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^ MESOPOTAMIA (REVIEW OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION).

E E V I E W

OF THE

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

MESOPOTAMIA

NOTE.

This paper gives aa account of the civil administration of Mesopotamia during
the British military occupation, that is to say, down to the summer of tlie present year,
when, a Mandate for Mesopotamia having been accepted by Great Britain, steps were
being taken for the early establishment of an Arab Government.

His Majesty's Government caU-^d for a report on this difficult period from the
Acting Civil Commissioner, who entrusted the preparation of it to Miss Gertrude
L. BeU, C.B.E.

India Office,
3rd December 1920.

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1920.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGE.

Chapter I. — Occupation of the Basrah Wilayat - - - 1

II. — Organisation of the Administration _ _ . 5

III. — The pacification of the Tribes and Relations with the

Shi'ah towns up to the fail of Baghdad - - - 20

IV. -Relations with Arab and Kurdish Tribes, and with the

Holy Cities after the fall of Baghdad - - - 33

V. — The Occupation of Mosul ----- 47

VI.— The Kurdish Question - - - - - 57

VII. — Development of Administration. The Revenue Depart-
ment ------- 74

VIII. — Judicial Administration ----- 90

IX. — Organisation of the Edu.cation Department, Levies and
Police, Civil Medical Service, Department of Commerce
and Industry, Public Works, Raihvays, Finance, and

Establishment - - - _ _ • . 103

X.— The Nationalist Movement - - - - 126

Index - 148

■■■■I

Mesopotamia: Review of Civil AdministratioD.

CHAPTER I.— Occupation of the Basrah Wilayat.

In the spring of 1910, Ottoman rule in Mesopotamia was epitomised by a singularly-
competent observer, Mr. J. G. Lorimer, British Resident at Baghdad, in words which
cannot be bettered. " The universal Turkish system of administration," he wrote in
the Political Diary for the month of March, " is in almost every respect unsuitable to 'Iraq.
The Turks themselves must recognise that it is a failure here, but probablj' few of
them appreciate the cause, though that is sufficiently obvious. 'Iraq is not an
' integral part of the Ottoman Empire, but a foreign dependency, very much in the
' rough ; and its government by sedentary officials according to minute regulations,
' framed at Constantinople for Western Turkey, can never be satisfactory. I had no
' idea before coming to Baghdad of the extent to which Turkey is a country of red
' tape and blind and dumb officialdom, nor of the degree in which the Turkish
' position in 'Iraq is unsupported by physical force. One cannot but admire, however,
' the dogged and uncomplaining resolution with which the Turkish civil bureaucracy
' and skeletion army persist in their impossible tasks, the former in that of governing
' according to code and paragraph, the other in that of maintaining a semblance of
' order."

This description outlines the conditions prevailing in the country at the outbreak
of war, except that the intervening four and a half years of administration under the
auspices of the Committee of Union and Progress had tended to exaggerate former
evils while arousing hopes of improvement which could not be fulfilled. Encouraged
by the catchwords of liberty and equality, the subject races of the Ottoman Empire
began to formulate aspirations wholly contrary to the centralising spirit which
animated the Committee even more than the regime it had replaced. Claims to local
autonomy, which had first been heard in Syria, were enunciated there in more
assured tones and found an echo in Mesopotamia, not only among the Arab population,
but also among the Kurds, who had been no less alienated than the Arabs by a
spasmodic assertion of authority which the Ottoman Government was powerless to
maintain. It is not too much to say that the Mesopotamian Wilayats of Basrah,
Baghdad and Mosul had reached the limits of disorder consouant with the existence,
even in name, of settled administration. For years past British Consular officials
had been accustomed to receive embarrassing requests from local magnates and tribal
chiefs that the British Government should put an end to the intolerable chaos by
assuming control of the country.

British maritime and commercial interests in the Persian Gulf, together with its
political importance to the Government of India, had thrust upon us responsibilities
there which we could not avoid. Our position with regard to the ruling Arab chiefs
along its shores had gradually been consolidated. We had entered into treaty
relations with the Sultan of Masqat, the Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast and of the Island
of Bahrain. Ibn Sa'ud, Ruler of Najd, who in 1913 had pushed his way down to the
sea, was anxious to obtain our recognition and support ; the Shaikh of Kuwait,
always apprehensive of Ottoman encroachments, had been assured of our protection,
and the Shaikh of Muhammarah, Arab by race though a subject of Persia, looked to
us for help in maintaining his position against Sultan and Shah alike.
I These alliances were a valuable asset when war was declared on Turkey on

"^ 29th October 1914, and it was of primary importance to make clear to the chiefs of
the Gulf the causes of the breach with the Ottoman Empire and the scope of
hostilities. Accordingly the Political Resident issued on 31st October, under the
orders of His Majesty's Government, a proclamation to the Arab rulers of the Persian
Gulf and their siibjects explaining 'that Turkey had entered into war at the instigation
of Germany, to her own destruction, and that it seemed impossible to hope that the
Ottoman Empire could be preserved. To the chiefs who had enjoyed the benevolent
protection of Great Britain we promised that no act of ours should threaten liberty or

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reh'gio'n; afiffwe' required of them on their part that they should preserve order and
tranquillity in their territories and should not allow the foolish among their subjects
to disturb the peace of their dominions or to injure British interests. By pursuing
this course they would emerge from the troubles which surrounded them stronger and
freer than before. On 1st November a second proclamation of wider application was
issued, touching the holy ylaces in the 'Iraq.

With these assurances the chiefs of the Gulf were satisfied. During tlie whole
course of the war we encountered from them no hostility, while the unwavering
friendship of leading men, such as the Shaikhs of Muhanmiarah and Kuwait and the
Ruler of Najd, proved of inestimable value not only to the British Government but
also to the Arab cause.

On 6th November, the British-Indian force which had been concentrated in
readiness at Bahrain, landed, under the command of General Delamain, at the mouth
of th^Sha,tt: :al-' Ar ab, and under cover of the naval guns, took Fao fort. On the same
day SirTercy Cox, who had accompanied the force from India as Chief Political
Officer, issued a proclamation in which he reiterated the regret of the British
Government at having been forced, by the unprovoked hostility of the Turkish
Government, into a state of war. " But let it be kuown to all," the proclamaiion
continued, " that the British Government has no quarrel with the Arab inhabitants
" on the river banks, and so long as they show themselves friendly and do not harbour
" Turkish troops or go about armed, they have nothing to fear, and neither they nor
" their property will be molested."

During the month of October the Turks had been clearing their encumbered
decks for action. For the better part of 25 years the peace of Basrah had been rent
and the slumbers of successive Walis disturbed by the activities of a member of the
leading Sunni family of the district, Saiyib Talib, eldest son of the Naqib. In
turn adherent of the Conunittee of TJnion and Progress and of its rival, the Liberal
Party, Saiyid Talib's ambitions were centred on the hope of converting the Basrah
Wilayat into an independent Arab amirate with himself as amir. For some years
he and his associates had dominated the town of Basra, and held the local Ottoman
authorities in defiance. Saiyid Talib was fully alive to the hazards he was taking, and
in October 1914, when Enver Pasha pressed him to come to Constantinople, probably
as the best means of getting rid of him, he made advances to us through the Shaikh
of Muhammarah. In return for recognition as local chief, he offered to raise an Arab
revolt, A reply was sent to him through Shaikh Kliaz'al of Muhammarah, advising
him to remain in Basrah and co-operate in our interest with the Shaikhs of
Muhammarah and Kuwait and with Ibn Sa'ud. He was promised immunity from
taxation for his date gardens, protection from Turkish reprisals .and the maintenance
of the hereditary privileges of himself and his father, the Naqib. Here negotiations
halted, and before our forces reached Basrah Saiyid Talib's position there had grown
too precarious. He fled to Kuwait and thence to Ibn Sa'ud, who interceded with us
on his behalf. He ended by going to India in voluntary exile, and was permitted in
1917 to remove to Egypt, where he remained till February 1920, when he returned to
Basrah.

The career of Saiyid Talib was, from our point of view, innocuous. The same
cannot be said of the career of 'Ajaimi al Sa'dun. The most virile member of a
family of Sunni landowners and tribal overlords in the province of Basrah, he was the
bitter foe of Saiyid Talib, who in 1911 had decoyed his father into the hands of
the Turks. Sa'dun Pasha was removed to Aleppo, where he presently succumbed to
the climate of an Ottoman gaol. By a strange perversion, hatred of Saiyid Talib
had thrown 'Ajaimi into the arms of the Turks, and it was upon him that they relied
to assemble and lead the Arabs in a holy war against the infidel.

All through the Ottoman Empire a determined effort was made to rouse
fanaticism by the preaching of a Jihad, and it met in Mesopotamia with some outward
appearance of success. The religious forces of Islam were mobilised and the Shaikh
of Muhammarah was urged by prominent mujtahids, the religioiis leaders of the
Shiahs at Najaf and Karbala, to take part against us. He replied that it was
his belief that the mujtahids acted under compulsion and that his obligations as a
Persian subject enjoined neutrality. But the tribesmen of the Euphrates and Tigris,
excited, it is to be suspected, more by hopes of boundless loot than by expectation of
reward in another world, came flocking down the rivers to oppose our advance up the
Shatt-al-'Arab — a wild and irresponsible horde which broke at the first onset. " As
for the guns of the English," explained one of the combatants some months later to a

"British resident in Hasrali, " they filled the air with noise, tore up the earth and
knocked down the palm trees. That, Sahib, is not war." After a brief experience of
these unfamiliar terrors, the speaker had returned to the cultivation of his garden,
■contentedly accepting our administration.

On J 1th November our outposts encountered and repulsed at Saihan a f'^-w
hundred Turks of the Basrah gai-rison. On the 16th and 17th, engagements were
fouglit at S'ahil and Kut al Zuin. The Turkish force was accompanied by Arab levies
and 'Ajaimi was present in commnnd of some :i50 irregular horse, but he hung upon
the outskirts of tbe battle, taking no part, and a large proportion of the tribesmen
decamped before the action. 'Abadan, the refinery of the Anglo- Persian Oil Company,
was henceforth safe, and from being an object the protection of which was one of the
primary duties of the Force, it assumed for the rest of the war the role of purveyor of
crude oil, kerosene and petrol to every branch of His Majesty's services. The record
of its work is one of which all those associated with it, as well as with the distant oil
fields on which it depends, may well be proud. The position of our good friend the
Shaikh of Muliammarah, which had been one of considerable anxiety, was assured
also.

After the defeat of 17th November the Turks retreated hastily to Qurnali,
abandoning Basrah, while 'Ajaimi withdrew to Zubair. Basrah was left at the mercy
of fleeing tribesmen and of its own liberal supply of cut-throats, who applied them-
selves with native ability to the task of looting the Custom House and the bazaars.
Urgent messages from the local magnates as well as from the British Consul were
sent to the Force, bidding it hasten, and we entered the town on 22nd November to
find the Custom House in flames and the population in great anxiety. On the day of
the occupation. Sir Percy Cox, in the name of the General Officer Coinmanding-in-
Chief, issued a proclamation assuring the inhabitants that we bore them no enmity or
ill will, and that we hoped to prove ourselves their good friends and protectors.
" No remnant of the Turkish administration now remains in this region. In place
" thereof the British flag has been established, under which you will enjoy the
" benefits of liberty and justice both in regard to your religious and to your secular
" affairs. I have given strict orders to my victorious troops that in the execution of
" the duties entrusted to them they are to deal with the populace generally with
" complete consideration and friendliness. It remains for you yourselves to treat
" them in the same way."

The town was placed under a Military Governor, who was shortly afterwards
given two Deputy Military Governors, one fov Basrah and one for the sulmrb of
'Asliar. The tribesmen along the Shatt-al-Arab, though they had figured, if they
had done nothing more, in the Turkish forces, began at once to make advances to us.
One of the first to come in was Shaikh Ibrahim of Zubair, the little oasis on the
desert edge, some eight miles west of Basrah, standing on the site of Sinbad the
Sailor's port. The Shaikh of Zubair had always been permitted by the Turks to hold
a position of semi-independence, and his village, peopled mainly by Sunnis from
Najd, has the appearance and atmosphere of Arabia rather than of Mesopotamia. It
is one of those Beduin market places which are scattered along the frontiers of the
settled lands, and as such echoes with tribal gossip and the politics of the interior
desert. These high matters being disciissed round the Shaikh's coffee hearth, he is
the best local authority on all that concerns the Beduin, and he played the part of
eyes and ears to the Chief Political Officer. More especially vras his friendship of
value when in the spring the Turks were concentrating on Shu'aibah, three or four
miles to the north of him.

On 9tli December we occupied Qurnah, at the confluence of the Tigris and the
■old Euphrates channel. The Shaikh of Qurnah had already sent down messages to
Basrah and has since the occupation been unwavering in his attitude towards us — he
became a familiar figure in the Basrah Political Office, with his restless and wary
glance, his beard died red with henna, and his flow of eloquent periods. A bit of a
scholar, he possesses a meagre library, and prides himself on a knowledge of history
Avhich covers a period extending, with lapses, to the days of Adam. The Shaikh of
Harthali, between Basrah and Qurnah, was already to be -counted among our
friends. He was one of the first of the rural magnates to enter the service of
the British Government. The connection had begun, as he is fond of recording, by
his being picked up wounded on the battlefield of Kut al Zain, where he had been
fighting against us. The intervention on his behalf of the Shaikh of Muhammarah
procured his pardon, and the treatment he received at our hands won his lasting
gratitude.

In February 1915 Lord Hardiuge, then Viceroy of India, visited Basrah, and in
reply to an address from the British community expressed the hope that though we^
coukl not Avithout a full exchange of views with our Allies lay down plans for the
future, we might be permitted to indulge in the confident assurance that thenceforth,
a more benign administration would bring back to the 'Iraq that jjrosperity to which
her rich potentialities entitled her. His Majesty the King had received on the 1st of
January a telegram signed by six of the notables of Basrah protesting their gratitude
at being included under the British flag ; nevertheless, in the spring of 1915 the
stability of that flag was gravely threatened. To the west, hordes of tribesmen were
gathering in the desert between Zubair and Nasiriyah. Undeterred by the military
inefficiency of tribal levies, the Turks summoned all the leading men on the-
Euplirates and Tigris to take part in the Shu'aibah attack. Political Officers have
frequently heard accounts of this expedition from shaikhs and saiyids, many of whom
subsequently occupied positions of trust under our administration. " What could we
do? "one of these men observed. " The Turks bade us fight, and Ave were in their-
" hands. But, Sahib, we did not fight. We got no further than Nukhailah (some
" 10 miles from Shu'aibah). And there, since the Turkish Commander had offended
" us, Ave rested. But Avhen Ave saw the Turks in flight Ave made haste to depart, and
" came back by boat with all speed to our homes." They took no furthe]- active part
in the Avorld war.

The Turkish army consisted of between 6,000 and 7,000 regular troops, the Arab-
tribal levies from the Euphrates, some 9,000 tribesmen under 'Ajaimi and his cousin,
'Abdullah al Falih, and over 1,000 Kurds. The tribesmen numbered in all over
18,000, of which the tAvo Sa'dun contributed a good half. Their lighting value Avas-
nil. After the occupation of Basrah, 'Ajaimi had sent Sir Percy Cox several nebulous
messages through friends to the effect that he Avished to enter into relations Avitn the
British Government and meet Sir Percy. The latter replied that Ave had no quarrel
with the Arabs of the 'Iraq or Avith their shaikhs, Avhom we Avished to free from
Turkish oppression. He expressed his readiness to meet 'Ajaimi at any appointed
place, since it might be difficult for him to evade the Turks and come to Basrah.
But to this definite offer 'Ajaimi returned no ansAver. Shortly afterwards 'Ajaimi
renewed negotiations by sending one of his henchmen, Muhammad 'Asaimi, to see
Sir Percy Cox. He Avas received Avith all friendliness and the former proposal was
repeated. Finally on 30th January the Chief Political Officer Avrote to 'Ajaimi a
letter Avhich was in the nature of an ultimatum. He recapitulated Avhat had occurred,
said he Avas still Avilling to meet 'Ajaiini and discuss matters, and offered him a safe
conduct to any place of meeting, suggesting Shu'aibah, But he added that time Avas
slipping away, and that 'Ajaimi must reply Avithin three days. The only ansAA'^er
given Avas that 'Ajaimi feared that his reputation Avould suffer if he abandoned
the Turks for no cause, but that he would find an excuse for leaving
them. His difficulty lay no doubt in determining Avhich side offered him the better
prospect of personal adA'antage. He distrusted the Turks, but they had promised him
a gift of all Sanniyah lands in the Basrah Wilayat, those Crown lands which 'Abdul
Hamid in the days of his prosperity had shown so much judgment in acquiring. On
the other hand, the British Government was an unknown quantity of very uncertain
stability. So he hesitated, while the tribal hordes gathering before Shti'aibah
strengthened his conviction that the time'to leave the Turks had not yet come.

It Avas not only the Muntafiq confederation of tribes Avhich the 'ulama Avere doing
their utmost to iirge to holy Avar, In January the son of the greatest mujtahid of"
Najaf, Mvdiammad Kadhim Vazdi, arrived in 'Amarah to preach Jihad. The infection
ran through the tribes of the Hawizah marshes into the territories of the Shaikh of
^Muhammarah, avIio began to express anxiety. But the concentration near Basrah Avas
reaching a head and occupied all our attention. On 9th April Lieut -General Sir John
Nixon landed at Basrah, and took over command of the Indian Expeditionary Force
" D," and three days later the battle of Shu'aibah opened. The Turkish General,.
Sulaiman al 'Askari, had been Avounded at Qurnah, and was carried on a stretcher.
His second in command, 'Ali Bey, placed 'Ajaimi's men on the right flank and the
other tribal forces on the left flank. They took little or no part in the battle. An
unusually high flood had stretched a belt of shalloAV Avater betAveen our position on
the Shu'aibah ridge and our base at Basrah. Across this lake our transport Avorked
as best it might, but a more difficult line of communication could scarcely have been
imagined and defeat would have meant annihilation. The battle lasted for 72 hours.
On the evening of the third day the regular troops began to fall back ; the tribesmen
had already fled, and 'AH Bey begged Sulaiman al 'Askari to give orders for a general.

retirement. Very reluctantly the general agreed, but before 'Ali Bey had
•couple of hundred yards he heard the report of a revolver. Sulainian al 'Askari had
shot himself on his stretcher. He was buried at Nukhailah. But the Arabs were yet
to take their share in the fight. The fleeing Turkish soldiery, as they toiled along
the southern shores of the llammar I-ake, where months later tl)e engineers of
Nasiriyah railway traced the deep wheel-tracks of their transport, encountered an
unexpected foe ; tlie Aral)S fell upon them, butchering and looting. It was with a
mere remnant of his force that 'Ali Bey won through to Nasiriyah.

On the very day on which the battle of Shu'aibah was joined, 12th April, a
mixed Turkish and Arab force attacked our tiny detachment at Ahwaz and waa
beaten off. The utmost success achieved by the enemy on this front was the tempo-
rary cutting of the pipeline from the oil fields by tribes roused to Jihad, but the
steadfast attitude of the Shaikli of Muhainmarah, combined with the effect of the
victory at Shu'aibah, checked further secessions. The Turks were driven back across
the Karkhah by Major-GeneraHiorringe, who carried his advance northwards towards
'Amarah, while Major-General Townshend pushed simultaneously up the Tigris.
'Amarah was occupied on 3rd June, to the complete satisfaction of the leading Shaikhs
of the powerful Albu Muhammad tribe, 'Araibi Pasha and Majid al Khalifah, who,
though they liad been obliged to join the Turks in their first resistance to us on the
Shatt-al-'Arab, had returned to their homes before the fall of Qurnah and had taken
the earliest oppoi-tunity of entering into correspondence with the Chief Political
Officer.

The next step was to guarantee Basrah from any repetition of the Shu'aibah
-attack by occupying the Avestern apex of the Basrah-Qurnah-Nasiriyah triangle.
General Gorringe's advance up the Euphrates in the middle of July was a singular
test of endurance on the part of the troops. In a pitched battle fought on the palm-
fringed banks of the river, the Turkish force of 6,000 men was routed, losing all its
guns and a quarter of its numbers killed, wounded and prisoners. Here, again, the
the Turks got no help from the Arab tribes, and the heart of the Muntafiq country
passed henceforth out of their hands.

With the capture of 'Amarah and Nasiriyah the first stage of the Mesopotamiau
campaign came to an end. Almost the whole of the Basrah Wilayat was now in British
hands and its story belongs to the annals of peace rather than to those of war.

CHAPTER II. — Organisation of the Administration.

The initial difficulties in setting up civil administration in the occupied territories
were greatly enhanced by the fact that, except for a few Arab subordinates, all the
former Turkish officials had fled, taking with them the most recent documents and
registers. Nevertheless, immediately after our arrival in Basrah a beginning was
made in establishing a system of government which should be consonant with the
spirit of our proclamations. The British military authorities had at first no leisure to
make any arrangements with regard to fiscal and revenue mattei's except in respect
of customs, but towards the middle of January a Revenue Commissioner, Mr. Henry
Dobbs, I.C.S., arrived in Basrah from India, and such records as had been left by the
Turks were overhauled. They were mostly out of date and were lying mixed with
masses of lumber on the floors of the Turkish offices, the only papers in any kind of
order being the registers of title-deeds to land and registered documents. Their
escape was fortunate, as their loss would have been a severe blow to landowners and
traders of the province. The administration was confronted with the task of setting
the whole of a stninge and complicated system on its legs as quickly as possible
without the aid of the most recent records or of the most experienced officials, while
the remaining records took many weeks to reduce to order. At the same time the
nearness of the enemy's forces caused a feeling of insecurity among the people, and
made many of them hesitate to compromise themselves by helping the authorities and ?
reluctant to pay their taxes. Moreover, the exactions of the Turks before leaving, the i
confusion into which the administration had for some months been thrown, and the
-dislocation of trade by the stoppage of commerce with Baghdad on the one side and
with India and Europe on the other, coupled with an unusually bad date season, had

temporarily deprived the population of casli and credit. The administration of civif
justice was in abeyance, so that the recovery of debts and rents, except by consent,
was impossible. It was necessary to set up temporarily some sort of revenue and
fiscal administration. To this end it was decided to keep intact the Turkish system,
to which the people were accustomed, but to free it from corruption and abuses and
increase its efficiency. The number of alien officials introduced was deliberately kept
low. All other appointments were filled by the more honest of the ex-official people
of the country, the large majority being Mussalmaus. This would have been in any
case inevitable, as the records of the departments were all in Turkish ; the language-
of vernacular records and receipts, together with all other official business, was,
however, changed to Arabic, a measure which satisfied local sentiment. One of the
curses of the Turkish regime was the number of its officials ; checks, counter-checks
and delays being multiplied in order to provide occupation for fresh appointments.
In consequence, no one did even half an honest day's work, and idleness pervaded
every office. Under the British organisation only the minimum number of officials
were re-employed.

On the whole the people adapted themselves with surprising alacrity to the new
order. During the four mouths which elapsed between the capture of Qurnah and
the crucial battle of Shu'aibah, in spite of the fact that a large Turkish force lay
almost at the gates of Basrah, the life of the town went on undisturbed, the bazaars
were busy and the streets safe. It Avas the best answer which could be given to
Turkish propaganda and reflected no little credit on the native population.

The victory at Shu'aibah removed the pressure of immediate danger, and within
three months the advance up the two rivers had more than tripled the area under our
control. Military Governors under the senior local military officer were appointed to
'Amarah and Nasiriyah, and Assistant Political Officers were placed in charge of the
political and revenue administration of the districts. The Assistant Political Officers
were responsible to the Chief Political Officer for purposes of civil administration,
and worked directly under the local military authorities for the purchase of supplies
and in measures connected with the safe preservation of the line of communications.

The confusion which reigned in the Ottoman administration was due as much to

a radically bad system as to the inefficiency of the Turkish staff. Financially, the

budget of the two provinces of Basrah and Baghdad had, until two or three years

before the British occupation, presented a deficit which had been converted into a

small surplus, probably as the result, not of improvement in method, but of financial

readjustments and increased taxation. How complicated were the existing financial

arrangements may be judged by the fact that no less than five departments of

government, apart from the general revenue, were independently collecting monies

, and remitting them to Constantinople. These departments were, firstly, the Regie, a

((foreign concession ; secondly, the Auqaf, the department of Pious Bequests; thirdly,

nhe Sanniyah or Crown lands, which since the constitution of 1908 had been

administered as State lands ; fourthly, the Ottoman Debt, to the service of which

12 petty taxes were allocated besides 3 per cent, on customs ; and, fifthly, the

International Board of Health, which collected so-called quarantine fees impartially

from the dead and from the living. The net result of these five excrescences was that

the normal life of the people was interfered with at almost every step and that no

unification of system or taxation was possible. References to Constantinople on petty

details of administration were incessant, and the hope of local autonomy Avhich had

come to birth in the Arab provinces of the Turkish Empire after the revolution of

1908 could not, even if it 'had received official approval, have taken practical shape.

There was a complete cleavage between the executive and revenue sides of the
administration. The executive officers provided force for the collection of taxes, but
they had no other concern with the revenue system. Taxes were collected usually by
farming or by subordinate officials appointed annually to collect a specific tax. With
few exceptions all demands were fluctuating. They were fixed each year by assess-
ments or by counts of the objects subject to taxation, such as sheep, bufi^aloes and'
-camels, or date and fruit trees, or, in the case of crops, by estimation of the yield.
The greater part of this work Avas done by a temporary official, who had no interest
in his particular employment beyond making the most of its short duration. There
Avas no one permanently responsible for the probity of the collector in any area,
and the system invited peculation and corruption. The invitation was seldom
refused.

The Turkish administrative system Avas thus one of Avatertight compartments,,
each in separate correspondence AAdth a head departmental office at Constantinople ;.

-7

■war conditions and the breakiuo- ol? of relations with tlie Turkish capital made it easy
"to put at end to a scheiue which was manifestly incompatible with efficiency. The
^anniyah or Crown lands were merged in the Revenue Department. The Hegie, a
hostile trach'no- concern, ceased to exist, and the regulation of the tol>acco trade, of
which there was little till the occupation of Baghdad brought its into contact with
tobacco-growing areas, fell under the direction of the same department, together with
other miscollaneons revenues. Ahmy of tliese miscellaneous revenues liad been
allocated to the public debt and collected by its officers ; the administration of the
-debt was therefore allotted to the Revenue Department, until in 1917 the separate
•organisation of the debt was terminated. Quarantine, which may have had its uses
in Turkish times in connection with the annual influx of i^ilgrims, chiefly from Persia;
was no longer needed, since pilgrimage had been intermitted by the war and the port
-authorities ilealt with arrivals by sea. In addition, Auqaf and Education were included,
^ike ( 'ustoins, in the Revenue Department. Such amalgamation was inevitable at
first owing to the lack of British officei's and of qualified Arab assistants, but it was
not intended to be otherwise than a temporary expedient ; and with the increase of
stalf and the development of administration, Customs, Auqaf and Education became
separate units. Tlie Revenue Department at Adniinisti-ative Headquarters worked
locally through the I'olitical C)fficers of the district, which put an end to the forme
division between the executive and revenue branches of the administration. A$
for the methods of collecting taxation, the gradual extinction of the tax-farmer vva^
the desired goal, together with the substitution of a fixed for a fluctuating demand',
■but neitlier aim could be achieved at once.

The name Revenue Department is perhaps misleading. A more correct
impression of this branch of the administration would be conveyed if it were to be
considered as the land agent of an estate, represented by the 'Iraq, the proprietor
being the Government. This was, in fact, the Ottoman concept, and it underlay the
agrarian system of the Turks. Mesopotamia was regarded by them as a conquered
country, and all such lands as had not been allocated by the Government to private
individuals belonged in theory to the State. State lands, Amiriyah, were controlled
by the lociil Finance Department under the Daftardar, the chief financial officer of the
province. Allocated lands came under the Daftardar for financial purposes, )jut
iinother department, that of Tapu, or land registration, was charged with recording
and verifying titles. Its decisions were not necessarily communicated to the Plnance
Department. 'Abdul Hamid's private property, Sanniyah lands, had been managed,
as has been said, by yet another organisation, wholly independent of the P]-ovincial
Government. They were well cared for, and the cultivators enjoyed certain privileges,
such as exemption from militaiy service. But with the granting of the Constitution
in 190S they were converted into State lands, and known as .Mudawwarah, tho
-converted. They were not, however, amalgamated with Amiriyah, ])ut retained their
separate organisation, though this was now detached from Constantinople and placed
under the Daftardar. This change was unfortunate for the estates concerned, w'hich
were suljsequently no better off than other institutions run bj' Turkish officials in the
public interest. The administration of all these different forms of landed property was
combined after the occupation of Basrah under the Revenue Department.

Practically all revenues other than those derived from land, except the taxes
allocated to the Public Debt, had been controlled directly or indirectly by the
Daftardar. Some of them, such as the military exemption tax and the Hijaz railway
subscription, became a dead letter — it is typical of Turkish methods that the Hijaz
railway subscription, which had been imposed to extinguish the debt on the Madinah
line, continued to be levied although the debt had loug since been paid oif ; some
Avere abandoned, notabty the income tax, which had been levied in the Basrah Wilayat
with so little success that in 1 903 it is known not to have produced a piastre. Beyond
the Daftardar's authority, a Special Accounts Department had been set iip in each,
wilayat at the beginning of the constitutional era (1908) as a result of the clamour,
especially loud in the Arab parts of the l^mpire, against the policy of draining the
provinces for the benefit of the central Government. There is an authentic story of a
Turkish Mutasarrif in Syria, popular with his superiors if not with the people he
governed, who boasted that his budget showed no expenditure at all. It consisted entirely
■of receipts. All the officials, from the .Mutasarrif himself downwards, drew no pay, but
lived on questionable perquisites, while repairs, maintenance, public works, &c., were
simply neglected. Not all the official world had bi'ought the Turkish art of govern-
ment to so high a degree of refinement, but most of its members Avere skilful and
willing students. The establishment of the Special Accounts Dei)artment was an
2041 A 5

admirable measure, but in practice it was nullified by the fact that it was imder the-
"VVali, who could, and often did, " borrow " large sums to make up deficits in general
revenues. It was abolished after the occupation.

It will be convenient here to tlesi;ribe the progress of Customs, Auqaf and
Education under the Revenue Departments, together with the administration of the
Public Debt until it was wound up in 1917.

On the occupation of Basrah the collection and assessment of Customs duty was
undertaken by Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie & Co., but after the fall of 'Amarali imports
greatly increased and the firm asked to be relieved of the work. An officer of the-
Indian Imperial Customs Service, Mr. Watkins, was deputed to Basrah as Collector
of Customs, a post which he continued to hold until he became Chief Collector of
Customs to the Force and subsequently also Secretary for Commerce. He undertook
the oraanisation of the Department with much zeal and efficiency. Customs were left
under the supervision of the Revenue Commissioner and passed Tinder that of the-
Revenue Board, which replaced the Revenue Commissioner in February 1917.

There is a distinction between land-borne and sea-borne Customs, because they
are collected in different ways. Sea-borne Customs were collected in Basrah, where-
the Collector of Customs worked directly untler the Revenue Board. In 'Amarah,
'Ali Gharbi, and, after the advance on Baghdad, at other stations where Customs were
collected on land-borne imports, the duties were taken by officials under the Political
Officers and Assistant I'olitical Officers. In sea-borne Customs are included the-
export duties levied in Basrah. The Turks levied an import duty of 11 per cent.
ad valorem, of which 3 per cent, was allocated to the Ottoman Debt. In October 1914
import dues were raised by the Turks to 15 per cent, and at other periods diiring the-
war to 30 per cent. These arrangements Avere made without the consent of the
Powers. With a few excepted articles the duty was reduced to 10 per cent, on
the occupation and the allocation of a portion thereof to the Ottoman Debt was
abolished. The Turkish export rate of 1 per cent, ad valorem was at first abolished,
but reimposed at a later period. The revenue from sea-borne Customs rose steadily,
the figtire for 1917-18 being nearly three times that of 1915-10. The general rate of'
10 per cent, was subsequently raised to the former rate of 11 per cent.

In Turkish times a central Customs House, under a Director-General responsible-
to Constantinople, existed at Baghdad, taking dues on all goods entering the Baghdad
Wilayat from Persia, either for local consumption or in transit, and on goods exported
to Persia. Subordinate Customs Houses were situated at Khaniqin, Qizil Robat,
Mandaii, and Badrah, on the Persian frontier. These establishments were for the-
purpose of checking merchandise imported from and exported to Persia, and taking
security up to the value of the Customs dues pending arrival in Baghdad, where the
actual duty wotdd be paid. An important function of the local Customs Houses was
to control the pilgrim traffic from Persian to the Shi'ah Shrines. Each pilgrim was
examined at the frontier, what he had with him noted, and a deposit taken from him.
On return he Avas re-examined ; if anything was missing he was compelled to pay duty
on it, and his deposit was given back to him.
^ When we occtipied Baghdad the frontier districts were not under our effective
control, and with the exception of a certain amount of smuggled tobacco, trade had
ceased. Pilgrim traffic was also in abeyance. It was obviously out of the question
to expect a revival till conditions had settled down and traffic with Persia re-opened..
At the same time cigarette and pipe tobacco was permitted to enter from Persia,
subject to a uniform duty of 10 per cent, ad valorem, and a temporary Customs
House was opened at Baghdad under the Revenue Board. All tobacco or goods
coming in had to be declared to the nearest Political Officer. If he considered
that such were for local consumption, he levied the dues himself, but as in the
majority of cases the goods were destined for Baghdad, he sent them through on pass
to the Customs there.

When Mandaii was brought under our effective control a Customs House Avas
■opened there.

Export Avas prohibited for military reasons, and the entry of foodstuffs, in order
to encourage import, Avas permitted free of duty.

Customs Avere separated from Revenue and organised as a separate Department
in May 1918.

The Auqaf, or Department of Pious Bequests, remained under the control of the
Revenue Department till the middle of the same year. Muhammadan sacred laAv
permits the OAA'uer of immovable property to dedicate it in perpetuity to any pious-
purpose, whether it is connected Avith the Muhammadan religion or not. But iit

practice the Turkish authorities did uot recognise any corporation as competent to
own real property except the Auqa£ Department, which followed the Ottoman official
creed and was therefore Sunni. The lands dedicated to Shi'ah shrines were held in a
kind of private trusteeship, over the discharge of which neither the State nor the courts
kept any watch. The Turkish Auqaf Department was opened in Mesopotamia some
60 years ago. Each Wilayat was in charge of a Mudir, who worked directly under the
Ministry of Auqaf in Constantinople, and exercised direct control over all subordinate
officials in the Wilayat. Tiio chief duties of the Department were the raauagemeut of
Auqaf properties and the administration of the affairs of a large number of mosques
and shrines.

These properties fall roughly into three categories, Auqaf Madhbutah,
administered directly by the Department ; Auqaf Mulhaqah, administered under
the supervision of tire Department by mutawallis or guardians for the benefit of
special objects ; and Auqaf Dhurriyah, which are held under a very effective kind of
entail, the dedicator demising his property in trust for the benefit of his direct
descendants, with remainder to a pious object, usually the sacred cities of Mecca and
Madinah, should the direct line fail, an event of rare occurrence.

There were also properties dedicated to educational purposes (Waqf Ma'arif), and
administered by a separate department, and charitable bequests (Waqf Iftah), of
which the Mufti disposed at his pleasure.

The practice of the Turks was to ignore the special object of all Madhbutah
dedications. They pooled the proceeds of agricultural lands and town properties, and
by a kind of rough, ecclesiastical commission, devoted them to the payment of the
salaries of persons employed in the Sunni mosques, the building of new Sunni
mosques, the repair of existing mosques and Auqaf buildings, and the pay of the
establishment of the Auqaf Department. Any surplus was seat to the Ministry of
Auqaf at Constantinople, and its ultimate disposal is unknown, except that
considerable sums Avere transmitted every year to Mecca and Madinah. In the
Basrah Wilayat there are large Waqf lands dedicated to the upkeep of the Mecca
shrines which are not subject to the Auqaf De]:)artment, though the latter has often
sought to get their administration into its hands. They are managed by negro
eunuchs specially deputed from Mecca.

The Aiiqaf Department exhibited all the usual defects of Ottoman administration.
The main object of the official staff was to remit as much money as possible to
Constantinople, and to this end the employes were starved, agricultural property
neglected, and mosques and houses allowed to fall into ruin. At the same time there
was no complete register of Auqaf properties and large arrears had been allowed to
accumulate. We found the Auqaf treasury empty and the estates suffering from years
of neglect.

The first care of the Revenue Commissioner was to inspect and register urban
and rural property, to provide for the payment of priests and other staff of the
mosques from the date of the occupation, and to undertake svich repairs as were
urgently needed — the sanitary arrangements of the mosque required, in particular,
immediate attention. The population was as astonished as it was gratified to see
an Auqaf Department which attempted to fulfil its obligations. Small advances were
made to occupancy tenants of date gardens to enable them to carry out the improve-
ments for which they wei-e responsible, and as soon as it was feasible tlie Turkish
system of farming out town properties was abolished and direct control over the
leasing of buildings substitvited, to the advantage both of the Department and of
the tenants. Efforts were made to oblige the mutawallis of Mulhaqah bequests to
render faithful account of their charge so as to ensure the "payment due to the
Department of a quarter of the net savings after the maintenance and upkeep of the
properties had been defrayed. Educational bequests were used for the purposes
intended, and the monies derived from charitable bequests were handed over to the
Moslem Poor Relief Fund. From the first all matters involving religious sentiment,
such as the dismissal and appointment of priests and the repair of mosques, w^ere
referred to a Committee of leading Sunnis. An Auqaf Committee for the Basrali
Wilayat received definite form in April 1917 ; the advice of its members was sought
unofficially until, in February 1918, it was made official.

At the end of 1918, although the salaries of the priests and servants of the
mosques had been raised, the Basrah accounts exhibited a surplus ofjuearly 21 lakhs of
rupees, nor could this sum be expended in developing Auqaf buildings owing to
the scarcity of labour and the fact that building material was almost unobtainable.
It was, therefore, held over until it could be employed usefully and profitably.

2041- B

In Baghdad the condition of Auqaf properties at the time of the occupation was,
if possible, worse than in Basrah. There was not a single Waqf garden in the
Baghdad area which was as well kept as neighbouring gardens in private hands, and
in many cases the Waqf land was a bare patch though flanked on both sides by
thriving date groves. The Turks had carried away all recent records, and the
Director and Chief Clerk of the Department had fled. A skeleton staff was engaged,
and from the older records and other available information a fairly accurate account
of the assets and liabilities of the Auqaf Department obtained. The local notables,
spiritual and temporal, were invited to take a share in the organisation. At the
request of the Chief Political Officer they elected a Mudir and showed their appre-
ciation of the confidence reposed in them by choosing a man of undoubted honesty.
A committee of five 'Ulama, well versed in Auqaf practice, was appointed to assist
him. The system of administration was assimilated to that which had been adopted
in the Basrah Wilayat. The Turkish arrangement, by which subordinate officials
conducted local Auqaf affairs under the direct supervision of the Mudir at Baghdad,
was abolished, and each Political Officer was placed in charge of the Auqaf in his
district, general control being maintained by the Revenue Board.

The Auqaf of Baghdad possesses sources of income additional to those of the
Basrah Wilayat. Peculiar to the Baghdad Wilayat is a due known as 'Uqr. It is
property in land and consists of a right to a fixed proportion of the produce varying
from "a'oth to Tj^th. Its origin is obscure ; it was regulated by a commission convened
by Midhat Pasha in 1872, and is registered in the Land Registration Department. It
takes precedence of all other rights except those of Government, and in practice
sometimes comes before Government rights also. 'Uqr is exempt from the ordinary
law of real property and follows sacred law. It is not confined to Waqf land, and
indeed is more usually found in State land, but wherever it exists it involves absentee
landlordism, the holder of 'Uqr not being permitted to interfere in any way with the
cultivation or management of the land. Secondly, there are many instances in the
Baghdad Wilayat of the dedication of the revenue share on land. A Turkish Sultan
would assign the Government dues in a given district to some pious object, and the
Auqaf Department would thereby become possessed of that portion of the revenues of
the State. Finally, Shi'ah Auqaf, which consist in Basrah almost entirely of private
bequests uncontrolled by the official Sunni Department, have an important place in
the Baghdad Department owing to the fact that the fees on burials in the Shi'ah holy
places, all of which are situated in the northern wilayat, are paid into its coffers. It
must be borne in mind that the Auqaf Department under the Turks was administered
by Sunnis almost exclusively for the benefit of Sunnis. The Sunni Imam, who often
had no hearers except the local officials, drew a salary from Auqaf, while the Shi'ah
Imam, whose flock was the whole village, had to depend for his living on casual
charity. In spite of the large sums derived from Shi'ah burial fees, very small
allowances were made for lighting and cleaning the great shrines at Najaf, Karbala.
Ivadhimain and Samarra, and salaries were fixed at a much lower rate than in Sunni
mosques. It was not on financial grounds alone that the Shi'ah community resented
the levying by Sunnis of a tax on the burial of pious Shi'ahs whose remains were
carried to one of their holy places for internment, but the financial grievance was
keenly felt, and claims were raised immediately after the occupation that the salaries
and allowances paid in respect of Shi'ah mosques and shrines out of Auqaf Depart-
ment funds should be largely increased. The demand had to be refused, as to accede
to it would have meant abandoning the rule, which economy had obliged us to lay
down, that no salaries should be raised above the level prevailing at the time of the
occupation until the solvency of the Department was assured. It was decided,
however, to keep the Shi'ah fmd Sunni Waqf accounts separate, so that the establish-
ment of an independent Shi'ah Auqaf Department, if found to be necessary, could
easily be accomplished.

There are various properties held in trust for synagogues, churches and non-
Musalman schools. The Auqaf Department exercises no control over these ; they
are managed by trustees under the deeds of dedication.

The Department of Education, like that of Auqaf, was merged with Revenue till
the summer of 1918. Education in the 'Iraq had lagged far behind education in
Syria. Being nearer to Europe, Syria has been more deeply affected by Western
ideas, while the greater activity of various European Missionary Societies has resulted
in the founding of schools, such as the American and French Jesuit Colleges at
Beirut, which have not only been of great value to the students trained in them, but
have also raised the general level of education in the country. The 'Iraq has felt

this -wholesome influence far less than Syria. Such foreign schools as there were,
e.g., those of the Latin Fathers, the Alliauce Israelite and the Church Missionary-
Society, confined their efforts almost exclusively to primary education, and in practice
had little to do with any but non-Moslems. The education of Moslems in 'Iraq
■was, in the main, what the Turks made it ; and so far as it exhibited any considered
policy, it was devised to Ottomauize the Arabs.

Apart from the maktabs, or mullas' schools, which were generally held in the
anosqiies and taught little more than a knowledge of Arabic script and of the QTjran,
the only oBicial schools maintained in the Basrah Wilayat were one normal school for
teachers at Basrah, one secondary school at Basrah and eight primary schools ill
Basrah itself, at villages on the Shatt al Arab and in 'Amarah, Nasiriyah and Suq al
Shuyukh. The principal language taught was Turkish, Arabic being treated as a
secondary language. The teachers were mostly Turks, often with only a scanty
knowledge of Arabic ; they were men of bad moral character, highly paid and
incompetent. The school buildings were dirty and insanitary, and the schools hot-
beds of vice to which respectable Arabs hesitated to send their boys. No one who
was not of the Sunni sect was recognised as a teacher, and this, in a population
predonrinantly Shi'ah, discouraged attendance. The registers were filled with
fictitious entries, but the total number of primary scholars was less than 500 for the
whole wilayat. The maktabs or mosque schools were financed partly by the Auqaf and
partly by the Education Department. No grants-in-aid were made to private teaching
agencies, which comprised an excellent primary and secondary school run by the
American Mission, and schools conducted by the Carmelite Fathers and by the
Chaldaean Church, the teaching in the Carmelite school being in French.

The British authorities continued to support out of Waqf funds those mosque
schools where the teachers had remained. As to secular education, it was clearly
undesirable to maintain any of the existing schools, either in their former buildings
or with their former staff, most of whom had in any case disappeared. On the other
hand there was an urgent need of trained Arabs for Government service, and it was
advisable from a political point of view that the British administration should not be
open to the accusation of neglecting to further education. It was, however, necessary
to proceed slowly, with the aim of getting a high standard of teachers, and of
opening no school until suitable teachers could be found. All sections of the population
wished their children to learn English for commercial purposes ; indeed, if English
had not been made a concurrent language from the lowest primary class, there would
have been no bait to attract boys to the Government primary schools, since a purely
Arabic education, sufficient to satisfy the meagre requirements of most parents,
cbuld be obtained in the schools of the mullas. Any scheme of higher ediication,
though it might have captivated the public imagination, would have been premature
until a sound basis of primary education could be established.

On these considerations it was decided that the medium of instruction should be
Arabic throughout with English taught as a foreign language, that only so many
primary schools should be opened as could be supplied with at least one trained
English-speaking teacher, that no secondary schools should be started until the
success of primary schools was assured, and that university education should not be
considered until there were enough educated secondary scholars to feed a university.
To secure teachers a grant-in-aid was sanctioned to the American Mission school at
Basrah, an institution mainly concerned with the teaching of Moslems, the principal
condition of the grant being that the school should provide immediately trained
teachers for two primary schools, and should also open a normal class to turn out
three good primary teachers every year. The American school also imdertook the
general supervision of the primary schools. Primary text-books were carefully
selected from the official primary text-books in use in Egypt, and class-room furniture
was purchased from abroad. Two primary schools were opened in October 1915, one
in Basrah and one in Abul Khasib, a prosperous district lower down the river. The
attendance was excellent from the first.

There were in Basrah a considerable number of Christians, mainly Oriental
Catholics. From among these the clerks employed by the Turks and in commercial
firms had mainly been drawn and were likely to continue to be drawn in the
immediate future. They depended for their education chiefly on the Carmelite
Fathers and the Chaldsean Church. Both these schools received graints-in-aid on
condition that they should admit British inspection and that English shoidd be the
principal language taught. Secondary education continued to be provided for by the
American schools only.

In the spring of 1916 a third school was opened at Zubair, which was a
promising centre. The popnlation is of a good type, mainlj' immigrants from Najd,
of pure Arab race. The small market towns which, like Zubair, are scattered along
the edges of the settled land, are usually due to the enterprise of central Arabia.
Their founders are men of independent character and commercial instincts, who
frequently amass considerable wealth in purveying for the desert, where they have
much influence. They are eager to profit by every opportunity for advancement,
and in Zubair were so desirous of learning English that before the opening of the
school it was not \musual to find a boy of 10 and a greybeard of 60 sitting in the
telegraph office, and struggling with the intricacies of the English tongue under the
indifferent tuition of a Babu clerk. The Arab has a remarkable aptitude for languages,
and before the school had been in existence for a j'ear, the children were chattering
in English, to the pride and admiration of their parents.

During 1917 and 1918 primary schools were opened at Nasiriyah, Suq al Shuyukh,
Qal'at Salih, 'Ali Gharbi, Madinah on the Euphrates, and 'Ashar, a suburb of Basrah.
It was a disputed point whether fees should be taken, but on the whole the
advantage of making a small charge was considered to prevail, and a fee of one rupee
per pupil was decided on. But a considerable elasticity was permitted, and if* in the
opinion of the Political Officer the parents were too poor to pay for the education of
the child, the fee was not exacted. At Abu'l Khasib there was a demand for
secondary education and a secondary section was started towards the end of 1917.
Grants-in-aid were extended to the schools of the Alliance Israelite at Basrah, and to
additional schools opened by the Carmelites and by the Catholic communities,
Armenian and Chaldsean, in Basrah and Ashar, as well as to a girls' school started
by the American Mission. Ihe boys' school founded in 1912 by the Arabian Mission
of the Reformed Church in America, continues to be easily the best school in the
Basrah Wilayat. The boys are well disciplined and carefully taught. The Bible is
read daily in Arabic in every class, but Moslem parents exhibit no objection to
instruction in the Book, and their children are even more punctilious than the
Moslems in the respect they pay to holy writ. The American Director relates a story
which illustrates Moslem feeling. One of the pupils, a Christian, lost his temper in
the Bible class, threw his Bible down and refused to read further. He was repri-
manded by the teacher, but the Muhammadan pupils were not satisfied ; they came to
the Director and begged that the Christian boy should be expelled for ill-treating a
holy book.

In the Baghdad Wilayat the Turkish educational programme was more compre-
hensive than at Basrah. It comprised a school of law, a secondary school (Sultani), a
normal school, a technical school, and 71 primary schools. The scheme, as set forth
in the official Turkish Education Year Book, full of maps and statistics, might have
roused the envy and despair of the British authorities of the Occupied Territories but
for the knowledge that, provided a school were shown correctly as a dot on a map,
the Turk cared not to enquire whether the pupils enrolled ever attended, or whether
the system of education pursued in it was that of Arnold of Rugby or of Mr. Wopsle's
great aunt.

These Government schools were by no means the only schools. They were
identified in the public mind with Sunni Musulman tenets (not unnaturally, since
they deliberately aimed at extending Turkish influence among the students and such
religious instruction as was given was Sunnij, and none but Sunnis attended them.
The Shi'ahs, the Christians and the Jews provided schools at their own expense, the
Special Accounts Department giving each of them, at least in theory, a grant-in-aid
on condition that the grant was expended on the teaching of Turkish.

The Syrian, Chaldsean, Armenian, Protestant and Latin Catholic communities
had each a private school, and there was a Ja'fari (Shi'ah) school for Shi'ah boys.
• The Jews had a number of schools for girls and boys, some controlled by the Alliance
Israelite Universelle, the others by local Jews.

With the departure of the Turkish authorities in March 1917, the law, sultani
and technical schools ceased to exist as institutions, for nearly all the teachers were
Anatolian Turks and left with the rest of Stambul officialdom, while in the case of the
technical school the Turks blew up the machinery and burned the building. As to
the primary schools, they were nearly all looted by the mob. If it took rather
longer to open some of the Baghdad schools than might have been expected, the
delay may be attributed to the people themselves, who looted all the furniture and
equipment of the schools and carried off the doors, windows and other portable
fittings. Most of the primary school teachers who remained were of an inferior type.

and there were no school books of any kind except a few in the possession of private
persons, and these were all in Turkish.

These problems would have troubled us less had we been able to follow the
policy adopted in Basrah, that of not opening any schools until good teachers could
be provided. But whereas Basrah was more interested in tlates than in education,
Baghdad contained a fair proportion of people who prized education for its own sake
— a relic, perhaps, of the time when Baghdad was a great centre of learning. A few
days after the occupation, the headmaster of the only primary school which had
•escaped looting offered to carry on his work with a staff composed entirely of primary
school headmasters, and this arrangement was accepted as a temporary measure.
Teachers were also sent to carry on the Government schools in three provincial
centres.

In order that popular opinion on the subject might be ascertained, an Education
•Committee was set up. It was composed of five men of education and influence.
The Committee is advisory only and it is not given to originating policy, but its
reports on questions put to it by the Revenue Board have been useful.

The most pressing need was for primary school teachers, and as there existed no
school like that of the Americans in Basrah, which assured a small but steady supply
of well-trained young men for the Government schools in the Basrah Wilayat, it was
in April decided to open a training school where ex-teachers and any other fairly
well-educated young men who might care to apply could receive a three months'
course in general subjects and in school method. This period had to suffice, in the
emergency in which we were placed, to make some of the partly trained material lit
to carry on the work of primary school teaching until better was to be had. It was,
not easy to find instructors for the training school, but eventually four teachers Avere
found — three Syrians and a native of Baghdad ; another teacher was borrowed from
the American school in Basrah for a few weeks to give lectures in school method.
The school started with an attendance of 81. This included all the ex-teachers who
wished to remain in the profession, for they were informed that it would be difficult
for us to employ as a Government teacher anyone who had not passed through our
training school. About a third of the students were promising; the rest, nearly all
■ex-teachers from little country schools, were unfortunately very poor material. A few
■of these persisted to the end, passed the examinations and were appointed as teachers,
but the majority dropped off, finding employment in the Quran schools attached to
the mosques, or elsewhere. Several young Shi'ahs entered the normal school, a
phenomenon unknown in Turkish times.

The administration was fortunate in securing the services of a capable and
■energetic Syrian as headmaster of the teachers' training school. When he left to
join the Sharif's army^is place was taken by another Syrian, no less capable and
energetic, who had served in many official capacities under the Turkish regime,
including that of Director of Education. After the opening of the primary schools'
he worked for a time as Director of Education under the supervision of the Revenue
Board.

With the 27 students who passed the qualifying examination at the end of the
three months' session, we were able to open five primary schools in Baghdad and its
suburbs, and two in the provinces. The successful students were too few to staff
these schools completely, and a few supernumerary teachers chosen from the best of
the remaining students were appointed, at lower rates of pay, to fill the gaps. These
schools were classed as Government primary schools and supported entirely out of
general revenues. We refused to defray out of public funds the cost of schools not
staffed with trained teachers, but private efforts were encouraged with grants-in-aid.
■Similar grants were made to all the denominational schools in Bagdad, whether Shi'ah,.
■Christian or Jewish.

Lack of school furniture was a serious difficulty. With regard to books, an
.appeal for help was addressed to the Egyptian Government, which responded with a
handsome gift of books sufficient to equip 20 primary schools and one secondary
school.

A small beginning was made in the direction of technical education. Except for
.a few ex-officers of the Turkish army, there were no local men capable of making
surveys or talcing levels. To supply this deficiencj' a school of survey was opened,
the only qualification demanded being a fair knowledge of arithmetic and mensuration.
Many applications were received, but, owing to the practical work to be done, the
•class had to be limited to 30. A 10 weeks' course was mapped out, at the end of
which the students who passed the qualifying examination were attached to irrigation
•engineers for work and for further training.

The poverty in Baghdad resulting from three years' war, combined with; the fact
that in Turkish times elementary, technical and normal education was free, made it
inadvisable that fees should be charged at first in the primary schools of the Wilayat.
They were not introduced till 1919.

As regards the Ottoman Public Debt, the interests of the European bondholders
were secured by allocating to the service of the Debt the revenues derived from no
less than 12 distinct heads. It was at first considered whether these allocated
taxes could be retained intact for the administration of the Debt, subject to adjust-
ment at the end of the war. This was, however, found to be impossible. In the
first place the continuance of the 'J'obacco Regie, an enemy company in the profits
of which the Debt had a large share, was prevented by the war ; secondly, it
seemed essential to reduce the Customs duties ; and, thirdly, the Turkish stamp
tax, of which most of the revenues were eai'marked for the Debt, was in
abeyance, while the British authorities would, in any case, have been reluctant
to enforce so vexatious and complicated a law. When ultimately it was re-
enacted, it was given a modified form. It was therefore decided that the
military authorities must retain full executive freedom of action as to the
treatment of these allocated taxes. The oSicials of the department had fled
from Basrah before our arrival ; but in the Baghdad Wilayat they remained and
continued at first to exercise their functions in a small way. Difiiculties, however,
arose which necessitated the abolition of some of the allocated taxes and alterations
in the methods of collecting others. Ultimately the maintenance of the Public
Debt administration as a separate entity seemed to be extravagant from the point
of view of bondholders and burdensome from that of the people. It was therefore
decided in June 1917 to close down the Public Debt administration as such, but
orders were given that all sources of levenue pledged to the Debt should be
administered separately with a view to rendering a careful account when it was
called lor. In most districts the collection of taxes allocated to the Debt is made
through the ordinary Revenue staff. Only in Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul towns has
it been found necessary to entertain a separate establishment. Opportunities of
service have been given to Public Debt officials, who had been better paid than
Government servants and had maintained a standard of efficiency and honesty well
above that of the ordinary Turkish employe. Care has been taken to appoint them
to positions approximating as closely as the altered circumstances permit to those
they held before the occupation.

The re-estabishment of judicial administration was subject to the same difficulty
which hampered the civil authorities in other departments, namely, that practically
all Turkish judicial officers had left their posts before the* occupation of Basrah.
Those who remained were not willing to continue their functions and no other staff
which had experience of Turkish law w^as available. As the Capitulations had
been abolished by the Turks at the outbreak of war no claim that they should be
revived in the occuJ)ied territories, at all events during the war, was to be admitted.
Alien enemy firms established in Basrah, exclusive of the indigenous population,
which was regarded as friendly, ceased to do business on the occupation of the towm,.
and their affairs were taken over by the Department of Hostile Trading Concerns,,
which was responsible to the Chief Political Officer.

In August 1915, for the purpose of providing for the administration of civil audi
criminal justice for the civil population, the Army Commander promulgated a code,
known as the 'Iraq Occupied Territories Code, which was based on the Indian Civil
and Criminal Codes. Powers were taken therein to enforce any Indian law, as well
as to introduce such amendments as might be necessitated by local conditions, and
courts were started in Basrah.

The course pursued w^as open to objections, but it had the great advantage of
providing without delay machinery which would not otherwise have been forthcoming,
and without such immediate provision, the activities of the community would in many
directions have been brought to a standstill. The practice of the new courts was so
far superior to that of the courts they superseded, and the Indian codes so much
better and simpler than the Turkish, that no objection was raised to the substitution
of ihe Indian for the Turkish judicial system. The people, accustomed to the
dilatory processes of the Turks, were amazed and delighted with the expedition
shown in the execution of justice.

Provision was made under the 'Iraq Code for the reference of any suit in whicL
at least one party was a Moslem to the Shar'ah or sacred law. A native jurist by
whom the case should be adjudicated was selected by the parties concerned, the^

selection being made from any persons who were recognised by the people themselves
iis religious leaders. Cases referred to the jurists were those which in Turkisli times
would have come before the Qadhi in the Shar'ah Court ; that is to say, they were
mainly domestic, relating to marriage, divorce, breach of contract of betrothal,
inheritance, and so forth. The decision of the jurist was confirmed by the British
<;ourts. The jurists received as emoluments half the court fees, and they worked
well ; litigants went before them willingly and accepted their decisions with respect.
It is true that the Sunnis were deprived for a time of regular Shar'ah courts under
a Qadhi ; on the other hand the Shi'ahs, who formed 90 per cent, of the population,
benefited under the arrangement by the fact that their jurists were accorded official
recognition. Under Ottoman rule the Qadhi was always a Sunni and regulated the
■cases brought to him by Sunni Law, with the result that no Shi'ahs resorted to the
-courts. They settled their cases by reference to their own religious leaders, whose
judgments had no official weight.

The bulk of the criminal worlc did not come into the courts. Serious cases were
tried by Military Commissions, but there was a consensus of opinion that serious
•crime was remarkably rare, that which existed being mainlj' theft or robbery
under arms. The Deputy Military Governors of Basrah and 'Ashar disposed of
most of the criminal suits. Until after the occupation of Baghdad, no courts existed
in the Basrah Wilayat outside liasrah town. In 'Amarah and Nasiriyah disputes
■of all kinds were decided by Military Governors, while in the rural districts the
same powers were exercised by Political Officers. In all these cases limitations
were set to the sentences which could be imposed.

The population of the 'Iraq is not litigious like that of India, and the people, or
at least the lower classes, show greater probity than is common elsewhere. As a
rule the defendant admits the facts of the case ; evidence on oath is extremely
reliable among the better classes, and the testimony of an oath on the part of the
•defendant is admitted hy the plaintiff. The people are accustomed to settlement by
arbitration and some 10 per cent, of the cases are thus adjusted. Arbitrators in
Basrah are chiefly wealthy merchants or landowners, and may be trusted to do their
utmost to come to an equitable decision.

Outside the towns the tribal population had not been wont to resort to the
Ottoman courts, in spite of all attempts on the Ottoman Government to induce or
force them to do so. In point of fact, over the greater part of Mesopotamia it was
not the Turkish judicial authorities who had regulated the relations between man
and man or assigned the penalties for breaches in their observance. Behind all
legal paraphernalia lay the old sanctions, understood and respected because they
were the natural outcome of social needs. The shaikh in his tent heard the plaint of
petitioners seated round his coffee hearth and gave his verdict with what acumen he
might possess, guided by a due regard for tribal custom ; the local saiyid, strong in
his reputation for a greater familiarity than that of other men with the revealed
ordinances of the Almighty, and yet stronger in the wisdom brought by long
-experience in arbitration, delivered his awards on disputes grave or trivial, and the
decisions thus reached were generally consonant with natural justice and always
conformable with the habits of thought of the contending parties.

This system of local justice was recognised by us to be a strong weapon on the
side of order and good conduct. Just as it was the habit of the British Military
Governors when hearing cases to call in the mukhtars, the headmen of the town
quarters, and ask them to take part in the proceedings, so the Political Officers turned to
the shaikhs of tribe and village and obtained their opinion. This practice was
extended by an enactment called the Tribal Disputes Regulation, issued with the
approval of the Army Commander in February 1916. It was laid down herein that
when a dispute occurred in which either of the parties was a tribesman, the Political
Officer might refer it to a majlis, or tribal court, consisting of shaikhs or arbiters
selected according to tribal usage. Unless the findings of this body were manifestly
unjust or at variance with the facts of the case, the Political Officer would pass
judgment in general accordance with it.

When, after 18 months' experience, the Political Officers of the Basrah Wilayat
were asked to furnish a report on the working of the regulation, the results were
found to be satisfactory. In some cases its provisions had developed in practice into
institutions not originally contemplated, though in no way contrary to the spirit of
the enactment. At Nasiriyah, Suq and Qal'at Salih a standing majlis had been
formed composed of leading citizens, Sunni and Shi'ah. A shaikh of the Sabeeans,
a sect which had been much harried by their neighbours in Turkish times, was
■called in when any case involving a Sabeean was referred to the majlis. At Nasiriyah

and Suq disputes of a purely municipal nature were from time to time submitted to
the majlis by an order of reference, and in this capacity its members formed a body
of honorary magistrates. At Qal'at Salih almost every dispute arising outside the
municipal limits had been referred to the majlis, which in most cases had returned
a verdict ; but sometimes, if both the parties were Moslems, th*? matter had been
passed on for decision to a local iAIufti, or, when both were Sabosans, to a Sabfean
priest. At 'Amarah tribal disputes were usually referred to the head shaikh, who
called on the other shaikhs of the tribe for advice when necessary, and dealt with
the case in accordance with tribal law and custom ; but if the issues involved
more than one tribe, a special majlis of representative shaikhs would be convened.
This procedure did not necessitate any interference by Government in tribal usage
and was liked by the tribesmen. In Qurnah a majlis was appointed to consider
important cases, but minor disputes were referred to the shaikh of the tribe in
which they occurred, or to the native mayor if they fell within the limits of the
municipality ; while in a third class of cases, such as disputes between villages,
a neutral arbitrator, usually the headman of the nahiyah, the sub-district, was
selected. As a rule when the duties of the majlis had been clearly explained to its
members at the beginning of the trial, their awards were honestly given, in
accordance with what they thought right. Their decisions were interesting, helpful
and usually sensible. The local majlis, with its witnesses on the spot, carried out
the work allotted to it with greater expedition than would have been possible for
a court at a distance, and in tribal disputes the prompt despatch of business is a
great asset. The decisions of the Political Officer, based on the finding of the majlis,
have invariably been accepted by the parties concerned, which shows that they had
fulfilled tribal conceptions of justice. It was universally felt that the regulation
had been the means of removing a heavj- burden froni the shoulders of Political
|, Officers, whose decisions would not in any case have been as satisfying as those of
!) the shaikhs, and it had the further advantage of raising tlie position and increasing
(l the responsibility of the latter by conferring upon them small judicial powers.
"^i- In one respect tribal custom, as administered by the majlis, is not wholly
satisfactory in our eyes. The tribesman regards the exaction of blood money payable
to the relations of the murdered man as of greater moment than the punishment of
the murderer, and is apt to be content with ihe fine without any further retribution.
The regulation empowered Political Officers to increase the sentence within defined
limits, but they judged it wise seldom to avail themselves of this permission and
no doubt they were well advised. The sentences of the majlis, if they had been,
subject to frequent enhancement, would have tended to fall below the due standard
of chastiisement. In accepting tribal usage the Political Officer might find himself
•called upon to impose penalties which are foreign to British judicial tradition. Thus
in cases of blood feud the tribes of the Euphrates almost invariably require the
guilty party, in addition to the payment of blood money, to hand over a virgin to the
family of the deceased; and they value this custom not only as a punishment, but
also a safeguard, for, as they justly observe, the payment of fines does nothing
towards allaying animosity, whereas inter-marriage provides a community of
interests.

In disputes touching the ownership of land the jurisdiction of the courts had to«
be exercised with due regard to the Turkish laws and regulations touching Tapu, or
land registration, which it was judged important to uphold. As already mentioned,
the Ottoman Government considered the 'Iraq as a conquered province, and
according to Turkish theory all land which had not been reserved definitely as
private property was the property of the conquerer. Such reservation was made
either at the time of the conquest, or at a later date by farman from the Sultan, or,,
since the land settlement of Midhat Pasha in 1871, by grants through the Tapu
Department, which has become, under British administration, a branch of the
Revenue Department. The original reservations and grants by farman were also
registered by Tapu, but this was merely the recognition of an existing and absolute
title. Midhat Pasha's land law provided for a Commission of land settlement which
was to investigate all claims, whether based on purchase or on continuous occupancy
or other title, but except in the Basrah district this work had not been completed.

Registration by the Tapu Department took the form of a sanad or title deed^
which it was necessary to renew on the occasion of any transfer or devolution from

' Except in the case of reservation at tbe time of the Turkisli conquest, or grants by farman, the
holder of a Tapu sanad does not enjoy freehold rights, but has a I'estricted title best defined as a right
of occupancy. Sanads of this nature may be more accurately described as occupancy certificates,
.than as title deeds.

the oi'igiiial traasferee. Technically, on every devolution or transfer Government
resumed the grant and regranted the land. This system, though cumbrous, had the
o'reat advantage of preventing complications of title by secret mortgages and the
like, since no such transaction wa,s binding imless officially registered ; but it must
be borne in mind that in practice it was too inefficiently carried out to be of much
value. It followed that the civil courts were precluded from enquiring into the
facts of an alleged transfer unless it had been registered by the Tapu Department.
They could grant compensation for failure to perform a contract to transfer, but
they could not compel its performance. In certain cases a Tapu sanad could be
set aside by the civil courts, e.g., where a sanad could be proved to have been
obtained by fraud ; but the respective spheres of the Tapu Department and the civil
courts are difficult to define, for the laws and regulations are not always clear and
precedents for all varieties of procedure can be found. The Tapu Department was
obliged to refer cases of inheritance to the Shar'ah courts and to abide by their
decision as to the division of shares, and it could of its own free will refuse to
grant a sanad until the applicant had obtained a decision from the civil courts on
any point at issue. This was done if a difficult and complicated question arose
which could not be decided satisfactorily by the comparatively summary enquiries of
the Tapu Department.

Unfortunately the Tapu system, though it possessed signal merits, was, like all
things Turkish, a theory rather than a fact. In practice a very large proportion of
devolutions and transfers had not been registered, or they had been registered without
proper enquiry into the facts, or obtained by bribing the Tapu officials. Moreover, it
was only in the small area where the Commission of Land Settlement had finished its
task that all claims anterior to 1871 might be presumed to have been investigated,
and either rejected or validated by Tapu sanad ; even that presumption, when
Turkish methods are taken into account, would probably be a large one. When none
of these objections arose and the Tapu sanads could be produced, they were found to
be drawn with great inexactitude ; no care had been taken in defining the boundaries
of the estate in question, and an examination of sanads revealed cases where the
boundary on all four sides was described as " the marsh," a line which was subject to
seasonal as well as to permanent variations with every change in flood levels. The
crowning example of Turkish methods was provided by a sanad referring to a garden
near Basrah which was described as being bounded " qiblatan " — a vague term which
may be taken to mean app];oximately S.W. — by the Red Sea.

Nevertheless, the Tapii Code was vital to the maintenance of the principles on
which Turkish land tenure was based, and it remained under tlie 'Iraq Code the law
of the laud. The decision has proved valuable. The wealth of Mesopotamia has
been in the past, and still continues to be, derived almost exclusively from agriculture.
Any sudden change in Turkish procedure in a matter of such fundamental importance
as title in land was to be deprecated. Moreover, Midhat Pasha's settlement was
conceived, as will be explained later, on wrong lines. It was impossible to proceed
to its iunnediate amelioration, but to have enforced it, as the courts would have been
bound to enforce it, on purely legal reasoning must inevitably have resulted in
political unrest. Reference to Tapu brought disputes into the cognizance of the
Revenue Department, which was in h position to take a wider view of the issues
involved, and had the advantage of exercising its authority locally through Political
Officers, who were able to get iirst-hand evidence on the spot and to judge of and make
allowance for the political significance of all claims that might arise.

Closely connected, from one aspect, with the land, that is to saj^ with its capacity
for production, is the provision of medical and sanitary facilities for the civil popu-
lation. If man-power is the primary asset in the national economy of every
community, in Mesopotamia the problems connected with its preservation and increase
present themselves in an acute form. The vast development of which the country is
capable waits upon a sidostantial addition to the number of its inhabitants. The
introduction of foreign agriculturists and settlers, who by reason of differences of race
or creed could not be absorbed by the existing society, would be attended by grave
political risks, and might well result in active local protests and disturliances. On
the other hand, it cannot be anticipated that settlers absorbable ami therefore accept-
able, Arab, Persian, or Kurdish, will immigrate to Mesopotamia in numbers sufficient
to make good the deficiency, the available supply being too small. The population of
the 'Iraq, though scanty, is prolific, but the absence of medical arrangements and an
all-prevailing ignorance of the laws of health and sanitation have combined to keep it
down. If infant mortality were arrested and children given a better prospect of
2041 C

reacliing adult life it might not improbably be doubled in the next thirty or foi'ty years.
Herein lies the safest assurance for the provision of agents who under favourable
conditions vfill bring about economic progress.

From a military point of view oare of public health and the sanitation of the
towns were necessary precautions if the troops were to be kept free from disease.
A civil dispensary was opened in Basrah immediately after the occupation, while the
Depvity Military Governors took steps to secure the cleanliness of the town. A civil
hospital was started in 1915, and additional dispensaries opened in 'Ashar. A Civil
Surgeon superintended these establishments, and was put in charge of sanitary
arrangements in Basrah, and an Army Medical Officer controlled the sanitation of
'Ashar. The sanitation of the gaol and the health of prisoners received careful
attention. Lunatics could not be provided for locally and were sent to India for
treatment. The attendance at the dispensaries and hospital was greater than was
expected. The people accepted inoculation and other precautions against plague, and
were eager for vaccination. After the occupation of 'Amarah, a hospital and
dispensary were opened there under a British Army doctor, and they proved as
popular as in Basrah. Similarly at Nasiriyah the services of a military doctor were
lent to the civil hospital and dispensary. It would be difficult to give too much credit
to the medical officers engaged in these duties, not for their zeal only, but for the tact
which they exercised towards their patients ; and no less praise is due to the Indian
dispensers and medical staff. A morning visit to a dispensary was enough to explain
how the timidity of children and tribeswomen had been overcome, suspicion allayed
and prejudice conciliated.

The sanitary condition of the towns made a notable advance dui-ing 1916.
Latrines and incinerators were everywhere in use, butcheries and markets inspected,
a successful campaign was carried on against flies and rats and infectious diseases
checked. In the villages of Qurnah, Qal 'at Salih and 'Ali Gharbi hospitals and
dispensaries were served by the medical military officer of the station, usually with an
Lidian Sub-Assistant Surgeon, but at Suq, owing to the extreme shortage of medical
staff, it was impossible to start regular medical work till 1917, and the absence of a
dispensary was regarded by the inhabitants as a grievance, though no such institution
would have been dreamed of in Turkish times. The readiness to submit to treatment
in hospitals was very remarkable. The fame of the British doctors spread through
the districts and patients came in from afar, willing to accept operation and even loss
of limb when they were told that it was necessary. Among their other uses, hospitals
and dispensaries provided a more convincing form of propaganda than any which
could have been invented by the most eloquent pi-eacher or the most skilful
pamphleteer.

It may fairly be said that the extension of the administration usually succeeded
in fulfilling a double function. Not only was efficiency increased, but close personal
contact was established between the governors and the governed, and confidence grew
correspondingly. A good example of the useful results which followed on more
intimate relations between British officers and the people of the country, and did their
share in turn in strengthening these relations, was the Shabanah. These tribal
guards were enrolled and paid by the local Political Officer to help in the preservation
of order and the protection of the lines of communication. They also carried
messages, went on errands and served as a kind of bodyguard. They were enlisted
through their shaikhs and organised under two grades of native non-commissioned
officers, but the organisation of the force varied according to the requirements of the
district. On the Tigris below 'Amarah, where the estates held by individual shaikhs
are large and the principle of local authority well understood, each shaikh provided
the men for his section of the river. As the force thus composed consisted of separate
tribal elements, no single non-commissioned officer was put at its head. On the other
hand, in the Hammar Lake, between Qurnah and Nasiriyah, where the tribal units
were small and conspicuous for a prevailing anarchy, it was thought inadvisable to
post Shabanah in their own districts as they were liable to be preoccupied by private
feuds rather than to devote themselves to their official duties. Nor were the Shabanah
organised on a tribal basis in the Suq district, where the main part of the force was
kept at headquarters, but three small units were placed under friendly shaikhs near
the town. Both Suq and Nasiriyah were provided with a body of tribal horse —
orginally enrolled at Nasiriyah under the military authorities.

The tribesmen showed no unwillingness to enlist either as Shabanah or in the
irregular horse, service in both forces being regarded as honourable employment.
Dismissal from Government employment entailed loss of esteem and was generally

te^arded as a heavy punishment. The results #ere on the whol6 satisfactory, eXc6pt
with regard to the prevention of blockade running, where the t^tflptatiofis to overlook
or abet evasions of the law were irresistible. The patrolling of traffic routes by thede
semi -military tribal levies was found to be an effective guarantee of security Ahd
service therein provided an outlet for restless spirits.

