Skip to main content

Full text of "Report of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan upon the organization of the Army of the Potomac and its campaigns in Virginia and Maryland"

See other formats

Glass _ 







Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, 


July 26, 1861, to November 7, 1862. 






! VyC5:^vc^y^j^v ' .V);. 








JXJL^^ GGtli, 1S61, TO IVOA^ElVUBETi T'tli 18GS, 





New York, August 4, 1S63. 

Sin — I have the honor to submit herein the official report of 
the operations of the array of the Potomac while under my 
charge. A'"corapanying it are the reports of the corp!?, divi- 
sion, and subordinate commanders, pertaining to the various 
engagements, battles, and occurrences of the campaign, and 
important documents connected with its organization, supply, 
and movemeuts. These, with lists of maps and memoranda 
submitted, will bo found appended, arranged, and marked for 
•onvenient reference. 

Charged, in the spring of ISGl, with the operations in the de- 
partment of the Ohio, which included the States of Illinois, In- 
diana, Ohio, and latterly Western Virginia, it had become my 
duty to counteract the hostile designs of the enemy in West- 
ern Virginia, which were immediately directed to the destruc- 
tion of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the possession of 
the Kanawha valley, with the ultimate objectof gaining Wheel- 
ing and the coutrol of the Ohio river. 

The successful afliiirs of Pbillippi, Rich Mountain, Carrick's 
Ford, Ac, had been fought, and I had acquired possession of 
all Western Virginia north of the Kanawha valley, as well as 
of the lower portion of that valley. 

I had determined to proceed to the relief of the npper Kan- 
awha valley, as soon as provision was made for the permanent 
defense of the mountain passes leading from the east into the 
region under control, when I received at Beverly, in Randolph 
county, on the 21st of July, 18G1, intelligence of the unfortu- 
nate result of the battle of jianassas, fought on that day. 

On the 22d I received an order by telegraph, directing me to 
turn o»er my command to Brigadier-General Roaecraos, and 
repair at once to Washington. 

I had already caused rcconnoissances to be made for in- 
trenchments u the Cheat Mountain pass ; also on the Hunter- 
Tille Road, ne^vr Elkwater, and at Red House, near tlie main 
road from R/jmney to Grafton. During the afternoon and 
night of the 22d I gave the final instructions for the construc- 
tion of these works, turned over the command to Brigadier- 
General Rosccrans, ana started on the morning of the 23d for 
Washington, arriving there on the afternoon of the 2iUh. On 
the 27th I assumed command of the division of the Potomac, 
compriaing the troops in and aroaud Washington, on both 
banks of the river. 

V'UV 'M" 'l :f „;,.', mont r.r t)ie events w!-, oh iramedintcly 
pr: :cv;-id ny 'cc! iir i;;,.d to the ccmmaud of liio trgopii 
■t V<ashiii«!ton, I ,irocceU to an accoani, f.-oBi inch aothontic 
daf I :ts .^.■' iw lu-in;!, of my niiliUry o^eittti'-aa wl;'' ^ .^^...- 
inUiJrr "' ^ aruiy of the I'uWttac* 

The subjects to ne eonslaerea naturally arrange ■themselves 

as f 'Hoiv-;' 

The organization of the army of the Potomac. The military 
events connected with the defenses of Washington, from July, 
1S61, to March, 1SC2. The campaign on the Peninsula, and 
tliat in Maryland. 

The great resources and capacity for powerful resistance of 
the South at the breaking out of tlie rebellion, and the full 
proportions of '.iie great conflict about to take place, were 
sought to be carefully measured j and I had also endeavored, 
by every men'i<; in my power, to impress upon the authorities 
the necessity l..r such immediate and full preparation as alone 
would enable the Government to prosecute the war on a scale 
commensurate with the resistance to be offered. 

On the 4th of August, 1861, 1 addressed to the President tbe 
following memorandum, prepared at his request: 

The object of the present war differs from those in which na- 
tions are engaged, mainly in this : that the purpose of ordinary 
war is to conquer a peace, and make a treaty on advantageous 
terms ; in this contest it has become necessary to crush a pop- 
uJation sufficiently numerous, intelligent and warlike to con- 
stitute a nation. We have not only to defeat their armed and 
organized forces in the field, but to display such an orer- 
whelming strength as will convince all onr antagonists, espe- 
cially those of the governing, aristocratic class, of the utter 
imposaiiility of resistance. Our late reverses make this course 
imperative. Had we been successful in the recent battle 
(.Manassas), it is possible that we might have been spared the 
labor and expense of a great effort. 

Now we have no alternative. Their success will enable the 
political leaders of the rebels to convince the mass of their 
people that we are inferior to them in force and courage and 
to command all their resonrces. The contest began .;ih j 
class, now it is with a people — our military success cas .i;uo'; 
restore the former issue. 

By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their 
places, and pursuing a rigidly protective policy as to 
property and unarmed persons, and a lenient course ft 
vato soldiers, we may well hope for a permanent res 
of a peaceful Union. But in the first instance the ant' 
'.he Government must be supported by overwhelming . 

Our foreign relations and financial credit also imp - ihe?T 
demand that tlie military action of the Government ; .ild b" 
prompt and irresistible. 

The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-fli ji 
"^eems proper for us to make the first great strug i; ih 
Hut while tlius directing oar main efforta. it is neces^ irj I > -i! 
minish the resistance tliere offered us, by movement OC rthv 
loints, both by land and water. 
Without entering at presentinto details, I would a i'. 




■.:' -B 

•it» of 



• itrsni; moremont oe f U on tha Missiseippi, and that the 
rebels be driven oat of II >souri. 

As goon as it becomes peifeclly clear that Kentucky if cor- 
dially united with us, I would adviM a tnovemeut tlimuf;)) that 
Bbtte iutn Eattcrn Teiincssee, Tor tlie purpose of ai^^isiiiig the 
Union men of that region, and of seizing the railroads leading 
from Met ,*Iiis to the l-Zast. 

The \m jL'.,sion of those roads by ns, in connection with the 
Biovetnent on the Mississippi, would go far towardi iletennin- 
Ing the evacuation of Virginia bv the rebels. In tlie mean 
time all the passes into Western Virginia from the east slmuld 
be securely guarded, but I would advise no movement from 
tliat qoarter towards Richmond, unless the political condition 
of Kantucky renders it impossible or inexpedient for us to 
make the movement upon Kastern Tcnncasec through that State. 
Every eltort should, however, be ma'lc to orjianize, equip, and 
arm as m.nny troops as possible in Western Virginia, in order 
to renUr the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other 

At as early a day as practicable, ft would be well to protect 
•ndrc-opcn the B;iUirnore and Oliio liailroa.l. Baltimore and 
Fort Uoni'oc should be occupied by garrisons sufficient to 
retain thera in our possession. 

The importance of Harper's Ferry and the line of the Poto- 
mac in the direction of Leesbnrg will be very materially di- 
minished, 80 soon as our force in this vicinity becomes organ- 
ised, strong, and efficient, because no capable general will 
cross the river north of this city, when we have a strong army 
here ready to cut oCf his retreat. 

To revert to the West. It is probable that no Tery large 
additions to the troops now in Missouri will be necessary to 
secure that State. 

I presume that the force required for the movement down 
tJic Misiissippi will be determined by its commander and the 
President. If Kentucky assumes the right position, not more 
than 20.000 will be needed, together with those that can be 
raised in that State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure the 
latter region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy 

The Vi'estern Virginia troops, with not more than five to ten 
thousand from Oliiu and Indiana, should, under proper man- 
agement, Buffii-e for its protection. 

When we have reorganized our main army here, 10,000 men 
oaght to be enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio R:iii- 
road and the Potomac, 5,000 will garrison Caliimore, 3,000 
Fort Uonroe, and not more than 20,000 will be necessary at 
the ntmost for the defense of Washington. 

For the main ari^y of operations I urge the following com- 

250 regiments of infantry, say 223,000 men 

100 field batteries, GOO guns 15,000 " 

28 regiments of cavalry 2.i,500 " 

6 regiments engineer troops 7,500 " 

Total 273,000 " 

Tlie force must be supplied with the necessary engineer and 
pontoon trains, and with transportation for everything save 
tents. Its general line of operations should be so directed 
that water transportation can be availed of from point to 
point, by means of the ocean and the rivers emptying into it. 
An essential feature of the plan of operations (vill be the em- 
ployment of a strong naval force to protect the movement of 
a fleet of transports intended to convey a considerable body 
of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-cnast, thus 
either creating diversions and rendering it necessary for them 
to detach Lirgely from their main body in order to protect 
■uch of their cities as may be threatened, or else landing and 
forming establishments on their coast at any favorable places 
that opportunity might offer. This naval force should also co- 
operate with the main army in its elTorts to seize the impor- 
tant seaboard towns of the rebels. 

It cannot be ignored the construction of railroads has 
Introduced a new and very important element into war, by 
the great facilities thus given for concentrating at particular 
positions large masses of troops from remote sections, and by 
creating new strategic points and lines of operations. 

It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial 
operations suggested, and such others as the particular case 
may require. We must endeavor to seize places on the rail- 
ways in the roar of the enemy's points of concentration, and 
we must threaten their seaboard cities, in order that each State 
may be forced, by the necessity of its own defense, to diuiin- 
Lih its contingent to the confederate army. 

The proposed movement down the Mississippi will produce 
important results in this connection. That advance and the 
progr.'-i'i of tha main army at the East will materially Sssisl 
each tber by diminishing the resistance to bo encountered by 
each. , 

The ;tendency of the Mississippi movement upon all (;ncs- 
lions Cionnci'ted with cotton is t(K) well understood by the 
Presidcyit and cabinet to need any illustration from me. 

Then ' i« another independent movement that has often been 

SKgeatjpd, and which has always recommended itself to tny 
•gmerlit, I refer to a movement from Kansas and Nebraska 
"nil\ the Indian territory upon lied river and Western 
T"» < fill r the purpose of protecting and developing the latent 
tJnlin OH d free-State sentiment well known to predominate in 
Ve^t' ' " 

Bto a f- 
.'^a, li a 

I fens, and wliich, like a similar sentiment in Western 
will, if protected, ultimately organize that sectio/ 

Slate. How far It will be possible to support thi, 

I I by an advance through New Mexico from Califoi 
patter which I hava not sufficiently examined to b 

able to express a decided opinion. If at all practicable. It Is 
eminently desirable, as bringing into play tlie resources and 
warlike qualities of the Pacilic States, as well as identifying 
them with eur cause, and connecting tha bond of Union be- 
tween them and the (.General Ooveniroent. - 

If it is not departing too far from my province, I will rentt, X 
to suggest the policy of an ultimate alliance and cordial un- 
derstanding with Mexico ; their sympathies and inleresta ara 
with us— their antipathies exclusively against our eneniiesand 
their institutions. I think it w.iuld not be difficult to obtain 
from the .Mexican Oovernmtnt the right to use, at least during 
the present contest, the road from Cuavmas to New Mexico ; 
this concession would very materially reduce the ob.staclcs of 
the column moving from the Pstilic ; a similar permission to 
use their territory for the passage of troops between tha 
Panaco and the lUo Grande would enable ua to throw a co- 
lumn of troops by a good road frdm Tanipico, or some of tlio 
small harbors north of it, upon and across the Kio Granda, 
without risk and scarcely firing a shot. 

To what extent, if any. it would be desirable to take into 
service and employ .Mexican soldiers, is a question eulirelT 
political, on which I do not venture to offer an opinion. 

The force I have recommended is lar;,;* ; the expense is 
great. It is posnible that a smaller force mighv accomplish 
the object in view, but I understand it to be the pnipose of 
this groat nation to re-establish the power of its Governm»nt 
and restore peace to its citizens, in tfie shortest possible time! 

The question to be decided is simply tliis : sliall we crush 
the rebellion at one blow, terminate the war in one campaign, 
or shall we leave it as a legacy for our descendants? 

When the extent of the possible line of operations is con- 
sidered, the force asked for for tho main army under my com- 
mand cannot be regarded as nuduly large ; every mile we 
advance carries us further from our base of operations, and 
renders detachments necessary to cover our communications, 
while the enemy will be constantly concentrating us he fslU 
back. I propose, w-ith tiie force which I have requested, not 
only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Ijichmond, 
but to occnpv Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, 
Mobile and New Orleans ; in other words, to move into tha 
heart of the enemy's country, and crush the rebellion in its 
very heart. 

By seizing and repairing the railroads as we adrnnce, tha " 
difficulties of transportation will be materially diminished. It 
is perhaps unnecessary to state that, in addition to the forces 
named in this memorandum , strong reserves should be formed, 
ready to supply any losses that may occur. 

In conclusion, I would submit that the exigencies of ths 
treasury may be lessened by making only partial payments to 
pur troops, when in the enemy's country, and by giving tha 
obligations of the United States fur such supplies as ma; 
there be obtained. 

CEO. B. McCLKI.L.-^N, 

Major- General, 

I do not think the events of the war havo proved thea* 
views upon the method and plans of its conduct altos;ether in- 
correct. They certainly have not proved my estimate of tha 
number of troops and scope of operations too large. It is 
probable that I did under estimate the time necessary for tha 
completion of arms and equipments. It was not strange, 
however, that by many civilians, intrnsted with authority, 
there should have been an exactly opposite opinion held on 
both these particulars. 

The result of the first battle of Manassas had been almost 
to destroy the morale and organization of our army, and to 
alarm Government and people. Tho national capital was ia 
danger; it was necessary, besides holding the enemy in check, 
to build works for its deleuse, strong and capable of being 
held by a small force. 

It was necessary also to create a new army for aclire opera- 
tions, and to expedite its organization, equipment, and the ac- 
cumulation of tlie material of war, and to this not inconsider- 
able labor all my energies for the next throe months wero 
constantly devoted. 

Time is a necessary element in tho creation of armies, and 
I do not, therefore, think it necessary to more than mention 
the impatience with which many regarded the delay in the ar- 
rival cl new levies, though recruited and pressed forward 
with unexampled rapidity, the manufacture and supply of 
arms and equipments, or the vehemence with which an imme- 
diate advance upon the enemy's works directly in our front 
was urged by a patriotic but sanguine people. 

The President, too, was anxious for the speedy employment 
of our army, and, although possessed of my plans through 
frequent conferences, desired a paper from me upon the con- 
dition of the forces under my command, and the imm>diat« 
ojeasurcs to be taken to increase their efficiency. Iccord- 
rngly, in the latter part of October I addressed the /oUowlng 
ittter to the Secretary of War: 

Sir— In conformity with a personal understanding with the 
President yesterday, I have the honor to subn:it the following 
statement of the condition of the army under my command, 
and the measures required for the pre^ervaiion of theGovern- 
ment and the suppression of the rebellion. 

It will be remembered that in a memorial I had the honor 
to address to the President soon after my arrival in Washing- 
ton, and in my commnnication addressed to Lieutenant- 
General Scott, under date of 8th of .August; in my letter to 
'.he Prf-sidcnt. SMtliorizing him, at hi* "rTio"* t.> w'»hdr»w 
,1,,, ! ■■ ■■ -■■■ ■ ■■ ■ • , -- ■ jf 

I \a Uisse •crerai eoBiia'itiico'; 

J 1 bare statad tki (oceil 



regarded as necessary to enable this army to aavancc with a 
reiisonable certainty of success, at tiie same time leaving tlie 
capital and the hne of the Potomac suflHciently guarded, not 
only to secure *'•€ retreat of the main army, in tiie event of 
fiir'astcr. bu» lO render it out of tlie enemy's power to attempt 
■^'diversion in Maryland. 

Si miicli time lias passed, and the winter is approaching; so 
rapidly, tliat but two courses are left to tlie Government, viz. : 
cither to go into winter quarters, or to assume the oHensive 
with forces gre.itly inferior in numbers to the army I regarded 
as desirable and necessary. If political considerations render 
the first course unadvisable, the second alone remains. While 
I regret that it has not been deemed expedient, or perhaps 
possible, to concentrate the forces of the nation in tliis 
vicinity (remaining on the defensive elsewhere), keeping the 
attention and efforts of tiie Government fi.ved upon this as the 
vita! point, where the issue of the great contest is to be de- 
cided, it may still be tiiat, by introducing unity of action and 
design among the various armies of the land, by determining 
the courses to be pursued by the various commanders under 
one general plan, transferring from the other armies the super- 
fluous strength not required for the purpose in view, and thus 
re-enforcing this main army, whose destiny it is to decide the 
controversy, we may yet be able to move with a reasonable 
pro3[iect of success before the winter is f,xirly upon us. 

The nation feels, and I share that feeling, that the army of 
the Potomac holds the fate of the country in its hands. 

The stake is so vast, the issue so momentous, and the effect 
of tiie next battle will be so important throughout the future, 
as well as the present, that I continue to urge, as I have ever 
done since I entered upon the command of this army, upon 
the Government to devote its energies and its available re- 
sources towards increasing the numbers and efficiency of the 
army on which its sah'ation depends. 

A statement, carefully prepared by the chiefs of engineers 
and artillery of this army, gives us the necessary garrison of 
this city and its fortifications, 33,795 men — say 35,000. 

Tlie "present garrison of Baltimore and its dependencies is 
about 10,000. I have sent the chief of my staff to make a care- 
ful examination into the condition of these troops, and to ob- 
tain the information requisite to enable me to decide whether 
this number can be diminished, or the reverse. 

At least 5,000 men will be required to watch the river hence 
to Harper's Ferry and its vicinity ; probably 8,000 to guard the 
lower Potomac. 

As j'ou are aware, all the information we have from spies, 
prisoners, Ac, agrees in showing tliat tlie enemy have a force 
on the Potomac not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled and 
equipped, ably comm.tnded, and strongly intrenched. It is 
plain, therefore, that to insure success, or to render it reason- 
ably certain, the active army should not number less than 
150,000 efficient troops, with 400 guns, unless some material 
change occurs in the force in front of us. 

The requisite force for an advance movement by the army 
of the Potomac may be thus estimated : 
Column of active operations 150,000 men, 400 gnns. 

Garrison of the city of Washington . . 
To guard the Potomac to liarper's 


To guard the lower Potomac 

Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis, 



5,000 " 

8,000 ■ 

, 10,000 ' 



companies of the third artillery, en route from California, ba 
»ent here. Had not the order for Smead's battery to come 
here from Ilarrisburg, to replace tlie battery I gave General 
Sherman, been so often countermanded, I would again ask 
for it. 

Tliird, that a more effective regulation may be made author- 
izing the transfer of men from the volunteers to the regular 
batteries, infantry and cavalry ; that we may make the best 
possible use of the invaluable regular "skeletons." 

Fourth, I have no official information as to the United States 
forces elsewhere, but, from tlie best information 1 can obtain 
from the War Department and other sources, I am led to be- 
1-eve that the United States troops are : 

In Western Virginia, about 30,000 

In Kentucky 40,000 

In Missouri 80,000 

In Fortress Monroe 11,000 

Total 161 .000 

Besides these, I am informed that more than 100,000 are in 
progress of organization in otlier norlhern and western States. 
1 would therefore recommend that, not interfering with 
Kentucky, there should be retained in Western Virginia and 
Missouri a sufficient force for defensive purposes, and that the 
surplus troops be sent to the army of the Potomac, to enable 
it to assume the offensive ; that the same course be pursued in 
respect to Fortress Monroe, and tliat no fnrtlier outside expe- 
ditions be attempted until we have fought the great battle in 
front of us. 

Fifth, that every nerve be strained to hasten the enrollment, 
organization, and armament of new batteries and regiments o( 

Siith, that all the battalions now raised for new regiment! 
of regular infantry be at once ordered to this army, and that 
the old infantry and cavalry en route from California be or- 
dered to this army immediately on their arrival in New York. 

I have thus indicated, in a general manner, the objects tc 
be accomplished, and the means by which we may gain oar 

A vigorous employment of these means will, in my opinion, 
enable the army of the Potomac to assume successfully this 
season the offensive operations which, ever since entering upon 
the command, it has been my anxious desire and diligent 
effort to prepare for and prosecute. The advance should not 
be postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possible to 
avoid it. 

Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy in action are 
indispensable. The entire military field should be grasped as 
a whole, and not in detached parts. 

One plan should he agreed upon and pursued; a single will 
should direct and carry out these plans. 

The great object to be accomplished, the crnshing defeat of 
the rebel army (now) at Manassas, should never for one instant 
be lost sight of, but all the intellect and means and men of the 
Government poured upon that point. The loyal States possess 
ample force to effect all this and more. The rebels have dis- 
played energy, unanimity and wisdom worthy of the most des- 
perate days of the French revolution. Should we do less? 

The unity of this nation , the preservation of our institutions, 
are so dear to me, that I have willingly sacrificed my private 
happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my conn- 
try. When the task is accomplished, I shall be glad to return 
to the obscurity from which events have drawn me. 

Whatever tlie determination of the Government may be.I will 
do the best I can with the army of the Potomac, and will share 
its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me. 

Permit me to add that, on this occasion as heretofore, it hag 
been my aim neither to exaggerate nor underate the power of 
the enemy, nor fail to express clearly the means by which, in 
my judgment, that power may be broken. Urging the energy 
of preparation and action, which has ever been my choice, 
hut with the fixed purpose by no act of mine to expose the 
Government to hazard by premature movement, and request- 
ing that this communication may be laid before the President, 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully. 
Your obedient servant, 

G. B. ilcCLELL AN, Major-OeneraL 

Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War. 

WhenI assumed command inWashington, on the 27th of Jnly 
ISGl, the number of troops in and around the city was about 
50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, and 0.50 artillerymen, 
with nine imperfect field batteries of thirty pieces. 

On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade organiza- 
tion of General McDowell still existed, and the troops were 
stationed at and in rear of FortCorcoran, Arlington and Port 
Albany, at Fort Rnnyan, Roach'sMills, Cole's Mills, and in the 
vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detachment at the Theologi- 
;al Seiiiinary. 

There were no troops south of Hunting creek, and many of 
the regiments were encamped on the low grounds bordering 
the Potomac, seldom in the best positions for defense, and en- 
tirely inadequate in numbers and condition to defend the long 
line from FortCorcoran to Alexandria. 

On the Maryland side of the river, upon the heights over- 
looking the Chain bridge, two regiments were stationed, whose 
commanders were independent of each other. 

There were no troops on the important Talleytownroad, or 
on the roads entering the city from the south. 

The camps were located without regard to purposes of da* 
fense or instruction, the roads were not picketed, and there no attempt at an organization into brigades. 

In no quarter were the dispositions for defense such as t9 
offer a vigorous resistance to arcapectablebody of the cncT". 

either la the position «nd numbers of the troops, or the nam- 
berand charactorof the diiten<ire work«. Eartlmnrks, in the 
nature of tfte» df portt, loolied upon the apprtiacbes to tlie 
Genrftetown aquo.luct and feTy, tlje I, uni; bridge and Alrx- 
and;ia,b.v the Lilllc river turnpike, and some simple defen- 
sive arrangements were made at the I'hain bridge. Wiih the 
iaitt-T exception not a Bin^le defensive woik liud been cuui- 
mcnced on the Maryland side. 

Tlicre was nothing to prevent the enemy shellinK the city 
from hcighta within easy rani;c. which could De occupied by 
a hostile column almor^t without resistance. Many ttoldicrs 
liad deserted, and the streets of Washinpton were cntwdod 
with strai??Iiiig officers and men, absent from their stAtions, 
without authiirity, whose behavior iudicuted the general want 
•yt di«cipline and organization. 

I at once de-ignatcd an efficient staff, afterwards adding to 
it as opporluiiiiy was afforded and ueces>ity required, who 
zealously co-"pcrjted with me in the labor of briiiiing order 
out of ci>nlusion, re-assisniou troops and commands, project 
ing and throwin^' up defoiL-ivo works, receiving and organiziii!;. 
oquipping and providing for the new levies arriving in the 

The valuable services of these officers in their various de- 
partments, during this and throughout the subsequent periods 
of Uie history of the arniy of the I'otomac. can hardly bo suf- 
ficiently appreciatid. Their names and duties will lie given 
in another part of this report, and they are commended lo the 
favorable notice of the War Department. 

The restoration of order in the city of Washington was 
effected through the appointment of a provost marshal, whose 
authority was supported by the few regular troops within my 
ouinmand. These troops were thus in position to act as a re- 
serve, to be sent to any point of attack where their services 
might be most wanted. The energy and ability displayed by 
Colonel A. Porter, the provust marshal and his assistants, and 
the strict discharge of their duty by the troops produced the 
best results, and WashiogtuD suou became one of the most 
quiet cities in the Union. 

The new levies of infantry, upon arriving In Washington, 
were formed in provisional brigades and placed in camp in 
the suburbs of the city for equipment, instruction, and disci- 
pline. As soon HS regiments were in a fit condition for transfer 
lathe forces across the Potomac, they were assigned to the 
brigades serving there. Biigadier-Genernl F, J. I'orter was 
at first assigned to the charge of the provisional brigades- 
Brigadier General A. E. Burnside wasthc ue.\t officer assigned 
this duty, from which, however, he was soon relieved by 
iirizadier-r.encral S. Casey, who continued in charge of the 
newly arriving regiments until the army of the Potomac de- 
parttil for the Peninsula, in March, 1.SI52. The newly arriving 
artillery troops reported to lirigadier-Genernl William V. Har- 
rv,tlie chief of artillery, and the cavalry to Bii.gadier-tJeneral 
Ccorge Stoneman, ilie chief of cavalry. 

Bv the lath of October, the number of troops in and about 
Wa>hington, inclusive of the garrison of the city and Alex- 
andria, the city guard, and the forces on the Maryland shoie 
of the Potomac below Washington, and as far as (.umbcvliinri 
above, the troops under the command of General Dix, at Balli- 
more and its dependencies, were as follows: 
Toul present lor duty 133,201 

" sick fl.2no 

" in cunHuemeot 1,1^6 

Aggregate present 143.S47 

^" kbseut 8,404 

Grand aggregate... 


The following table exhibits similar data for the period 
stated, including the troops in Maryland and Delaware : 

For convenience of reference the strength of the army of the 
Potomac at SLibsei^uent periods is given. 

In organixin^ the army of the Potomac, and preparing It for 
the Held, the Arst step taken was to organize the infantry in- 

brigades of four regiments each, retaining the newly arrived 
jesiments on the Maryland side, until their armament and 

quipment were issued and they had obtained some little ele- 
mentary instruction, before assigning them permanently to 
urigades. When the organization of the brig.ide> was well es- 
tablished, and the troops somewhat disciplined and instructed, 
.divisions of three brieadcs each were gradually formed, as ii 
elsewhere stated in this report, although I was always in favor 
of the organization into army corps as an abstract principle. 

1 did not desire to form them nn'il the army had been for 
some little time in the field, in order to enable the general 
oOicers first to acquire the requisite e.rperience as divisioa 
commanders on active service, and that J might be able to de- 
cide from actual trial who were best fitted tu exercise these 
important commands. 

For a similar reason I carefully abstained from making any 
recommendations lor the promotion of officers to the grade of 
innjor general. 

When new batteries of artilley arrived they also were retained 
in Washington until their armament and equipment were com- 
pleted, nnd their instruction sufficiently advanced to justify 
I'icir being assigned to divisions. The same course wm pur- 
sued in regard to cavalry. I regret that circumstances na-«e 
delayed the chief of cavalry. General George Stoneman, in 
furnishing his report op >n the organization of that arm tif ser- 
vice. It will, however, be forwarded as soon as ci'inplcted, 
and will, doubtless, show that the difficult and imjiortant 
duties intrusted to him were efficiently performed. He en- 
countered and overcame, as far as it was possible, continual 
and vexatious obstacles arising from the great deficiency of 
cavalry arms and equipments, and the entire inefficiency of 
many of the regimental officers first appointed ; this last dif- 
ficulty was, to a considerable extent, overcome in the cavalry, 
as well as in the infantry and artillery, by the continual and 
prompt action of courts-martial and bi>ards of examination. 

As rapidly as circumstances permitted, every cavalry sol- 
dier was armed with a sabre and revolver, and at Icxst two 
squadrons in every regiment with carbines. 

It wa« intended to assign at least one regiment of cavalry to 
each divi-iion of the active army, besides forming a cavalry 
reserve of the regular regiments and some picked regiments 
of volunteer cavalry. Circumstances beyond my control ren- 
dered it impossible to carry out this intention fully, and the 
cavalry force serving with the army in the field was never as 
large as it ought to have been. 

It was determined to collect the regular infantry to form the 
nucleus of a reserve. The advantage of such a body of troops 
at a critical moment, especially in an army constituted njainlr 
of new levies, imperfectly disciplined, has been frequently il- 
lustrated in military history, and was brought to the attention 
of the country at the first battle of Manassas. I have not been 
disappointed in the estimate formed of the value of these 
troops. I have nhvnys found them to be relied on. Whenever 
they h.ave been brought under fire they have shown the ntniost 
gallantry and tenacity. The regular infantry, which had been 
collected from distant posts and which had been recruited 
as rapidly as the slow progress of recruiting for the regular 
service would allow, added to the small battalion with Mc- 
Dowell's army, which 1 found at Washington on my arrival, 
amounted on tLe:;uih of August, to l,iilO men; on the 2sih of 
Febraary. ISOi, to 2.IP<2, and on the 30th of April, to 4,fi03. 
(In the 17lh of May, IJ^G?, they were .assigned to Ccnenal Por- 
ter's corps for organization as a division, with the filth regi- 
ment. New York volunteers, which joined May 4. and the tenth 
.Now York volunteers, which joined subsequently. They re- 
mained Irom the commencement under the command of Briga- 
dier-General George Sykes, major third iulaotry, United buiea 


The creation of an adequate artillery establishment for an 
army of lo large proportions was a formidable undertaking ; 

1 ■inasqw pTTi 
















For duty. 


In arrest or coo- 



S . 














April 30 4 705 
Jim« 50 4.1 C5 
July 10 3.8U 

104 610 
10 ,100 


10 541 









117 2ie 

27 700 






W 3 « ?* 

S4.tSi j »>-83 

• liiclu'llni; Krui.kllti. 

1 Kilo",' trwi^i-'ishlal-a division .b«n.. »M m- 



1 |S|a 


and had it not been that the conntry possessed in the regular 
cervice a body of accomplished and energetic artillery offi- 
cers, the task would have been almost hopeless. 

The charge of organizing the most important arm was con- 
fided to Major (al'terwardu Biigadier-CJencral) William F. Bar- 
ry, chief of artillery, who^c industry and zual achieved the best 
results. The report of General Hurry is appended among the 
accompanying documents. By referring to it, it will be ob- 
served that tlie followiug principles were adopted ad the basis 
of organization : 

" 1. Tbat tiK! proporttoo of artillery should be in the proportion of at 
Vast two and one half pieces to 1,000 meu, to be expauded, if possible, 
to Hirw pieces to 1.000 men. 

" 2. That the proportion of rifled guns EhouKl be restricted to the sys- 
tem of tlie United Statrs ordnance aL-p.irttiif ut ; and of I'urrott and the 
•Binooth bores' (with the es eption of a f..*w howitzers f«ir special ser- 
Tict;) to be exclusively the twelvc-poun -er gnu, of ttic model of IbbT, 
variously called the ' gun howitzer,' the ' light twclvcpoundcr,' or the 

*' 3. That each field battery shoald, if practicable, be composed or six 
(HiDS, and none to bo less than four guns, and in uU cases the guns of 
each Oattery should be of uniform caiitu'e. 

" 4. That tlie held batteries were to be assigned to divisions, and rot 
to brigades, and in the prorx-rtiou of four to each division, of which one 
was lobe a battery of regulars, the rfmainder of volunteers, the t-apt;iin 
of regular battery to be the commandant of artillery of the division. 
In the event of several divisions constituting an army corps, at least 
ono-half of the divisional artdlery was to couslituto the reservcartiilery 
of the corps. 

"5. Thut the artillery reserve of the whole army should consist of one 
hundred guns, and should comprise, besides a suihi^icnt number of light 
* mouutod batteries,' all the guns of position, and uutil the cavalry wuro 
mai^sed. all the horse artillery. 

*■ 6. ITi^it the amount of ammunition to accompany field batteries was 
not to be less than four hundred rounds per gun. 

"7. A siege train of fifty pieces. This was sub.scqu'mtly expanded, 
for special service at the siege of Yorktowu, to very nearly one hundred 
pieces, and comprised (he unusual calibres and enormously heavy'ht of metal of two 200-pounders, five 100 pounders, and ten 13-incij 
eeac^ja^t mortars." 

It has been before stated, the chief of artillery reports the 
■whole of the field artillery of the army of the Potomac, July 
2S, 1861, was comprised of nine imperfectly equipped bat- 
teries, of thirty guns^GoOmen and 400 horses, in March, 
lsG2, when the whole army took the field, it consisted of nine- 
ty-two batteries, of 520 gwns, 12,500 men. and 11,000 horses, 
fully equipped and in for active field service ; of the 
whole force thirty batteries were regulars, and sixty-two bat- 
teries volunteers. During the short period of seven months, 
all of this immense amount of material was issued by the ord- 
nance department and placed in the hands of the artillery 
troops after their arrival in Washington. About one-fourth of 
all the volunteer batteries brought with them from tlicir re- 
spective States a few guns and carriages, but they were nearly 
all of snch peculiar calibre as to lack uniformity with the more 
modern and more serviceable ordtiance with which the 
other batteries were armed, and tliey therefore had to he witli- 
drawn and replaced by more suitable material. While about 
one-sixth came supplied with horses and harness, less than 
one-tenth were apparently fully equipped for service when 
they reported; and every one of these required the supply of 
many deficiencies of material, and very exteusive instruction in 
theory and practice of their special arm. 

The operations on the Peninsula by the army of the Poto- 
mac commenced with a full field artillery force of fifty-two 
batteries of two hundred and ninety-nine guns. To tins must 
be added the field artillery of Frankliu's division of McDowell's 
corps, which joined a few days before the capture of York- 
town, but was not disembarked from its transports for service 
until after the battle of Williamsburg, and the field artillery of 
McCall's division of McDowell's corps, (four batteries, twenty- 
two guns), which joined in June, a few day.s before tlic battle 
of Mechanicsville, (June 26, lStj2), making a grand tot;il of 
fielil artillery, at any time with the army of the Peninsula, of 
gixty batteries of three hundred and forty-three guns. With 
this large force, saving in six corps d'armee of eleven divisions, 
and the artillery reserve, the only general and field officers 
were one brigadier-general, four colonels, three lieutcnunt 
colonels, and three majors, a nuinher obviously insufficient, 
and which ir'^aired to a great degree, in consequence of the 
want of rank and official influence of the commanders of corps 
and division artillery, the efficiency of the arm. As tlii.s faulty 
organization can be suitably corrected only by legislative ac- 
tion, it is earnestly hoped that the attention of the proper 
authorities may be at an early day invited to it. 

When there were so many newly organized volunteer field 
batteries.many of whom received their first and only instruction 
in the intrenched camps covering Washington during the throe 
or four inclement months of the winter of lHGl-'t;2, there was, 
of course, much to be improved. Many of the volunteer bat- 
teries, however, evinced such zeal and intelligence, and availed 
themselves so industriously of the instructions of the regular 
oflScers, their commanders, and the example of the regular 
batteries, their associates, that they made rnpid progress, and 
attained a degree of proficiency highly creditable. 

The designations of the different batteries of artillery, both 
regular and volunteer, follow within a few pages. 

The following distribution of regiments and batteries was 
made, as a prelimiuiry organizati<>n of tlie forces at hand. 
shortly after my arrival in Washington. Tiie infantry, artil- 
tiHery and cavalry, as fast as collected, and brought iuto pri- 
mary org.inization, were assigned to brigades and divibiuns, 
as ittdicu-ted in the subjoined statements. 

Orponuatinn of the diTxrum of thf Army of (he Po'omac. Avgust 4. 1S61. 
B'igstdic.-GciKivJ. UunUr's Brigade— 2Zi, 26Ul, 36lb, and 87th rft 

gimcnts New Tork vohintcora. 

Brigadier G'.mnil Hiiatrelmin^s Brtfyirf-r.— Sth regiment Maino vol- 
unteers, 16Lli, 26th, and 27th regiments New York volunteers, and 
TidltaU's battery, A. 21 Unitod States artillery. 

Brigadier- General \V. T. Slvjin-in's Brigrulf.. — 5th and 14th regi- 
ments Massachusetts volunteers, DoKalb re^rimfot New York volim- 
toers, 4th regiment Michigan voIunt<?crs, Hamilton's Battery, E, Sd 
United States artillery, and Co. I, 2d United states civalry. 

Bri'jadtKr- General Ktarwy'f Brigade. — 1st, 21, and 3d regiments, 
New Jersey volunteers, Green's battery, O, 2d Uuited States artil- 
lery, and Company G,2.l Udited Slates cavalry. 

Brija-Her General Ho-ih-r\-! BrignU. — 1st and 11th regiments Massa- 
chusetts volunteers. 2J regiment New Hiinpshiro volunteers, and 26th 
regiment Pennsylvania volunteers. 

ColonH Ktiji' Biiga'U.— 22 1. 24lh, and .30th f giments New York vol- 
ttn.eers,and 14th regiment New York Slate Militia. 

Brigadier- Gm^-al Franklin's Brigoitt; — 15th. 18th, 31st, and 32d regi- 
ments New York volunteers, Piatt's b.ittery, M, 2d Uuitud States ar- 
tillery, and Company C. New York Lincoln cavalry. 

C'dond BUmk-er's Brijaie. — 8th and 27th rcgimt-'iits N«w York volun- 
teers, "J'th ri'gim?ut I'eQusylvauia voIuuIolms, and Garibaldi Guard. 
New York volunteers. 

O'lon^l Ritfuirdson's B.iga-l'^. — ICth regiment New York volunteers, 
and 2J and 3d rcgimeius Michlg.-m voluiitciTS. 

Brinadi'^r-Gineral S'.on-'s Brirjudr. — '4th and Tammany regiments 
New York volunteers, IsL regiment Mmuesota volunteers, and 2d regi- 
ment New York .State miliiia. 

C'olond W.Uia.nx F. Smith' x Brija>ht—2\ and 3d regiments Vermont 
voluutocrs, 6th regiment Maine volunteers. 3-d regiment New York 
volunteers. Ojmpauy H, 2d United States cavalry, and Captam Mott's 
Now York battery. 

Col/ir f I C'iiick''s Brigade. — 2d regiment Rhode I.=!lan 1 volunteers, 7th 
and lOLh regiments Massachusetts volunteers, and 36lh regiment New 
York vi>lunteers. 

The 2d regimnt Maine, the 2d regiment Wisconsin, and the 13th re- 
giment New York volunteers, stationed at Ftirt Corcoran. 

The 21^1 regiment New York volunteers, stationed at Fort Runyon. 

The 17th regiment New York volunteers, stationed at Fori Kllsworth. 

By October the new levies had arrived in sutBcient numbers, 
and the process of organization so far carried on that the con- 
Btruction of divisions had been effected. 

The following statement exhibits the composition of the 
army, October 15, ISGl. 

Organization of the Armynf (ht Potomac, October 15, 1801. 

1. Brigadier- General George St/^neman't Cavab-y CommafW?.— flth 
United States caval-y, 4th I'ennsylvanki cavalry, Oneida cavalry, one 
company, 11th Pennsylvania cavalry, Harlan's, and Barker's lUinois 
cavalry, *uo company. 

2. CoUnd.n. J. Hani's Artillery ffejfrw.— Batteries L, A, and B, 2d 
United Statvs artillery, Batteries K and F, 3i Unitod States artiUeiy, 
Battery K, 4th Uuited States artillery, Battery H, 1st United Slatea 
artillery, and Battery A, 5th Unitud States artillery. 


Cavalry. — Companies A and E, 4th United States cuvalry. 

.^)(i//«)-!/.— Battery K,5th United States artillery. 

/n/ant/y.— 2d and 3d battalions United SUtes infantry, 8th and let 
Companies United States mfautry, and Sturgis' rilles, lliuois volun- 

4. BAN'Ks' Dl^^flo:ff. 

Cnvalry. — Four companies 3d regiment New York cavalry, Van Al- 
len *i. 

.lift'/ert/-— Best's battery E, 4th United Stales artillery, detachment 
0th New York artillery. Maith' ws' batti^ry E, 1st PcoDiiylvaiiia artil- 
lery, Tompkins' battery A, 1st Rhode Island artillery. 

Infantry. — Abercrom'bie's brigade ; 12ih Massachusetts, 12tb and 16lh 
Indiana, andSOih Peunsyivauia volunteers. Stiles' brigade: 3d Wis- 
consin. 'igth Pennsyivan'ia, and 13th Ma.csachusotts votui.terrs. and 9th 
New York State militia. Gordon's Brigade : 2d Massachusetts, 2oth 
and 19ih New York, 5th Connecticut, 46Lh and asth Pennsylvania, and 
1st Maryland volunteers. 

M'DOWEtL'S nm^oN. 

Camlry.—2>\ New York cavalry. Hams' Light, Colonel Pavis. . 

^,.(,7;rrj/,— Battery M. 2d, and Battery G, 1st United States artillery. 

Infaiitiy —Key »' i>riga<le : 14ih New York State miUtia, and 22.1, 
24tb", and ^Oth N«w York volunteers. Wad.swoi th's brigade : 12lh, 21st, 
■:3J,'aud 25th New York volunteers. King's brigade: 2d, 6th, and 
7th Wisconsin, and 19Lh Indiana voUmteeis. 


Ciua'ry.— Ist New Jersey cavalry , Colonel Halsted. 

Ailiilcry. — Thi-rapson's battery C, United States artillery. 

Infantry. — Richardson's brigade : 2 1, 3 J, and 5th Michigan, and STth 
New York volunteers. Sedgwick's brigade : Svl and 4th ilaiue, and 
3e',h and 40lh New York volunteers. Jameson's brigade: 32d, &>i, 
61st. and 45th Pennsylvania volunteora, and Wild Cat Reserves, Penn- 
sylvania volunteers. 

F. J. porter's division. 

Cavalry. — 3d Pennsylvaoiacavalry, Colonel Averill,and 8th Pennsyl- 
vania ca-A.%h-v, Coloiiel Gregg. 

AililU^ y.— Battery E, 2J, and battery E.* 3d United States artillery. 

/rtAuifri/,— Morell's brigade : 33d Pennsylvania, 4th Michigan, »lh 
Missafhusetts, and 4th New York voluntei.-rs. Martindalc's brigado : 
13ih New York, 2d Maine, and 18th Massachusetts volunteers, and 
DoKalb regiment New York volunteers. Builerneld's brigade: 60th 
New York, 83d I'oinisylvania. Colonel MrU'an. ITlh and 25ih New 
York volunteers, and Stockton's independent Michigan regiment. 
nt-vxRuN's Divismx. 

Cfii-a/ry.— 1st Now Tork cavalry, C<.ilonel McReynoMs. 

A HilWy. — Uattcrica D and G, 2d Uaited 6tatcs artillery, and Hoza- 
mer's baitory New Jersey volunteers. 

Infantry. — Kearney's brigade : 1st. 2d, 3d, and 4th New Jersey vol- 
imtJcrs. Slocum's brigade; 16ih, 26ih, uud 27th NfW York, and 6:h 
Maine votuiitcfrs. Newtoa's brigade : IStb, 18th, 31st, and S2d New 
York volunteers. 


Cirah-y — '^\x companies Sd New York, Van Allen, caTsIry. 

.4 rd/M-i/. —Ivlrbv's battory I, l«t United Slalos, Vaughn's battery B, 
Ist Rhode'lsiand artillery, and Bunting's 6th New York Independent 

Infantry. Gorman's brigade : 2d New York Stale militia, Ist MmnfW 

Foti, I5th Mai?sarlnisetts, and SUh New York v>>liinioorB, and Tam- 
many regiment New York volunteers. I<and«?r'a brigade : 19th and 
■:Oth Mass ichusetls, and 7th Michigan vidunteers, and a company of 
M.i.*^achu.sctts sharp«hootnr9. BaJier's brigade: Peuat>jlvauiA vuiuu- 
iiiers, iBt, lU, aud £d Caltforuia. 

■riru.** mrmov. 

Ur/infry— Batteries D and B. Ist rennBytvania artriery. 

/n/anfry.— ^'oucb'a brlvaJe : 31 l>hode Is'in!.T(li nij lOl^ Ma*?n 
cliuActla.anJ 3Cih N>w York voluDi<'crs. <■ -.tlo: t'dno 

Sifll pennaylvonia, and «:ili. Isl Lang IV i. 1M 'J«m-. 

BuioscbasaAurs. New Tuik vflunieors. i< 13ih and 31 

roBonylvaoia, and QiM| AQdcntoo Zouaves, ;A£i'i ^;h Nuw York vutuu 


M'CAtx s Dinnos. 

Ciertlry.— l8l rennflvlTaiiia Reserve taralry . Olon**! Bajra-fl. 

AitiiUri/ — tAsl-n's ItJltcry A, Coupor'a baUcry D, aud Kein's tat 
tery <«, l»i l*onDi»ylVRnia ariillory. 

/n/aR('y— Meade's bng^do : 1st rifle? Pennny'vania rcscrvi-s, 4ih 

31 Tih, lllh,and 21 Pcnii>yUMiiia resprvc inuniry. br. 

gal.! : 5ih, l^i, and 8tb I'cnn«ylv.iuia r- '^ervc iriTaQtry. brr 

gade : lOtb, Olb, ftih, aud l.:ib I*eu:i.<:ylviiuia reserve ioraniry. 

OxvaJry. Eigbt companies 3i Indiaaa caralrr, L)e-Jtonant-Col<rnc 


>4rfi'fcry.— Elder's battery E.lst I'nilH f='.atefl urllllery. 

Infantry. hr'c:- '" • Islan-llltb M wiirb(is?lta, 21 Sev. 

n»iap'^biro.2Qib PtiiDsylvoiiii.aud 1st Mi.rhipan VAlunt -oid. J^l.tkle- 
bngade : lBt.2d,3d, 4tb,An(l &th rcgimoiita Excelsior brl^'a<lc, New 
York volunteers. 

ftrnkbr's niirjADit. 

Cav3lr}/. 4th New York cavalry, m^fuutoj rlfltra, Oolonol Dlckel. 

^ffWIry— IMio b;ilt-ry. 

Infantry. Sih o:»d 29th NVw Y*>rk. 27th an-l 85th Pennnylvatiii to 

lunl'^ers, Garibaldi Guard and Camfrnn riflLfj, Xcw York vuluult'vrs. 

PHirn'.S VlVl^l 'S. 

Ca'-filry. — 5tb PennBj.vania cAvalry, Cameron Pragoons, Colono 

^r/i/M-y.—Ayree' battery F, 6th Dnili!!l Stat-s «rtll!cry, Motfs 2 " 
N*w York indepeudcul batl^*ry,mid Barr's buttery K,lst I'eniisylvani i 

Infantry ■ ■ brigade : 2d. 31, 4th. and 5th Vc-mont volnn 

le/'rs. Stevon<?* hriRiide :35th an I 49i'.i N'ew York. anJ 5ih MairiM t«', 
untfTPrn.and fTiiih New York Stito niilUia. Hincwk".'* briijido : f47ili 
and 49lbPcnnsylvaiuu. 431 New York, and ftih Wiscou^iu vuluntetrs- 
Companies Band E, Her.lan's shari^liiwtcrs.,y'i Proi-i vmal Biff^dv. — 5th. 6lh, and 7th New Jersey volun 
leers, |Roiuid-H''ad re>:inont Penney Iva.ii a r^dinl '.t.*, b.itlalioii 
PI iriri of Columbia vnhir.t-^crs. 40tb Peuusylvania, 8th New Jersey . 
and 4th New Hampsiure vdunf? rs. 

5. (jjrriiono^ j4(fxa'ui/*itt.— Brigadior-Gcncral Montgomery, military 
govornor. Cameron guard (Pennsylvania volunteers). 

Girrisonof F.rt Albiny—Mih .MaAs.ichnsctt'* volunteers. 

Otrripjn of Fui Rid^ifd^-n. — Itb Coimerticut voIuDtJOiU. 

<rj'ri«Tn of FM Wa^hin^on. — Curajwr.y p, 1st United Statasartlllcry . 
companies Hand I, o7tb New York volunteers, and Uuilcd Sutes re 
cruila uuassi^nod. 

6. Dix's nnraox, BALnvoRi. 

Oiivijry.— Company of Pennsylvania cavalry 

j4r/i;fcry.— Battery I. 21 I'nited States artillery, 2i Massnchusclt' 
llglit batiory, and a battery of NVw York artillery. 

InfniUry 3d, 4th, aint 5lh New York, 17th and 2Hh MnssachusHt^. 

2m Indiana. 6th Michieao. 4th Witiconsin, 7lh ilaioe, 2d Marylaoil 
batUllou, and Reading city ^'uard, vulunfers. 

On the 8th of March, 1^02, xhe Presidant directed, by the 
following order, the orfjLiiiiz;ilioD of the active portion of tlic 
armv of the Potomac into four nimy corps, and tlie formation 
of fi fifth corps from the division of RnnUs nnd Shields. 

The followitig is tlie text of the Presidcnt'.s order: 
'* rPrcflidcnl'8 General War Order No. 2 } 
"ExECtrnvR Mansikx, 

*' tVasKingUm. Mirch 8, 1882. 

" Ordered, 1st. That the maJf»r-genoral o>mmin ling the army of the 
rotomac proc?cd forthwith to orp-Vitzs that part nf iho .wi ' army 
destined to enter up«'n ai-tivc oitcralions (inclu'liiig the reserve, but ex- 
cluding the troops lo he lefi in liifl furtid -ation.s altmii WiL-^hingtoui, 
iot" lour army corps, to bo cummanded according to seniority of rank, 
u follows : 

'* First corps to consist of four divisions, and to be commanded by 
Major General 1. McDowell. St-cmd corps to consist of three d visions, 
and to be commande 1 bv Briga lier General H V. Sumner. Third coria 
to consist of ihreo divisions, and to bo commanded by Brigadier Gen- 
eral S. P. Ueintzelman. Fourth corps to conPiRt of three divisiuus, and 
to ba commanded by Hriga<lier General E. D. Kcyes. 

*'2. That the divisions now comm.mUed by the olllcors above as-^igned 
lo th; commands of army corps shall bo embraced in and lorm part of 
their respective corps. 

<'3. The forces left for the defense of Washington wi!l bo placed in 
command of Brigadier-General James Wadsworlb, wlio shall also bo 
military governor i>i the Ifisirict of Colnmltia. 

" 4. That this ord«r bo cxoculsd with such promptnena and diipatrh 
M not to delay the ci)mmonci'rn-nt of ibe oueratluus already directed to 
be undertaken by the army ol ilie P .lomjc. . , .. _ 

"6. A Oith armv be commanded by Majfir General N P. 
Banks, will be forrn-'U from his owu and General Shields' (lute General 
i.'ni ftiir'fti division. 

' " ABRAH.VM L1NC0L.\." 

The following order, which was made as soon as ciroam- 
itances permitted, exhibits the steps taken to carry out tha 
requirements of tlie President's war order Xo. 2 : 


" Fatrfjjc CoLhl-uuLM, Vutol>u, Mufcb 13, 1842. 
Omnui OBDXiaKo. IM ] 

" In cooipllince wilh Iho PreililPnfs war order So. 2, of March S 
18W. Iho oclivo p<.rllon or tho army of lUa Pulomuc U formed lliU 
»rmy corps, as foil Mt . .. „ „ . . , .k- 

"Flr«l corp», Mii>ir General Irwin MiDoweU, lo coBsisl for Ihc 
■rsaoBlof IhodlvUioDi of Kranlcllo. McCall.aoil Klnc. Second corps, 
Srliadior^OcDoral K. V. Suninor; illyiaiona, RicliarJ*nn, Ulcaker.and Third corps, Brieii.lior Ccncr 1 ?. P Htuur In.nn ; divi- 
tloui V J Porlor, Hooiior, ao.l HJiiiiiwn. Fourth corps. Brijadicr- 
Oanoral E. D. Koyco : divisluua, Coiicli, Smith, and C-i»oy. FifUi corps, 
IbOor General N. P. Banlu ; divisiuoa, Williams and ijbiulds. 

• Till* bflttfry wu tm>iifTn*i) to Sfi-rmmi'i ^^l'^•.^nioll. 
♦Thrnth Nrw Ywrk 8t»te nil Iti^ the cdi Pmutv .aiiln vo'iint-.-ri. nu* 
(k« Outtnd-Ucad nilawnt wen tr«uA(«rred to Uvucral SiMnuau'a rxpcdltioii 

"' Tbe canirr ragiBMoU atucbod to dlrlalooi will, fur tho presral, 
rcmaio so. tNiba^ueni orders wilt provide for tlicso r<'giiiiciiis, at 
woil as for tho rcs.'rvo arli lory. KoKUlar Infantry and rogMUr civalry 
arraogomcnlB will bs made to unite the divisions of each arm/ corps itM 
promptly as posslblo. 

"Tho commanders of divisions will at ones report in person, or 
where that la Imp ssiblo, by letter, to the commander of their aim/ 

** Br command of UjOor-Goneral MrHollan. 

" A. V. I ul.BURN, 

" Aut'iAin! A'ljvlait Gmtral." 

I add a statement of the organization and composition of 
tho troops OD April I, commencing with the pottiori of the 
army of the rotoni.ii; which went to the Peninsula, Riving 
afterwards the rcRinienls and hattcries left on the Potomac, 
and in M.iryland and Virginia after April 1, lSt;2. 

Troopi </ Uu army of Uu Pyr,mcLe tent to tJu PeHintuia in March and 
tarlif in AprU, 189Z. 
Ist. Cavalry reserve, Biig.iliirr.oiierai P. Si. G. Cooke.— Emery's 
bripide : 6th UniloJ Slates cavalry ; Cth I'niteit Sutes cavalry ; 6lh 
Pennsylvania cavalry. Illake's brija> : Ist Unllel Slat -s cjvalry ; 
8th Ponnsylvauiti cavalry ; Ilarkfr's squadron lllinnis cavalry. 

2d. Artlilory res-rvo. Colonel Henry J. Iluul: Uralum's battery K 
and G, iHi L'nited Stales, 6 Napticon Rtins ; lUndail's balloiy K. lal 
I'liited .States, 8 N'apok-ou guns ; Carlisle's battery E, 21 United Slates, 
6 20-pounder I'arroll guns ; Ilobertsou's battery. 21 United Slafs.ft 
3-iiicb ordnance nuns ; Uensoa's battery M,2J United Sut.-s, 3-iiich 
ordnance guns ; Ti Jbali's battery A, 2d Uulted States, 6 Sinch ordHanco 
guns ; fclwards's battery I, and M, 31 United Stalos, 6 10 polindor 
farrolt guns ; Gibson's battery C and G, 3d Untei statca, 6 3 inch 
ordnance guns; Livingston's battery F and K, 3d I'niteJ Slates, 4 
10 pounder i'arrotl guns ; Howe's battery 0, 4lh United Stales, 9 
Najiolcon guns; l)e Htj-s.Hcy'8 b.nicry K,4th Uniicd sl;iU'8. .S'a[>oleon 
guns; Weed's battery I, 5th United .States. 8 3 inch ordnance guns; 
Smoad's battery K, &lh Culled Slates, 4 Napoleon guns ; Ainos's bat- 
lory A, 6lh United Slates, A — t 10 poui^der I'arroll and 2 Xap Icon— 
guns ; Uiedi ick's battery A, Sew York arllllery and ballalion, 8 20- 
IKiunder I'arroll guns; Vogolle's battery B, New York artillery and 
battalion, 4 20 pounder I'arroll gun* ; Koiorim's ball-ry c, N.w York 
artillciyand batlalon, 4 iO pmnder I'arrotl guns ; Gitmnrs battery 
D, New York artillery and bal,alion, 8 32-poundor bowitzjr g ns. 
Total, 100 guns. 

3d. Volunteer engineer troops. General Woodbury ; ISlh New York 
volunteers ; 60th New York voiunteors. 

Regular engineer troops, Captain Duane . Companies A, B, and C, 
United Stales engineers. 

ArtllliTy troops, with siege trains : 1st Conoecticot heav]- artillery, 
Colonel Tyler. 

4th. Infaulry resorvo (regular brigade). General S.'Vet : C com- 
panies 2<1 UniteJ .Slates inranlrv,7com;>a:iies 3 I United .Sutes inianlry, 
10 companies 4lh Unitei States iura:itry, 10 coinpinies bih Culled 
Slates iiiLinlry. 8 companies 10th and 17lh Unllel Stall's iufa_lry, • 
companies llili Unil'>'l Staf.-s Infantry, 8 companies 12th Uiiiiod Slates 
inlantry, 9 c<impLtnir« 14tli United Slates infantry, and &lh New York 
voluntscrs, Colonol Warren. 

Caralry — Sth Illinois cavalry, Colonel Farnsworlh, and one sqosdroo 
6lh New York cavalry. 

aicnasDsox's division. 
-i^rliHTy.— Clark's battery A and G,4th United SUtes, « Napninm 
guns; Frank's battery G. l«l -New York, 8 10 |>onn ler Parrott guns; 
Pettii's battery B. 1<1 .'"lew York, 8 10 pounder I'arroll guut ; Hogau'a 
battery A. 21 New York, 6 10 poander I'arroll guns. 

/n/.iiitv._l|owards liriRade : 5lh .New llauipshlro, 81sl Penn- 
sylvania, and 61«t and f4t!i New York volunteers. Meaglier's briga le: 
69th, 631, aul 8jlh New York volunteers. French's brigade : 62d, 
6'lb, and C6th New Yoik, anJ 631 Pennsylvania volunteers. 

MnCWlcK'S WVL'IO!!. 

.ilrttllery.— Kirby'a battery I, lot United States, « Napnleon gnns ; 
Tompkins's battery A, 1st Rliole I^bn^,6— 4 10 lawnder rarrnll and 
2 12 plunder howi'tz r — guns ; Bartl-'tt's battery B, l5l Rhotle Island, 
6 — 1 10 pounder Parrott and 2 12 potmdcr howitzer — guus ; Owen's bat- 
■ory G. 6 3-ioch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Gorman's i>r;gado : 2d New York Stale miMtl,and 15tb 
lassichnsfitts. 54tli New York, and 1st Elaine volunteers. Biir-is's 
irigado : C9lh,71sl. 721,and l')6lh Pennsylv.iula voluntee s. Dana's 
irigade : 19th and 20th Massauuusetls, ;ih Michigan, and 42J .New York 

Kors — DIookor's division detached and assigned to tho mountain d» 


Cavalry. — 3d Pennsylvania cavalry, Colonel Avertll. 


.^rd'/lery.—Grifnn's battery K. Sth United States, 8 lOpoondcr Ta*. 
roll guns; W.vlcn'a li.iltery 0. Rhixit Island; Martin's battery OL 
M.assi,'b<:seiis. 6 Napoloou guns ; Allen's battery E, Uassacbusctis, 
6 8 Inch ordnance guns. 

f»/.in(ry,— Marlmdale's brleade : 21 Maine, 18th ard 22t Massa- 
ch;is.-tls. and 'iCUh and 13ih New York volunteers. Mcrell's brli;ad«; 
14lh Now York,4lh MicIiKan.9lti M.i'*<afhusi'lls.and 621 
volunii'frs. Iiuiioill'Id's b'igado : liih, 44th. and 12ib New Yark,S3d 
Pculiii) tvania. au'i >lo,.k Ion's Michigan voluuloora. 

First Curdau aharpslioolors. 

BOOCKK'S PiTisio:*. 

.4rtill'r» —Hall's battery H. Isl United Ststos, 8 — 4 10-pomidsr Par- 
roll and 2 12 pounder howilur—fjuns ; Smith's battery. 4th New Yo.-k, 
8 10 |>o.indor I'arroti gens; B.-ainhill'i battery .r.iti Nrw YcNk,8 3 inch 
ordnance sn i ; Osborn's ballery D, 1st New Yo.k artillery, 4 » inch 
ordnnnce g.ins. 

/iiAirK. I/.— siekles's brigade :1st. 21. 31. 4lh, nnd Sth Eiicelslnr. Ncw- 
Virk . Nairlee'n lirlgale : l»l and lllh Mas^>.ai :i i50tls,2St!i I'ennsvlvania, 
iii-l 21 N>'W llampahlrs vo.tinl-ors. Culouel Starr's brigade r 6lb, 6lb, 
itb, and 8tli Now Jersey voliinlerra 

llAUIt.TON'a niviMox. 

>(r*irf«7.— Tbemp*in's ballery G. 21 I'liiled States, 8 Vap'il'on gurs; 
nenni's b llery B. NfW Jers^^y. 6 — 4 10 pi'in.ler Parrott ami 2 Sajio- 
leon — {lies ; Itandolph's lutlery K. lUiooo Island, 6 — I It^pwiiodcr Par- 
roll and 2 N.niK)Voii — Rims. 

/ii/an-rv Jam>s"n's brisat- ; 10Sth.83d.and Slth ',N)nnsy]vanla,atld 

»fth New York voluntee s B.rnry's brlga<lo : 3«lh and 40lh Bsw- 

York. and 8d and ilh Maine viiluntecrs br - si^j 

6lb Micbljiaa, and dtib New York voiuntaera 




couch's DIVIFIOX. 

AriiU'^ry. — McCartliy's battery C, l;^t IVnosylvania, 4 10 pounder Par- 
rotl guns ; FlncKrs b:ittwy D, ist Peiinsylvauia, 4 10-poiimlci- Purrott 
giiDS ; Miller's battery E, 1st I'eunsylvauia, 4 Kupoleon guns ; BiaJy's 
battery F, IsL PoiiuRylvi.nia, 4 10-pnunder Parrott Runs. 

7n/Vin/rj/.— Grahiiii'B briga<le : 67Ui (1st I/mg Isiatid), and 65lh (1st 
tTnitoU States ch;is=eur.s) NcwYorL. 23d, 31st. ond 61st Ponnsyh'iinia 
Toluntr-ois. Pi'ck's brigade : 9Stb, 102d,and 931 Pcnusylvaiii:!, and 6*21 

and 66tli N'ew York volunteers. brigade : 2J lUiodo tiluud, 

7th aud lOlh llassacliusytts, and 36lh Now York volunteers. 

ArtiUfiy. — .Ayres' battory K, 5ih United States, 6 — i 10 pounder Par- 
rott and 2 Napok-nn — guns : Mutt's battery, Sd New York. 6 — 4 10- 
poundor Parrott and 2 Nupoicon — guue ; Wheeler's ballory E, 1st New 
York, 4 3inch ordnance guns; Kennedy's battery, 1st New York, 6 
8-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantiy. — Haucoc'-i^'s b rltjade: 4th Wisconsin, 49th Pennsylvania, 
43d New York, and 6th Maiuc volunteers. Brc>oks' brigade: 2-1, 3d, 
4th, 6th, and O.h Vurmo'H volunteers. L'aviclEou's brigade : 33d, 77th, 
and 49Lh Nvw York, and 7th Maine volunteers. 


ArtiVfrr/. — Regan's battery, 7th New i''urk, 6^3-inrh ordnance guns ; 
Fitch's Sth Now York, 6 3-inch ordnance guns ; Bates's brittciy A, 1st 
New York, 6 Napolcun guns ; Spratt's battery H, 1st Now York, 4 3 Inch 
ordnance guns. 

in/on(vj*.— Iveim's brigade : 85th, 101st, and 10"d Pennsylvania, and 
98th New York volnnteers. Palmer's brigade: 85th, OSth, 92d, 81st, 

and 93d New York volunteers. brigade: 104th, 52d Peuo- 

sylvauia, GSih aud lOOlh New York, and 11th Maine volunteers. 

5th. Piovf)st guaril : 2d United States cavalry ; battalions 8th and 
17th United States infantry. 

At general headquarters : 2 companies 4th United Ptates cavalry ; 1 
company Oneida Cavalrj' (New York volunteers) ; and 1 cumpany Stur- 
gea rifles (Illinois voluntccis). 

The following troops of the army of the Potomac were 
left behind, or detached on and in front of the Potomac 
for the defence of that line, April 1. 1S62. Franklin's and 
McCalPs divisiiins, atsubsequentand diffen^nt dates, joincdthe 
active portion of the army on the Peninsula. Two brigades 
of Shieldb' division joined at Harrison's Landing. 

Caval'-y— 1st. 2 i, aud 4th New York, and l3t Ponnsi^ylvania. 

SkaiyihooUis. — 2d regiment Bcrdan's s ha ri shooters. 


ArtilUry — Piatt's battery D, 'Id United States, 6Napoleon guns : Por- 
ter's battery A, Massachusetts. 6 — 410 pounder Parrott and 2 12 pounder 
howitser — g'lns ; Hexaratr's battery A. New Jersey, G — 4 10 pounder 
Parrott and 2 12-pounder howitzer — guns ; Wilson's battery F, Ist New 
York artillery, 4 3 inch ordnance guns. 

Infaniry — Kearney's brigade : 1st. 2d. 3d, and 4th New Jersey vol- 
Bntoors. Slocum's brigade : IGth and 27th Now York, 5tb Maine, and 
S6th Pennsylvania voliiutccrs. Newton's brigade : 32d New York, and 
05th Pennsylvania volunteers. 

m'c-\ll's nmyioN. 

ArtiUci'y. — Seymonr's battery C, 5th United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; 
Kaston"s battery A, 1st Pennsylvania, 4 Napoleon guns : Cooper's bat 
tery B, 1st Pennsylvania, C 10-pounder Parrott guns ; Koin's battery 
C, 1st i'e:ms\ivania, 6 — 2 10-pounder and 4 12-poundcr Parr-tt — gmi.s. 

Jnfantty — Reynolds' brigade: 1st, 21, 5th, and Sth Pennsylvania 
reserve regiments. Meade's Brigade: 3d, 4th, 7th and 11th Peniisyl 
▼ania reserve regiments. Ord's brigade : 6lh, 9th, loth, and 12th 
Pennsylvania reserve regiments. 

1st Pcnusylvania reserve rifles. 

king's D1VT5T0V. 

ArtilUry.— (iibhoa^B battery B, 4Lh United States, 6 Napoleon gims ; 
Monroe's battery D, 1st Rhode Island, 6 10 pounder Parrott guns ; Ger- 
risb's battery A. New Hampshire, 6 Napobonguns ; DurrcUs battory, 
Pannsylvania, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns. 

InfiLJitri/. brigade : 3 i.G'.h and 7th Wisconsin, and 19th In- 
diana volunteers. Patrick's brigade : 20tb. 21st. 23d. and 25ih New 
Tcrk Stitc militia. Augur's brigade : 14th New York State militia, and 
22d, 24th and 30th Now York vo:u:itr'crs. 


Ox^xdj-y. — I't Maine, 1st Vermont, 1st Michigan, 1st Rhode Island, 5th 
and Sth New York, Keyes' battalion of Pennsylvania, 13 companies of 
Maryland. 1 sq'iatlron ol Virginia. 

Unattached.— 2Slh Pennsylvania volunteers, and 4th regiment Poto- 
mac home brigade (MaryLmd volunteers). 


ArtiTUry.-^-^sVs bnttery F, 4th United States, 6 Napoleon guns; 
Hampton's battery, M;iry:and, 4 10 pounder Parrott guns ; Thompson's 
battery, Maryland. 4 lOpounder Parrott guns; Matlww'a battery F, 

Pennsylvania, 6 3 inch ordnance gnus; battery M, 1st New 

York, 610-poundor Parrott gims ; Knapp's battery, Pennsylvania. G 
10-pounder Parrott guns ; McMahou's battery, New York, 6 3-inch ord- 
nance guns. 

/«/(i»i>'i/.— Abercrombie's brigade : 12th and 21 Mass^ichuKotts. aud 
16ili Indiana. 1st Potomac horn.- brigade (Maryland), 1 compmy 7,ou- 

avcis D'Afriqno (Pennsylvania) volunteers. brigade : 9tb New 

York State militia, and :;9th I'ennsylvonia. 29th Indiana, and 3d Wis- 
consin vo.unteers. brigade ; 23th New York, 6ih Connecticut, 

46th Pennsylvania, 1st Maryland, 12th Indiana, and 13th Massachusetts 

emct.PR' PiviFioK. 

>rftl/(rry.— Clark's battery E. 4th United States, 6 10 pnundcr Parrott 
guns; JcDkE' battery A. Isl Virginia. 4 10-pounder I'arrntt and 2 6- 
pounder guns ; Davy's battery B, 1st V'irginia, 2 10 pounder Parrott 
guns; Huntington's bnttery A. let Ohio, 6 13 iwunder James' guns; 
Robin;=on*s battsry L, 1st Ohio, 2 12-ponndcr howiuers and 4 6 pounder 
guns, and battery, 4lh Ohio artillery. 

In/antry brigade ; 14th Indiana, 4th, 8th, and 67th Ohio, 

7th Virgiuia, and 84th Pennsylvania voluntccis. brigade : 

Mh, b2l, and 66th Ohio, 13th Indiana, and 39th Illinois v<ilnntcers, 

brigade : 7th and 29th Ohio. 7th Indiana, 1st Vu'ginia, and 11th 

Peansylvania volunteers. Andrew sharpslwoters. 


Cavalry— If^i Not Jersey cavalry, at Alexantlria, and 4th Pennsyl- 
vania cavalry, east of the Capitol. 

ArliVfry and infantry. — lOlh New Jersey volunteers, Bladensbiirg 
rcsad ; 104th New York volunteers. K.ilorama luiighlB ; 1st Wisconsin 
hoavy artillery. Fort Ca-^s, Virgiuia ; 3 battcri.s of New Yorkartillery, 
Porta Etlian Allen and Marcy ; A^ml of New York lipht aitillrry, C;inip 
Barrr-, 2:1 District of Columbia voluntec*i-s, Wn«!h'ington city; '26ih 
Ponnaylvauia volunteers, G sircot whuif ; 2GLh Now York volunteers, 

Fort Lyon ; 9511 Now York volunteers, CampThomaB; 94th New Torfc 

and detachment ot ftSLli Pennsylvania volunteerB, Ale.\andria ; OLst 
Pennsylvania volunlwrs, Franklin Square barracks ; 4th New York 
artillery. FortsCin oil njid Groblo ; 112th Pennsylvania volunteers, Fort 
Saratoga; leth Now York volunteers, Fort M;i«sacl.usetls ; 59th New 
York volnnt.-ers. Fort Pennsylv.inia ; detachment of 88th Pennsylvania 
volunteers. Fort Good Hope ; goth Pennsylvania volunteers. Fort Ma- 
hon ; 2d New York light artillery, Forts Ward, Worth, and Blonker • 
107th and 64th Pennsylvania volunteers, Ke-nlall ^reen ; Dickerson'a 
light artillery, 86th New York, and dctaclimont of 88th Pennsylvania 
volunteers, east of the Capitol ; 14th SlassachuFctLs (volunl-^ers) heavy 
artillery, and 56th PeiMisylvania volunteers. Forts Alba'iy.Tillinghast ' 
Richardson. Runyon, Jackson, Barnard. Crnig, and Srott ; detachments 
of 4th United Slates artillery, and 37th New York volunteers Fort 
Washington ; 97th, 101st, and 91st New York, and 12lh Virginia volun- 
teers. Fort Corcoran. 

Inc'impnfar >rii=/i;'n/7/on — 6lh and 10th New York, Swain's New- 
York, aud 2d Pennsylvania cavalry, all dismounted. 

Thes* troops (3,359 men) were ordered to report to Colonel 
Miles, conimanuing railroad guard, to relieve 3.:iO(i older troops 
ordered to be sent to Manassaa to report to General Aber- 


Cnvalnj.—^at Maryland cavalry and detachment of PnmeH 
Lejcion cavalry. 

ArlUler y.—]i:xttery T, 2d United States; battery — , Mary- 
land ; battery L, 1st New York, and two independent batteries 
of Pennsylvania artillery, 

i7j/a»i7*t/.— 3dand4tirNew York, lUh,R7th, find Tilth Penn- 
sylvania, detachment 21st Mfissarhusotts. 2d Delaware, 2d Ma- 
ryland, 1st and *2d Kastcrn Shore (Maryland) home fjnards.ana 
Purnell Le^^ion (two battalions) Maryland volunteers. 

In a staRcharged with labors so various and important as 
that of the army of the Potomac, a chief was indispensable to 
supervise the various departments and to relieve the com- 
mandins general of dt»i '<'■ Th** oO^."* '^f . ^ ' >' -f ' iff, v, '.i 
known in European armies, had not been considered neces* 
sary in our small peace establishment. The functions of the 
ofBce were not defined, and, so far as exercised, had been in- 
cluded in the Adjutant-General's department. The small num- 
ber of officers in this department, and the necessity for their 
employment in other duties, have obliged commanding gen- 
erals, during this war, to resort to other branches of the ser- 
vice to furnish suitable chiefs of staff. 

On the 4th of September, 1S61, I appointed Colonel R. B, 
Marcy, of the Inspector-General's department, chief of stafE^ 
and he entered upon service immediately, discharging the va- 
rious and important duties with great fidelity, industry, and 
ability, from tliis period until I was removed from command at 
Rcctortown. Many improvements have been made during the 
war in our system of staff administration, but mucli remains to 
be done. 

Our own experience, and that of other armies, agree in de- 
termining the necessity for an efficient and able stall. To ob- 
tain this, our staff establishment should be based on correct 
principles, and extended to be adequate to the necessities of 
the service, aud should include a system of staff and line edu- 

The affairs of the Adjutant-General's department, while 
commanded the army of the Potomac, were conducted by 
lirigadier-General S. VVilliams, assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel 
James A. Hardie, aide-de-camp. Their management of the 
department during the organization of the army in the fall and 
winter of 1^61, and during its subsequent operations in the 
field, was excellent. 

They were, during the entire period, assisted by Captain 
Richard B. Irwin, aide-de-camp, and during the organization 
of the army by the following-named officers : Captains Joseph 
Kirkland, Arthur McClellan, M. T. McMahon, William P. Ma- 
son, aud William F. Biddlc, aides-de-camp. 

My personal staff, when we embarked for the Peninsula, 
consisted of Colonel Thomas M. Key. additional aide-de-camp ; 
Colonel E. H. Wright, additional aide-de-camp aud major, Gth 
United States cavalry; Colonel T. T. Gantt, additional aide- 
de-camp; Colonel J. J. Astor, jr.. volunteer aide-de-camp: 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. V.Golbnrn, additional aide-de-camp and 
captain, Adjutant General's department; Lieutenant-Colonel 
N. B. Swcitzer, additional aide-de-camp and captain, 1st Uni- 
ted States cavalry; Lieutenant-Colonel Edward McK. Hudson, 
additional aide-de-camp and captain, Uth United States infan- 
try; Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Von Radowitz, additional aide- 
de-camp; Major H. Von Hammorstein, additional aid-de-camp; 
Major W. W. Russell, United States Marine corps; Major F, 
LeCompte, of the Swiss army, volunteer aide-de-camp; Cap- 
tains Joseph Kirkland, Arthi;r McClellan. L, P. D'Orleans, B. 
D'Orleans, M. T. McMalion. William P. Mason, jr., William F. 
Biddle, and E. A. Raymond, additional aides-de-camp. 

To this number I am tempted to add the Prince de JoinTille, 
wlio constantly accompanied me through the trying campaign 
of the Peninsula, and frequently rendered important services. 
Of these officers, Captain McMahon was assigned to the per- 
sonal staff of Brigadier-General Franklin, and Captains Kirk- 
land ajid Mason to tiiat of Brigadier-General F. J. Pttrter during 
the siege of Yorktown. Tliey remained subsequently witE 
those general officers. Major LeCompte left the army during 
the siege of Yorktown ; Colonels Gantt and Astor. Major Rus- 
sell, Captains L. P. D'Orlean.*, R. D'Orlcans, and Raymond at 
the close of the Peninsula campaign. Before its terniination 
Captains W. S. Abert and Charles U. Lowell, of the (ith United 
States cavalry, joined my staff as aides-de-camp, and remained 
with me until I was relieved from the command of the army of 
the Potomac. AH of these officers served me with great gal- 
lantry and devotion; they were ever ready to exei'ute anyaer- 
vice, uo matter how dangerous, diffioult, or fatiguing. 


When I assumed command of the army of the Potomac I 


fonnd Uajor J. 0, Barntrd, United States engineer*, nibie- 
qaontlr briKa>)ier-f;eneral of Tolantccrs, occupvinK the pnri- 
lion of chief engineer of ttitt army. I continued liiin in tlie 
tame office, ami at once gave the nccetsarj instructiona for 
tli« eompletiun of the defcnsea of the capital, and for the en- 
tire reorcanlEatiun of tlie department. 

Under Ilia Jircciion the entire aystein of defenaea waa carried 
Into excriiliun. Thia waa computed before the army departed 
{'>T Fort Mnnioe. and ia a autiicient evidence of the skill of the 
eufiineers an<l the dili;?ent labor of the troops. { 

For Bomc montha after the organiz.ition uf the army of the 
Potomac was commr'nced there were no engineer troopa with 
it. At length, however, three companiea wiTe assigned. Un- 
der the akillful management of Captain J. C. Duane, United 
Statea engineers the^e new companiea rapidly became efll- 
cicDt, and, a* will be aeen, rendered moat valuable aervice 
during the ensuing campaigna. 

The numiier of engineer troops being entirely inadeqnatc to 
the necessjtii'a of the army, an eflbrt waa made to partially 
remedy this defect by detailing the l/ith and 5oth*New York 
Tolunteers. which contained many aailors and mechanics, as 
engineer troops. They were first placed under the immediate 
aapcrintendence of Lieutenant-Cidonel B. S. Alexander, United 
Suites engineers, by whom they were instructed in the duties 
of pontonicTs. and became somewhat familiar with those ol 
aappera and ininera. Previous to the mnvcnient of the army 
for tlie Penin>uln, tliis brigade was placed umlerthe cnmraan'd 
of Bripadier-tjcueral V. P. Woodbury, rajjor United States 

The labor of preparing the engineer and bridge trains de- 
volved chiefly upon Captain Duane, who was instructed to 
procure the new model French bridge train, as I w«8 satisfied 
that the India-rubber pontoon was ontirely useless for the gen- 
eral purposes of a campaign. 

The engineer de])avlmcnt presented the following complete 
organization when the army moved for the Peninsula : 

Briga'lier-licneral J. tl. Barnard, chief engineer; First-Lieu- 
tenant H. C. Abbott, topographical engineers, aide-de-camp. 
Brigade volunteer engineers, Brigadier-General Woodbury 
commanding: l-Sth New York volunteera. Colonel )lcLeod 
Murpliy; Srith New York volunteers, Colonel C. B. Stewart, 
lialtalion, three companies United States engineers, Captain 
J.('. Duane commanding , companies reanectively commanded 
by First-Lieutenants C. B. Reese. C. E. Cross, and O. E. Bab- 
cock, United States engineers. The chief engineer waa ably 
asaivted in his duties by Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Alexander 
and l-'irst- Lieutenants C. R. Comstock, M. D. Mc.^lester, and 
HcrritI, United States engineers. Captain C. S. Stuart and 
Seeood-Lioutenant F. U. Faiquhar, United States engineers, 
jninad after the army arrived at Fort Monroe. 

The necessary bridge equipage for the operations of a large 
army had been collected, consisting of bateau.x with the anch- 
ors and flooring material (French model), trestles, and engi- 
Dcera' tools, with the necessary wagons for their transpor- 

The amall number of ofBcers of this corps available rendered 
it impracticable to detail engineers permanently at the hcad- 
quarttra of corps and divisions. The companies of regular 
engineers never had their proper number of olliicra. and it 
was nece<«ary. aa a rule, to follow the principle of detailing 
engineer officers temporarily whenever their services were re- 


To the corpa of topographical cngineera was intrusted the 
collection of topographical information and the preparation 
of campaign mops. Until a abort time prcvioua to the depar- 
tare of the army for Fort Monroe, Lieutenant-Colonel John \V. 
.^,. ro- '■ w ■ '- -''arce of this department, and oreoared ■ 
large amount of valuable material. He was i^uccecded by 
Brigadier-tJencrol A. A. Humphreys, who retained the position 
throughout the Peninaula campaign. These ofBcera were as- 
sisted by Lieutenants H. L. Abboit, O. G. Wagner, N. Bowen, 
John M. Wilson, and Jamea 11. Wilson, topographical engi- 
neers. This number, being the greatest available, waa so 
small '.hat much of the duty of the department devolved upon 
parties furnished by Professor Bache, Superintendent of the 
Coast Survey, and ether gentlemen from civil life. 

Owing to the entire absence of reliable topographical maps, 
tke labors of tl.ia corpa were difficult and arduous in the ex- 
treme. Notwithstanding the energy and ability displayed by 
General Humphreys, Licutenant-Colon'l Macomb, and their 
subordinates, who frequently obtajnc 'le necessary informa- 
tion ander tire the, movements '/ " . army were sometimes 
naavoidably delayed by tlir d - ,f obtaining knowledge 

of the country in advani -nit of their labors has 

been tli« preparation it series of maps, which 

and Surgeon Jonathan L<ett«nnan,who, in tnm, performed th« 
dniies of mc'lical director of the army of the Potomac, the 
former from August 12, IRfil, nntil July I, 1>>(;2, and the latter 
after that date. The dilBcultica to be overcome in organizing 
and making effective the medical department were very great, 

{ arising principally from the inexperience of the regimental 
medical olTiccra, many of whom were physicians taken sad- 

: denly from civil life, who, according to Surgeon Tripler, " had 
to lie instructed in their duties from the very alphabet," and 
from the ignorance of the line officers as to their relations 
with the medical officers, which gave rise to confnsion and 
conflict of authority. Boards of examination were instituted, 
by which many ignorant ofiicera were removed; and by the 
successive exertions of Surgeons Tripler and Leiterman, the 
medical corpa was brought to a very high degree ot elficieocy. 
With regard to the saniuiry condition of tke urmy while on the 
Potomac, Dr. Tripler says that the records show a constantly 
increasing iiimuinity from disease. ** In October and Novem- 
ber, ISUI. with an army averaging 130,000 men, we had 7,!<32 
cases of fever of all sorts ; of these, about 1,000 were report- 

will be invaluable >■■ versing the same ground. 

During the c mpoaaible to draw a distinct 

line of dem" ue duties of the two corps of 

■nglneer of recunnoijsancea of roads, of 

tines ' iclds for battle, and of the position 

of fchc construction of siege and defen- performed by details from either 
.;ace of the service demanded, 
.-ss my high appreciation of the skill, gal- 
.n displayed by the oUiccis of both corps of 
tlie most trying circumstances. 
.laryland campaign I united the two corpa under 
V. Duane, United .Statea engineers, and found great 
^«8 from the arrangement. 


For the operatlona of the medical department I refer to the 
renorta. tranamltted herewith, of Surgeon Charles B. Tripler 

ed as cases of typhoid fever. I know that errors cf diagnosis 
were frequently committed, and therefore this must be consid- 
ered aa the limit of tynhoid cases. If any army in tlie world 
can show such a record as this, 1 do nut know w hen or where 
it was assembled." From .September, |S(;1, to Febrnary,1862, 
while the army was increasing, the number of sick decreased 
from 7 per cent, to G.I8 per cent. Of these, the men sick ia 
the regimental and general hospitals were less than one-half; 
the remainder were slight cases, under treatment in quartera. 
"During this time, so tar as rumor was comeined, the arm^ 
was being decimated by disease every month." Ci the earn- 
tar^ condition of the army during the Peninsula campaign, np 
to Its arrival at Harrison's landing. Dr. Tripler saya : " During 
this campaign the army was favored with excellent health. No 
epidemic disease appeared. Those scourges of modern armies 
— dysentery, tupus, cholera — were almost unknown. We had 
Bome typhoid fever and more malarial fevers, but even these 
never prevailed to such an extent as to create any alarm. The 
sick reports were sometimes larger than we cured to have 
them ; but the great majority of the cases reported were snch 
as did not tiireaten life or permanent disability. I regret that 
I have not before me the retained copies of the monthly re- 
ports, so that I might give accurate statistics. I have endea- 
Tored to recover them, hut have been un8urces.srul. My recol- 
lection is. that the whole sick report never exceeded 8 per 
cent, of the force, and this including all sorts of cases, the 
trivial as well as the severe. The army of the Potomac must 
be conceded to have been the most healthy army in the service 
of the United States." 

His remarks at the conclusion of his report upon onr system 
of medical administration, and his suggestion fur ita improve- 
ment, are especially worthy of attention. 

The service, labors, and privations of the troops during the 
seven days* battles had, of course, a great elTcct on the health 
of the army, after it reached Harrison's landing, increasing 
the number of sick to about 20 per cent, of the whole force. 

The nature of the militar7 operations had also unavoidably 
placed the medical department in a very unsatisfactory condi- 
tion. Supplies had been almost entirely exhausted or neces- 
sarily abandoned ; hospital tents abandoned or destroyed, and 
the medical officers deficient in numbers and broken down bf 

All the remarkable energy and ability of Surgeon Letterman 
were required to restore the efficiency of his department ; bet 
before we left Harrison's landing he had succeeded in fitting it 
out thoroughly with the supplies it required, and the health of 
the army w as vastly- improved by the sanitary measures which 
were enforced at his suggestion. 

The great haste with which the army was removed from the 
Peninsula made it necessary to leave at Fort Monroe, to be 
forwarded afterwards, nearly all the baggage and transporta- 
tion, including medical stores and ambulances, all the vessels 
being requirea to transport the troops themselves and their 
ammunition ; and when the army of the Potomac returned to 
Washington after General Pope's campaign, and the medical 
department came once more ondcr Surgeon Lettermau's con- 
trol, he found it in a deplorable condition. The otlictrs were 
worn out by the labors they had performed, and the few sup- 
plies that had been brought from the Peninsula had been ex- 
hau^'ed or abandoned, so that the work of reorganization and 
,r-Bupplying had to be again performed, and this while the 
irmy was moving rapidly, and almost in the face of the ene- 
my. That it was successfully accomplished is shown by the 
care and attention which the wounded received after the bat- 
tles of South Mountain and Anlietam. 

Among the improvements introduced into his department 
by Surgeon Letterman, the principal are the organization of 
an ambulance corps, the system of field hospitals, and the 
method of supplying by brigades, all of which were institnted 
during the Maryland campaign, and have since proved 1*TJ 


On assuming the command of the troops in and around 
Wasliington, I appointed Captain S. Van Vliet, assistant qnar- 
terinaster, (afterwards brig adiorgcneral.) chief quartermaster 
to my command, and gave him the necessary instructions for 
organizing his department, and collecting the supplies rs- 
qui.>ite for the large army ttien called for. 

'fhe disaster at Manaatas had butrecently ocenrred, and the 
army was quite destitute «f quartcrmaster'a stores. General 
Van Vliet, with great energy and zeal, set himself about the 
task of famishing the supplies immediately necessary, and 
prcpairog to obtaio the still larger amoiuits which would be 


required by the new troops, which were moving in large mitn- 
bers towards the capital. The principal depot for supiilics in 
the city of Washington was under the charge of Colonel 1>. H. 
Eucker, a!=sistant quartermaBter, who ably performed his 
duties. Lieutenant-Colonel K. Ingalls, assistant quartermaster, 
was placed in charge of the dep.irtment on the south side of 
the Potomac. I directed a large depot for transportation to 
be established at Perryville, on the left bank of the Susque- 
hanna, a point equally accessible by rail and water. Captain 
C. G. Sawtelle, assistant quartermaster, was detailed to orga- 
nize the camp, and performed his duties to my entire satisfac- 
tion. Captain J. J. Dana, assistant quartermaster, had imme- 
diate charge of the transportation in and about Washington, 
as well as of the large number of horses purchased for the use 
of the artillery and cavalry. The principal difficulties which 
General Van Vliet had to encounter arose from the incxjie- 
rience of the majority of the officers of faia department in the 
new regiments and brigades. 

The necessity of attending personally to minor details ren- 
dered his duties arduous and harrassing in the extreme. All 
obstacles, however, were surmounted by the untiring industry 
of the chief quartermaster and his immediate suborOinatcs, 
and when the army was prepared to move the organization of 
the department was found to be admirable. 

When it was determined to move the army to the Peninsula, 
the duties of providing water transportation were devolvetl by 
the Secretary of War upon his assistant, the Hon. John Tucker. 
The vessels were ordered to Alexandria, and Lieutenant-("olo- 
nel Ingalls was placed in immediate charge of the embarka- 
tion of the troops, transport.ition, and material of every de- 
scription. Operations of this nature, on so extensive a scale. 
Lad no parallel in the history of our countrj'. 

The an-angements of Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls were per- 
fected with remarkable skill and energy, and the army :ind it>' 
material were embarked and transprprted to Fortress Monroe 
in a very short space of time, and entirely without loss. 

During the oper.ations on the Peninsula, until the arrival of 
troops at Harrison's landing. General Van Vliet retained the 
position of chief quartermaster, and maintained the tluirouL^l 
organization and efTlL-iency of his department. The priuripa! 
depots of supplies were under the immediate charge of Lieu- 
tenant-Colonels Ingalls and Sawtelle. 

On the Kith of July, 1^62, General Van Vliet having requested 
to be relieved from duty with the army of the Potomac, I ap- 
pointed Lieutenant-Colonel Ing.a;is chief quartermaster, and he 
continued to discharge the duties of that offiee during the re- 
mainder of the Peninsula and the Maryland campaigns in a man- 
ner which fully sustained the high reputation he had previously 

The immediate amount of labor accomplished, often under 
the most difficult circumstances, the admirable system under 
which the duties of the department were perforiued, and the 
entire success which attended the efforts to supply so large an 
army, reflect the highest credit upon the officers upon whoir 
these onerous duties devolved. The reports of tJencral Van 
Vliet and Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls, with the accompanyiut: 
documents, give in detail the history of the department from 
Its organization until I was relieved from the command of the 
army of the Potomac. 


On the 1st of August, ISGl, Colonel H. F. Clark, commissary 
of subsistence, joined my staff, and at once entered upon his 
duties as chief commissary of the army of the Potomac. In 
order to realize the responsibilities pertaining to this office, as 
well as to form a proper estimate of the vast amount of labor 
which must necessarily devolve upon its occupant, it is only 
necessary to consider the unprepared state of the country to 
engage in a war of such magnitude as the present, and the lack 
of practical knowle.lge, on tlie part of the officers, with refer- 
ence to supplying and subsisting a large, and at that time, un- 
organized army. Yet, notwithstanding the existence of these 
great obstacles, the manner in which the duties of the commis- 
sary department were discharged was such as to merit and call 
forth the commendation of the entire army. 

•During the st.ay of the army of the Potomac in the vicinity 
of .Washington, prior to the Peninsula campaign, its subsistence 
was drawn chiefly from the depots which had been established 
by the commissary department at Washington, Alexandria. 
Forts Corcoran and Runyon. In the important task of desig- 
nating and establishing depots of supplies, Colonel ClarV w:is 
ably seconded by his assistants. Colonel .\mos Beckwith, coui- 
missary of subsistence, U. S. A.; Lieutenant-Colonel <«eorge 
Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A. ; Lieutenant-C'ilonel 
A.P.Porter, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A.; Captain 
Thomas Wilson, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A. ; Captain 
Brownell Granger, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Volun- 
teers; Captain W. H. Cell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. 
A.; Captain J. H. Woodward, commissary of subsistence, U. 
S. Volunteers; and Captain W. R. Murphy, commissary of 
sobsistence, U. S. Volunteers. 

For a fnll knowledge of the highly creditable manner in 
which each and all of the above-mentioned officers disidiarged 
their duties, I invite attention to the detailed report ol Colonel 
Clark. The remarks and suggestions contained in his report 
are worthy of attention, as affording valuable rules for the 
future guidance of the subsistence department in supplying 
armies in the tield. The success of the subsistence depart- 
ment of the army of the Potomac was in a great measure at- 
tributable to the fact that the subsistence department at Wash- 
ington made ample provisions for sending supplies to the Pe- 
ninsula, and tliat it always exercised the most intelligent fore- 
sight. It moreover gave its advice and countenance to the 
officers charged with its duties and reputation in the licld, and 

those officers, I am happy to say, worked with if, and together, 
in perfect harmony for the public good. During the entire 
periodthatl was in command of the army of the Potomac there 
was no instance within my knowledge where the troops were 
without their rations from any fault of the officers of this de- 


This very important branch of the service was placed onder 
the charge of Captain C. P. Kingsbury, ordinance corps. Colo- 
nel and Aid-de-camp. Groat difficulty existed in the proper 
organization of tlie department tor the want of a sufficient) 
number of suitable officers to perform the duties at the various I 
headquarters and depots of supply. But far greater obstacles ' 
had to be surmounted, from the fact that the supply of small 
arms was totally inadequate to the demands of a large army, 
and a vast proportion of those furnished were of such an in- 
fcri ir quality as to be unsatisfactory to the troops, and con- 
demned by their officers. The supply of .artillery was more 
abundant, but of great variety. Rilled ordnance was just com- 
ing into use, for the first time in this country, and the descrip- 
tion of gun and kind of p,rojectile which would prove most 
effective, and should, therefore, be adopted, was a mere matter 
of theory. To obviate these difficulties, large quantities of 
small arms of foreign manufacture were contracted for ; pri- 
Viite enterprise in the construction of arms and ammnnition 
was encouraged; and by the time the army was ordered to 
move to the Peiiinsula the amount of ordnance and ordnance 
stores was ample. Much also had been done to bring the 
quality both of arms and ammunition, up to the pro [)er standard. 
Boards of officers were in session continually during the autumn 
and winter of 18G1, tO test the relative merits of new arms and 

The reports of these boards, confirmed by subsequent ex- 
perience in the field, have done much to establish the respec- 
tive claims of dirfprcnt inventors and manufacturers. Durina 
the campaigns of the Peninsul* and Maryland the officers con- 
nected with the dop.artment were zeabnis and energetic, and 
kept the troops well supplied, notwithstanding the perplexing 
and arduous nature of their duties. One great snnrce of per- 
plexity was the fact that it had been necessary to issue arms 
of all varieties and calibres, giving an equal diversity in the 
kinds of ammunition required. Untiring watchfulness was 
tiicrcfore ^incumbent upon the officers in charge to prevent 
confusion and improper distribution of cartridges. Colonel 
Kingsbury discharged the duties of his office with great effi- 
ciency until the day of July, 1SG2, when his health re- 
quired that he should be relieved. First Lieutenant Thonia.i 
(i. Baylor, ordnance corps, succeeded him, and performed his 
duty during the remainder of the Peninsula and Maryland 
campaigns with marked ability and success. 

The want of reports from Colonel Kingsbury and Lieutenant 
Baylor renders it impossible for me to enter at all into the 
details of the organization of the department. 


Immediately after I was placed in command of the "Divi- 
sion of the Potomac," I appointed Colonel Andrew Porter, 
IGth regiment infantry, provost marshal of Wasliington. All 
the available regular infantry, a battery and a squadron oj 
cavalry were placed under his command, and by his energetie 
action he soon corrected the serious evils which existed, and 
restored order in the city. 

When the army was abont to take the field. General Porter 
was appointed Provost Marshal General of the army of the 
Potomac, and held that most important position until the end 
of the Peninsula campaign, when sickness, contracted in tha 
imtiring discharge of his duties, compelled him to ask to be 
relieved from the position he had so ably and energetically 

The Provost Marshal General's department had the charge 
of a class of duties which had not before, in our service, been 
defined and grouped under the management of a special de- 
partment. The following subjects indicate the sphere of this 
department : suppression of marauding and depredations, and 
of all brawls and disturbances, preservation of good order, 
and suppression of disturbances beyond the limits of thfe ■ 
camps. j 

Prevention of straggling on the march. 1 

Suppression of gambhug houses, drinking houses, or bar- '^ 
rooms, and brothels. 

Regulation of hotels, taverns, markets, and places of public 

Searches, seizures and arrests. Execution of sentences ef 
general courts-martial, involving imprisonmentor capital pun- 
ishment. Enforcement of orders prohibiting the sale of intox- 
icating liquors, whether by tradesmen or sutlers, and of orders 
respecting passes. 

Deserters from the enemy. 

Prisoners of war taken from the enemy. 

Countersigning safeguards. 

Passes to citizens within the lines, and for purposes of trade. 

Complaints of citizens as to the conduct of the soldiers. 

General Porter was assisted by the following named ofH- 
eers : 

Major W. II. Wood, 17th United States infantry; Captnia 
James .McMillom, acting assistant adjutant-general. 17lh Uni- 
ted States infantry ; Captain W. T. (ientry, 17th United States 
infantry ; Captain J. W. Forsurth, 18th United States infantry ; 
Lieutenant J.W.Jones, 12th United States infantry; Lieu- 
tenant C. F. Trowbridge, IGth United States infantry; and 
Lieutenant C. D. Mclialfey, 1st United Slates infantry. 

The provost guard was composed of the 2d United ?^tit*« 
cavalry. Major I'lea-anton, and a battalion of thc^th and 17ti» 
United' States infantry. Major Willard. After General Porter 


WM TetlcTtd. Jfajor Wood was in charf^e of tlil? der'-rxment 
until aflcr tlic batlle of Antiolani. when liri.'adiL'r-UeDerul 
Patrick was appolnlc<l,I'rovn»t MarshalOcncral. 


When the army toolc the field, for the purpose of Becnrinc 
order and re','iiliiril.v in tlic camp of hta Iqiiaiters, and facili- 
tating its tiKivenieiils, the office of cummamlant of genera: 
headquarEers wuti created, and assigned to Majui U. 0. Haller, 
7th United 81ate« infantry. Six companien of infantry wcri' 
placed under his <n'iier8 fur guard and police duty. Ainon^ 
tho orderA appended to this report is tlic one deliiiing his du- 
tica, which were alwaya taliafactorily performed. 


From August. ISfll, the position of judge advocate was held 
by Oolnncl 'ihnnia-s T. Gantt, aide-dc-ciinip. until compelled 
by ill health to retire, at Harrison's lamlin;;, in Augnst, ls62. 
Ilia reviews uf tiie decisions of court^-niailial during this 
period were of great utility in correcting: the practice in mili- 
tary courts, didusin;; true notions of disiijdinc and subordina- 
tion, and setting bilurc the army a hiizli sLimlard of siddicrl.t 
honor. Upon the retirement of Colonel CantI the duties (il 
joilgc advocate were ably performed by Culuiicl 'ihumas U. 
Key, aide-de-camp. 

SIGNAL conps. 

TIic method of conveying intelligence and orders, invented 
knd introdnced into the service by JLijor Alhcit J..M.vcr, sic- 
aal oOicer United States army, was lirst practically tested in 
targe operations during the organization of the aruiyofthc 

Under the direction of Major Myer a signal corps was 
formed by detailing olTicers and men from the dilTcrent rei-i 
ments of volunteers and instructing them in the use of ti.e 
flags by day and torches by uight. 

i'hc chief signnl olTicer was indefatigable in his exertions to 
render his corps ell'ectivc. and it soon beciiine available foi 
aerviec in every division of the army. In audition to (he flag- 
and torches, llnjor Myer introduced a portable insulated tcK - 
graph wire, which could be readily liiid from point to point 
and which could be used under the same general system. Ii, 
front of Wa-iliington, and on the Loner I'otoniiic, at an; 
point within our lines not reached by the military telegraph, 
the great uselulness of this pystem of signals w:is niiide mnni 
fcst. But it was not until alter the arrital of the army u|iu. 
the Peninsula, and during the siege and battles of that an.! 
the Maryland ra'npaigtis that the great benelits to be deiivci. 
from it on the held and under Gre were fully appieciatcd. 

There was scarcely any action or skinuish in uhichthe signal 
corps did not render important services. Ollcn under hcnv\ 
fire of artillery, and not unfrcqucntly while exposed to mus- 
ketry, the officers and men of this corps fiavc inlornnilion r., 
tho movements of the enemy, and transmitted dircclious for 
the evolutions of our own troops. 

The report of the chief signal officer, with accompanying 
documents, uill give the details of the services of tlii^ 
corps, and cnll attention to those members of it who were 
particularly di;>tiuguishcd. 


The telegraphic operationsof the army of the Potomac were 
eupcrintcnded by Major ThomasJ. lickcrt. and under the ini 

mediate direction of ,Mr. Caldwell, who was, with a 

corps of oper.itors, attached to my heal(|uarters during the 
entire campaigns upon the Peninsula and in Maryland. 

The services of thiscorps were arduous and eflicient. Under 
the admirable arrangements of M.ijor lOckert they were con- 
stantly provided with all the material lor constructing now 
lines, which were rapidly established whenever the army 
changed po.sition ; and it was not unfrequently the case 
that the operatives worked under fire Irom the enemy's 
Runs; yet they invariably performed all the duliesrequired of 
them with great alacrity and cLeeriuluess, and it was seldom 
that 1 wa!i without the means of direct telegraphic commnnl- 
oation with the War Department and with the corps command- 

From the orgnnir.ation of the army of the Potomac np to 
November 1, 1k0'2, including the Peninsula and Maryland cam- 
paigns, upwards of twelve hundred (1, 200) miles of military 
telegraph line had been constructed in connection with tho 
operations of the army, and the number of operatives and 
builders employed was about two hundred (200). 

To Professor Lowe, the intelligent and enterprising ssronant, 
who had the management of the balloons, I was greatly in- 
debted for the valuable information obtained during hisascen* 

I have more than once taken occasion to recommend the 
members of my stalT, both general and personal, for promotion 
and reward. I beg leave to repeat these recoramendations, 
and to record their names in the history of the army of the 
Potomac, as gallant soldiers, to whom their country owes* 
debt of gratitude still unpaid, for the courage, ability, and un- 
tiring zeal they displayed during the eventful campaigns in 
which they bore so prominent a part. 

On the llth of October the main body of the army of the 
Potomac was in the immediate vicinity of Wa-hington, with 
detachments on the left bank of the Potomnc as far down as 
Liverpool point, and as fj.r up as Williamsportnnd its vicinity. 
The dilTerent divisions were posted as follows: Hooker at 
Badd's ferry, Lower Potomac ; Heintzelman at I'ort Lyon and 
elcinity; Franklin near the theological seminary ; Ulcidvcrneai 
Hunter'B chapel; McDowell at Upton's hill and Arlington; 
P. J. Porter at Hall's and Miner s hills; .^iiiitli at Mark.-.ll's 
hill; McCall at Uiigley; Uuell at Tenallytown, Meridial hill. 
Emory's chapel, Ac, on the left bank of the river; Casey at 
Washington; Stoncman's cavalry at Washington; Ilunt'sa. til- 
lerjr at Washington ; liaaks at Darncstown, with detachments 

at Point of Rocks. Sandy Hook, Williamsport. tec. ; Stone at 
I'oulesville ; and Dix at Baltimore, with detachmeuts on the 
Eastern Shore. 

On the loth of October, 1?C1, General McCall marched te 
Draiosville with his division, in order to cover reconnoisancea 
to be made in all ilircc lions the next day, for the purpose of 
learning the position of the enemy, and of covering the opera- 
tions of the topographical engineers in niuking niajis of that 

On the 29th, acting in concert with General McCall, General 
Smith pushed strong parties to I'rcedora hill, Vienna, Flint 
hill. Peacock huL&c, to accomplish the same purpose In that 
part of the front. These reconnoissances were succcsslul. 

On the morning of the 20th I received the following telegram 
from General Banks' headquarters : 

" IlARxasiows, Oclclfr to. 1S81 . 

'*SiR : Tho signal station at Sugar Loat totegraphjtlhHl the euemy hAVa 
mjvcd away from LLC-iburg. All qinct here. 

" K- U. torU.AND, Aln!ta«l AdJulantCcntral. 

o GcDcr.ll Marct." 

Whereupon I sent to General Stone, at Foolsville, the fol- 
lowing telegram: 

•' Camp OsiFyi;!, Oe(nl»CT- 20, 18*1. 

*' General McC'ePan desires me to Inform you i,hai C'-ueritl UcCall oo- 
cupicJ Drainsville yo-tordajr, auft is still ihero. Will s.-nd out heavy 
rcconnoijjsanccs tn-ilay In all directions Irom thaljM ii.t- Ihc general do- 
sires ttiAl you will keep a gtXhl look out uiwn I/-'esliitrK, to 8.-0 if thA 
movement has the rir.-cl to drive lln-m away . Pi.-i hai a n sllghl dumoo- 
slralKDon your pail would have tho clf-'Ct to move lii'.-m. 

."A. V. COLUUUN',>« sUlant Adjulant Oena-ttL 

" Brlgadlcr-Gcneral C- H. Stoxe, I'coltnllt." 

Deeming it possible that General McCall's movement to 
Drainsville, together with the subsequent reconnoissances, 
niiglit have the effect of inducing the enemy to abandon Lccs- 
burg, and the despatch from Sugar Loaf appealing to confirm 
this view, 1 wished General Stone, who had only a line of pick- 
ets on the river, the mass of his troops being out of sight of, 
and beyond range from, the Virginia bank, to make some dis- 
play of an intention to cross, and also to watch the enemy 
more closely than usual. I did not direct him to cross, nor did 
1 intend that he should cross the river in force fur the purpose 
of lighting. 

The above despatch was sent on the 20th, and reached (!en- 
cral Stone as early as 11 a. ra. of that day. lexpectcd him to 
accomplish all that was intended on the same diiy ; and this 
he did, as will be seen from the following despatch, received at 
I'.iy headquarters in Washington tromPoulsvillcon the evening 
of October 'iO: 

*' Made a feint of crossing at this place this afternoon, and at the 
same time started a reconnoitcrltig party towards Lcesliurg from f]ar- 
risou's island- The eneiny's [lick- is retired to intrin<hnn'iils. Ku{s>rt 
<if reconnoilering parly not yet received. I have means of cnssiug one 
hundred and twenty-Ovo mca onco ia ten miouloe al each of two 
points. Kivcr falliui; slowly. 

"C- P. STOXE, BrigadurGaieral 

' Major-Gcncral McCut.Tjlx." 

As it was not foreseen or expected that General McCall 
would be needed to to-npcrate with General Stone in an^ 
attack, he was directed to fall back from Drainsville, to his 
original camp, near Prospect hill, as soon as the required re- 
connoissances were completed. , 

Accordingly he lelt Drainsville, on his retnm, at about 8| 
\. M. of the ilst, reaching his old camp at about 1 P. .M. 

In the meantime 1 was surprised to hear from General Stone 
that a portion of his troops were engaged on the Virginia side 
of the river, and at once sent instructions to General McCall 
to remain at Drainsville, if he had not left befoie the order 
reached him. 

The order did not reach him nnttl his return to his camp at 
Langley. He was then ordered to rest his men. and hold his 
livision in readiness to return to Drainsville at a moment's 
lotice, should it become necessary. Similar instructions were 
given to other divisions during the afternoon. 

