conversation even came up?
A Not specifically. It may have been when I called
him to tell him that he was going to be the point of contact,
not Abe Azzam, and that he was to report directly to me.
It may have been in that conversation or at a subsequent
meeting .
I would call^^^^^^^uo periodically to ask for the
status of the investigation, aid either at a personal meeting
or the telephone call, I made reference to the fact that we
must be very careful to use drug money for drug investigations
only.
At subsequent meetings, my concern was if we were
develoDing informants, were we developing them and turning
them over to the appropriate age
J[iM£Jd£&^%dT
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liVCIBI
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43
In each case, I was assured that we in fact wers
domq tha
Q When you mentioned to him this situation with the
money and the fundma, was that generated out of your own
concern or had someone pointed that out to you, or had you
sought the advice of anyone prior to telling him about this?
A I can't recall anyone talkinq to me about it. It
was a concern I had that we were now involved in a SEO for
six months. Frank Monastero, the Chief of Operations, and
I on several occasions talked about the SEO and how long we
thought the SEO would continue.
It was certainly my view, and Frank's view, that
our role now was to encourage these informants to continue to
go into Lebanon to do hostage work that we could very easily
have just turned the informants over to the appropriate
agency to handle that, and we could get back to our own
responsibility, which is drug law enforcement.
And whether I or Frank brought up the money spent,
I ajn not sure. But clearly, I tolc^^^^^^H that we could
only spend the money on drug law enforcment.
Q Whpn you said that, did that apply equally to the
aaent's excenses as well as the oavment of bribes or
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payments for information to the sources?
A No. I didn't get into that because it was my
assumotion that the agents certainly would know what their
resconsibi lities were as far as vouchers were concerned, and
the rest.
Q Here is my question. After July of 1985, was it
your understanding that their expenses, the agents' expenses
would be paid by DEA|
A I don't think I even thought about it, to be perfectly
honest. In hindsight, the terms of reference indicated that
Dersonnel costs would be borne by the agency, and I had no
reason to think that that was not continuing to be the case,
that our personnel costs were continuing to be paid by the
agency, but if it came to generating money to pay to bribe
someone, I fully expected that that was not DEA money, because
we couldn't clearly do it.
Q So, was It your understanding throughout this
period, 1985 and 1986, that DEA was funding the expenses
for the agents to travel and so forth?
A Yes, it was my understanding.
Q Did anyone ever bring a different understanding to
you?
A
Q
A
No.
How much m total were you aware that DEA had funded?
At the time, I certainly knew of the initial S20,000.
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I don't remember being told that additional 320,000 went into
the fund, but that is not unusual.
Q And as to the bribe money, like the big sum
payments, the 200,000 and so forth, was it your understandina
this money was coming
A Yes.
Q Did anyone ever tell you differently?
A No.
Q When did you first learn that private individuals
had put up some money for this effort?
A After December of 1986.
Q When you mentioned to^^^^^^^^Bthat it was your
intention that if the sources were being used only to provide
hostage-related intelligence that they should be turned over
Idid he offer any opposition to that? In other
words, was he reluctant to let the sources go?
A No. I think he may have said, you know, based
upon your law enforcement experience, some sources don't
agency shop. They will only deal with us. But we will be
able to turn over all of our sources within a given time frame
Did^^H^^^^^Hor^^^^^^^Hsubmit any
reports to you throughout 1985 and 1986?
A No.
Q Is there any reason for that?
A No. That IS not unusual in that if we have an
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1 individual, an agent working with another a
2
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6 I get periodic verbal updates from!
as to how effective
the program is. But, no, that is net unusual.
We 1 1 , ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 1 s person actually
A No. That person is a DEA agent on loan to the
Q Through like an unreimbursed assignment?
A No. He is reimbursed. We have a reimbursable
agreement. I believe they may have even paid the cost of our
transferring him^^^^^^^^^B but I would have to check that
to be sure.
Q So that is really different than th^^^^^Band
tuation where they were not actually assigned to the
NSC^
A Right. That is right.
Q Did you ever instruct either of them not to write any
written reports either to you or to anyone else?
A Absolutely not.
Q Did there come a ti.me in 1985 that you discussed
lere come a ti.me in 1985 ti
prppTi
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47
these activities with the Attorney General?
A I may have -- I meet with the Attorney General
several times a week for breakfast or for lunch. I may have
said to him, we are developing information through the
informant program, which is of some benefit. I can't
SDecifically recall a date or time frame in which I did that.
Q All right. Did you ever go to the Attorney General
with any specific plan?
A None, never.
Q Did he ever give you any sort of advice or
instructions regarding this operation?
A No.
Q Do you know whether or not he was ever aware of the
private donations or the use of private monies in any of these
operations?
A I have no knowledge at all.
Q As long, as we are on this subject, the Attorney
General testified before the House Judiciary Committee in
March 1987, regarding the DEA operation. I take it that — in
which he testified he was not aware of these things. I take
It after that testimony, you had a conversation with him about
it?
A Right.
Q Could you relate that, please?
A Yes. After his testimony -- and I was not aware of
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48
his testimony. I received a call from John Bolton, B-o-l-t-o-n
John is the Chief of Congressional Affairs at the Department.
John stated that the Attorney General during testimony had
said that he was not aware or that he didn't believe that DEA
was operational, that the role of DEA in the hostage plan
was to develop whatever intelligence we could on the location
of the hostages and then that over to the appropriate agency.
I told Bolton that that, in fact, was what I had
told the Attorney General. Within several days, I met with
the Attorney General in Phoenix, Arizona at our conference
of special agents in charge.
I told the Attorney General that Mr. Bolton had
called me, asking me for my recollection of any conversation
I had with the Attorney General, and I told the Attorney
General what I told John Bolton.
Q What was the Attorney General's response?
A Non-conunittal .
Q Could you give us an idea when you say operational
-- everybody uses that term kind of loosely -- what you mean
and how do you define an operational role of an agent?
A If an individual is out conducting interviews,
making undercover buys, doing case-oriented things, developing
an investigation, that is what I would perceive to be an
operation.
If an individual is gathering intelligence, that
WHiLftinMn Cmi
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would be different in my mind's eye. That would be an
intelligence probe.
Q Would the rental of transportation and equipment
and a safe house for the extrication of hostages in your
mind be operational?
A Absolutely.
Q Has DEA to your knowledge ever been included in any
covert action findings under the National Security Act?
A Not to my knowledge.
Q Was there such a finding for this operation, to your
knowledge?
A No, not to my knowledge.
Q Have you since signed any documents or exhibits
generated by Colonel North describing some of the activities
of the agents, specifically in the plan to provide SI. 5
million to the captors and get the hostages out of Lebanon?
Some of them have been released by the committee publicly.
A There was a document that Mr. Hoffman had shown me
that indicated that DEA was involved in -- I can't recall the
details -- maybe the renint of a boat. This was May 24, a
document dated May 24.
Q Of 1985?
A Of 1985. ; ' ■
Q Have you ever seen, prior to anything Mr. Hoffman
showed you, I gather recently, but had you seen in 1985 or
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1986 any memoranda, PROF notes or anything else written by
anyone, by the White House or NSC regarding the role of the
agents in the operation?
A No. Received none, heard of none.
Q Now, in or around the early suiruner of 1935, there was
an operation afoot to try to extricate the hostages using
this combination of bribes and them lump sum payments to the
captors that was described in a memo of June of 1985 from
Colonel North to his superiors. Were you aware specifically
of that plan?
A No , I was not.
Q Do you recall^^^^^^Hbrief ing you around that
time period on anything that was happening?
A No. I recall in each cas^^^^^^^Htelling me about
informants, information from informants and at one meeting
did mention that there was some hope of extricating the
hostages, either through bribery or the use of military
action.
But I don't recall a date or a time frame.
Q Were are sums regarding the bribery brought to your
attention by
A I believe^^^^^^^^^Hmade reference to a million
dollars per hostage?
Q Were the specifics of any military extraction
explained to you?
UNCLASSIFIED
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A No, none.
Q Did^^^^^^^^^l explain what role he would have or
he or^^^^^^^H would have in supporting such military
extraction?
A No. In each case, as I mentioned, when
would brief me on what was going on, he would say, we are
]ust developing intelligence information, but the information
looks good because we may have a military extrication, but we
may be getting hostages out in the near-term.
Q What was your understanding of the amount of time
or the percentage of their time, let's say, that^^^^^^Hand
|were using on this project?
A Well, both were assigned full time to DEA
Headquarters. I thought the amount of time that they were
spending on this thing was minimal, perhaps -- it would be hard
to say. I thought perhaps a meeting a month m Washington
and an occasional trip to debrief an informant.
Q Okay.
But was It your impression they were spending 90
percent of their time on hostages? Would that have surprised
you?
A 90 percent of their time on this? Absolutely.
Q Getting back to the money, if I can for a minute,
the memo which we were given today dated December 9, 1986 from
to you, the very last entry in that says addendun
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11 II
As agreed previously, other than actual operational
expenses, no unappropriated funds were handled by DEA.
Do you know what that is referring to?
A No, I do not. When I talked to^^^^^^B in December
of 1986, It was specifically because newspapers were carrying
information about the activities and I wantet^^^^^B to
specifically outline for me again what our role was, and as
previously ^^^^^^^^^^1 said , our role was to develop informants
and to turn that information over to appropriate agencies.
I said well, I have read in the newspapers about
safe houses, about accounts, and he said none of that informatit)r
is accurate. I said , ^^^^^H sit down and write out in your
own handwriting what you have ]ust said. He prepared a hand-
written note to me, delivered it to my secretary in handwritten
form, and I had my secretary transcribe it as it appears.
Q All right. If I could see the entry on that for a
minute, it says, "As agreed previously that no unappropriated
funds would be handled by DEA." Do you recall discussing with
I or ^^^^^^^^H that DEA agents should not be handling
unappropriated funds?
A No, I do not.
Q Do you know if anybody in the DEA hierarchy had had
such a conversation with them or given them such instructions?
A I don't believe that anyone in DEA gave such
instructions based upon the administrative inquiry which we
UNCIASSIESEGL
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conducted.
Q I belive you had an appointment in October of
1986 with Colonel North; is that correct?
A Right.
Q Is that the first time you had actually met him?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us when that was?
A October of 1986. A specific date, I don't recall.
I can determine the specific date from my calendar.
Q I believe you told us in interviews that was October
14, and that corresponded to the calendar that we had from
North.
A Okay. October 14. The meeting was in my office,
based upon a call to my secretary asking if I would meet
with Colonel North. Colonel North came to my office, talked
in general terms about his appreciation for information that
we had developed on the location of the hostages]
umi
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\
Q What exactly did you gather was tr.e purpose of that
meeting? In other words, what was he offering to assist you
with?
A I don't think it was an offer of assistance at
all. I think that through ^^^^^^^^^^^| Colonel North had
learned of my impatience with our prolonged informant
development, because I had on several occasions during the
summer and fall expressed to^^^^^^Hthe fact that I was
having trouble -understanding why it was taking us so long to
negotiate with informants who either were long-term informants
or informants under development t
and that I wanted from^^^^^^^p date in which our intelligence
probe would be over.
And I think that my visit from the Colonel was an
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attempt to see Lf North's encouragement would encourage me
to keep supporting our intelligence probe.
Q Did he say something to that effect? Did he say we
hope we can continue to work with you, or --
A No. The meeting began with, you have been a big
help. DEA IS the only one that has positive information.
The information you have developed have assisted in this
terrorist thing, and in this situation and in this situation, a
we want to thank, you for your help. By the way, if there is
anything we can do.
I said, "Colonel, there is nothing you can d
So, as a matter of fact, when the Colonel arrived,
he asked to shut the door, which of course added the intrigue
to the meeting, and then when the meeting was over, I still
couldn't understand why the door was shut and what the intrigue
wa3 .
It was in my mind's eye a social call.
Q Did he make any reference to the fact he expected
some hostages to be released soon?
A He may have. He may have said that based upon your
information, we are going to get hostages released, but I had
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ommrn
56
brother ,
A
Q
A
Q
A
been hearing that beginning in May of 1985 and, as I say,
this was 15 months later, and there were no hostages and that
certainly was prompting my impatience with the whole
operation. I was not pleased with the position of North on
the giving of the $200,000 to the individual. We thought it
wasn't a good idea.
I just had decided that we were spending too much
effort in informant development in what clearly was not
our role.
Did^^^^^^Hever infoirm you of the role tha]
ever played in this operation?
No, he did not.
Did that come to your attention eventually?
Yes, it did.
Recently?
It came to my attention after the administrative
inquiry we conducted in May of 1987.
Q All right. I gather in your meeting with North in
October of 1986, North did not mention to you any payments of
monies that he had given the agents?
A No, he did not.
Q He did not mention that his operation was being
funded privately?
A No, did not.
Q Let me ask you some questions about Ross Perot.
iiieijcy$SM9rp
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A Sure.
Q When did you first become aware that he had donated
money for this operation?
A Well, I guess at the hearings, although in May of
198', with the administrative inquiry that was conducted,
eithez^^^^l -- think it was during^^^^^H interview
by the inspectors where^^^^^Bhad indicated that he now knew,
he knew during the time of the interview that one of the mdivi
duals who had furnished money to North worked for Ross Perot.
But prior to my reviewing that information with the inspectors,
I was not aware of Perot's involvement.
Q Did you ever speak about Perot's involvement with
the Attorney General?
A No.
Q And I gather you did not with Colonel North?
A No, I did not.
Q Had Mr. Perot on other occasions offered to donate
any money or any equipment or anything of that nature to the
DEA?
A No, he did not.
Q Have you ever met him?
A Yes, I have.
Q Can you tell us under what circumstances?
A I had lunch with Mr. Perot in Maison Blanche someti.-ne
last summer.
ujKinssjrm.
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mm
58
A
Q
A
Q Did you discuss -- did he offer or discuss his
involvement in any operations that DEA was undertaking?
A No. Our discussion had to do with something other
than what was ongoing as far as the hostages were concerned.
Specifically, it concerned Ross Perot's interest in the MIA
issue .
Were you aware of Agent
in support of this operati
Am I aware? I am not aware, yes
At the time, were you aware of it?
I was not aware. I became aware after the
administrative inquiry in May of 1987.
Q In 1985 or 1986, did you receive any reports from
^^^^^^^^^■regarding this sub]ect matter?
No, I did not.
Have you since spoken to him about this?
About this? No, I have not.
Are you aware of any activities on the part o
lin Central America during 1985-86?
A No.
MS. NAUGHTON: That is all of the questions I have
at this time. I may have some more for you later. I will
turn it on over to Tim Woodcock from the Senate.
A
Q
A
Q
UilfiUSSJEffi.
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UIICtEASSKIEBT
59
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. WOODCOCK: j
Q Mr. Lawn, I am going to be questioning you based on
some marginal notes here so there will be some jumping around.
A Okay. ;'
Q As I understand your testimony, you stated that as
of May of 1985, about the time the Buckley proof emerged
in Lebanon, you did not know Colonel North, is that correct?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q When you say that, does that mean you did not know
him personally or did you not know him by reputation?
A I had heard the name Colonel North, but I had not
met him. I could not even say that I was familiar with North
or what his specific position was at the White House.
Q Did he, to your knowledge, have a reputation with
DEA as of that time? Did you know of that?
A The first information that I had had to do with our
cocaine case, Colombian cocaine case, and the conversation
about -- our internal conversation about how the media might
have learned of our probe into the Colombian trafficking
cartel.
Q We have a document that we received from the CIA
which IS a memorandum recounting a meeting of which appears
to be the hostage locating task force. Excuse me. It is a
document relating to a meeting of several CIA senior officials
iwg(,i^^M
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1 and Abe Azzam. It is dated April 30, 1985, and it contains
2 the statement, "Azzam stated there is bad blood between North
3 and DEA because of a problem North created for DEA last year,
4 which had to do with the DEA operation that involved Nicaragua.
5 Is that what you were referring to?
6 A Yes. That puts it in the time frame that Pam asked
7 about, '84.
8 Q So it would have been earlier than that that you
9 would have become acquainted with North's involvement
10 or suspected involvement with the DEA operation; is that
11 correct?
12 A Right.
13 Q Now, armed with that knowledge, as of May 1985, you
14 would have known of North's reputation with DEA; is that correcjt
15 A I would have been aware of -- I recall the conversati(on
15 that I had with an individual about North and our narcotics
17 case, yes.
ig Q Let me ask you the question a little differently:
19 Would you accept that description that Azzam has purported
20 to have given to the CIA that there was bad blood between
21 North and DEA because of this operation?
22 A I don't know that. There was no bad blood between
23 me and North, because I didn't know North. If someone in
24 operations had an encounter with North, Mr. Azzam, who was
25 then in operations at that time, could have stated there was
I
I
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ONQll^li^
61
bad blood. But there was certainly no reason on my part to
share anyone's concern about bad blood.
Q Okay. That is not quite the question I am asking.
What I am asking is were you aware, not did you personally
share in it, but were you aware of any groups within DEA
or DEA institutionally having a feeling of bad blood between
itself and Colonel North?
A You know, I am trying to be very clear on this thing
An individual in DEA went to a meeting and expressed some
displeasure with Colonel North. If the displeasure he expressejd
is organizational, certainly he is not. He was displeased.
He undoubtedly told other people in DEA he was displeased.
But for Mr. Azzam to say that DEA was displeased
is a misnomer, because at least one individual I know was
displeased and based upon his displeasure, his supervisor
was unhappy with Colonel North.
But I cannot conform that DEA was unhappy with
Colonel North.
Q I think you have answered my question.
MS. NAUGHTON: Excuse me. Could we go off the record
for one second?
(Discussion off the record.)
BY MR. WOODCOCK:
Q Earlier in your testimony, you I think described
North's initial reservations about having Abe Azzam continue
TOT^ff^rKF^
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J
62
in the operation as being partly based on a lack of coherence
in the management of the operation.
Do you recall that? Is that correct?
A Not of coherence. It wasn't a coherence operation.
A lack of concurrence on how the operation should go forward.
Q That is a disagreement between North -- let me stop
you. What was the problem?
A The problem, as I understand it, was tha
and Colonel North were very enthusiastic about^^^^^^^^^^^H the
received ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^lt hey received and in point of fact,
wher^^^^^^^Bar rived in Washington w i t h^^^^^^^^H he delivered
^^Bdirectly to Colonel North.
Q Let me stop you on that. Was that appropriate for
him to go directly to North rather than to Azzam?
A No. It was not. Then, as a matter of fact, there
were words between Abe Azzam and^^^^^^^^^^^^Vabout the
appropriateness of that happening.
Q Do you know that or did you know it then?
A I didn't know it when it happened, but I learned of
It perhaps during the time probably in late May of 1985 when
Azzam me^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^|^^^^^^^^H As
said,^^^^^^Hwas most enthusiastic about the seat of this so-
called proof.
Azzam indicated that North was very encouraged about
It, and Azzam was not encouraged about it. Azzam then at a
mipiflccirfira.
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63
meeting with North told North that North should ask the CIA
what they thought. Azzam himself subsequently went to the CIA
and we, by now, know that North and Azzam had words over
why Azzam took ^^^^^^^^^H to CIA, and encouraged CIA not
to come up with^^^^^^^^^^^H
Q So, part of the problem was this disagreement over
the sufficiency of the proof.
A Right.
0 Anything else?
A I would say that if there was anything else, it
would have been a deteriorating relationship between Mr. Azzam
and!
Q Based on the proof or something more than that?
A I think initially based on the proof, that
should have tirought^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B|^^^|by the
to DEA, and DEA would then have established with the CIA and
with the FBI, if they were the agency,
^^^^^^^^Hthe bona fides of whether this was good proof or
bad prooi, prior to bringing it outside of DEA and presenting
it as tangible proof of the whereabouts of Buckley.
I mean, it is bad law enforcement procedure.
Q Were you yourself every directly in contact with
anybody m CIA over this hostage matter?
A No.
Q No one at all?
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UHOfASfiisfB^
64
A No.
Q You understand, I gather, from your previous
testimony, that CIA was in charge of this hostage matter
t h a t ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H a r e
A Yes. The terms of reference clearly indicated that
CIA was chairing the gathering of this information.
Q When you say terms of reference, you are talking
about the hostage locating task force; is that correct?
A Right. The terms of reference that all agencies
received .
Q And you understand this was being conducted under
the auspices of the HLTF; is that correct?
A That was my assumption, yes.
Q Given that assumption, what role did you understand
that North played in this?
A I assumed that North was part of the hostage locator
task force, and my assumption, I guess, was based upon the fact
that during the January-February meetings, when we were asked
to see if we could initiate an intelligence probe, the persons
with whom the agents met set up this breakfast meeting with
Colonel North. That certainly supported my belief he was part
of that particular group.
Q That he would have been subordinate to the chairman
of the group presumably; is that correct?
Absolutely.
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Q And the chairinan was CIA?
A Right.
Q When this call from North came in, and I understand
your testimony that you have reconstructed that it was a call,
but you have no specific recollection of it --
A Right.
Q -- when this call or communication came in from North,
did you agree to it on the spot, that is, his recommendation
that Azzam be taken out of the loop, or did you seek to discuss
the matter with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^for any other person?
A No, no. I called -- after the contact -- it had
to be a call, because I hadn't met North -- I called]
to tell^^^^^^Hthat he was going to be the point of contact
and he was to report directly to me.
So there was no -- I had no meetings with anyone befofr«
I made that decision.
Q So, you took no steps then to substantiate what North
was saying; is that correct?
A Took no steps to substantiate the fact that there was
Q There was bad blood or disagreement or unhappmess?
A I certainly was aware of that based upon my
conversations with Abe Azzam, with Mr. Azzam about the
insufficiency of the evidence, and I certainly agreed with
Mr. Azzam that the evidence was insufficient, but I thought it
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66
important that if, m fact, DEA was the only agency in a
position to furnish information on the location of the hostages
that that was the important thing, and that if a dispute
between individuals within DEA was going to hinder that, that
I was going to loosen the logjam.
Q I think I am pau»ing at the same problem that Pam
is. You earlier testified that Mr. Azzam had your confidence
as a professional agent, that he was knowledgeable in the
Middle East, that you agreed with his assessment of the
insuffiency of the proof.
You also testified that you agreed that he was correc|t
to be unhappy that the proof had not been brought to him
directly, but instead had been brought to Colonel North.
A Right.
Q Given all those circumstances, why is it that you
didn't brin<^^^^^^^Hin and say, look, I understand you have
got a problem with Azzam, and yet, frankly, you are in the
wrong. Why don't you clean it up?
A Again, in hindsight, it is hard to reconstruct,
was clear to me that^^^^^^^^H^^^^^H who were
introduced to the operation through Ed Hickey, had a good
relationship with the people up there.
Q People up where?
A The people m the White House, with the hostage
locator working group; They had met with North, met with
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Clarridge, met with the people involved in the operation, and
that antagonism was the -- the catalwst for the antagonism was
Pibe Azzain.
Q I gather you saw this then as more than just a series
of procedural missteps. Was it a personality problem involved
here? Is that why you agreed to it so readily?
A I honestly can't recall. I was anxious to see us
do what we could do in developing information on the hosta9es,
and again, I am going to have to fall back on the kidnapping
of our agent in Guadalajara, because when that happened,
each of the same agencies with whom I was dealing here helped
us in our investigation, and the CIA dedicated people around
the clock, seven days a week to our location of Camarena and
with the emphasis they were placing on the location of
Buckley, not only because he wasjone of theirs, but because of
some information that he had in his possession, I was anxious
to reciprocate in kind for what the CIA did for us on the
Camarena case, but I don't know whether that specifically
influenced my judgment in taking Abe out of the operation.
Q Let me ask you this: Did you have any information
from anyone that CIA joined in the unhappiness over Abe Azzam?
A Oh, no, no.
Q Would it surprise you to know that the CIA was not
unhappy with Abe Azzam?
A It wouldn't surprise me at all.
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ttMKsaf*
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68
Q Would It surprise you to know they were happy with
Abe Azzam?
A No, that wouldn't surprisane, because based upon
their meetings with Azzam, they indicated they would not
release^^^^^^^^^^^Hunless Azzam agreed it be released.
Q Then why is it that you are not checking with CIA
when you make this decision to remove Abe Azzam since the CIA
IS in charge of the operation?
A Because it was my call to make sure that we were
cooperating in every way possible in what was not a major
effort en DEA's part. This was not a major operation. It
was not even a minor operation. It was one or two agents talkijr.
to one or two informants over the possible location of hostages
in Lebanon, and it certainly I don't believe warranted my
double-checking on very senior people m DEA as to who liked
whom. This was not a big operation.
Q Well, it was big to the extent that it involved
William Buckley, wasn't it?
A It was big for the CIA.
Q And you valiantly supported the CIA in the Camarena
A I certainly did.
Q So, you wanted to make them happy in a case where
their agent was at risk; isn't that right?
A Yes. I intended to make them happy by ensuring
case?
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iJK^AS;s(Fier
69
that we continued to seek our information from our infornants
on the location of Mr. Buckley.
Q You mentioned a little earlier in your testimony
just a few minutes ago that you understand that at one point
Mr. Clarridge had been checked with; is that correct?
I am not speaking about this notion of removing
.!\be Azzam, but that he was involved in this hostage locating
effort; is that correct?
A Mr. Clarridge' s name did appear in the interviews
-f the persons, o^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l Clarridge and others.
I thinkj
Q ies,l
A Was the initial chairman of the committee, I think.
A Was another individual whose name the agents
mentioned during the administrative inquiry. And there was
another CIA person who actually traveled^^^^^^^^^^^H to
New York to debrief one or more of the informants after they
carae out!
Q Really, what I am driving at, your knowledge of
Clarridge' s involvement, is that based on your May 1987
investigation?
A Right, right. That is based on May 1987 -- that is
difficult for me, because it is hard to recall in 1985 what
^flW tfOVf CCDW
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P^jg^SJUIt
70
I knew with all the publicity that has been generated by the
hearings, my own administrative inquiry. That is why it is
difficult for me to give you a chronological analysis of
what I knew and when I knew it.
Q So, at least as far as the Azzam decision, that is
the dec/sli/ion to remove him, you don't have a recollection, I
gather, that Clarridge had been involved one way or the other
up to that point; is that correct?
A No. That IS right, no. That was clearly not the
case. Mr. Azzaro had suffered a heart attack and -- perhaps the
year before, and had come back on duty and was being moved
or already had been moved up to a position as Executive
Assistant to the Deputy Administrator.
The new Deputy Administrator was scheduled to arrive
at his post in early summer, July or August, and that, too, rr.ay
well have influenced me, that I knew he was going to be full-ti
with the new Deputy Administrator. But I can't give you all
the particulars that influenced my decision to take --
Q Excuse me. When you decided Azzam should be taken
out of the loop and that you when would become the person to
whoin^^^^^^B would report, did you sit down with him at that
point and get an update as to what he had done; where things
stood?
A In May or June of 1985, I did not.
Q How did you communicate this information that you --
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now we are the point of contact for him?
A I called^^^^HHand told him he was going to be the
point of contact and that I wanted him to apprize me as our
efforts continued and he did that.
Q And did you discuss with him what the status was
of this Buckley proof
A No, because I knew what the status was. The status
was that we would not authorize the release of the money.
Q Now, did he tell you that notwithstanding that positi
the operation might yet go underway?
A He didn't, no, he did not.
A I was told that information. Again, I don't know
the time frame. I thought it was considerably later than that.
I believe he told me that there was some hope of a hostage
being released in June of July and then when I met with him
for an update, I said, well, what happened? Why was there no
hostage released?
And he said, that because of the TWA hi]acking in Jun^
of 1985, that the heat was on or something, and that the effort
had to be curtailed.
Q For your information. North's notebooks, which have
been made available to the committee, show that on June 6, he
IIMf I ACCiriCTL
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which would be approximately two weeks or 10 days before the
TWA hijacking.
A I was not aware of that.
Q Now, in response to some questions from Ms. Naughton,
you said there was no procedure that you imposed upon either
^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 to make written reports to you; is that right?
A That is right.
Q I think she asked you whether that was not unusual,
and you said it was not, and referred to an example of a
DEA agent on assignment^^^^^^^^^^B^^^^^^^^^^^^His that
correct?
A Yes. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Q These agents ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H were a different
position than that agen^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bis that correct?
A Yes .
0 They never were relegated to any other agency other
than DEA; is that right?
A That is right.
Q They were on the DEA payroll the entire time?
A Right.
Q To your knowledge, their expenses were to be paid out
of DEA; is that correct?
A Right.
Q Even expenses relating to the hostage location effort
I
UIUUASS1£1E0,
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IS that right?
A No, no.
Q Who was to pay for that, and what was your
understanding on that?
A My understanding was that if information we are
developing or if an informant felt he could go into Lebanon
purely on the hostage issue, that the payment of that informant
would have to come from elsewhere land my assumption was it
was the CIA because the — in early 1985, the JRCIA had
furnished $50,000 for the payment of an informant who was
to specifically go into Lebanon for this development of hostage
informant was in fact paid in two installements . He was paid
$20,000 at one point, a month later paid S30,000 after he came
out. That was CIA money. We have seats for that. So, I
assume that in future endeavors, the money would be CIA money.
0 When you say you have seats for that money, you mean
you have a seat from a CIA or from your man reporting back that
he has disbursed the money?
A We have a seat from the individual who received it.
uNCL/LSSiaEII
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#3
emm- L
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Q That IS source one.
A " Right. That is a source. I don't know which
source it was .
Q At any time following that disbursement of 350,000
worth of CIA moneyr did^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H bring to your
attention that they had received additional CIA monies or
monies, that they denominated CIA monies?
A No. They did not.
Q Isn't It ordinary procedure within DEA when an
operation is ongoing that reports are made in a routine
fashion?
A On a drug case, absolutely. Where we are coopera-
ting with another agency, the generation of reports would
be with the agency responsible for the activity. That's
normal procedure.
Q Even when your men are still DEA men?
A Sure.
Q Even when all expenses are coming out of DEA and
they are being paid, their salary is DEA and they are not
normally designated to any other agency?
A Sure. For example, several years ago DEA
developed information on a ma]or counterfeiting rmc
As law enforcement does, we turned over the
i.-.f ormation over to the Secret Service. The Secret Service
initiated an investigation, asked us if we would, since we
UNCLASSIFIED
m/-\T% OTl/^^P I nil
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were aware of the operation, if we would have DEA personnel
operate m an undercover capacity to introduce Secret Service
people. The agents did that and the information they developed
went to the Secret Service because it was a Secret Service
operation, not a DEA operation, and DEA did not have the
agents writing duplicate reports on our involvement in
counterfeiting matters
Q Did either^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l ever use the expression
to you that they had received covert monies?
A No, sir.
Q When the operation started up, it was given the
enforcement No. 471. There came a time when the special
enforcement operation 471 terminated; is that correct?
A Right.
Q No substitute special enforcement operation ■"•as
started up m either place; is that correct?
A That's right.
Q Now, when that event happened, was that a -uncture
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at which you would bring^^^^^^Bin and say there no longer
IS a formal designation for this operation anymore; therefore,
this can only be a minimal amount of your time?
A No. I clearly -- no, to answer your question.
I clearly understand, unfortunately, that after we had made
the initial probes with SEO-471, that our future or continuing
involvement was going to be minimal involvement, a periodic
contact with an informant calling f ron^^^^^^Hor the Middle
East, and our meeting with the individual and the debriefing
of that individual. That was my understanding as to how we
would continue after the termination of 471.
Q You have a process in DEA where you regularly
review the performance of your agents?
A Yes.
Q Now, how IS that done?
A It was done as is done routinely for all our
personnel. Since both were assigned full time to supervision
within DEA, their immediate supervisors performed these
performance ratings.
Q Does that generate a report?
A Yes, It doe?.
Q How often are these done?
A Annually.
Q So that m the course of this operation beginning
m January, 1985, until late 1986, possibly two reports would
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would have been done o
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IS that correct?
A The evaluation period is the June or July time
frcime. So two reports wouldhave been generated over that
period .
Q Do those reports reflect the amount of time that
agents are spending on various activities?
A No. No, the report indicates -- a report first
outlines the critical elements we use in evaluating the
performance of a given individual. If he performs this
well, his rating is this. And then there is a narrative
portion of the report indicating how well he performed in
each of those critical alements. That is the way it is done
ordinarily and I can only assume that's the way it was done
with^^^^
Q Now, presumably this report process consists of
an interview, would that be correct?
A No, it does not consist of an interview.
Q What does it consist of?
A It consists of the immediate supervisor evaluating
the performance of thejindividual under his supervision, having
a mid-term review with that individual.
Q What does that consist of?
A That would be a sit-down with the individual where
you tell the individual how he is performing and if he is
no
t performing well, the individual has an opportunity to
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change his performance during the second part of the period
of evaluation.
Q Now let's take the example of^^^^^^^^^l He
>f DEA during
this period of time; is that correct?
A Right.
Q His supervisor only had authority over him to the
extent he was involved inl
is that correct?
A I would assume so.
Q Well, his supervisor in thel
^^^^^^^^^^would not have had jurisdiction over this hostage
locator effort; is that correct?
A No, that's correct.
Q That would be^^^^^^^B f i r s t , is that correct, and
then you?
A No.
Q Was^^^^^^^Ksupervismgl
A My assumption was that he was.
Q In this operation, this hostage operation?
A Right.
Q So that on tl
supervisor would perform the
assessment; right?
A Correct.
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.i«>;
79
Q To the extent there is something else the agent
IS doing and another supervisor is involved in that, would
that supervisor also participate in the preparation of the
report?
A He could. I'm not trying to be vague. I'm trying
to explain if an individual works 29 days in a given month
on an operation and then spends a day with someone else, we
wouldn't then go to the individual to whom he was assigned
for a day or what have you, or if an agent goes to the field
on a TDY assignment when his performance is being evaluated,
we would not necessarily contact that field element and say,
how did he perform or she perform during the 20 days he or
she was in your office.
So in the case o^^^^^K if he were gone for an
extended period of time, his supervisor and^^^Bhould have
gone and may have gone tc^^^^^^^Band said I can't rate him
outside of hi^^^^Bresponsibility . Can you give me input
into his rating.
A Now, if It were the case tha^^^^^H spent 90
percent of his time(on the hostage locating effort, presumably
his fitness report would reflect that, is that correct, or
at least reflect some assessment b^|^^^^^^Bof how he was
doing on the hostage effort; is that correct?
A Presumably, yes.
Q Have you seen^^^^^Bf itness_report?
seen^^^^^^Hf itness repo
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iMi^W
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A No, I have not, nor is that unusual.
Q I understand that. But I'm asking you, since this
matter has come up, you have not seen that fitness report;
is that correct?
A No.
Q Now, similarly w 1 1 t^^^^^^^^^^^^Ho n this hostage
matter, who would be the person who would write his portion
or the hostage portion of his fitness report?
A Well ,^^^^^^H was assigned full time to the
land the individual who would write his appraisal would
be his immediate superior. I can only surmise that was the
case withl^^^^^^^
Q But if -- let us assume hypothetically that
^as spending a large amount of his ti.me on the
hostage locating effort. Who would write his fitness report
on that matter?
A Well, I would say if he were spending -- if an
individual were spending a large amount of time on an effort
that the supervisor didn't feel comfortable rating, the
supervisor would go to someone else, whomever that someone is,
and ask that that input be prepared on his performance in
that additional duty.
Q Now, in^^^^^^^^^Vcase on the hostage matter, who
would have been the person who would have writter. that
portion of the report or would have been responsible for
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that portion of the report?
A That's unclear. I really don't know because we have
never explored that. The reason is that none of us thought
that^^^^^^H was spending any amount of time on this other
than perhaps weekend travel. In hindsight -- not in hindsight
but currently, having become aware of the travel that both
conducted, I'm very surprised.
Q Given your understanding of who was knowledgeable
at all of what^^^^^^^lwas doing, who would you say would
be m a position to write on his fitness report?
A Given what? What I know now?
Q Let me divide it into two questions. When you
eliminated Abe Azzam from the loop and told^^^^^^Vthat he
was going to report to you, who did you see as being respon-
sible for monitoring his involvement and performance in the
hostage effort?
A His current supervisor.
Q Who was?
A I don't recall who it was. I believe he was working
for^^^^^^^^^^Vat the time and then subsequently he was
moved to a different -- ^°^^^^^^^^^^^^^m ^ don't know
who his supervisor was on the^^^^^^^^^^Bthough .
Q Was his supervisor on the^^^^^^^^^^Bnade aware
by you or^^^^^^Hbf his other assignment on the hostage
matter?
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Ul9l$l«^fl^T
82
A I assume he was made aware hy^^^^^^^B I never
made him aware. The reason I didn't is because I was not
aware that^^^^^^Hwas doing anything other than what he
was assigned, namely either!
Q Except for the minimal reports he was giving you
on his hostage effort? You were aware of that, weren't you?
A Overtly I was aware that in perhaps four ten-minute
conversations in a year, that he continued to talk to the
individuals on the hostage locator task force about informant
information. But his assignment continued to be a full-time
DEA assignment and no one ever brought to my attention the
fact that either he or^^^^^lwere not full time at their
assignment posts.
Q If you were the person to whomH^^^^^Hwas supposed
to report, how could it beJ^^^^Bwould be the one who would
wind up writing the report on these hostage matters?
A There would be no report. The hypothetical, we are
going into what if s .^^^^^^^| was assigned full time to a
job in DEA. His immediate supervisor would write his perfor-
mance. If the immediate supervisor felt tha^^^^^f^Bwas
not available enough for him to write all aspects of his
supervision, he would have raised the question, who is going
to write that part of his evaluation. That did not happen.
That question never arose. Had it arisen as to who was going
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, ECRET
ASSIFSED
83
to write that aspect, at that point I would have had to
perhaps go to the hostage locator, the chairman of the hostage
locator task force or have someone go to them and say, "How
would you evaluate his performance with the hostage locator
task force." But that never, that question never arose.
So I was satisfied that botl-
employed full time, that they were doing DEA work on a full-
time basis.
Q Do you recall having -- calling Abe Azzam back into
the office during his recuperative period in June of '85 to
prepare you for a briefing of the Attorney General on the
hostage matter?
A No. I am aware that Mr. Azzam was called back, as
I was called back. I don't remember the exact dates, but I
was on leave in Ocean City and received a call from Judge
Webster on a document that the Judge received which was a
classified docuroent. The Judge said, "Jack, I've ]ust gotten
something. I would like to talk to you about it, and can you
come in tomorrow morning?" I called the office and said,
"Has anything come up? Have you seen any classified document
that should be of concern?" And they said, "No, but when you
come in, we will talk about it in the morning." I think
Frank Monastarro then called Abe and — called Mr. Azzam
and said, "It may be that Judge Webster wants an update on
the hostage situation. Can you update us?"
UNCLASSIFIED
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When I came in the next morning, I think Monastarro
gave me an update and I went to see the JuSge, and it was on
an entirely different matter.
Q When you say the Judge needed an update on the
hostage matter, do you know whether up to that point he had
been briefed on it at all?
A No , I didn't say the Judge needed an update. I
said that someone surmised, based upon my call when the Judge
called about a classified document he received, someone
surmised that that's probably what he was asking about, because
there was nothing else with which DEA was involved and might
be of interest to Judge Webster. But when I talked to Judge
Webster the next morning, the question that he had was some-
thing entirely different from the hostage situation. As far
as my briefing him, I did on one occasion -- again, we have
weekly breakfasts -- tell him that we were continuing to
furnish information to the hostage locator task force on
information being developed out of Lebanon, just as an aside,
33 I had done with the Attorney General .
MS. NAUGHTON. May I interrupt here?
MR. WOODCOCK: Go ahead.
MS. NAUGHTON. Did you discuss with the Director
the use of private monies to bribe anybody or any bribery
schemes or plans?
THE WITNESS: Absolutely not, no. Never did.
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.*"'«
35
BY MR. WOODCOCK:
Q I think you may have testified to this point, but
let me ask you. In the June, May/ June '85 period, were you
ever aware through^^^^^^Bbr any other source that a hostage
extraction effort was under consideration that involved the
payment of a million dollars per hostage?
A I am aware that that figure came up, but I believe
that my awareness of that came up as a result of our May,
1987, administrative review procedure that a million dollars
per hostage was a figure that -- I think it was a figure that
two members of a terrorist group stated in a meetmgl
[that this is what it would take to get hostages out.
I think that was later than May of '85.
Q Let me ask you the same question. Put it in the
time period of May, 1986.
A I believe that was the time frame that I'm referring
to about the million dollars, that it would take a million
dollars to bribe people to effect the release of two hostages.
Q A million dollars per hostage?
A I think It was a million dollars per hostage. As
I say, my knowledge of this came through our review of the
o f ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B-
Q I have a page from North ' s 'notebook which is dated
June 23, 1986. It has the entry on it, "Call Jack Lawn,
Say
that IS spelled
UNaASSiFiEEL
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86
Does that mean anything to you?
A That means nothing to me at all.
Q June 23, 1986.
A No. It means nothing to me.
Q There's an entry the following day, June 24, 1986,
under a "to do" list, one of the items is Jack Lawn,|
to help w 1 1 h^^^^^^^^^^^^HS Any recognition
that?
A No. Sorry.
MR. BERMINGHAM: Could you check your DEA indices
to see if you have anything on
THE WITNESS: Can we?
MR. WOODCOCK:
MR. BERMINGHAM: Evidentl
operatmg^^^^^^^Hand Central America.
MS. NAUGHTON: We think he may be related to
a c t i V i t i e s^^^^^^^^^^^l 1 n
BY MR. WOODCOCK:
Q Do you know whether any of the DEA sources ever
took the questions, the permanent questions that had been
developed about the hostages in May of 1985 back to Lebanon
and asked their sources to get the answers to them?
A No , I don't know that.
Q Mr. Lawn, looking at the memorandum that
**H^^H» ^ 1"^l*< ttipnTi
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"Mliffsffi^
87
provided for you, dated December 9, 1986, I gather
from your testimony that was prepared at your request?
A Yes.
Q And the purpose for it was to inform you about
w h a t ^^^^^^^^^^^1 3 n d^^^^^^^^^^Hf h a d
July of '85; is that correct?
A No. From July of -- June or July of '85, I was
getting periodic briefings fromJ
Q These are the ten-mmute briefings you referred
to, the four ten-minute briefings?
A Right, where^^^^^^Hwould indicate to me our
sole function was we are continuing to develop informants and
to debrief informants.
My purpose in this memoranduin , in asking him to
prepare this written document, was to have him think
seriously about whether that was all with which they were
involved. Because, as I say, publicity had been engendered
about other activities, about safehouses and with 25 years
involved in law enforcement and other work, very often you
know that the spoken word changes when it becomes the
written word.
When^^^^^^^^^^^H assured me this all they were
involved in, I said ,^^^^^^H sit down and write that out for
.Tie." It was my asking him to think hard about confirming
for me in writing that that was totally and completely the
mu&sifi£ftp
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activity with which we were involved. It wasn't to be a
report of all that had transpired, but merely my attempt to
assure myself that what he had told me verbally over the
past 18 months was in fact accurate.
Q Before this report was generated, was this based
on a face-to-face meeting wit
A This was a face-to-face meeting, yes. This was
based upon a face-to-face meeting I had wit
Q I gather from what you have testified that the
events that prompted the face-to-face meeting were reports
that had become public about DEA involvement in hostage
location efforts; is that correct?
.^ No . I was aware of the hostage location efforts.
What concerned me was the reports of Swiss bank accounts, of
safehouses, of activities which were clearly, as Pam had
noted earlier, operational type activities, and I was concerned
about It because I had been led to believe that we were not
operational in the hostage -- in our hostage efforts, and I
wanted written confirmation that what I had been verbally
told was in fact accurate.
Q In this face-to-face meeting, I gather then that
you made ^^^^^^H aware of your concern that he may have gone
operational; is that correct?
A I made^^^^^^^^^^^l aware that I was concerned
about what I had been reading and hearing about the hostage
WSICIASSIOECL
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16
imi^ii^iiT
89
1 situation and I wanted him to enunciate for me whether that
2 was any truth to this information.
3 Q Okay. Let me back up.
4 You testified a moment ago I think that some of
5 these reports that you had read had suggested that perhaps
6 the DEA agents had become operational m a way that Ms.
7 Naughton had probed in her questioning earlier; is that
8 correct?
9 A Right.
10 Q Now, is that one of the things that you brought to
11 ^^^^^^^^^^^Hat tent ion when he came in and sat down with
12 you face to face?
13 A Specifically I know that I did say that I was
14 concerned about what I had been hearing or reading in the
15 newspapers, and I wanted to hear from him whether there was
16 any substance of truth in what I had been hearing or reading,
17 and he said no. I said, "What have we been doing?" He
18 said, "Informant debriefing, informant development, nothing
19 more . "
20 Q Do you know whether he was familiar with what you
21 had been reading and wht was generating your concern?
22 A I didn't specifically talk about a given article
23 or a given periodical.
24 Q How did you know that he had an understanding of
25
what your concerns were?
WT^y*TPr*crrn'
814
17
iMME
90
1 A Well, when I talk about when I said references to
2 bank accounts, about safehouses, I think it certainly didn't
3 evoke any question about I don't know what you mean. He said,
4 "No, we are not involved m anything other than informant
5 development."
6 Q Do you recall him specifically saying or mentioning
7 the safehouses and the bank accounts to him?
8 A I probably did, because that was what the articles
9 I believe talked about, Swiss bank accounts and safehouses.
10 The term, the reference of my question would not have been
11 so confined as to say Swiss bank accounts; it would have been
12 Swiss bank accounts, safehouses, or any other activities
13 other than informant development.
14 Q Are these your initials on the memorandum?
15 A They appear to be, yes, sir.
16 Q I assume that indicates when this came m, you read
17 It; is that correct?
18 A Yes.
19 Q Did this memorandiun satisfy you as a complete
20 representation of the things that
21 had been doing since July of '85?
22 A No , but I wasn't looking for a report of their
23 activities from January of '85 or June of '85. I was looking
24 for written confirmation f rom^^^^^^f that what he had told
25 me during our periodic meetings, that our role was not
UmASSlfJEH
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operational was confirmed. Had I asked for a complete ar.aiysis
of what had transpired, certainly he would have provided that.
What I wanted solely was^^^^^^^^^^^^Bto confirm in writing
what he had ]ust told me durin^ur brief conversation.
Q Is this description of
activities consistent with what you now understand they had
been doing?
A No.
.MR. GENZMAN: Can you explain what you mean by that?
THE WITNESS: Yes. .^s a result of our administra-
tive inquiry, I now know tha^^^^^Vwas involved in the
movement of money from the United States. I know tha
|were involved m receiving money, which I had
been unaware of. And I now know that^^^^^Hwas actually m
a travel status for a considerably longer period than the
occasional weekend that I thought they were in travel status
I mean that's the reason for our administrative inquiry.
BY MR. WOODCOCK:
Q If^^^^^^fanc^^^^^Bhad received,
much as 515,000 from Colonel North, even assuming that they
felt that 'that' was c'ia' money, is that something you would
have expected them to report?
A I would have -- yes, yes, it is.
Q In the ordinary course when a DEA agent receives
a disbursement of money from another agency, is that agency
riitlfiLASStfiEd
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supposed to try and make some record of that for DEA as well
as the agency that's giving the money?
A Absolutely.
Q And in fact, that was done with the original
550,000; was it not?
A That was done with the CIA money, yes.
Q Is there anything in DEA practice or regulations
that forgives an agent from trying to make DEA's own record
of a receipt of monies from another agency if those monies
are considered to be covert .monies?
A I'm sorry, is there anything m the record that
forgives?
Q That's right, or excuses an agent from creating
evidence of receipt of monies from another agency if that
agent understands the money is to be covert monies?
A No. Our normal procedure requires when money is
recieved, that documentation is made to protect the integrity
of the agent and to protect the integrity of the organization.
MR. WOODCOCK: I don't have any more questions at
this point.
MR. GENZMAN: Let me follow up, first of all, on
how^^^^^^^^^^B and^^^^^^^^H became
assignment .
BY MR. GENZMAN:
Q We know^^^^^^^^_ was a neighbor of Mr. Hickey
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UNfQfSSVflSET
93
who came upon this idea. Did^^^^^^^^^ have any particular
expertise which made him suitable for this sort of assign-
ment?
A No .^^^^^^^^^^v as you stated, was a personal
friend of Mr. Hickey. Mr. Hickey had talked to Mr. Mullm
[behalf m the past and when he aske
whether DEA would be m a position ^^^^^Haidn ' t know, although
I has done a tour over seas .^^^^^^Bwas not familiar with
the Middle East and^^^^Wmdicated at that point that his
friend^^^^H^^^Hj^H would be the point of contact, a good
point of contact to determine whether DEA would be in a
position to assist.
Q What particular expertise di
for this sort of assignment
1^^^^ extremely good at informant
development .
Q I guess I would have expected someone actually
oversea^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^^^^^^^^^^^B to be
the sort that you would want to get directly involved in
this, someone who speaks Arabic and deals with the Lebanese
all the time, or even someone like Abe Azzam who is based
in the L . S . but is of Lebanese extraction and speaks Arabic.
I'm ]ust wondering, was there any sort of discussion as to
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whether there might be more suitable people tha
94
and
A No. In any event, the individual would have been
from headquarters because the SEO, by nature of an SEA, it's a
headquarters-supervised endeavor .^^^^^^^^Bknew a ma]or
source -- I think it was source one -- as did Mr. Azzara. So
vould have been on^of those persons we would have
considered had we been asked, think of a person suitable to
work with this hostage locator task f orce .^^^^^Hwould
not have.
Q Do you know what use these two agents made of
sources of other agent;
A Yes. After the close of our office in Lebanon
197 5 ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 was the for
intelligence being -- drug intelligence coming out of
Lebanon. .Many of the contacts that we had had, long-term
contacts we had had in Lebanon were!
|continue to furnish information on drug
trafficking. So both^^^^H anc^^^^^^H had extensive contact
witti^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^They had reviewed intelligence
findings fi
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95
individuals working with terrorist groups m Lebanon to sit
down and meet withl
Q You mentioned at some point you became aware of
money to be paid for the release of the hostages. I think
you mentioned the sum of $1 million per hostage. I believe
you said you became aware of maybe as late as May of 198~?
A I believe I had had a conversation witr
and he talked about bribing^^H^^^^^J that they were going
to try to bribe^^^^^^^^^to get the hostages out. I believe
as far as the money is concerned, it was the result of the
internal review l actually learned about the million dollars
and the involvement o^^H^^Hin the payment of a million
dollars .
Q One issue we are addressing is whether that money
was in the nature of a bribe or in the nature of ransom.
Can you give us your understanding as to how that money was
to be used?
A Yes. Any of the information that I have received
and that subsequently based upon an interview or that I had
with^^^^^H m May of 1987 indicates that the money was to
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UNCtftSSii^T
96
Q Earlier I thought I heard you mention that after
around June of 1985, you were not aware of the travel of
I; IS that correct?
A Yes.
Q I didn't understand at that point how it came to
be that the supervisors at DEA weren't aware of the travel
of these people.
A It was my belief that both^^^^Hand^^^^^^H were
full time at DEA headquarters, and that if there was travel,
it was very limited travel.
As a result of our 19 -- our May, 1987, inquiry,
I learned to my chagrin that that was not the case, that
there was extensive travel, specifically b>
Q Had you known of the extent of the travel, would
you have wanted to be apprised of their travel after June of
1985?
A Absolutely. ^ i^ '
MR. GENZMAN: I have nothing fui;,tbe«*St this point,
I might come back and follow up on an issue or two.
Thank you.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q I'm going to sort of hop all over the plain here.
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Is there anyone to your knowledge who works for
DEA with the last name of Lawson, L-a-w-s-o-n?
A Name is not familiar.
Q You mentioned earlier when we were talking' about
the cocaine case, via Colombia and Nicaragua, that Colonel
North was briefed on. But I didn't get it straight as to
how that briefing of the White House was set up or why the
White House was briefed.
A I don't know. With the questioning later the
time frame was different. The case from what I now know
was probably in 1984. I don't know why there was a briefing
at the White House on the caseJ
"lO called the meeting and why it was called,
I'm sorry, I don't know.
Q Is It your understanding the briefing took place
before or after the informant had made this trip?
A Well, the informant was the pilot of the airplane
that flew in with the cameras so the briefing would have
been after his initial trip. The question then arose as a
result of the briefing whether it was safe for the informant
to return to continue the operation, and this is what
generated considerable interest around certainly, around
Washington, whether because the briefing took place, that we
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URQJA^EJSBT
98
1 had created a situation where there was a potential for
2 leaks and that we would be putting the informant or under-
3 , cover agents in jeopardy.
4 Q Why was the White House briefed?
5 A Again I don't know why the briefing was conducted
6 because in ordinary operations, we certainly would brief
7 another agency involved, but I don't know why at this time
8 we briefed the White House.
9 Q Would that have been done with Mr. Mullin's per-
10 mission or could it have been done without his knowledge?
11 A I honestly don't know. I did not know of the
12 briefing before the briefing was conducted. It was only
13 after the briefing that I talked to our agent or supervisor
14 who conducted the briefing.
15 Q Who was that?
16 A That was Special Agen^^^^^^^^^^^H I just can't
17 recall who would have had^^^^^^Binitiate such a briefing.
18 Q This was at this point still an ongoing case.
19 A This was an ongoing major investigation.
20 Q Does DEA routinely brief the White House on ongoing
21 investigations?
22 A As I indicated, we do not.
23 Q Can you think of any other instances involving
24 Central America from the period of 1984 through 1986?
25 A I can't recall specific cases nor can I recall
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geographic areas, but, yes, we would prior, let's say, tc an
indictment being returned, we would give probably Carlton
Turner, Dr. Carlton Turner, we would advise Dr. Turner that
an investigation was going to be announced within a day or
so, so that the White House would have been apprised of the
fact that a nia]or investigation was ongoing because of the
high priority that this administration puts into drug law
enforcement .
Q And Dr. Turner's position was what?
A He was Presidential adviser on narcotics matters.
Q Would that be part of the White House sort of
domestic policy staff or part of the NSC?
A No. That would be domestic policy staff.
Q Do you know whether or not anyone at the NSC
would have been briefed on such occurrences?
A No. No, meaning they would not ordinarily be
briefed .
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UNIRJASBaSET
100
general qi
get more specific later. I know many committees of Congress
have made inquiries regarding drug trafficking through
Nicaragua and specifically either drug activities by the
Sandinistas or by the freedom fighters. At the risk of
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asking to go on and on, could you ]ust give us a thuiTib-nail
sketch in terms of what DEA has found regarding drug traf-
ficking in Nicaragua?
A Yes. When the question first began about the
involvement of contras or Sandinistas in drug Trafficking,
we formed a unit at DEA headquarters within our intelligence
branch to review all information that has been developed or
is in the process of being developed by DEA to determine
whether or not there is anything that we have that will
confirm such involvement. We sent communications to the
field, asked every field office where any allegations were
received to send those to this unit in headquarters. We
have not received any information to substantiate that there
is an effort by either the Sandinistas or the members of the
contras in any conspiracy to traffic in illicit drugs.
There are individuals who say they are contras
who are involved in trafficking and individuals who may be
Sandinistas who traffic, but to date we have not been able
to confirm or deny that there is such activity.
Q Have any reports actually been prepared by that
unit or by the DEA to send forward to Congress?
A I don't know. Internal reports have been prepared.
We have briefed Congressional staff members of Congress
and have answered that question before committees of
Congress. But whether an official report has been prepared.
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102
I don't know.
Q I want to ask you specifically about Mario
Calero. Are you aware of any episodes regarding a planeload
of narcotics that was perhaps brought down? I'm thinking
specifically in the July, 1985, time period.
A I aiT> not.
MR. BERMINGHAM: I think it's July, 1985.
MS. NAUGHTON: I could be wrong about that.
MR. BERMINGHAM: Possibly October, '85, in New
Orleans and DEA allegedly busted the plane of Mario Calero.
THE WITNESS: I'm not aware of it.
MR. BERMINGHAM: If I get you, through your counsel,
a date -- it's in a North note -- if I get that for you and
call you, could you check that out for us?
THE WITNESS: Absolutely.
MS. NAUGHTON: I appreciate that. So we would
sort of be interested in a run on Mario Calero as well as
the^^^^^^Hcharacter
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q I want to ask you about another episode and
this regards a Customs, basically, who was originally a
defendant in a Customs case, later became a Customs informant
and an informant for Secret Service, goes by the name of
both Kelso and Williams, originally became an informant cut
of New Orleans and was worked by those agencies out of
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iJNiBRIIIfB^^
103
New Orleans, and had information regarding a counterfeit
ring. He was on or about August 27 of 1986 in Costa Rica
working for those agencies and was then -- and this is
according to Customs -- rousted by DEA agents who raided his
hotel room and posed as Customs agents, where he then
eventually fled m Costa Rica.
Do you know anything about that episode?
A I'm not familiar with the episode at all.
Z Mr. Kelso then fled to John Hull's farm and I
would like to ask you whether or not you know of any drug
activities on behalf or by Mr. Hull or by individuals
utilizing his farm as a base?
A John Hull?
Q H-u-1-1, in Costa Rica.
A Not familiar with him.
A No information at all on Mr. Hull.
Q One other episode I want to ask you about. There
was a person acquitted eventually in Pennsylvania that was
acquitted under name -- of the name Z-a-d-a-h, who goes by
many names, and had posed himself to be a Saudi prince. As
out ,^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 had this
individual .
Were you briefed at all on their contact with the
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uffaii^fi^BT
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individual contemporaneously, that is, in either '85 or '85?
A No. I am now aware of their contact with the prince
but my awareness came as a result of our May, 1987, review.
Q I want to ask a general question about the use of
unappropriated funds. Is there a policy in DEA against the
use of unappropriated funds?
A The unappropriated funds is a generic term which
I heard during the hearings by one of the star witnesses.
We just have 31 U.S.C. 628 which outlines that funding can
only be used for drug enforcement and that's what we use
as our reason to expend or reason not to expend money.
Q That's sort of a different question. That goes
to how you would spend it.
My question is, I guess, more pointedly, is, has
DEA used any money from any private sources to pay a bribe
or any source for information?
A Not to my knowledge.
Q When the Attorney General was asked about this
during his testimony, he said private funds could be used
because you do it all the time in the areas of forfeiture
whereby when someone is acquitted on narcotics-related
charges, the profits from that drug trafficking, such as
assets and cash, can be then transferred to the government
and then used by DEA in their operations.
Do you consider this to be private money, such
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105
forfeited assets?
A Well, let me first clarify, yes, that's true. When
monies or property is seized and later forfeited to the
government, the money can be used for enforcement purposes,
but we cannot use that money for DEA operations because I
think 0MB is most concerned about our having a private fund
to conduct our operations. So it can be used -- the 0MB
regulations are quite clear that if we see -- last year we
seized 5400 million from traffickers. We can share that
money with state and local officers. We cannot use it for
operations. We can use a car that has been seized and
forfeited. We can use a piece of property that has been
seized and forfeited. We cannot use money in our operations
except for trafficker-generated funds.
If we are involved in an operation, an undercover
operation, and we are, let's say, like Operation Pisces,
the money laundering operation involving the government of
Panctma, we can use money furnished to us by the traffickers
to pay for the operation. But, no, we cannot use monies
seized in our operations for operational purposes.
Q Are those monies reverted to the general treasury
of the United States?
A They are reverted to the general treasury.
Q So they become U.S. funds at that point.
Yes.
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U^RSBBffiT
106
MR. GENZKAN: Can I follow up on that point?
MS. NAUGHTON: Sure.
MR. GENZMAN: Let me refer to this memorandum of
December 9, 1986, specifically the addendum which states,
"As agreed previously other than actual operational expenses,
no unappropriated funds were handled by DEA."
Can you first of all tell us how it came to pass
that this addendum was included with the memo?
THE WITNESS: No. This addendum was written at
the same time that he wrote the original piece.
MR. GENZMAN: Was there any particular reason he
called it an addendum to your knowledge?
THE WITNESS: I don't know why. Perhaps,
was the one who can best answer why. I have no idea why
that was so stated and added as an addendum when in fact it
was part of the original document.
MR. GENZt-lAN: You don't recall having him writing
out the rest of it and then asked him to add something about
unappropriated funds?
THE WITNESS: No. I had told him to write out
what he had told me about our continuing involvement in the
intelligence probe. He said who should I get to type it?
I said I don't want it typed. I want you to deliver it in
your own handwriting. He delivered it to my secretary,
tr^^i^^^^^^tfand I hac^^^^^^^^H type up in
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present form.
BY MR. GENZMAN:
Q That addeadum does specifically use the term
"unappropriated funds"?
A Yes .
Q Do you know the context of that term?
A N'o , I don't. As I mentioned earlier, the
language, unappropriated funds, is not something we use
m DEA and I have heard it referenced any of a number of
times during the hearings and most specifically by one of
the witnesses who continued to talk about unappropriated
funds .
Q Also the addendum mentions as agreed previously.
Do you know anything about this agreement, who the parties
were and what the agreement was?
A No. When I read what^^^^^^^^^H wrote my concern
was that he outline the fact that this was indeed an
intelligence probe. When I saw the last sentence I assumed
that what^^^^^^H was trying to say was that concerning my
instructions that if it is not a drug initiative, DEA
funding can't pay for it and that's why I didn't question
It at the time.
Q What you ]ust stated is an assumption?
.\ It's an assumption.
Q Z<- wasn't confirmed in conversation with
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A No, It was not.
Q I have nothing further on that point.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q I want to show you a document and ask you if
that IS your handwriting?
A Yes , It IS .
Q In that case I would like the reporter to ."nark
this as Exhibit No. 1 for the deposition.
(E.xhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.)
BY .MS . NAUGHTON :
Q Let the record reflect we have also marked as
Exhibit 2 the memo of DecemJser 9, 1986 of which you have
]ust been speaking.
(Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.)
BY MS . NAUGHTON :
Q Directing your attention to Exhibit No. 1 which
you have identified as your handwriting, are those, .Mr.
Lawn, contemporaneous notes that you took during briefings
with people at DEA regarding this subject matter?
A Yes. As I recall, this was the result of a
meeting that I had with^^^^^Hbut I don't recall why
I didn't date my notes.
Q Well, there's a reference at the top to_
February, '85, where there's a discussion of th
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wmm
y
109
ind so forth. So I gather this briefing
took place after February of '85, is that correct?
A Right. Yes.
2 Directi.ig your attention then -- I apologize, we
Tust have the one copy. Directing your attention to the
, i page there see.ms to be a division about one-third of
the way down and then a reference to Ed Hi^ey. Is this
rerlective of a conversation with Mr. Hj^key or are we
still in the middle of a conversation withl
K No. This, as I recall, was based upon
con^'ersation witr
Q Okay. If you could please start reading for the
record, since it is m your handwriting so we get an
accurate representation, of the handwriting from the words
Ed Hj^key on down.
A Okay.
The first column indicates 50,000, making reference
to 550,000. The next line, which is underlined, said
gc^^^^^^Mout early
and then on the right column is the name
'Buckley"-covert . The next line indicate
I assume that would make reference
to Buckley^^^^^l^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H m
19853^^^^^Hl mean^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Bl
assume they are maki.ng reference
-- meet
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A That would appear to be the case here, which would
contradict what Mr. Azzam had told me about what the CIA
had told h;
Q To the best of your recollection are these notes
then of a conversation you had with^^^^^^^^^Hor Mr.
Azzam?
A I would have to say they are conversations with
Q Do you recall did you take these -- there's three
pages of them. Did you take them all at once or are these
like your file?
A Well, some of the information .^^^^^^^^^Bobviousiy
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that IS something other than the hostage situation. I
believe this is one meeting because in subsequent meetings
I didn't ordinarily take notes because our meetings
were brief. The meetings generally consisted ofj
coming m, my meet ing^^^^^^^H not even sitting, saying what
is the status? He said well, we have X number of informants
doing the following. Things are going well or things
are going poorly. Thank you. Keep me posted kind of
thing .
If you would please continue reading the notes.
The next line says donor money not CIA.
What IS that a reference to?
I don't know. I don't know what I am.
referencing. Let me read a little further here. CIAJ
Iwill enter Beirut and then above Beirut I have
underlined five questions.
Q Now that would indicate that .Mr. Azzam wanted those
personal questions answered?
A That's right. It would probably indicate that
as a result of the lack of satisfaction which people ha
[that the informant was asked to go
back in with a series of questions into Beirut. CI will set
up meeting wi
Clear wit^^^^^^^^^^K bring i n to ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hth rough
Q
A
Q
A
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UNlTdtESSitEfiET
112
Again my assumption is that they are talking about
a plan to bring some of the hostages fron
ll probably asked about how much this
has cost and with an asterisk there is the notation we used
20T.ops, 20,000 operations money/ 50,000 gone and I assume
that would indicate the $50,000 which we received from the
DIA because below that it says signed 103s, meaning that the
informants had signed for receipt of that money.
Then there is the notation on the side the number
20, which is underlined, and PE/PI. This refers to operation.
funding that we use for the purchase of evidence or the
purchase of information. Then on the last notation is the
name Oliver North underlined.
Q I want to get back to that, but now you have
basically read that whole entry. Again referring your atten
tion to the part that says donor money not CIA, is it still
your testimony then that you were not told t^ab-rhis money
would come from private sources?
A I don't recall being told that it was donor money
1
but as I see I have it written down here that it says
donor money. Unfortunately I don't recall being told that.
Q The reference to Oliver North, you have a star
circled. Does that indicate anything in particular from
vour notes?
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A No.
Q Do you remember why you starred it?
A No, I don't.
Q If we could turn to the next page. If you could
continue reading.
A The first line again with an asterisk indicates
new avenue of approach through!
Then the next line says travel,
CI, meaning confidential informant, 50,000, $50,000 and then
in brackets 75,000, PE/PI, purchase of evidence, purchase
of information, and the number 30 in a circle for travel.
Q
Do you understand what the reference is to
No, I am sorry I don't know what the reference is,
So you don't know where that money came from.
No, I am sorry, I don't.
Is that an unusual for PE/Plpurchase of evidence?
Simply referring to the fact it's not a round
75,000?
A
Q
A
Q
number?
A No. Unless it's a cumulative total. Again I don't
remember the context of the conversation. It would appear
I asked what is the total amount of money that has been
spent or that has been distributed so far. The CI,
obviously that is the 50,000 from the CIA. 76,000 PE/PI,
we did not purchase any evidence to my knowledge m this
|}llftLAC£l£l£IL.
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effort. 30 tra-vei, I don't know what that refers to.
The next line is in brackets, facilitators will
not handle funds. Then below that I have again with an
asterisk the name Judge Webster underlined. Then below that
travel expenses, following line reporting to me and
underlined twice with the notation reporting to me. I
have a number 1 circled, contact with donor, and number 2,
below that I mean, the notation provide code book.
Q Do you know what those two references are to?
A No, I am sorry. I don't know what they refer to.
Q First of all, going to the facilitator's comment,
facilitators and in brackets will not handle funds,
is that a reference to the fact that the DEA agents would
simply facilitate the movement of private monies but would
not actually handle the funds? ~
A Again it's hard to recollect. It may be in
reference to a question -- I don't know if you are talking
about this funding -- are you involved in transporting,
generating funding and he said no, we are not involved,
will not handle funds. Facilitators, I don't know, nor
do I have any idea why I would put down Judge Webster.
Q Had you discussed with Judge Webstei
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A No, because I was not aware of it.
Q So in other words, you didn't get any
instructions from Judge Webster, any advice regarding the
agents being used only to facilitate the movement of
private monies?
A No. I certainly didn't.
Q Does this note refresh your recollection that
you may have been told then b^^^^^^f^^^^H that they would
not handle private monies?
A I assume that I was told. I am sorry, I ]ust
don't recollect having been told.
Q Do you recall whether you had given the instruc-
tions that the agents should not handle the funds
themselves?
MR. BERMINGHAM: Do you see any reason why they
shouldn't have handled the funds?
THE WITNESS: Do I ?
MR. BERMINGHAM: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.
MR. BERMINGHAM: What would have been the reason
they shouldn't handle private funds?
THE WITNESS: As I learned as a result of our
administrative inquiry, money was to be delivered to a source
either going into Leoanon or a source in -- who had come
UAICUS£ima
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out of Lebanon. I am not sure which, the money being the
5200,000. When I reviewed our results of the interviews
of the agents^^^^^B said that he couldn't deliver the
money but that he would get his brother to deliver the
money. As I read that I was astounded because if I can't
deliver the money and I recruit someone else to deliver it,
accompany me and deliver it for me, he is in fact an
agent of the government. He is operating for the government
and I was shocked in learning that^^^^^f had recruited
someone else to travel with him to deliver the money because
It didn't make any difference whether^^^^H himself did it
or he had his brother do it, because in either case they
were agents of the government.
I thought that^^^^V with his length of
experience, would have recognized that.
MR. BERMINGHAM: My question is why di<
feel, and why does this note indicate, they should not
handle money? I have seen cases, you have probably seen
it at the Bureau, I have handled on payoff money on a
ransom for kidnap victims. We on occasions used private
money. Why did he feel in this case he could not use,
handle the private money?
THE WITNESS: I think that was based upon what
we now know the conversation between North ant^^^^^Bwhere
i
North said will you find someone to deliver t.his money or
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ufflaRs^wHfeT
117
should I find someone to deliver the money. This was
North's instructions to^^^^^lthat^^^^Hcouldn ' t do it cut
that either North would find someone to do it or
should find someone to do it, and that is wher^
volunteered he could get his brother to do it.
.MR. BERMINGHAM: That doesn't square with your
.".otes where you say you shouldn't ha.ndle the money or
someone said they shouldn't handle the money. Could it
be because nobody wanted to be m the position of saying
the U.S. government paid ransom?
THE WITNESS: No. That clearly wasn't the case
because at no time did the question of ransom ever come up.
MS. NAUGHTON: I guess I will reask Bob's question,
which 13 what would be wrong with the agent himself actually
picking up money from Ross Perot or some other private
donor and delivering this bribe money?
THE WITNESS: Weil, first it would indicate to
me that we were involved in an operation, that we were
operational and if we are delivering money we are clearly
operational.
MR. GENZMAN: Can I inter]ect there? If you are
delivering money to someone who gives you information, you
consider that operational?
THE WITNESS: No. If I am paying an individual
for information he has given me on a DEA case, no, I tnir.k
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liWBlSSffiiP
111
that clearly 'is intelligence gathering. But if I am
I
giving someone money for something other than what we are
supposed to be doing, I think we have then crossed the
line of -- our line of authority as agents of the government.
If I had been asked by^^^^^^^B oi^^^^^Bmay I deliver
money, CIA ~.c-'-ey or private funding, that does trouble me
and I would have gone to probably to our counsel's office
to see whether that was appropriate. Because it ;ust does-.'-.
seem to me to be appropriate. Certainly if it were a DEA
case It would be, but here we are out assisting an intelli-
ge.nce gat.hering and this seems to be more than that to me.
MS. NAUGHTON: So if I can get at the heart of
your concern, your concern is not with the propriety of
using private money m general for let's say a drug-relatei
DEA activity, but is rather connected to using the DEA for
an operational role in intelligence gathering that is
not drug related.
THE WITNESS: Specifically in this case it would
have been my concern that we had exceeded the bounds of what
I thought our responsibility was and that was intelligence
gathering. In a drug case our delivering money to a
defendant or a suspect would not trouble me.
MS. NAUGHTON: Delivering private money.
THE WITNESS: Delivering private money that we
were documenting, that wouldn't be a problem to me if, as
rp
«
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Bob had mentioned, if we have an investigation and we
need money which, if we need 5500,000 flash money, if it were
to take a period of time for us to get it cleared but a
local bank said on your signature I will give you the flash
money, we certainly would use that private money, but we
would clearly indicate that this was money that came
from the bank.
But this IS more than that. This is operational
m an area where I didn't think we were operational.
BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q The reference again on the bottom of the page to
a donor --
A Contact with donor.
Q Does that refresh your recollection that you
were told private monies were going to be used?
A No. As I had mentioned -- no, it does not.
I had been aware, as I said, at some point -- maybe I
mentioned a million dollars -- that it was going to take a
million dollars for each hostage that was to be retrieved
from Lebanon and I thought that my recognition of that
fact was in May of 1987, but obviously it was sooner than
that. It would have been probably in June of 1985 when
reference is made to donor money.
Q This would be the one million per hostage as
opposed to the 200,000 that was used to sort of grease the
uflj^y^^pH^tW'fTi
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120
i
wheels to get the operation moving? '
A Yes, because I thought that that 200,000 dollars
was CIA money and it was only, as I say, m May of '87
that I learned that it was not.
Q Now, as to -- we have been talking aoout the
propriety of using private money to pay these bribes. Coul:
you comnient on t.he propriety then of using private monies
to pay the expenses, the travel expenses and eating
and lodging of the agents themselves?
A Yes. In my mind's eye that is clearly wrong.
In no case can I conceive of an agent traveling in an
official capacity who would use anything other than official
funding. What I mean traveling m an official capacity,
if an agent is traveling on a DEA case in an undercover role,
he would be paying cash, either his cash for which he would
be reimbursed, or trafficker assets which are part of an
ongoing operation. But whenever an agent travels on official
business the money must be paid by that agency. I don't
think we were allowed -- I know we were not allowed to have
any private source of funding for official travel.
Q Is that pursuant to regulation though?
A I believe that is pursuant to regulation. I think
It's 28 CFR, 28, Code of Federal Regulation. i
Q I think It's also a statute as a matter of fact.
You have si.nce learned, I gather, that both
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>'ere paid from private funds; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q What I'm curious about is you were obviously
ur.der the assumption DEA was paying their travel expenses,
correct?
A Yes.
Q If that had been the case, they would have had to
have filled out paperwork, submitted their tickets, their
vouchers and so forth, and expense receipts.
A Right.
Q Presumably someone either in accounting or
ad.ministration or some supervisor would have had to have
given approval for that.
Now, what I'm curious about is how is it that
let's take^^^^^^fcould have traveled so much without
anybody questioning why this guy didn't have any vouchers
or there was no paper accounting for these travel expenses?
A How was It possible? It should not be possible.
There clearly was a breakdown in the system. Which
breakdown, we are going to have to address when this
particular business is closed. That is the reason for
our administrative inquiry.
Q Are you saying then you don't know the answer to
that question yet until your inquiry is complete?
miASSI»EI^
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Q Maybe you can give me then a better general
picture of how normal travel expenses would be accounted
for. Maybe that would answer my question.
A Certainly.
Q An agent travels. I assume he fills out one of the
standard government forms and that is signed off by a super-
visor; IS that correct?
A Prior to his travel he must get a travel
authorization, for most personnel in t.he Drug Enforcement
Administration the travel authorization order is signed
on a trip by trip basis. In som.e cases someone has given
travel authorization for a month or for six months, let's
say an inspector on the inspection staff who does
considerable travel, the authorization will be for his tour
en the inspection staff. But generally it must be a
trip by trip basis. A supervisor must first authorize the
irWd. ASSfU C'i^
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travel and then a copy of that travel order must accompan'-
the voucher to our voucher staff section.
If the travel order is not there, the voucher
review clerk will bring that to the attention of the super
visor and that will generate inquiries as to the author izaticri
under which an individual traveled. If an individual works
m an overseas position, instead of having the actual travel
order documentation, he will present the copy of the
cable, a cable of Headquarters saying yes, you may travel
f rom^^^^^^Hto Washington, D.C. But a voucher will not
pass for approval without some authorization to travel.
Q So there has to be authorization before the
travel takes place.
A Right.
Q In the case o^^^^^^^^^Hwas this done in any of
his post-July '85 trips?
A No, It was not to my knowledge.
Q How could he then have traveled?
