4 €460S000 [92|ι ὃ
to κα
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
https://archive.org/details/republicshorey02platuoft
5 ; —
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D.
EDITED BY
τ. E. PAGE, c.u., trrr.p.
E. CAPPS, pu.p., 1.1... W. H. D. ROUSE, trrr.p.
L. A. POST, m.a. E. H. WARMINGTON, ».a.
PLATO’S REPUBLIC
Il
PLATO
THE REPUBLIC
WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
PAUL SHOREY, Px.D., LL.D., Lrrr.D,
LATE PROFESSOR OF GREEK, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
IN TWO VOLUMES
II
BOOKS VI—X
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
MCMXLII
PV PRUE ΑΚ ΔΊΣ soa ]
Pau ¥TeARVIAL aaa
van“os . Ἢ
eo στι ΠΣ
ILI ZR
PREFATORY NOTE
Wane activ ed, so far as his failing
would baht gic ae Thee for publication this the
second volume of his translation of the Republic of Plato,
Professor Shorey passed away on April 24, 1934, in the
seventy-eighth year of his life. In justice to him as
well as to the many thousands of readers who will study
and cherish this last and perhaps the greatest scholarly
work of the distinguished Platonist, the Editors of the
Loeb Classical Library desire to place on record here a
brief statement of the pertinent facts relating to the com-
position and the proof-revision of this volume. Behind
the bare narrative lies a record of unwavering courage
in the face of fast-approaching death on the part of the
veteran scholar and of dauntless determination both to
achieve a long-cherished purpose and to fulfil an obligation
entered into many years before with his friend Dr. James
Loeb and his collaborators in the editing of the Library;
and the Editors thought it right to offer this volume to the
public as nearly as possible approximating to the condition
in which the latest proofs passed under the author’s eye.
The translation had been finished and was in Professor
Shorey’s hands in proof form for about two years and had
been partially, though not finally, revised by him. The
Introduction was dictated by him, paragraph by para-
graph, in the scant hours of work permitted him by his
ἡ ivasny after his first break-down in December 1933.
e same is true of those notes accompanying the trans-
lation which are of an interpretative, literary or philo-
sophical character. The many notes on Platonic diction
and on matters of Greek grammar and idiom were in
large part compiled from Professor Shorey’s jottings on
the well-filled margins of his desk-copy of the Republic by
his research secretary, Miss Stella Lange, who had assisted
v
PREFATORY NOTE
him in that capacity during the preparation of What
Plato Said, to which important work she added many
references in the notes of this volume. The critical notes
under the text were added by Miss Lange during the
revision of the proofs, often from notes hho by ee hon
pena himself. te
‘The assembling in the form of copy for the printer of all
the material which is found in the a uetan end notes
has been the work of Miss Lange, undertaken at the
request of Mrs. Shorey ; and she has read all the galley
and page proofs of the volume in co-operation with Dr.
Page and myself. Miss Lange’s familiarity with her
teacher’s Platonic studies, his methods of work, his views
on the interpretation of passages of peculiar difficulty
has rendered her co-operation invaluable, and generou:
acknowledgements are due to her for her fidelity to the
heavy task which she willingly undertook. ΩΝ
To the writer of these words it would have been ἃ grate-
ful task, had this been an ABRFOB SNA place, to add a per-
sonal tribute to his colleague of many years at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, The familiar correspondence which
grew out of their renewed relationship during the prepara-
tion of the two volumes of the Republic has illuminated fo:
him in unexpected ways the life of tremendous and mg |
activities of the great scholar and humanist during the
years which for the ordinary man would have been a
period of decreasing labours, The ἡ ΑΕ Υ. and scholarly
roductivity of Professor Shorey in these later years falls
ttle short of heroism. But the readers of this interpre-
tation of the Republic who would know more about the
remarkable man and his life are referred to the review of
his career which introduces the July 1934 number of |
Classical Philology, the journal which he edited for twenty-
five years, and especially to President George Norlin’s
eloquent appreciation of “ Paul Shorey the Teacher,” on
pp. 188-191.
For the Editors
EDWARD CAPPS.
September 18, 1984.
vi
_
CONTENTS OF VOLUME
rn
ον Note ee ew
_ Inrropuction ...
pene Mie Pext
Jet The Translation .
oe
<a ὙΦΟΨΟΝΝ
‘ Boox IX. " 7 .
ett. ρει peathints
ΠΤ, Inpex or Names ae
TI. Inpex or Supsects . 4 - _
pa ἐν si “ag
OP ἐς teste
INTRODUCTION
Tuere is a sufficient outline of the Republic in the
introduction to the first volume. Here it remains
to consider more argumentatively certain topics of
_ the last five books which were treated summarily
_ there. They may be listed as (1) the theory of ideas
and the idea of good, (2) the higher education and
_ Plato’s attitude toward science, (3) some further
_ details of Plato’s political theories, (4) the logic and
logy of the main ethical argument of the
lic, (5) the banishment of poetry, (6) the con-
eluding myth.
eae as metaphysics, Plato’s theory of ideas Te Theeey
is, technically speaking, the deliberate and conscious τ
hypostatization of all concepts—the affirmation that
every abstract general notion of the human mind is
also somehow, somewhere, in some sense, an objective
entity, a real thing, outside of any mind. Some
-philologians and some sensitive aesthetic critics
object to the use of the words concept and hypo-
statization in this connexion. They have a right
to their personal distaste, but it contributes nothing
to the interpretation of Plato. Both words convey
definite meanings to students of philosophy and
there are no words that can replace them. The
Socratic dialogues are in fact largely concerned with
the definition of concepts, general or abstract ideas,
ix
τὰ ee ee ee Te
πῇ
“
aii a almaentan
ad
INTRODUCTION
general terms, Begriffe, call them what you will,
and some convenient synonym for this meaning is
indispensable in any rational discussion of Plato’s
philosophy. The Platonic word eidos may have
retained some of the associations of physical form,
and the modern psychology of the concept may
involve in some cases a more developed logic than
Plato possessed. - The word eidos or idea in Hero-
dotus, Thucydides, Democritus, the Hippocratic
corpus and Isocrates* may show the meaning con-
cept or Begriff imperfectly freed from the association
of physical form, but that does not justify the in-
ference that it was never so freed in Plato. The
terminology of the transcendental idea is indis-
tinguishable from the terminology of the concept
and the definition.’ It is impossible to say at what
point the metaphysical doctrine emerges in the minor
dialogues, or—on the, I believe, mistaken hypothesis
that the later dialogues abandon it—just when the
change took place. The logic of the definition in
the minor dialogues implies a practically sufficient
notion of the nature of a concept,° and it is sophistry
2 Cf. Shorey, De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, Munich,
1884, p. 1, and review of A. E. Taylor’s Varia Socratica, in
Class. Phil. vi.,1911, pp.361 ff.; Ritter, Newe Untersuchungen,
Munich, hg 228-326 ; Lewis Campbell, The Theaetetus
of Plato, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1883, pp. 268-269; C. M. Gillespie,
“* The Use of Hidos and Jdea in Hippocrates,” Class.
Quarterly, vi., 1912, pp. 178-203; Zeller, ii. 14, pp, 658, n. 2
and 661, n. 1; Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 248 ff.; Fried-
lander, Platon, i. pp. 16 ff.
® Cf. What Plato Said, p. 75.
¢ It is hard to understand the acceptance by several
scholars of Stenzel’s view that the concept and consequent!
the idea is a late discovery in the Platonic dialogues, a result
in fact of the analyses of the Sophist. He must take concept
x
INTRODUCTION
_to try to suppress so plain a fact by capitalizing the
word Form and insisting that Plato always or till
‘his. latest works visualized the ““ Forms” as types.
_ He did for some purposes and for others he did not,
_ and he always knew what he was doing. The ideas,
_as I have often pointed out, are ideals, types, or
_ hypostatized concepts or simply concepts according
_ to the purpose and the context.*
_ Many interpreters of Plato seem to assume that
philosophy is, like mathematics or chemistry, a pro-
in, some very esoteric si cance. For to common sense
ine Reno lainer that the concept is implied in
to define ethical terms and that it distinctly
with the terminology at least of the idea in
sid caineeall es of Plato and especially in the Buthyphro.
Stenzel’s shonght seems to be that the concept involves
that predication can be fully understood only
after the analysis of sentence structure in the Sophist and the
discovery of the meaning of “is.” But surely the conscious
analysis of sentence structure and the function of the copula
-is one thing and the correct use of predication, of propositions
and the conyersion of propositions and their combination in
virtual is another. All the elements of a sound
logic are present in Plato’s minor dialogues. They are
correctly loyed in inductive and deductive reasoning, in
the quest for itions and in the testing of them when
1 Stenzel means that the nature of the concept, of
the τ ελταῤ δ μἄα of abstractions is not definitively understood
in dialogues his postulate proves or demands too
much. The ultimate nature of the concept is still debated
to-day. But for all practical purposes of common sense any ©
one as consistently οὐδε γέ ἔοι ἀρῶ define abstract and
πὐτρέδαν aiid whee plies ἃ a0 logic’ the teatiig οὗ
definitions proposed, a sufficient notion of the-concept.
And anyone who a ends the concept may go on to
Bspostaline it_either an instinctive tendency of human
§ ~ glen: speech, or ith conscious metaphysics as Plato
eo σασμδυ....
[ἡ * Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 27 Ἐξ.
δ VOL. II ὃ χὶ
INTRODUCTION
gressive science ; that Plato, though a great artist,
was a primitive thinker whose methods and opinions
have only an historical interest to-day ; and that his
doctrine of ideas is the endeavour of an immature
mind to deal with a problem which. modern psych-
ology or the common sense of any dissertation-
writing philologian can settle in a paragraph. These
assumptions close the door to any real understand-
ing of Plato’s philosophy. ‘The ultimate nature of
general ideas, of abstract and conceptual thought in
relation both to the human mind and to the uni-
verse is as much a matter of debate to-day as it was
in the age of the schoolmen. This plain fact. of
literary history is not affected by the opinion of a
certain number of materialists and behaviourists that
the matter is quite simple and that there is or ought
to be no problem. They may or may not be right.
But the discussion continues, as any bibliography of
psychology and philosophy will show. he entire
literature of the “ meaning of meaning” and of
“imageless thought” is a renewal of the contro-
versy in other terms.
A great many thinkers are not satisfied with the
simple evasion of Aristotle that the human mind is
“such ” as to be able to experience this, namely the
separation in thought of things inseparable in ex-
perience. They cannot find any enlightenment in
the modern tautology that a general idea is an image
of a particular idea plus a feeling of generality. And
they are not convinced that the movements of the
body, even if we concede that they run exactly
parallel to the movements of the mind, really explain
them. And if we turn to the other side of the
problem we find that many of the leaders of modern
xii
INTRODUCTION
ics and mathematics are unable to conceive and
to admit that there is nothing in the objective
universe corresponding to the ideas, the concepts,
the laws, the principles by which they get their
results.
_ The Platonic theory of ideas is a convenient short-
hand, symbolic expression of the opinions that I have
_ thus summarized. If we disregard the rhetoric
_and physical imagery of the m by which Plato
_ exalts the importance of the doctrine or makes it
_ the expression of the ideal for ethics, politics and
aesthetics, all that it affirms is, first, that conceptual
thought is a distinct and differentiated prerogative
_ of man not sufficiently accounted for by the structure
of his body and the sensations which he shares with
the animals ; and second, that there must be some-
in the universe, something in the nature of
ὃ » that corresponds to our concepts and our
ideals—to the principles, for example, of ethics and
mathematics. These affirmations of Plato are primi-
tive animism only in the sense in which the same could
be said of the beliefs of some of the greatest mathe-
_ maticians and physicists of to-day or of Matthew
_ Arnold when he talks of a power not ourselves that
makes for righteousness. This is not reading modern
philosophies into Plato. It is merely giving him
credit. for knowing and intending what he in fact
says. The opposite interpretation underrates_ his
intelligence and really does read into his writings
modern ideas, the notions, namely, of modern anthro-
pologists as. to how savages think. Gomperz’
_ comparison. of the doctrine of ideas to Iroquois
_ animism (iii. 323; cf. iii. 1-2), Ogden and Richards’
_ designation of the ideas as “‘ name-souls” (The Meaning
xiii
INTRODUCTION
of Meaning, p. 45), Jowett’s illustration of what he
deems hair-splitting refinements in Plato by the
“ distinction so plentiful in savage languages,” Corn-
ford’s fancy (From Religion to Philosophy, p. 254) that
“the idea is a group-soul related to its group as a
mystery-demon like Dionysus is related to the group
of worshippers, his thiasos,” and all similar utter-
ances are uncritical, whatever airs of science or
pseudo-science they assume. The relevant illustra-
tions of Plato’s doctrine of ideas are to be sought
in the most subtle debates of the schoolmen, or in
modern psychological and epistemological literature’
about the meaning of meaning.* Te
There were, of course, some other more special con-
siderations that determined Plato’s deliberate and
defiant hypostatization of all concepts. It accepted
a natural tendency of the human, and not merely of
the primitive, mind, and rendered it harmless by apply-
ing it consistently to everything. If all concepts are
hypostatized, the result for practical logic and for
everything except metaphysics and ultimate epistem-
ological psychology is to leave concepts where they
were, as indispensable instruments of human think-
ing. The hypostatization of abstractions operated
practically as a short answer to the sophisms of crude
nominalists who obstructed ordinary reasoning by
raising ultimate objections to the validity of all ab-
stractions or general terms. This motive is distinctly
apparent in Plato’s writings and there is a strong
presumption that he was conscious of it. Ὁ
However that may be, Plato did in fact, partly as a
matter of imaginative style, partly as a matter of
* See Shorey in Proceedings of the Sixth International
Congress of Philosophy, pp. 579-583.
xiv
: INTRODUCTION
metaphysics, speak of concepts as if they were real
ybjects. He did, as his writings conclusively show,
_hypostatize all concepts, and all attempts to show
that he hypostatized only a few of the sublimer or
more dignified concepts are a@ priori improbable
hi use they deprive the doctrine of all rational
_ meaning and consistency,* and they are also refuted
by the
4
by incontrovertible evidence of the dialogues
‘themselves. Plato affirms this monstrous paradox,
_ not because he is a naive thinker unacquainted with
_ the elementary psychology of abstraction and general-
_ ization,” but because, as we have said, he regards it
as the most convenient expression of his rejection
i all materialistic and relativistic philosophies ° and
of all crude nominalism.4 He recognized that the
_ doctrine is a paradox hard to accept but also hard to
_ reject. But he deliberately affirmed it as the most
‘convenient alternative to inacceptable or unworkable
_ philosophies.’ He perhaps, as we have already sug-
_ gested, justified this procedure to himself, and we
_ may certainly justify it for him, by the reflection that
_ the theory is no more of a paradox than that involved
_ in every theology and ultimately in all science and
philosophy except the crudest dogmatic materialism.
_ And we may find further confirmation of this opinion
in the fact that both the metaphysics and the tran-
_ scendental physics of the past two decades discover
© Cf. Aristot. Met. 1043 Ὁ 21 and 991 b 6; Ross, i. pp. 192
and 199; and What Plato Said, p. 584.
» Cf. Charmides 158 2, Phaedo 96 5, What Plato Said,
ΟΡ. 533, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 47-48.
© Cf, Cratyl. 440 B-c.
4 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 574.
* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 586, on Parmen. 135 c.
7 Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 39, 268, 574.
,
«.
XV
INTRODUCTION
more helpful analogies in the Platonic theory of ideas
and in Plato’s applications of it to the philosophy of
nature than they do in any other philosophy of the
past. ᾿
In disregard of these considerations many critics in
every age, and notably Natorp and Stewart in ours,
have tried to free Plato from the stigma of paradox or
naiveté by trying to show that this uncompromising
realism (in the proper medieval sense of the word) is
not to be taken seriously, and that it was only a
poetic and emphatic form of conceptualism. This, as
we have seen, is at the best a halftruth. All Platonic
ideas are also concepts, but we cannot infer that they
were only concepts.* For many purposes of logic,
ethics and politics Plato practically treats them as
concepts. Why not? No reasonable writer ob-
trudes his ultimate metaphysics into everything.
And Plato is always particularly careful to distinguish
metaphysical hypotheses and their imaginative em-
bodiments in myth and allegory from the simple
truths of a working logic and a practical ethics which
are all that he dogmatically affirms.® But he always
affirms the metaphysical idea when challenged. To
this extent Natorp and those who agree with him
are right. But they pay too high a price for their
rightness on this point when they insist on deducing
all Plato’s opinions from his ontology, and obtrude
the metaphysical idea into passages where the doc-
trine at the most lends rhetorical and poetical eolour-
ing to the practical affirmation of the necessity of
concepts and the value of ideals.
* See Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 30, What Plato Said,
p. 585, on Parmen. 132 5,
» Cf. Meno 81 v-r and What Plato Said, p. 515, on Meno
86 B.
xvi
Ὶ INTRODUCTION
_ An example will perhaps make these distinctions
more: plain. Plato in the Republic (501) says that
his philosophic statesman will contemplate the divine
pattern of justice as an artist looks away to his model,
and that like the artist he will frequently glance from
the copy that he is producing to the model and back
again to the copy.? This may reasonably be under-
stood as only a heightened way of saying that the
true statesman must be guided by definite concep-
tions and strive for the realization of clearly ap-
-prehended ideals. The fact that Plato, the meta-
Ephysician, believed the transcendental reality of the
idea to be a necessary assumption of ultimate epistem-
ΤῊΝ adds nothing to the practical meaning of this
passage. When in the Phaedrus, however (247 pb,
_ 249 B-c), Plato says that every human soul has beheld:
} “the idea of justice in pre-natal vision, since otherwise
it would not have the power to reduce the confused
multiplicity of sensation to the unities of conceptual
“thought, he is clothing in mythical garb an epistem-
_ ological argument for the reality of the transcend-
_ ental idea, and he is not, as in the Republic passage,
thinking mainly of the explicit affirmation that the
_ true statesman must havesubmitted toa higher educa-
_ tion in conceptual thinking and have thus framed in
his mind ideals to guide his practice. The historian
οὗ philosophy who, without calling attention to this
- distinction, merely cites the two passages together
_in a footnote, only confuses the uncritical reader.
_ But again in the Parmenides (135 a-c), the Sophist
(246-247), the Cratylus (439 v f.; of. What Plato Said,
pp. 266-267), the Politicus (283-284, What Plato Said,
ΟΡ. 309), the Timaeus (51-52 and What Plato Said, p.
* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 458, on Euthyphro 6 π.
xvii
INTRODUCTION
613 on 28 a-s), there are passages in which, without
mythical dress, and with no specific reference to the
practical value of concepts and ideals, Plato postulates
the transcendental ideas as an epistemological neces-
sity, and the only escape from materialism and the
flux of relativity. No legerdemain of interpretation
or speculations about the chronology of the evolution
of Plato’s thought can explain away these passages,
and the interpreter who realizes that some virtual
equivalent of the Platonic idea is still to-day the alter-
native to thorough-going and unequivocal material-
ism will not desire to explain them away.
All that is needed in order to understand Plato
and to do justice to him as a rational philosopher is
to remember again? that, though the doctrine of ideas
is always in the background of his mind and would
always be reaffirmed on a challenge, he is not always
thinking explicitly of it when he is speaking of
logic, ethics, or politics, and we need not think of it
in order to enjoy his art or apprehend his meaning.
The transcendental idea, for example, is not needed
in the Republic except for the characterization of the
philosophic mind and the higher education of the
Platonic rulers.? It is not indispensable even there.
The concept will serve. The philosopher is he who
ean think and reason consecutively in abstractions.°
4 See supra, p. xvi.
> Of. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and What Plato Said, pp. 226-227.
It is also used in an intentionally crude form to confirm the
banishment of the poets. The poet does not deal in essential
truth, he copies the copy of the reality. Cf. infra, p. lsii,
on 596 a ff. and What Plato Said, p. 249. Stenzel’s
justification of this (Platon der Erzieher, p. 175) by the
consideration that good joiners’ work involves mathematics
seems fanciful and is certainly not in Plato’s text.
¢ Supra, Vol. I. pp. 516 ff.
xviii
INTRODUCTION
The curriculum of the higher education is designed to
develop this faculty in those naturally fitted to re-
ceive it. The thought and the practical conclusions
will not be affected if we treat the accompanying
bolic rhetoric as surplusage. Such statements as
that the philosopher is concerned with pure being,”
dwells in a world of light,* is devoted to the most
blessed part of reality,? satisfies and fills the continent
part of his soul,* undoubtedly suggest the meta-
physical background of Plato’s thought and the
emotional and imaginative connotations of his ideas.
But in the context of the Republic they are little
more than an expression of the intensity of Plato’s
feeling about his political and educational ideas.
It is obvious that the concept or idea is in many
eloquent Platonic passages an ideal, a type, a pattern,
to which aesthetic, moral and social experience may
approximate but which they never perfectly realize,
just as mathematical conceptions are ideals never
actually met with in the world of sense’ It is
possible, though not probable, that in some of the
minor dialogues we get glimpses of a stage of Plato's
youthful thought in which, though he already uses,
in speaking of the concept or the definition, much of
the terminology associated with the doctrine of ideas,
« Cf. supra, Vol. I. pp. 516-517, 520-521, What Plato Said,
pp. 233-234.
δ ATT a ff., 479 £, 484 5, 486 a, 500 5.
© 517 B, 518 a, 518 c, 520 v. 4 526 Ε,
* Rep. 586 8, Gorg. 493 B.
7 Phaedo 74 4. For the threefold aspect of the Platonic
ideas in metaphysics, logic and aesthetics see my Unity of
Plato’s Thought, p. 27, and T. E. Jessup, ‘‘ The Metaphysics
of Plato,” Journ. of Philos. Studies (1930), pp. 41-42. See
supra, Vol. I. pp. 504*505.
xix
INTRODUCTION
he has not yet consciously and systematically hyposta-
tized the concept.* These and similar qualifications
and speculative possibilities do not in the least alter
the fact that throughout the main body of his work
Plato is ready to affirm the metaphysical theory of
the hypostatized idea whenever the issue is raised,?
and there is not an iota of evidence in his own writings
that he ever abandoned or altered the doctrine, how-
ever much he varied the metaphors and the terms in
which he expressed it. Itis quite certain that he did
not, except in obviously mythical or poetical passages,
say more of the ideas than that they exist and that
they are in some sense real.° He did not say that
they are the thoughts of God.¢ There is no indica-
tion in his writings that he said that they are numbers.®
* See Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 31, What Plato Said,
p- 458.
Ὁ Cf. supra, pp. xvi and xviii. Pie
¢ Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 28 and p. 29, n. 188.
4 This Neoplatonic doctrine—based on ἃ misinterpretation
of such passages as Rep. 597 B f.—was adopted by many
Christian fathers and mediaeval scholars. Cf. Alcinous
in Hermann, Plato, vi. p. 163; Baumgartner, Philos. des
Alanus de Insulis, Ὁ. 54; Zeller ii. 14, p. 664, n. 5; Taylor,
Mediaeval Mind, ii. pp. 485-486 ; Webb, Studies in the
Hist. of Nat..Theol. p. 241 ; Harris, Duns Scotus, ii. p. 195:
C. G. Field, The Origin and Development of Plato’s Theory
of Ideas, pp. 21-22; Otto Kluge, Darstellung u. Beur-
teilung der Einwendungen des Aristot. gegen die Plat. Ideen-
lehre, p. 24.
It is very difficult to argue with those who attribute this
doctrine of ideas and numbers to Plato. Sometimes they
seem to affirm it only on the authority of Aristotle, which they
admit is in most cases hopelessly confused with his statements
about Speusippus and Xenocrates and other members of the
Academy. Sometimes they seem to admit that the doctrine
is not to be found in Plato’s extant writings. Sometimes
they hint rather than say that certain passages of the Philebus
XxX
Ἢ
Η
»,
>
ts
ν
Ε
Ve aoe aia
INTRODUCTION
And he never admitted that they are only thoughts in
the human mind,* though for practical purposes, as
we have said, they may usually be treated as such
when no metaphysical issue is involved.
It ought not to be necessary to debate these ques-
tions further. The only question open to debate
is the extent of Plato’s consciousness of what some
critics think the modern meanings that I have read
into him. The question of course is not whether he
and the Timaeus s that Plato’s mind was working in
this direction, though they are usually too cautious now to
affirm anything positive about Philebus 15-16 Ὁ, or Timaeus
53 8. I have more than once shown that there is no difficulty
in treating numerical ideas precisely like other ideas in rer
relation. to concretes. The number five is to five appre δὰ
sie sh is to red apples. It is present with them. I have
peatedly collected and interpreted the Platonic passages
(of What Pia y misled uncritical students of the Academy
-" Plato Said, p. 605, and infra on 525 pv, 526 a).
the distinction that there is only one idea while there
ie. many numbers of the same kind is quite pointless. There
is one idea of redness that is metaphysically or teleologically
really present entire in many red and there is one
idea of five or fiveness which is similarly present in many
groups of five. There is no more difficulty about the fives
that are present as factors in ten, fifteen, twenty, and twenty-
five than there is about any other ideas that may mingle
with or enter into the definition of another idea. The whole
_theory is a piece of scholastic ἐπετανθεῖλμε: to which a sound
interpretation of what Plato says lendsno support. And there
is no space and no need to transcribe here the exhaustive
collections of Robin (La Théorie platonicienne des Idées et
des Nombres d’aprés Aristote) or Ross’s ng tt summaries
of them in his commentary on Aristotle’s ἐποί μα. μεοράς:-
If Plato’s mind was really working such con-
clusions, why is there no hint of them in. in his huge work of the
‘Laws, or—if we grant them genuine for the sake of the
argument—in the Epistles ὃ
* Cf. Parmen. 132 8-c, and What Plato Said, p. 585, and
ibid. p. 594 on Soph. 250 8, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 30.
xxi
INTRODUCTION
could feel all the associations and connotations of the
modern words in which we have to express his mean-
ing, but whether his meaning is on the whole sub-
stantially that which I have attributed to him.
The obvious conclusion is that we can infer nothing
as to the composition or date of the Republic from the
fact that the ideas are not mentioned where there
is no reason for mentioning them, and that all hypo-
theses that different stages of the evolution of Plato’s
thought are indicated by the various aspects in which
the ideas are presented when they are mentioned are
uncritical.*| There is no occasion for the metaphysical
doctrine of ideas in the first four books. But the
general concept, the type, the ideal are referred to
in language which could be understood of the ideas.
The fact that it does not necessarily have to be so
understood is no proof that the doctrine was not
present to Plato’s mind at the time.
In the fifth, sixth, and seventh books the theory is
explicitly enunciated,’ illustrated by imagery and
applied to education. There is even a much disputed
but certain anticipation of the later doctrine that
while the idea is a unity its relation to things and to
other ideas seems to break it up into a plurality.°
The uncompromising statement of the subject in
the tenth book is sometimes taken to represent an
earlier and more naive form of the doctrine. But the
style of the passage is evidently that of a defiant
affirmation of the whole length of the paradox, or
rather perhaps of an expert explaining the matter to
« Cf. What Plato Said, p. 560, Unity of Plato’s Thought,
p. 35 and n. 238.
> 476 af. Cf. Vol. 1. pp. 516-517, 505 a ff., 517 5 ff.
¢ Cf. 476 a, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 34.
Xxil
νι
INTRODUCTION
laymen.* » The fact that the argument of the third
man is distinctly mentioned in the same connexion is
in itself evidence that the passage does not represent
an earlier and more primitive stage of Plato’s thought.
For the third man is mentioned in the Parmenides.”
But there would not be much profit in further discus-
sion of hypotheses that have no basis in the text of
Plato ὅν the philosophical probabilities of the case.
All that has been said of the ideas in general applies The Ideaor
to the idea of good. It is the hypostatization of the °°
concept “ good.’’ Its significance in the Platonic
system is that of its importance in human thought,
In ethics it is what modern ethical philosophy calls
the sanction. In politics it is the ideal, whatever it
may be; of social welfare. In theology and the phil-
osophy of nature it is the teleological principle, the
ign that implies a designing mind in the universe.
The first of these meanings is predominant in the
minor dialogues where all problems and all attempted
definitions point to an unknown good so consistently
and systematically that Plato must have been aware
of the reference... The second meaning is most
prominent in the Republic, but there is explicit refer-
- ence to the first and to the discussions of the minor
dialogues... In any case, ethical and social good are
not sharply separable in Plato.
Theidea of good is nowhere defined, but its supreme
importance and all of its meanings are symbolized in
the images of the sun and the cave. Its main mean-
“Οὗ 597 a Gs Ὑ ἂν δόξειε τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τοιούσδε Χόγους
διατρίβουσιν.
> 159 &-133 4. Cf. infra on 597 c.
* See What Plato Said, pp. 71-73, with marginal references
xxiii
INTRODUCTION
ing for the Republic is the ideal of social welfare on
which the statesman, as opposed to the opportunist
politician, must fix his eye, and which he can appre-
hend only by a long course of higher education which
will enable him to grasp it. Plato rightly feels that
no other definition is possible or desirable unless the
entire polity of the Republic was to be taken as its
definition. The Timaeus is the poetical embodiment
of the third meaning, though single phrases of the
Republic glance at it.t If there is a beneficent
creator, his purpose, his idea of good, is the chief
cause of the existence of the world and the best key
to the understanding of it.
I am not attributing these three meanings of the
good to Plato by an imposed symmetry of my own.
It is what Plato himself says and the chief problem
of my interpretation is not to understand Plato
but to account for the failure to recognize his plain
meaning. .
In view of my repeated expositions of Plato’s
doctrine of the idea of good there would be little
point in attempting here once more to set it forth in
a smooth, consecutive, literary statement.’ It will be
more to my purpose to enumerate in the briefest,
baldest, most explicit fashion some of my reasons for
feeling that I have been misunderstood, and that the
definite issues raised by my arguments have never
« Cf. infra, pp. xxv and 102.
> See my paper, “‘ The Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic,”
University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology, vol. i.
(1895), pp. 188-239; my article, “Summum Bonum,”’ in
Hastings’ Encycl. of Relig. and Ethics, vol. xii. pp. 44-48 ;
my review of Jowett and Campbell’s Republic, The Nation,
61, 1895, pp. 83-84; Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17 and π,
94; What Plato Said, pp. 71-72, 230 ff., 534 on Phaedo 99 a,
Xxiv
INTRODUCTION
‘been met. I have never intended to deny that
_ Plato’s language about the idea of good is in large
part the language of poetry and religion, that he
intends to suggest by it the ineffable and infinite
unknowable beyond our ken, and that his eloquence
has been a source of inspiration to many readers who
eare little for his dialectics and for the critical inter-
_ pretation of his specific thought. What I have been
_ trying to say is that the mere repetition of Plato’s
rhetoric or the attempt to better it in our own para-
phrases will not contribute much to the interpretation
of the precise meaning of the passages of the Republic
in question, assuming that in addition to their in-
‘spirational value they are intended to convey some
definite meaning and are not merely ejaculations
thrown out at an infinite object.
In the first place, then, since all Platonic ideas
are hypostatized concepts the hypostatization of the
idea of good is presumably irrelevant to its main
significance for the ethical and political thought of
the Republic. It does, of course, suggest the meta-
physical background of Plato’s thought; there are
a few sentences in which it involves the goodness
which teleologists discover in the structure of the
universe and in the designs of its creator, the theme
of the Timaeus;% and since goodness is the chief
attribute of God in religious literature from the New
‘Testament to Whittier’s hymn, there is a certain
plausibility in identifying it with God himself. But
the text of Plato, and especially the text of the
_ Republic, does not justify any of these extensions of
_ the idea if taken absolutely. The idea of good is
_ undoubtedly the most important of ideas, but it is
« Cf. on 508 Β and 509 8; Zeller ii. 1‘, pp. 687-688.
XXV
INTRODUCTION
not true that it is the most comprehensive in the
sense that all other ideas are deduced from it,* as in
some Platonizing pantheistic philosophies they are
deduced from the idea of Being. There is no hint
of such deduction in Plato’s writings. It is only
teleological ideas in ethics, politics and cosmogony
that are referred to the idea of good as the common
generalization or idea that includes them all. Even
the ideas are not in Plato’s own reasoning deduced
from the idea of good. It is merely said that a
scientific moralist, a true statesman, will be able so
to deduce them, and that the higher education is
designed to give him this ability.. In Republic 534
B-c, the dialectician is he who is able ἑκάστου...
λόγον . .. διδόναι and the idea of good is a special
example of the ἕκαστον. It is not said that the man
who does not know the idea of good does not know
any other idea, but that he does not know ἄλλο
ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν.
It is not even true that Plato’s philosophic ethics
is deduced from the idea of good. He only says that
the ethics of the guardians will be so deduced. So
far as Plato himself expounds a scientific ethics it rests
on the preferability of the intellectual life and the
comparative worthlessness of the pleasures of sense.”
The idea of good in the dialogues is a regulative not
a substantive concept.
Whatever its religious suggestions it cannot in
any metaphysical or literal sense be identified. with
the Deity.© The idea of God was taken by Plato
« Cf. my review of Paul Hinneberg, Die Kultur der
Gegenwart, Class. Phil. vi. p. 108.
ὃ φ; Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 24, and infra, pp. lvi f.
¢ Cf. my Idea of Good, gp. 188-189, Unity of Plato’s
Thought, n. 94, What Plato Said, p. 231.
xxvi
INTRODUCTION
_/from the religion of the Greek people and purified
by criticism. The idea of good came to him on an
_ altogether different line of thought. It is the out-
‘come of those Socratic quests for definitions of
ethical virtues and social ends which always break
down because the interlocutors are never able to
discover the sanction which makes the proposed
_ virtue or end a good and desirable thing.*
__ When these misapprehensions are cleared away I
_ trust that I shall not any longer be misunderstood if
_ Isay that the chief and essential meaning of the idea
of good inthe Republic is ‘* precisely” that conception
_ of anultimate sanction for ethics and politics which
i minor dialogues sought in vain. Plato does not
_ profess to have discovered it in the Republic except
_ so far as it is implied in the entire ethical, social and
“political ideals of his reformed state. He intention-
sally and wisely refuses to define it in a formula.®
_ He merely affirms that it is something which can be
apprehended only by those who have received the
‘training and the discipline of his higher education.
᾿ς ® For the idea of good and God ef. also V. Brochard, “ Les
_’Mythes dans la philos. de Platon,” L’ Année Philos., 1900, p.
11; Pierre Bovet, Le Dieu de Piaton, Paris, 1902, p. 177 ;
' eder, Platos philosophische Entwicklung, pp. 237, 381 f.;
Zeller, Phil. ἃ. Gr. ii. 1*, p. 718, n. 1, pp. 667, 694, 707 ff. ;
_ Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics (Eng. tr.), ii. p. 327 ;
Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. pp. 85 and 211; Inge, The Philo-
2 of Plotinus, ii. p. 126; Gustave ider, Die Ἶ
Ἀμαρία, p- 109; Taylor, Plato, pp... 8ὅ-89: Adam,
aie itality of Platonism, pp. 22 and 132; The Religious
_ Teachers ὁ eece, pp. 442 f., with my review in Philos.
Rev. vol. 18, pp. 62-63; Apelt, Beitrage zur Geschichte der
_ griechischen Philos., Vorrede, p. vi.; H. Tietzel, Die Idee
_ des Guten in Platons Staat und der Gottesbegriff, Progr.
Wetzlar, 1894. ad
" Cf. infra on 506 x, p. 95, note αὶ
VOL, II δ Xxvii
INTRODUCTION
The consummation of this education is characterized
briefly and soberly as a vision, just as in the Sym-
posium the long ascent of the scale of beauty cul-
minates in a vision which alone makes life worth
living. This language expresses the intensity of
Plato’s feeling about the intellectual life and his
own ethical and social ideals, but it does not make
him a visionary or a mystic in the ordinary sense of
the words. vi
If the interpretation here outlined is in itself a
rational sequence of thought and makes sense of
what Plato says, it surely creates a presumption
which cannot be rebutted by evading issues and
charging me with insensibility to Plato's deeper
religious and mystic meanings. It can be refuted
only by giving specific answers to specific arguments
and testing them by the texts. The interpretation
of the images, symbols, allegories (the synonym
does not matter) of the sun, the divided line and
the cave, provides the chief test, as the too literal
acceptance of them is perhaps the main cause of
misunderstanding.
The aptness of the sun as a symbol of Plato’s idea
of good might be illustrated by many quotations
from modern poetry and from the literature of sun-
worship.’ It would be interesting to compare what
Plato says of the sun as the primal source of light,
heat, life, growth, all things, with the language of
modern science. Herbert Spencer, for example,
innocently says (First Principles of a New System of
Philos., 1865, Amer. ed. p. 454): ‘‘ Until I recently
* Rep. 516 5, 517 B-c, Symp. 210 8 ff. Cf. Rep. 500 B-c,
» Cf. infra, pp. 100-101, on 508 a.
XxViii
INTRODUCTION
consulted his Outlines of Astronomy on another ques-
tion I was not aware that so far back as 1833 Sir
John Herschel had enunciated the doctrine that
“the sun’s rays are the ultimate source of almost
every motion which takes place on the surface of the
earth.’ ” Another line of illustration would lead
‘through the Latin poet Manilius and Plotinus to
Goethe’s “ War’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft.” ¢
‘This thought might be extended to include modern
‘debates on the nice preadjustment of the eye to
its function of vision. Does it, or does it not, imply
a creator and a design? Lastly, Plato’s statement
that, as the sun is the source of light, but is not itself
light (508 8), so the idea of good is not knowledge or
being but the cause of both and something that is
beyond and transcends being—this superhuman
hyperbole (509 B-c) is the source of all so-called
negative theologies and transcendental metaphysics
_from Philo and Plotinus to the present day.
_ But our present concern is not with these things
but with the direct evidence that the idea of good
is essentially for the interpretation of the Republic
what modern ethical theory calls the sanction. One
sentence I admit seems to identify the idea of good
with God. The sun, it is said, is that which the Good
created in the visible world to be its symbol and
analogue. This would seem to identify the idea of
good with the Demiurgos of the Timaeus, who is
both the supreme God and a personification of the
idea of good or the principle of teleology in nature.
But we have already seen that it is uncritical to
Tee Plato’s language about God, a word which
accepts from traditional religion and employs as
“ΟἹ infra, p. 101, note δ. on 508 8.
Xxix
INTRODUCTION
freely for edification and the rejection of militant
atheism as Matthew Arnold does. Moreover, there
are other sentences in this part of the Republic which,
if pressed, are irreconcilable with the identification
of the idea of good with God. In any case, apart from
one ortwo sentences of vague and disputable meaning,
the acceptance of the idea of good as the sanction more
nearly lends an intelligible and reasonable meaning
to everything that Plato says than does any other
interpretation. On this view, then, I repeat, the
idea of good is simply the hypostatization of what
the idea of good means for common sense in modern
usage. It is the good purpose in some mind able
to execute its purposes. It is what such a mind
conceives to be the supreme end to which all other
ends are subordinated and referred. bas: baopetd
The divided line and the cave are also images and
symbols employed to bring out certain other aspects:
of the theory of ideas and of the idea of good in
particular. ‘The main object common to both is to
put the thought “ Alles vergingliche ist nur ein
Gleichnis ” into a proportion. The four terms of such
a proportion may be secured either by invention or by
forcing special meanings on some of the terms. In
the case of the cave, the cave itself, the fettered
prisoners, the fire and the apparatus by which the
shadows of graven images are cast on the wall of the
cave are clearly inventions. There is a real analogy
between the release of the prisoners with their ascent
to the light of day (515 c ff.) and the Soeratie elenchus
which releases the mind and draws it up from a world
of sense to the world of thought (517 B-c). | But it is
obvious that all the details of the imagery cannot be
pressed and that we need not ask too curiously to
XxX
a
ἷ INTRODUCTION
[
_ what in Plato’s serious thought every touch that fills
_ out the picture corresponds.
᾿ On my interpretation critics have likewise erred by
refusing to admit a similar qualification of their too
iteral acceptance of the image of the divided line.
| The proportion: ideas are to things as things are to
their ections in mirrors or in water, has only three
ἢ terms. The fourth term is found in mathematical
_ ideas, which in their use in education and in respect
of the method by which the mind deals with them are
; in some sort intermediate between ideas and things.
We thus get our proportion. But in the description
_of it Plato is careful to distinguish the mathematical
i only by the method of their treatment in science,
not in dialectics, and not as entities of another kind.
This raises the presumption that Plato, as usual,
knows what he is doing and does not intend to dis-
_ tinguish objectively mathematical ideas as ideas from
_ other ideas. I support this presumption by pointing
_ out that in the later and final interpretation of
_ the line Plato names the objective correlates of the
_ mental processes corresponding to three divisions
__ of the line but omits the fourth on the pretext that
_ it would take too long. (Cf..on 534.4.) He names
_ the mathematical attitude of mind or method but
does not name its objects as something distinct from
_ ideas or a distinct kind of ideas. I go on to show that
_ there is no evidence in the Platonic writings for the
_ doctrine that mathematical ideas differ in themselves
_ from other concepts, and that the testimony of Aris-
_ totle is too confused to prove anything.* These
_ assumptions raise a definite issue which can only be
_ met by equally definite arguments. Instead of that
: = Cf. supra, pp. xx-xxi, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 82 f.
xxxi
INTRODUCTION
critics rebuke me for attributing insincerity to Plato,
or at the best they ask, How could Aristotle be mis-
taken? ney 6
Plato himself regards all literature except dia-
lectics as a form of play and much that passes for
dialectics as conscious or unconscious jesting. When-
ever he himself employs imagery, symbolism and
myth or an eristic dialectic he is careful to warn us ©
that it is not to be taken too literally or seriously,*
and he usually points out just how much of his
apparent conclusions it is necessary to accept for the
carrying on of the argument. Now the particular
synonyms I employ to describe this characteristic
trait of Plato’s method and style are obviously ir-
relevant to my main argument. Yet if in view of
the frequency of the idea and word παίζειν in Plato
I express the thought that the intermediate place of
mathematical ideas in the proportion of the divided
line is not to be taken literally and add that the
ambiguous coinage εἰκασία, or conjecture, is a term
of disparagement playfully thrown in to secure sym-
metry of subdivision in the two worlds and to suggest
a depth below the lowest depth,® I am sternly told
that “ It is surely a strange reading of the character
of Plato as a seeker after truth to maintain that in
the very heart of his greatest work and at the v
core of the problem of knowledge he should disturb
and confuse those who are seeking to understand his
doctrine with a little wholly uncalled-for ἡ playful-
ness,’ even though it should be for the sake of
‘symmetry.’”’* Now I am quite willing to sub-
® Cf. infra on 539 c, p. 227, note d. ~
> Idea of Good, p. 229.
¢ H. J. Paton, Plato’s Theory of EIK ASIA, Aristotelian
Society, 1922, p. 69.
xxxii
INTRODUCTION
stitute some other expression for “‘ playfully thrown
in.” But my precise expression, I repeat, is not the
point. Plato in fact does here, as elsewhere, resort
to artificial constructions and inventions in order to
ex} the relation between the ideas and what we
call realities by proportion. The εἰκόνες and <ixacia
are in fact introduced here to complete the symmetry
of such a proportion and to suggest ironical disparage-
_ment of the inferior type of thought. They contri-
_ bute nothing further to the solution of the “ problem
_of knowledge.” To recognize this plain fact is not to
impugn the character of Plato, and to rebuke my
_ frivolity with solemn eloquence is no answer to my
argument. Plato himself never thinks it incompat-
_ ible with a serious search for truth to mingle jest with
_ earnest and seriousness with irony.
Similarly of the ἀνυπόθετον (510 B). It obviously
suggests to modern interpreters the metaphysical first
principle, the Unconditioned, the absolute ground,
the noumenon, call it what you will. Plato himself
“may have been willing to let the word convey such
_ overtones, and those who are not interested in his
_ precise meanings may stop there and cry with Rous-
_seau, “O Mighty Being!” But it is also equally
obvious that the ἀνυπόθετον has a definite and less
_ purely emotional meaning in its context. It ex-
presses Plato’sdistinction between themanof science,
_ who starts from assumptions that he does not allow
_ to be questioned (510 c-p), and the philosopher or
_ Platonic dialectician, who is able and willing to carry
the discussion back, not necessarily always to a meta-
_ physical first principle, but at least to a proposition on
_ which both parties to the argument agree and which
_ therefore is not arbitrarily assumed as an hypothesis
XxXxili
INTRODUCTION
by the questioner. This meaning could be illustrated
by the Crito, in which it is said that all discussion is
vain without such a starting-point of agreement.? . It
is the essential meaning of the passage in the Phaedo
(101 p-r), where ἱκανόν, the adequate, the sufficient,
is for all practical purposes a virtual synonym of the
ἀνυπόθετον, though it does not suggest the possible
metaphysical connotations of the word...
Now this distinction between dialectics or philo-
sophy and the sciences is repeatedly borrowed by
Aristotle ὃ and even retains much of its validity under
the changed conditions of modern thought. , There
will always be these two ways of thinking and these
two types of mind. The passage, then, makes good
sense so interpreted and. lends a rational meaning
to the ἀνυπόθετον without denying the mystic over-
tones which are all that seem to interest some inter-
preters of Plato. )
To return to the political and social idea of good.
Plato’s conception of ultimate good in this sense must
be gathered from his writings as a whole. Neither —
in the Republic nor elsewhere does. he commit. him-
self to a defining formula of social welfare. . It is
enough for his purpose to emphasize the distinction.
between the statesman and the politician and describe
the education and the way of life that will produce
the statesman and develop in him the ideals and the
unity of purpose that distinguish him, But it would
not be difficult to gather Plato’s general conception
of political and social good from the Republic and the
Laws and certain passages of the Gorgias and Poli-
ticus. The true statesman’s chief aim will be not
4. Crito 49 νυ, infra, p. 175, note c, on 527 E.
» Cf. infra, p. 111.
XXxiv
INTRODUCTION
wealth and power and amusements, but the virtue of
_ the citizens. A sober disciplined life is preferable
_ to the unlimited license and expansiveness of an im-
_ perialistic -and decadent. democracy. The: states-
_man’s chief instruments for realizing his ideals will
be the as eee education and what to-day is called
δ.
_ Is this plain common sense, then, all that is meant
by Plato’s idealistic eloquence and the imagery of the
sun, the divided line and the cave ? 1 never meant
to say that it is all, but it is the central core of
without which Plato’s transcendentalism is
nly a rhapsody of words. If nature is more than
an nag pe Be himself be-
lieves: and believes indispensable to morality and
social order, his purposes, his idea of good, or, meta-
_ physically or mythologically speaking, the idea of
_ good which he contemplates as a pattern,’ becomes
the first, and chief cause of the ordered world, and
_ such understanding of his purposes as is possible for
__ us is a better explanation of things than the material
_ instruments that serve his ends.*__ This is the type of
_ explanation that the Socrates of the Phaedo desires
but cannot discover and that the Timaeus ventures
_ to present only in mythical and poetical form.’ It
_ has little place in the Republic, though we may sup-
_ pose it to be in the background of Plato’s mind and to
_ be suggested by his allegories. The idea of good in
᾿ _ * Gorg. 513 τέ, 517 B-c, 504 υ»-Ὲ. Laws 705 ν»-ῈΣ24 695 5.6,
ira. 309-310, Unit if Plato 62, n, 481
if -310, Unity ὁ i . 62, ἢ, :
Laws and Rep. passim. 7 a sain μέσων νῷ
_ * Cf. What Plato Said, p. 613 on Tim. 28 a-n.
4 Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 329, 346-347.
* Gf. my Idea of Good, p. 232,
- δ᾽" Ἂν IA τάν, IIE te A Ee ay Pil
XXXV
INTRODUCTION
this sense, like the heat and light of the sun, is both
the cause of the things we think “ real ” and the con-
dition of our apprehension and understanding of
them. It is not the substance of things; it is not
their “ being,” but something apart from and tran-
scending “ being ”’ in the ordinary sense of the word
(509 B). But the allegory and the transcendental
language apply equally well to the ethical and poli-
tical ideas which are the chief theme of the Republic,
and it is not necessary to look further. The cause of
any political or social institution is the purpose or
idea of good in some controlling mind, and, as Cole-
ridge said and Mill repeated after him, the best way
to understand any human institution or contrivance
is to appreciate that purpose. That will throw a
flood of light on everything.* .
I have never meant to deny the mystic and meta-
physical suggestions of Plato’s language. I have
merely tried to bring out the residuum of practical
and intelligible meaning for the political and ethical
philosophy of the Republic. It is a meaning that is
still true to-day, and it is the only interpretation that
makes intelligible sense of what Plato says. That
surely creates a presumption which can be met only
by definite arguments. |
Whatever the more remote suggestions of the idea
of good for general or ethical philosophy, this its
simple practical meaning for the Republic is clearly
indicated by Plato himself. It symbolizes the distine-
tion between the ideal statesman and the politician
of decadent Athens and marks the purpose and goal
of all the studies of the Platonic higher education.
The guardians have already received in a purified
Cf. my Idea of Good, p. 227,
XXXvi
INTRODUCTION
‘ form the normal Greek education in gymnastics and
“music,” described in the Protagoras, 325 c ff., and
_ virtually repeated in the education prescribed for the
_ entire citizenship in the Laws. The product of this
_ Platonic elementary and secondary education would
_ bea band of healthy, wholesome, sunburnt boys and
; girls, who, in Ruskin’s phrase, “ have had all the
_ nonsense boxed and raced and spun out of them.”
They would have dipped into fewer books than our
_ graduates, but they would know a few of the world’s
_ greatest books by heart, they would have no theory
_ of art or sentimentality about it, but their taste
_ would have been refined, almost to infallibility, by
_ hearing only the best music and seeing only the best
_ statues. They would have heard of fewer things
but would know what they did know perfectly.
They would have never studied a text-book of civies,
ethics, or “‘ sociology,’’ but the essential principles
of obedience, patriotism, modesty, order, temperance,
ἃ manners, would have been so instilled into them
that the possibility of violating them would hardly
occur to theirminds. They would not only be strong
‘and healthy, but through gymnastics, choral singing
᾿ς and dancing, and military drill, would have acquired
__ the mastery of their bodies and a dignified and grace-
ful
~ But already i in the age of the sophists Athens had
become too sophisticated for her ambitious youth to
_ remain content with this simple old Greek education
_ however reformed and idealized. There was a de-
mand for a higher university education, which was
_ met first by the sophists, and then in the next
_ generation by Plato himself and his great rival, the
orator Isocrates, who conducted academies side by
XXxvii
INTRODUCTION
side in Athens for forty years. The content of this
higher education is given in every age by the know-
ledge of thatage. Whatelse canit be? These Greek
teachers did not offer ‘‘electives”’ in the chemistry
of the carbon compounds, or the origin of Shintoism
in Japan, or the evolution of the English novel from
Tom Jones to Ulysses, for the simple reason that these
interesting branches of study had not yet been de-
veloped. The sophists taught a practical theory of
polities and business and the new art of rhetoric,
promising to make ‘their pupils effective speakers
and shrewd men of affairs.¢ The publicist Isocrates
taught what he knew, the application of this sophistic
doctrine to the composition of more serious political
and ethical essays. Plato taught what we should
call ethics, sociology and philosophy, but what he
called dialectics—the closely reasoned argumentative
discussion of problems of ethics, politics, social life,
philosophy and religion. f
But with wider experience Plato came to feel that
the “Socratic method” of plunging mere lads
directly into these difficult questions was unwise.
It was doubtless stimulating ; but it unsettled their
moral faith, confused their minds, and converted
them into pert and precocious disputants.? | Dia-
lectics demanded a preparatory training in some
simpler methods of close, consecutive, abstract
thinking. This preparation Plato found in the new
sciences of arithmetic and geometry and in the
sciences which he was among the first to constitute
or predict—the sciences of mathematical astronomy,
* Of. Protag. 318-319, Gorg. 452 τ, 456-457,
> Cf, infra, p. 220, note a, on 537 pv ff.
XXXViii
INTRODUCTION
,and acoustics.* By these studies the youth-
ful mind could be gradually lifted out of the region
_ of loose pictorial thinking, habituated to the thin
_ pure:air of abstractions, taught the essential nature
of definitions, axioms, principles, and rules of logic,
and made capable of following with continuous
attention long trains of reasoning. We value
mathematics and the exact sciences largely for their
_ practical applications.? In the Republic Plato prized
them as the indispensable preparation for equally
severe abstract thinking about the more complex
and difficult: problems of life, morals and society.*
In his Republic he combines this idea drawn from
the practice of his own school with his fundamental
political and social ideal, the government of mankind
_ by the really wise, and not by the politicians who
. _ happen ἰο get the votes. ' We need not stop to ask
eB mecthen a Utopia designed for a small Greek city is.
Η applicable to:a democracy of 120 millions inhabiting
ἜΣ Ὁ three million square miles. We are
_ concerned with the ideal and its embodiment in a
_ theory of education.
_ The Platonic rulers are chosen by a process of
_ progressive selection through ever higher educa-
_ tional tests applied to young men and women who
_ have stood most successfully the tests of the lower
_ education.4 Through arithmetic, geometry, and astro-
a : Cf. notes on Book vii. 521 ff., esp. on 521 c, 523 a; 527 a.
on 525 c.
pa Spencer speaks of “ Social science . . . the
_ science κῶς, σαν tereat all others in subtlety and complexity ;
7 the highest intelligence alone can master ..
J —the science now taught to undergraduates who have not
__Feceived the Platonic preparation.
* Cf. 587 a, B,D:
Ι XXXix
INTRODUCTION
nomy, mechanics and acoustics, so far as these admit:
of mathematical treatment, they are led up to the
final test in ethics and sociology, which is not speech-
making or slumming, or the running of university
settlements, but the power of close, exact, consecu-
tive reasoning about complex moral phenomena. It
must not be forgotten, however, that this theoretical
discipline is supplemented by many years of practical
experience in minor offices of administration.®
The consummation of it all is described pédetically
as the “ vision of the idea of good ᾿᾿ (540 a)—which,
however, as we have seen, turns out to mean for all
practical purposes the apprehension of some rational
unified conception of the social aim and human well-
being, and the consistent relating of all particular
beliefs and measures to that ideal—a thing which
can be achieved only by the most highly disciplined
intelligence. For in Plato’s time as in ours the
opinions of the average man are not so unified and
connected, but jostle one another in hopeless con-
fusion in his brain. Plato’s conception of the higher
education, then, may be summed up in a sentence :
‘* Until a man is able to abstract and define rationally
his idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet.
of all objections and is ready to meet them, not by
appeals to opinion but to absolute truth, never
faltering at any stage of the argument—unless he
can do all this he knows neither the idea of good nor
any other good. He apprehends only a shadow of
opinion, not true and real knowledge.” ὃ
Starting from the sound psychological principle
that the old-fashioned rote recitation of a text-book
« Cf. 539 £-540 a.
> See Rep. 534 s-c and notes.
xl
. INTRODUCTION
isan abomination, that verbal knowledge is no know-
_ ledge, that the concrete must precede the abstract,
_ that we must visualize before we theorize, and
_ apprehend objects before we analyse relations, we
_ have in practice abandoned altogether the attempt
_ to teach young people hard consecutive abstract
_ thinking. We scorn to drill them in the old-
_ fashioned studies that developed this power, such
_ as grammatical analysis, “ parsing,” puzzling prob-
_ lemsin arithmetic, algebra, or mechanics, elementary
_ logic,—mental science, as it was called,—and the
exact, if incomplete, methods of the orthodox
_ political economy ; and instead of this we encourage
~ them to have and express opinions about large and
_ vague questions of literary criticism, aesthetics,
_ ethics and social reform. A true apprehension of
_ Plato’s ideal of education would not swing the
_ pendulum back again to the other extreme, but it
_ would help us to realize that no multiplication of
_ entertaining knowledge, and no refinements of the
_ new psychology, can alter the fact that all instruction
_ is wasted on a flabby mind, and that true education,
_ while it will not neglect entertainment, useful know-
_ ledge, and the training of the eye and hand, will
_always consist largely in the development of firm,
hard, intellectual muscle. The studies best adapted
_ to this end will always retain a value independent
_ of practical utility or superficial attractiveness ; for
_ tochange the figure and adapt Plato’s own language :
: ΒΥ such studies the eye of the mind, more precious
than a thousand bodily eyes, is purged and quickened
_and made more keen for whatever truth higher
education or life or business may present to it
(527 p-z).
xli
The Four
Polities.
INTRODUCTION
Plato’s own account of the curriculum of his higher
education ought to be a sufficient answer to the
charge that in the training of his guardians he —
manifests an anti-scientific spirit. It is only by —
wresting phrases from their context and refusing to
make allowances for the quality of Plato’s rhetoric
that the imputation of hostility to modern experi-
mental science can be fastened upon him. As I
have shown elsewhere» and point out again in the
notes, Plato is (1) using scientific studies to develop —
the faculty of abstract reasoning; (2) incidentally
predicting the mathematical astronomy and physics —
of the future.° Both purposes tempt him to hammer
his main point with Emersonian emphasis and to
surprise attention with Ruskinian boutades in order to —
mark more clearly the distinction between himself
and contemporary empiricists. Hence his satire of —
the substitution of experiment for mathematics in —
acoustics (531 a-B), and the intentional epigram-
matic extravagance of his “‘ leave the stars alone”
(530 B). It is uncritical to quote these sentences
apart from their entire context and treat them as
if they were a deliberate and systematic attack on
modern experimental science. DOR st
The description of the four degenerate types of
state in the eighth book relieves the strain of dia- —
lectiecs and the tedium of continuous argument by
one of the most brilliant pieces of writing in Plato.
Macaulay says it is “‘. . . beyond all criticism. I
« Cf. on 529 a, 530.8.
> “Platonism and the History of Science,” Am. Philos.
Soc. Proc. lxvi. pp. 171 f., What Plato Said, pp. 235-236
° Cf. on 530 B.
xlii
INTRODUCTION
ember’nothing in Greek philosophy superior to
this ia "profundity, ingenuity and eloquence.” It
serves to lead up to the embodiment in the
tyrant span seachigeind argument that the unhappi-
ness of the worst man matches the misery of the worst
ate. The objections to the book or to its place in
the economy of the Republic raised by Aristotle and
thers are mostly captious irrelevances.”
~» The transition from the ideal state is resumed at
tl t where it was interrupted at the beginning
οἱ the fifth book, and it is pretended that Books V.,
VI. and VII; are a digression, though they are
obviously an indispensable part of the Republic.°
Matter-of-fact critics have argued that an ideal
or perfect state would contain within itself no seeds
of destruction and could not decay. But as Plato
himself said, the philosophic state is a pattern or
ideal which retains its value even if imperfectly
realized. tis a fundamental Platonic principle that
only the divine is eternal and unchangeable.? All
aie and material things are subject to change.
universe itself is only as good as the Demiurgos
‘able to make it, and the created gods are pre-
igerved from destruction only by his sustaining will.
The riddle of the * “nuptial ” number that deter-
8 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1316 a 1f. ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν
περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται καλῶς,
Which is rather cool after all his borrowings from Rep. viii.
in the preceding pages. And in ata dee: rg a
de Platon, p. 42.
I. on 449 a-s.
lg I. p. xvi, What Plato Said, p. 225.
f. on 499 τ and What Plato Said, p. 564.
Cf. a 207-208, Rep. vii. on the heavens, 530 B.
im. 37 D, 41 cp, What Pilato Said, p. 335. -
VOL. ΠῚ d xliii
INTRODUCTION |
mines the beginning of the decline has never been’
solved to the satisfaction of a majority of competent
critics. The solution would contribute something ἕο.
our knowledge of early Greek mathematical termin-_
ology but nothing to our understanding of Plato’s
thought. Emerson’s definitive word about it is,
“ He (Plato) sometimes throws a little mathematical
dust into our eyes.” The “‘ meaning ” of the number
is simply Burke’s statement (iv. p. 312) in Regicide
Peace, p. 2, “1 doubt whether the history of man-
kind is yet complete enough, if ever it can be so, to
furnish grounds for a sure theory on the internal
causes which necessarily affect the fortune of a
state.”* But though the ultimate causes of de-
* For Aristotle’s opinion ef. Pol. 1316 a 5 ff. For dis-
cussions of the number cf. Zeller, Phil. ἃ. Gr. ii. 14, pp.
857-860; Jowett’s translation of the Republic (1888), pp.
exxx ff.; Adam, Republic, vol. ii. pp. 264-312 ; Ueberweg-
Praechter, Philos. des -Altertums (1926), 94* ff; Paul
Tannery, ‘‘ Le Nombre Nuptial dans Platon,’’ Rev. Philos. i.,
1876, pp. 170-188; Georg Albert, Die platonische Zahl,
Wien, 1896, and “ Der Sinn der plat. Zahl,’’ Philologus, vol.
66 (1907), pp. 153-156 ; J. Dupuis, “ Le Nombre Géométrique
de Platon,” Annuaire de l’ Assoc. des Et. grecques, vol. 18,
τ Σ Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, pp. 47-48. Cf.
also Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. p. 336, C. Ritter, Platons
Stellung zu den Aufgaben der ριξε μας ας ὁ yp. 91-94;
Friedlander, Platon, i. p. 108; G. Kafka in ee Ae 73,
pp. 109-121; Ὁ. B. Monro in Class. Rev. vi. (1892) pp.
152-156; and Adam, ibid. pp. 240-244, and xvi. pp. 17-23;
Fr. Hultsch in Phil. Woch. xii. (1892) pp. 1256-1258. Cf.
further Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 25 “ It is to
be observed that Plato’s ‘ perfect year’ is also 36,000 solar
years (Adam’s Republic, vol. ii. p. 302), and that it is probably
connected with the precession of the equinoxes”’; Carl
Vering, Platons Staat, p. 167 ‘‘ Den Biologen wird die
Zahlenmystik Platons an die Mendelschen Vererbungs-
tabellen erinnern, durch welche die geniale Ahnung Platons,
dass es zahlenmissig darstellbare Vererbungsgesetze geben
xliv
INTRODUCTION
_ generation escape our ken, Plato mentions a practical
that is of considerable significance to-day.
_ Revolutions are due to the divisions and discords of
the dominant and educated classes. The allegory
_ of the four metals is kept up. The decline begins
_ when the rulers no — breed true and the gold
_ is mixed with base alloy.’
_ The limitation of the degenerate types of state to
_ four is conscious and artistic. It should not be used
_ to prove Plato's impatience of facts. There are end-
Tess minor varieties of social and political structure
_ among the barbarians (544 c-p). Plato leaves it to
_ Aristotle and the political and social science de
_ ments of the American universities to collect them.¢ Ρ̓
The sequence, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and
2 does not always reproduce the actual history
_of cities of Greece, but it anticipates many of the
vicissitudes of modern history more suggestively than
_ Aristotle’s laborious collection of instances.¢ " Plato
_ occasionally forgets himself or lets himself go in con-
pay satire or allusion that points to Athens
ΥΝΣ nach mehr als 2000 Jahren ihre wissenschaftliche
i ea hat.” Cf. Baudrillart, J. Bodin
et son temps, Ὁ . A tout cela Bodin ajoute des
- ealculs ce 8 ag sur la durée des empires, sur le nombre
nuptial . .
” Rep. δ45 Ὁ, Laws 683 π, 682 ᾿-Ἔ, Class. Phil. xvii.
pp. 154-155. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1305 a 39.
> 5478. Cf. 415 a-B.
__ * Aristotle says that there are not only more kinds of
government than these, but there are many sub-species of
each. Cf. Aristot. Pol. vi., 1288 ff., 1279 Ὁ, 1329 a 8, 1289 a 8,
Newman, vol. i. pp. 494 ff., and also Unity of Plato's Thought,
. 62-63.
"ὦ The case of the French Revolution and the rise of
Napoleon is one of the most outstanding examples.
xlv
The Ethical
Argument,
INTRODUCTION
rather than to any one of his four or five types.* But
the consistency of his hypothesis is sufficiently main-
tained to satisfy any reasonable reader. The in-
dividual types corresponding to the four political
patterns are the earliest and among the best system-
atic character-sketches in extant European literature
and may be counted among the sources of the
Characters of Theophrastus and their successors.”
Book [X. sums up and concludes the main ethical
argument of the Republic. This is not the place for
a systematic exposition of the Platonic ethies.
Ethical philosophy as distinguished from exhortation
and the code can always be stated in the form of a
discussion of the validity of the moral law and the
motives for obedience to it, in other words, the quest
for the sanction.° But this mode of statement is
especially suited to ages of so-called enlightenment
and transition when the very, existence of a moral]
law or its binding force is challenged, whether seri-
ously or as an intellectual game. ry eyaqnrs:
Such in Plato’s opinion was the age in which he
lived. The main drift of the speculations of the
pre-Socratic philosophers had been in the direction of
materialism if not exactly atheism.? The populariza-
« Of., e.g., 549 c and 553 a with Adam’s notes, 551 B,
556 ε΄ 562 νυ, 563 c, 565 B.
> Cf. also Matthew Arnold’s description of the Barbarians
and the Philistines in Culture and Anarchy.
° Of. Mill, Diss. and Dise. iii. p. 300 “The question con-
cerning the swnmum bonum or what is the same thing,
concerning the foundation of morality,” ete. . at
4 This has recently been denied. But the essential truth
of the generalization is not appreciably affected by a few
eens whose religious, ethical and spiritual purpose is
doubtful. Ὧν
xlvi
" INTRODUCTION
_ tion of these ideas by the so-called sophists and their
i tion to education, morals, politics and criticism
of life had further tended to do away with all tradi-
tional moral and religious checks upon instinct and
individualism. And the embittered class conflicts
_and the long demoralization of the thirty years’ war
had completed the work of moral and spiritual dis-
in 1.2 The Greeks had lost their old stand-
_ards and had acquired no new, more philosophic, prin-
_ ciples to take their place.’ Plato’s ears were dinned,
he said, by the negations of materialists, atheists,
_relativists, and immoralists.¢ How to answer them
was the chief problem of his ethical philosophy. To
_satirize these immoralists or to depict their defeat
in argument was one of the main motives of his
_ dramatic art.?
_- The evidence in support of Plato’s interpretation
of contemporary Greek life and thought has been-
i collected from Aristophanes, Euripides,
and Thucydides, the fragments of the sophists and
_the pre-Socratics and Plato’s own writings.? This
conservative view of the Greek “ enlightenment”
has in turn often been challenged by modern his-
_torians of liberal or radical tendencies, a Grote, a
, - a See T. R. Glover, Democracy in the Ancient World, pp.
ty! met ΤᾺ supra, Vol. I. p. xxxvi; What Plato Said, pp. 6,
-142.
es? & Rep. 538 c-£.
_ © Cf. Rep. 358 c, Protag. 333 c, Euthydem. 279 8, Phileb.
es Gorg. 470 vp, Laws 662 c, 885 v, Soph. 265 c, Phaedo
D.
4 Cf. Gorg. 527 a-, Rep. i., Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 25.
-? CF What Plato Said, p. 503, on Gorg. 461 c, for references,
and ibid. pp. 137, 145, 215 ff., 392-393, also W. Jaeger,
“Die griechische Staatsethik im Zeitalter des Platon,” Die
Antike, Bd. x. Heft 1, esp. p. 8.
xvii
INTRODUCTION
Mill, a Gomperz, and their followers.¢ The inter-
preter of the Republic need only note the sincerity
and intensity of Plato’s conviction and its effect
upon the form of his presentation of ethics.
A complete study of the Platonic ethics would i in-
corporate many other ideas drawn from the Prot-
agoras, the Philebus, the Laws, the minor Socratic ©
dialogues, and perhaps from the Phaedrus and
Symposium.” But the two chief ethical dialogues, ©
the Gorgias and the Republic, are cast in the form —
of an answer to dogmatic and unabashed ethical
nihilism. What is to be said to an uncompromising —
immoralist ? [5 it possible to convince him, or failing
that, to refute or seem to refute him to the edifica-
tion of the bystander? 5 The serious aim of both
Gorgias and Republic is to convince and refute, but
there are parts of the Gorgias and of the first book
of the Republic in which the chief dramatic purpose —
is the exhibition of Socrates’ superiority in argument
to the sceptic.
Many commentators ancient and modern object 3
that Plato has not proved his case. They are not
necessarily such immoralists as Plato had in mind.
Such moralists as Grote, Mill and Leslie Stephen say
that all men of goodwill would like to believe in the
identity of virtue and happiness, but that the facts
of experience are against it.? It is at best a general
9 Cf., ¢.g., Greek Thinkers, vol. i. ch. iv., esp. pp. 403-411.
> See International Journal of Ethics, Jan. 1929, pp.
232-933; What Plato Said, pp. 317, and 364; Unity of
Plato’s Thought, pp. 9-27.
¢ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 141.
4 Cf., ¢.9., Science of "Bihies, pp. 397-398, 434, and the
whole problem of the book of Job. Cf. also Sidgwick,
Method of Ethics, pp. 172-173.
xlviii
]
:
INTRODUCTION
tendency or probability, not an invariable rule.
yden is not sure that the law can always be verified
on individuals, but is half humorously certain that it
infallibly applies to nations, because in their case
Providence is too deeply engaged.
_ The problem is too large to be incidentally solved
by a commentator on the Republic. It is, as Plato
himself would admit, partly a question of faith,?
_and partly of the kind of evidence that is admitted
as relevant. “‘ Do you ask for sanctions?” exclaims
John Morley. ‘‘ One whose conscience has been
strengthened from youth in this faith can know no
greater bitterness than the stain cast by a wrong act
_. .. and the discords that have become the ruling
harmony of his days.” That is the kind of evidence
to which Plato appeals when he argues that his
Biv.
ΝΡ B98, 5. Lemon, T2890 νας Oa eae
Arno God and the Bible, chap. iii. p. 136: “‘ These truths
. . . are the matter of an immense experience which is still
going forward.... But if any man is so entirely without
affinity for them .. . for him Literature and Dogma was not
__° Of. also Morley, Rousseau, ii. 280, Voltaire, p. 293;
Faguet, Pour qu'on lise Platon, pp. 99-101, 138 ; Gomperz,
Greek Thinkers, iv. 257-258, 293-294; Huxley, Science and
Hebrew Tradition, p. 339, and the entire controversy arisi
out of his Evolution and Ethics; Arcesilas apud “ἰλύος κα
Les Sceptiques grees, p. 171. Cf. George Eliot’s novels passim,
and Mill’s “ Those whose conscientious feelings are so weak
as to allow of their asking this question,’’ which is practically
equivalent to Shaftesbury’s “* If any gentleman asks why he
should not wear a dirty shirt I reply that he must be a very
dirty gentleman to ask the question.” Cf. also Cicero, De
iis, iii. 29; Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, passim,
¢.g. 426 ff., and the arguments of Hazlitt, Macaulay and
Gthiers inst the Utilitarians. Such passages are a con-
¢clusive answer to the objection that Plato has not proved his
case.
xlix
INTRODUCTION
guardians will find more happiness in duty fulfilled
than they would by grasping at what are commonly
thought the good things of life. It is an argument
that will not appeal to men of stunted moral sensi- —
bilities. The issue is, as Plato says, whether they are
the best judges. The question has always been
debated and always will be debatable, and there is
little to add to the considerations on either side which
Cicero develops in his perpetual reargument of the
Stoic paradox, that virtue alone suffices for a happy
life, and that the sage will be happy on. the rack.
Matthew Arnold, Emerson and George Eliot. are as
fixed in the faith as Plato. Experience, says Arnold,
is perpetually sending the denier who says in his
heart, There is no God, back to school to learn. his
lesson better.° The writers most in vogue to-day
would agree with Mill and Leslie Stephen, if not wit
Thrasymachus and Callicles.? It is not necessary to
determine this controversy in order to justify the
Republic. To condemn the Republic because it is not
a demonstration that leaves no room for doubt is to
affirm that the question is not worth discussing, or
that Plato’s treatment of it falls short of what could
reasonably be expected. If it is not a proof, has any
one come nearer to a demonstration ? ὁ sion
@ Rep. 419-420. Cf. Vol. I. pp. 314-315.
> Cf. Rep. 580 τὸ ff., Laws 658-659,
© God and the Bible, p. xxxv. ‘
2 Brochard, La Morale de Platon, says: ‘‘Aucun moraliste
moderne n’entreprendrait de défendre la doctrine de Platon,
qui apparait comme une gageure.”’ Cf. Westermarck, Origin
and Development of Moral Ideas, i. pp. 17, 18, 321, and passim.
© Of. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 354: “ Evolution
implies that there must be at least an approximate coincidence,
and there is no apparent a priori reason why the coincidence
should not be indefinitely close.”
]
INTRODUCTION
As to the desirability of the attempt, Plato thought
_ that it is not safe to expose young minds to the un-
_ answered propaganda of philosophies of immoralism
and relativity. And recent experience of an amoral
and irreligious education of the masses has not yet
proved him wrong.* He believed in his own argu-
_ ments and in the doctrine which he taught. But
_ apart from that he also believed that civilized society
would disintegrate if morality were not effectively
_ preached.’ The charge hinted by Aristotle (Eth. x.,
_ 1172a 34-35) and often repeated that this implies the
“economy of truth ’’ © and the inner or double doc-
_ trineis sufficiently refuted by the depth and intensity
_ of Plato’s own “adamantine’”’ moral faith.4 . But
_ however that may be, the question which he asks in
_ his Laws still brings heart-searchings to the parent
_ who has inherited a conscience from a generation
that had not been swept from its moorings ; What is
_ a father to tell his son?* But I cannot give more
to these eternal controversies and must turn
_ to the direct summing-up of Plato’s argument in the
_ ninth book.
_ Plato sums up the conclusions of the Republic in
three formal. arguments. The first is the broad
_ * See my article in the June, 1934, number of the Atlantic
Monthly, pp. 722-723.
- ® Cf. Laws 890 v, 907 c, 718 Ὁ.
_ * Laws 663. c-p (What Plato Said, p. 364) may imply
*“ economy *’ in theology, but not in ethical religion. Cf. also
What Plato Said, p. 626, and Isoc. Antid. 283 καὶ ταῦτα
_ kal ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὕτως ἔχει καὶ συμφέρει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν. Cf. Harnack, Hist. of Dogma, pp. 183-
184: “ Gregory of Nazianzus speaks of a necessary and
: οἰκονομηθῆναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
2 Cf. Rep. 618 5, Laws 662 5.
* Cf. Laws 662 v-663 a, What Plato Said, p. 364.
li
INTRODUCTION
analogy between the individual and the state, which
runs Srongh the entire work.? Plato feels that here
he is not only clinching the subject, but finally
grappling with the problem debated in the pete γρρα
and to which he returns in the Laws. He is gat
ing up all his forces for a defiant reply to the im-
moralist and ethical nihilist. The result is an elabora-
tion, an intensity, an insistency, a repetition that are
offensive to readers who feel distaste for aie
that savours of moral didacticism.
The argumentative force of such an analogy is the
cumulative impression of the detail that makes: it
plausible. Plato points the application of this argu-
ment by a psychological portrait of the typical tyran-
nical man, developed out of the democratic man as
the democrat was developed from the oligarch. The
literary symmetry strains the logic a little, for while
the democratic man is the typical citizen of a demo-
cracy, the typical citizen of a tyranny is not the tyrant
himself, but any one of those whom he oppresses.
But it does not matter. To heighten his effect Plato
describes first the soul of the man destined to become
a Greek tyrant, and then the intensification of all
_ its defects and miseries by the actual possession
and exercise of usurped power.
Latent in all men are lawless instinets and appetites
which reason and disciplined emotion hold in check,
but which are sometimes revealed in dreams (57 18 ἢ).
In the tyrannical soul these lower propensities are
unleashed. The censor, to borrow the language of
a fashionable modern psychology, is dethroned, all
control is abolished and the soul is at the mercy of
the instincts of the night. Plato depicts the rake’s
9 Cf. Vol. I. p. xxxv.
lii
INTRODUCTION
"progress: of what again in modern terminology we
_ may call the typical gangster and boss in a lawless
_ democracy. He is the son of a democratic father,
_ but, unlike his father, does not settle down into a
mise between the caprices of un-
desire and the principles of tradition (572 p).
_ Inhim desire grown great, a monstrous Eros, a ruling
_ passion, with its attendant train of appetites, usurps
_ the throne and seizes the empty citadel of the mind,
_ yaecant of the only true guardians, the precepts of
_ eulture and right reason (573 a). He wastes his
r portion of the family inheritance, encroaches on the
of his brothers, and if further advances are
refused him does not shrink from the last outrage
_ that Greek conservatism attributed to the “ younger
generation ’—and “strikes his father.”"* He be-
_ eomeés the chosen leader of a gang of like-minded
_ roisterers from whom he is distinguished only by a
f more enterprising spirit and the greater strength of
τ ὐτιλαριο, okidesize:in hic souls and the gang,
_ if few, terrorize the city with crime (575 a-s),
_ if many, strike the father- and mother-land, over-
throw the constitution and establish a tyranny
(875
‘A modern moralist might improve the text that
the gangster lives in an atmosphere of greed, sus-
B viccon and fear, and is destined finally to be shot
_ by an ambitious rival. Plato, speaking in terms of
_ Greek experience, makes the “tyrannical man ”’ ful-
_ fil his nature and perfect his type by becoming an
actual tyrant of a Greek city. And he then de-
‘scribes, perhaps in reminiscence of his own observa-
tions at the court of Dionysius at Syracuse, and in
* 574¢c. Of. Aristoph. Clouds 1321 ff., 1421 ff.
ΠΠ
ΩΝ --. eS ων
liii
οξσωαρααξ μὴ ian
INTRODUCTION
prophetic anticipation of Caligula and Louis Napoleon,
the hell of suspicion, fear and insatiate and un-
satisfied desires in which such a tyrant lives.¢ As
the city which he misrules is, for all the splendour of
the court and the courtiers, as a whole the most
miserable of states, so is he, to the eye that can
penetrate the dazzling disguise of pomp and power,
“the farced title running ‘fore the king,” the most
miserable of men (577-579). + SOT AT SaaS
It is obvions that Plato forces the note a little
in the interest of his thesis. In actual history the
tyrant need not be the sensualist of Plato’s descrip-
tion. He may be only a cold-blooded, hard-headed
Machiavellian,—in Plato’s language a lover of honour
and victory, not a lover of the pleasures that money
purchases. But these cavils of a meticulous logic are
beside the mark. The real argument, as we have
said, is the psychological analysis and the facts of
Greek experience that lend plausibility to the ana-
logy. It prepares us to receive the more strictly
philosophic and scientific arguments that are to
follow. .
The gist of the second argument is that the intel-
lectual, the philosopher, has necessarily experienced
all three kinds of pleasure in his life, while the repre-
sentatives of the two other types have no experience
of the pleasures of pure intelligence (581-582). To this
is added the consideration that the organ or instru-
ment of all such judgements, reason and rational
« Of. Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6 “neque frustra praestantissimus
sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum
mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus, quando ut corpora
verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis consultis animus
dilaceretur.”’
liv
INTRODUCTION
‘speech, is the special possession of the philosopher
(582 4). This argument is never mentioned again
by Plato and is by many critics, including Leslie
Stephen,* rejected as a fallacy. But John Stuart
Mill accepts and makes use of it.
The issue thus raised is really the old question of
a distinction of quality and value in pleasure. No
one can judge or prescribe another’s pleasure, it is
argued ; pleasure qua pleasure admits no differences.”
But is there any such thing as pleasure qua pleasure ὃ
Are there not always inseparable accompaniments
_and consequences? And though the hog may be
sole judge of his own pleasures, is it on the whole as
desirable or as pleasurable to be a hog as a man? ὅ
There is room for interminable argument, for the
entire problem of relativity is involved. If all judge-
ments are relative, Plato elsewhere argues, we are
committed to chaos. The dog-faced baboon, and
not man or God, is the measure of all things. The
very existence of the arts and the sciences pre-
_ supposes that things are measured against standards
and not merely against one another. Thus, though
the argument is not repeated by Plato in this form,
it suggests and implies most of the fundamental
questions of his ethical philosophy.
“τα He calls it “a familiar short cut to the desired con-
clusion ” (Science of Ethics, p. 399). Cf. also Sidgwick,
re πρίν p. 148
494 © (What Plato Said, p. 508) and 499 85.
me too ; Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, p- 400.
© Cf. Phileb. 6 B, What Plato Said, p. 611. There is no
μα ἴο rhe 0 or quote here the Poe against the utili-
ee ne a
4 Cf. Theaet. 161 c, Laws 716 ἘΣ ;
. ἐν Politicus 284 B-c, 285 a-s.
lv
INTRODUCTION
The third argument, drawn from the negativity of
the pleasure of sense, is the basis of the Platonic
ethics, so far as it is an arguable doctrine. It is
necessary to dwell upon this point, for it is commonly
said that Plato’s ethical philosophy is deduced from
the idea of good.* That is true only from one oe
special point of view. The idea of good, as we
seen, is a postulate of the logic of ethics and of the
higher education of the philosopher. It is a blank
cheque that supports the credit of the system but —
which is not filled in. No virtue and no particular
“good” is adequately defined until it is explicitly
related to an idea of good (505 a, 506 a). It may
be defined provisionally and sufficiently for a given
purpose in terms of psychology or tradition or with
a tacit reference to an implied conception of good
(504 a-B). But nowhere in Plato’s writings are de-
finite controversial arguments or substantive prin-
ciples of ethical philosophy or rules of practice de-
duced from the idea of good. It is merely said that —
an ethical philosophy is not complete until we have
decided what is our sanction.
But such principles are deduced from the negativity
of the ‘‘lower”’ pleasures throughout Plato’s writings.? :
This supplies the missing link in the argument, of the
Protagoras that virtue and happiness depend on the ©
correct estimate of pleasures and pains.° The doc- —
trine is implied in the Phaedo (83-84), | It is distinctly
suggested in the Gorgias (493 ff.). It crowns the
«ΟἹ W. H. Fairbrother, “‘ The Relation of Ethics to
Metaphysics,’ Mind, xiii., 1904, p. 43; Martineau, Types
of Ethical Theory, 1886, p. xxvi. Cf. supra, p. xxvi.
> Cf. supra, p. Xxvi.
. Of. What Plato Said, pp. 130-131.
lvi
INTRODUCTION
_ argument of the Republic (583 Β ff.). It is elaborated
_ in the Philebus in order to reach a final settlement
_ of the controversy dramatized in the Gorgias. It is
_ tacitly employed in the endeavour of the Lams (660
_ E-663 £) to attach a practicable edifying conclusion
_ to the utilitarian arguments of the Protagoras. The
_ statement of the doctrine in the Republic, though
_ briefer than that of the Philebus, touches on all the
_ €ssential points, as the notes will show. It cannot be
_ proved to be either a résumé or an imperfect anticipa-
_ tion of the developed theory. It cannot be used to
_ date the ninth book of the Republic relatively to the
_ Philebus.* )
ΟΠ I am not here speaking of the absolute truth of
_ the doctrine, but only of its demonstrable relation
ἕο Plato’s ethical philosophy. As I have elsewhere
_ said, Plato teaches that sensuous pleasures are in
_ their nature impure and illusory, They are precon-
_ ditioned by, and mixed with, desire, want,. pain.
_ “ Surgit amari aliquid ” is ever true of them. They
_ are the relief of an uneasiness, the scratching of an
_ itch, the filling of a vacuum.’ To treat them as real,
_ or to make them one’s aim (except so far as our
_ human estate requires), is to seek happiness in a pro-
_ _* Though the Philebus is in fact later than the Republic, as
_ Mill said long before style statistics were thought of.
᾿ ὃ Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 24.
__ © Already in the Gorgias, 493 Ἐ, 494 c and the Phaedrus
_ 258 © ὧν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθῆναι, etc.; Rep. 584
_ 4-8. It has even been argued that the Phaedrus
takes for granted the fuller discussion of the Philebus
oa H. Thompson, Phaedrus, ad loc.), and why not?
Anything may be argued if the dialogues are Sup
: Bicerow out of one another and not out of Plato’s
Ἔ
lvii
INTRODUCTION
cess rather than a state,? in becoming rather than in
being. It is to bind oneself to the wheel of Ixion
and pour water into the bottomless jar of the
Danaids.® Far happier, far more pleasurable, is the
life that consistently aims at few and calm pleasures,
to which the sensualist would hardly give the name,
a life which he would regard as torpor or death.
Both the physiology and the psychology of this
doctrine have been impugned. It has been argued
that, up to the point of fatigue, the action of healthy
nerves involves no pain, and must yield a surplus
of positive sensuous pleasure. It is urged that the
present uneasiness of appetite is normally more than
counterbalanced by the anticipation of immediate
satisfaction. Such arguments will carry no weight
with those who accept Plato’s main contention, that
the satisfactions of sense and ambition, however
“necessary,” have no real worth, and that to seek
our true life in them is to weave and unweave the
futile web of Penelope. Whatever qualifications
modern psychology may attach to the doctrine, it is
the logical basis of Plato’s ethics. The unfeigned
α Phileb. 53 ς ff., 54 virtually =Gorg. 493 Ὁ. Cf. What
Plato Said, pp. 322-323. The literal-minded objection of
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1174 Ὁ, and some moderns, that pleasure
is not literally = κίνησις, is beside the point. Py
δ Gorg. 493 B τετρημένος πίθος, etc., Phaedo 84 a ἀν-
ἤνυτον ἔργον. . . Πηνελόπης ἱστόν, Gorg. 507 B, Phileb.
54 τ.
¢ Phaedo 64 B, Gorg..492 ©, Phileb. 54 Ἑ καί φασι ζῆν οὐκ
ἂν δέξασθαι, ete. In Laws 733, 734 5, the hedonistic calculus
of the Protagoras is retained, but is applied not directly to
the individual acts, but to types of life. The life of moderate
pleasures is a priori the more pleasurable because it neces-
sarily yields a more favourable balance than the life of intense
pleasures.
lviii
ον
Pee
ee ee
INTRODUCTION
recognition of the inherent worthlessness of the lower
ures removes at once the motive and the lures
to evil.* It is the chief link in the proof that virtue
is happiness. It insures the domination of reason
over feeling and appetite. It moulds man into
that likeness to the divine pattern which is Plato’s
expression for the ethical ideal,’ for the divine life
_knows neither pleasure nor pain.* It is the serious
argument that explains Plato’s repudiation of the
hedonistic formulas of the Protagoras¢ and justifies
the noble anti-hedonistic rhetoric of the Gorgias,
‘the PhaedoJ and the Philebus (in fine).
~ Regarded as a logical system, then, and meta-
physics apart, the Platonic ethics is not to be de-
duced from the idea of good. It is best studied and
expounded under a few simple heads : (1) illustrations
in the minor dialogues of the necessity and the diffi-
culty of defining ethical terms; (2) the search for
arguments that will convince, or at least confute, the
ethical nihilism of a war-weary, cynical and over-
enlightened generation—for proof, in short, that
virtue and happiness coincide; (3) the attempt to
find a compromise between the necessity of acknow-
ledging the truth in a certain sense of hedonistic
utilitarianism and our justifiable idealistic distaste
for that way of describing the moral life; (4) as an
essential part of the argument of both (2) and (3), the
ctl of the comparative worthlessness of the
_* Phaedo 66 c, Rep. 586 a-n, 588.
δ Theaetet. 176 5 ff., Laws 716 Ὁ, 728 a-B, Rep. 352 a-z,
612 x, Philed. 39 x. "
τ © Phileb. 33 5.
ὦ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 500.
* 512 p-x, What Plato Said, p. 149.
4 69 a, What Plato Said, pp. 171 and 174.
VOL. II e lix
INTRODUCTION .
lower or sensual pleasures, which, except so far as
necessary, are bought at too high a price, because
they are preconditioned by pain.* So
These categories are not of my invention. They are
the topies on which ethical discussion actually turns
in the dialogues. The Republic supplies ample illus- —
tration of all these topics. The first book, like the |
Gorgias, dramatizes Socrates’ dialectic superiority
to the immoralist. The second book restates the —
issue in its most fundamental form. The fourth book
resumes and for practical purposes provisionally —
solves the puzzles of the definition of the virtues in the
minor Socratic dialogues. The allegory of the idea οὗ
good, rightly understood, shows what Plato meant in ©
these minor dialogues by making the failure to define —
virtue always turn on the inability to discover the —
“good.” The ninth book, as we have seen, sums up ©
the argument and adds a sufficiently explicit exposi- —
tion of the doctrine of the negativity of pleasure,
which, as the Philebus shows, is the indispensable basis —
of the scientific and calculating ethics postulated in
the Protagoras.
But true virtue is something more than argument, —
and its mood, as an eloquent passage of the Phaedo
protests, is not that of the prudential, calculating
reason.’ And so the argument of the ninth book,
like that of the fourth, culminates in an appeal through
imagery and analogy to the imaginative reason and —
the soul. There (444-445) it was urged that the health
and harmony of the soul must be still more indispens-
* See my review of Lodge in International Journal of
Ethics, xxxix. pp. 232-233, and for the ethical argument —
of the Republic as a whole my ‘‘ Idea of Justice in Plato’s
Republic,” The Ethical Record, January 1890, pp. 185-199.
> Phaedo 69 a f., What Plato Said, p. 500.
lx
INTRODUCTION
able to true happiness than that of the body. And
we saw that the most scientific of modern ethical
y ies is finally forced back upon the same
y.2 In the conclusion of the ninth book the
motif recurs with still greater elaboration and in a
_ more eloquent climax. Every animal of the barn-
,Plato says in anticipation of Emerson and Freud,
found lodgement within this external sheath of
ity. And the: issue for every human soul is
Roubethér it Bisacsn to foster the snake, the lion and
i _ the ape, or the man, the mind, and the god within the
_ mind.’ Surely the wiser choice is that which values
ἱ all the so-called goods, for which men scramble and
t contend, only as they tend to preserve or destroy the
_ true constitution and health of the soul. This polity
_ of the sober and righteous soul is the symbol of that
_ City of God which may exist nowhere on earth but
on which as a pattern laid up in heaven he who will
med fix his eyes and constitute himself its citizen.
ἫΝ A characteristic feature of Plato’s art both in great The Banish-
_ and little matters is the climax after the apparent Poctry.
climax.?. The tenth book of the Republic, which is in
asense an appendix, adds the climax of the originally
_ disavowed religious sanction of immortality to that of
_ the appeal to the imaginative reason. _ The interven-
ing digression in defence of the banishment of the
ts is in effect, if not in Plato’s conscious intention,
_ arelieving interval of calm between the two peaks of
feeling. For the rest, the deeper psychology of the
» © * Cf. Vol, I. p. xvi.
ye . 589 τ. Cf. Tim. 90 4-8,
pt? : of Vol. I. pp. xlii-xliii.
f. supra, Vol. 1. pp. xxi-xxii, What Plato Said, pp. 140,
189, 248, ‘ales Ρ. 104.
lxi
INTRODUCTION
philosophic books and the theory of ideas expounded
there invited a reconsideration of the subject and
provided arguments based, not on the content of the
Homeric epic, but on the essential nature of poetry
and its influence. ra tis
‘The two arguments that have exercised the de-
fenders of poetry from Aristotle to Arnold @ are that
poetry is not truth but imitation, a copy of a copy,
and that poetry fosters emotion and so weakens the
salutary control of feeling by the reason and the will.
In support of the first the theory of ideas is invoked
in a form so intentionally simplified that it has given
rise to the fantastic hypothesis that this book must
represent an earlier period of Plato’s philosophy.’
God made one idea of a couch. The artisan copies it
in many material couches. The artist with words or
colours copies, not the idea, but the copy. This argu-
ment of course could be and has been answered in its
own terms by the claim of Browning’s Fra Lippo
Lippi that the genius of the artist does directly appre-
hend the idea or essence of things and reveal it to
those who can see only through his eyes.° But the
real question whether art deals with truth or appear-
ance is independent of Plato’s half-serious formulation
of it in the language of the theory of ideas. It is
still debated, and it is the business of the interpreters
of Plato to understand, not necessarily to pronounce
judgement.
The question whether poetry’s chief function is to
@ Sidney’s Defense of Poesy is probably the most familiar.
> Cf. What Plato Said, p. 249, supra, Ὁ. xviii.
° For, don’t you mark, we’re made so that we love
First when we see them painted, things we have passed
Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see ;
And so they are better, painted—better to us.
Ixii
‘> el
j INTRODUCTION
_ stimulate and exercise emotion, or to relieve, purge,*
refine, purify, sublimate and exalt it, likewise raises
_an issue which still divides psychologists, educators
critics. Its determination perhaps involves a
great and deliberate choice in the acceptance and
anagement of life as a whole. Plato’s decision to
; the honeyed Muse from his ideal city repre-
παν only one aspect of his many-sided nature. It is
obviously not, as is sometimes absurdly said, an
_ expression of his insensibility to Hellenic poetry and
art. It was his own sensitiveness that made him fear
its power. He himself wrote verse in youth. His
: the invention of his myths and the poetic
peseerr. his prose rank him with the world’s major
_poets.° He quotes poetry with exquisite and fond
_aptness throughout his writings. And there are no
more wistful w words than his reluctant dismissal of the
supreme poet, the author and source of all these
ties of epic and tragedy, the Ionian father of the
Brest Hower’ ¢ However, Plato’s ethical convictions
_gave him the courage of Guyon (Faery Queene, τι. xii.
83) in dealing with these enchantments :
᾿ς 4 Aristotle’s doctrine of κάθαρσι. Cf. my review of
Finsler, ‘‘ Platon und die aristotelische Poetik,” Class, Phil.
Grek’ 461-462 : also The Nation, xc. (1910) p. 319; Sikes,
86
View oe of Poetry, pp. 118-125.
τ ϑ °F Fried Plato Said, pp. 17 ff.
Friedlander, Platon, i. pp. 196 and 200; Sidney, in
ΠΩ Men of Letters, Ὁ. 150 “ Of all the philosophers he
most poetical ; ” Chesterton, The Resurrection of Rome,
57 “ But when we remember that the great poet Plato (as
must be called) banished poets from his Republic, we have
_aglimmer of why the great Greek Emperor banished sculptors
from his empire.
Patan ae Plato Said, pp. 7-9; Unity of Plato’s Thought,
pp. 81-82.
* Rep. 607 c-p: ef. What Plato Said, p. 250.
lxiii
TheDoctrine
of Immorta-
lity.
INTRODUCTION
But all those pleasaunt bowres and Pallace brave
Guyon broke downe with rigour pittilesse; _
Ne ought their goodly workmanship might save
Them from the tempest of his wrathfulnesse.* —
The guerdons of righteousness, worldly or other-
worldly, were explicitly excluded in the original
formulation of the question whether justice is or is
not intrinsically its own reward. But now, having
proved his case independently of these, Plato thinks
that no one can fairly object if he points out that in
fact honesty is usually the best policy even in this
world, and that there is good hope that the legends
of a life and judgement to come are in essence true.
There are hints of a life after death earlier in
the Republic.? And nothing can be inferred from
Glaucon’s perhaps affected surprise at Socrates’ offer
to prove it. The immortality of the soul as an article
:
of faith and hope, a sanction of moral law, an inspira-
tion of poetry, will be treated lightly by no student of |
humanity. But there is a certain lack of intellectual
seriousness in taking it seriously as a thesis of meta-
physical demonstration.* Plato’s belief in immortal-
ity was a conviction of the psychological and moral
impossibility of sheer materialism, and a broad faith
in the unseen, the spiritual, the ideal. The logical
obstacles to a positive demonstration of personal
immortality were as obvious to him as they are to
his critics.’ The immortality of the individual soul
® See also my review of Pater, Plato and Platonism in The
Dial, xiv. (1893) p. 211.
» Cf. Bk, ii., esp. 367 B-x.
“ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 251.
4 Cf. 330 p-x and Vol. I. p. 16.
ὁ Cf, What Plato Said, pp. 180, 177, 535.
7 See my review of Gaye, The Platonic Conception of
Immortality, in Philos. Rev. xiv., 1905, pp. 590-595.
lxiv
Set se el pe ce te cee neal ἐν. ee ee ee
INTRODUCTION
_ is for Plato a pious hope @ and an ethical postulate ὃ
_ rather than a demonstrable certainty. _He essays
_ various demonstrations, but nearly always in con-
_ nexion with a myth, and of all the proofs attempted
_ but one is repeated.? -In the Apology Socrates,
_ addressing his judges, affects to leave the question
open. But we cannot infer from this that the
_ Apology antedates Plato’s belief in immortality, and
Socrates’ language in Crito 54 Β is precisely in the
_ tone of the Gorgzas and the Phaedo’
_ Immortality was affirmed before Plato by Pyth-
_ agorean and Orphic mystics, and in the magnificent
_ poetry of Pindar’s Second Olympian Ode it is distinctly
associated with a doctrine of future rewards and
punishments. But Plato was the first great writer
_ to enforce it by philosophical arguments, or impress
_ it upon the imagination by vivid eschatological myths. _
And the Platonic dialogues, as Rohde shows,’ re-
mained the chief source of the hopes and aspirations
οὗ the educated minority throughout subsequent
antiquity. Plato’s name was the symbol and rally-
_ing point of the entire religious and philosophic
᾿ς * Phaedo 114 τη χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ, Gorg.
34 a-s, Phaedo 67 B. -
_ ὃ Rep. 608.c ff., Laws 881 Α, 967 pv-z, 959 a-B; with τὸν
; τε ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως ἀθάνατον [εἶναι] ψυχήν ef.
115 ΤῈ, and with the idea, 959 5, that the only
at the bar of Hades is a just life in this world, cf.
ἢ . 522 σ-Ὁ, 526 Ἐ, Crito 54 85.
᾿ς * Phaedo 85 c τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ
ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι. Cf. 107 ν-8, Tim. 72 υ,
Meno 86 ν-5, Phaedr. 265 c.
4 That based on the theory that the soul is the source of all
_motion, Phaedr. 245 ὁ ff., Laws 893 5 ff.
_ 440». Cf. also Phaedo 91 8.
_ * Cratylus 403 p-£ implies the doctrine of Phaedo 67, 68.
- * PP 5th and 6th ed., vol. ii. p. 265. N
v
INTRODUCTION
opposition to the dogmatic materialism of the —
Epicureans and of the positive wing of the Peri-
patetics. Cicero and Plutarch were in this his ©
disciples. The more wistful and religious spirits of
Stoicism—a Seneca, a Marcus Aurelius—came more _
and more to see in Platonism the hopeful “ alterna-
tive” of the great perhaps. Neo-Platonists and
Neo-Pythagoreans never grew weary of expanding
and allegorizing the great myths of the Gorgias,
Phaedo, and Republic. They were directly or in-
directly the chief inspiration of the sixth book of
the Aeneid, and in the majority of later sepulchral
epigrams that express the hope of immortality a
Platonic colouring is perceptible. All this was due
far more to the spell of Plato’s genius than to the
force of his arguments. That the soul is the principle
of motion (Phaedr. 245 c ff., Laws 893 B ff.), that it
must have pre-existed because its apprehension of
the ideas is reminiscence (Phaedo 72 & ff.), that it
could be destroyed only by its own specific evil,
injustice, which does not in fact destroy it (Rep.
608-611), that it cannot cease to exist because the
idea of life which is essentially present with it will
not admit its opposite (Phaedo 105 p-r)—these argu-
ments may convince metaphysicians, but they will
not stir the “ emotion of conviction ”’ that is fostered
by the serene confidence of Socrates in the hour of
death (Phaedo 114-118), by the vivid vision of the ©
scarred and naked ‘soul shivering at the bar of
Rhadamanthus (Gorg. 524 pv-£), by the detailed —
verisimilitude of the message brought back by the
‘“ Angel from there,” Er, the son of Armenius (Hep.
614 B ff.).
The Epicureans and the more austere Stoics
Ixvi
INTRODUCTION
censured this mythological symbolism as unworthy
of a philosopher; and Emerson contrasts Plato’s
license of affirmation with the self-restraint of the
_ Author of Christianity, who refused to entertain the
_ populace with that picture. But Plato has antici-
_ pated their criticism, saying in substance: No
_ reasonable man will affirm that these things are
_ precisely as I have described them. But since the
soul is immortal, something of the kind must be true,
and we ought to repeat and croon it over to ourselves
_in order to keep faith and hope alive (Phaedo 114 p).
_ This plea could be rejected only by those who are
_ willing to affirm that Plato’s poetical imaginings have
been more harmful in the encouragement of super-
_ stition than helpful in the maintenance of religious
_ hope and moral faith.*
_ But what of the metaphysical arguments? Did
Plato himself take them seriously ? And are they,
therefore, to be taken seriously by the interpreters
of his philosophy? Are they essential links in a
? Can we find in them clues to the progress
_and development of his thought and even date the
dialogues with their aid? It is not necessary to
_ answer these questions here. On the validity of the
_ arguments it would be idle to waste words. Some of
them, reinforced by the Theaetetus, may help to show
_ theinadequacy of a dogmatic materialistic psychology.
At the most they prove the eternity of something
other than “ matter”? which may be called “ soul.”
They do not prove the immortality of the individual
soul, which is nevertheless plainly taken as proved
in the eschatological myths and their ethical applica-
_ ® Cf. my article in the June, 1934, number of the Atlantic
Monthly, Ὁ. 721.
xvii
INTRODUCTION
tions. That the supreme dialectician, Plato, was him-
self unaware of that which is so readily perceived by
every puny whipster who thinks to get his sword is
to me unthinkable. A semblance of precedent proof
was essential even to the literary effect of the con-
cluding myths. And Plato himself in the Laws has
warned us that an affirmative answer to some questions
is required for the salvation of society and the moral
government of mankind.4 recet er fee
But the myth itself is the really significant ex-
pression of Plato’s hope and faith, and of its influence,
hardly less than that of some national religions, upon
the souls of men. After enumerating the blessings
that normally attend the old age of the righteous
man in this world, he says, we may fitly allow our
imagination to dwell upon the rewards that await
him in the world to come. ὌΠ
The enormous literature of the Platonic myths?
deals partly with their conjectural sources, partly
with their place and function in Plato’s art and philo-
sophy, and too little with the framework of definite
meaning as distinguished from the remoter and more
fanciful suggestions with which the ingenuity of
commentators has sometimes obscured it. Leaying
the translation and the notes to speak for themselves,
I need here say only a few words on this last point.
« Of. supra, p. li. δ
> Chey θὴ Γ Couturat, De mythis Platonicis, Stewart,
The Myths of Plato, with my review in Journal of Philos.,
Psy. and Scientific Method, 3, pp. 495-498; P. Frutiger, Les
Mythes de Platon; Karl Reinhardt, Platons Mythen, Bonn,
1927 ; Friedlander, Platon, i. pp. 199 ff.; W. Willi, Versuch
einer Grundlegung der platonischen Mythopoiie; J. Tate,
** Socrates and the Myths,” Class. Quarterly, xxvii. (April
1933) pp. 74-80; V. Brochard, ‘‘ Les Mythes dans la philo-
sophie de Platon,” L’ Année Philos., 1900, pp. 1-13.
lxviii
INTRODUCTION
it I may use without entirely adopting Professor
Stewart’s sper between myth and allegory, the
“distin feature of the Platonic myth is that it
embodies and reconciles the conflicting excellences
= both—the transcendental feeling, the poetic
mysticism of the true myth and the, to Professor
‘wart, almost offensive lucidity of the allegory.
In this it only exalts and intensifies a feature of
lato’s style as a whole. He is unique in his power
te “a con “ile: formal dialectic and deliberate rhetoric
wit tion and sincerity of feeling. He
mnounces the effect that he intends to produce and
oduces it in defiance of the psychology of Goethe’s
* Da ΓΒΕ man Absicht und man wird verstimmt.”
He can pour his imagination, his poetry, his mysti-
ism, aa exhortation, and his edification into a pre-
determined logical mould. He modulates from one
chord bite the other at the precise moment when
atiety begins.* He starts from a definition, pro-
s by analysis and division through firstlies and
ρα δα to perorations that sweep ain emotional
_ reader off his feet and make him forget or deny the
dialectic that conducted him to the mount of vision.
As Emerson puts it, ““ He points and quibbles ; and
and by comes a sentence that moves the sea and
a ὅν. nee δα
7: ὰ
Petz:
a ἢ τι Ὁ
a Ὁ ὙΥὐὙῊ
Ρ ᾿ 4 «ἃ we
«5 6.9.5 Phaedo 115 a, ΤΊ £-78 a, Euthyphro 6 s-c, 11
> . 507 £. The little sermons scattered through the
Law. ss have the same effect. Cf. in Goethe’s Faust the chorus
_ of angels followed by the devil. Cf. Carl Vering, Platons
Bt at, p. 7 “ Ein Dialog Platons wirkt niemals ermiidend ;
edesmal greift der Dichter Platon sofort ein, wenn der
: durch ein schweres Problem dem Leser hart
mgesetzt hat.”’ Cf. also Sikes, Greek View of Poetry, p. 128.
7 Ch, e.g., Symp. 211-212, Gorgias, in fine, Phaedo 114 c,
ἴ Des in fine.
lxix
INTRODUCTION
The definite thoughts embodied in the myth of Er —
the son of Armenius belong to Plato’s permanent
stock of opinions and do not differ appreciably from
those of his other myths or the implied conclusions of —
his arguments.* The saving faith in immortality and —
judgement to come cannot rest on scientific demon-
stration only. It needs the confirmations of imagina-
tion, intuition, vision, revelation. The universe is a
wonderful place whose structure is known to us only
imperfectly and in part. Symbols are the fit expres-
sion of our dim apprehensions of its infinite possi-
bilities. Heaven and hell are symbols of the most
vital of all divisions, that which separates the virtuous
from the vicious will. Purgatory may mark the dis-
tinction between remediable and curable wrong and
that which admits of no pardon.’ They are perhaps
states of mind rather than places, but imagination
may use what our imperfect science knows or divines
of the world beneath our feet or the universe above
|
our heads to give them a local habitation and a —
name, and our fancy may play in like manner with
the ultimate unanswerable questions of philosophy :
Whence comes evil’? and are our willsfree?? Ifthe
soul is immortal and lives through endless transforma-
tions and transmigrations, it may be that the evil
which baffles us here had its origin in some defect of
will in worlds before the man (Rep. 613 4). Perhaps
a great choice was offered to us and we chose wrong
under the influence of mistaken ideas acquired in
a former misspent life (618-619). Whatever the —
@ Of. the notes on 614 ff.
» Cf. What Plato Said, p. 536, on Phaedo 113 τὸ and 1138,
¢ Of. What Plato Said, p. 578, on Theaet. 176 a.
4 Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 644-645, on Laws 904 c.
lxx
INTRODUCTION
_measure of truth in these fancies two principles of
5 and morals stand fast. God is blameless
_ (617 £), and we must always blame rather ourselves.*
Οὐχ wills are somehow ours to make them his ; though
> must think of the sins of others as due solely to
gnorance.” It matters not that the Aristotelians
ll argue that this is reasoning in a circle.° We
know and must believe that virtue is free (617 ©).
And all the divinations of the soul and all the pro-
founder interpretations of experience reiterate the
lesson that the way of life that will present us fearless
at the bar of eternal justice is the way that will yield
the truest happiness here.? If we hold to that faith,
then both in our earthly pilgrimage and in all the
dventures of the soul hereafter, with us it will be
: “ἡ
< Tue Text
' _ As regards the text I have little to add to what was
Said in the first volume, except a few qualifications to
avoid misunderstanding. I have tried to be a little
‘more careful than I was in the first volume in correct-
_ing minor inconsistencies due to the reprinting of the
ubner text of Hermann. But the opportunities
lich these might afford to captious criticism do not
the least affect the main principle or its applica-
‘tions. That is simply that the variations between the
Φ» Cf. Laws 727 5, Rep. 619 c, Phaedo 90 ν, Cratyl. 411 ς,
ὃ Cf. Protag. 345 ν-Ὲ, 358 c-p, Laws 734 8, and What Plato
Said, p. 640, on 860 ἢ.
at Bras ot Eth. 1114 Ὁ 19.
od . 6291 ο. Cf. Gorg. 526 p-z, Phaedo 114 π.
Ἰχχὶ
πο --
INTRODUCTION
chief modern editions rarely make any difference for
Plato’s thought or even for his style, and that the
decision between different readings in the case of —
Plato should usually turn, noton any scientific ἘΣ |
of text criticism, but on knowledge of P
to and ©
knowledge of the Greek language. To put it drasti- _
cally : for all practical purposes of the student of the
Greek language, literature and philosophy, Her-
mann’s text of the Republic is quite as good as the
be constructed from the critical notes in Wilamowitz’
appendix. Hermann’s judgement on questions of
Greek idiom and Platonic usage was quite as good as
theirs. This is not meant as an illiberal disparage-
ment of the great and indispensable special disciplines —
of text criticism and palaeography. It is merely a
commonsense vindication of the intellectual right of
those who prefer to do so to approach the study of
Plato from another point of view.
Ture TRANSLATION
As regards the translation, I impenitently reaffirm
the principles that I stated in the preface to the first
volume—whatever errors of judgement I may commit
in their application. Much of the Republic can be
made easy reading for any literate reader. But some
of the subtler and more metaphysical passages can be
translated in that way only at the cost of misrepre-
sentation of the meaning. In order to bring out the
real significance of Plato’s thought it is sometimes
necessary to translate the same phrase in two ways,
sometimes to vary a phrase which Plato repeats or
lxxii
:
more scientific text of Burnet or the text that might —
INTRODUCTION
rep eat a synonym which he prefers to vary. It is
en desirable to use two words to suggest the two-
fold associations of one. To take the simplest ex-
ample, it is even more misleading to translate eidos
_“ Form ” than it is to translate it “idea ”—“ idea or
form” (without a capital letter) is less likely to be
_ misunderstood.
_ Again, Plato did not write in the smooth, even
style which Dionysius of Halicarnassus admired in
Lysias and Matthew Arnold in Addison, and it is not
_ the business of the translator to clothe him in the
; varb of that style.
_ Provided the meaning is plain and the emphasis
right, he allows himself unlimited freedom in ana-
_coluthons, short cuts, sharp corners, ellipses and
_ generally in what I have elsewhere called illogical
idiom. Anyone who does not like that style should
_ give his days and nights to the study of Isocrates and
_Lysias. According to his mood and the context
to’s style ranges from Attic simplicity to meta-
physical abstraction, from high-flown poetical prose
to plain colloquial diction. And his colloquialism,
though usually kept within the bounds of Attic ur-
banity, is not lacking in Aristophanic touches which,
if rightly rendered, shock the taste of critics who
approach him with a stronger sense of the dignity of
philosophy than they have of Greek idiom. In defer-
_ ence to friendly criticism I have generally suppressed
or transferred to footnotes my attempts to reproduce
this feature of Plato’s style. But I am not convinced.
‘As Taine aptly says (Life and Letters, p. 53), “ M.
ousin’s elegant Plato is not at all like the easy ...
ut always natural Plato of reality. He would shock
ops if we saw him as he is.”
\
᾿
lxxiii
he shih wT tet iy
i 5 ee
ἤτον, ἀν ΕΣ = Abate ths τὰ ‘SYK
AW Berta ane qn tint Yo,
cet ae ® ip Te es bite , ΕΟ; ΓΕ
> tee ἀρ ον
gt sims ad Bi ‘Ris a3dwae
Rpt ne gb Sot ‘bafitsitnly Wed
δ ;-- fjirit’ PA τὰ Beth eo ein ei!
Mig Bajo Lis ates oat wots Jeet Ἔ
Distoxle 9} a Sulla oil Foe or Wisi. 90 4
ae i: bitk ἜΗ δ ΠΝ bist ἢ, ot ie pi
ok va dest 3: 4 PB Bit: al ΟΥ̓"
; S207 "esitond Ϊ ΠΝ ἐξ ἢ- Galt πὰ μι. nck ὙΠ ;
πος, ameilyiipollos = bak noth I are aed
δος π᾿ τα ΠΤ Α Yo ahoued, οἷν. righ MY J tt uileg
eee oily 2 cathogs 12 δῆς τολεῖτα τὶ ‘panos! 10,
5 diberesbizris Vacsiear yaad toon Ὶ ere
ὁ ὧν 15 vii lb, att “ies
by
f
᾿ ΤΎΧΗΝ ὙΦ ΠΥ Φ ἀντ Ἰδὲ AY) reed ὦ
tei: bearssqqu2 eas xo oad μεμα Tey
= i eschew at of attack i, ‘Fee ἃ atontodinet! Sax (5)
peg Σ dsosni amon Sart ak ᾿ 10k Uh δ τ... otal De sactaat
AB.) (ae ay ῥἐτωδνδο nemosRiA) ΠΥ νον, ἢ ‘sith ΒΉ
¢ 7 onallte vi He
ee Sk Cok ls fa shou δὶ ἌΡΗΜΕ fasystae e
i μβορς bande oH viticervto osalt brit on ps
: J ewer ti oe |S
ore Sal ping!
TEATS ΟΝ
iPfoddandr ote deta WA WT
ἈΠΩΟΟΥΠΙ ΟΛΥ TOT AT
SRA th. rox SAD WVSATANS USHTATHAE
Ds tian τὸ
“ade REPUBLIC
πο ΒΘ ΟΣ SWS 62h 50
tsa) mourn Oxx ΡΝ H16 Ta dO τὰ
δι ay “τὶ ay ‘iy "Pest CO?
: ᾿ Gj ‘2
ry ἘΥΤ' “ΕΥ _. εἴ - τ > = 9
2 ἶ yx ita as τὶ Fy Guy
Ratha Toned ist3 ἴσοις ἰδαϑ εν
> ; νῪν ᾿
a tt γῦϑ oe sot GT St
© ‘ ar στ ᾽ =
ers JSS ἀτ9 κε. ΘῈΣ
. ;»Ά q = ὶ 94 ¢
> MUO 4 sami ZIM DAD SQ.
» ς eS ἃ - i Voge my
WY 8-4 (ohn. ὁ it WII
δ υ 5 4
24. 33D UOT. 80 “al. 16 om odie
πὰ ) ae °
APYRSTHONOa ‘WAU GNUN. ὁ του.
Ὁ αρ τινάν Shh ol ELD. owet δε "ιν ἡ ;
OP Shei sk wr An sub dusty ἣν ent
rel Coe
VoL. πὶ . Β
ΠΟΛΙΓΕΙΑ
[H ΠΕΡῚ AIKAIOT, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ]
TA ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠᾺ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΓΛΑΎΚΩΝ, ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ, ΘΡΑΣΎΜΑΧΟΣ,
AAEIMANTOS, ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ if
ς
St. T. IL p.
484 1. Oi μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων,
καὶ of μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς διεξελθόντος" λόγο '
μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἵ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι. “lows
γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ῥάδιον. Οὐ φαίνεται,
εἶπον" ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι et
περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ, πολλὰ τὰ
λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατόψεσθαι. τί διαφέρει. 7
B Bios δίκαιος ἀδίκου. Τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο͵
ἡμῖν; Τί δ᾽ ἄλλο, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἣ ἣ τὸ ἑξῆς; ἐπε 57)
φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ Ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως.
ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν
1 διεξελθόντος ADM, διεξελθόντες F.
ee Ν
® The argument is slightly personified. ΟἿ on 503 a. ‘
> It is captious to object that the actual discussion of the
philosopher occupies only a few pages.
¢ This is the main theme of the Republic, of which Plato
never loses sight.
2
4)
ΑἹ
Ὄ
ἱ
᾿
THE REPUBLIC
se, ἰο ΟΝ. JUSTICE: POLITICAL]
τυ 107
Ψ
.“
τ 15
ee
y sn4i
pee) τ Ὁ ee CHARACTERS
σι OST tye ᾿
Socrates, Graucox, Poremarcuus, THRASYMACHUS,
SRISABYH ris. ι
᾿ Averrantus, CEPHALUS
Ἦ .." Ἐπ πα,
| ὐλολ BOOK VI
. “So now, Glaucon,’’I said,“ our argument after
inding® along? and weary way has at last made clear
Ὁ us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom
nd who are not.” ‘‘ Yes,” he said, “a shorter way
perhaps not feasible.” ‘‘ Apparently not,” I said.
‘I at any rate, think that the matter would have
n made still plainer if we had had nothing but this
speak of, and if there were not so many things left
Ἢ our purpose ὅ of discerning the difference be-
‘the just and the unjust life requires us to
scuss.”” “* What, then,” he said, “ comes next?”
What else,” said I, “ but the next in order? Since
6 philosophers are those who are capable of appre-
ending that which is eternal and unchanging,* while
jose who are incapable of this, but lose themselves and
= ORR τον τ΄ στο’
i ν
OS FT τ τ;
4 For κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος cf. Phaedo 78 c, Soph.
48 4, Tim. 41 τ, 82 8, Epin. 982 and π᾿
8
PLATO
πολλοῖς Kat παντοίως ἴσχουσι πλανώμενοι od φιλό- —
σοῴφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι;
Πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγοιμεν;
« / Μ > > 4 ‘ ,
Οπότεροι ἄν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνωνται
φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων,
C τούτους καθιστάναι φύλακας. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. Τόδε
δέ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, dpa δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὀξὺ
ὁρῶντα χρὴ φύλακα τηρεῖν ὁτιοῦν; Kai πῶς,
ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον; Ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν
διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημέ-
νοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥ ὥσπερ γ γραφεῖς
εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε ἀεὶ
ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέ-
D στατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε
πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαί τε, ἐὰν δέῃ
τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σώζειν; Οὐ
μὰ τὸν Δία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρει. Τούτους
οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα, ἢ ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας
μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων͵
ἐλλείποντας μηδ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει. ᾿ἀρετῆς
ὑστεροῦντας; Ἄτοπον μέντ᾽ ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους
αἱρεῖσθαι, et γε τἄλλα μὴ ἐλλείποιντο: τούτῳ γὰρ
485 αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέ οιεν.. Οὐκοῦν
τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἷοί τ᾽ ἔσονται οὗ
τ ὁ δὲ 89, note hk, on 505 c,
Bune vi. 39, “Matt. xv. 14, John xix. 39-41.
4 Of Polit. 277 8, 277 pf., ete., Soph. 226 c, Par
132 Ὁ. Ν
4 ἀποβλέποντες belongs to the terminology of the ideas
Cf. supra 472 c, Cratyl. 389 a, Gorg. 503 ©, Tim. 28.4,
Prot. 354 ο, and my What Plato Said, p. 458 on Buthyph. 6 Ἐν
4
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
wander* amid the multiplicities of multifarious things,
are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to
_ be the leaders in a state?” “‘ What, then,” he said,
_“ would be a fair statement of the matter?”’ “ Which-
_ ever,’ I said, “ appear competent to guard the laws
and pursuits of society, these we should establish as
-guardians.”’ “ Right,’”’ he said. “Is this, then,” said
I,“ clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch
over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight ?”’
“Of course it is clear,” he said. “‘ Do you think,
then, that there is any appreciable difference between
_ the blind? and those who are veritably deprived of the
knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who
have no vivid pattern ¢ in their souls and so cannot,
85 painters look to their models, fix their eyes? on
_ the absolute truth, and always with reference to that
ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of
it establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful,
the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard
and preserve those that are established?” “No,
by heaven,” he said, ‘‘ there is not much difference.”
“Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our
. ee cas than those who have learned to know
e ideal reality of things and who do not fall short
of the others in experience ὁ and are not second to
them in any part of virtue?” “Τὸ would be strange
indeed,” he said, “ to choose others than the philo-
sophers, provided they were not deficient in those
other respects, for this very knowledge of the ideal
would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.”
“ Then what we have to say is how it would be pos-
sible for the same persons to have both qualifications,
© Of. infra 539 x, 521 2, Phileb. 62. Cf. Introd. p. x1;
Apelt, Republic, p. 490.
5 .
PLATO | FH
αὐτοὶ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν; ; Udvv μὲν οὖν. Ὃ
τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι. τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν
φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν: καὶ οἶμαι,
ἐὰν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσειν καὶ
ὅτι οἷοί τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους
πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἢ τούτους. Πῶς;
II. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων πέρι
Β ὡμολογήσθω ἡμῖν, ὅτι μαθήματός γε ἀεὶ ἐρῶσιν,
ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς. ἀεὶ οὔσης
καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.
\ ‘Quoroynabw. Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι. πάσης
αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμιω-
τέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἑκόντες ἀφίενται,
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν. περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ
ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Tdde
τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς
Ο τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει, ot ἂν μέλλωσιν ἔσεσθαι οἵους
ἐλέγομεν. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ
ἑκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος,
ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δ᾽ ἀλήθειαν στέργειν. Εἰκός | Υ᾽ i
ἔφη. Οὐ μόνον ye, ὦ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα
ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικῶς του φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ
ξυγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπᾶν.
᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. Ἦ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφίᾳ τι ἀλη-
θείας ἂν εὕροις; Kat πῶς; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Ἢ οὖν
δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ
4“ Lit. “‘is not made to wander by generation and decay.”
Cf. Crat. 411 c, Phaedo 95 π, whence Aristotle took his title.
See Class. Phil. xvii. (1922) pp. 334-352.
> Supra 474 c-p.
5 For similar expressions cf. 519 B, Laws 656 8, - 965 Cc,
Symp. 200 A.
4 ‘This and many other passages prove Plato’s high regard
6
"ρον ee
ron
ξ ΨΥ Γ Ρ
Pe
I SO ge Leg
—_
=
-
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
isitnot?” “Quite so.” “‘ Then, as we were saying
δὲ the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to
understand is the nature that they must have from
᾿ birth ; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this
cut also agree that the combination of qualities
_that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that
_we need no others for guardians of states than these.”
“ How so?”
~ II. “We must accept as agreed this trait of the
philosophical nature, that it is ever enamoured of the
_kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of
that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering
between the two poles of generation and decay.*”
_“ Let us take that as agreed.” “‘ And, further,” said I,
™* that their desire is for the whole of it and that they
do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more
precious or a less honoured, part of it. That was the
point of our former illustration ὃ drawn from lovers and
men covetous of honour.” “‘ You are right,” he said.
ἢ Consider, then, next whether the men who are to
meet our requirements must not have this further
quality in their natures.” “‘ What quality?” “ The
irit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood
in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth.”
It is likely,” he said. “It is not only likely, my
friend, but there is every necessity 5 that he who is by
‘Mature enamoured of anything should cherish all that
is akin and pertaining to the object of his love.”
“Right,” he said. ‘‘ Could you find anything more
akin to wisdom than truth*?” “Impossible,” he
‘said. “Then can the same nature be a lover of
for the truth. C/. Laws 730 c, 861 p, Crat. 428 p, supra
“382. In 389 8 he only permits falsehood to the rulers as
a drastic remedy to be used with care for edification. C7.
‘Vol. I. on 382 cand νυ.
7
PLATO
Ὁ φιλοψευδῆ; Οὐδαμῶς ye. Tov ἄρα τῷ ὄντ
φιλομαθῆ πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὅ τι
μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι. Παντελῶς γε. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν
ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν,
ἴσμεν που ὅτι εἰς τἄλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι,
ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον. Τί “μήν; :
Ὧι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον
ἐρρυήκασι, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἶμαι, ἡδονὴν. av-
τῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος
ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθῶς φιλό-
E σοφός τις εἴη. Μεγάλη ἀνάγκη. Σώφρων μὴν ὅ
γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος: ὧν γὰρ
ἕνεκα χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται,
ἄλλῳ τινὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ τούτῳ προσήκει σπουδάζειν.
Οὕτως. Καὶ μήν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν
486 κρίνειν μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μή. Τὸ
ποῖον; Μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας"
ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ
τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ
᾿ ἀνθρωπίνου. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. *He οὖν ὑπάρ-
| yer διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν
χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα
ΡΟΝ
α For this figure cf. Laws 844 a and 736'8, Eurip. Suppl. :
1111 παρεκτρέποντες ὀχετόν, Empedocles, Dielst 195 λόγου —
λόγον ἐξοχετεύων i ucretius ii. 365 “derivare queunt απὶ-
mum ἢ; and for the idea of. also Laws 643 c-p. é
» Of. my Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 45-46, esp. n. 330,
followed by Apelt, Republic, pp. 490-491. Cf. also Fried
lander, Platon, ii. pp. 579-580, 584.
¢ For πεπλασμένως cf. Soph. 216 c μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ᾽ ὄντως
φιλόσοφοι.
4 Of. Theaet. 144. τὸ χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα.
8 aan
a
a :
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
wisdom and of falsehood?” “By no means.”
“ Then the true lover of knowledge must, from child-
_ hood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every
form.”’ “‘ By all means.” “‘ But, again, we surely
are aware that when in a man the desires ira
strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for
Behe shines: It is as if the atom had been diverted
into another channel.*”’ “Surely.” “So, when a
man’s desires have been taught to flow in the channel
of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be con-
cerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in
itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body
is the instrument,” if the man is a true and not asham ©
_ philosopher.” “Thatis quitenecessary.”’ ““Suchaman
_ will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth;
for the things for the sake of which money and great
expenditure are eagerly sought others may take
seriously, but not he.” “It isso.’ “ And there is
_ this further point to be considered in distinguishing
the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature.”
ᾧ t point?” “You must not overlook any
_ touch of illiberality.¢ For nothing can be more con-
_ trary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that
is ever to seek integrity and wholeness? in all things
human and divine.” “ Mosttrue,”hesaid. “Do you
think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur
and the contemplation of all time and all existence
hie Cf. Goethe’s “Im Ganzen, Guten, Schénen resolut zu
4 Cf. Theaet. 174 τ, of the philosopher, εἰς ἄπασαν εἰωθὼς
τὴν γῆν βλέπειν, and 173 Ἐ, infra 500 B-c. Cf. Mare. Aurel:
vii. 35, Livy xxiv. 34 “ Archimedes is erat unicus spectator
eaeli siderumque,” Mayor, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. p. 128.
For πᾶς χρόνος ef. infra 498 νυ, 608 c, Phaedo 107 c, Gorg.
525 c, Apol. 40 π, Tim. 36 ©, 478, 90 v. Cf. Isoe. i. 11,
Pindar, Pyth. i. 46.
9
PLATO
τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον. βίον; ᾿Αδύνατον,
| Βἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται
ὁ τοιοῦτος; Ἥκιστά γε. Δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευ-
θέρῳ φύσει ΚΣ γπ ἡ ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ
ἂν μετείη. Ov μοι δοκεῖ. Τί οὖν; 6 κόσμ ς καὶ
μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδ᾽ ἀνελεύθερος μηδ᾽ ald
μηδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθ᾽ ὅπῃ ἂν δυσσύμβολος ἢ ἢ ἄδικος
γένοιτο; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ: υχὴν σκοπῶν
φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψει, εἰ
ἄρα δικαία, τε καὶ ἥμερος ἢ “δυσκοινώνητος καὶ
ἀγρία. άνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παρα-
Οσλείψεις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. Τὸ ποῖον; Ἐὐμαθὴς ἢ 7) δυσ-
μαθής. ἢ προσδοκᾷς ποτέ τινά rT ἱκανῶς ἂν
στέρξαι, ὃ πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις
σμικρὸν ἀνύτων; Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. Τί δ᾽; εἰ
μηδὲν ὧν μάθοι. σώζειν δύναιτο, λήθης ὧν wide?
dp’ av olds τ᾽ εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι; Καὶ
πῶς; ᾿Ανόνητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ, οἴει, ἀναγκασθή-
σεται τελευτῶν αὑτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην
D πρᾶξιν; Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; ᾿Επιλήσμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν ἐν
ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μή ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ
μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι. Ἰαντάπασι
μὲν οὖν. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ .
ἀσχήμονος φύσεως ἄλλοσέ ποι ἂν φαῖμεν ελκαμη Π ἢ
——e
a Cf. Aristot. Hth. Nic. 1123 Ὁ 32, the great-souled man,
ᾧ γ᾽ οὐδὲν μέγαν Diog. Laert. vii. 128 πάντων ὑπεράνω, Cic.
De fin. iii. 8 “infra se omnia humana ducens.’”’ Cf. infra
on 500 B-c.
For similar pessimistic utterances about human life and
mankind cf. 604 5-ο, 496 »-π, 500 B-c, 516 p, Laws 808 Β.
Cf. also Laws 708 2-709 5.
> Cf. Vol. I. pp. 200 f. on 386 s-c; Laws 727 τ, 828 τ,
881 a, Gorg. 522 x, Phaedo 77 x, Crito 43 B, eve 35 A,
10
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
can deem this life of man a thing of great concern*?”
2 ible,” saidhe. ““Hence such a man will not
Be, eath to be terrible?®” ‘‘ Least of all.”
a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could
have no part in genuine philosophy.” “ I think not.”
“What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a
lover: of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a
_ coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bar-
_ gains?” “ἢ Impossible.”’ “‘ This too, then, is a
point that in your discrimination of the philosophic
ie unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether
Soh is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial
tae ὰ Assuredly.” “ΝΟΥ will you over-
Lick “this, I fancy.” “What ?” ‘Whether he is
- quick or slow tolearn. Ordo you suppose that anyone
ἀρ Στὸ αν, love a task which he performed pain-
little result‘ from much toil?” “That
ah τς be.” “And if he could not keep what he
learned, being steeped in oblivion,’ could he fail to
_be void of knowledge?” ‘‘ How could he?” “‘ And
so, having all his labour for naught, will he not finally
be constrained toloathe himself and that occupation?”
“ΟΥ̓ course.” ‘“‘ The forgetful soul, then, we must
not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but
we require a good memory.” “ By all means.’
_~ But assuredly we should not say that the want of
ony and seemliness in a nature conduces to
anything else than the want of measure and propor-
40c. Cf. Spinoza’s “ There .is nothing of which the free
man thinks so little as de
_ © Cf. supra, Vol. I. on 442 x. ¢ Of. 375 ἃ
“ΟἹ Laches 189 s-B ἀηδῶς μανθάνων.
; ~ Theaet. 144 2.
9 Of. Theaet. 144 B λήθης γέμοντες. Cf. Cleopatra’s “Oh,
“my oblivion is a very Antony” (Ant. and Cleo. t. iii. 90).
1
PLATO
εἰς ἀμετρίαν. Τί “μήν; ᾿Αλήθειαν δὲ ἀμετρίᾳ
ἡγεῖ ξυγγενῆ εἶναι ἢ ἐμμετρίᾳ; ᾿Εμμετρίᾳ.. Ἔμ-
μετρον ἄρα καὶ εὔχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις
διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἑ ἑκά-
E στου τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
Τί οὖν; μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα
ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ
μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ
487 μεταλήψεσθαι; ᾿Αναγκαιότατα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπῃ μέμψει τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὃ μή
ποτ᾽ ἄν τις οἷός τε γένοιτο ἱκανῶς ἐπιτηδεῦσαι,
εἰ μὴ φύσει εἴη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής,
εὔχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιο-
σύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης; Οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁ Μῶμος,
ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ἦν. δ᾽ ἐγώ,
τελειωθεῖσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ
dpa οὐ μόνοις ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις;
Ill. Καὶ ὁ ᾿Αδείμαντος, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη,
‘ A a 7 > \ Ἅ es 3 ” > -
Β πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός τ᾽ εἴη ἀντειπεῖν"
>
ἀλλὰ yap τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες
4 ἰδέαν is not exactly “‘idea.’”’ Cf. Cratyl. 889.5, What
Plato Said, p. 458 on Euthyph. 6 Ὁ, ibid. p. 560 on Rep.
369 a and p. 585 on Parmen. 130 c-p. Cf. Class. Phil. xx.
(1925) p. 347.
> Lit. “following one upon the other.” Cf. Tim. 27 ¢
ἑπομένως, Laws 844 8.
© μεγαλοπρεπής is frequently ironical in Plato, but not here.
For the list of qualities of the ideal student ef. also 503 Ὁ,
Theaet. 144 a-p, and Friedlander, Platon, ii. p.418. Cf. Laws
709 © on the qualifications of the young tyrant, and Cic.
Tusc. v. 24, with Renaissance literature on education.
4 The god of censure, who finds fault with the gods in
Lucian’s cainlogues) Cf. Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 208,
12
ee ee
wh oe
Se ae
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
tion.” “Certainly.” ‘‘ And do you think that truth
is akin to measure and proportion or to dispropor-
tion?” “Τὸ proportion.” ‘Then in addition to
our other requirements we look for a mind endowed
with measure and grace, whose native disposition will
πρὶ it easily guided to the aspect of the ideal* reality
in all things.” “ Assuredly.” “Tell me, then, is
there any flaw in the argument? Have we not
_ proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and
compatible with one another for the soul that is to
have asufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?”
“Nay, most necessary,” he said. “15 there any
fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a
“man could not properly practise unless he were by
nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magni-
ficent,° gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice,
bravery and sobriety?” ““ Momus 4? himself,” he said,
“could not find fault with such a combination.”
“Well, then,” said I, “when men of this sort are
perfected by education and maturity of age, would
you not entrust the state solely to them ?”
_ Ul. And Adeimantus said, “No one, Socrates,
would be able to controvert these statements of yours.
But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you ¢
n. 1091, Otto, p. 227, 5.υ. Momus. Cf. Callimachus, fr. 70;
and Anth. Pal. xvi. 262. 3-4:
ν᾿ αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος
4 φθέγξεται, “Axpnros, Zed πάτερ, ἡ σοφίη,
“ Momus himself will cry out ‘ Father Zeus, this was perfect
51}. (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to Erasmus,
Chiliad, i. 5. 75 and interpreters on Aristaenet. Epist. i. 1,
p. 239, ed. Boissonade.
_* Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35, n. 236, and What
Plato Said, p. 468 on Crito 46 8. A speaker in Plato may
_ thus refer to any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamo-
witz’ suggested emendation (Platon, ii. p. 205) ἃ ἂν λέγῃς is
_ due to a misunderstanding of this.
13
ὝῬΙΑΤΟ ΠΗ ST
ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις" ἡγοῦνται δι’ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ
ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ᾽
ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα “σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροι-
σθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς. τῶν λόγων
μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἄνα a
νεσθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν. δεινῶν οἱ
μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ
Ο τι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλεί-
εσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας αὖ
ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ᾽ ἐν Bae
ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον rar ἔχε
λέγω δ᾽ εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας. νῦν yap a
ἄν τίς σοι λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸ
ἐρωτώμενον ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἔργῳ δὲ ὁρᾶν, ὅσοι ἂν
* A locus classicus for Plato’s anticipation of objections.
Cf. 475 5, Theaet. 166 λ-π, Rep. 609 c, 438-439, and Apelt,
Bapublic, Ῥ. 492. Plato does it more tactfully than Isocrates,
e.g. Demon. 44.
> Cf. Apelt, Aufsdtze, p. 73, Minto, Logie, Induction and
Deduction, pp. 4 ff.; also Gorg. 461 τ, 462 a, Soph 230 B.
¢ Cf. Phaedrus 262 5.
4 Cf. supra 451 a, and Theaet. 166 s, 168 a, infra 5346
ἀπτῶτ t.
¢ Of. Phaedr. 262 5, Cleitophon 410 a, Gorg. 495 a, schol.,
rods πρώτους λόγους τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ δηλονότι, Gorg. 457 Ἕ ols τὸ
πρῶτον ἔλεγες, and also Agathon in Symp. 901 8.
7 For this figure ef. Laws 739 a, 820 c-p, 903 Ὁ, Srycag
395 a-s, Hipparchus 229 π, Eurip. ‘Supp 1. 409.
Aristotle, Soph. El. 165 a 10 ff., borrows the nietaphor) ‘but
his ψῆφοι are those of book-keeping or reckoning. of os
Dem. De cor. 227 f.
9 Cf. Hipp. Minor 369 πε] and Grote ii. ΕΣ Ὡ “Though
Hippias admits each successive step he still mistrusts the
conclusion’; also Apelt, p. 492, supra 357 a-8 and Laws —
903 a βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, and also Hipparchus 232 B nt
14
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
argue thus feel in this way *: They think that owing
ἕο their inexperience in the πον of question and
_ answer ὃ they are at every question led astray ° a little
_ bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumu-
| ated : at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their
_fall¢ and the apparent contradiction of what they at
first said*; and that just as by expert draught-players’
_ the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a
move, so they are finally blocked and have their
mouths stopped by this other game of draughts
played not with counters but with words; yet the
_ truth is not affected by that outcome.’ I say this
_ with reference to the present case, for in this instance
_ ong might say that he is unable in words to contend
against you at each question, but that when it comes
_ to facts” he sees that of those who turn to philosophy,‘
the idea that dialectic constrains rather than persuades. In
_ the Jon, 533 c, Ion says he cannot ἀντιλέγειν, but the fact
“remains that he knows Homer but not other wees Cf. also
3 p. The virtually anticipates Bacon’s Novum
_ Organum, App. XIII. “ (syllogismus) . . . assensum itaque
_ constringit, non res.” Cf. Cie. De fin. iv. 3, Tuse. i. 8. 16,
and the proverbial οὐ yap πείσεις, οὐδ᾽ ἣν πείσῃς, Aristoph,
Plutus 600.
__*® See Soph. 234 & for a different application of the same
_ idea. There is no change of opinion. The commonplace
_ Greek contrast of word and deed, theory and fact, is valid
_ against eristic but not against dialectic. See What Plato
_ Said, p. 534 on Phaedo 99 ©, and supra on 473 4; also What
lato Said, p. 625 on Laws 636 a.
_ _A favourite formula of Aristotle runs, ‘This is true in
4 and is confirmed by facts.” Cf. Eth. Nic. 1099 Ὁ 25,
1123 Ὁ 22, 1131 a 13, Pol. 1323 a 39-b 6, 1326 a 25 and 29,
| 1334 a 5-6. A
4 * Scholars in politics cut a sorry figure. For this popular
view of philosophers ef. Theaet. 173 ὁ ff., 174 c-p, Gorg. 484-
ΡΝ c, Phaedo 64 Β. Cf. also Isoc. passim, σι. Antid. 250,
12.
15
PLATO
ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὁρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι
Ὁ ἕνεκα ἁψάμενοι νέοι ὄντες ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ
μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψωσι, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ
πάνυ ἀλλοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονή-
ρους εἴπωμεν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας
ὅμως τοῦτό γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὗ σὺ
ἐπαινεῖς πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι yeyvo-
μένους. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, Οἴει οὖν, εἶπον, τοὺς
ταῦτα λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι; Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς,
E ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούοιμι. ᾿Ακούοις
ἄν, ὅτι “ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τἀληθῆ λέγειν. Πῶς οὖν,
ἔφη, εὖ ἔχει λέγειν, ὅ ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν παῦε
σονται αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι
ἄρξωσιν, ovs ἀχρήστους ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι;
᾿Ερωτᾷς, ν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρί-
σεως δι᾿ εἰκόνος “λεγομένης. Σὺ δέ γε, ἔφη, οἶμαι,
οὐκ εἴωθας du’ εἰκόνων λέγειν.
IV. Elev, εἶπον: σκώπτεις ΤΕ Βλη δ ε εἰς
λόγον οὕτω δυσαπόδεικτον; ἄκουε by τῆς
488 εἰκόνος, ἵν᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ions, ὡς pvtise εἰκάζω.
οὕτω γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων, ὃ
πρὸς τὰς πόλεις πεπόνθασιν, ὥστε οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ἕν
οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον πεπονθός, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ πολ-
λῶν αὐτὸ ξυναγαγεῖν εἰκάζοντα καὶ ἀπολογού-
« The perfect tense is ironical in Crat. 3848, serious in
Laws 670 a-8. In Gorg. 485 « it is replaced by ὅσον ἸδΑ δέίας
χάριν.
Ἵ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 506 on Gorg. 484 ο.
¢ Cf. Buthydem. 306 π, Protag. 346 a, and for the idea
without the word, Soph. 216 c.
@ Cf. Eurip. Medea 299, and on 489 B.
¢ Cf. supra 487 a. In Euthydem. 307 8 Plato uses. both
ἐπιτήδευμα and πρᾶγμα.
16
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
not merely touching upon it to complete their educa-
* and dropping it while still young, but lingering
_long® in the study of it, the majority become
anks,° not to say rascals, and those accounted the
finest spirits among them are still rendered useless? to
‘society by the pursuit ὁ which youcommend.” AndI,
hearing this, said, “ Do you think that they are
I en in saying so?”’ “I don’t know,” said
he, “ but I would gladly hear your opinion.” “‘ You
may hear, then, that ] think that what they say is
true.””» “ How, then,” he replied, “can it be right
to say that our cities will never be freed from their
evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be
seless to them, become their rulers?” ‘‘ Your
estion,” I said. “ requires an answer expressed in
ἃ comparison or parable” “And you,” he said, “of
course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!”
_ IV. “ So,” said I, “ you are making fun of me after
driving me into such an impasse of argument. But,
the same, hear my comparison so that you may
ill better see how I strain after’ imagery. For so
ruel is the condition of the better sort in relation to
the state that there is nosingle thing” like it in nature.
But to find a likeness for it and a defence for them
Gne must bring together many things in such a com-
ae! Cf. a 517 pv, Laws 644 c, Symp. 215 a with Bury’s
Cf. parable of the great beast infra 493, and of
many-headed beast, 588-589.
_ * The word γλίσχρως is untranslatable, and often mis-
1 In 553 ¢ it means “ stingily *; in Cratyl. 414 Ὁ
itis used of a strained etymology, and so in 435 c, usually
1 tood; in Crito 53 πὶ of clinging to life; ef. Phaedo
117 ας in Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. 28 of a straine allegory
nd ibid. 75 of a strained resemblance; in Aristoph. Peace
of a dog. λ Cf. Laws 747 5.
VOL. II c 17
᾿
Β ἐ ἐν τῇ νηϊ πάντας, ὑπόκωφον δὲ καὶ ὁρῶντα
Ο διδακτὸν ἑτοίμους κατατέμνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ
PRADO TIA TAT
μενὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οἷον οἱ γραφεῖς tn a:
Kal τὰ τοιαῦτα μιγνύντες γράφουσι. νόησον γὰρ
τοιουτονὶ γενόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν ψεῶν πέρι εἴτε
μιᾶς" ναύκληρον μεγέθει μὲν καὶ ῥώ HT] ὑπὲρ beet |
αύτως βραχύ τι καὶ γιγνώσκοντα περὶ peace
ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, τοὺς δὲ ναύτας στασιάζοντας πρὸς
ἀλλήλους περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως, ἕκαστον οἰόμενον.
δεῖν κυβερνᾶν, μήτε μαθόντα πώποτε τὴν τέχνην
μήτε ἔχοντα ἀποδεῖξαι διδάσκαλον ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ
χρόνον ἐν ᾧ ἐμάνθανε, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φάσκοντας,
μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὡς
ἀεὶ τῷ ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι Ascuisians καὶ
rt
« Of. Horace, Ars Poetica, init.; What Plato Said, p. ὁ
on Phaedr. 229 p-®, and infra 588 cf. The expression |
still used, or revived, in Modern Greek newspapers. “Γ᾿
» The syntax of this famous allegory is anacoluthic and
perhaps uncertain: but there need be no doubt about the
meaning. Cf. my article in the Classical Review, xx. (1906 Ε᾿
p. 947.
to Ἂ, commends the allegory, Methods and Results,
᾿ 313. . also Carlyle’s famous metaphor of the
oubling Cons Horn by ballot. Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914
p. 362.
“ The Athenian demos, as portrayed e.g. in Aristophanes”
Knights 40 ff. and passim. Cf. Aristot. ‘Finet. 1408 35 καὶ
ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυκλήρῳ ἰσχυρῷ a ehane δέ,
Polyb. vi. 44 ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε τὸν τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων δῆμον παραπλήσιον
εἶναι τοῖς ἀδεσπότοις σκάφεσι, etc. Cf. the old sailor in Joseph
Conrad’s Chance, ch. i. ‘‘ No ship navigated . . in the
happy-go-lucky manner . . . would ever arrive into port.”
or ‘the figure of the ship of state ef. Polit. 302 a ff.,
299 5, Euthydem. 291 Ὁ, Aesch. Seven against Thebes 2-3,
Theognis 670-685, Horace, Odes i. 15 with my note, Urwick,
18
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
bination as painters mix when they portray goat-
‘stags ® and similar creatures. ὃ Conceive this sort of
thing happening either on many ships or on one:
Picture a shipmaster ¢ in height and strength surpass-
‘ing all others on the ship, but who is slightly deaf?
of similarly impaired vision, and whose know-
of navigation is on a par with? his sight and
hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with
‘one another for control of the helm, each claimi
‘that it is his right to steer though he has never learned
the art and cannot point out his teacher’ or any time
when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm
that it cannot be taught at all,’ but they are ready to
nake mincemeat of anyone” who says that it can be
taught, and meanwhile they are always clustered
about‘ the shipmasier importuning him and sticking
‘The Message of Plato, pp. 110-111, Ruskin, Time and
Tide i ‘That the governing authority should be in the
ἢ of a true and trained pilot is as clear and as constant.
Tn none of these conditions is there any difference between
‘a nation and a boat’s company.” Cf. Longfellow’s. The
Building of the Ship, in fine. Cf. Laws 758 a, 945 ς.
_ For the criticism of democracy by a figure ¢f. also Polit.
991 & ff.
_ * Cf, Aristoph. Knights 42-44.
_* Cf. 390 c, 426 v, 498 5, Theaetet. 167 8, and Milton’s
unknown and like esteemed,” Comus 630.
_ ? For this and similar checks on pretenders to knowledge
ef. Laches 185 ©, 186 a and c, Ale. I. 109 Ὁ and Gorg. 514 8-c.
αὶ Plato of course believed that virtue or the political art
an be taught in a reformed state, but practically was not
at Athens. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 14,
on 518 p, What Plato Said, pp. 70 and 511, Newman,
Aristot. Pol. p. 397, Thompson on Meno 70 a.
_* A hint of the fate of Socrates. Cf. infra 517 a, 494 8,
19
4
'
Ϊ
| D pev καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον
PLATO SAN AGT
πάντα ποιοῦντας, ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ yee
ἐπιτρέψῃ, ἐνίοτε δ᾽ ἂν μὴ πείθωσιν ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἢ ἀποκτεινύντας ἢ
βάλλοντας ἐκ τῆς νεώς, τὸν δὲ ἐνναῖον bar
μανδραγόρᾳ ἢ μέθῃ ἤ τινι an ῳ ξύμμορῖξα
τῆς νεὼς ἄρχειν χρωμένους τοῖς ἐνοῦσι
τάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, δ:
τοιούτους, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦντας ναυτικὸν
τὰ κατὰ ναῦν, ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς. ἢ, ὅπως
ἄρξουσιν ἢ ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι. τὸν ναύκληρον,
τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ψέγοντας ὡς ἄχ , τοῦ δὲ
ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου πέρι μηδ᾽ ὁ ἀὐκίννίθες ieee t
ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, ond
1 ératovras q, ératovres AFDM. ea
* For the idiom πάντα ποιεῖν of. a 8 c, infra 504 D-x,
571 c, 575 Ἐ, 494 π, Gorg. 479 c, Phaedr. 252 E, Apol. 39 .
and, slightly varied, Eurip. Heracleidae 841. .
