A retrospective view and consideration of India affairs; particularly of the transactions of the Mahratta War, from its commencement to the month of October, 1782

1

arc

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES

RETROSPECTIVE VIEW

A K D

CONSIDERATION

INDIA AFFAIRS;

PARTICULARLY OF THE

TRANSACTIONS

OF THE

M 1 1 A R A T T A W A K*

FROM ITS

COMMENCEMENT

TO THE

MONTH Of OCTOBER, 178-!,

LONDON;

PRINTED ion J. DKBPE-T, OPPOSITE BERLIN G T O N'-I! » L :
PICCADILLY, AND J. bEWELL, COICiHlLL,

r:DCCi.xs\j/5

■

4-7 3

7V3

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PREFACE.

X HE .writer Qf the following meets, in fub-
mitting them to the consideration of the public,
feels himfelf more influenced by zeal for the
community, than by any views of a private or
perfonal nature. He is therefore little folicitous
of literary rewards, or interefled in the reputa-
tion he is likely to obtain as an author, farther
than as fuch a wifh may be connected with that
Uriel: regard to truth and juftice, which is the
chief object of his ambition, and the only quali-
fication eflentiall' rcquifite to conftitute the cha-
racter to which he afpires.

If the impartial relation of circumftances to
which h has adhered mould fortunately refcue
one fact from the mill of falihood, with which
the arts of defigning and interefled men have la-
boured to difguife it, or affift in doing juftice to
the conduct of one individual, who might other-
wife fall a victim to the fee ret fhafts of envy, and
the malicious rancour of party, he will enjoy a
confeious and heart-felt pleafure, fuperior to eve-
ry other poffible gratification, and confider fuch a
<j\ recompenfe as fully proportioned to the amduity
and anxious trouble with which he has collected,

com-

( i* )

compared and arranged the feveral materials of
which the prefent narrative is compofed.

His fatisfaction will be perfect, and his reward
complete, if by an early and candid exposition
of the date of affairs in India, and of the feveral
political tranfactions which have led thereto, he
lhould be fo happy as to furnifh any information
of the fmalleft public utility, and tending to point
out the means of either remedying pair, evils, or
preventing a repetion of fimilar difafters hereafter.

It is with this animating hope that he pre-
fumes to addrefs the Honourable Court of Di-
rectors of the United 'Eaft-India Company upon
the prefent occafion, and to fubmit the following
production to their particular attention and con-
fideration, convinced that the watchful care and
ardent zeal, with which they are accuflomed to
fuperintend and promote the important interests
committed to their management and direction,
will make them gladly and favourably liften to
whatever bears an appearance of contributing to
advance the fame deferable object, and that at all
events, their well-known candour and generality
of fentiment, will make every indulgent and libe-
ral allowance, and pardon any defect in the per-
formance itfelf, in consideration of the motives
from which it originated,

A RE.

A

RETROSPECTIVE VIEW

AND

CONSIDERATION
o F

INDIA AFFAIRS.

A

FAITHFUL account of the Mharatta war,
including every material tran fact ion of a military as
well as political nature, that has occurred in India for
above eight years paft, muft at this juncture prove a
plealing and interefting fubject, and be of infinite uie to
throw a juil light upon thole important points, which
are at prefent the objects of public enquiry and difcuf-
fion, and in obtaining a certain knowledge of which,
national juilice, no lels than that due to many indivi-
duals of character and ftation in the Company's fervice,
is fo effentially concerned.

The magnitude and difficulty of the tafk, though it
excites my apprehenfion, cannot deter me from the
attempt ; becaufe, however defective my narrative, may
be found in the exterior ornaments of ilyle and grace
ot compofition, it will (I am confeious) be dictated by
the warmefl and moil zealous willies for the intereits

B of

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of my country, by a mind totally diverted of all pnju ■
dice or partiality whatever, and by an actual knowledge
ot moft: of the important facts that are related, whish
is derived either from perfonal obfervation, or from fuch
authentic papers and vouchers, as are pofitive and incon-
trovertible.

To the encouragement this confideration gives me,
is added another motive ftill more animating, when I
\j reflect that this narrative is expreffly intended for the
perufal of the Company's reprefentatives at home, and
upon a fubject which they have deemed deferving of
the moft particular and careful attention, and will, on
that account, no lefs than from their acknowledged
candor and liberality, receive, with flattering fatisfaction,
every information regarding it, that bears evident marks
of truth and moderation of temper.

I mall not take up' more time in the dull formality
of a preface, but after explaining in few words the
nature and extent of the prefent work, enter immedi-
ately into a detail of circumftances, avoiding as much
as poflible any impertinent or unneceflary intrufion upon
the patience of the public, as well as every attempt to
bias or influence their judgments, either by offering
opinions which are obvious and felf evident, or by put-
ting fuch interpretation and glofs upon facts, as might
difguife their true colour, and befl ferve any particular
and partial purpofe.

It is to a clear and exact, though not circumftantial,
relation of facts I mean to confine mylelf. I mall en-
deavour to fliew the confequences of every military and
political effort, and the advantages and difappointments
refpectively produced by them, without minutely de-
ferring the operations of the campaign, or the in-
trigues of the cabinet, farther than may be necefTary

to

C 3 )

to point out the errors of the particular fyftems from
which the latter may have originated, and to prove the
misfortunes that have ultimately flowed from them.

A more extenfive plan might encreafe and embel-
lifh the fubjec~t, but would not anfwer any ufeful pur-
pofe of information, which is the fole end I have in
view, and with the hope of which alone I am animated.
to enter upon the prefent tafk with zeal and chearful-
nefs.

The frequent occafion I mail have in the courfe of this
narrative to mention the Mharattas, their great power
as a nation, and indeed the circumftance of its being en-
tirely owing to the fyftem originally adopted by the
Company's fervants in India regarding them, that their
affairs are at prefent fo critically and alarmingly fituated,
renders fome account of their government in this place
highly proper and requifite.

The origin and foundation of their empire is a fub-
je6t, rather of curiofity and amufxng fpeculation than of
ufeful enquiry ; it cannot therefore properly belong to
this place : and were I even difpofed to difplay my ta-
lents for hiftorical investigation, and the induftry with
which I have exerted them, I fhould on this occafion
decline fuch an attempt, and acknowledge it anticipated
by a production which I have lately feen, published by
an officer of the Bombay efiablifhment, and containing
the mo ft reafonable, and (I believe) genuine account of
the original formation and fubfequent rife of the Mha-
ratta power, which has yet been obtained by the Euro-
pean enquirer. I ihall therefore only touch upon the
fubjedt, and in the moft general terms.

The mode of government eftablifhed by its fir ft great

founder, Sahou or Sewajie, proved to be of no long

duration, for although the name of fovereignty ftill

B 2 remains

/

I 4

remains with the Rajah, and each fucceeding Pclfliwa
receives the inveftiture of that office from his hands,'
according to the ceremonious forms originally prac-
t i fed ; this mark of fuperiority and attention is almcfl:
the onlv one at prefent ohfefved ; and the real power
of the ftafe, together with the entire control and ma-
nagement of affairs, is exercfed and conducted - hy,
and under the exprefs authority of, the Peifhwa, who
keeps his court at Poonah. This place is at prefent con-
fidered as the capital of the ivlharatta empire, fince
the Rajah, who conflantly refides at Settara, a flrong
and almoff. inacceffible fortrefs about fixty miles dif-
tant, is never permitted to ftir out of the latter, but
like the bird in its gilded cage, is dazzled and amufed
by the falfe glare of external ceremony and refpecfr,
which only ferves to make the gloom and wretchednefs
of his prifon more confpicuouily fplendid.

There is perhaps fcarce any family in the hiftory of
mankind, which has produced an equal number of il-
luftrious and able characters to that of the prefent
reigning Peifhwa. It was to the addrefs and influence of
its founder, Ballajee Pundit, that Rajah Sahou was
indebted for the eftablifhment as well as growth of bis
empire, and gratitude at fir ft made him repofe a confi-
dence in his benefactor, which habits of indolence
towards the latter part of his hfe, and the ability and
talents of the other, improved into a total relaxation
from the care and fatigue of bufmefs on his own part,
and a delegation of his authority to the Peifhwa. The
fuccefTors of the latter treading in his fooiflep^ have
transferred this authority to themfelves as matter of
right, and a precedent to eflablifil the fovereign power
at prefent excrcifed by them,

An

( 5 ;

An adminiflration formed and conduced by men of
the character above mentioned, and which, to other
engines of a defpotic and uncontrolable will, unites
that of religion, the moll powerful of all, mull; ne-
ceiTarily act with decifion and vigour, and by its wife
and cautious policy, continue to preferve the wide-ex-
tended empire it has acquired, no lefs from the fatal
confequences of domeftic diffentions than from the ef-
forts of foreign enemies.

The truth of this obfervarion Is proved by our own
dear-bought experience, and the difappointment given
to the hopes we have long cherifhed, and even yet un-
fortunately too much encourage, of creating a divifion
of intereft among the leaders, and in particular of
feparating Mahadjec Scindia from the miniiler Nana
Furnefe.

It is certain a combination of very extraordinary and
unforefeen events had, at one period, opened to us a
reafonable profpecr. of obtaining that influence at the
court of Poonah which good policy had long fince
fuggefled to the Company at home, and induced them
to recommend to theii fervants in India, as a conflant
and leading object, in order to exclude and defeat the
intrigue* of the French nation.

It is almoft unneceffary to add, that the period to
which I allude mull; have been that favourable crifis,
when Ragonaut Row, brother to the Pei/hwa Ballajee
Badjerow, after having adied as regent during the mi-
norities of his two nephew?, Madhurow and Narrain
Row, and upon the demife of the latter, having en-
enjoyed the dignity and exerciftd the functions of Peifli-
wa himfelf, was compelled to fiv from the machina-
tions of that very party which now governs the Mha-

jatta

V

A

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rntta ftate, and to implore the protection and aid of
the Englifh to reftore him to his native rights.

It is at that period I propofe to commence my nar-
rative, becaufe it was then that our affairs became fo
intimately blended with Mharatta politics, as to form
a leading object in all our future councils and meafures,
and it is to the line of conduct then adopted by the
government of Bengal, that we may afcribe the pre-
sent war with that nation, and of courfe the multiplied
misfortunes and ruin with which, in its confequences,
it has already overwhelmed the Britifji interefls in
India.

^ Had the Governor General and Council, when they

received a clear, and, as it afterwards appeared, unex-
aggerated account of the ftate of the war, (wifely, and
in conformity to the wifhes of the Company, entered
into by the government of Bombay in fupport of Ra-

lv gonaut Row) chofe to avail tliemfelves of the favoura-
ble opportunity, which their own unimpaired ftrength,
and the comparative weaknefs of the acting adminifira-
tion at Poonah, fo fortunately offered them, and inftead
of putting an immediate flop to hoftilitics, had they

J ihewed the fmallefl determination of fupporting the
claims of the unhappy exile, there cannot remain a
doubt in the breaft of any unprejudiced perfon, who
has read and confulered attentively the public records
of that period, but that Ragonaut Row, in conjunction
. with us, would have fhortly been enabled to dictate
terms of fubmimon to his opponents, and that with
the re-eftablifhment of his authority, all oar political
objects and wiflies in the Mharatta flate would have
been completed.

In proof of this aflertion, it is only neceflary to men-
. tion the following undoubted fact, " that when the

" treaty

( 7 )

*■ treaty with Ragoba was concluded by the Bombay
" government, and their troops had joined him in the
<l field, the minifters were fo exceedingly alarmed,
" that they fent a vakeel to Bombay to folicit peace,
" on terms the moft advantageous both to Ragoba and
"the Company; but before they had delivered their
" commiflion, which they were prevented fome days
" from doing, on account of the Governor's being in-
" difpofed, letters arrived from the Bengal government,
«' difavowing the war, and profefling a determination
«' to make peace ; in confequence of which, the vakeel
li changed his tone, haughtily demanding the reflitu-
" tion of Salfette, and the other places of which we
" had taken pofTeflion, and the furrender of Ragonaut
" Row into their hands.'*

It is farther worthy of obfervation, that at the time
of our withdrawing the Bombay troops from Ragonaut
Row's fupport, his own force confifled of between
thirty and forty thoufand men, the greater! confidence
and alacrity prevailed throughout the army, in confe-
rence of the fuperiority recently obtained over the
miniilerial leader, Hurry Punt Forkea, and many of
the principal chiefs of the oppofition had given proofs
of an inclination to eipoufe the interefts of Ragonaut
Row, which they would mofi: allured! y have followed,
if we had difcovered any intention of profecuting the
advantages already obtained by our arms, and encou-
raged them to take fuch a flep, by affording a fafe and
certain afylum againft the dangerous coniequences that
might otherwile attend it.

lnitead of this, a line of conduct totally different,

was unfortunately adopted, and the ientiments of a

majority, equally remarkable for the rectitude and in- \

fegrity of the principles which dictated all their xnea-

2 lures,

( 8 )

fures, as for the impolitic and fatal tendency of many
of the meafures themfelves, prevailed in Bengal againft
every argument of a jufl and wife policy, derived from
the long experience and obfervation of the gentlemen
who at that time conflituted the minority, and who in
the inftance now alluded to, were certainly directed by
a perfect knowledge of, and regard to, the interefts of
the Company and their country.

The confequence of thefe meafures was fuch as might
naturally have been expected. The Mharatta admini-
ftration, taking advantage of the eager and anxious
defire we difcovered for peace, dictated one, upon con-
ditions in every refpect difproportioned to the fuccefs
of our arms, and to the fuperior condition we were in
at that time to profecute the war.

Inadequate and imperfect as they were, we however
acceded to them, and the impatience of the Bengal
government to obtain a treaty, did not fuffer them to
difcern, that the one concluded by Colonel Upton at
Poorunda, March ifl, 1776, was of fo ambiguous and
^determinate a nature, as to give entire fecurity and
fatisfaction to neither party, and to put it in the power
of both to renew the war, whenever it might fuit either
their intereft or inclination.

The Mharattas in the mean time reaped the moft
folid benefits from this treaty. Sunk confiderably as a
itate in that confequence, which before the famous
battle of Panniput * they held among the ftates of

Hindoflan,

* In this remarkable battle, fought little more than twenty
years ago, the principal jVlahommcdan chiefs in Hindoflan,
ranged under the banners of the conquering Abdal'ah Duranncc,
fhuggled for fupcrioiity with the Hindoo powers led on by the

Mharattas,

( 9 )

Trlirtdoftan, and which, under the fhort but vigorous
sdminiflration of Madhurow, elder brother to Narrain
Row, they were juft: beginning to recover, when his
death, and the diflentions that enfued, joined to the
fuccefsful interpofition of our arms, plunged them once
more into weak nets and diftrefs, they required a fhort
peaceful recefs, not only to deliver them from the dan-
gers immediately impending, but to recruit their ex-
haufted ftrength, and prepare for future contefts.

Such a refpite was peculiarly feafonable to the party
'which then directed the government, in oppofition to
the claims of RagdnaUt Row, becaufe it afforded the
leaders of it an opportunity of exerting all their arts to
blacken his character and effectually ruin his caufe ;
and it is to the good ufe they made of this opportunity,
that we may attribute the total difaffecTion which af-
terwards prevailed again ft Ragoba thrdughoUt the De-
caa, and rendered every future effort in his favour in-
adequate and unfuCcefsful ; for by delaV, always dan-
gerous, and commonly fatal in do'meftic »jontefls, the
threats and prcmifes of the miniiler, joined to the li-
berality he found it necefTafy to practife on many oc-
oafidns, had leifure to operate in their full extent; and
thofe men who entered into the original afTociatioa

Mharattas, and, after a fevcrc and bloody conflict, proved vic-
torious. Soujah ul Dowla diftinguiflied himfelf greatly on this
occafion ; and on the fide of the Mhrattas, befides many leaders
of note, and above twenty-five thoufand men, the famous Su-
Jcba, brother to the reign' ng Pciflnva, Bailajec Pundit, and his
'Id (t fon, VifTnaut Row, svere unfortunately (lain- This mc-
lancholy event made fo de:p an irnpretfion on the mind of tlu
father, a<= to fhortcn his days, and for a confidcrable period be-
fore his dilTolution, lie was conftantly repeating the name of bis
'■ ■ vi In, and holding imaginary converfatioiu with fc:m.

C againft

•

{ 10 )

againfi: Ragoba, were not only confirmed in their owrt
enmity, but confcious of the refentment and jealoufy
which mull: continue to animate him, ihould he expe-
rience any favourable change of fortune, they felt it
impolTible to place the fmalleft confidence in his pro-
feffions of favour, and promifTes of forgivenefs, and
therefore confidered their own deftrudtion as the ne-
cellary confecjuence of his elevation to power.

The chara&er of the man greatly encouraged fuch
an idea, and the apprehenfion of his vindi6tive fpirit
was fo great, that even thofe who were originally well-
affe<5ted to his interests, and had never taken any adtive
part againft him, but who had peaceably acquiefced,
or perhaps continued to hold appointments under the
new adminiftration, thought it dangerous to rifque a
change, which muft expofe them to the efFedts of his
jealoufy and fufpicion, and became therefore interefted
in the fupport and fuccefs of his adverfaries.

Thus the impolitic and unfeafonable treaty, con-
cluded with the Mharattas in March 1776, deprived
us of the advantages which were then certainly within
our grafp ; arid by the ruin it brought upon the caufe
of Ragonaut Row, rendered a future war an object of
the greateft difficulty and hazard, and not to be under-
taken but upon grounds of expedient and indifpenfable
neceffity.

To the misfortune of the Company, their ruling fer-
vants in India were not contented with reprefenting
merely the difappointment occafioned by this treaty,
but they drew fuch a flattering picture of the unfettled
and diftradied fiate of the Mharatta government, and
fuggelted in fuch lively colours the advantages which
we might Hill be able to reap from their divifions, that,
as the " Delenda eft Carthago" of the wile Cato was

formerly

( « )

formerly the favourite and popular maxim with the
ambitious Romans, to pave their way to univerfal em-,
pi re, in like manner, the fettlement of the Mharatta
flate became a fixed and primary object with our lead-
ing politicians, both at home and abroad, in order to
fecure an unrivalled dominion in India.

From this circumitance it happened, that the Court ^
of Directors, deceived by falfe and exaggerated repre-
fentations, did not give that decifive and falutary check
to the clifpofition of their prefidencies in India, which
alone could have prevented a renewal of hoftilities : —
on the contrary, they contented themfelves with fimply
declaring their pofitive intention of ftrictly adhering to
the terms of the treaty made by Colonel Upton, which
they, however, acknowledge is not upon the whole fo
agreeable to them as they could wifh, and feel them-
felves at the fame time compelled, by motives of ho- y
nour, humanity, and juftice, to authorife a breach of ■«
it, by agreeing to the protection given to Ragoba, in
direct contradiction to an exprefs article (and no doubt,
in the opinion of the Mharatta mini Iter, the moll in-
terefling and important one) of the treaty. /V

It was, in fact, impoflible for the Company to have
adopted a different line. To have furrendered Rago-
naut Row into the hands of his inveterate, his perfonal
enemies, would have entailed an indelible Main upon
the honour and good faith of the nation, and have been
jutlly conhdered as a bafe and pufillanimous action,
which no profpect of future advantage could in any
refpect warrant. To perfift in affording him protec-
tion was an actual breach of treaty, and violation of
the public faith folemnly pledged for its performance.
The alternative appeared at fir it fight equal, and was
certainly a hard one, which required the mofl jud'.-
C 2 cioui

0 w >.

cious deliberation, but when maturely weighed, the
difficulty of choice foon vanished.

By the former we mufl have rendered ourfelves in-
famous in the eyes of Hindoflan and the world, whilft
bj the latter, we rifqued'little more than offending the
Mharattas, and incurring their juil refentment and fuf-
picion of our hoflile intentions.

It is even more than a reafonable fuppofition, that
by addrefs and proper management, influenced by a
Ulcere wifh on our part to preferve the peace, we might
ljave been able to fatisfy the minifler, and reconcile
him to a meafure, which it was furely our bufinefs to
Convince him originated folely from a regard to our
character and dignity as a nation, and not from any
views of a nature calculated to ferve our own fecret
purpofes hereafter, or to prejudice and deftroy his au-
thority in the ftate.

Jnflead of this, the whole of our conduct had evi-
dently a quite oppofite tendency. We infilled, with
the moll minute and ftudied exactnefs, upon the ftridt
performance of points in themfelves trifling and unim-
portant, but which, by making the fubjec~ts of difcuf-
fion, we forced into political confequence, in order
to irritate as much as poflible the minds of the Mha-
rattas. We difputed about the true meaning of a cou-
ple of Peril an words, which, if interpreted to our wifh,
would have added to the Company's annual revenue,
the enormous fum of about ten thoufand pounds ller-
ling more than the minifler propofed to give, in con-
formity to the fenfe in which he underftood tliern.
We alfo peremptorily demanded the difmifllcn oi a
per Ion belonging to the French nation from the court
of Poonah, who, with whatever intentions deputed
there, it is evident, and has been fmce fully proved,

d;d

( *3 )

did not enter into any formal engagements with the
minifler, although the latter would have been fully
juftified by our conduct relative to Ragoba, and the
unfriendly difpofition we fo ftrikingly manifefted, if
he had even folicited the alliance and fupport of the
French, as a fecurity againfl our future, hoftile at-
tempts.