A We now know that he traveled by receiving funds
for that travel outside of the DEA system.
Q Here is my question. He is working in the
[right? And he has I presume a supervisor m that
section, who presu.iiably knows that^^^^^Vis not presently
there and is someplace else. Would he not have had to have
signed an authorization for him to travel?
limwaiata
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A If DEA was paying for the travel he certainly
would have had to sign that.
Q Assuming that he did not, which you said he did
not, and^^^^H was gone for let's say three weeks, did that
not come to anybody's attention?
A As I understand it, in the inquiry that we did,
vent to the immediate supervisor and said that
IS working on a special project at the White House and the
supervisor raised the level of interest no higher.
Q Then in the case of^^^^^^^^^Htravelmg ,
who would have been the person to approve his travel?
A Up through June of 1985 it would have been his
i.-nmediate supervisor, Mr. Assam, myself or as I mentioned,
John .McKearnan who was my executive assistant who had that
authority in my absence. But after June of '85 I don't
believe that we have found a.ny travel vouchers for either
Q You had testified earlier that he would call you
to say he was traveling on this.
A Right.
Q On occasion, and would you authorize it
verbally. Why did you not sign a document that said he
could travel?
A Because up through 19 -- June of 1985 when he was
traveling I was not his immediate supervisor. His immediate
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supervisor would have signed the documentation and that
would have been ei ther^^^^^^^^^^^H Oave Westrate or
Frank Monastero. On the voucher it would indicate who
had approved the travel and the fact that the travel was for
SEO-^71 .
Q That IS fine for before July of '85. After that
you tell him to report to you and he comes to you and he
wants to travel. Why is it that you haven't signed of on
a request for travel? ,
A Because as I understand it, when he traveled he
did not travel on DEA/GTRS.
Q I understand what happened. I'm asking you
what you were thinking at the time. In other words, he was
to report to you and you were to supervise him.
A Right.
Q In the normal course, if DEA was to pay for these
funds, you would have to sign that.
A No. His immediate supervisor would sign it.
Q So It was your understanding he was to report
to you but you were not his immediate supervisor for travel
authorization?
A No, no. He was to report to me on the hostage
situation, but he was full time in his work on the heroin^
desk. So It was my assumption if he were traveling his
supervisor would have signed his travel orders and wculd
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have approved his voucher.
Q So you were assuming his inunediate supervisor
was actually handling the paperwork of the travel.
A Right. Right.
MR. WOODCOCK: Even though the mission was purely
hostage related?
THE WITNESS: Even though the mission were
hostage related, because the terms of reference indicated
that personnel costs would be borne by the agency.
BY MS. NAL'GHTON:
Q CIA?
A Personnel costs would be assumed by the agency
involved in the activity.
Q In this case DEA would?
A In this case DEA.
Q Did you ever check with his immediate super-
visor to see if those vouchers had indeed been --
A No, I did not because I was not aware that
Iwere traveling and certainly not to the
extent, as I mentioned earlier, thai^^^^^Hin fact was
traveling .
Q To the best of your recollection over time,
now that you knov^^^^^^^^Btraveled , did you give permission
for that travel or were there times when he did not seek
your permission?
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A As I recall there was only one time when he
requested authority to travel from me. The other instances
he is under the SEO it would have been his immediate
supervisor. After June of 1985 I can only assume that he
has sought no one's authority because DEA was not paying for
that travel, which is in violation of our administrative
procedures .
Q At the risk of beating this one, I want to get
your position absolutely clear on the record and give you an
opportunity. After seeing these notes which do make mention
of donor and not handling funds and so forth that we have
gone through, is it your testimony now that the notes
indicate you were told that donor money was being used but
that you don't recall raising the issue with him regarding
the propriety of using private money?
A Yes. As I mentioned, based upon the notes,
obviously I was told that there was donor money and I was
obviously told that it was not CIA money. I don't recall
hearing that. I don't recall recording that. But this
obviously is my handwriting.
Q Do you recall giving any instructions for him
not to handle the money?
A No, I do not.
Q Anybody else?
MR. WOODCOCK: I have got just a couple.
UMfiUlSSlFl£Di.
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EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE:
BY MR. WOODCOCK:
Q On the travel matter, i^^^^^^^^^^Hwere to say
that after June of 1985 whenever he did travel he did check
with you or with Mr. .McKiernan, do you know whether he would
be mistaken on that score?
A I can recall one occasion wher.^^^^^^Htold me he
was traveling on the hostage situation. Other than that
one time I did .not authorize any travel.
As I indicated, I subsequently have learned, and
I'm very surprised to the e.xtent to which bot^^^^^^^^fcnd
pad traveled.
Q So your recollection is you approved it that c^.e
time and no other time, is that correct?
.^ That one occasion.
Q And to the extent he did travel and to the extent
that anyone in DEA approved that travel, it was not you;
is t.hat correct?
A That's right.
Q Did he ever -- let me strike that.
I gather you would have understood that his
involvement in the hostage location effort was extremely
sensitive information; is that correct?
.^ Oh, yes. I would say that it was sensitive based
upon the sensitivity of the issue raised by the CI.^.
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Q Did you consider his involvement per se to be a
sensitive matter?
A No. Sensitive in what way? Too sensitive to tell
people about?
Q Something you would not tell others about that
would be perhaps related to people on a need to know basis
withm the agency?
A Yes. It would have been related on a need to know
basis in that any enforcement operation or intelligence
operations is handled on a need to know basis. We don't
advertise what we are doing because m this casej
m anv ca
Q Did^^^^^^^^^^^ever tell you that his
involvement in this anc^^^^^^H involvement m it was so
sensitive that the normal travel documentation procedures
should not be followed or could not be followed?
A Absolutely not.
Q Did he ever tell you that Lieutenant Colonel
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North was of that opinion?
A No, he did not. Quite the contrary. I had asked
•- I am sorry. I had asked the inspectors who
looked into this to asi^^^^^^^^anc^^^^^Hwhether they had
received any instructions not to advise DEA as to what they
were doing, and in their interviews they had said they had
not received any such guidance from anyone.
Q Although^^^^^^^Bvould have understood he had to
report to you or someone before he had to travel, would
he also or was it also an understanding within the Agency
that he would have to travel m such a way that he would not
leave a paper trail?
A It cearly was not my understanding.
Q Ever heard of such a notion associated with
this?
A Absolutely not.
Q Hac^^^^^^H suggested that to you, that this
was so sensitive he had to travel in a way he would not
leave a paper trail, what would your reaction have been?
A My reaction would have been to certainly pursue it
because it would have violated my understanding of what
the terms of reference were to our involvement in this
activity and it would have indicated that there was
something more ongoing than I anticipated was ongoing.
Q Let me ]ust shift gears slightly. On the subject
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of the donor money, were you aware chat in late April,
early May 1985, Abe Azzam was speculating that the private
monies were going to be coming from Ross Perot?
A I am aware now that Abe Azzam m his meeting
during that time frame made reference I believe to someone
in the CIA that the money that would be necessary, the
5200,000, that if the CIA didn't get it that North probably
will get It from Perot because in the follow up invest igaticr.
we conducted there was a notation that m North's comments
to Abe Azzam at their meeting in early May, North was
angry with Azzam because Azzam raised the issue of Perot
money involved in this activity.
Q You know that now but do you recall having a
contemporaneous knowledge m late April, early May of 1983?
A No, I don't.
Q That Azzam was so speculating?
A No, I do not.
Q I don't have anything more.
MR. BERMINGHAM: I have three questions.
EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE:
BY MR. BERMINGHAM:
Q The first one is talking about that whole
operation into Lebanon^^^^^^^^^l using three or
sources. Were they also reporting on narcotics matters?
A Yes.
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intOCASStf)@r
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Q Were they paid for -arcotics information through
DEA?
A I have not seen the vouchers, the informant
vouchers indicating that they were paid, but I did talk to
kwho tells me that individuals who were
Q Could you give us a statement whether during
that period of time thai^^^^^f an(^^^^^^^|were operating
these three or four fellows with a view to locating the
hostages, whether at that time they were developing also,
information they were being paid by DEA for the narcotics
information let's say from 19 -- February 1985 through
September 1986? I think that would be good to have on the
record .
A I know that the source one who received the
$50,000 did not additionally receive payment from DEA.
The other sour ce^^^^^^f^H who were furnishing
information, I don't know whether they were paid from DEA
funds for drug intelligence and were paid separately fo?
some other efforts involving the hostages. I don't know
that information.
Q Could you research that? I think that would be
very i.mportant m this whole matter whether these two
agents were actually operational in a DEA way, getting DEA
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intOEASfitf]^
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iegitiiHate drug information during that period.
A I could research it as far as our DEA files
v»«ere concerned. But if the individuals were paid by
from seme other f und .^^^^^^^Hand
Q That IS not the implication. The implication
would be were they operating as regular DEA informants gettm:;
drug information and being paid by DEA at the same ti.me.
A No. I believe again based upon my conversations
that they were receiving money
for providing on an ongoing basis drug information, but
they were not double paid.
Q I wasn't thinking about double pay. In other
words, this operation did involve getting legitimate drug
information of an intelligence nature for your information.
A Absolutely. Volumes of it m three ma]or
intelligence probes.
Q Other than source one, they were paid from DEA?
A Yes , sir .
Q Two other questions. To get back to the contra
newspaper type information that the contras are or have been
involved in narcotics smuggling, you say you have set up a
special unit in your intelligence division that coordinates
and looks into this business on a regular basis. I think
for our reporting that would be very i.mportant to point out.
imcLASsiEm.
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that you have done, that and to have an opportunity at the
same time from them to the committee summarizing their
results. Would that be possible?
MR. HOFFMAN: I would suggest that any request
for the committee for any document be channeled to DEA
through John Bolton's office, OLIA m the Justice Department
and let them determine the appropriateness of us furnishing
any document to the committee.
MR. BERMINGHAM: Your statement to us right
now is there is that active unit and to datet'ou don't see
any involvement by the contras as an organization or its
leadership or any government agency or officials involved
in sanctioning drug trafficking?
THE WITNESS: As of my last briefing there was no -
we had developed no such information.
BY MR. BERMINGHAM:
Q The last question. Maybe I'm mistaken but I
believe Buck Ravell has testified in the FBI they sent out
a teletype to all offices asking for any contacts you have
had with Oliver North or anybody from the NSC, possibly
trying to interfere with an ongoing investigation or trying
to get information.
Has DEA done that?
A No, we have not done that. Certainly I can even
explain why we haven't done it because if anyone requests
UpftV^j^r^TWrn
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any information of DEA, anyone outside of DEA personnel,
the field will always notify us. Even if a member of a
congressional staff arrives at a given city and says
we are investigating such and such, we would say well, we
will have to check with our headquarters to determine whether
It's appropriate for us to talk to you. And that is a very
strict mandate we have.
We can certainly send that communication out
but —
Q The same thing would probably hold for the FBI
except for the fact that they did send it out and we did find
out that Oliver North was m contact and we do know he was
in contact with other federal agencies with regard to
alleged violations by contras.
A Right. The difference would be, though, the
Bureau, as you know, have a multiplicity of violations.
They have terror system. North was interested in the
terror system factor. He was interested in this and that.
We ]ust have one violation. If someone were to come in to
raise some questions about drug law enforcement --
Q I'm trying to put myself in Ollie North's position
where my friends are being accused of being involved in
drugs. I know drug enforcement people. I would naturally
check with somebody in DEA to find out if my friends are
really involved in drugs.
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Did he .ever request any information from you?
A Absolutely not.
Q I think we have a gap here. You know if it
would be possible to send out some type of a thing like the
Bureau did ]ust to -- it would be of your own interest too
to know.
A Except for the fact our indices are different.
For example, ours are completely computerized indices and
an inquiry is made abou^^^^^^^^^^^f^^^Bthat is
recorded in the computer and when we check and find out that
there is^^^^^^^^B in our computer, the computer will
also tell us there was a prior check made on this individual
and the individual who made the inquiry is number such and
such and each of us have an access number.
So we can then track who it was that made that
inquiry. You must have an access number. And that is
different from the Bureau's system.
MS. NAUGHTON: Could I follow up on something Bob
asked about?
You mentioned^^^^^^^^^H said that he indeed paid
these same sources that were used for the hostage effort
for drug related information.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
861
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BY MS. NAUGHTON:
Q But were his payments to these sources out of the
SEO-4'1 account?
A No, they were not.
Q Do you know whether or not^^^^^Hand^^^^^^H pa id
after July of '85, paid any of these sources from the
SEO-471 account?
A No. We have no information that any additional
.-nonies were paid out of the SEO. We have accounted for the
monies that were placed in that SEO.
Q Okay. So what I'm asking is i^^^^^fand
I.Tiet with one of these sources, sources one through
four, that they used, let's say in the fall of '85, and
these sources had also given drug information, would that
have been paid from DEA money or would that have been paid
in the normal cash payment that^^^^^^Hanc^^^^^HTiight have
made to them from other funds?
A We researched that and have not found any
information in our files which indicate that those individual;
when they were debriefed furnished drug intelligence
information. So therefore they would not have been paid
from DEA funding. It's interesting because in our follow
up w 1 1 I^^^^^^^Han^^^^^H they said that during the course
of this whole thing they had continued to develop drug
niAt&&&l(.\EJ!l
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TQESECEET
ONULillSSfFirD
138
ir.tel 1 igence . We. have not found any memoranda generated
through their contacts with tbp^e informants which develcped
drug intelligence.
Q Were these sources interviewed in the course of
your inquiry m 1987?
A The sources, no. Our inquiry m .May of '8" was
an internal reviev
Q Okay. So you don't know, for instance, what
source one did with the S200,000?
A I do not.
MS. NAUGHTON: Thank you very much for your
patience .
MR. HOFFMAN: Will we be purchased a copy so
he can read and sign?
MS. .SAUGHTON: You will not be provided with a
copy of the deposition. You can come up here and review it.
We don't release t.hem.
That concludes t.he deposition. Thank you.
(Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the deposition was
concluded . )
863
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o*T»: December 9," 1986
UNiTED STATES GOVERNMENT
memorandum
»u«j«cT, PEA Support of U.S. Hostage Situation
T<^Y^ Mr. John C. Lawn
v/ Administrator
Participation of PEA of f icers|HHHH|m^^^^^^^^^^^Hand
l^m^^H^^H^H i n attempting to locate an^e)a^^cAmerican hostages
held in Lebanor^^^*
The following is a brief summa
i^ iJtilization ofj
(sources oTTfTOrm^W?^^naT?^^^TO^^^^^^^^fyre~oT~PEA' s"
good standing/reputation in the international law enforcement community.
3. Extensive debriefing of these SOIs regarding (a) narcotics traffick-
ing; (b) terrorism; (c) hostage-taking, etc.
The information gleaned from all of the abo.ve was passed/distributed/
made available to all concerned U.S. Government agencies and officials
on a need-to-know basis.
(N.B.) on two occasions, through the judicious use of information
obtained from one or more of the sources the possible extraction of
one or more of the American hostages appeared imminent, only to be
frustrated in the final negotiations by unreasonable demands by the
terrorists. Howev
bribes/eorruption possible
(Addendum) As agreed previously, other than actual operational expenses,
no unappropriated funds were handled by PEA.
unnei orovisicns ol E 0 12356
Ov K Jorinso:i National Security Council
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871
pbi
llMf 1 AR!
,'V^'-lW''N^
SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT
ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
I
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
UNITED STATES SENATE j
Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, July 29, 1987 ;
I
I
The deposition of CHRIS J. LEACHMAN, JR., called forj
examination in the above-entitled matter, pursuant to notice, 1
in the offices of the Senate Select Committee, Room 901, Hart |
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C, convened at 1:07 I
p.m., before Pamela Briggle, a notary public in and for the |
District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the ;
parties :
Partially Declassified/Released en '■^-Ji -SI
under provisions of E.O 12355
by N. Wsnan, National Security C:unc;l
■Ujn HU^JKTMO CO . MC.
10- C Sam N £
Vutunpoo D C 20002
iMmm
872
pb2
HU.!* KOOOTWO CO . MC
50- C Smei N E
WuhinfTon D C ;0<M2
APPEARANCES;
mmm
On Behalf of the Select Committee on Secret Military
Assistance to Iran and Nicaraguan Opposition of the
United States Senate:
JOHN SAXON, ESQUIRE
Associate Counsel
Room 901
Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.
On Behalf of the Select Committee to Investigate Arms
Transactions with Iran of the U.S. House of
Representatives:
ROBERT W. GENZMAN, ESQUIRE
Associate Minority Counsel
115 Annex 1, The Capitol
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
On Behalf of the Department of the Army:
COLONEL JOHN WALLACE
ICUSSIFIED
873
b3
ItlLLII) KOOOTIHO CO . MC.
10" C Suert N E
TuhinfTon D C Z0O02
mummi
WITNESS
CHRIS J. LEACHMAN, JR.
By Mr. Saxon
NUMBER
Leachman
Leachjnan
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Leachman
Deposition 1
Deposition 2
Deposition 3
Deposition 4
Deposition 5
Deposition 6
Deposition 7
Deposition 8
Deposition 9
Deposition 10
Deposition 11
Deposition 12
Deposition 13
Deposition 14
Deposition 15
Deposition 16
Deposition 17
Deposition 18
Deposition 19
Deposition 20
Deposition 21
Deposition 22
Deposition 23
Deposition 24
Deposition 25
CONTENTS
EXAMINATION
EXHIBITS
FOR IDENTIFICATION
I'iliSSIFIED
874
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uLEM nrottTma co . mc
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^mm
PROCEEDINGS
Whereupon,
CHRIS J. LEACHMAN, JR.
was called for examination by counsel for the Senate Select
Committee, and having been first duly sworn by the notary
public, was examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. S.IOC0N:
Q If you would, sir, state your name for the record,
please .
A
Q
A
Chris J. Leachman, Jr.
And what is your position, Mr. Leachman?
I'm currently deputy project manager for the TOW
program at Redstone Arsenal.
Q And how long have you been in that position?
A Since October of last year, of 1986.
Q And what was your position immediately prior to
that?
A I was chief of logistics for the TOW project
office, same location.
Q And this is a civilian -- your current position is
a civilian position?
A GM-15.
Q Sir, if you would, tell us what the nature of your
involvement was in chronological fashion with what we have
875
Db5
mm$m
_ 1 '] come to know as Project Snowball. That is, the shipment frcm
2 Anniston Army Depot to Redstone, and from there onward, we
3 now know ultimately to Iran, of TOW missiles starting in
4 early 1986. When did you first find out about this require-
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it*±u> ncPOimNa co , imc
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ment?
A The first knowledge I had of the requirement was a
phone call I got from my then project manager Colonel Jim
Lincoln. It was on a weekend. I don't remember precisely
the date, but it was sometime mid-January time frame of '86.
And the conversation was around a requirement for some TOW
missiles. And with almost an immediate -- a very quick
availability. -
Q At that time were the TOW missiles specified as to
type or stock number or price?
A If they weren't on that weekend, they were within
the next day or so at work. But some time very early in the
discussion, they were specified to be basic missiles--what we
term basic missiles--3 , 000 meter missiles. And they were to
be in the supply condition code alpha, or code A assets
available for unlimited use.
Q And were you given a specific stock number?
A At that point in time, no, sir, I was not given a
stock number.
Q Was the stock number dictated then by the two
things that you just stated? That is, that they should be
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basic TOW and that they should be condition code A?
A Yes, sir. That translates to us to a particular
stock number.
Q And if you would explain for the record how that
translates .
A I don't know how you mean, how to explain that it
translates. We have a complete listing of all the different
missiles we have in inventory, and that particular type would
be properly identified by the stock number that goes with
that type.
Q Let me see if I can explain tha way I understand '
it. If you're going to have a basic TOW--and none of these
have been produced since 1975--and you're going to put it in
condition code A, then that dictates that it have a particular
safety modification?
A That is correct. |
Q Which is a missile ordnance inhibitor circuit, or i
M0IC7
A Right, that's correct.
Q And if you're going to put a MOIC on a basic TOW,
then that has a particular stock number?
A Correct.
Q And what is that stock number?
A You're going to ask me to remember it, sir? I
don't remember it--
mm h^m^w
877
pb7
mm
1 Q No, not the long official stock nuinber, but is that
2 a 71 alpha 2?
3 A I have to be honest with you, after this extended
4 j period of time I don't have--I've got documentation here that
5 ■ I can refer to as to what those numbers are, but I believe
6 that is a 71 alpha 2. I just don't remember, John, at this
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point in the game, it's been so long. I haven't--but I'm
sure it's in previous testimony and you've got it on the
forms there. I think the record shows it is a 7 1 alpha 2.
Q I can find it if need be in your sworn testimony to
the DAIG, but you indicated that you normally deal with these
missiles in generic terms.
A Yes.
Q And that everyone knows that a basic TOW is a
certain type, a basic TOW with MOIC means something else and
so forth?
A Yes. And I can give them to you by type, not
necessarily by stock number and by PB number. There was a
point in time in this whole process where I had those all
fully in the front of my mind. Unfortunately, the last few
months I've gotten away from the logistics area and now I
have program management responsibility and I just don't
remember all of those things.
Q When did the issue of price first come up?
A Came up within the first week of the discussions.
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UH.LCII NC^OfmNO CO . INC
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And I did not communicate with the party in DA that was
providing the data to Colonel Lincoln, but he did--
Q That would be Major Simpson?
A Yes, sir. Major Chris Simpson. And our immediate
reaction to it was, if when we whatever--the requirement was
for 1,000 missiles, and our immediate reaction to it was that
we wanted to get paid back for TOW 2. That's generally the
approach we try to take on any type of transaction, FMS or
diversion of that nature, attempt to get the best back for
the Army. And that being the current model that we were
producing at that point in time, which was TOW 2. The price
at that was running right at $10,000 apiece.
Q And what was the price that you understood the Army
was going to be paid for--
A The initial price that we were offered was 3149.
Q And what was the basis for that price?
A According to Major Simpson, that was the current
AMDF price for the basic TOW missile.
Q AMDF is the Army master data file?
A That's correct.
Q And how would you describe the AMDF? What is it?
A It is the listing of all standard pricing for the
Army that is supposed to be updated periodically and dis-
tributed worldwide to Army users. Used most efficiently, or
.ock fund transactions
t of the ^ '"^jjj^^f')("^P||-fPr!''
879
pb9
liNMSIflED
_ 1 ■ where the user has to know what the price of an item is, and
2 he goes to the Army master data file to determine what the
3 current pricing of that item is. So it's a standard pricing
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document .
Q Was It your understanding that Major Simpson or
someone working for him went to the AMDF and looked up a
basic TOW missile price?
A Yes, sir, we were told that Major Simpson or
someone on his staff or on that staff had done that. He
didn't tell me personally, but he had told Colonel Lincoln
that he, in fact, was some sort of an expert on the AMDF
pricing. And that was the price for the missile that we had
described, which was a standard TOW, basic TOW missile.
Q At what point did anyone at Redstone realize that
the MOIC was going to be needed, and that that would change
the price in one way or another?
A I knew immediately to get condition code A missiles
of the basic type, that the only way we could get those, the
only ones we had in the inventory would be through the MOIC
process; those that had the MOIC, the safety modification
installed. So I knew immediately that that was the vintage
that we had to provide.
Q We should probably talk about some numbers here
You had been told to be prepared to ship how many missiles?
A Initial requirement was for 1,000 missiles.
iiMOi Aooinrn
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Q But did you know that there would be a following
requirement?
A No, sir, not initially. That was changed sometime
later. But initially it was just for 1,000.
Q Now my understanding from when we talked to you
before--and let me say for the record that we interviewed you
on June--I'm sorry, on May 22nd, 1987. You indicated that at
the time the requirement cajne--and correct me if I'm wrong--
that you had in excess of 2300 basic TOWs in condition code
alpha in usable stock at Anniston Axmy Depot; is that correct?
A That's correct. Something just slightly over 2300.
They were there to support the annual service practice,
annual training program that we have for the Army. So we did
have 2300 in stock.
Q At what point then did you determine that you were
going to have to go the MOIC route for additional missiles?
A As I said, that's the only vintage that existed was
basic missiles with the MOIC installed. The requirement for
1,0<30, when we looked at asset availability, we could tell
that we could readily meet that from current inventory. We
were somewhat ahead of our training requirements for that
fiscal year so we had sufficient assets to do that with.
0 And did Colonel Lincoln communicate that back to
24 '! Major Simpson?
HKJ.EII MVOMTINO CO . INC
507 C SuCTt N E 25
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Yes, he did.
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Q Now at the point at which the nujnbers increased
from 1,000 to something higher, when was that?
A Sometime within ten days of the initial contact.
Q And what did the numbers go to?
A 4508, if I recall precisely, sir.
Q At what point did someone communicate from Redstone
to DA that--it would be Major Simpson, I assume at desk log--
that the price would have to increase because of the addition
of the MOIC? And here I'm talking about going from 3169 to
roughly 3469, estimating that a MOIC would cost about S300?
A We made some initial attempt, as I said previously,
to get the TOW 2 price. I think we were told very quickly
that we weren't going to get that price.
Q By whom were you told that?
A Major Simpson.
Q Told that to Colonel Lincoln?
A Yes.
Q Was there any back and forth there?
A Yes.
Q Did he have to go talk to someone, or did he
immediately say-- ■ -
A There was some negotiation back and forth between
Colonel Lincoln and Major Simpson early with no outside
24 ! intervention. We finally decided--we were told categor icallv
t we were goijig to ger,-
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1 surfaced the MOIC issue, that that cost us about $300 a
2 missile. And we thought as a minimum 3469 was an acceptable
3 price, or the minimum price we could go with. And it was at
4 I that point in time that Colonel Lincoln involved our commander
5 ] at Redstone, General Burbules, who had some conversations
6 then with General Russo on the DA staff.
I
7 I Q Now that's General Peter Burbules who was the
8 I commander of the Army Missile Command?
I
9 A Yes.
10 Q And he talked to then Major General Vincent Russo
11 who was the assistant deputy chief of staff of logistics?
12 I A That's correct.
13 j Q And what do you know about the nature of that
I
14 I conversation?
I
15 A I know nothing of the nature of the conversation,
16 j except that the price discussion--that was what the conversa-
17 t! tion was over, was the price.
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18 'I Q And who told you that such a conversation was
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taking place?
A Colonel Lincoln did.
Q And when you say they discussed price, did they
discuss the difference between 3469 and the price of the TOW
2, or what I will call replacement cost? Or did they discuss
3469 versus a number of 8435, which we'll talk about in a
IHXIII HVOOnNO CO . wc
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A Sir, I don't know. But I know that that information
2 I was--Colonel Lincoln, I'm sure provided that information to
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General Russo. But I was not party to the discussion between
Colonel Lincoln and General Burbules, or to General Burbules
and General Russo, so I don't know specifically what was said.
Q Now when we talked with you before you indicated
that there came a point at which the price issue became moot.
And I think it's fair to say that was after the Burbules- ;
Russo conversation?
A Yes, sir, after. '
Q How did this issue of mootness get communicated to
you, and by whom was it communicated?
A General Burbules told us that the price that was
agreed to was 3469. ;
Q Told us? Told Colonel Lincoln? •
A Yes . I
Q And Colonel Lincoln told you?
A Colonel Lincoln told me. And it was never an issue ;
with me again in this entire exercise. j
Q To say that it was never an issue again, does that
mean you from that point forward didn't take note of or pay i
attention to any prices that may have_shown up on any
documents ?
A No, sir, 3469 become the price, and I saluted and
ices that may nave snown
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went forward.
Q I'm going to come back to these price issues in a
bit, but let me ask you about the AMDF . Is that something
that you were familiar with and have used?
A I am much more familiar with it today than I was in
January of 1986, I assure you. As I said, my association
with the AMDF had been primarily in the stock fund area. It
had been used--the extent that I knew that it had been used
is when there was 3omething--a Jeep was destroyed or some-
thing, that was the price that was used for report of survey.
And really had very little workable knowledge of the AMDF,
per se.
I knew that there was an AMDF price. I'd had some
involvement in a previous job with the AMDF price not being
properly updated and a user being charged the wrong price,
but I had no intimate knowledge of the workings of the AMDF
process .
Q Now help me understand something that either seems
con-fusing or curious. And that is that you were in a
position involving logistics. And as I understand the AMDF
price--and correct me if this is a wrong understanding--it is
like a master Army catalogue where if you want a particular
item, you look it up. You see the stock number. You see a
24 ! price. You use that as icmr basis for going forward in a
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logistics capacity .
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A Not necessarily. My experience with the AMDF was
that it was seldom right, seldom reflective of--
Q The issue of whether it's correct or not is not my
question right now, and in one sense is even irrelevant if
everybody is using it. Whether it's the right data or not,
it's the data that they're using.
If you didn't use the AMDF, what did you use at
MICOM for making price determinations?
A I have used the AMDF, but generally I would go to
the last contract price.
Q Where would you find that?
A In our procurement files.
Q If somebody called you up and asked you point blank
in the January '86 time frame, what is the price of a basic
TOW with a MOIC, how would you go about determining that?
A I would probably have gone to the AMDF and then
rechecked the current contract price.
Q And if you went to the AMDF, what would it have
tol-d you?
A In retrospect, it would have shown me the price for
that missile was currently listed at 8435.
Q And would other people with whom you worked have
followed a similar course of action for making that determi-
nation?
A Yes, they would have.
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Q What about the people at Anniston Army Depot?
A I doubt that they would have. They would not have
access to the procurement file. I think Anniston Army Depot
would refer strictly on the AMDF for current pricing informa-
tion.
Q Help me understand how this process works then.
Would it have been normal for Redstone to impose a tasking or
a requirement on Anniston Army Depot to be met to provide X
number of TOWs or X number of something else?
A Rephrase the question again. Would it have been
normal for us to--
Q Yes.
A Yes.
Q And I'm not trying to put words in your mouth, I'm
trying to understand how this works. You seem to have just
stated that at Anniston Army Depot they most likely would
rely on the AMDF and they would go to that first?
A Yes, right.
Q And with regard to Redstone, you said you would
have been more likely perhaps to go to your procurement files?
A AMDF and procurement files to determine if there
was any ambiguity between the two of them.
Q At what point do the pricj^.qet iLeci>n£i_led, or do
any ambiguities get reconciled?
A Well, the procedure that was in process when this
mimm
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1 ' was set up was every six months we were to provide--every six
2 months or when there was a significant change to the contract
3 ' price, we were required to provide--our project was, not my
4 ! office but the financial group was to provide an update into
5 I the AMDF file. We have since found out--as I'm sure you
6 I already know--that that procedure was not being religiously
7 ' followed .
8 ; And there was--some updates had been provided.
9 ! They were improperly priced, depending upon who you talked
10 ! to. But by the DAIG's interpretation, there was some pricing
11 i in that process. But that's how the system is supposed to
12 I work.
13 ] I'd like to say that in my last testimony up here
14 there was some discussion between you and I on whether the
15 ■ AMDF was updated monthly. And I said that I didn't think it
16 was. We were both right. Distribution to the field is on a
17 ' monthly basis, and it is updated to the field on a monthly
18 ' basis. In our end of the business, we do not update it on a-
19 ! -we do not provide a renewed input on a monthly basis. And I
20 i meant to call you back to tell you that but —
21 Q I appreciate that because that was something that
22 was a bit confusing to me . I asked you a few minutes ago if
23 someone had called you in January '86 and asked you for the
I
price of a basic TOW with MOIC how would you have gone about
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the AMDF. Let me ask this question. Would you have needed
to go to the AMDF, or did you already know the price of a
basic TOW with MOIC to be 8435?
A No, I didn't. I didn't know it, I didn't--just
typically, I would know the price of the current missile that
we were buying, but I would not have known the price--and we
have eight or nine different vintages of missiles, and I
would not have known without going to some record, what the
individual price was.
Q So your best recollection and your testimony would
be that without going to the AMDF, in the time frame we're
looking at of January '86, you would not have known that a
basic TOW with MOIC has a different price--let me withdraw
that.
You would not have known that the price for a basic
TOW with MOIC was 8435? -^fii.^
A No, I would not, without going to some records.
Q Would you have known that a basic TOW with MOIC had
a different national stock number from that of a basic TOW?
A Yes, I would know that. i
1
Q You might not have known what that stock number was?i
i
A That's right, but I would have known that it was a [
different stock number.
Q Would you have known that it having a different
stock number gave it a different price? I||^|A| AOPirir^
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1 A I would have known because of the increased price
2 of the MOIC. But we have similar items in the inventory
3 under different stock numbers that can carry the same prj.ce.
4 ;| It is possible.
i
5 I Q Let me ask you about the computerized system that
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Redstone, and I believe Anniston Army Depot used, which you
told us before has a--it's an in-house management system and
the acronym is PROMTS; is that correct?
A That's an in-house system that we have in our
project for internal management, yes. Anniston does not have
access to the PROMIS system though.
Q They do not have access to it?
A No. It is a project oriented data management
system. And as a matter of fact, the TOW project is one of
the few that has it. It's being considered as a standard
system for all projects. But if I said that before, it was--
didn't mean to tie that into PROMIS.
There is a standard Army system that's called CCSS .
I can't even tell you what that acronym stands for, but it is
the standard supply system. But it is totally divorced from
the PROMIS system that we have.
Q Your in-house management system, is that something
that's shared at Anniston Army Depot?
A No, it is not; the PROMIS system is not. It's a
type of system that tells me what sick leave usage is, and
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1 production status, and all those prograjn management type
2 activities. And Anniston would have no need for that type of
3 I data .
Q All right, I'm a bit confused. And just correct me
if I have recorded something incorrectly. when we interviewed
6 ' you earlier, my notes indicate that you said that the
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Redstone system feeds the Anniston Army Depot system.
A That would be the CCSS system.
Q And does that have pricing information in it? .
A Yes, it does have pricing information.
Q Does it have stock numbers of items?
A Yes, it does.
Q And would that include the TOW?
A Yes, it does.
Q Now when you answered a question earlier and said
that you thought the people at Anniston Army Depot would
likely go to the AMDF to look up the price of a basic TOW
with MOIC, is that something that you have reason to know
they would do? Or is that your guess based on the fact that
they would generally use the AMDF? Or what do you base that
on?
A I don't know that, but I just--even though I say I
didn't use it as a standard pricing document without double-
checking with the procurement system, it is used throughout
IMLUN nVCWTINO CO . INC '
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Tuhoiroo DC J0002 ii ii&iAi lAAiripn
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ICLIISinE!)
1 And I also believe in my testimony before I said
2 that I was under the impression that the CCSS system carried
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keyed this computer for a stock number, you get with it a
current standard price, which one would presume is reflective
of what's in the AMDF . I have not substantiated that, but I
still believe that that's inherent in that system.
Q Feel free, by the way, to correct me if I did get i
something from you in our earlier interview incorrect because
we've spent a lot of time together and I've got a lot of I
notes .
A If it's tied into the PROMIS system, that's '
incorrect, sir. PROMIS is an internal system that we've
developed.
Q Was there ever any discussion of price between the
depot and Redstone? I
A Not to the best of my knowledge; not with myself. :
Q What would have triggered the depot's responding to
the request to meet this requirement? Would that have been
the material release order? j
A Yes . I
!
Q Or is that simply a piece of paper that comes after j
2 3 I some telephone discussions have been had or what?
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A In this case there were some telephone discussions
There were some people that had gone to Anniston. And the
892
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UNCLASSIFIED
1 actual MRO process was the formalization of that. Back in
2 those--in '86, we could release by me telling material
3 management, who controls the assets, to release 1,000
4 missiles. They would generate the MRO to Anniston for the
5 release.
ij
6 ,! We have since put tighter controls on the system.
7 We now must have a standard requisition before we can release
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any ammunition material--which is a good thing, by the way.
Back in those days, we were not under that type of control.
Q Would there be any way under this new system to
override that with something that supposedly comes down from
on high as a--
A Even when it comes down from on high--and we still
have them on a day to day basis for FMS and diversion
requirements, special projects--we are still provided a
document number and a requisition for the assets before we
can release them.
Q You might want to explain for the record what you
19 j mean by a diversion because, in light of the arms sale money
20 I going to the contras, diversion has taken on a special
21 j meaning .
I
22 A Diversion is a standard term that we use. we have
2 3 I from time to time FMS requirements that come up and have to
24 'i be satisfied in a very short term. We don't have the
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work a process whereby we divert U.S. assets to the FMS
customer. And we take the FMS money and buy back to replenish
the Army stock. And that's the type of diversion that--
excuse me .
Q You never sent any missiles to the contras, did you^
A No, sir. I didn't send any to Iran.
[Laughter. ]
Q I was going to get to that. But I guess for the
record I should say, you personally had no knowledge that
these were going to Iran?
A No, I did not. Our customer was the Army.
Q And for that matter, you had no knowledge that
these were going to the CIA?
A No, sir.
Q But I believe you said you did have a suspicion
because you were told they were going to^^^^^^Eand you maybe
put two and two together based on a conversation you over-
heard; is that correct?
A Yes, and the fact that there was a representative
from the State Department escorting the first shipment. It
means they aren't going to Fort Stewart, Georgia.
Q I'm going to show you some documents in a little
bit. But my question now is, when did you first notice that
any documents bore the price of $8,435 for the basic TOW
missile?
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A To be very candid with you, sir, when this thing
broke loose back in November, December of last year. When
the DAIG came to Redstone and we started going through the
files that we had, that was my first knowledge that the
pricing was different on those documents--on the transfer
documents from Anniston, it was different from what was put
on the document that Major Simpson signed. I'd never noticed
it.
Q Do you recall what the price figure was on the
document Major Simpson signed?
A 3469. And he specifically requested that that
number be put there.
Q Was there any discussion--f irst , let me ask who he
requested that of?
A The initial document was prepared on the first
shipment, and Major Simpson and myself and Mr. Williams who
was deputy project--
Q That's George Williams, then the deputy--
A Yes, he was deputy project manager at that time.
The three of us set down on the eve of the first shipment and
negotiated, if you will, the contents of the particular
docujnent that you have record copies of .
Q And did Major Simpson say that in the box or the
block for price the price should be 3469?
A Yes , sir, he did .
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1 Q Did anybody make an effort to tell him it should be
2 some other price?
I
It was, at that point in the game it was a moot
4 ' issue with us.
5 j Q No one raised with him that there might be a higher
6 j price that would be appropriate for a basic TOW with MOIC?
7 i| A No, sir.
i!
8 1 Q Did he ever tell you anything which should suggest
9 that he knew that another price might be appropriate but that
10 ! either he made the decision or someone made it for him that
i
11 I it would be 3469?
I
12 ; A He never made that comment to me . I understand
,1
13 that he may have made some comment to Colonel Lincoln which ,
14 I sort of indicated that the price issue was overcome by
15 1 events. That the quote--I won't say quote, but that some i
i 1
16 : sort of deal had been struck and that there was no subsequent j
17 i discussion on pricing. :
18 I Q Now let me explore that because you talked about i
i ' '
19 ; that in your testimony at the DAIG. The notion thst a dea' '
i " :
20 j had been struck has a different connotation to it than simply i
I :
21 I saying, a price had been agreed on, or that a particular
22 ' price was the appropriate one and that had been communicated
I
23 ' to a purchaser and they had said, fine, that's what we'll
24 pay. And I don't want to put words in your mouth. Are you
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1 that might--
2 i A No. The context of the way it came back; to me was
3 .; that the customer had agreed to that price, whoever the
4 i customer.
5 1 Q Was it your sense that the customer had ever been
made aware that there might be a higher price more ap-
propriate?
A One would certainly hope so. Major Simpson had
certainly been made aware of it. But we had no way of
knowing who he was dealing with.
Q You gave us when you met with us earlier as good or
better an explanation of the safety problem that the basic
TOW had as anybody has. why don't you take a minute and tell
us what the problem was with the basic TOW that necessitated
the MOIC?
A In 1981 we had two incidents where the--the way the
TOW missile works, it has a launch motor that literally
throws it out of the tube.
Q It's really two things, a launch motor and a
warhead, right?
A Yes. A launch motor and a flight motor and a
warhead. A launch motor merely thrusts the missile out of
the tube to a distance that clears it from the gunner. At
that point in time, there is a flight motor that ignites that
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1 And of course, the warhead on the front end which detonates
2 when it hits the target.
3 We had two incidents wherein the missile was ejected
4 ; from the launch tube by the launch motor and the flight motor
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failed to ignite. Which means that at a distance of somewhere
between 60--well, it can vary between 40 to 60 meters--the
missile hits the ground. That's about as far as the launch
motor will project it. The missile tumbled then and reorien- ■
ted itself.. And a few seconds later, we had delayed ignition
of the flight motor.
Q By reorient itself, you mean it spun around or
turned around?
A Yes. No longer pointed down range, it pointed in
some other direction. And it's a little bit like Russian
roulette. Depending upon the direction that the missile was ■'
pointed, when the flight motor ignited, that's the way the
missile flew, and sometimes flew back in the direction of the ;
gunner. j
Q And that's referred to as a flyback problem?
A Flyback, yes, sir. !
Q You said we had two incidents. You mean Redstone
or Army-wide?
A No, there was one in Germany at Baumholder. And
24 ] then there was another one in Minnesota. And it was alleged
rmans had one which we cc
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1 But we had at least two that we knew that actually did this.
And what was determined to be the cause of this
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A After several million dollars investigation, the
best we could determine was the most probable cause--because
there was seldom debris left that we could analyze, and two
incidents is pretty few and far between. But the best, most
probable cause was determined to be a battery that was built
by a manufacturer called Eureka Williams.
Q The manufacturer was Hughes Aircraft?
A No, Hughes Aircraft is the manufacturer of the
missile. Their subvendor for the battery was Eureka Williams.
And the probable cause was determined to be a bad bonding
joint in the battery which kept the battery--and therefore
kept the battery from providing the proper voltage to the
flight motor. Therefore, the flight motor did not ignite.
Now as the missile hit the ground and tumbled, we
felt that there was a possibility that the battery would
complete its connection, provide the voltage to the flight
motor, and subsequently cause it to ignite.
The other thing, there was a possibility of a
thermal overheating in the battery which would do the same
thing. Once it overheated, it would cause the joint to make
and the battery to provide the power to the flight motor.
We did two things. First thing, we suspended all
899
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_ 1 firings of TOW missiles until we had determined the most
2 probable cause and a fix. Once we determined the probable
3 cause, we immediately suspended the use of those batteries.
4 I We had two manufacturers of batteries, and both missiles that
5 I had displayed this flyback phenomenon had batteries from the
6 ; same manufacturer. So we suspended the use of those bat-
7 teries .
8 And then we developed the MOIC, missile ordnance
9 I inhibit circuit. And what this little device does, it ■
10 ' monitors the time from launch to flight motor ignition, and
11 I that is a prescribed time frame. And if the flight motor
12 : does not ignite within a prescribed time frame, it inhibits
13 it from every operating. And therefore, if you don't get a
14 I proper flight motor ignition, the missile will just lay on the
15 ; ground and the flight motor will never ignite and you don't
i
16 I have a flyback.
17 I It apparently was a satisfactory fix because we
18 ■ have not had an indication of this failure mode since 1981.
19 : Q Was there an assembly line set up at Anniston Army
20 I Depot to do the modifications, putting the MOICs on the basic
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ULLEfl HEFOimNO CO . INC
10- c Sti«i, .vi E 2 5
TOWS?
A Yes, we established that assembly line in 1983.
Q Were you personally involved in that?
A Yes , I was .
Q Which means what? That you went down to the depot
900
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INCLASSIFIEI
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1 and-
We set a facility up at Anniston. We provided them
3 ^j with the tooling and the training. We bought the circuits
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themselves, the MOXC circuits and we provided those to the
depot .
We also provided for missiles--since these missiles
were being shot up in training, we pulled the oldest ones out
of the inventory. We arranged a process whereby Europe and
Korea would send back their oldest missiles that we could
feed into this production line. We set up the entire
process .
Knowing what we know about this operation, do you
really think it would have made any difference if someone
would have been told this thing has got a new stock number,
and that new stock number AMDF price is 84 35?
Q It certainly would make a difference to these
committees .
A Would it have made any difference to the trans-
action? That's my question.
Q No, but it would have made a big difference to
these committees, and that's the whole point.
A That's my point. I don't care what we offered
them, or what we asked, I don't think it would have been--I
think it would have been denied.
Q You were asked in the DAIG testimony, "Did we tell
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1 the desk log the AMDF price, 8435?
2 ,j "Answer: I don't remember the conversation, but I
3 believe we did."
4 i You continue, "Once it was decided that we were
5 going with missiles with MOICs on them, they also knew what
the stock number was, 1512. They had access to the same AMT'F
as I had. The prices were there in January of '86."
Now I read that to mean, if you knew that this was
a basic TOW with MOIC and it was a 1512 stock number, that
you just automatically knew it was 8435. Is that an incorrect
reading?
A Logic says that that is true. The same expert that
gave use the 3169 out of the AMDF had access to the same
stock number and the Scime pricing information for the new
stock number.
Q You were then asked, "How do you know that they
knew it was 1512?
"Answer: They told us. Chris Simpson told us--
you mean that stock number 1512?
"Question: Right.
I
"Answer: I know that he had the stock number when
he came down here to pick them up. He knew what he--l didn't
keep it, but he had a handwritten copy of a 1348 with stock
2 4 ' number and everything on it."
auw tnromrma co . mc
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It's reasonable to assume if they had that stock
902
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UNCUISSIF
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1 number that they could have looked it up in the AMDF?
1
2 i A Yes.
3 ,1 Q And we don't know if they did or not. But I take
this testimony to mean that you were given the stock number
5 I 1512; is that right?
6 I A Given, but we also knew what it had to be because
I
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7 ,1 we did, you know--or at least the command did the release
8 I document, so we had to know what that was.
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Q Bjit the stock number 1512 doesn't show up with the
3169 price, does it?
A No.
Q You were asked this question. And I'm not trying
to get this on the record to point the finger of blame, but
to get in the substance of your answer.
"Question: I understand you that the leadership,
or the PM, the deputy didn't know that it was your fault, and
17 1 I understand that.
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And to your credit, I should say you made a
statement to that effect just before this.
"Do you have any — do you think you told them or is
it just that you cannot remember?
"Answer: I think I told them."
Would that still be your best recollection, that
you told Colonel Lincoln and Mr. Williams about the 8435
UNCLASSIRFD
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LA55lfiO
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A I probably didn't.
Q You think you probably did not?
A I probably didn't tell them.
Q And what in the intervening time makes you think
that? And I don't know which is correct, and I don't know
6 ! that--
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A I don't know that it makes any difference, you
know. But no one--everyone else has said that I did not, so
apparently I did not.
Q I'm not asking you to base it on what other people
have said. I'm trying to determine what your best recollec-
tion is .
A I don't know. But if they say I didn't, apparently
I didn't.
Q You followed this with the statement, "Remember
now, I had to identify these things by stock number to tell
supply what I wanted the MR cut for. They had to know.'
I would take it from that testimony that you had
some input into the MROs ; is that correct?
A I did have in that we told them specifically what
to release.
Q And you told them by stock number?
A Whether I told them by stock number or told them in
generic terms. As I said before, those of us that dealt in
that process every day talked about an I-TOW or a basic TOW
IIMOI Aooinrn
904
pb34
UNCUSSIFIED
34
with MOIC And I don't find any evidence of any documentation
2 'I in any of my files on this thing that reflects that I gave
3 ; them a stock number.
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Q There's some further evidence of that in the next
question. The questioner say3--is talking about the discus-
sions between Colonel Lincoln and General Burbules. And he's
had the benefit of talking to some of these parties, and the
question is this .
"The project manager got General Burbules involved.
He initially stated that he didn't know the difference in
stock number and AMDF. And then when we were talking about
the General Burbules issue and I asked him, you know, who
prepared him and what information did he prepare himself with
he vaguely remembered telling or having a difference in stock
number and price, the AMDF price, and providing that to
General Burbules. Do you recall helping him get ready for
that?
"Answer: I would have been the guy that did it.
I don't know if this helps you any. It seems to
suggest that the investigators had talked to Colonel Lincoln
and he had some recollection of knowing about the different
stock number and the different AMDF price and passing that on
to General Burbules. Does that sound right?
A I know that we had some discussion before he went.
As a matter of fact, I was the one that recommended that he
mint Jinoirirn
905
pb35
35
vnj
_ 1 ! go to General Burbuies. At that point in time we had handled
2 |i everything in this operation strictly within the project.
3 ,1 And I recommended that he go to General Burbuies to get his
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endorsement.
I didn't think we could accept the pricing and go any
further in this operation without getting his involvement.
So yes, I prepared him for it. I don't have any record of
what I gave him, and he apparently didn't keep any record of
what he gave to General Burbuies.
General Burbuies seemed to think that he, at one
time had seen a message or something on this. We were unable
to substantiate that.
Q On this point of the AMDF and the national stock
number?
A Yes, sir, on the whole pricing issue. But we have
researched all the files at Redstone, including that he might
have had as commanding general that the rest of us didn't
have access to, but we were unable to locate anything.
Q You were asked a question about Major Simpson and
some comments that he might have made on this price issue.
And here was the question.
"Major Simpson made a comment to me "--to me being
the investigator--"late Friday night, that he said all you--
and he is referring to the office down here, the PM shop--had
to do was tell him the price, the agency would have paid any
906
pb36
UNCUSSiriED
35
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price. He said that no one down here gave him any good
arguments to increase the price, and no one ever gave him the
different stock number or different AMDF price after the
first day when all agreed on the recominendation on the
nomenclature NSN and the price of the basic TOW.
"Answer: Absolutely untrue."
Is that still your testimony?
A Absolutely untrue. And if his testimony--if you
would read that again. What did it say?
Q He said, "All you--referring to the office down
here, the PM shop--had to do was tell him the price, the
agency would have paid any price. He said that no one down
here gave him any good arguments to increase the price."
A And beyond that?
Q "And no one ever gave him a different stock number
or different AMDF price after the first day."
A No one ever gave him a different one. That's an
absolute untruth.
Q You think that he was given a different AMDF price?
A Yes, sir, I think he was, but I can't prove it.
Q By whom, Colonel Lincoln?
A Yes, sir. But we have no proof of that.
Q Has Colonel Lincoln told you that he thought he
Yes, he absolutely does not recall. He knows he
iiftifvi ■AAirirrv
gave-
907
Db37
icinssw
37
1 I had several discussions with Simpson over price but doesn't
2 recall any of the details of it.
3 Q There's a question here that I'm curious about
4 'because your answer seems to very quickly and readily confirm
5 I what you're asked. And they're talking about the MRO. And
6 ' the questioner says, "Just for your information, you may
7 already know this, when it was passed to Anniston verbally it
8 ' included the stock number and the correct price of 8435 on
9 J the MRO. •■ .
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Answer: Well, that was the only correct verbal
information passed."
Now you can read that either of a couple of ways.
13 J Either you're simply saying that if we know that they had the
I
14 [ stock number right, then we know the price would be 8435. Or
15 I
16!
you can read it to mean, yea» you kneocrthat that stock number
was passed and -^bat - that price wa* passed. What would be ^^^
17 i your instructions as td how "'we sBbuld read that? ^
18 ! A Considering where it's at in the testimony, it was
19
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late and I was trying to get out of there.
Q You have -*(j^ijiforniat ion, have no knowledge of what
specifically was verbally told to Anniston on this?
A None whatsoever. As I said before, this is the
first time I have seen the actual release documents. No,
don't know what transpired other than that. I don't even
HiLifii nvotmNO CO . mc. i
)o-csuct< NE 25 remember being asked that question as a matter of fact.
Wurunnoo. DC 10002 i «..___ _
908
cb38
ONClASSIFIfD
38
You were asked then something that I didn't go into
2 with you and I should probably ask quickly, about the
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3 ■ congressional limitation on the number of TOWs that can be
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purchased in a particular year. And the question was, "Hqw
was this limitation affected by this transfer?
"Answer: Well, the transfer didn't do anything to-
-weil, it could have had we gotten the money in a form where
we could have used it to buy back, then we would have been
faced with the congressional limitation on the number of
missiles I can buy per year."
Now I take that to mean exactly what it says . And
that is, that last year if you'd gotten the money back--
A Fiscal '86 I had bought everything that Congress
had authorized us to procure.
Q And just for the record, did you know that at the
time?
A No, we did not.
Q And again for the record, would it have had any
impact on readiness that you bumped up against that ceiling?
A None whatsoever. In '87, now it's a different
proposition. I have a 12,000 ceiling, but I have funding for
considerably less than that, so I'm below the congressional
threshold and I could, in fact, increase it.
Q And a final question. You were--actually the
question put to you is not that directly relevant and this
imnf Aoninrn
909
pb39
UNCLASSIFIED
39
_ 1 was relayed in your testimony. But you said, and I quote, "l
2 honestly believe--and you can make it part of the testimony
3 if you like--that the price was dictated to us. It didn't
4 make, excuse me, a damn what we said the price should have
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^0" c Sutct s £ 2 5
been, the deal had been struck."
And let me simply ask you in closing, what you mean
by that?
A They watered it down considerably, I think, from
what I actually said. '
Q Well, on this record you can say whatever you want.
A I believe, as I think I have told you in previous ;
testimony--and this is my personal opinion--is that Major
Chris Simpson looked up the stock number for a basic TOW
missile without MOIC, found 3169. I think somewhere a deal
was offered. We challenged, and in the course of the I
challenge we eventually got around to the MOIC. And he !
asked, what's that worth, and we said, about $300 apiece. I '
believe he went back to whoever it was was working this ■
I
process and said, they've got to have $300 more, and the deal
i
was struck. '
j
Now I honestly believe--you take all this televi- [
sion, and all the Tower Commission, and everything aside, I
think that that's what happened. And at least the way I read
the Tower Commission, it pretty much implies that; their
report .
y?
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910
pb4 0
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MR. SAXON: Mr. Leachjnan, let me say for the record
that we appreciate your being here this afternoon. You've
appeared voluntarily. You've let us question you at length
on two different occasions. We know you've come from out of
town. We appreciate it very much and your testimony has been
very helpful to the committee. Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
MR. SAXON: And for the record, the CIA had a
planning figure of $6,000 that they used all the way through
on these missiles, so they could have paid a little more.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the taking of the
deposition was concluded.]
UNCLASSiREO
•njLix KtroKJma co . mc
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
I, PAMELA BRIGGLE, the officer before whom the
foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the
witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition
was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was
taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or
under my direction; that said deposition is a true record of
the testimony given by the witness; that I am neither counsel
for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the
action in which this deposition was taken; and further, that
I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel
employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise
interested in the outcome of the action.
PAMELA BRIGGLE
Notary Public in and for the
District of Columbia
My Commission expires May 14, 1990.
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byK Johnson NaSional Secu„ry^Cobncrl
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941
STENOGRAPHIC MINLTBS
t'nreviMd and Unedited
Not for Qnotmtloo or
Doptlcmtloti
UNCLI^tfD"^^^^^-
Committee Hearinffs
of th«
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
vnder provf'Jj.is of E.O. 12355
'3/ B. Reger, f!:t!::ial Security Council
OFFICE OP THE CLERK
Office of Offldal Reporten
UNCLS^IED
IB
COPt
_0F-
COPlES
942
DtKll^tSIHIr
DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL A. LEDEEN
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions
with Iran,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, March 11, 1987
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14 The deposition was convened, pursuant to notice, at
15 9:45 a.m., in Room 1605, Longworth House Office Building.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
UNCLASSIFIED
943
15
IS
18
19
20
22
23
24
25
iwd-ftssra^
1 Mr. Eggleston. My name is Neil Eggleston. I am Deputy
2 Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee to Investigate
3 Covert Arms Transactions With Iran
4 Also present is George Van Cleve, Chief Minority Counsel,
5 and Mr. Lisker, from the Senate Select Committee, who is
6 here today in the capacity as an observer but not a participant
7 as I understand, in the deposition.
8 Let me say at the outset this deposition is classified,
g that Mr. Ledeen will be testifying to various things that are
10 highly classified and any reader of this deposition should
11 take particular care to make sure the names particularly of
■)2 individuals and the other information is treated in a classifieti
13 fashion
14 Whereupon,
MICHAEL A. LEDEEN
was called as a witness for the Select Committee, and, having
ly been duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and
testified as follows:
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
21 Q Mr. Ledeen, before you get into sort of a chrono-
logical recitation of your events, let me ask a little bit
about your own background and if you could generally tell me
in a summary fashion about yourself, where you were born,
your education, and your positions up until the time that you
nd your positions up until
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8
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12
13
14
15
16
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
MWISf
started to become a consultant with the National Security
Council?
A I was born in Los Angeles in 1941; attended
■0
^j^ona. College, in Claremont, California; Doctorate from
the University of Wisconsin in Modern European History and
Philosophy; taught for some years at Washington University in
St. Louis; emigrated to Italy, was visiting professor at the
University of Rome, senior Fulbright lecturer; correspondent
for the New Republic.
Moved to Washington in 1977 to become the founding
managing editor of the Washington Quarterly and senior staff
member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Was invited by Secretary of State Haig in 1981 to become
special advisor to the Secretary of State. Did that until
Haig resigned in 1982, Returned to the Center for Strategic
and International Studies at that point, where I am still today
Meanwhile did — was retained as a consultant by
the State Department and the Department of Defense. Was in
charge of the analysis and archiving of the captured documents
in Grenada in 1983. Did various projects primarily in
counterterrorism for the Pentagon in 1984. Became a consultant
to the National Security Council in 1985 where I reported to
McFarlane as long as he was there and thereafter to North.
Worked "mostly on terrorism but by appointment on some West
European questions.
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21
22
23
24
25
Q What kind of matters were you doing when you were
with Mr. Haig?
A There was on — was no theoretical limit to the
questions I would work on. I didn't have a regional or
substantive definition per se. To the special advisor to
the Secretary of State, simply did what the Secretary of St^te
wanted me to do. It was a personal position and reported
A
directly to the Secretary. My primary onrgoing responsibility
was to represent the Secretary in contacts with leading
members of the Socialist International and that involved
considerable amount of travel and talking to people, most of
whom were in opposition parties at that point. Many of them
subsequently became heads of government, but at that time they
were by and large opposition parties.
Q How was it that you became consultant to the
National Security Council?
A I was invited by McFarlane.
Q Did you have a previous relationship with
Mr. McFarlane?
A He and I worked together for Haig. He was at that
time counselor to the State Department.
Q What was the nature — let me ask this question
first. Was your employment relationship or your consulting
relationship in a formal fashion the same throughout the
period of time 1985 to 1986?
^ — fflHhLftiroHiiTrfr
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946
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1 A Yes.
2 Q Are you still a consultant for the National
3 Security Council?
4 A No.
5 Q When did you cease being a consultant?
6 A In December of 1986.
7 Q And were you as a consultant -- were you a full-time
8 consultant?
9 A No. Part-time.
10 Q And how was it decided what part of your time would
11 be working on matters related to the National Security Council
12 as opposed to outside matters?
13 A When there were things -- well, I would come in
14 regularly and read the intelligence on terrorism which was
15 roy primary responsibility.
16 Q Right.
17 A And when there were special tasks that people
18 wanted me to attend to, they would ask me to do that.
19 Otherwise, I would just come in periodically and read.
20 Q Let me just ask you, you indicated that you knew
21 Mr. McFarlane previously and that initially you had worked
22 primarily for Mr. McFarlane during the 1985 year; is that
23 correct?
24 A - Yes .
25 Q When in 1985 did you first become a consultant to
JUNmSSlEIEIL
947
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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14
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^ 20
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1 1
f*. f n ,t '^'i
the National Security Council?
A It was either December '84, or January "85. Right
at the beginning of the year.
Q Was there anyone else that you principally dealt
with at the National Security Council other than Mr. McFarlane
during 1985?
A Colonel North.
Q And did you also deal with the other individuals
who were in his office, in his suite of offices?
A Well, in '85 as I recall it, there were no other
people in his office per se. He shared a suite with Stark,
and a couple of other people. I did not work with them.
Q In 1986, did you work with anyone other than
Admiral Poindexter?
A Well, I never saw Admiral Poindexter in '86.
Admiral Poindexter would not speak to me during the time he
was National Security Adviser. So that I reported only to
North; and the other people at the NSC with whom I dealt in
1986 were Peter Rodman, who is an old friend, and I think
that's basically it. I had some chitchat with Coy Earl*
since they were in there.
Q Right.
A From time to time we would discuss questions with
them, b«t had no working relationships with them per se.
Q And when you indicate in an affirmative fashion that
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948
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22
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25
BNttf^ffSti'
Admiral Poindexter would not speak to you, what do you mean
by that?
A I mean that I several timesquqyition»^n
appointment with him and never got one.
Q Do you know why?
A No.
Q Let me ask you perhaps at this point, I think I
have done the background I wanted to ask you about. And
perhaps you can just start by telling us your first involvement
in this matter?
A As part of my work for the NSC, I would travel
primarily to Europe and would speak on behalf of McFarlane
or Poindexter with various members of the European Governments,
primarily involved in intelligence work; and would discuss
with them things on their minds and things — there was no
really fixed agenda for these meetings. You will find in
the Tower Commission Report references to letters of
introduction which I typically carried. One of these was
signed by McFarlane, the other by Poindexter in the cases that
they cite.
Q Which two do they cite in the Tower Commission
Report?
A They cite one to Mr. Schurer in Switzerland and
one to Grossouvre in France.
Mr. Woolsey. Off the record
rUNCLKSlflEU
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BNOtH^ffiti'
1 (Discussion off the record.)
2 (ML Deposition Exhibits No. 1 and 2 were marked
3 for identification.)
4 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
5 Q I show you what has been mar)ced Deposition Exhibits
6 ML 1 and 2. Are those the documents you were just referring
7 to?
8 A Yes.
9 Q Let me just so I am clear, I taXe it, Mr. Ledeen,
10 you have read the Tower Commission Report?
11 A I will not claim that I have carefully read every
12 line of the Tower Commission Report. I read a lot of it,
13 some of it repeatedly.
14 Q Are these the first, if you recall, letters of this
15 nature you received from the National Security Council?
16 A I don't really remember.
17 Q Did you receive others?
18 A Yes.
19 Q Did you receive letters to individuals in Israel?
20 A No .
21 Q 0)tay.
A May I make a parenthetical remar)t at this point?
Q Sure.
A • One of the things about the Tower Commission Report
that bothers me most is the amount of classified material that
ist 13 the amount or ciassii
\uL
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has been unleashed on the world. In my opinion, letters of
this sort had no business being included in public documents.
These were private letters written to private individuals.
The act of publication bothered me. So I just wanted to say
that.
Q Okay.
A In the course of the discussions that I had early
in 1985, one of the people with whom I spoke who was an
intelligence official of a West European country had looked
unusually tan and I asked him if he had been skiing. He said
no, in fact he had been to Iran and had gotten tan there.
This interested me a lot. I had been interested in Iran for
quite a while. I had co-authored a book on the fall of the
Sheih with Professor Lewis at George Washington University,
had met lots of Iranians, had a cousin who used to be in the
Peace Corps there in the sixties; and we spoke about Iran
at great length. Basically, what this gentleman said to me
was that in his opinion, the situation in Iran was now much
more fluid than it had been at any time since the revolution,
that it was a moment wh^n he believed the United States could
profitably play a role in Iran eind that he thought that we
should take a look at that. He encouraged me to go to Iran
and have a look at that
JIHCltSSMEll
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Q Let me interrupt you here for a moment.
Does this individual -- what I would like to do
IS not elicit names of people who are not relevant to the
inquiry, but I will tell you as to people who I think are
going to be relevant since it is a classified deposition;
I sun going to ask you to divulge their ncime .
Is this an individual that the intelligence
official, someone who plays a further role in this story?
A No. This is his one and only role.
Q Then I am not going to at this time ask you for
his name.
Mr. Woolsey. If I might interject, if it might
be possible to consider future times when names come up
or precise circumstances which might identify names, if
we could consider handling it in a very limited fashion
that we talked about — before the Chairman, or whatever,
the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member. We appreciate
that being a possibility.
Mr. Eggleston. Okay.
The Witness. So I asked him how he thought we
could best learn more about Iran. After all, my interest
from the standpoint of the NSC was two-fold. It was first
of all to learn whatever I could about Iran's role in
international terrorism, which was my area of major
interest. Secondly, to see insofar as it was possible to
MLA^m
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imAmifi^
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1 learn about the domestic situation in Iran, which was
2 inevitably going to be related to these terrorist activi-
3 ties.
4 He replied that in his opinion the Israelis knew
5 everything, or words to that effect, that the Israelis had
6 a terrific intelligence organization inside Iran, and that
7 they undoubtedly knew more about Iran than any other
8 country in the Western world, and that we should talk to
9 them.
10 So I returned to Washington sometime after these
11 conversations and reported on them to McFarlane.
12 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
13 Q Can you give us an approximate date of the
14 meeting, as best you recall the meeting with the Western
15 intelligence official?
1g A It is in the March-April time frame.
■)7 Q And I take it then the meeting -- the conversa-
•)3 tions you were about to tell us about that you had with
•)g Mr. McFarlane took place in April sometime? Do you have
20 a more precise date than that?
21 A No. I am somewhat handicapped in the testimony
22 on this subject because I did not keep a diary. Once
I had finished with my income tax return for 1985, I
threw away all the documents that referred to travel. I
am one of those people who has a tendency to acquire
wmwi
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enormous amounts of paper. My wife has always encouraged me
to throw away quickly anything I do not absolutely have to
keep. . >,
So all those airline receipts, used tickets, hotel
receipts and so forth, anything that I wasn't claiming as a
deduction -- most of this travel was paid for by the NSC,
so I wasn't taking it as any kind of tax deduction or
business expense -- I just threw them all away.
A lot of this will unfortunately be approximate.
I apologize, but it is the best I can come up with.
Q Okay.
A Also, I did not keep any records of conversations.
McFarlane and I had an understanding there would not be
anything in writing on these activities.
My reports to him were verbal. There were no
memoranda to him in any detail. Rarely I would write
something to him when it was impossible to get to him.
Q Was there a reason there was a decision made not
to have any written memoranda?
A It just didn't seem to make any sense to have
anything in writing.
One of the reasons that they -- people like
this wanted to private back channel to the V«rtiite House
rather than going through normal liaison, say the American
ilMHI Hl^EL
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embassy in their countries, which they could easily have
done, was because they considered this a more secure way of
communicating with the White House and therefore, I thought
for their concerns as well as some of ours, it was best
not to keep a written record of these conversations and
it was a practice I maintained throughout the entire
story.
So with very few exceptions -- and I think Jim
has given you some of his documents --
Q He has .
A -- which I retained by accident. I will confess
to you I was horrified to discover I still had them. If
anyone had asked, I would have said I had nothing. I went
I
through all the various d/jsks and discovered -- and some of
the funny sub-directories I made at that stage, these
things were tucked away. So I gave them to you.
So I am guessing at a lot of these dates. I am
sure that at least some of it is going to be wrong. But
t
the -- I can assure you the substance is accurate, even if
I may be off by a week or a month.
I reported on this conversation to Bud, and
pointed out to him that when I had done the socialist
international work for Haig, I had been friendly with
Shimon. Peres , because he was the Labor Party person with
whom I most frequently conversed for Haig and Peres had
Ay
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recently become Prime Minister of Israel. I suggested to
Bud it might be useful for me to talk, to Peres about this
subject .
Now, this trip which I discussed also very
briefly with Teicher and Covey simply to describe to them
what It was about and why I thought it would be a useful
trip to make, was fully approved by McFarlane before I went
to the extent that before I left he and I had a conversa-
tion in which he told me specifically what to say and what
tone of voice I was to use when I said it to Peres.
Q Was this trip paid for by the NSC?
A It was indeed. With the exception of my --
Mr. Woolsey. I might interject, the documents
on personal travel we got from the NSC and turned over to
the committee earlier have that -- the receipts from that
trip in it.
The Witness. What you will find is that from
the time this thing starts, from the time of the first
trip to Israel in May to the end, with the exception of
my July trip to Israel which was part of a long-scheduled
A
family vacation, all of my travel was paid for by the NSC
and all of it was approved by the NSC before I did it.
So we discussed what I would say to Peres, and
the nature of the conversation was that it was a research
project, and that while it was a project undertaken for
mmmi
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956
iKKLiWBIr
15
'' the National Security Council on which I would report
2 directly to McFarlane, it was nonetheless not a policy
3 initiative but simply a search for better information about
4 Iran. And what I said to Peres --
5 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
6 Q Let me ask a few questions before the meeting
7 with Mr. Peres.
8 What was Teicher's position at the NSC at the
9 time you had the conversation with Teicher about this
10 project?
11 A Teicher and Covey, they were the two people
12 on the Middle East.
13 Q Did you talk to them together or separately?
14 A Together.
15 Q Do you recall their reaction?
16 Let me ask another question. Was McFarlane
17 present at that time?
18 A No .
19 Q It was a separate conversation?
20 A Yes .
21 Q Do you recall their reaction to this research
22 project?
23 A They thought it was interesting.
24 Q " Did you -- do you know whether they approved
25 or disapproved of you together?
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UXXiVA. ■ ■■ Tl -
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A My impression was that Teicher thought it was a
good idea and that Covey was less enthusiastic. I don't
remember the discussion.
There is a thing in the Tower Commission that
says Teicher thought it was best to check with Nimrod
Novick to see whether that would be okay. Novick was a
special assistant to Peres in the Prime Minister's office
at that time. I don't remember whether that came up or
not in our conversation.
Q Thank you.
A Could well have. I just don't remember.
In any case, it was -- McFarlane told me formally
to go and I informed him when the appointment had been
scheduled and so forth. I strongly disagreed with the line
in the Tower Commission that says Ledeen on his own
initiative scheduled the meeting with Peres, since it was
decidedly not on my own initiative; it was a result of an
explicit approval from McFarlane down to the last detail
of the conversation.
So I went to Israel and met with Peres on the
4th, 5th, 6th of May, in this period. Just the two of
us. No one else present in the room.
Q How long was your meeting with him?
A- About 40, 45 minutes.
Q Was it a single meeting or did you meet with him
JltL&SSIflHL
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958
24
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1 on more than one occasion?
2 A On that trip, a single meeting. I met with him
3 again on a later trip.
4 Q If you could just describe the substance then
5 of your conversation with Mr. Peres?
6 A I said to him that we were interested in Iran
7 and in Iran's role in international terrorism, and we felt
8 frankly that our information was quite unsatisfactory. We
9 did not have a good picture of these subjects and we did
10 not have a good understanding of the Iranian situation over
11 all. We had a poor picture of the internal situation and
12 a poor picture of the way in which it operated interna-
13 tionally and that some people had suggested to us that
14 Israel might be better informed.
15 So my questions were two and a half in number:
1g Number one was, do you people know anything about Iran,
17 Iran's role in terrorism? Are you happy with you -- the
•ig state of your own information and understanding? If you
ig are, is there some chance that you might be willing to
20 share some or all of it with us so that we too could have
21 a better understanding of it? And finally, sort of half
22 a question: If at some date in the future we manage to
23 understand these things better, do you have any bright
ideas about useful things one could do with regard to
Iran in a general sort of way?
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This was what I put to him. Now, I want to stress
in light of most of what has been written that in that
conversation, various subjects were never discussed.
Contacts with Iran were not discussed. American hostages
in Lebanon were not discussed. These were not on my agenda.
They were not things we were looking for. Neither he nor
I raised them. They never happened at all.
His answer was a bit disappointing as to
A
basically that he didn't think their information on Iran
was particularly outstanding. He was unhappy with it.
That while it might very well be better than ours and that
would be understandable because they were a lot closer and
they had been more active in all of this, basically they
didn't have any great understanding of the situation. But
that he thought it was important and that he would be
delighted to work more closely with us to try to develop
better information and better understanding and that, in
fact, he would appoint Shlomo Gazit, a former director of
military intelligence who was then the president of the
Ben-Gurion University in Be'er Sheva, to head a group
which would liase with us. They would try to pull together
whatever information they could about Iran and that I
should work with Gazit and develop a relationship with him
and the thing would go forward. ^
Go ahead.
imMiEa
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IM/^tPKST
19
1 A And at the end of the conversation, when we talked
2 a bit more about Iran, what did they know, what did they
3 think.
4 (Discussion off the record.)
5 The Witness. He asked me if I would be willing
6 to carry a private message from him to McFarlane and he
7 said that they had -- had received a request from the
8 Government of Iran to sell a certain quantity of artillery
9 shells or artillery pieces, I don't remember which, to
10 Iran and that Peres would not do this unless he had explicit
11 American approval for it.
12 And I asked him please not to ask me to carry
13 that message since it was an awkward message for me to
14 carry and it was not a subject on which I worked at all
15 and I did not particularly wish to be involved in discus-
16 sions of this kind of subject. Could he please find
17 somebody else.
18 He said. Look, it was kind of pressing and it
19 wasn't so easy for him to find someone who would be able
20 to speak personally and privately to McFarlane and would
21 I please just ask him.
22 So I said. Okay, but I'd rather he didn't do
23 this, and that I would do it this one time and that was
24 that. -
When I cajne back and reported to McFarlane on
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the meeting with Peres, I reported this as well, and ]ust to
close this parenthetical, when I told this to McFarlane, he
A
said he would have to check and get back to me.
About a week later he called me in and asked me
to inform the Israelis that that was okay, but just that
one shipment and nothing else.
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q Now we are referring to your conversation
with Mr. Peres. Did Mr. Peres tell you how many shells
he wanted to sell?
A Yes.
Q How many?
A I don't remember.
Q Was it -- is it your recollection it was a
substantial quantity?
A It wasn't a particularly huge quantity.
Q Do you have any recollection at all?
A No.
Q Did he tell you who in Iran he was dealing with
wanted to sell it to, anything like that?
A The answer has been no.
Q Did he indicate to you whether Israel had made
other arms sales to Iran?
A. No.
Q And now jumping ahead to your conversation with
JIMCI tSSMSL
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21
1 McFarlane about this issue about the arms sales, did
2 Mr. -- this is the first conversation when you first reported
3 the message. Did Mr. McFarlane tell you who he would have
4 to check with?
5 A No.
6 Q The reporter can't take it if you don't say
7 yes or no. He can't look at you either.
8 A I don't blame him.
9 Q Then when he called you back a week or so later
10 to tell you that you should inform the Israelis that the
11 one shipment was okay, did he indicate to you who he had
12 checked with?
13 A No.
14 Q When you went to Israel in early May of 1985,
15 to your knowledge had the State Department been notified
16 of your trip?
17 A I had no knowledge about that. McFarlane had
■\Q told me before the trip that he would inform Shultz of
•jg it. So that there would be no glitch with Shultz. So
20 my impression as of the time I went was -- and I believe
21 I told Peres this -- was that Shultz knew about the trip.
22 When I subsequently discovered that Shultz had
23 not been told about the trip, I was surprised.
24 Q- I assume you are going to get to that?
25 A So I -- after the meeting with Peres, he arranged
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a meeting with Gazit. Gazit and I met and talked about how
we would proceed. We agreed that he would try to find out
what Israel knew about Iran and I would try to find out
what the United States knew about Iran and we would get
together and compare notes and see what we needed to know
and see if we could figure out some way that we could
advance that.
Then he arranged to have me talk to a couple of
land so I had conversations with several of
these people as well, and talked to some of the -- a
variety of Israelis, some of them who were knowledgeable
about Iran and some who weren't, particularly.
Then I came back to the United States and reported
on the conversation with McFarlane.
Mr. Woolsey. You said you reported on the
conversation with McFarlane. Is that what you meant?
The Witness. To McFarlane. And I believe that
that report provided the basic incentive for the tasking
of CIA to produce the special national intelligence
estimate on Iran in that period, the May-June period.
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q Did you deal with anybody at the CIA in order
to develop that report?
A No. In fact, I did not know anything about the
ilblCLIiSSlFm.