Ὁ The word ἐκβάλλοντας helps the obvious allegory, for ἶ
also means banish.
“ Here figurative. Cf. Gorg. 482 x, Theaet: 165% “Inf i
615 πὶ it is used literally. h, 5:6 Te
4 Cf. Polit. 297 x. The expression is slightly ironical.
Such is frequently the tone of γενναῖος in Plato. Of. Rep.
454 a, 363 a, 544 c, 348 c, Hipp. Min. 370 , Soph. bee
Hipp. Maj. 290 x, Polit. 274 x. A
4 Cf. Polit. 302 a, Laws 906 B, Jebb on Soph. An is
189-190. Ὁ ΨἘΪ
5 AOE I OEE iv. 26, vi. 69, vii. 95. Cs Sa
eo 427 ©, Laws 905 c, Pryx. 396 £, Aristoph. Knights 229,
either here nor in p-£ can ὅπως with the future mean
‘in what way,” and all interpretations based on that
caine are plainly wrong. The expression in both cases
refers to getting control. τς 838 5, Laws 757 Ὁ, 714 0,
962 p-r, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14.5. Cf. Class. Phil. ix. mie
Pp. 358 and 362. . "
* For τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον cf. Ale. 11. 145 ¢. LADOVas
20
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
at nothing 5 to induce him to turn over the helm to
the a. And sometimes, if they fail and others get |
s ear, they put the others to death or cast them out? |
m the ship, and then, after binding 5 and stupefying |
the worthy shipmaster ὦ with mandragora or intoxica-
tion or otherwise, they take command of the ship, |
nsume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make |
a voyage ὁ of it as is to be expected / from such, |
as if that were not enough, they praise and cele-|
brate as a navigator, a pilot, a master of shipcraft, |
‘the man who is most cunning to lend a hand? in per- |
‘suading or constraining the shipmaster to let them,
οὐ while the man who lacks this craft‘ they censure _
useless. They have no suspicion’ that the true
must give his attention* to the time of the year, |
Rs The ppl. must refer to the sailors; hence the acc. (see
or note ΄
i> W. the text and the amount of probable anacoluthon
‘sentence, the meaning is that the unruly sailors (the
mob) have no true conception of the state of mind of the
‘Teal pilot (the philosophic statesman), and that it is he
᾿ pting Sidgwick’s ofoudyy for the ms. οἰόμενοι in Ἐ) who
f not believe that the trick of getting possession of the
; is an art, or that, if it were, he could afford time to
practise it. Those who read οἰόμενοι attribute the idea of the
‘incompatibility of the two things to the sailors. But that
overlooks the points I have already made about ὅπως, and
een is in any case improbable, because the sentence as
a le is concerned with the attitude of the true pilot
), which may be represented by the words of Burke
to his constituents, ‘I could hardly serve you as I have done
court you too.”
Cf. Sidgwick, ““On a Passage in Plato’s Republic,”
of Philology, v. pp. 274-276, and my notes in A.J.P.
Ῥ. 364 and xvi. p. 234.
ΠΣ For the force of the article ef. Thucyd. ii. 65 τὸ ἐπέφθονον
t, and my article in T.A.P.A. 1893, p. 81, n. 6. C7.
also Charm. 156 © and Rep. 496 r.
21
ΡΡΑΙΡΟΙ 15. ΜΉΤ
καὶ ὡρῶν καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἄστρων καὶ henge '
καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλλει,
τῷ ὄντι νεὼς ἀρχικὸς ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει
E ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή, μήτε τέχνην τού-
του ΠΩ μελέτην οἰομένῳ' δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν,
ἅμα καὶ τὴν ταις τὐρενο αν τοιούτων δὴ περὶ τὰς
ναῦς 14 hota TOV ὡς ἘΣ RopcPaugeeer, οὐχ
ἡγεῖ dv τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ᾿ ἀδολέσχην
489 καὶ ἄχρηστόν σφισι καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς
οὕτω κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ Pres | Kat
μάλα, ἔφη ὁ ᾿Αδείμαντος. Od δή, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οἶμαι
δεῖσθαί σε ἐξεταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς
πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν διά-
θεσιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν ὃ λέγω. Καὶ μάλα,
ἔφη. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἐκεῖνον τὸν θαυμάζοντα,
ὅτι οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ τιμῶνται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι,
δίδασκέ τε τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ πειρῶ πείθειν, ὅτι πολὺ
Β ἂν θαυμαστότερον ἦν, εἰ ἐτιμῶντο. ᾿Αλλὰ διδάξω,
1 οἰομένῳ Sidgwick : οἰόμενοι Mss.
22
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all
that ins to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a
ship, and that he does not believe that there is any
art or science of seizing the helm @ with or without the
consent of others, or any possibility of mastering this
alleged art ὃ and the practice of it at the same time
with the science of navigation. With such goings-on
aboard ship do. you not think that the real pilot
‘would in very deed ° be called a star-gazer, an idle
babbler, a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships
‘managed after this fashion?’ ‘‘ Quite so,” said
Adeimantus. “ You take my meaning, I presume,
-and do not require us to put the comparison to the
proof? and show that the condition’ we have described
is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state
‘to the true philosophers.”’ “It is indeed,’’ he said.
“ To begin with, then, teach this parable’ to the man
ee is surprised that philosophers are not honoured
in our cities, and try to convince him that it would
be far more surprising if they were honoured.” “1
mm
also Class. Rev. xx. (1906) p. 247. See too Cic. De or. i. 4
“neque aliquod praeceptum artis esse arbitrarentur,”’ and
infra 518 νυ.
_ * τῷ ὄντι verifies the allusion to the charge that Socrates
was a babbler and a star-gazer or weather-prophet. Cf.
225 v, Polit. 299 5, and What Plato Said, p. 527 on
do 70 c; Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1480.
_# Plato like some modern writers is conscious of his own
imagery and frequently interprets his own symbols. Cf,
517 «-s, 531 B, 588 B, Gorg. 493 Ὁ, 517 pv, Phaedo 87 8,
Laws 644 c, Meno 72 s-8, Tim. 19 8, Polit. 297 ε. Gf.
also the cases where he says he cannot tell what it is but
4 what it is like, ¢.g. Rep. 506 2, Phaedr. 246 s, Symp.
215 4 5,
Bg — and ἕξις are not discriminated by Plato as by
Aristotle.
ΟἿ Cf. 476 v-r.
23
PLATO ΠΗ ΝΗῚ
ἔφη. Kal ὅτι τοίνυν τἀληθῆ λέγει, ὡς" “ἄχρηστοι
Ἱ
τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι. τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ:
τῆς μέντοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς. μὴ χρωμένους 1 κέλευε,
αἰτιᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει
φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑφ᾽
αὑτοῦ, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων
θύρας i ἰέναι, ἀλλ᾽ 6 τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο,
τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν, ἐάν τε πλούσιος ἐάν. τε
πένης κάμνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας
ἰέναι καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ
ἄρχειν δυναμένου, οὐ τὸν ἄρχοντα δεῖσθαι τῶν dpxo-
μένων ἄρχεσθαι, οὗ ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τι ὄφελος. hh
ἀλλὰ τοὺς viv πολιτικοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀπεικάζων οἷς
ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν ναύταις οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ
τούτων ἀχρήστους λεγομένους καὶ μετεωρολέσχας
iY iets
* This passage illustrates one of the most interesti
characteristics of Plato’s style, namely the representation
thought as adventure or action. This procedure is, or was,
familiar to modern readers in Matthew Arnold’s account in
God and the Bible of his quest for the meaning of God, which
in turn is imitated in°Mr. Updegraff’s New Word. It lends
vivacity and interest to Pascal’s Provinciales and
other examples of it can be found in modern literature. |
classical instance of it in Plato is Socrates’ narrative in the
Phaedo of his search for a satisfactory explanation of natural
phenomena, 96 a ff. In the Sophist the argument is re
sented as an effort to track and capture the sophist.
the figure of the hunt is common in the dialogues (ef. supr
Vol. ae 365). Cf. also Rep, 455 a-s, 474 B, 588 οὖν
612 c, ΠΝ 291 a-B, 293 a, Phileb. 24 a ff., 43 a, 44 D,
45 a, Laws 892 p-r, Theaet. 169 pv, 180 8, 196 D, Polit.
265 8, ete.
> Cf. 487 vy. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 3
24
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
will teach him,” 6 he said. “‘ And say to him further:
You are right in affirming that the finest spirits
among the philosophers are of no service to the multi-
_ tude. But bid him blame for this uselessness,? not the
liar. But the true nature of things is that whether
_ the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the
_ door of the physician, and everyone who needs to be;
_ governed? to the door of the man who knows how to
_ govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural |
_ subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good |
ing our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we
were just describing, and those whom these call useless |
-
ἢ we am not sure that I do not think this the fault of our com-
munity rather than of the men of culture.”
_ © For the idiom φύσιν ἔχει cf. 473 a, Herod. ii. 45, Dem.
ii. 26. Similarly ἔχει λόγον, Rep. 378 £, 491 v, 564 a, 610 a,
Phaedo 62 8 Ὁ, Gorg. 501 a, etc.
ἃ This saying was attributed to Simonides. Cf. schol.
. Hermann, 0, vol. vi. p. 346, Joel, Der echte und der
ische Sokrates, ii p. 81, Aristot. Rhet. 1391 a 8.
eS haedr. 245 a ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας, Thompson on Phaedr.
. E, supra 364 B ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας, Laws 953 τὸ ἐπὶ ras
τῶν πλουσίων καὶ σοφῶν θύρας, and for the idea cf. also infra
ἶ a and Theaet. 170 a, Timon of Athens tv. iii. 17 “ΤῊς
᾿ pate ducks to the golden fool.”
__ * For Plato’s attitude toward the epigrams of the Pre-
erates ef. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 68-69.
ad κοΐ Theaet. 170 Β and infra 590 c-p.
᾿ς ® For the idiom with ὄφελος ef. 530 c, 567 B, Euthyphro
48, Apol. 36 c, Crito 46 a, Euthydem. 289 a, Soph. O.C.
_ 259, where it is varied.
» 25
for anything.’ But you will make no mistake in liken- |
_ finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make |
e of them. For it is not the natural 5 course of |
things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be |
a. by him or that wise men should go to the |
_ doors of the rich.? The author of that epigram ὃ wasa |
PLATO ART
τοῖς ws ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις. ᾿Ορθότατα, ἔφη.
Ἔκ τε τοίνυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ῥάδιον.
εὐδοκιμεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα ὑπὸ τῶν
D τἀναντία ἐπιτηδευόντων, πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ
ἰσχυροτάτη διαβολὴ γίγνεται φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ τοὺς
τὰ τοιαῦτα φάσκοντας ἐπιτηδεύειν, ods 8) σὺ φὴς
τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγειν ὦ ὡς παμπόνηροι
οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἰόντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ ἐπι-
εικέστατοι ἄχρηστοι, καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ
σε λέγειν. ἢ γάρ; Ναί.
V. Οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀχρηστίας τὴν
αἰτίαν διεληλύθαμεν; Καὶ μάλα. Τῆς δὲ τῶν
πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ
τοῦτο διέλθωμεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ τούτου φιλοσοφία
Ε αἰτία, ἂν δυνώμεθα, πειραθῶμεν δεῖξαι; Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν. ᾿Ακούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν ἐκεῖθεν
ἀναμνησθέντες, ὅθεν διῇμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἷον ἀνάγ-
490 κὴ φῦναι τὸν καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐσόμενον. ἡγεῖτο
δ᾽ αὐτῷ, εἰ νῷ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν
διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ Cov
ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς. Ἦν
γὰρ οὕτω λεγόμενον. Οὐκοῦν ἕν μὲν τοῦτο
σφόδρα οὕτω παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις
περὶ αὐτοῦ; Kai μάλα, ἔφη. “Ap” οὖν δὴ οὐ
μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὃν SRNR
« Cf. Theaet. 178 ο, nat speak of unworthy philosophers ?
and infra 495 ὁ ff.
> Possibly “ wooers.” Of. 347 c, 5218. Plato frequently
employs the ey σέ of physical love in speaking
philosophy. Cf. infra 495-496, 490 s, Theaet. 148 & ff.,
Phaedo 66 ©, Meno 70 8, Phaedr, 266 3, etc.
° Cf. Theaet. 169 τ.
26
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots.”
“ Just so,” he said. ‘“‘ Hence, and under these con-
ditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit
should be highly esteemed by those whose way of
life is quite the contrary. But far the greatest and
chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon
it by the pretenders * to that way of life, those whom
you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser
of philosophy says that the majority of her followers ὃ
are rascals and the better sort useless, while I ad-
‘mitted ° that what you said wastrue. Is not that so?”
66 Yes. ᾽ν"
ΙΥΝ, “ Have we not, then, explained the cause of
ithe iusclessness of the better sort?” “γε have.”
“ Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the
Pdegencracy of the majority, and try to show if we
ean that philosophy is not to be blamed for this
either ὃ “‘ By all means.” “ Let us begin, then,
what we have to say and hear by recalling the start-
ing-point of our description of the nature which he
who is to be ascholar and gentleman “ must have from
birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recol-
lect, was truth. That he was to seek always and
' altogether, on pain of ¢ being an impostor without part
or lot in true philosophy.” “‘ Yes, that was said.”
“Ts not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing
opinion about him?” “ Itisindeed,” he said. ‘* Will
it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was
the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive
_ 4 The quality of the καλὸς κἀγαθός gave rise to the abstrac-
" καλοκἀγαθία used for the moral ideal in the Eudemian
thics. Cf. Isoc. Demon. 6, 13, and 51,. Stewart on Eth.
Nie. 1124 a 4 (p. 339) and 1179 b 10 (p. 460).
__ * For 4=“ or else” cf. Prot. 323 a and c, Phaedr. 237 c,
239 a, 245 v, Gorg. 494 a, Crat. 426 n, etc.
27
PLATO
εἴη dys ιλλᾶσθαι ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής, καὶ οὐκ
Β ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ “Τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἑκά-
στοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδ᾽ ἀπολήγοι
τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς
φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι
τοῦ τοιούτου" προσήκει δὲ ξυγγενεῖ" ᾧ πλησιάσας
καὶ μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι. ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλή-
θειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη καὶ τρέφοιτο. καὶ
οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δ᾽ ov. Ὥς οἷόν Ce ἔφη, ͵
μετριώτατα. Τί οὖν; τούτῳ τι μετέσται ψεῦ os ἢ
Ca ἀγαπᾶν ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον μισεῖν; Μισεῖν, ἔφη.
᾿Ηγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἄν ποτε, οἶμαι,
φαῖμεν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθῆσαι. Πῶς
γάρ; “AA ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ
σωφροσύνην ἕπεσθαι. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. Καὶ δὴ τὸν
ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν τί bet πάλιν
ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν; μέμνησαι γάρ
που, ὅτι ξυνέβη προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγα-
λοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη: καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλα-
D βομένου, ὅτι πᾶς μὲν ἀναγκασθήσεται ὁμολογεῖν
οἷς λέγομεν, ἐάσας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς
ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὧν 6 λόγος, φαίη ὁρᾶν αὐτῶν
τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς,
πᾶσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπισκο- —
ee ee ἂν γκωάδον δα
2 Similar metaphors for contact, approach and intercourse
with the truth are frequent in Aristotle and the Neoplatonists.
For Plato ef. Campbell on Theaet. 1508 and 1864. Cf.also
supra on 489 pv. Ι
>Cf. Phaedo 65 © f., Symp. 211 £-212 a. Ἷ
¢ Lit. “δα nourished.” Cf. Protag. 313 c-p, Soph. 2238,
Phaedr. 248 8. ae
4 A Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphor. Cf. Theaet,
148 £ ἢ, 151 a, and passim, Symp. 206 8, Hpist. ii. 313 ne
Epictet. ‘Diss. i. 9. 11.
28
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
_ emulously for true being and that he would not linger
_ over the many particulars that are opined to be real,
_ but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion
_ would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he
_ came into touch with? thenature of each thing in itself
_ by that part of his soul to which it belongs ὃ tolay hold
_ on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely—
_ and through that approaching it, and consorting with
_ reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth,
_ attain to knowledge and truly live and στον," and so
᾿ find surcease from his travail? of soul, but not before?”
_ “No plea could be fairer.” ‘* Well, then, will such a
_ man love falsehood, or, quite the contrary, hate it?”
_ “ Hate it,” he said. \* When truth led the way, no
_ choir? of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow
_ inits train.” ‘How could it?” ‘But rather asound
__ and just character, which is accompanied by temper-
_ ance.” “Right,” he said. “‘ What need, then, of re-
ἰ peating from the beginning our proof of the nec
_ order of the choir that attends on the philosophical
ἢ nature? You surely remember that we found per-
_ taining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul,
Ἰ Se tolearn,memory,f And when you interposed
_ the objection that though everybody will be com-
_ pelled to admit our statements,’ yet, if we abandoned
_ mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom
the words referred, everyone would say that he actu-
_ ally saw some of them to be useless and most of them
_ base with all baseness, it was in our search for the
__ * For the figurative use of the word χορός cf. 560 Ez,
_ 580 8, Euthydem. 279 c, Theaet. 173 B.
_~ * For the list of virtues ¢f. supra on 487 A.
ὁ Cf. for the use of the dative Polit. 258 a συγχωρεῖς οὖν
t Pile ν-
Σ οἷς λέγει, Phaedo 100 c τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς, Horace, Sat.
5 ‘ii. 8. 305 “ stultum me fateor, liceat concedere veris.”
PLATO
ποῦντες ἐπὶ τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ
κακοί, καὶ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν. τὴν
τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ ἐξ Goeyieys
E ὡρισάμεθα. "Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ταῦτα.
VI. Ταύτης δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῆς pope δεῖ
θεάσασθαι τὰς φθοράς, ὡς διόλλυται ἐν πολλοῖς,
σμικρὸν δέ τι ἐκφεύγει, οὗς δὴ καὶ οὐ πονηρούς,
ἀχρήστους δὲ »κκαλοῦσι- καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ τὰς
49] μιμουμένας ταύτην καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα, καθιστα- q
μένας αὐτῆς, οἷαι οὖσαι φύσεις ψυχῶν εἰς ἀνάξιον —
καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτῶν ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπιτήδευμα, - πολ
λαχῇ πλημμελοῦσαι, πανταχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας
δόξαν οἵαν λέγεις φιλοσοφίᾳ προσῆψαν.. Τίνας. δέ,
ἔφη, τὰς διαφθορὰς λέγεις; ᾿Ἔγώ σοι, εἶπον, ἂν
οἷός τε γένωμαι, πειράσομαι διελθεῖν. τόδε μὲν
οὖν, οἶμαι, πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει, τοιαύτην. φύσιν
καὶ πάντα ἔχουσαν, ὅσα προσετάξαμεν νῦν δή,
Β εἰ τελέως μέλλοι φιλόσοφος ᾿ γενέσθαι, ὀλιγάκις
ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας" ἢ οὐκ οἴει;
Σφόδρα γε. Τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων σκόπει ὡς
πολλοὶ ὄλεθροι καὶ μεγάλοι. Tives δή; “Ὁ μὲν
πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι ἕν ἕκαστον !
ὧν ἐπῃνέσαμεν τῆς φύσεως ἀπόλλυσι τὴν, ἔχουσαν
ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποσπᾷ φιλοσοφίας" λέγω δὲ ἀνδρείαν,
σωφροσύνην, καὶ πάντα ἃ διήλθομεν. λτοπον,
Ο ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι. “Ete τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρὸς
“Τα petit nombre des élus. Cf. infra 496 κ-5 and Phaedo
69 c-p, Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14. ;
ὃ For the Greek double use of ἄξιος and ἀνάξιος ef. Laws
943 ©, Aesch. Ag, 1527. Cf. “ How. worthily he died who
died unworthily ’’ and Wyatt’s line “ Disdain me not with-
out desert,”’ ee.
30
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
- eause of this ill-repute that we came to the present
question: Why is it that the majority are bad?
_ And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature
_ of the true philosophers and defined what it must
_ necessaril be?” ‘ That is so,’ ’ he said.
_VI. “ We have, then,” I said, “ to contemplate the
of the corruption of this nature in the majority,
_ while a small part escapes,? even those whom men
“call not bad but useless ; and after that in turn we are
to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp
_ its pursuits and see what types of souls they are that
_ thus entering upon a way of life which is too high ὃ for
them and exceeds their powers, by the many dis-
ec cords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere
and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute
pot which you speak.” “ Of what corruptions are you
Ὁ “J will try,” I said, “ to explain them
_to you ifI can. I think everyone will grant us this
t, that a nature such as we just now postulated
for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among
en and is found in only afew. Don’t you think so?”
b- Most emphatically.” ‘‘ Observe, then, the number
_ and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy
ese few.” ‘‘ What are they?” “‘ The most sur-
rising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature
which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its pos-
“sessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking
of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.°” “‘ That does
sound like a paradox,” said he. “‘Furthermore,’’ said I,
_, * Cf. Burton, Anatomy, i. 1 “This St. Austin acknow-
ledgeth of himself in his humble confessions, promptness of
wit, memory, eloquence, they were God’s good gifts, but he
_ did not use them to his glo
ξ Cf. Meno 88 a-c, and pst Ep. vy. 7 “ multa bona
oP
nobis nocent.”’
31
᾿
|
|
PLATO USA ΜΗ͂Τ
τούτοις τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πάντα φθείρει καὶ ἀπο-
σπᾷ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχὺς σώματος καὶ
ξυγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τού-
τῶν οἰκεῖα" ἔχεις γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω. "Ἔχω,
ἔφη’ καὶ ἡδέως γ᾽ ἂν ἀκριβέστερον ἃ λέγεις πυθοΐ:
μην. Λαβοῦ τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς,
καί σοι εὔδηλόν τε φανεῖται καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπα δόξει
τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη,
Ὁ κελεύεις; Ι]αντός, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, σπέρματος πέρι 7
a Ὁ 7
φυτοῦ, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων, ἴσμεν, ὅτι TO
μὴ τυχὸν τροφῆς ἧς προσήκει ἑκάστῳ μηδ᾽ ὥρας
μηδὲ τόπου, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐρρωμενέστερον 7, τοσούτῳ
πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων: ἀγαθῷ γάρ που
κακὸν ἐναντιώτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ ἀγαθῷ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
Ἔχει δή, οἶμαι, λόγον, τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν
ἀλλοτριωτέρᾳ οὖσαν τροφῇ κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς
φαύλης. "Ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ᾿ΑἈδεί-
Ε μαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφυε-
στάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως
κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἷει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα
καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ
ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίγνεσθαι,
* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 479 on Charm. 158 a. For
“goods” ef. ibid. p. 629 on Laws 697 8. The minor or
earlier dialogues constantly lead up to the point that goods
are no good divorced from wisdom, or the art to use them
rightly, or the political or royal art, or the art that will make
us happy. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71.
» This is for Plato’s purpose a sufficiently clear statement —
of the distinction between contradictory and contrary op-
position. Plato never drew out an Aristotelian or modern
logician’s table of the opposition of propositions. But it is
a misunderstanding of Greek idiom or of his style to say
that he never got clear on the matter. He always understood
32
μῆς, Ὡς. et
_? ea ee >
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
“all the so-called goods * corrupt and divert, beauty
_and wealth and strength of body and powerful family
‘connexions in the city and all things akin to them—
"you get my general meaning?” “I do,”’ he said, “ and
I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it.”
“Well,” said I, “grasp it rightly as a general proposition
and the matter will be clear and the preceding state-
‘ment will not seem to yousostrange.” “‘ Howdo you
bid me proceed?” he said. “γε know it to be univer-
sally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable
or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it
alls short of its proper perfection when deprived
of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For
evil ismore opposed tothe good than tothe not-good.?”
‘Of course.”” “‘Soitis, 1 take it, natural that the best
ature should fare worse° than the inferior under con-
ditions of nurture unsuited toit.” ‘‘Itis.” “‘ Then,”
said I, “ Adeimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that
the best endowed souls become worse than the others
under a bad education ? Or do you suppose that great
crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight
nature“ and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its
Cf. Symp. 202 a-z, and supra on 437 ν- 8, What Plato
te 595 on Soph, 257 xB, and ibid. p. 563 on Rep.
; ἢ ) B "
Ὁ “Corruptio optimi pessima.”’ - Cf. 495 ν-8, Xen. Mem.
. 2. 24, iv. 1. 3-4, Dante, Inferno, vi. 106:
ἢ Ed Pi ame: Ritorna a tua scienza
: e vuol, τ ea la cosa ἃ pit: perfetta,
‘ Pit senta il bene e cosi la doglienza.
Cf. Livy xxxviii. 17 “ generosius in sua quidquid sede gigni-
ir: insitum alienae terrae in id quo alitur, natura vertente
degenerat,”’ Pausanias vii. 17. 3.
Cf. 495; La Rochefoucauld, Maz. 130 “la faiblesse
le seul défaut qu’on ne saurait corriger’’ and 467 “la
blesse est plus opposée ἃ la vertu que le vice.”
VOL, II D 33
{
PLATO
ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν
αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι; Οὔκ, ἀλλά, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτως.
2 Ἣν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν, ἂν μέν,
οἶμαι, μαθήσεως προσηκούσης τύχῃ, εἰς πᾶσαν
ἀρετὴν ἀνάγκη αὐξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ
μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα
τρέφηται, εἰς πάντα τἀναντία αὖ, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῇ
βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχῃ. ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ
πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν
νέους, διαφθείροντας δέ τινας σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς,
ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα
Β λέγοντας μεγίστους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστάς, παιδεύειν
δὲ τελεώτατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἵους βούλονται
εἶναι καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ
a , / > a σ
γυναῖκας; Πότε δή; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Ὅταν, εἶπον,
, 3 ’ ¢ ΜΕΝ > ,
ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἀθρόοι οἱ πολλοὶ" εἰς ἐκκλησίας
ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τινα
» \ 7 uA ‘ ~ /
ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ
1 οἱ πολλοὶ Hermann: πολλοὶ Μ88., οἱ secl. Cobet.
«Ὁ, infra 497 Β, Tim. 42 "Ὁ. be
> This is the θεῖα μοῖρα of 493 a and Meno 99 5. Cf. What
Plato Said, p. 517. 2
¢ See What Plato Said, pp. 12 ff. and on Meno 93-94. Plato
again anticipates many of his modern critics. Cf, Grote’s
defence of the sophists passim, and Mill, Utility of Religion
(Three Essays on Religion, pp. 78, 84 ff.).
4 ἰδιωτικούς refers to individual sophists as opposed to the
great sophist of public opinion. Cf. 492 τ, 493 a, 494 a.
6 For καὶ ἄξιον λόγου ef. Huthydem. 279 c, Laches 192 a,
Laws 908 8, supra 445 c, Thucyd. ii. 54. 5, Aristot. Pol.
1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16,
Isoe. vi. 56.
t Cf. Gorg. 490 5, Emerson, Self-Reliance: “It is easy
. . . to brook the rage of the cultivated classes. . . .
But .. . when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the
34
a
aed
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause
of anything great, either for good or evil?’ “ No,”
he said, “that is the case.” ‘‘ Then the nature
_ which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives
_ the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to
consummate excellence, but, ifit be sown? and planted
and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome
will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to
_ the rescue.’ Or are you too one of the multitude who
believe that there are young men who are corrupted
y the sophists,° and that there are sophists in private
life who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning,’
and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this
_ strain who are the chief sophists and educate most
effectively and mould to their own heart’s desire
oung and old, men and women?” “ When?.”’ said
he. “ Why, when,” I said, “ the multitude are seated
together’ in assemblies or in court-rooms or theatres
or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd,
bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the
habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike asa
trifle of no concernment,” Carlyle, French volution:
“Great is the combined voice of men. ... He who can
resist that has his footing somewhere beyond time.”
For the public as the great sophist ef. Brimley, Essays,
. 224 (The Angel in the House): “The miserable view of
ife and its purposes which society instils into its youth of
both sexes, being still, as in Plato’s time, the sophist par
excellence of which all individual talking and writing sophists
are but feeble copies.”” Cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.‘ τι. 1. 601 “* Die
sophistische Ethik ist seiner Ansicht nach die einfache Kon-
Sequenz der Gewéhnlichen.’”’ This is denied by some recent
critics. The question is a logomachy. Of course there is
more than one sophistic ethics. Cf. Mill, Dissertations and
Discussions, iv. pp. 247 ff., 263 ff., 275.
For Plato’s attitude toward the sophists see also Polit.
303 ο, Phaedr. 260 c,*What Plato Said, pp. 14-15, 158.
35
PLATO
τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ
δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκάτερα, καὶ ἐκ-
Ο βοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δ᾽ αὐτοῖς al τε
πέτραι καὶ ὃ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν ἐπηχοῦντες
διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ
ἐπαίνου. ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον,
τίνα οἴει καρδίαν ἴσχειν; ἢ ποίαν ἂν αὐτῷ παι-
δείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν
ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου οἰχήσεσθαι
φερομένην κατὰ ῥοῦν, ἧ ἂν οὗτος φέρῃ, καὶ
φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι,
D καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσειν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσεσθαι
τοιοῦτον; IloAAy, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνάγκη.
VII. Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὔπω τὴν μεγίστην
ἀνάγκην εἰρήκαμεν. Ilolav; ἔφη. “Hv ἔργῳ προσ-
τιθέασι, λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες, οὗτοι of παιδευταί —
τε καὶ σοφισταί. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸν μὴ πειθό-
μενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις
κολάζουσιν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα. Τίνα οὖν
ἄλλον σοφιστὴν οἴει ἢ ποίους ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους
E ἐναντία τούτοις τείνοντας κρατήσειν; Οἶμαι μὲν
οὐδένα, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐ γάρ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ
ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἄνοια. οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε
γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται [ἄλλο ἢ] ἀλλοῖον
ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν
1 ἄλλο ἢ was added by Hermann, unnecessarily.
2 Cf. Eurip. Orest. 901, they shouted ὡς καλῶς λέγοι,
also Huthydem. 303 8 οἱ κίονες, 276 B and Ὁ, Shorey on
Horace, Odes i. 20.7 ‘‘datus in theatro cum tibi plausus,” and
also the account of the moulding process in Protag. 323-326.
» What would be his plight, his state of mind; how would
he feel? Cf. Shorey in Class. Phil. y. (1910) pp. 220-221,
Iliad xxiv. 367, Theognis 748 καὶ τίνα θυμὸν ἔχων; Symp.
36
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
and with loud uproar censure some of the things that
are said and done and approve others, both in excess,
_ with full-throated clamour and clapping of hands,
and thereto the rocks and the region round about
re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the
praise.* In such case how do you think the young
man’s heart, as the saying is, is moved within him??
What private teaching do you think will hold out and
not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and
applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will
affirm ° the same things that they do to be honourable
and base, and will do as they do, and be even
such asthey?” “That is quite inevitable, Socrates,”
he said.
VII. “ And, moreover,” I said, “‘ we have not yet
mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion.”
“Whatisit?” saidhe. “That which these ‘educators’
and sophists impose by action when their words fail to
convince. Don’t you know that they chastise the
recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and
death?” “They most emphatically do,” he said.
“ What other sophist, then, or what private teaching
do you think will prevail in opposition to these?”
“None, I fancy,” said he. ‘‘ No,” said I, “the very
attempt? is the height of folly. For there is not,never
has been and never will be, a divergent type of char-
acter and virtue created by an education running
219 D3 τίνα οἴεσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν ; Eurip. ILA. 1173 τίν᾽
ἐν δόμοις με καρδίαν ἕξειν δοκεῖς ;
“ Adam translates as if it were καὶ φήσει. Cf. my “‘ Platon-
ism and the History of Science,” Amer. Philos. Soc. Proc.
Ixvi. p. 174 n. See Stallbaum ad loc.
. * Cf. Protag. 317 a-s, Soph. 239 c, Laws 818 νυ.
* Cf. Od. xvi. 437. See Friedlander, Platon, ii. 386 n.
who says ἀλλοῖον γίγνεσθαι can only = ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, “* be made
different.”
37
3
Ι
᾿;
|
|
PLATO ἘΠῚ ΜΗῚ
πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε: θεῖον μέντοι
κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου: εὖ γὰρ
χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅ τί περ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον
498 δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν
Ὁ 4 ~ ij > cat DF is, 292 2)~O¥
αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων od κακῶς ἐρεῖς. Οὐδ᾽ ἐμοὶ
ΝΜ ” col ” : , ΩΝ 3 7
ἄλλως, ἔφη, δοκεῖ. "Ere τοίνυν σοι, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω. Τὸ ποῖον; “Exa-
“- - 5 \
στος τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, ods δὴ οὗτοι
A a \
σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι Kal ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ
ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα,
“a / μὴ ε ~ \ / ,
ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἁθροισθῶσι, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην
καλεῖν: οἵόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ
ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργάς τις καὶ ἐπιθυμίας
κατεμάνθανεν, ὅπῃ τε προσελθεῖν χρὴ καὶ ὅπῃ
ἅψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁπότε χαλεπώτατον ἢ πραό-
τατον καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ᾽
e ε 4 ” 0 θ ’ θ ‘ a 8» ἢ
οἷς ἑκάστας εἴωθε φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἵας ad ἄλλου
φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦταί τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει, κατα-
“- * / eee Be
μαθὼν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα Evvovaia τε καὶ χρόνου
τριβῇ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὡς τέχνην συστησά-
« Of. 529 c for the idiom, and Laws 696 a οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε
γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων
πρὸς ἀρετήν. ' Ἶ
» Cf. Symp. 176 c (of Socrates), Phaedr. 242 5, Theaet.
162 D-£.
¢ Cf. supra on 492 a, Apol. 838 ο, Phaedo 58 x, Protag.
328 5, Meno 99 κε, Phaedr. 244 c, Laws 642 c, 875 0, Jon 534.
4 Cf. Arnold, Preface to Essays in Criticism; Phaedo
60 pv, Laws 817 3, On Virtue 376 Ὁ.
4 Cf. Epist. v. 321 Ὁ ἔστιν γὰρ δή τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν,
ἑκάστης καθάπερεί τινων ζῴων, “each form of government has
a sort of voice, as if it were a kind of animal”’ (tr. L.A. Post),
Hackforth says this is a clumsy imitation of the Republic
which proves the letter spurious. Cf. Thomas Browne,
Religio Medici, ii. 1 “ If there be any among those common
38
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
counter to theirs*—humanly speaking, I mean, my
friend; for the divine, asthe proverbsays, allrules fail.”
And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and
turns out Sell in the present condition of society and
government, in saying that the providence of God ¢
preservesit you willnot be speakingill.” “‘Neitherdo
ithink otherwise,” he said. “‘ Then,” said I, “think ,
this also in addition.” “‘What?” “Each ofthese |
privateteachers who work forpay, whomthe politicians _
call sophists and regard as their rivals,* inculeates |
nothing else than these opinions of the multitude
__ which they opine when they are assembled and calls |
_ this knowledge wisdom. Itis asifaman were acquir- |
ing the knowledge of the humours and desires of a|
great strong beast ¢ which he had in his keeping, how |
_ itis to be approached and touched, and when and by |
_ what things it is made most savage or gentle} yes,
and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the’
occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by an-
other make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this
knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse >
"
᾿
᾿
᾿
of time should call it wisdom, and should construct |
_ objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great
enemy of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude .. . one
great beast and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra,”
Horace, Ppist. i. 1. 76 ‘* belua multorum es capitum.” Also
Hamilten’s “Sir, your people is a great beast,’’ Sidney,
4ircadia, bk. ii. ** Many-headed multitude,’’ Wallas, Human
Nature in Politics, p. 172 ‘*. . . like Plato’s sophist is learn-
ing what the public is and is beginning to understand ‘the
ions and desires’ of that ‘huge and powerful brute,’”
es. Coriolanus iv. i. 2 “‘The beast with many heads
Butts me away,” ibid. τε. iii. 18 “ΤῊΣ many-headed multi-
tude.”’ For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 B-c ff., Phaedr. 260 c
δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκώς, “‘ having studied the opinions
of the multitude,”’ Isoc. ii. 49-50.
39
PLATO
μενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς TH
ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν,
“ 4« cia ΚΣ LG ἘΛ τὰ \ om ἌΣ: a gs
ὅ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον
ΠΟΥ 3 ’ὔ \ 4 “- of πλάσας “
Οἢ ἄδικον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ
μεγάλου ζῴου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὰ
καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι
, ‘ > ~ > A > -“ , “a
λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ
A , \ A a > ,ὕ ψ ΠΡ “- ΄,
καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν,
ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη μήτε
ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι. τοιοῦτος δὴ ὧν πρὸς Διὸς
οὐκ ἄτοπος av σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι παιδευτής; “Epovy’,
ἔφη. Ἢ οὖν τι τούτου δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὃ τὴν τῶν
Ὁ πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ξυνιόντων ὀργὴν καὶ
ε ‘ / , ε 7 ΠΑΝῚ
ἡδονὰς κατανενοηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτ᾽ ἐν
- ας τὰ] ~ ” \ > a Ὁ
γραφικῇ εἴτ᾽ ἐν μουσικῇ εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ; | ὅτι
μὲν γάρ, ἐάν τις τούτοις ὁμιλῇ ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἢ
ποίησιν ἤ τινα ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἢ πόλει δια-
κονίαν, κυρίους αὑτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς πέρα
τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἡ Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἀνάγκη
ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὗτοι ἐπαινῶσιν: ὡς δὲ
καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἤδη
« Of. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 353, n. 1, ibid. xxiii. (1928)
Ῥ. 361 (Tim. 75 Ὁ), What Plato Said, p. 616 on Tim. 47 Ἐ,
Aristot. Eth. 1120 b 1 οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, Emer-
son, Circles, “ Accept the actual for the necessary,” Eurip.
1.4. 724 καλῶς ἀναγκαίως re. Mill iv. 299 and Grote iv. 221
miss the meaning. Cf. supra Bk. I. on 347 c, Newman,
Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 113-114, Iamblichus, Protrept. Teubner
148 Κ. ἀγνοοῦντος. . . ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ
ἀναγκαῖα, ‘not knowing how divergent have always been the
good and the necessary.”
40
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of
it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these
opinions and desires is honourable or base, good or evil,
just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the
judgements of the great beast, calling the things that
pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad,
having no other account to render of them, but should
call what is necessary just and honourable,* never
having observed how great is the real difference
between the necessary and the good, and being in-
capable of explaining it to another. Do you not
think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange
educator?” “1 do,” he said. “ Do you suppose
that there is any difference between such a one and
the man who thinks that it is wisdom to have learned
to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley
multitude in their assembly, whether about painting
or music or, for that matter, politics >| For if a man
associates with these and offers and exhibits to them
his poetry ὃ or any other product of his craft or any
political service,° and grants the mob authority over
himself more than is unavoidable,’ the ‘proverbial
necessity of Diomede* will compel him to give the
public what it likes, but that what it likes is really
good and honourable, have you ever heard an
> Cf. Laws 659 5, 701 a, Gorg. 502 B.
© Cf. 371 c, Gorg. 517 8, 518 B.
@ Plato likes to qualify sweeping statements and allow
something to necessity and the weakness of human nature.
Of. Phaedo 64 καθ᾽ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, infra 558 D-E,
500 Ὁ, 383 c.
¢ The scholiast derives this expression from Diomedes’
binding Odysseus and driving him back to camp after the
latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on Aristoph.
Heel. 1029 gives a more ingenious explanation. See Frazer,
Pausanias, ii. p. 264. :
41
PLATO
, / ” 2 +a. /, >
πώποτέ Tov ἤκουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ
Ἑ καταγέλαστον; Οἶἷμαι δέ γε, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐδ᾽
ἀκούσομαι.
VIII. Ταῦτα τοίνυν πάντα ἐννοήσας ἐκεῖνο
3 vai
ἀναμνήσθητι: αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ
καλά, ἢ αὐτό τι ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα,
» ΄-
ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως πλῆθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι;
ὝἭἭ / > ” Φ λό A ΝΜ 8° > ,
κιστά γ᾽, ἔφη. Φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
494 πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι. ᾿Αδύνατον. Kai τοὺς
φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη ψέγεσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν.
᾿Ανάγκη. Καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι
προσομιλοῦντες ὄχλῳ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.
Δῆλον. Ἔκ δὴ τούτων τίνα ὁρᾷς σωτηρίαν
φιλοσόφῳ φύσει, ὥστ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι μεί-
νασαν πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν; ἐννόει δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἔμ-
Β προσθεν. ὡμολόγηται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν εὐμάθεια καὶ
μνήμη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια ταύτης εἶναι
τῆς φύσεως. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐν παισὶν ὃ
τοιοῦτος πρῶτος ἔσται ἐν ἅπασιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ
>A ‘ ~ a” A “- = , > >
ἐὰν τὸ σῶμα φυῇ προσφερὴς τῇ ψυχῇ; Τί δ᾽ οὐ
7 » ΄ , ἜΞΩ: a
μέλλει; ἔφη. Βουλήσονται δή, οἶμαι, αὐτῷ χρῆ-
α καταγέλαστον is a strong word. | ‘‘ Make the very jack-
asses laugh’? would give the tone. Cf. Carlyle, Past and
Present, iv. ‘Impartial persons have to say with a sigh
that . . . they have ene no argument adyanced for it but
such as might make the angels and almost the very jack-
asses weep.”
Cf. also Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Phil. 84, 101, Antid. 247,
Peace 36, and καταγέλαστος in Plato passim, e.g. Symp. 189 Β.
* A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists.
Cf. 503 8, Polit. 292 ©, 297 B, 300 Ἑ.
Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 87, uses this to support his
view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes Gorg.
474. A τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ὀὐδὲ διαλέγομαι, which is not quite
42
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
attempted proof of this that isnot simply ridiculous?”
“No,” he said, ‘‘ and I fancy I never shall hear it
either.”
VIII. “ Bearing all this in mind, recall our former
question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or
believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as
opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or
can they believe in anything conceived in its essence
as opposed to the many particulars?’ “ Not in the
least,” he said. “‘ Philosophy, then, the love of
wisdom, is impossible for the multitude.” τς 2
sible.” “Τὸ is inevitable,* then, that those who
philosophize should be censured by them.” “ In-
evitable.” ‘‘ And so likewise by those laymen who,
associating with the mob, desire to curry favour ¢ with
it.” “Obyiously.”” ‘““ From this point of view do
you see any salvation that will suffer the born philo-
sopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the
end? Consider it in the light of what we said before.
We agreed* that quickness in learning, memory,
courage and magnificence were the traits of this
nature.”’ “Yes.” ‘Then even asa boy‘ among boys
such a one will take the lead in all things, especially
if the nature of his body matches the soul.” ‘‘ How
could he fail to do so?” he said. “ His kinsmen and
relevant. Cf. Renan, Piudes d’histoire relig. p. 403 “La
-philosophie sera toujours le fait d’une imperceptible
sninorité,”’ etc.
© It is psychologically necessary. Cf. supra, Vol. I. on
473 x. Cf. 527 a, Laws 655 ©, 658 -π, 681 c, 687 ο, Phaedr.
239 c, 271 B, Crito 49 pb.
4 Cf. Gorg. 481 £, 510 νυ, 513 8.
¢ In 487 a.
7 Cf. 386 4. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of /
Alcibiades. Alc. J. 103 a ff. imitates the passage. Cf. Xen. ὁ
Mem. i. 2. 24.
43
=>.
PLATO
θ > δὰ , / > 4 Ἁ | $e)
σθαι, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν
πράγματα οἵ τε οἰκεῖοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται. Πῶς δ᾽
οὔ; Ὑποκείσονται ἄρα δεόμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες,
προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν
“- a ~ 3.07
μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Dire? γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω
, Φ 4 ΝΜ > > ’ ‘ ~
γίγνεσθαι. Τί οὖν οἴει, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸν τοιοῦτον
ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιήσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τύχῃ
\
μεγάλης πόλεως ὧν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλούσιός τε καὶ
-“ >
γενναῖος, καὶ ἔτι εὐειδὴς καὶ μέγας; ἄρ᾽ ov
> / > « , ma.
πληρωθήσεσθαι ἀμηχάνου ἐλπίδος, ἡγούμενον καὶ
\ a ε 7 \ ‘ “- / Ὁ \
τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἱκανον
ἔσεσθαι πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν
΄ “ cd
αὑτόν, σχηματισμοῦ Kal φρονήματος κενοῦ ἄνευ
a ~ 4
vod ἐμπιπλάμενον; Kai μάλ᾽, ἔφη. Τῷ δὴ οὕτω
διατιθεμένῳ ἐάν τις ἠρέμα προσελθὼν τἀληθῆ
“a ~ a ‘ A
λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ, δεῖται δέ, τὸ δὲ
“-“ ~ >
od κτητὸν μὴ δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, dp
εὐπετὲς οἴει εἶναι εἰσακοῦσαι διὰ τοσούτων κακῶν;
Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. "Edy δ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τῶν λόγων
se > / / / ‘ / 1, @&
εἷς αἰσθάνηταί τέ πῃ Kal κάμπτηται Kal ἕλκηται
\ , oe γ 3, ; \
πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, Ti οἰόμεθα δράσειν ἐκείνους τοὺς
ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν χρείαν τε καὶ
@ For ὑποκείσονται ef. Gorg. 510 c, infra 576 a ὑποπεσόντες,
Eurip. Orest. 670 ὑποτρέχειν, Theaet. 173 a ὑπελθεῖν.
> ἐδ. endeavouring to secure the advantage of it for them-
selves by winning his favour when he is still young and
impressionable.
¢ Cf. Ale. 1. 104 5-ο ff.
4 Cf. Ale. I. 105 B-c.
4 ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν, etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation.
44.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make
use of him when he is older for their own affairs.”
“Of course.” “Then they will fawn upon? him
with petitions and honours, anticipating > and flatter-
ing the power that will be his.” “ That certainly
is the usual way.” “‘ How, then, do you think such
a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if
it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich
and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and
tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded
ambitious hopes,* and will he not think himself eap-
able of managing the affairs of both Greeks and
barbarians,? and thereupon exalt himself, haughty
of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void
of sense*?” ‘‘He surely will,” he said. “And if
to a man in this state of mind’ someone gently?
comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has
no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way
to get it is to work like aslave” to winit, do you think
it will be easy for him to lend an ear‘ to the quiet
voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil sur-
roundings’?”’ “Far from it,” said he. ** And even
supposing,” said I, “‘ that owing to a fortunate dis-
position and his affinity for the words of admonition
one such youth apprehends something and is moved
and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose
will be the conduct of those who think that they are
7 Or perhaps “subject to these influences.” Adam says
it is while he is sinking into this condition.
9 Cf. supra Vol. I. on 476 ©. Cf. 533 νυ, Protag. 333 Ἐ,
Phaedo 83 a, Crat. 413 a, Theaet. 154 ©.
* Cf. Phaedo 66 νυ, Symp. 184 c, Euthydem. 282 8.
ε Epin. 990 a, Epist. vii. 330 a-s.
7 oF "Ὁ. 135%.
PLATO
ε ΄ > ~ A ” = > » ’
ἑταιρείαν; οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον, πᾶν δ᾽ ἔπος λέ-
γοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας καὶ περὶ αὐτόν, ὅπως
ἂν μὴ πεισθῇ, καὶ περὶ τὸν πείθοντα, ὅ ὅπως ἂν μὴ
οἷός τ᾽ 7, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ εἰς
495 ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας; Πολλή, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἀνάγκη.
Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλοσοφήσει; ; Οὐ
πάνυ. ν᾿ ἶ
ΙΧ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ κακῶς ἐλέ-
ε ” \ : ak.’ \ “ / ,
γομεν Ws ἄρα Kat αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως
μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται, αἴτια τρόπον
τινὰ τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ τὰ
λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, πλοῦτοί τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη
παρασκευή; Οὐ γάρ, ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ἐλέχθη.
Οὗτος δή, εἶπον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὄλεθρός τε καὶ
\ , \ , a } ,
Β διαφθορὰ τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς βελτίστης
φύσεως εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὀλίγης καὶ
ἄλλως γιγνομένης, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν. καὶ ἐκ τού-
των δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργα-
ζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, καὶ
ot τἀγαθά, ot ἂν ταύτῃ τύχωσι ῥυέντες: σμικρὰ
δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην
οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὗτοι
Ο μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐκπίπτοντες, οἷς μάλιστα προσήκει,
a ‘ > a / , 3 7
ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῇ φιλοσοφίαν λείποντες αὐτοί τε
βίον οὐ προσήκοντα οὐδ᾽ ἀληθῆ ζῶσι, τὴν δὲ
@ For πᾶν ἔβγον cf. Sophocles, Zl. 615,
> Cf. 51a.
46
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word
or deed that they will stick at? to keep him from being
persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts
it,? both by private intrigue and public prosecution
in the court?” ‘“‘ That is inevitable,” he said.
“Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to
philosophize?” ‘‘ None at all,” he said.
IX. “Do you see, then,” said I, “ that we were not
wronginsaying thatthe very qualitiesthatmakeupthe
philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the en-
vironment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause
of its backsliding,’ and so do the so-called goods—4
riches and all such instrumentalities®?” ‘“‘No,”
he replied, “it was rightly said.” “‘ Such, my good
friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is
the destruction and corruption“ of the most excellent
nature, which is rare enough in any case,’ as we affirm.
And it is from men of this type that those spring who
do the greatest harm to communities and individuals,
and the greatest good when the stream chances to
be turned into that channel,” but a small nature‘ never
does anything great to a man or a city.” ““ Most
true,’ saidhe. “ Those, then, to whom she properly
belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy
forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and
alien life, while other unworthy wooers/ rush in and
4 For ἐκπεσεῖν cf. 496 c.
4 Cf. supra on 491 c, p. 32, note a.
* Cf. Lysis 220 a; Arnold’s “ machinery,’’ Aristotle's
χορηγία.
_ 1? Cf. 491 2-2, Laws 951 B ἀδιάφθαρτος, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 94.
| @ For καὶ ἄλλως ef. IL. ix. 699.
k Cf. on 485 D ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα.
‘ φ; on 491 £, p. 33, note d.
3 Cf.on 489 p, and Theaet. 173 ¢.
47
PLATO
ὥσπερ ὀρφανὴν ξυγγενῶν ἄλλοι ἐπεισελθόντες
ἀνάξιοι ἤσχυνάν τε καὶ ὀνείδη περιῆψαν, οἷα καὶ
σὺ φὴς ὀνειδίζειν τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας, ὡς οἱ ξυνόντες
αὐτῇ οἱ μὲν οὐδενός, ot δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν
» 7 Ὺ \ \ > » , 4 ie) i
ἀξιοί εἰσιν. Kat yap οὖν, ἔφη, τά ye λεγόμενα
ταῦτα. Εἰκότως γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λεγόμενα. καθ-
ορῶντες γὰρ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωπίσκοι κενὴν τὴν χώραν
ταύτην γιγνομένην, καλῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ προ-
~ a >
σχημάτων μεστήν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἱργμῶν εἰς
>
τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες! ἅσμενοι καὶ οὗτοι ἐκ
- - 2 ~ > sy Xr , « a
τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπηδῶσιν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ot av
κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι περὶ τὸ αὑτῶν τεχ-
viov. ὅμως γὰρ δὴ πρός ye τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας
,ὔ σ΄ ͵ὔ / ‘ se?
Kaimep οὕτω πραττούσης φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀξίωμα
/ \ > ,
μεγαλοπρεπέστερον λείπεται: οὗ δὴ ἐφιέμενοι
πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν
\ ~ 7 \ / 4
τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται,
οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀπο-
τεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν. ἢ οὐκ
ἀνάγκη; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Δοκεῖς οὖν τι, ἣν δ᾽
* Cf. Taine, ἃ Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865: ‘* Comme
Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa spécialité et c’est chez des
spécialistes comme ceux-la que la malheureuse philosophie
livrée aux mains gantées et parfumées d’eau bénite va
trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des enfants.”
Cf. Epictet. iii. 21.21. The passage is imitated by Lucian
3. 2. 287, 294, 298.
For the shame that has befallen philosophy ef. Buthydem.
304 ff., Epist. vii. 328 πὶ Isoc. Busiris 48, Plutarch 1091 τ,
Boethius, Cons. i. 3. There is no probability that this is
aimed at Isocrates, who certainly had not deserted the
mechanical arts for what he called philosophy. Rohde,
Kleine Schriften, i. 319, thinks Antisthenes is meant. But
48
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
defile heras an orphan, bereft of her Κίη and attach
to her such reproaches|as you say her revilers taunt
her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of
no account and the many accountable for many
evils.”’\_‘* Why, yes,” he replied, “ that is what they
do say.” “And plausibly,” said I; “for other
mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied
and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men
escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so
these gentlemen joyously bound away from the
mechanical arts ὃ to philosophy, those that are most
eunning in their little craft. For in comparison with
the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her
present low estate retains a superior dignity ; and this
is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of
pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed
and mutilated ὦ by their vulgar occupations *-even as
their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is
not that inevitable ?’’ ‘Quite so,” he said. “‘Is
Plato as usual is generalizing. See What Plato Said, p. 593
on Soph. 242 c.
ὃ Cf. the different use of the idea in Protag. 318 5.
5 rexvlov is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common
in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also ἀνθρωπίσκοι
in c, and ψυχάριον in 519 a.
ὦ Cf. infra 611 c-p, Theaet. 173 a-8.
4 For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompat-
ible with philosophy ef. infra 522 5 and 590 ο, Laws 919 ς ff.,
and What Plato Said, p. 663 on Rivals 137 8. Cf. Richard
of Bury, Philobiblon, Prologue, “ Fitted for the liberal arts,
and equally disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but
destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it wens ὧν a
sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts.’’ ΟἿ also Xen. Mem.
iv. 2.3, and Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 25 f. ‘“‘ How can he get
wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad
«+» and whose talk is of bullocks? . . . so every carpenter
and workmaster . . . the smith . . . the potter. . .”
VOL, II E 49
PLATO
| ἐγώ, διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν ἀργύριον κτησαμένου
χαλκέως φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ, νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ
δεσμῶν λελυμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου,
᾿ νεουργὸν ἱμάτιον ἔχοντος, ὡς νυμφίου παρ σκευα-
σμένου, διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ δεσπότου
496 τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη,
διαφέρει. Ποῖ ἄττα οὖν εἰκὸς γεννᾶν τοὺς τοιού-
τους; οὐ νόθα καὶ φαῦλα; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ti
dai; τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως, ὅταν ᾿ αὐτῇ πλησιά-
ζοντες ὁμιλῶσι μὴ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, ποῖ ἄττα φῶμεν
γεννᾶν διανοήματά, τε καὶ δόξας; dp’. οὐχ ὡς
ἀληθῶς. προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα, καὶ οὐ-
δὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς" ἐχόμοηονη
Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
Χ. Πάνσμικρον. δή τι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ᾿Αδείμαντε,
Β λείπεται τῶν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν ὁμιλούντων φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἤ
που ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθὲν γενναῖον καὶ εὖ eb pags
μένον. ἦθος, ἀπορίᾳ τῶν ᾿διαφθερούντων κατὰ
φύσιν μεῖναν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ, ἣ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν
μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῇ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως
ὑπερίδῃ" βραχὺ € πού τι καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλης ς τέχνης
ικαίως ἀτιμάσαν εὐφυὲς ἐ ἐπ᾽ “αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι. εἴη
δ᾽ ἂν καὶ 6 τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἑταίρου Θεάγους χαλινὸς
1 ἄξιον secl. Ast: ἄξιον ἀληθινῆς ΑΜ, ἄξιον ὡς ἀληθινῆς dD,
ἀληθινῆς ὡς ἄξιον F: ἀξίως conj. Campbell.
* For a similar short vivid description ef. Hrastae 134 B,
Buthyphro 2 8. Such are common in Plautus, e.g. Mer-
cator 639.
ὃ It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the
half-Thracian Antisthenes. Cf, also Theaet. 150 c, and Symp.
212 A.
© Cf. Euthydem. 306 Ὁ.
@ Cf. Phaedrus 250 a ὀλίγαι δὴ λείπονται, and supra 494 A
and on 490 εκ.
50
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
not the picture which they present,” I said, “ pre-
‘cisely that of a little bald-headed tinker ® who has
made money and just been freed from bonds and
d a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got
timself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry
his master’s daughter who has fallen into poverty and
; n moment?” “There is no difference at all,” he
aid. “‘ Of what sort will probably be the offspring of
‘such parents? Will they not be bastard ὃ and base?” |
“Inevitably.” “ And so when men unfit for cul-
cute, can philosophy and consort with her un-
γ, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we
say they t? Will they not produce what may
|
|
;
|
/
in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing _
that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence “δ᾽
_“ Quite so,” he said.
ΠΧ, “There is a very small remnant,? then, Adei-
mantus,”’ I said, “οὗ those who consort worthily with
ilosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it
may be, held in check* by exile,/ and so in the absence
of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its
quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born
in a little town scorns’ and disregards its parochial
affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural
affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they
justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion
Theages” also might operate as a restraint. Forin the
bo Peston “overtaken.” Cf. Goodwin on Dem. De cor,
ae It is ible but unnecessary to conjecture that Plato
may be thinking of Anaxagoras or Xenophon or himself
or Dion. σ Cf. Theaet. 173 8, infra 540 pv,
on τς ρα hes, become PROPER: Cf. Bie De my
tuenda ε ar. wt. IV. ᾿ or Cj.
also Apol. 385. and the spurious dialogue bearing peetas
51
C
ϊ
ὶ
:
——— :
PLATO
οἷος κατασχεῖν: καὶ yap Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα
παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἡ δὲ,
τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν
πολιτικῶν κατέχει. τὸ δ᾽ ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον
λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον" ἢ γάρ πού τινι ἄλλῳ
ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε. καὶ τούτων δὴ
τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ
καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὖ ἱκανῶς
ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὡς
ἔπος εἰπεῖν περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττει, οὐδ᾽ ἔστι
ξύμμαχος, μεθ᾽ ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν δικαίων
βοήθειαν σώζοιτ᾽ ἄν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄν-
θρωπος ἐμπεσών, οὔτε ξυναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε,
ἱκανὸς ὧν εἷς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρίν τι τὴν
« The enormous fanciful literature on the daimonion does
not concern the interpretation of Plato, who consistently
treats it as a kind of spiritual tact checking Socrates from
any act opposed to his true moral and intellectual interests,
Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 456-457, on Buthyphro 3 8, Jowett
and Campbell, p. 285. Pee OP
ὃ For rovrwy , . . γενόμενοι of. Aristoph. Clouds 107 τούτων
γενοῦ μοι. ‘ ὌΝ
© The irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is
the starting-point of Plato’s political ot social specula-
tions. Cf. infra 497 Β, Laws 832 c f., Epist. vii. 326 a;
Byron, apud Arnold, Essays in Crit. ii. p. 195. “I haye
simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all existing
governments.”
This passage, Apol, 31 x ff. and Gorg. 521-522 may be con-
sidered Plato’s apology for not engaging in polities. Cf,
J. V. Novak, Platon u. ἃ. Rhetorik, p. 495 (Schleiermacher,
Einl. z. Gorg. pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 441-442
“* Wer kann hier die Klage iiber das eigene Los tiberhéren?”
There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has
maintained, the Republic itself was intended as a programme
of practical politics for Athens, and that its failure to win
popular opinion is the chief cause of the disappointed tone
52
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
ease of Theages all other conditions were at hand
for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly
abit of body keeping him out of politics holds him
ek. My own case, the divine sign,” is hardly
orth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to
w or none before me. And those who have been
of this little company ὃ and have tasted the sweetness
and blessedness of this possession and who have also
come to understand the madness of the multitude
sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I
may say so, sound or right in any present polities,° and
that there is no ally with whose aid the champion
of justice? could escape destruction, |but that he
would be as.aman who has fallen among wild beasts,”
unwilling to share their misdeeds’ and unable to hold
out singly against the savagery of all, and that he
would thus, before he could in any way benefit his
of Plato’s later writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger’s Neue
Phil. Untersuchungen, Heft 6, Platos Apologie, pp. 31-33,
who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the
‘Apology before the Gorgias and that the same doctrine in
the seventh Epistle absolutely proves that the Apology is
Rie ae Theact 73 c ff, Hipp. Maj. 281 c, Euth
¥ . 173 c Εἰ, Hipp. Maj. 281 c, But
306 8, Xen. Mem. i. 6. 15. ΤΕ ir
# Cf. supra 368 5, Apol. 32 £ εἰ. . . ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις
and 32 ἃ μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου.
6 Cf. Pindar, Ol. i. 64. For the antithetic tuxtaposition
ef. also cis πᾶσιν below; see too 5208, 374.4, Menex. 241 5,
-haedr. 243 c, Laws 906 pv, etc.
- More in the Utopia (Morley, Ideal Commonwealths, p. 84)
phrases loosely from memory what he calls “ no ill simile
y which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philo-
sopher’s meddling with government.”
ΟΠ Cf. Democrates fr. 38, Diels 11.3 p. 73 καλὸν μὲν τὸν
ἀδικέοντα κωλύειν" εἰ δὲ μή, wh ξυναδικεῖν, “τὲ is well to prevent
i from doing wrong, or else not to join in wrong-
53
|
PLATO
πόλιν ἢ φίλους. ὀνῆσαι προαπολόμενος. “ἀνωφελὴς
αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἃ ἂν γένοιτο---ταῦτα πάντα
λογισμῷ λαβὼν ἡ ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράτ-
τῶν, οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ
πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς, ὁρῶν
τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας ἀγαπᾷ, εἴ
: Ἕ πῃ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων
τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν
αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἵλεώς τε καὶ εὐμενὴς
ἀπαλλάξεται. ᾿Αλλά τοι, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα
497 ἂν διαπραξάμενος ἀπαλλάττοιτο. Οὐδέ γε, εἶπον,
ἐν
τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ τυχὼν πολιτείας προσηκούσης" ἐν
γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται. καὶ
μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει
ΧΙ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὧν ἕνεκα τ κε
βολὴν εἴληφε καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ
1 μετρίως εἰρῆσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔτ᾽ ἄλλο “λέγεις τι σύ.
1 AW οὐδέν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἔτι "λέγω. περὶ τούτου: ἀλλὰ
τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῇ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολι-
Β τειῶν; Οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ
α Maximus of Tyre 21, 20 comments, *‘ Show me a safe
wall.”’ See Stallbaum ad loc. for references to this { Pane
in later antiquity. Cf. Heracleit. fr. 44, Diels* i. 67,
Stenzel, Platon der Hrzieher, p. 114, Bryce, Studies in
History and Jurisprudence, p. 33, Renan, Souvenirs, xviii.,
P. E. More, Shelburne Essays, iii. pp. 280-281. Cf, also
Epist. vii. 331 p, Eurip. Jon 598-601.
» Cf. supra Vol. I. on 331 a, imfra 621 c-», Mare,
Aurel. xii, 36 and vi. 30 in fine. See my article ““ Hope” in
Hastings’s Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
2 Ch Aristot. Bth. Nic. 1094 b9 μεῖζόν δε καὶ τελεώτερον
τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν, “yet the good of
54
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
friends or the state come to an untimely end without
doing any good to himself or others,—for all these
reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds
his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under
shelter of a wall? in astorm and blast of dust and sleet
and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content
if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity
and unholy deeds through this life and take his
departure with fair hope, serene and well content
when the end comes.” “ Well,” he said, “ that is no
very slight thing to have achieved before taking his
departure.” “He would not have accomplished any
very great thing either,°”’ I replied, “if it were not his
fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In
_ such a state only will he himself rather attain his full
stature? and together with his own preserve the
common weal.
_ XI. “ Thecauses and the injustice of the calumnia-
tion of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth,
unless you have something to add.*”’ ‘‘ No,” he said,
“I haye nothing further to offer on that point. But
which of our present governments do you think is
suitable for philosophy?’ {‘ None whatever,” I
said; ‘‘ but the very ground of my complaint is that no
the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to
attain and to secure” (tr. Ἐς H. Peters).
4 For αὐξήσεται ef. Theaet. 163 c ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ, and
Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 68 “‘ As the Christian is said to
be complete in Christ so the individual is said by Aristotle
to be complete in the πόλις,᾽᾽ Spencer, Data of Ethics, xy.
“Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man
as existing in the ideal social state.” Of. also infra 592 a-B,
520 a-c and Introd. Vol. I. p. xxvii.
* An instance of Socrates’ Attic courtesy. Cf. 430 5,
Cratyl. 427 p, Theaet. 183 c, Gorg. 518 c, Phaedr. 235. a.
But in Gorg. 462 c it is ironical and perhaps in Hipp.
Maj. 291 a.
55
'
PLATO
ἐπαιτιῶμαι, μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατά-
στασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως: διὸ καὶ στρέ-
, Α 3 ~ > ΄ σ ‘
φεσθαί τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι αὐτήν, ὥσπερ ξενικὸν
σπέρμα ἐν γῇ ἄλλῃ σπειρόμενον ἐξίτηλον εἰς τὸ
ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἰέναν, οὕτω καὶ
τοῦτο τὸ γένος νῦν μὲν οὐκ ἴσχειν τὴν αὑτοῦ
δύναμιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀλλότριον ἦθος ἐκπίπτειν. εἰ δὲ
Ο λήψεται τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ
a
’ > / ᾽ὔ Ψ “-“- A ΄-
ἄριστόν ἐστι, τότε δηλώσει, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὄντι
θεῖον ἦν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀνθρώπινα, τά τε τῶν φύσεων
καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. δῆλος δὴ οὖν εἶ ὅτι μετὰ
τοῦτο ἐρήσει τίς αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία. Οὐκ ἔγνως,
” > i) a » The ὑοῦ Ole ee ae one
ἔφη" οὐ yap τοῦτο ἔμελλον, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ αὕτη, ἣν ἡμεῖς
διεληλύθαμεν οἰκίζοντες τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἄλλη. Τὰ
A »” \ i 7 4 an A 9. Ὁ ’
μὲν ἄλλα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, αὕτη: τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐρρήθη
μὲν καὶ τότε, ὅτι δεήσοι τι ἀεὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει
D λόγον ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ καὶ
σὺ 6 νομοθέτης ἔχων τοὺς νόμους ἐτίθεις. ᾿Ἐρ-
ρήθη γάρ, ἔφη. \’AAN’ οὐχ ἱκανῶς, εἶπον, ἐδηλώθη,
φόβῳ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε
μακρὰν καὶ χαλεπὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν: ἐπεὶ καὶ
τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ πάντως" ῥᾷστον διελθεῖν. Τὸ ποῖον;
Τίνα τρόπον μεταχειριζομένη πόλις φιλοσοφίαν οὐ
διολεῖται. τὰ γὰρ δὴ μεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῆ, καὶ
1 πάντως AFDM: πάντων conj. Bekker.
* κατάστασις = constitution in both senses, Cf. 414 a, 495 υ,
464 a, 493 a, 426 c, 547 8. So also in the Laws. The word
is rare elsewhere in Plato.
> For ἐξίτηλον cf. Critias 121 a.
¢ This need not be a botanical error. In any case the
meaning is plain. Cf. Tim. 57 καὶ with my emendation.
@ For the idiom ef. αὐτὸ δείξει Phileb. 20 c, with Stallbaum’s
note, Theaet. 200 x, Hipp. Maj. 288 8, Aristoph. Wasps
56
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
polity * of to-day is worthy of the philosophic nature.
‘\his is just the cause of its perversion and alteration ;
as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to
be overcome and die out® into the native growth,°
so this kind does not preserve its own quality but
falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But
if ever it finds the best polity as it itself is the
best, then will it be apparent ¢ that this was in truth
divine and all the others human in their natures and
practices. Obviously then you are next going to ask
what is this best form of government.’’ “‘ Wrong,”
he said*; “I was going to ask not that but whether
it is this one that we have described in our establish-
ment of a state or another.” “In other respects it
is this one,” said I; “ but there is one special further
point that we mentioned even then, namely that
there would always have to be resident in such a
state an element having the same conception of its
constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing
its laws?” ‘That was said,’’ he replied. /* But it
was not sufficiently explained,” I said, “from fear
of those objections on your part which have shown
that the demonstration of it is long and difficult.
And apart from that the remainder of the exposition
is by nomeanseasy.2”’ “ Just what do you mean?”
“The manner in which a state that occupies itself
with philosophy can escape destruction. For all
great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly
994, Frogs 1261, etc., Pearson on Soph. fr. 388. Cf. αὐτὸ
σημανεῖ, Eurip. Bacch. 476, etc.
* Plato similarly plays in dramatic fashion with the order
of the dialogue in 523 B, 528 a, 451 B-c, 458 B.
7 Cf. supra on 412 a and What Plato Said, p. 647 on
Laws 962; infra 502 v.
% Cf. Soph. 244 c. See critical note.
57
PLATO
τὸ λεγόμενον τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά. ᾿Αλλ᾽
Ἕ ὅμως, ἔφη, λαβέτω τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις τούτου
φανεροῦ γενομένου. \O8 3 τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἣν δ᾽
ἐγώ, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει-
παρὼν. δὲ τήν γ᾽ ἐμὴν προθυμίαν εἴσει. σκόπει δὲ
καὶ νῦν, ὡς προθύμως καὶ παρακινδυνευτικῶς
μέλλω λέγειν, ὅ ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἢ νῦν δεῖ τοῦ. ἐπιτη-
δεύματος τούτου πόλιν ἅπτεσθαι. Πῶς; Νῦν μέν,
>, 2 / ς 1.8 , / ᾿ » >
498 ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ ἁπτόμενοι μειράκια ὄντα ἄρτι ἐκ
παίδων τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ
of renee αὐτοῦ τῷ amir te NA ope Be
τονται, φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι" λέγω. δὲ
yadeniraroy τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους" ‘gv δὲ ἐν ἔπειτα,
ἐὰν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων παρακαλούμενοι
ἐθέλωσιν ἀκροαταὶ γίγνεσθαι, μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται,
πάρεργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν' πρὸς δὲ τὸ
γῆρας ἐκτὸς δή τινων ὀλίγων ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ
Β μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου ἡλίου, ὅσον αὖθις οὐκ
ἐξάπτονται. Δεῖ δὲ πῶς; ἔφη. Πᾶν τοὐναντίον"
μειράκια μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μειρακιώδη παιδείαν
@ So Adam. Others take τῴ ὄντι with χαλεπά as, iis of
the proverb. Cf. 435. c, Crat. 384 4-8 with schol.
ὁ For the idiomatic ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ cf. Parmen, 150 8, πεῖν
296 5, Thompson on Meno, Excursus 2, pp. 258-264, Aristot.
An. Post. 91 b 33, Eth. Nic. 1101 a 12, 1136 b 25, 1155 b 30,
1168 a 12, 1174 a 27, 1180 b 27, Met. 1028 a 24, 1044 a 11,
Rhet. 1371 a 16.
¢ What Plato here deprecates Callicles in the Gorgias
recommends, 484 c-p. For the danger of premature study
of dialectic ef. 537 p-e ff. Cf. my Idea of Education in
Plato’s Republic, p. 11. Milton Re aie the thought with
characteristic exuberance, Of Education: ‘They present
their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with on
most intellective abstractions of logic and metaphysics .
58
a
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
says, fine things are hard.*”’. “ΑἸ the same,”’ he said,
our exposition must be completed by making this
plain.” |‘ It will be no lack of will,” I said, “* but if
ὃ a lack of ability, that would prevent that.
But you shall observe for yourself my zeal.. And note
again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to
say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in
just the reverse of our present fashion.°” “Τὴ what
way? "ΠΕ At present,” said I, “ those who do take
it up are youths, just out of boyhood, who in the
interval ὁ before they engage in business and money-
making approach the most difficult part of it, and
then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as
the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most
difficult part 1 mean: dinevitajoiacd In later life they
think they have done much if, when. invited, they
) listen’ to the philosophic discussions of others.
That sort of thing they think should be by-work.
And towards old age,’ with few exceptions, their light
is quenched. more completely than the sun of Hera-
cleitus,* inasmuch as it is never rekindled.” “‘ And
what should they do?” he said. “‘ Just the reverse.
While they are Madi and boys they should “occupy
to be tossed and turmoiled with their unballasted wits n
fathomless and unquiet deeps of controversy,” etc.
4 Cf. 386 a, 395 c, 413 c, 485 p, 519 a, Demosth, xxi. 154,
Xen. Ages. 10. 4, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 b 24, 1104 b 11, Isoc.
xv. 289. * Cf, 450.c,
τὴ Cf. 475 Ὁ, Isoc. xii:.270 ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλον δεικνύοντος καὶ
Ἐσήσαστοι ἠθέχησεν ἀκροατὴς γενέσθαι, “᾿ποι!ὰ not eyen be
to listen to one worked out and submitted by another ”
ter. orlin in L.C.L.).
9 Cf. Antiphon’s devotion to horsemanshi the Par-
1 196.6. For πρὸς τὸ γῆρας gies 552 v, Sa 653 A.
un A Nees Cr A . Meteor. ii. 2. 9,
Lucretius v. 662.
59
PLATO
καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων,
ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὖ μάλα ἐπι-
μελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους" προ-
tovons δὲ τῆς "ἡλικίας, ev ἣ ἡ ψυχὴ τελειοῦσθαι
ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια" ὅταν δὲ
Ὁ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν
ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, Τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ
μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν, ὅ τι μὴ πάρεργον, τοὺς
μέλλοντας. εὐδαιμόνως βιώσεσθαι καὶ τελευτή-
σαντας τῷ βίῳ τῷ βεβιωμένῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖρα
ἐπιστήσειν πρέπουσαν.
ΧΙ Ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, λέγειν.
προθύμως, ὦ ὦ Σώκρατες" οἶμαι μέντοι τοὺς pee
τῶν ἀκουόντων προθυμότερον ἔτι ἀντιτείνειν οὐδ᾽
ὁπωστιοῦν πεισομένους, ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρ-
ξαμένους. Μὴ διάβαλλε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐμὲ καὶ
D Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ
ἐχθροὺς ὄντας. πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσομ , ἕως
ἂν ἢ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ous, ἢ
προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν
αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωσι λόγοις.
“ΟἹ. 410 c and What Plato Said, p. 496 on Protag.
326 B-c.
» Like cattle destined for the sacrifice. A favourite figure
with Plato. Cf. Laws 635 a, Protag. 320. It is used literally
in Critias 119 Ὁ.
° Cf. infra 540 a-8, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 329-330.
Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 207-208, fancies that 498 c to 502 a
isa digression expressing Plato’s personal desire to be the
philosopher in Athenian politics.
4 A half-playful anticipation of the doctrine of immortality
reserved for Bk. x. 608 p ff. It involves no contradiction
and justifies no inferences as to the date and composition of
the Republic. Cf. Gomperz iii. 335.
60
ei ἀπδνανω
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
themselves with an education and a culture suitable
to youth, and while their bodies are growing to man-
hood take right good care of them, thus securing a
basis and a support? for the intellectual life. But
with the adyance of age, when the soul begins to
attain its maturity, they should make its exercises
more seyere, and when the bodily strength declines
and they are past the age of political and military
service, then at last they should be given free range
of the pasture® and do nothing but philosophize,°
except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and,
when the end has come, crown the life they have lived
with a consonant destiny in that other world.”
XII. “ You really seem to be very much in earnest;
Socrates,” he said; “* yet I think most of your hearers
are even more earnest in their opposition and will not
be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasy-
machus.” “Do not try to breed a quarrel between
me and Thrasymachus, who have just become friends
and were not enemies before either. For we will
spare no effort until we either convince him and the
rest or achieve something that will profit them when
they come.to that life in which they will be born
again ὦ and meet with such discussions as these.”’ ““A
Cf. Emerson, Experience, in fine, “‘ which in his passage
into new worlds ke will carry with him.” Bayard Taylor
Eameriogs Men of Letters, p. 113), who began to study
reek late in life, remarked, “ΟἿ, but I expect to use it
in the other world.’’. Even the sober itivist Mill says
(Theism, pp. 249-250) ‘* The truth that life is short and art
is long is from of old one of the most discouraging facts of
our condition: this hope admits the possibility that the art
eomnoyes in improving and beautifying the soul itself may
pat “cs good in some other life even when seemingly use-
in this.”
61
PLATO
Eis σμικρόν γ᾽, ἔῤη, χρόνον “εἴρηκας. Εἰς. οὐδὲν
μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, ὥς γε πρὸς TOV’ ἅπαντα. "τὸ
μέντοι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις ΄ τοὺς. πολλοὺς
θαῦμα. οὐδέν: οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόμενον. τὸ
E νῦν λεγόμενον, δὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα
ῥήματα ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ᾿ὡμοιωμένα,᾿ “ἀλλ᾽
οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ὥσπερ. vov hit
ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ παρισωμένον καὶ ὡμοιωμένι
μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ
δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει. ἕτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ, οὐ 'πώποτε
499 ἐ ἑωράκασιν οὔτε ἕνα. :οὔτε πλείους" ἢ ole; Οὐ α-
μῶς γε. Οὐδέ γε αὖ “λόγων, ὦ ὦ μακάριε, καλῶν τε
καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἱκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγόνασιν, οἵων
ζητεῖν μὲν. τὸ “ἀληθὲς ξυντεταμένως ἐκ. “παντὸς
τρόπου τοῦ γνῶναι χάριν, τὰ δὲ κομψά. τε καὶ
ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς
δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνου-
σίαις πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων. Οὐδὲ᾽ τούτων, ἔφη.
Β Τούτων τοι χάριν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτα προορώ-
μενοι ἡμεῖς τότε καὶ δεδιότες ὅμως ἐλέγομεν, ὑπὸ
LoD. "30 te
* For εἰς here cf. Blaydes: on) Clouds 1180. Herod. vii. 46,
gy Heracleidae 270.
'f. supra on 486 a, See too Plut. Cons. Apol. 17. 1lle¢
“a thousand, yes, ten thousand years are only an ἀόριστος
point, nay, the smallest part of a point, as Simonides’ Says.”
Cf. also Graeca (L.C.L.), ii. p. $338, Anth. Pal. x: 78.
© yevouevov... λεγόμενον. It is not translating to make no
attempt to reproduce Plato’s parody of “ polyphonic prose.”
The allusion here to Isocrates and the Gorgian figure of
παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις is unmistakable. e subtlety of
Plato’s style treats the ‘‘ accidental” occurrence of a Gorgian
figure in his own writing as a symbol of the difference
between the artificial style and fridincetity of the sophists and
the serious truth of his own ideals.
62
a
oo
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
brief. time* your forecast contemplates,” he said.
“Nay, nothing at all,’ I replied, “85 compared with
eternity.’ However, the unwillingness of the multi-
tude to believe what you say is nothing surprising.
For of the thing here spoken they have never
beheld a token,’ but only the forced and artificial
chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and
accidental as has happened here. _ But the figure of
aman ‘ equilibrated’ and ‘ assimilated ’ to virtue’s self
fectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and
olding rule in’a city of like quality, that is a thing
they have neverseen in one case orinmany. Do you
anja Sale * “By no means.” “ Neither,
my dear fellow; have they ever seriously inclined to
hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole en-
deavour was.to search out the truth? at any cost for
knowledge’s sake, and which dwell apart and salute
from afar? all the subtleties and cavils that lead to
naught ut opinion’ and strife in court-room and in
private talk.’’. “They have not,” he said. “ For
_ this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our
fears 7 declared under compulsion of the truth” that
» Cf. Isoc. x. 18 λεγόμενος... . γενόμενος, What Plato Said,
p. 544 on Symp. 185 c, F. Reinhardt, De Isocratis aemulis,
p. 39, Lucilius, bk. v. init. ‘hoc ‘nolueris et debueris’ te
lawyer A ie 172 p-e) and the eristic (Euthydem, 272 5,
Hipp. Maj. 288 p).
63
τος
PLATO
τἀληθοῦς ἠναγκασμένοι, ὅτι οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολι-
τεία οὐδέ γ᾽ ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μή ποτε γένηται τέλεος,
πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ
οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη
τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μὴ πό-
λεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι, καὶ τῇ πόλει κατήκοοι γενέσθαι,
7), τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις. ὄντων
υἱέσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆ ς
φιλοσοφίας. ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ. τούτων "δὲ
πότερα γενέσθαι ἢ ἢ ἀμῴοτερα ὡς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀδύνα-
τον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένα φημὶ ἔχειν λόγον. οὕτω γὰρ
ἂν ἡμεῖς δικαίως καταγελῴμεθα, ὡς ἄλλως.
ὅμοια λέγοντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτως. Ei τοίνυν
ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν. πόλεώς τις ἀνάγκη ἐπι-
μεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρελη-
λυθότι χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἔν τινι βαρβαρικῷ
τόπῳ, πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας π-
όψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου
ἕτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ
εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστι καὶ γε joeTal γε, ὅταν
αὕτη ἡ μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται. οὐ γὰρ
ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέ open
χαλεπὰ δὲ καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖται. Kai ἐ ἐμοί,
ἔφη, οὕτω δοκεῖ. Τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς, ἦν δ᾽ eels
9 Cf. Laws 747 ©. But we must not attribute personal
superstition to Plato. See What Plato Said, index, s.v.
Superstition.
> Cf. Laws 711 pv, Thue, vi. 24.33 50 iv. 4. 1 ὁρμὴ ἐπέπεσε.
¢ We might say, “talking like vain Utopians or idle
idealists.” The scholiast says, p. 348, τοῦτο καὶ κενήν φασι
μακαρίαν. Cf. supra, Vol. I. on 458 a, and for εὐχαί on 450 p,
and Novotny on Fpist. vii, 331 Ὁ
4 Cf, Laws 782 a, 678 a-s, and What Plato Said, p. 627 on
G4
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
neither city nor polity nor man either will, ever be
perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted
remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of
uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they
wish it or not,and constrains the citizens to obey them,
\or else until by some divine inspiration * a genuine
passion for true philosophy takes possession ἢ either
of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty
or of themselves. \To affirm that either or both of
these scannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite
unreasonable. th in that case could we be justly
ridiculed as uttering as futile as day-dreams are.°
Isnotthatso?” “ tie τ᾽ Te then, the best philosophi-
cal natures have ever been constrained to take charge
of the state in infinite time past,’ or now are in some
barbaric region ° far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter
be, we are prepared to maintain our contention’ that
the constitution we have described has been, is, or
will be?’ realized* when this philosophic Muse has
taken control of the state. It is not a thing impossible
to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities.
That it is difficult we too admit.”” “1 also think so,”
hesaid. “But themultitude—are you going tosay ?—
Laws 676 s-s; also Isoc. Panath. 204-205, seven hundred
years seemed a short time. “ Of. Phaedo 78 a.
7 For the ellipsis of the first person of the verb ¢f. Parmen.
enero 180 a. The omission of the third person is
very frequen
a ἐπα τάν tidus $a bccirTS0P: 888 Fr.
ἈΚ Cf. Vol. 1. Introd. p. xxxii, and ibid. on 472 8, and What
see Said, p. 564, also infra 540 p, Newman, Aristot. Pol,
Ρ. 377.
* This is what I have called the ABA style. Cf. 599 8,
Apol. 20 c, Phaedo 57 8, Laches 185 a, Protag. 344 c, Theaet.
185 a, 190 5, etc. It is nearly what Riddell calls binary
structure, Apology, pp. 204-217.
VOL, II F 65
Ε
δ00
PLATO ‘Tr
Ore οὐκ αὖ δοκεῖ, ἐ ἐρεῖς; Ἴσως, ἔφη. Ὦ μακάριε,
ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μὴ πανυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει,
ἀλλοίαν; τοι δόξαν ἕξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ δ
νεικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος καὶ ἀπολυόμενος
τῆς φιλομαθίας διαβολὴν ἐνδεικνύῃ, οὗς λέγεις. Hibs
φιλοσόφους, καὶ διορίζῃ ὥσπερ ἄρτι τήν τ τε φύσιν
αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν, ἵνα “μὴ ἡγῶνταί, σε
λέγειν ods. αὐτοὶ οἴονται. ἢ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται,
ἀλλοίαν τ᾽ οὐ" φήσεις αὐτοὺς δόξαν λήψεσθαι. καὶ
ἄλλα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι; ἢ οἴει τινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μὴ
χαλεπῷ ἢ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ “μὴ φθονερῷ, ἀφθονόν τε καὶ
πρᾶον ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν “γὰρ σὲ προφθάσας λέγω,
ὅτι ἐν ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἡγοῦμαι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ahr ήθει
χαλεπὴν οὕτω φύσιν γίγνεσθαι. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμέλει,
ἔφη, ξυνοίομαι. “Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ξυνοίει,
τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς πολλοὺς δια-
κεῖσθαι ἐκείνους αἰτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἔξωθεν οὐ
προσῆκον ,ἐπεισκεκωμακότας, λοιδορουμένους τε
αὑτοῖς" καὶ φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχοντας καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ
1 ἀλλοίαν AD, ἀλλ᾽ οἷαν F, ἀλλ᾽ οἵαν M.
2 +’ of Baiter: ro: uss.” Burnet brackets the sentence.
3 αὑτοῖς Burnet and Adam, αὐτοῖς Ast, Stallbaum, Jowett,
and Campbell.
« It is uncritical to find “ contradictions”? in variations of
mood, emphasis, and expression that are broadly human and
that no writer can avoid. Any thinker.may at one moment
and for one purpose defy popular opinion and for another
conciliate it; at one time affirm that it doesn’t matter what
the ignorant people think or say, and at another urge that
prudence bids us be discreet. So St. Paul who says (Gal. i.
10) ‘‘Do I seek to please men? for if I yet pleased men [
should not be the servant of Christ,’’ says also (Rom. xiv. 16)
“Let not then your good be evil spoken of.” Cf. also What
Plato Said, p. 646 on Laws 950 8.
»’ A recurrence to etymological meaning. Cf. ἄθυμον
66
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
does not think so,” said I. -““ That may be,” he said.
“ My dear fellow,” said I, “do not thus absolutely
condemn the multitude.* They will surely be of
another mind if in no spirit of contention but sooth-
ingly and endeavouring to do away with the dispraise
of learning you point out to them whom you mean
by philosophers, and define as we recently did their
nature and their pursuits so that the people may not
suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking.
_ Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you
still going to deny that they will change their opinion
and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone
is ungentleto the gentle or grudging tothe ungrudging
if he himself is ungrudging® and mild? I will antici-
you and reply that I think that only in some
ew and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or
harsh a temper to be found.” “ And I, you may be
assured,” he said, “concur.” “‘ And do you not also
concur ¢ in this very point that the blame for this harsh
attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that
riotous crew who have burst in? where they do not
belong, wrangling with one another,’ filled with spite’
4118, Laws 888 a, εὐψυχίας Laws 791 c, Thompson on Meno
78 x, Aristot. Topics 112 a 32-38, Eurip. Heracleidae 730
ase: : Shakes. Rich. IIT. v. v. 37 “ Reduce these bloody
: Σ For a similar teasing or playful repetition of a word ¢/.
517 c, 394 B, 449 c, 470 B-c.
. 3 For the figure of the κῶμος or revel rout ef. Theaet. 184 a,
Aesch. Ag. 1189, Eurip. Jon 1197, and, with a variation of the
image, Virgil, Aen. i. 148 and Tennyson, “ Lucretius”:
* As crowds that in an hour
Of civic tumult jam the doors.
4 Cf. Adam ad loc. and Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 121.
"7 Isoc. Antid. 260 seems to take this term to himself; οὐ
Panath. 249, Peace 65, Lysias xxiv. 24 πολυπράγμων εἰμὶ καὶ
θρασὺς καὶ φιλαπεχθήμων, Demosth. xxiv. 6. é7
PLATO
ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένους, ἥκιστα φιλο-
σοφίᾳ πρέπον ποιοῦντας; Πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη.
᾿ XIII. Οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ ᾿Αδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ
γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι
᾿Ο κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας, καὶ
ο΄ μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμ-
᾿ , >\)\> > , » : ὁ Aries eR
πίπλασθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τεταγμένα ἅττα καὶ κατὰ
ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα δρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτ᾽
> ~ " > 5 ΄ ik a , : , NB
ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ᾽ ἀδικούμενα ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ
πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαί
τε καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἴει τινὰ
μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτῳ τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ
μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο; ᾿Αδύνατον, ἔφη. Θείῳ δὴ καὶ
Ὁ κοσμίῳ ὅ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ
θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται" διαβολὴ δ᾽
ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. “Av οὖν τις,
α i.e. gossip. Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1125 a 5 οὐδ᾽ ἀνθρωπο-
λόγος, Epictetus iii. 16. 4. Cf. also Phileb. 59 5, Theaet.
173 p, 174 ο.
> Cf. supra on 486 a, also Phileb, 58 Ὁ, 59 a, Tim. 90 v,
and perhaps Tim. 47 a and Phaedo 79.
This passage is often supposed to refer to the ideas, and
ἐκεῖ in 500 p shows that Plato is in fact there thinking of.
them, though in Rep. 529 a-s ff. he protests against this
identification. And strictly speaking κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα
in c would on Platonic principles be true only of the ideas.
Nevertheless poets and imitators have rightly felt that the
dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philo-
sopher’s mind of the contemplation of the heavens. This
confusion or assimilation is, of course, still more natural
to Aristotle, who thought the stars unchanging. Cf. Met.
1063 a 16 ταὐτὰ δ᾽ αἰεὶ καὶ μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα. Cf.
also Sophocles, Ajax 669 ff., and Shorey in Sneath, Evolution
of Ethics, pp. 261-263, Dio Chrys. xl, (Teubner ii. p. 199),
68
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
and always talking about persons,* a thing least be-
fitting philosophy?” “‘ Least of all, indeed,” he
said.
_ XIII. “ For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose
mind is truly fixed on eternal realities ὃ has no leisure
to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of
men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled
with ory and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the
i of the eternal and unchanging order, and
seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by
one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids,
he will endeavour to imitate them and, as far as may
be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate®
himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to
imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself
with admiration?” “Impossible,” he said. ‘Then
the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order
will himself become orderly and divine in the measure
permitted to man.?_ But calumny ° is plentiful every-
where.” “ Yes, truly.” “ If, then,” I said, “‘ some
Boethius, Cons. iii. 8 “‘respicite caeli spatium ... et
aliquando desinite vilia mirari,” Dante, Purg. 14:
The heavens call you and o’er your heads revolving
Reveal the lamps of beauty ever burning:
Your eyes are fixed on earth and goods dissolving,
Wherefore He smites you, He, the all-discerning.
Cf. Arnold, “ A Summer Night,” in fine:
you remain
A world aboye man’s head to let him see
How boundless might his soul’s horizons be, etc.
© ἀφομοιοῦσθαι suggests the ὁμοίωσις θέῳ Theaet. 1768. Cf.
What Plato Said, p. 578.
4 Cf. on 493 pv, and for the idea 383 c.
* Cf. Hamlet τι. i. 141 ‘ thou shalt not escape calumny,”
Bacchylides 12 (13). 202-203 βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος πάντεσσι μέν
ἐστιν ἐπ᾽ ἔργοις.
69
PLATO ©
εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι
εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι, καὶ
μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἄρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν
αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιο-
σύνης καὶ ξυμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς;
ἭΚκιστά γε, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. ᾿Αλλ’ ἐὰν δὴ αἴσθωνται οἱ
E πολλοί, ὅτι ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν, χαλε-
501
“~ A a / 4. Ad , 5G ‘eu!
πανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν
λέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε
πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θείῳ παρα-
δείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι; Οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν,
> δ᾽ σ 27 ” 0 ἀλλὰ A Ud λ ,ὔ
ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐάνπερ αἴσθωνται. a δὴ τίνα λέγεις
/ “ - , 3 > /
τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς; Λαβόντες, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἤθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶ-
τον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν: ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον'
ἀλλ᾽ οὖν οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εὐθὺς τῶν ἄλλων
@ The philosopher unwillingly holds office. Cf. on 345 x.
» ἐκεῖ is frequently used in Plato of the world of ideas. Cf.
Phaedrus 250 a, Phaedo 109 ¥.
¢ For the word πλάττειν used of the lawgiver ef. 377 c,
Laws 671 c, 712 5, 746 a, 800 5, Rep. 374 a, 377 c, 420 6,
466 a, 588 c, ete.
For the idea that the ruler shapes the state according to
the pattern ¢ infra 540 a-B.
Plato applies the language of the theory of ideas to the
“ social tissue” here exactly as he applies it to the making
of a tool in the Cratylus 389 c. In both cases there is a
workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is
more or less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the
source of Aristotle’s doctrine of matter and form. Cf. Met.
1044 a 25, De part. an. 639 b 25-27, 640 b 24 f., 642 a 10 ff.,
Dean. 403 b 3, Zeller, Aristot. (Eng.) i. p. 867. Cf. also Gorg.
503 v-r, Polit. 306 c, 309 p and Unity of Plato’s Thought,
pp. 31-32. Cf. Alcinous, Εἰσαγωγή ii. (Teubner vi. p. 153)
ἃ κατὰ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ὁρᾶται, μελετῆσαι els ἀνθρώπων ἤθη.
@ Of. Aristot. Pol. 1829 ἃ 91 ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν. Of. also
70
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
compulsion ¢ is laid upon him to practise stamping on
the plastic matter of human nature in publie and
private the patterns that he visions there,’ and not
merely to mould “ and fashion himself, do you think
he prove a poor craftsman ? of sobriety and justice
and all forms of ordinary civic virtue*?’’ “By no
means,” he said. ‘ But if the multitude become
aware that what we are saying of the philosopher is
true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will
they distrust our statement that no city could ever be
blessed unless its lineaments were traced / by artists
_ who used the heavenly model?” “‘ They will not be
harsh,” he said, “if they perceive that. But tell
_ me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in
_ mind?” “ They will take the city and the characters
of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—?
no easy task. But at any rate you know that this
would be their first point of difference from ordinary
1275 Ὁ 29 with Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 229. Cf.
395 c δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας, Theages 125 a δημιουργὸν... τῆς
σοφίας.
4ΟΥ Laws 968 a πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς, Phaedo
82 a and supra, Vol. I. on 430c. Brochard, “La Morale
de Platon,” L’ Année Philosophique, xvi. (1905) p. 12 “Τὰ
᾿ς justice est appelée une vertu populaire.”’ This is a little
misleading if he means that justice itself is “une vertu
populaire.”
For μας, γρακόμῳ ef. 387 5 and Laws 778 a. See also
m 9
9 Cf. Vol. I. on 426 ν. This is one of the passages that
may used or misused to class Plato with the radicals.
Cf. 541 a, Laws 736 a-s, Polit. 293 pv, Euthyphro 2 p-3 a.
. W. Schneider, The Puritan Mind, p. 36, says, “ Plato
claimed that before his Republic could be established the
adult population must be killed off.”’
Cf. however Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxix, What Plato Said,
p. 83, and infra, p. 76, note a on 502 B.
71
PLATO
διενέγκοιεν, τῷ μήτε ἰδιώτου μήτε πόλεως ἐθε-
λῆσαι ἂν ἅψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ
παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ 7. αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς
x > ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα οἴει ὑπογράψασθαι
ἂν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας; Τί μήν; Ἔπειτα,
Β οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἑκατέρωσ᾽ ἀπο-
βλέποιεν, πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ
σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ
τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, ξυμμιγνύντες., τε
καὶ κεραννύντες. ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. τὸ δ
δρείκελον, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ. καὶ
Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον
θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ
μὲν ἄν, οἶμαι, ἐξαλείφοιεν, τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἐγγρά-
Ο φοιεν, ἕως ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἤθη εἰς ὅ ὅσον
ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλῆ ποιήσειαν. Καλλίστη γοῦν ἄν,
ἔφη, ἡ γραφὴ γένοιτο. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
πείθομέν πῃ ἐκείνους, οὗς διατεταμένους ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς
ἔφησθα ἰέναι, ὡς τοιοῦτός ἐστι πολιτειῶν ζωγρά-
dos, ὃν τότ᾽ ἐπῃηνοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, δι᾽ ὃν ἐκεῖνοι
ἐχαλέπαινον, ὅτι τὰς πόλεις αὐτῷ παρεδίδομεν, καί
τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούοντες πραὔνονται; Kat
4 The theory of ideas frequently employs this image of
the artist looking off to his model and back again to his
work. Cf. on 484 c, and What Plato Said, p. 458, Unity of
Plato’s Thought, p. 37.
> ἢ, ὁ. the idea of justice. For φύσις and the theory of ideas
cf. infra 597 c, Phaedo 103 8, Parmen. 132 v, Cratyl. 389 c-p,
390 τ.
¢ For ἀνδρείκελον ef, Cratyl. 424 E.
4 Jl. i. 131, Od. iii. 416. Of. 589 pv, 500 c-p, Laws 818
B-c, and W, hat Plato Said, p. 578 on Theaet. 176 8, Cie. Tuse.
72
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand
either individual or state or to legislate before they
either received a clean slate or themselves made it
clean.”” ‘And they would be right,” he said.
“ And thereafter, do you not think that they would
sketch the figure of the constitution?” “Surely.”
“And then, I take it, in the course of the work
_ they would glance? frequently in either direction, at
justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in
the nature of things,? and alternately at that which
they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling
_and blending from various pursuits that hue of
_ the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from
_ that likeness of humanity 5 which Homer too called
when it appeared in men the image and likeness of
God.*”” “Right,” he said. ‘‘ And they would erase
one touch or stroke and paint in another until
in the measure of the possible* they had made
the characters of men pleasing and dear to God
as may be.” “That at any rate’ would be the
fairest painting.” ‘“‘ Are we then making any im-
_ pression on those who you said’ were advancing to
attack us with might and main? Can we convince
them that such a political artist of character and such
a painter exists as the one we then were praising when
our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them,
and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear
what we are nowsaying?” ‘‘ Muchgentler,”’ he said,
i. 26. 65 “‘divina mallem ad nos.” Cf. also Tim. 90 a,
Phaedr. 249 c.
The modern reader may think of Tennyson, Jn Mem. .
eviii. “* What find I in the highest place But mine own
chanting hymns?”’ Cf. also Adam ad loc.
. * Cf. 500 » and on 493 νυ.
7 For γοῦν ef. supra, Vol. I. on 334 4. £ Cf. 414 A.
73
PLATO
D πολύ ye, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, εἰ σωφρονοῦσιν. Πῆ “γὰρ δὴ
ἕξουσιν ἀμφισβητῆσαι; πότερον μὴ τοῦ ὄντος TE
καὶ ἀληθείας ἐραστὰς εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσόφους;
Λτοπον μέντ᾽ ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν
αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου, ἣν ἡμεῖς διήλ-
θομεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην τυχοῦ-
σαν τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐκ ἀγαθὴν
τελέως ἔσεσθαι καὶ φιλόσοφον εἴπερ τινὰ ἄλλην;
ἢ ἐκείνους φή σειν" μᾶλλον, ovs ἡμεῖς ἀφωρίσαμεν;
Ε Οὐ δήπου. Ἔτι οὖν ἀγριανοῦσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν,
ὅτι, πρὶν ἂν πόλεως τὸ φιλόσοφον γένος ᾿ἐγκρατὲς
γένηται, οὔτε πόλει οὔτε πολίταις κακῶν Trad
ἔσται, οὐδὲ ἡ πολιτεία, ἣν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ,
ἔργῳ eae λήψεται; Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἧττον. Βούλει
οὖν, ἦν ὃ ἐγώ, μὴ ἧττον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ
παντάπασι πράους γεγονέναι καὶ πεπεῖσθαι, ἵνα,
502 εἰ “μή τι, ἀλλὰ αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν; Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
XIV. Οὗτοι. μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοῦτο
πεπεισμένοι ἔστων" τοῦδε δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισ-
βητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι βασιλέων
ἔκγονοι ἢ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι; Οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἢ
εἷς, ἔφη. Τοιούτους δὲ γενομένους ὡς πολλὴ ἀ ἀνάγκη
διαφθαρῆναι, ἔ ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν
σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ξυγχωροῦμεν" ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ
Β τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς σω-
θείη, ἔσθ᾽ ὅστις ἀμφισβητήσει; Kat πῶς; ᾿Αλλὰ
μήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἷς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων
1 φήσειν ADM: Adam reads φήσει; see his note ad loc.
@ Cf.591 a. This affirmation of the impossibility of denial
or controversy is a motif frequent in the Attic orators. Cf.
Lysias xxx. 26, xxxi. 24, xiii. 49, vi. 46, etc.
74
|
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
“if they are reasonable.” ‘‘ How can they controvert
it*? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are
lovers of reality and truth?” “That would be
monstrous,” he said. “Οὐ that their nature as we
have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best ?”’
“Not that either.” “ Well, then, can they deny that
such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will
be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can
be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of
those whom we have excluded?” “‘ Surely not.”
_ “Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when
we declare that, until the philosophic class wins
_ control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city
ΟΥ̓ citizens nor will the polity which we fable? in
words be brought to pass in deed?” ‘They will
_ perhaps be less so,’”’ he said. ‘‘ Instead of less so,
may we not say that they have been altogether
tamed and convinced, so. that for very shame, if
_ for no other reason, they may assent?” “Certainly,”
said he. _
_ XIV. “Let us assume, then,” said I, ‘‘ that they
_ are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that
there is no chance that the offspring of kings and
tulers should be born with the philosophic nature ? ”
“ Not one,” he said. “‘ And can anyone prove that if
so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The
_ difficulty “ of their salvation we too concede ; but that
in all the course of time not one of all could be saved,4
will anyone maintain that?’ ‘“‘ How could he?”
“ But surely,” said I, “‘ the occurrence of one such is
> Cf. 376 pv, Laws 632 £, 841 c, Phaedr. 276 Ξε.
Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, p. 13, says Plato uses the
word μῦθος only once of his own m . Polit. 268 zB.
© Cf. Laws 711 το τὸ χαλεπόν, and 495 a-s.
4 Cf. 494 a.
75
C
PLATO Tt
πειθομένην, πάντ᾽ ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα.
41 \ 4 ” 7A La ὃ᾽ > ᾿
Kavos γάρ, ἔφη. “Apxovtos γάρ που, ἣν ἐγώ,
τιθέντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ
διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δήπου ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν
τοὺς πολίτας. Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν. ᾿Αλλὰ δή, ἅπερ
piv δοκεῖ, δόξαι καὶ ἄλλοις θαυμαστόν τι καὶ
ὃ / O > ἷ ΝΜ re Ἁ Ἁ
ἀδύνατον; Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Καὶ μὴν
ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, εἴπερ δυνατά, ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς
” θ ες > > ὃ ONG] "I ~ 4
ἔμπροσθεν, ws ἐγῷμαι, διήλθομεν. “ἱκανῶς γάρ.
Νῦν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομο-
Ul
θεσίας ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο,
\ / = .
αλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, od μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε. Ξυμ-
aiver γάρ, ἔφη
XV. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόγις τέλος ἔσχε, τὰ
ἐπίλοιπα δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον, τίνα τρόπον ἡμῖν
καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ
σωτῆρες ἐνέσονται τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ κατὰ ποίας
ἡλικίας ἕκαστοι ἑκάστων ἁπτόμενοι; Λεκτέον
, ” \ O 35 / δ᾽ >? tA ΑἹ /
μέντοι, ἔφη. Οὐδέν, ἦν ἐγώ, τὸ σοφόν μοι
ἐγένετο τήν τε τῶν γυναικῶν τῆς κτήσεως δυσχέ-
ρειαν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παραλιπόντι καὶ παιδογονίαν
καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν, εἰδότι ὡς
ws 7 / \ \ / ς ~
ἐπίφθονός τε Kal χαλεπὴ γίγνεσθαι ἡ παντελῶς
E ἀληθής: νῦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἦλθε τὸ δεῖν. αὐτὰ
« Of, Epist. vii. 828 ο and Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 170.
Plato’s apparent radicalism again. Cf. on 501 a. Cf. also
Laws 709 , but note the qualification in 875 c, 713 n-714 a,
691 c-p. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 381-383 seems to say
that the εἷς ἱκανός is the philosopher—Plato.
ὃ Note the different tone of 565 £ λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον
ὄχλον. Cf. Phaedr. 260 c λαβὼν πόχιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν
πείθῃ.
¢ Of. on 499 νυ, and Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 48.
76
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
enough,* if he has a state which obeys him,” to realize®
allthatnowseemssoincredible.”’ ‘‘ Yes,oneis enough,”
he said. “‘ For if such aruler,” I said, “ ordains the
laws and institutions that we have described it is surely
not impossible that the citizens should be content to
carry themout.” ‘“‘Bynomeans.” ‘‘ Wouldit, then,
be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the
opinion to which we have come??” “TI think not,”
said he. “ And further that these things are best, if
possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently
shown.” “‘Yes, sufficiently.” “* Our present opinion,
_ then, about this legislation is that our plan would be
_ best if it could be realized and that this realization
is difficult * yet not impossible.” “‘ That is the con-
clusion,” he said.
XV. “ This difficulty disposed of, we have next to
speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a
result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers /
of the constitution will form a part of our state, and
at what ages they will severally take up each study.”
“Yes, we have to speak of that,” he said. “ I gained
nothing,” I said, “by my cunning’ in omitting hereto-
fore* the distasteful topic of the possession of women
and procreation of children and the appointment of
_ rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and
right way would provoke censure and is difficult of
realization; for now I am none the less compelled
"4 Cf. Epist. vii. 327 s-c, viii. 357 β ff.
* Cf. 502 a, Campbell’s note on Theaet. 144 a, and Wila-
mowitz, Platon, ii. p. 208.
7 Cf. on 412 4-8 and 497 c-p, Laws 960 ΒΚ. 463 8 is not
quite relevant.
9 For τὸ σοφόν ef. Euthydem. 293 pv, 297 vp, Gorg. 483 a,
Herod. v. 18 τοῦτο οὐδὲν εἶναι σοφόν, Symp. 214 a τὸ σόφισμα,
Laches 183 Ὁ.
“*® Cf. 423 τ.
77
PLATO
διελθεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ
παίδων πεπέρανται, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν δεῖ. ἐλέγομεν δ᾽, εἰ μνημονεύεις,
503 δεῖν αὐτοὺς φιλοπόλιδάς τε φαίνεσθαι, βασανι-
Copevovs ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λύπαις, καὶ τὸ δόγμα
τοῦτο μήτ᾽ ἐν πόνοις μήτ᾽ ἐν φόβοις μήτ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῃ
μηδεμιᾷ μεταβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ τὸν
ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον, τὸν δὲ πανταχοῦ, ἀκή-
ρατον ἐκβαίνοντα, ὦ ὥσπερ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασανιζό-
μενον, στατέον ἄρχοντα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι
καὶ τελευτήσαντι καὶ ἄθλα. τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα ἣν τὰ
λεγόμενα, παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ
Β λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν. ᾿Αληθέ-
στατα, ἔφη, λέγεις" μέμνημαι “γάρ. "Oxvos γάρ,
fi ᾿ ἔφην, ὦ φίλε, ἐ ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀποτετολμημένα"
ἢ νῦν" δὲ" τόῦτο μὲν τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς
ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι.
Εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἔφη. Νόησον δή, ὡς εἰκότως ὀλίγοι
ἔσονταί σοι. ἣν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν. δεῖν ὑπ-
ἄρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταὐτὸ ξυμφύεσθαι eens τὰ μέρη
* In Bk. V.
> Cf. 412 p-x, 413 c-414 4, 430 a-B, 537, 540 a, Laws 751. Cc.
$ oo on 412 £, 413 ὁ, Soph. 230 8.
4 +6 δόγμα τοῦτο is an illogical idiom. The antecedent is
only implied. Cf. 373 c, 598 c. See my article in Trans-
actions of the American Phil. Assoc. xlvii. (1916) pp. 205-236.
¢ Cf. Theognis 417-418 παρατρίβομαι ὥστε μολίβδῳ χρυσός,
ibid. 447-452, 1105-1106, Herod. vii. 10, Eurip. fr. 955 (N. )
Cf. Zechariah xiii. 9 “I... will try them as is
tried,’’ Job xxiii. 10 “* When he hath tried me I shall come
forth as gold.” Cf. also 1 Peter i. 7, Psalm xii. 6, Ixvi, 10,
Isaiah xlviii. 10.
7 The translation preserves the intentional order of the
Greek. For the idea cf. 414 a and 465 Ὁ-Ὲ and for ἄθλα ef,
4608. Cobet rejects καὶ ἄθλα, but emendations are needless.
78
OL ΝΝΕΝΝΝΝΝΝΝΝΝΝΟΡΝΝΝΟΝΝΝΝΝΝΝ
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
to discuss them. The matter of the women and
children has been disposed of,* but the education of
the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from
the starting-point. We were saying, if you recollect,
that they must approve themselves lovers of the state
when tested? in pleasures and pains, and make it
apparent that they do not abandon ® this fixed faith ὦ
under stress of labours or fears or any other vicissi-
tude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith
must be rejected, while he who always issued from
the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the ἔτεα," is
to be established as ruler and to receive honours in
life and after death and prizes as well. Something
of this sort we said while the argument slipped by
with veiled face? in fear” of starting‘ our present de-
bate.”’ “Most true,” he said; “‘ remember.” “‘We
shrank, my friend,’’ I said, ‘“‘from uttering the .
audacities which have now been hazarded. But now |}!
let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement
that as the most perfect/ guardians we must establish
philosophers.” ‘‘ Yes, assume it to have been said,”
said he, “ Note, then, that they will naturally be few,*
for the different components of the nature which we
said their education presupposed rarely consent to
τ Cf. Phaedr. 237 a, Epist. vii. 340 a. For the per-
‘sonification of the λόγος ef. What Plato Said, p. 500 on
Protag. 361 4-8. So too Cic. Tuse. i. 45. 108 ‘sed ita tetra
sunt eg ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio.”’
᾿" ναὶ Β.
ἡ Cf. the proverbial μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα, do not moye the
immovable, “let sleeping dogs lie,” in Laws 684 ν»-Ὲ,
9138. Cf. also Phileb. 16 c, and the American idiom “‘ start
something.”’
4 ees δύσι, SAL B, 340 Ε, 342 νυ.
* Cf. on 4944
79
PLATO —
ὀλιγάκις ἐθέλει, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ διεσπασμένη φύεται.
1 © Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ
| ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται
᾿ς οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν &, ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί; τε
καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, οἷοι κοσμίως
μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ “βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽
οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅ ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι,
καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται. ᾿Αληθῆ,
ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἤθη καὶ
οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς
χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους
δυσκίνητα ὄ ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταὐ-
τόν" δυσκινήτως. ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς ὥσπερ ἀπο-
νεναρκωμένα, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίπλανται,
ὅταν τι δέῃ τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν. Ἔστι ταῦτα,
Ἡμεῖς δέ γ᾽ ἔφαμεν ἀμφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε eal
καλῶς μετέχειν, ἢ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης
δεῖν αὐτῷ μεταδιδόναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς.
Ὀρθῶς, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἴει
E ἔσεσθαι; Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; Βασανιστέον δὴ ἔν τε οἷς
τότε ἐλέγομεν. πόνοις τε καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς,
καὶ ἔτι δὴ ὃ τότε παρεῖμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν
1 On the text see end of note a below.
—_————
* The translation is correct. In the Greek the anacoluthon
is for right emphasis, and the separation of νεανικοί re Kai
μεγαλοπρεπεῖς from the other members of the list is also an
intentional feature of Plato’s style to avoid the monotony of
too long an enumeration. The two things that rarely com-
bine are Plato’s two temperaments. The description of the
orderly temperament begins with οἷοι and οἱ τοιοῦτοι refers to
the preceding description of the active temperament. ‘The
mss. have καὶ before νεανικοί ; Heindorf, followed by Wilamo-
witz, and Adam’s minor edition, put it before οἷοι. Burnet
follows the mss. Adam's larger edition puts καὶ νεανικοί τε
80
a
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
grow in one ; but for the most part these qualities
are found apart.’”’ ““ What do you mean ? ” he said.
“ Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of
apprehension and their accompaniments, and youth-
ful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you
know, that are rarely combined in human nature with
a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives :
but such men, by reason of their quickness,” are driven
about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is
one out of them.” “You speak truly,” he said.
And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable
temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use,
_ and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to
ee ee
fear, are apt to act in the same way © when confronted |
with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with
difficulty, as if benumbed, and are filled with sleep ©
and yawning when an intellectual task is set them.”
“Tt is so,” he said. ‘‘ But we affirmed that a man
must partake of both temperaments in due and fair
combination or else participate in neither the highest®
edueation norin honours norinrule.”” “* And rightly,”
he said. “Do younot think, then,that sucha blend will
be a rare thing?” “Of course.” ‘They must, then,
be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which
we then spoke,’ and we have also now to speak of a
after ἕπεται. The right meaning can be got from any of the
texts in a good viva voce reading.
Plato’s contrast of the two temperaments disregards the
‘possible objection of a psychologist that the adventurous
temperament is not necessarily intellectual. Cf. supra on
375 c, and What Plato Said, Ρ. 573 on Theaet. 144 a-s, Cic.
Tusc. v. 24. Cf. Theaet. 144 a ff.
- * A touch of humour in a teacher.
# For the figure cf. Meno 80 a, 84 8 and c.
* Lit. “most precise.” Cf. Laws 965 B ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν.
ες 4 1n 412 c fi.
VOL. II Ga 81
PLATO
μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν δεῖ, σκοποῦντας εἰ
καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατὴ ἔσται ἐνεγκεῖν,
504 εἴτε καὶ ἀποδειλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄθλοις"
ἀποδειλιῶντες. Πρέπει γε τοι δή, ἔφη, οὕτω
σκοπεῖν: ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα;
XVI. Μνημονεύεις μέν που, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι
τριττὰ εἴδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι ξυνεβιβάζομεν
δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ. “σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας
καὶ σοφίας ὃ ὃ ἕκαστον εἴη. Μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων,
ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν. Ἦ καὶ
Β τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν; Τὸ ποῖον δή; ᾿Ελέγομέν
που, ὅτι, Ws μὲν δυνατὸν ἣν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατ-
ἰδεῖν, ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἴη περίοδος, ἣν περι-
ελθόντι καταφανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν
προειρημένων ἑπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν. τ᾽ εἴη
προσάψαι. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω
δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ
ἐφαίνετο, ἐλλιπῆ, εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν
τοῦτο εἴποιτε. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔμοιγε, Ae μετρίως" ἐφαί-
Ονετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. ὦ φίλε, ἣν δ᾽
1 ἄθλοις Orelli: ἄλλοις Mss.
« Cf. infra 535 8, Protag. 326 c.
> For the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I. on 435 a and 436 8,
Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42, What Plato Said, p. 526 on
Phaedo 68 c, p. 552 on Phaedr. 246 5, and p. 563 on Rep.
435 B-c.
° Of. Vol. I. on 435 pv, Phaedr. 274 a, Friedlander, Platon,
ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300, Frutiger,
Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea Good in
Plato” 8 Republic (Univ. of Chicago Studies in Class. Phil.
vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The
longer way is the higher education, which will ena Je the
philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right
from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it.
82
Re
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
point we then passed by, that we must exercise them
in eee, studies, watching them to see whether their
hook ἧδε χεῖρ οἵ enduring the greatest and most
es or whether it will faint and flinch @ as
men ae anc in the trials and contests of the body.” {
“ That is certainly the right way of looking at it,” he
said. ‘‘ But what do you understand by the greatest
studies ᾿ is
XVI. “ You remember, I presume,” said I, “ that
sSieBdistingdishing three kinds? in the soul, we estab-
lished definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and
wisdom severally.” “If I did not remember,” he
said, “ I should not deserve to hear the rest.” ‘‘ Do
you also remember what was said before this?”
What?” “We were saying, I believe, that for
the most perfect discernment of these things another
way ° was requisite which would make them
plain to one: who took it, but that it was possible
to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion.
And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on
this puleaitekdien that what we then said was said,
falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to
me, but if it contented. you it is for you to say.’
“Well,” he said, “it was measurably satisfactory to
me, and apparently to the rest of the company.’
' The outcome of such an education is described as the vision
of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a
restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the
cardinal virtues in terms of the ea elements of human
welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the
idea of good may mean a tcloologies interpretation of the
universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of
benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical
tee A in the Timaeus. The Republic merely glances at
from time to time and returns to its own theme.
© alse ntrod., p. xxxv.
83
PLATO
ἐγώ, eR τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον Kal ὁτιοῦν
τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μετρίως grain ἀτελὲς γὰρ
οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον- δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐνίοτέ τισιν ἱκανῶς
ἤδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζητεῖν. Καὶ
μάλ᾽, ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχουσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν.
Τούτου δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοῦ παθήματος ἥκιστα
δεὼ Ἂ ἕὰ- ae Ch αἱ de
προσδεῖ φύλακι πόλεώς τε Kal νόμων. Εἰκός, ἢ
δ᾽ ὅς. Τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἔφην,
D περιιτέον τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἧττον μανθάνοντι
, ” ΄ oe es NY Sy SPEEA IY
πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ: ἢ, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν,
τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθή-
μᾶτος ἐπὶ τέλος οὔποτε ἥξει. Οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη,
μέγιστα, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι τι μεῖζον paaeerryy τε καὶ ὧν
διήλθομεν; Καὶ μεῖζον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν
τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι,
ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι"
n ΕῚ ~ > \ \ ΝΜ la ΦΙΛΟ ΓΕ Bian
ἢ οὐ γελοῖον, ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις πᾶν
E ποιεῖν συντεινομένους ὅπως ὅ τι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ
καθαρώτατα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας
@ Of. Cie. De Jin. i. 1 “‘nec modus est ullus investigandi
veri nisi inveneris.”
Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the
style but the definite suggestion of Plato’s distaste for
relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the
criticism of the homo mensura in the Theaetetus, in the state-
ment of the Laws 716 c, that God is the measure of all things
(What Plato Said, p. 631), and in the contrast in the Politicus
283-284 between measuring things against one another and
measuring them by an idea. Cf. infra 581 a.
84
s
EO ————— ᾿
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
“ Nay, my friend,” said 1, “ a measure of such things
that in the least degree falls short of reality proves
no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is
the measure of anything,* though some people some-
times think that they have already done enough? and
that there is no need of further inquiry.” “ Yes,
indeed,” he said, “‘ many experience this because of
their sloth.” ** An experience,” said I, “ that least
of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws.”
“That seems likely,” he said. “Then,” said I,
“such a one must go around the longer way and must
_ labour no less in studies than in the exercises of the
body ; or else, as we were just saying, he will never
come to the end of the greatest study and that which
most properly belongs to him. ” ““Why, are not
these things the greatest?” said he; “but is there
still something greater than justice and the other
virtues we described ἡ “There is not only some-
;’ Isaid, “ but of these very things we
need not merely to contemplate an outline? as now,
but we must omit nothing of their most exact
elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every
nerve * to attain to the utmost precision and clarity
of knowledge about other things of trifling moment
and not to demand the greatest precision for the
ὃ Of. Menex. 234 a, Charm. 158 c, Symp. 204 4, Epist.
Vii. 341 a.
- From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used
in connexion with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the
idea of and the divided line are discussed.
_ * Cf, Phaedr. 274 a.
# je. sketch, adumbration. The ὑπογραφή is the account
of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433.
_.* For πᾶν ποιεῖν ef. on 488 c, for συντεινομένους Huthydem.
D.
85
PLATO ©
ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη,
[ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα }"-" ὃ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ
rept 6 τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἴει τιν᾽ ἄν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι
μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστιν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα. πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις
ἀκήκοας" νῦν δὲ ἢ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὖ διανοεῖ ἐμοὶ
505 πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος.. -οἶμαι δὲ
τοῦτο μᾶλλον: ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε a τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα
μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ἧ “ah δίκαια
καὶ τἄλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα
γίγνεται. καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο
λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς
ἴσμεν: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης, εἰ ὅ τι
μάλιστα τἄλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐδὲν ᾿ ἡμῖν
Β ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ εἰ κεκτήμεθά τι ἄνευ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οἴει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσιν ἐκτῆ-
σθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθήν; ἢ πάντα τἄλλα φρονεῖν
1 Bracketed by Scheiermacher, whom the Oxford text
follows. Cf. also Adam ad loc. Stallbaum ad loc. defends.
* Such juxtaposition of different forms of the same word is
one of the most common features of Plato’s style. Cf. 453 B
ἕνα ἕν, 466 Dd πάντα πάντῃ, 467 D πολλὰ πολλοῖς, 496 ὁ οὐδεὶς
οὐδέν, Laws 835 ἃ μόνῳ μόνος, 958 B ἑκόντα ἑκών. Cf. also
Protag. 327 5, Gorg. 523 5, Symp. 217 5, Tim. 92 5, Phaedo
109 5, Apol. 32 c, and Laws passim.
» The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 8, Crito 47 c, and p,
Laches 195 pv, Gorg. 467 ©. See critical note.
¢ Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the
unavailing quest for ‘the good”’ in the earlier dialogues is
an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. supra Vol. I. on
476 4 and What Plato Said, p. 71. Wilamowitz, Platon, i.
p. 567, does not understand.
4 Cf. 508 x, 517 c, Cratyl. 418 ©. Cf. Phileb. 64 © and
What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 a.
86
ae ee ee ἐνῶ
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
@ matters?” “It would indeed,®”’ he said;
ma do you suppose that anyone will let you go
orca. what is the greatest study and with
it is concerned?” “ΒΥ no means,”
said. ; “but do you ask the question. You cer-
tainly have heard it often, but now you either do not
apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble
for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is
rather the latter. For you have often heard° that the
test thing tolearn is the idea of good¢ by reference
towhich* justthings‘ and alltherest become useful and
_ beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that
this is what I am going to speak of and to say further
that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we
do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of
this we should know all other things never so well,
you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as
no possession either is of any avail? without the posses-
sion of the good. Ordo you think there is any profit”
in possessing everything except that which is good,
or in understanding all things else apart from the
Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of to a formula
and so seems to speak of itasa mystery. It wasso
throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and_by a
majority of modern scholars. Cf. my [dea of Good in Plato’ 3
Republic. pp τς ΒΡ, 188-189, What Plato Said, pp. 72, 230-231,
I, pp. xL-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv.
Ae tga ge which,” i.e. a theory of the cardinal
virtues is scientific only if deduced from an Dp ultimele sanction
or ideal.
7 The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely
generalizing colour. It makes no difference.
_* For the idiom οὐδὲν ὄφελος ef. Euthyph. 4 2, Lysis 208 ε,
supra 365 8, Charm. 155 k, etc.
Cf. 427 a, Phaedr. 275 c, Cratyl. 387 a, Euthyd. 288 Ἐ,
Laws 751 5, 944 p, etc.
87
PLATO
ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν “μηδὲν
φρονεῖν; Ma A’? οὐκ ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη. oh Jud
XVII. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς
μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, Τοῖς δὲ
κομψοτέροις φρόνησι ς. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; Καὶ ὅτι γε,
ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις
ον ae ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως. “Πῶς
C yap οὐχί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ ὀνειδίζοντές ὅτι. pw
ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσιν, φρό
νῆσιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς (ad: τοῖς
ιέντων ἡμῶν ὅ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
φθέγξωνται ὄνομα. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. Τί δαί;
οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὁριζόμενοι μῶν “μή τι ἐλάτ-
τονὸος πλάνης ἔμπλεῳ τῶν ἑτέρων; ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι
ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακᾶς;
@ καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν suggests but does not mean καλοκάγαθόν
in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the tae
with Platonie fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. Philed.
65 a and Symp. 210-211 where because of the Sie the
καλόν is substituted for the ἀγαθόν.
δ So Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias and later the
Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 1313;
Eurip. Hippol. 382 οἱ δ᾽ ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, and
supra on 329 a-B.
ere is no contradiction here with the Philebus. Plato
pa not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the
00:
ὃς κομψοτέροις is very slightly if at all ironical here. ΟἿ.
the American “‘ sophisticated” in recent use. See too Theaet.
156 a, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1905 a 18 οἱ χαρίεντες.
4 Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of
Prodicus (ef. Protag. 337 α ff.) and Aristotle (ef. Eth. Nie.
1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose.
Cf. EButhyd. 281 pv, Theaet. 176 5 with 176 c.
¢ Cf. 428 n-c, Euthydem. 288 τὸ f., Laws 961 Ἐ 6 περὶ τί
88
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
while understanding and knowing nothing that is
Saees ?” .“ No, by Zeus, I do not,” he said. —
οὐ But, furthermore, you know this too, that
the multitude believe pleasure? to be the good, and
the finer® rie intelligence or knowledge.*” . “ Cer-
tainly ou are also aware, my friend, that
those who Hold diss latter view are not able to point
_ out what knowledge * it is but are finally compelled
to say that it is the knowledge of the good. * “Most
absurdly,’ he'said. ‘‘ Is it not absurd,” said I, “ if
while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they
turn aboutand talk to us as if we knew it? For they
say it is the knowledge of the good,’ as if we under-
stood their meaning when they utter’ the word
“good.’”” “ Most true,” he said. “‘ Well, are those
who define the good as pleasure infected with any less
confusion” of thought than the others? Or are not
they in like manner?‘ compelled to admit that there
νοῦς. See Unity of Plato’s Thought, τι. 650. The demand
for specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf. Euthyph.
ae παν 199. τ, Gorg. 451 a, Charm. 165 c-£, Ale. I.
12455
# ‘There is no “ἐπε in the Greek. Emendations are idle.
Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it
_ makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf.
_ my note on Phileb. 11 s-c in Class. Phil. vol. iii. (1908)
pp. 343-345.
2 φθέγξωνται logically of mere physical utterance (ef. Theaet.
157 8), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular
utterance.
Δ Lit. “‘ wandering,” the mark of error. Cf. 484 5, Lysis
213 £, Phaedo 79 c, Soph. 230 8, Phaedr. 263 8, Parmen. 135 £,
Laws 962 v.
ὁ καὶ οὗτοι is an illogical idiom of over-particularization.
The sentence begins generally and ends specifically. Plato
does not care, since the meaning is clear. Cf. Protag. 336 ς,
Gorg. 456 c-p, Phaedo 62 a.
89
ΡΙΆΑΤΟ Γ
Σφόδρα γε. Συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ὅμο-
D λογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταὐτά. ἢ γάρ; Τί
μήν; Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ reed ἀνάια.
βητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Τί δέ;. τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ
πολλοὶ ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν μὴ ἢ, ὅμως
ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ
δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ
ὄντα ζητοῦσι, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς
Ε ἀτιμάζει; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν
ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει,
ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ
ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει
χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἵᾳ καὶ περὶ τἄλλα, διὰ τοῦτο
δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν,
506 περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν
ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ
4.Α distinct reference to Callicles’ admission in Gorgias
499 B τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, ras δὲ χείρους, ef. 499 c,
Rep. 561 c, and Phileb. 13 c πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι, Stenzel’s
notion (Studien zur Entw. ἃ. Plat. Dialektik, p. 98) that in
the Philebus Plato “ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates
503c weit entfernt”’ is uncritical, The Republic merely
refers to the Gorgias to show that the question is disputed
and the disputants contradict themselves,
» ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly disparaging, cf. Theaet. 163 c,
158 c, 198 c, Sophist 233 B, 225 8, but less so than ἐρίζειν
in Protag. 337 a.
¢ Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues
but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. Theaet.
167 c, 172 a-s, and Shorey in Class. Phil. xvi. (1921)
pp. 164-168.
4 Cf. Gorg. 468 B τὸ ἀγαθὸν dpa διώκοντες, supra 505 a-B,
Phileb. 20 νυ, Symp. 206 a, Euthyd. 278 8, Aristot. Bth. Nic.
90
A
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
are bad pleasures*?’’ ‘‘ Most assuredly.’’ ‘‘ The
outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same
things to be both good and bad, are they not?”
“Certainly.” “Then is it not apparent that there
are many and violent disputes® about it?” ‘ Of
course.” “ And again, is it not apparent that while
in the case of the just and the honourable many would
prefer the semblance° without the reality in action,
possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good
nobody is content with the possession of the appear-
ance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance
satisfies nobody here?” ‘‘ Quite so,” he said.
“ That, then, which every soul pursues? and for its sake
does all that it does, with an intuition ὁ of its reality,
but yet baffled’ and unable to apprehend its nature
adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it
as about other things, and for that reason failing of
any possible benefit from other things,—in a matter
of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow
a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens*
1173 a, 1094 a οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, Zeller, Aristot. i. pp. 344-345,
379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, Purg. xvii. 127-129.
* Cf. Phileb. 64 a μαντευτέον. Cf. Arnold’s phrase, God
and the Bible, chap. i. p. 23 “approximate 1] age
thrown out as it were at certain great objects which e
human mind augurs and feels after.’
? As throughout the minor dialogues. Cf. What Plato
Said, p. 71.
~* Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is
the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ that makes them good; but for the
ical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the
Sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 ‘* Toute
aultre science est dommageable celuy qui n’a la science de
Δ As in the “ longer way”’ Plato is careful not to commit
himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but
postulates it for his guardians.
gi
ΡΙΛΤΘΊ ΕΣ SY
πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν; Ἥκιστά γ᾽, ἔφη.
Olax γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε Kal καλὰ ἀγνοού- ΐ
μενα ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐ ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινὸς ἄξιον
φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα,
μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερόν γνώσεσθαι
ἱκανῶς. Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντέύει. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἡμῖν.
Β ἡ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὃ τοιοῦτος
αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὃ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;
XVIII. ᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δή, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φὴς εἶναι ἢ ἢ
ἡδονήν; ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὗτος, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
ἀνήρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανὴς ὅτι σοι
οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν.
Οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται
τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δ᾽
αὑτοῦ μή, τοσοῦτον χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευό-
Ο μενον. Τί δαί; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι
περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἷδε λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα; Οὐδαμῶς
γ᾽, ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθ᾽ ἃ
οἴεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν. Τί δέ; εἶπον" οὐκ ἤσθησαι
τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι ἀϊσχραί;
ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί: ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν
ἱ
'
'
* The personal or ab urbe condita construction. Of.
Theaet. 169 x.
Ὁ The guardians must be able to give a reason, which they
can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that
the statesman must know better than other men ef. Laws
968 a, 964 c, 858 p-£, 817 ο, Xen. Mem. iii. 6. 8.
¢ For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 B λελέξεται,
465 a προστετάξεται, Kurip. Heracleidae 980 πεπράξεται.
92
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
to whose hands we are to entrust all things?”
“ Least of all,” he said. “41 fancy, at any rate,” said
1, “ that the just and the honourable, if their relation
_and reference to the good is not known,? will not have
secured a guardian” of much worth in the man thus
orant, and my surmise is that no one will under-
and them adequately before he knows this.” “ You
surmise well,’’ he said. “‘ Then our constitution will
have its perfect and definitive organization? only when
such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it.”’
_ XVIII. “ Necessarily,” he said. “‘ But you your-
self, Socrates, do. you think that knowledge is the
or pleasure or something else and different ?”’
What a man it is,” said 1; ‘‘ you made it very plain?
long ago that you would not be satisfied with what
others think about it.” “ Why, it does not seem
right to me either, Socrates,” he said, “‘to be ready to
state the opinions of others but not one’s own when
one has occupied himself with the matter so long.*”’
“ But then,” said I, “ do you think it right to speak
as haying knowledge about things one does not
know?” “By no means,” he said, “as having
knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his
opinion what he opines.” ‘“‘ Nay,” said I, “ have
‘ou not observed that opinions divorced from know-
ledge’ are ugly things? The best of them are
blind.’ Or do you think that those who hold some
Ἢ For the personal construction cf, 348 ©, Isoc. To Nic. 1.
αταφανής is a variation in this idiom for δῆλος. Cf. also
Theaet . 189 c, Symp. 221 B, Charm: 162 c, etc.
* Cf. 367 v-r.
' ? This is not a contradiction of Meno 97 8, Theaet. 201 B-c,
and Phileb. 62 s-n, but simply a different context and
emphasis. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47, nn. 338
~ # Cf. on 484 c, Phaedr. 270 xe.
93
D
PLATO
διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων of ἄνευ νοῦ
ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες; Οὐδέν, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν
αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι τυφλά τε καὶ σκόλια, ἐξὸν παρ᾽
ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά; Μὴ πρὸς Διός,
ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει
ὧν ἀποστῇς. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν ὥσπερ
δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ,
διῆλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθῃς. Kat
γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει"
ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος
δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ μακάριοι,
E ἧς, ἊΝ ᾿ ΄ She τῶν 3 θό 27 \ oA
αὐτο μὲν TL TOT EOTL TAYE ον, EAOWUEV TO VUV
507
, v4 / n A ἊΝ
εἶναι: πλέον yap μοι φαΐνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παρ-
οὔσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ
νῦν: ὃς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ
ε ’, > “ ’, 52 7 > \ ec a
ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν
φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ἔφη, λέγε: εἰσαῦθις
γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτίσεις τὴν διήγησιν. Βου-
/ », > ¢ 4 Reh >
λοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀποδοῦναι
« Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries.
Cf. Phaedr. 250 c, Phileb. 16 c, Rep. 518 c, 478 c, 479 b,
518 a. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero
calls the lumina orationis of Isocratean style. The rhetoric
and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.
> Of. Phileb. 64 α ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἤδη προθύροις,
“‘ we are now in the vestibule of the good.”
© καὶ μάλα, “jolly well,” humorous emphasis on the point
that it is much easier to “define” the conventional virtues
than to explain the “sanction.” Cf. Symp. 189 a, Euthydem. .
298 v-x, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the Republic.
Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the
point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. ¢.g. 610 B.
ἃ Excess of zeal, προθυμία, seemed laughable to the Greeks.
94
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably
from blind men who go the right way?”’ “ They
do not differ at all,” he said. oh it, then, ugly things
that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and
crooked, when you might hear from others what is
Juminous® and fair?” ‘“ Nay, in heaven’s name,
Socrates,” said Glaucon, “do not draw back, as it
were, at the very goal.’ For it will content us if
you explain the good even as you set forth the
nature of justice, sobriety, and the other-virtues.”
“Tt will right well* content me, my dear fellow,” I
said, “ but I fear that my powers may fail and that
in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become
a i k.¢ Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss
for the time being the nature of the good in itself ;* for
‘to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch
above the impulse that wings my flight to-day.’ But
of what seems to be the offspring of the good and
most nearly made in its likeness? I am willing to
speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the
matter drop.”” “‘ Well, speak on,”’ he said, “‘ for you
‘will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time.”
“T could wish,” I said, “ that I were able to make
Of. my interpretation of Iliad i. in fine, Class. Phil. xxii.
(1927) pp. 222-223.
* Cf. More, Principia Ethica, p. 17 “Good, then, is
in é able x Petes so ΕΣ as ἐν ait oe dey: =
ethical writer, essor He idgwick, w ear
recognized and stated this fact.”
7 This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate
refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume
orasymbol. See Introd. p. xxvii, and my Idea of Good in
Plato’s Republic, p. 212. τὰ viv repeats τὸ νῦν εἶναι (ef. Tim.
48 c), as the evasive phrase εἰσαῦθις below sometimes lays the
topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 £
and 430 c.
9 Cf. Laws 897 »-Ἑ, Phaedr. 246 a.
95
IY 1008 PHAPTOINT THT
καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλα μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν Todds
τόκους μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ
ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε. εὐλαβεῖσθε
μέντοι μή πῇ ἐξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον
ἀποδιδοὺς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου. Ἐϊλαβησόμεθα,
ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν: ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε. Διομολο-
γησάμενός γ᾽, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τά
τ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη
Β πολλάκις εἰρημένα. Τὰ ποῖα; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Πολλὰ
καλά, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα
οὕτως εἶναί φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν TO λόγῳ.
Φαμὲν γάρ. Kat αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων, ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν,
πάλιν αὖ κατ᾽ ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης
τιθέντες ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν. “Kort
ταῦτα. Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὁρᾶσθαι φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι
C8 οὔ, τὰς δ᾽ αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μέν, ὁρᾶσθαι δ᾽ οὔ.
/, A ~ Of «ΕΣ ~
Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Τῷ οὖν ὁρῶμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν
τὰ ὁρώμενα; Τῇ ὄψει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
καὶ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις. αἰσθήσεσι
πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά; Τί μήν; ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
ἐννενόηκας τὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὅσῳ
* This playful interlude relieves the monotony of argument
and is a transition to the symbolism. τόκος means both
interest and offspring... Cf. 555 ©, Polit. 267 a, Aristoph.
Clouds 34, Thesm. 845, Pindar, Οἱ. x. 12. The equivocation,
which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a
great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the
article “ Usury’ in Hastings’s Encyclopaedia of Relig. and
Ethics, and Antonio’s
. . . when did friendship take
A breed for barren metal of his friend ?
96
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
— to receive the payment and not merely as
e interest. But at any rate receive this
᾿ρνρόβωρὶ and the offspring of the good. Have ἃ care,
Ἀακέγοτει lest 1 deceive you unintentionally with a
false τες koning of the interest.” “ We will do our
best,” he said, “ to be on our guard. Only speak on.’
ἜΣ Yes,” Isaid, “after first coming to an understanding
with you and reminding you of what has been said
» before and often on other occasions.””” ““What?’’
said he.’ ‘‘ We predicate ‘ to be ᾽ς of many beautiful
things and many good things, saying of them severally
thatthey are,and so define them in our speech.” ““We
* “ And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a
good. that is only and merely good, and so, in the
ease of all the things that we then posited as many,
we turn about and posit each as a single idea or
aspect, ing it to be a unity and call it that
which each really ἰ5. ὦ “It is so.” ‘‘ And the one
class of things we say can be seen but not ea Ἢ
while_the ideas can be thought but not seen.” ~
all means.”” ‘‘ With which of the parts of ee acibee
with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible
?>” “With sight,” he said. ‘‘ And do we
not,’ I said, “‘ hear audibles with hearing, and per-
ceive all sensibles with the other senses ? ” “ Surely.”
“ Have you ever observed,” said I, “ how much the
> Cf. 475 xf. Plato as often begins by a restatement of
the theory of ideas, i.e. practically of the distinction between
the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. Rep. 596 a ff.,
Phaedo 108 8 ff.
* The modern reader will never understand Plato from
translations that talk about“ Being.” Cf. What Plato Said,
ee ee is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf.
Phaedo 75 8, p, 78 pv, Parmen. 129 8, S 2lle, 490 B,
532 a, 597 a. a re
VOL. 11 H 97
PLATO
πολυτελεστάτην τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν Te καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι
δύναμιν , ἐδημιούργησεν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη. ᾿Αλλ᾽
ὧδε σκόπει. ἔστιν ὅ τι προσδεῖ ἀκοῇ καὶ φωνῇ
γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀκούειν, τὴν δὲ a ἀκούε-
D σθαι, ὃ ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον, ἡ μὲν οὐκ
E
508
ἀκούσεται, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται; ; Οὐδενός, ἔφη.
Οἶμαι δέ Ye ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵ iva
μὴ εἴπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾷ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός. ἢ
σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; Οὐκ ἔ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. Τὴν
δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι
προσδεῖται; Πῶς; ᾿Ενούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν
ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι
αὐτῇ, “παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖς," ἐὰν. μὴ
παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ᾿ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
πεφυκός, οἶσθα, ὅ ὅτι ἣ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται τά τε
χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα. Τίνος oy λέγεις, ἔφη,
τούτου; Ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν ὃ ἐγώ, Φῶς.
᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐ “σμικρᾷ ἄρα ἰδέᾳ ἡ τοῦ
ὁρᾶν αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμις τῶν
ἄλλων ξυζεύξεων τιμιωτέρῳ ζυγῷ ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ
μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς. ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε
δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι.
* Creator, δημιουργός, God, the gods, and nature, are all
vir tual synonyms in such passages.
> Cf. Phaedr. 250 τ, Tim. 45 B.
¢ This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound
required a medium, Jim. 67 8. But the statement here is
true enous h to illustrate the thought.
4 Lit. “ kind of thing,” γένος. Cf. 507 c-p.
* Cf. Troland, The Mystery of Mind, p. 82: “ In order that
there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical
object should exist before the eyes. There must also be a
nite φᾷ τ so-called ‘light.’’? Οὗ Sir John Davies’ poem on
the Sou
98
Ee
:
_—
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
greatest expenditure the creator “ of the senses has
lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen??”
“Why, no, I have not,” he said. “ Well, look at it
thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another
medium 5 so that the one may hear and the other be
heard, in the absence of which third element the
one will not hear and the other not be heard?”
“They need nothing,” he said. “ Neither, I fancy,” —
said I, “do many others, not to say that none require ©
anything of the sort. Or do you know of any?”
“Not I,” he said. ‘‘ But do you not observe that
vision and the visible do have this further need?”
“How?” “ Though vision may be in the eyes and
its possessor may try to use it, and though colour be
present, yet without the presence of a third thing ὦ
specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose,
you are aware that vision will see nothing and the
colours will remain invisible.?”” “‘ What? is this thi
of which you speak?’ he said. “The thing,” I
said, “that you call light.” “‘ You say truly,” he
replied. ‘“‘ The bond, then, that yokes together visi-
bility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no
slight form’ than that which unites the other pairs,
if light is not without honour.’’ “It surely is far
from being so,” he said.
But as the sharpest eye discerneth nought
Except the sunbeams in the air do shine;
So the best soul with her reflecting thought
Sees not herself without some light divine.
7 Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial
genitive, and we need not.
σ The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of
ἰδέα. Cf. Laws 689 pv καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος. “Form”
over-translates ἰδέᾳ here, which is little more than a synonym
for γένος above. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 250.
99
PLAFO!IAA SHUT
XIX. Τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ
θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ
ει a a / ) , « ἢ : (ἸΕῚ σὰ d
ὁρᾶν 6 τι κάλλιστα Kal τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι;
ov ‘ ” \ ¢ » Ὁ \ ΐ EAL
Ονπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ of ἄλλοι: τὸν ἥλιον
δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς. “Ap” οὖν ὧδε πέφυκεν ὄψις
πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν; ἸΙῶς; Οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἡ
» ” > IN ” 5. Tg, ἀφ A ON
ὄψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ δὴ Ka-
Β λοῦμεν ὄμμα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἡλιοειδέστατόν
γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων. Πολύ.
> lot \ \ ͵ὔ a ” > ͵ὔ
γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει, ἐκ τούτου
ταμιευομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται; Πάνυ
\ 5 > > \ ee ” αν cs Ξ-
μὲν οὖν. “Ap οὖν οὐ καὶ 6 ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ
ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ᾽ ὧν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς ταύτης;
* Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians
did (Cratyl. 397 Ὁ, Aristoph. Peace 406 ff., Herod. iy. 188).
Cf. Laws 821 8, 899 B, 950 », Apol. 26 v, Epinomis 985 8,
988 B. υ
> Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 223-225,
Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, pp. 374-384, Arnold,
“ Mycerinus ”’: ὦ et
Yet, surely, O my people, did I deem
Man’s justice from the all-just Gods was given;
A light that from some upper fount did beam,
Some better archetype, whose seat was heaven ;
A light that, shining from the blest abodes,
Did shadow somewhat of the life of Gods.
Complete Poems of Henry More, p. 77:
Lift myself up in the Theologie
Of heavenly Plato. There Til contemplate
The Archetype of this sunne, that bright Idee
Of steddie Good, that doth his beams dilate
Through all the worlds, all lives and beings
propagate...
.. . a fair delineament
Of that which Good in Plato’s school is hight,
His T’agathon with beauteous rayes bedight.
100
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
XIX. “ Which one can you name of the divinities
in heaven “as the author and cause of this, whose light
makes our vision see best and visible things to be
seen?”’ “Why, the one that you too and other people
mean,’’ he said; “‘ for your question evidently refers to
thesun.®”’ “Is not this, then, the relation of vision to
that divinity?” “What?” “ Neither vision itself nor
its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the
sun.” “Why, no.” “‘ But it is, I think, the most
sunlike ‘of all the instruments of sense.” “‘ By far the
most.” “ And does it not receive the power which
it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from
the sun?” “ Certainly.” “Is it not also true that
the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause ὦ thereof
Mediaeval writers have much to say of Plato’s mysterious
Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses
τἀγαθόν in much the same way.
It is naive to take the language of Platonic unction too
literally. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 394 ff.
* Of. 509 a, Plotinus, Enn. i. 6. 9 οὐ yap ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν
ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος and vi. 7. 19, Cic.
Tuse. i. 25. 63 in fine “‘ quod si in hoe mundo fieri sine deo
non Siri ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes
sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare,”’ Manilius ii. 115:
quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse,
et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum ?
Goethe’s
War’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Die Sonne kénnt es nie erblicken,
and Goethe to Eckermann, Feb. 26, 1824: ‘“‘ Hatte ich nicht
die Welt durch Anticipation bereits in mir getragen, ich ware
mit sehenden Augen blind geblieben.”
4 Cf. Complete Poems of Henry More, p. 113:
Behold a fit resemblance of this truth,
The Sun begetteth both colours and sight . . ., etc.
101
PLATO
3 ~
Οὕτως, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, φάναι
με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν
4 2 τ ΝΕ Wy ε A bd {Ὁ > “-
C ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, 6 τι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ
νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο
- εὐ “- -“" / \ ε
τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα.