On fuch immaterial and ill-founded points did we
infill with the minifler, and call his non-compliance a- %/
breach of treaty, forgetting how many more important
and more juft caufes of complaint he had. to exhibit
againft us, relative to Ragonaut Row, to the ceflions
made by Futty Sing of Chick ley, Verriow, &c. &c. ^v
and even to the restitution of Salfette itfejf; which he
had been abfolutely taught to expect from the juft ice*
and generofity of the Bengal government.

The apprehenfion (I fhould have faid, the know-
ledge) of an intended French alliance, has been po-
litically afligned as the principal motive of entering
into the war with the Mharattas. The ground* of
fuch a belief were, however, altogether fallacious, and
I make no fcruple to afTert, that the Mharattas never
had a thought of any thing more, than maintaining a. y
general good underftanding with the French nation ,
that they neither wifhed nor attempted to break their
alliance with us ; and that the hoflilities which im-
mediately followed the facts of which I have been
fpeaking, might not only have been prevented by our
eifor's, but were confequences originating entirely
from our own active meaiures, abfolutely calculated
as well as intended to produce a war.

This aflertion naturally excites curiofity to enquire,
fince the war on our part is evidently of choice, and

not

not of neceflity, by whofe management and counfel the
nation became involved in a conteft, which has proved
the fruitful fource of innumerable misfortunes, and has
brought us to the very brink of a precipice, beyond
which, if we advance a fingle ftep, certain and total
ruin muft enfue.

I have already mentioned the diflatisfa6lion with
which the treaty of March 1776 was juftly received
both at home and abroad, by all thofe who knew the
real fituation of affairs at the time it was concluded,
and were fenfible of the advantages we facrificed, with-
out obtaining any adequate benefit or fecurity, in re-
turn.

Thefe therefore, it is probable, would readily approve
of any fyflem they fuppofed to be calculated to recover
that fuperiority ; and unfortunately the ruling fervants
in India either did not fee themfelves, or chofe not to
let their conftituents fee, that the golden opportunity
was irrecoverably loft, and that thofe leaders in the
Mharatta ftate, who once difcovered an inclination to
fupport the interefts of Ragonaut Row, were, for the
reafons I have already affigned, become totally averfe
from his caufe.

From their partial and exaggerated accounts it un-
fortunately happened that a latitude of action was left
them, of which they did not fail to avail themfelves ; y
and the ambition of a majority on one fide of India
co-operated with avarice on the other, to precipitate a
rupture, which, if the wife counfels and able policy of
Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler could have prevailed,
mufl have been fortunately avoided ; nor would Hyder /\
Ally have fince dared to take advantage of a feeble and
corrupt adminiftration, to invade the dominions, and
ruin the power ot the Llngiifh in the Carnatic.

It

( ?S )

It is plain, therefore, that the difpofition and fenti-
ments of the Bengal and Bombay prefidencies perfectly
correfponded and co-operated on that occafion ; but as
the latter uniformly confulted with, and acted by the
exprefs orders of the former; and as every part of their
conduit was authorifed in the raoft full and direct man-
ner ; as the power of prevention alfo remained with the
Bengal government, and as they not only did not exert
it, but took an active and zealous part to promote hof--
tilities, it may furely be advanced, upon every ground
of political reafoning and juftice, that Mr. Haftings
was the real and refponfible author of the Mharatta
war, and that it remains with him to anfwer to the
Company and his country for the countlefs train of
evils and misfortunes in, which it has involved them. /\

I have thus conducted my narration to the actual
breaking out of the war, which I conceive to have been
in the early part of the year 1778, when the detach-
ment from Bengal commenced its march (at leafr then
fo underflood) to Bombay , for under whatever colour
the real intent of this meafure was difguifed, or what-
ever fpecious arguments were made ufe of at the time
to reconcile it to the Mharatta miniiier, and to over-
come the folid objections brought againft it by the mi-
nority, it is evident that Mr. Haitings forefaw, and
was prepared for, the coufequences ; and that, though
he affected to exprefs " a reafonable expectation of the
" administration at Poonah being alarmed at fo vigo-
" rous a meafure, and made to act with more good
" faith towards their allies," nothing was farther from
his idea, than to prevent hoftilities, which, it plainly
appeared from his fubfequent conduct, he was fully
bent upon, and determined fliould take place at all
events.

The

7

Hie iVIhamtis themfelves, well knowing the difpo-
Yition of the Boitihay, and, from recent circumftances,
Tufpicious of that 6f the Bengal government, could
not but behold this prOpofed acceflion of flrength to
the former at that particular juncture with the moil
jealous and anxious eye. They accordingly difcou-
raged the meafure all in their power, without abfolute-
ly refufing a paflage through their country, and there-
by offending the Englifh, which they iludioufly endea-
voured to avoid ; and when, notwithstanding their
declared difapprobation, the troops perfifted in their
march, the minifter certainly confidered fuch conduct
as an undoubted proof of our unfriendly intentions,
and equal to the moft Open and violent act of hoftility.

It was not till the middle of May that the Bengal
detachment, confifting of fix battalions of feapoys. a
company of native artillery, and about eight hundred
horfe, (in ail near five thoiifand men) crolTed the river
Jumna at Kalpee, a moit time previous to which a
revolution had been effected at Poonah in favour of Mo-
raba Furnefe ; and the government of Bombay, who,
it fliould be obferved, had neither afTifted in bringing
it about, nor exerted themfelves vigorcufly in fupport-
ing it after it was accomplished, from a belief of this
chiefs attachment to Ragonaut Row, lent directions
to the officer commanding the detachment, to halt
where their letter might reach him, until he received
their father orders.

This new adminiftration proved, however, of very
fhort duration, and Nana Furnefe, by the timely aid
and enttrprifing addtefs of Scindea,* icon recovered

his

* Nana Turncfc, while in the hantls of Maraba, had artfully
difi'uii'cJ his ambitious views unJcr the maik of the molt f-ccLus

mode-

( I? )

his fuperiority, and refumed the reins of government,
which he has ever fince continued to guide, while Mo-
raba lingers out a wretched captivity at Ahmednagur,
which has been lately made more clofe and rigorous by
the difcovery of a plot for his deliverance, to which it
is faid the governor of the fortrefs was privy, and has
in confequence iuffered death.

I cannot here avoid a fhort digreffion, to obferve
how firmly the power of the minifter, Nana Furnefe,
feems to be at prefent eftablifhed. Of all the chiefs
heretofore leagued with himfelf and rivals in powei,
and of all thofe who have been at any time fufpe&ed
by him, as favourers of the caufe of Ragonaut Row,
Moraba is the only perfon remaining to excite the mod
'diftant jealoufy or aj prehenfjon. All the reft have
either died in prifon, or have purchafed their liberty
by the payment of a large fum of money, and content-
edly fubmitted to poverty and a private condition.

Hurry Punt Furkea, the general of the flate, is fo!e-
ly indebted to the minifter for his prefent elevated rank
and confequence. He lives with him on the moil con-
fidential footing, and in cafe of his ruin, muft inevi-
tably lhare the fame fate, or fink into total obfcurity.

moderation, and had carried his deep diifimulation Co far, as to
declare that he had no other wifli, but to vifit the holy city of
Benares, for which purpofc he actually afTumcd a habit of pecu-
liar piety and devotion, while at the fame time he was fecretly
carrying on a correfpondence with Mahadjec Scindea, and fettling
with that chief the precife manner and particular hour for appre-
hending Moraba and refcuing himfelf. This fervice Scindea ac-
cordingly performed on the 28th of June, at the head of twenty-
five thoufand men, and fecured the perfon of Moraba, whilft
Nana laughed at the credulity of his rival, and deridingly told
him, that he meant to defer his vifit to Benares % little longer.
D Scindea,

J

( '8 )

Scindea, to whom Nana Furnefe may be faid to owd
every thing, has reaped and ft 111 enjoys every folid ad-
vantage, both with refpect to fortune and ambition,
which, as the moll powerful fubject of a great and well-
eftablifhed empire, (and to nothing more muft he af-
pire) he can poffibly defire or expect. No change of
government will prove beneficial to him ; and the de-
gree of jealoufy mutually fubfifting betwixt himfelf and
Hurry Punt, which Nana, it is probable, fees, and fe-
cretly encourages, to render each more immediately
dependant upon himfelf, muft at all events prove a
{ufficient check and obftacle to their forming any de-
signs prejudicial to a peifon, whofe continuance in
power they know to be fo ftrictly connected with their
own fafety and fuccefs.

Holkar only remains to be mentioned; and his per-
fonal character is an ample fecurity againft any mif-
chief which his influence in the ftate, even if prompt-
ed by fecret inclination, could poffibly effect ; for he
has all along been directed by Scindea in his political
conduct ; nor is there any reafon to fuppofe he will
venture to embrace a different fyftem.

From the above remarks, and from the farther con-
fideration, that all the other Mharatta chiefs of any
weight or confequence are Brahmins, and by their pre-
judices againft Ragonaut Row, no lefs than by their in-
terefted connection with the minifter, under whom
they enjoy confidence and authority, are of courfe
firmly devoted to his caufe, it is afluredly a reafonable
opinion, as far as human forefight can reach, to pro-
nounce the prefent adminiftration of Poonah eftablifhed
upon the firmeft and moft durable bafis, and equally
A cure from domeftic diffentions and internal treachery,
as it is from the efforts of foreign enemies, whofe dan-
gerous

( '9 )

^gerous and enterprifing attacks it has in a late ftriking
inftance, by an able, extenfive, and well-concerted
fyftem of policy, found means effectually to defeat in
the very moment of fuccefs.

The reftoration of Nana Furnefe's authority made ^
it neceflary for the Bombay government to revert once
more to their hoftile fyftem. They accordingly fent ^
orders for the advance of the Bengal troops, and rely-
ing upon their fupport, they proceeded to contrive the
means of oppofing and removing the acting adminiftra-
tion at Poonah, which had been the original object of
the formation of the detachment, and indeed of all
the meafures which they had been purfuing for. a con-
fiderable time before, in concert with the Bengal pre-
Cdency.

The refolution of the Select Committee of Bombay,
for adopting a fpecific plan in favour of Ragoba, was j
taken the 21 ft of July, and communicated to the ho-
nourable Governor General and Council, whofe ap-
probation they received the 27th of September follow-
ing. A formal treaty was then concluded with that
chief, bearing date the 24th of November, 1778, and y
the Bombay forces immediately took the field, in order
to conduct him to Poonah, and place him in the re-
gency, according to the agreements mutually made for
that purpofe.

Thus far no part of the conduct of the Bombay go-
vernment appears in any degree rcprehenfible. I do
not, however, allude to the particular conditions fet-
tled with Ragonaut Row on this occafion. It was,
perhaps, in one refpect, fortunate, that the entire fai-
lure of the enterprife itfelf prevented them from ever
becoming the fubjects of ferious conlideiation or dif-
cuflion. I fpeak only, at prefent, to the genera! na- /\
JD 2 ture

( 20 )

ture of the plan, which , it muft be acknowledged, was
undertaken with the pofitive fanc~tion, concurrence,
and, I may fay, knowledge of the Governor Genera]
and Council.

How ftrange, then, how inconfiftent, and how con-
trary to every rule of policy, and even common fcnfe,
will the conduct of the latter be judged, when it i»
known, that they were at the fame time fecretly at-
tempting a negotiation with Modajee Bofla, the Rajah
of Berar, the real object of which they ftudioufly con-
cealed from the knowledge of the Bombay govern-
ment ; and by a refinement in political intrigue here-
tofore uneflayed, thought to attain a determinate end,
by purfuing at one and the fame time two diftinct
avenues of action, which pointed to objects diametri-
cally oppofite, and which it was abfolutely impoflible
could ever unite, or be in the fmalleft degree reconciled
to each other.

In order to explain this bufinefs fully, it is neceffary
to recur to the period almoft immediately fubfequent
to the revolution at Poonah in favour of Nana Fur-
ncfe, when by the vigilance and zeal, of the gentle-
men who compofed the Secret Committee for managing
the Company's affairs in Europe, certain intelligence of
a French war was communicated with a fecrecy and
difpatch that can fcarcely be credited.

This intelligence did Mr. Haftings make the bafis
of his propofal for a plan he had long meditated of an
alliance with the Rajah of Berar, the grand object of
which involved the fuccefs of a project the mod wild
and impracticable that ever entered the mind of a po-
litician. It v/as in fact altogether chimerical, and in
no fhape to be reconciled to the known abilities and
political difcernment of him who cheriflied, and has

fince

( « )

fince continued to indulge it, to fuch a height of ex-
travagant and infatuated belief, as not to allow the evi-
dence of pofitive fa&s which carried conviction to all
the world befides, to diminifh the confidence he placed
in the friendly difpofition of the Berar prince, or even
totally deftroy the hopes he ft ill maintained of railing
him to the fovereignty of the Mharatta empire.

The delufion at firft imbibed has continued to ope-
rate to our prejudice during the whole of the war;
and I cannot but confider the propofals for a treaty
with the Mharatta adminiftration, tranfmitted through
the channel of Modajee Bofla, in October, 1780, and
the late appointment of Mr. Chapman to the court of
Naigpore, poffeffing at the fame time authority to ne-
gociate with the Mharatta flare, as two meafures equal-
ly weak, impolitic, and deflructive of the true interefts
of the Company, as well as fruftrating their ardent de-
fire for peace. But the juftice of this remark will be
more fully proved in the detail of fubfequent tranfac-
tions. It is fuflicient for the prefent purpofe to ob-
ferve, that even at the period of which I am now
fpeaking, and previous to the full difcovcry which the
government of Bengal might have made of Modajee's
real intentions, from the correfpondence of Mr. Wa-
therfton, who was deputed in December, 1778, to the
court of Naigpore by General Goddard, and particu-
larly from a letter addrelTed to them by the General him-
felf, dated at Burhanpore, February 5, 1779, where,
after mentioning the advices he had juft received from
the Rajah, of the total overthrow of the Bombay forces
at Telli igong, the uncertain, contradictory, and at the
fame time alarming, nature of the difpatches arrived
both from the Bombav Committee and their army in
the field, and the determination he had formed in con-

fcquence,

(

C 22 )

fequencc, of proceeding immediately towards Surar,
he gives his opinion of Modajee's averfion to the fu-
ture profecution of the propofed project in the follow-
ing clear and pointed words : " I am induced to be-
" lieve, he (Modajee) would obje£t to my continuing
** in his dominions, becaufe, with the account he has
" written me of the tranfaclions at Poonah, he has
«« propofed my returning to Calcutta by fuch road as
'.« I fhall find mod convenient and eligible, without
" making any reference to your expected replies to
',' his letters, or to their confequence in favour of his
*' views, in concert with your government."

I fay, exclufive of the lights derived from the above
fource, a cool and impartial confideration of the na-
ture of the plan itfelf would have ferved to convince
any unprejudiced perfon of its extravagance, and have
fuggefled the impoflibility of prevailing upon a wife
and difcerning court, like that of the then government
of Naigpore, to hazard and endanger its future exif-
tencc as a powerful flate, in purfuit of a chimerical
fcheme of aggrandizement, which, upon every prin-
ciple of political reafoning and judgment, was fur-
rounded by fuch great and innumerable difficulties, as
to be juftly pronounced impracticable.

"What excufe, then, can be brought for the Bengal
government's wifhing to adopt fuch a fcheme, and not
only ferioufly endeavouring to effect it, but doing fo at
a time when they had reafon to believe the presidency
of Bombay had actually entered upon the execution
of another, under their exprefs fanction and authority,
and depended for its fuccefs upon the fupport of the
Bengal detachment, fuppofed to be then on its march
to their alTillance ?

That
l

That this, however, was the cafe, it is only necelTaty
to obferve, that the approbation given by the Bengal
government to their propofed plan in favour of Rago-
naut Row was dated in Auguft, 1778, and the inftruc-
tions given to General Goddard, upon the grounds of
thofe formerly furnifhed Mr. Elliott, in the November
following. That in the preceding month of July, they
had briefly communicated Mr, Elliott's million to the
Bombay Council, but had concealed the particular ob-
ject of it, relative to an offenfive alliance with Modajee,
and his eftablifhment in the Rauge of Settara. That
it is true, they then ufed the precaution, in order, as
they fay, to prevent any iteps of a contrary tendency
on the part of the Bombay prefidency, to requeft iC that
u they would refrain from forming any engagements
'« of a nature hoftile to the adminiftration at Poonah,
*f excepting fuch as might appear abfolutely neceflary
" for the defence of their own pofleflions j" and that
even this precaution, vague and inconclufive as it muft
appear, was intirely neglected in the letter of approba-
tion above alluded to, which contained only a reftriction
*' from entering into any engagements with Ragoba
il of a tendency hoftile to the government of Berar,
" or contrary to fuch as Mr. Elliott might have ap-
<( prized them of his having concluded with Alodajee
" Bofla."

Thus, then, it plainly appears, that the government
of Bombay, through the whole of the tran fact ions
which followed Colonel Upton's treaty in March, 1776,
to the formation of the engagements made with Ra-
goba in November, 1778, were encouraged, fupportcd,
and fully authorised by the Governor General and
Council, who neverthelefs molt unaccountably, I had
almoft faid treacheroufly, defcrted their plan at the

very

( 24 }

very moment it became ripe for execution, and fecrei-
ly adopted a new and diftindt project, the purfuit of
which could not fail, in its confequences, effectually to
defeat the fuccefs of the enterprife in favour of Ra-
goba ; nor was it till the month of March, 1779, and
after the arrival of General Goddard at Bombay, that
a copy of Mr. Elliott's original inftru&ions was re-
ceived by the Prefident and Select Committee, and the
nature of the propofed alliance with Modajee Bofla
fully explained to them.

Another circumftance deferves mentioning, as it
tends farther to difplay the inconfiflency and duplicity
of the Bengal government throughout this bufinefs in
the moll finking colours; which is, that on the 15th
of October, 1778, they wrote to the prefidency of
Bombay, generally advifing them of the friendly dif-
pofition of the Beiar Rajah, but acquainting them,
that as Mr. Elliott was dead, they propofed to wait for
advices from the Rajah before they appointed any other
perfon to fucceed him. They at the fame time autho-
rife the gentlemen of Bombay to " give orders to the
" officer commanding the Bengal detachment, to pro-
«' ceed forwards in fupport of the plan for reinstating
" Ragoba in the regency, if they think fuch a ftep
" neceflary."

The unfortunate iflue of the expedition from Bom-
bay to accomplifli that object is too well known to re-
quire a defcription in this place. The malicious exer-
tions of party have operated in fecret, and the im-
predions made by a generous fenfe of national difgrace
and lofs, have publicly and powerfully united to load
the unhappy actors in that diflrefsful fcene with every
fpecies cf reproach and infamy, and even to plunge
them into irremediable ruin.

It

C ±s )

It is not the intention of the author of thefe meets
to join in the popular cry, or to wipe off the odiurri
which has afperfed their characters. It is a fubjett he
does not mean to difcufs. But juftice as well as huma-
nity generally claims the impartial teftimony of his peri
o'n this bccafion ; and the enquiring eye of unpreju-
diced truth will trace the failure of the enterprize to
a fource far different from the fuppofed mifcondudl: of
thofe men, who had the immediate management and
direction of it;

It will difcover the certain feeds of difappointment
in a diftruft and jealoufy which early took place be-
tween the two prefidencies, which deftroyed every
ground of mutual confidence, and which, by produ-
cing open neglect, on the one part, and fecret refent-
ment on the other, ultimately defeated the views of
both, and ended in the moll fatal and ruinous confe-
rences to the public.

It will fee the Governor General and Council of
Bengal prefering a favourite fcheme projected by them-
felves, yetfc as if confcious of its extravagance and ab-
furdity, afraid of openly avowing that preference, and
at the fame time purfujng fuch unaccountable means,
and ifluing orders of fo contradictory a nature, as to
perplex, embarrafs, and totally overturn the very plan
they were bound by their own inftruclions and pofitive
promifes to fupport.

It will alfo fee the prefidency of Bombay in their
turn, aware of this unlucky predilection, which inter-
fered with their views, ingenioufly contriving to de-
ceive themfelves as well as others into a belief of the
ftrength and fufficiency of their caufe, and without
encouragement from any partizahs of Ragoba, or wait-
ing for the fupport of the Bengal detachment, (which

E though

( 26 )

though delayed, rauft, they might have been confident,,
at lad arrive) precipitately plunging into a conteft to
which they were unequal, and facrificing the interefts
of their country to the feelings of refentment and thr
dictates of a felfifh and jealous 2mbition.

Thefe will be the latent caufes and fa£ts difcernable
by the keen and fearching eye of truth, and their rea-
lity will be confirmed, by oblerving the line of conduct
afterwards purfued by both parties. No crimination
or enquiry into the behaviour of individuals, but an
afFecled moderation on the part of the Bengal prefi-
dency, which in notorious cafes of public delinquency
is furely moft unpardonable, and no accufation of, or
reflection upon, the particular meafures of the Bombay
government,, in order to account for,, and explain the
caufes of the late mifcarriage, which was certainly due
to public juftice, and abfolutely neceflary for their own
vindication.

In {hort, a mutual confeioufnefs of the large fhare
each had contributed to the public misfortunes, made
neither party defirous of too minute an enquiry into
the tranfa&ions which led to them, and they judged it
for the common intercft to adopt a fyflem of forbear-
ance and moderation, whicli they have fince maintain-
ed towards each other whh a tolerable degree of tem-
per, but from which it is probable they will now very
(hortly depart.