964
25
UNS^SSKIilT
23
1 report, did not know that it was in the works until it was
2 actually produced and Fortier gave me a copy to read.
3 Q At this time, did you prepare anything written?
4 A No.
5 Q Did you report to anybody other than McFarlane?
6 A I reported -- I briefly told Fortier that I
7 had had the meeting and it was quite successful.
8 Q Fortier at this time was McFarlane 's deputy?
9 A Yes.
10 Q Okay.
11 A And I may have discussed it with either Teicher
12 or Covey but I don't have any recollection of that.
13 Q Up to this time in 1985, had you had any dealings
14 with Colonel North?
15 A Well, we had chatted. I worked out of his
16 office, after all. I was administratively assigned to
17 Colonel North's office. So that was the place where I
18 went to read the intelligence reports that I was supposed
19 to read and I don't remember at what point he started to
20 sign my time chits.
21 Q Did you keep him advised of what was going
22 on, what you were doing?
23 A No. I did not.
24 Q- I should say as of this time.
A No. North does not enter the story until
965
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September as far as I can recall.
Q Okay. So now I have taken you to about the
middle of May, I think?
A Right. If I can just put a tag on your last
question, I did not inform him of my Iranian-related
activities and he did not inform me of his Central America-
related activities. The discussions that tt* had invariably
concerned the things on which we were both engaged.
So my notion was to return to Israel fairly
quickly and talk to Gazit. I was particularly keen to
hear from him what Israel knew and to compare it with the
picture that we had in Washington. However, it was about
this time, late May, early June, when I was planning to go
to Israel when Shultz got angry upon learning that I had
been there .
Q How did you learn that he had gotten angry?
A McFarlane told me. Told me that there had been
a leak and that the embassy in Tel Aviv had found out
about it and that Shultz was angry.
Q Did you ask McFarlane about his earlier repre-
sentation to you that Shultz knew all about it?
A No. It was clear that he hadn't when he told
me that Shultz was angry at not having been told. It
didn't- seem appropriate to say. You mean you didn't tell
him?
mumB
966
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WKlMi)!'
25
1 Q Okay.
2 A But he said that he was -- he would talk to
3 Shultz and that he would calm him down and that it would
4 work out and that I would eventually go back, but that for
5 the moment, there would be no trips to Israel and no
6 further conversations with Gazit.
7 Q You think these conversations with McFarlane
8 about the flap involving Shultz took place in early June?
9 A That's what I think. Late May, early June. I
10 think in the Tower Commission, the cables from Shultz are
11 in this period also, as I recall.
12 , Q My recollection is that they are around May 30
13 or so.
14 A Yes.
15 So I waited and I had originally remembered a
15 June trip to Israel. However -- and I must tell you that
17 I still think that I remember having been to Israel an
■^g additional time. However, there are no Israel stamps on
19 "ly passport for June. There are no NSC travel records, and
2Q I am compelled to believe that my memory has added a trip
21 there where there was none.
22 However, I note for you in the Tower Commission
23 Report, there is someone else -- Shultz talks about trips
and there is someone else who talks about, talks as if there
is another trip in their someplace. Anyway —
liNCLASSm_
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Q Do you recall anything significant happening on
this trip?
A No. All I remember is conversations with Gazit
which could have taken place in July.
Anyway, the next documented trip is July. This
comes as a result of a meeting with Schwimmer in the middle
of the month. In the first half of July, I got a call
from David Kimche, the director general of the Israeli
Foreign Ministry. Given the structure of their Foreign
Service, he is in essence the Deputy Foreign Minister of
Israel .
Mr. Woolsey. Is or was?
The Witness. Was. He'^aiteir a couple of months
ago .
I had known him for some years. I had gotten
to know him, I guess, just before Reagan's election, or
immediately thereafter, and he was the person to whom I
reported in Israel when I traveled to Israel on behalf
of Haig because my practice when dealing with the Socialist
Parties in other countries was to talk to them and report
generally on my conversations to a senior person at the
Foreign Ministry in that country so the government wouldn't
think the United States was somehow going behind its back
in supporting or favoring their opponents in one manner or
another .
UNClASSra.
968
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WHWIEIEeT
27
Kimche was the person to whom I typically reported
on these meetings at the Foreign Ministry in Israel.
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q Did you develop a personal relationship with
Mr. Kimche?
A Yes. We are friends. Our family -- our wives
are friends, our children are friends. And we have seen
each other socially on a variety of occasions. He speaks
on occasion to international meetings of organizations which
I sometimes address as well. So we have run into each
covw ^Tj-^"/ o n S
other at international conferences and oornriirtaLioi'ij and
'V
what have you.
Q If you could tell us about that conversation
you had with him in early July?
A He called from Israel and said that a friend
of his ncimeo Al Schwimmer was coming to Washington and he
would appreciate it if I could listen to what Al Schwimmer
had to say. And a few days later, a person named Al
Schwimmer did indeed call.
Q I take it you did not know Al Schwimmer prior
to this time?
A I did not, no. He invited me to lunch.
Q I am sorry. Did Mr. Kimche tell you who Al
Schwimmer was? Why he would be calling?
No.
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Q Just that he would be getting in touch with you
and you should respond?
A Yes.
Q Okay.
A So Schwimmer came to Washington. This is the
first half of July. And we had lunch together and
Schwimmer told me that he was a close friend of Shimon
Peres, that he had been the president of Israel Aircraft
Industries, now retired, but that he still was active in
some matters on behalf of the Prime Minister and that in
that connection, he had been introduced a short time before
by Adnan Khashoggi to a very interesting Iranian by the
naune of Ghorbanifar, and that Ghorbanifar had a lot of
very interesting things to say both about Iran and about
the intentions of leading figures in the Government of
Iran, and that he thought under the circumstances it was
worthwhile for me to come as quickly as could possibly be
managed to meet with Ghorbanifar and that this could be
done either in Europe or in Israel.
Q Had you met -- just so the record is clear, I
take it as of this time you had never met Mr. Ghorbanifar?
A Had never met him. That was the first I heard
of him by ncime .
Q Mr. Khashoggi, had you met him before?
A I had run into Mr. Khashoggi before. I believe
run into Mr. Khashoggi bete
UblCLIlSSlffflL
1
970
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r^u^M
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UNGU^tfeT
29
we had been introduced but I had not met him per se . I
had no relationship with him.
Q When you say it was the first time you had heard
of Mr. Ghorbanifar by name, had you heard of him in some
other context, not by name?
A It turns out that I had, although I did not know
it then. In fact, I did not know it until long after all
these events -- I had ceased to be involved in these
events .
Ted Shackley had approached me a couple of months
before this conversation with Schwimmer. Shackley and I
typically tended to meet for lunch once every two to three
months or thereabouts, and at one of these luncheon
meetings, he told me about a meeting that he had had with
an Iranian in Europe at the end of 1984 and said that this
Iranian he found to be very interesting and very well
connected in Iran and had in essence offered his services
to arrange the ransome of Buckley and possibly other
American hostages, and Shackley told me that he had
reported this to General Walters at the State Department
and that there had been no response of any sort and that
he would like to try one more time simply to indicate --
call the attention of the American Government to this
conversation in case anyone was interested, and he gave
me -- subsequent to this conversation, he came over to my
MCL&SSiEIL
971
WMlt^tiilSIr
30
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2
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7
8
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12
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16
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24
25
house and gave me a memorandum dealing with the subject,
which I passed on to Colonel North without reading. And --
Q Let me stop you. I lost a little track of the
t line .
The meeting that you had with -- the luncheon
meeting that you had with Shackley where he is relating
the conversation, was that before or after you went to
Israel in April, if you recall?
Mr. Woolsey. You mean in May?
Mr. Eggleston. In May.
The Witness. I think the way it worked, the
luncheon was a month or so before my trip to Israel. I
think he probably gave me the memorandum either just before
I went or just after I returned in May. But it is all in
this sort of spring period.
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q Okay .
A In any case, the memorandum which I read for
the first time when the Tower Commission was kind enough
to show me a copy of it, had, in fact, Ghorbanif ar " s name in
It and had I realized that at the time, I undoubtedly would
have talked at some length to Shackley about Ghorbanifar
when I got to know Ghorbanifar; but I didn't, and I didn't.
Didn't, read it, didn't realize it. And never discussed it
with Shackley. So that's the answer to your question.
limilSSlElEL
972
4NMSi^
31
1 It turns out I had heard something about
2 Ghorbanifar, but wasn't aware it was Ghorbanifar about whom
3 I had heard.
4 Q Right.
5 A So Schwimmer told me all these things about
6 Ghorbanifar. He gave to me what I believe is called the
7 Khashoggi document, that is the -- as I read it, about a
8 40-page report in three or more sections, of which one
9 section dealt with Iran. The section on Iran, Schwimmer
10 told me had been written by Ghorbanifar and that he and
11 other Israelis found that section particularly interesting.
12 So I reported on this luncheon meeting to
13 McFarlane and gave him that middle section, the section
14 that Ghorbanifar had written about Iran after reading it
15 several times quite carefully.
16 Q Let me make sure I am clear. Did Mr. Schwimmer
17 have an official position in the Israeli Government at this
18 time?
19 A No, he didn't. He had -- well, maybe I shouldn't
20 be so quick to say no. He had some kind of advisory
21 position to Peres. That is, he had a title of some sort
22 but he certainly did not have a line position in the
23 Israeli Government, a formal position.
24 0" Okay.
25 A So I gave this document to McFarlane and asked
IMLASSIEIFB-
I \i
I
973
tmssi^eT
32
1 him if he wanted me to meet with Ghorbanifar and pointed
2 out to him that we were going to be going to Israel in any
3 case within a few weeks and spending three-and-a-half
4 weeks there on vacation and that if he wished, I could meet
5 with Ghorbanifar in Israel during this period, and he
6 approved it and told me to meet with Ghorbanifar while I
7 was there, so this was arranged. I informed -- I don't
8 remember whether it was Kimche or Schwimmer that I called
9 to tell this to.
10 Now, Schwimmer had mentioned that Ghorbanifar
11 was interested in discussing the subject of hostages and
12 had indicated that he believed the Government or Iran could
13 be helpful in obtaining the release of American hostages
b
14 from Leaanon. I reported this also to McFarlane.
15 When I got to Israel, I met first with Gazit --
16 Q Let me stop you at this point.
17 When you got approval from Mr. McFarlane to
18 meet with Mr. Ghorbanifar when you were on your own
19 vacation in Israel, was there any discussion about the
20 nature of the conversation that you were supposed to be
21 having with Mr. Ghorbanifar, as there had been on the
22 Peres meeting? Did you discuss with him the purpose, the
23 kinds of messages you should send, anything along those
24 lines ?-
25 A No. My instructions were simply to attend this
iibici Lmm.
974
3
4
WM/SENnajr
33
1 meeting and to report back on it, to learn whatever I
2 could.
Q Okay.
A In general, the one general estimate that can be
5 made about my participation in that meeting and in all
6 subsequent meetings was that at no time was I ever
7 authorized to negotiate on behalf of the Government of the
8 United States or to make decisions on behalf of the
9 Government of the United States. My role was always that
10 of someone who was supposed to attend meetings, listen,
11 ask questions, find out as much as I could, and then report
12 back.
13 I was not on that occasion or any other occasion
14 part of a decision-making loop or process. My conversations
15 about the whole subject were almost exclusively with
16 McFarlane and occasionally with North and other persons,
17 but they were always in the manner of one-on-one
18 conversations.
19 I never attended general meetings. I was never
20 at a National Security Council meeting on this subject,
21 never at a cabinet meeting on this subject. So that mine
22 was a talkative, fly-on-the-wall role, if you like. Watch,
23 listen, ask, but could never do. Never authorized to do
24 anything nor did I ever do anything. This was clear to
25 the other people, too.
U^IL^WJL
975
ttNeUtSStHffi
34
1
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6
7
8
9
. IaA- 11
\^.
15
16
17
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20
21
22
23
24
25
I expect that it will be discovered at a certain
point that the Israelis had a very clear definition of my
role from McFarlane as well as from me. I expect this
will also be borne out in time when they finally respond
to all these questions.
Q Did you report on the luncheon with Schwimmer
to anyone other than McFarlane?
A No, I don't think so. There is a thing in the
Tower Commission which says that I gave a short note on
it to Wilma Ha^tall, who was McFarlane 's secretary, and
that she may have given it to Admiral Poindexter, so it
may have gone originally from Wilma to Admiral Poindexter
to McFarlane, but the note in any case, if it was a note,
which I don't remember but could very well have taken
place, the note would have been addressed to McFarlane and
she would have passed it to Poindexter.
In any case, McFarlane said, Go ahead and talk
to this guy and let's see what happens. I got to Israel
around about the 16th or 17th or 18th of July, and met
fairly quickly with Kimche and discovered at that point
that Gazit's basic working group was Gazit, Kimche,
Schwimmer and a chap ncimed Jacob Nimrodi, who had been for
many years the Israeli military attache in Teheran and
who sppke Farsi, which was handy because as things
developed, we had the need for someone who spoke Farsi,
iiiyci m\\m
976
0
(^
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ItNCLitSSIfl^
35
and Nimrodi served as the Farsi speaker and was able to
check on the way Ghorbanifar was translating conversations,
conversations he would hold on the telephone in Farsi and
so forth.
Q Had you met Nimrodi before?
A Never met him before.
Q Did he have a position inside the government?
A No.
Q Did you know what his position was at the time?
A No . I found out that he was an arms dealer and
that he was politically and personally a close friend of
General Sharon's.
Q When did you find thatput? Approximately? Was
it after this whole thing was over?
A No. No. It was during that vacation trip.
Q Okay. Thank you.
A And the —
Q There is a public report in the Tower Commission
or somewhere there was a meeting, I think, in Washington
in early July of 1985 between Kimche and McFarlane.
A I have read that. I was not aware of it.
Q You were not aware of it?
A No.
Q- Did McFarlane ever tell you such a meeting took
place?
iMASsra
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A No.
Q And you obviously did not attend that meeting?
A No.
Q Please continue.
A If you want to guess, I will be glad to give you
a guess as to what I think that meeting was about.
Q An informed guess would be fine. A raw specula-
tion, I am not too interested in. I would be interested
in what your view is.
A I would say it is sort of a 65 percent informed
and 35 percent raw. I don't want to overstate it.
Q All right. .
A It is a guess but it is probably pretty close
to right.
I think Kimche came to talk to McFarlane to
say basically we have met this fellow Ghorbanifar, he is
an interesting fellow, we are thinking of pursuing this.
A, what do you think about this? B, is Ledeen the channel
through which we should go?
They could have gone any way they wanted. There
was no obvious reason for them to go through me . My
guess is that McFarlane in essence said. Let's see how
it goes, and, yes, that is as good as any.
Again, I don't know that, but that's my guess,
because one of the questions that occurred to me was, why
J1C1R<^EIL
978
IXKlf^lSIB^
37
1 were they doing this through me when they had so many other
2 ways that they could do it and when I saw this meeting had
3 taken place, my guess was that they had asked him.
4 Q When did you first learn that that meeting had
5 taken place? Not until you read the Tower Commission
6 Report?
7 A No. It was in the Senate Select Committee
8 Report. I think that's the first time.
9 Q Okay.
10 A Or maybe it was in McFarlane's public testimony.
11 I didn't know about it until then.
12 Q It was well after the event?
13 A Oh, yes.
14 So I met with Ghorbanifar. We had a meeting
15 towards the end of July, the 29th, I think it was, in
16 Tel Aviv. And it went all day. We met in the morning
17 and then we had lunch and then we met some more in the
18 afternoon. We talked well into the evening.
19 Mr. Woolsey. Excuse me. Who was present?
20 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
21 Q I was about to ask the same thing.
22 Who else was present?
23 A It is the basic group, as it would remain
24 throughout. That is to say, Kimche, Nimrodi, Schwimmer,
25 me, and Ghorbanifar.
nfvillLrhlCfllULDII
^i
979
5
6
MimHp
38
' Q What language did you speak?
2 A English.
^ Q How is his English?
^ A Good, not perfect, but good.
Q But good?
A Good .
7 The basic message that Mr. Ghorbanifar brought
8 was that there were powerful persons -- well, two stages.
9 First, that the internal situation in Iran was considerably
10 worse, more stressful, and more potentially explosive than
11 we had generally imagined. He told us stories of armed
12 conflict in the streets of Iran, of movements of large
13 numbers of people, for example, at night because Iran had
14 no night radar and the Iraqis could bomb cities at night,
15 so the people were moving out to the countryside at night
16 to avoid being bombed.
17 He described to us a model of internal political
18 conflict which over time I think basically checked out.
19 And he said that under these circumstances, there were
20 several of the most powerful figures in the government who
21 were interested in achieving better relations with the
22 West and that they recognized that Iran's policies up
23 tilJ then, primarily the policy of using terror as an
24 integral part of Iranian foreign policy and using terror
25 to export the ^^ai^revolution was alienating them with the
UNTillS^lElFJL
980
23
24
25
BttOt/^fflEEP'
39
1 Western world and t'hey were willing to work to moderate
2 Iranian policies in order to achieve better relationships
3 with the West, above all better relationships with the
4 United States.
5 That, therefore, it was possible, working with
6 these people, to achieve a change in the nature of the
7 Iranian regime and in the policies that it would carry
8 out and that in order to show their good will, their desire
9 to make these changes come about, and their capacity to
10 influence the course of events in Iran, they would under-
11 take to have a series of gestures occur which included a
12 change in the public rhetoric towards the United States,
13 an end to terrorist attacks against American targets, and
14 an effort to convince the hostage holders in South Lebanon
15 to release one or more American hostages; and that in
16 return, if the United States was, in fact, interested in
17 working toward a better relationship with such in Iran,
•J3 that they would expect a similar gesture from the United
19 States which would demonstrate the legitimacy of the
20 channel and the desire and capacity of the President to
21 move towards a better relationship with Iran and that the
22 only thing that would meet all those requirements would
be if the President of the United States enabled Iran to
obtain. the weapons that it so desperately needed to defend
itself against the Iraqi invader, weapons which it had
ilMCLIli«IL
981
VNtLimffl^
40
1 been prevented from obtaining in the past because of the
2 American arms embargo.
3 This is the basic test that Ghorbanifar proposed
4 and tests that emerged in the course of this long conversa-
5 tion, and we talked to him in some detail about the real
6 desire on the part of the leading Iranians to have the
7 policies of Iran moderated and their ability to do so, and
8 what could one hope to achieve over time and at great
9 length about the internal situation in Iran and about the
10 role that Iran had played, was playing and was planning to
11 play in international terrorism.
12 When our conversation was over the next day or
13 the day afterwards, the four of us -- that is the three
14 Israelis and me, without Ghorbanifar — met to discuss
15 what we ought to do about all of this.
■jg Q Before you get into that, let me just ask you
■J7 some questions I had arising out of the conversations.
•^g First, between the time that you had obtained
■)9 authorization to speak to Mr. Ghorbanifar on your trip and
20 the time you actually met with him, did you do anything
21 to check out who Mr. Ghorbanifar was?
22 A I was not in a position to do that.
23 Q Do you know whether Mr. McFarlane did anything
24 or anyone at the NSC to check out his bona fides or
25 anything along those lines?
XiAS^Eia
982
24
25
'VHSUtSStRiO'
41
1 A I don ' t k'now .
2 Q Did Mr. Ghorbanifar during the course of that
3 meeting tell you who he represented in Iran?
4 A Ye s .
5 Q Did he give you a specific name?
6 A He gave us several specific names.
7 Q Were those names people that you recognized?
8 A Yes.
9 Q They are people who you knew to be major
10 leaders in Iran?
11 A Yes.
12 Q How would you characterize their political
13 position in Iran? There has been excessive -- extensive --
14 although excessive may be more accurate -- discussion about
15 moderates, radicals, various other characteristics.
16 A Well, if I could say something about the question
17 of moderates, Iranian moderates. I do not believe in the
18 existence of Iranian moderates in the sense that one would
19 normally use the English word "moderate." I do, however,
20 believe -- and I took this to be Mr. Ghorbanifar ' s meaning -
21 that there are Iranian leaders who are willing and indeed
22 eager to moderate the behavior of Iran in the world and
23 to influence Iranian policy in a direction which we would
consider more moderate than the one that they are pursuing
now, and I do believe also that with^;Lthe Iranian --
IINfJ
983
MffiBISStffiV^
42
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1^ 21
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<
current Iranian regime, there are more and less radical
people, so there are people who are relatively moderate
compared to a very high standard of radicalism, which is
Khomeini himself and some of his people.
So with that, Ghorbanifar also stressed -- and
I think that it is something that has to be checked, but
it is certainly not to be rejected on the face of it --
that there are some people in Iran who appear to be
extremely radical and even fanatic but who, in fact, are
wishing for a different kind of government and different
kinds of policies which they are secretly prepared to
advance .
So that it is quite conceivable to me that
there are people in Iran who are publicly one thing and
privately something quite different. This was one of the
things which I thought we should be investigating and one
of the reasons why I urged one course of action rather
than the one that was ultimately adopted by the United
States Government.
But to answer your question, after all, I would
^haetarite^he public positions of the peopTe with whom
Mr. Ghorbanifar said he was in contact as mixed. Some of
them were among the people who had the most radical
reputartions ; some of them were people who had reputations
as being somewhat blander or somewhat less ferocious.
niJnll^nAMJMif^jBJiTi
984
UNttASSIfEST
43
1 Q Were you' able to reach a conclusion about whether
2 or not Mr. Ghorbanifar actually had contacts with these
3 individuals?
4 A We were able to establish to our satisfaction
5 that he did have contact because he was able to pick up
6 the phone in Tel Aviv and dial Teheran and talk to these
7 people and talk to them on a first-name basis, where
8 clearly they knew who he was, what he was, what he was
9 doing, and all that.
10 This was one of several occasions on which he
11 would make such calls with Nimrodi on the extension,
12 listening.
13 C Was it -- was Mr. Ghorbanifar in the posture
14 or did he inform you that he had been sent by the Iranians
■)5 or was he more in the posture of someone who was trying to
1g bring two sides together?
■^j A It was rather between those two positions and
ig the impression was of a person who was acting with the
■jg knowledge of people in Teheran who either -- depending upon
20 what sort of emphasis you want to give it -- either approved
21 of what he was doing or were willing to let him try, but
22 that in any case, they were interested in obtaining the
23 sajne results as he was attempting to obtain, namely an
24 improvement in the relationship between the two countries
leading to a moderation of the behavior of Iran. That was
25
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44
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the bottom line. -^
Q Was there any discussion in these conversations
about whether or not Iran had control of the hostages?
A Yes, there was.
Q What did he tell you about it?
A He told us that he believed Iran had considerable
control for the hostages and that they could, in fact,
effect the release of the hostages.
Q You indicated that as part of this discussion
he referred to the release of one or more hostages.
A Yes .
Q I take it it was not — those were carefully
chosen words by you, was not necessarily that they would
release all the hostages?
A No. The main hostage discussed, the hostage
on which he put the most emphasis from the beginning, was
Buckley. He knew who Buckely was. He told us that
Buckley was being tortured and he said that he thought
that they could get Buckley out, but he wasn't sure, but
he thought that they could get Buckley and several of the
others. This was the basic hope.
Q And finally, out of that last question, out
of that meeting, and I will let you move on, was there
any discussion about the quantity or the amount of arms
that they were seeking as a return gesture?
ilNCiflimiL
986
ONKASStKr
45
1 A Yes, there was, but I cannot remember anymore
2 whether it was 100 or 400 or 500, but it was TOW missiles.
3 Q It was somewhere in that vicinity?
4 A Yes.
5 Q So you were telling us that shortly after, the
6 next day after this meeting, you had a conversation among
7 the four of you without Ghorbanifar?
8 A Yes. We decided there was something that should
9 be reported quickly to McFarlane. And I agreed with that,
10 although the idea of flying back to Washington, interrupting
11 my vacation, was not attractive, especially because Kimche
12 had to go anyhow.
13 He offered to report on these conversations
14 to McFarlane. That was fine with me. I wrote a short
15 note that Kimche brought. And Kimche went to report on
16 this to McFarlane and carried with him a handwritten
17 version of some notes that he and I had taken and of which
18 we had produced a kind of joint copy of the conversations
19 with Ghorbanifar, what he had spoken about, what -- who
20 the people were inside Iran whom he thought would be
21 interested in working in this direction, what was the
22 basic lines of — what were the basic lines of conflict
23 inside Iran, et cetera.
24 Q' Do you know whether the State Department was
25 aware you were meeting with these individuals?
ilNHI h^M
987
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Vyi6
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tKKl/^tRBlE'
46
A I don't know.
Q Do you know why Kimche was going to Washington?
A I don't remember, but for Kimche to go to
Washington was not at all extraordinary.
Q I assumed that would be correct.
(Discussion off the record.)
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q Do you know when it was that Kimche spoke to
McFarlane back in Washington?
A The very beginning of August.
Q You were still in Israel at that time?
A Yes, celebrating my birthday, which was August
1st, which was another reason I felt was a bad time for
me to go. My parents had come over to Israel. We were
going around -to' Jerusalem together.
He went and briefed McFarlane about this and
came back and told us that McFarlane had said that for a
test of the sort that Ghorbanifar was proposing, he would
have to ask the President what the President wanted to do,
and that when he had an answer from the President, he
would report back.
Q Let me just make sure I have the chronology
in my head. Have there been any discussions of the release
of hostages prior to this meeting in Tel Aviv?
A There may have been a possibility of a discussion
IINHI ASSlflEL
1 )
988
iRSLimeD^
47
1
2
3
4
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6
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14
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17
18
19
20
21
of the release of hostages when Schwimmer and I had lunch
m Washington. In which case, I would have reported that
to McFarlane.
Q That would have been early July?
A Yes.
Q But no mention of arms?
A I just don't remember.
Q Okay.
A I tend to think not. But there may have been.
In any case, this so far as I can remember is the first
detailed discussion at which a test of the sort that
Ghorbanifar proposed to us was discussed, and again I want
to stress, as I have stressed on every occasion, that this
was not proposed as a swap of arms for hostages nor was it
in that context. The context of the discussion was the
relationship between the United States and Iran, and it
was necessary -- this was a stage through which this
dialogue must pass in order to establish who was who and
what was what. Because all the questions that one had
on each side, we were -- I was extraordinarily suspicious
of Mr. Ghorbanifar.
Mr. Ghorbanifar seemed to me at the time to
be altogether too good to be true. He was exactly the
thing ^hat we were all looking for and tiva# he magically
appears with all of the things that if we could prepare
UNCLASSML
989
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
UNGtii^eT
48
1 a wish list, there he was and he had it all. I do not
2 believe that things like that normally happen in a life-
3 time.
4 So we wanted to know about Iran and he knew more about
5 Iran than anybody knew. And we were interested in seeing
6 what was the chance in the future of change, and he caroe
7 proposing precisely that. So I was extremely skeptical
8 and I told McFarlane when I came back in August.
9 Q Do you remember when you came back, approximately?
10 A The middle of August. I told him that
Ghorbanifar could be anything and could even be a KGB
agent since if I were the KGB, I would certainly want to
know about American intentions with regard to Iran and
I might be willing to invent a Ghorbanifar and send him
to us to see how we would respond to this. That's the
sort of thing they had done.
I told him I thought we had to be extremely
careful with this gentleman. He, McFarlane, told me a
couple of days later that the President had approved this
test and he asked me to meet with Kimche as quickly as
possible to assure Kimche that the President had in fact
made this decision and to arrange a way that it was -- we
could communicate with the Israelis securely without going
throui^ the normal communications systems either in the
Israeli embassy or the Amer:Uaii embassv in Tel Aviv.
Rbassv in
990
9
10
IXW^SSlBilT
49
' McFarlane had written out a one-time code to be
2 used in connection with the hostages, were they were going
"^ to be released, and where, if at all, it would be required
^ for the United States to pick them up.
5 There were various contingencies that might come
up in connection with the release of one or more hostages.
7 They might be on a beach, in the city, on a hilltop some-
8 place.
I was to explain to Kimche that there were
places that were better than other places for us to extract
11 hostages in Lebanon and that in his conversations with
12 Ghorbanifar, I should stress if the Iranians had an option
13 of having these people emerge at certain locations, these
14 are the ones we preferred; if we could get advance notice,
15 that was all to the good, et cetera.
16 So I flew to London on the 20th of August.
17 Q Let me stop you for a moment.
18 As best you recall your meeting with McFarlane,
19 after you returned, it was sometime in mid August?
20 A Yes .
21 Q Can you -- you have no way to place it any
22 better than that?
23 A If I had to bet, it is between the 10th and
24 15th of August.
25 Q McFarlane indicated to you he had spoken with
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the President?
A Yes.
Q Did he tell you anything else about his meeting
with the President?
A No. He ]ust said the President had approved it.
Q Did he tell you whether or not any other senior
officials were involved in the decision?
A No.
Q So you didn't know the positions of Shultz,
Weinberger, Regan, or anyone else?
A No.
Q And did -- when he indicated to you that the
President approved the test, did you know at that time
what amounts both of hostages and weapons people were
talking about?
A I knew the amount of weapons . So far as I can
remember, we were talking about 100 TOWs .
Q Do you recall -- and again I understand that
It was not your position that this was a swap, but can
you recall how many hostages we anticipated getting out as
a result of it?
A I don't think that was explicit. That is, they
would do what they could. This was a gesture on their
part. ' Thej always denied being in control of the hostages,
although they -- Ghorbanifar said that he thought they
UMASSlfJfJL
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1 could get them out, but he said the Government of Iran
2 would always deny having either organized the taking of
3 these hostages or being directly involved with the hostage
4 takers.
5 Q Let me ask you this: Was it your understanding
6 if no hostages would be released, we would send the TOWs
7 anyway?
8 A Well, we were going to send the TOWs and then
9 we were going to see who came out, if anyone. The -- when
10 we met in Paris in early September, there was some talk
11 about perhaps there would be some magical way in which one
12 could achieve a form of simultaneity, of arrival of weapons
13 and departure of weapons. Since there was not very good
14 trust on the two sides.
15 I did not know, by the way, at this time --
16 Mr. Woolsey. At which time?
17 The Witness. At this time, either in August
18 or September, of the role played by Khashoggi in all of
19 this.
20 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
21 Q Your understanding is his role was one who had
22 written this memorandum?
23 A He introduced Ghorbanifar to the Israelis,
24 period.
25 But I didn't know about the bridge financing.
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I didn't discover that until sometime later.
Q Okay. You were telling me about a meeting on
the 20th.
A So I met Kimche at Heathrow Airport in London.
I rented a room at one of the little hotels there around
the airport. He flew from Tel Aviv, I flew from Washing-
ton. We met there for several hours. I gave him the
codes.
We talked about how this might work, and I then
'ew to Los Angeles where I was scheduled to give a speech
and when I was done with the speech, I went up to Santa
Barbara and briefed Bud. He was then in the summer White
House, about the conversations and gave him -- now Kimche
had prepared a detailed set of notes now properly typed
and all of that from the meetings in July. I gave those
to Bud and off I went and we waited to see what would
happen.
Q That would have now been around what time?
A Now the 22nd or so of August, 22nd or 2 3rd.
Now, so far as I can remember -- I am going
to leave in about five minutes.
Q I understood you would be leaving in five or
ten.
A So if you have questions, now might be a good
tune .
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1 Q No. No.
2 A Okay. I don't remember exactly the sequence,
3 but a reasonable sequence might well be that the first --
4 a number of TOWs goes at the end of August or the very
5 beginning of September. And nothing happens.
6 Q As you are describing this to me, are you
7 describing the knowledge that you had at the time?
8 A Yes. I think I knew when the -- when these
9 first things went.
10 Q Okay.
11 A Nothing happens. I was then invited to come
12 to Paris to meet with everybody to see what was going
13 to -- what was going on. So I went to Paris on the 4th
14 of September.
15 Q Did you know at that time how many TOWs had
16 been sent?
17 A I think I did. I think it was 100. As best as
18 I can remember.
19 Q Right.
20 A It was 100.
21 Q So the date of this meeting now is the 4th of
22 September?
23 A Fourth of September.
24 Q Did McFarlane tell you to go?
25 A McFarlane approved the meeting and the NSC paid
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for the trip. And you will find that in the NSC docujnenta-
tion.
Q Right.
A The discussions in Paris revolved around two
questions.
Q Who was present at the discussions, first? The
same five?
A The usual suspects.
Q The group of five now?
A Yes. Two subjects of conversation. One was
hostages and weapons, and Ghorbanifar is saying that with
just a few more TOWs , this whole unpleasant problem will
be solved; and I am not sure whether — I think my
recollection of this is prompted by something I read in
the Tower Commission Report, but in any event, it sounds
right to me. That is that the missiles -- the 100 TOWs --
were immediately coaeod^by the Revolutionary Guards and
therefore were unusable as a symbolic gesture by the people
that Ghorbanifar had in mind and on whose behalf he was
speaking and that this thing had been sabotaged by the
Revolutionary Guards and that it was necessary, unfor-
tunately, to send in more TOWs.
And there was then an extended discussion of
the future of the relationship between the United States
and Iran. By and large, when Ghorbanifar started to talk
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1 about hostages, Schwimmer and Nimrodi talked to him and
2 Kimche and I started to go off and talk about the broader
3 question of Iran and the United States.
4 Ghorbanifar also said that in the very near
5 future, we would see public statements by the -- by leading
5 officials in Iran that would show that a change was in the
1 process of taking place; and, indeed, shortly thereafter,
g on the anniversary of the fall of the shah, September 8,
g 9, 10, 11, in that period, both the Presidents and the
1Q Prime Minister, I believe, on occasions which in the past
l^j it would have been traditional to denounce the great Satan
12 and otherwise attack the United States, for the first time
13 since the fall of the shah, they did not do that. There
1^ were attacks against the United States in those speeches,
15 and, indeed, there was an attack against the Soviet Union,
1g which was interesting and encouraging.
*-t In any event, the Israelis went ahead and —
with the balance of these TOWs .
Q Do you know how the number of what turned out
to be 408 was arrived at?
A No. That was always a mystery to me, where the
eight caune from.
Q Putting aside the eight, which could well have
been a. ■ packing error, do you recall any discussion about
how the number 400 was arrived at?
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A Well, I am not certain whether the 500 figure
was not there at the beginning and the 100 was supposed to
happen and then the hostages would come out and the
remainder of the 400 would go in.
I tend to think that that was the arrangement,
because I don't remember any discussion at that point of
a whole new problem which I am quite sure I would remem-
ber. That is, it did not happen that we made our full
gesture and they did nothing and we decided, well, okay,
they didn't likepur first gesture; we will give you another
gesture. That did not occur. It was supposed to be
staggered.
Part of the sum total was to go in; then we
would hope something was going to happen, and the balance
would go in. That was the way it was designed. So the
400 were part of this gesture from the beginning. It
was not a whole new situation.
Q I take it then j»hat your recollection of
what happened was v«av that the reason there was no one
released between the two shipments is that the first
shipment ended up in the wrong hands?
A That's what was said. And it may even be
true. I don't know. I don't think I was ever able
to check that. It wasn't a surprise, mind you.
And another point I would like to make here in
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passing, because it is interesting in terms of understanding
the way this happened, when I was in Israel in the July-
August period.
But there is an image that gets generated
sometimes of a monolithic government of Israel which has
a master plan and all, which it is actively advancing.
What I found in Israel was an Israeli Government that was
as internally divided as our own, and it was divided for
many of the same reasons that our own government is
divided.
There were turf conflicts as well as substan-
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Q I don't want to keep you. It appears to be
11:12 or so. I have a few more questions. I guess we will
reconvene here at 2:15. The room will be reswept in the
interim.
Mr. Woolsey. Is that the soonest you can get
here?
Mr. Van Cleve. The earlier, the better as far
as I am concerned.
(Discussion off the record.)
(Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the deposition
recessed, to reconvene at 2:00 p.m., this same day.)
1000
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59
INKEL 1 Mr. Eggleston. Let me remind you you are still
CAS-1 2 under oath as a result of having been sworn in this morning.
2:15 p.m. 3 The Witness. Thank you. I happen to hold to the
^ Siiultz theory of these things anyway.
5 Mr. Woolsey. What is that?
6 The Witness. If you are not going to tell the
7 truth, you better not testify in the first place. It doesn't
8 matter if you are sworn or not.
9 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
10 Q When we broke for lunch, we were in the process of
11 discussing the August/September transfer of TOWs. I think
12 that you had -- we were in the position where you had
13 substantially told us about a meeting that took place with
14 the usual suspects on September 4th and I had a number of
15 questions. I can't remember at the time we broke, you had
16 additional things you were telling us.
17 A Why don't you ask a question.
18 Q As of, I guess -- as of September 4, did you have
19 any knowledge -- let me do it by as of September 15 or
20 something, to take it through the rest of the transaction.
21 Did you have any knowledge of any agreement between Israel and
22 the United States whereby the United States would replenish
23 the Israeli TOWs?
24 A - I didn't think that it required any kind of special
25 agreement.
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Q Is that no, there was --
A No. I don't believe there was a special agreement.
I hadn't been asked by the Israelis whether that would
happen. I think I once discussed it with McFarlane. He
said something to the effect, look, they have never
had any trouble buying weapons from us before, why should
they have trouble buying weapons from us in the future?
Q It was not your understanding that the United
States had committed specifically to replenishing whatever
TOWs had been sent from Israel to Iran?
A I don't have any knowledge of any specific
understanding.
Q Did you —
A However — excuse me. However, I do have the
clear impression that the Israelis asked the question and
that they were told in essence what I said to you before,
which is, look, you have always — you have never had any
trouble buying weapons from the United States before, and
we don't anticipate you will have any trouble in the future.
Q Okay. Did you have any knowledge of how the TOWs
were actually transported from Israel to Iran?
A Yes.
Q How was that accomplished?
A - It was in a chartered 707 and I used to actually
know the route, but anyway, it flew a route which in the
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1 end brought it over Iran either coming out of j
^^|H^^H^H||[|[H^H|^^B There were two
3 ways of going.
* Q Do you recall the charter company?
5 A No. I never knew that.
6 Q Do you know who arranged for the charter?
7 A Schwimmer.
8 Q Do you know whether there was any United States
9 involvement in the mechanical aspects of the transportation;
10 A I am virtually certain there was none.
11 Q That there was none?
12 A Yes. By United States, you mean the United
13 States Government?
14 Q I meant United States Government.
15 A I don't think there was any.
16 Q By any American citizens? Which is to say —
17 A I don't believe so. My impression was that the
18 crew was all foreign, foreigns, foreign citizens.
19 Q As of this date — and I don't think this is
20 necessary — did you know Richard Secord?
21 A Not then, and not now.
22 Q I take it there comes a time when you hear about
23 him.
24 Q - I had heard -- it was a name that I had heard
25 already then but it is a person I do not know.
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Q Is it a name you had heard then in connection with tf
operation?
A No. Not as of this time. And, in fact -- well, I
will let that go til later.
Q I have asked the questions I wanted to ask you
about the September fourth meeting.
A Okay. In the middle of September, then the
Reverend Weir emerged.
Q Right.
A And that was good news basically.
Q Were there any discussions between the -- I think
the Reverend Weir was released around the 14th of September.
The 15th? I have my chronology here somewhere.
Do you recall additional discussions between
September 4th and September 15th?
A No. I think — I don't think I had any. I would
have reported to McFarlane about the conversations on the
fourth when I got back to the United States.
Q Right.
A And North had been brought into this around this
time, early in September on the basis that if it is going
to be necessary to extract one or more hostages, that would
be North's assignment.
So' I had been asked to inform him if I had any informatior
that hostages were.gijfty-JlflB °Ut^k if ■^bldafi'^y knowledge as to
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where that would happen and when that would happen. And we
discussed that possibility, although I did not tell him about t
background offers.
Q Was this discussion prior to the release of, I
guess, ^i)en:?
A Yes.
Q The discussion with North was prior to that time?
A Sure. I was informed of V«h/*r's release by McFarlane
in an early morning telephone call.
Q Were you back in the United States?
A Yes. I was at home. He called 5:30 in the
morning, something like that, six o'clock to tell me that
there had been a release and it was a priest and
congratulations. And then the issue there was where did we go
thereafter. From my standpoint, we had established several
of the things that we needed to establish.
That is, the test had been successful up to a point,
because we had established, I thought, that Ghorbanifa^ was,
indeed, a channel to people in Iran, that these people in Iran
were, indeed, in a position to influence the condition of
hostages to the point where they could obtain the
release of at least one. That was all by itself a
considerable advance in our understanding.
Up until then, the experts on terrorism were very
sharply divided eunong people who thought that Iran had
4
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considerable control over this situation and people who
believed Iran had no control over this situation.
And of the category of people who believed they had
no control, there were those who thought that the groups
in Lebanon were truly independent, and autonomous and would
not respond to any country's pressure, and there were those
who thought basically this was a Syrian matter and only the
Government of Syria could effect the release of hostages.
So I thought that we had, in fact, learned that the
Iranians had a considerable degree of control over this.
Now, I want to make sure that I get this information
coming to you in the most coherent structure. Early in
September, when North was brought into this,
His primary interlocutor was a guy named
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turned out. I spoke to other people, as well.
From these conversations, we were able to confirm the
nature of his contacts and the fact that the Iranians were
really working on this question.
Now, Ghorbanifa|Pr gave me a verba<rl account of some of
the things that he had done in connection with the release of
wk/ei: and actions taken by the Iranian Government in order to
get this done.
One of the things that led me over time to come to believe
that Ghorbanif^/DT was reliable and was someone that we could ar|d
should work with was that his verbal account of how the release
of Weir had been obtained!
Since you will be in a position to look at this, it -
the story that he told me was that he had gone to Tehran — anc
don't ask me for the specific dates, because I will never
be able to remember this, but the basic story was he went to
Tehran, started talking to people , ^^^^^^^^^^^^H and
the president, whatever his name is. Excuse me for blocking or
this well-known placa'^ame.
And three of them were trying to generate motion to get
one or more hostages released. This effort runs headlong
into conflict from the groups themselves in Lebanon who were
the Hi^allahs who were extremely reluctant to do/ this and
from other people inside the Iranian. SffJiernment, primarily thos
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around the revolutionary guards.
This escalates to a full-scale internal fight which can
only be resolved by Khomeini, because the elements
themselves were not in a position to resolve it. No
possible compromise could be achieved.
The degree of compromise would be, say, one hostage
rather than three or four or whatever. On the issue itself
was at least one hostage to be released, they could not work
it out themselves.
So this went up to the old man who personally said that thje
release was to be done.
Q What you are relating to me now is what GhorbanifaWr
told you?
y
A What Ghorbanifa^ told me.
Ghorbanifa^ then said the group of them went
outside Tehran, up to a place closer to the Lebanese border,
that the leaders of the groups in Lebanon were called to
Iran for discussions, that they were reluctant to do it and
they had to be convinced to do it, that they finally came and
discussions were held and they were quite heated discussions ar
they finally went back and did what they were told to do
by the Iranians, namely, produce one hostage.
Now, the political model of that checked out over time.
It was coherent with everything that he had told us
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This was the beginning of the process which over time led
me to conclude that Ghorbanifa^r was indeed a person with whom
we could and should work because in my experience at least on <
series of significant occasiions, his story checked out,
and it was a story which in almost every case was a bit of
a surprise.
It was not what I expected to hear, what we could have
expected to hear. It was unique insight. As I will show you
later on when we get to October, November, December,
capacities which one would not have expected to find.
Q Let me
A
Q
Yes.
I guess you had access either to!
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A Yes.
Q I want to ask you just a couple of questions about
North's initial involvement when he first became involved.
You indicated he had put together-
What do you mean by that? What is it that he did? Who did he
task?
A I don't know how he did it. I was surprised that he
had done it. Probably would not have occurred to me to have
done it, but in any case, he had put
Q Did — excuse me. My question just drifted out of
my head.
A That is all right. When I remember the
Iranian name, I will spit it out. Khameini.
Q Was he involved at this time with other intelligence
officers?
Was he involved in putting this together to your
knowledge with individuals from the CIA
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Q And you saw it?
A And the President and the Vice President. And I
saw them, too.
Q And I take them McFarlane saw them?
A Absolutely.
Q Who else was in North's -- was anybody else working
with North at this time?
A No.
Q Do you know why it was that someone inside the
National Security Council was assigned to be responsible
for I think you phrased it getting the hostages out or
being responsible for following up on it when the hostages
came out? Why was it Oliver North from the NSC was assigned
to that role?
A Because it was a project which would have
required the coordination of several branches of the
government and this kind of coordination is traditionally
done by the NSC. That is its task.
Q ■ I just wish I could remember what it wejs I was going
to ask you. I can't.
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A Well, I am going to be here for a while.
Q It will disappear out of my head, I am sure.
A Is that it for the moment?
Q Yes. That is it.
A So we had then the next meeting of which I have
a record or a clear recollection is — takes place in
Washington, the first week in October, according to the
Tower Commission report, this is the eighth of October.
I will point out to you that in my earlier testimony,
I have placed this meeting in November.
However, it is the one that is listed on North's
calendar as the eighth of October and it actually makes
more sense to me in many ways if that date is taken as correct.
So I am going to accept that date
Ghorbanifac^ Schwimmer and Nimrodi came to Washington y^
for this meeting. This was because on the fairness
principle that I had had to travel to all the previous
meetings, it seems only fair that for once we can have one
where I lived.
Q I take it as of this time you were the only
American official — and I guess you were an official, to
the effect you were a NSC consultant, who had met with
Mr. Ghorbanifa^r? ^ A/
A • Yes. After living in Italy all those years, the
verbal is much less important ih_an__the___gestures
ess important than the aestu
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They came to Washington, and we had a --
Q Let me just, since we deviated, I lost my train.
We are talking October 8, Schwimmer, Nimrodi and Ghorbanifajar?
Yes. No Kimche at this point.
No Kimche. Okay. Was there a reason there was
A
Q
Kimche?
A I think he wasn't available.
He had other responsibilities.
Q Had you called for the meeting? I mean, had
Mr. McFarlane indicated to you a meeting was necessary or
how did the meeting develop, I guess is the way I want to
ask the question.
A It was clear we had to meet after Weir came out
because we had to evaluate where things stood and what, if
anything, we were to do in the future.
Q Okay.
A We met in the Executive Office Building -- Old
Executive Office Building, and although the Tower Commission
has drawn the conclusion that North was present at this
meeting because he had it on his calendar, I am quite
clear in my memory that he was not present at the meeting.
My recollection is that in connection with this meeting, I
had introduced Schwimmer to North because Schwimmer had asked
to meet North and North had said he was happy to meet Schwimmei
So I introduced them.
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My recollection is this would have been either
the day before or the day of this October 8th meeting. It say;
on North's calendar according to the Tower Commission that
this happened earlier in September. I am not sure which is
correct, but in any case, by the time of this meeting North
and Schwimmer either had met or did meet.
I think that is the important fact.
North did not attend these discussions, was not
present at them. He was told that if he wanted to attend,
that was fine, but he did not. He was busy the whole day.
Q Was he told that by you?
A Yes.
Q Was there any discussion about 'whether he ought to
attend?
A No. He was so deeply involved in this thing,
and
what-not, that I thought among other things it would be a
good idea for him to meet Ghorbanif air^ so he could get a ^l a.'
sense of Ghorbanifa^ for himself, personally, because this /^{^
was one of the major things that had to be evaluated,
whether Ghorbanifayr was reliable or not.
In any case, he was invited and did not appear, and
we spent — this meeting went on all day, several hours
in the morning. We ate lunch there, and several more hours
k
in the afternoon,
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The conversation dealt with the basic two questions
Ghorbanifa^^t conveyed from his Iranians the promise of more y^
hostages for weapons. Clearly now, as it had not been in the
original context, but clearly now a matter of hostages for
weapons.
And all kinds of weapons. Weapons, some of which
I had heard, some of which I had not heard. I did not know.
I must tell you I am not particularly well informed on the
subject of weaponry. It is not my field.
But he talked about everything from Phoenix missiles
to Sidewinders to harpoons. Hawks, TOWs , everything known
to man and many things --
Q Not known to that man?
A Not known to this man, anyway.
I jotted these things down so that I could describe
it. There was also considerable discussion of future
contacts with Iranians willing to cooperate with the United
States Government in order to change the policies of that
regime and he gave us names of individuals and promised
to arrange a meeting with one of the most important of these
in the month of October. And I stressed that I thought
this was probably the most important thing that he could do
then.
I expressed at the meeting a strong personal
antipathy to any further discussion of hostages and weapons.
^i^
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The Israelis were quite eager to pursue the matter of
weapons for hostages, and, in fact, accused me at a certain
point of being indifferent to the fate of my countrymen.
And I said, look, in any case, it wasn't going to
be my decision to make. I was just expressing a personal
antipathy to this business, but that I would report what their
feelings were.
I asked Ghorbanifa^ what his feelings were. And
he said that he, in fact, agreed with me that he thought it
was a mistake to get involved in the matter of the hostages
and said that if we get involved in this, we shall all
become hostages to the hostages.
We shall not be able to do anything except this, and
this will then become the one and only subject.
I reported on this discussion —
Q Before you move off the discussion, let me just
ask you a few questions. Did Mr. Ghorbanifa^ — was it / ^^j.
V
clear from what Mr. Ghorbanifa/!l^ said that he wanted either
the United States to supply the wapons, Israel to supply the
A
weapons, or didn't care as long as he got the weapons?
A That question never came up.
Q Are you the only American official who attended
this meeting?
A " Yes.
Q Was there any discussion about a phased hostage for
(a
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arms release;
A Thre may very well have been. That is one of the
questions I have here in my notes.
Q As --
A On some of -- on at least one of those
occasions, there was certainly such a discussion, so many
weapons, so many hostages, so many weapons, so many
hostages, a kind of alternating swap.
Q Do you have a sense just so that I can put it in my
head about how much or how many or dollar value of weapons
that he was talking about at that time?
A I can't help you with that, because I did not
and do not know what these weapons are worth.
Q Right.
A I don't know what a Hawk missile costs.
Q Had you ever, just to ask a slightly different
question, by this time you are a NSC consultant who is
negotiating directly with people who are in contact with
Iranians or involved with one of the most sensitive aureas that
the Government was involved in around that time. Had you ever
done something like this before?
A Well, I won't agree with your characterization. I;
would not describe what I did as negotiating. I did not
negotiate .
Q I will take out negotiating. You were involved in
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discussions about?
A Yes. Had I had sensitive discussions with foreign
leaders before?
-^j
Yes, I had. I +«ve- done that for the Secretary of '
State, and I had done it even several months earlier for the
National Security Advisor.
Q In a different context?
A Well, the letters that we have talked about brought
me into contact with people who -- with whom I discussed
subjects of considerable sensitivity.
Q Do you know whether by this time anyone at the
National Security Council had checked on other sources about
the reliability of Mr. Ghorbanif ac^? .
A Well, I had discussed Mr. Ghorbanifa*r with the
Israelis and the Israelis were, as I was, still at this
stage ambivalent about Mr. Ghorbanif aor . They felt on the
one hand that he surely had very good contacts. On the other
hand, they were suspicious of him. They thought that he might
be in this simply to make money.
They thought, as I thought, that he might simply be
some kind of a provocateur, some kind of Iranian scheme
whether to simply fool us or to expose and embarrass
us .
We didn't know. But there was no great enthusiasm
about Mr. Ghorbanif aK^i" at this stage from any quarter. I
l^
.J-
/■
lifa^ at this ste
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would say that none of us was prepared at that point to give
any kind of strong endorsement to Mr. Ghorbanifaafr
except to say that to date his performance had been by and lar
consistent with what he had said that he could do. And as
I have said before about this matter, the issue was not to
do a moral evaluation of Mr. Ghorbanifaer,, but to see
whether he could do things which were, after all, in the
national interests of the United States.
And to date, his performance had been quite
satisfactory.
Q Okay.
A So after the October 8 discussion, I had — at
least one conversation with McFarlane describing this to him
and describing in detail what the Iranians were asking for
in order to provide further hostages. And I said to him
surely by this time, if not bdafre, but more likely after this
meeting, because it is the logical time for this conversation
to have occurred, I asked him to, number one, get me out of th
hostage business, an expression which I would use
several times with him in the future, and I asked him to
r
re
instruct me and to instruct the Israelis in sofar as he
■^
U
could do that to drop the entire subject of hostages from our
contacts with GhorbanifaeJr' and any other Iranian and that this
subject" just be shut off because, I said, Ghorbanifapr ^
has said that he can get us contacts with important Iranians
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Mi^lHP'
and that is the subject of strategic impor
tafi&
78
to the
c-
'C/'r
A
United States, because what we need to know are the intentions
of these Iranians. Do they really wish to have better f u/>
relations with us?
Do they seriously wish to change the policies of
that regime?
Can they do it? And is that achievable?
This is the strategic interest. The matter of the
hostages not only is a secondary or tertiary question from
the standpoint of American policy and American interests,
but it makes it impossible to answer the fundamental questions
about the strategic interests, because so long as the
Iranians are able to obtain weapons from the United States
as a result of this dialogue with us, they will say anything
and they will do anything in order to continue to get
these weapons, and so long as that pipeline of weapons
functions, we will never be able to evaluate their
real intentions.
But it is their real intentions that we must be
able to evaluate. So for God's sake, shut down the whole
hostage question and let me deal with the political issue
and see what is there.
Q How did McFarlane respond?
A - He agreed, but he agreed too much. That is, he
said not only did he agree that the whole hostage question
ro
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was a bad question, and he used the expression "I have a bad
feeling about this whole operation", and he said that his
intention was to shut the whole thing down.
askednim not to shut the whole thing down, ^-
/
And I
but to let the political thing go ahead. And he said, well,
he would look at it, but that at the moment his intention
was that he wanted to stop the entire thing.
Meanwhile, probably shortly after this
conversation with McFarlane or perhaps shortly before
Ghorbanifair had told us that a meeting with a senior Iranian
official had been arranged in Europe and I told this to
McFarlane. He approved the trip for me to go and meet
with this person.
So I met with this person and that was -- this
person plus the usual suspects.
Q I sometimes lose who the usual suspects are.
A That is everyone including Kimche, Schwimmer,
Gorbanifasr, Kimche, and me.
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
Q Could we get a date for this?
MR. WOOLSEY: Let me interject one thing, if I may.
May we do it off the record?
(Discussion off the record.)
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Hr. Eggleston. Back on the record now.
The Witness. So we had conversation with -- well,
how did we want to handle this?
Mr. Woolsey. There was a meeting in Europe.
The Witness. There was a meeting in Europe with a
senior Iranian/ and the senior Iranian indicated to us
that he and a substantial number of his countrymen wanted
to work towards an improvement in the relationsip between
the United States and Iran, that they were willing to engage
in a considerable degree of cooperation with us.
He provided us with considerable information
about what was going on inside the country. And he said
that he believed that with proper support and cooperation
from the United States, that a significant degree of change
could be achieved in Iran peacefully through elections.
He thought that he and his people were sufficiently
strong, that they could place their people in a series of
key positions in the government, and that one way in which
that could be helped would be little ways in which we could
demonstrate that he had the support of the United States,
since this would carry weight inside Iran and show his people
that this was, in fact, the case.
He offered to establish not only a close working
relationship, but a secure communications channel. And he ■
asked if we could provide him with secure communications. So
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mmmn
81
we could be in regular contact with him so he would be sure
what he did was in sync with what we thought it was desirable
to do, and he could ask for advice, provide us with
information and all those other things.
At the conclusion of our coversation, he provided fJ
me with a document, a signed letter which expressed not only
his willingness to cooperate in various ways in which he
would cooperate, and the kinds of objectives that we might
achieve together, but also the names of all the other Iranians
who felt the same way, and for whom he spoke, and who would
do this. And he asked that we check with the American
Government, and make sure that this project would go forward,
that we should meet again within 30 days, and that if
everybody agreed to this, then we could go forward with this
cooperative program.
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q Are you about to move off the discussion that you
had with him?
Once again, if you are, then I have more questions.
Was there any discussion of arms in that
conversation?
A Yes. The discussion of arms in two contexts.
He was vociferously opposed to what had been done in providing
weapons to the Iranian regime over the course of ^the past
couple of months, said that all we could achieve by sending
I
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arms to Iran was to strengthen the Khomeini regime, which
was the opposite of what he thought we were about, and said
that this was a terrible thing, and had cost them the
possibility of achieving a significant advance in that
period, since those people had been weakening, and the
arms shipment had, in f act ,N^£e3tgFCfiadrM:hem. So he did not
like that at all.
When we are finished with this, let's come back
and talk about how to handle all this information, but
fairly fully for the moment, and go back and look at it.
We may wish to take a good deal of this off the
record, but anyway, it was made clear to him in this discussion
that he was dealing both with Israelis and Americans, and he
was under no illusion about that. He knew who the Israelis
were, and he knew that I was an American.
Mr. c-horbanifar did the translation. '^his gentlemaa
spoke only in Farsi. We spoke only in English, but Nimrodi
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UNCLffllED
83
was present and said that the translation was reliable.
Q The other communication channel, the secure
communications channel I was interested in, what did you
understand him to mean by that?
A He wanted some sa^e way to communicate with us,
not by open telephone line.
Q But did he mean a secure phone line, or did he
mean an emissary?
A No, he meant either radio communications or a
secure telephone line, something like that.
Q Okay.
A I returned once again and reported to McFarlane,
and this would be early November; and I said to him again
that this was precisely the kind of thing that we should be
looking for, and that this was what had to be evaluated,
because we had to be in a position to evaluate whether he and
people like him were for real, and again I said that, I
have even used this guy to support my previous position on
weapons and hostages. I said, here is a person who says
quite clearly, and he is right, if you send weapons to Iran,
you end up strengthening those bad people, and what we should
be trying to do is to weaken those people.
I should interject at this point that in the earliesi
disucssions I had with McFarlane and the subject/of Iran,
before I went to see PereSj J liai. SftA^^tlfit it was my view that
w^i^m
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whereas a lot of people in the government said that we
should be planning on what tO'ido after Khomeini died and
that was the problem to resolve, that my view of the situation
was that we should act to deliver some kind of blow to
Khomeini before died, if that was possible, because if
we waited for him to die, Khomeini was going to pass as
a legend. And the legend was going to be for the whole
radical Shiitism all across the world, from Iran to Indonesia,
Malaysia, Detroit, whatever you want to get from the Western
World, all you have to do is kill enobljh of them and they will
eventually do what you want.
And that is exceedingly dangerous, to permit that
illerie
legend to remain unchalleried. And if we could find a useful
A
way to do this, that we should try to do it. And he agreed,
and said, what we all said at that time; namely, the problem
we have, however, is that we do not know enough about Iran
to be able to evaluate any possible policy alternatives.
So I reminded him of that original discussion,
and when we spoke in November, and I said, it now appears
for the first time that we may have a real possibility of
developing enough contacts with people inside of Iran, not
people who are by our standards moderate or progressive,
or even particularly admirable, but they are people who
it seems would represent a consideration improvement in
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85
the behavior of Iran, and would enable us to develop our
contacts, leverage, influence over that country, which is
something we should certainly be looking for.
And I said, that ^horbanifar had said that of this C
sort of person, there were many that he could arrange !<<
to have us meet, and he did not wish to be the intermediary
in those relationships, that he wanted to introduce us to them
and get out of the way so we could pursue this relationship
ourselves, and 4w'' would not suspect «e*xif being involved ^^^mm
■\^
£>*i-^
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in all those contacts for his own purpose. And Jie'^said to -^ T
McFarlane, I though^^it was urgent that we pursue^Tthis /-
contact. I said another thing.
I said, if we are going to pursue this contact and
others like it, that this could not possibly be done by me
or even by the NSC, because once we moved from the level f^^^r
of research projects, and occassipnal meetings and contracts, *-
to a stage where we might start talking about secure communica-
tions, regular meetings, a variety of contracts, so forth. ^ y
At this point only your professional intelligence
service could do that. The NSC couldn't do it. I
certainly couldn't do it. I didn't have the time, couldn't
afford it, so he would have to in my opinion, address the
question if this was going to go forward, he was going to have
to decide what professional intelligence service^ was going to
it, and I urge<^ biii io. think about that
^
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wmim
86
Q Was Kimche at the meeting?
A Yes.
Q In your room?
A Yes, he was. I never received a response.
Q Was that an oral conversation you had with him?
A Yes, never received a response. Either then or
at any subsequent date, either from McFarlane or anybody else.
Q During this period of time, were you also briefing
Colonel North on these conversations?
A I did not brief Colonel North on this conversation.
Q Did you brief Colonel North on any of the other
meetings that you had?
A Yes, and I subsequently told Colonel North about
eX/thc
'Ju^
A
this conversation; but I did not tell him right theA^here
Q Were you briefing anybody else at the NSC besides
North and McFarlane?
A I don't think so. I saw Fortier very occasionally.
Q Poindexter?
A No .
Q I guess not.
A But I saw Poindexter as, on some occasions, when
he was deputy. We had lunch together a few times in the
White House mess; we shared It^^aWpassion for computer software
and so' we met to compare notes on the latest in computer
software, and during the course of those conversations, we
luring tne course or cnos
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UNUSinED
87
also discussed a few serious things, but mostly about computers.
Q Okay.
A I then received a call in late November from
Mr. ^orbanifar around the 25th or 26th of November, telling
me that he had an urgent message from the PriiMnister of ty I
Iran to give to the President, and the message was, in
essence, we have been very patient with you people. We
have acted in good faith throughout. We have done every-
thing we said we were going to do, and you are now cheating
us, and you must act quickly to remedy this situation.
I brought this into the White House, found
McFarlane not present, he was off at the summit, and was
invited to tell Poindexter about this.
I went in and told Poindexter, gave him this message
Poindexter responded by saying thank you, and he wrote it
down. And he said, you are being taken off this project,
at least temporarily, because we now need people with
greater technical expertise than you.
I interpreted this message to mean, Ghorbanifar
said something like, there had been a terrible screw up
in connections with a delivery, which I took to mean a
delivery of weapons, following from these discussions earlier,
and I took Poindexter to mean that there had been some
mechanical error of some sort. ,
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ONCmFIED
88
I subsequently found out what happened.
Let me just finish one last thing. And I said to
him, fine, because I didn't want to be involved that
business anyway. I said, however, the other business, I
said, is something that I want to remain involved in; and I
named the person with whom I had met in Europe.
He just gave me a blank look, and that was as
best as I can recall my last conversation with Admiral
Poindexter about the subject.
Q You have subsequently learned, for example, in
November 19, 20, 21, 22, something, the time period
immediately prior to the conversation with Mr. Ghorbanifar,
about the delivery of weapons, did you have any knowledge of
that at the time it was taking place?
A Not at the time it was taking place. I had an
r\ ^
impression that these coversations were going forward. ^
A '^ *<^
I have strained mightly to remember anytime that
I may have heard somebody say, okay, do it, or it has been
decided, but I have no recollection.
Q During this time period, November of 1985, how
much time were you spending at the old Executive Office
Building?
A I may have been spending as much as 2-1/2 days
a week "there ,
Q Die
ve an officer there?
:i hmm
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msjmm
89
A No, I worked out of Colonel North's office.
I had no office, and I had no desk and no files.
Q If you went there
ouldf/ou sit right in his office?
A Yes.
Q Did he — okay. As of, and this again is for
exeunple, to your knowledge, as of November 25, do you know
whether any American official other than yourself had ever
»d» Mr. Ghorbanifar?
A As far as I know no other American had met with
ftr. Ghorbanifar.
Well, let me put it somewhat differently. No,
in the context of this affair. I was aware by then that
Mr. Ghorbanifar had on at least two previous occasions met
with officials of CIA, once in 1980, and once again in
1984.
Q How did you come to be aware of this?
A He told me.
Q Did you inquire at the NCSC or the CIA about those
contacts?
A I mentioned them tp North. I informed him that
Ghorbanifar I
and he had a very bad feeling about CIA, did not like
CIA. " ,
Q Hoy .(ii^^j>l^n§J.^<2^{j Respond?
polygraphs in the past with CIA, J^
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UNCUESSIFIED
90
A He said he shared Mr. Ghorbanifar ' s evaluation of
the CIA.
Q Do you recall approximately when that — when that
coversation was?
A No.
Q Would it have been prior to November 25 or 1985?
Sometime in that period, October-November of 1985?
A Yes, it could have happened as early as September.
Q Okay.
A So I was removed. I^as then immediately taken '-^
out of the intelligence. ceased to read^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
wasn't asked for input, wasn't told what was going on, ^ust
the whole thing came to an end. I informed Kimche that
I had been taken out of this, so he could tell Schwimmer and
Nimrodi. And the next I heard from one of these people
was mid December when Ghorbanifar called me and asked if I was
planning to be in Europe, and I told him I was planning to be
in Europe in mid- December. And he asked if we could meet
for dinner.
1 agreed to that, and we had dinner together in
Geneva.
I was in Europe on other matters, in
Q.<^H '^^^-^
We had a long conversation in which he complainythat they^ ^
A. A
had given him a new person to deal with whom he did not like, _
a Polish gentleman, as he called it.
ty
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UNUSIFIED
91
Q This is the new person to deal with is the person
who took your place?
A Yes. .
Do you know who this was?
I have only a guess.
What is your guess?
Q
A
Q
A
Q
person.
My guess is it was fiacrpt-; Ghorbanifar says that-
A
I was laughing at the description of the Polish
I believe whoever it was that dealt with him
used a Polish name. You must remember that these
gentlemen almost never use their real name for anything.
^
J tor anytl
so that the name Ghorbanifar was given as a Polish name.
He said that he would prefer to deal with me.
I told him I had nothing further to do with this matter, and
would not.
He then said that he felt strongly that the
United States should, they even if that venture were going
to be dropped, that the United States still had to come to
grips with the problem of Iranian-sponsored terrorism, and
how to combat it. And I told him that was a matter on which
I could l£gitimately talk to him. He said that he had
A
a considerable amount of information about Iranian-sponsored
terrorism, and for that matter Libyan terrorism as well, and
that he would, be J'i.lJ-iQg to cooperate with the Government of
perate
Ipn
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mijmm
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:h^.
United States, even withthe Central Intelligence Agency, and
he then told me in greater - detail than he had before the
story of his two previous polygraphs, with CIA, in which he
said that he had indeed lied in the course of those polygraphs,
because he was compelled to lie, that there were questions
which he couldn't possibly be expected to answer truthfully
to these people because they were asking information about
his family, some of his activities which he wasn't prepared
to tell them about, but at this point he would be prepared to
sit down with them, go through all of that and explain to
them why and how this had all happened.
In addition, he proposed an operation having to do
with Libya. He had developed a channel to Qaqaittfi, and this V
channel had introduced Ghorbanifar to Qadajhlfi as a person
particularly well connected with the flafia, and therefore in
a position to carry out Mafia-type activities.
Qaelanfi had said that the was willing to pay / v «a
a large svm^ of money for the assassination of Mr. Al-Mugarief,
the nvain exile opposition leader in Libyan politicks, some- ^^
times in C^fl^, sometimes in various places in Western x
Europe. ^ M^^
What Ghorbanifar proposed to us was that a mock
assassination of Al-Mugarief be staged, complete with a mock
funeral, burial and so forth. That at this point, QadiaAipi
promised to do a favor in return to the presumed Mafia,
1034
jm 13
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(iNcimre
93
so that once this funeral were staged, Ghorbanifar would then
ask the Libyans to provide them with their contacts in
Western Europe, so that he could use them to go after his
presumed political oppoents, Iran's presumed political
opponents.
He said, therefore, this operation would achieve
two results. It w)uld in the end humiliate Qadal^fi because M
at some weeks afterwards, Mr. Al-Mugarief would throw a
surprise party and emerge publicly and said I was not killed.
QadaWfi thought he had killed me, but he hadn't. Indeed, we
took him for money and made a fool out of him, et cetera, and
at the same time expose the European network of Libyans because
:$.
the presumed Mayia would by then have been entitled to go
back to Libya and say, okay, give us your European people in
Western Europe, and the Libyans would have provided information
about their people there as well.
Well, that sounded like a good idea to me. And
so I came back to Washington, and reported this conversation
to North, who thought that was a fine idea, and therefore,
I went over to CIA and reported it to the counterterrorism
people, Charlie Allen and Clarridge.
Q Did you report it to anybody else other *
than the CIA?
No.
UNCti^FIFD
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jm 14
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Q Anybody else at the CIA other than Clarridge,
and who was the other one?
A Allen.
Q Allen?
A Yes, I reported it to Casey.
23
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jm 15
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UNCWIED
95
Q Let me just back up for a second, since you are
going into a new area. At the dinner that you had with
Ghorbanifar in Europe, in mid-December, was there any further
discussion with him or any decussion with him about the
arms delivery that had taken place m November?
e
A He gave m^ an account of that story. -^
A A>
Q Did the Polish person come up again?
A He just said there was a Polish person. I didn't
know who he was talking about, and I said, look, if you want
tovork with him, if you don't, don't.
M
A )
i/U,
Q Did he tell you what had gone wrong with the
shipment?
A He told me that there had been a shipment of 18
Hawk missiles which were no good for two reasons. First,
they were the wrong kind of Hawk missiles. They di
fly high enough. And secondly, they had Israelis markings
i
all over them which the Iranians took to be a
lidn't rJ
^
O
tv
DNCLMSiflED
''[t? ^o^J■ oc a -^C v\ ^
1037
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Mam\i9
96
Q Did he tell you anything about the financing
of the transaction?
A No.
Q Did he tell you anything about the mechanisms
of the transportation?
A No.
Q Okay, let me, and I am going to ask a question not
because I want you to repeat the Tower Commission, but I
seem to recall a little paragraph about Schwimmer opening an
account at the Credit Swiss around October, and the Tower
Commission reports that he gave you an account number and
you gave an account number to North; is that correct?
A Yes, around the time of the conversation with the
Senior Iranian official, we talked about the possibility
that it might be necessary to provide people like him with
some expense money, or something like that from time to time,
and it might be a useful idea to create an account in the event
that became necessary. Then we wouldn't suddenly have to
create an account on the spur of the moment. So with this
J^
if^jU
contingency, an account^was opened;-)
Q Did you know the name of the account?
A No. What I knew was that I, my name was not on the
account. I wasn't entitled to draw on it.
It was an account that Swimmer opened, and he
A
/<-
gave me the n
the account.
^.
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jm 17
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ICIWED
97
I
Q I take it you don't have the number?
A No. Onwards?
Q Onward, so we are at the point where you called
Mr. Ghorbanifar?
A Ghorbanifar came to Washington, this was, I think,
between Christmas and New Years. He came to Washington,
came to dinner at our house one evening. We had a long
dinner with Charlie Allen talking about Iran and about
terrorism. I ||
Q Charlie Allen came to your house for dinner as
well?
A Yes, I think that is right.
Q Excuse me?
I
1039
jm 18
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wi\mm
98
LIlL-
In any event ,^^^^^^Bpromised if Mr. Ghorbanifar
were willing to come back to take a polygraph on the previous
two polygraphs, that he was sure that this unpleasant
misunderstanding in the past could be quickly cleared up,
and that the only reason he was asking for a delay was because
he wanted to make sure that A, they had a Farsi-speaking
polygraph operator conduct the polygraph so it would be as
easy and as pleasant for Mr. Ghorbanifar as possible, and
that this older experienced polygra^ operator was unfortunately
r-
on vacation at the moment but would be back somewhat late, and *,,
could Mr. Ghorbanifar possibly return. He said, yes.
With reference to what is written. The memorandum
which allegedly describes the conversation we had at my
house with this person^^^^^^^Jl do not remember — it is
in the Tower Commission report — I do not remember any
discussion of an alleged $200,000 overcharge going back to
pay off Iranian Government officials.
His statement attributed to me that I had met
with Ghorbanifar some 20 to, 30 times is false. I, could
UNCIiS^flFO
1040
jm 19
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UNOLISSIflED
99
never have said any such thing, because as you see from this
account, one might possibly get up to, what, seven or eight
meetings but 20 to 30 is the wrong order of magnitude
entirely .
There was no suggestion in that memorandum, although
it may well have been edited, that the reason for the
conversation, and the fundamental subject of the conversation
was terrorism. So the conversation that I remember and the
one that^^^^^^HremeralDers are very different, one from the
other. That is all I can say.
In any case, Mr. Ghorbanifar did return early in
January, and had his polygraph.
What I had been told about the polygrapy";
was quite an explicit understanding, was that the sole subject k
of the polygraph was to be the two previous polygraphs that
he had taken. They were not to introduce new subjects.
Above all, they were not permitted to talk to him about
any possible recent contacts he had had with American
Government officials, or things that he may have done in
connection with the Government of the United States, that
this was to be a low key, non-hostile environment, that it
was not to be the senior polygraph operator speaking in
Farsi, and that they would make the results of the polygraph
known to us, to me, as soon as they had them. ,
Now, so far as I can tell, not one of these conditio
and there i
\\m As^inrn
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jm 20
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witmm
100
was adhered to.
Q Do you know this from conversations with Mr.
Ghorbanifar?
A And from the CIA, intelligence agency.
Q Do you know who conducted the polygraph?
A Don't knew the name, but I have been told by
several people , including Mr. Ghorbanifar, that it was
all in English. It was a young polygraph operator. It
lasted for five hours and he was quite distraught at the end
of it.
They asked questions,, some of which they have
even repeated in the Tower Commission report, which clearly
violated the guidelines of what had been reached.
Q
A In coversations between me and
When were these guidelines?
n
A-
^^^^^^Fand Mr.
Ghorbanifar.
Q At your house that day?
A Yes. To complete an otherwise perfect record,
Fthen disappeared once the polygraph had been given
and never reappeared. I only learned the results of the
polygraph from other persons at CIA, and through Colonel [* [
North who told me just as I told you. And he had, they will •^
make sure that Mr. Ghorbanifar does not pass this polygraph,
no matter what he says. ,
Q Did Colonel North tell you why he thought that
iiNPi mxim
1042
jra 12
UNCUmED
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would be the CIA reaction?
A Colonel North thought that they did not wish
to work with Mr. Ghorbanifar.
Q Did he indicate to you the reason he thought that
the CIA was unwilling?
A Yes, his belief was that since Mr. Ghorbanifar
was not theirs, they had not found him, they had not recruited
him, that it was a person who had worked with me and not
with them, that they would not want to have anything to do
with him.
Q Had Colonel North met Mr. Ghorbanifar by this
time, to your knowledge? / C y\
I ^
A Not to my knowledge. No, wat, he did. He came
A ^
that night or another night to my house. He met Mr. Ghorbanifar
at my house in this period.
Q Either some time in late December, or early
January?
A Yes.
It turns out that I know he had met Mr.
Ghorbanifar in London in December, but I had not known that
at the time and had not known about the December meeting
that Mr. McFarlane had with Ghorbanifar, and Schwimmer.
That is the basic story. From time to time, as I became
aware that ftie arms for hostage business was going forward,
I expressed my contrary views to a variety of officials of
contrary views to a van
1043
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UNCMflED
102
the American Government, always in the same terras; namely,
number 1, this is a mistake. It is wrong to do this. It
is a mistake on its own terms; but even worse, it is a
strategic mistake because it has turned the whole idea of
what to do with Iran backwards, inside out.
Q Who did you tell this to?
A I told it to North. I told it to Casey, to Gates,
later on to Weinberger and I attempted repeated to tell
Poindexter, and later on in the summer on Weinberger's recom-
mendation, I tried to brief Shultz and was unable to get an
appointment. I told Peter Rodman.
Q Who was at the NSC at the time?
A Yes. I always stressed that we had, in my opinion,
inexplicably walked away from the possibility of asking some
very serious questions to some important people in Iran,
and that these contacts which had beerpeveloped were never 5
pursued. Now there were other contacts that were never
pursued because Mr. Ghorbanifar offered to CIA to bring them
into direct fsersonal contact with the, let's call him an
official, one of the leaders of the Islamic Jihad organization
who had written this statement, biographical statement with
the knowledge that it would be given to the CIA and Mr.