- > , >
Πῶς; ἔφη: ἔτι δίελθέ por. ᾿Οφθαλμοί, ἣν ὃ
ΨΩ > Φ' “ ΄ ΕΞ ee an > \
ἐγώ, οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς
/ es nn A / \ ¢ A > 4
τρέπῃ ὧν av Tas χρόας TO ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ,
ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ
a A Ἷ A
ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης
a " 3
καθαρᾶς ὄψεως; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ὅταν δέ γ᾽,
D οἶμαι, ὧν 6 ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ
τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται. Ti
᾿ Ψ / \ \ a a 58. /,
μήν; Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει"
| a Ld - 7 ἀλ / ᾿ς ‘ A » >
ὅταν μέν, οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ TO OV, εἰς
τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέ τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ
νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται: ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ
κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον,
δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς
δόξας μεταβάλλον καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.
Ἐ Ἔοικε γάρ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον
τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν
α ἢ ὁ. creation was the work of benevolent design. This is
one of the few passages in the Republic where the idea of
good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis re-
served for poetical or mythical development in the Timaeus.
It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for
Plato. by identification of τἀγαθόν here either with God or
102
ae
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
is beheld by vision itself?’ ‘‘ That is so,” he said.
“ This, then, you must understand that I meant by the
offspring of the good? which the good begot to stand
in a proportion ὃ with itself: as the good is in the in-
telligible region to reason and the objects of reason,
so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects
of vision.” “ How is that?” he said; “ explain
further.” “‘ You are aware,’ I said, “ that when the
eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose
colours the light of day falls but that of the dim
luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they
appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell
in them.” ‘“‘ Yes, indeed,’ he said. ‘‘ But when, I
take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by
the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside
in these same eyes.” “Certainly.” “ Apply this
comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is
firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality
shine resplendent” it apprehends and knows them and
to possess reason; but when it inclines to
that region which is mingled with darkness, the world
of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its
edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and
thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason.” ‘‘ Yes,
it does.” “This reality, then, that gives their truth to
the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing
a τα: ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought,
oF Cf. Gorg. 465 s-c, infra 510 a-s, 511 ©, 530 pv, 534 a,
576 c, Phaedo 111 a-s, Tim. 29 c, 32 a-B. For ἀνάλογον
in this sense cf. 511 £, 534.4, Phaedo 110 νυν.
© Plato’s rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being, the
good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato’s ethical and
political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible
is the idea of good, i.e. the “sanction,” and not, as some
commentators insist. the truth.
103
~ PLATO
δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι,
αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς
γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν
5 [ f ΄ ef
ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο
ἢ ; » ye ΕΝ, aoe ΓΑ ΡΝ
καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὁρ Ds
ε Υ̓ ͵ ͵ -
ἡγήσει: ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ
509 φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον
δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ᾽ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα
3 A \ , a> 9 / > 27
ἀγαθοειδῆῇ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ᾽ ἀμφότερα ὀρθόν,
ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν.
᾿Αμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ 4 ἐπιστήμην
μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα
κάλλει ἐστίν: οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ
* No absolute distinction can be drawn between εἶδος and
ἰδέα in Plato. But ἰδέα may be used to carry the notion of
“apprehended aspect’’ which I think is more pertinent here
than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course
Plato would affirm that. Cf. 369 a, Unity of Plato’s Thought,
p- 35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.
» ‘The meaning is clear. We really understand and know
anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of
the πὐδὰ that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. The
position and case οἵ γιγνωσκομένης are difficult. But no
change proposed is any improvement.
ὁ Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree
of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 4058
αἴσχιστον . . . αἴσχιον, 578 B, Symp. 180 a-B and Bury ad
loc. ‘The same characteristic can be observed in his method,
6.5. in the Symposium where Agathon’s speech, which seems
the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates; similarly in the
Gorgias and the tenth book of the Republic. Cf. Friedlander,
Platon, i. p. 174, swpra Introd. p. Ixi.
This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric
rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist
uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing
104
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
to the knower, you must say is the idea? of good, and
you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge,
and of truth in so far as known.” Yet fair as they both
are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be some-
thing fairer still ¢ than these on will think rightly
of it. But as for knowledge and truth, even as in
our illustration it is right to deem light and vision
sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so
here it is right to consider these two their counter-
parts, as being like the good or boniform,? but to think
that either of them is the good® is not right. Still
higher honour belongs to the possession and habit 7 of
the good.” ‘An inconceivable beauty you speak of,”
he said, “ if it is the source of knowledge and truth,
and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you
surely? cannot mean that it is pleasure.” “‘ Hush,”
to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato
the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious
language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and
practical conclusions. ΟἿ. e.g. Meno 81 p-r.
ὁ ἀγαθοειδῇ occurs only here in classical Greek literature.
Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose.
¢ There is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous
pry ag good and the good here. Cf. on 505 c, p. 89,
note αὶ
7 ἕξις is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian
“habit.” However Protag. 344 c approaches it. Cf. also
Phileb. 11 τὸ, 41 c, Ritter-Preller, p. 285.
Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive,
e.g. ἕξις Laws 625 c, γένεσις Laws 691 5, Tim. 73 5, 76 F,
μοῖρα Phaedr. 255 5, 274 τ, Menex. 249 5, φύσις Phaedo
109 x, Symp. 186 8, Laws 729 c, 845 p, 944 p, εἰς. He may
have chosen ἔξις here to suggest the ethical aspect of the
good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction
of ἡδονή below supports this view. Some interpreters think
it=76 ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει, which is possible but rather pointless.
κῃ For οὐ γὰρ δήπου cf. Apol. 90 ο, Gorg. 455 a, Euthyph.
13 a.
105
PLATO
λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ: ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε μᾶλλον
Β τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει. Πῶς; Τὸν
ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον, οἶμαι, τὴν τοῦ
ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν
γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν
ὄντα. Πῶς γάρ; Kal τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν
μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ᾽
ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ
καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.
C XX. Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μάλα γελοίως, "Απολλον,
ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς! Σὺ γάρ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ
λέγειν. Καὶ μηδαμῶς γ᾽, ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μή τι
ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιών, εἴ
πῃ ἀπολείπεις. ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπο-
* i.e. not only do we understand a thing when we know
its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of
its existence, God’s mind for the universe, man’s mind for
political institutions. This, being the only interpretation
that makes sense of the passage, is presumably more or less
consciously Plato’s meaning. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi.
Quite irrelevant are Plato’s supposed identification of the
ἀγαθόν with the ἕν, one, and Aristotle’s statement, Met.
988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the
one is the cause of the ideas.
The remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental
rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great
part in Neoplatonism, in all plillosophiids of the unknowable
and in all negative and mystic theologies.
» It is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians
who sometimes said ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Plato’s sentence
would have made ὄντος very inconvenient here. But εἶναι
shows that οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος here.
ἐπέκεινα became technical and a symbol for the transcendental
106
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
said I, ‘‘ but examine the similitude of it still further
in this way.*”’. ““ How? ”..“* The sun, I presume you
will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of
visibility but it also provides for their generation and |
growth and nurture though itis not itself generation.”
“ Of course ποῖ." “‘ In like manner, then, you are
to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive
from the presence of the good their being known, but
their very existence and essence is derived to them
from it, though the good itself is not essence but still
transcends essence ® in dignity and surpassing power.”
XX. And Glaucon very ludicrously ¢ said, “* Heaven
save us, hyperbole can no further go.” “‘ The fault
is yours,’’ I said, “‘ for compelling me to utter my
thoughts about it.” ‘“‘ And don’t desist,” he said,
“ but at least © expound the similitude of the sun, if
there is anything that you are omitting.” “ Why, cer-
tainly,”’ I said, “ I am omitting a great deal.” “Well,
in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. Cf. Plotinus
xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop. De divinis nominibus, ii. 2, Fried-
lander, Platon, i. p. 87.
© He is amused at Socrates’ emphasis. Fanciful is Wila-
mowitz’ notion (Platon, i. p. 209) that the laughable thing
is Glaucon’s losing control of himself, for which he com-
pares Aristoph. Birds 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment
of Proclus, p. 265.
The dramatic humour of Glaucon’s surprise is Plato’s way
of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues.
Cf. 536 B, 540 5, Lysis 223 8, Protag. 340 ©, Charm. 175 £,
ratyl. 426 5, Theaet. 200 8, 197 p, etc. Cf. Friedlander,
Platon, i. p. 172 on the Phaedo.
4“ What a comble!’* would be nearer the tone of the
Greek. There is no good English equivalent for ὑπερβολῆς.
Cf. Sir Thomas Browne’s remark that “nothing can be
said hyperbolically of God.” The banter here relieves the
strain, as is Plato’s manner.
* Cf. 502 a, Symp, 222 π, Meno 86 ε.
107
PLATO ΓΗ
λείπω. Μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, πἀραλίπῃς:
Οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ πολύ- ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ᾽
ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατόν, ἑκὼν οὐκ ree Μὴ
D γάρ, ἔφη. Νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν ὃ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ
έγομεν, δύω αὐτὼ εἶναι, καὶ ᾿Βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν
νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ ὁρατοῦ, ἵνα
μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ
ὄνομα. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἴδη, ὁρατόν,
νοητόν; Ἔχω. Ὥσπερ, τοίνυν γραμμὴν. δίχα
τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα' τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε
ἑκάτερον τμῆμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ
ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου, καί σοι
ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν
Ἐ τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμῆμα εἰκόνες. λέγω
“ »
510 δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ
ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά
τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκε, καὶ πᾶν τὸ
τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς. ᾿Αλλὰ κατανοῶ.: Τὸ τοί-
νυν ἕτερον τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικε, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς
ζῶα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον
γένος. Τίθημι, ἔφη. Ἢ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ
φάναι, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, διῃρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή,
ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν
πρὸς τὸ ᾧ “ὡμοιώθη; Ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη, καὶ “μάλα.
Σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ἣ τμητέον.
1 ἄνισα ADM Proclus, ἄν, ἴσα F, dv’ ἴσα Stallbaum.
« Of. the similar etymological pun in Cratyl. 396 B-c.
Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-
translating for some tastes, or not translating at all,
ὃ The meaning is given in the text. Too many com-
mentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery.
Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See
Introd. p. xxxi for my interpretation of the passage.
¢ Some modern and ancient critics prefer av’ ἴσα. It isa
108
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
don’t omit the least bit,” he said. “‘ I fancy,” I said,
“that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless
so far as it is at present practicable 1 shall not will-
ingly leave anything out.” “Do not,” he said.
“ Conceive then,” said I, “ as we were saying, that
there are these two entities, and that one of them is
sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the
other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the
sky-ball,* but let that pass. Yousurely apprehend the
two types, the visible and the intelligible.” “I do.”
** Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided?
into two uriequal® sections and cut eachsection again
in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible
and that of the intelligible order), and then as an ex-
pression of the ratio of their comparative clearness
and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of
the visible world, images. By images 41 mean; first,
shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces
of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything
of that kind, if you apprehend.” “‘ I do.” Κ΄ As the
second section assume that of which this is a likeness
or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants
and the whole class of objects made by man.” “Iso
assume it,” he said. “ Would you be willing to say,”
said I, “ that the division in respect of reality and truth
or the opposite is expressed by the proportion: ¢ as is
the opinable tothe knowableso is the likeness to that of
which it is alikeness?”’ “I certainly would.” “ Con-
sider then again the way in which we are to make the
division of the intelligible section.” “ In what way?”
little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again
there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more
honourable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. Plut.
Plat. Quest. 3. 4 Cf. supra 402 B, Soph. 266 B-c.
* Cf. supra on 508 c, p. 103. note ὃ.
109
PLATO
Πῆ; Ἧι τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν' ὡς
εἰκόσι χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάξεται ἐξ ὑπο-
ἔσεων, οὐκ ἐπ᾿ ἀρχὴν πορευομένη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τελευ-
τήν, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ ἕτερον ἐπ᾿" ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον͵ ἐξ
ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ ὧνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων
αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι δι’ αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη.
Ταῦτ᾽, ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔμαθον. ᾿Αλλ᾽
C αὖθις, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ: ῥᾷον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων
μαθήσει. οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι, ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς
γεωμετρίας. τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι. τό τέ περιττὸν καὶ
τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἴδη
καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην μέθοδον,
ταῦτα μὲν Ws εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά,
οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι
περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων
D δ᾽ ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν
ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο, οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμή-
σωσιν. ἸΙάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε olda. Οὐκ-
1 τμηθεῖσιν DM, μιμηθεῖσιν A Proclus, τιμηθεῖσιν F.
2 [τὸ] ἐπ᾽ Ast.
* Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic, pp. 230-234, for
the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of
Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either
in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a
transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense
already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who
can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition
back, not to some assumed axioma medium, but to its
relation to ultimate Good. ΤῸ call the ἀνυπόθετον the Uncon-
ditioned or the Absolute introduces metaphysical associations
fore n to the passage. Cf. also Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.
he practical meaning of this is independent of the
Pt metaphysics. Cf. Introd. pp. xvi-xviii.
110
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
“ By the distinction that there is one section of it
which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating
as images the things imitated in the former division,
and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds
not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion,
while there is another section in which it advances
from its assumption to a beginning or principle that
transcends assumption,? and in which it makes no use
of the images employed by the other section, relying
on ideas” only and progressing systematically through
ideas.” ‘‘I don’t fully understand* what you mean
by this,” he said. “ Well, I will try again,” said I, “ for
τ will better understand after this preamble. For
think you are aware that students of geometry and
reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd
and the even and the various figures and three kinds
of angles and other things akin to these in each
branch of science, regard them as known, and, treat-
ing them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to
render any further account of them ὦ to themselves or
others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to
everybody. They take their start from these, and
pursuing the om a from this point on consistently,
conclude with that for the investigation of which they
set out.” “Certainly,” he said, “I know that.”
¢ Gf. Vol. I. p. 79, note c on 347 a and p. 47, note f on
338.p; What Plato Said, p. 503 on Gorg. 463 pv.
4 Aristot. Top. 100 Ὁ 2-3 οὐ δεῖ yap ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς
ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato’s thought
and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly
for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles
of logic. Of. the mediaeval “contra principium n tem
non est disputandum.”’ A teacher of geometry will refuse
to discuss the psychology of the idea re mint a teacher. of
chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is
111
PLATO
ody καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ
τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων
διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνων πέρι, οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε,
τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιού-
‘ ΄, > a >)\)? > eae a
μενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ᾽ od ταύτης ἣν
E γράφουσι, καὶ τἄλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα, ἃ
511
πλάττουσί τε Kal γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν
ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσί, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ
χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντές δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν, ἃ οὐκ
ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη,
λέγεις. widtye
ΧΧΙ.- Τοῦτο τοίνυν vontov μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον,
© , > > “ ᾿ νὰ, ὍΝ
ὑποθέσεσι δ᾽ ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ
τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ én’ ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ
δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαΐίνειν,
εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω
ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι
δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις. Νίανθάνω,
ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς
4 > a , , ’ , @ oki
ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις. Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον
μάνθανε tu . 00 νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο, οὗ
αὐτὸς 6 λόγος ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει,
« Cf. 527 a-s. This explanation of mathematical reasoni
does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkeley an
the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the meta-
physical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted
if isthe Ser
» i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative
reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect
imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere.
¢ Stenzel, Handbuch, 118 “ das er nur mit dem Verstande
(διανοίᾳ) sieht”? is mistaken. διανοίᾳ is used not in its special
sense (*‘ understanding.” See p. 116, note c), but generally
for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.
4 For the concessive μέν cf. 546 ©, 529 τ, Soph. 225 c.
112
Le
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
“ And do you not also know that they further make
use of the visible forms and talk about them, though
they are not thinking of them but of those things of
which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for
the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as
such, and not for the sake of the image of it which
they draw*? And so in all cases. The very things
which they mould and draw, which have shadows and
images of themselves in water, these things they treat
in their turn ὃ. as only images, but what.they really
seek is to get sight of those realities which can be
seen only ties mind.*”’ “ True,” he said.
-XXI. “ This then is the class that I described as
intelligible, it is true,* but with the reservation first
that.the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in
the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first prin-
ciple because of its inability to extricate itself from
and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it
uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are
themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below
them, and that in comparison with these latter* are
esteemed as clear and held in honour.f”’ “TI under-
stand,” said he, “that you are spea® ὃ of what falls
under geometry and the kindred arts.’’ ‘‘ Under-
stand then,” said I, “that by the other section of
the intelligible I mean that which the reason? itself
lays hold of by the power of dialectics," treating its
* The loosely appended dative ἐκείνοις is virtually a dative
absolute. Cf. Phaedo 105 a. Wilamowitz’ emendation (Platon,
ii. p. 384) to πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις rests on a misunder-
standing of the passage.
7 The translation of this sentence is correct. But ef.
Adam ad loe.
5, λόγος here suggests both the objective personified argu-
ment and the subjective faculty. fy
δ Cf. 533 a, Phileb. 57 ©.
VOL, II I 113
PLATO 1 aT
tas ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα
μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν
ἰών, ἁψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν
ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ,
αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ᾽
εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι᾿ αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς
εἴδη. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὔ--δοκεῖς γάρ
μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν--ὅτι μέντοι βούλει δι-
ορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι
ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον
ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑπο-
θέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ
αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ
μὴ ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὕπο-
’ “ 3 » \ > \ δὰ τὰ ΨΎΓΙ
θέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι,
α τῷ ὄντι emphasizes the etymological meaning of the word.
Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 Ἐ, Phaedo 80 v, Phileb. 64". For
hypotheses cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 229, Thompson
on Meno 86 8. But the thing to note is that the word accord-
ing to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an
assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—dpy%
—of the inquiry.
> Cf. Symp. 211 ο ὥσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις, “like steps of a
stair.”
5 παντὸς ἀρχήν taken literally lends support to the view
that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in
spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes
the παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανόν
of the Phaedo. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular
case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by
arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 8, p, 110, note a.
114
———
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally
as hypotheses,* underpinnings, footings,’ and spring-
boards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which
uires no assumption and is the starting-point of
all,¢ and after attaining to that again|taking hold of
the first dependencies from it, so to proceed down-
ward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of
any object of sense? but only of pure ideas moving
on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.*”
“1 understand,” he said; “ποῖ fully, for it is no
slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do
understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect
of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated
by the power of dialectic, as something truer and
more exact than the object of the so-called arts and
sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-
points. And though it is true that those who con-
template them are compelled to use their understand-
ing’ and not their senses, yet because they do not go
back to the beginning in the study of them but start
from assumptions you do not think they possess true
4 This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute
ta Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the
senses. Cf. on 530 8, p. 187, notec, The dialectician is able
to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring
to images. Plato is not here considering how much or
little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience.
* The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical
philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first
principle. I haye never denied that. The point of m
interpretation is that it also describes the method whi
distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science,
and that this distinction is for practical and educational
purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually
says in the next few lines. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 233-234.
7 διανοίᾳ here as in 511 a is general and not technical.
115
ΡΙΑΤΟ HT 3
καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. διάνοιαν δὲ
καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ
τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἕξιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι
δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν. “ἹἹκανώτατα,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι
τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω,
E διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν
ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον
αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας
μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετ-
έχειν. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ws
λέγεις. ἴθ poet ed
* γρῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous.
Colloquially the phrase means “have no sense.” For its
higher meaning cf. Meno 99 c, Laws 962 a.
Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι
and μετά here. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 345 mistakenly
resorts to emendation. The meaning is plain. Mathematical
ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathe-
matician does not deal with them quite as the dialectician
deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason
in the highest sense.
° Here the word διάνοια is given a technical meaning as a
116
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VI
intelligence * about them although ὃ the things them-
selves are intelligibles when apprehended in con-
junction with a first principle. And I think you call
the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or
understanding ° and not reason because you regard
understanding as something intermediate between
opinion and reason.” ‘“ Your interpretation is quite
sufficient,’ I said; “‘ and now, answering to? these
four sections, assume these four affections occurring
in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest,
understanding for the second ; assign belief? to the
third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,’
and arrange them in a proportion,’ considering that
they participate in clearness and precision in the same
degree as their objects partake of truth and reality.”
“Tunderstand,” he said ; ‘‘ I concur and arrange them
as you bid.” i
1 inferior to νοῦς, but, as Plato says, the terminol
pag matter. The adn has eee ene μῶν
For ἐπί ef. Polit. 280 a, Gorg. 463 8.
ἐ πίστις is.of course not “ faith in Plato, but Neoplaton-
ae take iar and commentators have confused the two
eas hopelessly.
7 eixacia asia bial had this connotation for Plato.
* Cf. on 508 c, p. 103, note ὁ.
117
Ζ
ἵ ᾿
14 17 Μετὰ ταῦτα δή, εἶπον, ἀπείκασον “τοιούτῳ
πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ
ἀπαιδευσίας. ἰδὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώπους οἷον ἐν κατα-
γείῳ οἰκήσει σπηλαιώδει, ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ
φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούσῃ μακρὰν παρ᾽ ἅπαν τὸ
σπήλαιον, ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παίδων ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς
t
* The image of the cave illustrates by another proportion
the contrast between the world of sense-perception and
the world of thought. Instead of going above the plane of
ordinary experience for the other two members of the
portion, Plato here goes below and invents a fire niittishiailars
cast from it on the walls of a cave to correspond to the sun
and the “ real”’ objects of sense. In such a proportion our
“‘real’’ world becomes the symbol of Plato’s ideal world.
Modern fancy may read what meanings it pleases into the
Platonic antithesis of the ‘real’? and the “ideal.” It has
even been treated as an anticipation of the fourth dimension.
But Plato never leaves an attentive and critical reader in
doubt as to his own intended meaning. There may be at
the most a little uncertainty as to which precise traits are
intended to carry the symbolism and which are merely
indispensable parts of the picture.
The source and first suggestion of Plato’s imagery is an
interesting speculation, but it is of no significance for the
interpretation of the thought. Cf. John Henry Wright,
* The Origin of Plato’s Cave’ in Harvard Studies in Class.
Phil. xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, Karly Greek Philo-
sophy, pp. 89-90, thinks the allegory Orphic. Cf. also
Wright, loc. cit. pp. 134-135. Empedocles likens our world
118
BOOK VII
1. “ Next,” said I, “ compare our nature in respect
of education and its lack to such an experience as
this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean
cavern * with a long entrance open? to the light on its
entire width. Conceive them as having their legs
and necks fettered® from childhood, so that they
to a cave, Diels i.2 269. Cf. Wright, loc. cit. Wright refers
it to the Cave of Vari in Attica, pp. 140-142. Others have
‘supposed that Plato had in mind rather the puppet and
marionette shows to which he refers. Cf. Diés in Bulletin
Budé, No. 14 (1927) pp. 8 f.
‘The iveness of the image has been endless. The
most eloquent and frequently quoted passage of Aristotle’s
-early writings is derived from it, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. 37.
‘It is the source of Bacon’s “idols of the den.” Sir Thomas
Browne writes in Urn Burial: “᾽ς yet discourse in Plato's
den and are but embryo philosophers.” Huxley’s allegory
of “Jack and the Beanstalk” in Evolution and Ethics,
pp. 47 ff. is a variation on it. Berkeley recurs to it, Siris,
§ 263. The Freudians would have still more fantastic inter-
pretations. Cf. Jung, Analytic Psych. p. 952. Eddington
perhaps glances at it when he attributes to the new physics
the frank realization that physical science is concerned with
a world of shadows. Cf. also Complete Poems of Henry
More (ed. Grossart), p. 44:
Like men new made contriv’d into a cave
That ne’er saw light, but in that shadowy pit
Some uncouth might them hoodwink hither drave, etc.
> Cf. Phaedo 111 c ἀναπεπταμένους.
© Cf. Phaedo 67 νυ.
119
PLATO
‘ A “λ ‘ A > ’ . td
kat τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας, ὥστε μένειν TE
> ~ ” ‘ ’ “-“
Β αὐτοῦ' εἴς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὁρᾶν, κύκλῳ δὲ
4 αλὰ ς ‘ “- ὃ “- LO , ,ὔ
τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν,
φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καό-
μενον ὄπισθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ
A ~ Ὁ 2 Li ae > a 291 ,
τῶν δεσμωτῶν ἐπάνω ὁδόν, παρ᾽ ἣν ἰδὲ τειχίον
παρῳκοδομημένον, ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυμὰτοποιοῖς πρὸ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ
e \ 4, 7 « - ΝΜ σ΄. :
ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν. Ὃρῶ, ἔφη. “O
, BY a \ , , “on Os Lin
τοίνυν παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας ἀνθρώπους
σκεύη τε παντοδαπὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ τειχίου καὶ
΄ ‘
515 ἀνδριάντας καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα λίθινά τε Kai ξύλινα καὶ
παντοῖα εἰργασμένα, οἷον εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν φθεγ-
γομένους, τοὺς δὲ σιγῶντας τῶν παραφερόντων.
” " λ , δὲν \ ὃ Aa ty tb
Ἄτοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτό-
- > Sach
mous. ‘Opotovs ἡμῖν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ: τοὺς yap τοιού-
“- δ 3 - ι ἀλλ ἽΝ " ΓΝ
τοὺς πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων οἴει ἄν τι
¢ i »” \ A A \ « ‘ Aa A
ἑωρακέναι ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς
εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσ-
~ / ” ΨΥ / 4
πιπτούσας; lds γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς
B κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἠναγκασμένοι elev διὰ βίου; Τί δὲ
an ~ /
τῶν παραφερομένων; od ταὐτὸν τοῦτο. Τί μήν;
Ei οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἷοί τ᾽ εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ
“- a >
ταῦτα" ἡγεῖ ἂν τὰ παριόντα" αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ὀνομά-
1 αὐτοῦ Hischig: αὐτούς.
2 οὐ ταῦτα D, οὐ ταὐτὰ AFM, οὐκ αὐτὰ ci. Vermehren.
8 παριόντα ser. rece., παρόντα AF DM, ὄντα Iamblichus.
120
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
remain in the same spot, able to look forward only,
and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads.
Picture further the light from a fire burning higher
up and at a distance behind them, and between the
fire and the prisoners and above them a road along
which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of
puppet-shows ® have partitions before the men them-
selves, above which they show the puppets.” “ All
that Isee,” he said. .“ See also, then, men carrying”
past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above
the wall, and human images and shapes of animals
as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material,
some of these bearers presumably speaking and
others silent.” “A strange image you speak of,’ he
said,“ and strange prisoners.”’ “‘ Like te us,” I said;
“for, to begin with, tell me do you think that these
men would have seen anything of themselves or of |
one another except the shadows cast from the fire |
on the wall of the cave that fronted them?” “How
could they,” he said, “if they were compelled to
hold their heads unmoved through life?” “ And
again, would not the same be true of the objects
carried past them?” “Surely.” “If then they
were able to talk to one another, do you not think
that they would suppose that in naming the things
* H. Rackham, Class. Rev. xxix. PP. 77-78, suggests that
the τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς should be transla “δὲ the marion-
ettes’” and be classed with καινοῖς τραγῳδοῖς (Pseph. ap.
Dem. xviii. 116). For the dative he refers to Kuehner-Gerth;
Ai τ τῆς are merely a part of the necessary machinery
of the image. Their shadows are not cast on the wall. The
artificial objects correspond to the things of sense and opinion
in the divided line, and the shadows to the world of refiec-
tions, εἰκόνες.
121
PLATO
σ “- .
ζειν ἅπερ ὁρῷεν; ᾿Ανάγκη. Τί δ᾽; εἰ καὶ ἠχὼ
‘ ~
τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ἔχοι, ὅπότε TIS
~ , ‘
τῶν παριόντων φθέγξαιτο, οἴει ἂν ἄλλο τι αὐτοὺς
ε a Α “- ,
ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ φθεγγόμενον ἢ τὴν παριοῦσαν σκιάν;
‘ n .
Ma A? οὐκ ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη. Παντάπασι δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
ε ~
C οὗ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ
\ ~ ~ :
Tas τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
Σκόπει δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, αὐτῶν λύσιν τε καὶ ἴασιν
noe, - tit Lis , σ΄ ~ oo» >
τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, ola τις av εἴη, εἰ
tA ,ὔ , 3 a « = a,
φύσει τοιάδε ξυμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς: ὁπότε τις λυθείη
καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαί τε καὶ περι-
ἄγειν τὸν αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς
3 7 ΜΝ / A ~ a > o ‘
ἀναβλέπειν, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἀλγοῖ τε καὶ
διὰ τὰς μαρμαρυγὰς ἀδυνατοῖ καθορᾶν ἐκεῖνα, ὧν
τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἑώρα, τί ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἴ
a γο , ¢ , ἀμ a, ἊΨ a
tis αὐτῷ λέγοι, ὅτι τότε μὲν ἑώρα φλυαρίας, νῦν
δὲ μᾶλλόν τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον
* Cf. Parmen. 130 pv, Tim. 51 8, 52 a, and my De
Platonis Idearum doctrina, pp. 24-25; also E. Hoffmann
in Wochenschrift f. klass. Phil. xxxvi. (1919) pp. 196-197.
As we use the word tree of the trees we see, though the
reality (αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι) is the idea of a tree, so they would speak
of the shadows as the world, though the real reference un-
known to them would be to the objects that cause the
shadows, and back of the objects to the things of the “ real”
world of which they are copies. The general meaning,
which is quite certain, is that they would suppose the
shadows to be the realities. The text and the precise turn
of expression are doubtful. See crit. note. παριόντα is
intentionally ambiguous in its application to the shadows
or to the objects which cast them. They suppose that the
names refer to the passing shadows, but (as we know) they
122
ee
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
that they saw* they were naming the passing objects?”
“ Necessarily.” ‘* And if their prison had an echo® .
from the wall opposite them, when one of the passers-
by uttered.a sound, do you think that they would
suppose anything else than the passing shadow to
be the speaker?”’ “By Zeus, I do not,” said he.
“Then in every way such prisoners would deem
reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the
artificial objects.” “‘ Quite inevitably,’ he said.
“ Consider, then, what would be the manner of the
release 5 and healing from these bonds and this folly
if in the course of nature? something of this sort
should happen to them: When one was freed from
his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and
turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes
to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and, because
of the dazzle and glitter of the light, was unable to
discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw, |
what do you suppose would be his answer if someone
told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat
and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality
really apply to the objects. Ideas and particulars are hom-
onymous. Assuming a slight illogicality we can get some-
what the same meaning from the text ταὐτά. “Do you
not think that they would identify the passing objects
(which strictly speaking they do not know) with what they
saw 9”
Cf. also P. Corssen, Philologische Wochenschrift, 1913,
p. 286. He prefers οὐκ αὐτά and renders: “Sie wiirden in
nag Sie sahen, das Voriibergehende selbst zu benennen
auben.”
ὃ The echo and the voices (515 a) merely complete the
picture.
© Cf. Phaedo 67 νυ λύειν, and 82 D λύσει τε Kal καθαρμῷ.
λύσις became technical in Neoplatonism.
# Lit. “by nature.” φύσις in Plato often suggests reality
and truth,
123
E
516
PLATO r
” “ , > , / ‘ ‘
ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερα βλέποι, καὶ δὴ καὶ
-“ ~ ~ yy.
ἕκαστον τῶν παριόντων δεικνὺς αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζοι
ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἔστιν; οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν
> A {niet Ge Ἀ 4 , ¥ ,
ἀπορεῖν τε ἂν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὁρώμενα
3 ἢ “- hy 2)
ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα; Πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη.
II. Οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι
Ἁ a rt
αὐτὸν βλέπειν, ἀλγεῖν τε ἂν τὰ ὄμματα καὶ
~ : } *
φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ δύναται
καθορᾶν, καὶ νομίζειν ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα
τῶν δεικνυμένων; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Et δέ, ἦν δ᾽
» ~ »
ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἕλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας
τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους καὶ μὴ aveln πρὶν
ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ
ὀδυνᾶσθαί τε ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἑλκόμενον, καὶ
> \ A A ~ ” 7 A Ἅ » A
ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς av ἔχοντα τὰ
»» \ ς aA 29> =A a 4 ~ -
ὄμματα μεστὰ ὁρᾶν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἕν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν
λεγομένων ἀληθῶν; Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἐξαίφνης γε.
> 0 7 ὃ / t 8 / > ΝΜ > “λλ, \ »,
ὑνηθείας δή, οἶμαι, δέοιτ᾽ ἄν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω
ὄψεσθαι: καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς ἂν ῥᾷστα καθ-
ορῷ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τά τε τῶν
3 / \ A ~ ” » « A
ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἴδωλα, ὕστερον δὲ
αὐτά: ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν
οὐρανὸν νύκτωρ ἂν ῥᾷον θεάσαιτο, προσβλέπων τὸ
Β τῶν ἄστρων τε καὶ σελήνης φῶς, ἢ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν
* The entire passage is an obvious allegory of the painful
experience of one whose false conceit of ett is tested
by the Socratic elenchus. Cf. Soph. 230 B-p, and for ἀπορεῖν
Meno 80 a, 84 s-c, Theaet. 149 a, Apol. 23 pv. Cf. also
What Plato Said, p. 513 on Meno 80 a, Eurip. Hippol.
Q47 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμαν ὀδυνᾷ, “it is painful to have
one’s opinions set right,” and infra 517 a, supra 494 νυ.
> Cf. Theaet. 175 5, Boethius, Cons. iii. 12 “ quicunque
in superum diem mentem ducere quaeritis’’; infra 529 a,
521 c, and the Neoplatonists’ use of ἀνάγειν and_ their
124
oO
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
and turned toward more real things, he saw more
truly? Andif also one should point out to him each
of the passing objects and constrain him by questions
to say what it is, do you not think that he would be
at kes « and that he would regard what he formerly
saw as more real than the things now pointed out
to him?” “Far more real,” he said.
II. “ And if he were compelled to look at the light -
itself, would not that pain his eyes, and would he not |
turn away and flee to those things which he is able
to discern and regard them as in. very deed more
clear and exact than the objects pointed out?”
“Tt is so,” he said. “‘‘ And if,” said I, “‘ someone
should drag him thence by force up the ascent ® which
is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had
drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not
think that he would find it painful to be so haled
along, and would chafe at it, and when he came out
into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its ~
beams so that he would not be able to see “ even one of
the things that we call real?” ‘“ Why, no, not im-
mediately,” he said. ‘Then there would be need
of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the
things higher up. And at first he would most easily
discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses.
or reflections in water? of men and other things,
and later, the things themselves, and from these he
would go on to contemplate the appearances in the
heayens and heaven itself, more easily by night, look-
ing at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day
° ical” virtue and interpretation. C/. Leibniz, ed.
Gerhardt, vii. 270.
᾽ 4; Laws 897 Ὁ, Phaedo 99 ν.
* Cf
Phaedo 99 p. Stallbaum says this was imitated by
Themistius, Orat. iv. p.51 Β΄ -
125
PLATO
τὸν ἥλιόν τε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
Τελευταῖον δή, οἶμαι, τὸν ἥλιον, οὐκ ἐν ὕδασιν
οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἕδρᾳ φαντάσματα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽
αὐτὸν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ χώρᾳ δύναιτ᾽ ἂν
ἰδεῖ ᾿ , ’ > Ai
κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν. ᾿Αναγκαῖον,
ΝΜ " κ a> nn ” / ‘
ἔφη. Kai μετὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ
αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὗτος ὃ τάς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ
ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ
C ὁρωμένῳ τόπῳ, καὶ ἐκείνων, ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων,
τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἴτιος. Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπὶ
ταῦτα ἂν μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ἔλθοι. Τί οὖν; ἀναμιμνη-
~ ~ ΠῚ δὰ
σκόμενον αὐτὸν τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ
σοφίας καὶ τῶν τότε ξυνδεσμωτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἴει αὑτὸν
\ ? / “ ~ 4 eS -
μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἐλεεῖν;
Καὶ μάλα. Τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς
’ > > 4 ‘ ,ὔ | » /
ἦσαν τότε παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων Kal γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθ-
ορῶντι τὰ παριόντα, καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα
ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα
πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ δυνατώτατα ἀπο-
μαντευομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἥξειν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν
- A “- 3
ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ
ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας, ἢ τὸ
ae "4 Ἅ ’ ‘ / 4,
τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἂν πεπονθέναι καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι
α It is probably a mistake to look for a definite symbolism
in all the details of this description. There are more stages
of progress than the proportion of four things calls for. All
that Plato’s thought requires is the general contrast between
an unreal and a real world, and the goal of the rise from one
to the other in the contemplation of the sun, or the idea of
good. Cf. 517 B-c. > i.e. a foreign medium.
¢ Cf. 508 8, and for the idea of good as the cause of all
things cf. on 509 5, and Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi.
P. Corssen, Philol. Wochenschrift, 1913, pp. 287-288, un-
necessarily proposes to emend ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων to ὧν σκιὰς €. Or
126
δ ἐλιὰ
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
the sun and the sun’s light.*” “‘ Of course.” “ And
so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon
the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections
in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting,’ but in
and by itself in its own place.” “‘ Necessarily,’ he
said. ‘“ And at this point he would infer and con-
clude that this it is that provides the seasons and the
courses of the year and presides over all things in the
visible region, and isin some sort the cause ¢ of all these
things that they had seen.”’ “‘ Obviously,” he said,
“that would be the next step.” “‘ Well then, if he
recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed
for wisdom there, and his fellow-bondsmen, do you
not think that he would count himself happy in the
change and pity them4?” ‘‘ He would indeed.” “And
if there had been honours and commendations among
them which they bestowed on one another and prizes
for the man who is quickest to make out the shadowsas
they pass and best able to remember their customary
precedences,sequences andco-existences,’ andsomost
successful in guessing at what was to come, do you
think he would be very keen about such rewards, and |
that he would envy and emulate those who were
honoured by these prisoners and lorded it among
them, or that he would feel with Homer “ and greatly
ὧν σφεῖς σκιὰς é., “ne sol umbrarum, quas videbant, auctor
fuisse di » cum potius earum rerum, quarum umbras vide-
bant, fuerit auctor.” 4 Cf.on 486 a, p. 10, note a.
* Another of Plato’s anticipations of modern thought. This
is precisely the Humian, Comtian, positivist, pragmatist view |
of causation. Cf. Gorg. 501 a τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην |
μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γἔγνεσθαι, “* relying on routine and |
habitude for merely preserving a memory of what is wont to |
result.” (Loeb tr.
7 Odyss. xi. 489. The quotation is almost as apt as that
at the beginning of the Crito.
127
ῬΩΛΤΘΙ ΜΗ AHT
ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὲ
ἀκλήρῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἂν πεπονθέναι μᾶλλον ἢ cd
E τέ δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκείνως ζῆν; Οὕτως, ἔφη,
οἶμαι, πᾶν μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι ἂν δέξασθαι ἘΦ
ἐκείνως. Kat τόδε δὴ ἐννόησον, ἦν δ᾽ eye €
πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβὰς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν. Bion
καθίζοιτο, ἄρ᾽ οὐ σκότους ἂν πλέως" σχοίη τοὺς
ὀφθαλμούς, ἐξαίφνης ἥκων ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου; Καὶ
μάλα γ᾽ “ἔφη. Τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιὰς ἐκεΐνας πάλιν εἰ
δέοι αὐτὸν ,γνωματεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι. τοῖς. ἀεὶ
517 δεσμώταις € ἐκείνοις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμβλυώττει, πρὶν. κατα-
στῆναι τὰ ὄμματα, οὗτος δ᾽ ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος
εἴη τῆς συνηθείας, dp’ οὐ γέλωτ᾽ ἂν παράσχοι, καὶ
λέγοιτο ἃ ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀναβὰς ἄ ἄνω διε ένος
ἥκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι
ἄνω ἰέναι; καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀν-
ἄγειν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀπο-
κτείνειν, ἀποκτεινύναι ἄν"; Σφόδρ α γὴ » ἔφη.
III. Terni τοίνυν, ἦν 15 ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ὦ
φίλε Ῥλαύκων, προσαπτέον ἅπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν
Β λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν. δι᾽ ὄψεως φαινομένην ἕδ
τοῦ “δεσμωτηρίου οἰκήσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ 70 τοῦ
πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει: τὴν δὲ
ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν
1 ἂν πλέως Stallb., ἀνάπλεως ss., ἂν ἀνάπλεως Baiter. See
Adam ad loc. on the text.
2 ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτεινῦναι ἄν F: ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν
AD lamblichus: ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι αὖ M, ἀποκτείνειαν
ἄν ci. Baiter.
@ On the metaphor of darkness and light cf. also Soph. 254 a.
δ Like the philosopher in the court-room. Cf. Theaet.
172 co, 178 ὁ ff., Gorg. 484 υ- Ὁ Cf. also supra on 487 c-p.
515 Ὁ, infra 517 D, Soph. 216 Ὁ, Laches 196 58, Phaedr. 249 τ».
128
᾿
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a
landless man, and endure anything rather than opine
with them and live that life?” ‘‘ Yes,” he said, “I
think that he would choose to endure anything rather
than such a life.” ‘“‘ And consider this also,” said I,
“if such a one should go down again and take his old
place would he not get his eyes full? of darkness, thus
suddenly coming out of the sunlight?” “ He would
indeed.” ‘‘ Now if he should be required to contend
with these etual prisoners in ἡ evaluating ᾿ these
shadows while his vision was still dim and before his
eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time re-
quired for habituation would not be very short—would
he not provoke laughter, and would it not be said of
him that he had returned from his journey aloft with
his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to
attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay
hands on and to kill the man who tried to release
them and lead them up, would they not kill him *?”’
“* They certainly would,” he said.
- ΠῚ. “ This image then, dear Glaucon, we must
apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening
the region revealed through sight to the habitation
of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power
of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and
the contemplation of the things above is the soul’s
* An obvious allusion to the fate of Socrates. For other
Stinging allusions to this ef. Gorg. 486 B, 521 c, Meno 100
B-c. Cf. Hamlet’s “ Wormwood, wormwood”’ (11. ii. 191).
‘The text is disputed. See crit. note. A. Drachmann, “ Zu
Platons Staat,”” Hermes, 1926, p. 110, thinks that an οἴει or
something like it must be understood as having preceded,
at least in Plato’s thought, and that ἀποκτείνειν can be
taken as a gloss or variant of ἀποκτεινύναι and the correct
hg peg must be λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι ἄν. See also Adam
ad loc.
VOL. 11 K 129
[
C
D
PLATO NAN TTL
τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεὶς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει τῆς
γ᾽ ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκούει"
θεὸς δέ που οἷδεν, εἰ ἀληθὴς. οὖσα τυγχάνει. τὰ
δ᾽ οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ι ἐν τῷ
γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις
ὁρᾶσθαι, ὀφθεῖσα δὲ συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς ἄρα
πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ἔν
τε ὁρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἔν
τε γοητῷ αὐτὴ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρα-
σχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα
ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. Συνοίομαι,
ἔφη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὅν γε δὴ τρόπον δύναμαι. ἴθι
τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ τόδε ξυνοιήθητι., καὶ μὴ
θαυμάσῃς ὅτι οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες οὐκ ἐθέλουσι
τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνω ἀεὶ ἐπείγον-
ται αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ διατρίβειν: εἰκὸς γάρ που οὕτως,
εἴπερ αὖ κατὰ τὴν προειρημένην εἰκόνα τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει.
Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τόδε οἴει τι θαυμαστόν,
εἰ ἀπὸ θείων, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά
τις ἐλθὼν κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα
γελοῖος ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρὶν ἱκανῶς συνήθης
* Of. 508 B-c, where Arnou (Le Désir de dieu dans la
philos. de Plotin, p. 48) and Robin (La Théorie plat. de
Vamour, p pp. 83-84) make τόπος νοητός refer to le ciel astro-
nomique as opposed to the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος of the Phaedrus
247 Α-Ἐ 248 B, 248 pD-249 a. The phrase νοητὸς κόσμος, often
attributed to Plato, does not occur in his writings.
ὃ Plato was much less prodigal of affirmation about meta-
a ultimates than interpreters who take his myths
plas have supposed. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515, on
eno 86 B.
130
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
ascension to the intelligible region,* you will not miss
my. surmise, since that is what you desire to hear.
But God knows? whether it is true. But, at any rate,
m dream: as it appears to me is that in the region
- known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen
is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs
point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the
cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful,
giving birth‘ in the visible world to light, and the
author of light and itself in the intelligible world
being the authentic source of truth and reason, and
that anyone who is to act wisely? in private or public
must have caught sight of this.” “I concur,” he
said, ° “so far as I am able.” ‘Come then,” I said,
: “and j join me in this further thought, and do not be
surprised that those who have attained to this height
are not willing’ to occupy themselves with the affairs
of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and
the yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I
take it, is likely if in this point too the likeness of
our image holds.” “ Yes, itis likely.” “ And again,
do you think it at all strange,” said I, “if a man
returning from divine contemplations to the petty
miseries’ of men cuts a sorry figure’ and appears.most
ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom,
and before he has become sufficiently accustomed
© Cf.
. is ws the main point for the Republic. The significance
of the ‘lea of good for cosmogony is just glanced at and
reserved for the Timaeus. Cf. on 508 B, p. 102, note a and
conooates For the preicel application cf. Meno 81 ν-Ἑ.
also Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxv
᾿ τό OL eal Ἰ. on 347 p, p. 81, note d.
9 Of Theaet. 174 c ἀσχημοσύνη.
131
PLATO
γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐν
δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἀγωγέξ ἐόθαῖ περὶ τῶν
τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ “ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, καὶ
Ε διαμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὑπολαμβάνεται
δ18
ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην μὴ πώποτε
ἰδόντων; Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν θαυμαστόν, ἔφη. ᾿Αλλ᾽
εἰ νοῦν γε ἔχοι τις, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μεμνῇτ᾽ ἄν, ὅτι
διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμ-
μασιν, ἔκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ
ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς" ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομίσας
γίγνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, ὁπότε ἴδοι θορυβόὺ-
μένην τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦσάν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἂν
ἀλογίστως γελῷ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπισκοποῖ ἂν πότερον ἐκ
φανοτέρου βίου ἥκουσα ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἐσκότωται ἢ
ἐξ ἀμαθίας πλείονος εἰς φανότερον ἰοῦσα ὑπὸ λαμ-
προτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ
τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου,
τὴν δὲ ἐλεήσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ βούλοιτο,
ἧττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ εἴη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ
τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἡκούσῃ. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη,
μετρίως λέγεις.
IV. Δεῖ δή, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ
αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν οὐχ οἵαν τινὲς
ἐπαγγελλόμενοί φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι.
α For the contrast between the. philosophical and the
pettifogging soul cf. Theaet. 173 c-175 £. Cf. also on
517 a, p. 128, note ὁ.
ὃ For ἀγαλμάτων ef. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic,
p. 237, Soph. 234 c, Polit. 303 c.
182
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
to the environing darkness, he is compelled in court-
rooms ¢ or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of
justice or the images? that cast the shadows and to
wi in debate about the notions of these things
in the minds of those who have never seen justice
itself?” ‘It would be by no means strange,” he
said. “ But a sensible man,” I said, “‘ would re-
member that there are two distinct disturbances of
' the eyes arising from two causes, according as the
_ shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to
light,° and, believing that the same thing happens
_ to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed _
and unable to discern something, he would not laugh?
unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming
from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the
unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the
deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world
and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision.¢
And so/hewoulddeem the one happy inits experience
and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased
him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laugh-
able than that at the expense of the soul that had
come down from the light above.’’ “* That is a very
fair statement,” he said.
IV. “Then, if this is true, our view of these
matters must be this, that education is not in reality
what some people proclaim it to be in their profes-
* Aristotle, De an. 422 a 20 f. says the over-bright is ἀόρατον
but otherwise than the dark.
4 Cf. Theaet. 175 v-¥.
* Lit. “or whether coming from a deeper ignorance into a
more luminous world, it is dazzled by the brilliance of a
greater light.”
7 i.e. only after that. For οὕτω δή in this sense cf, 484 ν,
429 p, 443 π, Charm. 171 kB.
133
ῬΟΑΤΟΙ ΠΗ ΠΗ
C φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης
σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι, οἷον τυφλοῖ is ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν
ἐντιθέντες. Φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. O “δέ γε ee
Adyos, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, σημαίνει, ταύτην ὴν ἐνοῦσι
ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ; ὄργανον,
im
καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατὸν
ἣν ἄλλως ἢ ἢ ξὺν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ
φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω ξὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ :
ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιάκτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ
ὃν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ yer
ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναί φαμεν τἀγα-
aa
Oov- ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Τούτου τοίνυν, ἦν. δ᾽ ἐγώ,
αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη τῆς περιαγωγῆς,. τίνα τρόπον
ὡς ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται,
οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν
αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι of
ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι. “Eouxe γάρ, ἔφη.
4 ἐπαγγελλόμενοι connotes the boastfulness of their claims.
Cf. Protag. 319 a, Gorg. 447 c, Laches 186 c, Buthyd. 4788,
Isoc. Soph. 1, 5, 9, 10, Antid. 193, Xen. Mem. iii. 1. 1,
i. 2. 8, Aristot. Rhet. 1402 a 25.
ὃ Ch. Theognis 429 ff. Stallbaum com Eurip. _ Hippo i
917 f. Similarly Anon. Theaet. Comm. (Berlin, 1908),
48.4 καὶ δεῖν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἐνθέσεως ΩΣ ἀλλὰ ava Beet
Cf. also St. Augustine: “* Nolite putare rhea tyudllet eae
aliquid discere ab homine. Admonere possumus per stre-
pitum vocis nostrae;*’ and Emerson’s “ἢ deri trictly speaking, it
is not instruction but provocation that I can receive from
another soul.”
¢ περιακτέον is probably a reference to the περίακτοι or tri-
angular prisms on each side of the stage. They revolved on
an axis and had different scenes painted on their three faces.
Many scholars are of the opinion that they were not known
in the classical period, as they are mentioned only by late
134
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
sions.* What they aver is that they can put true
knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if
they were inserting? vision into blind eyes.”” “‘They
do indeed,” he said. “ But our present argument
indicates,” said I, “that the true analogy for this
indwelling power in the soul and the instrument
whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that
could not be converted to the light from the darkness
except by turning the whole body. Even so this
organ of knowledge must be turned around from
the world of becoming together with the entire
soul, like the scene-shifting periact ὁ in the theatre,
until the soul is able to endure the contemplation
of essence and the brightest region of being. And
this, we say, is the good,? do we not?” “Yes.”
“ Of this very thing, then,” I said, “ there might be
an art, an art of the speediest and most effective
shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of pro-
ducing vision in it, but on the assumption that it
possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and
does not look where it should, an art of bringing this
about.” “ Yes, that seems likely,” he said. “‘ Then
writers; but others do not consider this conclusive evidence,
as a number of classical plays seem to have required some-
thing of the sort. Cf. O. Navarre in Daremberg-Saglio 8.0.
Machi . 1469.
ἃ Hard-headed distaste for the unction or seeming mysti-
cism of Plato’s language should not blind us to the plain
meaning. Unlike Schopenhauer, who affirms the moral
will to be unchangeable, Plato says that men may be preached
and drilled into ordinary morality, but that the degree of
their intelligence is an unalterable endowment of nature.
Some teachers will concur.
* Plato often distinguishes the things that do or do not
admit of reduction to an art or science. Cf. on 488 £, p. 22,
note 6. Adam is mistaken in taking it ““ Education (ἡ racdeia)
would be an art,” etc.
135
E
519
PLATO
Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς
κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος"
τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμ-
ποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσί τε καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν" ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι
παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς χάνει, ὡς
ἔοικεν, οὖσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν o οὐ έποτε ἀπ-
dAdvow, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρήσιμόν. τε καὶ
ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἄχρηστον αὖ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται.
ἢ οὔπω ἐννενόηκας, τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μέν.
σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον Kk
ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα ἐφ᾽ ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ τῶν
ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακίᾳ δ᾽ ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν,
ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσούτῳ πλείω
κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τοῦτο
μέντοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ
παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τὰς τῆς
Β γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἵ δὴ
« This then is Plato’s answer (intended from the first) to
the question whether virtue can be taught, debated in the
Protagoras and Meno. The intellectual virtues (to use Aris-
ΜΕ s term), broadly speaking, cannot be taught; they are
ift. And the highest moral virtue is inseparable from
rig tly directed intellectual virtue. Ordinary moral virtue
is not rightly taught in democratic Athens, but comes by
the grace of God. Ina reformed state it could be systemati-
cally inculecated and “taught.” Cf. What Plato Said,
pp. 511-512 on Meno 70 a. But we need not infer that
lato did not believe in. mental discipline. Cf. Charles Fox,
Educational Psychology, p. 164 *“‘ The conception of mental
discipline is at least as old as Plato, as may be seen from the
seventh book of the Republic . .
> Of. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 2 14-17 ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους.
Plato does not explicitly name “‘ ethical’’ and “‘ intellectual”
virtues. Cf. Fox, op. cit. p. 104 ‘ Plato correctly believed
136
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
the other so-called virtues α of the soul do seem akin
to those of the body. For it is true that where they
do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by
habit® and practice. But the excellence of thought,°
it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality, a thing
that never loses its potency, but, according to the
direction of its conversion, becomes useful and bene-
ficent, or, again, useless and harmful. Have you
never observed in those who are popularly spoken of
as bad, but smart men,’ how keen is the vision of the
little soul,* how quick it is to discern the things that
interest it,’ a proof that it is not a poor vision which
it has, but one forcibly enlisted in the service of
evil, so that the sharper its sight the more mischief
it accomplishes?” 1 certainly have,” he said.
“ Observe then,” said I, “ that this part of such a
soul, if it had been hammered from childhood, and
had thus been struck free’ of the leaden weights, so
that all virtues except wisdom could be acquired habitually
¢ Plato uses such synonyms as φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς, διάνοια,
etc., as Suits his purpose and context. He makes no attempt
to define and discriminate them with impracticable Aristo-
telian meticulousness.
ἃ Cf. Theaet. 176 pv, Laws 689 c-p, Cic. De offic. i. 19, and
also 819 a.
_* Cf. Theaet. 195 a, ibid. 173 a σμικροὶ. . . τὰς ψυχάς,
Marcus Aurelius’ ψυχάριον εἶ βαστάζων νεκρόν, Swinburne’s
** A little soul for a little bears up this corpse which is man”
(“Hymn to Proserpine,” in fine), Tennyson's “If half the little
soul is dirt.”
7 Lit. “ Toward which it is turned.”
* The meaning is plain, the precise nature of the image
that carries it is doubtful. Jowett’s “circumcision’’ was
suggested by Stallbaum’s “ purgata ac circumcisa,’’ but
carries alien associations. The whole may be compared
with the incrustation of the soul, infra 611 c-p, and with
Phaedo 81 8 f.
137
σ
PLATO .
25 ὃ a ‘ 4 ¢ ὃ a ‘ λ ’
ἐδωδαῖς τε καὶ τοιούτων ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνείαις
προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι κάτω' στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς
a ” a ,» 5» >
ψυχῆς ὄψιν: dv εἰ ἀπαλλαγὲν περιεστρέφετο εἰς
3 ~ \ > ~ Ἅ A A ~ ~~ Pim
τἀληθῆ, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν
> θ ’ 395 7 ε,’ σ ᾿ A é > a A
ἀνθρώπων ὀξύτατα ἑώρα, ὥσπερ Kal ἐφ᾽ ἃ νῦν
/ ie Ὃς ” , 34
τέτραπται. Ἑϊκός ye, ἔφη. Ti δαί; τόδε οὐκ
εἰκός, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων,
μήτε τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπείρους
~ “- » ΑΣ
ἱκανῶς ἄν ποτε πόλιν ἐπιτροπεῦσαι, μήτε τοὺς ἐν
παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους, τοὺς μὲν
ὅτι σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἕνα, οὗ atoxalo-
μένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ
τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ὅτι ἑκόντες εἶναι οὐ
πράξουσιν, ἡγούμενοι ἐν μακάρων νήσοις ζῶντες
” > / > ~ ” «ε / ᾽
ἔτι ἀπῳκίσθαι; ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη. ‘Hperepov δὴ
ἔργον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῶν οἰκιστῶν τάς τε βελτίστας
φύσεις ἀναγκάσαι ἀφικέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μάθημα ὃ
» ~ / ” ΄ > A
ev τῷ πρόσθεν ἔφαμεν εἶναι μέγιστον, ἰδεῖν τε TO
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν; καὶ
ἐπειδὰν ἀναβάντες ἱκανῶς ἴδωσι, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν
αὐτοῖς ὃ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται. Τὸ ποῖον δή; Τὸ
> ~ δ᾽ > 7 tA ‘ 20 “λ ΄
αὐτοῦ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καταμένειν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν πάλιν
1 κάτω Hermann: περὶ κάτω Μ85. : περὶ τὰ κάτω Iamblichus.
« Or “eye of the mind.” Cf. 533 p, Sym. 219 a, Soph.
254 a, Aristot. Eth. 1144 a 30, and the parallels and imita-
tions collected by Gomperz, Apol. der Heilkunst, 166-167.
Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 xr, Ovid,
Met. xv. 64:
. . » quae natura negabat
visibus humanis, oculis ea peetoris hausit.
Cf. Friedlander, Platon, i. pp. 12-13, 15, and perhaps Odyssey,
i. 115, Marc. Aurel. iv. 29 καταμύειν τῷ νοερῷ ὄμματι.
» For likely and necessary cf. on 485 c, p. 6, note ¢.
138
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
to speak, of our birth and becoming, which attaching
themselves to it by food and similar pleasures and
gluttonies turn downwards the vision of the soul?
—if, I say, freed from these, it had suffered a con-
version towards the things that are real and true,
that same faculty of the same men would have been
most keen in its vision of the higher things, just as
it is for the things toward which it is now turned.”
“Tt is likely,” he said. “ Well, then,” said I, “is
not this also likely ὃ and a necessary consequence of
what has been said, that neither could men who
are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever
adequately preside over a state, nor could those
who had been permitted to linger on to the end
in the pursuit of culture—the one because they
have no single aim 5 and purpose in life to which all
τ their actions, public and private, must be directed,
and the others, because they will not voluntarily
engage in action, believing that while still living
they have been transported to the Islands of the
Blest.2” “‘ True,” he said. “ΤῈ is the duty of us, the
founders, then,” said I, “‘ to compel the best natures
to attain the knowledge which we pronounced
the greatest, and to win to the vision of the good,
to scale that ascent, and when they have reached
the heights and taken an adequate view, we must
not allow what is now permitted.” ““ Whatis that?”
“That they should linger there,” I said, “‘ and refuse
* σκοπόν : this is what distinguishes the philosophic states-
man from the opportunist politician. Cf. 452 τ, Laws
962 a-z, Ὁ, Unity of Plato’s Thought, Ὁ. 18, n. 102.
* Cf. 540 5, Gorg. 526 c, infra 520 τὸ ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ and
Phaedo 114 c, 109 8. Because they will still suppose that
they are “building Jerusalem in England’s green and
pleasant land” (Blake).
139
PLATO
καταβαίνειν παρ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς δεσμώτας μηδὲ
μετέχειν τῶν παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις πόνων τε καὶ τιμῶν,
εἴτε φαυλότεραι εἴτε σπουδαιότεραι.. Ἔπειτ᾽, ἔφη,
ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χεῖὶ ἴρον or
δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὃν ἄμεινον;
EV. ᾿Επελάθου, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πάλιν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι
νόμῳ οὐ τοῦτο “μέλει, ὅπως ἕν τι γένος ἐν πόλει
διαφερόντως εὖ πράξει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τοῦτο
μηχανᾶται ἐγγενέσθαι, ξυναρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας
πειθοῖ τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, ποιῶν μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις
520 τῆς ὠφελείας, ἣν ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν δυνατοὶ
ὦσιν | ὠφελεῖν, καὶ “αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν τοιούτους ᾿ ἄνδρας
ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφίῃ τρέπεσθαι ὅ ὅπῃ. ἕκαστος
βούλεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα καταχρῆται αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ
τὸν ξύνδεσμον τῆς πόλεως. ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη: ἐπ-
ἐλαθόμην γάρ. Σκέψαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, ὦ ὦ Γλαύκων,
ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀδικήσομεν τοὺς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν φιλοσόφους
γιγνομένους, ἀλλὰ δίκαια πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐροῦμεν,
προσαναγκάζοντες τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαί τε καὶ
Β φυλάττειν. ἐροῦμεν γάρ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις
πόλεσι τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι
τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς πόνων" αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται
ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείας, δίκην δ᾽ ἔχει τό
γε αὐτοφυές, μηδενὶ τροφὴν ὀφεῖλον, μηδ᾽ ἐκτίνειν
* Cf. infra 539 πὶ and Laws 803 B-c, and on 520 ¢, Huxley,
Evolution and Ethics, p. 53 “‘ the hero of our story descended
the bean-stalk and came back to the common world,” etc.
> Cf. Vol. I. pp. 314-315 on 419.
¢ i.e. happiness, not of course exceptional happiness.
4 Persuasion and compulsion are often bracketed or con-
trasted. Of. also Laws 661 c, 7292 5, 711 c, Rep. 548 B.
¢ Of. 369 c ff. The reference there however is only to the
economic division of labour. For the idea that laws should
140
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
to go down again? among those bondsmen and share
their labours and honours, whether they are of less or
of greater worth.”’ “Do you mean to say that we
must do them this wrong, and compel them to live
an inferior life when the better is in their power ἢ ”
V. “You have again forgotten,” my friend,” said I,
“ that the law is not concerned with the special happi-
ness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce
this condition‘ in the city as a whole, harmonizing
and adapting the citizens to one another by per-
suasion and compulsion,’ and requiring them to im-
part to one another any benefit* which they are
severally able to bestow upon the community, and
that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it
may allow each to take what course pleases him, but
with a view to using them for the binding together of
the commonwealth.”’ ‘“‘ True,” he said, “1 did for-
get it.” “‘ Observe, then, Glaucon,” said I, “that
we shall not be wronging, either, the philosophers who
arise among us, but that we can justify our action
when we constrain them to take charge of the other
citizens and be their guardians. For we will say to
them that it is natural that men of similar quality
who spring up in other cities should not share in the
labours there. For they grow up spontaneously? from
no volition of the government in the several states,
and it is justice that the self-grown, indebted to none
for its breeding, should not be zealous either to pay
be for the good of the whole state cf. 420 s ff., 466 a, 341-342,
Laws 715 8, 757 νυ, 875 a.
1 Noblesse oblige. This idea is now a commonplace of
communist orations. -
5 αὐτόματοι : cf. Protag. 320 a, Euthyd. 982 οσ. For the
thought that there are a few men naturally good in any
state cf. also Laws 951 B, 642 c-p.
141
PLATO H
Tw προθυμεῖσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα" ὑμᾶς δ᾽ ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν
τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν
ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐ ἐγεννήσαμεν, ἀμεινόν᾽ τε
C καὶ τελεώτερον ἐκείνων πεπαιδευμένους καὶ μᾶλλον
δυνατοὺς ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν. καταβατέον οὖν
ἐν μέρει ἑκάστῳ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ξυνοίκησιν᾽ καὶ
ξυνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι: ξυνε wld
yap μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ, καὶ γνώσεσθε
ἕκαστα τὰ εἴδωλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν, διὰ τὸ πάλη
ἑωρακέναι καλῶν. τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι:
καὶ οὕτω ὕπαρ ἡμῖν. καὶ ὑμῖν ἡ πόλις οἰκήσεται,
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ὄναρ, ὡς νῦν. αἱ πολλαὶ ὑπὸ σκιαμαχούν-
D τῶν τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ
ἄρχειν οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μεγάλου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ 6: ὄντος.
τὸ δέ που “ἀληθὲς ὧδ᾽ ἔχει: ἐν πόλει ἧ ἥκιστα
πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ “μέλλοντες ἄρξειν, ταύτην
ἄριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι, τὴν
δ᾽ ἐναντίους ἄρχοντας σχοῦσαν ἐναντίως. Πάνυ
« ΟἽ Isoc. Archidamus 108 ἀποδῶμεν τὰ τροφεῖα τῇ πατρίδι.
Stallbaum refers also to Phoenissae 44, For the country as
τροφός see Vol. I. p. 303, note 6 on 414 £.
> Of. Polit. 301 v-®, Xen. Cyr. v. 1. 24, Oecon. 7. 32-33. —
¢ For τελεώτερον... πεπαιδευμένους ef. Prot. 342 πὶ τελέως
πεπαιδευμένου. :
ἃ They must descend into the cave again. ἔς infra 539 πὶ
and Laws 803 s-c. Cf. Burnet, Karly Greek Philos. pp. 89-
90: ‘‘It was he alone, so far as we know, that insisted on
philosophers descending by turns into the cave from which
they had been a eer and coming to the help of their -
former fellow-prisoners.’’. He agrees with Stewart or ‘yths
of Plato, p. 252, πη. 2) that Plato had in mind the ΤΡΑΝᾺ
κατάβασις εἰς “Αιδου to ‘‘rescue the spirits in prison.” Cf.
Wright, Harvard Studies, xvii. p. 139 and Complete Poems
of Henry More, pp. xix-xx “ All which is agreeable to that
opinion of Plato: That some descend hither to declare the
Being and Nature of the Gods; and for the greater Health,
142
πῶ
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
to anyone the price of its nurture.* But you we have
engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city
to be, as it were, king-bees ὃ and leaders in the hive.
You have received a better and more complete
education® than the others, and you are more capable
of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go?
then, in his turn, to the habitation of the others
and accustom yourselves to the observation of the
obseure things there. For once habituated you will
discern them infinitely* better than the dwellers
there, and you will know what each of the ‘ idols ’ is
and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen
the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good.
So our city will be governed by us and you with
waking minds, and not, as most cities now which are
inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream’ by men
who fight one another for shadows” and wrangle for
office as if that were a great good, when the truth is
that the city in which those who are to rule are least
eager to hold office‘ must needs be best administered
and most free from dissension, and the state that gets
the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this.”
Purity and Perfection of this Lower World.” This is taking
Plato somewhat too literally and confusing him with
Plotinus.
* For μυρίῳ ef. Eurip. Androm. 701.
7 i.e. images, Bacon’s “ idols of the den.”
5 Plato is fond of the contrast, ὕπαρ. . . ὄναρ. Cf. 476 c,
Phaedr. 277 το, Phileb. 36 ©, 65 8, Polit. 277 v, 278 &,
Theaet. 158 5, Rep. 574 νυ, 576 5, Tim. 71 τ, Laws 969 8,
also 533 B-c.
* Cf. on 586 c, p. 393; Shelley, Adonais st. 39 “‘ keep with
phantoms an unprofitable strife’; Arnold, ‘* Dover Beach ἢ":
..- a darkling plain...
Where ignorant armies clash by night.
* Cf. on 517 ς, p. 131, note 6.
143
-Ὡ-Ὡ-- ΟΝ»
Ε
521
ee
B
PLATO
\. Ev ” > , » ς« a ” ¢
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ᾿Απειθήσουσιν οὖν ἡμῖν, οἴει, οἱ
/ ied > 4 \ > > 5
τρόφιμοι ταῦτ᾽ ἀκούοντες, καὶ οὐκ ἐθελήσουσι
ξυμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἕκαστοι ἐν μέρει, τὸν δὲ
πολὺν χρόνον μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ;
᾿Αδύνατον, ἔφη: δίκαια γὰρ δὴ δικαίοις ἐπι-
τάξομεν. παντὸς μὴν μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον
αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἷσι τὸ ἄρχειν, τοὐναντίον τῶν νῦν
Sis Sie δ 3 ΄, “ ae ἐν aN)
ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει ἀρχόντων. Οὕτω yap ἔχει, Hv ὃ
ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε: εἰ μὲν βίον ἐξευρήσεις ἀμείνω τοῦ
ἄρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἄρξειν, ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ
γενέσθαι πόλις εὖ οἰκουμένη: ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ
»* ε ~ »” ,ὔ / >
ἄρξουσιν οἱ τῷ ὄντι πλούσιοι, od χρυσίου, ἀλλ
οὗ δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ
Ν > \ ‘ \ ~ > ~
ἔμφρονος. εἰ δὲ πτωχοὶ καὶ πεινῶντες ἀγαθῶν
»ο,ὕὔ a. 4 \ / "ΝΜ > ~ a4 Η
ἰδίων ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἴασιν, ἐντεῦθεν οἰόμενοι
τἀγαθὸν δεῖν ἁρπάζειν, οὐκ ἔστι: περιμάχητον
γὰρ τὸ ἄρχειν γιγνόμενον, οἰκεῖος ὧν καὶ ἔνδον ὃ
τοιοῦτος πόλεμος αὐτούς τε ἀπόλλυσι καὶ τὴν
ἄλλην πόλιν. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. "Ἔχεις οὖν, ἣν
δ᾽ ἐγώ, βίον ἄλλον τινὰ πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν κατα-
“- Ἃ \ a > ~ , bees BY
φρονοῦντα ἢ τὸν τῆς ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας; Οὐ μὰ
τὸν Δία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ ye μὴ ἐραστὰς
τοῦ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἐπ᾽ αὐτό" εἰ δὲ μή, οἵ γε ἀντ-
‘ ~ ~ > a / > a
ἐρασταὶ μαχοῦνται. Πῶς δ᾽ od; Τίνας οὖν ἄλλους
ἀναγκάσεις ἰέναι ἐπὶ φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, ἢ οἱ
* The world of ideas, the upper world as opposed to that
of the cave. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc.
> Cf. supra Vol. I. p. 80, note ὃ on 347 c.
© Of. Phaedrus in fine, supra 416 2-417 a, infra 547 B.
4 Stallbaum refers to Xen. Cyr. viii. 3. 39 οἴομαί σε καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο ἥδιον πλουτεῖν, ὅτι πεινήσας χρημάτων πεπλούτηκας, * for you
must enjoy your riches much more, I think, for the very reason
that it was only after being hungry for wealth that you became
rich.” (Loebtr.) Cf. also infra 577 2-578 a, and Adam ad loc,
144
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
“By all means,” he said.“ Will our alumni, then,
disobey us when we tell them this, and will they refuse
to share in the labours of state each in his turn while
permitted to dwell the most of the time with one
another in that purer world? ?” “ Impossible,’’ he
said: “‘ for we shall be imposing just commands on men
who are just. Yet they will assuredly approach office as
an unavoidable necessity,° and in the opposite temper
from that of the present rulers in our cities.” “For
the fact is, dear'friend,” said I, “‘if you can discover a
better way of life than office-holding for your future
rulers, a well-governed city becomes a possibility.
For only in such a state will those rule who are really
rich,° not in gold, but in the wealth that makes happi-
ness—a good and wise life. But if, being beggars and
Btatyelings 4 from lack of goods of their own, they turn
to affairs of state thinking that it is thence that they
should grasp their own good, then it is impossible.
For when office and rule become the prizes of con-
tention,’ such a civil and internecine strife’ destroys
the office-seekers themselves and the city as well.”
“ Most true,” he said. ‘‘ Can you name any other
type or ideal of life that looks with scorn on political
office except the life of true philosophers 2?” I asked.
“No, by Zeus,” he said. “ But what we require,’’ I
said, “is that those who take office” should not be
lovers of rule. Otherwise there will be a contest with
rival lovers.” “Surely.” “*‘ What others, then, will
you compel to undertake the guardianship of the city
© Cf. supra 347 Ὁ, Laws 715 4, also 586 ὁ and What Plato
Said, p. 627, on Laws 678 x, Isoc. Areop. 24, Pan. 145 and 146.
“ we Eurip. Heracleidae 415 οἰκεῖος ἤδη πόλεμος ἐξαρτεὕὔεται.
ὩΣ infra 580 νυ ff., pp. 370 ff.
ἰέναι ἐπὶ in erotic language means “to woo.” Cf. on
489 τ, p. 26, note b, also 347 c, 588 8, 475 c.
VOL. II L 145
PLATO —
περὶ τούτων τε φρονιμώτατοι, δι᾽ ὧν ἄριστα πόλις
οἰκεῖται, ἔχουσι τε τιμὰς ἄλλας καὶ βίον ἀμείνω
τοῦ πολιτικοῦ; Οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἔφη. oa
C VI. Βούλει οὖν τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη σκοπῶμεν, τίνα τρόπον
οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐγγενήσονται καὶ πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς
> ~ σ > σ , 24 ΚΙ
εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ “Αἰδου λέγονται δή τινες εἰς
θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἔφη.
“Τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴη περι- —
nF ae A “-“ A > ~ ον
στροφὴ ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινὸς |
ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὄντος οὖσα ἐπάνοδος, ἣν
δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν
᾿οὖν. Οὐκοῦν δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι τί τῶν μαθημάτων
D ἔχει τοιαύτην δύναμιν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί ἂν οὖν
εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ
Ἶ 2. ἡ ae , te ; δι» 4,
γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν; τόδε δ᾽ ἐννοῶ λέγων ἅμα'
οὐκ ἀθλητὰς μέντοι πολέμου ἔφαμεν τούτους
1 οὖσα ἐπάνοδος Hermann: οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον AFDM, ἰούσης :
ἐπάνοδον scr. recc.: οὐσίαν ἐπάνοδος ci. Cobet.
« Cf. on 515 £, p. 124, note ὃ.
> This has been much debated. Cf. Adam ad loe. | Pro-
fessor Linforth argues from Pausanias i. 34 that Amphiaraus
is meant. '
¢ Cf. Phaedr. 241 8; also the description of the game in-
Plato Comicus, fr. 153, apud Norwood, Greek Comedy,
p. 167. The players were divided into two groups. A shell
or potsherd, black on one side and white on the other, was
thrown, and according to the face on which it fell one group
fled and the other pursued. Cf. also commentators on
Aristoph. Knights 855. =
4 Much quoted by Neoplatonists and Christian Fathers.
Cf. Stallbaum ad loc. Again we need to remember that
Plato’s main and explicitly reiterated purpose is to describe
a course of study that will develop the power of consecutive
consistent abstract thinking. All metaphysical and mystical
suggestions of the imagery which conveys this idea are —
146
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
than those who have most intelligence of the prin-
ciples that are the means of good government and
who possess distinctions of another kind and a life
that is preferable to the political life?”’ “No
others,” he said. "
- VI. “ Would you, then, have us proceed to consider
how such men may be produced in a state and how
they may be led upward ? to the light even as some ὃ
are fabled to have ascended from Hades to the gods?”’
“Of course I would.” “So this, it seems, would not
be the whirling of the shell* in the children’s game,
but a conversion and turning about of the soul from
a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day—
that ascension ¢ to reality of our parable which we will
affirm to be true philosophy.” “By all means.”
“Must we not, then, consider what studies have the
power to effect this?” “‘Ofcourse.”’ “‘ What, then,
Glaucon, would be the study that would draw the
soul away from the world of becoming to the world
of being? A thought strikes me while I speak*: Did
_ We not say that these men in youth must be athletes
secondary and subordinate. So, e.g. Urwick, The Message
of Plato, pp. 66-67, is mistaken when he says “.. . Plato
oo tomy tells us that his education is ΟΝ simply and
ly to awaken the spiritual faculty which every soul
om, by ‘ wheeling the soul round and turning it away
m the world of change and decay.’ He is not concerned
with any of those ‘excellences of mind’ which may be pro-
duced by training and discipline, his only aim is to open the
eye of the soul... ." The general meaning of the sentence
is plain but the text is disputed. See crit. note.
~ * A frequent pretence in Plato. Cf. 370 a, 525 ο, Buthy-
ro 9 c, Laws 686 c, 702 5, Phaedr. 262 c with Fried-
r, Platon, ii. Ὁ. 498, Laws 888 p with Tayler Lewis, Plato
against the Atheists, pp. 118-119. Cf. also Vol. I. on
394 p-e, and Isoc. Antid. 159 ἐνθυμοῦμαι δὲ μεταξὺ λέγων,
Panath. 127.
147
PLATO ΓΗῚ
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νέους ὄντας; " Ἔφαμεν γάρ. Δεῖ
ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα ὃ 6 ζητοῦμεν,
πρὸς ἐκείῳ. TO ποῖον; Μὴ ἄχρηστον πολεμι-
κοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶναι. Δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη, εἴ ἴπερ οἷόν
Eve. Γ υμναστικῇ μὴν καὶ μουσικῇ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν
522
ἐπαιδεύοντο ἡμῖν. Ἦν ταῦτα, ἔφη. Καὶ γυμνα-
στικὴ μέν που περὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον
τετεύτακε': σώματος γὰρ αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως
ἐπιστατεῖ. Φαίνεται. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἂν εἴη
ὃ ζητοῦμεν μάθημα. Οὐ γάρ. ᾿Αλλ’ ἄρα μουσική,
ὅσην τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν; ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἦν ἐκείνη. γ᾽,
ἔφη, ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς, εἰ μέμνησαι,
ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατά τε ἁρμόνίαν
εὐαρμοστίαν τινά, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην, παραδιδοῦσα,
καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς λόγοις
ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ἔθη" ἄττα ἔχουσα, καὶ ὅσοι
μυθώδεις τῶν λόγων καὶ ὅσοι ἀληθινώτεροι ἦσαν"
μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ἀγαθόν," οἷον σὺ νῦν
Β ζητεῖς, οὐδὲν ἣν ἐν αὐτῇ. ᾿Ακριβέστατα, ἦν δ᾽
ἐγώ, ἀναμιμνήσκεις με' τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τοιοῦτον
οὐδὲν εἶχεν. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ δαιμόνιε Γλαύκων, τί ἂν εἴη
τοιοῦτον; al τε γὰρ τέχναι βάναυσοί που ἅπασαι
ἔδοξαν εἶναι. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; καὶ μὴν τί ἔτ᾽ ἄλλο
2 τετεύτακε(ν) ADM Euseb., τεύτακε F, ee vulg.
2 ἔθη F Euseb., ἔφη ADM
3 ἀγαθὸν ADM, ἄγον Euseb. et ἼΡρ D, ay (sie) F.
@ Of. 416 p, 422 5, 404 a, and Vol. I, p. 266, note a, on
403 π΄.
> προσέχειν is here used in its etymological sense. Cf.
pp. 66-67 on 500 a.
¢ This further prerequisite of the higher education follows
naturally from the plan of the Republic; but it does not
148
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
of ett tt “We did.” “ Then the study for which
we are. are sceking must have this additional? qualifica-
tion.” ‘What one?” ‘“‘ That it be not useless to
jiers.0” “ Why, yes, it must,” he said, “‘if that is _
sible.” “ But in our previous account they were ;
ππτεπαϑ in gymnastics and τητος. Ὁ “‘ They were,”
he said. “ And gymnastics, I take it, i is devoted ὁ to
‘that which grows and perishes; for it presides over
the growth and decay of the body.f” ‘‘ Obviously.”
“Then this cannot be thestudy that we seek.” “No.”
“Ts it, then, music, so far as we have already de-
ite” “ Nay, that,” he said,“ was the counter-
park of g ics, if you remember. It educated
the guardians through habits, imparting by the
y acertain harmony of spirit that is not science,*
and by the rhythm measure and grace, and also
qualities akin to these in the words of tales that are
fables and those that are more nearly true. But it
included no study that tended to any such good as
you are now seeking.’’ “ Your recollection is most
exact,” I said; “for in fact it had nothing of the
kind. But in heaven’s name, Glaucon, what study
could there be of that kind? For all the arts were
im our opinion base and mechanical.*’’. “Surely;
ποτὰ Plato much and is, after one or two repetitions,
af supra 376 & ff.
or reretraxe cf. Tim. 90 B τετευτακότι.
“ΟΣ 376. This is of course no contradiction of 410 c.
e ordinary study of music may cultivate and refine
feeling. Only the mathematics of music would develop the
power of abstract thought.
* Knowledge in the true sense, as contrasted with opinion
or
_ * Cf. supra, p. 49, note e, on 495 2. This idea is the
source of much modern prejudice against Plato.
149
PLATO SIT
‘
λείπεται μάθημα, μουσικῆς καὶ "γυμναστικῆς. καὶ
τῶν τεχνῶν κεχωρισμένον; Φέρε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ
μηδὲν ἔτι ἐκτὸς τούτων ἔχομεν λαβεῖν, τῶν ἐπὶ
πάντα τεινόντων σι λάβωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; Οἷον
τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται πέχναι τε
καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, ὃ καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώ-
τοις ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν. Lloiov; ἔφη. Τὸ φαῦλον
τοῦτο, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία
διαγιγνώσκειν: λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ee
τε Kal λογισμόν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ τούτων ἔ
ὡς πᾶσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται
αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίγνεσθαι; Kai μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκ-
οῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ πολεμική; ; Πολλή,
ἔφη, ἀνάγκη. Παγγέλοιον γοῦν, ἔφην, στρατηγὸν
᾿Αγαμέμνονα ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις Παλαμήδης
ἑκάστοτε ἀποφαίνει. ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας. ὅτι φησὶν
ἀριθμὸν εὑρὼν τάς τε τάξεις τῷ στρατοπέδῳ
καταστῆσαι ev ᾿Ιλίῳ καὶ ἐξαριθμῆσαι ναῦς τε καὶ
τἄλλα πάντα, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ ἀναριθμή τῶν ὄντων καὶ
τοῦ ᾿Αγαμέμνονος, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ ὅσους. πόδας
εἶχεν εἰδότος, εἴπερ ἀριθμεῖν μὴ ἠπίστατο; καίτοι
ποῖόν τιν᾽ αὐτὸν οἴει στρατηγὸν εἶναι; "Ατοπόν
τιν᾽, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, εἰ ἦν τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθές.
E VII. ἤλλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μάθημα ἀναγκαῖον
πολεμικῷ ἀνδρὶ θήσομεν καὶ λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ
@ Cf. Symp. 186 Β ἐπὶ πᾶν τείνει.
ὃ διάνοιαι is not to be pressed in the special sense of
511 p-e.
¢ A playful introduction to Plato’s serious treatment of the
psychology of number and the value of the study of
mathematics.
150
<a Se eee Se ee ἔπ νον
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
and yet what other study is left apart from music,
nastics and the arts?” “Come,” said I, “if we
are unable to discover anything outside of these, let us
_take something that applies to all alike.*”” “What?”
“Why, for example, this common thing that all arts
and forms of thought ὃ and all sciences employ, and
which is among the first things that everybody must
learn.” “‘ What?” he said.“ This trifling matter,*”
I said, “ of distinguishing one and two and three. 1
mean, in sum, number and calculation. Is it not
true of them that every art and science must neces-
6 of them?” “‘ Indeed it is,” he said.
“The art of war too?” said I. “ Most necessarily,”
he said. “‘Certainly,then,” said I,“‘ Palamedes? in the
play is always making Agamemnon appear a most
ridiculous * general. Have you not noticed that he
affirms that by the invention of number he marshalled
the troops in the army at Troy in ranks and companies
and enumerated the ships and everything else as if
before that they had not been counted, and Aga-
memnon apparently did not know how many feet
he had if he couldn't count ? And yet what sort of a
general do you think he would be in that case?”
“A very queer one in my opinion,” he said, “if that
was true.”
VII. “ Shall we not, then,” I said, “‘ set down as a
study requisite for a soldier the ability to reckon and
ἃ Palamedes, like Prometheus, is a ‘“‘ culture hero,’”? who
personifies in Greek tragedy the inventions and discoveries
that produced civilization. _Cf. the speech of Prometheus
in Aesch. Prom. 459 ff. and Harvard Studies, xii. p. 208,
n. 2.
¢ Quoted by later writers in pete of mathematics. Cf.
Theo Smyrn. p. 7 ed. Gelder. For the necessity of mathe-
matics ef. Laws 818 σ.
151
5
PLATO Hee
ἀριθμεὶν δύνασθαι; Πάντων x: ἔφη, μάλιστα, εἰ
καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέλλει τάξεων ἐπαΐειν, μᾶλλον δ᾽ εἰ καὶ
ἄνθρωπος ἔσεσθαι. ᾿Εννοεῖς οὖν, ἘΜΈΟ περὶ
τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα ὅπερ ἐγώ; Τὸ ποῖον; Κινδυ-
vever τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἀγόντὼν φύσει εἶναι
ὧν ζητοῦμεν, χρῆσθαι δ᾽ οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς, ἑλκτι-
κῷ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν. Πῶς, ἔφη.
λέγεις; Ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τό γ᾽ Siot
δοκοῦν δηλῶσαι. ἃ yap διαιροῦμαι παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ
ἀγωγά τε εἶναι of λέγομεν καὶ μή, ξυνθεατὴς
γενόμενος ξύμφαθι ἢ ἄπειπε, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σαφέ-
στερὸν ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον “μαντεύομαι. Δείκνυ,
ἐφη. Δείκνυμι δή, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾷς, τὰ μὲν ἐν
Β ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς
ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινό-
μενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην
ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς
ποιούσης. Τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον
ὅτι “λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα. Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν
δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὗ λέγω. Iota μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις;
Τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ
@ Of. Laws 819 υ.
ὃ Plato’s point of view here, as he will explain, i is precisely
the opposite of that of modern educators who would teac
mathematics concretely and not puzzle the children with
abstract logic. But in the Laws where he is speaking of
primary and secondary education for the entire population
he anticipates the modern kindergarten ideas (819 B-c).
ὁ For σαφέστερον ef. 523'c. Cf. Vol. 1. p. 47, note f, on
338 τ, and What Plato Said, p. 503, on Gorg. 463 τ.
4 Cf. Phileb. 38 c, Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 337.
152
ee
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
number?” “ Most certainly, if he is to know any-
thing whatever of the ordering of his troops—or
rather if he is to be a man at all.*”” “ Do you observe
then,” said I, “in this study what Ido?” “ What?”
“It seems likely that it is one of those studies which
we are seeking that naturally conduce to the awaken-
ing of thought, but that no one makes the right use? of
it, though it really does tend to draw the mind to
essence and reality.” “What do you mean?” he
said. “I will try,” I said, “ to show you at least my
opinion. Do you keep watch and observe the things
I distinguish in my mind as being or not being con-
ducive to our purpose, and either concur or dissent,
in order that here too we may see more clearly ὃ
whether my surmise is right.” “‘ Point them out,”
he said. “1 do point them out,” I said, “ if you can
discern that some reports of our perceptions do not
provoke thought to reconsideration because the
judgement? of them by sensation seems adequate,’
while others always invite the intellect to reflection
because the sensation yields nothing that can be
trusted’” “ You obviously mean distant’ appear-
ances,” he said, “and shadow-painting.*” ‘* You
have quite missed my meaning,*” said I. “‘ What do
you mean ?”’ he said. - “ The experiences that do not
provoke thought are those that do not at the same
® ἱκανῶς is not to be pressed here.
? For οὐδὲν ὑγιές cf. 496 c, 584 a, 589 c, Phaedo 69 8, 89 E,
90 ει, Gorg. 524 5, Laws 776 ©, Theaet. 173 8, Eurip. Phoen.
201, Bacch. 262, Hel. 746, etc.
_* The most obvious cause of errors of judgement. Cf. Laws
B.
* Cf. Vol. I. p. 137 on 365 ς.
* The dramatic misapprehension by the interlocutor is one
of Plato’s methods for enforcing his meaning. ΟἿ, on 529 a,
p. 180, note a, Laws 792 B-c.
153
PLATO
C ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα" τὰ δ᾽ ἐκβαί-
νοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ αἴσθησις
μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἴτ᾽
ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν. ὧδε δὲ ἃ
λέγω σαφέστερον εἴσει. οὗτοι, φαμέν, τρεῖς ἂν
εἶεν δάκτυλοι, ὅ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος
καὶ ὃ μέσος. Πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη. ‘Qs ὑφ st ὕθεν τοίνυν
ὁρωμένους λέγοντός μου διανοοῦ. ἀλλά μοι περὶ
> A , , ‘ a , : ES Be Es eat
αὐτῶν τόδε σκόπει. To ποῖον; Δάκτυλος μὲν
αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἕκαστος, καὶ ταύτῃ γε
οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἐάν τε ἐν μέσῳ ὁρᾶται ἐάν τ᾽ ἐν
ἐσχάτῳ, ἐάν τε λευκὸς ἐάν τε μέλας, ἐάν τε παχὺς.
ἐάν τε λεπτός, καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι τοιοῦτον. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ
, ? > 4 “- “- ς \
τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν
νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ δάκτυλος- οὐδαμοῦ
‘ ε »Ἤ 7 A “ > ’ A 4
yap ἡ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἅμα ἐσήμηνε τὸν δάκτυλον τοὐ-
ναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκ-
obv, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰκότως τό γε τοιοῦτον νοήσεως
οὐκ ἂν παρακλητικὸν οὐδ᾽ ἐγερτικὸν εἴη. Ἑϊκότως.
Τί δὲ δή; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα
ἡ ὄψις ἄρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν
μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ
« Cf. Jacks, Alchemy of Thought, p. 29: ‘* The purpose of
the world, then, being to attain consciousness of itself as a
rational or consistent whole, is it not a little strange that the
first step, so to speak, taken by the world for the attainment
of this end is that of presenting itself in the form of con-
tradictory experience ?”’ αἴσθησις is not to be pressed. Adam’s
condescending apology for the primitive character of Plato’s
psychology here is as uncalled-for as all such apologies.
Plato varies the expression, but his meaning is clear, Cf,
524 p. No modern psychologists are able to use “sensa-
tion,” ‘‘ perception,” ‘‘ judgement,” and similar terms with
perfect consistency.
δ᾽ For προσπίπτουσα cf. Tim. 33 a, 44 4, 66 a, Rep. 515 a,
154
EEE
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
time issue in a contradictory perception.* Those that
do have that effect I set down as provocatives, when
the perception no more manifests one thing than its
contrary, alike whether its impact’ comes from nearby
or afar. An illustration will make my meaning
plain. Here, we say, are. three fingers, the little
finger, the second and the middle.”’ “ Quite so,’’ he
“ Assume that I speak of them as seen near
at hand. But this is the point that you are to con-
sider.” “ What?’ “‘ Each one of them appears to
be equally a finger,° and in this respect it makes no
difference whether it is observed as intermediate or
‘at either extreme, whether it is white or black, thick
or thin, or of any other quality of this kind. _ For in
none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled
to question the reason and to ask what in the world
is a finger, since the faculty of sight never signifies
to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite
of a finge r.” “ Why, no, it does not,’’-he said.
“Then,” said I, “it is to be expected that such a
perception will not provoke or awaken? reflection and
thought.” “It 15. “ But now, what about the
bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our
vision’s view of them adequate, and does it make no
difference to it whether one of them is situated ¢ out-
side or in the middle; and similarly of the relation of
561 c, Laws 791 c, 632 a, 637 a, Phileb. 21; also accidere in
Lucretius, ¢.g. iv. 882, ii. 1024-1025, iv. 236 and iii. 841, and
Goethe's ** Das Blenden der Erscheinung, die sich an unsere
Ὁ This anticipates Aristotle’s doctrine that “ substances”
do not, as qualities do, admit of more or less.
# We should never press synonyms which Plato employs
for ποικιλία of style or to avoid falling into a rut of
terminol
4 κεῖσθαι perhaps anticipates the Aristotelian category.
155
δ24
PLATOTUIA ΜῊ
ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ
σκληρότητα ἡ ἁφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις dp’
οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν; ἢ ὧδε ποιεῖ
ἑκάστη αὐτῶν: πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τε-
ταγμένη αἴσθησις ἠνάγκασται καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μαλακῷ
τετάχθαι, καὶ παραγγέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ws. ταὐτὸν
σκληρόν τε καὶ μαλακὸν αἰσθανομένη; Οὕτως,
ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιού-
τοις αὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν, τί ποτε σημαίνει αὐτῇ
ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ σκληρόν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ 'μαλακὸν
λέγει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαρέος, τί τὸ
κοῦφον καὶ βαρύ, εἰ τό τὲ βαρὺ κοῦφον καὶ τὸ
Β κοῦφον βαρὺ σημαίνει; Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, αὗταί γε
ἄτοποι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι καὶ ἐπισκέψεως
ΕΣ ne Sal » a SS Gane > by ΔΙ
εόμεναι. Εἰκότως ἄρα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς TOLOU-
a a pee
τοις πρῶτον μὲν πειρᾶται λογισμόν TE καὶ νόησιν
ψυχὴ παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἴτε ἕν εἴτε. δύο
δ ἘΝῚ pe > , A 9.
ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων. ἸΠῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἕν ἑκά-
« Of. Theaet. 186 ff., Tim. 62 2, Taylor, Timaeus, p. 233
on 63 v-x, Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn, 222 and 225,
Diels, Dialex. 5 (ii2 p. 341). Protag. 331 τὸ anticipates this
thought, but Protagoras cannot follow it out. Cf. also
pre 13 a-B. Stallbaum also compares Phileb. 57 το and
56 cf. bah
> Plato gives a very modern psychological explanation.
Thought is proyoked by the contradictions in perceptions
that suggest problems. The very notion of unity is contra-
dictory of uninterpreted experience. This use of ἀπορεῖν (cf.
supra 515 Ὁ) anticipates much modern psychology suppo
to be new.. Cf. e.g. Herbert Spencer passim, and Dewey,
How We Think, p. 12 “‘ We may recapitulate by saying that
the origin of thinking is some perplexity, confusion, or
doubt’; also ibid. p. 72. Meyerson, Déduction relativiste
156
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hard-
ness ?.. And aré not the other senses also defective in
their reports of such things ? | Or is the operation of
each of them as follows? In the first place, the sensa-
tion that is set over the hard is of necessity related
also tothe soft,¢ and it reports to thesoul that thesame
thing is both hard and soft to its perception.” “It is
so,” he said. “‘ Then,” said I, “‘ is not this again a
case where the soul must be at a loss? as to what sig-
nificance for it the sensation of hardness has, if the
sense reports the same thing as also soft? And,
similarly, as to what the sensation of light and heavy
means by light and heavy, if it reports the heavy as
light, and the light as heavy?” “Yes, indeed,” he
said, ‘‘ these communications “ to the soul are strange
and invite reconsideration.”’ ‘‘ Naturally,then,” said
I, “it is in such cases as these that the soul first
summons to its aid the calculating reason? and tries
to consider whether each of the things reported to it
is one or two.’”” “Of course.” ‘“‘ And if it appears
to be two, each of the two is a distinct unit”
p. 142, says “ Mais Platon . . . n’avait-il pas dit qu’il était
impossible de raisonner si ce n’est en partant d’une percep-
tion?” citing Rep. 523-524, and Rodier, Aristot. De anima,
i.p. 197. But that is not Plato’s point here. Zeller, Aristot.
i. p. 166 (Eng.), also misses the point when he says “* Even
as to the passage from the former to the latter he had only
the negative doctrine that the contradictions of opinion and
fancy ought to lead us to go further and to pass to the pure
treatment of ideas.”
© For ἑρμηνεῖαι ef. Theaet. 209 a.
4 Cf. Parmen. 130 a τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις.
* Cf. Theaet. 185 8, Laws 963 c, Sophist 254 p, Hipp.
Major 301 Ὁ-Ἑ, and, for the dialectic here, Parmen. 143 b.
7 Or, as the Greek puts it, ‘* both ‘one’ and ‘ other.*”’ Cf.
Vol. I. p. 516, note f on 476 4. For ἕτερον ef. What Plato
Said, pp. 522, 580, 887-588.
157
iv a PLATO ΕΠ HH
τερον φαίνεται; Nai. El ἄρα ἕν. ἑκάτερον, ἀμφό-
Tepa δὲ δύο; τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα, νοήσει" oe
C yap ἂν ἀχώριστά γε δύο ἐνόει, ἀλλ᾽ ἕν. “Ὀρθῶς.
Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φαμέν,
AV’ οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἢ
γάρ; Ναί. Διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν. μέγα «
καὶ σμικρὸν ἡ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγ-
κεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τοὐναντίον ἢ κείνη.
᾿Αληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρ-
χεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν, τί οὖν ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὖ
καὶ τὸ σμικρόν; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Καὶ οὕτω
δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δ᾽ ὁρατὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν;
᾿Ορθότατ᾽, ἔφη.
ὙΠ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, λέγειν,
ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐστί, τὰ δ᾽
οὔ, a pev εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις
ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπίπτει, παρακλητικὰ ,δριζόμενος, ὅσα
δὲ μή, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως. Μανθάνω
τοίνυν ἤδη, ἔφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως. Τί οὖν;
4. ye vi termini. Cf. 879 5, 576 c, Parmen. 145 a, Protage
358 c.
> κεχωρισμένα and ἀχώριστα suggest the terminology of
Aristotle in dealing with the problem of abstraction. _
¢ Plato’s aim is the opposite of that of the modern theorists
who say that teaching should deal integrally with the total
experience and not with the artificial division of abstrac-
tion.
4 The final use of διά became more frequent in later Greek.
Cf. Aristot. Met. 982 b 20, Eth. Nic. 1110 a 4, Gen. an.
717 a 6, Poetics 1450 Ὁ 3, 1451 b 857. Cf. Lysis 218 νυ, Epin.
975 a, Olympiodorus, Life of Plato, Teubner vi. 191, 2bid.
p- 218, and schol. passim, Apsines, Spengel i. 361, line 18,
* Plato merely means that this is the psychological origin
158
ee ν ϑμμννω. ....
— ΞΣ Αι
"“
—
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
“Yes.” “If, then, each is one and both two, the
very meaning * of ‘two’ is that the soul will conceive
them as distinct.” For if they were not separable,
it would not have been thinking of two, but οἵ.
one.” “Right.” “Sight too saw the great and
the small, we say, not separated but confounded.°
Is not that so?” “‘Yes.’’ “ And for? the clarifica-
tion of this, the intelligence is compelled to con-
template the great and small,’ not thus confounded
but as distinct entities, in the opposite way from
sensation.” “True.” “ And is it not in’some such
experience as this that the question first occurs to us,
what in the world, then, is the great and the small?”’
“By all means.”” “ And this is the origin of the
designation intelligible for the one, and visible for the
οἶμον." “ Just so,” he said.
VIII. “ This, then, is just what I was trying to
explain a little while ago when I said that some things
are provocative of thought and some are not, defining
as provocative things that impinge upon the senses
tegether with their opposites, while those that
do not I said do not tend to awaken reflection.”
“Well, now I understand,” he said, “and agree.”
of our attempt to form abstract and general ideas. My
tion that this passage is the probable source of the
_ notion which still infests the history of philosophy, that the
the-small was a metaphysical entity or principle in
’s later philosophy, to be identified with the indeter-
minate dyad, has been disregarded. Of. Unity of Plato's
Thought, p. 84. But it is the only plausible explanation that
has ever proposed of the attribution of that “ clotted
nonsense” to Plato himself. For it is fallacious to identify
“μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον in Philebus 24 c, 25 c, 27 Ἑ, and else-
where with the μέγα καὶ σμικρόν. But there is no limit to
the misapprehension of texts by hasty or fanciful readers in
any age.
159
5
PLATO ΓΕ
ἀριθμός τε καὶ τὸ ἕν ποτέρων. δοκεῖ εἶναι; Οὐ
ξυννοῶ, ἔφη. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ἔφην,
ἀναλογίζου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ
Ε ὁρᾶται ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται. τὸ ἕν,
25
οὐκ ἂν ὁλκὸν εἴη ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ
δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν" εἰ δ᾽ del τι αὐτῷ ἅμα ὁρᾶται
ἐναντίωμα, ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἕν ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον
φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος δὴ δέοι ἂν ἤδη καὶ
ἀναγκάζοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν,
κινοῦσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν, καὶ ἀνερωτᾶν, τί
ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν | dye Gv dy
εἴη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἡ
περὶ τὸ ἕν “μάθησις. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γ
ἔχει οὐχ ἥκιστα ἡ περὶ αὐτὸ" ὄψις" ἅμα γὰρ
ταὐτὸν ὡς ἕν τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.
Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ ἕν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ξύμπας ἀριθμὸς
ταὐτὸν πέπονθε τούτῳ; Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; ΐ
λογιστική τε καὶ soe περὶ ἀῤιθμὼν πᾶσα.
Β Καὶ μάλα. Ταῦτα δέ γε φαίνεται aywyd πρὸς
ἀλήθειαν. “Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν. Ὧν ζητοῦμεν a, ἄρα,
ὡς ἔοικε, μαθημάτων ἂν εἴη" πολεμικῷ μὲν xa
διὰ τὰς τάξεις ἀναγκαῖον μαθεῖν ταῦτα, φιλο-
1 αὐτὸ F Iamblichus, τὸ αὐτὸ AD.
* To waive metaphysics, unity is, as modern mathemati-
cians say, a concept of the mind which experience breaks
up. The thought is familiar to Plato from the Meno to the
Parmenides. But it is not true that Plato derived the very
notion of the concept from the problem of the one and the
many. Unity is a typical concept, but the consciousness of
the concept was developed by the Socratic quest for the
definition.
» Cf.5238. The meaning must be gathered from the context.
° See crit. note and Adam ad loc.
160
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
“To which class, then, do you think number and
the one belong*?” “I cannot conceive,” he said.
“ Well, reason it out from what has already been
said. For, if unity is adequately ὃ seen by itself or
apprehended by some other sensation, it would not
tend to draw the mind to the apprehension of essence,
as we were explaining in the case of the finger. But
if some contradiction is always seen coincidentally
with it, so that it no more appears to be one than the
opposite, there would forthwith be need of something
to judge between them, and it would compel the soul
to be at a loss and to inquire, by arousing thought in
itself, and to ask, whatever then is the one as such,
and thus the study of unity will be one of the studies
that guide and convert the soul to the contemplation
of true being.” “ But surely,” he said, “ the visual
perception of it ὁ does especially involve this. For we
see the same thing at once as one and as an indefinite
plurality.¢” “‘ Then if this is true of the one,” I said,
“the same holds of all number, does it not?” “Οἵ
course.” “* But, further, reckoning and the science
of arithmetic*® are wholly concerned with number.”
“ They are, indeed.” “ And the qualities of number
appear to lead to the apprehension of truth.” “‘ Be-
ae anything,” he said. “ Then, as it seems, these
would be among the studies that we are seeking.
For a soldier must learn them in order to marshal his
troops, and a philosopher, because he must rise out of
᾿ ἃ This is the problem of the one and the many with which
Plato often plays, which he exhaustively and consciously
illustrates in the Parmenides, and which the introduction
to the Philebus treats as a metaphysical nuisance to be dis-
regarded in practical logic. We have not yet got rid of it,
but have merely transferred it to psychology.
4 Cf. Gorg. 450 p, 451 B-c.
VOL. II M 161
᾿
᾿
'
C μεγίστων μεθέξειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι καὶ ἀνθ-
πολέμου τε καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ῥᾳστώνης
D μοὺς μαθήματος, ὡς κομψόν ἐστι καὶ πολλαχῇ
’
PLATO [3
σόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως
ἐξαναδύντι, ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι. Ἔστι
ταῦτ᾽, ἔφη. Ὃ δέ γε ἡμέτερος φύλαξ πολεμικός
τε καὶ φιλόσοφος τυγχάνει dv. Τί μήν; ΤΙροσ-
ἤκον δὴ τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, νομοθε-
τῆσαι καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν
- A WP SUIS {Ὧι
ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῆς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ
i. υδϑωνοι κιδονὐνωνς π΄. - -ἰὖ
/ - ~ > ~ 7 > ’ , ν ~
θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ
‘ « ὶ
νοήσει αὐτῇ, οὐκ. ὠνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς
359 te
ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους μελετῶντας, ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα
μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ᾽ ἀλήθειάν te Kal
οὐσίαν. Ἰζάλλιστ᾽, ἔφη, λέγεις. Καὶ μήν, ἣν δ᾽
ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ ῥηθέντος τοῦ περὶ τοὺς λογισ-
χρήσιμον ἡμῖν πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα, ἐὰν τοῦ γνωρίζειν
ἕνεκά τὶς αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύῃ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ καπηλεύειν.
“ Cf. my review of Jowett, 4.J.P. xiii. p. 365. My view
there is adopted by Adam ad loc., and Apelt translates in
the same way. ᾿ ᾿
» It is not true as Adam says that “the nature of numbers
cannot be fully seen except in their connexion with the
Good.”. Plato never says that and never really meant it,
though he might possibly have affirmed it on a challenge.
Numbers are typical abstractions and educate the mind for
the apprehension of abstractions if studied in their nature,
in themselves, and not in the concrete form of five apples.
There is no common sense nor natural connexion between
numbers and the good, except the point made in the Timaeus
53 8, and which is not relevant here, that God used numbers
and forms to make a cosmos out of a chaos.
5 Instead of remarking on Plato’s scorn for the realities
of experience we should note that he is marking the dis-—
tinctive quality of the mind of the Greeks in contrast with
the Egyptians and orientals from whom they learned and
162
ne ee
a ae κὸν
ππ-- .-οϑυπε σαι κοιοος παρε, τς χω σαῶδο νος oe σοι ὦ ἀν.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
the region of generation and lay hold on essence or
he can neyer become a true reckoner.*”’ “It isso,” he
said. “‘ And our guardian is soldier and philosopher |
in. one.” “Of course.’’ “It is befitting, then,
Glaucon, that this branch of learning should be pre-
scribed by our law and that we should induce those
who are to share the highest functions of state to
enter upon that study of calculation and take hold of
it, not as amateurs, but to follow it up until they attain
to the contemplation of the nature of number,” by
pure thought, not for the purpose of buying and
selling,° as if they were preparing to be merchants or
hucksters, but for the uses of war and for facilitating
the conversion of the soul itself from the world of
eration to essence and truth.” “ Excellently
said,” he replied. ‘‘ And, further,’ I said, “ it occurs
to me,? now that the study of reckoning has been
mentioned, that there is something fine in it, and that
it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided
it is pursued for the sake of knowledge“ and not for
the Romans whom they taught. Cf. infra 525 ν καπηλεύειν,
and Horace, Ars Poetica 323-332, Οἷς. Tuse. i. 2.5. Per
of Science, p. 49: “In this the writer did not aim at the
mental discipline of the students, but sought to confine
himself to what is easiest and most useful in calculation,
Sueh as men constantly require in cases of inheritance,
legacies, partition, law-suits, and trade, and in all their
dealings with one another, or where the measuring of lands,
the digging of canals, geometrical computation, and other
objects of various sorts and kinds are concerned.”
_* Cf. on 521 pb, p. 147, note 6.
_* Cf. Aristot. Met. 982 a 15 τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν, and Laws
747 c.. Montesquieu apud Arnold, Culture and Anarchy,
p. 6: “The first motive which ought to impel us to study
is the desire to augment the excellence of our nature and to
render an intelligent being more intelligent.”
163
PLATO
Πῆ δή; ἔφη. Τοῦτό γε, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς
σφόδρα ἄνω ποι ἄγει τὴν exe καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν
τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀναγκάζει διαλέγεσθαι, οὐδαμῇ ἀπο-
δεχόμενον ἐάν τις αὐτῇ ὁρατὰ ἢ ἁπτὰ σώματα
ἔχοντας ἀριθμοὺς προτεινόμενος διαλέγηται. οἶσθα
E yap που τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὺς ὡς, ἐάν τις
526
, , 4a > ~ - , / LIS ted 1
αὐτὸ TO ἕν ἐπιχειρῇ τῷ λόγῳ τέμνειν, καταγελῶσί
τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν σὺ κερματίζῃς
αὐτό, ἐκεῖνοι πολλαπλασιοῦσιν, εὐλαβούμενοι μή
- Aa 1 a 3 ‘ \ / > 4
ποτε φανῇ τὸ ἕν μὴ ἕν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια. ᾿Αληθέ-
ΝΜ , / ἊΝ ΝΜ > y ”
στατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Τί οὖν οἴει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἴ
τις ἔροιτο αὐτούς, ὦ θαυμάσιοι, περὶ ποίων ἀρι-
θ ~ ὃ αλ / θ > ἷ ‘ Δ ἷο ς a > a FF
μῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἕν οἷον ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦτέ
ἐστιν, ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν
διαφέρον, μόριόν τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν; τί ἂν
οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι; Todro ἔγωγε, ὅτι περὶ
τούτων λέγουσιν, ὧν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ,
α Lit. “ numbers (in) themselves,”’ 1.6. ideal numbers or the
ideas of numbers. For this and the following as one of the
sources of the silly notion that mathematical numbers are
intermediate between ideal and concrete numbers, ¢f. my
De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, p.33, Unity of Plato’s Thought,
pp. 83-84, Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218.
> Cf. Meno 79 c κατακερματίζῃς, Aristot. Met. 1041 a 19
ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς αὑτὸ ἕκαστον: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἣν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι, Met.
1052 b 1 ff., 15 ff. and 1058 a 1 τὴν γὰρ μονάδα τιθέασι πάντῃ
ἀδιαίρετον. κερματίζειν is also the word used of breaking
money into small change.
¢ Numbers are the aptest illustration of the principle of
the Philebus and the Parmenides that thought has to
postulate unities which sensation (sense perception) and also
dialectics are constantly disintegrating into pluralities. Cf.
my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 222. Stenzel,
Dialektik, p. 32, says this dismisses the problem of the one
and the many “‘ das ihn (Plato) spater so lebhaft beschaftigen
164
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
huckstering.”’ “‘ In what respect ὃ he said. “* Why,
in respect of the very point of which we were speaking,
that it strongly directs the soul upward and compels |
it to discourse about pure numbers, never acquiescing
if anyone proffers to it in the discussion numbers
attached to visible and tangible bodies. For you are
doubtless aware that experts in this study, if anyone
attempts to cut up the ‘one’ in argument, laugh at
him and refuse to allow it; but if you mince it ἀρ.
they multiply, always on guard lest the one should
appear to be not one but a multiplicity of parts.*”
“Most true,” he replied. ‘“‘ Suppose now, Glaucon,
someone were to ask them, ‘ My good friends, what
numbers? are these you are talking about, in which
the one is such as you postulate, each unity equal to
every other without the slightest difference and
admitting no division into parts?’ What do you think
would be their answer?” “ This, I think—that they
are speaking of units which can only be conceived by
thought, and which it is not possible to deal with in
sollte.” But that is refuted by Parmen. 159 c οὐδὲ μὴν
μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν. The “ problem” was
always in Plato’s mind. He played with it when it suited
his purpose and dismissed it when he wished to go on to
something else. Cf. on 525 a, Phaedr. 266 8, Meno 72 c,
Laws 964 a, Soph. 251.
4 This is one of the chief sources of the fancy that numbers
are intermediate entities between ideas and things. Cf.
Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, i. Ὁ. 219: ‘*‘ Mathematical
ον ορωιμαμίῳ are therefore not as Plato thought intermediate
n sensible figures and universals. Sensible figures
are only less simple mathematical ones.” Cf. on 525 υ.
Plato here and elsewhere simply means that the educator
may distinguish two kinds of numbers,—five apples, and
the number five as an abstract idea. Cf. Theaet. 195 ©: We
couldn’t err about eleven which we only think, i.e. the
abstract number eleven. Cf. also Berkeley, Siris, § 283.
165
PLATO
ἄλλως δ᾽ οὐδαμῶς μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν. “Opas
οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ὅ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν
B δυῤεθξειθεῖναι τὸ μάθημα, ἐπειδὴ φαίνεταί γε
προσαναγκάζον αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει χρῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν
ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν; Καὶ μὲν δή, ἔφη, σφόδρα
γε ποιεῖ αὐτό. Τί δαί; τόδε ἤδη ἐπεσκέψω, ὡς
οἵ τε φύσει λογιστικοὶ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ὡς
ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὀξεῖς φύονται, οἵ τε βραδεῖς, ἂν ἐν
τούτῳ παιδευθῶσι καὶ γυμνάσωνται, κἂν μηδὲν
ἄλλο ᾿ὠφεληθῶσιν, ὅ ὅμως εἴς γε τὸ ὀξύτεροι αὐτοὶ
αὑτῶν γίγνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιδιδόασιν; Ἔστιν, ἔφη,
Ο οὕτως. Kai μήν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἅ γε μείζω πόνον
παρέχει μανθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι, οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως
οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὕροις ὡς τοῦτο. Οὐ “γὰρ οὖν.
Πάντων δὴ ἕ ἕνεκα τούτων οὐκ ἀφετέον τὸ μάθημα,
ἀλλ᾽ οἵ ἄριστοι τὰς φύσεις παιδευτέοι ἐν αὐτῷ.
Ξύμφημι, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς.
ΙΧ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, ἕν ἡμῖν κείσθω"
δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου σκεψώμεθα ἄρά τι
προσήκει ἡμῖν. Td ποῖον; ἢ γεωμετρίαν, ἔ
λέγεις; Αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. Ὅσον μέν, ἔφη,
D πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ αὐτοῦ τείνει, δῆλον ὅτι προσήκει"
πρὸς γὰρ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις καὶ καταλήψεις
«ΟἽ Isoc. Antid. 267 αὐτοὶ δ᾽ αὑτῶν εὐμαθέστεροι. For
the idiom αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν cf. also 411 c, 421 p, 571 Ὁ, Prot.
350 a and vp, Laws 671 B, Parmen. 141 a, Laches 182 c
Plato of course believed in mental discipline or “‘ spread.”
** Educators ’’ have actually cited him as authority for the
opposite view. On the effect of mathematical studies ef.
also Laws 747 B, 809 c-p, 819 c, Isoc. Antid. 265. Cf. Max.
Tyr. 37 § 7 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἴη ἄν τι τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ τὸ
φαυλότατον. Mill on Hamilton ii. 311 “If the practice of
mathematical reasoning gives nothing else it gives wariness
of mind.” Jbid. 312.
166
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
any other way.” “‘ You see, then, my friend,” said
I, “ that this branch of study really seems to be in-
dispensable for us, since it plainly compels the soul
to employ pure thought with a view to truth itself.”
“It most emphatically does.” “ Again, have you
ever noticed this, that natural reckoners are by nature
πὴ in virtually all their studies? And the slow,
if they are trained and drilled in this, even if no other
benefit results, all improve and become quicker than
oer were*?” “It isso,” he said. ‘“‘ And, further,
as I believe, studies that demand more toil in the
learning and practice than this we shall not discover
easily nor find many of them.?”’ ‘ You will not, in
fact.” “‘ Then, for all these reasons, we must not
neglect this study, but must use it in the education
of the best endowed natures.” “1 agree,” he said.
IX. “ Assuming this one point to be established,” I
said, “‘ let us in the second place consider whether the
study that comes next ° is suited to our purpose.”
“What is that? Do you mean geometry,” he said.
“Precisely that,” said I. “‘So much of it,” he said, “as
applies to the conduct of war? is obviously suitable.
For in dealing with encampments and the occupation
Ὁ The translation is, I think, right. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 365,
and Adam ad loe.
© Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 111: “Even
Plato puts arithmetic before geometry in the Republic in
deference to tradition.” For the three branches of higher
learning, arithmetic, metry, and astronomy, οἷ. Ws
$17 £-818 a, Isoc. Antid. 261-267, Panath. 26, Bus. 226; Max.
Tyr. 37 § 7.
* Cf. Basilicon Doron (Morley, A Miscellany, p. 144):
“ie yo it is meete yee have some entrance, specially in
the Mathematickes, for the knowledge of the art militarie,
. in situation of Campes, ordering of battels, making fortifica-
tions, placing of batteries, or such like.”
167
PLATO
χωρίων καὶ συναγωγὰς Kai ἐκτάσεις στρατιᾶς, καὶ
ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐν av-
ταῖς τε ταῖς μάχαις καὶ πορείαις, διαφέροι ἂν
αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ μὴ ὦν. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὖν
δή, εἶπον, πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα βραχύ τι ἂν ἐξαρκοῖ
γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν μόριον: τὸ δὲ πολὺ
E αὐτῆς καὶ πορρωτέρω προϊὸν σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ, εἴ
τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τείνει, πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν κατιδεῖν ῥᾷον
ἈΠ ΑΣ 9. a 297 ,’ , 7 ον, ᾽
τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν. τείνει δέ, φαμέν, πάντα ad-
τόσε, ὅσα ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον
/ > , ee ‘ \ > / ; ~
μεταστρέφεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ
» Δ a 3.% \ /, > - > ~ Μ
ὄντος, ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη,
λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν ἀναγκάζει θεάσασθαι,
προσήκει, εἰ δὲ γένεσιν, οὐ προσήκει. Φαμέν γε
527 δή. Οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ,ἀμφισβητή-
σουσιν ἡμῖν, ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι,
ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἔχει τοῖς ἐν
αὐτῇ λόγοις λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν μεταχειριζομένων.
« This was Xenophon’s view, Mem. vi. 7. 9, Whether it
was Socrates’ nobody knows, Cf. supra pp. 162-163 on 525.c,
Epin. 977 ©, Aristoph. Clouds 202.
ὃ Because it develops the power of abstract thought. Not
because numbers are deduced from the idea of good. Cf.
on 525, p. 162, note b.
: Cf. 518 c. Once more we should remember that for the
practical and educational application of Plato’s main thought
this and all similar expressions are rhetorical surplusage or
*‘ unction,’’ which should not be pressed, nor used ¢.g. to
identify, the idea of good with God. Cf. Introd. p. xxv.
4 Or “becoming.” Cf. 485 B, 525 5.
ὁ γε δή is frequent in confirming answers. Cf. 557 B, 517 Ὁ,
Symp. 172 c, 173 Ε, Gorg. 449 8, εἴς,
168
-“ .
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
of strong places and the bringing of troops into
column and line and all the other formations of an ,
army in actual battle and on the march, an officer
who had studied geometry would be a very different
person from what he would be if he had not.” “ But
still,” I said, “for such purposes a slight modicum? of .
yeometry and calculation would suffice. What we
Rave to consider is whether the greater and more
advanced part of it tends to facilitate the apprehen-
sion of the idea of good.’ That tendency, we affirm,
is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn
its vision round to the region where dwells the most
blessed part of reality,° which it is imperative that it
should behold.” “ You are right,” he said. “‘ Then
if it compels the soul to contemplate essence, it is
suitable; if genesis, it is not.” “80 we affirm.*”
“ This at least,” said I, “ will not be disputed by those
who have even a slight acquaintance with geometry,
that this science is in direct contradiction. with the
language employed in it byits adepts’” ““Howso?”’
᾿
7 Geometry (and mathematics) is inevitably less abstract
than dialectics. But the special purpose of the Platonic educa-
tion values mathematics chiefly as a discipline in abstraction.
Cf. on 523 a, p. 152, note ὃ: and Titchener, A Beginner's
'sychology, pp. 265-266: ** There are probably a good many
of us whose abstract idea of ‘triangle’ is simply a mental
picture of the little equilateral triangle that stands for the
word in text-books of geometry.” ere have been some
attempts to prove (that of Mr. F. M. Cornford in Mind,
April 1932, is the most recent) that Plato, if he could not
anticipate in detail the modern reduction of mathematics
to logic, did postulate something like it as an ideal, the
realization of which would abolish his own sharp distinction
mathematics and dialectic. The argument rests
on a remote and strained interpretation of two or three texts
of the Republic (ε΄. e.g. 511 and 533 8-p) which, naturally
in s merely affirm the general inferiority of the
169
PLATO
Πῶς; ἔφη. Λέγουσι μέν που μάλα γελοίως
τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως: ὡς γὰρ πράττοντές τὲ καὶ
πράξεως ἕνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιούμένοι
λέγουσι τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ
προστιθέναι καὶ πάντα οὕτω φθεγγόμενοι" τὸ δ᾽
ἔστι που πᾶν τὸ μάθημα γνώσεως ἕνεκα ἐπι-
τηδευόμενον. ἸΠαντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν
τοῦτο ἔτι διομολογητέον; Τὸ ποῖον; Ὥς τοῦ ἀεὶ
ὄντος γνώσεως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦ ποτέ τι γιγνομένου
καὶ ἀπολλυμένου. Εὐομολόγητον, ἔφη: τοῦ γὰρ
ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσίς ἐστιν. ‘OAKov
ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε, ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἴη ἂν καὶ
mathematical method and the intermediate position for
education of mathematics as a propaedeutic to dialectics.
Plato’s purpose throughout is not to exhort mathematicians
as such to question their initiatory postulates, but to mark
definitely the boundaries between the mathematical and
other sciences and pure dialectics or philosophy. The dis-
tinction is a true and useful one to-day. Aristotle often
refers to it with no hint that it could not be abolished by a
new and different kind of mathematics. And it is uncritical
to read that intention into Plato’s words. He may haye con-
tributed, and doubtless did contribute, in other ways to the
improvement and precision of mathematical logic. But he
had no idea of doing away with the fundamental difference
that made dialectics and not mathematics the coping-
stone of the higher education—science as such does not
question its first principles and dialectic does. Cf. 533 8-
534 ε΄
* The very etymology of “‘ geometry ”’ implies the absurd
practical conception of the science. Cf. Epin. 990 c γελοῖον
ὄνομα.
> Cf. Polit. 302 Ἐπ, Laws 757 ©, 818 5, Phileb. 62 5, Tim.
69 p, and also on 494 a. The word ἀναγκαίως has been
variously misunderstood and mistranslated. It simply
means that geometers are compelled to use the language
170
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
he said. “ Their language is most ludicrous,* though
they cannot help it,” for they speak as if they were
doing something ° and as if all their words were
directed towards action. For all their talk? is of
squaring and applying’ and adding and the like’
whereas in fact the real object of the entire study is
pure knowledge.?”’ “‘ That is absolutely true,” hesaid.
“And must we not agree on a further point?”
“What?” “ That it is the knowledge of that which
always is,” and not of ἃ something which at some time
comes into being and passes away.”” “ That is readily
admitted,” he said, “ for geometry is the knowledge
of the eternally existent.” “‘ Then, my good friend,
it would tend to draw the soul to truth, and would be
of sense tion though they are thinking of abstractions
(ideas) of which sense images are only approximations.
¢ Cf. Aristot. Met. 1051 a 22 εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμ-
ματα ἐνεργείᾳ" διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν, “* geometrical con-
structions, too, are discovered by an actualization, because it
is by dividing that we discover them.”’ (Loeb tr.)
ἃ For φθεγγόμενοι ef. on 505 c, p. 89, note g.
be ἘΠ Thompson on Meno 87 a.
7 E. Hoffmann, Der gegenwartige Stand der Platonfor-
schung, p. 1097 (Anhang, Zeller, Plato, 5th ed.), misunder-
stands the passage when he says: “ Die Abnei Platons,
dem Ideellen irgendwie einen dynamischen Charakter zuzu-
schreiben, zeigt sich sogar in preingee oe Andeutungen ;
so verbietet er Republ. 527 a fiir die Mathematik jede
A ung dynamischer Termini wie rerpaywrifew, παρα-
τείνειν, προστιθέναι." Plato does not forbid the use of such
terms but merely recognizes their inadequacy to express the
true nature and purpose of geometry.
9 Cf. Meyerson, De Verplication dans les sciences, Ὁ. 33:
“En effet, Platon déja fait ressortir que la géométrie, en
dépit de l’apparence, ne poursuit aucun but pratique et n’a
tout entiére d’autre objet que la connaissance.”
* ie. mathematical ideas are (Platonic) ideas like other
concepts. Cf. on 525 ν, p. 164, note a.
171
PLATO
>
ἀπεργαστικὸν φιλοσόφου διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἄνω
σχεῖν ἃ νυν κάτω οὐ δέον ἔχομεν. Ὥς οἷόν τε
Ο μάλιστα, ἔφη. ‘Qs οἷόν τ᾽ ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μά-
λιστα προστακτέον ὅπως οἱ ἐν τῇ καλλιπόλει σοι
μηδενὶ τρόπῳ γεωμετρίας ἀφέξονται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ
πάρεργα αὐτοῦ οὐ σμικρά. Ilota; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. “A
τε δὴ σὺ εἶπες, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον,
καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς πάσας μαθήσεις, ὥστε κάλλιον
ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἴσμεν που ὅτι τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ
διοίσει ἡ ἡμμένος τε γεωμετρίας καὶ μή. Τῷ παντὶ
μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη. Δεύτερον δὴ τοῦτο τιθῶμεν
μάθημα τοῖς νέοις; Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη.
ιν ΟΡ Bal; τρίτον θῶμεν. ἀστρονομίαν; ἢ οὐ
᾿
δοκεῖ; "Ἐμοιγ᾽ οὖν, ἔφη" τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὥρας εὖὐ-
αισθητοτέρως ἔχειν καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν οὐ
μόνον γεωργίᾳ οὐδὲ ναυτιλίᾳ προσήκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ
στρατηγίᾳ οὐχ ἧττον. Ἡδὺς εἶ, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι
ἔοικας δεδιότι τοὺς πολλούς, μὴ δοκῇς ἄχρηστα
μαθήματα προστάττειν. τὸ δ᾽ ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ
φαῦλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις
τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθ-
« καλλιπόλει : Plato smiles at his own Utopia. There were
cities named Callipolis, e.g. in the Thracian Chersonese and
in Calabria on the Gulf of Tarentum. Cf. also Herod. vii. 154.
Fanciful is the attempt of some scholars to distinguish the
Callipolis as a separate section of the Republic, or to take it
as the title of the Republic.
> Plato briefly anticipates much modern literature on the
value of the study of mathematics. Cf. on 526 zB, p. 166, note
a. Olympiodorus says that when de hig deigns to enter
into matter she creates mechanics which is highly esteemed.
172
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
productive of a philosophic attitude of mind, direct-
ing upward the faculties that now wrongly are turned
earthward.”’ “Nothing is surer,” he said. “ Then
nothing is surer,” said I, “ than that we must require
that the men of your Fair City? shall never neglect
geometry, for even the by-products of such study are
not slight.’” “‘ What are they?”’ said he. “ What
you mentioned,” said I, “its uses in war, and also we
are aware that for the better reception of all studies ὃ
there will be an immeasurable © difference between
the student who has been imbued with geometry and
the one who has not.’’ “ Immense indeed, by Zeus,”
he said. “Shall we, then, lay this down as a second
branch of study for our lads?” “ Let us do so,” he
said.
X. “ Shall we set down astronomy as a third, or
do you dissent ὃ “1 certainly agree,” he said;
“for quickness of perception about the seasons and
the courses of the months and the years isserviceable,?
not only to agriculture and navigation, but still more |
to the military art.” “‘I am amused,*”’ said I, “ at
your apparent fear lest the multitude may suppose
you to be recommending useless studies.’ It is indeed
no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there
is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge
that is purified” and kindled afresh by such studies
© For ὅλῳ καὶ παντί ef. 469 c, Laws 779 5, 734 π, Phaedo 79 Ἑ,
Crat. 434 a.
4 Xen. Mem. iv. 7. 3 ff. attributes to Socrates a similar
purely utilitarian view of science.
* For ἡδὺς εἴ ef. 337 v, Euthydem. 300 a, Gorg. 491 πε
ἤδιστε, Rep. 348 c γλυκὺς ef, Hipp. Maj. 288 8.
? Cf. on 499 v-x, p. 66, note a.
* Again Plato anticipates much modern controversy.
* Cf. Xen. Symp. 1. 4 ἐκκεκαθαρμένοις τὰς ψυχάς, and Phaedo
67 B-c.
173
PLATO i
᾿ ῳ ᾽
ΟΕ αἰίρεταί τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυ-
φλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον
ὃν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων: μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ
ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται. οἷς μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ,
3 4 ε εν / / a \ 4
apnxavws ws εὖ δόξεις λέγειν: ὅσοι δὲ τούτου μη-
' δαμῇ ἠσθημένοι εἰσίν, εἰκότως ἡγήσονταί σε λέγειν
| οὐδέν. ἄλλην yap ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐχ ὁρῶσιν ἀξίαν
λόγου ὠφέλειαν. σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν, πρὸς ποτέ-
528 pous διαλέγει, ἢ ἢ οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους, ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ
ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μὴν
292 ἈΞ ” oF , 93:15 πα ἃ oe : ;
οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλῳ, εἴ tis τι δύναιτο ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι.
Οὕτως, ἔφη, αἱροῦμαι, ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ πλεῖστον
λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. “Avaye
τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰς τοὐπίσω: νῦν δὴ ‘yap οὐκ
ὀρθῶς τὸ ἑξῆς ἐλάβομεν τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ. Πῶς
λαβόντες; ἔφη. Μετὰ ἐπίπεδον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐν
aN ” ‘ {4 4 a» % >
περιφορᾷ ov ἤδη στερεὸν λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ
Β αὑτὸ λαβεῖν: ὀρθῶς δὲ ἔχει ἑξῆς μετὰ δευτέραν
αὔξην τρίτην λαμβάνειν. ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο περὶ
\ a ΄ » \ ‘ 10 Lines
τὴν τῶν κύβων αὔξην καὶ τὸ βάθους μετέχον.
Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη: ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε, ὦ πκύκρραεβ,
α Another instance of Plato’s “unction.” Cf. Tim. 47 A-B,
Eurip. Orest. 806 μυρίων κρείσσων, and Stalibaum ad loc.
for imitations of this passage in antiquity.
> For ἀμηχάνως ὡς ef. Charm. 155 τὸ ἀμήχανόν τι οἷον.
Cf. 588 a, Phaedo 80 c, 95 ο, Laws 782 a, also Rep. 331 4
θαυμάστως ὡς, Hipp. Maj. 282 c, Hpin. 982 e-p, Aristoph.
Birds 427, [ysist. 198, 1148.
© This is the thought more technically expressed in the
“earlier? work, Crito 49 p. Despite his faith in dialectics
174
᾿ΤΗΒ REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
when it has been destroyed and blinded by our
ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation out-
weighs ten thousand eyes*; for by it only is reality
beheld. Those who share this faith will think your
words superlatively® true. But those who have and
have had no inkling of it will naturally think them
all moonshine.* For they can see no other benefit
from such pursuits worth mentioning. Decide, then,
on the spot, to which party you address yourself. Or
are you speaking to neither, but chiefly carrying on
the discussion for your own sake,? without however
grudging any other who may be able to profit by it?”
“ This is the alternative I choose,” he said, “* that it is
for my own sake chiefly that I speak and ask questions
and reply.” “ Fall back’ a little, then,” said I; “for
we just now. did not rightly select the study that
comes next/ after geometry.” ‘‘ What was our mis-
take?” hesaid. ‘ After plane surfaces,” said I,“ we
went on to solids in revolution before studying them
inthemselves. The right way is next in order after the
second dimension? to take the third. This, I suppose,
is the dimension of cubes and of everything that has
depth.” “ Why, yes, it is,” he said; “ but this sub-
ject, Socrates, does not appear to have been investi-
Plato recognizes that the primary assumptions on which
~ argument ily proceeds are irreducible choices of
ity. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 468, Class. Phil. ix.
(1914) p. 352.
"8 Cf. Charm. 166 », Phaedo 64 c, Soph. 265 a, Apol. 33 a.
© ἄναγε is a military term. Cf. Aristoph. Birds 383, Xen.
Cyr. vii. 1. 45, iii. 3. 69.
1 ἑξῆς: ef. Laches 182 5.
2 Lit. “increase.” Cf. Pearson, The Grammar of Science,
p. 411: ‘He proceeds from curves of frequency to surfaces
of frequency, and then requiring to go beyond these he finds
his problem lands him in space of many dimensions.”
175
PLATO
δοκεῖ οὔπω εὑρῆσθαι. Διττὰ γάρ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὰ
” Ὁ > , / / Dow ”
αἴτια: ὅτι τε οὐδεμία πόλις ἐντίμως αὐτὰ EXEL,
5 ~ a ἥ ᾿
ἀσθενῶς ζητεῖται χαλεπὰ ὄντα, ἐπιστάτου τε
é 2; eye
δέονται οἱ ζητοῦντες, ἄνευ οὗ οὐκ ἂν εὕροιεν,
ὃν πρῶτον μὲν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, ἔπειτα καὶ γενο-
“- ε a
μένου, ws viv ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν πείθοιντο οἱ περὶ ταῦτα
C ζητητικοὶ μεγαλοφρονούμενοι. εἰ δὲ πόλις ὅλη
ξυνεπιστατοῖ ἐντίμως ἄγουσα αὐτά, οὗτοί τε ἂν
, ‘ - Ἅ \ > /, 4
πείθοιντο καὶ ξυνεχῶς τε ἂν καὶ ἐντόνως ζητούμενα
ἐκφανῆ γένοιτο ὅπῃ ἔχει" ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν
πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα' ὑπὸ" τῶν
4 , > peer 2 ¢ Pr opis
ζητούντων, λόγον οὐκ ἐχόντων καθ᾽ 6 τι χρήσιμα,
ὅμως πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα βίᾳ ὑπὸ χάριτος αὐξά-
1 κολουόμενα AD, κωλυόμενα F,
2 ὑπὸ Madvig: ὑπὸ δὲ mssy
« This is not to be pressed. Plato"means only that the
progress of solid geometry is unsatisfactory. Cf, 528 pb.
There may or may not be a reference here to the ‘ Delian
problem” of the duplication of the cube (cf. Wilamowitz,
Platon, i. p.503 for the story) and other specific problems which
the historians of mathematics discuss in connexion with thi
passage. Cf. Adam ad loc. To understand Plato we need :
only remember that the extension of geometry to solids was
being worked out in his day, perhaps partly at his sugges-
tion, e.g. by Theaetetus for whom a Platonic dialogue is.
named, and that Plato makes use of the discovery of the five
regular solids in his theory of the elements in the Timaeus.
Cf. also Laws 819 x ff. For those who wish to know more of
the ancient traditions and modern conjectures I add refer-
ences: Eva Sachs, De Theaeteto Ath. Mathematico, Diss.
Berlin, 1914, and Die fiinf platonischen. Kérper (Philolog.
Untersuch. Heft 24), Berlin, 1917; E. Hoppe, Mathematik
und Astronomie im klass. Altertum, pp. 133 ff.; Rudolf
Ebeling, Mathematik und Philosophie bei Plato, Miinden,
1909, with my review in Class. Phil. v. (1910) p. 115; Seth
176
= .
a
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
gated yet.” “ There are twoccauses of that,” said 1:
“ first, inasmuch as no city holds them in honour,
these inquiries are languidly pursued owing to their
difficulty. And secondly, the investigators need a |
director,” who is indispensable for success and who, to
begin with, is not easy to find, and then, if he could
be found, as things are now, seekers in this field
would be too arrogant® to submit to his guidance. But
if the state as a whole should join in superintending
these studies and honour them, these specialists
would accept advice, and continuous and strenuous
investigation would bring out the truth. Since even
now; lightly esteemed as they are by the multitude )
and hampered by the i ignorance of their students? as |
to the true reasons for pursuing them,’ they neverthe-
less in the face of all these obstacles force their way
by their inherent charm’ and it would not surprise us
Demel, Platons Verhdltnis zur Mathematik, Leipzig, with
my review, Class. Phil. xxiv. (1929) pp. 312-313; and, for
further bibliography on Plato and mathematics, Bude, Rep.
Introd. pp. Ixx-lxxi.
ον Plato. is perhaps speaking from personal experience as
director of the ἤδομκονι Cf. the hint in Buthydem. 290 c.
° i.e. the mathematicians already feel themselves to be in-
dependent specialists.
This interpretation is, I think, correct. For the con-
struction of this sentence cf. Isoc. xv. 84. The text is
disputed ; see crit. note.
* Lit. “in what respect they are useful.” Plato
ἐτεὸν οἵ the half legal καθ᾽ ὅ τι. Cf. Lysis 210 c, Polit,
98 c.
7 Aneminent modern psychol meeet innocently writes: “ The
problem of why geometry gives pleasure is therefore a deeper
problem than the mere assertion of the fact. Furthermore,
there are many known cases where the study of geometry
does not give pleasure to the student.’”” Adam seems to
think it may refer to the personality of Eudoxus.
VOL. II N 177
PLATO
Ὁ vera, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν αὐτὰ φανῆναι. Kai
μὲν δή, ἔφη, τό γε ἐπίχαρι καὶ διαφερόντως ἔχει.
ἀλλά μοι σαφέστερον εἰπὲ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες. τὴν μὲν
γάρ που τοῦ ἐπιπέδου πραγματείαν γεωμετρίαν
ἐτίθεις. Ναί, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ. Εἶτά γ᾽, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν
πρῶτον ἀστρονομίαν μετὰ ταύτην, ὕστερον δ᾽ ἀν-
εχώρησας. Σπεύδων γάρ, ἔφην, ταχὺ πάντα δι-
εξελθεῖν μᾶλλον βραδύνω: ἑξῆς γὰρ οὖσαν τὴν
βάθους αὔξης μέθοδον, ὅτι τῇ ζητήσει γελοίως
ἔχει, ὑπερβὰς αὐτὴν μετὰ γεωμετρίαν ἀστρονομίαν
E ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὖσαν βάθους. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.
Τέταρτον τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τιθῶμεν μάθημα
ἀστρονομίαν, ὡς ὑπαρχούσης τῆς νῦν παραλει-
πομένης, ἐὰν αὐτὴν πόλις μετίῃ. Εἰκός, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς"
καὶ ὅ γε νῦν δή μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέπληξας περὶ
ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι, νῦν ἧ σὺ
529 μετέρχει ἐπαινῶ. παντὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δῆλον, ὅτι
i
α πραγματείαν : interesting is the development of this
word from its use in Phaedo 63 a (*‘interest,’” “zeal,”
‘inquiring spirit.” Cf. 64 £, 67 B) to the later meaning,
treatise.” Cf. Aristot. Top. 100 a 18, Eth. Nic. 1103 Ὁ 26,
Polyb. i. 1. 4, ete
» An obvious allusion to the proverb found in many forms
in many languages. Cf. also Polit. 277 a-s, 264 B, Soph.
Antig. 231 σχολῇ ταχύς, Theognis 335, 401 μηδὲν ἄγαν
σπεύδειν, Suetonius, Augustus 25, Aulus Gellius x. 11. 5,
Macrob. Sat. vi. 8. 9, “‘festina lente,” ‘* hatez-vous
lentement” (Boileau, Art poétique, i. 171), “Chi va piano
va sano e va lontano”’ (Goldoni, 7 volponi, τ. ii.), “ Bile
mit Weile’”’ and similar expressions; Franklin’s ‘* Great
haste makes great waste,” etc.
178
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
if the truth about them were made apparent.” “‘ Itis
true,’ he said, “‘ that they do possess an extraordinary
attractiveness and charm. But explain more clearly
what you were just speaking of. The investigation? of
plane surfaces, I presume, you took to be geometry ?”
“Yes,” said I. “‘ And then,” he said, “ at first you
took astronomy next and then you drew back.”
“Yes,” I said, “ for in my haste to be done I was mak-
ing less speed.” For, while the next thing in order is
the study‘ of the third dimension or solids, I passed it
over because of our absurd neglect? to investigate it,
and mentionednext after geometry astronomy ,@ which
deals with the movements of solids.” “* Thatis right,”
hesaid, ‘‘ Then, as our fourth study,” said I, “ let us
set down astronomy, assuming that this science, the
discussion of which has been passed over, is available,’
provided, that is, that the state pursues it.” “* That
is likely,” said he; “and instead of the vulgar
utilitarian’ commendation of astronomy, for which
you just now rebuked me, Socrates, I now will praise
it on your principles. For it is obvious to everybody,
© μέθοδον : this word, like πραγματεία, came to mean
“treatise.”
4 This is the meaning. Neither Stallbaum’s explanation,
“quia ita est comparata, ut de ea quaerere ridiculum sit,”
nor that accepted by Adam, “quia ridicule tractatur,” is
correct, and 529 © and 527 a are not in point, Cf. 528 5,
p. 176, note a.
¢ Cf. Laws 822 a ff.
7 i.e. “ assuming this to exist,” “‘ vorhanden sein,”’ which
is the usual meaning of ὑπάρχειν in classical Greek. The
science, of course, is solid geometry, which is still un-
developed, but in Plato’s state will be constituted as a
lar science through endowed research.
9 Cf. Vol. I. p. 410, note c, on 442 Ἐπ, Gorg. 482 ©, Rep. 367
4, 581 pv, Cratyl. 400 a, Apol. 32.4, Aristot. Pol. 1333 Ὁ 9,
179
PLATO
αὕτη ye ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀπὸ
τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε ἄγει. “lows, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, παντὶ
δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοί: ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως. ee: da
πῶς; ἔφη. ‘Qs μὲν νῦν αὐτὴν μεταχειρίζονται
ε xii Sep
οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες, πάνυ ποιεῖν κάτω
βλέπειν. Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς μοι
δοκεῖς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν λαμ-
΄ \ a ¢ 3
B βάνειν παρὰ σαυτῷ ἥ ἐστι: κινδυνεύεις γάρ, Kal
εἴ τις ἐν ὀροφῇ ποικίλματα θεώμενος ἀνακύπτων
/ ec a an“ a, ἃ / 3 >
καταμανθάνοι τι, ἡγεῖσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν νοήσει ἀλλ
οὐκ ὄμμασι θεωρεῖν. ἴσως οὖν καλῶς ἡγεῖ, ἐγὼ
δ᾽ εὐηθίικῶς. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι
δὲ ᾿ His
νομίσαι ἄνω ποιοῦν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ
57
pee ΔΙᾺ gags ἄν. pape seaghe: y.
ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν περὶ τὸ ὄν τε ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον: ἐὰν
* Cf. my review of Warburg, Class. Phil. xxiv. (1929) p.
319. The dramatic misunderstanding forestalls a possible
understanding by the reader. Cf. supraon 523 8. The
misapprehension is typical of modern misunderstandi
Glaucon is here the prototype of all sentimental Platonists
or anti-Platonists. The meaning of “higher” things in
Plato’s allegory is obvious. But Glaucon takes it literally.
Similarly, Soar critics, taking Plato’s imagery literally
and pressing single expressions apart from the total context,
have inferred that Plato would be hostile to all the applica-
tions of modern science to experience. They refuse to make
allowance for his special and avowed educational purpose,
and overlook the fact that he is prophesying the mathe-
matical astronomy and science of the future. The half-serious
exaggeration of his rhetoric can easily be matched by similar
utterances of modern thinkers of the most various schools,
from Rousseau’s “ écarter tous les faits” to Judd’s ‘‘ Once
we acquire the power to neglect all the concrete facts ...
we are free from the incumbrances that come through atten-
tion to the concrete facts.” Cf. also on 529 B, 530 8 and
534 A.
> ἀνάγοντες is tinged with the suggestions of supra 517 a, but
180
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
I think, that this study certainly compels the soul to
look upward? and leads it away from things here to
those higher things.”” “ΤῈ may be obvious to every-
body except me,” said I, “ for I do not think so.”
** What do you think?’ hesaid. “‘As itis now handled
by those who are trying to lead us up to philosophy,”
I think that it turns the soul’s gaze very much down-
ward.” “Whatdo you mean?” hesaid. “‘ Youseem
to me in your thought to put a most liberal ° interpre-
tation on the ‘study of higher things,’” I said, “ for
‘apparently if anyone with back-thrown head should
learn something by staring at decorations on a ceil-
ing, you would regard him as contemplating themwith |
the higherreason and not with the eyes. Perhaps you |
are right and I am asimpleton. For I, for my part, "
am unable to suppose that any other study turns the |
soul’s gaze upward ὁ than that which deals with being
the meaning here is those who use astronomy as a part
of the higher education. φιλοσοφία is used in the looser
sense of Isocrates. Cf. A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.
© For οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ef. Gorg. 462 p, where it is ironical, as
here, Phaedr. 264 8, Euthyph. 2 c, Theaet. 184. In Charm.
158 c it is not ironical.
ἃ The humorous exaggeration of the language reflects
Plato’s exasperation at the sentimentalists who prefer star-
gazing to mathematical science. Cf. Tim. 91 τὸ on the
evolution of birds from innocents who supposed that sight
furnished the surest proof in such matters. Cf. Walt
Whitman:
When I heard the learned astronomer . . .
Rising and gliding out I wander’d off by myself
In the mystical moist night air, and from time to time
Look’d up in perfect silence at the stars.
Yet such is the irony of misinterpretation that this and the
following pages are the chief support of the charge that Plato
is hostile to science. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c.
¢ Cf. Theaet. 174 a ἄνω βλέποντα.
181
PLATO
δέ τις ἄνω κεχηνὼς ἢ κάτω συμμεμυκὼς τῶν
αἰσθητῶν ἐπιχειρῇ τι μανθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ἄν
ποτέ φημι αὐτόν -- , ἐπιστήμην γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔχειν
τῶν τοιούτων -- οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ
σ βλέπειν τὴν ψυχήν, κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ
ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνῃ.
XI. Δίκην, ἔφη, ἔχω: ὀρθῶς γάρ μοι ἐπέπληξας.
ἀλλὰ πῶς “δὴ ἔλεγες δεῖν ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν
παρὰ ἃ νῦν μανθάνουσιν, εἰ μέλλοιεν oper
πρὸς ἃ λέγομεν μαθήσεσθαι; Ὧδε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ
ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπείπερ
ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποίκιλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ
D ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν
πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἃς τὸ ὃν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα Preuss
"OF, Aristoph. Clouds 172.
> συμμύω probably refers to the eyes. But οὐ, Adam ad loc.
© Cf. Phaedr. 264.4, and Adam in Class. Rev, xiii. p. 11.
Δ Or rather, “serves me right,” or, in the American
language, “I’ve got what’s coming to me.”’ The expres-
sion is colloquial. Cf, Epist. iii. 319 τ, Antiphon exxiv. 45.
But δίκην ἔχει in 520 B=“*‘ it is just.”
© Cf. Tim. 40 a κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον, Eurip.
Hel. 1096 ἀστέρων ποικίλματα, Critias, Sisyphus, Diels ii.* p.
321, lines 33-34:
τό τ᾽ ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας
χρόνου καλὸν ποίκιλμα τέκτονος σοφοῦ.
Cf. also Gorg. 508 a, Lucretius ν. 1205 “stellis micanti-
bus aethera fixum,” ii. 1031 ff., Aeneid iv. 482 *“‘stellis
ardentibus aptum,”’ vi. 797, xi. 202, Ennius, Ann. 372,
Shakes. Hamlet τι. ii. 313 “" This majestical roof fretted with
golden fire,” Arthur Hugh Clough, Uranus:
Then Plato in me said, "
*Tis but the figured ceiling overhead
With cunning diagrams bestarred .