After the return of the Bombay army from Tillia-
,gong, and the arrival of the Bengal detachment at Su-
ra', on the 25th of February, 1779, an event that, ex-
clufive of any merit denved from it in a political light,
reflected equal honour upon the courage and difcipline
of the troops, and the military flcill and abilities of
the officer who commanded and conducted them acrofs

the

< 27 )

the peninfula, the firft material circumftance that oc-
xurred, was the receipt of a letter from the Governor
General and Council, dated the 5th of the fame month,
appointing General Goddard their minifter at the Mha-
ratta court.

The inftru&ions that accompanied, were prepared
under a probable belief of the enterprife in favour of
Ragonaut Row having fucceeded, and were calculated
for entering upon a negociation with that .chief.

A fituation of affairs in the Mharatta empire, fo
widely different from what the Bengal government ex-
pected when they drew up the inftructions, had of
courfe rendered them entirely ufelefs and inapplicable
when they arrived, and accordingly the General wrote
to Bengal, that he mould defer making known to the
administration at Poonah the commiilion with which
.he was intruded, until he could receive farther instruc-
tions.

I muft, however, give a fhort extract from the Ben-
gal Council's letter here, as it marks fo ftrongly their
difappointment at the fuppofed fuccefs of a meafure,
which, though not of their own formation, they are
forced to acknowledge was authorised by them ; and,
indeed, the tendency of the letter altogether was fuch,
and exprefled fo pointedly their determination of pro-
iecuting the plan in favour of Modajee at a future op-
portunity, that I make no doubt, had even Ragoba
been raifed to the government, another revolution muft
fhortly have been attempted.

After acknowledging the receipt of General God-
dard's letters from Houflungabad, of the 4th and 6th
of January, communicating the failure of his negocia-
tion with the Berar Rajah, they proceed as follows :
" We are very much concerned that Modajee Boiia
E 2 mould

( =8 )

,, mould have fo f; r diftrufted the powers with which
„ you were inverted, as to fuppofe that any engagc-
„ ments formed by the Prefident and Council of Bom-
" bay, could preclude the accomplishment of a treaty
„ with him, if fuch had been concluded, and therc-
" fore} that he declined to enter into the propofed ne-
(f gociation. If a treaty had been executed by you on
" the prefcribed terms, it would have been our duty
" to enforce it in preference to any made at Bombay,
" and to have taken care, that no conditions in which
'* that prefidency might have bound itfelf, fhould have
(t operated to the prejudice of our engagements. But
*' in the prefent fituation of things, we approve and
*c applaud the prudence and active zeal for the inre-
" refts of the Company which you have fhewn, in the
V refolution fo immediately taken on receipt of the
" requifition from the Prefident and Select Committee
" of Bombay, to relinquifh the profecution of the
" commiflion which had been efpecially entrufted to
" you, and to proceed with the detachment under your
c< command to fupport the meafures, in which that pre-
" fidency was actually engaged, and in which they had
*' fo far committed the fafety and profperity of their
" own government, and perhaps the general welfare
" of the Company, as to require every aid that could
<c poflibly be given to them.

** As the treaty concluded by the Prefident and Se-
•c lcc~t Committee of Bombay with Ragonaut Row was
" declared to be made under our fanction and authc-
lc rity, and as we actually did grant our confent to
" fuch a treaty on the 17th of Auguft, 1778, we are
" determined to abide by and fupport it, notwith-
« ftanding the total change which has fince takeu
«' place in the circumftances under which it was pro-

« pole a

( *9 )

(t pofed to us, and the new meafures which we have
" ourfelves adopted on the fuppofed failure of thofe-
« planned by the prefidency of Bombay."

Speaking of the alliance with Modajee, they ufe the
following expreffive words. " However we may be
** restrained by motives of policy from profecuting
" this meafure, under the circumltances which have
<c caufed the fufpenfion of it, we are by no means pre-
«« eluded by the terms of the treaty with Ragoba ; the
" pretenfion of Bofla to the Rauge or fovereign autho-
" rity of the Mharatta ftate, exifting independently of
" any connections betwixt the Engliih Eaft-India Com-
" pany and Ragoba, and being perfectly reconcileable
« with them."

On the 5th of the fucceeding April, the Governor
General and Council having then received authentic ac-
counts of the defeat of the Bombay army, and of the
difgraceful convention made at Worgaum with the mi-
nifterial leaders for its fafe and unmolefted return, toge-
ther with the feveral tranfactions fubfequent to that un-
fortunate event, thought proper to furnifh * General
Goddard with frefh credentials, as their minifter at the
court of Poonah, and to empower him to negociate a
treaty, the exprefs obje£t of which was " to renew or
f* confirm that formerly concluded by Colonel Upton,
11 provided the Mharattas would previoufly agree to
" recede from the pretenfions they had acquired by the
" late engagements of Meflrs. Carnac and Egerton,
il and agree not to admit any French forces into their
1* dominions, or allow that nation to form eftablifh-
" ments on the Mharatta coait.*'

* It was at this time he was alfo advanced from the rank o£
Colonel to that of Brigadier-general, with every flattering enco-
mium and mark of diftinttion.

Under

4

( 3° )

Under thefe reftri&ions, and with this latitude of
action, excepting that authority was farther granted to
relax in fome trifling points relative to Colonel Upton's
treaty, which, it is curious to obfenre, were once deem-
ed of fo grent importance, as to conflitute the declared
ground of a rupture betwixt the two States, a negociation
was opened by General Goddard at Surat, and carried
on with the moft unremitting afliduity and zeal during
the months of Auguft, September, and October, 1779;
at the expiration of which period, a pofitive anfwer
was received from Poonah to the propofals tranfmitted
by the General, for the minhter's confuieration and ac-
ceptance, and in confequence of the determined fpirit
of hoftility which di&ated it, all farther negociation
was immediately broke off, and the Mharatta vakeels
returned to their matter.

It has been ill-naturedly f»ggefted, and continues to
be the malicious endeavour of thofe, who, upon the
illiberal principles of a miflaken policy, think they are
rendering a fervice to the Bombay administration, by
fixing a large fhare of blame upon the Governor Gene-
ral and Council, becaufe the latter neceffarily took
upon themfelves the care and refponfibility, to attri-
bute the failure of General Goddard's negociation to
an unreafonable obftinacy and feverity in the demands
he was inftru&ed to make, and to a wanton and ftu-
died wifh on his part to involve the Company in a war,
the management of which would be left to him.

This fufpicion, however, mud be proved to be as
falfe as it is ungenerous, when circumstances come to
be explained ; and candour will not only fimply acquit,
but in juftice acknowledge, that every proper effort
was ufed to bring about a peace, and that the failure
of the negociation, and fubfequent renewal of hoftili-

ties,

t 3* )

ties, \ras occafioned by the influence of the fentiments
which then prevailed in the Mharatta councils, and
which determined the minifter to reject all overtures
for an accommodation, and to put n& farther trull in a ^
power, whofe late perfidious breach of faith had proved
it to be totally undeferving of a generous confidence,
and incapable of a friendly alliance, unlefs where it
perfectly fuited with particular views of convenience,
or was dictated by neceflity.

In this latter point of view he certainly considered
our advances, and was therefore the more eafily led to
prefume, upon his late fuccefs at Telliagong, to hope
that the Peiihwa's arms would once more triumph, and
prove fupetior to our military exertions.

Add to this, the refentment the minifter muft natu- ^
rally feel at being fo egregioufly duped by a (ham con-
vention on our part, and at the ungrateful return we
made for his moderation and mercy, together with the
determined enmity we difcovered towards him, in con-
tinuing to afford protection to Ragonaut Row, and we
{hall then find the true caufe which prolonged the
Mharatta war, and which drove Nana Furnefe into an
unnatural alliance and confederacy with Hyder Ally. y\
This confederacy, to which Nizam Ally and Modajee
Bofla acceded, was formed fo early as the period I am
now fpeaking of, and General Goddard gave intelli-
gence of it to the Governor General and Council in>
the month of September, 1779.

I fhall difmifs the fubject of this ncgociation by ge-
nerally obferving, that the foirit of the Bengal go-
vernment's inflructions was certainly calculated to pro- \/
mote a juft and honourable peace, and that the actual
ftate of circumflanccs at that time would not have jul-
tiEed their agreeing to one of a different nature.

It

( 32 )

It -would not, however, be doing juflice to Gener z\
Goddard, to be totally filent regarding the exertions he
ufed to render them effectual, and therefore I fhall
give a brief abftract of his, conduct.

The vakeels from the Poonah court did not arrive at
Surat till the middle of Auguft, previous to which, he
had, by every means his fituation afforded, endeavour-
ed to imprefs the minifters with an idea of his pacific
and friendly intentions, in protecting and encouraging
the fubjects of the Mharatta ftate.

This conduct he perfifted in after the arrival of the
vakeels.* In explaining the feveral points of the ne-
gociation, he invariably expreffed himfelf in a language
the molt moderate, though firm, and in terms which
fully proved a fincere defire to become the inftrument
of a perfect reconciliation betwixt the two ftates*
He wrote to the minifter, accompanying the propofals
for peace, that as foon as he had communicated his ap-
probation of them, in order to prevent every avoidable
delay, he (the General) would immediately fet out
for Poonah ; and a confiderable time elapfmg without
any explicit anfwer being received to the propofitions
which had been tranfmitted, he difpatched Lala Nehal

* The following extract from the Governor General and
Council's letter, dated Sept. 16, 1779, proves the political ad-
^refs and moderation of his conduct : " We obferve with fome
" degree of plcafure, the notice taken by the Mharatta govern-
" ment, in their letters to you, of the liberal attention which
" you had Uicwn to the interefts of that ftate, in the protection
" given to their aumils in Guzarat againft the irregularities of
*' Ragoba's dependants, and we recommend a coat. nation of
" the fame kindnefj and moderation in all your conduct; to«
*' wards them."

Chuad,

( 33 f

Chuni one of the two Mharatta agents, fully iuftru<5l-
ed, and properly encouraged, to his matter .

This man carried the propoied conditions in Writing;
nor was it till his return to Surat, with the following
pofitive declaration on the part of the minifter, viz.
" That he cAuld rtot make peace with the Englifh, un-
" lefs they delivered up Ragonaut Row into his hands,
'* and made immediate reftitution of the ifland of Sal-
" fette," that the General, in obedience to the orders
he had received from Bengal, broke off the negocia-
tion, arid difmifled the vakeels.

All hopes of peace being thus deftroyed, it became
iiecefTary to prepare for hoftilities, and the General ac-
cordingly proceeded to carry into execution, a plan of
military operations which he had formed, with the
concurrence and approbation of the Select Committee
of Bombay ; who, in addition to the powers he had
received from Bengal, thought proper alfo to delegate
to him the authority of their government, and to ap-
point him their minifter with Futty Sing Row Guico-
war, and fuch other chiefs in the Guzerat, as it might
be neceflary to engage in our interests for the more
fucceisful profecution of the war.

It is proper here to obferve, that the general con-
duct of the war, both in the formation of plans, and
in the execution of them, was left to the choice and V
direction of General Goddard, guided by the advice
and information of the Bombay Presidency ; and as it
marks the cordial union which at one period tubfified
betwixt them, and the delicacy and moderation which
diftinguifhed the General's conduct, under circum-
ilances fo invidious and difgufting, it may not be amifs
to tranfcribe the following extract of a letter from the
honourable Governor General and Council, dated the \

F 14th

y

s\

/

( 44 )

*4*h of June, 17^9. " We obferve with the highefr.
*' fatisfadtion the approbation which the Select Com-
** mittee of Bombay exprefs at your conduct, and the
" ready difpofition which you have fhewn to aflift in
" the execution of tlieir defigns. It is with pleafure
*' that we have refolved to join with them in recom-
" mending you to the Court of Directors, for the ap-*»
" pointment of commander in chief at that Presidency,
*' whenever there may be a vacancy," &c.

Although by the efcape of Ragonaut Row from the
hands of their enemies in June 1779, and his arrival in
the Engltfh camp, where General Goddard had judged1
it for the honour and intereft of the Company to grant
him -and his family an afyhuri, and to promife him per-
ianal protection in the name and with the fubfequent
intire approbation of the Bengal government : I fay, al-
though from this circurnftance, matters had reverted to
the fame ftate in which they were previous to the Tef-
liagong expedition, it was not, however, found expe-
dient to extend our connection with that unfortunate
and unfriended chief beyond the mere afTurance of
perfonal fafety, or to renew in any fhape the engage-
ments which had been formerly entered into with him
by the Bombay government.

Fatal experience had already convinced us of the-
rooted averfion and enmity which prevailed againft him.
throughout the Mharatta ftate; and that therefore we
mould little grace or ftrengthen our caufe, by uniting
it with the affertion of his unpopular and otherwifc
unfupported claims.

His prefence in the cafe of a rupture with the Poo-
nah adminiftration, which had in fpite of every effort
proved unavoidable, was certainly of very beneficial
conference, in augmenting the fears of onr enemies,

and

( 3S )
and arming us with the means of injuring them more
efTentially if we proved fuccefsful, or of accommoda-
ting our difference with the greater eafe and advantage*
fhould we at any time wifh to bring the war to a ter-
mination.

From all thefe considerations, it was left to time and
future circumftances to determine the extent of our
benefits to Ragonaut Row ; and in the intermediate
lpace, we entered upon the war avowedly as principals,
compelled to it by the refuCal of the Mharatta minrfter
lo accept of the juft and reafonable conditions of peace
we had propoied to him, which rendered hoftilities on
our part an act of felf- preservation and defence.

The inferior eftimation in which the caufe of Rago-
ba was necefl'arily held, and the little influence it had
upon the future operations of the war, might almoft
render an apology requifite for having fufFered it to en-
gage fo much prefent attention : but the beft excufeto
be made is, that I Shall here take leave of him, and
that molt probably his name will not once occur during
the remainder of this narrative.

On the firft of January, 1780, the army under Ge- y
neral Goddard, reinforced by a fmall detachment of
Bombay troops, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel
Hartley, croffed the river Tappy, on its route to Gu-
i'erat.

It had been refolved to commence the campaign with
the fettlement of that province, and the General loft
;io time in accomplishing an object, which, befidesthe
great importance of it to the general fuccefs of the
war, it was particularly necefTary ihould be finally ad-
jufled previous to the arrival of the Mharatta forces in
the neighbourhood, left their prelencc Should intimj-
F 2 dat<%

( 36 )

date, and fix decidedly in the Peifhwa's intereft, Futty
§ing Guicowar, whofe inclination at the heft could
only be fuppofed to he wavering ; and we fhould by
that means be constrained to confine our operations to
the oppofition of their united ftrength, under every
poffible difadvantage, and without any acquifition of?
revenue or improvement of resource whatever.

I have already premifed, that it is not my intention
to fwell this narrative, by a minute defcription and de-
tail of military operations , but it is with no fmall
reluctance and regret that I muft on the prefent occa-
sion decline a talk, which, from the various^ proofs it
affords of fkilful conduit in the commander, and of
disciplined valour in the troops, would fo pleafingly
gratify my private feelings, and allow fuch ample fcope
to animated language, and all the force of nervous
eloquence: juftice, however, requires that T fhonld ge-
nerally bear teftimony to a merit fo diftingui/hed ; and
while I mention the many and ftriking advantages de-
rived to the Company by the operations of this cam-
paign, I cannot help celebrating the able exertions and
gallant fpirit of thofe, by whofe united labours and
perfeverance they were acquired.

The province of Guzerat could only be fettled by
the two following modes, either by a union of intereits
with Futty Sing, or by forcibly wrefting it out of hi?
hands.

Every idea of reafon and good policy dictated the
former, if it could pofTibly be effected. Upon the eve
of engaging in a war with the moft powerful (late in
Hindoftan, and unfupported by any friend or ally, nay,
even fufpicious of the defigns of thofe princes who
then profeffed a neutrality, it furely was a point of the

fir ft:

( 37 )

flrfl: confideration, to conciliate and attach Futty-5ing
to our caufe, fince by fo doing we fecured toourfelves
the immediate poiTeffion of a confiderable track of
country, and, as it has fince proved, the unmolefted
poffefllon of its revenue ; an object at that time abso-
lutely eiTential for enabling us to enter upon hoftilities
with vigour and effect ; whereas, if Futty Sing had
continued inimical to us, no prefent provifion could
poffibly have been made for the future profecution of
the war ; the province of Guzerat muft have been to-
tally defolated and deftroyed, and even fuch parts of it
as we might have been able to pofTefs ourfelves of»
muft have been expofed to the conftant inroads and ra-
vages of a depredatory enemy. Under the full con-
viction of thefe felf-evident truths, the General was
himfelf exceedingly defirous, and had it in charge from
the Select Committee of Bombay, to adjuft amicably
with Futty Sing the fettlement of the country, and to
render him, if poffible, a ferviceable ally to the Com-
pany.

The general character of the man, and the very
ftrong prejudices entertained againft him by fome in-
dividuals at Bombay, who, by a ftrange abufe and per-
verfion of juftice, chofe to ftigmatize him with the
perfidious ftains which, in reafon ought to have fullied
the Englifh name, for their treacherous conduct towards
him on a former occafion, naturally excited in the mind /\
of the General the ftrongenVdoubts and apprehensions,
of the little confidence that could be placed in any
promifes or declarations, however fpecious and friendly
in appearance, which the Rajah might be induced to
make, in order to preferve himfelf from the ruin which
then threatened to overwhelm him.

The

V

A

( 3» 5

The fears of meeting with a treatment fimilar ri»
Vrhat he had before experienced, * might alfo make
Fiitty Sing on his part douhtful and fufpicious of our
proffered friendfhip ; and thefe confederations, joined
to the dread of the Mharatta power, and of the pu-
nifhment their vengeance would certainly inflict, feern-
ed to create innumerable difficulties and obftacles to
the attainment of a friendly, fincere, and permanent
connection betwixt the Company and that chief.

Thefe unpromifmg circumftances, however, only
ferved to encreafe the General's folicitude and ardour
to accomplish an object of fucb. importance, a.nd fo ef-
fential to the fuccefsful profecution of the war. He
applied himfelf, therefore, to it with an earneft afliduL
ty and zeal, that fully proved the difinterefled fpiri.t
which governed his actions, and taught him to prefer
the conlcious fatisfaction of procuring a folid and cer-
tain benefit to the public, to the falfe glare of a narro\y
private ambition, or the feducing charms of a rapacious
avarice, both of which, the exclufive conqueft of Gut
zerat and the ruin of Futty Sing would have gratified
in their fullefi: extent.

Senfible of the good effects which the rapid move-
ments and approach of the army would produce upon

* In the year 1775, when the Bombay forces were in the
field, in fupport of Ragonaut Row's prctenfions, Futty Sing,
after a long ncgociation through the mediation of the Engliih
commander, and under the faith of the Companv, was prevailed
upon to rifquc an interview, when he was forcibly made prifoncr
bv Rigoba, compelled to agree to the payment of a large fum of
money, and not f'lffcred to return to his capital of Baroda, until
he had fent for his daughter, a child of fix or feven years of age,
and delivered ht-rnpas a fecurity for the performance of the en-

g:!<;crr.' nts viclt.-u'.y extorted from him.

Futty

( 39 )
fcutty Sing's counfels, the General left the banks of
the river Tappy on the 5th of January, and on the /
15th croiTed the Nerbuddah at Bovvapone-Gaut, where
lie was joined by fome battering cannon and ftores from
Baroche, a place of confiderable ftrength and com-
merce, upon the northern bank of the fame river, and
governed by a chief and council under the Bombay
Prefidency. On the 19th the army reached Dubhoy,
a confiderable walled town belonging to the Mharattas,
which the garrifon abandoned the night after the troop*
arrived before it.

The negotiation with Futty Sing had been carried
on, without interrupting the progrefs of the march,
through the means of vakeel* on his part, that pafled
to and from the camp ; and by the influence of a mo-
deration that does the General infinite honour, joined
to the greatelr. perfeverance and addrefs, the Rajah was
at length won over to our views, and agreed to an al- v/

liance with the Company upon the terms propofed to
fcim.

The treaty was finally concluded on the 26th of
January, at a village called Condeala, about four or
five miles from Baroda, Futty Sing's capital, and halt*
way betwixt the latter and our encampment.

By this treaty, the peaceand tranquillity of Guzerat
was fecured upon the molt, firm and folid baiis, an im-
mediate refource of revenue was provided, and that in
a manner the leaft expenfive and hazardous to the
Company ; and the certain ajid lpeedy fettlement of the
province, gave us leifure to turn our arms to new and
more neceiTary, though, perhaps, lei's beneficial cou-
quefts.

It was with the utmoit viiible and natural reluctance,
that Futty jiing wa^ prevailed upon tw accept of th*

country

./

( 4° )

country to be conquered from the Mharattas, north of
rhe river Myhie, in exchange for an equal proportion of
lands to the fouthward , nor is this uhwiliingnefs on his
part to be wondered at, fmce, although by uniting his
polTeflions inone regular and connected chain, he would
be a fimilar gainer with ourfelves, and although there-
V venues of the country to be mutually exchanged, dif-
fered very little in their amount, the real and intrinfic
Value of the lands could bear no manner of compan-
ion; and in lieu of a territory, fertile, well cultivated,
and to be collected at little or no expence, we put him
'in pofTemon of a track, it is true, more extenfive, but
wild and without culture, inhabited by a fierce and un-
ruly people, and conftantly expofed to the ravages of a
plundering banditti, which rendered the maintenance
of a confidesable military force at all times requifite,
to pref«rve the tranquillity of the country, and to en-
/\ force the collections.