By the end of 1916 the Shabanah numbered something over 500. As the force
improved it was given charge of the smaller posts along the Tigris line which had
been occvipied by British troops. British non-commissioned officers ivere lent fot
training purposes, and it would have been difficiilt to say whether they or the men
they trained were more eager that the Shabanah should make a creditable
appearance.

Medical facilities, integrity in the administration of justice, the gradual abolition
of the tax-farmer, the stabilising of taxation on a fair basis, the repairing of mosque
and village, together with a sympathetic handling of the tribes, these were the most
effective means of meeting Turkish and German propaganda, but steps were taken to
provide the reading public, a very small portion of the community, with news from
sources less tainted than those of the enemy. A Government press was instituted at
Basrah, and when the great initial difficulties in procuring material had been
surmounted, a vernacular paper, both in Arabic and Persian, was piiblished daily.
The news conveyed was mainly derived from Renter, but local weU-wishers were
encouraged to contribute ; for example, valuable articles on the treatment by the
Turks of the Shi 'ah holy towns were received from a respected saiyid. If the
circulation was not very large the paper reached a wider public than the numbers
bought would seem to indicate, for in a population almost whoUj' illiterate it is the
habit for one who has an acquaintance with letters to read the news aloud to the
company gathered round him in the coffee shop, and one copy will therefore serve
to instruct a group of listeners. As the press become better equipped, vernacular
pamphlets and broad sheets, reproductions of important native documents, such as a
petition against the Turks sent by the Shi'ahs of Najaf and Karbala to Persia, were
issued from it. Besides the vernacular and English daily papers the press gradually
accomplished more and more current official work, both civil and military, to the
alleviation of offices where typists were permanently too few and stenographers
almost unknown.

Arrangements were made for the circulation of reputable Egyptian vernacular
papers, which were imported and distributed, for the most part, free of charge. They
were appreciated by the very small public who read anything beyond the daily
telegrams.

Occasionally a refugee from Baghdad would bring news of a copy of the Auqat
Basrah, the Basrah Times, which he had found in a village, or even in an Arab tent,
on his way down, showing that the voice of the Government press was sometime^
heard beyond the limits of the occupied territories. The greater number of these
refugees were indigent Jews, but in the spring of 1916, after the Turks had taken
vigorous measures to break up and disperse the Liberal Committee in Baghdad, a
few Moslems of well-known' families succeeded in making their escape to Basi-ah.
They brought us news of the hope that had been aroused in the breast of themselves
and their colleagues when General Townshend's force reached Ctesiphon, and of the
disappointment, enhanced by considerable personal danger from the Ottoman
authorities, which had followed the retreat. They were given suitable allowances,
and in due course, after the advance to Baghdad, they returned to their home.

Whatever care might be taken to keep the pressure of war conditions from the
inhabitants of the occupied territories, so long as they observed neutrality, it was
impossible to avoid the infliction of some inconveniences. Of theee, perhaps the most
pressing was the blockade, essential to prevent goods reaching enemy hands from
the markets of Basrah, 'Amarah and Nasiriyah, which were now well stocked. It
extended to Kuwait and Najd and into Persia, and thus, besides being a severe
restriction on the population of the 'Iraq, threatened on several occasions to embroil
us with trusted friends whose subjects could not forgo the tempting profits of illicit
trade. A minor but galling grievance was the requisitioning of houses for military
and civil use ; more serious, but equally unavoidable, was the demand for native
labour. Dykes, railways, roads, the work of the port, growing daily more con-
siderable, the laying out of camps and other military necessities, obliged us to draw
the agricultural population away from the palm gardens and ai'able lands, where the
Surplus available was smaller than the supply called for. Not many of these works
were of public benefit, and some were even directly contrary to local interests, though

the exigencies of the campaign demanded them. All was done that could be done
to lighten the bmden by providing that the labourers should return periodically to
their home after short terms of work, and by making arrangements for their being
lodged in well-arranged camps, and adequately paid and fed. Arab labour when
properly handled was found to compare favourably with that of the Indian labour
corps employed in the country. Arab, Persian and Kurdish labour corps were
formed under the control of British officers, who quickly learnt how to make them-
selves popular with the men under their command, and thereby to get the best work
out of them. The organisation of labour, begun under civil auspices, was converted
in 1916 into a military department, since most of the work required was for militaiy
purposes ; but the task of providing labour through the shaikhs by persuasion or
demand remained with the local Political Officer, who, while he recognised the
inevitable requirement, sometimes groaned under it.

CHAPTER III.— The Pacification of the Tribes and Relations with the
Shi'ah towns up to the fall of Baghdad.

From a political aspect the Turkish system was open to objections quite as
serious as from that of administrative efficiency. Outside the immediate vicinity of the
towns the whole population of the country is tribal. Larger or smaller units — sometimes
combined into loose groups or confederations, sometimes existing at the hazard of
chance alliances — till the irrigated land along the rivers and pasture their flocks in the
intervening deserts. Some have been established in Mesopotamia from a remote
period, others have come in during the last two or three hundred years, but all are
originally nomads from the interior wilderness. The unbroken drift of her peoples
northwards is one of the most important factors in the history of Arabia. The
underlying causes were probably complex, but chief among them must have been a
gradual change in the climatic conditions of the peninsula, involving slow desiccation,
together with the pressure of an increasing population on a soil growing steadily
poorer. To the hunger-bitten nomad, the rich pastures of the Syrian frontier, the
inexhaustible fertility of Mesopotamia, offered irresistible attractions, and opportunities
for expansion were found in the weakness and political exhaustion of the neighbouring
northern States, whether they were Turkish, Byzantine, Persian or yet earlier empires.
The long records of Babylonia enable us to trace the pt-ocess in its earlier historical
phases ; a study of existing conditions shows that until a recent period it was still
going on, and if a forecast may be hazarded, it will not be arrested in the future,
though the nature of the immigration may be altered. Instead of devastating hordes,
sweeping like locusts over cornfield and pasture, the surplus population of Arabia
may find in a Mesopotamia reconstituted by good administration, not only abundant
means of livelihood, but far-reaching possibilities of social and intellectual advance ;
and they will be received with welcome in a land of which the unlimited resources can
be put to profit in proportion to the labour available.

The conversion of the wandering camel-breeder and camel-lifter into a cultivator
of the soil, in so far as it has taken place in Mesopotamia, was an inevitable process.
In their progress northward the tribes found themselves ultimately upon the limits of
the desert ; the wide spaces essential to nomadic existence no longer stretched before
them, while the pressure of those behind forbade any return. They were obliged to
look to agriculture as a means of livelihood. Thereby they lost caste with the true
Beduin. Yet, though these last would scorn to intermarry with tillers of the earth,
shepherds and herdsmen of buffaloes, they are nevertheless of the same blood and
tradition, and not infrequently fragments of very ancient and famous Arabian tribes
are present among the cultivators upon the outer limits of Arabian migration. Thus,
in Mesopotamia the Bani Tamim, who are divided among various big tribal groups,
were masters of the whole of Central Arabia before the time of the Prophet, and still
form a large part of the oasis population — their first appearance in Mesopotamia
dates from about the beginning of the Muhammadan era ; and the Khazraj, now found
chiefly on the Tigris above Baghdad, supplied by their martial exploits in the
southern deserts much of the romantic stock in trade of the pre-Muhammadan poets.

It follows from the conditions under which settlement has been effected that the
old tribes are often widely scattered along the edges of the cultivated land, large units

which once ranged over extensive stretches of desert having been split up and thrust
apart by the intrusion of others. For example, the Jubur, a tribe now only half
nomadic, are found along the Tigris as far north as Mosul, as well as on the Euphrates
and the eastern frontiers of Syria, and the Zubaid are divided between Mesopotamia
and the volcanic districts east of Damascus.

The transition from a nomadic to a settled life is always a slow process, and the
very doubtful security offered by Turkish administration did not tend to hasten it.
Except in the immediate neighbourhood of big towns, such as Baghdad and Basrah,
tribal organisation has not been relinquished, tribal law and customs hold good, and.
tribal blood feuds continued until a couple of years ago to be a terrible scourge. A.
periodical reversion to tents is common, and even the reed villagers are semi-nomadic,
shifting frequently from place to place. The puzzled map-maker may find his last
addition to geographical knowledge removed, almost before his eyes, from the spot
assigned to it in his survey and re-erected on another site. But the rising value of
land tends to pin down these restless husbandmen, and no sooner do they settle than
their numbers increase out of all comparison with those of their hungry if prouder
brethren in the wilderness who neither plough nor harvest.

The tribal population of Mesopotamia exhibits every stage in the conversion of
the Beduin into the settled cultivator of the soil ; there are tribes still purely nomadic
who have never yet put their hand to the plough, others who are concerned solely
with the care of their palm gardens, corn and rice fields, others again who combine
the occupation of agriculturist with that of shepherd, and yearly, with the coming of
the winter rains, send half their number to pasture the sheep of the community in the
desert. In the marshes small groups, as amphibious as their own buffaloes, live by
fishing and the weaving of reed mats.

From the head of the Persian Gulf up to Quruah, tribal organisation has almost
died out, except that many of the peasants working in the date gardens belong to the
tribes of our staunch ally on the Persian side of the river, the powerful Shaikh of
Muhammarah, who has in the past maintained the right to mobilise them for his own
tribal operations.

From near Qurnah almost to Baghdad a series of important tribes inhabit the
Tigris lands, the Albu Muhammad up to 'Amarah, above them the Beni Lam
approximately to Shaikh Sa'ad, then the Baui Rabi'ah round Kut and almost to
Bughailah. Along the Euphrates from the Hammar Lake to half-way between
Nasiriyah and 'Amarah both banks are peopled by the Muntafiq league of tribes.

Over these populations the shaikhs have such authority as their hereditary
position or their personal prowess can command, but Ottoman officials could exercise
little or no control on tribesmen who vanished at will into marsh or desert, whither it
was impossible to follow them. Instead of utilising the power of the shaikhs, the
Turks pursued their classic policy of attempting to improve their own position by the
'lestruction of such native elements of order as were in existence. The wilayat of
Basrah presented a comprehensive picture of lawlessness. On the Tigris an
intermittent authority had been maintained by playing upon the hereditary enmities
of the great tribal groups and the personal rivalry which existed between individual
members of the ruling houses. To recognise local domination and yoke it to his
service lay beyond the conception of the Turk, and the best that can be said for his
uneasy seat upon the whirlwind was that he managed to retain it. In the Euphrates
valley it may frankly be admitted that he had been dismounted. Yet if ever the
delusive precept which connects empire with disunion might have held good, it was
in a country parcelled out between a multitude of small units, well provided with
ancient feuds. From Qurnah to Nasiriyah, marsh, rice swamps, palm grove and
desert are occupied by some fifty distinct tribes of different origin, all of whom had at
one time formed part of the j\Iiintafiq league, under the once powerful Hijaz family of
the Sa'dun, while most of them are still in name constituents of that famous con-
federation. The Sa'dun spring from a Mecca family closely related to the Sharif, a
branch of which migrated to Mesopotamia towards the close of the 'Abbasid period,
about the beginning of the 15th century. Themselves Sunnis, they established their
authority over the Shi'ah tribes and played a considerable part in the stormy history
of the land. In the case of one scion of the family who had rendered valuable service
in Central xYrabia, the Porte even tried the experiment of appointing him Wali of
Basrah, but it proved a failure and was abandoned. Of late years the power of the
Sa'dun as a ruling family has diminished owing to internal rivalries and dissensions
and the Muntafiq presented a fair field for the disintegrating policy of the Ottoman
Government. Any shaikh who showed unusual capacity aroused official jealousy and

■was countered by hostility and intrigue ; group was pitted against group, tribe against
tribe, section against section, until in the welter which ensued neither Turkish
tax-gatherer, nor merchant, nor traveller could secure safe passage. Each petty
chieftain built himself a mud tower, from which he defied such part of the universe as
came within his ken, or sallied forth in his light mashhuf to plunder by lake and
eanal his neighbours and the passing stranger.

At the root of tribal unrest lay the Ottoman agrarian system, conceived without
regard for prescriptive rights which had been in existence prior to the Turkish
conquest. The Arab tribes, in successive waves of immigration, dating back to a
period long before the arrival of the Turks, had settled in the land, or if not settled,
had marked out spheres of influence which each tribe considered to be, not its own
particular property in the sense in which the Turks understood property, but at least
an area on which none other than its members was entitled to graze or cultivate.
These claims, which ran counter to the theory of the Ottoman conquerors, that all
conquered lands are State property, were as far as possible ignored.

It is characteristic of the 'Iraq that no one district exactly resembles another as
regards land tenure and the taxation derived from land, which is the principal source
of revenue ; 'Amarah and Nasiriyah presented wide divergencies. On the Tigris
almost all land was Sanniyah, Crown land, and is now State property let out in
large farms for a term of five years. rheoretically, the choice of lessee was
unlimited ; in practice it was difficult and dangerous to make over a country in the
traditional occupation of one tribe either to the shaikh of another tribe or to a non-
tribal townsman. The lessees were therefore, almost without exception, the leading
shaikhs of the local tribe. Every chief, if he wished to maintain his position, was
obliged to farm sufficient land to give employment to his dependants and followers,
at the risk of seeing them disperse and offer their services to another lord. Profiting
by this necessity, the Turks put up the leases to auction and encouraged the shaikhs
to bid against one another until the amounts bid reached a figure far above the value
of the estate. Both the Turkish officials and the farmers knew that they could neve*-
be paid, but the officials had the pleasure of exhibiting to the departmental heads
at Stambul enormous demands from their province which were comfortably interpreted
as being synonymous with enormous revenues, while they also enjoyed the satisfaction
of receiving continual bribes from the farmers to induce them not to press for
payment. The farmers had to be backed by merchant sureties who took from them
large sums. Finally, when immense arrears had mounted up against the farmer, or
he had attracted the private enmity of an official or the displeasure of Government,
the whole erection would topple over. AH arrears would be demanded at one blow ;
the farmer, if a shaikh, would pass from rebellion to imprisonment or exile, the lands
and houses of the surety would be confiscated, and the estate would be put up afresh
to auction and farmed for a still higher and more impossible rent to the rivals of the
supplanted man. Scarcely a year passed without conflict. The waterway of the
Tigris, which was the main commercial thoroughfare between Baghdad and the sea,
would be blocked by insurgent chiefs of the Albu Muhammad or the Bani Lam, who
advertised their just grievances by holding up traffic and firing on the river
steamers.

On the Euphrates the mistakes of the Ottoman Government were even more
fundamental. The Muntafiq tribes had acknowledged the overlordship of the Sa'dun
as long as the latter had contented themselves with tribute, militarj' service and the
honours of chieftainship, claims which the tribes, possessors of the soil from a remote
antiquity, had recognised with varying readiness. But the relations of a tribal
landowner with a traditional title to his traditional overlord did not fall within the
four corners of the Ottoman definition of proprietary rights, and in 1871 Midhat
Pasha, then Wali of Baghdad, effected a settlement on Turkish lines. The tribal
lands were partitioned between the Crown and the Sa'dun and registered verj-
imperfectly in Turkish title deeds. The tribes found themselves reduced to the
status of tenants and the Sa'dun bartered their ancient prerogatives for the
questionable satisfaction of official support in their new role of landlord. The tribes
never acquiesced in this change. Acute agrarian xmrest kept the Muntafiq district
in constant rebellion, attempts to suppress the insurgents ended very commonly in
the discomfitvire of Otton»an anus, and after the weakening of the Central Government,
consequent on the Italian and Balkan wars, neither the State nor the Sa'dun
succeeded in collecting more than a fraction of their rents.

In the 'Amarah district the Turks had removed or destroyed all records, and'
there was nothing but one torn piece of paper in a corner of the Basrah offices to

show what had been the revenues of the Division or the nominal rent of the farms.
When we occupied 'Amarah in June the spring crops had just been reaped and lay
on the threshing floors. The shaikhs and farmers, who had none of them paid their
rents for the spring harvest to the Turks, had already been informed by the Chief
Political Officer that, subject to good behaviour, they would be continued in their
farms by the British authorities. They were summoned to 'Amarah to discuss with
the Revenue Commissioner the conditions of their holdings, and were in most cases
induced to show their leases, though some pretended to have lost them. It was too
hot to attempt a thorough inspection of the ground, but a rough estimate was made
of the amount which the various estates could really pay, as against the nominal
demand under the Turks. After all discoverable information had been submitted,
the Army Commander sanctioned the reductions recommended. These were in many
cases very large, amovmting to as much as a half. The shaikhs were informed that
the amounts fixed were temporary imtil more thorough enquiries could be made.
At the same time the immense arrears standing in their names were remitted. Alter
a more thorough inspection in the autumn and winter of 1915-16 further reductions
were made, bitter boundai7 disputes between shaikhs were adjusted, and encroach-
ments by private owners on State lands were investigated. The check to the British
advance at Ctesiphon had made some of the chiefs doubtful, and the shortage of river
boats had prevented them from selling their autumn crops to merchants. It was
thought politic to insist as far as possible on the payment of dues, but it was difficvJt
to put much pressure on the farmers, and in the end only about two-thirds of the
reduced demand were collected.

Both here and in dealing with the Nasiriyah district the administration was well
served by the Revenue Commissioner, Mr. Henry Dobbs. It was he who made the
first study of agrarian conditions, and his acute eye, combined with a profound
acquaintance with tribal custom, enabled him to discern and account for agrarian
phenomena. The results of his observations, embodied in a series of brilliant
memoranda, have formed the basis of all subsequent revenue work.

That the general lines of the policy adopted were wise has been proved by
the result. We have never experienced any serious disturbance on the Tigris.
Occasionally a handful of lawless and lordless marshmen would cut a telegraph wire
or loot Government stores from a native boat tied up to the river bank for the night ;
one or two minor shaikhs yielded to Ottoman persuasion and went over to the enemy,
but except in the case of chiefs who were in direct contact with the Turkish army
the leading men stood firm in their allegiance to us. They accepted responsibility
for the security of those reaches of the river which passed through their lands.; they
bore without undue complaint the restrictions which a state of war imposed upon
them ; they met the heavy demands for labour which military exigencies obliged us
to make, even to the detriment of their own agriculture ; and as they became better
acquainted with the Political Officers of their districts, they gave them their confidence,
and through them came to regard the Great Government as on the whole beneficent
and well meaning. From time to time one or another would paddle down the Tigris
in his mashhuf to see " Kokus " — so the Chief Political Officer was universally known
in the 'Iraq — or, less fortunate, would be summoned to headquarters to receive a
reprimand. Big men, abundantly nourished and richly clad, they brought the savour
of their fat lands, into the tiny dusty rooms where the Chief Political Officer and
his exiguous staff struggled with a rising flood of office files. And they bore
testimony to their satisfaction with those who had been placed in authority over them.
"A good ruler," said an Albu Muhammad shaikh of his local Political Officer.
" Never do I go into his house but he gives me a fair welcome." And encouraged by
the treatment which had everywhere been meted out to him by the English, he
brought down his sick brother, a man who had spent his life in active conflict with
the Turks, to die, as it proved, in the arms of the British Government at Basrah.

On the Euphrates progress was not so rapid. War itself could scarcely enhance
the prevailing anarchy, but the greater proximity of the Turks made war a more
disturbing factor at Nasiriyah than at 'Amarah. Until the advance on Baghdad in
1917, the Turkish outposts lay within sight of Nasiriyah town ; an active Turkish
Commander, the Circassian, Mizhir Pasha, carried on from Shatrah, on the Hai canal,
continuous relations with the tribes ; and 'Ajaimi al Sa'dim, in the deserts to the
south, provided a convenient focus for disaffection. Tribal opposition was for many
months an irritating factor, and it made a heavy demand on the patience of the
military authorities. Turkish intrigue, Turkish and German money, backed by
prodigious promises for the future, maintained a constant if comparatively futile

effervescence among the tribes, resulting in small raids on the lines of communica-
tion, the cutting of telegraph lines, and such-like petty annoyances. Moreover, the
tribesmen had real though unavoidable grievances. The strict blockade, essential in
order to prevent traffic w^ith the enemy, vs^as galling to the population, and the
huge profits to be gained by evading it were a lasting temptation. The production
of the rice fields round Suq al Shuyukh had been seriously diminished by lack of
water, due to the necessity of keeping open the waterway from the Hammar Lake,
which was the sole means of access to Nasiriyah.

At first no attempt was made to gather taxes which for years past the Turks had
been unable to collect. The Sa'dun landlords, vi'ho looked to us to exact the payment
of dues which under the Ottoman regime they had been powerless to recover, were
provided with subsistence allowances when necessary pending a just settlement of
the rival claims of themselves and the tribes, which demanded detailed investigation
and an agrarian survey. Gradually tribal anarchy was reduced to some sort of order.
Influential headmen received recognition and were made responsible for their followers
in return for a subsidy. Arbitration on the basis of tribal custom was encouraged,
petty disputes over boundaries adjusted, and, with the help of shaikh and saiyid,
blood feuds were adjudicated and squabbles peacefully settled. Faithful dealing
with individual disturbers of the peace was limited by the fear of rousing a hornet's
nest which might have embarrassed military operations elsewhere, but on occasion a
tower was knocked down and a malefactor handed over to justice, with no other force
behind the civil arm than a band of tribal guards. A small body of tribal horse,
enrolled under military auspices and subsequently turned over to the civil authorities,
gave opportunity of suitable employment to the sons of shaikhs and to members of the
Sa'dun family whose pride of birth and fighting traditions precluded them from taking
any other part in the administration. After the lapse of a year the people began to
appreciate the advantages of a Government which, though it might hold inconveniently
clear-cut views on the payment of revenue, at least gave something in return.
Bazaars rose from the nxin in which the Turkfe had been content to leave them,
schools were opened, dispensaries started, encouragement and help were given in the
building of necessary dykes, and the curbing of lawlessness permitted cultivator and
merchant to go about their business undisturbed. Local freebooters were the first to
admire the discernment which guided British Political Officers in maintaining and
enforcing order. " There are among the Arabs," observed a chieftain who had
himself been a thorn in the flesh of Ottoman officials, " a great number of liars and
scoundrels, but our Hakim knows how to distinguish good from evil." The Arab,
quick to draw conclusions, began to compare the constructive activity of the British
with Turkish apathy. " They destroyed but you create," said a shaikh of Suq al
Shuyukh. The building of the railway from Basrah worked marvels in the pacification
of the tribes. As railhead drew near, townsmen and tribesmen rode out on visits of
inspection, and when the line was open a permit to travel by train was a coveted
privilege.

Before the operations had begun which resulted in the recapture of Kut and the
occupation of Baghdad, the fruits of victory had been garnered no less on the lower
Euphrates than on the lower Tigris. It may be that the leniency with which the
tribesmen were handled resulted in putting a premium on their maintaining relations
with the enemy, especially after the merciless treatment meted out by the Turks to
the inhabitants of Kut when General Townshend was forced to surrender the town in
1916. It was from that time forth abundantly clear to the dullest-witted that to desert
the Turkish cause meant death if the offender fell into Ottoman hands, or, at any
rate, exile under conditions which were tantamount to a death sentence ; whereas to
break promises given to the British implied, at the worst, internment for a period of
years in India in well-found camps.

But if we erred, we erred on the right side. We upheld steadfastly the theory —
for it was at first little better than a theory — promulgated in the first proclamation
issued on our landing on the Shatt al Arab, namely, that we were not at war with the
Arab race, but were co-operating with them for their liberation from Turkish
tyranny. As far as was consistent with a regard for the safety of our forces we shut
our eyes to small offences and our ears to delators, and we found reward for our policy
in the black days of 1915, after the retreat from Ctesiphou, and the blacker months of
1916 which succeeded the fall of Kut. Although the tribal leaders, who on our
advance to Ctesiphon had made submission to us, reverted to the Turks on their
reappearance ; although the same inevitable story recurred after the fall of Kut, thes
tribes in the Occupied Territories who were removed from the immediate pressure of

Turkish anus were not perceptibly affected, our line of communications was never in
danger, nor was the progress of civil administration disturbed.

Closely connected with our dealings with the settled and half-settled Shi'ah
communities on the Euphrates were the relations which we maintained with the
nomadic Suuni tribes of Arabia. First to come into touch with iis was the small
group of the Dhafir, nomads but not Beduin, who inhabit the deserts immediately
south of the river and find pasturage during the summer along its banks. The
southern portion of the tribe formed in the early part of 1915 a combination in our
favour with two of the semi-nomadic Muntafiq groups against 'Ajaimi, and when the
railway was built across their grazing grounds they were charged with responsibility
for its security. The Dhafir occupy the fringe of the arid wildernesses which, broken
by rare oases, extend over the Arabian peninsula. These oases are the headquarters
of independent Arab rulers whose authority radiates over the adjacent nomads.
Nearest to the Mesopotamian borders is the sturdy nation of the Shammar under
Ibn Rashid, whose seat of Government is at Hail, some 300 miles to the south-west of
Najaf. His forbears had been in alliance with the Ottoman Government, which
regarded Hail as the Arabian outpost of Turkish influence, and he nourished a
hereditary enmity with his great southern rival Ibn Sa'ud. Immediately after the
outbreak of war Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, who during a previous residence as
Political Agent at Kuwait had established a personal friendship with Ibn Sa'ud, was
sent on a mission to the Ruler of Najd. The rivalry between Ibn Sa'ud and
Ibn Rashid had reached one of its periodic culminations, and, probably with the
active encouragement of the Turks, the Amir of Jabal Shammar attacked his enemy
and met him in battle in January 1915. Captain Shakespear, who was present as a
non-combatant, was wounded by a chance buUet and killed in the charge of
Ibn Rashid's cavalry. Ibn Sa'ud reported the disaster to the Chief Political OflScer
with genuine sorrow. *' We fought against Ibn Rashid at Artawi," he wrote,
" and a great battle ensued ; alas that our cordial friend and rare well-wisher,
" Captain Shakespear, was bit from a distance and died. Please inform the exalted
" Government of my sorrow. We had pressed him to leave us before the fight, but
" he insisted on being present. He said : * My orders are to be with you. To leave
" ' you would be inconsistent with my honour and the honour of my Government. I
" ' must certainly remain.' "

The success of Ibn Rashid, though it was not followed up, left Ibn Sa'ud in
embarrassment. For the next year his attention was occupied by the revolt of the
'Ajman, one of the tribes over which he claimed authority. During the spring of
1915 he was hard pressed and could scarcely have extricated himself but for the help
of Mubarak Ibn Sablmh, Shaikh of Kuwait. That staunch ally of the British cause,
the ultimate success of which he had always predicted, died in the following
November and was succeeded by his son Jabir, who, though he followed in his father's
steps, could not hope to inherit his influence or his universal reputation as a master
of Arabian statecraft. Jabir lived less than a year and was followed by another son
of Mubarak, Shaikh Salim, a man of stronger character than Jabir, but a fanatical
Moslem lacking Mubarak's singular breadth of vision.

Ibn Rashid, even if he had nothing to fear from Ibn Sa'ud, gave his Turkish
allies no effective help, partly because of dissensions with his own tribe. An
important section of the Shammar broke away from him in the spring of 1916,
brought their tents and camels close to the Mesopotamian frontiers and entered into
friendly relations with the British Administration. Ibn Rashid appeared on the
confines of the Basrah WilUyat a few weeks later, returned no answer to the letters
addressed to him by the Chief Political Officer through Shaikh Ibrahim of Zubair,
and in combination with 'Ajaimi Ibn Sa'dun constituted some slight menace. But he
retired in July, and his hostility for the remainder of the war took no more active
shape, as far as the 'Iraq was concerned, than the smuggling and forwarding by his
people of goods from Kuwait or the Euphrates markets to the enemy at Madinah and
Damascus.

Late in October the treaty with Ibn Sa'ud, the preliminaiy negotiations for which
had been the object of Captain Shakespear's mission, was concluded by Sir Percy Cox.
A darbar was held at Kuwait, attended by the Shaikh of Muhammarah and the Ruler
of Najd, in which the latter was invested with the K.C.I.E., and in a speech as
spontaneous as it was unexpected pointed out that, wdiereas the Ottoman Government
had sought to dismember and weaken the Arab nation, British policy aimed at
2041 T)

uniting and strengthening its leaders. Complimentary telegrams were exchanged
with the Sharif of Mecca, then in the early stages of revolt against the Turks, though ,
in fact, Ibn Sa'ud has never regarded the King of the Hijaz with anything but
dislike and suspicion, and neither on the Shaikhs of Muhammarah and Kuwait nor on
public opinion in the 'Iraq did his rising produce any marked effect.

An attempt was made to reap immediate advantage from the striking exhibition
of goodwill on the part of the three shaikhs which the Kuwait darbar afforded.
When he visited Basrah a few days later, Ibn Sa'ud wrote to 'Ajaimi al Sa'dun and
urged him to throw in his lot with his fellows in the upholding of Arab and Moslem
liberties against the Turks. This letter drew from 'Ajaimi a decisive reply. " Oh
my honoui-ed brother ! " he wrote, "it is known to me and is beyond doubt that my
" attitude is one which is necessary in order to earn the approval of the Most High
" God and the elevation of the name of the Arabs by the discharge of loyalty ; and
" what greater loyalty is there than this, that I should carry out faithfully what God
" ordered me in his unchangeable book in regard to Jihad against non-believers, the
" enemies of God and of our religion. The ' blame of the blamer ' cannot apply to
" me, who walk in the love of God and of his Prophet, and of our country, and in the
" protection thereof from the pollution of the infidel. I had great hope from your
" piety and your Arab zeal that you would approve my opinion and my action for the
" enhancement of the name of the Arabs in this my attitude, and this is not
" disaffection by the grace of God, rather it is a simple attitude. For if the Turkish
" Government be a protection to the purity of Islam, it is my helper and the helper of
" my tribes. And verily I am an absolute ruler by the order of God and the
" Government, and according to my conviction and belief I am walking in the true
" path, which pleases God and the Arab race, with constant and unremitting
" attention ; and that is the spirit of Islam. This is the position, and I finish what I
" have to say by quoting the word of God : ' You cannot direct to the right path
"whom you like; it is God who directs whom he wishes.' If I had given any
" promise to them in the past or afterwards, I should have been bound to carry out
" my promise. But I gave undertaking for the service of my religion and jny
" Government and my zeal. The great God is the best of helpers and co-operators,
" and if you argue on the score of religion, then the discharge of my 'duty shoidd be
" according to the promise which I previously gave to my Government, and that is
" the first attribute of the Arabs. This is what had to be explained."

Whether he feared that his long hostility to the British had made it impossible
for him to secure advantageous terms, or whether his personal sentiments had
crystallised into the convictions expressed in his letter, his answer to Ibn Sa'ud left
no doubt as to the course to which he had pledged himself, and no further
attempt was made to move him from it. No pains had been spared to win him
over, but even if in the early part of the war he had come to terms with us, it
may well be doubted whether he would have remained in our camp. Proud as
Lucifer, like all the Sa'dun, and with an over-weening estimate of his own
importance, his ambitions must always have overstepped any favours which could
have been accorded to him. His position in the desert as a free lance, allied with
the Turks but beyond their control, exactly suited him. He drew large subsidies,
which he did little to earn, and his dignity was sustained by titles of honour and
windy promises. But at least it is to his credit that having chosen his part he
held to it.

Our own experiences, no less than those of the Tui'ks, go to prove that desert
alliances are of negative rather than of positive value. It is essential to have a
definite understanding with Arab rulers, whose wandering tribesmen haunt the
edges of the settled lands, nor should this be difficult in times of j)eace. They
depend for the necessities of existence, food, clothing, and the few domestic utensils
which they may require, on access to their customary markets, and such access can
be made contingent on their good behaviour. But as long as they respect the
frontiers of civilisation, with which alone they come into contact, their obligations
to society may be said to have been fulfilled. No administration can hope to control
their actions within their own sphere, nor is their military co-operation of any value
xinless it is organised by European officers. It is safe to predict that subsidies and
gifts of arms will rarely be used, in the manner intended by the donor. They will be
diverted to private qiaarrels, and even if the friendly chief succeeds in marshalling
his forces against the enemy of his ally, the first success, attended by the urgent need
of making off with the loot, will scatter his armies as effectively as any defeat.

With all the frontier tribes in our pay we never succeeded in dislodging 'Ajaimi,
though his followers were at times reduced to a mere handful, and similarly the
Turks, though they subsidised Ibn Rashid royally, never got him to fire a single
shot against us. Ibn Sa'ud, after years of inactivity, advanced on Hail in 1918,
and came within an ace of taking it, but he swerved off within sight of his
objective, and the campaign resolved itself into the usual desert alarums. With
the conclusion of peace there is fortunately no further need for attempting the
impossible task of making practical military use of the Beduin, and we may rest
content with alliances which regulate their relations to ourselves, and leave them free
to conduct their own affairs in the manner which seems best to them.

In describing Ottoman methods of administration it has been made suflBciently
clear that the Turks showed no consideration for the Shi'ah inhabitants of the 'Iraq.
Yet from the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab to a line which roaj' be drawn roughly
about the latitude of Baghdad almost the whole of the rural population and a
majority of the inhabitants of the towns are Shi'ahs. It is true that the Sunni
element, apart from the support given to it by a Sunni Government, enjoys a social
importance incommensurate with its size. It consists largely of great landowners
and wealthy merchants inhabiting the towns and holding estates along the rivers.
Sunnis from Najd control the desert markets ; and on the canals, in the heart of
Shi'ah communities, some shrewd trader of Najd origin, easily distinguishable by his
finer features and superior education from the surrounding tribesmen, will be found
presiding over the tiny bazaar which caters for the simple needs of the countryside.
Nothing can exceed the comprehensive contempt with which the Sunni merchant in
these small tribal markets regards his clients ; even the well-to-do shaikhs, with their
wide estates and hordes of armed retainers, are to him nothing but dogs of the
riverside, with whom neither he nor his co-religionists, the poverty-stricken Beduin,
would dream of intermarriage.

Nevertheless, neither official indifference nor the disdain of the local aristocrat
can challenge the plain facts that southern 'Iraq is a Shi'ah province and the holy
land universally venerated by the sect. j\Iesopotamia had declared itself for the
hereditary right of the direct descendant of the Prophet, as against an elected Khalif,
before the two divisions of Islam had taken definite form or name ; when 'Ali, the
son-in-law of Muhammad, fought the armies of the Umayyad, Mu'awiyah, at Siffin,
his Mesopotamian forces followed him, as the nearest relation of the representative
of God and the father of his grandsons. When 'Ali was nmrdered at Kufah and his
eldest son, Hasan, grandson of the Prophet, refused to claim his political inheritance,
it was the people of 'Iraq who invited the younger brother, Husain, to seek their
support. The strong infusion of Persian blood had introduced a Persian turn of
thought into the former domain of the Sassanians, fostering the mysticism, remote
from the Semitic mind, which underlies Shi'ah doctrines, and the religious colonies
of Persians settled in the holy towns brought with tliem that spirit of political
indocility which has always set the average Persian against existing secular
authority.

It would be a curious historical study, if the materials for it existed, to trace the
diffusion of Shi'ah doctrines in Mesopotamia. They have certainly spread, owing to
the missionary zeal of Shi'ah divines, during the last hundred years. For instance,
the large tribal group of the Zubaid, which stretcher from river to river from a little
north of Kut, half-way to Baghdad, was turned to Shi'ahism about 1830 by a famous
mujtahid whose descendants still dominate the politics of Hillah. It is significant
that the kindred tribes to the north, the Dulaim and 'Ubaid, a little further removed
from the persuasive influence of the holy places, have remained Sunni, As far as
can be judged the p^rocess is still going on. One of the nomadic tribes of the
Muntafiq, the Shuraifat, are probably recent converts (the nomads tend to hold to
Sunni tenets more than the settled cultivators) ; another, the Suhai3'im, are still partly
Sunni, and there are examples of conversion in the Sunni family of the Sa'dun, who
are Ashraf, akin to the Sharif of Mecca, and of the purest Sunni stock.

The sacred towns of the 'Iraq are four in number : Najaf, Karbala, Kadhimain
and Samarra. Najaf contains the reputed tomb of 'Ali, while near by, at Kufah, is
the mosque where that khalif was murdered. Karbala is built on the site of Husain's
battle and holds his tomb, together with the graves of several of his followers. The
sanctity of Kadhimain is of later date ; it is based on the fact that the 7th and
9th Imams (direct descendants of 'Ali) are buried there. Samarra, at a yet later date,
received the bones of the lOth and 11th Imams, while the 12th Imam disappeared

into a cave lying a few score of yards from the totnb. Neither Kadhimain nor
Samarra gave the Turks much trouble in the past. At Kadhimain, thovigh the
population is mainly Persian, the proximity of the great Sunni and Arab centre,
Baghdad, was a commanding factor. At Samarra, Sunnis have a yet more direct
control ; the Arab population is proportionately larger and the official guardians of
the mosque are Sunnis. But Najaf and Karbala, more particularly Najaf, have from
all time been the centres of religious fanaticism of a Persian type, centres also of
hostility to existing authority, and will continue to be so whatever govei-nment obtains
in the rest of the 'Iraq.

It is usually Najaf, Karbala, and Samarra which are the places of residence of
the great divines of the Shi'ah world, the mujtahids, and the leading mujtahid of his
time has always lived in one of these three towns, preferably Najaf. The Shi'ah
mujtahid interprets sacred law, and herein lies the essential difference between the
Sunni and Shi'ah forms of Islam. The former follow the interpretation of
Muhammadan ]aw laid down by the founders of the four orthodox Sunni sects, the
Hanbali, Shafa'i, Hanafi, and Malaki, and this interpretation is immutable. The
Shi'ah, on the other hand, follows the laws of the Quran as interpreted by the Imams,
and these laws again, or at least some of them, may be interpreted or modified by the
mujtahids as they think fit, though they seldom exercise this privilege. The
mujtahid has the power of promulgating a religious order or Fatwah, whether it be a
call to Jihad or a permit given to a sick person allowing him the use of alcohol when
there is no other cure. He can, and indeed he has, obliged the Shi'ah Persian
Government to rescind decrees ; there was a famous instance in the matter of a
tobacco monopolj'^ given to a British company, when the great mujtahid of the day
forbade Shi'ahs to smoke, on the ground that it was unlawful to give the monopoly to
non-Moslems. The Shi'ahs obeyed and the Government was defeated.

Theoretically, all mujtahids are of one grade, but actually they fall into three
recognised classes in accordance with the influence they possess and the number of
those who follow them. There is no prescribed course of study by which a student
of sacred law can become a mujtahid or pass from one grade to the next, nor is any
official examination of his attainments required. To be recognised as a mujtahid, the
postulant must obtain recognition of his claims from the greatest mujtahids of his
time, who certify him to be reckoned among their niimber and competent to give a,
Fatwah. This is usually the reward for anything up to 25 years' studj' in Najaf
under the great mujtahids only. During this time the character of the postulajit
must have been exemplary. Solitude is a necessity for the acquisition of the required
reputation, and it follows automatically that no man of good family ever becomes a
mujtahid. The next step of the certified mujtahid is to gather round himself learned
men and to send them out to various parts of the world to preach his fame. His
influence, if he is fortunate, gathers in volume like a snowball, until finally he is
recognised by universal acclamation as one of the great mujtahids. Students then
flock to attend his classes and pious Shi'ahs from all parts send him large sums of
money to distribute among his pupils and among the poor of the holy town in which
he resides. The descendants of mujtahids are not often mujtahids themselves,
though they have influence and command respect on account of their birth.

There is always a small group of mujtahids of the highest grade resident in the
^Iraq, one of whom is recognised as the first authority in Shi'ah sacred law. The
premier mujtahid is necessarily a man of years ; when he dies the next most respected
mujtahid, often as old as he, steps automatically into his place. The first duty of the
successor is to issue a Fatwah permitting the Shi'ah community to celebrate the
Friday prayers ; without this order the principal orisons of the week would have to
be suspended. The great mujtahids, absorbed in matters of religion, should not take
any part in temporal affairs ; if they concern themselves with politics, except in so far
as politics affect the faith, they do so at the risk of loss of influence. At the time of
the occupation the premier mujtahid was Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi. He was
pressed by the Turks to sign a Fatwah proclaiming Jihad, but held out for a
considerable time and gave it to be generally understood that he did not consider
that the circumstances called for holy war. His eldest son was active in preaching
Jihad during the winter of 1914-15 ; the subsequent treatment of the holy towns by
the Turks confirmed the father's attitude and modified that of the son.

Our connection with the Najaf-Karbala mujtahids had begun long before the
war. Since 1849 the Indian Government had been in relations with both towns in
connection with the Oudh bequest. A sum which, when all life interests had fallen

in, amounted to about Rs. 1,21,000 a year, had been bequeathed by Ghazi-ud-Din
Haidar, King of Oudh, to be expended in benefactions to deserving persons in the
two holy cities, and the Government of India, inheriting the responsibilities of the
East India Company, found itself in the position of trustee. The distribution of the
monies was the source of many difficulties, but in 1910 it was regulated by an
arrangement according to which the British Resident at Baghdad disbursed the
bequest through Charitable Committees of mujtahids and other respectable persons,
one in each town.

Prior to the Constitution of 1908 the Ottoman Government had recognised that
radical differences separated the holy towns from the rest of their dominions and had
accorded them some privileges, the most prized being that of exemption from military
conscription. Ft was, indeed, only reasonable that Persians should not be enrolled in
the Turkish army, and the Arab population of the cities slipped through the fingers of
the recruiting sergeant by a natural extension of the principle. But the doctrine of
equality on the lips of the Committee of Union and Progress meant the levelling down
of privilege so far as it touched non-Ottoman subjects, and even before the war the
Turkish Government showed a tendency to ride roughshod over the susceptibilities of
Najaf and Karbala. After the battle of Shu'aibah a number of fugitives from the
regular army sought sanctuary at Najaf. The Turks announced their intention of
himting them do^vn and threatened to impose conscription on the local popidation.
It was reported, also, that they intended to appropriate the treasure belonging to the
shrine for the purposes of Jihad. They proceeded to impress young men for military
service, raided the houses at night, molested the women on the pretext that men were
disguising themselves as women to escape conscription, and extorted large sums as
the price of immunity from conscription. The people rose, barricaded streets and
houses, and garrisoned the precincts of the shrine. The Turks turned their gims on
the rebels, and, either by intention or accident, damaged the minarets of the shrine.
Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi sent a telegram of protest to Constantinople, and
was told in reply to mind his business as a darwish and not to interfere in Govern-
ment affairs. Three days' fighting ensued, after which the Turkish troops surrendered
and were disarmed by the mob. The Government buildings were pillaged and burnt,
the Turkish Qaimmaqam's house demolished and he himself expelled.

Secular Najaf is divided into two tribal factions, mainly Arab by race, the Zuqurt
and the Shumurt. In 1916 the leading men of the Zuqurt were Saiyid Mahdi ibn
Saiyid Salman, whose father had occupied the same position, Haji 'Atiyah abu Qulal
and Kadhim Subhi, both self-made men, Haji 'Atiyah being ex-smuggler and brigand,
Kadhim Subhi, ex-coffee maker to Haji 'Atiyah in the early days of the latter'a
prosperity. The Shumurt followed Haji Sa'ad ibn Haji Radhi, who had begun life as
a butcher and exhibited in his person and manners unmistakable evidence of low
birth. These four men had authority respectively over the four quarters into which
Najaf is di,vided, Saiyid Mahdi ruling the Huwaish quarter, Haji 'Atiyah the 'Amarah,
Kadhim Subhi the Buraq, and Haji Sa'ad the Mishraq. After the disturbances in
April the four shaikhs took over the control of the town in consultation with Saiyid
Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi, who was represented by his son, Saiyid Muhammad 'Ali.

A month later, in June 1915, open dissensions broke out in Karbala. They seem
to have originated in an attack on the town by the neighbouring tribe of the Bani
Hasan, between whom and the citizens of Karbala there exists a jealous hostility
which the Ottoman Government, on the principle of playing off faction against
faction, did nothing to allay. On this occasion they reaped no profit out of hostilities
which they probably provoked. The Bani Hasan burnt and looted the Sarai, the mob
rose and turned out the Government, and the town shaikhs, led by the Kammunah
family, assumed the direction of affairs. Similar disturbances occurred at Kufah,
Hillah and Tuwairij, and everj'where the Turkish garrisons and Government officials
were forced to leave.

The situation on the Euphrates had become so serious that the Turkish authorities
took another tack and resorted to conciliation. A conamission of leading men was
organised to settle affairs .at Najaf, and brought about an agreement by which the
Qaimmaqam was allowed to return, with an infinitesimal bodyguard. The honours
remained with the insurgents. The Qaimmaqam was a puppet in the hands of the
town shaikhs, and the soldiers of his bodyguard were openly mocked in the streets.
At Karbala the Turks managed to re-establish themselves. At Hillah the townsfolk
refused to pay taxes until the Ottoman Government brought reinforcements and
obliged them to submit.

The pacification was a hollow victor}^ for the Turks. No sooner had it been
concluded than Haji 'Atiyah of Najaf, supported by Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi,
opened communication with the Chief Political Officer. In return for a guarantee
that we would respect the shrines, he suggested that Najaf and the surrounding tribes
were anxious to combine with us. In reply, the Chief Political Officer quoted the
proclamations which had been issued at the outbreak of war as a proof that we had no
quarrel with Arabs or with the Moslem faith. He pointed out that in spite of the war,
Great Britain had not suspended payment of the Oudh bequest, vfherever it was
possible to make payments, and that clemency had been shown by the military
authorities to any of the clergy or of their adherents who had fallen into our hands.
The messenger was asked whether distress was prevalent in Najaf, and what steps we
could take to relieve it.

Shortly afterwards, in September 1915, approaches were made on behalf of
Karbala. A month later Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali, the head of the Kammuuah Zadah,
established relations with Sir Percy Cox, who was then at Kut, and after a preliminary
exchange of letters, proposed that we should undertake to make him hereditary and
autonomous riiler of a sacred province extending from Samarra to Najaf. We were at
that moment engaged in the advance which preceded the battle of Ctesiphon, and it
seemed probable that we might shortly be m close touch with Karbala. Sir Percy
sent Muhammad 'Ali a friendly but colourless answer, together with a small present
in money, for which he expressed effusive gratitude. There for the time the matter
dropped, our withdrawal from Ctesiphon having changed the political outlook. We
remained, however, in commimication with Muhammad 'Ali, and from time to time
sent him money to assist him in retaining his adherents and upholding his position at
Karbala.

A liberal policy had been adopted by the military authorities in allowing food-
stuffs to pass tip and down the Euphrates to relieve distress. We did our best to
transmit small drafts of money, and anj- accredited agents who could be sent to
Nasiriyah received payments from the Oudh bequest.

In April 1916, the Turks made a second and more determined effort to subdue
Karbala. Accusing Fakhr ud Din Kammunah, brother of Muhammad 'Ali, of having
stirred up the Yasar shaikhs to aid the townsmen against the Bani Hasan, they
surroimded his house and arrested him. Thereupon the town rose, and after a sharp
conflict, during which the Turks trained their guns on the town of Karbala and
inflicted some damage on the shrines, they were turned out and a local administration
was re-established under the Kammunah brothers. Najaf and Hillah followed suit
and the Turks lost hold on the Euphrates for the second time. Envoys were sent
from Najaf to Basrah bearing an appeal addressed to the tribes and State of
Persia in which the sufferings of Karbala were set forth. Among the signatories
were several well-known mujtahids. The Chief Political Officer did not fail to
give this document wide circiilation. •

Muhammad 'Ali Kammunah, who continued to exchange letters with us,
repeatedly expressed his fear of the return of the Turks, and the anxiety of the
holy towns received an acuter edge from the outrages which occurred at Hillah in
November 191C. Turkish troops carrying munitions to 'Ajaimi appeared before
Hillah and demanded passage. A deputation of notables, which was senj; to arrange
terms, was seized, and on the following day a number of leading men were hanged.
The foremost divine, Saiyid Muhammad 'Ali Qazwini, narrowly escaped a like fate ;
the tl'oops entered the town, wrecked, burned, looted and murdered, and further
outraged Moslem feeling by sending women of respectable families to Baghdad and
elsewhere to be distributed among the soldiery.

The Turks in their dealings with the Shi'ahs of the Euphrates must be reckoned
among those whom the gods wish to destroy. The singular ineptitude of their
conduct was proved by the attitude of the tribes towards ourselves after the occupation
of Baghdad, but before that period they had expressed their friendly intentions. In
the summer of 1916, the Chief Political Officer had sent a messenger to the paramount
chiefs of the Khaza'il, a confederacy embracing many of the tribal groups on the two
channels of the river below Kufah and Diwaniyah, with letters and new sheets
informing them of the Sharif's revolt against the Ottoman Government. The
messenger returned with letters of a satisfactory character for the Chief Political
Officer and Shaikh Khaz'al of Muhammarah. He had reached the Euphrates at an
opportune moment. The Turks, through the medium of Saiyid Hadi Muqotar, a
member of a wealthy family of Saiyid landowners whose estates lie in and near

Shinafiyah, had fomented ancient jealousies among the tribes. The Ottoman Govern-
ment had always feared the authority of the Khaza'i] Shaikhs, and partly by treachery
towards the chiefs, partly by claijuing their lands as crown property and settling
other tribes more amenable to Ottoman control — such as the Fatlah — on these estates,
the ruling family had been weakened and its influence curtailed. The Turks now
urged the Fatlah to assist them in helping 'Ajaimi and in opening a passage for their
reinforcements to him. In pursuance of this end, the Fatlah and their allies attacked
the Khaza'il, but the latter, profiting by the bad odour which the Turks had acquired
among Shi'ahs, organised a combination in their own favour and successfully resisted,
their opponents. Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi was called in to make peace
Itftween the two parties, which he did on the basis that neither should give active
assistance either to the British or to the Turks, but that if the Turks attacked the
Khaza'il, the other tribes should join in repelling them. The Khaza'il shaikhs were
in dread of Turkish reprisals, and they begged that a small detachment might be sent
by us to Samawah, on the appearance of which they undertook to raise the country on
our behalf-iJ^™

We were, however, engaged in concentrating our efforts on the Tigris line. It is
unnecessary to give more than an outline of the capture, loss and recapture of Kut al
'Amarah, which were the central features of the Mesopotamian campaign. Shortly
after the taking of 'Amarah our forces had advanced to 'Ali Gharbi, which was
occupied in Julj?^ 1915. This brought us into contact with the Bani Lam, who hold
north of 'Amarah a position parallel and even superior to that of the Albu Muhammad
to the south. The most famous of the Bani Lam shaikhs, Ghadbhan ibn Bunaiyah,
who before the war had been in constant rebellion against the Turks, had been bribed
by the Ottoman Government at the outbreak of hostilities with a promised lease of
large estates, and had assisted in the operations against us at Ahwaz in April 1915.
After the fall of 'Amarah he made submission to the Chief Political Officer and
expressed his willingness to raise a force on our behalf when we advanced on Kut.
There was, however, some 'delay, and meanwhile the Turks, after recovering from
their flight from 'Amarah, pushed down the Tigris past Ghadbhan's encampment. He
broke off negotiations with us, and we heard shortly afterwards that he had accepted
:a heavy bribe and joined the Turks. His defection made it possible to restore the
estate recently made over to him by the Turks to the rightful lessee. Shaikh Juwi,
whose interests were thus identified with our own, and we occupied Kut al 'Amarah
in September without further trouble from the Bani Lam, though in October, when a
body of Turkish cavalry cut in on our communications, two of , the shaikhs, 'Alwan and
Chitab, returned to Ottoman allegiance. Some of the shaikhs of the Bani Rabi'ah,
the tribe round Kut, made us welcome, while some held aloof ; the tribes further
north, Zubaid and Shammar Toqah, proved on the whole friendly, and the move
from Kut towards Baghdad took place under the best auspices, as far as tribal _
sentiment was concerned. But the retreat from Gtesiphon in November, in the face
of vastly superior numbers, changed the political balance. The tribes, after their
custom, backed the winner, whose subjects, it must be remembered, they were, and-
during the whole course of the operations round Kut those who were in immediate
touch with the Turks hung like jackals round our troops, looted our camps, murdered
our wounded, stripped our dead. Kut was invested on 7th December ; the early
months of 1916 were marked by unavailing efforts to relieve the beleaguered force,
and on 29th April, after a siege of 14-3 days, General Towushend was compelled by
starvation to surrender. We stipulated in the terms concluded with the Turkish
Commander that those inhabitants of Kut who had perforce shared with General
Townshend's men the horrors of the siege and had been submissive to his orders,
should not suffer reprisals, but no sooner had the Turks entered the town than they
seized and hanged some of the best known Moslem citizens, including the shaikh.
All down the river, Arab and British alike listened to the tale with anger.

It was not till the end of 1916 that General Maude was able to begin operations
for the recovery of Kut. After bitter fighting against an enemy strongly entrenched
in a position of immense natural advantages for defence, he was able to dislodge the
Turks. By 24th February 1917 they were in full retreat. Baghdad was occupied on
11th March.

Most of the partisans of the Ottoman Government, Turks or Arabs, had accom-
panied the retreating army, and we were received at Baghdad with, enthusiasm by a
population which had been terrorised for two and a half years and had passed the
days immediately before our entry in acute fear for life and property. A certain
amount of destruction had been effected by the Turks before their departure, and

during the liours of interregnum the I'ifEraff of the town had been occupied in looting
the bazaars, but the speed of General Maude's movements hastened the departure of
the enemy before he could do mvich damage and gave little opportunity for robbeiy
to the mob. The one irreparable loss was the beautiful gateway called the Bab al
Talism, a monument of the 13th century. The door had been bricked up after the
Sultan, Murad IV., the Turkish conqueror of Baghdad, rode through it in the year
1638, and legend liad it that the gate would be reopened only to admit of the passage
of another victor. The Turks had \ised it as a storehouse for explosives, and, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, it was blown up before they left. A hole in the
ground was all that remained to show where it had been ; even such fragments of
masonry as were scattered roimd the site were rapidly removed piecemeal by the
natives for building purposes.

General Maude was instructed to issue a proclamation to the people of Baghdad
announcing that our armies came into the country not as conquerors but as liberators,
and pointing out that a long commercial connection had existed between Baghdad and
Great Britain, that the British Government could not remain indifferent to what took
place in Mesopotamia, and was determined not to permit again that which had been
done in Baglidad by the Turks and Germans. "But you, the people of Baghdad,"
the proclamation continued, " whose commercial professions and whose safety from
" oppression and invasion must ever be a matter of the closest concern to the British
" Government, are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government to
" impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government that
" the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realised once again. The
" people of Baghdad shall flourish and enjoy their wealth and substance under
" institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial ideal.
" In the Hijaz the Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans who oppressed
" them and have proclaimed Sharif Husain as their king, and His Lordship rules in
" independence and freedom and is the. ally of the nations who are fighting against
" the power of Turkey and Germany. So, indeed, are the noble Arabs, the Lords of
" Najd, Kuwait and 'Asir. Many noble Arabs have perished in the cause of freedom
" at the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed them. It is the
" determination of the Government of Qreat Britain and the Great Powers allied to
" Great Britain that these noble Arabs shall not have suffered in vain. It is the
" desire and hope of the British people and the nations in alliance with them that the
" Arab race may rise once more to greatness and renown amongst the peoples of the
" earth and that it shall bind itself to this end in unity and concord. 0, people of
" Baghdad ! remember that for 26 generations you have suffered under strange
" tyrants who have ever endeavotired to set one Arab house against another in order
" that they might profit by your dissensions. Therefore, I am commanded to invite
" you, through your nobles and elders and representatives, to participate in the
" management of your civil affairs, in collaboration with the political representatives
" of Great Britain who accompany the British Army, so that you may unite with yoxir
'" kinsmen in the north, east, south and west in realising the aspirations of your
race.

The 'ulama of Karbala and Najaf sent a telegram of congratulation to His
Majesty the King, who replied, in acknowledging it, that his earnest desire was for
the Avelfare of the 'Iraq and its people, the preservation of its holy places and the
restoration of its ancient prosperity. For the first few days the office of the Chief
Political Officer was crowded with visitors of all degrees, not excepting members of
the most distinguished Moslem families. With the Naqib of Baghdad, the religious
head of the Sunni community. Sir Percy Cox at once got on to good terms, and after
receiving a visit from the Chief Political Officer, the Naqib paid his respects in person
to the Army Commander. He had owed much to the Turks in the time of 'Abdul
Hamid, when Sunni magnates stood in high account ; but his susceptibilities had
been outraged by the levity shown in religious matters by the Committee of Union
and Progress, and he accepted the British administration as a preferable alternative.
Age and the temperament befitting a darwish, as he is fond of calling himself,
disincline him from compromising himself by the public expression of clearly-defined
opinions on politics, but his goodwill has not failed us. He offered to the military
authorities, under no further pressure than that of suggestion, his house on the river,
in which he customarily lives ; he has put up with personal inconvenience in small
matters, expressing his conviction that the Chief Political Officer would do all that
was in his power to spare him, and with a little persuasion he has shown himself
ready to oblige, even in questions which touched the privileges of the mosque and

tomb of his 14th century ancestor, the Shaikh 'Abdul Qadir. It is to this revered
objecc of Sunni pilgrimage that he owed his position. Its sanctity, together with his
own reputation for learning, place him in the forefront of the religious world, and its
rich endowments, which he administers, make him and his family some of the
richest landholders in the 'Iraq. But his political influence is not great, and he is
out of touch with the ways of thought of the younger generation.

On the heels of the Baghdad notables came the shaikhs of the small neighbouring
tribes, somewhat bewildered by the sudden overthrow of the old order, and far from
certain — as. indeed, which of us was certain ? — that the new would prove to be
lasting. Among the first to make their appearance from further afield were
Muliammad 'Ali Kammunah froin Karbala and Haji 'Atiyah from Najaf, with the
other town shaikhs of Najaf following a little later. They were assigned allowances,
and returned home with a mandate to maintain order until it was possible for us to
deal directly with the affairs of the two cities.

The shaikhs of the Euphrates tribes formed the next band of visitors, together
with the landowning saiyids who are a feature of the Euphrates channels. 8ome were
men of reputation like the shaikhs of the Bani Hasan, Fatlah and Khaza'il ; others
were chieftains of remote tribal groups in the marshes or on the edges of the desert,
these last half-nomadic. All alike had been non-submissive to the authority of the
Turkish Government, and few had been wont to visit Baghdad, where the more
distant were scarcely known. The country whence they came was almost unmapped,
map-making not having been encouraged by the Turks ; the course of the rivers alone
was indicated, and even that very incorrectly. Some attempt had to be made to form
a conception of whence these unknown visitors came, what their relations were to one
another, and what was their respective importance, a matter difficult to determine
since each man gave himself out to be a potentate superior in all respects to his
fellows. They were entertained at the guest house of the Government, giving small
presents in money and robes of honour, and sent back with injunctions to keep the
peace and busy themselves with their cultivation*. Gradually the stream diminished,
and the rigours of an exceptionally hot summer, together with the lassitude induced
by the fast of Ramadhan, combined to reduce the flow of visitors to normal
proportions.

CHAPTER IV.— Relations with Arab and Kurdish Tribes, and with the Holy

Cities after the fall of Baghdad.

For the tirst six months after the fall of Baghdad we held in effective military
occupation only the line of the Tigris up to Samarra, the Diyalah up to Ba'qubah (the
further advance here began in the month of October 1917) and the Euphrates from
the Hindiyah Barrage to Fallujah. We experienced at first a good deal of sporadic
opposition from wild tribal elements ; isolated officers and men were murdered, camps
attacked and forts raided, less as a part of military operaticms than as acts of defiance.
It was diffictdt for the tribesmen to believe, in the face of constant Ottoman pro-
paganda, that the Turks would not come back. Even in Baghdad a long uncertainty
prevailed as to the ultimate intentions of the Allies with regard to their return.
Until the success of our offensive in the autumn of 1918, it was the general iriipression
that the Central European Powers would win the war, or, failing complete victory,
that they would bring about a stalemate. Those who prided themselves on their
intimate acquaintance with world politics declared that the Traq would be handed
back to Turkey in return for the liberation of Belgium, and assurances to the contrary
were secretly disbelieved. These feelings found their counterpart among the shaikhs,
causing many of our firmest friends to waver, or at least to try to keep in touch with
the enemy by the despatch of an occasional letter couched in amicable terms.

Great as was the strain which the rapidity of the advance imposed upon the
army, it was no less serious to the civil administration, which found itself called upon, at
a few weeks' notice, to take over an area as large again as the territory already occupied,
and one in which the Turks had exercised more control than in the wilder and more
remote wilayat of Basrah. The extension of internal administrative responsibilities
was accompanied by a proportionate extension of external relations, not only with
neighbouring Arab nomad tribes, but also with the Kurds on either side of thft
Persian frontier.

204- E

Nevertheless, in the course of six months the tribes under British administration
were to a large extent pacified. During the operations which preceded the capture of
Baghdad, the tribal cultivators along the Tigris had been systemati(3ally cleared out
by the Turks, and those who remained had withdrawn before the British, the
Shammar Toqah north-east to Balad Ruz and Mandali, the Zubaid to the Euphrates.
But before the end of the autumn they had returned and were eagerly engaged, with
official help and encouragement, in agriculture. The paramount shaikh of the Zubaid,
'Ajil Beg ibn 'Ali al Saniarmad, maintained an attitude of veiled hostility and escaped
to the Turks early in 1918, to return and sue for pardon after the annistice. Further
down the river such shaikhs of the Rabi'ah and the Bani Lam as had taken active part
against us remained outlaws for a year, but their sons or other suitable kinsmen,
who had made submission, stepped into their place as lessees of State lands and
leaders of the tribes, and the Tigris line gave no further trouble.

A profound impression was produced among the tribes by the rebuilding of Kut.
This work, which partook of the nature of an act of piety in memory of those who
had given their life in the defence of the town, Arab as well as 13ritish, was under-
taken immediately after the occupation, and carried out with skill and judgment by
the Political Officer, Major W. C. F. Wilson. When the Turks fled headlong before
General Maude's armies, they left Kut completely deserted. It stood in tottering ruins
among palm groves blasted by artillery fire, the streets were choked with mud or
blocked by brick barricades, the houses pierced by shells find rifle fire, and honey-
combed by dug-outs, the river front lined with trenches. By a miracle the minaret
of the Sunni mosque still stood, though its summit had been shot awaj', but both
Sunni and Shi'ah mosques were much damaged and filled with dug-outs. The bazaar
had suffered badly, and the Sarai was wholly destroyed. The inhabitants began at
once to return, and by the middle of May there were 2,000 people in the town.
Houses were cleaned out as fast as possible and disinfected, rubbish was carted away,
and a small temporary bazaar opened, to which the neighbouring tribesmen brought
their produce. The battlefields were searched, and the dead buried or re-buried.
General Townshend's British cemetery, which contained about 300 graves, had not
been interfered with ; it was carefully wailed in, and a gardener was provided to keep
it in order. It was clear that the expense incurred must l)e largely a Government
charge, since it could not be borne by a populace of refugees. Besides the cost of
public buildings, substantial help in the rebuilding of a number of private houses
was given to the relations and dependants of the 70 men or more who had been put
to death by the Turks after General Townshend's surrender, to the families whose
male relations had been killed during the siege, to those who had received
acknowledgment from General Townshend of claims for damage done to their houses
by British troops owing to the necessities of war, as well as to the destitute poor.
Rs. 50,000 in all were expended, but by the end of the first six months Kut had so
far revived that Rs. 20,000 had been collected in revenue. Advantage was taken
of the fact that many houses had been reduced to ruin heaps to widen and straighten
the streets, but the crowning glory of the new Kut was an arcaded bazaar along
the river front, which was completed by the middle of July. Thus before the
oncoming of winter the refugees were lodged, and the town had become a more
flourishing market than it had been before its destruction. The country-side saw in
its regeneration, not only profit and advantage to themselves, but also a pledge that
the new order, so solidly established, would be permanent.

On the Diyalah tribal difficulties were caused chiefly by the groups on the border
line or beyond our sphere and vanished with our advance, but the country suffered
from the fact that the canal heads were in Turkish hands until the autunm, as well as
from prolonged devastation by Ottoman troops ; and the re-settlement of the culti-
vators, together with the development of agriculture, was a slower process here than
elsewhere.

On the Euphrates, west of Baghdad, the turbulent Zoba' tribe needed niore than
one lesson, and it was not until the fall of Ramadi in September 1917 that the
principal shaikhs made full submission. The same victory brought in the most
influential shaikh of the Dulaim, 'All ibn Sulaiman, who lives at Ramadi and could
not, even if he had wished, have broken with the Turks as long as they occupied his
estates. The Dulaim stretch far up the river, and a good part of the tribe remained
until the following year in Turkish territory, but the conduct of 'Ali Sulaiman and
the chiefs of other sections who were behind our lines was satisfactory, and they did
useful 8ei"vice by holding up in the Jazirah, the desert between the two rivers,
caravans from Mosul destined for the Turks.

On the middle Euphrates, from the Barrage to Samawah, the position was
curious. Not a single British soldier was posted south of the Barrage till December
1917, nor did the tribes set eyes on a British military uniform ; but the Hillah area,
the centre of the supremely important grain-prod ucdng district of the Euphrates
channels, could not he entirely neglected, and a Political Officer was posted there in
May 1917. His authority did not extend far to the south, where the shaikhs, after
their visit to Baghdad in the early summer, were perforce left pretty much to their
own devices. Beyond occasional communications by letter and the appointment of
some leading man to be' nominally our agent in keeping the peace, we had no direct
intercourse with those who lived south of Diwaniyah on the Hillah branch of the
river, and Kill on the Hindiyah branch. It was typical of our slender hold on the
middle Euphrates that a minute Turkish force which found itself marooned at
Diwaniyah held out until the end of August. It was commanded by a (yircassian
swashbuckler, Lieutenant Muhammad Effendi, who had hanged or shot his superior
officers when they recommended a prudent withdrawal. He occupied a warehouse
and caravansarai on the river's edge, and terrorised the townspeople, who scarcely
knew whether to fear most Muhanmiad Effendi, with his bomb-throwing bravoes
within their gates, or the tribes without. Finally a couple of aeroplanes convinced
him that we meant to put an end to the business and were in a position to do so, and
he surrendered with the thirty odd men to which the garrison had been reduced by
frequent desertions. No sooner did he reach Baghdad than he contributed the last
touch of comedy to the whole episode by offering to serve ourselves or the Sharif in
any capacity. This suggestion was not accepted ; he was sent to India as an officer-
prisoner, and his remarkable career as a fighting man terminated for the duration of
the war. A notable of Baghdad, Salih Eft'endi al Milli, who had in Turkish times
been Mutasarrif of Diwaniyah, was posted there as Government agent.

The chief problem of the Euphrates was, not the tribes, but the holy cities of
Karbala and Najaf. The town shaikhs, as has been mentioned, returned from their
visit to Baghdad with a mandate to carry on temporarily on our behalf the adminis-
tration, if it can be dignified by that name, which they had set up after the final
' ejection of the Turks in 1917 ; for this service they were assigned allowances. Short
of the appointment of a British officer with an adequate personal guard, a course
which on military grounds was not feasible, this was the only practical alternative ;
but it was obviously merely a stop-gap. Before many weeks had passed it became
evident that the arrangement was not satisfactory to the towns themselves. In
Karbala the Kammunah Zadah were said to be using their privileged position to
pursue their own schemes, and a growing dissatisfaction was apparent among the
other town shaikhs, chief among them the 'Awwad family, represented by 'Abdul
Karim al 'Awwad, a man much more typically Arab than the Kammunah, who are
half Persian bj' descent, and connected with the ruling dynasty of the Kajar.
Although the Kammunah were no doubt making hay during a period of sunshine,
there would not appear to have been much justification for serious complaint, and on
the whole Muhammad 'Ali ran the administration well and kept the town qiuet. But
from the point of view of the British authorities there was a more serious grievance
against the brothers. A brisk traffic in supplies with the enemy was started from
Karbala. Large caravans were reported to have come both from Damascus and
Aleppo seeking foodstuffs, and the Turkish forces on the Euphrates received constant
supplies. The men of the Kubaisah oasis, which was not in our territory, took a
lively part in these enterprises. When, in June, we concluded an agreement with
Fahad Beg, paramount shaikh of the 'Anizah, the largest Beduin confederation on
our western borders, the transmission of goods by way of the desert was to some
extent stopped, but with the connivance of the Kanununah the trade continued
furtively along the Euphrates, through Mas'ud and Jannabiyin country, where Fahad
Beg could not establish control.

It was impossible that the Kammunah Zadah could be ignorant of what was
going on ; there was, indeed, abundant evidence to the contrary. Of Muhammad 'Ali
the best that could be said was that he passively connived at the traffic, while Fakhri
was an active participant. The town police, whom Muliammad 'Ali, as representative
of the Government, had in his employment, were used to escort safely out of the town
goods destined for the enemy, and two retainers of the Kanmiunah Zadah were
accustomed to sign the necessary passes. Cloth, rice, wheat and coffee were the
favourite ejfports. While the large profits to be derived from the levy of fees of 1/.
and even 21. on each loaded camel were probably sufficient in themselves to explain
the Kammunah's behaviour, it is also possible that they had come to realise that under

E 2

British rule their grandiose personal ambitions stood small chance of materialising,
and so were perhaps inclined to listen to the voice of the tempter. The Turks were
undoubtedly carrying on extensive propaganda among the Euphrates tribes, coupled
with promises of autonomy when the 'Iraq should be restored to the Porte ; but from
whatever cause it arose the supplying of Turkish troops on the Euphrates could not
be permitted to continue.

On 7th September the Civil Commissioner, as Sir Percy Cox was now
styled, summoned Fakhri to present himself at Baghdad on the 9th. He complied,
and on arrival it was explained to him that his undoubted participation in and
encouragement of trade with the enemy had made his presence in Karbala incom-
patible with military interests, and that he would be sent to India as an officer
prisoner of war. He accepted with resignation a decision which could scarcely have
been unforeseen by him. The following day Muhammad 'Ali also received a verbal
summons from the Civil Commissioner, through the Intelligence Officer at Karbala, to
come to Baghdad. He expressed himself willing to leave next morning, but sub-
sequently, having received news of Fakhri's internment, he declined to go, though
given Hadh wa Bakht (assurance of personal safety) by the Intelligence Officer. The
Civil Commissioner therefore despatched to him a letter explaining the reasons for
the action taken with regard to Fakhri, and adding that since, in view of what had
happened, it was not considered to be in the interests of the administration that
Muhammad 'Ali should continue to act as Government Agent, a British officer had
been appointed as Assistant Political Officer. If Muhammad 'Ali, under existing
circumstances, preferred to retire from Karbala, the Government would make arrange-
ments for his residence in comfort in some other place or town in the 'Iraq to loe
agreed upon.

After some hesitation Muhammad, 'Ali decided to obey the summons and came
into Baghdad. In this decision he was largely swayed by the advice of Shaikh Husain
Mazandarani, a leading mujtahid of Karbala, who urged him strongly not to disobey
the orders of the Civil Commissioner, at the same time reminding him that the
British Government in no way resembled the Ottoman, and that promises of security
given by us might safely be trusted. The part played by Saiyid Muhammad Yazdi of
Najaf was no less gratifying. In reply to an appeal from Muhammad 'Ali to intervene
on behalf of Fakhri, he said that he had long since retired from the world ; if they
wished for his opinion on the word of God, he was prepared to give it, but he would
not express any view on the affairs of State. Incidentally he observed that he had no
intention of declaring a Jihad against aeroplanes and motor cars. He consented,
however, to put in a plea that the office of Kiliddar, keeper of the keys of the treasury
of the shrine, lately held by Fakhri, might not be removed from the family, and
Muhammad 'All's son, Hamid, was left in charge.

A British Assistant Political Officer was installed at Karbala, and Muhammad
'Ali Kammunah elected to reside in Baghdad. The i-eligious heads of the Karbala
community were highly delighted at the removal of the Kammunah brothers, with
whom, for the sake of their personal immunity from molestation, they had been obliged
to keep on outwardly friendly terms, though the authority of the Kammunah was a
source of jealous anxiety to them. The family was not, however, broken ; Muhammad
'Ali remained in enjoyment of his properties, his son, as has been said, held the post
of Kiliddar, and his brother, Shaikh Hadi, was appointed President of the Munici-
pality. But in the autumn, Muhammad 'Ali was found to be implicated in the
spreading of hostile rumours, and Hadi to be reaping more than permissible benefits
from his position. The former was sent to join his brother in India, and the latter
was tried and found guilty by a judicial commission. At the same time the office of
Kiliddar reverted to a member of the family which had enjoyed it before ; the
Kammunah Zadah used their influence to obtain it for themselves.

If at Karbala the inevitable ejection of the town shaikhs was accomplished peace-
fully ; at Najaf it took a more tragic turn. The materials in the latter town were much
more inflammable, and a wild firebrand, Haji 'Atiyah, was there to set them alight.
This man, who was a remarkable outcome of Turkish maladministration, had been for
many years a triumphant outlaw, safely holding his court in the desert a few miles to
the west of Najaf ; then a fugitive ; finally, immediately before the outbreak of war,
a prisoner at Baghdad, where he had been submitted to physical torture of an
angouising kind. The vicissitudes of his career had affected mind and tempera-
ment. The lawless and fearless bravo had been converted into a lawless and anxious
neurotic, and his ungovernable passions had been yoked by experience to fear. He
dominated his colleagues and the town of Najaf for eight months after the occupation

of Baghdad, and was doubtless at the bottom of much contraband trade with the
enemy and in close touch with 'Ajaimi ibn Sa'dun, who, possibly with money and
certainly with promises, tempted him to pursue the course natural to unstable political
conditions and keep a foot in both camps. It must always be remembered that during
these eight months not a single British soldier had been seen on the Middle
Euphrates south of the Barrage, but a Government agent, Hamid Khan, a resident of
Karbala, and cousin of the Agha Khan, had been sent to Najaf in July, at which date
another uative, in this case a Christian of administi'ative experience, was posted at
Kufah. In October 1917, the pressure of food shortage created the first local
disturbance. A shaikh of the wandering 'Anizah, our allies in the Syrian Desert,
came in to Najaf with a letter from the Political Officer who was responsible for the
desert borders, Colonel Leachman, to Hamid Khan, asking that the 'Anizah might be
assisted in obtaining considerable supplies of grain. The shaikh was allowed to
purchase his requirements, but as soon as the fact became known prices leapt up in
the bazaar. Next day, as ill-luck would have it, Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal, paramount
shaikh of the eastern 'Anizah, sent in 1,200 camels for grain, on passes signed by
himself. This was, in all probability, more than the town could afford to supply
to the desert and the populace rose in protest. Such of the Beduin as had entered
Najaf were hunted out, and on November lst-2nd a demonstration was made by the
townsfolk round the 'Anizah camp. It amounted almost to a free fight ; some shots
were fired, a camel was killed, three rifles stolen and a good deal of stuff looted.
Hamid Khan, whose authority was unsupported by force, was unable to grapple
with the situation.