Ghorbanifar offered to introduce a CIA person anywhere
in Europe. This was rejected. Mr. Ghorbanifar offered a
series of similar contacts that Iran was sponsoring in Western
iiNntj^iPipn
7/
1044
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UNCmFIED
103
Europe, all those contacts were reject
So a series of
interesting opportunities was declined.
What bothered me most of all was the fact that
starting with the senior official that I had met and
the prospect of meeting more, there had been no response
from the American Government across the board to what
seemed to me to be the only really serious strategic objective
that came up in the context of this entire affair.
It had always appeared to me to be the thing
about which we should care the most. I thought it was
exceedingly promising, and I cannot -^^thantasr' why it was never ,
^ ^/'^"■^
pursued. ,
A Right.
Q I have a number of additional questions; does this
eventually end your involvement in the initiative?
A Yes.
Q And so it ends in about mid-January of 1986?
A Well, my involvement in the Iran initiative
ends on that day in November when I spoke to Poindexter.
My involvement with, I from time to time was asked by various
CIA persons or North to call Ghorbanifar, urge him to get in
contact with one person or another, or say would you please
IINfllimiFIFn
lf„
1045
jm 24
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UNCUtSMIED
104
do this thing that you have been asked to do, and I continued
to do that. I continued to see Ghorbanifar, and do today.
I like him. He is a great source of understanding for me,
and I like him.
Furthermore, in September when we met, he told me
the story by which he may well have been fooled, the Khashoggi
story of the alleged Canadian financiers, that he invented,
I will only say he may have invented the story about inventing
it. It is equally possible. This was a case where you have
a document that I produced as a result of that, this
was September, and Ghorbanifar said these Canadians were
going to go public, and they had ways of going public, and
that if the Government of the United States was serious
OJsout not wanting this whole thing to come out, that it should
A
deal with this matter. So I reported this to Casey. And
Casey said that yes, he recently had spoken to Roy Furmark
about this, and Furmark also said he thought it was serious
and Casey was concerned, and what should I do. And I said,
look, I wasn't, this was not my problem.
I hated this whole thing anyway. And so he asked
me to go talk to Charlie Allen about it, which I did. And
Charlie asked me if I would write a possible damage assessment
in the event that either Ghorbanifar or one of the Canadians,
*
or somebody else, decided to go public with this 'story.
UNGU^REn
1046
jm 25
ONCIWIED
105
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because I had found Ghorbanifar, also said that his relation-
ship with CIA had become impossible, that he thought they were
capable of anything, and that he had arranged, in the event that
anything bad happened tomorrow, to have the entire story
told. And he had given versions of it to various people
in different parts of the world so they should give this to
the press if he were to die in some inexplicable way. And I
asked him, what if you die in an explicable way, and he said,
he didn't know what would happen then. But in any event,
I took that seriously, and said so. And I wrote a memo
to Charlie, reiterating my conviction that this whole
thing had been a mistake from the very beginning, stressing
we had promising contacts which I thought should have been
followed up and hadn't been, and here was the state of affairs
and what could one do; and I proposed again that he go back
to the two basic things which I thought were at the core of
this entire business.
23
24
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1047
jra 26
l'«f-;-5
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Q Let me return to a question in your chronology
for a second.
A Which confirmed the position?
Q _. — confirmed that he was a person worth dealing
with, was there anythii
[that would have supported your
view that he was a particularly worthwhile character, as there
had been with regard to Ghorbanifar and other people earlier
A" Well, no. Not that I know of
1048
jra 27
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2S
UNCIMFiED
107
I am not aware of any detailed conversations
that he had with that person that I met. However, I would
also add by the extent of his position, he was such a well-
known personality that the desirability of a working
relationship with such a person was intuitively obvious.
You would not have to go to any arcane methods to coifirm "
that. He was and is an extremely powerful person.
Mr. Eggleston. If no one else has an objection, I
would like to take a five-minute recess?
(Brief Recess.)
A
\^^'■
UNCLMEIED
1^
1049
jm 28
UNCySSIFIED
108
t (Back on the record.)
2 BY MR. EGGLESTON:
3 Q You have taken us through the chronology. I have
4 a number of other questions, and we will be jumping around
5 in some nature, and in that sense, let me start with the
6 time period that you have just given a little bit about.
7 This is the time period sort of from September
8 1986 through November of 1986, as things start to come out.
9 You have indicated that you had conversations with Mr.
10 Ghorbanifar in September of 1986. Did he indicate to you
11 at that time anything about a pricing problem that resulted
12 in a short-fall of money to him?
13 A He indicated that he was having banking troubles,
14 but he did not go into detail.
16 Q Okay. He told you the story about Khashoggi and the
16 Canadian investors and the pressure?
17 A He told me the story about Canadian investors,
18 not about Khashoggi and Canadian investors, but he referred
19 to Canadians.
20 Q Other than he is having a banking problem, he
21 did not tell you the name or specificity about a pricing
22 problem or he had not gotten paid by anybody?
23 A Well, he said he lost a lot of money himself,
24 personally, in all of this, and that the America:; Government-
28 should s&meh2w_raake it up to him, and said he-coui*cut out
low make it up to him, an
iiNPi^inpn
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1050
jm 29
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UNimSIFIED
109
of this whole thing, but he said just out of concern that
the future of this whole operation not be jeopardized, that
the American Government had to address the Canadian crisis.
Q Did he indicate to you how much money he had lost?
A No, he said the Canadians were owed $10 million.
Q He did not indicate how much money he personally
lost?
No.
A
Q He did not tell you that unless he was made whole,
he would go public or anything along those lines?
A No.
Q YOU had said then that you spoke shortly after
that with Mr. Casey who told you about a conversation with
Roy Furmark; could you relate what is it that Furmark had
told Casey as Casey reported it to you?
A He said basically Furmark had told him the same
story, or a similar story.
Q About the Canadian investors?
A Yes.
Q Are JDU, did you remain involved into early
November, or into November of 1986, where you were around
talking about these issues after the story was released in
the Beruit newspapers?
A I was in Europe when the story came ou,t.
Q Not on a matter related to this, I take it?
IINRlMQinrn
1051
jra 30
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UNcussra
no
A No, I was in Europe on private business.
Q Okay, did you, and how long after that did you
come back to the United States, if you remember?
A Three for four days.
Q Did you talk to either Ghorbanifar or anyone about
the story that had been raised?
A To North.
Q What did he say?
A I told him that I thought I was in an ideal
position to publicly defend the Iran policy, since I was
only involved in a period Wjr^r to 1986, and that there I v i^J
were no questions about activities of the American Government
or anything else that could possibly embarrass me, because
I did not know about them. But I could speak to the genesis
of the project, and the fact that it had a strategic, serious
strategic objective, and that, and I could defend that
objective on the concept of the policy. And he said that
I should not do that, that the White House did not want people
doing that, and unless I was specifically authorized to
speak publicly, he wished that I would not. So I did not.
And I sat around, did next to nothing for a week or so.
I called Mr. Knpel whom I had not met before, and told him
Q Why did you call Kh^el?
A" He was the National Security Advisor. ,
Mr. Woolsey. By this time.
IINRhA^yflFn
1052
jm 31
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UNCUniED
The witness. After North resigned.
Mr. Woolsey. I mean Poindexter?
The Witness. Poindexter resigned. North was
fired. I called Kheel and said I understood people were in
the process of putting together some kind of chronology
and there was, after all, a part of this that I thought,
so far as I know, none of the other people knew in any
detail, and I was a bit surprised that no one had asked
me to participate in the preparation of this chronology.
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q How did he respond?
A He said by all means, give us your chronology.
And I sent it to him.
Q You subsequently learned that the work on the
chronology began before North and Poindexter left their
points?
A Yes, I had a couple of conversations with North,
and there was one occasion in which North and McFarlane
cane by my house to talk about these questions. I wasn't
interested , I was trying to in my own mind reconstruct what
f^ J
had happened, and McFarlane and I had a brief coversation r \
A- A
in which he said in essence, look, don't get too far ^
out in front on this matter. He said, all these decisions
were my decisions. You were not negotiating for us.
representing us, so forth.
iiNHi ismm
ii.
1053
UNCypflED
112
1 I said, look, I have nothing to be ashamed of.
2 I am happy to tell people what happened. I thought it was
3 a good idea. I am sorry it wasn't followed through.
4 Basically,! have no problem. And then North and I, at one
5 point, had a conversation.
6 He was concerned because the Attorney General
7 seemed concerned about authorization for this November
8 shipment. And North asked me if I ever authorized or
9 remembered anybody authorizing a shipment of some number of
10 Hawk missiles to Iran in November of 1985? And I said, I
11 didn't. He said, clearly it happened someway or another.
12 But I did not remember how it happened or who, if anyone
13 had done it. So I said I had no recollection of it.
14 Q You probably now know that there is a chronology
16 where there is preparation for Casey's testimony, it takes
16 place on November 20; Casey testifies on the 21st. North's
17 files are searched on the 22nd. He is interviewed on the
16 23rd. The 24th comes and on the 25th everyone is gone. Did
1® you talk to North throughout that time period, the 30th or
20 the 21st?
21 A I talked to him a couple of times.
22 Q This is sort or a crucial time period, it turns
23 out in a lot of different ways, can you reconstruct , as best
2* you caii, maybe by the public events that are taking place,
26 when you spoke to him_ and .what _tbe_ conversations were about?
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A Well, I spoke to Urn on one day, when he said that
he was going on administrative leave shortly thereafter.
What day of the week was the press conference; was that
on Monday?
Q Meese's press conference was a Tuesday.
A So I may have well have seen North on the Monday
just before that, because there was a day when he said he
was about to go on administrative leave.
Q Do you recall what you spoke to him about?
A We spoke a good deal about terrorism. There
were some things that I was concerned ±>out . He spoke
a great deal about Iran, and he said that he hoped very much
that it would be possible for the hostages still to be
released.
He was very passionately engaged in the business
of trying to save these people.
Q Did he say anything to you about his interview
with the Attorney General?
A No, he didn't. He said that he had been interviewee
several times by several people. And he said that I should
prepare to be interviewed by the FBI.
Q Did he indicate to you why the FBI would be
involved in the follow up of the Iran initiative?
A I asked him on what basis people. Justice
Department people, were asking such questions in the first
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place, and he said they were investigating possible criminal
activities. And I said that if someone from the Justice
Department would be kind enough to tell me what conceivable
criminal activity of mine they wished to investigate, that
I would consider talking to them. But as far as I knew,
I had not committed any criminal acts.
Q Did he indicate to you, in retrospect, it is
plain it wasn't your criminal acts they were investigating,
but suggestions that he had made about criminal acts?
A Yes, his main concern was that there might have
been unauthorized shipments of weapons prior to the finding
of January, although I did not know about the finding
until after it came out in the press, but he referred to
the possibility of unauthorized shipments.
I said, this was not something which would cause
me any lack of sleep, because I was in no position to ever
authorize anything.
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Q Did he say anything to you about the suggestion
that there had been an unauthorized diversion of profits
to the Nicaraguan contras?
A No.
Q Did you -- do you recall any previous conversa-
tions with -- let me go back a little. These dates keep
falling out of my head.
As I generally recall, there was a Presidential
speech. Several days later, there was a press conference?
A We talked about the speech both before the speech
and after the speech.
Q And do you recall what you said on each of those
occasions? By "we" are you talking about you and North?
A Yes. I said before the speech that I thought
the President should tell the truth about what had
happened and after the speech I told him that I thought
it was a terrible speech and that even at the stage in
which I was engaged in, there was more than one tiny
p''aneload of weapons and that that would have eventually
come out, that that it had been a profound mistake to
permit the President to say things which could easily be
demonstrated not to be true . And that I thought that the
correct course of action for the President to take was the
one which I had understood Weinberger to have recommended,
which was to say that he had gotten emotionally involved
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with the hostages, that he regretted it, that he thought it
was a mistake, and that he had put a stop to it when he
knew it was happening, and that I thought he should still
do that and do it as quickly as possible.
Q How did Colonel North react to your reaction to
the speech?
A He said that in fact there were many people who
had suggested that to the President.
Q Did he indicate what his view was?
A Well, the implication was that he agreed with
them.
Q Did you have any conversation with him about --
I can't remember now if this was the speech or the press
conference, about the omission or the claim that there had
not been a third party involved in the transfers of arms?
A No.
Q Does anyone recall whether that was in the
speech as opposed to the press conference?
A I would think it was in the --
Q Press conference.
A — press conference and was corrected within
seconds of the end of the press conference.
Q Did you talk to Colonel North about the press
conference generally?
A I don't remember. We spoke -- we did not speak
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at any great length in this period.
Vj^
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Q Did you -- were you ever interviewed by the
FBI in the November-December time frame? I suspect you may
have been talked to.
A We -- after — not -- sort of not in the midst
of the crisis itself. When was it, December or January?
MR. WOOLSEY: I have to check the date. Frankly,
I forget whether it was just before Christmas or just after
the Christmas holidays. I believe it was after Mike
testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee and I
can check my calendar and let you know.
We did spend about four hours just like this
with the FBI, either just before Christmas or just after
New Years .
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q Did you indicate that you were not speaking
much with Colonel North during this time?
A He didn't have a lot of time.
Q During this time period, during the sort of
October-November time period, did you continue to speak
with Mr. Ghorbanifar?
A I may have spoken to him on the phone.
Q Do you recall whether you spoke to him about
anything with regard to this transaction or money problems?
A" I undoubtedly said to him at one point that I
had raised the matter with the director and that my
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impression was that it was being addressed.
Q Did you see Meese's press conference of
November 25?
A Yes.
Q Was that the first that you had learned that
there was a suggestion there may have been a diversion?
A Yes.
Q Have you spoken to Mr. Ghorbanifar since the
November 25 press conference?
A Yes.
Q Have you spoken to him about whether or not
he had any knowledge about whether there had been a
diversion?
A No.
Q You haven't spoken to him about it at all?
A No.
Q Have you intentionally not spoken to him about
it?
A I don't know how to answer that question, to
tell you the truth. I intend to discuss it with him
at sometime. The conversations we have had have not
conveniently led to a discussion of that matter, but I
will do it eventually.
Q • Did you know Mr. Nir?
A No.
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Q Did you ever meet him throughout this time
period?
A I think not. I spoke with Mr. Nir several
times on the telephone during the Achille Lauro affair.
We have spoken by telephone on several occasions.
MR. WOOLSEY: It might help to describe
briefly your role in the Achille Lauro affair.
THE WITNESS: I was -- I had worked on recom-
mendations about what to do with the Achille Lauro when
it was first htij^cked.
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q When was that?
A October of 1983, I believe.
MR. WOOLSEY: That early? 1983?
THE WITNESS: Yes. No. 1984. Sorry. 1984.
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Q Not too much detail on the Achille Lauro
here.
A Huh?
Q I said not too much detail on the Achille Lauro.
This was by way of me asking you about Nir. I don't mean
to cut- you off .
A Sorry. It is one of the few stories I actually
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en]oy telling.
Q We have a very broad resolution, but it does not
include the Achille Lauro.
A I i4nn went down to the White House and worked 'J
through the night, and one of the tasks I was given was
to work on the arrest warrant for Abul Aibas
Ri/"
Q And you don't think then that you spoke with
him in connection with this?
A I know for sure that I have never spoken to
him about this initiative.
Q There has been a report that there was a
suggestion about diversion that cajne from Nir or at least
came from the Israelis that some of the profit should be
diverted either^^^^^^^^^^^^Hor to the Nicaraguan contras
or something.
Do you have any knowledge of that?
A No. There was another suggestion of diversion
from Nir -- allegedly from Nir, that North reported in
his PROFS notes suggesting I had taken money from the
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profits of that.
Q I was going to get to that near the end so as not
to raise the temperature. Since you have raised it --
A It is false. It never happened. It was never
suggested by anyone. No one ever offered me a commission.
In fact, very early on when this thing started,
I sat down with Kimche and Schwimmer and Nimrodi and said.
Listen, gentlemen, in this sort of affair people like us
are always accused of taking money. I want a hard and
fast understanding that nobody is to take money out of
this. We all agreed to that.
I said I didn't want to see an account, touch
a check, a bill, nothing, nothing, nothing. That was
the agreement. That's the way it was.
In addition, the Israeli Government has now
issued a statement to the wire services here, it is now
out on the wires, in which Nir denies ever having said
anything to North.
Q Is this recent?
A Yesterday.
Q Let me just follow up. Since you have raised
it, let me follow up on questions about whether or not
you received any money.
There is a reference to a Mike receiving S50
per TOW. Is there another Mike who is involved in this.
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VNftiWSr
125
to your knowledge?
A No.
Q Are you in any kind of financial arrangement
with Mr. Ghorbanifar? Do you have businesses together or
share partnerships or any fashion like that?
A No.
Q Excuse me .
A I said no. I have to keep saying no.
Q You have in addition to whatever else you do,
you have a business, as I understand it, is that correct,
a consulting business?
A Yes.
Q What is the nsime of that?
A ISI Enterprises, Incorporated.
Q Does ISI stand for anything?
A No.
Q Is that based here in Washington?
A It is in my home in Chevy Chase.
Q What kind of business does that do?
A Does all kinds of legitimate consulting
business. It is the recipient of roost of my income; that
is if I speak and get paid for it, thatmoney goes to ISI. ui
If I write and get paid for it, that money goes to ISI.
In addition, ISI either me or me plus other
people who habitually work with ISI, do some consulting
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projects, and I have some regular clients for whom I
consult during the course of a year.
Q Do you have any other businesses orher than
ISI?
A No.
Q Do you have -- what kinds of consulting do
you do for which you get paid through ISI? Khen I say you,
I mean what kinds of consulting is ISI involved in for
which it gets paid?
A ISI does some security consulting; ISI recently
finished a consulting project for an airline advising it
on security and related matters. ISI consults with a
couple of companies simply advising them how to do
business in various parts of the world, and ISI is involved
in starting the manufacture of arranging for the manufac-
ture of spare parts for American automobiles in Portugal
at the moment. It is a normal business project.
Q Did ISI receive any money as a result --
A No.
Q — I am sorry. I have to ask these anyway.
Did ISI receive any money as a result of your
involvement in the Iran issue?
A No.
Q. Did ISI receive anything of value as a result
i
of your involvement other than prestige?
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A ISI purchased three carpets from Mr. Ghorbanifar
for the sum of S3000 in the fall of 1986.
Q And finally, before I get off this subject, is
your wife employed?
A Yes.
Q Where is she employed?
A She works at the Department of Defense.
Q Did she receive any money as a result of it?
A No.
Q Or thing of value?
A She received from time to time Iranian sweets,
I believe one bottle of perfume from Mr. Ghorbanifar, and
occasional tins of caviar.
Q I think you indicated that you were not aware
until after it came out in the press that there had been
a finding that took place in January?
A That's correct.
Q In the spring, sort of February, March, April
through May of 1986, there were, as you now know from the
Tower Commission Report, two different transactions, really
one in February and then again in May.
Did you have conversations with Ghorbanifar about
either one of those as they were going on?
A No. I received — I got -- someone in Washington
told me that the McFarlane trip was going to happen. I
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don't remember who it was.
I went to McFarlane, probably in March, and said
tcjhim that it would be a terrible mistake for him to go on
this trip because going on this trip would have the sole
effect of strengthening the very people in Iran that we
wished eventually to see removed. And I thought that the
trip couldn't achieve anything other than that, whatever
else people told him was going to happen, and that he must
not lend himself to such a trip, that it was a mistake.
Q How did he respond?
A He thanked me for my advice.
Q And went?
A He went, yes. McFarlane -- a couple of things
about McFarlane.
McFarlane was always rather closed mouth about
things. It was sometimes difficult even for those of us
who considered ourselves his friends to know what was on
his mind.
Secondly, McFarlane, after 1985, is not the same
person as the McFarlane prior to October of 1985. He had
a very tough time in that period. This is when the rumors
about his alleged romantic activities were running around
Washington. He took that very seriously and very hard.
He went through a period where in the old days people would
have said he had a nervous breakdown. He — conversations
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with him after that date were totally different from conver-
sations with him prior to it.
In fact, I asked Kimche to come to Washington in
November to implore McFarlane to stay because I thought he
was making a mistake by leaving and I thought it would be a
very bad thing if he left generally for the country. And
that was also unsuccessful.
So I did not have great success from September,
October on in convincing McFarlane to do things.
Q Did you continue to remain in contact with
McFarlane after he left the National Security Council as
adviser?
A Yes. We were colleagues at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
Q Did you have access to the PROF system?
A No.
Q Did you have a secure phone line?
A No.
Q Let me start with February, the February, 1986,
transactions invlving the TOWs .
Did you have any discussions with Mr. Ghorbanifar
about the financing of those — of that transaction?
A No.
Q Similarly, with regard to the Hawk spare parts
and what other else might have been involved in May on.
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did you have any conversations with Mr. Ghorbanifar about
that?
A No. Didn't know about the Hawk spare parts
until I read it in the Commission Report.
Q Or anyone else at or about that time, about the
financing?
A No. I never knew any of the details of any of
these transactions. I knew generally that this process
was going on and I was opposed to it, but I did not know
of the details.
Q There is another hostage released finally in
the summer of 1986 whose name I continue to forget as
well.
A The two in 1986 are Jenco and Jacobsen. Father
Jenco.
Q Jenco in July or sometime- Did you have any
conversation with anyone about his release?
A I read the debriefs.
Q Excuse me .
A I read the debriefs. I congratulated McFarlane
since I assumed that he had — congratulated North also.
Q Did you know that it had come as a result of
shipping additional weapons?
A. I didn't know, but I presumed it had.
Q I'm just going to cover some ares quickly.
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Let me ]ust ask you some questions about North's
involvement in the contra resupply operation. Were you --
A This is going to be a very short conversation.
Q I anticipate that it may well be, in which case
we will be done at least by my part of this in a very few
minutes .
Let me ask you if you know various people, names
I will give you, things like that. Were you aware generally
that he was responsible for overseeing what I think has been
called frequently the Democratic Resistance movement in
Nicaragua?
A Yes.
Q Had you heard — were you aware that he was
involved with various private fund raisers in furtherance
of that operation? Did you know that he was involved with
tStK Spitz Channell?
A I never knew of the existence -- I didn't know
who Spitz Channell was until just now. I knew he knew Ross
Perot. That was the person I knew about.
Q Were you aware of his dealings with Ross Perot
in connection with the hostages?
A No.
Q Did you know Robert Owen?
A. No.
Q You did not know him?
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A Don't know him.
Q I am sorry. I was not correcting you. I couldn't
hear you.
A Rob Owen came up and introduced himself to me
on the street in Washington one day. We shook hands. That
was our one and only contact.
Q Similarly, did you know a guy by the ncime of
Richard Miller?
A Yes.
You do know Miller?
I do.
Did you know Frank Gomez?
Yes.
Did you know them to be associated with Oliver
Q
A
Q
A
Q
North?
A Yes. I knew them before. I knew them from
State. They were both at AID when I was special adviser
to Haig and when I worked for Haig, I participated in the
Central American policy discussions as -- particularly
public policy, and they were present at those discussions
for the most part.
Q Did you continue — did you see them meeting
with Colonel North during the course of 198 5 and 1986?
A- No. Well, I saw Rich come to the office from
time to time. I never attended meetings at which he was
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'UtMll^SlfiliSr
133
present.
Q Did Colonel North ever tell you the reason he
was meeting with Rich Miller?
A No.
Q Or the reason he was meeting with Frank Gomez?
A I don't think I ever saw Frank there. I had an
additional contact with Miller in 1983. I was invited as
one of a group of other people to do an analysis of
the Central American situation for something called the
Gulf and Caribbean Foundation. I did this with Max Singer
and Elie We^^^ Wc ) S*- I .
Q Who?
A Elie Wei)^l, the guy who just won the Nobel
/
Prize. Ematra, from Boston University; Peter Burger from
I guess Boston, Boston College.
We did analysis -- a pamphlet on Central America
in which I was involved and Rich was involved in distri-
buting that in some way.
Q Did you have a particular interest in Central
America?
A Yes. I was interested in Central America. Still
am. It is an important sxibject.
Q It has become an important part of my life, I'll
tell you.
*
A Sure, but remember I was special adviser to Haig.
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'UNfiLftSSIfiffi'
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Haig felt very passionately about Central America.
One of the things that most agitated Haig was
his inability to convince the White House in 1981 to do
something about Central America. So I was deeply involved
with Central America from the very beginning. And never
had anything to do with Central America with North, didn't
work on Central America at all at the NSC, but I was
interested in the subject.
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MSKIBHF
135
Q Did you discuss the subject with North?
A Discussed it with him once. We had a disagreement
on EdjBn Pastora.
ii-
A ]Aj
Q What was the nature of that disagreement?
C
A He was very suspicious of EdAn Pastora and I thought
it was fundamental for the United States to support Pastora.
Q Other than that, you don't recall discussing
the Central American situation at all?
A No.
Q Do you know a man by the name of Jonathan Miller
at the White House?
A What does he do?
Q 1 am not sure.
A I think I have met him once or twice.
Q Let me ask you about some other individuals that you
may — or I suspect did not know. I asked you whether you knev
Richard Secord. Why don't I ask you that again because I
think I may have asked you —
A No, I don't know Secord.
I think I was once on a plane with Secord. I think
he once sat behind me on an airplane.
Q How about Robert Dutton?
A No.
Q - Did you ever meeti^ him?
I wish I had this guy's first naune. Richard Gadd,
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G-A-D-D?
A I don't think so.
Q Did you know Tom Clines?
A No.
0 Or — you did, I take it, know Mr. Shackley?
A I know him quite well.
Q Is he a close friend of yours?
A A friend. Close friend would probably be slightly
overstating it, but he is certainly a friend. I like him.
Q Before I get to Mr. Shackley, did you become
personal friends with Oliver North?
A Yes.
Q Did you socialize with him outside of the NSC?
A Rarely.
Q Did you become friendly with his secretary?
This is not a sexist question. Did you get to
know Fawn Hall well?
A Yes.
Q Did you also get to know Wilma Hall well?
A Indeed. I know Wilma much better than Fawn.
Q You do?
A Wilma was McFarlane's secretary at the State
Department in the Counsellor's Office to which I was attached,
so she Was my secretary as well for a while. ^
Q Other than the one incident that you have told us
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about, I think where you discussed where Mr. Shackley's name
has come up, have you discussed this matter with
Mr. Shackley at any other time, did you discuss it Iran
intiative with Mr. Shackley or Mr. Ghorbanifaor or
anything else?
A A few weeks ago I called him up and we had -- arrange
to have lunch. We had lunch and talked about it. I told
him that I thought I owed him an explanation of why I had nevei
read his memorandum. So I told him and he said he had always
been baffled by it and that he would remain forever
baffled by it because he simply could not imagine that I
wouldn't have read it, and having read it, wouldn't talk to
him at some point since I was dealing with Ghorbanifaor.
I said in retrospect, I probably had as much difficulty
understanding my behavior as he did, but anyway there it was.
That was about it.
Q Let me just run down some more companies. Did you
during the time period of 1984, 1985, or 1986 hear of a
company called Lake Resources?
A No.
Q How about a company called Udall, which has a
variety of endings, Udall Research, Resources, Services?
A No.
A company called ToyCo?
No.
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138
Q Hyde Park Square Corporation?
A No.
Q Do you know whether the account that Mr. Schwimmer
had set up at Credit Suisse in the fall of 1985 was ever used?
A No.
MR. EGGLESTON: I think I have no further questions.
I think what I would like to do — can I go off the record
for a second?
(Discussion off the record.)
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q Mr. Ledeen, is it true that pursuant to the
subpoena that was given to you, you produced to us three
documents that are entitled the following: document number
one, memorandum prepared by M. Ghorbanifajsr , July 198 5;
document number two, memorandum from Michael Ledeen to
Oliver North, December/ January , question mark, 1986; and
document number three, memorandum from Michael Ledeen to
Charles Allen, September 1986?
A Yes.
Q I have no other questions.
MR. VAN CLEVE: Can we go off the record?
(Discussion off the record.)
J
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139
BY MR. VAN CLEVE
Q Mr. Ledeen, what I would like to do is start out
by talking with you a little bit about one of the documents
Mr. Eggleston referred to previously on the record before we
took a break.
I would like to take advantage of your presence
here today and try and educate myself a little bit about
Iranian politics during the period, say, 1985, 1986, that
we have been talking about generally today.
I show you a document that we have identified as
Document 1 that says it was prepared by Manucher Ghorbanif«rr .
Generally, you are familiar with the document, I assume.
A Yes.
Q Generally what the document does, it starts out,
there are three more or less distinct groups. We call
them lines one, two, and three. All of Iran's internal
politics, foreign relations, economic affairs and social
conflict can be viewed through the interplay among and between
the lines.
Based on your knowledge, would it be fair to say
that what is being described here is a set of political
factions?
A Yes.
■Q Are these the same factions that are sometimes
i
referred to in terminology as moderates, radicals, so on.
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'liH£LiS8llil&'
140
generally speaking?
A Referred to as moderates, radicals, and so on, by
whom?
Q By, I think, various commentators on Iranian
politics, the CIA, in its internal agencies?
A No.
Q They are not. How are these factions different
from the terminology — let me just back up and tell you
what I am trying to do is to see if I can't get a better
understanding of the factions within what is obviously
a factional government, and try and match it up with
conventional terminology that is sometimes used to describe
these factions, if that is possible.
A I am not sure it is because in many cases Manucher
Ghorbanif^ would identify people with one public position, -
and another private position, and it would be the private
position to which he would pay attention.
Q I understand. But having said that, we were
talking earlier, for example, about moderates and radicals?
A Yes, you recall ijsaid I didn't think I knew any
Iranian moderates. I wouldn't use the word, "moderate" to
describe any of these people in the normal English language
sense of the word.
Q Let me give you an example.
This might convey what I think this terminology
r-
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141
is intended to convey actually. Within the Iranian
government, there are people who are willing, for example,
to try and commit terrorist acts against the Saudis during
religious festivals. In November of 1986, one of those
individuals was arrested for supporting that type of
activity; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q That would not be someone who is generally
referred to as a moderate, would it?
A Yes, I agree.
Q Those distinctions do have some meaning within
Iranian politics?
A There are very important distinctions.
Q Could you try and explain in general terms what
those distinctions mean in your mind?
A They basically refer to two areas: one is domestic
the other foreign, and domestic questions, the hard-liners,
are generally speaking for maximum state control, so
nationalization of banks and industries and state control of
all organizations, whereas the, shall we call them moderates.
the right line, as Manucher Ghorbani
^ip^ calls them, are ^ >-
1^ \
people who argue for private property, private control,
no nationalizations, so forth.
On foreign policy the disagreement is about the
export of the Shiite Revolution, here, basically the hard-
liners are in favor of export by all means, and in many
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ways, preferably by terror, whereas the right line is opposed
to the use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy,
and in large part, because it puts Iran in a pariah status,
vis-a-vis the West, and they are concerned with our
relations — with their relations with the West.
Q Based on your experience, are these realistic
political distinctions within their politics— describe sort
of coalitions within the Iranian political system?
A I have not followed the internal Iranian situation
with the same intensity since I was removed from this
project as I did when I was involved in it. When I was
involved in it, it seemed to me to have made good sense.
I cannot speak to the period after that or to 1986-1987.
Q I understand, but at the time, these types of
political distinctions did in fact generally describe sort
of factions within the Iranian Government?
A Yes,
Q And to, just to go back, instead of using the
right line, and hard line terminology, you might substitute
for that sort of a radical and moderate terminology?
Would that be roughly equivalent in terms of what people
normally mean when they talk about Iranian politics?
A Radical and conservative. I don't think I would
talk -edxjut radical and moderate. Moderate has always
struck me as the wrong word.
1.
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143
Q I appreciate — if I understand you correctly,
what you are saying is that is a term that is not descriptive
enough of the distinctions between Iranian politics?
A They are just not moderate, no matter how you
slice it.
Q The point I am trying to make is that in fact
there are factions within the Iranian government, and that
they do translate into real world differences, both in
domestic and foreign policy; that significance for our
policy makers as we look at the Iranian government and deal
with it?
A That is ray conviction.
Q To sort of follow on from that general discussion of
Iranian politics at the period when you were involved with
the Iranian iniative, I would like to ask you some
questions about your knowledge prior to January 1, 198 5.
Were you aware that Israel had periodically sold weapons
to Iran diiring the period 1980 to the end of 1984?
A No.
Q Have you since become aware that that is the
case?
A No.
Q Is it your view that that is not the case?
•A If I had to bet, I would bet that they had, but
that is different from knowing it.
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Q You had no information to that effect?
A No.
Q Okay.
A We are talking prior to January of 1985.
Q Yes.
A No.
Q During 1984 — strike that. My recollection is
that you said you had co-authored a book on Iran and I
don't recall you mentioned when it was published.
A It was published in 1981.
Q And during the period 1981 through the end of
1984, did you follow events in Iran relatively closely?
A No.
Q I see. Were you aware that within the United
States Government, during 1984 a reassessment of United
States policy toward Iran was underway?
A No.
Q Okay, as of January 1st, 1985, you becaune a
consultant roughly at that time to the National Security
Council. In your view was a reassessment of United 'States
policy toward Iran was desirable?
A I didn't believe we had a policy toward Iran,
so there was nothing to reassess. We were doing nothing.
We had no initiatives, no programs underway. We had not
i
defined strategic objectives so far as I can tell. So
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there was nothing to reassess. When I discussed with
McFarlane my notion that it was desirable to look for
something to do to Khamenei before he died, he said we
don't know enough about Iran to know if any such thing can
be done.
I agreed with that. Level of knowledge was so
poor that it was impossible to justify any particular
policy.
Q When you say the level of knowledge was so poor,
I am curious about your access to sources of information,
either prior to January 1 of 1985 or after you became
a consultant to the NSC.
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sre are many
other ways of getting information. If there were not,
there would be no such thing as history, because historians
have no good sources inside their countries.
It is possible to write a good history of 18th
century France without having sources there.
/V
Q How do you account for that?
A And I said that is alarming because I didn't
do anything special. I knocked -dcMsr^the obvious doors and ■- "^
A
asked the obvious questions. That is all there was. ^
Q
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yM/^fftEBr
147
Q Do you, yourself, have any formal intelligence
training?
A No.
Q Have you acted as a contractor for the CIA at
any time?
A No. y^
Q Was theJwork that you did for Secretary Haig
generally similar to the type of work that you described for
us during the 1985 period? I can be more specific if you
like. What I have in mind is that you served essentially as
a sort of an informal, it seems to me, based on your
prior testimony. You served essentially as an informal
intelligence link between various governments, and I am
wondering if you did similar things for Secretary Haig.
A There was some of that, but I would say the bulk
of what I did for Secretary Haig was diplomatic in nature;
that is, I carried on conversations with foreign political
leaders of socialist and social democratic parties, in
order, to explain to them the nature of our concerns, and
various fundamental foreign policy which were of mutual
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KNttASSMfir
148
interest. Central America, Southern Africa and arms control.
East-West issues, and I
tiiWed to
explain to them the basis
for American policy in these areas, and encouraged them
to share their concerns with us, and I suggested to them
that we were open to suggestions, and to change; that
we were rational and not bi«»J^ideological . y'-
In particular, if they thought they had a better
understanding of these problems than we did, please share
it with us because we were capable of altering our views,
and there were occasions which this happened. Very little
in the way of intelligence there.
From time to time, I would ask the intelligence
community to make it possible forine to share with them
some of our intelligence in order to explain to them why
we held the positions that we held, but so that would be
actually the reverse, I suppose, of what you have in mind.
Now, there was not very much of this, a bit, but
not very much.
3 I see, and when you were working for Secretary
Haig and had those types of contacts, if I understood you
correctly, you made the point that in situations where the
socialist party was an opposition government, you made
a practice of reporting that on those conversations to the
goverTiment in power?
1
Yes.
UNCIASSIM,
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Q In order to reassure them?
A To the foreign ministry.
Q Did you also have contacts with the intelligence
services in those countries?
A I had some contacts with some intelligence
services, one or two.
Q It was not a routine matter?
A No.
Q I see. How about with the CIA, when you
returned from trips like this, did you make a practice of
informing officials at the agency concerning the substance
of the conversations?
A No.
Q Okay, you said previously that it was your view
in 1981, 1985, theresUjouts , the United States really did
not have a policy toward Iran?
A Correct.
Q Please correct me if I am mistaken about this,
but I understand that it has generally been the policy of
the United States that we intended to remain neutral in the
war between Iran and Iraq and that has been our policy
since that war began; is that correct?
A Right.
-Q In addition, it is my understanding that for a
number of years, we maintained an armS embargo against Iran,
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mtt/mtlBr
150
which we strenuously sought to enforce around the world;
IS that correct?
A Correct.
Q Would it be fair to say, although we now have a
positive policy towards Irsm, we had a rather carefully
thought out negative policy with respect to Iran as of that
tiine?
A If you wish to characterize it that way, I have
no disagreement.
Q Okay. I don't want to put words in your mouth,
but it does seem to me-- and if you disagree, let me
know, that when you are looking at a couple of the major
issues that confront the Iranian government, our government
did have rather clearly declared positions on those issues
that would have been central to our relations with Iran as
a government. Is that fair?
A I agree wi^h that.
Q Okay, werArou aware that at the end of 1984,
there were a series of meetings between various arms
0-
dealers and Manucher Ghorbanif^r that continued into early
1985 concerning the possibility of establishing arms
relationships between Iran and the United States?
A No.
Q You were not aware of them at that time?
A That is right.
\)
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BMASSMSr
151
1 Q Were you later made aware that those meetings
2 had occurred?
3 A By the newspapers.
4 Q When you say the newspapers, do you mean generally
5 after November of 1986?
6 A Yes.
7 Q At no point in your conversations with Israeli
8 officials did they tell you about these meetings?
9 A That is right.
10 Q When you began working at the National Security
11 Council, I assume that you were basically given access to
12 whatever information, intelligence information, the NSC
13 had available in the areas that fell within your purview;
14 is that correct?
15 A Yes, in theory. In practice, it was a week to
15 week proposition where Colonel North instructed Fawn Hall
17 what to have shown me or he went out of his way to show me.
IQ Certain materials I would routinely see — the various CIA
19 «md Defense Department pxiblications on terrorism, for
20 example, the weeklies, the dailies, the sections of the
21 NID Intel that I was working on, whatever special studies
22 ceune up, so it was fairly routine.
23 Q This goes back to the period prior to January 1,
24 1985. Are you familiar with the term, "burn notice?" You
2« hecLTd that term?
WM W^nSWr" Ihf'P
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ItNGllSSIitift'
152
A I had not until quite recently.
Q This sort of takes the premise for the next question
but it was-- were you aware that such a notice, which is
technically referred to as a fabricator notice, will be
issued with respect to Mr. Ghorbanifer in 1984?
A No.
Q I see, and you, I take it, have only become aware
of that through the newspapers?
A No, I heard it for the first time from Charlie
Allen some time in 1986.
Q In 1986 some time?
A Yes.
Q Okay, what I would like to do now, I would like
to take you back through the chronology for 1985 and ask
what I hope will be some clarifying follow-on questions
for the record. I am not trying to introduce precision
where it doesn't exist in your mind, or it doesn't exist
in the record. I am trying to make sure that I understand
your view as to what happened at various points.
I am going to be working from a summary of events,
which is prepared principally on the basis of the National
Select Committee reports, all public documents.
Mr. WOOLSEY: Is it possible for us to look at
a copy?
MR. VAN CLZVE: I would be more than happy to show
'HHMN ?PTfVillMlJ4^
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2S
153
it to you as we go along. I only have the one.
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
Q Something happened on or about this date. Were
you aware of it at the time? To take an entry and we
would be happy to mark this as an exhibit and supply you
with a copy.
MR. WOOLSEY: We would like that.
MR. VAN CLEVE: Be happy to do it.
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
Q We have an entry here that in early 1985 an Israeli
official, David Kimche provides McFarlane with a list of
hundreds of Iranian moderates.
Were you aware of that at the time?
A No.
Q Okay. Can we go off the record?
(Discussion held off the record.)
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
Q If I understand your testimony clearly, you then
went to Mr. McFarlane and suggested that it might be
desirable for you to meet with the Israelis to pursue this
subject of your discussion in April.
Did you, prior to your discussion with hom on the
subject, did you at any time contact any official of the
Israeli government to discuss this subject with them?
A No.
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tlNtil^StW
154
A No.
Q Okay, prior to your meeting with Prime Minister
Peres, did you speak with any official of the Israeli
government concerning the agenda for the meeting?
A No.
Q If I understand you correctly, then you simply
called and asked whether or not it would be possible for
you to see the prime minister, but didn't explain the
subject matter.
A I asked Ambassador Netanyahu at the United
Nations to make a request or^^afci^^as to whether I could see
It V
hijn in a certain time frame, and I did not tell him what
the subject matter was.
Q I see, so at no time prior to the meeting was
any official of the government aware of the subject matter?
A That is correct.
Q You testified that, and your meeting with
Prime Minister Peres, you met with an Israeli intelligence
official, Shlomo Gazit?
A Former intelligence official.
Q And if I understood your testimony correctly,
you said that you agreed that he would attempt to determine
what Israel knew about Iran, you would undertake to do the
same -thing with respect to determining what the United .
States knew about Iran and get back together and compare
r-
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notes, was that the basic idea?
A Yes.
Q Could you explain how it is you intended to go
about determining what the United States knew about
Iran?
A I was going to ask.
Q Who?
A I was going to ask McFarlane, and indeed when I
came back, I described this, as I testified, and I
believed this was one of the reasons for the production of
the special national intelligence estimate which was
precisely that, a directive to the intelligence community
to tell the White House what was known about Iran, and that
was the basis for any next conversation with Gazit.
Q You testified, I think, that you met personally
with^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^pnd with other
who were considered knowledgeable about Iran?
A Yes.
Q Did you do anything similar here in the United
States at all?
A Yes.
Q Could you please describe those meetings?
A I talked to a variety of academics and some
government people who know about Iran.
Q Could you be a little more specific' The
lu^
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156
government people who know about Iran, who are those people?
A Harold Rhode at the Pentagon. I spoke to a
Professor Bernard Lewis at Princeton, a variety of Middle
East journalists. I don't think I could begin to remember
them all.
Q Are there any names that you do particularly
remember?
A Well, those are the two best neimes. These are
the two people who I think understand it quite well.
Q Did you contact the Central Intelligence Agency
to ask for thtLfer estimate of the situation in Iran?
A That had already been done through the NSC.
I had no reason to do it.
Q So you expected to get whatever information
was going to be forthcoming from them through the
mechanism of the SNIE?
A It was given to me.
Q So it was produced, you think, at Mr. McFarlane's
request as a result of your trip?
A No, the most I would say is I think it was in
part produced in that connection.
Q So it could have been, it could have been sort of
begun simultaneously?
■A Could have been fortuitous, or coincidence.
You just don't know?
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A No.
Q Okay, in your meetings with Prime Minister
Peres or the meetings subsequent to that with the
former Israeli intelligence officials, at any time did
anyone indicate to you that Israel had established a
channel into Iran?
A No.
MR. WOOLSEY: You mean other than whatever
contact they may have had with Ghorbanif^r?
MR. VAN CLEVE: It is not my recollection that
Mr. Ledeen had previously testified he was made aware at this
time.
THE WITNESS: There was an implication when Peres
asked me to relay the request about the munitions. It
was clear that there must have been a channel between the
government of Iran, the government of Israel, but I had
no notion as to what that might have been.
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
Q As a matter of inference, but he didn't explain
to you, we have developed a channel. They made this request,
so on?
A Right.
Q But you would regard it as obvious?
A Well, there must have been some way for them to
ask the Israelis for these things.
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Q That could have been done through a nonaal
diplomatic channel?
A Yes, but I didn't take your question to suggest
that it was necessarily an unusual channel.
Q Let me be a little bit more precise. At any
time during your meetings in May in Israel, did anyone
indicate to you that they had established a channel other
than a normal diplomatic channel?
A No.
Q The Senate Committee report indicates that
there has been testimony that Mr. McFarlane informed
the President that Israel had established a channel in
about mid June of 1985. Did Mr. McFarlane ever tell you that
he had independently received information that the Israeli
government had established such a channel?
A No.
Q Okay.
A If I had to speculate on that, I would guess that —
are you sure it is June?
Q Yes.
A Because if it were July, then that may well have
been Ghorbani^r.
Q I understand. The Senate Committee report uses
the June date, but I am not prepared to say that it is
correct.
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A Anyway I have no information about that.
Q Okay, were you aware that during late May and
June of 1985 there was under consideration a draft, what
is commonly referred to as a national security decision
directive concerning Iran?
A No.
Q You were not aware of that?
A Was not-
Q Was it part of your responsibility as a consultant
to the National Security Council to review documents such
as that that fell within your general areas of competence?
A No.
Q I see. Would the National Security Council have
used an independent consultant such as yourself to review
a document like that, or would that have been considered
very unusual?
A I don't know.
Q You were never asked to review that kind of thing.
During your time at the State Department, were you ever
asked to review a NSDD draft?
A No, but I routinely saw them and could have
commented on them if I had wished.
Q Okay, I think that the answer to this next question
is sort of obvious from what you have just said, but I
want to make sure that I don't overlook something here. I
III
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take it then you were not aware that during mid to late June
both Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger commented
on the draft NSDD on Iran to the general effect that they
were opposed to the suggestion that we change our arm
embargo policy with respect to Iran.
A That is correct. I did not know.
Q You met repeatedly with Mr. McFarlane concerning
the possibility that we might in fact sell arms to Iran?
A Correct.
Q Was it with —
MR. WOOLSEY: Excuse me, in late June?
THE WITNESS: July.
MR. WOOLSEY: The time period?
MR. VAN CLEVE: I am really referring from the
date of the Peres meeting on because that is the first
suggestion.
THE WITNESS: Wait a minute. Let's get this
straight again, because there tends to be some confusion
about the chronology. The question of arms is not discussed
prior to July, 1985. There was no discussion of arms between
me and Peres in May, except for the request that America
authorize that one discrete sale.
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
.Q That was in fact what I was referring to.
Oh.
IINCUSSIIII
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Q I want to frame this question in a way that you are
comfortable with. It appears from the chronology as though
events were sort of proceeding on two different tracks at
about this time. On one track you were having private
meetings with various governmental officials — Prime
Minister Peres, some intelligence contacts and in acquiring
additional information both from that government and from
the United States Government in response to that,
and yet at the same time it appears from the public
record that the formal National Security Council decision-
making process had under consideration a fundamental and
related change in policy that concerned essentially the same
subject and yet you were unaware of that fact; is that
correct?
A Correct.
Q Can you explain in your view why it made sense
to have you as consultant doing what you were doing and
yet make sure that you were not made aware of the fact
that a parallel track into the decision-making process in
the same organization was fundamentally reevaluating policy
you were working?
A Sure, not the least bit surprising. What would
have been surprising was if a part-time consultant such
as myself had to participate in a policy-making discussion.
What actually happened was that the full-time government
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officials made policy, and the part-time consultant that was
used as a part-time consultant which was to go off from time
to time and collect information, learn what he could learn,
attend a meeting, do a bit of travel, come back and
resume his normal activities which were not those of the
NSC.
It would have been surprising had I participated in
policy discussions. That would truly have been surprising.
Q Even in terms of being asked to comment as a former
State Department official?
A Yes, I would have been surprised.
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Q I see. Okay.
Again, I am going to talk about a series of events
which I think are now matters of public record either
from the Tower Commission report or whatever. I am going to adk
you if you were aware they occurred. On July 3 we
understand Mr. Kimche met with Mr. McFarlane in Washington
and told him Israel had established a dialogue.
A I cim unaware.
Q On July 14, what is referred to publicly as a
private emissary from Prime Minister Peres visited the
United Stated^ and, of course, met with various U.S. officials
Were you aware of that visit?
A I may have been if the reference is to Schwimmer.
I was certainly aware of it.
Q If the reference is not to Schwimmer, would you be
aware of it?
A I don't know of anybody else.
Q If I understood your prior testimony correctly,
in late July, you met with Mr. Ghorbanifaor . Were you given
any instructions prior to attending that meeting by
Mr. McFarlane?
A Yes. The instructions were to attend it.
Q Anything else?
A . No. Not that I remember.
Q Did he tell you before you left for Israel that
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he had been contacted concerning the possibility that it might
be possible to rescue some of the United States hostages?
A He did not describe to me any other discussions
that he had with the Government of Israel.
Q I see.
A Either then or so far, as I can remember at any other
time.
Q Maybe that way I can avoid a certain number of
questions .
Thank you for that.
If I understood your prior testimony, on a point
about which I believe there has been a fair amount of dispute,
in early August, Mr. McFarlane told you that it was -- you
should go ahead and proceed with a proposed arrangement or
test, I think was the term you used, in which we would --
Israel and the United States together would transfer a
certain cunount of weapons in the hopes that there would then
be hostages released by the -- through the influence of the
Iranians; is that correct?
A Among other things. Israel was to do the transfer.
The United States had no role in the transfer. What
Mr. McFarlane told me was that the President had approved
this test.
Q - So I take it that you have read in the public
record of the dispute on this point between Mr. Regan and
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I^NCLASSiSB^
165
Mr. McFarlane?
A Yes.
Q Based on your recollection of events, Mr.
McFarlane appears to clearly be correct on this point.
A I have no first-hand knowledge of what occurred.
I can simply tell you what Mr. McFarlane said to me.
Q I see. At about the same time?
A Yes. That Mr. McFarlane told me that the President
had approved it. And on the basis of that, I was to go ahead
and transfer this code to Kimche and so forth. But, again,
that is simply what McFarlane says. I don't have any first-
hand information of what went on in those meetings.
Q I understand. Just a couple of questions, if I
might, about the document that was referred to earlier in the
record as document two. The title we have been using is a
"memorandum from Michael Ledeen to Oliver North, December/
January, question mark, 1986."
Can you recall the circumstances under which you
prepared this memorandum?
A This was after my December meeting with Mr.
Ghorbanifa^ in Europe at which, so far as I can remember,
he first describes to me the possibility of thi
And I wanted to raise with North what I
thought" to be the central point about what had happened with
regard to Iran, so I put the two together in a single memo.
G
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Q If you recall, roughly when was the meeting
with Mr. Ghorbanif ajjr?
v^
A December.
Q But when in December?
A Mid — somewhere in the middle third of December,
if you divided it into thirds.
Q Sometime after the 10th, but before Christmas?
A Yes .
Q So this memorandum would have been prepared after
^v,^
that?
A
Q
A
Yes.
Roughly how long after that?
I am not certain. That is why I have said
December or January. Somewhere in the December/ January
period. I don't know when. It could be either month.
Q So it could have been as long as three weeks
after the trip?
A Oh, it could be as late as late January.
Q Based on your present recollection?
A Yes.
Q Looking at page 3 of the document, the first two
paragraphs start out "Our interlocutors in Iran took a
considerable risk". It lays out the request that had been
made at. the meeting that you have previously testified to in
1985. Then it says, "Instead of pursuing this highly
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promising operation, we have decided that everything will
wait. "
Is that a "we" a reference to the United States
Government?
A Yes.
Q Was there a specific event that you were referring
to when you said "we have decided that everything will
wait until the matter of the hostages is resolved"?
A No. There was no specific event or decision.
Q If you recall, what prompted you to represent
the situation at that time as — on the basis that there was
a decision?
A Casey had told me and would continue to tell me when
I raised this matter with him, which I di d on several
occassions, that he agreed with me that the strategically
significant aspect of the Iranian matter had to do with the
prospects of having some change in the Government there, but
that as he put it constantly, we have to do the hostage matter
first. That has to be done first.
Q At the risk of digressing, did you come into
frequent contact with Director Casey during 1985?
A No. Not frequent.
Q Was it part of your duties as a consultant to
the NSC to be in contact with him?
A There were times when North encouraged me to talk
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DNEiftSSIfl^
168
to Casey about things. There were times when someone at
CIA would encourage me to do it. We got along well. Casey
himself always encouraged me to call him when I had something
I wished to discuss.
Q I take it you had known him for some time?
A I knew him when I worked for Haig and we had several
discussions then
Q
Director Casey?
A Yes, indeed.
Q During 1985?
A During 1985. At the end of 1985, and several times
in 1986.
Q This would have been about the same period during
which consideration was being given to poligraphing
IS tnen.
Did you ever talk about Mr. Ghorbanifaer with /
u/
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]fjs
L
Mr. Ghorbanifa^r?
A Yes.
Q Prior to that time, say late 1985 to early 1986,
that period, had you talked to Mr. Casey about Mr. Ghorbanifa^i
A No. ^
Q I believe you testified previously that during
1985, you made several efforts to persuade various government
officials that a policy that involved trades of arms for hos-
tages was a mistake; is that correct? ^
1986?
UMtlASSltm.
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169
\S-7 1 Q Excuse me.
2 A In 1985, my conversations were almost exclusively
3 with McFarlane.
4 Q During 1986 -- and this would have been after you
5 were removed from active involvement?
6 A Yes. There were some in 1985. In 1985, I
7 would have spoken at least once with Casey and undoubtedly
8 made these points to North in 1985. I think that is probably
9 about it.
10 Whereas in 1986, there was Armitage, Weinberger,
11 Casey, again, Rodman, Gates.
12 Q Was this within the scope of your employment as a
13 consultant or something you did on your own?
14 A I would classify this as unsolicited kibbitzing.
15 Q Can you explain why you felt strongly enough about
16 this subject to undertake that sort of unsolicited kibbitzing?
17 A I thought we were making a strategic mistake. I
18 thought it was my obligation to make my points as clearly
19 as I could.
20 Q I take it you thought we were making a serious
21 strategic mistake?
22 A Well, there you have it in writing. Am I permitted
23 to say that nothing that has happened since this convinced
24 me that' I was wrong in my judgment.
25 Q You are entirely welcome to say that.
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iKm/sstfi^
170
MR. WOOLSEY: Your counsel will not advise you
against that particular interjection, although generally
brief answers are to be preferred to lengthy ones.
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
Q You testified previously that in your view, the
Central Intelligence Agency went to some lengths to put
Mr. Ghorbanifa^^ in a position where he was not going to y" U-*
be considered a reliable intermediary for the Iran relationshi
A Yes. They didn't like him at all. If I could just
say one thing, to be sure, there were some people at CIA who
thought that we should be working with him. At least three.
One was Charlie Allen. You see a memorandum to
that effect in the Tower Commission report.
r I
The second was Claridge, who thought that although
there were many serious problems with regard to Ghorbanifaci^,
still he clearly had contacts and information which were
important to us and that we should try it. And the third
was the director, who after all made the decision to override
the advice of all these other people and to continue to »rk
with him.
And there may have been others. These are the ones
that I know of.
Q Have you had other experiences like this with the
Central. Intelligence Agency where they decided that it was
not desirable to work with someone and you thought might be
/
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sort of a reliable interlocutory? You have done a fair
amount of this type of thing on your own, I gather.
A Could you --
Q I am referring to your prior testimony about the
kind of work you did for Secretary Haig and the follow-on
work, similar work you did.
A I cannot recall another occassion on which I made
any recommendation to the CIA cJjout working with a given
individual. So far as I remember, I think this was the only
occassion on which I have done that.
However, there are at least two other occassions on
which the CIA and some of the officials of the CIA and I
had serious disagreements over the reliability of a person
and each of these had to do with a Soviet bloc defector.
Q I believe you testified previously that your
company, ISI, does consulting work for a number of clients.
Are any of them foreign governments?
A No.
Q Have you ever done consulting work for any foreign
government?
A Yes.
Q Which foreign government?
A I have done consulting work for two foreign
governments. Could we go off the record on this?* Does that
matter to you?
DNCLIffilEIEL
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I have a great reluctance to —
MR. VAN CLEVE: Do my colleagues have any problem
with that?
MR. EGGLESTON: I don't object to going off
the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
MR. VAN CLEVE: Go back on the record, please.
BY MR. VAN CLEVE:
Q Have you discussed your testimony here today or
any prior testimony you have given before any Government
body with representatives of the Government of Israel?
A Yes , I have .
Q Would you please describe those conversations?
A When the Tower Commission report was published
and I saw in there the allegations that Colonel North made
in his PROFs notes to Poindexter and McFarlane alleging
that Mr. Nir had voipfed suspicions I had somehow profited J 0
r
from the sale of weapons to Iran, I spoke to a variety of
officials of the Government of Israel and told them that
I had been asked about the possibility of my having made any
money on this by the Tower Commission as well as by the FBI,
and the Senate Intelligence Committee, and that I had said that
any such allegation was a lie. That I now found these
allegations supposedly made by Mr. Nir and that I^ would
appreciate it if the Governmejrit_of_Israel would make a statemer
^»0
the Government of Israel wo
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as quickly as possible as to the status of these allegations
since if Mr. Nir had indeed made these allegations, I was
going to sue him and that if he did not make these
allegations, I felt it was his obligation and the obligation
of the Government of Israel to say so quickly so that I would
not have to constantly reply to questions from journalists
about allegations of my having made any money.
That is the — that I believe is all the
conversation that I have had regarding my testimony with any
Israelis.
Q Have you ever been registered as a foreign agent on
behalf of any foreign government?
A No.
Q Have you ever been an agent or an employee of any
foreign government?
A Well, ISI has done work for foreign governments,
but it was not the sort of work which required
registration. That is, it took place only in those countries
with regard to problems that those countries had and it had
nothing to do with the United States Government or the United
States.
Q With all due respect, I am going to repeat the
question I asked you. The question was have you ever been an
agent or employee of any foreign government?
I
No.
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ttHSLASStflifr
174
Q Thank you.
MR. VAN CLEVE: That concludes my questions.
MR. WOOLSEY: You were the coach of the Israeli
bridge team at one point.
THE WITNESS: Private. The Israeli Government
took a very dim view of the bridge team and it was not
sanctioned. All the money for that team was private.
MR. VAN CLEVE: I have no further questions.
MR. EGGLESTON: Nor do I.
Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 5:55 p. m. the deposition was
adjourned. )
tti^Hv^ndPffiU'T
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^■^JiL/tO^lffii/
^^XtAS^^^-
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
SllLSCT CCIU'-lTrEi: ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO IRAN Alio TIIE lilCARAGUAN OPPOSITIOll
JllITED STATES SENATE
MiO
SELECT CC'iniT';:rE TO liAfESTIGATE COVERT
AR^S TPA2JCACTI0KS WITH IRAW
Uo S. iiOUSE OF AKPRESEHTATI'^ES
* * '»
Oepcfiition of IlICHAEL A, LEDEEII
'.Ja3hinc,-ton, Do C
Juno 19, 19H7
r . "^
r-'.c'3 i. 'Jiru 127 Partially DecIassified/.RelMsed onll2iiaiiiZ
undgr provisions of E.0. 12356
^ B. Reg«r, HaSoiial Security Council ^
(1^
iuussife
MILLER REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
S07 C SirMI. N E
WoAingion. O C 20002
S4««666
1118
UU.£n MC^ORTINO CO . MC
107 C Suett. N E
WuhuifTon. O C Z0002
002) ^46-6666
ICLASSIFIEO
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION i
UNITED STATES SENATE
AND 1
SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT
ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
i
Friday, June 19, 1987,
Washington, D.C.
Deposition of MICHAEL A. LEDEEN, taken on behalf of ^
the Select Committees above cited, pursuant to notice, com-
mencing at 8:57 a.m. in Room 901 of the Hart Senate Office
Building, before Terry Barham, a notary public in and for the ;
i
District of Columbia, when were present: i
For the Senate Select Committee: i
PAUL BARBADORCEsq. I
Deputy Chief Counsel i
I
CHARLES KERR, Esq.
Associate Counsel
JOEL LISKER, Esq.
Associate Counsel
For the House Select Committee:
NEIL EGGLESTON, Esq.
Deputy Chief Counsel
RICHARD J. LEON ,
Deputy Chief Minority Counsel
uiiuLrtooiritil
1119
UNCLASSIFIED
MLi.£JI nCFORTINO CO . INC.
10' C Sunt N E
VuJunfton. D C 20002
I202\ M«6«6«
For Senator McClure:
JACK GERARD
Legislative Director
For the deponent:
R. JAMES WOOLSEY, Esq.
Shea & Gardner
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
CONTENTS
Examination by
Senate Select Committee (Mr. Barbadoro)
House Select Committee (Mr. Eggleston)
House Select Committee (Mr. Leon)
Senate Select Committee (Mr. Barbadoro)
House Select Committee (Mr. Eggleston)
Senate Select Committee (Mr. Kerr)
Senate Select Committee (Mr. Barbadoro)
House Select Committee (Mr. Leon)
EXHIBITS
None
UNCLASSIFIED
Page
3
27
29
37
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40
119
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UKLMK RtPORTIHa CO . INC.
107 C Sam, .S E
VuhtDfion. O C 20002
I 202) 146-MM
UNCLASSIFIED
PROCEEDI_NGS
Whereupon,
MICHAEL A. LEDEEN
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn,
was excunined and testified as follows: ]
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE j
BY MR. BARBADORO: i
I
Q Mr. Ledeen, you have testified many times about |
your involvement in the Iran arms initiative. I have had an
opportunity to review your testimony, on both occasions, to
the Tower Commission, your testimony to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, and your testimony in a deposition
taken by Neil Eggleston. !
i
Rather than review every event with you, I want to !
focus on certain aspects of your involvement, and I'm going
to take it out of chronological order. '
I want to start by asking you about your involvement [
in November of '86, and let me give you a point of reference.
On November 3rd, 1986, Mr. McFarlane's trip to Iran is
described in the Lebanese press, and two days later, the trip
is described in the American press.
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UNCLASSIFIED
■HLLUI rUM^mNO CO . INC.
10' C Sum N E
Wuhiafton J C :0002
HQ2) 146-6666
Let me start by asking you where you were in early
November, when you learned about the public disclosure of Mr.
McFarlane's trip to Iran?
A I was in Washington when the Ashgari story came
out, and by the time that Rafsanjani had given his speech,
and the story became, then, a confirmed story instead of just
an Iranian/Lebanese rumor, I was in Europe. I was at a
conference in Europe.
Q And what did you do when you learned of the
existence of the story?
A While in Europe I did nothing.
Q When did you return to the United States?
A I came back to the United States, I suppose, around
the 9th or 10th of November, I would bet, and I got in touch
with Lt . Col. North, and with Mr. McFarlane, suggesting that
I was happy, and thought it worthwhile for me simply to go
public with what I had done.
Q What did Colonel North tell you when you asked him
about going public with what your role was in the initiative?
A He said that I was not to do that, and that if and
when it became possible for me to do that he would tell me,
and that in the meantime, I should stay in touch with Mr.
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McFarlane about the matter.
Q What did Mr. McFarlane tell you when you asked him
about going public to explain your role in the initiative?
A Well, he originally said the saune thing as North,
and then, a couple of days later, when I complained about it,
he suggested that I talk to some journalists on background,
but no public statements, and no on-the-record statements.
Q The President gave his speech on the Iran initiative
on November 13. Prior to that, had you made attempts to
contact Admiral Poindexter to discuss this matter with him?
A Yes. I had.
Q Were you able to discuss it with Admiral Poindexter
prior to the speech?
A No.
Q Did you also try to contact Mr. Keel?
A Yes.
Q Were you able to discuss this matter with Mr. Keel
prior to the President's speech?
A Yes. I think it was prior to the President's
speech.
Q On November 13, 1986, Wilma Hall writes a note to
Mr. Keel stating that you wanted to get in touch with Mr.
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Keel. when was it that you think you finally did get in touch j
with Mr. Keel? {
A I think it was later that day, but I'm not certain, |
I
Mr. Barbadoro, but in any event, I did have a brief telephone I
I
conversation with Mr. Keel, in which I said essentially, how l
can you reconstruct what happens without listening to what I ;
1
do?
Q What was his response?
A He said that was a good point, and why didn't I type
up a page or two, just giving a simple chronology of what I i
I
had done, and turn it in. I
I
Q Did you do that? ]
A Yes.
Q When did you turn in that chronology of what you
did?
A Probably a day or two after that, and I gave it to
Colonel North.
Q Did you listen to the President's speech on Iran?
A Yes .
Q Did you disagree with anything that the President
said in his speech?
A Yes,
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Q What did you disagree with?
A I disagreed with the statement that all the weapons
could fit into one small aircraft, and I disagreed with the
statement-- if I remember right, it's been a while since I've
read it--but if I remember, he said that there had been at no
time no arms for hostages. And I felt that the policy,
although it had not begun as arms for hostages, that in fact
it had become that, at least to a significant degree.
Q When did you meet with Colonel North to turn in
your chronology?
A I don't remember, and I'm not even certain that I
met with Colonel North when I turned it in.
Q Did you have a chance to raise your concerns about
the President's speech with Colonel North?
A Yes.
Q What was his reaction?
A H© said that I was not the only one to say that,
and I said to him that I thought it was still not too late
for the President simply to tell what had happened, and to say
that we were looking for some kind of geopolitical demarche
with regard to Iran, that we unfortunately became enmeshed in
an arms-for-hostage affair in which the President, himself.
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had become emotionally involved with the hostage question, j
that he regretted it. He still felt quite passionately about '
the fate of the hostages, and would do anything reasonable to !
!
try to get them out, but felt that what had happened was j
probably wrong, and that he had put an end to it, and then i
i
would get on with it. !
My understanding was that in fact Secretary I
t
Weinberger had recommended exactly that before the speech, and 1
I thought it was a good idea, and I thought he should still |
1
do it. j
Q What was Colonel North's reaction? i
A Well, it said it wasn't only Weinberger in fact, j
that there were others . [
Q And did North tell you what his view was?
A He did not.
Q Do you recall whether this discussion with Colonel
North was in person or over the telephone?
A It was probably both. It was probably both in
person, and on the phone.
Q Did you discuss the Iran arms matter with him
several times during this period, around the time of the Pres-
ident's speech?
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A No. I don't think we did. We had discussed it |
I
enough before that. [
I
I
Q Do you recall a conversation with Colonel North in I
which he suggested that you should get a lawyer? j
A Yes . I
Q As best you can, what was the date of that conversa- '
tion? !
A I'm quite unsure about the date of this conversa- i
tion.
Q Would it have been before the President's speech,
I
or after? i
A My belief is that it was after the President's j
speech, but prior to the 21st of November. j
Q And would the conversation have been in person or j
over the telephone? |
A I don't know. It could have been either.
Q what do you recall Colonel North saying to you
about getting a lawyer?
A I remember Colonel North saying to me that there
were Justice Department people investigating the possibility
of an illegal sale of Hawk missiles to Iran in November of
1985, and that they would undoubtedly be questioning me about
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it, and that I might consider getting an attorney. |
Q Did Colonel North say anything about whether he-- '
Colonel North--had been advised to get a lawyer? i
A I think that he said that he had been advised to i
get a lawyer. I
I
Q And did he say whether he would be getting a lawyer? I
A I don't remember. I
Q How certain are you that this conversation occurred
prior to November 21?
A Look, I have a healthy amount of skepticism about |
the reliability of anybody's memory, and above all, about my !
own memory. However, I will explain to you why I think that
it happened before the 21st of November.
On the 21st, when I went to see him in his office in
the afternoon, he said, he asked me, what would you say if
you were asked what do you know about shipments of Hawk
missiles to Iran in November 1985? And when he said that to
me I remembered, or I think I remember remembering, a
previous conversation in which he had spoken about Justice
Department people looking into this, and telling me that I
would undoubtedly be asked this question.
So I recall recalling that previous conversation on
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11
the 21st and remember it as having been precedent. Now it is |
I
conceivable--the only other possibility, because the only
other time that I remember talking to him in that period, was I
the morning of the 21st at my house, but that was such a very f
brief encounter, that I don't think that that's when it i
i
I
happened, although that is possible, that it may have been I
the morning of the 21st. But I tend not to think so.
And I also lean towards believing that the conversa-
tion in which he said people were investigating it and I
might consider getting a lawyer, was part of a telephone
conversation rather than a face-to-face conversation. So
that's what I think I recall, and how certain am I? I
believe I have a fairly clear recollection of it, but I have
been wrong about things in which I have had quite clear
recollections in the past. So I'm doing my best to remember
it.
Q All right. Let's go back to the conversation where
Colonel North suggested that you should get a lawyer. Did
Colonel North explain to you what the problem with the
legality of the November '85 Hawk shipment was?
A No.
Q Did he say why it was being investigated by
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officials of the Justice Department?
A No, and, indeed, I found it peculiar, and I found j
the suggestion that this sale of the Hawks had been illegal I
to be silly. I didn't believe it and I told him so. I told '
him I didn't th^ink that there was the slightest possibility '
i
that that had been illegal, and I didn't think that anyone I
i
from the Justice Department was going to talk to me about it. '
Q Let me ask you as precisely, as you can remember,
what did you tell Colonel North when he suggested that you
should get a lawyer? i
A I said it's silly. I said all of that was perfectly
proper. Everything that happened in that period was approved ;
by the President.
Q What was Colonel North's reaction to that?
A He said he was just trying to advise me that this
was going on, and to try to be helpful.
Q How certain are you that he mentioned that Depart-
ment of Justice officials were investigating the matter?
A The same degree of certainty as attaches to the
whole conversation.
Q Okay. You mentioned that you prepared a chronology
of your involvement in the Iran arms initiative and submitted
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it to Colonel North. Other than preparing and submitting
that chronology, did you play any other role in the prepara-
tion of the chronologies that was ongoing at the NSC staff
during this period?
A No. I tried very hard to contribute to the
reconstruction of those events, but I never did.
Q You never participated in any meetings with NSC
staff officials where chronologies were discussed, correct?
A No. Correct.
Q And you never saw any of these chronologies that
were being drafted at the NSC staff?
A Correct.
Q You have referred to meetings with Mr. McFarlane on
November 21, 1986. How did that meeting come about?
A It was at my request.
Q And when did you make the request fora meeting?
A Oh, I think I'd been trying to talk to him for a
couple of days, and that he had--he probably called the night
before, or he may have called that same morning, to say how
about, what?, 11:00 o'clock at your place. And I was beating
my well-known and dying horse at that point, which was to the
effect, I thought that what we had done in 1985 was a good
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thing, nothing to be ashamed of. Quite the contrary. That
the story ought to be told, ought to be told publicly. That
I was the ideal person to tell it, both because r was the
only one in the room, as it were, when all these things
happened, but also, because so far as things that had
happened in 1986, which seemed to be much more controversial
I was not involved and had no direct knowledge of them.
So that I could reasonably and correctly, and
honestly, speak publicly to journalists, to television,
whatever, about what had happened in 1985, which I thought
was good and defensible, and that these other things, when
they asked me questions, I would simply say I don't know
about them which is the truth.
Q Up until November 21, had you been allowed to go
public, as it were, with your story on Iran?
A No.
Q And your purpose in asking to meet with Mr.
McFarlane on November 21 was in part to try to get that
permission to go public, is that right?
A Yes, in part, and then in part to discuss some
things which he had been saying about it where I had some
quibbles to make about his use of langauge, and so on.
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Q What were your concerns about what Mr. McFarlane
was saying?
A I felt that it was a mistake to use the word
"moderate" to describe the Iranians with whom we were in
contact .
Q Why did you think that was a mistake?
A For two reasons. First, I did not think they were
moderate. I don't think it's the right word. But second,
and more to the point, I think it's a dangerous label to have
around your neck in downtown Teheran.
Q What else were you concerned about, what Mr.
McFarlane was saying about the Iran initiative?
A It seemed to me that he had not remembered exactly
how the matter had begun, and I thought that he was a bit
confused about the Israeli role. So I wanted to run through
that with hijn and tell him the way I remembered it.
Q Did Mr. McFarlane come to your house at 11:00
o'clock on November 21?
A Yes.
Q What happened when he got there?
A We sat down and started talking, and we talked
about all these various subjects.
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Q What did Mr. McFarlane say to you when you asked to i
go public? I
A He said, first of all, that he did not think that |
I
this was--it was yet time to do it, that I could continue to
talk to journalists on background, and try to help them j
understand what had taken place. But that in any event, when '
I spoke about my own role in this, that I must not--if I I
remember his v;orda precisely, he said that I must not try to 1
i
get too far out in front on this matter, and that I should !
I
I
not represent myself as having been on a mission for him when |
I went to talk to Prime Minister Peres in May of '85. '
i
Q Let me ask you about that. Do you feel that you
were on a mission from Robert McFarlane when you went to talk
to Mr. Peres in May of 1985?
A Yes .
Q So you disagree with the assertion that Mr.
McFarlane is making on November 21, that you were not on a
mission, is that right?
A That's right.
Q What was your reaction when Mr. McFarlane told you
this?
A I didn't say anything. Some time later in the
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conversation--! tried to figure out why he was saying this.
Q What did you think about why he was saying that?
A Well, I thought there were several possibilities.
One was that he simply did not remember what had happened,
and had in his own mind made it a matter of, who knows?, a
happenstance conversation or change encounter in which Peres
and I had had a talk about Iran, and some interesting things
had happened.
The second was that he was trying to protect me by
attempting, publicly, at least, to minimize my role in it,
and telling the story in such a way that I simply dropped
out. Indeed, the way he was telling the story--and it looked
that way to me for quite a while, I must tell you--because
when he originally told the story, it tended to begin in
July, always, with Kimche's trip to Washington, and on that
basis I simply dropped out of the story, as having any kind
of important role.
And I said to him, whether towards the end of that
conversation or at a later date I don't remember--but I said
to him at a certain point, "Look, Bud, you cannot protect me
in this, there is no way, because my name is already out and
it's all over the place, and all the people who were in those
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meetings will eventually make that point, and people can add'.
But anyway, that was the second main explanation
that I had in my mind at that point.
Q What else did Mr. McFarlane say to you at that
meeting?
A He said that he agreed about the quibbling about
the word "moderate", thought that was probably the wrong word
to use, and agreed that it might in fact be dangerous to some
of the people that we were dealing with.
Q At some point, did Colonel North arrive at your
house?
A Yes .
Q Were you expecting him to show up at the meeting?
A I don't think I was.
Q What happened when Colonel North got there?
A He came in and said a series of things to McFarlane
which didn't mean much of anything to me. They were about
meetings and scheduling, and who was talking to whom, and so
forth.
Q At some point did Mr. McFarlane refer to a meeting
that he had had, or was about to have with the Attorney
General?
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A Yes.
Q What did he say about that?
A He said that he was trying to get straight in his
ovm mind the sequence of events, and what had happened, and
he thought that he was doing pretty well with it all, with
the exception of a shipment of Hawk missiles to Iran in
November of 1985, which he simply could not recall.
Q Was Colonel North there when he made that statement?
A Yes. He made it to Colonel North.
Q Did he also refer directly to a meeting with the
Attorney General?
A I thi^ic so, yes.
Q What did he say about that?
A I don't recall whether he said he had met with the
Attorney General or was going to meet with the Attorney
General, but it was one or the other.
Q When Mr. McFarlane said to Colonel North that he
was having trouble with a November '85 shipment, what was
Colonel North's response?
A No response.
Q What else happened when Colonel North was there?
A At a certain point, Mr. McFarlane simply got up and
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left, and Colonel North I think--he may have asked earlier
but he asked if he- could have a ride downtown. McFarlane had
said yes. So Mr. McFarlane went and got his car which was
around the corner, drove it to the front of the house. I
walked Ollie to the door, and on the way to the door he said,
■'We have to get together. Please call Fawn and get yourself
signed in for this afternoon. Come and see me."
Q Did you call Fawn and set up an appointment?
A I did.
Q What time was the appointment?