The fiist intimation I received from General Stone of the 
.cal nature of his movements was in a te!»graoi, as follows: 
" EOWAKDS' Ferkt, Ocl UL-r 21—11.10 A. M. 

o Tho enemy havo been eogagod opposite Harrison's irilaud ; our mcD 
iro behaving admirably. 

"C. P. STONE, BrigaditrCtrural. 
■* Major-Gcneral McClkliji:»." 

At 'i P. M. General Banks' adjutant-general sent the follow 


" D*R.«fTnw», October 21. 18C1— 2 P. M. 
" General istonc safely crossed iherivcr this murniiiK. !s qm eng.age 
nenis have uken place on Ibo other sido of tho river— how imporunl 
,s uoi kbuwn. 

"B. M. COm.AVD. 
*• Aciing AsHitant Adjiuant Gmrrdt. 
"General R. B. Marct." 

General Stone sent the following despatches on the same 
day at the hours indicated : 

" tDWARDS' Frrrt. October 21 , 1861—2 P. M. 
o There has been sharp flrmg on the right of our line, and our iroope 
ippear to tie advancing llicrc uniler Baker. The U-It. under Gorman- 
has advanced ilfl ^ikirinisliurs nearly ouo mile, and, if tho movement 
ci.'-uiues successful will turn the enemy's rlcl'l- 

" C. 1*. SIU.N'K, BrigadirrO^^ntnl. 
"Hator-Gencral UcCunuM." 

"Kdwards' Frrrt, October 21. 1861 — t P. M. 
" Nearly all my force is across the river. Baker on tho right ; Gor- 
•^D on Ibo lofl. Itltf hi sharply ou^tngud . 

•' C. P. STONE, Brigadur Gncrai. 
" General UcClru-as." 

•'Kdwards' Fibrt, October 21, 1861— ». SO P. M. 
•'! am occupied ia preventing further d Raster, and Iry to get lata 
I position to redeem. Wc havo lost somo of our best cominauder*— 
i:.ikcr dead, Cogswell a prisoner or secreted. Hie wounded ore being 
jireluiiv anil rapidly removed ; and Gorman's wing is being eau- 
lO' sly 'withdrawn. Any advance Crom DralusviiM musl ks iaa4a 


•'All w.\S reported eoinp well lip to Baki^r's death, out, in tlio 
confusion following Hint, tho right wiii^ was outll.inkod. In a few 
hours 1 £hnil, unk'S'^ a niglit attack is mailo, bs in the tamo position 
W last uigUt, s^vc tho loss of maoy good irien. 

"C. P. SrONE, Brijadia-Ceiiero!. 

"Major-General McClkllan." 

Altlioiigii no more fully informed of the state of nffairs, I 
had, duiing the afternoon as a precaiUioniiry measure, ordcrod 
General Banks to send one hi-igade to the support of the 
troops at Harrison's island, and to move wilh the other two to 
Seneca mills, ready to support Clcneral Stone if necessary. 
The 9.30 P. JI. despatch of General Stone did not give me an 
entire undeistanding of the state of the case. 

Aware of tho rtifliculties and perhaps fatal consequences of 
recrossiugsuch a river as the I'otoniac after a, and 
from these telegrams supposing his whole force to be on the 
Virginia side, I directed General Stone to intrench himself, and 
hold the Virginia side at all hazards until re-enforcements 
could arrive, when he could safely withdraw to the Maryland 
Bide, or holtl his position on the Virginia side, should that 
prove advisable. 

General Banks wa? Instructed to move the rest of his divi- 
sion to Edwards' ferry, and to send over as many men as pos- 
sible before liaylight to re-enforce Stone. lie did not arrive 
in time to etfect this, and was iustiucted to collect all the 
canal-boats he could find, and use tiiera for crossing at Ed- 
wards' feri-y in suUicient force to enable the troops already 
there to hold the opposite side. 

On the 22d I went to the ground in person, and reaching 
Poolsville, learned for the iirst time the full details of the 

The following extract from the evidence of General Stone 
before the "Coniiuittee on the Comluct of the War" ou the 
6th of January, 181)2, will throw further light on this occur- 

General Stone says he received the order from my head- 
quarters to make a slight demonstration at about 11 o'clock, 
A. M., on the '.iOth, and that, in obedience to that order, he 
made the demonstration on the evening of tlie same day. 

In regard to the reconnoissance on the 21st, which resulted 
in the battle of Ball's Bluff, he was asked the following ques- 
tions : 
I Question. " Did this reconnoissance originate with yourself, 
or had you orders from the genernl-in-chief to make it?" 

To which he replied : " It originated with myself— the re- 

Question. " The order did not proceed from General 

Answer. " I was directed the day before to make a demon- 
stration; that demonstration was made the day previous." 

Question. " Did you receive an order from the general-in- 
chief to make the reconnoissance ?" 

Answer. " No, sir." 

Making a personal examination on the 23d, I found that the 
position on the Virginia side at Edwards' feiTy was not a 
tenable one, but did not think it wise to withdraw the troops 
by dayliglit. I tlicrefore caused more artillery to be placed in 
position on the Maryland side to cover the approaches to the 
ground held by us, and crossed tlie few additional troops that 
the hitrh wind permitted us to get over, so as to be as secure 
as possible against any attack during the day. Bi;fire night- 
fall all the precautions were taken to secure an orderly and 
quiet passage of the troops and guns. 

The movement was commenced soon after dark, under the 
personal supervision of General Stone, who received the 
order for the withdi'awal at 7.15, P. M. 

By i A. M., of the 24th, everything had reached the Mary- 
land shore in safety. 

A few days afterwards I received information which seemed 
to be authentic, to the effect that largo bodies of the enemy 
had been ordered from Manassas to Leesburg, to cut oil our 
troops on the Vii'ginia side. Their timely withdrawal had 
probably prevented a still more serious disaster. 

I refer to General Stone's report of this battle, furnished the 
War Department, and his published testimony before tlie " Com- 
mittee on the Conduct of the War " for further details. 

The records of the War Department show my an.xiety and 
efforts to assume active offensive operations in the fall and early 
winter. It is only just to say, however, that the unprecedented 
condition of the roads and V^irginia soil would have delayed an 
advance till February, had the discipline, organization, and 
equipment of the army been as complete at tlie close of the 
fall as was necessary, and as I desired and labored against every 
impediment to make them. 

While still in command only of the army of the Potomac, 
aamcly, in early September, I proposed the formation of a 
corps of New Englanders for coast service in the bays and in- 
lets of the Chesapeake and Potomac, to co-operate with my 
own command, from which most of its material wiis drawn. 

On the 1st of November, however, I was called to relieve 
Lieutenant-General Scott in the chief and general command 
of the armies of the Union, The dii'ection and nature of this 
coast expedition, therefore, were «(»mewhat changed, as will 
goon appear in the original plan submitted to the Secretary of 
War, and the letter of instructions later issued to General 
Burnside, its commander. The wliide country indeed had now 
become the theatre of military operations from the Potomac to 

beyond the ilississippi, and to assist the navy in i)ert>clin^' offors it-sclf, 

and sustaining the blocl-iade, it became necessary to cxtciicj 
these oper;itii»DS to points on the sea-coa.^t, Uoanoke ishmtl 
Savannah, rtnd New Orleans. It remained iiI>to to equip ail.u 
organize the arniie9 o( 'tlie West, whof^e con(Htion was little 
better tUau that of ihc arm/ of the Fijtomac had been. The 

direction of the campaigns in the West, and of the operations 
upon the seaboard, enahlod nic to enter upon laii:;ijr combina- 
tions and to accomplish results, the necessity and advantage of 
which had not been unforeseen, but wiiich had been beyond 
the ability of the single army farmeidy audcr my command to 

The following Iettcr3, and a subsequent paper addrRssed to 
the Secretary of War, sulliciently indicate the nature of tliose 
combinations to minds accustomed to rea?ion upon military 
operations : 


" WjisnisoTOv, September 6, 18CT. 

"Sir: I have tho honor to siigsest tho following propopitic n, with 
the request that tho nyccssary autliorily bo at onco given me to carry 
it out ; io oryaiiizo a forca of two britjadcs of Ovc regimenOeach, uf 
Now Kiigland men, for thu general service, but particularly aclujitcd to 
const service— the offlcors and mou to be suffleiently couvcrsanl wilh 
boat service, to mana;;o steamers, sailiog ves-jcis, launches, l)argc^ 
surf boats, floating batteries, &c. To cliartcr or buy for tlio command a 
sufllcieiit number of propellers, or tug-boats, for trnnsportilion of 
men aurf supplies, the machinsry ofSvhich should be amply pro- 
tccted Ijy timber ; tho vessels to have permanent experienced ufflccrs 
from the merchant service, but to be mannetl by details from the com- 
mand. A naval otllccr to be attached to tho staff of the commanding 
oincr-r. Tho flAnk companies of each reginiont to boarmed wilb iJahlgrca 
boat guns, and carbines with water-proof cartrirtg'.-s ; tho other compa- 
nies to have sueh arms as I may hereafter designate ; to bo vpiiroraied 
and equipppd as tho I^hndo Islaud regiments are. Launches and floating 
batteries with timber parapets of aufUcieut capacity to lauU or briug 
into actii)n the entire force. 

''The entire management and org:inizition of tho force to be under my 
control, and to form an integral part of the army nf tlic Potomac, 

" The immodiate object of this force is for uperations io the inlets of 
Cliosapoako bay and tho Potomac ; by enabling me thus to laad troops 
at points whore they are needed, this force can also be used in conjunc- 
tion with a naval force operating against points on the so:icoasl. This 
coast division to be commanded by a general olficerof my selection ; the 
rcgimaots to be organized as other land forces ; the disbursements for 
vessels, A:c., to be made by tho proper department of the army upon the 
requisitions of the general commanding the division, with my approval. 

"I think the entire forco can be organized in thirty days, and by no 
moans the least of the advantages of this proposition is tlio fact that it 
will call into tho service a class of men who would not othorwiso onter 
tho ai'my. 

" You will immediately perceive that the object of this force is to fol- 
low along the coast, and up the inlets and rivers, tho muvemtnts of the 
main army when it advances. 

*' 1 am, very respectfully, your obedient sorvant, 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, MoJorGeneral Commanding. 

" Hon. SniON- Cameron, Srcietary of War." 

Owing chiefly to the difliculty in procuring the requisite ves- 
sels, and adapting them to the special purposes conieniplated, 
this expedition was not ready for service until Janmry, 1SB2. 
Tkcn in the chief command, I deemed it best to send it to 
North Carolina, with the design indicated in the following 
letter : 

"Headquarters of rmi Ananr, 

WAsmNGTOX, January 7, 1862. 

*'Gr:ntRAL: In accordance with verbal instructiuns horolofore given 
ynu, yon will, after uniting witli Flag-ofhcer Goldsborough at Fort Mod- 
roe, proceed under his convoy to Hatteras inlet, where you v^ill in con- 
nection witli hun take the mnst prompt measures for crossing the Heol 
over tho Bulkhead into the waters of tho Sound. Uiidcr theaccompany- 
ing general ordor constituting tho dci>artmont of North (.'arolina, you 
will assume command of the garrison at Hatteras inlet, and make such 
dis[)ositions in regard to that place as your ulterior oporations may ren- 
der necessary, always being careful to provide for tho safety of that 
very important station in any contingency. 

*' Your first point of attack will bo Koanoke island and its dependencies. 
It is presumed that tho navy can rciuco tho batteries on the marshes, 
an 1 cover the lauding of your troops on the main island, by which, incon- 
neotion with a rapid movemei t of the gunboats to the northern extrem- 
ity, as soon as the marsh battery is reduced, it may be hoped to cap- 
ture tho entire garrison of the place. Having ociupiod the island and 
its dependencies, you will at once proceed to thi erection of the bat- 
teries and deronses necessary to hold tho position with a small force, 
-hould the fla:-ofnccr require any assistance in seizing or holUmg the 
dcboiches of the canal from Norfolk, yon will please afford it to him. 

"The commodore and yourself having completed your arrangements 
in regard to Roanoko islaud, and the waters north of it, you wid pleaso 
at onco make a descent on Nowbcrn, having gained possession of which 
i!id tho raih'oad passing through it, you will at once throw a sutHcient 
orce upon Boiiufort, and tako the stops necessary to reduce Fori Macon 
xnd open that port. When you seize Newborn, you wdl endeavor to 
seize tho railroad as far west as Goldsborough, should circmnstances 
lUvur such a movement. Tho temper of the people, the rebel forco at 
!i.ind, iVc, will go far toward.s determining the question as to how far 
west the railrouil can be safely occupied and held. Should circum.'Jtances 
•■Odder it advisable to seize and hold Raleigh, tho main north and south 
Miie of railroad passirg through Goldsborough should ho so oir.'cluaIly 
le?troyed for cansiderable distance.'! north and south of t at point, as 
to render it impossible for tho rebels to use it to your disadvantage. A 
ri-eat point would bo gained, in any event, by tho effectual Uostruction 
of iho Wjimi igton and Weldon railroad. 

'* I would advise groat caution in moving so far into the interior as 
upon Raleigh. Having accomplished the objects mentioned, the next 
point of interest would probably bo Wilmington, tho reduction of which 
may require that additional means shall bo afforded you. I would urgo 
^■reat cuution in regard to proclamaliors. In no ca^o would I go be- 
yond a moilerato joint proclamation with tho naval commander, which 
-hould say as lilll-' as pussible about puliticsor Iliu negro : moroly .»5talo 
th:*l the true i^sue for which we aro Ikhiiug Is tho preservation of the 
t'nion, and upholding the laws of the Uenoral covcrument. and sitting 
that all who conduct tbomsL-tves properly, will, as far as possible, b« 
protectod in their persons and properly. 

Yuu will picusa report your operations as often as on opportunity 

'* With my best wishes for your aucces.'^. T am, kc. ' o , 

"(;i,o. B. Mcu.KMjlN, 
" MajnT-Oencfal C'jmmaytding in Ch^f. 
" Brigadier-Goncral A. E ErRNMOK, 

" C-'mmaniiu>g Expfditinn.** 

Tbe following letters of iustnictioa wcro sent tJ Generals 


RallM-k, Ductl. Sbcrman, and Batler \ and I also commnnicatcd 
verbaily to Ihese officers ray views in full rcg rding the field 
of operations asfi^nod to each, and gave them their instruc- 
tions as much ia detail as was necessary at that time : 

" UsAtMjrjtX'nERS of tbb Ahmt, 
, *■ W;»sni?*cTrij(, p. C, N'oTPinber 11, 1861. 

' *'flirvKWAL— Tn asci^ntng yiiu to the command of the department of 
>f't<<souri, it if TAft^bly UT>iicc<c8ary for me to state that I have intrust 
•d to you a duly which requires the utmost tact and decision. 

** Tou have not mort^-Iy the ordinary duties of a mtiitary commander 
to perform ; but the far more difficult task of reducing clvaos to order, 
of changing probably the majority of the personnel of the suff cf the 
department, and of relucing (o a point of ecnnomy, consistent with the 
Ini'M-efiis and necessities of the Slate, s tyrUm of reckl«s expenditure 
and fraud, |wrh:\|i6 unheard ol before in the history of the world. 

" Vol) will find in your department many general and s aJT officers 
'holding illegal conimi<islons and appointments, not rerognixcd or ap- 
proved by the IVcsidenl or S-creUiry of War. You will please at once 
inform these g>nl!emen of the nullity of their appoinlmant, and sec 
that DO p;iy or allowan<'es are iKSiicd to them until sueh time as com- 
,mis!tions may be authoriu'd by the President or Vecrelary of War. 

"If any of them give you the slightest trouble, you will at once them and send lliem, under guard, out of the limits of your de- 
partment, ipformiug them tliat if they return, they will be placed in 
clos« confliicrn'Mit. Vou will i lease examine into the legality of the 
•rgantzition of the troop* serving in the department. When yon find 
any ill'^giil, uousual, or improper organizations, you will give to ih'- 
oflBccrs and men an opportunity to enter the Ip^t' military establish 
ment under general laws and orders from the War IK-partmcnt ; re- 
jKfrting in full lo these headquarters any officer or orgauiiatiun that may 

*' Vou will please cause competent and reliable staff ofllcers to ex- 
amine a.'\ cxij'ting cont-'acts immcdiutely, and suspend all payments 
ii]>on thom until you receive the report in each case. Where there is the 
Blighlrst doubt as to the propriety of the contract, you will be good 
enough to refer the matter, with full explanation, to tboso hcadquarleis, 
Elating in each rase what would be a fair compensation for the services 
or materials rendered under the contract. Discontinue at once the re- 
ception of material or services untler any doubtful contract. Arrest 
and bring to prompt trial all officers who have in any way violated 
their duty lo th** tirtVi^rnment. In regard to the political conduct of 
tnuirs, yo»i will please labor to Impress upon the inhnbitants of 
Missouri and the a Ijdcenl States that we are fi^jhting solely for the iu- 
Icgnty of Ih Union, to uphold the |>ower of our Kaiional Cov rumcnt, 
and to ri^oro to the nation the blessinps of peace and good order. 

"With respect to military oijerati^ns, it is probable, from the best 
.informiition in my (>os=e!ision, that the intorestA of the Government wi.l 
'be best served by forlirying and holding in considcrablo strength Rolla, 
gedaia.and other interior points, strong patrols consuntly 
nioving from the t^rminal stations, and concentrating the mass of the 
troops on or near the Mij-rsissippi, prei>arcd for such ulterior operations 
as the public interests may dcm.ind. 

" I wautd be el'td to have you make, as soon as possible, a personal 
inspxion of all the important po.nts in your department, and report 
the result to me. I cannot loo strongly impress up<jn you the absolute 
ueceysily of keeping me constaoily advised of tl.e strength, cundiiion. 
and location of your troops, together with all facts that will enable me 
lo maintain that general direction of the armies of the United Slates 
whiih It is my purpose to exercise. I trust to you lo maintain ihorough 
organicatioQ, di.-cipiine, and economy Ihroughonl your department. 
Please inform mo, as soon as possible, of everything relating to ihe 
gunhsals now in process of conslruition, as well as those completed. 

<^Thc railitia force authorizi-d to be raised by lh« ^t^te of Ui&touri for 
its dcleoso will be under your orders. 

**I am, General, &c., kc.^ 

" Major-GfTur^ Commanding U. S. A. 

" Uiyor General TT. W. Haueck, U. S. A.. 

*- CummatuiiHg Department of ..Wu.'ourt." 


" WAs-H.'.vGToy, November 7. 1882. 
''OcTEKAt — la giving you instructlonR for your guidance in command 
of the department of the Ohio, I do not design to fetter you. I merely 
wi.«di to (-repress plainly the general ideas which occur to me in relation 
to the conduct of oi^rations there. That portion of Kentucky west of 
the Cumberland River is, by Its position, so closely related to the States 
ef lUiaos and Mis<^url, that it has seemed best to attach it lo the de- 
partment of >lis>^^uuri. Vour oi>erat)on.s there, in Kentucky, wi!l be 
oouOned to ptortion of the aato east of the Cumberland river. 1 
trust I need nut repeat to you that I regard the importance of the terri- 
tory committed to your care as aecond only lo that occupied by (he army 
tinder my inirafdiato command. It is absolutely necessary that we shall 
tjnld aJl the SUto of Kentucky ; not only that, but that the majoriiy ot 
its Inbabitantselialt be warmly in favorof our cause, it being that which 
best siibservee their interests. It is possible that the conduct of our 
(political a/fairs in Kentuclcy is more important than that of our military 
operacions. I certainly cannot overestimate the imiwrtance of the 
former. Yoo will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue 
'for which we are fighting ; that issue is the preservation of the Union 
and the rc«toratioQ of tlic full authority of the General Government 
orer all portif^na of our territory. We shall most readily suppress th s 
rebolliou, and restore the authority of the Govornment, by religioiisiy 
Tvsperting the constitutional rights of all. I know that I exprr«s tlie 
(foelwgs and opinion of the President when I say that we are flghimg 
looly to preserve the itKegrlty of the Union and the constitutional 
authority of the General Government. 

• •• Toe Irihahiunts of Kentucky may rely epon it that their domestic 
■institutions will to no manner b« interfered with, and that they will 
rtccive at our hinds every constitutional protection. I have only to 
repeat that you will in all respects carefully regard the local institu 
tioBS of the region in which you command, allowing nothing but the 
dieutes of military necessity to cause you to depart from the spirit of 
thee* Infitroctifms. 

" So much tn regard to political considerations. The military prob 
lem would be a simple ono ould it be entirely separated from polilical 
'inftuenccfl ; such is not the case. Were the population, among wbirh 
you aro to operate, wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that Xa-'^h- 
vilJe should be your flist and principal objective point. It so lia(>p*'ns 
Chat a largo majority of tli* inhabiianU of Eastrn Tennessee are m 
fi,vor of the Union : it therefore seems proper that you should remain 
■»Q*-the defensive on the line from l>juisville to Na=hvi!le, while y^u 
^fTo^ the mass of your force*, by rapid marches, by Cumltcrland Gap 
i fCjU kcr'i Gap, on Knoxville. in orUer to occopy the railroad ai that 
tmOijnd thus enable the loyal citiiens of Enstern Teunt(-»*.^' to nt-e. 
Vitg' the same lime, cut oOT the railway communication bciwtcn 
le!f«V '*'r£^"^*^ ^* Uia&issip{>i. U wiU bo prudcut to lorlify the 

past bctnre leavhig It In yotir re»r. 
*' Brlcadier-iicocral D. C. BtiiJ." 

"HsAPQTAirmtS 0? THl Abitt, 

" Waphixgtpx, November \t, IMl. 

*' GirxTmii— Upon assuming command of the department. I will b# 
glad to have vou make, as soon as pojinble, a careful report of the con- 
dition and si'tiiaiion of your irw>pa.and of the military and poliiioal 
coodltlon of your command. The main pt^lnl to which 1 desire to call 
yourauentlon is, the neceFslty of entering Fa^lern TeLncssce as soon 
.IS it can be done with reasonable chances of success ; and I hope that 
yon wiil. with Ihe least possible do'ay, organize a column for thai pur- 
pose, SI ffieirnily guariling at ilie Fame tjme the main avenut-a by which 
the rebels may Invade Kvntucky. Our conversationp on the subject of 
military operations have been so full, and my contld' nee in your judg- 
ment is so great, thai 1 will not dwell further upon the sut-j^rt, ( xc<-pt 
to urge upon you the neceFsity t-f keeping me fully inforn;ed as ttt the 
state of affairs, both military and politieal, and your m><vt~menlB. Ia 
regard to political matters, bear tn mind ttiat wu are U;.iuuig only to 
preserve the integrity of the Union, and to uphold the p-.wer of the 
General Cwverumcnl ; as far as miitary neceesity will permit, reli- 
gionsly re*p<-ct the constitutional rights of all. Preserve the strictest 
discipline among the troops, and while employing the utmost energy In 
military movements, be car? Oil so lo treat the unarmed inhabitants 
as to contract, not widen, tho breach existing between ub and the 

*' 1 mean by this that it Is the desire of the Government to avoid no- 
neccFsary Irritation by causeless arrests and i»er8ecution of individuals. 
Where tnere is good reason to believe that persona sre actually giving 
aid, comfort, or information to the enemy, it is of courfe necessary lo 
arrest them ; but I hav« always found lh;it it is the tendency of iubor- 
dinates to make vexatious arrests on m?rc suspicion. You will find il 
well to direct that no arrcits shall be made except by your order or 
that of your generals, unless in citrarirdinary caifs. always holding 
th« party making the arrest responsible for the propriety of bis course. 
It should be our constant aim to make it apparent lo all thul their pro- 
perty, their comfort, and their personal saicty will be best preserved 
by adhering to the cause of the Union. 

*' If the military suggestions I have mado tn this letter prove lo have 
been founded on erroneous dala, you are, of coorso, perfectly free to 
change the plans of operations. 

" Brigadior-General D. C. Bikll, 

*' (Xn^nvxnding Drpartment trf Ohio " 

•' UeiDijCAKtKRR OT THl Al»XT, 

" Washixcto!!, February 14, ISOT. 
" GK-irniAl^-Tour dispatches in regard lo the occupation oi liafirkle 
Island, kc. were received to day. I saw also to-day, for the Orst lime, 
your reqiiiieition lor a siege train for Savannah. 

"After giving Ihe Bohject all tho consideration In my power, I am 
forced to the conc!usion that, under present circumsLtntcs, iho siege 
and capture of Savannah do not promise results commensurate with 
the sacnDceg necessary. When I learned that it wa." po>sil»lo for the 
guuboatf to reach iho 'savannah river, above Fort I'ulitski. two opera 
lions Bugfe/sted themselves lo my mind as its imtnediaie n.'^ulu. 

*^Firft. Th«! capture of .Savannah by a ' coup de main ' — iha result of 
an instantaneous advance and attack by the army and navy. 

"The time for this has passed, and your letter indicatoa that yon are 
not accountable for the failure to seize the propitious momuit, but that, 
on the contrary, you perceived its a<lvantagcs. 

Second. To ifolate Fort Pulaski, cut vtt its supplies, and at least faci- 
litate its reduction by a bombaromcnt. 

"AlthoLgh we have a lung delay to deplore, the second course stiH 
remains open lo us ; and I strongly advlFe iho close blockade ol Pulaski, 
and its bombardment as soon R.*t the 13 inch mortars and heavy guns 
reach you. I am confident you can thus reduce it. With Pula.«;ki, you 
eain ail that is really essential ; you obtain complete rontn I of the har- 
bor ; you relieva the blockading fleet, and render the maia body of 
your force disposable for other oi>eratioD6. 

"1 do not consider the possession of ^^vannah worth a siege aflor 
Pulaski is in our hands. But the pofsc&."ion of Pulaski i% of the first 
imrortu*re. The expedition to Fcrnandiua is well, and Ishall be glad 
to learn that it is ours. 

Uul, after all, the greatest moral effect would bo pro'Hiced by tho 
reduction of Charleston and iu defe ses. There the rebellion had 
ts birth ; there thy unnatural hatred of our Governmont is mod 
nlense ; there is the centre of the boasted power and cour^ige of the 

" To gain Fort Pumter and hold Oiarleston Is a task w., 11 worthy of 
tr.r greatest effurts, and considorablc tacriGci-s. Tlrni w the pri'Mein I 
would be glad lo have you study. Some time must elap«o before wo 
ran be in all respects ready to accomplish that purpose Fleets are en 
cu// and armt(.'S in motion which have certain prt'Iiminary objects to 
ircf mplivh. before we are ready to take Charleston in hand. But the 
nme will, before long, arrive when 1 shall be prepai-ed to make that 
iiovemeiit. In the meantime, it is my advice and wish that no atu mpl 
l>e made uiwn Savannah, unless it can bo earned cciUinly by a 
CMtfi t// main ' 

" rirasc concentrate your attention and forces upon Pulaski and Fer- 
nandina. tl. Augusimc might as well be taken by way of an interlude, 
while awaiting the preparations for Charleston. Success attends ut 
everywhere al present. 

"Very trulv, yours, 

" G to B. M<<TJ1J.AN*, 
•' Mrtjnr-GmertUj Oimmanding VniUd Stata Jrviy. 
" Brig. Gen. T. W. ^la hmax. 

" Commnn-iing at J'frt Royal, rfc." 
** HBADQrARTEKs Of THl Arkt. WashlDfton, Febroary 23, 1861. 
*• Gbxkral — You are assigned W the command of th< land force* des- 
tined to cooperate with lilt- navy in the alUitks upon Now Orleans. 
Vou will use every means lo keep your de6t»iatton a prof, und secret, 
even from your staff officers, with the exception of your chief of tlaff, 
and Licntonant WcHzell.of the engineers. Tlie force at your disiKSal 
will consist of the first ihirtcen regimpnts named In your raemorao- 
dum handed tome i» person, the Slat Indiana. 4ih Wiscou^in, and <lb 
Michigan, (old and gc>od rtptmcnlsfrom Baltimore.) 

"The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6lh Uicbigan will await yonr 
orders at Fort Vlonn>e. 

" Two companies of the 21st Indiana will be drilled as heavy artil- 
lery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island will be suflk- 
cient for your purposes. 

" After full consultation with efflcers well 8c*|uaiMed with the cop.a- 
try in whieh il is profKsed lo operate. I have arrived at lh« citirlurioo 
th'r.t two (2) Irpht batteries fully equipi>ed, and one (1) wiih<MJl honca 
will be all that are i.ecessary. 

" This will muWe your f-rce aboyt 14,000 infantry. 275 cavalry. &80 
artillery ; total Ib.ihb men. The commanding general oi Ihe doport- 
ment oi Key West la atilhorlaed to loan 70U, temporarily, two re- 


jlmcnts ; Fort Pickins cm, probably give you another, wbich will 
briog your foico to nearly IS .000. 

" The oUji^ct of your expedition in ono of vital importance — the cap- 
ture of N'cw Drieaua. The roulo sclMCtod is up tbo >(is>-ift-i;>pi rtvi^r, 
and the first «jbKtac!e to be eiioountorod, iierhans tbo ouiy ono ia in 
tho resiBtiuice afforcd by Korts St rhilip ami Jackson. It vi expected 
that the navy can rcduco tlieso works ; in that caso you will, altor 
Ihelr capture, leave a suflkiont garrisou in th'?ra to render them p'^r- 
fectly secure; and it is rcconimonded that, on tbo upward p.issago l!i;il 
» few beav7 guns and some tri'0(.>3 bo loft at tho pilot station, iit the 
forks ol Uie river, to cover a retreat in ihe event of a disaster. These 
troops and gjns will, of course, bo ronuvcd as soon as tho forts are 

*' Should the navy fail to reduce tbo works, you will land forces 
aitd siege trdiu, and endeavor to breach the works, silcnco their lire, 
and carry thorn by assauli. 

" Tho uti.Kt resisij.nco will bo near the English Bend, whcro thoro aro 
eome earthen batteries. Hi-re it may be neccs^iary for you to hind 
your tro«-'p5 and c<>-operate with the nav.U attack, although it is more 
than probable that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish tbo result. 
If these works are taken, the city of New OrK^ans neoessaniy falls. 
In that event it will probably bo the best to occupy Al^i^-rs with the 
mass of your troops, also the e;istiTn bank of the river abovo the city. 
U may be neoeisary to placo s^me tmops in tbo city to preserve order; 
but if th'M-e appears to be sufScieut Union seniiiueul to control Ihii city, 
it may be best lor purposes of di9cii>liB9 to keep your men out of the 

'• After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to 
roduue all the works guarJing its approaches from tho, and parti- 
cularly to p;tiu the Manchac Pa.-ss. 

"Baton Rouge, Berwick bay, and Fort Livingston, will next claim 
your attention. 

" A feint on Galveston may facilitate tho object wo have in view. I 
n«»9d not call your attention to the necessity ot gaining possession uf all 
the rolling stock you can on the different railways, and of obtaining 
cautrol of the roads tht-msvlves. Tho occupation of Baton Rouge by a 
combined naval and land force should be accomplished as soon us pos- 
Bible after you have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your 
coramuoicnt^on with the northern column by the Mississippi, always 
bfiarjng )n mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, aa 
soon as you can safely do so, either after or before you have effcted 
Ihi junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaininc full posses- 
sion of alt the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accom- 
plished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined 
altaekon Mobile, in order to gain possession of tho harbor and works, 
aa wjU as to control the railway terminus at the city. In regard to 
this, 1 will fiend more detailed instructions aa tho operalioDs of tho 
northern column develop themselves. 

" I may brirfly state that the general objects of the expridition are, 
fi'itt, the reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches ; then Mobile 
and its defenses ; then Pensacola, tialvesion, ic. It is probable that 
by the tmie New Orleans is reduced, it will be in tbo power of tho Go- 
veruraent to reinforce the land lorces suOiciently to accomplish all 
these objects. In the meantime you will please give all tho assistance 
In your power to the army and navy commanders in your vicinity, 
never losing sight of tho fact, that tho great object to be achieved is 
thd capture and firm retontioa of New Orleans. I am, &c-, 

" Major- G-m'n-aly Comman ing UniUd Slatts Army. 
*• Major General B. F. Bdtlbr, Cnit^l Slatdi Volunt^i}^. 

The plan imlicateii in the above ietteva comprehended in 
its scope the operations of all the armies of the Union, the 
army of the Potomac as well. It was iny intention, for rea- 
sons easy to be seen, that its various parts should be carried 
out simultaneously, or nearly so, and in co-operation alung 
the whole line. If tliis plan was wise, and events have failed 
to prove that it was not, then it is unnecessary to defend any 
delay which would have enabled the army of the Potomac to 
perform its sliare in the execution of the whole work. 

But about the middle of January, 1S62, upon recovering 
from a severe illness, I found that executive anxiety for an 
immediate movement of the army of the Potomac had taken 
possession of the minds of the administration. 

A new change had been made in the War Department, and 
I was soon urged by the new Secretary, Mr. Stanton, to take 
immediate steps to secure the reopening of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad, and to free the banks of the lower Potomac 
from the rebel batteries which annoyed passing vessels. 

Very soon after hh entrance upon office I laid before him 
verbally my design as to the part of the plan of campaign to 
be executed by the arm}- of the Potomac, which was to attack 
Richmond by the lower Chesapeake, Ho instructed me to 
develop it to tlie President, which I did. The result was, 
that the President disapproved it. and by an order of January 
81. 1S62, substituted one of his own. On the 27th of January, 
1H62, the following order was issued without consultation 
With me : 

[President's General War Order No. 1 ] 

" EiKccnvE Mansion, \V.4suixaT0N, January 27, 18f^2. 

" Ordered, Tliat Ih", 2'2d day of February, 1S63, be the day for a gen- 
eral movem*nt of the land and naval forces of tho UMite4 Stitcs 
against the insurgent forces. Ihat especially the armies at and about 
Fortress Monroe, the array of tho Potomac, the army of Western Vir- 
ginia, near Muufordsville, Kontucky, the army and' flotilla, at Cairo, 
and a naval force in tho Gulf of Mexico, be rea<ly to move on that day. 

'• Tliil all other forces, both land and naval, with their rc>:[icctivo 
commanilers, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey 
additional orders when duly given. 

'•That tho heads of departni-nts and especially the Sccretarir's of 
War a^id of llie Navy, with all their sub -rdiuaies^ and tho gcntral-in- 
Cbief. with all olhor commauder/j of land and naval forces, will s ve- 
rally be held m their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execu- 
tion of lh>£ or>;cr. 


The order of January 31, ISfiS was an follow.'i : 
[Pr-rsideufs .Special War Order No 1 ] 
•' KxKcmvH MA>vt('>x, Wjshingtos. January 31. 1863. 

" OrdfTfi, T^\!\l ail tho di^^po?:iblo force of the army of the I'otomac. 
•ftor pruvi.ii: e srifoly for the deiens.; of Wa.^hingion.'bo formed into an 
exiwJitiun for the imine-ii^ti object of seizing itnd occupying n r»oiiil 
upon tho r.ailrcad soi'thwi'Slward ol what is known as .Manii^.-ix" June 
tlon, all details to bo iu tho disci'etiou of tho commandoi-iachief, and 

the expo lilion to move before or tho 22d day ofFebru.irv next. 


I asked his excellency whether this order was to be regarded 
B3 fin^l. or whether I could be permitted to submit in writing 
my objections to his plan, and my reasons for preferring my 
own. Permission was accorded, and I therefore prepared th^ 
letter to the Secretary of War. wliich is given below. 

Before this had been submitted to the President, he addressed 
me the following note : 

•' Kx>:ccTivB Masmos, WAsnixGTOY, Fcbruarf S, 1663. 

" Mt DsiR PiR : You and I have distinct and dilferent plans for • 
movement of the army of tho Potomac : yours to be done by the Chesa- 
pcako, up the tlappahanock to Urban*, and across land to the terminus of 
tho rai'Tcvl on the York river ; miiio to move directly to a point ou the 
railroad southwest of Manassas. 

" If you will giro satisfactory answers to the following questions, I 
shall gladly yit-id my plan to yours : 

" 1st. lK>e3 not your p'aa involve a greatly larger expenditure of 
iimi an.^ m'lity than mino? 

" 2d. Wherein is a victory irurre certain by your plan than mme? 

" 31. Wherein i.^ a victory more vahi<ib!f by your plan than mmef 

" 4th. In fact, would it not be Irss valuable in this : that it would break 
DO great hne of the enemy's communic.Uions, while mine would? 

"5th. In caso of disaster, would not a retreat be more difllrult by 
your plan than mine? Yours, truly, ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 

" Major -General McCleli-an." 

These qne:5tiona were substantially answered by the follow- 
ing letter of the same date to the SMcretary of War : 

" lKAW}rAETF.R3 OF THB .^RMT, Wishingtox, FeTifuary 3, 1^62. 

'* Sir : 1 ask your indulgence for the following papers rendered ncccfl- 
Sary by circumstances. 

*' I aV-iomed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on 
Saturday, July 27, 1861, six days after the battle of Bull run. 

'* I found no army to command ; a mere collection of regimen t.s cower* 
In; on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited 
by the recent defeat. 

•' Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern 
aoproaches to the capital by means of defensive works ; nothing what- 
ever had been undertaken to defend tho avenues to tho city on the 
nortliorn side of the Potomac. 

" The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilted, and dispirited ; 
they wore not even placed in military positions. The city was almost 
iu a condition to have been taken by a dash of a rcgmeut of cavalry. 

" Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task assigned to 
me ; that task the hononable Secretary knows was given to me without 
solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have accomplished it will bo 
best b? shown by the past and the present. 

*'The capital is secure against attack, the extensive fortifications 
erected by the labor of onr troops enable a small garrison to hold it 
against a numerous army, the enoray have been held in check, the State 
of Maryland is securely in our possession, tho detached counties of Vir- 
ginia are again within tho pale of our laws, and all apprehension of 
trouble in Delaware is at an end ; the enemy are confined to tho ptBt- 
tiOMS they occupied before tho disaster of the July. More than all 
thi?, I have now under my command a well-drilled and reliable army , to 
which the destinies of the country rany be confi loiuly committed. This 
army is young and untried in battle ; but is animated by the highest 
Bpirit, and is capable. of great deeds. 

"That so much has been accomplished and such an army created ia 
so short a time, from HOthiug, will hereafter be regarded as one of tha 
highest glories of the administration and the nation. 

" Many weeks, I may say many months ago, this army of the Poto- 
mac was fully in condition to repel any attack ; but th-^re isavxst • iD"i.T- 
enco between that and the cfliciency required to i nable troops to attack 
successfully an army elated by victory and intriinchcd in a position long 
since selected, studied, and fortified. 

*' In the earliest papers I submitted to tha Prcsi'lont, I asked for an 
effective and movable force far exceeding the agercyalo now on the 
banks of the Potomac. I have not the force I asked for. 

" Kvon when iu a subordinate position,! always lonkod beyond Iho 
operations of the army of the Potomac ; I was never sati fi'^d iu my own 
mind with a barren victory, but looked to combined and decisive ope- 

** Wh'^n I was placed in command of the armies of tho United States, 
I immediately turned my attention to the whnle Held of operations, re- 
garding the army of tho Potomac as ouly ono, while the most imiwrtant, 
of the masses under my command. 

" I confess that I did not then appreciate the total absence of a gene- 
ral plan which had before existed, nor did I know that utter disorgaul- 
Ziition and want of preparation pervaded the wc>;torn armies. 

" I took it for granted that they wore nearly, if nut quite, in condition 
lo move towards the fulfillment of my plans. I acknowledge that I 
made a great mistake. 

*' I sent at once — with the approval of the Executive— officers I con- 
sidered competent to command in Kentucky and Missouri. Thoir in- 
structions looked to prompt movements. I sof>n found that the labor of 
creation and orgaiiixition had to be performed there ; trans^toitation — 
a4-ms — clnthing — artillery — discipline, all were waatmg. Thi-se things 
required time to procure them. 

'■ The generals in command have done their work most creditably, 
but we are still delayed. I bad hoped that a general advance could bo 
made during the good weather of December ; I was mistaken. 

" My wi-;h lo gain possession of the Eastern Tennessee railroad aa 
a preliminary movement, then tofollow it up immi-iiiatcly by an altaclc 
on Nashville and Richmond, a.'s nearly at the same time as pos.«ible. 

" I have ever regarded our truo policy as being that of fully prep.iring 
ourselves, and then seeking for tho most decisive results. I do not wish 
to wa.ste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at Iho heart. 

*' Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the adraooe 
of tho army of the I'otomac : 

'Mst. That of Washington — its pre.'^ont position — involving a direct 
attack upon the intrenched positions of the onnmy at Ceutreville, Ma- 
nassas,. ^c, or else a movement to turn ono or both fl.mks of those puei- 
tions, or a combinati-m of the two plans. 

*'Tho relative force of the tw.'i armies will not justify an attack on both 
(lanks ; an att-ick on hi.s left flank alono invoivn.* a long lino of wagon 
»:otnniutiication,and canrot prevent him from collectirg fcu' the decisive 
J>att> all the detachm'^-nts now on his wxlreme right .and K-ft. 

'*:?hould wo attack his right flnnk by tho lino of tho Occ-qunn, and a 
t'rossing of the Potomac below that river, and nf^ar \\ia battcru's. we 
■iiuld p^-rhaps prevent the junction of the em-my's liphl with his Cfiiiro 
(wo m-ght destroy the former) ; we would remove tho obsirui.-litjns to 
the navigation of tho Pt>tom:ic, reibico tho length of w.igon tTan>p"rta. 
!inn by ejitablishing new depots at the noarost jwilnta (»f the I'utoi^ac, 
and strikd mor« directly bis main railway commuuication. 


' ne fords of Ui« Oecoqnui beknr tbe month of ths Bull rn? ar» pall ; all the wmt«r« of the CTicmiwalc« would b« van ; alt Tf rplnfn would 

watchod by the rebels ; batlortps xrc ruU U) be placed on Ihe hftghtu in 
Uio roar (concealed by ttie woods), and tbe arraogemcot of his troops 
ka suck th»l ho can opjto^e eome ooosideratlo resit>lancc to .1 )iA<i<uif;e of 
that stream. Ittrormatiun has Just been received to tlic afC-xl tluit the 
onemy art* ifilrfnchiiiR a lino of heights exlcn*ling from the vicitiily of 
fianKBter's (Cnmn mills) tovards Evan^port Early !d January, Jiprig^B' 
ford wx*! <iri i!p!(?d by General Rhodes, with 3. COO men and eight (8) 
fans ; Clior*- arc Ktrong roamms for believinir Itiat fUrls' ford s c>cr\i 
ple<L Tti*^'' (■ ire urns tarices indicate or prove that the enemy antirtpnt'^s 
tho moTomiMit in qiii^jitioD, and is prepared to rcsmt it. AMntminf; for 
Iho pre««'nl that this operation is determined upon, it may be well tu 
•xamlae brli-dy iU probable progress. In the preseiit slate cf affairs, 
our columa (fur the moTementtrf'so largoaforcc mu»t be ma<le in scvo- 
ral columns, at least 6v» or six) can reach the Accitirick wiih'^iit dan- 
ger ; duriny the march th'-nrt^ to the Occoquan, oar right flauk btoomes 
exposed to an atuck from Fairfax station, &iiif;&lor>, and Uuinn millri 
This danger muft be mf-l by orcupyiug in some forco eiilior the two 
ttrst named places, or. better, the point of Junctic^n of the roarlc lca<Iinp 
theuce t » th? village of Occoquan ; tlii'^ oc«-upation mupl bi- cfir.tmuea 
00 longas wee mtinue to draw supplies by the roads from this city, or 
until a bottle Is won. 

** Tlie croB-iiiK of the Occoquan should be made at nil the fords from 
Wolfs run to iht> mr-uth ; the p^jints of crr'ssiug not beiiiR ncceRsarily 
ooDflnod to the fords themselves, i^hould the enemy orcupy this tine in 
force, wo must, with whHt assistance the flDtilla cm aiford, endeavor ^n 
force the p.ut.<;aRe ncur the mouth, thus forcing tho enemy to abandon 
the whole line, or he taken tn flank himself. 

" Having gairu'd the line of the Occoquan, it would ho necessary to 
throw a column by tho shortest route to DumlVics ; partly to force tho 
«Domy to abatwloa his batteries on tlic Potomac ; partly to cover our 
left flank agiiiiiFt an attack from the direction of Aquia ,■ and hislly, to 
«0labliiih our communications with tho river by thtj best roads, and 
thus give u-i new d'^pols. The enemy would by this time have occupied 
the lino of tho Occuquan alOTC Bull run. hoUiing Brentevillc in force, 
aad perhaps extendi: g his lines somcwiiat further to the southwest. 

"Our ncxtstf^p would •-hen be to prevent tho enemy from crossing 
the Occoquan bflwcen Bull run and Broad run, to fall ujx^'U our riphl 
flank while moving on Brcntsville. This might be cfTccted by occupymg 
Bacod Raco church and the crossroads near the mouth of Bull run, or 
Bt II more crT'^ctualy by moving to the fords theinseiveB,aDd prcvoutiug 
htm from debouching on our side. 

" Th''S« operations would possibly be resisted, and it would require 
some time to elTi-ct them, as, nearly at the same lime as possible, we 
Bhould gain the fords necessary to our purposes above Broad run. Hav- 
ing secured our right flank, it would become necessary to carry Brents- 
Tillo at any cost, for wo could not leave it between tho right flunk a'M 
the maii] b-nty. The fina' movement on the railroad must bedcteriniiitJ 
by circum.=tances existing at tho time. 

"Tliis biiff sketch brings out in bold relief the great adrantage pos- 
Besfcd by the enemy in tho strong central position he occupies, with 
roads diverging in every direction, and a strong line of defense enabling 
him t<» rcm.iiii on the dpreiisive. with a gmall furcc on 000 (lank, while 
be concentrates everything on the oUicr for a decisive actiisn. 

'• should wc place a portion of our force in front of Ontrevillo, while 
the rest crosses tho Occoquan. wecommit the error of dividing our army 
by a very dilTlcult obstacle, and by a distance too great to enable the 
two parts Ui )iup;i-'>rtcach other, should eitherbeattackeJ by the masses 
of the en' my, while the other is held in check. 

•'I should perhaps have dwell more decidedly on the fact that the 
force left near S-'angster's must be allowed to remain somewhere on that 
Bide of the Occoqiinn until the decisive battle is over, so as to cover our 
retreat in the event of disaster, unless it should be decided to select and 
Intrench a new baso somewhere near Dumfries, a proceeding iuvolviog 
much time. 

*• After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this covering 
force could be <lrawn Into a m'jrc central and less exposed position — say 
Brimstone hill, or nearer the Occoquan. In this latitude the weather 
will for a considerable period be very uncertain, and a movement com- 
menced In force on to&da In tolerably firm condition will be liable, al- 
most certain, to be much delayed by rains and snow. It will, therefore, 
be next to Impossible to surprise the enemy, or take him at a disad- 
vantage by rapid manoeuvres. Our slow progress will enable him to 
dlvmc our*pur|Misei, and to take his measures accordingly. The proba- 
bility is. from the best information we possess, that the enemy has im- 
proved th<- reads Icadmg to bis lines of defense, wiiilc wc have to work 
M ve advauco. 

" Bearing la mlod what has been said. and tho present unprecedented 
and imi>ai!.'^able condition of the roads, it willjjc evident that no precise 
(period can be fixed upon for the movement on this line. Nor can its 
[duration bo closely calculated ; it seems certain that many weeks may 
lelapse before it is possible to commence tho march. Assuming the sue- 
■cess c^ this op -ration, and the defeat of tho enemy as certain, the ques- 
'lion at once ari.-^es as to tho, importance of the results gained. I think 
Itheso result"! would be confined to the possession of tho field of battle. 
Ithe evacuation of the line of the upper Botomac by the enemy, and the 

bo m our power, and Ih*- enrmy forced to abandon Tenn^s-!*^o and North 
Carolina. The alternative preaeated to the enemy would bo. to beat ub 
In apofitiou selected by oorBelveB, disperse, or pass benoath the Can- 
dlno forks. 

" Siioutd we he beaten In a battle we have a prtrf(»ctly sr»cure retreat 
down the Ivninsula upon lurt Uouroc, with our flanks perfectly covered 
by tbe doet. 

" Paring the whole movement our loft flank Is covered by tho water. 
Oar right is secure, tvr the reason that the enemy is loo distant u» reach 
OS la time ; be can only oppose us In Iront ; wb bring our floet into full 

•• After a pucccfsffl battle our podltinn would be — Burnstde formfn){ 
oar left — Nurfutk h'-ld fccurely— *'ur c-i:lro connf-rting Burnsida with 
Bufll, both by Raleigh and l.ynchhiir»;-~Uueli tn VJtsteru Teuneasee and 
Nurth Alabama — IliiiUck at Nashville and Memph s. 

" The next movement would be lo connect with Sherman on the left, 
by reflucing Wilmington and Charleston ; to odvauco our centre into 
South Carolina and Ci-orgia ; to puth Buell either towards Montgomery, 
or to unite with the main army in Georgia ; to throw Balleck southward 
to meet tho naval e.vpedition from New Orleans. 

" Wo should then be In a condition to reduce at our lelxure all the 
southern seaports ; tooeetipr ail the avenuex of c^'mtnunicitlon ; 10 ubo 
the great outlet of the Mlwissippi ; lo re eKtablt.'h our (:ovpri:ment and 
arms In Arkans-is. I.<juip;ana aud Texas ; lo force tho slave* to labor for 
Otir subsistence, inpt«ad of thai of the rebnls , and to b|<l dcflancc to all 
foreign (nlerfcrenc. Sich ia the object I havo ever hud in viow — this La 
tho general plan which I hope to aco'mplish. 

" For map " long months 1 havo labored lo prepare tho army of th« 
Potomac to \\^y its [i.irt in the programmo ; from the day wh^n I woi 
placed In command of all our armies, I h;ive exerted myt^elf to place all 
the other armies in such a condition that they, loo, could poiform their 
allotted dutii'S. 

" Should it 1)0 determined lo operate from tho low^r Chesapeake, the 
poirt of lau'tiiiff which promi-e< l!ie most brilliant results is Urbana, on 
tbo lower Bappalirniiir>ck. This i>oint Is easily reached by vessels of 
heavy draught ; it is noilhcr occupied or observed by the eiiemy— it la 
but one march from West Point, tho key of that region, and ihonco but 
two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from ITrlmra wouid pro- 
bably cut off Magruder In tho I'euinaula, and enable ti.s to oci-upy Rich- 
mond, before it could bestrongiy re enfurced. Should wefail in that, we 
could, with the co-operation of tbo navy, cross tbo James ami throw our- 
selves in rear of Kichmond. thus forcing tho enemy to comj out and 
attack us, for his posiUoa would be untenable, with us on tho southcra 
bank of tbo river. 

•* Should circuuistances render It not advisable lo land at Urh.ina . we 
can use Mobjack bay ; or. the worpi coming 10 the wor«t, mo can lako 
Fort Monrco as a ba.^te. and operate with completo security, although 
with less celerity and bnllioncy of results — up tho Penin»>ii!;i. 

*' To reach whatever point may be selected as a base, a largo amount 
of cheap water t:o:tsportation must be collected, consistipg ma nly of 
C&oal boats, barge.= , wood-boat?, schooners. &c., t-'wed by smull steam- 
ers, all of a very dilfrrer.t character from those requir*'d for all previous 
expeditions. This can certainty bo accomplished with:n thirty days 
from the time the order ie given. I propose, as tho best possible plaa 
that can, In my ju(lgni<^nt. be adopted, to Belect I'rbana as a hinJtnf 
place for the firtt dit-ichments ; lo transport by water four divisions ^ 
Infantry with their batteries, the regular inftntry, a few wagonR,0D6 
bridgetrain. ond a few Fquadrons of cavalry, making the vicinity of 
Hooker's position the place of embarkation for as many as possible ; to 
move the regular cavalry and rcicrvo artillery, tho remaining bridge 
trains and wagons, to a p 'inl somewh:'re near t ape Lookout, then ferry 
them over the river by m 'ans of North P.ivcr ferry -boaL'^, march theia 
over to the Rappahannock (covering tho movement by an infantry force 
near Hcathsvllle), and to cns-i the Itappahacnock in a similar way. 
The expense and didlculty of the movement will then bo very much 
dimini!^hed (a saving of trausportation of about 10,000 horses), and the 
result none the k-ss twrtain. 

* The concentration ( f the cavalry, kc. , on tho lower counties of Ma- 
ryland can be elf<.xie>l without exciting suspicion, and the movemtDt 
made without delav from that caufc. 

" This movement, if adopted, will net at all expose tbo city of Wash- 
ington to danger. 

'* Tho total force i/y be thrown upon Iho new line would be, according 
tocircumstHnccB, from llO.OOOlo 140X0:). 1 hope to uso the laller num- 
ber by bringing fresh troops Into Wasiiington, and still Icavii g it quito 
safe. I ful'y realize that lo all proieei.<; offered, tlmo will probably he 
the m''st valuable convideralion. It is ray decided opinion that, in that 
polTit of view, the second plan should bo adopted. It is ]ios.sibto, nay, 
highly probable, that tho weather ond state of the roads may be such as 
to delay the direct movement from Washington, with Its nup.^ti-ifaclory 
results and gre-it risks, fur beyond tho limo required to complete the 
second pUn. In tho firfitcise we can fix uodcfinito liinefur an alvance. 
Tho roads have gone from had Id worse. Nothing like theirpros^nt 
condition was ever known here before : they aro Imitayiwbln at pres^-.t. 
We arc entirely at th.- mercy of the weather. It is by no moans certain 

...._, .- -. _„ :roopB per: __ _ . . 

iflghl us again out of tho rango of tho iutrenchmcnts at Richmond, we; immense results. 

iwould QiKl it a very dtfllcult and tedious matter to follow him up theroJ *■ ilyjuilgment, as a general. Is clearly In favorof this project. Notb- 

fforhfi would destroy his railroad bridges and ctherwise Impede our jlng Is certain '.n war, but all the ciiances aro In favor of this movement. 

tprogres.s, through a region where the roads arc as bad as they well can So much am I in favor of the Eoulhern line of operations, that ■ wodM. 

fbo, and wo would probably find ourselves forced at last to change tho prefer tSc move from Fortress Vonroe a* » base— as a cerlaln (bougU 

tyhole theatre of war, or Uy seek a shorter laud route to Richmond, withi less briliiaul Dwvimcnt than tlial from Lrba;ia, lo an attack upon JU- 

••Waller available forco, and at aa expcn<Jiture of much more I. me, nassas. 

rthau were we to adopt the short lino at once. We would also havo 

Torced the enemy to concentrate his forces and perfect his dcfenflive the very points where it is dcsirablo to slriko hiu> whcu 

•least prcitar -d. 

" 11 The second baso of operations available for the army of the Po- 
tomac is that of tho lower Chesapeake bay, whieh affords tuc shortest 
ipoBsibte land route to Richmond, and strikes directly at tho heart of tho 
•enemy's power In tlie east. 

" The roads In that region are passable at all seasons nf the year. 
"The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive 

operations than that In front of WashlngtoQ (which \h wry unfavorable), 

much more level, more cleared laud, the woods Ie63 dense, tho imII more 

sandy, and tho spring some two or three weeks earlier. A '""i''*^"^'^"* ' V,,.en isHUCd. 

hi force on that line oblige* tho enemy to abandon his iutrenched posi- 

tloo at M.iuossas. in order 

mutt do this ; for shoi 

Hon can bo averted 

ho jnnst lip the ass:i 

eepltal, tbo communlutUoos, lUo supp! 

1 know that his excellency the PrcsidoDt. yon. and I, all agree inonr 
wishes, and that thL-so wishes are, to bring this war to a close as 
promptly as the m ans in our potsescion wdl permit. 1 bolieva that 
the mx'^s of the ppojilc have entire couQdenco in ns— I am .sure ut it. L«t 
ns. ihen. look only to the great result lo bo accomplished, and disregard 
everything else. 

I am, very resp'xtfulty. vour obedient servant, 

"GK). B. Kc(n.V.U..\S,M<^)orGeTural Commanding. 
"Hon. F. M. 9TA\toy, Secretary of H'ar. 

Tliis letter must have prodticed some efToct npna tlie mnd 
of the Presi'lcnt, Bince the execution of his order was not 
required, olthonph it was not revoked as formil'y a^ it hftd 
• * Many verbal cnnf<'rencc<i cni^tird, ■'" «>'!-»» 

w liich, 


point, In order to tliro\r the army over that point; but tins 
was stibscqiipnUv abandoned. It "was aiRO fonntl by experi- 
ence tliat it would require much time to prepare tiie canal- 
boats for use in transportation, to the extent that had been 
anticipated. ^„, 

Finally, on the 27th of February, 18G2. the Secretary of \\ ar, 
by the autliority of the President, instructed Mr. John Tnclcer. 
Assistant Secre'tary of War, to procure at once the neccs.s:»ry 
Steamers and sailing craft to transport the army of the Poto- 
mac to its new tield of operations. 

The foIKnviug- extract from the report of Mr. Tucker, dated 
April 5, will s'.iow the nature and progress of this well- 
esccnted service : 

if It * *»»»# 

" X was called to Washington by telegraph, on I7th January last, by 
Afflistant Sei;riHary of War, Thomas A. ^ott. I w-is informed ihtt 
Major-Gcncral McClellan wished to soo mo. From him I learned that 
ho desired to know if transportation on smooth water could be obtaiuo.1 
to move at one lime, for a short distanco, about 50.000 troops, 10,000 
horses, l.OOit wi'gons, 13 batteries, and the usual equipment of such an 
army. He fraulcly stated to mo that he always supposed such a 
movement entirely feasible, until two experienced quartermasters had 
recently reported it impracticable, iu their judgmout. A few dpys 
aftarwards,! reported to General McClellan that I was entirely conll- 
dcnt the trausixuls could be commanded, and stated ibe modo by 
which his object could be accompliEhed. A week or two afterwards I 
bad tbe hoiinr of an iutcrview with tho President and General McClellan, 
whon the subject was further discussed, and especially w to the time 

"I expressct! tbo opinion that, as the movement of the horses and 
wagons would have to be made chielly by schoonora and barges, Ihiit 
as each schooner would require to bo properly fitted for the protection 
of the horses, and furnished with a supply ol water and forage, and 
each transport for Uio troojis provided with water, I didnotdocm it 
prudent to assume that such an expedition could st;u-t within thirty 
days from the time the order was given. 

" The President and General Mcelcllau both urgently stated the vast 
Importance of an earlier movement. I replied that if favorable winds 
prevailoti. and there was great dispatch in loading, the time might bo 
materially diminished. 

" On tbe liih iVbruary yon (Secretary of War) advertised for tran- 
cports of variiius descriptions, inviting bids on the 27th February. I 
was informed that the proposed movement by water was decided upon. 
Tiiat evening the Quarterniastcr-Ueneral was informed of the declsiun. 
Directions were given to secure tbetran:>portation — any assistance was 
tendered. He promptly detailed to this duty two most ctllcicnt assist- 
ants in his department. Colonel Rufus lugalts was stationed at An- 
naiwlis, where it was then proposed to embark tha troops, and Captain 
lieury C. Hodg-,s was dircclod to meet mo in Phdadel|>hia, to attend to 
chartering the vessels. With these ai-rangements I left Wa.shiuglou on 
the 2Sth February. , 

"I beg to hand herewith a statement, prepared by Captain Hodges, 
of tbe vessels chartered, which exhibits tho prices paid, and partitas 
trom whom they were taken : 

113 ste.imors, at an averago price per day $215 10 

188 schooners, '* " " 21 45 

88 bargos, ** " " 14 27 

•'In thirty -seven days from tho time I received the order in Wash- 
ington (ami most of it was accomplished in thirty days), these vessels 
tiansportcd from Perry viile, Ak'xandria.and Washington, to Fort Monroe 
(the place of departure having bevn changed, which caused delay,) 
121,500 men, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 arabii- 
lancss, besides pontoon bridges, telegrapii materials. and the enormous 
quantity of cquipago, &c., required for au army of su-'h magnitude. 
The oaiy loss of which I have heard is eight mules and nine bargi-s, 
which lattj-r wont ashoro in a gale within a few miles of Fort Jlonroc — 
the cargofs being saved. With this trifling exception, not the slightest 
accident has occurred, to my knowledge. 

"I resp?ctfully, but con'fidL-nt'y, submit that, for economy and 
celerity of movement, this expedition is without parallel on record. 
• ••****** 

" ^OHN TUCKER, AssUl<int Secretary of TTar." 
In the meantime the desti-uction of the batteries on the 
lower Potomac, by crossing our troops opposite them, was 
considered, and preparations were even made for throwing 
Hooker's divij^ion across the river, to carry them by assault. 
Finally, however, after an adverse report from Brigadier- 
General J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer, given below, who 
made a rcconnois5;ance of the position?, and in view of the 
fact that it was still out of the power of the Navy Depart- 
ment to furnish suitable vessels to co-operate with land 
troops, this plan was abandoned aa impracticable. A close 
esamiaation of the eneniy*s works and their approaches, 
made after they were evacuated, showed that the decision 
was a wise one. The only means, therefore, of accomplish- 
uig the capture of these works, so much desired by the Presi- 
dent, was by a moTement by land, from the left of our lines, 
on the right bank of tho Potomac— a movement obviously 

The attention of the Navy Department, as earlv as August 
12,1861, had been called to the necessity of maintaining a 
etrong force of efficient war vessels on the Potomac. 


"WAsniNGTOS, August 12, 1861. 

" Stv : I have to-day received additional information which convinces 
me tba', it is more than probable that tho enemy will, within a very 
ehort tlaie, attempt to throw a respectable forco from the mouth of 
Aquia creek into Marylaud. Tliis attempt wih probably bo proce;lod 
by tby erection of batteries at iLitthias and White House points. 
Such a movement on the part of tho enemy, in couuecLion with otheis 
probably designed, would place Washington in great jfopxrdy. 1 most 
earnestly urge that the strongest possible naval force bu at once con- 
centrated near the mouth of Aquia creek, and that the most vigilant 
watch be maintiincd day and night, so aa to render such passage of 
the river absolutely impossible. 

"I recommend that tbo .Vlinoesota and any other vessels avail.ablo 
from Ilr\mplMn Roads be nt once ordered up there, and that a gn-at 
qauntily of coal be sent to that vicinity, sufficient fiir sovural weeks' 
Bupply. At least one strong war vessel should bo kept at Alexandria, 
and I ag.iin urge tho conceulration of a strong naval forco on the 
Petomac without delay. 

"If the Naval Department will render it absolutely fmposeiblo fof 
tho oucuiy to cross the river below Washington, tho security of th9 
capil^d will be greedily increased. 

'■ I cauuot too earnestly urge an immediato compliance with thcss ' 

"I am, sir, very rcspectfullv, your obsiient servant, 

"GKOUGK a McCI.ELLAN, M.ijnv- General Commanding. 
"Hon. GiDE3.\, Svcrd.ary of tht UniOid Siale-^ Navy." 

It was on the 27th of September, ISUI. that General Barnard. 
Chief Engineer, in company with Captain Wymaii.of the Poto- 
mac flotilla, had been instructed to make a recoimni^^^anco 
of the enemy's batteries as far as Matthias point. labia report 
of his observations he 6a3'3 : 

" Batteries at Mii,'h point and Cockpit point, and thence down to Chopa- 
wamiisic, cannct bo prevented. AVc may, indeed, prevent the. r con- 
struction on cer/ctira points, but along here somewhere tho enemy cuo 
establish, in spite of us, as many batterie.? as he choot^es What is I'ho 
renicily ? Favorable circinustauces, not to bo anticipated nor made the 
ba=is of any calculations, might j.LStify and render successful tho allacic 
of a particular battery. To suppose that wc can capture al/, and by 
moraattncks of this kind prevent the navigation being molcsteJ, is very 
much the same as to suppose that tbo hostile army in our own front 
can prevent us buikling and maintaining field works to protect Arling- 
ton and Alexandria by capturing Ihcm, one and all, as fast as they ar« 

In another commnnication npon the subject of crossing 
troops for tlie of destroying the batteries on the Vir- 
ginia side of the Potomac, General Barnard says: 

'• 'Ihe operation involves the forcing of a very strong line of defense 
of tbo enemy, and all that we would have to do if wo were realty open- 
ing a c:impiigu against them there. 

" It is true we hoped to force this line by taming it, by landing on" 
Freestone point. With reason to believe that this may be succcssrul. 
it cannot bo denied that it invol\-cs a of failure. Should we, then! 
considering all the consquooccs which may be involved, enter iiitu the 
operation, merely to capture the Tolomac batteries? I ihiiik not. 
Will not the Eiicssou, assisted by one other gunboat capable of keeping 
alongside thaso batteries, so far control their Are aa to keep tno naviga- 
Li'.n sufficiently free afi long as wo require it? Captain Wymau saya. 

It was the opinion of competent naval officers, and I concur 
with them, thtit had an adequate force of strong and well- 
armed vessels been acting on the Potomac from the beginning 
of August, it would have been next to impo.^s'-ble for the 
rebels to have constructed or maintained batteries upon the 
banks of the river. The enemy never occupied Matthias Point, 
nor any other point on the river, which was out of supporting 
distance from the m-ain army. 

When the enemy commenced the construction of ther.e bat- 
tel ies, the army of the Potomac was not in a condition to pre- 
vent it. Their destruction by our army would have afforded 
but a temporary relief, unless we had been strong enough to 
hold the entire line of the Potomac. This could be done either 
by driving the enemy from Manassas and Aquia creek, by 
main force, or by manoeuvring to compel thcra to vacate their 
positions. Tho latter course was finally pursued, and with 

About the 20th of February, 18G2, additional measures were 
taken to secure the re-opening of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road. The preliminary operations of General Lander for thia 
object are elsewhere described. 

1 had often observed to the President and to members of 
the cabinet that the reconstruction of this railway could not 
be undertaken until we were in a condition to fight a battle to 
secure it. I regarded the possession of Winchester and Stras- 
burg as necessary to cover the railway in the rear, and it was 
not till the month of February that I felt prepared to accom- 
plish this very desirable but not vital purpose. 

The whole of Banks' division and two brigades of Sedg- 
wick's division were thrown across the river at Harper's Ferry, 
leaving one brigade of Sedgwick's division to observe and 
guard the Potomac from Great Falls to the mouth of the 
Monocacy. A sufficient number of troops of all arm? were 
held in readiness-in the vicinity of Washington, either to march 
ma Leesburg, or to move by rail to Harper's Ferry, should 
this become necessary in carrying out tho cbjects in view. 

The subjoined notes from a communication subsequently ad- 
dressed to the War Department will auflicieutly explain the 
conduct of these operations. 

"When I started for Tlarper's Ferry, I plainly stated to tho President 
and Secretary of War that the chief object cf the operation would bo to 
open the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by crossing the river in force at 
Harper's Ferry ; that I had collected tho material for making a perma- 
nent bridge by means of canal-boats ; that from tho nature cf the river, 
it was doubtful whether such a bridge could bo constructed ; that if it 
could not, I would at least occupy the ground in front of Harpcr'sFcrry, 
In order to cover the rebuilding of tho railroad bridge; and flnaDy, 
when tho communications wore perfectly secure, m<ive on Winchester. 
*' When I arrived at tho place I found the batteau bridgo nearly com- 
pleted ; tbe holding-ground proved better than had been anticipated ; 
the weather was favorable, there being no wind. I atoncocri'BSodover 
the two bripales which bad arrived, and look steps to hurry up tho 
other two, belonging, rcspftctivoly, to Banks* and Sedgwick's divisions. 
Th« dilllculiv of crossing supplies had not then becomo apparent. 
That night I'tclographed for a regiment of regular cavalry and four bat- 
teries of heavy artillery to como up tho next day (Thursday), besides 
directing Keyea' diviKion of infantry to be moved up on FriJ.iy. 

" Next morning the attempt was made to p.-iss the caiial-boats through 
tho llftdock, in Older to comuience at once the construction of a perma- 
nent bridge. It was then fmnd for the first time that tho lock was too 
Bmall to permit thepa'^sago of tho boats, it having been built for a class 
of b lats running on tho Shenandoah canal, and loo narrow by somo 
four or six inches for the canal-boats. Tho lift locks, above and below, aro 
all largo enough for tho ordinary boats. I had seen them at Edwards' 
Ferry thus used. It had always been represented to tho engineers by 
the "military railroad employees, and others, that the lock wa* larga 
enough, and, the diff.'rooce being too small to bo dotocted by tho oye, 
no one had tuought of measuring it, or suspeciing any diftlcilty. I thus 
suddenly found myself umiblc to liuild tho permanent bridge. A vio- 
lent gale bad arisen, which threatenod tbe safety of our only moaiw of 

«/<ananmiloii ; th» B»rro« tppntOi to the trWie to «o crtmiai 
ud cloiied wllh wim»oi Uuit It wm »ery citar that. under fintm^-clr- 
cnuuTic™, n.ilhuiE more c«ild b« done Ihin to cr.*> over the bigg.g. 
■>4 (UDplits of the two brlg»dM. Of the olheni, ln«<^ of belnf .ble 
to croM b«lll duniig the morning, the iMl ■rrlv.-d only In lime U) (o 
■nr iQJl d.rk. 11 m evident thiil the tro.,p. ondrr or.lers 
would OTlr be in ihe wmy, ihoold they arrive, anl that It w..ulJ nnl b. 
Boffiible to fubs.Fl thi-m for a rapid march nn Wincheeter. It wi» there 


After what h»s Bc«n iaid already In rcRard to the effect of % 
movement to the lower Chenapciike it in unneceiwary for m* 
to comment opon this document, further than to nay that the 
time of beginning the movement depended upon the state of 
Xeadiness of Ihc tran-port^. the entire control of which had 
been placed by the Secretary of War in the hand.i of one of 
the Assistant 8ecreUrie«. and not under the yiiartcrmatter- 
<•.. I. .» •!...* natAn iftlij* innv»n\pnt vrpTe not imncdcd DT 

ornne. inc ou.i u., (Friday) I Bent a ftrotig rec'.nnoi^« to i j,p^n„.|iile irnpiirtant events were orcnring which materially 
CharlMtowii, and, under its proti-ctlon, went thore myB<.-ir. 1 men oe | jr^-j jj,^ di-«isns for the suhscqnent campaign. The ap- 
termlned toholJ that place. and to mwe the ir.«>p>. ''V^Jfr'"/, *"''"• n-arancc of the Merrimacii off Old Point Comfort, and the en- 
and Williams' cmnnnd. at once on Marim.borg and BunUr Uill, thus J"""5V,V"he United States squadron on the Hlh of March. 
eff.cti.allv cov-rinc tl.o recnnjirucium of ihe raiir<«id. I counter wH''^P.«.^5','.'_"„°it,„„, „f .i,. «1„,. f„r .i,„ I< 

txil. on mv return nere. unucr.i'-.u >.«>» ..... .^^.i—... -• ■ - •-- 

nooii learil' c Ibo whole slato of the case, the President was satis 
IsBed I coiilented myself. tlier..fore. with giving to the SccrcUry a 
brl"f»talomt:.l.aslhivo wnllcnhcre." 

The desicn aimed at was entirely compa«sed, and before the 
firat of Ipril the date of mv departure for the IVnin.sula. tlie 
railroad in running order. As a demonstration upon tlie 
left flanlj of the eneinv, this movement no doubt a.isistcd in 
determining the evacuation of his lines on the btU and 0th of 

On liiv return from Harper's Ferry, on the 2Sth of Fehrnary, 
the prepcrations necessary to carry out the wishes of the Pre- 
sident and Secrclarv of War in regard to destroying tlie bat- 
teries on the lower Potomac were at once undort;ikcn. Ma- 
ture reflee'ion convinced me that this operation would require 
the movement of the entire army, for 1 felt sure that the enemv 
would resist it with his whole strength. I nndirtook it with 
Kreat reluctance, both on account of the extremely unfavor- 
able condition of the roads, and my firm conviction that the 
proposed movement to the lower Chesapeake would neces- 
gariW as it subsequently did. force the enemy to abandon all 
hit no'sMlons in front of Washington. Besides, it did not for- 
ward my plan of campaign to precipitate tins evacuation by 
»nT direct attack, nor to subject the army to any needless Ions 
of life and material by a battle near Wasliington, which could 
preduse no decisive results. The preparations for a move- 
ment towards the Occoquan, to carry the batteries, were, 
howeyer. advanced as rapidly as the season permitted, and I 
had invited tlic commanders of divisions to meet at headquar- 
ters on l!ie Sth of .March, for the purpose of giving them their 
instructions, and receiving their advice and opinion in regard 
to their c .mmands, when an interview with the President in- 
dicated to me the possibility of a change in my orders. 

His e:tcellencv sent for me at a very early honron the morn- 
in" of the Rlh. a'lid renewed his expressions of dissatisfaction 
wilh the aff.iir at Harper's Ferry, and with my plans for the 
new movement down the Chesapeake. Another recital of the 
<-.>..*.. n-Kiph liail before mven SLitisfaction to his excel- 

the power of the former, am me omcr iMv|..i.n«n. 
were so e.Ttensive and formidable, that the security of !■ ort 
Monroe, as a base of operations, was placed beyond a doubt; 
and although the James river was closed to us, the \ ork riyer 
with its tributaries was still open as a line of communication 
wilh the fortress. The general plan, therefore, remained un- 
disturbed, although less promising in it* details than when tb* 
James river was in our control. 

On Sunday, the 9th of March, information from varions 
sources made it apparent that the enemy was evacuating his 
positions at Ccntrcvillc and Manassas, as well as on the upper 
and lower Potomac. The President and Secretary of W ar 
were present when the most positive iiifornmti'.n reached me, 
and I expressed to them my intention to cro.-s the river im- 
mediately and there gain the most authentic iuforuialion, prior 
to determining what course to pursue. , ^ i v 

The retirement of the enemy towards Richmond had been 
expected as the natural consequence of the movement to th« 
Peninsula, but the adoption of this course immodiatoly on 
ascertaining that such a movement was intended, while it re- 
lieved me from the results of the undue anxiety of my superiors, 
and attested the character of the design . was unfortunate in that 
the then almost impassable roads between our positions and 
■theirs deprived us of the opportunity for inflicting damage nso- 
ally aOorded by the withdrawal of a large army m the face of» 
powerful adversary. 

The retirement of the enemy and the occupation of ths 
labandoncd positions which necessarily followed prcsonled an 
opportunity for the troops to gain some experience on the 
march and bivouac preparatory to the camp and to 
eetrid of the superfluous baggage and other •■irapcdimente 
which accumulate so easily arouud an army encamped for • 
'ong time in one locality. . i •_ 

A march to Manassas and back would produce no delay m 
embarking for the lower Chesapeake, as the transports could 
not be ready for some time, and ii afforded a good interine. 
diate step between the quiet and comparative comfort of tli« 

;;; movement down the Chcapeake. Another recital of the ^■'"«„f,7„,^^^Tv^i7h ngtorand t li^^^ active operation,, 

same favts which had before given s^Uisfaction to his cicel- ""g'/^^'^'^plt,"^^^^^^ of determining the 

lency again produced, as 1 snpposed the same result. Sion and pKps the future designs ol the enomy. with the 

The view, which I expressed to the President were re-en- P°'' l^it'HfCing able to harass their rear, 
forced by the result of a meeting of t^X K<^n"al officers at poss'bi''^^^^^^^ 

headquarte. s. At that meeting my plans weje laid before the 1 I "'^' '";* '„^Ve„ent of the army the next morning towards 
div-i.n commanders, and were approved by a majority »( 1^" » «„^.X and Manassas.sendingfn advance two regiment of 
tho.3 present. Nevertheless, on ^e same day two impor ant Cent e^ ^l-j"" ',^'»"'', ^ Vj,, „Xh orders to reach Manassas if 
orders' were issued by the President, w.thout c»n'"l'?t'»n ^»/* [.{""jj^/^,^'^'^^ ^^^^ 
with rac. The first of these was the genor-1 war order No. 2, P°''V'I«: "^T." ."."i ,„h »nnov the enemv if reallv in retrest. 

with roe. 1 lie nrsi oi iuese n»s \uk f^^-ii..i..i .-«. v.iut,i *.v. «, 
diic'^ling the formation of army corps, and assigning their 
coiiiraandeis. . . , , 

I had always been in favor of the principle of an organiia 
tion into armv corps, but preferred deferring its l'|a<-ticsj 
exeoilion until some little experience in campaign and on the 
fiJld of battle should show what general officers »"«•»'»» 
""mpctent to exercise these high commands, for it n'OSt b« 
reme'^^bered that we then had no officers "hose e.xpe ence in 
War on a large scale was sufficient to prove that they pos- 
Te^ed the necessary qualifications. An '■"^""'P'"^"' "": 
m^der of an army corps might cause irreparable damage 
wMle U i. not probable'that »-. '"-■".I-'^"' ''i^Ce" Wew," 
mander could cause any very serious """^'V^f-pJ^^f'^, ".^^ 
had frequently been expressed by me to the Pr'"""^"' *"'{ 
members of the cabinet ■ it was therefore with as much regret 
as surprise that I learned the existence of this o"-''"- 
The first order has been given above ; the second order was 

as foUoWi . jpj^ijjni.. General War Order No. 8.] 

EiB-t-nT« MiXPiox, Washington, March S. I««l 

ever he coul.l to retard and annoy the enemy if really in retrest 
at the same time I telegraphed to the Secretary of t\ ar that it 
would be necessary to defer the organization of the .irmy corps 
untd the completion of the projected advance npon «»"»'»«»■»» 
thedivisionscouldnotbebroughttoRethcrintiine Ihesecre- 

tarv replied, requiring immediate compliance with the Presi- 
dent's order.hnt on my again representing that this would coin- 
nel the abandonment or postponement of the movement to 

shall be resp^nfible that U as ewly as thai day 

•■ Or^rJ Til a the army anl navy co operate In .n Immedlale eTOrt 
V, cnp^rTlh.. "nemy's b.lterio. upon lh« folom«i bolwouu « «..l..ngtoa 
and ib« ChMapeoke bay. ^ iMUHAM USCuUS. 

■ "L.T»o«as, Jrfjirt'ni-CoKroI.'* 

[anassas, he finally consented to its postponement. 

At noon on the 10th of March the cavalry a'lv*"" reached 
the enemy's lines at Centreville, passing tl.rongh his recently 
occupied camps and works, and finding still burmng heaps of 
military stores and much valuable property. 

Immodialclv after being assigned to the command of the 
troops around Washington. I organized » secret service force, 
under Mr K. J. Allen, a very experienced and efli. lent person. 
This force, up to the time I was relieved from command, was 
continuallv occupied in procuring from all possible sources in- 
formation-regarding the strength, posiuons, and movemenUof 

»««-nT» >w>si«i., „™o...f».... ...... - - -, '''lu'sjlies. '• contrabands." deserters, refugees, and many 

.. Ordered, That no change of the ba... of operations of the ""/ «I .ri,„ne'„ of war, coming into our lines from the front, were 

thsIvZoac ,11.11 be made without leaving n "<', :^;"'J^"^j° ?rref"llv examined, first by the out-post and division com- 

wch a force .is, in the opinion of the noneral In chief and th. conunand care lull} ^1^,^^ ofstaff and the Provost-Marshal 

er, of army co,,«, shall l«iv« .aid ciiy entire y«xure.iman^^^^^^^ „tatements. taken in writing, and in many 

■'That no more than two army corps (about B '>,"'™'»''2,.'XT,Si of ^tn.Ur oath Tom day to day, for a long period previous 

«rS^ ori;t.'th,.-r«.l<len. shah h.roafu=r giv. exprc P*'"*^.,, ;i,J considerable »^<^^'V»-y /„''^''™c"ter ."nd result^Tf 
•inn . na Summaries showing the character ana results oi 

ance Which len some joiuuaiii «k III* ^. -.— r- =» . 

office miwit!ini:ly to trille with the reputation of an army, and 
??delSde ihe country with quaker gun stories of the defences 
and gross understatements of the enemv- 

■Tlic lollowing oiders were issued lor the cx-tmination of per- 
ions coming from the direction ol the enemy ; 

'* JlitAi)CiiT.\ur;:i:^: ARMV 01' t':b rOTlMAC, 

'■"W^LjlMiiijtuii.Dcooinbjr 13,1861. 

•'The major-genoral commanding directs that hereafior all desortors, 
prisoners, spies, ' contmbantis,' an<l alU^thor persons whatever, coming 
or bTOOghl within our linos from Virginia, t^hall be taken immediately 
to the quarters of the commander of the division within whose linos tlu-y 
may come or be brought, without prc-vious examination by anyone, 
except so far as may bo necessary for tlio officer conimandi;>g the ad- 
vance guard to elicit information rcjardinpr his particular post ; that the 
division commander examine all such pcr.-ons hirasotf, or delegate such, 
duty to a proper officer of his stuff, and allow no oth'T persons to hold 
any communication with them ; that ho then immodiat -ly send them, 
with asulHcicnt guard, to tho provcpt-marshal in this cily for further 
examination and safo-kcepiug:, and that stringent orders bo given to all 
guards havin? such persons in charge not to hold any communication 
with them wbiitcvor ; and further, that tho information elicited from 
such persons shall be immediately communicated to tlie major-general 
commanding, or to the chief of stiff, and ti7 no other person whatever. 

"Tho major-general commanding further directs thai, a suUicient 
guard be placed around every telegraph station pertaining to this army, 
and that such guards bo instructed not to allow any person, except the 
regular telegraph corps, general olhcers, and such stitffuflicers as may 
be authorized by their chief, to enter or loiter around said stations 
within hearing of the sound of tho telegraph instruments. 

'* By command of Major General McClellax. 

" S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant- Gsnerdl. " 

*• HiLU)QtTARTa;s Akmt of the Potomac, 

*' \Yashingtoa, February 2t3, lSfJ2. 
" General Ordes No. 27. 

" All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and other persons coming 
within our lines, wiil bo taken at once to the provost-marshal of t!ie 
nearest division, who will examine them in presence of tho division 
commander or an officer of his staff, designated for tho purpose. This 
examination will only refer to such information as may afl'ect tho divi- 
sion and those near it, especially those remote from general headquar- 

*' As soon as this examination is completed — and it must be inado as 
rapidly as possible — tho person will be sent, under proper guard, tu IL.^ 
Proves t-> tar shal General, with asUitement of his replies to the quest 
asked. Upon receiving him, the Provost-Marshal General will at i 
send him, with his statement, to the chief of staff of the army of tlij 
Potomac, who will cause the necessary examination to bo made. Thi.' 
Provost-Marshal General will have the custody of all such perso:!.-. 
Division commanders will at once communicate to other division com- 
manders all information thus obtained which affects them. 

• «#**«•# 

" By command of Major-General McClellan. 

" S. WILLI.A.M3, Assistant Adjutant- GmeraZ." 

In addition to the foregoing orders, the division commanders wer- 
Instructed, whenever they desired to send out scouts towards tl-.c 
enemy . to make known the object at headquarters, in order that I mip 1 1 1 
determine whether we had the information it was proposed to obtain, 
and that I might give tho necessary orders to other commanders, so thui. 
the scouts should not be molested by the guard.';. 

It will be seen from tho report of the chief of the secret service corps, 
dated March 8, that the forces of the rebel army of the Potomac, at that 
date, were as follows : 
At Manassas, Centreville, Ball run, Upper Occoquan, and 

vicinity 80.000 men. 

AtBrooks' station, DumfrieSjLower Occoquan, and vicinity, 18,000 men. 

AtLeesburgand vicinity 4,500 men. 

In the Shenandoah valley 13,000 meu* 

115,500 men 

About three hundred field guns, and from twonty-sK to thirty siege 
gnDB were with the rebel army in front of Wiiahington. Tho report 
made on tho 17th of March, after the evacuation of Manassas and 
Centreville, corroborates tho statements contaiued in tho report of the 
Sth,and is fortiQed by the affidavits of several railroad engineers, con 
Ptrnctors. baggage-masters, &:c., whose opportunities for forming cor- 
rect estimates were unusually good. alfi'Iavjts will bo found in 
the accompanying reports of the chief of thi- secret service corp.?. 

A reconnoissance of tho works at Centreville, m.ade by Lieutenant 
McAIester, United States Eiigioeer, on March 14, 1862, and a survey ol 
those at Manassas, made by a party of the United States coast survey, 
in April, 1S62. couflrmed also my. conclusions as to the strength of the 
enemy's defeiis-^s. Those at Centreville consisted of two lines, one 
facing east, Hiid the other north. The former consisted of sovcn works, 
viz. : one b.istion fort, two redoubts, two lunettes, and two batteries • 
all containing embrasures for forty guns, and connected by iuf.intry 
parapets and double caponi6res. It extended along tho crest of tho 
ridge, a mile and three-quarters from its junction with tho northern 
front to ground thxkly wooded, and impassable to an attacking co- 

The northern front extended about one and one-foiirlh mile to Grjat 
Rocky run, and thence three-fourths of a mile further to thicklv 
wooded, impissablo ground in the valley of Cub run. It consisted oi 
six Inorttes and batteries with ombrasure.H Tir thirty one guns, con- 
nected by an infantry parapet in tho form of a creiuaillere line witli 
redans. At the town of Centreville, on a high hill commanding the 
roar of all ihe works within rango, was a largo hexagonal redoubt with 
ten embrasures. 

Manassas fitatien was defended in all dlrectlona by a system of de. 
tached works, with platforms for heavy gun.'i arranged for marine car- 
riages, and often connected by infantry parapets. This system was 
rendered complete by a very large work, with sixteen embrasures, 
wh-ch commanded the highest of the other works by about nfty feel. 

t^ketches of the reconnoissanccs above referred to will be found 
among tho maps appended to this report. 

From this it will bo seen that the positions selected by the onemv at 
Centreville and Manassas were naturally very strong, with impassable 
streams and broken ground, affording ample protection for their flanks, 
and that strong lines of intrenchments swept all the available ap 

Although tho history of every former war has conclusively shown 
the great advantages which are possessed by an array ailing on the 
defensive and occupying strong positions, defended by heavy earth- 
works ; yet, at the commencement of this war, but few civilians in our 
country, and. indeed, not all military men of rank, bad a just apprecia- 
tion of the fact. 

New levies that have never been In battle cannot be expected to td- 


varei* without c«ver under tho murderous lire from such df-f^nses and 
Barry them by ivssault. This is work in which vftcnin troo|,3 frcqeent- 
ly fulter, and arc rcputiod with loss. That an n-csatiltof t.ic eueray'i 
pijsitions in front of Washington, with the now trooiis oom:)osing the 
army of tho Fotomac. dm-iug the winter of 1801-^62, would huvo result- 
ed in defejvt and demoralization, was too probable. 

Tlie same army, though inured to war in many battles, hard fouffht 
and bravely won , has twice, under other generals, suffered such disasuira 
as it was no excess of prudence then to avoid. My letter to tho Secre- 
tary of War, dated February 3, 18G2, and given above, expresse'd the 
opinion thnt tho movement to the Peninsula would compel tho euomy 
to retire from his position at Manassas, and free Washington from 
danger. When tho enemy first learned of that plan, they did thus 
evacuate Manassas. During tho Peninsula campaign, as at no former 
pLTied, Northnru Virginia was completely in our possession, and the 
vicinity of Washington free from tho presynco of the enemy. Tho 
ground so gained was not lost, nor Washington again put in danger in- 
til the enemy learned of the orders for tho evacuation of the Peninsuli 
sent to me at Harrison's bar, and were again left free to advance north- 
ward, and menace tho national capital. Perhaps no ono now doubts 
that the best defease of Washiogtoa is a Peninsula attack on Rich- 

My order for the organization of tho army corps was issued on tho 
13th of Mavcii ; it has been given above. 

Whileat Fairfax Court-house, on ilarch 12, 1 was informed through 
tho telegraph, by a member of my staff, that tho following document 
had api>eared in the National Intolligcncei- of that morning : 
[President's War Order No. 3.] 
" KxECUTiVE Mansion, Wiishiugton, March 11 1S8; 
" Major-Gonoral 5tcCIellan having personally takcndho field at'lh© 
head oi' the army of the Potomac,until otiicrwise ordered, he is relieved 
from the command of tho other military departments, ho retainin" 
command of the department of the Potomac. * 

" Onlered furZ/ur, That the departments now under tho respective 
commands of Generals Halleck and Hiuitcr, toa:efher wiih so much of 
that under General Suell a? lies west of a north and south line indcfl 
n;t.::y drawn through Knoxvillo, Tennessee, be consolidated and desiir- 
nateil the department of tho Mif;sissippi ; and that, until otherwise or- 
dered, Major-General Halleck hav*' command of said departmont. 
** Ordered, also, That the country west of the department of the Po- 
tomac, and east of the department of tho Mississippi, be a military de- 
partment, to be called tho mountain department, and that tho same be 
• jcommanded by M:ijor-General Fremont. 

*' That all tho commanders of departments, after the receipt of thla 
order by them, respectively report severally and directly to the Secre- 
tary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be ex- 
pected of all and each of them. ABKAUAM LINCOLN." 

Though unaware of the President's intention to remove me from the 
position of gencral-in-chief, I cheerfully acceded to the disposition ho 
saw fit to make of mj' services, and so informed him in a note on tho 
12th of March, in which occur these words : 

*' I believe I said to you some weeks since, in connection with some 
western matters, that no feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever 
prevent me from devoting myself to tho service. I am glad to have 
the opportunity to prove it, and you will find that, under present clr 
cumstances, I sh:ill work as cheerfully as before, and that no con 
sideration of self will in any manner interfere with the discharge of my 
public duties. Again thanking you for the official and personal kind 
ness you have so often evinced toward? mo, I am," i:c., &c. 

On the 14th of March a reconnoissance of a large body of cavalry 
with some infantry, under command of General Stoneman, was eent 
along the Orange and Alexandria raihoad to determine the position of 
the enemy, and, if possible force his rear across the Rappahannock, but 
the roads were in such eondition that, finding it impossible to eubsist 
his men. General Stoneman was forced to return after reaching Cedar 
The following despatch from him recites the result of this expedition : 

" He^dqdartkks, Union Mills, March 16, 1862. 
*' We arrived here last evening about dark. We got corn for horses ; 
no provisions for men. Bull run too high to cross. Had we staid an 
hour longer we should not havo got hero to-day, owing to the high 
water in the streams. Felt the enemy cautiously, and found him in 
force at Warrenton Junction. Saw two regiments of cavalry and three 
bodies of infantry on the other side of Cedar run. Had we crossed, 
should not have been able to get back for high water. Had three men 
of 6th cavalry hit driving in enemy's pickets ; one slightly wounded in 
the head. Enemy acted confldently,and followed us someway back 
on the road, but did not molest us in any way. Enemy's force con- 
sisted of Stuart's and Ewell's cavalry, a battery of artillery, and some 
infantry. Railroad bridges all burned down up to Warrenton Junc- 
tion ; still entire beyond, but all in readiness to burn at a moment's 
w-trning, having dry wood piled upon them. Heard cars running dar- 
ing night beforo last ; probably bringing up troops from Rappahannock. 
Heard of two regiments of infantry at Warrenton engaged in impressing 
the militia and securing forage. Heard of a largo force of infantry this 
side of Piappahannock river, having come up to Warrenton Junction 
from Aquia creek day before yesterday. Bridges all destroyed this side 
of Broad run. The aides who take this will give you further particulars. 
" Very respectfully, fcc, 

" GP»UGE STONEMAN, Brigadier-Oeneral Commanding. 

" Col. COLBURN." 

The main body of the army was, on the 16th of March, moved back to 
the vicinity of Alexandria to be embarked, leaving a part of General 
Sumner's corps at Manassas until other troops could bo sent to relieve 
it. Before it was withdrawn a strong reconnoissance, under Gene- 
ral Howard, was sent towards the Rappahannock, tho result of which 
appeal's in the following despatch : 

" Warkes-tox Jcxcno.v, March 29, 1882. 

" Express just received from General Howard. He drove the enemy 
.across the Rappahannock bridge, and is now in camp on this bank of 
and near the Pjppahanaock river. 

" The enemy blew up the bridge in his retreat. There wassklrmlsh- 
Ing during the march, and a few shots exchanged by the artillery, with- 
out any U»ss on our part. Their loss, if any, is not known- General 
Howard will return to this camp to-morrow morning. 

" E. V. SUMNER, Brxgadier-OeneraL 

" Generals. Wdjjams." 

The line of the Rappahannock and tho Manassas Gap ralh^jad was 
thus loft roasonably secure from menace by any considerable body of 
tbo enemy. 

On the 13th of March a council of war was as.sembIod at Fairfax O&nrt- 
houso to discuaa the mUitary status. Tho President's order No. S of 
March 8ih, was considered. The following Is a memorandum of the 
procoodlBfiS of the council : 

*' Headqdartkrs Aritv or thb Potomac, 

J^iirfcx CourtAoriv JTajxA 13. igaj. 


if lli<* jT'uvraw com 
r\rmv ..1 t»v' V*..i .<■■ .. 

IL> . 

uuiftK ;iriny r«n* Ibo Itcri* 

Q from ui«l i^nal CAimturt, buiwot'u itio \ urk kdU jMirti • 


.bccoriny':- v --<- 1 ^''-''lmac, cao be oeutraiiz'J. 

tin nu-ao-'i o: i :,,auUiiMnt fof an ionnietiUtr 

^(urcotoU^ : :. bo roaUy at Wiuhiu^tOD ai J 

move down t;* ].;....-.. , uml 

a u.ivat Auxitiury lorcu cuu ho had, to tUeoco, or aU in 

f-n* luy's balU-iten on iho York rivir. 
. the lorco to bo left lo cover Wa.->t.lnb{ton eball ha sucli a<i 
Uro reeling of security for ils n^fily frum meciicu. (Uouii- 

novo -J 

Mil tt,.-n 

! foregoing CAnnnt b". *-*" '"-r, 

"uwmy, bc-bloil the ' U!.} 

_ i the rat-aiw for cu » li, 

AOd stocklufj thoTu with uiatir -,. . ., i ^- - -■■ -iuiy. 

should at ODco be Ct)Ilr>ct<'<l, ft>r boiU ibo uraiii^o uid Aluxuniinit aiid 
Aqala and IMchmona ruUnvwl^. (rnaolniouo.) 

'• N. B.— Tliat with Ihp forU on th«? rii^bl baak of thi» Potomac fully 
garrisoned, and tlio^e on the Iffi bouk occupied, a covering forcj', 
iDfrODt oflho Virginia line, of 25 .000 men would Putn<-6. Kvys, H.iiu 
xelman, anl McDowell. A total of 40,000 moji far the dofiiuiM: of th<' 
city would jjullice." {?iimner ) 

ThU was a*s!!enled Iw by myttclf, and immodialety commantcaled lo 
the War Dcpajlmtnt. Tbo followlitu roply w*is received lb*- Rjimc »!«y ; 
"War I)i:PAaTHR.vr, Starch 13,1S6:^. 

*' The Proaidcot havloK considered Iho plan of operations r.i:rei><l ui^^ 
by yoorsclfanil tho roTiimander«r>rarniy corps, inakoa uo obj<x.tiua to 
the Bamo, but gIVL-d the following diri-ct ions us to ilJi excci:tii>u : 

*'I. LAive such force at Miiuos-sas Junction as Khali miko it entirely 
certain that tlio enemy Bhall uut rcpo»;ao:>0 himde!f of >bat poc^lttoa and 
line of communlration. 

" 2. L/^avo Washington cnlirHy Bccure. 

" 8. Move tho roiuiilader of tho force down tho Potomac, choofiloK a 
new base at Forlreis Monroo,or anywhere bPtw<>cn bore a»d there, or, 
at all ovent3, move furh remainder of the army at onco in puri*uit of 
the enemy by some rouio. 

" EDWIN* M. JTAXTO??. Secrdarjf rf War. 

" Mijor C<»nora: Gboros B. MctL^UJLV." 

My pr*"pa.ratkjns W'-re at oaco bigua In accordance with tbews dlrcc- 
tloofl, aD>l on the lOih of March th>! following Instructionis were scot to 
Geaeral3 Brinks :iDd Wadsworlh : 

••<)UAI.T£S3 AKMT OF THK POTOSIAC, M^FCh 16, 1862. 

" Bl% : Too will post your command in tho vicinity of Maua^as, io- 
treocb your&.'lf strongly, and tbruw civairy piclbCL5 well out to tuu 


*' Yonr first care win be the rcboilJing of tho railway from Wa'-h- 
logtOQ to Manas&aa and to Strasburg, in urder to opea your communi- 
caiwns with tho vailey of the Shenandoah. As soon as tho ilacaHik-i.s 
GapraiUviiy is in rui.nlDg order, intrench a brigade of Infantry, say 
four rogimoDtA, with two balteriej^.at or near tbo point where tho 
railway crt«se3 the fhdnand'.vih. S>incthing like (to regimeats of 
cavalry should bo left In that vicinity to occupy Wiocheel^r, and 
thoroughiy scour tho country Routh of the railway iind up tho Khcuan- 
doah valley, as well x^ through Chester pap, which might porhaf^ be 
advantageouBly occupied by a detachment of infunlry , well intreitcbed. 
Block-houses sDOuld bo built Hi all the railway bridges. Occupy by 
grand guards Warreaton Junction and WiirreatOD itself, and aUo eomo 
Lttle more advanced p^^int on the Orango oad Alexandria railroad , as 
lOon as tho railway bridgo U repaired. 

" Great activity should be observed by the cavalry. Brides the two 
reglmeati} at Manassas, nnolhor r -gimeiit of cavalry will bo at your dis 
posal, to Kcodt loward3 the Urcoqu^^u, and probably a fourth towards 

"To recapitulate, the most impoitaat points which Bhould engage 
your attention are as follows : 

•'1. A strong force, well Intrencbcfl, in Iho vicinity of Munasio-S, 
perbbps even (>otrcvtlle, and another force, (a brigade) also wri: m- 
trmichcd, near Strasburg. 

'• 2. Block hoQEoa at the railway bridges. 

" 3. Coostant employment of the cavalry well to the front. 

*'4. Grand guards at Warreaton Junction and in advance, a? tir a^ 
4he B^ipahanoock. If Doasibla. 

** 6. Great caie Ut bt< «.xu. -*:!.': ad tn* buia full and early l&formatloa 
M to thocD>'my. 

" 6. The general object is to curer tho Uuo of the Fotomae and Wash* 

*' The above l3comrauDical4-'d by command of Major -Gcu ralMcOeUan. 
•' ii. WlLLIA>L■^, Atsislant AdjutaiU fM'.iural. 

" M^Jor General N. P. Bas^is, 

•' Cynimanding Fifth Corpt, Army tf the rotomae." 

'■ llKAiKii'ABfuca Arxt OF TBE I'oTOUAC, Manh 19,1962. 

**BaL : Tho command to which you have been a.iKigned, by InBtmo- 
tion« of the FresldoDt, as military governor of the bUirict of Columbia, 
embracee tho gcn^r.iphiral limlU of tho Distrii:t, aiid wiU also Include 
tbo city f'f AUxau'ln.i, the delcnflvo wtrkB K>uth of tho Potomac, from 
the Occoquan to Inlilculicrci'k.and ibe poslof Fi>rt WashtoKtou. 

" I inclose a li£t of tho trooi« and of Iho defenses embraced in thcee 

"General Banks will command at M.\Qassas Junction, with the dlvl- 
Btons of Williams and Shieldii, comporting the liTih cori««,but yc-u ehould, 
DQTertboless, exfrclse vigilaiico in your front, carefully guard the ap- 
proaches In that quarter, and maintain the duties of advanced guards. 
Yon will use the luimo prerautions on elilu r flank. 

•' All trooj>s not actually needed for the police of Washington and 
OflorgotoWQ, for tho Karrwons north of the Potomac, and for other indi- 
cated special dulieft. tibould be moved l«> the south sid^- cf Iho rivor. 

•* In tho centre of your front you flmuld pof^l tho main body of yonr 
troops, and pmpor proportions at suitable distances l^'wards your right 
and left Hanks. Carti^ul patrols will bu made, in order thoroughly to 
■oonr the country In front, from right lu left. 

" It is Biieclally enjoined upon you to malctaln th" fortfl and their ar- 
maments m tho best possiblo order, to look circfully to ihn instruction 
and discipline of thoir garrifujos, as well as all o:b>T troops uudcr your 
command, and, by frequent and rigid inspections, to insure tiio attaiu- 
meot of iheae ends. 

" The care of the railways, canals, depots, brMfTPs, and fcrrie*. within 
theaboTO named limits, will devolve upon you. and you aro to insure 
litelr secority and provide for their protection hy every means in your 
puwfir^You will also protect the d>>poia of tlM public stores and the 
transit of itorcs to troops inactive - vioe. 9 

"By means of palruia you U' : Koughly scour the colghtiorin^ 

I country, bouth of the Kastem |L-.*... .1. :kad bIaood your rigtatf and you 

I" --very pomibleprocav " — cpt malls, goods and penoM 

::.iMhoril"d to the < 

i."C'>sity of mainii W within your llmita, and 

..;y in the capital of lli. ...n.. ... ...uot be loo strongly enforced. 

•■ Voti will forward and faciliui>> the movement of all troopa destined 
for Iho active part of the army of the Potnmac.ondcspecialjy the transit 
of deiachmfnts to their prt^' " r'- ■■ - ' -n-l o^ryn, 

'The charge of the new i ' in Washinglon, and of an 

tro-.^is temporarily IhTe, w.: 1 you. You will form them 

iiitc/ provHional brUudo£, p:<'>.> >. >)i' .; i^-truction and dl8clpllaa,aDd 
.U'-i-jUto their equipment, pi^port all arrivals of Iroope, their slreogtb, 
■.'►mpfisition, and equipment, l-y every oiiportunity. 

'■ Ilosides tho rei-ular reh'risand r«'-l*irii9, which yoo will be required 
(•> render to the Adjutant Geoeral of tho army, you wiU make to tlieae 
licadquartors a onsolidated rei>ort «.f your commnnd, every Sunday 
morning, and monthly returns im tho first day or each month. 

*' The foreiroiug insircciioiis are communicated by command of U%}or 
|^>oural .McCeUao. 

" S. WILLIAMS, AssutaiU Adjutant GmeraL 
'* Brigadier General J 8. Wai-swoimh, 

" Military Goremor of th* I>L-trirf fif Cofurnbia. 

Tho Secretary of War had expressed a de=ire that I should commont 

um 10 the War Departmeot my denlnis with rejtard to the employment 
■' tho army of the Potomac in an oflkial form. 1 submiti«d , on the 19ih 
'' Match, the following : 

" Hxi»Qr.utT£-iei Arut op tuk Poroanc, 

"ThrolLv;ica! Siiijnary, Va., March 19,1S42. 

" ^jh : I have the honor to submit th>' following note.> on the propOMd 
■l-nilioiH of tbrt active j^jrlion uf the .iriuyjjf tho Potomac. 

•' Thf proposed plan of campai;,'u is I'l .■ip-'>Tme Fort Monroe as the first 
'1=0 of o}>crations, tiikipif tho lino ■ f ^ or k town aod West Point upon 
lU'hmond as th'* line of oKrotions, Kichni"iid beinp llie objective potnL 
U ii oi^umed that tho fall of Kichmond involves that of Korfolk and the 
whole of Virginia ; aL-io, Uial we fiball fight a decisive battle between 
Wen Point and F.uhTnond, to give whi-h battle the rebels will concen- 
trato all their avaiia)iio forcoe, uiider«iandiug. ns thoy will, that it io- 
volves the fate of lii-ir cause. It theroioro follow.^ — 

''l«t. That wo should collect all cur available forcen, and operate 
3pon adjacent lines, maintaining pcrOct conununicatioo bvtweeo ot;r 

' • 'J*! . Tliat no time f houM be lo^t in reaching the fleld of battle. 

" The ailvantagcgnf tho Peninsula between York and James rivers are 
too obvious to need explanation ; it is also clear that Weal F'oint ahoutd 
13 sor-n 03 posslbl'j h'- reach'^d, and u'^ed as our main de[)Ot, that we 
may have the ?hortv.>t line of land tniu-sKrialion for oar Supplies, and 
tho use of the York river. 

" There are two methods of reaching this point— 

'* l>it. By moving directly from Fort ilonroo as a base, and trosrmg 
to tho roads for our fiupplie<i, at ihii Fum*! time landing a ftrongcorpe 
as near Yorktown as possible, lu ordrr to tnra the rebel lines of defense 
gjuth ofTorktowD ; then to re-luce Yorktown and Gjcucesler byasiege, 
in all probability luvolvlnp a delay of weeks, i>cri:.ip3. 

" 2<i. To mako a cnrnbined naval and land att:uk upon Yorktown. Ibe 
first object of the campaign. Tiiis leads lo tho mc-st rapid and decistve 
results. To accomplish th:^- t>:e nnvy should at onco concentrate opoo 
the York rivor all their avai:;.' 1'! and meet powerful batteries; Its re 
duction should not in that c;i e ri-quiro many bnur^i'. A Rtrong corps 
would be pushed up the York, under cover of th" navy, directly upon 
Wc5t I*olnt, tmmodlatfly upon the fall of Yorktown. and we could ai 
ODce establish onr new base of op-'rations at a d:.stanreof some twenty- 
five miles from Kichmond. with every facility for developing and bring- 
ing into play the whole of our available force on either or both bank'' 
of the James. 

It Is impossible lo urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the fall 
co-op4>ratiofl of the navy as a part fd this programme. Without II the 
operations may bo prolonged for many weeks, and we ma^' be forced 
to carry In front several strong pcsillons which, by their aid, could 
bo turned without norioiis \"^ of t-iiher time or men. 

' It is aL^o of tir?t importonro to bear In mind the fact already 
alluded to. thai the capture of Richmond necessarily involves the 
prompt fall of Norfolk. \^.*iilo an oiM-ration against Norfolk, if succers 
ful, as the bet'iivninc of- the campai^, faciliutes tho redurtioo of Hicb- 
mond merely by thft demoralization of tho rebel troops in%-olved, and 
that after the fiill of N'orfi>Ik we should be obliged to undertake ibe 
capture of Richmond by tho same moan.s which would have accom- 
plishod It In tho boj:ianing, having meanwhile afforded the rebels 
ample time to perf<*ct iheir arranpemenU, for they would 
well know, from Iho moment the army of tho Potomac changed lie 
ba?e to Fort Monroe, that P.ichmond roust be lis ultimate object. 