Independently of the troubles at Najaf, the time had come when it was no longer
possible to leave the Euphrates channels south of Hillah without closer supervision,
if only because of the vital importance of collecting and controlling the coming
harvest. A Political Officer, Captain (now Colonel) Balfour, was appointed to the
Shamiyah, the rich agricultural district on the edge of which Najaf lies, and set out
with a bodyguard of shaikhs to make a preliminary inspection of the whole region
down to Samawah. There he met a second Political Officer, Captain Goldsmith, who,
with a similar escort, had travelled from Hillah through a wild tribal country.
Captain Balfour visited Najaf on his way down the river and arranged a settlement
between the town shaikhs and the 'Anizah, but when he returned Jfrom Samawah a
few days later he found that the terms agreed upon had not been carried out. Only
two of the town shaikhs, Haji 'Atiyah and Kadhim Subhi, came to see him, and an
attempt to put pressure on them led to a riot which was. secretly incited by Haji
'Atiyah. Captain Balfour stood to his post until the Government office had been
rushed three times by the crowd, and then consented to leave under the protection of
the Kiliddar, to whose house, at some distance from the office buildings, he went.
The riots did not cease with the looting of the Najaf office ; later in the day similar
disturbances occurred at Kufah, where the Government Agent 'summoned the local
shaikhs and speedily got matters in hand, and at Abu Sukhair, lower down the river,
where it was intended to place the headquarters of the Political Officer of the
Shamiyah. No Government official being at Abu Sukhair to deal with the rioters,
the office there was comprehensively gutted. Captain Balfour, still unsupported by
any troops, turned to the great mujtahid, Muhammah Kadhim Yazdi, for help. On
the advice of the latter, 'Atiyah and Kadhim Subhi asked for and were given pardon,
and the town returned to normal conditions. In the rural district the leading
shaikhs, who were actively engaged in cleaning out their canals with money borrowed
from us, with a view to sowing grain which the British administration was ready to
provide, were pledged to the existing order and upheld it. We were aided also by
the adherence of most of the land-owning saiyids. As shi'ahs their sympathies had
been alienated from the Turks by the treatment accorded by the latter to the holy
towns, Karbala and Najaf, in 1915 and 1916, as well as by the sacking of Hillah in
November 1916 ; as saiyids, their influence over the tribes was overwhelming, and
when exerted on our side, almost inevitably turned the scale in our favour.

Meantime at Samawah the course of events had not run smoothly. The leading
saiyid, Taffar, was from of old a friend, but the tribes were peculiarly difficult to
handle. All were broken up into small sections which were divided by feuds ; all
had been accustomed to find a livelihood in plundering the river traffic. On the one
hand, there was, therefore, no strong shaikh whose assistance could be sought ; on the
other, every petty chief and tribesman looked with disfavour on the introduction of
order and settled government. Since an early period in the war, Samawah had been
split into two factions, one chief being actively pro-Turkish, while the other, Saiyid

Taft'ar, was pro-British and had suffered on that account more than a year's confine-
ment in 'Ajaimi's camp, close at hand in the desert. He was released and allowed to
return to Samawah after the fall of Baghdad, but he could not, unaided, maintain
order, and matters went from bad to worse. The Bani Huchaim defied all authority,
and when Captain Goldsmith was sent down in November, unsupported In- troops, an
attempt was made to kidnap him. It was necessary to punish the worst offenders by
destroying their mvid towers, after which the district quieted down and the trade
routes oi)ened. Here, as elsewhere, we followed the policy of recreating tribal
X organisation where it had lapsed, by supjiorting the leading shaikhs and making them
responsible for the behaviour of their tribesmen, and as at Hillah and in the Shamiyali,
the hope of improvements in irrigation and agriculture came to otir assistance.

While the urgent need of food supplies for the civil population, no less than for
the army, gave the rich Euphrates basin an ever increasing importance, the danger
of a serious attempt on the part of the Turks and Germans to recover Baghdad was
diminishing and troops cmild be spared to complete effective occupation of the whole
area behind our lines. The Civil Commissioner visited the Euphrates earlj^ iii
December, and on his advice small detachments were placed at various points on the
river, but not in Najaf itself. The town, with its population of near 40,000 souls,
would have demanded a large number of men, and it was anticipated that the
presence of a mixed force at Kufah, seven miles away, would have, indirectly, the
tranquillising effect required. During the course;of his tour, Sir,Percy Cox interviewed
at Kufah the town shaikhs of Najaf, with the exception of Haji 'Atijah, who held aloof,
alleging his fear of treachery. He attempted to see the Civil Commissioner when the
latter paid a brief visit to Najaf, biit Avas told that he miist now come to Baghdad.
In spite of ail reassurances, he was too greatly fear-driven to show his face there ;
and by this time, although it was not then known, he had probably hitched his car To
'Ajaimi, who had recently returned from a visit to the Turks at Hit, plentifidly
supplied with money, and had opened a vigorous campaign of propaganda.

On the morning of ll^th January 1918, while the Indian cavalry, newly arrived
at Kufah, were training in the plain outside Najaf, a band of some 150 of 'Atiyah's
men opened fire on the troops from the walls, killing one man and wounding a second.
The cavalry rode on Avithout opening fire on the holy town. The officer in con)mand
of the troops, who happened to be in Najaf at the time, was escorted safely outside
the gates by the shaikh of the Mishraq Quarter, Haji Sa'ad. The latter, with Saiyid
Mahdi, the most respectable of the town shaikhs, and with others of less importance,
visited Captain Balfour at Kufah on 14th January, and all Avere sent back to Najaf to
maintain order. Next day Kadhim Subhi obeyed a command to come to the Political
Officer at Kufah, and Haji 'Atiyah. finding himself isolated, escaped to 'Ajaimi in
the desert. A fine of 500 rifles, or their equivalent in cash, was imposed on Najaf,
and paid by the appointed date, 1st Februarj-, on Avhich day an Assistant Political
Officer, Captain Marshall, Avith a small bodygTiard, took up his residence in a khan built
and owned by Haji 'Atiyah immediately outside the east gate.

Captain Marshall was singularly Avell qualified for his difficult task. He had a
fluent acquaintance with Persian, and had been for 10 months Assistant Political OflScer
at the Shi'ah holy town of Kadhimain, AA^here he was universally beloved. He had
hoped to return to England in the summer of 1918, in order to be married, but Avhen
the Najaf post Avas offered to him, he accepted Avith delight work of such great
responsibility, and set about it with a tact Avhich endeared him at once to the clerical
population, to Avhom he had brought high credentials from their brethren in
Kadhimain. Haji 'Atiyah, who had been outlaAved, Avas in the desert, but Avithout
following. He was reported to have left 'Ajaimi, and to be not withoitt hope of
obtaining the pardon of our Government. His three sons, Avho had not accompanied
him, tAvo of them being children, agreed to move with the women of the family to
Baghdad, but in the midst of preparations for departure tliey suddenly bolted, joined
'Ajaimi in exile, and were outlaAved. The son of Haji Sa'ad, Karim, a criminal of
pronotmced type, had fled previously, and he, likewise, was outlawed.

The first and most necessarj' measiire for the security of the town was the
reorganisation of the police. The police force, hitherto recruited from Najaf, had
been draAvn from the town tribes, and was obedient to the shaikhs. A contingent of
Shi'ah policemen was sent from Baghdad, another from Kut, and orders were issued
for the recruiting of the remaining number from outside Najaf. At Captain Marshall's
suggestion, the allowances which had been made to the town shaikhs when they were
acting on our own behalf were discontinued. The measure was just and necessary.
The shaikhs had failed in the discharge of their duties, and had been superseded by

a Britisli officer. It was, therefore, highly important that they should no longer be
acconled any privileged status. The payment of municipal taxation, extremely
irregular for several years past, was put on a proper footing. The cleansing of the
town, which was in a veiy bad sanitary state, was taken in hand, and a payment was
made of such monies of the Oudh Bequest as it had not been possible to distribute
owing to the war. ]3y the end of the month Captain Marshall was considering the
problem of supplying abundant drinking water to the town, which was the most
urgent of its needs. In spite of many advantages, the imposition of decent government
was not acceptable to all ; the riffraff of the town tribes, and even some of the lesser
saiyids, who had found profit in fishing in troubled waters, were covertly hostile ; but
the merchants, the rank and file of the poorer community, together with Saiyid
Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi, with his followers, were openly relieved at the breaking
of the yoke which the town shaikhs had laid on them, and the return to orderlj'^
conditions.

Final settlement was, however, to su.ffer farther delay. Turkish intrigue was
more active than before. When, in March, the 15th Division took Hit and raided
'Anah, there fell into our possession tlie German liaison officer, together with all his
papers. These documents demonstrated the existence in Najaf of an Islamic rebellion
committee, the avowed object of which was to use !Najaf as a centre for religious
agitation among the tribes. Some hundred or more of the religious community were
implicated, but among them were no men of first-rate importance, the chief being
one of the Bahr al 'Ulum family, the son of a saiyid, who was an energetic preacher of
the Jihad until the fall of Baghdad. The plan was well conceived, for it was clear
that if the British Government took active measures against the sacred town the best
material would be provided for future Turko-Germau propaganda. The town
shaikhs, stripped of the privileges which they had used so ill, were a fertile field, and
there is some reason to believe that a plot existed for the murder of the four Political
Officers on the middle Euphrates. How far the German liaison officer was an
accomplice was uncertain, and he was subsequently given the benefit of the doubt.
The probability is that the explosion occurred prematurely in Najaf before the plan
was fully laid, and, as a result, the British administration lost one only out of the
four officers posted in those regions. Captain Marshall was murdered in his house
outside Najaf by a band of some 12 assassins at dawn on 19th March. Two of the
murderers were sons of Haji Sa'ad, three were disbanded police, the leader was a
hired bravo. The chief movers in the plot were known to be Haji Sa'ad and Kadhim
Subbi.

Public opinion in Baghdad, Karbala, Hillah and Kadhimain united in condemna-
tion of the Najaf rebels. The tribes, all but two petty chiefs distinguished for
lawlessness, who were believed with good grounds to have been implicated, remained
quiet ; but tliere was no doubt that all were eagerly watching Najaf, and any active
measures taken against the holy city might, as the Turks intended, have called forth
a certain amount of fanatical feeling. But the chief danger lay in the contrary
direction : failure to punish the murderers of a British officer would have placed the
lives of all his colleagues at the mercy of rascals like Haji Sa'ad, incited to action by
Turkish gold. It was exceedingly fortunate that the successful advance to Hit and
raid on 'Anah occurred at this juncture, not only on account of the information with
which the captured papers supplied us, but also as demonstrating the military weak-
ness of the Turks and removing them to so great a distance from Najaf and 'Ajaiini
that neither the rebels in the town nor the Sa'dun chief could hope for any further
assistance.

Steps were taken to reduce the rebels to submission while sparing the men of
religion as much as possible, and avoiding any attack ou the town which might imply
risk of injury to the shrine and other holy sites within its walls. Najaf was
surrounded by a cordon of troops, which cut off the supply of fresh drinking water,
reducing the inhabitants to the somewhat unpalatable, if plentiful, water from the
num(?rous wells inside the walls. Immediately outside the walls there are several
mounds formed of earth excavated in preparing the deep substructures for which the
houses of Najaf are famous. The Huwaish mounds overlooking the quarter of Saiyid
Mahdi, who had remained loyal to the British Government and had given asylum to
the Kut police, were occupied on 7th April, and during the next few days all the
bastions of the walls were seized Ijy our troops. During the course of these opera-
tions, not a shot was fired into the town itself, and constant friendly communications
were kept up with the great mujtahid, Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi. By 10th
April the surrender of the murderers and of men on the proscribed list of suspects

which had been drawn up by us had begun, and by 1st May, out of some 110 persons,
102 were in our. hands. Haji 'Atiyah, attacked in the desert by 'Anizah friendly to
ourselves, gave himself up at Samawah before the end of April, and on 4th May the
blockade was raised. A court of three specially qualified officers was appointed to try
the murderers, its proceedings being conducted in Arabic. Thirteen persons were
condemned to death (in one case the sentence was commuted to transportation by the
Commander-in-Chief), five were transported for life and two for shorter periods, in
addition to the 100 suspects deported to India as prisoners of war. The death
sentences were carried out at Kufah on 30th May.

On the same afternoon a meeting, wholly spontaneous, was held in the house of
the Kiliddar of Najaf, and a sword of honour was presented to the Political Officer by
a representative gathering of divines, citizens, and shaikhs of the district. Ten days
later the Commander-in-Chief paid an official visit to the town, sheep were slaughtered
at the gate as he entered on a scale unknown since the pilgrimage of Nasi--ud-Din,
Shah of Persia, and a reception attended by divines, notables and shaikhs took place
in the house of the Kiliddar. In the speech he delivered on this occasion the
Conimander-in-Chief instructed the Political Officer to form a municipality for the
management of the town, and promised that the improvement of the drinking water
supply should receive immediate attention.
— 7 So ended what was undoubtedly the most delicate situation which had occurred
since the occupation. It was universally admitted in the 'Iraq that — thanks to the
tact and skill with which it had been handled by the military authorities on the one
i hand, and the Acting Civil Commissioner, Colonel Wilson (Sir Percy Cox was on his
j way to attend a Conference in England), together with Captain Balfour, on the other —
/_we came out with flying colours. But both Najaf and Karbala continued to form a
joint focus of political effervescence which could be excited just as easily by reflex
action from Persia as directly by affairs in the 'Iraq itself. The sending of British
troops to Persia for the purpose of opposing the advance of the Turks from Tabriz
produced in the autumn of 1918 the usual signs of excitement in the holy towns —
meetings of divines and flutterings of students from one place to the other. The
neighbouring tribal connnunities, busy wath their cultivation, paid no attention, though
in the winter of 1918-19 the restless mujtahitl element managed to rouse some of
them, as will be related later, to a passing interest, of a nature unfriendly to the
British Government, in current politics. How far the secular discontent of the
Persian religious leaders in Karbala and Najaf could succeed in disturbing the
equilibrium of the 'Iraq is as yet a doubtful factor in Mesopotamian problems ; all
that can be said is that it woitld tend to emphasise and give form to any local
grievance, whether it were an unpopular regulation or a dry season, and to draw
therefrom a moral unflattering to British statecraft. On the other hand, the longer
peaceful progress is maintained, the more will the people of the country learn to value
it in terms of cash, and the less disposed will they be to see it interrupted by the
prejudice or in docility of any class, however holy.

In describing the course of events at Karbala and Najaf, allusion has been made
to the co-operation and needs of the 'Anizah. This great confederation of Beduin
range the Syrian desert from the Euphrates to the Syrian border. They wander north
almost to Aleppo, and in these northern regions cross the Euphrates and occupy the
rich pastures of the Bilikh and the Khabur, where a line of hugh Assyrian village
mounds bears witness to the former wealth of the land. To the south the rolling sands
of the Nufudh are the customary limit of 'Anizah migration, for the Nid'udh is the
winter grazing ground of Ibn Rashid's tribes, theShammar. North-east also, wherever
the 'Anizah cross the Euphrates into the Jazirah, they have the Shammar for
neighbours (and incidentally for adversaries), but here the Shammar follow the Jarba'
family, not the Bani Rashid. The reason for this sandwiching of the 'Anizah between
slices of Shammar is to be found in the history of their migration from Arabia. In
the middle of the 18th century the Shammar overflowed their borders on the northern
edge of the Nufudh and washed over the Syrian desert, pushing the occupants of those
grassy steppes before them, or thrusting them aside on to the flanks of the settled
lands. Fifty years later the northern Shammar suffered a like fate at the hands of the
'Anizah, who, drifting northwards from their seat below the south-west comer of the
Nufudh, where many of their sections still remain, pushed their forerunners across
the Euphrates, and even there in the Jazirah denied them access to the Khabur and
Bilikh. The Shammar of the Jazirah, separated from their kinsmen round Hail in
Najd, took other chiefs, from the house of Jarba', but they remain theoretically one
with Ibn Rashid's followers, and on occasion a shaikh from the Jazirah will ga

down unquestioned to Arabian pasture grounds. On the other hand, wherever contact
betvveen Slianunar and 'Anizah is established, explosion follows ; feud between the
two tribes is never entirely extinguished.

The 'Anizah in the Syrian desert and Jazirah may amount to a quarter of a
million souls ; the computation, it must be understood, is based on the slenderest data,
no attempt to number the tents of the Beduin having been so much as proposed.
They are divided, roughly, into three groups. The 'Amarat, who claim descent from
a legeudary ancestor called Bishr, occupy, under Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal, the south-
east angle of the Syrian desert and spend the summer near the Euphrates. The
Ruwallah, under Nuri ibn Sha'lan, are opposite neighbours of the 'Amarat on the
Syrian side, and just as the 'Amarat turn to Karbala and Najaf for supplies, so the
Kuwallah turn to Damascus The third group is composite and consists of the Fad'an
and Saba', both descended, like the 'Arnai"at, from Bishr, and consequently frequently
termed collectively the Bishr. The Fad'an follow the Muhaid family ; among the
Saba', Ibn Murshid and Ibn Qu'aishish are the leading shaikhs. Fahad Beg claims
to be paramount chiel' of all 'Anizah, but whatever his de jure rights may be, de facto
he has no shadow of authority over the Ruwallah ; the Fad'an and Saba' give him a
scarcely definable recognition, which never, or very rarely, amounts to obedience, and
even his own 'Amarat shaikhs obey or turn a deaf ear to him as suits their convenience.
Overlordship among the Beduin is a loose term. Nevertheless, Ibn Hadhdhal is the
greatest nomad potentate on the western borders of the 'Iraq, and the Turks
endeavoured to incorporate him into their administrative scheme by making Fahad's
father Qaimmaqam of the desert between the Shithathah oasis and Karbala, where at
the end of a canal running out from the Euphrates he owned a few acres of arable
land, tilled by riverain fallahin. These his son inherited, together with the Turkish
title. It was one of the boldest strokes of Ottoman make-believe, but it could not
give the nomad shaikh the remotest resemblance to a Turkish effendi. Fahad Beg
has no fixed dwelling place. In the late winter and spring he may be found in the
shallow, grass-filled valleys of the Syrian desert, with a couple of hundred tents about
him, widely scattered in complete immunity from attack. His camel herds wander
for miles round his encampment, and his outpost camel riders, splendidly mounted, -
levy tribute from every caravan which comes that way. The old shaikh, seated on
fine carpets in his guest tent, with his hawk and greyhound behind him, offers a
picture of tribal dignity which the walled cities and lofty palaces of the central
Arabian princes, and their troops of armed slaves, cannot rival. ^

A couple of months after the occupation, Ibn Hadhdhal visited Baghdad and was
received with honour by the British authorities, who concluded with him an agreement
on the customary lines. He was given a subsidy and undertook to preserve peace
along our borders, to treat our enemies as his own, and to prevent the passage of
merchandise across the desert. As regards active military co-operation against the
Turks or their allies, the 'Anizah, owing to the imperfect character of tribal discipline,
did little ; but urged by the Political Officer of the Desert, Colonel Leachman, a far
better leader of raids than any of their own chiefs, they held up a considerable
number of caravans destined for Damascus or Hail, the value of the goods captured
and handed over probably exceeding that of Fahad's subsidy. In the winter of
1&17-18 the 'Anizah reaped full advantage from their friendly relations with the
British administration. The threat of famine which hung over the* 'Iraq could not
have failed to bring starvation to the desert, but Fahad's people received from us
regular allowances of corn and dates at a fixed price. The Saba' and Fad'an, on the
borders of enemy territory, met with very different treatment from the Turks and
Germans. Famished multitudes crossed the Syrian desert, and, ranging themselves
under Fahad, were given, with his tribes, their stint of food. By January a hundred
thousand Beduin were camped in the neighbourhood of Shithathah. Gentle and
tractable, like their own famous breeds of dogs and horses, they created no disturbance,
accepted with gratitude the provisions with which they were furnished, and in the
spring, when the fresh grass filled the udders of their milch camels, drifted away
from wadi to green wadi, and forgot, in the abiding interest of domestic feud, that
the part assigned to them in the war was to play the adversary to the Turks.

Intercourse between settled Governments and nomad tribes has the trick of
uniformity, and our dealings with the northern Shammar closely resembled those with
the Syrian 'Anizah. The Turks, owing to their entire lack of sympathy with any of
their subjects whose institutions fell outside the official Ottoman formula, had been
equally unsuccessful in handling all Beduin ; but the Shammar Jarba' were somewhat
less fortunately situated than their rivals the 'Anizah. Their camping grounds

2041 F

between river and river were less inaccessible than the wide Syrian desert, and
intermittently the Turkish Government stretched out its arm and dealt a blow which
did not miss. The last occasion had been in 1911, when a column sent out by Nazim
Pasha, then Wall of Baghdad, and skilfully led by his Chief of StafE, roimded up the
Shammar tribes with their chattels and their cattle great and small, and collected
sheep-tax and camel-tax overdue for a decade. The ruling Jarba' house was, and is
still, represented by the sons of Farhan al Jarba', 15 in number, and of varying
activity and importance in the tribe. The eldest, Al 'Asi, " the rebel " (the name might
suitably have been given by Farhan Pasha to all his progeny), a man advanced in
years, was recognised as paramount shaikh, and made responsible for the good
behaviour of the tribesmen. A younger brother, Humaidi, who had always been in
close touch with the Ottoman official world, as go-between on behalf of the tribe,
acquired the growing favour of the Turks, and after the occupation of Baghdad we
found him definitely on their side. Al 'Asi, who was far away in the northern
pasturages near Nisibin, prudently elected to remain there, and another brother,
Faisal Beg, who had been for some time in Najd, had journeyed to Mecca to pay his
respects to the Sharif,

The Shammar Jarba' were accustomed, if it suited them, to come down in winter
to the warmer climate of the 'Iraq, and since there seemed to them no reason why a
world war should affect their habits, they appeared among us to the tune of a thousand
tents in the autumn of 1917. They were led by yet another son of Farhan, 'Abdul
'Aziz Beg, and close on his heels followed his son 'Ajil al Yawar, with a further
thousand tents. Short of a standing military cordon from Euphrates to Tigris
charged with the duty of shooting at sight all who approached, no power could
prevent a tribal migration of this kind, which, like the ebb and flow of the sea, is
obedient to natural laws ; nor did we attempt, to emulate King Canute. The
Shammar were allotted pasture grounds, and food and small subsidies were accorded
to them.

A week or two later Faisal Beg came back from Mecca with glowing letters of
introduction from the Sharif. On the strength of these high credentials he was invited
to join his brother and nephew, and concert with them a scheme of operations against
the Turks in the northern Jazirah. But the re-united relatives lost no time in falling
out, and in the early spring 'Abdul 'Aziz and 'Ajil withdrew with most of those who
had accompanied them and returned to Turkish territory. Under no circumstances
would they have remained through the summer, the climate of the southern Jazirah
not being suited to them or to their camels.. Faisal Beg, who was too closely identified
with the Allies by his visit to the Sharif to venture north, was left behind with a few
tents, protesting to all who would listen that he and he only was shaikh and leader of
the Shammar Jarba'. 'Abdul 'Aziz and 'Ajil al Yawar, when they got back to the
Turkish zone, promptly rejoined the Turks^they could, indeed, do no less— but they
gave the Ottoman forces a hidicrously feeble assistance, and after the armistice they
made submission once again to us.

Almost immediately after the occupation of Baghdad we came into touch with
the southernmost Kurdish tribes. Tlie relations of the Ottoman Government with
the Kurdish tribes upon their eastern frontier may be summarised as having consisted
in ineffective efforts to exercise control on the one hand, and rebellion on the other.
Since the declaration of the Constitution in 1908, disorder had tended to increase
rather than to diminish, partly owing to the high-handed dealings of the Committee
of Union and Progress and partly to the political unrest engendered by the disappoint-
ment of those hopes which had been aroused by the constitutional movement. Both
causes led to vague yearnings for a racial autonomy, which, if they never assumed a
dangerously practical form, at least give a cadre embracing the general discontent
with things Ottoman which was prevalent among the subject I'aces in Turkey before
the war. Ottoman military power in the Baghdad Wilayat was absurdly insufficient,
nor were the Kurds the only insurgents who had to be coerced with the inadequate
force available ; and the disorders across the Persian frontier caused by the revolt of
the Salar-ad-Daulah, from 1911 to 1913, added to the difficulties, while exciting the
cupidity, of the Turkish Government.

The principal tribes along the section of the frontier south of the Lesser Zab are the
Hamawand and the Jaf, the former a sedentary people in the Sulaimaniyah district,
the latter nomadic, ranging up the left bank of the Diyalah from Sallahiyah (Kifri)
into Meriwan on the Persian side. Besides these the Bajlan, half Turkish and half
Persian, must be taken into account, the Turkish sections being under the influence
of Mustafa Pasha of Khaniqin, who is the most important political factor in that

district. At an early stage of the constitutional regime, the Ottoman Government
succeerled in raising afresh the hostility of the Hamawand by its impolitic action with
reoard to Shaikh Sa'id Barzanji. The Barzanji family had become the most
important in Sulaimaniyah ; they enjoyed a high repvitation as holy men, by right of
descent, not of conduct, and thereby influenced all the tribes of the district. Shaikh
Sa'id was a notorious tyrant and a disturber of the peace, but he had a far-
reaching reputation for sanctity, and when, after a short period of exile in Mosul,
he was murdered there, under circumstances never fully elucidated, in January 1909,
the Hamawand rose to revenge his death. Feeble attempts to stop their depredations
did no more than drive them across the Persian frontier, whence they continued to
raid villages and Turkish convoys. In July 1910, Nazim Pasha patched up an
agreement with them and accepted their nominal submission, but his policy of
conciliation, which was based on a realisation of the extreme weakness of the forces
at his disposal, was abandoned on his recall in April 1911, and by the autumn of that
year the Hamawand were as turbulent as ever. A scheme was set on foot in 1912
for pacifying the country by enrolling the Kurds in frontier companies, on the model
of the Hamidiyah levies of 'Abdul Hamid's time, but though a small number of
Hamawand, Jaf, and Dizai enlisted, no substantial improvement was effected, and at
the outbreak of war the Hamawand were still in rebellion.

As regards the Jaf, an attempt was made at the end of 1910 to extract from them
a heavy annual tribute, for they had paid little or nothing in the way of taxes since
the beginning of the constitutional era. One of the members of the family which
once ruled the Jaf, Mahmud Pasha Beg Zadah, who had still some authority with the
tribe, was called into Mosul and retained there for a year. This policy, which proved
almost entirely ineffective, was then revised ; Mahmud Pasha was allowed to return
home, but further negotiations for the settlement of the tribe led to no result, and no
headway was made during the years preceding the war.

Between Mustafa Pasha Bajlan and the Ottoman Government there was constant
friction. Before tlie constitutional era he spent many years in exile in Constantinople,
and has always been regarded with apprehension by the Turks on account of his pro-
British leanings. In 1912 he was detained for a period in Baghdad as a political
suspect.

Since the beginning of the war dislike of Turkish rule on the part of the Kurdish
tribes had been greatly intensified, as, being unable to emigrate, they suffered severely
under the impositions of the (jovernment ; while their religious leaders, to whom they
hold with singular tenacity, were subjected to humiliation and extortion. In the early
days of the war, before the Jihad campaign had been discredited, the Turks tried to
draw from the Kurds levies of irregular horse. A small contingent went to Shu'aibah,
but after serving well they were scurvily treated by the Turkish authorities. The
Kurds then returned to their home and did not subsequently supply a single horseman
against us, although the Turks worked ceaselessly to raise hostility to us. The lack
of success which attended Turkish propaganda was largely due to the action of the
religious leaders. They unanimously refused to preach the Jihad and proclaimed the
war to be one of self-aggrandisement on the part of the Turks, who were, they pointed
out, the hereditary enemies of the Kurds.

With the approach of the Russians another element was introduced into the
situation. The hope of Russian co-operation on our eastern flank had seemed to be
not unjustified when, after the fall of Erzerum in February 1916, Cossack forces
advanced through Persia, reaching Kirmanshah in March, There, however, the
energy of the Russian Generals suffered a decline and no attempt was made to second
our efforts to relieve Kut by a diversion on the frontier along the Kirmanshah-Baghdad
road. In June, after Kut had fallen, a small party of Cossack horse carried out a
daring reconnaissance through the Pushl-i-Kuh, where the sympathies of the almost
autonomous Persian ruler, the Wall, were Muhammadan and therefore Turkish, and
appeared on the Tigris at 'Ali Gharbi, pretty well exhausted by thirst and by the
heat. Three of their number paid a visit to Basrah, where they were decorated by
the Army Commander and stared at by the populace — their astrachan kolahs and
heavy cloth coats foi'ming a striking contrast to the white cotton garments of the
natives and the khaki of the British. But if they were the vanguard of the Russian
army, they proved for the time to be also its rearguard, for except for a brief episode
when Russian troops occupied Khaniqin for two hours, which they spent in looting
the town, no more fur-hatted and long-coated men showed on our frontiers until in
April 1917 they entered Qasr-i-Shirin, on the Baghdad road, and moved on once again
to Khaniqin, within the borders of Mesopotamia. Their presence at Kirmanshah had

- 44

served to staloilise the position in Persia, where a network of German and Turkish
intrigue had forced us to withdraw British ofHcials from Isfahan and Shiraz in 1915 —
not early enough to prevent our Consul at Shiraz, Colonel O'Connor, from falling into
the hands of hostile tribes and remaining prisoner for close on two j^ears ; but the
advance on Khaniqin, whatever may have been its military value, upset the political
situation in southern Kurdistan.

Before the war the attitude of the Kurdish tribes towards Russia all along the
eastern frontier of Turkey was not clearly defined, but on the whole it may be said
that while there existed a fundamental suspicion of Russia, resulting in a reluctance
to respond to her overtures, Ottoman niisrule tended to force the Kurds against their
will into her arms. Thus chiefs in the Mosul area, such as the shaikh of Barzan, after
holding out for several years against Russian invitations, w(;re in the end obliged to
seek refuge in Russian territory, and in the spring of 1914 it was rumoured that the
Hamawand, Jaf and Dizai, despairing of receiving from the Ottoman Government the
reforms they desired, were prepared to call in Russian aid.

These sentiments suffered considerable modification as the Russians drew near.
Cossacks are apt to be a heavy charge on the inhabitants of any country which they
occupy, and reports of the excesses committed at Rawandiiz in 1915-16 were not
reassuring to the southern Kurds. When, in March 1917, we entered Baghdad, it
was taken for granted by the Kurds round Khaniqin that we should assume responsi-
bility up to the Turkish frontier in that direction, and great satisfaction was felt.
The Kurdish tribes generally believed that the opportunity had now come for
asserting themselves as a race, and the idea of Kurdish autonomy, which had taken
shape under the constitutional regime, revived and was greatly stimulated by the
terms of our Baghdad proclamation to the Arabs, which showed a wholly different
attitude towards racial susceptibilities and aspirations from that which had been
adopted by the Turks. On our advauce up the Diyalah and the Turkish retreat to
the west of that river, the Kurds of the Kifri district evacuated the country occupied
by the Ottoman forces and refused to furnish them with supplies, in the belief that
we should without delay take over the whole region up to Khaniqin. From the
moment of our arrival in Baghdad, and especially early in April, when we had effected
contact with the Russians, then at Qasr-i-Shirin, the Chief Political Officer urged,
subject to military possibilities, the political impoi'tance of our occupying Khaniqin
in order to maintain our interests and influence with the Kurdish tribes who were
■ already well-disposed to us. Such a course, however, involved a dissemination of
force which military considerations were held not to admit of, and in these circum-
stances it was not possible to do more than urge Mustafa Bajlan, chief of Khaniqin,
to do his best to keep order in the town and district of Khaniqin in our interest.

The Russians occupied the town in April, and the inhabitants, though they had
aided the Turks to drive them back in 1916, refrained from opposition as soon as
they understood that they came as the allies and with the consent of Great Britain.
In a few days, however, news began to reach the Chief Political Officer that their
treatment of the inhabitants was causing terror and consternation- Mustafa Pasha
begged that a British Political Officer might be appointed to safeguard the interests
of the town, and his representations were placed before Army Commander. But
General Maude did not see his way to comply, fearing that friction with our allies
might result from the inherent difference in our methods of treating the natives of
the country. Letters and representations from the Bajlan, Jaf, Sharafbaini and
Talabani tribes, as well as from the notables of Qizil llobat, continued to be received,
all declaring that the behaviour of the Russians had aroused bitter resentment and
was calculated to depopulate the country, as the inhabitants were migrating in alarm
to territory occupied by the Turks. In the last dajs of April Mustafa Pasha himself
came into Baghdad to lay the case before the British authorities. Incidentally he
brought with him a letter, addressed to himself, from 'Ali Ihsan Beg, the Turkish
Commander, in which the latter informed him that he had intercepted a communi-
cation said to contain information of military value sent by Mustafa Pasha to the
British forces near Shahraban. He was charged with treachery and threatened with
speedy retribution.

Mustafa Pasha stated that the Russian regime had proved to be far harsher even
than that of the Turks. In Persian territory the inhabitants had not been molested,
but the Turkish Kurds were being treated as enemies and all classes looted alike.
He himself, in spite of the fact that he was in <■ friendly relations with us, had been
threatened with the whip, robbed of clothing, horses and foodstuffs, and had even had
his watch and chain removed from his person in his own house. The Russians, if

they paid at all for the ^oods which they requisitioned, paid in notes which had fallen
very low in value. The countryside had been denuded of flocks and herds, while all
the crops round Khaniqin had been cut or destroyed and the people had been
forbidden to tend their orchards. Wheaten bread had become almost unobtainable,
all hilt the wealthier classes were destitute, and there was an exodus to the Turks, at
Kifri. The Kifri tribes, who had at first refused to supply food to the Turks, were
producing their concealed stores, the news from Khaniqin and Qizil Robat having
caused so much alarm that the Turks had come to be considered a lesser evil tlian
the Russians. The change of sentiment brought about by the behaviour of our allies
was exemplified by the fact that a body of some 400 men who had fled under 'Ali
Akbar Khan> the leading chief of the Sinjahi, to the Bamu Mountain, about 50 miles
north-east of Khaniqin, intending to come over to us, were contemplating active
measures against us. Russian excesses had, in fact, proved of valuable assistance to
the Turks ; but we were ourselves rapidly losing prestige and sympathy among a
race which had always been friendly to us, while the growing hostility to the Russians
was rendering their position in southern Kurdistan untenable and throwing open the
country to the enemy as far as Qizil Robat and Mandali.

Mustafa Pasha represented that the Kurdish tribes luiderstood the need for the
presence of our allies, but begged that they should be urged to cease from looting and
violence and behave as an army of occupation. The Kurds were willing to do their
best to feed the Russian force if irregular requisitioning were replaced by a system
under a responsible head. In order to meet food requirements it woidd be necessary
to allow the cultivators to return and carry on their work witliout hindrance. They
again asked that a British representative, in whom the people would have confidence,
should be appointed to take over the civil administration of the district and that a
small detachment of British troops should accompany him. In return they undertook
to preserve law and order in Khaniqin and Qizil Robat, as well as on the road
between the two towns, to reassure tlie tribes on the Turkish flank, and raise from
them such levies as we might require. They would also promise to bring in supplies
from Mandali and Qizil Robat.

The fact was that the Russian force, which, owing to the upheaval brewing in
Russia, was thoroughly out of hand, knew that they were only temporary visitors in
the Khaniqin district and were not in the least concerned with what happened to it.
For us, however, thej" had prepared a very unpleasant legacy. On these groimds the
conditions disclosed by Mustafa Pasha's statement and by other information received,
appeared to the Chief Political Oflficer, even with due discount for exaggeration, to be
sufficiently serious to call for a reconsideration of the position. If from a sound
military point of view it was ijupossible for us to occupy Khaniqin ourselves and
inadvisable to send a British representative there, he was of opinion that His Majesty's
Government should be informed of the actual state of affairs and of the nolitical
results which might be expected to accrue from it. He recognised that the position
ol a British Assistant Political Officer would be a difficult one, and that he might not
be able to effect much directly, but he believed that his mere presence would
tend to reassure the inhabitants and act as a check upon the license of Russian
troops.

The General Staff doubted the accuracy of the Khaniqin reports and reaffirmed
their opinion that the despatch of an Assistant Political Officer from Baghdad would
create complications between the allies, while if the Russians were ultimately forced
to retire, they believed that the association of a British officer with them would be
harmful to our prestige. They considered that the step should not be taken without
previously consulting the Russian Commander, and when consulted he replied that
the moment was inopportune.

The situation, therefore, remained unchanged and petitions and complaints
continued to be received from Kurdish chiefs and merchants of Khaniqin. Mustafa
Pasha took up his abode in Baghdad as a guest of the British Government, while his
family, escorted by a section of his tribesmen, fled from Khaniqin into the Baghchah
Mountains to the south of the town, and his house was occupied by the Russians. He
asked permission to bring in his womenfolk to Shahraban under a tribal escort, to
whom a guarantee was to be given that the animals on which they rode were not to
be seized by the Russians, but the request was refused by the Riissian Corps
Commander on the ground that the tribesmen who were to serve as escort had
comfnitted outrages on the roads in the Qasr-i-Shirin district, and that Mustafa Pasha
himself was known to have taken part in action against the Russians (presumably in
1916) and to have commanded the Turkish frontier battalion.

Further information reached us in Baghdad that Khaniqin had been picked clean
and most of the loot carried across the frontier. Two women had been killed and
nine men, two of whom were Moslems and the remainder Jews, the latter, it was said,
for their inability to chanfje rouble notes. In the middle of May the General Officer
Commanding the Russian forces made arrangements to safeguard the road between
Qizil Robat and Kirmanshah, and traders desiring to travel eastward were notified.
that the road was open and that they should report themselves to the Russian
Commandant at Qizil Robat for a safe conduct ; but the Russian arrangements were
inadequate and the coimtry beyond Qizil Robat continued to be much disturbed.
The position at the end of May was that the tribes of southern Kurdistan, who should
have been under our influence and were acknowledged to be in our political sphere,
had been thoroughly disappointed and alienated by the treatment they had received ;
and whereas they had at first been ready to prey upon the retreating Turks and had
hidden their stores of grain in order to avoid meeting Turkish requirements, they had
found it better policy to seek relief from Russian truculence by allowing the Turks to
have access to their stores. The Turks were neither strong enough to impoverish
them completely nor desirous of devastating permanently a rich food-producing area,
whereas the Russians, as passing visitors indifferent to the future, destroyed every-
thing. But though the Kurdish tribes resented their intrusion and had ranged
themselves against them, there was reason to believe that they would still rally to us
if they were given tangible evidence that we could support them.

At the end of June the Russians evacuated Khaniqin, withdrawing into Persia,
and the Turks forthwith re-occupied the country down to and including the Jabal
Hamrin. They held the outlets of tlie great canals from the Diyalah, the Mahrut,
Khorasan and Khalis, on which the irrigation of the cultivated area south-west of
Ba'qubah depends, and were able to interrupt the flow of water. They also obtained
access to the valuable food supply of the Ruz and of Mandali. We occupied Balad
Ruz in July and Mandali at the end of September, by which date we had secured
command of the Diyalah canals. The occupation of a part of the Jabal Hamrin in
October further strengthened our position.

The ravaging of Khaniqin, begun by the 'Russians, was completed by the Turks,
and distress, owing to scarcity of food in Kifri and the neighbouring districts, was
increasing. At the end of August, when the Ottoman troops evacuated Khaniqin,
some of the inhabitants, who had taken up a strong position in the Baghchah Mountain
and were prepared to defend themselves against Turkish attack, returned to the town,
and the Bajlan began to come back to the cultivated areas to the north of Ivhaniqin
and to sow maize there. The smaller tribes south of Kifri were said to be emigrating
towards Mandali, Badrah, the Qarah Dagh and Shaikau. They had hidden their grain
stores in the low bills and foimd themselves obliged either to reveal their stock or to
starve. Their horsemen had joined the Talabani shaikh, Hamid, who had concentrated
his tribe in the Gil district north-east of Tauq. The Daudi and Talabani, who were
in close alliance, were sufficiently strong to keep open their grain stores without fear
of the Turks. We got into touch with Shaikh Hamid and other chiefs towards the
end of September and learnt that they had resisted all Turkish demands for assistance
and supplies, and woidd continue to do so as long as there was any hope of our being
able to come to their help. All their flocks had been sent north towards the Zab so
as to be out of reach of the Turks. The latter had responded by meting out very
harsh treatment to the people of Qizil Robat and Khaniqin. Several leading men, one
of them a member of a distinguished family of Sulaimaniyah, had been executed.
We were not in a position to give the Kurds any assurances which would encourage
them to enter into offensive action against the Turks, nor were we able to do so until
we occupied Khaniqin in December 1917 and Kifri in April 1918.

In no part of Mesopotiamia had we encountered anything comparable to the
misery which greeted us at Khaniqin. The country harvested by the Russians had
been sedulously gleaned by the Turks, who, when they retired, left it in tlie joint
possession of starvation and disease. The work of administration was at first little
more than a battle with these formidable adversaries. It was directed by an officer,
Major SoanCj, who besides being intimately acquainted with the district and its
inhabitants, possessed the rare accomplishment of a fluent knowledge of Kurdish.
For many months he laboured at a task which grew in direct ratio to the success
achieved, for no sooner did the Kurds on both sides of the frontier hear that help was
to be had, than they poured down the mountains, starving and typhus-stricken, to
be brought slowly back to health, or else to die in our camps and hospitals. Never-
theless, before the early summer, when Major Soane, worn out by incessant toil, was

forced to take a year's rest, the battle was won. His successor, Major Goldsmith,
transferred from Saniawah, found the maize crops springing from grain hastily
brought np from Baghdad and the re-peopled villages rising from their ruins

Politically, the Kurds in the Khaniqin district gave little trouble, and except for
the occasional indulgence of atavistic predatory habits, they acquiesced and helped
in the re-establishment of order ; but when in the spring we began to open up the
Persian road, the effects were felt of the deep hostility to the Allies which' bad been
roused by the conduct of the (Jossacks. 'Ali Akl)ar Khan, the most powerful man in
the Sinjabi confederation of semi-nomudic tribes, harboured German and Turko-
Persian iritrigners, and constituted a menace to the British line of communications.
His village in the mountains near Kermanshah was bombed by our aeroplanes, the
neighbouring tribes declared against him, and he fled to the Turks.

The destruction of the Persian road exceeded, if possible, that of Khaniqin. The
villages had been gutted by passing armies, Russian and Turkish, the roof beams and
all wooden fittings torn out and used as fuel, and the rain and snow of the winter had
couipleted the destruction of the unprotected mud walls. The fields lay untilled, and
if any of the husbandmen remained, it was because they were too greatly extenuated
by hunger to flee. But in fact there was no sure refuge for those Avho took flight.
Not only Persian Kurdistan but the whole Persian empire was in the grip of famine ;
and General Dunsterville's force, on its way up the Caspian, beat its swords
temporarily into soup ladli^s, and devoted its energies as much to the philanthropic
elTort to feed Persia as to an endeavour to save it bj^ arms from a fresh invasion on
the part of the Turks. As soon as the people had recovered sufficient strength to
work, they found abundance of Avell-paid employment on the road and in the
British camps. Forgetting their fears, they came down from their 'retreats in the
hills and njade friends with this suprising army, which distributed its surplus rations
and paid in cash for what it took. The kindly, easy-going British soldier directed
Kurdish labour parties, to the complete satisfaction of all concerned, in broken phrases
of Hindustani and Arabic, mixed with English, all as incomprehensible to his hearers
as their Kurdish and Persian were to him. He adopted starving orphans as willing
boot-blacks and infants-of-all-work, who trotted bj'^ him on the march and passed the
night rolled up in a bit of old blanket at the tent door. And- he had an insatiable
appetite for eggs, apricots, apples, and such-like country produce, together with an
inexhaustible supply of small coins with which to gratify it. To those who
travelled in the wake of our armies in the summer of 1918, the Persian road must
recall indelible pictures, siich as the children's soup kitchen at Hamadan, or the
village of Sar-i-Pul, lifting its gaunt ruins, such as the Russians had left them,
on one Ijank of the Alwand Rud, while on the other stood an incipient bazaar of
ragged native tent-cloths and. willoAv boughs, where returned Kurdish fugitives
drove a roaring trade in cigarettes imported from Baghdad, or fruit ripening in
Persian gardens, with every battalion that inarched across the bridge.

CHAPTER v.— The Occupation of Mosul.

The development of the Mesopotamian campaign was impeded in the
spring of 1918 by the necessity of guarding northern Persia from 'I'urkish attack.
'J'he defeat of the Turks at Gaza in the autumn of 1917 had put an end to the danger
of a 'J\arco-German offensive in Mesopotamia and made it possible to occupy Khaniqin
in December. Early in May 1918 a further advance began. The Commander-in-
Chief, Sir William Marshall, who had succeeded Sir Stanley Maude on the death of
the latter in November 1917, hoped to reach the Lesser Zab before the hot weather
set in, and from that favourable position to strike at Mosul in the autumn. Kifri, Tuz
and Kirkuk were occupied successfully, and our troops were well received by the
local population, which, except in Kirlaik, is mainly Kurdish. In the Kifri district
the powerful influence of Hamid Beg Talabani was exerted in our favour. The
inhabitants of Kirkuk are largely of Turkish blood, not Osmanli, but descendants of
Turkish settlers dating from the time of the Saljuqs ; yet nowhere was the
establishment of the British regime effected more smoothly. The Christian element,
which is considerable, greeted us with enthusiasm and the Moslems co-operated
heartily in the organisation of the town. To the east, in Southerti Kurdistan, a
meeting of chiefs and notables was held at Sulaimaniyah, and it was decided to set up

a provisional Kurdish Government under the local magnate, Shaikh Mahmnd
Barzanji, and to adopt a friendly attitude towards the British. Shaikh Mahmud sent
letters in which he claimed to represent the southern Kurds and offered to hand over
to us the reins of government or to act as our representative. Alike to the military
and to the civil branches of the Force it was a bitter disappointment when it proved
impossible to take advantage of so promising a situation. The diversion of all
available transport to the Persian road not only forbade advance but forced us to
relinquish Kirkuk. The Christian population were given the option of seeking
safety in Baghdad, and numbers availed themselves of the permission, leaving their
lands and houses to be plundered by the Turks, whore-occupied the town after it had
been evacuated by us. A sniall Ottoman force pushed on to Sulaimaniyah, where
Shaikh Mahmud had been appointed British representative, put the town under
martial law and sent the shaikh to Kirkuk. The Turks, however, did not venture to
risk a universal upheaval among the tribes, with Avhom Shaikh Mahmud's influence
as the head of a revered family was unique, and he was speedily set at liberty. Our
withdrawal produced an inevitable shifting of equilibrum in Kurdistan, but the Turks
were too weak to avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them, and in October
the victories of the Allies in France and of General AUenby in Syria restored the
balance in our favour. The Mesopotamian force was still crippled by lack of transport,
and a general advance on Mosul via Kirkuk could not be attempted, but a small column
was sent up towards Altun Keupri to guard the flank of the main body which advanced
up the Tigris Kirkuk was re-occupied on 25th October, and after sharp engage-
ment the Turks were forced out of their strong position in the Tigris gorge below
Qal'at Sharqat. Their retreat having been cut off from the north, the whole force
surrendered on*30th October. Meanwhile, the eastern column had driven the enemy
across the Lesser Zab, and the Tigris column was within a few mjles of Mosul. 'Ali
Ihsan Pasha, the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, was left in the city with a negligible
number of troops. He had ordered the evacuation of all stores, records, &c., but on
1st November these orders were countermanded, and the records and officials returned
from JSJisibin and Zakho, whither they had been sent. Aftfer some days' negotiation
as to whether 'Ali Ihsan Pasha was required to surrender by the armistice terms,
orders for his evacuation were received from Constantinople. Mosul was occupied by
our troops, and the Union Jack Avas hoisted over the Sarai on 8th November. On
the 10th 'Ali Ihsan left for Nisibin and Lieutenant-Colonel Leachman took charge as
the first Political Officer of the Mosul Division. The political future of the Wilayat was
uncertain ; according to the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, which the French held to
be binding notwithstanding the fundamental alteration of the conditions imder which
it had been concluded caused by the Russian revolution, the Mosul Wilayat almost in
its entiretj^ was to be in the French sphere of influence. Orders were therefore
despatched by His Majesty's Government that the system of civil Government
organised in the Baghdad Wilayat should not be extended to Mosul, which shoulcf be
placed under a purely military administration. In the course of a few months it was
tacitly understood that the agreement would be modified in respect of the Mosul
Wilayat, and civil administration there was assimilated with that of the southern
portion of the Occupied Territories.

Physically the Mosul Wilayat presents certain contrasts to that of Baghdad.
Nvth of the Jabal Maqhul, which is the continuation of the Jabal Hamrin, the Mosul
road runs for long stretches over rocky ground, an agreeable change after the alluvial
silt of lower Mesopotamia. On the right bank of the Tigris, in the Jazirah, the
whole country is undulating plain, broken only by the mass of the Jabal Sinjar. On
the left bank the plain extends for a varying distance from the river to the abrupt
rise of the Kurdish mountains. The nearer ranges form the background of the
landscape seen across the river from Mosul city — a sight welcome to the eyes of one
accustomed to the southern Mesopotamian plains, The highest mountains of the
Division do not rise above 7,000 feet, but they are extremely steep and sheer, the
separate ranges forming narrow and isolated valleys between which the roads must,
either climb difficult passes or follow exiguous gorges. In tlu; hills water is for the
most part abundant and perennial ; the valleys are filled with fruit trees, vines,
walnut and almond trees and poplars, and the mountaiii sides covered with stunted
oak ; but in the Jazirah the only water is at Tal 'Afar, the springs which rise at the
foot of the Jabal Sinjar, and a few springs, mostly sulphurous, which lie below the
]ine of hills from Qaiyarah to Tal 'Afar. These springs make the fortune of
Tal 'Afar. The small surplus of the Sinjar water whichis not used in cultivation
runs chiefly down the Wadi Tharthar, parallel with the Tigris, to lose itself in the

salt marshes north-west of Baghdad. The "\Vadi Tharthar and all the desert springs
are and have been brackish from the earliest recorded times. Ou the right bank of
the Tharthar stand the ruins of the ancient city of Hatra, a famous pasturing ground
of the Shammar Jarba', with brackish springs round it. On the left bank of the
Tigris some of the villages in the plains possess springs of sweet water which make
summer cultivation possible, but the wealth of the left bank is due mainly to the
affluents of the Tigris, chief among which are the Greater Zab and the Khabur.
Along the banks of the rivers grow poplar'and willow, but for the rest the plains are
treeless. The date palm is not found north of the Fathah gorge. Oil, bitumen and
coal are present in the Division, together with a soft grey marble easily cut and much
used for building purposes, carved with an elaborate tracing, which is the archi-
tectural feature of the district ; it adorns mosques, churches and the better houses.

In one respect the re-organisation of administration was easier in Mosul than it
had been elsewhere. Whereas in Basrah and Baghdad we had found no previous
records, and the Turkish Government officials had retreated with the army, in Mosul
the records and most of the staff were available. By the end of November
Colonel Leachman had visited Tal 'Afar, Sinjar, Zakho, Amadiyah, Dohuk, Bira
Kapra and 'Aqrah. In all these places the Turkish flag was found flying, and in
most of them there were Turkish troops and officials. The latter were cleared out,
the flags hauled down, and Assistant Political Officers were placed in charge of the
districts as we occupied them.

The Division as constituted was substantially the Ottoman Wilayaf, less the
Sanjaq of Sulaimaniyah. The population is more varied than in other parts of the
'Iraq. In the Tigris valley and the Jazirah desert to the west the inhabitants are
Arab tribes, settled and half-nomadic cultivators, or Beduin of the tribes of Shammar
and Tai. In the mountains east and north of Mosul the Arab race, dwellers in the
plain, gives place to the Kurdish, and even in the desert to the west, where the long
hog's back of the Jabal Sinjar lifts itself out of the level Mesopotamian world, its
slopes and crags are the home of the Yazidis, who are found also north-east of Mosul.

Kurdish in speech, and probably also by descent, the Yazidis number some
18,000 to 20,000 in the Division. They have been admirably described by
Sir Henry Layard, whose sympathies were roused by their continuous persecution
by Moslems and Christians alike. They are popularly su])posed to be worshippers
of the Devil, whom they call Malik Taus, the Peacock King, but a truer description
of them is that they are dualists deriving their beliefs from Zoroastrianism through
the Manichees. They propitiate the spirit of evil, believing him to be a fallen
angel who will in a future era return to his former state. They maintain, further,
religious practices which can be traced to those of the Assyrians, and have grafted
on to their composite faith fragments culled from Gnosticism, Christianity and Islam.
Their great shrine, frequently destroyed by the Turks, is at Shaikh 'Adi, almost due
north of Mosul, to which pilgrimage is made in the summer. Their religious and
temporal head, or Mir, resides at Ba'idhra, while the High Priest lives at 'Ain Sifni,
which, with Ba'shaikhah, is their most important centre after Shaikh 'Adi. They
possess seven golden peacocks, one of which was lost in South Russia at the beginning
of the war, which are yearly sent out to the various Yazidi centres for the purpose of
collecting offerings for the Mir and the priests. Their hierarchy seems to consist of
(1) the Mir ; (2; the Firs, spiritual dignitaries of great sanctity ; (3) the Shaikhs,
religious leaders and teachers ; (4) the Qawwals, attendants of the sacred peacock
images ; (5} the Faqirs, dressed always in black, apparently a kind of lay brother.
They are said to be divided into seven sects, all Yazidis belonging to one or the
other. Each sect has a guardian angel, the names of five of which are {V Shaikh
'Adi — his sect is the order of the Faqirs ; (2) Malik Taus ; (3) Shaikh Shams ;
(4) Malik Farah al Din, the moon ; (5) Shaikh Sharaf al Din. Probably endogamy is
practised as between the various sects Other saints are Shaikh Hasan al Basri,
whose descendants alone amongst all the Yazidis are permitted to read and write ;
Shaikh Muhammad Abu Dhiyak ; Khatuin Fakiirah, who keeps the gate of Paradise;
and Shaikh Aland, whose descendants can pick up vipers. Amongst them are found
" Kochak," diviners, dreamers of dreams. Somewhere in the Jabal Sinjar there is a
bottomless crevasse, down which the priests throw yearly a titlje of all the crops to
form a treasure for the use of Malik Taus when he returns again to earth.

The Yazidis have a spring fast of three days, one member of each family fasting
for the others ; their great feast is held at Shaikh 'Adi in the summer, and is
frequented by Yazidis from all parts. They are said to possess a " Black Book."

2041 G

This is generally supposed to be the Qurau with the name of Shaitan blacked out
wherever it occurs. It is believed that any Yazidi who pronounces the name
" Shaitan " will be struck blind, and words containing the sh — t combination, such as
shat, misht, &c., are avoided, as is the use of the word na'al, monastic. A tale was
related by the Principal of the Monastery of Alqosh to a Political Officer, a propos
of a lay brother thei-e who was a converted Yazidi. " That man," he said, " used to
" be a Yazidi, and when a hoj was one day out ploughing his father's fields. As he
" ploughed, all sorts of thoughts kept passing tlirough his mind, tiutil he happened
" to think of the prohibition against the wM^rd Shaitan and the penalty for breaking
" it. His curiosity got the better of him, until finally, focussing his vision on a
" stone, he said, very low, ' sh — sh — sh.' Nothing happened, and he ventured as far as
*' ' shai,' and by degrees he progressed further and further, until at last, in a firm clear
" voice he said, ' na'al shaitan,' and found his vision unimpaired. Elated, he returned
" home, and to his father sitting in the house said, 'Father, I have said that which is
" forbidden, and I am not blind.' ' Aren't you ? ' said the father, reaching for his
" gun, ' then you soon will be ! ' and he came running with his father behind him
" until he took shelter with us and became a Christian."

Anxiety lest he should unwittingly give offence to the Devil is a constant factor
in the Yazidi's daily life. A member of the sect visiting a foreign Consjd in Mosul
was specially struck by the spittoons in the Consul's office ; for, said he, it was clear
that these provided against a regrettable contingency, namely, that a man spitting
might inadvertently spit at Malik Taus.

Outside the Mosul Division there are Yazidi communities in the neighbourhood
of Mardin, Diyarbakr, Aleppo and in Caucasia. They are Kurdish speaking and
seem to have played a large part in the history of the Bahdinan Kurds. They are
entirely agriculturists. They are extremely tenacious of their peculiar faith, and
conversions, even in the times of persecution, to which thej' have been frequently
subjected, were rare. On the whole they appear tractable and amenable to control
and whole-hearted supporters of the British regime. Their morals are loose, and they
are notoriously addicted to strong drink. They profess a great sympathy for
Christians and during the war sheltered a large number of Armenian refugees in the
Jabal Sinjar. This, coupled with their raids on the lines of communication, led the
Turks to take punitive measures against them in 1917. A considerable force, with
guns, was sent out to the Jabal. The Tal 'Afaris and the surrounding Arab tribes
were raised against them, and after their resistance had been easily overcome, their
villages were destroyed and their stock driven off wholesale. They are hereditary
enemies of the Shammar, but appear to be on good terms with Shaikh Muhammad of
the Tai.

Their religious and temporal head is the Mir, of the family of Choi Beg, living
at Baidhra near the shrine of Shaikhan. The present Mir is Sa'id Beg. His cousin,
Isma'il, had previous to the occupation of Mosul Iteen in communication with us, had
visited iis in Baghdad, and had been instrumental in arranging a reconnaissance
made by Captain Hudson to the Jabal Sinjar in 1918. We were therefore under
obligations to him, especially as he had always stated that he was the head of the
Yazidis and had been treated as such by us As a compromise betw^een the rival
claims of Isma'il and Sa'id, it was arranged that three of the sacred peacocks (the
possession of which carries with it the light to collect offerings from the faithful)
should be given to Isma'il Beg. The arrangement, however, was unworkable, being
similar to the existence of rival Popes at Rome and Avignon. Isma'il proved to be
absolutely untrustworthy and unable to abstain from petty intrigue of every kind, and
eventually it was found necessary to send him to Baghdad, Sa'id regaining the undivided
headship. He is managed entirely by his mother, Maiyan, a masterful old lady whose
personal interests do not always coincide with the best interests of the tribe. Soon
after our occupation it was arranged that the Shar'ah cases of the Yazidis should be
dealt with by Sa'id Beg, assisted by a council of elders. At first this worked well,
but a growing feeling of dissatisfaction with his decisions is now manifesting itself.
The recent death of Shaikh 'Ali, the Bab al Shaikh, High Priest and keeper of the
shrine at Shaikh 'Adi, has removed a restraining influence from Sa'id Beg, who is
trying to postpone indefinitely the appointment of a successor, which lies in his
hands.

As a result of former persecutions the Yazidis seem to have lost large amounts
of their lands. In one or two places, notably in 'Ain Sifni, feeling is very strong
about this and it will be one of the most difficult problems confronting the land
settlen)ent in^the Division.

la Jabal Sinjar, ou our arrival, the leading man was found to be Hamu Sham,
an old man and a faqir. He was appointed Rais of the mountain, on a monthly-
salary, with a paid Wakil at Balad. Owing to its geographical position, thrusting
out as it does into the middle of the Jazirah, and owing to the pronounced anti-Turk
and anti-Arab proclivities of Hamu Sharu and the Yazidis, Jabal Sinjar forms an
important strategical bastion, which should be of great use in dealing with the
Shammar or with possible pan- Arab or Turkish movements.

In the fertile country round the city and east of the Tigris there are numbers
of Christians, mostly Chaldasans, though there are also small Jacobite and Nestorian
communities. The Chalda^an patriarch has his seat at Mosul, where the sect form
the bulk of the craftsmen and artisans. Outside the town the Chaldgeaus are
cultivators, famed for their skill, their villages being some of the largest and most
prosperous in the Wilayat: In the interests of the Chaldseans and Sj^rian Catholics
an Apostolic Delegate is maintained at Mosul and the Dominican Fathers have a
school and hospital, both largely attended. There are also Syrian Catholic,
Nestorian and Jacobite bishops, and the diversities of the Christian Faith are further
enhanced by the presence of small congregations of Roman Catholics, Protestants and
Greek Orthodox. The Roman Catholics and Uniate Churches (Chaldseans and
Syrian Catholics) were under French protection, as in other parts of the Ottoman
Empire. There can be little doubt that the prospect of securing a European advocate
with the Tui-kish Government was a powerful incentive to union with the Church of
Rome. Our policj^ before the war had shown an inclination to protect the Nestorian
Church as against its offshoot, the Chaldsean Catholic, partly because of the
existence among the Nestorians of a small but admirable missionary body known as
the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission to the Nestorians. On the other hand the
presence of the Dominican mission with its good school and hospital in Mosul
enhanced the tendency to look to France. The connection with Rome is strong and
is likely to remain so, as the Chaldsean Church has practically no endowments and is
financially dependent on Rome.

At Tal 'Afar, a big village on the edge of the desert between Mosul and the
Sinjar, a large proportion of the population is Turkoman. They claim descent from
Tamberlane's soldiery and the majority of them are Shi'ahs. But the Sunni sect
prevails in the Division. There are only 17,000 Shi'ahs in Mosul district as against
some 250,000 Sunnis, and no Shi'ahs at all in Arbil or to the north.

On the left bank of the Tigris between the river and the mountains are found
the flotsam and jetsam of every invasion and immigration for the last 2,000 years and
more. Besides Yazidis and Christians of every denomination, Turkomans, Arabs and
Kurds stand in close juxtaposition. There is a large block of Shabak and Sarli, said
to follow a secret faith or else to be Shi'ahs of an extreme type. They have some
affinity with the 'Ali-Ilahis, who are found on either side of the Persian road
between Qasr-i-Shirin and Kirmanshah. The Yazidi fringe runs all along the
foothills, while the mountains themselves are entirely Kurdish, with a few Jewish
and Christian villages — all that is now left of an extensive Christian population.
The Jewish community in Mosul is small and possesses none of the wealth and
importance which characterise the Jews of Baghdad. The town was full of Armenian
refugees on our arrival, but the majority of these were evacuated to Baghdad. The
number of Armenian residents is small.

Before the occupation of Mosul we had been in relations with the Shammar
Jarba', as has been related in a previous chapter. The shaikhly house is composed
of the 15 sons of Farhan Pasha, who died about 40 years ago. At his death the sons
divided the shaikhship between them. The oldest, Al 'Asi, is the real head of the
tribe. It is said of him that before the war he came to Mosul on a promise of safe
conduct from the then Wali, but he was cast into prison, and on his release he swore
by the oath of the divorce that he would never again set foot in Mosul. If the story is
true it throws considerable light /Dn his conduct during the last year. After Al 'Asi,
the most prominent members of the shaikhly house are Hachim, his son, and Daham
ibn Hadi, his grandson ; Humaidi, Badr and the rest of Al 'Asi's brothers ; the son of
'Abdul 'Aziz, 'Ajil al Yawar, with whom are generally associated the Aulad Shallal,
Mutni and Mishal ; Muhammad ibn Mutlamand 'Asi and 'Ubaid, the sons of Mijwal and
Faris. They are hereditary enemies of the 'Anizah, and during the war there was
considerable hostility between them and the Dulaim. •

One or two of the chiefs have tried the experiment of cultivation. Thus, before
the war, Humaidi and Badr cultivated the Farhatiyah Canal, near Balad ; 'Ajil al
Yawar was cultivating in partnership with Muhammad al Anjaifi, of Mosul, at Najmah

G 2

near Shurah. Rut the great majority of the tribe are entirelj' nomadic and live on
their own flocks of camels, as well as by taking " huwah " or tribute from the sheep
of other tribes, and from caravans, especially on the Nisi bin road.

During the war the Shammar, with the exception of Faisal, whose habitat is near
Mosul, and whose influence is small, were consistently on the Tui-kish side, which,
considering their geographical position, can be understood. They took advantage of
our advance up the river to join in looting the villages along the Tigris and also on
the Nisibin road, but on being summoned by us to come in, Humaidi, 'Ajil al Yawar
and 'Aiyadah ibn al 'Asi obeyed, Al 'Asi excusing himself on the ground of his great
age. They were told that they must remain in Mosul until some arrangement had
been made with regard to them, and they undertook to do so. After a few days,
however, 'Ajil, who j)0ssesses great influence among them, either from fear or some
other cause, left Mosul without permission. He was outlawed, and his camels and
family, which were not far from Sharqat, were raided and captured, but the camejs
stampeded in a thunderstorm and escaped as they were being brought in.

Humaidi, meanwhile, had made his submission to Government, had undertaken
to keep his sections, the 'Abdah and a portion of the Sayih, in order, and was given a
monthly allowance of Rs. 500.

Al 'Asi remained in the neighbourhood of Kisibin, sending in offers of submission
from time to time, which, owing to their vague nature, were net accepted. Ilachim
came in during the summer, but his overtures were rejected as he came alone.
Robberies, said lo be the work of the Shammar, occurred occasionally on the Nisibin
road and elsewhere, but nothing on a grand scale till September, when a caravan was
robbed of over T. ^^,000L at Abu Hamdhah on the Dair al Zor road. In retaliation
for this the Shammar were raided with armoured cars, and a considerable number of
their sheep captured. It was hoped to cut them off when the time came for their
annual migration south, but our plans miscarried and they slipped through. However,
Al 'Asi sent his grandson Daham into Mosid, with a letter saying that he had resigned
the shaikhship to him, and also with declarations from Hachim, Mutlaq al Farhan and
others, saying that they recognised Daham as their shaikh. Daham was informed that
as a first step he must collect and hand over a simi of T. 3,50UL as a fine for the
Abu Hamdhah robbery, after which he would be appointed Government Shaikh of
Al 'Asi's sections. He agreed, and soon sent in T. 1,800Z. He is believed lo have
collected the balance from the tribe when the Dair al Zor incident occurred, as will be
related subsequently, and made him wonder whether he was backing the right horse.
This caused delay in the payment, and sharifial propaganda delayed it yet longer. In
April he paid up another T. 1,500L, after which he moved north with his tribe and
passed outside our territory.

The question of huwah was brought up almost immediately by the tribes from
whom it had been extorted. This tribute was on a fixed basis, two sheep, four ewes,
four lambs, and six majidis in cash being taken from every flock. The sons of
Farhan had divided the right of collection. The taking of huwah from the smaller
tribes of the Jazirah is not unreasonable ; it is no more than a payment given in
return for permission to pasture in Shammar grazing grounds. The Shammar were
given to understand that they might go on taking it from the tribes on their sheep in
the desert, but at revised rates, and that village cultivation was to be exempt. The
right to take toll on caravans has not been recognised. The payment of huwah gives
the payer a right to protection and at the present moment it is hard to see how we
coiild prevent it.

Nevertheless the eternal antithesis between the interests of nomad and cultivator
or trader is well illustrated by the position of the Shammar. They are a public pest,
living on robbery and blackmail. Some of them in the last year have realised the
profits which are to be made by working their camels for transport. This may prove
a partial solution of the problem, as more money in their pockets will mean less
incitement to robbery ; but for the next few years at any rate our power over them
will depend on our ability to close the road of their migrations north and south.

After the Shammar, the chief tribe of the Jazirah is the Tai, their shaikh being
Muhammad 'Abdul Rahman. They range chiefly between Nisibin and the Jabal
Sinjar and except for a few villages in Tal 'Afar district are entirely nomad. With
the exception of one robbery on the Tal 'Afar road they have given very little
trouble, and on this occasion the prompt seizure of a number of their donkeys which
were working on pack transport near Mosul resulted in the return of the stolen goods.
Their shaikh is on good terms with the Yazidis of Sinjar and appears to be on not
very good terms with Al 'Asi.

The Mixtaiwid and Juhaish extend along the southern base of the Sinjar towards
Tal 'Afar, but are not tribes of great importance. The Hadidiyin are the shepherds
of Mosul, the big sheep-owners giving them their flocks to tend. They liave a reputation
for cowardice and are looked down upon by the Beduin, who will not intermarry with
them. There has been some trouble over the sbaikhship of the Albu FTamad, who
centre round Shurah. The leading shaikh is Bulaibil Agha, by origin a slave and an
engaging old scoundrel. The rival party is headed by 'Aqub, who is of the real
shaikhly house and whose leadership over some of the sections we have been
compelled to recognise. The Albu Hamad are at feud with the Jiibur who cultivate
along the river.

Relations with the Kurds have already been dealt with.

The British administration has preserved the Turkish administrative divisions of
the Wilayat, the Assistant F'olitical Officer of the District taking the place of the
Qaimmaqam of the Qadha. In accordance with our practice elsewhere, the revenue
and the administration have been amalgamated. Each district is divided into
revenue Nahiyahs under Arab Mamurs Mai, the whole being under a Mudir Mai at the
district headquarters. At the end of 1919, Hasan Bey, the head of the Sanniyah
Department in Turkish times, was appointed Revenue Inspector for the Division, a
post which had been held temporarily for two short periods by an Assistant Political
Officer. Under Ottoman rule the headquarters of the Sanniyah administration for the
whole of the Tracj had been at Mosul. As has been explained, the Sanniyah lands
were under their own special organisation, which dealt directly with Constantinople
and was independent of the provincial administration. To enable them to deal with
petty cases on the spot, the Mamurs in the Mosul and Tal 'Afar districts have been
given the powers of Third Class Magistrates, an experiment which on the whole has
worked well.

In the Mosul Division, especially in the plains, where the social unit is the village
rather than the tribe, the mukhtars or village headmen play an important part.
They are responsible for maintaining order and cleanliness in their villages and for
settling disputes according to custom and justice, for the apprehension of offenders in
cases of serious crime, for the observance of the orders of Government, for the
accommodation of Government officials and the safety of travellers and caravans
spending the night in the village. They are also bound to assist Mudirs Mai in
agricultural matters such as the estimation of crops. In return, customary dues may
be taken by them, for example a percentage on goods sold by merchants in their
village, and they may be given by Government a percentage not exceeding 3 per
cent, on winter crops and vineyards. Mosul, like Baghdad and Basrah, returned four
members to the Turkish Chamber ; one of these, a Christian who is verj popular in
the town, has been appointed Political Attache.

On our arrival the general condition of the province was very bad. The town
was full of refugees and extremely dirty. Prices were exceedingly high, chiefly
owing to commandeering for the Army and to the despatch of parcels home by
Gentian and Austrian troops. At least 10,000 persons are said to have died of
starvation during the winter of 1917-18. In the districts all villages except those of
the Christians had been depopulated by conscription. Transport and agriculture
were almost at a standstill owing to the large number of animals which had been
commandeered ; 50 per cent, of the land was untilled.

The staple crops of the Mosul Division are wheat and barley, a far larger
proportion of wheat being grown than in the southern Wilayats. Baghdad has
always been accustomed to look to Mosul for its wheat supply, as well as for such
fruits, nuts and vegetables as flourish better, or even exclusively, in the foot hills.
The closing of the Mosul road from March 1917 to November 1918 was, therefore, a
real hardship and contributed to the shortage of food supplies in Baghdad during
1917. The winter crops in the Mosul Division are all rain-grown, but owing to the lack
of summer water in the plains the summer crops are almost negligible, except along
the rivers where irrigation by lift is feasible or in such villages as possess perennial
springs. In the valley of the Greater Zab only is irrigation practised on a large
scale. In the mountains, on the other hand, the summer crops of rice, tobacco, and
fruit are much more important than the winter grain. Agricultural methods are
primitive. The wooden plough is drawn by a yoke of mules, oxen, or donkeys.
Normally about half a man's holding is under crop and a half is left fallow. As soon
as the year's seed is sown, last year's stubble is cross-ploughed and then left fallow
during the summer. In the autumn after the first rain it is single-furrowed and is then

ready for the seed. Manuring is practised by the best farmers. The average seed
rate is about 120 lb. to the acre and the average yield is seven to eight fold. After
the occupation iujmediate steps were taken to restore agricultural prosperity, and in
the iirst year some 550 plough cattle and Rs. 1,50,000 in agricultural loans were
distributed to cultivators, besides large quantities of Turkish grain taken over by us
and released.

There are indications that the bulk of the land in the Division was originally in
the hands of peasant proprietors, each man tilling his own land ; but at present most
of the land has passed into the hands of large proprietors, who are generally inhabitants
of iVIosul. They hold by right of Tapu sanads. Complaints as to how this process
was effected are frequent. It is said, for mstance, that a peasant would be offered for
his land 25 per cent, of its value, and on' his refusal to sell, he would be cast into
prison on a trumped up charge of murder, to remain there for years unless he
changed his mind. The introduction of Tapu seems to have given the city magnates
opportunities of defrauding the peasants of large quantities of laud by means of
spurious documents of sale and the like. Mortgages were another favourite weapon.
The Tapu owners are often absentee landlords who have never set eyes on their
estates. Their rights vary in different localities according to the fertility of the land
and the agreement made with the cultivators. The rate ranges from a quarter of the
crop to a sixteenth, an eighth being the most iisual. On summer crops the Tapu
owner takes a half, as the lord of the water rights. The position of the cultivator is
obscure. It is sometimes said that the reason so few build decent houses is that they
may be evicted at any moment ; and in theory there seems to be no reason why, if
the Tapu owner asked for an agreement raising the amount of his share and the
cultivators refused to comply, he should not evict them and bring others in their
place. The man who has more land of his own than he can cultivate himself, but
who wishes to farm it direct, employs a " murabba'ji," so-called because once upon a
time he used to get a quarter of the harvest of the land he tilled. Now he gets an
eighth and is frequently so heavily in debt to his master that he is to all intents and
purposes a serf attached to the land.