Before I purfue my narrative, it may not be improper
to give a brief account of the Guzerat province, and an
hiftoricai account of the Guicowar family, who pofTefs
thegreateft part of it, from their original founder, Pil-
lajee. This man was grandfather to the prefent reign-
ing prince, and being a very warlike and able chief,
attended Sahoo, Rajah of Setterah, in his wars, and
obtained, as a reward for his fervices, the province of
Guzerat, the greateft part of which he had himfelf
conquered from the Mahommedan princes, who at that
time governed it in the name of the Mogul emperors.

This rich and extenfive kingdom, for as fuch it has
ever been diflinguifhed in the hiftories of the eaft, was
conferred upon Pillajee in jaghire, but by a more full
and independent tenure than is ufually granted to the
jaghire officers among fl the Mharattas.

After

( 41 J

After his death, his foil Damajee fucceeded, and
upon fome differences he had with the Mharatta go-
vernment, was prevailed upon to repair to Poonah, in
order to accommodate them, when he was treacheroufly
made prifoner, and compelled to agree to a partition
of country with the Peiihwa, and to enter into fuchi
engagements as we're dictated to him, before he could
obtain his releafe.

From that period, the admin iftration at Poonah
found means to interfere more immediately in the fet-
tlement and government of the province, and the Mha-
ratta forces, under Ragonaut Row, in conjunction with
thole of Damajee, laid fiege, but without fuccefs, to
the capital Ahmedabad ; nor was it wrefted from the
poffeflion of the MufTelmans fo much by fuperior fo-
reign force, as it was at laft betrayed into the hands of
the confederates by domeftic treafon and treachery.

After the demife of Damajee, Futty Sing fucceeded,
in preference to his elder brother Seaje'e, who, being
difordered in his intellects, was judged incapable of
governing-. This unfortunate chief refides contentedly
at Soan G'hur, a fort belonging to the family, where
he is treated with every mark of attention, and has
liberty to amufe him'felf in thofe innocent purfuits,
which his infanity, perfectly inoffenfive in its nature,
confiitutes the only objects and employment of his
life.

Gouind Row, another fon of Damajee, but by a
different mother, though younger than Futty Sing, lays
claim to the fucceffion, under pretext of the preferable
right which the offspring of the lawful wife poffeffes
over that of the favourite concubine. This diflindtion,
however, is contrary to nature, and the eftabliihed
cuftoms of the eaft, and Futty Sing has been formally
G acknow-

( 42 )

acknowledged by the Poonah durbar, and received the:
inveftiture of his authority from the nominal Rajah of
Setterah.

Until the time of Aurungzebe, a^id while the Mo-
gul empire continued to flouriih, Guzerat was efteem-
ed one of the moft opulent provinces dependant upon
it. It is difficult to conceive a more intire revolution
than what has fince taken place. The imbecility of
fucceedrng monarchs, confpiracies and civil wars in
tht centre of the empire, and a total relaxation, and
decay of vigour, through all the remote and extended
provinces of it, univerfally encouraged the viceroys
tb affert an independence in their refpe&ive govern-
ments, nor was the Soubah of Guzerat more difpofed
tb give proofs of attachment and loyalty than the
rtft.

This feparation and difmemberment of the empire,
proved moft favourable to invaders, who attacked, and
with eafe poflerTed themfelves of the divided provinces;
and it was about this time that the Mharattas broke
forth from the mountains of the Decan, and, fpreading
Daughter and defolation wherever they directed their
deftrudtive fteps, terrified and fubdued the effeminate
and degenerated defcendants of thofe Mahommedan
conquerors, who had themfelves fo courageoufly efta-
Mifhed their empire in Hindoftan, by the edge of the
fword, and the terror of their arms.

Some of them, unable to ftem the torrent, abandon-
ed every thing to its rage ; and others, fatisfied with a
temporary relief, and the indulgence of prefent eafr,
attempted to divert its courfe, by the payment of large
furns of money, or ceflions of territory.

The province of Guzerat, as has been already ob«
ferved, foon fell into their hands. With the Iofs of

the

, ( 43 )

tfie capital Ahmedabad, the Mogul authority .became
totally annihilated, and the defcendants of the Nawab
Cummaul ul dien, the family which was then difpof-
fcffed of government, now refide in obfcurity upon a
fraall jaghire, allowed them in the neighbourhood of
Puttan, under the protection and jealous vigilance of
Futty Sing.

The only veftigesof the MufTelman dominion which v
now remain, are Surat and Cambait, the former fitu-
ated towards the mouth of the river Tappy, and thp
latter on that of the Myhie. Thefe places are pof-
fefTed by their refpe&ive Mahommedan governors, or,
as they flile themfelves, Nawahs, but their authority
is confined within the walls, and even the fcanty re-
venue of this circumfcrihed extent, they fhare with the
Mharattas, who receive a fixed and very considerable '/
proportion.

Befides the two large rivers above mentioned, this
province is alfo watered by a third, the Nerbuddah, /
which riles in the hills of Boghilhund, and, after run-
ning a weftern courfe of about one thoufand mites,
through the rich provinces of Malwa, Chandeiih, and
Guzerat, empties itfelf into the gulph of Cambait, a
little below the town of Baroche, which was conquer-
ed by the Englifh from its Navab a few years ago.

A fituation fo favourable for commerce could not
poflibly be overlooked, and we accordingly find, tha.t
this province, and efpecially the town of Surat, has
always carried on a moft extenfive and advantageous
trade, and was formerly confidered as the grand em-
porium of the Mogul's dominions, fupplying the moft
interiour and remote corners of them with every uleful
commodity* nay, even with every fupcrfluity and luxury

Q 2 J of

J

\

( 44 ) *
of life, which the hand of foreign invention or induflry
could contrive or produce.

Its own fertility, arifing from the nature and fitua-
tion of the foil, being a low flat land, and interfered
with many fmaller ftreams, befides thofe large rivers
already mentioned, enabled it to export great quantities
pf cotton, indigo, wheat and other grains ; and the
improved ftate of its manufactures amply fupplied arti-
cles for foreign markets, in exchange for the valuable
productions purchafed from them.

I fhall finilh this digreflion with a fliort account of
the city of Ahmedabad, which has long been efleemed
as the capital of the province. It is fltuated upon the
eaft bank of the Sabremetty Nuddy, a pleafant, whole-
v fome, and conftant, though fmall ftream, that runs in-
to the Myhie, and it was originally founded by Shaw
Ahmed, King of Guzerat, who flouriihed near four
centuries ago. The walls, which ftill remain, are
y about fix miles in circumference, and there is a very
wide and deep ditch carried all round. Befides this
ditch, new works have been /ince conftructed, where
the original defences, either from decay or iituation,
were judged infufBcient ; and upon the whole, it may
be pronounced a very ftrong and formidable place, ef-
pecially when garrifoned, as it was at the time wherj
General Goddard befieged it, by about fix thoufand
Arab and Sindy foot and two thoufand horfe.

There are twelve gateways, by which you pafs in
and out of the city ; and the extenfive circuit of the
walls, particularly at thefe gateways, appears to have
been ornamented, at regular diftances, with towers
bnd cupolas, which in the days of its fplendour, mud
have equally contributed to the magnificence and
irrength of the place. Within the city, and upon the

bank

( 44 )

bank of the river, is an extenfive enclofure, called the
Budder, which was formerly the royal refidence : it has
been ftrongly fortified, and entirely commands the
principal bazars, courts of juftice, and ftreets where
the palaces of the chief nobles were fituated. At pre-
fent, fo much is this city decayed, and fallen from its
Original flouriming condition, that not more than a /
quarter of the fpace within the walls is inhabited,
whereas, from infallible veftiges, and ruins regularly to
be traced, the fuburbs rauft formerly have extended be- /
yond them to the diftance of three miles round.

Ahmedabad is the jVIahommedan capital of Guzerat,
the work of Ahmed and his fucceflbrs, who enlarged
and beautjfied it out of the ruins of the ancient Hin-
doo cities Narwalla and Chappaneer. Baroche and Put-
fan, the latter of which is, I believe, a more rrfodern
name for Narwalla, are alfo of great antiquity ; but of
all thefe, little more than the name exifls at prefent ;
and the Guicowar capital is called Baroda, recently
founded upon the banks of the Bifwamuntry Nuddy,
and fituated betwixt the Myhie and Nerbuddah, about
twelve miles fouth cf the former.

In Ahmedabad is {till to be feen the mofque and
tomb of Ahmed, its founder, built entirely of ftone
and marble. Great tafte, (kill, and expence, mull have
been exerted on thefe ftruc"tures, which are curious and
magnificent, and remain perfect and uninjured by the
ruthlefs hand of all-deftroying time.

Many fuperb ruins, both within and without the
walls, merit a particular description ; but I have alrea-
dy digrefled fufHciently, and mail now return to the
fubjecl: of my narrative, after obfcrving, that Guzerat,
continued to be governed by a fucceflion of its own
kings, until the reign of Acbar, when it was finally

fubiecled,

( 46 )

fybje£ted, and made a province of the \Jogul empire,
the wretched fate of which it afterward fhared, as has
been already defcribed.

In conformity to the engagements made with Futty
Sing, for putting him in immediate pofleflion of the
IMharatta (hare of the country, north of the Myhie,
the army marched from the neighbourhood of Baroda,
and arriving before Ahmedabad the 10th of February,
upon a refufal of the governor, on the part of the
\J Peifhwa, to furrender, befieged andftormed it the 15th
in the morning. It was carried after a gallant and def»»
perate refinance, and abou. t four hundred of the enemy
were killed in the aflault. Mofl of thefe fell in the
ditch and one of the gateways, where, endeavouring to
efcape into the tpwrj as pur grenadiers advanced, they
were flopped by the narrownefs pf the paffage and
wicket, and falling one uppn another, crowded toge-
ther in a heap, their ammunition blowing up in their,
cartouch boxes, and every man periling before, relief;
could he given.

The troops diftinguiHied themfelves by every proof
ofdifcipline and humanity, injuring no perfon they
found in the place unarmed, and in the fury of attack,
fparing even many who laid down their arms and fub-_
mitted. The piifoners, amongft whom were fome
Arab Jemedars, were treated with the greatefr. clemen--
cy, and thofe that were wounded, received into our
hofpital, humanely taken care of, and afterwards re^
leafed *.

On.

A clrcumftance fimilar to the Following, muft give more
heartfelt plcafure to a humane and liberal mind, than the moft
lV\»ndul triumphs of viftory ; " an officer of the Bombay cfo-

klifhment,

v/

( 47 )

Ort the 26tfi of February, Fatty Sing was formally
put in poffefllon of Ahmedabad, and the fettlement of
the Guzerat perfected, and its future tranquillity ef-
fectually fecured, in left than two months from put-
ting the troops in motion.

This acquifition was by no means of the value or
importance to Futty Sing, which, from the reputation
of its being the capital, one would be led to fuppofe.
A confiderable part of its revenue, the whole of which
did not exceed three lacks, had been before received
by him, and of the collections of the country, north of
the Myhie, more than two-thirds had always belonged
to the Guicowar ; fo that, in farft, we did little elfe
than put him in poflemon of his own country, and this
he was to maintain and defend in future, at the ex-
pence of a garrifon which had before been paid by the
Peiihwa. The attainment of Ahmedabad was, belides,
not the objedt of Futty Sing's wifli : on the contrary,
he was totally averfe to it, and to the whole of the
propofed partition of territory, which included that
city in his (hare. /^

It became, therefore, an object of political confede-
ration, to gild the pill we had thus forced him to fwal-
low, and make it as palatable as poffible ; accordingly,
General Goddard exerted himfelf, to render the real as
well as ideal value of the place as important in Futty
Sing's eyes as he could. For the reafons already men-

blifhment, who belonged to a fmall party of fcpoys, which was
employed, foon after the ftorm of Ahmedabad, in the Concur,
and had been defeated, fell into the hands of the Mlurattas, and
by the influence of an Arab Jemcdar, who declared his motive
for interceding was, in grat fal acknowledgement of the humane
treatment his countrymen had met with from General Goddard
obtained his liberty, and returned to Bom'.iv '•

tioned,

I 43 )

tioned, he found it as irrpoflible to* £ive up the city t<$
plunder, as it would have been unjuft and impolitic to
inuft upon the Rajah's ranfoming it, by the payment of
a fum of money to the troops ; and he therefore ufed
every precaution to prevent a general pillage, in which
tlxeir good condudt and discipline fortunately enabled
him to fueceed ; but his regard for their interelts, and
defireof rewarding their valour, muft have made him
afterwards not forry to learn, that a partial prize had
fallen to their ihare; and to this circuraftance he found
means to reconcile Futty Sing^ although many, and
wo doubt exaggerated complaints, were daily made ;
and one merchant in the city eitimated his own lofs at
above fifty thoufand rupees. It is proper here to men~
ticn, that the greateft part of the property belonging
to the inhabitants had been conveyed away to places of
fecurity previous to the liege,- and almoft the whole of
the little that remained, was the property of people
connected with or immediately dependent upon the
Guicowar.

Previous to, and during the fiege of Ahm'edabad,
accounts were daily brought of the great military pre-
parations making at Poonah, and it was fooh known
(hat Scindra and Holka'r had defcende.d the gaHts with
a large army, and advanced towards Baroda, Futty
Sing's capital. General GocVbrd put the troops in
motion as expeditioufly aspoflible, and leaving Ahmeda-
bad the 2d of March, croffed the Myhie the 6th,
and encamped about two miles from Baroda, on the
Bifwamuntry Nuddy the 8th.

Scindia and Holkar, with their whole force, had
moved off to the eaftward, about twelve or fourteen
inij> from Baroda, and about the fame diftance from

Powaa.

t 49 )

Powan Ghur, * a very ftrorig fortrefs belonging to
Scindia, fituated upon an Exceeding high and almoli
Inacceflible mountain, and feparating the two provinces
of Malwa and Guzerat. Their united force confifted
of at leaft forty thoufand men, rhoft of which were
horfe, and they had with them a few light pieces of
Cannon only, having lent away all of a larger fize, as
well as every fpec'ies of heavy baggage which could
encumber of retard the celerity of their motions.

On the 9th, Meffrs. Farmer and Stewart, who had
been left with Mahadjee Scindia, as hoftages for the
faithful performance of the convention of Worgaum,
arrived in camp with letters from that chief and Hol-
kar, gerieralty expreiitve of their friendly fentiments,
and of the inclination of the Mharattas to live uport
terms of amity with the Englifh ; as a proof of which,
they had given the above gentlemen their difmiffion,
and inftru<5tedf them, in conjunction with Abajee Sha-
bajee, to make a full reprefentation of matters to Ge-
neral Goddard.

A conduct fo promifihg and friendly in appearance,
excited the moll fanguine expectations of foon effect-
ing a peace with the Mha'ratta State, or, at leaft, of
bringing about fome feparate agreement with Mahadjee
Scindia, which might be productive of the moft im-
portant benefits to the Company, in the final fettle-
ment of their difputes with that nation. It was, there-
fore, matter1 of the greateft concern to the General,
to fee his hopes ultimately difappointed, and all his
efforts for that defirable end unluckily defeated.

* The ancient city of Chappaneer ftood at the foot of this
mountain, and a fmall town ftill cxifls, under the fame name,
and upon the fame fpot, which is fubjec~t to Scindia*

H He

( 5^ >

He endeavoured, by every aflurance and argument
in his power, to imprefs the mind of Scindia with .1
belief of the fincere wifti of the Englifti for peace, and
of the particular fentiments of regard they entertained
for himfelf, of which they were ready to give the moil
ftrong and convincing proofs.

Hefuggeftedfome conditions mutually beneficial, on
which they were defirous of uniting with him, in fet-
tling the adminiflration of the empire upon a proper
ind folid balls, and failing in this attempt of feparating
Scindia from the minifter Nana Furnefe, for which
every -opening was given, healfo pointed out fuch terms
in an alliance with the prefent government, as the Eng-
lish had a right, founded both in juftice and reafon, to
expe<5t, and were ready to accede to.

A very few days* however, fully convinced the Ge-
v/ neral of the inemcacy of his own endeavours, and o£
the infmcerity of Scindia' s profemoiis. Abajee Shaba-
jee returned with propofals from his matter, which
pofitively proved his intimate connection with Nana
Furnefe, and were, indeed, of a nature, if poflibler
more difgraceful than thofe before made by the mini!"-,
ter himfelf, requiring the furrender of Ragoba's per-
fon into his hands, and alfo of his fon Badjerow, the
former of whom was to refide at Jancy, upon the al-
lowance Scindia had before fettled for his fubfillence,
and to relinquifh all /hare in the adminiftration, which
was in future to be conduced by Scindia, in the name
of Badjerow, upon whom the appointment of Dewan
to the Peiftiwa Madhurow Narain mould be conferred.
No exprefs advantage was propofed to be ftipulated for
the Englifli in return for thefe concemons : on the con-
trary, Scindia meant to have it underflood, that they
were to adhere to the engagements made at Worgaum.

Upotf

( $1 )

Upon the whole, it plainly appeared, that Scindia
was not in reality fo amicably difpofed, as his behaviour
refpecting MefTrs. Farmer and Stewart gave room to
conjecture ; or that, if he was defirous of peace, there
did not exift any reafonable hope of his intention to
conclude a treaty, but upon terms that were judged
difhonourable previous to the campaign, and which in
the midft of our prefent fuccefs would have been deem-
ed highly inadequate and difgraceful.

Thus ended the negociation with Scindia, and though
the General, towards the clofe of the campaign, and af-
ter the fuperiority of our arms over the Mharattas had
been repeatedly aflerted, availed himfelf of an oppor-
tunity of fome indirect overtures made by Scindia
through Futty Sing, to renew the negociation, this
fecond attempt proved equally unfuccefsful with the
former.

The military operations, after the return of the army
from Ahmedabad, were confined, on the part of Scin-
dia, to a determined fyftem of avoiding an engagement*
and on that of the Englifh, to every poffible exertion -J
to induce him to alter his refolution.

For this purpofe, the General twice advanced with
the whole army, and encamped upon the ground which
Scindia had occupied, and from which he had precipi-
tately retired as we advanced. A third time, with a
part of the army only, viz. two hundred European in-
fantry, ten companies of grenadier fepoys, two Bengal
and one Bombay battalion, two twelve and ten fix-
pounder pieces of artillery, and about feven or eight
hundred horfe, he formed and attempted a plan of fur-
prizing the enemy's camp. Their vigilance and excef-
five caution, however, prevented his advancing undis-
covered beyond their grand guard of fix thoufand men,
H 2 which

( 5* )

which was near two miles from the main army ; and
when he reached the encampment after day-light, hq
found the whole drawn up ready for action.

This appearance encouraged a hope, that the im-
portant moment at laft arrived, when the enemy, pre-
fuming upon their numbers, would avail themfelves of
the opportunity which offered, of contending with only
a part of our force, and ftand the decifion of a battle j
but this hope proved fallacious, and after a few brifk
though partial fkirmifhes, the Mharattas entirely
abandoned the field to the conquerors, who remained
upon it about two hours, and then returned without
lofs, to their own camp.

Thefe fignal triumphs moft ftrikingly evinced the fu-
periority of our arms, and wiped off the ftain they had
contracted from the late unlucky difafter at Worgaum.
They were, befides, the only fucceffes to be gained
over an enemy who would not fight, and who, it is
probable, wiftied for nothing more than to draw us on
beyond the proper line of our policy, and the defence
of our new conquefts, to an unprofitable purfuit of his
army into the Malwa province ; which, befides expofing
our valuable acquifitions in Guzerat, would alfo have
endangered the fafety of the prefidency of Bombay
itfelf, at this tithe threatened with an attack from the
^rench ; and even admitting our endeavours to have
been fo far fuccefsful, as that our arms had penetrated
to Ugein Scindia's capital, they could not poffibly
have produced any benefit at all proportioned to the
rifque, or uecifive towards terminating the war.

The two armies continued on the confines of Malwa
and Guzerat until the month of May, when they fe-
parated, on account of the approaching monfoon, Scin-

di*

( 53 J
<lia marching off to Ugein, and the Englifh returning
to Surat, where they arrived the beginning of June.

It would be unjuft not to mention the particular Cer-
vices of Major John Forbes and Captain John Camp-
bell, the former of whom furprifed and defeated a con-
fiderable party of the enemy under one of their princi-
pal leaders ; and the latter, who commanded two bat-
talions of Bengal fepoys upon a foraging party, being
attacked at the diftance of at leaft ten miles from camp,
by near fifteen thoufand of Scindia's beft horfe, after
killing a confiderable number, forced the reft to retire,
and faved not only his party, but brought the forage
he had collected fafe to camp.

I fhall conclude this general fketch of the Guzerat
campaign, with a fhort tefiimony to the merit and gal-
lantry of Lieutenant Welfli, who commanded a corps
of three hundred Mogul cavalry, and was detached
with that corps, and one battalion of fepoys, to fur-
prife and beat up the quarters of Gunnele Punt, one
of the rninifterial chiefs, who with about fix thoufand
men infefted the neighbourhood of Surat.

The diftance was about fifty miles, and Lieutenant
Welfli had moved with fuch fecrefy and rapidity, that
Cjunnefe Punt was unapprised of his approach. He
contrived fo as to reach the encampment early in the
morning ; but perceiving the day would foon break, he
ordered the infantry and guns to follow as expeditiouily
as poflible, and putting himfelf at the head of the ca-
valry only, rufhed forward into the midft of the ene-
my, who, terrified by the impetuoiity of an affault Cq
fudden and unexpected, fled on all fides, and left their
guns and baggage a prize to the victors.