Mind not the stars, mind thou thy mind and God
182
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
and the invisible. But if anyone tries to learn about
the things of sense, whether gaping up* or blinking
down,” I would never say that he really learns—for
nothing of the kind admits of true knowledge—nor |
would I say that his soul looks up, but down, even /
though he study floating on his back ¢ on sea or land.”
XI. “A fair retort,?”’ he said; “your rebuke is
deserved. But how, then, did you mean that astronomy
ought to be taught contrary to the present fashion if
it is to be learned in a way to conduce to our purpose?”
“Thus,” said I: “‘ these sparks that paint the sky,’
since they are decorations on a visible surface, we
must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and most exact
of material things ; but we must recognize that they |
fall far short of the truth,’ the movements, namely, of
The word ποικίλματα may further suggest here the com-
plication of the movements in the heavens.
7 The meaning of this sentence is certain, but the expres-
sion will no more bear a matter-of-fact logical analysis than
that of Phaedo 69 a-s, or Rep. 365 c, or many other subtle
saps ἐκ in Plato. No material object perfectly embodies
the ideal and abstract mathematical relation. These mathe-
matical ideas are designated as the true, ἀληθινῶν, and the
real, ὄν. As in the Timaeus (38 c, 40 a-B, 36 p-£) the
abstract and ideal has the primacy and by a reversal of the
ordinary point of view is said to contain or convey the
concrete. The visible stars are in and are carried by their
invisible mathematical orbits. By this way of speaking
Plato, it is true, disregards the apparent difficulty that the
moyement of the visible stars then ought to be mathemati-
cally perfect. But this interpretation is, I think, more
P le for Plato than Adam’s attempt to secure rigid con-
τ χὰ ἀμ, taking τὸ ὃν τάχος etc., to represent invisible and
ideal planets, and τὰ ἐνόντα to be the perfect mathematical
realities, which are in them. ἐνόντα would hardly retain the
metaphysical meaning of ὄντα. For the interpretation of
529 p ef. also my “" Platonism and the History of Science,”
Am. Philos. Soc. Proc. \xvi. p. 172.
183
PLATO
ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχή-
/ i ” \ \ » Κ
μασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα
2 Δ \ , \ \ I ἃ 1 “4 >
φέρει: ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτά, ὄψει ὃ
δ. “ἃ \ ” > a μὴ 2 ~ j =
οὔ: ἢ ov οἴει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, τῇ
περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον
τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ
E ἂν εἴ τις ἐντύχοι ὑπὸ Δαιδάλου ἤ τινος ἄλλου
~ ͵ ὦ,
δημιουργοῦ ἢ γραφέως διαφερόντως γεγραμμένοις
καὶ ἐκπεπονημένοις διαγράμμασιν. ἡγήσαιτο γὰρ
ἄν πού τις ἔμπειρος γεωμετρίας, ἰδὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα,
κάλλιστα μὲν ἔχειν ἀπεργασίᾳ, γελοῖον μὴν ἐπι-
σκοπεῖν αὐτὰ σπουδῇ, ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς
530 ληψόμενον ἴσων ἢ διπλασίων ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς
/ / > > / a
συμμετρίας. Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει γελοῖον εἶναι; ἔφη.
Τῷ ὄντι δὴ ἀστρονομικόν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὄντα οὐκ
οἴει ταὐτὸν πείσεσθαι εἰς τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φορὰς
ἀποβλέποντα; νομιεῖν μέν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα
τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω ἕυνεστάναι
τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν
A 7
αὐτῷ: τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἡμέραν ξυμμετρίαν καὶ
τούτων πρὸς μῆνα καὶ μηνὸς πρὸς ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ
Βτῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων πρός τε ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς
Bd > » ” « la A ,
ἄλληλα, οὐκ ἄτοπον, οἴει, ἡγήσεται τὸν νομίζοντα
γίγνεσθαί τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν
παραλλάττειν, σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα, καὶ
2 δημιουργῷ : an anticipation of the Timaeus.
» Cf. Bruno apud Héffding, History of Modern Philosophy,
i. 125 and 128, and Galileo, ibid. i. 178; also Lucretius v.
302-305.
° Plato was right against the view that Aristotle imposed
on the world for centuries. We should not therefore say
with Adam that he would have attached little significance
to the perturbations of Neptune and the consequent discovery
184
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
real speed and real slowness in true number and in
all true figures both in relation to one another and
as.vehicles of the things they carry and contain,
These can be apprehended only by reason and thought,
but not by sight; ordo you think otherwise?” “B
no means,” he said. “‘ Then,” said I, “νὰ must
use the blazonry of the heavens as patterns to aid
in the study of those realities, just as one would do
who chanced upon diagrams drawn with special care
and elaboration by Daedalus or some other craftsman
or painter. For anyone acquainted with geometry
who saw such designs would admit the beauty of the
workmanship, but would think it absurd to examine
them seriously in the expectation of finding in them
the absolute truth with regard to equals or doubles
or any other ratio.” “How could it be other-
wise than absurd?’’ he said. ‘‘ Do you not think,”
said I, ‘‘ that one who was an astronomer in very truth
would feel in the same way when he turned his eyes
upon the movements of the stars ? He will be willing
to concede that the artisan? of heaven fashioned it-and
all that it contains in the best possible manner for
such a fabric; but when it comes to the proportions
of day and night, and of their relation to the month,
and that of the month to the year, and of the other
stars to these and one another, do you not suppose
that he will regard as a very strange fellow the man
who believes that these things go on for ever without
change ὃ or the least deviation “though they possess
of Uranus. It is to Plato that tradition attributes the problem
of accounting by the simplest hypothesis for the movement of
the heavenly bodies and *‘ saving the phenomena.”
The alleged contradiction between thisand Laws 891 8 ff. and
Tim, 47 « is due to a misapprehension. That the stars in their
movements de not perfectly express the exactness of mathe-
185
PLATO r
ζητεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν;
᾿Εμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, σοῦ νῦν ἀκούοντι. Προ-
βλήμασιν ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, χρώμενοι ὥσπερ
γεωμετρίαν οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίαν μέτιμεν" τὰ
Ο δ᾽ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὄντως
matical concepiions is no more than modern astronomers
say. In the aap passage Plato protests against the idea
that there is no law and order governing the movement of
the planets, but that they are ‘* wandering stars,”’ as irregular
in their movements as they seem. In the Timaeus he is saying
that astronomy or science took its beginning from the sight
and observation of the heavenly bodies and the changi
seasons. In the Republic Plato’s purpose is to predict and
encourage a purely mathematical astronomy and to indicate
its place in the type of education which he wishes to give
his guardians. ere is not the slightest contradiction or
change of opinion in the three passages if interpreted rightly
in their entire context.
* The meaning is not appreciably affected by a slight
doubt as to the construction of ἕητεῖν. It is usually taken
with ἄτοπον (regarded as neuter), the meaning being that the
philosophic astronomer will think it strange to look for the
absolute truth in these things. This double use of ἄτοπον is
strained and it either makes παντὶ τρόπῳ awkward or attri-
butes to Plato the intention of decrying the concrete study
of astronomy. I think ξητεῖν etc. are added by a trailing
anacoluthon such as occurs elsewhere in the Republic. Their
subject is the real astronomer who, using the stars only as
‘“‘diagrams”’ or patterns (529 p), seeks to learn a higher
exacter mathematical truth than mere observation could
ΤΣ Madvig’s ζητήσει implies a like view of the meaning
ut smooths out the construction. . But my interpretation of
the passage as a whole does not depend on this construction.
If we 2a, ΔΑ ζητεῖν depend on ἄτοπον (neuter) ἡγήσεται, the
meaning will be that he thinks it absurd to expect to get
that higher truth from mere observation. At all events
Plato is not here objecting to observation as a suggestion
for mathematica] studies but to its substitution for them, as
the next sentence shows.
» That is just what the mathematical astronomy of to-day
186
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
bodies and are visible objects—and that his unre-
mitting quest is the realities of these things?” “I
at least do think so,” he said, “ now that I hear it
from you.” ‘‘ Itis by means of problems,” then,” said
I, “65 in the study of geometry, that we will pursue
astronomy too, and we will let be the things in the
heavens,° if we are to have a part in the true science of
does, and it is a πολλαπλάσιον ἔργον compared with the
merely observational astronomy of Plato’s day. Cf. the
interesting remarks of Sir James Jeans, apud S. J. Woolf,
Drawn from Life, Ὁ. 14: “The day is gone when the
astronomer’s work is carried on only at the eyepiece of a
telescope. Naturally, observations must be made, but these
must be recorded by men who are trained for that purpose,
and I am not one of them,” etc.
Adam’s quotation of Browning’s ““ Abt Vogler” in con-
nexion with this passage will only confirm the opinion of those
who regard Plato as a sentimental enemy of science.
¢ Cf. also Phileb. 59 a, Aristot. Met. 997 Ὁ 35 οὐδὲ περὶ
τὸν οὐρανὸν 4 ἀστρολογία τόνδε.
This intentional Ruskinian boutade has given t
The Platonist, we are told ad nauseam, deduces
the world from his inner consciousness. This is of course
not true (cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 45). But Plato,
like some lesser writers, loves to emphasize his thought by
x and surprise, and his postulation and prediction
of a mathematical astronomy required emphasis. Cf. my
Platonism and the History of Science, pp. 171-174.
This and similar passages cannot be used to prove that
Plato was unscientific, as many hostile or thoughtless critics
have attempted todo. Cf. e.g. the severe strictures of Arthur
Platt, Nine Essays, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1927, pp. 12-16,
especially p. 16: “Plato being first and foremost a meta-
physician with a sort of religious system would not have us
study anything but oe sics and a kind of mystic
religion.” Woodbridge Riley, From Myth to Reason, p. 47:
“νος Plato . . . was largely responsible for turning back
the clock of scientific progress. To explain the wonders of
the world he preferred imagination to observation.” Cf. also
Benn, Greek Philosophers, vol. i. pp. 173 and 327, Herrick,
187
PLATO Hf ἶ
ἀστρονομίας μεταλαμβάνοντες χρήσιμον τὸ φύσει
φρόνιμον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐξ ἀχρήστου ποιήσειν.. Ἢ
πολλαπλάσιον, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον ἢ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονο-
μεῖται προστάττεις. Οἷμαι δέ γε, εἶπον, καὶ
τἄλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ie a ἡμᾶς,
ἐάν τι ἡμῶν ὡς νομοθετῶν ὄφελος ἢ 7}
ΧΗ. ᾿Αλλὰ γὰρ τί ἔχεις ὑπομνῆσαι τῶν oe
ἡκόντων μαθημάτων; Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν.
οὑτωσί. Οὐ μὴν ἕν, ἀλλὰ πλείω, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἴδη
D παρέχεται ἡ φορά, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν “πάντα
ἴσως ὅστις σοφὸς ἕξει εἰπεῖν: ἃ δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν
προφανῆ, δύο. Ποῖα δή; Πρὸς τούτῳ, jv δ᾽
ἐγώ, ἀντίστροφον αὐτοῦ. Τὸ ποῖον; Κωδυνεύει,
ἔφην, ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς
πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγῆναι, καὶ αὗται
ἀλλήλων ἀδελφαί τινες ai ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, ὡς οἵ
τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Γλαύκων,
The Thinking Machine, p. 335, F.C. S. Schiller, Plato and
his Predecessors, p. 81: ‘“‘. . . that Plato’s anti-empirical
bias renders him profoundly anti-scientific, and that his
influence has always, openly or subtly, counteracted and
thwarted the scientific impulse, or at least diverted it into
unprofitable channels.” Dampier-Whetham, A History of
Science, pp. 27-28: ‘‘ Plato was a great philosopher but in
the history of experimental science he must be counted a
disaster.”
Such statements disregard the entire context of the
Platonic passages they exploit, and take no account of
Plato’s purpose or of other passages which counteract his
seemingly unscientific remarks.
Equally unfair is the practice of comparing Plato un-
fayourably with Aristotle in this respect, as Grote ¢.g.
frequently does (cf. Aristotle, p. 233). Plato was an artist
and Aristotle an encyclopaedist; but Plato as a whole is far
nearer the point of view of recent science than ees
Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, p. 163;
532 a and on 529 a, ἢ. 180, note a, and What Plato Said, p. 336.
188
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
astronomy and so convert to right use from useless-
ness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul.” |
“ You enjoin a task,” he said, “that will multiply
the labour * of our present study of astronomy many
times.” “ And I fancy,” 1 said, “that. our other
injunctions will be of the same kind if we are of any
use as lawgivers.
XII. ““ However, what suitable studies have you
to suggest?” “ Nothing,” he said, “ thus off-hand.”
“Yet, surely,” said I, “ motion® in general provides ©
not one but many forms or speciés, according to my
opinion. To enumerate them all will perhaps be the
task of a wise man,° but even to us two of them
are apparent.’’ “‘ What are they?” “In addition
to astronomy, its counterpart,’ I replied. “‘ What
is that δ᾿ γε may venture to suppose,” I said,
“that as the eyes are framed for astronomy so the
ears are framed? for the movements of harmony;
and these are in some sort kindred sciences,’ as the
Pythagoreans’ affirm and we admit,’ do we not,
* Cf. Phaedr. 272 πὶ καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν ye φαίνεται ἔργον.
- δ Plato here generalizes motion as a subject of science. -
© The modesty is in the tone of the Timaeus-
4 Por πέπηγεν cf. 605.4.
_ * The similar statement attributed. to Archytas, Diels: 1.5
p. 331, is probably an imitation of this.
7 ras is a great name, but little is known of him.
** Pythagoreans”’ in later usage sometimes means mystics,
sometimes mathematical physicists, sometimes both. Plato
makes use of both traditions but is dominated by neither.
For Erich Frank’s recent book, Plato und die sogenannten
Pythagoreer, cf. my article in. Class. Phil. vol. xxiii. (1928)
pp. 347 ff. The student of Plato will do well to turn the page
when he meets the name Hiuthagoras in a commentator.
5 For this turn of phrase ef. Vol. 1. p. 333, 424.c, Protag.
316 a, Symp. 186 5.
189
PLATO
ξυγχωροῦμεν. ἢ πῶς ποιοῦμεν; Οὕτως, ἔφη.
E Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ πολὺ τὸ ἔργον, ἐκεί-
/ ~ , ~
νῶν πευσόμεθα, πῶς λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν Kal εἴ
τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις; ἡμεῖς δὲ παρὰ πάντα
ταῦτα φυλάξομεν τὸ ἡμέτερον. ἸΠοῖον; Μή ποτ
. A > A > “ ca | eee =
αὐτῶν τι ἀτελὲς ἐπιχειρῶσιν ἡμῖν μανθάνειν ovs
, ~ aA , ae ae ¥ 24 ν
θρέψομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξῆκον ἐκεῖσε ἀεΐ, of πάντα δεῖ
ἀφήκειν, οἷον ἄρτι περὶ τῆς ἀστρονομίας ἐλέγομεν.
“σ᾿ a OV - ;
ἢ οὐκ οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἕτερον τοιοῦτον
ποιοῦσι; τὰς γὰρ ἀκουομένας αὖ συμφωνίας καὶ
φθόγγους ἀλλήλοις ἀναμετροῦντες ἀνήνυτα ὥσπερ
οἱ ἀστρονόμοι πονοῦσιν. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, καὶ
γελοίως γε, νώμακ:...«ἀφααὶ ὀνομάζοντες καὶ
παραβάλλοντες τὰ ὦτα, οἷον ἐκ γειτόνων φωνὴν
θηρευόμενοι, of μέν φασιν ἔτι κατακούειν ἐν μέσῳ
τινὰ ἠχὴν καὶ σμικρότατον εἶναι τοῦτο διάστημα,
α« For the reference to experts ¢f. supra 400 B, 4245. Cf.
also What Plato Said, p. 484, on Laches 184 p-x,
> παρά of course here means ‘throughout’ and not
“contrary.”
¢ I take the word ἀτελές etymologically (cf. pp. 66-67, note ὁ,
on 500 a), with reference to the end in view. Others take it
in the ordinary Greek sense, “‘ imperfect,”’ “* incomplete.”
4 This passage is often taken as another example of Plato’s
hostility to science and the experimental method. It is of
course not that, but the precise interpretation is difficult.
Glaucon at first misapprehends (ef. p. 180, note a, on 529 a)
and gives an amusing description of the mere empiricist in
music. But Socrates says he does not mean these, but those
who try to apply mathematics to the perception of sound
instead of developing a (Kantian) a priori science of harmony
to match the mathematical science of astronomy. Cf, also
p. 193, note g, on 531 8, W. Whewell, Transactions of the Cam-
bridge Philos. Soc. vol. ix. p. 589, and for music A. Rivaud,
“Platon et la musique,’ Rev. d’ Histoire de la Philos. 1929,
190
tn σιωναινασνονο
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
Glaucon?”’’ ‘“‘ We do,’ he said. ‘ Then,” said I,
“since the task is so great, shall we not inquire of
them what their opinion is and whether they have
anything to add? And we in all this” will be on
the watch for what concerns us.” ‘‘ What is that?”
“To prevent our fosterlings from attempting to learn
nything that does not conduce to the end*° we have
in view, and does not always come out at what we said
ought to be the goal of everything, as we were just
now saying about astronomy. Or do you not know
that they repeat the same procedure in the case
of harmonies?? They transfer it to hearing and
measure audible concords and sounds against one an-
other,’ expending much useless labour just as the
astronomers do.” ‘“‘ Yes, by heaven,” he said, “ and
most absurdly too. They talk of something they
call minims’ and, laying their ears alongside, as if
trying to catch a voice from next door,’ some affirm
that they can hear a note between and that this is
the least interval and the unit of measurement, while
pp. 1-30; also Stallbaum ad loc., and E. Frank, Platon
τι. d. sog. Pyth., Anhang, on the history of Greek music.
He expresses surprise (p. 139) that Glaucon knows i
of Pythagorean theories of music. Others use this to prove
Socrates’ ignorance of music.
* This hints at the distinction developed in the Politicus
between relative measurement of one thing against another
and measurement by a standard. Cf. Polit. 283 ©, 284 B-c,
Theat. 186 a.
᾿ 4 πυκνώματα (condensed notes). The word is technical.
Cf. Adam ad loc. But, as ἄττα shows, Plato is using it
loosely to distinguish a measure of sense perception from a
mathematically determined interval.
“ Cf. Pater, Renaissance, p. 157. The phrase, ἐκ γειτόνων,
is colloquial and, despite the protest of those who insist that
it only means in the neighbourhood, oe overhearing
what goes on next door—as often in the New Comedy.
191
PLATO aH
ᾧ μετρητέον, of δὲ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ὡς ὅμοιον ἤδη
Β φθεγγομένων, ἀμφότεροι ὦτα τοῦ νοῦ προστησά-
μενοι. Σὺ μέν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις
τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ
βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας"
ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἡ εἰκὼν γίγνηται, πλήκτρῳ
τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων καὶ κατηγορίας πέρι καὶ
ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας χορδῶν, παύομαι τῆς
εἰκόνος καὶ οὔ φημι τούτους λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνους
οὗς ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἐρήσεσθαι.
C ταὐτὸν γὰρ ποιοῦσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ: τοὺς
γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουομέναις
ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα
ἀνίασιν ἐπισκοπεῖν, τίνες ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ
, BA \ \ ee 4 4..." , ΟΜ ᾿
τίνες οὔ, καὶ διὰ τί ἑκάτεροι. Δαιμόνιον γάρ, ἔφη,
πρᾶγμα λέγεις. Χρήσιμον μὲν οὖν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρὸς
« Cf. Aldous Huxley, Jesting Pilate, p. 152: “Much is
enthusiastically taught about the use of quarter tones in
Indian music. I listened attentively at Lucknow in the
hope of hearing some new and extraordinary kind of melody
based on these celebrated fractions. But I listened in vain.”
Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. pp. 334-335, n. 85, thinks
that Plato ‘‘ shrugs his shoulders at experiments.” He refers
to Plutarch, Life of Marcellus, xiv. 5, and Quaest. Conv.
viii. 2. 1, 7, where Plato is represented as “having been
angry with Eudoxus and Archytas because they employed
instruments and apparatus for the solution of a problem,
instead of relying solely on reasoning.”
>» So Malebranche, ntretiens sur la métaphysique, 3, X.:
‘** Je pense que vous vous moquez de moi. C’est la raison
et non les sens qu’il faut consulter.”’
ὁ For χρηστός in this ironical sense cf. also 479 a, Symp.
B.
4 The language of the imagery confounds the torture of
slaves giving evidence on the rack with the strings and pegs
of a musical instrument. For the latter ¢f. Horace, 4. P. 348,
192
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
others insist that the strings now render identical
sounds,* both preferring their ears to their minds.>”
“ You,” said I, “ are speaking of the worthies * who
vex and torture the strings and rack them? on the
pegs; but—not to draw out the comparison with
strokes of the plectrum and the musician’s complaints
of too responsive and too reluctant strings °—I drop
the figure,’ and tell you that I do not mean these
people, but those others? whom we just now said we
would interrogate about harmony. Their method
exactly corresponds to that of the astronomer; for
the numbers they seek are those found in these heard
concords, but they do not ascend” to generalized
problems and the consideration which numbers are
inherently concordant and which not and why in
each case.”’ “Α superhuman task,” he said. “‘Say,
rather, useful,‘”” said I, “‘ for the investigation of the
nam neque chorda sonum reddit quem vult manus et mens
poscentique gravem persaepe remittit acutum.
Stallbaum says that Plato here was imitated by Aristaenetus,
Epist yxiv. libr. 1 ri πράγματα παρέχετε χορδαῖς ;
- 4 This also may suggest a reluctant and a too willing
witness. ;
7 4 on 489 a, p. 23, note d.
® Hedistinguishes from the pure empirics justsatirized those
who apply their mathematics only to the data of observation.
This is perhaps one of Plato’s rare errors. For though there
may be in some sense a Kantian @ priori mechanics of
astronomy, there can hardly be a purely a priori mathematics
of acoustics. What numbers are consonantly harmonious
must always remain a fact of direct experience. Cf, my
Platonism and the History of Science, p. 176.
* Of. Friedlander, Platon, i. p. 108, n. 1.
* Cf. Tim. 47 c-p. Plato always keeps to his point—ef.
349 B-c, 564 a-s—or returns to it aftér a digression. Cf. on
572 5, p. 339, note ὁ.
VOL, II re) 193
PLATO "
τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησιν, ἄλλως δὲ
μεταδιωκόμενον ἄχρηστον. Εἰκός γ᾽, ἔφη. .
XIII. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ τούτων
D πάντων ὧν διεληλύθαμεν μέθοδος ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ
τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκηται καὶ ξυγγένειαν,
καὶ ξυλλογισθῇ ταῦτα ἣ ἔστιν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεῖα,
φέρειν τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ βουλόμεθα τὴν πραγματείαν
καὶ οὐκ ἀνόνητα πονεῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνόνητα.
Καὶ ἐγώ, ἔφη, οὕτω μαντεύομαι. ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ
ἔργον λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δ᾽
ἐγώ, ἢ τίνος λέγεις; ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅτι πάντα
ταῦτα προοίμια ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ
μαθεῖν; οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦσί γέ σοι οὗ ταῦτα
E δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί᾽, ἔφη, εἰ
μὴ μάλα γέ τινες ὀλίγοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα.
᾿Αλλ᾽ ἤδη," εἶπον, μὴ δυνατοί τινὲς ὄντες" δοῦναί τε
καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἴσεσθαι ποτέ τι ὧν φαμὲν
1 ἀλλὰ ἤδη ADM, ἀλλὰ δὴ F. !
5. μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες ΑΞ ΕἾΜ, οἱ μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες A:
μὴ δυνατοὶ οἵτινες Burnet.
2 Cf. on 505 8, p. 88, note a. .
> μέθοδος, like πραγματείαν in Ὁ, is used almost in the
later technical sense of ‘treatise’? or “branch of study.”
Cf. on 528 pb, p. 178, note a.
° Cf. on 537.c, Epin. 991 ΕΞ.
4 Plato is fond of this image. It suggests here also the
preamble of a law, as the translation more explicitly in-
dicates. Cf. 532 p, anticipated in 457 c, and Laws 722 p-x,
723 a-s and Ἑ, 720 p-x, 772 £, 870 τ, 854 a, 932 a and passim.
4“ Of. Theaet. 146 58, and perhaps Huthyd. 290 c. ough
mathematics quicken the mind of the student, it is, apart
from metaphysics, a matter of common experience that
mathematicians are not necessarily good reasoners on other
subjects. Jowett’s wicked jest, “1 have hardly ever known
a mathematician who could reason,” misled an eminent
194
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
beautiful and the good,® but if otherwise pursued,
useless,” ‘‘ That is likely,” he said.
XIII. “ And what is more,” I said, “ I take it that
if the inyestigation® of all these studies goes far
enough to bring out their community and kinship °
with one another, and to infer their affinities, then
to busy ourselves with them contributes to our de-
sired end, and the labour taken is not lost; but
otherwise it is vain.” “‘ I too so surmise,”’ said he;
“but it is a huge task of which you speak, Socrates.”
“Are you talking about the prelude,?” I said, “‘ or
_ what? Or do we not know that all this is but the
_ preamble of the law itself, the prelude of the strain
that we have to apprehend? - For you surely do not
suppose that experts in these matters are reasoners
and. dialecticians®?’’ “No, by Zeus,’’ he said,
_““except a very few whom I haye met.” ‘“ But have
you ever supposed,” I said, “‘ that men who could
not render and exact an account’ of opinions in
discussion would ever know anything of the things
professor of education who infers that Plato disbelieved in
“*mental discipline’ (Yale Review, July 1917). Cf. also
Taylor, Note in Reply to Mr. A. W. Benn, Mind, xii. (1903)
p. 511; Charles Fox, Educational Psychology, pp. 187-
188: “... a training in the mathematics may produce
exactness of thought . . . provided that the training is of
such a kind as to inculeate an ideal which the pupil values
and strives to attain. Failing this, Glaucon’s observation
that he had ‘ hardly ever -known a mathematician who was
capable of reasoning’ is likely to be repeated.” On the text
ef. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 384-385, and Adam ad loc.
7 λόγον. .. dofvac. A commonplace Platonic plea for
dialectics. Cf. 534 5, Prot. 336 c, Polit. 286 a, Theaet.
202 c, 175 c, 183 ν, Seph. 230 a, Phaedo 78 c-p, 95 νυν,
Charm. 165 5, Xen. Oecon. 11. 99, Cf. also λόγον λαβεῖν
Rep. 402 a, 534 5, Soph. 246 c, Theaet. 208 p, and Thompson
on Meno 75 pv.
195
PLATO
532 δεῖν εἰδέναι; Οὐδ᾽ ad, ἔφη, τοῦτό ye. Οὐκοῦν,
> , 3) > , > ε {
εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὗτος ἤδη αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ νόμος
ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει; ὃν καὶ ὄντα νοητὸν
μιμοῖτ᾽ ἂν ἡ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις, ἣν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς
αὐτὰ ἤδη τὰ ζῷα ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς
αὐτὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν
ἥλιο Ὁ ‘ LA ~ ὃ αλ ,ὔ θ >
ἥλιον. οὕτω καὶ oTav Tis τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπι-
χειρῇ ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου
ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ,
Β πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ᾽
αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος
τότε ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
Τί οὖν; οὐ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν
καλεῖς; Τί μήν; ‘H δέ γε, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λύσις τε
ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφὴ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν
ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς
τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῷά τε
1 ὁρμᾶν Clemens: ὁρμᾷ AFDM.
* Of. Phileb. 58 pv, Meno 75 c-p, Charm. 155 a, Cratyl
390 c, and on 533 B, pp. 200 f., note αὶ
» This is not a literal rendering, but gives the meaning.
¢ Cf. 516 a-s. Plato interprets his imagery again Ted
and in Β infra.
4 Of. supra p. 180, note a, and p. 187, notec. Cf. also 537 p,
and on 476 4 ff. Cf. Bergson, [ntroduction to Metaphysics,
p. 9: “‘ Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dis-
pense with symbols”; E. S. Robinson, Readings in General
Psych. p. 295: “ A habit of suppressing mental imagery must
therefore characterize men who deal much with abstract ideas;
and as the power of dealing easily and firmly with these
ideas is the surest criterion of a high order of intellect . . .’’;
Pear, Remembering and Forgetting, p. 57: ‘“‘ He (Napoleon)
is reported to have said that ‘there are some who, from
some physical or moral peculiarity of character, form a
picture (tableau) of everything. No matter what knowledge,
intellect, courage, or good qualities they may have, these men
196
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
we say must be known?” “ Nois surely the answer
to that too.” ‘“‘ This, then, at last, Glaucon,” I said,
“is the very law which dialectics ¢ recites, the strain
which it executes, of which, though it belongs to the
intelligible, we may see an imitation in the progress ὃ
of the faculty of vision, as we described* its en-
deavour to look at living things themselves and the
stars themselves and finally at the very sun. In like
manner, when anyone by dialectics attempts through
discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of
sense‘ to find his way to the very essence of each thing
and does not desist till he apprehends by thought
itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at
the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our
parable came to the goal of the visible.” “‘ By all
means,” he said. ‘* What, then, will you not call this
progress of thought dialectic?”’ “Surely.” ‘‘ And
the release from bonds,” I said, “‘ and the conversion
from the shadows to the images * that cast them and
to the light and the ascent’ from the subterranean
cavern to the world above,’ and there the persisting
are unfit to command”’; A. Bain, Mind, 1880, p. 570: ** Mr.
Galton is naturally startled. at finding eminent scientific men,
by their own account, so very low in the visualizing power. His
explanation, I have no doubt, hits the mark; the deficiency is
due to thenatural antagonism of pictorial aptitude and abstract
thought”; Judd, Psychology of High School Subjects, p. 321:
“Tt did not appear on superficial examination of the stand-
ings of students that those who can draw best are the best
students from the point of view of the teacher of science.”
* εἴδωλα : cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 238 ;
also 516 a, Theaet. 150 c, Soph. 240 a, 241 ©, 234c, 966 5
with 267 c, and Rep. 517 p ἀγαλμάτων.
7 ἐπάνοδος became almost technical in Neoplatonism. Cf.
also 517 a, 529 a, and p. 124, note ὃ.
* Lit. “sun,” i.e. the world illumined by the sun, not by
the fire in the cave.
197
PLATO
καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἔτι ἀδυναμία!
C βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα" καὶ
σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιὰς δι᾿
ἑτέρου τοιούτου φωτὸς ὡς πρὸς͵ ἥλιον κρίνειν
ἀποσκιαζομένας, πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία τῶν
τεχνῶν, ἃς διήλθομεν, ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ
ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ᾿ Ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ
ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν, ὥσπερ. τότε τοῦ σα-
φεστάτου ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου ἐν
τῷ σωματοειδεῖ τε καὶ ὁρατῷ τόπῳ. "Kya “μέν,
ἔφη, ἀποδέχομαι οὕτω. καίτοι παντάπασί γέ μοι
δοκεῖ χαλεπὰ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἶναι, ἄλλον δ᾽ αὖ
τρόπον χαλεπὰ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι. ὅμως δέ--οὐ γὰρ
> ~ ~ ᾿
ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι μόνον. ἀκουστέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὖθις
πολλάκις ἐπανιτέον--ταῦτα θέντες ἔχειν ὡς νῦν
λέγεται, ἐπ᾿ a ov δὴ τὸν γόμον ἴωμεν, καὶ
διέλθωμεν οὕτως ὥσπερ τὸ προοΐμιον διήλθομεν.
λέγε οὖν, τίς ὃ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνά-
E pews, καὶ κατὰ ποῖα δὴ εἴδη διέστηκε, καὶ τίνες
> c / - \ Ἅ ” ε » « \
αὖ ὅδοί. αὗται yap av ἤδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἱ πρὸς
> A »” > / ὦ ε “-
αὐτὸ ἄγουσαι εἶεν, of ἀφικομένῳ ὥσπερ ὁδοῦ
5 ,ὔ nn ΜΝ ‘ / “ / ΕἸ ἘΞ
ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας. Οὐκέτ᾽,
1 ἔτι ἀδυναμία Tamblichus: ἐπ᾽ ἀδυναμίᾳ ADM, ἀδυναμία F.
2 θεῖα Mss., bracketed by Stallbaum: θέα Ast and Apelt.
Adam once proposed «καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε kal A>eia.
* See crit. note, The text of lamblichus is the only reason-
able one. The reading of the manuscripts is impossible.
For the adverb modifying a noun cf. 558 B οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν
σμικρολογία, Laws 688 B σφόδρα γυναικῶν, with England’s
note, Theaet. 183 © πάνυ πρεσβύτης, Laws 791 c παντελῶς
παίδων, 698 c σφόδρα φιλία, Rep. 564 a ἄγαν δουλείαν, with
Stallbaum’s note.
198
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
__ inability ¢ to look directly at animals and plants and
the light of the sun, but the ability to see the phan-
_ tasms created by God? in water and shadows of objects
that are real and not merely, as before, the shadows
of images cast through a light which, compared with
the sun, is as unreal as they—all this procedure of
the arts and sciences that we have described indicates
their power to lead the best part of the soul up to the
contemplation of what is best among realities, as in
_ our parable the clearest organ in the body was turned
to the contemplation of what is brightest in the
corporeal and visible region.” “1 accept this,” he
said, “as the truth; and yet it appears to me very hard
to accept, and again, from another point of view, hard
to reject. Nevertheless, since we have not to hear
it at this time only, but are to repeat it often here-
after, let us assume that these things are as now has
been said, and proceed to the melody itself, and go
through with it as we have gone through the prelude.
Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of
dialectic ? Into what divisions does it fall? And what
are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would
bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest
on the road and then come to the end of our journey-
δ θεῖα because produced by God or nature and not by man
with a mirror or a paint-brush. See crit. note and Class.
Review, iv. Ὁ. 480. I quoted Sophist 266 n-n, and Adam with
rare candour withdrew his emendation tn his Appendix XIIT.
to this book. Apelt still misunderstands and emends, p. 296
and note,
Pi This poor Fira for the ear Pag pee of
ato’s metaphysical philosophy generally. . Unity ὁ
Plato’s Thought, p. 30, n. 192, What Plato ΠΕΣ ΟἿ toe i
p. 586 on Parmen. 135 c. So Tennyson says it is hard to
believe in God and hard not to believe.
199
PLATO
533 ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, οἷός τ᾽ ἔσει ἀκολουθεῖν"
Peewee ἢ
ἐπεὶ τό γ᾽ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι" οὐδ᾽
εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὗ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ
ἀληθές, ὅ γε δή μοι φαίνεται---εἰ δ᾽ ὄντως ἢ μή
οὐκέτ᾽ ἄξιον τοῦτο διισχυρίζεσθαι: ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μὲν
δὴ τοιοῦτόν τι ἰδεῖν, ἰσχυριστέον. ἢ γάρ; Τί μήν;
Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνη ἂν
/ > , Μ e ~ A /,
φήνειεν ἐμπείρῳ ὄντι dv νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἄλλῃ
δὲ οὐδαμῇ δυνατόν; Kai τοῦτ᾽, ἔφη, ἄξιον δι-
/ , “- 3 > , > Ἂς ca
ισχυρίζεσθαι. Τόδε γοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν
e719
Β ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου
* This is not mysticism or secret doctrine. It is, in fact,
the avoidance of dogmatism. But that is not all. Plato
could not be expected to insert a treatise on dialectical
method here, or risk an absolute definition which would
only expose him to misinterpretation. The principles and
methods of such reasoning, and the ultimate metaphysical
conclusions to which they may lead, cannot be expounded
in a page or a chapter. They can only be suggested to the
intelligent, whose own experience will help them to under-
stand. As the Republic and Laws entire explain Plato’s
idea of social good, so all the arguments in the dialogues
illustrate his conception of fair and unfair argument. ΟἿ᾽
What Plato Said, Index s.v. Dialectics, and note καὶ below.
> For the idiom οὐδὲν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι cf. Symp. 210 a,
Meno 77 a, Laws 961 c, Aesch. Prom. 848, Thucyd. viii.
22. 1, Eurip. Hippol. 285.
ὁ On Plato’s ke ek, ca the dogmatism often attributed
to him cf. What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86 5.
4 The mystical implications of φήνειεν are not to be pressed.
It is followed, as usual in Plato, by a matter-of-fact state-
ment of the essential practical conclusion (γοῦν) that no man
can be trusted to think straight in large matters who has
not been educated to reason and argue straight.
* Plato anticipates the criticism that he neglects experience.
7 i.e. dispute our statement and maintain. The meaning
is plain. It is a case of what I have called illogical idiom.
200 ΞΡ
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
ing.” ‘‘ You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow
_ me further,* though on my part there will be no lack §
_ of goodwill.’ And, if I could, I would show you, no
_ longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the
very truth, as it appears to me—though whether
rightly or not I may not properly affirm.° But that
something like this is what we have to see, I must
affirm.’ Isnotthatso?” “Surely.”’ “And may we not
also declare that nothing less than the power of dia-
lectics could reveal? this, and that only to one experi-
enced “ in the studies we have described, and that the
thing is in no other wise possible ἢ “‘ That, too,” he
said, “we may properly affirm.” ‘This, at any rate,”
said I, “πὸ one will maintain in dispute against us/:
that there is any other way of inquiry 5 that attempts
Cf. T.A.P.A. vol. xlvii. pp. 205-234. -The meaning is that
Phi 58 π, 59 a. Other “science” may more
interesting or useful, but sound dialectics alone fosters the
disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake. Cf. Soph.
235 c, Phaedr. 265-266. Aristotle, Topics i. 2. 6, practically
comes back to the Platonic conception of dialectics.
The full meaning of dialectics in Plato would demand a
treatise. It is almost the opposite of what Hegelians call by
that name, which is represented in Plato by the second part
of the Parmenides. The characteristic Platonic dialectic is
the checking of the stream of thought by the necessity of
securing the understanding and assent of an intelligent
interlocutor at every step, and the habit of noting all relevant
isti , divisions, and ambiguities, in ideas and terms.
When the interlocutor is used merely to relieve the strain on
the leader’s voice or the reader’s attention, as in some of the
later dialogues, dialectic becomes merely a literary form.
Κα Cicero’s “via et ratione.” περὶ παντός is virtually
identical with αὐτοῦ ye ἑκάστου πέρι.
It is true that the scientific specialist confines himself to
his eer tao The epee a his base ee the
sophi oph. 231 a), is prepared to argue about anything,
Soph. 232 c f., Luthyd. 272 a-s. at Ὁ
201
.-.------«τ
Ἢ
᾿
|
PLATO
πέρι, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ἄλλη Tis ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος.
_-O8@ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν. ἀλλ᾽ αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι
a / a“ ‘ /, > 4 em
πᾶσαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπι-
θυμίας εἰσὶν ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις ἢ
πρὸς θεραπείαν τῶν φυομένων τε καὶ συντιθεμένων
ἅπασαι τετράφαται: at δὲ λοιπαΐ, ἃς τοῦ ὄντος τι
ἔφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς
ταύτῃ ἑπομένας, ὁρῶμεν ὡς ὀνειρώττουσι μὲν
περὶ τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, Ews ἂν
ὑποθέσεσι χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῶσι, μὴ
δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν
ὃ μὴ olde, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδε
συμπέπλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν
ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι; Οὐδεμία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς.
XIV. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος
μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα,
ἐπ᾿ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, καὶ τῷ
ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα
UT. supra 525 c, 527 B.
ὃ The interpreters of Plato must allow for his Emersonian
habit of hitting each nail in turn as hard as he can. There
is no real contradiction between praising mathematics in
comparison with mere loose popular thinking, and disparag-
ing it in comparison with dialectics. There is no evidence
and no probability that Plato is here proposing a reform of
mathematics in the direction of modern mathematical logic,
as has been suggested. Cf. on 5274. It is the nature of
mathematics to fall short of dialectics. ;
¢ Of. Phileb. 20 Β and on 520 ¢, p. 143, note g.
4 Cf. supra on 531 τ.
¢ The touch of humour in the expression may be illustrated
by Lucian, Hermotimus 74, where it is used to justify Lucian’s
scepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt’s remark on
Coleridge, “‘ Excellent talker if you allow him to start from
no premises and come to no conclusion.”
* Or “admission.” Plato thinks of even geometrical
202
oe
᾿ THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
systematically and in all cases to determine what each
_ thing really is. But all the other arts have for their
|
_ object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly
concerned with generation and composition or with
_ the service and tendance of the things that grow
and are put together, while the remnant which we
said did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry
and the studies that accompany it—are, as we see,
_ dreaming ὃ about being, but the clear waking vision ὃ
of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the
assumptions which they employ undisturbed and
cannot give any account? of them. For where the
ing-point is something that the reasoner does not
know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is
a tissue of things not really known,’ what possibility
is there that assent‘ in such cases can ever be con-
verted into true knowledge or science?’ “ None,”
said he.
XIV. “‘ Then,” said I, “15 not dialectics the only
process of inquiry that advances in this manner,
doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle
itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is
literally true that when the eye of the soul? is sunk in
reasoning as a Socratic dialogue. Οὗ the ex. ration Οἱ
this idea by the Epicureans in Cie. De fn. i. 21 quae et :
falsis initiis profecta, vera esse non possunt: et si essent vera
nihil afferunt quo iucundius, id est, quo melius yiveremus.”
Dialectic proceeds διὰ συγχωρήσεων, the admission of the
interlocutor. Cf. Laws 957 pv, Phaedr. 237 c-p, Gorg.
487 ε, Lysis 219 c, Prot. 350 ©, Phileb. 12 a, Theaet. 162 a,
169 D-E, 164 c, ps 340 8. But such admissions are not
valid unless when challenged they are carried back to some-
thing satisfactory—ixavdy—(not necessarily in any given
case to the idea of good). But the mathematician as such
in sa acg demands the admission of his postulates and
efinitions. Cf. 510 s-p, 511 B.
9 Cf. supra on 519 5, p. 138, note a.
203
PLATO
KaTopwpvypevov ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω,
συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἷς δι-
ἤλθομεν τέχναις" ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσ-
είἰπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου,
ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ
ἐπιστήμης. διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν
που ὡρισάμεθα- ἔστι δ᾽, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ
E ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις
δ84
ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη" [ἀλλ᾽ ὃ
ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σαφήνειαν, ἃ λέγει
ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀρκέσει ᾿Αρέσκει γοῦν," ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
ὥσπερ τὸ πρότερον, τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν
ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δευτέραν δὲ διάνοιαν, τρίτην δὲ
πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην" καὶ ξυναμφότερα μὲν
ταῦτα δόξαν, ξυναμφότερα δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα νόησιν" καὶ
δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν"
καὶ ὅ τι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν,
καὶ ὅ τι νόησις πρὸς δόξαν, ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν
καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν" τὴν δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ οἷς ταῦτα
1 The text as printed is that of Hermann, brackets by Adam.
ἀλλ᾽ ὃ AM, ἄλλο FD: ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ AFDM, ἔξω σαφηνείαν
Herm., πως τὴν ἕξιν, σαφηνείᾳ Burnet, τὴν ἕξιν πῶς ἔχει σαφηνείας
Bywater: ἃ addidit et σαφηνείαν emendavit Herm,; λέγει AD,
λέγειν FM, λέγεις ΑΞ: ἀρκέσει mss. See also Adam, Appendix,
2 ἀρέσκει MSS., καὶ ἀρκέσει Burnet; γοῦν AM, οὖν FD, Burnet.
@ Orphism pictured the impious souls as buried in mud in
the world below ; ¢f.363 p. Again we should not press Plato’s
rhetoric and imagery either as sentimental Platonists or hostile
critics. See Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 463, n. 3.
» All writers and philosophers are compelled to “speak
with the yulgar.” ΟἿ. e.g. Meyerson, De l’explication dans
les sciences, i. p. 329: ‘* Tout en sachant que la couleur n’est
pas réellement une qualité de l’objet, ἃ se servir cependant,
dans la vie de tous les jours, d’une locution qui l’affirme.”
204
¢
:
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
_ the barbaric slough* of the Orphic myth, dialectic
gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as
helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies
and sciences which we enumerated, which we called
sciences often from habit,? though they really need
some otherdesignation,connoting more clearness than
opinion and more obscurity than science. “Under-
standing, ¢ I believe, was the term we employed. But
I presume we shall not dispute about the name? when
ings of such moment lie before us for consideration.”
“No, indeed,” he said.¢* * * ‘‘ Are you satisfied,
then,” said I, “as before,f to call the first division
science, the second understanding, the third belief
andthe fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the _
last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellec-
tion, opinion dealing with generation, and intellection
with essence, and this relation being expressed in the
ion’: as essence is to generation, so is intellec-
tion to opinion ; and as intellection is to opinion, so
is science to belief, and understanding to image-
thinking or surmise? But the relation between
their objective correlates‘ and the division into two
- Male, 511 p, pp. 116-117, note ce.
4 This unwillingness to dispute about names when they do
not concern the argument is characteristic of Plato. Cf. What
Plato Said, p. 516 on Meno 78 s-c for numerous instances.
Stallbaum refers to Max. Tyr. Diss. xxvii. p. 40 ἐγὼ γάρ roe
τά τε ἄλλα, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐλευθερίᾳ πείθομαι Ἠλάτωνι.
¢ The next sentence is hopelessly corrupt and is often
considered an interpolation. e translation omits it. See
Adam, Appendix XVI. to Bk. VII., Bywater, Journal of
Phil. (Eng.) v. pp. 122-124. 4 Supra 511 p-.
* Always avoid “ faith” in translating Plato.
= Ig on 508 c, p. 103, note ὁ.
* That is the meaning, though some critics will object to
the phrase. - Lit. “ the things over which these (mental states)
are set, or to which they apply.”
205
C
PLATO
ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῇ ἑκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ
τε καὶ νοητοῦ, ἐῶμεν, ὦ ᾿᾿λαύκων, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς
πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρ-
εληλυθότες. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγ᾽, ἔφη, τά γε ἄλλα,
> “ 4 ΄“ a > ae,
καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι, ξυνδοκεῖ. Ἢ καὶ
\ a ‘ , to 2? /
διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα
τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν μὴ
» / Wy + / } ἔ
ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ
τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν; Πῶς
\ * > “ ’ > ~ Si ‘ “~
yap av, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, φαίην; Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως: ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ
λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τὴν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῇ διὰ πάντων
ἐλέγχων διεξιών, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ οὐρίαν
᾿ προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι naam
τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
“ > 4 \ σ΄ A 4 ” > A
φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν
» tA > > " > / ‘ > ,ὔ /,
οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴ πῃ εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ,
4 There are two probable reasons for this: (1) The objective
classification is nothing to Plato’s present purpose; (2) The
second member of the proportion is lacking in the objective
correlates. Numbers are distinguished from ideas not in
themselves but only by the difference of method in dialectics
and in mathematics. Cf. supra on 525 pv, 526 a, Unity of
Plato’s Thought, pp. 83-84, and Class. Phil. xxii, (1927)
pp. 213-218. The explicit qualifications of my arguments
there have been neglected and the arguments misquoted but
not answered. They can be answered only by assuming the
point at issue and affirming that Plato did assign an inter-
mediate place to mathematical conceptions, for which there
is no evidence in Plato’s own writings.
> Cf. supra.on 531 £, p. 195, note αὶ
¢ Cf. on 511 ν, p. 116, note a.
4 This would be superfluous on the interpretation that the
ἱκανόν must always be the idea of good. What follows dis-
tinguishes the dialectician from the eristic sophist.. For the
206
Ι
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the
intelligible, let us dismiss,* Glaucon, lest it involve us
in discussion many times as long as the preceding.”
“ Well,”’ he said, “I agree with you about the rest of
it, so far as I am able to follow.” “ And do you not
also give the name dialectician to the man who is able
to exact an account? of the essence of each thing?
And will you not say that the one who is unable to
do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an
account to himself and others, does not possess full
_ reason and intelligence ὁ about the matter?” “‘ How
could I say that he does?” he réplied. “ And is not
this true of the good likewise #—that the man who
is unable to define in his discourse and<distifiguish
and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea
of the ‘good, and who cannot, as it were in battle,
running the gauntlet® of all tests, and striving to
examine everything by essential reality and not by
opinion, hold on his way through all this without
tripping’ in his reasoning—the man who lacks this
power, you will say, does not really know the good
itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends
short cut, καὶ. . . ὡσαύτως, cf. 523 £, 580 p, 585 p, 346 a,
¢ It imports little whether the objections are in his own
mind or made by others. Thought is a discussion of the soul
with itself (cf. Theaet. 189 ©, Phileb. 38 ©, Soph. 263 £), and
when the interlocutor refuses to proceed Socrates sometimes
continues the argument himself by supplying both question
and answer, ¢.g. Gorg. 506 c ff. Cf. further Phaedrus 278 c,
Parmen. 136 v-e, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17.
* Cf. Theaet. 160 v, Phileb. 45 a. The practical outcome
= Laws 966 a-z, Phaedr. 278 c, Soph. 259 5-ο. Cf. Mill,
Diss. and Disc. iv. p. 283: “There is no knowledge and no
assurance of right belief but with him who can both confute
the opposite opinion and successfully defend his own against
confutation.”
207
PLATO : ᾿
οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον
> an ‘ ς uff \ > 799 >
ὀνειροπολοῦντα Kal ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδ᾽ ἐξ-
/ > 7 / > / /
εγρέσθαι, εἰς “Αιδου πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως
ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν; Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, σφόδρα
γε πάντα ταῦτα φήσω. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τούς γε σαυτοῦ
παῖδας, οὗς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ
ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι,
ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμὰς ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ
πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν,
ἔφη. Νομοθετήσεις δὴ αὐτοῖς ταύτης μάλιστα
~ / > 4 > > lod >
τῆς παιδείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐξ ἧς ἐρωτᾶν τε
καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστημονέστατα οἷοί τ᾽ ἔσονται;
E Νομοθετήσω, ἔφη, μετά γε . *Ap’ οὖν δοκεῖ
σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θῥῤιγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ
διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαΐϊ, καὶ οὐκέτ᾽ ἄλλο
τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι,
ἀλλ᾽ ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων; "Ἐμοιγ᾽,
ΝΜ
ἔφη. Ἁ 3 > 4 A /
XV. Διανομὴ τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ λοιπόν σοι,
τίσι ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα δώσομεν καὶ τίνα τρόπον.
Δῆλον, ἔφη. Μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν Ἀν ε ς
τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἵους ἐξελέξαμεν; Πῶς γάρ, ἢ δ᾽
σ »᾿ Ἁ A 3, , 4 3 >? A > ,
ὅς, οὔ; Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐκείνας
« For εἰδώλου ef. on 532 B, p. 197, note e. This may be one
of the sources of Hist. vii. 342 B.
» For Platonic intellectualism the life of the ordinary man
is something between sleep and waking. Cf. Apol. 31 a.
Note the touch of humour in τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν. Cf.
Bridges, Psychology, p. 382: ‘There is really no clear-cut
distinction between what is usually called sleeping and
waking. In sleep we are less awake than in the waking
hours, and in waking life we are less asleep than in sleep.”
¢ Plato likes to affirm his ideal only of the philosophic
rulers.
208
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
_ any adumbration? of it, hiscontact with itis by opinion,
not by knowledge; and dreaming and dozing
his present life, before he awakens here he
will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep for |
- ever?®” “Yes, by Zeus,” said he, “all this I will
stoutly affirm.” “But, surely,” said I, “if you
should ever nurture in fact your children ° whom you
are now hurturing and educating in word,’ you would
not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state,
and determine the greatest matters, being them-
selves as irrational® as the lines so called ingeometry.”
“Why, no,” he said. ‘Then you will provide by
law that they shall give special heed to the discipline
that will enable them to ask and answer’ questions
in the most scientific manner?” “I willso legislate,”
he said, “‘ in conjunction with you.” “‘ Do youagree,
then,” said I, “‘ that we have set dialectics akove all
other studies to be as it were the coping-stone ὅ-
that no other higher kind of stu uld rightly be
placed above it, but that our discussion of studies is
now complete”?” ‘I do,” he said. :
_ XV. “ The distribution, then, remains,” said I, “ to
whom we are to assign these studies and in what way.”
“Clearly,” he said. “ Do you remember, then, the
kind of man we chose in our former selection* of
rulers?” “ΟΥ̓́ course,” he said. “‘In most re-
spects, then,” said I, “ you must suppose that we
4 Cf. 376 νυ, 369 c, 472 κε, Critias 106 a.
* A slight touch of humour. Cf. the schoolgirl who said,
“These equations are inconsiderate and will not be solved.”
? A frequent periphrasis for dialectics. Cf. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον
aici Gorg. 461 ©, Charm. 166 νυ, Prot. 338 p, Ale. 1.
B.
5 For ὥσπερ θριγκός cf. Eur. Here. Fur. 1280, Aesch. Ag.
1283; and Phileb. 58 c-p ff.
* Cf. 541 B. * Cf. 412 v-£, 485-487, 503 a, c-E.
VOL. II P 209
D
ΡΠΆΤΟΙ ΤΠ ΤΗ͂Τ
\ 4 ΜΝ a > ,ὔ ‘
τὰς φύσεις οἴου δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι" τούς τε yap
᾽ὔ A \ 5 ὃ / ,ὔ
βεβαιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρειοτάτους ἤροαιρετέον,
καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τοὺς εὐειδεστάτους: πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις ζητητέον μὴ μόνον γενναίους τε καὶ
βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἤθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ τῇδε τῇ παιδείᾳ
Lin ΄ , ε ΤΡ vale
τῆς φύσεως πρόσφορα ἑκτέον αὐτοῖς. [οἵα
, ’ , τ ΣΎ ΣΈ δ Harbe
διαστέλλει ὶ Δριμύτητα, ὦ μακάριε, ἔφην, δεῖ αὖ-
τοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μὴ. ρος
“- a ' > , φφ Δ:
πῶς μανθάνειν: πολὺ γάρ τοι μᾶλλον ἀποδειλιῶσι
a 2 ryt: 7,
ψυχαὶ ἐν ἰσχυροῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις"
οἰκειότερος γὰρ αὐταῖς ὁ πόνος, ἴδιος ἀλλ᾽ οὐ
κοινὸς ὧν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος. ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη. Καὶ
μνήμονα δὴ καὶ ατὸν καὶ πάντῃ φιλόπονον
nTnTéov. ἤ τινὶ τρόπῳ οἴει τά τε τοῦ σώματος
edi} vis ar \ ͵ Dohirly.
ἐθελήσειν τινὰ διαπονεῖν Kal τοσαύτην μάθησιν τε
καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν; Οὐδένα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐὰν
\ ΄ ,, 3. ed τ \ ~ ~ ε 4
μὴ παντάπασί γ᾽ ἢ (εὐφυής. To γοῦν viv ἁμάρ-
t A
Tha, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ
ταῦτα προσπέπτωκεν, ὃ καὶ πρότερον elroy, ὅτι
a ὶ 3)
οὐ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἅπτονται: οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει
hd > A 7 Π ~ ” Il 7
ἅπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γνησίους. Πῶς; ἔφη. Iparov
μέν, εἶπον, φιλοπονίᾳ οὐ χωλὸν δεῖ εἶναι τὸν
ἁψόμενον, τὰ μὲν ἡμίσεα φιλόπονον, τὰ δ᾽ ἡμίσεα
ἄπονον: ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν τις φιλογυμναστὴς μὲν
καὶ φιλόθηρος ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος
φιλοπονῇ, φιλομαθὴς δὲ μή, μηδὲ φιλήκοος μηδὲ
5 RLY, as well as physically. Cf. 357 a, Prot.
350 85 f.
» Cf. Symp. 209 8-c, Phaedr. 252 © and Vol, I. p. 261 on
402 Ὁ. Ascham, The Schoolmaster, Bk. I. also approves of
this qualification. © For βλοσυρούς ef. Theaet. 149 a.
4 ΟἹ, 504 a, 374 π, Gorg. 480 c, Protag. 326 c, Euthyphro
15c.
210
|
ee ee
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
have to choose those same natures. The most stable,
the most brave and enterprising ¢ are to be prefcrresl;
and, so far as practicable, the most comely.? But in
addition we must now require that they not only be
virile and vigorous ° in temper, but that they possess
also the gifts of nature suitable to this type of educa-
tion.” “* What qualities are you distinguishing ? ’
“They must have, my friend, to begin with, a certain
or study, and must not learn with difficulty.
souls are much more likely to flinch and faint? in
severe studies than in gymnastics, because the toil
touches them more nearly, being peculiar to them and
not shared with the body.” “‘ True,” he said. “‘ And
we must demand a good memory and doggedness and
industry ὁ in every sense of the word. Otherwise how
do you suppose anyone will consent both to undergo
all the toils of the body and to complete so great a
course of study and discipline? ’’ “No one could,”
he said, “ unless most happily endowed.” “‘ Our
present mistake,” said I, “and the disesteem that
has in consequence fallen upon philosophy are, as I
said before,’ caused by the unfitness of her associates
and wooers, They should not have been bastards?” but
true scions.” ‘What do you mean?” he said. “In
the first place,” I said, “the aspirant to philosophy
must not limp” in his industry, in the one half of him
loving, in the other shunning, toil. This happens when
anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all
the labours of the body, yet is not fond of learning or
* The qualities of the ideal student again. Cf. on 487 a.
7 Cf. supra 495 c ff., pp. 49-51.
? Montaigne, i. 24 (vol. i. p. 73), “165 Ames boiteuses, les
bastardes et vulgaires, sont indignes de la philosophie.”
* Cf. Laws 634 a, Tim. 44 ο.
211
ee
PLATO
ζητητικός, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις μισοπονῇ" χωλὸς
} δὲ καὶ ὁ τἀναντία τούτου μεταβεβληκὼς τὴν
/ φιλοπονίαν. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν
ὃ» Kal πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἀνά-
Τὶ πῆρον ψυχὴν θήσομεν, ἣ ἂν τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον
ψεῦδος μισῇ καὶ χαλεπῶς. φέρῃ αὐτή τε καὶ ἑτέ ων
ψευδομένων ὑ ὑπεραγανακτῇ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀκούσιον εὐκό ως
προσδέχηται καὶ ἀμαθαίνουσά που ἁλισκομένη μὴ
ἀγανακτῇ, ἀλλ᾽ εὐχερῶς ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον. ἐν
536 ἀμαθίᾳ “μολύνηται; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
Καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνδρείαν
καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς
μέρη οὐχ ἥκιστα δεῖ φυλάττειν τὸν νόθον τε καὶ
τὸν γνήσιον, ὅταν γάρ τις μὴ ἐπίστηται τὰ τοιαῦτα
σκοπεῖν καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις, λανθάνουσι χωλοῖς
τε καὶ ψόθοις χρώμενοι, πρὸς ὅ Tt ἂν τύχωσι τού-
τῶν, οἵ μὲν φίλοις, οἱ δὲ a ἄρχουσι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη,
οὕτως ἔχει. Ἢ piv, δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
B διευλαβητέον, ὡς ἐὰν μὲν ἀρτιμελεῖς τε Kal ἀρτί-
ppovas ἐπὶ τοσαύτην μάθησιν καὶ τοσαύτην
ἄσκησιν κομίσαντες παιδεύωμεν, 7 τε δίκη ἡμῖν
οὐ μέμψεται αὐτή, τήν τε πόλιν καὶ πολιτείαν
σώσομεν, ἀλλοίους δὲ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ ταῦτα τἀναντία
« Of. 548 π, Lysis 206 c, μά. 274 c, 804 ο, and Vol. I.
p. 515, on 475 Ὁ.
ὃ Of. supra 382 A-B-c.
¢ Of. Laws 819 Ὁ, Rep. 372 Ὁ, Politicus 266 c, and my note
in Class. Phil. xii. (1917) pp. 308-310. Cf. too the proverbial
ds γνοίη, Laches 196 τὸ and Rivals 134 a; and Apelt’s
emendation of Cratyl. 393 c, Progr. Jena, 1905, p. 19.
@ Of. 487 a and Vol. I. p. 261, note ¢ on 402 c. The
cardinal virtues are not rigidly fixed in Plato. Cf. on 427 Ὲ,
Vol. I. p. 346.
212
ὦ».
ee ....
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
of listening * or inquiring, but in all such matters hates
work. And he too is lame whose industry is one-
sided in the reverse way.” ‘‘ Most true,” he said.
“Likewise in respect of truth,” I said,“ we shall
regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul
that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in
its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but
cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood ὃ and is
not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge,
but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively
as a pig.” “ By all means,” he said. “And with
reference to sobriety,” said I, “and bravery and
loftiness of soul? and all the parts of. virtue,’ we
must especially be on our guard to distinguish the
base-born from the true-born. For when the know-
ledge necessary to make such discriminations is lack-
ing in individual or state, they unawares employ at
random‘ for any of these purposes the crippled and
base-born natures, as their friends or rulers.” “It
is so indeed,” he said. “ But we,” I said, “‘ must be
on our guard in all such cases, since, if we bring men
sound of limb and mind to so great a study and so
Severe a training, justice herself will have no fault
to find’ with us, and we shall preserve the state and
our polity. But, if we introduce into it the other sort,
ε Plato is using ordinary language and not troubling him-
self with the problem of Protag. 329 τὸ (What Pan Said,
p- πὶ and Laws 633 a (What Plato Said, p. 624). Cf. also
on D.
7 πρὸς 5 τι ἂν τύχωσι: lit. “ for whatsoever they happen to of
these (services).”” Cf. Symp. 181 8, Prot. 353 a, Crito 44 το
and 45 p, Gorg. 522 c, Laws 656 c, Rep. 332 8, 561 p, Dem.
iv. 46, Isoc. Panath. 25, 74, 239, Aristot. Met. 1013 a 6.
* Cf. supra 487 a. For δίκη ef. Hirzel, Dike, Themis und
Verwandtes, p. 116.
213
PLATO
πάντα καὶ πράξομεν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω
έλωτα καταντλήσομεν. Αἰσχρὸν μέντ᾽ ἂν εἴη,
ἣ δ᾽ Os. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, εἶπον" γελοῖον δ᾽ ἔγωγε
καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἔοικα παθεῖν. Τὸ ποῖον; x: ‘
C ᾿Επελαθόμην, ἢ ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπαίζομεν, καὶ ον
ἐντεινάμενος εἶπον. λέγων γὰρ ἅμα ἔβλεψα πρὸς
φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ ἰδὼν προπε λακισμένην ἀναξίως
ἀγανακτήσας μοι δοκῶ καὶ ὥσπερ θυμωθεὶς. τοῖς
τὰν σπουδαιότερον εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον. Οὐ μὰ τὸν
᾽ ἔφη, οὔκουν ὥς γ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἀκροατῇ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὡς
] rie ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ῥήτορι. τόδε δὲ μὴ ἐπιλανθανώ-
| μεθα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ “προτέρᾳ ἐκλογῇ πρεσβύτας
_ ἐξελέγομεν, ἐν δὲ «(Ταύτῃ οὐκ ἐγχωρήσει: Σόλωνι
D yap οὐ πειστέον, ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς
μανθάνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἧττον 7 τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες
οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι. ᾿Ανάγκη, ἐφὴ.
XVI. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεω-
μετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἣ ἣν τῆς δια-
λεκτικῆς δεῖ ,προπαιδευθῆναι, παισὶν οὖσι χρὴ
προβάλλειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες μαθεῖν τὸ
τῆς διδαχῆς ποιουμένους. Τί δή; Ὅτι, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
E οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρὴ
4 καταντλήσομεν : ef. 344 Ὁ.
δ Jest and earnest are never far apart in Plato. Fabl
about justice is an old man’s game, Laws 685 a, 769 a. Life
itself is best treated as play, Laws 803 c. Science in Tim.
59 Ὁ is παιδιά, like literature in the Phaedrus 276 p-x, ibid.
278 5. Cf. Friedlander, Platon, i. pp. 38 and 160, and What
Plato Said, pp. 553 and 601.
¢ For similar self-checks cf. Laws 804 8, 832 B, 907 B-c,
Phaedr. 260 v, 269 8. For ἐντεινάμενος cf. Blaydes on Aristoph.
Clouds 969.
214
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
the outcome will be just the opposite, and we shall
_ pour astill greater flood? of ridicule upon philosophy.”
e That would indeed be shameful,”’ he said. “‘ Most
certainly,” said I; “but here again I am making
myself a little ridiculous.” “ In what way?” “I
forgot,” said I, “that we were jesting,” and I spoke
too great intensity. For, while speaking, I
turned my eyes upon philosophy,? and when I saw
how she is undeservedly reviled, I was revolted, and,
as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are
in fau “ No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for me® as
a hearer.” © “‘ But too much so for me'as a speaker,”
I said. “ But this we must not forget, that in our
former selection we chose old men, but in this one
that will not do. For we must not take Solon’s’ word
for it that growing old a man is able to learn many
He is less able to do that than to run a race,
Tothe young? belong all heavy and frequent labours.”
“* Necessarily,” he sai
XVI. “ Now, all this study of reckoning and geo-
metry and all the preliminary studies that are indis-
pensable preparation for dialectics must be presented
to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory
instruction.””” “‘Whyso?” “Because,” said I, “a
free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly ; for
4 Cf. Isoc. Busiris 49. Whatever the difficulties of the
chronbiog it is hard to believe that this is not one of Isocrates’
many endeavours to imitate Platonic effects.
* Cf. Soph. 226 c, Sophocles, Ajax 397.
Η τάς ζυβα δ᾽ ἀεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος, “I grow old ever learn-
ing man a % Cf. Laches 188 a-p; Otto, p. 317.
9 Cf. t. ee take This has been misquoted to the effect
that Plato said the young are the best philosophers.
_ *® This and παίζοντας below (537 a) anticipate much modern
kindergarten rhetoric.
215
537
B
PLATO
μανθάνειν. ot μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βίᾳ
πονούμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται,
ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον “μάθημα. ᾿Αληθῆ,
ἔφη. Μὴ τοίνυν βίᾳ, εἶπον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοὺς παῖδας
ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ
μᾶλλον. οἷός τ᾽ ἧς καθορᾶν ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἕκαστος πέφυκεν.
Ἔχει ὃ λέγεις, ἔφη, λόγον. Οὐκοῦν μνημονεύεις,
ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἔφαμεν. τοὺς
παῖδας εἶναι ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων θεωρούς, καὶ
ἐάν που ἀσφαλὲς ἢ, προσακτέον ἐγγὺς καὶ γευ-
στέον αἵματος, ὥσπερ τοὺς σκύλακας; Μέμνημαι,
ἔφη. Ἔν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοῖς τε
πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις, ὃς ἂν ἐντρεχέ-
στατος ἀεὶ φαίνηται, εἰς ἀριθμόν τινα ἐγκριτέον.
Ἔν τίνι, ἔφη, ἡλικίᾳ; Ἡνίκα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῶν
ἀναγκαίων. γυμνασίων. “μεθίενται. οὗτος “γὰρ ὁ
χρόνος, ἐάν τε δύο ἐάν τε τρία ἔτη γίγνηται,
ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι. κόποι γὰρ καὶ ὕπνοι,
μαθήμασι πολέμιοι: καὶ ἅμα μία καὶ αὕτη͵ τῶν
βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη, τίς ἕκαστος ἐν τοῖς γυμ-
νασίοις φανεῖται. ἸΙΪῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη. Mera
δὴ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσι-
* Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. 858, says Aristotle Valente
this distinction, Pol. 1338 b 40 μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα
γυμνάσια χρυὰ σίδ δον: τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην
πόνους ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἦ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν.
> Of. 424 2-425 a, Laws 819 π5-Ὸ, 648 5-Ὁ, 797 A-B, Polit.
308 Ὁ.
Cf. the naive statement in Colvin and Bagley, Human
216
EE ἀἕἐοβῆϑδεδιδις
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
while bodily labours * performed under constraint do
not harm the body, nothing that is learned under com-
pulsion stays with the mind.” “True,” he said. “Do
not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies
_ by compulsion but by play.’ That will also better
_ enable you to discern the natural capacities of each.”
_ “There is reason in that,” he said. “ And do you not
_ remember,’’ I said, “‘ that we also declared * that we
_ must conduct the children to war on horseback to be
_ spectators, and wherever it may be safe, bring them
to the front and give them a taste of blood as we do
_ with whelps?” “I do remember.” “And those who
__as time goes on show the most facility in all these toils
_ and studies and alarms are to be selected and enrolled
_ ona list.4” “At what age?” hesaid. ‘‘ When they
are released from their prescribed gymnastics. For
that period, whether it be two or three years, incapaci-
tates them for other occupations.’ For great fatigue
and much sleep are the foes of study, and moreover
one of our tests of them, and not the least, will be
their behaviour in their physical exercises.’ ἡ “Surely
it is,’ he said. “‘ After this period,” I said, “ those
who are given preference from the twenty-year class
Behaviour, Ὁ. 41: “‘ The discovery [sic /] by Karl Groos that
play was actually a preparation for the business of later life
was almost revolutionary from the standpoint of educational
sory and practice.”
© Cf. supra 467, Vol. I. pp. 485-487.
4 éyxpréov: cf. 413 το, 377 c, 486 pv, Laws 802 B, 820 ἡ,
936 A, 952 a.
* Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1339 a7 f. dua yap τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ
σώματι διαπόνεῖν οὐ δεῖ, etc.; Plut. De Ed. Puer. 11, De
Tuenda San. c. 25, quoted by Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p.
359, are irrelevant to this passage, but could be referred to
the balancing of music and gymnastics in 410-412,
7 Cf. Laws 829 B-c.
217
PLATO Sia ΠΗ͂Ρ
ετῶν ot | ἱπροκριθέντες τιμάς τε μείζους τῶν ἄλλων
οἴσονται, τά τε χύδην μαθήματα παισὶν ἐν τῇ
παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτοις συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν
οἰκειότητος ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ
ὄντος φύσεως. Μόνη γοῦν, εἶπεν, ἡ τοιαύτη
/ / > bal > / A ,
μάθησις βέβαιος ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται. Kat μεγίστη β
γε, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πεῖρα διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως καὶ μή
ς \ \ \ , ey q st} ᾿
ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς. διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὔ.
Ἑυνοίομαι, ἦ δ᾽ ἃς, Tatra τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
β
|
ΠῚ... ee
Εἰ δεήσει σε ἐπισκοποῦντα, οἵ ἂν μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι
ἐν αὐτοῖς ὦσι καὶ μόνιμοι μὲν ἐν μαθήμασι, μό-
> > ͵ \ a ΝΜ !
νιμοι δ᾽ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις,
΄ δε, .,.4 \ \ ΄, γι ; my
τούτους αὖ, ἐπειδὰν τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐκβαίνωσιν,
ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκρινάμενον εἰς μείζους τε
τιμὰς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν, τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι
4
δυνάμει βασανίζοντα, τίς ὀμμάτων Kai τῆς ἄλλης
αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθιέμενος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃν μετ᾽
ἀληθείας ἰέναι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς
α σύνοψιν: cf. 581 Ὁ. This thought is endlessly repeated
by modern writers on education. Cf. Mill, Diss. and Disc,
iv. 336; Bagley, The Mducative Process, p. 180: ‘* The theory
of concentration proposed by Ziller . . . seeks to organize
all the subject matter of instruction into a unified system,
the various units of which shall be consciously related to one
another in the minds of the pupils’’; Haldane, The Philo-
sophy of Humanism, Ὁ. 94: “‘ There was a conference attended
by representatives of various German Universities . . . which
took place at Hanstein, not far from Géttingen in May 1921.
. The purpose of the movement is nominally the establish-
ment of a Humanistic Faculty.. But in this connexion
‘faculty’ does not mean @ separate faculty of humanistic
studies. . . . The real object is to bring these μὰς τυ οι into |
organic relation to one another.” "ἢ
218 ;
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
will receive greater honours than the others, and they
will be required to gather the studies which they dis-
connectedly pursued as children in their former educa-
tion into a comprehensive survey? of their affinities
_ with one another and with the nature of things.”
“ That, at any rate,” he said, “ is the only instruction
_ that abides with those who receive it.”’ “‘ And it is
also,”’ said I, “ the chief test of the dialectical nature
_ and its opposite. For he who can view things in their
connexion is a dialectician; he who cannot, is not.”
_“Teoncur,” hesaid. “‘ With these qualities in mind,”
I said, “ it will be your task to make a selection of
_ those who manifest them best from the group who are
_ steadfast in their studies and in war and in all lawful
_ requirements, and when they have passed the thirtieth
year to promote them, by asecond selection from those
preferred in the first,’ to still greater honours, and
to prove and test them by the power of dialectic® to
see which of them is able to disregard the eyes and
other senses? and go on to being itself in company with
truth. And at this point, my friend, the greatest
Of. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, vol. i. p. 4 “So
| true is it that, as Plato puts it, the metaphysician is a
‘synoptical’ man.” Cf. Aristot. Soph. El. 167 a 38
διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. Stenzel,
Dialektik, p. 8, misuses the δήνεα to support the view
that Plato’s dialectic still looks for unity and not for
pets and distinctions, as in the Sophist. Cf. also ibid.
p. 72.
ὃ For the technical meaning of the word προκρίτων ef.
Laws 753 π5-ν.
* For this periphrasis ef. Phaedr. 246 p, Tim. 858. Cf. also
on 509 a.
4 The reader of Plato ought not to misunderstand this
now. Cf. supra on 532 a, pp. 196 f., note d, and 530 8,
p. 187, note c.
219
a i
i a
’ μι
PLATO © ΤῊ 7
ἔργον, ὦ ἑταῖρε. Ti μάλιστα; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκ ev-
E νοεῖς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ νῦν περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι κακὸν
γιγνόμενον ὅσον γίγνεται; Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. Lapa-
νομίας που, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐμπίπλανται. Καὶ μάλα,
ἔφη. Θαυμαστὸν οὖν τι οἴει, εἶπον, πάσχειν ad-
τούς, καὶ οὐ ξυγγιγνώσκεις; Πῇ μάλιστα; ἔφη.
Οἷον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἴ τις ὑποβολιμαῖος “τραφείη ἐὶ
πολλοῖς. μὲν χρήμασι, πολλῷ δὲ καὶ μεγάλως γέ
538 καὶ αξὲὶ πολλοῖς, ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος αἴσθοιτο,
ὅτι οὐ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν φασκόντων γονέων, τοὺς
δὲ τῷ ὄντι γεννήσαντας μὴ εὕροι, τοῦτον ἔχεις
μαντεύσασθαι, πῶς ἂν διατεθείη πρός τε τοὺς κό-
λακας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑποβαλομένους ἐν ἐκείνῳ τε
τῷ χρόνῳ, ᾧ οὐκ ἤδει τὰ περὶ τῆς ὑποβολῆς, καὶ
ἐν ᾧ αὖ ἤδει; ἢ βούλει ἐμοῦ μαντευομένου ἀκοῦσαι;
Βούλομαι, ἔφη. Sy
XVII. Μαντεύομαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν
Β τιμᾶν ἂν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τοὺς
ἄλλους οἰκείους δοκοῦντας ἢ τοὺς κολακεύοντας,
καὶ ἧττον μὲν ἂν περιιδεῖν ἐνδεεῖς τινός, ἧττον δὲ
α Plato returns to an idea suggested in 498 a, and warns
against the mental confusion and moral unsettlement that
result from premature criticism of life by undisciplined minds.
In the terminology of modern education, he would not
encourage students to discuss the validity of the Ten Com-
mandments and the Constitution of the United States before
they could spell, construe, cipher, and had learned to dis-
tinguish an undistributed middle term from a petitio
principii. Cf. Phaedo 89 v-x.
We need not suppose with Grote and others that this
involves any “reaction” or violent change of the opinion he
held when he wrote the minor dialogues that portray such —
discussions. In fact, the still later Sophist, 230 B-c-p,is more ~
friendly to youthful dialectics. i
Whatever the effect of the practice of Socrates or the —
220
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
care is requisite.” ‘‘Howso?” he said. ‘‘Do you
not note,”’ said I, “how great is the harm caused by
our present treatment of dialectics?” ‘‘ What is
that? ’’hesaid. ‘‘Its practitioners are infected with
_ lawlessness.?”” “‘ They are indeed.” ‘‘ Do you sup-
_ pose,” I said, “that there is anything surprising in this
state of mind, and do you not think it pardonable ὁ ὃ ἢ
_ “Tn what way, pray?” he said. ‘‘ Their ” gai
I, “resembles that of a supposititious son re
abundant wealth and a great and numerous famil
4
amid many figtterers) who on arriving at ma
hould. become aware that he is ot the child of
_ those who call themselves his parents, and should
not be able to find his true father and mother.
Can you divine what would be his feelings towards
the flatterers and his supposed parents in the time
when he did not know the truth about his adoption,
and, again, when he knewit? Or would you like to
hear my surmise?” “I would.”
XVII. “‘ Well, then, my surmise is,” I said, “that
he would be more likely to honour his reputed father
and mother and other kin than the flatterers, and
that there would be less likelihood of his allowing
them to lack for anything, and that he would be less
_ Sophists, Plato himself anticipates Grote’s criticism in the
_ Republic by representing Socrates as discoursing with in-
uous youth in a more simple and edifying style. Cf.
is 207 vp ff., Buthydem. 278 £-282 c, 288 v-290 pv. Yet
again the Charmides might be thought an exception.
Cf. also Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen, ii. 1, p. 912, who seems
to consider the Sophist earlier than the Republic.
δ i.e. they call all restrictions on impulses and instincts
tyrannical conventions. C/. Gorg. 483-484, Aristoph. Clouds,
passim, and on nature and law ¢/. Vol. I. p. 116, note a, on
359 c.
* Cf. on 494 a, p. 43, note ὁ.
221
PLATO) nT
παράνομόν τι δρᾶσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν εἰς αὐτούς, ἧττον δὲ
ἀπειθεῖν τὰ μεγάλα ἐκείνοις ἢ τοῖς κόλαξιν, ἐν ᾧ
χρόνῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ εἰδείη. Εἰκός, ἔφη. Αἰσθό-
μενον τοίνυν τὸ ὃν μαντεύομαι. αὖ περὶ μὲν τούτους
ἂν τὸ τιμᾶν τε καὶ σπουδάζειν, περὶ δὲ
κόλακας ἐπιτεῖναι, καὶ πείθεσθαί τε αὐτοῖς
C διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον καὶ ζῆν ἂν ἤδη κατ᾽
ἐκείνους, ξυνόντα αὐτοῖς ἀπαρακαλύπτως, πατρὸς
δὲ ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων, εἰ
μὴ πάνυ εἴη φύσει ἐπιεικής, μέλειν τὸ μηδέν.
Πάντ᾽, ἔφη, λέγεις οἷά περ ἂν γένοιτο. ἀλλὰ πῇ
πρὸς τοὺς ἁπτομένους τῶν λόγων αὕτη φέρει ἡ
εἰκών; Τῇδε. ἔστι που ἡμῖν δόγματα ἐκ παίδων
περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα
ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι, πειθαρχοῦντές τε καὶ τιμῶντες
αὐτά. "Ἔστι γάρ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ἐναντία
τούτων “ἐπιτηδεύματα ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα, ἃ κολακεύει
μὲν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἕλκει ἐφ᾽ αὑτά, πείθει δ᾽
οὗ Ree rere μι ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τιμῶσι
τὰ πάτρια εἵνοις πειθαρχοῦσιν. "Ἔστι ταῦτα.
4 * διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον : rh Phaedo 85 8.
ὃ οἷά περ ἂν γένοιτο is the phrase Aristotle uses to distinguish
the truth of poetry from the facts of history.
¢ That is the meaning. Lit. ‘‘those who lay hold on
discourse.”
4 Plato’s warning applies to our day no less than to_ his
own. Like the proponents of ethica nihilism in Plato’s
Athens, much of our present-day literature and
questions all standards of morality and aesthetics, and con-
fuses justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness. Its gospel
is expressed in Mr. Oppenheim’s lines:
222
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
inclined to do or say to them anything unlawful, and
_ less liable to disobey them in great matters than to
{ disobey the flatterers—during the time when he did
ποῖ know the truth. »~ “Tt is probable,” he said.
“ But when he foy _the truth, I surmise that
_ to them and pay-more-refard to the flatterers, whom
he would heed more than before * and would hence-
_ forth live by their rule; associating with them openly,
_ while for that former father and his adoptive kin he
would not care at all, unless he was naturally of a
very good disposition. ΚΑΙ that you say,” he
_ replied, “would be likely tohappen.’ But what is the
pertinency of this comparison to the novices of
dialectic®?”” “Itisthis. Wehave, I takeit, certain
convictions ἃ from childhood about the just and the
honourable, in which, in obedience and honour to
them, we have been bred as children under their
parents.” “Yes, we have.” “And are there not
other practices going counter to these, that have
pleasures attached to them and that flatter and
solicit our souls, but do not win over men of any
decency ; but they continue to hold in honour the
of their fathers and obey them?” “It is
Let nothing bind you.
If it is duty, away with it.
If itis law, disobey it.
If it is opinion, go against it.
There is only one divinity, yourself,
Only one god, you.
For the unsettling effects of dialectic ef. Phaedo 90 8; also
Sa hemes I see grb Bernard psa p. 249: he πνεῖν ΩΝ have
slu at anything that woke them u
μετ οὐπῴδ είν ing. . Noone.. \aliec inicabelaih 40
our age merely by as asking questions ‘unless he can answer
the question.” Cf. also on 537 p, p. 220, note a.
223
PLATO
Τί οὖν; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐλθὸν
ἐρώτημα ἔρηται, τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἀποκρινα-
μένου, ὃ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἤκουεν, ἐξελέγχῃ ὁ λόγος,
καὶ πολλάκις καὶ πολλαχῆ ἐλέγχων εἰς δόξαν
Ἑ καταβάλῃ, ὡς τοῦτο οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ
αἰσχρόν, καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ
καὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἦγεν ἐν τιμῇ, μετὰ τοῦτο τί οἴει
ποιήσειν αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτὰ τιμῆς τὲ πέρι καὶ
πειθαρχίας; «᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη, μήτε τιμᾶν ἔτι ὁμοίως
μήτε πείθεσθαι. Ὅταν οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μήτε ταῦτα
/ A > ~ σ Ἁ - ,
Cre τίμια Kal οἰκεῖα, ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ, τά TE
“- ᾿ ; -- a ‘ μι
639 ἀληθῆ μὴ εὑρίσκῃ, ἔστι πρὸς ὁποῖον βίον ἄλλον ἢ
τὸν κολακεύοντα εἰκότως προσχωρήσεται; Οὐκ
ἔστιν, ἔφη. Παράνομος δή, οἶμαι, δόξει γεγο-
νέναι ἐκ νομίμου. ᾿Ανάγκη. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην, εἰκὸς
τὸ πάθος τῶν οὕτω λόγων ἁπτομένων καί, ὃ ἄρτι
ἔλεγον, πολλῆς συγγνώμης ἄξιον; Kat ἐλέου γ᾽,
ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἵνα μὴ γίγνηται 6 ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ
τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι, εὐλαβουμένῳ παντὶ τρόπῳ
τῶν λόγων ἁπτέον; Kat μάλ᾽, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. *Ap’ οὖν
Bod μία μὲν εὐλάβεια αὕτη συχνή, τὸ μὴ νέους
α The question is here personified, as the λόγος so often is,
e.g. 503 a. Cf. What Plato Said on Protag. 361 a-s.
> A possible allusion to the καταβάλλοντες λόγοι of the
sophists. Cf. Buthydem. 277 Ὁ. 288 a, Phaedo 88 c, Phileb.
15 © and What Plato Said, p. 518, on Crito 272 B.
¢ This is the moral counterpart of the intellectual scepti- 4
224
q
q
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
so.” “ Well, then,” said I, “when a man of this kind
is
met by the question,* ‘ What is the honourable ?’
_ and on his giving the answer which he learned from
the lawgiver, the argument confutes him, and by
many and yarious refutations upsets” his faith and
makes him believe that this thing is no more honour-
able than it is base,’ and when he has had the same
experience about the just and the good and every-
thing that he chiefly held in esteem, how do you
suppose that he will conduct himself thereafter in the
matter of respect and obedience to this traditional
morality δ᾿ ““It is inevitable,” he said, “that he
will not continue to honour and obey as before.”
“ And then,” said I, “‘ when he ceases to honour
these principles and to think that they are binding
on him,? and cannot discover the true principles, will
he be likely to adopt any other way of life that
which flatters his desires*?’’ ‘‘ He will not,” he said.
“ He will, then, seem to have become a rebel to law
and convention instead of the conformer that he
was.” “Necessarily.” ‘‘ And is not this experience
of those who take up dialectics in this fashion to
be expected and, as I just now said, deserving of
much leniency ?”’ “‘ Yes, and of pity too,” he said.
“ Then that we may not have to pity thus your thirty-
year-old disciples, must you not take every pre-
caution when you introduce them to the study of
dialectics? *’ *‘ Yes, indeed,’’ he said. . ‘‘ And is it
not one chief safeguard not to suffer them to taste
cism or μισολογία of Phaedo 90 σὺν. Cf. What Plato Said,
p. 531, on Phaedo 89 "Ὁ.
4 For οἰκεῖα ef. supra 433 £, 443 pv, and Class. Phil. xxiv.
(1929) pp. 409-410.
* Cf. Laws 633 © and supra 442 a-s. Others render it,
“than the life of the flatterers (parasites).””. Why not both?
VOL, II Q ᾿ 225
ῬΟΛΤΟ ΙΗ ΜΗῚ
ὄντας αὐτῶν γεύεσθαι χ οἶμαι γάρ σε οὐ λεληθέναι
ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύ-
“-- A ~ ye he Pas
wvrat, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς
2 a NANI, , ᾿ “ΔΙ τῶν ς ἐλᾷ 1
ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγ-
χοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ
σκυλάκια τῷ ἕλκειν TE καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ ἰλόγῳ
τοὺς πλησίον ἀεί, Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν -
Ε ~ -“ ὃ Ἁ λλ 4 A Φ" ‘ ὅλ, γε. qv
Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοὶ ἐλέ ὑσίν, ὑπ. πὸ
C πολλῶν δὲ ἐλεγχθῶσι, σφόδρα καὶ ταχὺ ἐμπίπτουσιν
εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ὧνπερ πρότερον: καὶ ἐκ
, \ > , \ δ ὦ , ; " gio
τούτων δὴ. αὐτοί τε Kal τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι
εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη.
Ὅ ὃ \ ὃ \ + ὃ᾽ > , a \ ; oe)
€ δὴ πρεσβύτερος, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῆς μὲν τοι-
/ / > a 2 7 ‘ A
avrns μανίας οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι μετέχειν, τὸν δὲ
διαλέγεσθαι ἐθέλοντα καὶ σκοπεῖν τἀληθὲς μᾶλλον
μιμήσεται ἢ τὸν παιδιᾶς χάριν παίζοντα καὶ
ἀντιλέγοντα, καὶ αὐτός τε μετριώτερος ἔσται καὶ
ΣΝ Σ 7 > > /, : % :
TO ἐπιτήδευμα τιμιώτερον ἀντὶ ἀτιμοτέρου ποιήσει.
Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ προειρημένα τούτου
pF > 7 / A " “ete
ἐπ᾿ εὐλαβείᾳ πάντα a ee τὸ Tas φύσεις
, 5 {5} ΄ Φ ΚΠ ἢ
κοσμιοὺυς ELVOL και (OTAGL us οἱς TLS PETAOWOEL
@ See on 498 a-s. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon
(Morley, A Miscellany, pp. 49-50) : ‘* But the contemporaries
of our age negligently apply a few years of ardent youth,
burning by turns with the fire of vice; and when they have
attained the acumen of discerning a doubtful truth, they
immediately become involved in extraneous business, retire,
and say farewell to the schools of philosophy; they sip the
frothy must of juvenile wit over the difficulties of philosophy,
and pour out the purified old wine with economical care.”
ὃ Cf. Apol. 23 ο, Phileb. 15", Xen. Mem. i. 2. 46, Isoc.
xii. 26 and x. 6; also Friedlander, Platon, ii. p. 568.
¢ But in another mood or from another angle this is the
bacehic madness of philosophy which all the company in the
226
eee
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
of it while young?®. For I fancy you have not failed
to obserye that lads, when they first get a taste of
disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always em-
ploying it contentiously, and, imitating confuters,
they themselves confute others.” They delight like
puppies in pulling about and tearing with words all
who approach them.” “Exceedingly so,~ he said.
“ And when they have themselves many
and been confuted by many, they quickly fall into
a violent distrust of all that they formerly held true ;
and the outcome is that they themselves and the
whole business of philosophy are discredited with
other: men.” ‘‘ Most true,” he said. “‘ But an
bring credit rather than discredit upon Suit.
“ Right,” he said. . “ And were not.all our preceding
statements made with a view to this precaution—
our requirement that those permitted to take part in
such discussions must have orderly and stab! natures,
Symposium have shared, 218 a-s. Cf. also Phaedr. 245 s-c,
249 c-x, Sophist 216 pv, Phileb. 15 v-£, and What Plato
Said, p. 493, on Protag. 317 p-£.
4 Of. Gorg. 500 πο. Yet the prevailing seriousness of
Plato’s own thought does not exclude touches of humour and
irony, and he vainly warns the modern reader to distinguish
between jest and earnest in the drama of disputation in his
dialogues. Many misinterpretations of Plato’s thought are
due to the failure to heed this warning. Cf. ¢.g. Gorgias
474 a (What Plato Said, p. 504), which Robin, L’ Année
Philos. xxi. p. 29, and others miss, Rep. 376 8, Symp. 196 c,
Protag. 339 f., Theaet. 157 a-B, 160 8, 165 B, and passim.
Cf. also on 536 c, p. 214, note ὁ.
227
PRATO)T4 ΠΗῚ
τῶν λόγων, καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν ὃ τυχὼν καὶ οὐδὲν
προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ᾽ αὐτό; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
XVII. ᾿Αρκεῖ δὴ ἐπὶ λόγων μεταλήψει μεῖναι
ἐνδελεχῶς καὶ ξυντόνως, μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀντιστρόφως γυμναζομένῳ τοῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα
E γυμνασίοις, ἔτη διπλάσια ἢ τότε; “EE, ἔφη, ἢ
540
τέτταρα λέγεις; ᾿Αμέλει, εἶπον, πέντε θές. μετὰ
γὰρ τοῦτο καταβιβαστέοι ἔσονταί σοι εἰς τὸ
, A ile ow
σπήλαιον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο, Kal ἀναγκαστέοι ἄρχειν
τά τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ὅσαι νέων ἀρχαί, ἵνα
3 » / ¢ ~ ~ » \ ” \
μηδ᾽ ἐμπειρίᾳ ὑστερῶσι τῶν ἄλλων" καὶ ἔτι καὶ
5 εἴ
ἐν τούτοις βασανιστέοι, εἰ ἐμμενοῦσιν ἑλκόμενοι
πανταχόσε ἢ TL καὶ παρακινήσουσιν. Χρόνον δέ,
e Ὁ « , ᾿Ξ , LIAGELS Σῳ
ἡ δ᾽ ὅς, πόσον τοῦτον τίθης; Πεντεκαΐδεκα. ἔτη,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. γενομένων δὲ πεντηκοντουτῶν τοὺς
διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας πάντα πάντῃ ἐν
ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἀκτέον,
καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς
> 4 > 9 1 9 , A a γε ΠΑ
αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον,
4 For the idiom μὴ ὡς viv ete. cf. supra on 410 B οὐχ.
ὥσπερ: also 610 v, Gorg. 522 a, Symp. 179 π, 189 c, Epist.
vii. 333 a, Aristoph. Knights 784, Eurip. Bacchae 929, II.
xix. 403, Od. xxiv. 199, xxi. 427, Dem. iv. 34, Aristot. De an.
414 a 22.
» It is very naive of modern commentators to cavil at the
precise time allotted to dialectic, and still more so to infer
that there was not much to say about the ideas. Dialectic
was not exclusively or mainly concerned with the meta-
physics of the ideas, It was the development of the reason-
ing powers by rational discussion.
@ Cf, 519.c ff., pp. 139-145.
4 Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 13 seems to copy this. Cf. on 484 Ὁ.
228
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
_ instead of the present practice * of admitting to it any
_ chance and unsuitable applicant?’’ “By all means,”
| XVIII. “ Is it enough, then, to devote to the con-
tinuous and strenuous study of dialectics undisturbed
by anything else, as in the corresponding discipline
in bodily exercises, twice as many years as were
allotted to that?” “Do you mean six or four?” he
said. “Well,” I said, “set it down as ἔνε. ὃ For
after that you will have to send them down into the
cave ° again, and compel them to hold commands in
war and the other offices suitable to youth,so that they
may not fall short of the other type in experience?
either. Andin these offices, too, they are to be tested
to see whether they will remain steadfast under
diverse solicitations or whether they will flinch and
swerve.*”’ “ον much time do you allow for that?”
he said. “ Fifteen years,” said I, “‘ and at the age
of fifty’ those who fame survived the tests and ap-
proved themselves altogether the best in every task
and form of knowledge must be brought at last to the
goal. We shall require them to turn upwards the
vision of their souls? and fix their gaze on that which
sheds light on all; and when they have thus beheld
Critics of Plato frequently overlook the fact that he in-
sisted on practical experience in the training of his rulers,
Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 5, points out that this experience
takes the place of special training in political science.
© Cf. ὑποκινήσαντ᾽, Aristoph. Frogs 643.
* An eminent scholar quaintly infers that Plato could not
have written this page before he himself was fifty years old.
σ΄ Plato having made his practical meaning quite clear
feels that he can safely permit himself the short cut of
rhetoric and symbolism in summing it up.. He reckoned
without Neoplatonists ancient and modern. Cf. also on
519 8, p. 138, note a.
229
PLATO
καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, “παραδείγματι. χρω-
μένους ἐκείνῳ, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς
Β κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἑκάστους, τὸ
μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ
τὸ μέρος ἥκῃ, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας
καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑκάστους τῆς πόλεως ἕ ἕνεκα, οὐχ ὡς
καλόν τι ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας, καὶ
οὕτως ἄλλους ἀεὶ παιδεύσαντας τοιούτους, ἀντι-
καταλιπόντας τῆς πόλεως φύλακας, εἰς “μακάρων
νήσους ἀπιόντας οἰκεῖν" μνημεῖα. δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ
C θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ. ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία
, ξυναναιρῇ, ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε
καὶ θείοις. Ἰ[αγκάλους, «ἔφη, τοὺς “ἄρχοντας, ὦ
Σώκρατες, ee ἀπείργασαι. Kai
τὰς ἀρχούσας γε, ἥν "δ᾽ ἐγώ, « ὦ Trade: μηδὲν
\ γάρ τι οἴου με περὶ ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκέναι. μᾶλλον. a
εἴρηκα ἢ ἢ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὅσαι ἂν αὐτῶν ἱκαναὶ τὰς
φύσεις ἐγγίγνωνται. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. εἴπερ ἴσα γε
πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι κοινωνήσουσιν, ὡς διήλθομεν.
D Τί οὖν; ἔφην" ξυγχωρεῖτε περὶ τῆς πόλεώς τε καὶ
πολιτείας μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι,
ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μέν, δυνατὰ δέ πῃ, καὶ οὐκ. ἄλλῃ ἢ
δ
Ἂ
« Of. supra 500 5-π. For παράδειγμα ef. 592 5 and What
Plato Said, p. 458, on Luthyphro 6 ©, and p. 599, on Polit.
277 νυ.
δ Of. 520 pv. © Cf. 347 c-p, 520 π.
4 Plato’s guardians, unlike Athenian statesmen, could
train their successors. Cf. Protag. 319 Ἐ-890 8, Meno 99 zs.
Also ἄλλους ποιεῖν Meno 100 a, Gorg. 449 B, 455 c, Huthyph.
3 c, Phaedr. 266 c, 268 5, Symp. 196 £, Protag. 348 x, As
Demon. 3, Panath. 28, Soph. 13, Antid. 204, Xen. Oecon. 15.
10, and παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, generally used of the sophists,
ον. 519 x, Protag. 317 5, Huthyd. 306 ©, Laches 186 Ὁ,
Rep. 600 c
230
late δ. μων," ω,. .
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
the good itself they shall use it as a pattern? for the
right ordering of the state and the citizens and them-
selyes throughout the remainder of their lives, each
in his turn,’ devoting the greater part of their time to
the study of philosophy, but when the turn comes for
each, toiling in the service of the state and holding
office for the city’s sake, regarding the task not as
a fine thing but a necessity®; and so, when each
generation has educated others? like themselves to
take their place as guardians of the state, they shall
depart to the Islands of the Blest * and there dwell.
And the state shall establish public memorials’ and
sacrifices for them as to divinities if the Pythian oracle
approves? or, if not, as to divine and godlike men.*”” |
*“A most beautiful finish, Socrates, youhave put upon |
your rulers, as if you were a statuary.*’’ “Andon |
the women / too, Glaucon,” said 1; “‘ for you must not
suppose that my words apply to the men more than
to all women who arise among them endowed with
the requisite qualities.” “‘ That is right,” he said,
“if they are to share equally in all things with the
men as we laid it down.” ‘“ Well, then,” said I, “ do
you admit that our notion of the state and its polity
is not altogether a day-dream,* but that though it is
difficult,’ it is in a way possible ™ and in no other way
¢ Cf. p. 139, noted. Plato checks himself in mid-flight and
wistfully smiles at his own idealism. Cf. on 536 '8-c, also
540c and 509c. Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 170.
7 Cf. Symp. 209 τ.
9 For this caution cf. 461 © and Vol. I. p. 344, note c, on
427 ς.
Ὁ Plato plays on the words δαίμων and εὐδαίμων. Cf. also
Crat. 398 B-c. # Of. 361 v. 3 Lit. ** female rulers.”
llr lil t Cf. 499 pn.
™ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 564 on Rep. 472 8-2, and supra
p. 65, note h, on 499 p.
231
—
PLATO Ut TH!
εἴρηται, ὅταν of ws ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἢ
πλείους ἢ εἷς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι τῶν μὲν νῦν
τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ἡγησάμενοι ἀνελευθέρους
εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίας, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου
E ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτου τιμάς, μέγιστον
δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ
ὑπηρετοῦντές τε καὶ αὔξοντες αὐτὸ διασκευω-
ρήσωνται τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν; Πῶς; ἔφη. Ὅσοι
μὲν ἄν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκετῶν
ἐν τῇ πόλει, πάντας ἐκπέμψωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς,
τοὺς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς τῶν
νῦν ἠθῶν, ἃ καὶ οἱ γονῆς ἔχουσι, θρέψωνται ἐν τοῖς
σφετέροις τρόποις καὶ νόμοις, οὖσιν οἵοις διυ-
ἐληλύθαμεν τότε: καὶ οὕτω τάχιστά τε καὶ ῥᾷστα
πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν ἐλέγομεν, καταστᾶσαν
αὐτήν τε εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ἐν ᾧ ἂν
ἐγγένηται πλεῖστα ὀνήσειν; Πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη" καὶ
ὡς ἂν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς μοὶ, ὦ
Σώκρατες, εὖ εἰρηκέναι. Οὐκοῦν ἅδην ἤδη, εἶπον
ἐγώ, ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι περί τε τῆς πόλεως
ταύτης καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου ταύτῃ ἀνδρός; δῆλος γάρ που
καὶ οὗτος, οἷον φήσομεν δεῖν αὐτὸν εἶναι. Δῆλος,
ἔφη" καὶ ὅπερ ἐρωτᾷς, δοκεῖ μοι τέλος ἔχειν.
@ Cf. 418 c-p, 499 B-c.
> Cf. supra 521 B, 516 σ-Ὁ.
© τὸ ὀρθόν: of. Theaet. 171 c, Meno 99 a.
4 This is another of the passages in which Plato seems to
lend support to revolutionaries. Cf. supra Ὁ. 71, note g. It
is what the soviets are said to be doing. Lowell points out
that it is what actually happened in the New England of
1630-1660.
Cf. Laws 752 c, where it is said that the children would
accept the new laws if the parents would not. Cf. supra
232
ee
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII
than that described—when genuine philosophers,*
many or one, becoming masters of the state scorn?
the present honours, regarding them as illiberal and
worthless, but prize the right® and the honours that
come from that above all things, and regarding
justice as the chief and the one indispensable thing,
in the service and maintenance of that reorganize and
administer their city?” ‘‘ In what way?” he said.
“ΑἸ inhabitants above the age of ten,” I said,“ they
_ will send out into the fields, and they will take over
the children,? remove them from the manners and
habits of their parents, and bring them up in their
own customs and laws which will be such as we have
described. This is the speediest and easiest way
in which such a city and constitution as we have por-
trayed could be established and prosper and bring
most benefit to the people among whom it arises.”
“ Much the easiest,” he said, “ and I think you have
well explained the manner ofits realization if it should
ever be realized.” ‘Then,’ said I, ““have we not now
said enough” about this state and the corresponding
type of man—for it is evident what our conception of
him will be?” “It is evident,” he said, “and, to
answer your question, I think we have finished.”
_ 415 v, and. also What Plato Said, p. 625, on Laws 644 4 and
p. 638, on 813 pb. Ἶ
‘There is some confusion in this passage between the
imauguration and the normal conduct of the ideal state, and
Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 439 calls the idea “ ein hingewor-
fener Einfall.” But Plato always held that the reformer
must have or make a clean slate. Cf. 501 a, Laws 735 5.
And he constantly emphasizes the supreme importance of
education; Rep. 377 a-B, 423 πὶ 416 c, Laws 641 B, 644 a-z,
752 c, 765 E-766 a, 788 c, 804 bv.
For παραλαβόντες cf. Phaedo 82 © παραλαβοῦσα.
δ᾽ Cf. 535 a.
233
= at COTO ee
H | B24
ὕ48 I. Elev: ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὡμολόγηται, ὦ Ῥλαύκων,
τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει κοινὰς μὲν.
γυναῖκας, κοινοὺς δὲ παῖδας εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν
παιδείαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα κοινὰ ἐν
πολέμῳ τε καὶ εἰρήνῃ, βασιλέας δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι
A > , ‘ ᾿ ‘ / 1 J
τοὺς ev φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον yeyo- —
, ΣΕΥ͂, « 4, ΝΜ ay A \
votas ἀρίστους. ᾿Ὡμολόγηται, ἔφη. Kat μὴν καὶ
Β τάδε ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, ὡς, ὅταν δὴ καταστῶσιν οἱ
ν ») e ~
ἄρχοντες, ἄγοντες τοὺς στρατιώτας κατοικιοῦσιν
> / a / ες σο»"»
εἰς οἰκήσεις οἵας προείπομεν, ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν
οὐδενὶ ἐχούσας, κοινὰς δὲ πᾶσι: πρὸς δὲ ταῖς
τοιαύταις οἰκήσεσι καὶ τὰς κτήσεις, εἰ μνημονεύεις,
διωμολογησάμεθά που οἷαι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς. ᾿Αλλὰ
μνημονεύω, ἔφη, ὅτι γε οὐδὲν οὐδένα φόμεθα δεῖν
Ἢ a - εὖν “ r‘> ΄ ἵ
κεκτῆσθαι ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀθλητάς τε
πολέμου καὶ φύλακας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς δεχο-
μένους εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν τὴν εἰς ταῦτα τροφὴν παρὰ τῶν
ἄλλων, αὑτῶν τε δεῖν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως
« Strictly speaking, this applies only to the guardians,
but cf. Laws 739 c ff. Aristotle, Pol. 1261 a 6 and 1262 a
41, like many subsequent commentators, misses the point.
> Of. supra 445 p and What Plato Said, p. 539, on Menea.
238 c-pD.
© So Jowett. Adam ad loc. insists that the genitive is
partitive, ‘“‘ those of their number are to be kings.’
234.
π᾿
ete - BOOK VIII
I. “Very good. We are agreed then, Glaucon,
that the state which is to ἜΣ, λυ the height of good
vernment must have community* of wives and
children and all education, and also that the pursuits
of men and women must be the same in peace and
war, and that the rulers or kings” over them” are to be
those who have approved themselves the best in both
war and philosophy.” “γε are agreed,” he said.
“And we further granted this, that when the rulers are
established in office they shall conduct these soldiers
and settle them in habitations 4 such as we described,
that have nothing private for anybody but. are
common forall, and in addition to such habitations
we agreed, if you remember, what should be the
nature of their possessions.’’’ “ Why, yes, I re-
member,” he said, “that we thought it right that
none of them should have anything that ordinary men’
now possess, but that, being as it were athletes? of
war and guardians, they should receive from the others
as pay” for their guardianship each year their yearly
sustenance, and devote their entire attention to the
Ὁ Cf. 415 ε. * Cf. 416 c.
9 Cf. on 403 and 521 p. Polyb. i. 6. 6 ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες
ἀληθινοὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων.
* Of. 416 ε.
235
PLATO
> a A
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφην, λέγεις. ἀλλ᾽ aye,
> -“ ? ~
ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἀπετελέσαμεν, ἀναμνησθῶμεν, πόθεν
δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἴωμεν.
> ~
Od χαλεπόν, ἔφη. σχεδὸν γάρ, καθάπερ viv, ws
διεληλυθὼς περὶ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς λόγους ἐποιοῦ
/
λέγων, ὡς ἀγαθὴν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην, οἵαν τότε
D ὃ AAG. θ / 5A. \ » ὃ \ > / ὦ
ιῆλθες, τιθείης πόλιν, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν ἐκείνῃ ὅμοιον,
\ ~ e ” , wv 4 > ~ /
Kal ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικας, καλλίω ἔτι ἔχων εἰπεῖν πόλιν
544 τε καὶ ἄνδρα: ἀλλ᾽ οὖν δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημένας
ἔλεγες, εἰ αὕτη ὀρθή. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν
Μ ει
ἔφησθα, ὡς μνημονεύω, τέτταρα εἴδη εἶναι, ὧν καὶ
πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἴη ἔχειν καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν τὰ
ς ΄ ᾿ \ 5 Ἤν en cit | a
ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τοὺς ἐκείναις ad ὁμοίους, ἵνα
πάντας αὐτοὺς ἰδόντες καὶ ὁμολογησάμενοι τὸν
ἄριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα ἐπισκεψαίμεθα, εἰ
6 ἄριστος εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ 6 κάκιστος ἀθλιώ-
τατος ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοι: καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου, τίνας
Β λέγοις τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας, ἐν τούτῳ ὑπέλαβε
Πολέμαρχός τε καὶ ᾿Αδείμαντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ σὺ
« Of. Vol. I. p. 424, note c, and What Plato Said, p. 640,
on Laws 857 c. ‘
> Cf. 449 A-B. ¢ Of, Aristot. Pol. 1275 Ὁ 1-2, 1289 b 9.
4 Aristot. Pol. 1291-1292 censures the limitation to four.
But cf. supra, Introd. p. xlv. Cf. Laws 693 p, where only two
mother-forms of government are mentioned, monarchy and
democracy, with Aristot. Pol. 1301 Ὁ 40 δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία.
Cf. also Eth. Nic. 1160 a 31 ff. The Politicus mentions
seven (291 f., 301 f.). Isoc. Panath. 132-134 names three
kinds—oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy—adding that
others may say much more about them. See note ad /oc. in
Loeb Isocrates and Class. Phil. vol. vii. p. 91. Cf. Hobbes,
Leviathan 19 “ Yet he that shall consider the particular
commonwealths that have been and are in the world will ποῦ
236
if
}
3
:
’
[
᾿
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ care of'themselves and the state.” ‘‘ That is right,”
I said. .“ But now that we have finished this topic
let us recall the point at which we entered on the
ession® that has brought us here, so that’ we
ug
may proceed on our way again by the same path.”
“That is easy,” he said; “ for at that time, almost
exactly as now, on the supposition that you had
finished the description of the city, you were going
on to say® that you assumed such a city as you
then described and the corresponding type of man
to be good, and that too though, as it appears, you
had a still finer city and type of man to tell of;
but at any rate you were saying that the others are
aberrations,’ if this city is right. But regarding the
other constitutions, my recollection is that you said ©
there were four species? worth speaking of* and
observing their defects and the corresponding types
of men, in order that when we had seen them all and
come to an agreement about the best and the worst
man, we might determine whether the best is the
happiest and the worst most wretched or whether
it is otherwise.” And when I was asking what were
the four constitutions you had in mind, Polemarchus
and Adeimantus thereupon broke in, and that was
how you took up the discussion again and brought
perhaps easily reduce them to three . . . as, for example,
elective kingdoms,”’ ete.
© For ὧν καὶ πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἴη cf. Laws 908 Β ἃ καὶ δια-
κρίσεως ἄξια, Laches 192 a οὗ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον λέγειν, Tim. 82 c ἕν
γένος ἐνὸν ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας. ΟἿ. αἰδο Euthydem. 279 c, Aristot.
Pol. 1272 Ὁ 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth.
vy. 16, Isoc. vi. 56, and Vol. I. p. 420, note f, on 445 c.
7 For the relative followed by a demonstrative ef. also
357 B.
5 Plato’s main point again. Cf. 545 a, 484 a-pand Vol. I.
p. xii, note ὦ.
237
iPDATO!TIH SHT
ἀναλαβὼν τὸν λόγον δεῦρ᾽ ἀφῖξαι. ᾿θρθότατα,
i hae My SIONS ae, Πάλιν τοίνυν, ὥσπερ παλαι-
oh
στής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμοῦ
ἐρομένου πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἅπερ τότε ἔμελλες λέγειν.
᾽᾿Ἔάανπερ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγ; δύνωμαι: Καὶ μήν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς,
ἐπιθυμῶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαι τίνας SMS ‘Tas
τέτταρας πολιτείας. Οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἦν ὃ ἐγώ,
ἀκούσει. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἃς λέγω, darn Kal ὀνόματα
ἔχδυσδ; ἥ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐ Seba me ἡ Kpy-
τική TE καὶ ἀμρωνμτὴ αὕτη" καὶ δευτέρα καὶ
δευτέρως STOOL NEI, καλουμένη δ᾽ ὀλιγαρχία,
᾿ συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία: ἥ τε ταύτῃ
δα φορὸς καὶ ἐφεξῆς γϊγνομενὴ δημοκρατία, καὶ
γενναία δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πασῶν τούτων δια-
φέρουσα, τέταρτόν τε καὶ ἔσχατον πόλεως νόσημα.
ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἥτις καὶ ἐν
εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινὲ κεῖται; δυναστεῖαι γὰρ καὶ
ὠνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι. καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες πολιτεῖαι
μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὕροι δ᾽ ἄν τις αὐτὰς
« Cf. on 572 B, p. 339, note ὁ.
» Cf. Phileb. 13 Ὁ εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας, Phaedr. 236 B, Laws 682 Ἐν
Aristoph. Clouds 551 (Blaydes), Knights 841, Lysist. 672.
¢ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Sophist 267 p.
4 Cf. Crito 52 8, Norlin on Isoc. Nicocles 24 (Loeb), Laws
712 v-z, Aristot. Pol, 1265 b.32, Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15.
© ἡ, υ «αὔτη σαν (Cf. Midsummer Night's Dream, τ. iis
ad fin. and Gorg. 502 5, 452 E.
7 Of course ironical. Cf. supra 454 a, and What Plato
Said, p. 592, on Soph. 231 8.
g Cf. 552 c, Protag. 322 pv, Isoc. Hel. 34, Wilamowitz on
238
Ne
|
ν
¢
may have been thinking of Carthage. Cf. Polyb. vi. 56. 4.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
ἕο this point.” “Your memory is most exact,”
I said. “ A second time then, as in a wrestling-
_ to say.” ‘“‘ I will if I can,” said 1. “ And indeed,”
1
}
Ἰ
match, offer me the same hold,’ and when I repeat
my question try to tell me what you were then about
said he, “1 am eager myself to hear what four
forms of government you meant.” “ There will be
no difficulty about that,” said I. “* For those I mean
are precisely those that have names* in common
_ usage : that which the many praise,* your® Cretan
and Spartan constitution ; and the second in place
_ and in honour, that which is called oligarchy, a con-
stitution teeming with many ills, and its sequent
_ counterpart and opponent, democracy ; and then the
_ noble’ tyranny surpassing them all, the fourth and
_ final malady 9 ofa state.. Can you mention any other
type” of government, I mean any other that. con-
_ stitutes a distinct species‘? For, no doubt, there are
hereditary principalities’ and purchased* kingships,
and similar intermediate constitutions. which one
_ Eurip. Heracles 542. For the effect of surprise ef. Rep.
554 a, 373 a, 555 a, Theaet. 146 a, Phileb. 46 a κακόν and
64 © συμφορά.
® ἰδέαν : cf. Introd. p. x.
* Cf. 445 c. For διαφανεῖ ef. Tim. 60 a, 67 a, Laws 634 ο,
and infra on 548 c, p. 253, note g.
i δυναστεῖαι: cf. Laws 680 8, 681 pv. But the word
usually has an invidious suggestion. See Newman on
Aristot. Pol. 1272 Ὁ 10. Cf. ibid. 1292 Ὁ 5-10, 1293. a 31,
1298 a 32; also Lysias ii. 18, where it is opposed to demo-
cracy, Isoc. Panath. 148, where it is used of the tyranny of
Peisistratus, ibid. 43 of Minos. » Cf. Panegyr. 39 and Norlin
_on Panegyr. 105 (Loeb). . Isocrates also uses it frequently
of the power or sovereignty of Philip, Phil..3, 6, 69, 133,
ete. Cf. also Gorg. 492 8, Polit. 291 ν.
* Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 35 thinks that»Plato
239
PLATO STH SHT
οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς. βαρβάρους 7 τοὺς “Ἕλληνας.
Πολλαὶ: γοῦν καὶ ἄτοποι, ἔφη, λέγονται. > see, ΤῈ
Il. Otc? οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ , ἀνθρώπων |
| εἴδη, τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων * εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ |
πολιτειῶν; ἢ οἴει ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς
πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν
Ε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν. ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τἄλλα
ἐφελκύσηται; Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγ᾽ , ἔφη, ἃ ἄλλοθεν ἢ
᾿ ἐντεῦθεν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πέντε, κ καὶ αἱ
ΙΪ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε ἂν εἶεν.
\ Τώμην;͵, Tov μὲν. δὴ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ὅμοιον δι-
| εληλύθαμεν ἤδη, ὃν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον. ὀρθῶς
545 φαμὲν εἶναι. Διεληλύθαμεν. “Ap οὖν τὸ μετὰ
τοῦτο διιτέον τοὺς χείρους, τὸν φιλόνικόν͵ τε καὶ
φιλότιμον, κατὰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἑστῶτα πολιτείαν,
καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὖ καὶ δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν
τυραννικόν, ἵνα τὸν ἀδικώτατον ἰδόντες ἀντιθῶμεν |
TO δικαιοτάτῳ καὶ ἡμῖν τελέα Ὰ σκέψις ἢ, πῶς :
more ἡ ἄκρατος δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν τὴν
ἄκρατον ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας τε πέρι τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ
Ϊ
α Plato, as often, is impatient of details, for which he was
rebuked by Aristotle. Cf. also Tim. 57 τ, 67. c, and the
frequent leaving of minor matters to future legislators in the
Republic and. Laws, Vol. I. p. 294, note 6, on 4128. .
ὃ For the correspondence of individual and state cf. also
435 Ἐ, 445 cop, 579 c and on 591 πε. Cf. Laws 829 a, Isoc:
Peace 120.
¢ Or ‘“‘stock or stone,” 2.6. inanimate, insensible things.
For the quotation ἐκ δρυός» ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας of. Odyssey
xix. 163, Jl. xxii. 126 aliter, Apol. 34 Ὁ ol
Phaedrus 275 Bs also Stallbaum ad loc.
4 The “ mores,” 435 2,436.4. Of. Bagehot, Physics and.
Politics, p. 206: “A lazy nation may be changed into an
industrious, a rich into a poor, a religious into a profane,
240
Thompson on
»
7
‘
t
i
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
could find in even greater numbers among the bar-
barians than among the Greeks.*”” “Certainly many
strange onés are reported,”’ he said.
_ IIL. “ Are you: aware, then,” said I, “ that there
must be as many types of character among men as
there are forms of government’? Or do you suppose
that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak
or rock © and not from the characters ὅ of the citizens,
which, as it were, by their momentum and weight
in the scales* draw other things after them?”
“They could not possibly come from any other
source,” he said. “ Then if the forms of government
are five, the patterns of individual souls must be
five also.” “‘ Surely.”’ “‘ Now we have already de-
scribed the man corresponding to aristocracy 7 or the
government of the best, whom we aver to be the
truly good and just man.” “We have.” “ Must
we not, then, next after this, survey the inferior
types, the man who is contentious and covetous of
honour,’ corresponding to the Laconian constitution,
and the oligarchical man in turn, and the democratic
and the δ Se order that," after observing the most
unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just,
and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure
justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness
and unhappiness of the possessor, so that we may
as if by magic, if any single cause, though slight, or an
comb “πρότασις of Bien cade Senter to
~— the favourite and detested types of character.”
4 For the metaphor cf. also 550 Ἑ and on 556 FE.
1 ἀριστοκρατία is by both Plato and Aristotle some-
times technically, sometimes etymologically as the govern-
ment of the best, whoever they may be. Cf. 445 pb, and
Menex. 238 c-p (What Plato Said, p. 539).
5“. Of. Phaedr. 256 c 1, swpra 475 a, S47 5.
® Cf. on 544 a, p. 237, note g.
VOL. II R 241
a a Ae
σ
PLATO
bal
ἀθλιότητος, ἵνα ἢ Θρασυμάχῳ πειθόμενοι διώ-
κωῶωμεν ἀδικίαν ἢ τῷ νῦν προφαινομένῳ λόγῳ
δικαιοσύνην; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, “οὕτω
ποιητέον. *Ap’ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἠρξάμεθα. ἐν ταῖς
πολιτείαις «πρότερον σκοπεῖν τὰ ἤθη ἢ ἐν τοῖς
ἰδιώταις, ὡς ἐναργέστερον ὄν, καὶ νῦν οὕτω πρῶ-
τον μὲν τὴν φιλότιμον σκεπτέον πολιτείαν: 6 ὄνομα
γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον ἄλλο: ἢ τιμοκρατίαν ἢ
τιμαρχίαν αὐτὴν κλητέον" πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὸν
τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα σκεψόμεθα, ἔπειτα ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ
ἄνδρα ὀλιγαρχικόν, αὖθις δὲ εἰς δημοκρατίαν
ἀποβλέψαντες "θεασόμεθα ἄνδρα δημοκρατικόν, τὸ
δὲ τέταρτον εἰς τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἐλθόντες καὶ
ἰδόντες, πάλιν εἰς τυραννικὴν ψυχὴν βλέποντες,
πειρασόμεθα περὶ ὧν προὐθέμεθα. ἱκανοὶ κριταὶ
γενέσθαι; Κατὰ λόγον γέ τοι ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτω
γίγνοιτο ἥ τε θέα καὶ ἡ κρίσις.
* In considering the progress of degeneration portrayed in
the following pages, it is too often forgotten that Plato is
describing or satirizing divergences from an ideal rather
than an historical process. Cf. Rehm, Der Untergang Roms
im abendlindischen Denken, p. 11: “Plato gibt eine zum
Mythos gesteigerte Naturgeschichte des Staates, so wie
Hesiod eine als Mythos zu verstehende Natur-, d.h. Entar-
ag geschichte des Menschengeschlechts gibt. a iis Sidne
ay, on Bury, The Idea of Progress, in‘ ᾿ Methods
Stiense edited by Stuart A. Rice, p. 289: ve ie ‘was
a widely spread belief in an earlier ‘ golden age’ of simplicity,
which had been followed 7 a degeneration and decay of
the human race, Plato’s theory of degradation set forth
a gradual deterioration through the successive stages of
timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and despotism. ‘The Greek
theory of ‘cycles,’ with its endless, monotonous iteration,
excluded the possibility of permanent advance or ‘ progress.’ ”
Kurt Singer, Platon der Griinder, p. 141, says that the
timocratic state reminds one of late Sparta, ‘the democratic
242
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
either follow the counsel of Thrasymachus and
pursue injustice or the present argument and pursue
pereret ” “ Assuredly,” he said, “that is what we |
have to do.*” “ Shall we, then, as we began by ex-
amining moral qualities in states before individuals,
‘as being more manifest there, so now consider first
the constitution based on the love of honour? I do
not know of any special name ὃ for it in use. We must
eall it either timocracy® or timarchy.. And then in
connexion with this we will consider the mam οὗ that
type, and thereafter oligarchy and the oligarch, and
again, fixing our eyes on democracy, we will con-
template the democratic man; and fourthly, after
coming to the city ruled by a tyrant and observing
it, we will in turn take a look into the tyrannical soul,?
and so try to make ourselves competent judges οὗ
the question before 5. ““That would be at least’
a systematic and consistent way of conducting the
observation and the decision,” he said.
of Athens after Pericles, the oligarchic is related to Corinth,
and the tyrannical has some Syracusan features. , Cicero,
De div. ii., uses this book of the Republic to console himself
for the revolutions in the Roman state, and Polybius’s theory
of the natural succession of governments is derived from it,
with modifications (Polyb. vi. 4. 6 ff. Cf. vi. 9. 10 αὕτη
πολιτειῶν dvaxixdwors). Aristotle objects that in a cycle the
ideal state should follow the tyranny.
ὃ Cf. on 544 c, p. 238, note ὃ.
“6 In Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1160 a 33-34, the meaning is ‘‘ the
rule of those who possess a property qualification.”
4 ΟἹ 511 az. © Of. 582 a ff.
7 For the qualified assent οὐ Hamlet 1. i. 19 ““ What? is
Horatio there? A piece of him.’ It is very frequent in the
Republic, usually with γοῦν. Cf. 442 v, 469 B, 476 c, 501 c,
587 c, 584 a, 555 B, 604 p, and Vol. I. p. 30, note a, on 334 4;
also 460 c and 398 8, where the interlocutor adds a con-
dition, 392 5, 405 8, 556 ©, 581 B, and 487 a, where he uses
the corrective μὲν οὖν.
: 243
PLATO
Ill. Φέρε τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πεϊρώμεθα λέγειν,
τίνα ,Τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀριστο-
D κρατίας. ἢ τόδε μὲν ἁπλοῦν, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία
μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν
ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται" ὁμονοοῦντος δέ,
κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον ἦ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆν αι; Ἔστι
γὰρ οὕτως. Πῶς οὖν δή, εἶπον, ὦ Prasiain, ἡ
πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται, καὶ πῇ στασιάσουσιν of
ἐπίκουροι καὶ of ἄρχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ
πρὸς ἑαυτούς; ἢ βούλει, ὥσπερ. Ὅμηρος, εὐχώ-
μεθα ταῖς Μούσαιο. εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον
E στάσις ἔμπεσε, καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς ws
πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας,
ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν;
546 Πῶς; Ὧδέ πως χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν
οὕτω ξυστᾶσαν: ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά
ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἡ τοιαύτη ξύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ
/ > ‘ / 7 \ Ὁ“ > ,
χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται: λύσις δὲ ἥδε. οὐ μόνον
φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζώοις φορὰ
καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται, ὅταν
περιτροπαὶ ἑκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς ξυνάπτωσι,
βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας"
2 For the idea that the state is destroyed only by factions
in the ruling class ef. also Laws 6838. Cf. 465 8, Lysias
xxv. 21, Aristot. Pol. 1305 b, 1306 a 10 ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλίγα χία
οὐκ ebdud bOopos ἐξ αὑτῆς, 1302 a 10, Polybius, Teubner, volt li.
p. 298 (vi. 57). Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. Ῥ. 521, says that
Aristotle “‘does not remark on. Plato’s observation...
though he cannot have agreed with it.” Cf Halévy, Notes
et souvenirs, p. 153 “‘ histoire est la pour démontrer claire-
ment que, depuis un siécle, nos gearcmenierts n’ont jamais
été renversés que par eux-mémes’’; Bergson, Les Deux
Sources de la morale et de la religion, p. 303: “* Mais
244
πὰρ ον τῶν
He Se. 4...
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
IIL. “ Come, then,” said I, “let us try to tell in
what way a timocracy would arise out of an aristo-
cracy. Or is this the simple and unvarying rule,
that in every form of government revolution takes
its start from the ruling class itself,¢ when dissension
arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself,
however small it be, innovation is impossible ?”
““Yes, that is 50. “‘ How, then, Glaucon,” I said,
“will disturbance arise in our city, and how will our
helpers and rulers fall out and be at odds with one
another and themselves? Shall we, like Homer, in-
voke the Muses ® to tell ‘ how faction first fell upon
them,’ and say that these goddesses playing with us
and teasing us as if we were children address us in
smock-serious tragic’ style?” “How?” “‘Some-
what in this fashion. Hard in truth 4 it is for a state
thus constituted to be shaken and disturbed; but
since for everything that has come into being destruc-
tion is appointed,’ not even such a fabric as this will
abide for all time, but it shall surely be dissolved, and
this is the manner of its dissolution. Not only for
plants that grow from the earth but also for animals
that live upon it there is a cycle of bearing and barren-
ness’ for soul and body as often as the revolutions of
their orbs come full circle, in brief courses for the
short-lived and oppositely for the opposite ; but the
Vinstinct résiste. I] ne commence ἃ céder que lorsque la
classe supérieure elle-méme l’y invite.”’
ὃ For the mock-heroic style of this invocation ¢f. Phaedr.
237 a, Laws 885 c.
© Of. 413 8, Meno 76 π, Aristot. Meteorol, 353 Ὁ 1,
Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 146.
4 Of. Ale. I. 104 ε.
4 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 627 on Laws 677 a; also Polyb.
vi. 57, Cie. De rep. ii. 25.
7 Cf. Pindar, Nem. vi. 10-12 for the thought.
245
PLATO
γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου edyovias τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ
Β ὄντες σοφοί, οὗς ἡγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε,
οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμῷ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως τεύξονται,
ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ “γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε
οὐ δέον. ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος,
ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ ᾿
ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευό-
μεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λα-
βοῦσαι ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ
αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα , Tpoonyopa καὶ
ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν" ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν
πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρὶς
αὐξηθείς, τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις,
τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν
ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ ,διαμέτρων. ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομέ-
νῶν ἑνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ
κύβων τριάδος. ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος ἀριθμὸς γεω-
μετρικὸς τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χει-
D ρόνων γενέσεων, ἃς ὅταν ἀγνοήσαντες ὑμῖν οἱ
φύλακες συνοικίζωσι νύμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ καιρόν,
οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ᾽ εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται" ὧν
καταστήσουσι μὲν τοὺς ἀρίστους ot πρότεροι, ὅμως
δὲ ὄντες ἀνάξιοι, εἰς τὰς τῶν πατέρων αὖ δυνάμεις
ἐλθόντες, ἡμῶν πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν φύλακες
ὄντες, παρ᾽ ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἡγησάμενοι τὰ
μουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς: ὅθεν ἀ-
« Cf. Tim. 28 a δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως.
ὃ For its proverbial obscurity cf. Cie. Ad Att. vii. 13
‘est enim numero Platonis obscurius,’’ Censorinus, De die
natali xi. See supra, Introd. p. xliv for literature on this
“number.” ° προσήγορα: cf. Theaet. 146 a.
4 Cf. 534 τ: also Theaet. 202 B ῥητάς.
* Cf. 409 ν.
246
et
i ge
7 ee
"ἢ
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
laws of prosperous birth or infertility for your race,
the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for
all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined
__ with sensation,’ but they will escape them, and there
will be a time when they will beget children out of
season. Now for divine begettings there is a period
comprehended by a perfect number,? and for mortal
by the first in which augmentations dominating and
_ dominated when they have attained to three dis-
‘tances and four limits of the assimilating and the
dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render
all things conversable 5 and commensurable with one
_ another, whereof a basal four-thirds wedded to the
pempad yields two harmonies at the third augmenta-
tion, the one the product of equal factors taken one
_ hundred times, the other of equal length one way but
oblong,—one dimension of a hundred numbers deter-
_ mined by the rational diameters of the pempad lack-
ing one in each case, or of the irrational ὦ lacking two ;
the other dimension of a hundred cubes of the triad.
And this entire geometrical number is determinative
of this thing, of better andinferior births. And when
-vour guardians, missing this, bring together brides and
bridegrooms unseasonably,° the offspring will not be
_ well-born or fortunate. Of such offspring the previ-
ous generation will establish the best, to be sure, in
office, but still these, being unworthy, and having
entered in turn’ into the powers of their fathers, will
first as guardians begin to neglect us, paying too
little heed to music’ and then to gymnastics, so that
oat ad: ef. my note in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 285-
2 This does not indicate a change in Plato’s attitude toward
music, as has been alleged.
247
E
547
C
PLATO
/ / Cc A ates > )
μουσότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν of νέοι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων
ἄρχοντες οὐ πάνυ φυλακικοὶ καταστήσονται πρὸς
τὸ δοκιμάζειν τὰ Ἡσιόδου τε καὶ τὰ παρ᾽
ὑμῖν γένη, χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν
καὶ σιδηροῦν: ὁμοῦ δὲ μιγέντος σιδηροῦ ἀργυρῷ
καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσῷ ἀνομοιότης ἐγγενήσεται. καὶ
ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος, ἃ γενόμενα, οὗ ἂν ἐγγέ-
νῆται, ἀεὶ τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν. ταύτης τοι
γενεᾶς χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσιν, ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται
ἀεί. Kat ὀρθῶς γ᾽, ἔφη, αὐτὰς ἀποκρίνεσθαι φή-
σομεν. Καὶ γάρ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη Μούσας γε
οὔσας. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν αἱ
Μοῦσαι; Στάσεως, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, γενομένης εἱλκέτην
ἄρα ἑκατέρω τὼ γένει, τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλ-
κοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτῆσιν καὶ οἰκίας
χρυσίου τε καὶ ἀργύρου, τὼ δ᾽ αὖ, τὸ χρυσοῦν τε
καὶ ἀργυροῦν, ἅτε οὐ πενομένω, ἀλλὰ φύσει ὄντε
πλουσίω, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν
ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἠγέτην: βιαζομένων δὲ καὶ
ἀντιτεινόντων ἀλλήλοις, εἰς μέσον ὡμολόγησαν
γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας κατανειμαμένους ἰδιώσασθαι,
\ \ \ / \ ee 27 A « > /
τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέ-
ρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας δουλωσάμενοι τότε
περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες αὐτοὶ πολέμου
τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι,
” Ὁ ¢ / > “ , >
ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ μετάβασις ἐντεῦθεν γίγνεσθαι. Οὐκ-
obv, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐν μέσῳ τις ἂν εἴη ἀριστοκρατίας
«ΟἿ supra 415 a-B. > Of. Theaet. 159 a.
¢ Cf. Homer, Il. vi. 211.
4 ye vi termini. Cf. 379 a-B.
¢ Of. supra 416 £-417 a, 521 a, Phaedrus 279 B-c,
248
ed
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
young men will deteriorate in their culture;
and the rulers selected from them will not approve
emselyes. very efficient guardians for testing
iod’s and our races of gold, silver, bronze and
ron.* And this intermixture of the iron with the
silver and the bronze with the gold will engender
eness ὃ and an unharmonious unevenness, things
at always beget war and enmity wherever they
arise. “ΟΥ̓ this lineage,° look you,’ we must aver the
‘dissension | to be, wherever it occurs and always.”
ἜΑ rightly too, ** he said, “ we shall affirm that the
“Muses answer.” ‘“* They must needs,”’ I said, “‘ since
‘they are? Muses.” “ Well, then,” said he, “ what do
ef Muses say next?” When strife arose,” said
“the two groups were pulling against each other,
iron and bronze towards money-making and the
See of land and houses and gold and silver,
the other two, the golden and silvern, not being
r, but by nature rich in their souls,’ were trying to
aw them | back to virtue and their original consti-
ution, and thus, striving and contending against one
tee they compromised? on the planof distributing
and taking for themselves the land and the houses,
enslaving and subjecting as perioeci and serfs? their
former friends* and supporters, of whose freedom
eney ey had been the guardians, and occupying them-
lves with war and keeping watch over these
subjects.” “TI think,” he said, “that this is the
| -point of the transformation.” “Would not
this polity, then,” said I, “‘ be in some sort inter-
7 For els μέσον ef. Protag. 338 a; infra 572 Ὁ, 558 5.
_ * An allusion to Sparta. On slavery in Plato cf. Newman
. p. 143. Cf. 549 a, 578-579, Laws 776-777 ;. Aristot. Pol.
1259 a 21 f., 1269 a 36 f., 1330 a 29.
ΠΟΥ 417 an.
249
ΡΙΑΤΟ. ΓΗῚ
τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία; Πάνυ μὲ
οὖν.
IV. Μεταβήσεται μὲν δὴ οὕτω" jessie δὲ
D πῶς οἰκήσει; ἢ φανερὸν ὅ ὅτι τὰ μὲν μιμήσεται τὴν
προτέραν πολιτείαν, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἅτ᾽
μέσῳ οὖσα, τὸ δέ τι καὶ αὑτῆς ἕξει ἴδιον; Οὕτως,
ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. καὶ
γεωργιῶν ἀπέχεσθαι τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς “καὶ
χειροτεχνιῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου χρηματισμοῦ, ξυσ-.
σίτια δὲ κατεσκευάσθαι καὶ γυμναστικῆς τε καὶ
τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πᾶσι τοῖς
τοιούτοις τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται; Nad. . Τῷ δέ
E γε φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς. ἄγειν,
ἅτε οὐκέτι κεκτημένην ἁπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς τοὺς
τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μικτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ θυμοειδεῖς
τε καὶ ἁπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πό-
548 λεμον μᾶλλον πεφυκότας ἢ ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην, καὶ “Τοὺς
περὶ ταῦτα δόλους τε καὶ μηχανὰς ἐντίμως ἔχειν,
καὶ πολεμοῦσα τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διάγειν, αὐτὴ ἑ ἑαυτῆ
αὖ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἴδια ἕξει; Ναί.
᾿Επιθυμηταὶ δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, χρημάτων οἱ
τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις,
καὶ τιμῶντες ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου χρυσόν τε καὶ
ἄργυρον, ἅτε κεκτημένοι ταμιεῖα καὶ οἰκείους
θησαυρούς, of θέμενοι ἂν αὐτὰ κρύψειαν, καὶ αὖ
περιβόλους οἰκήσεων, ἀτεχνῶς νεοττιὰς ἰδίας,
« Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1328 b 41 and Newman i. pp. 107-108.
> Cf. supra 416 £, 458 c, Laws 666 B, 762 c, 780 a-B, 781 c,
806 ©, 839 c, Critias 112 c.
“ Cf. 397 8, Isoc. ii, 46 ἁπλοῦς δ᾽ ἡγοῦνται τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ
ἔχοντας. Cf. the psychology of Thucyd, iii. 83.
4 This was said to be characteristic of Sparta. Cf.
Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 13, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14. 2-3 —
250
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
| τ edi: ite between aristocracy and oligarchy?” “ By
Il means.’
IV. “ΒΥ this change, then, it would arise. But after
e change what will be its way of life? Is it not ob-
s that in some things it will imitate the preceding
ty, in some the oligarchy, since it is intermedi-
e, and that it will also have some qualities peculiar
itself ? ” “ Thatisso,”’ he said. ‘““ Then in honour-
ng its rulers and in the abstention of its warrior class
rom farming * and handicraft and money-making in
re -neral, and in the provision of common public tables”
nd the devotion to physical training and expertness
τὶ the game and contest of war—in all these traits it
vill copy the preceding state?”’ “Yes.” “‘ Butinits
fear to admit clever men to office, since the men it has
a this kind are no longer simple and strenuous but of
; aixed strain, and in its inclining rather to the more
“stratagems and contrivances of war and occupying
ae with war most of the time—in these respects
itself?” “Yes.” ‘Such men,” said I, “ will be avid
_ of wealth, like those in an oligarchy, and will cherish
a fierce secret lust for gold ¢ and silver, owning store-
ἷ uses 5 and private treasuries where they may hide
them away, and also the enclosures’ of their homes,
literal private love-nests% in which they can lavish
and 7. 6, and the Chicago Dissertation of P. H. Epps,
The Place of Sparta in Greek History and Civilization,
"pp. 180-184.
© Of. 416 νυ.
ΟἿ Cf. Laws 681 a, Theaet. 174 &.
__ * γερττιάς suggests Horace’s “ἔπ nidum servas” (Epist. i.
10. 6). Cf. also Laws 776 a.
ἱ 251
spirited and simple-minded type, who are better |
“suited for war than for peace, and in honouring the
the most part its qualities will be peculiar to |
PLATO | THT ᾿
τ΄
Β ἐν αἷς ἀναλίσκοντες γύναιξί τὲ καὶ οἷς ἐθέλοιεν.
ἄλλοις πολλὰ ἂν δαπανῷντο. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ φειδωλοὶ χρημάτων, ἅτε τιμῶντες καὶ
οὐ φανερῶς κτώμενοι, φιλαναλωταὶ δὲ ἀλλοτρίων.
δι᾿ ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ λάθρᾳ τὰς ἡδονὰς καρπούμενοι,
ὥσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες,
οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ
τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων TE καὶ, |
C φιλοσοφίας ἠμεληκέναι καὶ πρεσβυτέρως Yuba
στικὴν μουσικῆς τετιμηκέναι. ᾿Παντάπασιν, ε a
κα
λέγεις μεμιγμένην πολιτείαν ἐκ κακοῦ, τε.
ἀγαθοῦ. Μέμικται γάρ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ- διαφανέστατον
δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἕν τι μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς
κρατοῦντος, φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι. Σφόδρα,
γε, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, αὕτη μὲν ἡ
πολιτεία οὕτω γεγονυῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἄν τις εἴη, ὡς
D λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς.
ἀπεργάσασθαι, διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ
τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώ-
τατον, ἀμήχανον δὲ μήκει ἔργον εἶναι πάσας μὲν
«ΟἹ, Laws 806 a-c, 687 B-c, Aristot. Pol. 1269 Ὁ 3, and
Newman ii. p. 318 on the Spartan women. Cf. Epps, op. cit. —
pp. 322-346. wae 4
Ὁ φιλαναλωταί, though different, suggests Sallust’s “‘alieni —
appetens sui profusus”’ (Cat. 5). Cf. Cat. 52 ““publice eges- —
tatem, privatim opulentiam.” PUT)
© Of. 587 a, Laws 636 v, Symp. 187 8, Phaedr. 251 Ἐ. {
4 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1270 Ὁ 34 with Newman’s note; and ©
Euthyphro 2 c “ tell his mother the state.”
¢ Cf. Laws 720 p-e. This is not inconsistent with Polit.
293 a, where the context and the point of view are different. —
7 This is of course not the mixed government which Plato —
approves Laws 691-692, 712 p-n, 759 5. Cf. What Plato
Said, p. 629.
9 For διαφανέστατον cf. 544 ν. The expression διαφανέστα-
252
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
neir wealth on their women® and any others they
| please with great expenditure.” ‘‘ Most true,’’ he
id.. “ And will they not be stingy about money,
166. they prize it.and are not allowed to possess it
openly, prodigal of others’ wealth? because of their
petites, enjoying‘ their pleasures stealthily, and
running away from the law as boys from a father,4
since the ‘have not been educated by persuasion® but
by force because of their neglect of the true Muse, the
companion of discussion and philosophy, and because
of their preference of gymnastics to music?” “‘ You
perfectly describe,” he said, “ἃ polity that is a
nixture/’ of good and evil.” “‘ Why, yes, the elements
ave been mixed,” I said, “but the most con-
΄
“ἡ
' spicuous?’ feature in it is one thing only, due to the
ara of the high-spirited element, namely
‘contentiousness and covetousness of honour.””’ “ Very
mucho,’ said he. ‘‘ Such, then, would be the origin
_and nature of this polity if we may merely outline the
᾿ figure of a constitution in words and not elaborate it
precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show us
‘the most just and the most unjust type of man, and it
would be an impracticable task to set forth all forms*
tov . . . ἕν τι μόνον, misunderstood and emended by Apelt,
_ is coloured by an idea of Anaxagoras expressed by Lucretius
: i. 877-878: oa
: u
ΠΤ apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta.
Anaxag, fr. 12 in fine, Diels 1.3 p. 405 ἀλλ᾽ ὅτων πλεῖστα En,
ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἕν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν. ΟἽ. Phaedr. 238 a,
‘Cratyl. 393 p, misunderstood by Diimmler and emended
igh ἐγκρατής) with the approval of Wilamowitz, Platon,
. p.
- * There is no contradiction between this and Laws 870 c
_ if the passage is read carefully.
τ # Of. on 544 dD, p. 240, note a.
253
PLATO
πολιτείας, πάντα δὲ ἤθη μηδὲν παραλιπόντα
διελθεῖν. Καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.
V. Tis οὖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν ἀνήρ;
πῶς τε γενόμενος ποῖός τέ τὶς ὦν; Οἶμαι μέν,
ἔφη ὃ ᾿Αδείμαντος, ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος
Ε τουτουῖ τείνειν ἕνεκά γε φιλονικίας. ἴσως, ἦν δ᾽
ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε: ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ τάδε οὐ κατὰ τοῦ-
τον ,πεφυκέναι. Τὰ ποῖα; Αὐθαδέστερόν τε δεῖ
αὐτόν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑποαμουσότερον,
φιλόμουσον δὲ καὶ φιλήκοον μέν, ῥητορικὸν
549 οὐδαμῶς. καὶ δούλοις μέν τις ἂν ἄγριος «εἴη, ὁ
τοιοῦτος, οὐ καταφρονῶν δούλων, ὥσπερ. ὁ ἑκανῶς
πεπαιδευμένος, ἐλευθέροις δὲ ἥμερος, ἀρχόντων δὲ
σφόδρα ὑπήκοος, φίλαρχος δὲ καὶ φιλότιμος, οὐκ
ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἀξιῶν ἄρχειν οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοιούτου
οὐδενός, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ ἔργων τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ
τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, φιλογυμναστής τέ τις ὧν
καὶ ,Φιλόθηρος. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο τὸ ἦθος
ἐκείνης. τῆς πολιτείας. Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρημάτων,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὃ τοιοῦτος νέος μὲν ὧν καταφρονοῖ ἄν,
ὅσῳ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γίγνοιτο, μᾶλλον. ἀεὶ ἀσπά-
ζοιτο ἂν τῷ τε μετέχειν τῆς τοῦ φιλοχρημάτου
φύσεως καὶ μὴ εἶναι εἱλικρινὴς πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ
BF
ψ
«ΟἿ. Phaedo 65 a, Porphyry, De abst. i. 27, Teubner, p. 59
ἐγγὺς τείνειν ἀποσιτίας.
> αὐθαδέστερον. The fault of Prometheus (Aesch. P. V. 1034,
1037) and Medea must not be imputed to Glaucon. .
¢ Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, who imitates or
parodies Plato throughout, e.g. p. 83 ‘A little inaccessible
to ideas and light,” and pp. 54-55 “ The peculiar vexsea.t Alt of
aristocracies of Teutonic origin appears to come from their
never having had any ideas to trouble them.”
4 Cf. 475 νυ, 535 Ὁ, Lysis 906 Ὁ:
¢ Cf. p. 249, note g, on 547 c, and Newman ii. p. 317, In
254
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
of government without omitting any, and all customs
and qualities of men.” “ Quite right,” he said.
_-V. ‘ What, then, is the man that corresponds to
this constitution? What is his origin and what his
nature?” “I fancy,” Adeimantus said, “that he
comes rather close ® to Glaucon here in point of con-
tentiousness.” “Perhaps,” said I, “in that, but I
do not think their natures are alike in the following
respects.” “In what?” “‘ He will have to be some-
what self-willed ὃ and lacking in culture, yet a lover
of musi¢ and fond of listening? to talk and speeches,
though by no means himself a rhetorician ; and to
slaves such a-one would be harsh,’ not scorning them
as the really educated do, but he would be gentle
with the freeborn and very submissive to officials, a
| lover of office and of honour, not basing his claim to
| office? on ability to speak or anything of that sort
but on his exploits in war or preparation for war, and
he would be a devotee of gymnastics and hunting.” ”
“Why, yes,” he said, “that is the spirit of that
polity.*” ‘‘ And would not such a man be disdain-
ful of wealth too in his youth, but the older he grew
the more he would love it because of his partici-
_ pation in the covetous nature and because his virtue
_ i. p. 143, n. 3 he says that this implies slavery in the ideal
: state, in spite of 547 c.
4 Of. Lysias xix. 18. Lysias xxi. portrays a typical φιλό-
τῆσε, Cf. Phaedr. 256 c, Eurip. [.A. 527. He is a
enophontic type. Cf. Xen. Oecon. 14. 10, Hiero 7. 3,
Agesil. 10.4. Isoc. Antid. 141 and 226 uses the word in a
good sense. Cf.‘ But if it be a sin to covet honour,” Shakes.
Η. V. rv. ili. 98.
σ΄ f the ἀξιώματα of Laws 690 a, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 8 ff.,
1282 b 26, 1283-1284.
* Cf. Arnold on the “ barbarians ” in Culture and Anarchy,
pp. 78, 82, 84.
* For the ἦθος of a state cf. Isoc. Nic. 31.
255
C
is hace ΣΝ
PLATO i SEE
τὸ ἀπολειφθῆναι τοῦ ἀρίστου “φύλακος; Tivos;
ἢ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ ὁ ᾿Αδείμαντος. Λόγου, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, pons
κεκραμένου: Os μόνος ἐγγενόμενος σωτὴρ τὴρ ape
διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι. Καλῶς, ΜΗ λέγεις.
Καὶ ἔστι μέν γ᾽, ἣν ὃ δ᾽ ey, τοιοῦτος ὁ τιμο- |
κρατικὸς νεανίας, τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐοικώς. Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν. Diyverae δέ γ᾽ >, εἶπον, οὗτος ὧδέ. πὼς"
ἐνίοτε πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὧν νέος υἱὸς ἐν. πόλει
οἰκοῦντος οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένῃ, φεύγοντος τάς τε
τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δίκας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πᾶσαν
φιλοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐθέλοντος ἐλαττοῦσθαι, ὥστε
πράγματα μὴ ἔχειν. IA δή, ἔφη, γίγνεται;. ; Ὅταν,
ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, “πρῶτον μὲν τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούῃ “ἀχθομέ-
vns, ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνήρ ἐστι, καὶ
ἐλαττουμένης διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ψυναιξίν,
ἔπειτα ὁρώσης μὴ σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα σπουδά-
ζοντα μηδὲ μαχόμενον καὶ λοιδορούμενον ἰδίᾳ τε
ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ῥᾳθύμως πάντα
τὰ τοιαῦτα φέροντα, καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσ-
@ The Greek words λόγος and μουσική are eens h
Cf. also 560 8. For μουσική cf. 546 pv. Newman i. a
fancies that this is a return to the position of Boo
from the disparagement of music in 522 a. Cf. Cony 3
Plato's Thought, p. 4 on this supposed ABA development of
Plato’s opinions.