"It tryy be tnrnuied up in a few words, that, for tho prompt wo- 
cess of this cauip r.'i, it n abtiolul'-ly necessary that tho navy ehould 
at onco throw Its whole available force, its most powerful TCfsolB, 
against Yorktown. There is the most important point — there tho knet 
to be cut. An immediate decUtton upon tho subject matter of this 
communication Is highly desirable, and frecms called for by tho exi- 
gencies of the occo-sion. 

*' lam, sir, very respectfully, your ohedlpnt servant, 

•' GEORGE n. McCI.iJJjlN, Major-Ornfrat 

" Hon. E. M. Sr.vNTort, Sxrrtarp of IFar." 

In the meanlimo the tnwps destined to form the active army were 
collectO'l m camps cjnvcnleiit to the pcnols of embarkaimn, and every 
preparation mado to embark them as rapidly as pC'».Hib!e when tho 
transports were rcady. 

A few diy=; before sailing for Fort Monrfv. whll" ,.t;ll en'-:\mpM near 
Alexanilna. I mot the Pre.^ideiit, be .' -- He 

there informed me that ho luwl been • neral 

B!?nkor's division from my comin ■ .i Fre- 

mont. His Kxcellenry was rodJ eIlou^h t.. l ie,ifons for 

not uklnRlIlenkor's division from me. I . • force of his 

Huirgestioas. and was extremely gralifl-nl ■ _ ,10 allow the 

division to remain with tho army of th:) loi ... .c. U wa.?, therefore, 
wiih surprise thai I received, on the Sl^t. thi' fo;iowing note : 

" F.XKCmvi MAV?noN, Wa^iuvgm.x. March 31, 18A2. 
' Mr Pk-vr?!'*— This morning I felt constrained to order Bienker's 
division to Fremont, and I write this to assure yon that I did 8*> with 
great pain, und-r^iuiimi' that you would wish It oih;'rwLje. If you 
could know the ! ■! the case, I am cnnfll' nl that yon would 

justify it, even 1 ickaowledgmenl that the commander-in- 

chief may ord^-r v .^. Yours, very truly, 

*' A. UNCOI„\. 

" Msjor-General Mc<Yell*?i." 

To ihis I replied, in sulMiiaiice, that I regrette^l the order, and could 
ill aClord to l->so t'^n thoiL^and troops which had been counted upoo 
In forming mv plan of CAmpbtgn. but as Uiero waa no reraody, I wt»uld 
yield, and do the b:dt I amli wiih^>ut them In a coovenatioo w»tb 

Ibinp, au'l rxpn-jscd my regret that Bleiiker's divipjon bad been pivi n 
to Gtiueral Ficinout ij'om any pressure otiier tban the reqolreincut:' or 
the national exigoncy. I wflS partially reiievotl, however, by the I'rf- 
Kidcnt's iwsitivc and emphatic assuraiicc that I might bo ciiniirieut that 
no more troops beyond theso ten thousand should in any event bo taken 
Jrora mo, or in any way detache^l from my command. 
.At tho timo of tho evacuation of Mana£ by the enemy, Jarkson 
was at Winchester, onr forces occupying Cluiriestown, and Shiwld.s' 
reaching Bunker Hill on tho 11th. On tho morning of the 12lh, a bri- 
gade of General Banks' troops, under General U.iinillon, entered Wlu- 
cheeter, the enemy having left at 5 o'clock the evening boforo, his rear 
guard of cavalry leaving an hour before our ad\-ance entered tho place. 
The enemy having made hi5 preparations for evacuation some days be- 
fore, it wjs not possible to intercept his retreat. On the loth tho mas.^ 
of Banks' corps was conceutrated in the immediate vicinity of Winches- 
ter, tho enemy being in the rear of Strasburg. 

Onthoiaih General Shielda occupied .Strasburg, driving the enemy 
twenty miles south to Moimt Jackson. 

On the 20th the first ciivision of Banks' corps coraraonced its move- 
ment towards Manassas, in cumpliauce with my letter of Instructions 
of the 16th. 

Jackson probably received information of this movement, and sup- 
posed that no force of any consequence was left in the vicinily of Wm- 
chester, and uinjn the falling back of Shields to that place, for tho pur- 
pose of enticing Jackson in pursuit, the latter promplly followed, 
whereupon ensued a skirmi-^h on the 22il , in which General Shields was 
wounded, and an afl'air at Wmchestor on the 2Gd, resulting in the defeat 
of Jackson, who pursued us rapidly as the exhaustion of our troops 
and the ditHcnlty of obtaining supplies permitted. It is presumed that 
tho full reports of the battle of Wincht*ter were forwarded direct to 
Iho War Department by General Banks. 

It being now clear that the enemy had no mtention of returning by 
tho Manassas route, the followiug letter of April 1st was written to 
General Banks : 


*' On board the Commodore, April 1, 1S62. 

•' CiiNKKAl.— Tho change in alVairs in the valley of the Shenandoah 
has rendered necessary a corresponding departure, temporarily at least, 
from the plan we some days since agreed upon. 

" In my arrangements I assume that you have with you a force am- 
ply sufficient to drive Jackson before you, provided he 'is not reinforced 
largely. I also assume that you may And it impossible to ilelach any- 
thing towards ILinassas for some days, probably not until the opera- 
tions of the main army have drawn all the rebel force towards Rich- 


" Ifou are .%ware that General Sumner has for some days been at Ma- 
nassas Junction with two di visions of iufantry, six batteries, and two re- 
giments of cavalry , and that a reconnoissanc^ to the Rappahanock forced 
the enemy to destroy the railway bridge at Rappahannock J^tation,on 
the Orange and Alexandria railroad, yioco that time our cavalry have 
found nothing on this side of tho Rappahannock in that direction, and it 
seems clear that wo have no reason to fear any return of the rebels in 
that quarter. Their movements near Fredericksburg also indicate a 
final abandonment of that neighborhood. I doubt v.'lielher Johnson 
will now reinforce Jackson with a view of offensive operations. The 
lime is probably pa.^ed when he could have gained anything by doing 
so. I have ordered in one of Sumner's divisions, that of Rjcbnr.lson 
late Sumner's to Alexandria for embarkation. Clenker's has boon de-' 
tached from the army of tho Totomac, and ordered to report to General 

*' Abercrombie is probably at Warrcnton Junction to-day. Gearv iff 
at Whilo Plains. ' 

" Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered out, fl,nd are now on 
the way to relieve tho two regiments of Sumner. 

" Riur thousand infantry and one battery leave Washington at once 
for Manassas. Some three thousand more will move in one or two 
days, and soon after some three thousand additional, 
i*' I willorder Bienker to march on Strasburg and to report to you for 
temporary duly, go that should you And a largo force in your front you 
can avail yourself of his aid as soon as possible. Ploaso direct him to 
Winchester, thence to report to the Adjutant-General of tho army for 
orders ; but keep him until you are sure what you have in front. 

"In regard to your own movements, the most important thing at pre- 
sent is to throw Jackson well back, and then to assume such a position 
as to enablo you to prevent his return. As soon as tho railway commu- 
nications are rc-cstabllsheil it will be probably important and .advisable 
to move.on Staunton, but this would require secure communications, 
anda force of from twenty-five thousand to Ihirtv thousand for active 
operations. It should also be nearly coincident with my own move on 
KichmoEd, at all events not so long boforo it as to enablo tho rebels to 
concentrate on you, and then return on me. I fear that you cannot bo 
ready in time, although it may come in very well with a force less than 
that I have mentioned, otter the main battle near P.ichmond. When 
(kineral Sumner le.ives \\arrenton Junction, General Abercrombie will 
be placed in immediate command of Manassas and Warronton junction 
imder your general orders. Please inform me frequent!- by leloEranh 
and olliorwise as to the st.ite of thinss in your front. 
" I am, very truly, your.s, 

., . „ " *^,';';"'?1.''- ""^'"I'l''^^'. J^'-jor GinercU Commaniing. 

Major General N . P. Ean-ks, CommamXinij t'ifik Coiys. 

" P- S.— From what I liavo just learned, it would .seem that the re»i- 
mcnts of civalry intenuod for Warrenlou Junction have gone to Har- 
per's Ferry. Of tho four additional regimopts placed under your 
orders, two should as ua possible move by tho shortest route 
on Warreuton JuBcti.'n. 

" I am, sir, very re.spectrully, your obedient servant 

"GI-X)1:GK C. McCLEU.j\X, Jlrajm--G!ner<:l Commandii-a." 

This letter needs nn further explanation than to say that it was mv 
intention, had tho operations in (hat quarter remained under mv cliar-e 
.ither tohavo resumed tho defensive position marked out in the litt.-r 
i.f March 18, or to have advanced General Banks upon Staunton as mi.'ht 
m tho progress of events seem advisable. " 

It is to be remembered that when I wrote tho preceding and fol'nwlnq 
leiterecf ApriH, I haii no expectation of being relieved from tbeckaroo 
of the operations in the Shenandoah valley, tho President's war order 
Vo. 3 giving no Intimation of such an intention . and that so far as refer- 
ence was made to llnal operations after driving Jackson back and tak- 
ing such a position as to prevent his return, no posiilve orders wci-e 
(.nven in the letter, the matter being leftfor future consideration when 
th? proper time arrived fur a decision. 

From tho lollowing letter to the Adjulant-Goneral. dated April 1 
i 'i. It will bo seen that I leftfor thedcfenpe of tho national capital ami 
.:- .iii.r.r.elies, when I sailed for the IVniusala, 73.456 men, lOJ 
l'i..e.-of li::hl urt!;ler.,ino).-,|ingtll»33picc.« W Va^uicgtoa alluded 

olsf b " '■ '■'■•'■ • n ■•'niiiienJci oilier .-n.-iitablc liouns in Now York 

(more than ■lr,O0U) to bo at once ordered forward to reinforce them. 

" HEADQIJ.lltIKlw ARMV 01' THE PoroUAC, ^ 

" ''Itiomr Cmmcaore, April i . imS. 

" 1 have to request that you will lay the followinecommu- 
nicationbelor.: the Hon. Secretary of War. 

" The approximate numbers and positions of the troops left near and 
in rear ol tho Potomac are as follows ; 

" Gen. Dix has, alter guarding the railroads under his charge suffl- 
cient to give him 5,000 for tho defense of Baltimore, and 1 OSS availa- 
ble for the Eastern Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is vervwcU 
garrisoned by about 400 men. ' 

" The garrisons of tho forts around Washington amount to 10 600 
men ; other disposable troops, now with General Wudsworth about 
11,400 men. 

■* Tbo troops employed in guarding the railwayj in Marvland 
amount to some 3,36iJ men. Those it is dcsig-ed to relieve beine old 
regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to sentt forward to Manassas 

'M;oneriU Abercrombie occupies Warro^uton with a force which "in 
chiding Cukmol Geary, at White Plains, imd tho cavalry to be ot hia'dis 
posa!, will amouht to some 7,760 men, with V2 pieces of artillery 

*' I have Ibo honor to request that ali the troops or^'anized for service 
in Penupylvania and Kew York, and la any of the Ristorn States mav 
bo ordered to AVashinglou. I learn from Governor Curtin tbat there are 
somo 3,500 men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should be 
glad to liavo sent to Manassas. Four thousand men from General 
Wadsworth I desire to be ordered to Slanassas. These troops with the 
railroad i^imrds above alluded to, will make up a force imder the com- 
mand of tJeueral Abercronibio of something like 18 639 men 

" It is my design to push General Blenker's division from Varrenton 
upon Stra.?burp. He should remain at Stra&burg Ions enough to allow 
matters to a^ume a definite form in that region before proceeding to 
his ultimate dcstiuatiou. '■ '-^'^"'"s *" 

•"ITie troops hi the val-ey of the Shenandoah will thus, inclodine 
Bleukcrs division, 10,02S stron-, with 24 pieces nf artillerv • nS 
61b corps, which embraces the command of Gonnral f^hieldV 1ft fifli 
sM-ong, with 41 guns, some 3,652 disposable c:ivalrv,and the railrS 
guards, about 2,100 men, amount to about 35,-167 men. *"'"wiwi 

*' It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment, say 86( 
men. being, with somo 500 cavalry, 1,350 men on the lower Potomac. 

'* To recapitulate : At M'arreaLon thoro Is to be 7,780 men. 

*' At Mamu^siis, say 10,S59 '* 

"iu the valley of the Shenandoah 35,467 " 

"On tho lower Potomac 1,350 " 

"Inall 55,456 " 

" There wouM thus be left for the gai-risras and the front of Wash 
ington. umlor Gon»Tal Wadsworth, tjorae 18,000, inclusive of the bat- 
teries uu'Ur iuiftruction. Tho troops orcrauizing or ready for service 
in Kew York, 1 learn, will probably mimbor more than four thousand. 
These should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition wbere 
their services may bo most required. 

" lam, verv respecUullv. vour obedient servant, 

''OEOF.GE a M.CLELLAN, Mnjor-GenrraZ Commanding. 

" Brig-Gen. L. Thomas, AdjuUint-G'.neraL UnitL'd States Aiiny.'^ 

Tho followiug letter from General Barry shows that thirty-two 
(32) Held guns, wiih men, horses, and cquipment-s, were also left in 
Washington city when the army sailed. Thesewero the batteries under 
instruction referred to above . 


Washington, December 16, 1862. 

•'CEPrenAL: It having been stated in various public prints, and in 
a speech of Senator Chandler, of Miciiigan, in his place in the United 
States Senate, quoting what ho st-atod to bo a portion of the testimony 
of Brigadier-General Wadsworth, militnry governor of Washington, be- 
fore the joint Senate and House committee on tho conduct of the war, 
that Maior-Gencral McClellan bad left an insufficient force for the de- 
fense of Washington, and not a gun on whfds—' 

" I have to contradict this charge as followr; : 

" From official reports mado at the timo to me (thechicf of artillery ot 
tho army of the Potomac) and now in my posse-ssion, by the command- 
ing officer of tho light artillery troops left in camp in the city of Wash 
iny.ton by your orders, it appears that the followmg named field batte 
rieg were left ; 

"Battery C, let New York arlill:ry, Captain Barnes, 2 guns ; battery 
K, 1st New York arlilery, Captain Crounse, ti guns ; battery L, 2d Now 
Y'ork artillei-y^Captain Robinson, 6 guns ; 9ih Now York independent 
"oatlery, C-vaptain Monzordi,G guns ; 16th New York independent battery, 
(*apt;iiu Loclw ; battery A, *Jd battalion New York artillery, Captain 6 gnus; battery B, 2d battalion New York oi'tillery, Captain 
Mellahon, G guns : total of batteries, 02 guus. 

*• With the exception of a few horses which could have been procured 
from the quarterraa-ster's department in a few hours, the batteries wore 
all fit tor immediate service, oNccptiug tho Kith Now York battery, 
which having been previously oiil?red, on General Wadsworlh'a appU- 
oation, to report to him for special service, was unequipped with cither 
guns or horses. 

** I am , general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" W. F. B.UIRY, 
" iJ('i*«7.-<7'*jr. Tii:'prcfor irf Aj-tilkry United Stat€t Army. 
**Mai.-Gen. McCi.nt.LAN*, U.iVedSiaUz Amiy.^^ 

It is true tbftt Bienker's division, whichis Included la tho the force 
enumerated by me, was under orders to re-enrorcj General Fremont, 
but the fwll wing dispatch from the Secretary ol War. dated Mirch 31. 
1S62. willi'how Ibat I was autborisoi to detinu him at Strasburg until 
matters assumed a deflnile form iu that region, before proceeding to 
his uHimaie dostinatiou ; in other words, until Jackson was disposed 
of. And had ho boon detained there, inetead of moving on to Harper* 
Kerry and Franklin, nnder other orders, it is prob'bto that General 
Banks would have defeated Jackson, instead of being himself obligoii 
subsequently to retreat to William^port. 

"Wak Di;PARTMK.NT, Wav'Iiincton, D. C, March 31, 1S62. 

<'Tho order in respoct to Blenkcr is not designed to hinder or delay 
tho movement of lUchar^Ison, or any other force. Ho can remain 
wherever you dpsire him a.s long as required for your movements, and 
in any p'>sition you de,-ire. Tlie order \a simply lo place him vi position 
for re-enforcing Fremont, as F'>oii a-; yourdisiMwitkuis will permit, and 
he may go to Harper'.^ lorry by .such rouio and at such tirao as yoa 
phall direct, t'tato } our own wishea a.i to tho movement, when aur) 
how it shall bo raado. 

" KDWIN' hi. STANTON, Sccrftttry of War. 
"Maj.-Gen. McTnttAV." 

(C Without includ^^g G:>ncralBlrnkrr*s divi.oina, there were left 07 4^ 
Bttfu and 65 pk'oes of light nrtUUiy wli^ under fxUtlny circiiia 


■it ex- 

nii]ot hrivo ho'ii 
If th.' 

■ ■iloiil 

: more thu adcqtiato to iosnre (bo perfect secarlt^ of 
Wu.^4ii.>^i^u ;ii^iii&l U7 force the eDcmy could brtog against It, Tor tbo 
roUowiujc reuuos : 

The light troope I bad thro^m forwArd under C<»npnl Ptnn'-man In 
pursuit of the rebel army, after Iho evacuation pf ?' ■ - • 
ville, had driven thoir rear pu&rd across Cedar run . 
poditlons from Sumnor'fl corp^ had forced them b('\ 
noo': "''■'■ t ■ ! '!p3troyod all tho railroad brlOges liriiMn m.-n 
In' . y did not Intend to return vwr Hint route. 

if t: l)Led such a mowmcnt, th' ir prt 

bIo.. >..,n . ;, as It would f;- ■ - ■■ ■ . . i .1 . . . .. . 

bridge; ; and if my orders for t. 
to the front, to i;ivo timolv s* i 

bO-r- ■■ ■ :■■' ' ■ • ' ' 



tiro ii'JM-. .Ill .w. .« ..ini.oi., on i^.iii:^ iu ,-. ■ .i i, i>.tii i ;ir N ■ 

necessary poiM. 
It was clear to my mind, as T reiterated to tho nnthorlliM. 

moT-^r^' .... ,.. .t ,.<■ ,1. . 1. ,. „..,.. I. i 1, ..-., ,.■ .,. . . 

tbL' I 





fr. !: 
BUU , u.u 

Ing wa."^ V. 

tlons, vio[i ; .., .... ... ,i ... 

to Ueiacb from U15 mam arm> 

It is profHT to rt-mark, tb 

^cte4 the navy to oeutratize the Merrimae, 
ilj be done." 
< umm .ndiDg4tb army corps, tofitlAcsasfolloTrs bofora 

CaptalD C. v. m. A»i9Caat Secretary of the Nav}-, testiQcs bcfor« 

aodlprom. . 

Gt'DtTul K";, < - 
Iho comroilteo : 

•* During the lime that the subject cf the change of baso waa diacuased, 
I bad refused to consent to tho Tcnlnsula line of operations until I bad 
peut word to the Navy Department and asked two que?tii^ns: (Irst, 
whi'ther the Slerrirouc wxs certainly neutralized, or not? .Second, 
whether the na\-y wa*> m a condition to en operate rfilclcntly with Iba 
army to break throuRh between Yorktown and Gloucester Point? To 
bn(h of thesf. answcis wore returned In the affirmative ; that Is, tbo 
" ;inac wari neiitrnlized, and tho navy was In a condition to co- 
i<-* clOcicntly to break through botwcen Yorktowa Hud Gloucester 

ii. 'Mre starling fo- 
Alexander.of the 1 
.Tmiriion nnd it« \ 

^ lonelB.S. 
ur>oa tho 
• w:tb a small 

I'-rce of any magnitude m-ui.^ it.i nppoaraiico in 

ini; the proirrossof our operations on the I'oDin- 

„...«;,.... Tor my return from IUrrisou'8 land- 

'.1 nnmerons and Ptrong fortifiea* 

' " ' " ' iM not afford 

: jro fbr Fort 

Mor-' ' T-ycUipf of BLtU ..,„..„,... J,:.. ■ • ,., v. mo .it that timo 

be: s Willi ht-s exccilt'Bcy tho Prcaulent ami (lio Secretary 

of \ I to him a list of tho troops I proposed to leave fur tho 

dfftii. .^1 ...ww.i)c;ion,and tiio rositiou3 m wbicii I designed posting 
them. General iiiicbcock, after glancing his cyo over tho list, ob- 
eerved that h-: wis not tho judge of what was r* quired for defending 
the capital ; that Geueral McClelUn's position wa^ such as to enable 
hlin to under.'itAiid the subject much better than he did, and he pro* 
sumcd that if the force designated was, in his judgment, eufllclent, 
nothing more would bo requiri-'d. He wa.'s then told by t«e chief of stafl 
that I would be glad tt b;»vo hi«! opinion, as an old' and experionoctl 
officer ; to this be replied, that »s 1 had had tho eutire control of the 
doieupcs for a long timo, I was tho best judge of what was needed, 
and he declined to give any other expression or opinion at that 

On tho 2d of April, tho day following my departure for Fort Monroe, 
Generals Hitchcock and Thomas were directed by the Secretary of 
War to exiimino and report wliether tbo I'residuLt's instructions to me, 
of Ifarca 8 and 13 had bc^'U complied with; on tho same day their 
report wa.s submitted, and th'Mr df^ri.^ion was — 

<'Thal tbo requirement of the I'resident. that this city (Washington) 
aball bo left entirely secure, h.-^f not been (uliy complied with." 

Tho I'resident, in his letter to me on tho 9lh of April, pays : *' And 
cow allow mo toask, do you really think Isbould fwrmit the lino from 
r.ichniond, ria Maims.'vis Junction, to tbi.s city, to bo et:tirely open 
except what rcPisiauco could be presented by less than twenty thou-' 
sand unorganized troops." 

In tbo rep«.frt of Cunerals Hitchcock and Tlioman, n!tuded to, H Is 
ackaowloilgcd tliat there was no danger of an attack from tho direction 
of Uaua:i3as, in llieso words : " In regard to occupying Manas,";us Jmic- 
lion, as the oiiemy have destroyed tho railroads k-ading to it. it may 
be fair to a-snnn: that tliey have no intention of returning for the 'coc- 
cupatiuu «'I tin-ir Ulo poitio;i. and therefore no largo force bo 
necessary to bold Ibat pofitiun." 

That, as renr.arkcd before, \va9 precisely the view I took of it, and 
this was enforced by tbo subsequent movements of the enemy. 

In another paragraph of tho roiwrt it is stJited that (Iflyflvo thousand 
men was the numbf-r considered adequate for the dclienso of the atpilal. 
That General McClcliau, In his enumeration ol the lorces left, had in- 
cluded Banks' army cori«, operatin,? in tbo Shenandoah valley, but 
wbothcr this corps shoutd be regarded as availablo for the protection 
of Washington, Ihey decline toe?;pre£san opinion. 

At tho timo lliis report wa.=! made, tbo only enemy on any approach 
to Washington was Jaek.son'is force. in Irontof ^<•nk^ in tbo Sbenandcah 
\TiIlrv, with 1*1^ Mnm.ssos Cap railroad leading from this valley to 
Wj. -:. 1 be admitted. I prefiume, that Banks, occupying 

li. was in the br^l position to defend not only that 

api ;, but the roads to Harper's Ferry and above. 

Tlio number '■: tn-njij I ft by mo for tho defense of Wasbioglon, a« 
given in my lott*^ r to Va" Afijutant-Geueral. were taken from tbo latest 
<<Qlcial returns t f tbat tLite, au.l these, of course, constituted the most 
inistwortby and authentic eourco from which such Inlbrmation could tie 

Another statement made by General Hitchcock before the ' ' Committee 
on tho Conduct of thn War ."in rofercnce to this same order, f hould bo 
noticed. Ho was lukod tlio following question: " r>o you understand 
now that thi^ mivem'-Tit mado by General McClellan to Kort Monroo, and 
up tho Y> : in coinplianco with the recommendation of the 

counril < umiidliig corps, and held at Fairfax Court-house 

on the li I I, or lo violation of itf" 

To wbicti i:-- T- piM a .1^ follow? : *■ 1 have considered, and do now con- 
Flder, that it was m vinl.UiOQ of the recommf^ndalion of that council in 
two inu-ort-int parlicnIarH ; one particular being that portion v{ this 
report which represents tb" council as aRreeing to the expedition by 
wny of tho Peninsula, ynv>ri'd'_-</ the rebel steamer Merrimae roul 1 Urnt bo 
neutralized. Tlut inijxirtant provision General McClolian disreg-irded.' 
• ••••••«• 

fho second parllcular alluded to by General Hitchcock was in refer 
ence to tbo troops k-fi fur tho dofcnseof Washington, which has been 
disposed of a)»ove. 

In regard to tho steamer Merrimae,! have aUo stated that, so far as 
our operations on York river woro concerned, the power of this vopsel 
was uoatralizcd. 1 now proceed 10 give some of the evidence which 
iDflueoced me in comlnf! to tbat conclusion. 

FreviooB to our de|>artur'» for tho PeainFola, Mr. Watson, Assistant 
.Secretary of War, wa-* Pei»t by the I're'ident to Fort Monroe to consult 
with I'lwR-ofticer GoIdsborouyU upon this subject. Tbo result of ibat 
consultation Is contained In tbo iidbwing extract from tbc cvidcDce of 
Admiral Goldnborouch before tho "Committee on tlio Conduct of thn 
War." vi7_ : *' I told Mr. Watson, As-^tsfaul .S>crotary of War, that the 
rrv*t lent mirrbt mike hiRmind perf'*ct:y eiL-y nbout the Merrlm.ic going 
00 York river ; tbit sh'.- couM r.nver t;ei Ut^Te, for i had ample moaHS to 
prevent that." 

■■."""""■ L' I t :•. III. I- i; . \n u< .a l;i:ii [),, 

letters from Colonel Alexander will show 
liim to carry into effect this important order. 

1 rt ■ . I t'!-.. i[ii'. lij' --'-• >vbo succeeded me in command of the region 
in frt ni *f Wa-iiinKton, whatever were the fears for it» safety, did not 
deem it nr-ct'>~"iry to carry out my plans and instnic'.ions to them. 
Had Manas^a^J been placed in condition for a strong dtlV-nse. and iui 
communirations secured aii recommended by Colonel Alexander, tho 
result of General Pope's campaign would probably have been different. 
" W.v«iiNGTON, D. C, April 2, 18(12. 

" Fir : Y'ou will proceed to Manaffos at as early a moment as practl- 
cablo, and mark on the ground tho works for tho defen.'^o of that jdace, 
on the positions which 1 Indicited to you yesterday You will find two 
carpenters, cxperivuceJ in this kind of work, ready to r.Pcomp.any you, 
by calling on Mr. I>uughei ty, the master carpenter of the Treasury ox- 

*'Tbo general idea of tho defense of this position ts, to occapyUiA 
fringe of elevation which lies about half way between Manassas depot 
and the Junction of tho railroad, with a series of works open to the rear, 
60 that they may be commanded by the work hereafter to- be described. 

*' There will be at Uast four of works, throe of tb>^m belog on 
tho left of tho railroad leading from Alexandria, at the posit lon^' occupied 
by the enemy's works. Tha other on tho right of this road, on the poei- 
tloa wo examined yestcrdiiy. Tho works of tho enemy to ihe north of 
this latter position, numbered 1 and 2 on Lieutenant Cont?tock*a sketch, 
may nb^o form a part of tho frt>nt line of our defence ; but tbo sides of 
thccii? works looking towards Manassas station should be leveled, so that 
tbo interior of tho works may be seen from the latter position. 

" Embrasures should be arranged in all these works for^W artillery. 
The approaches should be such that a battery can drive into the works. 
Tlie number of embrasures in each battery will depend upon Ha size and 
tho ground to be commanded. It Is supposed there will bo from four 
to cieht embrxsorrs in e.arb battery. 

*' Tho other worl:- ' •" 1' ' -' '--TardP the east and sooth 

may bo slrengthcrj ;■ ii?e in these dircctlona. 

llio work No. a iu I h may be al>o Firength- 

CDcd and arranged i. . n .^ .-uin 1 . , wi.'n laui' will permit. This work 
is in a good position to cover a retreat, wbicb would be made down the 
valley in which the railro;ul ruo<; towar«bi Dull run. 

"At Manassas station tbere Ehould be a f"rt constructeil. The rail- 
road will pass through this fort, and the depot, if there should be one 
built, should b? pbcrd in its rear. This lutt t work should be regarded 
as the key to the posiiion. It should bo as largu as the nature of tho 
ground will permit. 

** By going down the slopes, which nro not steep. It may bo made 
largo enough to accommodate 2,000 or 3,000 men. The top of the posi- 
tion need not be cut away ; it will be better to throw up the earth into 
a largo traverse, whirh may also bo a bombproof. Its profile should 
bo strong, and it? ditches sliouid be Hanked. U should receivo a heavy 
armament of 24 or C2-p:unders, with some rifled (rarrott) 20 or 30- 
poundcrs. Its guns should command all tho exterior works, so that 
these works could be of no use to the eoemy, should he take tb^m. !n 
accommodating the fort to tbo ground, this cons ideratioa should not bo 
lostslKht cf. 

After tr-oclng lhe?e works on the gronnd, you w " - "'- " ■ 'r-^tch 
embr.icing the whole of them, showint; their relative 1 - ize. 

This sketch should embrace the Junction of the raibc uid 

for some distance rr • ' •'; .lin work. U need t-.^ b... ....1..,^ with 

extreme accuracy, j^ may bo pacc^d, or measured with a 

tape lino. The b liken by compass. 

t, J, _. . 1 „-. , , ,-...,.^.^. ..ud prriared your sketch, yon will ro- 
por: ;>->rick 11. frime, of tho corps of Engineers, who will 

furij IIS of construction. 

'■ U i-> ;.i; • '"- that tho.^o works should be built with the least pee 
Bible delay. You will, therefore, cip^'Jito matters as fast as t)0«siblo. 

'• Very respectfully, your obedient terva^U, B. S. AlJiXANlHU:. 

Lxc'iUnantColonelt AicL-d'^-Camp. 

" Captain Fred. R. UcvrnEa^Pncjeni." 

"WASBWC?rox, April fi. 1802. 

" Fm : I inci>5e you borewllh a copy of the instructions which 1 gave 
to C.-\pt;iiii Miiiilbcr, in rcforonco to the defenses of Manass-is. 

" As tlicro {ma h'f^n n new department created (tbat of the Rappa- 
hannock), It isp.t.'-viblo that you and I, as well as General McClellaa, 
aro relieved fjotu tho further consideration of this subject -t the 
prcFenl tim*'. 

•' 1 wi!!. li'twev'T, slate for your Informal Ion, should the subfeei over 
com>^ bi-ro you a>;ain, Ihat'ia my opinion the communication with 
M:inri -u« "uv hnd shniild bft r-'curcd. 

To ra-'Cl tbi- 
tended. I think t, 
above t'i:Tii!"fvi.l 
thai 1 
the .'. 

;i.Tnnpr, Fo far na my obFer\ation.*e.T- 

Bull run, near Union mills, and jnst 

.1 be rebuilt or thoroughly repaired, and 

\% I <T liireoopen batteri''S, should be erected on 

I prciti^Ct It as well as ttie railroad bridge. 

tion by bind would then bu through or nearCenlro- 

viMenv r ti ■ nai used by the onoroy. 

" 1 wriie this for fear something shn^ild detain me here : but I liopo 
to leave bore to join you to morrow. My health is much improved. 
*' Very respectfully, vour oboJlent E*^rvant, 

•■B. S. Al.VXASDVR,Li/'tiU:nantCoUmel,Aide-d€-Cainv 
" Brigadier-Oneral .1. *:. BARSAlIii. 

'■ Cni^f Knfji •.!■'>•)•, Army 0/ ihr Pnttynuic.*' 
t mav be periiiilted u'-o to ment'on that the phns (ftl«:o uncxecstM 
bv my V'lrceppor) tndicited in my lett<'r of InPtruciIons to General 
Hank.", dntoil M.irch 10. 1^02, for Intrenchtng Chester gap and the jwlnt 
whiTO the Mana-^^as railroml crossep tbo Shenandoah, were for the pur- 
poaa of p; .veuiinK even the attempt ol such a raid as that of Jackson 
lu the month of May followinj. 


MliJT.lK? I.\aDDI.ra op TDK FTOST I'EWOD. 

Kcforu tiikiiig up tlio history of Ihe embarkiuion and Pcninsnla cam- 
paign, I eIuiuM icmark tliat durJDg tbe fall and wiutor of lS61-'62, while 
Iho army of tho Potomac was in posilion in front of Washington, rocon- 
uolssauoes wore mado from time to time, and Elinmislics frequently oc- 
curred, which were of great importance in tho education of the trooiis, 
socustoming them to tho pi-esence of the enemy, and giviuR tliem con- 
IMenco under flro. There were many instances of individual gallant; y 
<lisplayed in these affairs ; the reports of them will bo found among the 
documents which accompany this report. 

One of tho most brilliant of thoso affairs was that which took place at 
Dramsville, on December CO, ISOl, when the 3d brigade of MeCall's di- 
vision, under Brigadier-General E. O. C. Ord, with Eiston's battery, 
routed and pursued four regiments of Infantry, ono of cavalry, and a 
battery of six pieces. 

Tho operations of Brigadier-General F. W. Lander on tho Upper Poto- 
mac, during the months of January and February, 1862, frustrated tho 
attempts 01 General Jackson against tho Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
Cumberland, &c., and obliged him to lall back to Winchester. His con- 
utitution was impaired by the hardships ho had experienced, and on the 
2d March tho fearless General Lander expired,* victim to tho excessive 
latigue of the campaign. 



The council , compo^od of tho four corps commanders, organized by the 
I'rosident of the United States, at its meeting on the loth of March, 
adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operationsVor the movement of the 
army of the Potomac upon liiclimond. For tho prommand succes.sful 
csecution of the projected operation, it w-as regarded;by all as necessary 
that the whole of the four corps should be employed, with at leiist the 
addition of ten thousand men drawn from the forces in 'the vicinity of 
Fortress Slonroe, that position and ils dependeucies being regarded as 
amply protected by tho naval force in its neighborhood, and tho ad- 
vance of the main army up the Peninsula, so that it could be safely 
left with a small garrison. 

In addition to tho land forces, tho co-operation of the n.avy was 
desired m the projected attack upon Yorktown and Gloucester, as 
well as controlling the York and James rivers for the protection of our 
flanks, and the use of the transports bringing supplies to the army. 
With these expecutions, and for reasons stated elsewhere in this report, 
my original plan of moving by Urbana and West Point was abandoned, 
and the line with Fort Monroe as a base adopted. In tho arrangements 
for the army to the Peninsula by water, the vessels were oi^iginally 
ordered to rendezvous at Annapolis ; but upon tho evacuation of 
-Manassas and the lower batteries of the Potomac by the enemy, it he- 
came more convenient to embark the troops and material at Alexandria, 
and orders to that eflect were at once given. 

Jto making the preliminary arrangemenls for the movement it was 
determined that the IJrst corps. General McDowell's, should move as a 
unit first, and eOecl a landing either at the faud-box, some four miles 
south of Yorktown, in order to turn all tho enemy's defenses at tihip 
point, Howard's bridge. Big Bethel, &c.,or else, should existing cir- 
cumstauces render it preferable, land on tho Gloucester side of York 
river, and move on West Point. 

The transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. In order, 
therefore, to expedite matters, I decided to embark the army by divi- 
sions, as transixirls arrived, keeping army corps together as much as 
possible, and to collect tho troops at Fort Monroe. In determining the 
orderof embarkation, convenience and expedition were especially con- 
suited, except that the-flrst corps was to be embarked, as 1 intended 
to move it in mass to tho point of disomh^lkalion, and to land it on 
either bank of the York, as might then bo determined. 

On the 17th of March ILimillon's division, of tho .'id corps, embarked 
at Alexandria, and jiroceedod to Fort Monroe, with the following ord»rs : 
. _ Wasuingtos, D. C. , ilarch 17° I S02. 

"Ton will, on your arrival at Fort Monroe, report to General \rool, 
and request him to assign you ground for encamping your division. You 
will remain at Fort Monroe until further orders from General McClellan. 
should General Wool require the services of your divi.^ioa iu repelling 
an attack, you wij obey his orders, and use every ellort to carrr out his 

,„ „ „ '-R. B M.\RGY, CA;«fo/aaff. 

General C. S. Haiiiltox, Comvumding Division. 

On tho 22i of March, as soon as transportation was ready General 
Fitz John Porter's division, of tho same corps, embarked. General 
Helntzelman was ordered to accompany it, under the followiiig instruc- 
tions ; " 

" Headquarters ARjrv op rwi Poto.hao, 
Sejii.varv, March 22, 1S62. 

" GEXtTUL— Upon the disembarkation of Porter's division at Fort 
Monroe, I have to request that you will move your two divisions, Por- 
ter's and Hamilton's, some three or four miles out from the fort to find 
good camping places, where wood and water can bo readily obtained 
and where your positions will bo good Inadcfensivo pointof view. You 
may find it advisaL->Ie to place ono division on or near tho road leading 
to Yorktown from Newport News — the other upon that leading to York- 
town direct from r ort Monroe. If yon find that the nature of°the coun- 
try will permit easy cemmunication and mutual support between tho 
two divisions, it will he best to place one on each road. It will be best 
to remain pretty near tho fort for tho present, in order to give the im- 
pression that our object is to attack Norfolk rather than Yorktown. You 
will do well, however, to push strong reconuoissanees well to tho front 
to ascertain the position of the enemv and his pickets. 1 will, as soon 
as possible, reinforce you by the 3d division of vour cnrp.<,and It is 
probable that a part or tho whole of tho 4th corps will also move from 
Fort Monroe. This will probably bo determined before your disembar 
kation is completed, and you will bo informed accordingly. 

"My desire would be to make no important move in advance until we 
arc fully prepared to follow it up and give the enemv no time to recover. 

" The quai termastor of your corps will receive detailed instructions 
m regard to land transportation from General Van Vlict. 

" It will be advis,ablc to mobilize your corps with tho least possible 
delay, and havo it prepared for an advance. I have directed extra 
clothing, ammunition, Sc, to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all defl- 
ciencies may be supplied without delay. 

•' Please report to me frequently and fully tho condition of things on 
tho new Hold of operations, and whatever inlelligouco yon gain as to the 

•■ lilngago guides iu sulUcieut numbers at once, and endeavor to send 
out spies. 

I am, very truly, yours. 

" :■':';' '■T^.':.\\.,V'ijor-Gev.nal.Cimmaniing. 

"Bngal. ' i \:i , (XmTitanuinr; iid Corps." 

The rem ,^ ranidiv as tran'-port.i r^nlH h,- 

On the 1st of April I embarked with the headquarters on tho Bteamer 
Commodore, and leached Fort Monroe on tho afternoon of the 2d 

In consequence of the delay in tiio arrival of the horso transports at 
j'.lexandria, but a small portion of the cavalry bad arrived, and tho ar- 
tillery reserve had not yet completed itsdisembarkation. 

Hound there tho 3d I'ennsylvaniacavalry and tho5th regular cavallT • 
tho second regular cavalry and a portion of tho Isl had arrived but not 
disembarked. So few wagons bad arrived that it waa not ptisslblo to 
move Casey's division at all for several days, while tho other divisions 
were obliged to move with scant supplies. 

As to the force and position of the enemy tho Information then In our 
possession was v.aguc and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained from 
tho stair officers of General Wool, and was simply to the effect that York 
town was surrounded by a continuous line of earthwork^ with stronir 
water batteries on York river, and garrisoned by not less than 16 OOO 
troops, under command of General J. B. Magrndor. Maps which had 
been prepared by tho topogr,aphical engineers under General Wool's 
command, were furnished mo, iu which tho Warwick river was repre- 
sented as flowing parallel to, but not crossing, the road from Newport 
News to Williamsburg, nuking the so-called Mulberry Island a real 
island ; and we had no iulOrmation as to tho true course of tho Warwick 
across tho Peninsula, nor of the formidable line of works which it cov- 
Information which I had collected during the winter placed General 
Magre.lers command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of 
Genei-al Huger s force at Norfolk, estimated at about 15 000 

,„",."'^ ?-^^° I'"''^™ '"^' "'"'■o were strong defensive w'orks at or near 
Williamsburg. """ 

Knowing that General Huger could easily spare some troops to rein- 
force Yorktown that he had indeed done so, and that Johnston's army 
of Manassas could be brought rapidly by tho James and York rivers to 
the same point, I proposed to invest that town withoutdelay 

Tho accompanying map of Colonel Cram,U. B. Topographical Ensi- 
ncers, attached to General Wool's staff, given to me as the result of sev- 
eral months; labor. Indicated the feasibility of the design it was also 
1.1 object of primary importance to reach tho vicinity of Yorktown be- 
;>'ie the enemy was reinforced sufBciently to enable him to hold in force 
..s -v.rks at Big Bethel, Howard's Bridge, Ship Point, &c., on the direct 
road to Yorktown and Young's Slills, on the read from Newport News. 
This was the more urgent, as it -n-as now evident that some days must 
elapse before the first corps could arrive. 

Everything possible was done to hasten the disembarkation of tho 
cavalry, artillery, and wagons iu the harbor ; and on the 3d the orders 
of march were given for the following day. 

There wero at Fort Monroo and in its vicinity, on the 3d, ready to 
move, two divisions of the Sd corps, two divisions of tho 4th corps, and 
ono division of the 2d corps, and Sykes' brigado of regular infantry, 
together with Hunt's artillery reserve and the regiments of cavah'y 
before named, in all about SS.OOOmen and 100 guns, besides the divi- 
sion of artillery. 

Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of tho 2d and 3d corps had not 
arrived, and Casey's division of tho 4th corps was unable to move for 
want of wagons. 

Before I left Washington an order had been issued hy the War De- 
partment placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies under my control, 
and authorizing me to draw from tho troops under General Wool a 
division of about 10,000 men, which was to bo assigned to the Ist 

During the night of the 3d I received a. telegram from the Adjntant- 
General of the army, stating that, by the President's order, I was 
deprived of all control over General Wrol and tho troops under his 
command, and forbidden to detach .any of his troops without his sanc- 

This order left me without any base of operations under my own con- 
trol, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it. 

On ray arrival at Fort !.ionroo the James river was declared bv the authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the com- 
bined influence of the enemy's batteries on its hanks and the confederate 
steamers Merrimac, Yorktown, Jamestown, and Tcazer. Flag Officer 
Goldsborough, then in command of the United States squadron in 
Hampton Koads, re::;arded it fund no doubt Justlv)as his highest and 
most imperative duty to watcli and neutralize tho'Slerrimac ; and as he 
designed using his most powerful ve.s-sels in a contest with her, he did 
net feel able to detach to the n^sistance of the army a suitable force to 
attack tho water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was 
contrary to what had been previously stated to me, and materially 
affected my plans. 

At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy pre- 
pared to loud us any material assistance iu its reduction until after our 
laud batteries had partially silenced the works. 

I had hoped, let me say, hy rapid movements, to drive before me or 
capture tho enemy on the Peninsula, open tho James river, and press 
on to Richmond before ho should bo materially re-enforced from other 
portions of the territory. As the narrative proceeds the causes will 
be developed which frustrated thesa apparently well-grounded expec- 

1 determined then to move tho two divisions of the 4th corps by tho 
Newjjort News and Williamsburg road, to take up a position between 
Yorktown and Williamsburg, whilo the two divisions of the 3d corps 
moved direct from Fort Monroe upon Yorktown ; tho reserves moving 
so OS to support either corps as mght prove necessary. I designed, 
shoiiM the works at Vorktown and Williamsburg oiler a serious resist- 
ance, to laud the 1st corps, ro-enrorced if necessary, on the left bank of 
tho York or on the .Severn, to move it on Gloucester .and West Point, in 
order to take in reverse whatever forco the enemy might have on tho 
Peninsula, and compel him to ab.indnn bis positions. ' 

In tho coinnioncement of tho movement from Fort Monroe, serious 
diinctilties \Yoro encountered from tho want of prccLw topographical 
Information as to tho country in advance. Correct local maps were not 
to be found, and tho country, though known in its general feature, wo 
fonuil to bo inaccurately described in e.^sential particulars in tho only 
maps and geographical memoirs or p;ipcrs to which access could bo 
bad. Erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, 
and no dependence could bo placed on tho information thus derived. 
This difllculty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of 
tho State of Virginia, through which my military operations have ex- 
tended . Keconnolssances, frequently under Arc, proved the only trust- 
worthy sources of information. Negroes, however trt;th;'iil their 
reports, posse.ssod or were ablo to communicate very little ncccurato 
and no comprehensive topographical information. 

On the 3d, tho following orders were given for the moreracnt of ibo 

" Porter's and Hnrailinn*s divisions, and Averill's cavniry, of the 8d 
corps, end t'edgwick's division, of tho 2d coriw. under Brige.dicr-General 

. -.Inr nri-r-- fiTl-r'« rln-^-on, «iUi AviTiirj cnW-y. at <l A. M. . 

.\ liw uM.i. . » i , V ... t.. . ■/. Iiff l;> : :.n ; i;. v..<ril K 

^ ■ t'l'" 


' iin- cv^l 'II »-■■ : ■ "-■•■■• , ' '-':; 

i-ion miy bo usr.l lor u::s purpcsc, il ni<M'rf..o . 111..1 1. 

lialtcrics should bo tcrrpK-J by our troii.< t" m..n(.w 

lUii 1 ri;'.:> ol llic divislou nol uccctsjry for this purpos* iviU cncanij. 

"' "Slwn'^'div.slon will march ot 7 A.M., by .he Now Brldgo roai 

irt ni£» Hi^lhcl ftQd will encamp on Howard B crPel:. .... , . 

-^Ml^^ks dIvUion wiU march al 8 A.M., by Iho Nownurkf 

bri.l^^S!fo(t to Srccl road 10 Hig lio.hol, and will also encamp a. 

"-T&t«r'uei«nil Koyes, conimamllng 4th corps, will move wi^h 
=mlllf?and Couch's diviBion at 6 \. SI. (Smith's d v., 

smllh'Band Couch's divluion at i. .v. ^. (.= = ....■Mm. in nd% nco), 

hTlha James nvcr road. Too Cih rcjuter cav,.lry, lcmp.vrarily as- 
.L^ i ?hu coTM will movo Kith smith's division, which wdl en. 
SS!?a^Yo.for° mi'lS hraw.nR lorward at least ono br.yado t« the 
JJS 'ora B,g t-'lhcl to Warwick. Couch's division will .ncamp at 

^f/Vi'^r" efvc oavalry, artillery, and inrantry will move at S 30 A. M 
by tK Ne^"*^''' "^W^" 10 Ble Bcth«l,whcr« It will encamp. On the 
^.Hh 11 will keen in rear orsedswiek s division." 
'Xfoll?«inri^i"«"''=l''«"''''° """" ^'"^ »" '"• *"■'" "" 
°^The°'roUowiaVmo«ment8 of the army wlU bo carried onl to-mor- 

'""^t'nVral Keyes will movo forward Smith's division at 6 A. M., via 
Warwt^k Court liouse and the ro..d Ica^llni; near the old shipyard, to 
tht^« Mfway House ' on the YorkKjwn and W illiarasbarg road . 

"O^oraT touch's dlvisio- will marrh at 6 A. 1., to close up on 
n«r.«ral Smith's division at the ' Uairw.iyHotisn.' 

"Genera Keyes' command will occupy and hold the narrow divlrt- 
, - ,i,i.« n,Ur the • I'air w,iy House,' so as to prevent the c-capo of the 
salr^n al^i^klo,^ by land, atJ 1 prevent re enforcements being 

'^"G?neraIHeinl?<•lmaowiH movo f.rward General Porter's two rear 
brliS?r^ A SI upon the a.iv.,.reJ guard, when the entire division 
w^nmlrancc to aV">' about two aud three quarters miles from York- 
Town ^ero tho Voad turns abruptly to the north, and where a road 

■^T^!!^^! H^^s ^SJ™*^" -o™ ='* A ?•■."«' '^"«- «*»• 

,.r«l Porter's division, r.-.imoinj; as near 11 as possible. 

"Oen-rLmd- °ck'3 division will march at 6 A. M. as far as the 
Warwick ?oad,«^icl' '■"<"« ""> "^'i. Yorktown road near Doctor 
Powers' house, and will await further orders. ,. , ,„ , 

"tSi re° ervo will march at 6 A M., upon the main "Vorktown road, 

the arti lery toiloKinc ncut, and the cavalry in rear. 

"Ceno?af s"dswlck'8 division will, for the presen act with tht' 
roBervo and tie will receive orders from hendquarters. ' 

?^.„^^».hrV„ orders of march for the 4th and 6lh, it was expjcted 
thitttee^vS bo no serious opposition at Big Bethel and that tl^ 
Iti. .» „r . ,« %! r.iriw bevond that point would force tho enemy to 
!^;»^the''wo',i,'=a'YoSng's mills, wl-lle our posso^^ion of the latter 
J^lH make it ner.-,-.ry for him to abandon those at Howard's bridge, 
Tnd thradvance Ih-ncc on Yorktown would place Ship point in <.ur pc«. 
sS^slon "together with its garrison, unless they abandoned it promptly. 

Xr?n"g\SeXn™!;''oi' tK"4''th"Ge„eral Keyes obtained information 
„r?he nrescncc of °ome 6,000 to 8,00e of the enemy in « strone pisition 
atSfe's roUU The nature of Ihit ,wsition in relation to tho Warwick 
Sol^elog at tdat time under.^tood, I instructed General KeycB to att«:k 

™l„Sy's wo^sat Je's Jlills, where the road from .Newport News to 

''^rpfo';r?iT?arh"c:i',mm'''i;ad been retarded by hea^T ra.n. on 
ihMdiv which had mide the roads almost impas^sable to the ratan.ry 
S^Keycs'"ol ™u and impassable to all but a small portion of the arld- 
torf, wWle th™mmunil.o.., provisions, and forage could not be brought 

""whel' General Keves anproached Lee's mills his leftflank was exp<Bed 
Uil^im art ^eryttrc from the further bank of Uie Warwick, and upon 
^^She virmity of tho mill, he found it altoReVher stronger than 
WM e"?«ted, unapproachable by reason of tho Warwick river, and In- 

TheTo^.^ »MU-mg Se'^vance of each column were, during the 
aftorn^^ under a WH?m artillery Ore, the sharpshooters even rf th. 
riht column being cigagcd when covering rcconnoi^sanc -s. , 

It wTraT?hlr?sl!l.;eaQ5 moment of tho campiiigu that the following 1 
telegram was sent to mo : _ ^^,^„ ,,^„ „ ,, 0^^^ April 4. 1662^ 

" Bv direction of tho President, General McDowell's army corps hM 
been delSd from the force "»d"J»"r;'""f.V»'" ^7;.";!,;'; b'y maiU 
general is ordered to report to tho ^f-«^VMX^-,/^':iI.'^s':L"r 

mo7'"Hd™'um"ng'i.romteed,ln an Interview following his order 
or toAht ,w ttiriw^ng Diooke'r's division of W »»», m;" f^" ,";y 
coinmand,thai nothing of the sort should be "P'?'"^-"^^' ' ."^^^ 
real assured that the campaign should proceed , » i.h ,■>» J "' '^, °" J^ 
ItonsTora tho force upon which it^ operations had been P ai,ned-I 
mav eoiif..'^ to having been shocked at this order, which, with that of 

he'.S^ u uVo ami .'hat of the 8d,remove1 "-"'>„« ,^»,'°^°'™ 
my coiuir... 1 . an.l rcUicod my force by more than »"'',"»"' '^^.^^^ '■? 
uak had b-en V^iimod ; lu oiwrations iilanned ; Its fiRlitmg begun To 
^e tie blow wo-s du^unrdlig. " /^^''''P^^'' 'r.'; "u o i .™: 

Sv^bsi-^x:^ "=^p^^ --i- --- - 

«« I beat could with the force at my coniniaod. 

Recoiir ,1 * inre.« made under fire on tint and tho fo. ei 

mined ll'.ut the tourers of ibi W.,r«v„k riv.r wer. . a^ 

comliinr.J.dby iu guns.vl " "" .,_,„u«ils; 

mouth on tlie Jiimefl river, > 'u, „iiich 

.^r- - - -I 'h- nulling of the roaJa. cau.'ed by the uams, had made 
ii, ■'■•wi..; , -'i-e.'lv inacc ? IMe onJ ixr-'-.-lWc to lura ; that York 

l".^ 1, and connected wlta 

i,"jcT.: ,.o.-nts, the ground in 

front of V . '1' "■•"' ''■^'' "'"'■ 

lalned thai Hi.- g_.':i.;o.;= l-^i bcti,, ui-.d w. r,- ,:.., y beine rc-cn.'prml by 
troope ficm Norlolk and the army under General J. E. J'hnsun. Heavy 
rains made tho roads to Port Monroe Impassable, and de.iiycd the ar- 
rival of troops, ammunition, and supplies, while storms prevented for 
several davs liio sailing of trans!>orla from lUmpton Koads.and tho es- 
tablishment of depot- on the creiks of York rivnr, near the army. 

The ground bordering the Warwiii river is covered by ver;, deiiscand 
extensive forests, the clearings being small and few. Tms. with tho 
"m^rllive llatncs.s ,.! thcc!ouutry, and tho alertness of tlio enemy, 
overvwhere in force, rendered thorough rcconnoissances slow, dacgcr- 
ouB, and difficult, vet it was impc.ssiblo otherwiio to determine whether 
oTkssault was practicable, or whether the more ledlouj but 
sure operations of a 5ic';c must be resorted to. 

I mrdo on the 6lh and 7th . clr«e personal rcconnoissances of tho r ghl 
and left oriho enemy's positions, which, with Information acquired 
JS-eady convinced mo that it was hes; to prepare for an a.s8ault by U» 
nreltoinary employment of h.avy guns, and some siege operations. 
Kstlni cis^ult w^^iuil have been sunple folly. On the 7ih I telegraphed 
to the President a-s fullows : «„,ii - i««'> 

" HlUDQl-.tRTEBS ARVT OP THB PoTOMAC, April . , 1«62. 

■■ Yoor telegram of yesterday is received . In reply, I Iwvo tho honor 
to BUilo ttat mv entife force for amounts to only about (W 000) 
e?ghK-avc thousand men. General Wo<.l's "'""'^"■i' .»-%>^<"' '!'" f*' 
servo from the accompanying order, has been taken out of my control, 
^though he hiu most cheerfully ccioperal.t with me. llf «»? "« 
that cin be made of his command is to prot et my communications in 
therea^ofthCpofnl. At this lime only flftc three thousand men tovo 
joined me. but tiiey are coming up as rapi.liy as my means of transpor 
"".W^aio i'ef'r'lo my des,«itch to the Se. r, t.ry of War to.night. for 
the deuils of our present situatlom^ ^ Mc^l-ELLAN, *ajor-«?«.croI. 
•'To the Pbesidkm, WMhmglon, D. C." 
On the same duv I sent the following : «•«„.„_. 

" HKADQCAiirau Awiy of ras Poiojuc, i> reosr "» Yoiucrowii 

A'pril 7,130- — 7 r. ML. 
" Tour telegram of yesterday arrived here whil- i was absent , ciatD- 
ininn tho euemv'sriBiil, which I did pretty clcxely 
'" "tJo vrtoT me o? the Warwick, which really levids within . mile of 
Yorktown, is stronilv defended by detached redoubts and other forlij^ 
Jat on^^rmed with heavy and guns. The approaches, except at 
Yo ktown. aro covered by the Warwick, over which hero is but one 
or at most two passages, be th of which are covered by strong batler- 
Tei U will be nece^Jiry to resort to the use of heavy euns and some 
sl^eo oprra ions, before we assault. All the prisoners slate that Gene- 
™l IF Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong rc-en- 
forcemenls It se?ms clear that I shall have the whole force of th. 
enemTon mv hinds-probably not les« than (100,000) one hundred 
tSnd n"J, Sad probably more. In consequence o^ the '"« "f 8^°! 
LerTd"visionandtholstcirps,myforcels possibly less than that of 
the cnemv, while thev have ail the advantage <•' P"'.;""''^ „^„,. ,„„ 

" Tan. inder ^reat oblig-.tions to you for the offer tlutt the whole for» , 
and mate 'a of the Government will be ,is ful y and as «l«*dlly «nder 
my COTimand a.s heretofore, or as if the new deiartmenls had nol been 

""*Sioco my arrangements *were made for this campaign, at least 
(50 MO) llt"y thousand men have been t.aken from my comuwnd Smce 

^ led bvdoublel^v number?, I should have no fears as to the resn^t^ 

rnder the dr" mstanees that have been developed since we arrived 

h.r« I fe, I f inv mp"c«sed with the conviction that hero is to bo fooghl 


.otter and one of the commander of tb^e ^^-^^^^-„,j,,.a,^^ 
;;"j,\r!:v'L1^Tmali'^ge1Sifani" supplies of intren.*. 

trooDS were uccmned in opening roaas w "'*^-. p,, ,„, TrnnrM wpiw 

=!t^tsttr:?s^^.n^^ "-^ r iotJn^rXS 

army wasiwstedas foll"»^: , r,o„,;„'B, and Hamilton's 

Sumner s corp>—.v-J!,*nksaivih f,ppo8,,o u) Wlons mills 

"'"i^'Ke^-^'ctis (-^rths.r.rhtandCa.LT^s divisions,) on tho 

'^>'"'^?^VirE'r^^^;:i'''srinr';;hii?o? cs; 

Ge' Sumner engage in ^- ' >^-^ ^..^'f ,'„';;Sd upoi, the rU=ht 

preaenU- 1 l'> tli " "" ■-. "" ' ■" ..,^,„n|ng them and breaking 

bank, " „f iiiproadtoWilliamsbarg, 

Ihathn. Miiipies. The forces under 

and cut r o'l.Mi, iiico ih' wirksbft- 

Geiicra 1 v>rt of the ISttl 

Iwt-cn \' i i in reconnolft. 

of April .^^ . .-Liy'sliuooppo- 

t^,UhJ .1- .;s'dLSCOver^d', wt uilaKva by assaoll without 


•^i ';ro^r'■''^■:?li:a^'ch,cf";^inc.^ or the avmy of tho Potomac wl.oso 
no«it on ocliti.c hW on„)lon U> Iho highest cousWcriilK.n, cx|>v.w?r I tho 
KdeCut t It >oso°ormiaablo works could uot, wthuny ,-«..onHolo do- 
jaagmcui in.a uiu. >. i assault Genc>ral Kcyoa, comnian') 

I[rj4";«n«'i - t^o'Viml^ouor tho enemy's' dcU.™ ou tho 
teft l^Croro ito "m to, acldreseod tbo foUowiug lotUu- to the Hon. Ira 
H»r'rir United suites VoBiue, and Ravo mo a coiiy. AltUoufu not 
S c to- offl al ,rd<-.c, ibos tlu^ situation at that time in somo rospe'Cts 
So w' ) iSat I havo taken the Uberty of introducing it hero : 

'■ Warwick rooKT-iioosi;, Va., A!iril7,lSC2. 

11 Mv IlBiR =FVAToii: Tlio plan of campaign on this liMO was m:>do 

wlth'So^: t,,;" iudersUiudluB that four army »^Pf^-*.".^^ ^»^7„- 

nloved ami that the navy should co-oporato m the taUm;; ol YorkWwn, 

ffi^a&Tal I uadorstood it) support ua on our loft by muving gunboats 

""..•'toT; mve learned that tho 1st f ^P'.7'"t»";'„";:Jj?,f ^fllil 
order wJto .,o^. 'co four divisions, and one division D '^'g^^ 
CM~nrr« hivo been withdrawn altogether Ironi tLio luu- o. op. ruiioua, 

Jfavy tbe plL 'o whlci wo are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance 
'".5'^oomm:n°dnhI"ames river column , and I left my c«mp near New^ 

encod bv niT?o:ul recf.rd or rtiylike lo any «t ray seniors tn ranlt. If 1 
were to ere 111 ail tht! opinions which havo be-jn pouied Into my eera, I 
mu<.t heliovo that, in reirard to my present tine command, I owe moch 
to Geueral >lci:owell and nothing to General McClcUaii Hut 1 have dls* 
renrdo 1 all such offlciousness, and I have from last July to the present, 
diiv suu'W-ti'd General MeL'Iellan, and obeyed all his orders with as 
heVr'tv a -oo 1 will as ihiugU he bad been my brother or tho friend to 
wl'inni I owed moat. I sliail continue to do so to the last, and so long as 
he is mv commander. Anil 1 am not desirous to displace him, and 
would not if I cjuld. no left Wiushington with tho understanding thai 
ho was to execute a delloito plan of campaign with certain prescribed 
means Tho plan was good and the moans sulOcient, and wiUiout medi- 
cation 'th- enterprise was certain of success. But with the reduction of 
force and means, the plau is entirely changed, and is now a bad plflU, 
with moans la=umcieul for certain success. . , . „ i 

'• 1)0 not look upon tliLs communication as the offspring of despond- 
ency I w-l-t despond ; and when you see mo working the tordeat, 
you may bo sure that fortune is frowning upon me. I am working now 

*" "inexs^Tbow this Utter to the President, and I should like also that 
Mr Stanton should know its contonls. Do mo tho honor to writo to me 
as soon as you can. and bcliovo me, with perfect rcsjKct, 
" Your most obedient servant. 

" E. D. KEYES, 
" Bn^c^vr-Gc^fToX^ C<irMD.o.nd\ng 4^1 Arm-if Ctorps. 
" Hon. iHJi Hahris, C. .9. &ita(*." 

On the 7lh of April, and before the of tho divisions of GeneraB 
Hooker UicUardsoii, and Casey, I received tho following dcspatchoa 
from IhoPiesiilent and Secretary of War: ,,.,„.„ .„„ 

'* WA.SHl.\nTON. April 6. 18G2 — 8 P. M. 
"Yours of 11 A. M. todav received. Secretary of War informs me 
that tho forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's 
brl"ade under vmir orders, is not, and will not b,\ interfered with. 
I'ou now hav" over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent 
of Wool's command. I think you better break tho enemy's 
lino from Yorktown to Warwick river at onco. This will probably usa 
time as advanUigeously as you e^u. _^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ 

"Genor.ll G. B. MeC..K.LAS."__^^^^.^^^ ^^^„ ^ .,gg3_„ p „ 

« The President directs me to say that your despatch t« him liaf beeu 
receiv«l1oneralSuuu.c,-.. corps is on the road to join you and will 
lo forward as last as possible. Franklin's division is now on the ad- 
^eorwardsianassas. There is no means of traiisportation he o lo 
^rilTorward in tim. to,l>e of sorv^_ m your jresen o erations. 

Z^^Z^t::^. ^^^f^^t^^^XS^ ^. ?S4Jr^nU>^Su.air. thopi^^^lhcGivernmenJ shaU b, 
tanle behuid a stream, or succ s, n "■ P™-- ""jX Kes river doalto'sustain you as occasion may reauire. ^^^_ 

|:?Sr tinrv^f^i^n^ -ilho ^h^r^mg m ;he .ames r ve. 

^ SX?^^:foS^:^^XS^^^U^,swam,.y,or 
thickly woodid ground, over roads which we aro obliged to repair or lo 

^e linTin f ™nt ef us Is therefore one of tho strongest over or-pesed to 

'""'Y^ou'wi^kTh™',"a,^l7wh;faIvocated such a line for our operations? 

"T/v^X-';>- -i'--e^f;l*^the'nayy we could take Yorktownand 
thenwirhguiiboatsonboth rivers we could beat any force opposed to 
SSn Warwick river, because the shot and shell from the gunbea 3 
would nearVyovoJuip across tho Peninsula ; so that if the enemy shouU 
retrcat^nd retreat he must-he would have a long way to go w hout 
rallor^^ trSisporUtian, and every soul of his army must fall into 

°" SheTr^aslin VoTmy supporting the new base and plan was, that 
thls^ne'ilwi expected, wiuld furnish water transportation nearly 

•".^NowTunposlne we succeed In breaking through the line in front of 
us what'can^ doTxt? Tho roads are very bad, and If the enemy 
na, What "^^"JJ" "" "^•„' ' -;_,,r .nd we do not first reduce Yorktown, 
[t'ruldTe'Tm'^po's^fbler ^rto'sul'ist this army .h-e maixl,^ be^ 
vood where it Is new. As the roads are at present, it is wilh tho 
Ilmost difflM ty that we can subsist it in the position it now occupies 

" Voii w 11 see therefore, bv what I have said, that the force origm- 
-1 vTn™D!l^dfor'the<Sptu ebt Richmond should bo all sent forward. 
?flhSt the four a?my corps necessary when I supi«sed tho navy 
,i?3„,l,-,w nnd when liudged of the obsUieles to be encountered 
by wh™t "rnldfrom Saps and'the opinions of olUcers long stationed 
^frort Monr™ aud from all other sources, how much more should 
think the ull?^raplemeut of troops requisite now that the navy cannot 
iS noera^o and now that tho strength of the enemys lines and the 
number of'ht^guns and men prove to bo almost immeasurably grMter 
?^r^ T Lrt be^M. Ie>l to expect The line in front of us, in the oiiinion of 
alUhe mhiuTy intn SeA"^ who are at all competent to judge is one of 
Sestrongininth™ world, and the force of the enemy capable of being 


«Then'foJe a^" Wss/ntial, and so 1 consulted it when I voted to 
Change our ^;-f™^,i|-,'ra:k"Yor[;;w" and if several strong gun- 
borc;;;rd tte'nTup";ame"?,ver, our succi-ss will be oer.a.n and 

"=":?s::^n!ii?^^r,:;rt^b:u^"!^r et^my's^^^^ wuh 
"^1? r s ?i;^^^;^:s^n^i:s;t;rr^m \.e ..aned 

from two erf I waSr courses in the hands of the enemy ; our supplies 
^"drv.-oi>tNv"d1ie enemy, equal if not superior in numbers, would, 

r»d MeX-lel Ian b ' d.-s the scrap o™r the Chesapeake, in the eare of I ix. 
"^grearba tlo of the war is to come off here. If we win it the 
r«l» ton w 1 be crushed-it we loso it tho coni^equenc-s "'iH he more 
l^BrriWo than 1 «ire to tell. Tho plan of campaign I voted for,if oiri ed 
ou[ with the tneans proposed, will certainly succeed. If any part of tho 
mii^s propose J aJe Ivi.hheld'or divert^.d, I deem it duo to myself to say 

'"iViri^rSfubr'^'r-'abr^tho comm-viderof the 1st -,« •« have 

. seA^"°d.>,«runent,and as this '".''•'■"f^-"^'' " .^^'^ '■„^.".'f, f ,^^ " 
erai Mc<-:!e;lan's enmm..nd. It i-s proper U. slate tkil I am no. .it all i..M. 

done to sustain you as oc=»^'"» "^^ j't^''^';S,.roN, Seor.tarj «/ TTar. 

Bytrelm or^^SiPl""d''a;q«ired a pretty good knowledge et th. 
~,»^inn%„d streiWlhof the enemy's works, aud tho obstacles to be 
rercomoOatto! day I received the following letter from the Presi- 

''«"'= ' WAsniMaTOS, April 9, 1862. 

•< Mv riEAB Fir : Your despatches complaining that you ore not 
proi^rly 8u"tainod, whilo they do not oDend me, do pam mo very 

""tienker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, 
and yo "know thrpressuro under which I did it, and, as I thought, ao- 
oulesced in it— certaiulv not without reluctance. ^ „.. 

•■After von left I aswrtaiued that less than £0,000 unorganized men , 
with^oua^iugle field battery, were all /ou designed '<> boj^l^ror^bo 
defence of Washington and Manassas Junction, and pai t of this even 
WAS "o go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks' «rps, onco 
desi'ned for Manassas Junction, diverted and tied up on the line <^ 
wf. ?heale7ai d Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing 
thn'oDer I'otomaeand the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This pre- 
BentTOT would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone a 
CT?U lemp^tton to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and 
S?k Was'iington. My implicit order tliat W.i.Mhiogton shou d, by the 
mdgmento lithe commknders of the army corps, bo li^ft "'' eJ' 
iecuret had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove to deUta 

''"aJo not forget that I was satlsfled with yoor ""•angement to leave 
Banks at Manassas .limction ; but when that arrangement was broken 
u^ and nothing substituted for it, of conrso ' J'^^"°=i™™al^ 
substitute something for It myself. And allow mo t« Ml' . ^o >™ really 
think I should psrmit tho line from Richmond, ina Manassas Junction, 
this Cite, to be entirely open, except what resis^tanso couW be pre- 
sented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops* This isaqueetlon 
which the country will uot allow me to evade. 

■• Thera is a curious mystery about the number of troops now Wlttl 
von. When I telegraphed you on the 6th , saying you bad over a hun- 
??ei thon^and with you , I just obtained from tie S«"^J "J War 
a statement taken, as he said, from your own 'o'"™, raaX og lOS.MO 
then with yon and tn rouU to you. You now say you will havo but 
85 000 when all m ronlt to you shall havo reached you. How can the 
disciepanry of 23,800 be accounted for? j ,, ,„ H„,„„rnr voo nro- 

'■ AS to tfeneral Wool's command, I unders and It Is do'"? or you Pre- 
cisely what a llko number of your own would have to do if that com- 

"'"\Vup1o^i''''the whole force which has gone forward for you Is with 
you by tliis time. And if so, 1 think it is the precise time lor you to 
strike a blow. By delay tbo enemy will relatively gam upon yon- 
that is, ho will gain faster by fortiflcatlons and re en ercments Uian 
you can by re-eiiforccnients alone. And once more "^' n>o '^J' J""' » 
s in.lispensable to you that you strike a "'o"' ' »" P°""'?jj2 
help thi.i. You will do mo the Justice to remember I ij'^"? f, '"»'!'«° 
that going down tho bay In search of a field. Instead of Asht ng at or 
JTar Manassns,wa8 only shifting, and ""' ^""™"°''''J' * ''"f.'.S'- 
that we would find the same enemy, and the ^atne or equal '"'rench- 
ments, at either place. The country will not fall to note is howMt- 
Ing, that tho present hesitation to move upon an Intrenched enemy U 

"'' {'be^o al™ you tha"\' hiwe-never written yon or spoken to yoa 
in gre'ati' kS^s of feeling than now, nor Vji^ » f""^/ ^SntS 
eustain you, so far as, in my most anxious Judgment, 1 consistently 
can. But you must act. 

..Yours, very truly, -a.LISCOUI. 

" Major-General McCij!iu!i." n..,, .jui 

With groat deference to the opinions and wishes of his excellency tM 
Pro-ident,I mr^t respec fully b.-g leave to refer to the fads w nch I 
have presente.1 .and those contained In Vi?,»c<--on',P«"5;"'f 'otter of Gen- 
eral Keyes.wiUi the reports ol General parnard and othoroffloere.M 
furiiishlnK i reply lo thi abovo letter. His oxeelloncy could not iaago 

of th 

hl' ■ 
ta-. . 
hav« b-- 
boeo re. 

forego IL ■ ..,_, ;.,..,.: ,. .. _,......... .., ,.., ,. 

sake of avuiUiUij Uio ;iorsua&i cjoscquoaccs muiuait,-a m ihe FresUcul *» 

The fulIoivinK fxtractafrom the report of tho chkf rn'i"'"-- ''-^ ■ 
dler-Gcneral J. G. Uarnnrd) ornb i^ly iho result of cur r ■ 
aod givo, with fiomo dcgreo of dctiit. tlio character ami 
defena'fl of York town and tho Warwick, and 8odiu oi i--. w....-.,. 
which the &rmy outfndod agaioslaud overcame. 

KtiracU from Oenrrat liamard'i report 

"Theam.nvM ,v 1 . ,!rn«,mi' . fi. .!. So. 2)kivc8 With accuracy tho out- 
line and iiKof Yorklown proper, with the 
detacher ■■■a with It. 

" Tht' i. . ....;. ,. ii;; toward8ourapproachmt,nppfnr 

to bare btco iMrlittst Uuiit, and huvo ahout flfteon feet ibickDeKa of 
parapet and right feet or ten feci depth of ditch, (he width vuryloc 
much, but DcvcrtcMiig Ic3sat top or 6c;irp thao flficoa fuel — I thii.k 
geoeralty much more. 

** Tho works extentliog arouod tbo tovro, from the western e.illont of 
•Wotsjust mcDtioucd, appear to have been furnishf^l durinj; tho ]Ki.'^t 
wlntor and «prlDg. n^ey have formidablft proflles, eighteen feet Ihick- 
Mis of parapet, and goueraUy U.-n ftvi <ippthof ditch. 
*"" Tho wal«r halloiioij bad generaliy ti^htceu feet parapet, the ganB la 

*' They were (as well as all the worlu meotiODed) carefully construct- 
ed with wellmado sod revctmoots. 

'» Thare were numerous travuries bclweon tho guns, and ample maga- 
xinea ; how BuDl-.ient in bomb-proof qtiaiiiu's I am unable to ray. 

" Tho two flmt guns ol tbo work on the belf;biti^ bear upon the water 
as well as thelanJ, and wore of h» avy calibre. 

" Th ' UH herewith gives all tho gun« in position, or for which there 
Wire empiacemeuts. Tho vacant iraplaceraeota were all occupied be- 
fore the evacuation by slogo guns, rifled 4>^-mch 24 pounders, aud 18- 

** In Fort Magruder ftho first exterior work) there were found mi« 
8-lDCh columbiad, one 42-poutidcr, one Sinch sie5;e howitzer ; tho two 
former in barbette. The sketch will show the emptarcnients for guns 
on fla d and slcg» cirria;es ; makine,l think, with the .'oro:TuiD;d;, twrnty- 
two. Two of ihe;o woie pluced buhind traverses, with embrasures 
coTered by blindages. 

"Tho two external redoubts, with tho connerting parapets, forme 1 a 
re-entrant With tho fronts of attack, and all the g una boro on our ap- 

•* It will bo seen, therefore, that our approaches were swept by the 
fire of at least forty nine guns, nearly all of which were heavv, and 
many of them tbo most formidable guns known. Besides that, two* 
thirds of the guns of the water batieno=! and all tho cuus of Glouce.sler 
bore on our right ba'-terles, iliough under disadvantageous circum.etances. 

'* Tho ravine behind which tho left of tho Yorktown fronts of attack 
was placed, was not very dilUcuIt, as the heads formed depressions in 
front of their left, imperfectly seju by their fire, and from wairh access 
could bo had to the ditches ; but we could not bo sure of th? Tact before 
the evacufttioa. Tiio enemy held, by means of a slight breastwork and 
rifle trenches, a position in advauco of tho beads ol these ravines as l:tr 
forward as the burnt house. 

"Tlio ravines which head between Iho Yorktown fortiflcattons and 
tho exterior works are deep and Intricate. They were tolerably well 
Be«D, however, by tho works which run wcstwdrdly from tho York- 
town works, and which wero too uumerous and complicated to be traced 
on paper. 

*- Fort Uagruder, tho first lonclto on our leR, appears to bavo bceif 
built at an early period. 

'■ The external connection botwecn this work was first a rifle trench, 
probably enlargod into a parapet, with external ditch an I 
an emi'licomcnt for four guns in or near tho small redan in the 

** Behind this they had constructed oumeroas epaulments, with 
connecting boyaus not fjlly arranced for infantry firt-s, and m.nnly 
Intended prol)ab:y to protect thnr caraps and reserves ngainst lliV- 
dutructivo c[f< ct8 of <mr artilli'ry. 

*■ Tram tba ' red redoubt ' theso trencbofi^taDd cpaolments ran to the 
woods and rivulet which forms one head of the Warwick, and continse 
almost without break to connect with tho works at Wynn's mill. This 
stream, Just mentioned, whatever ho its name (tho term ' Warwick,' 
Aocording 10 some, applying only to tho tidal channel from the James 
lirer up as high as Lee's mill), was inundated by a number of dams 
from noar where Ita bead is crossed by the opaulmeols mentioned down 
.to Lao's mill. 

*■ Below Lee's mil) tho Warwick follows a tortuouR course throngh 
salt marshes of two hundred yards or threo hundred yard.s In width, 
from which the land rise^ up boldly to a height of thirty or forty 

"The first group of works la at Wynn's rolll.whoro there is a dam 
and bridge. The next la to guard another dam between Wynn'p and 
l>ee'smlil8 (this is tbo point attacked by General ifmltb on the IGth 
ultimo, and where Lleutonant ilernll was wounded ; tho object uf the 
attack was merely to prevent tho further construction of works and 
fosl the Btrength of the poeilitHi). A work, of what strength is not 
known, was at the sharp anglo of tbo stream Just above Lee's mill, and 
a formidablf' vroup of works was at Leo's mill, where thera was also a 
dam a:i'l bn co. 

** From Ixt^'s mill a line of works extends across Uulberry Island, or 
Is supposed to do so. 

** AtSouthal's lauding Is anotberformidablogroupof works, and from 
here,, too, they extend apparently across to tbc James river. 

" These groups of field works wero connected by riflo trenches or par* 
pots for nearly tho whole distance. 

" They are far more extensive than may be suppored from the men- 
lion of tbem I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country 
aflbrds, such as abattis, mamb, inundation, &c., wiis i>ki!!rully uscl. The 
Jlne Is certainly one of tho moet cxtcn-iive known to modern timcfl. 

"The Lotil.try on both sides of the Warwick, from nf'ar Yorktown 
'down, is a dense forest with few clearing*. It was Rwimpy.and thi* 
iroods imp.u-t^able during tho heavy raln.i wo have '.ODStantly had, ex- 
cept where our own labors had corduroyed them. 

" If we could hivo broken the enemy's lino across tho Istlimua we 
ooold havo invested Yorkt'iwn, and IL mui-t,with itsgarrlnWD, bare soon 
Ealleo Into our hands. It wils not dcn^m d practicahlf, coneidering tho 
■trenglb of that Iiu:> and thed:fQci.liy of handling our iwces (uwiLg to 

out cf that pISM, 
M do by sle^ope- 

iiivu Ly^<j uAi.iiu<jija ij ..■.:■ .lii't kuo reduction of tL6 

nfiroarh(kf| anri their de*'.>nBO(« rm determined npoauid 

•'■ '^■' ' -^^ " -; ' n (\o. _.) It was 

• to tho works of 
St himultaaeouslj 
'■■*" »■. iiM '■ i;>Fiii Ji KTK nvur OB the right 

toil tho leri.a <.■ ne mile In length. Tbs 

prir. ,i^s wore din. the east end of the main 

work. ...... ii ...i.., most he ally .«i.u- -a .mui u>re both on tbo;wat«rand 

land, and lay between Wormley's creek and York river. There also 
were placed the mi«t ol the batteries designed to act against the Isad 
front to enQ!ade tbo water batteries, and to act upon Gloucester. 

I designed at the earliest moment to op^n simultaneously with sev- 
eral batteries, and as soon as tho enemy's guns, which swept the neck 
of land between Wormsley's creek and iho Warwick, were crippled and 
their flro kept down, to pufh tbo trenches as far forward as necessary 
and to assault Yorktown and tho adjacent works. 

The approachts to the batlerus, Uie necessary bridges, and the roads 
to the depot.*, bad been vigorously pushed to completion by the troops 
under Generals Heintzclman and Sumner, and were available for infan- 
I try, and In some In&ianci-s for artillery, on tho nth of April, when ths 
I batteries and their copuectlons were commenced, and labor upon Ibera 
: kept up night and day until finished. Some of the batteries on easy 
ground and concealed from the view of the enemy wore early com- 
pleted and armed , and hel l ready for any emergency, but not permitted 
to open, as the return fire <^f the enemy wuuld luterfero too much with 
the labor on other and more important works. The completion of lbs 
more exposed and heaviest batteries was delayed by storms, proTsnt- 
ing the landing of guns and ammunition. 

It having been discovered that the enemy wero receiving artillery 
stores at the wliarf In Yorktown, on May 1, battery No. 1 was opened 
with cff^L*ct upon the wlmrf and town. 

On the 2Jd of April, General Franklin, with bis division from Gen- 
eral McDowotl's corps, had arrived and reported to mo. The garrlsoo 
of Gloucester point had been re-onforcod, and the works strengthened; 
hot as this division was t"o smull to detach to the Severn, and no more 
troops could be spared. I determined to act on Gloucester by disembark- 
ing it on tho north bank of the York river, under the protection of the 
gunboatA. Tlio troops were mainly kept on board ship wbilo the nec««- 
sary preparations wore made for landing them, and supporting them In 
case of nec' s.<ity. For a full account of tins labor I refer to the report 
of Lleuteoont-Colonol B. &. Alexander, of the engineer corps, detalM 
for this expedition. 

While the siege works were being rapidly completed, the roarls on the 
loft wing necesKxry for conimnnicaiion and advance were opened and 
corduroyed over tho mirwhes, batteries were erected to silenco the 
enemy's guns, and drive him from his works at Wynn's and Lee's mills, 
preparatory to tbc general attack. Active rcconnoiaiaiiccs wore con- 
tinually going on, and attempts in force made to drive the enemy from 
the bonks. 

The result of various rrconnoL««Ances made under the ImmMiate di- 
rection of General W. F. Smith, commanding second division, fourth 
corps, led to tho belief tint thoweake&t point of that part nf the enemy's 
lines was oppoeite a field whero it was ascertained that thore was a 
dam, covered by a battery known to contain at least one gun. 

It was determined to push a strong recoonoissance on this point to 
silence the enemy's fire, and ascertain the actual Etrengtb of the posi- 
tion. Being prepared to sustain the r-^connoit* ring party by a real attack, 
if found e.'cpedicnt. General W. K- i?mtth was directed to undertake the 
operation on tho IQth of April. He silenced tho fire of the enemy's 
guns, discovered tbo existence of other works previously concealed and 
unknown, and sent a strong party acro«s the stream, which was finally 
forced to retire with some loss. Smith intrcDrhc<t himself in a poslttoa 
Immediately overlooking the dam and the enemy's works, so as to keep 
them under control, and prevent the enemy from using the dam as a 
means of crossing tho Warwick to annoy as. 

Many times towards the end of tbo month the enemy attempted to 
drive in our pickets, and take our rifle-pits near Yorktown, but always 

without EUCCCRS. 

As the siego progressed, it wa.«; with great difllculty that tho rifle pits 
on tho risht couM bo excavated and held, po little ctiverlng could be 
made against the hot firo of the enemy's artillery and infantry. Their 
guns continued Hrlng up to a lato hour of tbc nigut of the 3d of tlay, 

Oor batteries would have been ready to open on the morniug of the 
6th May at latest ; but on tho morning of tho 4th it was discovered that 
the enemy had already been compelled to evacuate his position durUag 
tho night, leaving behind him all bis heavy gens, uninjured, and a largo 
amount of ammunition and supplies. For tho details of tho tabor of 
tho siege I refer to the arcorapanymg reports and journals of Brigadier- 
General J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, cJiargcd with the selections, lay- 
ing out, end completion of the approaches and batteries ; of Brii;adier- 
Gonerol Wm. F. B;u-ry,chlef of artillery, charged with arming and sup- 
plying with ammunition all the siege anu field batteries ; and of Brigs* 
dier-Gencral t'ltzJohn Porter, director of the siege, to whom were 
assigned the guarding of tho trenches, the assembling and dutrlbntloo 
of tho working parties, &c., &c. 

Early in tho morning of the 4lh, on the enemy's abandoning bis line* 
at Yorktown, I ordered all the available cavalry force, with four bat- 
terii'8 of horse artillery, under Brigadier-General ?toneman, chief of 
cavalry, in immediate pursuit by tho Yorktown and Wiiliamsburgh 
road, with orders to har.-iss the enemy's rear, and try to cut oO such of 
his forces as had taken the Lee's mill and Willl.imsburg road. 

General Helntzelman was directed to send Hocker's division forward 
on the Yorkt/>wn and Williamsburg road to support General ^tonemao : 
and Smith was ordered to proceed with his division upon the Ix^'s mill 
and Williamsburg road for the sane purpo«ie. Afu-rwards, the divi- 
sions of Generals Kearney, Couch, and Casty were put en route— the 
first on the Yoiktown mad.ond the others on thol/^e's mill road. These 
roads unite ahout a quarter of a mile south of Fort M i t i i.t. ,L.nd are 
connected by crops-roads at several points bi'twi-r'n ^ ' Wil- 

liamsburg. After these directions had been tivi'U, ti - : the 

officer second In rank in the army of thi- Tolomaf) \. > pro- 

ceed to the front, and take Lmmcdiato chargu of opo><fcfciiM>s uuiU my 

General Stoneman moved firvTirl rri-n^i'i'v wil^i hl^ C'>nHr,Tiid, ooo- 
slq'ing of four i lonol 

llM's, thol«t an'! k , tiud 

Sihllli I'-is.ftod Hl . -billon 

until ho arrived in iVoiit ul lUo luoui/ li v.u.'Mii, aUoui twu a^i,^^ i-asi of 

At a point, about eight mllos-from Yorktown, in ace/irdance with my 
iustructititis, he detached General Kinory with Bcnsouhi baiiery, the 3d 


Pennsylvania cavalry (GiloiU'l AvtM 1.:), aiv! ! itikcr's s*i';M<:i-u:', lo 5 lin 
lUe Lee's mill road, and tmdeavor, with the aa-^l ;'nncc or Gjncr;ilPmilb, 
to cut off the portion of the enemy's roar guard which h:ul t:ikjn that 
route. GencinJ Emory lia,i\ Eomo sharp skirmishos-wita a r^'gimcnt of 
cavalry and a batlery under General Stuart, aud drove them, in the 
direction of Loo's mill. 

General Smith having met with obstructions in his front, had trans- 
ferred his column, by, to the Yorktown and 'WilHamsburg 
road, so that General Emory, finding; no force to co-operate with him, 
was unable to cut off the rear guard, aud they succeeded in escaping 
by a circuitous route along the bank of the James river. 

The position in which General Stouoman encountured thf> enemy is 
about four miles in extent, the right resting on Coll''gc crcpk, and tho 
left on Queen's creek ; neai'Iy three-fourths of i[3 frout being covered 
* by tributaries of these two creeks, upon which there arc ponds. 

The ground between Clio heads of tho boundary streams is a cultiva- 
ted plain, across which a line of detached works had been constructed, 
consisting of Fort Magruder, a largo work in tho contro, witli a bastion 
front, and twelve other redoubts and epaulments for field guns. 

The parapet of Fort Magrudor is about six feet high and nine feet 
thick ; the ditch nine feet wide and nine feet deep, tilled with water. 
Tho length of the interior crest is about 600 yards. The redoubts Lave 
strong profiles, but aro of small dimensious, having faces of about 
forty yards. The woods in front of the position wcro felled, and tho 
open ground in front of the works was dotted with numerous rille-pits. 
The roads leading from tho lower part of the Peninsula to Williams- 
bnrg, ono along the York river (tho Yorktown road), and tho other 
along tho James (tho Lee's mill road), unite between tbo heads of the 
tributary streams a short distance in front of Fort Magrudcr, by which 
they are commanded, and debouch from tho woods just before uniting. 
A branch from tho James river road leaves it about one aud three- 
fourths of a mile below Fort Magruder and unites with the road from 
Allen's landing to Williamsburg, which crosses tho tributary of College 
creek over a dam at the outlet of tho poud, and pa.sses just in rear of 
the line of works, being commanded by tho three redoubts on ttip /ight 
of the line, at about the same distance from Fort Magruder. A branch 
leaver, the York river road and crosses tho tributary of Queen's creek 
on a dam. and passing over the position and through tho works in its 
rear, finally enters Williamsburg ; this road is commanded by redoubts 
on the left of the lino of tho works. 

General Stoueman debouched from the woocl9 with his advance guard 
(consisting of a part of the 1st United States cavalry, and one section of 
Gibson's battery, under thocommandof General Cooke), and the encroy 
immediately opened on him with several fleld-pieccs from Fort Ma- 
gruder, having the correct range, and doing some execution. Gibson's 
battery was brought into position as rapidly as the deep mud would 
permit, and returned tho fire ; while tho 6th United States cavalry was 
sent to feel the enemy'sjeft. This regiment passed one redouljt, which 
it found unoccupied, and appeared in iherear of a second, when a strong 
cavalry force, with iofantry and artillery, came down upon it,where- 
■npon the regiment was withdrawn. The re^ar squadron, under com- 
mand of Captain Saundors, repelled a charge of the enemy's cavalry in 
the most gallant manner. In the meantime tho enemy was being rein- 
forced by infantry, and the artillery fire becoming very hot. General 
Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, ordered tho with- 
drawal of tho battery. This was accomplished, with the exception of 
one pieco. which could not be extricated from the mud. The enemy 
attempted to prevent tho movement, but theirchargcs were met by the 
1st United States cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grier, 
and they were driven back, losing several oEBcers and ono stand of 
colors. General Stoneman then look a defensive position a short dis- 
tance in tho rear of the first, to await tfie arrival of the infantry. 

The advance of General Smith's column reached SkifTs creek about 
11>3 o'clock, and found the bridge over that stream in fiames, and the 
road impassable. A practicable routo to the Yorktown road having 
been discovered, the dtvision, by order of General Sumuer, moved on 
by that road, andreachcdOeneralStoueman'spositionaboutS^:; o'clock. 
General Sumner, arriving with it, assumed command. 

Generals Heiulzclman and Kcyes also arrived. During the afternoon 
of the 4th, near tho Halfway House, Iho head of General Hooker's 
column encountered Smith's division filing into tho road, and was 
obliged to halt between three and four hours until it had passed. 
General Hooker then followed on, and at Cheesecake church turned off, 
by Genera! Heiutzelman's direction, taking a cruf^^-road, and moved 
out on the Lee's mill road, thus changing places with General Smith. 
Marching part of the night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early in 
the morning of the 6th. 

General Smith's division having been deployed. General Sumner or- 
dered an attack on the works In his front; but the lines having been 
thrown into confusion while moving through tho dense forest, and 
darkness coming on, the attempt for that night was abandoned. The 
troops bivouacked in the woods, and a heavy rain began, which con- 
tinued until the morning of tho 6th, malting tho roads, already iu very 
bad condition, almost impassable. 

During the morning of tho 5th General Sumner reconnoitred the 
position in his front, and at 11 o'clock ordered Hancock's brigade, of 
Smith's division, to take possession of a work on the enemy's left, 
which had been found to be unoccupied. Tho remainder of smith*s 
division occupied tho wooda In front without bPirig actually cngrtgcd. 

The divisions of Couch and Casey had received orders during the 
night to marchat daylight ; but on acnouut of the terrible comiitiou of 
the roads, and other impediments, were not able tu reach tho field until 
after 1 o'clock P. M., at which timethe first brigade of Couch's lilvision 
arrived, and was posted in tbo centre, on Honkcr*s right. Th'j other 
two brigades came up during the afternoon, followed by Casey's 

In the meantime General Hooker, having reconnoitred tho enemy's 
position, began the attack at 7K A. M-,and fi>r a while silenced the 
guns of Fort Magruder, and cleared the ground in his front; but the 
fuemy being continually reinforced, until iheir strength greatly ex- 
ceeded his. made attack after attack, endeavoring to turn hi.-* left. 

For several hours hia division struggled gallantly against the superior 
numbers of the enemy. Five guns of Webber's battery were lest, and 
between three and four o'clock his ammunition began to give The 
loss had been heavy, and tho exhaustion of tho troops w;i3 very great. 
At tbis time the division of General Kearney came up, who, at 9 A. M., 
had received orders to reinforce Hooker, and who liad the 
greatest exortion3, in passing Casey's troops, and pusliing onto the front 
through tho deep mud. General Kearney at once gallaut'y attacked, 
and thereby prevented tho loss ofanolh-Tbaltery,imddrovo the enemy 
hack at every point, enabling General Hooker to extricate himself from 
hia position, and withdraw his wearied troopsfc Peck's brigade, vl 
Couch's division, as has been mentioned before, was, immediately n:i 
ii3 arrival, ordered by General Somncr to deploy on Hooker's riul'i. 
This was promptly done, and tho attacks of tho enemy at thn; i : ; 
wcro repulsed. Gi:neral Peck held his position nntil late id :' 
•on, when he was roliovcd by tho other two brigades oi * 

on. i: :.■■'. ,- w.-. ii; \iuWi po?ses.«iou of the ground when night closed 
f ho coatfst. 'i'lio vig'irou." action of these troops relieved General Hooker 
considerably. (Jeuoral Eniory had been left with his command, on tho 
night of the 4th, to guard the brancli of the J*o's Mill road which leads 
to Alle.i's tarin ; luid on tho morning of the 6th it was ascertained that 
by th'S route the enemy's right could be turned. A rcque-t i'or infantry 
for this purpose was made to Goneral Ueintzelman, who, late In the 
afternoon, sent four regiments and two battcricsof jvearney's division— 
the di- potable tioops he had — aud directed General Emory to mako 
tbo attack. With those reinforcements his force amounted to about 
3,000 men and three batteries. General Emory, on account of want of 
knowledge of the ground, and the lateness of the hour, did not succeed 
in this movement. It Involved some risks, but, if successful, might 
have produced important results. 

At 11 A. M-jU^j before mentioned. General Smith received orders from 
General Sumner to send ono brigade across a dam on our right, to 
occupy a redoubt on the left of the enemy's line. Hancock's brigade 
was selected for this purpose. Ho crossed the dam, took possession of 
the first redoubt, and aiterwards, finding the second one vacated, he 
occupied that also, and sent for reinforcements to enable him to advance 
further and take the nert redoubt, which commanded the plain between 
his position and Fort Magruder, and would have enabled him to tako in 
reverse aud cut the communication of tho troops engaged with Gonorala 
Hooker and Kearney. 

The enemy soon began to show himself in strength before him, and as 
his rear and right flank were somewhat exposed, ho repealed his re- 
quest for re-enforcements. General Smith was twice ordered to Join 
him, with tho rest of his division, but each time tho order was counter- 
manded at the moment of execution, General Sumner not being willing 
to weaken the centre. At length, in reply to General Hancock's repeat- 
ed messages for more troops. General Suinncr sent him an order to fall 
back to his first position, the execution of which General Hancock de- 
ferred as long as possible, being unwilling to give up the advani^o al- 
ready gained, and fearing to expose his command by such a movement. 

During the progress of these events, I had remained at Yorktown to 
coraplciu the preparations fnr the departure of General Franklin's and 
other troop.? to West Point by water, and to make ihc neceseary arrange* 
meots with the iiaval cjmmawdcr for his co-operation. 

By pushing General Franklin, well supported by water, to the righl 
bank of the Pamunkey, opposite West Point, it was hoped to force the 
enemy to abandon whatever works he might havo on the Peninsula 
below that point, or be cut off. It was of paramount importance that 
the arrangements to this end should be promptly made at an early hour 
of the morning. I had sent two of my aids (Lieutenant-Colonel Swettaer 
and Major Hammersteiu) to observe the operations in front, with In- 
structions to report to me everything of importance tliat might occur. 
I received no information from them leading me to suppose that there 
was anything occurring of more importance than a simple affair of a 
rear-guard, until about one o'clock P.M., when a dispatch arrived from 
one of them that everything was not progressing favorably. This was 
confirmed a few minutes later by tho reports of Governor Spraguo and 
Major Hammersteiu, who came directly from the sc^ne of action. 

Completing tho necessary arrangements, I returned to my camp with- 
out delay, rode rapidly to the front, a distance of somo fourtee-; miles, 
through roads much obstructed by troops and wagons, aud reached the 
field between four and five P. M., in time to tako a rapid survey of the 
ground. I soon learned that there was no direct communication be- 
tween our centre and the left under General Heintzelman ; tho contro 
was chiefly in the nearer edge of the woods, situated between us and 
and the en(?my. As heavy firing was heard iu the direction of General 
Hancock's command, I immediately ordered Genera! Smith to proceed 
with his two remaining brigades, to support that part of tho line. 
General Nagloe, with his brigade, received similar orders. I then direc- 
ted our centre to advance to the further edge of tho woods mentioned 
above, which was done, and I attempted to open direct communication 
with General Heintzelman, but was prevented by tho marshy state «f 
tho ground iu the direction in which the attempt was made. 

Before Generals Smith and Nagleo could reach tho field of General 
Hancock's operations, although they moved with great rapidity, he had 
been confronted by a superior force. Feigning to retreat slowly, ho 
awaited their onset, and thon turned upon them, and after some terrific 
volleys of musketry, he charged them with the bayonet, routing and 
dispersing their whole force, kilting, wounding, and capturing ijOOto 
COO men, he himself losing only 31 men. 

This was one of the brilliant enga^ments of the war, and Gene- 
ral Hancock merits the highest praise for the soldierly qualities dis- 
played, and bis pe.fect appreciation of tbo vital importance of bis 

Night put an end to the operations bore, and all the troops who bad 
been engaged in this content slept on the muddy field, without shelter, 
and many without food. 

Notwithstaniiing the report I received from General Hcintz'^Iman, 
during tho night, that General Hooker's division had sufft:re 1 so much 
that it could not be relied on next day, and that Kearney's cnnld not do 
more than hold its own without re-enforcements— being satisflod that 
the result of Hancock's engagement was to give ns possession of tho 
decisive poiut of the battle-field during the night, I countermanded tho 
order for tho advance of the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, and 
directed tht-m to return to Yorktown, to proceed to WestPointby water. 

Our loss during tho day. the greater part of which was sustained by 
Hooker's division, was as follows : 

Killed, 456; wounded,l 400 ; missing, 372 j total, 2,228. 

On the next morning we found tho enemy's position abandoned, and 
occupied Fort Magruder and tho town of Williamsburg, which waa 
filled with the enemy's wounded, to whose a.ssi.stanco eighteen of their 
surgeons were sent by General J. E.Johnston, tho ofllcer in command. 
Several guns and caissons, which tho enemy could not carry off on 
account of tho mud, were secured. Colonel Averill was sent forward at 
once with a stroug cavalry force to endeavor to overtake tho enemy's 
rear guard. He found several guns abandoned, and picked up a largo 
number of stragglers, but theconditionof tho ro;ids aud the state of tho 
supplies forced him to return, after advancing a few mi'ep. 

It is my opinion that the enemy opposed us hero with only a portion 
of his army. When our cavalry first appeared there was rotbing but 
tlio enemy's rear guard at Williamsburg. Other troop? weio bn ught 
back during tho night and tho next day to bold tl.c works ,i.s '.ongas 
possible, in order to gain time for tho trains, kc. , already well on the 
way to Uichmond, to mako their escape. Our troops were greatly ex- 
hausted by the laborious match through tho mud from their popitlon in 
front of Yorktown, and by the protracted battle through whith they had 
just passedj Many of them wcro out of rations and ammunitiOD, and 
one division, \n Its anxiety to make a prompt movement, had marched 
with empty haversacks. Tho supply trains had been forced out of tho 
roads on the 4th and 0th to allow tbo troops and artillery tu po-^s to the 
front, and tho roads were now in such a state after thirty six hilars' 
contSnuoa3 rain, that it was almost impossiblo to jiass cmjity v/agons 

Qtor thsm Cciwral Honker's illTUion Ud (ii!!f;r»'l J05cr rf ly iliot It 
wisiuBO coDdlllon to folluw the enomy.eTm if Iho rot«J3 !wd li'.n 
fooil. Coder thetectrcumiUDCW, an iram«li»to pursait wa^lTnpc?^ bi". 
Stcpi were at oneo ukcn to earo lor and remove tUo woimtli <1, and lo 
britiK lip provision*, ammunition, and foraj:?. 

Tho ounditicn of has been jald, rendered it neitlo Im 
poesiblj to accoinpUeli this by land from Yorktown. A ti<Tii(>.ir!iry 
depot VMS Uiereforo promptly catabllabed on Queen'i crock , and Euri""^ 
drawn, and tbo wounded shipped from that irtice. 

ThediviFlona of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson were 
sent from Yurktown by ivat*r to tho right bank o( tho 1'aiiiar.Li.y. In 
tho vioinityof West Point. The nmalniDg divisions, the trains, and 
the rcEcrvo artillery mo«d fiil)ef(|"'uily by land. , . • .^ 

Earl> on the momlciR of tho 7lh (Jiut-ral Krnnklin had comp.^'rd the 
disembarkation ofbLs division, bnd bad placed It In a pood («fi"on In 
corer tho landlnn plac, both hlB flaiks and a largo portion of his front 
being protected by water. . , , . 

Dana's brlndeofijcdcwirk's division arrived dnrlnc the inornlnj. 
At about B A. JI. a large force of tho enemy npi«?nr.'<l, oiTi.-i .•-tiii-^ of 
WhIllng'B dlviflon and other trooiii-. and between 10 and II they 
atucked the part of Iho line h>ld by Newton's brifaJe. 

Tho action continued ontllS I'. SI., when the enemy retired, all his 
attacks havinK b ■"n ropuL'M. This affair, the mf«t Important In 
which tho division had yet been engaged, was highly ere iitoblo to 
General Kranklln and his comm.ind. For tho c:etill8 I r-fir to bis 
report, which l« herewiih submitlod. Our Iom wm 49 klU-d, 104 
wounilol. and « missing. Total, 19J. which includes a large propor- 
tion of oflicers. „ ., I .,. 
Cavalrv ri(.onnol'5«inee<i were sect out from William-'burg on ine 
mh a'id '7tb, end on the 81h Ci'neral Slonem .n moved with an advance 
(taard c.' cavalry, artillery, and infanlry to opon cvmmuiilcaloii with 
General Fraaklm. . , ,.., ,,. 

As soon as our supplies had been received and the condition ortne 
roods hod becomo a little bolter, thouch Etill very bnd, tiie advance 
of the remahiinis troops wiw btRun, fmith's divifon moving on the 
8th. On tho lOlh headquarters were at Kcper's chireh, 18 miles from 
WiUiamsbilrg, all the divisions whch had moved by land, except 
Hooker's, being In Uio vicinity of that place. 

Wo wero row In direct communication with the portion of the 
army which bad gone by water, and we began to draw supplies 
from them. j . .v 

tOn account of tho email number and narrowness of tho roads In this 
neigbborhood, movements were dlfllcult and slow. 

On tho 15th, headqonrtere and tho divisions of Kranklln. Porter. Sykes, 
and Sm!th reacJiod Cumberland . which was made a temporary ilepot 
Couch and Cisey were tlieu near New Kent Court-house. Hooker and 
Kearney near Koper's church, and Kicbardson and Sedgwick mar 
On the 14lh and 161h mnch rain fell. 

On the 15tb and 16lh tho division.'! of Franklin, Smith. and Porter were 
with great difflculTV moved to White Hoo.*, Ave mll"S In ndvauce. So 
bad was the road that Uie train of one of these divisions required thirty- 
six hours to pass over this short distance. General Suneman had occu- 
pied this place some davs before, after stvcral succ^sful f kirmishes. In 
which our oavalry proved superior to that of the enemy. Tho reports 
of these nlfairs aro appended, . „ ., . ,.,., , 

About this time, with tho consent of the President, two additional 
corps woreorganiz-d, vit ; the 6th provisional coriw. c')n-istiiig of the 
divisions cf I'urter and t;ykes. and the reserve artillery, under the com- 
mand of General F. J. Porter, and the 6th pio.isional corps, consisliiig 
of tho divteions of Franklin and Smith, under the coinnuuid of General 
W. B. Franklin. 

Hea<iquarters reached Wliite House on the 16lh, and a perniancut de- 
pot was at onco organlwd there . 

On tho 19th , headquarters and tho corps of Porter and Framtlin moved 
to TunsUll's sutlon, livo miles from White Uouto. 
On the 20lh more rain (ell. 

On the 21st the poslilon of Uie troop" was as fillows : Stonoman s 
j!uard,one mile from New bridge; FrnnUlin's corps Ciree 

»hro\Tii forward In snpporl.and Bottom's bridge immedistely rebuHl. 

In the m-antim'j our centre and ri^lit were ndvancod to the river 
«bove and ou tuu 2 Jib k •• c io of MeohaolosTlllo, driving 

the enemy out with O'lr iirt -ng tliem across the bridge, 

which they destrove I. i; •-■' the same day dlaUidged a 

force of tho enemyfrom the v ;■ . ;i'y ti iho '■ Seven I'lncs," oo the Bot- 
tom's bri lr^ road, and our advance on tho left secured a strong poeltloB 
near tliat placj. ^ ... 

Allthemfo-i i»r8, negroes, and spies, Indi- 

cated that tho i-ie approaches to Kichmood 

from the 
beyond ' 
ofad !. 

advanco guard. -_- _- 

miles from New bridge, with Porter's cor|w at "upivirtiDi: distant.- ,.• 
Its rear ; Samuor's corps 9a the railroad, about llire^ iiil!-s from the 
Chlck.ahomlny, connecting tho right with the kft ; U'Jm' cor)*, to 
New Kent road n^ar Bottom's bridge, with HeiuliolniBirb corps at sup- 
porting di.»tanco in the roar. 

The lord at Bottom's briJfo was in our |i06«esslon,nnd the rebuild- 
ing of the briilje, which had hceu desir..yea oy ih- euoiiiy, wa-s com- 

On the SM, headqoarteri mored to Coal naroor> 
On tho 26tii tho railroad was In operation as far 
and the railroad bridge across that slreamnearly completed. 

When, on tho 20th of May, our advanced light troops reached the 
banksof'the Chlokahomloy river, at Bottom's bridge, they found that 
this, as well aa tho railroad bridge, about a milu above, had been 
destroyed by the enemy. . , . , . ,i. »,i„.^ 

The Chlckahomhiy in this vicinity Is about forty feet wide, fringed 
with a dense growth of heavy forest trees, and bordered by low 
marshy bottom lands, v.arying from half a mile ton mile in width. 

Our operations embraced that part of tho river betwovn Bottom s 
and Meadow bridges, which covered the principal approaches to Klcli- 
mond from tho cast. ,,,_,»_ «..w 

Within these limiU the firm ground lying above high water ma« 
seldom approaches near tbo river on cither bank, and no locality w«i 
found wiUiln thu section where the hish ground came the stream 
on both sides. It was subject to frequent, sudden, and groat variation* 
In the volume of wator, and a rUo of a few feet overllowed tho bottom 
hmds ou Ixilh sides. , . j ■ ».. .i. 

' At low wator it could be forded at almost any point ; but dur ng high 
water It was above a fording slagc, and could then bo crossed only nl 
the few points where bridges had boon constructed. These bridges had 
all been devtroyed by the enemy on our approach, and It was necessary 
not only to reconstruct these, but to build several others. 