This gallant enterprife was fuceecded by the Surren-
der of Parneiro, a fort built upon an high hill, and

from

/

J

( 54 )

irom its fituation, if properly defended, capable pf de-
fying the raoft formidable force. The acquifitibn of
this, with the fmaller forts in its vicinity, which Lieu-
tenant Welfh alfo took, entirely completed the con-
queft of the Guzerat province, of which Parneiro may
be termed the fouthern limit.

Previous to his marching againft this place, Lieu-
tenant Welfh received a i mall reinforcement of fepoys,

J with battering cannon and ftores, from Mr. Boddam,
chief of Surat, whofe name I mould be unpardonable
to mention, without bearing teftimony at the fame
time to his zeal for the interefts of the Company,
which is ever a6tive, and has confpicuoufly diftinguifh-
ed itfelf on various occafions ; nor is he himfelf lefs re-
markable for the integrity and difmtereftednefs of his
public character, than for his many private virtues and
amiable qualifications.

Thus terminated the firft campaign of the Mharatta
war ; and General Goddard, befides the confcious fa-
tisfaflion of having uniformly fucceeded in every at-
tempt he made againft the enemy, and of having put
the Company in poffefTion of a territory yielding an
annual revenue of thirty lacks of rupees, had a farther
gratification, not the leaft pleafing to a generous mind,
of receiving the moft full and flattering teftimonies
from the government of Bengal, of their approbation
of every part of his conduct, and the high fenfe they
entertained of his fervices to the Company.

w During the monfoon of 1780, nothing material oc-

curred, except the important conquefl: of Gualior, at-
chievedby Major Popham, who carried it in the moft
enterpriiing and gallant manner, and by a fkilful and
well concerted ftratagem, that does the higheft honour
to his military talents and, abilities.

In

( & )

In the preceding month of November, Major Pop-
nam had received the command of twothoufand drafts,
intended to reinforce General Goddard's army, but
from various caufes, principally from the danger of
attempting to crofs the peninfula with fo fmall a force,
the defign was dropped, and a new plan adopted by the
Governor General, for making a diverfion in favour of
the general operations ofc" the war from the country of
the Gohud Ranna, which ilxould, in its conftquences,
involve a combination of the feveral Hindoo princes,
interfperfed through the province of Ajmeer, and to
the northward of Malwa.

An attempt was accordingly made. to negociate with
thofe petty chiefs, whi ch unfortunately did not fucceed
in any adequate or uferful degree ; and the political as
Well as military operations of that quarter, were con-
fined to an alliance W'rth the Ranna of Gohud, and the
recovery of.his country from the Mharattas.

It Was in the execution of this fervice that Major
Popham fignalized himfelf, and made the Company's*
name feared and refpe&ed throughout Hindofhm, by
planting the Britifh colours upon the walls of Gualior,
k fortrefs which hat f for ages been deemed impreg-
nable, and where* as i n a fecure and inaccemble afvlum,
the Mogul emperors. , in the days of their magniiicjnee
and power, had always confined the vanquiihed rivals
of their greatnefs, and other eminent prifoners of ftate.

No means of reconciliation with the Mharattas could
be found during the rainy feafon of the year 1780, and
accordingly a renewal of hoftilities became nece'dary.

After providing foi: the prefervation and fecu rity of
our acquifitions in Gozerat, the defence of wbi.ch was
committed to a detachment of our own troop1 ;, and a
proportion of horfe to be furnj/hed by our ally , Futty

1/

( J6 )

Sing, the army marched from Surat the 16th of Octo-
ber, and arrived before Baflein about the middle of
November. The battering cannon and flores were?*
landed with all expedition, and the fiege carried oh
with fuch unremitting vigour and alacrity, that on the
^ i ith of December, a practicable breach being rnade,
the garrifon, confifting of at leaft fix thoufand men,
Capitulated and laid down their arms.

Thus by the bravery and good conduit of theft-
troops, was the Company, in the very commencement
of the fecond campaign, put in poffeffion of a place,
which had been long the object, of their ardent wifhcs
and mofl eager folicitude, and which, in the treaty
made with Ragonaut Row in 1778, by the Bombay go-
vernment,- had been deemed of fo great importance,
as to conftitute the moft material article ftipulated with
him in behalf of the Eriglifh, for inverting him with
the regency and entire adminiftration of the Mharatti
empire.

The conqueft of BafTein was foon followed by the
furrender of Amoll, a fmall, though from its fituation
very tenable fort, upon an itland about one thoufand
fix hundred yards di'ftant from that of BaiTein, and
whofe pofTeflion is absolutely requifite to fecure the un-
fnolefted enjoyment of BaiTein itfe'lf.' The garrifons of
Tarrapore, Danou, and other forts, fituated along the
fea coaft of the Concan, thought proper to follow the
fame example ; and at thc'cnd of the year 1780, the
Englifh, to the conqueft of Guzerat, had added that of
the largeft and raoft valuable part of the Concan, and
were equally mailers of an extent of fea coaft from
Cambait to the mouth of tlie Pen river, which empties
itfelf into Bombay harbour, of above three hundred

Thus

V

( 57 )

Thus far we have conduced the Mharatta war, and
from a contemplation of the paft, fo far from difco-
vering any caufe of regret for having commenced it,
we. mould be led to entertain the mod reafonable and
well-grounded expectation, of being fhortly able to
bring it to a glorious and fucccfsful termination ; fince
befides the conquefts already made, we actually en-
joyed, at the period above mentioned, means for its
profecution infinitely fuperior to what we originally
poflefTed, or could have even hoped to acquire in fo
iliort a time from our own fingle and unaflifled efforts.

Various caufes, however, unfortunately contributed
to difappoint this hope, the principal of which I ac-
knowledge to have been the breaking out of the war
with Hyder Ally Chawn, and the great and unexam-
pled fuccefs of his arms in the Carnatic. I muft alio
be of opinion, that the meafures adopted for bringing
about an accommodation were in their nature of fo im-
politic and dangerous a tendency, as to throw obftacles
in the way of it, and by the eagernefs and anxiety they
betrayed, actually defeated the purpofe they were in-
tended to attain,

I {hall have frequent occafion in the courfe of my
narrative to elucidate this latter obfervation. I fhall,
therefore, at prefent confine myfelf to a description of
the immediate effects of Hyder's unlucky interference,
previous to which a fhort digreflion feems neceflary for
clearly comprehending the Subject.

Although the eontroling powers vefted in the Go-
vernor General and Council, were certainly intended
by the wifdom of the legifhture, to guard againft the
deftructive confequenccs, which an oppofition of in-
tercfb, and purfuit of feparate views muft unavoid-
ably produce, if the different prefidcncics of India were

I pi"r-

( 5§ )

permitted to a& independant of each other, (a fyftem
that, however confident, or at lead reconcileable with
the inferior intereds of a mere commercial body, could
not poflibly be applied to the fituation of the Company
as a great political power, which they are at prefent
univerfally confidered by the dates of Hindodan) the
tranfa&ions of the period I am now relating, fully
prove, that even this controling power is at prefent of
too circumfcribed a nature, and that, in order to give
vigour and dability to the Britifh empire in India, the
firft dep to which requires a confidency and uniformity
in political meafures, it is abfolutely neceflary, that a
full and unlimited authority, in all matters relative to
peace or war, and in every negociation with foreign
dates, be delegated to the Governor General and Coun-
cil, and that the prefidencies of Madras and Bombay
be directed, not only to give implicit and uncondition-
al obedience to their orders, but to confider themfelvcs
as immediately and folely refponfible to the Council
General for their conduCl in the execution of them.

If this plan had been originally adopted, we fliould
not afterwards have had to contend with the two mod
powerful dates in India, the Mharattas and Hyder
Allv, united with the combined ftrength of France and
Holland ; nor fhould we be now fuing for peace at the
feet of a vanquiflied enemy, who is reaping the harveft
of wars he does not fight, and recovering in the Car-
natic the territories he has, to every effort of his own
force, irrecoverably lod in the Guzerat and Concan.

It is true, the three prefidencies feem in one point
to have been mod cordial and unanimous, I mean in
their refolution to make Mar •, but although perfectly
agreeing in the fame general fyitcm, they unfortunate-

( 59 )

ly differed materially in the particular object to which
it {hould be directed.

In Bengal and in Bombay they mutually marked the **
Mharattas as the victims of their fanguinary vengeance,
but they attempted their destruction by means totally
diffimilar and irreconcileable j and whilft the one party
was actually in arms, ftruggling to exalt Ragonaut Row
upon the ruins of his country, the other was equally
active in oppofing a rival to his greatnefs in the perfon
of the Berar prince. *

In Madras, a conduct (till more extraordinary and
impolitic was adopted, and the bufinefs of the Guntoor
Sarcar will be a lafting monument of the folly and bad /
faith of the nation, as well as a reproach to the per-
fons who tranfacted it. In fhort, the records of that
government, during the period of which I am now
treating, exhibit fcenes of a treacherous policy, weak-
nefs and corruption, which are not to be equalled in
the annals of almoft any age or country. It would be ^
an endlefs talk, and exceed the intended bounds of this
narrative, to enter into a minute defcription of each
particular tranfaction. — Suffice it to touch upon the
fubject generally.

Notwithftanding the war then exifting with the
French and Mharattas, and a knowledge of the refent-
ment already harboured by Hyder Ally againft the
Englifh, the confequence of which was ever to be ap-
prehended from the rooted rancour and animofity which
Mahomed Ally and that chief mutually entertained,
the government of Madras, fo far from endeavouring
to ward off the approaching evil by any temporifing or
moderate conduct, at once took a Hep that nut only
irritated and offended Hyder beyond any hope of re-
conciliation, but threatened in its confequcnccs to draw

1 i en

( 6o )

on the refentment of Nizam Ally, Soubah of the De-*

N can ; nor could a rupture with the latter have been

avoided, but by the wife and well-timed interpofition
of the Governor General and Council, who cancelled
the engagements made with Bazalut Jung, contrary to
the faith of treaties then fubfifting betwixt the Englifh
and the Nizam, reftored the Guntoor Sarcar, and by
farther political advances and feafonable conceflions,

/\ feconded by the ability and addrefs of Mr. Holland,
who was employed to negociate at the court of Hy-

v/ derabad, preferred the Nizam in his neutrality, and
prevented him from giving any fupport to the Mharatta
adminiftration, with whom he was, and ftill continues
to be, very clofely connected.

To aggravate Hyder's feelings by every poflible means,
in addition to the feizure of the Guntoor Sarcar, and
the detaching a force towards Adoni, Bazalut Jung's
capital, to defend him againft the refentment of his
brother the Nizam and Hyder Ally, that force was di-

\J reeled to march through the territory of the latter, al-

though by a fmall circuit, his country might have been
entirely avoided.

This infult, added to former caufes of provocation,
and the engagements he had lately formed with the
Mharatta miniiter, precipitated Hyder's hoftile prepa-
rations, and in the middle of the year 1780 he descend-
ed the pafl'es and entered the Carnatic, which, accord-
ing to expectation, he found totally unprepared for
defence, and unable to oppofe or check his career.

The rapidity of his conquells and the fatal difafter
which b-jfcl our arms near Conjeveram, are facts too
well known, and too remarkable in their nature, to ad-
mit of being mentioned in this place, or even to re-
quire any comment, I mall, therefore, clofc this di-

g rem op.

gremon by the following general reflection ; that as the
mifconduct and imbecility of the Madras government
was the caufe of Hyder's immediately overrunning anl
deftroying the Carnatic, and poflefling himfelf of many
of the principal fortrefles almoft without oppofition,
it is alfo to the operation of that original neglect,
which rendered the country an intire defart, that we
muft afcribe both the fubfequent failure of the efforts of
the Governor General and Council, who ftrained every
refource to relieve the diftrefs of the Carnatic, and the
infufhciency of Sir Eyre Coote's perfonal exertions^
who has, however, acquired immortal glory, for having
fo long Hemmed a torrent he was prevented from ma-
king effectual head againft ; and it is ultimately in the
effects of this neglect, we muft look for the embarrafP-
ment in which even our fucceffes againft the Mharattas
have involved us, and the difappointment our hopes
from them are likely to experience.

I have thus in fome degree explained the caufes as
well as immediate confequences of the war with Hyder,
and it now remains to defcribe the manner in which
that event operated upon our conteft with the Mha-
rattas.

The firft idea which naturally fuggefted itfelf to the
Governor General and Council, after fending a fupply
of men and treafure to the coaft, was to endeavour to
terminate the Mharatta war, in order to employ their
whole collected force in oppofing Hyder, and driving
him from the Carnatic. For this puipofe propofals for
an accommodation were tranfmitted to the Poonah
adminiftration, and copies of them feparately forward-
ed to the Prefident and Select Committee of Bombay
and General Goddard, foi their information and ob-
servation. The letter to th? latter, d tted October 9,

1780,

( 62 J

2780, concludes with the following paragraph : lt And
" we hereby pofitively require and command you im-
*f mediately to fufpend all hoftilities and military ope-
" rations againfl the Mharattas, whenever you may
" receive a requifition in writing to that effect from
^ " the Peifhwa, that the like order had been given on
" his part to the officer commanding his armies ; but
*' in the mean time, and until fuch requifition and no-
" tification be received by you, we direct that you pro-
f fecute the war with the utmoft vigour, and act in all
*c circumftances as if the foregoing information had
f( not been fent you."

In the treaty tranfmitted, we offered to relinquifli

every conqueft excepting Ahmedabad and Gualior,

which had been guarantied to Futty Sing, and the

Ranna of Gohud, upon conditions of the Mharattas

uniting with us in an offenfive alliance againfl Hyder

Ally, of whofe dominions a conqueft and mutual divi-

lion was to be made. Should the Mharattas not accede

to an offenfive alliance, peace was neverthelefs pro-

pofed, each party retaining what it had acquired, or 3

fufpenfion of hoftilities was to take place on both fides

for one year from the date of the treaty, for the pur-

pofe of negociating the terms of a future and perpetual

adjuftment. Some ftipulations fufliciently favourable

were propofed reflecting Ragonaut Row, and Modajee

Bofla's offer of mediation and guarantee on this occa-

fion was declared to be accepted, himfclf permitted to

x/ become a party, and the treaty in confequence tranf -

mitted through him to the minifter at the Mharatta

court.

Three months having elapfed from the date of the
treaty, and no notification received from the Peifhwa,
either oi its arrival, or of any refolution he had come

to

( *3 1

to in confequence, the military operations continued to
be vigoroufly pufhed, and in the middle of January,
1 78 1, the whole of the army affembled at Vifrabuy, a V
place about twenty miles inland from BaiTcin, of re-
markable fan&ity and religious repute amongft the Hin-
doos, and where there are fome hot wells, 'deemed of
great medicinal efficacy.

A part of the army had been encamped in its neigh-
bourhood ever fince the 14th of the preceding month,
at which time General Goddard arrived himfelf with
the grenadiers from before Baffein, to the feafonable
relief of a detachment of Bombay troops, which had
been employed for a confiderable period before in the
fouthern parts of the Concan, protecting the country
and collecting the grain. The harveft was then over,
and the troops on their march towards Baffein had ad-
vanced as far as the neighbourhood of Vifrabuy, where, K/
having fuccefsfully oppofed fmaller parties of the ene-
my, they were at length attacked and furrounded by
fuperior force, and compelled to take poll in a very
flrong and advantageous fituation, from which it would
have been equally difficult for the enemy to diflodge
them, as it was impoffible for them to advance. This
force, at the time of which I am now fpeaking, acted
under the feparate and particular orders of the Select
Committee at Bombay, but was afterwards put under
General Goddard's fole command, and continued fo
the remainder of the campaign.

The Concan is a tract of country extending consider-
ably along the fea eoaft, and is feparated from the De-
can on the caftward by a chain * of high hills, running

111

* This chain extend, itfclf all alon the Mahhar coaft, al-
rcijft. j, far to the fouilr.va.rd a. An.-:r ■■ and the cnuam

tic

( 64 )

in a direction from north to fouth, and parallel with
the fliore, over which, in fuch places as are mod ac-»
ceflible, the feveral gauts or pafTes leading into the
Mharatta country, which from its great elevation is
filled the Balagaut, are fituated.

At the «time the army marched from BafTein, the
force of the Mharattas in the Concan and below the
gauts, under Hurry Punt Furkea, confifted of at leaft
twenty thoufand horfe and foot, with about fifteen
guns. Thefe were polled on the road to Bhore Gaut,
which is one of the molt eafy and practicable pafTes, and
where it was expected by the enemy we meant to af-
cend, being the neareft and moil convenient route to
Poonah, and having been preferred by the Bombay go-
vernment on a former occafion.

Notwithstanding their numbers, they were too much
intimidated to offer any ferious oppofition, and excep-
ting a few flight fkinv ifhes, in which we were always
fuperior, the army met with little or no refiftance till
it reached Campoley, at the entrance of the Bhore
Gaut, on the 8th of February. The enemy had pre-
vioufly afc ended, and from appearances there was eve-
ry reafon to believe they had come to a determination
of refolutely difputing the pafTage. This belief was
confirmed by the fpies, who gave intelligence, that
about four thoufand infantry with guns had taken poll

the Myforc country, and the whole of Hyder's dominions on the
vcftern fide of India, is in like manner rendered difficult and
hazardous by fteep and narrow pafTes over them, which muff nc-
cefTarily require anv plan of military operations entered into from
that quarter to be formed upon a very liberal and therefore ex-
penfivc fcale, not only to anfwer any real and adequate purpofc
of public advantage, but to guard a jainfl the danger of mifcar-
riagc, to which it would be othcrwifc certainly cxpoftd.

unon

( 6$ )

upon the top of it, that the whole Mhafatta army was
encamped at a little diftance, and that Holkar, with
about fifteen thoufand men from Malwa, and another
chief, called Ragonaut Pundit, with about half that
number, had lately arrived in their camp.

The General ccnfidering that any delay would not
only encreafe the confidence of the enemy, but give
them an opportunity of conftructing new works, fo as
to render the pafs every day more difficult and hazard*
ous, refolved upon ftorming it that very night. The
grenadiers were accordingly ordered to be in readinefs,
under the command of Colonel Parker, and a plan or. v
attack formed, which from its own judicioufnefs and
excellence, the gallantry and good conduct of the of-
ficer who executed it, and the difciplined, fleady valour
of the troops under him, proved fuccefsful beyond
even the mod fanguine expectation. The party en-
tered the fbot of the pafs at midnight, and by five in
the morning had gained entire pofTefiion of it, driving
the enemy from Condolah, the very fummit of the
hill, and four miles diftant from Campoley, mofl of
the road winding through narrow defiles, and up a very
fleep and rugged afcent.

Poonah, the Mharatta capital, is not diftant from ,
Bhore Gaut more than forty-five miles. Such were
the terrors impreffed upon the enemy, in confequence
of our near approach, and fo ftrong their belief oi our
intentions to advance towards it, that they entirely
burnt and deftroyed Telliagong, a very considerable
town about half way, and had actually made every pre-
paration for fetting fire to Poonah itfelf, by filling the
houfes with draw, and removing the inhabitants and
effecls to the neighbourhood of Scttara.

K A know-

( 66 )

A knowledge of this circumftance united with many
other confulerations to prevent our pufhing forward to
the capital, and to confine the remaining operations of
the campaign to a defence of the conquefts already
made.

In the firft place, our whole force did not exceed fix
thoufand men, and the enemy's could not be lefs than
eight times that number ; it was therefore impofhble to
make any divifion of our force, or even to leave a de-
tachment fufRciently ftrong to defend the poll at Bhore
Gaut if we advanced beyond it. Unaflifted by horfe,
we could entertain but little hope of being able to col-
lect provifion or even procure forage in a country to-
tally defolate and ruined, and we mud on that account
have carried a very ample fupply of grain with us,
which would of courfe have greatly encumbered and
endangered our march.

In addition to thefe confulerations, when we reflect
that no adequate or ufeful end could pofTibly be attained
by entering the Decan, either towards improving the
fuccefs of the war, or bringing it to a termination, that
we had not the moll diliant expectation of being joined
by any party in the Mharatta ftate, which alone would
have juftified our advancing ; and that without any de-
terminate object to gratify, or hope of a revolution to
excite us, we could only have acquired the empty glory
of poflefling the Mharatta capital for a few days, and
of effecting a retreat from it at the molt eminent peril
and certain hazard : I fay, when thefe matters come to
be fully confidered, the impropriety and impolicy of pe-
netrating into the Decan, under fuch an accumulation
of difcouraging circumitances, will be clear and ob-
vious to every one.

The

( 67 )

The rapid progrefs of our arms had hitherto produced
no overture or notification on the part of the Peifliwa,
according to the expectations derived from the contents
of the Bengal letter $ on the contrary, it appeared that
the minifter, from the time of receiving the Bengal
propofals, had become more remifs and indifferent in
his endeavours to accomplifh a peace, which from our
extreme anxiety and folicitude, he faw it was in his
power to obtain whenever it might fuit his own incli-
nation or convenience, upon terms far fuperiour to his
mod fanguine expectations.

The near approach of the army feemed, however,
to roufc him from this fecurity ; and a few days after
getting poflefnon of the gauts, a meffage arrived from
one Byroo Pundit, propofing to fend an emiffary to the "*
camp, to converfe upon the fubject of negociation.