> δέ ¥ marks the transition from the description of the
type to its origin. Cf. 547 », 553 B, 556 B, 557 B, 560 D,
561 5, 563 8, 566 x. Ritter, pp. 69-70, comments on its
frequency in this book, but does not note the reason. There
are no cases in the first five pages.
¢ Of. Lysias xix. 18 ἐκείνῳ μὲν yap ἣν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν,
with the contrasted type ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι, Isoc.
Antid. 227 ἀπραγμονεστάτους μὲν ὄντας ἐν τῇ πόλει. ΟἿ.
πολυπραγμοσύνη 444. Β, 484 B, Isoc. Antid. 48, Peace 108, 80,
256
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
is not sincere and pure since it lacks the—best
guardian?” ‘‘ What guardian?” said Adeimantus.
“ Reason,’ said I, ‘“‘ blended with culture,* which is
the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout
life in the soul that esses it.”” “‘ Well said,”’ he
replied. “This is the character,” I said, “ of the
timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his
name.” “By allmeans.” “His origin ὃ is somewhat on
this wise : Sometimes he is the young son of a good
father who lives in a badly governed state and avoids
honours and office and law-suits and all such meddle-
someness © and is willing to forbear something of his
rights? in order to escape trouble.*’’ “‘ How does he
originate?” he said. ‘‘ Why, when, to begin with,”
I said, “ he hears his mother complaining‘ that her
husband is not one of the rulers and for that reason
she is slighted among the other women, and when she
sees that her husband is not much concerned about
money and does not fight and brawl in private law-
suits and in the public assembly, but takes all such
matters lightly, and when she observes that he is self-
and 26, with Norlin’s note (Loeb). Cf. also Aristoph.
Knights 261.
ἀ ἐλαττοῦσθαι: ef. Thuc. i. 77. 1, Aristot, Eth. Nic. 1198 Ὁ
26-32, Pol. 1319 a 3.
* For πράγματα ἔχειν cf. 370 a, Gorg. 467 p, Ale. I. 119 5,
Aristoph. Birds 1026, Wasps 1392. Cf. πράγματα παρέχειν,
Rep. 505 a, 531 8, Theages 121 pv, Herod. i. 155, Aristoph.
Birds 931, Plutus 20, 102.
? Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 434 with some exaggeration
says that this is the only woman character in Plato and is
probably his mother, Perictione. Pohlenz, Gétt. Gel. Anz.
1921, p. 18, disagrees. For the complaints cf. Gerard, Four
Years in Germany, p. 115 “ Now if a lawyer gets to be about
forty years old and is not some kind of a Rat his wife begins
to nag him...”
VOL. II 5 257
PLATO
: fei
᾿ ἔχοντα det αἰσθάνηται, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μήτε πάνυ
| ~ , ε ΕΝ ἢ o
᾿ τιμῶντα μήτε ἀτιμάζοντα: ἐξ amdvrwy τούτων
| ἀχθομένης τε καὶ λεγούσης ὡς ἄνανδρός τε αὐτῷ
| 6 πατὴρ καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ
Ἔ οἷα φιλοῦσιν ai γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν.
: Κ \ ἐλ᾽ " = AS , AAd \o¢
’ Kat μάλ᾽, ἔφη ὁ ᾿Αδείμαντος, πολλά τε καὶ ὅμοια
| a >
ἑαυταῖς. Οἶσθα οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ οἱ οἰκέται
~ / -“ ~
τῶν τοιούτων ἐνίοτε λάθρᾳ πρὸς τοὺς υἱεῖς τοιαῦτα
λέγουσιν, of δοκοῦντες εὖνοι εἶναι, καὶ ἐάν τινα
mw a > ir / es \ > /
ἴδωσιν ἢ ὀφείλοντα χρήματα, ᾧ μὴ ἐπεξέρχεται ὁ
Ψ Μ » 3 ~ ,ὔ a
πατήρ, ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀδικοῦντα, διακελεύονται ὅπως,
ἐπειδὰν ἀνὴρ γένηται, τιμωρήσεται πάντας τοὺς
͵ὔ 4 > \ ~ Ν ~ ‘
550 τοιούτους Kal ἀνὴρ μᾶλλον ἔσται τοῦ πατρός καὶ
ἐξιὼν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούει καὶ ὁρᾷ, τοὺς μὲν τὰ
αὑτῶν πράττοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει ἠλιθίους τε καλου-
μένους καὶ ἐν σμικρῷ λόγῳ ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ μὴ τὰ
αὑτῶν τἰμωμένους τε καὶ ἐπαινουμένους. τότε δὴ
ὁ νέος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκούων τε καὶ ὁρῶν, καὶ
~ , : ~
αὖ τοὺς τοῦ πατρὸς λόγους ἀκούων τε καὶ ὁρῶν
τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἐγγύθεν παρὰ τὰ τῶν
»” ς / e. Ὁ 3 / , ~ \
ἄλλων, ἑλκόμενος ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, TOD μὲν
“- a =~ ,
B πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν TH ψυχῇ ἄρδοντός
\ ” ~ \ » / > A
τε καὶ αὔξοντος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τό τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν
«ΟἹ Symp. 174 τὸ, Isoc. Antid. 227.
» Cf. the husband in Lysias i. 6.
© λίαν ἀνειμένος : one who has grown too slack or negligent.
Cf. Didot, Com. Fr. p. 728 ris ὧδε μῶρος καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος ; !
Porphyry, De abst. ii. 58.
4 Of, Phaedo 60 a. For Plato’s attitude towards women
cf. What Plato Said, p. 632, on Laws 731 τ. δ
© ὑμνεῖν. Cf. Euthydem. 297 Ὁ, Soph. Ajax 292. Com- |
mentators have been troubled by the looseness of Plato’s
style in this sentence. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 385.
258 |
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
absorbed? in his thoughts and neither regards nor
ug: eg
i her overmuch,” and in consequence of all
_ this laments and tells the boy that his father is too
slack © and no kind of a man, with all the other com-
_ plaints with which women? nag? insuchcases.”’ “ Many
Se OO — SS
indeed,” said Adeimantus, “ and after their kind.’ ”
«You are aware, then,” said I, “ that the very house-
slaves of such men, if they are loyal and friendly, |
privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and
if they observe a debtor or any other wrongdoer whom
the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to
punish all such when he grows to manhood and prove
himself more of a man than his father, and when
the lad goes out he hears and sees the same sort of
thing.?» Men who mind their own affairs” in the city
are spoken of as simpletons and: are held. in slight
esteem, while meddlers who mind other people’s affairs
᾿
|
|
|
᾿
are honoured and praised. Thenitis‘thatthe youth, ὦ
hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand
listening to the words of his father, and with a near
view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other |
men, is slated OF both, his father watering and
fostering the growth of the rational principle? in his
soul and theothers the appetitive and the passionate*;
7 Cf. Aristoph. Thesm. 167 ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει.
9 ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: οὖ, on 488 B; also Gorg. 481 π, 482 A,
514 pv, Euthyd. 298 ©, Protag. 326 a, Phaedo 58 pv, 80 D, —
. 201 Ἑ, etc.
* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 8.
ὁ τότε δή: ε΄. 551 a, 566 c, 330 BE, 573 a, 591 a, Phaedo
pe 96 Β and pv, Polit. 272 ©. Cf. also τότ᾽ ἤδη, on
565 c.
i Cf. on 439 νυ, Vol. I. p. 397, note d.
* For these three principles of the soul ¢f. on 435 a ff.,
439 p-z ff., 441 a.
259
PLATO — iT
καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι
τὴν φύσιν, ὁμιλίαις δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων κακαῖς.
κεχρῆσθαι, εἰς τὸ μέσον. ἑλκόμενος ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων
τούτων ἦλθε, καὶ "τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν παρέδωκε
τῷ μέσῳ τε καὶ φιλονίκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ, ᾿ καὶ
ἐγένετο ὑψηλόφρων. τε καὶ φιλότιμος a το tr re
μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς τὴν τούτου γένεσιν διεληλυθέναι.
σ Ἔχομεν ἄ ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τήν τε δευτέραν πολιτείαν
καὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἄνδρα. Ἔχομεν, vA 4
VI. Οὐκοῦν pera τοῦτο, τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου, τς
γωμεν ἄλλον ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον, μᾶλλον
δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν προτέραν τὴν πόλιν; Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ein δέ γ᾽ ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ὀλιγαρχία
ἡ μετὰ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. Λέγεις δέ, ἦ δ᾽
ὅς, τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν; Τὴν ἀπὸ
τιμημάτων, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πολιτείαν, ἐν ἡ οἱ μὲν
D πλούσιοι ἄρχουσι, πένητι δὲ. οὐ μέτεστιν ἀρχῆς.
Μανθάνω, 7) ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν ὡς μεταβαίνει πρῶτον
ἐκ τῆς τιμαρχίας εἰς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, p ῥητέον; Ναί.
Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ τυφλῷ YE, δῆλον ὡς
μεταβαίνει. Πῶς; Τὸ ταμιεῖον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο
ἑκάστῳ χρυσίου πληρούμενον ἀπόλλυσι τὴν τοιαύ-
τὴν πολιτείαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δαπάνας αὑτοῖς
ἐξευρίσκουσιν, καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐπὶ τοῦτο map-
E ἄγουσιν, ἀπειθοῦντες αὐτοί τε καὶ γυναῖκες αὐτῶν.
Εἰκός, ἔφη. "Ἐπειτά γε, οἶμαι, ἄλλος ἄλλον ὁρῶν
3 Cf, the fragment of Menander, PNG? ἤθη χρήσθ᾽
ὁμιλίαι κακαί, quoted in 1 Cor. xv. 33 (Kock, C.A.F, iii.
No. 218). Cf. also Phaedr. 250 a ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν, Aesch.
Seven Against Thebes 599 ἔσθ᾽ ὁμιλίας κακῆς κάκιον οὐδέν,
> Of, p. 249, note f.
᾿ 1.0}. infra 553 B-c, 608 B.
ἃ ὑψηλόφρων is a poetical word. Cf. Eurip. 1.4. 919
260
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ and as he is not by nature of a bad disposition but has
fallen into evil communications,* under these two
solicitations he comes to a compromise? and turns over
_ the government in his soul ¢ to the intermediate prin-
. of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man
hau. of soul? and covetous of honour.®”” “ You
have, I think, most exactly described his origin.”
“ Then,”. _said I, “we have our second polity and
second ty eofman.” “ We have,” he said.
VIN we then, as Aeschylus’ would say, tell
of another ainipion before another gate, or rather,
in accordance with our plan,’ the city first?”’ “ That,
by all means,” he said. “‘ The next polity, I be-
lieve, would be oligarchy.” “And what kind of a 4
régime,” said he, “do you understand by a pin 51 » ἢ
“That based on ἃ. property qualification,’ ” of *, δ
“ wherein the rich hold office and the poor man ey
excluded.”’ “1 understand,” said he. “ Then, is
not the first thing to speak of how democracy passes
over into this?” “ Yes. ° “ And truly” satd T, “the
manner of the change is plain even to the pro-
verbial blind man.*” “How so?” “That treasure-
house 7 which each possesses filled with gold destroys
that polity ; for first they invent ways of expenditure
for themselves and pervert the laws to this end, and
neither they nor their wives obey them.” “‘ That is
likely,” he said. “ And then, I take it, by observing
* Cf. p. 255, note αὶ
7 Seven Against Thebes 451. λέγ ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πύλαις
εἰληχότα.
* Cf. Laws 743 c, and Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 345.
* Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1160 a 33, Isoc. Panath. 131,
Laws 698 8. aliter.
* Cf. 465 v, Soph. 241 pv.
4 Cf. 548 a, 416 ν.
261
whit
7
PLATO 1
καὶ εἰς ζῆλον ἰὼν τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὑτῶν
ἀπειργάσαντο. Εἰκός. Τοὐντεῦθεν τοίνυν, εἶπον,
προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ὅσῳ
ἂν τοῦτο τιμιώτερον ἡγῶνται, τοσούτῳ ἀρετὴν
ἀτιμοτέραν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλούτου ἃ ) ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν,
ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου ἑκατέρου ἀεὶ
τοὐναντίον ῥέποντε; Καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη. Τιμωμένου
δὴ πλούτου ἐν πόλει καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἀτιμοτέρα
ἀρετή τε καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί. Δῆλον. ᾿Ασκεῖται δὴ τὸ
ἀεὶ τιμώμενον, ἀμελεῖται δὲ τὸ ἀτιμαζόμενον.
Οὕτως. ᾿Αντὶ δὴ φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτίμων ἀν-
δρῶν φιλοχρηματισταὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι τελευ-
τῶντες ἐγένοντο, καὶ τὸν μὲν πλούσιον ἐ ἐπαινοῦσί τε
καὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγουσι, τὸν δὲ
πένητα ἀτιμάζουσιν. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν τότε δὴ
νόμον᾽ τίθενται ὅρον πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς ταξά-
μενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων, οὗ μὲν μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχία,
πλέον, οὗ δ᾽ ἧττον, ἔλαττον, ᾿προειπόντες ἀρχῶν
μὴ μετέχειν, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἢ οὐσία εἰς τὸ ταχθὲν
τίμημα, ταῦτα δὲ ἢ βίᾳ μεθ᾽ ὅπλων διαπράττονται,
ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου φοβήσαντες κατεστήσαντο τὴν
τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτω μὲν
α εὶς τὸ πρόσθεν : cf. 457 a, 604 5, Prot. 339 vp, Symp. 174 Ὁ,
Polit. 272 νυ, Soph. 258 c, 261 5, Ale. I. 132 5, Protag. 357 υ
where ἧς is plainly wrong, Aristoph. Knights 751.
δ Of. 591 v, Laws 742 5, 705 5, $31 ὁ ff., 836 a, 919 B
with Rep. 421 p; also Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 37-38.
“ Cf. on 544 ©, Demosth. v. 12.
4 This sentence has been much quoted. Cf. Cic. Tuse. i.
2 “honos alit artes . . . iacentque ea semper, quae apud
quosque inprobantur.”” Themistius and Libanius worked it
into almost every oration. Cf. Mrs. W. C. Wright, The
Emperor Julian, p. 70, n. 8. Cf. also Stallbaum ad loc.
For ἀσκεῖται ef. Pindar, Ol. viii. 22.
262
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ and emulating one another they bring the majority
of them to this way of thinking.” ‘‘ That is likely,”
he said. “‘Andso, as time goes on, and they advance®
in the pursuit of wealth, the more they hold that in
honour the less they honour virtue. May not the
opposition of wealth and virtue” be conceived as if
each lay in the scale ὁ of a balance inclining opposite
ways?” “Yes, indeed,” he said. “So, when
wealth is honoured in a state, and the wealthy, virtue
and the good are less honoured.” “ Obviously.”
“And that which men at any time honour they
1586, and what is not honoured is neglected.”
“Tt is 80. “Thus, finally, from being lovers of
victory and lovers of honour they become lovers of
gain-getting and of money, and they commend and
admire the rich man and put him in office but despise
the man who is poor.” “Quite so.” “And is it not
then that they pass a law defining the limits * of an
oligarchica] polity, prescribing’ a sum of money, a
larger sum where it is more’ of an oligarchy, where
it is less a smaller, and proclaiming that no man shall
hold office whose property does not come up to the
required valuation? And this law they either put
through by force of arms, or without resorting to that
they establish their government by terrorization.”
Is not that the way of it?’ “It is.” “ The
4 ὅρον: ε΄. 551 c, Laws 714 c, 962 pv, 739 pv, 626 8,
Menex. 238 v, Polit. 293 π, 296 £, 292 c, Lysis 209 c,
Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 7, 1271 a 35, and Newman i. p. 220,
Eth. Nic. 1138 Ὁ 23. Cf. also τέλος Rhet. 1366 a 3. For
the true criterion of office-holding see Laws 715 c-p and
Isoc. xii. 131. For wealth as the criterion ef. Aristot. Pol.
1273 a 37.
7 Por ταξάμενοι ef. Vol. I. p. 310, note ς, on 416 £.
* Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 13-14.
» Cf. 557 A.
263
}
PLATO
οὖν. Ἢ μὲν δὴ κατάστασις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν αὕτη.
Ναί, zn ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ ὁ τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας,
καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἔφαμεν αὐτὴν ἁμαρτήματα
C ἔχειν;
VI. Πρῶτον μέν, ἔφην, τοῦτο αὐτό, ὅρος
αὐτῆς οἷός ἐστιν. ἄθρει γάρ, εἰ νεῶν οὕτω τις
ποιοῖτο κυβερνήτας ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τῷ δὲ πένητι,
εἰ καὶ κυβερνητικώτερος εἴη, μὴ ἐπιτρέποι.
Πονηράν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτίλ-
λεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ ἄλλου οὕτως ὁτουοῦν
[ἢ Twos}! ἀρχῆς; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Πλὴν πόλεως,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἢ καὶ πόλεως πέρι; Πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη,
μάλιστα, ὅσῳ χαλεπωτάτη καὶ μεγίστη ἡ ἀρχή.
Ἕν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον ὀλιγαρχία ἂν ἔχοι
ἁμάρτημα. Φαίνεται. Τί δαί; τόδε dpa τι τού-
του ἔλαττον; Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ μὴ “μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο
ἀνάγκῃ εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν, τὴν μὲν πενήτων,
τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀεὶ
ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἀλλήλοις. Οὐδὲν pa A’, ἔφη,
| ἔλαττον. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν, τὸ ἀδυνά-
| tous εἶναι ἴσως πόλεμόν τινα πολεμεῖν διὰ τὸ
| ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἢ χρωμένους τῷ πλήθει ὧπλι-
E σμένῳ δεδιέναι μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἢ μὴ
1 4 τινος bracketed by Stallbaum, Burnet, and Hermann:
ἧστινος ci. Ast.
«ΟἿ supra 488, and Polit. 299 s-c, What Plato Said, p. —
521, on Huthydem. 291 pv.
> ’Stallbaum says that ἐπιτρέποι is used absolutely as in
575 pv, Symp. 213 x, Lysis 210 5, etc. Similarly Latin per-
mitto. Cf. Shorey on Jowett’s translation of Meno 92 a-n,
A.J.P. xiii. p. 867. See too Diog. L. i. 65.
¢ Men are the hardest creatures to govern. Cf. Polit.
292 p, and What Plato Said, p. 635, on Laws 766 4.
264
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ establishment then, one may say, is in this wise.”
es,” he said; “ but what is the character of this
constitution, and what are the defects that we said
it had?”
VII. “Τὸ begin with,” said I, “ consider the nature
of its constitutive and defining principle. Suppose
men should appoint the pilots ¢ of ships in this way, by
qualification, and not allow? a poor man to
navigate, even if he were a better pilot.” “ A sorry
voyage they would make of it,” he said. “‘ And is
not the same true of any other form of rule?” “I
think so.” “Except of a city,” said I, “ or does it
_ hold for a city ἴοο ὃ “ Most of all,” he said, “ by
_ asmuch as that is the greatest and most difficult ¢ rule
of all.” ‘‘ Here, then, is one very great defect in
oligarchy.”’ ‘‘So it appears.’’ “ Well, and is this
a smaller one ?”’ “What?” “That such a city
should of necessity be not one, but two, a city of
the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together,
and always plotting® against one another.” “No, |
by Zeus,” said he, “it is not a bit smaller.” “Nor, |
further, can we approve of this—the likelihood that +
they will not be able to wage war, because of the |
necessity of either arming and employing the multi- |
tude,’ and fearing them more than the enemy, or else,
if they do not make use of them, of finding themselves \
4 For the idea that a city should be a unity ef. Laws 739 Ὁ
and supra on 423 a-s. Cf. also 422 © with 417 a-s, Livy
ii. 24 “ adeo duas ex una civitate discordia fecerat.”” Aristot.
Pol. 1316 Ὁ 7 comments ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι
τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων... and tries to prove
the point by his topical method.
* Of. 417 5.
* For the idea that the rulers fear to arm the people c/.
Thue. iii. 27, Livy iii. 15 “‘consules et armare plebem et
inermem pati timebant.”
265
552
le
PLATO | |
χρωμένους ὡς ἀληθῶς. ὀλιγαρχικοὺς φανῆναι ἐν
αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα χρήματα μὴ ἐθέλειν
εἰσφέρειν, ἅτε φιλοχρημάτους. Οὐ καλόν. Τί δέ;
6 πάλαι ἐλοιδοροῦμεν, τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν γεωρ-
γοῦντας καὶ χρηματιζομένους καὶ πολεμοῦντας
ἅμα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ δοκεῖ
ὀρθῶς ἔχειν; Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν. Ὅρα δή, τούτων
πάντων τῶν κακῶν εἰ τόδε μέγιστον αὕτη πρώτη
παραδέχεται. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ
αὑτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ κτήσασθαι τὰ τούτου,
καὶ ἀποδόμενον οἰκεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν
τῆς πόλεως μερῶν, μήτε χρηματιστὴν μήτε δημιουρ-
γὸν μήτε ἱππέα μήτε ὁπλίτην, ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ
ἄπορον κεκλημένον. Πρώτη, ἔφη. Οὔκουν δια-
κωλύεταί γε ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις τὸ τοιοῦτον"
οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ μὲν ὑπέρπλουτοι ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ παν-
τάπασι πένητες. ᾿Ορθῶς. Τόδε δὲ ἄθρει: ἄρα
ὅτε πλούσιος ὧν ἀνήλισκεν ὃ τοιοῦτος, μᾶλλόν τι
τότ᾽ ἦν ὄφελος τῇ πόλει εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν;
a 95.) \ A > , > a . 3 pO
ἢ ἐδόκει μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναι, TH δὲ ἀληθείᾳ
οὔτε ἄρχων οὔτε ὑπηρέτης ἦν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν
¢ “2 3 / “ ” 39 7 4, 4
ἑτοίμων ἀναλωτής; Οὕτως, ἔφη: ἐδόκει, ἦν δὲ
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀναλωτής. Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
* He plays on the word. In 565 c ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς
is used in a different sense. Cf. Symp. 181 4 ὡς ἀληθῶς
πάνδημος, Phaedo 80 Ὁ εἰς “Αἰδου ws ἀληθῶς.
> Cf. supra 374 B, 434 a, 448 »-ε. For the specialty of
function cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 x.
¢ So in the Laws the householder may not sell his lot,
Laws 741 s-c, 744 p-e. Cf. 755 a, 857, Aristot. Pol.
1270 a 19, Newman i. p. 376.
266
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
on the field of battle, oligarchs indeed,* and rulers
over a few... And to this must be added. their reluc-
tance to contribute money, because they are lovers
of money.” “No, indeed, that is not admirable.”
“ And what of the trait we found fault with long ago”
—the fact that in such.a state the citizens are busy-
bodies and jacks-of-all-trades, farmers, financiers
andsoldiersallinone ? Do you think that is right ? ”
“ By no manner of means.” “* Consider now whether
this polity is not the first that admits that which is the
greatest of allsuch evils.” “What?” “ The allow-
ing a man to sell all his possessions,° which another
_ is permitted to acquire, and after selling them to go
_ on living in the city, but as no part of it,? neither a
money-maker, nor a craftsman, nor a knight, nor
a foot-soldier, but classified only as a pauper® and a
dependent.” “This is the first,’ he said. ““ There
certainly is no prohibition of that sort of thing in
oligarchical states. Otherwise some of their citizens
would not be excessively rich, and others out and
out paupers.” “‘Right.”’ “ But observe this. When
such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he then of
any more use to the state in the matters of which we
were speaking, or did he merely seem to belong to the
ruling class, while in reality he was neither ruler nor
helper in the state, but only a consumer of goods‘ ?”’
“Tt is so,” he said; “‘ he only seemed, but was just
a spendthrift.” “‘ Shall we, then, say of him that as
4 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1326 a 20, Newman i. pp. 98 and 109.
Cf. Leslie Stephen, U#il. ii: 111 “‘ A vast populace has
grown up outside of the old order.”
* Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1266 Ὁ 13.
7 ἑτοίμων : “things ready at hand.” Cf. 573 a, Polyb. vi.
(Teubner, vol. ii. p. 237); Horace Epist. i. 2. 27 “ fruges
consumere nati.”
267
PLATO δον.
φῶμεν αὐτόν, ὡς ἐν κηρίῳ κηφὴν ἐγγίγνεται,
σμήνους νόσημα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν οἰκίᾳ
κηφῆνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, νόσημα πόλεως; Πάνυ μὲν
οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ᾿Αδείμαντε,
τοὺς μὲν πτηνοὺς κηφῆνας πάντας ἀκέντρους ὁ
θεὸς πεποίηκεν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους ἐνίους μὲν
αὐτῶν ἀκέντρους, ἐνίους δὲ δεινὰ κέντρα ἔχοντας;
και εκ μεν τῶν ἀκεντρὼν πτωχοὶ πρὸς τὸ γηρας
τελευτῶσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κεκεντρωμένων πάντες
ὅσοι κέκληνται κακοῦργοι; ὑουκγάονος ἔφη.
Δῆλον ἄρα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐν πόλει, οὗ ἂν ἴδῃς πτω-
χούς, ὅτι εἰσί που ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀποκεκρυμ-
μένοι κλέπται τε καὶ βαλαντιατόμοι καὶ ἱερόσυλοι
καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημιουργοί.
Δῆλον, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις πό-
λεσι πτωχοὺς οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἐνόντας ᾿ ᾿Ολίγου γ᾽, ἔφη,
πάντας τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῶν ἀρχόντων. Μὴ οὖν oto-
E μεθα, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ κακούργους πολλοὺς ἐν
αὐταῖς εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας, ots ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ
κατέχουσιν at ἀρχαί; Οἰόμεθα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
*Ap’ οὖν οὐ δι᾽ ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακὴν τροφὴν καὶ
κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας φήσομεν τοὺς τοιούτους
αὐτόθι ἐγγίγνεσθαι; Φήσομεν. ᾿Αλλ’ οὖν
τοιαύτη γέ τις ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀλιγαρχουμένη πόλις καὶ
τοσαῦτα κακὰ ἔχουσα, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω. Σχεδόν
« Of. Laws 901 a, Hesiod, Works and Days 8500 ἔ,, Aristoph.
Wasps 1071 ff., Eurip. Suppl. 242, Xen. Oecon. 17. 15, and
Virgil, Georg. iv. 168 “‘ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus
arcent.”
The sentence was much quoted. Stallbaum refers to
Ruhnken on Tim. 157 ff. for many illustrations, and to
Petayius ad Themist. Orat. xxiii. p. 285 pv. Cf. Shelley,
Song to the Men of England:
268
a
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ the drone? springs up in the cell, a pest of the hive,
so such a man grows up in his home, a pest of the
state?” “ By all means, Socrates,’ he said. “ And
has not God, Adeimantus, left the drones which have
wings and fly stingless one and all, while of the drones
here who travel afoot he has made some stingless but
has armed others with terrible stings? And from the
stingless finally issue beggars in old age,” but from
those furnished with stings all that are denominated ¢
malefactors?”’ ‘Most true,” he said. “It is
plain, then,” said I, “‘ that wherever you see beggars
in a city, there are somewhere in the neighbourhood
_ concealed thieves and cutpurses and temple-robbers
τ ΩΝ
and similar artists in crime.” “Clearly,” he said.
“‘ Well, then, in oligarchical cities do you not see
beggars?” “‘ Nearly all are such,” he said, “ except
the ruling class.” “‘ Are we not to suppose, then, that
there are also many criminals in them furnished with
stings, whom the rulers by their surveillance forcibly ¢
restrain?’ ‘“‘ We must think so,” he said. “‘ And
shall we not say that the presence of such citizens is
the result of a defective culture and bad breeding
and a wrong constitution of the state?” “We
shall.” “Well, at any rate such would be the char-
acter of the oligarchical state, and these, or perhaps
even more than these, would be the evils that afflict
Wherefore, Bees of England, forge
Many a weapon, chain and scourge,
That these pee τος drones may spoil
The forced produce of your toil ?
> Cf. 498 a, Laws 653 a; also the modern distinction be-
tween defectives and delinquents.
© κέκχηνται : ef. 344 B-c.
4 βίᾳ is so closely connected with κατέχουσιν that the double
dative is not felt to be awkward. But Adam takes ἐπιμελείᾳ
as an adverb.
269
PLATO UTA: AAT
553 τι, “ἔφη. ᾿Απειργάσθω δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ αὕτη, ἣν δ᾽
ἐγώ, 7 πολιτεία, ἣν ὀλιγαρχίαν καλοῦσιν, ἐκ
τιμημάτων ἔχουσα͵ τοὺς ἄρχοντας.. τὸν δὲ τῆν πη
ὅμοιον μετὰ ταῦτα σκοπῶμεν, ὥς τε γίγνεται of
τε γενόμενος ἔστιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ᾿
VIII. *Ap’ οὖν ὧδε μάλιστα εἰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν
ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει; ; Πῶς;
Ὅταν αὐτοῦ παῖς “γενόμενος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ζηλοῖ
τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ἴχνη διώκῃ, ἔ ἔπειτα
Β αὐτὸν ἴδῃ ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἕρματι
πρὸς τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐκχέαντα τά τε αὑτοῦ καὶ
ἑαυτόν, ἢ στρατηγήσαντα ἤ τιν᾽ ἄλλην μεγάλην
ἀρχὴν ἄρξαντα, εἶτα εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα,
βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν, ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ.
ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν
ἀποβαλόντα. Ἑἰκός γ᾽, ἔφη. ᾿Ιδὼν δέ γε, ὦ
φίλε, ταῦτα καὶ παθὼν καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὄντα
δείσας, οἶμαι, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ
σ θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆ φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ
τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ταπεινωθεὶς ὑπὸ πενίας
πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος. γλίσχρως καὶ κατὰ
σμικρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος χρήματα
2 Cf. on 550 c, p. 261, note h.
> Cf. 410 5; Homer, Od. xix. 436 tyvy ἐρευνῶντος, ii. 406,
iii. 30, v. 193, vii. 38 μετ᾽ ἴχνια βαῖνε.
© For πταίσαντα ef. Aesch. Prom. 926, dg. 1624 (Butl.
emend.).
4 Of. Aesch. Ag. 1007, Humen. 564, Thue. vii. 25. 7, and
Thompson on Phaedr. 255 Ὁ.
4 Lit. “spilling.” Cf. Lucian, Timon 23, Shakes, Merchant
of Venice, τ. i. 31 ff.:
270
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
| it.” “ Pretty nearly these,” hesaid. ‘‘ Then,’ I said,
“let us regard as disposed of the constitution called
oligarchy, whose rulers are determined by a property
qualification.* And next we are to consider the man
who resembles it—how he arises and what after that
his character is.” ‘‘ Quite so,” he said. ᾿
‘VIII. “ Is not the transition from that timocratic
outh to the oligarchical type mostly on this wise ἢ τ᾿
“How?” “Whenason born to the timocratic man at
first emulates his father, and follows in his footsteps ὃ ;
and then sees him suddenly dashed,* as a ship on a
-reef,? against the state, and making complete wreck-
age® of his possessions and himself—perhaps he
has been a general, or has held some other important
office, and has then been dragged into court by mis-
chievous sycophants and put to death or banished? or
_ outlawed. and has lost all his property soles
likely,” he said. “And the son, my friend, after seeing
and suffering these things, and losing his property,
“eg timid, I fancy, and forthwith thrusts headlong?
m his bosom’s throne” that principle of love of
honour and that high spirit, and being humbled by
poverty turns to the getting of money, and greedily *
and stingily and little by little by thrift and hard
gas rous Γ'
Would scatter all her ieee the 5
Enrobe the roaring waters with my silks.
7 For ἐκπεσόντα cf. 560 a, 566 a. In Xen. An. vii. 5. 13
it is used of shipwreck. Of. ἐκβάλλοντες 488 c.
9 Cf. Herod. vii. 136.
* Cf. Aesch. Ag. 983, Shakes. Romeo and Juliet v. i. 3:
My bosom’s lord sits lightly in his throne,
and supra 550 B.
* For γλίσχρως ef. on 488 a, Class. Phil. iv. p. 86 on Diog.
L. iv. 59, Aelian, Epist. Rust. 18 γλίσχρως τε καὶ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον.
271
PLATO
ξυλλέγεται. ἄρ᾽ οὐκ οἴει τὸν τοιοῦτον τότε εἰς
μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ
φιλοχρήματον. ἐγκαθίζειν. καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν
ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας
παραζωννύντα; Ἔγωγ᾽ » ἔφη. Τὸ δέ γε, οἶμαι,
D λογιστικόν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς χαμαὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν
παρακαθίσας ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνῳ καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος,
τὸ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐᾷ λογίζεσθαι οὐδὲ σκοπεῖν ἀλλ᾽
ἢ ὁπόθεν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων χρημάτων πλείω ἔ “ἔσται, τὸ
δὲ αὖ "θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτόν
τε καὶ πλουσίους, καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι. μηδ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἑνὶ
ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ ἐάν τι ἄλλο «εἰς
τοῦτο $60. Οὐκ € ἔστ᾽ ἄλλη, ἔφη, μεταβολὴ οὕτω
ταχεῖά τε καὶ ἰσχυρὰ ἐκ φιλοτίμου ὮΝ εἰς
E φιλοχρήματον. *Ap’ οὖν οὗτος, ἦν ἐγώ,
ὀλιγαρχικός ἐστιν; Ἢ γοῦν μεταβολὴ iis ἐξ
ὁμοίου ἀνδρός ἐστι τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ὀλιγαρχία
δδ4 μετέστη. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη. Σκο-
πῶμεν.
ΙΧ. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τῷ χρήματα περὶ
πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη; Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
Καὶ μὴν τῷ γε φειδωλὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐργάτης, τὰς
ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας μόνον τῶν παρ᾽ αὑτῷ
ἀποπιμπλάς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα μὴ παρ-
εχόμενος, ἀλλὰ δουλούμενος τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας
ὡς ματαίους. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Αὐχμηρός γέ τις, ἦν
δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὧν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς περιουσίαν ποιούμενος,
4 ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν: cf. Protag. 315 8, Tim. 46 c, Critias
117 c, ete., Herod. iv. 175.
> Cf. 554 a, 556 c, Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 4 μηδὲ πρὸς ἕν ἄλλο
σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ, and Aristot. Pol.
1257 Ὁ 4-7, and supra 380 ο, See too Inge, Christian Ethics,
272
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
| work collects property.. Do you not suppose that such
a one will then establish on that throne the principle
of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great
king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of
gold, and girt with the Persian sword?” “I do,”
he said.“ And under this domination he will force
_ the rational and high-spirited principles to crouch
lowly to right and left* as slaves, and will allow the
one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of
| making more money from a little,” and the other to
| admire and honour nothing but riches and rich men,
_ and. to take pride in nothing but the possession of
| wealth and whatever contributes to ἐμὲ ἢ “ There
is no other transformation so swift and sure of the
| ambitious youth into the avaricious type.”” “Is this,
| then, our oligarchical man?” said 1. “ He is de-
_ veloped, at any rate, out of a man resembling the
_ constitution from which the oligarchy sprang.” “* Let
us see, then, whether he will have a like character.”
“ Let us see.”
ΠΝ. “Would he not, in the first place, resemble
it in prizing wealth above everything?” “ Inevi-
tably.” ‘‘ And also by being thrifty and laborious,
satisfying only his own necessary ° appetites and
desires and not providing for expenditure on other
things, but subduing his other appetites as vain and
table?” “‘ By all means.” “He would be a
squalid? fellow,” said I, “ looking for a surplus. of
p. 220; “ The Times obituary notice of Holloway (of the pills)
will suffice. *‘ pp ae 2 a an art by itself; it demands
for success the devotion of the whole man,*”’ ete. For the
phrase σκοπεῖν ὁπόθεν ef. Isoc. Areop. 83, Panegyr. 133-134
σκοπεῖν ἐξ ὧν.
, Ὁ Κλ τὸ gt ety bead
ἃ αὐχμηρός: ef. Symp. 908 v.
VOL. II T 273
~PLATO — iT
B θησαυροποιὸς ἀνήρ: obs δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος"
ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ὅμοιος;
: \ a » a 23 Pitas $s
Ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ: χρήματα γοῦν μάλιστα
ἔντιμα τῇ τε πόλει καὶ παρὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ. Οὐ γάρ,
οἶμαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, παιδείᾳ ὃ τοιοῦτος προσέσχηκεν.
Οὐ δοκῶ, ἔφη: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ
χοροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα. Ed, ἦν δ᾽
ww
Ἔ
eat
ἐγώ. τόδε δὲ σκόπει: κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας ἐν
αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἀπαιδευσίαν μὴ φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι,
τὰς μὲν πτωχικάς, τὰς δὲ κακούργους, κατεχο-
μένας βίᾳ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας; Καὶ μάλ᾽,
ἔφη. Οἶσθ’ οὖν, εἶπον, of ἀποβλέψας κατόψει
ar \ , a » » ae. =e
αὐτῶν tas κακουργίας; Ilot; ἔφη. Eis tas τῶν
ὀρφανῶν ἐπιτροπεύσεις καὶ εἴ πού τι αὐτοῖς
τοιοῦτον ξυμβαίνει, ὥστε πολλῆς ἐξουσίας Aa-
βέσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. ᾿Αληθῆ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τούτῳ
δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος,
ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ
ε ~ / ’ὔ EA A > , > 4
ἑαυτοῦ Bia κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας,
1 ἐτίμα μάλιστα Schneider. The ἔτι μάλιστα of the MSS. is
impossible.
® For περιουσίαν cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 50 and
Theaet. 154 5.
δ Of. Phaedr. 256 ©, Meno 90 λ-8β by implication.
Numenius (ed. Mullach iii, 158) relates of Lacydes that he
was ‘‘a bit greedy (ὑπογλισχρότερος) and after a fashion a
thrifty manager (oixovoyuxds)—as the expression is—the sort
approved by most people.”” Emerson, The Young American,
* They μὸς ὐγωνῆνδ ἢ conventional virtues, whatever will earn
and preserve property.” But this is not always true inan en-
vious democracy : οὐ Isoc. xv. 159-160 and America to-day.
274
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
profit* in everything, and a hoarder, the type the
_ multitude approves. Would not this be the char-
_ acter of the man who corresponds to such a polity ? ”
_ “ I certainly think so,” he said. “ Property, at any
rate,is the thing most esteemed by that state and that
_ kind of man.” “ That, I take it,” said I, “ is because
_ he has never turned his thoughts to true culture.”
_“ T think not,” he said, “εἶξε he would not have made
the blind © one leader of his choir and first in honour.*”
“Well said,” I replied. “‘ But consider this. Shall
we not say that owing to this lack of culture the appe-
tites of the drone spring up in him, some the beggarly,
others the rascally, but that they are forcibly re-
strained by his general self-surveillance and self-
control*?”’ ‘“* We shall indeed,” he said. “Do you
know, then,’ said I, “to what you must look to
_ discern the rascalities of such men?’ “Τὸ what?”
_ he said. “Τὸ guardianships of orphans‘ and any
such opportunities of doing injustice with impunity.”
“True.” “‘ And is it not apparent by this that in
other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a
τάξις A just man, he by some better? element in
_ himself forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling
* Plato distinctly refers to the blind god Wealth. Cf.
Aristoph. Plutus, Eurip. fr. 773, Laws 631 σ᾽ πλοῦτος οὐ
τυφλός which was often quoted. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 624,
Otto, p. 60.
4 Cf. Herod. iii. 34, vii. 107.
* Cf. supra 552 © ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ. For ἄλλης of. 368 B ἐκ
τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου.
7 For the treatment of inferiors and weaker persons as a
test of character ef. Laws 777 p-e, Hesiod, Works and Days,
330, and Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic, pp. 84-85, who,
however, errs on the meaning of αἰδώς. For orphans ¢f. also
Laws 926-928, 766 c, 877 c, 909 c-p.
9 ἐπιεικεῖ is here used generally, and not in its special sense
of “‘ sweet reasonableness.”
=
275
PLATO
ov πείθων, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ᾽ seer
ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἴλης οὐ
τρέμων; Καὶ πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη. Καὶ νὴ Δία, "ἦν, δ᾽
ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν εὑρήσεις, ὅταν
δέῃ τἀλλότρια ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος. ξυγ-
γενεῖς ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας. Καὶ hada, i) δ᾽ ὅς,
σφόδρα. Οὐκ dp’ ἂν εἴη ἀστασίαστος ὃ τοιοῦτος
ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἷς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυ ας δὲ
E ἐπιθυμιῶν ὡς τὸ πολὺ κρατούσας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίους
χειρόνων. "Ἔστιν οὕτως. Διὰ ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι,
εὐσχημονέστερος ἂν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἴη"
ὁμονοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς
ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτόν.
Δοκεῖ μοι. Καὶ μὴν ἀνταγωνιστής γε ἰδίᾳ ἐν
555 πόλει ὁ φειδωλὸς φαῦλος ἤ τινος νίκης ἢ
φιλοτιμίας τῶν καλῶν, χρήματά τε οὐκ ἐθέλων
εὐδοξίας ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγώνων ava-
λίσκειν, δεδιὼς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἀναλωτικὰς
ἐγείρειν καὶ ξυμπαρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ ξυμμαχίαν τε καὶ
φιλονικίαν, ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἑαυτοῦ πολεμῶν ὀλιγ-
αρχικῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἡ ἡττᾶται καὶ i πλουτεῖ. Καὶ i μάλα,
ἔφη. "Ext οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀπιστοῦμεν, μὴ κατὰ
τὴν ὀλιγαρχουμένην πόλιν ὁμοιότητι τὸν φειδωλόν
Β τε καὶ χρηματιστὴν τετάχθαι; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.
Χ. Δημοκρατίαν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, μετὰ τοῦτο
« For ἐνούσας cf. Phileb. 16 Ὁ, Symp. 187 8.
> Of. 463 ν. For the idea here ef. Phaedo 68-69, What
Plato Said, p. 527. ξ
© For the idea “ at war with himself,” cf. supra 440 B and & ©
(crdows), Phaedr, 237 Ὁ-Ἐ, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1099 a 12 ἢ
4 Cf. 397 .
¢ Of. on 443 p-x, Vol. I. p. 414, note ὁ: also Phaedo 61 a,
and What Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 188 Ὁ.
7 ὀλιγαρχικῶς keeps up the analogy between the man and
276
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
within,* not persuading them that it ‘is better not’?
_ nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and
_ fear, trembling for his possessions. generally.”
“ Quite so,” he said. “ Yes, by Zeus,” said I, “ my
friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to
_ spend the money of others, you will discover the
_ existence of drone-like appetites.” ‘“‘ Most emphati-
eally.” “Such a man, then, would not be free from
internal dissension.* - He would not be really one, but
in some sort a double? man. Yet for the most part,
his better desires would have the upper hand over the
worse.” “‘Itisso.” “And for this reason, I presume,
_ such a man would be more seemly, more respectable,
than many others; but the true virtue of a soul in
unisonand harmony ¢ withitself would escape him and
dwell afar.” “‘ I thinkso.” “ And again, the thrifty
stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally
in the city for any prize of victory or in any other
_ honourable emulation. He is unwilling to spend
money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing
to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into
alliance for the winning of the victory, με fights
in true oligarchical ‘ fashion with a small part of his
resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds
himself rich!*” “Yes indeed,” he said. ‘‘ Have
we any further doubt, then,” I said,“ as to the cor-
respondence and resemblance” between the thrifty
money-making man and the oligarchical state?”
*“ None,” he said.
X. “ We have next to consider, it seems, the origin
the state. Cf. my “Idea of Justice,” Ethical Record, Jan.
1890, pp. 188, 191, 195.
5 i.e. he sayes the cost of a determined fight. For the
effect of surprise cf. on 544 c, p. 239, note αὶ
ὁμοιότητι: ef. 576 c.
277
PLATO
σκεπτέον, τίνα τε γίγνεται τρόπον γενομένη TE
ποῖόν τινα ἔχει, ἵν᾿ αὖ τὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρὸς
τρόπον γνόντες παραστησώμεθ᾽ αὐτὸν εἰς κρίσιν.
Ὁμοίως γοῦν ἄν, ἔφη, ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πορευοίμεθα.
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μεταβάλλει μὲν τρόπον τινὰ
τοιόνδε ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν, dv ἀπληστίαν
τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ὡς πλουσιώτατον
C δεῖν γίγνεσθαι; Πῶς δή; “Are, οἶμαι, ἄρχοντες
ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸ πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, οὐκ
ἐθέλουσιν εἴργειν νόμῳ τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἂν ἀκόλαστοι
γίγνωνται, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀναλίσκειν τε καὶ
ἀπολλύναι τὰ αὑτῶν, ἵνα ὠνούμενοι τὰ τῶν τοι-
οὕτων καὶ εἰσδανείζοντες ἔτι πλουσιώτεροι καὶ
ἐντιμότεροι γίγνωνται. Ἰαντός γε μᾶλλον. Οὐκ-
οῦν δῆλον ἤδη τοῦτο ἐν πόλει, ὅτι πλοῦτον τιμᾶν
καὶ σωφροσύνην ἅμα ἱκανῶς κτᾶσθαι ἐν τοῖς
πολίταις ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου
ἀμελεῖν ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου; ᾿Ἐπιεικῶς, ἔφη, δῆλον.
Παραμελοῦντες δὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ἐφιέντες
ἀκολασταίνειν οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς ἐνίοτε ἀνθρώπους
πένητας ἠνάγκασαν γενέσθαι. Μάλα γε. Καθ-
nvra δή, οἶμαι, οὗτοι ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι
τε καὶ ἐξωπλισμένοι, of μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ
δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, of δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντές τε
καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὑτῶν
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες. Ἔστι
«ΟἹ, Phileb. 55 c els τὴν κρίσιν, Laws 856 c, 948 c.
> The σκοπός or ὅρος. Cf. on 551 a, p. 263, note e, and
Aristot. Eth. Nie. 1094 a 2.
278
ae
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
- and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the
character of that type of man and range him beside
the others for our judgement.*”’ “ That would at least
be a consistent procedure.” “‘ Then,” said I, “‘ is not
the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected
in some such way as this—by the insatiate greed for
that which it set before itself as the good,” the attain-
ment of the greatest possible wealth ?”’ “ In what
way?” ‘‘ Why, since its rulers owe their offices to
their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law
the prodigals who arise among the youth from spend-
ing and wasting their substance. Their object is, by
lending money on the property of such men, and buy-
ing it in, to become still richer and more esteemed.”
“ By all means.” “ And is it not at once apparent
in a state that this honouring of wealth is incom-
patible with a sober and temperate citizenship,° but
that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably
neglected.”’ “ That is pretty clear,” he said. “* And
such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness@
in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty
men of noignoble quality.” “It surely has.”” “And
there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with
stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others
disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring
against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of
the citizens, and eager for revolution.’” “ Tis so.”
¢ Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Plato, compares Luke
xvi. 13 “‘ Ye cannot serve God and Mammon.” (Cf. also
Laws 742 p-x, 727 πὶ f., 831 c.
4 ἀκολασταίνειν : ef. Gorg. 478 a, Phileb. 12 v.
* Cf. Laws 832 α οὐκ ἀφυεῖς. For the men reduced to
poverty swelling the number of drones ¢f. Eurip. Herc. Fur.
588-592, and Wilamowitz ad loc.
7 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1305 Ὁ 40-41, 1266 Ὁ 14.
279
PDATO iT SHPF
ταῦτα. Oi δὲ δὴ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκύψαντες, οὐδὲ
δοκοῦντες. τούτους ὁρᾶν, τῶν λοιπῶν τὸν ἀεὶ ὑπ-
είκοντα ἐνιέντες ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες, καὶ τοῦ
πατρὸς ἐκ όνους τόκους πολλαπλασίους. 'κομιζό-
δῦθ μενοι, πολὺν τὸν κηφῆνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι, τῇ
πόλει. Πῶς “γάρ, ἔφη, οὐ πολύν; Οὔτε γ » ἐκεῖ F
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκκαόμενον ἀπχουοι
ἀποσβεννύναι, εἴργοντες τὰ αὑτοῦ ὅποι τις βού-
λεται τρέπειν, οὔτε τῆδε, ἧ αὖ κατὰ ἕτερον. νόμον
τὰ τοιαῦτα λύεται. Kara δὴ τίνα; % 5. μετ᾽
ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι δεύτερος καὶ “ἀναγκάζων. ἀρετῆς
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ
κινδύνῳ τὰ πολλά τις τῶν ἑκουσίων ξυμβολαίων
Β προστάττῃ ξυμβάλλειν, χρηματίζοιντο μὲν. “ἂν
TTov ἀναιδῶς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐλάττω δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ
φύοιτο τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, οἵων νῦν δὴ εἴπομεν.
Καὶ πολύ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. Noy δέ γ᾽ ὴ ἔφην ἐγώ, διὰ
πᾶντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς μὲν ἡ ἀρχομένους οὕτω
διατιθέασιν ἐ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἱ ἄρχοντες" σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς
καὶ τοὺς αὑτῶν ap οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους
καὶ ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς
C τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς
@ Cf. Persius, Sat. ii. 61 “ὁ curvae in terras animae, et
caelestium inanes,’’ Rossetti, Niniveh, in jine, ‘* That set
gaze never on the sky,”’ Dante, Purg. xix. 71-73:
Vidi gente per esso che piangea,
Giacendo a terra tutta volta in giuso.
Adhaesit pavimento anima mea, etc.
Cf. infra 586 a κεκυφότεςς Cf. also on 553 τὸ for the general
thought.
> Cf. Buthyph. 5 c, Polit. 287 a, Aristoph. Peace 1051,
Plut. 837, Eurip. Hippol. 119, 1.1. 956, Medea 67, Xen.
Hell. iv. 5. 6.
© Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, ‘‘ the poison of
280
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
“ But these money-makers with down-bent heads,*
_ pretending not even to see” them, but inserting the
sting of their money “ into any of the remainder who
» not resist,.and harvesting from them in interest
_as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum,
foster the drone and pauper element in the state.”
_“ They-do indeed multiply it,” he said. “‘ And they
_ are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame
_ either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing
as he likes with his own,? or in this way, by a second
{
Ε
Ἵ
law that does away with such abuses.” “* What law?”
“ The law that is next best, and compels the citizens
to pay heed to virtue.* For if a law commanded that
most voluntary contracts’ should be atthe contractor's
risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless
in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke
just now would grow up there.’ ‘Much fewer,”
he said. ‘‘ But.as it is, and forall these reasons, this
is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce
their subjects, and as for themselves and their off-
spring, do they not make the young spoiled? wantons
averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand
their money.”’ τιτρώσκοντες 5 the poisonous sting,
especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones,
For ἐνιέντες cf. Eurip. Bacchae 851 ἐνεὶς . . . λύσσαν, “* im-
penuné madness.’ In the second half of the sentence the
gure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the
principal, which breeds interest, ¢f. 507 a, p. 96.
* Cf. on 552 a, Laws 922 £-923 a.
* Cf. Protag. 327 Ὁ ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, Symp.
185 B, and for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ef. What Plato Said, p. 464, on
Apol. 29 p-r.
7 For refusing to enforce monetary contracts cf. Laws
742 c, 849 ©, 915 ©, and Newman ii. p. 254 on Aristot.
_ Pol. 1263 Ὁ 21.
* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 483, on Laches 179 pb, and
Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 23. ;
281
PLATO | H
τε καὶ λύπας Kal ἀργούς; Τί μήν; Αὐτοὺς δὲ.
πλὴν χρηματισμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἠμεληκότας, καὶ
οὐδὲν πλείω ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένους ἀρετῆς ἢ
τοὺς πένητας; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὕτω δὴ παρ-
εσκευασμένοι ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν ἀλλήλοις͵ οἵ τε
ἄρχοντες καὶ ot ἀρχόμενοι ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν πορείαις ἢ ἐ ἐν
ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις, ἢ κατὰ θεωρίας ἢ κατὰ
στρατείας, ἣ ξύμπλοι γιγνόμενοι. ἢ συστρατιῶται,
ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι,
μηδαμῇ ταύτῃ καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν
πλουσίων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἰσχνὸς ἀνὴρ. πένης,
ἡλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ, ἐσκια-
τροφηκότι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἴδῃ
ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, ἄρ᾽ οἴει αὐτὸν
οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ πλουτεῖν τοὺς
τοιούτους, καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλῳ παραγγέλλειν, ὅταν
ἰδίᾳ ξυγγίγνωνται, ὅτι ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ παρ᾽
οὐδέν"; Ed οἶδα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὕτω
ποιοῦσιν. Οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ σῶμα νοσῶδες μικρᾶς
ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δεῖται. προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ
κάμνειν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει
αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ
διακειμένη πόλις ἀπὸ σμικρᾶς προφάσεως, ἔξωθεν
ἐπαγομένων ἢ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐξ ὀλιγαρχουμένης
1 ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ map οὐδέν Baiter: γὰρ οὐδέν AFDM:
ἅνδρες ἡμέτεροι" Adam.
@ Cf. 429 c-p, Laches 191 p-£, Laws 633 Ὁ.
> Cf. Tucker on Aesch. Suppl. 726.
© Cf. Soph. Ajax 758 περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα.
4 For a similar. picture cf. Aristoph. Frogs 1086-1098.
Cf. also Gorg. 518 c, and for the whole passage Xen. Mem.
iii. 5. 15, Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 24-25.
* The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force.
For κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ cf. Lysias ii. 65 κακίᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν, Rhesus
282
| THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
up against pleasure and pain,? and mere idlers?”
“Surely.” “And do they not fasten upon them-
selves the habit of neglect of everything except the
_ making of money, and as complete an indifference to
virtue as the paupers exhibit ?”” “ Little they care.”’
“And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the
ruled are brought together on the march, in way-
faring, or in some other common undertaking, either
a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or
fellow-soldiers or, for that matter, in actual battle, and
observe one another, then the poor are not in the least
scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not
suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy,
sunburnt ὃ pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich
man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous
flesh,° and sees him panting and helpless*—do you not
suppose he will think that such fellows keep their
wealth by the cowardice ὁ of the poor, and that when
the latter are together in private, one will pass the
word to another ‘our men are good for nothing ’?”’
“Nay, I know very well that they do,’ saidhe. “ And
justas an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse’
from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even
without that, all the man is one internal war, in like
manner does not the corresponding type of state need
onlya slight occasion.’ the one party bringing in” allies
813-814 τῇ Φρυγῶν κακανδρίᾳ, Phaedrus 248 8, Symp. 182 Ὁ,
Crito 45 ©, Eurip. Androm. 967, Aristoph. Thesm. 868 τῇ
κοράκων πονηρίᾳ.
ὦ Sheik . O.T. 961 σμικρὰ παλαῖα σώματ᾽ εὐνάζει ῥοπή,
μὰ slight impulse puts aged bodies to βἴεερ,᾽" Demosth.
Olynth. ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 τ.
9“ Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, apud Héffding, i. 30
“ Like every other being each illness has its appointed time
of development and close—interference is futile,” with Tim.
89 B. » Cf. Thue. i. 3, ii. 68, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108.
283
PLATO HT
πόλεως ξυμμαχίαν ἢ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατου-
᾿ μένης, νοσεῖ τε καὶ αὐτὴ αὑτῇ μάχεται, ἐνίοτε δὲ
557 καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει; Kal σφόδρα γε.
Δημοκρατία δή, οἶμαι, γίγνεται, ὅταν of πένητες
νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἑτέρων, τοὺς
δὲ ἐκβάλωσι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐξ ἴσου μεταδῶσι
πολιτείας τε καὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ
κλήρων αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῇ γίγνονται. "Ἔστι γάρ,
ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας, ἐάν τε καὶ
δι᾿ ὅπλων γένηται ἐάν τε καὶ διὰ φόβον ὑπεξ-
ελθόντων τῶν ἑτέρων. dita
XI. Τίνα δὴ οὖν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὗτοι τρόπον
Β οἰκοῦσι; καὶ ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη αὖ πολιτεία;
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι 6 τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ δημοκρατικός τις
ἀναφανήσεται. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν
δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ
παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν
ὅ τί τις βούλεται; Λέγεταί γε δή, ἔφη. “Ὅπου
δέ γε ἐξουσία, δῆλον ὅτι ἰδίαν ἕκαστος ἂν κατα-
σκευὴν τοῦ αὑτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ,
α στασιάζει is applied here to disease of body. Of. Herod.
v.28 νοσήσασα és τὰ μάλιστα στάσι, ‘* grievously ill of faction.”
Cf. supra on 554 pv, p. 276, note ὁ.
» Of. 488 c, 560 a, Gorg. 466 c, 468 p, Prot. 325 8. Exile,
either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper —
thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. |
The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for —
instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen
to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as. in
ancient Greece, must often be interpreted cum grano salis.
© ἐξ ἴσου : one of the watchwords of democracy. C/. 561 Β
284
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
from an oligarchical state, or the other from a demo-
cratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself,
-and sometimes even apart from any external im-
_ pulse faction arises*?’’ “‘ Most emphatically.”’ “‘ And
ἃ democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the
poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the
other party, drive out® others, and grant the rest
of the citizens an equal share 5 in both citizenship
and offices—and for the most part these offices are
assigned by lot.?” “* Why, yes,” he said, “that is the
constitution of democracy alike whether it is estab-
lished by force of arms or by terrorism 5 resulting in
_ the withdrawal of one of the parties.”
_ XI. “* What, then,” said I, “is the manner of their
life and what is the quality of such a constitution ?
For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn
out to be a democratic sort of man.”” “It is plain,”
he said. “Τὸ begin with, are they not free? and
is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom
of speech? and has not every man licence’ to
do as he likes?’’. “So it is said,’ he replied.
““And where there is such licence, it is obvious
that everyone would arrange a plan? for leading his
and c, 599 5, 617 c, Laws 919 νυ, Ale. I. 115 τ, Crito 50 £,
Isoc. Archid. 96, Peace 3.
4 But Isoc. Areop. 22-23 considers the lot undemo-
cratic because it might result in the establishment in office
of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin ad loc.
For the use of the lot in Plato cf. Laws 759 5, 757 ©, 690 c,
741 of 856 p, 946 5, Rep. 460 4, 461 ©. Cf. Apelt, p. 520.
7 551 B.
7 &ovcia: cf. Isoc. xii. 131 τὴν δ᾽ ἐξουσίαν ὅ τι βούλεται τις
ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii.
Doing as One Likes.
5 κατασκευή is a word of all work in Plato. Cf. 419 a,
449 a, 455 a, Gorg. 455 π, 477 5, etc.
285
PLATO
ἥτις ἕκαστον ἀρέσκοι. Δῆλον. Παντοδαποὶ δὴ
Cav, οἶμαι, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ μάλιστ᾽ ἐγ-
γίγνοιντο ἄνθρωποι. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Κινδυνεύει,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι"
ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλ-:
μένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἤθεσι πεποικιλμένη
καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο" καὶ ἴσως μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ
ταύτην, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδές τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ
ποικίλα θεώμενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν.
D Καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη. Καὶ ἔστι γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ᾽
ἐγώ, ἐπιτήδειον ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτείαν. Τί δή;
Ort πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν,
καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ βουλομένῳ πόλιν κατασκευάζειν,
ὃ νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς
δημοκρατουμένην ἐλθόντι πόλιν, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸν
ἀρέσκῃ τρόπος, τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι, ὥσπερ εἰς
παντοπώλιον ἀφικομένῳ πολιτειῶν, καὶ ἐκλεξα-
μένῳ οὕτω κατοικίζειν. “lows γοῦν, ἔφη, οὐκ
E ἂν ἀποροῖ παραδειγμάτων. Τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγ-
Knv, εἶπον, εἶναι ἄρχειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, μηδ᾽
* παντοδαπός usually has an unfavourable connotation in
Plato. Cf. 431 B-c, 561 pv, 567 π, 559 p, Symp. 198 8,
Gorg. 489 c, Laws 788 5, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 usesitina
favourable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does. ‘|G
For the mixture of things in a democracy cf. Xen. Rep.
Ath. 2. 8 φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι. .. ᾿Αθηναῖοι δὲ κε-
κραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων ; and Laws
681 p. Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 273,
says “‘ Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization
to confirm Plato’s judgement concerning the variety of
natures to be found in the democratic state.” De Tocqueville
also, and many English observers, have commented on the
monotony and standardization of American life.
286
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_own life in the way that pleases him.”’ “‘Obvious.”
“ All sorts¢ and conditions of men, then, would |
_arise in this polity more than in anyother?” “Of |
course.” “ Possibly,” said I, “this is the most
beautiful of polities ; as a garment of many colours,
embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked
and diversified with every type of character, would
appear the most beautiful. And perhaps,” I said,
““many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like |
and women?’ when they see bright-coloured |
_things.” “Yesindeed,”’ hesaid. ‘Yes,’ said I, “and
it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a
_ constitution.” ‘‘Whyso?” “Because, owing to this
licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that
anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just
now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and
select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar ° of
constitutions, and after making his choice, establish
his own.” ‘‘ Perhaps at any rate,” he said, “ he
would not be at a loss for patterns.’’ “ And the
freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a
> For the idea that women and children like many colours
ef. Sappho’s admiration for Jason’s mantle mingled with all
manner of colours (yr. Graec. i. 196). For the classing
oe of women and boys ¢f. Laws 658 pv, Shakes. As
ou Like It, ut. ii. 435 “‘ As boys and women are for the
most part cattle of this colour,”’ Faguet, Nineteenth Century
“ Lamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et
des femmes distinguées,”’
¢ Cf. Plutarch, Dion 53. Burke says “‘A republic, as
an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of
government, but a magazine of every spore Cf. Laws
789 8 for an illustration of the point. Filmer, Patriarcha,
misquotes this, saying “The Athenians sold justice... .,
which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where every-
thing is to be sold.”
287
WPDATOISHA THT
{av ἧς ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν, μηδὲ αὖ ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν. μὴ. |
| βούλῃ, μηδὲ πολεμεῖν πολεμούντων, μηδὲ. εἰρήνην
ἄγειν τῶν ἄλλων ᾿ἀγόντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιθυμῇς ᾿
εἰρήνης, μηδ᾽ αὖ, ἐάν τις ἄρχειν νόμος. σε δια-
κωλύῃ ἢ "und tet μηδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἄρχειν. καὶ
558 δικάζειν, ἐ ἐὰν αὐτῷ σοι ἐπίῃ, ἄρ᾽ οὐ θεσπεσία καὶ
ἡδεῖα ἡ ἡ τοιαύτη διαγωγὴ ἐ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα; Ἴσως, y
ἔφη, ἔν γε τούτῳ. Τί δαί; ἡ πῤᾳότης. ἐνίων τῶν
δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἢ οὔπω εἶδες ἐν τοιαύτῃ
πολιτείᾳ, ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου,
ἢ φυγῆς, οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτῶν μενόντων. τε καὶ
ἀναστρεφομένων ἐ ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντο aS
οὔτε ὁρῶντος οὐδενὸς περινοστεῖ ὥσπερ ἥρως;
Καὶ πολλούς γ᾽, ἔφη. “i δὲ συγγνώμη. καὶ οὐδ᾽
Β ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις
ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύνοντες, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν
φκίζομεν, ὡς εἰ μή τις “ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔ ἔχοι,
οὔποτ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὧν
εὐθὺς παίζοι ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύοι τὰ τοιαῦτα
'
2 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1271 ἃ 12 δεῖ yap καὶ Bévivioabe: eal μὴ }
βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cf. 347 B-c. ;
Ὁ Cf. Laws 955 5-0, where a penalty is pronounced for
making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph.
Acharn. passim.
ὁ διαγωγή: cf. 344 ©, where it is used more seriously of the
whole conduct of life. Cf. also Theaet. 177 a, Polit. 274 το,
Tim. 71 pv, Laws 806 ©. Aristot. Met. 981 Ὁ 18 and 982 Ὁ 24
uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too
Zeller, Aristot. ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5.
4 Cf. 562 Ὁ. For the mildness of the Athenian demo-
cracy cf. Aristot. Ath. Pol. 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51,
xxiv. 51, Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. Antid. 20, Areopagit. 67-68,
Hel. 37; also Menex. 243 πὶ and also Huthydem. 303 p δημοτικόν
288
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
city, even if you are qualified,* or again, to submit to
rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest
_are at war,” or to. keep the peace when the others do
So, unless you Senne piece ; and again, the liberty, in
defiance of any law that forbids you, to. hold office and
sit on juries none. the less, if it occurs to you to do so,
is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment ὃ
for the time being?” “ Perhaps,” he said, “‘ for so
long.” “And is not the placability ὁ of some convicted
criminals exquisite*? Or have you never seen in
such a state men condemned to death or exile who
none the less stay on, and go to and fro among
the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the
man slips in and out’ like a revenant’?”’ “‘ Yes,
many, he said.. “And the tolerance of demo-
cracy, its superiority* to all our meticulous require-
ments, its disdain for our solemn? pronouncements 7
made when we were founding our city, that except
in the case of transcendent * natural gifts no one could
ever become a good man unless from childhood his
play and all his pursuits were concerned with things
τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Here the word π᾿ is ironi
transferred to the ssa himself. SRE ET en
4 κομψή: of. 376 a, Theaet. 171 a.
7 For περινοστεῖ cf. Lucian, Bis Ace. 6, Aristoph. Plut.
121, 494, Peace 762.
__ ’ His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering
“spirit,” “one returned from. the dead” (a perfectly
ible meaning for ἥρως. Wilamowitz,. Platon, i. p. 435
ates “ Geist’) than with that of a hero returning from
the wars. Cf. Adamadloc. -
_* For οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία ef. on 532 Β ἔτι ἀδυναμία.
* σεμνύνοντες here has an ironical or colloquial tone—
“ high-brow,” “ top-lofty.”
7 Cf. 401 B-c, 374 c and on 467 a, Laws 643 8, Delacroix,
Psychologie de Vart, p. 46.
© For ὑπερβεβλημένη cf. Laws 719 Ὁ, Eurip. Alcest. 153.
VOL. II U 289
?
;
᾿
;
᾿
PDATO JIM ἘΠῚ
πάντα, ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς καταπατήσασ᾽ ἅπαντα
“- γα κ ,ὔ 2 ε 4.0. ” i? iF ἢ
ταῦτα οὐδὲν φροντίζει, ἐξ ὁποίων ἄν τις ἐπιτη-
| δευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ ἰὼν πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ τιμᾷ,
Ο ἐὰν φῇ μόνον εὔνους elvar τῷ πλήθει. Πάνυ ἢ
»" pfia0k pow oy Ἢ: Ὡς τὸ SW RET
ἔφη, γενναία." Ταῦτά τε δή, ἔφην, ἔχοι ἂν καὶ
j ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, Kat εἴη, ὡς
τούτων α ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, καὶ εἴη, ὡς
ἔοικεν, ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη,
ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις δια-
νέμουσα. Kai μάλ᾽, ἔφη, γνώριμα λέγεις. ΐ
ΧΙ. ἔάλθρει δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τίς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἰδίᾳ.
ἢ πρῶτον σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐσκεψά-
μέθα, τίνα τρόπον γίγνεται; Nai, ἔφη. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν
οὐχ ὧδε; τοῦ φειδωλοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ
Ὁ γένοιτ᾽ ἄν, οἶμαι, υἱὸς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμε
3 “ > , "Μ ΄ \ », / ei ᾿-
ev τοῖς ἐκείνου ἤθεσιν; Τί γὰρ οὔ; Bia δὴ καὶ
οὗτος ἄρχων τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ ἡδονῶν, ὅσαι ἀνα-
λωτικαὶ μέν, χρηματιστικαὶ δὲ μή, at δὴ οὐκ
ἀναγκαῖαι κέκληνται. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς διαλεγώμεθα, πρῶτον
"ἢ
ὁρισώμεθα τάς τε ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰς
fis, B 5A δ᾽ “ O > - Ad > a i ’
μή; Βούλομαι, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν ds τε οὐκ ἂν οἷοί
1 γενναία M, γενναῖα AFD.
@ μεγαλοπρεπῶς is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362c, Symp. —
199 c, Charm. 175 c, Theaet. 161 c, Meno 94 8, Polit. 277 8,
Hipp. Maj. 291 &.
δ In Aristoph. Knights 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the
sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade
are the very things that fit him for political leadership. .
¢ Cf. Aristoph. Knights 732 f., 741 and passim. Andoc. iv.
16 εὔνους τῷ δήμῳ. Emile Faguet, Moralistes, iii. p. 84, says of
Tocqueville, “Il est bien je crois le premier qui ait dit que la
démocratie abaisse le niveau intellectuel des gouvernements.”
For the other side of the democratic shield see Thucyd. ii. 39.
4 For the ironical use of γενναία cf. 544, Soph. 231 5,
Theaet. 209 Ἑ.
290
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
fair and good,—how superbly *it tramples under foot
all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices ὃ
and way of life a man turns to politics, but honouring
him if only he says that he loves the people!°”
“Tt is a noble? polity, indeed!” he said. ‘‘ These
and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit,
and it would, it seems, be a delightfule form of
government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind
of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals
alike!7”’’ “Yes,” he said, “‘ everybody knows that.”
XII.“ Observe, then, the corresponding private
character. Or must we first, as in the case of the
polity, consider the origin of the type?” ‘“‘ Yes,”
e said. “15 not this, then, the way of it? Our
thrifty 5 oligarchical man would have a son bred in
his father’s ways.” Ὃν not?” ‘ And he, too,
would control by force all his appetites for pleasure
that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those
which are denominated unnecessary.” ‘‘ Obviously.”
* And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first
define” our distinction between necessary and. un-
necessary appetites*?”’’ “‘ Let us do so.” “ Well,
* ἡδεῖα: of. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government, τοῖς χρωμένοις
ous.
ἢ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 634, on Laws 744 B-c, and ibid.
p. 508 on Gorg. 508 a, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1131 a 23-24, New-
man, i. p. 248, Xen. Cyr. ii. 2. 18.
_* Cf. 572 c, Theogn. 915 f., Anth. Pal. x. 41, Democri
fr. 227 and 228, Diels 1.3 p. 106, and Epicharm. fr. 45,
Diels 1.3 p. 126.
ἘΠῊΝ Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 190 Β, and p. 551,
on Phaedr. 237 τ.
* Cf. 554 a, 571 B, Phaedo 64 »-π, Phileb. 62 x, Aristot.
Eth. Nie. 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this
distinction.. Cf. Cie. De fin. i, 13. 45, Tuse. v. 33, 93,
Porphyry, De abst. i. 49. Ath. xii. 511 quotes this passage
and says it anticipates the Epicureans.
291
“
PLATO ΠΗ SH
τ᾽ εἷμεν ἀποτρέψαι, δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο,
K καὶ ὅσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελοῦσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων
γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη" |
559 7 ov; Kat μάλα. Δικαίως δὴ τοῦτο ἐπ᾽ αὐταῖς
ἐροῦμεν, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Δικαίως. Τί δαί; ἅς γέ
τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν, εἰ μελετῷ ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς
οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐ ἐνοῦσαι δρῶσιν, αἱ δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον,
πάσας ταύτας εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαίους φαῖμεν. εἶναι, ἄρ᾿
οὐ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Καλῶς μὲν οὖν. Προ-
ελώμεθα δή τι παράδειγμα ἑκατέρων, αἵ εἰσιν, wa
τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς; Οὐκοῦν χρή. *Ap” οὖν
οὐχ ἡ τοῦ φαγεῖν μέχρι ὑγιείας τε καὶ εὐεξίας κι ἶ
Β αὐτοῦ. σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου ἀναγκαῖος ἂν εἴη; Οἶμαι.
Ἢ μέν γέ που τοῦ σίτου κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἀναγκαία,
H τε ὠφέλιμος ἧ τε παῦσαι ζῶντα οὐ. δυνατή", ‘
Nai. Ἣ δὲ ὄψου, εἴ πῇ τινα ὠφέλειαν πρὸς
εὐεξίαν παρέχεται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; ἡ
πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίων ἐδεσμάτων ἢ τοιούτων
ἐπιθυμία, δυνατὴ δὲ κολαζομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ
παιδευομένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, καὶ
βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι, βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρός τε
© φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἄρα γε ὀρθῶς οὐκ
ἀναγκαία ἂν καλοῖτο; ᾿Ορθότατα μὲν οὖν. Οὐκ-
οῦν καὶ ἀναλωτικὰς φῶμεν εἶναι ταύτας, ἐκείνας
δὲ χρηματιστικὰς διὰ τὸ χρησίμους πρὸς τὰ ἔργα
εἶναι; Τί μήν; Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων.
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φήσομεν; Οὕτω. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν καὶ
1 παῦσαι ζῶντα οὐ δυνατή Hermann, παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή
AFD, μὴ παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή Mon., Burnet, παῦσαι πεινῶν-
ras Athenaeus, παύσασθαι ζῶντος ἀδυνατεῖ Wilamowitz (Platon,
ii, pp. 385-386).
292
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may
be properly called necessary, and likewise those
whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not ?
For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction.
Is not that so?” “ Most assuredly. » “Then we
htly use the word ‘necessary’ of them?”
“Righty” “ And what of the desires from which a
man pea free himself by discipline from youth up,
and whose presence in the soul does no good and in
some cases baat ? Should we not fairly call all such
unnecessary?” “‘ Fairly indeed.” ‘“ Let us select
an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend
the type.*” “Let us do so.” “ Would not the
_ desire of eating to keep in health and condition and
the appetite for mere bread and relishes” be neces-
sary?’ “I think so.” “The appetite for bread
is in both respects, in that it is beneficial
os in that if it fails we αἷς. “Yes.” ‘‘ And the
desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness ? ”
“ By all means.” “‘ And should we not rightly pro-
nounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these
and seeks other varieties of food, and that by cor-
rection ¢ and training from youth up can be got rid
of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a
hindrance to the soul’s attainment of intelligence and
sobriety?” “‘Nay, most rightly.” “And may we not
call the one group the spendthrift desires and the
other the ‘profitable ,? because they help production?”’
“Surely.” “‘ And we shall say the same of sexual
and other appetites?” ‘The same.’ ‘* And were
* Or “ grasp them in outline.”
» For ὄψον cf. on 372 c, Vol. I. p. 158, note a.
¢ For κολαζομένη cf. 571 8, Gorg. 505 w, 491 ε, 507
For the thought cf. also supra 519 a-B.
_ 4 Lit. “money-making.” Cf. 558 p.
293
560 7
PLATO
ὃν νῦν δὴ κηφῆνα ὠνομάζομεν, τοῦτον ἐλέγομεν —
τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα
καὶ ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, "τὸν δὲ
ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίῶν φειδωλόν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν:
᾿Αλλὰ τί μήν;
XIII. [ddw τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λέγωμεν, ὡς ἐξ
ὀλιγαρχικοῦ δημοκρατικὸς γίγνεται. φαίνεται δέ
μοι τά γε πολλὰ ὧδε γίγνεσθαι. Πῶς; Ὅταν
νέος τεθραμμένος ὡς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀπαιδεύτως
τε καὶ φειδωλῶς, γεύσηται κηφήνων μέλιτος καὶ
ξυγγένηται αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς, παντοδαπὰς
ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἐχούσας δυνα-
μένοις σκευάζειν, ἐνταῦθά που οἴου εἶναι, ἀρχὴν
αὐτῷ μεταβολῆς ὀλιγαρχικῆς τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰς,
δημοκρατικήν.' Πολλὴ payee ἔφη. “Ap οὖν,
ὥσπερ ἡ πόλις μετέβαλλε βοηθ nodons τῷ ἑτέρῳ
μέρει ξυμμαχίας ἔξωθεν ὁμοίας ὁμοίῳ, οὕτω καὶ
ὁ νεανίας μεταβάλλει βοηθοῦντος αὖ εἴδους
ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔξωθεν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν παρ᾽ ἐκείνῳ Ι
ξυγγενοῦς τε καὶ ὁμοίου; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Καὶ ἐὰν μέν, οἶμαι, ἀντιβοηθήσῃ τις τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ
ὀλιγαρχικῷ ξυμμαχία, ἤ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς
ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων νουθετούντων τε καὶ
κακιζόντων, στάσις δὴ καὶ ἀντίστασις καὶ μάχη
1 So ss.: μεταβολῆς... . ὀλιγαρχικῆς Burnet, μεταβολῆς ὀλι-
γαρχίας.. .. δημοκρατίαν, or insert πολιτείας after ἑαυτῷ Adam.
Jowett and Campbell suggest inserting ἐξ after μεταβολῆς.
@ For preorrs ef. 577 Ὁ, 578 a, 603 pv, 611 B, Gorg. 525 a,
522 ἘἙ, €
5 ie occurs only here in Plato. It iscommon in Pindar
and tragedy. Ernst Maass, “ Die Ironie des Sokrates,”
Sokrates, 11, p. 94 “ Platon hat an jener Stelle des Staats,
von der wir ausgingen, die schlimmen Erzieher gefahrliche
Fuchsbestien genannt.” (Cf. Pindar, Ol. xi. 20.)
294:
a
Ss et
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
ΜῈ not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the
drone is the man who teems? with such pleasures and
appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary
desires, while the one who is ruled by his necessary
pensiiies is the thrifty oligarchical man?” “‘ Why,
surely.” | |
XIUOT. “ To return, then,” said I, “‘ we have to tell
how the democratic man develops from the olig-
archical type. I think it is usually in this way.”
“How?” ‘* When a youth, bred in the illiberal and
niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste
of the honey of the drones and associates with fierce ®
and cunning creatures who know how to purvey
pleasures of every kind and variety * and condition,
there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning of
the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into
democracy.”’. ““ Quite inevitably,” he said. ‘“ May
we not say that just as the revolution in the city was
brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside,
coming to the support of the similar and correspond-
ing party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized
when a like and kindred? group of appetites from out-
side comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul?”
“By all means,” he said. ‘ And if, I take it, a
counter-alliance* comes to the rescue of the olig-
archical part of his soul, either it may be from his
father or from his other kin, who admonish and re-
proach him, then there arises faction’ and counter-
© Cf. on 557 c, p. 286, note a.
4 Cf. 554 νυ.
“ For the metaphor cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24 ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ
χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν, “they
[Critias and Alcibiades] found in him [Socrates] an ally who
gave them strength to conquer their evil passions.” (Loeb ir.)
“7 Cf. supra on 554 b, p. 276, note 6.
PLATOSIIA THT
ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν τότε γίγνεται. Τί μήν; Καὶ
ποτὲ μέν, οἶμαι, τὸ δημοκρατικὸν ὑπεχώρησε. τῷ
ὀλιγαρχικῷ, καί tives τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν |
διεφθάρησαν, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξέπεσον, αἰδοῦς. ἘΣ
ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, καὶ κατεκοσμήθη
πάλιν. Γίγνεται γὰρ ἐνίοτε, ἔφη. «Αὖθις δέ,
οἶμαι, τῶν ἐκπεσουσῶν͵ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄλλαι ὑπο-
Β πρεφόμεναι ξυγγενεῖς δι᾽ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς
πατρὸς πολλαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραὶ ἐγένοντο. Φιλεῖ
γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν εἵλκυσάν τε
πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ὁμιλίας, καὶ λάθρᾳ ἐυγγεγνόμενδα
πλῆθος ἐ ἐνέτεκον. Τί μήν; Τελευτῶσαι δή, οἶμαι,
κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν,
αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων
καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, ot δὴ ἃ ἄριστοι φρουροί τε
καὶ φύλακες ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσὶ διανοίαις.
Καὶ πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη. Pevdets δὴ καὶ ἀλαζόνες,
οἶμαι, λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνων ἀναδρα-
μόντες κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιούτου.
Σφόδρα γ᾽, ἔφη. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐ πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκείνους
τοὺς "ἐλάφι μώ κα. ἐλθὼν φανερῶς κατοικεῖ, καὶ
ἐὰν παρ᾽ οἰκείων τις βοήθεια τῷ «φειδωλῷ αὐτοῦ
τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφικνῆται, κλήσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι
ἐκεῖνοι τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας
οὔτε αὐτὴν τὴν ξυμμαχίαν παριᾶσιν οὔτε πρέσβεις
α τινες... αἱ μὲν, αἱ δέ, For the partitive apposition
ef. 566 ©, 584 pd, Gorg. 499 c. Cf. also Protag. 330 a, Gorg.
450 c, Laws 626 ©, Eurip. Hec. 1185-1186.
ὃ Cf. Tim. 90 A.
¢ For the idea of guardians of the soul ef. Laws 961 p,
supra 549. Cf. also on Phaedo 113 v, What Plato said,
p. 536. 4 Of. Phaedo 92 v.
¢ Plato, like Matthew Arnold, liked to use nicknames for
206
te οι κα ὦ,
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
faction and internal strife in the man with himself.”
“Surely.” “ And sometimes, I suppose, the demo-
eratie element retires before the oligarchical, some
of its appetites having been destroyed and others?
expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows
up in the young man’s soul and order is restored.”
“ That sometimes happens,” he said. “‘ And some-
times, again, another brood of desires akin to those
expell d are stealthily nurtured to take their place,
owing to the father’s ignorance of true education,
and wax numerous and strong.” “ Yes, that is wont
to be the way of it.” ‘‘ And they tug and pull back
to the same associations and in secret intercourse
engender a multitude.” ‘‘ Yes indeed.” “And in
the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel? of the young
man’s soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by
studies and honourable pursuits and true discourses,
which are the best watchmen and guardians®¢ in the
minds of men who are dear to the gods.” “ Much
the best,” he said: “‘ And then false and braggart
words? and opinions charge up the height and take
their place and occupy that part of such a youth.”
“They do indeed.” “ And then he returns, does he
not, to those Lotus-eaters * and without disguise lives
openly with them. And if any support ἢ comes from
his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those brag-
gart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress
within him and refuse admission to the auxiliary
force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys
classes of people; cf. Rep. 415 p γηγενεῖς, Theaet. 181.4
ῥέοντας, Soph. 248 a εἰδῶν φίλους, Phileb. 44 © τοῖς δυσχερέσιν.
So Arnold in Culture and Anarchy uses Populace, Philistines,
Barbarians, Friends of Culture, ete., Friends of Physical
Science, Lit. and Dogma, p. 3.
7 βοήθεια : ef. Aristot. De an. 404 a 19.
297
ΡΙΑΤΟΙ ΙΗ AUT
πρεσβυτέρων λόγους ἰδιωτῶν" εἰσδέχονται, αὐτοί TE
κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἠλιθιότητα
ὀνομάζοντες ὠθοῦσιν ἔξω ἀτίμως φυγάδα, owdpo=
σύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές τε καὶ προπηλακίζοντες
ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην
ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὖσαν πείθοντες
ς , A an A RSs py tee. “"
ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπι-
θυμιῶν. Σῴφόδρα γε. Τούτων δέ γέ που κενώ-
E σαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ. κατεχομένου τε
561
ee) 1 See”. ‘ ’ \ 4 ‘
ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μεγάλοισι τέλεσι,
τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν
καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατ-
ἄγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ ὑπο-
κοριζόμενοι, ὕβριν μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦντες,
5 / > / 3 ,ὔ
ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλο-
/ 5 i \ > / > > a
πρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν. dp’ οὐχ οὕτω
> > > ’ ,ὔ Ἃ A > on Υ ἐν
πως, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, νέος ὧν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν
ἀναγκαίοις ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου τὴν τῶν μὴ
ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθέρωσίν τε
ow \ / > > Ὁ > Coon -
καὶ ἄνεσιν; Kal μάλα γ᾽, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐναργῶς. Z
1 Badham, followed by Apelt, reads δ᾽ ὥτων, See Adam’s
note and Appendix IV. to Book VIII.
« ΟἹ 414, Thucyd. iii. 82. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 435-436
says that Plato had not used Thucydides. But οὐ Gomperz
iii. 331, and What Plato Said, pp. 2-3, 6, 8. See Isoc. Antid.
284 σκώπτειν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένους εὐφυεῖς καλοῦσι, etc.,
Areop. 20 and 49, Aristot. δέ. Nic. 1180 b 25, Quintil. iii.
7.25 and viii. 6. 36, Sallust, Cat. c. 52 ‘‘ iam pridem equidem
nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus,” etc., Shakes., Sonnet
Ixvi., “‘ And simple truth miscalled simplicity . . .,”’ Thomas
Wyatt, Of the Courtier’s Life:
As drunkenness good fellowship to call; . . .
Affirm that favel hath a goodly grace
In eloquence; and cruelty to name
Zeal of justice and change in time and place, ete.
208
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ to the words of older friends in private life. And
_ they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming
reverence and awe ‘folly’? thrust it forth, a dis-
honoured fugitive. And temperance they call ‘ want
_ of manhood’ and banish it with contumely, and they
teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are
‘rusticity’ and ‘illiberality,’ and they combine with a
gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive
‘them over the border.” ‘‘ They doindeed.” “ And
when they have emptied and purged® of all these
the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed?
and occupied, and whom they are initiating with
these magnificent and costly rites,’ they proceed to
lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and
_ prodigality and shamelessness,resplendent/ in a great
attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in
celebration of their praises they euphemistically de-
nominate insolence ‘good breeding,’ licence ‘liberty,’
prodigality ‘magnificence,’ and shamelessness “manly
‘spirit. And is it not in some such way as this,” said
I, “ that in his youth the transformation takes place
from the restriction to necessary desires in his educa-
tion to the liberation and release of his unnecessary
and harmful desires?”’ ‘“* Yes, your description is
most vivid,’ said he. “ Then, in his subsequent life,
> ὑπερορίζουσι: cf. Laws 855 c ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα, 866 ».
© Cf. 567 c and 573 8, where the word is also used ironi-
cally, and Laws 735, Polit. 293 p, Soph. 226 v.
4 κατέχομαι is used of divine “ possession” or inspiration
in Phaedr. 244 ©, Ion 533 £, 536 B, etc., Xen. Symp. 1. 10.
* Plato ently employs the language of the mysteries
for literary effect. Cf. Gorg. 497 c, Symp. 210 a 218 B,
Theaet. 155 2-156 a, Laws 666 8, 870 p-e, Phaedr. 250 B-c,
249 c, Phaedo 81 a, 69 c, Rep. 378 a, etc., and Thompson
on Meno 76 ε.
7 Cf. Eurip. fr. 628. 5 (Nauck), Soph. El. 1130.
299
PLATO
δή, οἶμαι, μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἰς
ἀναγκαίους ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκων καὶ
χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς: ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν
εὐτυχὴς ἢ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῇ, ἀλλά τι καὶ
πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος, τοῦ πολλοῦ θορύβου παρ-
ελθόντος, μέρη τε καταδέξηται τῶν ἐκπεσόντων. καὶ
τοῖς ἐπεισελθοῦσι μὴ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν ἐνδῷ, εἰς ἴσον
δή τι ,καταστήσας τὰς ἡδονὰς διάγει, τῇ παρα-
πιπτούσῃ ἀεὶ ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν
παραδιδούς, ἕως ἂν πληρωθῇ, καὶ αὖθις ἄλλῃ,
οὐδεμίαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἴσου τρέφων. Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν. Kat λόγον γ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ οὐ
προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ “παριεὶς εἰς τὸ φρούριον, ἐάν
τις λέγῃ ὡς αἱ μέν εἰσι τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν
ἐπιθυμιῶν ἡδοναί, at δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν
χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ κολάζειν τε καὶ
δουλοῦσθαι: ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀνανεύει τε καὶ
ὁμοίας φησὶν ἁπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἴσου.
Σφόδρα γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτω διακείμενος τοῦτο δρᾷ.
Οὐκοῦν, jv δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ διαζῇ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν οὕτω
χαριζόμενος τῇ προσπιπτούσῃ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, τοτὲ μὲν
μεθύων καὶ καταυλούμενος, αὖθις δὲ ὑδροποτῶν
ee
il I a Nae COP a PB rt ne
εἶ
α Yor the ironical δή cf. 562 p, 568 5, 563D, 374. 5, 420
and on 562 Ε, p. 307, note h. ‘
> Cf. Phaedr. 241 A μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ: —
For this type of youth cf. Thackeray’s Barnes Newcome.
For the lot cf. supra, p. 285, noted, on 557 a.
Ἃ ¢ Notice the frequency of the phrase ἐξ ἴσου in this passage.
if 557 A.
4 An obvious reference to the Gorgias. Cf. Gorg. 494 x,
Phileb. 13 8 ff., Protag. 353 Ὁ ff., Laws 733.
¢ The Greek says ‘*‘ throws back his head ’’—the character-
300
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time
no more on his necessary than on his unnecess
_ pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the
_ period of storm and stress does not last too long, and
_ as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him
_ passes, and he receives back a part of the banished
elements and does not abandon himself altogether
to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and
maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality,
_ forsooth,* and so lives turning over the guard-house ὃ
_ of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated,
__ as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in
| turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them
allequally.*” “Quite so.” ‘‘ And he does not accept
_ or admit into the guard-house the words of truth
when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise
from honourable and good desires, and others from
those that are base,? and that we ought to practise
and esteem the one and control and subdue the
others; but he shakes his head®¢ at all such admoni-
tions and avers that they are all alike and to be
equally esteemed.”’ “‘ Such is indeed his state of
mind and his conduct.’ ““ And does he not,” said I,
“also live out his life in this fashion, day by day in-
dulging the appetite of the day, now wine-bibbing
and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of
the flute’ and again drinking only water and dieting ;
istic negative gesture among Greeks. In Aristoph. Acharn.
115 the supposed Persians give themselves away by nodding
assent and dissent in Hellenic style, as Dicaeopolis says.
7 For the word καταυλούμενος ef. 411 a, Laws 790 πὶ Lucian,
Bis ace. 17, and for the passive Eur. 17. 367. Cf. also
Philetaerus, Philaulus, fr. 18, Kock ii. p. 235, Eur. rh 187.
3 μολπαῖσι δ᾽ ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ᾽ ἀεὶ θηρεύεται. For the type cf. Theo-
_ phrastus, Char. 11, Aristoph. Wasps 1475 ff.
301
PLATO .
De καὶ κατισχναινόμενος, τοτὲ δ᾽ αὖ γυμναζόμενος,
᾿
| ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε ἀργῶν καὶ πάντων ἀμελῶν, τοτὲ δ᾽ ὡς
[ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων: πολλάκις δὲ πολιτεύεται,
καὶ ἀναπηδῶν ὅ ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει"
κἄν ποτέ τινας πολεμικοὺς ζηλώσῃ, “ταύτῃ φέρεται,
ἢ “χρηματιστικούς, ἐπὶ τοῦτ᾽ αὖ, καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις
οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἔπεστιν αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡδύν τε
δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον
E τοῦτον χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ “παντός. Slavrdracw, ἦ
δ᾽ ὃ 5, διελήλυθας βίον ,ἰσονομικοῦ τινὸς ἀνδρός.
Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ παντοδαπόν τε καὶ
πλείστων ἠθῶν μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλόν τε καὶ
ποικίλον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον τὸν
ἄνδρα εἶναι: ὃν πολλοὶ ἂν καὶ πολλαὶ ζηλώσειαν τοῦ
βίου, παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν τε καὶ τρόπων
πλεῖστα ἐν αὑτῷ ἔχοντα. Οὕτω γάρ, ἔφη, ἔστιν.
562 Τί οὖν; τετάχθω ἡμῖν κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ὁ
τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ, ὡς δημοκρατικὸς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσ-
αγορευόμενος; Τετάχθω, ἔφη.
XIV. “et καλλίστη δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πολιτεία τε
καὶ ὃ κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ λοιπὰ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη διελθεῖν,
τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος. Κομιδῇ γ᾽ 5 ἔφη. Φέρε
δή, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται;
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει, σχεδὸν
δῆλον. Δῆλον. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτὸν —
« Cf. Protag. 319 Ὁ.
> For 6 τι ἂν τύχῃ cf. on 536 a, p. 213, note f, ὅταν τύχῃ
Eurip. Hippol. 428, 1.7. 722, Eurip. fr. 825 (Didot), ὅπου ἂν
τύχωσιν Xen. Oec. 20. 28, ὃν ἂν τύχῃς Eurip. Tro. 68.
5. ravrodarév: ef. on 557 c.
4 Of. 557 Ὁ.
¢ For the irony cf. 607 © τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν, supra 544 ¢
γενναία, 558 c ἡδεῖα.
302
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes
_ idling and neglecting all things, and at another time
seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And
_ frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up “ and
says and does whatever enters his head.’ And if
_ military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes,
_ and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no
order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this
life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happi-
_ ness and cleaves to it to the end.” “That is a perfect
description,” he said, “οἵ a devotee of equality.”
_ “ T certainly think,” said I, “‘ that he is a manifold *¢
_ man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that
᾿
᾿
like that city 4 he is the fair and many-coloured one
_ whom many a man and woman would count fortunate
in his life, as containing within himself the greatest
number of patterns of constitutions and qualities.”
“Yes, that is so,” he said. “Shall we definitely
assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with
democracy and would properly be designated as
democratic?” ὁ“ Let that be his place,” he said.
XIV. ‘And now,” said I, “ the fairest * polity and
the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny
and the tyrant.” ‘‘ Certainly,” he said. “Come
then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises.’ That
it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain.”
“Yes, plain.” “Is it, then, in a sense, in the same
7 τίς τρόπος . . . γίγνεται is a mixture of two expressions
that need not be pressed. Cf. Meno 96 νυ, Epist.. vii.
3248. A. 6. Laird, in Class. Phil., 1918, pp. 89-90 thinks
it means “* What τρόπος (of the many τρόποι in a democracy)
develops into a τρόπος of tyranny; for that tyranny is a
transformation of democracy is fairly evident.” That would
be a ition of what Aristotle says previous thinkers
_ overlooked in their classification of polities.
303
PDATOIJTAA NHI
ἔκ τε ὀλιγαρχίας δημοκρατία γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ
Β δημοκρατίας τυραννίς; Πῶς; Ὃ προὔθεντο, ἣν
δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι’ οὗ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καθ-
ἰστατο--- τοῦτο δ᾽ ἣν πλοῦτος" ἦ γάρ; Nai. Ἢ
4, ΄ 3 , " Lia Pyert =
πλούτου τοίνυν ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέ-
λεια διὰ χρηματισμὸν αὐτὴν ἀπώλλυ. ᾿Αληθῆ,
> De restorer Tray
ἔφη. “Ap” οὖν καὶ ὃ δημοκρατία ὁρίζεται ἀγαθόν,
ἡ τούτου ἀπληστία καὶ ταύτην καταλύει; Λέγεις
545.3 t NEY SEA
δ᾽ αὐτὴν τί ὁρίζεσθαι; Τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἶπον.
τοῦτο γάρ που ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ πόλει ἀκούσαις
C ἂν ὡς ἔχει τε κάλλιστον καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ
ταύτῃ ἄξιον οἰκεῖν ὅστις φύσει ἐλεύθερος. Λέ-
γεται γὰρ δή, ἔφη, καὶ πολὺ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα. “Ap”
La ΑΝ >. 3 / Ψ “- 1 Dey ak ,
οὖν, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅπερ ha viv δὴ ἐρῶν, ἡ τοῦ τοιού-
του ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια καὶ ταύ-
τὴν τὴν πολιτείαν μεθίστησί τε καὶ παρασκευάζει
I a ~ μ᾿ -
τυραννίδος δεηθῆναι; Πῶς; ἔφη. Ὅταν, οἶμαι,
δημοκρατουμένη πόλις ἐλευθερίας διψήσασα κακῶν
D οἰνοχόων προστατούντων τύχῃ, καὶ πορρωτέρω
τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς μεθυσθῇ, τοὺς ἄρχοντας
δή, ἂν μὴ πάνυ πρᾶοι ὦσι καὶ πολλὴν παρέχωσι
1 πλοῦτος Fy, ὑπέρπλουτος ADM, που πλοῦτος Campbell,
εἴπερ τι πλοῦτος Apelt, ὑπέρπλουτος πλοῦτος Stallbaum.
4
’
@ Their idea of good. Cf. supra 555 Β προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ.
Of. Laws 962 © with Aristot. Pol. 1293 Ὁ 14 ff. Cf. also —
Aristot. Pol. 1304 Ὁ 20 ai μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μετα-
βάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν. Cf. also p. 263,
note 8 on 551 B (ὅρος) and p. 139, note ¢ on 519 ὁ (σκοπός). |
> Of. 552 5, and for the disparagement of wealth p. 262,
note 6, on 550 Ἑ.
¢ Zeller, Aristot. ii. p. 285, as usual credits Aristotle with
the Platonic thought that every form of government brings
ruin on itself by its own excess.
4 Of. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 43 “The central
304
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ way in which democracy arises out, of oligarchy that
tyranny arises from democracy ἢ “‘ How is that ἢ ᾿
_ “The good that they proposed to themselves“and that
was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it
was wealth,® was it not?”’ “Yes.” “ Well, then, the
insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything
else for the sake of money-making was the cause of
its undoing.” “True,” he said. “ And is not the
avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and
criterion of good the thing which dissolves it * too?”
‘* What do you say its criterion tobe?” “‘ Liberty,4”
_ IT replied; “ for you may hear it said that this is best
managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that
is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care
to live.e” ‘‘ Why, yes,” he replied, “ you hear that
saying everywhere.” “Then, as I was about to
observe, is it not the excess and greed of this and the
neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this con-
stitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of ἡ
a dictatorship?” “How?” he said. “ Why, when a
democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers
for its leaders? and is intoxicated by drinking too deep
of that unmixed wine,’ and then, if its so-called
governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it
a of English life and politics is the assertion of personal
r ΕΣ]
* Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in
Plato’s Republic.
ja... ἐρῶν: of. 449 a, Theaet. 180 α.
σ Or “ protectors,” “‘tribunes,” προστατούντων. Cf. infra
on 565 c, p. 318, note ὦ.
» Of. Livy xxxix. 26 “velut ex diutina siti nimis avide
meram haurientes libertatem,’” Seneca, De benefic. i. 10
““male dispensata libertas,” Taine, Letter, Jan. 2, 1867
“nous avons proclamé et appliqué l’égalité . . . C’est un
vin pur et généreux; mais nous ayons bu trop du ndtre.”’
VOL. 11 " Χ 808
ῬΙΆΑΤΟ ΠῚ
( τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κολάζει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μιαρούς τε
᾿ καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς. Δρῶσι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο. Τοὺς
δέ γε, εἶπον, τῶν ἀρχόντων κατηκόους προ-
λ ,, ε 20 λ ὃ 5A \ nde a a ΚΕ
πηλακίζει ὡς ἐθελοδούλους τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὄντας,
τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀρχομένοις, ἀρχομένους δὲ
ἄρχουσιν ὁμοίους ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἐπαινεῖ τε
Ε καὶ τιμᾷ. ἄρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐπὶ
πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἰέναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Καὶ
καταδύεσθαί γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, εἴς τε τὰς
ἰδίας οἰκίας καὶ τελευτᾶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν
ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην. Πῶς, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον
λέγομεν; Οἷον, ἔφην, πατέρα μὲν ἐθίζεσθαι mardi —
ὅμοιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς υἱεῖς, υἱὸν δὲ
πατρί, καὶ μήτε αἰσχύνεσθαι μήτε δεδιέναι τοὺς
, “ voy A ? iy Poona
563 γονέας, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ἢ: μέτοικον δὲ ἀστῷ καὶ
ἀστὸν μετοίκῳ ἐξισοῦσθαι, καὶ ξένον ὡσαύτως.
Γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη. Ταῦτά τε, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
\ ‘A , + / / ea
καὶ σμικρὰ τοιάδε ἄλλα γίγνεται: διδάσκαλός. τε
ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβεῖται καὶ θωπεύει,
4 μιαρούς is really stronger, ‘‘ pestilential fellows.” Cf.
Apol. 23 ν, Soph. Antig. 746. It is frequent in Aristo-
phanes.
» For the charge of oligarchical tendencies ef. Isoc. Peace
51 and 133, Areop. 57, Antid. 318, Panath. 148.
“ Of. Symp. 184. ο, 183 a. Cf. the essay of Estienne de
la Boétie, De la servitude volontaire. Also Gray, Ode for
Music, 6 “ Servitude that hugs her chain.”
ἃ For οὐδὲν ὄντας cf. 341 ο, Apol. 41 £, Symp. 216 π, Gorg. |
512 c, Erastae 134 c, Aristoph. Eccles. 144, Horace, Sat. ~
ii. 7, 102 “nil ego,” Eurip. 1.4. 371, Herod. ix. 58 οὐδένες
ἐόντες.
© Of. Laws 699 © ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν, Aristoph. Lysistr.
543 ἐπὶ πᾶν ἱέναι, Soph. El. 615 εἰς πᾶν ἔργον.
7 Cf. 568 c, Laws 942 v.
506
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly,it chastises
_ them andaccuses them of being accursed? oligarchs: μὲ
; “ Yes, that is what they do,” he replied. ““ But those
_who obey the rulers,’ I said, “it reviles as willing |
slaves ὁ and men of naught,? but it commends and
subjects and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not
should go to all lengths*?” “Οἵ course.” “ And
this anarchical temper,” said I, “ my friend, must
the very animals.’” “ Just what do we mean by
ally tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his
sons, and the son likens himself to the father and
feels no awe or fear of his parents,’ so that he may be
forsooth a free man.” And the resident alien feels him-
foreigner likewise.”’ ‘‘ Yes, these things do happen,”
he said. “ They do,” said I, ‘‘ and such other trifles
as these. The teacher in such case fears and fawns
? A common conservative complaint. Cf. Isoc. Areop. 49,
Aristoph. Clouds, 998, 1321 ff., Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10, Mem.
iii. 5. 15; Newman i. pp. 174 and 339-340. Cf. also Renan,
Souvenirs, xviii.-xx., on American vulgarity and. liberty;
Harold Lasswell, quoting Bryce, “‘ Modern Democracies,”
in Methods of Social Science, ed. by Stuart A. Rice, p. 376:
“The spirit of equality is alleged to have diminished the
respect children owe to parents, and the young to the old.
This was noted by Plato in Athens. But surely the family
relations depend much more on the social, structural and
religious ideas of a race than on forms of government”’;
Whitman, ‘** Where the men and women think lightly of the
laws . . . where children are taught to be laws to themselves
. . . there the great city stands.”
* Por the ironical wa δή cf. on 561 5. Cf. Laws 962 ©
ἐλεύθερον δή, Meno 86 τὸ and Aristoph. Clouds 1414.
307
honours in public and private rulers who resemble ©
“αὐ,
inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty Ὁ
penetrate into private homes and finally enter into —
that?’ he said. ‘“ Why,” I said, “ the father habitu- Ὁ
self equal to the citizen and the citizen tohim, and the |
—
PLATO LAG
φοιτηταΐ τε διδασκάλων ὀλιγωροῦσιν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ
παιδαγωγῶν: καὶ ὅλως οἱ μὲν νέοι πρεσβυτέροις
ἀπεικάζονται καὶ διαμιλλῶνται καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ
| ἐν ἔργοις, οἱ δὲ γέροντες ξυγκαθιέντες τοῖς νέοις
Β εὐτραπελίας τε καὶ χαριεντισμοῦ ἐμπίπλανται,
μιμούμενοι τοὺς νέους, ἵνα δὴ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀηδεῖς
εἶναι μηδὲ δεσποτικοί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τὸ
δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔσχατον, ὦ φίλε, τῆς ἐλευθερίας
τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον γίγνεται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει,
ὅταν δὴ οἱ ἐωνημένοι καὶ αἱ ἐωνημέναι μηδὲν
ἧττον ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι τῶν πριαμένων. ἐν γυναιξὶ
δὲ πρὸς ἄνδρας καὶ ἀνδράσι πρὸς γυναῖκας ὅση ἡ
ἰσονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία γίγνεται, ὀλίγου ἐπελαθό-
|
C μεθ᾽ εἰπεῖν. Οὐκοῦν κατ᾽ Αἰσχύλον, ἔφη, ἐροῦ-
εἶπο ig
}
i
ἱ
—
μεν 6 τι viv HAV ἐπὶ στόμα; law ye,
καὶ ἔγωγε οὕτω λέγω τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θηρίων
τῶν ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅσῳ ἐλευθερώτερά ἐστιν
ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ, οὐκ ἄν τις πείθοιτο ἄπειρος.
ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ αἵ τε κύνες κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν
οἷαίπερ at δέσποιναι γίγνονταί τε δὴ καὶ ἵπποι καὶ
ὄνοι, πάνυ ἐλευθέρως καὶ σεμνῶς εἰθισμένοι πορεύ-
εσθαι, κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐμβάλλοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἀπαν-
τῶντι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξίστηται καὶ τἄλλα πάντα οὕτω |
σ Cf. Protag. 336 a, Theaet. 174 a, 168 8.
Ὁ For εὐτραπελίας cf. 1806. xv. 296, vii. 49, Aristotle, Hth.
Nic. 1108 a 24. In het. 1389 Ὁ 11 he defines it as remacdev-
μένη ὕβρις. Arnold once addressed the Eton boys on the word.
° Cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10 τῶν δούλων δ᾽ αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων
πλείστη ἐστὶν ᾿Αθήνησιν ἀκολασία, Aristoph. Clouds init., and
on slavery Laws 777 ©, supra p. 249, note g on 547 c and
549 a,
4 Nauck fr. 351. Cf. Plut. Amat. 763 5, Themist. Orat.
iv. p. 52 B; also Otto, p. 39, and Adam ad loc.
308
ee
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the |,
teacher or to their overseers either. And in general |
the young ape their elders and vie with them in /
eech and action, while the old, accommodating ¢
Sbicsanhves to the young, are full of pleasantry ὃ and
raciousness, imitating the young for fear they may
e thought disagreeable and authoritative.’’ “ By all
means, he said. “‘ And the climax of popular liberty,
_ my friend,” I said,“‘is attained in such a city when the
purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free®
_ than the owners who paid for them. And I almost |
_ forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal |
_ rights in the relation of men to women and women to,
men.” “Shall we not, then,” said he, “in Aeschylean
phrase,? say ‘ whatever rises to our lips’?” “* Cer-
tainly,” I said, “ so I will. Without experience of it |
no one would believe how much freer the very beasts ¢ |
subject to men are in such a city than elsewhere. The |
dogs literally verify the adage’ and ‘like their mis-
tresses become.’ And likewise the horses and asses
are wont to hold on their way with the utmost free-
dom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets
them and who does not step aside.’ And so all things
. * Cf. 562.z, Julian, Misopogon, 355 8B. . . μέχρι τῶν ὄνων ἡ
ἐστὶν ἐλευθερία παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς. καὶ τῶν καμήλων ; ἄγουσί τοι καὶ
ταύτας οἱ μισθωτοὶ διὰ τῶν στοῶν ὥσπερ τὰς νύμφας, “...
what great independence exists among the citizens, even
down to the very asses and camels? The men who hire them
out lead even these animals through the porticoes as though
they were brides.” (Loeb tr.) Cf. Porphyry, Vit. Pythag.
Teubner, p. 22, § 23 μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων Suxveiro αὐτοῦ
ἡ νουθέτησις.
7 Otto, Ρ. 119. Cf. “ΤΙΚε mistress, like maid.” +
σ Eurip. Jon 635-637 mentions being jostled off the street
by a worse person as one of the indignities of Athenian city
e.
309
SPLATOIJISA SAT
Ὁ μεστὰ ἐλευθερίας γίγνεται. Τὸ ἐμόν γ᾽, ἔφη, ἐμοὶ
λέγεις ὄναρ" αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς ἀγρὸν πορευόμενος
θαμὰ αὐτὸ πάσχω, Τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, ἦν δ᾽
ἐγώ, πάντων τούτων ξυνηθροισμένων ἐννοεῖς, ὡς
ἁπαλὴν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ποιεῖ, ὥστε κἂν
ὅτιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται, ἀγανακτεῖν. καὶ
μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι; τελευτῶντες γάρ που οἷοθ' ὅτι
οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων φροντίζουσι γεγραμμένων. ἢ
E ἀγράφων, ἵνα δὴ μηδαμῇ μηδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἢ hemes ;
Kat μάλ᾽, ἔφη, οἶδα. i Οἡ
ΧΥ. Αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ gide, 4
ἀρχὴ οὑτωσὶ καλὴ καὶ νεανική, ὅθεν. ὩΣ d
φύεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. Νεανικὴ δῆτα, ἔφη: ἀλλὰ
τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; Ταὐτόν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ
ὀλιγαρχίᾳ νόσημα ἐγγενόμενον ἀπώλεσεν αὐτήν,
τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλέον τε καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἐκ
τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐγγενόμενον καταδουλοῦται δημο-
κρατίαν: καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην
* Cf. the reflections in Laws 698 f., 701 a-c, Bpist. viii.
354 Ὁ, Gorg. 461 2; Isoc, Areop. 20, Panath. 131, Eurip.
Cyclops. 120 ἀκούει δ᾽ οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδενός, Aristot. Pol.
1295 Ὁ 15.f.
Plato, by reaction against the excesses of the ultimate
democracy, always satirizes the shibboleth “liberty ”’ in the
style of Arnold, Ruskin and Carlyle. He would agree with
Goethe (Eckermann i i. 219, Jan. 18, 1827) ‘‘ Nicht das macht
frei, das wir nichts iiber uns erkennen wollen, sondern eben,
dass wir etwas verehren, das iiber uns ist.”
Libby, Introd. to Hist. of Science, p. 273, not understand-
ing the irony of the passage, thinks much of it the unwilling
tribute of a hostile critic.
310
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of
: 2” “Tt is my own dream? you are telling me,”
he said “ for it often happens to me when I go to
_ the country. * “* And do you note that the sum total
_of all these items when footed up is that they render |
the souls of the citizens so sensitive ° that they chafe
at the slightest suggestion of servitude? and will not |
endure it? For you are aware that they finally pay
no heed even to the laws® written or unwritten,’ so
that forsooth they may have no master anywhere
over them.” “ I know it very well,” said he.
XV. “ This, then, my friend,” said I, “is the fine
_and vigorous root from which tyranny grows, in my
opinion.” “ Vigorous indeed,” he said; “‘ but what
next?” “‘The same malady,” I said, "ἡ “that, arising
in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more widely diffused
and more violent as a yenulf of this licence, enslaves
democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to
_ In Gorg. 484 4 Callicles sneers at equality from the point
of view of the superman. Οὐ. also on 558 c, p. 291, note f;
Hobbes, Leviathan xxi. and Theopompus’s account of
democracy in Byzantium, fr. 65. Similar phenomena
mex Be be observed in an American city street or
clu
* Cf. ΤΡ, Callimachus, Anth, Pal. vi. 310, and xii. 148 μὴ λέγε
» » - τοὐμὸν ὄνειρον ἐμοί, Cic. Att. vi. 9. 8, Lucian, Somnium
seu Gallus 7 ὥσπερ yap τοὐμὸν ἐνύπνιον ἰδών, Tennyson,
“ Lucretius ”’: “ That was mine, my dream, I knew it.”
* This sensitiveness, on which Grote remarks with approval,
is characteristic of present-day American democracy. Cf.
also Arnold, Culture and Anorchts p. 51 “And so if he is
stopped from making Hyde Park a bear garden or the
streets impassable he says he is being butchered by the
aristocracy.”
4 Cf. Gorg. 491 © δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν, Laws 890 a.
* Cf. Laws 701 8 νόμων ζητεῖν μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι.
4 ἐς For unwritten law οὐ. What Plato Said, p. 637, on Laws
793 a.
311
PLATO L BE
φιλεῖ εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἐν |
564 ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ
ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα. Εἰκός, ἔφη. ‘H yap
ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς ἄ
δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ πόλει.
Εἰκὸς γάρ. Εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης
πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας,
| ἐξ οἶμαι τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία: ere i
᾿ τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτη. Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.
οὐ τοῦτ᾽ , οἶμαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἠρώτας, ἀλλὰ ποῖον. Ϊ
᾿ Βνόσημα ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τε φυόμενον ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐν
δημοκρατίᾳ δουλοῦται αὐτήν. ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
᾿Ἐκεῖνο τοίνυν, ἔφην, ἔλεγον, τὸ τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ
δαπανηρῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος, τὸ μὲν ἀνδρειότατον |
ἡγούμενον αὐτῶν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀνανδρότερον ἑπόμενον" ᾿
|
|
ods δὴ ἀφωμοιοῦμεν κηφῆσι, τοὺς μὲν κέντρα
ἔχουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἀκέντροις. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ᾽, ἔφη.
Τούτω τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ταράττετον ἐν πάσῃ
πολιτείᾳ ἐγγιγνομένω, οἷον περὶ σῶμα φλέγμα τ
Ο kat χολή: ὦ δὴ καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρόν τε καὶ
νομοθέτην πόλεως μὴ ἧττον ἢ σοφὸν μελυττουργὸν
* Cf. Lysias xxv. 27, Isoc. viii. 108, vii. δ, Cie. De rep. i. 44
“nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus prin-
cipum, sie hunc nimis liberum . . .” ete.; Emerson, History,
“Α great licentiousness treads on the heels of a reformation.”
Cf. too Macaulay on the comic dramatists of the Restoration ;
Arnold, Lit. and Dogma, p. 322 ‘‘ After too much lorifica-
tion of art, science and culture, too little; after Rabelais,
George Fox; ” Tennyson: ᾿
He that roars for liberty
Faster binds the tyrant’s power.
See Coleridge’s Table Talk, p. 149, on the moral law of
312
--- ee ae
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ bring about a corresponding reaction“ to the opposite .
_ in the seasons, in plants, in animal Aina ies an mee
ecially in political societies.”’ “Probably,” he said.
“And so the iobable outcome of too suck freedom
is only too much slavery in the individual and the
state.” “Yes, that is probable.” “Probably, then,
tyranny develops out of no other constitution® than
democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the
fiercest extreme of servitude.’ ‘‘ That is reasonable,”
he said. “That, however, I believe, was not your
question,? but what identical* malady arising in demo-
cracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it?” ““You say
truly,” he replied. “ That then,” I said, “ was what I
had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men,
the most enterprising and vigorous portion being
leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were
likening them to drones,’ some equipped with stings
and others stingless.” ‘“‘ And rightly too,” he said.
“These two kinds, then,” I said, “ when they arise
in any state, create a disturbance like that produced
in the body?’ by phlegm and gall. And so a good
physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar
polarity. Emile Faguet says that this law of reaction is the
only one in which he believes in literary criticism.
δ᾽ For the generalization cf. Symp. 188 a-s.
* Of. 565 τ. The slight exaggeration of the expression is
solemnly treated by Apelt as a case of logical false con-
version in Plato.
4 Plato keeps to the point. Cf. on 531 c, p. 193, note i.
4 ταὐτόν implies the tenes. Cf. Parmen. 130 v, Phileb:
34 ky: Soph. 253. Cf. also Tim. 88 ο, Meno 72 c,
A.
Cf. 555 ν»-ε.
9 Cf. the parallel of soul and body in 444 c f., Soph. 227 x,
Crito 47 p f., Gorg. 504 B-c, 505 B, 518 a, 524 ».
For φλέγμα ef. Tim. 83 ς, 85 a-B.
313
PLATO AT
πόρρωθεν εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως. μὴ
ἐγγενήσεσθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὅ τι τά-
χιστα ξὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον.
Nai μὰ Δία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, παντάπασί γε: Ὧδε τοίνυν,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λάβωμεν, ἵν᾽ εὐκρινέστερον ἴδωμεν 6
βουλόμεθα. Πῶς; Τριχῇ διαστησώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ.
δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔχει." &
D μὲν γάρ που τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφύεται
δι᾿ ἐξουσίαν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχουμένῃ.
Ἔστιν οὕτως. Πολὺ δέ γε δριμύτερον ἐ ἐν ταύτῃ ἢ, ἢ
ἐν ἐκείνῃ. Πῶς; "Exe? μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔντιμον
εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀγύμναστον
καὶ οὐκ ἐρρωμένον γίγνεται" ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ
τοῦτό που τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς, ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων,
καὶ τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει,
τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσίζον βομβεῖ τε καὶ
E οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, ὥστε πάντα ὑπὸ
τοῦ τοιούτου διοικεῖται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ
χωρίς τινων ὀλίγων. Μάλα γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. "Αλλο
τοίνυν τοιόνδε ἀεὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους.
Τὸ ποῖον; Χρηματιζομένων mov πάντων οὗ
κοσμιώτατοι φύσει ὡς τὸ πολὺ πλουσιώτατοι
γίγνονται. ἙΕϊκός. Ἰ]λεῖστον δή, οἶμαι, τοῖς
κηφῆσι μέλι καὶ εὐπορώτατον ἐντεῦθεν βλίττεται.
Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, παρά γε τῶν σμικρὰ ἐχόντων
α μάλιστα μὲν. .. ἂν δέ: cf. 378 a, 414 ο, 461 c, 478 B,
Apol. 34 a, Soph. 246 Ὁ. Ἵ
> For εὐκρινέστερον cf. Soph. 242 c.
© Cf. Phileb. 23 c, which Stenzel says argues an advance
314
Ϊ
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and
chiefly * to prevent their springing up, but if they do
_ arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells
and all.” * Yes, by Zeus,”’ he said, “‘ by all means.”
“Then let us take it in this way,’ I said, “so that
we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly.” ”
“How?” “ Let us in our theory make a tripartite °
division of the democratic state, which is in fact its
structure. One such class, as we have described, grows
up in it because of the licence, no less than in the
_ oligarchic state.”” ‘‘ Thatisso.’’ “ But it is far fiercer
in this state than in that.” ‘‘Howso?” “There, be-
cause it is not held in honour, but is kept out of office,
it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But
in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare
exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches
and transacts business, and the remainder swarms
and settles about the speaker’s stand and keeps up a
buzzing? and tolerates? no dissent, so that everything
with slight exceptions is administered by that class
in sucha state.” “ Quite so,” he said. ‘‘ And so from
time to time there emerges or is secreted from the
multitude another group of this sort.” ‘‘ What sort?”
he said. ‘“ When all are pursuing wealth the most
orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become
the richest.” “‘ It is likely.” “Then they are the
most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and
it is the easiest to extract.f”” “ Why, yes,” he said,
“how could one squeeze it out of those who have
over the Sophist, because Plato is no longer limited to a
bipartite division. * Cf. 573 a.
“ ἀνέχεται: ef. Isoc. viii. 14 ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὔσης οὐκ ἔστι
παρρησία, etc. For the word cf. Aristoph. Acharn. 805 οὐκ
ἀνασχήσομαι, Wasps 1337.
7 For βλίττεται ef. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 794.
315
PLATO
τις βλίσειεν; ἹἸ]λούσιοι δή, οἶμαι, of τοιοῦτοι
καλοῦνται, κηφήνων βοτάνη. Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη.
565 XVI. Δῆμος δ᾽ ἂν εἴη τρίτον γένος, ὅσοι αὖὐτ-
ουργοί τε καὶ ἀπράγμονες, οὐ πάνυ πολλὰ κεκτη-
, a \ a , Δ, οἷν εὐ ἐκεί
μένοι: ὃ δὴ πλεῖστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον ἐν
yA av > lod ” art ΝΜ )
δημοκρατίᾳ, ὅταν περ ἀθροισθῇ. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ θαμὰ ἐθέλει ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ μέλιτος
3 ᾿ " ig? @
τι μεταλαμβάνῃ. Οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει, ἦν ὃ
ἐγώ, ἀεί, καθ᾽ ὅσον δύνανται οἱ προεστῶτες, τοὺς
ἔχοντας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρούμενοι, διανέμοντες τῷ
δήμῳ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν. Μεταλαμβάνει
LACKPAVEE ἢ
Β γὰρ οὖν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτως. ᾿Αναγκάζονται δή,
“- \
οἶμαι, ἀμύνεσθαι, λέγοντές τε ἐν TH δήμῳ Kat
πράττοντες ὅπῃ δύνανται, οὗτοι ὧν ἀφαιροῦνται.
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Αἰτίαν δὴ ἔσχον ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων,
κἂν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι νεωτερίζειν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύουσι
an / / > > , , / > i
τῷ δήμῳ καί εἰσιν ὀλιγαρχικοί. Ti μήν; Odn-—
οῦν καὶ τελευτῶντες, ἐπειδὰν ὁρῶσι τὸν δῆμον
Beg is the significance of πλούσιοι here, lit. “the
rich,”
» For the classification of the population ¢f, Vol. I..pp. 161-
168, Eurip. Suppl. 238 ff., Aristot. Pol. 1328 Ὁ ff., 1289 b 33,
1290 b 40 ff., Newman i. p. 97.
© ἀπράγμονες: cf. 620 c, Aristoph. Knights 261, Aristot.
Rhet. 1381 a 25, Isoe. Antid. 151, 9927, But Pericles in Thuc.
ii. 40 takes a different view. See my note in Class. Phil. xv.
(1920) pp. 300-301.
ἃ airoupyoi: cf. Soph. 223 pv, Eurip. Or. 920, Shorey in
Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 346-347.
“ Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1318 f 12.
7 Cf. Isoe. viii. 13 τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους.
9 For τοὺς ἔχοντας cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 1295.
For the exploitation of the rich at Athens cf. Xen. Symp. 4.
30-32, Lysias xxi. 14, xix. 62, xviii. 20-21, 1806. Areop, 32 ff.,
316
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
little?”’..“‘The capitalistic? class is, I take it, the name
by which they are designated—the pasture of the
q bare Ὁ “ Pretty much so,” he said.
“And the third class, composing . the
ee “would comprise all quiet ¢ cultivators of their
4 who possess little property. This is the
and most potent group in a democracy when
= meets in assembly.” “Yes, it is,” he said, * but it
_ will not often do that,’ unless it gets a share of the
honey.” “Well, does it not always share,” I said, “to
the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in
distributing’ to the people what they take from the
well- # to keep the lion” 5 share for themselves*?”
“Why, yes,” he said, “it shares in that sense.
xe so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered.
are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in
the assembly and any action in their power.” “Of
_ course.” “ And thereupon the charge is brought -
_ against them by the other party, though they may
_ have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting
against the people, and it is said that they are
oligarchs.*” “Surely.” “And then finally, when
_ they see the people, not of its own will’ but through
Peace 131, Dem. De cor. 105 ff., on his triarchic law: and
also Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592, Shakes. Richard II.1. iv. 49 f.:
Whereto, when they shall know what men are rich.
They Wen subscribe them for large sums “ hie
ar
ey
Ι Lay Thoughts of a Dean, p.
ΕΒ. 6p Risto ristoph. Knights 717-718, art sy ad Achilles
in JI. ix. 363.
_ _ 4 4,e. reactionaries. Cf. supra on 562 pv, p. 306, note 4,
Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 c μισόδημος. The whole passage
perhaps illustrates ‘the ‘disharmony ” between Plato’s upper-
_ class sympathies and his liberal philosophy.
_ 4 So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury
| Was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph. Acharn, 515-516.
317
tol oo ἃ
PLATO | YH
οὐχ ἑκόντα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀγνοήσαντά τε καὶ erie τη σαν
Cob ὑπὸ τῶν διαβαλλόντων, ἐπιχειροῦντα σφᾶς ἀ ἀδικεῖν,
τότ᾽ ἤδη, εἴτε βούλονται. εἴτε μή, ὡς ἀληθῶς
ὀλιγαρχικοὶ γίγνονται, οὐχ ἑκόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τοῦτο τὸ κακὸν ἐκεῖνος ὁ κηφὴν ἐντίκτει κεντῶν
αὐτούς. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Εἰσαγγελίαι δὴ καὶ
κρίσεις καὶ ἀγῶνες περὶ “ἀλλήλων γίγνονται., αἱ
μάλα. Οὐκοῦν ἕνα τινὰ ἀεὶ δῆμος εἴωθε δια-
φερόντως προΐστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτον τρέφειν
τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν; Εἴωθε γάρ. Τοῦτο μὲν
ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δῆλον, ὅτι, ὅταν περ φύηται
τύραννος, ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης καὶ ΜῊ ἄλλοθεν
ἐκβλαστάνει. Καὶ μάλα δῆλον. Tis ἀρχὴ οὖν
μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ τύραννον; } ἢ δῆλον
ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν ἄρξηται δρᾶν ὃ προστάτης τῷ
ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, ὃ ὃς περὶ τὸ ἐν ᾿Αρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς
τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερὸν “λέγεται; Tis, ἔφη. ‘Os ἄρα
ὃ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου, ἐν
ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἑνὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου,
ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας
τὸν λόγον; "Eywye. Ap’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὃς ἂν
δήμου προεστώς, λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον,
μὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐμφυλίου αἵματος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδίκως
α Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1110 a1, in his discussion of voluntary
and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or
through misapprehension (δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν) are involuntary.
> For τότ᾽ ἢδη cf. 569 a, Phaedo 87 x, Gorg. 527 Ὁ, Laches
181 Ὁ, 184 a, and on 550 a, p. 259, note i.
¢ So Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 80 iwayndo Onowy σύσταντες KaTa-
λῦσαι τὸν δῆμον, Isoc. xv. 318 ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες. . . ἠνάγ-
κασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς ἀϊτίαις.
4 Cf. 562 v, Eurip. Or. 772 προστάτας, Aristoph. Knights
1128. The προστάτης rod δήμου was the accepted leader of
the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, S./.@. 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476.
318
_ judgements and lawsuits on either side.” ‘‘ Yes, /
©
_ the oligarchy is nearer the id
Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme.
_ Cf. supra Introd. pp. xly-xlvi.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
misapprehension,* and being misled by the calum- ,
_ niators, attempting to wrong them, why then,? |
whether they wish it or not,° they become in very
deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is en-
gendered by those drones which sting them.”’ “ Pre-
cisely.” “‘ And then there ensue impeachments and
᾿ππσν αν
indeed.” “ And is it not always the way of a demos ἡ
to put forward one man as its special champion and
protector? and cherish and magnify him?” “Yes,
it is.” “‘ This, then, is plain,” said I, “that when a
eg arises he sprouts from a protectorate root ὁ and
nothing else.” “Very plain.” “‘ What, then,
is the starting-point of the transformation of a pro-
tector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the
_ protector’s acts begin to reproduce the legend that
_ is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia’? ”
_“ What is that?” he said. “ The story goes that he
who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced
up with those of other victims is inevitably trans-
_ formed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale?” —
“Thave.” “ And is it not true that in like manner
a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile
mob,’ does not withhold his hand from the shedding of
"The implications of this pesage contradict the theory that ἡ
than the democracy. But
* Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1310 Ὁ 14 οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων
γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν, etc., ibid. 1304 Ὁ 20 ff.
? Cf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p. 189) and Cook’s
Zeus, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic religious rhetoric of what
_ follows testifies to the intensity of Plato’s feeling. Cf. the
_ language of the Laws on homicide, 865 ff.
ως Note the difference of tone from 5028. Cf. Phaedr.
i
319
566
PLATOJIAT THT
ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια
ἄγων͵ μιαιφονῇ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων, γλώττῃ τε
καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίῳ γευόμενος. φόνου ξυγγενοῦς,
καὶ ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτιννύῃ καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ
χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, dpa τῷ
τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἵμαρται ἢ
ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ
ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
A
Οὗτος δή, ἔφην, 6 στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς —
ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας. Οὗτος. “Ap” οὖν ἐκπεσὼν
μὲν καὶ κατελθὼν βίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τύραννος ἀπ-
εἰργασμένος κατέρχεται; Δῆλον. Ἐὰν δὲ ἀδύ-
νατοι ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὸν ὦσιν ἢ ἀποκτεῖναι διαβάλ-
λοντες τῇ πόλει, βιαίῳ δὴ θανάτῳ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν
ἀποκτιννύναι λάθρᾳ. Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτω
γίγνεσθαι. Τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθ
λητον. ἐπὶ τούτῳ πᾶντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο mle penqinbee
ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς Twas τοῦ
σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ἢ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός.
Καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη. Διδόασι δή, οἶμαι, δεΐσαντες μὲν
ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, θαρρήσαντες δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν. ΚΚαὶ
μάλα. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ὅταν ἴδῃ ἀνὴρ χρήματα ἔχων
9 Cf, Pindar, Pyth. ii. 892 : Lucan i. 331:
nullus semel ore receptus
pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.
> For ἀφανίζων ef. Gorg. 471 8.
¢ The apparent contradiction of the tone here with Laws
684 £ could be regarded mistakenly as another “disharmony.”
Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical —
measures in Greek history. Schmidt, Hthik der Griechen, |
ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at
Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, Les Idées |
320
fi
reo
||
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ tribal blood,* but by the customary unjust accusations
_ brings a citizen into court and assassinates him,
blotting out a human life,and with unhallowed tongue
and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and
slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the
_ partition of lands*—is it not the inevitable consequence
_ and a decree of fate? that such a one be either slain
_ by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed
_ from a man into a wolf?” . “ It is quite inevitable,”
hesaid. “‘ Heitis,”’ I said, ‘* who becomes the leader
of faction against the possessors of property.” “Yes, |
he.” “* May it not happen that he is driven into
exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies,
returns a finished tyrant?” “ Obviously.” ‘‘ And
if they are unable to expel him or bring about his
death by calumniating him to the people, they plot
to assassinate him by stealth.” “ That is certainly
wont to happen,” said he. “* And thereupon those who
have reached this stage devise that famous petition’
of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard
to make their city safe? for the friend of democracy.”
“They do indeed,” he said. “ And the people
προ it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned
for themselves.” ‘“‘ Yes, indeed.” ‘‘ And when he
sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth
politiques d’Isocrate, p. 150, who refers to Andoc. De myst.
88, Plato, Laws 684, Demosth. Against Timoer. 149 (heliastic
oath), Michel, Recueil d’inscriptions grecques, 1317, the oath
at Itanos.
4 Cf. 619 c. © Cf. 565 4.
7 Cf. Herod. i. 59, Aristot. Rhet. 1357 Ὁ 30 ff. Aristotle,
Pol. 1305 a 7-15, says that this sort of thing used to happen
but does not now, and explains why. For πολυθρύλητον ef.
Phaedo 100 85.
5 For the ethical dative αὐτοῖς cf. on 343 a, Vol. I. p. 65, ©
note ¢.
VOL. II Υ 321
‘PLATO | 4H
kal μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων αἰτίαν μισόδημος εἶναι,
τότε δὴ οὗτος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατὰ τὸν Κροίσῳ
γενόμενον χρησμὸν ;
πολυψήφιδα παρ᾽ Ἕρμν
φεύγει, οὐδὲ μένει, οὐδ᾽ αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι.
Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, δεύτερον αὖθις αἰδεσθείη. Ὃ δέ
γε, οἶμαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καταληφθεὶς θανάτῳ δίδοται.
᾿Ανάγκη. Ὃ δὲ δὴ προστάτης ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς
δῆλον δὴ ὅτι μέγας μεγαλωστί, οὐ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ
D καταβαλὼν ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἕστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ
τῆς πόλεως, τύραννος ἀντὶ προστάτου ἀποτετε-
λεσμένος. Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη. -
XVII. Διέλθωμεν δὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἦν δ᾽
ἐγώ, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ἧ ἂν ὃ
τοιοῦτος βροτὸς ἐγγένηται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη,
διέλθωμεν. *Ap’ οὖν, εἶπον, οὐ ταῖς μὲν πρώταις
ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελᾷ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται
πάντας, ᾧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ, καὶ οὔτε τύραννός
E φησιν εἶναι, ὑπισχνεῖταί τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δη-
μοσίᾳ, χρεῶν τε ἠλευθέρωσε, καὶ γῆν διένειμε
δήμῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτόν, καὶ πᾶσιν ἵλεώς τε
καὶ πρᾶος εἶναι προσποιεῖται; ᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη.
Ὅταν δέ γε, oluat, πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς
μὲν καταλλαγῇ, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ, καὶ ἡσυχία
ἐκείνων γένηται, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς ἀεὶ ἢ
κινεῖ, ἵν᾽ ἐν χρείᾳ ἡγεμόνος 6 δῆμος ἢ. Εἰκός |
« For μισόδημος cf. Aristoph. Wasps 474, Xen. Hell. ii. |
3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast φιλόδημον, Aristoph.
Knights 787, Clouds 1187. > Herod. i. 55.
¢ In Jl, xvi. 776 Cebriones, Hector’s charioteer, slain by
Patroclus, κεῖτο μέγας μεγαλωστί, ‘‘ mighty in his mightiness.”
(A. T. Murray, Loeb tr.)
322
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
| the repute of. hostility to. democracy,* then’ in the
"words of the oracle? delivered to Croesus,
mw Necks By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos
Hi Raita hesSigtt, be. stays not nor blushes to show. the
"white feather.” |
“No, for he would never get a second chance to
blush.” “ And he whois caught, methinks, is de-
_livered to his death.” “Inevitably.” “And then
Ἷ ἴου that protector does not lie prostrate,
_ ‘mighty with far-flung limbs,’ in Homeric overthrow,°
but overthrowing many others towers in the car of
state? transformed from a protector into a perfect and
finished tyrant.” “‘ What else is likely ? ’’ he said.
XVII. “Shall we, then, portray the happiness,” said
I, “ of the man and the state in which such a creature
arises?” “ By all means let us describe it,” he said.
_“ Then at the start and in the first days does he not
_smile* upon all men and greet everybody he meets and
deny that he is a tyrant, and promise many things in
private and public, and having freed men fom debts,
and distributed lands to the people and his own associ-
_ates, he affects a gracious and gentle manner to all?”
* Necessarily,” he said. “ But when, I suppose, he
has come to terms with some of his exiled enemies’
and has got others destroyed and is. no longer dis-
turbed by them, in the first place he is always stirring
ΠΡ some war’ so that the people may be in need of
# For the figure ef. Polit. 266. More common in Plato
is the fi of the ship in this connexion. of. on 488.
* Cf. Eurip. 1.4. 333 ff., Shakes. Henry IV. Part I. tr. iii,
246 “ This king of smiles, this Bolingbroke.”
7 Not “foreign enemies” as almost all render it. Cf. my
note on this passage in Class. Rev. xix. (1905) pp. 438-439,
_ 573 B ἔξω ὠθεῖ, Theognis 56, Thuc. iv. 66 and viii. 64.
___* Cf. Polit. 308 a, and in modern times the case of
Napoleon. τ
᾿ 323
567 γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πῤίηνεεῖ
|
᾿
]
PLATO
γιγνόμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζωνται
εἶναι καὶ ἧττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσιν; ς Δῆλον.
Καὶ ἄν rye Twas, οἶμαι, ὑποπτεύῃ ἐλεύθερα φρονή-
ματα ἔχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέψειν αὐτῷ ἄρχειν, ὅπως
ἂν τούτους μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολλύῃ, ἐνδοὺς τοῖς
πολεμίοις; τούτων πάντων ἕνεκα τυράννῳ ἀεὶ
ἀνάγκη πόλεμον ταράττειν; ᾿Ανάγκη. Ταῦτα δὴ
Β ποιοῦντα ἕτοιμον μᾶλλον ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολί-
ταις; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν καί Twas τῶν
ξυγκαταστησάντων καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων παρ-
ρησιάζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, A
ἐπιπλήττοντας τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οὗ ἂν τυγχάνω-
σιν ἀνδρικώτατοι ὄντες; Εἰκός γε. “Ὑπεξαιρεῖν
δὴ τούτους πάντας δεῖ τὸν τύραννον, εἰ μέλλει ᾿
ἄρξειν, ἕως ἂν μήτε φίλων μήτ᾽ ἐχθρῶν λίπῃ
μηδένα, ὅτου τι ὄφελος. Δῆλον. ᾿Οξέως dpa δεῖ ΐ
ὁρᾶν αὐτόν, τίς ἀνδρεῖος, τίς μεγαλόφρων, Tis
φρόνιμος, τίς πλούσιος" καὶ οὕτως εὐδαίμων ἐστίν,
ὥστε τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, εἴτε βούλεται
εἴτε μή, πολεμίῳ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειν, ἕως ἂν
καθήρῃ τὴν πόλιν. Καλόν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμόν.
Ναί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σώμαπαι
α For ταράττειν in this sense cf. Dem. De cor. 151 ἐγκλήματα
καὶ πόλεμος. . . ἐταράχθη, Soph, Antig. 795 νεῖκος... ταράξας.
> ξυγκαταστησάντων is used in Aesch. Prom. 307 of those
who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods.
See also Xen. Ages. 2. 31, Isoc. Panegyr. 126.
¢ Cf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. δή, as often in the
Timaeus, marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf.
Tim. 67 c, 69 a, 77 c, 82 B, and passim.
4 Cf. on 560 pv, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a
democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i.
324
q
ele =
J
- SD Rm ett
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
aleader.” “That is likely.”” “ And also that being
impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote
themselves to their daily business and be less likely
to plot against him?” “ Obyiously.” “ And if, I
presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who
will not suffer his domination, his further object is
_ to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing
them tothe enemy? From all these motives a tyrant
_ is compelled to be always provoking wars??”’ “ Yes,
_ he is compelled to do 50. “‘ And by such conduct
will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the
citizens?” “Ofcourse.” “ And is it not likely that
some of those who helped to establish® and now share
in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course
of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one
another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?” —
“Yes, it is likely.” “‘Then the tyrant must do away*
with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has
left no one of any worth, friend or foe.” ‘‘ Obvi-
ously.”” “‘He must look sharp to see, then, who is
brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich ;
and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes
it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against
them all until he purge the city.*” “A fine purga-
tion,” he said. “ Yes,” said I, “just the opposite of
that which physicians practise on our bodies. For
Ῥ. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and
outstanding men ef. Laws $32 c, Gorg. 510 s-c, Xen. Hiero
5. 1, Isoc. viii. 112, Eurip. Jon 626-628, Milton, Tenure of
Kings, etc., init., Shakes., Richard I. ut. iv. 33 ff.:
Go thou, and like an executioner
Cut off the heads of too fast growing sprays
That look too lofty in our commonwealth.
All must be even in our government.
But cf. Pindar, Pyth. iii. 71, of Hiero, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς.
325
PLATO
coe \ . , 3 a , \
of μὲν yap τὸ χείριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσι τὸ
,ὔ « \ > / < ” 4 D5 5
βέλτιστον, 6 δὲ τοὐναντίον. ‘Qs ἔοικε yap, αὐτῷ,
ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἄρξει. ΣΡ
ἢ : BE A
XVIII. _ μακαρίᾳ ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκῃ
γε A
D δέδεται, ἣ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ φαύλων τῶν
“- ~ A
πολλῶν οἰκεῖν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενον ἢ μὴ
ζῆν. Ἔν τοιαύτῃ, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐχί, ὅσῳ
ba) > a / 5 / a. ~
ἂν μᾶλλον τοῖς πολίταις ἀπεχθάνηται ταῦτα δρῶν,
τοσούτῳ πλειόνων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων
ὃ , aA A ” ᾿ > ει Ὁ , ie |
εήσεται; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Tives οὖν οἱ πιστοὶ, καὶ
πόθεν αὐτοὺς μεταπέμψεται; Αὐτόματοι, ἔφη,
\ oo , 24 \ ἃ ΤΙ διδῶ ἥ
πολλοὶ ἥξουσι πετόμενοι, ἐὰν τὸν μισθὸν διδῷ. —
a a 4
Κηφῆνας, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν κύνα, δοκεῖς ad τινάς
νας, Y ἢ
/ 4 \ ͵ > “
E μοι λέγειν ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαπούς. ᾿Αληθῆ
γάρ, ἔφη, δοκῶ σοι. Τί δέ; αὐτόθεν; dp’ οὐκ ἂν
ἐθελήσειεν; Πῶς; Τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος τοὺς
/ > ’ὔ “ = ‘ ,
πολίτας, ἐλευθερώσας, τῶν περὶ ἑαυτὸν δορυφόρων
, , “1... 8 ye \ “ΜΓ,
ποιήσασθαι. Σφόδρα γ᾽, ἔφη: ἐπεί τοι καὶ πιστὸ-
7 A a / > > ΄ 4 3427-2
Tato. αὐτῷ οὗτοί εἰσιν. Ἦ μακάριον, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα, εἰ τοιούτοις φίλοις τε καὶ
568 πιστοῖς ἀνδράσι χρῆται, τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους
> / > A 7 ” / ~
ἀπολέσας. ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, τοιούτοις γε χρῆται.
Καὶ θαυμάζουσι δή, εἶπον, οὗτοι οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτὸν
καὶ ξύνεισιν οἱ νέοι πολῖται, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπιεικεῖς μισοῦσί
1 τί δέ; αὐτόθεν Hermann, Adam: τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν; AFDM:
τί δὲ αὐτόθεν Mon. (without punctuation): τοὺς δὲ αὐτόθεν
Stephanus.
« Cf. Laws 952 πὶ, Rep. 467 Ὁ.
> Cf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss
guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by
George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatics
in the Soviet armies.
$26
| THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
rf
while they remove the worst and leave the best, he
he said, “1 he is to keep his power.”’
XVIII. “ Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds
him,” said I, “‘ which bids him dwell for the most part
|
_with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his
life.” “‘ Such it is,” he said. ‘‘ And would he not,
_ the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have
_ the greater need of more and more trustworthy body-
guards?” “Οὗ course.” “‘ Whom, then; may he
trust, and whence shall he fetch them?” “ Un-
_bidden,” he said, “‘ they will wing their way * to him
ἴῃ great numbers if he furnish their wage.” “‘ Drones,
_by the dog,” I said, “ I think you are talking of again,
_an alien? and motley crew.*”’. “ You think rightly,”
he'said. “‘ But what of the home supply,’ would he
not choose to employ that?”’ “How?” “By taking
their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and
enlisting them in his bodyguard.”’ “* Assuredly,” he
id, “since these are those whom he can most trust.”
“Truly,” said I, “ this tyrant business ¢ is a blessed’
thing on your showing, if such are the friends and
| “trusties” he must employ after destroying his former
_associates.”’ ‘‘ But such are indeed those he does
: make use of,” he said. ‘‘ And these companions
admire him,” I said, “ and these new citizens are his
_ associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him.”
° παντοδαπούς: cf. on 557 ο.
4 For αὐτόθεν cf. Herod. i. 64 τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ
| Στρύμονος, Thue. i. 11, Xen. Ages. 1. 28.
* For the idiomatic and colloquial χρῆμα cf. Herod. i. 36,
_Enurip. Androm. 181, Theaet. 209 2, Aristoph. Clouds 1,
Birds 826, Wasps 933, Lysistr. 83, 1085, Acharn. 150, Peace
1192, Knights 1219, Frogs 1278.
For the wretched lot of the tyrant εὖ. p. 368, note a.
327
does the reverse.” “ Yes, for apparently he must,” |
}
Β
C
PLATO
τε καὶ φεύγουσιν; Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλουσιν; Οὐκ ἐτός,
β' ἐγ ’ ν / Ld \ cal :
ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἥ τε τραγῳδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι —
καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ. Τί δή; Ὅτι
καὶ τοῦτο πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόμενον ἐφθέγξατο,
ὡς ἄρα σοφοὶ τύραννοί εἰσι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ.
τ ν “ Ὁ ,ὔ A A
καὶ ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς οἷς
ξύνεστιν. Kai ὡς ἰσόθεόν γ᾽, ἔφη, τὴν τυραννίδα
τ
re
> ͵ὔ A > ᾿ {ὦ
ἐγκωμιάζει, καὶ ἕτερα πολλά, καὶ οὗτος καὶ οὗ
ἄλλοι ποιηταί. Τοιγάρτοι, ἔφην, ἅτε σοφοὶ ὄντες
οἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιηταὶ ξυγγιγνώσκουσιν ἡμῖν
τε καὶ ἐκείνοις, ὅσοι ἡμῶν ἐγγὺς πολιτεύονται,
ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα ἅτε
τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς. Οἶμαι ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη, ξυγγιγνώ- —
σκουσιν ὅσοιπέρ γε αὐτῶν κομψοί. His δέ γε,
οἶμαι, τὰς ἄλλας περιιόντες πόλεις, ξυλλέγοντες
\ * ‘ A ‘ / \ A
τοὺς ὄχλους, καλὰς φωνὰς Kal μεγάλας καὶ πιθανὰς
μισθωσάμενοι εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας |
μὲ \ ,ὔ / > “ Α
ἕλκουσι τὰς πολιτείας. Mada γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ |
προσέτι τούτων μισθοὺς λαμβάνουσι καὶ τιμῶνται,
μάλιστα μέν, ὥσπερ τὸ εἰκός, ὑπὸ τυράννων,
δεύτερον δὲ ὑπὸ δημοκρατίας: ὅσῳ δ᾽ ἂν ἀνωτέρω
ἴωσι πρὸς τὸ ἄναντες τῶν πολιτειῶν, μᾶλλον
ἀπαγορεύει αὐτῶν ἡ τιμή, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος
ἀδυνατοῦσα πορεύεσθαι. Ilavu μὲν οὖν.
® For οὐκ ἐτός cf. 4148. The idiom is frequent in Aristoph.
Cf. e.g. Acharn. 411, 413, Birds 915, Thesm. 921, Plut. 404,
1166, Feel. 245.
ὃ This is plainly ironical and cannot be used by the
admirers of Euripides.
° Cf. πυκιναὶ φρένες Iliad xiv. 294, πυκινὸς νόος xv. 41, ete.