Similarly in the mountains the land has in many cases passed from the peasants
into the hands of the Aghawat, but often for slightly different reasons. The ciiltivator
there was exposed to the raids and attacks of all wlio preferred to live on the efforts
of other people rather than their own, He could not live without protection and he
obtained it from the local big man at the price of a tithe on his laud, out of which
the lord paid as taxes to the Government the smallest sum which he could persuade
the Turks to accept.

It appears that at one time a considerable quantity of the land round Mosul was
held on that kind of feudal tenure called Timar, by which a man held his land on
condition of providing so many men for military service when called upon. When
Tapu was introduced by Midhat Pasha, this was compulsorily abolished and the land
registered in the name of the cultivator. The owners were compensated by a charge
upon the land, which charge decreased annually until it was extinguished.

In. Tal 'Afar the population is divided into clans, headed by their respective
Aghawat, who are spoken of as owning the land. In practice the cultivators have
never paid them Tapu though they have contributed small aids for entertainments, &c.

The need for land settlement is very pressing in the Mosul Division. The Tapu
registration there was probably no worse than elsewhere, but it was extraordinarily
bad. In the Tal 'Afar and Sinjar District there are known to have been a great
number of fraudulent entries which are being steadfastly opposed hj the victims.
In many cases on the left bank, especially in the Yazidi settlements, are found villages
divided into, say, 271 shares. Of these some 193 are the property of a Tapu holder,
and the remainder are the property of the villagers. The boundaries of the shares
are not recorded and are untirely unknown. The disputes wliich arise from a case of
this sort may be readily imagined.

It is noteworthj^ and surprising to find that on the plains the Christians alone
have succeeded in keeping their lands out of the clutches of the Mosid landlord. The
reason is probably that whereas the Muhammadan villages, had no means of obtaining
protection and obtaining the ear of the Government, except by attaching themselves
as clients (at a price) to the city magnates, the Christians had their Patriarchs and
Bishops who were their natural and ready protectors and spokesmen, and, in the case
of the Catholic Churches, they could appeal to a foreign Power.

As a general rule the Government share of the grass crop in the Mosul Division
is a tenth. To this had been added the various cesses introduced from time to time,

which brought the total demand up to 12|^ per cent. The reason why the rain-
cultivated lauds of this Division should pay less than the irrigated lands of Baghdad
is that the average yield is less, while there is always greater uncertainty in the case
of crops which depend on rainfall. Pests of various kinds take their toll, locusts
being specially dreaded, and in the prairie-like country of which much of the Division
consists, covered with grass which has been parched Ijy the sun, fires spread with
terrible rapidity. In the suinmer miles of grass may be seen ablaze. '

The Ottoman Government made many experiments in tax collection The usual
practice was to collect by farming, the Government share from each village being
put up to auction and sold to the highest bidder. The larger landlords generally
bought in tlie shares of their own villages at rates which allowed a considerable
margin of profit. There was also a class of professional multazirais, whose sole
means of livelihood was the annual buying up of the taxes of the smaller villages.

The means to be adopted by us were the subject of anxious deliberation. It w^as
at first intended to estimate by eye and then collect direct. It was found, however,
that, apart from other difficulties, we should not be able to find the requisite staff of
estimators whose results could be relied on. Land measurement was out of the
question owing to the very large areas involved. It was eventually decided to
continue the method of iltizam, with the precaution of a preliminary estimation of
the unthreshed heips, a method of estimation which was well known in the Sanniyah
lauds of the Division. This enabled us to put a reserve price on each village, leaving
us free to collect direct if it was not realised. The people of each village were also
given the option of buying in their own taxes at the highest bid if they wished to do
so The results were satisfactory. There is reason to suppose that, in the main, the
Government got neither less nor more than its proper share. Our option of direct
collection was exercised in one or two cases— to the chagrin of the Tapu owner, who
w^as deliberately underbidding in the hope that we should weaken and accept his
offer — and in several cases, though there were not as many as might have been hoped,
the cultivators bought in their taxes themselves. Results showed the estimation to
have been in the main fairly exact, and in future, in some areas at any rate, taxes will
be collected direct on estimation of this kind, as was done in 1910 for a good deal of
the summer crops.

Kodah, the dues paid on sheep and cattle, is an important tax in the Mosul
Division. In Turkish times the rate was 9|- piastres per head. It was fixed by us
this year at eight annas per head for sheep and Re. 1 for buffaloes. The count was
carried out by the Mamurs themselves with no extra staff. It is customary for the
sheep to be taken from the right bank to the left m March and April, and, as in
Turkish times, advantage was taken of this to have all sheep checked as they crossed
the bridge. The total number counted was 803,731, which is in advance of the
Turkish counts. In several cases, tribal shaikhs were appointed assistant counters
and received 3 per cent, of the sheep of their tribe which were counted. The
Shammar sheep were not, and could not be, counted, since they roam over an area
which extends beyond our boundaries. A number of the big Muslawis keep their
sheep with the Shammar and these also escaped the tax.

The Sanniyah lands of the Division are extensive. In 'Abdul Hamid's time they
were well administered, and owing to their immunity from the descents of gendarmes
and other advantages, cultivation therein was popular. Under the new regime the
success of their administration declined, and at our occupation they were as badly off
as the rest of the division.

If transport difficulties can be solved there would seem to be much greater
opportunities in this Division than in the rest of 'Iraq for the use of agricultural
machinery. Before the war several of the larger landowners possessed reapers, and
the large areas of rain-land not intersected by irrigation canals present none of the
obstacles found elsewhere to the use of machinery. The Tapu share on the Sanniyah
lands is almost always 7^ per cent., with the exception of a few villages in Zakho
district, which it is proposed to bring into line with the others.

Especially on the Jazirah side, there are large quantities of land said to be
Mahlul, that is escheated. It appears on investigation that the decision in almost
every case has been made the subject of au appeal which has never been heard, and
when the settlement comes it is doubtful whether the Government claim will be
upheld.

A beginning has been made towards the development and re-stocking of Govern-
ment forests which had been ruthlessly destroyed to supply the Turkish army. They
should ultimately prove a very valuable property. Baghdad in normal times depends

almost entirely on the northeru moimtain regions for wood. Rafts called kalaks, made
of logs borne on inflated skins, such as may be seen depicted on the Assyrian reliefs
in the liritish Museum, are floated down the Tigris carrying brushwood or other
merchandise. When they reach Baghdad, the rafts are broken up, the logs sold,
and the deflated skins loaded on to donkeys and carried back to serve anew. Wood
and charcoal taxes are a feature of the Mosul budget.

A British officer was appointed in June 1919 to take charge of the Customs ;
import duties on goods coming from Syria and Turkey were levied, and the old
Tobacco Regie organisation having been wound up at the end of 1918, the Customs
officer collected the duties on tobacco also. It is taxed in Mosul at a flat rate of
8 annas per kilo, and placed in a bonded warehouse.

Although the city of Mosul has a bad reputation, there has been remarkably little
crime. In the districts highway robberies and the theft of domestic animals are the
chief offences, and several gangs of thieves have been rounded up. Raids bj' the
nomad tribes on caravan routes were constant in Turkish times and are difficult to
cope with, but on the whole it may legitimately be said that public seciirity has
greatly improved during the last year. The police force of the city is locally raised ;
it is smart and efficient, and service in it is popular. A large proportion of the
Turkish gendarmerie was in existence at the time of the occupation ; it was taken
over to provide for immediate necessities, and has been very successful in district
police work. But it is not suited for any form of military duty, for which purpose a
body of Levies or Military f-^olice is about to be formed. On the disturbed Kurdish
border a small striking force of this kind is indispensable.

Municipal affairs in Mosul itself had been run by an elected Municipal Council.
The municipal revenues were insignificant, corruption was rife, and the town was in
an indescribable state of filth. Drastic re-organisation was imperative, and it was
inevitable that the Mayor and Council should become figure-heads which gradually
faded from view until they ceased to exist. Now that re-organisation has been
successfully completed, plans for a slightly modified Municipal Council are under
discussion, and it may be hoped that' it will exhibit a progressive spirit, for such was
not wholly lacking even before the war. During the war the Turks had begun to cut
main streets through the town, as at Baghdad. In Baghdad the work was completed,
and has proved an inestimable boon, since there was before the war no thoroughfare
wide enough to permit of any but the most restricted amount of wheeled traffic.

At Mosul the two new streets running at right angles to one another had been
begun, but were not finished before the occupation, and were brought to completion
during the year 1919. They will be well worth the money spent in compensation and
construction, though this necessitated a large grant-in-aid to the municipality. The
old bridge still exists. It has the peculiarity of stopping short in mid-stream, the
portion nearest the town being composed of pontoons. This part is left permanently
open when a high flood threatens, lest it should be carried away, and as in this
contingency the land at the eastern end of the bridge is commonly submerged, the
piers are left standing idly, if picturesquely, in the midst of the flood. A new bridge
is in course of being built, and plans for the laying on of a water supply are under
consideration. The town is now clean, and those who retain a mental picture of such
spots as the slaughter-houses at the old bridge-head in Turkish times will have
difficulty in recognising the Mosul of to-day as the same town.

At Tal 'Afar, the Assistant Political Officer had an advisory council of local
Aghawat to help him in municipal affairs. Other municipalities exist at 'Aqrah,
Dohuk, Zakho, and Tal Kaif, but in each case the work falls mainly on the Assistant
Political Oflicer.

Education was taken in hand very soon after our arrival in Mosul. At present
there are seven Government schools in Mosul, three for Muhammadan boys, one each
for the Chaldseans, Syrians, Jacobites, and Jews. There are also two schools for
Muhammadan girls. The attendance figures are most instructive. Seven-eighths of
the population of the city are Muhammadans, and yet, whereas the attendance at the
Christian schools is 791, there are in the Muhammadan schools onlj^ 259 pupils. The
streets of the city are full of idle and undisciplined children ; stories as to the bad
manners and worse morals of the young men are constantly repeated. The leading
Muhanimadans admit with affected regret the facts, but can suggest no suitable
remedies. They all agree that the fault does not lie in any way with the conduct and
administration of the schools. The Christian schools seem to be alive and progressive.
The attendance at the Muhammadan girls' schools is 149. It is not a large number,
but compares favourably, all things considered, with the attendance at the boys' schools.

In the Various villages round Mosul Muhammadan schools have been started in
five different places and Christian in 11. There are also five Government schools,
the largest being at Tal 'Afar with an attendance of 80 boys. It is noticeable that at
first there was a considerable reluctance to send the boys to school at Tal 'Afar, on
the grounds that they would become " effendis," i.e., members of the effete Turkish
official class.

The education of the Yazidis is complicated by the fact that the tenets of their
religion forbid reading and writing to all except one family of Shaikhs, the Bait al
Basri. When the school was started at Balad Sinjar, the more progressive decided to
send their sons there. Unfortunately, soon afterwards heavy rain caused a great
flood in the Wadi which swept away and drowned four of the children who had been
attending the school. This caused a reaction to the side of the conservatives, and at
present there are only four Yazidi boys in the school.

Of all the advantages conferred by Government, probably none are more popular
than medical treatment, or have more valuable political results. Great advance has
been made in this respect. The old Red Crescent Hospital has been expanded into
a civil hospital with both male and female wards. The Civil Surgeon has been aided
by an assistant British doctor, a matron and two British sisters, a staff of Armenian
nurses, and two or three native doctors. The Armenian nurses have turned out, on
the whole, very well, and have been of the greatest value. The native doctors are
capable and well trained, one of them having had a thorough medical education in
Paris. Dispensaries have been opened at all district headquarters, and in some cases
valuable aid is given by the military doctors on the spot. Malaria is the most serious
medical problem in the hill districts ; in places, the local population is terribly affected
and the rate of infantile mortality due to this cause is abnormally high. The Ottoman
Government distributed quinine free of charge as a sanitary measure. The gravity
of the malarial problem is in itself sufficient to justify the provision of medical aid in
the districts wherever it is possible.

Communication with Baghdad has been greatly facilitated by running the
railway up to Qal'at Sharqat, seventy miles from Mosul, and metalling long stretches
of the intervening road from Sharqat, but the completion of the railway to Mosul is
greatly desired by the native population, and would have the signal advantage of
bringing the two Wilayats into much closer connection.

CHAPTER VI.— The Kurdish Question.

The occupation of the Mosul Wilayat brought the British Administration into
direct relations with the Kurds. On either side of the Turco-Persian frontier the
mountains from a little south of Khaniqin to Ararat are inhabited by Kurdish tribes,
which extend eastward into Persia and westward through the highlands of Asia
Minor to Cilicia and the confines of Syria. Anatolia, the bridge between Europe and
Asia, has borne the attack of many invaders, its mountain ranges have provided
inaccessible vantage ground for diverse peoples, and offered asylum to communities
driven out of the Mesopotamian plains by successive waves of conquest. The
inhabitants exhibit a great variety of race and creed, among which are the Armenian
Christians, remuants of an ancient empire, the Kurds, possibly descendants of the
Medes, professing Muhammadanism in several forms, Sunui, Shi'ah, and other sects
only half assimilated to Islam, and the Turks, almost exclusively Sunni, whose
presence dates from the Saljuq and Ottoman invasion or from the nomadic penetration
of Turkoman tribes which began even earlier than the Saljuq era. In the soTith-enst
angle of the mountains dwells the small but valiant Nestoriau or Assyrian nation, who
are the descendants of the Christian subjects of the Sassanian Empire.

Towards the middle of the 19th century the Ottoman Government began a
serious attempt to establish its rule over the Kurds, the most independent as well as
the most turbulent element of the empire. The Turks rightly diagnosed the root of
the difficulty to be the power of the tiibal chieftains, who combined a ruthless
mediasval authority with a plentiful supply of rifles. They were a scourge not only
to the Christian population and the Government, but also to their own settled
tribesmen, who were little better than serfs, ground down by their overlords, the
2041 H

Aghawat. The Tiirks proceeded to deal with these gentry after Turkish fashion,
iisiiig one to undermine the power of his neighbours, laying stealthy hands on
another, subsidising a third till his power waxed and called for correction. In this
fashion they scattered over the empire the Baban family of Sulaimaniyah, in southern
Kurdistan, while in the north they brought the Badr Khans of Jazirat ibn 'Uniar to
Constantinople, subjected 'Abdul Qadir, the head of the ruling house of Shamsdinan,
to intermittent exile, favoured Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli, east of Aleppo, and then
encouraged his rivals to fall on him and destroy him. jMilitary pressure in wild
mountain country was seldom within the capacity of the Ottoman army, or if
undertaken rarely led to anything but Pyrrhic successes. The Sultan 'Abdul Hamid
conceived the idea of turning the fighting qualities of the Kurds into approved
channels by raising (and at intervals paying) a body of irregular horse known as the
Hamidiyah. Under better organisation the scheme inight have been productive of
considerable advantage ; even in Turkish hands the Hamidiyah were sometimes
useful to the Government. But a systematic attempt to exterminate the Armenians,
begun in 'Abdul Hamid's time and continued by the Committee of Union and
Progress, added official persecution to the other forms of disorder which racked
^ Anatolia. The Kurds were used as agents of destruction. Though when left to
themselves the Aghas treated the Christians little worse than they treated their own
people, the prospect of personal profit, lauds, women, and miscellaneous loot, to be
acquired by themselves and their followers by fulfilling the orders or hints of the
Government, and at the same time following what they conceived to be the teaching «
of Islam, was too advantageous to be neglected. The war brought the Armenian
policy to a climax. The massacres of 1896 and 1909 were not comparable to the
slaughter carried out with the tacit encouragement of the Germans in 1915 and the
succeeding years. The Kurds inherited the villages and lands of their dead fellow
countrymen, but they did nut go entirely impunished. Armenian refugees and
Armenians of the Russian (Jaucasus joined the Russian Army, and wherever the •
Russians crossed the Turkish eastern frontier, the Armenians took occasion to retaliate
on the Kurds, doing as they had beeia done by. The Kurds affirm that their losses
amount to 400,000 as against a million or more Armenians ; for example, at Rawanduz,
in 1916, the Russian and Armenian forces when they retreated left the town and
district a desolation.

The Turkish Nestorians, or, as they prefer to be called, Assyrians, had not been
comprehensively massacred, but a ^neighbouring Kurdish Agha, Simko, chief of the
Shikak tribe, between Van and Urumiyah, murdered their Patriarch in 1916. In
revenge they attacked him. When they found themselves too hard pressed they
migrated in a body and joined, their Persian co-religionists in the Urumiyah plain.
Together they offered a stout resistance to the Turks and Kurds until 1918, when
the whole community, men, women, children and cattle and such household goods as
they could carry, abandoned the position and marched south-east to Hamadan. Here
they were taken in hand by the British authorities and sejit on to Ba'qubah, near
Baghdad, where a refugee camp was prepared for them. They numbered about
40,000, added to which there were 10,000 Armenians from the Van district who had
escaped with the Assyrians.

On the victory of the Allies in 1918 there were thus two distinct problems to be
considered in connection with the Christians, both concerned almost solely with
northern Kurdistan ; firstly, what reparation could be made to the Armenians, and
vsecondly, what measxxres could be taken to repatriate the Assyrians. The first
question was the larger and the more complex, and it was unfortimate that the
benevolent intentions of the Allies towards the Armenians should have been
formulated and widely circulated without full certainty as to whether it would be
possible to carry them out. The Armenians themselves embarrassed the issue by
talking openly of their high hopes for the formation of an Armenian State,
comprising an area which was variously defined, but not infrequently included the
six Anatolian Wilayats in which Armenians are," or were previous to 1915, to be found :
Sivas, Erzerum, Kharput (Mamurat al 'Aziz), Diyarbakr, Bitlis and Van. The Kurds,
who are in an overwhelming majority in these districts, took alarm, and the strong
nationalist sentiments which already existed among them were enhanced by the fear
that the Western Powers contemplated putting them under the yoke of the despised
Armenians. The prospect of being forced to return to the survivors of the outraged
nation gains which could obviously not be regarded as legitimate, and of paying
penalty for hideous crimes which had been registered against themselves, changed

the attitude of the Kurds from one of friendship towards Great Britain to a keen
auxiety lest we or any other Western Power should obtain a mandatory authority
which might be used to enforce justice towards the Armenians. This fear made
northern Kurdistan a favourable theatre for Turkish propaganda, and during the
long and disastrous delay which occurred between the armistice and the conclusion
of peace with Turkey, the latter had full opportunity to exploit the advantage offered
by local conditions. At the same time the honour accorded to our Arab allies ia
Syria, and the fact that European engagements, combined with Arab sentiment,
dictated the establishment in December 1919 of an independent Arab State,
uncontrolled, and also unaided, by any Western Power, gave force to propaganda
from the Syrian side. With the growing dissatisfaction of the Sharifian party and
the Syrians with the conduct of Europe and America towards themselves, emissaries
from Syria promulgated a doctrine increasingly hostile to the West in general and
Great Britain in particular. Thus in our dealings with the Kurds we found
gradually arrayed against us a series of formidable prejudices, pan-Islamism stirred
from Constantinople, racial pride, cupidity and the arrogance of the Kurdish agha, who
feared the possibility of a strong European control far more than he feared the
Turks. Once again, as so often in his painful history, the Turk profited by the
errors arising out of the impossibility of reconciling European claims to protect or
dominate portions of his empire. A section of the Kurdish national party at
Constantinople, led by 'Abdul Qadir of Shamsdinan and the Badr Khans, was
probably anti-Turk and in favour of an autonomy controlled by the West, preferablj'
by Great Britain. But events in the Smyrna district gave to Ottoman propaganda
some justification for the contention that however many Points might be published
in America or Declarations issued in Europe, the secret intention of the West to
subjugate the East, regardless of national aspirations, remained unskaken. And
behind the Turks lay Russia in revolt, with Bolshevism ready to lend its aid to all
who had a grievance against the existing order of the world, and to proclaim (not
without reason) that it had proved inadequate for the regulation of human affairs.

These dangers were less prominent in southern Kurdistan, where the Christian
problem is almost non-existent, than in the north, and it was southern Kurdistan
which first came into our political sphere. As has been related, in the winter of
1917 we had occupied Khaniqin and found no difficulty in organising administration.
Before the final advance in 1918 we knew that the Kurdish chiefs in the Kifri district,
the Talabaui family aud the religious leader, Saiyid Ahmad Khaniqah, were pro-
British, and we had already been in relations with the leading man of Sulaimaniyah,
Shaikh Mahnuid. Shaikh Mahmud is the great grandson of a Kurdish holy man of
high reputation, Kaka Ahmad, who lies buried in a shrine at Sulaimaniyah, formerly
much resorted to by Kurdish pilgrims. His descendants, the Barziuji family, have
relied exclusively on the merit acquired by their ancestor, and it has proved sufficient
to procui'e for them a predominant influence. Shaikh Mahmud's position, except for
his religious prestige, depended chiefly on the reign of terror he had imposed before
the war aud the wholesale murder and rapine done in his name. His sinister power
was proved by the fact that Sulaimaniyah under his direction had been one of the
most turbulent parts of the Ottoman Empire ; it was to him that the Mutasarrif and
the Turkish garrison surrendered in the autumn of 19 J 8, leaving him in sole authority.
By the hand of two representatives he sent letters to Baghdad appealing earnestly to
His Majesty's Government not to exclude Kurdistan from the list of liberated peoples.
Since he was the most powerful factor in local politics, it would have been impossible
to neglect him ; his friendly attitude facilitated the extension of administration to the
Sulaimaniyah district, where there was a widespread desire for our presence in order
to check anarchy and ruin, and made it possible to dispense with a garrison, troops
for which were not available.

Accordingly, Major Noel, who had had much experience in Persia and among the
Bakhtiaris, was entrusted with a mission to southern Kurdistan, the instructions given
him being as follows : —

" You have been appointed Political Officer, Kirkuk Division, with effect from
November 1st. The Kirkuk Division extends from the Lesser Zab to the Diyalah and
north-east to the Turco-Persian frontier. It forms part of the Mosul Wilayat, the
ultimate disposal of which is under the consideration of His Majesty's Government.
For the present it must be considered as falling within the sphere of military
occupation and administration of this force, and you should proceed on this
assiunption in your dealings with local chiefs, bearing in mind that it is improbable

H 2

that the military authorities will see their way to detach troops permanently to
Sulaimaniyah or to other places east of our present line. It should be your object to
arrange with local chiefs for the restoration and maintenance of order in areas
outside the limits of our military occupation, for the exclusion and surrender of enemy
agents, and for the supply of commodities needed by our troops. You are authorised
to incur such expenditure as may be necessary to this end, subject to previous
authority, where practicable, in cases of large sums, and on the understanding, which
should be made clear to the chiefs, that any arrangements you may make are of
necessity provisional and subject to reconsideration at any time. You are authorised
to appoint Shaikh Mahmud as our representative in Sulaimaniyah, should you consider
this expedient, and to make other appointments of this nature at Chamchamal,
Halabja, &c., at your discretion. It should be explained to the tribal chiefs with
whom you enter into relations that there is no intention of imposing upon them an
administration foreign to their habits and desires. Tribal leaders will be encouraged
to form a confederation for the settlement of their public affairs under the guidance
of British political officers. They will be called upon lo continue to pay the taxes
legally due from them under Turkish law, modified as may be found necessary, for
purposes connected with the maintenance of order and the development of their
country."

The question of creating a southern Kurdish autonomous province had been
raised in June 1918 by General Sharif Pasha in conversation with Sir Percy Oox,
whom he met at Marseilles. Sharif Pasha, by origin a Kurd of Sulaimaniyah, had
been absent from his native country from boyhood, and having been exiled by the
Turks, had for some time been resident in Paris. In 1914 he had offered us his
services in Mesopotamia, with a view to winning over the Kurds, but we were not
then in contact with them, and the offer could not be accepted. When the Peace
Conference met in Paris he constituted himself the spokesman for Kurdish interests,
though the fact that he had been long out of touch with his countrymen gave his
opinion too academic a flavour.

Major Noel reached Sulaimaniyah in the middle of November and was received
with acclamation. He found the district incredibly wasted and impoverished by the
Turks, the town half ruined and trade at a standstill. He proceeded to introduce a
temporary system of government which would be acceptable to the people and satisfy
their aspirations for a Kurdish administration. Shaikh Mahmud was nominated
Governor of the district, and for each of the minor sub-divisions Kurdish officials were
appointed to work under the guidance of the British Political Officers. At the same
time, whenever possible, Turkish and Arab officials were at once removed and
replaced by natives of Kurdistan, while the Turkish officers and troops in the town
were evacuated to Baghdad. The system adopted was practically a feudal one ; each
chief was made responsible for the correct government of his own tribe. The tribal
chief was thus recognised as a duly appointed Government official, the whole being
controlled by British officers. Steps were taken at once to import foodstuffs, seed
grain and articles of merchandise, not only to cope with the immediate danger of
famine, but sufficient to allow to a certain extent the revival of trade. At the same
time the religious wants of the peoples were not neglected ; arrangements were made
for the repair of the principal mosques at Government expense, while a grant was
conceded to allow the carrying out of religious observances.

Signs were not wanting that the northern parts of southern Kurdistan up to
Arbil and Rawanduz, which form the limit of the dialect of Kurdish spoken in
Sulaimaniyah, were anxious to share in the peace, and above all in the financial
assistance offered by the British Government, by entering the southern Kurkish
confederation under Shaikh Mahmud, but the chiefs of Kirkuk and Kifri emphatically
denied any intention of acknowledging him as an overlord and asked for direct
British administration.

On 1st December 1918 the Acting Civil Commissioner, Colonel Wilson, visited
Sulaimaniyah and held a meeting which was attended by about 60 leading chiefs of
southern Kurdistan, including representatives of Persian tribes from Sennah, Saqiz,
and Aoraman. He had several conversations with Shaikh Mahmud, and explained
the political situation, so far as it concerned them, to the assembled chiefs. The
Kurds had suffered alike from Russian and Turkish methods, and while there was an
absolute unanimity amongst them as to their firm intention to resist to the last any
attempt on tlie part of the European Powers to allow the Turks to return, there was a
general recognition of the need of British protection if they were to prosper in the
future. There was, however, hesitation on the part of some of the chiefs as to the

wisdom of placing Kurdistan under eifectiA^e British administration, while others
claimed that Kurdistan must be separated from 'Iraq and be run direct from London,
which in their eyes had now replac'ed Constantinople.

After some discussion a document was drawn up in the following sense : —

His British Majesty's Government having announced that their intention in the
war was the liberation of the Eastern peoples from Turkish oppression and the grant
of assistance to them in the establishment of their independence, the chiefs, as the
representatives of the people of Kurdistan, have asked His British Majesty's
Government to accept them also under British protection and to attach them to the
'Iraq, so that they might not be deprived of the benefits of that association, and they
have requested the (Jivil Commissioner of Mesopotamia to send them a representative
with the necessary assistance to enable the Kurdish people under British aiispices to
progress peacefully on civilised lines. If His British Majesty's Government extend
its assistance and protection to them they undertook to accept His British Majesty's
orders and advice.

In return the Civil Commissioner signed a document stating that any Kurdish
tribe from the Greater Zab to the Diyalah (other than those in Persian territory) who
of their own free will accepted the leadership of Shaikh Mahmud, would be allowed
to do so, and that the latter would have our moral support in controlling the above
areas on behalf of the British Government whose orders he undertook to obey. The
tribes and townspeople in the Kifri and Kirkuk divisions were not Avilling to come
under Shaikh Mahmud, and the latter agreed not to insist on their inclusion. Kirkuk
subsequently become an independent Division.

It was explained to the representatives of the Kurdish tribes in Persia that our
public engagements precluded us from agreeing to their inclusion in the south
Kurdistan confederacy under British protection, and that they must remain loyal
Persian subjects, keeping on friendly terms with the confederation. They accepted
the position cheerfully.

Shaikh Mahmud further asked for British officers for all Government
departments, including officers for Kurdish levies, stipulating only that the
subordinate staff should, wherever possible, be Kurdish, and not Arab.

After the meeting many tribes came into the confederation, and when on 1st
January 1919 Majgr Noel went to Rawanduz, he found the population there to be
apparently favourable to Shaikh Mahmud. As Major Soane observed in his
administrative report on the Stilaimaniyah Division for 1919, so anxious were the
Kurds at that time for peace, so reduced by privation, that they were ready to sign
any document or make any statement to procure tranquillity and food. Thus tribe
after tribe which hitherto had been barely cognisant of Shaikh Mahmud, or at best
had known him as an unworthy descendant of a good man, signed the stereotyped
memorial praying for inclusion in the new State under Shaikh Mahmud, a condition
which they imagined the British Government to have made essential, for reasons of its
own. At the same time his appointment as British representative was regarded with
suspicion, and there was considerable scepticism as to the defeat of the Turk, owing to
the proximity of Ottoman garrisons and the activity of Ottoman officials on the other
side of the frontier.

Political Officers were appointed to Keui Sanjaq and Rania, and the system of
government introduced at Sulaimaniyah was extended to these areas and to Rawanduz.
Rawanduz was in a terrible state of starvation ; successive waves of advancing
Russians and Turks had reduced the country to abject desolation, while in the town
itself, out of an original total of some 2,000 houses, only 60 remained standing. In
the surrounding districts cultivation had for the last two years been completely
suspended, and the population had been reduced by about 75 per cent, of its pre-war
figure. So severe was the famine that in some districts the inhabitants were living
entirely on herbs and the few acorns which were left, and had been constrained to
devour cats and dogs, and even in some cases human flesh.

Steps were taken at once to deal with the famine ; grain was imported from
Arbil, poor relief started, agriculture encouraged, and a measure of law and order
secured.

The question of bringing the country north of Rawanduz under effective
administration was found to be one of great difficulty, for although the tribes and the
population are small, they are well armed and rent by bitter and continuous blood
feuds. Rugged mountains preclude the possibility of effective military action against
offenders, for to send gendarmes into such a country, even in considerable force, is
merely to offer a bait to the tribes, and to run grave risk of a rebuff to which there is

no effective reply. But the tribes, owing to the prestige of the British, showed
themselves willing to comply peacefully with our ideas, to avoid highway robbery
and looting, and generally lo behave better than might be expected considering the
remoteness of any effective force. In this district difficulties were increased by the
fact that it marches with the area of the Turkish occupation in the north-west, while
to the north-east is the Persian frontier of Azerbaijan, a province which was in a
state of complete chaos.

In Urumiyah, and indeed throughout Azerbaijan, the situation with regard to
Persian rule was one which could not fail to arouse grave misgivings, and serious
disorders there were almost certain to be reflected in the areas which were nominally
under our control. So great was the confusion existing there that it was difficult to
arrive at a definite conclusion as to what was actually occurring. There seemed to be
little doubt that two main factors were reacting on the situation : firstly, a feeling of
intense hostility to the retui-n of the Assyrians and Armenians, fostered by some kind
of pan-Islamic movement centred on Tabriz, and probably stimidated to a certain
extent by Persian officials ; and secondly, an intense dislike by the Kurds of the
emasculated Persian rule, which was incapable of producing any form of law and
order.

On the Turkish side of the frontier a movement towards Kurdish indepen-
dence had been reported in January 1919. It was born of fear of a return of
the Christians and fed by Turkish propaganda, which tended to give it a tinge of pan-
Isiamism. The notorious Simko was the chief local factor, possibly in alliance with
Saiyid Taha, hereditary Shaikh of Shamsdinan and grandson of Shaikh 'Ubaidullah,
who was famed for having led an attack on Persia in 1881.

In the north-west corner of the Mosul Wilayat pro-Turkish and anti-Christian
propaganda began to meet with considerable success ; the position of the Christian
villages between Zakho and Jazirat ibn 'Umar became one of considerable danger,
while in some cases anti-Christian disturbances actually took place. On 19th March
letters were intercepted from 'Abdul Rahman Agha, chief of the Shernakh Kurds,
north-east of Jazirat ibn 'Umar, iirging the expxdsion of foreigners and stating that
the movement had the suppox't and recognition of the Turkish Government, whose
efforts were being seconded by individuals and committees in Constantinople, Cairo,
and apparently Paris, working for an independent Kurdish State. » Turkish officers at
the same time visited Shamsdinan with Turkish propaganda, but were coldly received,
while one of them penetrated into the Mosul Wilayat with the same object.

The local centres of the evil were undoubtedly Jazirat ibn 'Umar and Shernakh,
both of which have been noted for anti-Christian feeling in the past and were
conveniently placed for any movement supported by the Turks. The actual instru-
ments were the Goyan, an unruly and turbulent tribe, situated for the most part just
outside our administrative border, to the north of Zakho. During the first week of
April, Captain Pearson, Assistant Political Officer, Zakho, proceeded on a visit to this
tribe to restore order and to make arrangements for the safety of the Christian
villages in the future. While actually in the company of certain of the Goyan chiefs,
he was treacherously ambushed and murdered on the march under circumstances
which left little doubt as to the complicity of some of his companions.

When first anti-Christian disturbances took place, military action had been asked
for, as it was recognised that in dealing with uncivilised mountain tribes trouble of
this nature, unless nipped in the bud, is extremely liable to spread. But difficulties
of communication precluded military action and aeroplanes were not at the time
available. With the murder of a British Political Officer, the need for drastic action
was immeasurably increased. During the latter part of the Turkish regime, the Turks
had not failed, if their officials were assaulted, to take the most drastic measures.
Under our rule this was the first case which had occurred, and the tribes naturally
looked upon it as a test of the vigour and strength of our Government and as a
measure of the extent to which we could be defied with impunity. It was suggested,
therefore, that military measures should at once be undertaken in the shape of an
expedition against the Goyan, coupled with the immediate occupation of Jazirat ibn
'Umar. The latter movement would have attacked the root of the evil at the last-
named place and at Shernakh, would have turned the worst of the ranges protecting
the Goyan country, and finally have isolated that tribe from support.

But the Goyan were situated outside the administrative border of the Mosul
Wilayat, and this, coupled with the difficulty of the country and the lack of supplies,
was held to outweigh the political necessity and preclude the possibility of military
action. It had been suggested tliat as the country to the north of our administrative

border was in the area of X^rkish occupation, the Turks might be called upon to take
action against the offenders and to arrange for the maintenance of order on their side
of the border in the future. But as the troubles on the frontier were largely due to
Turkish intrigue, intervention by them could hardly be expected to be either whole-
hearted or effective. It might, indeed, be dangerous, for not only were the Turks in
sympathy with the anti-British movement, but the mere fact that we called upon
them to act in the case of an offence against us would demonstrate to the tribes our
military weakness in the district and our inability to protect our own interests in the
mountains on the frontier.

It was decided, therefore, to abandon the proposal for Tiu-kish action, and,
aeroplanes having become available, a bombing raid was arranged for by way of
reprisals. It was unfortunately ineffective owing to bad weather and the difficulties
of the country, and the results of our inaction soon made themselves evident in the
spread of unrest, the attack on a gendarmerie post, the ambushing of a military
convoy, and the fact that not only the Goyan, but other tribes in the neighbourhood
began to assume a defiant attitude. We were forced, therefore, to continue bombing
raids on a larger scale. These were more successful ; the good results were
immediately evident, and the attitude of the tribes underwent considerable
improvement.

Meantime affairs were not running smoothly in Sulaimaniyah. From the first
a certain anxiety had been visible among the aghas lest British control should lead to
awkward questions as to land ownership, there being in most cases no title except
forcible possession. Though the power of agha and saiyid was contrary to the
interests of the bulk of the population, it was impossible at the moment to put a
curb on it, and in order to allay the fears of the ruling class the Tapu registers were
not sent to Baghdad, where they would have been subjected to inconvenient scrutiny,
but allowed to remain temporarily at Sulaimaniyah. By the end of December
doubts were beginning to arise as to the wisdom of allowing the power of Shaikh
Mahmud to increase to too great an extent. His record in Turkish times was not
one to inspire confidence, but apart from any reference to the previous history of the
family, the question with which we were now faced was one of practical politics.
The influence of Shaikh Mahmud undoubtedly existed, and we had recognised it.
Without the frill measure of co-operation and assistance which he was giving us, it
would have been necessary to bring in a strong garrison, which at the time was out
of the question. From the political point of view it was of great importance that we
should maintain order in the area, and at the time should avoid the appearance of
using force for this purpose. i

It was hard to tell how far a national movement for independence existed and '
how far it was an artificial product of the personal ambitions of the Kurdish leaders,
vrho doubtless saw in Kurdish autonomy an unequalled opportunity for furthering
their own interests. To many independence meant freedom from all law or restraint ,
and permission to indulge in imrestricted rapine and license. Their ambitions had > \
to be kept in check by continual reminders that His British Majesty's Government,
if it accepted the responsibility for Kurdistan, did so onlj^ on the strict understanding
that the people and those whom they chose as their leaders, would conform to the
regulations and principles requisite for the maintenance of order, the administration
of justice and the assurance of progress and development. A connection with
Baghdad was dictated by the inexorable logic of geography and was further a matter
of everyday convenience, if not of necessity, but there was no reason why it should
interfere with the development of the country on national lines.

It jvas explained to the people that the personnel of the administration was to be
as far as possible Kurdish. Kurdish levies were to be organised under Kurdish
officers, while the Kurdish tongue was to be the official language of Government.
Laws would be modified to conform with local custom and usage, and a system
of revenue collection and taxation devised to meet the needs of the people. In
dealing with the tribes, existing custom and law would be respefcted and the
recognised chiefs would be allowed to carry on the tribal administration of their
clansmen as heretofore. As regards finance, the country would have its own
provincial budget, and the taxes collected would be devoted to the administration
and development of the country, but a contribiition would be paid towards the
expenses of the parent administration at Baghdad. On the other hand, the asso-
ciation with Alesopotamia would assure material advantages of great importance ;
education, public works, agriculture and communications would all derive their
main inspiration and impetus from Baghdad.

Shaikh Mahraud's ambitions were not, however, consonant with this programme.
To quote again Major Soane's report :- —

" While southern Kurdistan was offered an autonomous condition under British
supervision and the help of British officials in organisation, Shaikh Mahmud, the most
powerful personality of the country, at once conceived the possibility of constructing
with our assistance a State which should be free from the obligation of administration
directly controlled from Baghdad, and which should — so far from being the vehicle
of emancipation and instrument of reconstruction of a ruined country — widen the
circle of his personal influence and power till he should become the despot of all
lands from Khaniqin to Shamsdinan and from the Jabal Hamriu to within the borders
of Persia."

He was known to be in communication with the hostile centre at Shemakh,
and it was clear that steps would have to be taken to prevent his influence
spreading to regions where it was unnecessary or objectionable and where it offered
a possible menace to peace in the future. Furthermore, there was a definite party
even in Sulaimaniyah itself in favour of direct British administration, which could
not fail to be more attractive to the merchant and trading classes than any system
based on Kurdish leadership.

But Shaikh Mahmud was not prepared to accept from us, any more than he had
accepted from the Turks, a limitation of his authority. He was surrounded by
interested sycophants who filled his head with extravagant ideas and encouraged him
to style himself ruler of the whole of Kurdistan. He interfered constantly in local
administration and flooded the administrative departments with his relations and
hangers on. He represented the interests of the aghawat, potent, if mainly>,potent
for evil, and as a religious leader of wild tribesmen he was a power which had to be
reckoned with. No sudden alteration could be made in our attitude towards him,
yet it was evident that peaceful progress and the general good could not be achieved
unless the jinn which had been let loose from the Sulaimaniyah bottle could be corked
down.

In the middle of March 1919 Major Soane, whose knowledge of southern
Kurdistan is unrivalled, was appointed Political Officer at Sulaimaniyah with a view
to reducing Shaikh Mahmud to a position consonant with his merits. Major Soane
had recently returned from a j^ear's sick leave. On his way to his post he studied
carefully the situation at Kifri and Kirkuk, decided on the line to be adopted, and
towards the end of April reported from Sulaimaniyah that Shaikh Mahmud's influence
was declining fast, to the satisfaction of the countryside. As order increased and
the benefits of a sound administration grew more obvious, the tribes became
increasingly dissatisfied with Shaikh Mahmud's rule. Accordingly Major Soane
removed the large Jaf tribe from under him and placed an Assistant Political Officer
at Halabja, east of Sulaimaniyah, to deal with the Jaf directly. As soon as it was
understood that we had no intention, as we had declared from the first, of forcing
Shaikh Mahmud on reluctant elements, his adherents diminished ; many who had
been terrorised by him into a declaration in his favour shook themselves loose, and,
except in the immediate neighbourhood of Sulaimaniyah, he was rapidly sinking into
a position of comparative innocuousness.

Nevertheless the situation was not wholly reassuring. Shaikh Mahmud's personal
ambitions were such as to urge him to active measures in order to prevent the final
disappearance of his power ; he was in touch with the Goyan and knew that the
outrages committed by them in the Zakho district had not been effectively punished,
and he was fully aware that we had no force at Sulaimaniyah capable of suppressing
disorder on a large scale. The Kurdish levies led by Kurdish officers were ready to
support Shaikh Mahmud, to whose influence they owed their appointment. Anxiety
was justified when, on 20th May, Shaikh Mahmud organised a cmp d'etat. He drew
his chief support from Kurds on the Persian side of the frontier, notably from the
Aoraman and Meriwan tribes, situated respectively about 40 miles south-east and east
of Sulaimaniyah, but he obtained assistance from the districts immediately to the
north and north-east of the town, and also from the armed riff-raff of Sulaimaniyah
itself.

The outbreak was sudden and unexpected. The small force of levies on the
spot were quickly defeated and dispersed, and the political and military officers were
confined to their houses, but were not maltreated. One motor driver was killed.
Shaikh Mahmud at once assumed entire control of affairs, appointed his own
Qaimmaqam, seized all Government records and the treasury, and cut telegraphic
communication with Kirkuk. A convoy proceeding from Kifri to Sulaimaniyah with

treasure, rifles and horses was captured by his adherents, and doubtless provided a
welcome accession to his strength.

Simultaneously with the movement against Sulaimaniyah matters became critical
at Halabja. On 25th May the Assistant Political Officer reported that his gendarmes
were deserting, and on the 26th Shaikh Mahmud's men took possession of the town,
while an aeroplane which flew over was fired upon. Both townsmen and tribes were,
however, in a state of indecision, and, taking advantage of this the Assistant Political
Officer and his staff were able with some difficulty to withdraw to Khaniqin. He had
been aided by the constant support of that remarkable woman, 'Adlah Khanum, whose
authority is second to none in Halabja. She is one of several Kurdish ladies whose
distinguished descent and personal qualities have given them a commanding position
over Kurdish tribes either in Turkey or Persia, and she has exercised her power
wisely. Her services on behalf of the maintenance of law and order on this occasion
were suitably recognised by the British Government after the Sulaimaniyah rising
was ended.

Immediate military action was essential, but so difficult were the problems
connected with supply, and with the safeguarding of lines of communication, that
some delay was inevitable. The rebellion, however, did not spread. In northern
Kurdistan Simko of the Shikak, and Saiyid Taha of Shamsdinan, the nephew and
bitter rival of 'Abdul Qadir, were jealous of Shaikh Mahmud's influence, and had,
prior to the rising, declared him to be growing too powerful. Saiyid Taha happened
to be in Baghdad on a visit to the Acting Civil Commissioner when the rebellion
broke out. He expressed his complete disassociatiou from Shaikh Mahmud, and
returned on 25th May, via Rawanduz, to Neri, his home in Shamsdinan, having
undertaken to use his influence against the rebel. His action exemplifies the lack of
unity and fellow-feeling between northern and southern Kurdistan ; even the dialects
employed by the inhabitants are mutually incomprehensible.

In Sulaimaniyah dissension was arising. Shaikh Mahmud did not pay his levies
and was short of ammunition. By 11th June, in spite of a success gained over a
British reconnaissance party, he was ready to negotiate ; but matters had gone too far,
and on IStli June we defeated his forces on the Bazian Pass, between Kirkuk and
Sulaimaniyah, and he himself was wounded and taken prisoner. Our cavalry were in
Sulaimaniyah the same night, to the great relief of the inhabitants. Shaikh Mahmud
and Shaikh Gharib, his brother-in-law, who had been captured at Bazian, were
brought to Baghdad and committed to trial for insurrection. Shaikh Mahmud was
condemned to death, but the sentence was commuted by the Commander-in-Chief to
ten years' imprisonment, while Shaikh Gharib was given five years' imprisonment and
a fine of Rs. 10,000.

The unsubstantial character of Shaikh Mahmud's rebellion was proved by the
fact that out of a potential backing of many thousands, his active supporters numbered
no more than 300. Since his removal the administration of Sulaimaniyah, while
retaining an individuality which differentiates it in some details from that of the
average Mesopotamian Division, conforms in essentials with the principles of civil
government which have been adopted in the 'Iraq, Care has been taken to appoint
Kjirds, not Arabs, to official positions under the British staff. In July the enlistment
of Kurdish levies was sanctioned and by the end of December the numbers had
increased to over 300. The officers are all men who have seen commissioned service
with the Turkish Army. Some of them have valuable military experience, but all
have proved ready to learn British military methods. Under a British non-
commissioned officer from Baghdad the police force has immensely improved, not
only in efficiency but also in status. The progress made in public security is witnessed
by the fact that in the autumn of 1919 pilgrim traffic from Tabriz began to pass
through Sulaimaniyah for the first time for many years. Great pains have been taken
to affoi'd educational facilities and to conform in religious questions to local prejudice.

Most striking is the progress which has been made in the town itself. When we
occupied Sulaimaniyah in November 1918, out of a normal population of some 6,000
not more than 2,500 were alive. Corpses were lying in the streets and sewers, and
famine and disease were fast killing the survivors. Few habitable houses were
standing. By the end of 1919 the population had risen to over 10,000, and in spite
of the lack of masons and building material, numbers of houses have been recon-
structed, and there are as many shops as there were before the war. The boom in
trade is such that the rents of business properties increased 300 per cent, in the last
five months of 1919, and owners are constantly receiving offers in advance at
enhanced rates from prospective tenants who wish to secure shops and office room,
2041 I

As regards the prosperity of the district, our agricultural loans were too late in
1918 to do more than save the population from famine, but they had the effect of
producing a crop sufficient for immediate wants. In the following year sowings
increased 2-|- times. Main roads, which are as vital to economic advance as they are
to the administration, are being constructed on a permanent basis from Sulaimaniyah
to Kirkuk by the Baziau Pass and to Halabja over the mountain spurs of Gwezha.

With prosperity has come peace. There are now no serious agents of disruption
in the district, and unless disorders in other parts of Kurdistan upset the balance and
arouse the ambitions of the Aghas, equilibrium is likely to be maintained.

When we occupied Sulaimaniyah, immediately after the armistice, the ramifica-
tions of the Kurdish question were as yet unknown and unforeseen, nor indeed did
they develop fidly until the following year. Kurdish national aspirations had been
put forward in November by General Sharif Pasha, and in January a Committee of
Kurdish Independence formed in Egypt appealed to us for help in the setting up of
a Kurdish State.

In northern Kurdistan, soon after the signing of the armistice, the Kurdish
movement broke into fresh activity. It was perhaps fostered by prominent Turks,
such as 'Ali Ihsan Pasha, who commanded the Turkish 6th Army at the time of the
armistice, and by the Committee of Union and Progress, with the object of
embarrassing the Allies. In January, members of the Committee of Union and
Progress were in Kharput, urging the K\irds to claim independence at the Peace
Conference. 'Ali Ihsan visited Kurdish chiefs and supplied them with money, arms
and horses to use against the British if they should attempt to occupy the country.
His relations with the Kui-ds dated from before the war, when he was one of the chief
instigators of the massacre of the Christians in Bitlis and Van. Towards the end of
January he was actively employed at Diyarbakr in suppressing any expression of
anti-Turkish feeling.

In the course of January Sir Mark Sykes, who was then at Aleppo, sent an
emissary to the Kurds of the Tur 'Abdin, a highland district north of Nisibin, to find
out whether they were likely to resist the British and also to prevent them from
providing 'Ali Ihsan with supplies. There was found to be a party which desired
British protection, but where 'Ali Ihsan had successfully tampered with the
tribes they were anti-foreign. At Diyarbakr and at Mardin a similar anti-foreign
agitation had been set on foot, but at Sairt, 75 miles south-west of Lake Van,
the Kurds rose against the Turkish garrison and drove them out, in spite of efforts on
the part of 'Ali Ihsan to bribe the chiefs. At Bashqalah, further south, there was a
movement in favour of Kurdish independence which found sympathy in Persian
Kurdistan, the leading figure being Simko, chief of the Shikak.

At the beginning of March the chief men of Severek, between Diyarbakr and
'Urfah, visited the Turkish authorities and the leaders of the local branch of the
Committee of Union and Progress, and decided to organise the Turkish forces and
the tribes in order to offer resistance to foreign occupation. They released Shaikh
Mahmud, paramount chief of the Milli Kurds east of 'Urfah, who was in prison on a
charge of disloyalty to the Government, and ordered him to call up his tribe and
co-operate in driving the British out of 'Urfah. In return the Turks promised to
recognise his position with the Milli, and to make him the most powerful Kurdish
chief west of the Euphrates. The help he gave after his release amounted, however,
to nothing, for he was unable either to rouse the Kurdish tribes or to keep them
together even in his own district, nor could the Turks openly support him in flagrant
breach of the armistice, and by May the loose confederacy he had tried to create had
collapsed. No greater success attended the efforts of emissaries despatched from
Constantinople by the group led by 'Abdul Qadir of Shamsdinan, who was a member
of the Turkish Cabinet and also President of the Committee of Kurdish
Independence,

In Diyarbakr and Mardin the Kurdish Club was already organised and at work. It
was composed, according to a subsequent report by Major Noel, mainly of corrupt and
degenerate notables who, for motives of self-interest, had been active supporters of the
Committee of Union and Progress. With the defeat of Turkey they were faced with
the possibility of the total disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, and joined the
Kurdish national party at the instigation of the Turks, who held out to them the bait
of Kurdish autonomy under Ottoman auspices. The Club was directed against
British intervention and against the Armenians, and stimulated the fears of the Kurds
that the appearance on the scene of any Western Power must inevitably lead to the
subjugation of Moslem to Christian interests. It contained some members who were

actuated by a genuine desire for the welfare of Kurdistan as a whole, but even these
more moderate men were handicapped by having been implicated in the massacres
of 1915, by which they had profited materially.

Although, as has been described, the status of Mosul had not yet been decided,
the Wiiayat, ravaged by the war, could not be left without administration or assistance,
and as soon as the military occupation had taken place. Colonel Leachman was
appointed Political Officer. When preliminary organisation had been completed,
officers were despatched east and north to 'Aqrah and Zakho in orfler to get into
touch with the Kurds and ensure peace on our borders. Beyond the armistice frontier
the situation was exceedingly obscure, and towards the end of March it was considered
essential to ascertain the trend of feeling in the Turkish zone, not only because,
without exact knowledge, it would be impossible for the Peace Conference to come to
a decision concerning the future of Kurdistan, but also because the unrest there had
already been reflected in Zakho, as was witnessed by the disturbances which
culminated early in April in the murder of Captain Pearson. Agitation had beep
started in Jazirat ibn 'Umar at the beginning of February by 'Ali Ihsan, whose
efforts here as elsewhere were directed against British occupation. Influential Arabs
and Armenians were detained without cause as prisoners, traffic on the Tigris was
impeded, and the enrolling and arming of the Kurds were carried on without
hindrance, orders from Constantinople that the terms of the armistice were to be
enforced being disregarded by the Kurds with the connivance of the local Turkish
authorities. A Turkish officer visited Shamsdiuan to spread Turkish propaganda,
but was coldly received, while another entered the Mosul Wiiayat on a similai
mission. 'Ali Ihsan was removed towards the end of February, but in March repre-
sentatives of the Kurdish National Committee at Constantinople passed through
Mosul on their way to Sulaimaniyah with letters urging the Kurdish tribes to rise
against the British. The Zakho disturbances were not, therefore, a spontaneous local
growth ; they were engineered by the Turks through men who had the advantage of
first-hand local knowledge and all the backing which could be provided by the state
of ferment which existed in the Ottoman Empire.

On 1st April Major Noel left for Nisibin with the concurrence of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Force, General Allenby, and from Nisibin he
went on to Diyarbakr. The gist of his reports was that there was an active pro-
Turkish party which was anti-British and supported by pan-Islamic elements, but
side by side with these irreconcilables a pan-Kurdish party, the aim of which was the
complete independence of Kurdistan. The latter he described as not definitely
anti-British, though it was alienated from us by the fear that we intended to pursue a
vindictive policy on behalf of the Christians. The Kurdish Club, which had at first
been fairly subservient to the Ottoman Government, had shown an increasingly
independent spirit. " The tantalising version of President Wilson's doctrine that
" everyone should do as they liked," Major Noel wrote, "has slowly dawned on their
" horizon, with all its alluring possibilities, and Turco-Kurds are now convinced that
" if they shout loud enough President Wilson will hear and allow them to mis-
" manage Diyarbakr by themselves, and to continue to fatten on the Christian
" property that they stole during the massacres, without even having to share the
" spoil with the Turks." The Ottoman Government regarded the Club with growing-
disfavour, and finally decided to liquidate it.

" The events which led up to this occurrence," continued Major Noel, " are ^
not without interest, in that they give a typical example of the many undercurrents
of intrigue which are flowing here, and the methods to which the Turks are having
recourse. When news of the occupation of Smyrna was received, the Turks
were not slow to turn it to their own uses. News was spread of a massacre of
Mohammedans by Greeks, and the British were represented as having brought in
the Greeks. The Kurds were invited to apply the analogy of Smyrna to Diyarbakr ;
the English would come first and occupy the town, which would be but a prelude to
the arrival of Armenian troops. All these measures had their natural effect. A good
deal of fanaticism was aroused among the common herd, and the old reactionary
and corrupt townsmen, who were now so-called members of the Kurdish Club, and
who dreaded an enquiry into their misdeeds of 1915, hoped for another massacre
which would destroy the last remaining witnesses of their past, and would effectually
confuse the issues. By this time the Christians were thoroughly frightened. A
deputation was sent off in hot haste to me at Mardin to ask for British intervention.
The Government also began to have its qualms, for its propaganda had sbghtly
miscarried. Feeling was to have been worked up against the British, not against the

Christians, while the inopportuneness of another massacre was fully realised.
However, a neat way out of the difficulty suggested itself. The Kurdish Club was
to be made the scapegoat, which could be done with a show of justice owing to the
activities of its more corrupt and fanatical members. Under the guise of protecting
the Christians an inconvenient organisation opposed to Turkish sovereignty could be
suppressed. The Christians were accordingly told that it was the Kurds, instigated
by the Kurdish Club, who thirsted for their blood. After their experiences of the
last few years they were always ready to believe the worst, and it was only natural
that they should have given full credence to this new presage of disaster. From
words the Government proceeded to deeds. Guns were mounted on the citadel to
overawe the town, the military were called out, the leaders of the Kurdish Club were
arrested, and finally the Club itself was closed on the 4th of June. The Government
had saved the situation, the situation of its own creation ! "

Major Noel was convinced that until fear of Christian predominance was allayed
it would be impossible to counter the agents of fanaticism and unrest. He believed
that many of the cultivators desired to settle down to the pursuit of agriculture, and,
given a sound policy in dealing with them, they might gradually cease to be a menace
to their neighbours and develop into a comparatively peaceful community. It must
be borne in mind that their sense of national existence does not imply a sense of
national unity. The tribes are divided from each other by almost impassable
mountains, and each one is swayed by immediate personal interests, while their chiefs
ai-e bitterly jealous of one another. They are all alike abysmally ignorant, and one of
their principal grounds for hating and fearing the Armenians is that the higher
attainments of the latter would give them the advantage officiallj'' and commercially,
though numbers and superior fighting qualities are on the side of the Kurds.

Major Noel recommended that a reassuring proclamation should be published
with regard to massacres carried out by the Kurds at the instigation or under the
direct orders of the Turks, together with a formal declaration that we should insist on
the restoration of immovable property only. Failing this, he thought that a verbal
assurance from himself, if he might be permitted to give it, would be sufficient. In
point of fact, by our silence with regard to our ultimate intentions we were allowing
our adversaries to stir up hostility against us and to charge us with harboiiring future
intentions which, as was daily becoming more evident, it would never be in the power
of the Allies to carry out even if on consideration they were approved. It was not
only our credit in Kurdistan or our position on its borders which was imperilled by
the agitation which was spreading through the country ; such Armenians as had
survived were in fear of renewed massacres which we should be powerless to prevent,
and their anxiety was shared by American missionaries on the spot. The danger was
greatly enhanced by the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, which had created a
new situation in the whole of the Turkish Empire. It is significant that when in the
autumn an American Commission was sent to Asia Minor to form an opinion based on
personal observation, the majority of its members came to the conclusion that it would
be impracticable to establish an Armenian State in Kurdistan.

With the approval of General AUenby and of the Commander-in-Chief in
Mesopotamia, Major Noel was directed on 4th May to announce a general amnesty on
the lines he had proposed in respect of Kurds within the Mosul Wilayat, and in a
subsequent telegram he was authorised to give any verbal assurances he thought
necessary in conformity with these instructions, with the proviso that the duty of
insisting on the return of abducted persons and stolen property would not be renounced.
The High Commissioner in Constantinople had pointed out on 1st May that there were
three courses open to us. We might disinterest ourselves in whatever happened
outside the limits of our occupation, leaving the Christians to their fate ; or we might
ask the Turkish Government to take action, which they were little likely to be able or
even willing to do ; or we might make use of such elements among the Kurds as were
anxious to stand well with us. The Acting Civil Commissioner in Baghdad thought
that the third course offered the best hope for the pacification of the country, and
proposed on 12th May that we should give full assurances, as far as His Majesty's
Government was concerned, regarding amnesty and freedom from Armenian
domination in areas predominantly Kurdish. Before an answer could be received in
London, Saiyid Taha of Shamsdinan arrived at Baghdad, his visit coinciding, very
fortunately, with the outbreak of disturbances in Sulaimaniyah. . Saiyid Taha is a
man of considerable influence, political and spiritual, in north-east Kurdistan. His
grandfather, Saiyid 'Ubaidullah, was famous for an attack which he led in 1876
against Urumiyah in Persian territory, where the family owns large properties.

'Ubaidullah was interned at Constantinople with his son 'Abdul Qadir, who is the
leader there of the Kurdish national party. Another son, Sadiq, who remained in
Kurdistan, was a well-known oppressor of the Christians. His son, Saiyid Taha, had
been before the war the honoured guest of a Russian Consul, and there was at one
time an idea that he might be used as the figurehead of a nominally independent
Kurdistan under Russian auspices ; nevertheless, he managed to keep in good odour
with the Germans, and the Russians, mistrusting him, destroyed his house at Neri
where they crossed the frontier in 1916. He is related by marriage to Simko, chief of
the Shikak, and is on good terms with him. Simko has fought in turn the Russians,
the Turks and the Armenians, and is notorious for having murdered in cold blood the
Assyrian Patriarch, Mar Shim'un. The two men, Saiyid Taha and Simko, are
opportunists of the kind which Kurdistan breeds in plenty, remorselessly pursuing
their own advantage. The Christian problem touched Saiyid Taha little, but Simko*
is determined not to yield up an iota of the gains which he has acquired at the
expense of the Christians during the war. The geographical position of both among
mountains where means of communication are non-existent, makes it difficult to see
who would be prepared to coerce them.

Saiyid Taha's object in visiting Baghdad was to press for a united Kurdistan
under British auspices, including the Kurds in Persian territory. When it was
explained to him that he could expect no help from us in realising this project as far
as the Persian Kurds were concerned, he expressed great disappointment and observed
that the separation of Persian Kurdistan from Persia was certain to come, even if we
withheld our consent. Nevertheless, he accepted the position and declared his
willingness to help us in every way possible in order to establish in Kurdistan the
regime which he and his friends desired, but he asked to be satisfied on the following
points : firstly, that a general amnesty would be proclaimed ; secondly, that no
attempt would be made to set up a single chief in Kurdistan, but that the country
should be organised in large autonomous groups ; thirdly, that the repatriation of
Christians should be conditional upon an undertaking on our part that the Kurds should
not be placed under Armenian or Nestorian domination ; and fourthly,* that His
Majesty's Government would be ready to provide the same material assistance as in
the 'Iraq.

As the Siilaimaniyah rebellion was threatening the peace of the whole Kurdish
frontier, it was advisable that we should make use of Saiyid Taha's friendly senti-
ments, and the Acting Civil Commissioner gave him a letter in Persian, of which the
following is a translation : —

" I have been authorised by His Majesty's Government to assure you personally
that His Majesty's Government have no intention of adopting a vindictive policy
towards Kurds in regard to acts committed during the war, but are prepared to grant
them a general amnesty. This will not prevent the representatives of the British
Government from using their friendly endeavours to make peace between Armenians
and Kurds in regard to their personal affairs, and they will also use their best
endeavours to settle between the two parties questions relating to land in a friendly
manner without resort to armed intervention. His Majesty's Government wish me to
assure you that the interests of the Kurds are by no means being lost sight of at the
Peace Conference."

The purport of these assurances was communicated to Major Noel, who on 23rd
June issued a notification in the Kurdish areas which were under his charge,
saying:—

" The future of the country variously known as Armenia or Kurdistan is a
question which must be decided by the Peace Conference. No one need doubt that
the Peace Conference will decide in accordance with its often expressed principle
that nations have the right tb determine their own government. The British Govern-
ment has given its assurance that the interests of the Kurds are not being overlooked
at the Peace Conference. Until the decision is made known it is the duty and the
interest of all nationalities and classes in Kurdistan to preserve peace and order.
With regard to the massacres of Armenians which resulted from the orders of the
Turkish Government, civilisation demands that the officials guilty of issuing such
orders should be severely punished. Armenians responsible for the massacre of
Moslims will be dealt with in the same way. Armenian women and girls shut up in
Moslim houses must be released, and lands or houses forcibly taken from Armenians
must be restored to their lawful owners. On the other hand, the British Government
so far as it is concerned has no intention of pursuing a vindictive policy towards

Kurds in respect of acts committed during the war, and is prepared to grant them a
general amnesty. It is necessary that the two races occupying the same area should
leave tlieir wrongs in the hand of Government, shoidd relinquish private griulges and
recriminations and prepare to live together in mutual toleration and goodwill. The
British authorities desire only this, and will severely punish any such uajust acts or
false accusations as lead to perpetual hostility or promote unrest."

The notification had a good effect among the leaders of the Kurdish national
movement, while to the letter given to Saiyid Taha may be attributed the fact that no
disturbances have occurred in his district. It would have been too much to expect
that he should have broken off relations with Turkish emissaries, nor is it probable
that he did so, but he has been of use in keeping the tribes quiet round Shamsdinan
and Rawanduz, and he seems to have done his best to limit Turkish propaganda. In
the early summer it was proposed to him that he should undertake the government of
the north-eastern portion of the Rawanduz district, together with the fertile lowlands
of l)asht-i-Harir, and administer this region in addition to Shamsdinan and possible
extensions on behalf of the British Government. He was to receive an allowance and
to undertake not to intrigue in Mosul or against the Persian Government. He gave
no definite reply ; on the one hand, he may have hestitated to embrace a role which
seemed not dissimilar from that which had been assigned to Skaikh i\Iahmud, with
results which were- unencouraging ; and on the other, the fact that the British
Assistant Political Officer at Rawanduz was withdrawn to Batas, a few miles to the
west in July, owing to events at Amadiyah presently to be related, may have aroused
in his mind misgivings as to the permanence of our occupation. Jn August, as he
had not accepted the proposal, it was withdrawn, without, however, any interruption
of cordial relations, and he is reported to have become more and more anti-Turk.

Simko made overtures to us in May. He wrote in friendly terms to the Acting
Civil Commissioner, whom he had known before the war. A personal grievance,
which was from our point of view a side issue, pre-occupied him. One of the ill-
wishers, of whom he has many (on this occasion it was a Persian official), had
conceived* the idea of sending him a bomb wrapped in a parcel. His indignant
description of the episode cannot be better recorded than in his own words : " 1
barely had time," he complained, " to throw it at my brother when it went off." In
retaliation he attacked Urumiyah in June. His hostility to Persia, with which
country we concluded an agreement in August, which put an end to any lingering
hope that we would favour a national union between the Turkish and Persian Kurds,
together with his fear of reprisals on account of his treatment of Christians, tended to
throw him increasingly into the arms of the Turks.

As for other Kurdish leaders. Shaikh Mahmud of Sulaimaniyah had been
eliminated by the failure of his rebellion ; Shaikh Mahmud of the Milli was a
candidate for the hypothetical post of ruler of a united Kurdistan ; in Constantinople
'Abdul Qadir of Shamsdinan was ready to assume the same role, and the claims of
the Badr Khan, formerly rulers of Bohtan, were no less than his own ; while at a
later date Sharif Pasha in Paris notified his election as head of a future Kurdish
State, though there is no evidence to show that he was chosen by anyone but himself.
In February the Grand Vizier had been prepared to iet 'Abdul Qadir or his son go to
Kurdistan on a mission of pacification. The scheme never materialised, but a rumour
which reached his nephew and rival, Saiyid Taha, to the effect that 'Abdul Qadir was
to tour Kurdistan under our auspices, probably enhanced Saiyid Paha's inclination to
keep a foot in the Turkish camp.

Towards the end of June Major Noel was sent to Constantinople to discuss the
situation with the High Commissioner on behalf of the Acting Civil Commissioner.
They agreed that the most salient feature was the break between the Kurds and the
Turks, and the High Commissioner suggested that Major Noel should be entrusted with
a second mission to Asia Minor, and that selected members of leading Kurdish families
should l)e allowed to join him and travel through the country, with a view to
impressing on the tribes the necessity of maintaining order and protecting the
Christians. He thought that if they were enjoined not to seek nationalist ends they
would have nothing to fear from the Ottoman Government, notwithstanding the fact
that the nationalist movement was regardetl with suspicion by the Turks. Mustafa
Kamal, a Turkish General whose activities were beyond the control of his own
Government in Constantinople, though he was m close touch with the Committee of
Union and Progress, stood for Turkish interests in Asia Minor against all comers. A
League of Eastern Anatolia had been formed under his auspices in defence of
Ottoman rights, its leading principle being the integrity of Turkey, with the

corollarj' that no Greek or Armenian State should be established within its limits ;
at the same time the rights of non- Moslems were to be guaranteed and a mandatory
Power which woidd respect Turkish nationalist feelings would be welcomed. The
central Government, it was stipulated, should be based on the will of the people and
a National Assembly should be convoked. A meeting of the League was held at
Erzerum in August, but subsequently Sivas was chosen as the headquarters of the
nationalist committee, which was to all intents and purposes a Soviet. Its influence
was sufficient to bring about the resignation in October of Damad Farid's cabinet,
which it decried as non-national. When 'Abdul Uidha Pasha succeeded Damad Farid
as Grand Vizier, the new Minister of Marine went in person to Trebizond to interview
Mustafa Kamal and brought back to Constantinople a representative of the Sivas
group.

In September Major Noel left Aleppo in company with two members of the
Badr Khan family, Kamiran and Jalabat. He reported that from 'Aintab to Malatia
the Kurds, who formed from 70 per cent, to 80 per cent, of the population, were
strongly imbued with Kurdish nationalist doctrines, but, unlike the Kurds of
Diyarbakr and Mardin, they were anti-Turk. He attributed this attitude to the fact
that they were mostly Shi'ahs and to the absence of the crucial Armenian problem,
the number of Armenians having always been very small. The Defence League took
alarm at the mission, on the ground that Major Noel was trying to create disturbance
by working for an independent Kurdistan which should be free from Ottoman
control. They accused Damad Farid's Government, which had consented to his
journey, of treachery to the interests of the Ottoman Empire, and Ahmad Jevdet,
who was in command of the 13th Army Corps, attempted to arrest the two Badr
Khans. The situation threatened to become difficult, and Major Noel and his
companions were recalled from Malatia by the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian
Force. The Kurdish National Society in Constantinople protested against the action
of the Turks and declared the Malatia incident to be an affront to Kurdish honour
and national sentiment. The breach between the Kurdish and Turkish nationalist
parties has since then become more pronounced. Mustafa Kamal's adherents have
closed all Kurdish clubs in the provinces, and, according to reports, have taken
severe measures against all who were known to favour Kurdish independence.
Among Turks also, the Defence League seems to be overreaching itself. The
Anatolian peasant is growing weary of calls to arms even when they are made in the
name of the fatherland, and is beginning to see in Mustafa Kamal an impediment to
the restoration of tranquillity and prosperity rather than a patriot. But such
sentiments are as yet in embryo.

These cross currents of intrigue and the hostilities which they engendered
reacted on our relations with the Kurds on the confines of the Mosul Wilayat and were
partly responsible for the outbreaks at Amadiyah and 'Aqrah in July and November.
It was the desire of the British authorities to provide for the repatriation of the
Assyrian refugees to their home in the Tiari Mountains. The nearest and most
convenient approach lay through Amadiyah, and with this end in view British
administration had been extended in that direction. In January a detachment of
troops was placed 4 miles from Amadiyah, and an Assistant Political Officer was
appointed in the following March. The Kurds were treated with great liberality as
regards agricultural advances, and no distinction was drawn between them and the
Christians ; but the Assistant Political Officer set himself to establish order and the
basis of administration, and it brought him into inevitable collision with Kurdish
chiefs, who saw their misused independence threatened. The town of Amadiyah was
rent by a standing feud between two of its leading citizens, a feud in which all the
inhabitants were accustomed to take an enjoyable hand, to say nothing of the aghas
and saiyids of the adjoining tribes. British administration was not distasteful so long as
its activities were confined to the distribution of advances and grants, without which
the ruined villages could not start agricultural opex'ations, but when it took the
direction of collecting taxes and curbing the lawless tyranny of the aghas it appeared
in a less pleasing aspect. The Turks had taken an easier view of their official
obligations, though they had been backed by a stronger military force than was
maintained by us. Moreover, it was common knowledge that we contemplated
repatriating the Assyrians, and the Christians of Amadiyah did not fail to draw the
attention of the Moslems to the fact that their day had dawned at last. There were
outside influences ready to exaggerate talk of this nature.

But the repatriation of thousands of families to a rugged alpine region beyond
our control was not a task to be undertaken lightly, and as the spring advanced it
became evident that the return of the refugees must be postponed. There was,

therefore, no advantage to be gained in keeping troops so far from the base, especially
as the lines of communication were difficult, and in June they were withdrawn to the
Suwarah Pass, 18 miles west of Amadiyah. This left ihe Assistant Political Officer,
Captain Willey, alone in the town, with Lieut. Macdouald and Sergt. Troop in
charge of Kurdish levies and a couple of Indian telegraph clerks — confident, as the
Englishman is apt to be, and more often rightly than wrongly, that his personal
authority is sufficient protection. The malcontents saw their opportunity, and during
the night of 15th July the leaders of the town factions, with the tacit connivance of
the tribes, enlisted the services of the local gendarmerie and murdered the whole
party. There can have been no question of personal unpopularity. Captain Willey,
who was an experienced officer, had only recently been appointed to Amadiyah, while
Lieut. Macdonald was zealous, efficient, and well liked. The outbreak was a
demonstration against British authority and definitely anti-Christian in character.
Tlie Christian villages of the Amadiyah district were systematically raided, and though
the loss of life was small, crops and sheep were everywhere destroyed and lifted. The
Goyan, who had been responsible for the murder of Captain Pearson in April, and the
Guli to the north of them, took part in the rising with the Barwar tribes of Amadiyah,
and when the British punitive column approached the town the murderers fled to
Goyan country. We entered Amadiyah on 8th August and captured some of the
minor offenders after having dealt with the insurgent chiefs in the villages of Lower
Barwari. Our troops drove the Upper Barwari tribes from the mountains north of the
town and then turned their attention to the Goyan and the Guli. Two battalions of
Assyrians, trained at Ba'qubah, were attached to the expedition and acquitted them-
selves well. Operations were concluded in September, and though the tribesmen,
whose lifelong business and pleasure is guerilla warfare, had eluded us in the
mountains (as they used to elude the Turks before us), we had yet succeeded in
inspiring them with a wholesome fear and a conviction that the rising had been a
mistake and that they had been fairly beaten on their own ground. By October all
sections and, with few exceptions, all the leading offenders, had tendered their
submission. They were dealt with leniently, the punishment which had been meted
out to them by our troops having been sufficient. We appointed our own nominees
to Amadiyah and Barwari, and, having provided them with means to maintain their
authority, withdrew in December to Dohuk, half-way between Amadiyah and Mosul.
The district has been quiescent since our withdrawal.