This Byroo Pundit poffeffed a confiderable fhare o£ V
the private confidence of the minifter, and had entered
into a fecret correfpondence with General Goddard fo
early as the month of October 1780, to which the lat-
ter gave every proper encouragement, in order to avail
himfelf of any means it might offer for accomplishing
a peace. Nana Furnefe was himfelf privy to the whole
tranfaction j and this renewal of correfpondence, after
it had been fufpended for above two months, induced
the General to form fome hopes favourable to peace.
He therefore determined to promote it all in his power,
and anfwered Byroo Pundit's letter, by confenting to
his propofal of fending an emiffary, who accordingly
arrived in camp the 12th of February.

All expectations of fuccefs, however, from this cir-
cumftance foon vanifhed ; and the man, after affirming
that «< although the minifter wifhed to unite with the
<"* Englifh againft Hyder Ally hereafter, it was his pre-

K 2 " fent

( 6* )

«c fent determination to adhere to the engagements he
il had made with that chief, and to make no treaty
" with the Englifh in which he was not included," re-
turned to his mafter, promifing to communicate faith-
fully the friendly intentions of the Englifh, and the
particular points given to him in charge by the Gene-
ral ; in confequence of which, mould the minifter ap-
prove, a public vakeel from the Sarcar fhould be imme-
diately deputed to negociate, or at all events an anfwer
fhould be returned in eight days. The anfwer was
written by Byroo Pundit, and repeated the minifter's
determination, «« to make no treaty with the Englifh
" in which Hyder Ally was not included as a friend
" and ally of the Teifhwa."

As Byroo Pundit's agent had declared in converfa-
tion, that the propofals for peace from Bengal had ne-
ver been received by the minifter, the General thought
it proper, that he might not have it in his power here*
after to plead ignorance of them, as an excufe for con-
tinuing the war, and to obtain a decided knowledge of
his prefent intentions, to fend him a copy of the pro-
pofals, declaring himfelf empowered to conclude an
alliance with the Mharattas, and ready to accede to
one upon the terms offered by the Governor General
and Council.

The minifter's anfwer, as it was clear and pointed
with refpect to his own intentions, and furnifhed an
additional proof of the fincere and friendly inclina-
tions of the Berar prince, I fhall here tranferibe. —
<c Before this time, Modajee Bofla wrote to the Sarcar
<* as follows : The Governor General and Council of
" Calcutta have fent a treaty to me, but as it does not
** meet with my approbation, how can it be approved
« and conceded to by the Peifhwa ? — I have therefore

jeturncd

( <*9 )

«* returned it to Mr. Haftings." The mlnifter pro-
ceeds — il At prefent that very treaty which you have
«« fent me has been perufed by your friend from begin-
" "ning to end, and it is certain that the contents there-
«* in written are not proper or fit for the approbation
«« of the Sarcar. If you are fincere and fervent in
*' your defire of friendfhip, it is incumbent upon you
*< to make a treaty that (hall include the propofals of
(l th'ofe who are allied to, and connected with the
*' counfels of the Sarcar."

Thus ended all attempts to negociate during this
campaign, the particulars of which were faithfully and
minutely communicated to the Government of Bengal,
as well as to the Select Committee of Bombay, with
whofe immediate advice and concurrence they had been
conducted.

The remaining military operations were reftrifted
entirely to a plan of defence ; and excepting fame
fmart, though partial attacks, made by very confiderable
bodies of the enemy, upon the efcorts of provifions
coming to the army from Pownwell, in which Colonel
George Brown and Major Donald Alackay, of the Ma-
dras eftablifhment, who commanded on two feparatc
occafions, acquired great honour and credit, the Mha-
rattas contented themfelves with now and then advan-
cing towards the poll at Condolah, on the top of th<J
gauts, with an appearance of rcfolution and vigour,
which, however, was fure to fail them whenever any
correfponding movements were made on our fide, or
after dilcharging a few effectual fiiot amongO; them.

In repeated letters from Sir Eyre Coote, who was at
that time preparing for the important conteit with Hy-
der Ally in the Carnatic, the moil earned and prefiing
recommendations had been ufed for making a powerful

divcrfion

( 7° )

diverfion in favour of his operations, by an attack upon
Hyder's dominions from the Malabar coaft.

The continuation of the Mharatta war, and the po-
sitive refufal of the minifter to accede to an alliance,
unfortunately rendered fuch a meafure absolutely im-
practicable. The utmoft exertion that could poflibly
be made on the weftern fide of India, while engaged
in a conteft with the whole Mharatta empire, was to
relieve the Madras troops at Tellicherry * by an equal
proportion from Bombay, and to fend the former round
to the coaft of Coromandel.

In order to effecl: this as early as poffible, General
Goddard found it necefiary to defcend the gauts, and
to march towards the fea coaft. He accordingly con-
certed his operations with fuch fkill and fecrefy, that
the whole of the artillery and heavy ftores reached the
foot of the pafs in fafety, and without the fmalleft
interruption from the enemy, who, indeed, remained
unapprized of his intentions, and were aftonifhed in
the morning of the 18th of April, to find that the poft
had been deferted during the preceding night.

The country through which the route of the army
lay to the fea coaft, was of a nature remarkably well
calculated to refill: any impreflion from large bodies of
horfe, being exceedingly full of thick bullies and jun-
gles, broken ground and narrow defiles, where it would
be impoffible, except in very few places, for cavalry to
act together. It was not, however, the lefs dangerous

* This is a valuable fettlement upon the coaft of Malabar,
dependant upon the prefidency of Bombay, which the Madras
detachment had garrifoned, after the capture of Mahe from the
French, and had defended it againft the attacks of the Nairs, tri-r
bmary to Hyder Ally.

i to

( p )

to the march of our troops, who had a perfect contempt
for the mod impetuous charge of the molt numerous
army of Mharatta horfe, and could only be efTentially
injured by parties of infantry concealed in hollow ways
and behind rocks and bufh.es, for which the fituation of
the country proved peculiarly favourable.

This mode of attack was accordingly adopted by the
enemy, who defcended into the Concan, under Hurry
Punt Furkea, Tuckojee Holkar, and Purrifs Ram Bow,
three of their principal chiefs. Their number could
not be fhort of fifty thoufand men, of which near ten
thoufand were infantry, mofl of them Arabs and Sin-
dys, who, excepting the fepoys regularly trained up in
the European difcipline, are by far the braveft and moft
ferviceable troops in Hindoftan.

The diftance from the foot of the gauts to the fea
was about twenty-four miles, and during the whole of
the march, which lafted three days, the enemy exerted
their utmoft efforts to harrafs and annoy the line, but
without producing any other effect than unfortunately-
killing and wounding fome of our people. They fuf-
fered very confuierably themfelves, but were unable to
obtain the fmalleft partial advantage over the Englifh
troops, or even to feize upon any part of the great
quantity of neccflary baggage and ftores which attend-
ed them : a circumflance that reflects the higheft ho-
nour upon the military conduct and fkilful manoeuvres
of the commander, and upon the fteady valour and gal-
lant perfeverince of the whole army.

This fevere action of three days continuance, in
which Colonel Parker, the fecond in command, gal-
lantly loft, his life, and which has been fuccecded by
no farther military efforts of any confequence, either
on our part or that of the Mharattas, terminated the

opera-

( 72 )

eperations oi the fecond campaign, as the enemy fhort-
ly after afcending the gauts, evacuated the Concan,
and the Englifh army prepared to canton at Callian du-
ring the approaching winter.

That I might not interrupt my narrative of the trans-
actions on the Malabar coaft, I have not regarded the
precife order of time, in communicating what was per-
formed during this campaign on the fide of Malawa.

In the beginning of the feafon, purfuant to the plan
before propofed, and which had been mod ftrongly re-
commended by General Goddard, in order to employ
Scindia and Holkar at a diftance from the fcene of his
operations, it had been refolved to augment the force in
that quarter j and notwithftanding the preferable claims
of Major Popham, from his having already diftinguifh-
ed himfelf in the command, he was unjuflly deprived
of it, and the conduct of the operations on their pro-
pofed extenfive plan committed to another officer,
whofe merits, however great they might otherwife be,
ought not to have been put in competition with Major
Popham's fuperior pretentions on this particular occa-
sion.

Another and more capital error, becaufe attended
■with injury to the public, was the infufficiency of the
exertions themfelves, and the inferiority of the force
employed, even after the propofed augmentation had
taken place, to anfwer any important purpofe of real
or adequate benefit ; by which means it happened,
that Scindia, confidering himfelf as fully equal to op-
pofe its progrefs, detached Holkar with a confidcrable
body of troops to fupport the minifter ; and notwith-
withitanding the decreafe of oppofition, the detach-
ment itfelf, after advancing as far as Seronge, which is
near one hundred miles north of the Nerbuddah, found

it

( 73 )

It necelTary to retteat towards the country of the Ranna
of Gohud-, in effe&ing which, Colonel Gamac, who
commanded, planned, and executed with fuccefs a ju-
dicious march upon Scindia, furprifing his camp, and
taking fome guns and elephants, and by that means
profecuted the remainder of his march to the north-
ward with lefs moleftation and difficulty.

I have thus conducted my narrative to the conclufioa
of the fecond campaign of the Mharatta war j and
here it may be proper to paufe, in order to take a fur-
vey of the general ftate of affairs at that period, as an
attention to, and knowledge of them, is abfolutely ne-
ceflary to form a proper judgment of the meafures af-
terwards adopted.

In addition to the conquefts of the preceding year,
BafTein and the country of the Concan, extending along
the fea coaft from Bombay to Surat, had been acquired
for the Company, which completed every view of ter-
ritorial pofieflion their moll fanguine wifhes, encou-
raged by the molt fignal and glorious fucceffes, could
have ever led them to expect, or even hope for. To /'
balance thefe advantages, Hydcr Ally had invaded and
overrun the Cirnatic, where he feemed to have efta-
blifhed himfelf fo firmly, by poffemng many of the
ftrong holds, and laying wafte the whole of the open
country, that any adequate exertion from that quarter
to drive him out of it was judged abfolutely beyond
our ftrength and impracticable. It became, therefore,
the chief and primary object of our political considera-
tion, to attack Hyder's dominions from the coaft of
Malabar ; nor is there any doubt but that this ex-
pedient, could it have been vigoroufly and excenfively
adopted, mult have fully anfwered every propofed ufe-
ful end, and have delivered the Camatic from its dan-

L gcrous,

V

( 74 )

gerous, its fatal invader. In effecting this point, hov-
ever, the difficulty lay, for it was obvious to the plain-
eft fenfe and mod common underftanding, that fome
accommodation with the Mharatta ftate was a neceflary
prelude to any attack on Hyder from Bombay. Ac-
cordingly propofals had been trnnfmitted for that pur-
pole to Poonah, through the Rajah of Berar, as has
been already feen j and although the enmity naturally
fubfifting between thc'Peiihwa and Hyder Ally, and
the advantage taken by the latter during the late trou-
bles in the Mharatta government, of polTeffing himfelf
of an immenfe territory fouth of die river Kriftna,
yielding annually near -a crore of rupees, might have
encouraged a reafonable hope of the rninifter's eagerly
embracing an opportunity to recover fuch valuable pof-
feflions, it was unfortunately found, that a refentment
of our conduct, a fenfe of obligation to Hyder for his
ieafonable interpofition, and a confidence in the im-
portant benefits expected from their mutual connec-
tion, prevailed over every other confideration, and de-
termined him to prefer his late engagements to an ad-
vantageous alliance with the Englifli, even though it
came recommended to his acceptance by an immediate
reftitution of all the conquefts we had made fince the
commencement of the war.

This determination on the part of the minifter to
perfevere in hoftilities, rendered any invafion of Ily-
tler's territories from the Malabar coaft utterly impoiii-
ble, and while it pointed out the neceftity of previously
bringing the Mharatta conteft to a determination, fug-
gelled a vigorous profecution of hoftilities, as the only
eiredlual and fpeedy means of doing fo.

That thefe were the fentiments of the Government
of Bengal, will appear frona the following extract of

their

( 75 )

their letter to the Select Committee of Bombay, dated
May 10, 1 78 1. " We have repeatedly declared, that
" we wifh fincerely a peace with the Mharatta ftate.
«< It is our fixed object, and we fhall deem the accom-
f* pliflmient of it on honourable terms a moft deferable
•* event. One mode of obtaining it has been tried ;
" advances have been made, but thefe advances have
«f not been fuccefsful. A repetition of them would in
<* our opinion have no other effect, than to fix an opi-
" nion of our weaknefs in the Mharatta government,
" and inftead of Shortening, prolong the duration of
*i the war.*

« We repeat our firm conviction, that nothing but
•' a vigorous and fuccefsful profecution of it, will pro-
** duce an honourable termination to it. Under this im-
«« preffion, our inftructions to General Goddard have
** been framed and continued ; and under the fame in*
<c fluence we exprefs to you our wifh, that your aid
«' may be afforded to General Goddard's operation."

Notwithftanding this decided opinion of the Go-
vernor General and Council, for a vigorous profecu-
tion of the war againft the Mharattas, the mo it urgent
and pointed reprefentations of the neceffity of making
a powerful diverfion on the fide of Malabar, were con-
stantly arriving from the coaft of Coromandel ; and
the confequences of neglecting to do fo immediately,
were difplayed in the moft lively and alarming colours,
without any reference to the actual ftate of circum-
stances at Bombay, or to the certain ruin with which

* How fincerely is it to be lamented, that this obvious and
felf-cvidcnt maxim did not always (hike the Governor General
and Council in the fame forcible and convincing manner, as it
frems to have done on the prefent cccafion.

L 2 that

( 7* )

that presidency would be menaced from the Mharattas,
if the force necefrtry for its protection and fecurity
was detached upon any remote or feparate fervice.

In this exigency, the government of Bombay, in
concert with General Goddard, drained every nerve
they poflibly could without leaving themfelves entirely
defencelefs ; and they certainly had merit in the difin-
tereftednefs with which they were willing to relinquifli
the rich prize within their grafp, and to facrifice every
Jiope of their own future aggrandizement, to their
defire of contributing to the immediate relief of the
diftrefs of the Carnatic. With this view, they fent the
greateft part of the Madras detachment round to the
Coromandel coaft, immediately after the return of the
army from the gouts, although from every argument
of a juft and rational policy, confirmed by the declared
opinion of the Governor General and Council, it was
fuppofed that the fucceeding campaign rauft be entered
upon with energy and vigour, in order to extricate the
Company's affairs from the misfortunes that generally
threatened their deftruction ; and in the fubfequent No-
vember, when it was found their own hands were effec-
tually tied up from active operations, as will appear in
the fequel, they fent down an additional reinforcement
to the garrifon of Tellichery, which enabled Major
Abingdon, the officer commanding, to make a gallant,
fudden, and well-concerted fally from the place, fur-
prize the camp, totally defeat and difperfe the army of
the Befiegers, and take Sardar Chawn, Hyder Ally's
general, prifoner, who died fhortly after of his wounds.
This fuccefs was vigorously purfued by Major Abing-
don, and follqwed by the capture of Callicut ; and al-
though thefe facts happened many months after the
period of which I am now treating, I have introduced

them

( 77 )

them here, that they may not interrupt the detail of
more important tranfattions.

Before I enter upon the latter, I think it alfo necef-
fary to mention a circumftance relative to General
.Goddard, whofe appointment * of commander in chief

at

* I have been the more particular on this fubjc£t, becaufc
from the manner in which the command of the Bengal troops
was continued to General Goddard by the Court of Directors, he
certainly was entitled to retain it during their ftay on the Malabar
coaft ; and his accepting the ftation of commander in chief at
Bombay, was in compliance with the wiflies of the Company,
and in obedience to their orders, nor could it in any fhape deftroy
his unalienable right to the command of the Bengal detachment.
In order to prove this, I fhall tranferibe the orders of the Com-
pany, appointing General Goddard, dated April 12, 1780.

Paragraph 21. Having taken into our particular and moft fc.
rious confederation, the ftate of the Company's military force at
your fettlcment, we have refolved to appoint an able officer to
the command of the troops at Bombay.

Par. 22. And having the higheft opinion of the zeal, expe-
rience, and military abilities of Colonel Thomas Goddard, wc
have thought fit to appoint Colonel Goddard commander in
chief of the Company's forces at Bombay, and granted him a
commiffion of brigadier.general in our fervice.

Par. 27. It is our order, that Brigadier-general Goddard
have a conftant feat as third in our faid Council and Select Com-
mittee.

Par. 28. And as a farther mark of our approbation of the
conduct of Brigadier-general Goddard, wc have directed, that
the pay and allowances received by him from Bengal, as com-
mander in chief of the detachment fent from that fettlcment, be
continued to him, and paid by our Governor Genera! and Coun-
cil, fo long as thofe troops fhall remain under General Goddard's
command on the vveftern fide of India. He mufl receive the pay

and

( 78 )

at Bombay had been received there in O&ober, 1780,
but from the important fervices on which he had ever
fince been employed, and his abfence from the prefi-
dency, he had not entered upon the immediate and
particular difcharge of that truft until the month of
June, 1 78 1, when he received a letter from the Go-
vernor and Council of Bombay on the fubjecT, an ex-
tract of which I fhall here tranferibe. « The Select
" Committee have acquainted us, that foon after the
*' receipt of the Company's orders of the 12th of
" April, 1780, they have tranfmitted to you a copy
«e of fUch parts as related to yourfelf ; in anfwer to
*f which you informed them, that you had forwarded
*• a copy thereof to the Governor General and Coun-
" cil, and waited their fentiments thereon. As a con-
'« fiderable time has fince elapfed, and you are now
tc come to refide here during the monfoon, we requefl
" to know whether it is the intention of the Bengal
€i government and your own wifli to accept of the fta-
" tion and appointments which the honourable Com-
" pany have conferred on you."

His reply, chearfully agreeing to enter upoh the im-
mediate difcharge of the duties of the chief command,
was conveyed in the following very clear and unambi-
guous terms. " I beg leave, in anfwer to your requi-
4t fition upon the fubjecl: of the orders of the honour-

and allowance of third of our Council a".d Select Committee at
Bombay ; but if our Governor General and Council fhall recall
the Bengal detachment, the pay and allowances received by Ge-
neral Goddard on that account, muft be difcontinued and ceafc
immediately upon the return of the faid detachment, as it will
be then no longer under his authority or command ; and after
that period, General Goddard muft receive the pav and allow-
ances cf cur commander in chief of our troops at Bombay.

I « able

( 79 )

" able Court of Directors of the 12th of April, to
*' tranfmit a paragraph of a letter received from the
«f honourable Governor General and Council, which is
" as follows : t We have great pleafure in congratu-
« lating you on the marks of diftin&ion conferred on
« you by the honourable the Court of Directors, ia
« their orders of the 12th of April, as honourable ia
« themfelves, as they have been defervedly beftowed,
« in reward and approbation of your fervices and con*

c dua/

" Although the above anf^er contains no pofitivs
«« declaration of the wilhes of the honourable Gover-
*< nor General and Council, yet I confider it as tacitly
" implying an approbation of, and function to, my ac-
•< ceptance of the important charge which our ho-
W nourable mailers have been pleafed to honour me
" with ; and therefore beg leave to acquaint you, that
<c fls it appears to me to coincide with the intention of
" the Bengal government, fo it is my own wifh to ac-
•' cept of the ftation and appointments conferred on
4* me by the honourable Company, and I am ready to
<* enter upon the discharge of the duties they impofe,
" whenever this government fliaii deem my fervicej
" requifite.

t{ I think it proper in this place to mention, that by
(t fo doing I by no means intend, nor is it at all a ne-
* ceffary confequence I lhould, to depart from the line
*l prefcribed for my guidance by the honourable Go-
<c vernor General and Council, in the general conduct
*f of the Mharatta war, and that in all matters rela-
" tive to it, as well as what regards the Bengal de-
<« tachment under my command, I mutt conGder my-
" felf as fubjeel to the exclusive and particular order*

«' of

( *o )

•» of that prefidency, in any manner they may think
" expedient and neceflary for the fervice."

I {hall now refume my narrative, which is, indeed,
drawing to a conclufion j and it is a painful reflection,
that the few facts remaining to be told, will unfortu-
nately difcover the fame want of decifion and vigour in
the councils, and of prudence and firmnefs in the mea-
fures of the Bengal government, which have fo con-
fpicuoufly marked the whole of their political tranfac-
tions with the Mharatta ftate, without the pleafing de-
tail of conquefl and military fuccefs that has hitherto
diverfified and enlivened the fubject.

Imprefled with the firm conviction of the neceflity of
terminating the Mharatta war, previous to the poflibi-
lity of undertaking any important or adequate enter-
prize againft Hyder from the coaft of Malabar, and
aflured from pad experience of the determined fpirit
of the Poonah Durbar, that an object fo defirable could
only be attained by a vigorous and fuccefsful profecu-
tion of hoftilities, General Goddard, as early as the
month of July, 1781, prepared a plan of operations
for the enfuing campaign, and laid it before the Select
Committee of Bombay, who concurred in its expe-
diency, and immediately tranfmitted it to the govern-
ment of Bengal for their approbation and afliftance to
carry it into effectual execution.

In the mean time every necefTary and leading ftep
was taken on the part of the Bombay government and
General Goddard which depended upon, or could be
effected by, their own means ; and the latter, not-
withftanding the fevere and tempefluous weather which
renders the navigation on the Malabar coaft extremely
hazardous, and almoft impracticable during the months
of June, July, and Auguft, failed for Surat, at which

place

( ax )

place he arrived the 2d of the latter month. He fhort- N "*
ly after erTe&ed an interview with Futty Sing, and ob-
tained from that chief a body of five thoufand horfe fqr
the fervice of the enfuing campaign, which was two
thoufand more than the number he was bound to fur-
nifh by treaty.