The west bank of tbo river opposite the New and JlechanlctTlUo 
bridges was bordered by el. rated blufts. which afforded tho cnenoy 
commanding positions to r»rnry. establish his batteries, enfllading tho 
approaches upon Ihe two principal roads to Iticbmond on our right, and 
rSist tho reconstruction of tho Imporunl brUgos. This obliged us to 
aelect other less exposed iioinis for our crofsi'.c'. ,,,,., „„,k„ 

AS tho enemy was not la Krcat I'm opr s bridge on the 

arrival of our loft at that i oinl. and a.s , t to s-<:ure a 

lodgmentupon therlitht 'oaii. I'T. I ,-. , .,r .ira. j 

his forces and conl'---t i' 
toCbrd the river and i 
done on the 20lh, ai:i i ' . > 

*■ Th^M "troops weco directed to throw up dcfcwes la an advanliv.'eonB 
poMtloa to iccuio our left Oank. (.'ciernl If.-io'»..'iman's e.oirs wa: 

y ftep of oar advance 
" 1" .in opposite our 
.dm not admit 
: 1 Kicbmond. 
l.\ ih--'!*«Uii iiie necessity 01 Mrongtiienlng the 
•rm.vfor iho s'truiigle, 1 did not fall to urge repeatedly upon my 
superiors the imponanco of re enforcing the army of tho Potomac with 
every dls|i< man, in order to Insure tho Eucccas ot our attack upon 
the rebel rj.piul. 
On the loib of Hay IteloKraphedasfoUows : 


May 10, 1882— « A. M. 
"From tho Information reaching me from every source, I regard It 
as certain that Ihe enemy will meet us with all his force on or new 
the ailckahominy. They can concentrate many more men than I have, 
and are collecting troops from all quarters, especially well disciplined 
troops from the .=ouih. Casualties, sick-ness, garrisons, and piarda 
have much reduced our numbers, aud will continue to do so. lehaU 
light the rebel »rmy wilh whatever force 1 may have, but duly require* 
mo to urge tliat every effort bo made to ro enforce me without delay 
with all the disiwsable troops in Ea.stcm Virginia, and that we concen 
tratc all our lorces, as far as possible, to flght the great bailie now Ixn 
pending, and to make It decisive. . _,.v . 

" It is possible tliat Ibo enemy may abandon RIcbmona wiuiont a 
serious struggle ; but 1 do not b<licve he will, and It wouh) be onwlM 
to count up<jo anything but a stubborn and desperate defense— a life 
and death contest. 1 see no oih.r hope for him than to Oghl this battle, 
and wo must win It. I shall flght them whatever their force may bo, 
but I ask for everv man that llic department can send me. No troop* 
should now be 1. ft unemployed. Those who enterlain tho opinion that 
tho rebels will ab.andou Richmond n iihout a struggle, are. In my Judg- 
ment, badly a.lvised,and do not comprehend their situation, which K 
one requiring desperate measures. , . ^ . • 

'■I beg that llio President and Secrclary will maturely weigh what 1 
say and leave nothing undone to comply with my ri quest. If I am not 
reinforced, ii is probable that 1 will be obliged to flght nearly double 
my numbers, strongly intrenched. Ido not think It » ill be at ail po«»lble 
for me to bring moro than (70,C0O) seventy thousand men upon the Qeld 

"GliO. B.KcCiaiJLS.Uajor General Comtnanding. 

"Hon. EowixM. Sr.isTOS,.%cr'J<in/o/trar ." ,.„,.. 

On Iho 14th of May I sent ihc following tolcgram to the President : 
'• Camp at CvMDtiAvn, May 14, 1842. 

" I have moro than twice telegraphed to the Secrc'^y of War, suting 
that In my opinion, the enemy wero concentrating all their available 
force to flght this army in front of P.ichmond, and that such ought to be 
their policy. I have received no reply whatever to any of these Ule- 
graphs 1 beg leave to repeal their substauco to your excellency, and 
lb ask that kind consideration nhich you have ever accorded to my 
renreseuUiion and views. All niv information from every source acces- 
sible to me I -lablishes tbo fixed nurposc of the rebels to defend Rich- 
mond acainsl this army by cffcring us battle with all the troops they 
c-in colK<:t from east, west, aud south, and my own opinion isconOrmed 
by lliiit of all my commanders whom 1 have been able to consulL 

'• Casualties n.-kuess, Kirrisous, aud guards have much weakened my 
force, and will coniinue to do so. 1 cannot bring Into actual balUe 
against the enemy moro than eighty thousand men at the utmost, and 
with them 1 must attack lu [losition, probably Intrenched, a much larger 
force, pcrnaps double mv numbers. It is possible that Richmond inay 
bo aliimdoned w itlimil a serious struggle ; but the enemy are actually In 
•real slrenglh lietwc<n hero uud there, and It would be unwise. 
Snd even in.s;m.-, for mo to dlculaie npou uiiything but a stubborn and 

desperate rcisiiuiLe. If they should iliandon Richmond, It m.ay well be 
that It Is done with the purpose of making a stoud at some place m Vlr- 
»hila south or nest of there, and we shuukj bo In condition to press 
them'withoutde'.ny. The confederato' loaders must employ their nlmost 
eBorts against ihw army in Virginia, and they will be supported by the 
whole body of tholr military oillcers, among whom there may be said to 
bo no Union feeing, a-s there Is also very lillle among Iho higher das* 
ofeitimns in the seceding SUtes. , „ , , .„ , ,k. 

" I have round no flgliting men left hi this Peninsula. All are In the 
ranks of the opporiing foe. 

" Even If more troops than I now have should prove nncecessary ror 
purposes ot military occupation, our greatest dUplay of Imposliig fore* 
In the caplUl of tho rebel government will havo the best moral effect. 

I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon your excellency that tte 
rpnortonlty bos come for striking a fatal blow at the enemie* of tM 
Constitution, and I beg tliat you wlU cause this army to be re enforced 
without di4ay hy all Iho disposable troops of tho Government. I UK 
for every man lliat tho War Department can send me. Any commander 
of the re-enforcements whom your cicelleocy may designate *'U be 
ureeptable to me, whalover expression I may have heretofore addressed 
to vou on tiiat .subject. ... ,. ,.,.1. ■ ^ 

•• I will flght tho enemy whatever their forte may be, with whatever 
foco I may have ; and I flrmly believe that we shall beat them, hot 
our triumph should be made decisive and complete. The soldiers or 
this array love tlieir Government, and will Oghl well In Its support. 
V.oi inav rely upon them. They have conOdence in me as their gener^, 
an I in you ns their President. Strong ro-enforceraents will at least 
f -ive tlic lives of many of thein. Tho greater our force the more per 
loci will bo our combinations, and the less our I0S.S. 

'For obvious reasons 1 beg you to give immediate consideration to 
this comniuoicalion, and 10 inform mo fully at the earliest moment of 
' o ir final delerminalion. , 

■• GrORGE B. llcajH.LAN, Major OelKral. 

" Ills F-xcellency AMtAttAX Li.vcuui,/'raii/nU"/(A« VnCtdSata." 

To which, on Ihe 18ih of May, I received this reply : 
j " WAsmxcTO.f, Slay 18—2 p. m. 

(iirtssAi— Your deajMlch to the President, asking for relnforccmenU, 

II , I,. .■■, ri ..v.- 1 :'.rul o.irori!'v considered. " 
SI II uncover tl. 'ly ; and 11 

■ prudent. 11 more lime 

■ array anc '.>. - ,..ijinnodtby 

lU' wa. ll Iho I'll'jiii .0 aid Voil; river, than liy .i li:wi march. In or- 
der therefore, to Increase the -•■Ireceth of Iho allack upon llichroood al 
' Ihe'eirli'-sl ni( inDol. (iem-rol SMiowell has bwu iH'derc* m «iarch upon 

- .1 c-tvbTth" ;h - K.ilaoriJered, keeping hiroseltalways 

m position 10 nive I, - 1 .;.iu>l irura all possible, ntlack, bo as to operate 
OS to put bis left wins m ..-onirnQnicatioa witb your wjiig, and 
ma are instruclcd f. c .-oporato so as w csUbUsh this commu.ucat.on 
as soon as possible by cxie.iding your right wing to tho north ol Rich- 

"U is believed that this communication can bo safely establichcd 

■ ■ la any event, you will be aljlo to prevent tho main body of tho enemy's 
forces from leaving Richmond, and falling in overwhelming force upon 
tJeneial McDowell. Ho will movo with between tliirty-ttvo (3o) and 
forty thousand (40,000) men. ,.,, .v nT,» 

"A copy of tlio insliuctions to General McDowell are with this. The 
speciBo task assigned to his command has been to provido against any 
danger to the capital of the nation. 

"At your earnest call tor reinforcements, ho Is sent forward to co- 
operate in the reduction of Richmond, but ciiarsed, in attempting this, not 
to uncover tho city of WashinKion,and you will give no order, either be- 
fore or after your junction, which can put him out of pceilion to cover 
this city. You and ho will communicato with each other by telegraph 
or otherwise, as frequently as may bo necessary for Eumcient go-opera- 
tion When Oener;!! Skitowcil is in position on your right, his supplies 
must be drawn from West Foiut, aud you will mstruct your stall officers 
to bo prepared to supply him by that route. „ . . ., . 

" The President desires that General McDowell retara the command 
of the department of tho Kappahaanock, and of the torcca with which 
he moves forward. 

" Ev order of tho President. . .„ 

toy muei oi vuo r _^ ^^^^^ ^^ STANTON, Secretary of War. 

"Major-General GsonQE B. McCLEtux, 

"Commmding Army of the PolmriM, before Ricnmmd." 
It will be observed that this order rendered it impossible for mo to 
as8 the .lames river as a liuo of operations, and forced me to establish 
our depots on tho I'amunkcv, and toapproach Richmond from the north. 
I had ai'viscd aud preferred, that re-enforcements should bo sent by 
water for the reasons that their arrival would bo moro safe and certain, 
and that I would bo left free to rest tho army on tho James nver when- 
ever the navigation of that stream should bo opened. 

Tho land movement obliged mo to e.xposo my right m order to secure 
tho Junction : and as the order for General JIcDowell's march was soca 
counterm.anded, I incurred great risk, of which tho enemy finally took 
advantage, and frustrated tho plan of campaign. Had General Mc- 
Dowell joined me by water, I could have approached by tho James, and 
thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickaho- 
mmy, aud would have had the army massed la one body instead of 
being necessarily divided by that stream. , ,, „ „ 

The following is a copy of tho instructions to General McDowell : 

" WiR Departme-\t, WAsmsGTOx, May 17, 1502. 
"Gesihai— Upon being joined by General Shields' division, you will 
move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond .and Fre- 
dericksburg railroad, co-operating with the forces under General Mc- 
Olellan, now threatening Richmond from tho hne of tho I'amiuikey aud 
York rivers. ., , , .■ t 

" While seeking to cstablLsh as soon as possible a communication be- 
tween your left wing and the right wing of General McClellau , you will 
hold yourself always in such position as to cover tho capital of the na- 
tion against a sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces. 

" General MoCleilan will be furnished with a copy of these instruc- 
tions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish 
communication with your left wiusr. and to prevent the main body of 
»ho enemy's armv from leaving Kiclimond, and throwing itself upon 
your column, before a junction of the two armies is effected. 

" A copy of his instructions m regard to tho employment of your 
force is annexed." 

" By order of tho President. 

■ ' EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War 

"General McDowra.1., Commamling De.partm(iU of EappahamjOK-k.' 

aaviog some doubts, from the wording of the foregoing orders, as to 
•*o extent of mv authority over the troops of General McDowell, and 
as to tho time when I mluhl anticipate his arrival, on the 21st of May I 
sent this despatch : 

" HE.<DqrAnTER'3 Army of Ten Potomac, 
" Camp nearTunstall's Station, Virginia, May 21, 1S62— 11 P.M. 
•* Tour de.spatch of yesterday, respecting our situation and the batter- 
»of Fort Darling, was received while I was absent with the advance, 
where I havo been all this dav. I have communicated personally with 
Captain Goldsborough, aud by letter with Captain Smith. The vessels 
5an do nothing without cooperation on land, which I will not be in con- 
dition to afford for several days. Circumstances must determine the 
propriety of a laud attack. 

" It rained again last night, and rain on this soil soon makes the 
roads increditly bad for army transporution. I personally croesed tho 
.aickahominy to-day at Bottom's bridge ford, and went a mile beyond, 
IhB enemv being about halt a mile in front. I havo throe regiments on 
the other'bank guarding the rebuilding of the bridge. Keyes' corps is 
an the New Kent road, near Bottom's bridge. Heintzelman is on the 
same road, within supporting dist.anco. Sumner is on Iho railroad, con- 
necting right with left. Stoocman, with advanced guard, is wilhin one 
alio of Now bridge. Franklin, with two divisions, is about two miles 
this side of Stoneman. I'orter's division, with the reserves of infantry 
and artillery, is within supporting distance. Headriuarters will proba- 
cy be at Coal Harbor to-morrow, one mile this side of Franklin. All 
the bridges over tho Chlckahominy are destroyed. The enemy aro in 
(•orce on every road leading to Richmond, within a mile or two west of 
aie stream. Their main *')dy is on tho road from New bridge, encamped 
nlong it for four or live miles, spreading over tho open ground on both 
aides. Johnson's headquarters aro about two miles beyond the bridge. 
All accounts report their numbers as greatly eiceeding our own. 
The position of tho rebel forces, the declaration of the confederate au- 
thorities, tho resolutions of tho Virgiania Legislature, the action of Iho 
city Government, tho conduct of tho citizens, and all other sources of 
Information accessible to roe give positive a-ssuranro that our approach 
to Kicbmond involves a dosperato battle between the opposing armies. 
"All our divisions are moving towards tho foe. I shall advance 
steadily and carefully, aud altack them according to my best Judg- 
ment, and in such manner as to employ my greatest force. 

" I regret the stale of things as to General JIcDowell's command, wo 
must beat tho enemy in front of Kichmond. One division added to this 
army for that elf.irt would do more to protect W^hlnston than his whole 
force can possibly do invwhero else in tho Oeld. The rebels aro con- 
centrating at all points lor the two battles at Kichmond and Corinth. I 
would still, most rcspeclfully, suggest tho policy of our concentrating 
bere by movements on water. 1 h,avo heard nothing as to the proba- 
bilities of tho contemplated Jmction of McDowell's force with mine. I 
have no ide.i v.-liou he cm start, what aro his moans of trausporlatinu, 
or when bo in v ')■' e.\p."-cu.d to re.icb this vicinity. I fear there is 

IHlle hope that he canjoin me overland in time for the coming battle. 
Delays on my part will be dangerous. I fear sickness and demoraliia- 
tion. This region is uuheaUhy for northern men, aud unless kept 
moving, I fear that our soldiers may become discouraged. At present 
our numbers are weakening from disease, but our men remain in good 

" i regret also the configuration of tho department of the Rappahan- 
nock, it includes a portion even of the city of Richmond. I think 
that myovvudepartmeutshould embrace tho entire field of military ope- 
rations do?igued (or the capture and occupation of that city. 

" .\gaiu, I agree with your excelleucy that ouo bad general is better two good ones. 

■• I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th In- 
ft lid .uldrepsed to myself aud General McDowell. If a junctloa Is 
.■fl '. L'mI before wo occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east of 
liie r:ulru.%d to Fredericksburg and within my department. This (act, 
inv superior rank, and the express language of tho 62d article of war, 
will place his command under my orders, unless it is otherwise specially 
r.iri'ted by your excelleucy ; and I consider that he will bo under my 
ci m man d, except that I am not to detach any portion of Itis forces, 
or i;ive any orders which can put him out of position to cover Washing- 
ton. If I'crr in my construction, I desiro to be at once set right. 
Friuikness compels me to say, anxious as I am for an increase of force, 
that the march of Mclioweirs column upon Richmond by the shortest 
ronto will, in my opiuiou, uncover Washington, as to any interposition 
by it, a** completely as its movement by water. The enemy cannot ad- 
vance by Frodericksburg on Washington. 

"Should they attempt a movement, which to mo Seems utterly Im- 
probable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. I desire 
that tho extent of my authority over McDowell may bo clearly deSnod, 
lest misunderstandings and conflicting views may produce some ot thofio 
injurious results which a divided command has so often caused. I would 
respectfully suggest that this danger can only be surely guarded against 
by explicitly placing General McDowell under my orders .n the ordinary 
way, aud holding mo strictly respousiblo for the cIo::CSt observance of 
your instructions. I hope, Mr. President, that it is not necessary for me 
to assure you that your instructions would be observed in the utmost 
good faith, and that I havo no personal feelings which could influeaco 
me to disregard them in any particular. 

" I believe that there is a great struggle before this army, but I am 
neither disraaved nor discouraged. I wish to sireiigthen its force as 
much as I can", but in auv event I shall light it with all the skill, cau- 
tion, and determination that I possess, and I trust that the result may 
either obtain for me tho permanent confidence of my Government, or 
that it may close my career. 

"(laiUGE 13. McCLELLAN, Jfajsr-CoKi-ol Commanding. 

" His Excellencv Absaii.vm Usctlx, 

" i'raidcnt of the United States." 

On the 24th I received the following reply : 

" Mat 24, 1862.— (From Wa-shington, 24th.) 

" I left General McDowell's camp at dark lasteveniug. Shields' com- 
mand is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday 
morning, the twenty -sixth (26th). Wo have so thinned our lino to get 
troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at l rent Royal, 
with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment infantry two (2) com- 
panies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril. 

" The enemy's forces, under General Anderson, now opposing General 
McDowell's advance, have, as their hne of supply and retreat, the road 

to Richmond. . . . « .<.„„_ 

"If in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, 

von rould send a force from your right to cut olf tho enemy's Euppliea 

'from Richmond, preserve tho railroad bridges across the two (-2) lorks 

of the Pamunkey and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent 

the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers 

of nearly litteeu thousand (15,000) men ; and if you succeed In saving 

1 t'ne brid'ges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition 

to the ono you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, 

while you aro building the Chlckahominy bridges? McDowell and 

Shields Loth say they can, and positively will, movo Monday morning. 

Zwuh you to move cautiously and safely. „ , ,. . i.»t_ 

' You will hate command of McDowell, after he joins you, Pr«f f * 

vou indicated in your long dispatch to us of the twenty-first (21st.) 

' "A. UNCOLN.PresuiCTt 

A. LINCOLN, PresidetiL 
<• Major-Goneral G. B. McCt-elt-as." ^ , „ j ,.,„ 

This information that McDowell's corps would march for Fredericks- 
burg on the following Mondav (the 20th), and that he would be under 
my command, as indicated in my telegram or tho 21st, was cheering 
news, and I now felt conhdent that we would on hisarrival be sufflcienlljr 
strong to overpower the largo army confronting us. 
At a later hour on the same d.iy I received tho following : _ „ , 
" May 24, 1S62.— (From Washington, t P. M.) 
" In consequence of General Banks' critical i>osition. I have hem com- 
pelled to suspend General McUowoU's movements to Join you. The ene- 
my are making a desperate push upon Harper's Kerry,and wo are tiyliig 
to throw General Fremont's force, and part of General McDowell s, to 
their rear. " A. LINCOLN , Ptendent. 

" Major-General Geo. B. MoCiEtiAN." . „ , „„n„»,.n 

From which it will be seen that I could not expect General McDoweB 
to Join mo in time to participate in immediate operations in ypot oj 
Richmond, and on tho same evening I replied to the President tuat I 
would make mv calculations accordingly. .... . 

It then only remained for mo to make tho best use of the forces at 
my di-jposal, and to avail myself of all artlQclal auxiliaries to compen- 
sate as much as possible for tho inadequacy of men. I concurred fully 
with the Prc?ideut in tho lojiuiotion contained in his telegram of the 
24th that it was necessary with mv limited force to move " cautiously 
and=afely " In view of tho pecuiiar character of tho Chick.ihominy, 
and the liability of its bottom laud to sudden inundation, it became 
necessary to construct between Bottom's bridgo and MechanicsviUo 
eleven (11) new bridges, all long and difficult, with extensivB log-way 

"The entire armv could probably havo been thrown across the ChlokB- 
homlny immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force 
on tho left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right 
and rear. If tho communication with our supply depot had been cut 
by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bijnk of the 
Chlckahominy, and the stage of water ns It wivs for many days iJlor 
our arrival tho bridgos carried away, and our means ol ir.msporlatlOD 
not furnishing a single day's supplies In advance, the trooiK must havo 
gone without rations, and the animals without forage, and tho army 
would have been paralyzed. . 

It Is Iruo I might havo abandoned my communications and pushed 
forward towards Richmond, trusting to the speedy dercot of the enemy 
and the conaequcul fall of the city for a renewal offupplies ; but the 
approaches were forliOed, and tho town itself wiis tjrr..ur.U-d with . 
.ironz lino of int.oi;elim.nts, renulrinjj a greater length ol timo to re- 

on t:>- 

It bi.,;. 

1 .<■'» of tbo army 
r to c, ■ .;> Milan of Coorral 
' l:(cl,uiil ihcrufuru I «u not 

■ ■ near New 

ical en:;;- 
utii.rf.-potijv. ly, iij- 1 1. j:,t; WooUbuiy 

•red iiI/)olsli»nare?imenl, find with 1-t('" '•r' strove 
.1. i'; vi'Ic, killioc a largouumbcr and i ,,al 

prisoners. (Iroai cr.Jit is due lo ibo nan officers, aa ,,.] 

Woodbury, Captaiu Gordou, aoU Ihclr commandii, for I. „u 

this cccaf Inn. 

Tho work tipon the bridges waa comnienced at ooco, nod pushed for-' 
ward with frcal vigor ; bin lli» rains, which from day to day conlinuej 
tofail.llooJcd ibe vri! • - M ILo watci- lo b greater helcht than 

bad been known fur i 

This demolijbeil a i of our labor, and ourflrft brld^M 

witb Uielr approachis. imi m », le not marto Kith refercnco to fiicU°cx-' 
Irems high water, wcro cirricd oil or rendered impafs.ible. \\e were 
obligod, with linmcn£o labor, to construct oibcrs, much longer moro 
elevated, and stable ; our men worked in the water, exposed to tho cne- 
mj's ftro from the oi)|>o£iic bank. 

On tho 25tli of May I received the foUowlnR tclngram : 

*' W.tiu;.NGT0.<, May 25, 1862 

" Tonr dispatch received. General Banks at sliarp=bur([ wilh 
about sil thousand fO.OOO) men, Shiclils having been takc-n from him to 
swell » column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and ihe rest of his 
force scattered at various places. On tho twenty-lhird (23d) a rebel 
force of seven (7) to tea thousand (10.000) foil upon one regiment and 
two companies guarding Iho bridge at I'ort Royal, di«troying it entirely • 
crossed tho Sbenando.ih,and on the twcnty-fourih (24th), ye^lerd.'-' 
pushed on to gel north of Banks on tho road to WinchcEt.'r. Genr ral 
Banks ran a race with Ihem, beating them into Wmchcsier ycBierdnv 
evening. TI1I3 morning a battle ensued between the two forces, lu whii ii 
General Banks was beaten back into full retreat towards Maitins-hiirg 
and probably 13 broken up into a total rout. Genry.on the Manasjiis 
Gap railroad . Jiisi now reports that Jackson is now near Front Roval « iih 
ten thousand (10,000) troops, following np and supporting, as i uniier- 
Btand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also, that another force of ten 
thousand Is near Orleans, following on in tho same direction. StripiB-d 
bare, as wo aro hero. I will do all wo cin to iirevcnt them crOMing the 
Potomac at Harper's Kerry or above. McDowell has about twenty tlr u- 
eand of his forces movlni; back to the vicinity of I'ort Royal ■ and I'ro- 
moot, who at Franlilin, is moving to Harrisonburg: both Ihcj^e 
movements Intended to get iu tho enemy's rear. 

" One moro of Mi'Dowell'sbrlg.ides is ordered through hero to Harper's 
Ferry ; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Kredericksburir 
\Te are sending such reqimentsand dribs from here and Baltimore as w-e 
can iparo to Harper's Kerry, supplying their places In some sort.callini 
in militia from tho adj.icenl Stales. Wo also have eighteen cannon oil 
the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at 
tiat point. This is now our situation. 

" If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, wo should be entire'v 
helpless. Apprehensions of Bomclhing lil;e this, and no unwillinimess 
tosustain you, has always been my reason for withholding JIcDowcii'i. 
force* from you. 

'!< d to, w«3 eiP-,-:ed by tho 

d V.UI luiecded to prevent 

^ ..... louto, or from tending r«- 

; f; ditpatch : 

-I. 1 .ini dad to kTv ^ - ■ -.-o 

f ■'■ i would oaru s;:v ciM •, 
' i nauks cf Slarch IC. to . 

v. ■'■'', -r \ !,,,.,, I 

I au.L'ji •■ 

down w '^ 

mail. II, ^ ' 
tradistlELi.aa to Fn;Joucki.biirg. " ' -^ "■"" ' ^"^ '■<•} ,u in ccn- 

"HisLxclloncyA. IjTJCoiL.1, /Vouf-iK " ■' '""^^'■ 

Later, on tho llrith, I tentlho following : 

" CAin .vE.(R New Bridoi!, May 26, 1862—7 SO P M 

t.. Cii .-^ out your last orders. Wcare qiilelly closing 

'.v to the last Hi ut-gle. Sll„at,.,l ,v9 1 am 

'iblo precaution u.^ainsi diraslc- .'ind to 

probably Euiwrior lurco in fronlof me 

" Have a 
In upon I 
I feelf! 

secure i 

" Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces von 
have. '' 

"A. USCOUi, PresiJrnt 
"HnJor-Ceneral McCim.ix." ' '^""'"" 

On the 25th the following was also received : 

WAsnixoTo.v, May 25, 18C2— 2 P M 
"The enemy is moving north InsuDlcient fore* to drive GeniTal Ba-i'ks 
before blm ; precisely in what force wo cannot tell. Ho is nls^j threat 
cning Leesburg, and Geary on the M.anas.ia3 Gap railroad, from both 
north and south ; in precisely what force we cannot tell. 1 think tho 
movement Is a general and concerted one, such as would not bu if he 
was acting upon tho purpose of a very deipe.-ato defense of Richmond 
I think the time Is near when you must cither attack Richmond or civc 
up the Job, and come to tho deionsc ol Wa^hinston. Let mo hear from 
you instantly. 

" A. LIN"C'Jl.N, I'retidaiL 

" MnJor General McCiiiiiN." ' '^""'^ 

To which I replied as follows : 

„ _ , " CoA'. nARBOB, May 25, 1802. 

'Telegram received. Independently of It, the time is very near when 
I stall attack Richmond. Ihe object of tho movement is prob.ably to 
prevent re eiifoi cements being sent tome. All the Information obtainec* 
irom balloc,ii3,de6erters,prl«onor8, and contriibands, agrees in thesUle- 
inent that tho matis of the rebel troops are still in ilie immedintc vicinity 
of Richmond, rcaily to defend it. 1 have no knowleilgo of Banks' posi- 
tion and force, nor what there is at Manassu ; thereloro cannot form a 
deflnito opinion as to the force against him. 

" I have two corps across Chlckahominy, within sii miles of Rich 
mond ; Uie others on lhi.< sid.; at olher crossings within tamo distance, 
and ready to cross when b.-idg.a are compkicd. 

.. n t^ „ " ''■.'*• i'cCU;U.AN, McfjorGtneral Cbnmandtng. 
" His Eicollency A. Li.\cul.\, I'rtsidaiL" 
On tho 26tb \ received the foi k.wing : 

..10 .. ^ .„ , ""••sniMTO^, May 26, 1S«3— 12.40 A.M. 

"Wo taaTC General Banks' oTriciul report. Ho ha.s Mved hii ari.iv and 
V*S',?,*' °" made a safe retreat lo tlm river, and is probably safe 
„.^"?°"P°''- ^^ reporu tho attacking force al Oftecn thousand 

"Major General srcCi.n.U!i." 

On tho 26th I received the following : 

,, _. " WA.>nnxGiox; Mit 2r., 1862. 

Can yon not cut Aqul.a Creek railroad. Also, what impn-sBinn have 
you as to inireii.-lielw.rki fir you lo contend with in front of Richmond? 
Can you get near monh 10 thr..w shells into the ciiv f 

" Mivjor General 0. B. McCLr.ilJlst." 
On the same day I sent tho following : 

.,„ . "COAtn" ■■ :,18e3. 

nave cut the Virginia Central road In three p ] laiiovor 

Courl-hou.loar'd thi tbickab.miinv. Will irv l.. . Id.Tnol 

My;tmi^n;s lor tomo.row aro Very important,' and irti!ix>M6taT 
wiU leave mo free to strike on tho return of the force detached ^^ ' 

" His Ejcellency A. trrciui, Prfridfnt." ""'^nu. 

On the same day I rocelvwl infills, ::co that « very considerable force 
or the enemy was in tho vicinity or Hanover Courthouse to the rliht 
and rear of our army, thus thr.-a|. iiing our communication, and In a 
position ei her to roenforco Jack „n, or to impede McDowell's Junction 
should he Unallv move to uniio wi'.h us. On tho same day 1 also re- 
ceived information from General McDowell, through the i-cretarv of 
V^ar, that the enemy hod fallen back from Fredorlcksl>org towards 
Elchmoml, and that General McDowell's command was elghTmiles south 
or the Ijppahnnnock. It was thus imperative 10 dislodge or defeat this 
force, independently even of the wir-hes of the I'resldent, as eiprossed 
In his leleKr.ini of the 20th. I intrusted this l.v^',; to Brig.vlier-Uoneral 
Fill John I'orter, commanding the liflh corps, wilh orders to move at 
daybre.ik on the 2ith. "■"■o •» 

'rhroughalie.ivyraln,and over bad road», that offlcer moved his 
command as follows : • ™ ui» 

Brigaiier-Generai W. H. Emery led the advance, with tho 6th and 
fcth regiments tnited .-tales cavalry and Benson's horse battery of the 
2d LnilcdSte.t.^ artillery, uking the road from New bridge ria Ito- 
cbanicsville, to Han«vcr Cocirl-houso, »""»•»- 

o^f""/",'. *''"!■'' w'^'"^'""'"' <^"^VOstA of tho brigades of Hartlndale 
BultcrfleId,andMc(}«ade.WilhBerdansreglmentorEhnrpehooter« and 
three batter cs, under Capi. Charles Crlffln, 6ih United States artil- 
lery, followed on the same ro.^. .^~«-» »i >u 

Colonel G. K. 
of the 6 

infantry, iu.> 0111 rennsyivania cavalry, and Weedin's Rhode Island 
battery, movtvl from his slaiion at Old Church by a road runninrto 
Hanover Court house, parallel to Ihe I'amunkey. ' 

After a fatiguing march of fourteen miles through the mud and rain 
General l.raory, at noon, reached a point about two miles fr.,ni Hanover 

'"^Il"' •>■;■?"■?". commanding a provisional brigade, composed 
) 6lh and 13th New lork, tho lat Connecticut artillery, actlngas 
lry,t.:e Gih Pennsylvania cavalry, and Weedin's Rhode Island 

think III' 
very s' 
from \\ . 
bridge 1. 

"'illablo ; but am in.; i. i;,i!n. Hopo 
Miice. H.1V0 railroad in ojxTalioa 
^y. 1 hope to have Cbickaliotuicy 
y of iolere-t l').d.ay. 

. r., «_ „ " ^^"- "• *"=L1''iU.,tX. McJw.OMa-al Camnumdiiu. 
'iIlsExcoUenry A. Ijvcoi.v, f/mit-i.'." 

the enemy formed in line across the Hanover OMirl-hnose road 

General Emory had, before this, been Joined bv the 2Sih New York 
(of Mnrtlud.tle's brigade), and Berdan's sharpshJxders ; these regiments 
were deployed with a section of Benson's battery, and advanced slowly 
towards the enemy until reinforced by General llutterfleld wilh fmir 
regiments of his brigade, when tho enemy was charged and ouicklv 
routed, one of his guns being captured hv the i;th New York under 
Colonel Lan.^ing, after having been dis.abled by the Ore of Benson's 
battery. Th" Bring here la3l»J about an hour. The cavalry and Ben- 
son's battery wore immediately ordered in pursuit, foi 'owed by Morell's 
Infantry and artillery, wilh tho exception of MarlinJalo's brigade 
barren's brigade having been del-ayed by repairing bridges, 4c now 
arrived, to.'i late to participate In this affair ; a portion of this command 
was sent lo the Pamunk"y to destroy bridges, and captured quite a 
number of prisoners; the remainder followed Jlorells divlskm In 
the meantime General Martindale, wilh tho few remaining legmrnls of 
his brigade and a s«tion of artillery, advonrcd on the Ashland road 
and fouud a force of the enemv's infantry, cavalry, and artillery In 
position near Bc.iko's station, on the Virginia Central Railroad •' he 
soon forced them to retire towards Ashland ' 

Tbe2oth Xcw York having been ordered torelnln him, General Martin- 
dale was directed lo form hi,s brigade and move np tho railroad lo relolo 
the rest of ihe command at Hanover Courl-houF«. 

Ho sent one regiment up t!;o inilrcad, but remained with the 2d 
Slaine, aflerwards Joined by the 20th New York, to guard the rear of 
the mam column. 

The enemy snon rctorncd to attack General Martindale, who at onoe 
formed tho 21 Slalne, 25th Vow York, and a iwrtlon of tho UlU New 
York, with one s.?cilon of Marlins battery, on tho New Bridge road 
facing- hi<! own position of t!io morning, and then held bis ground for an 
houragainst large oilds until reinforced. 

General Porter was at Hanover Court House, near tho bend of bis 
column, when ho lirned thai tho rear had been attacked by a largo 
force, lie at once r,ioed tho whole column about, reealli' I the cavalry 
sent In pursuit towanls Ashland, moved the ]3ih and liih N'ew York 
and firilBn's battery direct to Marlinsilulc'a n.<isifl,\uce, pushed Ihe »th 
Mas,'-.achusetts and 62 Pennsylvania, of McQuades brigade, through tho 
woodson the right, (our original left), and atlac'»ed the Dank of tho 
enemy, while Uutterlleld, with the 63d Pennsvlv-inla, and 16th Michi- 
gan, ha.^tened towards the scene of action by ihe railroad, and through 
the wools, further to the right, and completed the rout of the encmr 
fiuring the remalmier of this and the following day our cavalry wag lui- 
live m-ihe pursuit. Liking a number of prisoners, 

Civrt-iin Harrison, of the 6lh Dniled States cavalry, with a slngla 
compmy. brought In as prisoners two onlire c.unpanies of Infantry, 
with their aril! M-A im-n.iT .1 , n A p.irt uf Rush's lancers ahso cap- 
tured .m •-■ .rms. 

ITio Ini. 3 were, somotwohundrMofihe 

enemy'sii '^■•' '"'tidred and thirty prlfoners 

sent to the rear. ■ ■ alsson, a large number of 

small arms, and I 

Our loss amoui., .d and missing. 

Tho force eiicounleieJ and > General Branch's div^.'l.fl, of 
rcnrih Carolina and Georgia troops, supjtosed to have been tcnioOOOO 

Btrot: '. * 

'1 ' destroyed. 

1' ". iUi ae'lniogforce, 

'™^- ., -..„,,, .• ^ \, - - •■3ion of regulars to 

move on the ,i.^ta tiuin ?sew britigv luwar'l iianover Court House to 
be 10 position lo support Oeueral lorter. ;i.-y reached a point wllhln 


ttijoo miles of Hanover Court-liouBe, aucl remained there until the even- 
ing of the 29th, when they returned to their original camp. 

On tho 2Sth General Slouemnn's command of cavalry, horao nrtillery, 
and two regiments of iafautry, wcro also placed under Gcnorai Porter's 

On the same day I viaitod Hanover Court House, whence I sent the 
folloning despatch: 

" Hanoveh C!onp.T Hodse, May 29— ZV. H. 

" Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory ; too much 
credit cannot be given to his maguiflcenl division and its accomplighed 
leader. The rout of tho rebels was complete ; not a defeat, but a com- 
plete rout. Prisoners are constantly coming in ; two companies have 
this moment arrived with excellent arms. 

"Tlicro is no doubt that the enemy are concentrating exery thing on 
r.lchmond. I will do my best to cut ott' Jackson, but ain doubtful 
whether I can. 

" It is the policy and duty of the government to send me by water all 
tho well-drilled troops available, I am confident that Washington is in 
no danger. Engines and cars in largo numbers have been sent up to 
bring down Jaclisnn's command. 

" I may not be able to cut tlic-m off, but wiH try ; we have out all bnt 
the Fredericlisburg and Kichniuiid railroad. Tho real issue is in the 
battle about to bo fought iu trout of Kichmond, All our available 
troops should bo collected here, not raw reglmeucs, but tho well-drilled 
Droops. It cannot be ignored that a desperate battle is before us ; if 
any regimeuts of good troops remain unemployed, it will be an irre- 
parable fault committed. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-Gerin-al. 

" Hon. E. M. 5IAST0X, Secrclari/ of War." 

Having ascertained the state ofauairs, instructions wcro given Tor tbo 
operations oi tho following day. 

On tiie 2Sth a party under il.ijor Williams, 6tli United States cavalry, 
destroyed the common road brid^'cs over tho Pamuukey, and Virginia 
Central Railroad bridge over tho South Aun. 

On tho 29lh ho destroyed tho Fredericksburg and Kichmond I'aiiroad 
bridge over the South Ann, and tho turnpike bridge over the same 

On the sarao day, and mainly to cover tho moveraonl of Major Wil- 
liams, General Emory moved a column of cavalry towards Ashland , from 
Hanover Court House. Tho advance of this column under Captain 
Chambliss, 6th United States cavalry, entered Ashland, driving out a 
party of tlio enemy, destroyed tho railroad bridge over Stony Creek, 
broke up the railroad and telegraph. 

^Vnother column of all arms, under Colonel Warren, was sent on tho 
some day by the direct road to Ashland, and entered it shortly after 
General Emory's column had retired, capturing a sm.all party there. 

General Stoneman on tho same day moved on Ashland, by Leach's 
station, covering well the movements of the other columns. 

Tho objects of tho expedition having been accomplished, and it being 
certain that the 1st corps would not join us at once. General Porter 
withdrew his command to their camps, with the main army on the even- 
ing of the 2 Jth. 

On tho night of the 2ith and 23, 1 sent the following dispatch to tho 
Secretary of War ; 


" Camp nbab New Bridge, May 28, 1862— 12.S0 A. M. 

*' Porter has gained two complete victories over superior forces, yet I 
feel obliged to move in the morning with re-enforcements to secure the 
complete destruction of tho rebels in that quarter. In doing so, I ruu 
some risk here, but I cannot help it. The enemy are even in greater 
force than I had supposed. I will do all that quick movements can ac- 
complish, but you must send mo all the troops you can, and leave to 
me full latitude as to choice of commanders. It is absolutely necessary 
to destroy the rebels near Hauover Court-Honsc before I can advance. 
" G. B. McCLELLAN, Uajor-Gmcral. 

" Hon. E. JI, Etasion, Scci-dary of War." 

In reply to which, 1 received the following from tho President : 

" Washikgtom, May 28, 1S62. 

" I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory ; still, if it was a 
total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to Imow why tho Richmond and 
I'Yedcricksburg railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all 
tho railroiids but the Kichmond aud FredericUsburg. 1 am puzzled to 
ECO how. lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Rich- 
mond to West Point. The scrap of tho Virginia Central, from Kichmond 
to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That tho wholo 
of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think, cannot bo certainly 
known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs us that iareo 
forces, supposed to bo Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from 
Charlestown to-day. General King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg 
that contrabands givo certain im'ormation that fifteen thousand leit 
Hanover Junction Monday morning to re-enforce Jackson. lampain- 
t\illy impressed with the imporlaaco of tho slrusgle before you, aud 
shall aid you all I can coosiatently with my view of due rcgsrd to all 


" Jlajor-GeneralMcCLEUjv." 

At G P. M. of the 23th I s.-ut tho Secretary of War tho following dis- 
pat<di : 

" JIar i3, 1862—6 P. if. 

" General Porter pained Information that Ceneral Anderson left 
his position in vicinity ntFrederi(;',-sburg at 4 A. 51.. Sunday, with the 
following troops : 1st South Carolina, Colonel namilloo ; one battalion 
South Carolina rifles ; 34th and £SUi North Carolina ; 45th Georgia ; 12th, 
13tb,and Uih South Carolina ; S.l Louisiana ; two liaileries of four guns 
each, namely, Letcher's Virginia, and Mcintosh's fc'outh Carolina bat- 
teries. General Anderson and his command passed Ashland yesterday 
evening en route for Kichmond, leaving men behind to destroy bridges 
over the telegraph road which they traveled. This information is reli- 
able. It Is also positively certain that Br.anch's command was from 
Gordonsville, bound for Richmond, whither they have now gone. 

" It may bo regarded as positive, I thiuk, that there is no rebel forco 
between Frot?ericksburg and Junction. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-Ocnerai. 

" Hon. E. M. SiASTON, Stcrelarij of War." 

Tho t<)llowiug was also sent on the same day : 

" Hkadqi' Armt of ths Potomac, May 29, 1862. 

•* A detachment t»om Gen. V. J. Porter's command, under Major tVil- 
UaniK,6th cavalry, destroyed theSouUi Ann railroad biid?o at about 9 
A. M.^to-day; a la'rc- quantity of confederate public property was alsode- 
stroyod at Ashland this morning. 

" R. B. MAUCy, CKvf of Staff. 

" Hon. E. M. ETAN"rox, Sceretarif of IFiar." 

In reply towbich, the following was rcrelved : 

" W-tsmseroN, May 29. 1S62. 
- Your dispatch as to tho South Ann and Ashland being seized by our 
threes this mnrnin'; is received. Understanding these points Jo be on 
the Richmond and Kredericks'nirg railroa<I.I heartily congiatulato the 
country, aud thank General Moi'lollan and his army for thijir selzuro. 

. ** A. lilnCOLN . 
"General R. B. Marct." 
On tho 30th I sent the followiug ; 

*' Heaoqcartehs Ahstt of tub Potomac, May SO, 1882. 
*' From tho tone of j'our dispatches, and tho President's,! do not tblnlc 
that you at all appreciate the vaUio and magnitude of Porter's victory. 
It ha.s entirely relieved my right llank , which was seriously threatened ; 
routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the rebel forces ; taken 
over seven hundred and fifty prisoners ; killed and wounded largo num- 
bers ■ one gun, many small arms, and much baggage taken. It was one 
of Ihah.andsomest thingsof the war, both in itself and in its results. 
Porter bos returned, and myarmy is again well in hand. Another day 
will make tho probable field of battle passable for artillery. It is qolto 
cerliiin that there is nothing in front of McDowell at Frederick.sburg. I 
r.-e:rd tho burning of South Anno bridges as tho least important result 
uf Porter's movement. „„, .„ ,, . „ 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. 
'■ Tlnii. E. M. Rtastox, /fecrdary of War." 

Tiio n-sults of this brilliant operation of General Porter wore the dls- 
p-r.sal otGcneral Blanch's division, and tho clearing of our right flank 
aud rear. It was rendered impossible for the enemy to communicate by 
rail with Fredericksburg, or with Jackson via Gordonsville, except by 
til" very circuitous route of Lynchburg, and the road left entirely 
oiien for tho advance of McDowell he had been permitted to join the army 
01 tho Potomac. His withdrawal towards Front Royal was, in my 
Judgment, a serious and fatal error ; he could do no good in that direc- 
tion, whilo had ho been permitted to carry out the orders of Slay 17, 
tho united forces would have driven the enemy within the immediato 
iutrenchments of Richmond before Jackson could have returned t» its 
Euccur, and probably would have gained possession promptly of that 
place. I respectfully refer to the reports of General Porter and hte 
subordinate commanders for the names of the officers who deserve espe- 
cial mention for tho parts they took in these affairs, but I cannot omit 
here my testimony to tho energy and ability hero displayed by General 
Porter on this occasion, since to him is mainly duo the successes there 

On the SOth of May a reconnoissance was ordered on tho sonlh side or 
tho ChickaliEminy towards James river. T'his was accomplished by 
Brigadier General H. M. N.tjIco, who crossed his brigade near Bottom's 
bridge, and pushed forward to within two miles of Jamos river without 
serious resi^lauce, or Diidiug the enemy in forco. The rest of tho 4th 
corps, commanded by General E. D. Kcyes, crossed the Giickahominy 
on the 23d of May. 

On the 24th , 25th , and 26th . a very gallant reconnoissance was pushed 
by General Naglee, with his brigade, beyond the Seven Pines, and on 
the 25th the 4th corps was ordered to take up and fortify a position hi 
tha yiciuity of the Seven Pines. Tho order was at once obeyed ; a 
strong line of rlile pits opened, and abatis constructed a little hi the 
rear of tho point where tho nine-mile road comes into the Williamsburg 

On the same day General Heinlzelman was ordered to cross with hia 
corps, (the 3d), and take a position two miles in advance of Bottom's 
Bridge, watching the crossing of White Oak swamp, and covering the 
loft and the rear of tho left wing of the army. Being the senior ofHcer 
on that side of the river, he was placed in command of both corps, and 
ordered to hold tho Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw tha 
troops from the crossings of White Oak swamp unless in an emergency. 
On the 28th General Keycs was ordered to advance Casey's division to 
Fair Oaks, on tho Williamsburg road, some three-quarters of a milo in 
front of the Seven Pines, leaving General Couch s division at tho line ot 
rifle-pits. A new line of rifle-pits and a small redoubt for six field guns 
were commenced, and much of tho timber in front of this line was 
felled on tho two days following. The picket lino was established, 
reaching from the Chickahominy to White Oak swamp. 

On tho SOth General Heintzelman, representing that the advance tadl 
met with sharp opposition in Uiking up their position, and that he con- 
sidered the point a critical one, requested and obtained authority to 
make such dispositions of his troops as he saw fit to meet the emer- 
gency. He immediately advanced two brigades of Kearney's division 
about the fourth of a mile in front of Savage's station, thus placing them 
within supporting distance of Casey's division, which held tho advanco 
of the 4th corps. 

On the 30th tho troops on tho south side of tho Chickahominy were In 
position as follows : Casey's division on tho right of the Williamsburg 
road.atrightangles to it,thoccntroat FairOalcs; Couch's division at 
the Seven Pines ; Kearney 's division on the railroad , from near Savage's 
sution towards tho bridge ; Hooker's division on the borders of Whito 
Oak swamp. Constant skirmishing had been kept up between our pick- 
ets and tho.^n of the enemy ; whilo these lines were being taken up and 
strengthened, largo bodies of confeder.ato troops were seen immedi- 
ately to the front and right of Osey's position. 

During the dav and night of the 30th of May a very violent storm oc- 
curred, tho rain'felling in torrents rendered work on tho rilk-piusnnd 
bridges impracticable ; made tho reads almost imp^sable, and threat- 
ened tho destruction of tho bridges over the CliickahSminy. 

The enemy perceiving tho unfavorable position in which wo wero 
rlaced,.nndthero«ibildvofdeEtroyingthatpartof our army which was 
apparently cut off from tho main body by tho r.apidly rising stream, 
threw an overv,-he!miug forcerfgrand diviiioas of Generals I). H. Hill, 
lluger, Longstrcet, and G. W. imith.) upon tho position occupied by 
Casey's division. v . ». .» 

It appears from tho ofllcial reports of General Keycs and his subordi- 
nate commanders, that at ten o'clcek, A. M., on tho Cist of May, on 
ni-le-dc-cainp of General J. E. Johnston was captured by General Nog- 
I'-e's pickets. But little information as to tho movements of the enemy 
was obtained from him, but his presence so near our lines excited sus- 
picion and caused increased vigilance, and tho troops wero ordered by 
General Keyes to be under arms at eleven o'clock. Between eleven and 
twelve o'cloeklit was reported to General Cnsey that tho enemy wero ap- 
pr.iaehing In considerable forco on tho WiHiamEburgro,ad. Aithis time 
Ctiev's division was disposed as f.dlows: Naglee 's brigade extending 
fi-om"tlieAVii;iarasburgioad to the Garnett field, having one roglmcnl 
nrross tho rail.'oad ; General Weasel's brigade in the rifle pits, and 
General Palmer's In the rear of General WcssePs : one battery ofartil- 
I.rv in advance with General Naglee ; one battery in rear of rinc-plti 
to ill" ri"lit of the redoubt ; ono batlerv in rear of the redoubt, and ano 
•'i r tiaiierv nuharnes.'^ed in tho redoubt. General Couch's division 
' . Will- iliei.^cend lino, had CencralAbererombio'ibrigade on the right 
• ■ ■ • liiii uiiie-niile road, with two reiimeuts and one battery acro6» 
i.Tiiir^iad ncir Fair Oaks Elation; General leek's bngado on tni 

Oo the appronrh nr th« enemy, Gonrval Cwy wr.t forwftni one^ 
6(n(!ral Palmor's rCRlmenis lo eiip|>orl tho pickilli[i<!,bnt IhMrrfiimeDt 
gave way with <utniukiD|; mucb. If any, reaistaaco. Heavy OrliK at 
ooce commenccJ, and the pickets were (^nvon In. Ccoeral heyes 
•rd«red General Couch t" move General Peek's brijn'lo to occupy the 
fround on the IcTt of the Williamsburg road . which had c>>t borire been 
occupied by oor forcen, and tbos lo support Oeceral C.i>''v )•■ !pfl , whore 
Ibo Ural attack was the most Eoyere. The enemy now caiu^ ou in hea\7 
force, attackmjr General Casey elmallanecnifly Id front aud en both 
lanka. General Keyeasenl to General Ktlntzelman for re-enforcem'>nU, 
but the meFsenger was delayed, so tbat orders were not sent lo Geno- 
rals Kearney and Hooker ontll S o'c'.ock, and It was nearly 6 I". M. 
when Gf-nerals Jamesos and TerryM brigades of General Keorn''y'6 ril- 
vl-ion arrived on tho field. General Birneywasorderrdnp the railroad, 
tout by General Kearney's order balled hl.=^ brifT-t-le before arriving at 
the scene f'f act loo. Orders were also dl?:;uchrd for General Hooker to 
roOTO up from Wbit« Oak swamp, and he arrived after dark at Savage's 

\ 4kk soon as the firing was beard at headquarters, orders were sent to 
tien. Sumner to get bis cemmand uoiler arms and be ready to more at 
% moment's warning. His corps, consistioi; of General Richardson's 
and tedgwick's divisions, was encamped on the norlb Ride of the (.'hirka- 
hominy, some fix miles aboro Bottom's bridge: each divuiion bad 
thrown a bride over the stream oppo.«ite to it.s own poMt-on. 

At oao o'clock Generil Puniner moved tho two divi.'ions to their r«- 
•pectlvo bridges, with Instructions to halt and aw^ilt further orders. 
At two o'clock orders were sent fiom heailQuarters to cre^s these divi- 
8loi:is without delay, and push them rapidly toG'^ner.^1 H< liiizclman's 
support. This order was received, and communicated ut half past two, 
and the p>',!>sigo was Imme/liatcly commenced. In the meantime Gene- 
ral Nagieo's brlirade, with the batteries of General Casey's division, 
which General Nagtee directed, struggled gallantly to maintain the re- 
doubt and rifle-pits against the overwhelming masses of the enemy. 
They were ri'-enlorced by a regiment from General Peck's brigads. 
Tho artillery under command of Colonel G. D. Bailey, First New York 
artillery, and afterwards of General Nagloe, did good execution on the 
a Jranclng column. The left of this position, was, however, coon turned, 
and a sharp crofs-flro opened upon the gunners and men in the riSe- 
pits. Colonel iJalley, >laJor Van VallseDberg, and Adjutant Ramsev, c( 
iif tho same regiment, were killed ; some cf the guns in the redoubt 
were taken, and tho whole lino was driven back upon the position occu- 
pied by Gonoral Couch. Tho brigades of General Weasel and Palmer, 
with the re-enforcements which had been sent them from General 
Couch, bad also been driven from tho field with heavy loss, and tho 
whole position occupied by General Casey's division was taken by tho 

^Previous to this time General Keyes ordered General Couch to advance 
two regiments to relievo the prc.-.suro upon General t-asey's right flank. 
In making this movement, GciiTal Couch discovered largo masses of the 
enemy pu-ihir.g towards our right, and crossing the railroad, as well as 
a heavy column which had been held in reserve, and which was now 
making its way to Fair Oaks station. General Couch at once engaged 
this column with two regiments ; but, though re-enforced by two addi- 
tional re^'iments. he was overpowered, and the enemy pushed between 
him and the main body of his division. With these four regiments and 
one battery General Conch fell back about half a mile towards the Grape- 
vine bridge, where, hearing that General Sumner had crossed, he 
formed line of battle facing Fair Oaks sutlon, and prepared to bold the 

Generals B'irry and Jameson's brigades had by this time arrived In 
front of the Seven Fines. Gener:il B-^rrv was ordered to take possession 
of the woo<!s ou tho left, and push forward so as to have a flank fire oo 
Iho encmy',% lines. Ttls movement w.ts executed brilliantly, General 
Berry pti.--hi[ig bis regiments forward Ibuouph the woods until their 
rifles commi'iilo'l the left of thoc.imp and works occupiijd by General 
Qtsey'sdiv.-iou in the morning. Their fire on the pursuing columns of 
the enemy was vr-ry destructive, and nssisif^.-l niatrrially in checking 
the pursuit In part uf the Held. He held his po-itlon In these woods 
against several attacks cf superior numbers, aiul after dark, being cut 
cIT by tho enemy from the main body, he fell buck towards White Oak 
•wamp, and by n circuit brou;:ht hl-s men into our lines in good order. 

General Jameson, with two regiments (the cth'.-r I wo of his brigade 
bavlng boon detached — one to Gen 3ral Peek and one to General Blrney) 
moved rapidly to the front on the left of the Williamsburg road, and 
Bucccedeil for a time In keeping the abatis clear of the enerov. But 
large numbers of the enemy pressed past the right of bis IIqc, be, too 
» as forced to retreat throngh tbe woods toward* White Oak swamp, and 
•In that way gained camp nnder cover of niglit. 

r) Brlgadlcr-Uencral Devens, who had held the centre of General Coivsh'i 
UlTisioa, had made repealed and gallant i IT.irts to regain portions of tlw 
ground lost \-\ front, but each time was tiriven back, and fiaally with- 
drew behind tlio rifle pits, near Seven Pines. 

Meantime Genei-al ;;iiraner arrived with tho advance of his corpt. 
General Scilwic'ii'sdivir ion, at the point held I'vGeuernlCoui-h with four 
regimcni£ and one battery. Tho roads kailmc; fri-m the briilge wereso 
miry that It was only by tho greatest exeriinn General ScUtwick bad 
been able to get one of his batteries lo tbe fniit." 

Tho leadlns rcgimenl (Isl Minnesota, Colonel Ailly) wiS Immediately 
•leploycd to tho i ight cf Couch, to [irotcct tho Bmk, and tho rest oi the 
division formed in line of battle, Kirby's battery near the centre, in an 
angle of Iho words. One of General r<iuch'6 ri-Eimculs was sent to open 
coiDraunlcatlon With Central HeiDlzolmai' ^ - •- was these di«po- 
Kitlonsmado than the enemy came in El, o^iud a heavy 

flroalmg th« line. Ho ma Jo several C. .% cnch time re. 

pulsed with gre.1t loss by the stt.-ulyflrow ..nd the t-plcudid 

practice of tho ballery. After srstntning tiio encni'v » Oio far a con- 
siderable lime. General .''umner cruercd five reuimeuu (the S4tb New 

York, Colonel l^inter; S2J New York, I. i.-"i.r . , ii'.i ., 

Mas--arti-isetl.s. IJeutcn.iDl t'olcr.f I Kmii . 
1-ce : ;th Michigan, Major r.ichariisor.— ; 
man's UriKi'le, tho two latter of tienerai i .. . ...,.,„. . 

aud cb.arge with tho b.iyonct. Thu charge «■.. iiio racsi 

'brliUant manner. Our troops spricghig over iv, iwerete- 

tween them and the enemy, roshcd up. a hia : „ ,e him in 

confusion from that lort of the Hold. l;arknci>s uuw ti^ded the battle 
for that day. 

^Durliie til'.' nh-ht difp^Ulons were n-m'e r 
oral C-- . and so mn ' 

Icctcil 1 . General K- 

tioTen i ._ - ...1 1'eck, in i- 

Ut« In tho ufleriio-'D lu rallying 
and was taking them once moie i 

back to tho Intrenched camp by l . , 

bronght op Lis division about dai k , ua\ mg bwti ilclnved by the h-ari- 
a»«s uf the roads and the throng of (-igitivcs from ili« field, ihrougb 

..,,.,■, -•■■i-ns iigiiiieot i,--iartl reporls Le'-wM 

oblig.-d tof.ircehis wjy with tlic bayonet." Vh-a Jivaion bivouacked 
for the ri^jht in rear if tho right of the riOo-rits. on tho other side of 
the railroad. General Richardson's division aim carae upon tha field 
about sunset. Ho bad altcm.nled tbo passage of the Chlckahomlnr by 
Ibe bridge opposite bis own camp, but it was so far destroyed thai be 
was fortsed to move Generals Howard and Meagher's brigades with all 
his artilery, around by General Sedgwick's bridge, while' Genera) 
Frcnch'a brigade, with the utmost didlculty.croesed by the other 
General Sedgwick's division, with theregimeuu under General Coneb 
held about the same position as when the fight ceased and Genera] 
lt;ehardson on bis arrival was ordered to place his division on Ibe left 
to connect with General Kearney ; General French's brigade wa* 
posted along the railroad, and General Howard and Meagher's brlgadee 
in second and third lines. All his artillery had been left behind. It 
being Impossible to move It forward through the deep mud as rapidly 
as the Infantry pushed towards the field, bui during the night the 
three batteries of the division were bronght to the from 

About five o'clock on the morning of the first of June fkirmlshers and 
some cavalry of the enemy were discovered In front oi General Richard. 
son's division. Cnptam Pettit's battery (B, 1st ,\ew York) having come 
upon tbe ground, threw a few shells among them, when tbey dlsScrtwL 
There was a wide interval between General Richardson and tJcccaJ 
Kearney. To close this, General Kichirdscn's line was eiteo'lel u. f c 
left an* his first line moved over tho railroad. Ecarcely bad tbev 
galneo Ibe poeition, when the enemy appearing In largo force from the 
woods la ttont, oiKned a heavy fire of musketry at short range along the 
whole lln«- He approached very rtiplilly with columns oi atuck formed 
on the two roada which crossed the railroad. Theso columas were sup- 
ported by infantry in line ofbatilo on each side, cutting General 
Fmnch's Hoe. He threw out no skirmishers, but appeared determined 
to carry all befor« blra by one crushing blow. For nearly an hour the 
first line of General Richardson's division stood and returned the fire 
the lines ef the enemy being reinforced ami relieved time after time! 
tin finally General Howard was ordered with hi.s brigade to go to General 
French's assistance. He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few 
minutes tho fire of tho enemy ceased and b;s whole lino fell back on 
that part of the field. On Ihe opening oftho linns in the morning Gen. 
eral Hooker pushed forward on the raiload w ith two regimenta (6th and 
6ih New Jersey.) followed by General Sickle's Brigade. It was found 
impossible to move tho artillery of this division from its position on ac 
count of tho mud. On coming near the woods, which were held by tbe 
enemy In force. General Hooker found General Eirney's brigade Colonel 
J. Uobart Ward In command, in lineof battle Ho sent back to hasten 
Sickles' brigade, but ascertained that it had been turned ofl to the left 
by General Hcintitlman to meet a column advancing in that direction 
He at once made the attack with the two New Jersey regimenLs calline 
upon Colonel Ward to support him with General Birney's brigade Tlii 
was well done, our troops advancing into the woods nnder a heavy fire 
and pual-Jng Ibe enemy before them for more than an hour cf hard fight' 
leg. A charge with tho bayonet was then ordered by General Hocker 
with the 6th and 6tb New Jersey, 3d Maine, and CJth and 401h New 
York, and tho enemy fied in confusion, throwing down arms and even 
elolhiog In his flight. General .'^ickles, having been ordered to tbe Icfi 
formedlineof battle on both sides of Williamsburg road and advanced' 
under a sharp fire from tbo enemy, deployed In the woods hi front ol 
him ; after a brisk interchange or musketry fire while crossing tho onon 
ground, tho Excelsior brigade dashed into tbe timber with tho bayonet 
and put the enemy to flight. ' . 

On the right the enemy opened flre after half an hour's cessation 
which was promptly responded to by General Richardson's d'lvlsloo' 
Again the most vi;;orous eOTorts were made to break cur line and again 
they wore frustrated by the steady courage of our troops. In about an 
hour General Richardson's whole line rdvanced, pouring In their flre at 
clese range, which threw the hue cf the enemy back in some confusion 
■l^l' was followed up by a bayonet charge led by General French iii 
ivrson, with the 57lh and 6Cth New York, supported by two regiments 
sent by General Heintzelman, the 71si and T3J New York, which turned 
the confusion of the enemy into precipitated flight. One gun captured 
the previous day was retaken. * 

Our troops pushed forward u far as tho lines held by them on tbe 
Slsl before tl.o attack. On the battle field there were found many of 
our own and the confederate wounded, arms, caissons, wagons subsist- 
ence stores, and forage, abandoned by tho enemy In his rout The 
EtatCi.r \\js roads and impossibility of maDetuvrmg artillery prevented 
fiiJ'C'J» pursuit. On the next morning a rcconnolssance was sent 
forwii '•, which pressed back tho pickets of tbe enemy to within five 
•niltoof l',!cLmond; but again the impossibility of forcing oven a few 
lotteries fcrward precluded our holding permanently this position 
rh? lines held previous to the battle were tberCoro resumed General 
J. E. Johns! n rejiorU le)f3 cf tbe enemy in Locgstrcet's and J W 
Smith's div.sioos at 4,233 ; General I). H. Hill, who had t.\ken Ihi ad' 
vanco in tho atMck, cstimntcs his loss at 2,600 ; which would g to Iho 
oi.emv's lo-s 6,7So. Our loss,, in General Sumner's corps 1 ■>C3 ■ 
(;e;icral lleinti.-lmau's corps, 1,194 ;'Geiieral Kcycs' corps, 3,K(>— tnial" 
6,737. • 

Previous to llie arrival of General .Snmner upon tho field of battle en 
tho Slsl cf Hay, General Helalzolraan, tho srulnr corps cemman'der 
present was in the Iminpeliale command o( tbe forces ong.igeJ The Dtit 
informiif.inl r.v.'i.,! tliit the battle was in progress was a disfatcJi 

from him stlt::; 
of UlO Slsl I re 

vr !'-n had given wny 


•..11 from him 

iveii wny. During tbe night 
dated 6 4S p m.. in whicb 

-■. •'-le renewal. Gcn- 
• i could bo col- 
' nOe pits near 

1, had succeeded of stragglers, 
. when lie was orilei ed Geueeal Ho.>ker 

a I g-jl to tbe front the most of General 
,. *_ • • Ihe route of General 
..ic.Tcflcclcn the lri(.iis.i8 they came on 

■ I-...,- Iieei! ilMif-i, ba.'k." 

VIS received prcTious Casey's divisloo 

^\^:-l tao ttt.-a.ii> e-i Vi „r ul iLc ui a dicpatcli uii"iho"^6tb et 


I'he offl 
Tory cei 
ga'lo cf I 
tru^'ps. w:^- 
reporu iili 
sion nix : 
Ge'lieral ' 
the front - 


i^irls nf Oner.lls K-vr. r-is.y, „j f,,^,,, ,^g^ ,j,^, ^ 
1 ghl well, and thai the bri. 
■ lor its gallantry. Ihis di. 

■ e.ghtof comparatively i.t-w 

l..e„,.. l).v tiiti.,.,- ui;muera: yd, according to tb- 

lei, it ttocJ luo allaek lor •• three hours 1.. lure 1! k,j 

1 ;l 11 f iliv..-ion was thrown Into great couru- 

■ tic enemy ; bui the personal cfl^orla o* 

> , and other oQiceig, who boldly went In 

men by their presence and exam pie it 

liiUdagreal pari of tbe division, and there by 

enabled it to act a prommeDt part Id this severely contested battle. It 
therefore affords me great, satisfaction to withdraw the expression con- 
tained ia my flrst dispatch, and I cordially give my indorsement to the 
conclQsion of the diviEion commander, " liiat those parts of his command 
which behaved discreditably were exceptional cases." 

On the olst, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, wo had two of 
onr bridges nearly completed ; bi«' the rising waters Uooded Iho Idg- 
way approaches and made them almost impaasablo, so that it was only 
by tho greatest efforts that General Sumner crossed his corps and par- 
ticipated in thai hard-fougbt engagement. The bridges became totally 
Qseless after this corps had passed, and others on a moro permanent 
plan were commenced. 

On my way to headquarters, after the battle of Fair Oaks, I at- 
lomptod to cross the bridge where General Sumner had Taken over his 
corps on the day previoua. At tho time General Sumner crossed this 
was the only available bridge abovo Bottom's bridgo. I found the 
approach from the right bank for eome 400 yards aubmerged to the 
depth of several feet, and on reaching the placo whore the bridgo had 
been, I found a great part of it carried away, so that I could not got my 
horae over, and was obliged to send him to Bottom's bridgo, sii miles 
bcloT, OS tho only practicable crossing. 

Tho approaches to New and Mechanicsvillo bridges were also over- 
flowed, and both of thom were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries 
established upon commanding heights oa the opposite side. These bat- 
teries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having numer- 
ous rifle-pits in their front, which would havo made it necessary, even 
had the approachfts been in the best possible condition, to have fought 
asanguinary battle, with buthttlo prospect of success, beforoapassage 
oonld have been secured. 
''Tho only available moans, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair 
Oaks for an advance on jRichmoud soon after tho battle, was to marcli 
tbe troops from MechaoficsvUle, and other points, on the left banks of 
tho Chickahominy down to Bottom's bridg<*, and Ihence over the 
Williamsburg road to the position near Fair Oakp, a distance of about 
twenty-three (23) miles. In tho condition of tho roads at that time 
this march could not havo been mode with arliltery in less than two 
days, by which time the enemy would have been secure within his 
inlrenclinente around Richmond, lu short, the idea of uniting the two 
wings of the army in time to mako a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, 
with tho prospect of overt-iking him befora he reached Richmond, only 
Ave miles di.stantfrom the tjeld of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I 
presume, never for a moment aerioui^ly entertained by any one con- 
nected with tho army of tho Potomac. An advanct^. involving the 
separation of the two wings by tho impassable Chickaliominy, would 
have exposed each to defeat In detail. Therefore I held the position 
already gained, and completed our crossing as rapidly as possible. 

In the meantime tho troops at Fair Oaks were directed to strengthen 
their positions by a strong line of intrenchmenls, which protected them 
while the bridges were beingbuilt.gavesecurity to the trains, liberated 
a larger fighting force, and offered u safer retreat in tho event of disaster. 

Oa the 2d of June I sent tho following d)S|<ntob : 

" HfiADQUAimjUS AilMY oy 7!1R POTOMAC, 

" Nkw FJjiiDG^, .June 2, 1862—10.30 A. M. 
" Our left is overy'where advanced considerably beyond the positions 
tt occupied before the buttle. lam in .slior.g ho]>es thai the CTii'-ka- 

liomloy will fall sulBciently to enable mo to cross the ri.-^bt. Wo havo 
had a terrible time with our communications — bridges and causeways, 
built with great care, having been washed away by the sudden freshets, 
leaving uR almost cut olf from communication. All that human labor 
can do is being done to accomplish our purpos'.'. 

"Please regard the portion of this relaiiu.^ to condition of Chicka- 
hominy as cnntid^-ntial, as it would bo serious if the enemy were awaro 
of it. I do D'-i yet know our loss ; it has been very heavy on both sides, 
as the fighiii.'^ was desperate. Our victory complete. I especl still 
moro flghling before we reach Rirhmond. 

" G. B. McCLELL;lN, Major- General. 

*'Hoa. E. il. ^TAsTos, S':cT'iarif of War." 

On the t^amo day I received the following from the Secretary of War : 
" WASHiNGToy, June 2, 1862. 

'• Your telegram has been rerolved, and we are greatly rejoiced &L 
your success— not only in itself, but because of tho dauntless spirit anq 
courage it displays in your troops. You have received, of course, tbd, 
order mado yesterday in respect to Fortress Monroe. The object was to 
place at your command the disiwsablo force of that department. Tho 
indications ere that Fremont or McDowell will Oght Jackson to-day, and 
as soon aa ho is disposed of, another largo body of troops will be at your 

" Tho intetligenco from Halleck shows that the rebels are fleeing, and 
pursued in force, from Corinth. All interest now centres in your opera- 
tions, and full confidence is entertained of your brilliant and glorious 
success. "EDWUV M. STANTON, Secretary of War 

*' Major-Gcneral McC^ellan." * 

On the 3d I received the following from the President : 

•' W.iSfliNGTON', June 3, 181*2. 

" With those continuous rains, I am very anxious about tho Chicka- 
hominy— so close in your rear, and crossing your line of ccmmunlca- 
lion. I'leas-j loot to it. 


" Major Goneral McClkt-ms." 

To which I replied as follows : 


" New Bridoh, June 3, 1S62. 
'* Your dispatch of 5 P. H. just received. As tho Chickahominy has 
been almost tho only obstacle in my way for several days, your Excel- 
lency may rest assured that it has not been overlooked. Kvcry effort 
has been mado, and will continue to be, to porfcct the communications 
across It. Nothing of importance, except that It is again rainin?. 

"G. B. licCl jell A^ , Major -Genfral CommandiTM. 
" A. LracoLN, President, W'ashiriifton." 

My views of the condition of our army on the 4th ore explained lathe 
following dispatch to the President : 

*< Headquarters Armt of tub Potomac, 

" New Bbidgb, June 4, 1862, 
" Terrible rain-etorm during the night and morning- not yet cleared 
otr Chickahominy flooded ; briJgea Id bad condition. Are still hard at 
work at them. I have taken every possible step to insure tho security 
of the corps on tho right bank, but I cannot re-enforce them here until 
my bridges are all safe, as my force is loo small to iosure my right and 
rear, should the enemy att-ack in that direction, as they may probably 
attempt. I havo to bo very cautious now. Our loss in tho late battle 
"lU probably exceed (5.O0O) live thoiisand. I have not yet fuU retunu 


On Bcooaol of llio cff-^t i 
I reqQMt that ywi wilt - 
days. lamftjtuafleU H 
KrMt«r ; th^y wero t- 
nwrcly to fhow yon th:*! lii- 

L' OTi '■■ur own men an l t!;'^ iiii-thv. 

TnUtiOQ Of C 

I he onoor.y v. 
j'lj. I mcoti" 'I 
uy ur Lbo Potomac luui L;ulii(.riuu^ uoik, 

and no cIi.M'r i»Uy l--' b^'ore 

"You must maliu your calcu'dtions on Iho 8appo«itlon that I have 
been correci Trom (ho bcgioDiug in asserting that tbo serious opposlli'a 
ms to bo piado here. 

** G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-CencroX CommaAdivj. 
" A. LiNCiiN, Praident." 

.Uid In the following to lbo Secretary of War, on lb« BAtno day : 
'* IlKADi^rjumLts Army or toi rdTou.^r. 
•* N'bw BftiuGR, Juno 4, IStii 
" PtoAm Inform mo at onco xvhat re-enforccmcnt«, If any, I cjd count 
oponhav:"- .' ^■■■'•—'- M'(^, or White IIocsc, wiihln tho next tbroe 
ilays, an : may bo expected toarrlvo. Itisof tli- 

oUnost tin 1 kuow this Immodialcly. The losses iri 

the battle 71 i.- -vm amwjnl to (7, 0^> seven thousand. 

Regard Ibts ns c ' ^'e present. 

" If I can ha\ .v regiments for Fort Monro© ana Us de- 

pendonci!\<». 1 ci!i -i >" ■ ...rto morooM rcniments from tiur-- p ii- •.■ 
lean well ilHi'Dso 01 ri>i.r nvirc raw rcgimcnls on my cor: 
lean well flL-iMJso cf fnm (li) III teen to (20) twenty well 
monts amtnn l!i? oM br^aJcJi In brioginR them up to t'.. 
effectlvo strtTKih. Hecruita are especially necessary for the m-; .,ir 
and volunteer b.Uteri».*s of artillery, aa well as for iho rogular .md \. 1 n- 
teor regiments of Infantry. After tho losses in our la^t balli'\ I inM 
th&t I win no tonper be roKftrdei as an alarmist. I believe wo li;ivo at 
least one moro desperalo battle to fight. 

" G. B. McCLU.I-AV, Major-Gsncral Commanding. 
" Hon. E. M. Staxtov, S'-Triary of War.'' 
Also in my dlsp itch to tho .Secnlary of War, on tho 5lh ; 

*' HEiDQUAfrrfSts Army orTim Potomac, Nkw Bfudgr, June 5. 1862 
'<Rained moslof lbo ni^^ht ; has now cex«ed, but Is notrlrar. Tlie 
river Ftiil very hUh ojhI troubtesomo. Kncmy opened with scvcrnl 
batteries on our bridges near hfrc this morning ; our batl?ries sepmtJ 
to havo pretty much siloncod them, though some flriuR Plill kept up. 
The rain forces us to remain in eiatu quo. With great difficulty a tiivi- 
filon of infantry has been cros.=:pd this morning to support tho troop.s on 
tho other side, should the enemy renew attaclc. I felt obliged todothls, 
although it leaves us rather weak hero. 

"G. B. McCLELLA.V. J/ajor-ffrtifioZ Commanding. 
" Hon. E. M. Stamo.n, SiCida}-y cf War." 
Cq tho 6th tbo Secretary tclc^rnphcd mo as follows : 

" WAem.vcTOX, June 5, 18C2— 8.S0 P. .U. 
«' I wilt send yon Ave (5) new regiments as fast as transportation 
can lake them ; the first to start to-morrow from Baltimore. I intctd 
sendioR you a part of McDowell's force as soon as it con return from its 
trip to Front Royal, probably as many as yon want. The order to ship 
tho now regiments to Fort Monroo has already been given. I Rup]y>se 
that tboy may be sent directly to the fort. Piboso advise me if this be 
OS you desire. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, Sterdary 0/ War. 
*' Major General McCLntAN." 

Oa tbo 7th ot Juno I telegraphed as follows : 

nEAo<ii'AirreRS Ahmy oftbr I'tTOMAC. Juno 7, 1882 — 4.40 P. M. 
" In reply to your dispatch of 2 P. M. to-day, I havo tho honor to 
state that the Chickahominy river has risen so" as to flood the ontiro 
bottoms to tbo depth of tbreo and four feet. I am pushing forward the 
bridges in spite of thi.^, and tho men are working uigbt and day, up to 
their waists in water, to complete them. 

"The wholo foci • f tho country is a perfect bog, entirely Impassable 
for artillery, or even cavalry, except directly in the narrow roads. 
which renders any general movement, either of this or tho rebel army, 
entirely out of tho question until we have more favorablo weatbe.-. 

" I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward re-enforccmc:it£ so 

" I shaU be in porfoot readiness to move forward and take Richmond 
tbo moment McCall reaches hero, and the ground will admitlho pa?>a>:o 
of arlilk-ry. I have advancei my pickets about a mile to-day, driving 
off the rebel pickets and securing a very a-ivanUgeous position. 

"The rebels havo several battLTic.<! ojlablisbcil, commanding thode- 
bouchosfrom two of our bridges, and fire upnu our working parlies con- 
tinually, but as yot they have killed but very few of our men. 

" G.B. McCLtLI^AN, Alajor- General Commanding. 
" Hon. E. M. Stavton, S-xrdary (f War." 

As I did not think It probable that any rc-enforcemenls would be F.''it 
me in timofur the udvancoon Richmou'l, I stated in the f - - 
patch that 1 should be ready to movo when General .M« ' 
jsinod me ; but I did not intend to be understood by th^ 
re-enforcoments wore wautcd,as will be seen from tho iouuwni), ui. 

" JiTNB 10. 1883—3.30 P. 51. 
"I havo acaln Information that Beauregard has arrived, nnd lint 
eomoof bis troopj} are to follow him. No great reliance — perbap^ n- ';o 
whatever— call bo attached to this ; but it is possible, and ought to be 
their policy. 

•' I am completely checked by the weather. Tho roads nnd field* are 
literally imp.v;sablo for artillery, almost so for iufanliy. TUe Cliick- 
ahomioy is in a droadful state ; we bavo another rainsturm on our 

" I i^hall attack as soon as the weather ar.d ground wilt permit; brl 
there will be a delay, tho extent of which no ouo can fort;soe, fur iho 
season is altogether abnormal. 

" In view of these circumstances, I precont for your cnntlf'er.ntifm tbe 

propriety of delocbiog largely from Hallc.-!^' - ' .i. .. n. . 

fur U would seem that Balleck ba.s now no i 
of him, while we have. If this cannot b * 

with it, allow mo to suggest the roovomna -i u m- 1\ .^ ■ ■ .mn n-mi 

Dallon upon Atlanta. If but tho one ^an l>e done, it would botlr^r cod- 

- form to military prinrlpl^B tn titr*»nt'l>K'n tbia army. And even al- 

thonghlhore r:'' ■-■ — '■: • -- •- uke ivirt In 

tho ktUck upo; at, u:id Ihcy 

would ftiml^h \ .L 

" I wish tolM- u-i . ir, HI..;. TM'KM tiiti i-.ii' ir v i t i.t.- wcalher pcr- 
rallB, I will attack v. i;h whatever forco I may have, although a larger 
forco would enable ni- to paUi much moro decisive rt-sulls. 

"Iwftuld bo gl;'.'l In have McCall's Infantry sent forward by water 
at once, wllhout wniiing lor b\a arlltlery and cavalry. 

" If General Prim roluros ni Washington, pKaso converse with him 
as to the condition of aflairs hero. 

** GEO. B. McCLF-LIiAN, Major General Commanding. 
" Hon. E. M. 9ri!fro?(, Sfcreiary of War.' 

Oar work upon the bridges continued to be pushed forward vlgoroosTy 
unlrt Iheaoih, durlrg which lime It raintnt almost every day, and tho 
Qxposvc of the mcu caused much elckncbS. 

On the nth, the fuUowiog was received from ths Secretary of War : 
" WA'-mNCTO'T, Jnoe 11, 1862. 

•' Your dlsjutch rf throe thirty (3 30), ycster.Uiy, has bf»cn received. 
I nm fully l!ni)ri-'.'-e<I with the dlflkullies mentioned, and which no art 
or skill can v endure, and am striving to the uttermost to 

render you • n" power of the Govcrnnu nt. Your sugges- 

tions will bi- . (ommuulcaled to General Ilalleck, with a re- 

quest that he buaU c.'iiioi 111 to them. At last advice he contemplated 
sending a column to (ipcratc with Mltrhclt against Cbatlauooga, and 
thence upon l->i8tTe;jj. ••.o. Ilu-Il repnri.^ Kn . tuck y and Teonrsseo lob© 
in a critical condit - <iiiciitioo. Uolleck Bays 

tho main body of ! rn at Okolona. UcOall's 

fore? WT5 r(;-irl>' ... . ^ed, and on Its way to Join 

you ; 11.U TLSiduu of UclXjwt-irs furco also to Join 

you ' 

"1 ; fight, day before yesterday, with Jackson's 

force ai L':ii jn cLuri.h, Lii^ht miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the 
victory, but wafl badly tuudtcd. It is clear that a pretty Etrong fore*) 
is operating with J.t' k-^ i; fur tho puri)060 of detaining the forces hero 
from you. lam n- ' ;.3 possible, tho new Icvie*. 

"Be assured, p( : o never has been a moment when my 

d'^Fi'-e h i- b'.-ou o:I . -..-aid you with my whole heart, mind, 

■til. since tl.i; hi!'-: we first met ; nnd whatever others may 

.r own purposes, you liave never had, and never can havo, 

I 1 ro truly your friend, or nioroonxlous to supjwrl you, or 

mure joyful than I Ehall be at the success which I havo no doubt will 

soon bo achiovod by your armr*. 

*' OiWTN M. ^ASIOS, Secretary Iff War. 

" Mfljor-Oencra! n. B. McTuh-Iav." 

On tho 12th and mth G- neral McCall's dlvipion arrived. 

Onthol3:hof JuiiL- two ^fiu:. '.r. .s oftho 6tl» L'uitM Statei cavalry, 
nnder tho command of * > I, etaiioned near Hanover old 

church, were attack'jd ni. by a fore.' of the enemy's cav- 

alry, numbering about i I men, with four gunfl. lliey 

pushed on Inwards our de;.o:^:, but at Eome dl^Lance from our main 
body, and, though nurs'ieJ very cleverly, made the circuit of the army, 
repassing the Chickahominy ut Long Brii!t ' Ttu- burning of two 
schooners l.iden with forage, and fourt- t wagons, the de- 

struction of some sutlers' store.-, the ki <>{ tlio guard and 

teamsters at Garlick's landing, some \a\ . <-one ot Tunstall's 

station, nnd a little eclat, wefe tho precise rcsuU.-) >-f this expedition. 

On tho 14th I sent iho following to the Secretary of War : 

'* llEAncirAKTKRS Arut of thb Potomac, 

" Camp Ijxool.v. June 14, 1502— midnight 

" AU quiet In every direction. The stampede of last night ha."* passed 
away. Weather now very favorable. I hojw two days more will make 
the ground practicable. I shall advance as »0<>n as the bridges are com- 
pleted and tbo ground fit for artillery to move. At tho same time I 
would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to mo. I can use 
several new regiments to advantage. 

" It ought to be di-tinrtly undorRtood that McDowell and his troops are 
completely under my control. I received atelt>gram from htm request- 
ing that McCall's divtsioumight bo placed so as tojom him immediately 
on his arrival. 

** That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops 
come to me must bo disposed of eo as to do tbo most good. I do not 
feel that, in such circumstances as tha>e in which I am now placed. 
General McDowell should wish the general Interests to bo sacrificed for 
tho purpose of increasing his command. 

** If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but 
would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be re- 
sponsible for tho results. 

" Tho department lines should not be allowed to InUrfere with me ; 
but General Mcl>. ,and all other troops sent toroe,Fhoatd be placed com- 
pletely at my disposal, to do with them as I think befi. In no other 
way can they be of assistanre to me. I therefore request that I may 
have entire nnd fbll control. The stake at t^uc is too groat to allow 
personal considerations to bo entertained ; you know that I have none. 

" The indications are, from our balloon rtcoanois-'^anccs and from all 
other sources, that iho enemy aro intrenching, daily Increasing in 
numbers, and determluod to fight desperately. 

'*G. B. llc<iLVA.)Ji.S, Jfajor-Genrral Commetstding. 

"Hon. E. U. SrANTO-V, Secretary rf llTir " 

On the SOlh the following WOK > 'nt: 

'*Hk* i:ac, 

" < , I J-3P. M. 

" Your excellency's dliTxitch of (^il; vk\<Ai A. M., rt^civoil, also that 
of General i?igcl. 

"I bavenodouM that Ji'-Uc'^n has been re-cnforced from hero. 

There is reason to i 
Lee's army, with .< 

arrived n ■•iify fr 

fool,;U \v! 
to morrow 
of theOii- 

leral R. S. Ripley has recently joined 
''ion from Charleston. Troops have 
Tiieri^ ;■» rot the shphtest reason to 
::d ; bo is daily In- 
•,and every recon- 
i my way, foot by 
•ImV.'-u!! ci of the country ; by 
n-ering our position on this side 
-ted. I am forced tn v.vs by my 
inferiority t^r uuicbL-ii, tj tL;U 1 may bring the . -ible 

numbers iuto action, and cecuro tho anny against t' -sof 

unforc3oen ili-,i. tnr. I wo iM T > ^'Ifi'l to have perm i > fore 

yourescoll' . my views as lo i!v tin-sentstato 

of military li country. In Uio meantime I 

would boi>! .:<'n.fts to numbers and position, 

of thotrocps u..t un Itr my firM iH'l, in Virginia ard elsewhere.' 

" GEORGE n. McCIJXLAN, MrjorGcnciaX Commanding. 
"HisFAcellency A. Lincolv. President." 
To which I received this reply : 

'* WAsnrcCTTo:? . Jiuio 21. 1^83— « P. M. 
" Your dl?patch of ye.«tterday, two (2) P. M , was received this mom- 
i!ic. If It would not divert too much of your time and atienlk)D 
from the army under your immediate command. Iwotild b*^ glad to havo 
your views a.s to the present stato cf n.itit-rr;/ a(Ttl.-s throughout the 
wliolo rr-untrv. as you say you woull ' ." them I woald 

! ither it shou'ld be by letter than by i : :«e of tho better 

I'lance of secrecy . As to the numberf of the troops not 

under your command, iu Virginia anJ rW- u;i to. even !f loouM do it 
W'.th accurary, which I cannot, I would ratlnT not transmit either by 
t"'lcgraph or letter, because of tho chances of Us reaching the enemy. 
I would b.> very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp, 
%11'i i cannot well leave hero. 

" A. UNCOUV, FraidenL 
*• Mj^or General Gkorce B. McCif.ujv." 
To wbicb'I seat tho following reply : 

*• Cajif Ifvcour, June 23—1 P. M. 
' T hare the honor to acknowledge the receipt 'f your telegram of 

$ p M yirswrdtty. Undor tha cireuuistauMs, im slated in j-our (!i8- \ 
jiMch, I perceive that it will bo bettor at Iwvat to UofcT, lor the prtseot, 
I'M comniunicatjoD I desired to maka. 

" G. B. McajEl.L.\N, Maj'jr-General C^mmmding. 
" Hia EsccDoncy tho Puksidk-vt." 

All the information I oouKl obtain, previous to tho 24th of Juno, 
r^^arding the movenionle of General Jiickson, Ic-d to the belief that ho ftt Gordonsville, wboro ho was roceiving re-enfoiMmeDta from 
Uxhmond i-ia Lynchbiivp aud Stanton ; but what hi3 purposes were 
tlid not appsar until tlw diito specifled, wben a young man, very intolli- 
"cnl, but of suspicious apiwaranco, was brought in by our ecout3 from 
Ih-* direction cf Hanover Court-house. Ho at first stated that ho wa.s 
an escaped prisoner, from Colonel Kenloy's Maryland regiment, cap- 
ti:red at Frout Royal, but flaally oonfeesed b^ nself to bo a deserter 
from Jaclt-soQ's command, which he left noar Gordonsville on tho 21.H. 
.!ack.-on's troops wero then, as he Bald, moving to Frodorickshall, along 
the Virginia Central Railroad, for the purpose of attacking my rear on 
the 23tb. I immediately dispatched two trusty ne^iroca to proceed 
olong the railroad and ascertain tho truth of tho statement. Thoy wore 
uoahlo, however, to get beyond Hanovor Court-houss, where they en- 
oounlored iho CDOmy's picicels, and were forced to turn back without 
oblaiuing the deslrod informatlou. On that day I sent tho following 
Ui5})utch : 

*' ilKADQUARTEits Armt OP TiTB POTOKAC, June 24, 1862—12 P. M. 
" A very peculiar r-ase of desertion has just occurred from the enemy. 
The party st,it-'S that he left Jackson, Whiting and Ewell, (fifteen brig- 
atiee,) at GordotisviHo on the 2lst ; tbixt thoy wero moving to Frede- 
rlckshill, and that it was Intended to attack my rear ou the 2Sth. I 
would be glad to learn, at your earlieat convenience, tho moat exact in- 
formation you have as to the position and movements of Jackson, as 
well as the' sources from whicii your information is derived, that 1 may 
the bettor compare it with what I have. 

" G. B. McCLKLL,\K, Majar-G^neraV 
Xhu foUo\\ing is his roply : ^ , 

•' Washington, June 25, 1802. 
*- We have nodefloito information as to tho numbers or position of 
Jncicson's force. General King ycst.'rday roport&d a deserter's state- 
ment that Jackson's forco was, nine days ago, forty thousand men. 
t<iine reports placo ten thousooid rebels under Jacicson, at Gordoosvillo ; 
other;, that his force is at Tort Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. 
KniniDiit yesterday reported rumors that Westoru Virginia was threat- 
on-d ; and General Kelly, that Ewell was advancing to New creek, 
wlu^re Fremont has his depots. The last tciegram from Fremont con- 
trudtcls this rum •'r. The last telegram from Banks says tho enemy's 
pickets are strong in advance at Loray ; tlio people decline to give 
, any informaiion of his whereabouts. Within the last two (2) days 
the cridcnco is strong that for some purpose the enemy Is circulating 
rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to con- 
cca! the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, 
BOr Daaks and Fremont, who are at Hiddlctown, appear to have any 
accurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to tho De- 
partment vosterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville on the four- 
ttonth (14th) Instant, stated that tho actual attack was designed for 
Wrtshington and Baltimore as soon as you attacked Richmond, but that 
Iho report was to he circulated that Jackson had gono to Richmond, in 
order to mislead. This letter lo<rf£e4 very much like a bliud, and 
induces mo to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is towards 
l^ichmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like 
the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that 
while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a bltnd, that it 
could not safely bo disregarded. I will transmit to you any further 
iaformatlon on this subject that may be recoivod here. 

EDWIN U. STANTON, Secretary of War. 
'* Major-General McClellam." 

Ou the 25th, our bridges and intronchments being at last completed, 
an advance of our picket lino of the left was ordered, preparatory to a 
general forward movement. 

Immediately In front of tho most advanced redoubt on the Williams- 
burg road was a large opon field ; beyond that, a swampy belt of tim- 
ber, some five hundred yards wide, which had been disputed ground 
for many days. Further In advance was an open field, crossed by the 
Williamsburg road and the railroad, and commanded by a redoubt and 
rifle-pits of the enemy. 

It was decided to push oar lines to tho other side of the=e woods, in 
order to enable us to ascertain tho nature of the ground, an4 to place 
Generate Heint^Iman and Sumner in position to support the attack 
intended to be mado on the Old Tavern, on the 26th or 27 Lh, by General 
Franklfu, by assailing that position in the rear. 

Betwceu 8 and 9 o'clock, on the morning of the 25th, tho advanc-* 
was begun by General Heintzelraan's corps. The enemy were found to 
ho in strong force all along the lino, and contested the advance stub- 
bornly, but by sunset our object was accomplished. Tho troops en- 
gaged in this nff'xir wero the whole of Heintzelraan's corps, Paimor'ti 
brigade of Couch's division of Koyee' corps, and a piirt of Richardson's 
division of Sumner's corps. For tho details I refer to the report of 
General n»:!ntzelman. 

The casualties (not includUig thoeo in Palmer's brigade, which have 
not been reportoa) were as follows : officers killed, 1 ; wounded, 14 ; 
mi?B:ng, 1 ; enlisted men killed, 50 ; wounded, 337 ; missing, 03 ; total, 

Th3 following telegrams were sent to the Secretary of War, during 
tho day, from the field of operations : 

'* REDorBT No. 3, June 25, 1S32— 1.30 P. M. 
" We have advanced our pickets on the left coosidertibly. under sharp 
resistance. Our men behaved very handsomely. Some firing still con- 

" Q. B. MoCLEX-LAN, Major-General Commandin/j. 
" Hon. E. M. Stabtox." 

V "RiTDOCUT K>. 3,Junc25, 1852— 3.15 P.M. 

" Tlie enemy are making a desperate resistance to tho advance of 
onr picket lines. Kearnoy'i and one-half of Hooker's aro where I 
^want them. 

'* I havo this moment rc-enforccd Hooker's right with a brigad? ami 
a couple of guns, and hope in a few minutes to finish the work intended 
for to-day. Our men arc behaving splendidly. The enemy arc flyhtiu^' 
well also. This is r.ot a battle ; mcroly an affair of HeliitZ':'lmttn'.s 
oorps, supported by Keyes, and thus far all goes well. Wo hold ovory 
foot we t^ve gained. 

**ir we succeed io what wo have undertaken, it will boi a vitj 

important advantage gained. Loss not large thus far. Tbc flghtiug i.;: 

to this time has boon done by General Hooker's division, which ha^ b<' 

lured aa ueuai — that 13, most splendidly. 

** Oa ear right, Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries In hi;* front 

*' O. B. MoCLELL.\>r, 3faJQi--Qtn-:rai (hmmanding. 
•* Hen. E. il. SiA-vTON, Secretary nf War.'' 

" Ranorirr No. 3, June 25, 186S-5 P. M. 
" Tho ;itf.iir la over, and w^i havo gained our poiul fully, find with Ivii 
little loss, notwithsUinding the strong opposition. Our ra.'u have deny 
M tli It (■ 1 r. J hi- dc-^Ired. The atfair was partially deciJed by two gun.s 
th-tt 'i'i if' Riissoy brought gallantly iuto action under very d^lH 
cult circiiiTistuJjces. Tho eUL-my was dvivoo from the camps in front ol 
tliis place, and is now quiet. 

*' G. B. McCLELLAN, flfriji/r Gmcral Ccmmayidiv.j. 
" Hon. R. M. Staa-tos, S'XieMry of VAir." 
AUj, on tho same day, the following : 

" HBAi)^rAHTimji Armt oprmt Pot-^mac, 
*' ( -'n Lincoln Jun<- 2^, 1S62— G.15 P. M. 
" I have just returned from u. ; Hold, and &iid >"our dispatch in regard 
to Jiicksoa. 

" Pcvoralcoutrabands, just in, give Information condrmiug the sup- 
petition that Jackson's adyance is at or near Hmovor Conrt-hoiffle, and 
that Bcauiegard ar: ivcd, with strong re-enforcomentt^, in Richmond, yes 

" 1 incline to think that Jackson will attack my rip:ht and rear. Th:^ 
rebel lorce la stated at two hundred thousand ('^0,000,) including Jack 
sou 'aud Beauregard. I shall havo to contend against vastly superior 
odds if thf^e rrports be true. Bat this army will do all in the power of 
men to hold th^Mr position and repulse any attack. 

" I regi et my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no 
way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent re[>Gatedly the 
necessity of re-enforccmcnts, that this was the decisive poml, and that 
all the available means of the Government should bv concentrated hsre. 
I \nll do all that a general can do with tho spleudid army I have the 
honor to command, and, M it is destroyed by overwhelniiug numbers, 
can at least die with it and share its fate. But if tho result ol the action 
which will probably occur to-morrow, or witliin a short time, is a dis- 
aster, tho responsibility canuut be thrown on my shoulicrs ; it mu^t 
rest whore it belongs. 

''Since I commenced this! have received additional intelligence oou 
firming the supposition in rcg;:rd to Jackson's^movc-mL-nts and Bcaure 
g.ird's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to morrow, and now go to 
(he other siie of the Chickahnminy to arrange for the d'-fense oa that 
-ide. I feel that there is no use iu again asking for re-culorcemonts. 
*' G. B. McCLELLAN, Major -General 
"Hon. r. M. Staston, Se-cr'Aary of War." 

Tlio report of the chief of tho "secret sorvico corps," herewith for 
warded, and dated tho 27lh of Juno, show.'* the estimated strength of 
the enemy, at the time of Iho evacuation of Yorktown, to have been 
from 100,000 to 120, COO. The .=>ame report puts his numbers, on the 26th 
June, at about 130,000, and the specific iuformation obtained regardjifi 
their organization warrants the belief that this estimate did not oxc4:M 
his actual strength. It will be observed that the evidence contained in 
tho report shows the following organizations, viz.: two huudn-d ri?i>;i 
ments of infantry and cavahy, Including the forces of Jackaon and Ewell, 
just arrived ; eight battalions of independent troops ; five bat'Laliona of 
artillery ; tw^^lvo companies of infantry and independent cavalry, bo- 
sides forty-six companies of artillery ; amounting, in all, to from forty 
to fifty brigades'. There wore undoubtedly many othera whose designa- 
tions we did not learn. 

The report also shows that numerous and heavy earthworks had l>eoD 
completed for the defense of Richmond, and that in thirty-six of these 
were mounted some two hundred guns. 

Ou the 26lh, tho day upon which I had decided as the time for our 
final advance, tho enemy attacked our right in strong force, and tumol 
my attention to the protection of our communications and depots of 

Tho event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgmest which 
had been reiterated to my superior officers from the inception and 
through the progress of the Peninaula campaign. 
I notified the Secretary of War in the following dispatch : 

*' Hradquasters Abmt op the Potojuc, 

•' Camp Lincoln, Jtme2Q, 1862— 12 i£. 
*' I have Just heard that our ad\Tincod eavalry pickets on the le.~. 
bank of the Chickahominy are being driven In . It is probably Jackeoua 
advanced guard. If this be true, you may not hear from me for some 
days, as my communications will probably be cut off. The case Is per- 
haps a difficult one, but I shall resort lo desperate measures, aud wifl 
do my best to out-manoeuvre, out-wit, and out-fight the enemy. Do not 
believe reports of disaster, and do net bo discouraged if you learn thai 
my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of tbe 
enemy. Hope for the best, aud I will not d.'ceivo the hopes you former- 
ly placed in me. 

" G. B. MoCLELLAN, JUajor-General. 
" Hon. R M. SiAsrotif Secretary of War." 

•' Headquarteks Armt op thb Potomao. 
" Camp LiTKoln, June 26, 186:i— 2.30 P. M. 
" Your dispatch and that of the Preaidont received. Jackson is driv 
iug in my pickets, &c., on the other sldo of tho Chickahominy. It ia im- 
possible lo tell where re-enforcemenls ought to go, as I am yet unable to 
predict result of approachiug battle. It will probably be better that 
thoy .=hould go to Fort Monroe, and Ihenco according to state of afiairs 
when they arrive. 

*' It is not probable that T can maintain telegraphic commmiication 
more than an hour or two longer. 

" G. B. McCLEIJjAN, Major QeTiei'dL 
'' Hon. E. M. Sti>to!t, Secretary of War." 

On the samo day I received the followmg dispatches from the Seffl» 
tary of War : 

" WA5nisGT0N, June 25, 1862— ll.CO P. Jf. 
" Your telegram of 6.15 has ju5t been rocelved. Tho circomstancen 
that havo hitherto rendered it impassible for tho GovMnmiat to send 
you any more re-enforceraents than has been done, havo been so distinctl,? 
stated to you by the I'reaident, that it is needless for mo to repeat tbem 
"Every effort his been mado by the Prcsidont and myself tc 
strengthen you. King's division has reached Falmouth, Shields' divi 
sion and Iliccetls' division are at Maniissas. Tho Prceidcnt designs tc 
3und a pait of that fcrco lo aid you as spoi^dily as it c.»n be done. 

"E. M. STANaON^ Seocta:y of War. 
^'Major-GoneralQ. B. MoClelux." 

»* Washtngto!*, June 26, 1862— « V. H. 
"Arrangements are being mado as rapidly as popsible to send you 
five thousand (5,000) men aa fast as they can bo brought from Man 
a^HA to Alexandria and embarked, which can bo done sooner than tr 
wait for transportation at Fredericksburg. Thoy will be io'lowod by 
more, if needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont's force will bo coa 
solidatedas iho army cf Virginia, and will operate promptly in yom 
aid by land. Nothing will be spared to sustain you. and Ih.ivoun 
doubting faith In your Bucceas. Keep me advised fully cf your con- 

** EDWm M. arTA^NTON, Sefrdary (f War^ - 
*' Major-General 0- B. McCibllam." 

Bot (,000 of Ibe re-enforcomcau spoken of in ih«o 
cama to Ibo »rmjr ef Iba Potaouc, and Uwse rrucbcd us at Harruon's 
bv, ttur ib» Mvn days. 

Id aotieipatioo of a ipcedy adranco on Richmond, to provide for the 
cooungeocj of our communications with Iho depot at the White House 
fe«ing BCTered by the enemy, and at the pamo lime to be prepared for a 
cbanfeof the bass of our oper«ll"n» to James river. If circumstance- 
■iioald rander It advisable. I bad made arrangemonu more than a wi • I 
prerlona (on Iho 18th) to havo transports with supplies of proTisim 
and forage, under a eooroy of gimboaU", sent up James river. Th. 
reached Harrison's landing In time to be available for the army on it' 
arrival at that point. Kvent* soon proved thb change of baiHi to b 
though most Uaxardous and difficult, the only prudent course. 

In order to rolieva tbe troops of the Oih corps, on the Wih of Jui.c 
General Reynold*' and General Seymour's brigade*, of Goocral McCall 
division (Pennsylvania reserves), were moved from Galnea' farm tu 
a posilitin on Be.iver Dam crcc'i , General Meade's brigade being helu 
in reserve In front of Games' farm. One regiment and a battery 
were thrown forward to tbe heights overlooking Mechanicsvllle and 
» llna of picket* extended along the Chlckahommy river, between 
Uu Uecbauicsvlllo and Meadow bridges. As has been already slated 
1 received, while engaged on the 24ih In directing the operations of 
Hemtielman's corps, information which strengthened my suspicions 
that Jackson waa advancing with a largo forco upon our right and 
rear. On this day General Caney, at the White House, was Instructed 
to prepare for a vigorous resisiancc, and defensive works were or- 
dered at Tunsull's elation. Early on the 26ih General Porter was 
instructed to send out reconnoiiriug parlies umards Hanover Court- 
BMlso to discover tho position and force of ihi enemy, and to deslror 
Uu brldfw oa the Tolopotamoy vi (tir as jivuiuia. 

Op to Ibe 2«tii of June, the operations against Richmond had been 
copducted along tbe roads leading to it from the eaiit .in.l northeast 
The reatons (tho President's anxiety about covering Washington from 
Jwdericksburg, Mcltowcll's promised co-operation, jiarlial advance 
■Dd immediate wlthdniwal) which compelled the choice of this line it 
•pprooch, and our continuance upon it, havo been alluded to above. 
The superiority of tho James Kivur route, a.i a line of attack and 
■apply, IS loo obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that sub- 
ject bad been early given, and need not be repealed here. The dissi- 
pation of all hope of the cooperation by land of General McDowell's 
fcrces, doomod to bo occupied in tho defense of Washington, Iholr Ina- 
bility to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy 
and a new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from the 
Wbiio Uouso to the Chlckahominy, and forced an immediate change of 
fcase across tho Peninsula. To that end, from the evening of the Silh 
every energy of tbe army was bent. But such a change of base In th.' 
presence of a powerful enemy is one of the most dillicult underlakiugs 
in war. I was confldent of tho valor and discipline of my brave army 
and knew that it could be trusted equaUy to retreat or advance, and tj 
Bgbi the series of battles now Inevitable, whether rctroatlug from vic- 
toriee or marching through defeats; and, In short, 1 had no doubt 
wbalever ol its ability, even against superior numbers, to llghl iU way 
urougb to tho James river, and get a position whence a successful ad- 
TOice upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb coodiict 
through the next seven days Justlfled my faith. On the same Jay 
General Van Vliel, chief quartermaster of tbe Army of the Potomac 
liy my orders telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls, quailcrmastcr. to the 
White House, as follows ; 

" Hun the cars to the last moment and load them with provisions and 
•mmunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence and soud 
Miem to Savago siation, by way of Bottom's bridge. If you arc obliged 
to abandon While House, burn cverylbing that you cannot get olf. You 
Bust throw all our supplies up Ibe James river as soon as possible and 
accompany them yourself, with all your force. It will be of v;isl' im- 
portance to establish our depots on James river, without delay If wo 
•handon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement so 
long a* the wires work ; after that you must exercise your own Judg- 

AU these commands were obeyed. So excellent were tbe dispositions 
of tho different oIBcers In commmd of Ihe troops depots, and gunboats 
aod £0 timely the warning of the approach of the enemy, Ibit almo-i 
•very thing was saved, and but a small amount of stores destroyed to 
prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. General SUmemans 
communic^itions wilh Iho main army being cut off. ho fell back upon 
the White ll.iuai-, and then to Y..rklown, when the White Houfc was 
evacuatod. on the ■J6lb orders were sent to all tho corps commanders 
on the ni;lit bank ol the Cbickahominy to be prepared to seud as many 
troops as they could spare on the foliowiug day to tbe left bank of the 
xlvor as will be seen l.y ibe apnciided telegrams. General ftauklm re- 
ceived inslruclioMs to hold GeiAral Slocum's division In readiness by 
daybreak of ihe 2;tb, and if heavy flriug should at that time be beard 
Id the direction of General Porter, to move it at once to bis as^islauce 
without further orders. At noon on the 26lh the approach of tbo enemy' 
who had crossed above Meadow bridge, was discovered by the advanced 
picket.- al that point, and at 12.30 P. U. tbey were allackcd and driven 
in. All tbe pickets were now called In, aud the regiment and baiierv 
at Mechanicsvllle withdrawn. ' 


Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve, In rear of tbe line and 
shortly after .Martiudalo's and Griffin's brigades, of MorreU's division 
were moved forward and deployed on tho righl of McUll's divixlon to- 
ward fhady Grove church, tu cover that flank. Neither of iliree 
brigades, however, were w.irmly engaged, though two of GnlUn's reti- 
menls relieved a portion of KeynolUs' lino Just at tho close or the action 
pe poelllon of our troops was a strong one, eiUnding along the lell 
?,f°'',"[?"^''^';'''?^""''' Uioli'ft resluiK on the < bickal.onnny, and 
tho right in thick wood beyond tho upper ruad from MechanlcsviUe to 
Coal harbor. Tbo lower or river road crossed the creek m Kllison's 
mills. Seymour's brigade held the lert of llio lino from tho Chigkahom- 
iny^ to beyond the null, partly in woo-l.^ luiJ parllv in cleared ground 
right, p:-)nrip.,liy m the woods, and covering Ihe 
lill ry cce.ipii-d pcsillc.lm conim lulling ibe roa.l^ and 
.r.ri tlie .1,.:,. Timber l.iid beenlelletl, riUe-pils 
■ ^aro thill greatly con 


and Keyiiol 
appcrroud. Tl 
the open g '" :ii 
dug, and til-' I' 
tribilted tu tl 
cull ulung 111" . 
two roads will I 
ho formed lii^ It 
attacked our \vl: 
to fore" '' ■ '. 
•isted I 
to ret. I 
skirmii>l..„„ .... 

ol iML'.l.'. rip' 11. 