The year was not to close without a further loss of valuable lives which, the
political service could ill spare. Shortly after the armistice, an Assistant Political
Officer had been sent to 'Aqrah, which lies north-east of Mosul near the edge of the
plain about half-way between Amadiyah and Rawanduz. The mountains which
separate 'Aqrah from the Greater Zab are the home of the Zibari Kurds, while on the
opposite bank of the river are the territories of the Shaikh of Barzan. Barzan had
had a stormy history in Turkish times. The Shaikh, 'Abdul Salim, had suffered at
the hands of the Ottoman Government, and in 1909 the Turks sent an expedition
against him with very moderate success. Nazim Pasha, who was placed in 1910 in
supreme charge of the three Wilayats of Basra, Baghdad and Mosid, patched up a
peace, but when Nazim fell in 1911 all settlement which he had succeeded in
adjusting crumbled, and at the outbreak of the war the Shaikh of Barzan was
contemplating being forced in self-defence to accept the overtures which the Russians
had frequently made to him, and seek protection from them. There was a bitter feud
between Barzan and Zibar, and the Turks, following familiar lines of procedure, made
use of Faris Agha of Zibar, and with his aid entrapped and hanged the Shaikh of
Barzan. His successor, Shaikh Ahmad, inherited his feuds but not his wits.
When British administration was established in the district, he keenly resented being
placed under 'Aqrah, which he regarded as coloured by Zibari influence, and was at
one time anxious to move into the Rawanduz district, but the project met with no
encouragement from us. Faris Agha was, however, forbidden to cross the Zab into
Barzan territory. The attempt to hold the balance antagonised both parties and gave
a promising field for Turkish propaganda, Avhich was being skilfully conducted from
Van by an ex-goveruor, Haidar Beg. Reports were current in the early winter that
Enver Pasha had arrived at Van with reinforcements consisting of Turks and Russian
deserters, and that he was in active correspondence with Situ Agha of Oramar, north
of Amadiyah, the Barwari, and other malcontents. Through Turkish mediation the
quarrel between Faris Agha of Zibar and Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan seems to have
been adjusted temporarily. Agents from Syria were engaged at the same time in
disseminating doctrines to which the Aghas turned a favourable ear, for they offered
the prospect of a distant and ineffective Islamic control under which the Aghas would

be left with the real authority, but the tribal cultivators, who would be forced to
remain iu complete subjugation to their chiefs, did not appear to view the matter in
the same light.

Colonel Leachman had been succeeded as Political Officer at Mosul by Colonel
Bill, who combined long experience Avith singular capacity as an administrator.
Being new to the Division, he wished to make himself personally acquainted with it,
with a special view to forming conclusions on the Kurdish question. He visited
'Aqrali at the end of October, imposed a fine on Faris Agha and a second Zibari chief,
Babakr Agha, the followers of both having sniped our gendarmerie, and on
1st November crossed the Zab in order to inspect the levies of a local chief. The
two Zibaris, enraged at having been called to order and fined, communicated with
Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan, who sent his brother with some 20 men to their assistance.
These, with Faris, Babakr, and their followers, amounting in all to about 100 men,
ambushed the returning British officers close to Bira Kapra, Babakr's village, and
shot them. They were accompanied by four gendarmes. Two were killed ; one of
these was an Assyrian, the other an 'Aqrah man who tried to defend his officers.
The other two were Zibaris and went over to the enemy. All evidence goes to show
that the murder of the two British officers was not planned beforehand, but was due
to one of the sudden fits of anger which are typical of Kurdish temperament, but once
accomplished it gave the signal for rebellion. The Zibaris and Barzanis attacked
and looted 'Aqrah, and the British gendarmerie officer with difficulty escaped to
Mosul. Within a- day or two the tribes quarrelled among themselves over the loot,
and the Barzanis Avent home. Several of the local tribes sent us offers of help and
protests of friendship, and when, on 9th November, Captain Kirk, Assistant Political
Officer at Batas (Rawanduz), made his way into 'Aqrah accompanied only by Kurdish
levies, he found the townsmen praying for the return of the British administration.
On the arrival of a punitive column in the Zab valley, most of the villages flew white
flags and appeared to be in genuine fear of their aghas and to welcome protection
against them.

Our troops burnt the houses of the Zibar chiefs, and crossing the Zab inflicted
the same penalty on Barzan ; but following the practice enjoined on them in the
Amadiyah expedi.tion, the villagers were not molested. The rebels were unable to
rouse the neighbouring tribes, largely owing to the loyalty to us of the leading man
near 'Aqrah, 'Abdul Qadir Agha of Shush, and no resistance was offered to our
advance ; the four culprits, Faris and Babaker of Zibar, Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan and
his brother, escaped into the hills and were outlawed. No sympathetic disturbance
took place in Amadiyah, and Saiyid Taha of Shamsdinan refused to listen to the
suggestion of the Qaimmaqam of Neri, where the Turks kept a small garrison, that he
and Situ of Oramar should co-operate on behalf of the Zibaris. His attitude caused
the Qaimmaqam uneasiness as to his own safety and he left Neri and retired north to
Bashqal'ah. When operations were concluded it was decided that we should draw in
our frontier to 'Aqrah and make no further attempt to hold the Zibar country between
'Aqrah and the Zab.

Thus by the end of the year we had ceased to administer the mountain borders
of northern Kurdistan so far as w^e had engaged in that task. From Rawanduz the
British outpost had been removed some 18 miles south-west to Batas ; thence the
line ran to 'Aqrah and Dohuk, excluding the mountain system which flanks the right
bank of the Greater Zab, and leaving Amadiyah and Zibar outside our zone. Our amval
in the first instance had been in every case welcome because we provided means to
combat the ruin and famine left by the Turks. We distributed relief with complete
impartiality to Moslems and Christians, and it is probable that the help we extended
saved what remained of the agricidtural population. But we made no secret of our
intention to repatriate the Christian refugees who had sought our protection and were
continually pressing on as their desire to return to their home, and this just design
furnished the subject-matter of the propaganda directed against us. That we could
have avoided rousing the hostility of the aghawat was from the first impossible.
" The position of the average Kurdish agha," observed Colonel Nalder in commenting
on the Zibari rising, " is incompatible with our own or any other Government. Like
" a feudal baron of the middle ages, he keeps a body of armed retainers and tyrannises
" over the cultivators at his will. The lands owned by Faris Agha and his brother
" w'^uld not assure them an income of Rs. 1,000 a year ; their wealth depends entirely
" o.i extortion from the villages and their influence from the fact that they spend the
" money thus acquired in maintaining the armed bands which enforce their authority.
" Such men cannot but view the advent of any form of settled government with
2041 • K

" concern, and when to this prejudice anti-Christian sentiments and extensive Turkish
" propaganda are added, the present feeling on the border of northern Kurdistan is
" sufficienth' explained."

The justice of this description receives further proof from the existing state of
affairs in southern Kurdistan. Shaikh Mahmud's rel^ellion led to the elimination of
an authority which exactly corresponded with Colonel Nalder's summary. The
population of Sulaimaniyah district have shown no sign of regretting him and the
country is fairly established in the path of prosperity, whereas in northern Kurdistan,
where the aghawat have beaten the administration, anarchy prevails. Besides
Sulaimaniyah, the Arbil plain presents another satisfactory feature. The district,
which is easily accessible from Mosul, is not at the mercy of ciiief tains who require
mountain strongholds from which to conduct operations with safety. The people
value administrative union with the more civilised valley of the Tigris, and have no
wish to terminate a connection with Mosul and Baghdad which is equally profitable
to either party. Arbil, including Keui Sanjaq and Rania, has been given the status
of a Division.

The position of affairs at Amadiyah continues to be tranquil. Our nominee,
'Abdul Latif Agha, has succeeded in maintaining his position. At Kawanduz the
young Isma'il Beg ibn Su'aiyid Beg has our support and the backing of a detachment
of our Kurdish levies. The arrangement has proved eminently satisfactory.

CHAPTER Vn. Development of Administration. The Revenue Department.

The addition of the Baghdad Wilayat to the occupied territories had given the
work of administration a new significance. As the rich basins of the Euphrates and
Diyalah came under control and the probability of a Turkish offensive diminished,
administrative responsibility tended to outstrip in importance military considerations.
At the same time new political factors were introduced, not the least of them being
provided by the town of Baghdad. It is essentially a capital and regards itself as
such. Although Basrah and Mosul were organised by the Turks as independent
Wilayats, Baghdad was, in fact, the seat of Ottoman sovereignty in the 'Iraq, and it
remains the source of political inspiration.

Long before the armistice the force in Mesopotamia was called upon to solve
administrative and political rather than military problems. The importance of this
aspect of the campaign was recognised by His Majesty's Government. In July 1917
the status of the Chief Political Officer was raised to that of Civil Commissioner. His
duties were thus defined : —

" The civil administration nmst be carried on under such military supervision as
the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief considers essential, Vv'ith due regard to local
conditions and prejudices, if only to prevent disorder which might necessitate the
detachment of troops urgently required elsewhere. For the present only such
minimum of administrative efficiency should be aimed at as is necessary for the
maintenance of order and to meet the requirements of the Force ; the amendment of
laws and the introduction of reforms should be kept within the narrowest possible
limits. His Majesty's Government do not wish large or controversial administrative
questions raised or referred to them until the danger of Turkish attack is
passed "

The Civil Commissioner was given the right of direct correspondence with His
Majesty's Government ; he was told to address his reports to the Secretary of State
for India, and it was henceforth in the name of the Secretary of State that the
instructions of His Majesty's Government on other than military matters were issued.
Mesopotamian administration benefited very greatly from being placed in direct
connection with the India Office, w^here its needs and difficulties were the subject of
careful attention. Sound advice and judicious support and help, as far as the India
Office could supply them, were never lacking during the difficult years before <iivil
government came into being.

On the occupation of Baghdad a separate organisation was maintained in ihe
Wilayat of Basrah under a Deputy Chief Political Officer working in close touch with
the Chief Political Officer in Baghdad. The boundaries of' the Wilayat were the same

as ill Turkish times, except that the Turkish Quimniaqainliq of Kiit was transferred
to liasrah. The southern VVilayat consisted of five distiicts, Basrah itself, Qurnah,
Nasiriyah, 'Amarah and Knt, each administered by a PoHtical Oificer, with loc;il
Assistant Political Officers under him. The towns of Basrah, Nasiriyah and 'Amarah
were controlled by Military' Governors, whose oifice became steadily more civil than
military though the title remained unchanged.

In Baghdad Wilayat, Political Officers were appointed as the occupied territory
was extended. By the end of the year 1917 they were 10 in number, placed at
Baghdad, Samarra, Ba'qubah, Khaniqin, Aziziyah, Ramadi, Hillah, Karbala, Shamiyah
and Samawah.

After a year of trial, it was decided to allow the distinction between the two
Wilayats to lapse, and the whole work of administration was co-ordinated under the
Civil Commissioner at Baghdad. This change was carried out in September 1918.
The 14 divisions of which the two Wilayats had been composed remained unaltered
till 1919, when Diwaniyah was separated from Hillah and given the status of a
division, including Samawah ; Karbala was merged with Hillah and Aziziyah with
Kut. The advance of 1918 brought two more divisions into being, Sulaimaniyah and
Mosul. In 1919 Kirkuk was separated from Sulaimaniyah and Arbil from Mosul, both
becoming independent divisions, while Khaniqin and Ba'qubah were rolled into one
in 1920.

To the Revenue Department the occupation of Baghdad brought some modifica-
tions. At the end of 1916 a Revenue Board composed of two officers had taken the
place of the Revenue Commissioner. T^'he two members of the Board divided the
work between them, each being responsible for specified branches. When Baghdad
fell, the First Revenue Officer took charge of all revenue work in the northern
Wilayat, while his colleague did the same by the southern. The First Revenue
Officer, Mr. Garbett, I.C.S., remained in charge till Jiily 1918, and with his assistants,
at first one, then two in number, grappled with the very heavy work of initial
organisation in the Baghdad Wilayat. The difficulties of the task were aggravated
by a severe shortage of food supplies, to remedy which he proposed a bold scheme of
agricultural development which will presently be described ; it was approved and
carried out by the military authorities, with Mr. Garbett as Executive Officer and
representative of the Revenue Department. He fell ill in J uly 1918, and after intervals
of renewed work left the country on sick leave in December.

Changes had already been introduced into the scheme of the Department. The
Basz-ah office was closed on the amalgamation of the two Wilayats and the records
brought up to Baghdad. At first a Revenue and Finance Secretary assumed charge
of the combinetl Department, but in the summer of 1919 the duties were divided into
Revenue Department and Financial Department, with a Secretary at the head of
either.

Beside the Agricialtural Development' Scheme, which was in charge of the military-
authorities. Departments of Irrigation and Agriculture were formed respectively in
February and July 1918 as military units working under a Board of Agi-iculture.
The Board was presided over by the Deputy Quartermaster-General and composed of
five members, the Directors of Irrigation and Agriculture and the Financial Adviser
to the Commander-in-Chief representing the military side, the Revenue and
Financial Secretary to the Civil Commissioner and the First Revenue Officer, who
acted as Secretary to the Board, representing the civil side. This division of
authority in matters which touched the administration of the civil population closely,
though inevitable at the time, was not without its difficulties. For example, local
irrigation officers possessed the power of inflicting small punishments, without
reference to the local Political Officer, for breach of irrigation regulations or failure
to fulfil orders with regard to embankments, &c. ; yet the delinquent might be a man
whom it was advisable from a political point of view to handle with caution, and in
any case the existence of separate organisations issuing orders was confusing to the
native mind. It speaks well for the manner in which the military and civil authorities
worked together that the arrangement was carried out smoothly till 1919, "when
progress towards peaceful conditions permitted the handing over of irrigation and
agriculture to the civil authorities, who were now in a position to assume these
responsibilities.

From the point of view of an outgoing enemy Government the Turkish system
possessed one admirable feature. All the records were centred at headquarters and
the persons who knew anything about revenue work were remarkably few. It was
possible to destroy the records and remove personnel. This was done. When we

K a

readied Baghdad there was no revenue demand statement for a single tax on which
collection could be made, and there were no officials remaining at their posts. There
was a general idea prevalent among the people that the Turks would return, and there
was the history of Kut affording an effective warning to many who might otherwise
have volunteered their services. Not only Avere there no registers left, but the land
records had been taken away.

There was need for rapid decisions. The First Revenue Officer reached Baglidad
on 22nd March. The harvest begins on 15th April, and before it is ripe crop
inspection should be made and demand statements issued. The collection of the
Government share on the crop was considered important for two reasons. In the first
place the provision of foodstuffs locally would lessen the tonnage required at a time
when freight was particularly precious ; and secondly, pajaneut of revenue would
have a moral effect in so much as it was the outward and visible sign of the Arabs'
alleged submission. Payment of revenue is considered the measure of allegiance.
Revenue, therefore, had to be collected, and a system had to be devised which, while
in accordance with the fiscal policy of the late Government, should be acceptable to
the people and speedy in operation.

The easiest plan would have been to fall back upon the farming of taxes, but
there were two great objections. In the first place, the class of Baghdadis who usually
bid at such auctions were uncertain both as to the temper of the tribes and as to the
extent to which the new administration would enfoi'ce their rights. In the second,
important as it was to assert the existence of peaceful conditions by the actual
collection of revenue, the crops generally Avere small, and it Avas still more important
to gain the confidence of the cultivator so that measures for future development
should be Avelcomed. For this development the acquisition of detailed information
was immediately necessary, and the farming of taxes would in no Avay help towards
that end.

The system of collection from a single shaikh, AA-hich had proved so convenient
in parts of the Basrah Wilayat, was impossible, for the practice of farming large
estates (muqata'ahs) to tribal leaders, to AA'hich it Avas a sequel, had not been adopted
in Baghdad. There were, therefore, neither shaikhs accustoLned to take the
responsibility nor records from Avhich any just assessment could be made. The
Turkish Government had collected its dues from the landlord only in the case of such
lands as were both proprietary and situated in Avhat may be terjued the submissive
area. On Government lands and areas in Avhich control Avas not strong, they had
collected direct from the sub-lessee, the sarkal. It seemed necessary for the new
system also to work doAvn to the sarkal. The bringing of Government into direct
relations Avitli the sarkals had an advantage and a danger. The smaller the imit Avith
which Ave work the more accurate is the information Ave obtain, and the greater,
therefore, the assistance that Ave can afford. The danger is lest the already rapidlj^
moving process of disintegration be accelerated, and the power of the shaikh be
Aveakened. It Avas felt tliat this danger could be averted by insisting, Avherever
possible, on the responsibility of the shaikh for his sarkals and by giving him a
financial interest in the collection of revenue in his area. In pursuance of this policy
certain rebates of the GoA'ernment share were made in such a way as to give the
shaikh a share.

The best managed estates in 'Iraq had been the Sanniyah, or CroAvn lands. It
was, therefore, decided to adopt the Sanniyah system tentatively and apply it for
laud administration to the province as a whole. As each district came under control
a Political Officer was appointed to it. Sub-divisions of the districts were made,
following the lines of mudirates and other knoAvn divisions Avhere these existed,
and permanent mamurs Avere appointed, together with a permanent staff, for the
management of canals and granaries and for carrying messages. The area of a
mamurat depended on the density of cultivation. In the Hillah district there Avere
eight ; in 'Aziziyah, for an equally long strip of territory, there Avere at first only two.
Over the mamurs in each district a Mudir Mai Avas appointed, whose duties are to act
as revenue assistant, to collect and check accounts, and generally to furnish the
Political Officer Avith knoAvledge of local conditions in revenue matters.

The agricultural situation with which the Political Officers and their ncAvly-
appointed mamurs were faced may be summarised as follows : —

On the Tigris from Samarra to the vicinity of Baghdad all cultivation had been
destroyed. The actions in the neighbourhood of Balad and Istabulat had l)een
fought at a time Avhen the crop Avas ripe. What the Turks had not eaten they had
destroyed. Nearer Baghdad the rain and flood had failed. This was the third bad

season in succession, and stocks of vegetable seeds, cereals, and, most important of
all, fodder, had been reduced to a minimum. The feeding of agricultural stock
throughout the summer proved a most serious problem. From Baghdad to Kut there
was no cultivation except on a few lifts and an area in the Jazirah, where the ground
was still moist from the flood of 1915. Cultivation on flood lands such as this is
known as Chibis. The Turks had deliberatelj' removed the tribes from the river
banks and forbidden agriculture. On the Diyalah, in the Ba'qubah area, military
operations resulted in the destruction of many acres of green crops, and when in
September the head works of the canals came into our possession, roads and railways
were laid down so rapidly that a very large number of watercourses had to be
blocked. Tn Khaniqin the Russians and the Turks had devoured all that there was,
so that at the time of the British occupation the land was in the grip of famine. On
the Euphrates the inundation canals north of Musaiyib were Ijadly silted and
yielded a very small harvest. In the Musaiyib and Hillah districts there had been
very heavy sowings in the area commanded by the canals ; but the barrage not
being under control, and the rainfall having been scanty, the yield of the mature
crop Avas lighter than usual. Karbala and the lands round it had been flooded.
Many houses had fallen down and large swamps formed where before there were
gardens. On the Dagharah there seemed to have been a good crop, but the grain
there was in the hands of two or three of the cleverest and strongest men in the
'Iraq, and the full wealth of the district was for long kept concealed. The
breaching of the Saqlawiyah dam had so reduced the waters of the Euphrates
that twice the rice crops sown in the Shamiyah district failed to mature, while
the third sowing was only partially successful. In the Diwaniyah district the
pumps that existed in the main channel were useless for lack of oil ; the canals had
silted up years before, when the Hillah channel diminished.

These were the material conditions. The tribal aspect also presented difficulties
to agriculture. The Turkish authorities, their attention concentrated on the war, had
found little time to compose quarrels between those hereditary enemies, the town
landlord and the tribal cultivator. Hillah had been openly in revolt, and the land-
lords did not dare to venture near their properties. Where land was cultivated it
was cultivated by the tribes without any reference to the proprietors.

The admitted discrepancy between Turkish law and Turkish practice was an
added complication. Many of the anomalies of the Turkish laud system had been
mitigated by the laxity of the executive ; but British officials were frequently expected
to apply a law which in the 'Iraq, at any rate, had often been a dead letter.

The first essential was u revenue system that would enable the authorities at
headqxiarters to understand and remove the immediate difficulties of the cultivator.
Capitalist farming on a large scale was impossible ; the problem was to ascertain the
requirements of a holding of 10 or 15 acres, and to multiply such holdings up to the
limits of the cultivable land.

The next step was the remission of such portion of the Turkish demand as
seemed excessive. All cesses, except on the date tax, which was a fixed tax per
tree, and, compared with current prices, extremely low, were suspended, and the
Government percentage was reduced in areas in which the rate was abnormally high.

A great portion of the agricultural land in the Baghdad Wilayat is irrigated by
permanent canals, and the necessity of controlling irrigation was at once apparent.
Many canals are privately owned. In peace time it was incumbent on the proprietor
to maintain an overseer, whose wages were about £T.l per mensem, and whose duty
was the distribution of water. Canal clearance had also to be arranged, and for this
local engineers were engaged. Pending the establishment of an irrigation staff,
these duties were at first undertaken by the revenue officials.

By far the most important irrigation work which claimed attention was the
great dam at the offtake of the Hindiyah channel from the Euphrates below Musaiyib.
This division of the stream into two channels makes the fortunes of the Hillah and
Shamiyah Divisions, but for lack of control the distribution of water between the
Hindiyah and the Euphrates has been subject to destructive fluctuations. The
Hindiyah branch is of very ancient date. Sir William AVillcocks believes it to be
the Gihon of Genesis^ and the Pallacopus of Alexander's time. Periodically the
Hindiyah scours its bed, and threatens to draw off all the Euphrates water. This was
probably what was happening when Alexander conceived the idea of making Babylon
the capital of his world empire, and he set himself to secure the water supply of the

1 " from the Garden of Eden to the Crossing of Jordan,"' page 14.

city by the construction of a new head to the Pallacopus. The same conditions
recurred at the beginning of this century ; the Hindiyah took more and more water,
flooding the country through which it flowed, while the Euphrates shrank, until
Hillah, the modern Babylon, was waterless in summer. The Ottoman Government
entrusted the construction of the barrage to Messrs. Jackson, after Sir William
Willcocks had represented the urgent necessity of the work, and it was completed
shortly before the outbreak of war. British engineers visited it in May 1917, and
found that it had suffered insignificant damage, but the Turks had failed to com-
plete the subsidiary works on which its utility depended, namely, two canals, which
take off, one on either side of the Hindiyah, above the barrage. One had not even
been begun, the other was only partly finished. The completion of the work was put
in hand by us in May, the work being undertaken by the tribes, under the super-
vision of Shaikh 'Umran al Sa'dun of the Bani Hasan, and paid for by the Political
Officer of Hillah. As the military irrigation service extended, the Revenue Depart-
ment handed over control here and elsewhere. Water flowed down the two loop
canals in time to permit of the winter sowings of wheat and barley, and the (-otmtry
on either side of the Hindiyah, after having lain barren for several years, was in
January 1918 covered with springing barley. On the Diyalah the 'Awaijah dam,
which makes possible the distribution of water from that river, Avas till September
dominated by the Turkish position, but after a number of failures the Political Officer
at Ba'qubah diplomatically arranged for its reconstruction by Arab labour. The
Dagharah canal was first visited by British officers in September, and an irrigation
district was created here in November. This important canal, taking off from the
Euphrates between Hillah and Samawah, feeds what was and is one of the most
fertile areas in Mesopotamia — the Babylonian City of Nippur lies in its basin. For
years the Turks had had no authority in this region ; the canal was lined with the
mud forts of the shaikhs, and for some months after we took over tribal feuds
continued to menace the British peace ; but in 1918 the tribes vohmtarily determined
to destroy their forts, and within a few weeks they had carried out this remarkable
]'epudiation of their former habits. In the Shainiyah, a wonderfully productive
district below Najaf, there was no irrigation staff till the end of December ; the
construction of bunds and clearance of canals was supervised by the revenue mamurs.
Here also tribal conditions quickly exhibited a remarkable improvement. The Turks
had encouraged on the two branches of the Hindiyah (for the channel sub-divides
below Kifl, to reunite in the k=!hinafiyah marshes) the settlement of purely agricultural
tribes, more amenable to their authority than the half-nomadic Khaza'il and Bani
Hasan confederations. There was constant trouble between the newcomers and the
older possessors, in addition to which wild tribal groups, such as the Shibil, south of
Najaf on the edges of the desert, were so fortunately situated between marsh and open
wilderness that the Ottoman Government had been imable to coerce them into a
semblance of submission. The expectation of advantage to be derived from the help
which was given to cultivation led gradually to peace and obedience. But the
Shamiyah presented irrigation problems Avhicli have not yet .been solved satisfactorily,
and the district benefited less than the upper Hindiyah or the Hillah district and was
consequently not so well contented.

In addition to work carried out on the regular canal systems, advantage was
taken of facilities for occasional irrigation. North of Fallujah the Saqlawiyah
depression extends from the Euphrates to the 'Aqarquf marsh and thence to the
Tigris south of Baghdad. The head of this valley, to quote once more Sir William
Willcocks, has been for all time dammed, lest the Euphrates waters should scour the
channel and be diverted into the Tigris. Xenophon's account of the campaign of the
10,000 would seem to indicate that Artaxerxes entangled the army of Cyprus in the
overflow of the Saqlawiyah by cutting the dams after the battle of Cunaxa ; and with
the object of flooding Baghdad and thereby hindering our advance, the Turks resorted
to the same method. They came within an ace of success, as far as Baghdad was
concerned. The flood water filled the Hor 'Aqarquf and lapped against the Baghdad-
Samarra railway embankment. The Fallujah road was endangered and the flood was,
therefore, headed up by a bund, on the other side of which were a military road and
railway, and beyond them again a cultivable area that required only water and
cultivators to produce a crop. The authorities were approached and sanction was
eventually given to construction by the Arabs of culverts at spots selected by the road
engineers in communication with the railway authorities, while one Arab mamur was
appointed to allot the areas for cultivation and another to see that damage was not
done to the embankment.

From the crops so grown, 516 tons of fodder were cut green and supplied to the
army at the end of July, and altogether a harvest worth some 40,000L was raised.
Grass sprang round the edge of the retreating flood, and as the site of the depression
is Government land, a portion was reserved to be made into hay. Arab mounted
guards were asked for, but the proposal was modified and footmen only were sanctioned.
Nevertheless 2,800 tons of hay were preserved and brought in. The cost of the watch-
men was more than repaid by the fines levied from trespassing cattle. But the
diminution of water in the Euphrates, caused by the cutting of the Saqlawiyah bund
prior to the occupation, was felt as far down as Nasiriyah, to the detriment of
cultivation.

Previous to the posting of an officer to Hillah it was believed that the crops on
the Eiiphrates were heavy ; but in June 1917, when for the first time correct informa-
tion was forthcoming, it became apparent that the harvest there too had been below
normal, and that only by the expenditure of considerable capital and the careful
organisation of labour could the countrj' be restored to prosperity. The situation in
that month led to the decision that such expenditure could be justified only as a
military measure, and should be embarked upon to the extent necessary to produce
the grain and fodder required for military purposes, over and above the normal food
supply of the country. The First Revenue Officer accordingly drew up in July the
scheme previoiisly alluded to. It was officially termed the Agricultural Development
Scheme, and its object was to extend the irrigation programme on the Euphrates
channels so as to include the clearance of all canals, Government or privately owned,
as well as the provision of means to make cultivation possible throughout the
commanded area. These means comprised both political control, so that the tribes
should remain tranquil and cultivators should be forthcoming, and financial support,
so that seed and cash for the purchase of cattle and ploughs should be available.
Some six times the cropped area which had matured in the preceding year was
required, but famine threatened, and the price of grain was so high that holders were
tempted to sell or eat their seed stores. To make certain that the sclieme would
succeed it was necessary, therefore, to be able to advance seed for the area over and
above that which the cultivators would normally sow.

The scheme received administi'ative sanction on 14th August and final approval
on 19th September. The First Revenue Officer was appointed Administrator under the
Civil Commissioner, and it was laid down that the machinery to be used should be the
existing revenue system, supplemented, to begin with, by two political officers and
such other Arab staff as might become necessary.

Thbiigh the scheme was at first confined to a specific area on the Euphrates, the
further advance of the British in September made it possible to extend operations to
areas— still, however, strictly defined — on the Tigris and the Diyalah. Later, on
28th November, sanction was accorded to the development of all cultivable area in
both Wilayats which had not for military reasons been left vacant. At the same time
the Administrator was directed to report to the Deputy Quartermaster-General instead
of to the Civil Commissioner, and he acted as liaison officer responsible both to the
civil and military authorities.

When the sclieme had been sanctioned, a meeting of landowners in Baghdad and
Hillah was held and the intention of Government stated. They were invited to
co-operate and offered assistance, l)ut at the same time they were warned that no one who
neglected his lands would be entitled as of right to the landlord's share in the next
harvest. A tour was then made of the tribal areas and all the sarkals at each centre
summoned and the scheme explained. The forthcoming improvement of the canal
system and the necessity of preserving seed was impressed on them. The Chief
Political Officer had authorised tlie grant of certain concessions to the leading shaikhs
in return for their co-operation, and as a result the provision of seed for almost all the
Hillah canals was guaranteed without further assistance from Government.

The custom of the country ordains that the fallah is primarily responsible for
seed. If he cannot provide it from his sowings he must borrow it. When seed was
advanced to the cultivators of Sultan 'Abdul Hamid's extensive private estates, the
cultivator repaid at harvest only weight for weight. W^hen seed was borrowed from
private sources, the lender secured the best terms he coidd, sometimes a percentage
of the fallah's share of the crop, amounting possibly to five times the value of the
seed received at sowing time. It was necessary that the fallah should sow as much
of his own seed as possible. Whether the scheme was to accomplish all it aimed at
or not, the new crop would be a heavier one than its predecessor, and prices, which
had soared to an unprecedented height, were bound to fall. Everyone, therefore,

who conld obtain seed on easy terms from Government would sell his own and sow
what he borrowed.

This was the first year of our government, and the agricultural population was
anxious to be considered as having the right to possession of as much land as
possible. Tapu owners, i.e., owners of freehold titles, by the terms of their title
deeds, can be called upon to forfeit whatever land they have neglectfully left
uncultivated for three years. Landowners in general were warned that if they did
not cultivate their estates Government would take over the management of them, and
no guarantee would be given as to the time at which or the terms on which the
lands would be restored. If they claimed that thej^ had no seed, seed would be
provided at current market rates, to be repaid at the rates prevailing at harvest.

These measures, combined with the promise of future profit that was held out
by high prices, succeeded in inducing cultivators to soav all available seed ; so much
BO that the problem in many districts, particularly Samarra, Baghdad, Hindiyah and
parts of Ba'qubah, was to keep the fallahin and their cattle alive till the harvest.

When it became obvious that all their own seed had been sown, our terms were
modified by the insertion of two conditions, the first reducing the price of the seed
grain supplied to a level below market rates, and the second stipulating that at
harvest in no case would less than grain for grain or more than two grains for one
be taken.

The provision of an irrigation staff and the offer of advances of seed and money
required by the cultivators were not in themselves sufficient to secure cultivation.
Irrigation demands co-operation, and combined effort is possible only where there
is control. Three years of war had left tribal cultivators more independent than
ever. There were tribes, such as the Jubur, on the Hillah channel below Hillah,
split into sections, the sarkals of which were disinclined to recognise any shaikh.
There were others, such as the Albu Sultan on the opposite bank, who recognised
their shaikh, but were openly disobedient. It was, therefore, a point of policy to
restore the power of sarkals and shaikhs, and the Agricultural Development Scheme
was most successful in areas where this control was most firmly established.

Inter-tribal jealousies were another danger. The Juhaish and Mu'amarah
tribes, whose area extends along the north of the Hillah and south of the Musaiyib
districts, were at feud ; but for the composition of their differences by political action
a large area would have been thrown out of cultivation.

Another tribal trouble that lost to us the Abu Ghuraib lands west of Baghdad
during 1917 was due to the war. The Zoba' tribes were pro-Turkish until the fall
of Ramadi brought them definitely under our control ; after they had made submission
they paid their revenues, and work proceeded satisfactorily, but too late to be more
than of very little use for the spring crop.

It would be difficult to estimate the proportion of the crop of 1918 which was
due directly to the Agricultural Development Scheme combined with the operations
of the Irrigation Department, but the army was able to procure between 50,000 and
60,000 tons of grain from the spring crop, and the needs of the civil population were
supplied also. The cost of importing this amount of grain from India would have
been close upon 1,000,0001. ; but, apart from the financial aspect, the continuance of
food shortage and high prices must inevitably have led to political unrest, while
agricultural development was the strongest weapon we possessed in the pacification
of the tribes. Not only was Mesopotamia safeguarded from famine, but by releasing
the grain which had been stored against another lean year we were able to feed the
Bedouin, and thereby to keep them in order, and to succour the Kurds on both sides
of our frontier. Added to which India was progressively relieved of the task of
supplying Mesopotamia, and transport difficulties were lightened correspondingly.

The fruit and vegetable gardens round the towns are irrigated almost always,
not by flow, but by lift. Before the war a number of oil pumps had been introduced
into the country and eagerly bought by the cultivators. Arrangements were made
for their examination by mechanics sent out by the Revenue Department ; they were
registered by the local Political Officer, and necessary repairs were executed in the
military shops. The provision of oil was a difficulty. In the middle of 1918 a
scheme was brought into effect whereby, through the co-operation of the military
authorities (particularly the Inland Water Transport Department), the agents of the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Political Officers, a supply at a reasonable price
of the minimum quantity of oil required for irrigation pumps was ' assured. The
scheme was made to AA^ork so satisfactorily that two months later it was extended to
the Basrah Wilayat also.

Prior to the establishment of the Military Directorate of Agriculture as a branch
of the Board of Agriculture, a military agricultiiral orgauisation was in existence
■ which took charge of all Government farms, gardens and other cultivation carried out
by or for the benefit of the Force. The Deputy Director, together with his staff,
were placed at the disposal of Mr. Garbett, the Administrator of the Agricultural
Development Scheme, and by giving advice to Arab cultivators, as well as by
assisting military units to start vegetable gardens, they stimulated the production of
vegetables, so necessary to the health of the Force. Dairy farms and grass farms
grew up during 1918 under military supervision, and an experimental cotton farm,
controlled for the military authorities by the Administration of the Agricultural
Development Scheme, was established.

In a previous chapter the Tapu Department, organised by Midhat Pasha for the
purpose of registering rights, has been mentioned. Tapu was placed, under British
administration, in the control of the Revenue Department, but so imperfect and
confused was the Turkish system that for seven months after the occupation of Basrah
the Tapu office was closed to permit of the reduction of its archives to some sort of
order. When it was reopened it dealt only with urban and garden properties and was
forbidden to register transactions in agricultural lands, since questions of ownership
in the latter went to the root of the Turkish agrarian system and could not be
decided till the relative claims of tribal occupant and landlord had been determined.
Nor was any attempt made to enforce registration, a measure which had never been
taken by the Ottoman Government. By the end of 1919 Tapu offices had been opened
in five other towns in the Basrah Wilayat and in all the Divisions of the Baghdad
Wilayat, while in Mosul the Turkish office, Avithin the above-mentioned limitations,
continued its functions uninterruptedly after the occupation. The Tapu Department
is organised under a Director responsible to the Revenue Secretary, assisted by an
Arab adviser and two Arab inspectors. The headquarters office is at Baghdad, with
sub-headquarters at Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul and Sulaimaniyah, each of which has, or
will shortly have, a special Tapu officer. Each Division has a staff of mamurs and
clerks distributed among the towns of the Division as required ; they work under the
Political Officers on lines indicated by Tapu headquarters.

The registration of town properties is well advanced ; in all the larger towns
lists of properties have now been completed. That the work is not terminated is due
partly to the absence of many property owners and the loss of large numbers of
documents during the war. Advantage has been taken by some of the more intelligent
owners to verify and correct their Turkish deeds on the new record maps. No new
deeds are now issued unless the property is recorded and checked on the maps.
Among the cases where applications have been received for copies of entries in the
old Turkish registers, it has been found occasionally that the site indicated did not
exist, or that only a portion of the property is registered. The decision that the Auqaf
Department should register all its property in Tapu will enable many tiresome questions
to be settled. The Auqaf Department was required by the Turkish regulations to
register, but it never did so, and there was thus no recognised practice to show the
way through the rather conflicting regulations regarding the payment of fees. It was
finally decided that the Auqaf Department was liable, but that, as its failure to register
in Turkish times was largely the fault of the Tapu authorities, fees on the initial
registration would be levied at a lower rate than usual and arrangements would be
made for paj'^ment by instalments.

The rapid progress made in the mapping of the towns of the 'Iraq has been due
largely to the assistance of the Air Force. Air photographs, as adjusted by the
Department of Surveys, have made it possible to compile maps of towns which must
otherwise have gone unmapped for years.

While a Tapu sanad does not confer an absolute title, the fact that no sanad
issued by the Baghdad Tapu Department since the occupation has been cancelled by
a court, and that a decrease in the number of cases in the courts relating to freehold
property has been noticed since the Tapu Department began its work, may be taken
as a fair indication that the Tapu sanad gives the holder a good prima facie case. The
complete register of properties is an ideal which may some day be attained, but the
closer the problem is examined the fvxrther the goal recedes. If every owner cr
possessor of real property had a title-deed guaranteed by Government, the land
registration system of the 'Iraq would be perfect, but the Shar'ah law of succession
alone makes this almost impossible. It has resulted in a subdivision of property so
minute that there is a case on record where a single date tree and the land just
2041 L

sufficient to support it are owned by 21 persons in partnership. There are many cases
where the denominator of the fraction indicating the respective shares of the partners
is a figure of many millions, and this denominator is not constant. Every death in a'
property-owning family involves a readjustment of shares, always of some and some-
times of all the partners. This is only one-— though it is the most weighty — of the
considerations which make it unwise to impose a legal penalty for the nou-registration
of all properties. The confidence which the reorganised Tapu Department is inspiring
has already had its effect ; it is possible that a reduction in the rate of fees would be
even more effective.

Until a general survey of agrarian rights could be instituted it was inadvisable to
register transfers of agricultural land officially, lest such registration should be
regarded as confirming claims which might afterwards be proved untenable. In all
tribal areas the question at issue is practically the same, namely, the confiicting claims
of Tapu owners, usually townsmen holding Ottoman title deeds, disputed or undisputed,
and of the tribal occupiers of the land.

There was a further consideration of importance. It was feared that Arab
proprietors might be tempted by war conditions, whether they took the form of
temporary impoverishment or a sudden rise in the value of real property, to part with
their estates, either to local non-Arabs or to foreigners, and that consequently when
the time for resuming civil government returned the administration might be faced
with a vast and not necessarily beneficial change in the composition of the landed
class. Accordingly a notification was issued in November 1917, stating that "owing
" to the defection of many officials of the Tapu Department and the destruction of
" records, and for other administrative reasons, the alienation of immovable property
" situated within the occupied territories of Mesopotamia to persons other than Arabs
" of the occupied territories will not be recognised, unless the previous sanction of the
" General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, or some other person authorised by him on
" his behalf, has been obtained in writing."

Apart from measures necessitated by special conditions, which were dealt with
by the Agricultural Development Scheme, the organisation of revenue work in the
Baghdad Wilayat followed much the same lines as in Basrah. The cultivated area is,
however, larger, and the questions that presented themselves for solution were more
numerous. The Turk has a genius for lack of uniformity, and he applied his peculiar
gifts with notable success to every branch of his revenue system. Not only did the
methods of assessment present great variety, but the dues claimed differed with a
bewildering frequency, and no study could discover an underlying principle to serve
as a clue in this labyrinth. But it may be assumed that the demand of the Ottoman
Government exceeded any figure which could truthfully be set down as receipts,
or which anyone expected so to be set down. In the Baghdad Wilayat agriculture
is carried on by a fallah, who is the servant of the sarkal or sub-lessee. Whether
the Government or a private person is the landlord, the unit of cultivation is
almost invariably the sarkal. In settled areas, where the power of the proprietor
was strong and his rights enforceable in the law courts, the Government looked
normally to the owner for the payment of revenue ; but if the owner chose to
contract with the farmer that he should pay revenue. Government dues were collected
from the latter without reference to the proprietor. If a sarkal defaulted, the
ordinary procedure was to send a posse of gendarmes to live with him as his
" guests " until he had paid his revenue in full. This course was only possible in
areas in which thi; Turkish Government was strong enough to enforce its rights.
Elsewhere a bargain was more or less deliberately struck with the tribes, who agreed
to pay just so much revenue as would suffice to make the* movement of troops to
recover the balance unremunerative.

The ability of a landlord to collect his rent depended partly on his relations with
the local executive authorities and partly on his power of bargaining with the shaikh.
If the executive desired to assist, they would lend gendarmes and treat debtors of the
proprietor as if they were debtors of the State. More usually a bargain was entered
into with the shaikh, who, it is asserted, often succeeded in wringing from the landlord
half the amount collected from the fallah.

Pending an agrarian settlement, the British administration encouraged owners
and cultivators to come to a compromise in the matter of the owner's share, and the
number of complaints received by Political Officers was small. Nevertheless, as was
pointed out by the officer in charge of the Hillah Division, even though the Ottoman
rule had been there something better than a fiction, the cultivator had paid far more,
alike to Government, Tapu owner, and 'Uqr holder during the year following the

occupation than at anj' previous time. The good prices paid in markets encouraged
him to acquiesce, but as settled conditions became established it was inevitable that
we should be faced with a demand from owners of their full pound of flesh and that a
definite polic}' woidd have to be laid down. Examples were not infrequent where the
Baghdad landlord holding a Tapu sanad had never in Turkish times ventured to visit
his estate oi- received more than a small fraction of his rent from the tribal cultivators,
who snapped their fingers at his title deed ; yet when British administration had
made the roads safe and passable he would go himself to his lands and put in claims
for duf^s which it was certain the tribes would never recognise. Another very grave
issue was the right of the Tapu owner to eject tenants at will when those tenants were
the ancient tribal possessors of the soil. There was danger that the exercise of such
rights would lead first to tribal unrest and consequent disturbances of the public
peace, and later to the rapid dissolution of the tribal system without the provision of
a proper substitute. Cases of doubtful claims involved a different set of difficulties
no less urgent.

The long delay in the conclusion of peace with Turkey, which prevented a definite
pronouncement as to the future of Mesopotamia, affected the administration harmfully
at every point. Temporary measures, which were bearable during the first year,
were apt to become irksome in the second and intolerable in the third. Nowhere was
the need of a definite settlement more pressing than in matters connected with land ;
indeed, it was impossible entirely to postpone it.

When more than two years had passed since the occupation of Baghdad, the
Revenue Secretary, Colonel Howell, came to the conclusion that in a matter of such
vital importance as title in land it was impossible to carry on from hand to mouth any
longer. In May 1919 a circular was issued outlining the land policy which should
be adopted by the British administration and detailing the lines on which an
agrarian survey should be carried out. Colonel Howell qtioted the weighty vvoi'ds
pronounced in 18-39 by Sir James Thomason, afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the
Wjrtli- West Provinces, and called on all officers engaged in the survey to remember
" that the object of investigation is not to create new rights, but to define those that
exist." In Colonel Howell's view, action was imperative in the Divisions jof Baghdad,
Basrah, Hillah, and Mosul, where the land is mostly held by owners of Tapu sanads
and the Tapu Department, as a record of lights, is at its best. " If we succeed," he
wrote, " in making it a proper registry of title here, we shall be able to do it else-
" v/here. If it proves impossible here, it will be more impossible elsewhere. In
" India the record of rights in land maintained by the Revenue Department is in no
'' sense a registei- of title. It is merely a record of possession, and the entries in it
" give no more than presumption in favour of the person named, which is at any
" time liable to be challenged and rebutted in a court of law. The record is, in fact,
" more viseful to the collector of land revenue than to anyone else. So far as I have
" been able to ascertain, it was the sheer difficulty of maintaining an accurate record
" in a country where holdings are minute and tenancies complicated, that prevented
" the Indian Government from attempting the more an)bitious task of maintaining a
" registry of title. In this country the Turks were appai"ently of opinion that the
" thing could be done, and kept their Tapu Department to do it. This being so,
" although it cannot be denied that the Tapu Department was a failure, we have, 1
" think, no choice but to take over the Turkish machine and so improve it that we
" shall succeed where they failed, and where the Indian Government has not ventured
*' to try. If we can succeed, the freedom from the incubus of unending litigation,
" which is the curse of Indian rural life, will be ample reward."

Colonel Howell's opinion was supported ])y Colonel Wilson, Acting Civil
Commissioner, and during the winter of 1919-20 a beginning was made by
appointing a Settlement Officer and staff to two of the four Divisions where
decisions were urgent. But the completion of the agrarian settlement m-ust be a
matter of several years, and it will be necessary in many districts to find temporary
solutions. Perhaps the most difficult to deal with is the Muntafiq (Nasiriyah)
Division, where the divergent claims of landlords, mostly of the Sa'dun family, and
that of the tribes have already been described. In 1919 a temporary arrangement
was tried whereby, when the parties had been unable to come to terms. Government
should collect 30 per cent, of the crops and surrender to the owner, if his position as
owner had previously been admitted, half the amount realised. In such cases the
owner would have no right to interfere in the management of the estate. Where,
however, the so-called owner had come to terms with the tribes, the agreement

L 2 .

between tiiem, whether attested bj' an Assistant Political Officer or not, should be
understood as made with his consent and enforced, unless it was obviously grossly
unfair, either through undue influence exerted at the time of completion or by reason
of subsequent calamity. Repudiation of contract should only be allowed in very
rare cases, especially where the contract had been ratified bj- the Assistant Political
Officer.

This decision was -announced at a public meeting by the Revenue Secretary,
and stress was laid on the point that it was intended as a provisional measure to
apply to the winter and summer crops of 1919 only. It was received at the time
with satisfaction by the tril:)esmen and by most of the smaller Sa'dun. The more
influential Sa'dun accepted it as a reasonable compromise for temporary use, but
expressed the hope that it would not be made permanent.

The result has been that Government has collected from the tribes, in cases
falling under the first head, a revenue demand of 30 per cent., and in cases falling
under the second head at the 15 per cent, rates. The tribes have paid in full.

Having collected a large sum of money for payment to Sa'dun and other land-
lords, Assistant Political Officers were confronted with the task of investigating claims.
The difficulties besetting this work can only- be realised from actual experience. In
many cases deeds were acquired in the most irregular manner, and not in accordance
with the provisions of the Tapu law ; added to this, the wording of the title deeds
is extremely vague. Tracts measuring thousands of acres are shamelessly recorded
as being two or three donums in extent, merely to avoid the payment of full registration
fees to Government. The boundaries of holdings are given in the vaguest terms —
quite incapable of practical interpretiou on the spot. A map, prepared on the basis
of information contained in the title deeds, would be a mass of criss-cross boundaries
impossible to unravel. Vast areas, stretching as far as the eye can see, and supporting
thousands of tribesmen, thus form, as it were, the fiefs of various branches of the
Sa'dun, who for many years have not ventured to force an entry upon the land they
claim. It is in these circumstances that Assistant Political Officers are called upon to
decide the matters at issue.

In Suq district, where the agrarian problem is more acute than elsewhere in the
Division, over 200 claims are pending investigation. When it is remembered that
Suq district covers an area of 2,750 square miles and that it is one of the most thickly
populated districts in 'Iraq, it is unnecessary to add that the Assistant Political
Officer has been able to make only slow progress in the work involved. It has been
found necessary to send a special officer to Suq to cope with it.

Though the landlord under the scheme carried out in 1919 has received in most
cases a sum much larger than he has ever j'et been able to obtain, the Sa'dun are
deprived of the full rights of possession which they claim. Nor are the tribesmen
satisfied. Thej' have represented from the first that their position with regard to the
Sa'dun was forced on them by the 'I'urkish Government and that for years they have
paid only what they were willing to pay, which in some districts had, for the ten years
before the British occupation, amounted to nothing. They fear any scheme which
shall give official sanction to rights which they deny. The Sa'dun family numbers
from 5,000 to 7,000 souls, and as a class also they must be considered ; yet it would
be fatal to reinstate them on their lands. A land settlement commission is to begin
wprk in the autumn of 1920, but agrarian legislation will be needed if a final solution
is to be reached.

In the Hillah and Kut Divisions, where similar problems are rife, the policy
forced by circumstances upon the local officer has been to levy the revenue demand
on the tribal occupant, who alone can keep the land cultivated and protected from
flood ; to shield him from eviction at the Avill of the absentee landlord and to leave
the latter to make his own arrangements for the recovery of his share of the crop.
No other policy was feasible, but it would be idle to contend that this has been
wholly satisfactory. Indeed, it is only the general rise in prices and the extension
of the cultivated area, by which the Tapu holders have been able to draw rents larger
than they ever got before, which have kept them quiet. It is in the construction of
new canals that the hope of solution lies in the Hillah region. If there is land
enough and to spare for everyone, and if Article 68 of the Turkish Land Law —
under which Tapu land left uncultivated for three years continuously without excuse
escheats to the State —can be rigorously applied, the problem will solve itself. In
Kut, at least upon lands along the Tigris, where the Tapu holder is less commonly an
absentee. Government is attempting to deal directly with him. It remains to be seen
how this will work.

Settleiuent work lias been begun in the Baghdad and Hillah Divisions. Some
of the diffici;lties attending it are well described in the first report of the Settlement
Officer for the Baghdad Division : —

" The response to the call for claims and documents was at first scarcely
encouraging, and I have no doubt that even now a certain number of documents
are being withheld. Our work was regarded with apathy, not untinged with
suspicion, but the efforts of the Inspector and Assistant Settlement Officer have not
been without effect, and landowners are realising more and more, not only that the
settlement is really going to have some result, but also that we are going to
record rights and not to destroy them, and to follow existing laws and custom
instead of introducing new methods of our own devising. Even so, a searching
local enquiiy is necessary before all documents are produced, and in a good
many cases it is an undoubted fact that no documents exist to support rights
which cannot be disputed. This is noticeably so in Zuwiyah, the peninsula south
of 'Alumiyah, which is a mass of exceedingly small holdings for which in the
majority of cases no separate documents exist. One reason for the non-existence of
Tapu documents is clear. The holdings are so small that the expenses of procuring a
Tapu sanad bear an altogether unreasonable proportion to the vakie of the holding.
One owner of a small plot, which he valued at Rs. 200, pointed out that it would cost
him Rs. 51 to get a Tapu deed. If this is the state of things to-day, it is scarcely
surprising that in Turkish times sanads were not taken out for small freeholds. In
spite of this there is one instance of a document for a single tree. But the absence of
documents is not the only difficidty. Disputes are not more frequent where they do
not exist than where they do. In fact, the only dispute I have at present dealt with
in which the claimant can produce no documents is one in which any documents that
may exist to support his claim would be in the possession of his opponents. The
difficulty of interpreting documents when they are pi'oduced is even greater than
might have been expected. Even where no dispute existed, and the facts of the case
are quite clear, both from existing possession and from the history of the land as
revealed by local enquiry, combined with a study of older documents, the present
Tapu sanads can rarely be made to fit the ground. At the outset it is necessary
completely to disregard the points of the compass as given in the sanads. Even the
river itself is more often than not incorrectly placed. The most glaring instance of
incorrect orientation I have yet come across is in Zambaraniyah, outside the area at
present under settlement. Here a line of hills lying on the north-west of the property
is described as the eastern boundary in tlie Tapu sanads, and the western in the 'Uqr
sanads. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the points of the compass are more
often incorrectly than correctly stated. Nor is the description of the boundaries much
better, owing, in the first instance, to the absence of any attempt to keep them up to
date. If the eastern boundary of a property is shown as ' the garden of Haji
So-and-So ' in the document 100 years old, it will almost certainly be the same in the
most recent document, though Haji So-and-So's garden has changed hands many
times in the intei-val. A striking example is one of tlie Dabbaghiyah sanads, which
gives the boundaries as follows : east, north, west ancl south, Haji Hasan Beg's
garden. Unfortunately, no one knows which is the garden of Haji Hasan Beg. A
similar set of boundaries is given in the case of one property the ownership and
boimdaries of which are both in dispute. Nor does any attempt ever seem to have
been made to co-ordinate the documents of the neighbouring properties. Having
found that the garden of Zaid is bounded on the east by the cultivated land of 'Umr,
one turns hopefully to 'Umr's sanad, hoping to find Zaid's garden given as his
western boundary. As a matter of fact, if Zaid's garden is mentioned at all, it is
probably in the north or south. In many cases it is not even mentioned. A striking
instance of this lack of co-ordination is to be found in the sanads for Jaibachi and the
surrounding miri lands. Zuraijiyah, Hulaijah, 'AAvairij, and Kuwairish all have
Jaibaichi as one of their boundaries, but no single one of them is mentioned in the
Jaibaichi sanad. The Jaibaichi title deed and the miri sanad refer without doubt to
exactly the same area ; not one single boundary mentioned in the one appears in the
other. Areas are practically never mentioned. Where mentioned, they are without
exception incorrect, often to an incredible extent. Length and breadth measurements
are sometimes given, but they again are always inaccurate. Enough has been said
to show that xVuqaf deeds of gift and Tapu sanads are alike practically useless in the
case of a boundary dispute. Their only real value is to assist in determining the
shares of the various partners in a property, and very few freehold sanads are up to
date in this respect.

" Minor boundary cases id cultivated areas give little trouble, tliougli they may
take a good deal of time. The chief difficulty has been in settling boundaries between
freehold properties, a very large portion of which has either been uncultivated for a
long time or has been cultivated by persons other than those whose sanads entitle
them to the land. The best instance of this is the dispute with regard to the outer
boundaries of Kudhim Pasha's estate in Fahamah. This estate runs from the river to
the Darb al Manazil (i.e., out towards the desert), and so, according to their documents
past and present, do the estates on both sides. Only a comparatively small portion
of this area is, however, cultivable from the karads (w^ater lifts), and the smaller
owners had no means of getting water to their outer lands. Kadhim Pasha, with the
aid of w^ater from the Waziriyah canal, and later on from a canal which he dug
himself from the Daudiyah, cultivated the outer portion of his neighbours' lands as
well as his own. No objection was raised at the time, except by the owners of the
Bad'at Rashidiyah, partly because of Kadhim Pasha's influence, but still more because
the original owners had never cultivated the outer land themselves, and had no
prospect of being able to do so. Nor is it likely that they would have raised any
objection to the continued adverse possession of their outer lands. When, however,
they saw what the present settlement reallj^ meant, they not unnaturally relied upon
their sanads to give them a right which they have never exercised. The position has
been further complicated by the absence of any legal representative of Kadhim
Pasha's heirs, and as regards part of the land it has only been possible to pass a
temporary decision."

Scarcely less important than the definition of rights is the determination of the
reveniie demand. The policj' of the Revenue Department is to aim, wherever possible,
at a fixed demand, but, in the absence of all data on which it can be calculated,
progress must necessarily be slow. " In the 'Iraq," Colonel Howell explains in his
latest annual report, " the Turkish theory of land revenue has been modified under
" the influence of Quranic precept and pre-existing custom into a system of sharing
" on a decimal basis. On unirrigated lands the State share was one-tenth. If water
" was supplied by flow a second one-tenth was demanded in return for the water.
" Where water was obtained l)y lift no charge was made for it, and the land was
" treated for assessment purposes as if it were unirrigated. This treatment afforc/s
" an indication that in fixing the shares demanded by them the Turks were, at least
" sub-consciously, aft'ected by some consideration of the net assets of the cultivator.
*' It is, however, flow lands that are the important factor in Mesopotamian agriculture.
" On this the rates of demand (one-fifth) was so universal and so well established that
" in popular parlance ' Khums-al-miri ' (the Government fifth) is widely used to
" denote the Government land revenue demand. But in addition the Government
" generally regarded itself as the owner of miri and Sanniyah lands, and in some
" regions, especially on the Euphrates, claimed an owner's share as well as the tax.
" The basic fact seems to have been that in a country where land is unlimited and
" cultivators few, where the silt brought down by the river entails heavy annual
" labour in the clearance of canals, and the annual flood necessitates even greater toil
" on the erection and maintenance of flood banks, a population of nomadic origin
" could not be brought to cultivate at all unless the cultivator, the fallah, the actual
" pusher of the plough, were secured at least a half-share in the proceeds of his
" labours. Thus two fractions became, and still remain, rigid — one half, or 50 per
*' cent., to the fallah and 20 per cent, payable as tax to Government. The remaining
" 30 per cent, has always been debatable. Two-thirds of it, or 20 per cent, of the
" gross produce, are commonly regarded as the owner's share, whether that owner be
" a private person or the State or the Sultan. The remaining 10 per cent., with or
" without a slice of the owner's share, is the perquisite of the tribal headman, who
" alone is in a position to organise labour for common purposes and alone could give
" protection against aggression.

" The advantages of taking a fixed annual sum as the State share," he continues,
" are so obvious, that it is cause for surprise how seldom the Turks actually arriyed
" at this arrangement in the 'Iraq. In Basrah and part of Qurnah an assessment at
" a fixed rate per jarib of land under date trees was worked out 50 years ago in the
" days of Midhat Pasha. In 'Amarah the country is parcelled out into large tracts
" (muqata'ahs), mostly much too big for one man to look after, which in Turkish times
" used to be put up to auction amongst the tribal shaikhs for a term of five years.
" In many parts of the country custom prescribes a fixed quantitative or monetary
" demand on each bucket in a water lift. With these exceptions the whole

■ S7

•

" agricultural land of the country is under what would in Indian parlance be called
" fluctuating assessment, the State taking each year a proportion of the gross produce.
" That proportion itself varies from place to place according to local conditions. In
" these circumstances, with no pressure of population on the soil, it is not remarkable
" that impi"ovements should be conspicuous by their absence and that bad husbandry
" should be almost universal. Agriculture in 'Iraq is an uncertain business, and yet
" not so uncertain as to make a fixed demand generally impossible. It is certainly
" generally desired by the holders of flow lands. After considerable enquiry and
" thought I am driven to the conclusion that the Turks deliberately avoided a fixed
" demand, partlj' through fear of the tribes and desire to avoid anything which might
'' tend to foster the tribal sense of prescriptive right in the lands occupied by them,
" partly because the annual pickings which crop estimation and assessment afforded
" their revenue staff were congenial to the officials and saved the Treasury some
" expenditure on salaries." But a bewildering variety in rates resulted necessarily
from the Turkish system.

Similarly with regard to the date tax. " The rate of tax varies in different parts of
the country," to quote again Colonel Howell's report, "not according to the prevalent
" species of trees, proximity to markets, means of irrigation or any other apparent
" reason, but perhaps in accordance with the measure of the ability of the Turkish
" Government to collect. The highest rate in force in 1919 was seven and a half
" annas per bearing tree on certain sanniyah lands in Musaiyib (Hillah Division), and
" the lowest was two annas per bearing tree in the Abu Sukhair District of the
" Shamiyah Division. The latter figure is remarkable, in that the dates there are
" peculiarly fine, with a ready market at hand in Najaf, where the desert tribes come
" to purchase their requirements, and the land is claimed as Sanniyah, which is
" usually more highly taxed than other classes of land. The' explanation is said to
" be that the local growers were inclined to dispute the acquisition by Sultan 'Abdul
" Hamid of the gardens which they had planted, and could only be got to acquiesce
•* in it by the rate of their tax being left unaltered at the old miri figure."

It has not been possible as yet to make any considerable changes, but as
information accumulates the tax will, it is hoped, be put on a more uniform basis,
and some steps to this end have already been taken.

The cultivation of the date palm will play a considerable part in the settlement
and civilisation of the tribes, for the owner of a date garden takes root simultaneously
with his trees. Moreover, the importance of the date as a foodstuff increases in the
markets of the world, and Mesopotamia, with its peculiar material advantages in
water soil, and climate, must reap a rich benefit from the extension of date growing.

An Agricultural Department, started by the military authorities, became a
branch of the Revenue Department in March 1919, ai\d has done valuable experi-
mental and research work. Most important among its activities have been
experiments in cotton growing. The quantity of cotton grown before the war did
not exceed a few hundred bales, and was insufficient to meet local demands. It has
now been shown that in various parts of Mesopotamia cotton can be grown in quantity
equal to the best produced in Egypt and America, and that the yields are high. The
country has been visited by representatives of the British Cotton Growing Association,
and as a consequence of their visit arrangements have been made to cultivate cotton
on a commercial scale. But the demands of local growers have been restricted as far
as possible till 1921, by which time trustworthy conclusions will have been obtained
from the experimental cotton farms.

The production of silk was formerly a cottage industry, but with the war the
import of eggs ceased. Eggs-have now been imported from France and distributed
among former silk growers on the Diyalah, as well as to some farmers near Baghdad.
Different varieties of wheat have been imported and ordered ; there is an eager local
demand for improved seeds, besides which the Government farms provide an object
lesson to local cultivators. Studies of disease and of injurious insects have been
carried on diligently.

The Political Officer at Sulaimaniyah has taken up with great energy the task of
increasing the area of tobacco cultivation. At the request of the civil administration,
an agent was sent out by the British American Tobacco Company. He toured all the
tobacco growing districts, but reported that unless radical improvements were made
in growing, drying, and baling, Slesopotamian tobacco wo\ild never be fit for export.

With regard to miscellaneous taxes under the Revenue Department, it may be
noted that the Turkish Stamp Law was revived, with certain modifications, in

December 1919. It is working smoothly and brings in a satisfactory revenue with
very little trouble.

In March 1919 a set of rules relating to opium was published. They were
slightly amended in June. The ol:)jects aimed at were : —

(1) To prohibit the cultivation of the poppy in 'Iraq after the current year.

(2) To permit importation of certain qualities on license, and tax scientifically,

i.e., by the imposition of Customs duty, graduated if necessary, on
imported opium.
(o) To issue retail licences on nominal fees, so that the retail vendor would not
be driven to push the sale of his wares.

The scheme for taxing opium scientifically by the levy of import duty failed. In
Baghdad no applications were received for licences to import opium for consumption
in the country, though consumption went on unchecked In Basrah only small
quantities passed through the Customs while the opium habit spread. In Kut and
'xVmarah difficulties arose over opium grown in Pusht-i-Kuh. Its importation into
Kut and 'Amarah could not be prevented and thence it found its way to other areas.
The opium regulations have now been revised, and an improvement in control can be
predicted.

The Turkish income tax has not yet been reinstituted. A preliminary difficulty
lies in the fact that before the war foreigners were exempt under the capitulations ;
but the real problem — and it is one which was never solved by the Ottoman Govern-
ment — is that of assessment in a country where commercial records are scanty or non-
existent. Preliminary enquiries have, however, been instituted with a view to
re-establishing the tax when the status of the 'Iraq is settled. Divisional and
mimicipal councils have been consixlted and are generally averse from it, partly from
interested motives, partly because the Turkish law had led to grave abuses. But the
increasing wealth of the commercial classes, who have gained much during the war,
makes it more than ever imperative that they should take a greater share in the
burden of taxation.

All heads of revenue on the produce of the land included, the incidence of
taxation works out at Rs. 8. 1 per head of the rural population, which, as the Revenue
Secretary observes, is more than double that of the Punjab. He is careful to point
out that the analogy is not quite a fair one for two reasons. In the first place, the
normal run of prices and wages and the cost of living is from two to three times that
which obtains in India ; and secondly, in the Punjab practically all lands are on a
fixed assessment, which wasAvorked out before the war and had brought about a great
rise in the price of grain, while in the 'Iraq the Avhole of the land revenue demand
varies not only in accordance with the area under cultivation, but also to some extent
according to uixrrent prices. The second factor of variation appears because the land
revenue demand, though generally calculated in grain, is collected in cash. The
conversion rate is based on wholesale prices in the local market, and in 1919 and 1920
has been so fixed as to give a wide margin to the revenue payer. The British
administration has borne in mind that the Turkish rates were theoretical and were
seldom actually collected ; wherever they were seen to be excessive they were reduced,
and it is noticeable that where it has been possible accurately to measure crops there
has usually been a general reduction in the rates of demand. Thus although the
nominal share of the Government may have been 30 to ^0 per cent, of the gross crop,
this amount has nowhere been taken ; where the yield is estimated by eye, by
examination of the standing corn, or the stacks on the threshing floor — and these are
the customarj' methods — there is an inevitable bias against exactitude. Everyone is
concerned, for reasons good and bad, in keeping the figures down. The result is that
a demand supposed to represent 30 per cent, of the crop will in reality be little more
than half that fraction. But we have succeeded, where the Turks failed, in collecting
the full amount of the formulated demand ; that is to say, that persons called upon to
pay Rs. 100 have actually paid Rs. 100 into the treasury. This is in itself a
sufficiently surprising contrast to conditions as we found them. The country has
paid more in taxation than it used to pay, even if it has paid nothing approaching the
theoretical demand of our predecessors. Bearing in mind Lord Cromer's famous
precept that light taxation of the peasantry is the basis of sound administration,
Colonel Howell concludes that exactitude in determining the Government share will
have to be accompanied by considerable local reductions in the rate of demand.

Tw^o more aspects of the work of the Revenue Department must be mentioned,
both immediately connected with war conditions : the management of sequestrated

estates and the acquisition of land for Government purposes. With regard to the
first, the Revenue Secretary iu his latest report (April 1920) says : —

" During the war many estates were sequestrated, the owners of which were
known to be actively siding with the enemy and resident in territory occupied by the
Turks. The object of this action was twofold : to prevent the remittance of the
income to euemy territory and to ensure that production in general and Government
revenue in particular should not be prejudiced by neglect in the cultivation of the
estates. Except in Baghdad city and Basrah, where town property was managed by
the Controller of Hostile Trading Concerns, the local Political Officer was responsible
for the management of these sequestrated estates and for the keeping of a separate
account for each.

" During the year 1919 most of the sequestrated estates were returned to their
owners, usually with the mesne profits less 10 per cent., which was retained to cover
the expenses of management. In two or three cases where the owner behaved
treacherously during the war, first making his peace with the British authorities and
afterwards going over to the enemy again, we retained the whole or part of the mesne
profits.

" The 10 per cent, retained for expenses of management is credited to the
Controller of Hostile Trading Concerns in respect of estates which have been entirely
under his control. Where the management has been iu the hands of the Political
0£ticer only 2^ per cent, is credited to the Controller of Hostile Trading Concerns for
keeping the accounts ; the balance goes to general revenues.

" A few sequestrated estates are still in our hands, mainly because the owners
have not applied for their return, or because there has been difficulty in ascertaining
who the shareholders are or in finding agents for absentee landlords. It is expected
that diiring the course of 1920 the last of these sequestrated estates will be handed
back."

Land acquisition is a more delicate subject. Though pertaining naturally to the
Revenue Department, it was not transferred to the control of the latter until November
1919. Colonel Howell outlines the present position as follows : —

" The acquisition of a large area of land at Ma'qil- required for port development,
had been decided upon iu 1918, and on the 25th September 1918 a Land Acquisition
Proclamation, designed to suit local conditions at Basrah, was issued. This procla-
mation, drafted in haste and subject to the defects of extemporised legislation, was
applied also in Baghdad when land acquisition there too become necessary. The
proclamation, which is based on the Indian Land Acqtiisition Act, was revised in
March 1919 and again after the end of the year, but without substantial modification
of its principles. Under the powers defined in this proclamation the Commander-in-
Chief is able to acquire land compulsorily for a public purpose, which has to be
specified in the preliminary notice. The price to be paid is either market value on
the date of the occupation of Basrah by His Britannic Majesty's Forces, or if the land
has since changed hands, the price last paid, plus a solatium not exceeding 25 per
cent, and graduated according to circumstances. The price is fixed by a specially
appointed officer whose awards have to be confirmed by a committee, on which it has
been customary for a local representative or two to sit. When the first acquisition
proceedings began, the scheme was that the land should be acquired by His Britannic
Majesty's Government and be paid for by the Home Treasury. It would have been
obviously unfair to make the British taxpayer put down a price which included
compensation to the expropriated person for the enormous increment in land values,
due solely to the presence of His Majesty's forces in the country and the prospect of
decent government, both of which have already been paid for by him. Whether the
same argument applies with the same force when the acquisition is effected for the
Mesopotamian administration and paid for from Mesopotamian funds (as is now being
done in all cases) may be open to question. It was not, however, possible to make a
radical alteration in principle and procedure while acquisition was in full swing ; this
may hereafter be necessary with retrospective effect. On the other hand, most of the
expropriated persons have accepted the sums awarded without serious demur.
Nevertheless, the extensive programme of acquisition on which we have been
compelled to embark for military needs, railways, port development and the needs of
the civil administration are an unpopular feature of our regime, the more so because
of the boom in land values round Basrah and Baghdad and the inflated prices which
have been demanded and paid in private transactions."

2041 M

In the period of little over five years during which British revenue ofScers have
been at work in Mesopotamia, an exceedingly valuable body of information has been
collected and recorded. The material thus provided gives a solid basis for all revenue
administration vfhich may be undertaken in the future. More than this, the archives
of the Revenue Department throw a searching light on the social development of the
country, which is so closely inter-related with the agrarian that the one cannot be under-
stood without studying the other. Thus, the tribal system as we find it in Mesopotamia,
that is to say, settled or haK-settled agricultural communities, rests at bottom upon
an economic basis controlled by agrarian conditions. Such matters the Turkish
administration rarely attempted to fathom. By turns they would coerce or cajole the
tribes, and they exhibited considerable skill at the game ; but they were content to
let the root of the evil alone, even where they had recognised, as in the Muntafiq
country, that there was an underlying cause for disturbance. Whether with the
means at their disposal they could have carried out the comprehensive agrarian
settlement which can alone solve the problems for which their system has been
largely responsible, may be gravely doubted. Any administration which succeeds
them must bring to the task, if it is to be accomplished, singular integrity and
diligence, combined with a just comprehension of the conflicting claims of different
classes of the population. It must also command the confidence of the people so as
to secure the co-operation of public opinion, without which so complex a tangle
could not be unravelled.

CHAPTER Vni.— Judicial Administration.

During the years 1918 and 19L9, more especially after the armistice, the
organisation of civil administration made great progress. To govern the three
Wilayats by hand to mouth methods would have been impossible ; the increasing
claims of the commimity would not have been met, nor could our responsibilities
have been discharged. Alone among countries which had been directly involved in
the war, the civil life of Mesopotamia had not suffered any grave interruption.
Districts which remained in Turkish hands after the fall of Baghdad, such as the
eastern frontiers and the Mosul Wilayat, were seriously reduced by famine and by
Ottoman depredations, but Baghdad itself and the whole area occupied by (General
Maude's advance were saved by the energetic measures taken during the latter half
of 1917. By 1918, agriculture and commerce were reviving in the Baghdad Wilayat.
In Basrah, 'Amarah and Nasiriyah, the war scarcely produced a check, and the rapid
diffusion of security and order, coupled with the unlimited market offered by the
needs of the British Army for labour and local produce, gave rise to conditions of
prosperity unexampled in Turkish times. A developing community calls for the
development of administration, and small as was the staff of Political Officers, they
fulfilled the demand, aided by the efficient co-operation of the military authorities.
Lieutenant-General Sir William Marshall, when he took over the command in
November 1917, at once, recognised the importance of the administrative branch of
his force ; under the wise guidance of himself and his Chief of Staff, Major-
General Sir Webb Gillman, the military and civil establishments worked together in
complete harmony. Sir William Marshall's successor, Major-General Sir George
MacMunn, himself a distinguished administrator, carried on the same policy and was
able to give much valuable assistance and advice. Tliese relations, as rare as they
are fortunate, greatly facilitated the task of the Civil Commissioner and allowed the
Occupied Territories of Mesopotamia a fair field for advancement.

On the occupation of Baghdad the political staff cov;ld not immediately be increased
in proportion to the increased field of its work. A number of varied functions, such
as Education, Auqaf and Customs, had previously been grouped under the Revenue
Department, and to these was added the preliminary organisation of the machinery
of justice. Explicit instructions had been received from His Majesty's Government
that under no circumstances was the 'Iraq Code, based on Indian law, which had
been applied at Basrah, to be extended to Baghdad. Mr. Bonham Carter (now Sir
Edgar Bonham Carter, K.C.M.G.), head of the Sudan Legal Department, was
appointed Senior Judicial Officer in Baghdad. Until his arrival provisional
arrangements alone were called for.

A few days before the occupation the judges of Turkish race had fled, taking
with them several of the staff and the more recent records of the courts. The judges
who remained were neither legally competent nor sufficient in mxmber to form courts,
and the courts ceased sitting. In the inverval between the withdrawal of the Turkish
force from Baghdad and its occupation by the British forces, the riff-raff of the f own
broke into the court building and rifled its contents. Hence the British authorities,
on taking over the administration of the country, found no courts in operation, and
owing to the defection of a large proportion of the judicial staff the immediate
re-opening of courts was impracticable. A Court of Small Causes and a Mohammedan
Law CJourt were re-opened at Baghdad in the month of July, and Mohammedan
Qadhis were appointed at Hillah and Ba'qubah. Political Officers in the districts
were invested with powers sufficient to deal with urgent cases, and a Board of
Arbitration was established at Hillah. Subject to these exceptions, the law courts
were closed from the departure of the Turkish rulers to the end of the year, and there
was no way of enforcing civil rights by action. The administration of criminal law
was placed in the hands of the Military Governors and Political Officers.

The Baghdad Small Cause Court was established under a proclamation dated
2nd July 1917. It was directed to administer the existing civil law of the land. The
Mohammedan Law Court followed the Shar'ah law of Islam. A former deputy judge
of the Mohammedan Law Court was appointed to serve as judge in the Court of Small
Causes. As Qadhi of the Mohammedan Law Court, a member of a well-known
religious family of Baghdad was selected. The almost complete absence of petitions
against the decisions of the latter is sufficient proof of their justice and of the high
respect in which he is held. A small executive office was attached to the two courts.
The proceedings were everywhere conducted in Arabic, whereas under the Ottoman
regime they had been in Turkish.

Sir Edgar Bonham Carter reached Baghdad in 1917. After a couple of months'
study of the Turkish judicial system he produced an admirably lucid preliminary
report, in which he described the position before the occupation, as well as the course
which, in his opinion, should be pursued.

" Under the Turkish rule," he wrote, " the judicial system in the Baghdad
Wilayat, as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, comprised two main classes of courts,
the Mohammedan Law Courts (Mahakim Shar'iyah) and the Civil Courts (Mahakim
Nizamiyah).