This important point being accomplished, and a pro-
per provifion and difpofition of the force in Guzerat,
both for the defence of that province, and for co-ope-
rating with the detachment * ilationed on the northern
confines of Malwa, whofe active fervices and future
junction conftituted a neceflary part of the intended
plan, the General returned to Bombay ; and after the
vigorous exertions he had made, and the fanguine ex-
pectations he had been led to form of fuccefs, it is eafy
to conceive how great muft have been his mortification
and difappointment to find that the only benefit to be
hoped for from all his zealous endeavours, was the
alarm which it could not fail to excite in the mind of
the Mharatta minifter, and that he muft be compelled
to reftricl: his own future operations to a fyftem of mere
defence.

But before I explain the caufes of this difappoint-
ment, it is proper to take notice of fome events which
happened in Bengal during the monfoon. On the 1 ith
of June, the Governor General and Council renewed
the credentials they had before given to General God-

* After its return to the northward, the command devolved
upon Colonel Muir, who in confequcncc of Colonel Cam?.c'3
letters from Seronge, had been detached acrofs the Jumna to his
alfiftance, and had advanced as far as the Rana of Gohud's coun-
try, before the news of Colonel Camac's fucccfsful retreat reached
him.

M dard

( 8a )

dard, impowering him to conclude a treaty with the
Mharatta ftate, either in cafe of receiving overtures to
that end directly from the Poonah government, or in
cafe of the arrival of Dewaghur Pundit,* Modajee
Bofla's Dcwan at Poonah, for the purpofe of mediating
a peace betwixt the Englifh and Mharatta powers.

In the inftructions furnifhed at this time, after de-
claring the treaty tendered to the Mharatta government
in the preceding October, to be the bafis of that pro-
pofed to be now concluded, they particularly except
the ceflion of the fort and territory of BafFein, which
they fay, as the minifter did not choofe to avail himfelf
of their former proffer, and confidering the very fa-
vourable turn which their affairs have fince taken, they
are of opinion that they are warranted in referving, if
they can, for the benefit of the Company.

In a fubfequent paragraph of the fame letter, they
recede from the above determination in the following
words : " If the minifler fhali refufe to yield up the

* Here we unfortunately fee the unaccountable predilection in
favour of Modajee, the Rajah of Berar, and ill-placed confidence
in his friendship, operating with an equal degree of force to what
it had done upon fo many preceding occafions, notwithftanding
the leffons we might have learnt from his conduct when General
Goddard's detachment arrived on the coniines of his country, on
its march to Bombay ; from his acceding to the general confede-
racy in the middle of 1779, and afterwards detaching a body of
troops, under his fon Chimnajcc, towards Bengal ; from the too
fuccefsful arts he had pra&ifcd, to retard and obftrucl the early
advance of Colonel Camac's detachment to regain Scindia's ca-
pital; and from the line of treacherous policy he adopted much
about the fame time, with refpeft to the propofals for peace with
the Poonah government, tranfmitttd through him in October
*7Kc,

* <* prr-

( »3 )

w pretenfions of the Peifhwa to Baflein, and to accede
u to a treaty either of alliance or peace unlefs it be re-
«« ftored, we empower you in fuch cafe to give it up.
" This is a point of which, having exprefled our willies
«' as far as we can propofe them /or effect, we muft
*« finally and wholly rely on your discretion, to decide
" it in whatever manner you (hall judge bed for attain-
" ing the fole end which we have in view, which is
" Peace. In all events, an honourable and equal peace,
" and if it can be attained, an advantageous one."

I have been the more particular in tranferibing the
above paragraph, becaufe it proves, that the Governor
General and Council, at the time of penning thefe in-
itru&ions, had not adopted thofe defponding and me-
lancholy fentiments which have fince proftrated them
at the feet of an infulting, though vanquifhed enemy ;
and that General Goddard's opinion, repeatedly urged
both to the Government of Bengal and to the Select
Committee of Bombay, " that no peace could be ob-
" tained with the Mharattas but by a vigorous and
" fuccefsful profecution of hoftilities, and that folici-
" tude and anxiety on our part would only tend to en-
<( creafe the confidence of the minifter, and the info-
" lent extravagance of his demands," was, at the pe-
riod I am now fpeaking of, countenanced by the de-
clared ideas of the Governor General and Council
themfelves.

Their letters concluded with acquainting General
Goddard, that it being the Governor General's inten-
tion to proceed to Lucknow about the middle of July,
he would of courfe take Benares on his way, and pro-
bably Modajee's Dewan might lay afide his firft defigrt
of a journey to Poonah, and give the Governor Gencr

M 2 "l

( 8* )

ral a meeting at Benares, # in which cafe, be, the Ge-
neral, was to continue his negociation with the Mha-
ratfa government, but fufpend the execution of the
treaty, and conftantly advife the Governor General of
his proceedings, and of every thing material to be
known.

"Whatever effect: might be produced from the intend-
ed vifit of Modajee's Dewan to Poonah, it feemed to
the General pretty certain, that no overture could rea-
sonably be expected dire&ly from the Poonah govern-
ment, and that they would continue to be directed by
the fame policy as the preceding year, wifely avoiding
any advances themfelves, fince they had it in their
power to conclude a treaty whenever they might find it
convenient, upon fuch conditions as they mould judge
moft for their intereft, and confident with the actual
itate of circumftances at the time.

It was for this powerful reafon, and becaufe no ade-
quate or ferious attack could poflibly be made upon
Hyder's dominions from the coaft of Malabar, until
fome previous fettlement either of peace or alliance
Ihould take place with the Mharattas, that the Bombay
government and General Goddard were defirous of
adopting vigorous meafures,f and of making one great
and formidable exertion of all the force which they

could

* It unfortunately happened that Dcwaghur Pundit, Moda-
jee's Dewan, fell fick about this time, and died fhortly after, fo
that his intended journey either to Poonah or Benares never took
place, and the fincerity of Modajee's friendship luckily efcaped
the very feverc and arduous trial it mud otherwife have under-
gone.

f It appears by a minute of General Goddard's, at the Select
Committee of Bombay, early in November, that this opinion of

the

( 8$ }

could themfelves colled, generally aided by the Go-
vernor General and Council, and particularly fupported
by the operations of their detachment under Colonel
Muir, in order to imprefs the Poonah miniftcr with
that belief of our yet unreduced ftrength, and appre-
henfion of his own future lofs and danger, which they
were juftly fenfible could alone produce a difpofition
favourable to our views of peace, or even procure a
timely fufpenfion of hoftilities ; nor was it till the
month of November, 1781, that they found them-
felves compelled to abandon every idea of acting of-
fenfively, and to accommodate themfelves as far as the
neceflary attention to their own fafety would permit,
to the new fyftem adopted in Bengal, and the meafures
lately purfued in confequence of it. I have already
hinted Mr. Haftings's intention of proceeding to Luck-
now. He accordingly left Calcutta, and arrived at
Benares the middle of Auguft, in the neighbourhood
of which his journey terminated, for he was compelled
to retire into the fortrefs of Chunar, as an afylum from
the hoftile vengeance and fpirited refentment of Rajah
Cheyt Sing, a Zemindar, who rented the rich city and

the neccffity of preferving an appearance of vigour was ftrongly
fupported by the contents of a letter from Mr. Holland, refident
at the court of Hydcxabad, dated Sept. 2, 1 78 1 , where, after
acquainting the General that he had a ncgociation on foot with
the Nizam for an alliance againft Hyder Ally, he fays-, " I don't
■" know what your plan of operations may be ; if the cypher
" reaches you fafe, I mould be obliged to you for information,
" as they may very materially concern my movements in the nc-
*' gociation. If an active campaign be not intended, yet the
4< giving out a report of fuch intention, and making fome m vc-
*' ments to favour it, the Nizam thinks will be of ufc in difpo-
" fmg the Mharattas to Men tc term* of accommodation."

depeu-

( 86 )

dependencies of Benares under the Englifh Company $
and to this place Afluph ul Dowla, Nawab of Oude,
arrived in perfon to his relief and enlargement j by
which means an opportunity offered of fettling the bu-
finefs which carried the Governor General towards
Lucknow, without proceeding any farther.*

It was under the impreffion of the alarm and confu-
fion which the tumult at Benares excited, and I am
willing to believe, the difppointments given to his
hopes of Dewaghur Pundit's vifiting Poonah or Be-
nares, that Mr. Haftings authorized the officer in com-
mand of the northern detachment, to conclude a fepa-
rate treaty with Mahadjee Scindia ; by which it was
ftipulated, that the Englifh troops Ihould immediately
recrofs the Jumna, and Scindia promifed on his part to
endeavour to negociate a treaty of peace betwixt Hy-
der Ally and the Englifh, and betwixt the Peifhwa and
the Englifh ; in which fhould he not fucceed, he agreed
to remain neuter in our future contefls with them.

Thefe were the only articles of any importance to
the general interefts of the Company, and the termi-
nation of the Mharatta war. The reft provided for the
fecurity of fome of the petty Rajahs who had taken
i part with us, but in fuch loofe and indefinite terms,

* As the particulars are tedious, and unneceflary to a know-
ledge of the Mharatta affairs, I have thought it mod proper to
avoid a detail of Mr. Haftings' s tranfacYions with the Rajah of Be-
nares, as well as of the bufinefs fettled with the Vizier at this meet-
ing. It is fufficient here to obferve, that the Governor General's
object upon the prefent occafion was to raife a fum of money, in
which he materially fucceeded, and that the public neceffitics
had in his opinion fully juftified the following maxim upon poli-
tical, if not moral principles : " Get money, honcftly if you
" can ; but at all events get money,"

that

( 87 >

that it was plain we had fhamefully facrificed them to
our own political views ; as the free and unmolefted
enjoyment of their pofleflions was fecured to them only
during their own good behaviour, or, in other words,
during the pleafure of Mahadjee Scindia.*

A copy of this treaty was received by General God-
dard, at Bombay, in November ; and at the fame time
a letter arrived from the Governor General, explaining
his views in making a treaty with Mahadjee Scindia,
and his expectations of that chief's mediating a peace
betwixt the Englifh and the Mharattas, as well as of a
ceffation of arms being immediately agreed to for that
purpofe.

This point, however, Scindia feems to have confi-
dered himfelf as incompetent to fettle ; and Colonel
Muir, in his letter which accompanied the treaty, only
fays, that he had promifed Scindia to recommend a
ceffation of hoftilities fhould take place as foon as po£«
fible. It is worthy of remark alfo, that Scindia, in the
very article which ftipulates an endeavour on his part
to negociate a peace betwixt the Englifh and Mharattas,
agrees to attempt the fame good oflice betwixt the En-
glifh and Hyder j and his promife to remain neuter if
unfuccefsful, offers no material advantage to our future

ope-

* Tl*e fortrefs of Gualior had been delivered over to the Raima
of Gohud fome months previous to the treaty $ and it was ex*
prelTly ftipulatcd with Scindia, that he fhould continue to poflcft
it, but under the rcftri£tion above mentioned : accordingly,
Scindia Ihortly after, no doubt upon the cleared and moft con-
vincing proofs of his guilt, commenced hoftilities againft him,
and defolated his country. A ufeful lclTon, amongft many others,
to the princes of Hindoftan, how far they repofc a confidence in
JLnglifh honour and gencrofity.

operations in the one cafe more than in the other^ fincc
his perfonal attendance might eafily be difpenfed with,
gnd no diminution of the real ftrength and refources of
the Mharatta nation take place ; nor could he, as a
fubject of the Peiihwa, detain the revenue or military
force of the provinces in his own hands, without ex-
ceeding a neutral part, and acting in oppolltion to the
eftablifhed authority of the Poonah minifter, which I
am perfuaded, and a furvey of his whole conduct will
prove the afiertion, it never has been, nor will it in fu-
ture be, either his intention or his intercft to do.

About the time of this treaty's arrival at Bombay,
the Select Committee alfo received a letter from Fort
St. George, under the fignature of Lord Macartney,
Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes, and Mr. Mac-
pherfon, one of the members of the Supreme Council
of Bengal, to which place he was then on his way
from Europe, inclofmg a copy of one which they had
jointly addrefled to the Peiihwa, with offers of peace,
in the name of the Company, the King and Parliament
of Great Britain, and promifes, that the Governor Ge-
neral and Council would make a treaty upon the condi-
tions wifhed for by the Peiihwa, with which they de-
clared themfelves fully acquainted.

This felf created dictatorial junto, in their letter to
Bombay, ufe the following very extraordinary expref-
fions : <( It is our meaning, that all hoflilitics do im-
-" mediately ceafe on the part of the government of
w Bombay, in the fame manner as hoflilities ceafe on
" the part of the Mharattas," and conclude by ac-
quainting the committee, that they may expect to re-
ceive inftructions from Bengal of a fimilar nature as
foon as poflible, and that this letter would be forwarded

to

( *? )

to them through the channel of the Mharattas, to whom
they had tranfmitted it for that purpofe.*

In confequence of the earneft folicitude for peace
cxprefTed in the Madras letter, and the effectual bar
which that circumftance, as well as the recall of the
Malwa detachment, occafioned to every hope of ter-
minating the Mharatta war, by a vigorous and fuccefs-
ful campaign, General Goddard, in order that he might
be immediately enabled to turn the force on the Mala-
bar coaft againft Hyder Ally, and confidering a treaty
with the Peifhwa as a necelTary leading ftep, propofed
to the Selecl: Committee of Bombay, to make overtures V
to the Poonah minifter for commencing a negociation.
This meafure they highly approved of, and a letter was
accordingly difpatched, generally exprefling the friend-
ly difpofition and inclinations of the Englifh, and of-
fering to depute a confidential perfon to the Peifhwa's
court.

Although the government of Bombay, as well as
General Goddard, could not with propriety indulge the
hppe of effecting an alliance with the Mharattas, upon

* As a proof of the unfavourable effe£t which thefc earned
felicitations for peace on our part, and urged in fo extraordinary
a ftile, certainly produced in the mind of the minifter, it may nof
be amifs to obferve, that the original of the above letter, though
received at Poonah, was never forwarded to Bombay ; and that
when Captain Watherfton afterwards exprefled his furprife to
Nana Fuinefe at his neglecting to do fo, he acknowledged in re-
ply, that it appeared to him a matter of too little confequence to
deferve any ferious attention. The truth, however, really was,
that the cagernefs and anxiety we imprudently difc*>vcrcd, had
fully convinced the minifter of our wcaknefs and diftrefs, and
that it would always be in his power to chui'e the time, as well a.
dictate the terms of a treaty with the Enghih.

N the

( 9° )

the conditions which the Bengal inftruttions to the
latter of the nth of June, 1781, authorifed, they juft-
ly confidered, that fome overture on their part was re-
quifite to convince the minifter, that they poflefled the
fame pacific intentions with the other prefidencies ; and
they reafonably concluded, that frefh inftru&ions, fub-
fequent to the agreement with Scindia, and to the dif-
patch of the Fort St. George letter, would have been
tranfmitted to General Goddard, at that time publicly
invefted with plenipotentiary powers from Bengal at
the Mharatta court, and in all probability arrive at Bom-
bay before the confidential agent he propofed to depute
could fet out for Poonah.

Had this obvious, this direct line af policy been pur-
fued, there is the greateft reafon to believe, that even
lefs ample conceflions than thofe which have fince been
offered through Scindia, and fimilar arguments perfon-
ally urged to the minifter, would have proved fuccefs-
ful, and that the united force of the Peifhwa and the
Englifh would long ere this have acted offenfively
againft Hyder Ally, or, at lead, that by a concerted
neutrality on the part of the former, we mould our-
felves have been at liberty to make a powerful attack
upon his dominions from the Malabar coafl.

The Mharatta minifter having fignified his ready
and chearful acquiefcence to receive a confidential per-
fon, the General deputed Captain Watherfton * to
Poonah, where he arrived the 14th of January, 1782.

I mall

* The deputation of this gentleman to the Mharatta court
was peculiarly acceptable to Nana Furnefc the miniitcr, fmcc,
though not perfonally known, a correfpondence had commenced
betwixt them {0 early as the year 1779, and through the rccom-

roendarTori

I (hall not here enter into a particular defcription of
his negotiation, fince it ultimately failed in producing
a treaty. This failure, however, mull not be attributed
either to his want of zeatous endeavour, or to difincli-
nation on the part of the minifter, but to a new fyfteia
unfortunately adopted in Bengal, which deprived Ge-
neral Goddard of his plenipotentiary powers at the
very i rift ant when they promifed to prove effectual, and
placed a confidence in the fuppofed influence and good
offices of Scindia, which, even admitting the fincerity
of his intentions, they could not in good policy de-
fer ve.*

mentation of Dewaghur Pundit, Modajec Bofla's Dewan, he had V
frequently expreffed his ftrong defire, that an interview fhould
take place.

* The following fact clearly points out the impolitic tendency
of the various meafures adopted for obtaining peace, and parti-
cularly the falacious idea of expecting it through the mediation
of any other power, in preference to an immediate application
to the minifter himfelf, viz. In order to oifprove the arguments
advanced by Captain Watherfton, to prevail upon the Mharatta
court to confide in the effects of Mr. Anderfon's ncgociation,
r.nd to concur ferioufly and heartily with him in fettling the con-
ditions of a treaty, the minifter frankly declared that he could
not but entertain the ftrongeft doubts and apprehenfions on the .
prefent occafion ; for, fays he, *' You produced credentials ia^*

* the name of General Goddard, which the government of Ben-

* gal have fince transferred to Mr. David Anderfon, and," ad- >y,
ded he, with an expreffivc fmile, " Modajee Bona now writes

1 me, that an Englifli gentleman has arrived at the court of
1 Naigpore, with full powers from Mr. Haftings to conclude a
' treaty with the Peiftiwa. How do I know, bur that, when I
1 have finally fettled matters with the former, the latter may
' produce his credentials, and declare the engagements made by
1 Mr. Anderfon to have been illegal and uuauthorifed ?"

N 2 Captain

/

( 9* )

Captain Watherfton met with the mod gracious and
friendly reception from the minifter ; and although the
latter was exceedingly difappointed, that the expected
inftructions had not yet arrived from Bengal, and ac-
knowledged that he had authorifed Mahadjee Scindia
to receive propofals from Mr. Haftings from another
channel, he at the fame time declared his fincere hopes,
that thefe propofals might be made directly to him
through General Goddard ; and even afterwards, when
in confequence of the General's letter of the 24th of
V January from Bombay, communicating Mr. David An-
derfon's appointment to conclude a treaty with the
Peifhwa, and the fuperceflion of his own negotiatory
powers, Captain Watherfton folicited permiflion to re-*
turn to Bombay, the minifter repeatedly exprefled his
defire to detain him at Poonah, until the Governor
General of Bengal might furnifh him with frefh in-
ftructions. Indeed, fo earneft and prefling was he on
this head, that Captain Watherfton, notwithftanding
the orders he had received to quit the Mharatta court,
where his prefence could no longer be ufeful, as he
pollened no powers to treat, and the minifter might
improve it to his own particular views of advantage,
ventured to avail himfclf of the caution given at the
fame time of regulating his conduct by an attention to
the general wifh of the Bengal government for peace,
and to the particular fuccefs of Mr. Anderfon's nego-
tiation, and confented to remain at the Mharatta court
twenty-five days longer, at the expiration of which pe-
riod, the minifter promifed to agree to his departure,
fhould he require it.

This reluctance and unwillingnefs of the Poonah
adminiftiation to part with Captain Watherfton, vifibly
proceeded from the difappointment given to the hopes

which

( 93 )

*rhich his arrival had excited in the mind of the minif-
ter, of himfelf negociating and concluding any treaty
of peace or alliance with the Englifti, inftead of em-
ploying and trufting to the agency of another ; a mea-
fure to which he had already fhewn himfelf particularly
averfe in the cafe of Modajee Bofla, and which it was
reasonable to believe, he would, from motives of iea-
loufy and fufpicion, view in a light ftill more obnox-
ious with regard to Scindia, who, though an immedi-
ate fubjec-r. of the Peifhwa, and one of the moft firm
fupporters of the minifter, was known to be exceedingly
ambitious and enterprifing, and famed even among the
Mharattas themfelves for craft and diflimulation.

The meafure itfelf may alfo be confidered as a great
political error, and an irremediable misfortune with re-
fpecl to our own interefts ; for exclufive of the minif-
ter's entertaining the fentiments above mentioned, an
immediate communication with himfelf would cer-
tainly have proved moft beneficial, by obtaining an
early and decided knowledge of his real intentions, and
preventing the effects of thofe artful fubterfuges, and
that fyftem of procraftination, which he has fince found
means to pra&ife with fuch fuccefs.

Indeed Mr. Haftings himfelf was fo fenfible of the
fuperior political convenience attending this direct, in-
tercourfe with the minifter, that in reply to Captain
Watherfton's letter of the 15th of January, communi-
cating his arrival and friendly reception at the Mharatta
court, although a partiality to the mode of negociation .
he had recently adopted, or fome other equally power-
ful confidcration, would not fuffer him to invefl that
gentleman with any authority to treat upon particular
points, or even to impart to him the nature of the trea-
ty propofed to be concluded through Scindia, " he,

" however,

( 94 )

n however, dire&ed him to continue at Poonah, td
" employ his mod flcilful management and addrefs to
'* prevent any prejudice being had to the views of the
«* Bengal government, from the ftop thu9 put to his
*' farther negociation ; and finally to make fuch com-
«' munications to Mr. Anderfon, as his obfervations of
** the temper, objedr., and other circumftances of the
M Poonah government might fuggeft, and be ufeful to
" the fuccefs of the commiffion with which he was
" charged."