■ upptir iv^ 
Aller a f 

loss, A rap. 
d uIOQg the 

bta troops ior another effort 

f tbe C1-. ek was uuil- 

llery, except by tho 

lied. Al3r..M. 

iiers, aud stx'tx 

minei! attPnr.t 

line IT01.1, wnilu ttie I 

at the lower read 

two hours Ulor, wbich was likcwije repulsed by General Sevmour 
■v"^ ^"L •^*'^'- T"" l^'-g '^eaa^l, and the cnemrrSZi 
about » P. M., the action having lasted six hours Bui few if -inv^ 
Jackm'a troops were engaged on this day. The portion of 'ihe' enemy 
encounterc-d wore chiefly from the troops on tbe right bank of the river 
who crossed Ihe Meadow bridge and llecbani.avillo. The Inrormation 
in my possession soon alter tho dose of this action, convinced me t^it 
Jackson was really approaching in large force. The position en lieaver 
Dam creek, although as successfully defended, had lis riebi flank loo 
much in the air, and was loo far from tho main army to make it ivaJI 
able to retain 11 longer. I therefore deUrmin. .1 to send the beavv runa 
at Hogan's and Gaines' house* over the fhickahominy during the onrht 
with as many wajons of the Fifth corps as |«ii.=ible, and to wilhiir.w 
the corps lleelf to a position etretchtog around the bridges where \u 
flank* would be reasonably secure, tod it would be witbin suprori ni 
distance of the main army. General Porter earned out my order* to 
that effect. It was not advisable at that time, even bad It been practi 
cable, to withdraw tbo Kifih corps lo tbe right bank of the (.-hlckabom- 
Iny. such a movement would have exposed the rear of tbe armv 
placed us between two flres, and enabled Jackaou'a fresh troon* to In' 
tcrcept the movement lo J.imes river, by crossing the CbickabonUny in 
the Vicinity of Jones' bridge, before we could reach Malvern bill with 
our trains. I deUTmmed then to resist Jnck.wn with the Fifth 
corps, reinforced by all our dlspoBablo troop* in tho new position 
near the bridge heads, In order to cover the withdrawal of th* tValn* 
aud heavy guns, and to give time for the arrasgemenu to secure 
the adopiiiin of tbe Jame* river as our lino of supplies hi Ilea of 
the Pamunky. Ihe greater part of the heavy guns and the wagons 
having been moved lo the right bank of tbe Cbickahominy, the delate 
oiierailon of withdrawing the troops from Beaver Dam creek was com- 
menced shortly before daylight, and successfully executed. Meade'* 
and Crillhrs brigades were the first to leave tbe ground ; Seymoor's 
brigade covered the rear, with tho horse ballerle.4 of t^apiain Kobert- 
ton and TIdball ; but the withdrawal wti so skillful and gradual and 
the repulse of the preceding day so complete, that although the enemy 
followed the retreat slowly and some skirmishing occurred, ho did not 
appear in front of the rear line in force till about noon of the 27th 
when we were prcpircd to receive bim. About this lime General 
Porter, believing that General Sioneman would be cut ofl from bim 
sent bim orders to fall back on the White House, and afterward rejoin 
tho army as best he could. 

On the morning of the 27ib of June, during the withdrawal of hi* 
troops from Mecbanicsville to the selected position already mentioned 
General Porter telegraphed as follows : * 

" I hope to do wiihoui aid, though I request that Franklins, or some 
other command, bo held ready to reinforce me. The enemy are ■• 
close that I expect lo be hard pressed in front. 1 hope lo have a portion 
n position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, but rely- 
ing on the good qualities of Ihe commanders of dlvisious and brigades. 
I expect toget b.ick and hold tho new line." 

This shows how closely Porter's retreat was followed. Notwith- 
standing all the efforts used during the entire night to remove tlie 
heavy guns and wagons, some of the siege-guns were still in poBitlon 
at Gaines house alter sunrise, and were flually hauled off by hand. 
Tbe new position of the Fifth corps was about an arc of a circle, cov- 
ering the approaches lo the bridges which connected our right wing 
J"'" the troops on the opposite side of the river. Morrill's division 
held tho left of tbe line in a strip of woods on tbe left bank of tho 
Games' mill stream, resting its lelt flank on the descent lo the Chlcka- 
hominy. which was swept by our artillery on both sides of tho river 
and extending Into open ground on the right toward New Coal harbor 
In the line. General Butterflelds brigade held the extreme left 
General Martindales joined his right, and General Grimn, still furihcr 
to the right. Joined tbe left of General Sykes' division, which, part'y 
In woods and partly lu open ground, extended In rear if i-^' 1. .ri nr. 
Each l)rig.ade had in reserve two of its own rcglnienUs. SI ' a 

having been eng.iged the day before, was formed lu a .a 

rear of the flrsl, Meade's brigade on the left, near the (..:...; >, 

Reynold*' brigade on tbe right, covering tbe approaches from Coal 
harbor and luspatch sLition to Sumner's bridge, and Seymour's m 
reserve to the second line. Still further In the rear Ceucral P. St. 
George Cooke, with Ave companies of the Kiflh regular cavalry, 
two squadrons of tho First regulars, and three squadrons of tbe 
Sixth I'ennsylvannia cavalry (IjtncersV was poslcd behind a hill 
In rear of the position and near the Chlckahominy, lo aid in 
watching the left D.ank and defending ihe slope lo the rive- Tlio 
troops were all In position by noon, with the artillery on the command- 
ing ground , aud In tho Intervals between the divisions and brlgailes. 
Besides the division batteries, there wore Robertson's aud Tldbali s 
hcrso batteries, from the artillery reserve ; the latter posted on the 
right of Sykes division, and the former on tbe extreme left of the line. 
In tbe valley of the •hickabomiuy . Shortly afloc noon, tlie enemy was 
dLscovered approaching In force, and It soon became evident that the cu 
tire position was to be attacked. His skirmishers adv.aticej rapidly, 
and soon the firing became heavy along our whole front. Al 2 r. M. 
General Porter asked for reinforcements. Slocum's division, of the 
Sixth corps, was ordered to cross the left bank of the river, by Alcxan- ' 
der's bridge, and prt«eed Ui bis support. General Porter's flrst call for 
reinforcements, through General Barnard, did not reach me, nor hi* de- 
mand for more, through the same olDcer. By 3 P. M. the eugagement 
had berome so severe, and the enemy wore so greatly superior iii niiiii- 
bers, tluil llie enlirc second line and reserves had been moved (orwarl^ 
to sustain the first line against repeated and desiwrate assaults along our 
whole front At 3: 30 p. M.Slocum's division reached the field, and 
was immeduitely brought Into action al the weak point* of our line. 
(in the left the combat was for the strip of wood* running almost 
al riKbt angles lo the Cbickahominy m front of Adams' bouse, or 
briwi on that aud Galne*' house ; tbe enemy several time* charg. d 
up to this wood, but were each time driven back with heavy I'-ss. 
The regulars of .<5ykes' division on the right also repulsed several 
strong attacks. But our own loss, under the Iremenduous iie.r . 'i 
greatly 8ii|ierior numbers, wa* very severe, and the In 
whom had l-.-ou under arms more than two days, were r ^ 
tngexl..ic-l. I Iv Ihe iiki-'.-.s of Ireth meu con.tam'v I. 

them. W 
creased 1 . 
probably . 
The Hue w..o 
pierced al any 
ral I'nrl.-,- ul: 

1 RicUar-soii'i Liv.i; 
I port. Theeocttiy ; 

IS dlvbioii .irrlved 
lo some thirty -five 

.1 lUt 5 P. 

.1. '.■!.:,■ li- 

lr> cri'ss Ut hid sup 
6 1'. M., but'. 


to break our lines, although oiirloBS was very heavy. About7P.M., 
they threw fresh troops against General Porter with still greater 
fury, and finally regained tho woods held by our left. This 
reverse, aided by tho confusion that followed an ncsu(;cei=sful 
chargo by five companies of the Fifth cavalry, and followed as 
it was by more determined assaults on tho remainder of our lines, now 
outflanked, caused a general retreat tVom our position to the hill in the 
rear overlooking the bridge. French's and Meagher's brigades now 
appeared, driving before them tbo stragglers who were thronging to- 
ward the bridge. These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by 
their example as well as by the steadiness of their bearing, reanimated 
our own troops and warned the enemy that reinrorceniruts had ar- 
rived. It was now dark. The enemy, already repulsed several times 
with ternblo slaughter, and hearing the shouts of fresh troops, failed 
to follow up their advantage. This gave an opportunity to rally our 
men behind the brigades nf Generals French and lleagher, and they 
again advanced up the hill, ready to repulse another attack. During 
th^night our thinned and exhausted regiments were all withdrawn in 
eafely, and by the following morning all had reached tho other 
side of the stream. Tho regular infantry formed the rear guard, 
and about 6 o'olock on the morning of the 28th, crossed the river, 
destroying the bridge behind tbem. Our loss in this battle, in 
killed, wounded, and missing, was very heavy, especially in 
officers, many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners 
while gallantly leatling on their men, or rallying them to re- 
»eweil exertions. It is impossible to arrive at the exact num- 
ber lost in this desperate engagement, owing to the series of battles 
which followed each other in quick succession, and in which the whole 
army was engaged. No general returns were made until after wo had 
arrived at Harrison's landing, when tho losses during the whole seven 
days were estimated together. Although we were tinally forced from 
our first line after the enemy had been repeatedly driven back, yet the 
object sought l"or had been obtained. The enemy had been held at bay, 
our siege k'uis and material were saved, and the right wing had now 
joined the main body of the army. The number of guns captured by 
the enemy at this battle was twenty-two, three of which were lost by 
being run oil the bridge during the final withdrawal. Great credit is 
due for the elliriency and bravery with which this important arm of the 
Bervice (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last success- 
ful charge of the enemy that tho cannoneers were driven from their 
pieces or struck down, and the gims captured. Diedrich's, Knierim's, 
and Grimm's batteries took position during the engagement in front of 
General t^mith's line, on the right bank of the stream, and with a bat- 
tery of siege-guns, served by the First Connecticut Artillery, helped to 
drive back the enemy in front of General Porter. 


So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of 
the Chickahorainy. that it was impossible to decide, until the afternoon, 
where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were 
seen, during the day, near the old tavern, on Franklin's right, and 
threatening domimstrations were frequently made along the entire line 
on this side of the river, which rendered it necessary to hold a consid- 
erable force in position to meet them. On the 26th a circular was sent 
to the corps commanders on the right bank of the river, asking them 
bow many of their troops could be spared to reinforce General Torter, 
after retaining sufficient to hold their positions lor twenty -four hours. 
To this the follov.'ing replies were received ; 

Headquarters, TmRc Corps, 1 
June 26—4 P. M. / 
General R. B. Marcy : 

I think I can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for twenty- 
four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable ior service on 
the other side of tho river ; but the men are so tired and worn out that 
1 fear they would not be in a condition to tight after making a mtirch of 
any distance. ******* 

S. P. Hecvtzelmax, 

Telegrams from General Heintzeiman.on the 25th and 26th, had indi- 
cated that the enemy in largo force in front of Generals Hooker and 
Kearney, and on the Charles City road (Longstrcet, Hill, and Huger), 
and General Heintzelman expressed the opinion, on the night of the 
25th. that he could not hold his advanced position without"^ reinforce- 

General Keys telegraphed : "As to how many men will be able to 
hold this ixtsitinn for twenty-four hours, I must answer, all I have, if 
the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having .it all times appeared 
to me tUat onr forces on this flank are small enough.'' 

On tho morning of tlie 27ih, the following dispatch was sent to Gen- 
eral Sumner • 

He.*dquartrhs Army of the Potomac, "1 
January 27—8 : 45, A. iM. j 
General E. V. Sumner, commanding Second Army Corj.s; 

General Smith just reports that six or eight regiments havo moved 
^owa to the woods in front of General Sumner. 

(Signed) R. B. Marcv, Cbief of Staff. 

At 11 o'clock, A.M., General Sumner telegraphed as follows : "The 
enemy threaten an attack on my right, near Smith." At 12 :30, P. M., 
he telegraphed: "Sharp shelling on both sides." At 2:45, P. M, : 
" Sharp musketry firing m front of Burns ; we are replying with artil- 
lery and infantry. The man on the lookout reports some troops drawn 
up in lino of battle about opposite my right and Smith's left ; the num- 
ber cannot be made out." 

In accordance with ord«-s given on the night of tho 26th, General 
Slocum's division commenced crossing the river, to support General 
Porter, soon after daybreak on the morning of tho 27th; but, as the 
firing in front of General Porter ceased, tho movement was suspended. 
At 2. v. SI , General Porter called for reinforcements. 1 ordered them 
at onco, and 3 : 25, P. M. , sent hira the following : 

'* Siocum is now crossing Alexander's bridge with his whole com- 
mand. Enemy has commenced ad infantry attack on Smith's left. 1 
have ordered down Sumner's and Heintzelman's reserves, and you can 
count on the whole of ilocum's. Go on as you have begun." 

During the day tho following dispatches were received, which will 
show the condition of affairs on the right bank of the Chicknhoniiny : 

Ji*.\u 27, loC2. 
7b CrJonrl A. r. C- !hum ,A. A. G.: 

General SmiUi ilnuUs the enemy is massing hcrvvy columns in 
the clearings to tho right of James Garnett's houBO and on the other 
side of the river, opposite it. Three regiments arc reported to bo 
moving from Sumner's to Smith-e front. The arrangements are very 
good ; made by Smith. 

(Signed; W. B. Fr.^nku.v, 

Aftewards he telrgraphwl : "The enemy has begun an attack on 
Sm)th's lea with inlantry. 1 know no details." Aflerwurd tho fol- 
lowing; "Tho eupniy b;is opeL*d on Sniilb •Hrnn a baiipry of three 

pieces to the right of the White House. Our shells arc bursting wctf, 
and Smith thinks Suinucr wil soon have a cross-flro upon them that 
will silence them." Afterward (at 6:50P. M.) the following wa.s sent 
to General Kuyes : 

" Please send me one brigade of Couch's division to tluso lioadquar- 
tcrs without delay. A staff ofllcor will bo hero to direct thr brigade 
where to go." 

Subsequently the following was sent to Generals Sumner and Fraofc- 

" Is thero any sign of the enemy being in your front? Can you spar* 
any more forces to be sent to General Porter? Answer at once." 
At 6: 15, P. M., the following was received from General Franklin : 
*'Ido not think it prudent to take any more troops from here as, 
General Sumner replied as follows : 

" If the General desires to trust the defense of ray position to my 
front line alone, I can send French with three regiments and .Meagb«- 
with his brigade to the right — everything is so uncertain. I think it 
would 'be hazardous to do it." 

These two brigades were sent to reinforce General Porter, as has beoa 
observed . 
At 5: 25, P. M:, I sent the following to General Franklin : 
"Porter is hard pressed. It is not a question of prudenco, but of 
possibilities. Can you possibly maintain your position imtil dark witfc 
two brigades? I have ordered eight regiments of Sumner's to suppoal 
Porter, one brigade of Couch's to this place. * # :ii 

Heintzelman's reserve to go in rear of Sumner. If possible, send ». 
brigade to support Porter. It should follow the regiments ordered from 
Sumner." , ,, 

At 7.35, F. SI., the following was sent to General Sumner : 
"If it is possible, send another brigade to reinforce General Smitlu 
It is said heavy columns of infantry are moving on him." 

From the foregoing di.?patches it will be seen that all disposable troops 
were sent from the right bank of the river to reinforce General Porter, 
and that the corps commanders wore left with smaller forces to hoM 
their positions than tbey deemed adequate. To have done more, evea 
though Porter's reverse had been prevented, would have had still moro 
disastrous result of imperiling the whoio movement across the Penfiir 
Bula . 

The operations of this day proved superiority of tbe 
enemy, and made it evident that while he had a lar.E,'e army on tho west 
bank of the Chickahominy, which had already tuitied our right, aii* 
was in position to intercept the communications with our depot at the 
AVhile House, he was also in large force between our army and Kidt- 
mond. I therefore efil'Cted a junction of our forcir~. This might proba- 
bly have been executed on either side of the Cbickuhominy, and if the 
concentration had been effected on the left bank, it is possible we 
might, with our entire force, have defeated tho enemy there ; but at 
that time they held the roads leading to the White House, so that it 
would have been impossible to have sent forward supply trains in ail- 
vance of the army in that direction, and the guarding of those traioe 
would have seriously embarrassed our operations infthe battle we would 
have been compelled to fight, if concentrated on that bank of the river. 
Moreover, we would at onci- have been lollowed by the enemy's forces 
upon the llichmond side of the liver, operating upon our rear, and if, 
in the chances of war, we had been ourselves defeat- 
ed in the effort, wo would have been forced to &II 
back to the White House, and, probably, to Fortresc 
Monroe. And as both our flank and rear would then have been entirely 
exposed, our entire pupply train, if not the greater part of the army 
itself, n\ight have been lest. The movenienis ol the enemy showed 
that they expected this, and as they themseivts acknowledge, they 
were prepared to cut off our retreat in that direction. I, therefore, 
concentrated all our forces ou the right bank of the river. During the 
night of the 26th, and morning of the 27lh, all our wagons, heavy guns, 
&c., were gathered there. It may be asked why, after the concentra- 
tion of our forces on the right bank of the Cnickahnminy, with a large 
part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond, I did not, instead of 
striking for James river, fifteen milts beiow that i)lace, at once march, 
directly on Richmond. It will be remembered that at this junctios 
the enemy was ou our rear, and there was every reason to believe thai 
he would sever our communication with the supply depot at the White 
House. We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if we harf 
advanced directly on Richmond, it would have required considerabte 
time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our men 
would have been destitute of food , and even if Richmond had fallen before 
our arms, the eueniy would have still have occupied our supply commu- 
nications between that place and tho gunboats and turned the disaster 
into victory. If, on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated all his 
forces at Richmond during the progress of the attack and we had bcott 
defcateii, we must, in all probability, have lost our trains before reaching 
the flotilla. The battles which continued day after day in the progress of 
our flank movement to the James River, with the exception of the one 
at Gaines's mill were successes to our arms/and the closing engagement 
at Malvern Hill was the most decisive of .ill." 


On the evenmg of the 27th of June I assembled the corps command- 
ers at my headquarters and informed them of my plans, its reason*, 
and my choice of route and method of execution. Gen. Keyes was di- 
rected to move bis corps, with its artillery and baggage, across tho 
White Oak swamp bridge, and to seize strong |positions ,on the opposite 
side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains. 
This was executed on the 28th by noon. Before daybreak on the 28th I 
went to Savage's station, and remained there during the day and night, 
directing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of the army. Or- 
ders were given to the different commanders to load their wagons witk 
ammunition and provisions and the necessary baggage of tho oiBcers 
and men, and to destroy all property which could not bo transported 
with the army. Orders were also given to leave with those of tho sick 
and wounded who could not be transported, a proper complem'-nt ujC 
surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medi- 
cal stores. The large herd of 2.600 bei'f caltlo was, by the chief com- 
missary, Colonel Clarke, tiiiiisfcrred Lu Ibc Jiunea river without loss, 
tin til" morning of ihn 'iSMi, while Gcneial Franklin was withdrawing' 
his conmiaud frtm Goldiog's farm, the enemy opened upon General 
smith's division from Garnett's hill, from the vaUey above, and 
from Gaines' hill on tho opposite side of the Chickahomluyt 
and shortly afterward two Georgia regiments attempted to 
carry the works about to be vacated ; but this attack was repulsed by 
the t\ventythird Xew York and the Forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volun- 
teers, ou picket, and a sociion of Mott's battery. Porter's corps wa« 
moved across White Oak swamp during the day and night, and took up 
posiii 'ii.-! covering tho rtwds leading from Richmond toward the White 
Oak swamp and Long bridge. McCall's division was ordcrt'd on the 
Liciil (,' 111'' 2*''th to II.; ve a-ross the s'vamn and take a prnnor nositiu* 


h u '■■!•■ f:o ; •^«* ri-nmLuInn trcoi'^aii'Mr It-;, f trint; tbr* Mine 

I, , -i"K ..r Smilh, 

\» .iM mtrcuch- 

nil S'-vUlll to diVlitUli wl l-JUULll-SLOli^i W L. i.Tilill, 1 lU S.I VJgij'S SlftHOU 

ID i'=vivc. They wcruoiavn-tl ut hul-. tin- poMlliin unit! dark of tbo 
a^b, lu onior lu cover Ibc witbUrawal ul ilie trair;*, nnO llieo to fall 
back across tbc swanp and uuitc wiiii i*.u- u ir..iiiKi.'r of Iba army. 


On the bight of tb« 23tb I sont the r ilowing to lb- S-cr;tiry of War : 
BiitKiCAKnas Akmt or rmt IMtoiuo, 1 

e>vinE'!« i=T.>Tin», j 

Juno 25, 18i)i-12 20, A. M. 
I uow know the full ii'.Vjjry of t»i9 iJay. On ibii »;rte of tlw river— the 
ngbt biak— wo repul;»l wvcral strong alla-ks. On the left h:ink our 
men Hi all that m.-n coalJ ilo, all that soldiers could accomplish : bnl 
ihiy wcro ovorwholm 1 by vastly superior uirnbi-rj, even after I 
brought my K". re c.-v.'< i.ilo.i.llon. Tco loss on both Bide? li Kirrlble. 
I believe it will prove to be lb'; mo=t terrible batt'o of tin war. The sad 
romnants of my m.-n behave as men, those balt-iiioci whj foighl most 
bravely, ca.l sulTorod most.aro still lu the best ord.*. TnTfjulars 
woro superb, and 1 count npon what are l«fl to turn another haltle In 
company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. I twenty 
Ibousand (20 000) or even ton Ihous^tnd (10,000) fiwb lro.i|« to uie to- 
morrow, 1 conlJ take Uichnioad ; hut I havo not a man In r.:S'Tvo, and 
aliail be glad to cover my reirmt and save the mat^-rbl and per- 
ionnel of the army. If wo have lost the day, we have yet p.-esarv 

have i;\v.>ii • , - ■ 
tb > 

all ' 

troop-) -'I ■ 

of J mc-, « 

map vvi - 




Froin - ■ i»'- rn . . 

position than w 

B{kaoe of about li; 

and Genoral Smit:.'.i d. 

.-nisiilns iilow If O-n^riil Hjlulrilman hal been 
li Ti ral l]*inlielmaQ, la bU reiwrt of tho oper 

.'■'t!i f .rrir- 1 rc-cclvod orders to withdraw tliw 

p'.tioo they ha1 taken on the 25tlj 

i.afi aboulainil" in th'- .\ 

-, t: 'neral Sum:iM*'s au-l il-'neral 

ili , .M'Oiit ths next day, cur 

• • the new p^i'.toa. cautiously follow .-J by th' 

■ of our c.imp.1 :w soon n? we left them 

ilenera! Sumner heM a more advancd 

r. the map furril.shed me, there being a 

'L a mile b-.*tw.^'n the right of U\s corpd 

'la of General KraokllD's corps. 

ed our honor 
have lo.'t this 
that 1 am n-jt 

gen ral i\:.' ;- 

" AlH, A M .03lhir):'l,tb 
t>rii ■^-inimr's t^o i>i. a 
fe enoon rep^rt.i revel 
Itent's ho'w -. only a n 
oral CftvrCry rec-mrjo- i 
Franklin eanu; to ei 

^-z 'my commanced an attack on Geo- 
i-g vdthin my lines. I,ate in the 
rebels wnro In posseseioo of Dr 
.>m Sava;?'s station. Isontser. 

-1 :i-j-' n -ally wns;satI-lledof tbofact. General 
ll''iarl?r8 wliou I learned of the interval be- 

.: \ r-ii r. ■ ii.-ci blush for the Army of the I'olomac. i 
my force was too small. I aRuin repoai 
r this, and I say it with the o.irnis'<UiM!sof a 
-rl the loss of every bravo man who has been 
. iiiixd ij ilay, I still hope to retrieve our fortunes; bol 
I . 'Icvernmcnt most view the matter in the saino earnest 

1 , , You roust i^end toe very large reioforccmenla, and send 

tU'oia at one J. ^ shall cWaw back to this side of the Chicliahominy, and 
I tb.iik I can w.tii Iraw all our nutorial. Pioafo understand that in this 
battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best wo Lavo. In 
odditioa to what 1 have already said, I only wish to say to the I'l esldont 
that I think h-j H wrong in regardinj roe as ungenerous when 1 slid that 
mv force wa'; too we.ak— I merely iutimatcd a troth which to day hxs 
boVn too pljiiiily p.-ovoa. If, at this instant, I could di3[)o;c of (10,000) 
ten thousand frceh mon.Icoull gain the victor)' to-morrow. I know 
that a few thousand moro men would have changed the battle from a 
def at to a victory. As It is, the Government must not, and cannot, 
hold me ri--.))nn5ib!e for tho result. I feel too earnestly tonight— I have 
seen loo many doad and wounded comrades to feel otherwise, than that 
the Qovernmoat b.ns not sustained the army. If you do not do so now, 
Itie game i.i lost. If I savo this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe 
no thanks to yoj. or to any other person in Washington. You have done 
yoar best to sacridce this army. 

a. B. McCmus. 
Tb Hon. E. M. Stanton. 

The beaiqu-^r^.'scamp at Savage's station was broken op early oo the 
morning of the 29lb, and moved across tho White Oak Swamp- As the 
essential i^rt of the day's operations was the passage of the trains 
across the swamp and their protection against attack from the direction 
of New Market and Richmond, as well as tho Imine.llato and secure et- 
tablishmeut of our communications with tbo gunboats, I passed the 
day In examining tho ground, directing tho posting of the troops, »nd 
securing the uninterrupted movement of tho trains. Id the afternoon I 
instructed General Keyes to move during the night to James River, and 
occupy a defensive pisition near Malvern Hill, to a-.-coro our extreme 
MX Bank. General V.J. Porter was ordered to follow him and prolong 
the line towards tho right. The trains were to be pushed on toward 
James River In rear of this corps, and placed under tho protection ol 
the gunboats as they arrived. A sharp skirmish with the enemy's 
cavalry early this day, on tbo Quaker road, showed that his efforts 
were about to be directed toward impeding our procress to the rl?er, 
and rendered D;y presence in that quarter fKCSsary. 
"BATTLB or ALLE.<l'8 PABM." 
General Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on Juno 29, at day. 
light, and marched his command to Orch-ard station, halting at Allen's 
Field, botwooQ Orchard and Savage's station. Tho divisions of r.iohard. 
son and So Igwick wore formed on the right of the railroad. f;-.cing to- 
wards Richmond. Richardson holding the right, and SeJgwick Joining 
the right of neintzelman's corps. Tho llrot lino of Rich.irdi*on'e lUv 
«KXt was held by Gooeral French, General CaldwoU supporting In the 
ftecond. A log building in f^t of Richardson's division was held by 
Oolonel Brooks with one regteent (Fifty third Pennsylvania volunteers), 
with Haizard's battery, on on elevated pioco of ground, a little in roar 
of Colonel Brooks' command. At 9, A- M-, tho enemy commenced a 
furious attack on the right of Gonoral Sedgwick , but were repulsod . The 
left of General Richardwn was next attacked, the enemy attempting In 
Tain to carry tho position of Colonel Brooks ; Captain Hazzard's bat- 
tery, and Giplain Pcllit's battery, which afterwards replaced it, were 
served with gnat effect, while tho Fifty-third Ponn.sylvania k-pl up a 
steady fire on the ailvaiiclng enemy, compelUng thorn at last to retire 
tndiaordor- The enemy leoewod tbo attack three timos, but were 03 
oCen repulsed . 

General Slociim arrived at Savage's station at an early hoar on the 
SSth, and was ordered to cross White Oak swamp, and relieve Cicneral 
Keyes' cordis. As soon n^ General Keycs was thus rolievod, ho moved 
towards James river, which he reached in safety with all his artillery 
and baggage early on tbo morning of tho 30th, and took up a position bciow 
Turkey t>eok bridge. During the morning Gouoral Franklin heard that 
the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chicka- 
bomlny In largo forco, and advancing toward Savage's station. Ho 
oommunicatod this Information to General Sumner, at Allen's farm, and 
moved .Smith's division to Savage's station. A little after noon General 
8>imnor united his forces with those of General Franklin, and assumed 
eomm^d. I ha<! ordered General Helntzelman, with his corpe, to hold 
ths Williamsburg road until dark, at a point where were several Hold- 
works, and a skirt of timber between these works and the railroad ; but 
he fell back before night and crossed White Oak Swamp at Bruckelt's 
ford. Choral Sumner, In his report of the battle of Savage's sution, 
says : 

"When the enemy appeared on the Williamsburg road.I could not 
Imagine 4rhy General Helntzelman did not attack him, and not until 
BMno time afterward did I loam that General Helntzelman bad loft the 
Held, and retreated with his whole corps (about flfu>«n thousand 
men) l>efore the action commenced. Tbia defection might have been 
attiMided with Ihemoct disa-itroasconsixiuenee-i, bq'I, nltliough we boat _^„,j,. 
(kf enemy signally, and drove him from tho Hold, wo should ITurtalnljr I L.,ia,i 

twcon hu leri an-l Oea-^ial f':3macr's right. In which space Dr. Trent's 
bouse is. Also, that the rcb-?ls !r.d repairo'l one of lbs bridges across 
tbo Cbickaliominy, and were ttdvauLing. •. • • • 

• • • 1 rode forward to see General Sumner, and 
met bh troo]>-s fa'.tiiig back on the Williamsburg road, through my Itnes- 
Geoeral ^'jnimr informed my that be intended to make a stand at 
Savagc'.s Illation, and for me to Join blm, to determine his position. 

<> This movera-.-nt of General Sumner uncovered my right fi.tnk, and it 
became necessary for me to at oaoo withdraw my troops. 

• ••••«•••* 
" I rode bark to And GeQ''ral Sumner- After some delay, from the 

mass of troops In tbo tlel-l , I found him . and learned that the course of 
action bad been dc;ei-iiiln-.'>l on ; so returned to give the necessary orders 
for the ileslnictt-'vn of the railroad cars, ammunition, and provisions still 
remaiDlog on the ground. 

*' The whole open space near Savage's station was crowdej with 
troops, mor J than I sujiposcd could be brought in action Judiciously 
An aid from the comin aiding geueral bai, iu the morning, reported to 
me to ' iioint out a roaJ acr&ss the White Oak s-vamp, starting from the 
left of General Kearney's pcksitioo, and leading by Brasket's ford-' 
• ••••• • 

The advaaci- of the co'.imn reached the Charles City road at 8X, P. U., 
and the rear at 10 V. U. , without accident.'' 

The orders given by ml to Generals Sumner, H-^intzelman. and Frank 
lln were to b ild the p^itioua assigned them until dark. As stated by 
General Ueiutzelman, General Sumner did not occupy the designated 
position ; but as be was the senior officer present, on that side of thr 
White Oak swamp, he may have thought that the moveuenta of til 
enemyJiur-tlaJadovUiloo from the letter of the orders. It appeon 
from bit report that ho assumed command of all the troepe near 
Savage's station, and determined to resist Ibe enemy there, and that 
he gave General Helntzelman orders to hold tho same position as 
I bad assigned him The aid sent by me to General Helntzelman, 
to point out the road across the swamp, was to guide blm In retiring 
after darl£. On reaching ^vago's Station, Sumner's and Franklin's 
eommandfl were drawn np in lino of battle, to the large open field 
to tho left of the railroad, tho let» resting oo the edge of the woods, 
and the right oitending down to the railroad (General Brooks, with bis 
brigade, held the woods to the lell of the field, where be did ezcelleiit 
service, receiving a wouni, but retaining his comman'L , General Han- 
cock's brigade was thrown Into the woods on the right and front At 4, 
P.M., tho enemy commenced his attack In large force, by the Williams- 
burg road. It was gallantly met by General Burn's brigade, supported 
and reinforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the New York 
Sixty ninth- Hazzard's and I'etti'a batteries agaUi doing good service. 
Oebome's and Branihall's batteries also took part eff.'ctively In this ac- 
tion, which was continued with great obstinacy until between Band 9 
P. M-. when the enemy were driven ttom the field. Immediately after 
the battle, orders were repeated for all the troops to fall bade and cress 
Whlto Oak swamp, which we accomplished during tbe night in good 
order. By midnight all tho trooiw were on tho road to White Oak 
swamp bridge. General French, with bis brigade, acting as roar-guard, 
and at 6 A. U-,on the 30lb, ail had crossed, and the bridge was des- 
troyed. . ■ 
0HHATI0S6 OS TH« S&TH. ' ' 
On tho afternoon of the 23th, I gave to the corps commanders their 
iTiitruclions for the opei-ations of the following day. As stated beftore, 
Porter's corps was to move forward to James river, and with the corps 
of General Koyos, toociupy a position at or near Turkey bend, in a Iran 
perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Hich- 
mond, opening comrouuication with tho gunboats, and covering ths 
passage of the supply trains, which we pushed forward as rapidly as 
possible upon Huiall's planutlon- The remaining corps wore pressed 
onward and posted so as to guard the approaches from Richmond, as 
well as the crossings of While Oak swamp, over wblsh tbe army had' 
passed. General Franklin was ordered to hold tho p-iasigo of White 
Ouk Swamp bridge, and cover lbs withdrawal of the trains from that 
•jpoint. His command consisted of his own corps, with General Riah- 
ardson's division, and General Nagloe's brigade, placed under his orders 
for the occasion. General Slocum's division was on tho right of the 
Charles City road. On tho morning of tho 30ili I again gave tho corps 
commanders within reach instructions for p*ting their troops. 
I found that.i nolw.ihjiaading all the efforts of my personal 
staff and other ofllcers, the roads wore blocked by wagons, and 
there was great diOlculty in keeping tho trains lu motion. Tbe engi- 
neer oaicers whom I had sent forward oo the ftSth to roconnoiter 
tho woods, had neither returned nor sent in any reports or guides, 
and Generals Keyes and Porlor had been delayed, one by losing the 
road, tho other In repairing an old read, had not been able toaead me 
any information. We then know of but ono road tor tho movemeal oC 
the troops and cur Immense trains. 11 was therefore necessary to 
post tbe troops In advance of this road as well as our limited know.edgo 
of the ground permitted, so as to cover the movement of the trams lu 
the roar. I then examined tho whole line from the swamp to tho lelt, 
giving final Instructions for tho posting of troops, and the obotruc- 
tlona of tho roads toward Richmond ; and all corps commiimlors were 
directed to hold their positions until tho trains bad passed, after wliicb 
a moro concentrated position was to be taken up near Jaiue- I'Jvor. 
Oar fbrce was loo small to occupy and hold the ootne i.u« l-vni ui-j 
White Oak Swamp to the river, exjvosed as it was, i" be la^vii ; . r--- 
Tsree by a movement across the lower part of the s- <er»wM 
the Cbickahomiiy below the swamp. Moreover, iho,tro<>pi! were ' vn 
freatl) .-v'jaHUd, and required reit In a more »« ire jmilioii 1 
■ ■ am -.1 iLiu««orihecoiiiitrr Mfar asilaiaJ^i. -i^k^a-.-a 

tbo :ii'p."-<;li'-"f 10 Miivff-B, whii.V [OPiuju i i.f.cis.v. ■' «o bo llie key W 
OUT pwitiou ia this quarter, an.l wjs thus ciuTjlcil to cxfc '.'-to very con ■ 
eldprably xns iiissa^o of tlic tr.iius, aatl to ixctify the pjsitlcms of th» 
troops, t 

Everything being then quiet, t sent aids to the diCTeront corps codi- 
mandei-R to infurm them what I had dcna on thn toft, and to b;-i'.)f;ina 
InrnrmatioQOl tho coudiiion of anairscii tho riglit. I returned IVom 
»4alvoi'n to HuxulFs, and liaving inaJo arraugi^iiK'n's Tor iostant com- 
munication from Mftlvern by signals, went on Imard of Capt.Oo Kuilg- 
ors' gunhoat. lying ncar,tocoaIen;\-itii hina in rcfoi-ence totU'^couditioa 
otour supply vessels, and thestatoof thiu.^rs on tho vlvcr. [t was hid 
opinion thit it wouldbertoc^ssary for the army toiali bnc< to a position 
below City Point, as tbo channel th :-ro was so n-^ar tho pouthorn sJ;ore 
that it would not be possible to bring np tho transports. Phould the 
enomy occupy it. Hairison's Lauding, was, in his opinion, tho noirest 
fiQitablo point. Upon the termination of tha intorviow, I rcturcod to 
Malvern Hill . and remained there till shortly before daylight. 

On tho moroingof the 30Lh Gffiiei-alSumncr was ordered to march 
with Sedgwick's division to GlouiialQ (Xolson's farm). fT^uoial Mc- 
Coirs division (Peunsylvaniii reserve's) was halted di:nng tho morning 
oa the New M.uli^t road, just inadvancoof the point whoro the road 
turns ott to Quaker Church. This lino w;is formed pjrper.dicniariy to 
the New luarket road, with Meade's bripado ou tho risht, Sf-'yraour's 
on the left, and Reynold's brigade, commanded by Colonoi S. G. Sim- 
mons, of the Fifth Pennsylvania, in reserve ; Kamlali's regular battery 
on the right, Kcra's and Cooper's battL-ries oppositB the centre, and 
Dcitrich'3 and Kanerhun's batteries, of tho Artillery reserve, ou th'? 
left— all in front of tho infantry lino, Tho country iu Gcm^rril ^rcCiU's 
(ront wa? an open field, intersected toward the ri^ht by the Ne'S' Market 
road, and a small stri'p^f timber parallel toil. The open front was 
about eight hundred yards ; its depth about one thomacd yards. On 
the morning of the 30th, General Hcintz^elman ordered tho bridge at 
Braclc^lt's ford to be destroyed, and trees to bo felled across 
ihat rnad and tho Charles City Road. Cv^nevftl Plocum's divi- 
sion was to extend to the Charles City road. General 
Kcaruey's left to concert with General ^locura's Icfi. General McCcU's 
position was to the loft of tho Long Bridge road, In connectiDn with 
General Kearney 'i? left, and General Hunker was on the loft of General 
McCall. Between 12 and 1 o'clock thi; enemy opened a fierce c-mnonade 
upon tbo divi-^ions of Smith's, Richardson's, and Naglcj's brigades, at 
White Oak Sw;imp bridge. This artillery firo was continued by the 
enemy throni;h the day, .and he crossed some infantry beiuw our posi- 
tion. Richardson's divisions suffered severely. Captain Ayrcs directed 
our artillery with great effect. Captain Hazzard's battery, after losing 
many cannoneers, and Captain Hazzard being mortally wounded, was 
compelled to retire. It was rcplacd by Pettit's battery, which par- 
tially silenced the enemy's gjns. Gcnr>ral Franklin hckl his position 
until after dark, repeatedly driving back the enrray in their attempts to ' 
cross the White'Oak J^wamp. At 2 o'clock'm the day the enemy were 
reported advancing in force Ly tho Ciiavies City road, and at 2>i o'clock 
the attack wa.s made down tho on General Slocum's left, but was 
checked by his aviillery. After this the enemy, iu large force, com- 
prising the divisions of Longstrect and A. P. Hiil, attacked General 
McCall. whoso division, after severe figi\trng, was compelled to retire. 
General McCall . in his report of the battle, says : 
* • * " About 2>^ o'clock my picket-^ were driven in by a strong 
advance, after some skirmishing, without loss on our part. 

'* At 3 o'clcck the enemy sent forward a regiment on the It^ft center, 
and another oa the right center, to feel for a weak poiut. They wore 
un<? jr cover of a showor of shells, and boldly advanced, but were both 
dr' /en baek — on the left by the Twelfth regiment, and on the right by 
IliiSeveDth rofimeut. For nearly two hours the battle ragod hotly 
hero. • • • ♦ At last the enemy was compelled to retire before 
the well-direcl^tl musketry fire of the reserves. The Gorman batteries 
were driven to tho rear, but I rode up and sent them back. It was, 
however, of little avail, and they were soon after abandoned by the 
cannoneers. * • • * Tho batteries in front of the center were 
boldly charged upon, but the enemy were speedily forced bact. 
• * * * ^oou after thLsamost determined charge was madoujA-n 
Randall's battery by a full brigade, advancing in wedge shape, without 
order, but in perfect rcclessness. Somewhat similar charges h;id, I have 
stated, bcon previously made on Cooper's and Kern's batteries by single 
regiments w tihnut success, they havmg recoiled before the Ptorm' of can- 
nister hurled against them. A li!<e|reou!t was anticipated by Randall's 
Battery, and th'j fourth Rcgimcut was requested not to firo until the 
battery had don,-; with them. It? gallant ccmrannder did not doubt his 
ability to repel tho attack, and his guns did seem to mow down the nd- 
Tanr;'.ig host, but EiiU tho gapswcro closed, and the enemy came in 
upon a run to the very muzzle of his guns. Itwasa very torrent of men, 
and they were on his battery before tho guns could bo removed. Two 
guns that were, indeed, successfully limbered had their horses killed 
and wounded, .and were overt urncl on the spot, and the enemy, dashing 
past, drove the greater part of the Ff3urlh Regiment before them. The 
left company (3), nevertheless, stood its ground, with its Captain, Fred. 
A. Conrad, as did likewise certaiEi men of other companies. I had rid- 
den into the regiment and endeavored to check them, but with only 
partial success. «•«**** 

There was no running, but my division, reduced by previous battles tu 
less than 6,030, had to contend with the divisions of i>oiigRtroet and A. 
P. Hill, considered two of tho ationgcst and best among many of the 
Confederate Army, numbering ihat day 16,000 or 20,000 m-rn, and it was 
reluctantly compelled to givc'"way before heavier force accumulated up- 
on them." 

General Helntzelman states that aboutS o'clock, P. M., General Uc- 
Call's division was attacked in large force, evidently tho priucipal at- 
tack, that in lees than an hour the division gave way, and adds ; 

"General Hooker bemg on his left by moving to the ri:;ht, repulsed 
the rebels in tho handsomest mann'*r,with groat slau^''dter. General 
Sumner, who was with General Sedgwick in ilcftiU's rear, also greatly 
aided with his artillery and infantry in driving back tho enemy. They 
now renewed their attack with vigor on General Kearney's left, and 
were again rtpulpcd with heavy los-s. •**••* 

This attack commenced ^bout 4 P. M.. and was pushed by heavy 
masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain 
Thompson's battery, directed with gi-cal precision, firing double char- 
ges, swept them back. "Hie whole open space, two hundred paces wide, 
was fllled with the en<^niy; each repnlso broL:ght forth fre^h troops. 
The third aUack wif? only repulsed by the rapid :4nd determined charge 
of the Sixty third Pennsylvania, Colonel Hayes, and half of the Thirty- 
seventh New York Voiantocrs.'' 

General Mci'aJl's troojis soon bog;ia to emerge from tho woods into 
,the open field. Several batteries woro in position, and began to Are 
into the woxls ocor the hca-'ls t;f our men in front. Caiit;iin DcRussy'8 
battery was rtlac-d on the right of General Sumner's artillery, with 
ordei-s to £hcU the woods. Geaer;U Burr 'a brigade was then aUvancc<l 
CO moot th.'* enent;*. and fioou drove Uim baclc ; other traope bpsan to 

cturn fiom the White Oak swamp. Uiter in tbo day, at the caU of 
Genei-al Kearney, General Taylor's First .Vew Jersey's bri;.;i<le,Siocum'B 
divisioQ, was sent to occupy a portion of General McCall s deserted po- 
sition, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the 
enemy, who shortly after gave up tho attack, contenting themsolvea 
with keeping up a desultory firing till late at night. Between 12 and 1 
o'clock at night, General Ilcintzelman commenced to withdraw his 
corps, and suon after daylight btjth cf tho divisions, with General Slo- 
cum's div ision . and a portion of G eneral Suuiner 's command , reached 5Ial- 
vernHill. On the morning of th'i 30Lh, General Sumner, in obedlonco to 
orders, had move d promptly to Glcudab, and upon a call from General 
Franklin for reinforcements, scut him tw'o brigades, which returned in 
time to paiticipate and render good service iu tho battle near Glendalo. 
General Sumner says of this battlo ; 

•' Tho battlo of Giendale was the most severe action since tho battle 
of Fair Oaks. About 3 o'clock, P. M., tho action commenced, and after 
a furious contest, lasting till after dark, tho enemy was routed at all 
points, and driven from the field." 

The roar of tha supply trains and the reserve artillery of tho army 
reached Malvern Hill about, 4 P. M. At about this time the enemy be- 
gan to appear in General Porter's front, and at 5 o'clock advanced in 
large force against his left flank, posting* artillery under cover ofa skirt 
of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvr-rn Ilili, while, with 
his infantry, and somo artillery, he attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. 
A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear on the 
enemy, which, with tho Infantry of Colonel Warren's command, com- 
pelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel Warren. 
Tho gunboats rendered most eihcient aid at this time, and helped lo 
dnvo back the enemy. It was very late at night before my aids re- 
turned to give me the results of the day's fighting along the 
whole line, and the true position of affairs. Winio waiting to 
hear from General Franklin before ."sending orders to Generals Sum- 
ner and Heir.tzelman, I received a message from tho latter tha'i 
Geuf ral Franklio was falling back, whereupon I sent C^jloncl Colbum, of 
my staR", with orders to verify this, and if it were true, to order in Gen- 
erals Sumner and Hcintzelman at once. Ha had not gone far when ho 
met two olDccrs sent irom General l^rankliii's Ueahiuarters, with tho 
informft*.ion that ho was falling back. Orders were tbea Boat to Gener- 
als Sumucr and Heintzelmaa to fall back also, and definite instructions 
were given as to the movement, which wua to oonimenco on the right. 
The orders met their tronps already ejivoa^;; to tlalvcrn. Instructions 
were also sent- to General Franklin p.s to the route ho was to follow. 
General Barnard then received full instructions for posting the troops 
as they arrived. I then returuetl to HuxaU's, and a^ain left for Malvero 
soon after daybreak. Accompanied by several general officers,! once 
more made the enti re circuit of the position and then returned lo HuxelPs, 
whence I went with Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the 
aj-my tuid its depots. I returned to iLilvern before the serious fighting 
com'manced, and a^ter riding along tho lines, and seeiug most cause to 
feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity. 


The position selected for resisting the further advantje of the enemy on 
thefirst of July , was with the left and centre of our iiues resting on Malvern 
Hill, while tho rightcurvcd backr.'ard throughawooded country toward 
a poiut below Huxall-e. on James river. Malvern Hill is an elevated 
plateau , about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile in area, well 
cleared of timber,and with several converging roads running over it. 
In front are nuroerons defensible ravines, and the ground slopes gradu- 
ally to the north and east to the woodland, giving clear range for ar- 
tillery in those directions. Toward the northwest the plateau falls off 
more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James river. From the 
po£'ition of the enemy, his most obvious Hue of attack would bo from 
the direction of Richmond and White Oak swamp, and would almost of 
necessity strike in upon tho left wing. Here, therefore, the lines wore 
strengthened by massing tho troops and collecting the principal part 
of tho artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line — Sykes' 
division on the left, BlorrcUs on the right, with tho artillery of 
his two divisions advantageously posted, and tho avtiilery of the re- 
serve so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated tire of some 
eisty guns could be brought to bear on any point in his front or left. 
ColoV.el Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeeded iu /jetting two of 
his Kiegogaus in position on the hightst part of the hill. Couch's divi* 
> on was placed on the right of Porter's; nest came Kearney and 
lieoij^jr ; nest Seigwick and Richard?-on ; nest Smith and Slocum, then 
uio icmaiiiderofKcyes' corps, extending by a backward curve nearly 
to the river. Tlie Per.r.sylvania Reserve corps was held iu reserve, and 
^lalloued behind Porter's and Couch's pos.tion. Ono brigade of Porter '8 
wa-s thrown to the left, on tho low ground, to protect, that flank from 
tiiiy mivcmcnt direct from tho Ri.i-.mcud road. Tho line was very 
.'trougti'.ong the whole front of the u;>t-cr plateau, but thcnco to the 
ystreine right, the troops were more (U'oloycd. Tliis information was 
aniMirative, asan attacic would probaUiy bo made upon our left. The 
right was rendered as secure as po?3i!)!e by slashing the timbers, and 
by barricading the roads. Ct-mmocore Ko^lgers, commanding the flotilla 
on James River, placed his gunboats so as to protect our 
fliiiks, and to command the approaches from Rich 
mond. Between 9 and 10, A. ?.L , the enemy commenced feeling aloug 
our whole left wing with his artillery and skirmishers, as far to the 
right as Hooker's division. About two o'clock a column of the enemy 
was observed moving toward our right, with the skirt of woods in front 
of Heintzclinan's corps, but beyond the range of artillery. Arrangc- 
in:^iit3 wurcat once made to meet tho anticipated attack in that quarter; 
but though tho column was long, occupying more than two hours in 
pa^s-i:ig. It disappeared and was not again heard of. The presnmptiOD 
is, ttiai it retired by the rear and participated in the attack afterwards 
made on our left. About S. P.M., a heavy fire of artillery opened on 
Kcarr.oy's left and Coach's division, speedily followed up hy a brisk 
attack of infantry oa Couch's front. The artillery was replied to witb 
good e.T'ct by our own, and tho infantry of Co.ich's division r.-'jn^'i . 
lyinn on tho ground lUitll the advancing column waa within frhmt uius- 
kct-i:i;ice, when they sprang to their foi^t and poured iu a deadly vol- 
ley, which entirely broke tho attaciilng force, and drove them in disorder 
back on tbcirown ground. This advantage was followed up until we 
had advanced the right of our lines some seven or eight hundred 
yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us aetrouger posi- 
tion ami a better firo. Shortly aftT 4 o', the firing ceac-ed along 
tho whole front, but DO disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy 
to withdraw from the field. Caldwell's brigade, having been detached 
from Richardson's division, w.asEt;^t>ncd upon Couch's ri^'ht by Gen- 
eral Porter, to wh-tm he ha<l been o.-Jfert^ • to report. ^Hie whole line 
wag surveyed by the General, and everything held inreadincw to meet 
(he coming attack. At 6 o'clock tho enemy suddenly cpeaod upon 
C^uch and Porter with the whole strength of hi? artillery, and at once 
began pushing forward his colunvjs of attack, to carry tho hill. Br(- 
gidc .after h'igadefoini'il under ci-vtr of tho woodK. s'lartcd at a run 
locrofp theovw»c.j;ifo.andchr.ri^'>dourt.'^t' r " hv: Mi.-.h";'vy firoc^ 


JU gUDfi, Willi lli.' fo;\ ail(i si 

MK Bent them roi'itog back to 

MalrdeAduid wouD<leil. In ^ 

Iketr Dre, UDttI Ibeattac^ciDR colLima^. wL..>. 

«tf CAUiiterftUd ahcll from our artillery, baj ; 

of Mr lilies. Tlioy then pourud laaBiuslu 

>..r-i with 
. vr:ilibrl(l 

A tlip storm 
; rt.'\v yards 

Oil furward 




























villi thft bayonet, cai'turiiigri'>soDcrs and coior.:.::i:adr.viui:; tbo routed 
-olumna In coDfustou from the Odd. About 7 o'clock, a.9 fresh 
- roope wer* accumulullDg In front of Porter and Couch, McjgUcr aD<) 
ftskUm trere sent with ibolr brlgadM as soon aa it waa consldertd 

Cadent to wiihJrarr any portion of Sumner's and Ilemtzi'lmau's troops, 
reiuforco that part of (bo Uoo.aod bold the poailioos. These brigades 
rt!tcvo'] Kuch p'}rtioas of Porter's corps and Couch'0 dlvislou, as bad 
cxpcndc4f .thptr ammunitioD, and battorles from the rcs«rvo wcrt 
p«h»d forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Votil dark 
tkaeocmy porsiatod in bis efforts totakelho positioaeotenmiously de- 
tekdod, b.H despite bis vast numbers, bis repeated aud de-.porate at- 
tacks wero repalsed with fearful loss, and darknt-M ended tbt- battle of 
MalTsro bill, tbongb it was not ootil aftrr nino o'clock tl>nt the arttl- 
Isiycaued ItB Are. Durmg tbo.trbote battle, Commodoro Rodders add- 
ed gnsiUy to the discomfiture of tbo enemy, by throwing shelb) among 
UtrtBdrrcs and advancing columns. As the army, in it? movement 
frMB|UkftChlckabomloy to lUarrlson's Landmf;, was conttiiuallT occu- 
iM in nutrcblng by night and flgbtiog by day, lis<lcrs found no 
sWOrtOBlty for collecting data which would enable tbom to give exact 
wtBfM of casualties in each engagement. The aggregate of onr entire 
ISBM from the 26tb of June to the 1st of July, inclusive, was ascer- 
tained after our arrival at Harrison's Ijuidlng, to ue as follows : 
I/ittcfkdlal, wouTuted and musinj ui the Army of ike fotomac, /rem (kt 
f»tAofJune,lS(i2,totkc 1<( trf Ju^,■2,\ndu.n•'■ 
Corpg, KUted. H 

i. iicOaira division 223 

% Sumner's 137 

3. Heintzelmau's 189 

4. Koyes' 60 

& i'orler's 620 

& Franklin's £15 


flhvalry 10 

Total 1,583 7,709 6,955 15,249 

Altboogh the result or the battJe or Malvern was a complete victory, 
it was neverlholesi? n^-c-.-f^iiry to fall back still furibor, in order to 
reach a point where our'supplics could be brought to us w;th c^^rlainty. 
As before stated, in the opinion of Captain Rodgors, commanding 
ttio gantM>at fiotilla, this could only be done below City Point. 
OSncorrlDg in bis opinion , I selected Harrison's bar as the 
new position of the army. The exhaustion of our supplies 
of food, forage, and ammunition, made it imperative to reach tbo trans- 
ports Immediately. The greatest portion of the tran.'rportnlion of the 
army baring been started for Harrison's landing during the night of the 
aOlb of Juno and tin? 1?t of July, tbo order for the movement of tbs 
troops was at onco l.'-sucd upon the flnal repulse of the enemy at Malvern 
Hill .Theordorpr.iLTibod a movement by tbo left and rear, General 
Keyes' corps 10 cover the manoeuvre. It was not carried out in detail 
as regards the divisions on the left, tbo roatls being somewhat blocked 
by Iho rear of our trains. Torter and Couch were not able to move out 
as early as had been anticipated, and Porter foutid it necessary to place 
a rear guard between his command and the enpmy. Colonel Avcrell, of 
Ihf' Third Pennsylvania cavalry, was intrusted with this delicate duty. 
Bo had onder h\!i command bis own regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel 
BjchanAn's bri^do of regular infantry and one battery. Ey a Ju- 
dicious use of the r^^^ourcts at his command, he deceived tne enemy, 
•oaa to cover the withdrawal of the left wing without being attacked, 
jvmainlng himFclf on tbo previous day's baltle-fleld until about 7 0'- 
Sloclcof the 2<i of Joly. Meantime General Keyos, having rcselvcd bis 
ardors, commenced vigorous preparations for covering the movement 
«r the entire army and protecting the trains. It being evident that the 
knmcnso number of wt' us and artillery carriages pertaining to Iho 
army could not move wiUi colcrity along a single road. General Keyes 
took advantage of cv.ry acciileut of the ground to open new aveniiss 
aud t-5 fiicilitate the muvemeat. He made proparationa for obstructing 
the rixid-; after the army ha-! poised, so as to preventany rapid pursuit, 
4*-troyiiig cQ'-'cliially Turkey bridge on tbo main road, and rendering 
Mber roads ani ;'piir*>ache3 temi>orarlly imiK-ssible, by felling trees 
•cross them. U'^ koj't the trains wiMl cl"--- 1 up and directed the mare'i 
60 ;uat the troops could move on each side of the roads, not obstructing 
lUo pwsago, but being in good position to rope! an 'attack from 
any nuarlftr. His dispositions were so aucef?3ful that, to use his 
own words: "I do not think more \-ehiclc3 or more public 
property were abandoned on the march from Turkey Bend than would 
have been left in the same state of the roads, if the army had been 
moving toward the enemy instead of away from. And when it is 
' undnrstood tlial ihe carrLigofl and teams belonging to this army, 
ftrotchcd oat In one line, would extend not far from forty miles, the 
energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the pres- 
ence of an enemy vastly superior in numbers will be apprrciatjd.'* 
The last of the wagons did not reach the sil9 selected at Harrisons bar 
nulll after dark on the 3d of July, and the rear guard did not m-'ve 
Into their camp until everything w.^s secure. The enemy followed up 
with a small force, and on the 3d ttircw a few shell.'* at the rear-;imrd, 
but were quickly riippersed by our batteries and the Ore of our ;;un- 
boatA. Great credit mu.^t be conceded to General Keyes for the skill 
which cha. actcrl&'d bi<( (wrformiico of Iho important and delicate 
tfutles iuiruBtcd to his charRe. Hieh praise is also due to the oiO'-ers 
and men of the First Connecticut Arti'Iery, Colonel Tyler, for llie man- 
ner in which they withdrew all the heavy guns during Ihe seven days, 
and from Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state tf Iho roads, the 
teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the p^v^iition ; 
bnt these energetic soldiers remoyed the guns by hand tliat distauce, 
leaving nothing behind. 


On Ihelstcf July I received tbefollowiu;;; fr^^m the iVoidc-nt : 

Wa.siu.\gtv.s,JuI) 1,1502—3: 30, p. U. 
M.Oor-Cencral Geo. B McGeilan : 

11 Is linp'-ssihla to reinforce you for your present emergency. If wa 
bud a ni'lii-:):! of men wo couM not get them to you in time. We have 
QOl tbo meii to send. If you are not strong enough to face tho enemy 
you must find a place of security; wait, rest, and rei>air. Maiuuiln 
your ground if you can, but savo the army at all events, even if you 
fall back to Fortre.ta Monroe. Wo silll have strength enough In the 
'wuntry.and will bring it ool. 


In the dispatch from the President to me, on tiir 3d of July, he says : 
*' If yo3 think you are ooi stronf enough to U\\ti- Richm tml Just now, 

! 'o not wL»;i you to. Trv r^i my lujt -rial and pet 

,/u^aodI will i>(reiii.-r ^.,;;ii.> m as Icin. 

i 1 • GovcmorF* of elc) ( • ■ ■ .1 u» w levy of three buo 
irod thousaud, which 1 acH.' •,>'-." 

•*0nthe8d of July the f\>lIowing kind dispatch was received from 
t he President : 


\Va5ui.\oion, July 3, 1862 — 3, P. U. 
M:^|or -General G. B. HeCiellan : 

Yours of 5:30 y^ist-'rdiy is Ju-t reojived. I am s(i.>d that your- 
iic]l. ollicei.-). UD-l m'U have d'jn- the bi-st ytni coj)d. All arconuts say 
that better QiiUtlitg was never d >ae. Ton lh<>:is.iU'l tbnik^ for it 
• •••••••a 

On tbe 4th I sent the follin-iug to the Pr'^SMlent : 

[iKJklKfl AkMY or TOS POTOMAO, ) 

Harki^.n BaS, Ja3i» KiTKR, July 4, 1861. J 
.» the President: 1 ' 

i liaro the honor to acknowledge thtfreceiptof your dispatch of the 2d 
i .' lant. 

I shall make a staod at this p'.acc, and endeavor to give my men the 
rei>05e they so much require. 

After sending my communication on Tuesday, the enemy attacked 
the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lastmg until night. 
Tucy were repulsed with great slaughter. 

Had their attack E-Jcc^c^lcd. tbe toosf quences would have been dlsas- 
tr JUS in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting which had contin- 
:icd from the afternoon of tbo'^Olbu';t.,iu a daily series of engagements 
■vbolly unparalleled on this coftinenl for detei mioation and slaughter 
•)n both sides. The mutual IdM in killed and wounde<l is enormous— 
'.hat of the enemy certainly greatest. Ou Tuesday morning, the 1st, 
>ur army commenced its movement from lIuxiiHs to this point, our 
ino of defense there being too extended to be nialnuiiued by our 
veakcned forces. Our train was immi-n^-e, andabont 2, P. M., on the 
. I a heavy storm of rain began, wh>cb continued during tbo entire da^ 
-lad until Iho forenoon of ycs-tcrday. The road? bocamo horrible. 
IVoops, artillery and wagons moved on steadily, and our whole 
.irmy. men and material, was fituilly brought Faf ly into camp. 
The Last of the wasons reached hero at noon yesterday. The exhaus- 
tion was very great, but the army preserved its morale, and 
would bavo rcpelk-d any attack which the enemy was in con- 
dition to make. We now occupy a lino of heights about two miles 
from tho James, a plain extenJing from lb. ro to the river. Our 
front is aboi:t three miles long. These bciphts ciinmaiid our whole 
position, and must be mainlainod. The gunbaits can rooder valuable 
support upon both flanks. If tho enemy attack us in front, we must 
hold our ground as we best may, and at what-jver cott. Our iMteitious 
can bo carried only by ovcrwbu imiuj; nuinbir.^. 'Pie f-pirit of the army 
is eiocUeiit; straggU-r-^ arc (Indiug tl.-'ir r>gira>-iit.s, and the toldienJ 

exhibit the be.'^t results of disciplii 
pregnable, <■; ii''c;;illy as a mora.--- ' 
ironi our center to the Jame.-; on 
vast numbers, and. If so, our frnu 
Vo, which, if lost, will be deci.sive 
killed, wounded, and prisoners, 

[ ;.. \.\ 

-i.s im- 



fur a. my ;.-. U-uiiuli) \\LjKeiieJ by 
I cannot now apiircximalc to any 

statement of our losses', but wo wore not beaten m any tonOitt ^ The 
enemy were unable, by any off'jrts, to drive us from the field. Kevor 
did Bucii a change of base, invoiving a retrograde movemeut, and under 
inccssautallacksfromamutt determined and vastly mor.^ numerous foe, 
partake so little of di.sordcr. We have Inst ni.giin8,c.\ccpl twenty -ti\ eon 
the field of battle, twenty one of wbicb wi re lost by the givuig way of Uc- 
Call'sdivisiouumicr the oneel oisupiirior numbers. Our cmmunicatioo 
by,tbcJani''S river are not secure. Tht-re are points where the enemy can 
establish ihenisolves with eannun or musketry and commaud the river, 
and where it is not cortaui that our guubuat« con clnve them out. In 
case of this, or in cxseour front is bro'iten, I wil. still make every eflTorl 
to preserve nl ! th<- j^^umnel of thearony. and tho events ol the last 
few days leave no question that the troops will do all tliat their country 
can ask. tScnd such reinforcements us you can ; I will do what I can 
We are shipping our wounded and sick, and landing supplies. The 
Navy Department »^hould co-operate with us to the extent of its ro 
sources. Captain lUvlgors is doing all m his power in tho kindi*t and 
mostefllcient nmnnor. When nil the c:rriimslacct.« are kn->wn. it will 
bcacknowle'lg'dby all competent judges that the movement jost com 
pleted was unparalleled in the annaL< of war. Under tbemr-std'aicult 
cirtumstancos, we have preserved our trains, our guns, our matadal. 
and, above all, our Uodc:. 

G. B. Mcrij:LULK. 


To which I received tbe following reply: * 

Wasbi>ct»».'<, July 6. 1863—7, A. Hi. 
Mojor-Oenrral O- B. McClelland o/mmnnflmg Army t'l^r-nac : 

A thousand thanks for the relief your twn >f I'iandL. 

P. M. , yttsKrduy, gave me. Be ;w*ur'Vi. ili.t i, ;:i r,f your- 

self anil olllcers and iul-u. is ana i'.i;'.v.'r will . 
If you can hold >our pru.'icnt pu-sition, \to :iit . • w ■ ■■ •■ yei 

Major-General O. B. McClillah, 

Commandlai; .\rmy of tlie Potomac. 
The following letters wore received from bU Excellency, the Prert 


Was Ds?aktjie.nt, \ 

VkxfmiSGms, D. C.. July 4. 1S62. f 

I understand your position, a? '^'-*" ' " ' '" ' '' '^-nera' 

Harcy . To reinforce you so a.s : ""i^? 

within a month, or even six we :. ^"** 

arrivi d and now arriving from ih'- ■ ■ ' se), 

end .iboul lO.OlX) 1 hope you will reciiv ■ ^nd 

about fi.OOO frnm Hunter a little lat^r, ! > f " 

I another man within a month. I'uder th-.- ^ ...i.^... u-^ — usive 

I for tho prc*Mil must bo your only care, ."^ve the army lii si whore 
I you arc, if you can, and pre..M.dIy bv removal, if yo;i mu.M. You, mi 

j the ground, must be the i ' ' " ■■''^i-'b you will attempt, and of tho 

meaii-of cn"cclingli, I 1 i.iy opiuiun that, wiili ihoaid of 

tha gunboats, and tho r mentioned above, yuu can tioid 

your privent position, pr-'Mv.-^. , .■-.,. .. I.,iiK as you can keei> the ,1 imea 

1 river oprn l.rlow you. If you are not til-rably ronlldent you .-aii keep 

1 tbe James river open, you had better rcmcve as *«n as ixtssil.V I do 

I nat remember that you have o.^i.rrs^e<t any apprtbcusi.'U us to tn« 

danger of havmg your communic:.tion cut on tho rivor boluw you ; yt-l 

I dQ<iot suiiix»c it oaf. have eaCajH-d your attention. 

" A. laSOOLM. 

I-. p.— II at any time yoti fet-l able to take the offenaivo. you •*•« not 
restrained from doing so. 

The following tologmm wm s'lit on this 7th: 


Berkeley. July 7,1862— 8:30, A.M. J 
Aatho boai, is starting I havo only time to acknowledge the receipt 
of telegram by General Marcy. Tho oneray havo not attacked. My 
positit^n is very strong, and daily becoming more so. If not attacked 
today I shall laugh at Ibem. I havo been anxious about ray commu- 
nications. I had a long consultation about it with Fl.ig-OlDcer Golds- 
borough last night. He is confident he can keep tho river open. 
He should havo all gunboats possible. Will see him again this morn- 
ing. My men iu splendid spirits, and an.xious to try it again. Alarm 
yourself as littlo as possible about me, and dou't lose coDfideoce in 
this army. 

G.B. McClellas, 

A. Lincoln, President. 

While general-iu-chief and director of the operations of all our armies 
in the fiold, I had become deeply impressed with the impor- 
tance of a-lnptiug and carrying out certain views regard- 
ing the conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, were essen- 
tial to it5 objects and its success. During au active campaign of thre» 
months In the enemy's country, these were so fully confirmed that I 
conceived it a duty, in tho critical position we then occupied, not to 
withhold a candid e?tprossion of the more important of these views from 
the rommander-in Chief, whom tho Constitution places at the head of 
the armies and navies, as well as the Government of the nation. 

[Here follows tho It-tter from Harrison's bar, July 7, already pub- 
The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln : 


Camp near Harrison's Landing, I'a., July 7, 1802. 

Mr. President: You havo been fully informed that tho rebel 
army is in the front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attack- 
in^our positions or reducing ua by blocking our river communica- 
tions. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly 
desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your excellency, 
for your private consideration, my general views concerning the 
existing state of thu rebelliou, although they do not strictly relate to 
ihe eiiuation of this army, or strictly come within the scope of my 
official duties. These views amount to eonvietions, and are deeply 
impressed upon my mind p.ud heart. Our cause must never he 
abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. 
The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may 
he the cost iu time, treasure and blood. It secession is successful, 
other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither 
military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled 
purpofcc to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United 
Stales upon the people of every State. 

The time has come when the government must determine upon a 
civil and military policy, covering the whole ground of our national 

The responsibility of determining, declaring:, and supporting such 
civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national 
affairs in regard to tho rebellion, nuist now be assumed and exercised 
ty you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you po\Yer, 
even for the present terrible exigency. 

This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it 
should be regarded, and it should bo conducted upon the highest 

firinciples known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war 
ookiog to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. 
It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed 
forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, 
political executions of persons, territorial organization of Stales, or 
forcible abolition of slavery should be contem^plated for a moment. 

In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmL-d persons 
ihould be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military 
operations; all private property "taken for military use should be paid 
or receipted for ; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes ; 
all crmecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor 
by themilitai-y towards eitizons promptly rebuked. Military arrests 
ehouldnotbctolerated.except in places where active hostilities exist : 
and oaths, not required by enactments, constitutionally made, should 
he neither dera:uuled nor received. 

.Military government should be confined to the preservation of 
public order and the protection of pohtical right. Military power 
should not be allowed to Interfere with the relations of servitude, 
either by supporting or impairing thr authority of the master, except 
for repressing di.'^order, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband, under 
the act of Oon;;re-'s, seeking military protection, should receive it. 
The right of the government to appropriato permanently to i's own 
eervice claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the rit;lit of the 
owner to compen!?ation therefor should be recognized. This principle 
m^ight be extended, ui)on grounds of military necessity and security, 
to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumiasiou in 
such Slate; and in Missouii, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and 
possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure ia only 
a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional, and per- 
vaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive 
the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the 
the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it miglit be humbly 
hoped that it would commend it:*elf to the favor of the Almighty. 

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle 
shall be mailc known and approved, the eflbrt to obtain requiBite 
forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, espe- 
cially upon slavery, will rapiilly disintegrate our present armies. 'I'ho 
policy of the government must be aupi)orted by concentration ol 
military power. The national forces should not bedispcrseti in expe- 
ditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be 
mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies ol 
the Confederate Slates. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the 
political structure which they support would soon cease to exist. 

In can-ying out any system of policy which you may form, you 
■will require a commander-in-chief of the army, one who possesses 
your conlidence, understands your views, and who is competent to 
execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to 
the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask 
that place ;or myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as 
youmay a=sign me, and I will do so as faithfully asevcr eubordinalc 
served superior. 

I may ho on the brink of eternity; and as I hope forgiveness from 
my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and 
from love for my country. 

Very i-espeetfullv, your obedient servant, 
GEOUiiK n. McCLELLAN", MaJ -Gen. Commanding. 

Hi-* EscclU'iicv A. Lincoln, Presidrnt. 
IT. Ex. Doc.'l.'i 10. 

I telegraphed the President on the llth as follows: 

Headquarters Armt op thk Totomac, 

Berkeley, July 11, 1862— 3 p. m. 
♦ • » » * 

"We arc verj' strong here now, so far as defensive is concerned. 
Hope you will soon make us strong enough to advance and try-it 
again. AU in fine spirits. 

GEORGK B. McCLELLAN, Maj.-Qm, Commanding. 
A. Lincoln, Presidfnt. 

These telegrams yreve sent on the 12th, 17th, and 18th, to Ma excel- 
lency the President : 

Headquarters Armt op the Potomao, 

JJerkelnj, Juhj 12, 1862-7.15 a. m. 
Hill and Longstrcet crossed into New Kent county, via Long 
Bridge. I am still ignorant what road they afterwards took, but wiU 
know shortly. 

Nothing else of interest since last dispatch. Rain ceased, and 
everything <5[uiet. Men resting well, but beginning to bo impaUent 
for another light. 

I am more and more conviced that this army ought not to be with- 
drawn from here, but promptly reinforced and thrown again npoa 
Hichmond. If we have a little more than hall a chance we can 
take It. 
I dread the effect of any retreat upon the morale of the men. 

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, itfaj.-Cen. Commanding. 
A. Lincoln, President. 

Headquartbrs Armt of thb Potobao, 

Bp-rkekyj July 17, 1863—8 a. m. 
I have consulted fully with General Burnside, and would commend 
to your favorable consideration the general's plan for bringing (7) 
■even additional regiments from North Carolina by leaving Newburn 
to the care of the gunboats. It appears manifestly to be our policy 
to concentrate here everything we can possibly sptire from lesH im- 
portant points, to make sure of cru£hing the enemy at Hichmond, 
T\-hich seems clearly to be the most important point in reteldom. 
Nothing should be left to chance here. I would recommend that 
General Biirroidc, with all his troops, be ordered to this cany, to 
enable it to assume the offensive as soon as possille. 

GKOKGE B. UcChBLhA'^, MaJ.'Gen. Commanding. 
A. Lincoln, President. 

Headquabtebs Army of thk Potomac, 

Berkeley, July 18, 1862—8 a. m. 
No change worth reporting in the state of affairs. Some (20,000) 
twenty thousand to (2o,<X)0) twenty- live thousand of the enemy at 
Petersburg, and others thence to Richmond. 

Those at Petersburg say they are part of Beauregard's army. New 
troops arriving i-ia Petersburg. Am anxious to have determination 
of government that no time may be lost in preparing for it. Hours 
are very precious now, and perfect unity of action necessary. 

GEORGK B. UcQhKhljANj MaJ.-Gcn. Co7n7nandinff. 
A. Lincoln, President. 
The foilowLLs was telegraphed to General nallccton the 28th : 


Berkeley, July 2S, lSfi2— S a. m. 
Nothing especially new except corroboration of reports t}iat re- 
inforcement* reaching Richmond h-om south. It is not conlirraed 
that any of Bragg's troops are yet here. My opinion is more and 
more tirm that here is the defence of WAshing^on* and that I should 
he at once reinforced by all available troops to enable me to ad- 
vance. Retreat would be disastrous to the army and the cause. I 
am conffdcut of that. 

Major-Gencral H. W. Hallece, 

Commandi7ig U. S. Army, WashitigloTif D. C. 
On the 30th 1 sent the following to the general-in-chief. 

Ueadquarters Army of tue Potomac, 

Berkeley, July SO, 1862-7 a. m. 
I hope that it may soon be decided what is to be done by thla 
army, and that the decision may be to n;-enforce it at once. We are 
losing much valuable time, and that at a moment when energy aud 
decision are sadiy needed. 

GEORGE B. McSLELLAN, atajor-Gcneral 
Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. 
About half an hour after midnight, on the morning of August 1, 
the enemy brought some light batteries to Coggin's point and tho 
Coles house, on the right bank of James river, directly opposite 
Hanison's landing, and oi^ened a heavy lii'e upon our shipping and 
encampments. It was continued rapidly for about thirty minutes, 
when tliey were driven back by the tire of our guns ; this affair was 
reported in the following dispatch : 


Berkeley, August 2, 1862— S a. m. 

Firingofnight before last killed some ten (10; men and wounded 
about (i5j tilleen. 

No harm of the slightest consequenco done to the shipping, al- 
though several were struck. Sent parly across river yesterday to 
the Coles house, destroyed it and cut down the timber ; will com- 
plete work to-day, and also send party to Coggin's point, which I 
will probably occupy. I will atlend to your telegraph about preas- 
ing at once ; will send Hooker out. Givo me Burnside, and I will 
stir these people up. I need more cavalry ; havo only (w,700) thirty- 
seven hundred for duty in cavalry division. 

Adjutant General's office forgot to send Sykea's commission as 
major-general, with those of other division' commauders ; do me the 
iavor to hurry it on. 

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General Commanding, 

Major-Gencral U. W. Kalleck, Washington, £>. C. 

To prevent another demonstration of this character, and to insure 
a debouchu on the south bank of the James, it became necessary to 
occupy Coggin's point, which was done on tho 3d, and tho enemy, 
as will bo seeu from the following dispatch, driven back towards 
Petersburg : 

Headqcarters Army of tub Potomac, 

Berkeley, August 3, 1802—10 p. m. 

Coggin's point was occupied to-day, and timber felled so as to 
make it quite defensible. 1 went over tho ground myself, and found 
that Dnano had, as usual, selected on admirable position, which coed 
b^ intrenched with a small amount of labor, so as to maUcitafor- 
niidiblu tOte de pout, coverliiir the landing of a large force. 

I shall begin entrenching it by the labor of contrabands to-morrow. 
The position covers the Coles house, which is directly in front o( 
Wcfltovtr. Wc have now u safe debouche on the south bank, and 
are secure against midnight cannonading. A few thousand more 
men would jilace us in condition at least to annoy and disconcert the 
enemy very much. 

I sent Colonel Avcritl tlils moniing with three hundred (300) 
cavalry to examine the country on the south side of the James, ard 
trv to catch some cavah-y at t?ycaniore church, which is on the mftMl 


lb].Oen. G. B. McClilhs. 

Id occupying Coaslti'ii point, as already dcecribcd, 

roMllTOm IMcrtburjio Sallulfc, lud rum ■ nvr (») mi!r» trrm Colo* 
houto. lie foandiCiiialry Ion. ' fly (4JC) iii.u, 

all-icked ll.omal once, (liovc In i. s i« ilulrcamii, 
wbfrcwohail»«ll»iT'l""n'**'if' • Inur-'^r. 

lie burned Ihtirenlin- .-Anip, ». ill. J. r .■o.i.L,.-"i.ry an.t quartcr- 
Molor'a utoirm alld tlto rilurn.:.! snd rt-rri.f!".i »:.o livir. He 
;..oU but (-) two pnaoui-nt, hnU one mao woundLJ ly a baU, and cue 
by a Mbrc oat. 

Car'ain HcInlo<li made a handtomo charjo. ♦The troopa olii-agcd 
wore of the (6tl>J tUlh regulars, and lUu (3d) lliird l'uji..fyhani» 

"SlMicl Averlll condnclcd llila aflUir, a* bo do«» every tWnif lie na- 
dertaSoa, to my entire «ail«facti.>n. 

O. H. McCLKLLAN, ilcjer Gtntral Commandinf. 
M«] Oon. n. W. lliLiicit, 

Cvmnayuiing L'nilut Sulci Amy, Waihiitg/on, D. C. 
On tholslof Augu»l 1 rtctlvi.l ilietoMowluK dispaiclicu : 

WisnisoToir. yuiy ao, lSo_'— S p. m. 
A dianateh Joat tMeifcd from (itnfral I'opo taya that dciiriore 
report lliav tbo enemy la motlPK (ouih of Jamia river, and lliat liic 
force In Ulchraond la very Jmall. I «us«(-«t ho be pressed In that 
direction, eo aa to aacertain tbe facto of ilio caac. 
oirecuon, ao a> ^^ ^ UALLECK, Major-OtnaraL 

Val.-Qen. O. B. UoClillim. 

^ WiBHisoTOK, July 30, 1883-8 p. m. 

In order to enable you to move in any dln-ction, it i« nec<-«tary to 
relievo you ol your nick. Tbe SorgeonOtncril li.-i(, ihcr.'lon!, been 
directed to nmkc arrangemcnU for Ihcm at other plaoca, in.I the 
OnarUTmaater General to provide tranaportation. 1 hope you will 
w-nd them away oa quickly aa poBniblc, and advise me of their 
rcmovaL ^ ^ HALLECK, Major-Oeneral. 

MalGen. O. B. MoClilias. 

Itla clear that the generalin-cblcf attached »omc weight to the re- 
port received Irom General I'ope, and I waa jumiftcd In aoprnsing 
that the order In regard to the removing the sick conlcmplat d an 
oOenalvc movement rather than a retreat, aa I had no other <lata 
than the telcsrami Jual (riven, from which to form an opinion aa to 
IJielntentioBfi of the government. ,...,.„, 

The followini! iclciiram alrengihened mo In that beller: 

Gcncinl I'or'! again telegraphs that the enemy la renorte<l tj be 
cvacuaUng Klchmond, and falllngbact on Dnnvlllc an.f Lynchhurg. 

I was Influ- 
enced by the neceteliy of po8»e«4ing a Bccu're dcliondie on the (onth 
uf the Jamca, in order to enable me to move on the commnnioiitiona 
of Klchmond in that direction, aa well aa to prevent a icptliiiot of 
midnlglit caiinonadee. ,,.„.,. 

To cirry out General Hallcrk'! Drjl order of Jnly 30, 11 wna nec.^e- 
airy Urat to uain popsesi'ion of Malvern Hill, which win occupied by 
the enemy, apparently in i-oroe little force, ami eontrolied th' direct 
approach to Itichmond. Ite Icmponry occupation, at least, wa« 
I uuatly ncccfftary in the event of a movement upon reterafcura, or 
even tne at.andonment of the Peninsula. General IIooNer. with hie 
ownidlvUlon, and I'icafnnton's cavalry, was therefore directed to 
g iln potfcuion of Malvern Hill on tlie nlfhlof the 2d of AuginU 

lie lallcd to do to, ai the following dispatch recites: 


Drrk'l'!/, Aujuil i, 1S82— lO.iOp. m. 
The movement nnderU-'kcn up the ilver last night failed on ac- 
count of the Incomp.'tency of auilcs. ,,_,_,. 

The prop, r steps have been taken to day to remedy thi« evil, and 
I hope to be re.irty tomorrow night to carry out your mcecslions aa 
to presalng, at Icuat to afconipll..h the lirst tndippencable step. 

O. n. ilcCI.El.L.\N', Maj. Gen. Commanding. 
MaJ.-Oen. nilLECH. C'lmmirn i.nj (.'in(fd .'ilalri Army. 
On the H'.h General Honker was r.inforced by Oei.eral 8edi!Wirk'« 
divlalon, and haviup obtaitied a kiiowle.J^'eof theroada, ho auceeejed 
In turning Malvern Uill, and driving the enemy l,uck towni.l8 
The following is my report of this .^f^llr at the time: 

U*ivE«B llii.!., ><iija»i 6, 1R6J— 1 p. m. 
General Ilooker, nt 5 30 this moniing, nttaeUe.l a vei-y consWeralle 
force of inlanlry Hid .trlillery Btulioped at this p'ace, and carried it 
bandeomely, di"lvin« the enemy towards Newmarket, which is four 
miles distant, and where it Is i.->ld they hav<! a large force. We have 
captured 100 prisoners, killed and wounded several, with a loss oa 
our part of only three killed and eleven wountied ; among the latter, 
two oQlcers. 

I shall prob.tWy remain here to-night, ready to act as clrcumslances 
may require, after the return of my cavalry reconnlssaneea. 

The niafs of the enemy escaped under the cover of a den.»e r.,,:; but 
oar cavalry arc ftiU In pursuit, and I tru»l may succeed in enp- 
turlnK many mere. 

This Is a very a.lvnntacenus poplllon to cover an advance oa Kich- 
mond, ar.d on!yl4\ n.iles distant; and I feel ccr.lidenl that with 
rclnforeem' nl« I wuul.l »i.ireb this army there in live days. 

I this lIl^tallt learn that fevenil brigades of the enemy are four 
miles from here on the Quaker road, tmd 1 have token steps to pre- 
pare to me.-i them. 

OenernI Hooker's dispositions were admirable, and hl« oOlcers and 
men displayed their nsiml ealiiu.iry. 

GKcltuK ii. McC'LEI.l.AN, ifey.-Coi. CVm'n^ 
Ml^.-Qen. H. "W. Hallbcic, t'vm. (/. & Army. 

Malverx- niLl^ AllgltStb. 18«5-Sp. !». 
Since my last dispatch, CoIjirI Averlll has returned IVom a reeon- 
polseanci-. lu the direction of Savage's Htatlon, towards Klchmond. 
Be encountered the 18lh VlaHnia cavalry near White Oak Swamp 
Bridge. eliari,',d and drove lie m some distance towards Richmond, 
captuiii.g >> men aud horses, killing an-1 wounding several 

Uor ti.>.>ps buve advanced (12) tw.lve miles in one direcUon, and 
(17) seveiiuen in another, towards li.cbmond to-day. 

We have *. eured a strong* p o*IUon at Ce/uln's Point, opposite our 
quartermaster's depot, w hi. li will cflVclaally prevent the rebels from 
unlilg artlK. ry hereallir i.gali -t our c nip'S. 

I I, am this evening that iiierc Is n ferce of 30,000 men abont six 
miles balk from this (.oint, on the south hank of the river. What 
Ihelr ob>.ct is I do not knuw, but will keep a sharp lookout on their 

I am seii.ling off sl.-k as rifi )ly as our transports will t-vke them. 
1 am aUo dniiig ev;r. '.':'.r>j !;i .n.v vowcr to carry out y >ur, t'v 
jnah reconm)i»:.ii''-'' - ■ . . -. i .■ '"i. and hop'sonn lotitid 

•at wheth. r the i 
AM true. 

ItsJ.-QeD. Tl. U'. 

To the dUpatcb ul i [■. in., Angust 6, tbe tullowing i 

Wjsui.''nToi<, ..4u;iuf S, 1842—8 «. ik. 
1 have no relnforoemen's to send vou- 

U- \V. UALUECK, ^l^j«r•0^ll^n^. 
MsJor-'Jencrd O. It. McUlkllax. 
And eoon alter the lutiowiiig: 

WAsnixoiOii, AufuH t, ISfll. 
You will Immedl.ttely •.•nd a regiicent of cavalry and several bai- 
tcries of artillery lo bulbsl.le's cun.iKand at Aqula Creek- U Ls 
reported that Jackson is moving nr rti. v^ ith n very large force. 

a. W. llALLiit-'K, Majar-Oeural. 
Major-General G. B. McClbllas. 

On the 4th I bad re« Ived General ILalleck's order of the Sd, (which 
appears below,) directing me to withdraw the army to Aqnia, and on 
the same day sent an earnest protest against it. A few hours before 
this, Generui Hooker had Informed mo that his cavalry pickets re- 
ported lar,:e iwuics of ^t«e erii'my advancing and driving Ihcm in, and 
that he would probatny oe attaeke.l at daybreak. 

Un.ler tli.;se circuin. iinees I had detetmlned to support bim ; but 
as I could not g^-i the ^vl.ole army in position until toe next after- 
noon, I coDcIu'ii'd, upeii liie receipt ot the above telegram from tbe 
Gcneral-iu-Chief, to withdraw General Hooker, that there might be 
the least possible delay in conforming to General Uailocdt's orders. 
1 therefore sent to General Hooker the following letter; 

Hbadqitarters Arut or tbb roTevAe*, 

llrrltlty. August 0, 18«'J— 10 p. •>. 
Mt Dxar Ge:«f.bal: I find Itwiil i.ot oe port^ible to get the whole 

army Into rosltlon t-'- -^ - '"Me to-niun-ow afternoon, which 

will be too late to su ; ' . ... 1 the entire position, should 

the enemy attack in f - a..y break, which there is strong 

rensons to suppose he* i,..- .. .^ -.. .: .i. 

ghcnld we li^ht a general balile at Malvern, It will be neeesaary to 
abandon the whole of our works here, and run the risk of getting 
back here. 

Uuder advices I havo received from Washington, I think it neces- 
sary for you to abandoa the position to-night, gelUog everything 
away before daylight. 

rieaee leave cavalry pirkets at Malv.;ni, with orders to destroy tbe 
Turkey Creek bridge when they are forced back. 

The roads leading into llaxalTs front tiio right shoul.l be strongly 
watched, and Haxatl's at least held by strong cavalry force and somo 
light batteries as long as pofsible. 
1 leave the manner of tl:5 withdrawal entirely to your discretion. 
Please sicnal to the fl>7et when tbe withdrawal Is about completed. 
Keport in-quently to these headquarters. 

General tiumner was ordered up lo support yon, but will haU 
where tills passes liim, an.i will Inform you where he Is. 

OEOKGi; B. McCLKI.LAiH, Major-eaural 
General J. HoOKBR, Otrntnanding at Malvrrn Jiili. 
And the following reply vti.s seni to General Halleok: 

IlBAnqtiARTRns Armt or tbr Potoiiac, 

JirrkcSry, Augult, 18li2— ll;20p. OS. 
Dispatch of to-day received. I h*ve not quite (4,000) lour thooa- 
and cavalry for duty in cavalry division, so that 1 cannot possibly 
spare any more. 

1 really need many moix) than 1 now have to carry out your In- 

The enemy are moving a larje force on Malvern Hill. In view of 
your .lispatehes, and the fact that I cannot p!aee the whole army in 
position before daylm-ak, I have or.l red Hooter to withdraw during 
the iii^ht if it is possible ; if he eaimot do so, 1 must support him. 

Until this matter is developed I cannot send any batteries ; I hope 
I can do so to-morrow if transportation Is on hand. 

I will obey the order as soon aa circumslanceMi permit. My artil- 
lery la none too num^-rous now. 1 have only been able to send ofT 
some (1,*."00) twelve hundred sick. No transportation. There shall 
be no delav that I can avoid. 

GEOI'.GK B. McCI.ELl..\N, .tf.7;or.(;CT/ToI Commanding. 
Ma}or-G.-neral U. W. IIallkck, Commanding U. S. Army. 
Five batteries, with their horse* and equipments eompft'te, were 
embarked oa the 7th and 8th, simultaneously with Gtnei-al Hooker's 
opel aliens upon Malv.-m. 

I dispatched a cnvnlrv- force under Colonel Averlll toward Bavage'a 
Station, to ascertain if the enemy were making any movements to- 
wards our right fl.ank. 

Ho found a rebel cavalry recimenl near tho White Oak Pwamp 
brUlge, and complt-tely routed it, pursuing well towards Bavage's 

These Important prelimirary opt-nttions assisted my preparations 
for the removal of the army to .\cqul.v Ciiiek ; and the sending off 
our s.efc and i^upplies was pushed both day and night as rapidly as 
the means of traiihportati.m permitted. 

On the subject of the wiilidrawal of the army from Hirrison's 
I^Andiiii,;, the lolJowing correspondence passe-d br.-tween th.- G-nerai- 
in-Chlef and myjM.;f, while tlio reconnoissances towards ICicbiuond 
were in progress. 

On the nd ol August I received the following : 

WasuisctoX, Auguill, 1882— 3.4a p.m. 

Tou havo not answered my telegram ol July 3<i, 8 p.m., about the 
r 'moval of your sl.k. Remove them as rapidly as pussiWe, an! tele- 
graph me whe 1 th.y will K' out of yourway. The President wishes 
in anatver aa early as po^aible. 

H. W. HALLKCK, Uajor-Ommt. 

>laJorOereral O. B. McClkllax. 

To wliicb this reply was sent : 


li^rk*i*y. Auguxt 3—11 p. ss. 

Voui lelr;rrain of (2) second Is received. The answer (to disiiatcb 
of July .-.O) wai sent this muixlng. 

We have al>out (12,501) twelve thousand live hundred tick, of 
whotM perhaps (4 OOO) lour thoufund iiilshl make easy mArches. We 
have here the means to liar...port (l,20ii) twelve hundred, and will 
■mbark lo-morrow that number ot the worst eases. Willi all the 
meaniat the .lisposal ol the Medical I>. rector; the remainder could 
be shlppiM in Irom <7) seven lo (10) ten days. 

II is Impossible lor me to de^^ide what cises to Bond off, unless 1 
know wiiat is lo t** dene with this army. 

Were the dls..siroos ine.x-urs of a retreat adopted, all the sick 

who cf.nnnt m 

Bliotild the 

the depots. I 

assumes still ' 

Until I um 1 

r li . I • "ji't fh.iuld lie .Jlspatched by water. 

'. many ot the sick could l)e of service at 
: 1 hero any leugth oi time, tho queetlonj 

. ,s bj h" d.ini'. 1 crniiot act understand- 

^Tv" >/?.' ^cuvf^T' ' '"s'y "' ""' "'." •f'*"^ "" '"" •"* '^- ^' '' "'" '^°''' '"°«" '" '*■"* 

! I..A.N, Mi'j.-OinrraL 

anecot uh ttlt^tti liv ..Ce4ited, 1 cannot bu expected to aecompLUk 
the In view. 


In tho menn timo I tvlll do aU in my power to cany out what I 
ftoncelve to be your wiphes. 

GEO. B. YtcGl.'E'Jjh&.NjXaJor'Gm'.ralCommanainff, 

*iajor-General 11. W. IUlleck, 

Commanding United ^Stales Armij, Washington, L. 0. 

Thomome-Dt I received the instnictions tor roinovmt; the eick, I at 
oiiee gftve the neeespary dii'ectionB for c:iiTying them out. 

"With the small amount of traneportation at h;md,t!ic removal of 
lliQ Bevere cases alona wouUl neccs?rri-lly take scvenil days, and, in 
the mean time, I desirsti Informjition to dctermind what 1 should do 
with the others. 

TIio order required niotoeen.l them ftwnyrtg qiilf^kly as possible, 
and to notify tho Goijeml-in- Chief tvhc.n thct/ were itmov^J, 

Previoo* to the receipt of tha di^pr.teh of the 2d of Aiisust, not 
having been Rdvieed of wliat Ih3 army under my command was ex- 
pected to do, or Tvhlch wfty It wiis to move, if it moved at all, I sent 
(ho following dlepateh : 


Bfi^-C't!/, Ju^ust 3, 1SC2. 

Ih;arof»ei eteamersat Fort Monroo ; are they fori cmovuig my 
nick t If ao, to what extent am I vcquireito go in seudiug them ofi? 
There are not many wlio need go. 

Ab I ara not in tny way infovmeil of tho intentions of the govern- 
mvnt in rrgard to thia army, I am uiiahle to judge what proportion 
Of the 6ick should leav-.* h$\o. and must ask for spocIQc orders. 

<T. 15. McCLKLLAN, Major-Gcucral Commaridivff^ 

Major-Goncral H. W. IIallkck, 

Commandinj b'nu'id Stales Arnn/ TTasJiinplon. 

If the army was to rclveafe to Foit Monroe, it was important that It 
should be DM encumbered with any eick, wounded, or other men who 
mieht at all interfere with its mobility; but if Uie object was to 
operate directly oa Richmond, A-om tho position we then occupied, 
there were many cases of slight sickness whicli would epeediFy bo 
cured, and the paticnta returned to duly. 

Asthes-nvice of ovei7 man wouJd bo impoitatitln the eventofa 
forward offensive movement, I coiieidcrod it to be of the utmost con- 
eequcnce that I should knowwhat was to be done. It was to ascer- 
tain this that I sent the dispatch of 11 p.m. on the Cd, before receiv- 
Uig tb« following telegram : 

■WisniSGTON. Aiujiisi n, 1862— 7.45 p. «, 
■'I have waited most anxiously to learn the roeuit of your forced re- 
connolssance towards Kichraond, and also whether all your sick 
bavo been sent away, and I can get no .inswer to my teles^i-ara. 

It is determined to withdraw your army from "the l^eninsula to 
Aquia Criwk. You will take immcUatc measures to efl'^ct this^ 
coverir^g the movemeut tho best you can. 

lis real object and with Jrawal should be concealed even from youi 
own oflicera. 

Your material and transportation enould he removed firpt. Toti 
will assume control of aU the means of transportation within yonr 
reach, and apply to tlie naval force,^ for all the .is>isiance tbey can 
render yon. You will consult freely with the co:nmniiderof ilieeo 
forces. The entiie esocntionof the movemeut is left to your dia- 
cretton and jii Igmeut. 

You will kavo such forces as you may doom proper at Fort Mon- 
roe, Norfolk, audolher places, which we oconiiv. 

Major-Gena'al Co7nntnnding United States Army. 

Major-General Gbo. B. WoClellan-. 

I proceeded to obey tiiis order with aU possible vapidity, firmly 
Impressed, however, with the conviction that Iho withdrawal of the 
army of the Totomac liom Hanison's landing, where its communi- 
cations had by llie coopoiation of liie gunboute bt-en rendered pcr- 
fcclly secure, would, at ihat time, have the most disaa'roua eflcct 
■upon onr cause. 

I did not, as ihe commander of that army, allow the occasion to 
pass without dielincUyettting forth my views upon tho aubjectto 
tne authorities in the following telcginni: 

Headqtjaktebs Anav op the Totomac, 

Beikdei/f Aitgust 4, lH.Z—VZvt. 

Your telegram of last evenina; is received. I must confeKs that it 
has caused me tho gi-catestpam I ever experienced, forlaracon- 
Tlnced that the order to wlthdr.^.w this army to Ac^iuia creek will 

Svove dieaslrouB to our cause. 1 fear it will bo a fatal blow. Several 
ays avo necessary to complete the preparations for so important a 
movement as thi«, and while they aic iu progress, 1 be^ that, careful 
considcralion may be ^ivcn to my statements. 

Tlii3 army ia now iu csccllcni disciplme and con ^.11 (Ion. "We hold 
a dchouehc en both b.inks of tlu James river, eo that we arc fvea-to 
act in any direction ; and with the assistance of the gunboats, I con- 
sider our I'onimunicaliona as now secure. 

■^We are twenty live (55) miles from Ilichmoud, and are not likely to 
meet the enemy in force eufllcient to light a battle nutil we have 
marched Qii^n (ir,) to eiL'hteen (IS) miles, which brings ns practically 
Bithin ten (10) miles of llichmoud. Our longest line of land Irans- 
/tovtation would be from this point twenty-tlve (25) miles, but with 
Ihe aid, of the guuboals we ran supply the army by water during its 
advance, certainly to within twelve (12) miles of Ulchmonrt. 

At Acqnia creek wc would bo ecvc-nty-Iive (75) milca fi'om Kich- 
mond, with land transportation all the way. 

From here to Fort Monroe is a maich of about Peventy C70) mHes, 
for 1 regard it as imjtracticablo to withdvav. this array and iia mate- 
rioU cicept by land. 

The result of the movement would thus bo a march of one hundred 
Rnd forty-live (145) miles to reach a point now only twentydlvo (20) 
miles distant, and to deprive oureclvos entirely of tne powerful aid of 
the ruiiboats and water transportation. 

Add to this the certain demorali^ition of this army which would 
ensue, the tenlbly deprepeingeftcctupon the people of tho north, and 
the strong probaniliiy that it would induence foie'Ljn powers to re- 
cognize our adversaries; and those appear to meKuni^ient reasons 
to make it my imperative duty to urgo in tiio strongest terms 
alfurdcd by our language that this order may be rescinded, and that 
f\rfromrecalUng thlanimy, it may be promptly reinforced 5o enable 
tt to resume tho oflensive. 

it may ba said thrit thero are no reinforcements available. I 
point Ic'Buroside's force; to that of Pope, not neceseary ton^aintaln 
ft Btrict defoneivo in front of AVaehin-toiiand Harper's Ferry ; to 
those portions of the army of tho west r.ot required for a strict <le- 
fcnslvo there. Here, directly in front or this army, is the heart oT 
tljo veliellion ; it isbevo that ail our resources should bo collected to 
9\.v'.k'.i the blow which will dctermlno the iate of the nation. 

All points of secondary importance elsewiiere should bo abandoned, 
und cvetj* a'.'aiiabio man brongbt here ; a decided victory here, and 
Iho miliTary strcnelh of the rebellion is crushed. Iti uiattere not 
»vjiat pani'il rc^vereori wo may meet with elsewhere ; here is the true 
defence of Wnsliingten; Ilia here, on th« banks oi the James, that 
th:>f:«teof the Umi'ii should be decided. 

Clear iu my co.'ivi:^ti:;:m of right, strong in tho cotsecloupncflolhftl 1 
bavd ever been, and still am, aetuated solely by the love of mj 
countr>', knowing that no ambi'irus or eclUnh motives havo in- 
fluenced me frora~the commencement of this war, I do now, what 1 
never did in my life before, 1 entreat iliiit tliifl oi'der may be 

If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart otey you\ 
orders to the utmost of my power, directing to the movement, ivhich 
I clearly forCFce will be one of tba utmost delicacy cjid difllculLy, 
whatever skill I may possess. "Whatever the i-esult may he— and 
may God grant that I am mistaken in ray forobodiaga— I Ehall at 
least have the Internal satisfaction that I havo written and spoken 
frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avertdisaster 
from my country. 

i\. B. McCLELLAN, Major Ccnn\il Cnmmandhtif. 

Major-General H. W. Ualleok, Commi'ndfu'j Um'ied Sfaies Army. 

Boon after pending thia telogiam, I received the following, in reply 
to mine of 11 p. m. of the 3d. 

Washington, AtiQusii, 1862— 12,45 p. m. 

My telegiam to you o; ytstorday -wiU satisfy you la regard to 
future operations; it wos expected that you would have sent oil' your 
eickj as directed, without waiting to know what were or would be 
the intentions of the (Jovernmcni respecting future movements. 

The President expects that tlie Instructions which were sent yon 
yesterday, with his approval, will bo carried out with all possible 
dispatch and caution. The Quartermaster-General is scndiDg to 
Fort Monroe all the transportation he can collect. 

H. W. HALLECK, irey03*-<?«icr«2. 

Major-General G. B. McCi.ellan. 

To which the following Is my rcplj' : 

Headquarters Arjit op thb Potomio» 

B^.rktlnj, August 5, JS62— 7 a.m. 

Yourteleeram of yeet»-r.lay received, and is being carried out as 
promptly as possible. With the means at my command, no hnnoan 
power could have moved the sick in the time you say you expected 
them to be moved. 

• •♦•** 

GEO. B. McOLKLLAN, Mojoi^GtneraL 
Haj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Com, U. S. Army. 
Myefforts for brining about h change of policy were nnsuccessfol, 
tewill be seen from the following telegram and Ictterroccived by me 
In reply to mine of 12 m. of the 4i h ; 

WAsntsoTOiT, August 5, 1802— 12 m. 
You cannot regret tho order of tlie withdrav/al more than I did the 
necessity of t'lving it. It will not be resclnd'.-d, and yoa will be ex- 

fiected toes-.'cute it with all possible promptncs-s. It isbKlieved that 
t can be dona now without seriouB danrrer. This may not be so, it 
thero should be any delay. I will Wiite you my viewi more fully by 
mall. H. "W. HALLECK, MaJ.-C^n. Co:n, U. ^. Aral/, 

Major-Gcncrci G. B. McClbllas. 

The letter was as follows ; 

Headqcarthrs or the Aniiv, 

^^^as?>ilii^t07l, Au{just C, 1862. 

GN!?mtAL: Tour telegram of yesterday was received thia morning, 
and I immediately telegi-apbed a brief reply, promislos to write you 
more fuily by mail. , , 

' You, genctal, certainly could not havo been mora pahied at receiviDg 
my oruer than i was at tba necessity of i£siiing tt. 1 was advised by 
high ofljcers, iu whosQ judgmeut I bad great confidence, to mako the 
order immrdiately on ray arrival hero, but 1 determined not to do so 
until I couU learn your wishes frcni a personal interview. And even 
after th.U interview 1 tried every means in my power to avoid with- 
drawing your army, and delayed my decision as loug 03 I dared to 
delay it. 

la^uvcyon, general, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but 
one that caused me more anxious thoughts than any otl^or of ray lifia. 
But after full and raatin-oconr-ifleration of all the 2""m and cons, I was 
reluctantly forced to tho conclusion that tho order must bo issued— 
there was to my mind no altoruative. 

Allow me to alkido to a few of the fact;; in the cas?. 

You and yonr ofDcers at cur interview estimated tho enemy's forces in 
and aro;ind Kichmond at two hundred thousiud men. Since then, you 
and others repoittbat they havo received and ere receiving large r&- 
inforccments from the aorlli. General I'opc's Army, covering Wasb- 
icgtc«i, is only about forty thousand. Your eQ'octiva foi'c-> is only about 
ninety tlioueand. You aru thirty miles from P.ichmc-nd, and General 
Poiie eighty or ninety, with tho caemy direct'y between you ready to 
fail with his superior nuinbers upon one or tho other as ho may elect ; 
neither can rcinforco tlio other m of such on stlaclf. 

K Gijneral Pope's army bo diminished to rcinforco yon,*\rashinglon, 
Mivj land, and Pennsylvania wovdd be left uncovcr.3i.t and e::yosed. If 
your force be rcaixcd to strengthen Pope, you would bo too wea&to 
oven hold tho position you cow occupy, sitouM the enemy turn rotind 
and attack you in full force. In ether words, the old Army of the 
I'otomac is split into two paits, wiih tho entire force cf tho enemy 
directly between them. They cannot bo uoitcd by land without ex- 
posing both to destruction, and yot Ihoy masi bu united. To send 
Popes forces by water to the I'eninBula is, under present circumsiancea, 
anr.iitary impossibility, Tiio only altornulive is to send tho forces ea 
tho Peninsula to some poiiit by water, say i'redoricUshuvgh, where the 
two armies can bo united. 

J^t mo now allude to some of the objections which you hivo urged : 
you say that tho witlidrawal from the present position will came the 
ccrtajn demoralization of the ai-my ^ Wuich is uow m e:vC>;lleat dlEClpline 
and condition.'* 

1 cannot umlerstand why a simplcchatigeof position to a new and by 
no means dislautbseo will demoralize an army in excellent dlseiplino, 
unless the cDiCcrs ihenisolves assist iu that demoralization, which I am 
8ali.«ried they will not. 

Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court House 
to your present condition was over thirty miles, but 1 have not heard 
that it dtfiiioralizod your trooiJS, notwitUitaiiLliiig tho severe losses tbcy 
Buslaiuod in cllcctiug it. 

A now bapa on the Rappahanuoct at Frodoricksburgh brings you 
within abnut sixty miles of Richmond, and sectu'es a reiuforceraent of 
forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciiilir.ed troops. 

The chauge with such advantages will, I think, if properly represented 
to your army, encourage rather than demoraiizi your troops. More- 
over you, yourself, suggested that a junc.iou micU*. bo ofTected at York- 
town, but tiiat a flank march across tho iclUiaus would bo more hazard- 
oas than to retire to Fiut Monroe. 

You will remember that Yovktown is two or three milfs further than 
Frederieksburgh Is. Bei^idefi, the latter la between Ulchmond and 
Washington, aii:i coveiii Wasbin.iton from any ntt;ick of tho enemy. 

Tliopohticulfkoct of tiiO wiiltdi'awal may atflrst bo uafavor.D^j ;boi 
I think tho public aro beg uuing to uudcrstaud its necessi'". ind iliat 
they will havo m'li'h mo.'o coi;fi^enco in a united arm/ i:-,iiu in »ts 
6ej'!u-:iled rr;'i.m;^nl3 


But 7(m will reply, wlif not rcUiforce mcbcrtf.aoLbnt Icantirike 
Richmond from uiy present poAiiion t To do ihi*. you ki:), nt our 
Interrlew, th.'xt you required thirty ihousanj Riilitionul tioona. I 
lolJ you that It was Impossible to give you eo M;;iiiy. Vnu jjiially 
thought thftt you ■would Dare*'BomechGnc«'* o5i;uc?c::«j wi:u twenty 
ttioas&od. Uut you afterwards Ulegruphcd mo iliat you would 
reaoire thlrly-fivo lUousand, at the enemy was bclug Urgcly re- 

It your estimate ofthe enemy's strength w; = r requUi- 

tlonwai perfectly reasonable ; bnt it was u Ic to fltl 

it until new troops cotUd bo coUsted and c _ . . h would 

require several weeks. 

To keep your army in Its present position nntU it could be to re- 
inforced would almost destroy it In that climate. 

The months of August and ficptcmber are almost fatal to white* 
who Itvo on that part of James lUver; and even after you received 
tho reinforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce 
Kort Dii-Ung and tho river batteries before you could advanco on 

It is by no meana certain that the reduction of the^c rortlUcaUons 
would not require considerable time— perhaps as much as those at 

This delay might not only bo fatal to the health of your army, bnt 
in the mean time General Tope's forces would be LX])0«ed to the 
heavy blows of the enemy without the alighest hope ol assistance 
from you. 

In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the 
Peninsula to theUappabannock, I mual remark that a lar^c number 
of yonr highest oQiccrB, indeed a majority of those whose opinions 
havij been reported to me, are decidedly In favor of the movement. 
J-^vcn eereral of those who originally advocated the Hue of the Ten- 
iaeula now advise its abandonment. 