A I don't remember. I know that the appointment book
says it was 3:30. I think it was earlier, in practice. I
think it was around 2:30 or 3:00 o'clock.
Q And who was in North's office when you got there?
A I guess Fawn and Barbara.
Q And Colonel North?
A Yes, but his door was closed, so, the question w^as
who was there when I went in.
Q Okay. And did you go into Colonel North's office?
A Yes.
Q Tell us what happened when you met with Colonel
North in his office.
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21
A Well, it was a standard Ollie conversation, which
is to say it's a conversation with Ollie, and at least two
and sometimes three telephones. So, a variety of phone
calls, conversations of various sorts, and so forth, and in
between we talked a bit about Iran and were there still
prospects there for the future.
And he said, he then asked me, "What would you say
if you were asked if you knew anything about a shipment of
Hawk missiles to Iran in November of 1985?" And I said I
would tell the truth of the matter, which was that T had been
aware of it, and I knew about it. That I had known about it
at the time, but that I did not, and do not know who had
authorized it, or how and where the authorization took place.
Q What was his response?
A He said fine.
Q What else was said at this meeting?
A I don't think much of anything else. A bit of
chit-chat. I told him I hoped that his position would be
secure, and that nothing bad was going to happen to him,
despite all the rumors.
Q What led you to make that statement?
A There were a lot of rumors, as there had been.
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intermittently, for months, that Ollie would be dismissed.
Q What was his response? i
I
A He said that he served at the pleasure of the |
President and any time the President thought that he, North," '
was becoming a burden, he would be happy to leave. I
Q Do you recall anything else of significance that was '
I
said at the meeting? If you don't remember anything, then I
you can say so. |
A Ah, yes. He said words to the effect that he was |
I
going to--that he had had some things which he was saving for
his grandchildren, which he was now, unfortunately, going to :
have to shred.
Q Did he explain why he was going to have to shred
these things?
A No. Nor was it at all clear to me, one, whether he
was serious about it, two, what he was referring to. It did
not suggest to me, for example, that he was talking about
documents because documents are not the sort of thing one
normally saves for one's grandchildren.
Q By this point you knew that Justice Department
attorneys were investigating the Iran arms initiative,
correct?
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A Yes.
Q Did you connect his statement about shredding to
that investigation?
A I really didn't think much about his statement, to
tell you the truth. You have to keep in mind that I had
worked with him for the better part of two years at that
point. I had found him, all the way through that period, to
be quite scrupulous in observing all manner of legalities,
not simply trying to--as he's been portrayed in public
sometimes--try to go to the limit of the letter of the law
while trampling all over its spirit.
I had, for example, worked with him during the
Achille Lauro affair, in which he was under enormous pressure
to do all kinds of things, and he had, at every step of the
way, meticulously, double and triple-checked everything with
a variety of lawyers, to make sure that everything we were
doing was technically legal and proper.
And he had repeatedly assured me that with regard
to his Central American activities, about which I didn't know
much, that all of that had been very carefully checked by
lawyers, and had been guaranteed, been assured that it was
proper.
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And the McFarlane statements in the fall of 1985 !
had made a very great impression on me, when McFarlane had ;
said to the congress people who were investigating North, i
that he, McFarlane, had personally authorized everything that |
North was doing, and that if anybody had a complaint they |
I
should please go to McFarlane, because I had nothing but the i
I
highest respect for McFarlane, who I knew to be a scrupulously I
rigorous observer of the law. |
So it really never entered my head that Ollie had
done anything improper, let alone illegal, or therefore that
he had anything to hide form any investigation. So it really
wasn't something on which I focused very closely.
Q When did you next speak with Colonel North after
November 21?
A I believe the next time was the afternoon after the
Attorney General's press conference.
Q Did you watch some of the press conference on
television?
A Yes.
Q And did you call Colonel North shortly after the
press conference?
A Yes,
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UNCLASSIFIED
What was said in that conversation?
He told me that--
What did you say to him?
25
A I told him sorry, and if there was anything I could i
do to help, I'd be happy to do it. And he said that he had j
gone, he had resigned the day before, that he had met at ten |
in the morning with the Attorney General, the President, with
Poindexter, and I think with Don Regan, and they had gone
over the problem, and they had asked Ollie what he thought
ought to be done.
And he had given them a list of his priorities in
which he said he thought the important things were the
country, the President, the Democratic resistance, the
hostages--! don't remember the order, but they were things of
that nature.
And that he was way down near the bottom of that
list, and he would do whatever was necessary. And that he
then went back to his office, and the next thing he knew,
someone called him to urge him to turn on the television set
because the President had just announced that Ollie had been
fired.
Q Was he surprised that he had been fired?
UNCUSSIFIFn
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A I don't think he was so much surprised that he had ,
been fired as he was surprised that he had not been informed j
of his having been fired before the public announcement.
Q And was he disappointed about that?
A Yes.
Q Did you ask him about the alleged diversion of
funds to the contras which Attorney General Meese had
discussed in the press conference?
A No.
Q Why not?
A My call was--I was making a condolence call. I j
I
wasn't making an investigative journalist call. It seemed
to--it would have been in bad taste, I thought.
Q Did Colonel North say anything else about the
meeting he had had at ten o'clock with the President, and the
other people you described?
A No.
Q What else did he say in the phone conversation?
A He would be in touch.
Q And did you talk to him again after that phone call?
A I don't' think so.
MR. BARBADORO: Let's go off the record for a
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second .
[Brief discussion off the record.]
MR. BARBADORO: Maybe the best thing to do is get
all the questions in for this period of time, and I would
defer to Mr. Eggleston, if he has any questions for this
period.
MR. EGGLESTON: Thank you.
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q Mr. Ledeen, I just have a couple of questions.
First, you indicated that in this conversation--you can't
exactly place when--the first conversation that you had with
him, with Colonel North about "perhaps you should get a
lawyer", you'd indicated that he had said that he had been
advised to get a lawyer.
Did he indicate to you who he had spoken to, or who
had advised him he should be getting a lawyer?
A These same unnamed Justice Department people.
Q But it was your understanding it was someone in the
Justice Department who advised him?
A That's what I recall.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Nothing more specific? It wasn't the Atto
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General? It was someone else?
A No, I don't have the impression that it was someone
like the Attorney General.
Q Nobody at that level?
A No.
Q This is a somewhat unrelated question. When you
talked about the Achille Lauro affair, and you said he had
worked with lawyers, that was a situation where you were
actually involved personally. Do you remember which lawyers
he worked with in order to check the legality of his actions?
A Yes. It was mostly State Department lawyers,
Sofaer and company, and with U.S. Attorney Larry Barcella,
whom I'd known from the Wilson-Terpil business.
Q Was Paul Thompson consulted during that time?
A I'm sure he was, yes.
Q The last question I have for you is, over the
weekend, or the period of time, November 20th to November
25th, did you talk to any Department of Justice officials
about this matter?
A No.
Q Nobody from the Department of Justice. You've now
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learned from the same hearings that there was some investiga-
tion going on. No one from the Department of Justice
contacted you?
A No.
Q Did you have any conversations with Attorney
General Meese over this time period?
A I had a conversation with Attorney General Meese on
the 16th of November.
Q 16th of November?
A Yes.
Q And that was about--I will not go into it--but that
was about the matter that you've spoken to us previously in
an interview?
A Yes.
Q You don't recall any telephone conversations with
the Attorney General around the time period of November 22nd,
23rd, 24th, 25th?
A No.
MR. EGGLESTON: Okay. Thank you.
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
HOUSE SCLECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. LEON:
UNCUSSIFe
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Q Let me ask you, Mr. Ledeen: when Ollie described to
you that there was' an investigation going in, did he mention
with regard to the meeting the prior day, that he was at
with the Attorney General, and Mr. Casey, and Mr. Poindexter
and others, that there was a discrepancy over whether or not
there was--to what extent there was any United States
Government knowledge of weapons in the 1985 time period?
A No. r didn't know anything about this confusion or
disagreement, or whatever you wish to call it, until well
after that. '
Q Okay. So he didn't crystallize for you the issue
that was being investigated, so to speak, by the Department of
Justice?
A No. All he said was it was an investigation of an
alleged, an allegedly illegal shipment of Hawks to Iran in
November.
Q The next morning when you met with him, Friday
morning, the morning after his--the day following his meeting
with the Attorney General on the 21st--was there any mention
of shredding of documents on that occasion, that morning?
A Not that I can remember.
Q That wasn't until later that day, in the afternoon?
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Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
Right.
Okay. Do you know an attorney named Tom Green?
No.
Had Ollie ever mentioned him in your presence?
No.
How about Leonard Garment?
Yes .
Were you aware that Ollie had met with Leonard
Garment in that summer of '86?
A Yes.
Q In July. Do you know why they met?
A They met because--! think they met because Ollie
was under pressure, there was some talk that people, some
people wanted Ollie out, and Ollie talked to Leonard because
Leonard is a very knowledgeable man about the political
process of this city, and he was someone to whom a person
like Ollie, in such a situation, would want to bounce ideas
and have conversations, to see what did he think, what had he
heard, and just go for wisdom and advice.
Q Do you know if he asked him for any legal opinions
as to Ollie '3 conduct in the past?
A I don't know. I wasn't present at the conversa-
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tions.
Q Okay. He met with Tom Green shortly after that,
within a week's period of time after that. You were not
aware that he subsequently met with Mr. Green?
A No.
Q Okay. I think you mentioned, just a few minutes
ago, that Ollie had commented about he sought legal advice
with regard to his conduct on the Central American front?
A Yes.
Q Did he mention who any lawyers were that he had
sought advice from for that area?
A No .
Q Had he ever mentioned to you that he was thinking
of altering any documents?
A No.
Q Or that he had altered any documents?
A No .
Q Just a general question in terms of the relationship
between McFarlane and North. Was it still a close relation-
ship after McFarlane had left the position as NSC advisor?
A I really can't speak to that because I don't think
I saw them together after that, with the exception of the ten
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minutes or so at my house that morning.
Q Was there anything to indicate that they were at
odds with one another? |
i
A No. I
Q Or "on the outs", so to speak? |
A No. Certainly, when Bud was National Security
Advisor it was a very close relationship. '
Q You mentioned that one of the reasons why McFarlane
might have told you to not say that you were on a mission for
him was that he might have been trying to protect you? |
A Yes. ;
Q Was that a natural reaction of Bud McFarlane, do
you think? Is he the kind of person who tends to try to j
protect his friends or associates?
A That's the way I've always thought of him.
I
Q Did Ollie ever mention to you that he thought of j
I
himself as a scapegoat, on that Friday, the 21st, or on any
I
earlier occasion? That he was going to be a scapegoat in the
future?
A No . He had said, for a long time, that he expected
soon, or later, that he would be fired, but he thought of
that as normal and predictable for someone involved in
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controversial activities. At a certain point, when they
become too controversial, people at his level are asked to
leave, and he expected that. He didn't talk in terms of
being a scapegoat.
Q Had he ever intimated to you that he thought he
might be doing things that were illegal?
A No . On the contrary. He always said that everyth-
ing he was doing had been cleared and was legal.
Q And when he made that comment to you about, "I
might have to shred some of these things I've been saving for
my grandchildren", or words to that effect--when you heard
him say that, did it occur to you at that point, well, maybe
there'd be something illegal about what he's about to do, and
that therefore you should caution him not to do it, as a
friend?
A No. It never occurred to me that he ever had, or
would do anything illegal.
Q One last area. The conversation you had with him--
I Just want to make sure I've got these dates straight in my
mind. The conversation you had with him after the Attorney
General's press conference, when you talked to him on that
occasion, he was in his office, wasn't he, when you talked to
UNCLASSIFIED
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1 him?
,2 A I think so. It may have beer, later in the day, and
3 he may have been at home by then. I don't know. But I think
4 he was in his office.
5 Q You don't think he was at a hotel room anywhere, do
6 you?
7 A No. Not that I know of.
8 Q Okay. Did he make any reference to having been
9 talked to by the President over the telephone?
10 A No . He was angry. He was angry at having been
11 treated that way. I mean, it's a pattern of behavior. Most
12 everyone who's been fired in this Administration has been
13 fired exactly that way.
14 Q Blinds ided.
15 A Not being told in advance, learning either through
16 the newspapers or television. So, I mean, he's just the
17 latest in a long string. But everyone always reacts that
18 way, which is--it's a very, singularly unpleasant way to be
19 fired. It's much better if they tell you earlier.
20 Q You are aware, are you not, of testimony that he
21 got a phone call from the President at some point?
22 A Yes.
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" 1 Q So was it your impression that you talking to him
2 I was prior to his getting that phone call?
3 ' A That's my impression, but it may be that--
4 Q Could be otherwise?
5 A Yes.
6 Q Well, when you did speak to him on the phone, he
7 [ recounted a meeting that he had attended?
8 A Yes .
9 I Q Was it your impression that that meeting had taken
10 I place that day, the 25th, earlier that morning?
11 A Yes.
12 Q And it was just those four people that you men-
13 1 tioned?
14 A
15 Q
16 A
17 Q
18 meeting?
19 I A He said that he, Ollie, would hear from them.
20 Q And he also gave you the impression that he, Ollie,
21 had already resigned at that point, the prior day?
22 A Had resigned the prior day, yes.
Yes .
Did he say where the meeting took place?
I don't remember.
And did he say what the President said during the
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Q So the purpose of the meeting wasn't to tender his
resignation to the President?
A No.
Q At least your impression.
A That's right.
MR. LEON: Thank you.
MR. EGGLESTON: Paul, there were some questions
that were asked at the very beginning that confused me. Can
I just ask two follow-up questions?
MR. BARBADORO: Sure. Let me just ask one, first.
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. BARBADORO:
Q The call that you made on the 25th to Colonel
North, you called him at his office, correct?
A Correct.
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. EGGLESTON:
Q Mr. Leon asked you some questions that had some
facts in them, and I wasn't sure, in your answers, whether you
knew the facts.
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He mentioned to you I think about a meeting that
had taken place on the 20th among the Attorney General and
Casey and Poindexter, and then you responded to the question,
but I didn't know, from your response, whether you knew that
that meeting had taken place.
A I had not.
MR. EGGLESTON: You did not know that meeting took
place. Okay. That's all I want to know.
MR. KERR: Paul, if I can.
MR. BARBADORO: Yes.
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. KERR:
Q Let me just ask a couple of questions, some more
detail on the "get a lawyer" conversation that you had, that
you placed prior to November 21. Where did that conversation
take place?
A The conversation when he said that there were
people investigating from the Justice Department?
Q Yes .
A I think I said that I don't remember either when,
or precisely where.
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Q Do you have any recollection of who else might have
been present, if anybody?
A There was no one else present. There was never
anyone else present when North and I spoke in his office.
Q All right.
A And I lean in the direction of believing that that
conversation was a telephone conversation in any case.
Q Did you act in any way upon_^fce suggestion that you
get a lawyer?
A No. I told him I thought it was silly and that no
one was going to call me. In fact no one did call me.
Q So you didn't make inquiry of any attorneys that
you knew?
A No.
Q And there would be no records, that you know of,
that they, or other people might keep of such an inquiry, that
would help us place in time when it actually occurred?
A That's correct.
Q And you didn't keep any notes on it, I take it?
A That's right.
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
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BY MR. BARBADORO:
Q As I mehtioned before, Mr. Ledeen, we all know
you've been questioned at great length about these matters,
and I want to go over some of the meetings you had with
people in Israel, and elsewhere, in the summer and fall of
1985, but I'm not going to ask you to recount every detail
from those meetings because you've testified about them
before.
I want to focus on certain matters with you, that
may or may not have been discussed in those meetings. I'm
particularly interested in discussions about the pricing of
weapons and about the issue of replenishment, and I hope we
can move through these meetings relatively quickly.
Let me start with a trip that your travel records
show that you made to Israel on May 1, 1985. Do you recall
that trip?
A Yes.
Q Who did you meet with in Israel?
A I met with Prime Minister Peres, and I met subse-
quently with Shlomo Gazit.
Q In general terms, would you just describe what you
discussed in your meeting with Mr. Peres.
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A I discussed the inadequate information that the !
Government of the United States had about Iran, and about
I
I
Iran's role in international terrorism. And I asked him if he'
felt that Israel had a satisfactory understanding of that
situation. He said no, but that he agreed that it was an i
important matter and he proposed to create a study group, or :
whatever you care to call it, who would try to pull together I
what Israel knew about Iran, so that we could compare notes i
and try to achieve a better understanding together. ]
1
Q Did he ask you to convey a message to Mr. McFarlane?
A Yes. i
Q What was that message? '
A Said that they, Israel, had been asked by the |
Government of Iran to sell to Iran a certain quantity of--I
think it was artillery shells, but it could have been
artillery pieces--! don't recall--and that they would not do
this without explicit American approval, and would I ask
McFarlane if the United States approved.
Q Did he mention a specific kind of artillery shell,
or artillery?
A I don't recall.
Q And you can't recall the quantity that he was
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talking about shipping to Iran?
A There was a quantity but I don't remember it.
Q Was this shipment linked in any way to the potential
release of hostages?
A No.
Q Was there any discussion at your meeting with Mr.
Peres about getting hostages released?
A No.
Q Were TOW missiles discussed at that meeting?
A No.
Q Was Ghorbanif ar ' s name mentioned at that meeting?
A No.
Q Was there any discussion at the meeting about
improving U.S. relations with Iran by shipping weapons to
Iran?
A No. There was no discussion of the relationship
between the United States and Iran at all.
Q Did Mr. Peres explain why he wanted to ship this
artillery or artillery shells to Iran?
A He said that Israel had found it useful to have
channels into Iran, that if we were interested in getting
maximum information out of Iran, that this was one way. Those
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sort of channels helped them get information.
Q And is it also fair to say that at this meeting, he
expressed a willingness to try to cooperate with the United
States in improving the quality of the intelligence that was
available on Iran?
A Yes.
Q After this meeting in May, you returned and briefed
Mr. McFarlane on what Mr. Peres had to say, correct?
A Correct.
Q And at that time, or shortly thereafter, there was
discussion about you taking a second trip to Israel?
A Well, I had intended to take--I had expected to,
and asked to take a second trip rather sooner than I ended up
doing, because my understanding with Gazit had been that I
would check to see what our knowledge of Iran was, and he
would do the same in Israel, and then we would meet to
compare notes .
Q Let me jump back and ask you about what was the
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purpose of meeting with Gazit? i
A Gazit was tasked by the prime minister to coordinate
Israeli knowledge of Iran with us. So that he would then--
Gazit was a former head of military intelligence, and so ,
Gazit would pull together what was known from their Intel- i
ligence community, from their various sources, as well as i
from a variety of non-governmental sources.
Q Let me jump back ahead, then, to your meetings with
McFarlane after the May trip. Did you learn, at some point
in May, or early June, that your next trip to Israel had to
be postponed because Secretary of .State Shultz had found out
about your earlier trip, and was angry about it?
A Yes .
Q Who told you that?
A McFarlane.
Q Did McFarlane explain why Secretary Shultz was
angry about your trip?
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A No, and it was a bit embarrassing since Mr.
McFarlane had previously told me that he was going to tell
Shultz about the trip before it took place.
Q Did McFarlane explain to you why he had not told
Secretary Shultz about your trip?
A No, but someone in McFarlane's position frequently
gets so busy that he simply doesn't have a chance to relay a
message of non-earthshaking import to the Secretary of State.
So I imagine that it was just some mechanical reason, that it
hadn't happened.
Q Did McFarlane tell you that Secretary Shultz had
expressed hostility about the purpose of the trip?
A No.
Q Did McFarlane tell you that you were to have no
further contact with people in Israel about using Israel to
gain intelligence infoirmation about Iran?
A No. He told me to do nothing for a while, and that
he would talk to Shultz about it.
Q As he characterized it, he wanted you to postpone
it for a while rather than to cancel it altogether, is that
right?
A Yes.
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Q And do you recall a luncheon meeting with Mr.
Schwimmer in July of 19857
A Yes .
Q How was that meeting arranged?
A Mr. Kimche called me from Israel and said that a
friend of his was coming to Washington and would like to see
me.
Q Did Mr. Kimche tell you why Mr. Schwimmer wanted to
see you?
A No.
Q According to a PROF message that Wilma Hall sent to
McFarlane--excuse me--a memorandum that Wilma Hall sent to
McFarlane, your meeting with Mr. Schwimmer was on July 11,
1985. Does that strike you as the approximate time when the
meeting occurred?
A Yes. I would have--I must say, I would have said a
bit earlier in the month.
Q Okay.
A Are you sure that she said July 11th?
Q I'll tell you that the message is dated July 11.
It is to Robert McFarlane from Wilma Hall, and the message
says: "Schwimmer has flown down here and had lunch today
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with Michael Ledeen, and Ledeen called back with the follow-
ing". Do you recall telling Wilma Hall that you'd met with
Schwimmer? i
A Oh, yes.
Q And passing a message through her to Mr. McFarlane?
A Yes .
Q Wilma Hall has described the message you relayed in
this way, and I'll quote it to you. Quote: "It is indeed a
message from Prime Minister of Israel. It is a follow-on to
the private conversation he had last week when David Kimche
was here. It is extremely urgent and extremely sensitive,
and it regards the matter he told David he was going to raise
with the President. The situation has fundamentally changed
for the better, and that I must explain to him because it
will affect his decision. It is very important, it won't keep
more than a day or two, but could keep until Saturday
morning. This is the real thing and it is just wonderful
news . "
Do you recall giving that message to Wilma Hall to
relay to Mr. McFarlane?
A Yes.
Q Let me ask you some questions about it. Did Mr.
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Schwinuner say to you that he was giving you a message from the
prime minister of Israel? >
i
A Yes. I
I
Q Did he say that it is "a follow-on to the private •
i
conversation that had been had last week when David Kimche '■
I
was here"? i
A I don't remember that, but I don't have any reason |
to doubt it. I
Q And It says that "It is extremely urgent and
extremely sensitive and it regards the matter he told David he;
was going to raise with the President". '
Do you know what that sentence means? j
A Yes. I think that what happened was that the I
!
Israelis had met Ghorbanifar some time before, and my I
i
impression at the time was that they had very recently, only '
very recently met him, but it may be that they had met him a j
couple months earlier, as now appears, and had just taken a
while to figure out whether he was someone that they wanted
to put forward in this role.
In any event, as I understand it, what McFarlane
had been told was that they had met an extremely interesting
Iranian, and the question was whether--and this Iranian
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wanted to talk to the Government of the United States, and it
was a question of whether the United States was interested in -
picking up this contact and pursuing it. |
Q I refer specifically to the reference to "the
matter he told David he was going to raise with the Presi-
dent". Does that mean that it relates to something that |
Kimche had told McFarlane and McFarlane had told Kimche he i
was going to raise with the President? Is that what that i
sentence means? j
A I'm going to have to guess as to what that sentence
means because I don't remember what I had in mind.
Q Well, who did you think was talking to the President
about this initiative? :
A McFarlane.
Q And what did you think McFarlane was telling the
President about the initiative prior to your meeting with
Schwimmer?
A I doubted that McFarlane had told the President
anything about this initiative before then, because so far as
I knew, there was nothing of any significance to report.
Q Was it your understanding that Kimche had met with
McFarlane to discuss the initiative, prior to your meeting
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with Schwiminer on July 11th?
A I hadn't known about that. And in fact I must
confess to you that I had forgotten that Schwimmer had told
me about it until you just read me Wilma's note here.
Q Well, Wilma quotes you a saying it is "a follow-on
to the private conversation he had last week when David
Kimche was here'. Does that refresh your memory as to
whether Kimche had met with McFarlane prior to your luncheon
meeting with Schwimmer?
A As I told you, I had not remembered Schwimmer
telling me that until you just read that to me.
Q Do you remember it now?
A No. I don't particularly remember it now. But I
have every confidence in Wilma's accuracy, so I'm quite sure
it's right.
Q And do you have any present recollection of Mr.
McFarlane telling you that he had been discussing your
meetings with the Israelis with the President, prior to July
11, 1985?
A No.
Q And my reading you this note from Wilma Hall
doesn't refresh your recollection about that?
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A No . I would guess that the reference of David
discussing something with the President would refer to a
matter that Bud was going to take to the President as a
result of his conversations with David Kimche, and not i
because of anything I had done. A new subject. There was
nothing in what I had done that had to go to the President.
Q Let me ask you about the luncheon meeting with Mr.
Schwimmer. That meeting was the first time where anyone had
mentioned Ghorbani f ar ' s neime to you, correct?
A Correct .
Q And in the meeting, Mr. Schwimmer explained that he
had had contact with Mr. Ghorbanifar, and that Mr. Ghorbanifar
might be able to help us in establishing better relationships
with Iran? j
A Mr. Ghorbanifar could be helpful to us in a variety
of ways with regard to Iran. He had exceptional contacts in
Iran, in many different sectors of Iranian life, and with
I
very high-ranking government officials. And in addition, Mr. j
Ghorbanifar said there was a possibility that the American
hostages in Lebanon could be sprung in exchange forja ce/rtain
number of TOW missiles.
Q In a message that Mr. McFarlane sent to Secretary
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of State Shultz two days later, on July 13, he describes a
*.2 proposal by an Iranian official, which was endorsed by the
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Government of Israel. He doesn't name Mr. Ghorbanifar, but by
reading the message, it's clear that the proposal he's
talking about is Mr. Ghorbanifar ' s proposal as relayed to ycu
through Mr. Schwimmer. ,
And he describes the proposal as having both !
— I
"short-term and long-term dimensions' to it. The short-term j
dimension concerns the seven hostages; the long-term dimension
involves the establishment of a private dialogue with Iranian
I
officials on the broader relationship.
Is that consistent with your recollection about i
i
what Mr. Schwimmer described to you in this luncheon meeting? ;
A Yes . j
Q And the short-term dimension involved a proposal i
that concerned the exchange of U.S. arms for hostages, '
i
correct? I
A I think it's not correct.
Q How would you describe it?
A I would describe it differently, and I would say
that I think in Schwimmer's original presentation--it was
given to us in an excessively compressed form--and when I met
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with Ghorbanifar and he explained what was involved, the
linkage between what McFarlane calls short-term and long-term
was much clearer, and I think that McFarlane may have gotten
a better picture of it from Kimche than I had gotten from
Schwimmer .
The notion was that there were people in Iran, some
in very high positions in the government, who were interested
in a better relationship between Iran and the United States.
And they were interested in taking steps in that
direction. That they were prepared, on their part, for their
part, to make a series of gestures which would demonstrate to
us two things. First, their willingness to move Iran in that
direction, and second, their capacity to bring about changes
in Iran that would move the country in a more moderate
direction, the one case in which I think the word moderate is
used directly.
And that as they made these gestures, among which
one would be obtaining the release of hostages in Southern
Lebanon, the United States would be expected to make a gesture
also. And that the one gesture which would convince the
Iranians that the United States was also willing and able to
move in the direction of this better relationship, would be
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if Iran could obtain weapons which the Americans had denied
them because of our arms embargo. That's the way I would
describe it.
Q In this message to Secretary of State Shultz,
McFarlane specifically mentions TOWs and specifically
mentions a quantity of 100 TOWs.
Do you recall Mr. Schwimmer telling you that in the
luncheon meeting in July?
A Yes. I think that's right.
Q Was there any discussion about pricing, at what
price these TOWs would be sold to Iran, in this July meeting
with Mr. Schwimmer?
A No.
Q Was there any discussion about U.S. replenishment
of Israeli TOWs in this July luncheon meeting with Mr.
Schwimmer?
A No.
Q Is it fair to say that the next contact you had
with the Israelis on this matter was in July, when you
travelled to Israel on a vacation?
A Yes .
Q And prior to going on that vacation, you obtained .
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Mr. McFarlane's approval to meet with Ghorbanifar and
Schwimmer, Nimrodi and Kimche, in Israel, correct?
A Correct.
Q What instructions were you given by Mr. -McFarlane
about what you were authorized to do on that trip?
A I was authorized to meet and to learn as much as I
could, and then to report back to him on what had taken place.
Q You weren't given any authority to approve this
proposal that involved the exchange of missiles as a gesture
of good will, which would in turn result in the release of
hostages?
A I think it was inconceivable that a person at my
level could negotiate anything regarding such matters.
Q And you weren't given any instructions to negotiate
by Mr. McFarlane, and you did not negotiate, is that right
A That is right.
Q Tell me how much time you spent with Ghorbanifar,
Schwinuner, Nimrodi and Kimche during this trip to Israel in
July.
A I would say the better part of two days.
Q And in general terms, is it fair to characterize
your meetings as discussions about Ghorbanifar ' s proposal?
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A Yes . !
Q And cat this point did you learn more details about i
I
the proposal than you had learned in the luncheon meeting i
with Mr. Schwimmer?
t
i
A Mainly we learned a great deal more about Iran. •
Since Ghorbanifar was saying that a change in the relationship
I
was possible, we were quite curious about what it was in Iran I
that would make a change come about, after so many years of I
violent hatred on the part of the Iranians toward the West in
general, and the United States and Israel in particular. So I
why now, and how could it be that they were now thinking in |
terms a new relationship in which not only were they willing I
to contemplate better relations with the United States, but j
even had a man travel to Israel and deal with the government ■
!
of Israel in this connection? |
Q At this point, would it be fair to characterize I
I
Ghorbanifar ' 3 proposal in the same terms that Mr. McFarlane |
I
did, in that it had a short-term dimension and a long-term
dimension?
A Yes . - -^c
Q And that the short-term dimension was part of
achieving the longer-term dimension?
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A Yes .
Q I want to focus on the short-term dimension of this
proposal. When you left this series of meetings with
Ghorbanifar, Schwimmer, Nimrodi and Kimche in July, did you
understand the short-term dimensions of this proposal to be
that the United States would make a gesture by allowing
Israel to ship 100 TOWs to Iran, and that in turn, the
Iranians would make several gestures, one of which was to
effect the release of hostages?
A Yes.
Q So it was your understanding in July, that the
figure of 100 TOWs was still being discussed at that point?
A I don't remember that, to tell you the truth. It
could very well have been, and it may not have been.
Q Do you recall any discussions in these meetings in
July about the issue of how much Iran was going to pay for
the TOWs?
A No.
Q And do you recall any discussion in these meetings
in July about whether the United States Government would
replenish the Israeli stock of TOWs?
A Yes. That question was raised.
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»v.' 1 i
Q Who raised it with you?
A Well, at' a minimum, Defense Minister Rabin raised
it with me.
Q What did he say to you?
A He asked me whether Israel would be permitted to
buy TOWs to replace the ones that they were selling to Iran,
because he was not enthusiastic about depleting their
stockpile of TOW missiles.
Q And what was your response to that statement?
A I told him that I wasn't competent to answer the
question .
Q Did you pass on his concern about replenishment to
McFarlane, when you returned to brief him on the trip?
A No.
Q Did Kimche say anything to you about the issue of
replenishment during these July meetings?
A I don't think so.
Q Did you keep any notes of what was said at these
July meetings?
A I did at the time, yes.
Q Did you turn them into anybody?
A I gave McFarlane a set of notes regarding what
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Ghorbanifar had had to say about Iran, and the picture of the
situation in Iran.
Q Notes that you prepared from the discussion with
Ghorbanifar?
A Yes. These were extremely long conversations, so
that part of the time Kimche took notes, and part of the time
I took notes, and when it was over, we sat down and typed up
our notes, respectively, and got an overall copy of what had
taken place and this was given to McFarlane.
you :
Q
A
And you do not have copies of those notes today, do
No. I do not. Haven't you found those?
MR. BARBADORO: Off the record.
[Brief discussion off the record.]
BY MR. BARBADORO:
Do you know, did Kimche get a copy of those notes?
I suppose he did. I don't know, but I presume he
did.
Q At these meetings in July, was Ghorbanifar holding
out the possibility of introducing you and the Israelis to
senior Iranian officials?
A Yes. And not only senior Iranian officials, but
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UNCLASSIFIED
60
Iranians from various sectors of Iranian society and activity.
Q And was that part of the appeal of this proposal to
3 I you and to the Israelis?
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A It was, frankly, the major part of the appeal to
us. By the way, if I could just add one thing, because it is
always forgotten in these conversations, and that is, that in
addition to the seven American hostages in Lebanon, there were
twelve Jewish hostages being held by Hezbollah, and the
Israelis were concerned about them and were trying to do what
they could. They were trying to help in that situation as
well.
Q I take it that when you returned to the United
States after this trip, that you briefed McFarlane on what
had transpired, correct?
A Well, Kimche had already briefed him. Kimche had
come to Washington early in August.
Q While you were still in Israel?
A Yes .
Q And Mr. McFarlane '5 calendar shows that that was on
August 2nd. Does that sound right to you?
A Yes.
Q And it was your understanding that Mr. Kimche was
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going to brief Mr. McFarlane on the proposal, wasn't it?
A Yes .
Q When you returned in August, did Mr. McFarlane say
anything to you about whether he had discussed this proposal
with the President?
A Yes.
Q What did he tell you?
A He told me the President had approved it.
Q And when you say the President had approved it, you
understand that to mean that the President had approved this
proposal with two dimensions, and the short-term dimension
being the sale of TOW missiles from Israel to Iran which it
was hoped would result in a reciprocal gesture from Iran that
would involve the release of hostages?
A Yes.
Q Was it your understanding that it would involve the
release of all the U.S. hostages?
A It was what the Iranians, through Ghorbanifar, had
said they would attempt to do . I did not expect all the
hostages to come out. Indeed, many of us-l
expected that no hostages would come out. But it seemed to
most of us, that it was important to test the overall
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situation, not simply the capacity or the willingness of the
Iranians to do that, or the other things, which were also
important .
One was, after all, an end to Iranian-sponsored
terrorist attacks against Americans and American targets.
Another was a change in the public rhetoric of the regime,
which did take place, both of those. But it was a way of
testing the legitimacy of Ghorbanifar as a channel, to see
whether the contacts he had were indeed the ones that he said
he had, and not least of all, to discover whether, indeed,
Iran was capable of having any influence over the situation
of hostages in Southern Lebanon, because this was not known.
Indeed, I would say that most of the experts on
terrorism at the time would have argued that Iran did not
have that capacity, and that if you had polled the terrorist
experts--not only in the United States Government, but I
would say throughout the West on this--most of them would
have said no. I think most of them would have thought that
Syria, only Syria could effect the release of hostages in
Southern Lebanon.
Maybe 20 to 25 percent would have said Iran, and
the rest would have said it's a matter of independent
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"crazies" or groups of one sort or another. So that the
invB:stment , if you- like, of a quantity of TOW missiles at
that point, was a way of testing many different things at
once.
And to think of it simply in a narrow context of
■American hostages in Lebanon is, I think, a big mistake. It's
conceptually wrong. That there were a lot of things that--l
mean, you put your TOWs into that slot and pulled the lever,
and you had a possibility of a lot of different things coming
out .
Q One more question about t.he July meetings . You
spent two long days with this group of people. Do you recall
any discussion during that period of pricing of these TOW
missiles?
A No.
Q Is that because you think there was no discussion,
or you simply can't recall any discussion?
A Look, I made it clear to all of these people that I !
was not going to be involved, i.pn any way, in the technical \
questions associated with this. That my role was that of a i
I
person who could attend meetings, who could try to express in I
a general way to help people understand what the position of
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the United States Government was about these various things,
and how I thought people might be likely to respond.
I could answer hypothetical questions, and so
forth. That I was there to listen to what they had to say
and to report back to McFarlane.
> So that insofar as there was anything operational
in all of this, whether this had to do with how airplanes
were going to go to Iran, or how much things were going to
cost, or money being handled, and so forth, I was not going
to be involved in those things. That was their problem.
Q Is it your position that any discussion about
pricing of TOWs would have occurred outside of your presence
during these July meetings?
A That's correct. I was asked at some later date, by
Schwimmer, by telephone from Israel, to please check and see
how much a new TOW missile cost, and he was so alarmed by the
price that I obtained from the Pentagon that he never asked
me that question again.
Q All right. Could you just give me your best
estimate as to the date of that call.
A I think that call probably took place some time in
the middle of September. But I could be off by a month in
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either direction.
Q Back to the July meetings, you recall discussing
with the parties there, that no one was to make a profit on
these transactions, don't you?
A Yes.
Q And you were the one that made the statement about
no one making a profit?
A Yes.
Q And can you explain why you made that statement.
A I made the statement for the simple reason that it
was obvious to me that all of us being involved in such a
matter were going to be accused of having made a profit, no
matter what we did, and that we were going to have to be in a
position of demonstrating greater purity than Caesar's wife.
So that I wanted all of us to be in a position where, when we
were accused of making money, we would simply say to every-
body, okay, here are my accounts, take a look at it all, and
you find it for me, and you will see that it is not there.
And I wanted them to handle the accounts on all
these transactions in such a way they could always point to
them and say, look, it just didn't happen; you can't find it
here.
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Q And did they accept that?
A Yes .
Q Your records show that you made a one-day trip to
London on August 20, 1986. Do you recall that trip?
A Yes.
Q Did you obtain approval to make that trip from Mr.
McFarlane before you made it?
A Yes .
Q And what was your purpose in making that trip:?
A To confirm with Kimche that the President had
approved the test, and to give him a code in which we could
communicate by telephone, should it be necessary for him to
tell us when and where the possible pickup of American
hostages in Lebanon would occur.
Q Prior to going to that meeting, did Mr. McFarlane
tell you that there were certain preferred locations where
the hostages should be released?
A Yes.
Q And did you tell that to Mr. Kimche when you met
with him in London on the 20th?
A Yes.
Q Other than telling him that the President had
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approved the initiative, that there were certain preferred
locations for the hostages to be released, and that you gave
him the one-time code to be used, what else did you talk
about?
A I think that's it. Was there anything else?
Q Was there any discussion of replenishment at this
meeting on the 20th?
A Not that I recall.
Q Was it your understanding at this time that the
initiative involved 100 TOWs , or more than 100 TOWs?
A I don't really recall.
Q Do you recall whether you understood the initiative
to involve a one-time shipment of weapons or a sequence of
shipments of weapons?
A I think I remember it as a staggered sequence.
That is, a certain quantity of weapons would go in, and then
something good would happen with regard to the hostages, and
then a subsequent quantity of weapons, and however many
hostages were finally going to come out.
Q As you now know, a 100 TOWs were shipped from
Israel to Iran on August 30, 1985, and no hostage was
released. What happened after the TOWs were shipped and no
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hostage was released?
A They shipped more TOWs .
Q Was there any discussion between you and Mr.
McFarlane about the fact that the first shipment of TOWs had
been made and no hostages had been released?
A Yes. And I think in fact that there was a meeting
in Paris between the first shipment and the second shipment.
Q Was that meeting scheduled because no hostages had
been released, as you thought was going to happen after the
first shipment?
A Yes.
Q And did McFarlane approve you going to that meeting?
A Yes .
Q And could you tell me what the purpose was of that
meeting. i
i
A The purpose of the meeting was to decide where--if '
!
anywhere--we were going to go from here. j
Q This meeting was attended by you, Mr. Schwimmer,
Mr. Nimrodi, Mr. Kimche and Mr. Ghorbanifar, correct?
A Correct.
Q Did Mr. Ghorbanifar have an explanation as to why
no hostages have been released?
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A Yes.
Q what was it?
A The wrong people had gotten the missiles.
Q . What does he mean by that? i
A Well, he meant that the missiles were supposed to I
go in such a way as to permit a moderate faction of the armed |
forces to get their--to obtain them, or at least to obtain the
credit for having gotten them, and instead, some of the nasty
revolutionary guards took possession of them.
Q And did he promise that if more missiles were sent,
that this time hostages would be released?
A Yes.
Q Did you believe him?
A I think it's the wrong question, with all due
respect.
Q Well, did you urge that the initiative continue at
this point?
A I don't recall that I urged one thing or the other.
I think the consensus was that as between 100 TOWs and 500
TOWs, it wasn't such a big difference, so that one could
pretend to having been pure at a hundred and corrupt at five
hundred.
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And that if one was seriously interested in testing
it, that a good deal of what Ghorbanifar had to say about
j
what had happened was plausible, and that if you wanted to i
test it, you might as well go ahead and test it, and this
I
would constitute the final test, if you will. •
i
So I think on that basis, the consensus was might as i
well go ahead and give it a try, and see how it all ends. I
Now I think we learned an awful lot from both the first i
hundred, and the second four hundred, and I think that I
probably on a cash basis, it's one of the best investments
that anybody ever made, just in terms of understanding the
i
way things work. I
Q Is it fair to say that as of this meeting on I
September 3rd, you were still an advocate of pursuing the ■
initiative? j
A By "pursuing the initiative", what do you mean?
Q I mean continuing with both the short-term and
long-term dimensions of this initiative.
A No. That would considerably overstate it. My view
was, I was full of suspicion of Mr. Ghorbanifar. I did not
know who he was. I was deeply suspicious for quite a long
time that Mr. Ghorbanifar was an agent of a hostile country,
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since, if I were a hostile country I would attempt to create
a Ghorbanifar and send him to the Americans to see what their
intentions were.
And this was something, after all, that the KGB has
done repeatedly, and he was, for my money, potentially a
classic case of this sort of operation. So I was extremely
skeptical about it and I was skeptical . I came only reluc-
tantly to believe in this. I was still basically doing what
I had been asked to do at the outset, which was to try to
learn more about Iran.
The one thing that was working in all of this was
that we were learning things about Iran. We were learning a
lot about Iran, and, actually, in an odd way, the TOW missile
shipments turned out to be a terrific investment for intel-
ligence acquisition.
Q I guess it's then fair to characterize your
position as not being an advocate of the proposal during this
period, is that correct?
A That's right.
Q It's also fair to characterize your position as that
you were not a negotiator during this period?
A That's right.
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Q You were simply a messenger carrying information
that you acquired in Israel back to Washington, so that you
could keep Mr. McFarlane informed, is that right?
A Yes.
Q As of this period, September 3rd, 1985, what was
the state of Colonel North's knowledge of the initiative, as
far as you knew?
A As far as knew, zero.
Q You had not talked to him about what you were doing?
A The time at which North was informed of this is j
I
I
still not clear in my mind. I had not told him about it. At j
a certain point I learned from him, I think, if I remember it j
!
correctly, that McFarlane had told him about it, and m !
I
particular, Ollie said that I was supposed to tell him--I was i
supposed to keep him up to speed about the possibility of a j
hostage release, in the event that anyone had to go and get
I
them, because he would be in charge of managing that.
So by early September, he knew at least something
about it.
Q All right. You're aware that in early September,
that Colonel North tasked Charles Allen to collect intel-
ligence information on certain Iranians in connection with
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this initiative, aren't you?
A Yes.
Q So he knew enough, at least by early September, to
do that tasking?
A Yes.
Q Had you told him Ghorbanif ar ' s name?
A No.
Q The CIA was not involved in this initiative at all
during the summer of 1985, correct?
A Correct.
Q Was that a conscious decision on your part and Mr.
McFarlane's part, not to involve the CIA in the initiative?
A Yes.
Q What was the basis of that decision?
A First, there was no reason to. There was nothing in
it that required a professional intelligence agency, and
second, there was some concern that CIA was not as good at
keeping secrets as it ought to be.
Q Were you aware at this time that Mr. Ghorbanifar,
during the summer of 1985, had, through other parties, made
overtures towards the CIA along the same lines that he made
to you through Israel?
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A No.
Q You have no knowledge of any overtures that Mr.
Ghorbanifar may have made through other intermediaries to the
CIA during the summer of 1985?
A That's correct.
Q And was it Mr. Ghorbanifar who suggested to you
that you not inform the CIA of what was--of his proposal?
A No.
Q Did any of the Israelis suggest to you that the CIA
not be involved?
A No.
Q So that was a decision that was made by you and Mr.
McFarlane?
A It was made by Mr. McFarlane.
Q And it was a decision with which you agreed?
A Enthusiastically.
Q Okay. On September 9, 1985, Wilma Hall sends a
PROF note to McFarlane and it says on the top, RE Michael
Ledeen and it says quote the issue of replacement the people
who sold the soap for us want to replenish their supply. Do
you recall telling Wilma Ha-ll that around that time?
A I don't but that sounds right and probably what
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happens is that in Paris, Kimche would have said would you
please check and see when we can get the hundred missiles.
Q So at that point clearly, there was discussion
about U.S. replacement for the Israeli TOWs that had been
shipped, correct?
A Yes, and I remembered discussing it with McFarlane
at a certain point. I don't remember the date but I remember
raising it with him and he said that he couldn't imagine what
the problem would be. Couldn't they just buy it is the
normal course of events. Why was there a need for some
special arrangement?
Q All right. At some point, did you learn that the
Israelis were charging the Iranians a higher price for the
TOWs and the Israelis had paid for the TOWs so that they
could replenish the TOWs from U.S. stocks?
Yes, I did.
When did you learn that?
I don't remember when, but I certainly became aware
A
Q
A
of it.
Q Would it have been in connection with this phone
call from Schwimmer?
A It certainly was clear from the phone call with
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Schwimmer because when I quoted him a price--a price that I
had been given from somebody in the Pentagon on TOW missile
he was alarmed and it sounded very much to me as if, in this
case at least, he had charged the Iranians too little, rather
than too much.
Q Do you recall who you contacted in the Pentagon?
A I don't.
Q Do you recall what the price was per TOW that you
were given?
A No.
Q You have not even a rough sense of what the price
was?
No.
A
Q And in any event, when you told Mr. Schwimmer what
that price was, could you, as best you can remember, describe
his reaction and what he said?
A He said it's impossible, it's much too much.
Q Did he in any way tie that statement to the price
that the Israelis were charging the Iranians for the TOWs?
A No.
Q What did you think he meant when he said it's much
too much.
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J
A That it was more than he intended to pay or that he
was hoping to pay. It's what we normally mean. I
Q And what was your response to that?
A He then said go tell them it's much too much and I
said why don't you go tell them, I'm not in the business
anyway and it can't be that difficult for the government of
Israel to figure out how to buy TOW missiles from the i
i
Government of the United States. |
1
Q Do you recall any discussion with either Ghorbanifar :
or the Israelis around this time where it was discussed what I
price the Iranians would be charged for the TOW missiles that
had been shipped?
A No. I didn't learn — I learned that after awhile
but I didn't learn that until October or November.
Q Uh-huh. So in October or November, you learned
that there was a connection between the price that Israel was j
i
going to have to pay the U.S. for the TOWs and the price that
the Iranians had been charged for the TOWs?
A Yes, but that was evident because there were
expenses associated with this thing and they had to be paid
somehow and it was implicit, if not explicit, that the
Iranians would be charged enough to cover all of that.
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Q Did you understand prior to the TOW shipments that
the Iranians were going to be asked to pay for TOWs?
A Oh, yes. They were going to pay for it. Indeed,
some of the most entertaining discussions were the relation-
ship between the timing of the arrival of the TOWs and the
arrival of the money in some account.
Q Okay. So you recall being present during some of
these discussions?
A Yes. I remember, in particular, I shall remember
it to my dying day being present at a discussion where we
were searching for a method of achieving some kind of magical
simultaneity whereby money could be electronically trans-
ferred at the precise*that an aircraft entered Iranian
airspace and all kinds of things of this nature.
Q Did you understand that the price that was being
charged would also include the Israeli expenses for shipping
the TOWs to Iran?
A Sure. That was understood.
Q Did you understand that there would be any other
mark-up in the price of the TOWs?
A No.
Q You don't recall any discussion about a profit
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being made so Ghorbanifar could make some profit?
A Look, there has been a lot of talk. Ghorbanifar
also had expenses. I think that the Israelis believed that
some of the money that Ghorbanifar was claiming for expenses
actually represented something other than expenses--money for
other persons. But it was--I never heard any discussion of
organizing this thing in such a way that persons would be
paid nor have I ever seen any evidence that that took place.
Q Do I understand you to say that you assumed that
Mr. Ghorbanifar would include ;he cost of his expenses in
here and perhaps a mark-up as well but no one ever told you
that?
A No. Mr. Ghorbanif ar--I was present at discussions
where people said that the expenses had to be covered. These
expenses were not only Israeli expenses. Mr. Ghorbanifar
also had expenses in connection with this and when they said
that the expenses were going to be covered, it was going to
be everybody's expenses and all those, including my expenses,
were paid for by my Government. These people had quite
extraordinary expenses in some cases. I mean, they were
renting planes and flying them all over the world and so
forth. It wasn't a minor matter. So the expenses were going
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to be covered in the pricing. That was understood. what I'm
saying is that subsequently some of the Israelis suspected
that Mr. Ghorbanifar ' s expenses were not just expenses, but
that there was also some private money there for one person
or another just as Mr. Ghorbanifar, on his side, suspected
that the money that the Israelis took out of this also
involved private money.
Q So, everybody was suspicious of everyone else.
A Yes.
Q But you had no knowledge of anybody making more
than expenses out of the deal?
A I had no knowledge of it and I had their word that
none would be made.
Q Prior to the TOW shipments in August and September,
15 ! was there any discussion about some of the money generated by
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the sale of these TOWs being used to pay expenses of other
persons in Iran? Other than Ghorbanifar?
A Not that I can recall.
Q No discussion of payments for expenses for any
other purpose to other factions or leaders of factions in
Iran to help improve Israeli or U.S. relationships with Iran?
No.
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Q Colonel North's calendar shows a meeting with you '
on September 26th at 11:00 and a meeting with Mr. Schwimmer
at 11:30 on the same day. Do you recall meeting with Colonel
North on that day and do you recall Colonel North meeting
with Mr. Schwimmer immediately after your meeting?
A No.
Q Is it fair to say that you don't remember Schwimmer ',
i
being in the United States during this period? ;
A I don't. I think that the first time that those '
i
two met was about ten days later, when Schwimmsr and Nimrodi
and Ghorbanifar met with me in the EOB.
Q Okay. According to records we have, that meeting
occurred on October 8. Does that sound about the right time
i
for you? j
I
A Yes . !
Q And the people that met at the OEOB were Ghor-
banifar, Schwimmer, Nimrodi, and you?
A Yes.
Q Was Kimche there?
A No.
Q What was the purpose of this meeting?
A Well, this was the first meeting since Reverend
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Weir had been released so we were meeting to assess what had
happened and how it had happened and where we stood and where
we were going to go.
Q Is it fair to say that Ghorbanifar was discussing
the possibility of Israel making additional arms shipments to
Iran?
A Yes .
Q And that he was making representations that
additional arms shipments would result in additional hostages
being released?
A Yes.
Q Were there discussions of any particular type of
weapons at this meeting?
A Oh, yes.
Q Were Hawk missiles discussed?
A Hawks, Phoenixes, Harpoons, Sidewinders, every
missile known to man or beast.
Q And what was the reaction of the Israelis when
Ghorbanifar would raise a possibility of additional arms
shipments?
A Well, it didn't exactly happen that way. He gave
us long lists of missiles that he's like to have and I
liNCLASSlRED
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expressed an opinion that I thought that this was as good a
time as any to get out of this whole business and that we
ought to just stop talking about the hostages altogether.
Q What caused you to be reluctant to continue with
the initiative?
A Because I felt that what was important for us to
establish was whether there were indeed these people in Iran
that Mr. Ghorbanifar had told us about. People who wanted a
better relationship between the two countries and were in a
position to achieve it from the Iranian side. And I was
convinced, first of all, that if we acted in such a way as to
permit Iran to continue to obtain American weapons of
whatever description, that it would make it impossible for us
ever to gauge the real intention of our interlocutors because
they would say anything, do anything in order to keep the
weapons coining because they desperately needed these weapons.
So since the important matter for the United States, in my
opinion, was to establish who these people were, and what
they were all about, and what they could deliver, I felt that
so long as weapons were going there, we would never be able
to answer that question. And that was the question that had
to be answered.
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iFIED
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Furthermore, I think that the business of bartering
for hostages is a mistake and that in the end all you get for
it, is more hostages taken, more hostages released, and I
didn't want to encourage other people around the world to
take Americans hostage.
Q Did you feel that, by this point, what had been a
two part proposal with arms exchanges for hostages being only
one small part of the proposal, had now become a one part
proposal which was solely arms for hostages?
A No, because the other part was there. The discus-
sion of the political matters had, in fact, Ghorbanifar
asking us for dates when we could start to meet with some of
the Iranians and try to arrange the set-up of such meetings,
where could we meet them and so forth and who would be
present. So that was certainly there and indeed, when I said
I thought that we ought to get out of his hostage business,
Ghorbanifar endorsed it. I asked him, I said look, I'm not
in a position to make a decision anyway, but what I propose
to say to McFarlane is that I think it's a lousy idea, what
do you think. He said, I think that that is correct and that
if we continue with this, we shall all become hostages to the
hostages.
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Q Isn't it fair to say, though, that Ghorbanifar was
very much interested in continuing with the arms part of the
arms for hostages?
A There was no way to continue with the arms part of
the arms for hostages without continuing with the hostage
part.
Q So you think he was prepared to abandon his efforts
to obtain arms for Iran as of October 8?
A All I can do is report to you what he said at the
meeting. At the meeting, he said that he thought it was a
mistake to continue with the hostages for the reasons stated.
That we would find our hands tied and we would be unable to
move on other matters because we would be locked into the
hostage question. That proved to be an accurate forecast.
He--there is sometimes a confusion between what Mr. Ghor-
banifar believes and what he is being asked to transmit by
his government and one should try to distinguish between
those two.
Q Do you think you can?
A Well, sometimes you can. Sometimes you probably
can't. His was, and probably still is, unusually delicate
and complicated position. It's a complicated area. I don't
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know many people capable of doing it. All I can tell you is
that is what he said on that occasion. And I was struck by
it. And I was struck by it at the time. It was, in fact,
one of the things that led me over time to revise my original
profound skepticism of him because if, indeed, he were
willing to take that position, then I thought one might want
to re-think who he was, and all that.
Q Was Colonel North present at this meeting on
October 8th?
A No. •
Q As of this time, had you told Colonel North who
Ghorbanifar really was?
A Yes .
Q Did you know that Ghorbanifar was also being
referred by the alias of Ashgari?
A Yes.
Q But you're quite certain that you had told Colonel
North as of October 8th, that Ghorbanifar ' s name was Ghor-
banifar and not Ashgari?
A Oh, yes. I had told him what Ghorbanifar ' s name
was. I told him, indeed, the name of the passport on which
Ghorbanifar was travelling which was neither Ghorbanifar nor
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Ashgari .
What was it?
KrayToag.
Q KrayloGC . Was Ghorbanifar one of the many that got
a White House tour?
A Not that I know of. I did not give White House
tours .
Q Do you know whether he was shown into the White
House while he was there?
A Not that I know of. I showed him only to the OEOB
and out again.
Q In whose office did you meet with him?
A We met in no one's office. We used an empty
conference room on the third floor.
Q Why did you decide to meet with him there rather
than at your home or some other place?
A I think because originally the intention was that
Ollie would attend to at least part of the meeting and it
would be more convenient for him just to walk down the hall
rather than to go out of the building and have to go someplace
else and then come back.
Q As far as you know, did Ollie meet with them at all
H't
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when they were in the United States at this time? I
A I think that Ollie met with Schwimmer at that time i
and he may have met Ghorbanifar. I just don't remember but I 1
don ' t think so .
[Brief discussion off the record.]
BY MR. BARBADORO:
Q Mr. Ledeen, at some point that Fall, did Mr.
Ghorbanifar put you in touch with Iranian officials?
A Yes .
Q I want to ask you about one senior Iranian official
in particular. Did he put you in touch with a senior Iranian
official?
A He did.
Q And without referring to the time, place, or method
of contact, could you describe in substance what was discussed
between you and that senior Iranian official?
A The senior Iranian official told us that he
I
believed it possible to, in essence, change the nature of the
Iranian regime through peaceful, parliamentary methods--that
this change in personnel would lead to a dramatic change in
the policies of the country, including abandonments of terror
and the abandonment of the policy of trying to violently
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export radical Shi 'ism and to better relations with the
western world in general, and with the United States in
particular. And that he wanted to cooperate quite closely
with the United States in this transformation, and asked us
for various forms of modest support, more, again, along the
lines of a gesture that would commit us to him rather than in
terms of anything substantial.
Q What did he want from the U.S. Government?
A Specifically, he wanted some small arms for the
security of himself and his allies inside Iran, some training,
and some secure communications.
Q What would the secure communications equipment be
used for?
A It would enable him to coordinate his moves with us
and to advise us as to what the situation was and what he was
thinking of doing.
Q And what were the small arms to be used for?
A To protect him and his allies against the pos-
sibility of violence from people who he expected to be
defeating in his political maneuvers.
Q What kind of arms were discussed?
A I really don't remember. The picture I have in my
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mind is of pistols and small caliber automatic weapons.
Q Were silencers also discussed?
A They may have been, I don't recall.
Q And how about quantities? How much was he looking
for?
A I don't think we discussed the specific quantities,
to tell you the truth. I think these were things that he
listed as to things that he would like. It was clear to him
that he was one step removed from a substantive discussion.
So that we were talking about what would happen if we were
able to work out such an arrangement .
Q Did this official ask you for money?
A He did not.
Q Did this official also provide you with information
about the political situation inside Iran?
A The official did and the official also expressed
considerable opposition to the sale of American weapons to
Iran.
Q What did he say about that?
A He said that he was quite angry about that because
that had, in fact, strengthened his opponents. It had
strengthened the very people that it was necessary to remove
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if one were going to transform the Iranian government into
something more reasonable.
Q Did his statement affect your view about the wisdom
of continuing to ship arms to Iran?
A Well, I was encouraged to hear it since I had
expressed similar views and so it surprised me. In fact,
many things about the exchange with this Iranian official
surprised me but I was quite surprised and quite pleased to
hear (a) that he was opposed to it and (b) that he thought it
was counter-productive because I thought it would strengthen
my own arguments . .
Q Did this person provide you with any written
information? A list of names of people who supported him?
A Yes. I don't see why it's important but I'll
answer it.
Q Did you provide the written information he gave you
to Mr. McFarlane?
A I think so.
Q After these discussions with this senior Iranian
official, did you brief Mr. McFarlane?
A Yes.
Q And did you raise with him the request from this
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senior Iranian official?
A Yes, I did and I told him that the general under-
standing at the meeting was that we would attempt to respond
to him within a month.
Q What was Mr. McFarlane's response?
A He said he would take it under consideration.
Q Did he ever tell you whether the proposal was
acceptable or not?
A No.
Q Did you continue to try to get an answer from him?
A No.
Q And it's fair to say that you were unsuccessful in
getting an answer from him?
A That's correct.
Q And it's also fair to say that to your knowledge,
the U.S. Government never followed up on this proposal?
A The U.S. Government not only did not follow up on
this proposal, but it did not follow up on other contacts
with other Iranians which were arranged in the same period
which produced for us the--
Q Could you describe those contacts that Mr. Ghor-
banifar arranged?
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A Yes. These were contacts with other Iranians in a
position to know a great deal about Iranian activity outside
the country and it produced tremendous amounts of information
on very sensitive areas for us. And the people who provided
us with this information, who were in key positions for Iran,
offered additional cooperation with us in the future in even
more active forums and, just as in the case of the senior
Iranian official, I and other people recommended that these
contacts be followed up and expanded and nothing ever came of
it.
Q Did you specifically go to people in the CIA with
the information you had obtained?
A Yes.
Q When was that?
A I first went to the CIA in December of 1985, after
I had been instructed by Admiral Poindexter to stop my
activities on the Iran matter and at a time when McFarlane
had told me that he was going to shut down the entire Iran
initiative .
Q And was that your first contact with the CIA
concerning the initiative?
A Yes.
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Q I want to get to that but let me go back first to
the November Hawk shipment. You have described a meeting on
October 8, 1985, and you have also described contacts with a
senior Iranian official and other Iranian officials. Other
than those contacts and that October 8 meeting, when did you
next meet with Mr. Ghorbanifar, Mr. Schwimmer, Mr. Nimrodi,
or Mr. Kimche? Did you see any of those people prior to the
November Hawk shipment?
A I don't think so. ' -
Q Did you have any discussions over the telephone
with them?
A I'm sure I had discussions on the telephone with
them but I can't give you any great detail.
Q Is it fair to say that during this time, you were
still involved in the initiative?
A Yes, indeed.
Q And so it's likely that you would have had contacts
with these people through the month of November, right?
A Oh, yes.
Q But you can recall no face-to-face meetings?
A No, I don't recall any and I can't find any record
of it in my records.
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Q During your contacts in November of 1985, were you
told that a shipment of Hawk missiles was being planned?
A Yes, I was aware of that.
Q And did you inform Mr. McFarlane that a shipment of
Hawk missiles was being planned?
A Again, I don't recall whether I discussed it with
Mr. McFarlane.
Q Isn't that something that you would have if your
role was simply as a person who was passing infonnation from
one source to another?
A Absolutely.
Q So if you had acquired that information, isn't it
reasonable to assume that you would have passed it on to Mr.
McFarlane?
A Yes, sir. But we're still in the position of
contacts with people like Kimche, where I'm sure I had
contact. But I just don't remember it specifically. In the
case of McFarlane, it is certainly reasonable that I would
have had such contact, but I can't recall it and I can't
place it.
Q Do you remember how many Hawk missiles they were
proposing to send?
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A No.
Q At one point, I think you told me in an earlier
discussion, that the number one hundred seemed to ring a bell
with you.
A I remember asking North at one point, how many
Hawk missiles could you get into a 707? And I remember him
saying —
Q You remember North asking or you asking?
A No, I asked North. How many Hawk missiles can you
get into a 707? And he said something like twelve and I
said, what do you mean, twelve? He said, well, they come m
big cases and big wooden boxes and packing and so forth. I
said so that's interesting. And I remember saying to
Schwimmer at one point, what are you going to do, have a
caravan of 707s for these Hawks of yours? And he said no,
we'll send a couple of planes. And I remember saying to him,
but you can only get twelve Hawks in a 707 and he said, what
are you talking about? We can get 40 or some such. So I
remember sort of roughing it in my mind saying it was going
to be something like three planes, three 707s. I was
thinking along those lines. I think a hundred is about right.
Q Why did you ask Colonel North how many Hawks can
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you get in a 707?
A Just because Hawks were going to go to Iran and I
was wondering planes it was going to be this time. It had
been so exciting the last time with one plane. I wondered
how many adventures we were going to have this time.
Q Were you led to believe that this shipment of Hawks
would result in the release of the remaining hostages?
A Well, that was the theory.
Q And you were skeptical about that, I take it?
A Well, I was opposed to it.
Q By this point you were opposed to any further
exchanges of weapons for hostages, correct?
A Yes.
Q And you had made Mr. McFarlane aware of your
opposition?
A Yes.
Q Did you know anything prior to the shipment about
the way in which the Hawks would be shipped other than that
they were going to be shipped by 707? Did you know who was
going to be shipping?
A I wasn't even sure of that. Well, the Israelis
were going to ship them. I mean, remember, we were still in
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J
the same basic mode as the August-September TOW shipments, j
which is to say that Israel was selling these weapons to
Iran. That the United States knew about, that the United
States approved it, but it was nonetheless not an American
operation and America was not operationally involved. So
that it was for the Israelis to manage all of that stuff.
Whatever the price was, they set it; however the stuff was to
be transported, they were to do it; we were not engaged.
Q And as far as you knew, the CIA was not involved in ',
any way in this proposed shipment? j
A My instructions still were that I was not to inform
the CIA of any of this. i
Q And prior to the shipment, you recall no discussions!
about involving any private U.S. citizens in the shipment to i
i
Iran? i
A No. I was not privy to the arrangements anymore i
than I was in the first case. Actually, Schwimmer told me a
day or two before what was going to happen, but it wasn't any
of my business.
Q Is it fair to say that in the November shipment,
that Colonel North's role increased?
A Yes, although in retrospect, it is now clear that
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his role increased. At the time, I wasn't particularly aware
of the role that he was playing.
Q You weren't aware of his involvement in the
planning for the details of the shipment?
A That's correct.
Q Prior to the shipment, do you recall any discussion
with any of the principles about the price that was going to
be charged for the Hawk weapons?
A No. I don't believe I know to this day what price
was charged for the Hawks .
Q Ail right. At some point during the shipment, do
you recall learning that there were problems with the
shipment?
A Yes.
Q What were the problems that you were aware of at
the time?
A I received a call from Mr. Ghorbanifar. Well, let
me go back. Let me see if I can remember the sequence
correctly. I got a call from Schwimmer saying that things
were frightfully screwed up and what had gone wrong. That
North had made various promises and it wasn't working out
right and the planes couldn't land and so forth. I remember
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reporting this to North who told me the same thing except
that Schwimmer had said various things and nothing had worked
out.
And then, I think a few days later, I then got a
call from Ghorbanifar in which he said, on the very edge of
hysteria, that the most horrible thing had happened. That
these missiles had arrived and they were the wrong missiles.
That it was a provocation and that it was an Israeli provoca-
tion because not only were they the wrong missiles, but they
came with Israeli markings all over them. And you can
imagine what effect this has had on our people and so on and
so forth and that various high Iranian officials may go into
cardiac arrest within hours and here is a message from the
Prime Minister for the President of the United States and he
read it to me and I copied it down and I carried it into
Poindexter later that evening.
Q What was the message?
A The message was that we have been honest with you
people, we have done everything that we have said we were
going to do, you are now cheating us and provoking us, and
you must set this thing right iinmediately.
Q Did you get any response when you submitted that
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message?
A Yes. I was fired on.
Q Do you connect the delivery of that message with
the decision to remove you from the initiative?
A No, I don't.
Q All right. I believe it's correct that you did not
know, by name, by Richard Secord was involved with this
shipment in any way, is that right?
A That's right.
Q You had heard someone make reference to the name
Copp, though, during this time?
A Yes.
Q Who made that reference and in what context did
they make the reference?
A Well, North made that reference. Copp was the name
that I'd heard around the office. He would tell Fawn to call
Copp or Fawn would say Copp's on the phone or here's Copp or
there's Copp. That was a known name.
Q And how did you connect it with the November Hawk
shipment?
A Ollie told me at a certain point that when the
thing had gotten messed up and he had been asked to come in
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and salvage it, that Copp had been the man on the spot and
had gone there and done it all.
Q Do you recall any discussion around that time about
using a cover story for this shipment?
A No.
Q That it should be considered oil drilling equipment
rather than Hawk missiles?
A No.
Q Did you know at that time, that a CIA proprietary
was involved in the shipment?
A No.
Q Did you know of any CIA involvement with this
shipment, at that time?
A No.
Q I want to go back to the contact you had with the
senior Iranian official in the Fall and ask you if you ever
learned that Ghorbanifar had made payments to that official?
A Yes, I did learn that he had made payments.
Q How much did you understand that Ghorbanifar had
paid that official?
A He said, if I remember right, that it was in the
neighborhood of $300,000.
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Q When did he tell you about this payment?
A I don't remember but it was certainly by December.
Q Could it have been earlier?
A It could have been.
Q Did he say where this money had come from?
A My understanding was that he had advanced it.
Q He, Ghorbanifar?
A He, Ghorbanifar.
Q Did he, Ghorbanifar, say how he expected to recoup
the costs of his payment?
A He said he hoped, in essence, to make it part of
the expenses associated with it and he hoped that he could
get it out of future sales.
Q And here you're talking about arms sales, correct?
The arms sales from Israel to Iran?
A Yes.
Q Do you also recall a discussion with Mr. Schwimmer
about the possibility that payments would have to be made to
this senior Iranian official or other Iranian officials?
A Well, I would put it differently. Schwimmer,
Nimrodi, and I had a conversation in which we considered the
possibility that at some time in the future, it might be
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necessary to provide money for a cooperative project with
people like this senior Iranian official and/or others and
that, in the event that that became necessary, it might be
wise for us to have a separate account in which any money
used for that project would be placed or through which it
would pass so as not to confuse the two accounts for the arms
sales on the one hand, and then this on the other.
Q What were these payments to be used for by these
Iranian officials?
A Well, it wasn't clear but it was in the manner of a
contingency account in the event that we wished to do it, so
whether we wanted to provide things like communications gear
for them, or weapons or ammunition, or airplane tickets to
travel to meet with us from time to time, or hotels overseas
to stay in if we were going to talk to them, or whatever it
might be.
Q Or to give them money to be used for expenses they
had in Iran?
A It might be conceivable that that would happen,
also. What was never discussed was anything like personal
money to them or bribes to them.
Q What prompted you to suggest that an account should
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be opened?
A Simply looking ahead and thinking in terms of
possible contingencies.
Q And your best estimate as to when you asked for
this account to be opened would be late October?
A Yes.
Q And what prompted you to ask for the account to be
opened at that time?
A Could we go off the record for one second?
[Brief discussion off the record.]
BY MR. BARBADORO:
Q At the time you suggested to Mr. Schwimmer that an
account might be opened to handle money that might be used to
pay expenses in connection with the proposed relationship
with this senior Iranian official, was there any discussion
about the possibility of funds generated by the arms sales to
Iran being used as a source of money for these expenses?
A Yes.
Q Who raised that possibility with you?
A I don't remember. I think it was Schwimmer or
Nimrodi .
Q What did he tell you?
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A He pointed out that if funds were going to become 1
necessary for this project, that it might be possible to
generate at least some of them through proceeds from weapons
sales to the Iranians.
Q What was your reaction? I
A I said that that's one of the things that would
1
have to be discussed and I would raise that with McFarlane as
we 11. j
1
Q Did you raise that with McFarlane? :
A I don't recall and I don't think that I did. I i
think that the way I probably presented it to him was to
describe contacts and the kind of relationship that was
proposed and asked him to make a decision on that and that if
the decision on that were positive, I would then present to
him the operational matter. It wouldn't make any sense for !
me to ask him about a tactical question when he hadn't j
i
resolved the strategic decision. '
Q Shortly after this discussion with Schwimmer, you i
i
learned that he had indeed, opened an account, correct? j
A Yes. He gave me the account number.
Q And you gave the account number to Colonel North?
A Yes, at some later date.
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Q Do you recall whether you mentioned to Colonel
North the reason why this account had been opened?
A I don't think I did.
Q Why would you have given him the account number?
A Because he replaced me in the Iran initiative.
[Brief discussion off the record.]
BY MR. BARBADORO:
Q What is your best estimate as to when you gave
Colonel North this account number?
A The second half of November.
Q Would it have been around the time that you were
removed from the initiative?
A Yes.
Q Do you recall whether you ever told Colonel North
about the possibility that had been discussed with you of
using funds generated from the arms sales to pay expenses of
officials inside Iran?
A I doubt that I did.
Q You don't think you talked to Colonel North about
it?
A This question never became a real question. It was
only a hypothetical issue so long as I was involved.
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Q And, in fact, the account that Mr. Schwimmer had
opened and given you is an account that has never been used?
A Correct.
Q Did there come a time in late November of 1985 when
Colonel North asked you to place a phone call to Mr. Schwim-
mer?
A Yes.
Q What did he tell you about why he wanted you to
place that phone call?
A He said that he had, in the course of cleaning up
the mess with the Hawk sales, he had incurred a million
dollars in expenses and that Schwimmer had said that that
would be paid for and that the money had not arrived and
would I please call Schwimmer and tell him where 's the money.
So I called Schwimmer and said Ollie says you owe him a
million dollars and Schwimmer said tell him to look in the
account. It's there. And that's the last I ever heard of it.
Q Did you know what the million dollars in expenses
were for?
A No.
Q Did you know where Ollie was expecting the money to
be?
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A Yes, I think I knew it was in Switzerland.
Q So, it's fair to say that you knew that North had
some kind of control over an account in Switzerland, is that
right?
A Well, Copp did, remember. I knew that Copp had
been sent there to do this so I knew that Copp, at least--
there was a bank account where Copp could receive a million
dollars .
Q Did you understand Copp to be a U.S. Government
official?
A I had no idea who Copp was .
Q But you knew that he had worked with Colonel North
on the November Hawk shipment?
A That's what I knew.
Q What did you know about what he had done?
A The question is when did I know it. After awhile,
I knew pretty much what had happened. That the Israeli
planes had turned around and that they had to organize a
whole new airlift and that there was quite a bit of activity.
In a general sort of way, I knew that Copp had gone in and
figured out how to get these Hawk missiles from Israel to
Iran. It's a short answer. And I didn't know very much in
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the way of detail.
Q And when Ollie told you that a million dollars in
expenses had been incurred, who did you think had incurred
these expenses?
I thought that's what Copp had spent in doing all
this.
Q Did that seem to you to be a reasonable figure?
A I'm the wrong person to ask.
Q Well, I'm just asking for your impression. It
didn't strike you at the time as being--this is obviously more
than any expenses that Copp could have incurred?
A No, I didn't say to myself that's outrageous.
Q You just took it at face value, is that fair to say?
A Yes and indeed, people with a lot more experience
in these matters than I, namely Schwimmer and Nimrodi,
obviously took it at face value also. I don't think they
thought they were making any contribution.
Q Why did you think that North came to you and asked
you to call Schwimmer rather than North or Copp calling
Schwimmer themselves?
A I don't know. It didn't strike me as bizarre at
the time.
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Q And when you called Schwimmer, he told you to have
Ollie look in the account, the money was there, did he? Your
answer is yes?
A Yes.
Q And you relayed that message to Colonel North?
A Yes .
Q Did Colonel North say anything else to you about
the account or the issue of expenses?
A That's the last I heard of that question until
Secord testified.
Q Okay.
MR. KERR: Secord testified in these proceedings?
THE WITNESS: Yes .
BY MR. BARBADORO:
Q Colonel North never raised the issue again with you
even during November of 1986?
A That's right.
Q I want to skip now from the period of November into
1986 and we'll come back to the December-January period, and
I want to ask you about your attempt to contact a number of
senior U.S. Government officials about this initiative.
First, let me establish this. Is it fair to say that you
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1 ||were removed from this initiative some time in late November
2 or early December?
A Yes.
Q Can you describe the circumstances under which you
were removed?
A It was on the occasion when I delivered the message
from the Prime Minister of Iran to Admiral Poindexter. I
went into his office and I read him the message and he copied
it down and he said, we're going to take you off this thing
for awhile because we need somebody with more technical
expertise, by which I thought he meant he was taking me off
this weapons and hostage business, which had created all this
I
confusion, which was fine with me and I said that's great, but i
1
I want to continue to work on the and then I named the senior :
Iranian official project. I said because that's something i
that I've been trying to understand all along and I think I'm ]
I
in a good position to do it and he gave me a blank stare |
which led me to believe that he hadn't known anything about
that project. And so I left and that is really, I think, the
last contact that I had with him on this subject, since from
the time he became National Security Advisor, I was unable to
get an appointment with him.
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Q Is it safe to say that as of that date, you had
become a definite opponent of continued arms sales to Iran in
order to effect the release of U.S. hostages?
A Since early October I had been. I don't think
those events affected my feelings one way or another.
Q But as of that date, you were opposed to continuing
with the arms initiatives?
A That's right.
Q And you had made Mr. McFarlane aware of your
opposition co continuing with the initiative, correct?
A Yes .
Q After that point, did you make attempts to contact
a number of senior government officials to make them aware of
your opposition to continuing with the arms part of this
initiative and your desire to continue with the contacts with
the senior Iranian official?
A Yes.
Q Who did you first contact about that?
A I think the first person I contacted was Casey.
Q When was that?
A That was in December of 1985.
Q What did you tell Casey?
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A I told Casey the story. I briefed him on how I had
met Ghorbanifar; how Ghorbanifar had arranged the various
contacts, not simply the one with the senior Iranian official
but the range of contacts; and what these contacts could
potentially do for us and urged Casey to tell the President
that pursuing the hostage was backwards and it was permitting
the tail to wag the dog, as it were, and that we should
instead, pursue the political manner.
Q All right. Even before contacting Casey, had you
prepared a memorandum for Colonel North that had laid out
your position on this issue?