" The Mohammedan Law Courts date from the early days of Islam, and originally
had general jurisdiction both in criminal and civil cases. But their jurisdiction has
been gradually much curtailed, until in modern times it has become limited to
questions of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, guardianship, majority, wills
and successions, Mohammedan charitable endowments (waqf) and a few other matters
of minor importance. The law which these courts administer is based on the Quran,
and on the traditions of the Prophet and of his immediate successors. On this basis,
during the second and third centiiries of the Mohammedan era the Sunni system of
law was built up by four so-called schools of eminent lawyers, some of whom, it may
be suspected, had an indirect knowledge of some of the pi'inciples of Roman Law.
The four schools of Sunni Mohammedans are called after their founders the Hanafi,
Malaki, Hanbali and Shaf'i. The differences between them relate only to ininor
points, but the traditional view is that, while it is open to a Mohammedan ruler to
adopt the law as expoimded by any one of these schools, he must follow the ruling of
the school adopted in its entirety. The courts of the Ottoman Empire follow the
Hanafi school.

" The law laid dovra by the four schools at an early date became fixed, and
although fairly adequate for the society for which it was formed, proved incapable of
development to meet the needs of later more complicated societies.

" At various times modifications were introduced by Turkish rulers in parts of
the law, and in particular in the criminal law, but until the nineteenth century these
were of small importance. During the nineteenth century the legal system was
submitted to far-reaching reforms. The jurisdiction of the Mohammedan Law Courts
was limited to questions of personal status and the like. A new system of Civil
Courts, known as the Nizamiyah Courts, was established, with an organisation and
procedure based on French models. Commercial and Penal Codes were adopted
from the Napoleonic Codes and promulgated. And finally the judiciary was
completely separated from the executive.

" The organisation of the Mohammedan Law Courts conformed to the admi-
nistrative divisions of the Wilayat. For administrative purposes the Wilayat was

M 2

divided into three districts (Liwahs), and each district was divided into sub-districts
(Qadhas). A Mohammedan Law Court was estaljlished in every Qadha, presided
over by a single Qadhi. There was also in each Qadha a Mufti, a jurisconsult whose
duty it was to issue opinions on legal questions referred to him by the Qadhi, and to
give advice to Government Departments and to the public on questions of Moham-
medan law. As already stated, the jurisdiction of the Mohammedan Law Courts
was in practice limited to questions relating to personal status, charitable endowments
and a few other matters.

"An appeal lay from the decisions of the Mohammedan Law Courts to the
Shaikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople.

" The organisation of the Nizamiyah courts in the Baghdad Wilayat, as elsewhere
in the Ottoman Empire, was as follows : there was a hierarchy of courts conforming,
generally speaking, to the administrative divisions into which the Wilayat was
divided.

" In each Qadha, other than a Qadha which was the headquarters of a Liwah,
there was a Court of First Instance, having general jurisdiction in civil cases and
jurisdiction in criminal cases, to hear any case of ' delict ' or ' contravention ' ^
committed within the Qadha. The Qadha Court was composed of a president and
two judges.

" At the headquarters of each Liwah there was a court composed of six judges
and two assistant judges. A section of the court, sitting as a Court of First
Instance, had jurisdiction to hear any civil or commercial case arising within the
Qadha within which the court was situated. Sitting as a court composed of five
judges it had jurisdiction to hear any case of 'crime ' committed within the Liwah.
In addition it had powers of appeal from the judgments of Courts of Qadhas within
the Liwah in civil and commercial cases of a value of more than £T.50. In practice
the Qadhi of the Mohammedan Law Court was usually a member of this court and
acted as president of the civil section.

" At Baghdad the Court of First Instance before the war was divided into three
sections — a penal section dealing with ' delicts ' committed within the Qadha ; a
civil section ; and a commercial section.

" The Court of Appeal at Baghdad was the Supreme Court of Appeal for civil
and commercial cases arising within the Wilayat. It heard appeals from judgments
in cases of ' delicts ' coming from Courts of Liwahs, and sitting as a Court of First
Instance heard all cases of ' crimes ' committed within the Liwah of Baghdad. Before
the war it was composed of two presidents, eight judges and two assistant judges,
and sat in two sections, a civil section and a penal section. But owing to several of
the judges having been called up for military duties, at the fall of Baghdad the
number of judges had been reduced to a president, four judges and two assistant
judges.

" There were in all 12 Qadha Courts, four Liwah Courts and the Baghdad Court
of Appeal. The stafE of judges reached the large number of about 80.

" From judgments of the Baghdad Court of Appeal in commercial cases between
Ottoman subjects an appeal lay to the Commercial Court in Constantinople. If the
interests of foreign subjects were involved, the appeal went to the Mixed Commercial
Court. There was no similar appeal from judgments of the Baghdad Court of Appeal
in civil cases not of a commercial nature.

" Against the final judgment of any court, whether in civil, commercial or
criminal cases, appeal lay to the Court of Cassation at Constantinople. This court
examined cases brought before it, and either rejected the application or annulled the
judgment, returning the case to the competent local court for re- trial or revision of
judgment. It had not itself any power of revision. The appeal was heard on the
record of the case and the written statements of the parties. Judgments in cases of
' crime,' in which a sentence of imprisonment of three years or more was passed, were
referred to the Court of Cassation for examination, even if no appeal was submitted.

" A Public Prosecutor (Procureur General) was attached to the Baghdad Court
of Appeal, and a Deputy Procureur General was attached to each Liwah Court.

" During the war the Turkish legislators established a new set of civil courts
called Peace Courts, for the trial of small causes of a less value than £T.50 and of

^ Under the Ottoman Penal Code, as under the Napoleonic Code, criminal offences are divided,
according to the gravity of the punishment to which they are subject, into (1) crimes, (2) delicts,
(3) contraventions.

petty offences. The law (of the 30 Jamadi-al-Awal 1331) by which these courts were
established and are regulated, is a competent piece of workmanship, and the procedure
of the courts is in some essentials a decided improvement on that of the older
established courts. A special Judge of the Peace was appointed for Baglidad. In
other Qadhas the Qadhi of the Mohammedan Law Court or one of the members of the
Nizamiyah Court undertook the duties of the post.

" The procedure of the Nizamiyah Courts in civil matters is governed by the
Code of Civil Procedure published in the year 1880, which follows in general the
French Code of Civil Procedure of 1807. Considerable amendments of the Code,
which were much needed, have been recently effected. The criminal procedure of
the courts is regulated by the Criminal Code of Procedure, which was published in
the year 1879, and which differs but little from the French Criminal Code of
Procedure.

" Commercial suits between Ottoman subjects were heard in accordance with the
Code of Civil Procedure, but, if one of the parties was a foreigner, the Code of
Commercial Procedure, which had received the assent of the Powers, was followed.

" The substantive law administered by the courts consists of (1) the Majallah,
(2) the Commercial Code, (3) the Marine Commercial Code, (4) the body of Ottoman
Legislation.

" The Majallah or Ottoman Civil Code is a Code published in the year 1869 of
Hanafi Mohammedan Law. The principal subjects dealt with are sale, letting and
hiring, suretyship, transfer of obligations, pledge, deposit, loan, gift, wrongful taking
and destruction, inhibition of persons who are legally incompetent from dealing with
their property, pre-emption, joint ownership, servitudes, partnership, agency, com-
promise and releases. It also contains sections relating to actions, evidence and the
duties of a judge. A code of law which had remained unchanged for a thousand
years cannot be a satisfactory instrument for determining legal rights at the present
time. The best that can be said of it is that it is surprising how often its provisions
are in agreement with modern law. So far as commercial transactions are concerned,
it has been superseded by the Code of Commerce, and its provisions as regards actions
have been replaced by the Code of Civil Procedure and later amendments. Unfortu-
nately its provisions as regards evidence are still in force.

" The Code of Commerce is a translation with some omissions of the sections of
the French Code of Commerce relating to partnerships and companies (societes), bills
of exchange, and bankruptcies.

" The Marine Commercial Code is based principally on French law. The
Baghdad Courts have little concern with it.

" The general body of Ottoman legislation down to the year 1906 can be
consulted in Mr. George Young's admirable Corps de Droit Ottoman, a work which
has greatly facilitated the task of British lawyers and administrators in this country.
Legislation subsequent to that work exists at Baghdad only in the Turkish originals.

" It will bo gathered from the foregoing summary that the organisation of the
Nizamiyah Courts was logical and complete and more than adequate for the needs of
the country. It erred indeed in being over-complicated for the state of society in this
Wilayat and for the personnel who administered it. The procedure of the courts,
with the exception of the provisions of Majallah as regards evidence, is not imsatis-
factory, though, being based on old models, it requires amendment to bring it up to
date, and is also over-complicated for local conditions. And, subject to some
reservations, the codes and the Turkish laws provide a body of law sufficiently
modern and complete to enable cases which come before the court to be decided in a
reasonable and just manner.

" Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the administration of justice was
extremely unsatisfactory. Like so many other Turkish administrations, the courts
presented a fair appearance on paper, but failed serioiisly in working. The principal
causes of this failure are obvious.

" In the first place, the salaries paid the judges were quite inadequate. A judge
of a Court of First Instance received the wretched pay of from £T.7^ to £T.10
monthly. An ordinary judge of a Court of Appeal received £T.15 monthly. The
President of the Court of Appeal received £T.35 monthly. The clerical staff was paid
on a still more inadequate scale. The salaries were neither adequate to attract men
of sufficient ability for the duties of a judge nor to maintain a standard of efficiency
or honesty amongst judges or subordinate staff. Few of the judges were men of any

general education or had had any sort of legal training beyond such as they acquired
in subordinate positions as clerks of the court.

"Secondly, the procedure of the courts is over-technical. And, as usually
happens when a technical business is administered by persons of narrow education
or of inadequate professional knowledge, this fault of the procedure was accentuated
in practice.

" Thirdly, all the proceedings of the courts were conducted in Turkish, a language
unknown to the mass of the population.

" To complete the survey of the courts existing under Turkish rule in the
Baghdad Wilayat, mention mast be made of three other classes of courts which
existed in the Ottoman Empire, namely, the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Christian
and Jewish Ottoman Communities, the Mixed Tribunal at Constantinople, and the
Consular Courts of Foreign Powers having extra-territorial jurisdiction under the
capitulations.

" It was estimated before the war that the population of the Baghdad Wilayat
comprised some 50,000 Jews and some 6,000 Christians. The Jewish community in
the city of Baghdad is a very important section of the community, outnumbering the
8unnis or Shi'ahs. It is presided over by a Grand Rabbi. The principal sects
represented amongst the Christians are Chaldasan Catholics, Syrian Catholics,
Catholic and Gregorian Armenians and Roman Catholics. The Patriarch of the
Syrian Catholics resides at Baghdad.

" Mr. Young, in his Corpn de Droit Ottoman (Title XXI), published in the
year 1905, stated that the authorities of the non-Musulman Ottoman communities had
exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions concerning members of their com-
munity relating to marriage, including dowry, marriage gift, alimony and divorce, and
that certain communities also had the right to settle questions concerning wills, and
that judgments rendered by such authorities within their competence were executed
by the Ottoman authorities. He added that since the last reorganisation of the
judicial system in 1879 a tendency on the part of the Porte had manifested itself to
restrict as far as possible the privileged jurisdiction of the non-Musulman com-
munities. In the Baghdad Province the jurisdiction of the authorities of the non-
Musulman communities as courts of law has in practice been reduced to narrow
limits, and, unless exercised with the consent of all the parties, does not go beyond
the granting of divorces, the certifying of legitimacy, marriage and relationship, the
. granting of maintenance allowance payable to a wife, and in certain communities the
certifying of the validity of wills. Disputes as to rights of succession were habitually
entertained by the Mohammedan Courts and decided in accordance with Mohammedan
law.

" The Mixed Tribunals of the Ottoman Empire were courts for the trial of civil
and commercial suits (other than suits relating to immovable property) between
Ottoman subjects and the subjects of foreign Powers who possessed extra-territorial
jurisdiction, or between such foreign sulajects. No such tribunal existed in the
Baghdad Wilayat. Such cases were heard by the commercial section of the Baghdad
Court of First Instance, with the addition of two temporary judges of the nationality
of the foreign parties to the action. The dragoman of the Consulate of the party to
the action attended the sitting of the court and signed tlie record, but otherwise took
no part in the proceedings. As already stated, an appeal lay from the decision of
this court in a mixed case to the Mixed Commercial Court at Constantinople."

" The Consular Courts of foreign Powers possessing extra-territorial jurisdiction
under the capitulations, at Baghdad as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, had
exclusive jurisdiction as regai'ds criminal offences committed by the subjects of such
Powers. They also heard all disputes relating to questions of personal status of their
subjects.

" After the outbreak of war the Turkish Government issued a declaration
cancelling the capitulations. The Mixed Tribunals were abolished ; and the
jurisdiction of Consular Courts was no longer recognised."

On Sir Edgar Bonham Carter's advice a further proclamation was issued by the
Commander-in-Chief at the end of December 1918, providing for the establishment of
a Court of Appeal at Baghdad and of Courts of First Instance at Baghdad and
elsewhere as required. The right of appeal to the Court of Cassation in Constantinople
was abolished, and in its place a power of revision similar to that exercised by an
Indian High Court was given to the Senior Judicial Officer and the Court of Appeal.

The continuation of the Peace Court and the Shar'ah Court which had been opened in
July was sanctioned, and similar courts were to be set up wherever thej' were needed,
but the jurisdiction of the Shar'ah Courts was not the sanle as it had been under the
Turks. It was limited to suits concerning Sunni Mohammedans arising, out of
marriage, divorce, guardianship, succession or wills, charitable endowments or pious
bequests, while the jurisdiction formerly possessed by the Sunni Shar'ah Courts over
Shi'ahs, Jews, or Christians was transferred to the civil Courts of First Instance, and
is exercised in accordance with the personal law of those concerned, or any custom
applicable to them. The courts were authorised to refer this type of case respectively
to a Shi'ah religious priest or to the Christian or Jewish religious authorities.

The civil courts continue to administer in general Turkish law, subject to such
additions and amendments as have been made by proclamation issued by the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, while the procedure is governed by the Turkish Code
of Civil Procedure and subsequent amending laws.

As regards criminal jurisdiction. Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, in his annual report
for 1918, wrote as follows : —

" According to the theories of International law, upon the occupation of an enemy
country, local criminal law should be continued, if this is possible and consistent with
the welfare of the Army of Occupation. In 'Iraq this was obviously impossible,
both because few British officers are acquainted with Turkish and because Ottoman
Law requires a multitude of courts, enquiring magistrates and prosecutors, much in
excess of what coiild be provided, whether from the army, or from the officials of the
former Government. But apart from this, the Ottoman Penal Code is ill-arranged,
incomplete and difficult to interpret, while the Ottoman Criminal Procedure Code,
however suitable an instrument it may be for other more advanced and populous
parts of the Ottoman Empire, is over-complicated and ill-adapted for application
amongst the backward rural and nomad population of Mesopotamia.

" To replace the Ottoman Penal Code and the Ottoman Criminal Procedure Code,
Codes have accordingly been published, entitled respectively the Baghdad Penal
Code and the Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations. Explanations of the sources
and objects of these Codes having been given in the prefaces to these Codes, I shall
confine myself here to repeating one or two observations.

" Both these Codes have been prepared to meet the conditions under which the
country is now being administered, and are intended as temporary laws. They will
no doubt be replaced, after the conclusion of peace, by more finished and fully
considered legislation.

" The Baghdad Penal Code is based on the Ottoman Penal Code, which at the
date of occupation was in force in Baghdad as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman Penal Code is itself based on the French Penal Code, but contains
important divergences from that Code. It was published in the year 1859, and has
frequently been amended. Such amendments have usually been clumsy. The
result is that the Ottoman Code as it now stands is unscientific, ill-arranged and
incomplete. It was necessary, therefore, to make very considerable amendments and
additions to the Ottoman Penal Code. These have mostly been taken from the
Egyptian Penal Code, which is also based on the French Penal Code, or from other
^^gyptian sources. The local conditions in Egypt and this country have so many
resemblances, that provisions which have been found to work well in that country are
likely to be suitable here. While large additions and amendments have been made,
and provisions from Egyptian sources have been substituted bodily for some of the
most unsatisfactory parts of the Ottoman Code, a complete revision has not been
attempted.

" The Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations are based on the Sudan Criminal
Procedure Code, which was prepared under the instructions of Lord Kitchener after
the re-occupation of the Sudan, and has proved very suitable to that country. The
Sudan Penal Code is itself in the main based on the Indian Penal Code, but draws
important provisions as regards constitution of courts, confirmation and appeal from
British military law. The Regulations also adopt certain provisions from the Ottoman
Criminal Procedure Code, the ultimate source of which is the French Code of
Criminal Procedure.

" Four classes of Criminal Courts are constituted by the Regulations, namely : —

" (1) Courts of Session.

" (2) Courts of Magistrates of the First Class.

" (3) Courts of Magistrates of the Second Class.
•' (4) Courts of Magistrates of the Third Class.

" Political Officers and 'British Judges are Magistrates of the First Class.
" An Assistant Political Officer is a Magistrate of the Second Class.
" The Civil Commissioner may appoint any person a Magistrate of the First,
Second, or Third Class.

'' A Court of Sessions is a court consisting of three magistrates, inclusive of at
least one magistrate of the first class. In districts where a British judge is stationed,
he will ordinarily be appointed President of the Court of Sessions.

" Findings and sentences of Sessions Courts require confirmation by the Civil
Commissioner. Findings and sentences passed by magistrates do not require
confirmation ; but, if the sentence exceeds that which the magistrate can pass
summarily, an appeal lies against it, either to the Political Officer or to the Civil
Commissioner.

" In addition to the powers vested in them as regards cases which are brought
before them by way of appeal, Political Officers and the Civil Cilommissioner have
powers of revision. A Political Officer may call for and revise the judgment of any
magistrate subordinate to him, while the Civil Commissioner may call for and revise
the judgment of any Criminal Court.

" Mention may be made of two leading principles followed in the Baghdad
Criminal Procedure.

" In the first place ample provision is made that crimes should be tried locally,
and without unnecessary delay. This principle is important in every country, but it
is especially important in Mesopotamia, where the camel and the donkey are still the
principal means of conveyance for the people, and where large parts of the population
are in a backward condition. The bringing of accused and witnesses long distances
for trial is often in itself a serious hardship. Further, an accused person who has an
honest defence can make it most easily in his own country where he is known ; while
a dishonest defence, which would not be plausible at the place of the crime, may pass
muster if advanced in a distant district. Witnesses will speak the truth more readily
in their own districts, where the evidence will at once reach the ears of their
neighbours, than amongst strangers in a court remote from their home. And a long
joixrney affords opportunities for communication between witnesses, and even between
witnesses and accused, which not infrequently lead to evidence being concocted.

" A second feature of the Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations is that it
provides adequate machinery by means of appeal and confirmation for the supervision
of criminal justice throughout the occupied territories. The Political Officer of a
Division is given powers of revision of cases tried by magistrates within his Division.
The Civil Commissioner, for whom the Judicial Secretary will exercise functions
similar to a Judge Advocate-General, confirms all cases tried by Sessions Courts, and
has power to revise any case tried by a magistrate. On the other hand the system
avoids the principal objections which are incident to a system of appeals to a formally
constituted court. There should be a minimum of delay and little room for the
upsetting of decisions on purely technical grounds."

The opening of the Baghdad Courts coincided with the termination of the
moratorium, which had been extended from time to time by the Turks, subject to thfe
payment of instalments of the debts. In accordance with the advice of local merchants
it was determined that no further extension should be granted. The decision proved
to be wise. With the opening of the courts, creditors realised that delay was no
longer in their interest ; the majority paid up or came to a fresh agreement with their
creditors, with the result that the number of cases brought into the courts was
comparatively small. The ease with which the moratorium disappeared was a
remarkable proof of the prosperity which the British occupation had already brought
to the mercantile community.

Two important changes in judicial administration came into force on 1st January
1919. In the first place the system of justice in force in the Baghdad Wilayat was
extended also to Basrah, and the 'Iraq Code, based on the Indian Codes, which had
been in force since 1915, ceased to exist. It was desirable, both on administrative
and on political grounds, that this amalgamation should be effected ; it permitted the
staffing of the courts of the southern Wilayat with Arabs much more freely than had
hitherto been the case, and substituted a procedure and law with which litigants were
familiar for one which w^as foreign to them. The courts of the Mosul Wilayat were

also brought under the same sj'stem. The Mosul Court of First Instance is the only
court which was taken over as a running concern from the Ottoman regime. Though
several of the judges left with the Turks, it was possible to reorganise it at once.
The number of judges was reduced and their salaries increased.

At the same time a Judicial Department was formed under an administrative
head, the Judicial Secretary, who is responsible to the Civil CommiBsioner for the
administration of justice and exercises no judicial functions. Sir Edgar Bonham
Carter was appointed to the post. " Some explanation of this change," he wrote,
" may be of interest. Great Britain, unlike almost every continental nation, has
" never possessed a Ministry of Justice. The absence of such a Ministry cannot
" be justified on logical grounds, but is due to historical causes. The British system
" has been adopted in most British Colonies and Dependencies, without the
" justification of the historical reasons which exist in Great Britain. It is arguable
" that even in Great Britain the administration of justice would benefit by the
" establishment of a Ministiy of Justice. However that may be, for building up
" a system of justice there are undoubted advantages in placing the courts
" under an administrative head, who, forming part of the central administrative
" staff, is familiar both with the policy of the Government and the tendencies of the
" courts, and who is open to the criticism of his colleagues and of the public. The
" efficient administration of justice is dependent not solely on the correct decision of
" isolated oases, with regard to which judges under any system must be absolutely
" independent, but on questions of administration. This is especially the case where,
" as in this country, two sets of courts, the Civil Courts and the Shar'ah Courts, exist
" side by side, and where there are considerable districts the population of which are
" not sufficiently advanced for a highly developed and rigid judicial system."

The Judicial Secretary in his annual report for 1919 described the organisation
of the courts as existed at the end of that year. " The Civil Courts," he writes,
" which replace the civil and commercial jurisdiction of the Turkish Nizamiyah
" Courts, have general jurisdiction except in cases which are within the jurisdiction
*' of the Religious Courts.

" They are of three grades : —

" (a) The Baghdad Court of Appeal ; (b) Courts of First Instance ; (c) Peace
Courts.

" Court of Appeal. — The Court of Appeal, which sits at Baghdad, is the supreme
Court of Appeal for the whole of the occupied territories. It replaces the three
Turkish Courts of Appeal for the Baghdad Wilayat, the Basrah Wilayat, and the
Mosul Wilayat. But whereas the decisions of those courts were subject to revision by
the Court of Cassation at Constantinople, the decisions of the present Court of Appeal
are final.

" The Court of Appeal is at present composed of a British President and two
Arab judges. The Turkish Court of Appeal was normally composed of a Turkish
President and four Arab judges. The present Arab judges of the Court of Appeal
receive a salary of Es. 1,0U0 a month. The President of the Turkish Court ol
Appeal received £T. 35 a month, and an ordinary member of the Court of Appeal
£T. 15 a month.

" An appeal lies from every judgment of a Court of First Instance to the Court
of Appeal.

" According to the Turkish system, judgments of peace judges were not liable to
appeal, but were liable to revision, or, to speak more correctly, to be set aside, by the
Constantinople Court of Cassation. Now applications for revision from judgments ol
peace courts lie to the Baghdad Court of Appeal, which, in addition to the powers
possessed by the Txirkish Court of Cassation of setting aside the judgment and
ordering a new trial, can, if it has the necessary facts before it, give a final judgment
in the case.

" Courts of First Instance. — Under the Turks there was a Court of First Instance
at the headquarters of each Liwah and of each Qadha. At the headquarters of
Liwahs and in the more important Qadhas, the Court consisted of a President, who
received a salary of £T. 16 a month, and of two members, who received £T. 10 a month.
At Baghdad the court comprised a Civil Chamber and a Commercial Chamber. In
less important Qadhas, the Qadhi of the Shar'ah Court was President, and the two
members were local inhabitants without legal training, who received a small allowance.
In the Wilayats of Baghdad, Basrah, and Mosul, there were altogether 10 Liwah
2041 N

Courts of First Instance, and 40 Qadha Courts of First Instance. It is obvious that
there n^ere far too many courts and that, having regard to the salaries paid, the
majority of tbese courts were incompetent.

" These courts have been replaced by the folloAving courts : —

" (i) Court of First Instance, Baghdad, consisting of a British Presideut, an
Arab Vice-President and four members. The court sits in tvro
chambers, one presided over by the British President and one by the
Arab Vice-President.
" (ii) Court of First Instance, Hillah, consisting of a British President, an Arab
judge, and of the Qadhi of the Sunni or Shi'ah Shar'ah Court.

" The Presideut goes on circuit and holds courts also at Najaf and
Karbala.
" (iii) Court of First Instance, Ba'qubah, consisting of a British President, an
Arab judge, and the Qadhi of the Sunni Shar'ah Court.

" The President also holds courts at Khaniqin and Mandali.
" (iv) Court of First Instance, Basrah, consisting of a British President and two

Arab judges.
" (v) Court of First Instance, Mosul, consisting of a British President and two
Arab judges.

" The President also holds courts at Arbil.

" The Arab Vice-President of the Baghdad Court receives a salary of Rs. 800 a
month, and most of the judges of Courts of First Instance receive a salary of Rs. 525
a month. Having regard to the high cost of living, it will be necessary in due course
to increase the salaries of the latter.

" If the number of Courts of First Instance under the Turks was excessive, the
present number is insufficient, and must be increased as suitable staff becomes
available.

" Peace Courts. — These courts on their civil side were small cause courts having
jurisdiction to hear cases up to £T. 50. They had been established a short time before
the outbreak of the war, and existed as separate courts only in two or three places in
Mesopotamia.

" Since the occupation, Peace Courts have been established at Baghdad, Mosul,
Basrah, 'Amarah and Kirkuk. Elsewhere Judges of Courts of First Instance and
Qadhis officiate as Peace Judges in addition to their other duties. And in places
where there are no other courts, Political Officers, Assistant Political Officers and
other Government officials also officiate as Peace Judges with varying powers."

Some 30 Sunni Mohammedan law courts have been appointed in the occupied
territories. In place of the Court of Revision at Constantinople, to which there was
appeal from the judgments of the Qadhis in Turkish times, a Court of Revision
consisting of three Sunni judges has been established in Baghdad. Shi'ahs can now
refer cases relating to personal status between Shi'ahs to Shi'ah judges who have
been appointed where there has been a demand for them ; while for the Christian and
Jewish communities, ecclesiastical courts with a limited jurisdiction in matters of
marriage, legitimacy in family relations continue to exercise their former functions.
The appointment of Shi'ah Mohammedan law courts has been fully justified. The
Government has been fortunate in securing the services of widely-respected men as
judges. Owing to the difficulty of forming a Court of Appeal which would meet with
acceptance throughout Mesopotamia, none has yet been established, and it is therefore
the more satisfactory that complaints or petitions against the decisions of the judges
have been rare. The appointment of Shi'ah judges at Najaf and Karbala presents
special difficulties because of the privileged position of the mujtahids in those towns ;
some part of their authority has been derived from the fact that the Shi'ahs have
been accustomed to submit disputes to their arbitration rather than to the Turkish
courts, An appointment has, however, recently been made for Karbala.

An interesting note is appended to the report on the work of the Court of Appeal
by the Presideut, Mr. H. F. Forbes : —

" The Court of Appeal reflects the gradual settling down of 'Iraq to peace
conditions both in the constitution of the court and in the constant increase of work
consequent on the reopening of the courts generally throughout the country. A
review of the past year's work would therefore be incomplete without a reference to

the former Turkish judicial system and the gradual and successful progress achieved
in making the courts self contained and independent of Constantinople.

" Up to the outbreak of war there were combined civil and criminal Courts of
Appeal or Courts of Firt Instance with limited appellate powers in Basrah, Baghdad,
Ba'qubah, Karbala, Kirkuk, Muntafiq, Mosul and Diwaniyah. Their decisions were
final save that a further petition might be presented to the Court of Revision at
Constantinople. This right of revision was very necessary owing to the composition
of the benches. These were composed largely of men of straw, many of whom had
little or no knowledge of law and were, in fact, little but dummies, useful only in
recording and enforcing the views of the President. The President was usuallj' a
Turk, and the work of the court was entirely in his hands. If he were energetic and
honest the outturn was excellent, but if not the dummy tail could always be trusted
to enforce his views by their majority vote. As a result, every case which was
appealed was taken on to the Court of Revision as a matter of course. The Court
of Revision, however, had not power to issue a decree. It could confirm or set aside
a decree directing the Court of Appeal to issue a fresh decree. In this way cases
usually took years to decide, and the whole bench had frequently changed when the
case finally returned to the Court of First Instance.

" By the issue of the Appendix to the Code of Civil Procedure in A.H. 1328
compelling the appellant to appeal his case as a whole and not piecemeal as he had
done previously, and by the promulgation of the Peace Judges' Law in A.H. 1329
restricting the right of appeal to sums over 501. the Turks had effected a much
needed reform. The full effects of these changes, however, were not yet evident
when war broke out and practically put an end to all litigation. The Courts of
Appeal had been ovei'burdened with such a mass of arrears that even in Mosul they
had not been worked off in six years from A.H. 1329-35.

*' Our present court has a considerable advantage in thus starting with a fairly
clean slate, which, indeed, was made cleaner by the destruction of the court records
generally throughout 'Iraq by the retreating Turkish Army. The enforcement of
the new laws should make one bench sufficient to hear all appeals from 'Iraq for
some time to come. It is further to the advantage of the litigants that they should
be able to employ the Baghdad Bar in their appeals, as the Bar outside Baghdad is
for the most part of very mediocre quality. The whole country will benefit by the
reduction in expenditure caused by combining eight Courts of Appeal into one. The
opening up of communications will remove any hardship the litigants may find in
coming to Baghdad. The formation of a strong and independent bench — unlike the
dummies of the past — will, I trust, more than compensate for the loss of the right of
revision."

"TheCriminal Procedure Regulations," continues Sir Edgar Bonham Carter,
" and the Penal Code, although intended only as temporary laws, to be replaced by
more fully considered and finished laws on the conclusion of peace, have worked
satisfactorily and have proved suitable for the requirements of the country. Many of
the magistrates have little previous experience of criminal law, but cases have been
tried carefully and the punishments awarded have in general been lenient.

" As the country settled down to peace conditions and the judicial staff increased,
it was possible to arrange that most serious crime should be tried by Sessions Courts
composed of a British and two Arab judges. This has the double advantage of
providing a court of trained judges, and of associating Arabs with the British staff in
the administration of justice.

" A considerable number of Arabs have also been appointed magistrates of
various classes.

" The administration of criminal law in this country is difficult and demands in
the magistrates not onlj' the possession of an intimate knowledge of the language and
ideas of the people, but judicial experience and the exercise of much care. In many
classes of cases the evidence is very unreliable. Perjurers may be divided into three
main classes. First there is the witness coming from the large uncivilised and
uneducated classes, who has no knowledge of the value of evidence and fails to
distinguish what he has himself observed from what he has been told or has
inferred.

" Secondly, there is the witness who, having satisfied himself, very likely without
adequate grounds, that the accused is guilty, considers that the end justifies the
means and attempts to add to the value of his evidence by invented details. This

100

class -of evidence frequently occurs in cases of murder of wMcli the motive is revenge
or a tribal feud. Such murders are usually committed under circumstances which
prevent the certain identification of the offender by any person present. It is known
to the friends and relatives of the murdered man that the murderer is one or other of
a few individuals, and after a few hours' discussion all present at the murder are
prepared to swear to the identity of murderer or murderers. To men brought up
under the tribal custom that the tribe is responsible for a murder committed by anj'
member of the tribe, it must seem of comparatively little importance which member
of the tribe committed the murder.

" For the two forms of perjury already described, some excuse may be found in
the ignorance and customs of the people. No such excuse can be offered for the
downright malicious perjurer. He is, perhaps, less common in this country than in
some countries which are usually considered more advanced. But an exception must
be made in the case of persons who are themselves accused of a crime. The obtaining
of evidence by the offer of free pardons to accomplices seems to have been a usual
method adopted by the Turkish police. The result is to give rise to a popular belief
that the safest course for an accused person is to incriminate someone else. The
evidence of accomplices, which in all countries is unreliable, is here especially so.

" Considering the unsatisfactory state of public order under the Turks, and that
periods of war are usually followed by a considerable increase in crimes of violence,
the amount of crime has been less than could have been expected, and is a striking
testimony to the efficiency of the administrative work of political officers. Public
order has been well maintained. For some time after the occupation the Diyalah
Division was disturbed by some daring highway robberies ; and the same crime has
been not uncommon in the Mosul Division. The capture and condemnation of the
principal criminals in the Diyalah Division has re-established order there.

" In Mosul Division the conditions are more difficult, but public order has been
steadily improving.

" During the year the death sentence was carried out on 28 individuals.

" There are two forms of crime which are regrettably common and are so
ingrained in the habits of the people that they will be difficult to eradicate. The
first is murder from motives of revenge or from a grudge. Such murders are often
accompanied by circumstances of great brutality. A man will lie in wait at night
at the door of his enemy's house and shoot him as he comes out of his house. Or a
band of men will make their way at night to the house of their victim and shoot him
while he is sleeping in his bed in the midst of his family.

" The second is murder by her family of a girl or married woman who has been
unchaste. Amongst tribal Arabs in this or in other countries there is no pity for the
girl who has lapsed from the strict path of virtue. She has put a stain on the family
honour that can only be washed out by her blood. But in Mesopotamia this feeling
extends beyond the limits of tribesmen proper. And if the cases which have come
before me during the last year are characteristic, the custom in this country differs
discreditably from that observed by Arabs elsewhere. For here it would seem that
the members of the girl's family do not, as elsewhere, risk their lives by meting out
to the girl's lover the same fate as to the girl herself.

" The Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations provides a procedure for
the trial by a Tribal Majlis appointed by the Political Officer of offences committed l^
tribesmen and for their punishment approximately in accordance with tribal law.
The Regulations are valuable in enabling Political Officers to deal with cases between
tribesmen who, owing to their inaccessibility, or for other reason, are not under strict
Government control and with regard to whom the Government is not prepared to
accept full responsibility for law and order ; as also with cases between tribesmen, when
the evidence is not sufficient for trial by an ordinary Criminal Court, but the facts are
well known within the tribe and can be dealt with by a Tribal Majlis which has soiirces
of information which are not open to a law court. The punishments which may be
awarded imder the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations are limited to fine
■ and imprisonment. A death sentence caimot be passed except by the ordinary
Criminal Courts.

" According to tribal law, minor offences are punishable by compensation and fine.
For murder, the law is a life for a life. It is the duty of the relatives of the murdered
man to avenge his death, but they may compound the crime by accepting a fine, and
in this country are usually willing to do so. The object of vengeance is not limited
to the murderer. If the nmrderer and murdered man belong to different families in

• •-••<

101 :* '/'.': '■:': ."'•:;:.

the same sub-tribe, the relatives of the murdered man have the right to kill any one
man of the murderer's family. If the mui-derer and murdered man belong to different
sub-tribes, vengeance lies against any one man of the murderer's sub-tribe. If the
murderer and murdered man belong to different tribes, vengeance lies against any one
man of the murderer's tribe. So also the fine is payable not solely by the murderer,
but by his family, sub-tribe, or tribe, as the case may be. For murder or other serious
crime, a tribesman may also be banished from his tribe.

" Tribal law is not an effective deterrent to crime, in that the liability to
■ punishment lies not on the individual who commits the crime, but the family, sub-
tribe, or tribe to which he belongs. The share of a blood fine which the actual
criminal in fact pays may thus be insignificant. There was a tendency in some
Divisions for Political Officers to make use of its provisions in cases which could be
more effectively dealt with by the ordinary' courts. A circular was accordingly issued
pointing out the limits within which the use of the Tribal Disputes Regulations should
be confined."

At the close of his report Sir Edgar draws an interesting comparison between the
courts set up since the occupation and those which they have replaced : —

"The existing courts," he observes, "follow Turkish procedure, and, with the
exception of a few British judges, are staffed by Arab judges and clerks. How far,
then, are they superior to the old Turkish courts ? Without attempting to be exhaustive,
one may draw attention to the following considerations : —

" (1) The work of the court is conducted in Arabic, and all the records of the
civil court are kept in Arabic, instead of, as formerly, in Turkish, a foreign
language in Mesopotamia.

" (2) The judges of the civil courts are honest. The dishonesty of the Turkish
courts is proverbial in the East, and anyone who takes the trouble to make
enquiries from residents in this country who had means of knowing
cannot fail to be convinced that their evil reputation in this respect was
well deserved.

" It is said that during the last 40 years before the occupation there
were only two Qadhis of the Baghdad Shar'ah Court who were honest.
There are men living at Baghdad who in the course of a few years' tenure
of a poorly-paid Qadhiship advanced from extreme poverty to wealth.
I had occasion recently to read the reports and accounts of the adminis-
trator of the estate of a British subject domiciled in Baghdad, who died a
few months before the war. In the course of the administration, it became
necessary to register some docmnents in the Qadhi's court. A visit was
paid by the administrator to the court, and he was assured by the Qadhi
that the work was straightforward and would give rise to no difficulty.
The heirs attended the court on several occasions, but were constantly put
off. One of them, realising the cause of the delay, had an interview with
the Qadhi, and promised him a commission upon the completion of the
work. No further postponement was then necessary, and the accounts of
the estate in the records of the British Consulate contain the entry : — ' To
the Qadhi for his trouble, £T.15.' The work in this case being non-
litigious, no wresting of justice was involved. But bribery was not
confined to non-litigious work, nor to the Qadhi's court. I have been
informed by merchants of standing that they could never obtain justice
without paying for it.
. " (3) Cases are heard with reasonable promptitude both in the Courts of First
Instance and in Appeal. The inordinate delays to which the Turkish
system of appeal, both in civil and criminal cases, lent itself, is a thing
of the past.

" (4) By reducing the number of the courts, by careful selection of the judges,
and by increasing their pay, the status of judges has been raised and a
higher degree of competency has been obtained.

" On the other hand, the civil courts are stiU hampered by mediyeval
rules of evidence and antique laws."

The main difficulty, as he has elsewhere stated, in providing the country with
sufficient law courts lies in finding British judges who are Arabic scholars and Arabs
who are trained lawyers. A step has been , taken towards the training of native
lawyers by reopening the Baghdad School of Law in November 1919. It was the

onlj' higher school in Mesopotamia in wtich the teachers were well paid, and it had
therefore a certain reputation. Founded in 19U8, it was closed on the outbreak of
war. Those students who had completed a period of the four years' course were
vmable to finish their studies or to obtain a diploma. The Judicial Secretary judged
it necessary to remove this hardship as soon as possible, and though lack of housing
accommodation and of teachers forbade the immediate re-establishment of the school
on the pre-war scale, provision was made for all former pupils to finish their studies
in one or two years. Some 50 students availed themselves of this opportunitj'. One
fundamental difference exists between the new school and the school it replaced :
whereas under the Ottoman Government all teaching had been conducted in Turkish,
under British auspices it is wholly in Arabic. The reopening of the school was well
advised. The administration would have been subject to just criticism if it had not
made an effort to provide at least such facilities for higher education as existed under
the Turks, especially when the education in question is such as will enable natives of
the country to occupy posts of importance by qualifying themselves for practice at the
bar or for judicial appointment. Nor is the utility ol the Law School confined to the
courts, for men who pass through it will also be well fitted for many administrative
posts.

The Auqaf Department, after its separation from the Revenue Department, was
placed under the Judicial Department. With the exception of a British I)irector, it
is staffed entirely with natives of the country, the Deputy Director being one of the
notables of Baghdad. In accordance with a scheme contemplated but never put into
execution by the Turks, the Department has been divided into an administrative and a
learned branch, the latter controlled by a committee of leading Sunnis, to whom all
matters connected with religious regulations and appointments are referred. A large
measure of autonomy in dealing with local Auqaf is exercised at Basrah by means of a
council of local magnates.

The development of Auqaf properties has gone steadily forward. Care is taken
that Auqaf lands should be profitably leased— a striking example of what can be done
in this direction is provided by a rich palm-growing area above Baghdad, which
brought in no revenues in 1917, but in 1918 yielded Rs. 38,000.

Owing to a large portion of the Auqaf records having been burnt by the Turks
after their evacuation of Baghdad, it was necessary to carry out investigations in
many districts to ascertain Auqaf rights in properties. As a result of these investi-
gations, which were carried out by inspectors of the Department, a rental roll has
been compiled. In many cases, properties that had been fraudulently converted to
the use of individuals have been recovered. In consequence of the increased demand
for business premises and the new urban property constructed by the Department, as
well as increased rents fram agricultural lands, there is at present a surplus of over
five lacs which can be applied to the repair of properties and religious foundations.
A very large sum is necessary for this purpose, the Turks having left many of the
mosques in a very dilapidated condition.

The revenues accruing from burial fees levied in the large Shi 'ah shrines have
been set aside for the upkeep of these shrines. In addition to sums already expended
on repairs, there is a surplus of over one lac, which will be devoted to this object.

There is also a large class of Auqaf the revenues of which were dedicated to the
Haramain (Mecca and Madinah). These also were neglected by the Turkish Govern-
ment, and large sums are required to bring tlie properties into good condition. At
present the accounts of these Auqaf show a surplus of two lacs, part of which will be
devoted to the improvement of the properties, and part will be available for remitting
to the Haramain.

A department is charged with the duty of auditing the accounts of Mulhaqah
Auqaf, which are pious gifts administered by a trustee (Mutawalli). If a trustee's
accounts are not satisfactory, he is dismissed and a new trustee appointed by the
Qadhi.

A delicate though necessary task was that of careful enquiry into the detail of
miscellaneous expenditure in mosques, which revealed many irregularities, and
resulted in the saving of Rs. 60,000 in 1918 alone. These enquiries were prosecuted
by the native officials of Auqaf, many of whom were diligent in the detection and
suppression of abuses.

It is an interesting sign of the times that there is a considerable pressure of
opinion amongst the younger and more advanced men, many of whom are free-
thinkers, against the system of Auqaf expenditure inherited from the Turks. They

103

would like to divert monies dedicated by testators to specific objects, and apply them
to ends which they hold would be more beneficial to the community, higher education
being ' that which they have specially in view. The complaint they raise is that in
matters of Auqaf British administration has proved more conservative than that of the
Turks. From some points of view it is not improbably the case, since a non-Moslem
Governmenl must walk warily in dealing with purely Moslem institutions. On the
other hand, it must be borne in mind that higher education benefits a class which
rarely coincides with the stratum of society for which Auqaf bequests were generally
intended, when they were not dedicated to purely religious objects. Pious founders
provided for the poor, and if their bequests should be applied in the future to
educational purposes it is to primary schools rather than to colleges that they could
justifiably be devoted. Where Auqaf funds have been bequeathed to higher education,
the Department has done its best to see that they are used to advantage. For example,
the Moslem college at Mu'adhdham, the burial place of the founder of the Hanafi
branch of Sunni Islam, has been reorganised and provided with an adequate teaching
staff and a i-easonable curriculum and time-table.

In another respect the Auqaf Department has a duty to perform. It is the
greatest landlord in Mesopotamia, and as landlord and religious body combined, so
far as it is not restricted by Shar'ah law, it should set an example. It should not
seek to drive the hardest bargains, but it should bear in mind the general interest of
the community and the educational value of generous policy in a tribal country where
the relations between landlord and tenant are still in embryo. Agrarian content will
be largely dependent on their right definition, and it is here that the Department of
Pious Bequests may lead the way.

CHAPTER IX.— Organisation of the Education Department, Levies and Police, Civil Medical
Service, Department of Commerce and Industry, Public Works, Railways, Finance,
and Establishment.

Education.

A Department for Education was organised in the summer of 1918, with Major
H. E. Bowman (lent by the Egyptian Ministry of Education) at its head. No
immediate change was made in the general principles which had guided the Revenue
Department, but the burden of work had become heavy and demanded a special staff.

Among the most important points which called for decision was the difficult
question of religious instruction. The Turks had made provision for Sunni teaching
only, thus discouraging all but Sunnis from attending their schools. Our aim was to
make it possible for boys of all creeds to attend the Government schools, and when
the first primary schools were opened in Basrah it was determined provisionally, after
careful consideration, not to have formal religious teaching, but to close the schools on
two days a week, Sundays and Fridays, in order to give parents the opportunity of
obtaining for their children the religious instruction which they preferred. It was
found, however, that the general feeling among Moslems in favour of religious
teaching in the Government schools was so strong that it resulted in a tendency to
withdraw the boys from our schools and send them to the muUas' schools, inadequate
though they were. An arrangement was made, therefore, by which an hour was set
aside weekly for religious instruction in Government schools, such instruction being
given, not by Government teachers, but by special teachers appointed for the purpose
and paid out of other than Government funds. Sunni teachers, recommended by the
Auqaf Committee, were appointed by the Education Committee, subject to the
approval of the British officer responsible for the Education Department, and paid
out of Waqf funds ; while the Christian, Jewish, and Shi'ah communities were
invited to send teachers to give instruction to the boys of their respective creeds at
the appointed time. But no definite syllabus had been drawn up and practice varied
in different schools. In some cases the boys still went to the local mulla. One of
the first acts of the Education Department was to introduce religious instruction as a
definite part of the school curriculum. In each school a religious teacher was
appointed who belonged to the community of the majority. The minority are exempt
and are allowed facilities to obtain instruction in their own faith where these exist.
The Department, however, does not undertake to place a religious teacher of the
minority on the establishment unless its numbers reach a certain proportion of the
total attendance. To make full provision for several religions in one school is often

104

impracticable. It is not claimed that the solution is completely satisfactory, but it ' is
the one which gives the nearest approximation to justice. With the exception of one
Jewish and three Christian schools in Mosul, which before the war were maintained
largely by funds from France and Rome, but which have recently been taken over by
Government to save them from financial disaster, the majority of boys in Government
schools are Mohammedan. Several Government schools are now attended by Jewish
boys, who are taught their faith by religious teachers of their own community. The
Jews of Kifri recently abandoned their own school to attend that of the Government,
and a Jewish religious teacher has been appointed to the Maude Memorial School,
'Amarah, to which tl^e Jewish community subscribed liberally. The religious
syllabus, adopted in those Government schools in which the majority of boys are
Mohammedan, was dawn up as far as possible to meet the views of both Sunnis and
Shi'ahs ; but in response to a special request from certain of the Shi'ah centres, a
religious syllabus based on purely Shi'ah lines has recently been introduced into a
few schools such as Karbala and Najaf, where the pupils are entirely composed of
Shi'ahs. In other places the original syllabus, which was admittedly a compromise,
has been received without demur.

The Education Department has persisted steadily in the task of establishing
throughout the Occupied Territories an adequate provision of primary schools of
elementary and higher type before embarking on a system of secondary education
on a large scale. The Annual Report for 1919 recorded that 21 new schools of this
type had been opened during the year, bringing the total number up to 75.' Four
of these are denominational schools at Mosul, three Christian and one Jewish.
These retain their special character, but are directly controlled by the Department,
the staff and part of the equipment being maintained out of Government funds.
Besides these schools, most of the Christian villages of any importance in the Mosul
Wilayat possess schools, the main object. of which is to give instruction in the
liturgical language, Syriac or Chaldean, as the case may be. They also provide
elementary instruction in Arabic, reading and writing and arithmetic, and are thus
a long way ahead of the Islamic muUas' schools. Some of the village priests have
been educated in Beyrut or Rome, or else in the French school at Mosvd, and their
services as teachers are not without value. An annual sum has been assigned
from the budget of the primary schools to assist these schools in the Christian
villages.

Grants-in-aid continue to be given in annually increasing amounts to the schools
founded before or since the war by various religious bodies. In return for this the
schools are placed under the supervision of the Department, and accept certain
conditions which, while conceding complete liberty in religion, involve greater
control than was at first possible or desirable. In addition to the American Mission
school in Basrah, the Alliance Israelite schools in certain of the larger towns, and the
schools for boys and girls controlled by the various Christian communities, those
receiving a grant-in-aid include the Shi'ah school in Baghdad, elementary Persian
schools in Baghdad and Karbala, and a Sunni school, known as the Madrasat
Ahaliyah, recently started by private enterprise in Baghdad. It is satisfactory to
record the marked progress in the comparatively short period, since the grants were
first made, of certain of these denominational schools.

Steps are being taken to revive the regulations, strictly followed in Turkish
times, by which private or sectarian schools must obtain a licence from Government.
There is no desire to check private enterprise, but it has been found that schools are
often opened, sometimes by undesirable persons, without due thought being taken
either for their necessity or their future upkeep.

An educational system cannot be created in a day. Barely 6 per 1,000 of the
population were registered in April 1920 as pupils of Government schools and
denominational schools in receipt of a grant-in-aid, and the average daily attendance
fell considerably below that figure. At certain seasons of the year parents withdraw
their children to work in the bazaars and fields, urged by the high cost of living and
tempted by the correspondingly high rate of wages. Compulsory education would
be impracticable, since it would commit the Department to obligations which it could
not at present fulfil, owing to financial stringency, the shortage of teachers and the
difficulty in obtaining suitable accommodation and furniture. As vrar conditions
disappear, these difficulties will be gradually overcome, but it wiU be long before the

' By Api-il 1920 there were 85 boys' schools of all types and five girls' schools.

105

number of adequately trained teachers will be sufficient to meet the needs of the
.community.

The language question, perhaps unexpectedly to those who think of Mesopotamia
as a purely Arab province, presents problems of its own. In the 75 primary and
elementary schools which were in existence at the end of 1919, teaching was being
conducted in Arabic in 50 schools, in Turkish in 11, for the benefit of the Turkomaji
colonies scattered along the Eastern frontier from Mandali to Arbil, and also at Tal
'Afar ; in six schools it was given in Kurdish, in one in a Kurdish dialect called
Shebek, which is spoken near Mosul, and in another in Persian, Fallahi, or modern
Syriac, is the medium of instruction in the Chaldean and Syrian denominational
schools of the Mosul Wilayat, though Arabic is generally learnt and used as the
written language in the more advanced schools.

Under the Ottoman Government, when all teaching was given in Turkish, this
complication was avoided, but times are changed and our object is to teach the
children in a language they can understand. In the syllabus issued in May 1919, it
is laid down that the language of instruction shall be the local vernacular. Arabic is
taugJit as a foreign language in Kurdish and Turkoman schools, and Persian in a few
schools where local conditions make it desirable. English has been introduced only
in those places where a real need for it exists. Some conflict of opinion has arisen
over the teaching of English in certain schools, and it has been difficult, if not
impossible, for the Department to lay down a hard and fast rule on the subject. In
principle the general policy has been that English should be confined for the present
to the larger towns, where a knowledge of the language is likely to be of practical
value. Even here its study is much hampered by the lack of competent teachers, and
it is a regrettable fact that, owing to more competent teaching of the language in the
denominational schools, English is as a rule better known by Jewish and Christian
boys than by Moslems.

Kurdish as a medium of instruction is handicapped by the absence of a
formulated grammar and orthography. Major Soane, Political Officer at Sulai-
mauiyah, and Captain Farrell, Education Ofhcer for that area, have undertaken
to provide a grammar and an elementaiy Kurdish reader.

In the Training College at Baghdad the difficulty in dealing with the variety of
languages is felt acutely. The few students who have entered from Kurdish or
Turkoman districts have as a rule been returned to their native towns owing to their
inability to follow the teaching and their reluctance to learn Arabic. This difficulty
can only be solved by setting up Training Colleges in those districts where Kurdish
and Turkish are spoken, but for the present the College at Baghdad has to meet the
needs of the whole country. One satisfactory feature worth recording is the large
number of students from the provinces. In April 1920, out of a total of 68 students
attending the Training College, no less than 44 were from outside Baghdad, and of
these the majority are boarded and lodged at Government expense. The general
tone of the College is good. Sunnis, Shi'ahs and Christians work, play and live
together in a spirit of camaraderie and good fellowship, which a few years ago would
have been thought impossible. There is a reluctance on the part of the Jews to
attend this institution, but it is probable that this pj;eJ4idice will be overcome iri
time. "*''

Physical and manual training are included in the official Curriculum and the boy
scout movement is making headway in the towns.

One British and three native Inspectors assist the Director of Education, and the
native inspectorate will shortly be increased. The salaries of teachers have been more
than doubled and fixed in a series of grades according to qualifications. The system is
sufficiently elastic to allow of higher rates when budgetary provision can be made.
It is hoped that better pay and more definite prospects will attract a better type of
man to the teaching profession. More satisfactory supervision will be attained by
greater decentralisation. Sub-departments, each under a British Education Officer,
assisted by a native Inspector at Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul, have been formed, and
this scheme Avill be extended shortly to Hillah and Kirkuk. The channel of communi-
cation on educational matters is the Political Officer, and through him the Assistant
Political Officer who controls and supervises the schools in his district. In places
where an Educational Officer is stationed permanently, the schools are placed under
his direct control, biit he keeps in touch with the Resident Political Officer, so that
full consideration may be given to local conditions.

The Education Committee, composed of local representatives with advisory but
no executive powers, continues to meet at Baghdad. In the near future, it is proposed

2041

106

that its powers should be enlarged and that similar committees should be appointed
in each area.

A beginning has been made in the matter of female education. A few girls'
schools existed in Turkish times, but were not well considered, mainly because of the
unsatisfactory reputation of the teachers. Apart from this, however, the position with
regard to the education of women is curious. Men of religion of the old school are
secretly opposed to it, while with the younger generation it has become a kind of
catchword. Men whose mothers never leave the house and who would be horrified at
the suggestion that they should walk in the bazaars, even closely veiled, point to the
emancipation of women in Constantinople as a proof that the Turks have rightty
understood the female problem and have thereby laid the foundation for national
greatness ; and the implication that the British administration has been laggard in the
'Iraq is not absent. They do not recognise that a proper teaching staff will take time
to form, and that without it schools are of no value.

Five Government girls' schools had been opened by the beginning of 1920, two
at Mosul, one at Baghdad, one at Karbala, and one at Diwaniyah. The Baghdad
school is in charge of an English Directress, who has had long educational experience
in India, and who came to Mesopotamia in the autumn of 1919. Some of the school
mistresses employed in Turkish times have been re-engaged ; they are supplemented
by girls trained in the American Mission College at Mardin. The teacher at Diwaniyah
until recently could neither read nor write and confined herself to giving sewing
lessons and instruction in the Quran. A better educated woman, an Armenian, has
lately been appointed. The Christian and Jewish communities still do most of the
work of educating girls and are likely to maintain this position for some time to
come.

This is also the case with regard to secondary education, which is still in its
infancy. There are at present secondary sections in Baghdad and Mosul for boys
who have completed the primary course. They are not well attended — the numbers
at the end of 1919 were seven in Baghdad and 27 in Mosul, 18 of the latter being
Christians. There are boys who should attend them and do not, possibly because
they do not think them institutions of sufficient importance. These might be attracted
by a more imposing organisation, but in fact the number of boys who have been well
enough grounded to benefit by a secondary school is not great. The institution
referred to previously, the Madrasat Ahaliyah, is called a secondary school but is in
fact hardly above the standard of a Government primary school.

The only higher schools in the country in the time of the Turks were the Law
School and the Training College in Baghdad. These are both now open and are well
attended. In addition to these, a Commercial School has been opened under a British
principal, where the course is three years and where the student can receive a good
general education in economics and prepare himself for Government service or a
business career. It is mainly attended by Jews, and there is a tendency for the
students to leave before completing the full course ; but it is at any rate the germ of
another faculty.

A Technical School on a small scale has been opened in Baghdad, and is shortly
to be developed. A Survey School, begun immediately after the occupation of
Baghdad, was closed for a few months in 1919 and reopened under better auspices.
It is the germ from which it may be hoped that an Engineering College will spring.
A School of Agriculture will be opened shortly, a good site having been selected on
the Diyalah.

Little further progress in the direction of technical education can be made until
a body of teachers has been trained, bat its importance in the development of a
country like Mesopotamia is obvious. All forms of higher education have hitherto
been sought mainly in Constantinople, since before the Constitution of 1908 it was
almost impossible for parents to send their children to Europe. Medicine is a studj'^
to which boys of good family are apt to turn, and the School of Medicine in the capital
had a deservedly' high reputation. Similarly the Military and Law Schools of
Constantinople were famous all over the Turkish Empire, and the French and
American Colleges there drew many pupils. The Sultan 'Abdul Hamid founded a
Shaikhs' College, to which, under some pressure from the Turkish authorities, sons of
tribal chiefs were sent ; but its frankly Ottomanizing tendencies detracted from its
popularity. Boys went also to the American and French Colleges at Beyrut, and it
may be hoped that they will continue to go there until facilities are provided
at home.

The cry for secondarj'^ and higher education is likely to be louder than the
demand for technical education, The Nationalist InteUigenzia value higher educatioA

107

as the only road to independent Nationalist institutions, since they believe that it
alone can create a body of men capable of filling responsible offices of state. Failure
to satisfy them might vvejl be regarded as a deliberate effort on the part of
Government to hold the people back in the path of national progress. It may
therefore be advisable to erect some of the superstructure in the 'Iraq before the
substructure is complete in every part ; and if this process presents disadvantages, it
will at least be wholly to the good that the generation now neariug manhood, on
whom the Mesopotamian Government must draw in the course of the next few years
for an official class, should as far as possible be educated at home. Nor is there, if
the opinion of those who have been longest acquainted with the Arab of Mesopotamia
is to be trusted, any very salient danger of creating a large class which will look only
to official appointments as a means of livelihood. The 'Iraqi is a money-maker,
whether he be cultivator or trader ; under an equitable administration there will be a
better prospect of acquiring wealth through agriculture or commerce than in
Government service, especially if the country develops according to reasonable
expectation. If technical education, with schools of commerce, agriculture,
engineering, and so forth, goes hand in hand with that of a higher literary type, the
attractions of the first may be trusted to balance those of the second.

Arch^olooy.

As a preliminary measure, archaeology has been placed under the charge of the
Education Department. Shortly after the occupation of Baghdad, a proclamation was
issued in the name of the Army Commander providing for the preservation of ancient
monuments and antiquities, as well as for the prohibition of traffic in forged articles.
It was based on the Turkish law and forbade the destruction or defacement of any
ancient monument or site and the sale of antiques except under licence. The
German excavations at Babylon were visited by a Political Officer ; such antiquities as
were found in Professor Koldewey's house were carefully sealed up and guards were
placed in the ruin field to prevent the depredations of visitors.

In the spring of 1918 a short period of work was undertaken at Abu Shahrain,
the ancient Eridu, and at Tal al Lahm by Captain Campbell Thompson on behalf of
the British Museum, and in the following year Mr. H. R. Hall was sent out from
London by the British Museum, and worked for a few weeks at Tal Muqaiyir, the
ancient Ur, at Abu Shahrain and at Al 'Ubaid.

All antiquities resulting from these excavations were sent to the British Museum.
Mr. Hall's finds at Al 'Ubaid were of the utmost importance. They are of the
Sumerian period and date from not later than 3000 B.C. Owing to their fragile
nature it would have been impossible to retain them in Mesopotamia ; when once they
had been taken out of the ground they would have perished immediately without
expert treatment, which could not have been supplied. It is exceedingly doubtful
whether they could ever with safety be lodged in a museum at Baghdad, where the
extremes of climate would prove injurious to them. For the present, therefore, the
collections have been retained by the British Museum.

His Majesty's Government, impressed by the danger to which objects so valuable
and delicate would be exposed, decided that further excavations should be prohibited
until an adequately staffed Department of Archaeology had been created by the
Mesopotamian Government. No further work has in consequence been done.

In the spring of 1920 Mesopotamia was visited by Professor A. T. Clay, who
holds the Chair of Assyriology and Babylonian Literature in Yale University. His
immediate purpose was to establish in Baghdad an American school of Oriental
research, in accordance with the terms of the will of the late Dr. William Hayes Ward,
whereby, subject to certain conditions, a valuable Babylonian library was bequeathed
to Baghdad. Almost at the same time Professor Breasted, of the University of
Chicago, brought out a small expedition and visited a number of ancient sites.
Returning ])y Aleppo they examined at Salihiyah on the Euphrates a frescoed church
of great antiquity which had just been brought to light.

The immeditite need in Mesopotamia is an archaeological authority on the lines of
that which exists in Egypt or that which has been founded in Palestine. It will be the
guardian of all ancient sites and monuments, and to it will fall the duty of granting to
suitable persons or societies the permission to excavate, in accordance with regulations
previously determined. A comprehensive archaeological survey should be under-
taken under its auspices. A museum must be provided in Baghdad as soon as funds
are available, but discretion must be used in the retention of antiquities. Such

lt)8

objects as are likely to suffer from the climate should not be left in Baghdad, nor
such as in the interests of archaeological research should be available to students ni
more accessible centres.

Levies.

The organisation of natives of the country for semi-military and police duties
passed through several stages.

In the early part of the war Arabs and Kurds were seldom employed as supple-
mentary and auxiliary to the army of occupation. A force of 40 mounted men was
raised at Nasiriyah by Major Eadie under the Intelligence Branch for the collection
of intelligence, military and tribal, as advanced scouts in front of military patrols, and
as guides. They were known as the Muntafiq Horse and proved themselves of
considerable value to the 15th Division at Nasiriyah. They afterwards formed the
nucleus of the present 5th Euphrates Levy.

Other forces under civil control were raised, as has been described in a previous
chapter, for the pui-pose of guarding the lines of communication of the army. In
June 1915, after the fall of Kut, when the relieving army was at Sunai'at, a corps of
guards for the river and telegraphic line between Qurnah, 'Amarah and Basrah was
recruited. This force was divided into two sections in June 1916, to correspond to
the political divisions, and placed under the control of Assistant Political Officers. By
April 1917 its strength was 109, and from it have developed the present 3rd Tigris
Levy at Qal'at Salih and the Qurnah District Police, respectively.

In July 1917 the Army Commander sanctioned a total maximum strength of 900
Shabanah in the Baghdad Wilayat, 500 mounted and 400 dismounted. His views
with regard to native levies had been laid down in May of that year, when he informed
the Chief Political Officer that he was " not in favour of their employment, his policy
*' being to keep the Arab population as quiet as possible and to avoid their being
" drawn into the operations," but he was prepared to make an exception in places
where we should derive from them obvious advantages. With the cessation of
hostilities, the risks attached to the employment of armed Arabs were greatly reduced,
while the need for local executive forces for the civil authorities continually increased,
and this policy was relaxed. Though the principle, that one of the main duties of
Shabanah was the relief of military guards, continued to be complied with, the
Shabanah forces during 1918 and 1919 passed into a second stage. Controlled by
the civil authorities, they were used as nondescript forces maintained to supply
the executive needs of the civil administration, as police, qolchis and messengers.
But they were commanded by military and not police officers, and such training as
was possible proceeded on a military basis. The possibility of training and using
Shabanah as striking forces, the possible nucleus of an Arab army, was increasingly
advocated, till it became evident that a policy of compromise between police and
military duties was no longer possible, but was likely to lessen their usefulness in
both capacities.

The direct relations of Shabanah with Political Headquarters at Baghdad
necessitated a central organisation to deal with questions of equipment and pay,
though their control remained decentralised. For some time this was carried out by
the Civil Commissioner's office, but in March 1919 an Inspecting Officer of Arab
Militia was appointed. The Shabanah were now officially recognised as Militia and
were organised as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Euphrates Militia, with Headquarters
at Ramadi, Hillah, Abu Sukhair, Diwaniyah and Nasiriyah, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th
Tigris Militia with Headquarters at Samarra, Kut, Qal'at Salih and Qurnah, and the
Basrah and Ba'qubah Militias. In July 1919 the designation of the force was again
changed to that of Levy, and levies at Dair-al-Zor, Khaniqin, Kirkuk and Sulai-
maniyah, and gendarmerie at Mosul were included under the general organisation.

In August 1919 the control of levies and the duties of the Inspecting Officer
and Commandants were re-defined. Levies were now placed a* the immediate
disposal of Political OBBcers, who were directed to issue orders to the nearest officer
in charge of levies, whether British or Arab, and not direct to the mfen. The general
administration of the force was placed under the supervision of the Inspecting Officer.
The Inspecting Officer's duties were laid down as the supervision and inspection of
levies for the Civil Commissioner and the direction of Political Officers and
Commandants as to the administration, organisation and training of their units.
Commandants were now to deal direct with the Inspecting Officer in regard to matters
of training, discipline, clothing, equipment, pay and accounts, while remaining
responsible to the I'olitical Officer for the, training, discipline, efficiency and interior

economy of their commands. When carrying out duties on behalf of the mihtary
authorities, however, the Political Officer was to take his instructions from the Military
Commander of the area, and to be responsible to him for the efficient performance
of these duties, and in the event of definite hostilities he was to come under the control
of the Area Commander.

The result of these orders was considerably to increase the administrative duties
of Levy Headquarters, since its function, which had hitherto been confined to equip-
ment, inspection and report to the Civil Commissioner, was now widened to include
direct administration. In September the Headquarters office was reorganised and
divided into " A " and " Q " branches.

The development of this force, especially in the Middle Euphrates divisions, had
now reached a stage when it became imperative that a reconstitution should be made.
Proposals were therefore submitted to the Civil Commissioner in September by the
Inspecting Officer for the division of the existing levies into : —

(a) A striking force of levies at local headquarters.
(6) District police.

But it was decided to confine this policy to the divisions of Hillah, Diwaniyah and
Shamiyah in the first place, as an experimental measure.

The division took place in January 1920. The forces hitherto known as the 2nd,
3rd and 4th Euphrates Levies were organised as the 2nd Euphrates Levy with
pei-manent detachments at Diwaniyah and Abu Sukhair. The force was given six
months for training, free of all duties except its own guards, and was placed at the
disposal of Political Officers after that period for minor military operations and
pi;nitive expeditions! considered by them to be beyond the scope of the District Police
and not sufficiently serious for the employment of regular troops. It consisted of
Mounted Infantry, trained for mobility and rapid action, mounted on Government
horses and armed with British rifles. All duties previously found by levies in these
Divisions were now to be found by District Police, with the exception of guards and
escorts on treasure and on Divisional Political Officers. Men were to be enrolled (on
an official form) for two years with the option of re-enlisting for a further three years
with a bonus of two months' pay.

This experimental force has now been under training for six months. The
discontent Avhich had prevailed previously has disappeared with the sanction of
increased pay and improved and definite conditions of service. The general improve-
ment in training, discipline and espint de corps of the levy represents a very hopeful
achievement in so short a time, and effectually disposes of the criticism that Arabs
will not submit to discipline and military life. During the first three months the
strength of the force has risen from 360 to 480 total Arab ranks.

The same principle is now being applied throughout the Occupied Territories with
the exception of the existing forces in the Dulaim, Mosul and Sulaimaniyah Divisions,
which, owing to political circumstances and difficulties of communication, and in order
to avoid dual control, have been placed under the fuU administrative and financial
control of the Political Officers concerned. The reconstituted levies are now organised
on a military footing and will be controlled from Levy Headquarters. The establish-
ment of levies under the direct control of Levy Headquarters will total 3,075 Arab
ranks, that of gendarmerie and levy, controlled by Political Officers, 1,786 Arab and
Kurdish ranks, making a total of 4,861 Arab and Kurdish ranks, on a military footing
in the Occupied Territories. Levies at.Kirkuk, Samarra and Qurnah have been
transferred to District Police, and District Police established at Hillah, Diwaniyah,
Shamiyah, Kut al 'Amarah, 'Amarah, ISlasiriyah, Diyalah and Arbil. The reconsti-
tuted levies are disposed according to political divisions, and though liable to service
within the Occupied Territories and frontier zone, are normally intended for use as
divisional striking forces within their own divisions.

A chain of forces on a military footing and organisation was in being by the
spring of 1920 from Nasiriyah to Abu Kamal on the Euphrates, and from Qal'at Salih
to Mosul on the Tigris, while on the more inflammable frontiers a screen of forces in
the Dulaim, Mosul, Arbil, Sulaimaniyah .and Diyalah Divisions was established, from
which frontier posts were or were intended to be found. These forces are experimental
and in embryo, but there is every reason to suppose that they will fulfil in the course
of a year the promise they have given hitherto.

The type of recruit, especially in the reconstituted 2nd Euphrates Levy, is
improving in class and physique. As a general rule recrujtment by tribes or sections
of tribes has been avoided as likely to perpetuate a class spirit which esprit de corps
should replace. The problem of the supply of officers in the Arab levies has been a

110

difficult one. Normally men of the shaikhly class have either not been forthcoming
or have been unsuitable as officers when obtained. The abrupt transition from
the traditionally free and debonair life of the desert shaikhling to the arduous
discipline of a military career is hard to bridge, and too hard in most cases for them
to accept readily. The majority of Arab officers in Arab levies are therefore pro-
moted rankers, whose training, experience and discipline is normally so little in
advance of that of the men they command that their prestige and powers of command
are small.

The Sulaimaniyah Levy, the Arbil Levy and the greater part of the Mosul
Gendarmerie are almost entirely Kurd. Without the mercurial temperament and
quick intelligence of the Arab, the Kurd has more stolidity and has shown himself
amenable to training and discipline in Sulaimaniyah, where alone systematic training
has been possible. Of these forces also the tribesmen have generally fought shy.
Kurds of the ex-official class have been freely employed as officers, and on the whole
have justified employment. There is no lack of intelligent and well-trained ex-oflicers
in Kurdistan whose employment is politically desirable ; they bring to these levies,
along with traditions of the Turkish officer class, which are probably not ineradicable,
habits of discipline and command which are invaluable to so young a force. While
the Arab effendi is generally disliked and distrusted by the rank and file, the Kurdish
official is, on the whole, respected. The two classes of officers in Arab and Kurdish
levies are therefore widely separated in race, tradition and status.

The Kirkuk Levy has been transferred to District Police, but the Turkomans of
Kirkuk have drifted into levies outside the Division. They take more kindly to
officialdom, discipline and exile from their home than the Arab or the Kurd. Both
Kurds and Turkomans are to be found in Arab levies in the 'Iraq. At Hillah a
Kurdish troop has been formed. Racial feeling is small and the experiment has so
far been successful. British ranks have been supplied by a fortuitous engagement of
officers and other i-anks from regular or temporary units. The bulk of these are
temporary officers and non-commissioned officers, of whom a few of the former and
most of the latter are demobilised. All ranks serve on the general list of the civil
administration.

For minor puuitive expeditions and for arrests this force has proved itself a
valuable weapon in the hand of Government. It is for work such as this, and not for
major operations, that it is at present trained. On several occasions, however, they
have unavoidably been involved in serious disturbances for which they were unfitted
to cope, for all of which military columns had subsequently to be despatched. It
should be recorded to their credit that they put up a fair fight at 'Aqrah in November
1919. Though they were outnumbered and forced to retire after a few hours, their
presence was useful as blockading the Mosul road and providing a reserve for a loyal
but nervous Kurdish ally. Again, when Dair al Zor was taken by Ramadhan al
Shallash in December 1919, the levies were employed by the Political Officer during
the first two days as patrols, and in every case returned bringing valuable informa-
tion. When the barracks were attacked by a rabble of tribesmen and townsmen
numbering over 2,000, 20 out of the total of 60 men in the levies stood by the
Political Officer. Except on one occasion, their conduct has been uniformly good
when employed in small operations against tribal forces, or for the arrest of persons
wanted by the Government, and more than once they have been specially commended
for gallantry. If grave offences must be recorded against them at Amadiyah and
Tal 'Afar, their gallant defence of their officers at Shahraban in August 1920 must
not be forgotten, nor the steadfastness of the levies at Hillah. The relations between
native officers and n)en and British officers and non-commissioned officers are
normally so good as to merit special remark. The British staff show a most
encouraging enthusiasm and confidence in their task, and the levies are beginning
to take the utmost pride in their own attainments and achievements.

Police.

On the reconstitution of the Levies the police force took over such Shabanah as
had not been incorporated into the new striking force. Many of them were not found
suitable for police work ; new recruits had to be enlisted and trained, which put a
considerable strain on the force, but its strength is now almost complete.

The police force had had small beginnings. On the occupation of Basrah the
police employed in the arms traffic blockade in the Persian Gulf were transferred

temporarily to Basrah under their Indian subordinate officers, who were acquainted
with the language, and a local police force trained, though it was difficult at first to
make careful selection and the stamp of men who enlisted was not always satisfactoiy.
As the system of town police was extended to provincial towns such as 'Amarah and
Nasiriyah, it was an almost insoluble problem to find a sufficient supply of Arabs
suitable for employment as officers. The Turkish police had had a bad name ; men
of good family would* not willingly enter the service, nor was it advisable to draw on
men who had been employed as police by the Turks. A small detachment of police
from Aden were of great assistance ; Egyptian police who were serving as a Labour
Corps in Basrah were used in Baghdad after the occupation, but they were accused
locally of unnecessary roughness and were got rid of.

The regular police is now a centralised force, controlled and administered by the
Inspector-General of Police at Baghdad, with a Deputy Commissioner at Basrah and
Baghdad and Assistant Commissioners at 'Amarah, Samarra, Kirkuk and Shamiyah. In
these divisions, the town and district police form part of the same force. In the Mosul
and Arbil Divisions regular police are in charge of the towns. This force is controlled
by an Assistant Commissioner stationed at Mosul. In the divisions in which the regular
police are located they are not independent of the local Political Officer, who, as head
of the division, is responsible for the law and order of the division, and for this
purpose controls the police, leaving the administration and interior economy to the
care of the Assistant Commissioner. In the remaining divisions the district police
are at present under the sole control of the Political Officers in charge of the
divisions.

There is, in addition, a railway police service, which extends over the whole railway
system. This is controlled by an Assistant Commissioner of Police and forms part of
the regular police. Here the position of the Director of Railways is similar to that of
the Political Officer in other police forces.

The Criminal Investigation Department, with branches at Basrah and Baghdad,
conducts political and technical enquiries, and includes the Finger Print Bureau and
Passport Department. Both branches are under an Assistant Commissioner.