I have not inquired, and do not wiah to know, by whftno advice or 
for what reasons tho Army of the I*oloraac was ecparattil iato two 
parts with the enemy between them. I mu^t taku tuingiiaa I Hod 

I find the forces divided, and I wish to nnite them. Only one 
fef.slMe plan has been presented for doing tUs. It' you, or any one 
' ''■' h?.d prcscntcda K*llcr plan, I crtaiuly slioald I'lavc adopted it. 
: oiyour plan* require reiiir*cement9 wiiich it is impossible 
you. Ii is Tcrj- t-afy to aik for rcJnforci.rnenl«, but it is not 
^^ ^M,-y 10 give them wbcn you have no dI«x>QSul:!o troops at your 

I have written vei-y plainly as I understand the case, and I hope 
you will ijivo mo credit for having fully considered the matter, 
although I inay bavc anivcd at very dUTcrent coucliuions from your 

Very rcspcetfully, your obcdlenl sorvnnt, 

n. \V. HALLECK, Cen^yalin-CUi^, 

MaJ.-Gen. G. B. McCi.kllas, Com. <fc., Daktity, To. 

On the «ih I received llie JolloAVing teKgram; 

■Wa-sbisctos, Auffutt 7, 1SC2-I0 a, m. 

You will immediately report- the number of siak sent cCf ince yo'.i 
received my order, the number slill to be shipped, and Iho amount o: 
trar.pporla'lon at y.>ur Ll.-iposid— that i«, the number of pctJioiis thai 
can be carried on all tho vessels which by my order you weru author- 
ized to coir.rul. , 

TL W. HALLECK, Itt^jor-Ccneral. 

MftjorCc-iiTal O. B. McCi.ellas. 

To which X made this reply: 


Au^f.y. 7. ISC-:— 10.40p. m. 

■ to V 'ur (1l«pat::h of 10 C- m. 1 : ■ Ti r :; ilic numbi r 

Tn r. 
ofsi U • . I received yAiir 

8cV(:i ■ ■ Jorty, including; Pi. 

and V. :iio morning. Tl:'-- 

as ncarh :i-» c;.n Iv^ aecortaioed, five it; 
The einl>iifcation of five batlcrk-s ( 
T"",-'in«, &c., required most of our a\ 
All ti).; transports that cau a 
will be here to 


i tonight 

■-. ippcd ie, 


:'i their horses, 

\ ■< ]>\ the feny- 

l to ! ;> j''.iu..- have been 

n \>w cvenim;. t'olontd InjivIIa 

i_to luc that there are no tiar^sjuirts now avaUa?*!!' lor cavalry, 

I bo ob- 

I up; they 
1 to luc tha 
HIM Aviil not h'' fir two or three dav(<. Ab soon us thty can 
talne 1 1 i-hiill send oft' the First New'Vork cavalry. 

Aft'^r thy transports with sick and wonnficd hive returned, in- 
clu'Hng some heavy-draft steamers at Kort M'lnroe 1 !ir.l c;:Mfioi come 
to this point, we can transport tw.-nty-live thousand m;:a ut a time. 
We have some propeller* hero, but they are laden with eommissary 
supplies and are not av.illable. 

Tho transports now employed in transporting sick and wounded 

will carr>- 1:;,000 weii infantry soldiers. Thoso at Fort Monroe, and 

^' ' -^ U-avy draft to eom-r hero, will cairy 8,000 or 10,000 infanlr^-. 

d of the largest ftcamers hr;ve bcca usod for iransporllng 

ra of war, and have only become availa'jlo for the sick 

OHOKGE B. lie Ch^hhA'S. Major- General 
Maj.-Gen. n.W. Him.eck, Com. IT. S. Army. 
The report of my chief qua; tcrmaster upon the subject la ai 
follows : 

TTciDQtriKTsns of rna Armt or thb roToiiio, 

O^ar/tAlV/Ori.' - V ;. ,r /',::,f.^^t£aud\rtff. ^1:^.7.1582. 

Qxxeril: I hav n the papers herewith which 

you sent mc, with t 

M'caro cmlaiki' , '^-i^- win- iii.vr h^ i-^ « hnt- 

g-ve, &-•.. which rcquiit* liio <1- ,t«, 

except the ferryboats. Them'- ..f 

our Urcf*>t transport vessels, wl . ^ . , ■_ _ . -.9 

men. iJeftldes, tnerc are eome heavy ,.:r»u'tti«>araers at Fort Monr<^ 
that cannot come to this point, but which can cany 8,0t>0 or 10,000 

I have ordered all up here that can p. seen d tn this d.»pot, TIfy 
will be hero to-morrow evenlnj?. As it now i?, ofter tho di-.i.iis 
already made, we cannot tiaD:apoit from this place mora tuan 5,000 

There arc no transjMrts nowavaUable for cavalry. From and after 
to-moirow, If the vessels ariive, 1 could tran*;p:M' 10 roT irfn-nv. 
In two or three days .a rf'ln.cnt of cr.vntry car . ; * ; 

you w.ii:, and ship from VL.kioun o: >'oit i]' 
woundi'.; transport* are ai ni> il c; ■^:;i. w.-r;^ t 
lime. Tronutiihcr that can Go iruuspoiledlscomm^-.-:,*. on L;.vum- 
ai.inccs r. f-jired to. 

Most of the propellers licro are laden with commissary or other 
cupiUes, and mnst of tho tugs aio neccssAry to tow off sail crafl aUo 
laden with supplies. 

lata, very resp-' '.fuKv, vonr mot ohodk-nt ncrvaot, 

itrFL;^' IKUALLS, V/,i^ Quaritrmmikr. 

Oencrat E. B. UAaor, CUu/fj Siaj}'. 

Oa ibc Olb 1 received tbis u^^^auh : 

WxiUiSGxov, ^H^Msf 9. 18<&*12.4&p. m. 
tam oTthcowtiKm tbat Uiccnniiy 18 miK^tug h* forect la ironi cf 

I (;..n^-, . n .,^. _ 1...... I, QQj j^i |jg cxi>ect« to crush them and 


i.ts iDStantly to Acq'iia creek. 

1^-- .^ .^ ^^ >.•• ,K.^^. uAosix)rtal:«Qat your diS|)oeal, your delay 

13 uul sausfaciory. iou mu^i move bitb ah tio^.- l>:o celerity. 

U. vr. M^UX.^, Major GtneraL 
Mi^or General G. B. UcClellah. 
To wtijcb I Mol the fudowiDg reply : 

HRAOttcAnva? Arkt or tna Potoxac, 

ji-.i ;>„ .1--.-.M0, 18G2— fi«.m. 
Tclc^rjira of yesterday received, : ui lo Buroside took 

ibe hiBiavaiLil'Ie traiisport yestcrd.v. : .,"ush have since ar- 

rived to Eiiip one rLg.mont of cavahy : _ ... . i„^ uci. are being em- 
barked as rdpidly as possible. TUe.e Uila bciu no unnecessary delay, 
03 you asscil— not ao hour's— but everything has been and is being 
pushed as rapidly as poasible to carry out your orders. 

G. B. McCLEuair, ilajor Gtneral CommandinQ. 
MaJorGeneral B. W. Ballcck, Ccmmandtng V. S. Amy. 
The follovriug report, made OD toe Bime day by ths olQcer then to 
chargo of the iratu>pori8, exposes the ujc&tjce of tho remark in the dia- 
patcb of the general m-chlef, that, "couEideriug the amoual of IrsnsiKMr- 
taUOD at your dispoeal your delay is not satisfaclory." 

AssuTAiiT ljCARTBiui.i3TBa'aiirnci, Arut or titb Potomio. 

Jiirriion't LandinQ, Vtrjinui, AugratlO.iiVl. 
Colooel Inealls, being himself ill, has requested me to telegraph to yov 
ccnceroinj; itie £tato and capacity of tho transports now here. On the 
night of the Slh 1 diSpaUbed eleven steamers, prmcipally email «oee. 
andsjcscboooerp, flveballcnea of bcavy horse artillery, none or 
which bavoyct returaed. 

Kcqmsitiou l3 made this morning for transportation of one thousand 
cavaU-y to Acquia creek. All the schocners that liad been chartered for 
carrying boiecs bavo been long sinco discharged, or changed into freigbt 

A largo prorc^-tltQ of the ftcamsrs now here are still loaded with 
stores, or . . jicrvtce engaged ia removiog tbe 

sick. T d cavalry tuitay will take all tb« 

availabl . i i . ■ ;;a^ei In i'.'> f:r-. .c->of ibeliarbor. 

These ateain/rs -■ ! t t.ikc a lar^o number t : aare not well 

adapted to tbecari/ing cf hordes, and mucl i jst. Several 

steamers are exi>*cl'.d hero today, and \ . .ugEchooners 

rapi'lly ; nio:-t of tbescare tot chartered, but arc bc-Dg taken for tbe 
service i\ HI'-' d, at same rates of pay as other chartered schooners. 
If you coull t aa.-;>'>a morcsneeJy rcturaof tbe stoAmcrs sent avay from 
here, it wouM fac iiiiaie matters. C. G. SAWIKLLK, 

O'^.'itn and AuislarU-QuarterouuUr, commanding DtpoL 
CeacralM. C. Meics 

Q.iarU)Tnaiiir-G!neTGX Unit-Kt S (fUi Amy, WatJiin^fion, 
Onr wharf ;ac;l;tic5 at Harrison's Lindiog wero very limited, admit- 
ting but few vcs?i'3 fit one time. These wore coniia':;i'ly m use as loof 
as thcfc \ ~.M, and (ho cflicer3 cl the medical and 

quartern . with all the available forces, were iaces- 

sautlyr , .^i m GfflbArlciiig and eendug off tho tick 

men, tii-'; , r.:i ; i.--^a.r ii. 

KDtw;Uo:ai;.;i!.s tr:e repeated representsllons I made to tho general- 
la*Cbicr that Sdcb t7cre the facts, on the lOtU I received the following : 
VisnixOTOK, AvffVLSt 10, 1862— 12 p. m. 
The CDcray is crossing the Rapirlna in largo force. They are Hgbtiog 
General roi>c to-day ; there must bo no furtbcr delay m your move- 
ments ; that which has already occurred was CDlirciy unexpected, axul 
must bo £a'.:'-ric t nly explained. Let not a mom^Dt's time be lost, and 
tcl'*5raph mo ilaiiy what progress yoa have ma le >n executing the order 
tot 'Atiirr r your tioopg. 11. W. 11A1X£CK, Major-Gaterol. 

ItJjor GeaorAlG. B. McClbllas. 
To which 1 scut this reply : 

HsAnqrARTiBS Aaw or -mi Potomac, 

BtrUUy, AmquU 10, 1S02— 11.30p. M. 
Yonr dispatch of to day is received. 1 assure yoa again that there baa 

not been ■.- •' ^-iry delny in carrying out your orders. 

You ai ring under some great mi£takeas to tbe amonnt 

of trails, .i'jlehore. 

I bavc 1 M > w. » to tbo utmost In gcttlog off oar sick, and tbe 
troops yo.i ordered to BurnBide. 

Colonel lufialts has more than once icformcl the Qiurtormaster-Geo- 
eralof tho cunditioM of our water trausportat.on. From the fact that 
you directed mo to keep the order sccrtt, 1 look It for granted Uut you 
would t.iko the fil..*ps necessary to provide the rtquicite tracsporlatioci. 

A lar^'^ number or truosports for all arms of service, and for vragoM, 
Ebould at once be sent lo Yorktowa and Fort Monroe. 

1 shall be ready to move tbe whole army by land the moment tba 
sick are Jsjxvsed of. You may be sure that not au hour's delay will oc- 
cur that can bo avoided. I fear yoa do not realize the ditUcaliy of tbe 
oiK-raliou propc«ed, 

Tbe ri';t of cavalry far Burnsldo has been In course of embarka- 
tion today RtiJ to-nigbl ; (10) ten tteainers were required for the pur- 
pose ; (1,*<:£S) twclre hundred and Uny-tight sick loaded to-day and to* 

Our mesne exhausted, except one vessel returning to Fort Monroe Im 
themoruiug,wb:ch will take eome (500) flee hundred cases of sligbC 

Tho pre? 'nt moment U probably not t'le proper one for me to refer to 
the uouec'.-sary, Lar&h, and unjtut touo of your tclognuns of late. It 
wiU, bjwuvcr, u^ke no oifTerence to my (>ni<:i&l actiou. 

G. a McCLELLAX, Major GmeraX Conutanduip. 
M:iJ'^r General H. W. IliLLtnr, CVmmandwi^ V. H. Anny. 
Ou tbu eleventh tbtS report wus made : 

fit:.4r^L'.^nTK£.<i Aamr or thk PoroMsc, 

Ji'rk>:lrif, August II, lb6-— II ZO f. m. 
Tbe cnbark^tkni of (850) cii;ht bunorcd and Oi'ty cavalry, ad (l| 
oho h. •■.U: V'. iufautry will be cunipleled by (J) I'wo o'clock la IBt 
morn 1 ^ ; (^'^O) live buudred Bick wcro erob^irkcil todiy. Aoctbtv 
v^ss-l arnvfvl todght, and (CCW) £.x htjnJfpl more t^ck are bow 
beio; tnl^-lrk<vI. 1 ahll liavo some (4,00^ >) h>ur itjousAcd sick to d!t* 
pes; of. Yo i liavo beca greaiiy malcu as lu tbo aimjuutof traajporli- 
t.'P .-It my il -[•■'.-al. 

> ' to tb?ir utm '': . .,• *ior:s, and others Indil* 

' ice here, luv t'l >uj as avutiablo for 

,'. I well. 1 a:. . .^U ihAl cao l>{^ uoluaded at 

I'j.l ^.i.i;kl lo havo UiL-m il'.jlu u^iv. 1 re^ieai Uiat I have lost no 

timo in carr>ing oal ordera 

G. B. McCLH.I..* V. M>fjbrGeneral Cotnutandin;;. 
Mfti r noii. :a^ II. W. Hailk'k. C-fAmi-tiin V. A Army. 
On i)i>- 1 .iai<? d.iy I rt-ccived tile luUuWiug from tb« quartermaster lo 
charge <al Ihu dc^ut : 
Harri$OH'§ landing, August II. \dfi2. 
COI.ONFI. : In rcMy to the couimuuicatioD irom General Marcy. 


wbii't: WAS ref«.'iTcd to ms by you, I b:ive to slat« lli;i; ilu-i-.- ;H'' ^i nv ' 
in ihi^- harbor no di;.-!. usable UanKimrts not alivaily di'iailod, fjlbcr 
l-.r the nse of the hospital ilepurtmeut, for the Irnnsjiortation ol'liu- Ist 
N. Y. Cavalry, or for the necesf^ary sprvice in the hiirbor. I thin'.i tlio 
Bleamers lor.dinfr nud to bf loaded with cavalry could take in HtMitinn 
three tlious;inJ infantry. These boats are, however, directed lo leave 
as fuit a-f lluy ai-e loaded; some have already started. The embar- 
kation of this cavalry regiment is poin^ on very slowly, and it is not in 
my iiowcr to hurry the matter, altbongU I have had several agints of 
the department and one coromissioued oflicer at the wharf, to render 
all the assistance possible. The entire army is this morning turning 
in, to bo stored on vessels, knapsacks, oflicers' baggage, and other 
snrplu;^ property, and with our limited wharf facilities it is iDiposaibie, 
unless the regular iasues of forage, &c,, are suspended, to avoid great 
coufuaioa and delay with what is already ordered to be done. Of 
courue, if any infantry ia ordered to embark on theso cavah'y trans- 
ports, the confusion and difficulties will bo increased. 

I know of no boats that may be expected hero to day, except the 
South America and Fauny Cadwallader, a propeller which was or- 
dered lo be fcent back from Fort Jlouroe. 

The tran-^ports with the artillery left for Acquia creek on tho 
night of the Stb aud the morumg of the 9th. They were ordered to re- 
tiu'n immediately. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant 

' C. a .-SAWTELLr., 

Captain and A. Q. M., commanding DtpoU 
Lieut. Colonel RuFUS Isgalls, 

A. D. C. and Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac 

On ihc 12Ui 1 received the following :— 

WjsniscTo:?, Avgnst 13, 1SG2— 12 m, 

TheQunrterroftsterGeneral Informs me nearly every available (i' 
vessel ill the coaulrv is now under Tour control. To send more from rhilauci- 
phia, Ballimure. and New York, would interfere ivilh the tr-iiispurtalion of 
army safn)lies. and break up the channel of travel by which we are to brina 
forward Uic new troops. Burnside moved nearly thirteen tliMuaaiid (13,IHH)> 
troops to Acquia Creek in less lliau two (2) days, and his transpurls were ini- 
metlJatelr sent hack to you. All vessels In the James River arid ibe i^lu-sa- 
peakc liiiy were placed at yinir disposal, and it w'as supposed Ihul (S) eight or 
(10) ten tlionsnud tif your men could be transported daily. 

In addition to steamers, there is a largo fleet of sailing vessels which could 
be used as iraiisnorts. 

Tbebulkof vour material on shore, it -was thought, could hesentto For- 
Monroe, covered by ilul part of the Army whi'h could not get water trnuspor- 
Uuion. Such were the views of tlie Government here ; perhaps we were mis- 
informed as to the facts. If so, the delay could be explained. Xdtliiiii; iu my 
telegram was intentionally harsh pr unjust, but the delay was so uuexpecled 
that an fxplanallon was required. There has been, and is, the most urgent 
necessitj' tor chspatch, and not a single momeni must be lost ingetuusuddi- 
tioaal troops in from uf Waahiagtou. 

H- W. KALI.ECK. Major-Geneiol. 

Major-General G. B. McCleixas. 

I telegraphed the folloiving reply:— 


I^vr'.rley. AuyuH IL', 1'^<.;J— 11 p. m. 
Your dispatch of noon to-day received. It is positivelj' the fjci that no more 
men could have been embarknd hence than have gone, and tlwt uo nimeti-s- 
eary delay has occurred. Helore your orders were received, t;oloael logails 
directed nil aviiilabiii vessels lo come from Monroe. Oflicers have bi-en sent 
to t.ake personal direction. Have heard noiliiiij; here of liurnside's tlL-ei. 

There are some vessels at .Monroe — such us Atlantic and Baltic — wlii*;h draw 
too much to come here. Hospital accommodations exhausted this side New 
York. Propose filling Atlantic and Baltic with serious cases, lor New York, 
and to encamp sli£;ht cases (or the present at Monroe. In this way can pro- 
bably get ofTihe fJ.iUU) tbirly-four hundred sick, still on hand, by day alter lu- 
tnorrow niqht. 

I am siue that you have been misinformed as to the availabiUty of vessels on 
hand. We cannot use heavily-loaded supply vessels for troops or animals, 
and such constitute the mass of those here, which have been represented to 
you as capable of transnorting this Army. 

I fear you ^vi]l lind very great delay in embarking troops and material at 
Yorktown and Monroe, both from waiit of vessels and of facilities of embarka- 
tion ; at least two additional wharves sbould at once be built at each placti. 1 
ordered two at the latter some (2) two weeks ago, but you couutermuuded the 

I learn that wharf aceommodatlona at Acquia are altogether iuadequate for 
landing troniis aud supphes lo any large extent. Kot an hour should be lust in 
remediius this. 

Great d^-Uy will ensue there from shallow water. You will find a vast defi- 
ciency in horse transports. We had nearly two hundred when we came here ; 
I learn of only (2lI) twenty provided now ; they carry about (5LI) horses each. 
More hospital accoramodirtions should be jirovided. We are much impeded 
here, because our whnrves are used night and day to land current supplies. 
At Mouro'; asimdar difiicully will occur. 

With rH the facilities at Alexandria and Washington, (G) six weeks about 
were occupied in embarking this Army aud its material. 

Burnside's troops are not a fair criterion for rate of embarkation. All his 
means were in baud, his outfit especially prepared lor the purpose, aud his 
men hi\bituated lo the oiovenient. 

There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufactjure vessels. I 
state these dilTicnliies from experience, and becauseit appears to me thjdv.e 
have been lately working at cross purposes, because you have not bt-i-it i>ro- 
perly informed bv those around you, who ought to know Uie inbercni diiiicul- 
Ues of such an undertaking. It la not possible for any one to place this Army 
where vou wish it, ready to move, in le^ than a mouth. 

If Washington is in danger now. Uiis Army can scarcely arrive in tirnc to 
save it ; It ia in much better position to do so from here than from Acipiia. 

Our material can only be saved by using the whole Army to cover it. if we 
are pressed. If sensibly weakened by deiachments, the result nii:jhL be the 
lo6s of much material and many men. i will be at the telesrai'b niiicn to-mor- 
row morning. G. U. McCLBLLAN, Major -Gcneruf. 
>Iajur-(JeneralH. W. Ualleck, WafJiinjf>,n, D. C. 

To the reasons given in tho foregoing dispaicli, to show why General 
5urns:uc's movement from Fort Monroe was not a fair critcrioa for our 
operations, the following may bo added :— 
He wa3 not encumbered by cither sick or wounded men. 
He ha 1 no cavalry, artillery, wagons, or teams. His force consisted 
of infantry alone, with a few ambulances and omcers' horses. 

His baggage was already on tbo transports, where it had remained 
since his arrival from Nortli Carolina, aad his men bad only to resume 
Iheir places on board. 

The cavalry and artillery mentioned in my dispatches of the 7th, lOtb, 
and nth, were sent to supply bis total dcacioncy in those arms. 

I may also repeat that the vessels used by Genera! Durusidc bad not 
returned from Acquia creek when tho Army left Harrison's bar. 

It wdl be seen by tho concluiling paragraph of the foregoing dispatch 
that, in order to havo a more direct, speedy, and full os]ilanation of the 
coDoilion of affairs in the Army than I could by sondingasinsle dispatch 
by steamer to the nearest t-ilcgraph office at Jamestown island, some 
seventy miles distant, and wailing ten hours for a reply, 1 propeacU to 
go ia person to the oliico. Thus I did. 

On my arrival at Jamcsiowii island, there was an interrnpt-mi in the 
electrjc current, which rendered it necessary for mo to coniiuue on lo 
Fori Monroe, and across the Chesapeake bay to Cherry Stone inlet, ou 
the ''t-nslern shore," where I arrival lato in the eyening, and Immo- 
diately 8cut the annexed dispatches 

Plensc come to e/Ece ; wish to talk to you. nil r. ^ws frtmi Pope? 

G. IJ. McV;Lb."LLAN, Major -GtnfiXtt. 

Mtjor-Gencral H. W. IlALLt;cK, Wttsfiiiujtr.n. 

CnEitRY Stone Inlrt. AugtrntA^, 1862— 12..W a. m. 

SLurieJ to Jamestown tlaml lo tr»lk with > on ; found cable broken and 
came hern. I'li-asn read my long teh::;riim. (Sr-i: above dispatch of August 
111. II p. h.) All quiet at citmp. Kneiuy burned wharves at City I'oint yes- 
terdiiv. Nn rebel pickets within eithl (!>) inlles of t'ogfiln'.-i point yestt- iday. 

Ki<-lii»oiid prisoners slate that large force with gnus lelt RicLoiond uorlh- 
vai'd on tiuuday. 

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major ■Gmeral 

Major-i General H. W. Halleck, Wa.'iJiiiii/ton. 

To which tho following reply vfan received : 

Wasiiingto-n. AvQ}ffit U, 1S52— V-iOa. nt. 

I have read your dispatch. There is no clu'ingft of plana. Von will send up 
your iion|is as" rapidly as possible. There is no diUicuUy in lauding tlifm. Ac- 
citrdiii;; \<> your own accounts, there is nodillicuity In witbdrawlug your forces. 
Do 80 with all poastbie rapidity. 

H. W. HALLECK, Major ^GeneraL 

Major-General G. B. McClellan. 

Boloro i bad time to decipher and reply to this dispatch, tho telegraph 
operator in Washington informed me that General Ualleck had gone out 
of the office immediaKily after writing this dispatch, without leavaig any 
Intimation Oi' the fact for me, or waiting for any further information as 
to the object of my journey across the bay. As there was no possibility 
of other communication with him at that time, I sent the following dis- 
patch, aud returned to Harrison's landmg : 

Cheekt Stone I.slet, Auffust M. 1S62 — l.iO a. m. 

Tour orders will be obeyed. I return at once. I had hoped to have had a 
longer and fuller conversation with you. after travfllin;:; so far for the purpose. 
G. B. MdCl.hLLAH , ilajor-Geiicrat. 

Major Cieiieral II. W. Ualleck, Wa.i7iington, D. C. 

On the 14ib and loth, and before we had been able to embark all our 
Bick men, two Army corps were put in motion towards Fort Monroe. 
T bia was reported in the annexed dispatch : 
• Headquarters Armt of tob Potokac. 

Berhdq/, Au;jua H, 1S62— II p. m. 

Movement has commenced by land and water. Alt sick will be away to- 
morrow ni^ht. Kvervlbiug being done to carry out your orders. I don't like 
Jackson's movements; he will suddenly appear when least expected. Will 
telegraph fuiiy aad understandhigly in the morning. 

G. B. Mccr.ELLAN, Major-SeneraL 

Major-Gcnera.1 H. W. Halleck, Washinjlont D. C 

The phrase " movement has commenced," it need not be rcraarkcdp 
referred obviously to the movement of tho main army, after com- 
pleting the necessary preliminary movements of the sick, Ac, Ac. 

The pervergion ot the term, to which the Genoral-in-Chiel gaw fit 
to give currency in a letter to the Secretary of War, should have been 
here rendered impogsibleby the dispatches which precede this of the 
14th, which show iliat the movement really begun immediately after 
the receipt of the order of Aogust 4th. 

The progress made in the movement on the 15lh was reported in 
the following dispatches : 


Aitn.\^> 1^62— 12 m. 
' Cblonel Tn^nils Ibis moment reporls that after embarkmg the remaining 
brigade of McChU's division, v.ith the sick, who arc tou&lautly accumulatiug, 
the truus|Mirts uov.- disposable will be all ci-iismned. 

Tvvouf my army corps marched last ni-lil and this morning tn, route for 
yorktowu— uue D.i Jone's Bridge, aud the olh-u- via Barrett's Fevry, where 
we have a pontoon bridge. The other corps will be pushed forward as fast as 
the roiulsari^ clear, aud I hope before tomorrow morning to have the entiie 
army in motion. , . . . • 

A report iust been received from my pickets that the enemy m f^rce is 
idvancmg on lis from the Ohickahominy, but I do not credit it; shaUkaow 
lOon. Should auv more uansjiorU arrive here belbre my departure, and the 
enemy do not sho'w such a force in our front as to require jill the IiooijS I have 
remaininc to insure the safely of the land movement with its imu3eui>e train, I 
thallseadevcrymanby vvater thalU-ansports wiUcarry. ., , , „ 

G. B. Moi'LELLAN, jrajV-ffe/ierat. 

Maior-Genei-al H. W. HAiXEca, Com. U. i<. Annj/. 


Berhd,.->l. A>i'j. l.-J. litJJ— 1 . 30 p. m. 
The advanced corps and trains are fairly started. I ieara nothing more in 
relation to reported atlvance ol rebels riu Junes* Bridge. SliaU push lh« 
movement as 1 at idly as possible. „„., ^, -,,.„., . « > 

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major -GeneraL 
Maior-Gencral U. W. Halleck, Wmlnng^on, D, C. 

HcAnaoAttTBiis Akut of thb Potomac, 

Btrkdty. Aug. 15, IStiJ— lU p. m, 
CO'"^:n's Point is abandoned. The whole of Md.'all's division, w Itli its artil- 
lery, is now cii route lor Burnslde. We have not yet traDsporliiUou siUUcient 
for our sick. I hope we will get it to-morrow. , , , . 

Forler is across tbi: Chifkahorainy, near its month, with his wagons and 
reserve cnillery. Hciiuzelmau at Jones' Bridge with a portion of his corps. 
They will all be up by morning. . , , , . . .l 

AvcruU's cavalry on the other side. AH quiet thus far. I cannot get the 
last of the wagons as lar as Charles City Court Uyuse before some Ume tu-mor- 

I am hurry iQg matters with the utmost rapidity possible. Wagons wiU move 

*^^^'^*' G. B. McCLELLAX. Major-Gmeral. 

Major-Ceneral IT. W. Halleck, Wa^hin^ton, D. C. 

After the commencement of the movement, it was continued with 
the utmost rapidity, until all the troops and material were en rovlf 
both bv land and water, on the morning of the 16th. 

Late* in the afternoon of that day, when the last man had disap- 
peared from the deserted camps, I followedwith my personal staff in 
the track of the Grand Army of the Totomac ; biddiug farewell to the 
scenes still covered with the marks of its presence, and to be 
forever memorable in history as the vicinity of ita most brilliant 

uiouth'of'lhe ciu^ckahominy/and' throw across the nver at that point 
a pontoon bridge. Tliis was executed promptly and satistactorlly 
under the cover of gunboats ; and an escotlent bridge of about two 
thousand feet in length was ready for tho first arrival of troops. 

The greater part of the army, with artillery, wagon trains, &c., 
crossed it rapidly, and in perfect order and s.ifety, so that on the night 
of the 17lh everything was acro.^8 tho Chickahoininy, except the rear- 
guard, which crossed early on the morning of tho 18th, when the 
pontoon bridge was immediately removed. 

Ueneral Torlor's corps, which was tho first to march from Har- 
rison'.-* Landing, had been pushed forward rapidly, aud on the 16tb 
reached WilliumBburg, where I had directed him to halt until the 
entire army was across the Chickahominy. 

On his arrival at Wiliiamaburg, however, hercceivrd an interocpleo 
leltor which led to the btllcf that General Tope wotiM have to con- 
tend iUaiust a very heavy force then in his front. General Forter. 
thereloro very properly took the responsibility of continuing hu 
march directly on to Newport News, which jihico he reached on the 
mortiinz of the ISth of August, having marched hi* corps eixty mUe& 
iu tho short period of three days aud one night, hulling one day at U.€ 
crossing of the Chickahominy. % 

Tiie cinbavkaiion of this corps commenced as soon as M-anapc^ 

I'rcvious to the departure of the troopB, I had directed Captain 
uane, of the engineer corps, to proceed to Barrett's Ferry, near the 

CnF.cRTSro>-E..4i,'jurf 13, 1362-11.30 p.m. ^' ^^^^^ ready, and oa the 20th it b:id all failed for Aquia Creek. 1 

•luitle Uie foIlowlDg report f 

Rvaivthinr Isrtmo'nd Irou. 


y THE PornMAC. 
-H'/ff. 17. .!» 2— .!«.■!. 
^ ^- _4^ i il^, Ko [iroifcrty ncr 

I oorj.! ta»tWim«m»burjf with all ft* wa^rtosan.! Oi<* r^jerro 

■ -he Utter before ihiabour. 

11 Vridcn b<!r<*, nnJ are 

«1 cnllrf ly accHre unUl I bivo tlie whol« ormy bfyouU (he 
< I niil Uicu b«;;lii to forwarU troojia bjr w.ucr na fiut &» u&iu- 

por»;U.>j:. ^<.. ti.lU. 

_ C. B. McCLSI.I.AM. VaiorGaunxtOmt. 

Maj.Oeo. H. W. niiXECK. Ow-i. T. & A., ».i/Ai"7(o/i. i». Ci 

On the lS;h and 10:h our mftrcb wai cuniiiiucd to WiUinmaburg 
and Yorktown, and on ihc 20Lh th^ remainder crihcaroiy wa« icaJy 
to cinbaik al Vorktown, Kortroea Monroe, aoJ Newport Xcw»*. 

Tlio muvemcnt of the main bod v of tho army on this nimcli w»» 
covered by Uoncral Flcat'Onton with his cavalry and borne ariillcry. 
That (iinp^r remained at Ilaxill'a unlil the army had p-***^'*! Ohailea 
City Court Houic. wht-n he gradually fell lack, pioLiiit: up tli.' *trag- 
•<lfr« an he procteued, and crossed Uie bridge o\ i-r the Cliiviiiliomlny, 
filur llio main body bad marched toward* WuliumBburj;. IIIh iroona 
were lb- Uii to cross tho bridge, and ho dCBurvca t^oai credit lor the 
manner in wbicli he performed this duty. 

General Averill did a almilnr service, In tho same aatlf factory way. 
Id coverini; the march ol the Gd corps. 

Ae liie campuign on the I'cninsuia termlnalM here, I cannot eloM 
thin pail of my report wlthont (tivlng an t xitr.-.-Hion of my sincere' 
thanks and Rraitlude lo the ofllcera and men whom I haU Ibc honor 
to command. 

From tbc commencement to the termination of this most ardnon* 
campaik:n. the Army of the Potomac alwayeevinced tbc moat perfect 
ftubordmaiion, zeal, and alacrity in the peiformanco of all tbc doUca 
required ol it. 

The amount ofseverc tabor accomplished by this army In the con- 
irtraction of entrenchments, roads, bridges, &c. waa enormous; yet 
all the work was performed with the most gratifying cheerfulness and 
devotion xc ,hc interests of the 8er\icc * 

DarlniT the campaign teu severely contested and sanguinary bnltlrs 
had been fonyht, tweides numerous smaller entraytmenls. In which 
the troopft exlubllud the most determined ettthuslusm and braverj-. 
They submitted to exposure, sickness, and even death, without a 
marmnr. Indeed, they had become vttemns in thrir coupiry'e 
cause, and richly deserved the warm comraendatlon of Ibe bo\ em- 

It was in view of these facts that this seemed to mean appropriate 
occasion for the Oeneralln-Chief to civo, in general orders, some ar>- 
prcciattvo esprc^Kion of tho aervicea of iho army while upon 
the Peninsula. Accordingly, on tho 18th I sent him the foUowiOK 


A '!■! t • [ \r., 1 -<■ J— 1 1 n. m. 

Plcasti »ny a klnrt vrnrd to myarmT that I c^n rn-..^.- lo lUem tii pr irral 
enlers In rPfnH to their condnct a; Yr^iktown, Wiilu-.mstiurp. West lo-nL 
IJaiiover Touri HotiRe, anj on the ChlctHhoniiny, as w ell as lu rc^rtird to ibe 
(7) Bevcn ii.i>an.>ri iheroccnl rrtrcat, 

NoMHR Ilia ever said tmyihiiic to cheer thrm but mvse'if. Pay notWnpahont 
nn;. M^r(-:y Rive my men and oaic?ra credit for wliiii they have done. It will 
do jia 1.. 1 h Rcoi. nod ulU airenxtlien you m.irh w.ih liiem if von Iwriea 
)i3ti(laom<) orilcr w them in re^ai-d to what tliey kAvd accomuUaLcd. 'ibev 
deaervuiL ' 

„ „ .„ „, 0. B. McCLSLLAN.Jf^VorffMfrat 

SlRjor ficncral lUucCK. TTiu^itn^on. A c. 

As no reply wiit* received to this communication, and no order wae 
issRod by the Ceneralin-Ohief, I conclude that suggestion did not 
m^^ei l>i« a;<pi-«i<<ition. 

All ihoi-tTnonneland material of the army bad been Iransferred 
frorr Harrison's Landing to the difierent poiTits of embaikallon in 
the very brh-f period of live davs without the Bhghtcf t low or d;uniii{e. 
Porter's troops piilcd from Newport News on the 19th ami iJOth. 
Heinlxelin tn'n corps ealleJ from Yoritown on theUUt. On that day 
I received lb© following tciegmm irom the Gen ralinChii f: 

I,sav(» siKh K«rr;s/inR In Forlrcsa Monroe, YorkLo.\ :i, .Cc. un \n\ ni.i> deem 
prop-r. TJicy will ue replaced l-y ncwiroojjsas raiyidlv ;i» po.>ilu; 

Tlie loreirsuf Itrir.-j-tidi: njj Tope are hard jmsheJ, luui i cauiro ui 
u you can bend IL Come youraclf aa aoon ua you can. 

iiyail [n»',-in^aeeth«t the Irooms'^Dt have itlruiy ofnm'nunUinu. We liave 
Pili-T'' I "''^ **' supply ibeoi. >iorfOver. Ui?y m«y have ut Vi^»\. as booii m 


M:S)or Gcuotftl U. W. lUurci;. fTojA/fi^n, U.C. ' ■r' 

lliurhjviKTK'rs ar^t of t-t Potomac. 
C. i^."7;5?.r'?I ' ■ 'r?rktoJn'ii4 

• ■' ■"■ ■■■" ■' ' " . Timo!Ut#Iy lo 

(T'- ■.r„.nce4 

*■'' t.nnJrod 

•"', -.•■1 ta an 

"' ■ ^- ,■.■."'. 1 ' '~ ■''--'■ "J "•"!•'-'.•, iii-a M^t tbtre. 

On ilif lSJ JTranUin'a cufptsaUed, I reported IhU In the followlne 
dispatch : ■ 

Uftax>aDAB-ntfts Ar.Mr or ma Potoma*:. 

Fr-inkMn s eTi* bas I ahill bUiri far Aciuu lu a:,u ji UaU hnham 
So trdiu>i>oria \ el fur Sumiif r'a corjia. 

Mnjor General II. W. 11 Oyn. V. S Arm*'. 

On that evi »'i'.ic 1 ^ ' - i with my Fiutf for Aeqnla Creek, wher* I 
arrived at daylight ou t.iu fjllowiii'^morrdn^, re)K>riin{; as followa: 


Ar^. i^ CicfJi, .4110. 24 IMl. 
I have reached here, and reBpectfUIIy report for (.r.;- . a. 

(I. It. MCCLKI.LA5, Jfa;or-ff«urrai 
Mft^or-GeuTal !T4LLC0b, r^ri. U. S. Anny. 
I also telegraphed as tui.owa: 

UtArmrAHTEn^ Anvr nr 'ni: rcTf»«AC, 

. StatMm 

; Th« 

<i -ire aop- 

.Morfll aad 

wtuch )■ 

1 &4Uiro did aa I'apidly 


-„ ,„ , n. W. HALLECK.JIf.^;. Cm. C««. U.&^r«». 

General Met iillix. ^ 

To iffblch the following are replies: 

JlEADtji-'AiircRS A^vy or tiik pnroMAC. 

/■'.>.<. rv« .',' ] \l—~ "Op m, 

Yotirdl^p-iichoffCl s'.T p. m. rc^eivfl. I i , ,,orrr in j^ndlna 

lrr.»I.*.n..rTMllI. Kr..nfcli,i is l..-iv. .-.imU w . - ofh;. t.oopaoB 

board to I hid ali. \<lv ot.l-r.v.i ulUhc - . ;v^r<l 

1 wiU pill ljcvU,...ti>rt nu l,(..ti.; >hli> e.:;;;. :., .i. (...n uiarbiii- Mt that 1 
r,'»nie»ve;ilam"»U'U..«.. 1 :i.),.c iLit I r.m ::• i (>'i i>i .mrnnv. .stall I 
pMli. iK.r«mt*»Ao) ii\. nril'i yo.iv.;,h to S.'O ni- fuNt ;a n;.M,n.-.:-<iii? |[ you 
wiiUai canprubauiy*lj:p«n.iic au aiuoum oi amuiii..iLou it-r oUier Irootf* 
thau U)l»aru»y. ^ 

vf „ ,„ _ — ,. O. n. McCI.ELT.A.V,Jfrt/or.C«<raJ. 

Uajor-UeDCral Uauxcx, Wa<Jti}iyi<}n, D. C. 


, . . „ , ^wrt .Vomio^, Avfi. 2i, 186:— l-.l.r.p. at. 

^ lh'^TenTnTile_fTippIlMornmniir,;,riiir.Li.irv.-iLi I ,i. i.,lf-ry. and wiU Uava 

■ i . Ueucrul I'ojx'a 

, have that r-cndy 

, " ■ . , ■ .--.-. .>i J .....,.•»; Ifcpj •.h'nild 

■i'lrc, and lhei« la nooiijc-tinn. pt«aa« cemmi inJeale tn m.- fuPv 
'■■ • ^ aiid your pLias. i will tucu be cuaukd to arroocc detaiia 

Major nTtfml nAlircn. W<fOi{n'jicm. ^^ 

lmmcdi:»lciy on nachinn t'ort Monroe, I pivo dirertlons for 
eten^th'-ninc; th- <1. fences of Yorktown, to retilst anv attack from the 
direction of i;i imn id, .ind lea Geneml Keyes, with h's cori»s, lo 
perform the woifc, -.ind tcnipo: irlly {rtrrlsoD tho place. 
I tclegrapheU as foUow-i on the 22^ : 

HEii.Qt'AnTERS Aaxr or the PnTOKAO. 

loC'iii.ij.,:; w.^ Sun.atr t- .£.j:;«iv. i tJ.,*.'; Ui.:.i uu^ oU Uui ^k*]ri iui 

Your teJecram received. Mnrell'ti f 
burned and at,An lojivi l-y I'ope, nitbo'.i. 
was tele«r*i>:i'.-.l >ou .-..ii- li uir.jj. 
posed to be wii!t 1' 
Sykea are De^r >i 

Dock. w;ih no ir, ..I'lon, 

reported ab'^udui ' 

J'leaae inromi ■■■■ --xacUy where Pope If.anJ whatdoinic ; nntU 

I knnw that I ca: .>-t'b mov^'menls ; b" H much cifM>Md now, 

anddecidf J mra^i ■ at o;.ce I i.;.i I -.:ijiv im' .t my com- 

ninnd and pri&jilou irr t. If, i :, 1 ulii:iher ;i..i - ' - lu Ibe 

command iclicatt;! ;n \tmrlir(it I(^u.-r lo me'.v l ., Bara- 

-Id-?, ai the Chirkalinm.iiy, T cinj-.ol deciJ': wl: .g*. U 

yuur determlntiM>n la uncbnngud, I ought to a^ --"vj-i > : 1.1 bi (^a>-t'. flaaae 
^ufmc my puaiLou aud duUc*. 

. „ „ „ G. B. McCLKIXAK. Jtfcvor-C«a«fal 

Major Gpncr.'d II. W. nAuacK, Corn. V. S. Anny. 

To which I received the following reply : 

, , , ,..,_, WAsnuiCTOir. vli/7. «, 18tt 

ion ask me for InfnrmaUoa whjrn j cannot ftve. I do n-^i know etthv 
v.herc (-.eiiTal l*ope i«, or wiirre 'lie enemy In forc« la. These arc maltere 
\sliicii I have all day beco mouatiilous Mav^'er. li;). 

U. W. HALLEOK. etntralinChiti. 

On the 26th I received th* following: 

, . . W/: invcTOic, Ai'^uH 3C. ISG-ll a. m. 

Th-rc Nreaaon to^'■.,■»ve tfiat th- m-nv '.^ m'^vi'i,; r rir.-*^ forc« loto the 

I Sh^ntn Ir^^h vftll-y 1 H^lntlt- 

einiiiii'9 roi^irtu.! -. '9 trtll 

prooaMy ;'f sciil v Uoopt 

down llie R?ip|i*i > ^ ,. : in the 

dlrefi.on o( Uir Mn;;. iii-lufth. IVrliii]* :■ ': iroftide 

luchar/jeal Acquia cn'i-K.andcom«; in , lUriU** 

are reiMirted Ibcre* Uenei'ai FraukUo'^ < receive* 

trans iioriaUoo. 

B. W. IIALI.ECK. GentmlinChin. 

Major General O . B. WcOleu-as. 

On receipt of ihla 1 immedbitely sailed for Alexandria, and reported 
ap follows*. 

AtTXAieoRlA. Avj. S7. 1SG2— 8 a. m. 
I arrived here last nt^ht. and hare tak- . ■.:..:-(•., tijaflri-riiUn ibeatateof 
pflairs here, and that prvpi^r rrmed'esrr. ■ -'u&t recclvelarumor 

tbat raJl.vay bruise over iJuIl Kun wns i 

y- .\S. UajoraamtLi 

Uaior-General 11. W. Hilixck, Cam. V. . .;. „.i,. 

AuiJiA.i.'miA, Aus. 27. lSC2-9.4Qa. m. 
The town ts quiet, alihon^h Quite full of soMiers, u bo are said to be chleOy 

Tbe atlaira of the Quartrrnustcr'A Department are reported a« ROtog on 

It i* aald that the HiiM'a Rnn ^^!4!~<• will be repril»*f 1 by to morrow. The 
titsembaikaUon uf Sumner's corps commei-eed a; Aci;':'! yr^tT !iy aP.ernooo. 
I louad that he could reach Kappahacnork Siailnn rai-Utr that w ay ibiui from 

G. R. KcChV^lAJiH, JiqJorGmtraL 
Mitjor- General H. W. IlAtt.ECK, fhm. U. S. Anny. 
Oil the same day I received the following: 

Wa^iisctow, Aw/. 37, 1862. 

T. •' ■ - .no '-r-Ti Or c-.i! rr--'r- Ni nr-*'i- .1 r.i- ■- I. -■■.! r^,-..!..^ ) -tHy that 
n.. r^nUHi; 

}'-• ■ 'Eiforoe 

i' .ininenL 

F. . ' r four 

tl;v ' ■■ rhapa 

yo. . .Hjuu 

ivl . . , . ; ^ I :;i your 

dlnrciiuu:!. Then: has tec: s uni: fiiiljus Lc^^Iks:; U £u.i:-J Uie r^Jro.'ul, which 
sUuuld be iameiiaicly remedied. 

B. W. E.iLLGCE, Gatemi-im-Chi^. 
Major Crneral KcrLCixxat. 
I replied aa follows : 

ALFXA5MlA,i4N<7 27. INS— 10 a. «. 
r^-i^rt reeelved. I h-ivL* a*-!;; ordera to Kranlilin to prepare 
't^ice, and to repair here in person to luform lao aa ta 

..'. Rappahannork Station ; Portnr at BealtOD. Kelllp, 
'.n-i- v.iii commence reachmz t-'almomh to-day. Wtlhamr 
U'-y will bo mostly at Kalmoiilb to-ilay. 
'' roy pcraoual cacort (uu« •Qundroa 4th Regulara} lo aeoat 

Trl^?rnTn I 
to m»i< h v 

B,!- ■ •' ' 

1 . 

1 (.'ouch's dlTlalon to Cf)tr» at on*"?. 

A 8 r.ut as I gain any lafbr- 
maliou I w.U forn-ard It, althuiiffa you mix nlrv t'!v hrtvc It. 

C. i;. X^^rt.i^.lA.AS, Uiifor-eattral. 
Major GeneraUI. W. HAUeCK. ITrtVii^'/lon, X». a 
I abio rvceivcd the following teiei;r.iO)s : 

W.uni!(0TOX,>4t^. tt, 1863- 
I»f>. • {>-^«'! it Ciaey to furalah jou about flro ihouaaod of tbeoew troop* 

Ui . 1. 

'' ( im of th" s»ndln? om! of I^- trot;'* frofl>lria. 

1' i^ot I'r-torliy hi lr«>i«.'>rt I'ion.and lb" pltces Iher ihaD 

Qr<... 1 .' . f> .L' ;>l'>'t-iriei'a are ne.ii- Wairnnija Junetloo. bul I akoaol 

aacerbuui iltK pruk^iit poniLiuu ol bU troniHt- 

. U. W. HALLGCK, CtntraiiMChiff. 
M.\;or-General MoCixu.A}f. 

■\v ' ■ ■-:. \HZ 

Tcan CPinoBr»lIi»f^r(ory hiformntlon frnm Ih" • i';nyor 

of our lr«<',>ft. There ncrma u» h»ve b»—i. ::fi'ai ii • .- .iboul 

>: .: .s..^ t Krnnklm'a corps abuuli mari-!i Id ih'ii .; >»slt>l^ 

Ml uOt: ir fthuukl bn ecnt oui lo Uka iluce^^a u. .ttUir* oi thai 

B. W. BALLECK, CneratAnCUtff. 
At ./ ' .[.et.alMfCirLUN. 

li)>on tiien-ceiptof thenel immediately sent the foUowiog tclegtaa 
ic 0( uiialf lIeitiL2LlmiUi au>i Porter* 


WTjerf are voa. nwA ti-hnl la st*>ift oC affairs— wlmi trcnjis in your iront, 
rirM onti lefi"? Sumner is now lAndinr; iil Ac-im i. nii..-ro Is Top-?'? Ift, 
and whi'.t of eatmy ? Kucmy burued bull Ruu bridgo bisl ui^h: w ah cavab-y 

^*'"'-' ff. U. HcCLiaLLAN.JVr/jy/--Cf;imii 

M:uor-t;ciiei'al foi'.Ttit, JWfUcn. 

I' a,—\ f thesR jeiiftnil oflic<-'i's are uot at the places name^l, tienrcat operator 
Will please hiiv«meBs;vyoforwHr'led. ,,,_,._ _„ 

I also tflemaphcd to Ibe GcnevftMn-Chu-f as follows: 

® ^ ALCXANmtiA, Aufj.i;. IS62— 10,50 rt.m. 

T hi>ve sent all ihr Informat'oti T possess to Hiniisulr, iiir.lnuTiii!; him to look 
nut wfl' f.'i- his rii:ht llaiik. i)eL\\-eeu the KapiialianiiUL-tt imd roinmic. Hnrt to 
Beu'InoUfthislo I'lii'terwilliontanescdVt. Itenr lli« cavalry who (i^isli-^d at 
iJilU Kmilisiiii;:liii"ay trouble Uunisilea lath-. I liavest^iil In (•nmmiiincale 
with Portoraiul HijintzelDi^ia, via Falmouth, ami hope to givu you some ileiiuiie 
tnrormulion in a ff w hmirs. I shiiU laud thn oi.-xt cavalry I yet lioli* ol hi:re, 
audseudii outtn kei-p open the commiinicaLion between rope ami Poricr. ulso 
to watch vicinity ofMauiisiias. Please send me a \\\\m\wv oi copies ol the boat 
niansofm-eseutlieldoroperatious. lean useiifiy (50> loadvimtaEje. 
^^ * G. li. McCl*liLLAN, Mujor-GeneraX 

■' ALEXANDTitA, ^"7. 27, 1862—12.50 rt. m. 

In Tiew of Enn-.sido'B dispatch, jnsl received. KoiiM il uot W. ;idvis^b!(' to 
thro* the mass of tiiimn^-r's corps hure, to move out with t- ranklui to;u-e- 
ville gr viiifltv* If a decisive battle is foii;;Iil at Wanenton, a .bsaster wuiild 
le'.'.-e ftov troop? cni i>ower Kappahanuock in a dau^erous posiliou, 

ThL-y vrould do l-^oUU- service lurrout of \\ashiii;;ton. ,„ „ . _ , 

Major-Gener^lHiLLECK, H't^AifiJton, />. C. 

Mv aid has \n< r-.tnrned from General Franklin's camp; repotia that 
Genenils Franklin, Smith, and Slocnm are all in W aslun^jton. He Rave the 
order to the next in rank to place the coriJS in i-eadiness 10 move at once. I 
learn th-ii he ivv nrin" has been heard this moruini; at t,enlrevllle, sad liave 
BCnt to u&cerUtiii Uie truth. I can find no cavalry to bead out on the roads. Are 
the worki, "arriaoned and ready for defence 1 
UieworiLi.„anii.oueui.u ^ ^ McCLKLLAK. Major ■Gcncr(\l 

Mfljor-liencralHALLECa, HWtin^o". 

^^ Ai.E.tAHDKiA, Auo- 27, 1S62— i2.20j>. »t. 

Wiat brid"es exist ov^r Bull Run? Have steps been taken to mnstrvtcl 

bridqes lor the aUvtiuce ol troops to reinforce Pope, or to enable him to retreat 

Tlieru^-^hoidd be two gunboats at AcqiUa creek at once. ShaTl I push the 
rvst of Sumner's wrps here, or is Pope so strong as to be reasonably certain 
of success? I hav^ sent U) inspect the works nenr liere and their sarrisons. 

A» soon as I can lind General Ctisey, or eome olhin* commanding olllcer. I 
will see to the raiiway, kc. It wouid be well to have them report to me, as I 
do not know where ihev are. I am iryinp to lind llieni, and will lose no time 
U, caiTi-ing out your orders. . Wo^'ld hke to see lim-n^de. ^. . „ , 

MftJ.-aen. H. W. Haixeck, Was}th>f;f'>r.. ,«,,««,.* 

Alexandria. Avfjiu^t 27. 1853—1.15. p. m, 

Franklin'3 artillervhave no horses, exff|)t for (J) ionr ^una without caissons. 
I can pick up no cavalry. In view of tbea:? liicts. will il not be well to pnsh 
Sumner's corps here by waiet" as rapiJly as pos.iil>le, to make immediali- ar- 
rancements lor ulacios the witrks in front of WaslMiiijtoa in an etlicient condi- 
tion of defence? I have CO meaua of knowins the enemy's force between 
Pope and oarsclves. , , «. . * , 1 

Can FraukUn, uHhout hU artillery or cavaU-y, effect any u»efnl purpose in 

Should not Burnside take steps at once to evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, 
at thf* same lime covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fan 
back In that direction? ,. . ^ ^ , , .- ..u 

I do not see that we Iwive force enonijh m bans to form a connection with 
Pope, whnae exact position we do aot know. Aa-e wo aafo ia the direction of 

^* "*"^* ' G. B. McCLELLAN Major -a^neral. 

Mai. -Gen. Haixeck, Waiiiinffton. 

A«XANDRiA, AtiwjsU 27, 1862— 1.36. p. m. 

I learn that Taylor's bricade, sent this morning to Bull run brids©, is either 
tut to pieces or captured. 

That the force against them had many gims, and about (5,000) live thous'ind 
Infantry, receivlo;;; reinforcements every minute ; aiso. that Gainesville is m 
poassssion of ihc enemy. Pleaseseud some cavalry out towards Drainsville, 
via Chain bridge, to watch Lewiosville and Drainsville, and fjo as far aa ihny 
can. If you will give me even one squndron of good cavalry here. I wlllascpr- 
tain the atalo of the case. I think our policy now is to make these works pt- r- 
fectly aafe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible ; but not to ail 
Tance them until they can have their artillery and cavalry. I have sent for 
Colonel Tvler to place his arullerymeu in the works, 

U Fort ilarcy securely held? 

•^ G. B. McCLELLAK. i[ajor'Ge.if7nJ. 

Oeaeral Halleck. ^ „ ,„^„ „«.. 

At.examdria. Aufjtift 27, 1S62— 2.S0. p. m. 
Sumner has been ordered to send here all of his corps that are within rfac!.. 
Orders have been sent to Couch to come here from Yorktown with th<? lensi 
possible delay. But one s-inadron of my cavalry has arrived ; that will bo dLs 
embarked at once and sent to the front. 

Tf there is any Ciivalry In Wiishingtou, it should be ordered to report t/t nu- 
tX once. 
I siill think that we should first provide for the immediate defence of Wash 
■ Inpton on both sides ofthe Potomac. 

1 am not responsible for the pjist. nnd cannot be for the fuluro. unles.'^ I 
receive authority to of the' av;iil;ible troops according' to myjniiynu-nt. 
Ph-aso ialonu me at tiiice what my posiliou is. I do not wiaa to act in tin 

0. B. McCLELLAN, MoJor-Gt'Mml 
Maj.-GeQ. H. W. Hallc(S, Com. V. .*?. Armt/. 

AtKXANERlA, Auffii.<4 27, 1863— 6 p. m. 
I huve just received the copv of a disi)atch frj^m Cleuerat Pope to you. dai'-d 
10 a.m., this morning, in wlncli he says "" ....-•. 


_ All forces now »ent forward shoulil 

be sent to my rif;ht at iJainesvUle." 

I now have at mv disposal hero about (10,000) Ion thousand men of Fnink- 
Uii's vup-s, about (2,6ii0j t wenty-elghl hnmlrcJ of Gi-neral Tyler's brit;aile, and 
Ci'ionel Tyler's Fir?t Coiiiiectii ut Artllltry, which I recommend shoiiUl be 
held In liaiid for the detcnce of Washini:ton. 

If you wish me to order any part ol tlils force to \he front, It is in read(nes.4 
to march at a moment's notice to uny pomt you nmy iiidlcaLe. 

In view of the existing state of things in our frout, I have docmcd It best to 
order Ueneral Casey to hold his men tor Yorktown ia readlacss to move, but 
not ty send them off till further orders. _ 

G. B. McCLELLAN. J^t^/or-C<n*ToI. 

Mai. .'Ten. H. W. Halleck, C*m. U. S. Armi/. 

Oa Uio '^Ih I telegraphed as follows : 


Au^j'Lst 2?. 1S*VJ— IHl. p. VI. 

Oeneral Frankllo la with me here. I will know in u few minutes the condt- 
U[i> of iirtillery and cavalry. 

We are not yet in condition to move ; may be by to-morr«\v mornlnc. 

Popf; must cut through to-day. or ailopt the plan I angjieated. I have or- 
dered troops to garrison the works at Upton's hill. Th«y must be held at any 
cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare them, I will send a corps of Rood 
troops there. It Is the key to Wuahiugtoa, which cannot be seriously menaced 
OS Uiuz as il Is held. 

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-GauraL 

MaJ.-Oen. Hallfck, WofJiinfj'on, t>. C. 

I received the folluwiug from the General-lii-Cliief : 

WAsniWGTO^, Avt}vxf 23. 1862. 

I thlnte you had hotur place Sitmner's corps, a^ it arrives, oear the kuus. and 
parlJCularK* at the bridge. 

The princtpai thing 10 be tearo^l now iJ a aavolry raid Into thts city, CApeciall/ 
iB the ulghtume. 

Dso c<*t'» and Tajlor'a brJgad), aod tho new troopa t'tr tbe «yne oliject. If 
fou Deed them. 

■er \M;t('8 to Burnside from Bristow,*. m, yeatcnl ip. that Pi. 
forct-s weri' thfii imvfii;; on Man;iss;is, and that Burunidc wuuld soon heat 
tliem by wnv of Muxmiibia. 

General ONllum ii is ■_"n<' to Harper's Ferry, aud I have only a 8ii);;Ie regfi 
lav otllcer lor duty nv the olli"'':. 

PleiiM send some of your oJii'^f rs to-^ay to see that every precaution is taken 
at the forts ajjaiust a raid ; itlso ut Uie bn.ige. siiswer. 

a. W. UALLEl-K, Gcneralin-Chitf. 

Maj.-fien. Mi:('i.ELLAS. 

On the 'iMh ttio loiluwing dispatch was telegraphed : 


il".7»A( 29, IboJ— 10.30 a.m. 
Franklin's con>s Is In motion ; started about p^J &ix a. m. I c;iii give him 
but two sTi:idroiis of cavalry. 1 propone movini; (ie.iera! ^'ox to Ujit-jn's hlH, 
to hold til It iniroi'taul pf»ii;t with Its Wi>rkri, ao'l to push Ciivaliy ^i»ut3 to 
Vienna. vii> t'j'f'>ioin h;li and Humor's lane. Cox has (2) two s<iuadronsof 
covahv. ri'MS-- :,ns\vfr at once whether thi.<! meets your approval I have 
dlrect--d Woo.lliui y, with tlK* engineer brigiuic. in hold Fort .Sumner 
det;iclied. lust iiiL;ti't, two regimems to vicinity of Forts Klhan ,\Ileu and .^Iarcy^ 
Meiij-her's bi-lgjKlH IS still lit Ac.;uia. If he moves in sU))port of Fr.tnJclin, it 
leaves iw without juiy relialile troops in and near \V;ishingtoii." Yet Franklin 
is loo weak alone. vVhatshnll be douef No more cavalry arrived ; have but 
(3) three sqUHdrnns. Franklin hiis but (Hi) forty rounds of ammniiilion, and 
no w^igoite to move more. I do not tinnk Franklin is in condition to accom- 
plish itiiich, if he meets witli serious resisl:ince. I should not have moved him 
But for your pressing order of bisi uighu What have you fi-om Vienna and 

O. B. McCLELLAN, Major ■G'meral. 
Maj.-Oen, llAi.LrcK, tTtWiiri.^.'on, D, C. 
To wbicli thi! loHowiUi; 15 ii reply : 

Washisctok, i4m;i(t(29, 1S62— 12 m. 
Upton's hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons aod ammunition 
to Franklin as fiist as iliey arrive. 

Meagher's brigade ordered up yesterday. Flt7-IIii.<;h Lee was. it is said on 
good authority, in Ale)::mdria ur. ;3and.iy last for three hours. I have nothiug 
trom Drainesviile. 

H. .W HALLECK, General inChie/. 

Oa the s.tmc day ttie following was received from bis excellency tbe 
President : 

WASHiNt;TON, Au^w^t- 29, 1S62— 2:Vlp. m. 
Wliat news from direction of Manassiis Juuciiou( What generally? 

To which 1 replied as foUovs : 

Camp icear AtEXAHDniA, 

A'lq'iU 29, 1.562-2.45 p. m. 
The last news I received from (he direction of >ianass:is was fromslra^- 
glera, to the ellect that the enemy were evacuating CeutrevUla aad retiring 
tow ards Th()nMiL;hfiu-e gap. This by no me;*ns reliable. 

I am clear lli.i'. one of two courses should be adopted : — 1st. To concentrate 
nil our available forces to open communicdtioos with Popo ; to leave Pope to 
get out of hisbcrape, and at once use all our means to make iha capital per- 
lecUy safe. 

No middle ground will now answer. Tell mo what von wish me to do. and 
I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know my orders 
and authoniy lire. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. 

I only aik a prompt decision, that 1 may at once give the necessary orders. 

II will uot do 10 delay longer. 

O. B. JIcCLELLAN, Major-Gcnerak 
A- Lincoln, President. 
And copy 10 General Halleck. 
To which the lollowiog is a reply : 

Wasiii:»gtox, Aufjuit 29. 1?B2— 4.10 p. m. 
Yours of today just received. I think your first alternative — to wit, '*!• 
concentrate all our available forces to upeu communic«lioo w-ith Pope"- is the 
right one; but I wish not to cootruL That I now leava to General Halleck, 
aided by your counsels. 

Maj.-Gea. McClellah. 

It had been olliciaJiy reported to me from Washington that the enemy^ 
in KtroDg force, was moving through Vienna In the direclioti of tho 
Chain bridge, andh;d a large force In Vienna. Th!src-port, In coDnectlon 
with the dispatch of tho genoral-in-chief on the 2Slh, before noted, in- 
duced mo to direct Franklin to halt his command near Anandale until tt 
could be dciermiiied, by recounoissaoccs to Vienna and towards 
Manassas, whether these reports were true. General Cox was ordered 
tofleud his small cavalry force from Upton's hill towards Vienna and 
Draluesvillo in one direction, and towards Fairfax Court House in the 
other, and Franklin to push his two squadrons as far towards Manassas 
as jwssible, in order to ascertain the true position of the enemy. 

With the enemy in force at Vienna, and towarda Lcwinsville, it would 
have been very injudicious to havo pushed Franklin's small f*rC6 be- 
yond Anandale. It must be remcnihored that at that time wo were cut 
ofl from direct communication with General Pope ; that the enemy was, 
by the last accounts, at Manassas in strong force, and that Franklin had 
only from 10,000 to 11,000 men, with an entirely insufficient force of 
cavalry and artillery. 

In order to represent this condition of afTiirs in its proper light to the 
gcneral-ia-chicf, and to obtain dcfiulto iustrucl.ons from him» I tele- 
graphed as follows : 

Cavp KHAR Alexandria, 

Augttst'^. lSt>2-13r»*. 
Have ordered most of the (12ih) Twelfth Pennsylvania i.'avalry to report to 
General Barnard fur scouting duly towards RockvitlCt Poolsville, Ac. 

If yon apprehend a riiid of cavalry on your side ot river, I had better send 
a brigade or two of Snniiier's to K-Nir Tenaliytown, where, with two or three 
regimenla in Forts Allen and Marcy, they cua watch both t^'hatn bridge and 

Would it meet TOur views to post the rest of Sumner's corps between Arllop- 
toti and Fort Corcoran, when.-e tJiey cau either support Coi, Franklin, or 
Ch.lin bndg>>. and even Tennallvlowii? 

Franltlui has only between (lu.OOi') ten thousand and (ll.OOW eleven thousand 
for duty. 
How lar do you wisli this force to advance? 

G. B. McCLELLAN, J/ajor-ffeiierat 
Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Ua*7.oi.7(o;L 

Caslp wear Alexandria, 

Avgvat 2D. Iii62— 1 p. m. 
Iu3xlously await reply to my last dispatch in regard toBumucr. wish to 
give the oi-ilt"-'- ^i once. 

Ple.ase auitiori:'* mc to attach new reghnenta permanently to my old 
brigades. I do much good to oM and new troops in that way. I shall 
endeavor to hold a line hi advance of Forts Allen and Marey. at least wlUi 
strong admiiced guards. I wish to hold the line through Pi-espet* hill. 
Mackall's, Mmor'a. and iPall's lull. This will give us timely warniufr. Shall 
I do as seems best to me wilh all the troops la this vicinity, including tranklha, 
who. I really iliink, ouyht uot, under present circmnsunces, to advance be- 
>ond ADa„a,U. I ^^ NcCLEi-IAX, i!aS,>r.amrral. 

General HALLEnt. . _, , 

On tho samo day I received a dispatch fWira the Geueial inChtcf, m 
which he asks mo why 1 halted Fraukliu ia Anandale, to which I replied 
as follows : 

Cwp :»^AU Alkxandrla, 

Autnist 29. 18C3— 10.30 1. m. 
By referring to mv tf-'-oyrama of lO.^il a, m.. U' ni,. and I p. m., tOL^nher 
with your reiJy of 2Ai p. m., ymt will see why Frankhn's corps htUtt^d at An- 
andale. His small cavaJry fore«— all I UiU to give Uim— wai ordered 10 puab 
00 as fhr as poa-iible toward^) Manassas. 
UwaM not Male fur Fraakhu u> move boxoad Anandale, onder tttdofrcuift' 

««nfM. iniil wekTitw wB.1 w« « vieno*. 

rifDtral Kr>nHlnrrni:.ltii-J liireunUI about 1 1. ». .a. 
for iiipplir, -or l.„ . ,„,nu.ii.l. I .m r"l ,^" , , "^^ "■ :,"^,'«'">ri''l! U> arrmas, 
•"J do I .r wiu In .1,^,1 ■ ■■■-<■ clrtunuUDCOi, 

* ''^ ■ Icri ID rtr-T- 

row. I .undllaupllo ii^i.l. of lomor. 

OencnU Ij l.r i„ furnUh thn nri-MMry BUardj 

cSed Ike dlKrcUou you commlUBi tome ""''"• ""^ ' ■■*>• """H'y m"- 
On Iho same evtaiog 1 wdi ib'o roUowlDg dlsiratdiM : 


'7>. m. 

iLC hini- 

Not hearing from j-ou. I hare kM t^rxWrHlv 
•eir In comtnunlcaUnn wllli General Pui.e as b 
Ume cover the irnowl of f o|.e*» luunliei ' •" """' 

K,«"!JS!;:;^!,e^;." "'"" '" ■■'"'»••>• ''°'' "-s"- '"Uu lo mov. u> pop* wub 

M^jor Gfoeral IliLUCK, ITcuJli^on. "' "' *'"•■''■'''■'*•'<■. -"'VorCaimii. 
ri>rc«, are al Manu^ut ~ -uimj auurces laai Lee and Stuarl, with large 

cy;o^T„\sr;sro^lK!!?c 'r°eoX.'*2"i!J',J',r'' v "- "" "' '-"«• 

addUIODal troaps to ,lf fet,,! lMnv7ilI^J^l„„'V^ »J.lll.oo«l artiilervmen, and 

few rftimn.ts doiulbote.! aln„c ibf line, o riv r, nn •^' '"'"'" ''"''" ""^ » 

agree with him l„lly. „„d il,|,,|t onr fwl hc5 „„^ ^ ''^,":Th'' '""'"' ""'' "■"»»"■ 

line on tills side Ihe river very iinwre ,<• lih ih. r t " "'.' '"''"''' 1'"" "' ""' 

movemecu of tbe enentj- ««,i .„ iStea'.; a'n a'SJk'r.u '■'h.fsV';;';';!,'.'''' '"' 

aeoeral IT. W. ITAI.I.RCK ''■ "' *'<^*-'''^'-LAN, J/<tJarUtnaaL 

etMralinCU^ U. s. Ami/. W<uhiii<^<m. D. C. 

Camp near Aiexandria, 
roar leleitram of 9 «. m. received Fr»r .i,,,. '*"/''"' *>. J*-'-! 1 .38 a. m. 
nonce that he ,«« ,o mareh (™m Alcrm Iria he 1 i^SJi •■™"kl,„ received 
iransportilior. Irom the •inanern^Tuter at Aie>»„ ih.'''.^"/^'". '''"■'"^'o C" 
been told ihat there was n.i.el,,no?i, ,?''"''"''• •"", '"' >>" "iiirormly 
wasocs. Alter the dep.-,,- , re oM,' , co?n I .' ™'"""",'' '""'"'"' "•'"■""' 

.^c„„, and wa. Obliged to ^^^^^'^^^r^to^:!;;!^:^-^-^^'^vi';i,,;^°^si:i'edtirb'^,':i?,^,'.,,"r„?o^'",i''^'''"'.T "-"" ">« «^« 

« .11 ,...1 go far inward. M,„phr"-"b"de?,?,i° cy """^ '•"' '•""'""' ; but Itey 

ini;?!;|.,Jhs„i;^s,^;jd ^o/s^^'s/^^-s™'""" "" -"■'■ 

d.ile. Kveryell.irt b».s been m.i le to enrrv „..?\^ . " "™''"""*''"- 

great dlllle.ilty .eems lo consist in the laet X ll^ "";:':;"■" Pfp"!!'"/- The on band at Alexandria and n"..!.!.,™, » i ""^""r I>«rl of the leans 
.uppbeaol 'hegarri«>n. Such ," the Mal^oftl,;''' "<■'■" •^■"'•'^ for c.rrent 
by the aunrtermaaters. and I. appea,', t, be ,r, e ' ""* " f'^l-'-esenled lo me 

I UU I. ror .ranted thai ,b,» fa. not bee^j^' ' erly e.nlalned to you. General riiLitcK. n^n.mliani'f' ■^■'•■^''-'■-'-'-*-"'. ■«.■/<>' Ctiwrol 

At 11 a. ni. the following telcsnim was sent : 

Cam- HEAR AnnynniA, 

M«Jor_General Mau.fcr, TI7W,/,v7(^ ''■ "' "'^CLELLAN, Af-jfor Sctc™;. 

Un lhc-.amo day I received iho following: 

Aniinunlllon. and parlleularlv foe .^^n"'""'"^' -<"»*'. I?r.J-l « p. m. 
«ri;rd lo CentrevlUe ftrUeniri/ I'ooe i 5 ■ 7" K"a''"= tan-'H^K^ly »enl (or. 
P«u;h. ueoeratJope. " miut ke done wIJi all pSji^bledii; 

lieneralMcTLiLLAi,. "• ^- DALLECK. CoKnainCkV 

To wbxb tLi8 rcptx was made : 

, . Caw hiar AttiinDRia, 

n-v'.n?,7,.°°'*';^'" "■• ""•"■« of Pope', arliller't"'"';',?^' "^^T^.'OP-"- 
"■> Td/MrH-oflicerloIoad up all Ihe wae™. .//.'. i.' '^''.^'' '*'"''''••'* 
' liu.rler. wacins. You w^fi h'. '*",' '° '""• ' ''"e already 
"■■ lean d" no,hlngm"e STa »"'/«'''»' "Woa are .eol 

.In Alexandria shall feToJedMon^e" ""^ """ "■" "«^ 

I- I have sent off . L ■- ■"".'""■P«''»<''«" "«Pt Ihe 
" -'" 'h- ;, Jin. aayoudwcl. iWri?.'!!;;'' '"". '^'"<'' ""'' "I" -ow 
..rvL'''"'"-''-Vl> ""Ti Sumner I ci?, T'"" "J' ""lyemalntof 
-> mano. '^e Army c, the rolo^.^e ^JIs^y.Hrn'^^-^^- "»- 

At 10.80 p. m. lUe fo|l„«,„g ,j,,^„ ^jj ^^, . 
CaMr N 

lauded. A. I ha 'e",e".°my ri J to"'tie"fronL I'^J^ ','" •"•,'""''^- "^ 
of t.rejt£-a cavalry with me, If alio "d lo en ' "" ^^' •<"»• 

Major leneral n W. HA.irrK "' "' ■'"<^<^'-KI'''AN. U,^i<„c„,raL 

Ta ^iy/t "• •"'.'''■"V. ll»/.,..:,fo», D. C. 

To », on U,« loUowoK day,'] ■■er..ived th|. .nmor : 

Ibavejnflseenyourlelegraraof ll" ' -'3-9.18 o. m. 

wmewli-n receii ed. but I did nut k.i nee «raa slated 

JlW'^ly. I r.viu.< answer without „.'. , . ■' reply imm«. 

r/hl-'w >>!'!••■"'"''•"' U>odei,.rlu„„, - i-oiw to m 

U.i Llufc'rield:" • '""^°'' •^''" «•' '— -rd a. rapidly a. po«IW.. ^ s^ 

Major General McCi.ruj» "• ^- HALLECK, Ctntral-iM-Oiif/: 

Ou ibc eamc day the following wiu roceiretl : " nenlarem.Yi""!"?'?-''' '*'''■ "• 1««;-12 « P M 

aenl lo the v.uuiy o, Chain bridge. "'"''• """' "»»■■'= «'">"l«l Si 

Major^enenU McOirllar "' '^^ l'-*'-I-ECK, eeaeroj-ia «■<>/. 

Al 2.80 p. m. Uio followpug dlipatch was lelegraphcd : 


Major Ilaller Is al Palrfai slailnn with mv rroroa'^Z;^' k Ji*^^""' ""- 
and olher troops. I have r..,|u,,i"d (iT i„,Tr'^~I2?^ ""Mdquarwn gtianl 
once, and the ,,reeau.lon.v.,u,:irect„!h!.tok^°" ««nP«nl« lo bo Hint » 

I'nder lb- « :,r llep;mm"eut order of yeslerdav I hare no <vn.t„t 

ma"r • v,r:°Th\'"*'^''^'"'^" '" -''™p" ^StSrfer,^ 

kn. .. „; or'anv b'?^ .K;,rK "^il-.K "-"'T'"^"' "' 

com. I ^ and 111..". .1. . . .1 "^ '»' ept Ihov! near here. Their 

. 1 kiv. M-eu evils t u„,ier me. 

think It Is the btolnesa ot 1 ' l'a\e eorreeled them. 1 

field, and a matter betwceii ' "'f ""^w reglmenu for Ihe 

Tlclnlty of ihaln bralge. .\e .h. r o- i) . ,„ , , "' '" "''der olbers lo the 
War Departmeul order I have no risht'i.lgl™ litm o.'de"'""^''' "" ^' '^<' 

General naiXLCI. WiuMn/HM "' " *''^^'''f i-'-V.N'. Ufjor Batnl. 

To which the following la an answer ; 

BInee receiving yonr dispatch. r^uiwV'l'o^'ri^A^J'^' ""Jrl'nP- "i. 
answer .nny nnl of absolute ue„e„lly f Mre^?^?; '.i?"'' ,'"" *""■'" ""^ » 
bul will wri,.. to you In the morning \Mlin^^n,t'r""''' "' r'^'"b'X 
Ihing M, il„« >,. .nl.y not temi...rarlhl,el,„,^|,i,li;i",J'''J ""',"'»;;•'■■' '»''>■ 
am cutu-cly ircd out. ^ " "" ""^ ^■''""' '"•""^ ""J ■■-pci lenL I 

General McCtriUH. ^ ^^- "ALLECK. GmmUina.l./. 

The order rcfdrred to in the preceding dispatch was a, follow. 

The follo-ving are Ihe commnMer, of .h^'arJSIerXrMi^'lT?'^!'- .''*==• 
Genera llurnslde romm i ■ ■ .irraies oper.iun:; hi \ [rsliil.t : 

tcn,„oranlv d, ucL Z"' ' .flw'"' ""'"' "*" """' >««■■ 

Gener.1l VrrielUn eomiii.. ■ of il,'i i™,.r.v - 

haanolL..ens.-m(oi-wirdl... - commiiiiT^ "°'"'"'"' 

Al 11.30 p. m. I telegraphed Uic following : 

Cane .MAR Alfjakoria, 

The Squadron of 2d resular cavalry that I senf w,';!! ol.'olliVi"*'''- "'■ 
caotnred 10 dival.oul 2n m some iflree n,ne» liL^ [■ pj""?' i'nmner vma 
yoiul It on the r,lul,. rlrer n7ke,^i^ri,z Ih,?b lie^w,I?i''''\"s''"" """«• "< 
and three lulu lM>.»ne, ' ' *• **'' "'"' '*'« Ihonsaud cavalry 

Ihav - .i ,C.,_,.. . ■ ,. . 

they w ■i' n nen be last saw ibem 

s^uadr ir.ioin 00 that roail : this 

l;enln.^ - -" "1 ours on llie right of 

da.v. A r,.s.-l ,u:ij„r r..l,L Uu- mtc. anl ;1, .1 ir,e',.:„.;i.'h"^'j;-', ""■'"' ''"^"" ""= 

and rta.'".":pr,T,ih^ uSe'lv ."^^S "■" "" '"•'= "»<">• "''"en J eslerday 
B.lrn';"-"""'';".,;':,';! "■^ more-or tv.ueh', division be sent ,0 the from th« 

'^ '-'" '"re as soon as praelicable, and ili,ii , - - ■> ' 'rff 

:'vnln alonce. Includjuclhe ;i ' ,,. 

■ .hat the enemy will, or have I , 

"It oil I'upe cuurtly, imless .. ,0 

I . ^lieakfrankl.r--andtheo«:«alon requires 

... .jl «-.,l,i,, and r fear the total de^iruc ' 

-«|V„? ■■* """.<•■''" "^•"ry out any orders 

. f,^.'" '" ^""''- .""'' "emand. grave mVasuresT 

the country I learn that our loss veMerday 

. We cannot allord such loioea wllboui an ob- 

positii.i . 

11— Ihe.-. 

tlon of tl 
you m;i, 
The qu. 

amouul,-: . ....^ 

jeel. » wv- 

shiVwT.'ntai'Tt^niaiid^'Io'iSb'^alilr?^ •" "• ""^° '"-»*°'' "-« POP' 

1 snail be up all msbt, and ready to obey anv orders you give me 
General Haukk. W,^l,in^o„ "■ "• "'-■'-'''KIJ'A.V; Jr^jor-aaml. 

To which this reply was' received : 


Major General McClilU!!. "' "^- "■^'-'-ECK, CmeraJ (a-ai^; 

l-AKP M , , 

><l\\Y'Zt':l^.tTr'''''yiroop.. wlAlhees';.. ; . .^^;/^„^ 

iir I ,""!" '^''" i-cesaary lo Insure lis i;.,„ ,., "'UvUlon, 

• return Of one Of my aid., who mil give aSb'tTn' 

'In end m-rtinrallon I hiv 

'.'.'■■m iniuuot'di.;,,;^ 1 


command 01 itu defences cxurcj<;iv i.m.i,,,,. V. „ . , ' """"T- '" 'a*-" 

, SBSiS§#S=|Sr'£s 

, I auiirs , I toiooel Kelion, bis aaaUiani adjutant general. 

^ ■ me encct that be ilesircd me w joai once lo his liapse 


,,, president i«forn..a u,o tbat ho haa -;^^J^,,f:;iS ^ X 

Kow "Sl'^'i -n^. 'n* "T>. ?,lsLtiavfy hat I was conOdcnl Ibat 
IL 8UW of Ib.DSB ! '«i;''«i' |*',f'S»Uv'" CBliniale the Army of 
be was mismformcd ■^^^^f^.l'^^lfJ.VJroYi, that Ihey would obey his 
tho Potomac might «"'''['*'n' uximt ajd'clo their whole diUy. The 
orders, support him '» "!^ f^V'™^ '^J^a' me to telegraph to " F. z John 
President, who «'?? ""f ""^f^feuds '. and try to' do away with any 
SrhTrghfe^tlaTdJ^rttt- 1 CUM rectify tho e.a,anathat 
Tfhert°pon"'?oW him that 1 ''onld cheerful^ telegraph to General 
Po'rtlr, or 'oanythine o^.e m my powc^^^tograwy h^^^^ ^^ ^^^ 

„ ^^ by the general.m.ehicf : ^,,„,„„,, S,p,»i.r 1 1^3 

I .A of you, for my .alee., that of t|;« ""^e^'fu" tot au dt o°s??o'r°mi ™-^p. 

torn"? thai you »n<l aU my 'V.Ti^^irSnsno v gotag on. The desli.ilos of 

S^tloa to General Tope m all *= oP„''""??,Uo™ nd afi depends now upon thu 
Ture ouDlry, the b™,r of om^arms are aUtake, a^^^^ 

'»-^SiSslT^SSn~S,'^l^eo..aU I can to 


To ttUch he sent the foUowlng reply : 

V„„ may restassured that all ynnr^rie^^s, as wHla^veg ^oJUs^in. 
try. will ever give ".'*»y^^\5Si'cc\Xno all orders and plans. Our kill- 
ir^;SSaXrdlnSeS*op?atteBtour devoted d„.y.j^_ _,_ ^^^^^^ 

Gener»l O^OBC>^V.KcCt^<:^s^^^^^^^.^^_ v,^m<,ion. 

«-,i,.nv..iinn nf the Irooin at Foil Monroe, Newport News and York- 

to.Bonehmidredmcn,maBy of whom wero orderlies, invab^, mem- 
w? nf bands fee A 1 the headquarters teams that arrived wero sent 
™wihs™p'les and ammunition , none being retained even to movo UiO 
hllrnartcFs camp The stiiiadron that habitually sorvc.las my per- 
STsconw™^ at Falmouth with General Burnside.aB bewas 

deficient in cavalry. , , .. .. _ ,^._„ 



g eat°y ei S bv' Z authorities, tho enemy should be merely mak^g a 
fe.Bt with a Fu-all forcQ to draw off our army, while with their mam 
forces they St" od ready to seize the first fayorable opportoDily to attaa 

'"fn'theteantime the process of reorganization, ""f""* ""'^r 

and ali posSe steps were taken to learn tho positions and movemenls 
"'iheS^ng table shows the movements of the army, from day to 
day, op to the 14th of September : 

Kelther at the .me I ^^^^l^^^^^^^TXili:T.'Zl'^l'^ 

^--=SrS^nS».e. .me to 

turned from the front ; I''''' »",?,? LflceVof Washington ; the roads 
army was In ft" ' *-^.»' "CiX^d me to 'akf steps at inco to stop 


General Pope with the following letter : 


G„„=B.t : Oeneral Haneekinstrucled rne^o re^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

farS?f-eri''''^i'si;-""^^^^^^^ '"'"' " ''"' 


H would be beal In move 1 ?r er'» cm « x^^ KlSiu'e to Oie worlis fn front 

Hall's hill, *o.; 'fcnowelU to Union slnlli^»^ ^^^ ,,,.,. ^ i^:„,.„,.,,„, 


JViijor Genfmi ITnifCii SMtes Army. 
Major General John Pope, C^nmandiug Army of Virginia 


l6t corps. liooker.. 


12th corpp.'VrilUan^' 
2U corps, Sumner. . 

6lh corps. Frantliu 
Couch's division.. 

Sykes' division.... 

September 4. 

7tb-str't road. 
L'ptou's hill-- 


Ten illy to WD 


Pope and McUoKLll. AJJf' S-'""-, m„ icft to give iustructions to tho 
I sent the few ojds at n^y d br|06al to 'h<J^'=" '^ 8 , ^^^j ^^lillery 

,eVe^°rJc="pv?si'nrms\nS,™;1o Sarsumn^, and St a late hour 

•^f'S^Lr^SSTlIatTe^ -'""-pulse any attack made by the 


and the information which I received 'h''"<=^.'J,^'^ ".""nite '^ai„ially 
tended to cross 't" "S/aTfnl ?r=* ^o l"tre'Jf%rra"ons'; 
changed the aspect of 'OiifB.*"'' *"'",ive campaign would bo neces- 

""/aore, on the third, ordered ti'' JVe'iJenlh'^r^et'^ro'ad" ne'ar 
town, and the 9th corps to a point on the =°"™\'''^,,, ' L,;,. n„r 

'"^ll;??fh"ri;l'a';.S'S£"c,';;T.rwcr-orilored *» I.eesh«rg; IboCth 


now^u;w"a''of ^hins., had been made, and General Banks was left m 

Otb corps. Rem — 
1st corps, Hooker.. 

12tli corps. WUifim; 
2a corps, Sumner. 

6th corps, FraultliD 
Sytes' «UvSst6Q. 

September e. September 9 

r^eesbarg . 
Leesburg . 

Rockville . 
aoctcvUie . 

September 10. 

FrookTnie , 
UrootviUe ■ 

■ iMKUIeburg. 

TenallvlowTi .!'narnesto\'ni.. 

Oftufs CrosSiMoulU SeiiecG 



N'ew Market 

Clarksburg . 




Damftscus ... 

Clr.iksbui-;i . . 



September 14. 

S'lh Monnlain 
S'tb Mountain 

cr-iny oa tbe 

Moiiyncv... . . . 

viiie Frederick. 

Cross Koads 

CrcsB r.oada 

Urbaoa . 

Frederick — 

Frederick — 

3'tb Mouatam 

MiddletOTTD . . 

^Sr;Si"t wing, consisting of ^J" r<,rFr'der[J'k'- ttflst tVs™^ 
S.^ih:fSrmo'S^E\toa?a?d".Ie\m'c^n.3 «•« Damascus 

-4?^^a"nrxl!-hcorps,formi„. .ho centre nn^der^.^ 

General Sumner, moved on Fre denck .the 'ormer ^^ ^^^ 

K^-Sn gj3 gd i.^ckeysto^ j^ 

Darneslown, D"^=™""^„^°''^^'f,f '/ni iei°g n I position to conaect 
rh'Sn"d^S?,^??re?ei?r?!st^uM'i??ilv'o^ielnnece^.ary (as w« sup- 
posed) to f"™ '!;^„f,°« dVy fh"™°vef r'oad," covering that approach, 
wSnVthofoXrtherotomac.'a'nd ultimately foUowmg and .up. 

•""iLfforrgS^^ds rvom telegr^ns receiv.l hy^^^^^^^ 
parture fr«n. Washington will how how 11 t^o ^^;^°°„«^,,i„„4 f„ the 
^'^?e?y"oT?hr^fp"r"?i;rrors'ept^mSerrGoueral Ua,locl= icle. 
graphed mo as follows : numbers of the enemy at 

SlL^;;^rof?ur'.^?cef fid-.hratfeS^p??o\tlacl froL tho Vhsinia 
^'raih^°h^trmio?»be^bcncral^H.J^^ telegraphed mo aa 
'"l^^y not order forward Kej^s or Si^ljJlihiuU^^^^^^ 
iho en. loy isiu your fro,, ; " ,''J, ""','„,^°;ic7c ,' l,o Conduct of lis 

KT;^i'danco with th;.,suKCElion lacked. on tlic Eamo day,tbataU 

me troo[>3 ih.u csiild be epircJ shonW at odco bs Bcnl lo rciaforce mo, 1 

'' On tho lim TKtWii llio following teifgram from hia excellency Ihc 
I'rc-siJcDl : " aovcrror Curlln tdcifrapha nif, 'I bin ortvlcc» thit Jack- 
BJn IS crojsii.g the Poloroao ol W.lllamepoit, and JProbsljly Iho wholo 
rebel army will bo drawn from Mirylanil.'" Tbo rroalaeot »d<H : 
••Rocoivlnjnolhlngfrom Harper's F«ry or Marlinsbargh to day, and 
iK)3iUvc iDformallon from WhccUng that Iho lino Is cot, corrobornlca the 
IJei that tho enemy Is re croeslng the rolomac. Flewe do not let bim get 

'''o""ui°o'l3ih ^uencral Halleck telegraphed »3 follows : " tntll yon 
know more ccrUlnly tho enemy's force south of tho rolomac, yoo are 
Kfons in thus uncoyerlng tho capital. I am of the opinion thai the en- 
oroy will send a small column towards Pennsylnnla lo draw your forces 
in that direcllon, then Euddenly move on Washington w ah the foicea 
auviUi of the roluraac and those ho may cross over." Again, on the 
Hlh, General Halleck telegraphed me that " scouts report a- lareo force 
stUI on tho Virginia side of the Folomac. U so, I few yon are exposing 

*°Agaln,Rslaloes'thol6th,aft«r we had the most po3itive evidence 
that Ue's coUie army was la front of us, I rocelied the followioj : 


Sepuiiitr 18, 1S62-12 3 p. m. 
Toors of 7 a. m. la tlils moment received. As you five mo r.o hifoimillon In 
reaa°d to llie po.iaon of your forces, excerl lliM u bbiunsburf. ot jourto I 
"m" »J. Ijf . I lliioU, hSwevcr, you will hnd thai the wkole farce of lUe die- 
roy "n vo'.r front hiucroMed llio river : I fear row more thin ever th»tthoy 
"vlil r« croM Kl H.ipe. '» Ferry, or below, and turn your Ion, th.n cut .ng jv 
off rrom WMhlaetou. ThiB has ap|>e»reJ to me lo be a pan of Ibolr plan, aud 
hence my anxl.ty on Iho .ui>jecl ; a beavj^r.m '^^j^^^^^^^^.^.f^.ai,/. 

T&°p'a*UDc"'i?'m«rog with all dne cantlon, 60 nsnottonncofor 
tho ualloua! capital until the enemy's poalllon and p!»ns woro developed, 
«||3, 1 believe, fully appreciated by mo ; and as my Iroopj oxleniled 
froni the Ballimoro ana Ohio railroad to the rolomac, with the extreme 
K-nflink moving a'ong that stream, and with strong pickets left in rear 
t-) watch and coard all tho BvaUablo fords, I did not regard my lelt or 
rear as In any decvee exposed. But it appears from tlio foregoing tele- 
iriTms that the B'.-..»r^il iu-chlef was of a different opinion, and that rny 
n.ovemcnls weio, in bis judgment, too precipitate, not only for the safe- 
ly of Wa'Shingtcn, but also for tho secnrily of my left and rear. 

The precise naluro ot these daily InJuncUons agslnst a precipitate ad- 
vnnce may now bo perceived. The general in chljf, In bis testimony 
before tho CoroKiaiee on the Conduct of fjo War, stys : " I" respect to 
Ceneral McCIoIlan going loo fast or too slow from Washirslon, there can 
bo fooul no such telegram from me to him. U« had miElaken the mean- 
Hie of the telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed him that hi) was goiog too, not from Wushiiigion, but from tho 1-olomac, leaving General Leo 
theo;>porlunity locomodowntherotorajc and gtt between him and 
W»i«liiiJElon. I Ihooght General Wcaellin sliouia l;oep more on the ro- 
lomac, and pros.! forward his left, r»lb« than his eight, BO as the more 
nadily to rehevo Kurpers Kerry." , ,,. .j, _ 

As 1 can Olid no telegram from the general in chli f recommending me 
to koep my left flank nearer iho Folomao, I am com|>elled to be'jcvo thai 
wlion ho gavo this testimony ho had forgultcn tho purport of the tele- 
crams above Quoted, and had also ceased lo remember the fact, well 
known to him at tho time, that my left, from the lime I left Washington, 
always rested on the Potomac, and my centre was continually In posi- 
tion to reinforce the left or right, as occasion might require. Had I ad- 
v.iiiced my left Oank along the Potomac more rapidly than the olher 
colomns marched upon the roads to the right, I ehould have thrown 
that out of supporllng distance of tho olher troops, and greatly ex 
iH.wd it. And If t had marched the entire army In one column along 
the bank of tho river instead of upon live different parallel roads, the 
column, with Its tran-s would have extemled about dlty miles, and the 
enemy might have deftaled tho advance before tho rear cou d have 
reached the scene of action. Iloroover, such a movement would havo 
uncovered the communicalions with Baltimore and Washington on our 
rivht, and eipcsed our right and rear. I presume It will be admitted 
by every military men thai It was necessary to move the array m such 
order Ihat it could at any lime be concentrated for batlle ; and I om or 
oiiiiiion that this object could not have been accomplished in any oiucr 
w.-iy than the ono employed. Any other d.spoailiun of our forces would 
have Eubjccttd them to defeat in dolichcd fragments. ... 

On the 10th of September I received from my scouls information 
which rendered II nuiio probable that General Leo's array was in th.^ 
vicinity orFioderiek, but wbother his Inlenlion was to move towards 
atltiroore or PennsyivaDla was not then known. On Iho lllh I ordered 
Ccuorol nurnsido to push a strong reconuoisance across the National 
road and the Daltlmoro and Ohio railroad, towards New Market, and, If 
bo learned thai Ide eiemy had meved towards Hagerslovm, to press on 
rapidly to Fredsrlck, keeping his troops constantly ready to meet the 
enemy In force. A corresponding movemeni of all the troops In tho 
centre an* en the left was ordered m the direcllon of Urbona and I'oola- 

"on the l!lh a portion of the right wing entered Frederick, after • 
brisk eklrm'.sh at the ounklrls of Ihe city and In the etreets. 

On the 10th the main bodies of tho righl wing and centre passed 
throngh Frederick. II was soon ascrrlalned that the main body of tho 
enemy's forces had marched out of the city on Iho two previous days, 
taking the roads to Boousboro' and Harper s Ferry, thereby rendering it 
necessary to force tho passes through tho Catoclln and EoulX Mountain 
ridges, and gain postessien of Boonbero' and Eohrersvdi, telore any 
relief coold bo extended to Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry. 

On Ihe liJth an order fell Into my hands. Issued by General Lee, which 
fully disclosed his plans, and I Immediately gavo orden for a rapid asA 
vigorous forward movement. 

Tha folfonhii U a copy of tho order referred lo : 
Usanuoasisas Aaiir or KoainiBie vnoima, 

BtjAon^jtT 9, J»S, 

1 outMton or the llalUmore and Ohio rilhYi.d. Mpluro such or lie enemy la 
mjTb!?°M»"l°'''"B. «"» inleiteplsuch a* mayaUempl lo eicapo trom 

"oene«l''£n«tr.-ts command will pursue the -i^." "'^" '" " ^f Si'. 
iMro', where ll will bull with Uie reserve, supply and baggage Iralna ol ine 

"Te'i.eralMeLawe, with hi. own divUlon S"?,""' »' "««"'.^ ,'|i AV.h, 
«oi-. will follow General Ixiajtlrcel ; on reaelilni Mlddletown, b. will lake he 
rot- "lo If.rner'. FeriT, a"d. by f ndny moialug, po»e«. hlm.«ll of the 
KyUnd heleliu, and eiiearor to'captuie the enemy at Uarper'. Ferry and 

"lle'oerol Walter, wld. hU dlrlaloa. after acrotnplii'ahM the eWeel I" «JJlth 
;.. I. .ow .ii£«eed: WIU crou Ih. Poforaaa ft Uh.ek'. ^"rd. "cend It. rij k 
l).okloI/iveU4.dl«.l»kepo«ieMiOBof ixiudon helshu, U P"'^;'"''*.''^'!!!, 
d«rnwr. -.-riC'J'" Itird on hU left, and the road bolwceD Ui. end .f Ita 

»iouiila:n au,l Ilia rolomac on bin rl^lit. 11. wol, aa far a« pracLcable, co-op 
eraw with General UcLawi and General Jackaoo In inlerce>iUng the retreeluf 

General D. fT. ffiiridlr'.£loo wUl form tk. rear guard of 111 e army, pnrsuhii; 
the road uken hy tbe main body. Th. reserve ariUlery, ordnance and supply 
trains. Ac., will prrced. General nilL 

General Stuart win detach acquiidron of cavalry to accompany the eoeaaaada 
of Geaerali Longilrcet, Jaekton oud Mcl>awa, aod, with the main tKidy of the 
cavalry, wUl cover the route of Iho army, and bring up all Btraggleri tnat may 
have been left behind. 

The comnundi of Generals Jackson. Melons and Walker, after acoom- 
plishlnj tbe objects for whlcb tbey hare been detached. wUl Join Ihe raaiji body 
of tbe army at tioootbore'.or lla«er»U>wa. 

Each resimcnt no the march will habitually carry Its aaes Id the regfauen- 
tal ordnance wagons, for use of Ihe men at Ihelr cnoampmeots, to procure 
wood, Ac 

Sj command of General B. C 

B H. CHILTON. Aulitoal /Ujutonl Ceneraf. 

Major-Oenersl D. H. niii, CoiH»wntir«j iH^inon. 

In tho report of a military commission, of which Uajor-Gcneral D. 
Banter was president, whkh convened al Washiogtoa for Ihe pnrpcte 
of invcstgallog the conduct of certain ofQcers m connexion with the sur- 
render of Harper's Ferry, I find the following : 

•'The commi-sfion has remarked freely on Colonel Miles, an old ofDcer, 
who had been killed In tbe service of tho country, and It cannot, from 
any motive of delicacy, refrain from ccnsuthig those In high command 
when It thinks such censnre deserved. 

"Ihe general In chief has teetltted that General McCloUnn, after havtag 
received orders to repel the enemy Invading Ihe Slate of Marylaad, 
marched only six miles per day, on aa average, when pursuing this ts- 
yading army. . .... 

"The geucral-ln-chlof also tcstifles that, to his opinion, he could asd 
ehould havo relieved and prelected Harper's Ferry, and In this opinloo 
the commlESlon fully concur." 

I have been greatly surprleed that this commission, in Its loTestigs- 
tlons, never called upon me, nor upon any officer of my staff, nor, so tar 
as I know, upon any cfllcer of the army ot the Poloraac able lo give an 
Intelligent BUtemcnt of tho mOTcmenls of that army. Bal asotber 
paragraph In tho same report makes tesiimony from such soiircea q»ito 
superfluous. II is as follows : 

" By a reference to tbe evidence It wlU be seen that, at the very mo- 
taent Colonel Ford abandoned Maryland helghu, bis Uttlo army wa« In 
reality relieved by Generals Franlaui's and Sumaer'a corps at Qramp- 
lon's gap, wllhin seven miles of his position." 

Thocorpsof Generals Franklin and Sumner were a part of the army 
whlcb I at that lime bad the honor to command, nod they were actiig 
under my orders at Craroplon's gap and elsewhere ; and If, as the com- 
mission states. Colonel Ford's "lllllo army wa» hi reality reaeved" by 
the thoeo officers, 11 was relieved by me. 

I had, on the morning of tho 10th, sent tho following dispatch in rela 
Uoo t« the commaail at Bar per 's Ferry : 


Stptcmhrr 10. 1861-».t6 ». «. 

Colonel MUes Is al or near Harper's Ferry, aa I underatand. with nine lheu_ 
sand Iroopa He can do nothlnx where he a. but could be ef greal TCrvlM il 
ordered to Join me. I suggest that he be ordered to joui me by the moat prac- 
ticable route. „ B.'KcCLBLLAK. U^i^S»nl. 

Major-General HiU.fCi, iroiWaoten, DC 

To this I reoelvod the following reply: . ., „, j. ^ 

There li no way for Colonel mile j t» Jolii yoa at present • hla only efcaoce k 
lo defend his works UU you can cpeu communlcaUoa "h"*™- ^^LLgcK. 

It seems necessary, for a dlstinot understandtag of Ibis matter, to stole 
that I was directed on tho 12Ui to assume command of the garnsoa «f 
Harper's Ferry aa soon as I should open communicalions w •» Ihat plase, 
and ibat when I received this order all communication from ihe oirec lion 
mwhch I was approaching was cut off. t"p to that tine, however, 
Colonel Idlles eould. In my opinion, have roarobed his eomi-aad into 
reunsylvaulii, by crcsslng the Potomac at Wliilamsporl or above .asl 
thlsouinlonwascoriOrmed bv the fact tbatCelonel Dava marches Ue 
cavalry cart of Ci Milea's command from jUrper's Ferry on toe 
Ulh ukingthomam roadtoHigerttown, and uo encountered noen- 
croy except a small picket near the mouth ol the Antieum. 

Before I leri Wash ngtio. and wh.n there certamiy could »»" «" 
no enemy to prevent tho wiUidrawH of the force* of Cjloael Mllee, I 
recomraon.'e4 to the proper nutoorUles that Ihe garrison of Larper » 
Ferry should be withdrawn via Hajerstown, to aid m covcrlog the 
Cumberland valley : or that, taking up tbe P""""?,'"-'^':' »?f *^''"?; 
Ing the railroad bnJge, It ehould fail back to the Maryland heights, and 
there hold out to tbe list. .-.,,. _ _ .i.». « 

In this posiuon it ought to have maintained lUelf f<"'..'"'^y ^'J'';. " 
WHS not deemed proper to adopt either ot thcee sutgestiors, wad "ben 
llio matter was left to my discraion It was too '"" f"'^^«" "'J?,''"I[- 
thing but endeavor to relieve tbe garrison. I accord.rgly ^ '"Jo-' ": 
liliery to be Bred by our advance al freiiuent Imcryals as • slgaal Jiat 
relief was at band. This was done, and, <«.' »""Tfi" '"""u'J?! 
reports of the cannon were distlortly heard at Ilai p. r s Ferry. U was 
coLflJently expected that Colonel Miles wou'd hold «"' ''■■^' »• '"'^ "f" 
ried the mouuUlo passes, and were In condition to send a deta^mem. ij 
his relief. The left was therefore ordered to mote >f J'^J^.i^^f??'""^ 
pass in fronlcfBurkcltsvllle, while the ceatroand right marched upon 
Turner's pass In front of Ulldlelown. i.j _Ht,.v. („^,n.»nh» 

It may bo asked by Ihoso who are not acq'ialnled with the topopn^y 
of h" country In ot Harper's EeffyL^S^f'"'!'"' S,^ 
of marching his columa over the circoilous road froin JelfersOT via 
Burkeluvilfe and Brownsville, was bot ordered U) move a,.,„g to dlreel 
iiirnnike lo KnoxviUe and Ihi-nco up the river to Harpei s terry. 

ItTis forlSe rmon that 1 had received information tJiai toe en^y 
we oant'clpallog our approach In that *lf«^™' "'iJ?''' "'fj^Sj 
batteries on the iouth side of the FolotM" "J'''^^ f™™»S,'J"^^LX 
approaches to Knoxvllle; moreover the red f«"^ '"'" P* °' *'"X* 
rectiv along the river bank al tho fool of a precintous mountain, where 
Iher, was ?o onoorlunity of forming in Une of balUo, and where the co- 
lmTc^u"dhavSpla«dbaUefic.onbolhaldcsof the river lo endlad. 

"ih"o"a;;^?rcou°g'h '^':z^.-> p«s, ^^ch ?«"»-••■" 's'°^„i«si 

ant vaUey In rear of Maryland heights, was tho only one which aflorded 
any'rellao'nable prospect of earrying tUt .formidab e P«it)«. tat t^ 

6.m. tZ, the".';.*^ upJn that 'road were in better relallon to iIh, main 

' oJlt°m'.r""g%f the 14th a verbal messaje reached >n'f"'"Colonel 
mJw, wh™b was'ihe first autUenUo Inteliigei.ce 1 h^.r«=l«'i,':ii3 S' 
condliloo of things at Harper's Ferry. 

'fbo mersenger Informed mo 

S; ne^prlSg-^S^iSSn MarVl'f aj^jihis bU been nbaglon.1 
by our lioops after repelling an otlack of the rebels, nnltl«tWooei 
Milea-8 entire force w»s concentrated al Harper's H-ry tno Mj; J"^'^^ 
I/wdon, and Bollv,r heights having been •"'"f^'.'f '',^,^'"^,"f;^;*i," 
Pled by the i nrniy. The mefscngcr aUo stated tliai Uiero was '"> "•l* 
MntroMoolor tie ab.ndoam^ut rf the Ihuyland heights, and Uirt 


Cdlond ir.ks instruclcd htm to siy ttat he could hold cot with cortatolj 

»wo days longiv 

, days K'Tisi 1 • . j^ If nossihle, wilh thn information 

ftiu;;:::^a;;r««btag ra„; and leu confident 

•" oTtlio simc aflorooon I wrot., tho following leltcr to Colmel Jtllc9, 

. I ;,^,lh„,l il ■,.(. cm.ics hy three rtilT. rem couriers, oa dilTLTetroulM. 

Idtdto'Chom.ic^SuthJauy of these meu succeeded la re.chu,g 

Harper's Ferry : Micdletowk, Sri,l'm',.-r H, ISlii 

mikms evi-iy .-ll" l " ,' V '^J 'i "the last extremllv. II il is nnss l.l.-. i-e-orci- 

py "h"*!''',*,':' ',,:"',.„„ ■\sM,' CMntMin vnllfy Is 111 our possHSSKm, yon 
ittt^cl^o^^Mi-iv^.- >^e,.luoH,,..e^r.ty^^ ,.r a. o,„„»,.,«u o„ th.s 

aide ot the rn-er is '•^'"='-"y"ij/j[j.i;LEI,L,AN, Mujar-Ganeral ComuMndmij. 

Oolonein.S., ,„„„,, ._ 

On the previous day I had ecnt General Franklin the following In- 

.tructions : j[^^„„„„„.„, *„ht of th.! Potohac, 

OI...I1 iinir rndrni-k. S^^lrm'-er 1.1, lSfi2-ri. J) f>. m. 
,■ rnll mf.irraatiouns to movements nnd '7^1;"''""?" '"l" 

,1 iirMilps-a.-elivillinvanls the wi-st. A dimi'm on the 
vV'sf. r'.n-v L..„J.m heiKl.t-s aiKl cut oil' Ills retreat 

inn,., direction. it'^^-^-:^^^;;;^^'SIi:X;ml^^'r^ii:i yL^^^i 
AnU^rson « to "';'■ ; .''•'' " "J '"J ' "/.h^l he i, ninv in I'leAsiint v:vlley. Tl.e 
iMljlUs. rh- signal r, 1.; er,, ; ^"'^J » , LTO'ltreel was to move In Ho.ins- 
The firing shovv,,,hat Ml ;_ss.,]l._^^ldoul.^I.™„s.,e^l ^^^^ __^ ^^^^^ 

, slrassfers, .Ic. Wf. hare cleaied out n.l 

B and north of iia. The last I heard Irora 

■ ■ - A divi- 

TjMo.lioro lowarOstnarpsonrg, rou ■"111 endea-en w fall upon him and ctrt 
On'tae'lsl'htui'iOllowiug were received from General Fr.inklin : 

ATl-llF. FOOT OF M'H;St1*I.VA!=V>T, 

S'-pt''m'>cr 15— B.50 a. in 

inline, nnt I ^i 


Gr.NRnAr.: Mv command si^rlf^rt at(UyIight thl8m«i-i ,,„,„;„«£ 

wKni.u*i.. GriiPi-al Cnwrh arrived about li' n'clnck List JiifjW. 

liii":ulfB iiii'l oii« baileryt) Hoh^ '-is. ill« wr lo ibe 

" ;u-my is drawn up In liju: iif luUllo al*eul 

ill si" liu As sii.iii as I «in smr tli*t Ruh- 

'iVr 1= .,.,., iniP.i 1 shill muve liiruiint In nUHrk Llv; <'n.-my. Tliis mi\y lif 

rersj'lUMs (-ciiMP ishjiim^n ^.^_^ ^_^ ^^^^ i.ulfii-ao.l lh« ro.s;aimi o» 

■"■" mefLr tliat U has-it la my opiuioa thai I sliuuM b« slroueU 

lohiVH It ci'i^frl up limv. 
I hw'K nrdi-red iMie of 111! 
slroiii;'*Bt iioi:it in its vicii 


fii-iiii; m.ik.ft 

Genera' G, B. McClbi-las. 