A Well, I know the memorandum you're referring to. I
don't remember exactly when that went to Colonel North,
whether it was December or January, so I can't place that.
Q Somewhere around that time?
A Yes.
Q Okay. What was Casey's reaction when you explained
this to him?
A Well, Casey said he found it all very interesting
and, indeed, I think it was that conversation with Casey, or
at least in part that conversation with Casey, that led to
the invitation to Ghorbanifar to be polygraphed.
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Q Did you meet with Casey again in the December-
January period?
A I met with Casey several times in that period.
Q We'll go into this in greater detail in a minute,
but can you just summarize what was Casey's position as he
expressed it to you?
A He expressed it to me--he agreed that the political
matter was considerably more important than the hostage
question, the geo-political matter. However, he felt that
there were internal Administration reasons or the politics of
Washington, as he put it, that it was necessary to do the
hostages first and get that out of the way and then pursue
the other matter.
Q What other officials did you meet with to try to
express this position?
A Gates, Armitage, Weinberger, Peter Rodman, North,
Charlie Allen, Dewey Clarridge.
Q Am I accurate in characterizing it as you were on a
campaign to try to get this arms for hostage effort stopped?
A I was trying to do two things. I mean I don't want
to over-state the vigor with which I pursued this. It sounds
better now than it was in reality, I must say. I mean, it
SSIFIED
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was not a particularly intense campaign. It was sporadic.
People never welcomed this kind of approach. They weren't
cheered to see me coming in to talk to them about this
matter. And I didn't enjoy it all that much but I felt it
was my obligation to try to do this.
The obligation I felt was less a matter of trying
to stop them from doing the hostages because I must tell you
that if people want to try and save American hostages,
there's a limit to my rage even though I think it's a
mistake. It's not something that's going to get me frightful-
ly exercised. What did get me frightfully exercised and
which, frankly, continues to baffle me, is why this Governmt.it
was unable to pursue these other contacts which struck me and
still strikes me as so interesting that any person with even
a minimum intellectual curiosity would feel driven to pursue i
!
them and expand them. Quite aside from what you intend to do I
but just from what they provide in terms of our knowledge of I
i
the world and our understanding of things and the ability we |
1
would have to deal in that part of the world and it just i
drove me crazy and I wanted to--I did not want to be in a j
position of thinking that I had failed to do whatever I could I
to try and encourage that. And that is basic to what I was j
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trying to do and when I did that, I also made the point that
the hostage thing was a mistake because it prevented us from
understanding all these other matters and it was wrong on its
own merits .
Q Let me ask you specifically about the meeting with
Secretary Weinberger. When did that take place?
A That took place in the early Sununer of 1986.
Q What did you tell him?
A I told him the story--the same stories I told
everybody.
Q And did you explain the contacts you had had with
this senior Iranian official?
A Yes.
Q What was his reaction when you told him the story?
A He said it was an amazing story because he had
never heard it before. And he said why have I never heard
this story before?
Q Did he express a view on the Iran arms initiative?
A He said he hated it. This was no secret and he
said but this, however, sounded very interesting and he asked
me if I would give the same briefing to the Secretary of
State.
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Q Did you try to give that briefing?
A I did.
Q And it's fair to say you were turned down?
A Yes.
Q Did anyone ever explain why?
A No.
Q I think I'd like to do is defer to Chuck Kerr and
let him ask some questions about the December-January time
frame because our time is growing short.
[Brief discussion off the record.]
BY MR. BARBADORO:
Q Mr. Ledeen, as you know, we have agreed to continue
this deposition Monday morning at which time we will ask you
more questions about the period of time from November 1985
through January and February of 1986. So what I'd like to do
at this time is let Mr. Eggleston or Mr. Leon ask any
questions they have and then we'll adjourn the deposition
until Monday.
MR. EGGLESTON: Actually, I have to leave now, in
any event, so I will either show up on Monday, which is
unlikely, or forego my opportunity to ask any further
questions. As Mr. Ledeen knows, we had a long day some
ti^oU&ire
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months ago where I covered most of this or was asked in any
event, so thanks a lot and appreciate your time today and
sorry to go away.
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. LEON:
Q Let me ask you first a question just to avoid the
risk that some pundit or newspaper reporter, sometimes one in
the thing, will misinterpret something you said earlier. You
were talking about a meeting on October 8th where you said
you talked about all kinds of weapons, Hawks, Phoenixes,
Sidewinders, and I think you made some phrase like, just
about every weapon under the sun. You didn't talk about
nuclear weapons, did you?
A No.
Q I just want to be sure that there's no reports for
the future that there were nuclear weapons being bandied
around.
A Well, when I said discussed them, it was that the
Iranians were asking for everything, I think, that they could
find in a catalogue.
Q Okay. Now you obviously have testified that you
a '. .■ ?
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wanted to see the ending of a linkage between hostages and
i
arms?
A Yes.
Q That was something you thought was dangerous folly. '
A Look, I thought two things. I thought first that
to deal for the hostages was a mistake on its own merits.
However, I thought that it was also an even graver mistake to
put ourselves in a position where we were bartering weapons I
to Iran because once that started, it would be impossible for
us to gauge the intentions of the people we were dealing
with. From the beginning all along, I was concerned and
believed that my government was fundamentally concerned, not
with these seven people but with Iran and it's the importance ';
I
of Iran in the world which is quite significant.
Q Wasn't Iran making this like a pre-condition in
order to pursue any talks?
A Look, they can attempt to make anything they want a ;
pre-condition to pursue talks, but we don't have to accept
it, and the fact that they want our weapons, doesn't mean
that we have to sell them to them. And I thought it was
simply a mistake on both levels. It was a tactical mistake
with regard to questions of hostages and counter-terrorism .
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and it was a strategic mistake with regard to the relationship
between us and these Iranians.
Q Did you have any sense whether Israel thought it
was a mistake, too?
A The Israelis--
Q The government.
A Well, the first point to make on that is that there
is a tendency here to see the Israeli government as monolithic
on this question when in fact it was divided. There were
people who liked it and people who didn't like it and there
were people on all sides of every one of these questions.
They were as badly divided as we were. It's important to
remember that. In general, I think it's fair to say, that
the Israelis, since they are in the Middle East, are less put
off by the question of using weapon sales to accompany
political demarches than we are. However, I would also say
that the Israelis themselves were divided on my question,
which was isn't this a mistake to deal for the hostages at
all in this context. Some agreed and some disagreed.
Q Well, they certainly have a lot of experience in
the hostage area.
A They do and sometimes they've done well and
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sometimes they haven't.
Q There seems to be a perception anyway, that they
don't believe in making deals, at least overtly, for hostages.
They seem to have a public policy against it.
A Well, yes, but then they dealt 1,500 plus terrorists
for four non-commissioned officers, which is not the toughest
position ever heard.
Q Exactly. Were you aware of what the Israeli
government's position was once the news reports started
coming out about McFarlane's trip?
A No.
Q Did you talk with Nir about that at that time frame?
A I never, at any time, discuss this matter with Nir.
Q Okay, well how about with anyone in the Israeli
government. Once the reports started coming out about
McFarlane's trip in November of 1986?
A I was at a conference at which David Kimche was
present shortly before this thing blew up and we discussed
briefly about what a shame it was that it had worked out the
way it had. But no, I don't remember discussing how to
handle it, or what reactions should be, or anything like that
with any Israeli.
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Q Did Ollie ever tell you about his conversation with
Nir on November 22nd?
A 1986?
Q 1986.
A No.
Q Do you know David Halevy?
A Yes .
Q Do you know his relationship with Ollie at all?
Are you familiar with it?
A I don't know it from first-hand experience. David
has said to me that he had a fairly close relationship vsrith
Ollie.
Q Do you know if it was a friend relationship or a
professional relationship?
A I think it's a little of each.
Q Do you know if it related to the Israeli side of
Ollie's work or the Contra side of Ollie's work?
A I think it related to a journalistic interest that
David had in both Central America and in the question of
special forces generally.
Q And he is with Time Magazine?
A Yes. I don't think he knew much of anything about
ih
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the Iran matter.
Q The chronology you prepared for McFarlane, was it?
A I prepared it for Keel and I gave it to North.
Q You gave it to North? You don't have any copies of
that anymore, do you?
A No and as I think I said the other day, I wouldn't
want to be remembered for that because it's full of mistakes.
I mean, I always thought that this meeting at the OEOB was in
November rather than October and I had an extra trip to
Israel in there.
Q Did you ever learn what, if anything. Admiral
Poindexter did with the message that you gave him from the
Prime Minister to President Reagan?
A No. I'm sure he gave it to McFarlane, though.
Q But you don't know for certain whether or not he
did?
A
Q
A
No.
Do you know if Ollie was aware of the message?
I don't know.
MR. LEON: I don't have anything else right now.
MR. BARBADORO: Okay. Let's then adjourn the
deposition until Monday morning. Thank you, Mr. Ledeen.
'sjm
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[Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the deposition was
adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Monday, June 22, 1987,
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I have read the foregoing pages, which contain
a correct transcript of the answers made by me to the
questions therein recorded.
MICHAEL A. LEDEEN
of
Subscribed and worn to before me this
, 1987.
My commission expires;
uiiybiv :'3
1 . -■ ■
It!
_day
Notary public in and for:
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY REPORTER
I, Terry Barham, the officer before whom the
foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the
witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing transcript
was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was
taken by me and thereaftrer reduced to typewriting by me or
under my supervision; that said deposition transcript is a
true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken;
and, further, that I am not a relative or employee of any
attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor
financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the
action .
Terry BarhajB-r Notary Public in
and for tfie District of Columbia
My commission expires May 15, 1989.
rvcn
iED
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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
;.::3c-' cc---iittee os secret MrLiTARY assistance
Tt; IRXM A>;D THS mCARAGUiU^ CPPOSITICN
UHITED STATES SENATE
AND
si:i.scr coMf-iirrEE to ira'ESTiGATS convert
MMS TRA\'SACTI0NS WITH IRAN
■J.i. :iOUa2 OF F£?Pi:nr«TA'?IVE3
Cou -.inuad Ceoosition of MICHAEI. A, LSDEEN
Washington, D.C,
June 22, 1337
Pages 12U thru 293
Rartially Declastifiad/A^ritil m g^" Tc/t^ 1987
!qfS.Rajnlta|fcai||aenjlt^Councn /-^ "^
iMiimM^^^
MILLER REPORTING COMPANY, INC
507 C Street, N E
WaJhington. DC 20002
546-6666
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
UNITED STATES SENATE
AND
SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT
ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 22, 1987,
Washington, D.C.
Continued deposition of MICHAEL A. LEDEEN, taken on
behalf of the Select Committees above cited, pursuant to
recess, commencing at 10:05 a.m. in Room 220 of the Hart
Senate Office Building, before Terry Barham, a notary public
in and for the District of Columbia, when were present:
For the Senate Select Committee:
CHARLES KERR, Esq.
Associate Counsel
JOEL LESKER, Esq.
Associate Counsel
For the House Select Committee:
PATRICK CAROME, Esq.
Staff
For Senator James A. McClure:
. JACK GERARD
Legislative Director !
UNCIASSIRED
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DENNIS TETI
Special Projects Director
For the deponent:
R. JAMES WOOLSEY, Esq.
Shea & Gardner
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
CONTENTS
Examination by
Senate Select Conunittee (Mr. Kerr)
Senate Select Conunittee (Mr. Lesker)
Office of Senator James A. McClure (Mr. Gerard)
Office of Representative Jim Courter (Mr. Teti)
House Select Committee (Mr. Carome)
EXHIBITS
Ledeen Exhibits
Page
130, 241, 250
208
237, 304
309
314
Marked
250
UNCLASSIFIED
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PROCEEDINGS
Whereupon,
MICHAEL A. LEDEEN
resumed as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. KERR:
Q Mr. Ledeen, you remain under oath. This is a
continuation of your deposition of last week.
With regard to some of the matters we talked about
just as we were closing, it was my understanding from talking
with you that you first met with Charles Allen of the CIA in
August of 1985, is that correct?
A I can't remember that, and I can't imagine being
able to figure out when it was. But it sounds plausible.
Q Can you describe for me the circumstances under
which you first met Mr. Allen?
A Well, insofar as I remember, I think Lt . Col. North
thought that the two of us should get to know each other. We
had similar interests--he was NIO for Counter-Terrorism; I was
after all a consultant to the NSC, and a great deal of our
work done involved terrorism. So that Charlie was a person
that I should know.
Q At the time that you met him, did you have any
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discussions at chat point about the Iran initiative?
A No, I don't think so.
Q So your recollection of the first meeting was that
it was essentially a meeting of folks with like interests
getting to know one another, is that correct?
A Yes .
Q With regard to the next occasion that you met with
Mr. Allen, when would that be?
A I couldn't possibly remember it. Mr. Allen and I,
with the passage of time, got to know each other better,
became friends, and we met, I would say, rather often. I
would say that over the course of 1986 anyway we might well
have met as often as two to three to four times a month and
would probably have spoken on the telephone an additional
two, three, four times, depending on what was going on.
Q Do you recall either by date or circumstance the
first occasion that you had discussed the Iran initiative
with Mr. Allen?
A It would be after Admiral Poindexter had taken me
off the affair.
Q And you have placed that when?
A Oh, the end of November, beginning of December
would be when I first raised this thing with Mr. Allen--and I
think Mr. Clarridge at the same time. '
Q Let me move a little bit further ahead in time.
:■■ ;■■••:; '.> r. .-. . ■ :;S "^ - ■ <
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You met with Mr. Ghorbanifar and others on or about October
8, 1985, isn't that correct?
A Yes, that's right.
Q With regard to that meeting on October 8, 1985,
what role did you play in causing Mr. Ghorbanifar to come to
the United States?
A I'm not sure I played any role in causing him to
come to the United States . I think that it was with a group
that regularly met--Ghorbanif ar , Schwimmer, Nimrodi, Kimche
on and off, and I. We had by then met once in Israel and two
or three times in Europe, and an application of the fairness
doctrine seemed to call for a meeting in the United States at
a certain point so that I wouldn't have to travel.
Q When and how was the meeting scheduled?
A I don't really remember. I think we said it was
time for another meeting, and everybody said this time we'll
do it in your place. And we would make calls among us to try
and figure out when was a convenient date, and the date was
hit upon, and that was that.
A Correct.
Q How did you become aware of that?
A I was told it by Mr. North.
Q Were
e you anything cif^h^fiircumstances
s under which
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how he went about
Q Did you at the time have knowledge of the role that
Mr. Allen playedj
A No.
Q Mr. Allen prepared a memorandum I
with regard to the incident. And let me read some selected
passages from the memorandum to you to see if they give you
any further or better recollection of the circumstances under
which Ghorbanifar came]
He says that "On September 28, he [Charles
Allen] was informed by Colonel North to increase]
ith regard to Ghorbanifar worldwide, and
that there was an expectation as of September 28, 1985, that
William Buckley would be released some time between 3 and 5
October." Let me stop there for a moment.
At the time you were aware that this October 8
meeting was going to happen, did you have any sense or
expectation that William Buckley or any other hostage was
about to be released at that time?
A I don't think so.
Q You will recall that there was a shipment of TOW
missi
les on the 14th of Seote:
-ttiHf
'. V! r*
om Israel to Iran. Using
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that as a way of focusing your recollection, did you have an
expectation of the release of a hostage to occur after that
mid-September shipment of TOW's?
A I did, that Reverend Weir came out.
Q Reverend Weir came out exactly at that time. Did
you have an expectation of a hostage in addition to Mr. Weir
coming out?
A "Expectation" is too strong a word; there were some
representations from Iranians that there might be an addition-
al hostage or two. I did not expect it.
Q Nothing had occurred between September 15 and
October 6 that had caused you to believe that another hostage
was coming out, particularly Mr. Buckley, in the early
October time frame?
A No, I don't think so.
Q Were you aware of Mr. Ghorbanifar making efforts to
determine the status of Mr. Buckley and to secure his release
in early October 1985?
A Yes.
Q And how were you aware of that?
A He had said all along that that was what he was
going to try to do. When Buckley was not released after the
TOW shipments and it was instead Reverend Weir, he was
challenged as to whether people had been lying to him all
along and wasn't Buckley actually dead. He said he would
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undertake to try to find this out, and said he was rattling
around, and some of the things that he came up with were that
people were saying no, it was okay, and in fact Buckley would
be released. I don't think anybody particularly believed
that. I certainly didn't believe it.
Q Who raised the challenge to him that Buckley was
already dead? Was that something you mentioned to him?
A I don't really recall who it was. It could well
have been Schwimmer or Nimrodi.
Q In terms of Americans dealing with Ghorbanifar at
that time, you were the only American that was in contact
with him, is that correct?
A So far as I know, yes.
Q And do you have a recollection of carrying to him
the Buckley question at that point in time?
A I have a recollection of discussing the Buckley
question with him in the October 8th meeting. I don't
particularly have a recollection of discussing it with him
between mid-September and the October meeting. But I might
have discussed it in a phone conversation, and I might well
have discussed it in a phone conversation with an Israeli
also .
Q Let me give you another representation from Mr.
Allen's October 7, 1985, memo. He says "The announcement by
the Islamic Jihad on 3 October that it planned to execute
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Willicun Buckley created a new -dimension in the continuing
context between the American intermediary and Ghorbanifar.
The White House, through intermediaries, indicated to
[blanked out name] that it was important that he come to the
U.S. in order to determine whether a potential still exists
to secure the release of Buckley, assuming that he had not
been killed, or the remaining hostages held by Hezbollah."
In terms of that blank, I have deposed Mr. Allen.
He indicated that he thought it was an American intermediary,
although he did not know at that time it was you. The
representation he is making is what he is saying here. Does
that give you any further recollection of the role you were
playing in terms of trying to bring Ghorbanifar to the U.S.?
A Well, I don't think that what Mr. Allen is saying
is at odds with what I said.
Q It isn't necessarily.
A Look, let me try to put this thing in context for
you again, because I don't know how much you have heard of my
previous depositions on the subject of Buckley, which
continues, frankly, to be a baffling subject for me as well
as for you gentlemen.
I have read no end of reports saying that the
American government was obsessed with Buckley to the point
where the Buckley matter was the driving force for* this
entire initiative. And I have said^^every time this question
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has come up--and I shall continue to say it--that I was not
aware of any particular sense of urgency on the part of the
American government regarding Mr. Buckley. Nobody ever
pushed me on the matter of Buckley--not North, not Casey, not
McFarlane; it never came up. When I talked to people about
what was said by Mr. Ghorbanifar and what was transmitted
through him from the Iranian governinent--they raised the
question of Buckley and I reported it. But there was no huge
sense of urgency, at least that reached me. There may have
been, but I was not aware of it.
So that while Buckley was a subject that would be
discussed in the next meeting, it was not by any means the
central issue of discussion. So Mr. Ghorbanifar was going to
come, but there was, for example, no arrangements, so far as
I can recall, that Mr. Ghorbanifar was going to talk to
anybody else in Washington so that the specific question of
Buckley could be raised with him, at least so far as I can
recall--I don't recall any such thing. And I don't believe
there was a discussion.
Q Do you recall being specifically asked after the
Jihad made its threat that it was going to execute Buckley on
October 3rd something to the effect: please get Ghorbanifar
to Washington, D.C., so we can talk to him. Did anything
like that occur after the Jihad threat?
A Not that I can ^;ec^:^ ..», J^ .aa^-case — could I go off
? ?. ft. ~ ''*^ • , ' ■ - ,*■ i. ■"; •> ■' * ■' -
^/t-i'>' ^n
■1 «
Li<4'^ija>i vaka AnilJ ga^,|.j
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the record for just one second?
Q Sure.
[Brief discussion off the record]
BY MR. KERR:
Q In terms of what you were doing in early October
with regard to the upcoming Ghorbanifar visit, you did not
connect it with the threat of the Islamic Jihad to execute
Buckley, correct?
A Well, in the sense that the IJO threat to execute
Buckley was not a cause of the meeting. It's conceivable--!
don't recall it, but if someone were to say might it have
speeded up the date for such a meeting, that might have
happened. But it certainly wasn't the cause. The reason for
us to meet was the logic of the situation: the TOW s had
gone. Weir had emerged. And we clearly had to sit down to
discuss the next steps.
Q With regard to what was known at that time--you
were aware that Ghorbanifar used the alias "Ashgari," isn't
that correct?
A Yes.
Q Colonel North was aware of that as well, isn't that
right?
A
Q
Right.
Was Colonel North witting, as the CIA li^es to say.
of the real identity of Ghorbanifar as of early October 1985?
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A Oh, yes.
Q So you had told North who Ghorbanifar was, is that
correct?
A Correct.
Q Were you aware of that time that he had been the
subject of a prior burn notice by the CIA?
A No.
Q When did that come to your attention?
A Oh, I think not until, oh, November or December of
1986.
Q As you know from the Tower Commission report, or
may recall from the Tower Commission report. Secretary Shultz
says he became aware of the CIA burn notice back in July of
1985. But that had not come to your attention at that early
date, is that right?
A That's right.
Q You came to know of the burn notice in '86 under
what circumstances?
A Either in testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence or in conversations with people at
CIA, after the story had broken.
Q So prior to the story breaking, you had not been
made familiar with any of the content of the Ghorbanifar 201
file, is that correct? '
A I think I'm still not familiar with it. I knew
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that there were violent objections to Ghorbanifar within the
DO, and I knew several of the people who held these violent
objections and have discussed some of the objections with
some of them. But, no, I have no need to see that informa-
tion.
Q The formalization of those objections in the form
of notices going to other intelligence services you had not
become acquainted with.
A That's correct.
Q Now, at the time of the meeting, October 8--you
have described that in other places at other times, but there
were a couple of other points I wanted to touch on there. I
have interviewed Roy Furmark. Do you know Mr. Furmark?
A Yes .
Q Mr. Furmark has indicated that he came to Washing-
ton, D.C., on the 8th of October and had dinner with Mr. Ghor-
banifar. Were you aware of that?
A He had dinner with Mr. Ghorbanifar, my wife and me,
so it was quite a group.
Q Good. Can you describe the relationship, as you
understood it, between Furmark and Ghorbanifar at that time,
about October 8th.
A I understood it to be a business relationship.
Q What did you understand the nature of th^ir
business to be?
UNCLASSIFIED
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A They had done some oil deals together.
Q How well did you know Furmark at that time?
A That was the first I had met him.
Q Had Ghorbanifar ever described to you his relation-
ship with Furmark prior to this occasion?
A He said he had a friend in New York named Furmark
once before, and had asked me if I knew him..
Q Did you know of Mr. Furmark's relationship with
John Sheheen?
A No . I knew about a relationship between Furmark
and Kashoggi.
Q Were you aware that there had been a business
venture between Kashoggi, Furmark, Ghorbanifar, and Sara
Hashimi?
MR. WOOLSEY: This is on October 8th?
MR. KERR: Yes. I'm sorry.
THE WITNESS: No .
BY MR. KERR:
Q And that was not discussed, to the best of your
recollection, when you had dinner that evening, October 8th?
A That is right. In fact, I remember distinctly the
first time I ever heard it discussed.
Q And when was that?
A It was discussed on a "Night Line" program I was on
with Mohammed Hashimi, the brother of late Sara Hashimi.
liMP! h^mM
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Q All right. Can you place that in time for me?
A Oh, gosh. It was probably mid-December of 1986, or
maybe even January of 1987.
Q Again, after the story had broke?
A Yes.
Q Okay. So you were not aware of a relationship that
7 ' Hashimi had to Ghorbanifar, Furmark and others in the Summer
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of 1985; is that right?
A That is right.
Q Were you aware of John Scheheen's contacts with
Director Casey in the Summer of 1985, designed to, through
I Hashimi. set up a relationship, trading arms for hostages?
A No.
Q Did it ever come to your attention?
A No.
Q So specifically, it never came to your attention at
that dinner on October 8th or any other time, that John
Scheheen had contacted Director Casey in mid-June and that
there had been a prolonged series of contacts and meetings
between representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency
and folks, acting on behalf of Hashimi, related to
Ghorbanifar in the Summer of 1985?
A That is correct.
Q With what frequency did you see Mr. Furmark after
October 8th, 1985?
UNCLASSIFIED
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A
Q
A
A I don't believe I have seen him since.
Q You had no contact with Mr. Furmark a year later,
October 1986, when he began making contacts with Mr. Casey
about the Iranian initiative?
A I spoke to him once on the telephone.
Q Can you place that in time?
It would have been sometime in October —
October 1986?
Yes. -- when I called him and encouraged him to
relax, that my understanding was, people were trying to
address his problems.
Q What did you understand his problem to be in
October of 1986?
A $10 million.
Q I.e., he was looking for $10 million that he
believed to be owed to Messrs. Kashoggi and Ghorbanifar;
correct?
A And Furmark, if my memory serves.
Q I believe that is correct.
Were you aware at that time that he had received a
commission, if you will, for these arms transactions?
A No. I am still not aware of it.
Q You weren't aware of a payment of something in
excess of $80,000 to Mr. Furmark? ;
A No. If it is true,, I, ^wxpii,5iyci*r would tell Jimmy
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Breslin that.
Q Life being what it is, Mr. Breslin will probably
find out.
With regard to Mr. Furmark, though, did you initiate the
call or did he call you?
A No. I called him.
Q How did you know about Furmark in October of 1986,
his interest in the $10 million in October of 1986?
A I had been told by Mr. Ghorbanifar, had raised the
matter with Director Casey, and had discussed it at some
length with Mr- North, Mr. Allen, -- I don't even remember
all the people with whom I had discussed it at that time.
Q To the best of your recollection, would this call
that you had to Furmark have occurred after Furmark 's
conversation with Casey in early October, of around the 7th
of October?
A Yes, I should think so.
Q And, again, in a nutshell, give me your best
description of the message you conveyed to Mr. Furmark at
that time.
A I said to him simply, don't -- "Just to let you know
that this matter is being discussed and people are trying to
find some reasonable way to solve it. Don't go off and do
anything crazy or precipitous. Relax for a while.*
Q With regard to the, tale of the angry Canadians, at
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that time, was that related to you by Mr. Furmark?
A No. It had been by Mr. Ghorbanifar.
Q By Mr- Ghorbanifar. Were the allegedly angry
Canadians identified to you?
A No.
Q Okay. Did you know anything about them other than
there were, supposedly, angry Canadians on the war path?
A Yes. They were said to be friends of Senator
Leahy s .
Q These are representations that were being made to
you by Mr. Ghorbanifar?
A Yes. Well, this last point about friends of
Leahy's, I think came not from Mr. Ghorbanifar but from
Colonel North. I think that was a detail in the end.
Q All right. Did Furmark tell you at that time that
he intended to give to Mr. Allen the number of Mr.
Ghorbani f ar ' s Swiss bank account as an appropriate place to
make a $10 million deposit?
A No. He simply said, "Look, I'm just a simple
businessman, trying to balance my books," or words to that
effect .
Q And the balance would be helped by a contribution
of $10 million?
A I think that was the whole discussion. J think I
just called and said, "Hello, " looked into this, "Relax a
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while," and he -- "I'm just a businessman trying to balance
my books," or words to that effect.
Q All right. Now apart from that conversation in
October, did you have any subsequent conversations with
Furmark?
A I do not think so.
Q Any correspondence, documents exchange between you
and he?
A Never •
Q Any record --
A Oh, wait. There was, actually. We got an invi-
tation from him to attend the OSS banquet as his guests.
Q In what year would that have been?
A In 1986.
Q 1986. But in terms of other social occasions, where
you met with Mr. Furmark, there was only the one, back in
October of 1985?
A So far as I can recall, that is the one and only
time that we met.
Q And in terms of conversations and the like with
him, after the October meeting, your recollection is that you
had none? October 1986.
A I think that is right. It is conceivable that from
time to time he may have called me and asked if I had talked
to Ghorbanifar, but that would be the sum and substance of
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it. But that IS just speculation because I don't recall any
such.
Q And in terms of the conversations that you had in
October, that was not memorialized in writing, you did not
take any notes; no record was kept of it, I take it?
A That is correct.
Q At the time of the October 8th meeting, that was
the same time that the Achille Lauro incident was going on;
isn't that correct?
A No. I thought the Achille Lauro was a bit later.
Q It was about October 7th or 8th -- in any event,
when the Achille Lauro occurred, you had occasion to work
with Charlie Allen?
A Among others, yes.
MR. WOOLSEY: Excuse me. There is a gap in time, I
believe, between the Achille Lauro hijacking and the time at
which the incident occurred over Sicily and Siganeila, which
Mr. Ledeen was involved in. That might be the discrepancy in
time.
THE WITNESS: It was about five days later.
BY MR. KERR:
Q You don't associate anything occurring with the
Achille Lauro with the meeting that was held with Ghorbanifar
on October 8th; is that right?
A That IS right.
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Q There was no discussion that you can recall, at the
meetings that were held on the 8th of October, about the
Achille Lauro incident?
A I think that is right. I do not remember any such
discussion .
Q All right. Coming to Mr. Allen, when the Achille
Lauro incident occurred, did you have occasion to work with
Allen on the Achille Lauro?
A Yes .
Q Was that the first occasion you had had to work with
Mr. Allen?
A No. We had spoken off and on about many different
things. I mean "work with," there were undoubtedly -- I
can't place them at the moment, but there were undoubtedly
some other things, because that was quite a busy season for
terrorists, the summer and fall, so we had undoubtedly been
in touch on other things.
Q During the course of the contacts you would have
had with Allen on the Achille Lauro matter, did you have
occasion to have any discussions with him about the Iran
initiative, you role in it?
A No. Again, so far as I can remember, the first
time I ever talked to him about the Iran initiative was after
I was taken off it in late November. And I cannot* place for
you whether I told him atjoiff ^t<>,w>*<*i^Ji^y at the end of
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November or the beginning of December, but it is in that
period .
Q All right.
A And there was a reason for it. I had been
instructed not to discuss it with anyone at CIA, explicitly.
Q You had gotten that instruction from Colonel North?
A McFarlane.
Q From McFarlane.
MR. KERR: Let's go off the record.
[Discussion held off the record.)
MR. KERR: Back on the record.
BY MR. KERR:
Q Moving later in the Month of October, you did have
occasion to travel to Geneva in late October, did you not?
A Yes.
Q And you were in Geneva approximately October 2 6
through October 29, 1985?
A Yes, I guess that is right. That is the general
period .
Q The travel records that we have seem to indicate
that. That is where I got the dates.
The purpose of that meeting was to engage in additional
discussions relating to the Iran initiative; correct?
A Yes . .'
Could we just go off the record for one second?
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MR. KERR: Off the record.
[Discussion held off the record.]
MR. KERR: Back on the record.
BY MR. KERR:
Q Moving to November 1985, with regard to the
shipment of Hawk missiles that occurred approximately the
24th and 25th of November 1985; between the time of your
meeting in late October and the time of the Hawk shipment in
the third week or so of November, can you describe for me the
degree of awareness and involvement that you had in prepar-
ation for the Hawk shipment?
A I think I was generally aware that there was going
to be such a shipment. I cannot remember at what time I
became aware, or how I became aware that a decision had been
made to approve this shipment, and I had no role in planning
for it or organizing it.
Q All right. In terms of what happened in the
October 26 through 29 meetings, was there specific discussion
of the Hawk shipment in those meetings?
A I don't think there was.
Q So you have no recall of details of the shipment
being discussed at that meeting?
A That is correct.
Q In terms of your knowledge of the Hawk sfiipment,
and November 26,
in you place in ti"}f ^ -tf '^^SC ii'i^^**^ f^
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when you became aware that a Hawk shipment was going to take
place?
A No, I cannot. And, indeed, I may have been aware
that a Hawk shipment was going to take place before October
26th. I would not exclude that.
Q All right.
A If you compelled me to take a stab in a very bad
memory of when and how I learned this, I would guess that I
knew it before October 25th.
Q Can you picture in your mind the circumstances
under which you acquired this awareness?
A No.
Q Whether it was a meeting, a conversation with
somebody?
A No. And I have tried very hard. And I'm just not
going to force myself to tiry to remember something about this
because it's just not there. My guess is that if I forced
myself, it would probably be misleading.
Q All right.
A My memory is bad enough for things like this
without trying to strain it.
Q In terms of what you knew and when you knew it,
with regard to the Hawk shipment itself, did you have
knowledge that it had occurred contemporaneous witll the event?
A Yes.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Q Okay. In terms of your involveniGnt , though, you
cannot recall what role you had, if any, in trying to help
this Hawk shipment come off before you knew that it had
occurred; is that right?
A No , I had no role. I was not involved in it, any
more than I was involved in the original TOW shipments.
Q So I am clear, though, did you become aware of the
problems that they were encountering in making this Hawk
shipment in the third week of November?
A I did.
Q How did you become aware of the problems?
A Well, let's see. I believe that Colonel North told
me there were problems, because I believe he was in contact
with Mr. Schwimmer. And I believe, also, that Mr. Schwimmer
called me and told me that they were having problems, because
he had been in .contact with Colonel North. I would not be
surprised if I had one or two calls from Mr. Ghorbanifar as
well in this time. Anyway, I was well aware of it.
Q Okay. You get the calls; are they asking you to do
anything, or are they just ventilating?
A Ventilating, for the most part.
Q So you recall being told by various people that
there were problems, but not being given a task to perform to
try to solve the problems; is that correct? ,'
A I had no cc
\V
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:cunpeten<5)e - tg^-;Be«p|anBr-any of the obvious
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tasks .
Q Competent or not, you weren't given a task?
A No, no. They were smarter than that.
Q All right. Did you have occasion to speak with
anyone at the Central Intelligence Agency during that period
of time relating to difficulties that were being had in
moving the Hawks?
A No.
Q And you were not present at Langley during that
period of time; is that correct? Didn't actually go out to
the CIA headquarters?
A I was very often at Langley, but I certainly
wouldn't have gone out about this matter.
Q All right. Let me give you that question then.
You do not recall being present at Langley, dealing with or
being part of the group that was dealing with the problem of
moving the Hawks?
A That is correct. I was not.
Q Did you know, at that time, Mr. Allen's role in
that matter?
A No. And still don't.
Q Okay. And in terms of individuals at the Central
Intelligence Agency who would have been involved in trying to
resolve the problems that were being encountered, Aid you
know their identities at that time?
UNCLASSIFIED
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A No. Mot then and not now.
Q With regard to General Secord's role in this
transaction in the 'third week of November 1985, you were
aware, I take it, of someone named Copp who was doing
something; is that right?
A Yes. I was aware that Copp was trying to clean up
the mess, and then some months later I figured out who Copp'
was, but not at the time.
Q So you did not have contemporaneous knowledge of
who Copp was; correct?
A That is correct.
Q You didn't have contemporaneous knowledge of what
Copp was doing; is that right?
A That is also right.
Q Okay. There is one other event that occurs between
the October 26 through 29 Geneva meeting and the November
24/25 Hawk shipment, and that is an attempt to photograph
certain people in Dubai, one identified as^^^^^^^B the other
as ci ^^^^^^^^^^^1 Did you have any involvement in setting
that up?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell me what your involvement was?
A Let me see if I have got the sequence right.
Q Let me help you with time. It is my understanding
that that photographic expedition took place the last couple
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of days of October and the product was delivered on or about
November 5th.
A I think the sequence was this, that Ghorbanifar was
trying to help us to identify and understand the various
leading Iranian figures, and he offered to invite them to
various places where we would be able to photograph them and
generally watch them and learn about them and get some notion
as to who they were, what they were, and one was to invite
this fellow to -- he asked if Dubai was a good place for us,
and said he could invite this particular person to Dubai.
I then asked North whether this made sense to him, and
he said, "Yes, indeed." I said was Dubai a good place, and
he said he thought that it was. So I told Ghorbanifar to go
ahead, and Ghorbanifar went ahead, and he then called us a
day later and gave us the hotel and the room number in which
this gentleman was staying, and arranged to bring him into
certain areas where it would be easy to see him.
This should probably also be in code words, wouldn't you
think, this subject.
Q Again, it is a matter of public record, I believe.
If you like, we can put a special seal on this portion.
A Where is it?
Q It's been in the newspapers, among other things.
All right. with regard to this Dubai trip, did you see
the product?
UNCLASSIFIED
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UILLER RCPOATINO CO-. tNC.
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A No.
Q Were you present when the product was presented to
Colonel North?
A He referred -- he told me that they had obtained it.
Q Do you have knowledge of a report that Colonel
North received at the time that he got the photographic
product from Dubai on what the CIA knew about^^^^^^^Band
A I think I knew that he had gotten such a report. i
!
Q Do you know the source of that? Would that have !
been something North would have told you? j
A He would have told me. It is the only place I would
have heard about it.
I
Q And the identification of Ashgari with Ghorbanifar j
was something that was known, certainly to North at that j
t ime ? j
A Yes . '.
!
Q Do you recall the report he got from the CIA on |
what it thought it knew about Ghorbanifar at that time? i
i
A I do not recall. I mean I do generally recall that I
the CIA didn't like him, and that the CIA said that when they
first became aware that Ghorbanifar was involved in this.
But remember that this came as no surprise to me, since
Ghorbanifar had told me about that as early as the.' previous
July. It was a reciprocal attitude, and he had already
itwergji^iFn
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explained to me that he did not like them, that they did not
like him, and that he had lied to them on several occasions.
Q Let me focus in on something that isn't clear to
me. In terms of what you knew Colonel North knew --
A Yes .
Q -- did Colonel North know, prior to November 5th,
that the CIA regarded Ghorbanifar as an unreliable person?
A I don't know the answer. What he knew was -- I
had, by then, told him about the backgrounds, that Ghorbanifar
had flunked polygraphs with them in the past, since he had
volunteered that to me, and I would have told North that by
then. I would have also told him of Ghorbanifar ' s great
contempt for the CIA.
Q So you would have apprised North of what Ghorbanifar
had related to you about his relationship with the CIA?
A Yes.
Q And it is your recollection that Ghorbanifar had
been relatively candid with you, that the CIA didn't like him
very much?
A No question.
Q And you had passed that on to Colonel North?
A I had.
Q In terms of North's confirmation of that, through
the Central Intelligence Agency, you are telling m^ you don't
know the extent to which he confirmed it?
UNCLASSIFIED
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I
A Well, I can't remember the date, but there was no
doubt about that at any time, I mean not that he -- there was
certainly a time when he would have said something like, "You
told me they didn't like him but you didn't tell me how much
they didn't like him," or something like that, or "It's worse
than you thought," or "Worse than anything."
Q Now, you have indicated in prior testimony that
your first and last contact with Admiral Poindexter occurred
after the November flight, when the Hawks were delivered,
when you gave a message to Poindexter, which had been given to
you by Ghorbanif ar ; is that basically correct?
A It was certainly my last conversation with Admiral
Poindexter. I may have passed a message or something through
him to McFarlane at some time previous, but that, so far as I
can remember, was my last contact with him.
Q In terms of trying to place in time when you had
this contact with Poindexter, it would have occurred after
the 25th of November, I take it?
A Yes. Right around then.
Q Okay.
A That is, if you can figure out the day on which the
Hawks were landed in Tehran, that is likely to be the date.
Q All right. But you think it was the day the Hawks
landed, which would be approximately the 24th?
A Yes. I would guess it is the 24th or the 25th.
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Q All right. And you went to Poindexter because
McFarlane was out of pocket; is that right?
A He was. the summit.
Q And your interpretation of what Poindexter was
telling you is that he was taking you out of the Iranian
initiative?
A That is not my interpretation; it is what he said.
Q Help me on that. There is a distinction between
some aspects of it that apparently continued, as you under-
stood it, and some that didn't, and I am having -- no, wrong.
Okay.
A No. He said, "We're going to take you off this
matter, at least for a while, because we need to have people
with more technical know-how or expertise, " or words to that
effect.
Q When he used the term "this matter," what did you
understand that to encompass?
A The hostage and Iranian matter, the whole --
Q Is it the whole ball of wax, or just the exchange
of arms for hostages?
A I then said to him, "That's fine, but I want to
continue to work on the --" and named the senior Iranian
official matter, and he didn't recognize that.
Q All right. So you got no response from fiim on that
score?
UNCLASSIFIED
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A Correct.
Q What was your interpretation of that?
A That I had been taken off the whole matter.
Q Including the matter relating to the senior Iranian
official?
A Well, he didn't know that there was a matter
relating to the senior Iranian official, so I was going to
wait and raise that with McFarlane, but McFarlane was
leaving. So I intended to go to McFarlane and say, "Great,
you have gotten me out of the hostage business, just as I had
hoped, but what about this other matter?" But that conver-
sation never took place.
Q Tell me, looking over the days after November 24,
November 25, what did you do, in terms of trying to determine
whether or not you should stay involved in the matter
relating to the senior Iranian official?
A I asked North what my status was.
Q Place in time for me, if you can, when that conver-
sation occurred -
A Probably the next day -- but Thanksgiving is in
there someplace, isn't it?
Q Right. So we're still talking late November, as
far as you can remember?
Yes.
Before the beginning of December
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A Yes, I think so.
Q And you would have asked North at his office?
A Yes .
Q Anybody else present?
A No. There was never ever anybody else present.
Q Okay. And what is your recollection of the
conversation with North?
A My recollection is that he said that I was out of
this thing and that, in fact, he had been instructed not to
discuss any matter with me, that I was to cease reading the
special compartmentalized intelligence, and was not to be
told anything at all about this matter.
Q And you interpreted that to mean the matter
relating to the senior Iranian official, as well as arms for
hostages?
A It sounded to me like it regarded the entire
matter, and I said, "Okay. However, what about the question
of Ghorbanifar and all the various things that he knows about
terrorism, and the contacts that we were developing with
regard to that matter." And I said to him that I would like
to raise that with people at the Agency, and he said he
thought that was a good idea, proper and legitimate, and why
didn't I do that.
So I did t-hat. I have no reason to doubt thaif what you
read to me the last time, that Charl-**' said that I had
last time, that Charl-i
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informed him late in November that I was going to tell him
about this stuff, and then when I got back a few days later,
I sat down and described it to him.
Q Okay. Did he identify to you who at the Agency
you should talk to, or did you identify to him who at the
Agency you intended to talk to?
A I don't remember, but we would have come up with
the same two names.
Q And the people at that timjs were Mr. Allen and the
Chief of the European Division?
A It was Mr. Clarridge at the time, the Chief of the
European Division, yes. Those are the people.
Q He was transformed into the Chief of|
a few months later.
A Yes, I guess that is right. I think it was clear
already at that point, though, that he was going to be that.
Q Yes, I believe his report was being generated at
that time.
There is a McFarlane PROF note at November 26th that is
quoted in the Tower Report in which McFarlane, on November
26, 1985, tells North that he is inclined to, quote. Take
Mike out of it," closed quotes, that we'll await Poindexter's
reaction. He instructs North to have no further communication
with you until he hears from McFarlane, and there is also a
reference to an -interest J.n_ travel on your part.
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Do you recall having any contact with McFarlane, by
phone or otherwise, in this late period, November 1985?
A No. But the reference to travel is undoubtedly
that I had been reminding him that I had promised a senior
Iranian official that we would get together, and we had not,
and we had not fixed a date for it, and I was eager to do
that.
Q All right. With regard to the requested travel,
what came of that?
A Nothing.
Q You did not go to Geneva?
A I did not go anywhere. I never met the man again.
Q All right. Do you recall that you did go to Europe
in the period November 30 through December 1, 1985?
A Yes.
Q The purpose of that trip was what?
A Private business.
Q Private business. Did you have occasions to meet
with any of the folks that you had previously met with on the
Iran initiative while you were in Europe?
A On that trip? --=.-•""''•'■ *^' ••■.';.,-•■ ■
Q Yes.
A No.
Q In terms of your itinerary on that trip, 'where did
you go?
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A Again, this is private business we're talking about.
Q I understand.
A So subject to all these things that we have said
before, I flew to Paris, met a client there, we got into his
airplane and flew to Turin, had a business lunch in Turin.
Flew to Rome, had a business dinner in Rome. Got up the next
morning and flew to Paris and flew from Paris to Washington.
Q Okay. There was a meeting that was held in Geneva
amongst Kimche, Secord, Ghorbanifar, and another Iranian
official on the weekend of November 30 and December 1; and
subsequently, after December 1, a trip was made to Paris with
Secord and Nimrodi. You had no knowledge of those meetings?
A I had no knowledge of the meetings, and I have
never met General Secord.
Q Okay. And you did not participate, by phone or
otherwise, in the meetings that occurred in Geneva and Paris
during the period of time November 30 through December 2nd
and 3rd?
A That is correct.
Q Has anyone ever related to you what transpired at
those meetings?
A No.
Q Specifically, Ghorbanifar did not tell you what
occurred at those meetings? •
A That is correct.
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Q Let me show you a document. It has previously been
marked as Allen Exhibit 12. Mr. Allen has testified that he
believes he received this document from you in November, on
the occasion when that first meeting took place.
A November 1985?
Q Yes, sir. It has been coded as C219 and C220 in our
records. I would like you to look at the document and tell
me if you have ever seen it before.
A (Witness peruses document.)
Yes.
Q Okay. Can you tell me what you know about that
document?
A Yes. I am the author.
Q When would you have prepared the document?
A In the period October, November, December of 1985.
Q Okay. Why would you have prepared the document?
A Why would I have prepared the document?
Q Yes. Why did you do it?
A I prepared it because I thought the CIA ought to
have this information.
Q So you prepared it for the purpose of giving it to
the Central Intelligence Agency?
A Yes .
Q Do you recall whether this document was given by
you to Allen on the first, m^e^^nfl jt^feat^i^^u had with Allen and
- rf ' -J .
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the Chief of the European Division?
A I do not remember. I tend to think that I had sent
it over to them earlier. But I might have called their
attention to it at that meeting.
Q Okay. To the best of your recollection, was this
the sum and substance of what you sent them, or is this a
piece of a larger package?
A This is it.
Q That is it. Okay.
Now, apparently, you met with Mr. Allen and the Chief of
the European Division on December 4th, 1985. In terms of
that meeting, can you give me your best recollection of what
transpired at the December 4th, 1985, meeting?
A Well, I told them the basic story of what had
happened, since I believed -- I felt that I could discuss it
with them at this point because I thought the thing was over.
So what I was discussing with them was my experiences with
Ghorbanifar, why I thought he was a useful person for the
Agency to deal with, because of his contacts and his knowledge
and sources. And I encouraged them to follow up on some of
the contacts that I had made or was about to make through
Ghorbanifar, or because of Ghorbanifar, particular in the
area of counterterrorism.
Q All right. Let me read you some excerpts from Mr.
Allen's memorandum on that meeting. He says that the meeting
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began at about 3:00 o'clock on December 4th and that you had
just explained that you had just returned from Paris where
you had conducted some unspecified business.
That reference would be to the trip to Paris and Italy
that you have just described; correct?
A I had just returned from Paris.
Q And you were not relating to Mr. Allen and the
Chief of the European Division anything which you had learned
in Paris about the Iran initiative; is that right?
A I hadn't learned anything in Paris. I was trying
to make enough money to support my family.
Q All right. The problem I've got is what Allen says |
about that meeting. Let me read to you what he says and see I
if you have any further recollection. He says, "While there
in Paris, he --" meaning you "-- acquired certain documents
and other information that he believed would be useful in a
collection that --" Allen "-- is conducting on behalf of
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, NSC Staff, relating to the
U.S. hostages . "
Then he says, "Subject also proposed a new initiative
against President Khaddafi and Libya, utilizing certain
resources, et cetera."
It leaves the impression that you were telling Allen
that you had acquired certain things relating to trfe initia-
tive in Europe. Is that incorrect?
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A So far as I can recall, it is incorrect. Read me
those sentences again, would you?
Q "He," meaning Ledeen, "explained that he had just
returned from Paris where he had conducted some unspecified
business. While there, he acquired certain documents and
other information that he believed would be useful in a
collection effort that the NIO/CT, " Mr. Allen, "is conducting
on behalf of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, NSC Staff,
relating to the U.S. hostages."
( Pause . )
A Look, on one of these occasions of my -- I went to
Paris quite often in the period November/March. I was
probably there once a month and sometimes twice a month.
There was one occasion in which I had to change an Air France
ticket and I went into the Air France offices on the Champs
Elysee and walked up to the counter, and Ghorbanifar was
standing next to me.
So even though I had been ordered not to talk to him and
so forth, there I was, and we went out to dinner. And while
we were out to dinner, he gave me some documents, some stuff
dealing with terrorism. It may have been that occasion.
U All right.
A I tend to remember that it was later than that. I
would have placed it into 1986, this contact. But , 'it could
have been on this occasion, and it could be that that was the
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time I brought some of these things back. And they consisted
of this kind of information, some telephone numbers, somen
photographs of people and things of that nature. It is
possible .
Q This doesn't give you any further refreshed
recollection of actually participating in meetings that
occurred in either Geneva or Paris at this time?
A No. I certainly did not participate in any of the
meetings that you have discussed. I absolutely did not . -
Q All right.
A And it, furthermore, sounds to me, from your
description of the dates of those meetings, that it would be
very hard for Mr. Ghorbanifar to have been in Paris at the
same time, although I guess it is possible.
Q Europe is a small continent -- what can I telllyou.
A It is a small continent, yes.
Q Okay. He goes on to say that you informed himf of
private efforts that you had undertaken, with White House
encouragement, to establish contacts within the Iranian
Government, contacts that were helpful in securing the
release.
So I take it, you gave him kind of a history of what you
had been doing?
A That's right. /
Q Was he knowledgeable of your involvement, as vou
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perceived it, at the time of this meeting? Were you telling
him something new, or did he already know about it?
A I don't really -- I don't remember.
Q All right. You also identify for him Ghorbanifar
as Ashgari at this meeting, according to Mr. Allen. As to
that, was that news to Allen, or did he know who Ghorbanifar
was?
A No, that seemed to be news.
Q That did seem to be news to him?
A Yes .
Q You also identified to Mr. Allen a person that you
identified to him as the Iranian Government's principal
contact with Ghorbanifar. Do you recall discussing who that
person was with Allen?
The very same guy.
Then he makes some representations on expectations on
hostages that I want to review with you.
A Yes .
Q He says ,_ _'Le^e_en_ explained that the four hostages
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were expected to be released just before Thanksgiving because
of the Hawk missiles that had been delivered with !
intermediaries who include, among others, David Kimche. After
delivery of 20 of these missiles, S^utherland, Anderson, |
Jenko and Jacobson were to be released ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H Once I
these four were released, another 100 Hawks would be delivered!
to Iran. This did not occur because there were disagreements I
over the particular model of the Hawk missile that was
delivered . "
He is saying that that is what you were telling him. Do
you recall making those kinds of statements to Allen?
I
A I don't even recall these arrangements, but I don't I
i
challenge them. Anyway, I don't remember it but -- I
Q It doesn't give you a refreshed recollection is ]
what you are telling me?
A No.
Q All right. he says, 'On November 28th,
[was frantically trying to contact Speaker Rafsanjani,
urging him to reciprocate by freeing the hostages now that the
Americans had shown good faith. According to Ghorbanifar,
the disagreement appears to have resulted from the misunder-
standing on both sides concerning what specific type of
equipment was requested."
Do you recall giving that level of detail to rfllen?
A Yes.
UliUnED
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Q You did. Okay. Then he says, according to you,
relating what Ghorbanifar has to say, "The opportunity to
deal with Iran is 'now excellent because Tehran is desperate
for specific types of equipment, such as TOW, antitank
missiles. He also notes that neither Iran nor its surrogate
has kidnapped any Americans in some months."
Did you discuss those kinds of things with him?
A Certainly.
Q The level of desperation that you perceived was
discussed?
A I believed it.
Q Okay. The discussion of the Libyan scam operation,
do you recall reviewing that with Allen at that time?
A Yes .
Q Do you recall being an advocate of that, as a good
idea?
Yes.
A
Q Do you recall telling him that Colonel North had
been apprised of the program?
A Yes.
Q Do you recall telling him that Colonel North
endorsed the program?
Yes.
Was that true^
Yes.
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Q You had discussed it with North?
A Yes .
Q When?
A Previously.
Q In a one-to-one meeting that you and North would
have had?
A Yes. North -- look, the Libyan scam gasped along
for a year with North, at least in conversations with me,
saying that he was always in favor of it, and with North, I
think, finally even voting formally for it as late as October
1986, so there is no doubt about that. And the thing was
raised formally at some interagency meeting in the Fall of
1986.
Q Okay. All right. But from your perspective. North
is on board?
A Oh, yes.
Q It was a good idea, and you were basically relaying
all that to Allen?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Down in Paragraph 8 of this memo, he says
that you noted that you would be traveling again shortly to
Europe and would be discussing the proposed Libyan operation
further with Mr. Ghorbanifar. "He was hopeful that in the
meantime some reaction could be obtained from CIA,.* and then
he goes on to sav that you noted that you had discussed this
iv that you noted that yoi
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issue with Oliver North of the NSC who favors the undertaking
of this operation.
Do you recall those representations?
A We are still talking about Libya?
Q Yes .
A Yes .
Q Okay. So you told him that you were going to be
meeting with Ghorbanifar in the future, in Europe, about the
Libyan operation.
A Yes .
Q In terms of your understanding of the direction
that you had received from Poindexter and, within a day or so.
North, that you were out of the operation, how did that
correspond to your representation to Allen that you were
going to go to Europe to talk to Ghorbanifar about the Libyan
sting?
A It was not — what I had been removed from was
Iran. I had not been removed from work on terrorism.
Q All right. So you perceived that to be -- the
Libyan operation to be a different compartment, so to speak?
A Oh, absolutely.
Q Okay. In terms of the upshot or the result of this
meeting with Allen on the 4th of December, what was your
perception of what you had accomplished? ;
A I had informed two of the best people at the CIA of
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the potential that I thought existed, and had brought them up
to speed so that they were, hopefully, now knowledgeable
enough to evaluate things better.
Q All right. With regard to other things that
occurred at that meeting, Mr. Allen has indicated that you
told him in some detail about the political lay of the land
in Iran, and that he asked you to provide him with your
thoughts in wri::ing. Do you recall any such request?
( Pause . )
A I don ' t recall .
Q You don't. Let me show you a document that Mr.
Allen has told us he received from you shortly after the
meeting of December 4th. It has previously been marked as
Allen Exhibit 13, and it is Document Number C230 through 241.
A (Witness peruses document.)
Yes. This document we know.
Q Okay. How do you know it?
A Well, let me just go through all of these.
Q Yes. Take your time.
A (Witness peruses documents.)
This is, in fact, one of the documents that we have
provided to you in a redacted form.
Q And you provided it to us because you found it
lodged in some kind of electronic storage system? •'
A Yes.
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Q You did not actually still have a hard copy version
of that; is that right?
A Right. You have here, actually, several documents
that run together.
Q Good -- maybe you can help me figure out how the
pieces fit together. That would be great. Charlie's filing
system sometimes leaves a bit to be desired.
A Yes. Well, I suffer from the same disease. I'm a
terrible filer.
Okay. The document that deals with -- well, if you
compare them to what we have given you, then you will be able
to segregate them pretty well. So from C231 through C235,
that is a document.
Q Okay.
MR. WOOLSEY: THen let's get that one clear first.
MR. KERR: Yes, let's stop there.
BY MR. KERR:
Q With regard to that document, when was it prepared?
A These are the -- this is the writeup, based on the
conversations with Ghorbanifar in Israel in July of 1985.
Q All right.
A Written up, I guess, by — this is the agreed-on
version between Kimche and me, some of which he did, some of
which I did. •
Q So it would have been generated in approximately
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" 2 A Yes.
-3 Q And it would have been conveyed to Mr. Allen -- is
4 he correct -- December 4th, or before then?
5 A Well, probably after that.
6 Q After that. Okay. But you think it would have
7 been sometime in the Month of December when this would have
8 gotten into his hands from you?
9 A Or January.
10 Q Okay.
11 MR. WOOLSEY: Now, with respect to what has been
12 provided to the Committee, at least the House Committee, this i
13 was provided in redacted form, with portions that were
14 redacted, and the names shown to the Committee Staff, and Mr.
15 Ledeen expressed his willingness to deliver the rest of the
16 names at the time of the Committee's desire.
17 MR. KERR: Okay.
18 ! THE WITNESS: Now, C236 through the first four lines of
C239 is a document regarding the senior Iranian official.
MR. KERR: Correct.
THE WITNESS: Which we have provided, again, in redacted
form .
MR. WOOLSEY: Just a moment.
THE WITNESS: It has never been subpoenaed, caught by a
subpoena, in our og.ijiiorii We have_re^rred to it and we have
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offered to make it available.
MR. WOOLSEY: And we have shown it to the Committee
Staff and offered to make it available at the time of their
choosing.
BY MR. KERR:
Q Not to worry. But this is a document that you
created?
A (Witness peruses document.)
No. That's giving me much too much credit. It is a
document that originated with me, probably, this text, yes.
Q And that would --
A The senior Iranian official created the document.
Q I understand. I'm sorry.
That would have been created at approximately what point
in time?
A Well, I had either reported on it or given a copy
of it to McFarlane within a few days of my meeting with this
senior Iranian official.
Q Tell me about that. Are we talking about the
October period of time?
A No. There we are again.
Q All right. You've got him covered enough, I think.
But in terms of when this thing came into your hands, it
would be late October, early November?
A (Witness peruses document.)
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Yes. Let's say sometime in the fall.
Q All right. I really do have to -- if you want to
write it on a piece of paper, fine, but I want to know when
the thing was created. Are you telling me that you don't
know; is that what you are saying?
A You mean when did I print this out from my printer? I
i
Q Yes . j
A This copy here? I imagine I printed it out the day
before I gave it to Charlie.
Q All right. Charlie thinks it got into his hands
about December 4th. Do you have any reason to think that
isn't true?
A No . I don't remember it one way or the other.
Q Okay.
A Then from after Line 4 of C239, these are simply my
notes of various conversations.
Q All right. And in terms of when they would have
been created, can you place them in time for me?
A Well, I mean it is the same piece of paper, it's a
follow-on .
Q So it certainly would have been created no later
than early December 1985?
A Correct.
Q All right.
UNCLASSIFIED
A Now let me just go through these.
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(Witness peruses document.)
Q So looking at that document, it looks to you like
the document, in its entirety, was produced sometime before
December 4th; correct?
A Yes .
Q And with regard to providing this information to
Allen, it would be your recollection that you gave it to him
as a package, or did you give it to him in pieces; do you
know?
A I do not know. I could very well have given it to
him as a package.
Q All right. Were you aware, at the time you had
your meeting with Mr. Allen and the Chief of the European
Division, that North was blaming, if you will, for the
problems with the November shipment?
A No.
Q Okay. In a PROF note of December 4th, 1985, from
North to Poindexter, North attributed the Hawk problems to
you and to Mr. Schwimmer.
A Right.
Q You didn't have contemporaneous familiarity with
that?
A That is right.
Q Did that ever come to your attention? ,'
A No.
UNCLASSIFIED
..■*»s
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Q Not until the Tower Commission?
A Not until the Tower Commission.
Q All right. In that same note, he says that
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I take it, you wouldn't characterize it quite that way;
is that right?
A Could you read that again?
Q Sure. Ghorbanifar is quoted by North as having
said that the discussions --
A This m on those PROF notes?
Q Yes, of December 4th.
In terms of the notion of hostages for arms, the
concept, that was initiated -- in terms of the American that
know about it -- that was initiated in your presence? You
would be the first American to have known of that concept?
A Well, the way I would describe it is that the
explicit thing of arms for hostages became a clear-cut theme
following the release of Reverend Weir, and then at subsequent
meetings the message from the Government of Iran was, "You
give us so many missiles, we give you so many hostages." It
was by the time of the November shipment that there was an
explicit arms for hostage discussion.
I would not have characterized our previous conversations
as being an arms for hostages affair. Although arms were
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involved and hostages were involved, it was much broader and
much more wide ranging.
Q But by the time of the November Hawk shipment --
A By the time of the November Hawk shipment, it was
my opinion that the thing -- that the Iranian Government, at
least, was presenting it in that light, although the conver-
sations with Ghorbanifar covered other areas. It wasn't just
restricted to arms and hostages.
Q And when you say, "in that light," it was your
perception that the Iranian Government saw itself dealing in
arms for hostages, as of November?
A Yes .
Q Okay. And your point is that Ghorbanifar had a
wider horizon, as well?
A Yes. I keep reminding you that at the October
meeting, when all of this became quite explicit, and I said
to Ghorbanifar, "What do you think we should do?" he suggested
giving up the hostage matter.
Q Okay. Now, that October meeting was the October
8th meeting?
A October 8th in the OEO Building.
Q And you, as I recall, are not clear whether North
actually was there at that time?
A I think he was not there. I am morally certain
that he was not present in those conversations, and I think
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he did not make an appearance all day, even at lunch time,
although I do believe that he and Schwimmer spoke, the two of
them, at some point, either the day before, the day after, or
something like that. But I did introduce them there, and
they did meet and speak.
Q Refresh my recollection. Was there any other U.S.
Government representative there besides yourself?
A No.
Q Okay. So we are talking about the meeting that
took place in the Executive Office Building.
A Yes .
Q But you were, essentially, the only U.S. Government
representative present throughout is, I guess, correct; is
that right?
A As far as I know.
Q Do you know of that conversation or those meetings
being monitored electronically, were they recorded or not?
A No , I think they were not.
Q They were not. You didn't have with you, for
example
A No.
Q Turning now to December 7 through 10. As you
aware, certainly from the Tower Commission Report ,,' there were
two Presidential meetings that occurred during that period of
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time, one before McFarlane went to London and one that
happened after he came back.
What knowledge did you have of those meetings and that
trip at that time?
A None .
Q When did you become aware of either the meetings or
the trip?
A Sometime around the time of the Tower Commission.
Q All right. Let me just try to refresh your
recollection. The Chief of the^^^^^^^^Bfor the Central
Intelligence Agency, reporting on his conversations with you
on December 22nd, says that you told him of the position of
the various secretaries and the like at Presidential meetings
which occurred earlier in the month.
Do you recall knowing that these meetings had occurred?
A The man is a liar. He lied about almost everything
in that document, so far as I can tell.
Q So you don't have any recollection of either
knowing that or saying that to the CIA?
A No . I absolutely did not know about the meetings,
and I absolutely did not say anything of this sort to this
man.
Q All right. You, according to your travel records,
were back on Europe on the 14th of December, in Rome. Can
you describe what you were back ther^e for? Do you recall
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being back there? Let's put it that way. That's the easiest
way to go at it.
A I think I was in Rome, accompanying Secretary Perle
to a meeting of U.S. /Italian high level defense group. I was
a regular attendee at the meetings of U.S. /Italian high level
defense groups, whether they took place in Italy or the
United States. That year it was in Italy, and I think that's -
why I was there.
Q They indicate that you then went to Geneva on
December 16 .
A Yes .
Q The same operation, or different?
A No. December 16 is when I went to Geneva at the
invitation of Mr. Ghorbanifar to have dinner with him.
Q Now, in terms of that invitation, that came to you -
when, sometime earlier in December?
A Yes .
Q He invited you to meet with him in Switzerland
because he knew of your trip to Rome; is that correct?
A As I recall it, he called and asked if we could get
together. He said he had something he wanted to discuss with
me. I told him that I was going to be in Europe anyhow in
that period, and could meet him wherever he liked, because I
would be simply heading back from Rome, so I could.' meet him
anywhere between Rome and London, and he suggested Geneva,
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and I said fine- So I met him in Geneva.
Q Now, with regard to that meeting, had you told him
by that time that you had been taken off of the Iranian
initiative?
A Yes.
Q With regard to the meeting that occurred in Geneva,
you -- what -- just had dinner together?
A Yes.
Q What did you discuss?
A Well, he discussed his various problems, what
should he do at this point. He also confided his suspicion
that the Israelis had made money out of this. This is part
of the -- as I think I said last time, this is an affair in
which everyone thinks that everybody else made money. So he
said he was suspicious of Nimrodi and so forth, and I told
him that was only fair, since Nimrodi was quite suspicious of
him.
In any event, he said he just -- he did not know what to
do. He said that the Americans had sent him a Polish
gentleman -- this was Copp -- whom he did not like and with
whom he felt he could not work.
Q Did you know the identity of this Polish gentleman
at that time?
A No. And I told him I didn't know who if was, and
told him, furthermore, that I didn't care who it was because
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I was not involved in this thing, and I did not wish to be
dragged back into it because this would only end up by
creating problems for me with my colleagues in Washington.
And every time he would try to raise this thing, I would try
to say, "Look, please leave me out of this."
We spent a good deal of time talking about the Libyan
matter and the situation in Iran, which I was interested in
and remain interested in, and the various terrorist questions
that he was following. That was the bulk of the conversation.
Q
A He said that he was willing to do anything that he
could to have a working relationship with the United States
Government. He very badly wanted cooperation, both in the
area of terrorism andi
whether he would be willing to take a polygraph.
And I am pretty sure that I asked him on that occasion,
"If they asked you to take another polygraph, would you be
willing to do it?" In any case, if it wasn't at that
occasion, it was on another one, and he said, "Sure." And I
said to him that I would convey that to them and tell them,
if they wished to schedule such a thing. •
Q Let me; jiip^ g ' Y^ Y"U f\ V.^tiu] ^ of Other events and
liiffi^ffiw
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let's try to filter them in about what's going on in mid-
December. As you may recall, the Chief of the European
Division was off in Europe; right? He left, apparently,
sometime during the course of your meeting on December 4th
and didn't return until about 10 days later.
Casey was also out of pocket on December 4th, comes back
into town in the middle of December and, according to the
records that we have from his office, you and he had a face-
to-face meeting on December 19th, 1986, which I have heard
about secondhand from Charles Allen. Allen did not attend,
but apparently discussed the meeting with Casey after it
occurred.
Using those kinds of events and --
A When did I go to Rome?
Q You went to Rome on the 14th of December.
A All right. So I am back by then?
Q Right. You are in Geneva on the 16th; your meeting
with Casey occurs on the 19th. We know that on the 20th,
Casey called the Operations Director of the CIA and said, We
want you to get somebody to reevaluate Ghorbanif ar . " So
you've got that series of events going on.
With regard to the meeting that you had with Ghorbanifar
on the 16th, if you had scheduled your meeting with Casey, I
would have thought that would be one of the topics/you would
have discussed with him. And if you did, I would like to
B;>fi. '"=■.:•■■ - T:7.
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know what the nature of the discussions were.
Q One other thing that's going on, to try to trigger
any further recollection you may have, is a memo in the Tower
Commission Report, dated December 10, 1985, where Casey
basically says, "We've met, after McFarlane's trip. McFarlan€
is down on Ghorbanifar. The president says, 'This thing is
coming to an end,' but I'm not sure how strong his feelings
are . " In essence, that is what he is saying.
Somehow, between December 10 and December 20, 21, the
initiative revs up again. Is it your recollection that you
didn't know that the President had said no to the initiative
on December 10th?
A No. Well, I didn't know about meetings, per se.
It was my sensation that the whole thing was over.
Q As of December 10th? /
A Oh, well before then.
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Q Okay. By December 19, however, I assume you would
have had some knowledge that some life was coming back to the
Iran initiative?
A Wrong.
Q Wrong. Okay. You do not recall discussing that
with Mr. Casey on the 19th of December?
A That is correct. My discussions with Mr. Casey --
well, it would be wrong to say that I didn't discuss Iran
with Casey. I certainly did discuss Iran with Casey, and I
certainly, on that occasion and every other occasion that I
may have seen him, expressed to him my very strong feeling
that the kind of contact that had been established with the
senior Iranian official should be pursued and expanded, and
that I found it inconceivable that we, as a governinent , were
not doing that. I said I thought we had to do that.
So all of that I would have said, along with all the
other stuff. I mean every time I managed to get to a person
at that level, I always said that.
Q Bear with me, Mr. Ledeen. The juxtaposition of
events here strikes me, if nothing else, as intriguing.
Allen writes up his memorandum of his meeting with you
of December 4th on December 18th, 1985, and apparently it is
put into Director Casey's hands so that he will have it when
he talks with you on December 19th, 1985. So I wopld have
thought that one of the things that you all would have
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discussed is the very things that you discussed with Charlie
Allen on December 4th. Can you recall?
A No. Caiey, -- I never went through a detailed
account with Casey of how the thing had started and how it
developed. I did discuss Ghorbanifar with Casey, both on
that occasion and on subsequent occasions. I urged Casey a
couple of times, I don't remember if at that meeting, but
certainly at another meeting, to meet with Ghorbanifar
personally to try to form an impression of him, because I
stressed to Casey that I had started full of suspicion and
that, with the passage of time, bit by bit, I had come to the
conclusion that this was a useful person, and that I thought
there were things that Ghorbanifar could do for the United
States which, so far as I could tell, nobody else could, and
that we just could not walk away from such a useful character.
So this was the bulk of what I was saying, and that I
thought the Libya thing was a good idea, and there were other
things that one could do to terrorists that I thought were
great ideas. Remember, my passion on terrorism was to find
ways to strike both at terrorist organizations and at states
that sponsored terrorism; that we were severely limited by
law as to what sorts of things one can do. You can't kill
anybody .
We were m this paradoxical situation where it's illegal
to assassinate an individual, but it's okay to bomb a city,
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which 1 have always found to be crazy approach to the subject
of counterterrorism.
So the nice psychological strokes are attractive.
Someone tends to look for things of this sort, and I thought I
the business of humiliating Khaddafi, especially since i
something very much like it had been done by the Egyptians a i
couple of years earlier, was a wonderful idea, particularly ■
i
since the way t"iis was structured it would not only have •
embarrassed Khaddafi, because it would have proclaimed the ,
man dead and then the guy would have stood up and said, "Yoo, \
hoo," some months later, but also because there was an I
arrangement whereby once this mock funeral were held,
Khaddafi was then obliged to give to the presumed assassins
of his opponent elements of the Libyan terrorist structure in
Europe, so that would have been exposed at the same time. So I
I was arguing for all of these things. j
Q Let me come back on what is going on during that
period. First off, the meeting with Casey, how did it get j
set up? Who set it up? Did you call Casey? Did he call you?;
A No, I called him. |
Q You called him. Let me jump back because of that.
When you met in Geneva, was anybody else present at this
meeting you had with Ghorbanifar?
A No . /
Q Just you and he. Did you make any record of what
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transpired at that meeting?
A I took some notes .
Q Do you still have those notes?
A No.
Q With regard to what transpired at that meeting, did
you report this back to anyone, what had occurred?
A Yes, I did.
Q To whom did you report?
A I reported it to North, and I reported -- I think I
reported it probably to Charlie, as well.
Q To Charlie Allen?
A Yes.
Q Did you relate what occurred at this meeting to
Casey, when you met with Casey?
A I ant sure I did.
Q When you met with North and related what happened
at this meeting -- this would have been shortly after you
came back?
A Yes .
Q And you told him what occurred at the meeting?
A Yes .
Q North did not react negatively to you having had
this meeting; is that correct?
A Thav. is correct. '
Q So hg ^dj.^ not sa^ ^'l^Youare outside your mandate in
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meeting with Ghorbanifar anymore"?
A That IS correct. I had already told him about it in'
advance, in any case. I
Q All right. Now, with regard to the meeting with
Casey, did Casey tell you that he was going to be assigning
someone from the Operations Directorate to reevaluate
Ghorbanifar? i
A No. \
I
Q You were contacted by somebody that told you that ;
I
an agent from CIA was going to come visit with you, within a ]
I
day or two of meeting with Casey; isn't that right? |
A This wonderful man, yes. <
Q Who contacted you? j
A Charlie, I think. |
Q Charlie did? i
i
A I think it was Charlie. j
Q All right. What did Charlie tell you in that i
• ■ I
regard?
A He said I was going to be contacted by a person who
was working in this matter.
Q Did he give you the name of the person?
A No . He said the person would be using one of their
funny names .
Q Do you recall what funny name was being , "used?
A He called
himself ^^^^^Ht
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Q All right. And ^^^^^^Bdid call you?
A Oh, yes.
Q And h° asked you to arrange with a meeting with
Ghorbani far?
A Yes .
Then, was Ghorbanifar planning to come in, in an
y
Q
event?
A Yes, I think so.
Q And you arranged for the interview to take place at
your home; is that correct?
A Yes. Ghorbanifar was at our home for dinner; it
12 I seemed the easiest,
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Q And according to^^^^^^^^|note.s , he met with you
first, and then later was joined by Mr. Ghorbanifar. Is that
your recollection?
A Yes .
Q In his memorandum, which is actually a memorandum
by one of his superiors, there is a statement, something to
the effect that the Iran initiative had been begun by
McFarlane in late 1984, as a result of a meeting between
yourself and Mr. McFarlane. I think the e.xpression was, "a
year ago," or 'over a year ago." Do you recall telling him
that?
A Look, I am sure that we can go through this whole
memorandum lin^ i)y .l^rip ^nd. Liod-itlflt^ it is all wrong and
immiiirh
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although, as I said before that nobody is perfect, so there
are probably seme things in there that are right, that is one
of the most misleading memoranda I think I have seen.
The bulk of the conversation that we had in my house,
both before Mr. Ghorbanifar came and after, was about
terrorism and about leading personalities in Iran. So far as
I have seen in that memorandum, I have seen nothing in there
about terrorism, and very little about leading personalities
in Iran.
The reason, I suspect, that there is so little in there
about leading personalities in Iran is that^^^^^^Hdid not
recognize any of the names of the leading Iranian per-
sonalities, for which I don't condemn him. After all, he had
spent his whole career in ^^^^^^^^^^^Bto that point and
wasn't much familiar with Iran. But the fact of --
Q How did you know his background?
A I found it out from other people at the Agency.
Q Who?
A Oh, I don't recall. I talked to probably 10 or 15
people. But the fact of the matter was that he did not
recognize the names of many of the leading figures in the
country. And it shook me that CIA had sent to talk to
Ghorbanifar, who is a different person to evaluate, a guy who
was so clearly ].gnorant of the basic information aljout Iran,
so I asked myself on what basis could this man possibly
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1 evaluate Ghorbanifar.
2 Q Speaking of Iranian evaluations, at the time you
3 gave the information that you gave to Mr. Allen, did you know
4 that he was going to make use of that information to prepare
5 I a memorandum for the use of Mr. McMahon at the December 7th,
1
6 I 1985, meeting with the President?
A No.
Q In terms of the memorandum he did prepare on
December 6th, 1385, on the Iranian political scene, you do
not recall having reviewed that memorandum; is that correct?
A I did not review it.
Q And my representation to you that there was such a
memorandum prepared in anticipation of a meeting with the
President on December 7th doesn't give you any further
recollection that you knew there was a meeting with the
President scheduled for December 7th?
A I did not know there was a meeting scheduled. I did
not know the meeting was held, so I did not know there was a
trip to London. I do not know that meetings took place in
London involving Mr. McFarlane and Mr. Ghorbanifar. These
were all things I learned about after the story exploded, not
before.
Q Let's look at the things you did know. At the time
that you met on December 4th with Allen, Clarridge^* was there
t correct?
at least for part of the meet
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A I think that is right.
Q Clarridge was aware, as far as you could tell, of
the shipment of missiles to Tehran, was he not?
A I don't know.
Q You don't know. Okay.
MR. KERR: Joel, do you want to take some time now? I
ran a lot longer, so let's shift gears.
BY MR. LESKER:
Q Let's go back to the relationship with the SISMI
Bureau. First of all, prior to your coming on as a consultant
to the Department of State, Mr. Ledeen, did you have a
relationship with any agency of the Italian Government?
A I did some consulting work for two different parts
of the Italian Government. I did one for SISMI and another
for the Office of the Presidents of the Republic.
Q What was the nature of the work that was done for
the SISMI?