The higher branches of police work are being developed. Training schools have
been opened at Baghdad and Basrah, where all recruits are trained. All inspectors
are passed through these schools and have also a thorough training in law and
procedure, investigation, finger prints, &c. Several young Arabs have been trained
as inspectors ; they have developed remarkably well and have shown detective ability
of a high order. As the efficiency and experience of the Arab staff has increased, it
has been possible to reduce the number of British sergeants. With the exception of
a smaU number of British officers and other ranks, and a few Indian inspectors and
clerks at Baghdad and Basrah, the whole force is locally recruited.

The expansion of the police force has demanded rapid recruiting and training ; it
would be surprising if it did not include some undesirables, but great care is taken to
discover and discharge them and a better type of recruit is coming in. Promotions
from the ranks to inspectorates are made with satisfactory results and are an incentive to
good service. The oi'ganisation of police in oriental countries is admittedly one of the
most difficult problems of administration, opportunities for corruption and petty
oppression being both numerous and difficult to trace, while complaints brought
against the native police are usually of too vague and general a character to be
followed up.

The increase in public security which was, perhaps, the most salient feature of
the three years of British administration since 1917 was, however, due only in part
to such organisations as levies and police. The fundamental cause was the presence
of the British Army of Occupation. As Nazim Pasha recognised in 1911, no
permanent improvement in the preservation of law and order can be expected until
the tribes are disarmed. A beginning had been made in this direction, and by March
1920 some 50,000 rifles had been collected in the Wilayats of Baghdad and Basrah.
When this had been accomplished, arms regidations were issued which forbade the
carrying, possessing or dealing in arms without a licence. A gradual application of
these regulations was contemplated, but it had barely begun before the outbreak of
disturbances in the summer of 1920.

Civil Service.

During the process of demobilisation by which the army of occupation was
reduced to a peace footing, it became incumbent on the civil administration to take

112

over fiinctious which had hitherto Been exercised wholly or in part by the military
authorities. This was a task of considerable magnitude. On the one hand, the army
had been responsible for important branches of the administration ; on the other, the
organisation of the country had reached an advanced stage. The conditions presented
peculiar difficulties. Demobilisation was .rapid, and men who had long been out of
England wished to avail themselves of the earliest opportunity to return home.
Owing to distance and lack of transport, leave had been less easy to obtain here than
in France, and many who intended to remain in the country were reasonably desirous
of a few months' absence. Moreover, officers who had been lent to the civil
administration by India or Egypt were urgentljf recalled by their respective Govern-
ments, which, no less than Mesopotamia, were faced with the problems resulting from
demobilisation and the re-establishment of peace conditions. But in Mesopotamia a
further embarrassment had to be overcome. Ne civil service could be constituted
until the conclusion of peace with Turkey made it possible to define the form of
government which would idtimately be set up ; no assured future could therefore be
offered to men who wished to stay in Mesopotamia rather than return to their former
posts. Many were obliged reluctantly to go, and the civil administration was thus
shorn of senior officers who had learnt Arabic and become familiar with local habits
and ways of thought. The people, on their side, disliked the removal of officers whom
they knew and trusted. Such men are always difficult to replace, and their with-
drawal threw an additional burden on those who remained. More than once a
complete breakdown in the administration seemed imminent. To Colonel A. T. '
Wilson (now Sir Arnold Wilson, K.C.I.E.), whose discrimination had been one of the
chief factors in calling the service into being, is due the credit of having inspired it
with the determination to carry the work through and of using his materials to the
best advantage. His own labours were never intermitted, and he exhibited unfailing
resource in dealing with the many and varying problems which arose. The
immediate difficulty of personnel was partly met by re-engaging demobilised officers
or engaging new recruits on a year's contract. As the formation of departments
proceeded the group of competent men placed in charge at headquarters relieved the
Acting Civil Commissioner and provided him with a body of expert opinion on which
he could rely.

Medical.

It was of the first moment to assure the continuance of an adequate health and
medical service when the military authorities could no longer give the assistance
which they had formerly rendered. By the middle of 1918 there was a civil hospital
or dispensary in each military station of any importance. Either a civil surgeon was
in charge or an officer of the Indian Medical Service who undertook civil work in
addition to his military duties, with the help of an assistant or sub-assistant surgeon,
usually a native of India drawn from the military staff. Native doctoi-s, many of them
Armenians, who had been trained at Constantinople, Beyrut, or other medical colleges,
were employed whenever they were available, and after the armistice the return to
Baghdad of some Turkish doctors, who had long practised in the town, was a boon to
the native population. But on the whole native practitioners are so imperfectly
trained that their sphere of usefulness is somewhat limited. In several of the larger
towns, such as Basrah and 'Amarah, the civil surgeon was responsible for public
health and sanitation ; in Baghdad the duty was performed by a medical officer and
assistant lent by the military, assisted by a military sanitary section, tmtil the spring
of 1919. One of the pioneer sanitary sections — a London territorial section — took
charge of the city work in 1917, and the varied accomplishments of its highly trained-
civilian personnel found ample scope for employment and filled the gap which existed,
due to want of any municipal organisation for health matters. The inferior staff at
the disposal of the civil authorities, both in the hospitals and for sanitary work, was
very small, and all medical and surgical equipment was supplied by the militaiy
stores. The civil institutions had not been co-ordinated, owing to the absence of any
central organisation, but in x\ugust 1918 this was remedied by the appointment of a
civil Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services, who worked in the office of the
Militaiy Director of Medical Services and acted as a liaison officer. In February 1919
he became administrative head of the Civil Medical Department, and in March, with
the more complete organisation of the Health Department, he was appointed Secretary
for Health. There were then in existence some 50 civil hospitals and dispensaries,
three-quarters of which were run by a civil staff, though in nine of these supervision
was undertaken by military medical officers. Arrangements had been made with the

■ iW

base medical stores before the end of 1918 to maintain sufficient supplies to meet all
the requirements of the civil Medical Service for the year 1919, and the nucleus of a
civil medical depot had been formed in Baghdad. By arrangement vrith the Red
Cross Society, which demobilised in March 1919, this depot had the first option on all
the Red Cross stock in the country. As regards sanitary work, locally trained
inspectors and gangs replaced sanitary sections in the towns in which they had been
employed, and the care of public health began to pass everywhere into civil charge.
It includes the inspection of prisons, markets, noxious trades and slaughter houses,
the provision of chlorinated water, measures to ensure general cleanliness and the
destruction of rats, mosquitoes and flies. The Civil Surgeon of a provincial town, who
is also Health Officer, is overwhelmed with administrative work in addition to his
medical work, and ii is only by unceasing labour that he can accomplish his task.
The devotion shown by the officers of the Medical Service, and their tact and skill in
handling the native population, have been beyond praise.

Immediate steps were taken to enlist Avhat medical personnel was available in
Mesopotamia and to recruit at home such additional staff as was required, with the
result that it has been possible to supply urgent needs. There are now hospitals and
dispensaries in every town which is a divisional headquarters, besides hospitals in
most of the smaller provincial towns and dispensaries in a number of villages. In
Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul, nursing sisters tend the civil hospitals, and both
Baghdad and Mosul have hospitals set apart for women and children. The women's
hospital in Baghdad has an interesting history. It is lodged in an excellent building,
which was in Turkish times the civil hospital of the town. A small staff of French
nuns had been employed by the Ottoman Government as nurses ; they had endeared
themselves to the people, and their community had earned our lasting gratitude by
the services they had rendered to British prisoners during the war. It was decided
to ask the nuns to continue to serve in the hospital under the new arrangements, and
employment was offered to an additional number of trained sisters who are being
brought from France. To see these admirable women carrying on their work with
eveiy advantage that the British Medical Service can supply carries conviction that
all is not wrong with the world.

In Basrah, where the house used as a civil hospital is not suitable, a new building
will be erected out of funds siibscribed voluntarily by the inhabitants in memory of
General Maude. Nasiriyah also boasts a Maude Memorial Hospital. The British and
French nursing sisters undertake the training of native girls, not only to serve in the
hospitals, but also with the object of creating a body of trained nurses to work among
the native population. The better class women of Baghdad readily admit the need of
trained midwives, for, as they observe, the existing midwives bring disease instead of
combating it.

Depots for medical stores have been instituted both at Basrah and at Baghdad,
and in the latter place, besides the women's hospital, there is a civil hospital for men,
an isolation hospital, an X-ray institute taken over from the army, a dental institute,
two dispensaries, a niirsing home for officers and their wives, and a venereal hospital
for women. The terrible scourge of venereal disease receives special attention at
other centres. The prevention of infectious diseases is being dealt with effectually,
perhaps the most gratifying achievement having been the checking of an epidemic of
plague in 1919 by a whole-hearted resort on the part of the local popidation, male and
female, to inoculation with plague vaccine. Over 80,000 people were inociilated. A
vaccine lymph depot, started, by the Dfiilitary authorities at 'Amarah, was taken over
by the civil authorities in February 1919, and ensures a supply of caK vaccine
throughout the Occupied Territories. In the Mosul Wilayat the most serious problem
which confronts us is the universal presence in the hills of malaria of a violent type.
The condition of the villages is deplorable ; some, indeed, are reported to be
uninhabitable. The efficiency of the local gendarmerie is impaired, and the disease
is a threat to the civil staff. The free distribiition of quinine in these areas was one
of the sanitary steps taken by Turkish Government and will be reverted to by
ourselves ; but the problem is grave, and it is only by accumulating knowledge of
local conditions that any soliition can be found. Already in most areas occupied or
traversed by our troops careful malarial surveys by specialist officers have been made,
and it is hoped soon to preserve these records by making them available in a
condensed printed form so that they be accessible to all concerned.

Danger of infectious disease is notably increased by the influx of pilgrims to
the Shi'ah shrines. During the war the pilgrimage was necessarily intermitted ;
permission to renew it was given in 1919, and exceptionally large numbers availed
2041 P

114 '

themselves of it. An average of 7,000 pilgrims a month passed through the frontier
town of Khajiiqin. Isio attempt has been made to imitate the Turkish quarantine
arrangements, which were as burdensome as they were inefficient, but careful
measures are taken to ensure the cleanliness of Khaniqin, and a dispensary for the
treatment of pilgrims will be opened at railhead. In the holy towns the pilgrims
entail much additional sanitary work, but the precautions which have been taken
cannot yet be considered to suffice. At Kadhimain a small hospital has been opened
for pilgrims. " After a prodigious journey in inclement weather," writes the Civil
Surgeon, " subsisting upon a minimum of food in the shape of chupatties, slaking his
" thirst with impure water and, as a result of his diet, w^eakened by enteritis and a
" form of scurvy, the pilgrim arrives at the holy town at last, with the wish to die
" there as his sole sustaining force. He proceeds to die in the street or in the mosque,
" and it is to make the end of these pilgrims more comfortable, or even to give them
'' a chance of recovery, that in December 1919 a small twelve-bedded hospital was set
" up to take in the dying pilgrim and do the best for iiim. As regards statistics, the
" just way to look at the figures is to say that about 50 per cent, recovered."

The Health Department takes charge not only of living pilgrims but also of the
dead, whose bodies are brought for burial to Karbala and Najaf. The existing
quarantine regulations conform with Turkish practice, which had been regulated by
an international commission and was controlled through the International Quarantine
Board. Corpses njust have been buried for at least three months, and those brought
from Persia are examined at the frontier. The Turks permitted immediate burial at
the shrines of local corpses, subject to the absence of infectious disease and of
nuisance from advanced decomposition. This privilege was somewhat extended
during the winter of 1919-20, the sending of fresh corpses from Baghdad to Najaf or
Karbala having been allowed. This was mainly on account of the possibility of
motor transport, but it was recognised that it might have to be modified in the
summer, and the permission was limited to the period up to 31st March. The
question of regulation of pilgTim and corpse traffic is a difficult and delicate one
with many side issues, and will demand in future very careful scrutiny and
consideration at the hands, it is hoped, of a committee in which various interests,
such as railways, political and medical, will all be represented.

It may be said with assurance that in few directions has more rapid progress
been made since the occupation than in the case of public health. In Baghdad,
Basrah, and Mosul the increase in the number of beds is as notable as is the increased
efficiency of the present hospitals compared with those that existed in Turkish times.
But it is perhaps in the provinces that the greatest change has been effected.
Provincial hospitals and dispensaries were rare under the Ottoman regime, and even
where they were to be found they were of little value. At Nasiriyah, for example,
the staff consisted of a single doctor, who frequently shut the dispensary and went
away, leaving all work at a standstill. The Turks made no attempt to win the
confidence of the tribesmen, and the bulk of the population was thus left without
medical aid of any kind. In the villages sanitary precautions were non-existent and
in the provincial towns they Ivere grossly insufficient. The efforts of Political Officers
and Civil Surgeons have brought about improvements which are indeed remarkable.
Let those who knew Mesopotamia before the war revisit Hillah or Kirkuk and recall,
if they have the courage, sights and smells which are now an evil memory.

Department of Commerce and Industry.

A Department of Commerce and Industry was organised in 1919 which included
Customs, Posts and Telegraphs, Civil Stores and Transport and the Government Press.
The Chief Collector of Customs is Secretary.

As regards Customs, duty is collected on imports and exports by sea at Basrah
and at Baghdad, the dutiable importations at the latter place being restricted to goods
on a through bill of lading ; this provision is necessary to enable the volume of trade
dealt with in Baghdad to be limited to the quantity for which Customs accommodation
is obtainable. There is a Collector of Customs at each of these places. Their decisions
are subject to appeal to the Chief Collector of Customs, who is Chief Customs authority
and whose office is in Baghdad.

The Collector of Customs, Baghdad, has charge of the land Customs frontier
stations, of which the principal are at Tirauq (near Khaniqin on the Persian frontier),
Mosul and Sulaimaniyah, at each of which places there is a Deputy Collector.

115

The following table indicates the total value of imports and exports to and from
Baghdad and Basrah for the years from 1910 to 1919 inclusive : —

Lacs of Rupees. Lacs of Bnpees.

1910 - - - 395 1916 - - - l04

1911 - - - 428 1917 - - - 625

1912 - - - 398 1918 - - - 1,110
1915 - - 94 1919 - - - 1,840

The figures for three pre-war years are taken from consular reports, and are
converted from sterling at the rate of Rs. 15 to the £. Any tendency towards
inflation owing to higher world prices must be largely balanced by the increased
exchange value of the rupee, in 1919 at any rate. Although there are thus certain
difficulties in making comparisons, the figures may be taken as giving a correct
indication of the growth of the volume of irhports into the country. In 1919 the
imports were approximately four and a half times greater than the avei'age in the three
pre-war years dealt with.

According to the latest trade report issued in 1920 from the office of the Civil
Commissioner, it is estimated that from one-half to three-fourths of the imports by sea
eventually find their way to Persia, and it cannot therefore be emphasised too much
that the trade of Mesopotamia is closely allied with that of Persia or with that portion
that can be reached with ease via Baghdad.

The marked increase in imports during the last two years has been due : —

(1) Very largely to the almost complete cessation of imports into Persia via the

Caucasus ;

(2) The largely increased spending power of Mesopotamia owing to the

presence of troops ;

(3) The depletion of stocks in Mesopotamia and Persia due to inability to

obtain freight and supplies — in fact, due to war conditions.

To maintain the increase in prosperity it is essential to increase production and
to stimulate the transit trade by reducing to a minimum freight, handling charges,
Customs and Port dues, and, equally important, delay in transit. It will be necessary
for steamers and railways to reduce their charges so far as possible, and for manufac-
turers to pay as much attention to Persian requirements as to those of the population
of Mesopotamia.

The same report contains a section dealing with Basrah port facilities, from which
the following may be quoted : —

" One of the benefits, and perhaps not the least, which the inhabitants of
Mesopotamia will reap as a result of the war, and the taking over by Great Britain of
mandatory powers for the country, is the provision of a ready-made and well found
port.

" Prior to the war no facilities existed, and ships depended entirely on their own
gear and native craft for the landing and shipping of cargo.

*' The very large quantities of war material, however, which were poured into
the country made it necessary to provide adequate wharves, capable of accommodating
deep steamers, fitted with up-to-date cranes and laid out with railway sidings and
other cargo-handling appliances capable of effecting the rapid transport called for.
Under the military administration, suitable sites were selected, and wharves, well
built and well found, were laid down capable of dealing efficiently with the then very
great volume of traffic.

" By the Proclamation cited as the Port of Basrah Proclamation, 1919 (Pro-
visional), by the Commander-in-Chief, Ilia Majesty's Forces in Mesopotamia, dated
8th October 1919, the port, on its present footing, was brought into being, and its
areas, organisation, duties, powers, &c., defined. As a natural development of peace
conditions the port was transferred from military to civil jurisdiction on 1st April
1920, its organisation and development remaining in the hands of the existing Port
Directorate, assisted by an Advisory Board consisting of representatives of the military
and civil administrations, Basrah Chamber of Commerce and local notabilities.

" Peace time requirements do not call for the same extensive provision as was
required during the war period, but it is satisfactory to find that under the civil
administration to which the port has been transferred, a carefully thought out scheme
which does not overlook probable future development will absorb a very great
proportion of the military port lay-out. and plant.

" The military will thereby recover a substantial portion of their forced
expenditure, while the country benefits by coming into immediate possession of an

lie

up-to-date port, whieli will only require sornfe comparatively minor adaptations to
make it fit to deal efficiently with all probable requirements for many years to ccmie.

" Organisation is necessarily still in a state of transition, but steady progress is
being made to place the port on a sound commercial footing, affording full facilities to
trade and at the same time making it self-supporting. With the latter object in view
a provisional schedule of daes and charges was compiled and put into force on 1st
November 1919, subject to revision, and since confirmed by the civil administration
for the ensuing year. Charges have as far as possible been fixed in keeping with
services rendered."

■'" The postal service of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force and Persian Lines
of Communication was transferred to civil authority and placed under the Commercial
Secretary in May 1919. In the following year the Post and Telegraph Departments
were amalgamated under a single Director.

The Department of Civil Stores imports and issues such supplies as may be
necessary for official requirements and is catering for private needs until local
enterprise is sufficient to cope with them at reasonable prices. Furniture, even of
the simplest kind, is at present almost unobtainable in the native bazaars.

The duty of the Transport Department is to provide motors and inotor launches
for official use and to see to their upkeep and repair ; to engage and supply drivers
and also to train them. Local drivers have been under training since the beginning
of 1920 and are proving fairly satisfactory. Political Officers in the districts are
dependent on motor transport, whether by land or water, and without it would find it
impossible to keep in touch with their work.

The Government presses at Basrah and Baghdad are now able to undertake
most of the work required by military and civil departments besides a certain amount
for business firms. A small press was installed at Najaf in 1918 and another at
Sulaimaniyah in 1919. English daily papers are published at Baghdad and Basrah
and vernacular papers in Baghdad, Basrah, Sulaimaniyah, Kirkuk and iMosul. The
need for official vernacular papers is, however, coming to an end, and already at
Baghdad and Basrah they have been replaced by papers privately run. Illustrated
supplements dealing with pilgrimages to the holy towns and an illustrated book of
the Shrines of the 'Iraq have been issued from the Basrah press. Local labour is
employed as far as possible, but is difficult to obtain owing to the high rates of pay
which are given in business firms ; local compositors in particular, even if their
knowledge of English is rudimentary, are at once attracted elscAvhere.

Public Works..

As regards public works, organization is tending towards a single department
for combined civil and military works. It will be manned by civil or military officers
as may be selected and will eventually, it is hoped, be run as a civil department.
The Irrigation and Survey Directorates have already been handed over to it.

Irrigation, formerly a military department, was transferred to the Civil Com-
missioner in April 1919, and placed in charge of the Revenue Secretary. It passed
under the control of Public Works in June 1920. But since it must always be closely
connected with the Revenue Department, and consequently with the Political Officers
of Divisions who are the local revenue authorities, the organisation secures the closest
connection between Irrigation, Revenue and Political Departments.

The chief duties of the Irrigation Directorate are flood protection, a heavy item
with rivers which have a spring rise of 20 feet or more ; the control and conservancy
of rivers and canals ; the provision of an adequate water supply at the heads of water-
courses, and the distribution of water as between different watercourses, but not
detailed distribution below that point. Demobilisation resulted, in a large reduction
in the establishment of the Directorate which had to be met by amalgamating and
cutting down the number of responsible posts. No large projects have been taken in
hand, but on existing canals many small improvements have been carried out, in the
light of the experience which has been gained during the preceding years. Several
canals have been re-aligned or extended, the new lands commanded by them being
eagerly taken up. An important piece of work is now in progress between two of the
Euphrates channels which it is hoped will bring back into cultivation large tracts^
which have long lain barren, including the Fawwar region south of the Babylonian
city of Niffer. The project has been received with enthusiasm by the tribes, who are
supplying the necessary labour.

Under the organisation set up during the war, roads and liridges, other than
those at Baghdad and Basrah and those maintained by the Army for military purposes,
were generally in the charge of the Irrigation Department. In the transition period,

117

before a comprehensive Department of Public Works came into being, roads and
buildings, as a part of the duties of the Irrigation Department, were looked after by
the Revenue branch of the Civil Commissioner's office. During 1919 a number of
roads which had been kept up by the military were made over to the civil
administration. Those bridges which the civil administration required, and of which
the Army were i-eady to surrender control, were also taken over, financial adjustment
being provisionally made on the lines suggested in Sir John Hewett's report.

.[Railways.

On 1st April 1920, the civil, administration assumed responsibility for the
railways in Mesopotamia.

Subject to the exigencies of military conditions and the prior importance given to
military traffic, the department is organised according to the ordinary procedure of
commercial railways and run on the departmental system.

The transfer from the Army was effected under orders from the War Office at a
few days' notice ; the railway organisation had therefore to be taken as it was, still
dependent on the Army for medical supply and other services. These services are
now in process of oi-ganisation, but the Railway Department is not yet self-contained
or entirely independent of the Army.

The system as it existed on 1st April consisted of the following lines : —

Metre gauge main lines : — Miles.

(1) Basrah to Baghdad West - - - - 352-28

(2) Baghdad East to Quraitu on the Persian frontier - 130 09

(3) Kut to Baghdad East - - - - - 108*00

Metre gauge branches of the above : —

(4) Zubair to Jabal Sanam, a line built to get access to

the stone quarry at Jabal Sanam - - - 23 • 55

(5) Ur to Nasiriyah - - - - - 9*75

(6) Qaraghan to Kingarban near Kifri - - - 33 " 46

(7) Lines in the Port of Ma'qil near Basrah aggregating - 35 • 72

(8) There was also under construction a line connecting

Baghdad East and Baghdad West, including a
wagon ferry for taking loaded trucks across the
Tigris. This is expected to be in operation in
early September - - - - - 5'97

Total metre gauge lines - - 697*82

Standard gauge (4 ft. 8|- ins.) lines : —

(1) Baghdad West to Sharqat on the Tigris. This line

includes the Baghdad -Samarra section built by the
Germans - - - . - 185 "9

(2) Baghdad West to Baghdad South - - 2-1

Total standard gauge lines - - 188 '

Light lines of 2 ft. 6 ins. gauge .•—

(1) Baghdad South to Fallujah on the Euphrates - 37 • 94

(2) Hillah to Kifl on the Euphrates - - - 21*00

Total 2 ft. 6 ins. lines - - 58-94

There also existed a 60-centimetre tramway system connecting the various
camps and supply depots at Ma'qil, Makinah, and 'Ashar, which aggregated some
20 miles. This line is shortly to be taken up and handed over to the army for use
elsewhere.

The system enumerated above was not in any sense complete either as regards
construction or equipment of rolling stock.

The military policy was to do nothing that was not essential to meet the military
reqiiirements of the moment ; stations, goods sheds, and quarters for the railway
staff were non-existent, while the engines and rolling stock were mostly old and
partly worn out.

The civil Government of Mesopotamia will therefore have to face a heavy outlay
during the next few years before the railways begin to show a return on the capital
invested in them.

118

The personnel of the Railway Department numbered on 1st April 1920 approxi-
mately 24,928 of all grades. Of these approximately 80 per cent, were Indians, 3 per
cent. Europeans, and the rest inhabitants of Mesopotamia, including Arabs, Kurds,
and Jews. The demand for labour, both skilled and unskilled, is and will be for some
time to come far beyond the local resources of Mesopotamia, and it is inevitable that
for a considerable period of time the railways of Mesopotamia must be dependent to
a large degree on outside sources. It must be borne in mind that Turkish railway
systems, whether in the Arab provinces or in Asia Minor, were stafPed mainly, as
regards the higher grades of the service, by Greeks and Armenians, not by Turks
and Arabs. In Mesopotamia the Armenian population is small and Greek practically
non-existent.

This, in fact, will be one of the limiting factors in any railway development in
'Iraq during the next few years, and for the moment the problem is the more difficult
as the railways, owing to the policy of economy, cannot even offer decent housing
accommodation as an attraction to service.

The problem would in any case be a difficult one, for it is interesting to note
that whereas India after 70 years has approximately one mile of line per 11,000 of her
population, 'Iraq, which five years ago had practically no railways, has now one mile
per 4,500 of her population. No country in a similar state of civilisation to that of
'Iraq could be expected to man its railways at such a rate.

Finance.

Touching the financial side of the administration, a note by the Financial
Secretary may be quoted : —

1. Except on its purely technical side, financial administration may be regarded
as an aspect of the general administration of public affairs, an account of which has
already been given. I propose to confine myself to two main groups of questions :
firstly, how much money was spent on the civil administration of Mesopotamia from
the end of 1914 to the end of financial year 1919-20, and where did it come from ;
and secondly, what currency was used, and why.

2. Public accounts were imperfectly kept during those strenuous years, in the
early part of which the civil administration at headquarters was conducted by about
three officers, who divided the bulk of the clerical work between them. But
comparatively complete summaries of estimates of receipts and expenditure were
prepared in expectation of super-audit in India and are tabulated below.

RECEIPTS.

Main Headings.

1915-16.

1916-17.

1917-18.

1918-19.

1919-20.

Rs.

Es.

Rs.

1. Land Revenue and General

25,55,976

21,86,555

79,34,295

217,47,430*

198,27,290

Taxes on Agricultural Pro-

duce, Sheep, Cattle, &c.

2. Customs

18,34.497

57,64,400

67,.S8,000

65,00,000

220,24,000

3. Judicial ...

1,18,528

1.05,820

1,57,720

3,46,500

5,00,000

4. Medical

—

17,400

95,800

3,50,000

5. Education . . -

—

3,330

3,500

15,000

1,82,000

6. Posts ...

,32,75,650t

(received from

the public

8,00,000).

7. Telegraphs and Telephones -

20,74,500
(received from
the public
2,25,000).

8. Jails : charges for labour

—

3,600

20,109

1,02,000

2,84,200

supplied.

9. Departmental Receipts, Go-

—

1,54,500

4,31,650

9,40,870

vernment Stationery Depots,

Newspapers, Ti-anspoi't, &c.

10. Miscellaneous ; including

59,641

44,545

2,26,524

74,800

78,000

principally fines, also re-

Tni Tx ri a /lr.f*

Totals

45,68,642

81,08,250

152,52,048

293,13,180

495,36,510+

* Inclusive of revenue gi-ains supplied to Anny valued at 60 lakhs,
t The accounts of a small Civil Post Office maintained for local needs prior to
India, + Excludes contribution for levies from military.

1919 were sent to

119

EXPENDITURE.
Note. — Financial Year is from 1st April to 31st March.

Main Headings.

1915-16.

1916-17.

1917-18.

1918-19.

1919-20.

Rs.

1. Headquarter Administrative Ex-

5,54,2.30

11,83,425

24,18,253

33,90,100

81,26,270

penditure, including salaries of

Gazetted Officers, Secret Service,

subsistence allowances, cost of

sea passages, telegrams,

stationery, dep6t and Press, <fcc.

•

2. Political Officers, Revenue Estab-

5,55,392

9,19,085

51,89,233

93,21,690

78,17,470

lishments.

3. Customs - - - .

1,11,898

3,85,800

5,80,350

6,75,000

17,40,550*

4. Judicial • - ' -

1,20,207

1,27,295

2,14,983

3,73,000

8,92,320

5. Medical . - . -

61,345

87,180

1,39,887

4,63,750

28,75,600

6. Education

—

23,530

35,500

1,80,000

9,89,250

7. Police ... V

1,99,146

2,86,975

8,90,163

12,04,080

19,-36,940

8. Public Works

—

1,05,450

4,61,400

8,74,700

66,11,720

9. Jails ....

20,126

44,460

98,517

1,67,400

7,47,830

10. Posts - - - -

- ��

—

31,46,500

11. Telegraphs

—

14,26,450

12. Survey - - . .

—

■ —

—

1,44,230

13. Land Settlement -

— "

—

1,00,460

14. Irrigation

—

52,25,000

15. Agriculture ...

■ —

—

7,16,270

16. Levies ....

—

32,02,890t

17. Transport

—

50,62,280

18. Stores ....

—

2,24,500

19. Land Acquisition

—

12,01,250

Totals

16,22,344

31,63,200

100,28,286

166,49.720

521,87,780

* Includes refunds of Rs. 12,00,000 for goods imported and subsequently exported,
t Nett : excluding services on account of military.

3. The figures (which relate to civil revenues and expenditure only) illvistrate the
growth in the extent of occupied teiTitory. Up to the end of 1916 we took revenue
only as far north as 'Ali Gharbi. In 1917 the Baghdad Wilayat was added and
proved an expensive possession, in which our liabilities seemed at first sight greater
than our assets. By the end of the financial year 1918-19, Mosul Wilayat was under
our provisional administration, which thus embraced the whole area of what was
formally the 'Iraq province of the Ottoman Empire.

4. The statements illustrate also the gradual progress of expenditure designed
for the direct benefit of the inhabitants. In 1915-16, with the exception of a couple
of lakhs on police, a little more than a lakh on a judicial service, an insignificant sum
for medical assistance, and a few grants in aid of education, the whole expenditure
was devoted to the machinery of administration. In 1916-17, expenditure on the
above three objects of direct public benefit was higher, and a modest beginning was
made towards the establishment of a department of education. A lakh was spent also
on public works, including communications.

In the following year, 1917-18, this tendency developed, and expenditure on
objects of direct public benefit increased, that on police being trebled, while four
times as much as in the previous year was spent from civil funds on Public Works.

In 1918-19, when Baghdad Wilayat had been added, a further large increase
took place in the provision allotted to objects of public benefit.

5. But perhaps tlie most conspicuous feature of the first four years is the
relatively large surplus regularly accruing. Military law enjoins upon an occupying
Power the obligation of collecting the revenues ordinarily levied by the dispossessed
Government, and of carrying on the normal functions of government. It wiU not be
claimed, however, that the items on which money is shown to have been spent during
the four years from 1915-19 coA-^er all the normal objects of public expenditure.

In 1915-16, for instance, expenditure on education was limited to a few grants in
aid, and the total spent on this vital subject during the four years was only some
three lakhs, whereas the Turks spent annually a large sum. Up to the end of 1918-19,
practically the only expenditure from civil revenues on irrigation, that primary an(i

120

indispensable means of conserving and developing the wealth of countries with scanty
rainfall, was a sum of 15 lakhs in 1917, on the Hindi j^ah Barrage. Apart from the
grant of loans to cultivators, nothing was spent before 1919 on the improvement of
local agricultural methods, though this is a commonly accepted function of modern
Governments. The important services of posts and telegraphs were not undertaken
by the civil administration until 1918 and 1919 respectively ; and expenditure on
public works was on a scale much below the ordinaiy requirements of the country, in
communications and other works of public utility,

6. This appears to be a somewhat grave indictment of the civil administration,
but the phenomenon of unemployed surpluses, so suggestive at first sight of undue
parsimony, can be sufficiently explained.

At first,*undoubted]y the principal factor conducive to underspending was lack
of staff. With very few exceptions officers were not sent out expressly for the civil
administration ; they were merely lent from military service from time to time as the
demand for them became more and more insistent. The supply was constantly
behind the demand, and only the barest essentials of administration could be
attempted. Several normal functions of civil government thus remained in abeyance ;
while some of them, being required no less for the benefit of the Expeditionary Force
than for the needs of the civil population, were undertaken by the military authorities
and paid for by military funds {i.e., by the British taxpayer). Communications, for
instance, including transport by road, river and rail, and postal and telegraphic
facilities, were entirely in military hands, and indeed the military demand was so
great that there was little opportunity for the civil population to benefit by those
services. It was not until 1918 that a small civil branch of the Postal Sei-vice was
organised for the carriage of civilian mails, and for military reasons any considerable
use of public communications by the local population was not practicable.

In the matter of the improvement of cultivation the Arab taxpayer was fortunate
in finding military objects coinciding generally with his own interests, and he profited
considerably by the agricultural development scheme initiated in 1917 vmder military
auspices, on which a sum of not less than a million sterling was spent.

7. The determination of the precise extent to which military and civil interests
respectively were involved in the various proposals for expenditiire arising during the
war provided much material for correspondence of the kind in which ingenious brains
in Government secretariats delight to engage ; and if the solution offered after much
analysis of the problem on a variety of hypotheses did not entirely set at rest the
doubts of those engaged in audit and other sceptical pursuits, this is no doubt
because the subject was not susceptible of clear-cut definition. The oracle which
eventually, after one or two preliminary utterances, issued from Simla in 1918, for
guidance of those authorities who were vested with power to incur expenditure
chargeable to the civil revenues of Mesopotamia, and who wanted to know what was
so chargeable, affirmed as follows : —

^ " If the immediate necessity for the measure on which tiie expenditure was
incurred arises primarily from military considerations, we have held that the
expenditure should in its entirety be charged in the accounts of the military force,
though the measure may also benefit the local administration either immediately or
ultimately. If, on the other hand, the immediate necessity for the measure arises
primarily from considerations connected with the administration of the occupied
territory, we have held that the expenditure should in its entirety be charged to the
revenues of the occupied territory, even though it may help materially the military-
operations, directly or indirectly."

This announcement, which reaffirmed with somewhat greater precision the rule
laid down in 1917, was somewhat too late to be of much use in exercising powers
of sanction to expenditure, and that it was not completely satisfactory as a guide to
subsequent adjustments appears from the fact that Sir J. Hewett, in his exhaustive
and lucid report prepared for the War Office early in 1919 on military expenditure in
Mesopotamia and its allocation between military aud civil funds, was compelled to
adopt an arbitrary division of the respective interests.

8. It may be left to the various audit offices to wrangle over the precise appor-
tionment of expenditure incurred during the campaign in Mesopotamia. The broad
principle remains that the value of works of lasting benefit to the population, such as
roads and bridges, railways, the Port at Basrah, which were constructed at the
expense of army funds, will eventually be repaid by the civil Government. The

121

excess revenues, therefore, of the first few years of our occupation are, in fact, held in
trust for the discharge of those obligations which, in normal times, would have been
met year by year. The works of public benefit, indeed, bequeathed by the array of
occupation to the civil administration much exceed in value the aggregate surpluses
which accrued during the war (their sale value may perhaps be put at about six
millions sterling), and will constitute a charge on the revenues of the country for
many years. To this extent, the financial liabilities of the country have been largely
determined by military exigencies, which led to the early, and in some cases, almost
premature, institution of many works and services beneficial to the civil population,

9. Tlie question of the kind of currency employed by the civil administration
of Mesopotamia, and the reason for its adoption, can be dealt with very briefly. The
subject of foreign exchange does not really arise in this connection, and readers who
are unacquainted with the details of Turkish coinage will find all the information
they require in such standard works of reference as Tate's Modern Cambist.

10. The statement attached in para. 2 shows that in the five years ending 31st
March 1920 the aggregate civil expenditure was approximately eight million sterling
(at the present rate of exchange), while the receipts amounted to about 10 millions.
On both sides of the account a considerable, and a progressively increasing, share
consisted of book transactions. At a rough estimate, a total of nearly one million may
be deducted on this account, in addition to which a further two millions or so stand
to the credit of the administration with His Majesty's Government. The amount
represented by cash disbursements was thus about seven millions. The medium by
which these transactions were effected was Indian rupee notes and silver.

11. The introduction of an alien currency, leading to the virtual exclusion of the
indigenous system, has been criticised in some quarters as contravening the principles
regulating the administration of occupied territory. But the critics probably overlook
the fact that Indian money was introduced in the first place to meet military require-
ments, to enable the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force to make local purchases and
payments. There was no currency available in anything approaching the quantities
required by them except rupees imported from India. Up to the end of 1917 nearly
one hundred million rupees (about two-thirds paper and one-third silver), or the
equivalent of 10,000,000/. at the present standard rate of exchange, had been imported
from India to meet needs of the army ; and the two succeeding years saw further
importations, though not on nearly so large a scale. As the army acted at first as
treasurer to the civil administration, it was almost inevitable that the currency
employed by the latter also should have been Indian.

12. A further contributory cause was the fact that revenue did not begin to come
in for several months, and though it was certainly not levied on a gcale in excess of
that enforced under Turkish rule, even that small demand would probably not have
been forthcoming if there had been no medium of payment except Turkish money.
The Turkish authorities were busily putting gold out of circulation, and substituting
for it Government paper issued for war purposes only, which never had its face value
and rapidly depreciated to about a quarter of its nominal value.

13. Further, even assuming the possibility of using local currency for all
purposes of civil administration, the fact that the army was, by the very extent of its
needs, dependent on Indian money would have resulted in a dual official currency
consisting of liras (gold and paper), rupees (paper and silver), medjidis, piastres and
the smaller Indian and Turkish coins, besides the pre-war admixture of sovereigns
and krans — a currency pandemonium such as, later, was experienced in Syria and
other occupied territories, with a consequent obligation on the authorities to fix ratios
between the various constituents.

14. The introduction of Indian currency did not, during the war, have very
important consequences on external exchanges. Trade with Persia (except from the
north) had previously been mainly with India and the United Kingdom, and was
consequently always effected by rupee and sterling exchange. Exchange with Persia
was no doubt difficult during the period under review, but that was due chiefly to the
stoppage of trade with and via Russia, and to the heavy local purchases within Persia
for the forces operating there. On the other side, i.e., with other provinces of the
Ottoman Empire, trade was of course prohibited during the war, and exchange
difficulties did not arise until a part of those provinces came under British occupation.
Then, in some quarters, a demand was made for uniformity of currency throughout
the occupied portions of the Turkish Empire ; but, though the general question is
under consideration, it is unlikely that the future currency policy of this country will

2041 Q

122

be determined solely -witli reference to the requirements of countries with which trade
relations are at present on so unimportant a scale.

15. Looking at the question as a whole, I think it will be agreed that the
introduction of Indian currency was practically inevitable, and was not injurious to
the interests of the occupied territories. Whether the future currency of the new
'Iraq State will be based on the Indian rupee is a question for the future to decide.

16. Less justifiable, perhaps, from a purely currency point of view, were the
measures taken to restrict the use of Turkish currency. Turkish paper was definitely
demonetized for political reasons by a proclamation issued at the end of 1916, and it
was only in 1920 that the prohibition was partially withdrawn in favour of debtors
whose debts were expressed in terms of paper. A proclamation of August 1917 fixed
a ratio between lirasand rupees for the settlement of obligations, viz., 1 lira = Rs. 14,
though the fact that the lira was not legal tender made it inexpedient to treat it
otherwise than as bullion, the market rate of which was fluctuating, or to attempt to
give it a standard value in relation to rupees, except in the comparatively few cases
where the administration was com.pelled to accept payments in liras of revenue
xp ressed in rupees.

Establishment.

The attached return shows roughly the position of the civil administration of
Mesopotamia on the 1st August 1920, excluding Railways : —

Officers all over Rs. 600, and all Personnel drawing

pay from Civil

Officej's drawing less th

Administratian are counted,

even though Sick or on Leave.

Rs. 600.

No.

Name of Department.

British.

Indian.

Arah.

Remarks.

British.

Indian.

Arab.

Total.

Central AdminJstriition -

128

Revenue - - -

—

Finiiiiee - - -

—

130

154

Judicial -

—

238

246

Jails

—

Customs -

— _

—

107

Health -

.74

—

Includes
25 Nurses.

195

263

Engineering

—

112

Executive Staff, Divisions

106

—

316

862

1,206

Agriculture

—

Repatriation *

—

Education

—

479

487

Posts and Telegraphs

—

138

868

303

1,309
13

Waqf

—

— ■

—

Police - - -

—

" 17

2,397

2,470

16 C.H.T.C. - - -

1 -

—

17 ! Printing and Publishing -

—

164

18 1 Stores

—

19 Transport -

—

389

462

20 Port

—

380

427

21 Levies

—

2,987

3,037

22 ! Irrigation -

110

178

289

23 Cypher ■

—

24 Survey

—

25 Tapu

—

147

149

26 Veterinary

—

27 ! Railways -

Excluded
.... '

Excluded

Total

507

25 nurses

515

2,209

8,546

11,270

It may be convenient to analyse the return, which appears at first sight to involve
the employment of an unusually large number of officers.

In the first place, officers employed in connection with repatriation of refugees,
the control of hostile trading concerns, together with some 15 officers, shown under
" Executive Staff, Divisions," employed in Persia as Political Officers with troops, and
some five whose services have been lent for duty in the Gulf Ports : total, 41. These
appointments are of a purely temporary nature arising out of the winding up of the
war in the Middle East, and cannot be considered as part of the civil administration
proper.

123

Officers employed in Cypher Department, Survey Department, Land Registration
(Tapu) Department, Veterinary Department, and Printing and Pnblisliing Department
total 20. These hold highly technical posts, for which in each case they have special
technical qualifications.

Under Printing and Publishing are included the British editor of the Baghdad
Times and his colleague in charge of the Basrah Times. Negotiations have been
undertaken for the transfer of these organs to private enterprise, but owing to the
disturbed state of the country it has not yet been possible to arrange this, and in the
meantime it ig considered necessary to publish these papers in English both for the
benefit of the public and the troops, amongst whom they command a ready sale.
The journals are self-supporting and no cost falls on the State in connection with
these papers, the receipts from which suffice to pay the cost of the editors.

The Superintendents of the Government Presses at Baghdad and Basrah are
technical experts with long pre-war records in this branch of industry. Printing
business, involving, as it does at Basrah, the care and maintenance of a quantity of
valuable machinery, which prints books in half a dozen languages, and with
apparatus for preparing half-toned lined blocks, coloured by three-colour process, and
at Baghdad the custody and issue of all stamps and stationery for all departments, is
certainly not overstaffed.

The Survey Department is a predominantly military organisation, which has for
the past year devoted most of its time to meet military requirements. The cost is
met parfly by military and partly by civil funds according to the amount of work
done. In no department has more pains been taken to train local personnel. The
department produced on the spot all maps required by the military forces of the
(Jrown, lined blocks, plans and reproductions in colour of every sort required by an
army in the field. Its operations are an essential preliminary to any future develop-
ment in this country, whether by irrigation or otherwise. It prepares maps required
for the Railway Department and the Irrigation Department. Almost all of the
officers have been borrowed from the Government of India at considerable incon-
venience to that Government, and it may be said without fear of- conti'adiction that
this department is short of superior personnel.

The Tapu (Land Registration) Department deals with land registration for the
whole of Mesopotamia. With the exception of two officers, the staff is entirely
local. Few, if any, departments touch the daily life of the people more closely.
Remembering that it is necessary to make some provision for leave and sickness, and
for the head of the department to tour areas to inspect the work of subordinates at
other centres and to check operations of surveyors working under his orders in the
larger towns, it will be clear that the provision of two officers for this department is
not excessive.

The Cypher Department consists of four officers. This highly confidential work
by the custom of the service cannot be entrusted to persons not enjoying the status
of an officer ; and in point of fact, of the four officers shown one is a senior cypher
officer of experience from India ; of the remaining three all are ex-officers of the army,
of whom two have been partially incapacitated by wounds received in action. The
working hours of this department are 18 hours.

The Veterinary Department consists of three officers. This department under-
takes the purchase of all remounts required for the Arab Levies, and for officers of
ail grades of the civil administration ; provides for periodical inspection of stables,
with training of personnel in shoeing, and maintains veterinary hospitals at Baghdad
and Basrah. It maintains stocks of serum against rinderpest, and is responsible for
training local veterinary assistants for inoculating cattle in affected areas. The
successful operation of this department in a single district, or the economy effected by
the approved purchase of horses in a single year, more than pays for the cost of the
whole establishment.

Engineering services account for some 42 British officers in the Irrigation
Department and 22 in the Engineering Department. Nearly 25 per cent, of the
Irrigation Department is already Indian or Arab, and there is no reason why this
percentage should not before long be substantially increased, provided men now
under training turn out well ; but considerable difficulty has been experienced in
practice in inducing qualified inhabitants of the country to leave Baghdad, where
opportunities for public service in such branches a$ irrigation are comparatively

Q 2

124

limited. Nor is local personnel always popular amongst the tribes, as has already
been pointed out. The engineering staff are scattered all over the countiy and are
responsible for all civil public works in the country, for all roads, whether military
or civil, and for the guidance of municipal enterprise in engineering matters. In
many places they undertake, in addition to their civil duties, the execution of minor
work on behalf of the military authorities. The total amount of military work so
executed is estimated dixring the present year at 50 per cent, in the case of the
Engineering Department, 25 per cent, in the case of the Irrigation Department.

Tlie 74 officers shown uuder Public Health include doctors, nurses (25), medical
storekeepers, chemical analyst and quarantine officials,- and are responsible for all
the civil hospitals in the country, one in each Division ; for quarantine, for public
health in the larger towns, vaccination, dentistry, for the care of wives and families
of civil officials, and for multifarious duties directly connected with the military
authorities, such as, for example, the joint maintenance of X-ray apparatus, water
analysis and the like. Financial considerations alone preclude the administration
from employing a much larger number. The shortage of doctors is such that it has
been impossible to induce local practitioners to enter the civil administration on any
terms which the administration could possibly offer.

Posts and Telegraphs account for 33 British officers. 10 per cent, of the depart-
ment is Indian. 75 percent, of the work of this department is at present military and
is paid for by the army. It is for the most part of a highly technical nature. All
superior posts in this department were before the war iield almost exclusively by
non-Arabs and non-Turks. Considerable progress has been made in training local
personnel for the junior grades, but it is difficult to see how the peisonnel can be
found for the superior grades within a short space of time. The work is for the most
part, not only highly technical, but verj' laborious.

Jails in Mesopotamia, three large jails at Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul respectively,
and about 12 smaller ones, are under the control of the Inspector-General of Jails and
his assistant, who is also responsible for the maintenance of juvenile reformatories
and for the custody of lunatics. The Inspector-General himself, Lieut.-Colonel W. B.
Lane, CLE., C.B.E., is an officer of great experience in Indian jails with a wide and
human outlook on life, and it can scarcely be doubted that the appointment has not
only justified itself, but that the maintenance of jails without some such expert
supervision would lose half their value.

The Port, Basrah, accounts for 28 officers. This is virtually an independent
entity of the administration with its own budget and its own revemies. The number
of officers over Rs. 600, having regard to the amount of traffic passing through the
port, compares favourably with any Indian port if allowance be made for (1) the
unhealthiness of the climate, which makes it necessary to have a larger percentage in
reserve to provide for men sick and on leave, and (2) for the large amount of
temporary military Avork now being performed. The total includes harbour masters,
pilots, engineers, and all responsible executive staff.

The Civil Stores and Civil Transport Departments, staffed by 14 and 5 officers
respectively, require some explanation. Civil Stores Department is responsible for
the ordering, handling, custody and issue of all requirements of all civil departments.
Owing to the incomplete nature of communications in Mesopotamia it is a matter of
unusual difficulty to guarantee safe arrival of any given consignment to an out-station,
and owing to the difficidty of sea transport and river transport at present it is
necessary to maintain larger stocks than would ordinarily be the case. The plan of
delegating a portion of this work to commercial firms has not been wholly successful.
Owing to the uncertainty of political conditions in Mesopotamia, firms have as a rule
been unwilling to maintain large stocks, and it has generally been found cheaper and
more expeditious for the administration to make its own arrangements. In course of
time, however, a reduction of about 50 per cent, will probably be possible in this
department.

Revenue, 8 ; Finance, 18 ; Judicial, 14, plus 10 Arabs ; Agricultural, 11 ; and
Education, 11, may conveniently be considered simultaneously. The number of
officers in these administrative departments must depend xxpon the general policy to
be adopted with regard to the administration of the country. It would not be difficult
to defend the numbers in each department separately, and it may be noted in
particular that the Finance Department, responsible as it is for the audit of a number
of departments quasi-military in nature, is probably considerably larger now than will

125

be necessary in two years' time. Moreover, an immense amount of work is thrown on
this department temporarily, of a non-recurring nature, e.g., the settlement of accounts
between military and civil in respect of departments handed over from the army, or of
a quasi-military nature, and the initiation of fresh accounts arrangements consequent on
the separation of Mesopotamiau administration from the general military organisation,
and from the audit of the Government of India.

The same is to a great extent true of the Revenue Department, which is still
engaged in laborious spade work, and will for many years to come be engaged in
detailed settlement operations which require much knowledge and patience and
cannot be unduly hastened. To stint this department in officers would be very bad
economy.

The same is to a great extent true of the Agricultural Department. The value of
research into plant diseases, and of the pest of cotton, wheat, flax, &c., and other
technical enquiries, are by common consent part of the duties of any civilised
Government, and their worth has been proved wherever they have been systematically
undertaken. Results are not immediately visible, but it can scarcely be doubted that
the department is one which will justify its existence.

The numbers of the Judicial Department, which is nearly half Arab, are as low
as is consistent with the due execution of justice in a country the communications of
which are so undeveloped, but will probably be susceptible to gradual reduction in
the future.

It remains to consider the executive staff of Divisions, 106 officejs. These officers
represent, along Avith the Revenue Department, the " Hukumah " to the vast majority
of the inhabitants. Scattered over some 15 Divisions, over an area of nearly 150,000
square miles, with some 15 of their number employed in Persia and about 20 con-
stantly sick or on leave, the actual number throughout the country has seldom
exceeded 70. It may be possible in time to reduce the nvmiber, but not unless the
whole' system of government is radically changed. The total numbers are certainly
considerably less than that of superior Turkish officials employed before the war in
similar capacities in Mesopotamia.

Finally, it is necessary to point out that at the time of the armistice personnel of
the civil administration, and of the militaiy departments which it has since taken
over, had practically without exception been continuously at work in Mesopotamia for
from two to five years Avithout leave home, and it was absokitely necessary that all
personnel should, with a few exceptions, get a spell of leave at home of not less than
three months during the two years folloAving the armistice.

In order that this might be possible without a very serious breakdown, it was
necessary to maintain temporarily a larger reserve to provide for leave and sickness
than is normally required. In practice it has not been possible to build up this
reserve, and nearly all departments have been actually greatly under-staffed during
this period.

The difficulty of the position was accentuated by the great delay in obtaining
passages home and out and the length of time spent on the journey. For the first
18 months after tlie armistice the journey to England on the voyage took two months
each way, and thus an officer on three months' leave was in practice away for seven
months. It is unnecessary to emphasise the effect of this on cadres.

Since the armistice more than 50 per cent, of the personnel of the civil
administration has been changed. Some 60 officers belonging to other Government
services have reverted to their permanent employments at the urgent requests of
their own Governments. About 100 were demobilised at their own request and
reverted to their pre-war occupations, and about 50 from various departments, mostly
Government of India, reverted to India and were replaced by other officers. This
process, which is not yet complete, involves the retention on the books of the
administration during the period of transfer, for some months, both of the officer
relieved and of the relieving officer, and as in most cases the relieved officer was
entitled to some months' leave at the expense of the administration, and the relieving
officer was recruited in England, it follows that double staffs were maintained in
respect of many appointments for a period of six or eight months.

126

CHAPTER X.— The Nationalist Movement.

l^efore tlie armistice the people of Mesopotamia liad accepted the fact of British
occupation and were resigned to the prospect of British administration. Sections
of the inhabitants were more than resigned ; they looked forward with satisfaction to
a future in which they would be able to pursue commerce and agriculture in profitable
security with a strong central authority preserving peace and order, and this frame
of mind was probably most prevalent where British rule had been longest established.

r As early as 1917 the inhabitants of Basrah made public declaration of their
K h contentment with a condition of afEairs which allowed them to engage in business

[^with the certainty of advantage. They observed with truth that their town had made
almost incredible progress, and they recognised gratefully that the comfort of their
lives had been increased beyond all anticipation. They added, however, that the
demands of the Government on labour were too heavy for the district to bear without
injury to agricultural interests, and they begged that the supply might be sought in
India. There can be little question that they had in their mind some system of
indentured labour, and that they did not contemplate the settlement of colonies of the
natives of India in the 'Iraq.

Grievances such as the labour and housing questions no doubt there were, and

• the longer they endured the harder they pressed, but on the whole it was recognised
' that they were due to a state of war and that the British civil officials were as anxious

to see their disappearance as were the people themselves. Throughout the country
there was a conviction, which frequently found open expression, that the British
meant well by the Arabs, and coupled with this an appreciation of the material
prosperity which had followed in the track of our armies— notwithstanding the food
shortage and high prices of war — together with a hope that the advent of peace
would bring about instant improvements.

Roughly outlined, such was the temper of Basrah, 'Amarah, Hillah and the
country districts generally. Baghdad, which is a far more active centre of political
thought than "any other part of the 'Iraq, had not spoken. As for the holy cities,
Kadhimain, like Baghdad, had been voiceless ; in Karbala any difficulties which had
arisen had been purely local, while in Najaf the troubles of 1917 and 1918 had been
fostered by Turco-German intrigue and allayed by the defeat and withdrawal of the
,_euemy and the removal of turbulent local elements.
U A new turn was given to the native mind firstly by the publication in the official

'^ Mesopotamian newspapers on 11th October 1910 of President Wilson's 14 points,
which, though declared to the Senate on 8th Jaunar^'-^'Vere unknown in the 'Iraq till
they appeared in Reuter's telegrams ; and secondly, on 8th Novembeff?)! the Anglo-
French declaration which stated that it was the intention of the two Governments to
establish among those peoples who had long been oppressed by the Turks " national
" governments and administrations drawing their authority from the free choice of

* " indigenous populations." " Far from washing to impose any particular institutions
" on these lands," the declaration continued, "the two Governments have no care but
" to assure by their support and effective aid the normal working of the governments
" and administrations which they have adopted of their free will. To ensure
" impartial and equal justice, to foster the spread of education, and to put an end to
" the divisions so long exploited by Turkish policy— such is the role which the two
" allied Governments assume in the liberated territories."

This announcement of a policy in accordance with the principles on which the
war had been waged did little but reiterate the intentions which had already been
announced on the occupation of Baghdad, but it differed from the former pronounce •
ment in one important particular, namely, that whereas the Baghdad proclamation
bad been issued while the upshot of the war was still extremely doubtful, and for that
reason had been regarded as mainly a war expedient, the Anglo-French declaration
was published after the victory of the Allies had been achieved and commanded
belief. If, previous to its appearance, the people of Mesopotamia had been as a whole
content to accept the decision of arms, the declaration opened out other possibilities,
the nature of which was not clearly understood, nor indeed was it likely to be
imderstood, by the people to whom the declaration was addressed. Some regarded it
merely as an indication of the uncertainty of its authors as to the future, and
proceeded to canvas any insignificant incident or act on the part of the authorities
with a view to discovering whetl>er it- might B«t- imply a hidden intention of handing

127

the country back to the Turks, a prospect which was regarded with mixed fcehngs,
but suggested at least the iustaiit need of hedging; others went to the opposite end
of the scale and interpreted the expressed wish of tlje Allies to set up an indigenous
government in Mesopotamia as a recognition of the capacity of Arabs to embark on
native administration without assistance or control. In Baghdad, where political
ambitions are more highly developed than elsewhere in Mesopotamia, within a week
of the publication of the Anglo-French declaration the idea of an Arab Amir of the ''
'Iraq was everywhere being discussed, and in Mohammedan circles it met with
universal approval. But there was no consensus of opinion as to the person who
should be selected to fill the post. At first the choice wavered between a son of the
King of the Hijaz, a member of the family of the Sultan of Egj'pt, and a magnate of
Mosul ; the Naqib of Baghdad was mentioned, and once a preference for a republic
was expressed. But the idea of a republic was not agreeable to most Moslems, and
the Naqib showed some reluctance to accept high office of State.

Debate in the town took ahuost at once a sharply controversial colour, and this
was due partly to the fact that a new element had been imported into Baghdad after
the armistice. According to the terms arranged with the Turkish Commander, all ^
men of Arab birth who had been in Ottoman employ, whether civil or military, were
permitted to return to their home. A proportion of these were men who"_of free choice
had accompanied the Turks when they retreated before General Maude's victorious
army, and were ex hypothesi unlikely to entertain kindly feelings towards the
coutiuuance of British control, however liberally it might be exercised. Moreover,
the Turkish system of administration was based on the multiplication of small posts
which gave employment to a horde of petty officials, more or less, and more i-ather
than less, unworthy of office. A number of these had fled with the Turkish army
after the occupation of Baghdad and had been given sinecures in the Mosul Wilayat '
pending the recapture of the capital. We found the public offices choked with
salaried persons having no visible duties ; unemployed, and to a great extent
unemployable, they retui-ned to Baghdad and formed a nucleus of discontent and
hostility.

The Jewish community, which is the most wealthy in Baghdad, and comprises
considerably more than a third of the population of the town, took alarm at the windy
and violent oratory in the coffee shops, and sent in a unanimous petition asking to be
allowed to become British subjects if an Arab Government were set up in Mesopotamia ;
the Christians, a small body, about one twenty-fifth of the whole population, were ^
equally perturbed and declared that the attitude of the Moslems towards themselves
was becoming truculent.

Meantime instructions had been received from His Majesty's Government by the
Acting Civil Commissioner, Colonel Wilson, to ascertain the views of the local
population in the areas affected upon the following points : —

(1) Whether they were in favour of a single Arab State under British tutelage

extending from the northern boundary of the Mosul Wilayat to the Persian
Gulf ?

(2) If so, whether they considered that the new State should be placed under an

Arab Amir ?

(3) And in that case whom would they suggest ?

X In the light of experience it may be doubted whether any such enquiry carried
out under official or other auspices would have been likely to elicit answers which
might serve to guide the questioner. The bulk of the people to whom the questions , y
were addressed had no definite opinion and were not in a position to form one. It ,
was clearly impracticable to pursue the enquiry among the rank and file of the tribes-
men, the shepherds, marsh dwellers, rice, barley, and date cultivators of the Euphrates
and Tigris, whose experience of statecraft was confined to speculations as to the
performances of their next-door neighbours. They would in any case have done na i
more than re-echo by command the formula prescribed by their immediate chiefs, and !
it was just as profitable, besides being more expeditious, to refer the questions to the. \
chiefs only. Accordingly, in the country districts and provincial towns it was the . j
shaikhs and men of a certain importance who were asked for their views. ~

On one point there was unanimity ; all considered that the Mosul Wilayat should
be united to the Wilayats of Baghdad and Basrah. In other respects, in the 17
distinct enquiries which were set on foot the most definite reply was received from

128

the Hillah Division, where the population, guided largely by the advice of the leading
Saiyid, Muhammad 'Ali Qazwiui (who, it will be remembered, had narrowly escaped
execution by the Turks in November 1916) declared whole-heartedly for the
continuance of British administration, and refused to yield to nationalist or other
propaganda. In six more divisions British goverjunent without an Amir w^as
requested, and in four cases it was desired that Sir Percy Cox should be nominated
as High Commissioner. A similar reply was received from yet another five divisions,
with the difference that an Amir was regarded as the ideal if any person could be
fixed upon, and as a possibility in the near future ; twice a protest against an Amir
chosen from the Sharifian house was raised. In the Ba'qubah Division there was a
sharp difference of opinion ; the inhabitants of Ba'qubah town, influenced by Baghdad,
wished for an Amir of the Sharif's family, probably with the implication that no
foreign control was needed, while the tribesmen asked for British administration.
In Najaf and the Shamiyah Division, in which Najaf lies, j)ublic opinion made more
than one volte-face, but on the whole it could be gathered that a Mohammedan Amir
under British protection was generally favoured, and the family of the Sharif was
mentioned in this connection. In Karbala and Kadhimain the rnujtahids forbade
believers to pronounce in favour of anything but an Islamic government, and
controversy ran so high that enquiries were broken off, after which several petitions
in favour of British administration were received, bearing the signature of shaikhs
and townsmen of standing. Last of all, t/he decision was taken in Baghdad. The
Qadhis of the Sunni and Shi'ah sects were asked to select 25 notables of their
respective creeds, the Grand Rabbi 20 leading Jews, and the heads of the Christian
communities 10 Christians. The Qadhis, either by intent or under religious and
political pressure, did not execute their task loyally. With considerable difficulty
they produced a packed assembly, in which the heads of the leading Moslem families
declined to take part on account of its advanced tendencies ; the Jewish and Christian
elements withdrew from it for the same reason, while the assembled Moslems signed
a petition in which they expressed their preference for an Arab State headed by a
Mohammedan king who should be one of the sons of the Sharif. Nothing was said
about I'oreign protection, but it was known that the extremists desired to exclude it.
The Jews and Christians presented separate petitions in which they plumped for
British administration, and in the following days a number of similar petitions were
received, signed by the heads of leading Moslem families and merchants, all of whom
had refused to take part in the assembly. It is worthy of note that the Naqib had
forbidden any of his family to attend it.

The extremists had in fact overshot the mark. Men Avho had at first welcomed
the idea of an Arab Amir were alarmed by the wild talk and the excitement which had
been aroused, and rejected an alternative the mere discussion of which had given rein
to passions dangerous to the political stability of the country. At the request of some
of the principal citizens, seven of the agitators, all of them ex-Tu]'kish officials, who
had taken a leading part in anti-British propaganda, were sent to Constantinople vi&
India and Egypt ; the rest relapsed into quiescence. A,
V During the ensuing year some progress was made towards the establishment of

native institutions. From the first it had been the practice of the administration to
employ Arabs as much as possible ; if Englishmen directed the conduct of the work,
the subordinate establishment was locally recruited. This principle applied equally to
political and revenue work, to the Auqaf Department, which was run entirely by
Arabs with a British Director, and to the Education Department, which, except for
the British Director and his immediate assistants, was wholly Arab. In the Judicial
Department, Arab judges had sat in the Shar'ah and Peace Courts from the first, and
as the courts increased in number Arabs were placed in most of the newly-created
posts. As conditions became more settled natives of the country were advanced to
positions of greater responsibility. Arab Political Assistants were appointed to the
Political Officers of Divisions, and in many cases the British Assistant Political Officer
was replaced by an Arab Deputy Assistant Political Officer, who ran his district directly
,^ under the headquarters of the Division. These innovations were not always attended
[ by success. Regrettable instances occurred when the rising murmur of complaint
against the practices of the Political Assistant or the Deputy Assistant Political Officer
grew so loud as to demand attention ; a judicial prosecution would be instituted, and
')(^ ■ the evidence brought before the courts would precipitate the officer in question from
his too advantageous seat. An incident of this kind would be followed by a
reiteration of native advice given in private to Political Officers, to the effect that

129

our administration should be kept clear of Arab officials, who were constitutionally
incapable ol honest dealings, let alone that they had been corj-npted by Turkish
communications. To take a recent example, a petition from the shaikhs of the Bani A
Sa'id, ]\luntafiq Division, received in March 1920, runs as follows : — " Now that, we /
" are under the protection of Great Britain we beg to request that our affairs may be (
" dealt with directly by the Assistant Political Officer of Shatrah. We have suffered |
" enough from Arab Mamurs, and therefore we hope that Great Britain will not
" refuse us justice, ami will refer our affairs direct to the Assistant Political Officer."

A further difficulty lies in the fact that the sources of supply from which native
officials can be drawn exist almost exclusively in the towns of Baghdad and Basrah, ^
and mainly in Baghdad. Even provincial centres such as Hillah and 'Amarah are
not rich in a comparatively educated class which can provide personnel for Government
employment, while among the tribal population of the country districts no one but a
chance saiyid or the secretary of a shaikh can read or write, the shaikh himself being
usually illiterate. Yet the inhabitants of the provincial towns are jealous of the ) ,
Baghdadi, and resent his being placed exclusively in authority, and the tribes still '
more profoundly dislike and mistrust the " effendi," a term which on their lips
has almost the exact significance of " Baghdadi," the educated classes of the
capital being to them the epitome of effendi-ism. The gulf between Baghdad and
the provinces is wide. The townsman of the official class is reluctant to serve
in jjrovincial posts, and the Baghdad landlord in nine cases out of ten has never
set eyes on his estates outside the town — he leaves them to be mismanaged by an
agent. But it is not only the landowning class Avhich is unconcerned by the interests
of the cultivator ; the intelligenzia from top to bottom neither have any knowledge of
rural conditions nor have they begun to realise that these must be studied and known ;_^
and those who talk loudest in the coffee-shops concerning Arab liberties have in their \
mind only the liberties of the frequenters of coffee-shops. Except for the families of /)
tribal descent, of which there are a considerable number in the town, the Baghdadi**
knows little about tribal organisation, the position and influence of the shaikh for
good or ill, or the characteristics and customs of the various tribes ; and he regards the
whole tribal population, on which the economy of Mesopotamia ultimately rests, with
a mixture of fear and disdain. It is not, therefore, remarkable that the tribesman on
his side has no warm feelings for the townsman. This sharp differentiation between
the urban and the rural classes of the population complicates the j^roblem of \!
government in more ways than one, but notably in the selection of native officials. *

Nevertheless the system of employing natives of every denomination and qJL,
training them for future employment has been adhei'ed to. Doubtless their inefficiency^
and other delinquencies constitute a charge on the public, but in the long run it will \
pay the public to stand the native official class its education. Nor, indeed, is there \
any alternative.

' Opportunities for public service were found also in the municipalities. Under
the Turkish regime, a municipality was established in every town or hamlet of any
size. Nominally they existed to provide sanitation, policing and lighting ; actually to
furnish salaries to the leading man of the town and his office staff, as well as to form
a source of communal income wheref rom to defray the expense of entertaining officials
on tour. The expense to the public of the actual services rendered in the smaller
municipalities may be judged by scrutinising an Ottoman municipal budget. For
example, at Ghammas, a small town on the Euphrates, the total yearly receipts
amounted to Rs. 1,810 ; the expenditure was Rs. 1,510 and was made up of Rs. 1,302
in salaries to the officials and office expenses, and Rs. 208 for sweeping, lighting
burying and the upkeep of roads.

Municipal income depended in most cases on ferries, many of which were distant
from the municipality, building taxes, brokerage on every kind of transaction which
took place within municipal limits, and half the proceeds of the slaughter house tax.
In the larger municipalities taxes were levied on shops and houses, noxious trades and
other small items. Revenues were derived also from license fees, rents of municipal
lands and buildings, and from fines. The Turkish administration had made no
attempt at uniformity, and our first care was to simplify and systematise taxation. The
larger municipalities were placed in the charge of Political Officers, who were assisted
by informal councils which coiild develop later into municipal bodies. In smallei-
centres the Ottoman system of local management by the townsfolk was I'e-created but
placed on a better footing. In a few cases where the expenditure side of the budget
showed little but the pay of the president and his clerk, and the municipality was
2041 R

130 '

obviously unable to rise above tbis level, it was abolished. There are now 80
municipalities most of which perform valuable public services, of which lighting and
sanitation are the minimum. Cleanliness has everywhere made notable improvement
and interest is taken in municipal affairs. In many cases important improvements
have been effected at the suggestion of the Political Officer ; streets have been widened ;
pits, dug long ago in brick-making and left to fill with water and become breeding
places for mosquitoes, have been levelled 'up ; municipal gardens have been begun,
bridges built, bazaars roofed and their floors covered with bitumen ; flights of steps
have been constructed down the river banks to the water — a small matter, but
important where all the water for household iise has to be brought from the river by
the womenfolk — and raised pathways edged with brick have been made to form a
road where in muddy weather there was nothing but a quagmire.

At first most municipalities had to be subsidised from general revenues, but
nearly all are now self-supporting and most are making a contribution towards the
cost of medical services, education and police. Many towns are embarking on
municipal enterprises, such as electric lighting, water supply, and flour mills. A few
of the municipalities have taken over water and electric plant from the military
authorities, and in at least one case an electric lighting plant has been acquired by a
^ local company in which the municipality holds a quarter of the shares. _Ithas been
/^ necessary to put some restraint on premature ambitions, but where the scheme seems
sound, and the municipal funds cannot provide the whole of the capital cost, the
municipality has sometimes been given a loan from general revenues, repayable in
three or four years.

That it was not our intention to rest content with embryo municipal bodies, even
though the delay in concluding peace with Turkey postponed the setting up of civil
government, was announced by the Acting Civil Commissioner in a speech delivered
at a banquet held at Baghdad in honour of the King's Birthday on 29th May 1919.
"The British Government," said Colonel Wilson, " has already declared its intention
" of assisting in the establishment in the 'Iraq of a form of administration calculated
"to be agreeable to the population, whilst at the same time ensuring equal justice,
" economic development, and the spread of education. You may like to know what we
" are already doing towards introducing a system of government which will enable the
" inhabitants of 'Iraq to take a share from the fi rst-in man a ging their ^ own affairs.
" Mesopotamia has been divided into several divisions (liwahs), e.gr.-, Basrah, 'Amarah,
" Muntafiq, Kut, Baghdad, and the Euphrates. In each of these provinces it is
" proposed to set up as soon as possible a Council of Notables, who shall assemble
" periodically to advise Government as to matters of provincial concern, such as
" education, agriculture, irrigation, roads, and the like. The President of the Council
" will be the Political Officer of the Division, the Secretary will be an inhabitant of
" 'Iraq, who will generally be the adviser (mushawar) of the Political Officer. 'I'he
" advantage will be that this will enable local opinion to be thoroughly ventilated. In
" various Departments of State, e.g., Revenue, Education, Justice, it is intended. to
" appoint an inhabitant of 'Iraq of suitable qualifications to act as adviser to the head
" of the Department, and it is hoped by this means to initiate an increasing number of
" 'Iraq officials and non-officials into modern methods of administration, and at the
" same time to ensure that the administration will be in touch with local feeling and
*' ambitions. These measures are first steps, and must be regarded as such and as an
" earnest of our intentions rather than as a considered scheme of government, biit I
" would remind those who would be glad to see more ambitious schemes set up forth-
" with that 'Iraq needs expert guidance and foreign assistance if it is to escape the
" fate of neighbouring countries and to fulfil its high destinies. It needs time to
" educate its sons in the ways of modern administration. It is well known that
•' amongst those people who have developed self-government the kernel of development
" has commonly been the city with its autonomous institutions. So then in Baghdad,
" Basrah and 'Amarah the control of municipal affairs will, subject to the general
" supervision of the Divisional Political Officer, forthwith vest in the Municipal
" Council, chosen by Government in receipt of remuneration for its services."

In fulfihnent of the undertakings here given, the first step that was taken was
the rem.odelling of the municipality of Basrah. In place of the existing advisory body
a Municipal Council was created, which consisted of a British President, an Arab
Vice-President, British and Arab technical advisers and 20 members, one of whom
was a British subject representing the Chamber of Commerce, while a second repre-
sented the Associated Indian Trades. As regards the remaining 18 members, opinion

131

in Basrah was not in favour of recourse to general election, and a mixed scheme was
agreed to combining nomination with election.

The project of forming a Municipal Council for Baghdad was under discussion in
November 1918, and had been laid before the existing Municipal Advisory Committee.
The most important point to be decided was the manner in which the Council should
be selected. The Committee, composed of representatives of all sects, was unani-
mously in favour of some form of election, btit equally divided between direct election
according to the old Turkish law, which provided for a property qualification of
2,500 piastres annual value (about Rs. 212), with certain classes, such as convicts and
foreigners, ruled out ; or election by a college composed of some 500 to 600 electors
selected from each quarter by the mukhtar, or headmen, subject to the approval of a
central scrutinising body. It is, however, to be noted that only one Moslem member
of the Committee voted against adhering to the Turkish method. There was also
unanimity in opposing the inclusion of any local nominated members, but it was
agreed that the Military Governor should be President and that the two Deputy
Military Governors should sit as members exercising votes.

It must be borne in mind that although under the Turks the Municipal Council
was elected on a wide franchise its powers were limited. The budget and all schemes
and projects for works, &c., had to be approved by the Municipal Assembly, which
was formed by the union of the Municipal Council and the Administrative Council.
As the latter was composed chiefly of officials, the Ottoman Government could always
obtain an official or semi-official majority in the Assembly. Thus, while seeming to
place the management of municipal affairs on a popular basis, the Turks in reality
maintained complete control of all important matters.

The formation of an elective Municipal Council for Baghdad was delayed by the
party feeling which was aroused by the self-determination enquiry. In the early
summer it was again the subject of careful consideration, and it had alreadj^ been
decided to take the first step towards self-government in the town by appointing an
assistant to the Military Governor ; the latter had been a political appointment since
the end of 1918, though the name of Military Governor was maintained. At this
juncture there arrived in Baghdad from Aleppo, early in June, Naji Effendi Sviwaidi,
who was offered the post, and took up the woi-k on 3rd July. Naji Effendi is a
member of a distinguished family of Baghdad, said to be descended from the
'Abbasids. His father, Yusuf Effendi, was known for his pro-Arab sympathies, and
was exiled from Baghdad to Constantinople in 1915 when the Turkish Government
broke up the Liberal Party in the town. The whole family fell under a cloud. One of
Yusuf Effendi's sons, vpho held office in Diyarbakr, was murdered on account of his
refusal to obey official commands in respect of the massacre of Armenians. Naji,
who was also in office, remained at Constantinople till the armistice, after which he
went to Syria, and was appointed Deputy Military Governor of Aleppo. When he
came to Baghdad in June 1919 he let it be understood that he was prepared to take
office in Mesopotamia. He was offered the choice of two posts. Adviser to the Judicial
Secretary or Adviser to the Military Governor, and chose the latter. It was intimated
to him that it would be his first and most important duty to assist the Military k
Governor in working _ out the new administrative arrangements for the city. The /
schemes and notes with regard to the proposed municipality, which had been put
forward after a close study of Turkish methods by the Judicial Secretary aijd other V
heads of departments, were laid before him ; but without giving himself time to
weigh them thoroughly, he drew up and presented on 7th July a scheme on somewhat
different lines, salient divergences being that the body should be elected by universal
suffrage,_ and that no British officer, with the exception of the Officer of Health and
the Municipal Engineer, should be a member.