W. B. FRANKLIN, JUnj-Gen. Ojm. Ohtm. 

Gbnkral; Iharcnf^ 
enemy, Jacksi-n li '! 
Mivrllnsbnrp and c 1 
soirth side of the rntmnic wns l-i 

bi»fo', antl llie' 

f^|~liSHS;KS The 

i°?.'-iiL^,,m.eo .lie 1, sclivisioi, and join you as rapidly as pn.s.v .le. W ilh- 
ordered to "'"'7;;'';'',' le of that division to join, you ivlll move at daybreakm 
out wailmslir "•'•", ';^°\'ketlaviHeiM>oilhe roarl to Rohrersville I 
Die mornins liy;le.lei »..ii .anil »j;.*|^^;f„\,',,„ ,;„„ ,jj, „,,, ^^j ,5 |,racllrable for 

' ■ ■'- ^ cneinv In lorce, seize 

orrlerto etit oil' the 

,s pass held by liie 

make all yinird.spjsltloiis for the attack and cummenee 

havrreliabre inrnrmalioii that the mm.ntun pass by tn s rna 
.runervandwaKmis. If this pass Isnol oeenpied by he en( 
JiSsoonTs linv^Uealile, and debouch upon Rohrersville, no 
rreatof or'd«,iov Mil.a«'a command. ^ If you Iind this 

retreat of or desti 
enemy in large force, 
It about half an hour 
pike, where the m,u, iKidy 
willbeflrsiu - ' ''"'■• 

r vouliear severe finni! at thepasson U,e Uas»stfnvn 

dy will alt^u-k. lladnj gained the pass, your dnty 

11 desirov, or cai.tiire's cumraand ana relieve t^iP 

•"^^ *','S'iS;e™;S' »in a.vVi;;mssU^el'\ow,rds the i^iomae, or prevent 

a) idea is lo rut ihe cnpmy in two and beat 

to cut oil'. — I 

the re-passage <^^;-j^"]; ^^^ 'i^lISniiVVxpiamed ^yinlendons. I ask of 
ntellL-claud the iTtmost activity that a 

Sept''inht!r 15 — U a.m. 
rr^ruAi * T have recflivfd your tliRpalch l-y Captain u'liefif.-. Thn rnwmf 

- - ■• --'-■-' '•- ■, iRoWlt* 

o( conree 

i^hiill com- 

[ shiiU wail 

the force 

I have had a i ery close view 

rlH^.svV-r o piusuft the enemy un^ler these circiimstanc-s. I .1 
mun u'-»i I '^'n,sdp»s soon is possible In ^%^^l' l}^''^^ 


of it and Us pusitkJD is very biv 

I see io front. 

Rusjcctiullv, . . „ . 

\V. B. FRANULIN, Mtijor-GmtrtO, 

Cot oS >l IS "nrr.iid .el Harper s terry at 8 a.m. on the Inlh, as the 
ce3"l.on<.f ihellrini; in.licate.l, an 1 General Franklin wa-t .edorodw 
Remain he w .s to watch the ia-ge force in front ot l.iin, and pro- 
[ec our lea and rear until the nishl o( Iho 16th wh n he was ordore.) to 
min the ,i.iin hodv ot the army at Keedysnllo, after sendni;. Couob'e 
l,„n tno n^^"^ ■ , ^ ,1,^3 ,vhilo the events which . ave Just been 

dcljiil ed were takinj placo at Cra.npt.,n's gap the troops of the ceulre 
and riKht wing, which had united at Frederick on the 13th,weroeD- 
eaced in the cnlcsl for the potsessain of Turner's gap. , ^. . 

* Lthemornmgof the ISth General Pleasunton was ordered to .end 
McKeyiiol I'a brigade and a sectimi of irWIery in the directum ol .enys- 
huiB and K.ish'5 regiment towards .Tefferson to comm. ucate 
Franklin, to whcin, the Cth United Slates cav.alry and a section ,->f iirtrt- 
lery had prevLoisiv heen sent, and to proceed with lh-- remainder ot his 
force in tna direction of Maldetnwn in pursuit c* the enemy. 

Alter skirmishing wilh tlio enemy all the morning .-inl dnymg them 
from several strong positions, he reached Turner's gup i 

l( Sou'h 
m.unlak, mthc afternoon, and found the eneinyjn forfe and apiwrently 

bim in detai.. _ 

);ou. at this import ml moment, all yonr u 

J6aer»lcaaesercis,-^_^^^^^p^ ^ McOLKLI.AN. Jf^jor-'Jtner*! Coimnondinsr. 

Maior-General W. ti. F«askijx. thiiui.aa.Knj i:('i <i»ps. 

aiiua, on ttiii 14th, 1 sent him the lollowing: 


FiKlrrirl.: Srplanl'i-r M. l,<iii— 2 p. m. 
nnr dieoateh of 12 Sdinst received. Send back lo hurry up Couch. Mass 
Tm,?°f«>PS and carry 1! ,1 kensville at any cost. We shrill have strong oppo- 
Sn aUiotl, Sa.s--es As lasi »s ihc troops come up I will hold a reserve In 
?iS"ness to Buppor roa If vnu lied Ihk enemy in very force at any ot 
S^J o Ses lei me ke„v at ..ucc, and amuse then, as besl yon can so as lo ro- 
Sfah^mlli^ri. In tha event I ,vill probably throw the mass o llle arinyon 
S "pass la front of li-re. II I carry that It wil clear Ae way for you, and 
you must follow 'I'f, -f,7iTFrB."MccUxLlN'. Wr C^croi toman*.,. 

GetTarFSkta^l^Ued hi. corps rapidly forward towards Crarnp- 
Van's pass, .and at .iboe.t 12 o'clock on the 14lh arrived at Burkeltsvillo, 
iinmodiatcly in rear of which ho found the enemy's infantry posted in 
force on both fiiilesot the road, wilh artillery in strong positions to de- 
fend the appro.aehe,, to the pass. Slocnm'B division was lormed upon 
the rigbtii the load leiding through iho gap, and smith's upon the lelt. 
A Hue formed of liartletl's and Torbetfs origades, supported by New- 
ton whose activ ty was conspicuous, advanced steadily upon the enemy 
at a charge on the nglit. The enemy wero driven frum iheir posilion 
at the bale of the mountain, where tliey were protected hy a stone 
wall, steadily force i back up the slope until they readied the position of 
iheir battery on the road, well up the There Ihey inade a 
ftand They were, however, driven bick, relirmg their artillery in 
eohoion until, after an action o( three hours, the crest was gained, and 
the enemy ha:tllv did down the mountain on the other 5id.>. 

On the left of toe road, Dro ks anJ Irviu's brig.ades, of Smith s di- 
Tlsiim formed f t the protection of Slocum'3 flank, charged up the 
mountain in tlie. sa ne steady manner, driving the enemy before thm 
ontll the crest W..S carried. Four hundred prisoners from seventeen 
diBfarent organirilions, seven hundred stand ot arms, one piece ot artil- 
lery and three colore were captured by our troops in this b.-illi.iiit ac- 
tion It was conducted by General Franklin in all its d tails. These 
details are given 10 a report of General Franklin, herewith submitted, 
tnd due crerllt awarded to the gallant olTiccrs and men engaged. 

The loss io General Frankhn's corps was one hundred and nfteen 
killed, four huudrel and slmeen wounded, and two missing. The en- 
emy's loss was about the same. The enemy's position was such that 
our artillery coo d not bo used wilh any clfect. The close of the .action 
found General Frankhn's advance in I'lcasanl Valley on the night of the 
Ulh, within throe ant a half miles of the point on Marylaud heights 
where he might, on the same night or on the morning of the 15lh, have 
formed a junction with the garrison of Harper's Ferry had U not been 
previously withdrawn from Maryland beighls, and within six miles of 
Harper's" Ferry. ..,.., 

Oi> the night of the 14th the following dispatch was sent lo General 

BoLlTAR, Sfpkmher 15 — 1 a. m. 

RlNEaAL- •••»••••• 

The rammandlnr nener.,1 directs that Ton occupy, with your command the 
read fi-on, Kohre^^vllle to Harper's Ferry, placang a snllieient force ul Kid,- 
rersTllle u. hold Ihai posilion. In case 11 nhoul.l lie all icked by ihe enemy 
t-om Knonsbnro'. Endeavor to open commuulcallon with (.olouel Jlilcsal 
Harper's Ferry, atlaokina and destroyloR such ot the enemy as yon m ly nml 
ta Pleasant valley. Should you luoceed in .pcinng comniunica ion wiUi 
Colonel Miles, direct him lo join you ,v:tn his whole command, wth all the 
• una and public properly Ihal he c.ui carry with liiin Tho remainrler of the 
mns will be spiked or d-strovej ; the rest of the public propcilv will also be 
destroyed You will iTieii proceerl lo Boo«.sl)oro', which place Ihe command 
k>e General Intends lo atc-ok to morrow, and join the mam body of the army 
Utim place ; shoold you find, howover, tk»l the enemy have reueaied from 

determined lo defend the pass. He sent back" for !"''"""">','", ."T/ifi 
Buroside, who lia.l been directed lo sui'port him, and proceeded tomaKc 
a recoon lissanco of the posilion. . r . -„ i,»i«,,» 

The Soul . mount,iiu is at this point about one thousand fert in height, 
and lis general direction is from n^ rlheast to seulhwest Tlia niUiona] 
roadfroti, Kreilerck to Hagerstown crosses it nearly at r:Kht angles 
through Turner's gap, a depress.on which is some four hundred feet 

'"■The'm'ounlain on the north side of Ihe turnpike •' ''i^"''"','',™"' J^' 
cr.-su, or ridges, hv a narrow volley, which, though deep at the pass, 
becom-a asliglit dep'ression at about a mile to the north. 1 here are two 
C.UI try roads,. me to the nght of tlic turni ike and the other to Uio 'eft. 
which give access to the crests overlooking the mam road. T » oneoQ 
ihe lelcillcd the '• Old :^liar|;5biirg '»t"l. ' >f .'"■'^'"■y I""",',"'''''! 3 
about hall a m,le distant from tbo tiirnriike, until it reaches the crest of 
the raounuiin. when it bends ell to the lelt. The other road, called Iho 
"iildHaeerslowu road," pa.ssrs up a r.avine in the mom. anui about a 
mile from Ihe turnpike, and be ding to the ■» "^•"°-'' ,"'""8 ',?"„?" 
crest, enters the turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit ol 

" On'tl^ night of the 13th the positions of the diflerent corps were u 
follows ; 

Reno'scorps at Middlctown, except Redman's division at Frederick. 

Hooker's c-irps on the Monocacy, two miles from irodurick. 

Sumner's corps near Frederick. 

Bank's corps near Frederick. 

Syke^'s divii^ion near Frederick. 

Franklin's cTps at Buckeystown. 

Cotch's division at Licksvihe. ,j.h _~>-. .= 

The orders from headquarters for the march on the 14tn wen as 

luth, il.SOp. m.— Hooker to march at daylight lo Middlelovni. 
13th, 11 3 1 p. m — Sykes to move at 6 a.m. after Hooker, en Ue Bll- 
dletown and Hagerstown road. 

14th, 1 a, m.— Artniery reserve lo roUow Sykes closely. 

lsth,8.45 p.m.— TurnertomovealTa.m. a .» mm 

14ih, 9 a. m.— Sumner ordered to take the Shookslown roail to ma- 

13ih!'6.45 p.m.— Couch ordered to move to JefferBon wUh his wHole 
div sion. ^ ., „„. «.j. 

On the 14th General Pleasonton continued his roconncnssunco. U«>- 
son's batlei v and afterwards Bcnj imm's battery (of Kenr '3 corps) were 
placed on lifeh ground lo the left of the turnpike, and obtained a dtfta 
Creon the enemy's position mtbe gap. „., n--«— t 

General Cox's divLsion. which ba.l been ordered nplo stipport GeoerW 
Pleasonlon, lelX ds bivojac, near Middlelown, at 6 a.m. The 1st hrlgadj 
reached the scene of acli..n about 9 a.m., and was sent up tbeoW 
Sharpsburg road by General Pleasonton to feel the enemy and "jcortom 
if he held the . rest on that side in strong force. This was soon «»«« «» 
bo theca-o; and General Cox having arrived with the other brigade, 
and iuformaion having tei-n received from Gemral R,no that tb« 
column w.uld he supported by the whole corps, "■« '''''s'"'' ";^„2» 
dered to asuanH the f.osition. Two 20 pounder Parrotts of Sin»"»™^ 
hallerj- and two sections et McMullau's battery were lelt In 'heiw » 
position near the turnpike, where they did good service durmg tho da^ 
a..ainn the enemy's batteries in the gap. Colonel bcammoo s tNngado 
w"as depl.Ared, and, well covered by skirmishers, moved up the sloi«lo 
the left of the road with the object ot turning the enemy S'''«ht if pos- 
sible. It succeeded In gaining tl.e crest and eslablisling ''-,'■''"'"'■•'» 
spite of Uie vigorous efforls of the enemy, who p. sled iK-hind oJoto 
walls and in the edges of timber, and the fire of a b,att.M-y w hi rf. poured 
in canister and case shot ou the regiment ou the right of ho brigade- 
Col.inel Crooke's brigade marched tn columns at supix>rling d»lanoe_A 
section ot McMullau's battery, under Lieutenant ^- ■"""''«'■ ,^'''Si «^» 
serving one of h.s guns,) was moved up with great dilhculljr, aod 
opened wilh cani^iter at very short range on tbo enemy s '"^'[7.^^ 
whom (after having doao considoiabl. execuUou) it was soon silcfcced 

and forced to withdraw. .. _ ,„ 

One rcfiiraonl cf Crooi-ia brigade wna now dcplcyert oii. bcammon s 


left and the olh^r IwB In h'i r«»r. .nd they »eT«rml Uraet futfred lb. 
Irai IHit .nd nhcv.d ib. i.|i.racnii lu troDl «t thcw wDrn hard 
prS.'d. A Kcli.n orSunmerib.lUT)>,ghlup.D<l pacediD 
fhoopoi fpMO m lb. woodl, where « did gocd mtyk. durmg Ibe ml 

"tt. eo^T K-ver.! UmM .lU-ltilHcd to ret.k. Iho cr«l. edvancinp 
WMb bou" »' , 1...1 «cr« cch litn. repulfcM. Th-y then wi Udrovr Iho f 
5«rerylo.|..ii.lra..rn » iu« r.ijhl, .nd formod c«lumni. on our 
STnH It wl.» ii"« "boiil »«>n. 'ol » lull weurro 1 m lUo conli-sl wh ch 
iMWd'ationll... hour-, Uurmn which Iho rwl of the c»r|« w^». r.n. uf 
„ G°ii»rai \^M.^)<•« mv,..nD wa. ihe dm to arrive. Wh« h« reach.d 

PICi««^uD al ID a i.oK,l,.«i. The lallor lndK-.t«l that od ihe r^^ht arter 
ward^akon u,. by li'ueral Booker. General Wilcoi wa. In lb- a.l of 
OCT I'r 10 wcJl.y ih,. ground, when be rercvcd un order Iron. General 
bS.0 lomrve,^,. the old Cbar|»hurg r.«..l and lake •!««";'"'"•« 
r^hl oreriockiud lUe lump k.. Two reBimenli w.Te dourhod to Kif. 
JiSrl G"n»l C«, at hla rrqvitsu One ... l,.« of Cooke , ba.lery Wat 
ES^ ,dT«>I1i« . e-'r Ihe turn of the r.«d, (eu Ibe ore.t,) and o|«ned 
S e^ V^Tl'' l..u.-rie. acroa th. g.P. The d.vm.un wa, pro. 
?iJd™tl^.^P'.'y'oU..rl<bt of the r«.d, when Iho .ud, enly 
iw«<-1 (■« o... 1.0 u.reJ and Bay y»rd«) with a ballery which eutlla '.ed 
.il. 1 1 ii i. ■f.uiil drove (.(TCnoWs cannonnen wiib f eir Imbors, 
2Sr.'.M a' e'u :;;:'•, Z'c m wb,eb .h. ^un. ».« ncany in,. Bb. 
Se-OibNcw V.ukuu.J 17lh Mlcl.ljaa pr...opl y rallied, cban.e,! front 
nndrr a '.Mvy Ore. and mo»e.l out lo proleel the euns w.U. which Cap- 
UwC' r.-mi.hi«rt. Order was «)on restored, and the d'visnn 
formed Ui hue on ilie n,rhl cl C'X, and was kepi conccak-d aa murb aa 
2iStteuii i.r llio until the whole Hue a,lvanc«l. l w.. ei- 
KSd nor,inly to the Hre of the battery in front, but also » that of lb6 
Caleri.a on Ibe other tiile of the turnp.ite, and 1...1 

Shorl-.v beiore ll.a liaio Generali Burn^.do and R.mio arrived al tb» 
b.^ of Ibe mounlain-.anl the former directed the latter ..move np 
JTi.visinn. of Generals SmrRis and Rolr" " T" "- ,h hi i^i 
.7>.l WilcMi and lo move upon the enemy's position with hM whoU 
^,ve a. .^'n as ho was inloVui^l that General Hooker (who had |.»t 
bi^Q .lirecled .0 allack on lb« rigbl) was wuU advanced np lb. 

"T"e"iRnolbenwenl loth, front and nnsumed .he direet'on of 
JLri 'e |...-i.."..« haviun been expl ined lo hira by General P .ason- 
lo^ ihori y br for. Ibis time 1 arrived nt ihe point oecupici by General 
^,'ns .10 a.'l my hea.lquarter» were located there until the cone usion 
bJ nsde.and my hea.?iuarters were looted there untl the eoncluMon 
or lb aolion Gineial Slurdls had le.l Ins c:.rap a. 1 p. m., and reach- 
2 bo !=cue ol a.-l o-. a lou. 3^ p. m. Clarks ua.lery, o. his division, 
t« senl to awis. Coi's Icfi: by order ol General Reno, and two 
re^men"(°J«ar, land and 6lh Vew Hampshire) were deiacbed by 
G,!'n"r«n; and wnt f.'.rward a short distance on the left ol .be Inrn. 
Bk. H.« div.s.ou was formed in rear o( Wileofs and Kodman s civi- 
ion- CI lulKaircbiWebriKad. being plaeed on Ihe mrime le(l,and 
Co!oo'el HarIand-8, under GcnoraJ Bodman-« personal BU|H!ry.sion, on 

"'Mv'urd-r In move Ihe whole lino forward and uke or silenc. Ihe ene- 
mv^ab.>tLri.8 m from was execu.-d with enthusiasm, fho enemy 
SLe a dcs cra.e resistanc., cbarRin, on, advaueiug lines with Dero.- 
nc-*, but lb y were everywhere routed and fled 

Our Chi 1 less WI.S in Wilcoxs division. The enem> s hallery was 
(ouudli. b«n.n*sagorgoand bejond tU re .. h ol our infiii.ry ; bul 
£l Sisilion made un.enable, and it .a, hastily removed and not 
l^arr.'ut in posiiion near es. Bul th. balt.r.ea across the gap SOU 

''•;;l,:^,:w;c'xp?lsls my highly Ih. conduct of the nth Miehig« 
to llui aUance-a regiment which hid been .reamze.l scarcely . 
Sonth but which charged the advancing enemy In a flank manner 
SuMb, ol *e.eran tr.',,*; and also that of th. 46th lenusylvania, 
»hicb hravelv mi. Ihcm in Iholront. ,,.,,, . _„_.^ t. 

''coi°.b.lle-ryn.i*reH.pen.d fl-e. Slurgia'. division »" J""™* ♦» 
Ibo front ol Wilcois, ocrup)ing the '"^w K'°""'> «" .'""^ ."^ *? 
"rther side of the slope and hi. arllllory opened on the b.tle.les across 
lh"fi.i.. ll.e enemy mat. an edorl to tor. our left about dark, bul 
were rVputaid by >alrchilds'9 brigade and Clark's battery. 

At about -ocLk the enemy made another elTorl '? /'P^'" 'h° '"•» 
irouni al a.-kiugnlnugSturtis's front aLdiMrlnl (.<.! s. A '^I'y n'* 
*« "eplip uutil nearly » o'clock,. everal charges being •""'lo "y lh« 
enemy an.lrcp.iued with .Inughler, and w. Unally occupied Ui. hight.l 

'•Ge^'er'^irr'iri.illed Jus. b.'oresunset, while making a reeoono|^ 
■ance W lb. from, and lb. command o( corps d.f uived oiw" ..euoral 
Obi. In General lleno lb. nation lost on. ol iu best general olBccr.. 
He wasatkiillul Bobiler.a brave and houeslnian. 

There »u» no flring after 10 o'clock, and the troop, slcnt on 
uiiis ready to rcew .lie light at dty :.g»i . h«l iw .nrmy qoiniy re. 
5l«dfr.m our front durhig Iho nigbt, abandoning iheir wounded iind 
leavlns tb' in lame numbers sc.llered over the Oeld. WbI.e 
Oleic op.r.l'..iis .er.. piogressing en, lb. left of Uio main column the 
r g I inder (^.i.cral H .. ker was actively cnpnged. His c. r, s lell the 
«l«i..carv early In Uie morning, and lis advance reached theCatociu. 
ereck nboul 1 p. m. General Hooker then went forward lo ciamme 

'Afrboi't'l n'cl ck General Meade's division wa» ordered to make * 
.AMnluii m favor of Reno. Tb. following Is the order sent : 
^ KcrTEMnKR 14—1 r- «. 

imy move up oi 
a y'uu (o cotnplj 

■Ctxrr.Al' General Reno rc'iiiesullial a division of yours nmy m 
iWr^lit (iiiTl'i) ot Ui'.mHin r..»d. General Mcll-llan dr.ire. y.Mi I 

' wUk'Ww rV-.,'iH al'h..i.lij»c v.Mir vhnW corpa Id rciulUic-M to «upi)orl the muie 

'^lr;'^;r,^K.'',:l■.'■;.'rl;.'!;-"'■-mmeneed .mnnr. I-t General Me- 
• CleiWiiilM Inforiaed as »eon aa vou omimeDce your movemeut 
vKK-^i GKOBiiKII. BUlilil.h.-. . ,..,,„ 

O'lltmtL, JjnMtant AiiJulaHtGtMrau oiui Auu-di-Camp, 
UtiofO^^ml Ilooiaa. 

Meade's division lefi Catoclln creek about two o'clock, and liirned oH 

iil«lhorliilfi>mthcman io«d on th. old U.gerstown road lo Mount 

■.Tabor ciiorch. where General liooker was, and deployed a short ote 

■lance 'a aavant*;, its right resting about one and a half mile Irom the 

.tiiioplke. Ilw enemy Bred a (ew shoU fnm a battery on the mo^n 

tam side, but.dil no tonsiderablo damage. Cooper's Battery •• B, 1st 

J^BMvlvaniaiiilillery, was placed in posilloB on high ground at about 

tkroe md a half « cLick , and Bred al the enemy on the sloiie, but soon 

ceued by order << General H.>oker, and Ihe p. silion of our line* pre. 

wMUid anr further use of artillery by us on lb « pari of the Oeld. Th. 

Z . .. ' ^, ... iri. uT.a a/ni „n the vallev la the richt 

monstralicn en th. enemy's centre, np the mam rood, as MOb u *• 
movemvnu on th. ngl.l and Irti had suOlciently profress^d. The Is. 
l'enn«>lvania rifles of General Seymour's brigade were soul forward ai to le. I Iho enemy, ai d it was found mat he was In tore.. 
Mead, waa then directed lo advaiic. his division lo lb. itghl of th* 
road, so a* to ouiOjiiik them If possible, and then to move forward and 
atlaik while Hatch waa directed lo lake wilh his divWon the crest eo 
the lell of the old Hagcrttoau road, Rkkett's dlvunon being held in ro- 
sirvfc ttymoor. bngailowatsenluptothe lop ol the Hi iw, on th. 
rigbl of the ravine through which the roail runs ; and then moved along 
the summit parallel to the roa.1, while Colonel Gallagher', and Colonel 
V iirllon'a brigade, moved m ILe wmo di.ection along Ihe slop, and In 

Ihe gfound wasof tb. moat diftlcult character for lb. moremeol <* 
Uo..i« Ibe hlilmde. being very sleep and loeky, and ob'trui ted by 
.U>ne walls and limber, lb. enemy was vary soon en ounUreJ, and in a 
short lime lliea tun became general along the whole froi i ol the diTl- 
(ion The line a.lvanced steadily np tho mounta n fiJe, wh^re the en.- 
ror waa nosied behind trees and rocks, trom which he »«s gradsally 
ilsliKlged^ Iinring Ibis advance Cotooel Gallagher, commandicg M 
bngide, w,is seve.ely wounded; and tie cooiffiaod devolved upoo 
Ll,utcnaui-< oluucl Ri.berl Anderson. ... 

General Miado having reason to believe that the enemy were altcmpt- 
Ingio oulflank bim on bis .ight, applied to General Hooker lor re n- 
foiceraents. General Duryea'a brigade, o'. Klckeil s division, wss or- 
dered up, bul did not arrive unlil th. close ot the action. It was ad- 
vanced on Seymo r's left, but only one regiment could open «r. before 
the enemy ri tired and darkness inlervene<l. 

Gi-mnl M. a,le speak, highly of General Seymour', skill In handling 
bin brigade on the extreme .ighl, securing l>y his maniMTtra the great 
object of the movem.nt, the outll..ukrog ol Ibo eriemy. 

While General Mea.le was galUntly driving Ihe enemy on the right. 
General Hutch's division was engaged in a .ev.r. o nle.t K" ll>« P»- 
session of Ibe crrsl on tho left ol the ravin. ; .1 moved up Ih. ra™»- 
lom in the following order : two regiment. o( General Pa.r.eks brigade 
deployed as skirmUets, wi.h .he other two f<«'°>f" • "f '>■• »"« 
Sr^gade them. Colonel I'helpa' brigade In lino "f hallahon. 
In mas< alVeployiog distance. General IKiublcday's br gade in th. satn* 
or"? bnt^fUg up the rear. Tho ilsl New York having gon. s.ralght 
uplbesuK "'toad of around to the "ght. a. directed, the 2d Lmuk^ 
SU les sharpsh.«ters was sent out in lis place^ Phe |*' »■»> '"f J'/'J • 
bnirad« were dcp oyed in turn as they reached the wix^Js which bo- 
gM itourbiir op Ihe mountain. General Palrnk with hit nk.rmi.beM 
f"n«ew the Ore ol the ei>emy,and found hira strongly polled be- 
hi^d "fence which bounded the fpoco on the lop of the ridge, 
^° i„g on 1, sTront the wo.,d, through which our line was advaccmg, 
ud in his rear a eornfleld lull of rocky ledges, w bicb aflurded good cor- 

•;^;:;'^'b'^ga°"gi^!am.y'advanced,nnde, a hot Ore. lo Cere qnjr- 
ters and altir ten or arteen minute, m heavy firing «. boih fid.s (i. 
wKGcneral Hatch waa wounde.i while urging on bis men) tt. renc. 
Jli carried by a charge, and our line advanced a. few yard, beyond it, 

T?:ble^li^"rb';;tr, rw'lXr^'lh'^^'jLand Of Uen.™ 

n^n^m^n loVnelWainricht having been wiHinded,) relieved I help*. 

?nd ronllnied «^rB ?ir rnour and a ball ; the enemy b.bind kdge. 

HH TJa\i:g'"to'^ch^.^o^n z ^:^:z^rx. 
"^€^hrr ernvnerer:'f^r^%rg°j"de'sr/.te°;pr 

ST'^s'in're-len.UcT'w-rel^Ued by tb. TUb New York and iU, 
^■h,°jLm> brigad. ol Rcketls' division (General HarUr.trr) wai 
right. w« "•« ""K both sides of th. roounlain.and >b. troop* 


Jo^ad^^wdSm r»g. of th. « gun., which wer. flring on Ih. 
column Irom the gor^^^^ ,„„ n^ peeironi 

r roiirb-i "trroT;"i.'^:rr^££ won^^ 

When It was relieved by «""»' «";,7";%^;^^h,eSremrcd on Ib^ 
,i,i,«, Sumner's corps V'HT™?ntbirr»"te movement, handled hi. 

^;!g?;::Tt"h'-^.s;xl^;-a,;"drfp"'.f-i- 1—.-^ ^ 

,h.,r «"='l'-«'''™"irTX''r church in "l^."on to mippor. our right 
'i'!"ir~7a',v«it,on.o.upj«rlourcen«jmdl^^^^^ ^^,,^ 

General Sykes' dlrlsloo of "f"'*™ 'ZlSJht o the 14ih ihe whol. 
for the -'8'" " »'t:"^°';?-,eJ'?,'S. .Jld o1'baUie,'ln readmeM V, 
army was massed in "l« ^''''""J,°i,^„ ,. pursuit of the enemy. Al 
renew the action the next day, or torn" ^rT-^^ound that b. h*d 
daylight our •''''";''''"■ ••'^,';i:"jrti"tn'.:." eld, «>d b- wound- 
re.reated during the nigbt, leavuig ni. -~- 

*d oncared for. .,i.»„,r« were Ukcn by n» during the*, 

AlHiut Ol-Uen ?""•'"'> prlsonrjswereiay ^^^ ^^ 

Md Ibe loss lo the enemy !"»'"« "beloved that the f.'rce .p|lo.e<i 
and, P^''>'ably,,also in wounded » ''„'"^"-, .* "eorpa, (16,000,) «.d a 
^r'?"n<rir:b':re,'^rn1,lr ers.andperhap. a poruoo " ^'^^ 

Kn''«. probably some »" '>?*' '" * I jq joo men and nor lo*»c* amouiHa4 

W. went »»» «)™ -; ^.""^"ifi^^a",'? "5 22 mifSUig). 
''^'S.'SSirryfhi.'rb.V.S'u.r.eeiv.'tb. follow., very 

L,--. .Kn ™,.>..menl.. if aiiy. of the eiwmy to that direction, and one » 'VL.x" JT 

, Aral Ma«!achus«ll. cavalry waa »i ni up mc .»..ij .• —• . ■»-• — -- 
, aerao lUo movemenia, if aiiy, of the eiwmy in that direction, and one 
rtatoA'Ut of Meade's division was posted to watch a road coming hi 
thrnnedir.i'ion. TTie oUior divisions wer. deployed as Ibey came 
BP. General ll»lchs 00 Ibo letl, and General Klcketi's, which arrive<l 
alVp m. mUierear. Gem ral Gibbon's brigade wits detached from 
UaMLadiTiaiM bj GeMral ilumaido, for tb* imrpo*. of makun ad* 

,. .. J.. ,» Uiidbi«asl«u;aiidaU»lilijoo:aeMe.» 

Tenr dlspsfh '< l»-^«T r«ce4v«l uoo iwa. i , „, _ 

Ibe rebel army u posaible ^ A. USCOLH. 

M^v-Guaral McCuix^s. 



On tbA uleht of «ie battle of t^th Monntiin, orders wore given to the 

«o u^ c..inm;iu.lor3 to |.rct8 f.nward the pickets at early ihiwii. Ihia 
adv uir- revealct llie fact iliit lUo eiiemy h^d left hts poeiiious, and an 
imtn-'.lii'e p'lnmit wdsordeivd: the cavalry, under General t Wnsontou, 
BU.1 III.' three c Tps under G.-i-'crals Sumner, Htjoker, and MamOel-l (Uie 
Irtttcr ni whom h*! arrived Ihul morning and assumed c-f>inmaud of ilie 
l-'ih (rt'irUnis' corps), by the u:iliouaUurn[)ike and Boonsboro' ; the 
tori'S «•' Gi'uerals hurMstde and t'oricr (the litttcr coiHinand at ihat time 
0)nat?^tng ol but one weak divisfon, dykes') by tbe old a^iarpsburg 
ruuil an.lGeneral F.ankliu lo muve into Tk-asaui valley, occupy Rob - 
rersvdl*) by a ueucliment, and eudt-avor to n lieve Hai iK.*r's Fony. 

Oen^ralsUuriisdeand r.piter, upon reaching the road from Boona- 
boi-«' to Kolir^rsvillo to reiulV.rcc Fraukliu, or to movo nn tiharpsburgh, 
accordHiK loctrcamsvan-cs. 

Fr.itkia m -v d towards BrrtwnsvUIo and fonnd Inore a force of tbe 
♦n^^niy mu. h eup.-rior iu autnbors to bis own, drawn up ni a strong 
posit o . tu receive biin. At Urn tinae Ibe cessation o( fliing at Uarper'8 
i'wn-y iud-caied tne surrender of Ihnlpiaco. „ ,. , ^ 

liieow^ly overlo^.k ibe eotmy's cavalry in Boonsboro', made a 
daririti ci.arge, killing and wounding a ouuiber, and t^pturmg *^0 pris- 
ouTB aii'i two guns. ^, , KxhartiMia's divteion of the 2a cor|is pressing the rear guard 
Of the enemy with v.yor. p^issed Boonsboro' and KL'e<i.\bVille, and came 
«pon (ho main of Uie eneoiy, occupying in large force a BtrODg 
|>osit,<'n a tew miles beyond the laUer place. . ,^ ^ ■ ,. , 

li hvi biped w engajic the enemy during Ibe 15lh. Accordingly, 
InBtructJ.M.s were given that if thw enemy were overta^ien on ihe march 
thw MuHil I bo Mlt'u-k^d at once ; if fo-ud m l»eavy ^oice and m pusiUoD, 
the corps m advauw sh<wld be p aoed iu position lor attack, and await 
my ai i iv«l On reauhn>g ibe aovaoced positii« of our iroopp, I lound 
birt (WO divisoiffi, Richard&ou's and Syk.;'s, in position ; the other 
troops were halted iu tbo road ; the Lead of the columu some disiauce 
in veifof Rrehardson. ........ ., * .t^ 

Th<- i'Q'Wiy occnp'*^'* ^ strong position on the heights, on tlie west snie 
of Ai.ti'-iam creek, diE laying a large force of infantry and cavalry, 
wlh numerous batteries 01 aitilleiy, which opened on our columua as 
tbt-yiip.earedinsightontheK etlysvillero.danlSaarj>sburg imnpke. 
which IJrL- was returned i.y Captain Tidball's li^ht baitry, 2d United s ait.llery, and 1 eltit's uatlcry, let New York artdlery. 

The i-ivi('ion of Gei eral Rcbardson, following close on the boels ol 
the retreat ng re, halted BBd deployed near Antulara nver, on the 
right of the >liari*burg road. General Sykes, leading on the division 
©frt-gtiiarsoQ thcoU tbarpsburg road, came up aad deployed to tbe 
left 01 tK-noial Riohitr.lson, on the left <.l the roa-J. 

Aiitotam creek, in this vicKiiiy, iscrobSi-d by four stone briges— the 
Oppi r one on the Keedy.-ville and Williamspoit road ; the second on the 
Kec-'iN viite and ."-harpisburyh tunpiWe, eomi! two and a haif raik-s be 
h-w ;'Uic third about a mde bfh'w the second, on ibe Ruiirersviile and 
Shmps'-urg road; and the louith near the mouib of Antict^m creek, 
on ihc naa leading from Hariwr's Ferry to Sharpsbuigh, some three 
miks 'j.-ioAr the thn-a. Th.* stream is eluggit-h, with lew and ditticult 
fonls Alter a rawd exaimnauon of the p. sition, i found that it was 
too l.ite to attack ibat d-y, aud at once direct^jd the placing of the bat 
terries in position in Ute ctnire, and indlcateti the bivouacs for the dif- 
fi-retit curi*s muSbii.g thein and on both srlts of the tiharpsburg 
tuinpike. The corps w^jre uUall in Uieir positions untd ibe next morn- 
ing alter euBri^^e. 

0.1 the morning of Uic Ifilh, it waa discovered that the enemy had 
cbaiigcl the potilion of his b;tiU'ries. The misses of bis troops, how- 
ever, were still concealed behind the opposite heigdt^ Their left and 
centre were uixin and in front of the ^i^a^psburgh and Hagerstown turn- 
pik-?, hid.Un by woods and irregularities of the ground ; their exiiem- 
left r'Siing U)ion a woodC' emincr.ce near the cross rua;lB to thw north 
of J. Miller's larra ; their left resting up^n the Potomac. Ihcir line ex 
tended south, the right resting upou the hills to the south of bharps 
bjrth, near Hiaveley's farm. 

The bri ge over the AntiL-lam, described as No. o, near this p in t, was 
strongly covered by protected by ritie pit,=, etono fences, &a, 
and CNliUdeO by artillery. The ground in front of this line consisted oi 
wnduUimg hilis, their crtsts in turn commanded by others in their rear. 
On all favoruble points the enemy's artillery was posted and tiw-'ir re 
serves from view by the h lis, on which their line of battle wn^ 
formed, coulul manneuvre unoiserved by our army, and from the short 
Less III ihpir hno could rapidly reinforce any point Unciitcned by our 
attark. Tbcrr pusition, eirctcbing across the angle formed by the I'oto 
mac a d Aiitietam, their a^mks and rear protected by thisestreams, wns 
one (d the strongest to be lound iu this region of country, is well 
adapted to defensive 

On ibc r'ght, near KecdysviUe, en both sides of tho Sharpsburgli 
turnpike, were cfuniuer's and H.Ji>ker'8 cor|)S. In advance, on Uio right 
of the turnpike and near the A&tietam river, General Richardson's di 
vision oi General Sumner'fi cor^■« was iwsted. General Syke.'s division 
of General t'orler's corps was on iheleft oi the turnpike and iu lino with 
General Rich irdson, protecting the bridge No. 2. over the Amietiim 
T.eleitof the line, opjKtsite to and some distance Irom brktgc No. 3, 
was I ccupik-d hy General Bnrnside's corps. 

Bjfore giving General Hooker his orders to make Ihc movement which 
will presently be described,! rode to the left of the lino losatisl'y myseh 
that ilie troops were pro|)erly posted there to secure our left flank from 
any aitiick mt''e along the left bank of the AutieUm, oa well as to en 
able us to carry brntge No. 3. 

I foim I it neceSf^ary to m.iUe considerable changes In tho positloD o; 
Generul Burnsido'scoriiB, anil directed him to advance to a strong po»i 
tion iu the immediate vicinity of tho bridge, and to reconno.tro the ai* 
proachcs to the bridge carefully. In front of General Sumner's ami 
Hooker's corps, near Keedysville, aud ou the ridge of the first line ol 
tolls overlo. king the Autieum, and between the turnpike and Fry V 
house OH the right of the road, were p'aced Captaiu T.ffs, Lanjjnc 'g, 
VoQ Klei7,er'a and Lieutenant Weaver's batteries of twenty-poun<tei 
Parrott guns. Ou the crest of the hill in tho rear and right of briilg-^' 
Ko. S.CapUia Weed's three-inch and Lieutenant Benjamin's twenty 
pounder batteries. General Franklin'g corps and Gcni.-ral Couch's di 
vis ou held a position iu Pleasant valley in front of Brownsville, with a 
ttrong force of the enemy in their front. General Morell s division oi 
Porter's corps waa en route from Booiisboro', and Gene^;*! Humphrey V 
division of new troops en rouU from Frederick, Miryland. About day- 
light on the 16th the enemy opened a heavy Qre of artillery ou oi,r 
guns in posiiinn, which was promptly relumed ; their (ire was silenced 
for the time, but was frequently renewed during the day. In the heavy 
fire Qt the morning, M-ijor Arndt. commanding first battalion flret New 
York artillery, was mortally wounded whil,e diroclmg tho operations of 
hm battenee. 

It w.iB afternoon before I could move Ihe troops to their pfjsilions for 
aliark, being compelled to spend the morning in ree^uino-'tiing the ik-w 
position taken up by the eacm/, exammiog the grouud, liading fotds, 

clearing the approaches, and hurrying ap the ammunition ani mippty 
trains, which had been delayed by the rapid march of the troops ovoi 
the few practicable approaches from brederick. These had been crowd- 
ed by the masses of infantry, cavalry and artill'Ty presgingt'n with the 
hope of overtaking the enemy before he could form to resist an attack. 
Many of th.; troops were out of ratii-ns on the pr.-viois day, and a good of their ammunition bai been e.xp.ndcd in the severe action of the 

My plan for the impendiue; general engai^ement was to attark the en* 
•my's leit Willi the corps of Hooker ana Minslield, BU|)porlcd by .'^uin- 
oer'a. and il necessary by Franklin's ; and, as soon as matters looked 
favorably there, to move the corps of Burnaide ag.iinsl the enemy's ex- 
treme right, 'jpon the ridge ru:iniiig to the south and rear ot ^^h.irpg- 
burgb, and having c.irried Iheir position, to p-^ess along the crest to- 
wards our rght ; aud whenever either of thr-se flank movemcnisslionld 
be successful, to advance our cent) e with all the forces then di-< os;tb!e. 

About 2 p. m (General Hooker, with his corps, consisting of Gcner il 
Rickett's, M'-ade'a and Doubeday's divisions, was orderotl to cross the 
Airtie am at ihe ford, and at bridge No, 1, a sllort distance a'tnve, to attack 
•nd, if possible, turn the cuemy'B lelt. tleneral Sum er was ord^n-ed to 
erofcs Ihe corps of General Mans'leld (the lUlli) during the ni^ht, anJ 
hold his own (the 2d) c 'rps ready to cr^ss early the next morning. On 
retching the vicinity of the enemy's left a fhJirp coni-st commenced 
with ihi; Pennsylvania rnseivos, the advance of General Hooker's corjis, 
near ih; house of D. M'lier. The enemy were driven from the slrio of 
woo Is where he was lii»t met. The firing lasted until after dark, when 
General tlookor's corps rested on their arms ou ground wou from the 

I'uring the night Genertl Manf-flold's corps, consisting of Generals 
Wilhams's and Gi ecu's divisions, crossed the .Anttclam at the same ford 
aud briiige thai (Jencral Hooker's troo|i8 had pas>:ed,and bivouacked on 
thefai » of J. r>)ll»?ni>erger, about a mile in rear of General Hooker'g 
position. At djtyiight on tho 17lh the ac ion was commenced by the 
Bkirniishers of the IViins-ylvania ri serves. The whole of General Hook- 
er's corps was soon engaged, and drove the enemy from the 0|>eu Hold 
in front of the tirst line ff woods into a second tmc of woods beyond, 
which runs to the eastward of aud nearly parallel to the Snarpsburgb 
and Hagerstown turnplk'% 

The contest was oh£tinato, and as tho troops advanced the opposilioo 
became more determined f.nd the number ot tiic eiieo j ^re:iter. Gen- 
eral liooker then ordered up the corps of General jlansfleld, which 
moved promptly toward ibe scene of action. 

The 0rst division. General Williams's, was deployed to the right on 
appro ching the enemy ; General Crawiord's bruaile on the right, its 
right resli g on the Hi-gerstown turnpike ; on big le t General Gordon's 
brigade. The second division, t-'eneral Green's, joining the left of Gor- 
don's, extended as far as the burnt buildnigs to the north nn<l east ol 
the while church on ihe turnpike. Iiuring the deployment, that gallant 
vet ran General Mansfie'd fell mortally wounded, while examining the 
ground in front of hislroi>p3. General Hartsnlf of Hooker's corps, was 
s vorely wounded, v^bile bravely pressing forward Uis troops, aud waa 
taken from the tield. 

The command of the twelfth corps fell upon GenTal Williams. Five 
regiments -'f first divisiou of this corps were new troop?:. One brigade 
01 the second division was sent t** sui>port General Iioubleday. 

The one h udred and twenty-fourth Penn.«ylvania voluuteerB were 
pushed across the turnpilce into the woods beyond J. Miller's house, 
with orders to hold the posiii u as long as possible. 

The lino of battle of this corps was lormed, and it became engaged 
about seven a. ra., the aiuitk being opened by Kuapp't (remisylvania), 
Cothran's <N'ew York), and Hampton's (I'.tttburgh) hauerifs. To meet 
thisaitaek the enemy had pushed a strong column of troops into the 
open fields iu front of the turnpike, while he occupied the woo<Js on tfte 
west of the turu! ike in strong lorce. The woods (as was found by sub- 
sequent obsej-vaiious) were traversed by outcropping ledges of rock. 
Several hundre-l yaius to the nght and rear w 'sahiii wh ch romnianded 
the debouche »-f tho woorip,and in the fields between was a long line of 
stone fences, continued by hie^istworks of rails, which covered the en- 
emy's infantry IV- m our musketry. The same woods formed a screen 
behind which his movem'-nts were coiicea'cd, and his batteries on the 
bi-ll and tho riflo works covered from the fire of our artillery in front. 

For about two hours the b.iltle raged with varied succ^^ss, the enemy 
endeavoring to drive our troops into the second line of wood, and ours 
In turn to get posse--Bion of the lino in front. 

Our troops ultimately succeeded in forcing Ihe etiemy back into the 
woods uear the turnpike, General Green with hs two brigades cropsing 
into the woods to the led of the liunbar church, fmriug this conflict. 
General Ciawford, commanding first division after General ffihiams took 
command of the corps, wjs wuuuded, and left tho field. 

General Green being much exposed and applying for reinforcements, 
the thirteenth New Jertey, Iwenty-evcnth ln.iiana,und the third Mary- 
land were sent to his suppoi t wiih a seciion of Knapp's bjtt^ry. 

At about nine o'clock a. m.. General Sedgwick's division of General 
Sumner's corps arrived. Crossing the ford previously mentioned, this 
division marched iu three columns to the supi>ort of the attack on the 
enemy's left. On nearing the tcene of act on the columns were halte<l. 
faced to the fmut, and tsiabushcd by General i?umuer iu three parallel 
lines by brigide, lacing towards the S'>uth and west ; General Gorman's 
brigade in front, General Dana's second, and Gei'eral Koward's third, 
witu a distance between the lines of some seventy paces. The division 
was then put m raution and moved u\wn the field of battle, under fire 
from the enemy's concealed batteries on tho bill beyond the roads. 
Pasfcing diigonaliy to the fro. t across the open space aud to the front of 
the first division of General Willtums' corps, this latter division with- 

Entering the woods on the west of Ihe turnpike, and driving tho enemy 
before them, the first line was met by a heavy fire ol musketry and shell 
from ihe enemy's breastworks and the batteries on the hill commanding 
the exit from the woods ; meantime a heavy column of the enemy had 
succeeded in crowding back the troops of General Green's division, aud 
appeared in rear of the left of CH-dgw'ck's division. By command of 
General Sumner, General Howard fuced the third due to the rear prepar- 
atory to a change of front to meet tho column advancing on the left ; 
hut this line, now suQ' ring from a destructive Arc both in fronland on 
its left, which it was unable to return, gave way towards the right and 
rear in considerable cunfuBion, and was soon followed by the flrst OBd 
eccoud lines. 

General Gorman's brigade, and on? regiment of General Dana's, soon 
railed and checked the advance of the em my on the right. The second 
aud third lines now lormed on tho left of General Gormau's brigade and 
poured a destructive fire u]>on the enemy. 

During General Sumner's attack, ho ordered General Wl'liams to sup- 
port him. Brigadier-General Gordon, with a portion of hie brigade, 
moved forward, but when he reached the woods, the left of Geueral 
Sedgwick's division had given way ; and finding himself, as tho smoke 
ckarcd up, opposed to Mm enemy m force with tus small comuandi be. 


«»hdrew 14 (be rrv of !:•« bXloriM *< lb« tcconil Hoc of wxotli. A> 
Gen ral CorJon'i lro<i|« unm skul our b itltrioi on the lefl, lli.'y ojicn 
td »nb csnalur ; tbc b:iui'ric» of CapUiin Oahran, Isl New Vurlt. a.> 

but •lUiUrv.cninnuJtil b> llo .k uaut Wi<oJruff, loud nrVK^' 
aablo 10 »ilh«uiiil llm Utad y llro 111 fioul aud IIjc miuk.lry Uro (roiii 
Uta right, llio enemy naiu iuughl aboller in the wjoda and rutks btyuu.. 
tbe turniiik'-'. , 

Uuritig thu awaolt General! S ilgwIcV an'l Hani were «crlnu«I> wouu . 
•d aii.l lAk.-n from Ihi- tlcld, lieipTal Se.lj<»ii s tl..Mi|;h l«|ro woiindcl 
•a'l faiiil Irom h<M of blood, rculueu c-iiiioaiiJ of hi.^ division lor inort.* 
than an hour after lil> Ursl woiuid, animal>iig tiU cvmrnand by bw pro 

About the time of General Sedgwirk't adrance, General Iloolcer, wliil" 
argliig on ha commanJ, »»• levcrely wounded In the toot and lak.-n 
fr.ra lie Hilif, and ocncrsl Mca lo wn- placed in commmd of hn corjn 
General Uu«ard awumcd comiiinnil idler Gener.l Siiigwiek retired. 

Tlie roiHilBO of the cDcniy oO' red opiwrlunity to re arrange Itic Im'S 
aud re oisiini" Iho coinniaivU in tbe right, now Bwro or leu in ciolu 
•lOO. The bal en.aof Iho rci.u6)lvaiii» rmcrvo, pn b gh gri.un I, n m 
I I'l.ffei.b'jrgor « houj.-, o|».o d a e. and ch- cV'd several iilieni|<ts o 
the em my tu isubl*b balierict In fiout of our righi, lo turn that fl,.iii- 
and enllUuo the line". ■.,.». 

While Ihu coidlicl was so obstinately raging on the right, Genera 
French »a»|iusliiiig hsdiv.Bin agnlnsi the eiinniy otiil fui ther lo lh> 
ton. Thu dlvieiou cnwaed Iho Autiplam at Iho Mmc f'r I as Genera, 
8edg*i k.ftud mim"''i;ileiy in bis rear. I'aHsiug over Iho stream i> 
Uiiec col inns, llieiilvuin mar. bed about a nnlo from the lord, llie. 
facing to the left, more.1 III three lines towan's llm enemy , General M.i.\ 
Weber's brig-ile in front, C"loncUP»)ghl Morn 's brigaJeof iawln>0|«. 
«ndri led, a id moving f. r the Bnl time unJer Die. in the second, an. 
General Kimball's bnga Ic In the third. The division ».18 Ursl a-taiie 

by a fire of ai tillory, bul fil<>i\dily 
tnijher's, au I encouiileied th 

Ivuucod, driving In the enemy 'stk r 
inlanlry in gi-ine force al Hogr-iiiio 
kaus li on Koulello'ii lanu (.eiieral Web. r's bniiade gnllarilly advaia 
ed w.tb nn ubwaviriug front aud drove tlic enemy from lUcir pos lio 
about Iho lioiujei. . « .- , , 

While Gener il Wehor was hotly enjioged with the first line of the ei. 
emy.Geucfal Frcu' h received o. dure from General liumuer. his corp 
flomm.'ui'ler, to pui»b on wilti renewed vigor to ra-ko a diversion inf.i.o. 
01 tlieallac< ou the rithl. Uavmg tbo n w trn<iiis, who bcei 
thrown iiilo some coufiWion from their mircli IhrougiicO', i,ve 
fences, *c., to form as a reserve, he ordered tho brga^c ni Geiiei.. 
Kimball lo ihe Iront, passin,; lo Iho left of General Web. r. The en ni\ 
were presi-eJ back to near the crest of tho hill, where he wjs em o.o, 
tered m greater blfcoglh posiU'd in a sunken road forming a naiur-l rifl 
pit ruMUin; In a corlbweslerly clireetion. In a cornOeid In leaf of Ihi 
road were also strong bodies of the eut my. As the line weened ll e 
orcstoflUe hill asaduiK flro w.s oiwneil on It from the mink i. r.wlai il 
eoi-nOeltl. Here a torriUc Ore of musketry buiat from boih Iiocs,and the e nil." I al'" i le^ wiiole Ine «iih ar"! Kl.i.ithl. r. 

The enemy attempted to turn the lea of the I no, but were met by the 

7tll \' ly,.;!.! aui lo-d VolU. I'-.-ls, aoU rep.lse.i. lii...a .1. 

this tbe eiiemv matle « .leternnu d as.'ault ou the fionl, but were nun 
bjaoharg from our lin.-» which drove Ihrm back with fcveielosF 
leaving ill our hands some three hundred prisoners and Fevcral »>t.»nd o. 
colors. Tho enemy having been repulsed by the torr.ble . xecnlion o, 
Ihe batteries and the musketry Ore on thocitreme right, now namipied 
t« assi't the attack on Ge.jcrul French's division iiy asHaHing Inni on li f 
right and. n eavonng to turn Ihsll.iuk; but this alia, k w,is met ami 
checked by the Nlh In iiiina aud 8lh volunl. e-rs, and by cmiisur 
Irom CapUiin Tompkiuas balUry, Isl Rliole Is and artillery, ll.iunt: 
b«en under a-, almojil c.inliiiii.ies lire for n-.-atly four h'.urs, an I the am. 
munition nearly expended, ths division now l^iok |Kisft:on iinni"it iit..dy 
below Ihe . rest of the lieighs on which they had so na'liiul y lo ghl. 
the enemy making no altempt lo regain their loH ground. 

On the Icftol General French, Gen.ifal Kl.jiwr.lsnns d vision was liotl.\ 
engaged. Having crossed Ihe Aiiti lam aboul 9.di a m. at lie for.i 
crossed by the other divifi.ins of Sunmer'a lorps. U ninv-;.! on a In. 
nearly laiallel to ihe «nli Liin, and forme I in a ravine bJiiud ihe high 
oronnd" ovorlnokng lloulelle'e houso; the '2.1 (Iri-h) brl-.'nde.r.omniin.l- 
ed by General Mo-gher, ou tho riKlil; H"" 3d brigade, comm oi.U.l b.v 

GoneriU Caldwell, on his left, and ihc hrig.ide c-nimainiel b.e ''"I M 

Brooks f3<l Pcnnsylvai.ia vol.inleers, in 8up|h,rt. A..* Ih-: divi-i"0 niove.i 
■|l,'l to lake lis |iisiti..n on the Bel.l, ih» -oeniy d reeled a fire of m 
liliery aja 1191 il, but owing lo Ihc irrey -ir- sa ..'the gruuud did hot 

Uttl* damage. , u .i 

We.gtior's brigade 8le!i<l>l%* ^ iMVJiine eiig.ig^.l with llie 

•oeiBV p 'Siod In llio lell an.l in IroiiLol i:,...;,nl.- s li.. .*'. lie..! I 

to iin.ler a heavy Ore nearly to Ihe crest of tbe bill nverleoking 
Piper s house. Ilia enemy i<....ied in a oiiitinnalion ol the sunkeo 
roaa aud corn i.el.l belore reierred lo. Hero tho bravo Irish brigade 
oie «o uiirtn the enemy alerr.lic miifckeliy Ore. 

All orJeneral Sumner', crpi wi.s no* engag'd; Genera' bedgwiek on 
tbe right- lieneral Fren. h ill iho centre, and lieneral Ihchar.lliou . n tbo 
le<t Tn« Ir Bb brigioio s suinod lU well-earned reputation. After sul- 
f.iu g lorrihly in i.Hlceis nu.l m n, .ind strewing the ground with II eir 
ene-es as they drove Uieni baek.tbair ammiiuilion i early expend..!, 
a^.l ti.eir comma- der, Genoial M.agher, disabled by 11 e fan of his hor.« 
Sliol under bim. 'hiK brlKado was ordered lo give place to General did- 
wed s brigade win. b a.Wiiiced to a sh, rt disluuce in its rear. The lines 
were ty the Irah hi igade breaking by eon puny, to the rear, and 
Geo. al C ildwell's by comimnv t„ the front as Bl.adily as on dull, tol- 
0<.el Urookss brigade now became ihe seen. I lino. . , . , , 

The I round over which General K ehardson's and Frenfh'a divlslonr 
were owning was very irr. gnlar, iniersecled by u. nierons ravines 
kins cotered wilh growing coru, cud iwd by stone wallH, b.-hind whnt 
iceenera* could ailvano uliot.herved u(-.u auy exp aed iioiul ol out 
line*, laklng advantage ol t..l8, ihe enemy alloo pled to gain he 
right ol I'achards.-n's |K.Bition Ui a coriO.ld Koul tic 8 noiue, 
WU -re ihe eivismn hud bccoroe F.|Miraled from thai of General I- ren. U ». 
A»e ol front by the 62 .ew York an.l 2d l).la»»re voliintwrs, ol 
Col.mel Hrw.ks a bi gade ninler Colonel Kiank, nno the alt-ek nia. e bj 
tbo Wd l'e.n8yiv«l»v..lunleerB,s.ll leriher lo tho riflil 1» uib «el 
Bio-ksto eUwe this gap in ihe line, and ihe m.i«-me.t.I lb' "i-o 
i'o .U'l.> and Jib »lig n.a v. lunUers ol General Fr.-ucl. 1 dlvisiuu, 
•eloi erof. rred l", drove Ihein from the coi nil i.i i.iiJ u-sbre • the lii e^ 
Th.- brlve.le ol G.n.-rai t l.lw.dl, wilh delenni ed gn l..ntry, pu b-d 
Uu COMiy ba k uppo lie tho left and cenlre ol ihiH du i-loll, bul ab.^.l. r- 
e.1 m tie ».iMken road, Ihey »l 11 hold our for... 00 Ui.- iighl of Ca.d^ 
IteU Inchack, C..|..uel Bur ..w.con.mandig the Cist an.. M.h ^cw 
■ -V..rkrKinuni..if CUw-ir. h, .ga.!e, seen.g a l4voral.leopiA.rl1.ely, 
V«'d»«~-d .bep-gwut. .« He lelt, taking toe lino u. Ihe suukc-e r.aJ 
'*ai*,-. ».l liu-m 10 turrenUer, e,.i«uiing -ver iLrcc nuo- 
•♦Ml priaonerH ano tbr«v .la,"... of color.". . .^ ,. -, , „.^ 

jbo wb'jle 01 the bi.j|...., wlib the 6;ih and Mlb Vow York regl 
I uf toloLei Uiool .'• b. iga4o, who b d moved thf« r.f menu in- 

to the 6r»l line, now ».lranrod wilh gaTanlry, drtnog Ihe neray be- 
fore them m cen-usiOL. Into tbe corn(l.jld beyond the sunken ruad. Tht 
lelt of tbe division was now weU advan.-ed, whcii Uio oiH-my, conceal 
ed by tbe Intervening ridge, endeavored to turn lU R-tt aiid rear. 

to|.>Del CroM, 6lb X^w llam|«liire, by m rbange of frout to the left 
and rear, broughl his regiment la. ing the a.lvai cmg line. Ile/e a ajnr- 
itcd conveel ar.«e to g.-iin a c«.mman.|ing height, lliu two opptwilrg force* 
moving )«ral>el lo eaoll other, givirg and receiving llro. -Ihe frlh gain- 
ing live advanUge, fai-cd la tho rghl and delivere*d its volley, lieing 
reinforced by ttie blsl p.nnsyl-. ania, theee rrgimeots met the advance 
by a (ounlor cbarg.'. The enemy, leaving many kll.ed, weun.led, 
and priaonere, aou tbe c.dors ol the 4lb Norlli Carolina. 111 our ba. '^s. 

Anolber column of tho enemy, advanc og under slielter ol a stoDC 
wall iin.l corotlold, prcSKud down on Iho right el the d.v.niini ; but Coo- 
nel Harlow aga.n advanced ibo ttlsl and &4Ui New Yoik againft these 
ireM.>|i6, and w lb the aliack of Kiuibali's bngade oti tbo iigbl,drovs 
th.-m from this p.«ilioD. 

Our t.ooijs on the left of this part of tbe line having driven the en*, 
my far bitk, ili*y,wrth reinlorced numbers, a determined attack 
..u-e- lly in Iront. To meet this. Colonel Barlow broughl his two regi- 
ments lo their poeil 00 in line, and drove the enemy ti. rough tbe coro- 
tekl into the orchard beyonit, under a heavy fire of mui-keiry , and n 
Bre of cnniKWr Iroin pi. ees of a tillery in the orchard, an<l ■ battery 
further 10 tho right, turowmg shell an.l case shot. Tl-ta advance gave 
us possi-ssion of rii»r's house, the strong i«iii t . onteude.1 for by the en- 
emy at this part of me line, il being a delensible buil.liiig t.veral hun- 
dred yar.lB in advance of tho sunsen road. Ihe m tkelry Bre al Ibis 
point of tho line now ciasrd. HeWiug l'i()er's bouse, G«n. ral Hicbard- 
son withdrew llie 1 no a mile way to the crest ol tbohnl,a more ad. 
vantageous |a sMon. Ip l» time tbe div.M.« wa- wuhout artillery, 
and iu the new potiton suffereu severely fr. m arlillery B e whi. h could 
not be rcpiiel in. A «e, lion of KoberUou's In r».e battery, commanded 
by laenl. nam Vinci-i.t, 2d attillery, now arrive.! ou Ihe gr< unit and did 
ejcellenl service. Subs.quenlly a ballery ol bi:.ii« guns, commande* 
by laplainUiahanrs let aililbry, arrived, and was |K»led on the crest 
of tho bill, an.l s.hjii rll -need the two gixis In llie ..r. hard. A heavy 8r» 
soon ensue! between the Iwtlery further to tho 1 ighi and our own. Cap- 
Uiii Orahama ballery was bravely and skil nil) 8eried,hul unable lo 
reach the enemy, who bad iilled guns ol gr.-ater range Ibai. ogr bmoolb- 
bores, retired by oreer ol Gooeral kieliartbon, 10 euve it Irom useless 
s.icr.llco 1 1 men and taori-cs. Ih - brave geueial was hiouell mortaUf 
wounded while |« directing lis Ore. . , - 

Genera! H iiieo4-k was placed m conimiuid of Ihe division nller tbe fan 
of General Kicllardson. General Meegher's briga.l.-, now commanded 
by l>.louel Burke, ol the tdd .Sew VorK, hiving reOlled Ib.-ir carlriilga- 
boxcs W.18 iigain ordered forwar.l, and took puation in the lenlrc ol lh« 
line, 'iho .livision now.ccupied one hoc in el.4e proximity U)lbeeoen,y, 
who had c.k. n up a |«^«ilii.n in the rear ol 11|«r's liou«. c.donci Dw igul 
Morris, with the J4lh Conn.-clicui and a deuehmenl ot the U*lb New 
York, of G. neral French's division, was sent by General Fi ench lo lbs 
supiiorl af General Kiebardson's division. This command was now plac- 
ed in an interval in the Imo belwe~ '«BCral CaldwcU'sand the Irak 

The reouiremenls of the extei &a «f oadle hail so engaged thesr- 

Idlory thai the application of Ge. i a. Hancock f..r urlil,cry lor the .livl- 
sibn could n.H be coinplie-l with Immediately by lhoelii.-l ot an.l ery or 
the corps commiunlers In his vicinity. Knowing the tried courage ol the 
troous General II incck lelt conll enl Ihat he ould bold his |a«tlon, 
allhouib siilfenng irom tho enemy's artillery, bul was bo weak lo al- 
Uick M the Lreul longlh of the lino he was obl-g.d lo bold prevented 
him from form eg more than one I ne ol battle, aud, Irom his aUvaeced 
nosilon the II c wns already pan y enflla.lod by Iho baltern-eol Ibe 
enemy on the rivhl,whi.h weic prolecl.-d from our batleries opposite 
them by the woo 13 at the l.unker chur.h. 

Seeing a bo 'y ol the enemy a.lvancing 00 some ol our troojis lo tlw 
leflof his pis.ton.G neral Hancock oblumed Iloxi.m.-rV battery from 
General F.anklins eori s. which i.F8Sled maierially m fri.siraling this 
attack II al».>ate.s«d tic attack 01 the lib Maine, ol Fraukllu so- il«, 
which wilhoul other aid, made an ntiaek against the enemy's hue. and 
drove 'in skirnuslH-rs who were annoying our artillery and lr-oi» ..u ths 
ruht l-ienlena t Wo<Ornir, with ballery I, 41 artd'ery, relieved C«p- 
uin 'H<xi.ncr, whoso ammunition was .i| ended. The ewmy at o« 
l.,nc seemed to be aiwnl makieg an alt.-ick in force up..ii this pan of th. 
Il e auladvan.edalongcolumn of infanlry towards this division; bul 
on n'earing tliu i...sili.m, Gener.l I'le sonlon op-i mg on ti.era wnli tuiees 
guns th. t hailed, gave a 4.-.nll..ry tire, ami iel..-aled, cl..sing the 0|«-r- 
ali.ns on 'this poriion of ibe Bold. I return lo tbo mcidenu occurring 

"t^:-e'ri"an?iT.'"m General FranVlln-. corps arrived on the Bold 

..f b.-ilt'e, liavmg le.l Uieir camp near tranipton's l«.s» al d «. m . l.-aT- 

I. e General Co. ch wih or ors to move wiih bisdivisirm 10 occupy Mi.ry- 

.M . I- 1 1 <■'. General's division led tho eolomn, lolIoweJ by oc»- 

"?! ?m'''nlendcd to keep this corps hi reserve OS the east side ot 
Ihe AnlKl.Mii,t. operation elher Bank re. in-unecs 

ill un U10 

night r.-<liiire; but 0,1 ncir ng K.-edysviilc, llio Itr... g oil' ^ ion on U 
icht de.el..|.ed by the atlacks ol ll.K.ker and eumner. r.inlered It m 
essary al once lo send tins corps 10 the awislmce ol lb.- nthl wn g. 

mnlilon w.u. nearly exi 

ilh hie h|lc-ole. In r. him 

O.neral Br.«.k« l..r.ll.-d hl» I., ig- 
on the livin ." lienura. r i.o...... where th.-y te..lili'i.-.l ''"'i""."" 

„".der nl the day aud night, Iroqilenlly under Iho llro ol the one 

'i;'w'a''v;'?;; ihe h,i...,.le of Col I Iiw.n h.. I Kdh-n 1* kjU. 

I., '.I Ih.. ri-e ol iponnd thai the ■;>h M .!...•. by ord.'r ol Colonel Ir 
w...' Ihe C'l'"!! iHaelc :,lr.-.dv '. l.-it-l "> ....... 

Tuo sdvsiioe ul U.neral Vr..ukJiu'e Jorpa w»» oppoiluno. H'« »' 


*,rV of tlie eTiemy on llil« posiUnn, Tjut Tor llii! tlmoly arrival of his 
r„7?;,.UvoonGeneial8S..'Jgwlck'saiidFiTricl.'B divisions. 

oJn'r«rF,unkU, oidcied two bri,.a.|e8 or«e,ic,:a Slocum'. 4ivi- 
^m, G™ em Nuwton's and Ooloiu-l TorWerl's, lo lorm m <=«lumn to 
r-";uU t"iO womta tlmt liad b.-en so Hotly cont^ted before by Ocnc- 
xalB Sum M-and Hooker, general BarUetl's bngado was ordered to 
f > m ^r a retetre. At this time General Sumner, having command 
on LriJ^t dnected further ofTen.ivc to he postponed 
^ ilie ivtiulie of Uiis, the only remaining corps availaWfi ibr attack, 
would Tieril the safety ol the whole army. j- , • „ .f 

tienm Sorter's iorps, coneislini; of General Sykcs^s dirieion of 
re^v la s ^nd volunteers and General Morell's division of volunte.,^ 
rceupieda poeilion on the east side of Antiefo™ creek upon he 
mam lurnpike leading to Sliarpsburg, and directly opposite the cen- 
r?e of the enemy's line. This coips tilled the interval between ttie 
I !ht winiand Genetal Bnrnside's command, and guarded the main 
aloroMh fiom tlie enemy's position to our trains ot supply.. It wa* J 
ne^essTiyfnalch tWs pa'to> our line with the utmo.t viu.lance, 

S"«p"-a"e^?^ourTarc™W K^lxIiJiwi.h but f^ble resi^Unc^ 
S there w°re no reserves to reinforce or close up the g.ap. 

Towards Uie middle of the afternoon, procee-dms! l<> the right, I 
iowaras uie mijuie Manftield's corps had met with 

lound that ^^ai'«' « «-0°^',^^;',^°^l„,,,.^ ,,,,, heen carried from the 
ti'ld "sJv°e^ ly'wounded, fndtt aspect of aQaiis xvas anyUiing but 
tiL-ld fs^'^'^'y 7°°^ ,.^V „f ercatly expoeliig our centre, I ordered 
promis.tig. At the .fckot great y p i ^^ ,^ ,.^,,„. 

two bruavles i-ora 1 orter a coi p^ , ^ ^ ^^_^^ ^^ 

forwai'^ac^'oitlfe ASic^a^hri.Uon the mlin road to. att.iek and 
S^re back the enemy's sharpshoot^s, who were annojing Heason- 
WshSrsebattertesin advance of the bridge ; Wanen's brigade, of 
Porter's core" was detached to hold a position on's r. ut 
iortei := «f'T?; ""f , J ijft at one time with only a portion of 

Ifkj:^ divM^sin and on" "oall brigade of Morell's division (but Uttle 
Si,, -three thousand racL) to hold b'i important position. . , „ , 
GenS Sumt*er eiorissed the most decided opinion against an- , 
/.iheral^mpt during that day to assault the enemy's position In ] 
?ionc Is noit ons of our troops were so much scattered aud demoral. 
fi^S' In view of these circumstances, after making changes in the 
jzed. in view oi t»"^ irnniis I lUiected the dilTorcnt commanders 
fot;^7t^4 posittons^ani b^.ins satistied that Uiis could be done 
^itt^u. Ih^ LsistaSee of the two brigades from the ceutre, I coun- 


,<;m^roon3 alter this, but our batteries soon silenced tliera 

in tl^ m "ning of tlie 17lh General Pleasonton, with ht3 cavalry 
,div^"ion and the horse batteries, under Captahis Kober son Tidball, 
.1,1 I ieuienaiit Haines, of the 2d arUUeiy, and Captain Gibson, 3d 
^nmiV was ordered to advance on the turnpiic towards i-harps- 
t lit acro^fbrX No. % and support the left of Genera Sumner's 

t^ tIic iJl^c^heing covered i- «- °' -"caJ^Lin 'ftdba^;^' tat 
<.ra cavalrv skiTmishers were tlirown out, and Captain 1 dliausnac 

teivrdTanccdbj piece and drove oflthe sharpshooters w.h canister 

iuffieicX to eitAblish the battel ies above mentioned, wh.rdi opened 

•on the enemy with effect. The firing was kept up for about two 

hours whi^tl^ enemy's fire slackening, the batteries were relieved 

b? Ei^dS and Van Rved'^ batteries, United Blates artillery. 

A^.out 3 o'clock Tidball, Robertson,and Haines returned to the rpo- 

ilt ouson the west of AvaieUm, Captain Gibson having l«en placed 

in position on the east side to guard tile a,.proache» to the biKige. 

•TlKse bat°fJ-°esdtd good serviet, ooncenualing their Rre on the cob 

omn of the ei^ny about lo aturck General Ilancock's pcs.tton, and 

fiomnelUng it to find shelter h».'hiiMl the hills in rear.^ 

cSal Sykes'8 dirision had been in p.^ition since the 15th, er- 

Tiisedw the enemy's artillery and sharpshooters. General Morell 

?ad come up on the 16tb, and relieved General ll.chardson on he 

iight oioen'eia" Sykes. Continually, ulder the vigilant watch of the 

' ^S-^^S^ retae^ril^uiFdrOene,,! riea.o.tan hein. one 
<if2reat exposure, the battalion of the 2d and 10th United States i. ■ 
?anffy? under ciplain Pollard, 2d infaniry, was sent to h.s support. 
eubse^uenUy four battalions of regular il""!'"j'""'*"„^7;,'»'",f' .J^ 
«rUh infantry, were sent aeroes to assist la driving od the shaip- 

*'Thc"baullron"of"'the 2d and 10th infantry, advancing far l«yond 
the baiter es compelled the cannoneers of a battery o '1<'=,';™'">"» 
abandoiTthe r "ons. Few in numbei-s, and unsupported, they were 
*nable ?o bring'them ot The heavy loss of this smaU body of men 

^"rh"t™op.'''ofG'?Jral Burnslde held the left of the line opposite 
trid -e Ko 3. The attack on the right wa-s to have beet, stjpported 
tv an aliack on the left. Preparatory to this attack, on he .vening 
oJ- the 16U', Genital Burnslde*s corps was moved forward and lo the 
lert, and look up a position nearer the bridge. 

I visiWid G.meral Bumeide's poaillon on the 16th, and after point- 
ing oS^lhml'e proper disposi, ions to be made of his troops dur- 
ing the day and nij^^.t, informed hira that he would probably bo re- 
quired to Sk th? eiemy's right on llw following morning, and di- 
rected him lo make careful reconnoissances. n„„„„i. 

General Burnside's corps, eon.isting ol the of G="^™'» 
Cm, Wilcox, Rodman, and Bturgi*. was po.ted a. '»' x^'- .^;'''»°,f 
Kroiks'e brigade, Cox's division, on the right. General butrgiss div - 
i^onir^mediS'inrear. On the left was Genera Kodman's divt- 
VZ ^Th Oenefal Scaramon's brigade. Cox's division, in aupporL 

General Wilcox's division was held m reserve. 

The corps bivouacked In position on the uiijht^of the Iflb- 

Early on the morning of the 17th I ordered Genera Burnslde o 
form hl« troops, aud hold them in readiuess to aeaault the bridge in 
his front, and to await further orders. , -. . ,Ttri..,„ »„„„ 

At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieatenalil Wilson, topo- 
srrphical engineers, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of 
the Whls beyond, and to idvance along their crest upon Sharps- 
burg and its rear. 

After some time had clapBcd, not hearing from him, I despatched 
an aid lo ascertain what had been done. '1 he aid returned with the 
information that but little progress ha.l been made. , I ' >=" 'r"' ""^ 
b.aekwilh an order to General Burnside to assault the bridge at 
once, and carry It at all hazards. The aid returned to me a seeond 
time with the report that the bridge was siill m the possession of the 
«nemy. WhereSpon I directed Colonel e.i-kett, insp'^':'"'- f "-■"'• 
to deUver lo thiaavi Buftuide my posidve ord«c to push forward I 

S his troops without a momtmt's delay, and. If necessary, to earry t*« 

bridge at the point of the bayonet : and I ordered Colonel Backett to 

'1 remfhi wiOi Seneral Bnrnside and see that the order was executed 

'"Aften^iese three hours' delay, the bridge was carried at one o'clock 
by a brilliant charge of the 61st Sew Vork andSlst l''^"\'>;^^»n^ ™i 
unleers. Other troops were then thrown over and the oppostUI 
bank occnpied, the enemy retreating to the lieig his beyond. 

A bait wis then made by General Burnside's ""f"'"' ""'"I ' P' »•> 
nnnn hearing which, 1 directed one of my aids. Colonel Kej. Jo ">- 
llnm General Burnslde that I desired him lo push forward bis iroop. 
with the utmost vigor, and carry the enemy '» position on the heights , 
hat the tnOTcment was vital to our sueeess ; that this was a time 
when we must not stop for loss of life, if a great object could thero- 
Cbe accomplished. * hat if, in his judgment, his attack would faU 
to inform mo so at once, that his troops might be withdrawn and 
used elsewhere on the Held. He replied that he would soon od- 
".'ncerand would go up the hill as far as a battery of the enemy on 
the left would permit. Upon this report, I again immediately sent 
Colonel Key ti General tiurnside with orders to advance at once, « 
possible to ttank the battery, or storm it an.l carry he heigh s; re- 
Uating that if he considered the movement impracticable, to infoi in 
mrso, that his troops might he recalled. The advance was then gal- 
lantly resumed, the enemy driven from the guns, the lieigh s hand- 
somely carried, and a portion of the troops even reached the out- 
skhts of Sharpsburg.'^ Uy this time it was neariy dark, and strong 
reinforeements just then reaching the enemy roni Harper s Feiry 
•ittacked General Burnside's troops on left flink, and foiced 
them to retire to a lower line ol bills nearer the bridge. 

If this important movement had been eonsummated two hour« 
earlier, a position would have been eeenred upon the In i-l.s, from 
which our batteries might have enliladcd the gr. aler pait of heene- 
my's line, and turned their right and tear, our victory might lhu» 
have been much more decisive. 

The loUowing is the substance of General Burnside's operations aa 

^'chll'onel CioSk's brigade was ordered to storm the bridge. This 
t.iidoe, No.3,is a stone strucluie of ihiee aicbee with sloi.e pa.a- 
tets? The hanks of the stream on the opposite side aic precipilr'UB, 
Lid (»mmand the eastern approaches to the bridge. On the hi 1- 
side. Immediately by the bridge, was a stone fence running parallel 
to the stream; the Inms of the roadway, as it wouiid up the h, It 
were covered by rifle-pits and hreaslworks of '•■'""•,*';■• J '',',';^ 
works, and the woods that covered the slopes, were hll.d with the 
enemy's riflemen, and batteries were in position to enhlade the bnoge 

""GenevarKodniLnwas ordered to crofs the ford below the bind™ 
From Colonel Crook's posiUon it was found imposstt,le to car y tn« 

General Sturals was ordered to make a detail from his division foi 
that purpose. 'He sent forward the 2d Maryland and the 6th Is ew 
HampBhirc. These regiments made several successive auaeks 10 
the most gallant style, but were driven back. ,v„i, «,.„ „„ 

The artillery on the left were ordered to enneentrate their flie on 
the woods above the bridge. Colonel Crook b'""S?ht a section trf 
Captain Simmons's battery to a position to command the bridge. 
The 61st New York and 61st Pennsylvania were then ofdereil to 
assault the bridge. Taking advantage of a small spur ol the hilU 
which ran parallel to the river, they m..ved towards the bridge. Fiona 
the crest of this spur they rushed w ith bayonets hxed and cleared the 

'"rhedivislon followed the storming party, also the brigade of Colo- 
nel Crook's as a support. The enemy withdrew to still higher 
ground, some five or six hundred yards beyond, and opened a fire o 
Irtillery on the troops in the new position on thd crest of the hill 

^''oeneJ'al "Rnanian's division succeeded in crossing the ford after a 
sharp fi.c of m^ifketry and artillery, and Joined on the eft « Slrirgls, 
Icanimon's brigade c, os,ing as support General Wilcol's division 
was ordered across to take position on General S',"'«'» '"Shl- 

Tliese dispositions being enmplet. d about 3 o'clock, the eommand 
moved forward, except Sinrgis's division, left m reserve. Clark « 
and Durell'. batteries accompanied Kodman's division ; Cook s bat. 
terv with Wib-ox's division, and a seeiion of Biramons's battery wil» 
Colonel Crook's britrade. A section of Simmons's battery and Mnl- 
lenburgh's and McMnllan's batteries wore in poeiuon. 1 he oiler 
f.r the advance wa., obeyed by the troops with alacrity. General 
Wilcox's division, -with Crook in support, moved up oil both »"1^ M 
the turnpike leading Irom the britlge lo i^li.arpsburg General Bou- 
man's division, supported by Seamiuoii's brigade, on the Ml »[ Gen- 
eral Wilcox. The cnemv rclreated belore the advance of the tioo.s. 
The 9th New York, of G^eral Kodman's division, captured one of 
Ihe enemv's batteries and held it for some time. As the comm-and 
wasdr viJgllie enemy lo the nialn heights on the left of the luwn, 
Iho light .livision of General A. P. Hill arnved upon the held of bat- 
tie from Ilirpcr's Ferry, and with a heavy artillery hre njade a strong 
attack on ttie. extreme left. To meet this attack the left dtvsion di- 
verged from the line of mareh intended, and opened a gap ^'■■«^t° 
it and tre right. To fill up this it was necessary to order tlis 
troops from lire second line. During these '^"T.^'^ep^' *^«';™' "™; 
man was mortally wounded. Colonel Hailand's brigade, ol General 
Socman's division, was driven back. Colonrd Seammon's hrigad^ 
bv a change of front to rear on his right fl.,nk, saved the left lioin 
being driven completely in. The fresh troops of the ^netny l-ouring 
in and the accuraulatiM of artillery against this command, destroy- 
ed all hope of its being able lo accomplish anything more. 

It was now nearlv dark. General Smrgis was ordered fonf^d to 
support the left. Solwilhstanding the hard work in the early part 
of the day, his division moved forward with spirit. With Us as- 
sistance the enemy were checked and held at bay. 

The command was ordered lo fall back by General Cox, who 
comaanded on the held the troops engaged in ibis aflair heyoijd the 
Atitietara. The artilhry had been well »' "'■^'i"".';* "je day- I^>gh« 
cl.sed the long and desperately contested battle ol the Hth Nearly 
two hundred thousand men and live hundred pieces of arUlh ry weie 
for fourteen hours engaged in this merrRirablc ^1110. We had at 
lacked the enemy in a position selected !>>' t';=,e^V7 ™ 'Jii.S frn m 
hen in person direeting^heir operations. , We hai driven them from 
their line on one II .mk, and secured a fooHiig within t on the other 
The army of the Potomac, notwi.hstanding the moral eflect incident 
to previuu. I. verses, bad achieved a victory over an adversary in- 
v?s?ed with the prestige of recent sueeess. Our soldiers slept that 
night conquerors on a Held won by their valor and covered with lh« 
dund and wounded of the en. my. .vi-,i,. 

The night, however, brought with H grave responsibilities. 
Whether ?o renew the altick on the ISlh, or lo defer it, even with 
the risk ot the ei.t my's rcl.rcniei.t, was the question before Bie. 
AlUr a uight of auxious deUbertition and a lull and cateliil au» '••* 


of the altafttlon and condilloD of onr army, the atrenirth and potUlo- 
orthoeoeiiiy, 1 conctu'lfd that the kiiccca* or an attack on the Ibib 
waa LOl cciiMiu. I am aware u( llie TacL ih;kt, uiMur ortijiiarjr clrcuin- 
»unc(^, a Kc'K-ral >« «-x[><-ctf<l to ri)>k a battle If li<- han a ri.*aaonablc 
pro^pixt oi aucceM ; but at thia cniical Juncture I pliouli have had 
a iiurruw vl«'w ot the coDililion of the country lia<l I he«n willing to 
liax^inl anutlicr biittlc wiih leva than an atfrnute auurance of suc- 
ccM. At that iiioiDuot— Viiifihia lo*t, Wa"Iilri«ion menaced, BJaiy- 
Uml Invad'U— the ii»llonal rAu»c could aiVorJ no rUki of defeuT. 
Oi ebHttlu loai, arid nlmoai all would have bocntoat. Ix-c'iariny niiuht 
then h.4ve nwrcbt -1 a» U jili-uscd ou Wastdngiun, Bhiiiinore, Titila- 
d«l|*bU. or New Vuik. Ilcould have iLvieo lia ■upplle* Irom a fer- 
llilo and und^vii*lat('d country ; eztuitid Iribjio fruni wialtliy and 
(M>|Mi uus ciii^-*; and nnwhure east of tbe AlUgliaulet wiu there 
ani'lber ort{anir<ii force abk to arrettt iia mardi. 

Thefol uwintf areamung the cnnfidrralions whlr^h led me to doubt 
thf C4-itttinty uf sucreu hi attacking before th<-- lOlb: 

The tro<>i>« were ^re;itly overcome by lliu fitil^uo and exbautllon 
atlen<'ant upon the lung eonilnued and st.vcrt-]y conleAled b;ttile ot 
the 17th. tOKiilM'r with the long day and ni^lii mnrchea to which 
th<-^' haJ U^-n anbj -uit-d durlni; ilie previous three dny«. 

Ihe tiipply tritlii* wert* In the rear, nnd many of ine troops had 
•ull'tficd imni hnnifiT. Tin y nquiivd r »t and refrcilimcnt. 

One division of tiumncr's and all of Iluker'a corpa, on the right, 
had, after tixhink' moat valiantly for aevtrul hours, bct-n ovt rpowcrtd 
by numherrt, dr>v n back in gnat d sorJi-r, nnd much icaticrcd, so 
Uiat they were (or Itiu time somewlint demonilized. 

la Hooker's coips. according to tho return made by O.-noral 
Ucade, coinmamiiiig, iIkic wcr»j but <i.'2& men pn «■ nt on the ISlh ; 
wben»a,on the mornlugof the 2id, thiio we-re 13 0M men present 
for duty tn the a:trao corp«, showing that previ'jus to and during the 
Latllu 6 3M men w>-ro separated from their cnmiunnd. 

Qi'nentl M.-idt*, In an otluial couimuuication upon thi* •ubicct. 
dated Hrptiinb. r 18, lS6-.>, ?;.ys : ' ^ 

•' 1 enclose a Held return oi the corps mndc this afternoon, wlilch I 
deaire you will lay btfore the cnmmati-lini'g.Tioial. 1 am salUriL-d 
the great r\-diietion in the cor pB since the recent * nga..'cm*-nls la not 
docsoUly to the e;u«ualtlcs of batile. and that a considernhlc num* 
b«rof men are still In the rear, soiue lmvir!;diop|>ed out on the march, 
and many dlnper^ing and leaving ye-terJay during Ibi* tl^ht. 1 Ihmfc 
the cfll<.-iency uf the corps, so far as it goes, good. To rrsi«t an at- 
tack In our present strong position I think I hey may bcdcp«-nikd on, 
and J hope tlM*y will pfdurm duly in i-^ihc' we make anaUack, ili.>ugh 
I do not think their moiuleisas ^ood for an oUuiklve asudifea- 
•Iva rooveraeHt." 

One division of Sumner's corps had aI«o Vrn overpowered, and 
waa a guod dt-al sc*att( red and demoralized. It was not d< emrti by 
ltacorpscomnmnd<riu proper condiiiou toatuck the enemy vigo* 
rousty the n» zt d;iy. 

Somoof the n<-w (roo]:aon Iho let, aliboiigb many of them f-'ught 
wellduhi'g ih-^ battle, a-'il arc enlit'cd In g' eat creoit, were, at theciwso 
of the action, dcivcii back, onJ their morale imioired. 

Ou the morning of ihe l''(h, General Burnsxie requcfiled me to send 
bim anulher tlivis on lu assist in hohhng 1il3 p. a (h-u uu the other side of 
Ibo Antlctaai, and la enable h m to wiih<Waw his cor|» if ho «lio M be 
attacked by as- jvrior force. H^ gave mc the iini>rc8iion th^uf he wore 
attacked og^tin that morning he woulJ not be able to mnke a very vigor- 
ous re«tstauce. I vlvitd Ins tH>»'it"o eai]v,()eteiniii;od to s> nd G iieral 
Alorell's • ivhiiin to lisaitt, and <l ncted that it thould he placoil on this 
Bide of the Antieinm, In order that it mig^t cover the retreat rf his own 
corps fr'..m the uher si le o( tNo Anlicum. ft>:<MilJ tli .t be. ome iioa-s- 
•ary, at the sjm** time it was m positiou to reinforce t^ur ccutro or right, 
If that were nre led. 

Late iu the alirrnoon I fonn-I that, although he htd pot been nllifked, 
Geooral Hifr)K.<le hau wiihilrann li'S own eon s lo tit s fl lo < f iho Aulio- 
tam, and sent over Worcll's <liv -(ton alone lo h'-M ib ■ (>)ip<>Hite cl-K'. 

A large Dumber of onr hravirsi ami mnei eDiricnt bjitcrtnt hid con- 
fumed all their ammnnilion on the )6tl) and 1 tih, ami it was mi|K«rf.blo 
lo supply them until late on the folluwuig duy. 

gu|.j»lios or provisions and f ra^e had looe l>rou{{ht up and issued, and 
faranirf ammunition diAirihuteti. 

KiDa ly, reiuioi cements to the tiumher of 14 V') men— lo aav nothing 
of lrooi>«ext>Ti'>d from I'cuu&ytvaiiia^had not arrived, but were ex- 
pected d rJ'g Ibo Hiiy. 

The l^lh was, iliei.r<>r«. sp^nt In eollprthig thf* d'upr-rsed. giving rest 
lo ihe fttligiiiMl. r m:'v*ng xbti w«.nnrlfit,b.iryiiig th-^ dead,aail the ucccs- 
•ary preiMrAt o'>s u-ra rriinwat of iltf bjttii'e. 

(if the'f («, rnonii's div>imi, nii»n hmj with commendable 
ni>Mily , came up Into |Kt8:tino at a late hour in tne morning. 
pbrey's divl'K^n of new irorps, lo th»|r anilr-ty to lu l e b, 
tie which wns rsgtug, when ihry received the order t-innrrh tr< nt Kred* 
•Tick at about hHir-ia-t three p m. rm iho 17th, pitMfd forward dor ng 
the oiiltre n'glit, » nd the maps of tbe div Pion re-iehe.) the army during 
Ihe following mornirg. Hnviug murchfd more Ihm twentv three miM 
after hal pn«l ff-^ir o'clock on the preceillng a'ltrno n, thry were of 
eonrpo, gr. ally exhnnBUd. and needed rest and r^frei^hmi-ut. Urge're- 
Inforcemont-iexjt-cied from I'rnn*i> Iv,tnia never arrived. Purtng tho 
ISib orders were giv-n for a renewal of tfao attack at dayhf ht on the 

On Ih** night of the IRih the enemy, after p^«nlng troops In tbfl tatter 
part of Ihe dny Trom th" Virgiui i shnro to ih.-ir position behrnd Sharif- 
burir, «F •cpn by o'-r -fll'-em, suddenly lorme.t ihi- ^tetii^u of ab n-i.-n- 
Inr their po^iti-m, and reireating arr «* the river A" iheir line waftbni 

? short dl tanco tr«m Ihe river, thf evacuation prcMmUd but little dffl- 
uitv, a' d WIS efr cled be'o e da> light 

Ahoiit y.Totirf tbecn my's dead were, under the direction of l!nj'>r 
ravis,as«riiant in^pctor ^enrr) C'lintcd and burii-fi uihu the i>ati • 
flelii (4* ABiK tam. A portion of their dt-ad bad b<t,>n pri-v 
by the en- my. litis is ev 
tD*.t:h gresUT loss ihaa we. 

Thhteen gui s thirty nine colors, upwards of fifteen thousand stand 
or small arm", and more than six ttion-^.nd ph-'nn.TS. w-vo trip tr<>|>lu<'s 
which at tea ih» suLMeps or our army In tbe battles of South llo ntain 
Crampton sC.ip and Aut<< tarn. f* 

f*oi a ciiigle p. in or color was lost by our army dnMrg i'mhic buttle* 

AnMtlmateof thf forces m.dfr the Conftderate General I/re, mad* 
ap by direction of General lianks, liom infonnuiioii obialned by the 
examination of pi l.-oners, destriers, spice, Ac, previous lo the batue 

Tliese estimates give the actoal number of men present and nt fot 

Ourownforcesattbebnttleof Antlelam wereaa follows: 

1st cnrps l*.'^.mn. 

»^e.irp« i»^u •• 

fttti CNM-M (iNM divlaua DM arrived) .\i.'-'.^t ** 

•tb c<>rps u.yo '• 

Vlh corps Ib,?l9 •* 

12ih corps |u.i:« •• 

Cavalry dirisioo 4,.-ia * 

Total lo B«H(on Bl.lfc* 

Tabidttr rfport of eauuiUt'et in Ihe Ar%ny of the Pofnittne, *n fh$ 
hatUt of Anttetam^oH the \^(h ani \7th of Sfptnnber, ISfii 

■«--!■. odircri 

Corps and divisions. 

litsorps. MsJ.-Gen. TTooker? 

Iftt di*:s'on 


Sd ditisluo 


Sdeorpa. MaJ. 

1st div'sitin 

Sd dlr.M'tn 

Sd dlviaon 


•en. Kumntr: 

Stfc mr^ii. M:iJ.-Gen. F. J. Porter: 


X-l divuKtn 

AmiJrrjr resorve 


Cih corps, M-^J. Geo. Franklio: 


2d dlvlfclou 


9tb corps. VsJ -Cen. Ilurnslde: 

Im •.hidon 

INi dirition ,. 

iid •livis'oii 

iih divialoa 


I2lh rorps (iUo. Banks). Urlg.-Gen 
W .i; :nus [. inmdndiiig: 

ls\ rluiA ita 

rdd[ i-;..a 



Jfaj.-Oen. Courh's dirls'on 

Urn:. Mtm^rM J'lvasoiiivn, cavalry 
dltiSiOU ' 

Grand total.. 

I-...I I 


Enlisted mfn. 

» 1« 

S.-S i,>;: 


I 811 







M l.OTI 


<>> i.;«2 

:*•! l.'J'S 6. 

MS y borl-d 
ence that the enemy SitainiHl 

Of Anlielain, is us foil 

(Jeiiersl .laI^•■^ 
If-itfrii |>. H I' 

" !■■,. 

'■trot- 1 

. Kui 



-..».» f-rlL'sde.... 

!»■»• u-i tiictiuled luab<*ve. , 

24.77.<; raea. 

ZiM2 '■ 

IJ..M» " 

«.*« " 

S.UMI ** 

I\*U) ** 

6.0OU •• 

UaiDQUARTSkS Akbt or TUB P.TOJ».»C. 

Cmmj/ Mut ^aiutifuto, HeiHttuJtr 29, MriX 
OfficiaL S. WII.l.lAMS. 

\7Iiei our civa!ry advance roachel ibe river on ihe morni ^ of tb« 
19iii, It was d>s -uviT'-d netrly all lUceucmy'a forces eroased 
into Viigiiia during iho iigbl, tli'-.r rear e>c:ipii>g undtT cover of eigbi 
b;aT< rien, placed lu strong (Hisit ons uix)n the elevated bli'fT- on the o^ 
p«>^il3 bank, liencral > urier, commtu'ling the Gth corpe>, order, d a do- 
taeltm-ut irum GlUId's and Etrnc^'a brigu leJ>, under t<e. nal Griffln. M 
crtiss tbe river nt dark, and Cirry thce.c-niy's baticrk*?. lll<^ uus gal- 
lantly ilone under tbe flro of tbe eu( niy ; several gnus, vaihkuna, Ix., 
wlto takiu, and »op|K)ris diiveu baek half a mde. 

'Ihc iiiluiu):ilioi) oljtaincd du ug tbe pri>gri>a of xhSn. sfT-ir indicated 
lb»l thu mus of Iho enemy bad retnat< d tm ?he ( hai hfliiwti and Mar- 
tnsbiirg ru.>d.->, towards \ViLclut>ter. To veiiiy th 8, and io.i^<crtaiB 
iit:in* ' how far Iho enemy bad retired, Gi-ocral l'< rt> i wis authonzed to «letarb 
from hi4 corps, on the mornit'g of Ibu '.>tli, a jsirty la 
greater forct>. Tits deL-icliraeni cr- s.ed the rtver, aodadva< eed al»oDt » 
mile, Hhou it wat attacLc>l by a brgc bo<ly ot the eni my l\ < g in am- 
bush h) the wuutls, and dnvcii back acri>sd the rtver wi.b t*u(..->idi-rab;a 
[•■sa. Tirs rccoiiiioifv-'ante 8)i«vicd that the enouiy Mas £tdl m force o» 
ilie Viigmia bank of Uie I'ulomac, p.ciurod t» r«.6'Si Wif luiUisr ad- 

It was reported lo m^ on the t9lh tlat Gcnf ral Sluart fcal rea le bi« 
appearance at WMIiantstort with souoe luur ttiou>-sol ravulry a d s.z 
pieces of ai ioe<y, an<i )hat ten ili<>ii»and inr<ulry ^rre uarclm.g iki the 
same )<oi I h'oni tl)<> dim lion ot >MticlH'Tlor. I ordeicd •.i-nt-ul Coueb 
to ra^irch at once with his d>vi<^ion, a'ld a |iait of i ledsnnl'>u's cavalry. 
With Franklin's cor|>s, wiibiu 6iipi>oriitig distiuce, for the por|M-ge of eu- 
deavoniig lo capiuru mis toicc. Oenural Cotuh made a p(oni|il and 
rapid march to >VtllianuiiH>rt, an I attacked ibo eueoiy vii^urouvly, bul 
Ibcy made tliiir c»catK) acro*^ ihe nrwr. 

1 dispatched tba foliowtug tcle^raj>bic report to the gr-neraMti chief : 

IlEAnQCAaxaas >imv or the roroHAC. 

;KAm.j>4wj0. S'i^n'^r .y ISfil 
I have th«hon«r la report that Marvhnd Isant rvly i, red ii\i»ilie ^cfvrnfM 
Ol lb*! enriiix. nUohiborfn (U-ivru armss lb • i'i> '>tii ic. No i.pp<I uow 
be folft t.diivd for Uiu saiviy of reuus^bauia. I kli<4ll at ouee ocvn^ty Har- 
per's Kerry. 

G. B. McCLEI.LAIf. Mtm.L^tn. Qm. 
MxyCfn IT. W. TTuwcK. fb»i. V. .«. .<».*. 
Ou the following day 1 recelv- d ibis tt-h gram : 

\Vjisttis«:TO\, i^iirn\*»r 81. IfW^— 5 p. st. 
TTesje still I^'ft r^tlrely In th-durk in rr^.-rd ■o)-.Mr tivvu n»..wniriiis an-* 
thdiM* ni ihfi •'ii^mr. 'J'b ssliotitU uwt Im lui. Vti-j sliuuld kt:e|> our »>ivised of 
boia, so Ur as > oii know iheiu. 

U. .W IlALLKCE, C«iarMf i»af« 
W.'ijitr OnriMl .Mei'LtLlAM. 

lo wbleh 1 atwMured hi lot ows : 

UK«iHivjtniKRS ArvTorTiiK Porn* AC. 

A"i< :tlHiii'.iuij.i^^fm'*ri\ 1N2-" 

..VI, i 

Tour t'*!Tr,ini f>U^ 
and l> 
(It^ik > 
»e:\r I. 

•nrrai^ ..-. „ 

Mai-itaabtti^, 4M Ifcinnlissisr. 

_ . "P. SI, 

» r»i.lvrd. l(<*l.'.;ri|di'*.l J..II vr*'rr.| n oil 1 knew, 

inyrt.i of ilntd ths (Tviil li. Willl.Miu K f-orps 

i-.'.li'.B Ai I -liy. The rrw itf i*if:iruk.r la 

.%(>o, u biru isai (b'S nwMn>'iiiri>-.M,f «« db tbe 

: Uif> enemy is r^irtns. ritt l^hirl-s 'iivii awl 

Ua kM mgvi re-flosiipied M lUiatHStnifi by a 


•man foroft. Imt will b# out of U by morning. I IBIht he has & fores of InfMi- 
iry uear Pti'iihjwdBUiwn, 

I rftflier. 'h^it von riiiiJ it m^cewarj- to eonch every dtnpatrh I hav« the honor 
Ut rftixMre tV<mi y'm in a epiritof fault (liidinx, and thai you liavo Dot yet found 
k'iautc tu a-iy one wor.l in pmnin«uilRt!on of the receiit achievements of thie 
armv, or evrii (o allurte 'o thrin, 

1 have al'HiaiDcd from piving the number of Runs, cnloni, imaU ermi, 
prlsonrri. Jtc, faptured. until I could do so with Rome accuracy. I tope 
by to morrow e\-eniiic to bis ablo lo give at least ati approximate ■UUameiiL 
O. a. Mc»-I,K1,I-\N. i/<i;<n--fiV««-aia»nuwUM«j«f. 

Major-tleneral UallkcK, Generdl-utCMe/, WaiAuu/fon. 

Ou Ibe eamu day I telegr.iphed tie t'oUowB : 


Scpteniher W, 1661. 
Ai the, rebel army, now on the Vlrplnla side of the PotoniKC, numt In a great 
mraavire Ik* dcpen'fent for supplies of anuniiniilon and provisions upon Ktch- 
nioiid, 1 would rcapecLfiilly 8iiKtt«'*tlJiat (.Jciieral Banlta be flireclea to send 
out II cavalry lorce to cut their supply comimuilcation opposite Washington. 
Tta'.b wouid aerkiusly embarrajia their operalious, and wUl aid this army mft> 

O. B. McCLEIJi.VN, Major-Gateral Ounmandinj^ 
HrO- Gen. H. W. Hallecr, Com. V. S. Army. 

M;trj)anJ ht-iglits wore occupied by General Williams' corps on thlB 
day. and od tiiL- 22d UeueraJ ^Sumner toot possession of Barper's Ferry 
It will be ri lucmbcred that at thetimo 1 was assigned to the commaDd 
of the f<iro«.e fo the defcuco ol tho national capital, on the 2d day of 
6eptoml)er,lS62,thci;reaterpart ofall iho aval able irooiJs were Buffering 
under the. lishe.U'eiiing iufluetces of the eenous dof'-'al lb ey had en- 
couutered during the brief and unfortunate Cimpaign of General Pop«. 
Their numbere w^to greatly reduced by casualiies, their coiifldenco was 
much Bbakwi. aud lUey had lost ei.'inetliing of that "«prrt dw eorpt," 
wliioh iH uidlsp'ihsable ti ttie eflJciency of an army. Moreover, they bad 
left behind, lost, or worn out, the greatest part of the r clottiing and 
camp equipage, require*! renewal before ihey could be In proper 
coBtiiiiou t-i take the dt-Id again. 

The luteing'juco that the enemy was crossing the Potomac into Mary- 
land was ri-tveived in Wiishingtoo on the 4tb of September, and the army 
of tbe r i.tnmac was agam put in motion, under my directiou, on the fol- 
lowmg dav, so that buta very brief interval of time was allowed lo re- 
organize or procure sdpphes. 

The B^in^urna-y battled of South Mountain and Antietiira fought by this 
army a few d .ys afrerwards, with tbe rcconnois^ances immedintely fol-" 
lowing, reeuite'd in a loss lo ub of ten gt-ceral officers, many regimenlal 
and compiuy otflcers, and a large number cf enh*^ied men, amouet ng 
in th« aggregate 10 fllUeo thousand two hundred and iwputy (15^'Jiij. 
Two array corps had been s.idly cut up, aoattend, and somewhat de- 
xnuraliz^-d in the action on the ITth. 

IuGLner.ll riumner s corps alouo forty-one (41) commissioned officers 
»nd eigltt hundrea and uiueteen (SIH) enlisted meji had been killed ; four 
(4) general ulhc'^rs, eighty-nine (8'.') <'lher commissioned nIBccrs, and 
Uirue th usaud seven hundred and eight (3,708) enlisted men had been 
wouiuk'd, btsidts Ave hi ndredand forty eight (54S) missuig ; making 
he aggrcgarte It'Ss lu this splendid veteran Korps, in this one battle, Ave 
Ihiuis^iiU twu hitiulred and nine (5,209). 

in Genera Hooker's c^tj*. the casualties of the same engagement 
amouutou to two thousand six hundred and ninct^'en ('2,619). 

Tbe entire army bad been greatly exhausted by uuaviWble over- 
wore, faiimung marches, hunger, and want of sleep and rest, previous 
to the last battle. 

When the enemy recrossed the Potonwc into Virginfh the means of 
trauspoiUticm at my disposal were inadequate to furnish a single day's 
supply of suhsiste coin advance. 

Many of the tn'ops were new levies, some of whom had fought like 
veterans, but the morale of others had been a good deal imp;'ired in 
Ihuse severely contested aciioiis, and they reqiireti time to recover as 
well as tti atq^iire Hie necessary drill and disciplme. 

Uuder thrsi-' circumstances 1 did not feel authorized to cross tbe river 
with the mam army over a very deep and difhcult ford in pursuit of tbe 
retreating eu* m.> , known to be in strong force on the south bank, and 
thereby plac« that stream, which was liable at any time to risu above a 
fording et*ge, betwcrn my army and it« base of supply. 
I telegraphed un tLe22d lo the general m-chiei as follows : 
** As SLion as the eiigeu- ica of the service will a-tmit of it, this army 
should be reorgaoizeJ. It is absolutely necessary to secure its efl'icieu- 
cy, that the old skeleton regiments $hu<ild be Qllcd up at once, and oth 
cers app'iiuieu to supply the numerous existing vacancies. There are 
Instances whi re captains are coffmaiiding regiments, and coinp;i.niea are 
without a single commissioneo (.flic-r." 
Ou liic 23d th-; foil 'Wnng w;is telegraphed to the geDcral-iu-cbief : 


A«u- Skcp'trd^Kncn. s^trmt'Tr 23. 1862—9.30 a. m. 

From several difierent source* ! Ie;irn iliat General B. E. Lee is eiiU oppo- 
site lo my position lit Leesuiwn, between StiejjhirdslowD and Vaiiifisbur*;, am! 
Ihat lii-neral Jacks'>n IS ou the Opequao creek, about :hrec mdes alioVe Its 
moalh. ln'Ui with large forces Theie are also indieatioris of heavy reinforce 
meets a\o\ in ; upwards them from Winchester and t'h^irlcfltowu. I have iberi- 
fore ordered 'ienerai Ki'iiiikliu to take position with his corps at the cross 
roads abouioiie mile n<>rlliea£t ot Uakeravill«, on the Bakergville aad Wil 
hamsjiori road, and tJenfrul Couch lo establish his division near Doivrisvlllo, 
leaving Biiiricieui lorce at Willitimspoit to watch and cuiinl the ford at ih-i 
place, llie faci i.f the enf-my's remaining so lorn; in our Iront. and the indi- 
cations of an aiivance of reinforcements. KOem to InJicale ihit he will give uo 
aiioiher baulc with ail his av.dlable fores. 

As 1 nieniioiied lo you before, our army h^s been very mu'^h reduced by 
Cft-'tHallies in the recent banles. and in my jiidijmeQt all the reinforcements ol 
old troops ih.U cm possibly be dispensed with around \^'ashl^:;ton and other 
piaoes should l-e uisliuitly puslied forward by rail til this uriiiy. \ defeat at 
thiajmicture would be ruiilousto our cause. 1 cinnot think it possible thai 
ttiu en*"my wtli bring any turces to bear upon Washini^ton tdl alter the tjuestlon 
Is dttcided here; but if he should, troops Van soon be stmt backfmm this armj 
by rail to remtorce the garrison iliere. 