4 Cf. Theages 125 8 f. The line is also attributed to
Sophocles. Cf. Stemplinger, Das Plagiat in der griechi-
schen Literatur, p. 9; Gellius xiii. 18, F. Diimmler, Aka-
demika, p. 16. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 119 thinks this an
328
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
“Why should they not?’’ “Not for nothing,*”’ said
I,“ is tragedy in general esteemed wise, and Euripides
beyond other tragedians.’”’ ‘‘ Why, pray?’’ “ Be-
cause among other utterances of pregnant thought °
he said, ‘Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.?”
He meant evidently that these associates of the
are the wise.”’ “‘ Yes, he and the other poets,”
he said, “call the tyrant’s power ‘likest God’s’* and
praise it in many other ways.” ‘‘ Wherefore,’’ said
I, “ being wise as they are, the poets of tragedy will
rdon_us and those whose politics resemble ours
for not admitting them/ into our polity, since they
hymn the praises of tyranny.” “I think,” he said,
“that the subtle minds? among them will pardon us.”
“But going about to other cities, I fancy, collecting
crowds and hiring fine, loud, persuasive voices,* they
draw the polities towards tyrannies or democracies.”
“ Yes, indeed.” ‘‘ And, further, they are paid and
honoured for this, chiefly, as is to be expected, by
tyrants, and secondly by democracy.‘ But the higher
they go, breasting constitution hill, the more their
honour fails, as it were from lack of breath’ unable to
proceed.” “* Quite so.”
allusion to Euripides and Agathon at the court of Archelaus
of Macedon.
Isocrates ix. 40, like the poets, praises the tyrants, but ii.
3-5 contrasts their education unfavourably with that of the
ordinary citizen. Throughout the passage he is plainly
thinking of Plato.
δ ΚΑ Vol. I. p. 119, note ¢, Eurip. Tro. 1169, Isoe. ii. 5.
7 Cf. supra 394 υ. What Plato Said, p. 561, infra 598 ff.
® κομψοί is used playfully or ironically.
* Cf. See. 502 8 ff., Laws $17 c, and for the expression
- D.
* Cf. Laches 183 a-B.
3 Cf. Shakes. Ant. and Cleop. τι. x. 25 “Our fortune on
the sea is out of breath.”
329
PLATO ἼΣΗ SET
XIX. ᾿Αλλὰ δή, εἶπον, ἐνταῦθα. μὲν ἐξέβημεν:
λέγωμεν. δὲ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατό-
πεὸδον τὸ “καλόν τε καὶ πολὺ καὶ ποικίλον καὶ
οὐδέποτε ταὐτόν, πόθεν θρέψεται. ae ἔφη,
ὅτι, ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ἢ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα
3 / μὲ A, Ὁ, δον ἐν ~ " A ~ >
ἀναλώσει ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐξαρκῇ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀπ-
ολομένων," ἐλάττους εἰσφορὰς ἀναγκάζων τὸν δῆμον
E εἰσφέρειν. Τί δ᾽ ὅταν δὴ ταῦτα ἐπιλείπῃ; Δῆλον, ᾿
569
ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατρῴων θρέψεται αὐτός τε κ
οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ ἑταῖραι. Μανθάνω,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. ὅτι ὃ δῆμος 6 γεννήσας τὸν eget,
θρέψει αὐτόν τε καὶ ἑταίρους. Πολλὴ αὐτῷ, ἔφη,
ἀνάγκη. Πῶς δὲ λέγεις; εἶπον" ἐὰν δὲ ἀγανακτῇ |
τε καὶ λέγῃ ὁ δῆμος, ὅτι οὔτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι
ὑπὸ πατρὸς υἱὸν ἡβῶντα, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίόν ὑπὸ
υἱέος πατέρα, οὔτε τούτου αὐτὸν ἕνεκα ἐγέννησέ
τε καὶ κατέστησεν, ἵνα, ἐπειδὴ μέγας γένοιτο,
τότε αὐτὸς δουλεύων τοῖς αὑτοῦ δούλοις. τρέφοι —
ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τοὺς δούλους μετὰ ξυγκλύδων. |
ἄλλων, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶι s
κἀγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθείη
ἐκείνου προστάντος, καὶ νῦν κελεύει ἀπιέναι ἐκ
τῆς “πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὥσπερ
πατὴρ υἱὸν ἐξ οἰκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν. ξυμποτῶν
ἐξελαύνων; Γνώσεταί γε, νὴ Δία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, τότ
ἤδη ὃ δῆμος, οἷος οἷον θρέμμα γεννῶν ἠσπᾶζετό
1 καὶ τὰ Baiter, τὰ Μ88.: ἀπολομένων Α3,, ἀποδομένων ΔΕΏΜ,
πωλουμένων οἷ. Campbell. See Adam, App. VI.
9 Cf. on 572 5, p. 339, note ὁ.
Ὁ Of. 574 νυ, Diels? p. 578, Anon. Iambl. 3.
© Cf. Soph. O.T. 873 ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον.
330
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
_ XIX. “ But this,” said I, “is a digression.* Let us
return to that fair, multitudinous, diversified and
ever-changing bodyguard of the tyrant and tell how
it will be supported.” ‘‘ Obviously,” he said, “ if
there are sacred treasures in the city he will spend
these as long as they last and the property of those
he has destroyed, thus requiring smaller contribu-
tions from the populace.” “‘ But what when these
resources fail®?” “‘ Clearly,” he said, “ his father’s
estate will have to support him and his wassailers, his
fellows and his she-fellows.” ‘‘ I understand,” I said,
_ “that the people which begot the tyrant? will have
to feed him and his companions.” “It cannot escape
_ from that,” he said. ‘“‘ And what have you to say,”
I said, “in case the people protests and says that it
is not right that a grown-up son should be supported
by his father, but the reverse, and that it did not beget
and establish him in order that, when he had grown
great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed
him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble
of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector,
it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and
the so-called ‘better classes,’ ὁ and that it now bids him
and his crew depart from the city as a father expels®
from his house a son together with troublesome
_reyellers?” ‘‘ The demos, by Zeus,” he said,“ will then
learn to its cost’ what it is and what? a creature it
4 For καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ef. Aristoph. Knights 185, and Blaydes
on 735. See also supra on 489 π, p. 27, note d.
* Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 123.
7 For the threatening γνώσεται cf. 362 a, 466 c, I. xviii.
270 and 125, Theocr. xxvi. 19 τάχα γνώσῃ, and Lucian,
_ Timon 33 εἴσεται.
σ For the juxtaposition οἷος οἷον cf. Symp. 195 a, Sophocles
El. 751, Ajax 557, 923, Trach. 995, 1045.
331
PLATO > aise
τε καὶ nde, Kal ὅτι ἀσθενέστερος ὧν. ἰσχυροτέ-
ρους ἐξελαύνει. Πῶς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λέγεις; τολμή-
σει τὸν πατέρα βιάζεσθαι, κἂν μὴ πείθηται, τύπ-
τειν ὃ τύραννος; Ναί, ἔφη, ἀφελ ὀμενός γε τὰ
ὅπλα. Πατραλοίαν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λέγε τύραννον
καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς dou τοῦτο δὴ
ὁμολογουμένη ἂν ἤδη τυραννὶς εἴη, καὶ τὸ λεγό-
μενον ὁ δῆμος φεύγων ἂν καπνὸν δουλείας ἐλευθέ-
ρων εἰς πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας ἂν ἐμπεπτωκὼς
εἴη, ἀντὶ τῆς πολλῆς ἐκείνης καὶ ἀκαίρου ἐλευθε- ὦ
ρίας τὴν χαλεπωτάτην τε καὶ πικροτάτην δούλων —
δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος. Καὶ μάλα, ἔ “on, ταῦτα
οὕτω γίγνεται. Te οὖν; εἶπον" οὐκ ἐμμελῶς
ἡμῖν εἰρήσεται, ἐὰν φῶμεν ἱκανῶς διεληλυθέναι, ᾿
ὡς μεταβαίνει τυραννὶς ἐκ δημοκρατίας, γενομένη [
τε οἵα ἐστίν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.
«ΟἹ, infra on 874 ο, pp. 346-347, note ὁ. ᾿
» As we say, “ Out of the frying-pan into the fire.” of
Anth. Pal. ix. 17.5 ἐκ πυρὸς ὡς aivos ᾽πεσες és φλόγα, Theo- —
doret, Therap. iii. p. 773 καὶ τὸν καπνὸν κατὰ τὴν Winer '
ἔοικε, φύγοντες. εἰς αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ἐμπεπτώκαμεν. See Oito, ᾿
137; also Solon 7 (17) (Anth, Lyr., Bergk-Hiller, 9 ἢ
'dmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus, i. p. 122, ges Classical
332
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VIII
ἶ begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in
its weakness it tries to expel the stronger.” ‘“ What
_do you mean?” said I; “ will the tyrant dare to use
_ force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to
strike him*?” “Yes,” he said, “after he has once
taken from him his arms.” “A very parricide,” said I,
“you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse
of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open
and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying
to eseape the smoke of submission to the free would
haye plunged into the fire® of enslavement to slaves,
and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable
liberty ¢ has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel
and bitter servile servitude.?”’ “ Yes indeed,” he said,
“that is just what happens.” “ Well, then,” said I,
“ shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we
have sufficiently described the transformation of a
democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the
tyranny itself?” ‘‘ Quite sufficiently,” he said.
Library) εἰς δὲ μονάρχου δῆμος ἀιδρείῃ δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν,
Herod. iii. 81 τυράννου ὕβριν φεύγοντας ἄνδρας ἐς δήμου
ἀκολάστου ὕβριν πεσεῖν, and for the idea Epist. viii. 354 Ὁ.
- we Epist. viii. 354 νυ.
4 For rhetorical style ef. Tim. 41 a θεοὶ θεῶν, Polit.
303 ὁ σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς, and the biblical expressions, God
of Gods and Lord of Lords, ¢.g. Deut. x. 17, Ps. exxxvi. 2-3,
Dan. xi. 36, Rev. xix. 16. Cf. Jebb on Soph. 0.7. 1063
τρίδουλος.
333
θ ey
571 1. Αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπός, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὁ TUE pene
ἀνὴρ σκέψασθαι, πῶς τε μεθίσταται ἐκ κρα-
τικοῦ, γενόμενός τε ποῖός τίς ἐστι καὶ Tia 7 ρόπο
ζῇ, ἄθλιον ἢ PEEL Aounds γὰρ οὖν ἔτι yea Ὃς,
ἔφη. Οἶσθ᾽ οὖν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὃ ποθῶ ects Τὸ:
ποῖον; Τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οἷαί τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰσίν,
οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν ἱκανῶς διῃρῆσθαι. τούτου |
Β ἐνδεῶς ἔχοντος, ἀσαφεστέρα ἔσται ἡ ζήτησις ο
ζητοῦμεν. Οὐκοῦν, ve δ᾽ ὅς, ἔτ᾽ ἐν καλῷ'; ; Πάνυ.
μὲν οὖν: καὶ σκόπει y δ ἐν αὐταῖς βούλομαι ἰδεῖν.
ἔστι δὲ τόδε. τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ
ἐπιθυμιῶν δοκοῦσί τινές μοι εἶναι παράνομοι,
κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ἐγγίγνεσθαι παντί, \Glotaaee
de ὑ ὑπό τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν
μετὰ λόγου ἐνίων ἐν ἀνθρώπων ἢ παντάπασιν
ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἢ ὀλίγαι λείπεσθαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς,
Ο τῶν δὲ ἰσχυρότεραι καὶ πλείους. Λέγεις δὲ καὶ
τίνας, ἔφη, ταύτας; Τὰς περὶ τὸν ὕπνον, ἦν δ᾽
1 ἐν καλῷ Μ and almost all editions: ἐγκαλῶ AFD, defended —
by Apelt, Berl. Phil. Woch. 1895, p. 965.
@ For ἐν καλῷ ef. Soph. El. 348, Eurip. Heracleid. 971,
Aristoph. Heel. 321, Thesm. 292.
> Cf. on 558 ν.
ὁ For κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c.
4 Of, Aristot. Bth. Nic. 1102 Ὁ 5 ff. ὁ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς
334
BOOK Ix
I. “ There remains for consideration,” said I, “‘ the
tyrannical man himself—the manner of his develop-
‘ment out of the democratic type and his character and
the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy.”
“Why, yes, he still remains,” he said. “Do you
know, then, what it is that I still miss?’ ““ What?”
“ In the matter of our desires I do not think we suffi-
ciently distinguished their nature and number. And
‘so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clear-
ness.’ “‘ Well,” said he, “‘ will our consideration of
them not still be opportune*?”’ “By allmeans. And
observe what it is about them that I wish to consider.
Itis this. Of our unnecessary pleasures? and appetites
there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably
are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled?
by the laws and the better desires in alliance with
reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of,
or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain,
while in others the remnant is stronger and more
numerous.” “‘What desires do you mean?”’ he said.
“Those,” said I, “that are awakened in sleep? when
ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ᾽ ὕπνον, etc.; also his Problem. 957 a 21 ff.
Οἷς. De divin. i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further
Herod. vi. 107, Soph. O.T. 981-982.
Hazlitt writes “We are not hypocrites in our sleep,”
a modern novelist, “* In sleep all barriers are down.”
The Freudians have at last discovered Plato’s anticipation
335
PLATO
ἐγώ, ἐγειρομένας, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τῆς ψυχῆς
εὕδῃ, ὅσον λογιστικὸν καὶ ἥμερον καὶ ,ἄρχον
ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ θηριῶδές τε καὶ “ἄγριον, ἢ σίτων ἢ
μέθης πλησθέν, σκιρτᾷ τε καὶ ἀπωσάμενον τὸν
ὕπνον ζητῇ ἰ ἰέναι καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ αὑτοῦ ἤθη:
οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι πάντα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τολμᾷ ποιεῖν, ὡς
ἀπὸ πάσης λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον αἰσχύ-
νῆς καὶ φρονήσεως. μητρί τε γὰρ, ἐπιχειρεῖν
Ὁ μίγνυσθαι, ὡς οἴεται, οὐδὲν ὁ ὀκνεῖ, Ὁ TE ὁτῳοῦν
ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων, μις νεῖν τι ἣ
ὁτιοῦν, “βρώματός τε ἀπέχεσθαι μηδενός: καὶ
λόγῳ οὔτε ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει οὔτ᾽ ἀναισχυντίας.
᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὅταν δέ γε, οἶμαι,
ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ καὶ σωφρόνως, καὶ
εἰς τὸν ὕπνον ἴῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν μὲν ἐγείρας ἑαυτοῦ.
καὶ ἑστιάσας λόγων καλῶν καὶ σκέψεων, εἰς
σύννοιαν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀφικόμενος, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν
E82 μήτε ἐνδείᾳ δοὺς μήτε πλησμονῇ, ὅπως. ἂν
ἘΠῚ τ
of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in —
Peace and War, p. 74: “It has been perhaps. Freud’s most —
remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this
emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious
into the conscious field.’’ ‘‘ The barriers of the Freudian
unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep” senten-
tiously observes an eminent modern psychologist.
Valentine, The New Psychology of the Unconscious, p. xiii.
and ibid. p. 93: ‘‘ Freud refers to Plato’s view that the
virtuous man contents himself with dreaming that which the
wicked man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows
a knowledge of the following passage in the Republic. . ..”
Cf. ibid. p. 95: “* The | fae several aspects of the Freudian
view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the
censor, was to be found in Plato. ‘The Freudian view
becomes at once distinctly more respectable.” 1
336
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant _
part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, re-
plete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling
sleep, endeayours.to sally forth and satisfy its own
Be @ You are aware that in such case there is
thing it will not venture to undertake as being
S ae from all sense of shame and all reason. It
not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother
or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It
is fee for any foul deed of blood ; it abstains from no
food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly”
and shamelessness. ὌΝ Most true,” he said. “Βαΐ
when, I suppose, a man’s condition is healthy and
sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational
part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts,
and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has
neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appeti-
r- bg of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, ex-
Ited the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams,
nade it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on
Aesch. Eumen. 104, Pindar, fr. 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589:
εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὑδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς «ὀνείροις
| δείκνυσι τέρπνων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, “but it
sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep,
in π ἢ dream it giveth presage of a decision of things
€ or doleful.™ * (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan.
ix. 23, Cic. De div. i. ay Sir Thomas Browne, Religio
M edici, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not
share these superstitions. “Cf. the irony of Tim. 71 p-¥,
und my review of Stewart’s “Myths of Plato,” Journal
Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods, vol. iii., 1906,
“pp. 495-498.
_* The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are
Passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the
CO test for ἦθος, φύσις and such words.
“ὃ For the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει ef. Soph. Trach. 90, Demosth,
liv . 34. Cf. also 602 p and on 533 a, p. 200, note ὁ.
VOL. II Ζ 337
SPLATOMTA ΠῊΤ
572 Κοιμηθῇ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ. θόρυβον τῷ βελτίστι
χαῖρον ἢ λυπούμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐᾷ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ adrc
μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαί του καὶ
αἰσθάνεσθαι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἢ τι τῶν γεγονότων ἢ
ὄντων ἢ καὶ μελλόντων, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ
θυμοειδὲς πραὔνας καὶ μή τισιν εἰς ὀργὰς ἐλθὼν
κεκινημένῳ τῷ θυμῷ καθεύδῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχάσας μὲν
τὼ δύο εἴδη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας, ἐν ᾧ τὸ φρονεῖν
ἐγγίγνεται, οὕτως ἀναπαύηται, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τῆς +
ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἅπτεται κα
ἥκιστα παράνομοι τότε at ὄψεις φαντάζονται τι
ἐνυπνίων. ἸΙαντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἶμαι οὕτως
Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐξήχθημεν εἰπεῖν" ὃ δι
βουλόμεθα γνῶναι, τόδ᾽ ἐστίν, ὡς ἄρα δεινόν τι καὶ
ἄγριον καὶ ἄνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστι,
καὶ πάνυ δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίοις μετρίοις εἶναι"
τοῦτο δὲ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γίγνεται ἔνδηλον. εἰ
οὖν τὶ δοκῶ λέγειν καὶ ξυγχωρεῖς, ἄθρει. ᾿Α
ξυγχωρῶ. Ἵ
'᾿
« Cf. Browning, Bishop Blougram’s Apology, “‘ And body
gets its sop and holds its noise.’ ; ΝΣ
Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages”
x
|
in the Republic, Laws, Gorgias, and Phaedo. Cf. Herbert ἢ
L. Stewart, ‘‘ Was Plato an Ascetic?” Philos. +3 τ},
pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, Christian Ethics, Ὁ. 90: “The
asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane and
moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination οὗ
self-restraint and simplicity with humanism.” ;
» Of. Ephesians iv. 26 ** Let not the sun go down upon
your wrath.” é 3
5 ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 B, 465 a, 470 c, 492 c, 590 a,
Lysis 212 c, Laws 625 τ. )
4 This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says.
**Pater’s complaint that Plato’s sentences are long may be
regarded as Pater’s single excursion into humour.” But
338
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
tive ors lai it may be lulled to sleep? and not
disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but
‘may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and
reach out towards and apprehend some of the things
unknown to it, past, present or future ; and when he
has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and
does not after a quarrel fall asleep® with anger still
awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the
two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in
which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are
aware that in such case* he is most likely to apprehend
truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely
to be lawless.” ὁ “1 certainly think so,” he said.
“ This description has carried us too far,’ but the point
that we have to notice is this, that in fact there
exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most
ble,’ a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of
desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep.
Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I
say, and whether you admit it.” “* Well, I do.”
ater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato’
pees le. He “ais this passage Plato's ering ah 2 yer. a
Be PinG always tela’ τὸ the polit after a digression.
Cf. 543 c, 471 c, 544.8, 568 pv, 588 8, Phaedo 78 B, Theaet.
77 c, Protag. 359 a, Crat. 438 a, Polit. 287 a-s, 263 c,
B, Laws 682 £, 697 c, 864 ο, and many other
. also Lysias ii. 61 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθην, Bemosth.
cor. 211, Aristot. De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i,
and Plato’s carefulness in keeping to the point under dis-
cussion in 858 ο, Theaet. 182 c, 206 c, Meno 93 a-s, Gorg.
479 v-£, 459 c-p, etc.
--? For the irony of the expression cf. Laws 633 p, Aesch.
Eumen. 373, and for the thought Othello mu. iii, 138:
who has a breast so pure
bs But some uncleanly apprehensions
Keep leets and law-days, and in session sit
With meditations lawful?
339
ml
PLATO! ΠΗῚ
Il. Τὸν τοίνυν δημοτικὸν. ἀναμνή τι ol
C ἔφαμεν εἶναι. ἣν δέ που γεγονὼς. ἐκ νέου
φειδωλῷ. πατρὶ τεθραμμένος, τὰς χρὴ ατιστι ἃς
ἐπιθυμίας τιμῶντι μόνας, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους,
ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα. ae:
μένας, ἀτιμάζοντι. ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Συγγενόμενο.
ἐ κομψοτέροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ᾿ ἄρτι.
διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὁρμήσας εἰς. ὕβριν, Te di νῇ
καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων εἶδος μίσει τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς Σ
λίας, φύσιν δὲ τῶν διαφθειρόντων. βελτίω. Fan
Da ἀγόμενος ἀμφοτέρωσε κατέστη εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῖν
τοῖν τρόποιν, καὶ μετρίως δή, ὡς. ᾧετο, ἑκάστωι
ἀπολαύων οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον. βίον
ζῇ, δημοτικὸς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γεγονώς. Ἢν γάρ. ἡ
ἔφη, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα περὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον.
Θὲς τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ “ἐγώ, πάλιν τοῦ τοιούτου 701
πρεσβυτέρου γεγονότος νέον υἱὸν ἐν τοῖς τούτου
αὖ ἤθεσι τεθραμμένον. Τίθημι. Τίθει τοίνυν καὶ
τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα περὶ αὐτὸν γιγνόμενα, ἅπερ καὶ
E περὶ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ, ἀγόμενόν τε eis πᾶσα
παρανομίαν, ὀνομαζομένην δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγόντι »ν ἢ
ἐλευθερίαν ἅπασαν, βοηθοῦντά τε ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ |
ταύταις ἐπιθυμίαις πατέρα τε καὶ τοὺς «ἄλλου
οἰκείους, τοὺς ὃν. αὖ παραβοηθοῦντας" ὅταν
ἐλπίσωσιν οἱ δεινοὶ μάγοι τε καὶ τυραννοποι
οὗτοι μὴ ἄλλως τὸν νέον καθέξειν, ἔρωτά τινο
αὐτῷ μηχανωμένους ἐμποιῆσαι προστάτην τῶν
|
Cf. 559 vf. q
ὃ els μέσον : ef. p. 249, note αὶ
© Tronical “δή. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire onl
“ moderate” drinking and “ moderate ”’ preparedness. b
@ ὡς @ero is another ironical formula like ἵνα δή, ὡς dpa, ete,
340
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
IL. “ Now recall ¢ our characterization of the demo-
cratic man. His development was determined by
his education from youth under a thrifty father who
approved. only the acquisitive appetites and dis-
approved the unnecessary ones whose object is enter-
tainment and display. Is not that so?” “Yes
“ And by association with more sophisticated men,
teeming with the appetites we have just described,
he is impelled towards every form of insolence and
outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by
his hatred of his father’s niggardliness. But since
his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being
drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise ὃ
between the two tendencies, and indulging and en-
j each in moderation, forsooth,° as he sup
lives what he deems a life that is neither iiperat
hor lawless, now transformed from an_ oli
democrat.” ‘‘ That was and is our belief about ‘this
” ** Assume,’ then, again,” said I, “ that such a
manwhenhe i is older has ason bred in turn/ in his ways
of life.” “Iso assume.” ~ And suppose the experi-
e of his father to be repeated in his case. He is
wn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by
his seducers complete freedom. His father and his
otherkin lend support to’ these compromise appetites
while the others lend theirs to the opposite group.
And when these dread magi” and king-makers come
to realize that they have no hope of controlling the
youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in
* θές: ef. Theaet. 191 c, Phileb. 33 Ὁ.
_ * This is the αὖ of the succession of the genera eat Cf.
p. 247, note αὶ
ae Ch. 559 ε.
_ * An overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the
false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff.
341
573 ἀργῶν καὶ τὰ ἕτοιμα Siaenoperon meses
PLATOUNA FAT
ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφῆνά τινα τὐμᾶλλο ῥηντάλκν.
εἶναι τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἔρωτα; “οὐδὲν Ὶ
δ᾽ ὅς, ἄλλ᾽ ἢ τοῦτο. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν as {3}: ὃν
βομβοῦσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, θυμιαμάτων. τε
γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ olvw
τῶν ἐν “ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν. ‘aera
μένων, ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὔξουσαί τε καὶ τρέφουσαι ’
πόθου κέντρον ἐμποιήσωσι τῷ κηφῆνι, τότε δὴ
Β Sopudopetrat τε ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ οἰστρᾷ. οὗτος ὁ
προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἐάν τινας ἐν αὐτῷ doc ς
ἢ ἐπιθυμίας λάβῃ ποιουμένας χρηστὰς. καὶ €
ἐπαισχυνομένας, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὠθεῖ πα
αὑτοῦ, ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης, μανίας" δὲ
πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ. Παντελῶς, ἔφη, τυραννι
ἀνδρὸς λέγεις γένεσιν. “Ap οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, Kal τὸ
πάλαι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον τύραννος ὁ "Ἔρως λέγεται;
Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, εἶπον, καὶ
σ μεθυσθεὶς ἀνὴρ τυραννικόν τι φρόνημα. ἴσχει. 4
Ἴσχει γάρ. Καὶ μὴν ὅ γε μαινόμενος καὶ ὑπο-
κεκινηκὼς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν
ἐπιχειρεῖ τε καὶ ἐλπίζει δυνατὸς εἶναι ἄρχειν.
/
Kat μάλ᾽, ἔφη. Τυραννικὸς δέ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
1 ἥτιΑ: ἢ τί FDM. 2 μανίας FD: καὶ μανίας AM. *
@ Of. Symp. 205 Ὁ.
> προστάτην: cf. 562 p and 565 c-p. 4
¢ For ra ἕτοιμα cf. 552 B, Symp. 200 ἢ and 8, and 1 Horace
ae i. 31. 17 ‘ frui paratis.”
. Ale. 1. 185 © ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον and the fragment of
Babu us (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178): . 4
τίς ἣν ὁ γράψας πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἄρα
ἢ κηροπλαστήσας Ἔρωθ᾽ ὑπόπτερον;
842
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
hissoul a ruling passion ® to be the protector? of hisidle
and prodigal® appetites, a monstrous winged drone.
Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is
aught else?’’ “ Nothing but that,” he said. “‘ And
when the other appetites, buzzing ¢ about it, replete
with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and
the pleasures that are released in such revelries, mag-
and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the
drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,’ why then
this protector of the soul has madness for his body-
guard and runs amuck,’ and if it finds in the man any
opinions or appetites accounted” worthy and still
capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth
until it purges ἡ him of sobriety, and fills and infects
him with frenzy brought in from outside’” ΤΑ
ect t description,” he said, “‘ of the generation of the
man.” “And is not this analogy, ’’said I,
“the reason why Love has long since been called a
tyrant*®?” “‘That suey well be,’ he said. ‘‘ And does
not a drunken man,! my friend,” I said, “ have some-
thing of this tyrannical temper?” “‘ Yes, he has.”
* And again the madman, the deranged man, attem pe
and expects to rule over not only men but gods.” “*
indeed, he does,” he said. ‘‘ Then a man becomes
- ε ΕΝ
fe Phaddius 253 Ἑ.
_ 9 For οἰστρᾷ cf. Phaedr. 240 ν.
ΠΝ For ποιουμένας in this sense ef. 538 c, 498 a, 574 ν.
_* Cf. on 560 pv, p. 299, note c.
ΟΥ ἐπακτοῦ: cf. 405 8, Pindar, Pyth. vi. 10, Aesch. Seven
against Thebes 583, Soph. Trach. 259.
* Cf. 573 pv, Eurip. Hippol. 538, Andromeda, fr. 136
(Nauck) θεῶν τύραννε... . Ἔρως, and What Plato Said,
Ρ. 546 on Symp. 197 5.
* For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood cf. Laws 649 π,
671 8, Phaedr. 238 8.
343
ΡΡΆΨΟΙ ΤΙΝ HHP
δαιμόνιε, ἀνὴρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν ἢ φύσει ἢ
ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις μεθυστικός Te |
ἐρωτικὸς καὶ μελαγχολικὸς ria? ek Tlav
μὲν οὖν. ῬΕΓΝ
iil. Γίγνεται μέν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τοιοῦ:
ἀνήρ: ζῇ δὲ δὴ πῶς; Τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, en
D τοῦτο σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς. “Λέγω δή, ἔφην. οἷ
γὰρ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑορταὶ γίγνονται παρ᾽ αὐ
καὶ κῶμοι καὶ θάλειαι καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ τὰ τοια if
,ὔ φι nn” "eh , évdo 7 A ;
πάντα, ὧν av "Ἔρως τύραννος ν οἰκῶν.
κυβερνᾷ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα. ᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη.
*Ap’ οὖν οὐ πολλαὶ καὶ δειναὶ παραβλο στάνουσιν
ἐπιθυμίαι ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἑκάστης, πολλῶι
δεόμεναι; Πολλαὶ μέντοι. Ταχὺ ἄρα ἀναλίσκον-
ται, ἐάν τινες ὦσι πρόσοδοι. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; Καὶ per ¢
E τοῦτο δὴ δανεισμοὶ Kat τῆς οὐσίας παραιρέσεις.
Τί μήν; Ὅταν δὲ δὴ πάντ᾽ ἐπιλείπῃ, ἄρα obi
ἀνάγκη μὲν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας βοᾶν πυκνάς τε
σφοδρὰς ἐννενεοττευμένας, τοὺς δ᾽ ὥσπερ
κέντρων ἐλαυνομένους τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶ;
καὶ διαφερόντως ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔρωτος, πάσαις ταῖς
ἄλλαις ὥσπερ δορυφόροις ἡγουμένου; οἰστρᾶν κι
σκοπεῖν, τίς τι ἔχει, ὃν δυνατὸν ἀφελέσθαι ἀπατή-
574 σαντα ἢ βιασάμενον; Σφόδρα γ᾽, ἔφη. ᾿Αναγκαῖοι
δὴ πανταχόθεν φέρειν, ἢ μεγάλαις ὠδῖσί τε καὶ
ΗΜ
«ΟἹ Adam ad loc., who insists it means his origin as wel
as that of others, and says his character is still to be
described. But it has been in c and before.
> Cf. Phileb. 25 B and pemiaps Rep. 427 © with 449 p
The slight jest is a commonplace to-day. Wilamowitz, Platon,
ib p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the
hilebus.
344
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
: ical in the full sense of the word, my friend,”
I said, “‘ when either by nature or by habits or by
both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic,
the maniacal.” “‘ Assuredly.”
III. “‘ Such, it seems, is his origin and character,*
but what is his manner of life?’ “ As the wits say,
you shall tell me.®”’ “Ido,” Isaid; “for, I take it,
next there are among them feasts and carousals and
revellings and courtesans ° and all the doings of those
whose? souls are entirely swayed ὁ by the indwelling
tyrant Eros.” “Inevitably,” he said. ‘‘ And do not
many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master
passion every day and night in need of many things ?”
“Many indeed.” ‘ And so any revenues there may
be are quickly expended.” “Of course.” “ And
after this there are borrowings and levyings* upon
the estate?”’ “Of course.” ‘‘ And when all these
resources fail, must there not come a cry from the
frequent and fierce nestlings ? of desire hatched in his
soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by
geads, by the other desires, and especially by the
ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—
to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and
look to see who has aught that can be taken from
him by deceit or violence?” “* Most certainly.”
“And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every
© Cf. Vol. I. p. 160, note a, on 373 a. Emendations are
superfluous.
ὧν ἄν: cf. 441 p-£ ὅτου, etc., 583 a ἐν ᾧ, and my review
of Jowett and Campbell, A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.
¢ Cf. Phaedr. 238 s-c.
7 For παραιρέσεις ef. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot. Pol. 1311 a 12,
1315 a 38.
9 ἐννενεοττευμένας: ef. Alc. I. 135 2, Laws 776 a, 949 c,
Aristoph. Birds 699, 1108.
345
PLATO TSH ΠΗ
ὀδύναις ξυνέχεσθαι. ᾿Αναγκαῖον., "Ap οὖν, ὥσπερ
at ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τῶν ἀρχαίων
πλέον εἶχον καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων ἀφῃροῦντο, οὕτω καὶ
αὐτὸς ἀξιώσει νεώτερος ὧν πατρός 7 καὶ μη ς
πλέον ἔ ἔχειν καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐὰν τὸ αὑτοῦ ING
ἀναλώσῃ, ἀπονειμάμενος τῶν ᾿πατρῴ ύων; ὰ
τί “μήν; ; ἔφη. “Av δὲ δὴ αὐτῷ μὴ emurpenwoow,
dp’ od TO μὲν πρῶτον ἐπιχειροῖ av κλέπτειν. καὶ
ἀπατᾶν τοὺς γονέας; Πάντως. “πότ. ότε δὲ “μὴ
δύναιτο, ἁρπάζοι ἂν καὶ βιάζοιτο μετὰ ,Τοῦτο;,
Οἶμαι, ἔφη. ᾿Αντεχομένων δὴ καὶ κάμε caesar
θαυμάσιε, γέροντός Te καὶ γραός, ἄρ᾽ εὐλαβὴη
ἂν καὶ φείσαιτο “μή τι δρᾶσαι τῶν τυραννικῶν; ere
πάνυ, ἢ δ᾽ ὃς, ἔγωγε θαρρῶ περὶ τῶν γονέων. τοῦ
τοιούτου. ᾽᾿Αλλ᾽ > ὦ ᾿Αδείμαντε, πρὸς Διός, ἕνεκα
νεωστὶ φίλης καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας ἑταίρας γεγονυίας,
τὴν πάλαι φίλην καὶ ἀναγκαίαν μητέρα, ἢ ἕνεκα,
ὡραίου νεωστὶ φίλου γεγονότος οὐκ ἀναγκαίου. τὸν
ἄωρόν τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον πρεσβύτην πατέρα ᾿ καὶ
τῶν φίλων ἀρχαιότατον δοκεῖ dv σοι ὁ ποὺς dros
πληγαῖς τε δοῦναι καὶ καταδουλώσασθαι ἃ ἂν αὐτοὺς
ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνοις, εἰ εἰς ν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν ἀγάγοιτο;
Ναὶ μὰ Ar’, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. ἐν γε “μακάριον, ἦν δ᾽
ἍΝ ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ τυραννικὸν υἱὸν τεκεῖν. ὦ νυ
» ἔφη. Ti δ᾽, ὅταν δὴ τὰ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς
tit
a Cf. Aesch. Lumen. 554. ;
> Cf. σον. 494 a ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας. Pion 189
¢ Cf. Vol. I. 849 Bf.
4 The word dvayxaiay means both “ necessary’? and
“akin.” Cf. Eurip. Androm. 671 τοιαῦτα Adorkers’ τοὺς
ἀναγκαίους φίλους.
ὁ For the idiom πληγαῖς. .. δοῦναι ef. Phaedr. 254 E
346
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
source? or else be afflicted with great travail and.
pain.”” “‘Heis.”. “And just as the new, upspringing
pleasures in him got the better of the original passions
of his soul and rebbed them, so he himself, tho
ounger, will claim the right to get the better‘ of rk
father and mother, and, after spending his own ‘share,
to seize and gids to his own use a portion of his
father’s estate.’ “‘ Of course,” he said, “ what
else?” “ And if they resist him, would he not at
first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and
deceive them?” . “ Certainly.” And if he failed
in that, would he not next seize it by force?” “I
think so,” he said: ‘““ And then, good sir, if the old
man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him,
would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a
tyrant? “TI am not without my fears,” he said,
“for the parents of such aone.” . “ Nay, Adeimantus,
in heaven’s name, do you suppose that, for the sake
of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no neces-
sary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his
by necessity? and from his birth? Or for the sake of
a blooming new-found. bel. ami, not necessary to his
life, he would rain blows¢ upon the aged father past
his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends ?
And would he subject them to those new favourites
if he brought them under the same roof?” “ Yes,
by Zeus,” he said. “* A most blessed lot it seems to
be,” said I, “ to be the parent of a tyrant son.” , “ It
does indeed,” he said. “ And again, when the re-
sources of his father and mother are exhausted’ and
ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν with Thompson’s note. Cf. 566 ὁ θανάτῳ
δέδοται. For striking his father cf. supra 569 B, Laws
880 ε ff., Aristoph. Clouds 1375 ff., 1421
= Ἐοὲ widely ef. 568 ©, 573 E.
347
D ἐπιλείπῃ τὸν τοιοῦτον, πολὺ δὲ ἤδη ξυνειλεγ ο
ἐν αὐτῷ a. τὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν σμῆνος, οὐ πρῶτον μὲν
οἰκίας τινὸς ἐφάψεται τοίχου ἢ τινος ὀψὲ νύκτωρ
ἰόντος τοῦ ἱματίου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἱερόν τι νεω-
κορήσει; καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πᾶσιν, ἃς. πάλαι εἶχε,
δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν. τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, τὰς
δικαίας ποιουμένας, αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυ- ;
μέναι, δορυφοροῦσαι τὸν ἔρωτα, κρατήσουσι. μετ᾽
ἐκείνου, αἱ πρότερον μὲν ὄναρ ἐλύοντο ἐν ὕπνῳ,
E ὅτε ἦν αὐτὸς ἔτι ὑπὸ νόμοις τε καὶ πατρὶ δημοκρα-
τούμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ" τυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ ἔρωτος,
οἷος ὀλιγάκις ἐγίγνετο ὄναρ, ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος a
γενόμενος, οὔτε τινὸς φόνου δεινοῦ. ἀφέξεται. οὔτε
575 βρώματος οὔτ᾽ ἔργου, ἀλλὰ τυραννικῶς. ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ
ἔρως ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ ζῶν, ἅτε αὐτὸς
ὧν μόναρχος, τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ πόλιν
ἄξει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τόλμαν, ὅθεν αὑτόν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ
αὑτὸν θόρυβον θρέψει, τὸν μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσεληλυθότα
ἀπὸ κακῆς ὁμιλίας, τὸν δ᾽ ἔνδοθεν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεθέντα καὶ ἐλευθερωθέντα. &
ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ὁ βίος τοῦ τοιούτου; Οὗτος μὲν οὖν,
ἔφη. Kai ἂν μέν γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι
Bev πόλει ὦσι καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πλῆθος σωφρονῇ,
«Οἵ, Meno 72 a, Cratyl. 401 ©, Blaydes on Aristopms
Clouds 297.
> He becomes a τοιχωρύχος or a λωποδύτης (Δεινίας
Frogs 772-773, Birds 497, Clouds 1827). Cf. 575 5, Laws
831 E.
© νεωκορήσει is an ironical litotes. So ἐφάψεται in the pre- |
ceding line.
@ For ποιουμένας ef. 573 w. For the thought cf. 538 c.
348
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
fail such a one, and the swarm 5 of pleasures collected
in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands
on the wall® of someone’s house or the cloak of some-
one who walks late at night, and thereafter he will
make a clean sweep* of some temple, and in all these
actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about
the honourable and the base, the opinions accounted
just,? will be overmastered by the opinions newly
emancipated® and released, which, serving as body-
guards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance
with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were
freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under
the control of his father and the laws, he maintained
the democratic constitution in his soul. But now,
when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is
continuously and in waking hours what he rarely
became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity
of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion
that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost
anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole
autocrat, will urge the polity,’ so to speak, of him in
whom it dwells’ to dare anything and everything in
order to find support for himself and the hubbub of
his henchmen,” in part introduced from outside by
evil associations, and in part released and liberated
within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this
the life ofsuchaone?”’ “Itis this,’ hesaid. “‘ And
if,” I said, “ there are only a few of this kind in a city,
and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-
* Of. 567 ε.
7 Cf-on 591 ©.
9 τὸν ἔχοντα: ef. Phaedr. 239 c, Laws 837 8, Soph.
Antig. 790 and also Rep. 610 c and Ε.
* For the tyrant’s companions ef. Newman, i. p. 274,
note 1.
349
ΧΙ ἈΟΟΕΓΡΙΆΠΟΙ ΜΙΝ THT
ἐξελθόντες ἄλλον τινὰ δορυφοροῦσι τύ Manca
μισθοῦ ἐπικουροῦσιν, ἐάν. που πόλεμος ἢ: ὡς ἐὰν.
ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ γένωνται, αὐτοῦ πὰ
πόλει κακὰ δρῶσι σμικρὰ πολλά. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ
λέγεις; Οἷα κλέπτουσι, τοιχωρυχοῦσι, βαλαντιο-
τομοῦσι, λωποδυτοῦσιν, ἱεροσυλοῦσιν, ἀνδραπ 53
δίζονται' ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε συκοφαντοῦσιν, ἐὰν δυνα ατοὶ
ὦσι λέγειν, καὶ ψευδομαρτυροῦσι “ae oe οδο-
κοῦσιν. Σμικρά γ᾽, ἔφη, κακὰ Acres ὰ Ny οι
ὦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι. Τὰ γὰρ σμικρά, ἦν δ᾽
τὰ μεγάλα σμικρά ἐστι, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ δδοδιαι
τύραννον πονηρίᾳ τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι πόλεως,
λεγόμενον, οὐδ᾽ ἴκταρ βάλλει. ὅταν γὰρ δὴ ολλο
ἐν πόλει γένωνται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ δ: ν-
«πόμενοι αὐτοῖς, καὶ αἴσθωνται ἑαυτῶν τὸ πλῆθος,
τότε οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τὸν τύραννον. γεννῶντες.
δήμου ἀνοίας ἐκεῖνον, ὃς ἂν αὐτῶν βάσανα αὖ
ἐν αὑτῷ μέγιστον καὶ πλεῖστον ἐ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
νον ἔχῃ. Εἰκότως γ᾽, ἔφη: τυραννικώτατος"
oF
av εἴη. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν ἑκόντες ὑπείκωσιν" ἐἰ
δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ ἡ πόλις, ὥσπερ. τότε. μητέρα |
πατέρα ἐκόλαζεν, οὕτω πάλιν τὴν πατρίδα, ὧν
οἷός T ἢ, κολάσεται ἐπεισαγόμενος νέους ἑταίρο a
καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις δὴ δουλεύουσαν τὴν πάλαι qa y
ὅν.
s
« Of. the similar lists of crimes in Gorg. 508: Ἐν πλεῖ Mo
is2. 62.
> So Shaw and other) moderns argue ina somewha at
different tone that crimes of this sort are an unimportant
matter. -f σὰ
350
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some
tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercen-
aries in any war there may be. But if they spring up ~
pens verse and tranquillity they stay right there
sparc sat effect many small evils.”” “ What
of evils do you mean? ’’ “ Oh, they just steal,
break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their gar-
ey plunder temples, and kidnap,’ and if they are
fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear
false witness and take bribes.”’ “‘ Yes, small evils
-indeed,®”’ he said, **if the men of this sort are few.”
“Why, yes,” I said, “‘ for small evils are relatively
small compared with great, and in respect of the
corruption and misery of a state all of them
together, as the saying goes, don’t come within hail ¢
of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men
of this sort and their followers become numerous in a
_ state and realize their numbers, then it is they who,
ἴῃ conjunction with the folly of the people, create a
out of that one of them who has the greatest
and mightiest tyrant in his own soul.” * Naturally,”
he said, “for he would be the most _tyrannic.
“Then if the people yield willingly—'tis well,? but if
the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case
_ the man chastized hil mother and his father, so now in
turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing
-in new boon companions beneath whose sway he
ot. hold and keep enslaved his once dear mother-
a οὐδ᾽ ay βάλλει was proverbial, “doesn’t strike near,”
᾿ Gf ako mg ag range.” Cf. πὰς Das xv. 29.
; οὐ ἐγγί 5» ymp. 198 5, 221 pb, ii. 121,
»Ἔ the Greck th the rotag
ΓΝ π ree apodosis is supp ressed. Cf. P. :
"325 v. pce ἄς τας Sales δ n. Xix. pp. ul?
351
PLATO DA ΠΗΤ
μητρίδα τε, Ἱζρῆτές φασι, καὶ πατρίδα ἕξει re καὶ
θρέψει. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τέλος ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐπιθυμίας
E τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρός. Τοῦτο, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, παντάπασί
γε. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὗτοί γε τοιοίδε γίγνονται.
ἰδίᾳ καὶ πρὶν ἄρχειν: πρῶτον μὲν οἷς ἂν ξυνῶσιν,
ἢ κόλαξιν ἑαυτῶν ξυνόντες καὶ πᾶν €roipo
576 ὑπηρετεῖν, ἢ ἐάν τού τι δέωνται, αὐτοὶ ὑποπεσόν-
τες, πάντα σχήματα τολμῶντες ποιεῖν ὡς οἰκεῖοι,
διαπραξάμενοι δὲ ἀλλότριοι ; Καὶ σφόδρα γε.
Ἐν παντὶ ἄρα τῷ βίῳ ζῶσι φίλοι μὲν οὐδέποτε
οὐδενί, ἀεὶ δέ του δεσπόζοντες ἢ δουλεύοντες
ἄλλῳ, ἐλευθερίας δὲ καὶ φιλίας ἀληθοῦς τυραννικὴ
φύσις ἀεὶ ἄγευστος. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. *Ap’ .
οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀπίστους καλοῖμεν;
Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; Καὶ μὴν ἀδίκους γε ὡς οἷόν τε
Β μάλιστα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὧμο
γήσαμεν περὶ δικαιοσύνης, οἷόν ἐστιν. ᾿Αλλὰ μήν,
ἡ δ᾽ ὅς, ὀρθῶς γε. κεφαλαιωσώμεθα τοίνυν, ἣν ὃ
ἐγώ, τὸν κάκιστον. ἔστι δέ που, οἷον ὄναρ δι-
ήλθο ὃς ἂν ὕ ῦτος ἧ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἤλθομεν, ὃς ἂν ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος 7 μὲν οὗ
Οὐκοῦν οὗτος γίγνεται, ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος
φύσει ὧν μοναρχήσῃ, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν πλείω χρόνον ἐν
ΟΡ Β
τυραννίδι βιῷ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τοιοῦτος. ᾿Ανάγ-
” ΄ \ / ¢ 7 ‘
Kn, ἔφη διαδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον 6 Γλαύκων.
* So also the Hindus of Bengal, The Nation, July 13, 1911,
p- 28. Cf. Isoc. iv. 25 πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα, Lysias ii. 18.
μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα, Plut. 792 © (An seni resp.) ἡ δὲ πατρὶς
καὶ μητρὶς ὡς Κρῆτες καλοῦσι. Cf. Vol. I. p. 303, note 4, on
414 ©, Menex. 239 a.
δ Cf. the accidental coincidence of Swinburne’s refrain,
“This is the end of every man’s desire” (Ballad of Burdens).
© ὑποπεσόντες: cf. on 494 c ὑποκείσονται.
4 σχήματα was often used for the figures of dancing. Cf.
352
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
land*—as the’ Cretans name her—and fatherland.
And this would be the end of such a man’s desire.®”’
ξ: Yes,” he said, “ this, just this.” “‘ Then,” said I,
is not this the character of such men in private life
and before they rule the state : to begin with they
associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything
to serve them, or, if they themselves want something,
they themselves fawn® and shrink from no contortion?
or abasement in protest of their friendship, though,
once. the object gained, they sing another tune.*”
“Yes indeed,” he said. “ Throughout their lives,
then, they never know what it is to be the friends of
anybody. They are always either masters or slaves,
but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedom?’ or
true friendship.” ‘‘ Quite so.” “May we not
rightly call such men faithless??”’ “ Of course.”
“Yes, and unjust to the last degree, if we were right in
our previous agreement about the nature of justice.”
“ But surely,” he said, “we were right.” “ Let us
sum up," then,” said I, “the most evil type of man.
He is, I presume, the man who, in his waking hours,
has the qualities we found in his dreamstate.” “ Quite
»- And he is developed from the man who, being
y nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and
the ate he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger
this quality becomes.’’. “ Inevitably,” said Glaucon,
taking up the argument.
Laws 669 pv, Aristoph. Peace 323, Xen. Symp. 7. 5, Eurip.
Cyclops 991. Isoc. Antid. 183 uses it of gymnastics.
“ὁ Cf. Phaedr. 241 a ἄλλος γεγονώς, Demosth. xxxiv. 13
ya ἤδη . . . καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός.
“7 Cf. Lucian, Nigrinus 15 ἄγευστος μὲν ἐλευθερίας, ἀπείρατος
δὲ παρρησίας, Aristot. Hth, Nic. 1176 Ὁ 19, 1179 Ὁ 1ὅ.
9 Cf, Laws 730 c, 705 A.
Cf. Phaedr. 239 τ ἕν κεφάλαιον.
VOL. II Qa 353
,
PHATOUNA ΠΗῚ
IV. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὃς ἂν φαίνηται πονὴ-
Ορότατος, καὶ ἀθλιώτατος φανήσεται; ᾿ καὶ ὃς ἂν
πλεῖστον χρόνον καὶ μάλιστα τυραννεύσῃ, μάλιστά
τε καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον τοιοῦτος γεγονὼς Th ἀλη-
θείᾳ; τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ. ᾿Ανάγκη,
ἔφη, ταῦτα γοῦν οὕτως ἔχειν. ἤΑλλο. τί οὖν, ἦν
δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ τὴν τυραννουμένην
πόλιν ἂν εἴη ὁμοιότητι, δημοτικὸς δὲ κατὰ δημο-
κρατουμένην, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὕτως; Τί μήν; Οὐκ-
οῦν, ὅ τι πόλις πρὸς πόλιν ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ,
D τοῦτο καὶ ἀνὴρ πρὸς ἄνδρα; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τίέ
οὖν ἀρετῇ τυραννουμένη πόλις πρὸς βασιλευο͵ ευομένην, '
οἵαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν; Πᾶν τοὐναντίον, ἔ "
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρίστη, ἡ δὲ κακίστη. Οὐκ ἐ ἐρήσομαι,
εἶπον, ὁποτέραν λέγεις" δῆλον. γάρ". ἀλλ᾽ εὐὖ-
δαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως
κρίνεις; καὶ μὴ ἐκπληττώμεθα πρὸς τὸν τύραννον
ἕνα ὄντα βλέποντες, μηδ᾽ εἴ τινὲς ὀλίγοι περὶ
ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς χρὴ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθό ντας
E θεάσασθαι, καταδύντες εἰς ἅπασαν καὶ ἰδόντες
οὕτω δόξαν ἀποφαινώμεθα. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη,
προκαλεῖ: καὶ δῆλον παντί, ὅτι τυραννουμένης μὲν
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθλιωτέρα, βασιλευομένης δὲ οὐκ
« Cf. Gorgias 473 σ-Ὲ.
> Cf, the defiance of 473 a and 579 D κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ,
Phaedr. 277 © οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ, and Phileb. —
67 5, also Gorg. 473 πὶ “‘ you say what nobody else would
say,” and perhaps 500 Ὁ διαβολὴ δ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. Cf.
Schopenhauer’s “The public has a great many bees in 5.
bonnet.”
354
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
IV. “ And shall we find,” said I, “ that the man
who is shown to be the most evil will also be the most
“miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for
the longest time is most and longest miserable? in
‘sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.®”
“That much, certainly,” he said, “ must needs be
true.” “Does not the tyrannical man,” said I,
“correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude,° the
democratic to the democratic and the others like-
wise?” “Surely.” “ And may we not infer that
the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and
happiness is the same as that of the man to the man?”
ΠΟΥ course.” “ What is, then, in respect of virtue;
the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city
as we first described τὲ ἢ “They are direct con-
traries,”” he said; “the one is the best, the other
the worst.” “I'll not ask which is which,” I said,
“because that is obvious. But again in respect of
happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the
same or different? And let us not be dazzled? by
fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few °
_of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire
city, as is right, and declare our opinion only
after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses
and contemplated its life asa whole.” ‘That is a
fair challenge,” he said,“‘ and it is clear to every-
body that there is no city more wretched than that
in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than
* Cf. Tim. 75 pv, Rep. 555 a, Parmen. 133 a. For the
analogy of individual and state ¢f. on 591 Ε.
4 Cf. 577 a, 591 νυ, 619 a ἀνέκπληκτος, Crat. 394 5,
Gorg. 523 vp, Protag. 3558. Cf. also Epictet. iii. 22. 28 ὑπὸ
τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπομένοις, and Shelley, “.. .
thing to gaze on epesebeeons tyrants with a dazzled eye.”
* εἴ τινες: of. Gorg. 521 B ἐάν τι ἔχω.
355
PLATO Ht
εὐδαιμονεστέρα. *Ap’ οὖν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ πε
577 τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλούμενος. ὀρθά
ἂν προκαλοίμην, ἀξιῶν κρίνειν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνον,
ὃς δύναται τῇ διανοΐᾳ εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἦθος ἐνδὺς διιδεῖν;
καὶ μὴ καθάπερ παῖς ἔξωθεν ὁρῶν ἀκπλήτξεται
ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν π οστάσεως, ἣν πρὸ
τοὺς ἔξω σχηματίζονται, an ἱκανῶς διορᾷ; εἰ
οὖν οἰοίμην δεῖν ἐκείνου πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀκούειν, τοῦ |
δυνατοῦ μὲν κρῖναι, ξυνῳκηκότος δὲ ἐν. 'τῷ αὐτῷ
καὶ παραγεγονότος ἔν τε ταῖς κατ᾽ οἰκίαν. πράξεσιν,
Β ὡς πρὸς ἑκάστους τοὺς οἰκείους EXEL, ἐν οἷς
μάλιστα γυμνὸς ἂν ὀφθείη τῆς τραγικῆς. “σκευῆς,
καὶ ἐν αὖ τοῖς δημοσίοις κινδύνοις, καὶ ταῦτα
πάντα ἰδόντα κελεύοιμεν ἐξαγγέλλειν, ie ἔχει
εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὁ τύραννος 7 soto,
ἄλλους; μὰ καιρόν ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα πρδκαλοῖδὶ
Βούλει οὖν, ἦν ὃ ἐγώ, προσποιησώμεθα ἡμεῖ
εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἃ ἂν κρῖναι καὶ ἤδη ΠΣ i
τοιούτοις, ἵνα ἔχωμεν ὅστις ie ag Le ἃ
ἐρωτῶμεν; Πάνυ γε.
CV. Ἴθι δή μοι, ἔφην, ὧδε σκόπει. τὴν ὁμοιό-
* For the contrast of bea aia ΤΈΝΝΗΝ cf. 587. By
Polit. 276 ©. It became a.commonplace in later orati
on the true king. Cf. Diimmler, Prolegomena, pp. δ᾽
δ The word προστάσεως is frequent in Polybas. is
Boethius iv. chap. 2. Cf. 1 Maccabees xv. 32, “ Wien h
saw the glory of Simon, and the cupboard of gold and silver
ere and his great attendance [παράστασιν]. Of. also Isoc.
. 32 ὄψιν, and Shakes. Measure for Measure τι. ii.
τ ceremony that to great ones "longs, ” Henry V. tv. i.
“farced title running ’fore the king.” Ν
© For σχηματίζονται ef. Xen. Oecon. 2. 4 σὸν σχῆμα 66
περιβέβλησαι, Dio Cass. iii. fr. 13. 2 ees ae ἧς:
and σχηματισμός, Rep. 425 5, 494 v. δ
356
_ THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
t governed by a true king.*” “And would it
not also be a fair challenge,” said I, “ to ask you to
accept as the only proper judge of the two men the
one who is able in thought to enter with understand-
ing into the very soul and temper of a man, and who
is not like a child viewing him from outside, over-
_awed by the tyrants’ great attendance,’ and the pomp
and cireumstance which they assume‘ in the eyes
_ of the world, but is able to see through it all? And
_ what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom
we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity
with a tyrant? and has witnessed his conduct in his
_own home and observed in person his dealings with
his intimates in each instance where he would best
_ be seen stripped? of his vesture of tragedy,’ and who
_ had likewise observed his behaviour in the hazards
of his public life—and if we should ask the man who
_ has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the
happiness or misery of the tyrant as compared with
challenge,” he said. ‘Shall we, then, make believe,”
said I, “ that we are of those who are thus able to
Judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so
that we may haye someone to answer our questions?”
“ By all means.”
. “ Come, then,” said I, “‘ examine it thus. Re-
εὐ ὁ Itis an easy conjecture that Plato is thinking of himself
and Dionysius I. Cf. Laws 711 a.
* Cf. Thackeray on Ludovicus and Ludovicus rex,
Hazlitt, “* Strip it of its externals and what is it but a jest?”’
also Gorg. 523 ©, Xen. Hiero 2. 4, Lucian, Somnium seu
Gallus 24 ἣν δὲ ὑποκύψας ἴδῃς τὰ γ᾽ ἔνδον... Boethius, Cons.
iii. chap. 8 (Loeb, p. 255), and for the thought Herod. i. 99.
7 Cf. Longinus, On the Sublime 7 τὸ ἔξωθεν προστραγῳδού-
“μενον, and Diimmler, Akademika p. 5.
357
other men?” “ That also would be a most just”
of judgement and who has lived under the same roof |
PLATO
TTA ἀναμιμνησκόμενος THs τε πόλεως Kal τοῦ
2 Sod ¢ θ5 ὁ ᾽ ͵ 200d 7h
ἀνδρός, οὕτω Kal? ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει ἀθρῶν,
παθήματα ἑκατέρου λέγε. Τὰ ποῖα; ἔφη. Ilpa-
τον μέν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὡς πόλιν εἰπεῖν, ἐλευθέραν ἢ,
δούλην τὴν τυραννουμένην ἐρεῖς; ‘Qs οἷόν τ᾽, ἔφη,
/ 4 ‘ \ Rw σε > Dy ay ,
μάλιστα δούλην. Kal μὴν ὁρᾷς ye ἐν αὐτῇ δεσπό-
τας καὶ ἐλευθέρους. “Opd, ἔφη, σμικρόν γέ τι
τοῦτο" τὸ δὲ ὅλον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ
ἐπιεικέστατον ἀτίμως τε καὶ ἀθλίως δοῦλον. Hi
D οὖν, εἶπον, ὅμοιος ἀνὴρ τῇ πόλει, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ
tee, \ FA / 2 κα ᾿ a év
ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἐνεῖναι, καὶ πολλῆς μὲν.
δουλείας τε καὶ ἀνελευθερίας γέμειν τὴν ψυχὴν
αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη δουλεύειν, ἅπερ
> ,ὔ ‘ A \ \ /
ἦν ἐπιεικέστατα, σμικρὸν δὲ Kal τὸ μοχθηρότατον
καὶ μανικώτατον δεσπόζειν; ᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη. Τί
οὖν; δούλην ἢ ἐλευθέραν τὴν τοιαύτην φήσεις
εἶναι ψυχήν; Δούλην δή που ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν ἥ
γε αὖ δούλη καὶ τυραννουμένη πόλις ἥκιστα ποιεῖ
ἃ βούλεται; Πολύ γε. Kai ἡ τυραννουμένη ἄρα
Ἑ ψυχὴ ἥκιστα ποιήσει ἃ ἂν βουληθῇ, ws περὶ ὅλης
᾽ - a [ \ A ” a ty Oris / 7 κ
εἰπεῖν ψυχῆς" ὑπὸ δὲ οἴστρου ἀεὶ ἑλκομένη βίᾳ τα-
ραχῆς καὶ μεταμελείας μεστὴ ἔσται. Πῶς yap
οὔ; Πλουσίαν δὲ ἢ πενομένην ἀνάγκη τὴν τυ-
578 ραννουμένην πόλιν εἶναι; Πενομένην. Καὶ ψυχὴν
1
:
4 In Menez. 238 © Plato says that other states are com-
posed of slaves and masters, but Athens of equals.
> For τάξιν cf. 618 B ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν. _
5 γέμειν : cf. 544 ο, 559 c, Gorg. 522 Ἐ, 525 a. 7
4 Of, 445 B, Gorg. 467 8, where a verbal distinction is
358
ΡΝ
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
call the general likeness between the city and the ©
man, and then observe in turn what happens to each ,
of them.” “ What things?” he said. “ In the first _
place,” said I, “ will you call the state governed Ὁ
a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state?
“ Utterly enslaved,” he said. “‘ And yet you see in
_ it masters and freemen.” “I see,” he said, “ἃ small
portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and
_the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly
_enslaved.2” “If, then,’’ I said, “the man resembles
_ the state, must not the same proportion? obtain in |
him, and his soul teem*¢ with boundless servility and
_ illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it
_ being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and ἔπε.
most frenzied, plays the despot?” “ Inevitably,”
he said. “Then will you say that such a soul is
_ enslaved or free?” “ Enslaved, I should suppose.”
“ Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city
least of all do what it really wishes4?” ‘‘ Decidedly
so.” “ Then the tyrannized soul—to speak of the soul
as a whole *—also will least of all do what it wishes, ©
but being always perforce driven and drawn by the ©
_ gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repent-
ance?” “Of course.” “ And must the tyrannized
city be rich or poor?” “ Poor.” ‘‘ Then the tyrant
drawn with which Plato does not trouble himself here. In
Laws 661 8 ἐπιθυμῇ is used. Cf. ibid. 688 8 τἀναντία ταῖς
βουλήσεσιν, and Herod. iii. 80.
* Cf. Cratyl. 392 c ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος.
7 Cf. Julian, Or. ii. 50 c. In the Stoic philosophy the
stultus repents, and “‘ omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui.”
Cf.-also Seneca, De benef. iv. 34 “‘non mutat i
ilimm . . . ideo numquam illum poenitentia subit,”
Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. iii. 147. 21, 149. 20 and 33,
Stob. Ee. ii. 113. 5, 102. 22, and my emendation of Eclogues
ii. 104. 6 W. in Class. Phil. xi. p. 338.
359
:
a
PLATO 1 SHE
dpa τυραννικὴν πενιχρὰν καὶ ἄπληστον ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ
εἶναι: Οὕτως, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Τί δέ; φόβου γέμειν ap’
οὐκ ἀνάγκη τήν τε τοιαύτην πόλιν τόν τε τοιοῦτον
Χνδ ὺ Tors 708 O Fey 52 2) ee tS
ἄνδρα; ἸΠολλή ye. υρμοὺς δὲ καὶ στεναγ-
ot ® ‘ ΄, Ὁ 1:9 ἃ" ” » rw
μοὺς Kal θρήνους καὶ ἀλγηδόνας οἴει ἔν τινι ἄλλῃ
πλείους εὑρήσειν; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἔν ἀνδρὲ δὲ ἡγεῖ
τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὲ πλείω εἶναι “ἢ ἐν τῷ
μαινομένῳ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμιῶν τε καὶ ἐρώτων τούτῳ
τῷ τυραννικῷ; Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη. Eis πάντα
Β δή, οἶμαι, ταῦτά τε καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας
τήν γε πόλιν τῶν πόλεων ἀθλιωτάτην Expivas.
lol ~ - ΕἸ : ,
Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς; ἔφη. Kat μάλα, fv δ᾽ ἐγώ.
3 “- “- “- ν Σ
ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς αὖ τοῦ τυραννικοῦ τί λέγεις
εἰς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων; Μακρῷ, ἔφη, ἀθλιώ-
τατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. Τοῦτο, ἢν δ᾽
ἐγώ, οὐκέτ᾽ ὀρθῶς λέγεις. Πῶς; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς.
Οὔπω, ἔφην, οἶμαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὃ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα.
᾿Αλλὰ τίς μήν; Ὅδε ἴσως σοι ἔτι δόξει εἶναι
Οτούτου ἀθλιώτερος. Ποῖος; Ὃς ἄν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
A ἍἌ 4A > 7 , ~ > a)
τυραννικὸς ὧν μὴ ἰδιώτην βίον καταβιῷ, ἀλλὰ
δυστυχὴς ἢ καὶ αὐτῷ ὑπό τινος συμφορᾶς ἐκ-
πορισθῇ ὥστε τυράννῳ γενέσθαι. Τεκμαίρομαί σε,
» > - ΄, 3 a +. ἢ
ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ναί, ἦν —
δ᾽ ἐγώ- ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ οἴεσθαι χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ᾽ εὖ
“ΟΥὨ Laws 832 a πεινῶσι τὴν ψυχήν, Xen. Symp. 4. 86.
πεινῶσι χρημάτων, Ocecon. xiii. 9 πεινῶσι yap τοῦ ἐπαίνου, —
Aristot. Pol. 1277 a 24 “ Jason said he was hungry when he
was not a tyrant,’ Shakes. Tempest τ. ii. 112 “50 dry he
was for sway.” Cf. Novotny, p. 192, on Epist. vii. 335 5,
also Max. Tyr. Diss. iv. 4 τί γὰρ av εἴη πενέστερον ἀνδρὸς
ἐπιθυμοῦντος διηνεκῶς -. «; Julian, Or. ii. 85 B, Teles (Hense),
860
— ar
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
soul also must of necessity always be needy @ and suffer
from unfulfilled desire.’ “ So it is,” he said.“ And
ΒΡΗ͂, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be
full of terrors and alarms?” “It must indeed.” “And 5
do you think you will find ar lamentations and
3 and wailing and anguish in any other city ?”
“By no means.” “ And so of an δα you think
these things will more abound in any other than in
this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and
passions?”’ “ How could it be so?” he said.- “Τὰ
view of all these and other like considerations, then,
I take it, you judged that this city is the most miser-
able of cities.” “‘ And was I not right?’ he said.
“Yes, indeed,” said I. “ But of the tyrant man,
what haye you to say in view of these same things?”
“That he is far and away the most miserable of all,”
he said. “1 cannot admit,” said I, “ that you are
right in that too.” “How so?” said he. “ This
one,” said I, “I take it, has not yet attained the
aeme of misery.”” “Then who has?” “Perhaps
you will regard the one I am about to name as still
more wretched.” “‘ What one?” “ The one,” said
I, “ who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live
out © his life in private station? but is so unfortunate
that by some unhappy chance he is enabled to
become an actual tyrant.” “I infer from what has
already been said,” he replied, “that you speak
truly.” “Yes,” said I,“ but it is not enough to suppose
such things. We must examine them thoroughly by
pp. 32-33. For the pnts iy see also Gorg. 493-494. Cf. also
sepre 521 a with 416 ©, Phaedr. 279 c, and Epist. 355 c.
Cf. supra on 508 x, p. 104, note c.
© Cf. Protag. 355 a, Ale. I. 104 £, 579 c.
4 Stallbaum quotes Plut. De virtut. et vit. Ὁ. 101 p, Lucian,
Herm. 67 ἰδιώτην βίον ζῆν, Philo, Vit. Mos. 3.
361
PLATO ἢ
μάλα τῷ τοιούτῳ" λόγῳ σκοπεῖν. περὶ γάρ τοι
τοῦ μεγίστου ἡ σκέψις, ἀγαθοῦ τε βίου καὶ κακοῦ.
᾿Ορθότατα, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Σκόπει δή, εἰ ἄρα τὶ λέγω.
D δοκεῖ γάρ μοι δεῖν ἐννοῆσαι. eK τῶνδε π ρὲ αὐτοῦ
σκοποῦντας. Ἔκ τίνων; Ἐξ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τι
ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι πλούσιοι ἐν πόλεσιν. ἀνδράποδα
πολλὰ κέκτηνται. οὗτοι “yap τοῦτό γε προσόμοιον
ἔχουσι τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ πολλῶν ἄρχειν: "διαφέρει!
δὲ τὸ ἐκείνου πλῆθος. Διαφέρει γάρ. Οἶσθ᾽ οὖν
ὅτι οὗτοι ἀδεῶς ἔχουσι καὶ od φοβοῦνται τοὺς
οἰκέτας; Τί γὰρ ἂν φοβοῖντο; Οὐδέν, elmo :
ἀλλὰ 76 αἴτιον ἐννοεῖς; Ναί, ὅτι γε πᾶσα ἡ πόλις
Eé ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ βοηθεῖ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. Karas, ἦν δ᾽
ἐγώ, λέγεις. τί δέ; εἴ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα ἕ! eva, ὅτῳ
ἔστιν ἀνδράποδα πεντήκοντα 7 πλείω, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας θείη εἰς
ἐρημίαν μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης. οὐσίας τε καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν,
ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς τῶν ἐλευθέρων μέλλοι βοη-
θήσειν, ἐν ποίῳ ἄν τινι καὶ πόσῳ φόβῳ οἴει γενέ-
σθαι αὐτὸν περί τε αὑτοῦ καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικός,
μὴ ἀπόλοιντο ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν; Ἔν παντί, 7 δ᾽
579 ὅς, ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν ἀναγκάζοιτο ἄν τινας ἤδη
θωπεύειν αὐτῶν τῶν δούλων, καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι
1 On τῷ τοιούτῳ, the reading of the mss., see note a below.
* Adam ad loc. emends τῷ τοιούτῳ to τῶ τοιοῦτω, insisting
that the ms. reading cannot be satisfactorily explained.
> Of. supra Vol. I. p. 71, note f on 344 Ὁ-Ἑ and What
Plato Said, p. 484, on Laches 185 a.
¢ Cf. Polit. 259 . But Plato is not concerned with the
question of size or numbers here.
362
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
reason and an argument such as this.* For our in-
quiry concerns the greatest of all things,” the good
life or the bad life.” “ Quite right,’ he replied.
““ Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say.
For I think we must get a notion of the matter from
these examples.” “‘From which?” “From individual
wealthy private citizens in our states who possess
many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being
rulers over many, only the tyrant’s numbers are
” “Ves, they are.” “You are aware,
then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their
slaves?” “ What should they fear?” “ Nothing,”
I said; “‘ but do you perceive the reason why?”
“* Yes, because the entire state is ready to defend each
citizen.” “ You are right,” I said. “ But now sup-
pose some god should catch up a man who has
or more slaves“ and waft him with his wife and children
away from the city and set him down with his other
possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no free-
man could come to his rescue. What and how great
would be his fear,’ do you suppose, lest he and his
wife and children be destroyed by the slaves?”
“The greatest in the world,’” he said, “if you ask
me.” “And would he not forthwith find it neces-
sary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them
4 Plato’s imaginary illustration is one of his many antici-
pations of later history, and suggests to an American many
: Ch Critias, fr. 37, Diels ii.? p. 324, on Sparta’s fear of
her slaves. :
4 For ἐν παντί cf. 579 B, Symp. 194 a ἐν παντὶ εἴης,
Euthyd. 301 a ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, Xen. Hell.
v. 4. 29, Thucyd. vii. 55, Isoc. xiii. 20. ἐν πᾶσιν . . κακοῖς.
Cf. παντοῖος εἶναι (γίννεσθαι) Herod. ix. 109, vii. 10. 3,
iii. 124, Lucian, Pro lapsu 1.
363
PLATOUAR 5
πολλὰ καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν οὐδὲν δεόμενος, καὶ κόλαξ
αὐτὸς ἂν θεραπόντων ἀναφανείη; ἸΠολλὴ ἀνάγκη,
ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ἢ ἀπολωλέναι. Τί δ᾽, εἰ καὶ ἄλλους,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὁ θεὸς κύκλῳ κατοικίσεις γείτονας.
πολλοὺς αὐτῷ, ot μὴ ἀνέχοιντο, εἴ τις ἄλλος ἄλλου
δεσπόζειν ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ᾽ εἴ πού τινα τοιοῦτον λαμ-
βάνοιεν, ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωροῖντο τιμωρίαις; "Eze
B av, ἔφη, οἶμαι, μᾶλλον ἐ ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἴη, κύκλῳ
ρουρούμενος ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ
ἐν τοιούτῳ μὲν δεσμωτηρίῳ δέδεται ὁ τύραννος,
φύσει ὧν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, πολλῶν καὶ παν-
τοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἐρώτων. μεστός" λίχνῳ δὲ
ὄντι αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχὴν μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε
ἀποδημῆσαι ἔξεστιν οὐδαμόσε οὔτε θεωρῆσαι ὅ ὅσων
δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταί. εἰσι, κατα-
δεδυκὼς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῇ,
C φθονῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ἐάν τις ἔξω
ἀποδημῇ καί τι ἀγαθὸν ὁρᾷ; Παντάπασι μὲν
οὖν, ἔφη.
VI. Οὐκοῦν. τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς πλείω καρ-
ποῦται ἀνήρ, ὃς ἂν κακῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ πολιτευόμενος,
ὃν νῦν δὴ σὺ ἀθλιώτατον ἔκρινας, τὸν τυραννικόν,
α Tor the idiom οὐδὲν δεόμενος cf. 581 πε, 367 AB, 410 8.
405 c, Prot. 331 c, and Shorey in Class. Journ. ii, p. 171.
ὃ For ancient denials of the justice of slavery ef. Newnian,
Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 140 ff., Philemon, fr. 95 (Kock ii. p. 508)
κἂν δοῦλος ἐστί, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει, φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος
ἐγενήθη ποτέ. ἡ δ᾽ αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο, and Anth.
Pal. vii. 553 with Mackail’s note, p. 415.
¢ Of. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant’s terrors ef. Menander,
᾿Ασπίς Gj fr. 74, Kock iii. p. 24), Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6, 579 £
and Xen. Hiero 6.8. The tyrant sees enemies everywhere.
364
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
many promises and emancipate them, though nothing
would be further from his wish*? And so he would
turn out to be the flatterer of his own sery ants.”
“He would certainly have to,” he said, “or else
perish.” ‘‘ But now suppose,” said I, “that god
established round about him numerous neighbours
who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be
master of another,?. but would inflict the utmost
poate on any such person on whom they could
ay their hands.” “1 think,” he said, “ that his
plight would be still more desperate, encompassed
by nothing but enemies.”” “And is not that the
sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being
ofa ἐκ ne such as we have described and filled with
multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites?
Yet greedy ° and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the —
citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the
sacred festivals? that other freemen yearn to see,
but he must live for the most part SOW EMng in the
recesses of his house like a woman,’ envying among
the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees
any good thing.” ‘ Most certainly,” he said.
V1. “And does not such a harvest of ills 7 measure
the difference between the man who is merely ill-
governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical
temper, whom you just now judged to be most
- miserable, and the man who, having this disposition,
4 Cf. Xen. Hiero 1.12 οἱ δὲ τύραννοι οὐ μάλα ἀμφὶ θεωρίας
ἔχουσιν" οὔτε γὰρ ἱέναι αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλές. Cf. Crito 52 B ἐπὶ
θεωρίαν.
Φ Cf. Laws 781 ¢, Gorg. 485 p.
τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς is the measure of the excess of the
unhappiness of the actual tyrant over that of the tyrannical
nevi private life. Cf. my review of Jowett, A.J.P. xiii.
Ρ
865
PLATO
| μὴ ὡς ἰδιώτης καταβιῷ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκασθῇ ὑπό τινος
Ϊ , a Los aA A 2 ΣᾺ =>
τύχης τυραννεῦσαι, Kal ἑαυτοῦ ὧν ἀκράτωρ ἄλλων
: |
ἐπιχειρήσῃ ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις κάμνοντι σώματι
καὶ ἀκράτορι ἑαυτοῦ μὴ ἰδιωτεύων ἀλλ᾽ ἀγωνιζό-
Devos πρὸς ἄλλα σώματα καὶ μαχόμενος ἀναγκά-
ζοιτο διάγειν τὸν βίον. Ἰ]αντάπασιν, ἔφη, ὁμοιό-
τατά τε καὶ ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, παντελῶς τὸ
/ ” \ a ¢ \ ~ / ’
πάθος ἀθλιον, καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ σοῦ κριθέντος χαλεπώ-
a 7 ” a ¢ ~ ~
tata ζῆν χαλεπώτερον ἔτι ζῇ ὁ τυραννῶν; ἸΚομιδῇ
γ᾽, ἔφη. "Ἔστιν ἄρα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, κἂν εἰ μή τῳ
δοκεῖ, 6 τῷ ὄντι τύραννος τῷ ὄντι δοῦλος τὰς
E μεγίστας θωπείας καὶ δουλείας καὶ κόλαξ τῶν
πονηροτάτων: καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν
ἀποπιμπλάς, ἀλλὰ πλείστων ἐπιδεέστατος καὶ
πένης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ φαίνεται, ἐάν τις ὅλην ψυχὴν
aod . ΄ \ / / A ‘
ἐπίστηται θεάσασθαι, καὶ φόβου γέμων διὰ παντὸς
τοῦ βίου, σφαδασμῶν τε καὶ ὀδυνῶν πλήρης, εἴπερ,
A aA 4} διῶθέ » " 4 δέ:
τῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ἧς ἄρχει ἔοικεν. ἔοικε δέ
80 ἢ γάρ; Kat μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τού-
τοις ἔτι ἀποδώσομεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἃ τὸ πρότερον
ΝΜ i > 4, \ ‘ ” ~
εἴπομεν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι Kat ἔτι μᾶλλον.
/ 0 > ~ Ἃ ’ if ὃ A A > \ φθ ἊΝ
γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθο
“- > , 350." 3 / > , ‘ /
vep@, ἀπίστῳ, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, avooiw, Kal πάσης
κακίας πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ, καὶ ἐξ ἁπάντων
2 Cf. infra ὅ80 c and What Plato Said, p. 506, on Gorg.
91
ὃ For the analogy of soul and body ef. 591 B and on
564 B, p. 313, note g.
366
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
does not live out his life in private station but is
constrained by some ill hap to become an actual
tyrant, and while unable to control himself? attempts
to rule over others, as if a man with a,.sick and in-
continent body” should not live the private life but
should be compelled to pass his days in contention
and strife with other persons?” “Your analogy is
_ most apt and true,’ Socrates,” he said. “Is not that
then, dear Glaucon,”’ said I, “a most unhappy ex-
perience in every way? And is not the tyrant’s life
still worse than that which was judged by you to be
the worst?” “ Precisely so,” he said.“ Then it is
the truth, though some may deny ἰδ, that the real
tyrant is really enslaved to cringings and servitudes
beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and
that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for
his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor
man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to
observe a soul in its entirety ; and throughout his
life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions
_ and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the
city which he rules; and he is like it, is he not?” |
“ Yes, indeed,” he said. “‘ And in addition, shall we
not further attribute to him all that we spoke of
before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason
of his rule, come to be still more than he was,’
envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel
and nurse?’ of all iniquity, and so in consequence be
© Cf. Soph. 252 c ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές.
4 Cf. on 576 c, p. 354, note ὁ.
© Cf. 576 Bc.
7 πανδοκεύς is a host or inn-keeper; cf. Laws 918 8. Here
the word is used figuratively, Cf. Aristoph. Wasps 35
φάλαινα πανδοκεύτρια, ‘an all-receptive grampus’”’ (Rogers).
367
PULATOUIAA SHI
τούτων μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεῖ εἶναι, ἔπειτα
'δὲ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον αὐτῷ τοιούτους ἀπεργάζεσθαι.
Οὐδείς σοι, ἔφη, τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ἀντερεῖ. ἴθι
Β δή μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἤδη, ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων
κριτὴς ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ οὕτω, τίς πρῶτος κατὰ
τὴν σὴν δόξαν εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τίς δεύτερος, Kal ᾿
τοὺς ἄλλους ἑξῆς πέντε ὄντας κρῖνε, βασιλικόν,
τιμοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικόν, δημοκρατικόν, τυραν-
, > ‘ ε / » ε , , 5 a
vucdv. ᾿Αλλὰ ῥᾳδία, ἔφη, ἡ κρίσις. καθάπερ yap
εἰσῆλθον, ἔγωγε ὥσπερ χοροὺς κρίνω ἀρετῇ καὶ
κακίᾳ καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ. Μισθωσώ-
μεθα οὖν κήρυκα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἀνείπω, ὅτι
6 ᾿Αρίστωνος υἱὸς τὸν ἀριστόν τε καὶ δικαιότατον
εὐδαιμονέστατον ἔκρινε, τοῦτον δ᾽ εἶναι τὸν
βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα αὑτοῦ, τὸν δὲ
KaKLOTOV τε καὶ ἀδικώτατον ἀθλιώτατον, τοῦτον
δὲ αὖ τυγχάνειν ὄντα, ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος ὧν
ἑαυτοῦ τε ὅ τι μάλιστα τυραννῇ καὶ τῆς πόλεως;
7A , 6 ” 7H = 4
νειρήσθω σοι, ἔφη. οὖν προσαναγορεύω,
εἶπον, ἐάν τε λανθάνωσι τοιοῦτοι ὄντες ἐάν τε μὴ
α On the wretched lot of the tyrant ef. Xen. Hiero passim,
eg. 4. 11, 6. 4 8, 15. The Hiero is Xenophon’s
rendering of the Socratico- Platonic conception of the
unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See too Gerhard Heintzeler,
Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon, esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.;
Cie. De amicit. 15, Isoc. Nic. 4-5, Peace 119, Hel.
32 ff. But in Luag. 40 Isocrates says all men would admit
that tyranny “‘is the greatest and noblest and most coveted
of all good things, both human and divine.” In Epist.6.11 ff. —
he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better
than the tyrant’s. But in 9, 4 he treats this as a thesis which
many maintain. Cf. further Gorg. 473 £, Ale. 1. 135 5,
Phaedr. 248 5, Symp. 182 c, Eurip. Jon 621 ff., Suppl. 429 ff.,
Medea 119 ff., I. A. 449-450, Herodotus iii. 80, Soph. Ajaw |
1350 “‘not easy for a tyrant to be pious’’; also Dio Chrys,
368
_— ore -
em ee 4
"".
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
himself most unhappy * and make all about him so?”
_ “No man of sense will gainsay that,” he said.
_ “ Come then,” said I, “‘ now at last, even as the judge
_ of last instance” pronounces, so do you declare who in
_ Your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and
_ simi ly judge the others, all five in succession, the
_ ‘royal, Sera the oligarchic, the democratic,
_ and the tyrannical man.”” “ Nay,” he said, “ the
_ decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge
them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them
in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its con-
pies Gi ἢ Shall we hire a herald,* then,” said I, “ or
all I myself make proclamation that the son of
Ariston pronounced the best man? and the most
pany to be the happiest,¢ and that he is the one
who is the most kingly and.a king over himself; and
declared that the most evil and most unjust is the
most unhappy, who again is the man who, haying
the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, becomes
most of a tyrant over himself and over the state?”
“Let it have been so proclaimed by you,” he said.
“Shall I add the clause ‘alike whether their character
Or. iii }f., Anon. Jambl. fr. 7. 12, Diels ii.* p.
J. A. Kk Thomeon Greek Pit Ldraeesey p. ᾿ 1 ἜΑ
Diimmler, Prolegomena, p. 31, Baudrillart, J... Bodin et son
temps, pp. 292-293 “ Bodin semble . . ..se souvenir de
Platon issant le tyran. .. .᾽ἢ
» Adam has an exhaustive technical note on this.
© Cf. Phileb. 66 ἃ ὑπό. τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων, ete.,. Eurip.
Ale. 737 κηρύκων ὕπο. Grote and other liberals are offended
by the ‘intensity of Plato’s moral conviction. See What
= Said, p. 364, Laws 662-663, Unity of Plato's Thought,
p. 25.
4 Plato puns on the name Ariston. For other such puns
ef. Gorg. 463 ©, 481 ν, 513 B, Rep. 600 8, 614 B, Symp.
174 B, 185 c, 198 c.
* Cf. Laws 664 B-c. 7 Cf. on 579 c, p. 367, note a.
VOL. II 2B 369
PLATO 1ΠΗ “ΠῚ Τ
πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεούς; Εἰροσομκίμόραεν
ἔφη.
ΜΗ. Εἶεν δή, εἶπον" αὕτη μὲν ἡμῖν ἡ Baebes
D pia ἂν εἴη: δευτέραν δὲ ide «τήνδε, ἐ ἐάν τι δόξῃ
581
εἶναι. Τίς αὕτη; ᾿Επειδή, ὥσπερ πόλις,
ἐγώ, διήρηται κατὰ τρία εἴδη, οὕτω καὶ
ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τριχῇ, [τὸ λογιστικὸν" δέξεται, ὡς
ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἑτέραν ἀπόδειξιν. Twa ταύτην;
Τήνδε. Ζριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναί μοι͵ φαί-
νονται, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μία ἰδία" ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὧσ-
avTws καὶ , ἀρχαί. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Τὸ eo
paper, ἦν ᾧ ᾧ μανθάνει ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ ᾧ ᾧ θυμο
τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυειδίαν ἑ evt οὐκ ἔσχομεν. ὀνό-
ματι προσειπεῖν ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ὃ ὃ μέγιστον καὶ
ἰσχυρότατον εἶχεν ἐν αὑτῷ, τούτῳ ἐπωνομάσα,
ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλήκαμεν διὰ σῷ ΄-
TTA τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδὺς
καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα, καὶ
φιλοχρήματον δή, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα
ἀποτελοῦνται αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμίαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς
γ᾽, ἔφη. ᾿Αρ᾽ οὖν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ
φιλίαν εἰ φαῖμεν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἰς
1 δὲ ἰδὲ Adam: δεῖ δὲ AFDM: δὲ de? Mss. recc.
2 τὸ λογιστικὸν A, λογιστικὸν A®2FDM, λογιστικὸν ἌΝ
τικὸν θυμικὸν Par. 1642: omitted by more recent mss.
° Cf. supra 367 Ἐ, 427 νυ, 445 a, infra 612 B.
> Cf. supra 435 B-c ff.
¢ Practically all editors reject τὸ λογιστικόν. But Apelt,
p. 525, insists that δέξεται cannot be used without a subject
τς Σιν μων.
on the analogy of 4868 Ὁ ἔοικεν, 497 ο δηλώσει and δείξει,
hence we must retain λογιστικόν, in the sense of “ ability to
reckon,” and he compares Charm. 174 8 and the double
sense of λογιστικόν in Rep. 525 8, 587 p, 602 £. He says it
is a mild mathematical joke, like Polit. 257 a. ,
870
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
is known to all men and gods or is not known’ *?”
_ “ Add that to the proclamation,” he said.
VIL “ Very good,” said I; “this, then, would
be one of our proofs, but examine this second one
and see if there is anything in ἰδ. “‘ What is it?”’
“Since,”’ said I, “ corresponding to the three types
in the city, the soul also is tripartite,’ it will admit,’
I think, of another demonstration also.” ‘“‘ What
is that?” “The following: The three parts have
also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one
peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and
controls.” “* What do you mean?” he said. “* One
part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one
is that with which he feels anger. But the third
part, owing to its manifold forms,* we could not
easily designate by any one distinctive name,’ but
gave it the name of its chief and strongest element ;
for we called it the appetitive part ’ because of the
intensity of its appetites concerned with food and
drink and love and their accompaniments, and like-
wise the money-loving part,’ because money is the
chief instrument for the gratification of such desires.”
“ And rightly,” he said. “ And if we should also say
that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit,
@ Cf. Phileb. 26c rd. . . πλῆθος. Cf. Friedlander, Platon,
ii. p. 492, n. 2.
“ Here again the concept is implied (cf. supra on 564 8B,
p. 313, note e and Introd. pp. x-xi). Cf. Parmen. 132 c,
135 8, Phileb. 16 τ, 18 c-p, 23 τ, 25 c, Aristot. Eth. Nic.
1130 b 2 évi ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, and eis ὃν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα,
581 a, Schleiermacher’s interpretation of which, “50 wiirden
wir uns in der Erklarung doch auf ein Hauptstiick stiitzen,”
approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point
that there is no one name for it ef. What Plato Said, p. 596,
on Soph. 267 νυ.
7 Vol. I. 439 ». 7 Of. Vol. 1. p. 380, note ὃ.
371
PLATO! ΠΗ͂ HHT
ἕν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε τι
ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς δηλοῦν, ὁπότε τοῦτο “τῆς ψυχῆς "τὸ
μέρος λέγοιμεν, καὶ καλοῦντες αὐτὸ φιλοχρ ine ed
Kal φιλοκερδὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν; Ἔμ οἱ γι
δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐ πρὸς pr
κρατεῖν μέντοι φαμὲν καὶ νικᾶν καὶ εὐδοκιμεῖν
Β ἀεὶ ὅλον ὡρμῆσθαι; Καὶ μάλα. Ἐλ οὖν φιλόνικον
αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγορεύοιμεν, ἐμμελῶς
ἂν ἔχοι; ᾿Εμμελέστατα μὲν οὖν. a μὴν. ᾧ
γε μανθάνομεν, παντὶ ᾿ δῆλον ὅ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι. τὴν
ἀλήθειαν ὅ ὅπῃ ἔχει πᾶν ἀεὶ τέταται, καὶ χρημάτων
τε καὶ δόξης ἥκιστα τούτων τούτῳ μέλει. λύ
γε. Φιλομαθὲς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον καλοῦντες αὐτὸ
κατὰ τρόπον ἂν “καλοῖμεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἄρχει ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν μὲν τοῦτο,
τῶν δὲ τὸ ἕτερον ἐκείνων, ὁπότερον ἂν τύχῃ; 08-
Tos, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν
τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη elvar, φιλόσοφον, φιλόνικον,
φιλοκερδές; Κομιδῇ γε. Καὶ ἡδονῶν δὴ τρία
εἴδη, ὑποκείμενον" ἕν ἑκάστῳ τούτων; Πάνυ γε.
1 ὑποκείμενον AFD, ὑποκείμενα A2M defended by Adam.
@ Since there is no one specific name for the manifold
forms of this part (580 p-£), a makeshift term is to be used
for convenience’ sake. See also p. 371, note e. Ὁ}
> Or “15 bent on,” τέταται. Οὗ. 499 κα ζητεῖν. . τὸ ἀληθὲς
συντεταμένως, Symp. 222 α and Bury ad loc., Symp. 186.8 ἐπὶ
πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει. For the thought ef. also Phileb. 58 Ὁ.
¢ Cf. Phaedo 67 B τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.
4 Cf, 338. p, 342 «. .
¢ Cf. my review of Jowett in A.J.P. xiii. p. 366, which
Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (Republic)
adopt. For the three types of men cf. also Phaedo 68 σ᾽, 82 c.
Stewart, Aristot. Eth. Nic. p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, ‘* The
372
"αν ee
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
_ should we not thus best bring it together under one
head ¢ in our discourse so as to understand each other
when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify
_ourcalling it the money-loving and gain-loving part?”
_ “I, at any rate, think so,” he said. “ And, again,
__ of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it
_-is wholly set on predominance and victory and good
+ - 30
_ repute?” “Yes, indeed.” “‘ And might we not
ΣΉ, designate it as the ambitious part and
at which is covetous of honour?” *“ Most appro-
‘priately.” “‘ But surely it is obvious to everyone that
all the endeavour of the part by which we learn is ever
towards® knowledge of the truth of things, and that it
least of the three is concerned for wealth and re-
ion.” ‘‘ Much the least.” ‘* Lover of learning ¢
and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations
for ἐμαὶ. “ Quite so,” he said. “Is it not also
true,” I said, “that the ruling principle? of men’s
souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one
of the other two, as it may happen?” “ That is
so,” he said. “And that is why we say that the
primary classes° of men also are three, the philosopher
or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover
of gain.” “Precisely so.”’ “‘ And also that there are
three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively
three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three
classes of men distinguished by Plato (Rep. 581)... .
Michelet and Grant point out that this threefold division
oceurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heracleides
Ponticus (apud Οἷς. Tuse. v. 3)... . Cf. Aristot. Eth.
Nie. 1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also Diog. L. vii. 130 on Stoies,
Plutarch, De liber. educ. x. (8 a), Renan, Avenir de la
science, p. 8. Isoc. Antid. 217 characteristically recognizes
only the three motives, pleasure, gain, and honour. For the
entire argument cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 31, 1177 a 10,
and supra, Introd. pp. liv-lv.
373
PLATOUWIS THT
Οἷσθ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ θέλοις τρεῖς τοιού-
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον. ἀνερωτᾶν, τίς
τούτων τῶν βίων ἥδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος
μάλιστα ἐ ἐγκωμιάσεται; ὅ ye" χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς
D τὸ κερδαίνειν τὴν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ
μανθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἴ τι
αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ; ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη. i δὲ ὁ
φιλότιμος; ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ: οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ᾿ χρη-
μάτων ἡδονὴν φορτικήν τινα Nir a καὶ αὖ τὴν
ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν, ὅ τι μὴ μάθημα τιμὴν ee
καπνὸν Kal φλυαρίαν; Οὕτως, ἔφη, EXEL
φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ᾽ “ἐγώ, τί οἰώμεθα τὰς
E ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι rab oan ὅπῃ
ἔχει καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα;
τῆς ἡδονῆς" οὐ πάνυ πόρρω, καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὄντι
1 ὅ ye Hermann, followed by Adam, ὅ τε Mss.
2 τῆς ἡδονῆς poner notata in A, secl. Baiter: ... μανθάνοντα
τῆς ἡδονῆς; οὐ. .. Adam. iJ
α For ἐν μέρει cf. 468 B, 520 c and pb, 577 c, 615 Ay Gorg.
trasted
496 B, Laws 876 B, 943 a, 947 c, Polit. 265 a; con
with ἐν τῷ μέρει, Meno 92 Ἐ, Gorg. 462 a, 474 a. —
The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how
a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g. καινὸν οὐδέν (Gorg.
Lo lle
448 a) has nothing to do with the idiom οὐδὲν καινόν (Phaedo ὶ
100 B); τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα (Rep. 612 ο) is different from λόγου
ἕνεκα (Theaet. 191 c—dicis causa); πάντα τἀγαθά (Laws 631 B)
has no connexion with the idiomatic πάντ᾽ ἀγαθά (Rep. 471 ¢, —
ef. supra ad loc.); nor Pindar’s πόλλ᾽ ἄνω τὰ δ᾽ αὖ κάτω (Ol.
xii. 6) with ἄνω κάτω as used in Phaedo 96 By Gorg. 481 νυ,
ete. Cf. also ἐν τέχνῃ Prot. 319 ὁ with ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ SLT ty
νῷ ἔχειν Rep. 490 a with ἐν vg ἔχειν 344 Ὁ, etc., τοῦ παντὸς
ἡμάρτηκεν Phaedr. 235 © with παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν 937 c. The
same is true of words—to confuse καλλίχορος with καλλέχοιρος
would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about ©
ὁμοουσία and ὁμοιουσία were perhaps not quite as ridiculous
as they are generally considered.
374
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
_ toeach?” “By allmeans.” “‘ Are you aware, then,”
said I, “ that if you should choose to ask men of these
_ three classes, each in turn,’ which is the most pleasur-
able of these lives, each will chiefly commend his
own®? The financier will affirm that in comparison
with profit the pleasures of honour or of learning are
of no value except in so far as they produce money.”
“True,” he said. ‘‘ And what of the lover of
honour®?”’ said I; “ does he not regard the pleasure
_ that comes from money as vulgar ὦ and low, and again
that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge
confers honour, mere fume*’ and moonshine?” “‘Itis
so,” he said. “And what,” said I, “‘ are we to sup-
pose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures
compared with the delight of knowing the truth’ and
the reality, and being always occupied with that
while he learns? Will he not think them far re-
moved from true pleasure,’ and call* them literally‘
δ Of. Laws 658 on judging different kinds of literature.
* Cf. p. 255, note f,on 549 a. Xenophon is the typical
φιλότιμος. In Mem. iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians “ ex-
cel all others . . . in love of honour, which is the strongest
incentive to deeds of honour and renown” (Marchant, Loeb
ἐγ). Of. Epist. 320 a, Symp. 178 pv, and also Xen. Cyrop.
i- 2.1, Mem. iii. i. 10.
“4 6; Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 b 16, and supra on 528 x.
* Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 320, and Turgeniev’s
novel, Smoke. 7 Cf. Phileb. 58 c on dialectic.
2 Cf. 598 5, Epist. iii. 315 c, Mare. Aurel. viii. 1 πόρρω
φιλοσοφίας. Hermann’s text or something like it is the only
idiomatic one, and τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω must express the
philosopher’s opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower
pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. A.J.P. xiii.
p. 366.
4 For the infinitive cf. 492 c καὶ φήσειν, 530 B καὶ ζητεῖν.
* τῷ ὄντι marks the etymological use of ἀναγκαίας. Cf. on
511 8 and 551 &£, p. 266, note a.
375
582
‘)) PLATO). it
ἀναγκαίας, ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενον, ei μὴ
ἀνάγκη ἦν; Eb, ἔφη, δεῖ εἰδέναι. ltr ied, by
VIII. “Ore δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ᾿ἀμφισβητοῦνταιϊ᾽ ἑκά-
στοῦ τοῦ εἴδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὃ βίος, hee
πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρ
καὶ ἄμεινον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἥδιον καὶ Do-
πότερον, πῶς. ἂν εἰδεῖμεν, τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα
λέγει; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε ἔχω εἰπεῖν. Αλλ᾽
woe σκόπει. τίνι χρὴ , κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα
καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι; op ovK ἐμπειρίᾳ. τε καὶ
φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ τούτων ἔχοι ἄν τις βέλτιον
κριτήριον; Καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἔφη. Σκόπει δή" τριῶν
ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐμπειρότατος πασῶν ὧν
εἴπομεν ἡδονῶν; πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδής, μανθάνων
αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν οἷόν ἐστιν, ἐμπεὶρ ρότερος δοκεῖ
Β σοὶ εἶναι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ asad ἡδονῆς, ἢ 6 φιλό-
C
codos τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν; Πολύ, “ἔφη, δια-
φέρει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι τῶν ἑτέρων
ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξαμένῳ: τῷ δὲ φιλοκερδεῖ, 6 ὅπῃ πέ-
φυκε τὰ ὄντα μανθάνοντι, τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης, ὡς
γλυκεῖά ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γεύεσθαι οὐδ᾽ ἐμπείρῳ
γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένῳ οὐ ῥάδιον.
Πολὺ ἄρα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, διαφέρει τοῦ γε φιλοκερ-
δοῦς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἡδονῶν.
Πολὺ μέντοι. Τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου; cise μᾶλλον
“ΟἿ, 558 Ὁ f.
> This anticipates Laws 663 a, 733 a-B, 734 a-B,
© 4.e, what is the criterion ? Of. 582 Ὁ δι᾽ of, Sext. Empir.
Bekker, p. 60 (Pyrrh. Hypotyp. ti. 13-14) and p. 197 (Adv.
Math. vii. 35). Cf. Diog. L. Prologue 21, and Laches
184". For the idea that the better soul is the better judge
cf. also Laws 663 ec, Aristot. Eth. Nie. 1176 a 16-19.
4 Of. 582 pv, On Virtue 373 Ὁ, Xen. Mem. iii. 3. 11.
376
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX .
_ the pleasures of necessity,* since he would have no
use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?”
_“ We may be sure of that,’’ he said.
_ VIII. “Since, then, there is contention between
_ the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves,
not merely as to which is the more honourable or the
more base; or the worse or the better, but which is
_ actually the more pleasurable ὃ or free from pain, how
could we determine which of them speaks most
truly?” “In faith, I cannot tell,” he said. ‘‘ Well,
consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if
they are to be judged¢ rightly? [5 it not by experi-
ence, intelligence and discussion? ? Or could anyone
name a better criterion than these ?”’ “How could
he?’ he said. “Observe, then. Of our three types
of men, which has had the most experience of all
the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the
lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has
more experience of the pleasure that knowledge
yields than the philosopher has of that which results
from gain?” “There is a vast difference,” he said:
“for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of
the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood ; but
the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of
tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure
of learning the true natures of things,* but he cannot
easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it.”
“ The lover of wisdom, then,” said I, “‘ far surpasses
the lover of gain in experience of both kinds’ of
pleasure.”’ -‘‘ Yes, far.”’ ‘‘ And how does he com-
pare with the lover of honour? Is he more un-
© The force of οὐ extends through the sentence. ΟἿ Class.
Phil. vi. (1911) p. 218, and my note on Tim, 77 8 in A.J.P: x.
p. 74. Cf. Il. ν. 408, xxii. 283, Pindar, Nem. iii. 15, Hymn
Dem. 157.
377
PLATO | Str
ἄπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς ἢ ἐκεῖ-
νος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν; ᾿Αλλὰ τιμὴ μέν, ἔφη,
ἐάνπερ ἐξεργάζωνται ἐπὶ ὃ ἕκαστος ὥρμηκε,
πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἕπεται" καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος. ὑπὸ
πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὃ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὁ σοφός, ὥστε
ἀπό γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οἷόν ἐστι, πάντες τῆς ἡδονῆς
ἔμπειροι" τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θέας, οἵαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει,
ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ γεγεῦσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλόσόφῳ.
᾿Ἐμπειρίας “μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ἕνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν
ἀνδρῶν κρίνει οὗτος. Πολύ γε. Καὶ μὴν μετά
γε φρονήσεως μόνος ἔμπειρος γεγονὼς ἔσται... Τί
μήν; ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ dv οὗ γε δεῖ ὁ ὀργάνου κρίνε-
σθαι, οὐ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς τοῦτο ὄργανον οὐδὲ τοῦ
φιλοτίμου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου. Τὸ ποῖον; Διὰ
λόγων που ἔφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι. ἢ γάρ; Ναί.
Λόγοι δὲ τούτου μάλιστα ὄργανον. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ;
Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει ἃ ἄριστα ἐκρίνετο
τὰ “κρινόμενα, ἃ ἐπήνει ὁ φιλοκερδὴς καὶ ἔψεγεν,
ἀνάγκη ἂν ἦν ταῦτα ἀληθέστατα εἶναι. Πολλή. γε.
Ei δὲ τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκῃ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ, ἄρ᾽ οὐχ ἃ
ὁ φιλότιμός τε καὶ ὁ φιλόνικος; Δῆλον. ᾿Επειδὴ
δ᾽ ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ᾿Ανάγκη,
ἔφη, ἃ 6 φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ὁ φιλόλογος ἐπαινεῖ,
ἀληθέστατα εἶναι. Τριῶν ἄρ᾽ οὐσῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν
ἡ τούτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ ὃ μανθάνομεν,
OO ee
‘ 3 φΦ q
ἡδίστη ἂν εἴη, Kal ἐν ᾧ ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἄρχει, ὁ
@ For the periphrasis γεγονὼς ἔσται ο΄. Charm. 174 Ὁ
ἀπολελοιπὸς ἔσται.
δ Cf. 508 B, 518 σ, 527 pv.
¢ Cf. on 582 a, p. 376, note ὦ.
378
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
_ acquainted with the pleasure of being honoured than
that other with that which comes from knowledge ὃ
“Nay, honour,” he said, “if they achieve their
several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is
‘honoured by many and the brave man and the wise,
so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure
that honour brings; but it is impossible for anyone
except the lover of wisdom to have savoured the
delight that the contemplation of true being and
reality brings.” “Then,” said I, “so far as experi-
ence goes, he is the best judge of the three.” “ By
far.” “‘ And again, he is the only one whose experi-
ence will have been accompanied? by intelligence.”
“Surely.”’ “ And yet again, that which is the instru-
ment,or ὄργανον, of judgement? is the instrument, not
of the lover of gain or of the lover of honour, but of
the lover of wisdom.” “ What is that?” “It was
by. means of words and discussion 5 that we said the
judgement must be reached; was it not?” “Yes.”
“And they are the instrument mainly of the philo-
sopher.” “ Of course.” “‘ Now if wealth and profit
were the best criteria by which things are judged,
the things praised and censured by the lover of gain
would necessarily be truest and most real.” “ Quite
necessarily.” “* And if honour, victory and courage,
‘would it not be the things praised by the lover of
honour and victory?” ‘Obviously.’’ “But since
the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion,
what follows ?”’ “ Of necessity,” he said, “‘ that the
things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion
are most valid and true.’’ “‘ There being, then, three
kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul
whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the
man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasur-
379
PLATO ΓΗ Ὲ
τούτου βίος ἥδιστος; Πῶς δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη"
κύριος γοῦν ἐπαινέτης ὧν ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον
ὃ φρόνιμος. Τίνα δὲ δεύτερον, εἶπον, βίον καὶ
τίνα δευτέραν ἡδονήν φησιν ὁ κριτὴς εἶναι; Δῆλον
4 3 > ἘΠΕ}
ὅτι τὴν τοῦ πολεμικοῦ τε καὶ φιλοτίμου: ἐγγυτέρω
γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ ἡ τοῦ χρηματιστοῦ. “ἵστατην
δὴ τὴν τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς, ὡς ἔοικεν. Τί μήν; ἢ
δ᾽ ὅς £ ᾿ ‘i By, i ἰδ
Β ΙΧ. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω δύ᾽ ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη
καὶ δὶς νενικηκὼς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον" τὸ δὲ
,ὔ > ~ a“ af \ ~ >?
τρίτον ᾿Ολυμπικῶς TH σωτῆρί τε καὶ τῷ ’OAvp-
πίῳ Διί, ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθής ἐστιν ἡ τῶν
ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρά,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ pow τῶν
σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκηκοέναι. καίτοι τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη μέγι-
στόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων. Πολύ
γε: ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις; Ὧδ᾽, εἶπον, ἐξευρήσω,
C σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ζητῶν ἅμα. Ἐρώτα δή, ἔφη.
Λέγε δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμὲν λύπην
ἡδονῇ; Καὶ μάλα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μήτε χαίρειν
μήτε λυπεῖσθαι. εἶναί τι; Ἐΐναι μέντοι. Με-
@ The third cup of wine was always dedicated to Zeus the ἱ
Saviour, and τρίτος σωτήρ became proverbial. Cf. Charm.
167 a, Phileb. 66 Ὁ, Laws 692 a, 960 c, Epist. vii. 334 ἢ),
340 a. Cf. Hesychius 5.0. τρίτος κρατήρ. Brochard, La
Morale de Platon, missing the point, says, “ Voici enfin un
troisitme argument qui parait ἃ Platon le plus décisif
puisqu’il l’appelle une victoire vraiment olympique.” For
the idea of a contest ef. Phileb. passim.
- © Of. Phileb. 36 c, 44 D ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς. For the unreality
of the lower pleasures cf. Phileb. 36 a ff. and ~ 44 c-D,
Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 23-25, What Plato Said,
pp. 322-323 and 609-610, supra Introd. pp. lvi-lix, Rodier,
Remarques sur le Philébe, p. 281.
¢ Of. Phileb. 52 c καθαρὰς ἡδονάς, and 53 ὁ καθαρὰ λύπης.
380
a να."
|
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
able.” “How could it be otherwise?” he said. °
“ At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with
_ authority when he commends his own life.” “‘ And
: to what life and to what pleasure,” I said, ““ does the
ign the second place?”’ “ Obviously to
judge ass
_ that of the warrior and honour-loving type, for it is
nearer to the first than is the life of the money-
maker.” “And so the last place belongs to the lover
_ of gain, as it seems.” “‘ Surely,” said he.
. “ That, then, would be two points in succession
_and two victories for the just man oyer the unjust.
_ And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the
saviour * and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other
pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether
eyen real? or pure,* but is a kind of scene-painting,? as
I seem to have heard from some wise man®; and yet’
this would be the greatest and most decisive over-
throw.” “Much the greatest. But what do you
mean?” “J shall discover it,” I said, “if you will
answer my questions while I seek.” “ΑΒΕ, then,”
hesaid. ‘“ Tellme, then,” said I,“ do we not say that
pain is the opposite of pleasure ὃ “γε certainly
do.”” “And is there not such a thing as a neutral
State*?” “There is.” “15 it not intermediate be-
4 Cf. Laws 663 c, Phaedo 69 8, supra 365 c, 523 B, 602 τ»,
586 Ὁ, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266. -
* One of Plato’sevasions. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 513, on
Meno 81 4, Phileb.44 8. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266 misses
the am and says that by the wise man Plato means himself.
? For this rhetorical cairo: cf. 360 c, 376 B, 438 5, 440 D,
Gorg. 452 ©, Laws 663 £, 690 c.
9 Cf. Phileb. 22 π, Aesch. Prom. 919, Soph. Antig. 1046.
* If any inference could be drawn from the fact that in
the Philebus 42 τὸ ff. and 32 πὶ the reality of the. neutral
state has to be proved, it would be that the Philebus is
earlier, which it is not. ἢ
381
PLATO!) 5Ἢ
ταξὺ τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν ev μέσῳ ὃν ἡσυχίαν τινὰ
περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς; ἣ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὸ ea
Οὕτως, 4 δ᾽ ὅς. *Ap’ οὐ μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ᾽
τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους, οὗς λέγουσιν ὅτ Ν
κάμνωσιν; Ποίους; Ὥς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἥδιον
D τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς pte πρὶν κάμνειν,
ἥδιστον ὄν. Μέμνημαι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν
περιωδυνίᾳ τινὶ ἐχομένων ἀκούεις λεγόντων, ὡς
οὐδὲν ἥδιον τοῦ παύσασθαι ὀδυνώμενον; ᾿Ακούω.
Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε, οἶμαι, πολλοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσθάνει
γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπῶν-
ται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιού-
του ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἥδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν. ᾿
Τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἡδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν
Ε γίγνεται, ἡσυχία. Καὶ ὅ ὅταν παύσηται ἄρα, εἶπον,
χαίρων τις, ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν ἔσται.
Ἴσως, ἔφη. Ὃ μεταξὺ ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων Ἷ
ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε G, ερα
ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή. Ἔοικεν. Ἢ καὶ
δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὃ ὃν ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι; Οὔ
μοι δοκεῖ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμε- -
νον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησίς τις ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν"
584 ἢ οὔ; Ναί. Τὸ δὲ μήτε λυπηρὸν μήτε ἡδὺ οὐχὶ
ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτοιν ἐφάνη ἄρτι;
᾿Εφάνη γάρ. “Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν.
ἡδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀνιαρόν; Οὐδα͵ μῶς. ;
Οὐκ €ariv ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, !
᾿
ἔν,
« For ἐν μέσῳ cf. Phileb. 35 Ἐ-
ὑ Cf. perhaps Phileb. 45 8, iAristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 a 24,
and Heracleit. fr. 111, Diels 1.8 p. 99 νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδύ.
¢ Cf. Phileb. 43 8, Hipp. Maj. 300 8 ἢ.
382
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
tween them, and in themean,* being a kind of quietude
of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your
notion of it?” “ It is that,” said he.“ Do you not
recall the things men Whe in sickness? ’’ . “ What
art, of things >” “Why, that after all there is
sweeter than to be well,’ though they werenot
_ aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were
il.” “T remember,” he said. “And do you not
_ hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there
is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this
suffering?” “TI do.” “ And you perceive, I pre-
_ sume, many similar conditions in which men while
suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief
from that.as the highest pleasure, and not positive
ight.’ “ Yes,” he said, “‘ for this in such cases is
sik what i is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—
peace.” “ And so,” I said, “ when a man’s delight
comes ἴο δὴ end, the cessation of pleasure will be
” “Tt may beso,” he said. “‘ What, then,we
just now described as the intermediate state between
_ the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain
and pleasure.” ““Itseemsso.” “Is it really possible
for that which is neither to become both*?” “T
think not.” “And further, both pleasure and pain
ising in thesoul are a kind of motion,?are they not?”
“Yes.” “* And did we not just now see that to feel
neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and
an intermediate state between the two?” “ Yes,
we did.” “ How, then, can it be right to think the
absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy pain-
ful?” “In no way.” “ This is not a reality, then,
but an illusion,” said 1; “‘ in ‘such case the quietude
4 Aristotle attacks this doctrine with captious dialectic in
his Topics and De anima.
383
PLATO iit THT
παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ Kal παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλγεινὸν
τότε ἡ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαν-
΄ : \ ε ms SP Ps ‘ ae Dy) iy Fares
τασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις.
Ὥ 7A seky A " ΡΣ ΤΟΔΗ δ
ς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει. τοίνυν,
Β ἔφην ἐγώ, ἡδονάς, at οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν, ἵνα μὴ
πολλάκις οἰηθῆς ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω τοῦτο πεφυ-
Y πάρβοντ' ὑτὸ πεφῦ
κέναι, ἡδονὴν μὲν παῦλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ
ἡδονῆς. Ποῦ δή, ἔφη, καὶ “ποίας λέγεις; Πολ-
" , \ oo» , 2 F ΣΡ Jee
Aat μέν, εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλαι, μάλιστα δ᾽ εἰ θέλεις
ἐννοῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδονάς. “ αὗται γὰρ
> / > / > /, ‘ /
οὐ προλυπηθέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος
γίγνονται, παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν κατα-
λείπουσιν. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. Μὴ ἄρα πειθώ-
Ο μεθα καθαρὰν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν λύπης ἀπαλλαγήν,
μηδὲ λύπην τὴν ἡδονῆς. Μὴ γάρ. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι,
εἶπον, αἵ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνου-
σαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναὶ σχεδὸν at πλεῖσταί τε καὶ
μέγισται τούτου τοῦ εἴδους εἰσί, λυπῶν τινὲς ἀπ-
αλλαγαί. Ἑϊσὶ γάρ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ af πρὸ μελλόντων
τούτων ἐκ προσδοκίας γιγνόμεναι προησθήσεις τε
καὶ προλυπήσεις κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσιν; Kara ταὐτά.
D Χ. Οἷσθ’ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οἷαί εἰσι καὶ ᾧ
μάλιστα ἐοίκασιν; Τῷ; ἔφη. Νομίζεις τι, εἶπον,
\
ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω, TO δὲ κάτω, TO δὲ
«ΟἹ 586 c, and Phileb. 429.8 and 41 π.
» For οὐδὲν ὑγιές in this sense cf. on 523 π. j
¢ Cf. Phileb. 44 c-p, Xen, Oecon. 1. 20 προσποιούμεναι
ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, etc. :
4 For the idea that smells are not conditioned by pain
cf. Tim. 65 A, Phileb. 51 B and τ, and Siebeck, Platon als
Kritiker Aristotelischer Ansichten, p. 161.
© Cf. Gorg. 493-494, Phileb. 42 c ff., and Phaedr. 258 ©, —
which Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 267 overlooks.
384
—— ἀν ων
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
in juxtaposition * with the pain appears pleasure, and
in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these
illusions haye no real bearing” on the truth of pleasure,
but are a kind of jugglery.*”’ “So at any rate our
argument signifies,” he said. ‘‘ Take a look, then,”
said I, “ ete which do not follow on pain, so
that. you may not haply suppose for the present that
itis the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain
and pain from pleasure.’ “ Where shall I look,” he
said, “ and what pleasures do you mean?” “‘ There
are many others,” I said, “ and especially, if you
ease to note them, the pleasures connected with
smell. For these with no antecedent pain ¢ suddenly
attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation
leayes πὸ pain after them.” “‘ Most true,” he said.
“ Let us not believe, then, that the riddance of pain
is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain.”’ ‘‘ No, we
must ποῖ." “ Yet,surely,” said I, “ the affections that
find: their way through the body/ to the soul? and
are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and
the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases
‘from pain.*”’ “‘ Yes, they are.” “ And is not this also
the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains
that precede them and arise from the expectation
ofthem?” “It is.”
X. “ Do you know, then, what their quality is and
what. they most resemble?” “‘ What?” he said.
“Do you think that there is such a thing in nature
7 Cf. Phaedo 65 s, Phaedr, 258 ©, Vol. I. p. 8, note a,
on 328 p, and supra p. 8, note ὃ.
σ Cf. Tim. 45 Ὁ (of sensations) μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς, Laws 673 a,
Rep. 462 c πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη. Cf. Phileb. 33 v-r,
34, Cf Ph δον What Pilato Said, p. 608.
. Phileb, 44 8, 44 churay . . . ἀποφυγάς, Protag. 354 8.
* For ἐν τῇ φύσει ef. Parmen. 132 v. ros
VOL. II ὡς 385
ΡΙΡΆΠΟΣΓΤΗΠ NAT
μέσον; Ἔγωγε. Οἴει οὖν av τινα ἐκ τοῦ κάτω
φερόμενον πρὸς μέσον ἄλλο τι οἴεσθαι ἢ ἄνω
φέρεσθ αι; καὶ ἐν μέσῳ στάντα, ἀφορῶντα ὅθεν
ἐνήνεκται, ἄλλοθί που ἂν ἡγεῖσθαι. εἶναι ἢ ἢ ἐν τῷ
ἄνω, μὴ ἑωρακότα τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω; “Μὰ Av’, οὐκ
ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἄλλως οἶμαι οἰηθῆναι ἃ ἂν τὸν ρα δίον: |
AM’ εἰ πάλιν γ᾽ ἢ ἔφην, φέροιτο, κάτω Tr ἂν '
οἴουτο φέρεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ οἴοιτο; Πῶς ap οὔ;
Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα πάσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔμπειρος
εἶναι τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω τε ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κο ὶ
κάτω; Δῆλον δή. Θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν, εἰ καὶ of
ἄπειροι. ἀληθείας περὶ πολλῶν τε ἄλλων μὴ ὑγιεῖς.
δόξας ἔχουσι, πρός τε ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην. καὶ τὸ
μεταξὺ τούτων οὕτω διάκεινται, ὥστε, ὅταν. μὲν.
585 ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν φέρωνται, ἀληθῆ τε οἴονται καὶ
τῷ ὄντι λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ λύπης ἐπὶ ee
μεταξύ, σφόδρα μὲν οἴονται πρὸς πληρώσει - τε καὶ
ἡδονῇ “γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ πρὸς μέλαν φαιὸν ἀπο-
σκοποῦντες ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον
οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀ ἀπειρίᾳ ἡδονῆς ἀπατῶνται: ἑ
Μὰ Aca, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἀλλὰ, πο
μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει. Ὧδέ γ᾽ οὖν, εἶπον,,
ἐννόει" οὐχὶ πεῖνα καὶ δίψα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κενώσεις
ee oS τ ..
« For the purposes of his illustration Plato takes the
popular view of up and down, which is corrected in Tim.
62 c-p and perhaps by the ironical δή in Phaedo 112 c.
Cf. Zeller, Aristotle (Eng.) i. p. 428.
> Cf. Aristot. Met. 1011 b 30-31 and Eth. Nie. 1154 a 30
διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι.
¢ The argument from the parallel of body and mind here
belongs to what we have called confirmation. Cf. What
Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 78 8. \ The figurative use of
repletion and nutrition. is not to be pressed in proof of ‘con-
386
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
as up and down and in the middle?” “TI do.”
“Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is trans-
ported from below to the centre would have any
other opinion than that he was moving upward 4?
And if he took his stand at the centre and looked in ©
the direction from which he had been transported, do
you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere
_ but above, never having seen that which is really
_ above?” “No, by Zeus,” he said, “1 do not think
that such a person would have any other notion.”
** And if he were borne back,’ I said, “ he would
both think himself to be moving downward and would
think truly.” “Of course.” “ And would not all
this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance
with the true and real up and down and middle?”
“Obviously.” “‘ Would it surprise you, then,” said
I, “if similarly men without experience of truth and
reality hold unsound opinions about many other
matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and
pain and the intermediate neutral condition that,
when they are moved in the direction of the painful,
they truly think themselves to be, and really are, ina
state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the
middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that
they are approaching fulfilment and pleasure, and just
as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing
grey with black,’ so, being inexperienced in true
pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness
in its relation to pain?” “‘ No, by Zeus,” he said,
“it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were
not so.” “In this way, then, consider it.© Are not
hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or
tradictions with the Philebus or Gorgias. Cf. Matthew v. 6
“ Hunger and thirst after righteousness.”
387
PLATO
Β τινές εἶσι τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἕξεως; Τί μήν;
ΓΑγνοια δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη ἄρ᾽ οὐ κενότης ἐστὶ τῆς
περὶ ψυχὴν αὖ ἕξεως; Μάλα γε. Οὐκοῦν » πληροῖτ᾽
ἂν ὃ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὃ νοῦν ἴσχων;
Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; Πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἧττον
ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος; Δῆλον, ὅτι τοῦ μᾶλλον.
Πότερα οὖν ἡγεῖ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας
μετέχειν, τὰ οἷον σίτου τε καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψου καὶ
ξυμπάσης τροφῆς, ἢ ἢ τὸ a τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ
Ce ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ év λλήβδην αὖ πάσης
ἀρετῆς; ὧδε δὲ κρῖνε" τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον
καὶ ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὃν
καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναΐ σοι δοκεῖ,
ἢ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ
τοιοῦτο καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ γιγνόμενον; ; Πολύ, “ἔφη,
διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου. Ἢ οὖν ἀνομοίου"
οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιστήμης μετέχει;
Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δ᾽, ἀληθείας; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Ἐλ δὲ
ΝΞ
ἀληθείας ἧττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας; ᾿Ανάγκη. Οὐκ-
οῦν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη 7
τῶν γενῶν αὖ τῶν περὶ THY τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν
1 ἀνομοίου Hermann: ἀεὶ ὁμοίου mss. followed by Ast and
Stallbaum. Adam reads ἀεὶ ἀνομοίου and inserts ἡ before
ἐπιστήμης. C. Ritter treats ἀεὶ ὁμοίου οὐσία as a marginal
note and reads Ἦ οὖν οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον A ἐπιστήμης μετέχει
(Philologus 67, pp. 812-818). Apelt entirely recasts the
passage (Woch. f. kl. Phil., 1903, pp. 348-350).
2 For κενώσεις cf. λήϊον. 35 B, 42 c-p, Tim. 65 a,
> For the figure of nourishment of the soul ef. Protag.
313 c, Phaedr. 248 8, and Soph. 223 ©.
¢ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517, on Meno 98 Α-Β.
388
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
_ emptinesses* of the bodily habit?” “Surely.” “And
is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness
of the habit of the soul?” “ΤΙ is indeed.” “ And
he who partakes of nourishment ὃ and he who gets
wisdom fills the void and is filled?” “ΟΥ̓ course.”
“And which is the truer filling and fulfilment, that
of the less or of the more real being?” “ Evidently
that of the more real.” “ And which of the two
_ groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure
essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and
nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,’
knowledge and reason,? and, in sum, all the things
that are more excellent®? Form your judgement thus.
Which do you think more truly ἐδ, that which clings to
what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth,
and that which is itself of such a nature and is born
in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what
is mortal and never the same and is itself such and
is born in such a thing?” “ That which cleaves
to what is ever the same far surpasses,” he said.
“Does the essence of that which never abides the
same partake of real essence any more than of
knowledge >” “ By no means.” “Or of truth and
reality?” “* Not of that, either.” “‘ And if a thing
has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or
existence ?”’ “ Necessarily.” “* Andis it not gener-
ally true that the kinds concerned with the service
of the body partake less of truth and reality than
4 Different kinds of intelligence are treated as synonyms
because for the present purpose their distinctions are ir-
relevant. Cf. 511 a,c, and Ὁ διάνοια. Cf. Unity of Plato's
Thought, p, 43 and p. 47,n. 339. Plato does not distinguish
synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as Prodicus
did. Cf. Protag. 358 a-s.
* Cf. Symp. 209 a φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.
889
PLATO ΤΠ ΠΗῚ ᾿
ἧττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας. μετέχει; Πολύ γε.
Σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἴει οὕτως; Ἔγωγε.
Οὐκοῦν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον. καὶ
αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ὃν ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται ἢ τὸ τῶν
ἧττον ὄντων καὶ αὐτὸ ἧττον ὄν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
Εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων
ἡδύ ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον
Ε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον o ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν
ἂν ποιοῖ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἧττον. ὄντων
μεταλαμβάνον ἧττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως
πληροῖτο καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἧττον
ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι. ᾿Αναγκαιότατα, ἔφη. Oi
586 ἄρα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι, εὐωχίαις δὲ
καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀεὶ ξυνόντες, κάτω, ὡς ἔοικε,
καὶ μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονταί τε xed
ταύτῃ πλανῶνται διὰ βίου, ὑπερβάντες δὲ τοῦτο
| πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν πώποτε οὔτε,
Γ΄ ἠνέχθησαν, οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος τῷ ὄντι ie deal
R
4
~~
'
4
1
οὐδὲ βεβαίου τε καὶ καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς εὔσαντο,
ἀλλὰ βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ba βλέποντες καὶ
ἱ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται
| Β χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες, καὶ ἕνεκα τῆς τοῦ
@ For ξυνόντες see Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1404,
* Of. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 79 ὁ for eXokdis
of error in thought. This is rather the errare of Liucre
ii. 10 and the post-Aristotelian schools.
° Of. on 576 a ἄγευστος, and for the thought of the winds
sentence ef. Dio Chrys. Or. xiii., Teubner, vol. i. p. 240, and —
William Watson, “ The things that are more excellent” :
To dress, to call, to dine. . .
How many a soul for these things lives
With pious passion, grave intent...
And never even in dreams hath seen : 7
The things that are more excellent.
——
800
' THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
those that serve the soul?” “ Much less.” “ And
doe you not think that the same holds of the. body
itself in comparison with the soul?” “I do.”
“ Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more
truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly
filled and satisfied than that which being itself less
real is filled with more unreal things?” “ Of
course.” “ If,then,to be filled with what befits nature
is pleasure, then that which is more really filled
_to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes
of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely
filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and
less true pleasure.’’ ‘ Most inevitably,” he said.
“Then those who have no experience of wisdom and
virtue but are ever devoted to “ feastings and that sort
of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back
again to the centre, and so sway and roam ὃ to and fro
throughout their lives, but they have never tran-
ed allthis and turned their eyes to the true upper
m nor been wafted there, nor ever been really
τῇ
@ Cf. Milton, Comus, “‘ Ne’er looks to heaven amid its
gorgeous feast,” Rossetti, “‘ Nineveh,” in jine, “‘ That set
gaze neyer on the sky,” ete. Cf. 8. O. Dickermann, De
Argumentis quibusdam ap. Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristo-
telem obviis 4 structura hominis et animalium petitis,
Halle, 1909, who lists Plato’s Symp. 190 a, Rep. 586 a,
Cratyl. 396 5, 409 c, Tim. 90 a, 91 ©, and many other
* Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 Ὁ 20 βοσκημάτων βίον. Cf.
What Plato Said, p. 611, on Phileb., in fine.
391
_ filled with real things, nor ever tasted® stable and pure _
_with real things would more really and truly cause us —
—
pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth and |
heads bowed down over their tables they feast like |
cattle,’ grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more |
PLATO
πλεονεξίας λακτίζοντες καὶ κυρίττοντες ἀλλήλους
σιδηροῖς κέρασί τε καὶ ὅπλαϊῖς ἀποκτιννύασι δι᾿
| ἀπληστίαν, ἅτε οὐχὶ τοῖς οὖσιν οὐδὲ τὸ ὃν οὐδὲ
| τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν πιμπλάντες. Παντελῶς, ἔφη ὁ
| Πλαύκων, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρησμῳ-
‘
| δεῖς βίον. *Ap’ οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη Kai ἡδοναῖς Evv-
- / , > lA “ 3 ΓΞ
εἶναι μεμιγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοις τῆς ἀλη ots
ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις, ὑπὸ τῆς παρ᾽
Ὁ ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχραινομέναις, ὥστε σφοδροὺς
ἑκατέρας φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἔρωτας ἑαυτῶν λυττῶντας
τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἐντΐκτειν καὶ περιμαχήτους εἶναι,
ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης εἴδωλον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ,
Στησίχορός φησι γενέσθαι περιμάχητον ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ
ἀληθοῦς; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτὸ
εἶναι. ἘΣ
ΧΙ. Τί δέ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα
ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται
ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βίᾳ διὰ φιλονικίαν ἣ
D θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ
νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ
νοῦ; Τοιαῦτα, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦτο
εἶναι. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν,
«ΟἹ supra 373 ©, Phaedo 66 c ff., Berkeley, Siris 330
“For these things men fight, cheat, and scramble.”
ὃ τὸ στέγον : ef. Gorg. 493 8, Laws 714 a.
¢ Plato laughs at himself. Cf. supra 509 c and 540 B-c. ©
The picturesque, allegorical style of oracles was proverbial.
For χρησμῳδεῖν cf. Crat. 396 p, Apol. 39 c, Laws 712 a.
4 Cf. on 584 a, p. 384, note a.
——
4 For περιμαχήτους cf. Aristot. Hth. Nic, 1168 Ὁ 19, Bth. —
Bud. 1248 Ὁ 27, and supra on 521 a, p. 145, note ὁ.
? For the Stesichorean legend that the real Helen remained
in Egypt while only her phantom went to Troy ef. Phaedr.
243 s-s, Eurip. Hel. 605 ff., Hlect. 1282-1283, Isoc. Hel. 64,
392
"Δ
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
of these delights; and in their greed® kicking and
butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they
slay one another in sateless avidity, because they. are
vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real
the unreal and incontinent part? of their souls.”
“ You describe in quite oracular style,° Socrates,” said
Glaucon, “the lite of the multitude.” ‘ And are
not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably
commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure,
illusions of scene-painting, so coloured by contrary
juxtaposition ἃ as to seem intense in either kind, and
to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls,
and to be fought for,’ as Stesichorus says the wraith
of Helen’ was fought for at Troy through ignorance
of the truth?” “Τὸ is quite inevitable,” he said,
“that it should be so.”
XI. “So, again, must not the like hold of the high-
spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satis-
fying that part of his nature—his covetousness of
honour by envy; his love of victory by violence, his
ill-temper by indulgence in anger, pursuing these
ends without regard to consideration and reason ? ”
“The same sort of thing,” he said, “ must necessarily
happen in this case too.” ‘‘ Then,” said I, “ may we
aad Phi . 634 fF. Di er, A ika p. 55,
thinks grea ar ec κῃ a ᾿λολωνος Gf. also
Teichmiiller, Lit. Fehden, i. pp. 113 ff. So Milton, Reason
of Church Government, “A lawny resemblance of her like
at air-born Helena in the fables.’* For the ethical sym-
bolism ¢f. 520 c-p, Shelley, ‘“* Adonais’’ 39:
*Tis we who, lost in stormy visions, keep
With phantoms an unprofitable strife.
Arnold, *‘ Dover Beach,” in fine:
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.
393
PLATO} 754 SH?
ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ φιλοκερδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόνικον ὅσαι
ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσίν, at μὲν ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ
ἑπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσαι,
ἃς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγῆται," λαμβάνωσι, τὰς
ἀληθεστάτας τε «λήψονται, ὡς οἷόν τε αὐταῖς
ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, ἅτε ἀληθείᾳ, ἑπομένων, καὶ τὰς
E ἑαυτῶν οἰκείας, εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον ἑ ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο
καὶ οἰκειότατον; ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, οἰκειότατόν γε.
Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἑπομένης ἁπάσης τῆς '
καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἑ ἑκάστῳ τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει. εἴς
τε τἄλλα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν καὶ δικαίῳ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ
καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας
587 καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν τὰς ἀληθεστάτας. καρποῦσθαι.
Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Ὅταν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἑτέρων τι
κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ μήτε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονὴν
ἐξευρίσκειν, τά τε ἄλλ᾽ ἀναγκάζειν ἀλλοτρίαν καὶ
μὴ ἀληθῆ ἡδονὴν διώκειν. Οὕτως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν
ἃ πλεῖστον φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ λόγου ἀφέστηκε,
ἄλιστ᾽ ἂν τοιαῦτα ἐξεργάζοιτο;; Πολύ γε. Πλεῖ-
στον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμου τε καὶ
τάξεως; Δῆλον δή. ᾿Ἐφάνησαν δὲ πλεῖστον ἀφεστῶ-
σαι οὐχ αἱ ἐρωτικαί τε καὶ τυραννικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι;
4 Of Phaedo 69 8, and Theaet. 176 B μετὰ φρονήσεως.
ὃ ἐξῃγῆται has a religious tone. See on ἐξηγητής, 427 c.
Of. 604 5.
° Cf. on 583 B, p. 380, note b.
4 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 491, on Lysis 221 π΄.
¢ Cf. 352 a, 440 B and £, 442 νυ, 560 a, Phaedr. 237 B.
7 ae What Plato Said, p. 480 οπ Charm. 161 8.
or els τὸ δυνατόν ef. F 00 Ὁ, 381 c, Laws 795 p, 830 B,
888 B, 900 c.
» What follows (587 8-588 a) is not to be taken too seri-
ously. It illustrates the method of procedure by minute
links, the satisfaction of Plato’s feelings by confirmations
394
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving
_ and the contentious part of our nature all the desires
that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing
their pleasures in conjunction with them,? take only
those pleasures which reason approves,” will,since they
_ follow truth, enjoy the truest® pleasures, so far as that
is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are
_ proper to them and their own, if for everything that
_ which is best may be said to be most its “own’??”
“ But indeed,” he said, “it is most truly its very
_ own.” “Then when the entire soul accepts the
_ guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled
with inner dissension,* the result for each part is that
it in all other respects keeps to its own task’ and is
just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper
pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a
thing is possible,’ the truest.” “‘Preciselyso.” “‘And
so when one of the other two gets the mastery the
result for it is that it does not find its own proper
pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien
pleasure and not the true.” “ That is so,” he said.
“ And would not that which is furthest removed from
philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this
effect*?*” “* Quite so,” he said. “ And is not that
furthest removed from reason which is furthest from
law and order?” “Obviously.” “ And was it not
made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic
and tyrannical appetites?” “ Quite so.” “And
and analogies, and his willingness to play with mathematical
bolism. Cf. 546 8 f. and William Temple, Plato and
hristianity, p. 55: “‘ Finally the whole thing is a satire on
the humbug of mystical number, but I need not add tha
the German commentators are seriously exercised. . . .”
See however A. Ὁ. Laird in Class. Phil. xi. (1916) pp.
395
PLATO
B Πολύ ye. ᾿Ελάχιστον δὲ αἱ βασιλικαί τε καὶ
κόσμιαι; Ναί. Πλεῖστον δή, οἶμαι, ἀληθοῦς ἧδο-
νῆς καὶ οἰκείας 6 τύραννος ἀφεστήξει, ὁ δὲ ὀλί-
γιστον. ᾿Ανάγκη. Καὶ ἀηδέστατα ἄρα, εἶπον, 6
7 7 ε A A iA Ἂν
τύραννος βιώσεται, ὃ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἥδιστα. Πολλὴ
ἀνάγκη. Οἶσθ’ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅσῳ ἀηδέστερον
ζῇ τύραννος βασιλέως; “Av εἴπῃς, ἔφη. Τριῶν
ἡδονῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐσῶν, μιᾶς μὲν γνησίας, δυοῖν
C δὲ νόθαιν, τῶν νόθων εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα ὑπερβὰς ὃ
4 \ , ‘ 7, , A
τύραννος, φυγὼν νόμον τε καὶ λόγον, δούλαις τισὶ
δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς ξυνοικεῖ, καὶ ὁπόσῳ ἐλαττοῦται
οὐδὲ πάνυ ῥάδιον εἰπεῖν, πλὴν ἴσως ὧδε. Πῶς;
» > A ~ 3 ~ / ε Δ
ἔφη. ᾿Απὸ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τρίτος που ὃ τύραννος
ἀφειστήκει: ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ δημοτικὸς ἦν.
Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡδονῆς τρίτῳ εἰδώλῳ πρὸς
ἀλήθειαν ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ξυνοικοῖ ἄν, εἰ τὰ πρόσθεν
ἀληθῆ; Οὕτως. Ὃ δέ γε ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ
Ὁ βασιλικοῦ αὖ τρίτος, ἐὰν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀριστο-
κρατικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν τιθῶμεν. Τρίτος γάρ.
Τριπλασίου dpa, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τριπλάσιον ἀριθμῷ
ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς ἀφέστηκε τύραννος. Φαίνεται.
3 ,ὔ | ahs Ν ε μὲ A
Ἐπίπεδον dp’, ἔφην, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ εἴδωλον κατὰ
τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμὸν ἡδονῆς τυραννικῆς ἂν εἴη.
Κομιδῇ γε. Κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην
“- ,ὔ
δῆλον δὴ ἀπόστασιν ὅσην ἀφεστηκὼς γίγνεται.
Δῆλον, ἔφη, τῷ γε λογιστικῷ. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις
E μεταστρέψας ἀληθείᾳ ἡδονῆς τὸν βασιλέα τοῦ
τυράννου ἀφεστηκότα λέγῃ, ὅσον ἀφέστηκεν,
@ Cf. Polit. 257 5 ἀφεστᾶσιν.
» Of. Vol. I. p. 282, note a, on 408 p and supra p. 344,
note 6, on 573 Ὁ.
¢ For els τὸ ἐπέκεινα cf. Phaedo 112 8 and supra 509 B.
@ Cf. Vol. I. p. 422, note ὃ, on 445 p and Menez. 238 Ὁ.
396
;
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
least so the royal and orderly ἢ “* Yes.” “Then the
tyrant’s place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest re-
move* from true and proper pleasure, and the king’s
at the least.” “ Necessarily.” ‘‘ Then the tyrant’s
life will be least pleasurable and the king’s most.”
“ There is every necessity of that.” “Do you know,
then,” said I, ‘‘ how much less pleasurably the tyrant
lives than the king?” “ΠῚ know if you tell me,’ ” he
said, “‘ There being as it appears three pleasures,
one genuine and two spurious, the tyrant in his flight
from law and reason crosses the border beyond ° the
urious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary
pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not
easy to express except perhaps thus.” “‘ How?” he
said. “ The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third
remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came
between.” “‘ Yes.” ‘“‘ And would he not also dwell
with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three
stages removed from that other, if all that we have
_ said is true?” “ Thatisso.” “ And the oligarch in
turn is at the third remove from the royal man if we
assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king.*”’
“ Yes, the third.” “Three times three, then, by
numerical measure is the interval that separates the
tyrant from true pleasure.” “‘ Apparently.” “The
phantom ὁ of the tyrant’s pleasure is then by longitu-
dinal mensuration a plane number.’ “* Quite so.”
“ But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the
interval of this separation becomes.” “It is clear,” he
said,‘ to areckoner.”’. “ Then taking it the other way
about, if one tries to express the extent of the interval
between the king and the tyrant in respect of true
* Cf. Phaedo 66 c εἰδώλων, where Olympiodorus (Norvin,
p. 36) takes it of the unreality of the lower pleasures. . .
397
PLATO
ἐννεακαιεικοσικαιεπτακοσιοπλασιάκις ἥδιον αὐτὸν
ζῶντα εὑρήσει τελειωθείσῃ τῇ πολλαπλασιώσει, τὸν
δὲ τύραννον ἀνιαρότερον τῇ αὐτῇ ταύτῃ ἀποστάσει.
᾿Αμήχανον, ἔφη, λογισμὸν καταπεφόρηκας τῆς
ιαφορότητος τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ
588 τοῦ ἀδίκου, πρὸς ἡδονήν τε καὶ λύπην. Καὶ
μέντοι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντά γε; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
βίοις ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ αὐτοῖς προσήκουσιν ἡμέραι
καὶ νύκτες καὶ μῆνες καὶ ἐνιαυτοί. ὰ μήν,
ἔφη, προσήκουσιν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τοσοῦτον ἡδονῇ
νικᾷ ὁ ἀγαθός τε καὶ δίκαιος τὸν κακόν τε καὶ
ἄδικον, ἀμηχάνῳ δὴ ὅσῳ πλεῖον. νικήσει εὖ-
σχημοσύνῃ τε βίου καὶ κάλλει καὶ ἀρετῇ; ᾿Αμη-
dvw μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἔφη.
XII. Elev δή, εἶπον" ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα λόγου
Β γεγόναμεν, ἀναλάβωμεν τὰ πρῶτα λεχθέντα, bv?
ἃ δεῦρ᾽ ἥκομεν" ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον, λυσιτελεῖν
ἀδικεῖν τῷ τελέως μὲν ἀδίκῳ, δοξαζομένῳ δὲ
δικαίῳ. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἐλέχθη; Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Νῦν δή, ἔφην, αὐτῷ διαλεγώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ διωμο-
λογησάμεθα τό τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν
ἣν ἑκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν. Πῶς; ἔφη. Εἰκόνα
πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ, ἵνα εἰδῇ ὁ ἐκεῖνα
C λέγων οἷα ἔλεγεν. Ποίαν τινά; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Τῶν
τοιούτων τινά, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οἷαι μυθολογοῦνται
παλαιαὶ γενέσθαι φύσεις, 7. τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἡ
« Cf. Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 14 ** Hence estimating
life by multiplying its length into its breadth.’ For the
mathematical jest ef. Polit. 257 s-B.
>’ Humorous as in 509 c ὑπερβολῆς.
sa Phileb. 13 a; 14 a, Parmen. 141 c, Theaet. 209 A
and p.
398
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplica-
tion that he lives 729 times as happily and that the
tyrant’s life is more painful by the same distance.?”’
“An overwhelming? and baffling calculation,” he
said, “οὗ the difference* between the just and the
unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain!” “‘ And
what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the
lives of men if days and nights and months and years
pertain to them.” “ They certainly do,” he said.
“ Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good
and just:man over the bad and unjust is so great as
this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and
beauty of life and virtue.” “ Inconceivably indeed,
by Zeus,” he said. tie τς
XII. “Very good,” saidI. ‘‘ And now that we have
come to this point in the argument, let us take up
again the statement with which we began and that has
brought us to this pass.? It was, I believe, averred
that injustice is profitable to the completely unjust °
man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposi-
tion?” “Yes, that.” ‘‘ Let us, then, reason with its
proponent now that we have agreed on the essential
nature of injustice and just conduct.” “How?” he
said. ‘‘Byfashioning in our discourse a symbolicimage
‘of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition
may see precisely what it is that he was saying.”
“ What sort of an image?” he said. ““ One of those
natures that the ancient fables tell of,” said I, “as
that of the Chimaera/’ or Scylla? or Cerberus,* and
@ Plato keeps to the point. Cf. 472 5, Phileb. 27 c, and
p. 339, note ¢, on 572 8. © Cf. 348 B, 361 a.
7 Cf. Homer, Il. vi. 179-182, Phaedr. 229 v.
9 Od. xii. 85 ff.
* Hesiod, Theog. 311-312.
399
᾿
᾿
PLATO
Σκύλλης καὶ KepBépov, καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς συχναὶ λέ-
γονται ξυμπεφυκυῖαι ἰδέαι πολλαὶ εἰς ἕν γενέσθαι.
Λέγονται γάρ, ἔφη. Πλάττε τοίνυν μίαν μὲν ἰδέαν
θηρίου ποικίλου καὶ πολυκεφάλου, ἡμέρων. δὲ
θηρίων ἔχοντος κεφαλὰς κύκλῳ καὶ ἀγρίων, καὶ
δυνατοῦ μεταβάλλειν καὶ φύειν ἐξ αὑτοῦ πάντα
Ὁ ταῦτα. Δεινοῦ πλάστου, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον" ὅμως δέ,
ἐπειδὴ εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ τῶν. “τοιούτων
λόγος, πεπλάσθω. Μίαν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλην ἰδέαν
λέοντος, μίαν δὲ ἀνθρώπου: πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον ἔστω
τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον τὸ δεύτερον. Ταῦτα, ἔφη,
pdw καὶ πέπλασται. Σύναπτε τοίνυν αὐτὰ εἰς
ἕν τρία ὄντα, ὥστε πῃ ξυμπεφυκέναι ἀλλήλοις.
Συνῆπται, ἔφη. Περίπλασον δὴ αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν
ἑνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε τῷ μὴ
E δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον
” e¢ a “a - +
ἔλυτρον ὁρῶντι, ἕν ζῷον φαίνεσθαι, ἄνθρωπον.
Περιπέπλασται, ἔφη. Λέγωμεν δὴ τῷ λέγοντι,
* Stallbaum ad ἴοσ. Abe a long list of writers who
imitated this p esiod, Theog. 823 f., portrays a
similar monster i n Ty] yhoeus, who had a hundred serpent-
heads. For the animalin man ¢f. Tim. 70 £, Charm. 155 p-£,
Phaedr. 230 a, 246 « ff., Boethius, Cons. iv. 2-3, Horace,
Epist. i. 1. 76, Lamblichus, Protrept. chap. iii., Machiavelli,
Prince xvii. (La Bestia), Emerson, History: ‘‘ Every animal
in the barnyard . has contrived to get a footing .
in some one or other of these upright heaven-facing speakers.
Ah, brother, hold fast to the man and awe the beast,”’ ete.
Cf. Tennyson, lines ‘‘ By an Evolutionist”;
But I hear no yelp of the beast, and the Man is quiet at
last.
400
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
_ the numercus other examples that are told of many
_ forms grown together in one.” “Yes, they do tell
_ of them.”. “‘ Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold
_ and many-headed beast? that has a ring of heads of
_ tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause
to spring forth from itself all such growths.” “Τὸ is the
_ task of a cunning artist,” ” he said, ‘‘ but nevertheless,
since speech is more plastic than wax © and other such
_ media, assume that it has been so fashioned.” “Then
_ fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and
let the first be far the largest ὦ and the second second
in size.” “ That is easier,” he said, ‘‘ and is done.”
** Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to
| grow together.” “They are so united,” he said.
_ “Then mould about them outside the likeness of one,
_ that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to
look within ¢ but who can see only the external sheath
it appears to be one living creature, the man.” “‘ The
_ sheath is made fast about him,” he said. ‘‘ Let us,
_ “In Memoriam,” cxviii. :
; - Move upward, working out the beast,
ἱ And let the ape and tiger die.
ΠΑ modern scientific man solemnly writes: “The theory of
evolution has prepared us to acknowledge the presence of
᾿ 8 δ᾽ of the ape and tiger in us.” For an example
_ of modern: nimiety or too-muchness ¢f. Sandburg’s ‘‘ There
_ is a wolf in me. . . . There is a fox in me. . . . There is
ahoginme... O,I got a zoo, I got a menagerie inside
m Ὅν te Cf. Brunetiére, Questions actuelles, p. 114.
. 696 σ.
© Cf. Cic. De or. iii. 45 “sicut mollissimam ceram. ᾿.
imus.” Otto, p. 80, says itis a proverb. For the de-
velopment of this figure ef. Pliny, Epist. vii. 9 “ ut laus est
‘cerae, mollis cedensque sequatur.”” For the idea that word
is more precise or easy than deed cf. supra 473 a, Phaedo
99 Ἐ, Laws 636 a, 736 B, Tim. 19 £.
* Cf. 442 a. “ΟἹ 577 A.