The Acting Civil Commissioner, at the request of the Military Governor, Colonel
Balfour, appointed a committee under the presidency of the Judicial Adviser,
consisting of two British officers, four notables of Baghdad, including Naji Effendi,
and an Arab secretary, to consider these proposals ; but on 14th July, before the
Committee had had time to meet, Naji Effendi resigned office. In the letter tendering
his resignation, he stated that his "managing the administration of the municipality
" and directing its affairs before the election of the council and the completion of the
" organisation will neitlier secure the success aimed at nor derive the intended
" benefits," and this somewhat shadowy explanation was the only one which he
offered. He left for Aleppo in the following month and resumed his former
appointment there ; but before leaving, and in subsequent letters, he declared that he
would be willing to return at any future time if he were needed.

132

The post vacated by him in Baghdad was accepted in a somewhat modified form
by another leading Sunni, who became Mayor of Baghdad, while a Shi'ah notable was
made mudir of Karkh, the smaller section of the town situated on the right bank of
the Tigris. The Military Governor formed a committee consisting of these officials :
two representatives of British firms and nine leading men of the town, Moslems,
Jews and Christians, and invited them to consider a scheme drafted by the British
heads of departments. The scheme approved by them provided for a Municipal .
Council selected by a system of electoral colleges. The primary electorate was to be
composed of property owners over 21 years of age paying house tax of not less than
V Rs. 41 a year. These conditions limited the number of voters to 762, which in the
eyes of the Baghdad notables was sufficient for a population of nearly 200,000.
Similarly in Mosul, a town of from 60,000 to 80,000 inhabitants, when an elective
municipality on the basis of the Turkish municipal law was set up in the summer
of 1920, the electorate, on the qualifications approved by the local committee ol'
notables, worked out at about 450.

With regard to Divisional Councils, the first to be organised was in Basrah in
November 1919. Others were formed during the winter and spring of 1919-20 in
Kirkuk, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Samarra, 'Amarah, Diyalah and Ramadi Divisions. The
Baghdad Council was (lelayed till after the first municipal election, which has not yet
taken place owing to difficulties in preparing the register.

Informal advisory councils composed of townsmen and shaikhs had from the first
existed in several divisions, and the new councils did not differ from them in principle.
Members representative of different classes and interests, urban and rural, were
selected by the Political Officer, who himself acted as President. When a decision
had been reached on the subject under discussion it was forwarded to the Civil
Commissioner, with whom lay the final ruling. The debates have covered a wide field,
including railway and irrigation schemes, agrarian settlement, local agricultural
questions, the preservation of law and order, &c. At Basrah, where the members
took a lively interest in the proceedings, the management of Auqaf funds has been
subjected more than once to criticism. The setting up of the councils was generally
welcomed, and at Hillah the first act of the newly constituted body was to re-affirm
the petition of January 1919 in favour ,of British administration.

No attempt has as yet been made to apply a system of election to local councils.
In Turkish times the Administrative and General Councils of the Wilayat Avere both
elected, the first on principles which the Turkish law characteristically does not
indicate, the second by the secondary electors of the preceding Parliamentary election.
For the election of these secondary electors the franchise included all male tax-
payers over 24 years of age who were not disqualified by other causes. Each group
of 500 electors chose one secondary elector. In a country like Mesopotamia, where
all but an infinitesimal fraction of the population is illiterate and wholly ignorant of
public affairs, the Turkish system was little better than a fiction. The elections were
in fact run by the Committee of Um'ou and Progress, which indicated candidates
suitable for election. The choice made by the Committee was, however, usually a
reasonable one. How to create and foster popular institutions which shall have a real
significance and enjoy a real responsibility is the problem of the near future. The
Divisional Councils as created by the British Administration were intended only as a
tempor^y measure. Apart from the question of election, they had no direct
responsibility, without which they could not satisfy popular ambition or maintain
vitality. In one case, that of the Shamiyah Division, the members of the newly
appointed council resigned in a body after the first meeting on the ground that till
the future of their country was decided they did not feel themselves at libertj^ to give
their opinion freely. This incident, which took place in February 1920, was directly
connected with the course of events in Syria.

In October 1918 an Arab Government had been set up from Aleppo to Damascus,
practically independent, as far as administration was concerned, though it was under
the general control of the British army of occupation. At its head was the Amir
Faisal, who had served as a general under Lord Allenby. Most of the leading men in
Faisal's army were of Mesopotamian origin, many of them being Baghdadis. They
had always contended that they fought the Syrian campaign for the liberation of their
own country, and as early as the Avinter of 1917-18, during the hostilities before
Ma'an, they formed a society called the 'Ahd al 'Iraqi, the object of which was to
secure the independence of Mesopotamia from all foreign control and its close union
with an independent Syria, under the family of King Husain of the Hijaz. This

133

society, led by the Baghdadi, Yasin Pasha, when at the fall of Damascus he was
taken prisoner and exchanged his high position in the Turkish army for that of Chief I
of Faisal's General Staff, was responsible for the rapid acceleration of nationalist /
ambitions in Mesopotamia. It is doubtful how far it had the support of Faisal^/
himself, who was more embarrassed than aided by the chauvinism of its political (|
principles. On several occasions he has denounced actions which were unquestion-/
ably engineered by the League ; but since, through the participation of Mesopotamian\y
officers, it commanded the army, he was powerless to control it. _J

At the date of the armistice the frontier between Syria and Mesopotamia had not
been defined. Under Turkish rule the Baghdad Wilayat had embraced the Qadha of
'Anah, which extended up the Euphrates to a few miles above Qaim. IBetween
Qaim and Raqqah, the southernmost town in the Aleppo Wilayat, lay the Mntasar-
rifliq of Dair al Zor, which was included in neitlier Wilayat, but was directly
dependent on Constantinople. For a short period before the war these administrative
divisions had been altered and the province of Dair had received a large increase to
the south, including 'Anah.

After the retreat of the Turks a British Assistant Political Officer was sent to
'Anah. So far as the authorities at Baghdad were aware, no arrangements had been
made with regard to Dair, but towards the end of November the inhabitants requested
the Political Officer at 'Anah that an officer might be sent to Dair in order to preserve
law and order. The matter was referred to His Majesty's Government who on 13th
December agreed that, as a temporary measure, pending the decision of the Peace
Conference, a British officer should go to Dair in a purely military capacity. While
the question was under discussion a telegram was received from the High Commis-
sioner in Cairo intimating that the Arab Government at Damascus claimed that the
Mutasarrifliq of Dair should be administered from Damascus ; he therefore urged that
a decision should be taken as soon as possible.

As soon as the permission of His Majesty's Government was received, a qualified
officer was despatched fi'om 'Anah to Dair, but when he reached Albu Kamal he
found that a Qaimmaqam, representing the Arab Government, and sent by order of
the Governor of Aleppo, with a subordinate stafE and some forty gendaraies, had
arrived there on 23rd December and had instructions to occupy 'Anah. An Arab
Mutasarrif was already on the way to Dair, and when he reached his post he
proceeded to appoint large numbers of officials and to enrol gendarmes at a rate of
pay far higher than was offered in the British zone. The Civil Commissioner was in
complete ignorance as to whether the Military Governor, who was said to have issued
the orders, was an Englishman, a Frenchman, or an Arab. On reference to Aleppo
lie was found to be Shukri Pasha al Ayyubi, who declared that the Arab officials had
proceeded to Dair and Albu Kamal contrary to instructions and ordered their
inmiediate withdrawal.

The inciden t remained obscure. It is not impossible that the original orders for the
occupation of the Mutasarrifliq of Dair may have been given in all good faith by Faisal
before he left for Paris, or they may have been issued by the League without his
knowledge. But for the request from the inhabitants for a British officer, the British
Administration in Mesopotamia would have been reluctant to extend their responsi-
bilities as far up the river as Dair ; indeed, the Commander-in-Chief declined to
undertake military protection upstream of Qaim. Though the question was settled y
amicably it left an impression of rival and incompatible ambitions, of which the ^
Mesopotamian League did not fail to make use. In February and again in July 19)9,
an agent of the Leagne, wlio was ascertained later to have been Ramadhan al Shallash,
canvassed the tribes of Dair and obtained documents in favour of the Arab Govern-
ment. Ramadhan was himself by origin a mukhtar, or headman, of one of the local
tribes, the Albu Sarai, cultivators and sheep breeders above and below Dair, He had
been an officer in the Turkish army and had deserted at Madinah to the Sharif.

The propaganda cari-ied on by the League was not confined to Dair. Continuous
correspondence was carried on by the 'Iraqis in Syria and their relatives and friends
in Mesopotamia, the purport of which was to urge the latter to combine with Syria in
demanding complete independence. Funds were sent from Syria to help the ii
Mesopotamians in the diffusion of these views.-' \\

Experience gained by administering Dair convinced the civil authorities in
Mesopotamia that the frontier should be drawn so as either to include the whole of
the Dair Mutasarrifliq or to exclude all tribes directly dependent upon Dair, the
arbitrary division of tribal groups being a sure means of generating friction and

134

misunclerstanding. Militory considerations made it advisable to exclude Dair and its
tribes from Mesopotamia. Troops cotild not be maintained at a point so distant, and
with tbe exception of two armoured care, the Assistant Political Officer relied entirely
on Arab levies. A provisional boundary proposed during the summer of 1919 by
His Majesty's Government, namely, a line crossing the Euphrates some miles below
Dair at the mouth of the Khabur, and following up that tributary, was not held to
accord with local conditions. The same tribes occupy both banks of the Khabur,
and in the interests of peace it was essential that they should be placed under a single
mandatory. Nevertheless, in the convej satious between Great Britain and France in
September 1919, it was decided provisionally to maintain the Khabur as a frontier.
The Amir Faisal was at that time in Europe, and was present at some of the
conferences, but it is not certain whether he was aware of the exact nature of the
decision which was reached, though he undoubtedly knew that it was the intention
of the allied Governments to exclude Dair from the Mesopotamian State. The
impression in Syria seems to have been that Great Britain would evacuate the whole
of the Mutasarrifliq, the southern boundary of which could be variously stated as
being at Qaim, the old Turkish administrative frontier, or below 'Anah at the point
temporarily adopted by the Turks.

It was of importance that when the evacuation took place the incoming authority,
whether French or Arab, should be installed by us with due ceremony in order to
avoid misapprehension and tribal disturbance. In the absence of any official
pronouncement, great uncertainty as to the future was felt at Dair, nor was it
diminished by an incident which occurred on 4th November, immediately after the
evacuation of Syria by the British forces had begun. The Assistant Political Officer
heard that a Turkish Qaimmaqam had arrived at Hasaqah, on the Khabur. north-east
of Dair ; at the same time letters were circulated among the tribes announcing the
immediate return of the Turks. Captain Chamier went to Hasaqah, interviewed the
Qaimmaqam, and at the suggestion of the latter went on to Ras al 'Ain, where he
telephoned to the Turkish Commandant at Mardin, and asked for an explanation.
The Commandant replied that he had understood that we had evacuated Dair, but
since that was not the case he would recall the Qaimmaqam.

On 19th November a telegram from the High Commissioner at Cairo was
received in Baghdad, intimating that Ramadhan al Shallash had left Aleppo with
instructions to proceed to Dair. He reached Raqqah early in December, and began
actively to intrigue among the tribes, styling himself Governor of the Euphrates and
Khabur. Unfortunately the orders of His Majesty's Government, which were
on their way, had not been received, when on 10th December the Assistant
Political Officer, Captain Chamier, heard a rumour that an Arab force was
moving down from Raqqah to attack Dair. Accompanied by the officer in
command of the armoured cars, he made a reconnaissance by motor along the
Raqqah road, and found no trace of any unusual movement, but on his return
he was ambushed and fired at by tribesmen. With difficulty the two officers
got back to Dair. Even then Captain Chamier did not believe that a serious
attack on Dair was intended, but he telegraphed to Baghdad announcing serious
trouble, arrested the mayor, whom he suspected of connivance, made such dispositions
for the peace of the town as were possible, and withdrew with the Arab levies to the
barracks. Early in the morning of 11th December Dair was entered by tribesmen
from the south, and, together with the townsmen, they raided the hospital, chiirch,
one or two mosques, and the Political Office, where the safe was broken open and its
contents taken. The petrol dump was blown up, with some 90 casualties among the
assailants, and all prisoners were released. An armoured car, wjiich went out to
make a reconnaissance in the town, was fired at and badly damaged, and later in the
morning fire was opened on the barracks. The machine guns, which had been
mounted on the roof, replied, but were soon put out of action by the enemy's fire.
Shortly afterwards Captain Chamier was invited to come down to the town for a
conference. His position was difficult, as he had neither food nor water in the
barracks to withstand a siege ; accordingly he thought it best to comply with the
invitation, and taking with him his Arab personal assistant he went to the house of
the mayor, where he met the leading citizens. They seemed anxious to make a truce,
and it was evident that, having got the tribesmen into the town, they found themselves

1 Yusuf Effendi Suwaidi told Saiyid Talib Pasha in July 1920 that he had received in all 16,000Z.,
and complained of the inadequacy of a sum -which had to be divided " among so many." Another 3,000i.
is known to have been received by Shaikh Sa'id Naqshbandi.

135

nnaHe to control them. In order to put a stop to the wild firing which still continued,
Captain Chamier, together with the mayor, walked through the town to show that
there was no war between the British and the Arabs. On his return to the mayor's
house he met the shaikhs who had led the rebellion ; they were in a great state of
excitement and exhibited fanatical hostility. Their general view was that, having ^
gone so far, they might as well kill the British officers and staff, and they would
possibly have acted on this threat but for the fortunate appearance of two aeroplanes \
from Mosul, which proceeded to machine-gim the town. The shaikhs changed their '
note at once, and begged Captain Chamier to stop the bombardment. When the
aeroplanes had left they concluded an armistice for 24 hours.

Ramadhan Shallash reached Dair in the afternoon and sent immediately for
Captain Chamier. He produced a number of letters wliich he said had been written
by the Shaikhs of Dair asking him to take over the district on behalf of the Arab
Government. He observed that just as the British had been invited in December
1918 to come in and preserve peace and order, so they were now invited to leave.
Captain Chamier replied that he had had no instructions to vacate Dair, but that as
he was unable to make any resistance he was willing to leave if Ramadhan al
Shallash wovdd undertake to preserve order and not to take action against the Arab
officials who had served under the British administration, or against the Christians.
There were a number of Armenian refugees in Dair, as to whose fate he felt a
justifiable anxiety. Ramadhan al Shallash agreed to these conditions, but during
the night he changed his mind and asked Captain Chamier to guarantee that after
his safe arrival in the British lines Dair should not be attacked by land or air. This
promise Captain Chamier was unable to give, but he agreed to attract the attention
of an aeroplane and induce the pilot to land. He did to in the course of the day —
no small praise being due to the pilot for venturing to land — <ind a message was sent
to the British authorities explaining that the British in Dair were held there as
hostage for the safety of the town.

Once he had entered Dair, Ramadhan's propaganda consisted in giving
appointments to everyone who came to his assistance, the salary to be fixed at a later
date. He informed the tribal shaikhs that it was the intention of the Arab Govern-
ment to initiate local institutions under the shaikhs themselves. A number of
mukhtars of the tribes along the river and the majority of such shaikhs of the 'Anizah
as were hostile to our staunch ally, Fahad Beg, came in to visit him, but though they
professed loudly that it was necessary to raise the tribes against the British and even
to carry the war into India, all the more important shaikhs, after they had received
gifts of money and gauged the situation, returned to their tents and took no further
action. There is no doubt that Ramadhan was badly misled as to the extent of
support which he would receive from the tribes. One of the leading shaikhs of the
'Aquaidat, to which tribe Ramadhan's own section, the Albu Sarai, belongs, remained
in active co-operation with us till in May we withdrew from his territory, when he
was obliged to come to terms with the Arab Government.

Meanwhile, the shaikhs of the Dulaim, lower down the river, had placed
themselves at the disposition of the British Government, and Fahad Beg ibn
Hadhdhal, paramount chief of the 'Anizah, had expressed his readiness to help us,
while the leading shaikhs of the Shammar Jarba' promised to co-operate with the
Dulaim,

The Amir Faisal was in Paris, but on being told of the hostilities at Dair he sent
a telegram to his brother and deputy at Damascus, the Amir Zaid, repudiating in the
strongest terms the action of Ramadhan al Shallash and ordering the Arab officials
to withdraw from Dair. He added that all who were responsible for what had
occurred would be punished as rebels. This message was dropped in Dair by our
aeroplanes on 22nd December, together with a letter from the Commander-in-Chief,
requiring Ramadhan to send the British officers and men in safety to Albu Kamal,
otherwise action would be taken against Dair. Ramadhan was no doubt aware that
the seizure of Dair could not be justified, though he supported it by claiming that
Dair had been assigped to the Arab Government by the Peace Conference. He was
also undeniably anxious as to Turkish movements, a natural anxiety seeing that he
was a deserter from the Ottoman army. On 19th December he told Captain Chamier
that the Turks were concentrating in Ras al 'Ain ; he added that he had no wish to
make war on the British Government, and asked whether, in the event of a Turkish
attack, we would support him, at any rate with money. Throughout the period of
Captain Chamier's imprisonment he was treated by Ramadhan with unbroken
courtesy.

136

On 21st December, two officers arrived from Aleppo, Raxif Beg and Taufiq Beg,
the latter being the Aide-de-Camp of Ja'far Pasha, Military Governor of Aleppo.
Rauf Beg brought a letter from Ja'far to Captain Ghamier, which he was not allowed
to communicate to him imtil two days after his ai'rival. In it Ja'far asked the British
officer to consult with Raiif as to the best means of restoring order. Rauf informed
Gaptain Ghamier that he had instructions to dismiss Ramadhan from his post as
Qairamaqam of Raqqah and to send him under arrest to Aleppo. But as the represen-
tatives of the Arab Government had no power to enforce these orders, and as
Ramadhan alone stood between the British officers and the fanaticism of the local
tribesmen, Gaptain Ghamier suggested that action would l)e postponed, and that
Lieutenant Tauiiq with one of the British officers should go to Albu Kamal to interview
the British authorities. The Acting Givil Gommissioner happened to be in Albu
Kamal when Lieutenant Taufiq arrived there, and was informed by him that
Ramadhan al Shallash had disclaimed allegiance to the Arab Government. Lieutenant
Taufiq begged the British administration to eject him, but in reply was told that we
had never desired to hold Dair except to maintain order, and that as Ramadhan had
produced the existing state of anarchy, it was the duty of the Arab Government to
right matters. Orders from His Majesty's Government with regard to withdrawal to
the Khabur had by this time been received, and Lieutenant Taufiq was given a letter
to Ramadhan saying that by agreement between the British and Arab Governments
the frontier had been drawn provisionally at the Khabur, and that this boundary
would be observed by us. Lieutenant Taufiq promised to do his best to induce
Ramadhan to comply with the decision of higher authorities. A letter to the same
effect was also dropped by aeroplane in Dair, and it was intimated to Ramadhan that
if the British officers and men were sent in safety to Albu Kamal within 48 hours,
Dair would not be touched. The prisoners were released on 25th December, and left
after receiving assurances that no harm should come to the Ghristian population of
the town.

The Arab Government at Damascus in a telegram to Cairo protested, on
12th January, against the provisional Khabur boundary, using the same argument
that had been urged six montlis earlier from Baghdad, namely, that it split tribal
units. They asked that Mayyadin and Albu Kamal should be included in the Arab
zone. The methods adopted by Ramadhan al Shallash were niore direct. He took
up from the first an attitude of defiance to the Amir Faisal's orders, declared that the
British must withdraw to the llauran valley, some 50 miles below 'Anah, and asserted
that this was the frontier adopted by the Peace Conference. Incidentally he
announced his intention of going on to Mosul. He collected taxes wherever he could
within British Iwundaries, encouraged the tribes to rob and raid, sent threatening
messages to tlie Political Officers at Albu Kamal and inflammatory letters to the
shaikhs in British territory. To these letters he received replies of a discouraging
character, but he had greater success in his efforts to excite such sections of the
'Aqaidat as had joined him. The prospect of unlimited highway robbery was very
much to their taste, and they were ready enough to raise any cry, religious or political,
which justified looting. The situation was regarded in a different light by the
merchants of Baghdad, who were engaged in buying gold in Syria and transporting it
at great profit to Mesopotamia. Their tales of the danger of the road and the losses
they had experienced usually ended with a description of their heartfelt satisfaction
when they reached Albu Kamal, a British garrison and safety.

Official protests against Ramadhan's acts of hostility were conveyed by aeroplane
to Mayyadin and Dair. He was warned that if he continued to trespass within the
British boundary the Commander-in-Chief would be forced to make reprisals, and that
any representations which he had to make on the subject of the frontier should be
addressed to his own Government, which was in amicable discussion with the other
Governments concerned. He replied by denying that he had been informed of the
agreement which had been reached, and the windy threats with which his letter ended
were followed on 11th January by a determined attack on Albu Kamal, carried out
by his tribesmen, who entered the suburbs, looted the houses of Arabs who were in
British service and violated their women. Nor were matters improved when, in the
middle of January, Ramadhan left for Aleppo and was superseded by Maulud Pasha
nl Khalaf, who had previously been in command of a division in Damascus. Like
his predecessor, Maulud was a Mesopotamian (he hailed from Mosul) and a prominent
member of the Ahd al 'Iraqi. His first step on assuming command was to write to
the CJomnuuuler-in-Ghipf in Mesopotamia, informing him that the Khabur frontier was

137

impossible to maintain for tribal reasons, and urging immediate withdrawal to the
Wadi Hanran — an alternative which would have beeu equally open to objection, since
it would have involved the arbitrary division of the Dulaini tribe. At the same time
he suggested the reopening of post and telegraph services.

No answer to such letters as these was possible except that which had already
beeti given to Ramadhan, namely, that the boundary had been provisionally agreed
to in Europe and could not be discussed except through the usual diplomatic channels.
Reinforcements were despatched to Albu Kamal ; but, in order to avoid unnecessary
friction and bloodshed, the territory up to the Khabur was not occupied. We
continued to assume that the Arab Government was not responsible for what was
done by its officers and that a state of war did not exist, but it was an assumption
increasingly difficult to maintain. Maulud was as actively engaged in hostile
propaganda as his predecessor. His letters reached the shaikhs as far down as
'Amarah, and he appeared to be amply supplied with funds, which he distributed
among such tribal leaders as he thought capable of causing disturbance within our
sphere. Our forbearance strained the loyalty of our own supporters, who were
unable to understand why the British Government did not deal summarily with an
enemy as insignificant as Maulud and his handful of marauders, and why we did not
extend immediate help and protection to those within our boundaries who were ready
to stand by us if they were assured against reprisals. With a view to stabilising this
position, we advanced at the end of Januarj'- to Salihiyah, half-way between Albu
Kamal and the Khabur. Maulud made this advance an excuse for fresh hostilities,
declaring that he was unable to restrain the fury of the tribes. Led by Arab officers,
the tribesmen attacked Albu Kamal in the middle of February, Avhile British lines of
comnmnication as far south as Qaim were subject to continuous raids.

Maulud was reported to have left for Aleppo before the attack on Albu Kamal,
but to him or his representative the following letter was despatched by the
Commander-in-Chief on 20th February : —

" I write to point out to you that troops under your command have occupied i
Maj'yadin and disturbances have occurred in the area down river of that place, which \J
I can only conclude, from the terms of your own message to me and from other A
evidence, to have been instigated by you or by other persons under your orders, and
this although the provisional boundarj- fixed by the two Governments crosses the
Euphrates above Mayyadin. I have given instructions to my troops that they should
not attack and reoccupy Mayyadin, although that place is within the area in which
my Government has directed me to enforce and maintain order, because it is not
desired to establish a state of hostilities between the British and the Arab Govern-
ments. My only desire is that peace and friendliness with the representatives of the
Arab Government should be maintained, and, whilst questions of areas and boundaries
are left to be settled by our respective Governments, to maintain order in the area
in occupation of my forces, and to co-operate with you in similar action in your area.
It has, however, been clearly proved that tribesmen under your control and troops
actually in the pay of the Arab Government have attacked British convoys and troops
in the area assigned to me by His Majesty's Government ; I have, therej,'ore, to notify
you that Mayyadin will be attacked bj^ air should any disturbance be caused or
fomented by troops or tribesmen sent from Dair al Zor or Mayyadin. Any assembly
of tribesmen with an apparently hostile intention in the area down river of Mayyadin
will be liable to attack, and if any aeroplane be fired on it will reply to this hostile V
action by fire and by bombs. My commander on the Euphrates has been instructed '^
not to take action on the above lines against Mayyadin before the 27th."

At the same time Damascus was informed by His Majesty's Government that they

would be held responsible for any encroachment on the provisional boundary by tribes /

or officials under Maulud, and that the continuation of the subsidy which was being ;

paid to the Arab Government by Great Britain would be dependent on its ability to !■

impose its orders. '

Their expostulations were as vain as those which had preceded them. Ramadhan
Shallash was permitted, or ordered, to return to Dair. Maulud brought back with

him small reinforcements of regular troops from Aleppo, and an 'Iraqi noted for his . i

anti-British sentiments was appointed Governor of Mayyadin. Propaganda of a Y

fanatical character issuing from these sources reached Karbala and Najaf. I

While Maulud was issuing incitements to Jihad on the Euphrates, the Amir
Faisal returned to Damascus from Paris. Early in March he despatched letters to
Cairo expressing his regret for what had happened at Dair al Zor, coupled with an
2041 S

. 138

assurance that he was taking steps to prevent further occurrences of a like nature.
But he pointed out that the provisional frontier line cut across tribal lands and
divisions, and was likely to give rise to misunderstandings! and disorder. He there-
fore suggested that a mixed commission of British and Arabs should be appointed
to modify the arrangement which had been reached in Jauuar}'. The British autliorities
in Mesopotamia agreed readily to this proposal, the more so as at the moment Maulud's
attitude seemed to be growing somewhat more reasonable. Ramadhan Shallash, who
had come down to IMayyadin, was recalled at the request of the Commander-in-Chief
and returned to Dair, where he fell out with Maulud and went back to his tribe at
Tibni, above Dair. Early in May, after exacting fines and tributes from the
\ hostile tribes roimd Salihiyah, the British advanced position was moved back to Albvj.
I Kamal.

Before the meeting on the Euphrates took place, a Syrian Congress assembled in

I Damascus, and on 11th March proclainied Eaisal King of Syria, while a second body,

jf\ purporting to represent Mesopotamia, composed of Mesopotamian olEcers in Syria,

' appointed his brother, the Sharif 'xlbdullah. Amir of the 'Iraq. The Mesopotamians

^ in Faisal's army, who were at the root of the Nationalist agitation, were doubtless

j finding their position in Syria a difficult one. There was a growing tendency on

I the part of Syrians to claim for themselves the important posts held by men whom

they regarded as foreigners, and the Mesopotamians saAv their prospects in Syria

diminishing without, as they thought, any hope that their services wouklbe acceptable

in their own country should the Britisli Government be entrusted with the mandate.

A Mesopotamia free from British control seemed alone to offer them hope of office.

The meeting proposed by the Amir Faisal took place at 'Asharah, 15 miles l5elow
the mouth of the Khabur, on 5th May. Maulud pleaded ill-health and was
represented by two officers of the Arab army. It was agreed that Albu Kama! shoidd
revert to the jAIutasarrifliq of Dair, to which it had previously belonged, and the
frontier was fixed provisionally immediately above Qaim, soine 70 miles below
the Khabur and 50 miles above 'Anah. The Arab Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Damascus informed Field- Marshal Lord Allenby that the evacuation of Albu Kamal
by British troops had made a remarkably good impression on the Arab Government,
and would be accepted by the people of Syria as a sign of cordiality on the part of
His Majesty's Government, but no similar spirit was apparent on the Euphrates.
Tribal raids and attacks on convoys continued imabated, together with political
propaganda of a violent and menacing kind and requests that the frontier should be
withdrawn to tlie Hauran. Faisal was again informed of the situation of His Majesty's
Government, and warned that if raids continued below the frontier agreed upon we
should reserve to ourselves the right to take counter-measures.

The willingness of the British administration to yield on the Euphrates to any
proposal which offered a reasonable hope of satisfying the claims of the Syrian
Government was discounted by the Mesopotamian League and its agents by our
obvious difficulty in maintaining a long line of communications against the attack of
irregular forces. A conciliatory attitude was regarded as a sign of military weakness,
and as such proved an incentive rather than a sedative. The account of hostilities
given in the ^rian native press, preposterous as it was, commanded belief. It was
said that the British army had been turned out of Dair, had been forced by the
Arabs to evacuate Albu Kamal, and awaited staggering a last and decisive l)low at
'Anah which could be dealt by the Amir 'Abdullah at the head of invincible forces.
While the Baghdad coft'ee-shops echoed with these rumours the desert took action.

The Shammar of the Jazirah, hereditary robbers of the Mosul road, needed little
encouragement to revert to their secular traditions. They were joined by the northern
sections of the Dulaim on the Euphrates. In March small raids began to occur on
the railway and road between Baghdad and Mosul. On 21 st April the first caravan

. which for some time had got through from Aleppo arrived at Mosul via Dair, and its
appearance inaugurated a fresh period of sedition in Mtjsul itself. Nationalist

[ meetings were held and anti-British notices bearing the seal of the Mesopotamian
League were posted on the walls at night. Raids on our line of communications
increased, culminating in the burning of a train near 'Ain Dibs on 24:th May, and all

Vinformation pointed to the imminence of an attack on Mosul. News was received of
a concentration at Fadghami, on the Khabur, under a Jiative of Mosul, Jamil Beg,
who was an officer in the Syrian army. He was said to be drawing munitions down
the Khabur, i.e., from Turkish territory, and letters subsequently captured showed
that he was in close touch with the ex-Qaimmaqam of Jazirat ibn 'Umar. The latter

139

was a well-knowu source of hostile propaganda. His activities among the Kurdish
tribes had been the subject of formal protest. He had thereupon been dismissed
by the Turkish Government at Constantinople, but he continued to exercise his
functions.

On 2nd June the Assistant Political Officer reported that a Nationalist meeting
had been held at Tal 'Afar, an isolated village west of Mosul, inhabited b}- a mixed /^
Turkoman, Kurdish, and Arab popidation. Two days later some tribesmen rode into ,
Tal 'Afar and gave the signal for the rising.| The plot had been carefully laid.
Jamil Beg's intention was that all British officers and staff should be made away with
by the gendarmerie before his arrival. The notables and townspeople, though they
w.ere not directly implicated in the nuxrders, must have been fully aware of what was
going on. The gendarmerie officer, Captain Stewart, was shot by one of his own
officers. The three remaining members of the British staff, an instructor, a clerk,
and a machine gunner, held out ou the roof of their house until Jamil's band arrived,
when they were killed by a bomb. The Assistant Political officer, Captain Barlow,
who was touring in the district, was seized and brought in to Tal 'Afar. As he
neared the town he caught sight of two armoured cars which had been sent out ou ■
reconnaissance from Mosul. He made a dash for them and was shot. The cars were
ambushed and none of the crews escaped. 4_

The fall of Tal 'Afar gave the signal for a general rising of the tribes in the
district. The Shammar and other tribes on the borders of the desert were originally
involved in the plot, but more or less sedentary tribes were carried away with
the tide. Yazidi and Christian villages east of tlie Tigris were attacked and repeated
raids were delivered on the railway and the road, but in every case the raiders
were beaten off and suffered considerable losses. Before Jamil Beg had time to ,
concentrate for a march on Mosul he was surprised by a British column and fled with )\
his officers to Dair. The tribesmen melted away without resistance. Tal 'Afar Avas
occupied by a strong detachment of troops, civil administration restored, and all
concerned in the disturbances adequately punished. The ease with which the
insurgents were dispersed pricked the bubble of sedition in Mosul, where groat stress "
had been laid upon the impotence of the British Government owing to the alleged ''
insignificance of the garrison and shortage of ammunition. But if the counter blow
had not been both rapid aud successful the town and the Wilayat would have been
given over to anarchy and the safety of the large Christian population gravely
threatened.

When news of these events reached Damascus, the Arab Government in a
telegram to the High Commissioner expressed its regret for the burning of the train
and dissociated itself completely from the activities of the extremists in Mesopotamia'. \
The Prime Minister, who signed the telegram, went on to say that Eamadhan al
Shallash had been summoned to Damascus and gave assurances that the Syrian
Government could take all possible measures to prevent the recurrence of revolutionary
movements. Early in July, Maulud Pasha was removed from Dair and replaced bj' a
Syrian official of moderate views.

But already the centre of propaganda had been transferred from Syria and the "^
Euphrates to Baghdad. The dissatisfied element of ex-Turkish employees had '
received considerable reinforcements during the 18 months which had elapsed since
the armistice. Among their numbers were officers who had served in the Arab army
and had witnessed the course of events in Syria. But whether they were
pro-Arab or pro-Turk they were usually averse from foreign control. They received
under the British administration a proportion, never amounting to less than a
quarter and sometimes the whole, of the pension to which their services would have
entitled them if the Ottoman Government had continued. The payment of pensions
was not an obligation recognised in other occupied territories, and in so far they were
better off in Mesopotamia than in Palestine, but the sum was small and with the \
universal rise in the price of living the recipients could barely maintain themselves. |
The problem which they presented might have been partly solved if a native army, '
in which they could have found employment, could have been set on foot irrespective
of the long-delayed peace with Turkey and the granting of the mandate, as had
occurred in quite different circumstances in Syria. The contrast between the two o
Arab provinces which had been freed from Turkish rule gave point to the com- S
plaints of the malcontents, and led them to disbelieve in the genuineness of official
declarations. They argued that the creation of the Syrian State was due to the
victory of Arab arms and that similar liberties in Mesopotamia could be gained

140

only by a successful resort to force. This was the point of view which underlay the
mistaken and disastrous political programme of the L'esopotamian League, and it
gained ground as the weakness of the British garrison became apparent.

During the course of the winter of 1919-20 a group of the younger men of
Baghdad, some of whom had been well educated in Constantinople or Europe, began
a movement for the rapid extension of facilities for higher education, with the
implication that the administration had not given sufficient attention to the subject.
Their object was in itself irreproachable, and secured a limited amount of financial
support from the magnates of Baghdad, with the result that an independent secondary
school was opened in January 1920. Its teaching staff was composed of ardent young
nationalists, mostly of the ex-official class, and it numbered some sixty to seventy
students. Its standard was very little above that of the Government primary schools,
but so far as it went it was unobjectionaljle, and the Education Department saw^ no
reason to refuse to it the grant-in-aid which was subsequently requested. But it
speedily became much more significant from a political than from an educational
u point of view, and by the spring it was the headquarters of the extreme nationalists.

The announcement that Great Britain had accepted the mandate for Mesopotamia
y, was made on 3rd May, It was accompanied by a carefully considered explanation of
the duties of a mandatory Power, in which stress was laid upon the fact that the
--^-ultimate goal was the development of independent institutions. The announcement
spurred the nationalists to fresh activity. The claim to immediate and complete
' independence on the Syrian model, though it commanded the sympathy of members
of the upper classes who looked to taking a leading part in the Arab State, and of men
out of a job who hoped to gain a livelihood from the same source, did not make much
headway in rousing the mass of the population. To that end an argument was
^ needed which woidd be understood by the most ignorant and it was found in an
""i appeal to religious fanaticism. For some time "past it had Ijeen obvious to the
j nationalists that ^t would be necessary for them to present a united Islamic front.
I The deep prejudices wliicli se|ia]-ate the_ Snjim__und Shi'ah sects were temporarily
/jOTercome. The first symptom of a rapprochen^ent occurred in the summer of 1919,~
when on two occasions Sunnis attended the religious meetings which were held in
m emory of the deceased Shi'ah mujtahid, Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi. But it
] was not till the following month of Ramadhan, which began on 19th May 1920, that
j the political significance of the reconciliation became apparent. Services known as
j^Mauluds, in honour of the birth of the Prophet, were held in every Sunni and Slxi'ah .
mosque in turn, members of both sects attending by invitation of the authorities in
charge of the mosque or the heads of the quarter in which it was situated. On some
occasions the reading of the Maulud, which is distinctively a -Sunni celebration, w-as
followed by a Ta'ziyah, the Shi'ah ritual condolence on the martyrdom of Husain^ but
in all cases the main features of these gatherings were the political speeches and
recitations of patriotic poetry which followed the religious ceremony. The Arab is
'peculiarly susceptible to high-ilown o/atory, and the frantic appeals which were made
"lo^ religion, patriotism and to the Amir 'Alidullah, urging him to hasten the advent of
his holy kingdom, roused extreme enthusiasm. Prominent in one of the first Mauluds
was a young employee in the Auqaf Department, who indulged in a speech which was
judged dangerous to public order. His arrest was made the excuse of a meeting
the avowed object of -which was to arrange for his release by force. A couple of
armoured cars were sent to patrol the main street of the town, and on one of them
being attacked a few shots were fired over the head of the crowd. It dispersed with
all possible celerity. The casualties consisted of one blind man, who was accidentally
knocked down and run over.

The leaders of the movement and organisers of the Mauluds were men of varying
status and capacity. The ablest among them were two Shi'ahs, Saiyid Muhammad al
Sadr, a member of a renowned family of Shi'ah divines, and Ja'far abu Timman, a
Shi'ah merchant. Chief among the Sunnis were Yusuf Effendi Suwaidi, Shaikh
Ahmad Daud, and 'Ali Effendi Bazirqan.

This group was officially warned that no breach in the peace would be permitted,
but the civil administration considered it inadvisable to resort to extreme measures of
repression. The Mauluds were allowed to continue, and those who viewed with
disfavour the holding of political gatherings in mosques were afraid to refuse
subscriptions to defray the expenses incurred or to fail attendance, lest they should
be labelled as infidels and traitors to Arab liberty. Rumours of impending

141

■

disturbance were circulated mainly th ough the agency of teachers in the nationalist ^^
school, with the result that tlie bazaar was repeatedly closed and the normal life of 'i
town interrupted. The progressive drawing in of our frontier on the Euphrates, and I
the attacks on Tal 'Afar and the Mosul road, gave substance to the belief that our /
military position was not such as would enable us to hold the tribes if they could be^
roused. Early in June one of the most consistent of our supporters among the tribal
shaiklis near Baghdad sounded a grave note of warning, and at the same time, on the
Euphrates, the paramount shaikh of the Dulaim, who had turned a deaf ear to the
propaganda which had been addressed to him, solemnly declared that unless we could
score some striking success he could no longer answer for his tribesmen. He urged
the reoccupation of Dair ; but whatever might have been the merits of the scheme, it
was far beyond our powers of performance. While well-Avishers Avere alarmed at our
failure to put an end to tribal disorder, and by the sufferance accorded to the antics ,
of the extremists, debates in the House of Commcms and articles in the English papers
were quoted by the latter as evidence tliat the mandate was as inacceptable in London
iis in iiaghdad.

It was under these unfavourable conditions that a declaration of future policy
was made. In April a small committee of Political Officers, presided over by the ^
Judicial Secretary, had drawn up a scheme for the setting up of Arab institutions. It
provided for a provisional constitution, including both a Council of State composed
of British and Arab members with an Arab President appointed by the High
Commissioner, and a Legislative Assembly chosen by election. Within a period
limited to two years, the Legislative Assembly was to draw up an organic law for the
permanent settlement of the country. The Acting Civil Commissioner was under no
illusions as to the reception which would be accorded to this project by the extremists,
but he hoped that its publication might strengthen the position of the moderates, and
he was anxious that it shoidd be issued before the fast of Ramadhan increased the
existing tension. His Majesty's Government did not, however, consider that a de-
claration of this nature was justifiable until the terms of the mandate had been
framed.

But if the scheme was not officially published, its details were universally known V/'
before the middle of Ramadhan, and the opposition which had been anticipated was
not lacking. A self-chosen committee of 15 persons, styling themselves Mandubin,
i.e., appointed delegates, of Baghdad and Kadhimain w'as formed to resist the mandate
and asked for an opportunity of laying their views before the Civil Commissioner. A
large body of sober-minded opinion doubted the wisdom of the programme and
disapproved of the methods which had been taken to advertise it, and when, on 2nd
June, Colonel Wilson invited the Delegates to meet him he extended the invitation to
some 25 other persons, all of whom were leading notables of Baghdad, including »-
several Jews and Christians, neither of which communities were represented among
the Delegates.

■"O^

He opened the proceedings with a speech in which he expressed his regret that
circumstances beyond our control had delayed the establishment of civil government
in Mesopotamia, but he warned the Delegates that in encouraging disorder and inciting
•the population against the existing regime, they were rousing forces which would V
prove too strong for native institutions while in their infancy. He alluded to the
proposals which had been submitted to His Majesty's Government and were already
tnown to most of those present, and undertook to transmit to London any represen-
tations which the Delegates should make.

y. The Delegates presented a document in which they demanded the immediate
formation of a Mesopotamian Convention elected in conformity with the Turkish
■electoral law, with a view to drawing up proposals for a national Arab Government as
promised in the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918. By this means, they

• stated, the people of Mesopotamia might attain independence. They asked, in
•conclusion, for complete freedom of the press. .y

Colonel Wilson, in replj^ promised that he would urge His Majesty's Government
to expedite matters as much as possible, and in communicating the results of the
meeting to London he proposed that the idea of a provisional Government should be
discarded, and that as soon as the terms of the mandate had been formulated steps
should be taken to summon a Constituent Assembly to consult on the future form of
•Government.

142

With, the approval of Sir Percy Cox, who was iu Baghdad for two days ou his
way from Tehran to London, an official announcement in this sense was sent to the
leading delegates on 20th June. It ran as follows : —

" His Majesty's Government having been entrusted with the mandate for
Mesopotamia, anticipate that the mandate will constitute Mesopotamia an independent
State under the guarantee of the League of Nations and subject to the mandate to
Great Britain ; that it will lay on them the responsibility for the maintenance of
internal peace and external security, and will require them to formulate an organic
(law to be framed in consultation with the people of Mesopotamia, and with due regard
to the rights, wishes and interests of all the communities of the country. The
mandate will contain previsions to facilitate the development of Mesopotamia as a
self-governing State until such, time as it can stand by itself, when the mandate will
(.•ome to an end.

" The inception of this task His Majesty's Government has decided to entrust ta
Sir Percy Cox, who will accordingly return to Baghdad in the autumn and will
resume his position on the termination of the existing militar\- administration as Chief
British Representative in Mesopotamia.

'* Sir Percy Cox will be authorised to call into being, as provisional bodies, a
Coimcil of State under an Arab President, and a General Elective Assembly repre-
sentative of and freely elected by the population of Mesopotamia, and it will be his
duty to prepare, in consultation with the General Elective Assembly, the permanent
organic law."

' The Delegates replied on 30th June bj' repeating their request for the immediate

formation of a General Council for^tlTe 'L-aq. It is to be noted that this was the last
I occasion on which they figured as a imited body. Dissensions among themselves
became increasingly frequent. The rapid development of tribal disturbance detached
the more moderate of the group, who were alarmed by the results of the agitation they
had started and were unable to control. Even when united, the claim of the Delegates
to represent the 'Iraq, or even to represent more than a section of Baghdad opinion,,
was manifestly untenable. The members of the Divisional Council at Basrah had on
22nd June condemned their action unanimously and expressed confidence in the
British Government. In 'Amarah efforts had been made to secure support for a
petition in favour of independence, but no signatories could be found and the petition
was torn up. Mosul also was unrepresented. A further announcement made on
12th July had the advantage of bringing these neglected elements into play, while-
making provision for the immediate discussion of the Turkish electoral law, which was
admittedly inapplicable to existing conditions. The annoimcement ran as follows : —
/, " His Majesty's Government has authorised the Acting Civil Commissioner to

C" invite the leading representatives of various localities to co-operate with the Civil
Administration in framing proposals under vi'hich election to the General Assembly
will, in due course, be held, and in making the necessary arrangements for electoral
areas, the preparation of the registers of electors and other matters preliminary to the
election of the General Assembly. And inasmuch as there are at present in the 'Iraq
individuals who were the representatives of the 'Iraq in the Turkish Senate or the
Turkish Chamber of Deputies, and who therefore have experience in matters relating
to elections and in the discussion of public affairs, all these ex-Senators and ex-
Deputies have been invited by the Civil Commissioner for the above-mentioned

purpose This Committee will be invited to elect a President from among

their number, and to co-opt additional members from areas which, owing to the
absence or death of the former Deputies, or from some other cause, are not already
represented."

% Among the ex-Deputies was the most prominent figure in Basrah, and perhaps

in Mesopotamia, Saiyid Talib Pasha, eldest son of the Naqib of Basrah. He had
returned to his native land in February 1920, after spending the years of the war
in voluntary exile in India and Egypt. His renown was due largely to the
determination with which he had pursued political ends under the Turkish regime,
but he had undoubtedly figured before the war as the spokesman of national
aspirations and had been so regarded by the Nationalist Party in Syria. Since his
return he had lost no opportunity of testifying to his conviction that the welfare of
Mesopotamia was dependent on the acceptance of the .British mandate. Together
with the other ex-Deputies of Basrah and elsewhere in Mesopotamia, he did not
hesitate to comply with the invitation. Kor did the ex-Deputies in Baghdad refuse to
attend the Committee, though two had signed the petition of 2nd June as Delegates.

The Committee held its first meeting ou Gth August, and, after a formal opening-
by the Civil (Jommissioner, elected Saiyid Talib Pasha as President. At the second X
meeting on the following day they proceeded to the co-option of additional members,
and included among the number Yusuf Effeudi Suwaidi, Saiyid Muhammad Sadr, !
and other persons known to hold extreme views. Thus constituted, the Committee .
•could not be accused of bfiug unrepresentative of any brand of opinion. I

^ But the two leaders of the Delegates refused the invitation, and at the same time v
''it became known that they intended to make a final appeal to the Baghdad mob by f\
holding a Maulud in one of the principal mosques, followed by a demonstration in the
town. Serious disorder and violence could not have failed to have resulted, and an
order was issued for the arrest of Yusuf Suwaidi, Shaikh Ahmad Daud, Ja'far abu
Tiraman and 'Ali Bazirqan. All except the second succeeded in making their escape,
but the action of the Goveriunent, accompanied as it was by a proclamation forbidding
the holding of further Mauliids and l)y strict maintenance of peace and order, restored
■confidence instantaneously. The occupation of Damascus and Aleppo by the French
■on 2f)th July may have contributed something to the collapse of the agitation in Baghdad,
but its ultimate effect cannot yet be gauged.

The flight of the three principals redounded to their discredit. Their followers J
had anticipated that they would glory in imprisonment in the cause of liberty, and
were disconcerted hj their unwillingness to assume the martyr's crown. When their
houses and the nationalist school were searched, documents were brought to light
which proved that the funds collected for the school had been used for the purpose of
hiring assassins with the object of removing prominent Arab personages who were
opposed to their political views. The stalwart attitude of the Arab police in Baghdad
and the steadiness of most Arab officials in the civil administration were most
encouraging features in these difficult days.

The danger of the revolutionary tactics which had been adopted lay not, however, \/
in Baghdad, but in their effect upon the tribes. Beyond the immediate confines of ^
the towns the population of Mesopotamia is composed of nomadic and semi-nomadic "
confederations, Avhich have offered a secular resistance to ordered government. Tribal
■organisation is a centrifugal force adverse to the formation of a unified State. The
Turks had contented themselves with holding the balance by playing off one group
against another and had thus succeeded in preventing any dangerous combination
against themselves. The policy we pursued was to reconstruct and support the power
of the shaikh, making him in turn accept responsibility for his tribe. But the
measure of obedience to central authority which we demanded was far greater than
that which had been expected by our predecessors. At the same time we did our i
best to heal the feuds and settle the ancient disputes which wrecked local peace. p>^
Thus hereditary animosities by which the Turks had profited were to a great extent, f
at least temporarily, extinguished. /

The policy of backing the shaikh had its drawbacks, f He is a pettj tyrant whose s/
misdeeds reflect on the Government which supports him. ^ He resented any check ^
imposed on the rapacity which he had been given a fair field to exercise, and he and
his tribesmen alike resented the attempt to enforce upon them the obligations of V
citizenship, the preservation of order and the payment of taxes, which in the past
they had successfully evaded. Nevertheless, the nature of their organisation made it
little likely that the tribes would take concerted action on their own initiative. It
remained for the nationalists to weld together their individual grievances and their
predatory instincts into a common purpose. The first successes in arms facilitated
the task. The tribes witnessed the withdrawal of British administration and were
• convinced that their efforts would, as they had been assured, drive the British out of
Mesopotamia. This conviction spurred on those who had already risen and won over
the half-hearted, who could not risk being left on the losing side.

vj The end in view was an Islamic Government, but apart from the wave of ^i .

/^nationalist feeling, which was a world-wide consequence of the war and should not be ■
discounted, it made a different appeal to different sections of the community. To the
Shi'ah muj tabids it meant a theocratic state under Shar'ah law, and to this end they I
did not hesitate to preach Jihad ; to the Sunnis and free-thinkers of Baghdad it was

y an independent Arab State under the Amir 'Abdullah; to the tribes it meant no

\government at all. It was significant that when the shaikhs on the Tigris were pressed

to join the movement they replied that they must be assured that under the new order

they would not be required to pay any gov^ernment dues. There is no lack of evidence

■u

/ 144

to sliow that a league of conspiracy, organised by tlie Bolslieviks in co-operation with
the Turkish Nationalists, had been long in touch with extremist Arab political
societies, with the object of exploiting the common ground of religion — the only
unifying bond between these various elements— iii'^'order to undermine the British
position in the Middle East.

The effect of propaganda from Syria and Baghdad was first apparent in the
Shamiyah, whei'e the theocratic influence of the holy towns is strongest. Rumours
to the effect that an Arab Government under 'Abdullah was imminent and that the
British were about to withdraw from the country disturbed the political equilibrium
and suggested to tribal shaikhs and landowning saiyids the advisability of declining to
pay official dues to a GoA'ernment which was about to disappear. The same feeling
of uncertainty brought about the resignation of the members of the newly constituted
Divisional Council. Before open agitation in Baghdad had begun, the Shi'ah
religious element in the holy towns was busily engaged in intrigue. The death of
Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi had placed the chief religious authority of the
Shi'ah world in the hands of the aged Mirza Muhammad Taqi, who was guided
entirely by his son, Mirza Muhammad Ridha. The latter, an active and restless
politician, bitterly opposed to the Anglo-Persian agreement, set himself to work
against the British CJovernment in the 'Iraq. He was in touch with the Bolsheviks,
who in an open telegram proclaimed him to be the head of the movement of
liberation from the British ; he was also in receipt of money from the Turks. Though
he had no religious status and was not even recognised as an 'alim, he enjoj^ed the
respect which is accorded to the family of the premier mujtahid, and his influence with
hiis father enabled him to work the supreme oracle. In the autumn of 1919 the
discovery of a plot against the life of British officers and employees in Karbala had led
to arrests, but the suspects were released on a guarantee from Mirza Muhammad Taqi
and reverted at once to their former courses. The episode encouraged rather than
checked intrigue. Early in March 1920 Mirza Muhammad Taqi was said to have
issued a fatwah declaring service under the British administration to be unlawful.
The Political Officer at Diwaniyah reported that the corpse of a member of the levies
was not accorded the usual burial rites by a Shi'ah priest and that resignations
from Government service were increasing. After the proclamation of 'Abdullah
in Damascus on Uth March, the shaikhs of all the Euphrates tribesmen were asked to
sign a document asking him to take possession of his Kingdom, and a petition in
that sense was, it is believed, sent to him from the Shamiyah. As the agitation in
Baghdad took shape, the efforts of the Karbala group increased. Innumerable letters
bearing the seal of Mirza Muhammad Taqi reached the tribes and the provincial
towns, informing them that the moment had come for a united movement on
constitutional lines in favour of Islamic government, and inviting tliem to send
delegates to Baghdad. Nor was direct incitement to rebellion absent. The leading
shaikhs of the Hillali Division held out against ttiis agitation, but expressed the
gravest fear that if it were allowed to continue they woitld not be able to control their
tribes. Symptoms of growing lawlessness began to appear. On 16th June an
unsuccessful attempt was made to derail a train near Ilillah. Two days later a
section of the Bani Tamin, one of the Baghdad tribes, attacked a caravan of the
friendly Dulaim, against whom they had an old grudge. The shaikh of the Bani
Tamin urged that this breach of the peace should not be overlooked, and himseK
accompanied the cavalry who Avere sent out to round up the culprits. On the same
day Persian pilgrims were attacked and robbed on the Hillah road near Alahmudiyah.
The tribesmen implicated resisted the police, worsted a body of levies sent out against
them from Hillah, c:,ud were finally dispersed by regular troops. Robberies on the
Persian road in the Diyalah Division became freqiient, but a deliberate attempt to
reproduce in Ba'qubah the methods of agitation which had been resorted to in
]3aghdad was nipped in the bud by the arrest of Sayid Salih, at Hilli, who had been
sent to Ba'qubah to hold Mauluds.

Towards the end of Ramadhan the bazaar at Hillah was placarded Avith notices
urging the people to rise against the Government and insulting all who were friends
of the British. At a public meeting a speaker who was closely in touch with the
Baghdad group, announced that the British would withdraw from the country at the
'Id, the festival which follows Ramadhan, and similar information was strewn broad-
cast among the tribes, who were urged to precipitate matters by rebellion and
pillage. At Karbala the same tactics were pursued, coupled with a strenuous attempt
to collect signatures to a covenant by which the Mesopotamian tribes bound themselves.

145

to stand by one another in order to secure tlieir rights. The position was rapidly
becoming critical, and on 22nd June Mirza Muhammad Ridha, the son of the Mujtahid,
was arrested with nine adherents at Karbala, following on the arrest at Hillah a few "^
days previously of six minor personages who wei-e the leaders of the agitation there.
The prisoners were treated witli all consideration, and sent to Heujam, where careful
arrangements for their comfort had been made. Most of the 'Ulama had refused to
associate themselves with ]\lirza Muhammad Ridha's plan of campaign, and few
letters of protest or intercession were received, but at the request of the Persian
Government he was released after about a month's confinement and allowed to go to
Tehran. It is not without significance that Mirza Muliammad was mentioned by
name in a wireless message issued by the Bolsheviks at Resht as " working for the^
Bolshevik cause at Karbala."

In the liillah Division the arrests relaxed the tension. The most important
shaikh, 'Umran, of the northern Bani Hasan, brought to the Assistant Political Officer
the covenant he had signed under pressure and tore it to pieces. But in the
Shamiyah the position became increasingly delicate. It was, ho^v•ever, at Rumaithah,
in the Diwaniyah Division, that the first outbreak took place.

The tribal group of the Bani Iluchaim, which extends from Rumaithah to
Samawah, and down the Euphrates to Darraji, had never been submissive to civil
control. When we occupied Samawah in December 11(17, they presented a complete
example of tribal disintegration. Most of the units were not onlj- at feud with one
another, but w^ere broken up into warring sections. For many years before the war
Ottoman authority had been set at defiance, and if we effected a partial pacification
order was never completely established. Though the assessments were lighter than
in other parts of the Diwaniyah Division, crop measurements Avere resisted and the
payment of Government dues was frequently in arrears. Below Samawah restlessness
was partly due to natural conditions. The Sufran and the Barkat sections of the Bani
Huchaim occupied lands which had gone out of cultivation owin^ to changes in
the river. Their tribal organisation was breaking up, and, as is usual during siicfi
processes, they sought a liveliTiood by pillaging their neighbours. Their depredations
were carried out chiefly on peacefid cultivators and sheep-breeders on the tail of the
'Afaj canal and in outlying regions on the Gharraf. It was incumbent upon the
administration to protect the interests of these people. __

But Shaikh Ma'juji of the Sufran refused to come in to Samawah or to comply
with, any demands of Government. The Political Officer feared an outbreak of tribal
disorder which w^ould be difficult to allay, and in September i91D action was
taken against Ma'jun's villages. This ' resulted in a split in the tribe. The
opposition to Ma'jun Avas headed by his brother Nahi, and the experiment was tried
of recognising the latter as shaikh. He proved to have no hold on the tribe.
The majority of the tribesmen remained defiant, refusing either to paj' revenue or to
bring in the fine of 500 rifles, which had been imposed. Nahi fell back on Govern-
ment support, and requested that a few Arab levies might be sent to live in his tents.
The Arab officer, with mistakeii zeal, took a hand in collecting rifles fruin a section
of the tribe which had remained loyal to IMa'juu, whereupon a conflict occurred in
which two of the levies were killed. Though this entailed a further fine as blood
money, Ma'jun in February 1920 sent in his son to say that he would accept the
terms of Government, and it was decided to reinstate him. There, however, matters
remained. Ma'jixn neither came in nor showed any serious intention of collecting
the rifles. Our commitments elsewhere made it impossible to deal with him, and his
attitude reacted on the neighbouring tribes. Lawlessness spread to the Barkat,
whose territory lies next to that of the Sufran, from the Barkat to the Antar, a
section of the Jayyash, and thence through the Jayj-ash. They held ujd the Assistant
Political Officer while he was engaged in estimating crops, while thefts and acts of
violence were frequent in railway camps and stations. The principal Shaikli of the
Jayyash complained that he could not be expected to keep his tribe in order while
the Sufran were left unpunished. The trouble had now spread up to Rumaithah,
where the 'Ajib, who had paid little or no attention to the disarmament order issued
in the previous year, attacked their neighbours, the Albu Hassan, who had surrendered
their arms pretty completely.

It was not till towards the end of May that aeroplanes were available. Two days
before operations were begun Ma'jun died a natural death, though this was not
tnown till later. After a few days of intermittent bombing, which residted in some
204 L T

110

20 casualties in killed and wounded, together with the destniclioii of about 1(J0
sheep, the Sufran a)id the Albu .Tayyash sulmiitted, but no permanent settlement was
effected, and the position remained unsatisi'actory. Punitive action by air had not
brought a decision, and no other methods wen; available.

^ Meantime intensive propaganda from Baghdad aiul Kai'bala was spreading

through the Shann'yali into Diwaniyah. A definite plan for revolt seems to have been
formulated when at the 'Id, in the middle of June, many shaikhs and notaldes made
a pilgrimage to Karljala. Late in June a tribal gathering was reported to have been
held at Shomali, (jn the luiphrates north of the Dagliarah canal, at which the leading
shaikhs from Hillah to Shinafiyah were present and unanimously determined to follow
the lead given by Yusuf Snwaidi and Saiyid Muhanunad Sadr. One of the most
activ'e in imbuing the Diwaniyah Division with this progranune was llaji Mukhif, a
wealthy landowner of 'Afaj on the Dagharah Canal. He was a man of considerable
ability and had a wide reputation as a good Moslem. He had dominated the 'Afaj
district in Turkish times and found himself since the occupation shorn of an authority
which had been exercised to the detriment of his less powerful neighbours. When
his activity in preaching armed resistance to the existing government had been
ascertained beyond question, he was arrested and sent to Basrah where he was
allowed to remain at libert}^ on a security.

It was perhaps unfortunate that, on the occasion of the 'Id, well-wishers in
Diwaniyah Division should have conceived the idea of re-afhrming the pronouncement
which had been made in favour of British rule in the previous year. The names of
four of the leading notables were absent, and the publication of these addresses from
Diwaniyah, 'Afaj and Budair, followed almost immediately l)y far-reaching disturbance,
gave ground for doubting the spontaneousuess of the sentiments expressed. The
shaikhs of 'Afaj and Budair did, however, suit their deeds to their Avords. They stood
by the Assistant Political Office)- till the British forces withdrew from l^iwaniyah, and
the leading shaikh of Budair accompanied the column to Hillah. Their attitude was
largely determined by fear of the return of Haji Mukhif to power, for it was only
under the British administration that they had found protection from his tyranny.

^ Haji Mukhif's ari-est did nothing to stop the movement. Rebellion was

V/ encouraged by assurances that under the terms of the mandate Great Britain was

/ precluded from using military force, and that she had in fact withdrawn her army

irom Mesopotamia. The news fell on fertile soil among the Bani Huchaim. The

immediate cause of the rising was trivial. The shaikh of the Dhaw'alim, who had

failed to repay au agricultural loan of the preceding year, Avas sent for by the

Assistant Political Officer at Rumaithah on 2nd July, and exhibited so much truculence

that he was placed in the sai-ai, with the intention of sending him to Diwaniyah.

Following an example which had been set at Samawah a few weeks earlier, the

Dhavvalim broke into the sarai and released him. The neighbouring tribes to the

north did their utmost to prevent the Dhawalim from entering their territory, but the

latter had received definite orders from the Shamiyah to rise. The railwaj' was cut in

three places, below Samawah and above and below Rumaithah, isolating both towns.

Samawah could be relieved with comparative ease by river, but a relief train went

down from Diwaniyah to Rumaithah was captured ancl burnt, and though a company

of infantry succeeded in getting through, they could do no more than join the besieged

political and railway stall". The strength of the ti-il)es was underestimated, and a

small column despatched fi'om Hillah was fcn'ced to turn back without occupying

^ Rmnaithah. It Avas not till l^Oth Jul}- that a strong force pushed its way through,

after encountering serious and organised opposition. The tribes were well entrenched

■V and their tactics revealed a familiarity with Turkish military methods which pointed

to their being led by ex-officers of the Turkish and Arab armies who had joined them

from Baghdad and Dair al Ymv. The course of events at Rumaithah was eagerly

Avatched in the Shamiyah. Every day's delay made the position there more critical,

and finally on 13th July the Mishkhab tribes below Xajaf, led by 'Abdul Wahab of

the Fatlah, marched on Abu Sukhair immediately to the south of Kufah. Next day

the southern Bani Hasan Avere out under 'Alwan al Sa'dun, brother of Shaikh 'Umran,

and the influential shaikhs of the Khaza'il, Avho had assured the Assistant Political

Officer at Umm al Ba'rur that they would stand firm, signified to him that he had best

leave under safe conduct for Kufah. He held on for a day or two till he had convinced

himself that he could do no more to stem the tide and tlien Avent in to Kufah. The

garrison from Abu Sukhair also arri\-ed safely at Kufah, partly Avith the help of

certain sections of the tribes.

147

The tribes still seemed to l)e wiivering. 'Umraii had not j-et thrown in his lot
with the insurgents, and on 19th Jul}' accompanied the Assistant Political Officer at
Tuwairij to their camp opposite Kufah where a cessation of hostilities was arranged.
But next- day the shaikhs laised their demands and negotiations were dropped. The
Barrage and Musaiyib were evacuated on 24th July, on information that the uncertain
fealty of 'Umran had at length given way. Au unlucky reverse occurred on the same
day. Three companies of the ilanchesters, who had been sent out to form a post on'
the road to Kifl and Kufah, ran short of water, and exhausted by heat, were obliged
to return in face of an attack which, though not strongly pressed, cost them half their
nmnbers in prisoners. This incident, which was greatly exaggerated by rumour,
gave the signal to the whole of the country west of the Hillah channel to rise in arms.
On the left bank the tribes still hesitated — Shaikh 'Addai of the Albu Sultan, in
particular, did his best to preserve peace — v?hile on the Tigris the equilibrium was
maintained.

No active steps could be taken till the Diwaniyah column, which represented
pracrfcally all the troops in the country available for pimitive measures, got back to
Hillah. Their retirement was a fine performance ; mending the railway line as they
went, they brought in rolling stock, non-combatants, wounded, and military stores,
and inflicted heavy losses on the tribesmen who attacked them. The Kufah garrison
was not hard pressed and before it was relieved communications with Baghdad were
assured and the Barrage re-occupied.

Nevertheless anai'chy gained ground. Outside the perimeter of the Baghdad
defences order could not be maintained. The tribes were out for loot and attacked
indiscriminately native merchants and British officers. Colonel Leachman fell a
victim to the personal rancour of the principal shaikh on the Fallujah road, to whom
he had paid a visit. His host's son ambushed_jind murdered him as he left the tents.
But the Dulaim tinder Shaikh 'Ali Sulaiman and the 'Anizah under Faliad Bey and
his son Mahrut, with whose help Colonel Leachman had held the Euphrates fron»
Fallujah to 'Anah, remained faithful to the government which he had represented.
On the Diyalah a handful of men of the insignificant Karkhiyah tribe cut the railway
and attacked l^a'qubah. An initial lack of success in dealing with them convinced
them that British jnilitary weakness had not been exaggerated, and the whole district
was roused in an orgy of plunder. Balqujjah._was abandoned to the mere}' of the-
mcb, and the villages higher up the river cut off. The tragic massacre of the
administrative staff at Shahraban, after a defence of three days in which the Arab
levies stood loyally by their officers and fell with them, was repeated at KifrL
Elsewhere, as the skirts of the revolt widened, successive Political Officers were held
in custody by the insurgents, but not otherwise molested.

The rising in Diyalah made a painful impi'ession on the notables of Baghdad,,
most of whom have large estates on the Diyalah canals. The tribes did not hesitate
to laj^ hands on their grain stores and fruit, proceedings which led to a remarkable
revulsion of feeling among those who had taken part in the early stages of the
nationalist movement. The Naqib of Baghdad was not far from expressing public
opinion when he observed : " We have seen what has never been seen before, and we
have learnt from it."

2041

148

INDEX.

"Abdallah, Sharif, 138, 140, 143.

Agricultural Development Scheme, 75 sqq., 79 iqq.,

121.
Agricultural Department, 75, 87.
^Ahd al 'Iraqi (Mpsopotamian League), 132 sq.,

136, 138, 140.
Air Force, 145.
'Ajaimi. 2, 3, 4, 26.
Albu Kamal, 136 sqq.
Alliance Israelite Universelle, 12.
American Schools, 11.
Anglo-French declaration, 126, 141.
^Anizah, 40 sqq.
Ai-ab Amir, 128 sqq.
Arabic language, 6, 11, 105.
Arab i-isinjf. leaders of, 140.
Ai-abs, employment of, 99, 122, 128-9.
Arch89ology, 107-8.
Annenian massacres, 58-9.

Armenian and Assyrian refugees, 58-9, 62, 72-3, 74.
Assyrian battalions, 72.
Auqaf, 8-10, 11, 102-.3, 128.

Baban famil}% 58.
Badr Khan family, 58-9, 71.
Baghdad, occupation of, 31-3.3.
Baifour, Col., 37. 40, 131.
Barlow, Capt., 139.
Basrah, occupation of, 2.
Basrah, Port, 115, 124.
Bill, Col., 73 sq.
Bolshevism, 59, 143, 145.
Bonham-Carter, Sir E., 90 sqq.
Budgets, civil, 118-9.

Capitulations, 94.

Carmelites, 11-2.

Chaldeans, 51.

Christians, 51, 59, 94, 127.

Civil Administi-ation, personnel, 122-5.

Civil Commissioner, title of, 36, 74.

Commerce, Department of, 114-6.

Committee of ex- Deputies, 142.

Committee of TJnion and Progress, 1, 29, 42, 70.

Constitution of 1908, 29, 42.

Cotton, 87.

Council of 'Iraq, demand for, 142.

Councils, see Divisional Councils, &c.

Cox, Sir P., 2, passim.

Ctesiphon, 31.

Currency, 121-2.

Customs, 6, 114-5.

Dair al Zor, 133-8.

Damascus, Arab Government, 132, 136.

Date tax, 28.

Demobilisation, 112.

Dette (Ottoman Public Debt"), 7, 14.

Disarmament, 111.

Divisional Councils, 130.

Divisiims, executive staff of, 125.

Dobbs, Mr., I.C.S., 5, 23.

Dominican Mission, 51.

Dunsterville, Gen., 47.

Education, 10-3, 57, 10.3-7, 128.
Kxtremist, arrest of, 140.

Extremists, condemnation of by Basrah Arabs,
142.

Fahad Beg, 41, 135.
Faisal, Sharif, 133 sqq.
Famine in Persia, 47.
Famine in Mosul, 53.
Famine in Khaniqin, 46.

Finance. 118-22.
Forbes, Mr., I.C.S., 98.
Frontiei-s, Euphrates, 137.

Garbett, Mr., I.C.S., 75.
Genei-al Elective Assembly, 142.
Goldsmith, Major, 47.

Hardinge, Lord, 4.

Health, Public, 17-18, 112-4, 124.

Hewett, Sir John, 120.

Holy cities, 27 sqq., ch. 4.

Howell, Col., 83, 86 sqq.

Ibn Rashid, 25.

Ibn Sa'ud, Ruler of Najd. 1, 2, 25.

Ibrahim, Shaikh of Zubair, 25.

Imports and Exports, 115.

Income tax, 88.

'Iraq Code, 14, 90, 96.

Iii'igation, 77 sq., 116, 123.

Ja'afar Pasha. 136.
Jabal Siiijar, 49 ■■tqq.
Jails, 124.
Jews, 12"7, 129.
Jihad, 2-3.
Judicial, 14-17, 90 sqq.

Baghdad Penal Code, 95.

Baghdad Criminal Procedure Code, 95.

Court of Appeal, 97.

Courts of First Instance, 97-8.

'Iraq Code. 14, 90, 96.

Law School, 101-2.

Peace Courts, 98.

Tribal Disputes Regulations, 15-6, 100-1.

Tux-kish Courts, 91-4.

Karbala, 27 sqq., ch. 4.
" Kokus," 23.
Kufah, 27-8
Kurdish Club, 66 sq.
Kurdistan. North, 6Q.
Kurdistan, South, 59 sqq , 73 sq.
Kurds, 42 sqq., 58-75.
Kut, 31, 34.

Laboui-, 19-20, 126.

Land Acquisition, 89.

Land Revenue, system of, 76.

Land Revenue, demand, 86-8.

Land Settlement, 16, 85.

Land Tenure, 22.

Lane, Col., 124.

Leachman, Col., 41, 48, 67, 73, 147. .

League of Eastei-n Anatolia, 70.

Legislative Assembly, 141.

Lorimer, Mr., I.C.S., 1.

Macdonald, Capt., 72.

MacMunn, Gen., 90.

Mandate, 140, 142.

Marshall, Gen., 90.

Marshall, Capt., 38-9.

Maude, Gen. Sir S., 31 sq., iT, passim.

]\Iaulud PHsha, 136 sqq.

Mauluds, 140.

Mesopotamians of Faisal's Army, 132-4.

Military works of public value, 120.

Milli Kurds, 58, 70.

Mirza JIuhammad Ridha, 144.

Mixed tribunals, 94.

Mosul, occupation of, ch. 5.

^Mubarak, Shaikh of Kuwait, 25.

Muhanimaiah, Shaikh of, 1, 2.

Mujtahids, 28.

U'J

Municipalities, 56, 129 Mjfj.

Muntafik, 4, 21, 83.

Mustaplia i'aslia Beg Zadali, 43 nqq.

Najaf. 27 s/i'/., cli. 4.
Xiijd, Kuler of, see Ibn Saud.
Naji Effeiidi Siiwaidi. 131.
Xiiqib of Bagiidad, 32, 147.
Nationalist inovemeiit, 12(5 stjfj.
Xoel, Major, (50, 68 .<qq.

Opium, 88.

Oudh Bequest, 28-9.

Pearson, (^apt., 63, 72.

Pilgrinuige, 113-4.

Plebiscite, 127-8.

Police, 110-1.

Port of Basral), 115.

Posts and Telegraplis, 11(5, 124.

Press, Goveiiiment, 19, 116, 123.

Proclamation to Baghdad, 1917, 32.

Public Works, 116-7.

Pusht i Kuh, 43.

Railways, 117-8.

Ramadhan al Shallasb, 133 sqq.

Refugees, 58-9, 62, 72-3, 74.

Revenue, 7, 75 sqq., 88, 118.

Revenue Department. 7-14, 75 -(qq.

Russians, 43 sqq.

Russian reconnaissance in Pusht i Kuh, 43.

Sa'dun problem, 21, 24, 83 sq.

Saiyid j\[uhammad Kadhim Yazdi. 4, 28, 29, 140.

Sayid Taha, 63, 66, 70 sqq.

.Saiyid Talib, 2, 142.

Sanniyah lands, 4, 7, 22, 55, 76.

Shaikh Mahmud, 48, 60 sqq., 65 sqq.

Shakespear, Capt.. 25.

.Shammar, 41-2. 51-2.

Sharif 'Abdallah, 138, 140, 143.

Sliiirif Faisal, 133 sqq.

Sharif Hus.sain, Sharitiaii Party, Ac, 42, 59,

127 sqq.
Sliia'lis, 27-31, 35-40, 98.
Sliu'aibah, 4 sq.
Silk, 87.

Siniko, 66 sqq., 70.
Soaiie, Major, 46, 64, 65 sqq.
Stam]) Law, 87-8.
Stores, Civil. 116, 12)..
Sulaimaniyah, 48, (30 sqq.
Surplus, 119.
Survey Department, 123.
Sykes, Sir Mark, M.P., 66.
Sykes-Picot Agreement, 48.
Syrian Congress, 138. •

Tal 'Afar, 51, 53, 139.
. Tapu, 16-7, 54, 81 sqq., 123.
Taxation, incidence of, 88.
Tobacco, 87.
Townsliend, Gen., 31.
Tiunsport Department, 116, 124.
Tribal conditions. 20-1.
Tribal Disputes Regulation, 15, 100-1.
Tribal policy, 23 .95., 143.
Triiial rising, 144 sqq.
Turkish Administration, 1, 6-7, 22, 27.
Turkish courts, 91-4.
Turkish tribal policy, 21-2.

Veterinary Department, 123.

Wa<if (see Auqaf), 8-10, 11, 102-3.

Willcocks, Sir'VV., 78-9.

Willey, Capt., 72.

Wilson, Sir A. T., 83, 112, 127, passim.

Wilson. Major, 34.

Xenophon, 78.

Yazidis, 49-51.

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