A There was two basic elements. There was a kind of
standard risk assessment, the details of which I, frankly, do
not recall, but they were kind of standard, country-by-
country risk assessments about the political future and so
forth, and did a simulation for some of the SISMI counter-
terrorist people.
Q When was this work done?
A It was done in the Fall of 1980
UNCUSSIFIEP
I
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Q Was there compensation paid?
A Yes .
Q Can you tell me what the level of compensation was
for these two projects?
A Are you talking about -- there were other people
involved .
Q Well, to you personally.
A To me personally?
Q Yes .
A Well, I do"'t remember precisely but it is somewhere
in the neighborhood of a grand total for the two of them
together of maybe $65,000 of $70,000.
Q How much time was consumed by these two projects?
A It is hard to say because between the negotiations
for them and discussions and meetings and so forth, they
covered several months. How much time was actually put in on
the projects themselves, preparation of the simulation, off
and on for a couple of weeks, then a day to get there, a day
to rest, two days to run it, four days to do an evaluation,
write a report, stuff like that, so a few weeks just for that.
Then the -- it is impossible to calculate how long it
takes to prepare a risk assessment because you would have to
figure out how long it took me to learn what I needed to know
to do it. ;
Q Who IS your principal contact in the SISMI Bureau?
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A General Santo Vito.
Q Did you also know a man names Francesco Pacienza?
A Yes .
Q Was he connected with the SISMI Bureau?
A Yes .
Q Did you ever have occasion to travel to the United
States with Pacienza?
A I don't think so. I don't recall.
Q Do you recall ever bringing him to Connecticut to
meet with General Haig?
A I introduced him one day to General Haig in
Connecticut, yes.
Q Did you ever have a conversation with Pacienza
about coming to work for the Department of State?
A No. About my coming to work for the Department of
State?
Q Yes.
A I don't think I did, no.
Q Did you ever have a conversation with him about
going to government, coming into government, your coming into
government?
A I might have discussed with him the general
possibility.
Q Did you ever make a request of him for financial
assistance in the event you did decide to come into
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government?
A Never-
Q Were you' ever the beneficiary of a payment,
arranged by the SISMI Bureau, as a result of a conference
which would have been sponsored by corporate entities, in
other words the --
A No , I never was.
Q What -■•'as the source of the money that was paid to
you for the two projects which you previously described?
A I have no idea .
Q You don't know whether there were corporate
subscribers to those projects?
A I have no reason to think there were. In the one
case, money was paid directly by an official of SISMI, and in
the other case there was a transfer, by wire, from the Bank
of Italy. So I would tend to doubt, in either case, there
was any corporate money involved.
Q Were the proceeds of these two projects received
by you as an individual, or by your company, ISI?
A It varied.
Q Well, in these two cases?
A In one case, as an individual, and in the other
case , as ISI .
Q And was the money received abroad or in fhe United
States?
UNCLASSIFIED
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A In one case it was received abroad, and in the
other case it was received in the United States.
Q Which case was received abroad?
A The personal money was received abroad; the IS I
money was received in the United States.
Q What was the amount of the personal money that was
received abroad?
A It was somewhere between $40,000 and $50,000.
Q How was it received?
A Cash.
Q What did you do with the money?
A I deposited it in a bank in Bermuda.
Q Okay. Can we get the number of that account?
A It has been provided, I think. It is on a return.
But I must ask --
MR. WOOLSEY: If the material requested, any connection
with Mr. Ledeen's financial matters has been limited to 1985-
'86, both by the independent counsel and by Mr. Barbadora .
Consequently, nothing relating to the period as long ago as
1980 has yet been subpoenaed.
THE WITNESS: Do you mind if I ask what relevance this
has to this case?
MR. LESKER: I will get to that a little bit later. It
is related to statements which were attributed to you in the
Department of State.
UNCLASSIFIED
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'kiM
203
MR. WOOLSEY: So the account hasn't been provided yet
because it hasn't been subpoenaed or requested until this
point. Any accounts in 1985- '86 have been provided.
BY MR. LESKER:
Q Is it an account which is still in existence?
A No.
Q When was it closed?
A Just at that time. I had opened it because I had
9 been told by an attorney that if I kept money earned overseas
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in an offshore account, that I would not have to pay taxes on
it until I brought it into the United States. I checked this
about a couple of months after I opened this account with
another attorney, who told me that that was wrong. So I took |
i
the money out of the account, paid it to myself here, and
declared it and paid taxes on it, and that was that.
Q Well, let's just defer then on the account number
and so forth at this point, because I think I can cover this
information.
A It is singularly uninteresting, I must tell you,
this account.
Q But as I understand your response to the question
on Mr. Pacienza that you, at no time, had any discussions
with him about subsidizing your employment in government
through either Mr. Pacienza or sources which might.' be
available to him; is that correct?
UNCLASSIFIED
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204
A I had, in fact, with the exception, so far as I can
remember, one phone call from him. I had no contact with Mr.
Pacienza during the time of my service in government.
Q Why did you bring him to meet with General Haig?
A Because General Santo Vito asked me if I would do
that so that Mr. Pacienza could give General Haig a message
from General Santo Vito.
Q What was the message?
A It had to do with terrorism.
Q Do you recall what the message was?
A Well, I am not going to discuss it, but it had to
do with the knowledge of the Italian Government about a
particular terrorist then.
Q I see. Prior to your meeting with Secretary Haig
with Mr. Pacienza -- or General Haig with Mr. Pacienza, how
many meetings had you had with General Haig? In other words,
prior to this meeting in Connecticut, how many times had you
met with General Haig?
A In my lifetime?
Q Well, in your professional lifetime.
A I don't know; a dozen.
Q Was this primarily as a result of his NATO appoint-
ment, or did it relate to other matters?
A No. I knew him primarily after NATO. Wtlen he left
NATO, he came to CSIS, then we got to know each other. I had
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known him when he was in NATO, but primarily afterwards.
Q Had General Haig ever made a commitment to you, at
this time or about this time, regarding an appointment,
should he become Secretary of State in the next
administration?
A No.
Q When did you first become interested in an appoint- I
ment at the State Department?
A I wasn't interested in an appointment at the State
Department .
Q Well, how did you come to be a consultant at the
State Department?
A I was never a consultant. I mean I became a
consultant afterwards. I was a full time -- I had a full
time position at the State Department. Haig offered me a
full time job in the Spring of 1981.
Q He personally offered that to you?
A Yes .
Q When was that offered? In other words, what
context was that offer made? Was it a meeting at the State
Department?
A We met during the transition period in the State
Department, and he asked me what position I -- what sort of
job would I like, and I said that I was not interested in a
job, per se, and that if what he had in mind was that we were
mm mmm
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friends and he wanted to be nice to me and presumed that I
wanted such a position and so what was I interested in, if
that was the purpose of the conversation, then he should give
it to somebody else who really wanted it, because I was happy
doing what I was doing.
I explained to him what my career ambitions had been
and, basically, they were to do what I was, at the time,
doing, editing my own magazine, writing where I wanted to
write, and so forth and so on.
But I said to him if at some time in the future there
was a particular task that he thought I was the right person,
that he had only to ask and I would certainly do it, and I
did not care what the title was. So that was the basis on
which we left it, and he thanked me. About three months
later he called me and said he wanted me to do various
things, and he was going to create a position called Special
Advisor to the Secretary of State.
Q Did he personally call you in for that?
A Yes.
Q And you met with him?
A Yes.
Q You did not meet with Woody Goldberg or someone
else?
A
Q
I also met with Woody.
Did you come on board immediately at that time?
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A I started to work there a couple of months later.
I mean the paper work took a while longer, but I was given an
3 I office and so forth. I think probably starting in May, late
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April or early May.
Q Whose staff were you assigned to?
A The Secretary's staff.
Q How 1 3ng did you stay on the Secretary's staff?
A All the time. I had a parallel -- I mean the
bureaucratic locus of the Special Advisor to the Secretary,
it was peculiar, because I was in "S" but was bureaucratically
attached to the Counselor's Office.
Q At any point were you attached to Lawrence
Eagleberger ' s staff?
A That was later. That was after Eagleberger -- |
after McFarlane left and Eagleberger became Under Secretary,
I moved over there, but I was not originally on Eagleberger ' s |
staff. At that time, Eagleberger was Assistant Secretary for
Europe.
Q
A
Q
A
What level clearance did you have at that time?
I got Top Secret and then Code Worit clearance.
Roughly around the same time?
No. It took several months before all the
clearances came through. It wasn't until the fall.
Q When did you meet McFarlane? .'
A I had met McFarlane in '79, '79
UNCLASSIRED
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Q In connection with his work in the Senate --
Committee?
A Yes .
Q Had you seen him during the intervening period?
A No.
Q When did you meet Teicher, Roy Teicher?
A When he came to work for McFarlane.
Q That was the first time you had met him?
A Yes.
Q During the process of your application at the
Department of State, which took apparently several months for
the processing of your papers and so forth, did you tell
anyone that you were expecting a large sum of money from
abroad and that you intended to go to Bermuda to open a bank
account to receive the money?
A No. I may have said that -- let's see what I might
have said in that period that would have led someone to
conclude, erroneously, that I said that.
(Pause. )
All I can imagine that I might have said was that in the
past I had received -- I may have told them the story of this
money in Bermuda, which was that I had at one time received a
large sum of money and had put it in the Bermuda bank. Yes,
X might have said that. But there was no expectation, there
was no arrangement, therf !|h^« •%« cltc^uht to which I was going
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to travel to receive it, no such thing. |
Q Was the account closed at that time?
I
A I doubt it. Technically closed? I
• I
Q Yes. I
A It may have been technically in existence, but
there was no money in it.
i
Q Did you and your wife travel to Bermuda during the I
period of time vhen your application for employment with the
Department of State was pending?
A I don't think so, Joel. I think that the time I
went there to open the account is the only time I have been
to Bermuda .
Q And you went there by yourself at the time?
A Yes .
And that would have been in 1980?
Yes .
You were asked previously, I think in the House
deposition, regarding foreign bank accounts, and I think Dan
Finn and I, in our informal interview, brought that up, and
at that point you had said that you had no foreign bank
accounts. Were you making a distinction between what was then
open and pending and what had been open and pending
previously?
MR. WOOLSEY: Could I ask for a clar if ication,' of that
question, Mr. Lesker?
Q
A
Q
UNCLASSIFIED
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MR. LESKER: What I am asking is, it had been my
impression up uatil recently that you never had a bank
account, a foreign bank account. I think, in response to
that question, you may have been making a distinction between
accounts which were then open or currently open, and accounts
in the past, which you didn't include within the ambet of my
question .
MR. WOOLSEY: This is a question you asked in an
interview in our offices in April?
MR. LESKER: Yes.
MR. WOOLSEY: I didn't bring my notes with me of those
questions. It is my impression that this whole business
about the Bermuda account has been public matter for some
time.
MR. LESKER: Well, it has been in the newspapers, but I
had not, frankly, been aware of it at the time that I
conducted the interview.
MR. WOOLSEY: Your question is, if you asked about it in
April in the interview, after it was in the newspapers, and
if he responded that he did not then have an account in a
foreign country, did he mean to exclude the publicly-known
Bermuda account from 1980?
MR. LESKER: That is right. In other words, wasn't
thinking of it in a current context as opposed to "^hat may
have been opened in the past.
UNCLASSIFIED
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MR. WOOLSEY: Well, he may have been thinking of the
charter of the Committee which, based on my reading here,
relates to the direct or indirect sales, shipment or provision
of arms or other assistance to Iran, and the use of any
proceeds to provide assistance to any faction or insurgency
in Nicaragua. That also, frankly, seems to me to the subject
of this deposition.
MR. LESKER: Yes. Well, what I am referring to is a
vehicle which may have been established to receive funds,
assuming that you received payments, as has been alleged by
some individuals, that there would have been a vehicle by
which those payments could be received offshore. That is the
point .
MR. WOOLSEY: So we are back now to the question.
Assuming that question and answer from your April interview,
had he intended -- if that was your question and if that was
his answer -- had he intended to discuss --
THE WITNESS: I have no account. The question was, "Do
you have any foreign bank accounts?" I have no foreign bank
accounts. At one time I had a foreign bank account. I mean
I find the whole thing tiresome, to tell you the truth.
I want to make one quiet point to you. That is, at evert/
stage having to deal with my activities, any time anybody has
asked me a simple question, I have given them every last bit
of detail about it. I mean the Italian thing is kind of a
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sore subject with me because, as you may be aware, I have a
criminal libel suit pending for an awful lot of the allega-
tions that people have made about it.
You should also keep in mind that last December, when
the current head of SISMI was called to testify, what he said
about what Pacienza had said, and about all the various thing
that had been attributed to him by the Italian press, that it
was all a lie, and that it had not happened, and that he had
not said a word of it, and that he had not the slightest
thing to say about me, because there was no evidence to
support any of these claims.
All right. I mean I just note this in passing, since we
are doing a deposition and since you have asked various
questions about the Italian matter, I want to put that on the
record as well.
There was, for a brief period, this account. It was
opened for the period, for the purpose that I have described,
and I got lousy --
BY MR. LESKER:
Q When was it closed?
A I meaa it just died.
Q Was it in 1981?
A Well, it was gone by the end of 1980 because I
declared all that money on my 1980 tax returns. N9 additional
money was ever put into that account. That account has never
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been used for anything.
Q So, as I understand it, there is no offshore
account open today, nor has there been during the period of
the time in question, which begins for 1985 to 1986?
A Yes. That is the best of my knowledge.
Q I meaa for you. I mean you would certainly know
that.
A Well, I mean there is no operative account. Let's
put it that way.
Q Is there an inoperative account?
A I mean I could not swear to you that there was ever
a formal document or instruction to this Bermuda account
saying, "Please close it off." What I am saying to you is
that the account was opened for the purpose of receiving that
payment. That was the only income that account has ever had.
The money was taken out of it, and I have no dealings --
Q You don't get statements on the account?
A I don't get statements from it. I don't have a
checkbook for it. So far as I am concerned and so far as I
know, the account is closed. However, since I don't want to,
I mean I don't want somebody someday to say, "Well, where is
the letter instructing them to close it?L" I am not sure
that I ever wrote it. I tend to think I did, but in any case
there is no life to it.
Q This is an account at the bank in Bermuda, was an
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account at the bank in Bermuda?
A Yes. I declared it on my tax returns. It was
identified as such in 1980.
Q We don't have the authority to get tax returns.
That is the reason that we try to get them from the
independent counsel.
MR. WOOLSEY: You have authority to subpoena them.
MR. LESKER: Correct. We did do that. We did
subpoena tax returns.
MR. WOOLSEY: Well, to put this on the record, what was
subpoenaed was 1985-1986 tax returns. As a result of
discussion with Committee Counsel, Mr. Barbadoro, the
original versions of the returns, in clear copy, are in the
hands of independent counsel, and there has been rather
extensive correspondence back and forth between Mr. Barbadoro
and myself since we got those subpoenas around June 15th, in
which I expressed, on Mr. Ledeen ' s behalf, no objection to
the Senate Committee examining the 1985- '86 returns and
return information, subject to the constraints of the
Internal Revenue Code, Section 6103, that I described at the
beginning of this deposition.
MR. LESKER: Right. Thank you, and we appreciate your
cooperation. We are endeavoring to get that material.
BY MR. LESKER: .'
Q Mr. Ledeenj_ let me show you a copy of an official
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printout, a report based on two filings that you made, with
respect to disclosure of the importation of currency under
the Customs regulations, and these are identified with you
through your passport and your Social Security Number.
The first importation of currency, apparently, -- I
apologize for the quality of copy, it is pretty bad, but in
indicates, in Fart Three, that 3100,000 in currency was
imported from a country with the initials SP, which I assume
is Spain, by you on 11/24/79, or at least that is the date
the report is filed.
A Yes.
Q Can you tell me what that importation relates to?
THE WITNESS: Do we have to make our little statement
again?
MR. WOOLSEY: As long as -- it is clear that this is
return information and, consequently, subject to 6103.
THE WITNESS: ISI was in the process of doing a project
for the Spanish Government, and this was payment by the
Spanish Government.
BY MR. LESKER:
Q In cash?
A Yes .
Q Is it customary to pay those expenses in cash?
A I believe it is, yes. It is my distinct 'impression
that most west Eurqnft^O JJQvQjrrupents , on sensitive projects.
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pay in cash.
Q I see. The next importation of currency occurs,
according to this report, on February 8th of 1981 and it
relates to $12,001, apparently received from France, Paris,
France, and imported by you. Is that a correct report?
A This is 1981?
Q Yes. February 8th, 1981.
A I do not recall.
Q You do not recall?
A No.
Q How many such filings have you made in the course
of your business experience?
A Any time that I have found myself in possession of
cash which required me to declare it on the Customs' form, I
always declared it. So these would be the only two occasions.
Q And, yet, you don't remember the -- did you have an
account with a representation of an agency of the French
Government?
A It just says "currency," and it doesn't give a
country identification.
Q Yes, it says, "Imported from Paris, xx, " for FR.
A Would you show me that?
Q See, right here. It says, "Imported from Paris."
A Yes, fine. But it is in dollars, evidenlJly, Joel,
because up here when it says, "Currency, country, Spain,"
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that was in pesetas.
Q Was It §100,000 —
A -- dollars worth of pesetas.
Q -- in pesetas? Okay.
A Yes, It was paid in pesetas.
This one is dollars, because it says, "Country, U.S."
All right.
Q Well, it says, "Arrived at --"
A It says, "Currency, currency, country, U.S."
Q Oh, yes. Right.
A So, "Currency, currency. " X mean there is no other
thing, so that was in dollars. I don't recall what that was.
But in any case, --
Q The reason that I bring it up, it is in this time
period when you were applying, I guess, for the position at
the Department of State; is that right?
A No, absolutely not. February 1981, I wasn't
applying for anything.
Q So you made no effort at that point in time?
A Do you want to go through it again? I did not
apply for a job at the Department of State. I was offered a
job by the Secretary of State in the Spring of 1981. So I
did not have anything pending in this period. 1 was not
asking for anything. I had told the Secretary of State
designate, in the transition period, that I was not looking
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for a job in the Department of State, and that if he wanted
to offer me one, I would accept it, and I didn't care what
its title was. I didn't care about rank or whatever. I had
an option of asking for particular jobs there.
It was he who created a position for me in the Spring of
1981 because there things that he wanted me to do for him,
and I accepted that position. But I was not lobbying for
anything, or negotiating anything, or applying for anything.
I didn't have any papers on file there, or anything of the
sort.
MR. WOOLSEY: Mr. Lesker, maybe you can enlighten me
further about the relevance of this to the Committee's
investigation .
MR. LESKER: Individuals who have been interviewed by
the Committee have been informed that during the period that
Mr. Ledeen's paper work was pending at the Department of
State, he had made certain statements, indicating that he was
about to receive a sum of money and that the money would be
received in this Bermuda bank account. I think we have been
over this before-
BY MR. LESKER:
Q Now, you indicated that the Secretary of State
personally offered you this position, and that you came on
board without regard to rank or title, that sort of thing, to
serve the Secretary.
UNCUSSIFIED
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How many times, after you came on board, did you
actually see the Secretary of State?
A Oh, many times.
Q More than five?
A Sure.
Q I mean where you were in conversations with him?
A Yes .
Q I don't mean that you just saw him in the hall.
A Oh, yes.
Q Would it surprise to you that the Secretary of
State, Saturday, said that he had seen you perhaps twice in
all that time?
A He is mistaken.
Q You have a definite recollection, though, that he
offered you a position, personally?
A Yes.
Q Who is Rinah Schwimmer?
A I don't know.
Q You don't know Rinah Schwimmer?
A I don't think so.
Q She lives at 20 West 64th-Street in New York City.
A You haven't helped me.
Q You called her 18 times in 1985 and 1986.
A No, I didn't. .'
Q Well, your telephone records show that you did.
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A Well, I may have called -- I mean if that is a
phone number --
Q The phone number is 212-580-2974.
A Could I have the number?
Q Area Code 212-580-2974.
A If that is a phone number at which Al Schwimmer is
located, I might have called him, but I don't know anybody --
I don't know anyone, by name, named Rinah Schwimmer. I
haven't spoken to a Rinah Schwimmer, at least to my knowledge.
But if that is an Al Schwimmer phone number, I could well
have called Al Schwimmer at it in 1985 or 1986.
Q Did, in fact, you call Al Schwimmer at a number in
New York City extensively during that period of time?
A Yes, I am sure I did.
Q Do you know Richard Miller?
A Yes.
Q How do you know Richard Miller?
A I knew him when I worked at the State Department .
Q In late 1984 and early 1985, did you have occasion
to call him at his office?
A I could well have.
Q Do you recall what it might have related to?
A Well, I did a project, along with Elie Wiesel and
Max Singer and Dean Maitre from Boston University ijn the
Caribbean, on Central America, for something called the Gulf
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and Caribbean Foundation. They, at a certain point, brought
in Rich Miller to help with some public relations campaign
they were involved in to distribute the brochure that we
wrote .
I think that was earlier. I think it was '83-'84 that
we did this project. But I knew Rich Miller. I called him,
we spoke every now and then.
Q When you came on board at the Department of State
in 1981, did you have prior knowledge of other arms deals
which the Government of Israel had done with Iran?
A By "prior, " you mean during the period of the Shah,
for example?
Q No, I'm sorry. During the period 1979, after the
arms embargo was imposed.
A No.
Q You had no knowledge?
A That is correct.
Q Did you know David Kimche during that peric5d of
time?
A 1979-1981?
Q Yes.
A Yes .
Q Had you ever discussed with David Kimche, or anyone
else in Israel, the benefits of U.S. acquiescence (Jr approval
of arms transfers from Israel to Iran?
unclassifieO
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A No.
MR. WOOLSEY: I'm sorry -- ■'ever" -- at what point?
MR. LESKER: Well, during 1979 to 1981.
BY MR. LESKER:
Q Prior to your May 4th and 5th meeting, or May 4th
or 5th meeting with Shimon Peres, on how many occasions had
you met with him prior to that time?
A I would say three or four.
Q Were they private occasions, private meetings, or
were they with other individuals?
A Some private, some with other individuals. I
Q How many times have you met with him privately? i
A Once that I can think of, prior to that one. Just j
i
to round it out -- all the meetings that I had with Peres,
prior to the one in May 1985, were in connection with my work
for Haig to the Socialist International.
Q Had you any knowledge of a deal which had been
proposed by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to transfer certain
aircraft tires to Iran for, I think, their F-4's?
MR. WOOLSEY: When was this?
MR. LESKER: This would have been in the period around
1981.
THE WITNESS: All I can remember about that, Joel, is
that I remember reading some articles in the newspaper where
there were allegations that Israel was shipping things, and I
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think I remember someone writing, in an article, that it was
tires, but aside from that -- I have some kind of vague
recol lection .
But I was not involved. I mean I hasten to point out
that in the State Department I did not work on Iranian
matters. It was not part of my brief. I didn't receive
intelligence on Iran. I didn't read intelligence on Iran. I
didn't follow the matter at all.
BY MR. LESKER:
Q You had prepared a book on the fall of the Shah,
and at what period of time was that published?
A That was published early in 1981.
Q In order to prepare the manuscript for that book --
A The manuscript was -- it is an interesting story.
The manuscript was essentially in shape in the Summer of
1980, actually before the Summer of 1980. We had two
identical offers from two very good publishers, one of whom
wanted to bring it out as a paperback in time for the
campaign, because they thought it would sell very well as a
campaign book, and the other was from Knopf who said they
could not bring it before the Spring of 1981 as a hard cover.
And we opted for Knopf, because we didn't want a campaign
book, we wanted a serious book. So the book was written a
year before it came out. »
Q If I can go back for a minute to the December 16th
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dinner meeting with Ghorbanifar that was raised initially --
MR. KERR: That is December 16th, 19857
MR. LESKER: Yes, 1985.
BY MR. LESKER:
Q What was discussed at that meeting?
A I told you.
Q Well, you --
A We talked about his various problems, we talked
about the situation in Iran. We talked a great deal about
Libyan operation that he wanted to run. we talked about
terrorism .
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FROM THE OFFICE
OF SENATOR JAMES McCLURE
BY MR. GERARD:
Q I think you indicated earlier, Mr. Ledeen, that you
had met Mr. Ghorbanifar at the Air France counter on an
occasion. Was that prior to the December 16 meeting?
A As I said before, I don't precisely remember when
it was, but it could hardly be related to the December 16th
meeting because the December 16th meeting, I had been
previously in Rome and then went to Geneva for the express
purpose of having dinner with Mr. Ghorbanifar. So it was
either before or after. I am guessing that it was before.
Q But at that point of contact, you had dinner with
Mr. Ghorbanifar that evenjjigi is^bai.iCCXect?
■immm
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A Yes, that is correct.
MR. WOOLSEY: I am sorry -- December 16th or at the time
of the Air France contact.
MR. GERARD: At the Air France contract.
THE WITNESS: It is true in both cases.
BY MR. GERARD:
Q What was discussed at that meeting, when you ran
into him, I think you said just coincidentally , at the Air
France counter?
A I don't really remember.
Q And you went and had dinner with him that evening.
A Yes .
Q You don't recall anything at all?
A No. But if it is the occasion in which I guessed
earlier, then it would be an occasion on which he would have
spoken to me a great deal about terrorism, and I would have
taken notes, and that would have given me the basis to give
some things to Charlie Allen whenever it was, the 4th of
December. I mean that is a possibility.
Q Terrorism, but not the Iran initiative?
A Look, I want to be as clear as I can; that as of
the time that Admiral Poindexter said that he was taking me
off of this, I did my very best not to involve myself in the
Iran initiati-e. »
I did continue, tQ jsur^ue iH. the activities that I
iid contLnue,^^|>y^|u^^l^^h^
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thought were legitimate in connection with counterterrorism.
1
so that in my conversations with Mr. Ghorbanifar subsequent to i
i
whenever it was, the 25th, 26th of November 1985, when he
raised, as he invariably did, something connected with the
Iran initiative, I would always say, "Please don't talk about
that with me because I'm not involved. You will only get me
into trouble if you talk about it, so please leave me out of
it. ■•
My role in the Iran affair, from November 27th, 1985. on
consisted primarily in my efforts to convince American
officials not to do arms for hostages and to return to the
geo-political initiative.
Q I would like to ask one other question. You
indicated times, I think after Mr. Poindexter had told you or
indicated to you that you were off the initiative, and your
best recollection that you talked to Ollie North about that,
to try to get some impression, perhaps, what that actually
meant, that you were no longer part of that.
Ollie indicated to you at that time that you would no
longer be allowed to review information in his office; is
that right, or can you clarify that point?
A What I think I said was he told me I was no longer
to have access to the special compartmentalized intelligence
dealing with the Iran initiative that I had been reading up
until that point.
UNCUSSIFIED
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Q So from that point on, you no longer had any access
to that compartmentalized information dealing with the Iran
initiative; is that correct?
A That is correct.
Q But you did continue to visit Mr. North's office on
numerous occasions to read other information, I assume
related to terrorism but not specifically the Iran initiative;
is that correct;
A That is correct.
MR. KERR: Let me jump in. I know you all have to leave
in about five minutes, but there are a couple of questions I
was asked to make sure that we got at, and we are going to
cover some territory one more time.
FURTHER EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE:
BY MR. KERR:
Q Let me take you to October 27, 1985, in terms of
the meeting in Geneva that we talked about before, okay. If
you would look at this piece of paper which has a number of
people listed on it; can you tell me if you met with the
people that are on that list on October 27th, 1985?
A The first person on this list was not present, to
the best of my knowledge.
Q If you would just draw a circle around tfie people
that weren't there, that would be good.
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A (Witness marks document.)
Q Okay. Anybody else who was present but is not at
that list?
A Well, my name is not on the list.
Q I understand. Other than you?
A There was another person who was in and out, but
probably did not speak the language we were speaking and
probably doesn't --
Q Do you know the identify of that person?
A No.
Q Do you know their nationality?
A Yes.
Q What was their nationality?
A It would be an Iranian.
Q An Iranian?
A Yes.
Q But you don't know the identity of that Iranian?
A That is right.
Q All right. Now, with regard to that meeting on
October 27 that occurred with the people that you have listed
present, was there discussion of 600 Hawk missiles at that
meeting at that time?
A No, I don't think there was.
Q At any time, during the period that we h^e talked
about in October, which is the 26th through the 2 9th, was
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there discussion of 600 Hawk missiles, that you were present
for, where you actually about it?
A I don't think so.
Q Has anyone ever told you that there was discussion
of 600 Hawk missiles at that series of meetings that took
place between the 26th and 29th of October?
A Not that I can remember.
Q And you have no recall of a specific request being
made by the Iranian representatives for delivery to them of
600 Hawk missiles?
A From as of the meeting in the OEOB on 8 October
1985.
Q All right.
A There was a series of requests from the Government
of Iran for a variety of missiles which covered an enormous
range and quantity of missiles, and which changed according
to sunspot activity, or something like that, so that for
almost any quantity and any type of American missile,
probably in that period, there was a request for it, or twice
it, or ten times it.
But I don't recall any specific request for a quantity
of 600 Hawk missiles at any point. And I don't' believe it
came up at all in that period, in the period you are referring
to.
Q All right. You believe that it came up at an
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earlier time, if I remember your testimony correctly; the
Hawk missile question came up in a period --
A The Hawk missile question, in general, yes, came up
at an earlier time.
Q And that earlier time would have been on or around
October 8th, 1985; correct?
A That is correct.
Q Let me move you again to another area. November
15, 1985, were you aware of a meeting with Rabin, McFarlane
and others?
A No.
Q You were not?
A Rabin?
Q Yes -- I'm not very good at names or pronunciations.
I can't spell them either.
A No, I was not.
Q When, if ever, did that come to your attention that
there had been a meeting between McFarlane and Rabin?
A Just now.
Q Just now?
A Well, no. I think McFarlane testified to it.
Q Okay. But prior to the events of November '86, you
did not know that there was a meeting on November 15 between
Rabin and McFarlane; correct?
A That is correct.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Q All right. Were you aware of a meeting on November
7, are you aware of a November 7 meeting of Kimche and
McFarlane? That is November 7, 1985.
A There was a meeting between Kimche and McFarlane
which I arranged, but I think that was later in November.
Q What is your recollection of the meeting?
A Well, I had asked Kimche to talk to McFarlane
because I was convinced that McFarlane was getting ready to
resign, and was in a bad psychological state and was planning
to abandon the entire Iranian initiative. I urged to Kimche
to talk to McFarlane to ask him, first, not to resign; and
second, not to abandon the political initiative with regard
to Iran.
Kimche came to Washington. We had lunch together with
North who urged him to do the seune thing, and then he went
and spoke to McFarlane. But I think that was later in
November .
Q Can you place it in time with relation to the Hawk
delivery of November 23, 24?
A Well, if I had to guess, I would guess that
happened, that such a meeting was after that.
After that?
Yes.
After Thanksgiving?
UNCLASSIFIED
Yes, I think so. Don't you have a record of a
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Kimche/McFarlane meeting in late November or early December?
Q I don't. I have got one November 7th.
A I mean it could have been that early.
Q With regard to the meeting, did you attend the
meeting between Kimche and McFarlane?
A No.
Q Did you receive a report from anyone about the
meeting?
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Yes.
From whom?
From Kimche.
What did he tell you?
He said that he was going to resign.
He said that —
His impression was that McFarlane -- McFarlane told
him that he hadn't decided yet, but Kimche 's clear impression
was that McFarlane was going to resign.
Q All right. Now, the other aspect of the meeting
was supposed to be the Iran initiative. Did Kimche give you
any report of what he and McFarlane talked about in terms of
the Iran initiative?
A Kimche just told me that he had said to McFarlane
that he thought it was important to continue it, and that for
all the difficulties and problems, that the contacts we had
made and the prospect for a broader range of political
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contacts was sirriply too promising to give up and that it
should be pursued.
Q All right.
A But it could be that that November 7th meeting' is
that meeting.
Q Do you have any knowledge today of anyone else who
attended that meeting between Kimche and McFarlane?
A No. My clear impression was that there were only
two people present.
Q Do you know of any writing that sets forth what
occurred at that meeting?
A No.
Q Do you know of any discussion at that meeting of
the Hawk transaction?
A No.
Q When you had lunch with North and Kimche about this
meeting, was the Hawk transaction discussed?
A No, not so far as I can recall.
Q And the only people at lunch were you, Kimche and
North; is that correct?
A That is right.
MR. KERR: I have run you out of time. Arthur, are
there other things that you want to cover on this matter?
Anything else. I apologize, Joel. ;
MR. LESKER: I just have, really, one more question.
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THE WITNESS: I just don't want to come back again, so
if you have more questions, please ask them until you are
finished, and let's end this thing. I mean I will stay until
you are done, but let's exhaust the questions.
BY MR. LESKER:
Q In connection with the Kimche meeting with McFarlane
in the Summer of 1985, Fawn Hall, I believe, testified that
Mr. Kimche was brought to Colonel North's office.
A Yes.
Q Can you tell me why that was?
A I think that -- look, I think that Fawn has
confused two meetings in her memory, because the meeting that
I thought they were asking her about would have been the
meeting in July or the meeting in August, and she said she
thought that I brought him there as a holding place, waiting
to go and see McFarlane.
Now, I didn't know about the July meeting, so it could
not have been that one, and the August meeting I was in
Israel, he just came, so I couldn't have arranged that. The
one that I did arrange is this one in November and there,
David did come to the OEOB and waited in Ollie's office until
Bud came free and then walked down to see Bud. So I think
that is the meeting --
Q You think she is just confused? ,'
A I think that is one she is rememb.ering, yes. But,
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1 |1 again, I have no knowledge of either July or August. I
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- 2 I didn't know there was a July meeting and the August meeting I
I
* 3 ! knew about but wasn't present. So my guess is that what she
4 has done is to confuse these.
5 MR. WOOLSEY: We will stay longer if you have further
6 questions. I would like to go ahead and wind this up today.
7 MR. KERR: Do you have further questions, Joel?
8 MR. LESKER: No, I just asked all mine.
9 MR. KERR: The first thing I would like to do is get
10 this folded piece of paper marked as Ledeen Exhibit 1.
11 (The document referred to was
12 marked for identification as
13 Ledeen Deposition Exhibit 1.)
14 BY MR. KERR:
15 Q Let me take you back into December so that we can
16 proceed with the chronology --
17 MR. WOOLSEY: Of 1985?
18 MR. KERR: Yes, December of 1985.
19 I am going to have to take you through some things that
20 were set forth in this memorandum of what occurred at the
21 meeting, so that you have an opportunity to tell me why it is
22 that they're wrong.
23 MR. WOOLSEY: 'This memorandum" is the one by the CIA
24 official?
MR. KERR: Correct.
UNCLASSIFIED
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MR. WOOLSEY: Would it be possible for him to see the
memorandum while you are asking him about it?
MR. KERR: Sure.
BY MR. KERR:
Q What is your clearance at the present time, Mr.
Ledeen?
A I have no current clearances.
Q I think you guys are going to have to let me read
you selected excerpts. Mr. Ledeen, I don't like this any
more than you do. Back home in Baltimore, we don't do this
kind of nonsense. I'm beginning to learn of a whole new
worked in Washington, D.C.
Mr. Lesker, who is always a stickler for knowing
details, wants to know — you lost your clearance when you
left the NS^, is that right?
MR. LESKER: I thought you still had a DOD contract?
THE WITNESS: No. At the moment, I have no government
relationship, as of a couple of months ago.
BY MR. KERR:
Q And the government, being the government, they took
your clearance when you stopped being an employee?
A No need to know.
Q No need to know. You're compartmented ojt . Okay.
This memo is broken down. It is printed in large
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1 I detail. Most of everything that is in it is in the Tower
2 I
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Commission Report, so it's not going to come as a surprise to
* .3 jj you . But the first portion of the memorandum describes the
4 meeting that apparently occurred between the CIA Chief of the
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and yourself, at least as he recollected it.
He said that at the meeting, which he said occurred on
December 22nd, you reviewed with him your relationship with
Ghorbanifar, and then you said the following: Quote, About
a year ago, he (Ledeen) had done to the former National
Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, to discuss the need for
an Iran policy. Ledeen suggested to McFarlane that he be
authorized to contact the Israeli Government to see what
could be done in conjunction with them. McFarlane authorized
this contact, and shortly thereafter Ledeen met with Prime
Minister Peres . "
That memo was written December 22nd, 1985, and by the
"year ago" reference, it seems to relate back to sometime
late 1984. Were you in contact with McFarlane about Iran or
changes in Iran policy at that time, late 1984?
A No.
Q And the authorization from McFarlane to you to meet
with Peres would not have occurred in late 1984; correct?
A It occurred in May of 1985.
Q So the chronology, as you recall it, begins in the
Spring of 1985; it does not begin J.n_ihe Winter of 1984?
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A The chronology, my first conversation with McFarlane
about the subject was not until the late winter or early
Spring of 1985.
in his report
Q Okay. The Chief of tha
which goes through yet another layer before it gets published,
says that you had told him that you had met, as of December
22, 1985, with Ghorbanifar 20 to 30 times; is that true?
A False.
Q Did you tell him that?
A No.
Q You did not. He says that you told him that from
this contact the operation developed to have the Israelis, at
our behest, deliver to Iran 500 TOW missiles, and more
recently 18 Hawk missiles in exchange for the release of all
the hostages held in Lebanon. Do you recall making that
representation to him?
A I do not recall it.
Q You were knowledgeable about these deliveries, as
of that time?
A I was .
Q And he did ask you to relate to him, I guess, the
history of your involvement with Ghorbanifar?
A He did.
Q So it is not completely inconceivable th^t you
would have re
ers to him; is that correct?
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A That is correct.
Q All right. He then goes into a discussion of what
went wrong on the Hawk transaction. How knowledgeable were
you about what went wrong with the Hawk transaction, as of
December 22, 19 35?
A I don't know, because I don't know to this day
exactly what all the details were. I had had, by then, an
account from Ghorbanifar, in some detail, despite all my
protestations. Please don't tell me," so I had had a bit of
that .
Q Do you remember when you got that? Was that at the
December 16 dinner?
A Yes .
Q So Ghorbanifar -- I have read a lot of Ghorbanifar
material now. My guess is he unburdened himself to you on
December 16; is that fair?
A Yes .
Q So he would have told you his view of what had gone
wrong with the Hawk transaction on December 16?
A I am quite sure that he did that.
Q Okay. That is helpful. Do you recall the extent
to which you related to the CIA representative what
Ghorbanifar had related to you?
A No, I don't recall it. i
Q Let me read vou this passage and see if it is
!! ii.^.^!nrn
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consistent today, in terms of what you recall today knowing
back then. "The delivery of the Hawk missiles has been an
operational nightmare. There was a misunderstanding about
the type of missiles the Iranians were seeking. They wanted
a missile that could hit a target at 70,000 feet and already
had Hawk missiles in their arsenal.
"What they thought they were going to get was a modified
and advanced version of the Hawk. They are quite angry about
the delivery of the missiles, and have asked that they be
removed from Iran as soon as possible. Their presence in
Iran is politically troublesome to the Iranian hierarchy.
They are now asking for Hercules or Phoenix missiles."
Do you recall relaying that kind of information to him?
A Well, they had long since been asking for Hercules
and Phoenix missiles. Essentially, I think that account is
what I remember knowing about it.
Q Okay. The details like whether they would shoot
down planes at 70,000 feet was the kinds of things --
A No. I knew that one of the problems had been that
the Iranians wanted a missile that could shoot down things --
I remember 60,000 feet at the moment, to tell you truth,
rather than 70,000, but that they wanted something which had
a greater range than what they had gotten.
Basically, the Iranian complaint about the miisiles that
arrived were two-fold — well, three-fold. First, it was the
I
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wrong missile, because it didn't have the range they wanted;
second, they were defective wrong missiles; and third, they
had Israeli markings all over them. So it was a defective
missile that was a provocation, and they were angry, and they
wanted people to come and take the awful things away.
Q All right. On that score, as you now know from
reading the Tower Conunission Report, and as we mentioned
earlier on. North had attributed the wrong missile to your
good offices .
I want to make it clear. You, to the best of your
recollection, didn't negotiate with the Iranians on what kind
of missile they were going to get, did you?
A If I could be more explicit than that, I would. I
did not, at any time, discuss with any Iranian what kind of
missile they were going to get. The missiles were sent by
the Israelis to the Iranians, and all negotiations over the
technical characteristics of any of these things, or how they
were to be delivered, or what they were to cost, what was
going to be paid for them, how it was going -- all those
technical details were things that I knew nothing about and
in which I was not involved.
Q Do you know the identities of the people who
negotiated those details?
A I do not know. I presume that it was th$ usual
people, namely Schwimmer, Nimrodi and Kimche.
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Q All right. But so that I understand you, when
Ghorbanifar unburdened himself on December 16, he didn't
identify to you the specific human beings to which he
attributed this foul-up?
A That is correct.
Q And to this day, you don't have this knowledge?
A That is correct.
Q Now, the next paragraph of this memorandum talks
about the reference we talked about earlier, about a previous
meeting. Let me read you what he says and tell me if it
gives you a refreshed recollection, or if you remember saying
these things.
It says, "Ledeen stated that at a recent high level
meeting which included the President, Secretary of State
Schultz, and Defense Secretary Weinberger at that meeting, a
decision was made not to proceed with Ghorbanifar in an
effort to release the hostages. Schultz and Weinberger
reportedly are quite unhappy about this operation. '
First, do you recall relating this description of a high
level meeting to this CIA representative?
A No.
Q Did you have knowledge of such a meeting at that
time?
A No . I had knowledge of earlier meetings,' at the
beginning of the project, at which time both Schultz and
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Weinberger -- my understanding had been that both Schultz and
Weinberger had been opposed to it, but I had no knowledge of
a recent meeting.
Q Specifically, did you have knowledge of a recent
meeting that included the President of the United States?
A No.
Q Did the CIA agent relate to you his knowledge of
such a meeting?
A I don't think so.
Q Okay. As of today, do you have any knowledge of the
basis for this representation in this December 25-26
memorandum?
A No . I would guess that he misunderstood something
I may have said about a meeting back in July or August of
1985 to refer to something which had happened recently. That
is the only explanation I can give you.
Q To make sure we are on the same wave length,
though; you, at that time, did not know of the meetings of
December 7th or December 10th that included the President?
A I don't know today about the meetings of December
7th, December 10th.
Q But you certainly didn't know then?
A No.
Q Okay. Then we come to the famous aside /-- he says,
"That as an aside, Ledeen noted they had purposely overcharged
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the Iranians and had used about $200,000 of these funds to
support Ghorbanifar ' s political contacts inside Iran." Did
you say that?
A I don't think I said it. I don't think I drank
that much. What he probably -- what I may have said was
that, because I believed it, was that Ghorbanifar had spent a
significant amount of his own money to support people inside
Iran, and he hoped to be able -- that in the future, he would
be able to recoup this in one way or another.
But I did not have then, and I will say again, I do not
now have any basis for believing that commissions were paid
to anybody in this affair. I just don't -- I have never seen
any proof of it. I have heard a million and one allegations,
but I have never seen any evidence.
Q Did you know then, in December of 1985, of any
conscious overcharge for the purpose of generating monies
that would be used by Ghorbanifar to pay -- whether you call
it commissions, bribes, gratuities, gifts, whatever -- to
Iranians?
A No, I didn't. I knew that there had been, if you
want to put it this way, a deliberate overcharge, as I
testified last time.
Q Make the distinction for me again. When you use
that term, what are you referring to?
A What I am referring to is the necessity of gener-
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ating money to cover the purchase of replacement weapons and
the expenses associated with the operation, travel, transport,
insurance, pilots, airplane rentals, all that sort of thing.
Q But for the purpose of putting cash money in
people's pockets, that would not be used to pay for airplanes,
or missiles, or things like that, you did not understand that
to have been part of the deal?
A That 15 correct. Indeed, I would, and have put it
more strongly, which was I believed we had an explicit
understanding, at least with the Israelis, that there was to
be none of that, and there would be none of that.
Q All right. I f I am remembering your testimony
correctly, you did not know of the burn notice, as of the
time you had this meeting with the guy from tm
A Correct.
Q He attributes to you, in this memorandum, not only
knowledge but representation to him that there was such a
thing. He says, "Ledeen said that when he learned of our
burn notice on the subject of Ghorbanifar, he contacted
Ghorbanifar in an effort to have him explain the situation."
Does that refresh your recollection, that you knew of
the burn notice and that was why you were summoning Ghor-
banifar back?
A No . I summoned Ghorbanifar because -- yiu mean for
this meeting here?
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Q Yes .
A No. I sununoned Ghorbanifar at CIA's request.
Q Okay. And that, as I understand it, is you got a
call or had a discussion with -- Charlie Allen is your
recollection, right, in which Charlie said, "We want to meet
with Ghorbanifar."
A Yes .
Q Could it have been someone else that you had that
discussion with?
A Could have been -- you know, it could have been
Casey or it could have been this chap here. I do not recall.
But CIA wanted to talk to him. The original conversation was
with Casey, and Casey said, "Well, let's try to clear the
thing up with him. '
Q But there is a matter of emphasis here that I want
to get clear in my mind. One could read the events, and
particularly this memorandum suggests that Michael Ledeen was
trying to package up and sell to the CIA Manucher Ghorbanifar
as somebody they ought to be doing business with, or getting
to know, or learning to love, any of those kinds of concepts.
A Yes.
Q What I am hearing from you is that it was the CIA
that was asking you to bring this gentleman in, not you
trying to persuade them to have the meeting; is th^t correct?
A No, no,, jig , ^^ w^s^^d^^^^^^ trying to convince
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the CIA that Manucher Ghorbanifar was someone with whom I
thought they should work, on the grounds that he had provided
us with considerable amounts of information that proved to be
accurate .
Remember, by now, we had several months where we could
check this out. He had provided accurate information about
Iran. He provided accurate information about terrorism. He
had given us lines which enabled us to greatly expand our
knowledge of the political situation inside of Iran and
personalities inside Iran, as well as various people active
in the terrorist universe, whether they be Iranian or other;
some Syrian, some Libyan, et cetera.
I simply thought that from the standpoint of the
American national interest, that someone with these contacts
and with such knowledge, was someone with whom the Government
of the United States ought to work. How, in what way, in
what kind of relationship, who should do it, and all of that,
was not a matter for me to decide. I am not a professional
intelligence officer.
But I simply did what I thought was my duty in such a
matter, which was to bring to their attention the fact of the
existence of this person and to tell them what my experiences
had been.
Q So you were an advocate for Ghorbanifar fceing
utilized by the U . S,-| eovsjjnjtvpo^. i^ R^pejiber of 1985?
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A I would put the emphasis on the American side, as I
was an advocate of the utility to the United States of using
Mr. Ghorbanifar for some purposes, yes.
Q The next question I have, though, is were you an
advocate of the CIA being the entity that was using that? I
mean up until you meet with Charlie Allen on December 4, the
CIA had, at least as I understand your understanding, been
out of the picture. Why, come December 4, are you suggesting
that the CIA reevaluate Mr. Ghorbanifar?
A Because -- well, the reason why I had made no
approach to the CIA previous to December 4, was that I had
been instructed not to inform them.
Q By?
A By McFarlane.
Q And by North, or just by McFarlane?
A No. By McFarlane. In this matter I worked for
McFarlane.
Q All right.
A So there was no reason to do it, and there was
every reason not to do it.
Once the Iran project, as far as I understood it, was
terminated, and certainly my role in it was at an end, I felt
now free to go to CIA, to tell them about Ghorbanifar for
different purposes, that is to say terrorism, counJer-
terrorism. And so my approach to CIA was simply to inform
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them of the existence of this person and to encourage them to
make use of him in our counterterrorist program.
Q Again, if I am understanding your testimony, you
cleared, through North, this idea of going to the CIA?
A Yes. I told North that I was going to do that, and
he said he thought it was a good idea.
Q You did not discuss the approach to the CIA with
McFarlane?
A Correct.
Q Or Poindexter?
A Correct.
Q So your contact point was North, and North said it
was okay by him if you went to seem him?
A Right .
MR. WOOLSEY: If I might interject, Mr. Ledeen has
testified previously about his efforts to see Admiral
Poindexter, and his lack of success in being able to do so.
MR. KERR: I understand that. The problem I have had
is: A. making sure I understand when, from the various
testimonies, that Poindexter message came. That isn't
altogether clear in the previous testimony.
BY MR. KERR:
Q I think you have placed it, as best you can now, as
having occurred sometime after November 24 or 25, Sometime
around November 26.
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A Viell, he said to me -- when I carried him the
message from the Iranian Prime Minister, that was when he
said to me, "You're being taken off this thing."
Q All right. The problem I am trying to pursue is,
you are taken off of it; yet, you are at the CIA within days
of having gotten that instruction. You are there because
North said you could go; correct?
A Yes- But, look, I don't see why this should
surprise you. I am there, not to talk about an Iranian
project. I am there to talk about a Libya project and a
whole series of things to do, with regard to terrorism. I am
not there lobbying them to go back into Iran. I didn't go to
Charlie, Allen, Dewey Clarridge and so forth and say, 'Hey,
you know, we really ought to continue that wonderful Iran
project that we had." Not at all.
I went to them and said, "Look, here is a man, he had to
do with this Iran thing. I have nothing further to do with
it anyway. I think it's finished. " That was my understand-
ing, remember, that there was no Iran program. All right. I
said, "Okay. But here's a guy that you people should use.
He has a Libya idea which I think is a good idea. He has all
kinds of information, entrees in the world of terrorism. He
is extremely useful to us." This was my work there at the
n/c . ,'
Q You were aware, were you not, as of this time, the
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third week of December, that Ghorbanifar was having
discussions about further arms for hostage transactions with
American representatives at that time?
A I don't know if I knew that then or not. I
certainly knew it within a month or two.
Q You can't place it any closer than that? I mean as
of the time January 11, 12, and 13, Ghorbanifar is back at
your house and having his lie detector test taken. You knew
that there were discussions that were going on, that he was
having with Americans about continuing the arms for hostage
transactions; correct?
A I knew he was having discussions, but I didn't know
that anything had been decided, as best I can recall it. I
think it took a while longer for me to figure out that they
were actually -- that they had done it, they were going to do
it again.
Q All right. But in any event, as of December 22,
when you were meeting with this CIA representative, your
state of mind is such that you don't have a present under-
standing that the arms for hostages aspect of the Ghorbanifar
relationship is a continuing matter?
A No. So far as I was concerned, it was finished.
Q All right. There is a representation in this
memorandum that you made the point that any serioufe covert
action operations directed against Iran using Ghorbanifar
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should be run out of the White House, not CIA, because,
quote, "It will leak from Congress." Closed quote.
Do you recall giving that bit of advice to the CIA
representative?
A I don't recall it, but it is conceivable.
Q All right. You would have been an advocate at that
time of not having the CIA run whatever covert operation the
government was running against Iran out of the CIA; is that
right?
A No, that is wrong. In fact, I had, starting in
October, said to McFarlane that I thought any serious Iran
program could only be conducted by a professional intelligence
service, and could not possibly be managed by the NSC,
because we didn't have the manpower to do it and we didn't
have the technical capacity to do it. I said that to him
already in October.
I think that probably what^^^^^^Bmis interpreted in
this discussion -- again, I have no recollection of saying
anything quite like that, but what I might have said to him
would have been words to the effect that when one deals with
contacts like Ghorbanifar and some of his Iranian friends,
where the sensitivity of the contacts is such that their
disclosure might cost them their lives.
It is sometimes better to have these contacts,' done
through the NSC because you don't have the same reporting
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requirements, or words to that effect.
Q Well, this notion of not having reporting require-
ments, how did you come by that notion? One assumes that
that has a certain amount of legal analysis built into it.
Who had presented that notion to you?
A Well, CIA is required to report all current --
Q I know CIA's reporting requirements. As to the NSC
not having the same reporting requirements, where did that
come from?
A I think that when the NSC has discreet contacts
with foreign officials, that it is not automatically required
to report them to Congress.
Q Going beyond contacts to operational roles, were
you aware of the NSC being engaged in intelligence operations?
A No. what I would be referring to was contacts.
Indeed, there was, exactly at the point where this thing was
becoming an operation, that I was going to McFarlane and
saying — or when it had developed the potential that at some
subsequent date it might become an operation, that I expressed
the opinion that it required a professional intelligence
organization .
Q All right. So insofar as this gentleman is
relating to the CIA that you suggested that a covert operation
for Iran be ran by the NSC, as opposed to the CIA:' A. you
didn't say that, and B. it would have been a misconstruction
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by him of what you were saying; is that right?
A I certainly don't believe it.
Q Do you recall saying that?
A No.
Q The memo also says that Colonel North dropped by
that evening. Do you recall Colonel North dropping by?
A That IS correct.
Q What was the occasion that caused the Colonel to
come by; had you told him that you were going to be meeting
with a CIA representative and Ghorbanifar that evening?
A Yes.
Q Did he indicate an interest in coming by to visit?
A Yes. Well, I invited him to come by, if he was
interested.
Q Okay. To what extent did Colonel North participate
in the discussions with the CIA representative that evening?
A I don't really recall. I recall him arriving
fairly late, and that it was mostly chit-chat.
Q The reference that is contained in the memo about
North seems to relate something to the effect "that North
dropped by to say hello to Ghorbanifar and talk with
Ghorbanifar about the problem of retrieving the missiles from
Iran. " Do you recall that discussion?
A I don't recall it, but it is possible. ,'
Q The memo also says that the question of a polygraph
iiNHi hmm
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for Ghorbanifar came up at this meeting on the 22nd; do you
recall that?
A Yes. I think t ha tflH^^H asked Ghorbanifar if he
were willing to take a polygraph.
Q Was that a bolt from the blue, or had you been
aware of the fact that the CIA wanted to repolygraph Mr.
Ghorbanifar before this meeting?
A I was aware of it.
Q And you were aware from what source?
A I think from the Director.
Q From Casey?
A Yes.
Q Did Casey explain to you why he felt another
polygraph of Ghorbanifar was a good or bad thing?
A Yes, because he said that since the objection to
Ghorbanifar at the Agency rested so largely on the two
previous polygraphs that one way to resolve this matter, or
clear it up, might be to give him a polygraph where he could
explain what happened on the first two, and that if he could
satisfactorily account for why he made false statements on
the first two polygraphs, that might then lay the basis for a
good relationship in the future. So this was to be a
polygraph on the first two polygraphs.
Q So you clearly understood this to be a rfevisitation
of prior situations?
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A Now, that was explicit. That was explicit, not only |
I
on the occasion of that evening at my home, but it was I
reaffirmed just prior to the polygraph itself a few weeks '
later. I
I
I
Q And the representation on what the polygraph was to I
be about was made to you by Casey? |
8yJHH|H|^
Q By^^H|^^H Both on December 2 2nd and, i
subsequently, about January Hth; is that correct?
A Correct. |
I
Q In terms of the understanding on when Ghorbanifar |
was to be polygraphed, what was your understanding, as of '
December 2 2nd? |
1
A That it would take place in the near future and [
that the main question was one of the availability of a
senior polygraph operator that^^^^^^Hwas trying to locate,
because he said he did not want some inexperienced operator.
This was supposed to be a friendly polygraph, so they wanted
and that when this person was available, he
would get back in touch with me and I would try to see if
Ghorbanifar could come and make that schedule.
Q All right. Again, these representations about the
details came froml
Yes.
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Q Were you aware that the next morning, which would
be a Monday, the 2 3rd of December, Casey was going to have a
session with various high ranking officials in the CIA about
Ghorbanif ar?
A No.
Q Did tnat ever come to your attention before the
Tower Commission Report came out?
A No.
Q So you didn't have any discussions with Casey the
next morning yourself; is that right?
A I think that is right. I don't remember. I may
have spoken to him on the phone.
Q The sequence of events seems to be that you had
your meetings on the 22nd, there was this meeting with Casey
and various other folks on the morning of the 23rd, and then
later on the 23rd, a second visitation took place with
Ghorbanifar by^^^^^^^^ Do you recall a second meeting with
on the 23rd?
A No, I don't. But then Ghorbanifar wasn't staying
at our house, so it --
Q He was staying at a hotel?
A Yes.
Q We have an indication that you met with him at that
hotel on the 23i.J; do you recall that? /
A I may well have done that.
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Q Okay. Do you recall^^^^^^^^being present when
that occurred?
A I may, actually.
Q Okay. What do you recall about that meeting?
A Nothiag, nothing, but I think I do remember -- I am
sorry. I don't remember it.
Q According to Colonel North's calendar, on the 23rd,
he met with you and Ghorbanifar at the Madison Hotel at 2:30
p.m. Do you ha-J's any recollection of that meeting?
A No, I don't.
Q All right. Again, according to his calendar, he
then went from that meeting at 2:30 to another hotel here in
Washington, D.C., the Hay Adams Hotel, and met with General
Secord. Do you have any knowledge of that meeting?
A No.
Q Do you have any knowledge of a relationship between
the meetings with yourself and Ghorbanifar at 2:30 and the
meeting with Secord at 3:45 p.m., that very day?
Q No, I do not.
Q Okay. So you didn't know General Secord was in
town?
A
Secord .
Q All right. Did you know a Polish gentleAan by the
name of Copp who was in town when that occurred?
I keep telling you that I didn't know General
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A No.
Q No? All right. Do you know of any meetings
between the Polish gentleman named Copp and Ghorbanifar that
4 ) would have occurred on the 23rd of December?
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A No, I didn't. I never heard about that.
Q If you all will give me leave, let me then move to
the polygraph test on the 11th of January. Were you charged
with responsibility for coordinating the meeting of the CIA
polygrapher and Ghorbanifar? Was that your function?
A No.
Q How was the CIA apprised of the fact that
Ghorbanifar would be in town on the 11th of January?
A ^^^^^^Hasked me to tell him the date, and I
communicated it to him, and then we arranged to meet
for lunch just before the polygraph.
Q And those present for lunch were]
and Ghorbanifar; is that right?
A Correct.
Q Was anybody else present?
A No.
Q Certain representations were made to you at that
time about what the polygraph would be about?
A Correct.
Q But you were not present for the polygraf)h?
A Correct.
yourself
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Q You did not learn about how the polygraph had gone
until Ghorbanifar emerged from the polygraph?
A Until he arrived at our home.
Q He went to your home that evening?
A Yes.
Q And he told you what had happened with the
polygraph?
A Yes.
Q What did he tell you about the polygraph, in
summation?
A Well, first, he was physically in pain and he
wanted a doctor, because he had bruises on his arm and he had
severe back pain, and he had some pain in his legs which he
was afraid, at the time, might have related to some arterial
problem or something. He was really fit to be tied. He was
furious and he was hurting.
And he said, in essence, that all the rules had been
broken, that the questions were asked by a young person who
-- and, in fact, he had black and blue marks on his arm.
And he said that all the subjects which were explicitly
declared to be off limits were raised, and they ju4t kept on
going over and over and over and over again, and to current
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events and things that had happened in the past few months,
and his relationship with other people in the American
Government, and what had been happening with the hostages and
4 ! all the rest of that, all of which had been quite explicitly
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decided was off limits and would not --
Q When you say they had been decided, how had it been
decided?
A ^^^^^^H'^^'^ told both me and Ghorbanifar twice --
first, the evening at my house; secondly, at the luncheon
just before the examination, that this polygraph was to be
given for the exclusive purpose of resolving the questions
that attached to Ghorbanifar ' s veracity because of the first
two polygraphs.
Therefore, they were simply going to go back over the
questions to which he had given unsatisfactory answers in the
first two polygraphs, that he could explain to them why he
had not told them the truth; that there would be no discus-
sion, no questions relating to recent events, current
relationships, what he had been doing with other members of
the government, and the recent past and so forth. I mean that
was quite explicit.
Q If the CIA was so far off of the agreed-upon
script, why had Ghorbanifar, if he explained to you, proceeded
to go ahead with it anyway?
A He had gotten angry, he said
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I
then
Q Well, why didn't he walk out? I mean nobody was
chaining him to the chair, I assume.
A I understand. He apparently decided that he would
just sit there and answer their questions.
Q All right. Did he tell you whether he was answering
their questions truthfully or untruthfully?
A He said he had answered them truthfully.
Q Did he tell you that evening how he had fared on
the polygraph?
A He said he didn't have a score or anything, but
had said that I would get that the next day.
had told you that at lunch?
Yes .
All right. When did you learn of how Ghorbanifar
had fared on the polygraph?
A About a week later.
Q And from what source?
A I don't remember. Somebody at the Agency, or maybe
it was Casey. It certainly wasn' t^^^^^^B who disappeared
as soon as the polygraph was over.
Q All right. You had no further contact with
after the polygraph?
A Correct.
Q You did have a contact with someone else.' from the
CIA that weekend, though, didn't you?
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A Who was that?
Q Charlie Allen.
A I could well have.
Q Don't you recall Charlie Allen coming to your house
that Sunday, the 12th?
A Now, what is the date of the polygraph?
Q The 11th, Saturday.
A So Charlie comes the next day?
Q Yes. Do you recall that?
A I don't, but he may have.
Q Do you recall him not only coming the next day, but
the day after aad spending five hours in your house inter-
viewing Ghorbanifar?
A Yes, I do.
Q Do you recall him only coming once or coming twice?
A I mean I remember the long interview with
Ghorbanif ar .
Q At your house?
A At my house.
Q But you don't recall talking with Charlie the day
before, on the 12th, at your house?
A I don't specifically remember it.
Q All right.
A But there is no reason why that shouldn'tf have
happened. what day of the week was that?
UNCLASSIFIED
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Q Sunday is the 12th, Monday is the 13th.
A So Monday, the 13th, is the five hours at my house?
Q Right.
A And the day before was a Sunday, when he may have
dropped by, and that is what month? December?
Q January.
A January?
Q After Christmas.
A January 13th. I am trying to place it -- I am
asking you this because I am trying to place it. I mean are
there football games or what? I mean what sort of things are
going on on the Sunday?
Q The Super Bowl doesn't occur until the 26th.
A Right. I still don't recall it; but why not.
Q All right.
A I certainly remember the long conversation between
Charlie and Ghorbanifar.
Q Were you present for that conversation?
A I was not, no.
Q It did occur at your house?
A
Q
A
Q
A
Yes.
But you were not present:
Yes.
Okay. Why is that?
UNCLASSIFIED
Because the two of them wanted to talk.
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Q What IS your knowledge about how this meeting with
Charlie Allen got set up on the 13th?
A I think I arranged it.
Q Why?
A Well, I think that Charlie expressed an interest in
talking to Ghortianif ar , as long as he was here in town
anyway, that he had questions to ask, quite aside from
polygraphs .
Q When did you have occasion to discuss this with
Charlie?
A Charlie was current on it all the way through.
Q Charlie has testified that he was not current ail
the way through, that he gets a call from Casey and is
basically told by Casey to go and reevaluate Ghorbanifar, and
he does, and that this is a hurry-up, sudden, bolt from the
blue kind of direction from on high. But that ain't the way
you recall it; is that right?
A No. .^is I recall it -- now, i may confuse Charlie
and Dewey here sometimes because --
Q They have different personalities.
A I know they are totally different personalities,
and one of Charlie's few defects is that he doesn't smoke
cigars, but my recollection is that the whole matter of the
polygraph was something where I was informed of]
existence and that ^^^^^^Hwould be contacting me via
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Charlie, but perhaps it was Dewey. It would make more sense
that it was Dewey, in fact.
So I may be incorrect about that. But I certainly
discussed the matter of the polygraph with Charlie afterwards
and I presume that I discussed it with him beforehand. I
think I probably did discuss it with him beforehand, and he
just forgot about it.
Q All right. But in terms of having a better notion
of why it was that Allen was there, parked in your living
room, interviewing Ghorbanifar for five hours --
A He asked that he wanted to talk to Ghorbanifar, and
I arranged it. That Casey was the one who instructed him to ]
do it, he did not tell me.
Q Charlie seems to recall that you were present for
this interview, but that is inconsistent with your
recollection.
A I think I was there bits of the time, but most of
the time I think I left them by themselves.
Q Do you remember Colonel North coming by that same
day, on the 13th, that Monday?
A I am going to have to start keeping a diary when
this thing is over.
I don't remember his coming by. I don't really remember
the day that clearly. .'
Q All right. Colonel North, in a January 16th PROF
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memo, says that he met with Ghorbanifar on the evening of
January 13th. Presumably, that would have been at your
house. Ghorbanifar wasn't staying any other place that trip;
is that correct?
A He wasn't staying at my house either, even though
it sounds that way.
Q He was staying at a hotel?
A Yes.
Q So it is possible that he could have met with North
at the hotel on that occasion?
A Yes.
Q What hotel was he staying at?
A He was staying at the Four Seasons.
Q Four Seasons. You do not have recall of being
present with Ghorbanifar and North on the occasion within
days of the polygraph; correct?
A I don't have recall of a meeting with any content
to it. If you were to ask me, do I remember a meeting with
Ghorbanifar and North --
Q Well, let me give you some specifics. We have
another PROF note. This is a PROF note dated January 14, the
next day, Tuesday, from McFarlane to Poindexter, in which he
says that "Ledeen has been in touch with Kimche regarding the
senior character in Iran meeting, and that that meeting is
now going to be scheduled for later in January. " Do you have
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any recollection of that?
A I had been trying to encourage McFarlane -- it is
very funny about McFarlane's PROF notes on the subject --
Q This is post-retirement by McFarlane. We are now
in January.
A I understand that. And he named the senior Iranian
official?
Q Yes.
A That is interesting. As I have said, I thought
that we should follow up this meeting, and I kept on
encouraging McFarlane because he was the only one I could
talk to that had anything to do with the NSC to try to get
that done. And I had said to McFarlane that Kimche concurred
in that, something which McFarlane knew, because Kimche had
said that to him at the November meeting, and that Kimche was
urging a meeting in January, later on in January, and said to
McFarlane, "Is that possible?"
So I think he has overstated or misunderstood exactly
what was being said, because I mean it was a subject that he
often misunderstood because later on, there was another PROF
note from McFarlane in March, if I remember it right, where
he -- it is to North -- where he says, 'Mike was trying to
get me to arrange a visa for Ghorbanifar to Switzerland, and
I have said, 'If he can't get his own visa, what giiod is he, '
or something to that effect
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That was, again, when I was saying to McFarlane that if
we want to meet with this senior Iranian official, that
Ghorbanifar had informed me that the senior Iranian official
could not get a Swiss visa. He was having trouble getting a
Swiss visa, and I had said to McFarlane, "Can we arrange to
get him a Swiss visa?"
Q I think, actually, you are about February 27th when
that occurs with McFarlane.
A Okay. But I mean it's a bit later. And that is
for the senior Iranian official which, again, -- so either I
was explaining myself frightfully badly all the way through
that period, or McFarlane just wasn't concentrating on it
very well .
Q Ail right. Let's focus on that. We are mid-
January, January 13, 14, that period of time. Do you recall
discussing with McFarlane these matters?
A X would discuss the matter of the senior Iranian
official with McFarlane whenever I could.
Q All right. Were you in touch with Kimche in that
period of time, January 13, January 14, January 12?
A I do not remember when I would have had the
conversation with Kimche, but you ought to have a record of
that, because almost all the calls I made to Kimche were made
through the signal board.
Q Through the White House?
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A Yes.
Q Ail right. But bear with me. In terms of meetings
with Ghorbanifar, which are going on 11, 12, 13 January, the
meeting with North which he says occurs January 13, now
discussions with Kimche; do you recall being involved in that
kind of three-legged conversations during that period of time?
A No. It only looks three-legged, it is actually
two-legged, because when I would speak to Ghorbanifar, as
opposed to periods when other people were speaking to
Ghorbanifar, Ghorbanifar would inevitably say to me, "What
about the senior Iranian official?" and this would provoke
me. Probably that is the occasion on which I would have
called McFarlane and talked to him about it.
Q Why were you communicating with McFarlane then?
McFarlane has hung up his guns by that time, right?
A Because there was nobody else to talk to at the NSC
about it, and I was hoping that McFarlane still exerted
enough influence on Poindexter to convince Poindexter to
reopen and reconsider the matter.
Q I see. So you would get in touch with McFarlane
because you are having difficulty reaching Poindexter
yourself; is that right?
A Yes. You have understated it very nicely.
Q Okay. There is a North PROF to Poindexter, and it
is dated January 16. It says, "That as a result of the
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January 13 meeting he had with Ghorbanifar, he is convinced
that you tell all to Ghorbanifar and, further, that N«»r
suspects a, quote, 'secret business arrangement between
Ledeen and Ghorbanifar.'"
A Don't you have it backwards? He finds that
Ghorbanifar tells everything to me, not that I tell everything
to Ghorbanifar?
Q No, actually, I have it right. But in any event,
do you have recall of discussions that would have gone one
during this period of time that would have been the foundation
for this statement by North?
A No.
Q In terms of N«»r ' s suspicion that a secret business
arrangement between Ledeen and Ghorbanifar existed as of that
time, do you know of any basis that North would have had for
that?
Neither nor North or N««r; there was no basis for
it.
Q Okay. Did you have knowledge at that time that
N««r was saying such things about you?
A No.
Q He then makes a suggestion to Poindexter, he
suggests that you made a contact employee of the CIA in order
to require you to take periodic polygraph tests yofirself.
A Yes.
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Q Did you have knowledge of that suggestion being
made?
A No. It Is a bizarre suggestion, of course, because
there was no lack of polygraphing at the NSC.
Q Yes, sir. Did anybody, during this period of time,
offer you the opportunity to become a contract employee of
the CIA?
A No. Surely the CIA didn't.
Q All right. So you didn't sign any such contracts,
and none were offered to you?
A That is correct.
Q Then there is a January 24, 1986 PROF from North to
Poindexter that says, Casey shares concern over Ledeen and
that, quote, "More recent information tends to indicate that
there is even further grounds for concern, given what may
well be/have been a financial arrangement among Schwimmer,
Nimrodi, q^gbi and our friend." "Our friend" being a
reference to you.
Again, that PROF memo, you had no knowledge that that
kind of thing was percolating at that time?
A At no time did anyone at the NSC ever ask me about
this matter. No one in the government ever asked me about
this matter. The only time it ever emerged in a discussion
with a person in the American Government was when {lorth said
to me, rather late in the Fall of 1986, that some people in
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the Department of Defense suspected that I had made money off
the sale of missiles to Iran.
I was never asked about it. I was never interviewed
about it. I was never investigated for it. It was never
brought to the attention of the FBI. I was never asked to
take a polygraph. The whole thing remained at the level of
electronic gossip, which is what this is.
Q I am going to shift gears on you completely. We
have obtained from Mr. Allen certain notes that he made on
his January 13 interview with Ghorbanifar. One aspect of
those notes that does not appear in Allen's formal memoranda
on that meeting is a reference to assisting "Ollie's boys" by
way of money that will be generated through at
Do you have any knowledge of that taking place in your
house on January 13th between Ghorbanifar and Allen?
A No.
Q Did you have any knowledge of Ghorbanifar proposing
to Allen various covert operations from the Libyan stings and
nert explosive matters that would be used to generate
monies that could be diverted to the Contra operation?
A I knew both thej^^^^B inert explosive story and the
Libya sting thing, and I knew that they were matters that
Ghorbanifar was proposing. I further knew that thfese things
stood to generate money --
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Q For Ghorbanifar?
A For Ghorbanifar, and for Ghorbanif ar ' s various
programs, whatever he was involved in. It was never proposed,
or Ghorbanifar never suggested to me that this was going to
be a way of generating money for Ollie's boys, or Ollie's
projects, or Contras, or anything of the sort.
Q So you did not know in January, 1986, that
Ghorbanifar was proposing to Charlie Allen a variety of
activities that could generate money for Ghorbanifar which
would be used for Ollie North's Contra operation?
A That is right.
Q You did know that he was proposing various things
to Charlie Allen and others that would generate money for him?
A And said so. I knew it, and I said so.
Q Yes. But you didn't know that a piece of that
action was earmarked for Ollie North and the Contra operation?
A If, indeed, it was.
Q All right. One of the places that it is, is
another matter that I wanted to discuss with you. Were you
in London on January 26th, 1986, at the Churchill Hotel with
Ghorbanifar and Charlie Allen?
A It sounds possible. I mean there was a day when I
went by the Churchill and saw Charlie and Ghorbanifar.
Q We haveJ^^^^^^^^^^^^^Hmia meeting
that took place between Charlie Allen and Ghorbanifar which,
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saying, 'I'm here," and then walking upstairs to meet with
Ghorbanifar and Charlie Allen. Do you recall that occurring?
A Well, I came to meet with Ghorbanifar, not with
Ghorbanifar and Charlie Allen.
Q Did you know that Charlie was going to be there
when you arrived at the Churchill Hotel?
A I don't know if I did or not.
Q Were you surprised when you opened the door and
found Charlie Allen sitting there?
A I think I was, yes.
Q And there is elaborate discussion of hellos and
eating fruit and then going off to see the Super Bowl,
apparently on the television. I didn't know they did that
kind of thing in London.
A You would be amazed at how much progress the Brits
have made .
Q If that is progress. All right.
A The Chicago Bears played in WXmbley Stadium last
year.
Q You do not, today, recall being aware of the fact
that Charlie Allen was going to be meeting with Ghorbanifar
at the hotel at the very time that you show up; is that right?
A I may have been aware that Charlie was gaing to be
in London and talking to Ghorbanifar in that period. I think
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I remember being pleasantly surprised when I walked into the
room and Charlie was there. I mean I am always happy to see
Charlie. So it was a pleasant surprise, as I recall it.
Q Were you apprised of what they had been discussing
before you walked into the room?
A No.
Q They didn't tell you about the various programs
that Ghorbanifar and Charlie had been reviewing?
A No.
Q Do you recall that they were also discussing
certain silenced weapons at that time?
A No. they didn't discuss silenced weapons with me.
Q 9 millimeter weapons, silenced Kalashnikovs , those
kind of things were not brought to your attention?
A No, sir.
Q You had no knowledge of what use they intended to
make of those weapons''
A Well, since I had no knowledge that they were
discussing the weapons, it follows that I had no knowledge of
the use.
Q I am trying to refresh your recollection. None of
this is coming back to you?
A No.
Q Among other things that is discussedj
before you arrive, however, is monies for Ollie's
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boys in Latin America. You don't recall being aware of that
fact at that time?
A No.
Q So Ghorbanifar didn't tell you of any program he
had at that point for sending money to Ollie's boys in Latin
America?
A No, sir. Not at that point, not at any point.
Q I believe the quote, specifically, is that he was
proposing thej^^H^Hscam, quote, "To help Ollie for his
costing in South America," closed quotes. He didn't discuss
that with you, though?
A No.
Q You also said that you had just returned after a
trip to Rome for a court appearance. Were you in Rome at
that time in January?
A Yes. That is my celebrated libel suit, these
matters that interest Joel so much.
Q We then touched on the February PROF, but so that
we can kind of close this out; you had no knowledge in
January, February of 1986 of any program being proposed by
Ghorbanifar to generate money that would be used by North for
his Contra activities; correct?
A That is correct.
Q You also had no knowledge, in this perio(J of time,
that North was concerned about, or said he was concerned
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about a financial relationship that he thought you had with
Ghorbanif ar?
A I will say it again.
Q Please do.
A The only time that North ever raised that -- that
North or any other American Government official ever raised
with me the question of a possible financial relationship
between me and the Iran operation was that one occasion in the
Fall of 1986 when North said, "Some people in the Department
of Defense suspect that you made some money off the missile
sale to Iran." That is the one and only occasion.
My greatest wish is that they had behaved in a respon- |
sible way, and that is when this came from N«Br , if it indeed
came from N««r, because N«*r denies every having said it, but
let's assume that he did say it for the moment -- when it
came in, if they had simply been gentlemen about it and
investigated it, then it would have been put to rest long
since, and we wouldn't have to go through all of this
nonsense. But they didn't investigate it.