VOL. II 2D 401
—
Pe a Ee
PLATO "ΤΊ
ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τούτῳ ἀδικεῖν τῷ sgt δίκαια
δὲ πράττειν οὐ ξυμφέρει, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο φησὶν ἢ ἢ
λυσιτελεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ παντοδαπὸν θηρίον. εὐωχοῦντι
ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν
589 λέοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον λιμοκτονεῖν. καὶ ποιεῖν
ἀσθενῆ, ὥστε ἕλκεσθαι. ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκείνων ὅπότ'
ἄγῃ, καὶ μηδὲν ἕ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ξυνεθίζειν μηδὲ δον
ποιεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐᾶν αὐτὰ ἐν αὑτοῖς δάκνεσθαί τε καὶ
μαχόμενα ἐσθίειν ἄλληλα. Παντάπασι γάρ, ἔφη,
ταῦτ᾽ ἂν λέγοι ὁ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐπαινῶν. Οὐκοῦν αὖ
ὃ τὰ δίκαια "λέγων λυσιτελεῖν φαίη ἂν δεῖν ταῦτα
πράττειν καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν, ὅθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ
Β ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ἐγκρατέστατος, καὶ τοῦ
πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελήσεται ὥσπερ γεωρ-
γός, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα τρέφων καὶ τιθασεύων, τὰ δὲ
ἄγρια ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι, ξύμμαχον ποιησάμενος
τὴν τοῦ λέοντος φύσιν, καὶ κοινῇ πάντων κηδό- —
μενος, φίλα ποιησάμενος ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ αὑτῷ,
οὕτω θρέψει; ἸΚομιδῇ γὰρ αὖ λέγει ταῦτα ὁ τὸ
δίκαιον ἐπαινῶν. Κατὰ πάντα τρόπον δὴ ὁ μὲν
C τὰ δίκαια ἐγκωμιάζων ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι, 6 δὲ τὰ
ἄδικα ψεύδοιτο. πρός τε γὰρ ἡδονὴν καὶ πρὸς
εὐδοξίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν σκοπουμένῳ ὁ μὲν ἐπαινέτης
τοῦ δικαίου ἀληθεύει, 6 δὲ ψέκτης οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ᾽
4
« The whole passage illustrates the psychology of 440 κ ff.
> Cf. Protag. 352 c περιελκομένης, with Aristot. Hth. Nic. —
1145 Ὁ 94,
¢ Perhaps ἃ latent allusion to Hesiod, Works onde
Days 278.
4 Cf. “τῆς inward man,”’ Romans vii. 22, 2 Cor. iv. 16,
Ephes. iii. 16.
“ Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, Ρ. τὸ “ Religion
says: ‘ The kingdom of God is within you’; and culture, in —
402
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
_ then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this
man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his
_ advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that
ἀξ profits him to feast and make strong the multi-
: farious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the
_ lion, but to starve the man “and so enfeeble him that
he can be pulled about ὃ whithersoever either of the
others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile
with one another the two creatures but suffer them
_ to bite and fight and devour one another.*” “ Yes,”
_ he said, “that is precisely what the panegyrist of
injustice will be found to say.’’ “ And on the other
_ hand he who says that justice is the more profitable
_ affirmsthat all ouractions and wordsshould tend to give
the man within us? complete domination ¢ over the
_ entire man and make him take charge’ of the many-
headed beast—like a farmer?’ who cherishes and
trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of
_ the wild—and he will make an ally* of the lion’s
_ nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first
make them friendly to one another and to himself,
and so foster their growth.” “ Yes, that in turn is
| precisely the meaning of the man who commends
justice.” “‘From every point of view, then, the pan-
egyrist of justice speaks truly and the panegyrist of
_ injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure,
reputation, or profit, he who commends justice speaks
the truth, while there is no soundness or real know-
like manner, places human perfection in an internal condi-
tion, in the growth and predominance of our humanity
proper, as distinguished from our animality.”
: a Gorg. 516 a-B.
* Cf. Theaet. 167 wc, and What Plato Said, p. 456, on
ἦτο 2 v.
& Cf. 441 a,
403
_ PLATO
εἰδὼς ψέγει 6 τι ψέγει. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς,
> oa , 7 ᾽ a ae
οὐδαμῇ ye. ΠΙΕείθωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὸν πράως, οὐ
γὰρ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει, ἐρωτῶντες" ὦ μακάριε, οὐ
καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ νόμιμα διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν
D φαῖμεν γεγονέναι" τὰ μὲν καλὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ,
~ Se ” ‘ ε ‘ - θ ὔ 4 6 7
μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως τὰ ὑπὸ TH θείῳ τὰ θηριώδ
ποιοῦντα τῆς φύσεως, αἰσχρὰ δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀγρί
‘ -“ ΄ 7 bal ~ ,
τὸ ἥμερον δουλούμενα; ξυμφήσει ἢ πῶς; “Hav
ΝΜ ’ὔ ΝΜ > a
prot, ἔφη, πείθηται. "Ἔστιν οὖν, εἶπον, ὅτῳ λυσι-
τελεῖ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου χρυσίον λαμβάνειν ἀ-
δίκως, εἴπερ τοιόνδε τι γίγνεται, λαμβάνων τὸ
χρυσίον ἅμα καταδουλοῦται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτοῦ τῷ
Ε μοχθηροτάτῳ » ἢ εἰ μὲν λαβὼν χρυσίον. υἱὸν «ἢ
θυγατέρα ἐδουλοῦτο, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ εἰς ἀγρίων τε καὶ
“- > A ? a ἂν τα αι ἷϑ , 292°
κακῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐλυσιτέλει οὐδ᾽ ἂν
΄ λ > ta λ ’ > δὲ ‘ ε ~
πάμπολυ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
θειότατον ὑπὸ τῷ ἀθεωτάτῳ τε καὶ μιαρωτάτῳ
~ ‘ A > a > ΝΜ v , ‘> eS
δουλοῦται καὶ μηδὲν ἐλεεῖ, οὐκ ἄρα ἀθλιός ἐστι καὶ
ἃ 3 αὶ , \7 \ , PTAA
590 πολὺ ἐπὶ δεινοτέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ χρυσὸν δωροδοκεῖ ἢ
᾿Ἐριφύλη ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ψυχῇ τὸν ὅρμον
δεξαμένη; Πολὺ μέντοι, ἢ δ᾽ ὃς 6 Γλαύκων: ἐγὼ
γάρ σοι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἀποκρινοῦμαι.
XIII. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν οἴει διὰ
τοιαῦτα πάλαι ψέγεσθαι, ὅτι ἀνίεται ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ
α πράως: ef. the use οὗ ἠρέμα 476 Ἐ, 494 dD.
> Plato always maintains that wrong-doing is involuntary
and due to ignorance. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 640, on
Laws 860 pv.
¢ Of. supra 501 8, Tennyson, ‘‘ Locksley Hall Sixty Years
after,” in fine, “‘ The highest Human Nature is divine.”
4 Of. Matt. xvi. 26, Mark viii. 36, “* What shall it profit
a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own
soul?” A typical argumentum ex contrario. Cf. 445 a-B and
404
|
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
ledge of what he censures in him who disparages it.”
“ None whatever, I think,” said he. ‘‘ Shall we; then,
_ try to persuade him gently.* for he does not willingly
__ err,” by questioning him thus: Dear friend, should
_ wenotalso say that the things which law and custom
_ deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like
_ reason—the fair and honourable things being those
_ that subject the brutish part of our nature to that
_ which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that
which is divine,’ while the foul and base are the things
_ that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he
assent or not?” “ He will ifhe is counselled by me.”
_ “Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to
_ accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the
acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the
_ worst? Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking
of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to
fierce and evil men, it would not profit him,’ no matter
_ how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the
_ ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to
the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be
deemed wretched and is. not taking the golden bribe
much more disastrously than Eriphyle ὁ did when she
received the necklace as the price’ of her husband’s
life?” “Far more,” said Glaucon, “ for I will
answer you in his behalf.”
XUI. “ And do-you not think that the reason for
_ the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because
Vol. I. p. 40, note 5. On the supreme value of the soul ef.
Laws 726-728, 743 ©, 697 B, 913 5, 959 a-B. Cf. supra 585 τ».
* Cf. Od. xi. 326, Frazer on Apollodorus iii. 6. 2 (Loeb).
Stallbaum refers also to Pindar, Nem. ix. 37 ff., and Pausan.
=x.'29. 7
‘For ἐπέ in this sense cf. Thompson on Meno 90 pv. Cf.
Apol. 41 α ἐπὶ πόσῳ, Demosth. xlv. 66.
405
PLATO
τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο καὶ πολυειδὲς θρέμ,
πέρα τοῦ δέοντος; Δῆλον, ἔφη. ἫἩ δ᾽ αὐθάδεια
Β καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντῶδές τε
καὶ ὀφεῶδες αὔξηται καὶ συντείνηται ἀναρμόστως;
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τρυφὴ δὲ καὶ μαλθακία οὐκ ἐπὶ
τῇ αὐτοῦ τούτου χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται,
ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δειλίαν ἐ ἐμποιῇ; Ti μήν; Κολακεία
δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ
θυμοειδές, ὑπὸ τῷ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ ποιῇ, καὶ ἕνεκα
χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας προπηλα-
κιζόμενον ἐθίζῃ ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον
C γίγνεσθαι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Bavavota δὲ Kat
χειροτεχνία διὰ τί, οἴει, ὄνειδος φέρει; ἢ δι᾿ “ἄλλο
τι φήσομεν ἢ ὅταν τις ἀσθενὲς φύσει ἔχῃ τὸ τοῦ
βελτίστου εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄρχειν τῶν
ἐν αὑτῷ θρεμμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ἐκεῖνα, καὶ
τὰ θωπεύματα αὐτῶν μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν;
"Ἔοικεν ἔφ Οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ
2 7)»
ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἵουπερ ὁ βέλτιστος, δοῦλον αὐτόν
D φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ “ελτίστου, ἔ ἔχοντος ἐν
αὑτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου
@ See Adam ad loc. on the asyndeton.
> αὐθάδεια : cf. supra 548 Ἐ.
¢ Not mentioned before, but, as BH ie he agent sa 8,
might be included in τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα. Cf. Adam ad loc, ©
Or Plato may be thinking of the chimaera (1. vi. 181).
4 Cf. 620 c. © Cf. p. 49, note 6. 4
7 For the idea that it is better to be ruled by a better man _
ef. Alc. I. 135 B-c, Polit. 296 8-c, Democr. fr. 75 (Diels ii.8 —
p. 77), Xen. Mem. i. 5. 5 δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς —
ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν, Xen. Cyr. viii.
1. 40 βελτίονας εἶναι. Cf. also Laws 713 p-714 a, 627 EB, ©
Phaedo 62 v-£, and Laws 684 c. Cf. Ruskin, Queen of the
Air, p. 210 (Brantwood ed., 1891): “The first duty of every —
man in the world is to find his true master, and, for his own .
406
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
that sort of thing emancipates that dread,’ that huge
_ and manifold beast overmuch?”’ ‘‘ Obviously,’ he
said. ‘“‘ And do we not censure self-will® and irasci-
bility when they foster and intensify disproportion-
_ ately the element of the lion and the snake ¢ in us?”
“ By all means.” ‘‘ And do we not reprobate luxury
_ and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of
this same element when they engender cowardice in
it?” “Surely.” “ And flattery and illiberality when
they reduce this same high-spirited element under
the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for
the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the
beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth
up and become an ape“ instead of a lion?” “ Yes,
indeed,” he said. ‘And why do you suppose that
‘base mechanic ’* handicraft is a term of reproach ?
Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part
is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern
and control the brood of beasts within him but can
only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of
flattering them?” “80 it seems,” he said. “‘ Then
is it not in order that such an one may have a like
government with the best man that we say he ought
to be the slave of that best man’ who has within
good, submit to him; and to find his true inferior, and, for
that inferior’s good, conquer him.” Inge, Christian Ethics,
p. 252: “It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things,
that men of intemperate minds cannot be free.” Carlyle
(a M. Barton and O. Sitwell, Victoriana): “‘ Surely of
the rights of man the right of the ignorant man to be
guided by the wiser, to be gently or forcibly held in the true
course by him, is the indisputablest.”” Plato’s idea is perha
a source of Aristotle’s theory of slavery, though differently
expressed. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1254 Ὁ 16 f., Newman i. pp.
109-110, 144 f., 378-379, ii. p. 107. Cf. also Polit. 309 α f.,
BEpist. vii. 335 p, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii, p. 106.
407
ΡΙΆΤΟ.
οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος
ᾧετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἄμεινον ὃν παντὶ
ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν
οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὑτῷ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξωθεν. ἐφ-
εστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες ὅμοιοι “ὦμεν καὶ
φίλοι τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι; ᾽ Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ᾽, ἔφη.
E Δηλοῖ δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ νόμος, ὅτι τοιοῦτον
591
βούλεται," πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν “τῇ πόλει ξύμμαχος ὦν:
καὶ ἡ τῶν παίδων ἀρχή,. "τὸ μὴ ἐᾶν ἐλευθέρους
ΝΣ
εἶναι, € ἕως ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν
κατασ ἤσωμεν, καὶ τὸ “βέλτιστον ,θεραπεύσαντες
τῷ παρ ἡμῖν τοιούτῳ ἀντικαταστήσωμεν φύλακα
ὅμοιον καὶ ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε δὴ ἐλεύθερον
ἀφίεμεν. Δηλοῖ γάρ, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Πῇ δὴ οὖν φήσο-
μεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ κατὰ τίνα λόγον. λυσιτελεῖν
ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἢ ἀκολασταίνειν ἤ ἤ τί αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν, ἐξ ὧν
πονηρότερος μὲν ἔσται, πλείω δὲ χρήματα 7, ca .
τινὰ δύναμιν κεκτήσεται; Οὐδαμῇ, ἦ ὃ ὅς.
Πῃ δ᾽ ἀδικοῦντα λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ διδόναι δίκην
Β λυσιτελεῖν; ἢ οὐχὶ. ὁ μὲν λανθάνων ἔ ἔτι πονηρότερος
γίγνεται, τοῦ δὲ μὴ λανθάνοντος καὶ κολαζομένου
τὸ μὲν θηριῶδες κοιμίζεται. καὶ ἡμεροῦται, τὸ
δὲ ἥμερον ἐλευθεροῦται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς
τὴν βελτίστην φύσιν καθισταμένη τιμιωτέραν ἕξιν
1 βούλεται Iamblichus and Stobaeus: βουλεύεται. ADM.
See Adam, ad loc.
2 Cf. supra 343 B-c.
> Cf. Lysis 207 τ f., Laws 808 v, Isoc. xv. 290, Antiphog, ¢
fr. 61 (Diels ii.? p. 303).
° Cf. on 591 8, p. 412, note d.
4 Cf. on 501 v, p. 74, note a.
"
ὁ The paradoxes of the Gorgias are here seriously re- ;
affirmed. Cf. especially Gorg. 472 & ff., 480 a-B, 505 a-B, —
408
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK ΙΧ
__ himself the divine governing principle, not because we
_ suppose, as Thrasymachus* did in the case of subjects,
_ that the slave should be governed for his own harm,
_ but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be
_ governed by the divine and the intelligent, prefer-
ably indwelling and his own, but in default of that
_ imposed from without, in order that we all so far as
_ possible may be akin and friendly because our
governance and guidance are the same?” “ Yes,
and rightly so,” he said. “ And it is plain,” I said,
_ “that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally
of all classes in he state, and this is the aim of our
control of children,® our not leaving them free before
we have established, so to speak, a constitutional
government within them ὁ and, by fostering the best
element in them with the aid of the like in ourselves,
have set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler
in the child, and then, and then only, we leave it free.”
“ Yes, that is plain,” he said. “In what way,’ then,
_ Glaucon, and on what principle, shall we say that it
_ profits a man to be unjust or licentious or do any
_ shameful thing that will make him a worse man, but
_ otherwise will bring him more wealth or power?”
“In no way,” he said. “ And how that it pays him
te escape detection in wrongdoing and not pay the
penalty? Or is it not true that he who evades
detection becomes:a still worse man, while in the one
who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is
lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and
the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best,
attains to a much more precious condition in acquir-
509 αἴ. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 187, 380 5 of δὲ ὠνέναντο κολαζό-
μενοι, and 728 c; and for the purpose of punishment,
What Plato Said, p. 495, on Protag. 324 s-s.
409
PLATOUAS ΤῊΤ
λαμβάνει, σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, μετὰ
φρονήσεως. κτωμένη, ἢ σῶμα ἰσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος
μετὰ ὑγιείας λαμβάνον, τοσούτῳ ὅσῳπερ, ψυχὴ
σώματος. τιμιωτέρα; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
Ο Οὐκοῦν ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο
ξυντείνας βιώσεται, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ μαθήματα
τιμῶν, ἃ τοιαύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπε γάσεται,
τὰ δὲ ἄλλ᾽ ἀτιμάζων; Δῆλον, “ἔφη. eur γ᾽,
εἶπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ὅπως
τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας. ἐνταῦθα
τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων,
οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγιὴς, ἢ
καλὸς ἔ ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ σωφρονήσειν μέλλῃ ἀπ
D αὐτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἁρμονίαν τῆς
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα ξυμφωνίας ἁρμοττόμενος φανεῖ-
ται Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐάνπερ μέλλῃ τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ μουσικὸς εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, καὶ
ὁ μων δ» ee |
1 φανεῖται Iamblichus: φαίνηται ADM, aorearee pp. Fg
Bracketed by Hermann.
@ The a fortiori argument from health of body 1 to health
of soul is one of the chief refutations of the immoralists.
Cf. supra 445 τ» f., Gorg. 479 », Crito 47 p-x. For the
supreme importance of the soul cf. on 589 £.
δ Cf. Gorg. 507 v, Isoc. Epist. vi. 9, Xen. Ages. 7. 1.
¢ Health in the familiar skolion (of. Gorg. 451 ©, Laws
631 c, 661 A, 728 D-E, Euthydem. 279 s-B, Meno 87 £, Soph.
Frag. 356) is proverbially the highest of ordinary goods.
Cf. Gorg. 452 a-s, Crito 47 p, Eryxias 393.c. In feet, for
Plato as for modern “ scientific” ethics, health in the higher
sense—the health of the soul—may be said to be the
ultimate sanction. Cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xvi and xxi,
Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 26, Idea of Good in Plato’s
Republic, pp. 192-194 f. But an idealistic ethics sometimes
expresses itself in the paradox that “not even. health,”
410
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
ing sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom,
than the body* does when it gains strength and
beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is
_ more precious than the body?” “ Most assuredly,”
_ he said. “Then the wise man will bend all his
_ endeavours ὃ to this end throughout his life ; he will,
_ to begin with, prize the studies that will give this
quality to hissoul and disprize the others.” “Clearly,”
he said. “ And then,” I said, “ he not only will not
_ abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the
brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face
_ set in that direction, but he will not even make health
his chief aim,° nor give the first place to the ways
_ of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless
_ these things are likely to bring with them soberness
of spirit, but he will always be found attuning the
_ harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in
_ his βου]. Δ᾽ “ By all means,” he replied, “ if he is to
be a true musician.*”’ “ And will he not deal likewise
highest of earthly ρος Ὁ value com; Decay
the true interests of goods soul. s 661 ce 28 D-E,
| T44 a, 960 v, Laches 195 c; se Arnold, bog Mal and
ae ἐν Pad 17 “Bodily health and ur... have a
ecsrrs Sac ky ~ a ίσοσσις as they are
eee cele connected with a ect spiritual Pian, rid
than wealth and population are.” This idea may be the
source of the story from which the Christian Fathers and
_ the Middle Ages derived much edification, that Plato in-
tentionally chose an unhealthy site for the Academy in
es to keep down the flesh. Cf. Aelian, Var. Hist. ix.
36, Ellen 7 the first mention, Porphyry, De abstinentia i,
er, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 14 416, n. 2; Camden on Cam-
Gosse, Gossip in a Li , p. 23, and Himerius,
Bel iii. 18 (Diels ii.* p. 18) ἑκὼν ᾿δόδει σῶμα Δημόκριτος,
ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ τὰ κρείττονα.
4 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 188 Ὁ.
* Cf. Phaedo 61 a.
411
bo
PLATO
ev τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει ξύνταξίν τε καὶ
ξυμφωνίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ πλήθους οὐκ
ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ
ἄπειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων; Οὐκ
E οἴομαι, ἔφη. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἀποβλέπων. γε, εἶπον, πρὸς
τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείαν καὶ φυλάττων, μή τι
παρακινῇ αὑτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας ἢ δι᾽
ὀλιγότητα, οὕτως κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ ἀνα-
λώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν οἷός τ᾽ ἧ. Κομιδῇ
A > ΝΜ 3 A \ \
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμάς γε, εἰς
ταὐτὸν ἀποβλέπων, τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται
ἑκών, ἃς ἂν ἡγῆται ἀμείνω αὑτὸν ποιήσειν, ἃς δ᾽
Ἃ ,ὔ A « / σ΄ , »ο "7 A
ἂν λύσειν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἕξιν, φεύξεται idia καὶ
δημοσίᾳ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἔφη, τά γε πολιτικὰ ἐθελήσει
πράττειν, ἐάνπερ τούτου κήδηται. Νὴ τὸν κύνα,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὐ
«α Of. p. 355, note d, on 576 pv. pes,
> ὄγκον : cf. Horace’s use of acervus, Shorey on Odes ii.
2, 24.
¢ Cf. Vol. I. p. 163, note g, Newman i. p. 136. For the
evils of wealth cf. Laws 831 c ff., 870 B-c, Rep. 434 B,
550 Ὁ ff., ete. χὰ
4 This analogy pervades the Republic. Cf. 579 c and
Ῥ. 240, note ὁ, on 544 p-x, Introd. Vol. I. p. xxxv. Cf. ὥσπερ
ἐν πόλει 590 ©, 605 B. For the subordination of everything
to the moral life cf. also 443 p and p. 509, note d, on 618 c.
e As in the state, extremes of wealth and ΕΝ are to
be avoided. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 645, on Laws 915 B.
7 Almost Aristotle’s use of ἕξις.
9 Cf. pp. 52-55 on 496 p-z. The later schools debated the —
question whether the “‘sage’’ would take part in politics,
Cf. Seneca, De otio, xxx. 2 f. and Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet.
Frag. i. p. 62. 22 f.: “* Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam
(sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit;”’ ébid. iii. p. 158. 31 ff.:
“consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et
administrare rempublicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem
adiungere et velle ex ea liberos;”’ ibid. p. 174, 32: “negant
412
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
_ with the ordering and harmonizing of his possessions ?
He will not let himself be dazzled ¢ by the felicitations
_ of the multitude and pile up the mass? of his wealth
_ without measure,’ involving himself in measureless
_ ills.” “ No, I think not,” he said.“ He willrather,”
_ I said, “ keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in
his soul,? and taking care and watching lest he disturb
prt gy tee h either by excess or deficiency of wealth,?
so steer his course and add to or detract from his
_ wealth on this principle, so far as may be.” “ Precisely
_ so,” he said. “‘ And in the matter of honours and office
_ too this will be his guiding principle: He will gladly
_ take part in and enjoy those which he thinks will make
him a better man, but in public and private life he
will shun those that may overthrow the established
_ habit’ of his soul.” “ Then, if that is his chief con-
_ cern,” he said, “he will not willingly take part in
politics.2”". ““ Yes, by the dog,*”’ said I, “in his own
_ nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum ;”
ibid. 37 ff.: “ praeterea, cum sapienti rempublicam ipso
dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam,
_ etiamsi recesserit;’’ ibid. iii. p. 157. 40 ff. ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις
ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι Tov σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύ-
ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας
πολιτείας; ibid. p. 172. 18 f. δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας,
πολιτεύεσθαι yap κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον. . .: ibid. 173.
19 ff. ἔφαμεν δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον Χόγον
οἷόν ἐστι. μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐάν τι ζκωλύῃ» καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν»
μηδὲν ὠφελεῖν μέλλῃ τὴν πατρίδα, κινδύνους δὲ παρακολουθεῖν
ὑπολαμιβι μεγάλους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας: ibid.
p. 175. 8 f. πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύη, ὥς
ᾧῴφησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων: ibid. 6 ff. Χρύσιππος δὲ
πάλιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἹῬητορικῆς γράφων, οὕτω ῥητορεύσέιν καὶ
πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ
τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγείας.
* Cf. on 399 £, Phaedr. 228 5, Gorg. 466 c, 461 A, 489 5,
Phaedo 98 ©, supra 567 ε.
413
PLAEFO!UN# TUT
μέντοι ἴσως ἔν γε τῇ πατρίδι, ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις
ξυμβῇ τύχη. Μανθάνω, ἔφη: ἐν ἣ νῦν διήλθομεν
οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις ete
Β ἐπεὶ γῆς ye οὐδαμοῦ ὦμοι αὐτὴν εἶναι. pre ‘si
Satan
-ν
4 θείᾳ... τύχη. So θεῖα μοῖρα is often used ΝᾺ account
for an exception, ¢.g. supra 493 a, Laws 875 c, 642 ς Cy Meno
99 Ἔν εἰς. of. θεῖον. ᾿ . ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου 492 Ἐπ. ᾿ ἘΝ
δ Lit. “in words.’’ This is one of the most famous —
passages in Plato, and a source of the idea of the City of
_ God among both Stoics and Christians. Cf. Mare. Aurel.
' ix. 29 μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἔλπιζε, ustin Martyr’s
ἐπὶ γῆς διατρίβουσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτεύονται, Which recalls
Philippians iii. 20 ἡμῶν δὲ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει,
and also Heb. xii. 22, xi. 10 and 16, xiii. 14, Eph. ii. 19,
iv. 26, Rev. iii, 12 and xxi. 2 ff. "Ackermann, Das Chit
liche bei Platon, p. 24, compares Luke xvii, 21 τ
kingdom of God is within you.” Of. also John xviii. 36.
Havet, Le Christianisme et ses origines, p. 207, says, ‘**Platon —
dit de sa République précisément ce qu’on a dit plus tard
du royaume de Dieu, qu’elle n’est pas de ce cabashaat
also Caird, Lvolution of Theology in. Greek Philosophy, ike
p. 170, Harnack, Hist. of Dogma (tr, Buchanan), vol. i..p. 332, _
li, pp. 73-74 and 338, Proclus, Comm. ὃ 352 (Kroll i. 16); —
Pater, Marius the B icurean, p. 212 ‘‘ Marcus Aurelius
speaks often of that City on high, of which all other cities
are but single habitations .. .,” p. 213 ‘ . the vision
of a reasonable, a divine order, not in nature, but in the
condition of human affairs, that unseen Celestial City,
Uranopolis, Callipolis. ... ᾿ς ibid. p. 158 “thou. hast
been a citizen in this wide city,” and pp. 192-193. Ge
further Inge, Christian Ethics, pp. 104-105, “Ἰοὺ us fly
hence to our dear country,-as the disciples. of Plato have
repeated one after another. There are a few people who
are so well adjusted to their environment that they do
not feel, or rarely feel, this nostalgia for the infinite
τὸς Lamartine, i in his’ poem, “ Isolement”’ (apud Faguet,
Dix-Neuvieme Siécle, p. 89) beautifully cxpreiees this nost-
algia for the home of t ὁ ideal : Ἶ
414
he
a
j
a
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
city he certainly will, yet perhaps not in the city of
his birth, except in some proyidential conjuncture.* ”’
_ “Tunderstand,” he said ; “you mean the city whose
f establishment ‘we have described, the city whose
_ home is in the ideal;® for I think that it can be
found nowhere on earth.¢” “ Well,” said I, “ per-
ον La, je m’enivrerais a la source oi j’aspire ;
_. La, je retrouverais et l’espoir et l'amour,
Et ce bien idéal que toute ame désire,
Et qui n’a pas de nom au terrestre séjour.
Likewise the lovely sonnet of Du Bellay which in an English
version might run as follows:
If our brief life is to eternity
But as a span; if our ephemeral sun,
Gilding the shadows that before it flee,
Chases our days to darkness one by one,
Why, O my soul, pent in this prison obscure,
Wilt thou in these dim shadows take delight,
When to soar upward to the eternal pure
Luminous heavens thy wings are spread for flight?
There is the good for which all hearts do burn.
There is the for which all creatures yearn.
There is the love supreme without a stain.
There too is pleasure that is not bought with pain.
There upon heayen’s dome and outmost shore
Thou’lt know the ideas and recognize once more
The beauty whose image here thou must adore.
Somewhat different is the Stoic idea of a world state and
of the sage as citizen of the world, e.g. Marc. Aurel. iv. 4,
Sen. De otio 31, Cie. Nat. deor. ii. 62 (154). Cf. Newman,
Aristot. Pol. i. p. 92; also ibid. pp. 87-88. For the identi-
fication of the πόλις with philosophy ¢f. Diog. Laert. vi. 15
and vii. 40, Lucian, Hermotim. 22, Sale of Lives 17, Ver.
Hist. 17, Proclus i. 16 (Kroll). Diogenes Laertius, ii. 7,
reports that, when Anaxagoras was reproached for not con-
cerning himself with the affairs of his country, he replied,
“Indeed, I am greatly concerned with my country,” and
pointed to heaven.
. Cf. 499 ον.
415
ΧΙ ΠΟΘΙ PRADO IAA ANT
γὰρ ταύτης μόνης eH
Εἰκός γ᾽, ἔφη Ὁ
a a. oP Theaet. aes wh
s must refer to the
Plato Said, Rs,
iftijed A Oy Eb thy Vy zalf ᾿ ptt tes ¥ ioe δηρδᾷ
56: ἼΩΝ RS eit 3:
ubdetore yhataer ib peers
«ἢ ti actteal joy), υὐὐόδδδα bch
ome χὰ γ FA EB TB [1 οι ΦΙΣ ΒΔ): 7
Shunde weg. εἰ nites ἢ τῦξας pee
ddaiistrestet εὐ ἐκ ini shah ἰδ Sad
Tag darwpedo mld) οὐ γερο als: ob cot Wit
dik ποῦ bsaure wareris cert en ὑπο
arene). αἱ ori be ἀαϊείγε weilsboergrar| οἰ ας
ΜΝ "Ὁ tld doithy ahsiiteg oct μέ φαδαθβην, ΤΣ
ito jooftip wanted of: αὖ ἀνα ae
TT E Ρ eet bide fog ῳ a Rt {κε Sin? Peds πὲ bse BI") Wy iy
ἐγγίμ vntuehaeenob.2 ead tay oadactin
Paints) raion Ste dnobi aff) oad Witod Bs oe
Midewe Jtinly No rh, sales τ vusodadt Ti
Bina siete ΒΡ ty ‘est me a0 oF terra ὉΠ ily, πη
dy A , εἶ
eer Listy é PSY Te ΤΟΥ rey te ani » Σὰ
f 7 t (o é ae | ᾿ ere Lf
ry f arly '4 ene ty. pape « oe?
OP ΝΟ Na iat olinta ἘΠῚ AR ἘΠ
aS TY ἀντ W ote eg SO OH Ee Fahd ie
rep Lehi sad F ἐνροθδίμε Hoey Ὁ ΕΠ
' rf } tort # ἀϑῆν
μοὶ PF dy whines ant ta SpA) eh te att
: 71s
inhi
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK IX
haps there is a pattern? of it laid up in heaven for
him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding
to constitute himself its citizen.o But it makes no
difference whether it exists now or ever will come
into being.° The politics of this city only will be
his and of none other.” “ That seems probable,” he
said.
> ἑᾳυτὸν κατοικίζειν: Adam “‘found a city in himself.”
See his note ad.loc. Cf. Jebb on Soph, Oed. Col. 1004.
xe Ly. Re, 413 b=, and What Plato Said, p. 564.
VOL. II 2E 417
595 1. Καὶ μήν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα rept
αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, ὡς παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς φκί-
ζομεν τὴν πόλιν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ
ποιήσεως λέγω. Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. Τὸ μηδαμῇ
παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική: παντὸς yap
μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς
Β ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα δι-
ἤρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη. Πῶς λέγεις; Ὥς μὲν.
πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι--οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς 3
τοὺς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
ἅπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς--λώβη ἔοικεν εἶναι,
/ ~ ~ ~ a 4 Ἶ
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι
A ΝΜ
μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει
3, - d ε τι
ὄντα. Πῇ δή, ἔφη, διανοούμενος λέγεις; “Pyréov,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ
« In Book III. On the whole question see Introd. pp. Lxi-
Ixiii. Max. Tyr. Diss. 23 Bi καλῶς Πλάτων Ὅμηρον τῆς ἸΠολιτείας
παρῃτήσατο, and 32 Ei ἔστι καθ᾽ Ὅμηρον αἵρεσις. Strabo i.
9 88. Athenaeus v. 12. 187 says that Plato himself in the
Symposium wrote worse things than the poets whom he
banishes. Friedlander, Platon, i. p. 138, thinks that the
return to the poets in Book X. is intended to justify the
poetry of Plato’s dialogues. On the banishment of the
418
a |
ἘΣΤῈ Yet BOOK X
ἘΞ τὶ “And truly,” I said, “ many other considerations
ἘΠῚ me that we were entirely right in our organiza-
tion of the state, and especially, I think, in the matter
of 2” “What about it?” he said. “In re-
fusing to admit? at all so much of it as is imitative*;
for that it is certainly not to be received is, I think,
still more plainly apparent now that we have dis-
tinguished the several parts? of the soul.” “* What
do you mean?” “ Why, between ourselves*—for
you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all
other imitators—that kind of art seems to be a cor-
ruption’ of the mind of all listeners who do not possess
as an antidote’ a knowledge of its real nature.”
“What is your idea in saying this?” he said. “I
must speak out,’’ I said, “ though a certain love and
poets and Homer ¢f. also Minucius Felix (Halm), pp. 32-33,
ertullian werradee - ii. c. 7, Olympiodorus, Hermann vi.
p- 367, Augustine, ἢ) civ. Déi, i ii. xiv.
* Supra $04 Ὁ, 568 a, and on $08 a-n, infra 607 A.
' © In the narrower sense. Cf. Vol. I. p. 224, note ς, on
392 p, and What Plato Said, p. 561.
4 Lit. “species.” Cf. 435 58 ff., 445 ¢, 580 p, 588 Β ff,
Phaedr. 271 v, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42.
1° Cf. ee ee eee
4 Cf. 605 ον, Meno 91 ο, 890 B
9 φάρμακον : this passage is the source of Plutarch’s view
of literature in education; see Quomodo adolescens poetas
audire debeat 15 0.
419
PLATO
παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ ὋὍμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.
Ο ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων τούτων τῶν
τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν.
γενέσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ πρό Ye τῆς ἀληθείας
τιμητέος a ἀλλ᾽, ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον. Πάνυ “μὲν.
οὖν, ἔφη. “Axove δή, “μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποκρίνου.
Ἐρώτα. ,Μίμησιν ὅλως ἔχοις ἄν ΟΝ εἰπεῖν ὅ τί
ποτ᾽ ἐστίν; οὐδὲ γάρ τοι αὐτὸ ξυννοῶ,
τί βούλεται εἶναι. Ἢ Tov, ag’ ν Ὁ “ἐγὼ, Γ
νοήσω. Οὐδέν γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἄτοπον, ἐ τεὶ π' Are
596 tor ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον. ὁρῶντε ς
πρότεροι εἶδον. Ἔστιν, ἔφη... οὕτως" ἀλλὰ. τοῦ
παρόντος οὐδ᾽ ἂν προθυμηθῆναι οἷός τε εἴην εἰπεῖ My
εἴ τί μοι καταφαίνεται" ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς ὅρα. -Βούλε
οὖν ἐνθένδε ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες, ἐκ τῆς εἰ-
ὠθυίας μεθόδου; εἶδος, γάρ. πού τι ἕν ἕκαο
εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά; ἷ
@ Isoc, ii. 48-49 is perhaps imitating this.
a source of tragedy ¢f. also 598 p, 605 c-n, 6( fA
Theaet. 152 Ἐν schol Epbei rem ὃ p ‘a ff.; Dry
Discourse on Epic Poetry: “* The origin of t
the epic poem .. . those episodes of the stage was Ὁ
proper for the state ‘the poets amplified each into an Action;
ete. Cf, Aristot. Poet. 1448 b 35 f., obinge Laert. ΑΘ ΚΑ an
swpte 393 a ff. )) ἀπ
ὃ Of. What Plato Said; p. 532, om Phaedo 91 cA stot
Eth. Nic. 1096 a 16 ἄμφοιν yap. Cire pirow ὅσιον 1,
ἀλήθειαν, Henri-Pierre Cazac, Polémique d’ Aristote contre d
théorie platonicienne des Idées, Ὁ. 11, n.: “ Platon lui-méme,
critiquant Homére, .. . fait une semblable réflexion, ‘ On
doit plus d’égards ἃ ‘la vérité qu’a un homme,’ Cousin
croit, aprés Camérarius, que c’est la l’origine du mot célebr
d’Aristote.”” Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei x.30 “ hen ni
praeposuit veritatem.”’ ;
° For 4 ποὺ ef. Phaedo 84 τ».
4 Perhaps a slight failure in Attic courtesy. Cf.
420
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
reverence for Homer * that has possessed me from a
boy would stay me from speaking. For he appears
to have been the first teacher and. beginner of all
_ these beauties of tragedy. Yet all the same we must
not honour a man above truth,? but, as I say, speak
our minds.”” “ By all means,” he said. “Listen,
then, or rather, answer my question.” . “ Ask it,” he
said. ‘‘ Could you.tell me in general what imitation
is? For neither do I myself quite apprehend what.it
would be at.” “ΤῈ is likely, then,*” he said, “ that I
‘should apprehend! ” “Tt would be nothing strange,”
‘said I, “since it often happens that the dimmer vision
‘sees things in advance of the keener.*” ‘‘ Thatis so,”
‘he said; “ but in your presence I could not even be
-eager to try to state anything that appears to me, but
do you yourself consider it.””. “ Shall we, then, start
6 inquiry at this point by our customary procedure *¢?
e are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea
‘or form? in the case of the various multiplicities to
715 p-x, and for ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων 927 B, Euthydem. 281 Ὁ,
wer 404 a, Themist. Orat. ii. p.32c. Cf. the saying πολλάκι
Kat
‘the concept here (cf. 597 4), and his transition from the
“concept to the “idea,” has been mistaken for a primitive
many interpreters. Itis quite un-
-critical to use Aristot. Met. 991 b 6 ff. to prove that Plato’s
“later” theory of ideas did not recognize ideas of artefacts,
and therefore that this passage represents an earlier phase
of the theory. He deliberately expresses the theory as
simply as possible, and a manufactured object suits his
ΠΥΡῸΝ here as it does in Cratyl. 389. See also supra,
ntrod. pp. xxii-xxiii.
* “ Forms ” with a capital letter is even more misleading
than. oe ideas.”’
421
PLATO | ᾿
ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις; Μαν-
θάνω. Θῶμεν δὴ καὶ νῦν ὅ τι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν.
Β οἷον, εἰ θέλεις, πολλαί πού εἰσι κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι.
Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; ᾿Αλλὰ ἰδέαι γέ που περὶ ταῦτα τὰ
σκεύη δύο, μία μὲν κλίνης, μία δὲ τραπέζης. Ναί.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν, ὅτι 6 δημιουργὸς
ἑκατέρου τοῦ σκεύους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων
οὕτω ποιεῖ ὃ μὲν τὰς κλίνας, 6 δὲ τὰς τραπέζας,
αἷς ἡμεῖς χρώμεθα, καὶ τἄλλα κατὰ ταὐτά; οὐ
γάρ που τήν γε ἰδέαν αὐτὴν δημιουργεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν
δημιουργῶν: πῶς γάρ; Οὐδαμῶς. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὅρα.
C καὶ τόνδε τίνα καλεῖς τὸν δημιουργόν. Τὸν ποῖον;
Ὃς πάντα ποιεῖ, ὅσαπερ εἷς ἕκαστος τῶν χειρο-
τεχνῶν. Δεινόν tia λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα.
Οὔπω γε, ἀλλὰ τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις. ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ
οὗτος χειροτέχνης οὐ μόνον πάντα οἷός τε σκεύη
ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἅπαντα
ποιεῖ καὶ ζῷα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ
ἑαυτόν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ
θεοὺς καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν “Αἰδου
ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται. Πάνυ θαυμαστόν,
D ἔφη, λέγεις σοφιστήν. ᾿Απιστεῖς; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ"
᾽ὔ
; :
Kal μοι εἰπέ: TO παράπαν οὐκ ἄν σοὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι
«ΟἹ, Cratyl. 389 a-s. There is no contradiction, as
many say, with 472 Ὁ.
» Of. Emerson, The Poet: ‘‘ and therefore the rich poets—
as Homer, Chaucer, Shakespeare and Raphael—have no
limits to their riches except the limits of their lifetime, and
resemble a mirror carried through the streets ready to render
an image of every created thing.” (Cf. 596 D-E κάτοπτρον
περιφέρειν and Julian, Or. ν. 163 pv.) Empedocles, fr. 23
(Diels 1.3 pp. 234-235) : εἰ
ὡς δ᾽ ὁπόταν γραφέες. ..
δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας. . »
422
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
which we give the same name. Do you not under-
stand?” “Ido.” “In the present case, then, let us
take any multiplicity you please ; for example, there
are many couches and tables.” ‘‘ Of course.” “ But
these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or
forms, one of a couch and one of a table.”’ “‘ Yes.”
“ And are we not also in the habit of saying that the
craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes *
on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the
couches and in the other the tables that we use, and
similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman
makes the idea itself. How could he?” “ By no
means.”’ ‘‘ But now consider what name you would
give to thiscraftsman.” “What one?” “Him who
makes all the things” thatall handicraftsmenseverally
produce.” “‘ A truly clever and wondrous man you
tell of.” “ Ah, but wait,° and you will say so indeed,
for this same handicraftsman is not only able to make
all implements, but he produces all plants and
animals, including himself,* and thereto earth and
heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in
Hades under the earth.” “A most marvellous
sophist.*” he said. “‘ Are you incredulous?” said
I. .“ Tell me, do you deny altogether the possibility
© Climax beyond climax. Cf. on 508 8, p. 104, note c.
4 lt is a tempting error to refer this to God, as I once did,
and as Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 604 does. So Cudworth,
True Intel. System of the Universe, vol. ii. p. 70: “ Lastly,
he is called ὅς πάντα τά τε ἄλλα ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἑαυτόν, ‘he
that causeth or produceth both all other things, and even
himself.’’’ But the producer of everything, including him-
self, is the imitator generalized and then exemplified by the
_ painter and the poet. C/. Soph. 234 a-n.
_ * Eurip. Hippol. 921 δεινὸν σοφιστὴν εἶπας.
423
PLATO it
τοιοῦτος δημιουργός, ἢ ἢ τινὶ μὲν πρόπῳ γενέσθαυ
ἂν τούτων ἁπάντων “ποιητής, τινὶ δὲ, οὐκ ἄν; ἢ
οὐκ αἰσθάνει, ὅτι κἂν ἀὐτὸς οἷός 7 εἴης. πάντα
ταῦτα ποιῆσαι τρόπῳ γέ τινι; Kat tis, pee ὁ
τρόπος οὗτος; Οὐ χαλεπός, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ
πολλαχῇ καὶ ταχὺ δημιουργούμενος" τάχιστα δέ
που, εἰ θέλεις λαβὼν κάτοπτρον π μα κεν παν:
E ταχῇ᾽ ταχὺ μὲν ἥλιον ποιήσεις καὶ. τὰ ἐν τῷ.
οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ be γῆν, ταχὺ δὲ σαυτόν τε kat
Τἄλλα ζῷα καὶ σκεύη καὶ φυτὰ καὶ πάντα. ὅσα,
νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο. Nai, ἔφη, yee οὐ μέντοι
ὄντα γέ mov τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. Καλῶς, “ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, “καὶ
εἰς δέον ἔρχει τῷ "λόγῳ. τῶν τοιούτων γάρ,.
δημιουργῶν καὶ ὃ ζωγράφος ἐστίν. ἢ yap; Πῶς
γὰρ οὔ; ᾿Αλλὰ φήσεις OK ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, αὐτὸν.
ποιεῖν ἃ ποιεῖ. καΐτοι τρόπῳ γέ; τίνι, καὶ ὁ ζω-
Ἵ: ν᾿
4 καὶ τίς is sceptical as in Aristoph. Acharn. 86. ;
ὁ Art is deception. Diels ii p. 339, Dialex. 3 (10) ἐν
γὰρ τραγωιδοποιίᾳ καὶ Swypagia ὅστις. <Ke> πλεῖστα. ἐξαπατῇ
ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος, Xen, Mem. iii. 10... 1
γραφική ἐστιν εἰκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων. Cf. ἐοες ;
adolescens 17 ¥-18 a on painting and are
many specious resemblances between P. ator lee on i ait
and morality and those of the “ lunatic fringe” of Platonism.
Cf. Jane Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual, pp. 212%
Charles F. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi's Ἴδαν: 582.
Cf. further R. 6. Collingwood, “ Plato’s Philosophy of ΑΝ
Mind, 34, pp. 154-172. Stewart, Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas, |
p. 60, fancifully says: “ Between the lines of Plato’s criticism. |
of bad art here, as copying the particular, we must read the |
doctrine that true art copies or in some way sets forth the
idea.’”’ But the defenders of poetry have always taken this
line. Cf. Hartley Coleridge’s sonnet: :
The vale of Tempe had in vain been fair
: if the sight inspired
Saw only what the visual organs show,
If heaven-born phantasy no more required
424
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
of such a craftsman, or do. you admit that in a sense
there could be such a creator of all these things, and
in another sense not ? Or do you not.perceive that
you yourself would be able to make all these things
in a way?” “And in what way,* I ask you,” he
said. *‘ There is no difficulty,” said I, “‘ but it is
something that the craftsman can make everywhere
and quickly, You could do-it most quickly if you
should choose to take a mirror and oie it about
everywhere. You will speedily produce the sun and
‘all the things in the sky, and speedily the earth and
yourself and the other animals and implements and
plants and all the objects of which we just now spoke.”
“Yes,” he said, “ the appearance of them, but not the
reality and the truth.” “Excellent,” said I, “ and
‘you come to the aid of the argument opportunely. ~
For I take it that the painter too belongs to this class
of producers, does he not ?.’. “ Of course.” . “ But
you will say, I suppose, that his creations are not real
andtrue. And yet, after a fashion, the painter " too
‘Than what within the sphere of sense may grow.
The beauty to perceive of earthly things
_The mounting soul must heavenward prune her wings.
Mrs. Browning, “ Aurora Leigh”: --
._ ._... . Art’s the nature of what is .
~ Behind this show. If this:world’s show were all,
_. -Then imitation would be:all in art. "
William Temple, Plato and Christianity, p. 89: ‘‘In the
tenth book of the Republic he says that, whereas the artificer
in making any material object imitates the eternal idea, an
artist only imitates the imitation (595 4-598 p); but in Book
vy. he said that we do not’ blame an artist who depicts a face
more beautiful than any actual human face either is or ever
could be (472 p).”” But this does not affect Plato’s main
point here, that. the artist imitates the “‘real’’ world, not
the world of ideas. The artist’s imitation may fall short of
or better its model. But the model is not the (Platonic) idea.
425
PLATO |
γράφος κλίνὴν ποιεῖ. ἢ οὔ; Ναί, ἔφη, pon alate
ye καὶ οὗτος.
ὅ97 ΤΙ. Τί δὲ ὁ κλινοποιός; οὐκ ἄρτι μέντοι ἔλεγες,
ὅτι οὐ τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, ὃ δή φαμεν εἶναι 6 ἔστι
κλίνη, ἀλλὰ κλίνην τινά; "Ἔλεγον γάρ. Οὐκοῦν
εἰ μὴ ὃ ἔστι ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὃν ποιοῖ, ἀλλά τι
τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ ὄν, ὃν δὲ οὔ: τελέως δὲ εἶναι ὃν
τὸ τοῦ κλινουργοῦ ἔργον ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς χειρο-
τέχνου εἴ τις φαίη, κινδυνεύει οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγειν;
Οὔκουν, ἔφη, ὥς γ᾽ ἂν δόξειε τοῖς περὶ τοὺς
τοιούσδε λόγους διατρίβουσιν. Μηδὲν ἃ ape, θαυμά-
ζωμεν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀμυδρόν τι τυγχάνει ὃν πρὸς
Β ἀλήθειαν. Μὴ γάρ. Βούλει οὖν, ἔφην, ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν
τούτων ζητήσωμεν τὸν μιμητὴν τοῦτον, τίς ποτ᾽
ἐστ; Ei βούλει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τριτταί τινες
κλῖναι αὗται γίγνονται: μία μὲν ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει
οὖσα, ἣν φαῖμεν av, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι.
ἢ τίν᾽ ἄλλον; Οὐδένα, οἶμαι. Mia δέ γε ἣν ὁ
τέκτων. Nai, ἔφη. Μία δὲ ἣν 6 ζωγράφος. ἢ
γάρ; "Ἔστω. Zwypddos δή, κλινοποιός, θεός,
τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπιστάται τρισὶν εἴδεσι κλινῶν. Ναὶ
C τρεῖς. Ὃ μὲν δὴ θεός, εἴτε οὐκ ἐβούλετο, εἴτε τις
α ὃ ἔστι belongs to the terminology of ideas, Cf. Phaedo
74 p, 75 B, 75 vp, Rep. 507 8.
ὃ τελέως... dv: ef. supra 477 a, and Soph. 248 Ἑ παντελῶς
ὄντι.
¢ An indirect reference to Plato and his school like the
** friends of ideas”’ in Soph. 248 a.
4 Cf. 597 c, 598 a, 501 B φύσει, Phaedo 103 5, Parmen.
132 Ὁ.
426
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
makes a eouch, does he not Poi. ”. “ Yes,” he said
“ the appearance of one, he too.’
IL..“.What of the cabinet-maker? Were you not
just. now saying that he does not make the idea or
form which we say is the real couch, the couch in
itself, but only some particular couch?” “ Yes, I
was.” “‘ Then if he does not make that which really
is, he could not be said to make real being but some-
thing that resembles real being but is not that. But
if anyone should say that being in the complete sense”
belongs to the work of the cabinet-maker or to that
of any other handicraftsman, it seems that he would
say what is not true.” “ That would be the view,”
he said, “of those who are versed in this kind of
reasoning.” ‘‘ We must not be surprised, then, if
this too is only a dim adumbration i in. comparison with
reality.” “‘ No, we must not.”” “Shall we, then, use
these very examples in our quest for the true nature
of this imitator ἢ “ If you please,” he said. ‘* We
get, then, these three couches, one, that in nature,?
which, I take it, we would say that God produces,’ or
who ones ?” **No one, I think.” “ And then there
was one which the carpenter made.” “ Yes,” he
said. “* And one which the painter. Is not that so?”
“So be it.” “ The painter, then, the cabinet-maker,
and God, there are these three presiding over three
kinds of couches.” “‘ Yes, three.” “ Now God, whether
because he so willed or because some compulsion was
* Proclus says that this is not seriously meant (apud
Beckmann, Num Plato artifactorum Ideas statuerit, p. 12).
Cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1, p. 666, who interprets the passage
correctly; A. E. Taylor, in Mind, xii. me 5 “ Plato’s mean-
ie jocules been supposed to be adequa y indicated by such
ular instances as that of the idea of a bed or table
in Republic X.,” etc.
427
PLATO
> tA > ~ A ,ὔ μὴ / > ~ 4 > Oe 2
ἀνάγκη ἐπῆν μὴ πλέον ἢ μίαν ev τῇ φύσει ἀπεργά-
σασθαι αὐτὸν κλίνην, οὕτως ἐποίησε μίαν μόνον
αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ὃ ἔστι κλίνη: δύο δὲ τοιαῦται ἢ
, ΕΣ 3 ta € A ~ Ἁ
πλείους οὔτε ἐφυτεύθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτε μὴ
φυῶσιν. Πῶς δή; ἔφη. Ὅτι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ε
δύο μόνας ποιήσειε, πάλιν ἂν μία ἀναφανείη, ἧς
ἐκεῖναι ἂν αὖ ἀμφότεραι τὸ εἶδος ἔχου καὶ εἴη
ἍἌ a # ’ὔ > ’ὔ 5 > .) ε Ψ 5 > ats
ἂν ὃ ἔστι κλίνη ἐκείνη, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ αἱ δύο.. ᾿Ορθῶς,
” “- , 2D A ¢ , ᾿ ΄ nes
ἔφη. Ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, εἰδὼς ὁ θεός, βουλόμενος
Ὁ εἶναι ὄντως κλίνης ποιητὴς ὄντως οὔσης, ἀλλὰ μὴ
κλίνης τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις, μίαν φύσει
αὐτὴν ἔφυσεν. Ἑοικεν. Βούλει οὖν τοῦτον μὲν
φυτουργὸν τούτου προσαγορεύωμεν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον;
Δίκαιον γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ φύσει γε καὶ τοῦτο
A "
καὶ τἄλλα πάντα πεποίηκεν. Ti δὲ τὸν τέκτονα;
dp’ οὐ δημιουργὸν κλίνης; Ναί. Ἢ καὶ τὸν
ζωγράφον δημιουργὸν καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τοιούτου;
Οὐδαμῶς. ᾿Αλλὰ τί αὐτὸν κλίνης φήσεις εἶναι;
E Τοῦτο, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ μετριώτατ᾽ ἂν
προσαγορεύεσθαι, μιμητὴς οὗ ἐκεῖνοι δημιόυργοί.
Εἶεν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸν τοῦ τρίτου ἄρα γεννήματος
ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως μιμητὴν καλεῖς; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,
7
4 In Tim. 31 a the same argument is used for the creation
of one world ἵνα... κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ἣ τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ.
See my De Plat. Idearum doct. Ῥ. 89. Cf. Renan, Dialogues
Phil. Ὁ. 25: “ Pour forger les premiéres tenailles, dit le
Talmud, il fallut des tenailles. Dieu Jescréa.”
ὃ The famous argument of the third man. Of: What
Plato Said, p. 585, on Parmen. 132 a and Introd. p. xxiii.
¢ Of. Soph. 265 πὶ θήσω τὰ μὲν pice λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ
τέχνῃ, Hooker, Eccles. Pol. i. 8. 4 “those things which
Nature is said to do are by divine art performed, using —
nature as an instrument,” Browne, apud J. Texte, Etudes
de littérature européenne, p. 65 “la nature est l’art de
428
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
laid upon him ¢ not to make more than one couch in
nature, so wrought and created one only,” the couch
_ which really and in itself is. But two or more such
were. never created by God and never will come into
ira ΤΆ “How so?” he said. “ Because,” TT 1,
“if he should make only two, there would
appear one of which they both would possess the form
or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in
and of itself, and not the other two.” ‘‘ Right,’ he
said. “ God, then, I take it, knowing this and wishing
to be the real author of the couch that has real being
and not of some particular couch, nor yet a particular
cabinet-maker, uced it in nature unique.’ πὰ ΠΝ
_ it seems.” “ Shall we, then, call him its true and
, natural begetter, or something of the kind?” “That
_ would certainly be right,” he said, “since it is by and
siindtiire that Re has made this and all other things. .
_ “ And'what of the’carpenter? Shall we not call him
the creator of a couch?.”’ “Yes.” “‘ Shall we also
_ say that the painter is the creator and maker of that
sort of thing?” “ΒΥ no means. ” “ What will you
say he is in relation to the couch?” ‘ This,” said
_ he, “seems to me the most reasonable designation
_ for him, that he is the imitator of the thing which
_ those others produce.” “* Very good,” said 1; “the
producer of the product three removes 4 from nature
re eall the’ imitator?” “ By all means,” he said.
Dieu,” Οἷς, De nat. deor. ii. 13.“ deoque tribuenda, id
est mundo,” De leg. i. 7. 21, Seneca, De benef. iv. 7
“quid enim aliud est natura quam deus?” Hdffding, Hist.
of Mod. Philos. ii, 115 “‘ Herder uses the word Nature in
ποτ in order to avoid the frequent mention of the name
oO ?
4 Cf. 587 c, Phaedr. 248 ©, where the imitator is sixth in
_ the scale.
429
PLATO
ἔφη. Τοῦτ᾽ ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ ᾿τραγῳδοποιός,
εἴπερ μιμητής ἐστι, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ
τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μιμηταί.
Kudvveder. Tov μὲν δὴ μιμητὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν"
ὅ98 εἰπὲ δέ μοι περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου τόδε: πότερα ἐκεῖνο
αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἕ ἕκαστον δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιχειρεῖν
μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα; Τὰ τῶν
δημιουργῶν, ἔφη. ἾΑρα οἷα ἔστιν ἢ οἷα φαίνεται;
τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Ὧδε:
κλίνη, ἐάν τε ἐκ πλαγίου αὐτὴν θεᾷ ἐάν τε κατ-
αντικρὺ ἢ ὁπῃοῦν, μή τι διαφέρει αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς,
ἢ διαφέρει μὲν οὐδέν, φαίνεται δὲ ἀλλοία; καὶ
τἄλλα ὡσαύτως; Οὕτως, ἔφη" φαίνεται, διαφέρει
Β δ᾽ οὐδέν. Τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ σκόπει: πρὸς. πότερον ἡ
γραφικὴ πεποίηται περὶ ἕκαστον; πότερα πρὸς 77 ἢ
ὄν, ὡς ἔχει, μιμήσασθαι, ἢ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς
φαίνεται, φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὖσα μίμησις;
Φαντάσματος, ἔφη. Πόρρω ἄρα mov τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
ἡ μιμητική ἐστι καί, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ τοῦτο πάντα
ἀπεργάζεται, ὅτι σμικρόν τι ἑκάστου ἐφάπτεται,
καὶ τοῦτο εἴδωλον. οἷον ὁ ζωγράφος, φαμέν,
ζωγραφήσει ἡμῖν σκυτοτόμον, τέκτονα, τοὺς Ξ
Ο λους δημιουργούς, περὶ οὐδενὸς τούτων ἐπαΐων
τῶν τεχνῶν" ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως παῖδάς τε καὶ ἄφρονας
ἀνθρώπους, εἰ ἀγαθὸς εἴη ζωγράφος, γράψας ἂν
τέκτονα καὶ πόρρωθεν ἐπιδεικνὺς ἐξαπατῷ ἂν τῷ
« Cf. Gorg. 488 p, Soph. 222 c.
» Of. Soph. 263 5, Cratyl. 385 8, Euthydem, 284 ο.
¢ Cf. 599 a, Soph. 232 A, 234 E, 236 B, Prot. 356 ἢ.
4 Cf. 581 zB.
4 For εἴδωλον cf. p. 197, note 6.
430
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
“This, then, will apply to the maker of tragedies
also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three
remoyes from the king and the truth, as are all
other imitators.” “Τὸ would seem 50. ‘‘ We are
in agreement, then, about the imitator. But tell me
now this about the painter. Do you think that
_ what he tries to imitate is in each case that thing
itself in nature or the works of the craftsmen? ”
_ “The works of the craftsmen,” he said. “Is it the
_ reality of them or the appearance? Define that
_ further point.*” “‘ What do you mean?” he said.
_ “This: Does a couch differ from itself according as
you view it from the side ‘or the front or in any other
_ way? Or does it differ not at all in fact though it
_ appears different, and so of other things?” “‘ That
_ is the way of it,” he said; “it appears other but
_ differs not at all.”’. “ Consider, then, this very point.
_ To which is painting directed in every case, to the
imitation of reality as it is® or of appearance as it
appears? Is it an imitation of a phantasm or of the
truth?” “ΟΥ̓ a phantasm,°” he said. ‘‘ Then the
peoicee Se fat rcmared* fom tenth, and this, it
_ séems, is the reason why it can produce everything,
because it touches or lays hold of only a small part
_ of the object and that a phantom *; as, for example,
a painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter,
and other craftsmen, though he himself has no ex-
pertness in any of these arts,‘ but nevertheless if he
were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his
picture of a carpenter he would deceive children and
7 Commentators sometimes miss the illogical idiom. So
Adam once proposed to emend τεχνῶν to τεχνίτων, but later
withdrew this suggestion in his note on the passage. Cf.
supra 373 c, Critias 111 ©, and my paper in T.A.P.A, xlvii.
(1916) pp. 205-234.
431
[008 PLATO THT
δοκεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τέκτονα εἶναι. Τί δ᾽ οὔ;
᾿Αλλὰ γάρ, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε; τόδε δεῖ περὶ πάντων
τῶν τοιούτων διανοεῖσθαι: ἐπειδάν τις ἡμῖν. ἀπ-
αγγέλλῃ περί του, ὡς ἐνέτυχεν ἀνθρώπῳ πάσας
ἐπισταμένῳ τὰς δημιουργίας. καὶ τἄλλα πάντα, ὅσα
D εἷς ἕκαστος οἶδεν, οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐχὶ ἀκρ ἐστερον
ὁτουοῦν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὑπολαμβάνειν δαὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ,
ὅτι εὐήθης τις ἄνθρωπος, καί, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐντυχὼν
γόητί τινι καὶ μιμητῇ ἐξηπατήθη, ὥστε ἔδοξεν
αὐτῷ πάσσοφος εἶναι, διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἷός αἱ
εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην καὶ μέμησο
ἐξετάσαι. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. ᾿
>, 3
I. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν ἐγώ, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπτυν τὰν
τήν τε τραγῳδίαν. καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον,
ἐπειδή. τινῶν ἀκούομεν, ὅτι οὗτοι πάσας μὲν τέχνας
E ἐπίστανται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν
* Of. Soph. 234 8. %
» So Dryden, Essay on Satire: “Shakespeare . . - thon
... in either of whom we find all arts and sciences
moral and natural philosophy without knowing that wee
ever studied them,” and the beautiful tha sody of Andrew
Lang, Letters to Dead Authors, p. 238: y believe not
that one human soul has known every art, and all the
thoughts of women as of men,” etc, Pope, pref. to his
translation of the /liad: ‘‘ If we reflect upon those innumer-
able knowledges, those secrets of nature and physical
philosophy which Homer is generally supposed to have
wrapped up in his allegories, what a new and ample cee
of wonder may this co ne OSFaHON afford us,’ aa: aa
op 4, 6. Brunetiére, Hpoques, 105, Bean rneille —
Ot iquait de connaitre 4 fond l’art de la valitigac εἰ
celui ie a guerre.”’ For the impossibility of universal know- 4
ledge cf. Soph. 233 a, Charm. 170 5, Friedlander, Platon, ii.
p. 146 on Hipp. Min. 366 c ff. Cf. also Ion 536 Ἑ, 541 5,
540 5, and Tim. 19 pv. Tate, “᾿ Plato and Allegorical Inter-
432
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
foolish men,* and make them believe it to be a real
earpenter.” “Why not?” .“ But for all that, my
friend, this, I take it, is what we ought to bear in mind
᾿ς inallsuch cases: When anyone reports to us of some-
one, that he has met a man who knows all the crafts
and everything else ὃ that men severally know, and
that there is nothing that he does not know“ more
exactly than anybody else, our tacit rejoinder must
__ be that he is a simple fellow, who apparently has met
_ some magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator
and has been deceived by him into the belief that
he is all-wise,* because of his own inability to put to
the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance * and
! imitation.” | “* Most true,” he said.
TE Then,” said I, “have we not next to
serutinine: tragedy and its leader Homer, since some
people tell us that these poets know all the arts and
all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all
) pretafion,”” Class. Quarterly, Jan. 1930, p. 2 says: “‘ The true
por ΆΙς for og philosopher as well as as poet. He must
. Platon, ii. p. ἐν να combleasly misunderstands
Sens tepeend the: pasta Cf. Class. Phil. xxvii. (1932)
po E. E. Sikes, The Greek View of Poetry, p. 175, says
a lp held that “a poet is obliged to know all arts and
Aristotle from a different point of view says we
νον tha wise tnd to know-everything inthesense in which
that is possible, Met. 982 a 8.
© Cf. οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχί Charm. 175 c, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ Ale. I
105 ©, Phil. 54 8, Phaedo 110 ef, aa 3 c, Euthydem.
294 p, Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Herod. v.
ites lone nabalignineottaltes nice Cf. What Plato
Said, p. 489, on Lysis 216 a.
“ For ἀνεπιστημοσύνην cf. Theaet. 199 & f.
4 For Homer as tragedian cf. on 595 B-c, p. 420, note a.
VOL. II 2F 433
PLATO
καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τά γε θεῖα: a ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν
ποιητήν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ καλῶς ποιή-
σειν, εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι ποιεῖν.
δεῖ δὴ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον μιμηταῖς τούτοις
οὗτοι ἐντυχόντες ἐξηπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν
599 ὁ ὁρῶντες οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ
ὄντος καὶ ῥᾷδια ποιεῖν μὴ εἰδότι τὴν ἀλήθειαν"
φαντάσματα γάρ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν" ἢ τὶ καὶ
λέγουσι καὶ τῷ ὄντι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἴσασι περὶ
ὧν δοκοῦσι τοῖς πολλοῖς εὖ λέγειν. Πάνυ μὲν
οὖν, ἔφη, ἐξεταστέον. Οἴει οὖν, εἴ τις ἀμφότερα
δύναιτο ποιεῖν, τό τε μιμηθησόμενον Kat. τὸ εἴ-
δωλον, ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν εἰδώλων δημιουργίᾳ. ἑαυτὸν
ἀφεῖναι ἂν σπουδάζειν καὶ τοῦτο προστήσασθαι
Β τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ βίου ὡς βέλτιστον ἔ ἔχοντα; Οὐκ ἔγωγε.
“AM εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἐπιστήμων εἴη TH, ἀληθείᾳ
τούτων πέρι, ἅπερ καὶ μιμεῖται, πολὺ πρότερον ἐν
τοῖς ἔργοις ἂν σπουδάσειεν ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς μιμήμασι,
καὶ πειρῷτο ἂν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔ ἔργα ἑαυτοῦ κατα-
λιπεῖν μνημεῖα, καὶ εἶναι προθυμοῖτ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ὃ
ἐγκωμιαζόμενος. ἢ ὁ ἐγκωμιάζων. Οἶμαι, ἔφη:
οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ὕ τε τιμὴ καὶ ἡ ὠφέλεια. Τῶν μὲν
τοίνυν ἄλλων πέρι μὴ ἀπαιτῶμεν λόγον Ὅμηρον
σὴ ἢ ἄλλον ὁντιναοῦν τῶν ποιητῶν ἐρωτῶντες, εἰ
ἰατρικὸς ἣν τις αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ μιμητὴς μόνον
ἰατρικῶν “λόγων, τίνας ὑγιεῖς ποιητής τις τῶν
παλαιῶν ἢ τῶν νέων λέγεται πεποιηκέναι, ὥσπερ
« Cf. on 598 5. > Cf. 598 B. :
¢ Cf. Petit de Julleville, Hist. lit. frangaise vii. p. 233,
on the poet Lamartine’s desire to be a practical οἰκί νείμας
and ibid.: “ Quand on m’apprendrait que le divin Homére a
refusé les charges panels de Smyrne ou de Colophon,
434
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
things divine? For the good poet, if he is to poetize
rightly, must, they argue, create with know-
ledge or else be unable to create. So we must consider
whether these critics have not fallen in with such
imitators and been deceived by them, so that looking
upon their works they cannot perceive that these are
three removes from reality, and easy to produce with-
- out knowledge of the truth. For it is phantoms,* not
pee cag is there’something
heir claim, and do good poets really know the
Using about which the multitude fancy they speak
well?” “‘ We certainly must examine the matter,”
he said. “ Do you suppose, then, that if a man were
able to produce both the exemplar and the semblance,
he would be eager to abandon himself to the fashion-
ing of phantoms ὃ and set this in the forefront of his
_ life as the best thing he had?” “I donot.” “ But, '
_ I take it, if he had genuine knowledge of the things |
he imitates he would far rather devote himself to real
things® than to the imitation of them, and would
endeavour to leave after him many noble deeds ὁ and
works as memorials of himself, and would be more
r to be the theme of praise than the praiser.”
“J think so,” he said; “ for there is no parity in the
honour and the gain.”’. “ Let us not, then, demand a
reckoning * from Homer or any other of the poets on
other matters by asking them, if any one of them
was a physician and not merely an imitator of a
physician’s talk, what men any poet, old or new, is
reported to have restored to health as Asclepius
je ne croirais jamais qu’il eft pu mieux mériter de la Gréce
en administrant son bourg natal qu’en composant I’Jliade
et POdyssée.” 4 But cf. Symp. 209 Ὁ.
¢ For the challenge to the poet to specify his knowledge cf.
Ton 536 & f.
435
PLATO
᾿Ασκληπιός, ἢ Twas μαθητὰς ἰατρικῆς κατελίπετο,
ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος τοὺς ἐκγόνους, μηδ᾽ αὖ περὶ τὰς
ἄλλας τέχνας αὐτοὺς ἐρωτῶμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐῶμεν" περὶ
δὲ ὧν μεγίστων τε καὶ καλλίστων ἐπιχειρεῖ λέγειν.
Ὅμηρος, πολέμων τε “πέρι καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ
D διοικήσεων πόλεων καὶ παιδείας πέρι ἀνθρώπου,
δίκαιόν που ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν πυνθανομένους". ὦ φίλε
Ὅμηρε, εἴπερ μὴ τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἶ
ἀρετῆς πέρι, εἰδώλου δημιουργός, ὃν δὴ μιμητὴν
ὡρισάμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος, καὶ οἷός τε ἦσθα
γιγνώσκειν, ποῖα ἐπιτηδεύματα βελτίους ἢ χείρους
ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, λέγε ἡμῖν τίς
τῶν πόλεων διὰ σὲ βέλτιον ᾧκησεν, ὥσπερ διὰ
Λυκοῦργον Λακεδαίμων καὶ δι’ ἄλλους πολλοὺς
E πολλαὶ μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραί: σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται
πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφᾶς
ὠφεληκέναι; Χαρώνδαν μὲν γὰρ ᾿Ιταλία καὶ
Σικελία, καὶ ἡμεῖς Σόλωνα: σὲ δὲ τίς; ἕξει
τινὰ εἰπεῖν; Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων" οὔκουν
λέγεταί γε οὐδ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν “Ὁμηριδῶν. ᾿Αλλὰ
600 δή τις πόλεμος ἐπὶ Ὁμήρου ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἄρχοντος
ἢ ξυμβουλεύοντος εὖ πολεμηθεὶς μνημονεύεται;
Οὐδείς. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οἷα "δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς
πολλαὶ ἐπίνοιαι καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς τέχνας 7} τινας
ἄλλας πράξεις λέγονται, ὥσπερ αὖ Θάλεώ τε πέρι
« Cf. Ton 541 ἃ f.
» Of. Gorg. 515 B, Laches 186 8.
¢ Cf. Laws 630 Ὁ, 632 p, 858 κε, Symp. 209 Ὁ), Phaedr. 258 B,
Minos 318 c, Herod. i. 65-66, Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 2and passim,
Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus.
4.Cf. Symp. 209 pv, Phaedr. 258 8, 278 c, Charm. 155 a,
436
ee "6.6...
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
did, or what disciples of the medical art he left after
him as Asclepius did his descendants ; and let us dis-
miss the other arts and not question them about them;
but concerning the greatest and finest things of which
Homer undertakes to speak, wars and generalship *
_ and the administration of cities and the education of
_ men, it surely is fair to question him and ask, ‘ Friend
_ Homer, if you are not at the third remove from truth
_ and reality in human excellence, being merely that
_ creator of phantoms whom we defined as the imi-
_ tator, but if you are even in the second place and were
_ capable of knowing what pursuits make men better
_ or worse in private or public life, tell us what city was
_ better governed owing to you,” even as Lacedaemon
was because of Lycurgus,°and many other cities great
_ and small because of other legislators. But what city
_ eredits you with having been a good legislator and
_ haying benefited them ? Italy and Sicily say this of
_ Charondas and we of Solon.* But who says it of you?’
_ Will he be able to name any?” “I think not,” said
_ Glaucon ; “ at any rate none is mentioned even by the
Homerids themselves.” “ Well, then, is there any
tradition of a war in Homer’s time that was well
conducted by his command or counsel?” “‘ None.”
“Well, then, as might be expected of a man wise in
practical affairs, are many and ingenious inventions ¢
for the arts and business of life reported of Homer as
157 ©, Prot. 343 a, Tim. 20 x ff., Herod. i. 29 ff. and 86,
ii, 177; v.. 113, Aristot. Ath. Pol. v. ff., Diog. Laert. i. 45 ff.,
Pp reaete Life of Solon, Freeman, The Work and Life of
4 On the literature of “‘ inventions,” εὑρήματα, see Newman
ii. p. 382 on Aristot. Pol. 1274 Ὁ 4. Cf. Virgil, Aen. vi. 663
“inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artes,” and Symp.
209 a.
437
PLATO
τοῦ Μιλησίου καὶ ᾿Αναχάρσιος τοῦ Σκύθου; Od-
δαμῶς τοιοῦτον οὐδέν. ᾿Αλλὰ δὴ εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ,
ἰδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμὼν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται
Ὅμηρος γενέσθαι, of ἐκεῖνον ἠγάπων ἐπὶ συνουσίᾳ
Β καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις ὁδόν τινα παρέδοσαν βίου
ὋὉμηρικήν, ὥσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτός τε διαφερόν-
τως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἠγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι. ἔτι καὶ
νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου
διαφανεῖς πῃ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις; Οὐδ᾽
αὖ, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ Kpew-
φυλος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἴσως, 6 τοῦ Ὁ μήρου ἑταῖρος,
τοῦ ὀνόματος ἂν γελοιότερος ἔτι πρὸς παιδείαν
φανείη, εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀληθῆ.
λέγεται γάρ, ὡς πολλή τις ἀμέλεια περὶ αὐτὸν ἢν
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ" ἐκείνου, ὅτε ἔζη. :
C IV. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ. ἀλλ᾽ οἴει, ὦ
Γλαύκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οἷός 7 ἣν παιδεύειν ἀν-
θρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι “Ὅμηρος, ἅτε
περὶ τούτων οὐ μιμεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκειν δυνά-
μενος, οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἂν πολλοὺς ἑταίρους ἐποιήσατο. καὶ
ἐτιμᾶτο καὶ ἠγαπᾶτο ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν; ἀλλὰ Πρωτ-
αγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ ᾿Αβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὃ
Keios καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ᾽
Ὁ ἑαυτῶν παριστάναι ἰδίᾳ ξυγγιγνόμενοι, ὡς οὔτε
1 ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ Ast, Adam: ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ mss.
« Diog. Laert. i. 23-27.
» Diog. Laert. i. 105 says he was reported to be the
inventor of the anchor and the potter’s wheel.
¢ In the (spurious?) seventh epistle, 328 a, Plato speaks —
of the life and λόγος advocated by himself. Cf. Novotny,
Plato’s Epistles, p. 168.
4 Diels Ὁ pp. 27 f.
© Cf. ὀρφικοὶ . . . βίοι Laws 782 c.
438
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
hey, are of Thales α the Milesian and Anacharsis ὃ the
” “ Nothing whatever of the sort.” “* Well,
Si if no public service is credited to him, is Homer
reported while he lived to have been a guide in edu-
cation to men who took pleasure in associating with
him and transmitted to posterity a certain Homeric
way of life ¢ just as Pythagoras ¢ was himself especially
honoured for this, and his successors, even to this day,
denominating a certain way of life the Pythagorean,’
are distinguished. among their contemporaries ὃ ”
“ No, nothing of this sort either is reported; for
_ Creophylos,? Socrates, the friend of Homer, would
perhaps be even more ridiculous than his name ’ as a
i representative of Homeric culture and education, if
what is said about Homer is true. For the tradition
is that Homer was completely neglected in his own
lifetime by that friend of the flesh.”
IV. “ Why, yes, that is the tradition,” said 1; “ but
do you suppose, Glaucon, that, if Homer had really
_ beenable to educate men” and make them better and
_. had possessed not the art of imitation but real know-
_ ledge, he would not have acquired many companions
and been honoured and loved by them? But are we
to believe that while Protagoras * of Abdera and Pro-
Gicus’ of Ceos and many others are able by private
teaching to impress upon their contemporaries the
7 “Of the beef-clan.’’ The scholiast says he was a Chian
and an epic poet. See Callimachus’s epigram apud Sext.
Empir., Bekker, p. 609 (Adv. Math. i. 48), and Suidas s.v.
κρεώφυλος.
9 Modern Greeks also are often very sensitive to the
etymology of proper names. Cf. also on 580 8, p. 369,
note
& See on 540 B, p. 230, note d.
* Of. Prot. 315 a-B, 316 c.
7 See What Plato Said, p. 486, on Laches 197 Ὁ.
439
ΡΙΛΤΟΊΤΗ ΜΤ
οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὑτῶν διοικεῖν οἷοί τ᾽
- ~ ΔΕ δὲ ἱ Ὺ΄
ἔσονται, ἐὰν μὴ σφεῖς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσι τῆς
, ΝΕ Ν , a , oi ΝΕ AG
παιδείας, Kal ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα
φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐϊς ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς
, ἢ ἐν Soyer ἐνὶ “ / 3: wil
περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς ot ἑταῖροι: Ὅμηρον δ᾽ dpa
aia pic SB Bese» ” ar > yey wa
οἱ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνου, εἴπερ olds τ᾽ ἣν πρὸς ἀρετὴν
ὀνινάναι ἀνθρώπους, ἢ ᾿Ησίοδον ῥαψῳδεῖν ἂν
περιιόντας εἴων, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν ἀντ-
είχοντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἠνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίσιν
” Ἃ > a ggg νος ae ee
Ἑ οἴκοι εἶναι, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδὸ-
σγώγουν ὅπῃ ἤεσαν, ἕως ἱκανῶς παιδείας μετα-
λάβοιεν; ἸΠαντάπασιν, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώ-
> “ΔΖ ae a 9 Gein ΒΙΔῚ AE
κρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Οὐκοῦν τιθῶμεν ἀπὸ “Ομήρου
ἀρξαμένους πάντας τοὺς ποιητικοὺς μιμητὰς εἰδώ-
> ~ Α ~ y+ \ e ~
λων ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ποιοῦσι,
τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας οὐχ ἅπτεσθαι; ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ νῦν
δὴ ἐλέγομεν, 6 ζωγράφος σκυτοτόμον ποιήσει
~ ἢν“. .4. > > oh ‘A
60] δοκοῦντα εἶναι, αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπαΐων περὶ aKUTO-
τομίας καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπαΐουσιν, ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων
δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Οὕτω δή, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν
@ For διοικεῖν cf. Protag. 318 Ἐ,
> See Thompson on Meno 70 8.
¢ On μόνον οὐκ cf. Menex. 235 c, Ax. 365 B.
ἃ Stallbaum refers to Themist. Orat. xxii. p. 254. a ὃν
ἡμεῖς διὰ ταύτην τὴν φαντασίαν μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταὶς κεφαλαῖς
περιφέρομεν, Erasmus, Chiliad iv. Cent. 7 π. 98 p. 794, and
the German idiom “‘ einen auf den Handen tragen.”
“ Of. Protag. 328 8.
440
Ι THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
_ conviction that they will not be capable of governing
_ their homes orthe city ¢unless they put themin charge
_ of their education, and make themselves so beloved
_ for this wisdom ὃ that their companions all but ὁ carry |
them about on their shoulders,? yet, forsooth, that
Homer’s contemporaries, if he had been able to help
men to achieve excellence,* would have suffered him
or Hesiod to roam about rhapsodizing and would not
have clung to them far rather than to their gold,/ and
constrained them to dwell with them 5 in their homes,
or failing to persuade them, would themselves have
escorted them wheresoever they went until they
should have sufficiently imbibed their culture?”
“What you say seems to me to be altogether true,
Socrates,” he said.. “‘Shall we, then, lay it down that ,
all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer,’ are imi- |
tators of images of excellence and of the other things
that they ‘create,*’ and do not lay hold on truth ὃ
but, as we were just now saying, the painter will
_ fashion, himself knowing nothing of the cobbler’s art,|
what appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to
_ those who know nothing but judge only by forms and
colours/?” ‘ Certainly.’’ ‘‘ And similarly, I suppose,
we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing
7 The article perhaps gives the word a contemptuous
significance. So Meno 89.8 τὸ χρυσίον.
9 οἴκοι εἶναι: J.J. Hartman, Ad Platonis Remp. 600 x,
Mnem. 1916, p. 45, would change εἶναι to μεῖναι. But ef.
Cic. Att. vii. 10 “‘ erimus una.”
* Cf. 366 ©, Gorg. 471 c-p, Symp. 173 v.
ὁ Or “ about which they versify,” playing with the double
meaning of ποιεῖν,
7 For the association of χρώματα and σχήματα ef. Philed.
12 τ, 47 a, 51 B, Laws 669 a, Soph, 251 4, Meno 75 a with
‘Apelt’s note, Cratyl. 431 ¢, Gorg. 465 5, Phaedo 100 pv,
Aristot. Poet. 1447 a 18-19.
441
PLATO
oi
spar ἄττα ἑκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι
καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαΐοντα —
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μιμεῖσθαι, ὥστε ἑτέροις τοιούτοις ἐκ τῶν
Β λόγων θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, ἐάν τε περὶ σκυτοτομίας
τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, πάνυ
εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, ἐ ἐάν τε περὶ στρατηγίας ἐάν
τε περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν. οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα
μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔ ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα, γε
τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς χρωμάτων τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν,
αὐτὰ ἐφ᾽ αὑτῶν λεγόμενα, οἶμαί σε εἰδέναι ο
φαίνεται. τεθέασαι γάρ που. “Eywy ᾿, ἔφη.. Οὐκ-
obv, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔοικε τοῖς τῶν ὡραίων προσώ-
~ \ / ,ὔ > a iJ >
ποις, καλῶν δὲ μή, οἷα γίγνεται ἰδεῖν, ὅταν αὐτὰ
τὸ ἄνθος προλίπῃ; ; Παντάπασιν, 7 δ᾽ ὅς. "TA δή,
τόδε ἄθρει" ὁ τοῦ εἰδώλου ποιητής, ὃ μιμητής,
φαμέν, τοῦ μὲν ὄ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἐπαΐει, τοῦ δὲ φαινο-
Ο μένου: οὐχ οὕτως; Nai. Μὴ τοίνυν ἡμίσεως
« Cf. Symp. 198 8, Apol. 11 οσ. The explicit discrimina-_
4
tion of ὀνόματα as names of agents and ῥήματα as names of
actions is peculiar to Soph. 262. But ef. Cratyl. 431 B, 425 he
Theaet. 206 p. And in Soph. 257 Β ῥήματι is used oe Fate
See Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 56-57. Cf. uthydem.
;
304 © with Symp. 187 a, Phaedr. 228 p, 271 c and my note
in Class. Phil. xvii. (1922) p. 262.
> Of. What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 240 a.
© Cf. 607 c, Laws 840 c, Paddys 315 a-s.
4 Cf. Gorg. 502 c εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς. ποιήσεως πάσης τό TE
μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμόν, supra 392, Ion 530 5, Epicharmus apud
Diog. Laert. iii. 17 περιδύσας τὸ μέτρον ὃ viv ἔχει, Aeschines, _
In Ctes. 136 περιελόντες τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ μέτρον, Isoc. Hvag.
11 τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ with Horace, Sat. i. 4. 62 ‘*invenias
᾿
7
4
etiam disiecti membra poetae,”’ Aristot. Rhet. 1404 a 24 ἐπεὶ |
δ᾽ of ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τήνδ᾽
τὴν δόξαν. Sext. Empir., Bekker, pp. 665-666 (Adv. Math.
the ordinary layman. Cf. also Julian, Or. ii. 78 Ὁ, Coleridge,
442
|
ii. 288), says that the ideas of poets are inferior to those of —
Sb fete
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases ἃ
the colours of the several arts in such fashion that
_ others equally ignorant, who see things only through
words,” will deem his words most excellent, whether
he s in rhythm, metre and harmony about
cobbling or generalship or anything whatever. So
_ mighty is the spell “ that these adornments naturally
exercise ; though when they are stripped bare of
their musical colouring and taken by themselves,? I
think you know what sort of a showing these sayings
of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed
_ them.’
“resemble the faces of adolescents, young but not
“I have,” he said. “ Do they not,” said I,
really beautiful, when the bloom of youth abandons
them?*” “ By all means,” he said. “ Come, then,’
said I, “consider this point: The creator of the
, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of the
reality but only the appearance. Is not that so?”
“Yes.” “ Let us not, then, leave it half said but con-
‘Table Talk: “If you take from Virgil his diction and metre
_ what do you leave him?”
_ * Aristot. Rhet. 1406 Ὁ 36 ἢ, refers.to this. Cf. Tyrtaeus
8 (6). 28 ὄφρ᾽ ἐρατῆς ἥβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, Mimnermus i. 4
ἤβης ἄνθη γίγνεται ἁρπαλέα, Theognis 1305:
ΡΜ ' παιδείας πολυηράτου ἄνθος
ὠκύτερον σταδίου,
Xen. Symp. 8..14 τὸ μὲν τῆς ὥρας ἄνθος ταχὺ δήπου παρακμάζει,
Plato, Symp. 183 π τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι, Spenser,
“ An Hymne in honour of Beautie”:
For that same goodly hew of white and red
With which the cheekes are sprinckled shal decay,
Ségur’s refrain: **Ah! le Temps fait r l’Amour,”
Emerson, Beauty: “The radiance of the human form. . .
is only a burst of beauty for a few years or a few months,
at the perfection of youth, and, in most, rapidly declines.”
443
PLATO [HT
αὐτὸ καταλίπωμεν ῥηθέν, ἀλλ’ ἱκανῶς ἴδωμεν..
Λέγε, ἔφη. Ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ἡνίας τε γράψει.
καὶ χαλινόν; Ναί. Ποιήσει, δέ γε σκυτοτόμος
καὶ χαλκεύς; Πάνυ 1 γε. *Ap’ οὖν ἐπαΐει. οἵας Set
τὰς ἡνίας εἶναι καὶ τὸν χαλινὸν ὁ ypageds; ἢ
οὐδ᾽ 6 ποιήσας, ὅ τε χαλκεὺς καὶ ὃ σκυτεύς, a
ἐκεῖνος, Bowe τούτοις ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, μόνος,
6 ἱππικός;. ᾿Αληθέστατα. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐ περὶ
D πάντα οὕτω φήσομεν ἔχειν; Πῶς; Περὲ ἕκαστον
ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησομένην, ποιή- —
σουσαν, μιμησομένην; Nai. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ
κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἑκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζῴου καὶ
πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρείαν ἐστί, τ πρὸς
ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον a πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός; ὕτω
Πολλὴ ἀ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἑκάστῳ ἐμπειρὸ
τατόν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι. τῷ ποιητῇ,
οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ᾧ j
E οἷον αὐλητής που αὐλοποιῷ ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ
αὐλῶν, οἱ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει
οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὁ δ᾽ ὑπηρετήσει. ads δ᾽ οὔ;
Οὐκοῦν 6 μὲν εἰδὼς ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ χρηστῶν κα ἢ
πονηρῶν αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ πιστεύων ποιήσει; ‘ Nai.
Τοῦ αὐτοῦ dpa σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς πίστιν
@ The δέ ye has almost the effect of a retort. .
ὃ Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 a 10-11 καθάπερ ἐμὰ ἊΣ
ἱππικὴν ἡ χαλινοποιικὴ..
¢ For the idea that the user knows best see Cratyl. 390
Buthydem. 289 5, Phaedr. 274 ©. Zeller, Aristotle (Eng
ii. p. 247, attributes this “* pertinent observation ” to Aristotle.
Cf. Aristob, Pol. 1277. Ὁ 30 αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος. τς
1282 a 21, 1289 ἃ 17. Coleridge, Table Talk: “In ge
444
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
sider it fully.” “‘ Speak on,” he said. ‘‘ The painter,
we say, will paint both reins and a bit.”” “Yes.” “But
the maker ¢ will be the cobbler and the smith.” “ Cer-
tainly.” “‘ Does the painter, then,know the proper
quality of reins and bit? Or does not even the
maker, the cobbler and the smith, know that, but only
the man who understands the use of these things,
the horseman®?” ‘“ Most true.” “ And shall we
not say that the same holds true of everything?”
_““What do youmean?” “ That there are some three
arts concerned with everything, the user’s art,’ the
maker's, and the imitator’s.” “Yes.” “ Now do not
the excellence, the beauty, the rightness * of every
implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the
use ὁ for which each is made or by nature adapted ?”’
“Thatisso.” “ It quite necessarily follows, then, that
the user of anything is the one who knows most of it
by experience, and that he reports to the maker the
or bad effects in use of the thing he uses. As,
for example, the flute-player reports to the flute-
maker which flutes respond and serve rightly in flute-
playing, and will order the kind that must be made,
and the other will obey and serve him.” “Ofcourse.”
“ The one, then, possessing knowledge, reports about
the goodness or the badness of the flutes, and the
other, believing, will make them.” “Yes.” “Then in
respect of the same implement the maker will have
those who do things for others know more about them
than those for whom they are done. A groom knows more
about horses than his master.” But Hazlitt disagrees with
‘© Plato’s view.
')) 4 So in Laws 669 a-n, Plato says that the competent judge
*S of a work of art must know three oes first, what it is,
ε second, that it is true and right, and third, that it is good.
4 For the reference of beauty to use see Hipp. Maj. 295 c ff. ᾿
445
PLATO THT
ὀρθὴν ἕξει περὶ κάλλους TE καὶ πονηρίας, ξυνὼν
τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ
602 εἰδότος: ὁ δὲ χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην. Πάνυ. γε.
ὋὉ δὲ “μιμητὴς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμην
ἕξει ὧν ἂν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε μή,
ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ
εἰδότι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα χρὴ. γράφειν; Οὐδ- |
έτερα. Οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει. 6°
μιμητὴς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται “πρὸς κάλλος ἢ ἢ πονη-.
ρίαν. Οὐκ ἔ ἔοικεν. Χαρίεις ἃ ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει,
μιμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν περὶ ὧν av ποιῇ. Οὐ πάνυ. δ᾿
Β “AW οὖν “δὴ ὅ ὅμως γε “μιμήσεται, οὐκ εἰδὼς. περὶ
ἑκάστου, ὅπῃ πονηρὸν ἢ χρηστόν" ἀλλ᾽, ὡς ἔοικεν,
οἷον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ
“ μηδὲν εἰδόσι, τοῦτο μιμήσεται. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο;
Ταῦτα μὲν δή, ὥς γε φαίνεται, ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν
διωμολόγηται, τόν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι,
ἄξιον λόγου περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι adic
τινα καὶ οὐ “σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τούς τε
τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ἁπτομένους ἐ ἐν ἰαμβείοις. καὶ «
ἔπεσι πάντας εἶναι μιμητικοὺς ὡς οἷόν τε μά
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
CV. Πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμεῖσθαι.
τοῦτο οὐ περὶ τρίτον μέν τί ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλη-.
θείας; ἦ γάρ; Ναί. pds δὲ δὴ ποῖόν τί ἐστι
ἡ
« πίστιν ὀρθήν is used because οὗ πιστεύων above. It is ἃ
slightly derogatory synonym of δόξαν ὀρθήν below, 602 a.
Cf. 511 ε΄.
> This does not contradict Book v. 477-418. For sill
opinion and knowledge cf. 430 8 and What Plato Said, Pe
517, on Meno 98 a-s.
5 χαρίεις is ironical like χαριέντως in 426 a and καλόν: in
Theaet. 183 a, but Glaucon in his answer takes it seriously.
446
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
right belief* about its excellence and defects from
association with the man who knows and being com-
pelled to listen to him, but the user will have true
knowledge.”” )“ Certainly.’”’ ““ And will the imitator
from experience or use have knowledge whether the
ay ay portrays are orare not beautiful and right, or
will he, from compulsory association with the man
_ who knows and taking orders from him for the right
_ making of them, have right opinion®?” “‘ Neither.” ~
_“ Then the imitator will neither know nor opine
_ rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his
imitations.” “It seems not.” “‘ Most charming,° then,
would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in
respect of true wisdom about his creations.” “ Not
at all.’’. “‘ Yet still he will none the less? imitate,
zh in every case he does not know in what way
_ the thing i : .. But, as it seems, the thing
verse,’ are all altogether imitators.”’ “ By all means.”
__ Y. “In heaven’s name, then, this business of imita-
tion is concerned with the third remove from truth,
is itenot?” “Yes.” ‘And now again, to what
ἃ Note the accumulation of particles in the Greek. Simi-
larly in 619 8, Phaedo 59 pv, 61 5, 62 B, 64 a, Parmen.
i 127 pv, Demosth. xxiii. 101, De cor. 282, Pind. Pyth. iv. 64,
Tsoc. Peace 1, Aristot. De gen. et corr. 332 a 3, Iliad
» * Cf. on 536 c, p. 214, note ὃ. 7 Cf. 608 a.
9 For ἐν ἔπεσι cf. 607 a, 379 a, Meno 95 ν.
447
=
————_s
ian
ῬΙΑΛΤΘΊΤΙΠ THT
τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχον τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει;
Τοῦ ποίου τινὸς πέρι λέγεις; Τοῦ τοιοῦδε.
ταὐτόν ποὺ ἡμῖν μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε Kal Top
διὰ τῆς ὄψεως οὐκ ἴσον φαίνεται. Οὐ γάρ. Καὶ
ταὐτὰ καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὕδατί τε θεω-
μένοις καὶ ἔξω, καὶ κοῖλά τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχοντα διὰ
τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώματα αὖ πλάνην τῆς. ὄψεως, καὶ
D πᾶσά τις ταραχὴ δήλη ἡμῖν ἐνοῦσα _ αὕτη. ev τῇ
ψυχῆ: ᾧ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ
σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη. “γοητείας οὐδὲν. ἀπολείπει
καὶ ἡ θαυματοποιία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται
μηχαναί. ᾿Αληθῆ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν. καὶ
ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἱστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται. πρὸς
αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν. τὸ
φαινόμενον μεῖζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ ἢ πλέον ἢ ἢ βαρ
ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ μετρῆσαν ἢ καὶ eiGroll
E Πῶς yap οὔ; ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ :
dv εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργον. Τούτου yap οὖν.
Τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι,
μείζω ἄττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα. ἑτέρων ἢ ἴσα.
τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταὐτά. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν
ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν,
603 ἀδύνατον εἶναι; Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ᾽ ἔφαμεν. Τὸ παρὰ |
@ The antithesis of περί and πρός marks the transition.
> Cf. Protag. 356 c, supra 523 c ἡ
“ΟἹ. Tennyson (“The Higher Pantheisin ”) * For all we
have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool.” For the
illusions of sense, and measurement as a means of correcting —
them cf. Phileb. 41 £-42 a f., 55 EB, Protag. 356 c-p, i
hro 7 c.
oe ἐπιθεμένη helps to personify σκιαγραθία. Cf. Gor, cnet 464.
* Adam’s “leaves no magic art untried”’ is misleading
ἀπολείπειν is here used as in 504 σ, For the idiomatic οὐδέν᾽
ἀπολείπει see p. 200, note b, on 533 a.
448
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
element? in man is its function and potency related?”
“Of what are you speaking?” “Of this:. The
same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and
from far® does not appear equal.’’ ‘‘ Why, no.”
““ And the same things appear bent and straight ¢ to
who view them in water and out, or concave and
convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colours,
and there is obviously every confusion of this sort in
_ oursouls. And so scene-painting in its exploitation ἃ
of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of
witchcraft,’ and so do jugglery and many other such
contrivances.” “‘True.”’ “ And have not measuri
and numbering and weighing’ proved to be most
gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul
of the apparently? greater or less or more or heavier,
and to give the control to that which has reckoned*
and numbered or even weighed?” “Certainly.”
$ a this surely would bé the function‘ of the part
| soul that reasons and calculates.’” “ Why,
a of that.” ‘‘ And often when this has measured *
_and declares that certain things are larger or that
_ some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at
the same time an appearance of thecontrary.” “Yes.”
And did we not say’ that it is impossible for the same
thing at one time to hold contradictory opinions about
the same thing?” ““ And we were right in affirming
es or The part of the = then, that opines in
7 Cf. Sam, Mem. i. 1.9.
σ Cf. Protag. 356 τὸ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις.
® λογισάμενον : cf. Laws 644 v, Crito 46 5.
* Cf. Vol. I. p. 36, note a. Of course some of the modern
connotations of “function ” are unknown to Plato.
~ 9 For λογιστικοῦ cf. on 439 ν».
® See p. 448, note c, and my Platonism and the History of
Science, p. 176. ' 436 5, Vol. I. p. 383.
VOL, II 2G 449
PLATO
τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ
μέτρα. οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ᾿Αλλὰ
μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦον , βέλτιστον
ἂν εἴη τῆς ψυχῆς. Τί μήν; Τὸ ἄρα τούτῳ
ἐναντιούμενον τῶν φαύλων ἄν τι εἴη ἐν ἡμῖν.
᾿Ανάγκη. Τοῦτο τοΐνυν διομολογήσασθαι. βουλό-
μενος ἔλεγον, ὅ ὅτι ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ ἡ μιμητικὴ
πόρρω μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον
ἀπεργάζεται, πόρρω δ᾽ αὖ φρονήσεως 6 ὄντι τῷ ἐν
Β ἡμῖν προσομιλεῖ τε καὶ ἑταίρα καὶ φίλη ἐστὶν ἐ ἐπ᾽
οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἀληθεῖ. (μα, es ἡ δ᾽ ὅς
Φαύλη ἄρα. φαύλῳ ξυγγιγνομένη geile γεννᾷ ἡ
μιμητική. "Eouxev. Πότερον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἡ κατὰ
τὴν ὄψιν μόνον, ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἣν δὴ
ποίησιν. ὀνομάζομεν; Εἰκός γ᾽; “ἔφη, καὶ ταύτην.
Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῷ εἰκότι “μόνον πιστεύ-
σωμεν ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ αὖ
σ ἔλθωμεν τῆς διανοίας τοῦτο, ᾧ προσομιλεῖ ἡ τῆς
ποιήσεως μιμητική, καὶ ἴδωμεν, φαῦλον ἢ ἢ σπου-
δαῖόν ἐστιν. ᾿Αλλὰ χρή. “Ode δὴ ΡΝ
πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικ:
βιαίους ἢ ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ
εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις
δὴ πᾶσιν ἢ λυπουμένους ἢ ἢ χαίροντας. μή τι ἄλλο,
Av" παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὐδέν. *Ap’ οὖν ev ἅπασι τούτοις͵ |
D ὁμονοητικῶς ἄνθρωπος διάκειται; ἢ ὥσπερ κατὰ
1 ἣν Ast: ἢ ΑΜ, ἢ ED. ᾿
4
@ Cf. 604 v, Phaedr. 253 Ὁ and Ἐ. ἢ
> Of. Lysias ix. 4 ἐπὶ μηδενὶ ὑγιεῖ and for the idiom οὐδὲν,
ὑγιές supra on 523 B, p. 153, note f.
© Cf. 496 a, and on 489 p, p. 26, note ὃ.
450
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
contradiction of measurement could not be the same
with that which conforms to it.” “ Why, no.”
“ But, further, that which puts its trust in measure-
ment and reckoning must be the best part of the soul.”
“Surely.” ‘‘ Then that which opposes it must belong
to the inferior elements of the soul.” ‘“‘ Necessarily.”
“This, then, was what I wished to have agreed upon
_ when I said that μορίαν and i in general the mimetic
__ art, produces ap at is far removed from truth
_ in the accomplishment of its task, and associates with
the part in us that is remote from intelligence, and
is its companion and friend ἃ for no sound and true
_ purpose.” “ By all means,” said he. “ Mimetic art,
_ then, is an inferior thing cohabiting with an inferior
and engendering inferior offspring.°” ‘‘ It seems so.’
_ “ Does that,’’ said 1," hold only for vision or does it
_ apply also to hearing and to what we call poetry ?”’
“ Presumably,” he said, “ to that also.” ‘‘ Let us not,
then, trust solely to the plausible analogy ¢ from paint-
_ ing, but let us approach in turn that part of the mind
to which mim emcee poe. appeals and see whether
it is the inferior or the nobly serious part.’ “So
we must.” “Let us, then, put the question thus:
Mimetic poetry, we say, imitates human beings acting
under compulsion or voluntarily,’ and as_a result of
their actions supposing themselves to have fared
well or ill and in all this feeling either grief or joy.
Did we find anything else but this?” “‘ Nothing.”
“Ts a man, then, in all this of one mind with himself,
or just as in the domain of sight there was faction
ὁ Cf. Phaedo 92 vD διὰ τῶν εἰκότων.
* Cf. supra 399 a-s, Laws 655 ν, 814 & ff., Aristot. Poet.
1448 a 1-2 ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται of μιμούμενοι πράττοντας ἀνάγκη
δὲ τούτους ἣ σπουδαίους ἣ φαύλους εἶναι, ibid. 1449 Ὁ 36-37 f.
451
Ps
PLATOUNA ΠῚ
τὴν ὄψιν ἐστασίαζε καὶ ἐναντίας, εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ
δόξας ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς
πράξεσι ,»στασιάζει Te καὶ μάχεται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ;
ἀναμιμνήσκομαι δέ, ὅτι τοῦτό γε. νῦν οὐδὲν δεῖ
ἡμᾶς διομολογεῖσθαι" ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἄνω "λόγοις
ἱκανῶς πάντα ταῦτα διωμολογησάμεθα, ὅ ὅτι μυρίων
τοιούτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἡ
γέμει ἡμῶν. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. ᾿Ορθῶς άρ, vd
ἐγώ: ὃ τότε ἀπελίπομεν, νῦν μοι δοκεῖ ἀναγ-
E καῖον εἶναι διεξελθεῖν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. ᾿ ΐρ,
ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐπιεικὴς τοιᾶσδε τύχης μετασχών, υἱὸν
ἀπολέσας ἢ τι ἄλλο ὧν περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖται,
ἐλέγομέν που καὶ τότε ὅτι ῥᾷστα οἴσει τῶν ἄλλων.
Πάνυ γε. Νῦν δέ γε τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα" πότερον
οὐδὲν ἀχθέσεται, ἢ ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον, μετριάσει
δέ πως πρὸς λύπην; Οὕτω μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τό, γε
604 ἀληθές. Τόδε νῦν μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέ: πότερον
μᾶλλον αὐτὸν οἴει τῇ λύπῃ μαχεῖσθαί τε καὶ
ἀντιτείνειν, ὅταν ὁρᾶται ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἢ ὅταν
ἐν ἐρημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς καθ᾽ αὑτὸν γίγνηται; TloAd
που, ἔφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὁρᾶται. Μονωθεὶς δέ γε,
οἶμαι, πολλὰ μὲν τολμήσει φθέγξασθαι, ἃ εἴ τις
αὐτοῦ ἀκούοι αἰσχύνοιτ᾽ ἄν, πολλὰ δὲ ποιήσει, ἃ
οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτό τινα ἰδεῖν δρῶντα. Οὕτως ἔχει,
ἔφη.
@ See What Plato Said, p. 505, on Gorg. 482 a-B.
> Cf. 554 νυ, and p. 394, note e, on 586 E.
¢ 439 » ff. ᾿
4 Plato sometimes pretends to remedy an omission or ἴθ.
correct himself by an afterthought. So in Book vy. 449 B-c ©
ff., and Tim. 65 c.
4 387 D-E.
‘ This suggests the doctrine of μετριοπάθεια as opposed
452
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
and strife and he held within himself contrary
opinions at the same time about the same things,’ 50.
also in our actions there is division and strife ὃ of the
man with himself? But I recall that there is no need
now of our seeking agreement on this point, for in
our former discussion we were sufficiently agreed
that our soul at any one moment teems with count-
_ less such self-contradictions.” “* Rightly,” he said.
“Yes, rightly,” said I; “‘ but what we then omitted?
must now, I think, be set forth.” “ What is that ?”
he said. “ When a good and reasonable man,” said I,
“experiences such a stroke of fortune as the loss of a
son or anything else that he holds most dear, we said,
I believe, then too,* that he will bear it more easily
than the other sort.” “ Assuredly.”” “ But now let
us consider this: Will he feel no pain, or, since that
_ is impossible, shall we say that he will in some sort
be_moderate/ in his grief?” “ That,” he said, “is
rather the truth.” “Tell me now this about him:
Do you think he will be more likely to resist and fight _
against his grief when he is observed by his equals
or when he is in solitude alone by himself?” “He
will be much more restrained,” he said, “ when he
is on view.” “ But when left alone, I fancy, he will
permit himself many utterances which, if heard by
another, would put him to shame, and will do many
things which he would not consent to have another
see him doing.” “80 it is,” he said.
to the Stoic ἀπάθεια. Joel ii. p. 161 thinks the passage a
polemic against Antisthenes. eca, Epist. xcix. 15 seems
to agree with Plato rather than with the Stoics: “‘inhumanitas
est istanon virtus.” So Plutarch, Cons. ad Apol.3 (102 cf.).
See also thid. 22 (112 r-r). Cf. Horace, Odes ii. 3. 1
“aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem,” and
also Laws 732 c, 960 a.
453
PLATO ΠΤ ΉῚ
VI. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀντιτείνειν διακελευόμενον
Β λόγος καὶ νόμος ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ἕλκον ἐπὶ τὰς λύπας
αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος; ᾿Αληθῆ. ᾿Εναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς
γιγνομένης. ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα δύο
φαμὲν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; Οὐδ,
τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἕτοιμον πείθεσθαι, ho
νόμος ἐξηγεῖται; Πῶς; Λέγει, που ὁ νόμος, τι
κάλλιστον 6 τι μάλιστα ἡσυχίαν «ἄγειν ἐν ταῖς
ξυμφοραῖς καὶ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὡς οὔτε δήλου
ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων, οὔτε
εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαῖνον τῷ χαλεπῶς
C φέροντι, οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἄξιον ὃ ὃν μεγάλης
σπουδῆς, ὅ πε δεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅ τι τάχιστα. παρα-
γίγνεσθαι ἡμῖν, τούτῳ ἐμποδὼν γιγνόμενον τὸ ᾿
λυπεῖσθαι. Τῶι, 7 δ᾽ ὅς, λέγεις ; Τῷ βουλεύεσθαι,
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει [
κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὑτοῦ
πράγματα, ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ βέλτιστ᾽ ἂν ἔχειν,
ἀλλὰ μὴ ᾿προσπταίσαντας καθάπερ παῖδας ἐχο-
μένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ Body διατρίβειν, "ὧν
Da ἀεὶ ἐθίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ὅ ὅ τι τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι. πρὸς
τὸ ἰᾶσθαί τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ
eum
® Cf. Laws 645 a, Phaedr. 238 c, and for the conflict in |
the soul also Rep. 439 8 ff.
ὃ The conflict proves that for practical purposes the soul
has parts. Cf. 436 B ff.
¢ Cf. Apology, in fine.
4 Gf. Laws 803 8 and Class. Phil. ix. p. 353, n. 3, Fried-
lander, Platon, i. p. 143.
¢ Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 99, refers to Saxo’s
tale of the different effect which the news of the murder of +
Regner Lodbrog produced. on his sons: he in whom the —
emotion was weakest had the greatest energy for action. 5
454
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
- VI. “ Now is it not reason and law that exhorts
him to resist, while that which urges him to give way
to his grief is the bare feeling itself?” ‘‘ True.”
“And where there are two opposite impulses? in a
man at the same time about the same thing we say
that there must needs be two things ὃ in him.” “ΟΥ̓
course.” “‘ And is not the one prepared to follow
the guidance of the law as the law leads and directs?”
“Howso?”’ ‘The law, I suppose, declares that it is
best to keep quiet as far as possible in calamity and
not to chafe and repine, because we cannot know
what is really good and evil in such things* and it
advantages us nothing to take them hard, and nothing
in mortal life is worthy of great concern,* and our
_ grieving checks ὁ the very thing we need to come to
our aid as quickly as possible in such case.” ““ What
; hesaid, “do youmean?” “Τὸ deliberate,’ I
said, “ about what has happened to us, and, as it were
in the fall of the dice,’ to determine the movements of
our affairs with reference to the numbers that turn up,
in the way that reason indicates* would be the best,
and, instead of stumbling like children, clapping one’s
hands to the stricken spot* and wasting the time in
wailing, ever to accustom the soul to devote itself at
onceto the curing of the hurtand the raising up of what
7 Cf. Shakes. Richard 11. 11. ii. 178:
My lord, wise men ne’er sit and wail their woes
But presently prevent the ways to wail,
Herod. i. 20 πρὸς τὸ παρεὸν βουλεύηται.
σ Cf. Eurip. Electra 639 and fr. 175 πρὸς τὸ πῖπτον, Iph.
Aul. 1343 and Hippol. 718 πρὸς ra viv πεπτωκότα, Epictet.
ii. 5. 8. See also Stallbaum ad loc.
* Cf. 440 8, 607 B, Herod. i. 132.
* Cf. Demosthenes’ description of how barbarians box
iv. 40 (51), del τῆς πληγῆς ἔχεται.
455
PLATO
| νοσῆσαν, ἰατρικῇ θρηνῳδίαν ἀφανίζοντα. °Op66-
Tata γοῦν av τις, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰς τύχας οὕτω
προσφέροιτο. Οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὸ μὲν βέλτιστον
τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐθέλει ἕπεσθαι. Δῆλον δή.
Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναμνήσεις τε τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὸς
τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς ἄγον καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχον. αὐτῶν
ἄρ᾽ οὐκ ἀλόγιστόν τε φήσομεν εἶναι καὶ ἀργὸν καὶ
δειλίας φίλον; Φήσομεν μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν. τὸ
E μὲν πολλὴν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλην ἔχει, τὸ ἀγα-
νακτητικόν" τὸ δὲ φρόνιμόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος,
παραπλήσιον ὃ ὃν ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὔτε ῥάδιον μιμή-
σασθαι οὔτε μιμούμενον εὐπετὲς καταμαθεῖν, ἄλλως |
τε καὶ πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς
θέατρα ξυλλεγομένοις. ἀλλοτρίου γάρ που πάθους
605 ὴ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται. Παντάπασι. μὲν οὖν.
δὴ μιμητικὸς ποιητὴς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ
τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκέ γε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ
τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν, εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν
ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν τε
καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος διὰ τὸ εὐμίμητον εἶναι. Δῆλον.
Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐπιλαμβανοίμεθα,
καὶ τιθεῖμεν ἀντίστροφον αὐτὸν τῷ ζωγράφῳ;
καὶ γὰρ τῷ φαῦλα ποιεῖν. πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἔοικεν
αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ὁμιλεῖν τῆς
Β ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, καὶ ταύτῃ
ὡμοίωται: καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἂν ἐν δίκῃ οὐ παραδεχοί-
« Cf. Soph. Ajax 582 θρηνεῖν ἐπῳδὰς πρὸς τομῶντι πήματ
with Ovid, Met. i. 190:
sed immedicabile vulnus
ense recidendum est.
456
PT
tn
AOI eth iow
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
has fallen, banishing threnody? by therapy.” “That |
certainly, he said, would be the best way toface ©
misfortune and deal withit.” “Then, we say, the best
part of us is willing to conform to these precepts οὗ
reason.” “‘Obvyiously.”’ “And shall we not say that
the part of us that leads us to dwell in memory on our
suffering and impels us to lamentation, and cannot
get enough of that sort of thing, is the irrational
and idle part of us, the associate of cowardice®?” —
“Yes, we will say that.” “And does not the
fretful part of us present® many and varied occasions
for imitation, while the intelligent and temperate dis-
position, always remaining approximately the same,
is neither easy to imitate nor to be understood when
imitated, especially by a nondescript mob assembled
in the theatre? For the representation imitates a
type thatis alientothem.”’ “ By allmeans.” ““ And
is it not obvious that the nature of the mimetic poet
is not related to this better part of the soul and his
cunning is not framed to please it, if he is to win
favour with the multitude, but is devoted to the
fretful and complicated type of character because it
is easy to imitate?” “Τὶ is obvious.”’ ‘‘ This con-
sideration, then, makes it right for us to proceed to
lay hold of him and set him down as the counterpart °
of the painter; for he resembles him in that his
creations are inferior in respect of reality ; and the
fact that his appeal is to the inferior part of the soul
and not to the best part is another point of resem-
blance. And so we may at last say that we should be
δ Cf. on 603 8, p. 450, note a.
ς ἔχει in the sense of “involves,” “admits of,” as fre-
quently in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
4 For πέπηγεν cf. 530 ἢ.
* ἀντίστροφον is used as in Aristot. Rhet. 1354 a 1.
457
PLATO it |
μεθα εἰς 'μέλλουσαν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν, ὅτι τοῦτο
ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν
ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει ὅταν τις
μοχθηροὺς ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῶν παραδιδῷ τὴν πόλιν, ᾿
τοὺς δὲ χαριεστέρους φθείρῃ" “ταὐτὸν καὶ al
μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν. ἰδίᾳ
ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ. ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς
Ο χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἥττω
διαγιγνώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν μεγάλα.
ἡγουμένῳ, τοτὲ δὲ σμικρά, εἴδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα,
τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα. Hay
μὲν οὖν.
VII. Οὐ μέντοι πω τό γε μέγιστον ᾿κατηγο-
ρήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἱ
εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάν-
δεινόν που. Τί δ᾽ οὐ «μέλλει, εἴπερ γε δρᾷ αὐτό;
᾿Ακούων σκόπει. οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι juan”
ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδο-
D ποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει
ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς
ὀδυρμοῖς, ἢ 7) καὶ ᾷδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθ᾽
ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα
ξυμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ws
ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅ τι μάλιστα οὕτω
διαθῇ. Oida- πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; Ὅταν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τινι
ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς αὖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ
καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν δυνώμεθα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ
E καρτερεῖν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ
β Cf. P . 412, note ὦ. iat: Ρ. 420, note a, on 595 B-c. i
© Por ἐν πένθει cf. Soph. El 290, 846, Herod. i. 46. j
4 Cf. Phileb. 48 a. 4
“ See the description in Jon 535 ©, and Laws 800 ἢ. 4
Ὁ
458
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered
state, because he stimulates and fosters this element
in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy
the rational part, just as when in a state * one puts
bad men in power and turns the city over to them
and ruins the better sort. Precisely in the same
manner we shall say that the mimetic poet sets up in»
ang individual soul a vicious constitution by fashion-
ng phantoms farremoved fromreality,andby currying
foc’ with the senseless element that cannot dis-
tinguish the greater from the less, but calls the same
ing now one, now the other.’’ “* By all means.”
VII. “ But we have not yet brought our chief
accusation againstit. Its power to corrupt, with rare
exceptions, even the better sort is surely the chief
cause for alarm.” ‘‘ How could it be otherwise, if it
really does ἐμαὶ ὃ “Listen and reflect. I think
her toe that the very best of us, when we hear
omer? or some other of the makers of tragedy imi-
tating one of the heroes who is in grief,° and is de-
livering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting
and beating ‘his breast, feel pleasure,“ and abandon
ourselves and accompany the representation with
sympathy and eagerness,’ and we praise as an excel-
lent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this
way.” “I do know it, of course.” ‘“‘ But when in
our own lives some affliction comes to us, you are also
aware that we plume ourselves upon the opposite,
on our ability to remain calm and endure, in the
belief that this is the conduct of a man, and what
we were praising in the theatre that of a woman’ ”
“1 do note that.” ‘Do you think, then,” said I, ‘that
οὐ 7 This is qualified in 387 Ἐ-388. a by οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις.
Cf. also 398 ex.
459
606
Ba
PEATOUAA SHT
γυναικός, ὃ τότε ἐπῃνοῦμεν. ᾿Εννοῶ, ἔφη. a
καλῶς οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὗτος 6 ἔπαινος “ἔχει, τὸ
ὁρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτόν Tis μὴ ἀξιοῖ
εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ αἰσχύνοιτο ἄν, μὴ βδελύττεσθαι t ἀλλὰ
χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν; Ov μὰ τὸν Ae, ἔφη, οὐκ
εὐλόγῳ ἔ ἔοικεν. Nai, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ ἐκείνῃ ᾽ αὐτὸ
σκοποίης. hs Ki ἐνθυμοῖο, ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατ-
εχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις ξυμφοραῖς καὶ πε-
πεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς
καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὃν τοιοῦτον οἷον. τούτων
ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιή
πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαῖρον" τὸ δὲ φύσει. βέλτιστον
ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον. λόγῳ « οὐ
ἔθει, ἀνίησι τὴν. φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνώδους. τούτου,
ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ πὰ
αἰσχρὸν ὄν, εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι
ἀκαίρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν",
ἐκεῖνο κερδαίνειν ἡγεῖται, τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
δέξαιτο «αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι καταφρονήσας ὅλο
τοῦ ποιήματος. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, olan, ὀλί
τισὶ μέτεστιν, ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν
ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα" ᾿θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις
ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεεινὸν οὐ ῥάδιον ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ
« Of. Vol, 1. p. 509, note b, on 478 π᾿.
> Cf. Isoc. Panegyr. 168 for a different application. ;
¢ This contains a hint of one possible meaning of the
Aristotelian doctrine of κάθαρσις, Doct. 1449 b 27-28. Cf.
κουφίζεσθαι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς Pol. 1849 a 14, and my review of
Finsler, “" Platon τι. ἃ. Aristot. Poetik,”’ Class. Phil. iii. p. 462.
But the tone of the Platonic passage is more like at of
Ruskin, Sesame and Lilies: ‘‘ And the human nature of us
460
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
this praise is rightfully bestowed when, contemplat-
ing a character that we would not. accept but would
be ashamed of in ourselves, we do not abominate
it but take pleasure and approve?” “‘No, by Zeus,”
he said, “τὸ does not seem reasonable.’ “ΟἿ yes,*”
said I, “if you would consider it in this way.” “In
what way?” “‘ If you would reflect that the part of
the soul that in the former case, in our own misfor-
tunes, was forcibly restrained, and that has hungered ,
for tears and a good cry ° and satisfaction, becauseitis —
its nature to desire these things, is the element in |
us that the poets satisfy and delight, and that the
best element in our nature, since it has never been
properly educated by reason or even by habit, then
relaxes its guard? over the plaintive part, inasmuch as,
this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no
shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming
to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his
grief ; but it thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much
ear gain,® and would not. consent to forfeit it by
disdaining the poem altogether. That is, I think,
because few are capable of reflecting that what we
enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves.
For after feeding fat 5 the emotion of pity there, it is
not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings.” ‘“ Most
imperatively requiring awe and sorrow of some kind, for
the noble grief we should have borne with our fellows, and
the pure tears we should have wept with them, we gloat
over the pathos of the police court and gather the night
dew of the grave.”
4 This anticipates the idea of the “censor’’ in modern
* Cf. τῇ δ᾽ ἀσφαλείᾳ κερδανεῖς Eurip. Herc. Fur. 604, which
is frequently misinterpreted ; Herod. viii. 60. 3.
7 For the psychology cf. Laws 656 8 and supra on 385 c-p.
9 Cf. 442 a.
461
= ΝΣ
PLATO
Cc πάθεσι κατέχειν. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. “Ap? οὐχ ὃ
αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου, ὅτι, ἂν αὐτὸς
αἰσχύνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν ἐν μιμήσει δὴ ᾿κωμῳδικῇ
ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀκούων ‘obcBpa “χαρῇς καὶ μὴ
μισῆς ὡς πονηρά, ταὐτὸν “ποιεῖς ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἰ
ἐλέοις; ὃ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ αὖ κατεῖχες ἐν σαυτ. Ι
Ι
βουλόμενον γελωτοποιεῖν, βούμενος δόξαν Bapo
λοχίας, τότ᾽ ad ἀνίης καὶ ἐκεῖ νεανικὸν ποι cas
ἔλαθες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐξενεχθεὶς . ὥστε
D κωμῳδοποιὸς γενέσθαι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. “Καὶ
περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάντων͵
τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἡδέων. ἐν
τῇ ψυχῇ, ἃ δή φαμεν πάσῃ πράξει ἡμῖν eneobats,
ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιητικὴ μίμησις ewtiteraki
τρέφει yap ταῦτα ἄρδουσα, δέον adypeiv, καὶ
ἄρχοντα ἡμῖν καθίστησι, δέον ἄρχεσθαι αὐτά, wa
βελτίους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἀντὶ χειρόνων καὶ
ἀθλιωτέρων γιγνώμεθα. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως φάναι,
E y) δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, @ Γλαύκων, ὅταν
ὍὍμηήρου ἐπαινέταις ἐντύχῃς λέγουσιν, ὡς τὴν
“Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὃ ποιητής, καὶ πρὸς
διοίκησίν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. πραγ-
μάτων ἄξιος ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν τε καὶ κατὰ
* Cf. Vol. I. p. 211, note f, La Bruyére, Des Ouvrages de
Vesprit (Giuvres, ed. M. G. Servois, i. p. 137): “Dot vient
que lon rit si librement au théatre, et que l’on a honte digs
pleurer?”’ ᾿
ὃ In the Laws 816 Ὁ-Ὲ Plato says that the citizens nou |
witness such performances since the serious cannot be ~
learned without the laughable, nor anything without its
opposite; but they may not take part in them. That is left _
to slaves and foreigners. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 239, note ὃ, on
396 8.
¢ i.e. as opposed to public performances. Cf. Huthydem.
462
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
true,” he said. ‘‘ Does not the same principle apply
to the laughable,* namely, that if in comic representa-
tions,° or for that matter in private talk,° you take in-
tense pleasure in buffooneries that you would blush
to practise yourself, and do not detest them as base,
you are doing the same thing as in the case of the
pathetic? For here again what your reason, for fear of
the reputation of buffoonery, restrained in yourself
when it fain would play the clown, you release in turn,
and so, fostering its youthful impudence, let your-
self go so far that often ere you are aware you become
yourself a comedian in private.” ‘‘ Yes, indeed,” he
said. “‘ And so in regard to the emotions of sex and
anger, and all the appetites and pains and pleasures
of the soul which we say accompany all our actions,?
the effect of poetic imitation is the same. For it
waters¢ and fosters these feelings when what we ought
to do is to dry them up, and it establishes them as our
rulers when they ought to be ruled, to the end that
we may be better and happier men instead of worse
and more miserable.” “1 cannot deny it,” said he.
“Then, Glaucon,” said I, “when you meet encomiasts
of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the
educator of Hellas,f and that for the conduct and
refinement 5 of human life he is worthy of our study
305 p ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις, Theaet. 177 B, Soph. 232 c ἔν γε
ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις, and Soph. 222 c προσομιλητικήν with
Quintil. iii. 4. 4. Wilamowitz, Antigonos von Karystos,
oa fantastically says that it means prose and refers to
phron. He compares 366 ©. But see Laws 935 B-c.
Cf. supra 603 c. ¢ Cf. 550 5.
7 Isocrates, Panegyr. 159, says Homer was given a place
__ in education because he celebrated those who fought against
the barbarians, Cf. also Aristoph. Frogs 1034 ff.
9 The same conjunction is implied in Protagoras’s teach-
ing, Protag. 318 © and 317 ΒΕ.
463
607 σκευασάμενον ζῆν, φιλεῖν μὲν χρὴ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι
|
Β. VIII. Ταῦτα δή, ἔφην, ἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν
ῬΠΑΦΟ ΤΠ GAT
τοῦτον τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον κατα-
ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται, ᾿ καὶ
συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι. καὶ πρῶ- |
τον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δέ, ὅτι ὅσον. OV
ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως
παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν: εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην
Μοῦσαν παραδέξει ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι
καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε
καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου, bbe
᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη.
ἀναμνησθεῖσι περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως, ἄρα
τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστέλλομεν τοιαύτην
οὖσαν: ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἥρει. προσείπωμεν δὲ
αὐτῇ, μὴ καί τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν
καταγνῷ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ ore
τε καὶ ποιητικῇ" καὶ γὰρ ἡ λακέρυζα πρὸς 8
σπόταν κύων ἐκείνη πρβυγάξῥυσα, καὶ μέγας ἐν
@ For the μέν cf. Symp. 180 ©, Herod. vii. 102. aouDg
ὃ The condescending tone is that of Huthydem. 306 c-p. rt
¢ Aristotle, Poet. 1453 a 29, says that Euripides is Tp ε
τατος of poets,
4 Cf. 605 c, 595 B-c.
* Cf. Laws 801 p-x, 829 σ-Ὁ, supra 397 c-p, 459 £, 468 D,
Fried ander, Platon, i. p. 142, and my review of Pater, Plato
and Platonism, in The Dial, 14 (1893) p. 211.
7 Cf. Laws 802 c τῆς γλυκείας Μούσης. See Finsler,
Platon u. d. aristot. Poetik, pp. 61-62.
9 See on 604 c, p. 455, note A.
+ For the quarrel between philosophy and poetry ef, Lave
967 c-p, Friedlander, Platon, ii. p. 186. It still aie on in
modern times. Cf. Keats, ** Lamia ”’: ἫΝ
464
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
and devoticn, and that we should order our entire
lives by the guidance of this poet, we must love 5 and
salute them as doing the best they can,’ and concede
to them that Homer is the most poetic of poets and
the first of tragedians,? but we must know the truth,
that we can admit no poetry into our city save only
hymns$~to the gods and the praises_o ?
or it y nt admission to the honeyed met
lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your
city instead of Iaw and that which shall from time to
time have approved itself to the general reason as
the best.” “‘ Most true,” he said.
VIII. “ Let us, then, conclude our return to the
topic of poetry and our apology, and affirm that we
really had good grounds then for dismissing her from
our city, since such was her character. For reason
constrained us.? And let us further say to her, lest she
condemn us for harshness and rusticity, that there is
from of old a quarrel * between philosophy and poetry.
For such expressions as ‘ the yelping hound barking
at her master and mighty in the idle babble of fools,’*
Do noi all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy ?
Wordsworth, “A Poet’s Epitaph”:
Philosopher! a fingering slave,
One that would peep and botanize
Upon his mother’s grave.
But Anatole France thinks otherwise, ‘“‘Les Torts de
Vhistoire,” Vie littéraire, ii. Ὁ. 123: “J’ai remarqué que
les philosophes vivaient généralement en bonne intelligence
avec les pottes . . . Les philosophes savent que les poétes
ne pensent pas; cela les désarme, les attendrit et les
enchante.”
* Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 252, conjectures that these
quotations are from Sophron; ef. also ibid. ii. pp. 386-387.
VOL, IT 2u 465
—
PLATOUTA THT
Ο ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίαισι, καὶ ὃ τῶν διασόφων. ee
κρατῶν, καὶ οἱ λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες ὅτι ἄρα
πένονται, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία σημεῖα παλαιᾶς. ἐναντιώ-
σεως τούτων. ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω, ὅ ὅτι ἡμεῖς γε, εἴ
τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἡ "πρὸς" ἡδονὴν. ποιητικὴ,
καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὡς χρὴ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὖ-
γομουμένῃ, ἄσμενοι. ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα" ᾿ὡς ξύν-
ἰισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον meres αἱ.
Ὁ. ἢ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλεῖ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, κα
μάλιστὰ ὅταν δι᾿ Ὁμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν; Πολ
re ὡς ev μέλει 7 τινι ἄλλῳ μά δ ον 3 Bie
μὲν οὖν. Δοῖμεν δέ γέ που ἂν καὶ τοῖς Sect ες
αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταὶ δέ, ἄνευ
μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνε
ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ
τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστι" καὶ εὐμενῶς ἀκουσό:
E μεθα. κερδανοῦμεν γάρ που, ἐὰν μὴ μόνον ἡδεῖα.
φανῇ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη. Πῶς δ᾽ οὐ μέλλομεν,
ἔφη, κερδαίνειν; Ei δέ γε μή, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε,
ὥσπερ οἱ ποτέ του ἐρασθέντες, ἐὰν ἡγήσωνται μὴ
ὠφέλιμον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως. δὲ ἀπ-
έχονται, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως, διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα
a
1 ἀπολογησαμένη A, ἀπολογισαμένη FD, ἀπολογησομάνῃ Ax
τὰ
« Cf. p. 420, note ὁ, on 595 c.
> Cf. supra, Introd. p. xiii. owt
466
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
and “the mob that masters those who are too wise
for theirown good, and the subtle thinkers who reason
that after all they are poor, and countless others are
tokens of this ancient enmity. But nevertheless let
it be declared that, if the mimetic and dulcet poetry |
ean show any reason for her existence in a well-
governed state, we would gladly admit her, since we ©
ourselves are very conscious of her spell. But all the
same it would be impious to betray what we believe
to be the truth.* Is not that so, friend ? Do not you
yourself feel her magic ὃ and especially when Homer? |
is her interpreter?”’ “Greatly.” “Then may she
not justly return from this exile after she has pleaded
her defence, whether in lyric or other measure ? ”
“ By all means.” “ And we would allow her advo-
cates who are not poets but lovers of poetry to plead
her cause ¢ in prose without metre, and show that she
a
is not only delightful but beneficial to orderly govern- |
ment and ail the life of man. And we shall listen
benevolently, for it will be clear gain for us ifit can be’
shown that she bestows not only pleasure but benefit.”
“How could we help being the gainers? ” said he.
“ But if not, my friend, even as men who have fallen
in love, if they think that the love is not good for
them, hard though it be,’ nevertheless refrain, so we,
¢ In Laws 658 τὸ Plato says that old men would prefer _
Homer and epic to any other literary entertainment.
4 This a Ὁ was taken up by Aristotle (Poetics),
Plutarch (Quomodo adolescens), Sidney (Defense of Poesie),
and many others.
* Big μέν, ὅμως δέ: of. Epist. iii. 316 2, and vii. 325 a,
and Raeder, Rhein. Mus. lxi. p. 470, Aristoph. Clouds 1363 -
μόλις μὲν GAN ὅμως, Eurip. Phoen. 1421 μόλις μέν, ἐξέτεινε
δ᾽, and also Soph. Antig. 1105, O.T. 998, Eurip. Bacch.
rh Hee. 843, Or. 1023, El. 753, Phoen. 1069, I.A. 688,
467
PLATOUI HHT
ἔρωτα τῆς τοιαύτης Πονήσέονα ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν
608 πολιτειῶν τροφῆς, εὖνοι μὲν ἐσόμεθα. φανῆναι
αὐτὴν ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην, ἕως δ᾽ ἂν
μὴ οἵα τ᾽ a ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροασόμεθ᾽, αὐτῆς
ἐπάδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέ-
γομεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπῳδήν, εὐλαβούμενοι
πάλιν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικόν τε καὶ τὸν, τῶν
πολλῶν ἔρωτα. αἰσθόμεθα' δ᾽ οὖν, ὡς οὐ σπου-
δαστέον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει. ὡς ἀληθείας. τε
ἁπτομένῃ καὶ σπουδαίᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ εὐλαβητέον! αὐτὴν"
Β τῷ ἀκροωμένῳ, περὶ τῆς ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείς LS
Sedidrt. καὶ νομιστέα ἅπερ εἰρήκαμεν περὶ ποιή-
σεως. Ilavtaracw, a δ᾽ ὅς, ξύμφημι... Μέγας
γάρ, ἔφην, ὃ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε ᾿λαύκων, μέγας, ο
ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε
οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ap)
οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ ἄξιον ἀμελῆσαι δικαιο-
σύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς. Ξ Ξύμφημί, σοι,
ἔφη, ἐξ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν: οἶμαι δὲ καὶ
ὁντινοῦν. γ
C IX. Kai μήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα
ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἄθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν;
᾿Αμήχανόν τι, ἔφη, λέγεις μέγεθος, εἰ τῶν εἰρημέα
1 αἰσθόμεθα AFDM, εἰσόμεθα scr. Mon., ἀσόμεθα᾽ Madvig,
followed by Burnet.
2 ADM have ὃν after αὐτὴν, F ὃν, More recent mss.
omit it.
@ Tronical, as καλλίστη in 562 a. og
468
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
one. to the love of this kind of poetry inbred in us
slay education in these fine * polities of ours, will
y have the best possible case made out for her
ess and truth, but so long as she is unable to
make i her defence we shall chant over to our-
selves ὃ as we listen the reasons that we have given as
a counter-charm to her spell, to preserve us from slip-
ping back into the childish loves of the multitude; —
for we have come to see that we must not take such .
try seriously as a serious thing ° that lays hold on
truth, but that he who lends an ear to it must be on —
his guard fearing for the polity in his soul ὦ and must '
believe what we have said about poetry.” “ By all
means,” he said, “1 concur.” “ Yes, for great is
the struggle,° ’’ I said, “‘ dear Glaucon, a far greater |
contest than we think it, that determines whether a |
man proye good or bad, so that not the lure of honour |
or wealth or any pF no, nor of poetry either, ©
should. incite us/ to be careless of righteousness ἀπά :
all_ excellence.” “I agree with you,” he replied, |
“in view of what we have set forth, and I think that |
anyone else would do so too.”
IX. “ And yet,” said I, “‘ the greatest rewards of
virtue and the prizes proposed for her we have not
set forth.”” “ You must have in mind an inconceiv-
able? magnitude,” he replied, “if there are other
> For ἐπάδοντες cf. Phaedo 114 τ, 77 ε.
: oe 602 B.
4 et A tes: E, p. 412, note d.
Phaedo 114 c, 107 c, Phaedr. 247 5, Gorg. 526 π,
Blay es on Aristoph. Peace 276, and for the whole sentence
Phaedo 83 s-c, supra 465 pb, infra 618 s-c f. and p. 404,
note d, on 589 rE.
7 éxapbévra: cf. 416 c.
9 Cf. supra 494 c, 509 a, 548 D, 584 B, 588 a, Apol. 41 c,
Charm. 155 Ὁ.
469
PEATOTUH HRY
νων μείζω, ἐστὶν ἄλλα. Τί δ᾽ ἄν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ,
ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ μέγα γένοιτο; πᾶς γὰρ οὗτό, οι
ὁ ἐκ παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτου χρόνος πρὸς πάν:
ὀλίγος πού τις ἂν εἴη. Οὐδὲν “μὲν οὖν, ἔφη
οὖν; οἴει ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ TO σούτου ὃ
D χρόνου ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ εν
Οἶμαι ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη: ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο λέ
ἤσθησαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν͵
καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται; καὶ ὃς Bre as μοι
καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε Μὰ Ai, οὐκ ἔγωγε: (Od): δὲ
τοῦτ᾽ ἔχεις λέγειν; Ei μὴ ἀδικῶ γ᾽, ἔφην" οἶμα
δὲ καὶ σύ: οὐδὲν γὰρ χαλεπόν. ἡβμοι ὰ » ἔφη" ὁ
δ᾽ ἂν ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμι τὸ οὐ χαλεπὸν τοῦ
᾿Ακούοις ἄν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐ ἐγώ. Λέγε μόνον, ἔφη.
E θόν τι, εἶπον, καὶ κακὸν καλεῖς; "Ey . *Ag
οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ περὶ αὐτῶν διανοεῖ; Τὸ ποῖον;
Τὸ μὲν ἀπολλύον καὶ διαφθεῖρον πᾶν τὸ Ka ν
Υ
α Clement, Strom. iv. p. 496 B ὁθούνεκ᾽ ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν
ἀνθρώποις μόνη οὐκ ἐκ θυραίων τἀπίχειρα ἈΔΑΡΨΗ, αὐτῇ δ᾽ μι UTI
ἄθλα τῶν πόνων ἔχει. Tennyson, “ Wages”: i
. . if the wages of Virtue be di st,
Would she have heart to endure for the life of the we r
and the fly? Ἧ
She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of Sidanaes
To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer Pays
Give her the wages of going on, and not todie.
ὃ Tennyson, “‘ Locksley Hall Sixty Years After”:
Good, for Good is Good, he follow’d, yet he looka beyo Ἴς
the grave...
Truth for truth, and good for good! The Good, the '
the Pure, the Just— ,
Take the charm “‘ For ever”’ from them, and they crui
into dust.
470
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
Si πρ creat thine than those of which we have spoken.* ”
’ said I, “ could there be in a
little time τὸ ? For oar. the whole time from the boy to
the old man would be small compared with all time.° ”
af : it is nothing,” he said. “What then? Do
you that animmortal thing “ought tobe seriously
concerned for such a little time, and not rather for all
time?” “1 think so,” he said; “ but what is this
that you have in mind?” “ Have you never per-
ceived,” said I, “‘ that our soul is immortal and never
perishes?” And he, looking me full in the face ¢ in
amazement,’ said, “No, by Zeus, not I; but are you
able todeclare this?’’ “1 certainly ought to be,?”’ said
I, “and I think you too can, for it is nothing hard.”
“It is for me,” he said; “and I would gladly hear
from you this thing that is not hard.*” “ Listen,”
said I, “ Just speak on,” he replied. “‘ You speak
of‘ good and evil,do younot?” “Ido.” “Is your
notion of them the same as mine?” ‘What is it?”
“ That which destroys and corrupts in every case is
the evil; that which preserves and benefits is the
is me on 486 a, p. 9, note f and 498 Ὁ.
or the colourless use of πρᾶγμα see What Plato Said,
Ρ. 497, on Protag. 330 c-p. Cf. Shakes. Hamlet, τ. iy. 67
‘being a thing immortal as itself.”
« 28 as: ef. Charmides 155 c.
7 Glaucon is surprised in spite of 498 p. Many uncertain i
ἜΞεντα have been drawn from the fact that in spite of
the Phaedo and Phaedrus (245 c ff.) interlocutors in Plato ;
are always surprised at the idea of immortality. Cf. supra, Ι
Introd. p. Ixiv.
9 For the idiomatic εἰ μὴ ἀδικῷ cf. 480 ©, Charm. 156 ‘a,
Menez. 236 8, infra 612 pv.
ἡ Cf. Protag. 341 a τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο, which is a little
different, Herod. vii. 11 τὸ δεινὸν τὸ πείσομαι.
* See Vol. 1. p. 90, note a and What Plato Said, p. 567, on
Cratyl. 385 8.
471
PLATO'S ὑΠῚ
ἔφη. Τί δέ; κακὸν ἑκάστῳ τι καὶ “ἀγαθὸν. λέγεις;
609 οἷον ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀφθαλμίαν καὶ ξύμπαντι τῷ σώματι
νόσον, σίτῳ τε ἐρυσίβην, σηπεδόνα τε i 7
χαλκῷ δὲ καὶ σιδήρῳ ἰόν, καί, ὅπερ λέγω, nee
πᾶσι ξύμφυτον ἑκάστῳ κακόν τε καὶ νόσημα;
Ἔγωγ᾽ , ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν τῴ τι τούτων 'προσ-
γένηται, πονηρόν τε ποιεῖ ᾧ προσεγένετο, καὶ i τελευ-
τῶν ὅλον διέλυσε καὶ ἀπώλεσεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Τὸ ξύμφυτον dpa κακὸν ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρίι a
ἕκαστον ἀπόλλυσιν, ἣ ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ :
B ἄλλο. ye αὐτὸ ἔτι διαφθείρειεν. οὐ γὰρ. τό. γε
ἀγαθὸν μή ποτέ τι ἀπολέσῃ, οὐδὲ αὖ τὸ μήτ
κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθόν. Πῶς. γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη.
ἄρα τι εὑρίσκωμεν τῶν ὄντων, ᾧ ἔστι. μὲν. pa: :
ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν, τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ οἷόν τε
αὐτὸ λύειν ἀπολλύον, οὐκ ἤδη εἰσόμεθα, ὅτι τοῦ
πεφυκότος οὕτως. ὄλεθρος οὐκ ἦν; Οὕτως, ἔφη,
εἰκός. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ" ψυχῇ Pp οὐκ ἔ ἔστιν
ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν κακήν; Kat μάλ᾽, ἔφη, ἃ νῦν δὴ
0 διῇμεν πάντα, ἀδικία τε καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία,
καὶ ἀμαθίαᾳ. Ἦ οὖν τι τούτων αὐτὴν διαλύει
καὶ ἀπόλλυσι; καὶ ἐννόει, μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν
οἰηθέντες τὸν ἄδικον ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνόητον,. ὅτα
ληφθῇ ἀδικῶν, τότε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας,
πονηρίας οὔσης ψυχῆς" ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε ποίει" ὥσπερ
σῶμα ἡ σώματος πονηρία νόσος οὖσα τήκει κα
διόλλυσι καὶ ἄγει εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι, καὶ ἃ
* Ruskin, Time and Tide § 52 (Brantwood ed. p. 68):
“Every faculty of man’s oi. and every instinct of it by
which he is meant to live, is exposed to its own special form
of corruption”; Boethius, Cons. iii. 11 (L.C.L. trans, p. 283)
things are destroyed by what is hostile; Aristot. Top. —
194. ἃ 28 εἰ yap τὸ φθαρτικὸν διαλυτικόν, ἂν
472
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
good.” “ Yes, I think so,” he said. ‘‘ How about
“this: Do-you say that there is for everything its
special good and evil, as for example for the eyes
i a for the entire body disease, for grain
w, rotting for wood, rust for bronze and iron, and,
as I say, for practically everything its congenital evil
and disease*?”’ ‘“‘I do,” he said. ‘‘ Then when one
of these evils comes to anything does it not make the
thing to which it attaches itself bad, and finally dis-
integrate and destroy it?” “Ofcourse.” “Then
the congenital evil of each thing and its own vice
destroys it, or if that is not going to destroy it,
nothing else remains that could; for obviously® the
good will never destroy anything, nor yet again will
that which is neutral and neither good nor evil*.”
“How could it?” he said.. “If, then, we discover 4
anything that has an evil which vitiates it, yet is not
able to dissolve and destroy it, shall we not thereupon
know that of a thing so constituted there can be no
destruction ?’’ “ That seems likely,” he said. ““ Well,
then,” said I, ““ has not the soul something that makes
it evil?’ “ Indeed it has,” he said, “ all the things
that we were just now enumerating, injustice and
licentiousness and cowardice andignorance.”” “‘ Does
any one of these things dissolve and destroy it ? And
reflect, lest we be misled by supposing that when an
unjust and foolish man is taken in his injustice he is
then destroyed by the injustice, which is the vice of
soul. But conceive it thus: Just as the vice of body
which is disease wastes and destroys it so that it
no meee. a body at all,’ in like manner in all the
> ye vi termini. Cf. 379 a, Phaedo 106 pn.
* See What Plato Said, p. 490, on Lysis 216 σ᾿
* Cf. Vol. 1. p. 529, note a, on 478 Ὁ.
“ΟἿ Aristot. Pol. 1309 Ὁ 28 μηδὲ ῥῖνα ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι.
418
D τῷ προσκαθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνεῖναι διαφθειρούσης, εἰς, τὸ
610
a
E γάρ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ᾿λαύκων, 6 ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς
ἐμποιῇ ἡ αὐτῶν πονηρία τῶν σιτίων γί σά σώματι Ὶ
PHATO' {15 TH
νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ἅπαντα ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κακίας,
pay εἶναι ἀφικνεῖται- -οὐχ οὕτως; Ναί. Ἴθι
καὶ ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον σκόπει, ΡΟΣ ὲ
ἐνοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κακία τῷ ἐνεῖναι.
καὶ προσκαθῆσθαι φθείρει αὐτὴν καὶ μαραίνει, ἕως
ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγαγοῦσα τοῦ σώματος χωρίσῃ;
Οὐδαμῶς, ἔ ἐν τοῦτό γε. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι ἐκεῖνό Ve
ἄλογον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὴν μὲν ἄλλου. πονηρίαν. ἀπ-
ολλύναι τι, τὴν δὲ αὑτοῦ μή. “Adoyov. Ἐννόει, ᾿
τῶν σιτίων πονηρίας, ἣ ἂν a αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, εἴτε,
παλαιότης εἴτε σαπρότης εἴτε ἡτισοῦν ἐν οὐκ
οἰόμεθα δεῖν σῶμα ἀπόλλυσθαι" ἀλλ᾽
σώματος μοχθηρίαν, φήσομεν αὐτὸ δι’ ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ
τῆς αὑτοῦ κακίας νόσου οὔσης ἀπολωλέναι" ὑπὸ
δὲ σιτίων πονηρίας ἄλλων 6 ὄντων ἄλλο ὃν τὸ σῶμα,
ὑπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίου κακοῦ μὴ ἐμποιήσαντος τὸ ἔμφυτον.
ἐάων: οὐδέποτε ἀξιώσομεν διαφθείρεσθαι. ᾿Ορθό-
τατα, ἔφη, λέγεις." i :
x. Kara TOV αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐ ἐὰν.
μὴ σώματος πονηρία ψυχῇ ψυχῆς πονηρίαν ἐμποιῇ
1 ὀρθότατα. .. pins Adam: ὀρθότατ᾽ av... X
AF DM: ὀρθότατ᾽ ad... λέγεις Stephanus: ὀρθότατ᾽ ay . “ail
λέγοις Hermann. τῇ
α« The argument that follows is strictly speaking a fallac |
in that it confounds the soul with the physical principle of —
life. Cf. on 335 c and on 352 π, Gorg. 477 B-c, and supra,
Introd. p. Ixvii. But Dean Inge, ‘* P atonism and Human ~
Immortality” (Aristot. Soc., 1919, p.288) says: “Plato’s ar, u-
ment, in the tenth book of the Republic, for the immortality _
of the soul, has found a place in scholastic theology, but is —
supposed to have been discredited by Kant. I venture to —
474
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
examples of which we spoke it is the specific evil
which, by attaching itself to the thing and dwelling
in it with power to corrupt, reduces it to nonentity,
Is not that so?” “Yes.” ““Come, then, and consider
the soul in the same way.* Do injustice and other
wickedness dwelling in it, by their indwelling and
attachment to it, corrupt and wither it till they bring
it to death and separate it from the body?” “ They
certainly do not do that,” he said. “ But surely,”
said I, “ it is unreasonable to suppose that the vice of
something else destroys a thing while its own does
not.” “Yes, unreasonable.” “‘ For observe, Glau-
con,” said I, “‘ that we do not think it proper to say
of the body either that it is destroyed by the badness
of foods themselves, whether it be staleness or rotten-
ness or whatever it is;° but when the badness of the
foods themselves engenders in the body the defect
of body, then we shall say that it is destroyed oming
to these foods, but by “ its own vice, which is disease.