A considerable time before the receipt of thefe or-
ders from the Governor General, Captain Watherfton
had left the Mharatta capital, and returned to Bombay,
trhere he arrived, after an abfence of two months and
a half, the 18th of March, 1782, accompanied by Cap-
tain Banks of the Madras eftablifhment, and Mr. Shaw,
two gentlemen who had languimed fince December
1 779, under a long and fevere captivity at Poonah,
and whofe releafe Captain Watherfton warmly folicit-
ed, and had at length the heartfelt fatisfa&ion to ob-
tain from the minifter previous to his departure, with-
out ranfom or any condition whatever, and as a de-
clared teltimony of perfonal friendfhip and efteem.*

How.

* As the whole of Captain Watherfton's public correfpon-
dence during his refidence at Poonah, and particularly his addrefs
to the Governor General, dated Jan. 23d, 1781, will have been
tranfmitted to the honourable the Court of Directors, any partial
extracts from his letters mud be unnecefTary. I fhall therefore
at prefent finifh the fubjecr. of his embafly, by tranferibing his
own words fiom the concluding letter of his correfpondencc with
Mr. Haftings, dated Poonah, March 9th, i?Sz, which de-
feribes in very juft and impartial colours the nature and effects
of his negociation. " In the fevcral letters which I have had

( 95 )

However mortifying and unjuft this fuperceffion of >/
the powers delegated to General Goddard, and at the

" the honour to addrefs you from this place, every circumftance
" has been reprefented in as minute and clear a manner as I pof-
" fibly could ; and nothing at prefent occurs to me, as before
" omitted, the communication of which is neceflary to lay open
*' the fentiments and defigns of this court with the greater cer-
** tainty and precifion, than what my correfpondence may have
" already effected.

" If I have failed in accomplishing the important objects of
4* my deputation, or in rendering fuch effential fervice to the
** Company's interefts, as might have been expe&ed from my
" fituation, the former muft be attributed to circumftances which,
" could not be forefeen or avoided, and the latter I may lament
" as a misfortune, but cannot help entertaining a hope it will
** never be imputed as a fault, being confeious in my own breaft
" of having been actuated by the moil zealous and unprejudiced
" wifhes for the public good, and of having exerted all my cn-
" deavours ftrenuoufly and folely to that end ; and although the
41 fanguine expectations formed by General Goddard, when he
" deputed me to Poonah, of fulfilling your defire of an allianco
" with the Mharatta ftate, have been difappointed, he has Hill
" the happy confolation to reflect, that my prefence with the
" minifter at this time has been productive of fome benefit to the
" public caufc, and afiifted in laying the foundation of future
" friendfhip, by an early difcovery of the fecret defigns of the
" Mharatta government, and the policy which influences their
" conduct, by rendering the arts of concealment and procrafti-
" nation on their part lefs eafy to be practifed hereafter, by efta-

" blifhine a more free and unrefei ved communication of fenti-

-J
tl ment on both fides, and by removing every doubt and fufpt-

" cion from the mind of the minifter, relative to your intentions

«* in deputing Mr. Andcrfon, of whofe exclufivc and fupcriour

'♦ powers to treat, he has at laft declared himfelf to be, perfectly

«« fatisfied."

i very

A

( * )

very inftant of his commencing a negociation, mud
have reafonably appeared to him, it is evident from
his initructions to Captain Watherfton, and from the
whole of his fubfequent conduct, that he did not al-
low his own private feelings on this occafion to operate
to the prejudice of the public intereft, or relax in the
fmalleft degree in his zealous and unwearied endea-
vours to forward the future views of the Bengal go-
vernment, to whom, in his addrefs of the 16th of Fe-
bruary, acknowledging the receipt of the Governor Ge-
neral's letter, which had revoked his plenipotentiary ap-
pointment, he exprefled himfelf in the mod temperate
though fpirited terms j and in the language of unbiafTed
truth and candid fenfibility, while he declared his fixed
determination of ftrenuoufly and invariably exerting
himfelf to promote the fuccefsful accomplifhment of
Mr. Anderfon's treaty, he only added a fincere and fer-
vent hope, " that the meafures then adopted, and the
" change which had taken place in the channel of ne-
" gociation, might not prove in the mod diftant de -.
<c gree of proportion fo prejudicial to the Company's
" interefts, as he was compelled to feel and declare
u them injurious to himfelf."*

Imme-

* It is worthy of remark, that though the Governor General
and Council, in their letter to General Goddard of the 24th of
Dec. 1 78 1, ufe the following words, ** The Governor General
u will explain to you, that the appointment of Mr. Anderfon,
" as miniftcr to Poonah, was a meafure of local neceffity, and
" not dictated by any difapprobatiou of your conduct in the pie-
n nipotentiary character with which you were inverted," Mr.
Hauings contented himfelf with an explanation far lefs fatisfac-
tory than fuch a liberal declaration on the part of the Bengal
government gave reafon to expeft, and rcftrittec it to a fimple

and

( 97 0

Immediately after Captain Watherfton's. return from
Poonah, and the eonfequent ceffatjon of hoflilities with
the Mharattas, which, though not formally agreed to,
had then actually taken place, by a confent mutually
implied, though not declared, the government of Bom-
„bay, in concert with General Goddard, meditated an
attack upon Hyder's dominions from the coaft of Ma-
labar j and however averfe they were to' any inferior
attempt, which they were fenfihle muft only produce
an augmentation of expence, and be attended with im-
minent hazard, without any adequate acquifition in
profpeft, and without any hope of ferioufly alarming
Hyder with fears for the fafety of his kingdom, and
thereby compelling him to relinquifh the Carnatic, they
planned an expedition againil Magalore, and would
certainly have entered upon its execution, had not the
latenefs of the feafon, and the very dangerous naviga-
tion upon the Malabar coaft, rendered fuch an enter-
prife utterly impracticable previous to the commence-
ment of the monfoon.

Difappointed in their wiflies of making an immediate
diverfion, they were under the necefhty of contenting
themfelves for the prefent with palling a refolution to
attack Hyder Ally as foon after the breaking up of the
rainy feafon as circumftances would poflibly admit, and
they entertained the ftrongeft hopes of receiving fuck
effectual fupport and afliftance from the Governor Ge-

and unqualified intimation, ** that he had thought proper to in*
** veft'Mr. Andcrfon with plenipotentiary authority to conclude a
*' treaty of peace and alliance with the minifters of the Mha-
•' ratta government at Poonah, and that he would firft repair to
" Mahadjce Scindia, who had offered to be a mediator with the
'* Mharatta adminiM.ation, in order to concert with him the
*' meant moil likely to produce a fafc and honourable peace."

Q ncral

( 9* )

neral and Council during the intervening period, as
might enable them to enter his dominions in force, an4
with preparations correfponding to the important ad*
vantages expected from, and only to be obtained by, a
powerful and formidable invafipn.

For this purpofe a plan of operations was prepared by
General Goddard, and delivered into the Select Commit*
tee of Bombay the middle of April, 1782, in which he
itated the number and quality of the troops it would be
abfolutely neceflary to employ upon a fervice of fuch
moment and magnitude, the expence in which its ef-
fectual execution would finally involve the Company,
and the fum of money immediately requifite to fet fuch
an enterprize on foot.

His plan, though directed to fo grand and extenfive
an object, was confefiedly calculated upon fuch mode-
rate and limited principles, in the means propofed for
jts attainment, that nothing but the raoft prefllng and
urgent neceflity of affairs, together with a merited con-
fidence in the known character, experience, and mili-
tary abilities of the officer by whom it was to be con-
duced, could have juftified the approbation and con-
^ currence it met with. The Bombay government tranf-
rnitted a copy of it round to Bengal, defcribing at the
fame time their own total want of refources, and the
dependance they mull necefTarily place upon the Go-
vernor General and Council's afliflance for the means
of accomplifhing it with effect ; nor were they without
fome grounds of hope, from the very flattering and fa-
vourable accounts they were continually receiving of
the progrefs and ftate of Mr* Anderfon's negociation,
that the endeavours of that gentleman to conclude a
treaty of peace or alliance with the Mharattas, through
the mediation of Mahadjee Scindia, might be attended

with

( 99 )

with fuccefs> and that they might enter upon a plan of
hoftilities againft Hyder, not only without any appre-
henfion of an attack upon theif own fettlements from
the Mharattas, but even fupported by them as a power-
ful and ufeful ally.

I have thus conducted my narrative to the commence-
ment of the rainy monfoon of the year 1782 ; and here
I mull neceflarily bring it to a conclufion, being unin-
formed of fuch material occurrences as may have hap-
pened in India, fubfcquent to the following month of
October, when the monfoon clofed, and the feafon of
action commenced.

At that period the ftate of the war on the Coroman-
del coaft, as far as the land-operations extended, wore
an afpeft far from unfavourable, and even encouraged
fome hopes of a fuccefsful termination, if either our
naval efforts fhould fortunately prove equal to drive the
French fleet from the Cororrrandel coaft, which there
was great reafon to expect the fuperiority occafioned by
the junction of Sir Richard Bickerton's fquadron, that
left Bombay about the middle of September, would
certainly enable us to effect ; or if any adequate diver-
fion could be made in its favour by a ferious and power-
ful attack upon Hyder's dominions from the fide of Ma-
labar.

This latter point, however, feemed to depend en-
tirely upon the two following circumftances, viz. " the
«' refult of Mr. Anderfon's negociation with Mahadjee
fl Scindia," and " the refolution of the Governor Gc-
«* neral and Council fubfequent to their receipt of the
*' plan of military operations propofed by General
« Goddard."

Refpcdting the former of thefe, although as early 33

the 17th of May, 1785, a treaty had been fettled and

O 2 con-

( lOO ) -

concluded upon terms, the molt humlliatirig and de-
rogatory on our part that could poflibly be exacted by z
vi&orious enemy i and although, befides the reftitution-
or our late conquefts, we had confented to reHnquifh
whatever had been ceded to us by the Poorunda treaty,
as well as to abandon entirely the interefts and caufe of
Ragonaut Row, the Poonali adminiftration had fuffered
a period of five months to elapfe without finally ap-
proving and ratifying the conditions of the treaty; and
it appeared moft probable, that the minifter, fenfible of
the little danger he had to apprehend, and of the un-
prepared ftate to which we had reduced ourfelves of
acting offenfively againft the Peifhwa, would avail him-
felf of the advantage he derived from the mode of ne-
gociation we had adopted, to protract the final adjust-
ment of matters with us, until he had completely ma-
tured his own political fchemes, and might find it in
every refpect convenient and perfectly agreeable to
himfelf, to take a pofitive and decided part either for
or againft our inteiefts.*

* I have chofe to avoid entering more fully into the fubje& of
this treaty at prefent for the two following rcafons. Firft, Be-
caufe the treaty itfelf until ratified does not in reality exift ; and
fecondly, Becaufe however inconclufive and inadequate to the
facrifices we have offered, fuch articles as relate to Hyder Ally,
may appear in their prefent ftate, they may poflibly lead to, and
form a bafts of future engagements of the moft important nature,
which it was neccflary fhould for fome time remain fecrct, or be
the fubje£t of a feparate argument. The following circumftance,
however, defcrves to be particularly noticed in this peace, that
Modajec £ofla, Rajah of Bcrar, in the prefent treaty is permitted
to aflume his proper political character and ftation, and is included
together with Nizam Ally Chawn and Hyder Ally Chawn, as a
friend and ally of the Mharatta ftate.

Regarding

Regarding the (econd circttmftance above alluded to,
vir. <( the refolution of the Bengal government upon
'* considering' rhe plan tranfmitted from Bombay for*
" their approbation," the advices received from Cal-
cutta were not only the moft unfavourable and difcou-
raging, but totally deftroyed every hope of equipping'
an armament of fufficient force to make any ferious* or
ufeful attack upon Hyder's dominions frOm the Malabar
coaft, fmce the Governor General and Council declared
themfelves unable to furnifh the fmalleft affiftance ;
and in confequence of this declaration, the Select Com-
mittee of Bombay, fo late as the beginning of October
TJ%2, were compelled to acknowledge that their utmoft
exertions during the approaching feafon of a&ion could
not poffibly extend beyond the reduction of Mangalore,
or fome of Hydei^s fortrefles upon the fea coaft ; and
even to operations of a nature fo circumfcribed and fo
inadequate to the important objects which in policy
prompted an invafion, and which alone could juftify
the facrifices offered to the Mharattas, in order to be
in a condition to undertake it, the means pofTefTed by
the government of Bombay feemed exceedingly doubt-
ful and difproportioned.

I (hall here clofe my narrative, nor is it, I hope, ne-
ceflary to recapitulate the feveral facls contained in it,
to prove the juftnefs and propriety of the following
ideas, which are at lead founded upon an impartial
confideration and candid comparison of them.

In the firft place, I conceive it will be apparent to all
unprejudiced and unbiafled minds, that the Mharatta
war in 1778 originated with the governments of Ben-
gal and Bombay, and was a matter of choice, not of
political neceffity.

I Second,

V

Second, That let the circumftances under which it
commenced have been ever fo favourable, the total
want of confidence and unanimity which marked the
fubfequent counfcls and condu£t, of the two prefiden-
cies, muft have afiaredly defeated every hope, and de-
ftroyed even the pofiibility of fuccefs.

Third, That the failure of the negociation for peace
in 1 779, and the fubfequent renewal of hoflilities, was
altogether unavoidable, and a meafure founded upon,
principles of felf prefervation and defence.

Fourth, That the fuccefs which afterwards attended
our military operations, would in all reafonable expec-
tation have fhortly terminated the war to our honour
and advantage, had not our own mifcondu£t, and the
misfortunes of our arms on the coaft of Coromandel,
unfeafonably interpofed and prevented.

Fifth, That in order to make any ufeful or adequate
diverfion from the fide of Malabar, and draw Hyder
Ally out of the Carnatic, no partial or inferior opera-
tion could have availed, and that therefore it was ne-
ceflary to enter his dominions in force fufficient to alarm
him with fears for their fafety, as well as to contend
with the formidable oppofition which the troops em-
ployed on fo important a fervice muft in fuch cafe ex-
pect to encounter.

Sixth, That the means of doing this mufl entirely,
depend upon, and could only be fupplied by the Go-
Yernor General and Council of Bengal.

Seventh, That previous to any enterprize, it was
abfolutely necefTary to conclude a treaty with the Mha-
rattas, or at lead to agree to a ceuation of hoflilities.

Eighth, That the moft certain and effectual mode of
producing a difpofition in the Poonah minifter, favour-
able

( i©3 )

able to our views of peace, wa9 by a vigorous and fuc-
cefsful profecution of the war ; and

Laftly, That, when after the repeated proofs we had
experienced of the inefficacy of every folic itation and
overture on our part, the Governor General and Coun-
cil were ftill determined to adhere to the fame humi-
liating fyftem, and to facrifice every thing to the at-
tainment of a peace^ it would have been more confiftent
with a wife and prudent policy, and in all probability
have fucceeded better, efpecially as Captain Wather-
fton's deputation to Poonah had put matters in fo fair
and favourable a train, if General Goddard had been
authorized to make thofe propofals directly to the mi-
nifter himfelf, which were unfortunately tranfmitted to
him by Mr. David Andcrfon, through Mahadjce Scin-
dia, and which by the arts of procraftination the Mha-
ratta court has already pra&ifed, and the opportunity
^hereby loft to us of improving the feafon of action to
the greateft advantage, his acceding to hereafter can
x^ot poflibly render an object of political benefit, or
anfwer the ufeful purpofe originally intended, and
jnuft therefore be deemed, on oar part, a moft unwar*
jrantable, profitlefs, and deftructive facrifice.

yv

post-

i

( i05 )

JPOSTSCftlPf;

J. HE very important intelligence which has been re-
ceived from India, fince the above meets were fent to
the prefs, renders it neceflary for the author to fay a
fbw words in addition. It is, however, fuperfluous to
expatiate, or enter very fully into particulars, fince the
difcerning public will at once perceive the nature and
real value of the advantages above alluded to, as well
as1 the caufe by which they have been produced.

The ratification and exchange of the Mharatta treaty,
arid the fiiccefsful expedition upon the coaft of Mala-
bar, are the two points that defervedly attract the pre-
fent attention of the nation ; fince the former is an
event which has long been eagerly defired and expect-
ed, and the latter promifes to be followed, by the moft
favourable confequences, relative to the Operations o£
the war in the Carnatic.

A perfect knowledge of cireumftances, and an exa-
mination of the means by which thefe two points were
effected, will, however, be fuilicient to convince every
candid and unprejudiced perfon, that both thefe inci-
dents have been confequences of the death of Hyder
Ally Chawn, whieh preceded them ; and it is there-
fore upon an event fo providential and feafonablc to the
Britiih iutercfts in India, as the exit of that extraordi-
nary man- from the bufy fcene of life at this critical.
P juncture.

C *>6 }

juncture, that the author feels a fmcere and patriotic
pleafure in congratulating the public.

He cannot avoid mingling a considerable {hare of re-
gret with his fetisfaclion, when he reflects upon thr
wilucky caufes of delay which intervened to prevent
the eonclufion of a treaty, until the period of fuccefsful
fortune above mentioned ; a period that juftified the
moft fanguine hopes of an honourable termination to
Our Indian contefts,. and muft in its progref* have in-
fallibly procured for us conditions of peace with the
Mharatta ftate, proportioned in fome meafure to the
conquefts we had made from it-

The preceding narrative clearly explains what is.
meant; by the caufes of delay above referred to j and a
perufal of the treaty itfelf will beft point out to the- in-
telligent reader, the motive of the author's regret for
the great and unprofitable Sacrifices which have been
made to obtain it.'

The prefidency of Bombay, deprived of every po-"
Ktical confequence it had acquired during the late
fuccefsful ftruggle with the Mharattas, muft now fink
into an obfcurity, from which it will be alrnoft impof-
fible ever again to emerge -, and inftead of indulging
the flattering profpect. of an extended commerce or en-
creafed revenue,, muft be contented to move in a line
the moft humiliating and circumfcribed, pofleiTing no
power or refource whatever, receiving- no refpect or
confideration from any of the neighbouring dates, and
burdening the Company with a heavy and conftant
expence, without even- the moft diftant hope of relief
at any future period, or by any probable turn of for-
tune whatever.

That this picture is by no means too highly coloured-

or overcharged, a comparifon of the treaty concluded-

2 ' bv

( *°7 )

by Colonel Upton in March 1776 with that now made
public, will at once difcover.

It is, indeed;, but too evident, that had Hyder Ally
ftill lived to infult the Camatic, the ftipulations of the
prefent treaty offer no adequate benefit, or profpect of
advantage, proportioned to the important facrifices
made in it : but when we reflect, that by his death tho
whole fcene has been reverfed, and a new fet of actors
introduced upon the ftage ; that a change of intereft^
and political connections has confequently taken place j
and alfo, that the chiefs who reluctantly fubmitted to
the father, are with difficulty restrained within the
bounds of obedience to the fon,* how fincerely and
how ferioufly is it to be lamented, either that a treaty
could not have been concluded with the Mharattas at a
time when their alliance might have been of ufe to re-
trieve our affairs, or that we did not poflefs a fufficient
(hare of political wifdom and forefight, to have left our-
felves the freedom of deliberation and choice, when-
ever a fortunate opportunity might prefent itfelf of ex-
pecting and demanding honourable, if not advantageous
terms,

I will even venture to go a flep farther, and I am
perfuaded, the impartial part of mankind will not think
I hazard too much in affirming, that the conditions to
which we have fubmitted are of fo ruinous and difgrace-
ful a nature, that nothing but fome fecret agreement, to

* This fpirit of rebellion has already manifefted itfelf in tlie*
fortunate defection which put us in pofie'Iion of the Bidcnoir
country, and promifes to produce effects Mill more important and
beneficial, (hould the projected revolution at Scringapatnam, iu
favour of the d'.^hroned family cf My fore, be attended with
fuccef*.

which

( «8 )

which we arc at prefent (hangers, and an equal parti-
tion of the whole of Hyder Ally's territories betwixt
the Englifli and Mharattas, can poffibly juftify, or evert
excufe coir acceding to them;

With this remark I fliall now difiriifs the fiibjed"t,
and defer its farther confederation until recent advices
from India fhall admit of our properly eftimating the
lofs we at prefent fuftain, and of comparing it with the
extent of future benefit, which it may be intended to
produce.

That Providence may fortunately continue to inter-
pofe, aad prevent the misfortunes with which a tiain
of political errors has long threatened to Overwhelm
the Britifh interefts in Hindoftan, is furely a wifh irr
which every real lover of his country will warmly and
heartily concur ; and the author feels himfelf at the
I fame time infpired with the mofl lively and confident
hope, of feeing the wifdom and power of the legiflature
foon and effectually exerted to eftablifh a new, liberal^
and uniform fyftem of adminiftration in India, to unite
the divided and diflant prefidencies under one fovereign
authority and control, and by directing their atten-
tions and endeavours to the fame determinate objects of
political purfuit, to render our valuable and extenfive
empire in the eaft, equally folid, beneficial, and per-
manent*

T M e end.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

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