Q Okay. Were you aware that missiles, TOW missiles,
were being delivered to Iran on February 27, 1986?
A No.
Q You were not aware of that?
A I was not aware of that.
Q One of the documents that is generated from that
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period of time is a KL-4 3 message from Secord which reports
the arrival of missiles in Tehran, and handwritten on that
message, in North's handwriting, and I know you have seen
this before or at least heard about it, is that Ghorbanifar
was to receive $13,200 per missile and that $50 per missile
was to go to Ledeen, and that is handwritten on the KL-4 3
message for February 27th, 1986.
You didn't have any such financial arrangement, as of
February 1986; correct?
A I had, at no time, and have no financial relation-
ship with Mr. Ghorbanifar to do anything, with regard to
anything -- missiles or mermaids.
Q Okay. And you weren't getting S50 a missile, $100
a missile, $160 a missile?
A We have not done any business together. We have
done no joint ventures. I have never received commissions
from him, for anything.
Q Okay. Well, let me broaden that. Have you ever
received commissions, remuneration of any kind, gifts, money,
Iranian rugs, anything of that kind from Ghorbanifar?
A I purchased Iranian rugs from Mr. Ghorbanifar.
Q Was it your understanding that you were paying fair
market value for that rug?
A I did.
Q Having negotiated for rugs in Istanbul, I'm not
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sure how one determines fair market value, let alone does it
well .
And no gift, gratuities, remuneration of any kind from
Ghorbanifar?
A I mean occasional small presents for family and
things like that, but those were reciprocal, I mean we gave
him, he gave us.
Q And your firm --
A And I want to be explicit as to what sorts of
things they were. They consisted of sweets for the children,
perfume for my wife and caviar for some identified member of
the family which, by and large has gone to raise the morale
of the Washington National Security community. And from our
side, they were toys for the children, perfume and decanters
for the wife, and various odd books, mostly, for him.
Q Okay. Your firm, your corporation has not received
any financial remuneration from Ghorbanifar or Ghorbanifar
entities; correct?
A That is correct. Not from anybody who has any
association with this affair. Not only not from Ghorbanifar,
not from Ghorbanifar, not from Kashoggi, not from anyone
associated with either of them, not from Schwimmer, not from
Nimrodi, not from Kimche, not from anybody or any Israeli or
Israeli entity, or entity of the Israeli Government, or
kibbutz in Israel or Israeli movie company, nothing. Nothing
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from anybody associated with this thing, not a cent.
I am net minus, financially, on the Iran operation
because some of my expenses were not reimbursed by the
government .
Q All right. Bear with me. There is another North
PROF, dated September 3rd, 1986, talking about, in very
cryptic terms, a "Ledeen caper." Would you have -- do you
have any knowledge what that caper might have been?
A What is the date?
Q September 3rd, 1986.
A Can you give me the context?
Q That is the context. THat is really what it is.
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A It is a piece of paper that says "Ledeen caper"?
Q Right. From North.
A From North. To whom?
Q I believe it is to Poindexter. I had a little
trouble reading the handwriting.
A It is a PROF note?
Q Yes, a PROF note.
A You mean it is in the computer?
Q Yes .
A The only thing I can think of is that maybe the
Libya business again. We were trying to rev up th'fe Libya
business again.
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Q At that time, September of 1986?
A Later. Well, I mean I kind of nudged them on it
all along. I always thought it was a good idea. It acquired
greater urgency later when the $10 million problem emerged.
In addition to its standing on its own merits, the thing
became more attractive as a possible way of solving the 510
million problem.
MR. KERR: I am notorious for being able to run these
things for a long time, but you all have been very kind to
me. I am an hour past where you wanted to quit, and I am
content to let it go at this point.
Joel, do you have anything else?
MR. LESKER: No, I don't have anything else.
MR. WOOLSEY: We have testimony this Friday, we've been
told. There was some discussion earlier that there was a
chance it was Thursday afternoon. Do we know yet whether it
is Thursday or Friday?
MR. KERR: I have not been advised.
MR. WOOLSEY: For the logistics of that, who do I deal
with? Paul?
MR. KERR: Yes.
MR. WOOLSEY: All right. Then I will call him.
MR. KERR: These folks look, however, like they may have
a couple for you, but why don't we take a break first.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
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MR. KERR: Back on the record.
BY MR. GERARD:
Q I will be very short. I just want to go back to
the very beginning of the Iran initiative and your involve-
ment. I think your very first involvement was either on the
4th or 5th of May. After meeting with McFarlane, you then
went to Israel and met with Peres at that point in time?
A Correct.
Q Now, in the Tower Board Report, something that has
raised a question, I wanted to clarify it here. In Part 3,
under -- entitled "Israelis provide a vehicle," you are
probably familiar with this because I think it is the first
time it mentions you, speaking of an opening to Iran and your
involvement on the 4th or 5th of May. It is talking about
Israel's and Iran's interest.
I want to read a quick paragraph here, it is in Part 3,
Page 5. It says, "The Iranian interest in these weapons was
widely known among those connected with the arms trade.
These included --' and it goes on. It indicates Ghorbanifar,
Schwimmer, Nimrodi, et cetera, et cetera.
A Correct.
Q Then it comes down to about the middle part of that
paragraph. It says, "In a series of meetings, beginning in
January of 1985, these men had discussed using arme sales to
obtain the release of the U.S. citizens held hostage in
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Beirut and to open a strategic dialogue with Iran."
Now, in your meeting with Mr. Peres in May of 1985, in
your discussions, at any time did he indicate that either he
or some of these other people had been involved in conver-
sations dealing with arms for hostage exchange?
A No. The subject of hostages did not come up in my
discussions with Peres.
Q What exactly came up in that discussion, if you
could just --
A It is what I have testified to before. We discussed I
the question of Iran and Iran's role in international
terrorism. And I said that my -- I had been instructed by |
Mr. McFarlane to raise with Peres the question of Israel's
knowledge of things Iranian, and that I should say to him, in
as hypothetical and as low key a way as possible, with Peres,
that we were interested in knowing whether, by any chance,
Israel had what it considered to be satisfactory information
about Iran. And if Israel, indeed, had good information
about Iran, whether Israel would be willing to share it with
us. That was the subject of discussion.
Q Okay.
A There was no discussion of hostages at all in that
conversation, or anything related to the subject of hostages.
Q Did you have any knowledge at all that pfior to this
time, these particular individuals or officials had been
?
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discussing arms for hostages, et cetera, as it alludes to in
the Tower Report?
A No, I did not. In fact, I was not put in touch
with those people. I was put in touch with Mr. Gazit, and
the purpose for which I was put in touch with Mr. Gazit was
strictly a matter of exchanging information and trying to
compile as accurately as possible a picture of Iran as the
two governments could achieve.
The first contact I had with any of the people named
there was when Kimche called me in July to tell me that Mr.
Schwimmer, who was a person I had not met before then, was
coming to Washington and wished to talk to me. And the first
I met Schwimmer was at that luncheon that I had with him in
July in Washington. And the first I met Mr. Nimrodi or, in
fact, the first I had ever even heard his name was in July
when I went to Israel.
Q Do you have any knowledge or any reason at all to
believe, then, that there were prior discussions regarding
arms for hostages before you ever went to Israel, for
example, on May 4th or 5th?
A No. I have no first-hand information to confirm
that.
Q Aside from first-hand information, any other reason
to believe that there were conversations of this nature?
A Well, I have read, by now, articles in newspapers
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and so forth alleging that, but I don't have any direct
knowledge of it.
Q Okay. One last point. Shifting now to late 1986,
or at the time this whole initiative was exposed and initially
became public, et cetera, have you had any contact with Mr.
Peres from that point until, say, now?
A Yes .
Q What was that in reference to?
A When the Tower Commission Report came out which
contains the allegation that N««r had said to North that I
had taken money, I called Peres and I said to him that N«*r
is quoted in the Tower Commission Report as saying this, and
that the Government of Israel had better do something quickly
with regard to this allegation, which was totally false,
because if N*»r did not very quickly correct the record on
this matter, one way or another, I was going to sue him.
And Peres said to me that he didn't believe N««r could
have said it because there was no basis for such a statement,
and he knew perfectly well that I hadn't taken any money, and
that he would speak to N««r and take care of it as quickly as
he could. That is the only contact I have had.
Q You didn't have any contact with Mr. Peres between
the point of exposure and your actual contact with him on
that occasion regarding the release of the Tower Report?
A That is correct.
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Q Is that correct?
A That is correct.
MR. GERARD: That is all I have.
MR. KERR: Gentlemen?
EXAMINATION BY SPECIAL PROJECTS DIRECTOR
FOR CONGRESSMAN JIM COURTER:
BY MR. TETI:
Q Mr. Ledeen, there is a mention, I think twice, in
the Tower Commission Report about possible initiatives to an
Iran opening, by Senator Kennedy in one case, and also by
from Secretary of State Haig. And I wondered if you have ever
heard of anything having to do with such an opening, either
from Iranian officials or anybody in U.S. Government or
anybody else?
A No.
Q It is completely mysterious to you?
A I have heard references to Senator Kennedy, also in
testimony or questions regarding it in testimony before these
committees, but that is all I have heard.
Q The same thing with Secretary Haig?
A I have no knowledge of any activity by Secretary
Haig.
Q One or two other things. I think you mentioned n
Friday that Colonel North had made remarks at some .'point, I
guess fairly close towards the period just before the
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November press conference, about possibly being fired, or
something like that.
I just wondered whether he had ever, either at that time
or any other time, expressed some financial concerns or
financial hardships about himself?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us what that would have been?
A The concerns that he expressed on a variety of
occasions -- we saw each other socially a few times, not
simply in the office -- and he had expressed an anxiety
concerning his children's college education, and just simply
scratching his head and saying he just wondered how he was
going to be able to send his children to the colleges they
deserved, since college education had become so expensive,
and his wife wasn't working and his salary didn't permit him
to send his children to good colleges.
Q Can you say when that would have taken place, when
he would have expressed that?
A Oh, on a number of occasions.
Q How about, say, the last time you might have heard
it?
A Oh, gosh. It could be almost any time. Not in the
period after this matter became public, because we didn't
have any of the sort of conversations that would Ippse over
into concerns of this sort. But I remember one time.
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whenever it was that his pickup truck had sugar or sand or
something put in the gas tank and he would have to try to
find another vehicle.
This was at the time when the Washington Post put his
name out in connection with the Central American initiative,
and he was having -- and he said then that he was having
trouble figuring out how he could afford a new vehicle, let
alone face things of college education for his children. So
it was an anxiety for him.
Q He never gave any indication that he had some clue
or way to solve that problem?
A That's right. This was a person who didn't have
money and didn't have prospects of money.
Q He never said anything about any possible efforts
that Mr. Hakim maybe was making on his behalf?
A I never heard the name Hakim until this thing
became public. He had mentioned from time to time that he
had had some private offers that he was thinking of taking,
but he didn't specify them.
Q One other point, -- maybe this will be my last
point. You said also on Friday that you had spoken to
Colonel North, I guess immediately or shortly after the
Attorney General's press conference on November 25th.
A Yes . .'
Q And he had talked about a meeting that he had
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participated in the same morning, with the President and a
number of other people present.
A Yes.
Q I just wonder if he told you, to any extent, what
was said at that meeting. You indicated that he did not say
that he had been fired at that point, expressed unhappiness
that nothing was indicated to him.
Did he say anything else as to whether anything was said
about Poindexter, for instance?
A No.
Q Anything?
A No.
Q He said nothing specific about the meeting at all?
A What he said was -- I think what I testified to was
that he had been asked, I gathered -- well, I didn't gather.
He had been asked at the meeting what he thought ought to be
done, and he had expressed his sense of priorities. He had
listed out the priorities, what he thought was important, and
he named things like the President, the hostages, -- what
were the other things? Anyway, things of this nature, and
that Ollie North was well down the list, was not a top
priority and that, therefore, whatever decision was made was
one that he would abide by.
Q Does that mean, or did he say to you anything about
the diversion issue itself specifically coming up at that
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meeting?
A No.
Q So you still, at that point, didn't know anything
about that?
A Oh, I did know, because the Attorney General had
referred to it in his statement, and the President had
referred to it in the press conference.
Q I will ask you one very last question, if you don't
mind. You said a little bit earlier today -- we were talking
about the angry Canadians, the two angry Canadians who were,
I guess, upset about not having their financial situation
restored .
Did you say that they were stories that you had under-
stood that they were friends of Senator Leahy's? Do you have
any indication or any reason to think that Senator Leahy had
ever been contacted by them to ask for some assistance with
this problem?
A No, no, that was the threat. The threat was that
if they didn't get their money back, they were going to go to
their friend Senator Leahy.
Q It doesn't appear as if that ever happened, as far
as you know?
A The present state of my knowledge, if you were to •
suggest to me that there were no Canadians at all, 'I would
have to entert
tiiirA^ftm
othesis.
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MR. TETI: That is all I have.
MR. CAROME: I just have one question.
BY MR. CAROME-:
Q A number of the documents, prepared in advance of
the November Hawk shipment, appear to indicate that the
original destination was to be Tabriz rather than Tehran. My
question to you is, do you know any reason why the original
destination might have been Tabriz, and whether there was
some change in destination at the last minute that Ghorbanifar
or any anyone else at that time talked about?
A No, I can't help you at all. I have no idea.
MR. CAROME: I don't have anything else.
MR. KERR: Thank you. That's it.
(Whereupon, at 2:00 p.m., the taking of the deposition
concluded. )
(Signature not waived.)
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY REPORTER
293
I, Terry Bar ham, the officer before whom the
foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the
witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing transcript
was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was
taken by me and thereaftrer reduced to typewriting by me or
under my supervision; that said deposition transcript is a
true record of the testimony given by said witness; chat I am
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken;
and, further, that I am not a relative or employee of any
attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor
financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the
action.
Terry Bferhanj^^^otary Public in
and for the District of Columbia
My coroniission expires May IS, 1989.
UNCLASSIHED
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SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT
ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
UNITED STATES SENATE
Thursday, September 10, 1987,
Washington, D.C.
Deposition of MICHAEL A. LEDEEN, taken on behalf of
the select Committees above cited, pursuant to notice, com-
mencing at 10:04 a.m. in Room 901 of the Hart Senate Office
Building, before Terry Barham, a notary public in and for the
District of Columbia, when were present:
For the Senate Select Conmittee:
ARTHUR LIMAN, Esq.
JOEL LISKER, Esq.
PAUL BARBADERO, Esq.
For the House Select Committee:
RICHARD J. LEON, Esq.
DENNIS TETI, Esq.
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For the deponent:
R. JAMES WOOLSEY, Esq.
Shea & Gardner
1800 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Also present:
SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE
Chairman
Senate Select Committee
SENATOR JAMES A. McCLURE
Member
Senate Select Conunittee
JACK GERARD
Senator McClure's staff
CONTENTS
Examination by
Mr. Liman
Senator McClure
Mr. Lisker
Mr . Leon
Mr. Teti
Page
4
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39
51, 64
62
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EXHIBITS
Ledeen Deposition Exhibits
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2-A through 2-C
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PROCEEDINGS
Whereupon,
MICHAEL A. LEDEEN
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. LIMAN:
Q Dr. Ledeen, you gave us a statement which we are
prepared to include in the record.
If you wish to read it or amplify on it, this is
your opportunity.
A I don't need to read it. However, I would like to
add some additional materials to the record, with the Commit-
tee's permission.
Q All right.
A Let me run through these things so I can keep all
my notes straight.
First are basically correspondence. There's a copy of
my opening statement.
I can tell you the way we've labelled these — it may
help you: Block 1 includes my opening statements, correspon-
dence between my counsel and the Committee Chairman concerning
my financial documentation, authorizing the independent
counsel to provide these Committees with all of the materials
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they wanted.
Then some material obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act from Mr. Noah Cook's office regarding my work
on terrorism and counterterrorism for the Department of
Defense, and my expertise thereto.
And two additional letters on that subject from
Colonel McDaniel and Mrs. Claire Sterling in Italy.
MR. LIMAN: Why don't we mark this group that
you've described as the first Ledeen exhibit of today.
(The document referred to was marked for
identification as Ledeen Deposition
Exhibit No. 1. )
THE WITNESS: Then I have two additional documents,
which we've labeled 1-A.
BY MR. LIMAN:
Q We will give that our own number.
A Yes, I'm sure you will. But just to keep it
straight for accounting purposes.
Q You are handing me a --
A These are two additional letters.
Q Two additional letters, one to Chairman Inouye, a
covering letter to Chairman Inouye from you, another letter
from your attorney to Chairman Hamilton, and a third letter
to Chairman Inouye.
The letters are dated, respectively, August 5, July
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24, and July 24. And, Senator, if you have no objection, we
will include these as part of the record.
SENATOR McCLURE: I have no objection.
(The documents referred to were marked
for identification as Ledeen Deposition
Exhibits Nos. 2-A through 2-C.)
THE WITNESS: Then I'd like to add to this three
letters dealing with questions on my work in counterterrorism,
one from Dr. Tophoven in Bonn, one from Professor Laqueur
here, and one from former Secretary Haig.
MR. LIMAN: These will be given the next numbers.
I don't know whether you gave them to us before but —
THE WITNESS: No, this is new.
MR. LIMAN: But your attorney described them to us,
to Mr. Barbadero.
(The documents referred to were marked
for identification as Ledeen Deposition
Exhibit No. 3. )
THE WITNESS: Finally is a text in Italian, with my
translation into English, of testimony given by Admiral
Martini in the libel suit in Rome which I have brought
against an Italian magazine. I'll explain the relevance of
this in just a moment.
MR. LIMAN: On behalf of the Committee, I'm
grateful that you translated it.
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THE WITNESS: Well, anyway, I've given you the full
Italian -original in case there's any questions.
(The document referred to was marked for
identification as Ledeen Deposition
Exhibit No. 4. )
THE WITNESS: If I can have just a couple of
minutes to run through why we provided this information and
what it refers to.
MR. LIMAN: Sure.
THE WITNESS: The letter from Secretary Haig, Mr.
Lisker had asked rae how many times I had met with Secretary
Haig when I was Special Advisor to the Secretary of State.
And he asked me in particular if I would be surprised to
learn that Secretary Haig had said that he only met twice
with me during that period. I responded that if Secretary
Haig had said that, he would have been mistaken.
This letter indicates that Secretary Haig's
recollection is similar to mine, and if this Committee or the
investigators for this Committee received other information,
it may have been received second or third hand.
The Admiral Martini testimony I have introduced
again because of Mr. Lisker 's questions regarding my Italian
activities, in particular the questions regarding Mr.
Pazienza.
Admiral Martini had been quoted by L' Espresso
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Magazine, which is the magazine I have sued for criminal
libel in Italy, that I had been involved in questionable
activities in Italy along with Mr. Pazienza. And you will
see from his testimony that Admiral Martini denies having
said any such thing.
With regard to Mr. Cook, Mr. Cook was asked by
Senator McClure if he, Mr. Cook, considered me to be an
expert on terrorism. Mr. Cook replied that he did not. So I
have provided these five letters from persons with extensive
firsthand experience with the knowledge of international
terrorism whose judgments are in conflict with Mr. Cook's.
BY MR. LIMAN:
Q Dr. Ledeen, as a trial lawyer, I can tell you it is
not always a compliment to be called an expert.
A Well, in this case, I'm happy to be called an
expert, Mr. Liman. I've risked my life to get that qualifica-
tion. So it's one that I'm quite proud of.
One of these documents that wie've introduced is a
written justification for a wording of sole-source contract
for work on terrorism for the Department of Defense that
comes from Mr. Cook's office. And I just note in passing
that Mr. Cook, in writing in some of this documentation,
attested to my qualifications as an expert on several
occasions .
And, finally, I've included a letter that Mr. Cook
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wrote in response to an inquiry about a possible violation by
me of the Foreign Agents Registration Act prior to 1981. In
the course of that letter, Mr. Cook claims to have restricted
my access to classified information as of mid-1984. In fact,
as you can see in the letter, that did not occur until the
following year when I had decided to devote the bulk of my
time to work at the NSC.
So this documentation shows, among other things,
that Mr. Cook has had trouble remembering his own evaluation
of my work on several occasions.
A final point. Although I have not submitted any
documentation on the subject, during Mr. McFarlane's tes-
timony. Senator Cohen asked Mr. McFarlane if he had been
aware that I had "entered the country carrying large amounts
of cash." And Mr. McFarlane said that he was not aware of
that. And I assume that since there was no such event during
the period of my government service, I presume that Senator
Cohen was alluding to the events of 1980 and early 1981 when
I twice made written declarations to U. S. Customs officials
upon entering the United States. Those two declarations are
discussed in my previous Senate deposition.
Q Right .
A Then I have a few points concerning Mr. Clair
George's testimony, but if you want to defer that until later
on.
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Q Why don't you continue, and then we can, if that's
agreeable to the Chairman and Senator MoClure, we can ask you
questions when you finish that.
A I have a few points to make with regard to Mr.
Clair George's testimony. The first point I would like to
make off the record, if I may, because it concerns one of the
things we've been trying to keep off the record all along.
MR. LIMAN: With the permission of the Chair, can
we go off the record?
SENATOR INOUYE: So ordered.
(Discussion off the record.)
THE WITNESS: On pages 273, 274, Mr. George says
"Gorbanifar was the agent to Israel. It was the Government
A
of Israel that said we have got one hot cookie here that can
help us make contacts with Iran to release the hostages.
Michael Ledeen seems to be playing a variety of roles in
this. "
I doubt that Gorbanifar was the agent to Israel.
And I wish that Mr. George has been asked for concrete
evidence. I noted before that the Israeli mtelligence
Service, Mossad, was opposed to this operation, and that the
executive branch of the Israeli Government was sharply
divided.
Moreover, I resent Mr. George's suggestion that I
was "playing a variety of roles." My role was precisely that
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assigned to me by the National Security Advisor to attend
meetings and to report on them to him.
Somewhat later, in his second day of testimony, Mr.
George said, on page 146, "We were asked in December 1985 by
Michael Ledeen, Bill Casey, and the Administration to make
contacts with Manuchar Gprbanifar because he was an outstand-
ing source of intelligence on Iran. It now becomes evident
after the fact that we were being asked to meet with
Gorbanifar and learn to love him because they were about
ready to put us in touch with him in the Iran initiative."
I cannot speak for Director Casey or "the Ad-
ministration. " But when I informed the CIA about my contacts
with Gorbanifar, I was convinced that the Iran initiative was
over. My purpose was to enable CIA to get better information
about Iran's role in international terrorism, and I note that
two of CIA's most knowledgeable experts on terrorism, Messrs.
Allen and Clarridge, believed as I did that it was a worth-
while undertaking.
Mr. George said, page 286, that in December 1985,
"Everybody in the whole directorate is being wooed and wined
by Mr. Ledeen." In this period, it is true that I was once
wined and fed by Mr. George. But the suggestion that I had
many contacts with the Operations Directorate in this or any
other period is false.
Aside from Mr. George, I know only two or three
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persons in the entire Directorate, and I most certainly did
not seek them out with the exception of Mr. Clarridge whom I
was supposed to inform.
BY MR. LIMAN:
Q You may know more without knowing that they are in
the Directorate.
A It's possible, yes. It was, after all, Mr. George
who sent me the unnamed person who came to my house to
interview Mr. Gorbanifar and arrange the polygraph.
A
Finally, page 150, Mr. George said, with regard to
the results of the polygraph, "I am almost certain that Mr.
Ledeen was advised, and, if he was advised, you can count on
it like night follows day he told Mr. C^rbanifar." The
implication seems to be that I informed Mr. Gorbanifar of
whatever I knew about the action of the U.S. government.
This is also false.
I communicated to Mr. Gorbanifar what I was asked
to and withheld what I was supposed to, including the
collection of intelligence on Mr. (k)rbanifar's contacts and
activities of which Mr. Gorbanifar was unaware.
And that is all I have to introduce into the record.
Q I have a few questions. Dr. Ledeen, and some of
them may be repetitive but, since your last testimony, we
have been able to review North's notebooks and have had some
information from Israel, and it may refresh your recollection
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or at least help us in understanding some of the facts.
- First, did you take notes at any of your meetings
in the suminer and fall of your discussions with Gprbanifar or
the Iranian? ' . '
A Yes, I did.
Q And were those notes turned over to us?
A Those notes no longer exist, sir.
Q And when did you dispose of those notes?
A It varied.
MR. WOOLSEY: One set of notes was — you may not
think of them as notes--it was a document provided to the
Committee, and you were questioned about it.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I know. Well, there are
different sets of notes. In some cases of notes on meetings,
I simply briefed Mr. McFarlane verbally from those notes, and
when I had finished briefing him, I destroyed the notes.
BY MR. LIMAN:
Q And was that pursuant to instructions from McFarlane
or just your practice that, because this was a sensitive
operation, you did not want to have documentation around?
A It was my practice, and I had an understanding with
Mr. McFarlane, that unless there was some particular reason to
do so, there would be nothing in writing regarding this.
Q Continue, I'm sorry.
A But there were no specific instructions case by
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case to destroy specific things.
Q - No, I was not trying to suggest any innuendo there.
I just wanted to know whether for operational security you
destroyed them.
A Oh, no, no, I understand, I didn't think there was
any innuendo.
The lengthy meetings with Mr. (K>rbanifar in Israel
in late July 1985, I took extended notes, and Mr. Kimke took
extended notes . And we subsequently prepared an integral
version of those notes, since he took notes part of the time
and I took notes part of the time, and we combined these.
And these notes were given to Mr. Mc Far lane, and you, I
believe, have a copy of those notes.
I had retained, it turns out, a version of those
notes on a computer disk, which I later printed out and
provided to the Committee.
But, with that exception, so far as I know and so
far as I can find — and I've done a thorough search, not only
of all the paper I have in my possession but also of my
various computer disks and so forth — that is the only set of
notes that I have that exists.
MR. WOOLSEY: Speaking of the Iranian official,
there's a document that proceeded from that.
THE WITNESS: Yes, but that is the document
regarding a meeting with an Iranian official, a document
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which I did not create but was created by an Iranian, by
Iranians.
BY MR. LIMAN:
Q And that was turned over.
A And that was also turned over.
Q Dr. Ledeen, we're all very much aware of that
debate in The Wall Street Journal between you and Mr.
McFarlane on your position on arms sales.
Did you ever conununicate in writing to Mr. McFarlane
your views that arms should not be used as a way of opening a
relationship with Iran?
A No, I did not communicate my views or my opinions
on any part of this initiative to Mr. McFarlane in writing at
any time.
Q Now, do you recall having any meeting in Paris with
the Israelis and Gorbanifar?
A Yes, I testified to that.
Q And I want to ask you about a meeting that you did
not mention in your testimony.
Do you recall a meeting in Paris in September 1985,
after Weir's release, in which Gtorbanifar asked for Hawks? Do
you have any recollection of that?
A What I think I've testified to is a meeting I think
the second week in September in Paris, which I thought was a
meeting before Weir was released, when Hawks were certainly
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discussed.
Q ■ This was one that was after Weir's release.
A No, I don't remember it.
Q You have your travel records still, don't you?
A Well, I've turned over all the records of travel
that I had. And I don't have the record of such a trip nor
does the NSC seem to have a record of such a trip.
Now, it's conceivable, I must add, that this
doesn't mean that there was no such trip. There may have
been one because I sometimes — if a meeting coincided with a
trip that I was going to take anyway, I did not bill the
White House for travel .
Q Did you ever communicate the NSC's position with
respect to sale of Hawks to the Israelis?
A Well, if you would tell me what the NSC's position
on the Hawks was .
Q Did you have any position? Did you communicate
that the NSC was opposed, that it was in favor? By the NSC,
I'm referring not formally to the NSC institution, but to Mr.
McFarlane and the staff.
A Listen, I will say again what I've said many times
in the course of these depositions, which is that at a
certain point I became aware that there was an approval for
the Hawk sale. And I was aware prior to the time that the
shipment took place, I was aware when the shipment took
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place, and I had conversations with people, including Mr.
Schwimmer, where we talked about it was going to happen.
So I knew it had been approved and clearly had
discussed it with them. I do not remember when or how I
learned that.
Q Did you express your objection to Mr. McFarlane to
that?
A I had expressed my objection to all American
activities dealing with the question of hostages as of the
first week in October 1985 to Mr. McFarlane. And I had told
him that I thought it was a mistake for the United States
government to pursue the hostage question at all on the
grounds that so long as Iran was able to obtain American
weapons, we would never be able to judge the real intentions
of the Iranians that we were talking to. And he agreed with
that.
NOW, having said that, and having expressed my
opposition to it, I cannot tell you whether, on every
additional occasion when I attended a meeting and reported on
it to Mr. McFarlane, I reiterated my objection. But, in
general, I had objected to it.
Q NOW, you said that Mr. McFarlane agreed with it,
and I think in one of your earlier sessions you said that Mr.
Gorbanifar agreed with this position.
I sit here as counsel for the Senate Committee and
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say how come, if McFarlane agrees that there shouldn't be arms
sales, Gorbanifar agrees that there shouldn't be arms sales,
A
that you become aware at some point that McFarlane has
approved arms sales and that (gorbanifar is the intermediary?
A Well, I don't see why it should be so surprising--
it's perfectly conceivable. Mr. Gorbanifar, after all, is not
the government of Iran; Mr. Gorbanifar is a message carrier,
as I was .
Mr. Gorbanifar perhaps had greater input into the
Iranian policymaking process than I had into the American.
But, nonetheless, he was still an intermediary. So whatever
he may have thought himself for his own interest, or what he
thought this group should be doing, was certainly something
which was not necessarily the same as what the government of
Iran thought.
Q So you were drawing a distinction between
cfcrbanifar's personal views and those of the government that
he was representing?
A' The point I am trying to make is that whatever Mr.
Grprbanifar 's private feelings or personal feelings in the
matter may have been, he was carrying messages from the
government of Iran which was certainly eagerly interested in
obtaining American weapons and continuing the arms-for-
hostage process. And it's important, I think, not to assume
that there ' s a total identity between those two views .
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Similarly, in my case, I attended meetings and
would, trom time to time, express a personal opinion. But I
was not involved in a decisionmaking process in the United
States government either. And whatever decisions were made
were made at meetings which I did not attend and about which
I did not know.
Q Well, let me be more precise. You testified a
moment ago that KcFarlane agreed with your view that arms
should not be used as a currency for testing the opening with
Iran.
Did he ever tell you why, if he had that point of
view, that he was approving the Hawk transaction?
A Well, if I can just quibble about one part of that
formulation.
He did approve, as I approved, the original
shipment of TOW missiles as a way of testing —
Q I'm sorry, I was talking about the Hawk transac-
tion, because my understanding is that your view changed
after that, that it was after the TOW shipment.
A After the TOW's, that's correct.
And my answer to you is I cannot account for it
because I was not privy to the policymaking decisions. I do
not know who made the decision or when it was made.
Q Now, let me turn to a meeting that you discussed
off the record — and I don't think that we have to, for the
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purpose of this record, either identify the date or the
place, only that it was in Europe.
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was a meeting you attended, the Israelis
attended, and there was an Iranian official, and Gorbanifar
was there .
A Yes.
Q At that meeting, is it fair to say that the
Iranians communicated the desire of Iran for missiles?
A No.
Q Your position is that they did not?
A My position is not only that they did not, but that
they said that they were unhappy with the weapon shipments
that had already taken place. And they said that they were
unhappy with that because it strengthened people with whom
they were in political conflict Inside Iran.
Q At the time of the meeting, the shipments that had
taken place were TOW's, am I correct?
A* Correct .
Q Is it your recollection that they did not ask at
this meeting for Hawks and anti-aircraft missiles?
A That's correct. I have no recollection whatsoever
that they asked for any missiles at this meeting.
Q Dr. Ledeen, do you have any recollection of whether
at this meeting you told the Iranians that the hostages had
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to be released if there was to be an improvement in relations
with the United States?
A I might well have said that. It was certainly the
logic of the situation, and I believed it.
Q And do you have any recollection that the Iranians
said that in order to gain the release of the hostages, they
had to be able to produce missiles in Iran?
A No. I'm quite confident that no such exchange took
place.
Q And you have no recollection that there was any
discussion of eighty Hawk missiles at that meeting?
A No, sir, I'm quite confident that there was no such
discussion in my presence at that meeting.
Q Let me just ask you--and then I think that I am
finished with questions, but the Senator undoubtedly has
some, and others may--you still maintain your relationship
with Gorbanifar?
A Yes.
Q You testified that your belief was that he was not
a Mossad agent?
A I'm very skeptical of that, I would be quite
surprised.
Q And you based that in part on the fact that the
Mossad like the CIA was opposed to using him?
A Well, I base it on a variety of things. It seems
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to me, frankly, that if he had been an Israeli agent that
Mossad would have been more enthusiastic about the project.
But instead they were not. And everything that one heard
about him inside the government of Israel was very skeptical.
And it just seems to me that if they had been able to control
him, if he was indeed their agent, they would have had
something encouraging to say about him.
Secondly, he is a person who, from the standpoint
of an intelligence service, really is not possible to
control, and he has the kind of personality which any
professional intelligence service would be very leery about
working with. I mean, he's a highly mercurial, independent,
headstrong individual.
Not only have I seen no evidence to the effect that
he was an Israeli agent, but there is all this circumstantial
information which suggests that he was not.
Q When was the last time you had any contact with any
of the Iranian officials to whom he had introduced you?
a' I have had no contact with the Iranian officials to
whom he introduced me since I was taken off this initiative
in November of 1985.
Q And what about your contact with Mr. Schwimmer,
when was your last contact with him? Has it been in the last
six months.
A No, I am trying to remember whether it was December
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of '85 or January or February of '86.
Q . Let me confine myself to after November of 1986.
Did you have any contact with Nir, Schwimmer,
Nimrodi, or Kin\%» in that period?
A Yes.
Q Which one?
A Nimrodi, Nir--I had one telephone conversation with
Nir.
Q When was that, sir?
A That was when I was in Israel in last April or May.
Q And did you discuss the initiative with him?
A I asked him--I had previously spoken to Peres at
the time the Tower Commission came out. I had called Peres 's
attention to the allegation that Nir had allegedly said that
I had taken money. And I asked Peres if he would speak to Nir
and ask him to clarify that one way or the other. And I had
a very brief phone conversation with Nir in May, asking him
if he was not prepared to make a public statement.
Q" And what about the others?
A I had dinner with Nimrodi.
Q And when was that?
A That was at the same time.
Q You are aware that North has testified that Nir
told him that he heard you were getting $500 a missile, and
then that apparently all traces back to some remark that
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Gorbanifar allegedly made to Nir.
-■ You have turned over your financial information to
us--and I will say for the record that we found no such
evidence.
But have you discussed with Gorbanifar whether he
mentioned to Nir that he intended to use some of his profits
to make payments to you?
A I think I did discuss what was in the Tower
V
Commission with Gorbanifar. And at that time I was not aware
that the alleged statement by Nir allegedly derived from an
alleged statement by Gorbanifar — but I did ask Gorbanifar
whether he thought Nir had actually said such a thing,
because I was trying to figure out who had invented this idea
in the first place.
Q What did Gorbanifar say?
A
A Gorbanifar said that he couldn't imagine that Nir
would have any reason for it, and certainly Nir ought to know
that it was false.
Q' Gorbanifar didn't tell you that he had made such a
statement?
A He did not volunteer that he had made such a
statement .
Q Have you asked him did he ever make such a state-
ment?
A No, no, I haven't.
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Q Did you ever discuss in 1985, in the fall of '85,
or the Slimmer of '85, when you were having discussions with
W
Gorbanifar whether money would be set aside out of his
/<
profits for some of the expenses of the initiative?
A I was not aware that he had any profits at that
time. I was generally aware, as I've testified before, that
the prices being charged the government of Iran for the
missiles included a quantity of money which represented
expenses. Generally speaking, these expenses were in two
categories: they were Gorbanifar 's expenses and they were the
Israelis' expenses.
And certainly there was to be a sum of money as a
result of the sales that was going to go to Gorbanifar to
cover his expenses in that connection.
Q Was that ever put in terms of a certain amount per
missile? '
A It may have been, but these were all matters that
were discussed between Gorbanifar and the Israelis.
Q' Was it ever discussed in your presence that it
would be $500 a missile or some figure like that?
A No.
Q Were you told by McFarlane the fact that he had
visited the President in the hospital to discuss the initi-a-
tive?
A Yes.
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Q And did McFarlane ask you to pass on to the
Israelis something that had occurred at that meeting?
A Yes .
Q And would you tell me, as you recall it, what the
message was?
A Yes. Let me tell you first of all that my recollec-
tion of this has gone through several phases. And I want to
explain to you why, because I want you to understand how I
have been trying to reconstruct this in my own mind.
Q But would you also explain to me whether what
you're giving me now is a reconstruction or whether you
really do actually remember it?
A The first time I was asked this question, in fact
the first time I discussed it with counsel, my recollection
was that McFarlane had raised with the President the question
of was the United States in principle prepared to sell a
certain quantity of TOW missiles to Iran in conjunction with
a general test. And that I had been given the President's
positive answer by McFarlane just as the President came out
of surgery at Bethesda Naval Hospital, and that he had told
me the next day, or thereabouts, that the President had said
yes, and that we had flown to Israel and I had said yes in
principle, and then we discussed this.
Then when I checked the date of the President's
surgery and saw that it was in July, I had reasoned with
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myself that it was not possible that I had been told that in
July because I had not remembered that Schwimmer had raised
the TOW question with me at our luncheon in Washington.
And I reasoned that the first I ever heard about
TOW missiles and all of that was when I finally met Gorbanifar
in Israel in late July.
And so in some of my earlier testimony on this,
based on that analysis, I had said, well, the discussion with
the President must have been later. It must have been after
Kimte's trip and briefing of McFarlane at the beginning of
August .
However, now that I have recalled, thanks to a memo
that Wilma Hall wrote about the phone call I made to her
after I had lunch with Schwimmer, that in fact the TOW
question did come up at that luncheon and that I had raised
it with McFarlane.
I now go back to my original recollection about
which I now have a very confident feeling, which is the
answer" is yes, and McFarlane did raise it with the President
after his surgery, and it was told to me that, in principle,
the answer is yes, and that I could tell the Israelis that,
and I so did.
Q And this was to be a shipment by Israel of TOW's
from its stocks?
A Correct. Well, let me put it this way: my
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recollection of this was that the United States was agreeable
in principle but that we would then want to hear all of the
Where's and wherefore's and so forth, but that for the
purposes of their consideration and these discussions, it was
a possibility, it was not something that was --
Q It was agreeable in principle, subject to the
details being
A What was it, what was involved, and so on.
Q Now, let me ask you, after the first shipment of
TOW'S, which, as you know, was roughly 100--actually it was
96 TOWs shipped in quantities of, I've become an expert--but
Weir wasn't released at that point. He wasn't released until
after a second installment of 400-odd TOW's, actually 404 were
sent, one-sixth or so, whatever the multiple is that you put
8 into.
A It came to 508.
Q It wasn't quite — it was 504.
But what do you actually recall now--not what you
reconstructed--but what do you recall now of discussions that
intervened between those two shipments in tetms of the United
States' consent to the second shipment?
A I recall discussing with McFarlane what I had
V
discussed with Gorbanifar and the Israelis, and McFarlane
A
saying we might as well go ahead and do the whole thing and
see what came of it.
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Vn
Q And what did Gorbanifar tell you was the reason
A
that the hostages didn't come out after the first shipment?
A I will tell you what he told me, and then I will
also tell you what we decided had actually happened, if that's
helpful to you.
What he told us was that the missiles had fallen
into the wrong hands; that instead of the missiles arriving
in such a way that good Iranians could take credit for them
they were taken over
Q They were taken over by the Revolutionary Guard?
A Yes, exactly. If you would like me to speculate,
give you my conclusion as to what had happened in Iran, I'd
be glad to do it.
Q Since you've qualified yourself as an expert, I
can't resist.
A I think that there were people in Iran who were
skeptical of some of the things Mr. Gorbanifar was saying to
them as there were people here and in Israel skeptical of
things "that he was saying to us. And I think there was
considerable surprise in Teheran when these missiles actually
arrived. And I think that, prior to the arrival of the
missiles, they had had conversations with Gorbanifar, and
A
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Gorbanifar said on the seventh, at 9:45 a.m., these missiles
A
will arrive, and they said great. And he said you'll have
the hostages--you ' 11 do something with the hostages, and they
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said sure, sure--never believing for a moment that the
missiles would arrive. Then all of a sudden they arrived.
And I think at that point they suddenly said it was
serious after all and now we had better do something about
it. And I think that that same kind of scenario is repeated
again the following spring on the occasion of McFarlane's
trip. I think it's a kind of paradigm for many of the things
that happened.
Q Can I ask you one more question, since you've talked
efforts at reconstruction versus recall.
A Yes .
Q You testified previously about your meeting on
November 21, which was a Friday, with Oliver North and
McFarlane, and you testified that North told you that the
Attorney General had suggested that he hire a lawyer.
Is that recollection or is that reconstruction?
A What I've testified to is not the Attorney General
but that someone in the Justice Department had said that to
him, and he told me that in the course of a conversation in
which he suggested that I myself might wish to get a lawyer.
Q So that's actual recollection?
A That's actual recollection, but the recollection
didn't have a date attached to it, Mr. Liman. And I think
what I said in my deposition was that when North asked me on
the afternoon of the 21st what would I say if asked what did
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I know about the sale of Hawk missiles to Iran in November of
1985--and at that point I remembered his saying to me that
there had been Justice Department people asking him questions
about a possibly illegal shipment of Hawks to Iran in
November, and that he was talking to me about possibly
getting lawyers.
And when he asked me that question on the 21st, I
remembered the other conversation.
Q So that the conversation had taken place earlier?
A So that my position is--my recollection is
Q Recollection as opposed to
A Yes, because I remember my recollection of the
conversation the 21st includes my recollection of the prior
conversation .
Q Now I have a question that I have been dying to
ask. We'll put it off the record because I think the Senator
may want to hear the answer, too.
(Discussion off the record.)
EXAMINATION BY SENATOR McCLURE
V,
Q In regard to Gorbanifar, the possibility of him
A
acting as an Israeli agent, as I recall George's testimony,
the question and the answer perhaps were not precise as to
when he might have been or might be acting as agent.
I think if you go back and look at it, it's at
least ambiguous or subject to the interpretation that he was
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talking about the current time or at some previous time.
Your answers and the circumstantial evidence to
which you refer gives you reason to doubt that he seemed to
be contemporaneous and don't necessarily refer to an earlier
period of time.
Would your answer be the same with respect to any
previous time?
A I asked various Israeli government officials in the
course of this, since it was so clear that the evaluation of
Gorbanifar was the central element in whether one should
attempt any aspect of this proJect--I asked several of them
whether the government of Israel had had any previous
V
experience with Gorbanifar, and specifically whether
/I
Gorbanifar had ever worked for the government of Israel in
A
any capacity. And I was always told no.
Q Was your relationship with those officials such
that you feel that they would have given you information,
accurate information, even though they might regard it as
rather" sensitive or proprietary?
A Not necessarily, no. It's quite possible that they
might not have told me what they knev/.
However, I keep coming back to the basic point.
Senator, which is that if Gorbanifar had had some relationship
V
with Israel, or if Gorbanifar had a working relationship with
A
Israel at the time of the project, one would have assumed the
I
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Israeli government to have been more supportive of it. And
yet you have Mossad opposed and you have Minister Rabin
opposed, and so forth. And they are opposed on the basis of
Gorbanifar in large part, they are not sold on him.
Q That might be the result of an earlier experience,
however .
A That's conceivable, that's conceivable. I can only
told you that they--every time I asked them, and I asked
people some of whom were in favor of what we were doing and
some people who weren't.
Q NOW, it is fair to say, is it not, that there was a
--let me rephrase that.
A number of people have remarked about isn't it
strange that here in the united States Government, you have
NSC and NSC staff doing things that the State Department
didn't like, and it was also true in Israel, was it not?
A I think it's a universal condition of mankind. I
don't know of a single executive branch of any country with
which I'm familiar that has any great affection for Its
foreign ministry. If you look at the British TV series,
"Yes, Minister"-! think you'll find it once a week.
Q But that was and is a fact in Israel, was— let me
put it in terms of this sequence of events.
There was a division within the Israeli government
A Yes, indeed.
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Q And between their Foreign Service and the Prime
Minister's office.
A No, I think in this case, it's a division
Q I'm not saying that to try to cause problems or
erect problems there.
A No, no. These conflicts exist regardless of what
we say. The conflict inside Israel is between the Prime
Minister's office on the one hand--the Prime Minister is in
favor of this, and the Minister of Defense is opposed, and
Mossad was opposed.
In this case, the Foreign Ministry tended to be
supportive, as I understand it.
Q And some of the information or reactions you would
get might stem from whatever that division was as well as
what caused the division?
A Certainly.
Q You testified earlier about your knowledge of
Israeli arms sales to Iran, I believe, but I would like to
explore it just a little bit.
We have quite a lot of evidence that Israel has
been involved in arms trade with Iran both before and since
the fall of the Shah of Iran, is that not correct?
A I don't know that. The only--I certainly am aware
of evidence that Israel was involved in arms shipments to
Iran prior to the fall of the Shah. I have only one piece of
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firsthand knowledge that there was any such transaction after
the fall of the Shah, and that is the specific case that I
was asked about by Prime Minister Peres where I came back and
relayed his request to Mr. McFarlane.
And with that exception, I don't have any other
firsthand knowledge of it. I am aware, as I'm aware of
rumors and newspaper stories and things like that, but real
information, no.
Q And are you making any distinction between U.S.-
supplied arms and Israeli-produced or third country?
A No, this is the general question of Israel selling
weapons to Iran.
A You've told us today that you had a conversation
with McFarlane--! think you've testified to it earlier--with
respect to the United States' approval in principle of the
arms shipments by Israel of arms supplied to Israel by the
United States.
You said that that was a general in principle go
ahead and discuss it, but it was subject to the requirement
that we would have to know more about it in detail before it
was complete?
A Yes, sir.
Q I don't want to put words in your mouth. That's
what I understood what you said.
A You're exactly right.
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Q Are you aware of whether or not there was further
discussion about the detail prior to the shipment?
A Yes. Kimfc flew to Washington early in August and
briefed McFarlane. And then I returned to Washington later
in the month and discussed it with McFarlane. And McFarlane
told me that the President had approved it. And I then flew
to London to confirm that to Kimte and to discuss some
additional details.
Q So that the earlier prior approval in principle was
fleshed out by these events and the conversations that took
place?
A That is what I was told.
Q Now, when Kimte was here and held those discussions
here, you were not present at the time of those discussions?
A Correct.
Q And you were not the conduit of information with
respect to those discussions?
A Well, the set of notes concerning the discussions
V ^^
with Gbrbanifar was something that both Kimte and I had
worked on so that that document that McFarlane received was
something where I had seen it and could vouch that it was
accurate .
And I had a subsequent discussion with McFarlane on
my return to Washington later in the month.
Q And that subsequent conversation with McFarlane
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confirmed the details of that transaction?
A - That's right.
Q Did he discuss the details or just indicate that
they had been discussed?
A No, we reviewed where things stood and what was
being proposed and what was supposed to happen.
Q Was there any variation between what had been
discussed and what was then discussed?
A I don't see how I can answer that. There was no
indication from McFarlane that there was any difference
between what I was saying and what he had understood.
Q Now, you talked about the Israeli arms shipments and
your understanding that there would be enough money to cover
expenses .
Are you aware of circumstances that occurred prior
in other arms shipments to Iran from Israel in which Israelis
had generated what later has been referred to in testimony
before us as "residuals," generated profits for use in other
covert" operations disassociated from those that generated the
money?
A Well, since I wasn't aware of any other Israeli
arms shipments, it follows that I couldn't have been aware of
what had come as a result of that. The answer is no.
Q A little earlier you said something that struck me
_-I can't get it into my mind, the sequence.
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You said--and I hope I wrote this down accurately
when you said it--"When I talked to them about Gorbanifar, I
A
thought the Iran initiative was over."
A Yes. That refers to when I briefed the CIA for the
first time early December 1985. When I briefed them about
K
Gorbanifar, my understanding was that the entire Iran
/\
initiative had been shut down, cancelled.
Q I thought that had occurred in October rather than
December .
A My understanding was it happened in December.
McFarlane had told me in November- -wel 1 , he had told me
already in October that he was thinking of shutting it down.
In November, I had invited Kimlfe to come to Washington and
discuss the matter with McFarlane precisely because it seemed
to me that he was planning to shut down the entire initiative.
Kimhe confirmed to me that McFarlane was clearly intending to
resign and, in connection with resigning, was planning to
shut down the whole initiative. And I was then told in late
November and early December by North also that the thing was
finished.
So my clear impression was that it was finished --
and, in fact, I think that one is entitled from the record,
as we now know it, to conclude that it was in fact finished,
at least for a few weeks in December. And that was my view
of it, and I think it was an accurate view of it.
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MR. LIMAN: Off the record.
- (Discussion off the record.)
MR. LIMAN: Could I just establish for the record
that it was McFarlane who made the decision to keep the CIA
out of the initiative?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I testified to that
previously--that ' s correct.
SENATOR McCLURE: When was that communicated to you?
THE WITNESS: From the very beginning.
MR. LIMAN: And did that include Mr. Casey?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It included the whole CIA
without distinction.
SENATOR McCLURE: Did you and Colonel North ever
discuss that? Was that ever mentioned between you in your
conversations?
THE WITNESS: The fact that the CIA was not to be
informed about this?
SENATOR McCLURE: Yes.
MR. LIMAN: And the reason leaks?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. LIMAN: Do you have anything further?
SENATOR McCLURE: Nothing further from me. Thank
you.
(Briefly off the record.)
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
. BT MR LISKERi
Q During the previous deposition, which I believe was
on June 22, at page 216, I asked ypu about the currency
importations that you alluded to in the beginning of this
session today. With regard to the $12,001 importation that
took place, according to the deposition which you filed on
February 8, 1981, you said that you could not then recall the
source of that money. Since that session, have you been able
to recall the source of that money?
A 7es . And again, this is the information that we
consider to be return information. This was final payment;
this was the final tranche of anHj^^HB payment, and that
money was paid in dollars. So that represented $10,000 which
was the final payment to me for that project, and $2,000
which was my own money, which wasn't coming from any place or
going to emy place, but was just my pocket money.
Q And where did the extra dollar come from?
A' And was there still one dollar on account?
Q Yes, $12,001.
A I don't know. I guess I had an extra one dollar.
Q And when you say from thc^^^^^^B government,
that's the same agency of th^^^^^^| government that you
alluded to earlier in your testimony?
A I frankly — yes, that's the same agency.
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Q Now, prior to January 4, 1985, did you have a
businese relationship with Ted Shackley?
A Prior to January 4, 19857
Q Yes .
A Well, I did one project — Ted Shackley and I worked
together on one project.
Q was that ^h4E|^H^ Pi^oject?
A Yes.
Q At or about that time, did you, on occasion, have
lunch with Ted Shackley?
A Still do.
Q During a luncheon period, did Ted Shackley ever
impart to you any information about efforts by Mr. Cyrus
Hashemi or Mr. Gorbanifar or others to acquire arms on behalf
of Iran?
A NO.
Q There was never any discussion? Did the subject of
Iran ever come up at these meetings?
A- Oh, Iran often came up. Iran was a subject we
often discussed.
Q
13 it true that part of Mr. Shackley 's business
relates to oil opportunities or int4||||g|e with respect to
oil? •wHI^F
A I don't know that much about Mr. Shackley 's
business, but my understanding is that it does have to do
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with oil companies. My general understanding is that it has
to do with risk assessment work for oil companies.
Q You testified previously that you did not learn
about the memorandum which Mr. Shackley gave to you at your
home until sometime in June of 1985. Is that correct?
A No. You mean that I didn't learn about the
contents of the memorandum?
Q That you didn't actually have the physical posession
of the memorandum until some time — I'm sorry; that the
memorandum wasn't actually discussed until sometime in June
in detail, but actually--
A May or June.
Q It had been delivered to you earlier, but you
hadn't read it, and you passed it on to someone.
A No, I don't think that's right. The way I remember
it is that Shackley and I had had a conversation about the
fact that he had met an Iranian who thought it was possible
to arrange for the ransoming of Buckley, and that it was
possible to do a money-for-Buckley deal. That Shackley had
informed Ambassador Walters of this fact, and had asked if
there was any interest on the part of the United States
government, and the answer had been negative.
He then asked me if I were willing to pass this on
a second time since he felt obliged to make every effort to
see if there was any interest in doing this, and I said sure,
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and he gave me a written memorandum. I think it was May.
Q It was after your trip to Israel, though? Your
trip to Israel was early May, so this was some time after?
A Yes, I think that's right, although I must tell you
that only an astrologer could believe that there's any
signif icance--there' s no relationship to the Israel trip.
There would have been a relationship to it later if I had, as
I undoubtedly should have, read the memorandum. But instead
I simply passed the memorandum to North, and said, "Shackley
met an Iranian who thinks that it's possible to ransom
Buckley. If you're interested, here it is. "
Had I read it at that time, when I met Gorbanifar in
A
July, I hopefully would have remembered what the memorandum
said, and said, "Ah, here's the same person again," and I
would have discussed it with Shackley. But in fact I didn't
read the memorandum, and so therefore never discussed it with
him.
Q Did you discuss with Shackley, at any time prior to
your visit to meet with the European intelligence officer
that set in motion this whole chain of events as you previou-
sly described them, did you discuss discuss with Shackley
your intended meeting with the European intelligence staff
officer down there?
A No, I certainly don't.
Q To your knowledge, is Shackley acquainted with this
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individual?
A " I have no idea.
Q So it's never been discussed?
A No.
Q Before or after?
A No.
Q Are you aware whether or not Mr. Gorbanifar has
ever presented himself as Iranian Prime Minister Mousavi's
representative for intelligence affairs in Europe?
A I don't know.
0 So you are not aware of that?
A He didn't present himself that way to me.
Q Did Mr. Nimrodi ever communicate to you that
Gorbanifar had presented himself that way?
A
A Not that I can recall.
Q That's all I have.
A If I just add another--! am aware that there are
people who think that Gorbanifar might have had such a
function. But your question was whether Gorbanifar so
presented himself.
Q Yes.
A And my answer is no.
Q Thank you .
THE WITNESS: Mr. Liman, could I come back to that
business with regard to Hawk missiles?
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MR. LIMAN: Sure.
- THE WITNESS: You can well imagine that when this
conversation took place, and I was told by the Iranian
official that we was unhappy about the fact that the United
States had sold weapons to Iran, that this made quite an
impression on me . I was quite cheered to hear this, because
this was support for the position I held, which was that we
shouldn't be selling them weapons at all.
Had there been, later in that conversation, a
request on his part that we go ahead and sell additional
weapons to Iran, there would have been great dissonance . I
mean, that would have registered very strongly. There was
no — in my presence, there was no discussion and no request
from this Iranian official for any sale of weapons to Iran so
far as I can recall on that.
MR. LIMAN: Which meeting are you referring to?
[Witness and attorney consult.]
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry — Hawk missiles.
MR. LIMAN: Hawk missiles. Which meeting are you
referring to now?
THE WITNESS: You asked me about a meeting where we
weren't going to talk about date or place.
MR. LIMAN: Yes, that's what you're talking about.
THE WITNESS: And you asked me repeatedly whether I
had any recollection--
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MR. LIMAN: I just wanted to show we were placing
it at the same time.
THE WITNESS: And my counsel has reminded me, and I
want to stipulate it, just on the off chance that there may
be a misunderstanding here, that I'm talking about Hawk
missiles, and I'm happy to confirm that there was some
conversation of small arms and material of that sort.
MR. LIMAN: I understand.
THE WITNESS: If you'll permit me one final little
remark.
MR. LEON: I have some questions. You can choose
to do it now, if you'd like--I don't care.
THE WITNESS: Well, I've got this on my mind, let
me just put it in. I think it might interest Senator McClure
also.
You asked questions of various of the witnesses--
Secretary Schultz, Secretary Weinberger, and so forth--about
the assessment of how Iran felt about the war. And remember,
the Prfesident at one point had said how we were helping the
weaker side, and statements to this effect.
I'm going to make a kind of general point about
this, if I may, about the way it seemed to me, because my
impression of this picture of this relative strengths of Iran
and Iraq, I must confess, is a lot greyer than the one that
some of the witnesses have presented, and also I think--I
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believed, and you'll find statements of mine on the record
here from place to place, saying that the Iranians were very
concerned about the way the war was going. They felt that
they desperately needed certain kinds of weapons to defend
themselves .
I have written about this, that there was a major
Exodus from Iranian cities at night, because they were afraid
of being bombed from the air, and that there was no night
radar functioning in Iran, and that Iraq had complete control
of the skies, and that the Iranians were very concerned about
this, and i-. had real social consequences.
Now, I am not a military expert, and I'm the last
person on earth to try to outthink military intelligence
analysts. However, speaking as a professional historian, I
think that it's fair to say that the winning and losing of
wars often depends on factors aside from a brute assessment
of tanks and guns and infantrymen and so forth; that morale
and perception play a major role. And I think that there was
and still is every reason to believe that there were lots of
Iranians who feel, in many ways, helpless before Iraqi
military power.
Even the events of the last few days, where their
cities are being bombed, and their factories are being
bombed, and their counter-reactions are really quite feeble,
I think shows that there are many Iranians who could legiti-
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mately hold that view and be quite concerned about the future
of their country and the stresses within the society that
this kind of pattern produces.
So I don't want to get into an argument with people
who are much better-versed in military questions than I, but
I simply want to say that when you find, from time to time,
Iranians really very upset about the way the war is going, I
think one has to remember the extent to which Iraq can bomb
Iran virtually at will, without fear of being shot down,
particularly at night, and that this produced major social
consequences inside Iran, and that for a government that is
concerned about its own future, the kind of turmoil that this
thing produced in the past and is producing today inside
Iran, is a serious matter.
I think this may explain some of the attitudes that
some Americans held about the balance of power in the war.
FURTHER EXAMINATION BY SENATOR MCCLURE
Q Did you have any conversations with either Mr.
e
McFarlan4 or Mr. North with respect to the relative strength
of Iran and Iraq?
A The conversations I had were the ones in which I
e,
recounted--! remember conversations with Mr. McFarlani. I
don't particularly at this time remember any with Colonel
North--where I described what I had learned to have been the
consequences inside Iran of these Iraqi assaults.
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Q Did Mr. McFarlan4 at that time express to you any
opinion -as to the relative strength of the two countries,
military and otherwise--
A No, sir.
Q --as to who was winning or losing the war?
A No, sir, he did not. However, I will tell you that
I have a very clear recollection of a series of discussions
and memoranda in the Department of State, when I was working
there, in late 1981 and early 1982, where it was the clear--
I'm not sure that "conviction" is the right expression — but
concern on the part of NEA, that Iran was about to overwhelm
Iraq, that Saddan Hussein was about to fall, and that next
would come Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and that we would be
facing a hegemonic Iran within a matter of months.
There were proposals then of many of the things
which were proposed later on--sharing intelligence with Iraq,
shoring up Saudi 's, looking for places to base forward
material, and so forth--back in 1981. So that the fear of
the imminent collapse of Iraq is one which has been with us
for quite a long time, and so the American government-- I
remember at the time expressing some skepticism as to whether
Saddan Hussein was as feeble as all of that, and whether we
were going to have a hegemonic Ayatollah.
Q Yes, but you didn't hear the opposite side of that
at a later time, from any source within the government, that
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somehow Iran was about to be defeated by Iraq?
A - No, I don't think anybody held that view.
Q What was the prevailing view expressed to you by
Israeli officials?
A Oh, the view expressed to me by Israeli officials
was that the war was a virtual standoff.
Q They didn't express to you--
A They didn't think either--
Q --the fear that Iran was getting the worst of it?
A No, they didn't seem to. I don't recall any
Israeli expressing to me a belief that either side was in any
danger of winning that war. No.
Q You have said that it was your clear impression,
and it was Kimbt's clear impression, that this project was
e
off, or about to be terminated by McFarlani.
A That's right.
Q Some time early to mid-December?
A Early to mid-November.
Q November.
A Yes.
Q By the time you were talking to the CIA in December,
it was at that time your impression that the Iranian initia-
tive was over.
A Yes, sir, that's right.
Q What caused it get back on track?
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A I don't know. I'm not familiar with that part of
the story.
Q Were you surprised that it was--I assume it would
be correct to say--started up again?
A Yes, I was. I was surprised that it was started up
again, and did not understand why. It is one of the subjects
that I have resolved to investigate, because I'm not satisfied
with all the explanations that I've heard today.
EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. LEON:
Q I'd like to follow up, Mr. Ledeen, on a question
that Senator McClure had asked you a little while ago. Are
you familiar with Gary Sick's book, "All Fall Down"?
A I've read parts of it. I'm not sure that I've read
all of it.
Q About the United States government's dealings with
Iran and effort to get the hostages out.
A' Yes .
Q There's a passage in this book dealing with October
22, 1981. The Carter administration was working feverishly
in an effort to get the hostages out. At that point in the
book, Mr. Sick, who was personally involved and knew exactly
what was going on, has a footnote, and I'll read it and ask
you to comment upon it if you're knowledgeable. It's
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footnote 10 on page 372. I'll quote.
"In the midst of this delicate process, a message was
received from Prime Minister Begin, indicating that Israel had
been contacted by the Iranians, seeking military equipment
and spare parts. He said that one plane-load of material had
alreay been dispatched, and he sought U.S. approval to
continue to provide spare parts for Iran's U.S. -built
aircraft. At a time when every effort was being exerted by
the United States on its allies to insure the integrity of
the embargo, this request was received with astonishment,
bordering on disbelief. Begin was informed that any leakage
in the embargo would be regarded as unhelpful to U.S. efforts
to bring pressure on Iran to end the hostage crisis, and he
was asked to desist. He said he would."
Were you familiar, at about that time, that those
kinds of efforts on the part of Israel were going on, vis a
vis, Iran, providing spare parts, that is?
A Well, it was clear that American officials informed
the executive editor of the Washington Quarterly of such
goings-on at that time, and the answer is no, I didn't know
anything about it.
Q How about since then? Do you have any knowledge of
Israel providing spare parts on its own initiative to Iran,
despite the embargo?
A No. We keep going through this, and my answer is
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no.
Q - Just want to verify that with regard to this
particular point.
A I remembered Mr. Lisker once asked me if I knew
anything about tires. I said that I remembered reading some
newspaper story about tires for airplanes, something like
that. I have a vague recollection of reading a newspaper
story about General Sharon and tires for airplanes in Iran.
But that's it. I did not work on these matters. This was
not my area.
Q Could you state for the record what you thought
Israel saw its interests being in this strategic initiative
that McFarland was working on and thinking about in 1985? How'
did Israel perceive its interests in that taking place?
A Israel-well, Israel. Because there were differen-
ces. There are Israelis who differ as to what is the best
thing to do. SO far as I understood the Prime Minister's
position and the position of the people around the Prime
Minister, it was that, so far as the war was concerned, they
did not want a winner and a loser. The best outcome was
either that the war should end in place, or that the war
should continue indefinitely.
The worst outcome was that one side wins and the
other Side loses. And if you have to pick between the two
Winners, .f someone has to win, it's probably better from the
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Israeli position that Iran win than Iraq win. And that
because -Iraq is an Arab country and part of the radical Arab
bloc--froni Israel's standpoint, very bad--and that Iran,
although at the moment very hostile, is a country with a
tradition of being anti-Arab like Israel, and therefore the
enemy of my enemy is my friend. Also there is a history of
good relations between Persia-Iran and Israel over time, so
that Israel is prepared to swallow the short-term unpleasant-
ness in terms of a long-term enduring parallel interest with
Iran.
So that Israel's strategic objective in that part
of the world is to maintain the integrity of Iran if possible.
So that when things change with regard to the Iranian regime,
they will then have a good relationship with that future
regime. But they do not wish to see Iran disintegrate,
because a disintegrated Iran removes the buffer between the
Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and can no
longer block the radical Arab expansionism coming from Iraq,
and possibly Syria as well, on the other.
Q Do you think the Mossad would have agreed with the
Prime Minister's assessment as you think you've just stated
it?
A I don't know what Mossad's position on this is.
Q Was, actually. I want to focus on what you thought,
back then, they thought.
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A I don't know what they thought. I was aware that
there were views violently opposed to this in the Israeli
government. There were people, for example, who thought that
it was a grave mistake on the part of Prime Minister Peres
and the people around him to be dealing with and supporting
radical Shi 'ism, because their view was that while one could
come to terms with one or another Arab country over time
that it was the nature of the Khomeini revolution and of
radical Shi 'ism that it would be forever opposed to Israel,
and that this was indeed a far greater threat to Israel than
any Arab country, no matter how radical it might be.
So there were people within Israel and within the
government who felt this very strongly indeed. So was it was
an object of no little discussion inside Israel.
Q How possible do you think it was back then, Mr.
Ledeen, that there were those within Mossad, let's say, who
might have been opposed to the initiative, and who thought,
therefore, it would be in their interest to have Gorbanifar
involved, because he would ultimately bring a doom to the
initiative? Had you considered that possibility back then,
and if you hadn't, looking back on it, do you view that as a
possibility, that there were those who were anti-initiative
who saw Gorbanifar as a person who would work their will
indirectly?
A It's always possible to argue that, when you set up
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a hypothesis and then you find evidence that runs counter to
it, that it's not the hypothesis that's wrong, but it's the
evidence, after all, that's wrong, and the evidence only
appears to be wrong, and secretly, deep down underneath, it
is the opposite of what it appears to be.
Q Some would say an investigation is like that.
A I must say that I think it's always very hard to
find out the truth about anything, but I do think that in a
case like this, it's a bit too deep for me. And that most of
the time in a country as rough-and-tumble and outspoken as
Israel, the position that people state are the positions that
they actually hold, and not positions stated for the reason
of achieving the opposite of what they say they're trying to
achieve. It's just too clever by half.
Q You've produced evidence today that suggests,
supports, the notion that you are an expert in the area of
terrorism. I didn't hear Mr. Liman challenge it, certainly —
MR. LIMAN: I didn't think that the purpose of this
was to challenge it. I accept the fact that Mr. Ledeen has
the credentials he described in counter- terror ism, and that
he is an expert.
MR. LISKER: I can testify to that.
BY MR. LEON:
Q I will agree to that, certainly, so I would like to
ask you this. From the vantage point of an expert on
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terrorism, which I think you bring to this discussion
certainly, can you conunent on the importance of human
intelligence, as opposed to other forms of intelligence, in
the fight against terrorism?
A Yes. It's indispensable. You can not do it
without it. Technical intelligence can only carry you so
far, because basically what you need to know in terrorism are
the intentions of the terrorists. What are they planning to
do? That's the basic information that one requires. Unless
they are awfully incautious and behave in such a way that you
can gather this information by one form or another of
surveillance, you're going to have to get inside the organiz-
ation.
Furthermore, if you want to destroy the terrorist
organization, you must also get inside one way or another and
dismantle it from within, because strikes from without, for
the most part, never succeed in getting the whole organiza-
tion. You have to get the core of it. So you must get
within' it, and this can only be done by people.
If you'll permit me one footnote. One of the
arguments I've been having within the American political
debate on this question of terrorism and human intelligence
has resolved around the executive order on assassination. We
have now the third president that has stated a position that
not only can no American official be involved in assassina-
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tion, but can not be associated with assassins. Excuse me,
Mr. Liman, but the lawyers have written this to great length,
and so not only can you not assassinate, but you can't cause
to be assassinated or encourage assassination or have
anything to do with assassins.
Unfortunately, in the process of getting good intel-
ligence about terrorists, if you're going to talk to a
terrorist, you're going to talk to an assassin, because
terrorists are made into assassins. In other words, they're
not let into the group. So, oddly, we have this executive
order which makes it extremely difficult to get good intel-
ligence. For many years — people are trying now to ease up
some of it--but the way thing is written, you simply can not
effectively penetrate a terrorist group. I think it's a
terrible mistake. We have to address this.
Q when you began your work on the initiative back in
1985, what was your assessment at that time of the state of
human intelligence in the United States and Iran?
A Very poor .
Q Were we relying, out of necessity, on Israeli
intelligence assistance?
A I don't know what we were relying on, but I must
stress that it was not simply my assessment, it was the CIA's
assessment. When the Special National Intelligence Estimate
was done in the late spring or early summer of 1985 on Iran,
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if you read the document you will find repeatedly language,
"We don't know much about this. We have fragmentary informa-
tion. We are unable to identify the basic political organi-
zations in this country, or what the lines of political
conflict are. "
If we were relying on Israeli intelligence, it
wasn't very good, either, and indeed I remind you that Prime
Minister Peres said to me that he did not think that their
intelligence on Iran was particularly good.
Q How about in Lebanon, at that time?
A In Lebanon, I think that they would feel that their
intelligence— they would feel better about their intelligence.
Q Better than in Iran.
A Yes.
Q When the initiative was being worked on, back then
in 1985, was there any consideration to improvement in United
States human intelligence in Iran as one of the objectives?
A I don't know. I don't function within the intel-
ligence community per se .
Q Did you have any evidence of any fabricated or
inaccurate intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency
back at that time to support the initiative?
A NO. The only intelligence from the CIA of which I
was aware was the SNIE, and that was poor quality but
admittedly so. I don't think there was any reason to suspect
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them of duplicity.
Q - Let me finish up by focusing on two last sections.
First of all, with regard to November of 1986, that time
period of November 21 area there, why was it, if your
involvement had been cut off in November of 1985, which you've
testified to repeatedly, at the end of November of 1985, why
e
was it that McFarlan4 and North needed to see you in November
of 1986 with regard to the events that were unfolding at that
time?
A Because I wanted to speak about my involvements in
1985. I wanted to speak publicly about it, and they didn't
want me to. So that meeting took place, you'll recall, at my
request.
Q The Friday meeting.
e
A Yes. I wanted to talk to McFarlant about it.
Q At your house.
A At my house. And then North said that we needed to
talk about something. I saw North anyway. I was working for
North . "
Q Did you know he was going to show up that morning,
the 21st?
A No, I don't think I did know that. I think I was
surprised.
Q That he showed up on the scene.
A Yes . And then I went down and then we discussed
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61
the Hawk question. But there was nothing surprising about
those meetings .
Q They were looking for your assistance only with
regard to information.
A No, they weren't looking for my assistance at all.
No one asked me for my assistance.
Q The chronology, they weren't asking for any help
with that either?
A No, quite the contrary. I finally had to call
Keele and say, "How do you propose to do this chronology
without my input?" And he said, "Good idea. Why don't you
write us something?" So I did, but never heard anything from
North or McFarland about that.
Q Do you remember when that would have been, roughly?
Certainly it was before the 21st, obviously.
A It was before the President's speech.
Q With regard to your discussion that you've testified
to earlier today, relating to the need, perhaps, for you to
get a lawyer with Colonel North. He didn't identify,
obviously, who it was at the Justice Department that he said
he had been speaking to. That's correct, isn't it?
A That's correct.
Q Is it possible that that conversation with him-
might have taken place the following Monday, the 24th, after
he had met with Justice Department people over that weekend?
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A It's conceivable, but again my recollection of the
conversation with him on the afternoon of the 21st was that
when he said to me, "What would you say if asked the following
questions," I then recalled his previously said to me, "I'm
being asked questions by Justice Department people," et
cetera.
Q Did you link that conversation with it was raining
that day or something like that?
A No.
Q Is there any other way you can link it to that day,
besides what you've already testified to?
A No, I have no recollection of the date, and the
only recollection I have is that I think that the previous
conversation, the one about lawyers, took place on the
telephone.
Q Dennis, do you have anything else you'd like to add?
EXAMINATION BY COUSEL FOR THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. TETI:
Q There is some speculation somewhere in the Tower
Commission Report on Gorbanifar's connection in Teheran, with
the possibility suggested by someone, I don't know who, that
he may have a connection with someone who is a KGB agent. Do
you remember that?
A Yes.
*
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63
Q I just wondered whether you might have any kind of
information or any feeling as to whether that could be true,
or whether it's entirely unlikely, or any independent
information about it.
A I've seen no information to suggest it. It was one
Vn
of the hypotheses that I held about Mr. Gorbanifar at the
beginning. I was for quite a while extremely suspicious of
him, and thought it entirely possible that he might have been
sent to us by the KGB in order to determine our intentions
with regard to Iran. It took me quite a while to get over
that suspicion, I must tell you.
But I did get over it after a while, and I haven't
seen anything to suggest that that's true.
Q The other thing, if could ask you about this, you
were talking about the fact that in late November and
December of 1985, you had been given the distinct impression
that the Iran initiative was over. Did you ever have any
conversation either with Mr. McMahon or with Admiral Poindex-
ter that would have led you to believe that at the time?
A No.
Q I just find it — I mean, that just happens to be the
time when the first finding is being put together. That's
the reason it strikes me as being odd.
A No. I never spoke to Mr. McMahon about this, and I
tried repeatedly to talk to Admiral Poindexter, but never was
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given an appointment .
Q - When did you finally learn that the initiative had
been resumed?
A I'm not sure. Probably in February or March.
Q How did you learn that?
A I think it just beceune evident. I mean, I saw
Gorbanifar from time to time in Europe, and I worked in
North's office, and after a while it beceime clear.
FURTHER EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
BY MR. LEON:
Q Something just occurred to me. Let me ask just a
couple of questions. When did you first learn, Mr. Ledeen,
about McFarlani's trip in May of 1986 to Teheran with North?
A Well, I heard about a month before it took place
that it was about to take place, that it was being discussed.
I went to him and urged hiro not to do it .
Q Where did you hear that from?
A I don't remember where I heard it.
Q You urged him not to go? For what reasons?
A For the scune reason that I was opposed to the whole
arms-for-hostage thing all along, which was that this trip
could only, whatever else it accomplished, it could only have
the effect of strengthening the regime in Iran, and that our
interest was in weakening the regime in Iran, and not
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And who had informed you that it had taken place?
K
Part of it came from Gorbanifar, and bits and
65
strengthening it. And I did not think we should do anything
to strengthen those people further.
Then I did not know that it had actually happened.
Q Until it came out in the paper?
A No. I knew that it happened by the fall. I guess
by about September or so, I knew that he had done it, but I
didn't know exactly when it had happened, and I knew bits and
pieces about what had gone on there.
Q
A
A
pieces of conversations that I either overheard or par-
ticipated in, in Washington. I couldn't place them all for
you .
Q After it had become public knowledge by virtue of
the new leaks from Iran that the trip had taken place, did
you have any conversations with Nir or anybody connected with
the Israeli government as to how Israel wanted McFarlan* and
the President to handle these disclosures?
A" No. I had no discussions with any Israeli about
this until, I think I called Peres to scream at him about
what Nir had allegedly said in the Tower Commission. I think
that's it.
Q Did you have any discussions with Nir on the
weekend of the 21st of November or thereafter?
A No.
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Q I have nothing further. Thank you very much, Mr.
Ledeen . .
(Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the taking of the
deposition concluded.)
1479
67
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY REPORTER
I, Terry Barham, the officer before whom the
foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the
witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing transcript
was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was
taken by me and thereaftrer reduced to typewriting by me or
under my supervision; that said deposition transcript is e
true record of the testimony given by said witness; th;^.t I am
neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of tne
parties to the action in which this deposition was taken;
and, further, that I am not a relative or employee of any
attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor
financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the
action.
, -.2^
/^erry B^rh^ Notary Public in
and for the District of Columbia
My commissi
ion expires May 15, 1989
HUB) MPomvM eo, HC
VJ7 CSom. NE
Wi^oftos. DC wool
(lOJ)
o
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