But the body being one thing and the foods some-
thing else, we shall never expect the body to be
destroyed by their badness, that is by an alien evil
that has not produced in it the evil that belongs to it
by nature.” ‘‘ You are entirely right,’ he replied.
ΠΧ, “ On the same principle,” said I, “‘ if the bad-
ness of the body does not produce in the soul the
think that his argument, that the soul can only be destroyed \ .
by an enemy (so to speak) in pari materia, is sound. \
Physical evils, including death, cannot touch the soul. And ἢ
wickedness does not, in our experience, dissolve the soul,
nor is wickedness specially apparent when the soul (if it
perishes at death) would be approaching dissolution.” Cf.
} 610c. Someone might object that wickedness does destroy
Τ the soul, conceived as a spiritual principle.
» Plato generally disregards minor distinctions when they }
“do not affect his point. © Cf. 610 pv.
475
PLATO © ΠῚ
μή ποτε ἀξιῶμεν ὑπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίου κακοῦ ἄνευ τῆς
ἰδίας πονηρίας ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρου κακῷ
ἕτερον. Ἔχει. γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. Ἢ τοίνυν ταῦτα :
Β ἐξελέγξωμεν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν, ἢ ἕως ἂν
ἀνέλεγκτα, μή ποτε φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ μηδ᾽. αὖ
ὑπ᾽ ἄλλης νόσου μηδ᾽ αὖ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, μηδ᾽ εἴ τις
6 τι σμικρότατα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα κατατέμοι, ἕνεκα
τούτων μηδὲν μᾶλλόν ποτε ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι,
πρὶν ἄν τις ἀποδείξῃ, ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα,
τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἀδικωτέρα καὶ ᾿ἀνοσιω- ;
τέρα γίγνεται: ἀλλοτρίου δὲ κακοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ.
γιγνομένου, τοῦ δὲ ἰδίου ἑκάστῳ μὴ ἐγγιγνομένου,
Ο μήτε ψυχὴν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν ἐῶμεν φάναι τινὰ,
ἀπόλλυσθαι. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οὐδείς,
ποτε δείξει, ὡς τῶν ἀποθνησκόντων ἀδικώτεραι
at ψυχαὶ διὰ τὸν θάνατον γίγνονται. ᾿ΕΒὰν δέ γέ
τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἰέναι ne
λέγειν, ὡς πονηρότερος καὶ ἀδικώτερος γίγνεται
ὁ “ἀποθνήσκων, i ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζηται ἀθανάτους
τὰς ψυχὰς. ὁμολογεῖν, ἀξιώσομέν που, εἰ ἀλη
λέγει ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, τὴν ἀδικίαν. εἶναι θανάσιμον
D7@ ἔχοντι ὥσπερ νόσον, καὶ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τούτου
ἀποκτιννύντος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἀποθνήσκειν τοὺς
λαμβάνοντας αὐτό, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα θᾶττον
τοὺς δ᾽ ἧττον σχολαίτερον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν
* τούτου scr. Mon. adopted by Hermann, Jowett and —
Campbell, and Adam: τοῦ AFDM, followed by Burnet. —
"
* For the challenge to refute or accept the argument of
Soph. 259 a, 257 a, Gorg. 467 B-c, 482 8, 508 a-B, vide
60 D-E.
> Or “to take the bull by the horns.”’ For ὁμόσε ἕξει.
476
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
soul’s badness we shall never expect the soul to be
destroyed by an alien evil apart from its own defect—
one thing, that is, by the evil of another.” “‘ That is
reasonable,” he said. “‘ Either, then, we must refute
this and show that we are mistaken, or,’ so long as it
remains unrefuted, we must never say that by fever
or any other disease, or yet by the knife at the throat
or the chopping to bits of the entire body, there is
any more likelihood of the soul perishing because of
these things, until it is proved that owing to these
affections of the body the soul itself becomes more
unjust and unholy. But when an evil of something
else occurs in a different thing and the evil that
belongs to the thing is not engendered in it, we must
not suffer it to be said that the soul or anything else
is in this way destroyed.’ “ But you may be sure,”
he said, “ that nobody will ever prove this, that the
souls of the dying are made more unjust by death.”
“ But if anyone,” said I, ‘‘ dares to come to grips with
the argument? and say, in order to avoid being forced
to admit the soul’s immortality, that a dying man
does become more wicked and unjust,‘ we will postu-
late that, if what he says is true, injustice must be
fatal to its possessor as if it were a disease, and that
those who catch it die because it kills them by its own
inherent nature, those who have most of it quickest,
and those who have less more slowly, and not, as now
What Plato Said, p. 457, on Euthyph. 3c. Cf. ἐγγὺς ἰόντες
Phaedo 95 8.
¢ Herbert Spencer nearly does this: ‘* Death by starvation
eon pea blity to catch prey shows a falling short of conduct
m its ideal.”* It recalls the argument with which Socrates
eatches Callicles in Gorg. 498 =, that if all pleasures are alike
those who feel pleasure are good and those who feel pain are
477
PLATO TSA NHI
διὰ τοῦτο ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων δίκην ἐπιτιθέντων ἀποθνή-
σκουσιν οἱ ἄδικοι. Ma A’, a δ᾽ ὅς, οὐκ. ἄρα
πάνδεινον φανεῖται ἡ ἀδικία, εἰ θανάσιμον ἔσται
τῷ λαμβάνοντι: ἀπαλλαγὴ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κακῶν"
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οἶμαι αὐτὴν φανήσεσθαι. πᾶν τοὐ-
E ναντίον τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποκτιννῦσαν, εἴπερ. οἷόν τε,
τὸν δ᾽ ἔχοντα. καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν παρέ Silay ea
πρός γ᾽ ἔτι τῷ ζωτικῷ ἄγρυπνον" o ω 5
που, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐσκήνηται τοῦ ᾿θανάσιμος
Καλῶς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λέγεις. ὁπότε γὰρ
ἱκανὴ ἥ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον. ακὸν,
ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχήν, σχολῇ τό γε ἐπ᾽
ἄλλου ὀλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἢ τι ὁ
ἀπολεῖ, πλὴν ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τέτακται. Σχολῇ γ ?, ἐφ
ὥς γε τὸ εἰκός. Οὐκοῦν ὁπότε μηδ᾽ δ᾿ Evo
611 ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ, μήτε οἰκείου. μήτε, ΠΡΆΘΗ͂Ν
δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὃν εἶναι, εἰ oa ἀεὶ :
ἀθάνατον. ᾿Ανάγ yen, ἔφη. '
ΧΙ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὕτως. eye ω"
εἰ δ᾽ ἔχει, ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ἀεὶ ἂν elev αἱ αὐταί. οὔτε
γὰρ ἄν που ἐλάττους γένοιντο μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυ:
μένης, οὔτε αὖ πλείους" εἰ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀθαν a
των πλέον γίγνοιτο, οἷοθ᾽ ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ,
γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἴη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα
Ξ
α For the future indicative after εἰ, usually minatory
monitory in tone, cf, Aristoph. Birds 759, Phileb. 25 νυ.
> Cf. Phaedo 107 c, 84.8, Blaydes on Aristoph. Acharn. 757
© μάλα is humorous, as in 506 p, Euthydem. 298 Ὁ, Sy jm
189 a. ᾿
4 Cf. Horace, FEpist. i, 2, 32 “ut iugulent homir or
surgunt de nocte latrones.” =
4 For the metaphor ef. Proverbs viii. 12 σοφία κατεσκήνως
βουλήν. Plato personifies injustice, as he does justice i
612 D, σκιαγραφία in 602 Ὁ, bravery in Laches 194 a, Kor
478
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
in fact happens, that the unjust die owing to this but
‘by the action of others who inflict the penalty.”’ “Nay,
by Zeus,” he said, “‘ injustice will not appear a very
terrible thing after all if it is going to be “ fatal to its
εαροσου rea that would bearelease from all troubles.®
But I rather think it will prove to be quite the con-
rary, something that kills others when it can, but
renders its possessor very lively indeed,° and not only
lively but wakeful,? so far, I ween, does it dwell* from
deadliness.”” “You say well,” I replied; “for when the
natural vice and the evil proper to it cannot kill and
destroy the soul, still less’ will the evil appointed for
the destruction of another thing destroy the soul or
‘an else, except that for which it is appointed.”’?
“Still less indeed,” he said, “in all probability.”
“ Then since it is not destroyed by any evil whatever,
either its own or alien, it is evident that it must
necessarily exist always, and that if it always exists
it is immortal.” ‘“‘ Necessarily,” he said.
_ XI. “Let this, then,” I said, “θὲ assumed to be so.
But if it is so, you will observe that these souls must
always be thesame. For if none perishes they could
not, I suppose, become fewer nor yet more numerous.”
For if any class of immortal things increased you are
aware that its increase would come from the mortal
and all things would end by becoming immortal.*”’
στική in Soph. 229 a, κολακευτική Gorg. 464 c, σμικρότης
Parmen. 150 a, πονηρία Apol. 39 a-z, and many other abstract
‘conceptions. See further Phileb. 63 a-s, 15 p, 24 a, Rep.
465 a-8, Laws 644 c, Cratyl. 438 pb.
. eae ef. 354 c, Phaedo 106 v. 9 Of. 345 pv.
* Cf. Carveth Read, Man and His Superstitions, p. 104:
“Plato ap υαὰ that by a sort of law of psychic conservation
m
there must always be the same number of souls in the world.
“There must therefore be reincarnation. . . .”
_ * Cf. Phaedo 72 c-p.
479
ῬΙΆΑΤΘΊΕ 2
᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ἦν Sts ἐγώ, oe τοῦτο
Β οἰώμεθα, ὃ γὰρ λόγοξῃ οὐκ ἐάσει, μήτε a
ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει τοιοῦτον εἶναι doch
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ay: οἷον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῇ Dae
C θείᾳ, οὐ λελωβημένον, δεῖ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι ὑπό τε
τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶ
ὥσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ οἷόν ἐστι καθ
γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἱκανῶς λογισμῷ διαθεατέον,
καὶ πολὺ κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὑρήσει καὶ ἐναργέστερον
δικαιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας διόψεται καὶ πάντα ἃ
νῦν διήλθομεν. νῦν δὲ εἴπομεν μὲν ἀληθῆ περὶ
αὐτοῦ, οἷον ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαίνεται: τεθεάμεθα
Τ) μέντοι διακείμενον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττ
r λαῦκον ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥᾳδίως. αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν
τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε παλαιὰ "τοῦ
« The idea of self-contradiction is frequent in Plato. 5
What Plato Saad, 505, on Gorg. 482 B-c.
> σύνθετον : t. Phaedo 78 c, lotinus, Enneades i. 1.1 Ἃ
Berkeley, Pricciplen § 141: ‘We have shown that the sou |
is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended; and it is conse-
quently incorruptible. . . . Changes, deca and dissolutions
. cannot possibl affect an active, simple, uncompounded
substance.”’ See ass Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. iis 1, pp. eee
¢ 603 Ὁ. . See also Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, ned ts
ἃ Such as are given in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, eee 5 Κ᾿
elsewhere. ig)
¢ Cf. also Phaedo 82 Ἑ, 83 ΡῈ, 81 ¢, and "Wisdom. 9
Solomon ix. 14 φθαρτὸν yap σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχήν, καὶ βρίθει
480
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
“You ἐπ διδὸν. ” “ But,” said 1, “we must not
suppose. this,.for reason will not suffer it; nor yet
moust we think that in its truest nature the*soultis
the kind of thing that teems with infinite diversity
and unlikeness and contradiction in and with itself.”
She am [ to understand that?” he said. “It is
,” said I, “ for a thing to be immortal that is
ae of many elements ὃ not put together in the
‘best way, as now appeared to us ¢ to be the case with
the soul.” “Τὸ is not likely.” “ Well, then, that the
soul is immortal our recent argument and our other ὁ
proofs would constrain us to admit. But to know its
true nature we must view it not marred by com-
munion with the body ¢ and other miseries as we now
contemplate it, but consider adequately in the light:
of reason what it is when it is purified, and then
you will find it to be a far more beautiful thing and
will more clearly distinguish justice and injustice and
the matters that we have now discussed. But
we have stated the truth of its present appear-
ance, its condition as we have now contemplated it
resembles that of the sea-god Glaucus’ whose first
nature can hardly be made out by those who catch
τῳ τος of him, peciiee the original members of his |
abate res νοῦν πολυφρόντιδα, “for the corruptible body
down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth
the mind that museth upon many
7 See schol. Hermann vi. 362, Eurip. Or. 364 f., Apol-
lonius, Argon. 1310 ff., Athenaeus 296 Band pv, Anth. Pal. vi.
164, Frazer on Pausanias ix. 22. 7, Gadecker, Glaukos der
Meeresgott, Gottingen, 1860. Cf. Lionel Johnson's poem:
Ah, Glaucus, soul of man!
. Encrusted by each tide
That since the seas began
if Hath surged against thy side.
VOL. II 21 481
PLATOINS VHT .
σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συντετρί-
φθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμά
ἄλλα δὲ προσπεφυκέναι, ὄ ὄστρεά τε καὶ φυκία.
πέτρας, ὥστε παντὶ μᾶλλον θηρίῳ ἐοικέναι, Σ οἷος
ἣν φύσει, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα
διακειμένην ὑ ὑπὸ μυρίων κακῶν: ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὦ ὦ UX ΄-
κων, ἐκεῖσε βλέπειν. Ποῖ; 7 δ᾽ ὅς. Eis τὴν
Η φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐννοεῖν ὧν ἅπτεται. καὶ
οἵων ἐφίεται ὁμιλιῶν, ὡς ξυγγενὴς. οὖσα τῷ. τε
θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι, καὶ ola ,
γένοιτο τῷ τοιούτῳ πᾶσα ἐπισπομένη καὶ
ταύτης τῆς ὁρμῆς ᾿ἐκκομισθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ πό
ἐν ᾧ νῦν ἐστί, καὶ περικρουσθεῖσα πέτρας. Te
612 ὄστρεα, ἃ νῦν αὐτῇ ἅτε γῆν ἑστιωμένῃ γεηρὰ αν
πετρώδη πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια ,περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν
εὐδαιμόνων λεγομένων ἑ ἑστιάσεων. καὶ τότ᾽ ἄν τις
ἴδοι αὐτῆς τὴν ἀληθῆ φύσιν, εἴτε πολυειδὴς, εἴ =
μονοειδὴς εἴτε ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ὅπως: νῦν δὲ, τὰ εἰ
τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ πάθη τε καὶ εἴδη, ὡς evap. Ἑ
ἐπιεικῶς αὐτῆς διεληλύθαμεν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν,
ἔφη. ee
XII. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τά τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσά:
Β μεθα' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τὰ
δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπηνέγκαμεν, ὥσπερ “Hoto
1 ἀπελυσάμεθα AFD Stobaeus: ἀπεδυσάμεθα M, defe
by Stallbaum.
« Cf. Tim. 42 c προσφύντα. a
> Cf. Phaedr. 250 c ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι, Phaed
1104
Ch. Phaedo 79 v, Laws 899 p, and supra 494 Ὁ τὸ συγγενὲς
τῶν λόγων.
4 Of Phileb. 55 ο περικρούωμεν, supra 519 a περιεκόπη-.
482
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
body are broken off and mutilated and crushed and
in every way marred by the waves, and other parts
haveattached themselves? to him, accretions of shells?
and sea-weed and rocks, so that he is more like any
wild creature than what he was by nature—even
such, I say, is our vision of the soul marred by count-
less evils. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucon.”
“Where ?”’ said he. “To its love of wisdom. And
we must note the things of which it has apprehen-
sions, and the associations for which it yearns, as
being itself akin to the divine © and the immortal and
to eternal being, and so consider what it might be
if it followed the gleam unreservedly and were raised
by this impulse out of the depths of this sea in
which it is now sunk, and were cleansed and scraped
free ¢ of the rocks and barnacles which, because it now
feasts on earth, cling to it in wild profusion of earthy
and stony accretion oa pare ese feastings that
are accoun nappy A en one might see
human life of ours.” ‘* We certainly have,” he said.
XII. “Then,” said I, “‘ we have met all the other
demands of the argument, and we have not invoked
the rewards and reputes of justice as you said Homer
_¢ Of. Charm. 158 a, Laws 695 a, 783 a. See λεγόμενα
ἄγαθά supra 491 c, 495 a, Laws 661 c.
“7 Cf. Phaedo 246 a. In Tim. 72 p Plato says that only
God knows the truth about the soul. See Laws 641 p, and
Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42.
9 Of. Phaedr. 271 a.
ἫΝ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπως: cf. 621 B, Phaedo 100 v, Tim, 37 «38,
Laws 652 a, 834 8, 899 a and B.
483
oe
whether in its real nature 7 it is manifold? or single in |
its simplicity, or what is the truth about it and how.’ |
But for the present we have, I think, fairly well de- |
scribed its sufferings and the forms it assumes in this —
PLATO τ
τε καὶ Ὅμηρον ὑμεῖς ἔφατε, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ δικα
αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄριστον εὕρομεν, καὶ ποιητέον ε
αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάν τ᾽ ἔχῃ τὸν Γύγου δακτύλι
ἐάν τε μή, καὶ πρὸς τοιούτῳ δακτυλίῳ fd “AiBos |
κυνῆν; ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. ; Ap” οὖν,
δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Ῥλαύκων, νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονόν pa
πρὸς ἐκείνοις καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ.
CTH ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅσους τε καὶ οἵους τῇ
ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν, ζῶντός
τε ἔτι τοῦ 0 ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτή NODS Παν
τάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. ἾΔρ᾽ οὖν ἀποὶ
ἃ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ; Τί μάλιστα; φ᾽
ὑμῖν τὸν δίκαιον δοκεῖν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ. τὸν ἄδικον
δίκαιον. ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἡγεῖσθε, κἂν εἰ μὴ Svve
εἴη ταῦτα λανθάνειν καὶ θεοὺς “καὶ ἀνθρώπ'
ὅμως δοτέον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα, ἵνα αὖ
D δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν αὐτὴν κριθείη. ἢ ᾿
μνημονεύεις; ᾿Αδικοίην μέντ᾽ ἄν, ἔφη, εἰ μή.
᾿Επειδὴ τοίνυν κεκριμέναι εἰσίν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πάλιν
ἀπαιτῶ ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης, ὥσπερ ἔχει coat i
if
* Supra 363 B-c. > 359 ἢ ἢ. ὃ Of, 367
4 Iliad ν. 845, Blaydes on Aristoph. Acharn. 390.
. Cf. Soph. 243 a, Laws 801 £ ἄνευ φθόνων; Eurip. Πρ
497 οὐκ. ἐπίφθονον, Aeschines, De falsa legatione 167 “(4s
Friedlander, Platon, ii. Ὁ. 406 does object: and finds: tk
passage inconsistent with the idealism of. 592 and with Law.
899 pv ff. and 905 s. Cf. Renan, Averroes, pp. 156-157,
Guyau, Esquisse d’une morale, pp. 140-141. aie Unity
of Plato’s Thought, p. 80 and n, 612, Idea of Justice in
Plato’s Republic, pp. 197-198. Gomperz, ignoring this
passage and interpreting the Republic wholly from 367 ©
strangely argues that Phaedo 107 c proves that the Phaed
must have been composed at a time when Plato was les
sure of the coincidence of justice and happiness. A τὰ δὴ
484
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
and Hesiod * do, but we have proved that justice in
itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and that the
soul ought to do justice whether it possess the ri
of Gyges ὃ or not, or the helmet of Hades ὁ to boot.’
“ Most true,” he said. “Then,” said I, “ Glaucon,
there can no longer be any objection,’ can there, to
our assigning to justice and virtue generally, in addi-
ion, all the various rewards and wages that they
bring to the soul from men and gods, both while the
man still lives and after his death?” “ There cer-
tainly can be none,” he said. “ Will you, then, return
tome what you borrowed‘ in the argument ?”’ “‘ What,
pray?” “I granted to you that the just man
should seem and be thought to be unjust and the
unjust just; for you thought that, even if the conceal-
ment of these things from gods and men was an im-
ibility in fact, nevertheless it ought to be conceded
for thesake of the argument.’ inorder that the decision
might be made between absolute justice and absolute
injustice. Or do you not remember?” “It would
be unjust of me,*”’ he said, “if I did not.” “ Well,
then, now that they have been compared and judged,
I demand back from you in behalf of justice the repute
_ A religious thinker may in his theodicy justify the ways
of God to man by arguing that worldly happiness is not the
Teal happiness, and yet elsewhere remark that, as a rule, the
teous is not forsaken even in this world. Cf. Psalm
xxxvii. 25 ff., Prov. x. 3 and sim. See Renan, Hist. du
Peuple d’ Israel, ii. p. 376: “Τὶ en est de ces passages comme
de tant de préceptes de l’Evangile, insensés si on en fait des
articles de code, excellents si on n’y voit que l’expression
hyperbolique de hauts sentiments moraux.”
Cf. Polit. 267 a.
9 τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα: not the same as λόγον ἕνεκα. See on
581 c, p. 374, note a.
* Cf. ci μὴ ἀδικῶ 608 v.
485
PLATOUIA TT
mapa θεῶν καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὁμο-
λογεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖσθαι οὕτως, ἵνα καὶ τὰ
νικητήρια. κομίσηται, ἃ “ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν κτωμένη,
δίδωσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτήν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ
εἶναι ἀγαθὰ διδοῦσα ἐφάνη καὶ οὐκ ἐξαπατῶσα
τοὺς τῷ ὄντι λαμβάνοντας. αὐτήν. Δίκαια, ἔφη,
E αἰτεῖ. Οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τοί
ἀποδώσετε, ὅτι θεούς γε οὐ λανθάνει ἑκάτερι
αὐτῶν οἷός ἐστιν; ᾿Αποδώσομεν, ἔ ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ,
λανθάνετον, ὁ ὁ μὲν θεοφιλὴς ἃ ἂν εἴη, ὁ δὲ co
ὥσπερ καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ὡμολογοῦμεν. a στι ταῦ
Τῷ δὲ , θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε.
618 θεῶν γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἷόν τε ἄριστ.
εἰ μή͵ τι “ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρ
ἁμαρτίας ὑπῆρχεν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὕτως dpa
ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν T ἫΝ
πενίᾳ γίγνηται ἐάν sae ἐν νόσοις ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν
δοκούντων κακῶν, ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν ἢ
τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐ yap 8
ὑπό ye θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθᾳ
ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν eis
Bo ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. Εἰκός " Υ Fa
~ ~ > 4, . ;
Οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τἀναντία τούτων δεῖ
διανοεῖσθαι; Σφόδρα γε. Τὰ μὲν δὴ παρὰ bed
4 For the idiom ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης cf. 365 4 ὡς. . . ἔχου
τιμῆς, 389 c ὅπως... πράξεως ἔχει, Thucyd, i, 22 ὡς. «
μνήμης ἔχοι. For the thought cf. Isoc. viii. 33.
» Cf. Phileb. 22 5 and ©.
© ye vi.termini. Cf. 379 a and Class. Phil. x. Ρ
4 Cf. 365 νυ. «ΟἹ. Phileb. 39 π΄. Cf. 352)
9 This recalls the faith of Socrates in Apol. 41 c-p 4
486
kone
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
that she in fact enjoys * from gods and men, and I ask
that we admit that she is thus esteemed in order that
she may gather in the prizes ὃ which she wins from the
seeming and bestows on her possessors, since she has
been proved to bestow the blessings that come from
the reality and not to deceive those who truly seek
and win her.” “ That is a just demand,” he said.
“Then,” said I, “ will not the first of these restora-
tions be that the gods certainly 5 are not unaware ὦ of
the true character of each of the two, the just and the
unjust?” “ We will restore that,” he said. ‘“‘ And
if they are not concealed, the one will be dear to the
gods* and the other hateful to them, as we agreed
in the beginning” ‘ That is so.” “‘ And shall we
not agree that all things that come from the gods
work together for the best? for him that is dear to the
γενέ ei from the inevitable evil caused by sin in a
πε ἢ “ By all means.” “This, then, must be
ourconviction about the just man, that whether he fall
into poverty or disease or any other supposed evil, for
him all these things will finally prove good, both in life
andindeath. For by the gods assuredly that man will
never be neglected who is willing and eager to be
righteous, and by the practice of virtue to be likened
unto god ἦ so far as that is possible for man.” “It is
reasonable,” he said, ‘‘ that such a one should not be
neglected by his like.?” ‘‘ And must we not think
the opposite of the unjust man?” “ Most em-
phatically.” “Such then are the prizes of victory
Phaedo 63 8-c, and anticipates the theodicy of Laws 899 ἡ ff.,
904 p-s ff.
* Besides obvious analogies with Buddhism, this recalls
Empedocles fr. 115, Diels 1.3 p. 267.
4 Cf. ὁμοίωσις θεῷ Theast. 176 8, and What Plato Said,
Ῥ. 578, supra p. 72, note d. i Cf. Laws 716 c-p, 904 E.
. 5 481
ῬΗΑΈΟ 15 THT Ἷ
τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη νικητήρια τῷ δικαίῳ. Κατὰ γοῦν
ἐμὴν δόξαν, ἔφη. Τί δέ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, παρ᾽ ἀνθρώ-
πῶν; ἄρ᾽ οὐχ ὧδε ἔ “ἔχει, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ὃν τιθέναι;
οἱ μὲν δεινοί τε καὶ ἄδικοι δρῶσιν ὅπερ ο οἱ ke
ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἀπὸ :
ἄνω μή; τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀξέως ἀ arom ὥσι, τε
σ τῶντες δὲ καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, τὰ ὦτα ἐ
TOV ww ἔχοντες καὶ ἀστεφάνωτοι ἀποτρέχοντες
οἱ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δρομικοὶ εἰς τέλος ἐλθόντες τά
ἄθλα λαμβάνουσι καὶ rage eh οὐχ οὔτ
τέλος ἑκάστης πράξεως καὶ ὁμιλίας καὶ τοῦ f
εὐδοκιμοῦσί τε καὶ τὰ ἄθλα παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώ
φέρονται; Καὶ μάλα. ᾿Ανέξει ἄρα λέγοντος ἐμ
D περὶ τούτων, ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἔλεγες περὶ τῶν
ἐρῶ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι, ἐπειδὰν πρεσ p=
τεροι γένωνται, ev TH αὑτῶν πόλει ἄρχουσί τε «
βούλωνται τὰς ἀρχάς, γαμοῦσί τε ὁπόθεν ἂν
λωνται, ἐκδιδόασί τε εἰς οὗς ἂν ἐθέλωσι, καὶ πο
ἃ “σὺ περὶ ἐκείνων, ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω περὶ τῶνδε:
αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων, ὅ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν, αἱ
ἐὰν νέοι ὄντες λάθωσιν, ἐπὶ τέλους τοῦ δρόι Lo )
αἱρεθέντες καταγέλαστοί εἰσι καὶ γέροντες. yes:
μενοι ἄθλιοι προπηλακίζονται ὑπὸ ξένων te
« For the order cf. Laws 913 B χελὀβέδον εὖ, "Thucyd. .
71. 7, Vahlen, Op. Acad. i. 495-496. For the figure of the
race of. Eurip. £1. 955, 1 Corinthians ix. 24 f., Heb. xii.
Gal. ii. 2, v. 7, Phil. ii. 16.
ὃ English idiom would say, ““with their tails between
their legs.” Cf. Horace, Sat. i. 9. 20 “ dimitto auriculas.’
For the idea cf. also Laws 730 c-p, Demosth. ii. 10, and for
488
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
which the gods bestow upon the just.”” “So I think,
at any rate,” he said. “ But what,” said I, “ does
he reeeive from men? Is not this the case, if we
are now to present the reality ? Do not your smart
but wicked men fare as those racers do who run
well? from the scratch but not back from the turn?
They bound nimbly away at the start, but in the end
are laughed to scorn and run off the field uncrowned
and with their ears on their shoulders.? But the
true runners when they have come to the goal receive
the prizes and bear away the crown. Is not this the
usual outcome for the just also, that towards the end
of every action and association and of life as a whole
they have honour and bear away the prizes from
men?” “So it is indeed.” ‘‘ Will you, then; bear
with me if I say of them all that you said ¢ of the un-
just? For I am going to say that the just, when they
become older, hold the offices in their own city if they
choose, marry from what families they will, and give
their children in marriage to what families they
please, and everything that you said of the one I now
repeat of the other; and in turn I will say of the
unjust that the most of them, even if they escape
detection in youth, at the end of their course are
caught and derided, and their old age? is made miser-
able by the contumelies of strangers and townsfolk.
εἰς τέλος, Laws 899 Ἑ πρὸς τέλος, Hesiod, Works and Days
216 ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα, Eurip. Jon 1621 els τέλος γὰρ οἱ
μὲν. ἐσθλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀξίων, “for the good at last shall
overcome, at last attain their right.”” (Way, Loeb tr.)
© Cf. Vol. I. pp. 125-127, 362 s-c.
4 Cf. Macbeth v. iii. 24:
And that which should accompany old age,
As honour, love, obedience, troops of friends,
I must not look to have.
489
PLATO r
E ἀστῶν, μαστιγούμενοι καὶ ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ
εἶναι, ἀληθῆ λέγων, [εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ
ἐκκαυθήσονται 7 πάντα ἐκεῖνα οἴου καὶ ἐμοῦ.
κοέναι ὡς πάσχουσιν. ᾿ ὃ λέγω, ὅρα εἰ ἰ ἀνέξαι,
Καὶ πάνυ, ἔφη: δίκαια γὰρ λέγεις. Ν
XIII. “A μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ζῶντι τῷ Bisa
614 παρὰ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἄθλά τε καὶ μισθοὶ
καὶ δῶρα γίγνεται πρὸς ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς
αὐτὴ παρείχετο ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη. Καὶ
μάλ᾽ - ἔφη, καλά τε καὶ βέβαια. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν |
δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὐδέν ἐστι πλήθει οὐδὲ μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκεῖνα,
ἃ τελευτήσαντα ἑκάτερον περιμένει. χρὴ δ᾽ αὐτὰ
ἀκοῦσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἑκάτερος: αὐτῶν ἀπειλήφῃ τὰ Ὶ
ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὀφειλόμενα ἀκοῦσαι. Λέγοις ἄν,
Β ἔφη, ὡς οὐ πολλὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἥδιον ἀκούοντι. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ
μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ᾿Αλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, ᾿Ηρὸς τοῦ ᾿Αρμενίου, τὸ
γένος Παμφύλου" ὅς ποτε ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας,
ἀναιρεθέντων δεκαταίων τῶν νεκρῶν ἤδη διεφθαρ-
μένων, ὑγιὴς μὲν ἀνῃρέθη, κομισθεὶς δ᾽ οἴκαδε
1 Ast, followed by Hermann and Stallbaum, omits εἴτα.
στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται, ‘‘then they will be racked
and branded”: Jowett and Campbell and Burnet keep it. ~
« He turns the tables here as in Gorg. 527 a. The late
punishment of the wicked became an ethica] commonplace.
Cf. Plutarch’s De sera numinis vindicta 1, also Job and
Psalms passim.
” Cf. 361 Ἑ ἀγροικοτέρως, and Gorg. 473 c.
° 7.e. the just and unjust man. 4 τελέως : cf. 361 A.
¢ See Proclus, In Remp., Kroll ii. 96 ff., Macrob. in
Somnium Scip. i. 2. The Epicurean Colotes highly dis-
490
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
They are lashed and suffer all things * which you truly
sid are unfit for ears polite.” Suppose yourself to
ve heard from me a repetition of all that they suffer.
ab as I say,consider whether you will bear with me. =
" he said, “ for what you say is just.”
κι ΤΟΣ Sach then while he lives are the prizes,
the wages, and the gifts that the just man receives
from gods and men in addition to those blessings
which justice herself bestowed.” “ And right fair
and abiding rewards,” he said. “Well, these,” I
said, “ἅτε nothing in number and magnitude com-
pared with those that await both*¢ after death. And
we must listen to the tale of them,” said I, “ in order
that each may have received in full 4 what is due to be
said of him by our argument.” “ Tell me,” he said,
“ since there are not many things to which I would
more gladly listen.” “1 is not, let me tell you,”
said I, τ the. tale ¢ to Alcinous το] 4 7 that I shall unfold,
but thetale of a warrior bold.’ Er, the sonof Armenius,
be race a Pamphylian.* He once upon a time was
ain in battle, and when the corpses were taken up
on the tenth day already decayed, was found intact,
approved of Plato’s method of pu his beliefs in this
See Chassang, Histoire du reise 15. See also
Deeias Nekyia, pp. 114 ff., and Adam ad loc.
ial Odyssey i ix.-xii. The term also became proverbial for a
ΩΣ See K. Tampel, ᾿Αλκένου ἀπόλογος, Philologus
5 Plato puns on the name Alcinous. For other puns on
proper names see supra on 580 8.. See Arthur Plait, ** Plato’s
Republic, 614 8,” Class. Review, 1911, pp. 13-14. For the
ἀλλὰ μέν without a corresponding δέ he compares Aristoph.
Acharn. 428 οὐ Βελλεροφόντης" ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνος μὲν ἦ χωλός.
͵ ears Blaydes changed to ἀλλὰ μήν), Odyssey xv. 405 and
ryxias 398 5.
* Perhaps we might say, “‘ of the tribe of Everyman.”
_ For the question of his identity see Platt, loc. cit.
. 491
PLATO
—ee— er «ὦ
μέλλων θάπτεσθαι δωδεκαταῖος ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κεί-
μενος ἀνεβίω, ἀναβιοὺς δ᾽ ἔλεγεν ἃ ἐκεῖ ἴδοι. ἔ
δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὗ ἐκβῆναι τὴν ψυχήν, πορεύεσθαι μετὰ
πολλῶν, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαι-
μόνιον, ἐν ᾧ τῆς τὲ γῆς δύ᾽ εἶναι χάσματα ἐχομένω
ἀλλήλοιν καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἀλλ
καταντικρύ: δικαστὰς δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων καθῆσθαι,
οὕς, ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν, τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύ-
ειν πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ
οὐρανοῦ, σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων
ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν
τε καὶ κάτω, ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὄπισθεν
a
σημεῖα πάντων ὧν ἔπραξαν. ἑαυτοῦ δὲ προσελθόν- β
— —
« Thomas Browne, Urn Burial, ch. iii., “ Plato’s historian
of the other world lies twelve days incorrupted, while his
soul was viewing the large stations of the dead.”’ See also
Rohde, Psyche ii.6 pp. 92-93.
ὃ Stories of persons restored to life are fairly common in
ancient literature. ‘There are Eurydice and Alcestis in
Greek mythology, in the Old Testament the son of the
widow revived ey Elijah (1 Kings xvii. 17 ff. Cf. 2 Kings
iv. 34 ff. and xiii. 21), in the New Testament the daughter
of Jairus (Matt. ix. 23 f.), the son of the widow of Nain (Lake
vii. 11 ff.), and Lazarus (John xi.). But none of these recount
their adventures. C/. Tennyson, “In Memoriam,” xxxi.: —
Where wert thou, brother, those four days? ...
The rest remaineth unreveal’d ;
He told it not; or something seal’d
The lips of that Evangelist.
Cf. also Luke xvi. 31 “If they hear not Moses and the
rophets neither will they be persuaded though one rose
hom the dead.’ But in that very parable Lazarus is shown
in Abraham’s bosom and the rich man in torment. See
further, Proclus, In Remp. ii. pp. 113-116, Rohde, Psyche
11,6 p. 191.
¢ For the indirect reflexive cf. p. 507, note f, on 617 &.
4 For the description of the place of judgement ef. also —
492
ἢ
4
δ
+
«
4
7
7
4
3
——-
el
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
and having been brought home, at the moment of his
funeral, on the twelfth day ¢ as he lay upon the pyre,
revived,” and after coming to life related what, he said,
he had seen in the world beyond. He said that when
his soul 5 went forth from his body he journeyed with
a great company and that they came to a mysterious
ion? where there were two openings side by side
in the earth, and above and over against them in the
heaven two others, and that judges were sitting ὁ
between these, and that after every judgement they
bade the righteous journey to the right and upwards
through the heaven with tokens attached 7 to them
in front of the judgement passed upon them, and the
unjust to take the road to the left 5 and downward,
they too wearing behind signs of all that had befallen
them, and that when he himself drew near they told
Gorg. 524 a. Cf. Phaedo 107 pv, 113 Ὁ, where there is no
deseription but simply the statement that the souls are
brought 2 a place and judged. On the topography of the
myth in general ¢f. Bréhier, La Philos. de Plot. pp. 28-29:
“ Voyez, par exemple, la maniére dont Numénius . . . inter-
préte le mythe du X® livre de la République, et comment il
précise, avec la lourdeur d’un théologien, les traits que la
ie de Platon avait abandonnés ἃ l’imagination du
ur. Le lieu du jugement devient le centre du monde;
le ciel platonicien devient la sphére des fixes; le ‘lieu sou-
terrain’ ot sont punies les Ames, ce sont les planétes; la
“bouche du ciel,” par laquelle les Ames descendront ἃ la
naissance, est le tropique du Cancer; et c’est par le
Capricorne qu’elles remontent.”’
“ Cf. Gorg. 523 πὶ f., 524 £-525 B, 526 B-c.
7 Cf. Gorg. 526 5, Dante, Inferno, v. 9 f.:
E quel conoscitor delle peccata
vede qual lu d’ inferno é da essa;
cignesi con la coda tante volte
quantunque gradi yuol che git: sia messa.
* Cf. Gorg. 525 a-s, 526 8. For “right” and “left” cf.
the story of the last judgement, Matt. xxv. 33-34 and 41.
| 493
PLATO
Tos εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δέοι αὐτὸν ἄγγελον. ἀνθρώποις
γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ διακελεύοιντό οἱ ἀκούειν τε
καὶ θεᾶσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ. ὁρᾶν δὴ ταύτ
μὲν καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον τὸ χάσμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ res hes
τῆς γῆς ἀπιούσας τὰς ψυχάς, ἐπειδὴ αὐταῖς δικα-
σθείη, κατὰ δὲ τὼ ἑτέρω ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνιέναι ἐκ
τῆς γῆς μεστὰς αὐχμοῦ τε καὶ “κόνεως, ἐκ δὲ δ
ἑτέρου καταβαίνειν ἕ ἑτέρας ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καθαι
E καὶ τὰς ἀεὶ ἀφικνουμένας ὥσπερ ἐκ : πολλῆς aipces
φαίνεσθαι ἥκειν, καὶ ἀσμένας εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα,
ἀπιούσας οἷον ἐν πανηγύρει κατασκηνᾶσθαι, καὶ
ἀσπάζεσθαί τε ἀλλήλας ὅ ὅσαι γνώριμαι, καὶ “mid
νεσθαι τάς τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡκούσας παρὰ τῶν ἑτέ-
ρων τὰ ἐκεῖ καὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ‘Tap?
ἐκείναις" διηγεῖσθαι δὲ ἀλλήλαις. τὰς. μὲν. ὀδυ- ἱ
615 ρομένας τε καὶ κλαιούσας, ἀναμιμνησκομένας ὅσα
TE καὶ οἷα πάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ
τεἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη--τὰς δ᾽ αὖ ἐκ
τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εὐπαθείας διηγεῖσθαι καὶ θέας a ᾿ἀμηχά-
vous τὸ κάλλος. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, ὦ Γλαύκων,
πολλοῦ χρόνου διηγήσασθαι: τὸ δ᾽ οὖν κεφάλαιον ;
ἔφη τόδε εἶναι, ὅσα πώποτέ τινα ἠδίκησαν καὶ
ὅσους ἕκαστοι, “ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων δέκην δεδωκέναι ev
μέρει, ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου δεκάκις, τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναι κατὰ
Β ἑκατονταετηρίδα ἑκάστην, ὡς βίου ὄντος. τοσού-
᾿ os
« Cf. the rich man’s request that a rndsiecmante al sent to
his brethren, Luke xvi, 27-31.
> ἐκεῖ: so in 330 ἢ, 365 a, 498. σ, Phaedo 61 E, 64 a,
67 8, 68 εκ, Apol. 40 £, 41 c, Crito 54.8, Symp. 192 Ἐ, i
500 p and Phaed?. 250 a it refers to the world of the ideas,
in 516 c and 520 c to the world of the cave.
¢ Of. Gorg. 524 as ; Ν 1
404
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
him that ke must be the messenger? to mankind to
tell them of that other world,® and they charged him
to give ear and to observe everything in the place.
And so he said that here he saw, by each opening of
_ heaven and earth, the souls departing after judgement
had been passed upon them, while, by the other pair of
openings: there came up from the one in the earth
souls full of squalor and dust, and from the second
there came down from heaven a second procession of
souls clean and pure, and that those which arrived from
time to time appeared to have come as it were from
a long journey and gladly departed to the meadow 5
and encamped ὅ there as at a festival,* and acquaint-
ances greeted one another, and those which came from
the earth questioned the others about conditions up
yonder, and those from heaven asked how it fared
with those others. And they told their stories to one
another, the one lamenting and wailing as they re-
called how many and how dreadful things they had
suffered and seenintheir journey beneath the earth’—
it lasted a thousand years ’—while those from heaven
related their delights and visions of a beauty beyond
words. To tell it all, Glaucon, would take all our time,
but the sum, he said, was this. For all the wrongs they
had ever done to anyone and all whom they had sever-
ally wronged they had paid the penalty * in turn ten-
fold for each, and the measure of this was by periods
of a hundred years each,‘ so that on the assumption
4 Cf. 621 a, 610 ry John i. 14 ἐσκήνωσεν.
“4 IB
7 Cf. Phaedr. 256 pv, Epist. vii. 335 8-c.
9 Phaedr. 249 a, Virgil, Aen. vi. 748.
᾿ * Cf. Phaedo 113 »-Ἑ.
4 The ideal Hindu length of life is said to be 100 years.
495
PLATO
a δῶ
τοὺ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου, ἵνα δεκαπλάσιον τὸ ἔκτισμα —
τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοιεν" καὶ οἷον εἴ τινες πολ-
λῶν" θανάτων ἦσαν αἴτιοι, ἢ πόλεις π ἮὮ
στρατόπεδα καὶ εἰς δουλείας. ἐμβεβληκότες,. Ἢ ἢ
τινος ἄλλης κακουχίας μεταίτιοι, πάντων τούτων
δεκαπλασίας ἀλγηδόνας ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου κομίσαιντο,
καὶ αὖ εἴ τινας εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετηκότες καὶ
C δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἶεν, κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὴν
ἀξίαν κομίζοιντο. τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς “γενομένων καὶ
ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων πέρι ἄλλα ἔλεγεν οὐκ ἄξια
μνήμης" εἰς δὲ θεοὺς ἀσεβείας τε καὶ εὐσεβείας
καὶ γονέας καὶ αὐτόχειρος φόνου μείζους ἔτι. τοὺς
μισθοὺς διηγεῖτο. ἔφη. γὰρ δὴ παραγενέ
ἐρωτωμένῳ ἑτέρῳ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου ὅπου εἴη ᾿Αρδιαῖος
ὁ μέγας. ὁ δὲ ᾿Αρδιαῖος οὗτος τῆς Παμφυλίας ἔν
τινι πόλει τύραννος ἐγεγόνει, ἤδη χιλιοστὸν ἔτος
εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, γέροντά τε πατέρα, ᾿ἀπο-
D κτείνας καὶ πρεσβύτερον ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ
πολλά τε καὶ ἀνόσια εἰργασμένος, ὡς ἐλέγετο.
ἔφη οὖν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον εἰπεῖν, οὐχ OE ίναι,
οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἥξει δεῦρο. ;
XIV. ᾿Εθεασάμεθα. yap οὖν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο. τῶν
δεινῶν θεαμάτων. ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς τοῦ στομίου ἦμεν
μέλλοντες ἀνιέναι καὶ τἄλλα πάντα πεπονθότες,
1 πολλῶν scr. Ven. 184, Hermann and Adam: mona
D Stobaeus: πολλοὶ AFM.
@ For the words cf. Tim. 76 £ εὐθὺς γιγνομένοις. Plato
does not take up the problem of infant damnation!
Warburton says, “and I make no doubt but the things ποῦ
worthy to be remembered was the doctrine of infants in
purgatory, which appears to have given Plato much pirares
who did “μοὶ αἱ that time at least reflect upon its origi
and use.’’ See also Mozley, Augustinian Doctrine of Pre
496
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
that this was the length of human life the punishment
might be ten times the crime; as for example that if
anyone had been the cause of many deaths or had
betrayed cities and armies and reduced them to
Havers or had been participant in any other iniquity.
ete receive in requital pains tenfold for each
of these wrongs, and again if any had done deeds of
kindness and been just and holy men they might
receive their due reward in the same measure; and
other things not worthy of record he said of those who
had just been born® and lived but a short time; and he
had still greater requitals to tell of piety and impiety
towards the gods and parents ὃ and of self-slaughter,
For he said that he stood by when one was questioned
by another “Where is Ardiaeus* the Great?’ Now
this Ardiaeos had been tyrant in a certain city of
Pamphylia just a thousand years before that time
and had put to death his old father and his elder
brother, and had done many other unholy deeds, as
was the report. So he said that the one questioned
replied, ‘ He has not come,’ said he, ἡ nor will he be
likely to come here.
XIV. “‘For indeed this was one of the dreadful
sights we beheld ; when we were near the mouth and
avout to issue forth and all our other sufferings were
destination, p. 307, apud Seebohm, The Oxford Reformers
(3rd ed.), p.495: “* "Augustine had laid down that the punish-
ment of such ‘children was the mildest of all punishment in
h . Aquinas laid down the further hypothesis that
this punishment was not pain of body or mind, k but want of
the Divine vision.” Cf. Virgil, Aen. vi. 427, Anth. Pal. ix.
359. 10 θανεῖν αὐτίκα τικτόμενον. Stallbaum and Ast think
ἀποθανόντων dropped out of the text after γενομένων.
> Cf. Phaedo 113 £-114 a, where there is a special penalty
for murderers and parricides.
¢ Cf. Archelaus in Gorg. 471.
VOL. IT 2K 407
PLATOUIN THT
ἐκεῖνόν τέ κατείδομεν ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἄλλους, σχεδόν
τι αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους τυράννους" ἦσαν δὲ καὶ
E ἰδιῶταί τίνες τῶν μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκότων" ει
οἰομένους ἤδη ἀναβήσεσθαι οὐκ ἐδέχετο " τὸ στόμιον,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐμυκᾶτο, ὁπότε. τις τῶν οὕτως͵ ἀνιάτως
ἐχόντων. εἰς πονηρίαν ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδωκὼς δίκην
ἐπιχειροῖ ἀνιέναι. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, ἄγριοι,
διάπυροι ἰδεῖν, παρεστῶτες καὶ κατ θάνοντες
τὸ φθέγμα τοὺς μὲν διαλαβόντες. ἦγον, τὸν
616 ᾿Αρδιαῖον καὶ ἄλλους συμποδίσαντες. χεῖράς τε καὶ
πόδας καὶ κεφαλήν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδεί-
ραντες, εἷλκον παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ᾽ ᾿ἀσπαλάθων
κνάπτοντες καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ “παριοῦσι σημαίνοντες, ὧν
ἕνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν τάρταρον ἐμπεσούμενοι
ἄγοιντο. ἔνθα δὴ φόβων, ἔφη, πολλῶν καὶ παντο-
δαπῶν σφίσι γεγονότων, τοῦτον ὑπερβάλλειν, μ᾽
γένοιτο ἑκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα, ὅτε ἀναβαίνοι, κι
ἀσμενέστατα ἕκαστον σιγήσαντος ἀναβῆναι.. καὶ
τὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ “τιμωρίας τοιαύτας τινὰς
Β εἶναι, καὶ αὖ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ταύταις ἀντιστρόφους"
ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι ἑκάστοις ἑπτὰ ἡμέραι |
γένοιντο, ἀναστάντας ἐντεῦθεν δεῖν τῇ ὀγδόῃ πο-
uF pa
« Cf. Gorg. 525 v-526 a, Dante, Inferno xii. 100 ff, Spenser,
FQ... v.51: bey
But most of all which in that dun n lay ΠΟΤ
Fell from high Princes courtes or εἶτα bowres.
Lang, “ Helen of Troy”:
Oh, Paris, what is power? Tantalus.
And Sisyphus were kings long time ago,
But now they lie in the Lake Dolorous ;
The halls of hell are noisy with their woe.
> Cf. Gorg. 525 c, and What Plato Said, p. 536, on Phaedo 7
498
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
ended, we suddenly caught sight of him and of others,
the most of them, I may say, tyrants.* But there
were some of private station, of those who had com-
mitted great crimes. And when these supposed that
at last they were about to go up and out, the mouth
would not receive them, but it bellowed when anyone
of the incurably wicked ὃ or of those who had not com-
pleted their punishment tried to come up. And
thereupon,’ he said, ‘ savage men of fiery aspect ° who
stood by and took note of the voice laid hold on them 4
and bore them away. But Ardiaeus and others they
bound hand and foot and head and flung down and
flayed them and dragged them by the wayside, card-
ing them on thorns and signifying to those who from
time to time passed by for what cause they were
borne away, and that. they were to be hurled into
Tartarus.*’ _ And then, though many and manifold
dread things had befallen them, this fear exceeded all
—lest each one should hear the voice when he tried
to go up, and each went up most gladly when it had
keptsilence. And the judgements and penalties were
somewhat after this manner, and the blessings were
their counterparts. But when seven days had elapsed
for each group in the meadow, they were required to
rise up on the eighth and journey on, and they came
1138. Biggs, Christian Platonists, ii. p. 1417.“ At the first
assize pierre will. be found those who like Ardiaeus are
incurable.
¢ This naturally suggests the devils of Dante (Inferno xxi.
25 ff.) and other mediaeval literature. See Dieterich, Vekyia,
p- 4 and pp. 60 f.
4 See Rogers on Aristoph. Knights 262. Cf. Herod. i. 92
ἐπὶ κνάφου ἕλκων διέφθειρε.
* Il. viii. 13 f., Hesiod, Theog. 682, 721, etc., Pind. Pyth.
i..15 f., Eurip. Orest, 265 μέσον μ᾽ ὀχμάζεις. ὡς βάλῃς εἰς
Τάρταρον.
499
PLATO
ρεύεσθαι, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους ὅθεν καθορᾶν
ἄνωθεν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον
φῶς εὐθύ, οἷον κίονα, μάλιστα τῇ ἴριδι προσφερῆ,
λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον. εἰς ὃ ἀφικέσθαι
C προελθόντας ἡμερησίαν ὅδόν, καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κατὰ
μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν
δεσμῶν τεταμένα: εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς ξύν-
δεσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἷον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν
τριήρων, οὕτω πᾶσαν ξυνέχον τὴν περιφοράν: ἐκ
δὲ τῶν ἄκρων τεταμένον ᾿Ανάγκης ἄτρακτον, dv
ς / > / A 4 A
οὗ πάσας ἐπιστρέφεσθαι τὰς περιφοράς: οὗ τὴν
\ > ΄ \ 1 » > 95. 7
μὲν ἠλακάτην τε καὶ τὸ ἄγκιστρον εἶναι ἐξ ἀδά-
μαντος, τὸν δὲ σφόνδυλον μικτὸν ἔκ TE τούτου καὶ
ἄλλων γενῶν. τὴν δὲ τοῦ σφονδύλου φύσιν εἶναι
D τοιάνδε: τὸ μὲν σχῆμα οἵαπερ ἡ τοῦ ἐνθάδε,
νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔλεγε τοιόνδε αὐτὸν εἶναι,
σ΄ ΠῚ stig εν 4 ΄ . .
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐν ἑνὲ μεγάλῳ σφονδύλῳ κοίλῳ καὶ
ἐξεγλυμμένῳ διαμπερὲς ἄλλος τοιοῦτος ἐλάττων
ἐγκέοιτο ἁρμόττων, καθάπερ οἱ κάδοι οἱ εἰς
ἀλλήλους ἁρμόττοντες- καὶ οὕτω δὴ τρίτον ἄλλον
καὶ τέταρτον καὶ ἄλλους τέτταρας. ὀκτὼ γὰρ
\ , , > > Ζ
εἶναι τοὺς ξύμπαντας σφονδύλους, ἐν ἀλλήλοις
i ant δι Rall —_
ae
@ Of. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 279, Acts xxvii. 17.
> Of. Plotinus, ἔπη. ii. 3 § 9, p. 35, vol. ii. Budé ed. —
“Mais (dira-t-on) rappelons-nous ‘le fuseau’; pour les —
anciens, c’était un fuseau matériel que tournent en filant les
Moires; pour Platon, il représente le ciel des fixes; or les
Moires et la Nécessité, leur mére, en le faisant tourner, filent
le destin de chaque étre ἃ sa naissance; par elle, les étres _
engendrés arrivent ἃ la naissance,” etc. St. Paulinus Nolanus —
calls it a deliramentum. Tannery, Science helléne, p. 238,
thinks it alludes to the system of Parmenides. ‘Le fuseau —
central de la Nécessité l’indique suffisamment; sila présence _
500
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
in four days to a spot whence they discerned, ex-
tended from above throughout the heaven and the
earth, a straight light like a pillar, most nearly re-
sembling the rainbow, but brighter and purer. To
this they came after going forward a day's journey,
and they saw there at the middle of the light the
extremities of its fastenings stretched from heaven ;
for this light was the girdle of the heavens like the
undergirders * of triremes, holding together in like
manner the entire revolving vault. And from the
extremities was stretched the spindle of Necessity,°
through which all the orbits turned. Its staff and its
hook were made of adamant, and the whorl of these
and other kinds was commingled. And the nature of
the whorl was this: Its shape was that of those in
our world, but from his description we must conceive
it to be as if in one great whorl, hollow and scooped
out, there lay enclosed, right through, another like it
but smaller, fitting into it as boxes that fit into one
another,° and in like manner another, a third, and a
fourth, and four others, for there were eight of the
whorls in all, lying within one another, showing their
des sirénes est une marque de pythagorisme, elle peut seule-
ment signifier soit les relations de Parménide avec l’école
soit plutot lorigine des déterminations particuliéres que
donne Platon et qui évidemment ne remontent pas 41’Eléate.”
sf ibid. p. 246. For various details of the picture ef.
ilton, the Genius’s speech in “ἢ Arcades’’ (quoted and com-
mented on in E. M. W. Tillyard, Milton, p. 376}.
¢ Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philos. pp. 216-217 “* In Plato’s
Myth of Er, which is certainly Pythagorean in its general
character, we do not hear of spheres but of the ‘lips’ of
concentric whorls fitted into one another like a nest of
boxes...’ With 616-617 Ce Laws 822 a-s, Tim. 36 pv,
Dante, Convivio, ii. 3. 5 ff. The names of the planets occur
first in Epinomis 987 s-c.
501
Ε
617
————— νων» "»(0(32
ΓΡΙΆΤΟ ot
> t ΄ » \ , , ‘ + a
ἐγκειμένους, κύκλους ἄνωθεν τὰ χείλη φαίνοντας;
νῶτον συνεχὲς ἑνὸς σφονδύλου ἀπεργαζομένους
περὶ τὴν ἠλακάτην' ἐκείνην δὲ διὰ μέσου τοῦ
ὀγδόου διαμπερὲς ἐληλάσθαι. τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν
τε καὶ ἐξωτάτω σφόνδυλον πλατύτατον τὸν τοῦ
ry , w \ A a ᾿ }. ἢ
χείλους κύκλον ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἕκτου δεύτερον,
τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ
ὀγδόου, πέμπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἑβδόμου, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν
“- ° - FA Sos ;
τοῦ πέμπτου, ἕβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ὄγδοον δὲ
τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου. καὶ τὸν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου /
΄ \ \ ~ ¢ , 4 ᾿ Ἢ \
ποικίλον, Tov δὲ τοῦ ἑβδόμου λαμπρότατον, Tov δὲ
τοῦ ὀγδόου τὸ χρῶμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔχειν προσ-
λάμποντος, τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πέμπτου παρα-
/ > / / > , eH,
πλήσια ἀλλήλοις, ξανθότερα ἐκείνων, τρίτον δὲ
λευκότατον χρῶμα ἔχειν, τέταρτον δὲ ὑπέρυθρον,
δεύτερον δὲ λευκότητι τὸν ἕκτον. κυκλεῖσθαι δὲ
δὴ στρεφόμενον τὸν ἄτρακτον ὅλον μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν
4 ἔα, ἡ
φοράν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ περιφερομένῳ τοὺς μὲν ἐντὸς
ἑπτὰ κύκλους τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ ὅλῳ ἠρέμα περι-
φέρεσθαι, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τάχιστα μὲν ἰέναι τὸν
+ Ld A ‘ Ψ > 7 5 rl f
ὄγδοον, δευτέρους δὲ Kai ἅμα ἀλλήλοις τόν τε
¢ \¢ \ ’ , 1 Qi t
ἕβδομον καὶ ἕκτον Kal πέμπτον" Tpitov’ δὲ φορᾷ
ἰέναι, ὡς σφίσι φαίνεσθαι, ἐπανακυκλούμενον τὸν
τέταρτον: τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τρίτον καὶ πέμπτον
τὸν δεύτερον. στρέφεσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς
2A / / δὰ ὃ A ~ ta λ > ᾿
νάγκης γόνασιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ
ΝΜ 24> ε 4 , p> ~ Ὁ"
ἄνωθεν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρῆνα συμπερι- —
A \ , tia Ψ , 2.2 a.
lav ἱεῖσαν, ἕνα τόνον" ἐκ
φερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἱεῖσαν, ἕνα τόνο πασῶν
1 See note ὁ, p. 503. “-
2 ἕνα τόνον AM Proclus: ἀνὰ τόνον D: ἀνατόνον F: ἀνάτονον —
Mss. rece. al
ες ΘΝ
« Burnet, op. cit. p. 123, says: “‘ This view that the planets —
502 5
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
rims as circles from above and forming the continuous
back of a single whorl about the shaft, which was
driven home through the middle of the eighth. Now
the first-and outmost whorl had the broadest circular
rim, that of the sixth was second, and third was that
of the fourth, and fourth was that of the eighth, fifth
that of the seventh, sixth that of the fifth, seventh
that of the third, eighth that of the second ; and that
of the greatest was spangled, that of the seventh
brightest, that of the eighth took its colour from the
seventh, which shone upon it. The colours of the
second and fifth were like one another and more yellow
than the two former. The third had the whitest colour,
and the fourth was of a slightly ruddy hue; the sixth
was second in whiteness. The staff turned as a whole
in a circle with the same movement, but within the
whole as it revolved the seven inner circles revolved
_ gently in the opposite direction to the whole,* and of
these seven the eighth moved most swiftly, and next
and together with one another the seventh, sixth and
fifth ; and third ὃ in swiftness, as it appeared to them,
moyed the fourth with returns upon itself, and fourth
the third and fifth the second. And the spindle
turned on the knees of Necessity, and up above
on each of the rims of the circles a Siren stood,
borne around. in its revolution and uttering one
sound, one note, and from all the eight there was
had an orbital motion from west to east is attributed by
_ Aetios ii. 16. 3 to Alkmaion (96), which certainly implies
that Pythagoras did not hold it. As we shall see (152) it is
| far from clear that any of the Pythagoreans did. It seems
rather to be Plato’s discovery.” © Cf. ibid. p. 352.
ο΄ ὃ The best mss. have τὸν before τρίτον. It is retained by
some editors, but Schleiermacher rejected it and Adam and
_ Burnet omit it.
503
PLATO EH
δὲ ὀκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν ἁρμονίαν ξυμφωνεῖν. ἄλλας
Οδὲ καθημένας πέριξ δι’ ἴσου τρεῖς, ev θρόνῳ
ἑκάστην, θυγατέρας τῆς ᾿Ανάγκης Μοίρας λευ-
χειμονούσας, στέμματα ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν ἐ ἐχούσας,
Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Κλωθὼ καὶ "Ἄτροπον, ὑμνεῖν.
πρὸς τὴν τῶν Σειρήνων ἁρμονίαν, Λάχεσιν μὲν
τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθὼ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, Λτροπον. δὲ τὰ
μέλλοντα. καὶ τὴν μὲν Κλωθὼ τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ
ἐφαπτομένην συνεπιστρέφειν. τοῦ ἀτράκτου τὴν ἔξω
περιφοράν, διαλείπουσαν χρόνον, τὴν δὲ [Ἄτροπον
τῇ ἀριστερᾷ τὰς ἐντὸς αὖ ὡσαύτως". τὴν δὲ
D Λάχεσιν ἐν μέρει ἑκατέρας ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ xetpl
ἐφάπτεσθαι.
XV. das: οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ἀφικέσθαι, εὐθὺς δεῖν
ἰέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν. προφήτην οὖν τινὰ σφᾶς Ξ
πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τάξει διαστῆσαι, ἔπειτα λαβόντα ἐ ἐκ
τῶν τῆς Λαχέσεως γονάτων κλήρους τε καὶ βίων
παραδείγματα, ἀναβάντα ἐπί τι βῆμα ὑψηλὸν
εἰπεῖν: ᾿Ανάγκης θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος.
* The music of the spheres. Cf. Cie. De nat. déeor. iii.
9. 26, Mayor, vol. iii. p. 86, Macrob. on Somn. Seip. ii. 3, —
Ritter-Preller (9th ed.), pp. 69-70 (88 81-82), K. Gronau, Posei-
donios und die jiidisch-christliche Genesisexegese, pp. 59-61.
Aristotle’s comment, De caelo 290 b 12 ff., is that the notion
of a music of the spheres is pretty and ingenious, but not
true. He reports the (Pythagorean?) explanation that we
do not hear it because we have been accustomed to it from —
birth. See Carl vy. Jan, ‘“‘ Die Harmonie der Spharen,”
Philologus, lii. 13 ff. Cf. Shakes. Merchant of Venice, v.i.60:
There’s not the smallest orb which thou behold’st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young ey’d cherubims . ..
Milton, “ Arcades” (Tillyard, p. 60. Ibid. p. 375, he says that
Plato is referred to in Milton’s academic exercise De sphae-
rarum concentu); Pope, Essay on Man, i. 201-202:
504
al . OO κϑνννννονν μζυν. «(ἡ "
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
the concord of a single harmony. And there were
other three who sat round about at equal intervals,
each one on her throne, the Fates,? daughters of
Necessity, clad in white vestments with filleted heads,
Lachesis, and Clotho, and Atropos, who sang in uni-
son with the music of the Sirens, Lachesis singing
the things that were, Clotho the things that are, and
Atropos the things that are to be. And Clotho with
the touch of her right hand helped to turn the outer
circumference of the spindle, pausing from time to
time. Atropos with her left hand in like manner
helped to turn the inner circles, and Lachesis alter-
nately with either hand lent a hand to each.
~ XV. “ Now when they arrived they were straight-
way bidden to go before Lachesis, and then a certain
prophet*° first marshalled themin orderly intervals, and
thereupon took from the lap of Lachesis lots and
patterns of lives and went up to a lofty platform and
spoke, “This is the word of Lachesis, the maiden
If Nature thundered in his opening ears
And stunned him with the music of the spheres.
Complete Poems of Henry More, p. 77. Addison rational-
izes the thought:
Ἐς ‘The spacious firmament on high . . .
ΝΡ" What though in solemn silence all
Move round the dark terrestrial ball ;
What though no real voice or sound
Amidst their radiant orbs be found ?
In reason’s ear they all rejoice
And utter forth a glorious voice,
For ever singing as they shine:
The hand that made us is divine.
> Pictured in Michelangelo’s Le Parche. Cf. Catullus
64. 306 ff.; Lowell, “ Villa Franca”: “ Spin, Clotho, spin,
Lachesis twist and Atropos sever.”
¢ See What Plato Said, p. 550, on Phaedr. 235 σ:
505
ΟΡῬΙΚΑΙΟΥΤΗ ST
ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι, ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ
E γένους θανατηφόρου. οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται,
ἀλλ᾽ ὑμεῖς. δαίμονα αἱρήσεσθε. πρῶτος δ᾽ 6
λαχὼν πρῶτος ᾿αἱρείσθῶ" βίον, ᾧ συνέσται ἃ
ἀνάγκης. ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, ἣν τιμῶν
ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἕξει.
αἰτία ἑλομένου: θεὸς ἀναίτιος. ταῦτα ἐ εἰπόντα
ῥῦψαι ἐπὶ “πάντας τοὺς κλήρους, τὸν δὲ 7 τ αὐτὴν
πεσόντα ἕκαστον ἀναιρεῖσθαι, πλὴν οὗ: € δὲ οὐκ
ἐᾶν: τῷ δὲ ἀνελομένῳ δῆλον. εἶναι, ὁ ὁπόστος. εἰλήχει
618 μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰ τῶν βίων πα Delving
εἰς TO πρόσθεν obey θεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν,
πλείω τῶν παρόντων, εἶναι δὲ παντοδαπά" ἶ
τε γὰρ πάντων βίους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς pw ;
ἅπαντας" τυραννίδας τε γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι,
μὲν διατελεῖς, τὰς δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ δὲ é
Kal εἰς πενίας τε Kal φυγὰς Kal εἰ ᾿ πτωχεία:
ἮΝ
«ΟἹ Laws 923 a, Pindar, Pyth. viii. 95, Aesch. Prom.
83, 547, Aristot. Hist. an. 552 Ὁ 18 f., Cie. Tuse. i. 39. 94
Plut. Cons. ad Apol. 6 (104 4) ἀνθρώπων εἰ eae ἐφήμερα τὰ
σώματα, ibid. 27 (115 D) ἐφήμερον σπέρμα. See also Stallbaum
ad loc., and for the thought Soph. Ajax 125-126, Tliad ¥ vi.
146, Mimnermus ii. 1, Soph, fr. 12 and 859 (Nauck), Jo
vii. 6, viii. 9, ix. 25, xiv. 2, xxi. 17, etc.
. Cf. Swinburne, “The Life of Man” sine Atalanta
Calydon) :
Life the shadow of death.
With life before and after
And death beneath and above,
For a day and a night and a morrow,
That his strength might endure for a span.
and ‘‘ The Garden of Proserpine’; ‘‘ Here life hath death fe
neighbour.”
506
ibid.
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
ohne 9 eoettaeran hi Souls that live for a day,* now
is the of another cycle of mortal generation
where birthisthe beacon of death. No divinity ¢ shall
cast lots for you, but you shall choose your own deity.
Let him to whom falls the first lot first select a life to
which he shall cleave of necessity. But virtue has
no master over her,? and each shall have more or less
of her as he honours her or does her despite. The
blame is his who chooses : God is blameless.*’’’ So say-
ing, the prophet flung the lots out among them all,
and each took up the lot that fell by his side, except
himself; him cen did not permit.‘ And whoever took
Seaton a Jot: saw plainly what number he had drawn. And
this again the prophet placed the patterns of
lives before them on the ground, far more numerous
than the assembly. They were of every variety, for
there were lives of all kinds of animals and all sorts of
human lives, for there were tyrannies among them,
some uninterrupted till the end? and others destroyed
midway and issuing in penuries and exiles and beg-
* Zeller-Nestle, p. 166, says that this looks like intentional
correction of Phaedo 107 p. Cf. Phaedo 113 τὸ and Lysias
ii. 78 8 re δαίμων ὁ τὴν ἡμετέραν μοῖραν εἰληχὼς ἀπαραίτητος.
Arnobius, Adversus gentes, ii. 64, says that similarly Christ
offers us redem emption but does not force it upon us.
4 Cf. Milton’s “‘ Love Virtue; she alone is free” (Comus).
¢ Justin Martyr, Apol. xliv. 8, quotes this. Cf. Tum. 42 p,
Dieterich, Nekyia, p. 115, Odyssey 1s 39 f5 Bacchylides xiv.
51 f. (Jebb, p. 366) Ζεὺς. .. οὐκ αἴτιος Gnaoet μεγάλων ἀχέων,
etc.; Manitius, Gesch. d. lat. Lit.d. Mittelalters,ii.p. 169. For
the problem of evil in Plato see What Plato Said, p. 578 on
Theaet. 176 a, and for the freedom of the will ibid. pp. 644-
645 on Laws 904 c.
7 Cf. Symp. 175 c, where the words are the same but the
construction different. For the indirect reflexive cf. 614 5
οὗ ἐκβῆναι, Symp. 176 pv, Symp. 223 5 ὃ δὲ ὕπνον λαβεῖν.
5. For διατελέῖς cf. Laws 661 Ὁ τυραννίδα διὰ τέλους.
507
C
PRATOTIA πῇ
τελευτώσας" ἐΐναι δὲ καὶ δοκίμων ἀνδρῶν. βίους,
τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ εἴδεσι καὶ κατὰ κάλλη καὶ τὴν ἄλλην
ἰσχύν τε καὶ ἀγωνίαν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπὶ γένεσι. καὶ |
προγόνων ἀρεταῖς, καὶ ἀδοκίμων κατὰ ταὐτά,
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ. γυναικῶν" ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν οὐκ
ἐνεῖναι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλον ἑλομένην
βίον ἀλλοίαν γίγνεσθαι: τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ
πλούτοις καὶ πενίαις, τὰ δὲ νόσοις, τὰ δὲ ὑγιείαις
μεμῖχθαι, τὰ δὲ καὶ μεσοῦν τούτων. ἔνθα δή, ὡς
ἔοικεν, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὃ πᾶς κίνδυνος. ἀνθρώπῳ,
καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον ὅπως ἕκαστος,
ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων “μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας. τούτου͵
τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητὴς καὶ μαθητὴς. ἔσται,
ἐάν ποθεν οἷός 7 ἧἦ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν, τίς. αὐτὸν
ποιήσει δυνατὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον καὶ χρηστὸν
καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, τὸν βελτίω ἐκ τῶν
δυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀναλογι-
ζόμενον πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, ξυντιθέμενα
ἀλλήλοις καὶ διαιρούμενα πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου πῶ
ἔχει, εἰδέναι, τί κάλλος πενίᾳ ἢ πλούτῳ κραθὲν
καὶ μετὰ ποίας τινὸς ψυχῆς ἕξεως κακὸν
ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τί εὐγένειαι καὶ δυσγένε 7
καὶ ἰδιωτεῖαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἰσχύες καὶ ἀσθένει
καὶ εὐμάθεια. καὶ δυσμάθειαι καὶ πάντα τὰ
τοιαῦτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχὴν ὄντων καὶ τῶι
—_———
* For the idiom ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν cf. Phaedo 91 5, Laws
171 E, 928 ε, Lysias vi. 35. .
> μεσοῦν Phaedr. 241 Ὁ.
¢ Of. Phaedo 107 c, 114 p, Gorg. 526 Ἐπ, Eurip. Medea 235°
508 q
‘
+
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
garies ; and there were lives of men of repute for their
forms and beauty and bodily strength otherwise and
prowess and the high birth and the virtues of their
ancestors, and others of ill repute in the same things,
and similarly of women. But there was no deter-
mination of the quality of soul, because the choice
of a different life ir inevitably # determined a different
character. But all other things were commingled
with one another and with wealth and poverty and
sickness and health and the intermediate? conditions.
—And there; dear Glaucon, it appears, is the supreme
hazard°foraman. And this is the chief reason why it
should be our main concern that each of us, neglecting
allotherstudies, should seek after and study this thing?
—ifin any way he may be able to learn of and discover
the man who will give him the ability and the know-
ledge to distinguish the life that is good from that
which is bad, and always and everywhere to choose the
best that the conditions allow, and, taking into account
all the things of which we have spoken and estimating
the effect on the goodness of his life of their con-
junction or their severance, to know how beauty com-
mingled with poverty or wealth and combined with
what habit of soul operates for good or for evil, and
what are the effects of high and low birth and private
station and office and strength and weakness and
quickness of apprehension and dullness and all
similar natural and acquired habits of the soul, when
ἀγὼν μέγιστος, Thucyd. i. 32. 5 μέγας ὃ κίνδυνος, Aristoph.
Clouds 955 viv yap ἅπας... κίνδυνος ἀνεῖται, Frogs 882
ἀγὼν . . . ὁ μέγας, Antiphon v. 43 ἐν ᾧ μοι ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος ἦν.
For the expression cf. Gorg. 470 © ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία
ἐστίν.
δ ΟἿ, supra 443-444, 591 £-592 a, Gorg. 527 8 f., Laws
662 8 f., ‘904 4 a ff.
509
PLATO ΜΠ ΠῚ
ἐπικτήτων τί ξυγκεραννύμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα
Feed με
ζεται, ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν.
συλλογισάμενον αἱρεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τῆς ς,
φύσιν ἀποβλέποντα, τόν τε χείρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω.
Ε βίον, χείρω μὲν καλοῦντα ὃς αὐτὴν ἐκεῖσε ἄξει, ee
TO ἀδικωτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμείνω. δὲ ὅστις. εἰς τὸ
δικαιοτέραν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαί ᾿ pew ἐάσει"
ἑωράκαμεν. γάρ, ὅτι ζῶντί τε καὶ τελευτήσαντι
619 αὕτη hanes αἵρεσις. ἀδαμαντίνως. ὴ δεῖ ταύ-
τὴν τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα εἰς ἽΑιδου ἐ ἰέναι, ὅπως ἂν.
καὶ ἐκεῖ ἀνέκπληκτος. ὑπὸ πλούτων. τε καὶ τῶν.
τοιούτων κακῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐμπεσὼν εἰς τυραννίδας καὶ
ἄλλας τοιαύτας πράξεις πολλὰ μὲν ἐργάσηται καὶ
ἀνήκεστα κακά, ἔτι δὲ αὐτὸς μείζω πάθῃ, ἀλλὰ
γνῷ τὸν μέσον ἀεὶ τῶν τοιούτων βίον αἱρεῖσθαι cab
φεύγειν τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἑκατέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷδε
τῷ βίῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔπειτς
Β οὕτω γὰρ εὐδαιμονέστατος γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος. "
wienhe τὸν μὲν προφήτην οὕτως εἰπεῖν" καὶ
τελευταίῳ ἐπιόντι, ξὺν νῷ ἑλομένῳ, : συντό υς
ζῶντι κεῖται βίος ἀγαπητός, οὐ κακός. μήτε, ὁ
ἄρχων αἱρέσεως ἀμελείτω μήτε 6 reAeure Dv
ἀθυμείτω᾽" εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τὸν πρῶτον λαχόντα
ἔφη εὐθὺς ἐ ἐπιόντα τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἑλέσθαι,
καὶ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαιμαργίας οὐ πάντα
Ο ἱκανῶς ἀνασκεψάμενον ἑλέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸν λαθεῖν
« The singular verb is used after plural subjects, because _
the subjects are united in the writer’s mind into one general
idea. Cf. Rep. 363 a, Laws 925 5, Symp. 188 8. τ
» See Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 25, Laws 661-662, and
for the word supra 360 B, Gorg. 509 a. :
510
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
blended and combined with one another,? so that with
consideration of all these things he will be able to
make a reasoned choice between the better and the
worse life, with his eyes fixed on the nature of his
soul, naming the worse life that which will tend to
make. it more unjust and the better that which will
make it more just. But all other considerations he
will dismiss, for we have seen that this is the best
choice, both for life and death. And a man must
take with him to the house of death an adamantine ὃ
faith in this, that even there he may be undazzled ° by
riches and similar trumpery, and may not precipitate
himself into tyrannies and similar doings and so work
many evils past cure and suffer still greater himself,
but may know how always to choose in such things the
life that is seated in the mean ὦ and shun the excess in
either direction, both in this world so far as may be
and in all the life to come; for this is the greatest
happiness for man.
_ XVI. “ And at that time also the messenger from
that other world reported that the prophet spoke
thus: “Even for him who comes forward last, if he
make his choice wisely and live strenuously, there is
reserved an acceptable life, no evil one. Let not the
foremost in the choice be heedless nor the last be
ged.’ When the prophet had thus spoken
he said that the drawer of the first lot at once sprang
to seize the greatest tyranny,’ and that in his folly
and greed he chose it without sufficient examination,
and failed to observe that it involved the fate of eating
° Cf. 576 ν.
4 An enticipation of the Aristotelian doctrine, Eth. Nic.
ΐ What Plato Said, p. 629, on Laws 691 c.
ist. vi. 12, Xen. Hiero 7.2 ὅμως προπετῶς
φέρεσθε εἰς αὐτήν.
511
PLATO ΠῚ Ἷ
ἐνοῦσαν εἱμαρμένην, παίδων αὑτοῦ βρώσεις καὶ
ἄλλα κακά’ ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν “σκέψασθαι,
κόπτεσθαί τε καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν, οὐκ
ἐμμένοντα τοῖς προρρηθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου"
οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τύχην
τε καὶ δαέμονας καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον. ἀνθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ.
εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐ ev
τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιωκότα,
D ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. ὡς δὲ
καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις,
ἁλισκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἥκοντας, dire
πόνων ᾿ἀγυμνάστους" τῶν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τοὺς 7
ἅτε αὐτούς τε πεπονηκότας ἄλλους τε ἑωρακότας,
οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς. τὰς αἱρέσεις. ποιεῖσθαι. διὸ δὴ
καὶ μεταβολὴν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ταῖς
πολλαῖς τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ
κλήρου τύχην. ἐπεὶ εἴ τις ἀεί, ὁπότε εἰς τὸν
E ἐνθάδε βίον ἀφικνοῖτο, ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῖ καὶ! "δ,
κλῆρος αὐτῷ τῆς αἱρέσεως μὴ ἐν τελευταΐοι:
πίπτοι, κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλομέ 4
νων οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὴν
ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε καὶ δεῦρο πάλιν πορείαν οὐκ ἂν
χθονίαν καὶ τραχεῖαν πορεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λείαν -
καὶ οὐρανίαν. ταύτην γὰρ δὴ ἔφη τὴν θέαν ἀξίαν
εἶναι ἰδεῖν, ὡς ἕκασται αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡροῦντο τοὺς
620 βίους: ἐλεεινήν τε γὰρ ἰδεῖν εἶναι καὶ γελοίαν κ
θαυμασίαν" κατὰ συνήθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου
τὰ πολλὰ αἱρεῖσθαι. ἰδεῖν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν ἔφη τήν
ποτε ᾿᾽Ορφέως γενομένην κύκνου βίον αἱρουμένην,
ὴ t
2 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 532, on Phaedo 90 ἢ.
ὃ Phaedo 82 zB. |
512
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
his own children, and other horrors, and that when
he inspected it at leisure he beat his breast and be-
wailed his choice, not abiding by the forewarning
of the prophet. For he did not blame himself ¢ for his
woes, but fortune and the gods and anything except
himself. He was one of those who had come down
from heaven, a man who had lived in a well-ordered
polity in his former existence, participating in virtue
y habit ὃ and not by philosophy ; and one may per-
haps say that a majority of those who were thus
eaught were of the company that had come from
heaven, inasmuch as they were unexercised in suffer-
ing. But the most of those who came up from the
earth, since they had themselves suffered and seen
the sufferings of others, did not make their choice
precipitately. For which reason also there was an
interchange of good and eyil for most of the souls, as
well as because of the chances of the lot. Yet if at
each return to the life of this world a man loved
wisdom sanely, and the lot of his choice did not fall
out among the last, we may venture to affirm, from
what was reported thence, that not only will he be
happy here but that the path of his journey thither
and the return to this world will not be underground
and rough but smooth and through the heavens. For
he said that it was a sight worth seeing to observe
how the several souls selected their lives. He said
_it was a strange, pitiful, and ridiculous spectacle, as
the choice was determined for the most part by the
habits of their former lives.° He saw the soul that
had been Orpheus’, he said, selecting the life of a
¢ Of. Phaedo. 81 κε ff., Phaedr. 248-249, Tim. 42 a-p,
ΘΙ ἢ. For the idea of reincarnation in Plato see What
1 Plato Said, p. 529, on Phaedo $1 £-82 8.
VOL. II 2L 513
ΡΙΛΤΟΊΤΗ ΠΗῚ
μίσει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους διὰ τὸν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων.
θάνατον οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικὶ γεννηθεῖσαν.
γενέσθαι: ἰδεῖν δὲ τὴν Θαμύρου ἀηδόνος ἑλομένην"
ἰδεῖν δὲ καὶ κύκνον μεταβάλλοντα εἰς “ἀνθρωπίνου
βίου αἵρεσιν, καὶ ἄλλα ζῷα μουσικὰ ὡσαύτως,
Β εἰκοστὴν δὲ λαχοῦσαν ψυχὴν « ἑλέσθαι λέοντος βίον: |
εἶναι δὲ τὴν Αἴαντος τοῦ Τελαμωνίου,, φεύ-
γουσαν ἄνθρωπον γενέσθαι, μεμνημένην τῆς ᾿ τῶν
ὅπλων κρίσεως" τὴν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γαμέμνονος"
ἔχθρᾳ δὲ καὶ ταύτην τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου. γένους διὰ
τὰ πάθη ἀετοῦ διαλλάξαι βίον. ἐν μέσοις δὲ
λαχοῦσαν τὴν ᾿Αταλάντης ψυχήν, κατιδοῦσαν peya-
λας τιμὰς ἀθλητοῦ ἀνδρός, οὐ δύνασθαι πα ρελθεῖν,
C ἀλλὰ λαβεῖν. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὴν Ἐπειοῦ.
τοῦ Πανοπέως, εἰς τεχνικῆς γυναικὸς ἰοῦσαν φύσιν"
πόρρω δ᾽ ἐν ὑστάτοις ἰδεῖν τὴν τοῦ γελωτοποιοῦ͵
Θερσίτου πίθηκον ἐνδυομένην" κατὰ τύχην δὲ. τὴν.
᾽Οδυσσέως, λαχοῦσαν πασῶν ὑστάτην, αἱρησο-.
ἔνην ἰέναι: μνήμῃ δὲ τῶν προτέρων πόνων
φιλοτιμίας λελωφηκυῖαν ζητεῖν “Περιιοῦσαν χρόνον.
πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος, καὶ μόγις,
εὑρεῖν κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ τῶν
@ Urwiek, The Message of Plato, p. 213, says: “Tf Ξ
knew anything at all of Indian allegory, he must ha
known that the swan (Hamsa) is in Hinduism the invaria
synibol of the immortal Spirit; and to say, as he does, that
Orpheus chose the life of a swan, refusing to be born
of a woman, is just an allegorical way of saying that h
passed on into the spiritual life... .” One is tempted
cap this with Donne: ᾿᾿
Oh, do not die, for I shall hate
All women so when thou art gone
That thee I shall not celebrate ι. ialg
When I-remember thou wert one. e
514 |
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
ἃ beeanse from hatred of the tribe of women, —
owing to his death at their hands, it was unwilling
to be conceived and born of a woman. He saw the
soul of Thamyras ὃ choosing the life of a nightingale ;
and he saw a swan changing to the choice of the life of
man, and similarly other musical animals. The soul
that drew the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion;
it was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telamon, which,
because it remembered the adjudication of the arms
of Achilles, was unwilling to become a man. The
next, the soul of Agamemnon, likewise from hatred
of the human race because of its sufferings, sub-
stituted the life of an eagle.“ Drawing one of the
middle lots the soul of Atalanta caught sight of the
great honours attached to an athlete's life and could
not pass them by but snatched at them. After her,
he said, he saw the soul of Epeius,* the son of Pan-
opeus, entering into the nature of an arts and crafts
woman. Far off in the rear he saw the soul of the
buffoon Thersites¢ clothing itself in the body of an ape.
And it fell out that the soul of Odysseus drew the last
lot of all and came to make its choice, and, from
memory of its former toils having flung away ambi-
tion, went about for a long time in quest of the life
of an ordinary citizen who minded his own business,’
and with difficulty found it lying in some corner
disregarded by the others, and upon seeing it said
“δ Like Orpheus a singer. He contended with the Muses
in song and was in consequence deprived by them of sight
and of the gift of song. Cf. also Jon 533 s-c, Laws 829 pz,
Iliad ii. 595.
¢ Cf. Aesch. Ag. 114 ff.
4 Who built the Trojan horse. See Hesychius 5.0.
* Of. Hiad ii, 212 ff.
. f For ἀπράγμονος cf. on 565 a, p. 316, note ὁ.
515
PLATO ΠΤ
D ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἰδοῦσαν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξε,
καὶ πρώτη λαχοῦσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἑλέσθαι. καὶ ἐκ
τῶν ἄλλων δὴ θηρίων ὡσαύτως εἰς ἀνθρώπους.
ἰέναι καὶ εἰς ἄλληλα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα εἰς, τὰ arate
τὰ δὲ δίκαια εἰς τὰ ἥμερα μεταβάλλοντα, κ ;
πάσας μίξεις μίγνυσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ οὖν πάσας μέ,
ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ἡρῆσθαι,. ὥσπερ ἔλαχον, te
τάξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν: “ἐκείνην δ᾽
E ἑκάστῳ, ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα ξυμπέμ μ-
πειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων :
ὃν πρῶτον μὲν. ἄγειν αὐτὴν πρὸς τὴν Κλωθὼ ὑπὸ
τὴν ἐκείνης χεῖρά τε καὶ ἐπιστροφὴν τῆς τοῦ
᾿ἀτράκτου δίνης; yeepoprre ἣν hes <lNero μοῖρα γα
ra: ἐντεῦθεν δὲ «ἃ ἀμεταστρεπτὶ. ὑπὸ "τὸν.
21 ᾿Ανάγκης ἰέναι θρόνον, καὶ dv ἐκείνου. oe
ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διῆλθον, acigk: a ἅπαι ας
πνίγους δεινοῦ: καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὸ κενὸν $e Sbed ye
τε Kal ὅσα γῆ φύει: σκηνᾶσθαι οὖν σφᾶς. ἤδη
ἑσπέρας γιγνομένης παρὰ τὸν "dynes ποτα
« Phaedr.249 specifies that only beasts who had once |
men could return to human form, at
> Cf. supra 617 ©, and for daemons in Plato. What P
Said, pp. 546-547, on Symp. 202 x, Dieterich, Pha p. 5
© δίνης : ef. Cratyl. 439 c and Phaedo 99 x.
“i Cf. Laws 960 σα.
ὁ τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα : cf. Laws 957 ©, Theaet. 169 c, and the
Platonic epigram on Dion, Anth. Pal. vii. 99 Μοῖραι éwéxhwoar,
516
|
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
that it would have done the same had it drawn the
it lot, and chose it gladly. And in like manner,
of the other beasts some entered into men @ and into
_ one another, the unjust into wild creatures, the just
transformed to tame, and there was every kind of
mixture and combination. But when, to conclude,
all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of
their lots, they were marshalled and went before
Lachesis. “And she sent with each, as the guardian
en life and the fulfiller of his choice, the genius?
had chosen, and this divinity led the soul first
ον under her hand and her turning οὗ the
spindle to ratify the destiny of his lot and choice ;
and after contact with her the genius again led the
soul to the spinning of Atropos4 to make the web of
its destiny ¢ irreversible, and then without a backward
look it passed beneath the throne of Necessity. And
asa it had passed through that, when the others
also had passed, they all journeyed to the Plain of
Oblivion,’ through a terrible and stifling heat, for it
was bare of trees and all plants, and there they
camped at eventide by the River of Forgetfulness,’
Od. i. 17, iii. 208, etc., Aesch. Eumen. 335, Callinus i. 9 Μοῖραι
ἐπικλώσωσ᾽.
7 ΟἹ, Aristoph. Frogs 186.
~~ In later literature it is the river that is called Lethe. Cf.
Aeneid Vi. 714f., Milton, Par. L. ii.
bros) Lethe, the river of oblivion; rolls
φῇ χω wat’ a fo oa whereof who drinks,
_— ormer state and being forgets. .
Scents,“ Ode on Melancholy *’: No; no! go not to Lethe,”
_ Tennyson, *‘ The Two Voices ”
ἱ ὴ As old mythologies relate,
oS aye draught of Lethe might await
4 The slipping thro’ from state to state.
517
Ῥάμαϑττη πΗῚ
οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν στέγειν. μέτρον μὲν
οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον “εἶναι " ἐξ
τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει μὴ σωζομένους πλέον πίνειν τοῦ
μέτρου: τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ πιόντα πάντων ἐπιλανδαάμεαθαι,
Β ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ μέσας νύκτας. γενέσθαι, ]
βροντήν τε καὶ σεισμὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν.
ἐξαπίνης ἄλλον ἄλλῃ φέρεσθαι ἄνω els τὴν ye
veow, ἄττοντας ὥσπερ ἀστέρας. νον: δὲ τοῦ
usy ὥς eRe πιεῖν" om μέντοι καὶ ὅπως
καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη. rit οὐκ
Ο ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐ
καὶ τὸν τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸν εὖ; διαβησόμεθα καὶ
τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ μιανθησόμεθα: ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθώ-,
μεθα, νομίζοντες ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν καὶ δυνὰ
πάντα μὲν κακὰ ἀνέχεσθαι, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθά,
» ¢ lol ΕΝ tf7 ‘ , « ὡς
ἄνω ὁδοῦ ἀεὶ ἑἐξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μ
φρονήσεως παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσομεν, ἵνα καὶ
Cf. Εν Peace 833 f. ὡς dea γιγνόμεθ᾽ roe τις ἀποθά il
. . . with the Platonic epigram to “Aornp: .. « νῦν δὲ θανὼν
518
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
whose. waters no vessel can contain, They were all
required to drink a measure of the water, and those
who were not saved by their good sense drank more
in the measure, and each one as he drank forgot all
things. And after they had fallen asleep and it was
the middle of the night, there was a sound of thunder
and a quaking of the earth, and they were suddenly
wafted thence, one this way, one that, upward to
their birth like shooting stars. Er himself, he said,
was not allowed to drink of the water, yet how and
in what way he returned to the body he said he did not
know, but suddenly recovering his sight ἢ he saw him-
self at dawn lying on the funeral pyre.—And so,
Glaucon, the tale was saved,’ as the saying is, and was
not lost... And it will save us 7 if we believe it, and we
shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our
soul unspotted from the world.? But if we are guided
by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and
capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil,
and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and
pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever,
λάμπεις Ἕσπερος ἐν φθιμένοις. There is an old superstition
in European folklore to the effect that when a star falls a
soul ἘΣ up toGod. Cf. also Rohde, Psyche, ii.® p. 131.
» Cf Phaedrus 243 5 ἀνέβλεψεν.
“© Cf Phileb. 14 a, Laws 645 8, Theaet. 164 v.
4 Cf. Phaedo 58 8 ἔσωσε τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. σώζειν is here
used in its higher sense, approaching the idea of salvation,
not as in Gorg. 511 cf., 512 p-£, Laws 707 pv, where Plato
uses it contemptuously in the tone of ‘‘ whosoever shall seek
to save his life shall lose it.”
¢ Cf. James i. 27, Phaedo 81 5, 2 Peter iii. 14, and the
Emperor Julian’s last speech “animum . . . immaculatum
conservavi.”” Cf. Marius the Epicurean, pp. 15-16: “* A white
bird, she told him once, looking at him gravely, a bird which
he must carry in his bosom across a crowded public place—
his own soul was like that.”
519
WOOk PRAPO WIA SAT
ἡμῖν. αὐτοῖς. ς ἕλοι ὦμεν καὶ τοῖς ἐνὸν
[ ἼΘΤΙΕ pati ‘ fear
onions, εὖ πράττωμεν. aan’ ott? we
TOS eT hae Ὁ ἘΠΕ 1 | fA
ὁ Cf. Laws 608. ἑαυτῇ φίλην, J 5, Horace, Epist
1 yn2 fi PNDOME MURS Mba FY ο a: a ddd
ἢ "Hence lives he to his inner self endeared, re enw
Jowett’s “dear to one. pe por we
Phan 115: ἘΝ, fine ὡς word ο
il. vii. p. 115: “In iii. n¢
ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκονται are τα συ me because “tes cee
Marc-Auréle sont loin de Ἐς τέξεται
παρὰ that reagent ample stultitia ἢ ay Uh
ult e2ow ylotee sel
τῇ Ὠἰπον, oi nowt! acetal
li owl fle le sw om yal
a] ; ha <r δὴ" to οἰ δα ᾿
: τ iyo blad dad. Gewvorhal
ΓΝ ὃ: hema ες Srey it
ἌΣ
ἶ ἀροσοε ἡ
Ὁ of σὰ esee Tn
pap Ly dott
Greve stk
etl ts Ὁ vad Ae be
bi [βου 9. . estes μή ef αἱ baad
» dhcbéve reo) biray ΩΤ.
; inteyeeie nog ii aan
ΤΕ ΤΣ x ΠΤ.
ΓΙ mn \¥ ἣ y ΕΣ
keys TOTS Rie
ΤΕΥ ΒΟΝΣΝ
Salita, [δ Srid ΝΣ
᾿ Tie Fart hd t
GW ig νἀ εὐ δἰ
520
THE REPUBLIC, BOOK X
that we may be dear to ourselves* and to the gods
both during our sojourn here and when we receive
our reward, as the victors in the games” go about to
gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that
journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you,
we shall fare well.¢”
is good Stoie doctrine, and that the idea that only the wise
and good man can be dear to himself is found in the last
a of Plato’s Republic.” Cf. also Soph. O.C. 309
ς ἐσθλὸς οὐχ αὑτῷ φίλος ;
vy Vol. I. p. 480, note c, on 465 ».
¢ For the th t cf. Gorg. 527 c εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ
τελευτήσας. Cf. Vol. 1. p. 104, note ὃ, on 353 ©. The quiet
solemnity of εὖ πράττωμεν illustrates the same characteristic
of style that makes Plato begin his Laws with the word
θεός, and Dante close each of the three sections of the Divine
Comedy with “stelle.”
521
ἰδ ‘eat tis, ὨΡῸΣ ai δὲ rae roe
ts [π΄ on 5 ἡ Ἐ ae Ἶ τᾷ Morr aon.
oilel Sti pall: ᾿ “eirtune, a .
brow ΗΕ el
anvil Ke auth 19 sh OIE
δὲ
I. INDEX OF NAMES
(Mere references to an author im the notes are
there is some
POPSRNSGGRESSRRGUERSEGS REE ὃ Ξ
sestetacdeessse2 ἼΩΣ faa αὶ :
i «ἈΞ ἘῈ oe pe Lou ἔξ ξ 22 af ἔξ
gteea ἘΠ ΕΙΣ ἐξέ! SFR R ας ze
page sahanetea geesedeie*’ finda ΓΝ
rd eS lgataneay gagti it cet
"Ξ ry nos δε 2 Se
He ‘Sagedegegese sd ἐξξεφεξα! ας 110)
agp ἐπ Ξε τα
εἴ ἐξ 8 ΠῚ]
23 Ron 5. ,8.5 SR og. BE:
ἕξ eee Bus in jetties 8 SBE
ἐς 4. Ὁ Sok cr ee ai 3 aie.
ἕξ Ξ δότε 88, Gules Big eee ss Bug
nbets® frre Gd gos B ἢ aria tS 65
ἘΠΕ mt ge, ἘΠΞ f Ἢ Fn gare ΜῈ
a Hf laa ξ ἢ ἫΝ ἘΣ "ἢ
ani PUT EEEELEL REED aa
I. INDEX OF NAMES
Augustine, St., I. xliii, 180, 11. 134,
420, 497
Autolycus, I. 30, 31
Bacon, I. 194, 508, II. 15, 119
Bagehot, I. 20, 898, II. 240-241
Bain, 11. 197
Bendis, I. viii, 3
Bergeon, ΠῚ 196
rgson, 196, 244-245 ~~ «|
Saccelon, 1. δὲ L119 119, 480 | it
Bias, I. 37
Boethius, I. 508, do 69, 124, 472
I. xiii
Britn ey, IL. 35
Brochard, II. 1, 71
Browne, Thomas, I. 16, 19, 354,
IT. 88-39, 107, 119,492...
Browning, 338
erowaing, we 212, πὶ 435.
nekle, I Cae ane"
Bulwer-Lytton, I. 808.
ba te xxxix, 235, oe a, eo
Barnet, 1 xy, IL 142,
Butcher, Κ δ 5, pe
1. 16
Butler, Samuel, I.
Byron, 1. 1τ
Campbell, I. xlvi a
Carlie, f ἐ 96, 157, UL iB, (35, 42,
407
Cephalus, I. 6 f.
Cerberus, IT. 399
Chairemon,I. 210’ ;
Charondas, Π 437 ea oe
Chaucer, I. ili 275,
Cheiron, 1. 221
Chesterfield, Lord, I. 128, 211
station on, ἃ; K., 1, 1 xix, 454,
ποκα
Chrysippus, I. 98, 111
Cicero, I. 7, 8, 9, 18, 20, 22-28, 80,
15, 138-139, 210, 388,
15, 485, of 495 303, Ἧ
13 101, 2 48, 36, 812, 10 ᾿
429
524
Cleanthes, I. 184
prea te I. ix
Clement, IT. 470
Clotho, 11. 505, 517
Clough, A. H., II, 182
idge, 11. xxxvi, 202, 443, 444-
Coleridge, Hartley, IT. 424-495
Conrad, IL. 18 if
: Θ,
Cornford, I. Xxxvi, ἢ . xiv
Cratinus, I. eet 425
438-489)
IL. 352 eo purads
Crete, constitution of, II. 238
sollidad
2 ate
vied rene
wee ae A
τ SOL .F
went et ea ao
Damon, I. 253, 3 oe
Dante, I. $7, 366, He
sora to, 8
Cudwort i Ἧς
336, 864, a ᾿ τί 1.
De Quincey, I 5 Μ ΜΝ"
Descartes, 1. son a out
Dewey, IL. 156 esbnobe A
Ῥίοάσῥις Ἢ Ἰδὲ vig vill, 21, i 268,
eet ey Καδης, ἃ ͵
4 ih vil, ae
bry ἄν 4 L dios
αὶ Bellay, ἃ iL
Diimmler, I ic Boas
ΠΩΎΤΑ
ἐρρέδον Ε ae ἱ
Ἴ
I. INDEX OF NAMES
Frederick the Great, I.
Freud, L. xxiv, IL. 336-337
Glancon, I, 145, HI. 255.
Ἡ, 481 ai
L. xiii, 507, U1. 101, 210 -
per ape ae
Grote, IT. 369
IL. 392-393) >
Hephaestus, 1. 181, 212-213,:219
Hera, Ε. 181, 217 :
Heracleitus, 1. 168, 177, 396; the
6 al hi
I. xliv, 8, 128-129, 133, 178-
_ 179,304, 482-483, 490-491, IT, 248-
405, 490-491; 494, IL 945, 370,
Banishment of, L. 242 f. :
Criticism of, I. 178 ff., 193, 196-
Homerids, II. 437
Hooker, I.°148-149, 11. 428 Ἴ
Horace, I. 8, 128, 276, 312, IT. 29,
= 39, 192-193, 251, 267, 442, 453,
elis, I. 23922 ΥἶΣ
828, 334, 337, 338, 349, 417,
441, 454, 496, 533, 535, 11 xxxvii-
Xxxviii, 48, 166,167, 214-215 236,
239, 250, 255, 285, 298, 318, 329,
368, 373, 442
Italy, IL. 437
James I., I. 509
Jeans, Sir J
La Bruyére, II. 462
Lacedaemon, II. 437
I. INDEX OF NAMES
Lachesis, II. 505, 517
Lamartine, IT. 414, 434
Landor, I. 202
Lang, A., Il. 432, 498
La Rochefoucauld, I, 275, II. 33
Leibniz, 1. 46 ᾿
Leontius, I. 399
Lethe, ΕἾ. 517, 519
2 1 oF 3
Locke, 1. 97, 227
Lowell, I. ΓΝ 421, IT. 232, 505
275, 484, 452, IT. 48, 202, 311
Lucretius, 1. 250 513, II. 182, 358
Lycaean Zeus, Il. 8
phe IL 486487,
Lysias, 1. ix, II. 255, 256
I. xxiv, 274, 27 278,
MO Thx ¥(a76,
Mandeville, I. 159, 164
Manilius, If. xxix, 101
Marcus Aurelius, I. 354, 508, 509,
IL. 187, 138, 414, 415, 520
wavtnes of Tyre, ta 54, 166, 360
Megara e of, I. 144
Menander, I. ant IL. 260
Milton, I. 9, 40, 109, 192, 246, 415,
II. 58-59, 391, 393, 501, 505, 507,
517
Mimnermus, II, 443
Minucius Felix, 1, 188, 292
Moliére, I. 512
Mommsen, I. viii
Momus, II. 15
Montaigne, I. 234, 495, II. 91, 211,
283
Montesquieu, 11. 163
More, Henry, II. 100, 101, 119, 142
More, Thomas, I. 508, ΤΙ. 58
ayo John, I. 134, 292, 450-451,
I. xlix
Minray, Gilbert, [. xxxix
Musaeus, I. 129, 135
Muses, Il, 245, 249
526
Napoleon, IL. xlv, 196-197, 828
Nabo leon HIT., T. 7008 1 atajolgt
Na ᾿ Il. xvi (88 1 παρ ἷ
2 Ser are πρὸ ty} iemA 10 0s 3
i 1 421, II, 3
S07, 146, 197, ay Τῇ Sores Le
ewman, 1. xxiv, 814, 819, 497,
IT. 215, 229, 289, 864.0 =
Nietzsche, F447 ex A ΠΤ
Niobe, I. 187 £ bei
Numenius, II. 274, 403. 351 +
Odysseus, II. eae πο
Olympian Zeus, II. ‘a
heus, I. ret TE. 513-515 ΣῪ
Ovid, 11: 188,456 ip αὶ ππσΕΥΝ
Palamedes, I. 151) ἢ ἡ
Panathenaia, 1.181 ς΄
I. 187
Perdiccas, I. 37 >A ase
Periander, I. 37 [ SLi a §4
Pericles, 4 xxxvi ii-xxxviii i, 208, 889
ome? ἔτος I, 275 bed LE
Phocylides, I. 276-277 9 5
Phoenicians, I. 380
832-333, 1s 452, IL. Ixv, 887.
XXxVii Ἃ
Primitive?, ΤΠ. xii, xiii ΠΝ
Indifferent iste
poet, II. lxiii
Anti- epientific?, IL 180-1
Not a mystic 0
otam τ 3 oe 200
No ascetic, IT i
Radical or conservative?, IL
71, 76, 232-238
I. INDEX OF NAMES
ix ἐδῖ |!
re kon . 238, 484, 504, 508,
; ond ἘΜ δ iw
Pope, I. 234, 394, 514, II. 432,
(5060) iF ee :
Prometheus, IT. 151, 254
L 349, IL. 439
y 5, I. xv, xxxiv, 177,
415, Π. Ixv, 189, 439, 501, 503
Quintilian, 1. 121, 485
Rabelais, 1. 17, 172, 470-471
pa he dha Sr og
IL, 280, 391
180
Ruskin, L. xxxix, 41, ΤΊ, 180-181,
258, 313, 347, IL.
» xxxvii, 19, 406-407, 460-461, 472
Sallust, 11. 252, 298
Sandburg, IT. 401
Santayana, I. 512
ee μας δὴν τά Est
, F.C. 8., IL 188
|
:
, I. xxxiv, 11, 257,
fs
er,
6
399
339
274, IL. 31, 305, 859, 429,
ΠΝ
Bers
Seriphus, I. 13 ;
Shaftes ΠῚ xlix
Complaints-of, 1, 38
et age tovhis fate, IL 19,
Solon, I. 163, 314, II. 215, 436-437
Sophocles, I. 10-13, II. 283, 456,
Sop! I. 433
Sparta, I. xx, 306, 307, 311, 326,
be 250-251
Stenzel, II. x-xiii, xviii, 112, 164,
219, 314
phen, Leslie, I. xvi, xxi, 96,
315, 399, 443, II. xlviii, 1, ἵν,
267
Stesichorus, II. 392-393
Stewart, I. xvi, 142, 372-373, 424
Stoics, I. 108, 176, 207, 258, 279,
361, a0, 398, II. 412-413, 414-415,
Strauss, I. 237
Swinburne, I. 5, 303, 502, IL. 137, ©
352, 506
Il. liv
xxiii, 48, 305
Taci
Taine,
527
I. INDEX OF NAMES
Tartarus, IL. BA κα ηϊτοῦλ
Ταληον, Ἄν ἘΣ; a σπάσμα ποι
en 11, 17, 138, 255,
901 86g, 204° 11, δ, Hy im Be
400, 404, 448, 470, 517
Terence, L
Theon, I.
Poe L4 284, 435, 513,
eau Π 515. |
Thetis, Ἶ, 193, 197
T , St., 1. 184
as, I. ix, 99
Thucydides, I. xxxvi, 13, 193, 242,
436-437, 486, 495, 11. 250, 366.
Thiimser, 344 i
{11 yy
ya Ἢ ;
} Uranus, 1 170 0 ΟΝ ety
- Whittier, I. ἫΝ χὶ
ΤΡ
{ΚΗ
8 δ Ὑταύποῖοα
Ων ΚΒ 220,
496, 617, 11. 1
116,
483,
turers eat
ah! Calta
PROTA ;
“4 MPL SE A
yer ἐ EE Fe το ἃ
Vers, ub dhe >
THysTh. SOTO wy
bet) J Rige iA Sie Ὁ
AE-SFR ab eee eens
es Bet σου
Mtr Ek qian :
{Side sepals
Tat bbw) sient
σε: nee
Il, INDEX OF SUBJECTS
να ον Sigua ἀμευο Or. eee
in the notes are here included.)
ABA style,
jets εὐ τὴν
prope yore a
Allegory, I. = a
ἀμηχάνως ws, 11. 174
᾿ affec by excess of
li Ὁ LI. 309
fi 1. 433
Anticipation of objections, IL. 14
icipation of 0 18,
ig pares XXXIii-XXxiv,
rgumentum ex contrario, 1. 40-
41, IL. 404-405
Aristocracy, II. 241
Arithmetic. See s.v. Mathematics
ting, porteyy ot etc.) is de-
ay is I. 424-425
See alsos.v. Poetry and Mimetice
Artists, L. 260. See also 8.0. Poets
es aa practical uses of, IL.
does it. it eet the soul upward ὃ,
to be δ μὰ abstractly, 11.
186-189
Athletes, I. 266-267
Athletes’ ie war oe guardians),
I, 267, IL. 148, 285
Attic Sabi If. 55
αὐτὸ δηλώ. , IL. 56
Antoehthon ny of ib naon, I. 303
αὐτουρ 816
ἄξιος, onble use of, IT. 30
(καὶ) ἄξιον, 11. 237
pers (‘base mechanic”), II.
49,
Be et of poets, I, 242-245,
65 ᾿
Barbers, I. 168
Beast, the great, IL. 38-39
Beast, the many-headed, IT, 400 f
Beauty, of mind and body, L
261-263
in the education of the young,
Art (τέχνη), I. 22-23, 135 I. 255 f.
strives only for its own per- youthful bloom of brief, II. 443
fection, I. 58-61 Bees, IL. 143
VOL. II 2M 529
Il. INDEX OF SUBJECTS
ey good, makes good end-
Being and Vnot:being, I. 520 ff.
llacy of not-being, I. 526
Absolute being, I. 530
Material objects and opinions
intermediate between being
and not-being, I. 532-533
aw man, best to be ruled by,
peakrabinadto of soul, 1. 494
ppp ee of the tyrant, Il. 326-
Bravery, I. 852 f.
four kinds of, I. 356
Bridle of Theages, IT, 51
Callipolis, 11. 172
Cause, IT. 106
oe jimage of the, II. xxx, 118-
11
alongs to refute argument, 11.
Change, inevitable for all created
things, Il. xliii ~
Children, to be trained in the new
customs, IT. 232-233
Control of, I. 408
In a democracy, do not fear
aetpetad i ie 27
jue colloquial, 3
Chr istian Fathers, I. 2-8, 177
Christianity, 1. xv, xxxiv, 124, 397,
433, II, 279, 387, 402, 404, 414, 492,
498, 506, 507, 519
Citizens, number of, to be kept the
same, I. 462-463
City, the primitive, 1. 158-159
The luxurious, I. 160-163
age of God, I. xlii-xliii, IL. Ixi, 414-
City, -state, the Greek, I. 328
Civic or popular virtue, Il. 71
Claims to rule, II. 255
Classes, the four, of men, I. 304-305
Classes of population, IL. 316
Climate determines national char-
acter, I, 879-381
630
Cen ay after sa. I. xxi-xxii, 270,
Clubs, τομαὶ, I. 137
Colour and form, association of, II.
m, purpose
I, =o 310-311.
wives, I. 330-331,
ee is rh ix, xiv-
not ἀκιλ και — Leen of
one and many, IT
Conceptual thought, IL. xii-xiii
Pp
.Confirmation, ‘aviary, κὸν sae pen
Contracts, monetary, not to
forced, IT
Con and tontaedle
tion, IT. oo, alta
(ΟἹ tio
orruptio optimi
Counsel sara 2 ch
Craftsman, or pe
fallible, [. 54 ff.
Crimes, list of,” IL =
Criterion of juagement, 1 316 tf
Cycles, II, 242-243 br
Daimonion, II. 52 διῶ idles
Day-dreams, I. 454-455 — ἡ
δέ ye in transition, II. ‘et?
Dead restored to life, 17. 492
Dees ee IT. 520-521
Rare t not to feared, Ἱ. 300.
Debts, abolition ἀ IL 320-821. ᾿
Deeds preferable to poems, 18
πο Ὁ Thrasymachus
stan
of, II. x
Definitions, is Plato, not absol
I. 364 q
Delian problem, 11. 176 —
Psi re Nag ety Po TL. 285 5.
mildneas of it ΟΝ ᾿
sensitiveness of, IL. 811°"
wea | |
ii ΤΟΥ͂
Il. INDEX OF SUBJECTS
cientist, IL.
xxxiv, 110-111 ff., 168 f., 201 f., 206
ee and sophist, II. 201,
διάνοια, IL. 112, 115, 116-117, 137, 150
Dice, metaphor of, Il. 455°
Di προ opr secearinag: Ἐν 49
‘im mous,
Diomedean atts IL. 41
treatment of, I. 272-273,
278-281
Ts cence oye nap 317, 320
Divided i ay rey of, IL. xxx-
108 ff.
Diviin τόν ὦ ᾿ξ 266
players, metaphor of, II.
Dream state, Mes veya
Depekennemy δ. ἀποβενλλ mem
“Economy of truth,” II. li
eT | importance of, I. 330-
331, I
I, 233
not the insertion of knowledge,
34
Elements (στοιχεῖα), A. 258-259
Ellipsis of ver’
Emotion, shew a ἡ May L
benefited, I. 25
treatment of, in war, 1. ae f.
ἐ boas If. 1
παγγέλλομαι tful,
Ephemeral nature of man, iL 506
Equality to unequals, IT. 291
μα, , ἢ.
ap 1. 441
Erotic terminology, used of philo-
sophy, II. 26, 28 145
Eternal, th the, contemplation of, IL
Bihical anew argument of the Republic,
πο ΡΩΝ meaning, recurrence
to, Il. 66-67
Eugenics, E. 459, I. xxxv
Euphemisms, II. 298-299
εὐτραπελία, IT. 308
Ps έρεια, 1. 340-341, IT. 212
2 ovesyihing destroyed by its
own, II . 472
Evil, the problem of, a 507
Dreams, IL. ἕξις vs. δύναμις, 1.
Drones in Aes ar Π. 269, 281, not technical δια Prato, I. 371
295, 318, 315 8377, IL. 105
VOL. ΤΙ 2u2 531
II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS
trae does Plato neglect it?,
essential for the guardians, 11.
5, 188-139, 229.
90
Explanation, dramatic, ex-
ΚΡ, ποῦ clear, I. "a7 79, II.
ἀνοικ of infants, I. 463
Eye of the mind, Il. 138
‘* Faculties,” 1. 381
Faith (wires); If. 117, 205
Fallacy (double - meaning of εὖ
πράττειν), 1. 101 f., 104-105
, the essential, 1. 194-195
ee and involuntary, II.
Fates, "the three, II. 505, 517
Fathers’ admonitions (prudential
morality), I. 126 ff.
Feast of reason, I.
28, 198
peeoe. figure of, I. 815
2
ie II. 301
IL. x-xi :
μὰς the true, I. 360-361
Function (ἔργον), I. 36, 100 ff.
Generalization of terms, I. 418
Gonsrestuy, = decay, il. 6
piace Mes 66 ff.
rage war, a. T6168
its true purpose, II. 168-171
terminology of, II. 170-171
gives pleasure, II. 177
solid, II. 175 f.
not yet sufficiently investi-
ented, a 176
λέσχρως, 1
γνώσεται, threatening, IT. 331
t-stags, II. 18
God, goodness of, I. 183, II. xxv
not the author of evil, I. 184-
185 ff., ΤΙ. 507
does not change T. 188-189 f.
does not lie, I. 194 ff.
makes the ideas, tr 427 f.
See also s.v. Idea of good
532
ΓΟ aficcist
the, not definate 05° ree
bay in that which
eee us oped
Good sod life, the supreme thing, 11.
for women, I. 434 f.
abr e A grnc
study, IT
Happiness of buy lace: not
Ἐπ of the law, 1. 816, πὸ ;
Hard to accept and bard to
. 199
Hart, the only, is making one
virtuous, 1.
Harmonics, IT. 190 f.
|
|
aie
i
rile
ἡ
ἢ
ὅ αὶ
i
)
Τ᾽ Ἢ
it
" if
ie
Lea
τὸς mam, dear το God, το ὃ, TE
ἃ
Il. INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Justice, only eT 5 fear of con-
sequences, 1. 116 ff.
n, antithetic, IL. 53
" of different forms of same wend,
TI. 86, 881
κάθαρσις, II, κι, 460-461
καὶ μάλα, humorous, If. 94
καίτοι, rhetorical, II. 381
Kee ing to the ints IL 193, 899
Reventon te the point, IT. 339
King shepherd of the people, ἂν
Knowledge vs. a. 1, 416, 522-
523, 524-525, 11. 98, 446
Knowledge, universal, is im-
_possible, IT, 432-433
κῶμος, figure of, II. 67
Labourers (wage-earners), 1, 156-157
Laughs at himself, IT. 107, 231
Taughies violent, deprecated, T. 211
, no matter, I. 430
ΤΑΝ μὐναικαύέγτι κῃ IL. 811
Law-courts and judges, Pa of
degenerate state, I. 270-2
Laws, on insignificant things not
ela hg, ae 335 ;
without right princip es use-
less, 1. 338-339, 340-341
Laws, to be for the good of the
whole state, II. 140-141 —
Legal metaphor, I. 482
Liberty, in a demoeracy, II. 306 ff.
Life after death, I. 16-17, 129-131,
» See also s.v. Immortality
Life, not a matter of great concern,
Light, essential to sight, II. 98-99
Like to lik e, 5.9
Likeness to God, the aim of the
righteous, II. 487
Links, minute, in the argument, I.
48, 362, IL. 389, 894 ἢ,
Literary genres, Τ᾿ 230-231
Logie, in the minor dialogues, IT.
xi
λόγον δοῦναι, 11, 195
λόγος vs. λέξις, I. 224
534
Long vs. short speeches, T. 83, 93.
ar ante ὅλο, Erno he
vt its
αλοπρεπῶς, i
Mental discipline, IL. 166, 194
erchants and —_—-
156-157
ee to separable, πὸ
Motenipépchonstny IL 611 ff,
— mn Il. 487 to
Mimetic appeals” nfer
element of. soul, IT. 461.
Il. INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Mythology, δον 1. 118 ff.
not to be disputed about,
Neutral stats (may seem pleasurable
or. wicktames, ἐν θῖν
aoa nuptial, IT. xliii-xly,
and the IL 1 68
‘Numbers good, eee
playin τοὺς Bedy Ideas)
εἰς ns chidiiren, 9400-465
er ee. ), IL 240
Stymie Fins 1. 480-481, Ef. 5
160, 161, 168165
a
One man, one task (division of
labour), I. 152-153, 232 ff., 242
ae ΤΕ a 142
er” (ἕτερον), II. 157
τύχωσι, IL. 213, 302
Persuasion and compulsion, IT. 1
iy ermal”: L 184-185, ΤᾺ
ΓΞ ta
kinds of know
a lover of true
true, loves all
ἘΠ 514-515
Ga 377 f. ~ =
_in the ete ian eg ἐπ: ἢ 133
ers ΤῊ)
509, 11,232 per
popular view of, IL. 15-17
Philoso qualities of,
TI..11-13, 29, 211
corruption of, TH. 42-47
535
Π. INDEX OF SUBJECTS
aes hd. the shame of, II, 48,
ΤῊΝ for the young, IT. 226, hang
ox fpr of IL 226-227
ἰλότιμος, IT. 255, 875
hoenician tale, 302-308
sca tbat ot fo: ian f
r, sign Οἱ r
training, I. 268-271. en
should be well acquainted with
diseases, I, 282-283
Physics, transcendental, Il. xy-xvi
φύσιν and the ἔχει, IL. 25
dh and the itp of ideas, II.
vos, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη, I. 167, 324
aon ἐς (of error), IL. 89 :
Planets, IT. 503. (Bees. tars)
πλάττειν (used of the Fatih Il,
wey cee children’s, importance of, I,
Play on + sive) at + 281, 265
Play or jest (watcew), IL. xxii.
also s.v. Jest cae earnest)
Playful threat, I
Playing with the. prin ΤΙ. 57
Pleasure and pain, a kind of motion,
II. 888
is not cessation of ee} 885
Pleasure, as the good,
three kinds of, IT. liv-ly, 372 ff.
seh ey akin to madness,
6
Pleasures, harmless, I. 109
good and bad, ΤΊ. 90, 300
of mind and body, I. 8, 408
negativity of lower, 11, lvi-lix,
380 ff., 390 ff.
πλεονεξία, I. 87 f.
Poetry, function of, IL. Ixiii
is re pees Il. ‘ixii, 419, 429 ff.,
stripped of its adornments, II.
(See
waar mi i old quarrel
between, IT. 464-465
τ challenge to defend, II. 467
Poets, ἀμαη το but not wise, I, 21
cannot be questioned, I. 21
make all things, II. 422-423
know all things, II. 432-433
banishment of, II. lxiii, 329,
418-419, 465-467
536
Political aoe I, 349.
προ ΟΝ TL: 1541
zpoowtereer,
Public opinion, defiance of, IT. 35
Beblis pinion, reward, a
ben one II. 495- τς 1 “+h
nishm ana 87 Υ
408-400 Ὁ
Puns, i. 108
on names, IT, 369
Puppet- -shows, If. 121
Purgatory, LI. Ixx Re
Bae ses ath ἸΘΗ͂ΝΗ βε δρῦς i
Qualiaesiton of ΡΣ ΤῊ
ments, IT. 41
Qualified a assent, II. 243
Race, metaphor of, ae L488
Reaction, law y=
Realism in art ἐσθ
237
Il. INDEX OF SUBJECTS
m (vs. nominalism), ΤΙ, xiv-
n and | emotion, conflict of, IT.
ποτα, OH. 519-517
rat αι
Wie distaste for, τ τοτγττλεή βε αν a 4
ne He inthe χὰ
realization: ‘of, I.
em, ἣν but not deiscuaiblo,
of the minor
solves. probledis
dialogues, I. 26, 344-345, II.
ai ey oh aap et: 1. xii-xiv, II.
Η. 333
: Rito ey ot, II. 816-317
Rich’ fee τορος ag ἯΙ. 85
Riddle, I. 530-531
Ridicule, no test of truth, I. 434
Pale, he the true, must be paid wages,
is πον δῆς to hold office, I
81, IT, 144-145, 231
Rulers, dissension among, the
cause of revolutions. (See s.v.
Revolutions)
Sanction, in ethics, II. xlvi. (See
also s.v. Idea of Good Good)
Satire of socialistic millennium, I.
318-319 ; :
ena,” IL. 185
and, 1. xix, IL.
Shell, turning
part ng Tet L ae, IL. 18-19
σκοπός, 11. 139 :
Slavery, I. 156-157, II. 249, 254-255,
ἃ ee (toillustrate ‘tyranny )
vera in manatee
a ne vakiig: IT. 208
pleasures of, IT. 384
Social contract, I. 114-115
1, 34-35
are not the real corrupters of
youth, II. 34:39
Soul, tripartite, I. 376°f.; IL» 82,
, 370-371.
and body, II. 313, 367, 386-387,
410°
nourishment of, II. 388
supreme value of, ΤΙ. 405, 410-
411, 511
immortality of. (See s.v. Im-
Souls must always be the same in
number, IT. 479
σώζειν, IL, 519
‘* Speak with the vulgar,” II. 204
Specification, demand for, ΕΠ. 88-89
Stars, II. 182 f.
movements en IL. 183-186
= IL 1
souls, pats 518-5. ff
arses (faction) in the ands I. 417,
State, Plato’s, vs. the modern, L
XXViii
537
II. INDEX OF SUBJECTS
State— ;
derives its b seo from in-
ans
of, IL.
vidual vertosted 4 in, II.
- should be a unity, 11. 264-265
Statesman, the true, 11. xxxiv-
XXXV
must ee 9 than other
men, II.
Striking Serr Il. 347
Sun, symbol of i ie of good, 11.
xxviii-xxix, 100
Superstition, none ‘n Plato, 1. 839,
Supposititious son, parable of, II.
220 ff.
Surprise effect, II. 239, 277
Suspicions man not eee judge, I.
di
four t
the ind
55
δ
ae Ma not ‘histinenished, .L
386, II. 88, 137, 155, 388
Synoptie, II. 218-219
Syracusan table, I. 268-269
σωφροσύνη, 1. 358-359 f.
Teleology and the idea of good, II.
xxiii, xxv
Testing by pains, fears and plea-
sures, I. 298-299
Text of the Republic, I. xlvy-liii, IT.
Ixxi-Lxxii
θεῖα μοῖρα, II. 414
ird man argument, II. xxiii, 428
Third person, used for politeness,
I. 24
Thought portrayed as action, II.
24
Thought, a discussion of the soul
Pas itself, II. 207
parish: {ede of men, IL. 372 ἢ
batts
Time, ΠΑ οἷς past, II. 64-65
Timocracy, II. 243
Torch-race, I. 5
Trade, ungentlemanly, II. 49
Tragedy, favourable to tyrants and
democracies, II. 328-829. (See
also 8.0. Poetry and Mimetic)
Train successors, II. 230
Transfer of argument, I. 20
τρίτος σωτήρ, 11. 380
538
ἐπ τος ἐπ 1 194197,
io Be honoured above man, an re
not concerned with §
Ey unwillingly depri i
Te. temperaments, 1. 168- 171,
got ane Diended in the guar.
Not freatently combined, τι
vs. true
wh Nobie tyranny,”
ἐκ τ..." wicked, eat ~g
“ Unction,” II, 168, 174
Unity of feeling προ oy ‘the
essential, 1. 470-
Valelpitiiastapionis I. 272-281
Vege’ L 46, 153
per ἐλ Ἂ mn
unity of, I. 422
must be a good
is health ofeoal. iE Las ff
of Οἴου, aim of true
man, II. xxxv
and aden Mes IL. xlviii-
importance of, IT. 469
Il. INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Wealth, benefits ALS oy ἢν
is
iskentiglt oe κα acquired, I, 14-15
Reh Tt
rene dangers of, I. 320-
Werewelf, legend of, IT. 319
Wicked but clever men, IL. 137,
lose in the end, 11. 489
Wicked, late panes of, IT. 490
Wisdom (
va mp oe teil the truth, I.
Wolf dink deprives of speech, I.
Weems inferior to men, I. 446-447,
IL. 459
to share — of men, L
287
Word vs. deed, 11. 15, 209, 401
World state, If. 415
Worse element the larger, I. 360-
361
Wrongdoing involuntary, II. 404
Young, labours belong to, IT. 215
Printed in Great Britain by R. & R. Ciarx, Limren, Edinburgh.
SQ lo γυραιεῖν δ frog δὴν y
Bees. epee Daan be |
em: ΡΝ oe
“ean } ay
"ἢ Aes on iT TA ad
Gob ΠΝ Ro.) μοᾶμ ἼΣΩΝ he! betel
i nee Ty Gaal ij rary |
Pints a? oa θὲ me ss : ἐς bal
ἣν
δ Mi ota igi δι gett teow
{
GEE bag ) Ἐδιβάσι, abba αγαν wy
δ t ΠΣ oe
Ἵ anaes 16: wadiemry arate pd
πο ἢ δα δ. 45,
ν αἱ aaa
y wid! Dips
soon Pde ors?
bor: ψ “gett murat ἃ
ate, ft met nod εἰ To dat ϑαυοῖ |
Ἢ ds NT
δ᾽ ὅδα, 3 a
$i .
( 1S HM OF ἡ
¥ aa
᾿ς Ἢ Tiler, Heart ΞΟ, .
ἢ
᾿ . Saver }
a e
a4 ᾿
ire ἴδ. τ t Tz, αν
- area | tie χα»
wks - genes iy
‘ aie ΣΝ Ὁ a!
ἃ Γ Ἢ
ΗΝ % iid the νἱ
with ι .
Mr i} Red
᾿ :
ἊΝ
' Hy)
t ,
{tT t GQ
ἢ 1 fe
δ
4 ' 1 μι
ty
ele = om ry
Reet merit was
a fing tol we | (
THE LOEB CLASSICAL
LIBRARY
VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED
LATIN AUTHORS
AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS. J.C. Rolfe. 3 Vols.
APULEIUS. THE GOLDEN ASS (METAMOR-
PHOSES). W. Adlington (1566). Revised by S. Gase-
lee. (6th Imp.)
ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS OF. W. Watts
(1631). 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 4th Imp., Vol. 11. 3rd Imp.)
ST. AUGUSTINE, SELECT LETTERS, J. H. Baxter.
rhe ae Ae Η. G. Ἐπεῖνοὶ White. 2 Vols.
BOETHIUS : TRACTS a anp DE CONSOLATIONE
i ay? aot ay Rey. H. F. Stewart and E. K.
. Rand. oa?
CAESAR: CIVIL. ARS. A. 6. Peskett. (4th Imp.)
CAESAR: GALLIC WAR. H. J. Edwards. (8th Imp.
CATO arp VARRO: DE RE RUSTICA. UH. B. Ash an
W. Ὁ. Hooper. (2nd Imp.)
CATULLUS. F. W. Cornish; TIBULLUS. J.B.
costes? ; AND PERVIGILIUM VENERIS. J. W.
Mackail. (11th Imp.)
CELSUS: DE MEDICINA. W. G. Spencer. 3 Vols.
(Vol. I. Ind hh evised.)
CICERO: BRU us anpj ORATOR. G. L. Hendrickson
and H. M. Hubbell.
CICERO: DE FATO; PARADOXA STOICORUM;:
1
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
DE PARTITIONE ORATORIA H. Rackham. (With
De Oratore, Vol. II.)
CICERO: DE FINIBUS. H. Rackham. (3rd Imp. revised.)
pee Bors NATURA DEORUM anv ACADEMICA.
CICERO: DE OFFICIIS. Walter Miller. (4th Imp.)
CICERO: DE ORATORE. E. Ὗς Sutton and i
Rackham. 2 Vols.
whet DE REPUBLICA anp DE LEGIBUS. Clin-
n W. Ke
CICERO: OE SENECTUTE, DE AMICITIA, DE
DIVINATIONE. W. A. Falconer. (4th Imp.)
CICERO: IN. CATILINAM, PRO MURENA,, PRO
SULLA, PRO FLACCO. Louis E. Lord.
CICERO: LETTERS TO ATTICUS. Εν O. Winstedt.
3 Vols. (Vol. 1. 5th Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp. and Vol.
ΠῚ. 2nd Imp.)
CICERO: LETTERS TO HIS FRIENDS. Ὅν αν
Williams. 3 Vols,
CICERO: PHILIPPICS. W.C. A. Ker. (Qn Im )
CICERO: PRO ARCHIA, POST REDITU)
DOMO, DE HARUSPICUM RESPONSI: PRO
PLANCIO. _N. H. Watts. (2nd Imp
) ;
CICERO: PRO’ CAECINA, PRO. LEGE MANILIA,
PRO CLUENTIO, PRO RABIRIO. H. Grose Hod
CICERO: PRO MILONE, IN PISONEM, PRO
SCAURO, PRO FONTEIO, PRO RABIRIO POS-
TUMO, PRO MARCELLO, PRO LIGARIO, PRO
REGE DEIOTARO. Ν. H. Watts.
CICERO: PRO QUINCTIO, PRO ROSCIO AMERINO,
PRO ee COMOEDO, CONTRA RULLUM,
J. H. Frees
CICERO: “TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS. J. E. King. a
2nd Imp.)
CHCERO” VERRINE ORATIONS. L. H. G. Green-
wood. 2 Vols.
CLAUDIAN. M. Platnauer. 2 Vols.
COLUMELLA: DE RE RUSTICA. H. B. Ash. 2 Vols,
Vol. I. Books I.-IV.
FLORUS. E. S. Forster; and CORNELIUS NEPOS,
J. C. Rolfe.
FRONTINUS: STRATAGEMS ann AQUEDUCTS.
C. E. Bennett and M. B. McElwain.
2
“πε νὰ —
—
ee
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
FRONTO: CORRESPONDENCE. Ὁ. R. Haines. 2 Vols.
GELLIUS. J.C. Rolfe. 3 Vols.
pc pee ar pure anp EPODES. C. E. Bennett. (11th
Imp. )
HORACE: SATIRES, EPISTLES, ARS POETICA.
H. R. Fairclough. (5th Imp. revised.)
JEROME: SELECT LETTERS. F. A. Wright.
JUVENAL ayp PERSIUS. G.G. Ramsay. (θέλ Imp.)
LIVY. Β.0. Foster, F.G. Moore, Evan T. and A. C.
Schlesinger. 13 Vols. Vols. L-VI., IX.-XII. (Vol. I.
3rd Imp., Vols. 11.. III. and IX. 2nd Imp. revised.)
LUCAN. J.D. Duff.
LUCRETIUS. W.H.D. Rouse. (4th Imp. revised.)
MARTIAL. W.C. A. Ker. 2 Vols. (3rd Imp. revised.)
MINOR LATIN POETS: from Pusuitis Syrvus to
Rourimius Namatianvs, including Grarrivs, CaLpuRNius
Sicurus, Nemestayus, Avianus, with “Aetria,” “ Phoenix”
aon i Aare J. Wight Duff and Arnold M. Duff.
ov. tt ART OF LOVE ἂν OTHER POEMS.
J.H.M . (2nd Imp.)
OVID: Ε Sir James G. Frazer.
OVID: HEROLDES anpj AMORES. Grant Showerman.
OVID: me eA MORPHOSES. F. J. Miller. 2 Vols.
(Vol. 1. 7th Imp., Vol. 11. 6th Imp.)
ere anise. anpj EX PONTO. A. L. Wheeler.
PETRONIUS. M. Heseltine; SENECA: APOCOLO-
CYNTOSIS. W.H.D. Rouse. (7th Imp. revised.)
-PLAUTUS. Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vols.
II. and III. 3rd Imp.)
PLINY: LETTERS. Melmoth’s Translation revised b
W. M. L. ran. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 5th Imp., Vol.
IL. 4th Im
PLINY: NATURAL HISTORY. 4H. Rackham and
W.H.S. Jones. 10 Vols. Vols. I., I. and III.
PROPERTIUS. H. E. Butler. (5th Imp.)
QUINTILIAN. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. (Vols. I., II. and
IV. 2nd Imp.)
REMAINS OF OLD LATIN. E. H. Warmington. 4
Vols. Vol. I. (Ennius and Caecilius). Vol. 11, (Liyius,
3
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
Naevius, Pacuvius, Accius). Vol. III. piaemerers Cais
of the XII Tables). Vol. IV. (Archaic Inscriptions)... >
SALLUST.. J. C. Rolfe. (2nd Imp. revised.) -
SCRIPTORES HISTORIAE AUGUSTAE. | De Magic.
3 Vols. (Vol. 1. 2nd Imp. revised.) '
SENECA: APOCOLOCYNTOSIS. es PETRONIUS.
SENECA: EPISTULAE MORALES. R. My _Gummere,
3 Vols. (Vol. 1. 3rd Jmp., Vol. IL. 2nd Imp. m3 Vols
SENECA: MORAL ESSAYS. J. W. Basore. lai
(Vol. II..2nd Imp. revised.)
SENECA: TRAGEDIES. F.J. Miller, 2 Vols. (Vol. I.
3rd Imp., Vol. 11. 2nd Imp. revised. Ι
SIDONIUS: POEMS AND LETTERS. W. B. Anderson.
2 Vols... Vol. 1.
SILIUS ITALICUS. J.D. Duff. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)
STATIUS. J. H. Mozley. 2 Vols. |
SUETONIUS. J.C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (5th Imp. revised.)
TACITUS: DIALOGUS. Sir Wm. Peterson ; and AGRI-
COLA ann GERMANIA. Maurice Hutton, t eon sh
TACITUS: HISTORIES ann ANNALS.
and J. Jackson. 4 Vols. (Vol. 1. 2nd Tp)
T ieee . aa Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. etn Imp.
ο δέ )
TERTULLIAN APOLOGIA anp DE SPECTACULIS.
T. R. Glover; MINUCIUS FELIX. G. H. Rendall. ἡ
VALERIUS FLACCUS. J.H. Mozley. (2nd Imp. revised.)
VARRO: DE LINGUA LATINA. .R.G. Kent. :2 Vols.
VELLEIUS PATERCULUS ann RES GESTAE ΕΝ
AUGUSTI. F. W. Shipley.
VIRGIL. H.R. Fatholoughs 2. Vols. . (Vol. I. 14th Imp,
Vol. Il. 11th Imp. revised.)
VITRUVIUS: DE ARCHITECTUBA. F. Granger. 2 Vols,
GREEK AUTHORS
ACHILLES TATIUS. 9. Gaselee.
AENEAS TACTICUS: ASCLEPIODOTUS anp ONA-
SANDER. The Illinois Greek Club.
AESCHINES. Ὁ: D. Adams.
4
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
ἣν US. = he algere cms 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 4h Imp.,
Ἁ on ats. Sir James G.Krazer. 2;Vols...(Vol L
$ RHODIUS. R. C.Seaton... (4th I
ie 2 Vols
the FATHERS, | Kirsopp
a Ing Vo 4th Imp.)
AN HISTORY.- Horace White. 4 Vols.
pe τη IL, Ill. and IV. 2nd δ
Ra ραν MACHUS. ΜΝ
Benjamin Bickley Rogers. 3 Vols.
. and II. 4th Imp., Vol. III. 3rd Imp.) Verse
trans.
ἀπ συμ, ART OF RHETORIC. J. Η: Freese.
‘ARI “E: ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, EUDE-
ΕἸ MIAN ETHICS, VIRTUES axp VICES,—H. Rackham.
ARI : DE CAELO. W. K. C. Guthrie.
ARISTOTLE: METAPHYSICS. H. Tredennick. 2 Vols.
Ξε
AkiSrOH : Ri Helle WORKS. W. S. Hett. Own
Ox Turycs Hearp, Puystoexomics, Oy
“Pras, Ox Maarvetiovs Turxes Hearp, Mecuanican
or se Ow Ixnprvistste Loses, Srruations anp Names
nen ἃς Ow Metissus, XenorpHaNes, anD GorcIas.
/-NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. H. Rack-
eee jovi revised.)
ARISTOLLE, OECONOMICA axp MAGNA MORALIA.
pare wit ; with Vol. Il. Metaphysics. (2nd Jmp.)
ARISTOTLE : RGANON. H. P. Cooke H. Tre-
dennick. 3 Vols. Vol. I.
ARIS LE: ON THE SOUL, PARVA NATURALIA,
ON BREATH. W.5S. Hett. (2nd Imp. revised.)
ARISTOTLE: PARTS OF ANIMALS. A. L. Peck;
~ MOTION AND PROGRESSION OF ANIMALS.
E. S. Forster.
ARISTOTLE: PHYSICS. Rey. P. Wicksteed and F. M.
Cornford. ane, Vol. Il. 2nd Imp.)
ARISTOTLE : CS ann LONGINUS. W. Hamil-
ton Fyfe; DEMETRIUS ON STYLE. W. Rhys
. Roberts:, (4th Imp. r gia Ἢ
ARISTOTLE: POLITICS. Rackham.
5
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
ARISTOTLE: PROBLEMS. W.S. Hett. 2 Vols.
ARISTOTLE: RHETORICA AD ALEXANDRUM.
H. Rackham. (With Problems, Vol. EH.
ARRIAN: HISTORY OF eae nthe ici ski ayp INDICA.
Rev. E. Hiffe Robson. 2 Vols.
ATHENAEUS: DEIPNOSOPHISTAE. Ὁ. Β. Gulick.
7 Vols.
St. BASIL: LETTERS. R. J. Deferrari. “ Vols.
CALLIMACHUS ayn LYCOPHRON. A. W. Mair;
ARATUS. 6. R. Mair. :
eeed ieiyi OF ALEXANDRIA. Rev. G. W. Butterworth.
nd Im
COLLUTH S. CGH
DAPHNIS ayn CHLOE, Thornley’s Translation revised
by 3 Bir arte: and PARTHENIUS. S. Gaselee.
3rd Im
DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA anv DE FALSA
LEGATIONE. C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. (2nd
Imp. revised.)
DEMOSTHENES: MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTO-
rset TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON. J. H.
ince.
DEMOSTHENES: OLYNTHIACS, PHILIPPICS ayn
MINOR ORATIONS: I.-XVII. ann XX. J. H. Vince.
gee ire PRIVATE ORATIONS. A. T. Mur-
ray. 3 Vo
DIO CASSIUS: ROMAN HISTORY. E. Cary. 9 Vols.
(Vols. I. and 11, 2nd Imp.)
DIO CHRYSOSTOM. 5 Vols. Vols. I. and Il. J. W.
Cohoon. Vol. III. J. W.Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby.
BRT SICULUS. C. H. Oldfather. 12 Vols
ols
DIOGENES LAERTIUS. R. Ὁ, Hicks. 2 Vols, (Vol.
I. 3rd Imp.)
DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS: ROMAN ANTI-
QUITIES. Spelman’s-translation revised by E. Cary.
7 Vols. Vols. I.-III.
EPICTETUS. W. A. Oldfather. 2 Vols.
EURIPIDES. A. 8. Way. 4 Vols. (Vol. II. 6th Imp.,
Vols. I. and LV. 5th Imp., Vol. III. 3rd Imp.) Verse
trans.
EUSEBIUS: ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY. Kirsopp
Lake and J. E. L. Oulton. 2 Vols. (Vol. Il. 2nd Imp.)
6
ele ee ee el,
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
GALEN: ON THE NATURAL FACULTIES. A. J.
THE GREEK HOLOGY. W. ΒΕ. Paton. 5 Vols,
aman. Imp., Vol. 11. 3rd Imp., Vols. UI. and IV.
GREEK F ELEGY AND IAMBUS wits rue ANACRE-
ONTEA. J.M. Edmonds. 2 Vols.
THE GREEK BUCOLIC Sha ως (THEOCRITUS,
BION, MOSCHUS). J. M. Edmonds. (6th Imp.
revised.)
GREEK MATHEMATICS. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols.
HERODES. Cf. THEOPHRASTUS: CHARACTERS.
HERODOTUS. A. Ὁ. Godley. 4 Vols. (Vols, L.-Lil.
8rd Imp., Vol. ΤΥ. 2nd Imp.)
HESIOD aypv THE HOMERIC HYMNS. H. G. Evelyn
White. (5th Imp. revised and enlarged.)
HIPPOCRATES ann tHE FRAGMENTS OF HERA-
CLEITUS. W.H.S.Jonesand E.T. Withington. 4 Vols.
Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)
HOMER: ILIAD. A.T. Murray. 2 Vols. (4th Imp.)
HOMER: ODYSSEY. A.T. Murray. 2Vols. (5th Imp.)
ISAEUS. E. S. Forster.
ISOCRATES. Norlin. 3 Vols. Vols. I. and II.
ST. JOHN DAMASCENE: BARLAAM AND IOA-
Tien Rey. G. R. Woodward and Harold Mattingly.
(2nd Imp. revised.)
JOSEPHOS. H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus,
9 Vols. Vols. L-VI. (Vol. V. 2nd Im p.)
WO i. a Cave Wright. 3 Vols. (Vols. I. and IL
2
LUCIAN. A. M. Seren 8 Vols. Vols. 1.-V. (Vols.
I. and ΤΙ. 3rd
LYCOPHRON. if CALLIMACHUS.
LYRA GRAECA. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. L
3rd Imp., Vol. IL. 2nd Ed. revised and enlarged, Vol. III.
2nd Imp. revised.)
LYSIAS. W. R. M. Lamb.
MANETHO. W. G. Waddell. PTOLEMY: TETRA-
BIBLOS.. F. E. Robbins.
MARCUS AURELIUS. C.R.Haines. (3rd Imp. revised.)
MENANDER. F.G. Allinson. (2nd Imp. revised.)
MINOR ATTIC ORATORS. 2 Vols. Vol. 1. ANTI-
PHON, ANDOCIDES. K. J. Maidment.
7
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
NONNOS: DIONYSIACA. W.H. D. Rouse. 8 Vols.
(Vol. III. 2nd Imp.)
OPPIAN,COLLUTHUS, TRYPHIODORUS. A.W. Mair.
PAPYRI. NON-LITERARY SELECTIONS. A. S.
Hunt and C. C. Edgar. Ἧ Vols. ee ae
TIONS. Vol. I. (Poetry). Ὁ). L. Pag yee twin
PARTHENIUS. Cf. DAPHNIS any CH
PAUSANIAS: D RIPTION OF GREECE. W. H. 5.
Jones. ὅ Vols. and Companion Vol. arranged by REE.
Wycherley. (Vols. I. and III. 2nd Imp.)
ἈΕῚ O. 10 Vols. Vols. I.-V. F. H. iso’ αὐᾷ Rew G.
H. Whitaker; Vols. VI.-IX. F. H. Colson. (Vol. Tv.
Qnd Imp. revised.)
PHILOSTRATUS : THE LIFE OF APOLLONIUS. OF
TYANA. F.C. Conybeare. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd Jmp.,
Vol. II. 2nd Imp.)
PHILOSTRATUS: IMAGINES ; CALLISTRATUS:
DESCRIPTIONS. A. Fairbanks.
PHILOSTRATUS ann EUNAPIUS: LIVES oF THE
SOPHISTS. Wilmer Cave Wright.
PINDAR. Sir J. E. Sandys. (6th Imp. revised.) :
PLATO: CHARMIDES, ALCIBIADES, HIPPARCHUS,
THE LOVERS, THEAGES, MINOS anv EPINOMIS.
W. R. M. Lamb.
PLATO: CRATYLUS, PARMENIDES, GREATER HIP-
PIAS, LESSER HIPPIAS. H. Ν, Fowler. (3rd Imp.)
PLATO: EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAE-
DO, PHAEDRUS. Η. Ν. Fowler. (8th Imp.) .
PLATO: LACHES, PROTAGORAS, MENO, EUTHY-
DEMUS. W R. M. Lamb. (2nd Imp. revised.)
PLATO: LAWS. Rev. R. G. Bury. 2 Vols. (2nd imp)
PLATO: LYSIS, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAS. W.R.M
Lamb. (3rd Imp. revised.)
PLATO: REPUBLIC. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
PLATO: STATESMAN, PHILEBUS. H. N. Fowler;
ION. W.R.M. Lamb. (3rd Imp.
PLATO: THEAETETUS ann SOPHIST. . H. N. Fowler.
(3rd Imp.)
PLATO: TIMAEUS, CRITIAS, CLITOPHO, MENEXE-
NUS, EPISTULAE. | Rev. R. 6. Bury.
PLUTARCH: MORALIA. 14 Vols. Vols. 1.--ν. F. C.
Babbitt; Vol. VI. W. C. Helmbold; Vol. X. H. N.
Fowler. :
<1 le
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
PLUTARCH: THE PARALLEL LIVES. B. Perrin.
11 Vols. (Vols. I., 11., III. and VII. 2nd Imp.)
POLYBIUS. W. ΒΕ. Paton. 6 Vols.
PROCOPIUS: HISTORY OF filed WARS. H. B,
Dowie 7 Vols. (Vol, 1. 2nd
OTETRABIBLOS. CLMANETHO,
AEUS. | A. S. “hee owt.
(Wal IRICUS. Rey. R..G. Bury. 3 Vols.
SOP 2 a imp) Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 7th Imps Vol.
II. 5th po ae Verse trans.
RABO EOGRAPHY. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols.
(Vols. I. and VIII. 2nd Imp.)
THEOPHRASTUS: CHARACTERS. J. M. Edmonds ;
HERODES, etc. A. D. Knox.
THEOPHRASTUS: ENQUIRY INTO PLANTS. Sir
Arthur Hort. 2 Vols.
THUCYDIDES. C.F. Smith. 4Vols. (Vol. I. 3rd imp.,
Vols. II., III. and IV. 2nd Imp. revised.)
TRYPHIODORUS. C/. OPPIAN.
geo CYROPAEDIA. Walter Miller. 2 Vols.
2nd Imp
XENOPHON : HELLENICA, ANABASIS, APOLOGY,
anpj SYMPOSIUM. C. L. "Brownson and O. J. Todd.
8 Vols. (2nd Imp.)
XENOPHON : MEMORABILIA anp OECONOMICUS.
' _E.C. Marchant. (2nd Jmp.
XENOPHON: SCRIPTA ΜΠ NORA. E. C. Marchant.
VOLUMES IN PREPARATION
GREEK AUTHORS
ALCIPHRON. A. R. Benner and F. Fobes.
ARISTOTLE: DE MUNDO, etc. W. K. 6. Guthrie.
ARISTOTLE: HISTORY AND GENERATION OF
ANIMALS. A. L. Peck.
ARISTOTLE: METEOROLOGICA. H. Ὁ. P. Lee.
DEMOSTHENES: EPISTLES, ete. N. and H. J. De
~ Witt
3 9
THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
LATIN AUTHORS Lut pide
S. AUGUSTINE: CITY OF GOD, J. H. Baxter.
[CICERO : :] AD HERENNIUM. _H. Caplan.
ICERO: PRO SESTIO, IN VATINIUM
CAELIO, DE PROVINCIIS CONSULARIBU Us, PRO
BALBO. J. H. Freese and R. Gardner.
CURTIUS, Q.: HISTORY OF ALEXANDER. J. C.
soy
PRUDENTIUS. Η. J. Thomson.
DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS ON APPLICATION
Cambridge, Mass. . HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
London : , WILLIAM ΒΝ LTD
τ 10 ΡΝ
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
a
woo
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11