The evl ience I have tlmt ret^'f'irceraents are coming to the rebel army con 
■isis ii the faei thai long columns ot dust eiiending fmm Wincheso^r lo t-h.^r 
lestowo ail'' fn>m Chttrlesiown in tiiis directltm, and also iruops moving this 
way, weresi-en laaieveumg. This IscorndnTTaled bycmzeiis. General rium- 
ner with hiB corps and William's lUauk's) occupies Harper's Kerry and Ihe 
surroaiidliii; heights. I tbiuk he will be able to bold his position till reinforce 
ments arrive. 

G. B. McGLEIXAN, MajorGmeral. 

Stuj or- General Haixcck. Gfnemf in-O'irf. Wuthinffton. 

On tbe 27tb 1 made the followitig report: 


Sepl'nnf'er 27, IW^— Wo. m. 

All the InfnrmaUoD In my poaspMlon goes to prote that the m.un tiydy ul ihe 
•nemy in concentrated not far from MartMiBbiirR, with some ir<<ops :tt I'barles 

town ; not many in Wiucbeaier- Their movementsof late huve i n an exien 

Slon t'>war<l£ our right ucd beyond it. Tfiey are receiving remjurcein' Dts In 
WhirheBter, ntauily, I thmk, of eouscrlpU— perliapa enlirelj so. 

This army 18 not now in oondhinn to undei-dtke another c»mpal<!D, nor to 
brJu;:on another battle, unle&t great ulvantiges are ullered by timie mistake 
of the t^oeiny, or pressing aiililary exigencies render it nrcessary, Wc are 
greatly delioIiMi\ ill Olhcers. Mi*iiy of iJie old it-glm'-nU are reduced to mere 
skeletons. The new re^luie'iiLn need Instruvtlon Not a d»j- sh.mid h*' lost in 
filhnc the old re';niiruoi~<iiir main dependeuce — sod In supp>yuij[ vacanciAH 
among the olllccn by promotMa. 

My present purpose ts to hold the army ahont fti It Is now. renderlne Har» 
per's Kerry secure and walching tlie river closely. Intending to attack the en^ 
my riiould he attempt to ornsn to this shl«. 

Our pnasession oi Harper's Kerry elves iis the great Advnntiik.'e of a seouro 
debuuche. bm we caimoi avail oiirselven of it until ihi; r.-ilhoiid bridge la flu* 
Ished because we cannot otherwise supiily a greater number ui iroops than 
we now have on tlie Virginia side at thi*i point. When li.e river rises so that 
the enemy c.nmol cross in f'lrce, I purpose concentrating the army aonieivherS 
near Harper's Ferry, and then acnnf; according lo cirmirastancea. viz: mov 
Ing on Wmchester, if trom ihe position and attitude of tlio enemy we are hke- 
]y to gain a great advantage by doing so, or else devoting a rea-soiiable ttons 
to the organization of the army ard nistnirlion of the new troops, preparatory 
to an advRu^ie on whatever line may be determi.ied. In any event. \ regiicd 
It absolutely necessary U} send new reL'hnentaat once to the old corps, for pur- 
poses of Inyiriicllon, and th^t the old ret;lineiita be liiied at once. I have no 
rears as lo an titlark on Wa.« by the line of Manassas. Holiling Har- 
per's Kerry as I do, they will not run llu^ risk of an attack on their tlaiik and 
rear while ihe_\ h.ive the garrison of Wa^lnoj.'Um In iheir iroiu. 

I rather apprehend a renewal of the attempt In Maryland should Ihe river 
remjiin low tor a great length of time, and should they receive con»i.ler*ble 
addition to iheir force. I would he glad to have Peck'a diviaion ut huuii ns p<«- 
Bible, lam surprised that Sigel's men Khonld have been sent to WeHiein 
Virginia without my knowledge. 'Ihc last I heard from you on the subject 
was that they were at my disposition. In the last b.^ltles the eininy w a» un- 
doubtedly greatly Hupr-rior tens in number, and it was only by very hard 
fighting that we gained the advanlafie we did. Ah it was, the result at one 
period was very doubtfui. and we hwd all we coubl do to the day. If the 
enemy receives considerable reinforc'-mentB and we none, it is jiossible thiit I 
may have bto much on my bunds in thw nexi battle. My own view oi" the prop- 
er policy to be pursued is to retaui in WiliIuhkioii mei ely the torce necrssary 
to garrison it. and lo send everything elw avuil^ible to reinforce ili^s army 
The railways give ua the means of promptly reinforcing Wnshin^iton sliould It 
become iiece-.s:ii v. If I iim reinforced, as 1 tisk, and am allowed to lake my 
own eriurse. I will hoM mvself respniisihle for the 9;-«fty of W^ishi'i^lon. Sev- 
eral persons recently from Kichiiiond s iy thai ther»» are no troops ibere ex 
cept consc.ripia, and they few in number. I hope to give you it^ti-ils as tc ^ 
late uattles by this evening. I am about stai tuig again for Harper's Kerry. 
G. H. Mci'l'KldiAN. Mnjoi-General CuiiunitndttMg. 
Maj.-Gen. Hali-BCK. Ge«€ri\linChv/, Washinf/lmt. 

The work of reorganiziiijf. drilling, and 8upp;ying the army, I begaj) 
at the earln'.'^t momL-ut. iue different corps were stiitiuireu along the 
river in the best positions lo cover and guard the fords. 'Ihe great ex- 
tent of tlio river trout froiii uear Washi i-gion to Cumberland (some one 
h<mdred and fifty miles), iijeiher with the line of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad, was in be rt .-ofully watched and guarded, to proTent, il 
possible, the enemy's raids. ReoonivolBsancAS upon the Virginia side of 
the river, for the purpose of learning the enemy's positions and move- 
ments, were made frequently, so that our cavalry, which, from the 
timewc left Washington, had performed the oiost laboriims service, and 
had from the commencement ber^n deflclcnt In numbers, w.ts found to- 
tally Inadequate to the requirements of the army. 

This overwork bad broken down tho greater part of the horses ; dis- 
'Oiise had appeared among them, and but a very small portion of ooT 
'original cavalry force was fit for service. 

To such an extent bad this arm heci^rac reduced, that when GF?ne^al 
Stuari made his raid into Pennsylvania, on the llLh of October, with 
two thousand men, I could only mount eight hundred men to fo low him. 
Harper's Ferry was occupied on tbe 22d, and in order to prevent a 
catastrophe similar to the one which had happened to Colonel Mile.^i, I 
immediately ordcrfd Maryland, Bolivar, and London heights to bo 
BtroDgly I'ortiQnd. This was done aa far as tho time and means at our 
;dispopal permitted. 

The army of the enemy, during this time, remained in tho vi- 
■clnity of Martinsbnrg and Bunker hill, and occupied itself in draftii.g 
and coercing every able bodied citizen Into Ih'-i ranks, forcibly taking 
their property, where It was not voluntarily offe.-ed, burning bridges, 
and dcstrc'yiiig railroads. 

On the first day of October, his Excellency the President honored the 
army of the Potomac with a visit, and romaiued seV'^ral days, durijig 
which ho went through the dilTerent encampmenis, reviewed the troops, 
and went over the battle fields of South Mountain and Antietam. I had 
the optKiituuity, during this visit, to de^cnb^' to him tho operations of 
the army since tho time it left Washington, and gave him my reasonfl 
for not following th',- enemy after he crossed the Putomac. 

On the 6th of October, th^' divi-siuc of General O'X (about 5,000 meo) 
was ordered from my command to Western Virginia. 
On the 7th of October I received the followiog telegram : 

Wasbi.tgto:;, I). C, Oftnher fi. 1863. 
1 am Instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President dir.Ht!* llim yoa 
cms* The Potomac and give battle to Ihe enemy, or rlrive him soutti. Your 
armv inuBl move now, while the roads are gooiL If yoii cro^s tho river be- 
tween the ^nemy and rtasbli gioo, and cover the kuter by your operation, you 
can be re;nforced with 3().i>Jn man. If you mox e uo the vdilev of the SUenan- 
doah, not more than ll'.iWO or I.MX) can be sent bi you. The Presider.l ndvisej 
tbe Interior line between Washington and the enemy, but docs not order it. He 
Is very desirous thai your army move as soon as possible. Yon will lnim>^dl- 
ately report \vh.U line you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river ; also 
to what point the reinforcements are to tie sent. It is necessary that the plan 
of your operations be jiositively determined on, bel-jre ordi-rji are Riven for 
huildlns bridges and repau-ing railroads. I r.m dlre-'ted to add, that theSecre- 
Wry nf War and the general-in-chiof fully concur with '.he President lu these 
iDStrncttnns. ^ . 

H. W. HALLECK. Ganer'il^n-CJitrf. 
MfVJor-Geu3ral McCleu-an. 

At this time Geiiei al Averlll.with tho greater part of our emcient 
cavalry, was in the vicinity of Cumberlan'l, and General Kel:y, the com- 
manding oilicer, had that day rejtortcd that a largo of the inemy 
was advancing on 0:>louel OamphLdl, at St. John's River. This obliged 
me to order General Averiil to proceed with his force U> the .«up[X)rt of 
Colonel Campbell, which delaved his return to the army for several days. 
On the 10th of OcU^ber Stuart crossed the river at McCoy's Kerry wflh 
2,000 CAvalty acn a battery of horse artillery, on his raid into Maryiand 
and Pennsylvania, making It necessary to use all our cavalry against 
him This eshJiHsting service completely broke down nearly all of our 
cavalry horses, and rendered a remouDt absolutely iud^pensablo bofore 
wo could advance on the enemy. 

The following were the dispositions of troops made by me to defeat 
tbe purpitses of this raid. 

Gen ral Averiil, then at Green Springs, on the upper Potomac, was 
ordered to move rapidly down upon the north side of the river, with all 
his dispt»sablt cavalry, using every oxeriicai to get upou llie trail of the 
eoL-my, and fuUow it up vigorously. 

General Pleasonton, wiilithe remaining cavalry force, wns ordered to 
take the road by Cavetown. Harman's g;ip, and Mechauicsviilo, and cut 
ofl" the retreat of the cD-miy shwild he make for any of ih.- fords below 
the position of the main army. His orders were to pursue th^m wiih tbe 
utmiist rapidity, not to spare bis men or horses, and to destroy or cap- 
ture them tf pbssibte. 

General t.n)i'k, at that time commanding Cox's division, at Hanooek, 
en route for Western Virginia, was ordered to halt, place his men la 
cars, and remnin iu roidlness to move to any point above should the 
en.niy return in tlmt direction. kee|.ing hfs scouts wu.l out on all the 
romls lea^ling froiu the dircctinn of C^Uuuhcrsburg to the upper Potomac. 
The other commanders between Hancock and Harper's Kerry were 
Uistruetud to keep a vigilant watch \i\)OU all the load^and fords so as to 


prarcat tta mc»p& of tht r«b«Ia wlUiIn these Hmlls. 

1p«M In f^ artlcW Ihat ar« fthtmhitrfy l(in(*p'*nnM« to Om 
nUruiMl iDAnftsen forward •»(n'|f* 

eroaatoft. Ihent (o rcmHtn lo cAm. with (<team up, rntdy to more to an) 
prHnt OQ the rmtlroat] to which Stuftrt mi^ht t>« almtng. whilr Colonel 
kus&.at Kf' dork:!^ was directed lo ki:0() bis tuac^rs acoutiog on the ap 
pruacMUH rnrm Cliambcraburg , to aa U> give timely uotico to thu com 
maader of th«' two brMtv^M el the Mooocacy cro»«ing. 

Gaoera St'<nfmjui, wboaa hMUlquarters werv tb«^n at PoolsTllle, ooca- 
pfisf with hifl divufon the dltT-rmit fordnon the river tx'low th« mouth 
or the Honocary, wan directtrd to keep bit cavalry well out <m tb*^ ap- 
pruacbee frum tbo directioo of Freitorick,80 as to Rivvbim timu to ma«s 
nu trou|M at any pnlut where the enemy might attemiit to crosK the 
I'u&<miu: iiihb viclutty. Be waaiuTormedof GeueralPleiuootou't) muve- 

AlU'r Uie orders were given for covering all the fords upon the river, 
1 did not think It p()s«ible f'>r Stuurt to re^rosd, aud I b'^lli-ve'l that the 
capture or df^tnirtutn of bis entire foice wi<is pfrfuctly cerlxuu ; but 
owing to Ui<- iht'A that my ordors wre not in all cases earned out aa I 
eKpeciad , li<- •tTt-tcl his i-ecape Into Virginia wlib'tut much loss. 

Yhe tnN.|w <u-nt by i^eneral KuniRide to the Monocacy. owing to eome 
D'-fll'-cl in in't givti.g the ni^cssary orders to the coninuinder, iu^tead of 
rcmaiauic nt the niilnta'l cA>e.-liig. a« I directed, nuLrchcd four miles 
Into Fitde; ick, und there romained until alter iHuarl bad pabsed the 
rfHlmail.oTvy Six milea bcluw, near which point It was said he had halted 
Ibr hrtakCast. 

tVuntTaj i'l'-asonton ascertained, after hie arrival at HechaDicsTllIe, 
that 'he eni'iny were r>nly about an hour ahead of him, beating a boflly 
rolreat Uw^oi^ the mouth of the Mooocacy. Be pushed ou vi^oiou^Iy, 
and, near, its in>>utti. overtook them with a part of hU force, having 
niar«h(Ml sevi-nty-ei^'bt miles m twouty-four huur^.aod tiavingleft mui> 
of hit horses briit;.>u down upon th** road. Be at ouce aitai-kod with hi- 
ftrtitlery, and the firing continue<l for several hotirs, during which tim'' 
he Btat4St tliui bo received tbn support of a small portion of Genera 
^tooeinan'K commaud, not sufflclant to cITect any material damage opoa 

Geourkt SUmcman reports that, lo accordance with bis Instruolione, 
be gave a.11 ii<-rfsi«ary orders lor Intercepting the return of the rebels, 
and Colonel Staples, commnnding one of tbe brigades, states that bs 
wotHro ri'K'io'MiU i>{ infantry to th'^ mouth of the MoiKM.iry , and one 
regiaaeDt to \\ bite's ford ; that on ihc morning <T the 12tli. about tea 
o^Block, be. by (^onorul Stonemftn's order, marched, the remaining three 
Nghaeotf uf iiH command nom I'oolf^villc towards the mouth of tne Mo- 
uOCKcy ; that bifore gt'iting Into acMoi he was relieved by General 
VMwd, who stat«-s that he reported lo tieoeral Ple&soDtoo with bis con* 
maod, while the enemy wa» croeaing tbe river, and was informed hf 
htm (uen-ral Ploosouton) t .at he was too late, and that nothing ooald 
tkedooe then, 

Seneral I'le isontnn, in bis report of this affair, says : " It was at thl3 
'<roe that Cukm'd Ward reported to me from General S*loneman's dtvl- 
SKW, with a bn^ I'le of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a section of 
irtMery. I UjM liiro that his command could beof no use, as the enemy 
had then ciofi<-'d the river. These are the only trooi**, that 1 knew of. 
that were in ihnt vicinity, and this was the first Inlimalion I receired 
that any troops were endeavor ng to a.ssist mc in capturing the rebels. 
I soooeeded in preventing tlie enemy from crossing at the mouth of the 
Uonocaoy, and druvo bim to White's ford, three mSlea below. Had 
While's f'l-r d been occupied by any force of oiirs previous to tbe time of 
the occi>#atiMu by tbe enemy, the capture of Stuart's whole force would 
Itave been certtin and inevitable. With my small force, which did not 
eioeeil\irth of the enemy's, it was not practical fur me to occup/ 
tbatCord wlii.e Ihc enfiny was in Ironl " 

II would sei-m from the rer>ort of General Stoneman, that tbe dl<ipoel- 
ttoo be laad? uf blr. troops, previ^jus to the arrival of Stuart, was a good 
oofr. Be stationed two regiments at tbe mouth of tbe MonocAcy.and 
tm regiments at Whit*'> ford, tbe latter In tbe very place where the 
croeshig wis made, and the former only three miles off, with a reserve 
of thr«' repimenia at Pool«vi!!c, snme six miles distant. General Plea 
soDton's report shows that from tbe time the firing commenced until 
ihs enemy were acros.« the river was about four and i half hours. Gou 
eral !?toacman states that be started tbe reserve from I'oolsvillc at about 
nias o'ckKk. but it app'>ars, Irom tbe report of General Pleasaoton, that 
it dM not rench him until about half-past one. 

At tb(> time 1 re<:cived the order of Ocl"ber A, to croes the river and 
aitark the enemy, tbe army was wholly dcflcieut in cavalry, and a 
btrge part of our troops were in want of slioes, bLuiketA. and other In- 
dnpeiMMble articlfv of clothing, notwithsLindtiig all the cnbrts that had 
bcni made since the battle of AntietJim, and even trior to that date, to 
roflt the armv wifh cVithinr. an wHl as brines. I at onre onsulled 
ivlth Ortonet logalts, the chlff quartermaster, who belleve<l thai the 
necessary art'civs could be supplied In about thre'>< days. Urders were 
inmediately ifwued t ■ the dUK-rwit comm4nl|l■r^ who bad not already 
»0nt tft their r--qtii8it)ons, to do so at once, and ull the neccRsary steps 
were forthwith tJik-n by me to insure a prompt deliv«-ry of the sup- 
pll'«. The reqoitliioa-» were forwardtid to the proper department at 
Vfashtngton. and 1 exported that ibe articles would reach our depots 
daring the three -lays sp<x.-iIVk1 ; but day after day elapofd, and only a, 
ftmaU portion of the clothing arrived. Cor\» oommanders, upon r»- 
cetvlnKn4*tico from the quartermasters that they mi^ht expect to re* 
ceiv9ihetr supples at certain dales, sent tbe trains fur them, which, 
HtUtr waiting, were compelled to return empty. S« veral Instaneea oo- 
currod where these trains went back and forth from tbe camps to tba 
i)epo«sas ofun as four or five difTeretit time.", without receiving their 
supplies, and I was Informod by one corps commander thit hu wagoa 
train had travcl<'d over one hundred and fifty miles, lo and from ihs 
ilepiitA, before hv succeeded In obtaining bi^cl'-thing. 

Thoorpt* uf Gttnorai Franklin did nt>t get \Ut c oibing until after It 
had cronjMrd ilie r oU'niar, and wm moving into Virginia. Geikoral Key- 
BStd's cor{>e wxs delayed a day at Berlin, to complete Ik suppMen, and 
(iirneral Porii-r only c<^mpieU)d bis on reaching the vlcmity of Harper's 

I made every exertion in my pow<^.and my q^jarter masters dM tbe 
sawc, to huv<.- tbi-se supplies hurried fotward rapidly ; and I wits repeat- 
edly told that tl)f>y had (llli'il the rouisttutuii ul Washington, atid tlial the 
aaypKea had be<-u fcrrwarUird. But they di>J not come to us, aiid of 
o»an»wore Inaccusstble to the army. I did not fall to make frequvol 
raprssea tat tons of this condition of things lo the general-iu chief, and k 
appears Uiat be referred the mailer to the QaarturmaBt^r G*Doral, who 
oousuntly replnd thtt tbe supplWs had been prompily ordered. NoU 
withstanding (bis, ihi>y dtd out reach our dep^tts. 

T^ CoUowiuK oiLt-atAtf are from telegrams upon Ibis subject : 
Ilaai»qoAaTBaa Akiit or thk Potomao. 

Ort'.tmt II. I»t3-»a. si. 
• ••••••••• 

We litre b«en miklns every efT^rt to gft suppllr« of cJultituir for (hta army 

-t^f (oloiiel |n;:'«II« baa rec^i\^d KdrlrfKthiU It biu been forwunli-d by 
rea^; Mit, owln^ ui had minAe''mem on thi m«d<i, or frim «nin* oik" 


A eosses la very •;owly, and u will vkke a miwb loafier time ihao was aotfcft- 



I am e"mf>HI*d attain to eall your altrnden \n the gr^at deflri ■u.-.- nf Kb««s 
and other IndHiirnsahlc artl'-lm ^f el'^'hfni; 'hst stil! ••x'fjt (n «,,::■-■ if ih.- r.irpa 
loihii^rmy- I'umi th- --•■■■-t — ^ -' •,^ -' ■ .i**^!!!!* 

■H]<-i]iMi<'ii iip->n lofo- .. vfsj'ild 

b^ fMrv*:i-dr.l »t c.-ruii , ji,, .^-^ 

fc»*rn nud Hf«rii«r'« Frp , in nmiia 

!rel arrived. L'n'f'M •"inf iti»-,i*iiff< ,ir- uW-m : ■ .. ■■.■ r,' ;.. ■ n ,[ rnr^-ard- 
ng of thoBP luirtd'^K. there will n*c«*^iMnIy \<ra t^>r- '■■^.ioti i(t«i: t-Uv In ectttng 
the army ready m more, aa tbe m-n cann-d m»rrh w.ihifit wb-t^ Krerythtnr 
hui been done that can be doucKtthe*eh«ad(piRrtrrB toaccunuhfh th''d*-*h-e3 

«KOROK B. MoTI.KI.T.AN. W'.fw-floMM? 0»«ima«rfbw. 
Maj.-Oea. n. W. Ualleck, ff mcra/ m TAv/, Huj^inylnn. 

Bui*40ARTias, Akmt or thk PoroViLO. 

Orl-Jlw 15. IWi— 7p. SI. 

lam uslne every prjeslblr «x»rtlon U> gtA tbts anay r^^tv I* movfi. || was 
•oly yeM-nlay 'h» a part of oor thora knd < loUilmf arrived ai H.^^rwtowo. 
It U r>«in^ l»9>icd to the LriK>p« u rapMly aa |M>Kit.il4e. 

ft. H. McOLELLAX. jr..>>^ -ffnwoL 
MjVt.-Oeo. H. W. Uaixsck. G*iuraimChit/. 

UcAOQDARTEas Armv rw thc Potomac, 

General Franklin rfporu that them !■ bv no misits as inu>-li rlMbm:; .-^ wea 
called for at IInc--^*'"**" I ibuHl. lh«r*'(oni*, too hti'l b»-n^r h'tve ad<1Hinnal 
suppll^i. rxr^'^'i^hv of ahnea, forwanKd lo Harper's Kftrrr BMsotm i>a|iaw»tls. 

R H. MAKCY. rihV*'^«^f- 
Colonel R. liciAua. 

Cbre o/Calontt Rueker, (jmnrlenmuUr, TTatAinyto.!. 


General T. F, Reynolds ju»l telejiraph* ai foUnnn: " My lUtr.rrnaaAter p^ 

forts ih:u there are nn iHim-s. tents, blankets, at knipsarka si H:ti;er»tAwn. 
le wafl nbl- tft prrM-MKe only a complete siii)ply o( ovtM-i-^Ats and pants, whh ft 
few i*'(Hi». drwwiTu, ao'l Tiijla. This leAvn inmny o( ihe in-n y**t «rlUt<mt ft 
sb<>«. My requlMiion* call Iw 6.2&& pairs of skorit." 

rieasr push the shoes and sto«klii|^ up to Ilarper's Ferry as fn»t aa poaat 

R. n. MARCY. rti^/t^SHf. 
Colonel R. Isgalls, 

Q*r« of O»lontl Jfidw, Q^tarUrmcuUr . Wtttl,ir-gimL 


Camp arar KMnirUU. Md.. Or«n6«r 9, t9SI 
TondM rlchtln seodlntt clutblnc to Harptr's Kerry. You will nxitw ablcio 
send ton much or too quickly. We want biai)kets, sbof s. ranlrens. Ac. very 

Liad.-CU. aad Aiik^Ckmp. CMp/ i^NaHtamuMr. 
Cokwel C. O. Sawtxlle. 

Jjfpnt Quartermtuttr, Washington. 

nEAiKjOARTcas Armv or trr Potommi, 

Camp »>ar A'nnrpiV/v. .tfd., (yto'^ 10. \9Bt. 
Shipments to Haz^rslowD must bv m^de ■Ilr^ct ihrnu^b. to avukt Ike coo- 
lempilhiedBlayaal H^rilshUPg.. IfC'tl'inrl I'r. ii« w;*» c•^'^f^^>4 in send 
cloChlng. I hope he has senill, for tbesutTerinc and itniuilifi.i" are eite^aiiire. 

LirvL CoL and Ai-ie^U f^imp. CMrf ^wai ril^ajjlT. 
Captafak AVCDSTTS Born, fimxrUrm^Hkm . FttHiutf'phfn 


Oiittp narir Kn'xrn'if. '>*^-t W. UM. 
Baa tbe clotblnir arrived yelf If not, do you krw>a m here >t isi Wkai eliMh- 
htC was tAken by thi- rebels alCbambersburiiT Did ihiiy ruunye any onnief- 
ty thai w-ii en rooie to you T Havr we not cot eiolhine at Marrlsl'urjtT Send 
an ajtent nr^ the road u> obtain tofbrraatlon. and h'lrry up tbr anpptea. R*- 
ply at once. 

L4nd. -Cht. and Aidtit^-eamp. n,i*j ifarUrmtaitbm. 
t Osptahl GSORGE H. Wacas. I>rpot QmarUrmaMtr . fhtyrrttnyf, 

Kuari-sbl'kg. f>4^'Ci- 15. IMl 
lliavej!i»t returned from Ilacersukwn, where I huve iwreri lor Um rintMof 
for the eorps. Th^re wra nothing there but overc-i-tts, inn*»»Ti and a fe* 
unir«»rm coals ar..l &(Mt«. Th*Te werv iiM any «l>o«. liUoH'-is. »-hin«. orfih-ller 
[•■Ills. Will you plfn.'ir tell me wbere and wbrn th*" haUnre eaa be h-wl. 
' Shall I aend to Ilnri-er's Kerrv for th«-m to ninrr<iw ■ Tlie conw sameoa baa 
JitsI made a requ'siuno (or 45fiOftpllal tenU There are Moo*" a: IUc«rslowB. 
Win Tou oleaae lo loform me If I cui gel tbeai at Harper's Perry * 

General IxCAixs. „ „ . „ ..^ 

Hao«rstowi». OiWm- 15. IMl 
I want at le«l ten thmisand (W.OOO) suits of chthinc In ««ld1tlon lo wtuU t 
have received. It should be here now. 

a. W. WKKKS, AunMaM Q^rnvritrmaatm. 
Colonel I.tSALLS, (^utMrttrmtoMtr.. 

IlARrKR'S FkRRV. Or*.9<*rn. W«. 
We have bootees. I2.i<00: creatcoals. 4.0ib); drawer* aivl shfria arw «nr>a| 
blankets and siockioipi nearly so; 15.UU0c>arh of iheae four HrUcIf^Hr** wanted. 

Al.KX. Hl.r>n, 
aiptoia and A*n^^M VMn-to-noMr. 
Gsoeral IiraAlU, Chi^ QtaarUrmatt m ; d-f. 

Hfl Jlkllar'i HsAnqVAavcHS. 

rw<y-rr 24. \r^t- k\ n. m. 
Please aend u>CapUln UMss. at Ilarpar's Fsrry. lO.lAfci hlanlcis I :*>v cops, 
S OW overcoats, PUKJo pairs booiees, 2.t»XI artillery and CA*«!ry tMH>tSk 
liouu pairs slockincs. li.iMJ diawsrs. and U.oiU panta Tbe rlo-hiLK arrivea 
alnwW; t'au It not be hurried alouj faster f May I aak you lo ohtalii auiborhj 
forlhlashlpmentt ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ 

Lina.Cot. and Jidi-dt^xtmp, Ciit/ Q^irt u m m ttm . 
Captain P. O. Thomas. 

aUitary Stortiiteptr. Watkingtom. 

HaOFR-^TOWM. Ortrf^r ."ML 

GlolhlDiE has arrived IhU momtnc. Kens Uk«n by ret els Shall I supply 
Kranklln, and retain ponious lor Forler and Reynold* ","';■ •*■•?*: I!^Ja 

Oiytafo and AMiMimt QuarurmatUr, 
Colonel INOALU. 
Colonel lupillB, chief qu»rt«nnastcr. In hU r«rorl npoo Ihu subjeei, 

•' There wu great delay In recelvrng our clolhing. The ordera were 
promptly given bv me auJ npprovej by Ounera! >l.'i«». 1>«1 tbe riieiijl 
were slow to Irausporl, parliculary Ihi- Cumborlan I Valley n«cl. 

" For iMlance, clothing ordored to Uag.TfUiwn en the 7th October for 
the corn* of Knuik in, I'orler, and JWynnlds, did Dol arrive tl>«re niitU 
abotll the 18th. and by Umt time, ol course, there were mcreaMd wanta 
and ch;in;c3 in ponitlon of trwiw. The cl>thing"f Sumner arrived m 
ireal aiiaiililK* near tlie iMl oT i)ctober,aliiio8l u>o late (ur iBtiM, aa UM 
army was croisiog Into VLgluia. We BoaUy left 40,000 tull8 at Harpert 
Ferry, parU^ un tJu tart Mut oti-ived, and partly In store." 

The following etatemept, tak< n (rem a report of thc chief cinartci* 
maaler wiih the army, will ihow wluit proi(re« wa« made in eupply- 
tB< Ibe army with eiuthiiiK (roio the let of Seplimljir to Ihc Ja'e ol 
cmmlng 111' ruloiiiac on Ike :Ul ol < letoher, and that a (jreater part 
of the clolliirc lUd Dut reach our dapuU uuul afUur llie Uih of 0»- 




3 B 

S 1 

5 " 

a ? ST 






c- ^c 



-A li O 

Cavalry jaclcets. 

Flaunc! sbii ts- 


Trowsers (mounted). 

Shcltsr teuts. 

Camp k'jUles. 

Mess paus. 

>4 ta 

i s 

Overcoats (foot). 

Artillery jackets. 

Overooals (mounted) 

Infaatry coats. 

Trowsers (fool). 









EnU Ebirbf. 

The cai".so^ o^ tho roduclton of our cavalry Otcj liavo alre.iily beoQ ui- 
cUcd. 'flio tl ;Ecu!ty ia gsUiiii: now sapnlics from the usual suutc-s Ic-d 
mi loapfj'y rora:i'lobtai'j a-Ub'-.-ny lur ihe cavalry an4 artuloryoffl- 
ec-rs to inirV'ji-:e ilicir owa iiur«?3. TbofuUowiUg aro tii© telegrftms and 
le;.ers &a tb^ subject : 

Hejidqcabteus Abmt of the Pc>TO«ir, 

OciQJ'^r 12, isfi:;— I2.i3 j». m. 
tt •• ibsoliitcly necessary that some enpr:;etic means be taken lo supply th-" 
«*r»lryof lb is aim v with remount hors-s. The. presoiu rate of suaplv i?? 
(I il60i ten hundred iind (irtv i>«r wppk. for lh»« eiulro army heie and In fioiu 
of WasuiDetoa. From this immber lUe arUllerv (1r*«* fur ihclr b-iueriea. 

a. H. McCUiLbAN. Maj.'Gea. Com. 
Ganeral H. W. IIALLECK, GmfraiuiCJii"/. 

The gjnc-'ai-m-chlcf, In a letter to mo, datod \Va<;l-iinfitno, p. C., Octo- 
bet 14, 1862, replii.'S to this dispatch in the toIlowiTit; languiiRe : 

" I b-Ave r.i'isod tli*? niaiie.-.s 0otHi>latueU of ia yuur iciej;rams of Ibc 
. lltb tad 12th to be iuveslig.tteJ. 

•* Tu regard to horso', you day thit the present rntn of supply ia only 
150 per wcr:< C->r the entifo army bore and in front of Wasbiogto:). I ihui 
fro-n the records ilut the imuos fur tho last 8;x weeks bave beeo 8,754, 
inalEiDg ui average por week of 1.4.jO." 

Onfl tho-L-and and fli'ty (1060) i5 th<5 nnmhor Mitcd m th*? originai 
dcsjiiiiUh, uov iu my pui>i»(.-8)>iou j aud as not outy H^uru^ were usoU, but 

tbe Dumber was written out'in full,! nan hardly see how it ispocRihle W 
the Ifllegrapbic operator to have made a mistake iu the traDsmi«alofl of 
the mafisajG. 

llBiDQUARTEU ABMT OF TRE POTOMAC, 14, 18ti2— 7 P- «. 

WUh mv small eavalrv fbrce It is impoRsiMe for me to watch tli« line of thi 
Potomac properly, or even make tlie recuiiuwsanct^thaLare necessary fur oui 
movemenia lids makes it uecfsstiry for me to weaken my line very mnth, 
by extendiiiR the Inrantrv to Riiard the innumerable fords. Tliis will contmue 
uiuil'the river rises, and it will bo noxt te impossible to prevent the rebel 
cavalry raids My cavalry force, as I iirsed lliis morning, should be larcely 
and immedliitely iiici-t-ased. luid^r any hypothesis, whether to guard the riv«r, 
nr advance oa the enemy, oi' both. * 

Maj-Geo. HAI.LECK. ComwKi»'I«-i;i-B(>/. T, 

Th« fn'.lowin* is an extract from the; oraniat report of Co!oneI lopAlls r 
" Immediately ailor the batt'e of Anlict;ira clT-jris were male to sup* 
ply dcfi.,u-nfie3 ia cloibiof; and uor.sos. I^rgg r--'<inisi'.ion3 were pr^ 
lorftd a;!d .wQt in. Tlio a.iiUfry aiid cavalry r.q'iired large n;iiubcr8 t» 
cov r losses sublaiucd ia batilr, mi Ibo march, and by liis-jasi-S. Bo!l» 
of those arms WLH-e dcdriPiit wheu lliey left Wiishinfitou. A most vio- 
Icutand dcsimclivo diKetiHc made I'.s appcaray-ijc at tbia limi:, which 
put ii"a:ly 4,OCiO animals out of .svirvico. Horsus mKtrtcd porfecily 
well oue day wouM be dcrvl lame th-uioxl.and it was riiiftcult to fcceseo 
wU'-i-y it wiiiild erd, itr what number w mid cove: th-3 lusa. Tbey were 
a:>.ackfl M tiio bool'and louguo. No ons sectiwd abi'i toaccount fur l^ 
appearau^'j of disease. AttimaK k-^ot at rest would rt-cover iu tlm^ 
but could not tic w:irk^. I midc appic;u:on to scud Wl-si and piircbi«« 
hovspsat oi:cc,butU was refusr^d.on li)CgrouDd that the onistamliiig 
contract.'? p'-ovidcd for enoiigh, but thnj us-t-e not ddivcrtd suJ}ki^n'Jjffastf 
nor ia Euncioiit nuiobers iiMlt lale iti CVi-jbcr and early iii Nt«vcmber. 
1 wa= antUori/'d to buv 2.;'00 Uie '.v- October, Imil Uk- ut>liver/ wis u<i( 
completed until in .Vn/eiibpr, aacr we renci:ea iVar:enlr«^.'' 

in aleU'T fromCcufra! Mei^"., written oa ibi lliii of Ov.Lober, awl 
addiT.^r-cd to iVs"goncialiiwJ.ijl',it \i sLaud : " I'-.-re ":-ave oeen i«swJ. 
Ibcrc.'cro, to the army of tti-) Povom.ic, s.nco the b..nk-3 Iu frt-nt o. 
W^shlng|/'!l, toi.-pl:iCQ iCHSCS, (9,"i-l) Lino thoiiiaud two buadroi rdJ 
fi-rtv-foor hn.S''5.'' 

Whit m.iubororb-trFes were s*nt to Gcr.'iral Pope bcr.'re b;."? rctr^rB 
t J V.n diiuglcQ, 1 have do raear.s of d'Hirmiaii's ; bat the fjllowiug »t4.a- 
moiit made upon my order, by the chief quar term? star with the army, 
an I who had mcaas for g.dnfiig accurate information, force upon Bjy 
miud the coticlusiou that the Quartermaster-General was in error: 
Headquarters Army ot the Po70^fAO. 

<:i,i''/Qua>ienna.'ltr's Ofve. Oti-J^er SI. 1S61. 
ITorsPS purrlnsed since Seplemiier 6. i^V2, by Colonel Installs, rhief 
(4[i:»rternvisier. mid Issued to the forces under the immediate com- 

maud of M;ijOf-(>eneral tJeor^e li. McClellaii 1,200 

leaned and turned over to the above force l*y Captain J. J. Dana, As- ^ 

tistant li uar If r master (in Wasliini-ton) .■ — ■■ ■•. ^^* 

Is-uedto Itrrces M and near Washington which have fiinoe joined lite 

conim:*iid ■ ; ";:" ' " 

Total pMrchased by Cobnel Inealls. and issued and turned over by tap- — — 

tain Dana to thei'iiices in this immediate command ;. S,W» 

Issued by t'a|>taiu J. J. Dana, Assistant yuarlerinaster, to the lorces in 
uae ficioiiy ot Wasbiugton **™ 

Grand total, pnrch.nsed by Colonel R. Tncalls, Cliief Qnarlermaster. and 
issued and turned o^er bv Captain .1. d. I)an^. Assistant (iuariermiia- 
t^r, to the entire Army ot the Pulomac and the forces around Wash- 
Ington *'** 

About3,'X)0 hnrs^s have been t.irned over to the Q-iarlermnsler's Depart- 
ment by onicers as unfit for service ; ueaily l.Sutt should bow be lurued OTcr 
also, beiurr woru nut and diseUsed. 

Limt.'Cot. and tinai Unntuter. 

This ofllcial sUtement. moAe up from tho reports of tho qiiurtcrmas- 
ters Klio iccsivcd an,l dslribut-jil tho horses, exhibits the iruo state ol 
the cise. aud gives the toul number of hoisfs received by tho army cpJ 
therolomac, and the troops around Washington, during a period ol 
cisJit W'-eks as (7,176) seven thousand ono hundred aud sev.-nty-six or 
(2,07J) two thuuBJiiid and sovooty-oight less than tho number stated by 
the Quarterniaster-Gc'eral. 

Supposing that (1,600) lllteon hundred wore issued to tho army undor Pope previous lo its relun to Washington, as General Msigs 
ft.ites, there would still remain (57S) five hundred and seventy-eight 
horses which he does not account lor. 

The letter of the general in cliiel to tho Secretary of War on tho 28ta 
of Uctobpr, and the letter of Ceueral Meigs to the geiieral. in-chief on the 
the nth 01 Oclobor, cou\-3y the iranression that, upon my re|)cated ap- 
plications lor cavalry and artillery horses for the army of the Potomac, 
I bad rccivcd a much greater number than was really Iho case. 

It will be seen from Coionel Myers' report that, of all the horses al 
ludedtobv General Meigs, only (3.813) throe thousand eight hundred 
and thirteen came to the army, wilh which I was ordered to follow wA 
atlack tiro enemy. Of course the remainder did not in the slightest de- 
ereo conlribute to the cfflcicney of the cavalry or artillery of the army 
wiUi which 1 was to cross the river. Neither did Ihey in the least la- 
cilitate any preparations for cariying out the order to advance upon tbel 
enemy, as the general-in chief's lell;r might seem lo imply, *■ 

During the same period that w» were receiving tlie horsvs alluded lo, 
about (3,000) three thousand of our old stock w.-ro turned into Ul« 
qiiarterniasler's depai'tmenl, and 1,500 more reported as in such ceo- 
dltion that they ought to be turned in as unfit for sorvioe ; thus leariug 
the active army some 706 short of the number required to make good 
e."t,Bting tleficiencies, to say nothing of providiog remounts for men 
whoso horses had died oi' been killed during tho cam|>aiga .and thosa 
l>revi«is^Iy dismounted. Notwithstanding all the efforts made lo obtaiD 
a remount, there were, after deducting the force engaged in picketing 
the river, but about a thousand serviceable cavilry horses on tile 21Si 
day of October. 

In a lettor dated October 14. lS9'i, the goneral-in-chier says : 

" II is a'.so reported to me that tho uuinher of animals with yonr 
army hi the field is about 31,000. It is believed that your present pro- 
portion of cavalry and of animals Is much larger than that m' any otbel 
of our armies." 

What number of animals our other armies bad I am not prepared to 
say, but miliUry men in Kuropean armies have been of theopiiiinn that 
an army to be clBclent, wlirle carrying on active operations in the field, 
should have a cavalry force equal In numbers to from one-sixth to one- 
fourth of tho infantry force. My cavalry did not amount lo one- 
twentieth part of the army, and henco the necessity of giving every 
one of my cavalry soldiers a serviceable horse. 

Cavalry may be said lo constitute tho anlj;nn<t of any army. It scouts 
all the roads in front, on tho flanks and m tho of Iho advancing 
columns, and constanily feel the enemy. The amount of labor r»Ulug 
on this arm during the Maryland campaign was excessive. 

To persons not familiar w'llh the m.jvi-iuenls of lioi'ps, and the amount 
of Irausporlutiou required tor a largo army marching away Ciooa waler 


m rallrcad cnmmatilcatinns, Uia tiamber of ar.tmOs mentioned bj the 
^■••r&i-la-chier foay liiivp aji[H-arc4 uriiiot-v<^A;Liil/ Ur^v ; bui l) • oili- 
tery maa, wbo uko.i t'.io ir>' iht? to enlor Int'i au accurnio and dctailud 
compututiuD of tUo iiuiiibc>r H [xmn-la uf lub^^iot nee and fnraifr- rer|'iired 
for feucfa au army as tlial of the E'utoinic, U wiil h<< #c«d tbal the mjOOO 
«Diiualii «'cru cuiuiKiuiably lu^ lUaa w^ absoliAuty necessar/ lo ad 

As wc wre roquirM to moro thmnf;h a cotmtrjr which could not h« 
dcpcud 'd uiton fur any of our suirjihwi, H b"cam9 u«:cs«nry lo lf»n»i|>oPt 
•verytbiitg in wagout, and to bu |»re[iared for all Oln).TKcnci(^^ I dtd out 
couiiUvr It tmX^ tu luttvo Ihc rivvr wiiboui aubaulcDCc aaU Tura^c for tun 

'i:ip oinrial returns nf that dat« xhnw th« acercttato «trrnRth of the 
army for duty to have been abmit Mp,000 m'^nof a!i .1 ms nusat-l p.ti 
ioclu'k' I'-.m-ior*, rmt-n cm 'ii'V^. -.Wo-ni' S'^rvanU, &c., amuuntlti£ 
to«onic l'J,0O0, whicit ^ik\t> a ^>lal ol I'J^.OOU in*-Q. 

!nie<(<ibM<)i ■live ai< oe nf this arfny for lea dayd required for lis trjD< 
ftortatioii i,t}'^ ^Jt;ua4 at 2/HM'pouuU9 to ibo w;ijv>o, and 10,9JM) 

•Our cavalrv horses at that tioi« amounted to 5,049, u<l oor vtillery 
bonct u> 6.s3r>. 

To trans|K>rl ruH f'trape r»rlhp«e 22 8«2 inimi'j for ten days re^nlred 
17,832 a-ItiiiHinal aniin.'iis ; an I tins loraijo f^'-)!!! I only siirjdy tlio . iit'ic 
luumb'T ('l<).''94) ni nuinmla wilb a small frociiou ovwr ball aMonaucc 
Tor the timcppe^jiQcd. 

It Will bu uu,-> . vo I that this psilmata does not embrace tho animuls 
occc£S.iry t<» tiaii*:]K>rt qua't rmasl^rs' eucphe?, bagi;«j;e, cump cqu'p 
age, aniliu'anc-ff. ri-gcrvo .nmrnunltion, forajre, lor ofllr Ta' buritL-s, toe., 
wbi<:h wwiM gre.itly aiicmfnt tbo nocepsary tranaporlation. 

It may very truly bv* sjikI that we dil m ik« th- mirch wHh the 
sneans at our (Ii5]<u*al, bit it will be remembered wc met with no 
various «p(V)fiilioii from tbc en<>my ; neittierdid wo cncoanlcr delays 
from any otlior can^c. The roads were tn excellent cotiditiun, auU the 
(roopd miTlicd with the ntost c/»mm2n<Inb'n* order and celerity. 

If wc hfJ mot With a deu>rniioed rojisionco from tho enemy, and oor 
progTc*^ bal boon very much rclardcd Ih reby, we wotild Jiitc on- 
sumed our supplies b'rforc Ibf^y could have been renewed. A proiicr 
ealimate of iny roBix-n^ibiiiLi.-s aa the c^'mm-mdcr of that arntydul 
uuljust:fy me m hasinK my prepaiatinns for the cx]H*ditinii ufjo lue 
SupiKJAiLioa that I wx'^ X*} have au uiiiutorruptud raarcli. Ua tbo con 
trary, It was my duly to be prt-parcd lor ull emt^PKcncica ; and ii»>l tbo 
leafit imiKirtaril of my rcRpottsibillliL'S wa« the duty of iimkiiig ainplu 
provi^Hii lur 8uppiy>ng my men and aiiim^ils with rations and to'age. 

Kuowuiif ihci feuiicitude of the I're^'ideut fur liu early iniiv m---til, and 
•hating with bim folly his anzety f»r prompt a'tiua.uu th^ ihil ul 
Oclobcr I iLlcgta^cU lo the geucral-in chicl as follows: 

UcaiMiOAftTEas Aaur or ths Pomvir, 

<kioUr ■i\,\?/i\ 

fbwn the ree*lpt of th^ Preinilent'i order lo move on lh« ciMsmy. I have been 
maklncevfrv «>it*nioi) 10 g<l Lbia ariay sapiih^^d wilh cluLbiug absolutely uc- 
'cessftry for iinu-cliuis. 

Thta, I am liai>i»y 10 say. Is now nearty RC'n>m[>nihed. I hnve sIbo. during 
OteuRip tiiiif. I'eif ;tw.ll> wr-AftX upon youlb^ imporiaueeof aupplyins: caralry 
aiid Knillcry lt'ii>.-s u^ replace lhos<; b'rr^k^n doM u by hard sei-vice, and siepi 
hare b*en tik'-ii i-» insure a prompt delivery. 

Oar Citvali y, rv-eii wli<:ii wfll supplied with horses. Is murh infnrlor In num- 
bers to thai o[ the en^nir. but In eiUi-iency hits proved itself superior. 80 
Joreibly has that Ix-f n imprc-wieil »h our old re;,'tfieiua by repealed surcewp*. 
that the men are liilly pcitiuaded tint tliey aie equal lo twice their uuinOer of 
rebel eavairv. 

Excluaive of ihe caralry foree now enpii-cd In pickctioff the river. I huve 
*Bat at preicnt over one th'>u«and fl.t^Xf) linn»e» tor B«-rvic«. (Hli««rilnve 
been tent m vanouti dinM-tiont to purchisti ho.-te«. and I ezpecuhem toon. 
Vtthcut more cavalry hnraea. our corDrpimii-Hlioiui, from the mometil we 
march. woi;)d b** at the mi-rcv o( ihe lanje eavairy fitrce ol the enemv, and it 
Srould not be pouihle lor ua to rncfr our tlmiks properly, nr to ol>Ltin ih^ ne- 
o^UJiry iiiform'ttion of the iioitiiiim and m<*vcinenta fif the t^ncmy. m such a 
WMy Ksto tiih'ire siu-cr>st(. My eaucrtenee b;u ahowa the uecessity of a hix^e 
^d ffllci»*nl cjtvairy force. 

■ Under the lorn-.'Oins cirr-nmiiUncPS. T hes leave to aak whether the P real - 
deotdeare* mt; to n^'ii-ch on the eiifmy hi once, or to Hwait ihf! recet>tioo of 
Um new buraca, ^xkc}/ powiblc step banns beeu lakeu lu tiuare Uieir prompt 

GEO. B. UcCLELLAN.Jft^.-ffM. Com. 

Major -ften^ral XIwimck. 

C«nfialtHChttj\ ITaJiitttjtim. 

Ob tlic same day Ucuoral il^.let^k replied aa follows • 

' WisHiNCTOM. Odohfr JI. 1862 — ^ j». m. 

Vour [*l*'?rftm of 12 m has h*pn lu^iniued Ui the I'remdeiit. He di recta 
ue tn a\v Uial he hnn no chaiiue to mtke in his onlrr of the tith liialaul. 

I' V'tu have not U>*eu and «re not now. in eoHilitioo lo »l>ey tt. yon will b# 
•ii.-lr tn t-Ji .(V tiich winil fif alillUy. The [• Ifiti does no* expert ImpoMlblli- 
lies; Utu he ;a k<.i-^ aniiu'it Ihat «1I tbis soud weather nhuuli uot be wasted to 
Ina'-tU iiy. Tele|,Tapb when yov wdl move, and on what Unet you propose W 

XI. W. HAIXBCK, GouraJinChi^. 


Jioiu lUi? tvnmr 01 tills dospalch I conceived that it w.\s left for my 
Ju<lem?nt lo diKidc wtiot ler or not it was pjs^iblo to moro with s-ifoty 
to the army at iha*, time ; and ibis re^poiiMbility 1 exorcui 'd with the 
marc copil |fiitr» m view of th-' etronc aisuraoces of bis trust In me, as 
commander of (Jtit army, with which tbo I'lcsidunl had 8<jeu lit to honor 
Bfi duriic Ins I lat visit. 

Vbftea,vjlry r<-quirements, without wliicb an advance would hare 
been 111 (he hiftheht degree injuuicious and nitBKf<.\ were still wanting. 

The ci-Hnitry before -js was an enrmy'acnuntj y, where tlte iidiabiunm 
furnisiied to the enemy every pc*8iblo assii-lanco ; providing to; "d tor 
vnon and forage for animals, giving all inform iliun concerninK ourmove- 
■n"ufci, and rendering every aid In their ixiwer to the enemy's cause. 

It was .Tttuif'-st that we should find it, as weflubKr>qiicntly did.a hos- 
tile district, where we could derive no all from tbe tnhabiianla that 
would J tstify dlfii^CDsIng with the active co-operaiion of an cfflrient c&v 
airy force. Aoc t lingly I fixed upon the Brst of .November as the ear- 
lioet dal*' at which the forward movement could well be comm^^nced. 

The goneral-inchlef. iq a letter lo the -i/^creiary of War, on the 2Sth 
of October, (s.iys ; ** In my opinion there has been no siich want of b*i|v 
pUee tn the army under General UcClellan as to prevcat his cumphance 
VUh the orders to advance against the enomy." 

NoCwithstanding this opiuion. cxpf^^sed by tnch high avthorlly, 
I an compelird to .«ay ngain that the d< I ly in the rec'»irt|''n of m-c'^'arf 
SuppUvs up to iliat date bad left the armv in a con>lition U tally unfit to 
Advance againut tti" enemy — that an advance, under the ext«-liDg cir* 
«am.4taiices wonht. In my Judgmc-nt, have been atbrndod with (he high- 
eat degree of peril, with great euffring aixl sickne«.<i among tbe Dar>n, 
and With Imm nenl daiigi-r of being cut off from our stipptiea by ihe 
«up?rH>r cavary loire of the eiiemy, and wilh do rcosouubke prospect 
of gamin" any advantage over bira. 

1 disn.iss this !tul*j<'ci with the remark that I have fotmd it Impofsl 
Ua l« r<-84fltlhe force ttt my own convirtif>DS, that the commander ol an 
army who, from tbe time of lu organiiuvtion. has for eiKht->on mow Lin 
been In convtaut couimun cation with ita * Rlcurs and m<n. tbo greaior 
ftftctf Uio Ume eugagud iu aclive wrvtoca u (be Held, mad who hoe 

eierdsM Ibis cnmmvMl In many hntlles, mnst certainly be roMldewi 
comix-tent to dci.*rmme whoth<i his army is tn pnipor condition lo ad- 
vance on thee'ioray or not ; airl be must nee<-sMrilv poai-^u greater 
laciiliiej for forming a correct Judcmeut in regard to the wanU of bt» 
m^-n, and the condition of bi« supplies, ih»n ih* gpnenil in chief hi bif 
oHlco at W.tshingUm city. The movement from W.iKlnngton into Uary*, which culmmatel in tbo biUk-s cf Stuth Monmain and Antielam, 
w.i^ not a pari f»f an offensive campaign, with iii» obj vt of au )D%'Uioa 
of the enemy's terriU)rT and an attack H|M.n hi-* cwpital, but was dcfea- 
Bive m \Xfi (MiriiuM.'S. a'thougb off-nilvo It us cbaiaclo. , and wouUl he 
technically c-iMed a " defensive itfensive camp;*ign." 

It und-TUikeo at a ttm-^ wh- li our armv ha-l experionccd srvvrft 
defeaU, and Its obJ ct was to preserve the nalionnl capiUlaD'* Balti- 
more, to proU-ct l'cmi>yivaiiia from inva.<ion, .and to drive tbo enemf 
out of Mary bind. Ihe^e pnrp'-seR wcro fully and flnaMy ac mi4ishedby 
the b:ittle of Antietam, which bro'ight the a^my of tliu I'oicmac into 
what rotglit be termol an nctidentai i-o^itionon tbe iipiK-r I otomac. 

Having gained the imme^tiat- obj cl o; tbe campaige, the Q :it thlrj 
lo bo done was to insu.-e Maryland frt<n a return ot the enemv ; th* 
socoiid, lo prep.u-e our own army, exhansicd by a seri,-!* f>f s.-v.-re bal- 
tl-«,r.estltute to a great extent of suppti'>8. and very OeOcicnt In artil- 
lery and cavalry bor^-a, for a definite ofr.'usivo naovjmcnl, and lo deter- 
mine iipoi) a line of o|>eratUms for a further adv mc?. 

At tbe time of the battle of Anil. 'Um the Potomac was very *ow, and 
'l>res-nt^ a comi>aralivcly weak lino of defcuso unlo^ watched by 
large maasea of troops. 

The rcoccuiution of H.arper'8 Ferry, and the dispoKilkm of troops 
:ibove that p<jint, rendered the Iwe of the Potomac secuioagimsl every- 
thing except cavalry raids. No time was lost in pl.w mg tbe army for 
an a vvance, ami tbo orrumitnnces which cati«?d the delay after the 
Vattloef Antietam have been fnlly ennm-rat-Hl ei^owbure. 

I never regarded Harper's Kerry or its vicinity as a proper base of 
operations ft>r amoveminit upon Richmond. I Ftill comcdered the lino 
of the Peninsula as tho true approach, bjt, for obvio^ reasons, did aot 
make any propos li Ut rvLurn to it. 

On the 6tb of October, as stal«><| above, I wa.-* or-lereil by the Preei- 
dcid, IhrouKh bis general inchicf, tocron the Pot m ic and give hattto 
to the enemy, or drive him south. Two lines were p.-t.-seotod for my 
choice : 

1st. Up the vaPevof thef^benandoah, In which case I woa lo bavo 
12,000 to 15,000 3d titmnal Iroo^. 

2d. To cross bc-tW'xm the enemy and Wa-^hinglon— that I*. ea«t of iho 
Bine Ridpe— in which event I w.-w to be re enforcd wlh CO ,000 iii*^n. 

At first I determined to atlopi (he line of the Sh.^naml'-ah, for thes* 
reasons : tbe Hir)>er's Ferry and Winchost<ir ICulroad, and the varioua 
lurnpikea converging upon Winchoster, arforded superior facilities for 
suppliofl Our cavalry being weak, this lim? of comniinicati.m coold bo 
more easily proiocted. There was no advanUga tn mturposmg at lliat 
lime tho Iflud Kidge and the Shenandoah between tbo enemy aud my- 

At the period In qnostton the Potomac was still vry !nw. and 1 ap- 
prehended thai. If I croKiel the river below lUrp r'e Ferry, the enemy 
would promptly check the movement by rocro^-stng Into Maryland, al 
Ihe sam.' lime covering his rear by occupying in sine g firct? the pisvce 
leading through the BUie Ridge from the southeast iiito the rsbenaudoab 

I aiiticipalH, as Iho result of tb« first courf^e, that T/re would fifhi 
mc near Win- heater. If he could do so under favorable uncumstaaces - 
or else that ho would abandon tho lower Shetmnda-ih. and leave tho 
army of the I'oionwc free lo act u|Km some other line oi ot>crati'^«8. 

Tf ho ahandmird the Shenaudoali, bo would naturally fall back upon 
his railway communications. I luive since been confirniod io the belief 
that, if I had crossed tho Pobimac below ILtrper's Kerry lo the early 
part of October, General I.ce wtnjld have rccro*.sed into Maryland. 

As above cxp!ain<Ml, the army not in condition to move imtil lata 
Id October, and in llie meantime circumslancc5 had rtuingc 1. 

Tho period had arrived when a rudden and great risu in tho Potomaa 
might be looked for at any moment ; tho sea.<^on of bad n>ads and diffl- 
cult movements w.u; approaehing, which would naturaly dolcr the en- 
emy from exposing him-cif very far from hts base, and bis movcmenLi 
all appeared to io'iicau a Calling back from thu river towards his sup- 
plies. Under the-«c circumstances, I fell at liberty lo dijre;ard the pos- 
■*ibilrty of the enemy's recrowiing iltc Potomac, and d'-tTrnmod to select 
the Hue east of the Rluc Rnlgc, feeling cjiivmced thu*. it would secure 
me tbe largest arcs-ion of for«e, and the most cordi il supiK>rt of tha 
rrigjttcnt, whose views, from the beginning, were in fnvor of that line. 

The subject of tha defense of Ihe line of the upper Potomac, after tho 
advance of tbo main army, had long occupied my .itlei>ti*m. I desired 
lo jdace Harper's Kerry and its depeudenci'-s in a strong ••late of defense, 
and frequently addrc^ncd the goneral-in chii-f upm ibo subject <A the 
erectiOD of field-works and pcrmanenl bridges there, asking for the 
funds Dcccfsary toaccom|>li«h tbe purpose. AlthrMigb I d>d my best t» 
explnio, as clearly as I was able, that I did not wish 10 erect permanent 
works of maJ^onry, and that neither the works nor the p<^rmareni 
hridges had ony reference to tho a<lvance of the army, b;it solely lo tha 
pcrmanetit occuoation of Hirper's Kerry, I could never m.iko tha general- 
lu chief understand my wH<lHrs. but was refu.^d tbe funds nec<^sary to 
erecA the Qokl-wurks, oD tho ground that there was no :^;>proprKil:oD 
for Iho erection of ixymaneut fortifications ; and was not allowed ta 
build the permanent bridge, on the ground that the mam army could 
not be delayed in itfl movemetiLs until its compielli>n. 

of course I never thought of delaying Uio advaoco < f the army for f 
tliat |>urpose, and so staled repeatedly. On tbo 2dtb of October 1 senV 
to the geucral-iu chief the foPowmg telegram : 

" UBAi^i'A-riRS Armt or -ill r^rr^nar, 
•• (ktobtr 25, 1S62— 10-44 n. ||. 

" A« the moment *s at hand for the adr.mce oi tins at my, a questio» 
an9r3 for the decision of the general In chief, which, altlio-.igb pcrha)ia 
im^^ltedly d* cid<-d by the I're^ilont hi his hitfr of tho 13(h, should ba 
cirarly presented by mo, as I do not regard il as iu my province to do> 
lc^m:Q» It. 

'* Thi< question Is the exl/'nt to which thn lino of the Potomac fhould 
be giii>.rdeu, aUor the anny leaves, ii- ordor to cover Maryland aud Pami- 
syivar.ia irosa invasion by Ivgec small pariie.s of the enemy. 

**It will always bo somewhat difllcult to guard the imm<.-dule Iir>e of 
the river, to its great cxtcDl and the numerous lossagcs wbtcb 

*' It has long appeared lo me that the best way of mvcrlng Ih's Ho* 
would be by occtMO'li^K Front Royal, Sirasbiirg, War>lemville, nud 
MoTirrflnld, or the debouches of tho several valleys lu which they are 

arc Ule.Tled. 

•' Tikcse |>>iiDts, or loltable places In thi^ir vicinity, should be stroogfy 
IntrcDthrd and p'rmaiK'nily held. One great advntii.i'*e of this.-u-raiiga- 
ip> ui would bo the Ci'Vei mg the Btlitmore and uhio Raiimail. aad aa 
e«> part of tiK' syitrm would be Ihe conslruction of Uie Itaik oC 
railway from Winchester to .Mr.isburg. and the rebuildiog of lUe H*> 
uaaftas Uay fi^iwajr br*Ugo over tbo ^"■n*Ti^*"b 


" The liitrenclimcnt ofMannsffas Junction wonM coTnplH? Uio SViStcm 
for tho clcfPiiso of llio approaches lo Wiisliiiigtoii ami tUo upper rotomac. 
Many months ago I rccoinnien-lcU tliis arrangement ; in fact, gave or- 
ders for it to bo carried iuto clTjct. I still regard it as essential under 
aJl oircuniKtatices. 

"Tho views of tba ebief engineer of this aimy, in regard to the de- 
fense's Bad garrison of Harpar's Ferry and its dd'euseji, are id your 

•* Xli ) only troops under my command, ontsirle of Ibfl organixxfion of 
the army of the Potomac, arc tho Maryland brii;aJe, un^cy i^eiu^nU J^eo- 
Icy ; ihe 51th I\Miii:?ylvHnia, Colonoi Voss ; 12ih llliimis cavalry, aud 
CoU>i>e! IXiv'is' 8Hi New Yurk cavalry; totai, 2,8;)J infantry, one bat- 
tery, an I about 900 cavalry men. 

" i'li'^ra are als> two of m> regiments of cavalry (alwut 750 men) 
ginviiiijg tho B:iltimord aud Ohio Railroad between llaiicock and Cum- 

'■ A* I have no dcinrtment, and command simply an active army in 
the fi *ld, my responsibility for the safely of the lino of tho rntoinac aii.l 
tlio ^tatf s north of it must tprminate the moment I advance so fiir be- 
yond that Uiio as to adopt another for my base of oper;iti"n'?. Tho ques- 
tion for Iho g»iieral-iQ-chiof lo liecide, aud wliich I regard as beyond my 
province, is this : 

" 1st. !<b.ill tiio safety of Harper's Ferry and the lino of tho Potomac 
be reg:ird(?d as as-jured by the advance uf tho army s>ulh of tho UIuo 
Ridgo, and tho line Icli. to take care or itself P 

" '2 I. If It is deemed uecessiry to hold Iho line, or that horeinbcfore 
indicated in advance of it, hov;' many troops ykni! bo placed there, at 
what points (and in what nnmb'^rs aud of wh;it composition at each), 
and wliero shall they be supplied — ». e., from the army, or from otbtjr 
•onrcos ? 

" OiniUing the detixched troops mentioned above, and the email gar- 
risons of Komslioro' and Frederick, tlic last rctui'ns show the sLienj;th 
of this a'mylVirduty to be about ni6,000) one hnn^lred and sixteen 
tliousaiid, ottirei's and men. Tliis inchnlcs tlie divisions of Stoneman and 
Whipp'e, but (l07s not include ilL-inlzelman, Sigel.aud Hayard. 

*' II" II iipi-r's Ferry auil tho river above are ren'lered fully secure, it 
Is possilile that the a<.'tive army, if it supplies the garrison, may be re- 
duced so much as to lie inadeq late to the pnrposc:^ conterui'latctl. If it 
Is preserved intact, Maryland, Fenasylvauia,aud ih; Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad nmy bi utoiuly expcseJ. 

*' I leave itte dccisinn of Ihese grave q icstions to tho g?neral-in-chief. 
I kaow nothing of the number ol troo|ts at Haltimore, &;:. 

" An imporUint clpment iu tho s ilution of this pioblem is the fact that 
& great portion of Uragg*s army is probably now at liberty to unite itself 
Willi I/^c's c<nnmau'i. 

" I comnunice crossing the river at Berlin in the morning, and must 
ask a p.ompt dccisina of ilie questions prop')seu herein. 

'•(i. B. MrCI.ELI-AX, M>ijor anrrnl Cnmmatuling. 
\ *' Mijor-Ceneral ITaileck, O^Turalvi-Chi-/, Wiuhinfflon." 
i To which I received the following rep'y : 
' " Wasuingicv, OcUiber 23, 18G2— 1.3?tp.m. 

" In addition to the command whii;h you had wlien I came hero, you 
also have tlw gieabT part of that of M;ijor-General Poj e. Moreover, you 
have beeu auihonz m1 to nso any troops within yonr rcac!i in General 
Woor.s depart ui'^ht, aud iu Westora Virginia. General Bank's command 
1^ also under your iiirectioji, with the si gle nsiri'tiou that he is nut to 
remove the tioup^ from Wasliington till he ha3 noiiti;d mo of his oitlcrs. 

Siuce yoi leti Wash ngton I liave advised an 1 su^'^'-'stid in relation to 
your movi'moiits.but I h ive given you no orders ; I do not give you any 
now. Tha govcrum>^ut has fcuirnsted you with di-fL-ating and driving 
back the Rebel army iu yoU' front. I shall not alttinpt to control you 
la t'le measures ydu miy adt>pt for that puri><jse. V m aro informed of 
my viewt^, bill tho I'resideut has lelt you at liberty to adopt them or 
not, as you mny di;ein heat. 

"Ifcrn Will also o.xtTcise your own discretinn inrrgird to what pnhits 
on the I'ot0(na<^and the Biltimore and Ohio Radioad are to be occupied 
<H' fort fi'-"J. I will only add ih >t th ro is ni» aopropiiaii"n for /•ermanait 
entrcnchme' ts on that line. Moreover, I Uiinkit will be tiniy enoinh to 
de.'.ide upmi furtirying Frunt Ro>al, S-li.tSbnrg, Wiiriionvi !<.■, and Moore- 
fleld, wlicn the enemy is driven south of tiiem, and they come iuto our 
possess. 0.1. 

''I do not think that wo need have «ny immMi te foar of Bragg's 
army. You iro withiu (-O) twenty miles of Leo's, whdo Bragg is dis- 
tant about (400) four hundred mil'S. 

"H. W. HAIXEGK^G«»«ral-ia-CAi-/. 

"M:»jor G'>neral G. B, McCi.kixan.*' *■"* 

Oa tlie 29tli I sent the followin.;? : 


Otoh^r 2i\ 1862— 1. 15 p.m. 
On the 35th Instant I sent you a despatch requ-stini; you to decide what 
step* should tw taken to guard the rtiic ot' tiie Potomac w hen tld.i armj 
leaves tiere. To t.hi:5 1 ri?CLnved your reply that I had lieen intrusted by ttie 
PrL'si-lent with deiV^aUng and driving away the rebel army; tiiat yon had 
given me no orders heretofore— did not give mw any then, &c. Under 
these circumstances I have only to make such arrangements for guarding 
fthia extended line as rlie means at my disposal will r>ermit, at tlie same 
[time keeping In view the supreme necessity of mrdutaining tho moving 
[army in adciuale 1' rce to meet the rebel army iK^foro n-^. 
I The diripoa.tlons I have ordered are as follows, viz: Ton thousand men 
to be loft at tiarpoi's i-Vrrv; one brigade of Inlautiy in front of yhari-s- 
bur^; Kenlev's brli^ade of infantry at Williamsport; Kelly's brigade, In- 
cluding (Colonel Oanipbell's 5Uh Pennsylvania mfautry, at (Cumberland; 
and betvvcen tliat point and Hancock. I have also left lour small cavalrv 
regiment* to patrol and watch the river and tho Baltimore and Oiiio rail- 
road from I'umborland down to Harper's Ferry. 

I do not regard this force as sutliciont to cover securely this great extent 
of line, but I do not foel justiUed in detaching any more iruopn from my 
ttovinj C-iluiiins; I would, therefore, recomn>cnd that some new regi- 
ments of infantry and cavalry be seiit to &trengtlien the force* Iplt by me 
There should be a brigade of Infantry and section of artlllfry in the 
irloiuity of Cherry run, another brigade at Hancock, an addiilunal bilgaiie 
at Wdllim'^port, one regiment at lla,'eratown and one at Chambersburg, 
With a section of artillery at each place if po-islble. ThU is on tlie sup- 
positlofl that the enemy retain a coJi-iJerable cavalry forco west of the 
Blue Rid^e; If they go east of It, the occupiitioo of the points nuined In 
my desiiatch of the IMh Iniitant will obviate the necessity of keeping 
many or these troojjs on the river. 

There are now several Imndre.'l of our wounrleJ, Including tjoneral Rich- 
atdaon, in Uie vicinity of Sharpsburg, that cann jt pojsiL-ly be moved at 

I repeat, that I do not look upon the fnrcos I have been able to leave 
froia toil army as sailiciont to prevent cavalry ndda intu Maryland ami 
Pennaylvania, as cavalry is the only doBcription of trun»fl ade.piate to this 
•orvleo, and I am, as you are awaru. deticient in tlili arm. 

(J. B. MaULELLAM, M-tM (.V.i.jut, Commamdiita. 
Major General Hallbck. G'}nenil-in-chi''f\ w-i^hinfjio.i. 
^ To whicU I received on the 30th this rrpiy : 

Washinutox. 0<v^.V. 30, ISfiS— 11.30 a. m. 

Tour telec;ram of yesterday was received late last pvenlug. Tho trowps 

proposed for Thorouglifare gap will be sent to that "place whenever yoa 

are In po-^rtlon for their co- operation, as previotwly itated, I>ut no new 

^at* can be licut from here to the upper Futomac Tho jjuarUlnf ol 

that line l9 left to your own discretion with the troops now nndor yoor 

command. H. W. IIALLKf^K:, Gtiieral-in-CJiie/. 

Major General O. B. McClellan. 

1 iiecoidiogty left the I'Jth eorpH at Ilai'per'a Ferry, dotach'ns on© 
brii^aJo tothe vi'.dnily of Sliarpiiburgh. ti neral MoroJl wa^t plaeed 
In command of the line from the mouth of the Antietam to Cumber- 
land ; General Slocum in command of Harper's Kerry ajid tho line 
cant of the moulh of the Antietam. 

The ordera given to these offlcers wevf^ rf follows : 


Orf','>r> '2$, ISii2-l p. m. 

The general commanding directs that yon send one bngadp of yonr 
corps to march at once to the position now occupied by Gimeial t". J. Por- 
ter's corps, iu front of Sharp.sburg, to watcti and guard the tine of tli© 
river, the ford near the mouth of the Antieiatn creek to tiic month of th© 
Opequan creek. 

Thy oihcer in command will also take steps to a^ord proper pn>tectioQ 
to the hicU and wounded in the hospitaU in the v'ciuiiy of yiiarpsbnrg antl 
Boouiboro'. The regiment no\v at Boonsbori)' will be placed undcT hi* 
o.aers. General Kenley, at Williamiport, will cuaid the river iro:;i the 
mouth of the Opeciuan alone, including the ford at tlie mouth of the Opo- 

The commanding general also directs that you take immpdlab* steps to 
estaidish the reniai^ndor of your corps as follows, vb,: one brigade oa 
Maryland heiglits, on* brigade on Loudon heights, with the remainder on 
Bolivar heights and at Harper's Ferry. 

Theae dispo-iitiouH should be uiaJf at once, go that General Couch can 
move with his corps. Please acUnuwlcdgu the receipt of this. 

R. B. MAHl^Y. <hht' nf Siajff. 

<3eueral II. W. SLOCUU, C^^mmnnilinf} Armi/ r,.. i^-:, H.i>n.,U F-rn/. 


;^i OY'.v, 31,1802: 

(~*^ kAL ; I am instructed by the commanding general to say to you, 
that ux, h;w selected you to perform the iii^rhly important aufl responsible 
duty of ttiking cliai-ge of and commanding the troop,'4 left for tho defence 
of tlie line of Uie Fotomac river, from theiuoulli of Uie Antietam tot'nm- 
berland. as well as any other troojis that may hcreaiter be sent for the 
prot'jction of the Ma-.-yland and Pennsylvania ftonti'M" within the limits 
of the !irie^ herein specided. The force wliic'i i)!('n lelt to iro-ird the 
line is nut deeiueJ adequate to wevent ca\':ilry raiJ^, i>nl it is all that the 
commanding general feels authorized to -.Itttach from the annv ol the Po- 
tomac at the [jresont time, and it devolves upon you to mike the beat use 
of tills force in your power. You will have Unir cavalry re^inienta under 
yonrc>niinand, whicli shou'd be so distribuLed aloiu the liver ii.>i Vt watch 
all the available fords, and give timely notice to tlie Infaniiy of She ip- 
nruach of ativ f.trceof rebels. 

Tou will a.Toid all the protection In yocr power to the Baltiirore and 

You will endeavor to prevent any cavalry raids Into Maryland aua 

You Will take stey-s to have all the sick and wounded of onr aiT.iy, as 
well as of tUe rebel army wiMiin your lines, properly taken care oi' imtil 
they can be sent to steneral l»>spitals, or discharged, or puroJed. 

You will Make your head'piarters at ilagerstown, and occasionally Tlslt 
the dirtereiit parts of your Ime. 

You wiH please report promptly to these head<:uarter3 eveo'thlng of im- 
portance that ticcurs wiriiin the limits of your com-nand. 

The tliree briga^les now at Cumberland, Williamsport, and SJiarp'^burg. 
including the liity-fourth Pennsylvania volniitee's, near Cuioberland, will 
be uni'.er your command. They are commanded by Geuerals Kelly, Ken- 
ley, and Gordon. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

S. WILLIAMS, A^si^lmt Adjutant General, 

General G. W. MOUEH,, CommnmUng Upjyfr i'ulitmar. 

On lilt' 2Ji.h of October the poutoqu bridge at Biji lin was con=trnctcd, 
Ihero being alrcaly one across tho Potomac, and another across ihc She- 
nandoah, at Harper's Ferry. 

On tho 2jth two divisions of tho ninth corp.', and Plca^anton'a brigade 
of cavalry, crossed at Berhn and occupied I,<iveU.svilIe. 

The fiirit, sixth, and ninth corps, the cavalry, and the reserve artille- 
ry, cro.ssod at Berlin between the 2t)th ot October and The 2d of No- 

Tiio second and fifth corps crossed at Harper's Ferry between the29tli 
of October and the of November. Heavy rains ilclaycd tho move- 
ment C'usiderably in the beginning, and tho flist, lllth and sixth corps 
were obliged to halt at least one day at the cro.-sings to con^pleto, as lar 
as pos-sibie, nccess.iry supplies that could not be procured at an earlier 

The plan of campaign I adopted during this a-lvance was to move the 
army, well in hand, parallel to the Blue Ri'Ige. taking Wanenton as the 
point of direction for the main army; seiiii.geach i>as3 on the Blue 
Ridge by detachmenis, as we approachod it, and guarding them after 
we had passed as long as they would enable the ei;emy to trouble our 
communications with tho FotonKic. It was expected that we woukl 
unite with tho eleventh corps and Sickles' divi-ion near ihoronghfare 
gap. We depended upo.. Harper's Ferry and Berlin for suj.plies until 
the Maanassas tiap railway was reached ; when that occin're<l ihc passes 
in our rear were to be abandoned, and the army mussed ready foractioa 
or movement in any diroction. 

It was my intention if, upi>n reaching Ashby's or r.i.y othor pass, 
1 found that the enemy vvere in forco between it and the Potomac Jn Uie 
valley of the Shenandoah, to move into tho valley and endeavor to gain 
their rear. 

I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did expect that by stiiltmg la 
between Culpepper Court-house and Little tt'a'^hingtou I could cither 
separate their army and beat them in detail, or loico them to ewi- 
centrate as far back as Gordonsvlilo, and thus place the army of ihe Po- 
tomac in position cither lo adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance 
upon Richmond , or to be removed lo the Peninsula, if, tu! 1 apprehended, 
it were found impossible to supply it by Iho Orange aud Alexandria rail- 
road beyond Culpepper. 

On tho 27th of October the remaining divisions of tho nnim corps 
crossed at B>.-rliD, and Ploasanton's cavalry advanced to rnrcollville. 
The concentration of the sixth corps, delayed somewhat by hitelligence 
as lo the movements of the enemy near Hedg..sville, &c- , was com- 
menced on this day, and the first corps was ahcady iu moliou for 

On the 23lh the first corps and tho general hcadquarlors reached 
Berlin. , ^ . t .. 

On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed and encamped near Lovctt^- 
villo. Sjtnncman'3 division, lemimrarily atta*:hed to tho ninlh crps, 
occupie<l I.<cesburg ; Averill's cavalry brigade moved towards Beriiu 
iVum Iljg-'r-town ; two divisions of iho ninth corps moved to Wheat- 
land one to Wnterford. The second cori>3 commenced the ixi^snge of ibo 
SlieiiandoaU at Harper's Kerry, aud moved mlo Ihu valley cast of Loudoa 
hcighta. „ .. ^ .1 

On the 30th the first corps croj^sed at Berlin ond encamped near l-ov- 
cttsville, aud the s-cond corps completed tho pas-sagoof theSh-nandoab. 
The fifth corps commenced its mirch from K-b;upsburp lo Haruer'a 

*0n the Sast the second corps move<l to tho vicinUy of Hillsborough ; 
tho sixth corps reached Boonsboro' ; the finh cwps reached Uiuper'a 
Kerry, one division crossing the Shenandoah. 

On I he 1st of November tho first corps innred to rurcolvilloand IFain- 
Utoa ■ the second corps to Woudgrove ; Iho tiflh cQrjis lo Hdlsboroush j 


lTi« tlilb eorpn roschcd BctIIh , ore dhrlsloo erMtln; PVitjroKm'i c* . 
airy (ccupkJ I'bilomont, having a sliarp ekirmiati ihera aiul at Bloom 

Oa Kovamber 2d llie acoond oorp* occnpled Salckcr'i gap ; th« firih 
eor|it, Sulckerivillo ; Ihe slilh eorpa croef«.a th« IVHomai; u.i eocamix'il 
iu«r WhfallAnJ: llw Dlulh corpa advanced to Bloam&rld, I'uloD, aod 
riiilom'Mill' rip.vsAiitoti drove the enemy out of UntoD. Avertll waa or- 
dered to Jom I'l.'ii>Aiiton. lite ejiemy offered no aerioua refiiataiice t«i 
the occui»itJoii of !-Diiker'« g ip. but advanced to gain pi^aosaloii of It 
w:th a eolumn of vumo 6.00 i t.i S.OvO Infaotry, wbo were driven back 
by a few roundfi from our rilled guns. 

Ou liie 3 I the flriit corp« ra-'Vcd to Phllomont, Union, Bloomfleld, 4c.; 
the second coriw to the vicinity of L'pi*rviJlc ; the hftb ioi|.« remained 
at Pnu-ker'spap ; the Pixlh corps moved to I'urcellTille ; the ninth cori« 
mova<l towar.18 t'p!>ervi::e. Picasantoo drove tb» emmy out of Lp 
p^rvllle afer a • -vei* Bsbt 

On the 4'h iW- 21 ciriB t'ok posjesjion of A«hby'» gjp ; the wh corps 
rcai-hcd Union ; the 9ib crirp", Up!«rvillc ; the cavalry occupied Picd 
mont. On l c llli tlie 1st co ps moved to Rectortnwn and While I'laltis ; 
•nc division of the 2«1 coria to the Intersection of the I'aria and Pie-I 
mont with the IpperviMe aiul Hurl>er'« road ; the 6th cor|w to the Aldie 
r.iVe east of I'pivrvi.le ; the ninth corps beyond the Hanauas railroail, 
bemTLcn Piedmont and Silc m, with a brigade at Manassas gap. Tlte 
cavalry tinder AverlU a Bkirmlsh at Uanassaa gap, and the bri 
fade of I'Kii^ontnn gamed a handsome victory over sujierior numbers at 
Barbers iriws It.iads. Uiiaids cavalry bad Some sharp fkiimiehlng 
In fjont of Sal-m. 

On tlio 6lU the Isl corps a/lvanccJ to Warrenlon ; the 2d corps to 
Rectorlown ; the 6th corps coramence<l Its movement from Snicker's 
gap to White Piainj ; the 91h corps to WaU>rlo<i and vicioity on the Ra|i. 
p.ihanno<:k ; the Ilih corjis Via at Kcw Baltimore, nioroiiglifare and 
fiopewell's K->p> ; stickles' dills on guarding the Orange and Alexandria 
railroad fioin Mnn.x'sas Junction t<>ivaid.s Warreutoo Jmictum ; the cav- 
alry near Mint hill ; Riyard to cut off there might be In Warrenton, 
and to prorc-'d to the Rippaliannock st'.tion. 

NovemUo. 7lh : Oeiieral l'!ca«'ntoa was ordered to move towards Lit 
tie Washington and .^perrjvil.e, and thcuco tuvrarUs Culpejicr Court 

November 8ih : the 2-J corps moved half way to Warrenton ; Uio 61li 
C3ri« to New Haltimore. 

Sovemb'T 9 : llio 21 and 51h coria reached Warrenton ; the Clb 
•orpe, Kcw Ua'.limore. 

l*to on thf i.iiht of Uic 7lh 1 received as order rcllevmg me from the 
(omniand of the army of the Potomac, and dire=tiug me to turn it ever 
to Gcitctal Burnsldc, which I at once did. 

": had already given the orders for the movements of the 8lh and 9th ; 
these orders were carrie.l into eff*ct witbout ch.-'iige. 

Ttie position i.i whlcli I leil the army, as the result of the orders I bad 
fVven, was as f"ll. ws : ,^ ^ 

The Ist, 1 1, ai;d iith corps, reserve artillery, and general heidinar- 
ters at t''«rrenton ; the 9ih C'lrp? oo the line of the RappahioihKk, lil | 
the Vic ity of Waterloo ; the 6th corps at New Baltimore ; the llIU 
»orps . New naltimire, GainL-tville, and TboroUKhfare gap ; Sickles 
divif /liof the 3i corps, on the Orange an. I Al' xandria railnad, from 
Ma' .ssa« Junction to Warrenton Jiiuction ; I'loisoiiton across liic Kap 
nj iiiQck at Aniissvillo, .Jeirerson, &c., with his pickets at Ilarel river. 
fr iiigLt'i-gelrect, six miles fiom Culpepper Court-house ; BjyarJ iiear 
1 .ppaha-ihOcUstAtion. 

Tlicaraiy was thvs massed near Warrenton, ready to act In any re 
luircd direction, perlcclly in hand, and In admirable condition and 
«i>lrlts. i doubt whcthor, during tlie whole period thai I had the honor 
to comman \ the arinv of the Potomac, it was In such excellent condi 
lion to fightagre-il battle. When I gave up the command to General 
BurnsKle, the best i'.firinatlOTi incur iiosscjsion indlealcd that I/Hig- 
strect wai ImineJialcIv iu oar trcnt near Culji;f.per ; Jackson, with en", 
|vi hit* both of .he Ldls, li-ar Chester and luornton's gaps, the 
mttss of their lorro west of the Blue Riil^e. 

The rciKjrU fr -m G -iieral I'leasnaion oo the advance Indicated the 
p.v« b'lily ofse ural iijt the two wlniis of the enemy's forces, and either 
keaiing Longiireet se|.araiely, or forcing him to fall back at least ui»n 
Car lonsville, to off ct hi? junction with the rest of Ihe army. 
Ihe leMowiiB Is from the report of General I'leafonton : 
'• At Ibis time, and from the 7th instant, my alvane.-d pickets were 
«t lliMl river, » liiiin si! miles of Ctiipciiiier, besides hiving tny Rjrk 
nickels towards I hivitriinl lliornton's gaps extended to i aincsCiO'S 
Kjads Xewby a Ciof.j Boa Is, wlh nu.iiaoi.u patrols iu the ,',lrection 
vt Wo-Kivllie, l.tlle Wnslii.nton, on I Spcrryvillo. 

"Itie lormmiliun taineJ trom these parties, and a'so from doserlcrj, 
prsoDi-rs, eo[:'.ribaal5. ts we'! as c.l.ieus, e»t-a>. lijhed I'ae :;.-jl of la>nj- 
llreet, »illi his command, being at Ciil|K-i>er, while JiickKin, with I). II. 
iliU.with ibcirrcspeclivc commands, were In the MienanOoah valley, on 
the wettern side of the Blue Kidge covering Cbttter and llioriitou'i 
gajie, and expecting us to iiaF.s through and atuck them. 

•• As tale iis the lith of November, a controband Just from Etrasburf. 
came iu my camp aud reiwrtwl that D. H. Illll'a coriM was two calks 
beyond that place, on the railroad to Mount Jackson. lliU was tear- 
ing up the load and destroying the bridges, under the impresiMOo that 
we intewlcd to follow into that valley, and was en route for Staunton. 

" Jackfon'f cor|i.s Wis b twccn Strasburg and Wlncheeter. Kwell and 
A. P. Hill were with Jackson. Provisions were scarce, and the rebels 
were obllgi-d to keep moving to obUIn tliem." 

ilad I i*mained iu lominand, I should liave made the attempt to dl- 
Tide the enemy as before suggested, aud could he have been brought to 
k battle wilhin reach of my supplies, I cannot doubt that the result 
/would have been a brilliant victory for our army. 

Oa the IClh of November General Pleasontnn w.ts attacked by I/wg- 
•treet with one division of infantry and Stewart's cavalry, but repulsed 
(be atuck. ,^ , . 

Tliis Indicates the relsllve position of our army and that of the enemy 

at the time 1 was relieved from command. 

/ It would be iiii|K»sible to participate iu operations, snch as those de- 

•crltied In the f'Tegoing {uges, without fuming fixed opinions opoo 

sniijrcts colluded with the or^aniutlun of our artnics, and the gcDcral 

conductof military operations. ,.,.,,._. 

Tins rc'^irt would be incomplete without a brief alnslon to aom* 
.general co'imlderations which have been flimly Improaied upon me by 
the events will, h hn-o occurred. 

To my mind the must glaring defect to our armici Is the absence or 
'gi-'t, ni In the appiintmint aud promotion of general and other olDcera, 
»iid the ■want ■■( uicans for the theoretical Instruction of the mass of ofll- 
•crce The ciiwiMon of the army was so great and so rapid at the cam- 
llivncemeiit of the exlBling war that It was pcrbapa IfupoMible, In tke 
«rfat seareity of iustructi-d ifflcers, to have adopted any oilier coune 
Ihau wukli was puisued ; but the time has arrived when roeasnrw may 
ibe InitI ile.l to ri medv existing dcfecU, and provide against their recur- 
' 1 think lt«t lie army should be regarded as a ptrmuicBt on* ; 

that is 10 8cy, n« alTalrc ihenld be administered precisely as If an wbo 
belonged So it bad made it their prtifes^ion fi-r life ; aiiJ tinier rules fbr 
liroiixition, Ac., which have l>een found necee-sary in the best for«lga 
armies to excite honorable emulation, pro«luco au fypntJn curpt aoA 
procure efficiency, should be followed by us. Alt oflicers and soldier* 
tUould be made te feel tluit merit — '.liat Is to »ay, courage, guod ooo- 
duct, the knowlc<lge and performance of the duties uf their grade, and 
fitness to exercise tbose of a eujierior g^ade — will lueuie to them ad- 
vancemeot in their profi'si^ion, and can alone secure it for them. Ueft- 
eures should be adnpledto secure the theoretical iiistructiou of staff 
officers at least, wbo should, as far as possible, be S'-teetod fiom officers 
having a military education, or wbo have seen seivice In tba 
field. Ibe liumber of cadets at the Military Acudeni)' uliouid be at once 
Increased to the greatest extent permKled by tho ca|iacity of the insil- 
tutlun. The regular army should be increased and m-ilutaiued compteia 
In numt>ersand elUclency. 

A well-organlxed system of recruiting and of depots for InatriKlioo 
should lie adopted. In order to keep the ranks of the ri-ginienlii full, and 
supply prouijitly the los-ses artsirg from battle or disease. 'Ihis Is e»- 
pectally necehS-iry for the arti lery and cavalry arms of tlio service. 
whii h, from the beginning of the war, have rendered great s.'rvicos,aaa 
which have never been fully appreciated by any h^l tlieir oomradcs. 
We need also large bodies of well- instructed engineer trtiopa. 

In the arrangenient and conduct of campaigns the dircctiuu should b« 
left to professional sol^llerB. A stati^tmaii may, periutja, be more com- 
petent tlum a soldier to determino the imlillcal objects and liiiectlon of 
a camjiaign ; but thoec once decided u|kiii, everything should t>e left to 
the responsible military head, without Inu-rference liom civilians. la 
no other manner is succ-ss probable. The meddling of lU'livi-lual mem- 
bers of committees of tXingrcss with subj..-ets wtilih.fium lucJ; of expe- 
rience, they are of course Incaimble of comprehend lug, and which tbej 
are too ai>t to view through the distorted medium ol |iai tlsan or per- 
sonal prejudice, can do no good, and is ccruin to produce tucalcuiabl* 

I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to the President for tbs 
constant evidence given me of his sincere personal regard, and his de- 
sire to susuin the military pUins which my Judginviit led me to urge 
for adoption and execution. I cannot attribute hisinilure toado|>t seme 
of those plans, and to give that supiK^t to others whieli was uecrseary 
to their success, to any want of confidence iu me ; and it only retnalns 
for me to regret that other counsels came betwi-eii tin* c<iiiiititntii<D*l 
commander-in chief and the general whom be had plated at the head of 
bis armies counsels which resulted In the failure of grout aiMiiaigns. 

If the nation p«sesses no geoeials in service comtit.'tent to direct Hs 
military altairs without the aal or supervision of iKi.iticians. the sooner 
It fluils them aud places them in positiou the better will it be for Um 
fortunes. , ... 

I may bo pardoned for calling attention to the memorandum submitted 
fyoK to the President on tlie 4Ui of August. 1861 ; my I. tier to hiin of 
Ju'y 7 lSt2 ; aud other simiktr commiiHicatloiis t-i Iiim an«l to the :?ee- 
re<Ary'of War. I luve seen do reason to change iu any matoi la! regard 
the views there expressed. 

After a calm impartial, and patient consideration of the sniijeet— » 
suhj-ct which demands the clieest thought on the i«irt of ev>ry ti oo 
lover of bis country— I am convinced that by the iiroper ein|rio) ment 
Of our resources it is entirely iioesible to bring this war to a siv ces«rul 
military issue. I believe that a necessary preliminary U> the re-e»taU. 
lifihmeiit of the Union is the entire defeat or virtual destruclWiii of tb« 
organlzeJ military iwwer of the confederates ; and that a result 
should be accomiKiii led and followed by cuneiliatory measure*; and 
that by pursuing the iwlitical course 1 have always advised. It Is possl- 
ble to bring about a permanent restoration of tlic Inioii— a re union hy 
which the rights of both seitions shall be preserved, and by which both 
parties sliall pri serve their self rcE(iect, while they reepecl each other. 

in this report 1 have conflued mvself to a plain narrative of such facU 
as are necessary for the purposes of h story. Where it was |<»«ible, I 
have preferred to give these facts in the language of dispatches, wrHteo 
at the time of their cccurrence, ralber than to atunipt a new relation. 
The reports of the snboidinate commanders, hcreio annexed, rccito 
what tin>e and 6|ace would fail me to mention hero : th<«e individual 
Instances of con-picnouB bravery and skill by which every baltle nM 
marked To them I must especially refer, for wilhjut th-ra this narra- 
tive would be incomplete, and Justice fail to be done. But I cannot omil 
to tender to my corps commanders, and to other general olllccrs uivder 
them, such ami*! recognition ol their cordial CO oivralion aud thelrdc- 
voted services as these reimrt- abundant y avouch 

1 have not so-iglit to defend the army which I had the honor to com- 
mand nor myself, against the h.«tile criticisms nice >o rife. It has 
Eceme'd to me that ncthlug more was required than such a [ilain ami 
truthful narrative to enable those wh.*o ri^kt it I* to form a 
Judgment on the Important matters Involved. ';bls report Is, In fact, 
thrbistory of the array of the Potomac. 

•^ring Uie |>triod occupied In tho organintlon of that army. It served 
as a barrier agaiust theadvimce of a lately vlotorioiis enemy, while the 
f,.rtillcalioneof Ihe capital were in progress ; and under thod; ciplmo 
which It then received it acquired strength, education, and sim^ ol tluu 
experience which U necessary to success in active opeialions. and whicH 
enabled it aflerwanls to suslam itself under clrcuinsiaiicM trying to 
Ihe most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes occurred al .iig the lines, 
conducted wlUl great gallaulry, which mured our trooiB to the realiUes 

* I'hc'army grew Into shape but slowly ; and the delays which attended 
on tho obtaining of arms, continuing late into the winter of l,-a-«J, 
were no le?s trying to the soldiers than to the peoplo of the country. 
Even at the time of the orpaniation of the Peninsula camraign, some or 
tile finest rcgim-nls were without rifics ; nor were the ulmist exertion* 
oo the part of the military authorities adi-quato to overcome the obslSr 

' When at lenpih, the army was in condition to lake the ft-ld. the Pe- 
ninsula i-amrolgn was plamied, and entered upon with enthusiasm by 
Xer.ind'meS. Had this campaign been followed up as it wa. de- 
sicned I cannot doubt that it would have resulted in a glorioas trlum|in 
to our arms, and the permanent resloratioii d the power of the govern- 
l»ent In Virgitila and Korib Carolina, if not throughout the rovolUng 
(Stales n was, however, otlierwise ordered, and Instead uf rciwrtUig & 
vlctorioti camVuIgn, It has been my duty to relate the heroism of a re- 
duced army sent uiwu an expedition Into an enemy s country, there to 
abandon one and originate auolher and new plan of caro|vaijii, which 
mlibtaod would have been successful if 5u|>ported with aiiireclalmn ol 
Its necessities, but which failed because of Ibe repealed failure o: pioia. 
ited support at the most critical, and, as It proved, the roost latal mo- 
nwnls That heroism suriiassos ordinary description, lis illu-tralioo 
must be left for the pen of the liistoriiin la limes of calm re fiectlon , wbelj 
Uie nation shall be locking back to the past from the midst of iicaceful 

'*;' w me, now, It U »uaicieut to «»y that my comralc* »ero Ticlors oa 


every field ?ave one, and thero tho eadurancA of but llltlo mero than a 
Biugle corps iiccomplished the object of thi; fiKhliiig, and, by siHJUiinK to 
il>6 urmy its ttaDtiit tu ibe Jauios, irl't to the eumiiy a ruiuous and b.-ir- 
ren victory. 

The army of the Potomac was first rcdiicod by the withdrawal from 
my comm.iud of the divisiou of General Blwukcr, which wirs orderod to 
Die Muuiit-iiii Dt'partiiieiu. under General Fiemuut. Wo had scarcely 
landed on tlie Feniiiealu wh«o it was further roducnd by a dispatch re- 
Tokiug a previous order giving me command at Fortross Monroe, and 
nuder which I had expected to take ten thousand men fiom point 
to aid in our operations. Then, when under fire brfore tlie drfonsea o'. 
Yorktown, we received the news of the withdrawal of General Mellow- 
ell's coi ps of about 35,000 men. Tliis completed tho overthrow of t:ie 
original plan of the campaign. About one third of niy ontlroariny (live 
divisions out of lourteen, one o!" the rine remaining being but iillli.- 
larger than n brigade) thus laki-n fi om me. Instead of a rapid ad 
vancc which I had planned, aided by a Hank movt-mfint up the York 
river, it wjs on y left to besiego Yurktown. Th:it s'vg.- was :succi:-sstuliy 
conducted by tne army, and when these strong works at length yielded 
to our approiicheB.the trot>ps rushed forward to the sanguinary but suc- 
ces.^ful lj,itt 11 of Wi! iim^ibiirg, and thus opone*' in ani'si unresisted 
advance to tliohanksof the Cbickahommv. l.ichinond lay before them, 
surrounded with fortifiL-ations, and guarded by^a army largru- than our 
own ; bat the prospect did not shake the courjigo of the brave men who 
composed my c mimand. Relying still on tho support which tho va«t- 
oossof oiT undertaking and tho grand results dep'^nding on our succe.=s 
seemed to insjre us, wo pressed forward. Tho wrathor wa^ stormy 
beyond precedent; t lie deep soil of tho Teninsula was at times one 
vast mora-ss ; tho Chickahoniiiiy rose to a higher stago thin had been 
known fur y-^ais before. I'ursuing tho a-Jvanco, thj cro.ssiog3 were 
sei»jd, a:nl tiie right wing extended to ed'jct a juncti >n wilii reenforce- 
meuts HOW promised and enrnestiy desired, and upon the arrival of which 
tiiQ complete 8acce.«s of the campaign seemed clear. The biilliant but- 
tle of HanoV'-r Court-house was fought, which op^^ned tho w,iy for the 
first corps, w:th the aid of which, had it ctme, we should then ha v.-; 
gone into the enemy's capital. It never cyme. Tho bravest army 
could not (!o more, under such overwhelming disappointment, than tlie 
army of tlie Potomac then did. Fair Oaks attests their courage and 
endurance when they hurled back, again and agaiu, the vastly s iperior 
masses of th ■ enemy. But mortal man could nut accomplish the mira 
c'cs that seem-d to \xxve been expected of them. But one courso w;i3 
left — a flank march in the face of a powerful enemy to anoilier and 
better base— one of the most hazardous movements in war. Tuo army 
of tho Potom;ic, holding its own safety, and almost the safety of our 
cause, lu its h md.9, was equSl to the oicasion Tho si;ven d:iys are 
daesic-al in American history; those days in which tho noble soldiers 
of the Union and Constitution fought an outnumbering enemy by day, 
nnH retreated successive victories by nij:ht, through a w^■ek of 
battle, ch siug t.e terrible series of conflicts wiih the cver-mL-m'uablo 
victory of .Malvern, where they drove back, beaten and shattered, tiio 
entire east-rn army of tho confederacy, and thus secured for thera- 
sel|fc-fi a ]d:tce of rest and a point for a new advance up'>n tho capital 
from the hauks of the James. Richmond was still within our grasp, 
bad the army of th^ Potomac been reinforced and jjorniilted to advance 
But couns.'ls. which I cannot but think subsequent events proved un- 
wise, prevailed iu Washington, and we were ordered to abandon the 
camp.iign. Xever did soldiers better deserve the thanks of a nation 
than the army of the Potomac for the deeds of the Peninsula campaign, 
and atthoiiph that meed was withheld from them by th? authorities, 
I am persuaded they have Received the applausj of tho American peo- 

The army of the Potr>m.ic wan recalled from within s'ght of Richmond, 
and inctwporuted with the army of Virgmia. Tho di-appointmeuts of 
the campaign on the Peninsula had not damped th-dr ardor nor di- 
inini.=?bed their patriotism. They fought well, faithfully, gallant'v. 
uader General Pope ; yet were compelled to lall back on "WashiugtOJ, 
defeated and almost demoralized 

^Tlie enemy, no longer occupied in guarding his own capital, poured 
bis troops northward, entered Maryland, threatened Pennsylvania, and 
even Washington itt^elf. Elated by his recent victories, and a.ssurei 
imt our troops were disorganized and dispirited, he was coidi ient that 
tho seat of war wiis permanently transferred to the loyal Mates, and 
that his own exhausted soil was to be relieved from tho burden of si;p- 
purting two hostile armie-s. But he did not understand tlio spirit wln^h 
animated the s^ldi^rs of the Union. I shall not, nor can I living, forget 
that when I was ordered to the command of the truojis for the defence 
of th-^capital, th; soldiers, with whom I had shared so much of tho 
anirety,and pain, and suff^ringof tho war, had not lost their confid-'nco 
in me as their coinmmdor. They sprang to my call with all lUrir 
ancient vigor, discipine, and courage. I led th^m into Maryland. 
Fifteen d;iys after they had fall-^n back defeated before V^ashington, 
they vanquished the enemy on tho rugged height of South MounLiin, 
pursued him to the hard-fought field of Antietam, and drove him, 
broken and disappointed, across the Potomac into Virginia. 

The army had need of rest. After the terrible experiences of battles 
and marches, with scarcoly an interval of repose, which thty had gone 
grougb from the time of leaving for the Peninsula; the return to 
Washington ; ih.i def.-at in Virginia; the victory at t^oath Mountain, 
and agaiu at Antiefam, it was not surprising that thev wyro in a larga 
degree destitute of tho absolute necessaries to efroctivo duty. Shoi-s 
wore worn out ; blankets were lost ; clothing wa,s in rags : iu short, Ibo 
army was unfit for active service, and an interval for rest and cqiiip- 
m.-nt wag necessary. Whoji the slowly forwarded supplies came to us 
I led the army acro^:3 the river, renovat'sd, refre.she.l, in g wj order 
and du^ciphue, and followed the retreating foe to a position where I wis 
confident of decisive victory, wh«n, In the midst of the moveriipnt, 
while my advance guard was actually m contact with the enemy, I 
removed from the command. 

I am devoutly grateXul to God that mv last camnaign with this brave 
army was crowned with a victory which savo-i the nation from tlio 
great^^t itcni it had th-n undergone. I havo not accomplished my pur- 
pose if, by this reiwrt tho armv of the I'ntomac is not placed high on 
the roll of (he hisu>rio armies of tho w.^rld. It'* dcois ennoble the na- 
tion to which it bolimgs. Always ready for battle, always firm, Fto,ad- 
fast, and trustworlhy. I novt-r callod on it In vain ; nor will the nuti.m 
over have cuise to attribute its want of success, under mysoT, or under 
oth<v commanders, to any failure of patriotism or bravery in tliat noble 
body of Anifrictin soldiers. 

No man can just'y charge upon any portion of that armv, from the 
oommumlinp general to th.i private, anv lack of devotion to thf s.-rvice 
i)( the Unit"d States Governu ent. and to the rauso of the O-nstitution 
and the Union. Th-y have provid their fealty in much sorrow, suITt- 
hig, danir.T, and thro^^trN tho v.-ry sh.i low of death Tlifir C4>mra(ic» 
doftd oo all Ui^ lijiJ3 wUora wc i«ui;hi Uava sojrcjlyJiuore cLiiui to the 

honor of a nation's reverence than their survivors to Ihd JoBtloeef • 
nation's gratitude. 
I am, fir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 


Majur-Gi7unal I'nileil Slat/ts Anaiif. 
Brigadier-General L. Thomas, 

Adjutant- Guneral Unit4ti StaUs Army. 

Adjutant GonoraPs Office, Wa.'^hingtou, Peccmber 22, 1963. 
I certify the above 13 a true copy of the original report oa filo fa 
this ofi]ue. 


Jais'Mnt Adjutant QcneroL 



Memorandum to the President I 

IxtUT to the Secretary of War 2 

Situation at Washington in July, ISfil 3 

Organization of Army of the Potomac 4 

Ariiliery 4 

Organ izatinn of Divisions % 

President's General War Order No. 2 .' 9 

Army Corps ^ 

Troops sent to t^e Peninsiila Q 

Ti-oti}« I. ft Behind or DeUiched .' T 

I'ersouai ctaff 7 

Engineers 7 

Topographical Engineers g' 

Departmeiits— Medical, Quarlerinuater'p.Snbsisteiuu-, Ordnance 8 

iTovostMaishal's Hepartmeut 9 

Commandtint of General Ueddquarters !,!.. I'l 

Judge-Advocate It) 

Sigual-Corns , '..'.'..'. It) 

Tel>grai.hic , lO 

Bait e of tiall'a Bluff 10 

Forces for C»«i.-t Service 11 

I-istructions to General Burnside, Balicck, Bueii, .nurmau, Botltr....ll 

Peninsula Route Projiosed \A 

Pres;deul'3 General War Order No. 1.,. .' .','.'.....'.'.'*,'.'.."..!.. 13 

" Sprcial " " *' \\ 3 

Nolo from President to McClellan 13 

l>_-tter from McCioilan 1 5 Secretary of Uar t3 

Vessels for Transport l5 

War Vessels on the Potom.^e ' 15 

RfUelOhstruciionof the Potomac ....,,. 15 

NutL'S FxpiainiDg Operations 1.^ 

President's .special War Order No. :i !*.."."! 1* 

Advanceof tho Army on Manassas.. . ' jl4 

Circular In Relation to Spies, DeserieiS, &c '. IT 

Strength of the Rebel Army .......'. ..' V 

Presueni's War Order No. S , t8 

I'n-paratioi'S for Peninsula Campaign " 1$ 

Instruct i"ns to Generals Banks and Wadsworth 18 

Official Note on the Employment of the Army 18 

Bletiker'd Division Ordered to Kicmoot 18 

TiO/ips lelt in Rear of the Potomac 1* 

Security of WasbiiiRtou l^ 

Fortification id" ilanass;is Recominti!i;e. -0 

Military luculents of First Periou -1 

SECOND Pr.Ri01>. 

Embarkation at Alexandria and Arrival at Fort Mo'-iror* ^1 

Mtdiow. ll's Troops detached -Ji 

Preivirations fur tiege of Yort.iown 2 

L' ttvr from General Keyns to Senator liirne 23 

Letter from President— Washington Defences— If.i^t-.- '^3 

Extract from Barnard's Uepoit 24 

Siege uf Yorkunvn '. 24 

Bittle of Willi. .msburgli ii 

Reiuforcoinents Request i-i 2* 

Mi:i owell ordi?red to Ci. operate .'.7 

Richmond tube Atiaukeu t*oon 2* 

Act on at Hanover's Court House 24 

Htttleoi F/.ir O^ks 24 

Affur at Redi'ubt No. a S3 

Bitiie of Mechanics vilie 4 

(James' Mill i4 

A'l n's Farm 08 

J-avafiifs Station ; ^li 

Nelson's Farm, or Greuaale .' 37 

Maivein Hill 3T 

List of Kilh'd, WnuiMlod and Jilisaint;, Iroui Juii>< 2^^ i > ju > Iht, l'So«...39 

Kutruat 10 Harrison's Bar JlS 


Correspondenca between Gen, VcClellan .aud the Presi'^'-nt 3? 

UcupatiMn ot Cogcius' J'oint..' 40 

Alfiir at Malvern Hill 4> 

Order for the Evacuaimu of Harr;Mi-.ii'M Bar -)i> 

RL-monstniice of General MuClellyo -ll 

Correspoudeoce between Genera s Huitak una Aii:Licliai. 41 

General McPlellan ordered to take Command of WapVdnTton Df^fnnces. .4(1 

Iiiiervii'w with iho President 47 

Table of Army Movemonts troiii uay to u;iv up ^^ i-i. 14, ISrt. 47 

Spi-cial Kebel Orders No. 1?1 ,' 48 

SituUion at Harper's Fi rry- losiruciioi.s lo ■ m. jnn^s 4* 

Instrucijons to General Franklin 4> 

Action at Burkettsville 49 

Surrender of Haiper's Ferry tj 

Battle of South Mountain ■*<• 

HaMle of Anticlnro 6t 

Retreat of Rebel A rmy fi4 

T^l)ular Report of Loses , &4 

Estimated aircngth of Rebel Aiiny M 

S^trengih of McCUdUn's Army -4 

Corres|*ondence— Condiliou of ihu Ai ni\ 5*? 

Statement of Clothing and Equpage leceiM- .'iT 

McClrllan Reliev»-d from Commant' 6i 

Cuuclusion — General CuusiUoiuUuLf» CO